

Abstract

This paper uses Cambodia as a case study to problematise the notion of choice in the spread of English. I explore specific historical contexts which were central to the construction of the demand for English and English language teaching (ELT) in Cambodia. The actions of a range of external agencies resulted in the close discursive articulation of English with Cambodia's 'reconstruction and development' which was constructed along broadly neo-liberal lines. Alternative models of development were not considered, thus language alternatives were similarly ignored. One language alternative, a programme of mass literacy, was completely ignored, leaving the majority of Cambodians functionally illiterate. I conclude by arguing that the use of 'choice' in language choice theories as a form of agency often masks the fact that choice is a marker of socio-economic and political privilege.

Keywords

Cambodia; development and reconstruction; English; ELT; international aid; language choice; language policy; language spread theories;

Abbreviations

AIDAB	Australian International Development Aid Bureau
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
CAMSET	Cambodian Secondary English Teaching project
CELT	Cambodian English Language Training project
DfID	Department for International Development (UK)
KPNLF	Khmer People's National Liberation Front
MoEYS	Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
QSA	Quaker Service Australia
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Fund
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

The problem of ‘choice’ and the construction of the demand for English in Cambodia

Introduction

Choice has figured prominently in debates concerning the global expansion of English. In particular, language choice theories, most closely associated with the work of Joshua Fishman (e.g. Fishman 1972, 1972, Fishman, *et al.* 1996, Fishman, *et al.* 1968), view the global spread of English as driven by the rational choices of individual and institutional actors at a national level, based on the assumed functional benefits English provides with little regard to how these choices may be structured by supra-national actors. The use of the word choice within language choice theories assumes that the individual and institutional actors involved actually have a choice, in the sense that they have two or more language options across a range of contexts (educational, economic, political, social, technological, etc.). This may or may not be the case, but more importantly, the availability of choice is differentiated by socio-economic status, gender, ethnicity, and so on reflecting the structural, and often spatial, locations of individual social actors. As Raey and Lucey have pointed out in a different context:

The prevalent focus on ‘choice’ within educational theorizing as a form of agency often masks the fact that ‘choice’ is a marker of economic privilege. The more distant subjects are from economic necessity, the more ‘choice’ becomes a possibility. ‘Choice’ is guaranteed to those who can afford to choose. (Raey and Lucey 2003: 138)

Robert Phillipson has produced the most sustained critique of language choice theories (see for example, Phillipson 1992, 1994, 1997, 2001). His linguistic imperialism thesis views decisions made in the metropolitan centres as driving and shaping the spread of English, helping to bind periphery nations into unequal and

exploitative economic and political relations with these metropolitan centres. Phillipson analysis of the spread of English has been rightly criticised for neglecting the agency of individuals and policy makers, his reductionist and outdated centre/periphery view of global political economy (Holborow 1999: 76-80, Clayton, T. 2006: 247-8), and his view of language and culture as merely ideological reflexes of global capitalism (Pennycook 1994: 56). However, the strength of Phillipson's work is in charting how the English language has been spread through the activities of key actors and institutions in both the 'centre' and (arguable less so) in the 'periphery' and, more importantly, to de-naturalize and (re-)politicize language spread.

In this paper, I employ a methodological approach similar to that of Phillipson and take Cambodia as a case study to explore how the demand for English and English language teaching (ELT) was constructed through the policies and actions of a range of external agencies. As I show below, English was closely articulated to a discourse of 'reconstruction and development' that emphasised the 'need' for Cambodia (and Cambodians) to be able to access global free markets and global knowledge. In the view of the majority of external agencies, Cambodia needed to embrace 'development' through open markets and a minimal state. English, with its assumed status as the global language of trade, science, technology and telecommunications, was viewed as a natural requirement for the development of Cambodia. For individual Cambodians, the ability to 'choose' has always been closely related to their socio-economic status, gender and geographic location. Choice in this case was clearly masking forms of privilege. But language 'choice' was further restricted as alternative models of development were not considered, thus alternative language policies were neglected. One possible alternative 'choice' would have been a programme of mass

literacy, but literacy in Cambodia has been largely neglected leaving the majority of Cambodians functionally illiterate.

This paper comes out of a larger project, which was initially based on my experience of working as an English language teacher and teacher-trainer in China, Laos and the UK during the 1990s. In 2000-2001, I was employed through a UK voluntary agency as a training advisor in a regional teacher training centre on a UK government-funded project in Cambodia. This project, the Cambodian Secondary English Teaching (CAMSET) project, aimed to establish a sustainable national infrastructure for English language teaching (ELT) at lower secondary school level. During this period, I was also conducting ethnographic research which aimed to examine the competing claims about the socio-economic and cultural effects of English language teaching in developing countries (see Clayton, S. 2004).

The demand for English

There is little question of the strength of demand for learning English in contemporary Cambodia. Whilst working in Cambodia, I encountered numerous Cambodians studying English including market stall holders, usually female, in the expatriate/tourist markets of Phnom Penh; *moto*¹ drivers (often state employees in their second or third job), who wanted to communicate with tourists; street children in Phnom Penh selling English-language newspapers; staff and students from schools and colleges; officials from various government ministries studying English for current or future employment prospects, and many others.

¹ Motorcycle taxi, the cheapest and most popular form of 'public transport' in Cambodia.

This widespread demand sustained a burgeoning private sector in education with English language teaching at its core. In Phnom Penh brightly-coloured street banners and wall posters advertised an endless array of private schools, from the elite and expensive, such as the Australian Centre for Education, to small private classes run by individual teachers. I worked in a provincial capital with a population of around 37,000 people. The town had four large private schools (two of which were branches of private schools based in Phnom Penh), which taught English as well as other courses (taught in Khmer), such as computing and business. In addition there were myriad small private 'schools' teaching English. Other provincial capitals had a similar range of private schools. In rural villages, small wooden signs hung on trees advertising private classes run by secondary school teachers in their own homes.

Although a French protectorate from 1863, French was never the medium of instruction in the majority of schools. It was, however, in the system of Franco-Cambodian schools established by the colonial power to produce French-speaking Cambodians for the colonial civil service (for more detailed discussion see Clayton, T., 1995, 2000: 52-7). From the early 20th century the elite classes increasingly sent their children to these schools suggesting an accommodation to the language amongst these groups. In the post-colonial era, Khmer replaced French as the language of instruction except for at tertiary level, and French remained the working language of the government until the Khmer Rouge period (Ablin 1991: 25-6). Although taught in Cambodia since the 1960s, English has increasingly replaced French as the dominant foreign language taught in the education system. Since 1989, students in state schools have been able to choose to study either English or French between grades 7 to 12 (lower and upper secondary school), but English increasingly attracts more students.

In 1996, for example, 40 percent more students registered for the Grade 8 French exam than for the English exam, but by 2001, 37,000 students took the Grade 9 English exam, twice the number who took French. In 1995 the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport (MoEYS) estimated there were 529 English and 1,378 French teachers, by 2000/2001 there were 728 and 331 respectively, and by 2004/2005 the figures were 1,481 and 406. By 2000, over 1,000 of the approximately 24,000 students in state and private higher education institutions were studying for a BA in English, while only 250 were taking the French equivalent (Lon 2001, MoEYS 1996, 2005, Taylor 1995: 3, Ahrens and Kemmerer 2002: 9).

This high demand for English was embedded in the discourses of Cambodian teachers and trainers, development project specialists, Ministry staff, international agency staff and volunteers like myself. However, the nature and source of the demand was rarely examined – so self-evident and so widespread was this demand that it appeared to be unnecessary to question. As one ELT teacher I interviewed commented, ‘[I] didn’t think anybody had ever even questioned or thought that there was any doubt that we should be doing English.’ For others, the high demand simply reflects their view that English has become the global *lingua franca*. One writer reported that the Cambodian Secretary of State for Commerce, explaining that seventy percent of his own work was conducted in English, simply concluded that ‘English is integrated with the global economy’, whilst an economist with the Cambodian Development Resource Institute contended that ‘Language choice is market driven and the market favours English’ (both cited in Clayton, T. 2002: 6).

The unasked question here is how has this high demand for English come about? Answering this requires examining the contexts within which decisions concerning national language policy were made, but also within which individual Cambodians were choosing to learn English. Here, I examine three arenas that were central to the construction of the demand for English and indicate the some key factors structuring both individual and institutional language choices. First, I discuss the establishment in the mid-1980s of the Cambodian English Language Training project by the Quaker Service Australia, the first aid-funded English teacher training project in Cambodia. Second, I describe the teaching and learning of English in the refugee camps operating in the Thai-Cambodia border region from the 1970s to 1990s. Third, I examine how the operations of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia in the early 1990s affected language choices. These three arenas, whilst not representing an exhaustive account of how the demand for English was constructed, illuminate how different Cambodian social actors, at different times and in different locations, perceived economic, social and political incentives for learning English. They also highlight how individual perceptions of the value of the English language were shaped through the articulation of English/ELT to Cambodia's "reconstruction and development" and how this, in turn, reinforced the demand for English/ELT.

The QSA Cambodian English Language Training Project

Although during the 1980s the Australian government officially refused to recognise the People's Republic of Kampuchea, they actively promoted English teaching by funding the Cambodian English Language Training (CELT). This was the first aid-funded English teacher training project in Cambodia since the 1960s and came at a time when teaching English was officially forbidden and Cambodia was under an UN-

led aid embargo. Funded by the Australian International Development Aid Bureau² (AIDAB), the project was established and managed by Quaker Service Australia (QSA) between 1985 and 1993. A small faith-based international NGO, QSA had been funding a series of small-scale construction projects in Cambodia since 1979, but had no previous involvement in English language teaching or teacher training. An unofficial history of the CELT project, written by QSA Committee member William Oats, provides a detailed record of the establishment and operation of the project, as well as the attitudes and motivations of the Australian project team members.

The catalyst for the establishment of CELT was the visit of Bill Hayden, then Australian Foreign Minister, to Laos and Vietnam in June and July 1983. His comments on this visit, in the foreword to Oats' book, encapsulate the view that English was the only effective language for Cambodia's reconstruction and development. Given his political position, these probably reflected Australian government policy.

In my discussions with officials, it became apparent that one of the most effective ways by which Australia could assist with the process of reconstruction was to help with training in the English language. English, of course, is the international means of communication in the modern commercial and technological world, and it seems to me essential that if the countries of Indo-China, including Cambodia, were successfully to rebuild they needed access to all these skills. (Oats 1994: 5)

² Renamed the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) in 1995.

He urged that Australia initiate the teaching of English as an essential first step for Cambodia to take advantage of available international aid (*ibid*: 31). Hayden presupposed that English was central to the reconstruction of Indo-China, not merely Cambodia, and gatekeeper to the necessary 'modern' technology and commercial world. Although a wide array of technology, scientific knowledge and commercial markets are accessible largely through English, Hayden's statement provides a specific discursive construction of Cambodia, rather than reflecting some existing reality that can be said to be Cambodia, which has been replicated in the discourses of various international agencies operating in Cambodia ever since. He views an external orientation for Cambodia and Cambodian education as an essential requirement for successful rebuilding. As David Ayres (2000: 187) has pointed out, however, such external orientation within Cambodian education has repeatedly failed to meet the needs of the rural majority. Hayden portrays Cambodia as economically and socially homogenous, assuming English and ELT is accessible to all regardless of class, gender, ethnicity, age or geographic location, and that the external goods English provides access to are similarly beneficial to all. As I discuss later, access to English remains restricted to a minority of Cambodians and is closely related to their socio-economic position. Likewise, the fruits of an externally-oriented economy, under contemporary globalisation, are far from evenly distributed (Weisbrot *et al*, 2002; Edward, 2006).

The explicit link between English and aid is also clear. During the 1980s, Cambodia was refused development aid, but allowed humanitarian aid by the UN. This restricted funding to a limited range of projects implemented by UN agencies with an emergency relief mandate (UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR), and prevented the operations of

the development-focused agencies (e.g. UNDP, WHO, UNESCO) in Cambodia (Mysliwiec 1988: 75). The CELT project was an aspect of the Australian government's expansion of aid to Indo-China, through Austcare and AIDAB, which provided funding of Aus\$399,000 for its initial phase (1985-88) increasing to Aus\$2.4m by phase three (1991-3) after which QSA involvement ended and the project became part of formal bilateral assistance (Oats 1994: 31 & 83). However, as the Australian government had signed up to the ASEAN and USA ban on bilateral aid at government level, this was officially a QSA project even it was wholly funded by AIDAB.

Oats' discussion of the initial process of establishing the project, in which he was closely involved, repeats the assumptions concerning the central importance of English. A QSA Committee met in November 1984 to consider a request from AIDAB to undertake a feasibility study for an ELT project in Cambodia. QSA had previously defined criteria and priorities for potential projects. Such projects would be related to the needs of women, the disabled, improving water supplies and training in agricultural and technical skills, and would be organised by local groups rather than by government. As the proposed project fell outside these criteria, doubts and unease were expressed within the organisation throughout its involvement. Oats claims the Committee felt that restoration of contact with Western nations was essential for building peace, and further that the 'teaching of English would not only be the key to open Kampuchean access to Western technology for rebuilding its shattered economy, but it would be a vital contribution to the renewal of an education system which had been almost totally demoralised' (*ibid*: 31-32). Facing difficult decisions, Oats maintains that QSA members focused on the principle that they 'had agreed to go into

Kampuchea, not to tell the Kampucheans how to rebuild their education system, but to listen, to share our experience and to work alongside to find solutions best suited to their needs' (*ibid*: 43). However, he felt that '[t]here was no doubt that the Kampuchean government, even if reluctantly, had realised that the resumption of contact with the West would require the resumption of the teaching of English in its schools' (*ibid*: 32). Thus the emphasis shifts from 'rebuilding their education system', towards 'contact with the West' which inevitably requires the teaching of English.

Prior to its establishment, doubts were expressed about both the need for the project and the feasibility of implementation. QSA consultant, Mike Call, an American Friends Service Committee Cambodian (AFSC) representative who had been working in Cambodia since 1982, expressed these most clearly. After talking to Ministry officials, he:

reported a 'mixed picture' from his preliminary discussions. He was not sure the Kampucheans wanted ELT. While he conceded that the importance of English was realised for communication and access to technical information, he warned that political considerations could colour decisions on whether it should actually be taught. (*ibid*: 34)

In contrast, Jennifer Ashton, the QSA consultant who conducted a feasibility study in 1985, reported 'a very positive attitude to ELT' (*ibid*). However, she also reported differences between Ministries and that no common policy had been developed. Then Vice-Minister of Education, Mr Ek Sam Ol, and other officials, although interested in developing ELT, stressed problems of priorities and favoured a cautious, step-by-step

approach. The two sections of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs she dealt with, the Australian/Asian Department and the International Organisations Department, also appeared to have divergent policy views on ELT. The former favoured scholarships for government officials to study English in the International Relations Institute in Hanoi, whereas the latter prioritised the re-establishment of national educational resources (*ibid*: 37-8).

This absence of a common policy stance within the government bureaucracy and the divergent views within the NGO community reflect neither simple ‘choices’ by national policy makers, nor straightforward imposition by external agencies, nor do they provide clear examples of ‘resistance’ to English. There is, however, a suggestion that within the governing elite there was a reluctant recognition, if lacking a clear policy direction, that English would become more important, at least for government officials, in the future.

In March 1985 QSA accepted the recommendations of Jennifer Ashton’s feasibility study and submitted them to AIDAB. By May, a contract had been signed with AIDAB and Ashton was appointed as project officer. QSA’s involvement with CELT lasted until the end of the third phase of the project in July 1993. By this point, the main goal of the project was ‘to contribute to the increase in sustainability of English language capability in Cambodia’ to be achieved through: the training and retraining secondary teachers of English; the design, production and dissemination of appropriate course materials for training English language teachers; and assisting the Ministry to produce appropriate textbook and other teaching materials for ELT in

secondary schools. The rationale for the project again emphasised the importance of English for external contacts, particularly with Western aid agencies.

Without a knowledge of English, Cambodia's access to the outside world is severely constrained, in regard to communication with external agencies and governments and access to scientific and technical information (most of which is in English). This reinforces Cambodia's isolation and reduces access to development assistance. [...]

In the event of a comprehensive settlement for Cambodia under the auspices of the UN, the country is likely to experience increased interest from Western aid donors. To enhance communication with donors, and to increase Cambodian participation in aid related activities, it is essential that students have access to international language training, especially in English. (*ibid*: 5-8)

The first paragraph exemplifies the de-politicisation of aid and development within international agency discourses. Cambodia's 'isolation' in the 1980s resulted from the decision of the UN General Assembly in September 1979 not to recognise the Heng Samrin government and to give Cambodia's UN seat to the Khmer Rouge representative. This was accompanied by the embargo on UN 'development' agencies working in Cambodia, which effectively limited 'access to development assistance' (for details see Shawcross 1984: 137-8 and Mysliwiec 1988: 72-76). The complex effects of Cambodia's location as a Cold War battlefield and the effects on different sections of the population are reduced to constraints resulting from an inadequate 'knowledge of English'. English becomes the key to accessing the latest wave of

foreign intervention in the form of donors and aid³. It is also the key to individual Cambodians increasing their participation in ‘aid related activities’, making it clear that these activities are to be conducted in English. What is not mentioned is the reciprocal access to Cambodia which English provides the international aid agencies. As these agencies largely fail to train their workers in local languages, their access to countries like Cambodia is reliant on the teaching of English. Thus the suggestion that English language teaching will ‘increase Cambodian participation in aid related activities’ additionally implies that such activity will be under the auspices and control of non-Cambodians.

As a result of increased tensions within the project and between QSA and AIDAB regarding project priorities, QSA withdrew and handed over the management of the project to a consortium from the University of Canberra and IDP Education Australia Ltd in July 1993. The project was renamed the University of Phnom Penh English and Education Project and run by the consortium until aid funding ceased in 1997 (Denham 1997: viii). IDP also established and operates the Australian Centre for Education, according to its website, ‘a major provider of English Language Training (ELT) for embassies, NGOs, private companies, various UN agencies and other

³ Cambodia’s history can be read as a series of foreign interventions and invasions punctuated by attempts by indigenous elites to control the state apparatus and build an independent Khmer nation, which were characterised by elite political infighting and internal uprisings (see Chandler 1996, Ayres, 2000, Clayton, S. 2004). These waves of foreign intervention often involved attempts to introduce or impose new ideologies through language and linguistic change. English is the linguistic element of the latest wave of foreign intervention, which is this time being conducted not by an aggressive or expansionist neighbour, or a colonising power, but by an array of international agencies organised around notions of ‘reconstruction’ and ‘development.’

donors'⁴ as well as fee paying individuals. Around the same time, the UK government established the aid-funded Cambodian Secondary English Teaching Project (CAMSET), which ran until 2001. This project aimed to develop sustainable ELT in lower secondary schools and was partially based on some of the teacher-training aspects of CELT, and initially used the CELT-produced textbook. CAMSET was managed by the Centre for British Teachers (now only know by its acronym, CfBT). This organisation began as a provider of English language teachers mainly in Malaysia, Oman and Brunei, and has since benefited from the UK government's policy of opening up the process of tendering for development projects, and has operated in a number of developing countries. Organisations like IDP and CfBT have promoted English and ELT on the basis of its apparent functional benefits and through the use of bilateral aid funding. What is less obvious is that their own operations and the expansion of their operations also relied upon both the expansion of the demand for English and the development of a core of English-speaking Cambodians with whom they could work. This is not to propose some conspiracy in which these agencies collaborated, but to suggest that they operate under the same rationale as any other capitalist company in which market expansion is a necessity.

In the border camps⁵

The formation and history of the Thai border refugee camps, some of which operated for over two decades, reflect the complexity of Cambodia's shifting political alliances

⁴ IDP Cambodia <http://www.idp.com/cambodia/ace/article4.asp>. Accessed 15-06-07.

⁵ I am indebted to Richard Rowat who maintains the *Thai / Cambodia Border Refugee Camps 1975-1999 Information and Documentation Website* (<http://www.websitesrcg.com/border/index.html>) which is the source of some of the details in this section.

and geo-political location as a Cold War battlefield. Here, I focus on provision of education within the camps, specifically, the teaching of English. I examine how the demand for English among Cambodian refugees was driven by the fact that it was the medium of communication with international agencies operating in the camps⁶. The importance of this is that between 1992 and 1993 361,462 refugees were repatriated from the camps (Williams 1997: 165), bringing with them whatever education and training they had received, including English language skills. Those refugees who gained experience in the camps in dealing with international agencies developed useful skills once they were repatriated for dealing with what became an entrenched aid regime inside Cambodia in the 1990s.

The destruction and disruption stemming from Cambodia's escalating civil war and increasing entanglement in the Vietnam War in the late 1960s and early 1970s, resulted in the displacement of around half the population and the creation of large refugee movements both inside and outside the country. Those fleeing abroad were in two categories: initially around 34,000, mostly affluent and well-educated, who fled to Thailand and were subsequently resettled in a third country (the USA, France, etc.), and some 320,000 Cambodian-born Vietnamese who went south to Vietnam (Mysliwiec 1988: 95). Under the Democratic Kampuchea regime (often referred to as the Khmer Rouge regime), a further 150,000 Khmers and Sino-Khmers fled to Vietnam, but only some 26,000 Khmers managed to enter Thailand, although 20,000

⁶ As well as relevant UN agencies, NGOs such as the American Refugee Committee, Care International in Thailand, Catholic Office for Emergency Relief and Refugees, Christian Outreach, Caring for Young Refugees, Handicap International, International Rescue Committee, Japan Sotoshu Relief Committee, Japan International Volunteer Centre of Thailand, and Médecins-sans-Frontières-France (MSF-F) among others were operating in the camps (Suenobu, 1995: 37)..

of these were resettled in third countries by 1978 (*ibid*: 95). Up to this point, Cambodian refugees fleeing to Thailand were treated sympathetically by Western nations, perhaps because the majority were well-educated and anti-communist. However, after the Vietnamese-backed ‘liberation’ of Cambodia in 1979, and an increased flow of refugees, attitudes changed dramatically. Thailand, which was now attempting to deal with hundreds of thousands of refugees, closed its border from March to April 1979 and subsequent enforced repatriation led to thousands of deaths amongst the refugees (Shawcross 1984: 82-92).

From this point, the Cambodians who had fled to the Thai border were no longer given refugee status, but instead were referred to as ‘displaced persons.’ Overall only around ten percent of the refugees in the Thai border camps were ever given refugee status (Becker 1998: 448). The camps were often makeshift, sometimes transient settlements, formally under Thai control and overseen by the United Nations Border Relief Operation (under the UNDP), with the exception of one of the largest camps, Khao I Dang, which was co-managed by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Thai Ministry of the Interior. As most camps were not recognised by the UNHCR, the residents were not eligible for asylum, emigration or other rights guaranteed to refugees under international conventions. The various factions of the anti-Vietnamese military opposition, including the Khmer Rouge, operated openly in the camps and most camps were aligned to one of these groups.

Sources describing education and specifically English language teaching in the camps are limited. Jeffery Dufresne, who worked in Ampil Camp, part of the collection of camps known as Site 2, provides some detail of the provision of education within the

Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) controlled camps and the political importance education held for the KPNLF leadership. His work also contains the voices of Cambodians directly involved in education within the camps.

Education provision was initially very basic and mostly consisted of refugees who had experience of teaching, or some useful knowledge, teaching those who possessed neither, using little or no materials in 'classrooms' under the trees. Both the UN and the Thai government were reluctant to develop education programmes in the camps as it was felt that this might act as a magnet for those still inside Cambodia (Suenobu 1995: 20). However, Dufresne suggests it was politically important for the KPNLF to get credit for education provision rather than it going to outside forces (Dufresne 1993: 136). He provides a telling quote from an interview with Um Ream, who was in charge of the construction of Nong Samut camp, about concerns behind the drive to provide education:

The UN and all the other foreigners believed that all our intellectuals were dead and the only remaining people knew nothing. I wanted to show the international agencies that we did have some resource people left who knew what to do. We could do it by ourselves, organize it by ourselves. We just needed some resources. I wanted to do it, to be directly involved, to build our spirit, and to show our spirit to the outside. (*ibid*: 139)

According to Dufresne, the quality of education provided in the camps improved gradually as the UN began supplying resources and assistance. He details the establishment during the 1980s of primary and secondary education facilities and a

teacher training centre in Ampil Camp. By 1992 Ampil High School had 86 teachers, 1,315 students and was providing a full curriculum (*ibid*: 256-7). The curriculum duplicated the structure of pre-1970 Cambodian education with one notable exception; the teaching of French was replaced by English. This was difficult as few of the teachers had English skills and there was a need for outside assistance. However, there were important political as well as educational concerns behind this decision. Sonn Nosay, at the time Deputy Director of Education for the KPNLF, explained the pragmatic reasoning behind the curriculum change to Dufresne:

We could see that English is the international language. If we were to deal with foreign governments, it would be in English. All the workers from the U.N. and humanitarian organisations speak English, even if they are Thai or Japanese. [...] If you can speak directly to the foreigner, without translation, it gives you higher status. They are more willing to deal with you and can see your abilities. [...] This is valuable for the future also. In the future, those who can speak English to foreigners, to government, to businessmen, they will have the power. [...] For these reasons we have promoted the study of English. (*ibid*: 165)

This underscores that these were knowledgeable and active social agents calculating their future options in relation to their perceptions of a shifting global order. However, at the same time, their 'choices' were being framed by the activities of the UN bodies and other agencies who were using English as the main medium of communication. The agencies do not appear to have made widespread use of other languages, such as Khmer, Thai, Chinese or even the colonial language, French. In a short-term or emergency situation, this may be understandable, given the time and resources

required for language training, but the border camps operated for up to two decades, long enough for the establishment of education provision by the refugees themselves. Paradoxically, both the UN and the Thai government refused to support the teaching of English in the camps, except for health workers, on the grounds that the camp residents might use this to aid their emigration to third countries. Nevertheless, English 'became an unofficial portion of the curriculum, and assistance for English education came only quietly from humanitarian organisations' (*ibid*: 166). One such organisation was the Catholic Office for Emergency Relief and Refugees (COERR), which set up English classes within the context of teacher-training.

In her memoir of the period, Margot Grant, a health educator and activist who worked for eight years in camps at Site 2 and at Ampil for COERR, describes how she provided informal English lessons to Cambodian colleagues and other camp residents. She corroborates Dufresne's descriptions of how, as education facilities improved in the camps, English was taught more widely, often by foreign workers like herself. She also details how her son sent books from Australia to help establish an English library in one of the camps (Grant 2000: 56-7, 84-93). In her account, Grant makes little mention of having learnt Khmer and most of the Cambodians that the foreigners dealt with appear to have spoken English, an ability and choice that seems to have been taken for granted. In Suenobu's account of the management of education programmes in the camps, she discusses how many programmes were managed by non-refugee staff on short-term contracts, which led to serious problems in implementation, but also indicates again how the ability to operate in English was taken for granted (Suenobu 1995: 20). Foreigners speaking Khmer are rarely mentioned in these accounts and when they are, they appear to be the exception. This was similar in my

experience working in Cambodia (and in previous work in China and Laos). The vast majority of foreigners working for international agencies (including myself) were not able to speak Khmer well enough to work in the language, even those who had spent many years in the country. Those foreigners who had become fluent in Khmer appeared to me to be treated with greater respect by other foreigners and regarded as 'knowing' the country better by virtue of their linguistic skills. The same attitude was rarely displayed by foreigners (again, including myself) towards Cambodians who spoke not only Khmer, but perhaps also Chinese or Vietnamese if it was a family language, and perhaps French, Russian, Vietnamese or English as a second, third or even fourth language. As Sonn Nosay's above remarks suggest, the ability to speak English carried the highest status and Cambodians who could speak English well were often taken more seriously by foreigners and regarded as more able than those who could not.

Although this is only a brief analysis of English language teaching in the camps, it indicates how ELT was being requested by Cambodian individuals and organisations in the camps. It indicates how these individuals and organisations were choosing to learn English, rather than it being imposed on them, but that this was a highly constrained choice. Camp residents understood that communication with the international agencies working in the camps was in English, but also that this was a result of the international status of English and that the language would be key to future economic and political access to the outside world. Despite some reservations from UN organisations, ELT was supported and promoted both formally and informally by NGOs and also by those UN organisations working in health. Dufresne describes how camp residents with English skills were badly needed in the camp

administration, resulting in international workers being routinely requested to run English classes regardless of their own teaching abilities (Dufresne 1993: 252-3). An irony here is that some of these same agencies would later point to the problems within Cambodian education resulting from the number of poorly or completely untrained and inexperienced teachers.

The UN later funded teacher training programmes in the camps and a demographic report on three border camps noted that a considerable percentage of the graduates from these programmes preferred:

working in other programmes run by voluntary agencies and international organizations in the camps, as the incentives for this type of work are seen by many as greater. Such incentives include the opportunity to learn other technical skills or to learn foreign languages by working with international personnel.

(Lynch 1989: 24)

This suggests a ‘brain drain’ away from education in the camps toward the international agencies, a theme also found in the 1990s in Cambodia with the rapid expansion of these agencies inside the country. Despite the reservations about teaching the language, the operations of the international organisations were largely conducted in English, demonstrating the close articulation between the organisations and the language. This pattern was replicated during the UNTAC period, to which I turn next.

United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia was established to secure the implementation of the Paris Peace Accords, which aimed to end the civil war and commit all sides to a peaceful and democratic future for Cambodia (Findlay 1995:11). It was the most expensive UN peacekeeping operation undertaken at the time, totalling US \$1.7 billion (United Nations 1996: 481) whose main purpose during its two-year mission was to restore peace, promote national reconciliation and to establish a neutral political environment in preparation for free and fair democratic national elections in 1993. To what extent this unprecedented and complex mission was a success is open to debate,⁷ but my interest here is in the wider effects of the UNTAC intervention. As UNTAC operations provided increased security and the potential for future stability, aid organisations, predominantly operating in English, began to increase their presence in Cambodia. This heightened the perception of and demand for English as the international language of this new wave of foreigners, and increasingly articulated English with discourses of reconstruction, development and democratisation. The high salaries and allowances paid to UNTAC personnel created unprecedented earning opportunities, especially for urban-based, middle-class Cambodians. The relatively high salaries paid by UNTAC and the aid agencies to Cambodian staff created a drain of skilled and experienced personnel away from the government bureaucracy, in a way similar to that noted in the border camps. These factors worked to restructure local labour markets to service the UNTAC intervention. In addition, there was the establishment of an apparently permanent presence of often highly paid, English-speaking foreign ‘experts’ from the international agencies in positions of power within the state bureaucracy.

⁷ Examples of this debate can be found in Findlay 1995, IPS/UNITAR 1995, Doyle, *et al.* 1997, and Heininger 1994.

The penetration of UNTAC personnel into Cambodia was much deeper than that of the earlier French colonial administration. UNTAC was a vast operation involving 15,900 military personnel, 3,600 civilian police and 1,020 civilian personnel from over 30 countries (IPSS/UNITR 1995: 4). In addition, the organisation recruited an estimated 7,000 Cambodian staff, including 2,500 interpreters, and around 60,000 temporary electoral staff in preparation for the election in May 1993 (United Nations 1995: 182). Whilst many were based in Phnom Penh, UNTAC personnel were spread throughout the country. Military personnel were based in 270 locations, the civilian police in 21 provincial-level and 200 district-level units, the civil administration had 95 staff in Phnom Penh and 123 in the provinces, and the human rights component had 15 foreign staff in Phnom Penh and 21 in the provinces (IPSS/UNITR 1995: 9-25). Additionally, over 450 UN Volunteers, based at district level, acted as District Electoral Supervisors managing 4000 local electoral registration personnel (Findlay 1995: 54). Thus, Cambodians all over the country came into contact with UNTAC international personnel, the vast majority of whom were using English as their medium of communication.

As the aid embargo was lifted, official development assistance, channelled through international NGOs and multilateral agencies, expanded from US\$18.5 million in 1988 to US\$90.9 million in 1991 (McAndrew 1996: 1) as did the numbers of NGOs operating in Cambodia. A 1991 fact finding report into Cambodian education listed at least 29 different international NGOs involved in education and training projects in different ministries (six of which were teaching English), along with three multilateral and two bilateral agencies. It also noted that the number of international NGOs in

Cambodia had gone from around 50 in early 1991 to 60 by September that year and was continuing to expand rapidly (Blom and Nooijer 1992: 38-42). All but seven of these international NGOs were from English-speaking countries and had English as their working language and it is likely that the others were doing much of their work in English.

Although officially a dual-language operation (English and French), English became the dominant medium of communication of the mission. In mission reports and other documents, the French language is notable mainly by its absence. A summary report of the UNTAC debriefing conference held in Singapore in 1994 notes that the vitally important Mixed Military Working Group Secretariat, 'issued a considerable volume of correspondence, agendas and other papers, in English and in Khmer, designed to keep UNTAC well ahead of developments' (IPS/UNITAR 1995: 11). In making recommendations for future missions, the report notes the need for provision of competent interpreters, and that:

[I]anguage should be taken into account in the selection of potential police-contributing countries. If there is an English-speaking mission, junior personnel from non-English speaking countries could have trouble communicating. (*ibid*: 17-8)

This again indicates how English was used by the vast majority of UNTAC personnel spread around Cambodia. In addition, as in the border camps, English language classes were being provided to Cambodian staff both on a formal basis as part of the training component of the mission and informally by many of the UNTAC personnel.

UNTAC was also highly reliant on skilled and experienced local personnel. Although Findlay (1995: 123) notes that there was a critical shortage of Khmer-speakers, translators, typists, and computer programmers, there were still a large number of Cambodian staff, many of them English speakers, who played a vital role in the mission. This included the 2,500 local interpreters, without whom the mission would simply not have functioned as these could not be supplied from any non-local source. This was foreseen in the envisaged training needs, which stated that '[l]anguage training will be essential for local staff, especially for upgrading interpretation techniques,' although Khmer language training for international staff was only regarded as 'additional' to their other training needs (United Nations 1995: 178). As was the case with international agency personnel in the camps noted above, training in Khmer was undervalued and the training of local staff in English given priority.

Grant Curtis, who was at the time a senior programme officer in UNTAC's Rehabilitation and Economic Affairs component, indicates how UNTAC's personnel needs and relatively high salaries created a 'brain drain.'

Although UNTAC's Khmer staff received monthly salaries lower than the daily mission subsistence allowance (MSA) paid to the international staff, thousands of Cambodian civil servants and teachers left their offices and classrooms to work for UNTAC, resulting in serious curtailment of basic services. (Curtis 1998: 9)

Local monthly salaries paid by UNTAC were at least fifteen times the average Cambodian monthly salary at the time, but paled in comparison to the allowances paid to international staff. The daily MSA for UNTAC international staff was US\$130, just below the Cambodian per capita annual income at the time of US\$150 (Curtis 1993: 16). In the UNTAC budget, local salaries accounted for some US\$2 million (or 1% of the total), whilst expatriate salaries totalled around US\$806 million (*ibid*: 10 & 16). Curtis explains that there was competition between UNTAC and other international organisations for ‘the limited, but nevertheless surprisingly elastic supply of trained Cambodian labour with multilingual or other employable skills’ which drove up the price of local labour (*ibid*). As well as this severely affecting services during the UNTAC period, he predicted that many of those skilled personnel employed by UNTAC and other external agencies would be unwilling to return to government service if salary levels were not scaled-up to cover at least basic living costs (*ibid*: 17).

It is important to note that while aid workers’ and agency reports of the time often remark on the lack of capacity within the government administration, little is made of how it may have been the operations of UNTAC and aid agencies that emptied the ministries of their most skilled and entrepreneurial staff. This ‘brain drain’ and the association of high salaries with working in English, either with or for foreign organisations and personnel, continues to affect the Cambodian labour market. The effects of per diem payments to local staff and the amount of aid money spent on technical assistance salaries remain contentious, although largely hidden issues within the ‘aid community’ in Cambodia (see Adams 2002a, b, Godfrey, et al. 2000). So too are the ways that these deep economic inequalities between foreign workers and

Cambodians affect relations between many of them. Carol Livingston, a writer who worked as a freelance journalist in Cambodia during and after the UNTAC period, describes how:

A subtle form of imperialism crept into many *barang*-Cambodian⁸ economic relationships. An employer might balk at paying a maid \$100 rather than \$60 a month. The same employer might then enrol that same maid in an expensive English course, rather than pay the higher salary and let the maid decide what she could afford for lessons. In many instances the important thing for the *barang* was to feel they were not being taken advantage of. They were dispensing largesse and retaining control, rather than simply paying an adequate wage. In a country where even backpacking English teachers could afford, and were expected by both ex-pats and Cambodians to have, domestic staff, the old-fashioned colonialist attitudes most *barang* would have instantly decried still existed, mutated into subtler, end of twentieth-century forms. (Livingston 1996: 42-3)

Whilst not the primary cause of these shifts in labour markets and relations between Cambodians and *barang* here, the English language is at the centre of them. As with the earlier examples, the UNTAC intervention helped to privilege English and to shape (foreign) language choices, both individually and institutionally. The ability to choose English, and to access the economic and other benefits stemming from this choice, was also shaped by existing socio-economic, political and geographic differences. In this case, those in urban areas, who were educated beyond primary level and who had some existing knowledge of English were the main beneficiaries.

⁸ *Barang* is the Khmer word for generally used to refer to foreigners.

What is clear is that these choices were not ones open to all in Cambodia regardless of their socio-economic status, gender, ethnicity or geographical location.

Problematising choice

Whilst far from an exhaustive account of the contexts for language choice in Cambodia, these cases highlight some common themes shaping these choices. In all three contexts, English and ELT were closely articulated with the ‘reconstruction and development’ of Cambodia through the operations of a range of external agencies. These agencies helped to promote an externally oriented model of development, which emphasised the ‘need’ for open markets and an enabling, not commanding state. This reinforced the primacy of English as the ‘global’ language providing access to markets and knowledge, but also to those same external agencies. There is, in this sense, a reciprocal relationship between the form of development being promoted by the various external agencies and English and ELT. However, what is also clear is that in all three contexts there were knowledgeable Cambodian social actors reflexively ‘choosing’ English, even if this is within what, I argue, are constrained circumstances. These choices ‘made sense’ and were not the result of some ideological imposition, although they may be seen as reflecting a hegemonic discourse that privileged a specific mode of development which privileges the English language.

Thomas Clayton has used his own analysis of language choices in Cambodia to propose a synthesis of the language choice model and linguistic imperialism thesis that might provide the best explanatory statement of language spread in the contemporary world (Clayton, T. 2006: 267-70). His work provides a detailed and

impressive case study which poses serious questions for both camps in the language choice debate (reviewed in Clayton, S. 2007). Clayton's thorough and thoughtful analysis displays, however, the same weakness as other analyses which employ a language choice framework, in that it assumes 'choice' to be an unproblematic concept. In the case of Cambodia, Raey and Lucey's (*op. cit.*) contention that the focus on 'choice' as a form of agency masks how it operates as marker of economic privilege is particularly telling. In all the contexts described above, the actors engaged in the (constrained) choice of English were, to differing degrees, privileged. This might not always have been in simple economic terms, but in terms of their political position and in terms of their relation to external agencies. A similar argument can be made about the contemporary demand for English and ELT in Cambodia. Whilst this is clearly very high, it comes largely from predominantly urban and relatively economically privileged sections of the population. This is reflected in both secondary school enrolment rates and the costs for private English classes.

English is taught as a foreign language at secondary school level; however, secondary education enrolment rates in Cambodia are some of the lowest in the world. As is shown in Table 1, net enrolment to lower secondary school is barely over a quarter of the eligible population. There is also a clear urban bias, although only just over 41 percent of those eligible actually enrol in lower secondary school, and female enrolment is much lower in all cases. Thus those able to 'choose' to learn English through state education are a minority of the eligible population.

Table 1 about here.

In terms of the costs of private English classes, at the time I was working in Cambodia, basic English classes in rural areas or small towns cost anything between 100 and 500 riel (or 2 and 12 US cents)⁹ per student per hour. Textbook-based courses in private schools were often priced monthly; with the lower grades being around US\$5 per month (for 30 hours study) rising to \$10 per month for higher levels. At the time the average civil service salary was around \$25 per month and in the garment factories that encircle Phnom Penh the monthly minimum wage was \$45. The affordability of private English tuition is clearly limited. The ‘choice’ of English, therefore, is restricted to those who are able to enrol in school, which is also closely related to affordability (Bray 1999), and/or those who can pay for private tuition. The demand for English then has been shaped and promoted in Cambodia through the processes outlined above, but choosing to learn English remains the privilege of a limited section of the population.

Another language ‘choice’ could have been made by a much wider section of the Cambodian population - literacy in the Khmer language. According to a Ministry of Youth, Education and Sport survey (MoEYS 2000a) two-thirds of the adult Cambodian population remain functionally illiterate. Given these high rates of illiteracy, a national literacy program would appear to be an essential part of education policy. In 2000, however less than 2% of the totally illiterate adult population were enrolled in either government-sponsored classes or NGO and donor supported literacy programs. Government-sponsored programmes, which cost \$12 per student, claim to produce functional literacy in 55% of students, with a 45% success

⁹ At the time I was working in Cambodia the exchange rate of the riel was relatively stable at around US\$1 = 3,900 riel. The exchange rate was similar when I returned in 2002.

rate for NGO programmes at an estimated per student cost of \$23 (MoEYS 2000b: n.p.). Since the pioneering work of Paulo Freire (Freire 1970), the importance of literacy, not just as a basic need, but for its wider role in social and political transformations has been recognised. The World Bank's *Sourcebook for Poverty Reduction Strategies* elaborates this very clearly.

Adult literacy programs are also important in poverty reduction strategies. While the universalization of primary education for children should eventually eradicate adult illiteracy, countries with high illiteracy rates cannot afford to wait a generation for the beneficial impact on incomes and poverty that literacy brings. Nonformal programs that impart literacy and other basic skills to adults and out-of-school youths can directly improve family income generation and have strong positive impacts on family health status, children's educational attainment, and the sustainable management of local natural resources. A widely reported outcome among adult learners is a sense of empowerment and an ability to act with greater confidence in public arenas. (Klugman 2002: 234)

Given the political roots of the problems in Cambodian education (see Ayres 2000), and other problems in Cambodian society, such as in primary health care, a mass literacy programme would be a means of genuine empowerment for the still marginalised majority. Such programmes have not been seen as a priority by either the Government or the many external agencies.

A comparison of the financing of literacy programmes in Cambodia with that of ELT programmes, clearly indicates how donors have prioritised the latter over the former.

A recent report into the state of adult literacy in Cambodia estimated that between 1994 and 1999, Cambodian government spending on literacy and other non-formal education programmes amounted to about Riels 9.5 billion (US \$2.3 million) and external assistance over the same period amounted to US \$5 million (Rosenbloom 2004: 4). In comparison, UK government funding for a single ELT project, Cambodian Secondary English Teaching Project (CAMSET) between 1997 and 2000 totalled just over £2 million¹⁰ (Hansard 2000). Similarly, the total budget for the University of Canberra/IDP managed project was Aus\$4.1 million (Coyne 1999: 144) and AusAID also provided US \$3 million in the mid-1990s for a project at the Foreign Language Institute in Phnom Penh to produce English language teachers (Coyne 1997: 25). This raises a key question: Why did these external agencies not provide the ‘choice’ of improved literacy, through offering the same level of programmes, funding and expertise as that provided for English?

Conclusion

In the above sections, I have argued that for Cambodia in the post-Cold War world there was only one development ‘choice’ on offer. This was centred around an economic model which emphasised externally-oriented open markets and a minimalist role for the state – a model captured by the term neo-liberalism. The external orientation of this model resulted in the privileging of English, largely through an appeal to its assumed functional benefits. A different development model would probably have resulted in different language choices. For example, a model which emphasised internal political and economic development focused on basic needs may well have privileged a programme of mass literacy. Would an alternative

¹⁰ Roughly US \$3 million at the average exchange rate in 2000.

model have been supported by the major multinational organisations, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank, that finance and advice developing nations? It would appear unlikely given these institutions actions over the past thirty years. Thus, both the ‘choice’ of development model and, by implication, the ‘choice’ of language were not merely shaped, but were severely constrained. Furthermore, I would also argue that this development model removed the ‘choice’ of literacy from a substantial proportion of the Cambodian population. As I have also argued, language ‘choices’ were further constrained through existing and shifting socio-economic, gender, ethnic and geographic differences and inequalities. Most analyses of language choice have little to say about how these choices are structured according to existing and shifting social differences, which assumes that everyone has the ability or is, in Milton Friedman’s words, free to choose. In the case of Cambodia, these choices were not only structured according to social inequalities, but the privileging of English within this neo-liberal economic model resulted widening inequalities as an effect of the restructuring of local labour markets. What then does the Cambodian case say about theories of language choice? To rephrase Reay and Lucey, the use of ‘choice’ in language choice theories as a form of agency often masks the fact that choice is a marker of socio-economic and political privilege, the less privileged subjects are the less ‘choice’ is possible. Thomas Clayton has called for an ideologically unencumbered inquiry into English language spread in response to what he views as the ideological baggage being carried by Robert Phillipson (Clayton, T. 2006: 270). I would argue that such unencumbered inquiry also requires the rejection of the flawed notion of ‘choice’ in favour of more sociological and political analyses that would ask questions about the social, political and economic effects of language policy decisions and that would seek to analyse

Choice and the demand for English

how are these decisions made, by what individuals and institutions, under what conditions and with what outcomes for different social groups in the country or region being studied.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the Economic and Social Research Council, which provided the funding for the research project behind this article. I would also like to thank the positive and helpful comments of two of my anonymous reviewers.

References

Ablin, D. A. 1991 *Foreign Language Policy in the Cambodian Government: Questions of Sovereignty, Manpower Training and Development Assistance*, Phnom Penh, UNICEF.

Adams, B. 2002a 'Time to put the brakes on the gravy train' *Phnom Penh Post*, 11/18 Edition, Phnom Penh.

— 2002b 'What 'technical assistance' means' *Phnom Penh Post*, 11/18 Edition, Phnom Penh.

Ahrens, L. and Kemmerer, F. 2002 'Higher Education Development', *Cambodian Development Review* 6(1): 8-11.

Ayres, D. 2000 *Anatomy of a Crisis: Education, Development and the State in Cambodia 1953-1998*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

Becker, E. 1998 *When The War Was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution*, New York: Public Affairs.

Blom, H. C. J. and Nooijer, P. G. 1992 *Focus on Higher Education and Vocational Training in Cambodia: Report on the Nuffic Fact Finding Mission*, The Hague: NUFFIC.

Bray, M. 1999 *The Private Costs of Public Schooling: Household and Community Financing of Primary Education in Cambodia*, Paris, UNESCO.

Chandler, D. 1996 *A History of Cambodia*, Second Edition, Updated Edition, Colorado: Westview Press.

Clayton, S. (2004) *English for Cambodia? Aid, Depoliticisation and Development* University of Essex, Unpublished PhD Thesis.

Clayton, S. (2007) 'Review: Language Choice in a Nation Under Transition, Thomas Clayton, Springer, 2006' *Compare*, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp 401-3.

Clayton, T. 2006 *Language Choice in A Nation Under Transition: English Language Spread in Cambodia*, New York, Springer.

Clayton, T. 2002 'Language choice in a nation under transition: The struggle between English and French in Cambodia', *Language Policy* 1(1): 3-25.

Clayton, T. 2000 *Education and the Politics of Language: Hegemony and Pragmatism in Cambodia, 1979-1989*, Hong Kong, University of Hong Kong.

Clayton, T. 1995 'Restriction or Resistance? French Colonial Educational Development in Cambodia' *Education Policy Analysis Archives*, Vol. 3, No 19, Available at: <http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v3n19.html>

Coyne, G. 1999 'The Bachelor of Education (TEFL) Programme: Issues of Quality Assurance', in D. Soper (ed) *Higher Education in Cambodia: The Social and Educational Context for Reconstruction*, Bangkok: UNESCO.

Curtis, G. 1993 *Transition To What? Cambodia, UNTAC and the Peace Process*, Geneva, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

— 1998 *Cambodia Reborn? The Transition to Democracy and Development*, Washington: Brookings Institute and United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Doyle, M. W., Johnstone, I. and Orr, R. C. (eds) 1997 *Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dufresne, J. R. 1993 'Rebuilding Cambodia: Education, Political Warfare and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front': University of St Thomas, Michigan.

Edward, P. (2006) 'Examining inequality: Who really benefits from global growth?' *World Development*, Vol. 34, No. 10, pp. 1667–1695.

Escobar, A. 1995 *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Findlay, T. 1995 *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lesson of UNTAC*, Oxford: OUP.

Fishman, J. A. (ed) 1972 *Advances in the Sociology of Language Vol II: Selected Studies and Applications*, The Hague: Mouton & Co.

— 1972 'National languages of wider communication in the developing nations (1969)', in A. S. Dil (ed) *Language in Sociocultural Change: Essays by Joshua A. Fishman*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Fishman, J. A., Conrad, A. W. and Rubal-Lopez, A. (eds) 1996 *Post-Imperial English: Status Change in Former British and American Colonies, 1940-1990* Berlin: Mouton De Gruyter.

Fishman, J. A., Ferguson, C. A. and Das Gupta, J. (eds) 1968 *Language Problems of Developing Nations*, New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Freire, P. 1970 *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, London: Penguin.

Godfrey, M., Chan, S., Kato, T., Long Vou, P., Dorina, P., Tep, S., Tia, S. and Chea, V. 2000 *Technical Assistance and Capacity Development in an Aid-Dependent Economy: The Experience of Cambodia CDRI Working Paper 15*, Phnom Penh: Cambodia Development Research Institute.

Grant, M. 2000 *Bamboo and Barbed Wire: Eight years as a volunteer in a refugee camp*, Mandrake, WA: DP Publishing.

Hansard 2000 'Written answers to Questions', 9 Nov 2000 : Column: 373W, Hansard, <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmhansrd/vo001109/text/01109w16.htm>.

Heininger, J. E. 1994 *Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in Cambodia*, New York: Twentieth Century Fund.

Holborow, M. 1999 *The Politics of English: A Marxist View of Language*, London: Sage.

Institute of Policy Studies of Singapore & The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (IPSS/UNITR) 1995 *The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC): Debriefing and Lessons Report of the 1994 Singapore Conference*, London: Kluwer Law.

Klugman, J. (ed) 2002 *A Sourcebook for Poverty Reduction Strategies*, Washington: World Bank.

Livingston, C. 1996 *Gecko Tails: Journey Through Cambodia*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Lon, N. 2001 'Cambodia's students flock to learn English' *Phnom Penh Post*, 10/19 Edition, Phnom Penh.

Lynch, J. F. 1989 *Border Khmer: A Demographic Study of the Residents of Site 2, Site B, and Site 8*, Joint Voluntary Agency/Ford Foundation.

McAndrew, J. P. 1996 *Aid Infusions, Aid Illusions: Bilateral and Multilateral Emergency and DEvelopment Assistance in Cambodia, 1992-1995*, Phnom Penh: Cambodia Development Resource Institute.

MoEYS 1996 *Survey of English Language Teaching in Secondary Schools*, Phnom Penh, MoEYS.

— 2000a *Report on the Assesment of the Functional Literacy Levels of the Adult Population in Cambodia*, Phnom Penh, MOEYS/UNDP/UNESCO.

— 2000b 'Strategic Analysis Chapter 10: Non-formal Education and Literacy Situation Analysis', Vol. 2003: MoEYS.

— 2005 'Education Statistics and Indicators 2004/2005': Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport.

— 2007 'Education Statistics and Indicators 2004/2005': Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport.

Mysliwiec, E. 1988 *Punishing The Poor: The International Isolation Of Kampuchea*, Oxford: OXFAM.

Oats, W. 1994 *I Could Cry For These People: An Australian Quaker Response to the Plight of the People of Cambodia, 1979-1993*, Hobart: Quaker Service Australia.

Pennycook, A. 1994 *The Cultural Politics of English as an International Language*, London: Longman.

Phillipson, R. 1992 *Linguistic Imperialism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

— 1994 'English language spread policy', *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*(107): 7-24.

— 1997 'Realities and myths of linguistic imperialism', *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 18(3): 238-248.

— 2001 'English for globalisation or for the world's people?' *International Review of Education* 47(3-4): 185-200.

Reay, D. and Lucey, H. 2003 'The Limits of `Choice': Children and Inner City Schooling', *Sociology* 37(1): 121-142.

Rosenbloom, J. 2004 *Adult Literacy in Cambodia: Research Report*, Phnom Penh, Pact Cambodia, www.pactcambodia.org/Publications/WORTH_Education/Adult_Literacy_in_Cambodia.pdf

Shawcross, W. 1984 *The Quality of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust and Modern Conscience*, Bangkok: DD Books.

Suenobu, Y. 1995 *Management of Education Systems in Zones of conflict-Relief Operations: A Case-Study in Thailand*, Bangkok, UNESCO.

Taylor, G. 1995 *Management Plan For English Language Teaching In Cambodia*, Phnom Penh, Cambodian Secondary English Language Project.

United Nations 1995 *The United Nations and Cambodia 1991-1995*, New York: United Nations.

— 1996 *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping 3rd Edn*, 3rd Edition, New York: United Nations.

Weisbrot, M., Baker, D., Kraev, E. & Chen, J. (2002) The scorecard on globalization 1980-2000: its consequences for economic and social well-being, *International Journal of Health Services*, 32(2), 229-53

Williams, B. 1997 'Returning home: the repatriation of Cambodian refugees', in M. W. Doyle, I. Johnstone and R. C. Orr (eds) *Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.