

PURSUING NATIONAL LEADERSHIP IN THE MEDITERRANEAN:

Spanish and French European Policy since 1995

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By

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ABSTRACT

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The Mediterranean is a complex area where many interests converge. For long, France has been the leading actor in Euro-Mediterranean policies. However, since the 1990's, this privileged position has been challenged with the emergence of a 'new' member-state with entrepreneurial ambitions: Spain. What kind of entrepreneurial action has been undertaken by France and Spain and under what conditions? To what extent have these two key Mediterranean policy actors been able to collaborate? This thesis analyses the strategies of Paris and Madrid in relation to European foreign policy-making towards the Mediterranean in their attempt to focus more attention on the south.

The comparative method adopted in this research presents the role played by France and Spain in projecting their national preferences onto European foreign policy-making towards the Mediterranean. During the Barcelona Process, Madrid played a more significant role than Paris and Spain emerged as an important regional partner with capacity to influence European policy by adopting a collaborative role with other partners and the European Commission, although not without certain contradictions during the different governments of Felipe González, José María Aznar and José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero.

France's role in the Mediterranean, however, has gone through different approaches: the government of Chirac adopted a new regional strategy based on a return to the Arab Policy of France which entailed a reorientation of French strategy with the Barcelona Process becoming a secondary interest. The change of incumbents at the head of the French government again put the focus on the Mediterranean under Sarkozy with a new controversial proposal that, initially, left out the European Union, and represented a new 'leadership' style. Although, there has been 'continuity' in the

different strategies of the Elysée towards the Mediterranean, in the sense that all governments have given great attention to the inland sea, the focus differed greatly under Chirac and Sarkozy.

This thesis argues that the Barcelona Process meant the consolidation of a 'tandemship' or duo between Paris and Madrid that has gone through different phases from 1995 to nowadays.

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In loving memory,

Every single word is for them.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AECI	Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional
BP	Barcelona Process
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
COREPER	Committee of Permanent Representatives
CSCM	Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean
DG	Directorate General
EaP	Eastern Partnership
EC	European Community
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
EIB	European Investment Bank
EMP: BP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Barcelona Process
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
EP	European Parliament
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EuroMesCo	Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission
FEMISE	Forum Euro-méditerranéen des Instituts de Sciences Economiques
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GMP	Global Mediterranean Policy
HDR	Human Development Report
IMA	Institut du Monde Arabe
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
MAEC	Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación (Spain)

MAEE	Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et Européennes
MEDA	Mesures d'Accompagnement
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MPCs	Mediterranean Partner Countries
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PHARE	Poland and Hungary Aid for the Reconstruction of the Economy
UfM	Union for the Mediterranean
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
WEU	Western Europea Union

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The conception of the nation-state meant the reorganisation of world politics. The concepts of power and influence were attached to this new entity and, since then, we have witnessed several theories that have explored their relationship. Nowadays, however, many scholars have suggested that the state is losing its relevance, and new actors have emerged in the international arena. This development adds complexity to current understandings of international relations; but, at the same time, this change enriches contemporary theoretical debates. Trends occurring in regionalisation, multilateralism, and cooperation are in the news day in, day out, with the aim to provide a better explanation of the current situation.

The creation of the European Union (EU) added new elements to the study of foreign policy. This new entity challenged some assumptions about world configuration, the role of the state and its interests, and the processes of projecting influence. New debates were introduced to explain the path to European integration. Some discussions were based on the centrality of European institutions, and put forth a multi-layered approach; others focused upon how EU member states adopted a state-centric interpretation of integration. After all, the European Union represented a new international body that did not fit well with the expectations of the realist theory of international relations. Today, there is a broad literature base that analyses the foundation of the EU and its impact in the areas of political organisation, including foreign policy.

Over half a century later, the European Union seeks to become an important actor *per se* and, in so doing, the position of the state is questioned; at the very least, the role of the state is being reconsidered. Are we witnessing the end of the nation-state? I suggest otherwise. The nation-state is still the main actor in international politics and, given the current global structure where multiple entities play a relevant role in decision-making, states have found new ways to exercise their traditional influence: to

adapt or die. This research acknowledges the role of the European institutions. The Euro-Mediterranean policies are a mix of multilateral and bilateral relations that are institutionalised at several levels. For instance, France and Spain are part of the European Union, and their actions at European institutional level have an impact upon their Mediterranean policies. More recently, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) has been also institutionalised; as a result, it is not possible to reduce the role of the institutions to be mere spectators. I aimed to develop a theoretical framework that recognises the importance of both entities.

This research will set the framework for comparing the national strategies of Spain and France regarding Euro-Mediterranean relations, and will show the input of both states in the development of Euro-Mediterranean policy since 1995. The central argument will be that Euro-Mediterranean policies are rationally used by France and Spain to project influence within the European Union and, conversely, that they benefit from their position within the EU to pursue their national interests in the Mediterranean.¹ Thus, region-building has become a strategy and not only a geographical context that member states use to enhance their influence. If world politics is increasingly complex, the states are trying to place themselves within these regional structures to gain or, at least, not to lose their importance in the international system.

The race to become dominant actors ironically entails greater collaboration between France and Spain, and both states are “forced” to set aside their rivalry in order to maintain a pro-Mediterranean commitment inside the EU. In a European context, where multiple actors can influence the development of Mediterranean policies, France and Spain have seen how their regional influence has been jeopardised by new actors. In addition, the Eastern EU enlargement that falls largely under German influence receives European attention, and southern European countries perceive this as a risk that may unbalance the regional resource distribution and the Franco-German

¹ In this sense, national interest, also known as *raison d’Etat*, is the country’s ambitions in any policy area and is at the core of international relations theories. States, as autonomous actors, seek the maximisation of their own objectives in the international arena, and foreign policy is designed to achieve these goals and protect the state’s interest. All areas of international politics are part of the strategic interest of the states: economy, culture, security, etc. The realist school, as presented later in this thesis, relies heavily on the importance of national interests for explaining the international configuration (Krasner, 2003; Hyde-Price, 2007; Gilpin, 2006).

axis. As a result, this thesis will argue that France and Spain are doomed to leave behind their potential rivalry and work together in order to maintain their weight within the Union and within the Mediterranean.

In light of the above, this research attempts to answer one main question: are France and Spain key EU regional players capable of exerting sufficient leadership to produce policy change? Following this central question, the thesis also raises four sub-questions: (1) how consistent has each country been in their Mediterranean strategies, (2) how has this affected each country's policy-making effectiveness? (3) how often and how do France and Spain cooperate? and, finally, (4) what kind of leadership is exerted by these two countries? This thesis intends to document France and Spain's actions, analysing how these countries have projected their national preferences in the European Union to encourage greater EU involvement in the Mediterranean. In order to accomplish this objective, this study will take an in-depth look at the processes involved in leadership, influence and the use of resources. The aim is to present a comparative research study that will show the degree of effectiveness of Paris and Madrid in the specific case of the Mediterranean.

While the EU's eastern borders are far from being fixed and further enlargement may well take place, there is a clear delimitation of the southern border. Morocco discovered this when it applied to the European Community for membership in 1987, and was turned down based on the argument that Morocco is not in Europe. As an alternative to admission, southern European members have put in place throughout the years initiatives such as the 5+5 Dialogue, the Barcelona Process (or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership), the Neighbourhood Policy of the European Union, the Alliance of Civilizations, multilateral dialogues framed under the OSCE or NATO and, more recently, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).

The main focus of the thesis will be the different efforts of France and Spain to exert influence over the *Mare Nostrum* within the Mediterranean policy of the European Union. Different Mediterranean initiatives have been developed ever since European Communities were created in 1957; however, the context, the degree of involvement and collaboration between Paris and Madrid have been different with each

proposition. This research will focus on events at European level that have been taken place from 1995 when the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was first launched, focusing on the foreign ministers conferences and the Euro-Mediterranean summits where I will try to identify issues of strategy and high politics that led to introduction of a new policy orientation.

Six moments of Euro-Mediterranean policy will be analysed: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership launched in Barcelona in 1995, which in turn is also the initiative that has lasted longest so far (from 1995 to 2008), the Paris summit that took place in the French capital in 2008 and that substituted the Barcelona Process, the Marseille Ministerial conference of 2000, the Valencia Ministerial conference of 2002 and the Barcelona conference of 2005, all of them in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and, finally, the 2nd UfM summit of Heads of State that never took place and was finally cancelled.

Chart 1 – Hypothesis and its conditions

	Policy window	Broker -entrepreneur	Collaboration
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (1995)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> France & Spain	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
The Paris Summit (2008)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> France	Coordination
The Marseille Ministerial Conference (2000)			Coordination
The Valencia Ministerial Conference (2002)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Spain	Coordination
The Barcelona+10 Summit (2005)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Spain	Coordination
The 2 nd Summit UfM (Cancelled)		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> France & Spain	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

The argument that will be developed is that when 3 elements converge, it is possible to introduce policy modifications successfully that last in time (see next section). These conditions, the existence of a policy window, a high involvement on the part of a national actor (in this case, France or Spain), and close collaboration between the two of them, have to exist in order for them to project influence in an effective way. In the thesis, these conditions will be presented in the different events listed above, and will be tested to see whether the hypothesis is valid or not.

Although the Mediterranean is one of the priorities of the European Union, in the case of France and Spain, the importance of the Mediterranean is much more obvious. Both countries have a long history in this area, and their geopolitical situation is a determining factor in their foreign policy-making. Therefore, both of them have set a foreign policy structure that concedes great resources to this area, having specific institutions to strengthen their presence in the Mediterranean. They may collaborate or be part of other initiatives outside the ones of the European Union, but this research will leave aside other frameworks and actors and will be mainly focused in the Mediterranean policies of France and Spain within the European Union.

In academia, the Mediterranean has been the subject of numerous studies in Spain and France, focusing in particular on the Maghreb and the Middle East. However, few studies have comparatively analysed Spanish and French foreign policies from a strategic perspective. This is especially visible in the case of foreign policy input in the European Union. Although many scholars attempt to highlight the role of the two countries in the Mediterranean, a review of the literature does not show any comparative research that tries to conceptualise the different leadership and input of Madrid and Paris. When done, such studies take more of a European regional formulation perspective. There is little research in comparative terms, resulting in the accumulation of broad-based studies of the Mediterranean focused on politics of the European Union, France, or Spain alone, and rarely tackling the controversial question of the interests that both states might have to become the dominant southern European voice.

1.1 OBJECTIVES AND INITIAL HYPOTHESES

In view of what has been presented, this thesis has one principle objective and two secondary ones. The central objective is to compare France and Spain's policy-making efforts and their resources allocated to such efforts by looking at the foreign policies of the different governments of France and Spain since 1995. As mentioned, few comparative studies on France and Spain's role in the Mediterranean have been published in the last decade. In recent years, many scholars have analysed the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, or the Mediterranean from the perspective of France and Spain on particular issues. A comparative approach, especially since 1995, is yet to be seen.

Turning now to the secondary objectives, the first is to present the way France and Spain project influence in the Mediterranean and the European Union. By adopting a comparative approach, I will try to shed light on the strategies used by Paris and Madrid when addressing the Euro-Mediterranean foreign policy. To what extent do they use bilateral strategies as opposed to multilateral approaches? As this is a very wide topic, I will focus on the strategies carried out by the two countries to push forward Euro-Mediterranean relations and to develop such policies once they are in place. I will limit the strategies to the domain of institutionalised Euro-Mediterranean framework, though I shall include some references to how bilateral relations are exploited for this purpose. The other secondary objective is to analyse France and Spain's styles of leadership in the European Union. In other words, to what extent can leadership on the part of an individual country be effectively realised, and what forms does such leadership take? Leadership may also entail the capacity to support coalitions and build influential relationships to achieve certain common objectives.

By addressing how France and Spain act regarding Euro-Mediterranean relations, and by comparing these two countries, this thesis seeks to understand what actors and conditions are necessary to produce a policy reorientation. At this point, it is possible to formulate one main hypothesis that has 3 conditions linked to it. The core hypothesis of this research is that it is largely individual states that drive the development of the Mediterranean policy of the European Union. The central claim is that since 1990, when three elements of national and European foreign policy

converge, the Mediterranean policy of the European Union has progressed. These elements have roots in the national strategies of France and Spain, mainly, and to a lesser extent, in other Mediterranean partners. The three elements may be presented as follows:

1. The existence of a policy window both at national (France and Spain) and international levels (European Union, the Mediterranean and the Middle East)
2. A national actor, namely France or Spain, that is capable of exercising the role of leadership under the formula of broker entrepreneur, or “tandemship”
3. A close collaboration and division of roles between Madrid and Paris

Regarding the first condition, a window of opportunity occurs when there is a favourable structural condition for implementing or pushing toward a new policy initiative. Such opportunities may not necessarily be favourable. The ‘9/11’ attacks had terrible consequences for the international system, but served as the starting point to rejuvenate the Barcelona Process. For Bicchi, cognitive uncertainty is the engine that forces an actor to react, and it is “the key reason why member states are prepared to discuss a topic at the European level is that they “puzzle” and they need to find new ways to address domestic issues. (...)” (Bicchi, 2007: 20). However, opportunity requires leadership. This is why these three pre-conditions need to coincide in order to produce successful results.

The 2nd condition is slightly controversial. It is widely agreed upon that France has more resources than Spain. Therefore, the first problem is how Spain can be effectively compared to France. One may think that despite the effectiveness that Spanish diplomats have shown in recent years to increase the weight of Madrid, French international strategies are still more effective than the Spanish strategies due to France’s traditionally strong bilateral efforts and further resources at a multilateral level. French tradition, resources, and weight in the European Union and in the Mediterranean are difficult to match. However, I argue otherwise. Influence is based on actions and perceptions. Spain has greatly benefited from its adhesion to the

European Union and late economic, political and social development, and its well-known pro-European attitude may represent an asset difficult to counteract in some areas where Paris encounters difficulties when trying to overcome its history, tradition, or even clichés in its international behaviour. Tradition has a positive but also a negative counterpart in the French international psyche. The most individualistic realist approach has always been linked to French diplomacy. Such approaches tend to raise suspicions among the rest of France's international partners every time that France attempts to adopt a more proactive role. On the other hand, this has also given France a certain credibility and *savoir faire* when dealing with complicated issues that need to be addressed in a more direct way, as it is widely viewed as an effective and influential interlocutor.

The third and last condition is that France and Spain seem to be doomed to rivalry at the regional level, as both countries share the same objectives. However, the race to become the dominant influence might entail a paradoxical consequence: a greater collaboration between the two countries. A shared position, or at least effective cooperation between Madrid and Paris, might occur in order to maintain the pro-Mediterranean impulse inside the European Union. I argue that, nowadays, there is no space for hegemony or single leadership in the Mediterranean. No country of the European Union (or the Mediterranean) can exercise a traditional use of force or resources. Therefore, multiple leaders or entrepreneurs may coexist, collaborate or exchange roles depending on the topic and the situation, and may be influenced as well by actors not necessarily from within the Mediterranean region.

The aforementioned elements are formulated as statements rather than as questions. This means that throughout this project, I will test if these assertions are valid or not. Whatever the outcome, the results would be useful because they will confirm the alternative hypotheses, which will also provide useful information that may inform future studies.

1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW

This study analyses the input of France and Spain into the Mediterranean policies of the European Union. The research can be placed in the area of Euro-Mediterranean

studies, foreign policy of EU member states and national foreign policies in Europe. The aim of this literature review is to identify and assess those existing works that contribute to the explanation of the Euro-Med policies, and especially those who have covered the role of France and Spain since 1995. Paris and Madrid have made major contributions to the development of Mediterranean policies, but few works have analysed in depth their inputs from a comparative perspective and focused on the competition/collaboration dynamics. Further coverage on power and leadership, coalition building and international relations debates will be addressed separately within the theoretical framework for it is in that section where I set out the assumptions and approach upon which this thesis will be built.

This thesis has greatly benefited from a proliferation of works on the Mediterranean policy, especially after the launch of the Barcelona Process. Several academic journals focusing on Mediterranean studies have been created since 1995. *Mediterranean Politics*, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, *Maghreb-Machrek* and *The Journal of Southern Europe and Balkans* are just some examples. In addition, a number of thematic think tanks and academic networks have contributed with research and publications to the field. The *Institut Europeu de la Mediterrània* (IEMed), the *Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission* (EuroMeSCo) and the *Institut de prospective économique du monde méditerranéen* (IPEMED) are, today, active organisations.

The scholarly literature on Euro-Mediterranean foreign policy has dealt with the process that led Europe to develop a regional Mediterranean policy. Authors like Bicchi (2007), Gomez (2003) and Adler *et al.* (2006) provide a theoretically-founded explanation of the causes for the regional construction of the Mediterranean. All of these works provide valuable background and coverage of the European foreign policy (EFP) towards the EU southern border. They provide an insight about the institutions highlighting some of the contributions of the different actors. Gomez's and Bicchi's volume have been particularly useful for both of them offer a detailed and rigorous analysis of the policy-making until the Barcelona Process was launched. My research draws from Bicchi's work *European foreign policy-making towards the Mediterranean* (2007) for she has analysed what external conditions have given rise to European interest in the Mediterranean, and the process by which individual actors have

managed to influence the EU Mediterranean policy agenda. For the author, European foreign policy formulation “is first and foremost an ideational process in which member states and EC/EU institutions converge towards a common definition of a problems, policy solutions and the EU/EU’s role in them” (Bicchi, 2007: 9). This convergence happens as a result of a policy window based on policy uncertainty and the existence of an entrepreneurship action that brings further European integration in a process of collective construction.

This collective construction of the Euro-Mediterranean policies is also shared by Adler *et al.* (2006) who adopt a normative approach that examines the prospects of cooperative security practices and region-building focused on the Mediterranean. By developing a common European identity, the EU has advanced towards further integration and Adler’s team consider the potential for a similar region-building process in Europe’s southern neighbourhood. Yet as the authors point out, “we must be careful, however, not to push the generalization potential of the European case too far. Conditions in Europe may not be replicable elsewhere, (...) and we also must be aware of the huge obstacles that Mediterranean integration effort face and will continue to face” (Adler *et al.*, 2006: 18). Gomez, on the other hand, offers a detailed analysis of the conception and evolution of the EMP and the negotiation that led to the signature of the Barcelona Process based on a European strategic action that is limited by the member states but that has developed a capacity to formulate strategic objectives and possess a set of interests (Gomez 2003, 14).

My thesis draws from these authors in several areas like Bicchi’s identification of the factors that led to a new policy introduction, or Gomez’s strategic action conceptualization, but I adopt a rational choice approach focused on the centrality of the member states as main actors for international policy introduction and their capacity to influence European institutions and create Mediterranean initiatives shaped according to their preferences (see later in this chapter).

The initiatives covered in this research, the Barcelona Process and the Union for the Mediterranean, have been widely analysed. Several scholars pointed out structural problems of the EMP at an early stage that have provided useful background for

studying the role and weight of member states vis-a-vis the institutions. Some authors have made a critical analysis of the institutional design of Euro-Mediterranean frameworks. Johansson-Nogués (2003) examines in depth the institutional configuration of the UfM when it was in its infancy, and Philippart (2003) presents the institutional body of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership from a critical perspective, pointing out that the Barcelona Process is not a real Partnership. Joffé (1997) and Monar (1998) explain the constraints that have affected the good development of the EMP, especially the influence that member states have exerted within this initiative.

Other academic contributions are centered on the challenging geo-political context in which multilateral initiatives have been undertaken. Calleya (2009) sees as problematic the asymmetries existing in the Mediterranean that make it difficult to work towards further integration in the way that the EMP or the UfM would like. Aliboni (2009), on the other hand, observes that the UfM has changed some problems for others, like the paralyzes brought by the concept of co-ownership and the alienation of northern countries as a result of the distribution of roles within the UfM. In this sense, Barbé's (2009) paper provided an excellent analysis when the UfM was not yet fully implemented and few information was available for the academics; and Soler i Lecha presented how the negotiations to establish the UfM were conducted, explaining some of the actions carried out by the French diplomacy (Soler i Lecha, 2008, 2009).

Several authors of different specialties evaluate the role played by France and Spain. The work of Gillespie has been particularly useful in this research for he has a comprehensive approach to the entrepreneurship action adopted by Spain since the conception of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to nowadays. Gillespie's analyses of the Spanish role within the EMP (Gillespie, 1997, 1999, 2006), the adaptation to the UfM (Gillespie, 2011b) and the regional consequences of a certain institutional design (the UfM co-ownership and institutionalism framework) have helped to explain the entrepreneurship style of Spain from the Barcelona Process to the UfM. The Spanish entrepreneurship role has also been analysed in detail in Barbé's research. This role and the negotiations that preceded the Barcelona Conference of 1995 have been extensively covered in several of her works, including the complicated negotiations to arrive at an agreement over the Barcelona Declaration (Barbé, 1996b), the

Europeanisation of the Mediterranean policy (Barbé, 2000) and the progressive evolution of the Spanish approach to the EU institutions (Barbé, 1996).

Since I am analysing the capacities of Spain and France to project influence, understanding the institutional design of the foreign ministry of each country and the resources available to support Mediterranean diplomacy was of real value. Hernando de Larramendi and Mañé present in their book *La política exterior española hacia el Magreb, actores e intereses* (2009) a critical review of the Spanish institutions and other non-state actors that contribute to build the Spanish foreign presence in the Mediterranean. However, understanding Spanish capabilities requires a wider perspective which is not offered in Hernando de Larramendi and Mañé's work, which is too limited in scope for their book focus only in the Maghreb. Sanz's research, also from a critical perspective, provides a detailed insight of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs from a broader geographical external relations, including data like the number of diplomats or the institutional network (Sanz, 2011), and Molina and Sorroza (2012) complete the picture by focusing in the Spanish presence in the new European External Action Service (EEAS) where they explain the evolution that went from a disappointing distribution of roles to a progressive acquisition of senior post in the new European agency.

One area where there is not much specific literature is the Spanish rotating EU presidency of 1995. Morata and Fernández Pasarín's paper (2002) "*The Spanish Presidencies of 1989, 1995 and 2002: from commitment to reluctance toward European integration*", present a comparative evolution of the three Spanish presidencies up to 2002 (altogether Spain has had four). In this work they explain the evolution of the Spanish role that progressively was adopting a more pragmatic approach. Ruiz Tartás's paper "*la Présidence du Conseil de l'Union Européenne et la deuxième Présidence espagnole*" (1995), on the other hand, is less analytical and more technical, and it only partially addresses the rotating Presidency for it was wrote before the semester ended. There are other contributions on Spain's European position analysed from a historic perspective, such as Powell's work on Spanish membership of the European Union (Powell, 2002). Nevertheless, the lack of academic attention to the Presidency is also visible in the Spanish PhD thesis database Teseo

where Fernández Pasarín's dissertation (2005) is the only thesis that appears.² This does not mean that other theses have not addressed this subject, but does mean that the topic has been secondary. In contrast, the Presidency of 1995 has received more academic consideration in relation to both Mediterranean Policy and the negotiations that preceded the Barcelona Conference (Gomez, 2003 / Gillespie, 1997 / Barbé, 1996).

Turning now to France, one of the main books that study French leadership in the Mediterranean is *La politique Méditerranéenne de la France: entre diplomatie collective et leadership* (Chérigui, 1997, 2000) This is, perhaps, one of the most comprehensive research works on French Mediterranean leadership, although it hardly covers the road to the Barcelona Process and it does not introduce sufficiently the actors that are Paris' potential regional competitors. Nevertheless, the conceptualisation of the Arab and French Mediterranean policy contains a thoughtful interpretation that was largely confirmed in my own interviews. Dorothee Schmid (2009) and Jean-Robert Henry (2009) are other authors that discuss the distinction between Arab Policy and Mediterranean policy, although they rely on Chérigui's work as well and do not introduce much theorisation about the different policies. While Chérigui situates the origins of French Mediterranean policy in Mitterrand's government, Rubio Plo (2008) provides a French Mediterraneanist vision that goes back to 1945 in a memorandum sent by Kojève to De Gaulle. Rubio Plo's historical overview that he links to the current Union for the Mediterranean provides an explanation that helps to understand French leadership role in the region.

The analysis of the French leadership style is also examined in the works of Lequesne (2008), Schmid (2005, 2009), Mohsen-Finan (2008) and Vaïsse (2009). Filiu (2013, in Lequesne and Vaïsse 2013) analyses the role of Chirac and his change to the Arab Mediterranean Policy of France, although he does not consider the relevance of this for the Barcelona Process and the multilateral Mediterranean strategy. Sarkozy's high activity during the rotating presidency of 2008 and the way the French President introduced the initiative prompted several works. Lequesne or Král (2009) are particularly critical of the EU rotating presidential semester, accusing the French President of being too active, duplicating the activity of other EU actors. Lequesne,

² Research carried out in July 2013

however, points out that this style may have helped when dealing with the several crises of this EU presidential semester. Schmid and Mohsen-Finan's works address the French conception of the Mediterranean and Sarkozy's desire to return France to a leading position in Mediterranean regional building.

Vaïsse, on the other hand, with his historical and institutional perspective, explains the evolution of France and the domestic institutional changes, such as the role of the Elysée and the influence and impact that the President has in the foreign policy-making of France. Reviewing the recent history, Vaïsse (2009) attempts to answer the question about France's role: [France] *La puissance ou l'influence?* This question reflects a French concern that has been present in the French literature for a long time now and which has introduced the concept of *déclinologie*, addressed in chapter 4.

1.3 FINDING A THEORY FOR A WORLD OF VARIABLE GEOMETRY

In order to prove or discard the main hypothesis and its conditions, I will explore some elements of international relations theories in relation to current debates. Then, a few particular elements will be considered. These are: the notions of region-building, especially in the Mediterranean, where I will define which approach on regional building will be applied in this thesis; the role of the state and the decision-making, which will engage with the current paradigms in International Relations (IR); and, finally, the concept of power and leadership in International Relations that will set the basis for the roles of France and Spain in Euro-Mediterranean foreign policy-making.

1.3.1 IS THE MEDITERRANEAN A REGION?

During the last century, we have witnessed the rise of a bipolar world in International Relations and a posterior reconfiguration. When the Berlin wall fell in 1991, it meant the beginning of a new international system that put an end to a bipolar distribution of power. The consequence was a new world where multiple actors had a voice, new institutions were created and there was a progressive trend to regionalisation. This brought new elements of analysis into the field of IR.

Consequently, there is a tendency, particularly from the liberal and constructivist theorists, to claim that the state is no longer the main actor in International Relations.

However, many scholars, particularly in the USA, still defend the centrality of the state in world politics, although they acknowledge the existence of other actors. Much of this literature focuses on the adaptation of the state to the new international situation (Jessop, 2002; Jones, 2006). Jessops and Jones deny the dissolution of this form of political organisation, where geography still matters. As Krasner points out, “those who claim the death of sovereignty misread history. The nation-state has a keen instinct for survival and has so far adapted to new challenges – even the challenge of globalisation” (Krasner, 2003: 139). The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is a good example of the state adaptation, where member states introduced new measures of controlling the Commission when negotiating the Association Agreements. Another example is the Union for the Mediterranean itself, where it is possible to observe the evolution from a European initiative towards an intergovernmental framework of negotiation.

On the other hand, the study of different regions has become a central issue in IR. Although the literature is broad, there is still no widely accepted definition of what a region is (Fawn, 2009: 10; Mansfield, Milner, 1999: 590). Several components are commonly accepted. For some scholars, geography is the main feature that identifies a region, although others argue that it is much more than just the delimitation of the land. However, as Hurrell states, “without some geographical limits the term ‘regionalism’ becomes diffuse and unmanageable” (Hurrell, 1995: 38). It is clear that a region cannot be defined just in geographical terms, and some other features should be included: cooperation among their members; a self-perception or identity, although it might be just in economic or cultural terms; conflict prevention mechanisms; and finally, some degree of institutionalisation. Institutionalism may be considered as a “later stage of a region’s progression” (Fawn, 2009: 19). For some other scholars, regions can also be the result of an exerted political leadership (Keating, Hoogue, 2001: 240).

The definition of region that will be applied in this research will greatly rely on Cantori and Spiegel’s work (1970), for the distinction that the authors concede to the core, the periphery and the intrusive system, which is useful to analyse the role of France and

Spain in this research (Cantori, Spiegel, 1970: 20-27).³ Despite the years that have passed since they formulated their understanding of regions, their definition is surprisingly up-to-date when put in the context of the Mediterranean. Cantori and Spiegel

Consider regions to be areas of the world which contain geographically proximate states forming, in foreign affairs, mutually interrelated units. For each participant, the activities of other members of the region (be they antagonistic or cooperative) are significant determinants of its foreign policy; while particular members or certain regions may have extraregional concerns, their primary involvement in foreign affairs ordinarily lies in the region in which they find themselves. Under normal conditions, they cannot accomplish successes elsewhere until they have achieved and are able to maintain a permanent position in their own area" (Cantori, Spiegel, 1970: 1).

Having said that, two questions might be raised: Are the European Union and the Mediterranean regions? And if so, what are the positions of France and Spain in them? There is little doubt that Europe is a region. Any project on regionalism and regionalisation uses the European Union as an example. Europe has a long history, delimited territory⁴ and, above all, the will of being a single regional unit. Other different units compose Europe but these (sub) regions coexist harmoniously with the one that includes them all. The Mediterranean, on the other hand, is more difficult to define. It has a clear space delimitation, but, as mentioned above, geography *per se* is not enough. Regarding issues such as economies or cultural identities, there are traces of every single country; yet, the degree of cohesion, cooperation, identity or assimilation is debatable. If the Mediterranean has the raw material, it evidently lacks the will of being.

³ The core is composed by the central states in the region, but they accept the fact that it is possible for more than one core sector to exist. The rest of the states of the given region compose the periphery. Their isolation might be due to several causes, not only geographical. Finally, the intrusive system is the influence of external states in the given region.

⁴ Although in political and cultural terms, there is a strong debate on the limits of Europe in its Eastern part.

Some of the many faces of the Mediterranean are represented in the differentiation between Maghreb and Mashreq, North Africa, Western and Eastern Mediterranean, and North or South Mediterranean, among others. There are too many different entities that lack an apparent hierarchy. In other words, the Mediterranean is a sea with many shores, as shown in *Navigating Regional Dynamics in the Post-Cold War World: Patterns of Regions in the Mediterranean Area* (Calleya, 1997) or “Normative power: the European practice of region-building an the case of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” (Adler, Crawford, 2004). Nevertheless, some other authors like Fernand Braudel describe the single entity of the *Mare Nostrum*. However, he also asserts that the Mediterranean is not one sea but many. In Braudel’s opinion, the interconnection among the countries, based upon not only social factors but also on geography, makes the Mediterranean a unique system, despite it being not only a civilization but civilizations mounted one on top of another (Braudel, 1997: 11). Regarding Europe, although there were several previous attempts to develop the Barcelona Process, none of the previous initiatives had a coherent concept of regionalisation. It may be argued that “European state-driven region-building in the Mediterranean began in Barcelona in November 1995 when the EU’s member states signed the Euro-Mediterranean policy” (Jones, 2006: 420). France adopted the Mediterranean notion very recently (Chérigui, 1997), and before its European adhesion, Spain had positive relations with the Mediterranean Arab countries, but they were not as clearly ‘labelled’ with the rest of the Mediterranean partners, not to mention the lack of recognition of Israel.

For the purposes of this research, however, I will consider the Mediterranean as a single entity for two main reasons mainly related to foreign policy considerations. First, both France and Spain currently have a well-established and institutionalised Mediterranean policy. They both address the Mediterranean as a continuum, although their involvement in the Western Mediterranean may be more accentuated due to historical events. When and how both countries defined their Mediterranean policies is different but, nowadays, France and Spain regard the *Mare Nostrum* as a single space. Second, this same consideration might be extended to the European Union, for whom “international region-building has become one of the critical ways in which the

EU seeks to define itself as much as order its relations with the outside world” (Jones, 2006: 420). The EU Mediterranean policy is part of this strategy.

Regarding the second question—the position of France and Spain in the two regions—this also depends on several issues. Generally speaking, France would be located in the core of the two regions, and Spain would find its place in the core of the Mediterranean and in the periphery of the European Union. However, if there is little doubt of the relevance of France in Europe, since German unification and the eastward EU enlargement France has been losing its political and geographical centrality. Nowadays, the centre of Europe seems to be in Berlin rather than in Paris. In a Europe of 28, France has more limitations, and this is perceived and acknowledged not just internally but also externally (Brzezinski, 1997). Despite this, without French support, it is very unlikely that any initiative, either European or Mediterranean, can be realised.

It is more difficult to establish the international status of Spain. Its position in the world is dependent upon its position in Europe much more so than France. In terms of geography, its peripheral place determines when and where to set its priorities in foreign policy: Europe, Latin America and the Mediterranean (Barbé, Mestres, Soler i Lecha, 2007: 36). European policy in Eastern Europe is not (yet) a national priority. Thus, on some issues, Spain is at the core of the European Union for its role in other areas such as Latin America, or in issues such as immigration. Nonetheless, Spain still needs more influence in other regions and on other issues in order to become a more relevant power. Also, during the 1990s, Spain had a European weight that, in light of the new European configuration and in the current context of crisis, has been eroded, showing greater international limitations than in the past. Thus, as defined by Cantori and Spiegel, Spain has the potential to be at the core of Europe, yet still it is not. Spain’s strategy, therefore, will be different. France attempts to keep its position in the core, whilst Spain seeks to obtain a much more important role.

1.3.2 WHY STATES, AND MEMBER STATES MATTER IN DECISION-MAKING

In the past, the realist theory of international relations was the one that provided answers about how the international world functioned. Liberalism, first proposed by

Keohane and Nye in 1977, also had enough support among those who saw the work through different lenses. Nevertheless, several events, among them the end of the Cold War, introduced new ways of thought although none of these new theories have been able to completely replace liberalism and realism. Yet realism is no longer the only rational approach that explains the international arena. In an international context, realism evolved to a new theoretical reformulation, neo-realism, which includes a systemic approach rather than one embracing separate units, and it paved the way to increase the dialogue among different schools of thought (Salomon, 2002).

A general overview of the assumptions of realism is that states are the main actors that play in a world which is anarchic by nature, and where states try to maximize their leading position, depending on the distribution of power in the international system. There may be relatively more emphasis on the states, community, or individuals depending on the structural (also called neo-realist) or classical subdivisions (Dunne, 2007),⁵ but the centrality of the state is the key to understand this debate. On the other hand, constructivism and liberal institutionalism argue that there are many other actors playing in the international system. Constructivism includes actors from NGOs or any other international organisations. Institutionalists, however, emphasise more international institutions and regimes in a broader conception of institutions. For instance, it acknowledges that not all institutions had to have physical headquarters and staff, and that today several norms or rules that guide states' behaviour exist (Milner, Moravcsik, 2009, 6). For realist scholars, such institutions are not or should not be durable in international politics, and this challenges the European Union as such.

However, an important point to bear in mind about realist theory is that it is a general theory that attempts to explain some patterns of behaviour emphasising certain aspects (security and defence) and subordinating some others (economy or culture) (Gilpin, 2006; Donnelly, 2000; Crawford, 2000; Waltz, 1979; Morgenthau, 1948). As a theory, it seeks rigour and testability but, as with any other theory, it has its gaps.

⁵ Also, there are several other debates among realism: hawkish and dovish realist; pessimistic and optimistic; and offensive and defensive realist. For further information, the book of Frankel (2006) provides clarification.

In order to fill these gaps, scholars adhering to other schools of thought also adopting a state-centric analysis have explained international relations by putting the focus on other actors. Liberal-institutionalism, the main competitor to realism and structural realism, was first proposed as a paradigm called “institutionalism” but that soon produced other variants: liberal-institutionalism, liberal-intergovernmentalism or the more recent historical-institutionalism.

For the first, liberal-institutionalism, the main problem is that neo-realism ignores the role of supranational institutions and how they help provide information, reduce transaction costs, and make coalitions more credible. Supranational organisations may be understood as a union whereby member states transcend their borders and share or delegate the decision-making to another institution. This is the case of NATO or the United Nations. For the purposes of this research, the European Union is the most important supranational institution affecting the Euro-Mediterranean policies of France and Spain. The decisions adopted at European level have an impact in the strategy of Paris and Madrid and, equally, both countries try to influence the EU in order to reflect their own national interests.

For liberal-institutionalists, international relations are “a world in which actors other than states participate directly in world politics, in which a clear hierarchy of issues does not exist and in which force is an ineffective instrument of policy” (Keohane, Nye, 2001: 21). But, is this theory so different from realism? This is debatable, as some very important elements are common in both ways of thought. Like realism, “institutionalist theory is utilitarian and rationalistic” (Keohane, Martin, 1998: 384) but “in contrast, it seeks to state in advance the conditions under which its propositions apply” (Keohane, Martin, 1998: 386). This theory sees the EU as a region upon which member states’ governments can rely for managing the increasing level of interdependency between states (Keohane, Hoffman, 1989). The state demonstrates its preferences and uses the institutions as a means to achieve domestic interests, reducing the transaction costs associated with acting in a highly international context.

The second state-centric variant is intergovernmentalism. It explains European integration by the rational choice of governments in a very similar way as liberal-

institutionalists, although the emphasis is more in the intergovernmentalist negotiation and bargaining in the European Union. They “share the view that states are critical actors in world politics, and that they are by and large rational” (Milner, Moravcsik, 2009: 5). Yet, the driving force that has pushed for greater integration was not based on security concerns, but rather on economic and commercial interests (Moravcsik, 1998: 473).

Finally, the third variant, historical institutionalism, offers a different perspective by focusing on understanding the continuation of institutions over time and analysing instruments of governance in the European Union (Bulmer, 1994). Or, as Thelen and Steinmo have written: “By shaping not just actors’ strategies (as in rational choice), but their goals as well, and by mediating their relations of cooperation and conflict, institutions are able to structure political situations and leave their own imprint on political outcomes” (Thelen, Steinmo, 1992: 9).

As previously mentioned, this research will rely on a hybrid approach based on liberal-institutionalism with some elements of structural realism. The reason is that there are many areas where these two theories converge (rational choice or systemic-level theories, for example), and in order to fill in the gaps found in some neo-realist tenets, liberal-institutionalism will be used to better explain European integration. Structural realism and institutionalism share a number of features: besides the centrality of the state and the different conceptions already mentioned, both adopt a systemic-level theory of international politics where it is argued that systems greatly influence and constrain states. For neo-realists, anarchy and the different capabilities of the states are the core factors that influence states. Liberal institutionalists also share this belief, but they think that the institutionalised world and its interconnectedness diminish this risk. However, this may be problematic when dealing with the Mediterranean and the European Union. While for the European Union, liberal-institutionalism seems to be the appropriate paradigm to apply in this study, the Mediterranean is much more difficult to define. Given that many of their current problems are linked to security concerns, the structural realist approach fits better considering its understanding of anarchy and the maximization of security over other areas. I have adopted the liberal-institutionalist-structural realist approach as the focus is in Euro-Mediterranean

policies, but I am conscious that, the Arab Spring is a challenge in terms of a paradigmatic definition for the Mediterranean considering the complex situation. Finally, both theories consider the utility of force as a relevant element in international actions, but an institutionalist approach concedes great importance to cooperation, although this cooperation is less idealistic and more rationally oriented than constructivist views of cooperation, and it has been central to the EU political approach.

Chart 2. Theoretical Approach

	STRUCTURAL REALISM	LIBERAL- INSTITUTIONALISM	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	States are central	States central + Other international actors (focus on international institutions)	
	The world is anarchic	Interdependence (and institutionalised world)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	States maximize security and power	Other elements equally important; no hierarchy on the importance of issues	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Systemic-level theory	Systemic-level theory	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	States are critical actors (rational)	States <i>and</i> institutions are critical actors (rational)	
	Utility of force	Utility of force + Cooperation	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Source: Self-elaborated. Premises about realism from Frankel, 2006: 14-18.

However, the main reason to adopt this theoretical hybrid approach is that this thesis focuses on international foreign policy—a field subject to more influence from national interests, where members are not willing to cede sovereignty; this is in opposition to other European policy areas, where institutions have a greater capacity when it comes to action, resources and power. The Common Foreign and Security Policy is, mainly, of intergovernmental nature in terms of decision-making. In the EU, governments have retained most decision-making capacities. The European Commission plays an auxiliary role, the European Parliament has little but growing influence, and the Court of Justice has no authority in this field. Some of the mechanisms of European integration are present, such as socialisation processes or the proliferation of working groups that have strengthen collaboration but more in a sort of a consensus rather than by

establishing rules (Forster, Wallace, 2000, in Wallace and Wallace, 2000: 489-490). Some authors consider that a limitation of the CFSP is that it was created in response to national ambitions of France and Germany, who wanted to advance toward a wider objective of political union (Nuttall, 2000: 271). The Maastricht Treaty did not solve this problem, as it had a capability-expectations gap that brought forth “contradiction[s] between the ambitions of EU member governments to play a larger international role and their reluctance to move beyond an intergovernmental framework in doing so” (Hill 1996: 5). In this very same line, Peterson and Sjursen think that despite good intentions, the Maastricht Treaty did not change the European Political Cooperation’s commitment to act only by consensus, resulting in the ability to act only within a very narrow set of actions on which the member states could agree (Peterson, Sjursen, 1998: 5).

The Lisbon Treaty has only recently introduced some modifications by providing a Head of the European Diplomacy and a body of European diplomats. Its application, according to Gross, has been limited, and the process of the CFSP is “too intergovernmental ... because of the intergovernmental nature of decision-making in the EU, CFSP and ESDP, the policies and attitudes or national governments towards CFSP are relevant” (Gross, 2009: 2-3). Therefore, liberal-institutionalism that concedes importance to institutions—yet also recognizes states’ capabilities—provides a better understanding of the role of institutions than historical institutionalism does.

In this research, institutional weight is acknowledged and accepted, especially in the European Union (but not in the Mediterranean). However, institutions are seen as (1) highly influenced by the state and, (2) when they are not and institutions act as entrepreneurs, member states find a way to maintain their weight, especially in the areas of foreign affairs and defence. As Krasner asserts, the “EU is a new and unique institutional structure, but it will coexist with, not displace, the sovereign-state model” (Krasner, 2003: 148).

To conclude, member states matter because they project their national preferences toward the European Union, affecting its configuration, shaping its institutions, and impacting EU governance. This process, known as bottom-up Europeanisation, is now

part of the theoretical debate and has been published about extensively. What is clear is that if there is this input in the European Union, the same opposite situation may occur. This top-down Europeanisation explains the influence that Europe has in the national policies of the member states.

Top-down Europeanisation is defined as “an incremental process re-orientating the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EU political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy-making” (Ladrech, 1994: 71). For Borzel, it is “a process by which domestic policy areas become increasingly subject to European policy-making” (Börzel, 1999: 574). On the other hand, the bottom-up approach is defended by authors like Moravcsik, who argues that Europe strengthens the nation-state by weakening the parliaments and reinforcing the governments (Moravcsik, 1994). Palau and Chaqués share this view, and they present the case study of the Europeanisation of law-making in Spain. For the authors, “Europeanisation has contributed to reinforce the already-predominant position of the Spanish government with regard to the Parliament. The government plays a key role as the legitimate national representative in the EU policymaking process, controlling the political agenda on EU affairs and most of the transposition of EU directives (...), which finally results in the reduction of the already limited legislative capacity of the Spanish Parliament (Palau, Chaqués, 2012 in Brouard et al, 2012: 174). Following this distinction, this study will focus on the initiatives emerging from the process of bottom-up Europeanisation.

1.3.3 CONCEPTUALIZING POWER AND LEADERSHIP

Realism has often been accused of not providing a comprehensive response when addressing issues of cooperation. In a way, this is true. However, structural realism provides a more complete explanation when describing the distribution of power, which varies greatly depending on whether it is multipolar, bipolar or unipolar, in both the regional and global system. Some analysts would distinguish between balanced multipolarity and unbalanced multipolarity (Hyde-Price, 2007; Mearsheimer, 2001). This is a key difference when explaining the balance of power. In contrast, in a unipolar or bipolar system there are not many powerful actors; in the multipolar system, the understanding of power relations is substantially different.

The core of the theory of balance of power introduced by Waltz in 1979 lies in the belief that states, in order to counter the hegemony of one of the actors, make coalitions. Here, there are two ways to act: one is to align with other states to counteract the power of the strongest state. This is known as balancing. The other is the so-called bandwagoning strategy, which entails an alliance with the state that represents the risk (Waltz, 1979; Walt, 2003; Schweller, 1994).

Opting to balance power is a way of achieving security, in other words, to try to avoid the formation of a power that could entail a real threat. Furthermore, according to Stephen M. Walt, it “increases the new member’s influence within the alliance, because the weaker side has greater need for assistance. Allying with the strong side, by contrast, gives the new member little influence” (Walt, 2003: 109). The bandwagoning alternative could be an interesting choice for those small- or middle-sized states that face a risk in their sub-region and want to gain benefits from this alliance with the stronger superpower. In addition, it could be an attractive option to facilitate some international involvement or to justify an increase of military power. However, bandwagoning also carries some risks like placing trust in the more powerful state, or to increase its capabilities by joining this alliance, just to mention some. Adler and Greve also point out that while “the alliance formation is an inherent practice of the balance of power mechanism of security governance, in the predominant view it does not fundamentally change the competitive power dynamics” (Adler, Greve, 2009: 68). How and when states balance or bandwagon depends on several factors such as geography, size and strength of the state, the gains that the state might obtain, and the capacity to change the outcomes among others.

Although these principles are mainly conceived to explain theories of peace and war, and while the literature review does not explicitly address their application when explaining the European Union or cooperative behaviour,⁶ I argue that this distinction is not only interesting but also useful to explain how member states may act within the European Union in order to create alliances. Structural realism may not be at its height, but its generalist and highly theoretical nature is helpful to set definitions, especially in

⁶ Bicchi briefly mentions these two concepts when explaining European visions of integration, but I intend to apply these concepts in a more detailed way, applying them specifically to Mediterranean policies.

those areas that deal with understandings of power. Therefore, the concept of balancing and bandwagoning will be tested throughout this study to explain the dynamics of cooperation and alliances between France and Spain.

This coalition-building strategy is closely linked to the kind of leadership that is exerted by the relevant actors. To do so, I will apply Bicchi's distinction between broker and believer entrepreneurship and, also, from Young's own works for these two authors distinguish about different kinds of leadership that may help to explain the different attitudes of France and Spain when trying to influence other partners. Bicchi sees a broker entrepreneur as an agent who "have more of an idea of the kind of change that is required and the steps to achieve it, but do not necessarily hold the monopoly of action, information and knowledge, or of concrete policy ideas" (Bicchi, 2007: 29). For Young, a broker entrepreneur seeks "deals acceptable to parties engaged in competitive-cooperative interactions and, in the process, to dissolve or circumvent the collective-action problems associated with institutional bargaining (Young 1999, 805-806). In other words, this kind of leadership is highly cooperative. Bassols' work echoes Young's ideas of cooperative bargaining, and believes that the key of a negotiation is to achieve compromises without producing winners and losers.⁷

For Bicchi, a believer negotiator focuses more on goals and acts according to the certitude of the appropriateness of the proposal. Young defines this kind of leadership as structural and, instead of focusing on beliefs, he emphasises a negotiator's resources. For Young, "structural leaders achieve success by devising effective ways to translate power measured in terms of the position of material resources into influence over the behaviour of actors engaged in processes of institution building" (Young 1999: 805). Both distinctions will be applied, as the reasons behind the behaviour are as important as the role exerted by the actor.

Young introduces the concept of intellectual leadership, which is based on producing and disseminating intellectual capital that impacts the negotiation process. However, this kind of leadership is more difficult to identify and, quite often, is linked to individual persons rather than to actors. However, I argue that this kind of leadership

⁷ Personal communication with Raimundo Bassols. Notes from the course "Diplomacy and international negotiation" in the Master Programme of the CEU University in Madrid. 2008.

is frequently conflated with the other two kinds of typologies as, quite often, intellectual capability recognition is a pre-requisite to accept a broker or structural entrepreneurship.

To conclude, the concept of Europeanisation may also serve to explain the processes of influence, not only to describe the European integration. I argue that Europeanisation is a new way to project influence upon other member states. In other words, in the case of states adapting after finding new ways to project their influence, this is especially visible in the process of bottom-up Europeanisation. When there is a process of bottom-up Europeanisation, there is also a process of top-down Europeanisation for the other member states that have to integrate new policies adopted at European level. This is an indirect way to influence other member states in a respective area where, if not for the existence of the EU, would be more difficult. Therefore, states have found new ways to resist regionalisation by maximizing the resources at their reach.

1.4 METHODOLOGY

This thesis draws from international relations debates and European studies. Conducting research on the projection of influence is not an easy task, especially when it is addressed under a comparative approach. Creating a methodology in order to make a consistent approach across different issues and countries over time implies making some methodological choices, all of which I will elaborate upon in this section. First of all, I will attempt account for the themes of this research and explain the procedures by which I have tried to address these areas. Secondly, I will address the resources I have used to shape this comparative study and, finally, I will debrief the inevitable limitations of a study of this kind.

As presented in this chapter, this thesis revolves around three main themes: the comparative approach, the concept of influence, and collaborative dynamics. Regarding the comparative method, the objects that will be compared are, as explained, France and Spain as rational choice actors that make rational decisions in order to influence the outcomes of Euro-Mediterranean policy. I will focus on the governments of these member states, looking into the different structures and

resources they have in order to carry out their national strategies. Regarding the method, I will use Landman's distinction between "most similar systems design" (MSSD) and "most different systems design" (MDSD) (Landman 2003, 29). I will apply the former due to the fact that France and Spain are two similar countries that share a comparable history, common geography interests, analogous cultures, and related interests. Nevertheless, an important part of this study is to identify the different elements that affect political outcomes.

In the case studies design, I will draw attention to each country's EU presidencies, analyse a relatively comparable number of interviews, and selection topics where the two countries have a common interest that may cause rivalry or cooperation. Setting the time framework between 1995 and 2010 satisfies these requirements: a period where the two countries are part of the European Communities / European Union, and when both have sufficient resources (and the will) to exert a preponderant position if desired.

Turning now to the notion of influence, not precisely measurable that is, therefore, qualification in the sense of typology of leadership rather than quantification will be the methodology applied throughout the study, since influence or power is not a tangible element. This is extrapolative to the concept of leadership, although it has an element that can be, somehow, assessable. Leadership requires the acceptance and acknowledgment of other countries. Meanwhile, the concept of influence does not necessarily imply leadership. Becoming a leader means that the country possesses a great degree of influence and it is able to demonstrate its influence. Therefore, this study will try to identify those areas where France and Spain have more input in European foreign policy by analysing the strategies and the proposals launched, and the degree of implementation that they finally managed.

Projecting influence depends on several factors. Depending on the field of study, there are many ways to address this topic: security, cultural expansion, economy, etc. All of these factors are tools at the service of foreign projection. However, a topic of this magnitude is almost impossible to cover in a single project. In considering so, this study will contain the following subject structure:

1st. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the more recent Union for the Mediterranean to explain French and Spanish input in the European external policies (chapter 2, 3, 4), and how these two countries build coalitions in order to achieve their objectives, both at multilateral and bilateral levels.

2nd. The use of the EU rotating presidencies in two different ways. EU rotating presidencies that took place during the Barcelona Process will be addressed in chapter 3, where the focus will be on those that are held by France and Spain. The main goal is to identify the capacity to keep the initiative afloat and see it through according to schedule. This will help us to understand one of the criteria for assessing leadership effectiveness, as mentioned above. The second way will be the use of EU presidencies for policy changing; therefore, the Spanish presidency in 1995 and the French presidency of 2007 will be included in a separate chapter (chapter 5). The reason behind this choice is that both countries shared comparable elements: institutional change, motivation to formulate policy, and initiative by a Mediterranean member-state and, to some extent, the different Presidencies; this provides a good base for the comparative objective of this thesis.

By addressing these topics, it is possible to distinguish elements of influence and leadership within both countries. For instance, it is central to identify the capacity of France and Spain to place issues in the European agenda, even if it is not the priority of the moment. I will focus especially on the ability of France and Spain to bring about major new policy direction without significant modification being made in a multilateral context, and the ability to make this initiative to stay in time. This will be researched by looking at three elements: (1) the capacity to create a window of opportunity, (2) the capacity to build coalitions and collaborate with other members to succeed in the initiative formulation and implementation, (3) the capacity of making other members engage actively with the proposal once it is in place. In order to do so, I will look into the context, the collaborative approach, and the style of the leading country and, finally, the outcomes of the initiative once it is in place and the degree of involvement of other partners in making it to succeed.

This concept of leadership is closely link to the third theme of the thesis, cooperation, and therefore they both will be addressed quite often together, as the ability to make coalitions and keep them going according to schedule are important to succeed as a leader. This will be particularly evident in the close attention that this study will pay to the Franco-Spanish tandem that emerged prior to the launch of the Barcelona process. Throughout this study, the interaction between these two countries and the level of collaboration between Madrid and Paris will be closely regarded.

In order to tackle this research I use primary and secondary sources. An important part of the methodology has involved conducting interviews with officials and academics with the aim of obtaining original content. Interviews will be used to address those elements more difficult to evaluate: perceptions of the success of a given action, perceptions on the strategy that one of the countries has applied and, finally, evaluation of the relationship with the other country. That is particularly important in those areas of cooperation and divergence that usually are not reflected by secondary sources. By including political analysts, scholars, and experts in the list of people to interview, I expected to achieve a better understanding of the situation. Depending on the profile of the interviewee, the questions were divided into themes, some common to all profiles (collaboration, perception of the role played by the given country, strategies used to implement their proposal, bilateral or multilateral approach), and some specific (the context, the Euro-Mediterranean policy, or the institutional structure). The combination of diplomats, scholars and experts is a way to balance the points of view and allows for a more in-depth analysis. These opinions will be compared with the institutional position, when possible, so the element of subjectivity will be diminished. It will be particularly important when comparing the different points of view about a same topic, such as the evaluation of the Barcelona Process, which can be different for Spanish diplomats than for the French ones. To complement the interviews, other sources have been used like published official documents, unpublished documents when possible, databases, surveys, and finally, media coverage of events.

Regarding archival research, it is especially relevant to analyse the policies of the two countries and the European Union. The problem is that due the huge quantity of

information available and the distribution of data between different organisations, this kind of research was expensive and not very effective. Certainly, a lot of documentation is available online and can be accessed more easily now, but it is not as effective as visiting the documentary centres of the European Institutions. A way to face this problem was by narrowing down the topics addressed in the thesis. Archival research was in the national libraries of France and Spain and was used mainly when addressing the presidencies, with the goal of seeing which actions were taken by the two countries and what were the results in European terms. Finally, I used news analysis with the aim of identifying the social perception of success or failure. It is not the aim of this study to explain the pressure or the influence of the media in politics, but it is a good tool to distinguish if any initiative is popular and supported by citizenship.

To conclude, this thesis acknowledges certain limitations: ones of methodological and conceptual nature, and others related to capabilities and resources. In methodological terms, the wide topic is a limitation *per se*. Understanding the priorities of the member states and how they pursue these objectives may help to understand the development of Mediterranean regional policies. This question implies looking at the origins and the processes until the initiative has been fully implemented. A certain reductionism in the theoretical approach is necessary and acknowledged due to the nature of the thesis, and bilateral relations will only be included when they had an impact on the multilateral policy formulation. On the other hand, France and Spain are also part of other Mediterranean initiatives that are not directly linked to the European Union. Regarding these initiatives, they will only be referenced when they affect the Euro-Mediterranean policy.

Finally, by putting the focus on France and Spain and the input of these two countries in the Euro-Mediterranean policies, this thesis suffers from a certain imbalance, although there are mentions of other states such as Italy, Portugal and Greece when they have played a key role. However, the attention is deliberately kept on France and Spain. In the case of Italy, Portugal and Greece, these countries are also part of the European Union and have an important role to play, not only as member states with capacity for policy formulation, but also as potential partners for balancing or

bandwagoning when developing new initiatives. They are mentioned in the research when their role vis-à-vis Madrid or Paris is relevant, but other than that, the focus is kept in France and Spain. This is also the case for the United States, China, Russia or other countries that have an important presence in the Mediterranean. In this case, the delimitation is easier to set for they are not part of the European Union, although their influence in the Mediterranean is remarkable. This is an intentional research decision which, although it precludes offering a complete view of the Euro-Mediterranean policy, is necessary to compare in a more effective way the roles of France and Spain.

This is also the case of certain events that have a direct impact on policy development such as the Arab/Israeli conflict or the more recent war in Syria. Although, clearly these events clearly affect the Barcelona Process or the Union for the Mediterranean, their impact will only be addressed in terms of their capacity to influence the good development of these initiatives. The roles of France and Spain, or even the European Union in these conflicts, will not be explained for it is not the direct object of this study. Obviously, this also entails a certain reductionism which I have tried to limit by referring to these conflicts when the effect was the direct consequence of them (i.e. the cancellation of the 2nd meeting of Head of States within the UfM, or the difficult negotiations hindering the progress of the EMP and the UfM as a result of the Arab/Israeli conflict).

Another important constraint is researching the concept of competition and collaboration. Mediterranean policies, and especially the Union for the Mediterranean, is a sensitive topic because it deals with an initiative which is alive and still in place—an initiative that is conceived to frame the relations with the southern shore of the Mediterranean. Most of these countries are, today, in a complicated political situation, and diplomats are not willing to talk about certain issues if these results are going to be published. This contrasts with academics' willingness to engage in debate.

A final constraint is the limited financial resources. In order to do an effective comparative thesis, I needed to interview different actors in different countries. Financial resources was a constraint when contacting diplomats in different countries

who have a limited time and cannot easily adapt to the constraints of a PhD budget. Another resource limitation was conducting research in four different languages with the consequent outcomes: contacting the person in his/her native language, conducting the interview, and understanding and reproducing the right meaning. This was a beautiful challenge as well as a limitation, especially at the beginning of the thesis. It also affected secondary source research, as much of the literature is only in French, Spanish or English.

Despite these limitations, the multi-theory, multi-country and multilingual approach is a challenge that I expect to bring positive and innovative outcomes in the research of Euro-Mediterranean policies.

1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

This thesis is structured around 6 chapters. The first chapter defines the theoretical framework based on a hybrid approach where member states still are the central actors, although not the only ones. Institutions play a relevant and increasing role, yet are highly influenced by states. It is not the aim of this thesis to create a new paradigm, but instead to draw from diverse theories. Elements of neo-realism and are mixed with liberal-institutionalism to set the conceptual designation. Equally important is the definition of leadership that is introduced in this chapter, where there is no longer space for traditional unilateral leadership.

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the development of the Euro-Mediterranean policies prior to the Barcelona Process. It also introduces some elements of the national foreign policies of France and Spain, without which it would not be possible to understand their priorities and capabilities. Regarding the Mediterranean, the focus will be in the changes of the different governments and how this impacted some countries' reorientation of their Mediterranean projection.

Chapter 3 presents the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, considering the input of France and Spain under a multilateral perspective and addressing the international context and the ministerial conferences hold by France and Spain. It also presents the national preferences in the development of the EU's institutional framework, including

the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) that brought some changes to the Barcelona Process and, therefore, was regarded with certain suspicion by France and Spain. On the other hand, the EMP also strengthened the Mediterranean dimension of the European Union.

Chapter 4 deals with the introduction of the new initiative called to substitute the Barcelona process under the French leadership. The case of the Union of the Mediterranean will demonstrate the importance of the member states in shaping the European Union's institutions, and it will also establish the trend towards intergovernmentalism. This trend, although present in some areas of the EMP, was not as remarkable as the new institutional design, closer to French preferences and perceptions of foreign policy.

Chapter 5 presents the use of EU presidencies to produce policy reorientations. Two case studies are used to analyse the strategies of Madrid and Paris: the Spanish presidency of the Council in 1995, at the moment of the signature of the Barcelona process (and how this occasion was rationally used to push toward the materialization of the new policy). The same is done for the French presidency of 2007, when the Union for the Mediterranean defined a new institutional framework designed by and for France, at least in its conception.

Chapter 6 will return to the research questions and will compare the main elements already presented in the theoretical chapter in the light of what has been found during the study. It presents France compared with Spain in the areas of influence style, highlighting their more cooperative or individualistic style, the multilateral or bilateral approach, and how these countries prefer to interact within the Mediterranean initiatives. Finally, the degree of consistency in the initiatives carried out for both countries in the regional formulation will be discussed. In order to provide enough empirical illustration, one sectoral case study will be presented and linked to the research questions of this thesis: the migration policies in the Mediterranean. The reason for selecting this policy area is that there are important elements of cooperation and confrontation between France and Spain when addressing this subject.

The conclusion will be the moment to engage with the initial hypothesis and its condition, and to present the results after having tested these elements by examining evidence relating to the last 18 years of Euro-Mediterranean relations. It will assess the outcomes of the initiatives and the role and evolution of France and Spain, analysing the inputs of these two countries in the European Mediterranean policy.

CHAPTER 2

FRANCE, SPAIN AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

INTRODUCTION

There is little doubt about Paris' weight in the Mediterranean. France is one of the few countries that has global political and economic influence. It has a prominent place among world nations for reasons of history, economy and political will. France is member of all international organisations (OSCE, NATO, OECD), a founding member of some of them (UN, EU), and has special rights in the most important ones (permanent seat in the UN Security Council). Although in recent years the perception has been that its role has been diminishing in favour of new emerging powers, the fact remains that nowadays, France is a point of reference in the international arena. However, the French fear of losing influence is not new. For some years now, the country has been trying to return to its former *grandeur*, as evoked by De Gaulle.

Irony is often present in foreign affairs. De Gaulle invested much energy in trying to reverse the trend toward a polarised world in the belief that a multilateral framework would benefit France's interests. The USA-Russia dichotomy hampered Paris' aspirations, but as De Gaulle's wishes came true and the world developed new poles of power, new states became more influential, and France's ability to remain a first-rate country was gradually eroded. Progressive European regionalisation and the weight of the new so-called emerging countries have had a direct impact on French ambitions. Hence, the widespread perception that France has lost influence in a multi-polarised world. Today, France is a medium power with global influence. This phenomenon, as will be presented later in the thesis, has been referred to as *déclinologie*.

Spain, on the other hand, has a different starting point: the incorporation into international society after a long period of isolation under Franco. While this integration into the global system was gradual and not just a result of Franco's death, the fact is that, for many years, the Iberian country was completely isolated. In this

sense, one sees the first element of comparison: each country's widespread pro-European public opinion. When Spain officially entered the European Community in the mid-1980s, it was exultant, energetic, ready to show its commitment to democracy, and willing to develop its economy and welfare state. Taking into consideration the poor starting point, any improvement was a victory.

Although Spain had had a long and complex history in the Mediterranean, joining the EC was not that remarkable when it came to institutionalising this relationship at the multilateral level. Although it had few resources, the Iberian country was highly motivated to show that it could be an important actor both in Europe and the Mediterranean, as shown in Felipe González's investiture speech in 1982 (González, 1982). The young democracy claimed its right to be in Europe and was ready to develop a coherent and ambitious international presence with the support of the Spanish civil society.

The section that follows will present an overview of the two countries, their strengths and weaknesses, and other pertinent factors that conditions foreign policy, especially in the Mediterranean. The second part of the chapter will introduce each country's historical context at the national and European level, and will frame the context under which the Barcelona Process was launched. To conclude, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, other relevant international agencies, each country's degree of presidential involvement, and other distinctive features will be presented.

2.1 FRANCE AND SPAIN AT A GLANCE

France is the largest country of the European Union in terms of land area; with its 632,834 Km² France represents one fifth of the EU's territory.⁸ Its geostrategic position is very favourable, and France has long been decisive regarding its centrality on the European map. However, since the Cold War, France has become more marginal. Centrality is not just a political adjective; it has physical consequences. Paris is a transit corridor in terms of economy, energy exchanges, and communications connections—three factors that mark its relations with Spain. France also has a Mediterranean and Atlantic dimension. In terms of geography, France has an important role in Europe and

⁸ France has overseas territories that are included in the referred extension. Metropolitan France is 543,965Km² and its DOM territories are 88,969 Km²

the Mediterranean, and these geographical interests are similar to those of Spain, but European centrality places Paris in a different geopolitical dimension: a central country vs. peripheral one. Regarding the Mediterranean, despite having a Mediterranean shoreline, France's relative distance from North Africa is another factor to consider; this distance is substantially shorter in Spain or Italy.

A second element of comparison is population. Again, France stands out as one of the most populated countries, this time after Germany. In January 2013, the French population reached 65,59 million (INSEE).⁹ This figure is important given the European Union system of representation, which makes France the second-best represented member-state within European institutions. On the other hand, the number of non-nationals living in France is very difficult to estimate due to the absence of reliable data. The country lacks an adequate system for registering immigrants, and official data are not regularly updated, as some demographers have pointed out (L'express, 18 March 2010). As a result, the final number may be bigger than the one published.¹⁰ According to Eurostat, the number of non-nationals living in the country, including citizens of the European Union, was 3,769,016 million in 2010 (Eurostat, 2012a), of whom more than half come from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries (chart. 3). The weight of Mediterranean migration, and the fact that almost five million Muslims are from or live in France, can be viewed as a justifications of the attention and resources devoted by the French government to the region.

Chart 3. Number of Foreign Nationals from MENA countries in France (2007)

	Algeria	Morocco	Tunisia	Egypt	Syria	Jordan	Leba- non	Pales- tine	Israel	Turkey	Total
FRANCE	682,931	685,567	225,618	14,932			25,177			266,927	1,901,152

Source: IEMed, Fundació CIDOB, 2010 (pp. 401)

A third factor to take into consideration is energy dependency. France, like the vast majority of EU countries, is poor in energy resources. According to Eurostat, France

⁹ Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (consulted: 27 July 2013)

¹⁰ As an example of the lack of data, the OECD has its own statistics, but in the case of France there are many years without documented statistical information

had an energy dependency rate of 49.3% in 2010 (Eurostat, 2012b: 28).¹¹ France is well aware of its energy situation and, since 1974, is working for geographical and partner diversification. Furthermore, the country is trying to be less dependent on oil by increasing production of nuclear energy and, more recently, renewable energy sources.¹²

A fourth element of comparison is the national economy. At the moment of writing, France was the sixth most dynamic economy in the world, the fifth largest exporter of goods, the fourth in services, and the third in agriculture (but the first in Europe). Most of its trade was within the European Union (66%, of which 50% is within the eurozone). It was the world's second largest host country for direct investment from abroad. In 2010, national expenditure on research and development amounted to €37.99 billion, or 2.26% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).¹³ That made France the fourth country among the OECD partners in terms of research after Japan, the USA and Germany.

Turning now to Spain, the second largest country of the European Union: its surface area is 505,987 km², and it has a privileged geo-strategic position that is advantageous in several aspects. Its location on the map makes the peninsula not only a place of transit, but also it acts as a bridge between Africa and Europe. The often-overlooked fact that Europe has a direct border in Africa through the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla has political and geographic implications. There are merely 14 kilometres that separate both continents; consequently, Spain is the external border of the European Union in a very sensitive region: the Strait of Gibraltar. Diplomatic relations with Morocco are influenced by geography. Spanish possessions in North Africa and the Moroccan claims of Ceuta, Melilla, and some nearby islands and rocks give rise to conflict from time to time. As a result of territorial disputes and the extension of maritime limits, diplomacy plays an important role. The inverse situation applies

¹¹ The energy dependency rate shows the proportion of energy that an economy must import

¹² Crude oil imports from the Middle East fell from 71% in 1973 to 17% in 2009. New partners are to be found in the North Sea (18%), Sub-Saharan Africa (20%) and some countries of the former USSR (33%). Diversification policies also apply to gas. In the 1970s, France was a producer but nowadays it is almost completely dependent on imports (98%). Currently, in the interest of long-term energy security, contracts are signed for 25 years to ensure stability. In 2009, French main providers were Norway (32%), Russia (15%), Algeria (16%) and the Netherlands (16%). Ministère de l'écologie, du développement durable, du transport, et du logement (2010)

¹³ Gross domestic expenditure on R&D, 2000-2010. Eurostat. Consulted on August 2013.

regarding the rock of Gibraltar, which falls under British sovereignty but is claimed by Spain as its own territory. Eastward enlargement has been positive in terms of making the European Union a bigger region, but it has had a negative counterpart for Iberian interests, at least geographically speaking. As Europe expands to the East, Spain becomes more peripheral—a fact that is shared with France, to some extent.

With regard to demographic factors, in January 2013, Spain’s total population reached 46,704,000 including 5,118,000 immigrants (INE).¹⁴ Spain is the fifth most populated country in the EU; this has important consequences at the EU level. For instance, in the European Council Spain has 27 votes (two fewer than France, which has 29), and under the Lisbon Treaty, Spain has 54 seats compared with France’s 74. In the European Parliament, Spain gained four new seats and France two.

Turning now to the non-national population living in Spain, statistics show that the main foreign communities are constituted by nationals from American countries and by Europeans—not from the Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs), contrary to what it is frequently perceived by the population—with the exception of Morocco, which is the second biggest community (INE, 2011: 9).¹⁵ According to the *Institut Europeu de la Mediterrània* (IEMed), there are 693,945 foreigners from the MPCs (Chart. 4). Likewise, according to the National Institute of Statistics, the only southern community represented in their graphic is Morocco. The difference between the first (Morocco) and the second (Algeria) in the table is considerable. In 2013, the number of Muslims in Spain reached 1.6 million, of which 1.1 million are foreigners and 464,978 are Spanish nationals (UCIDE, 2013).

Chart 4: Number of Foreign Nationals from MPCs in Spain (2009)

	Algeria	Morocco	Tunisia	Egypt	Syria	Jordan	Lebanon	Pales- tine	Israel	Turkey	Total
SPAIN	52,990	627,858	2,065	5,747	491	754	217	169	947	2,707	693,945

Source: IEMed, Fundació CIDOB, 2010. pp 401

¹⁴Instituto Nacional de Estadística (Acceded 27 July 2013)

¹⁵Available at: <http://www.ine.es/prodyser/pubweb/espcif/espcif10.pdf>

Spain is also extremely dependent on foreign energy sources. Its dependency percentage is 76.7% (Eurostat, 2012b: 28). Accepting the inevitability of high reliance on foreign energy, Madrid has implemented a strategy of diversification. Spain, however, is rich in renewable energy, being one of the biggest producing countries in this sector. Nevertheless, energy security is a big challenge that the Ministry of Industry has to face considering the huge reluctance of the population to adopt nuclear energy. Spain relies more on the Middle East and the Mediterranean than France does.¹⁶

Before the economic crisis beginning in 2008, Spain was the eighth economy in the world, having recently overtaken Italy. However, recent events have shown that the Spanish economy was not as solid as it was believed to be. The crisis has affected the country in several areas, including its international capacities and influence both in Europe and the Mediterranean. Almost all economic indicators show the delicate economic situation that the Iberian country is going through. Regarding research and development, the percentage of expenditure represented 1.39% of the GDP in 2010,¹⁷ an increase compared to previous years; yet, it still remained far from that of other European countries. That leaves Spain in the middle of the ranking when compared with other EU members (15th) (El Mundo, 08 September 2009), but far behind France and Germany.

If there is a sector that has greatly influenced Franco-Spanish relations, it is agriculture. After France, Spain is the second European member-state in terms of agricultural land. Before Spanish adhesion to the EU, this was a source of constant conflict. Madrid and Paris competed exporting the same products and both had strong lobbies that influenced the negotiations. Nowadays, the old pattern of rivalry has given way to collaboration. Both countries negotiate together for funding at the European Union and contribute to the European policy regulation (Ambassade de France en Espagne, 2012: 17).

¹⁶ Its main partners are: Russia (14.9%), Iran (12.1%), Arabia Saudi (11.1%), Mexico (11%), Libya (9.6%), and Nigeria (10.4%). The main Spanish gas supplier is Algeria (35.4%), followed by Qatar and Nigeria (both with 12.5%). Corporación de Reservas Estratégicas de Productos Petrolíferos. (Ministerio de Industria, 2010).

¹⁷ Gross domestic expenditure on R&D, 2000-2010. Eurostat. Consulted on August 2013.

2.2 HISTORICAL CONTEXT: FRANCE, SPAIN, EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

Spanish, French, and Euro-Mediterranean relations did not flourish from one day to another. Having examined the individual profiles of the two countries, we are in a better position to analyse the dynamics of both countries up to the start of the Barcelona Process in 1995, including those found at the multilateral level, or more specifically, in the Euro-Mediterranean context. France, as a founding member of the European Economic Community (EEC) was a leading player from the beginning. The Spanish situation is different. Madrid's perspective will be addressed separately, as the country did not join the EEC until 1986, but the analysis contained herein will make reference to the wider European context. This is an important element in comparative terms as for decades, France was a country from where policies emanated while Spain lacked the means for initiating negotiations. This discrepancy places the two countries at different levels of decision-making.

The creation of the EEC in 1957 demanded a new strategy toward the Mediterranean in several areas. Economic and security reasons in the context of the Cold War were behind this new reconsideration (Gomez, 2003: 26) and France, as a traditional actor in the region, was particularly concerned with the terms of these relations. The EEC signed Association Agreements with Greece (1962) and Turkey (1963), in the hope that the countries would become more stable (Bicchi, 2007: 46). These agreements were also extended to those Mediterranean countries that were not part of the European Community at that moment. Therefore, the 60s were years when bilateralism prevailed.

The 1970s, on the contrary, were years for Mediterranean regional formulation (Gomez, 2003: 30). In October 1972, the Paris summit took place and the EC adopted a global approach: the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP). The context was not the most propitious. Certainly, it was not a peaceful time; Cold war tensions worsened, terrorism events affecting European interests arose, and the oil crisis of 1973 demonstrated the extent of the EC's dependence on the Mediterranean region. As a result, the GMP included a series of trade improvements in certain industrial products,

better access to the products from the Maghreb (as long as these did not affect member states' interests) and increased development aid (Gomez, 2003: 33).

During 1970s, especially between 1972 and 1974, France behaved as the main policy entrepreneur (Bicchi, 2007: 63). It was a period when France was concerned with the "German problem" and European federalism (Moravcsik, 1998: 259). The new German chancellor, Brandt, had prioritised the normalisation of East Germany and Soviet Union relations. This situation meant that France had to face the risk that the traditional Franco-German balance was not balanced anymore. Meanwhile, dialogue between the USA and the USSR took place, and Europe had little influence (Chérigui, 1997: 123). Therefore, in 1972, France, in order to improve its international recognition as a big power, made use of its Mediterranean role and acted as a broker-entrepreneur paving the way toward the Global Mediterranean Policy. This was not accomplished without strengthening its own relations with the region first, for these had been neglected under De Gaulle's government (Bicchi, 2007: 86-87). France made a demonstration of effective diplomacy (Theis *et al*, 2005: 483-487).¹⁸ On a multilateral level, Paris, in close collaboration with Rome, called for greater recognition of the Mediterranean as a region. This collaboration led to the negotiations of the global agreements of 1972, pushing toward a more comprehensive approach in two ways: first, by introducing a more unified perspective; and second, by including other areas of policy-making interest beyond strict economic considerations (De Castro-Ruano, 2003: 147).

The materialisation of these efforts was the Paris summit that took place between 19-21 October 1972. Present were the six founding EC members plus the three that would join the EC the next year, and they discussed how to improve European integration. In this summit, the guidelines that would dictate the new association agreements were established. At times, Italy took the lead, but it was France who "behaved as the main policy entrepreneur" (Bicchi, 2007: 63). Evidence suggests that France played the Mediterranean card as a way to even the situation. Paris increased its bilateralism in the southern and northern part of the *Mare Nostrum* in order to place itself in an advantageous situation while calling for a greater recognition of the Mediterranean as

¹⁸ The authors explain the progressive approach to the Middle East and the Maghreb despite the tense relations with Algeria.

a whole. In the early 1980s, with Mitterrand as leader, two major axes of French diplomatic action emerged: the strengthening of French influence in the Western Mediterranean and the 'locomotive role' in European political construction.

In the meantime, Spain was struggling with a very difficult international situation. After the Second World War, Spain was practically isolated. France closed its border with the Iberian country, and only three embassies had representation in Madrid. However, the dynamics of the Cold War opened space for dissension and a timid opening to the outside world. Despite its isolation, the regime of Francisco Franco had particularly good relations with Arab countries. Since 1953, Spain had progressively become part of some international organisations, although the EEC remained closed until Franco's death; it was then when EEC entry negotiations started.

The transformation of the country, known as the Spanish miracle, brought a new optimistic climate and it even got a name: the Spanish model. This optimistic climate highly contributed to the establishment of a positive image of Spain and helped its diplomats to place the country within the international institutions, sometimes even beyond what one might have expected given the country's resources. In contrast, France was experiencing what would later be known as *déclinologie*.

The Spanish democratic transition entailed the establishment of autonomous regions, satisfying the nationalist claims of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, and brought the complete integration of Spain within the international order. On the other hand, the Spanish miracle is directly associated with the country's economic boom, its business, cultural, social and technological modernization and, significantly, the improvement of the "country brand."

The young democracy had one main objective: to become part of the European Communities, although this was not new for this ambition was held already by the previous regime. In addition, the relations with the Mediterranean countries and the Arab world were considered as a priority, although they were highly influenced by the Western Sahara conflict (Hernando de Larramendi *et al*, in Hernando de Larramendi, Mañé, 2009: 69). This was due to the Spanish fear of upsetting countries such as Morocco and Algeria.

Franco-Spanish relations became very relevant, especially at the ECC level. According to Lemus and Pereira, “France made it clear, Spain accepted, and finally, to some extent, it happens just like that, that this Republic would be the channel through which the Peninsula would accede to the European Community” (Lemus, Pereira, 2003, in Pereira 2003: 522).¹⁹ After Franco’s death in 1975, relations on both sides of the Pyrenees were reinforced. It should be noted that by the time Franco died, French-Spanish relations already were considerably active, especially on economic issues, as Spain was seen as an opportunity for French foreign investors.

However, conflicts arose during the negotiations of the Spanish adhesion to the European Community. From 1977 to 1983, bilateral relations between the two countries were heavily eroded given certain specific areas of rivalry. In addition, a lack of understanding in areas such as police cooperation or the fight against terrorism were added to the long list of national disputes. The French government’s lack of will to actively support the Spanish candidacy resulted in the obstruction of French investment in Spain. Disagreements not only affected commercial interests, but also contributed to the decline of French political influence in Madrid (Lemus, Pereira, 2003, in Pereira 2003: 525). There were two factors that helped to break the deadlock: on one hand, the change of the French and Spanish government that improved bilateral relations, bringing socialists into both governments; on the other, the attempted *coup d’état* by Colonel Tejero on February 23, 1981, which brought a breakthrough in negotiations. In 1986, Spain officially became part of the EEC. The long negotiations had a positive result: Spanish diplomats gained experience in defending national interests (Bindi, Cisci, 2005, in Bulmer, Lequesne, 2005: 160). Spain set new priorities by stressing three particular axes: Europe, the Mediterranean, and Latin America. Other elements to consider in the new course of Spanish diplomatic action were the United States and the claim of sovereignty over Gibraltar (Congreso de los diputados, 1982).

Southern Europe’s enlargement in 1981 had economic consequences for the Maghreb countries, mainly Morocco and Tunisia, especially in terms of agriculture and investment in the region. On the European side, it also meant a greater southern

¹⁹ My translation

orientation. Brussels was more Mediterranean than ever. However, if a vast collaboration between Europe's Mediterranean countries was expected, this collaboration was limited. Spain was often accused of contradictory behaviour, but its position has to be understood within the new challenges that the country had to assume to introduce the European Monetary Union (EMU). France, on the other hand, sought to keep its privileged position in the Maghreb. Paris often sided with the Maghreb countries by supporting their demands (Gomez, 2003: 36) but the Iberian country considered that "there had been too many assurances given to the Maghreb upon the insistence of Paris" (Gillespie, 1999: 139). It was a time when French and Spanish interests in the region collided, mainly owing to commercial competitiveness and the Sahara conflict. The solution came by signing additional protocols with MPCs under the GMP. Divergences also arose in the multilateral framework when France tried to launch the *Forum Méditerranéen* in 1988, with not much enthusiasm of Spain and Algeria (Dakowoska, 2001: 110).

Between 1989 and 1992, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl made German unification his government's major priority, and attempted to attract central and Eastern countries to the influence of the EEC/EU. The Federal Republic of Germany considered that its unification was linked to European integration (Dinan, 2004: 240) and proposed specific programmes of cooperation such as the Phare and Tacis programmes. Both of these programmes were addressed to Eastern European borders, thus entailing a certain marginalisation of the Mediterranean.

Yet, the combination of social unrest and economic stagnation in the Mediterranean became an important issue that Europe could no longer ignore. A progressive emergence of Islamist parties, migration pressures, and the increasing feeling of uncertainty brought about a renewed activism toward the region. Spanish action reflected its geographic position. According to Bicchi, "Spain was the most central entrepreneur, as it sought to have its new status of 'democratic middle power' acknowledged by the other European countries. Supporting Spain in sparking a process of interaction among member states were France, the [European] Council, and at times Italy, all playing different roles" (Bicchi, 2007: 130). In 1989, the Commission, by means of its Spanish commissioner Abel Matutes, put the Mediterranean back on the

European agenda and initiated the re-evaluation of its Mediterranean policy. Matutes argument was that Europe's security was inseparable from the stability of its southern frontiers and presented some proposals in the Strasbourg European Council in 1989. His document paved the way to what was called the Renewed Mediterranean Policy (RMP), a new approach that tripled funding, offered further aid and credit, and implied a wider range of cooperation and dialogue between Europe and the Mediterranean (Gillespie, 1999: 147).

Due to Spanish and Italian efforts, the Mediterranean gained greater prominence on the European policy agenda. Initiatives like the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) were put forth, but this time the French were not as supportive as expected (Chérigui, 1997: 195). The European Commission produced, at French request, two new documents,²⁰ that led to the Lisbon Council in 1992, where a declaration that recognised the need to broaden dialogue with the Maghreb countries was adopted (European Council, 1992).

In the 1980s, Spain also increased its influence in the European Commission. By the end of 1988, Spain, along with France and the Federal Republic of Germany, had two members in the Commission (El País, 17 December 1988). Commissioner Manuel Marín was responsible for fisheries and development cooperation, and Abel Matutes covered the Mediterranean, North Africa, and Latin America, replacing the French Claude Cheysson. Hernando de Larramendi affirms that "the existence of a stable group, united and with continuity, which allowed the consolidation of a specialised group of diplomats in the region who combined their placements in the ministry with their experience in the Spanish embassies in the Maghreb" (Hernando de Larramendi *et al*, 2009, in Larramendi, Mañé, 2009: 71-72).²¹

From this moment forward, Spain worked hard to link the concept of security to the borders of the East and the Mediterranean (Florensa, 2007: 141). Madrid took advantage of the "German problem" that France was facing and it presented itself as

²⁰ One of the documents was assigned to Spain, which worked in close collaboration with Matutes. He suggested that the Commission should increase economic relations with Morocco and Tunisia and, eventually, Algeria. The novelty was a new approach that included several other issues beyond traditional economic ones (Gillespie, 1999: 150; Gomez, 2003: 53)

²¹ My translation

the voice of the Mediterranean. In those days, Paris was struggling with the question of whether to concentrate efforts on competing with Germany in the East, or to increase its role in the Mediterranean. Italy was in the same situation. This favoured an environment that helped Spain establish itself as the main actor (Bicchi, 2007: 149).

These changing roles came with French approval, when French President François Mitterrand, in a Franco-Spanish summit, entrusted Spain by saying “*tout ne peut pas se faire de Paris*” (not everything can be done in Paris) (Chérigui, 1997: 179). Interestingly, France proved very active in promoting other Mediterranean initiatives like the Mediterranean Forum (1989) and the 5+4 and 5+5 Dialogue (1990), each including European Mediterranean countries but not Europe *per se*. All this suggests that Spain was more active at the European level, while France was particularly active sub-regionally, acting both countries in tandem.

By 1994, Spain and France were acting under an “efficient division of roles and labour” (Bicchi, 2007: 164). At the European Council of Essen (1994), the need to address the Mediterranean as a single entity was taking shape. A final document containing the fundamentals of the Barcelona Declaration was presented (European Council, 1994), and negotiations on Euro-Mediterranean Agreements opened with Tunisia and Morocco. At this point, good relations between González and Kohl, as well as French pressure on other northern and southern member countries, were decisive. The fact that France, Spain, and Italy held the Presidency of the Council prior to and after the signing of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was a determining element. The Cannes European Council in June 1995 led to the Barcelona declaration and, in November 1995, the Barcelona Process officially came to life.²²

2.3 GOVERNMENT AND MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

When talking about foreign action, a country must have a clear strategy, adequate resources to implement it, and effective resource management. How nations interact is a direct consequence of their political and government system. This is not just a theoretical distinction, but also is pertinent to understand the decision-making process, the number of actors involved, and the resources at the disposal of the government. A

²² The months prior to the Barcelona Process that fell under the Spanish presidency are addressed in chapter 5.

second element to consider is the multiplicity of issues addressed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Meeting new requirements entails the evolution and adaptation of all ministries; this is essential in order to carry out the new global tasks. Similarly, the internationalisation of almost all policy areas demands closer ministerial coordination to avoid duplicated efforts.

Although France and Spain share many traits because the Spanish administration draws heavily upon the French one, there are several noteworthy differences that explain how the two countries act at the international level. The following section will present the *Ministère des Affaires Étrangères et Européens* of France, and the *Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación* of Spain. Some agencies within the Ministry will be mentioned when relevant.²³ In addition, the following section will address the theoretical debate on Mediterranean vs. Arab policy in France. Although I have tried to find a parallel debate in Spain, there are not enough elements that suggest an intellectual dilemma among academics. This does not mean that Spain sees the Mediterranean as a single entity but, in terms of definition, this debate simply has not taken place in Spain, or at least not to the same extent it has in France. In Spain, the Arab policy allusions refer mainly to bilateral relations with some Arab partners, and especially during the dictatorship were relations with Israel were non-existent. Since Spain joined the European Communities, the Mediterranean approach has become the priority, and no real debate or theorisation has taken place at the academic level.

2.3.1 FRANCE: EXTERNAL ACTION AND THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The structure of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs is very complex and has suffered from several changes during the Fifth Republic. The most important attribute of French foreign policy is the centrality of the *Elysée*; this means that the French President has the main role not only in foreign policy, but also in defence. De Gaulle established that

²³This research acknowledges certain reductionism. As mentioned before, several other ministries and agencies have an important role to play as well, but taking into consideration that diplomacy falls, at least nominally, under the umbrella of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, other ministries, institutions, and organisations will not be included.

foreign policy was the President's realm. The direct involvement comes from the interpretation of Article 5 of the Constitution (Vaïsse, 2009: 17), which is not very clear in terms of the President's level of participation. According to Duhamel, to assure presidential pre-eminence in the three domains reserved to the President (diplomacy, defence and institutions), the constitution was interpreted in a sense that favoured the Premier (Duhamel, 2003: 184). However, in times of cohabitation, the Prime Minister increases his influence and input in the French foreign policy-making.

Under Sarkozy's government, some changes were made to empower the parliament; however, as Vaïsse points out, in practice there have no been major changes concerning foreign policy. Hence, what is the role of the *Quai d'Orsay*? In theory, it is in charge of French foreign relations. Nevertheless, there was a limit: the *Elysée* itself.

Some authors argue that lately, French Prime Ministers have increased their role. While admitting that originally, the Prime Minister had no official function in European affairs, the creation of the *Secrétariat Général du Comité Interministériel pour les Questions de Coopération Economique Européenne* (SGCI) partially corrected this dysfunction (Balme, Woll, 2005; in Bulmer, Lequesne, 2005, 107-108); this body is directly linked to the Prime Minister, as the French Constitution forbids linking any institution to the President. The only official who can conduct interministerial missions is the Prime Minister (interview with French official, 26 October 2010), and this gives them a more visible role.

All Presidents of the Fifth Republic have been very active, travelling abroad more than other European leaders. This zealotry may reinforce the external perception of French unilateralism when it comes to defending national interests, but also it may have a positive effect, for it helps to break the deadlock under exceptional circumstances where the negotiations become especially complicated. Diplomats are given little leeway to act as French representatives. Another consequence is that despite the continuity in terms of foreign policy, especially in the Mediterranean, an excessive presidential role overseas may make a sudden strategic reorientation more likely than in other systems where the distribution of power is clearer.²⁴

²⁴ A good example is Sarkozy's decision of returning to the military structures of NATO— a substantial change in the French security and defence strategy.

Other positions such as the Secretary-General and the cabinet directors have a variable role depending on the government. Cabinet directors supervise a large number of people, and their influence has increased throughout the Fifth Republic. This is particularly remarkable in the case of Pierre Sellal, who was Hubert Védrine's cabinet director (1997-2002), and Jacques Vimont (2002-2007) (Vaïsse, 2009: 43). Therefore, it can be suggested that, in the last decade, there has been a redistribution of power within the *Quai d'Orsay*, although always in accordance with the official tenets of power.

The functions of ambassadors are often pushed into the background, given the President's extensive activity. Having a huge network, as France has, does not necessarily imply effectiveness. The constant travel of the President and Ministers has a direct consequence: the ambassador is often relegated to the role of organiser rather than that of a negotiation figure (Vaïsse, 2009: 59).

The Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs has gone through several changes. At the beginning of the Fifth Republic, there were four geographical distinctions: Europe, Africa-Levant, America, and Asia. In the 1990s, Ministers Alain Juppé and Hubert Védrine carried out new reforms. At the end of the decade, as in Spain, there was a major adjustment—the largest the Ministry has experienced in the Fifth Republic, the dissolution of the Ministry of Cooperation. Consequently, a new agency appeared: the General Directorate for International Cooperation and Development (DGCID).

Cooperation is often used as part of foreign policy for it may serve the interests of a given country. This is not just the case of France, but Paris has been one of the first that has developed this way of external action in a very ambitious way. French success in this regard is difficult to refute. French is the mother tongue of 181 million people, and there are an additional 82.5 million people who are learning it; it is a working language of the United Nations, the European Union and other international organisations; it is the only language of the postal services and the main one of the African Union; it is associated with aeronautical and rail progress, gastronomy, the luxury and fashion industries, technology, *savoir-faire*, and modernity (Ayache, 2006: 53). All in all, it is a good share capital.

The General Directorate is an important agency of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, whose weight is considerable. This Directorate alone is allocated 86% of the operating budget of the whole Ministry.²⁵ Moreover, the cultural units of all the embassies around the world come under this agency. In terms of human resources, there are 480 people working in the central administration and 7,200 agents working in the network. *C'est le 'soft power' à la française.*


Changes did not end with the creation of the DGCID; 2008 witnessed the most recent revision in the organisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The creation of a Directorate of Globalisation was also one of the biggest changes. Currently, there are five geographical directorates subordinate to the General Directorate of Political and Security Affairs. These are: Continental Europe, Africa and Indian Ocean, North Africa-Middle East, America-Caribbean, and Asia-Oceania (Figure 1). Despite the Mediterranean regional approach, the region has no geographical Directorate, although it has the interministerial mission (which is not dependent from the *Quay d'Orsay*). The European Union is not included in the Directorate for Continental Europe. The EU has its own directorate in France. The inclusion of this EU Directorate has forced the adoption of a new name for the Ministry: *Ministère des Affaires Étrangères et Européennes.*

France possesses the second largest diplomatic network in the world after the United States. It had a body of 15,500 agents in 2011 (Le Monde, 23 June 2011). In 2008, France had 163 embassies, 16 permanent representations and 92 consulates (*Ministère des Affaires étrangères*). However, cultural diplomacy is not included in this breakdown. Cultural promotion is not only very active, but also it is highly institutionalised and receives generous funding and resources. In addition, France has up to 135 centres and cultural institutions to be included in this outstanding amalgam of diplomatic centres (MAEE).²⁶

²⁵ Direction Générale de la Coopération internationale et du développement. Consulted on 27 February 2011

²⁶ Acquired in July 2013

Figure 1: Simplified Organisational Chart, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011)



Source: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et Européennes, 2011

To conclude, in France, the proactive stance of the President's involvement in international political affairs is institutionalised, and perhaps it is precisely because of this great involvement that national elections are influenced by international affairs. A high level of activism is expected from the President both in national and international politics. Institutional reorganisation has gone hand-in-hand with this international proactivity, with the goal of attempting to adapt to new international requirements. However, few changes have been made to limit the capacities of the President.

2.3.1.1 MISSION INTERMINISTÉRIELLE DE L'UNION POUR LA MÉDITERRANÉE AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS

Following the introduction of the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008, a new institution was set up: the *Mission Interministérielle de l'Union pour la Méditerranée* (see Figure 2) (Legifrance, 2008), whose head is directly appointed by the President of the Republic (Art.2) and which has its own personnel and resources (Art.4). In October 2010, the Mission's team comprised nine members who were experts in different areas (interview with French UfM diplomat, 25 October 2010). At the head of the *Mission interministérielle* was Henri Guaino, the ideologue of the Mediterranean Union and close advisor to the President. Serge Telle, former ambassador to the EMP, was the ambassador in charge of the UfM. However, the Mission is not an institution of the *Elysée*. In terms of administrative issues, budget, etc., it reports to the *Secrétariat General du Gouvernement* (SGG). Nonetheless, the head of Mission has an important political influence (Martín, 2009: 7). Once again, this highlights the role of the French President, as the *Mission Interministérielle* is perfectly in line with the official tenets of French foreign policy.

Figure2. Organisational chart of the Interministerial Mission of the UfM (2010)



Compiled with data gathered during interviews. October 2010

The Interministerial Mission was created in order to achieve defined objectives: to ensure the success of the EU Presidency that France was holding in 2008; to launch the UfM projects agreed upon at the Paris summit, and to coordinate the French ministries

that might be involved in different areas of policy. It is worth noting that the UfM is a unique institution. No other Mediterranean or non-Mediterranean partners have a similar body—a fact that the mission members regret. In the opinion of an UfM officer, “It would have been desirable that other countries install an interministerial task force similar to our own. Putting all the projects together in each of the countries, the task forces could have shared their initiatives with other countries. In the end, it is possible to ask whether that reflects the level of commitment [to the UfM] in each country” (interview with French UfM official, 26 October 2010).

Created in December 2008, another body is the *Conseil Culturel de l’Union pour la Méditerranée* but it is not linked to the Interministerial Mission; these are independent, complementary institutions that share the same facilities. The *Conseil Culturel* does not operate within the institutional framework of the UfM, but rather acts at the initiative of France as a network of people and projects who work toward the goal of developing cultural projects. It reports both to the Prime Minister and the *Sécretariat General du Gouvernement* and was set up for just five years (Legifrance, 2008b: Art.1). Its objective is to promote the French cultural dimension in the Mediterranean region together with the association *Marseille Provence 2013, capitale européenne de la culture* (Marseille Provence 2013, European capital of culture) (Art.2). In this sense, the *Conseil Culturel* has an important role in helping the 2013 event succeed. The Conseil is composed of eight members from different French ministries and other qualified people who are representative of civil society (Art.3). As of May 2011, there were 22 such representatives from various areas who come from different countries, not only France. It also has a general secretariat with four members (the Secretary-General and three project managers). The Prime Minister appoints qualified people at the suggestion of the President of the *Conseil Culturel* (Art. 3) who, in turn, is appointed by the President of France (Art.4). This institution is in line with the *Elysée* given that the French President appoints the President of the *Conseil Culturel*.

The operation of the *Conseil Culturel* is interesting from a strategic standpoint. The cultural dimension did not find a specific place among the UfM projects that were selected at the Paris summit in 2008. France wanted to include culture among the initial projects (interview with French diplomat Conseil Culturel UfM, 22 October 2010),

but cultural proposals failed to be prioritised by other government delegations. Perhaps the *Conseil Culturel* may be seen as an agency created to fill the gap in an area vital for French interests. As mentioned above, cultural projection is one of France's most powerful diplomatic instruments, promoting the culture of *francophonie*. The Avicenne Report of 2007 analyses how France might strengthen its presence in the world and bemoans the fact that today Arab television networks have moved from Paris to London, while highlighting the need to reverse this trend (Rapport Avicenne, 2007). The creation of the *Conseil Culturel de l'Union pour la Méditerranée* has opened new channels for cultural projection, giving France a comparative advantage over other countries that have not followed its example and have not shown the same degree of activity. At the moment, there are just six UfM project areas, but the cultural dimension could be added in the future.²⁷ The experience and network are already there, permitting the *Conseil Culturel* potentially to act as consultants if this area is ultimately institutionalised.

Yet another important organisation has a certain influence on the Mediterranean policy of France: *l'Institut du Monde Arabe* (IMA). By the nature of its activity, mainly in the area of cultural affairs and development cooperation, it is common for the director to be a politician or a diplomat who has worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the institute is not linked to any French ministry. The IMA serves to strengthen international relations and is also significant at the national level due to the large community of Arabs established in France; its public value has been recognised by the Interior Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

2.3.1.2 ARAB POLICY vs. MEDITERRANEAN POLICY IN FRANCE: JUST AN ACADEMIC DEBATE?

In France, there is a distinction between the Arab and the Mediterranean policy. However, there is little research on this matter, even if academics and scholars constantly mention it. First of all, evidence suggests that these are two sides of the same coin, hence the difficulty and even confusion when addressing the policy from a

²⁷At the time of writing, there is no sign of a cultural project being included in the framework of the UfM, and it is difficult to envisage a bigger number of projects given the current blockage of the whole initiative.

theoretical perspective. Precisely because the differences are too theoretical, it may lead to a misunderstanding when theory becomes enmeshed with political reality.

Ever since the foundation of the Fifth Republic, France has maintained consistency toward the Mediterranean. This is generally stated in all the interviews conducted in the framework of this research: continuity prevails over change. Consequently, when analysing Mediterranean vs. Arab policy, divergences appear only on some elements, but do not entail a completely new political strategy. It was De Gaulle who founded the traditional Arab policy of France although, interestingly, he never used this expression. The Arab Policy denomination was forged under Pompidou's government, and fully implemented under Giscard d'Estaing presidency (Filiu, 2013, in Lequesne, Vaïsse, 2013: 199). Although during electoral campaigns it is common for presidential candidates (like Mitterrand and Sarkozy) to promise a break with the past, the truth is that once the new President is in the *Elysée*, no major changes are undertaken. When looking at the discourses of Mitterrand and Sarkozy, it is possible to see great similarities between the two of them (interview with French diplomat, 19 April 2010). Economic interests and historical links are important factors that cannot be ignored. France's Mediterranean policy, at least nominally, is relatively recent. Paris has traditionally been a major player in the Mediterranean, but primarily by maintaining strong relations with Arab countries. It was during Mitterrand's Presidency that French Mediterranean policy developed, as defended by Chérigui in all of her works,²⁸ and this is commonly accepted in other French literature (Schmid, 2009; Dakowoska, 2001).

During the time that Spain was negotiating its adhesion to Europe in the 1980s, François Mitterrand introduced the Mediterranean policy, but despite the name change, it continued being based on De Gaulle's principles. However, discourse with a southern orientation was also present in Mitterrand's new Mediterranean policy.

In the 1980s and 1990s, a methodological debate about how to act in the Mediterranean region arose. France pledged its commitment to a vertical association between European countries and the Arab Maghreb Union that went beyond the institutional segmentation (Chérigui, 1997: 7-8). Therefore, between 1988 and 1989,

²⁸ Chérigui analyses the evolution from the Arab to the Mediterranean policy from the perspective of regional leadership.

Paris sponsored two events to strengthen regional policies. The first event was the Mediterranean forum,²⁹ and the second was the establishment of the 5+4 (or group of nine) that eventually became the 5+5 Dialogue. Shortly after, the European Community approved the Renewed Mediterranean Policy. While Spain was focused on developing the Mediterranean policy within the Communitarian framework by emphasising the concept of region-building, France concentrated on other regional initiatives where Europe was not necessarily involved, and with a different approach than the ones of the Spanish counterparts. In that sense, French efforts were based on “*une recherche unilatérale de leadership*” (a unilateral quest for leadership) (Chérigui, 1997: 8).

A number of factors influenced the European interest in deepening relations with the Mediterranean at regional level: the failure of Franco-Algerian cooperation, the rise of Islamism and, finally and most importantly, German unification and its consequences for the European Communities.

But, what exactly is the Mediterranean policy of France? Although it was Mitterrand who re-established this concept, it is only the result of a much longer process (Rubio Plo, 2008). This is what Schmid calls “*l’appropriation politique de la Méditerranée par les Français*” (the Mediterranean political appropriation by the French) with the introduction of the Mediterranean as a regional concept. This perspective of “*mediterraneisme*” is what Mitterrand would ‘impose’ in the 1990s (Rubio Plo, 2008: 3).

This is in line with Braudel’s conception of the Mare Nostrum, as previously mentioned. In more recent times, the Mediterranean policy intends to be an answer to increasing regionalisation. It is the French fight to find a place in the world. Paradoxically, the French answer consists in developing a progressive Mediterraneanisation which, in turn, is based on an “individual Mediterranean”³⁰ (Chérigui, 2000: 144). This notion embraces states as well as other actors who share common values and whose nature is inclusive and multilateral.³¹ This sense of belonging is reinforced by the Mediterranean mythology that French diplomacy has used since 1930 (Henry, 2009: 21). In opposition,

²⁹ Later on, it was suspended and resumed again in 1993-1994 at the initiative of France and Egypt.

³⁰ Individual, in this sense, is indivisible.

³¹ It is inclusive because the only condition to be Mediterranean is the geographic component.

French Arab policy is exclusive, as it is established on a monoculture approach that includes only the Arab countries. It aims for the reconstruction of a national discourse and has a strong component of bilateralism (Chérigui, 2000: 144).

One may think that with the return of a Gaullist, Jacques Chirac, to the *Elysée*, the traditional line would be re-established; however, according to Chérigui, since 1997 French Mediterranean policy has been the main diplomatic tool in the country's relations with southern Mediterranean countries (Chérigui, 2000), although evidence suggests that this only occurs when France acts at a multilateral level. Several authors pointed out that Chirac turned again to the Arab policy, combining the two policies for a short amount of time (Filiu, 2013, in Lequesne, Vaïsse, 2013; Bozo, 2012). Nevertheless, Arab policy has not been entirely abandoned. On the contrary, it is an important element of foreign policy and sometimes it is not easy to define it in practice, as discussion surrounding the concept is more of a theoretical debate than a practical one.³² In fact, French policy regarding the Mediterranean region is articulated around three axes: Mediterranean, Arab, and *Francophonie*, which ultimately constitutes a powerful machinery to project influence toward the region.


This research points to the existence of a hierarchy, which includes Arab policy within the Mediterranean policy, where both dimensions coincide (see Figure 3). Arab policy does not disappear; the two coexist, and what differs is the degree of emphasis as well as the institutional framework in which they operate when a given policy includes the same actors. When that occurs, I argue that France prioritises the Mediterranean policy. The *Francophonie* axis, however, is carried out in a different dimension. It has a global nature since many of the states are not exclusively Arab or Mediterranean, and therefore this aspect of Mediterranean policy contains some features that cannot entirely apply to the region.

Having said that, it is important to note that, quite often, when speaking with individuals about these policies, a kind of simplification occurs. It is commonly

³² In my interviews with French officers and scholars, I have been able to get a clear distinction between these two policies. Most of the time, interviewees have linked Arab policy to a pro-Arab attitude, and Mediterranean policy to a pro-Israel attitude. Paradoxically, this reductionism has been even bigger within academia. Diplomats have pointed out other elements for evaluation, although they have played down the importance of this debate in practical terms, contrary to what academics did, and for whom this was a very important distinction when defining French foreign action toward the region.

acceptable to identify the Arab policy with a more pro-Arab approach, and link the Mediterranean policy to a more pro-Israeli attitude. However, as shown by Chérigui (1997), the latter is not exclusively based upon the degree of support for Israel. This reductionism also applies to the common misunderstanding that conservative Mediterranean governments are more pro-Arab, while the parties situated at the left are more pro-Israel, which is a “caricaturisation” of the reality (Filiu, 2013, in Lequesne, Vaïsse, 2013, 200).

Figure 3. The Mediterranean - Arab dilemma



Source: self-elaboration (Delgado, 2011)

To conclude, the argument developed here is that Arab policy has not been replaced, subordinated, or neglected, but when two issues or areas coincide and both policies overlap, it is the Mediterranean policy that prevails, although this may entail some contradictions in the strategy carried out by the different governments, as it will be explained with further detail in chapter 6. Nevertheless, it is precisely the existence of this debate that proves French commitment to the region.

2.3.2 SPAIN: EXTERNAL ACTION AND THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Spanish organisational structure in foreign policy, and more precisely, the Ministry of Foreign and Cooperation Affairs, have to be understood as an evolution and adaptation from the transition from a dictatorial regime to democracy. From the mid-1950s, the military-backed Franco regime was not as isolated as it was during its first stage, yet Spain was still not fully integrated in the international community. Thereafter, with the establishment of a democratic system in 1982, it was intended

that this system would create a new structure that would serve Spanish ambitions of becoming an influential and committed country.

Following Article 97 of the Spanish constitution, the Iberian country is ruled according to the principle of unity of action abroad—a fact that does not prevent other actors or institutions, such as regional governments, from engaging in external activities. On the other hand, the centrality of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation is, somehow, affected by this activity. Furthermore, the specific notable role of the Prime Minister and the duties that other ministries have in some areas also reinforce this dynamic of cooperation / competition.

The Spanish constitution defines the political system as a Parliamentary Monarchy (section 1). Spanish law frames the King's attributions and it has helped to reinforce the role of the Premier. Following Blázquez's argument, the Spanish system permits a vote of no confidence that would entail the Prime Minister's resignation from office. Also, the head of the executive branch is elected by the legislative body. Finally, government and Prime Minister are collectively known as the executive body. But, there is a contradiction here, as Blázquez points out.

The Spanish Prime Minister acts as a one-person executive, especially in foreign policy, and this action is bolstered by the party list system. This means that in practice, the PM can never be brought down by the Parliament and this enhances the role of the Prime Minister by permitting decisions to be made without the approval of other members of the government (Blázquez Vilaplana, 2002, 55-57). Therefore, there are elements at parliamentary level that may serve to constrain the Prime Minister's actions but, in practice, rarely occurs; thus, the nature of the system reinforces the role of the Premier, mainly in foreign policy. The key point, however, is that the Prime Minister is not directly elected, nor is the head of the state.


Turning now to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, the current organisation is the result of a long restructuring process, but it has not been a far-reaching reform. After Franco's death, external resources seemed to be poor and inadequate for the new era that Spain had just embarked upon. Early years were marked by minor reforms and continuity with the existing structure (Moreno Juste, 1995: 244). It was under the government of Felipe González (1982-1996) that this

restructuring was undertaken coinciding with the Spanish accession to Europe (see figure 4). There were three major changes (Hernando de Larramendi *et al*, 2009, in Hernando de Larramendi, Mañé, 2009: 70-71):

1. Creation of a Secretariat of State of the European Union to replace the one of the Relations with the European Communities.
2. Creation of the Secretariat of State for International Cooperation and for Latin America.
3. Establishment of a General Secretariat for Foreign Affairs that thereafter would coordinate all the activities of the General Directorate for Foreign Affairs, as well as other high-level tasks.

It is certainly interesting that, although the Mediterranean is one of the vectors of Spanish foreign policy, it lacks a Secretariat of State unlike other European and Latin American countries. The Mediterranean area was thus framed within the General Directorate of Foreign Policy for Africa and the Middle East, and within the current distribution, Mediterranean affairs fall under the umbrella of the General Directorate of Foreign Policy for the Mediterranean, North Africa, and Middle East. Perhaps that is why it was necessary to create diverse sub-directorates such as North Africa and the Middle East, Israel, etc., that are still in place. In addition, there is a special Ambassador for the Mediterranean, another for Israel, and another for the Muslim communities that compensate for the lack of named institutional focus.

Figure 4. MAEC simplified organisational chart (1988-1996)



Source: Hernando de Larramendi, *et al* (2009)³³

An innovative change was the creation of the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (AECI) in 1988. It reflected the Spanish ambition to become a first-rate power. In 2004, the Foreign Affairs Ministry's structure was modified to accommodate the preponderance that official development aid had acquired. The name was modified and it became the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MAEC) (B.O.E, 2004). This branch, which has its own network of independent centres, not only deals with development cooperation and aid, but also it has responsibility for promoting Spanish culture and science. This leads to rivalry with the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Economy and Finance and within the MAEC itself. The severe crisis affecting Spain finally eroded economic aid, as Zapatero starting cutting over €600 million (Cadena Ser, 13 May 2010) and the current government has cut by 23.4% in international development aid (El Mundo, 30 September 2012).

In 1996, a change in the government could have led toward a new restructuring process. However, the Maastricht Treaty, which obliged states to control public deficits, forced Spain to keep the same structure. Abel Matutes assumed control of the foreign

³³(*) In 1994, this General Directorate disappeared. Their functions were divided among two other institutions of the AECI


(**) From 1995, the name changed and it became the Institute for Cooperation with the Arab World, Mediterranean and developing countries

affairs portfolio and drafted a preliminary proposal on reform of the Foreign Service that, finally, was not implemented. None of Matute's proposals were designed to give further relevance to the Mediterranean region. The Mediterranean was an important topic of the foreign policy rhetoric, but not to the extent of having its own Secretariat. Instead, the General Directorate of Foreign Policy for Africa, Asia, and the Pacific took over the region.

Josep Piqué, the new Spanish Foreign Minister from 2000 to 2002, immediately drew attention to the lack of foreign affairs resources and showed further ambition for the role of the Ministry and Spain in general (Piqué, 2001). The General Directorate for Foreign Affairs in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa was established. From this moment on, the Ministry had a Special Ambassador for Mediterranean Affairs, who would take responsibility for the Barcelona Process and, later, the Union for the Mediterranean. The arrival of the Socialist Party in power and the return of Miguel Ángel Moratinos as Minister of Foreign Affairs suggested a greater "Mediterraneanisation." Moratinos was well aware of the need to make far-reaching reform, as shown by his appointment of a Commission for the Comprehensive Reform of the Foreign Service (CRISEX) in 2005 (see Figure 5).

The economic crisis that began in 2008-2009 had a direct impact on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, forcing it to reduce costs despite the fact that in 2010 Spain would hold the rotating presidency of the European Council. While this fact significantly affected Piqué's reform mentioned above, the truth is that, ultimately, the Mediterranean division has not undergone major adjustments compared to other Secretariats (interview with Spanish diplomat, 10 February 2011). For instance, there are no major changes between the structure or team composition since the launch of the Barcelona Process in 1995, even if a new initiative such as the Union for the Mediterranean has replaced the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

Figure 5. Organisations within the MAEC (2010)



Source: Sanz (2011) pp. 587

Spain has a diplomatic network of 118 embassies abroad (Sanz, 2011: 605), and the same ambassador may be responsible for several countries. Also, there are numerous representatives in international organisations, which, at the time of writing are 15, in addition to the 32 Ambassadors on Special Missions (MAEC).³⁴ Regarding consular offices, Spain has 184 representations around the world (MAEC).³⁵ Also, the overseas civil service offices that lack an official state representative are housed in centres that reinforce Spain's presence. If the number of ambassadors is not sufficient to cover all countries, the human resources investment is not enough for the Spanish institutional network. In 2005, Spain had around 10,500 individuals engaged in Foreign Service, of which about 1,000 were diplomats, and the rest belonged to other administrations. It

³⁴ MAEC list of representatives at international organisations. Consulted on 27 February 2011.

³⁵ *Ibidem*. Consulted on 27 February 2011

was in 2010 when Spain, for the first time, reached a thousand diplomats (1005), of whom one third work in the central services and the rest in embassies and other international bodies (Sanz, 2011: 605).

Other important agencies of the Ministry are the Diplomatic School, the Cervantes Institute, and the Spanish Academy of Rome. These are not, however, the only entities involved in the dissemination of Spanish culture. The Arab House, the Mediterranean House and the Sefarad House (for Israel) are three very active and well-recognised institutions. Finally, certain think tanks have played a significant role in lobbying European institutions. Currently, some of them receive public funding. Among these think tanks are: the *Institut Europeu de la Mediterrània* (IEMed), the *Intituto para las relaciones internacionales Elcano*, *Fundación para las relaciones internacionales y el diálogo exterior* (FRIDE) and the *Centro de investigación internacional y documentación de Barcelona* (CIDOB).


Madrid does not have a very big budget for foreign policy. Traditionally, there has been a significant gap between objectives and resources, and this has been the subject of much analysis and criticism. In recent years, despite an increase in foreign expenditure, Spain's foreign policy investments certainly have not been able to match those of neighbouring France. In 2012, Spain reduced its foreign budget by 54.4%, with the MAEC being the ministry most affected by the economic crisis (El Mundo, 30 September 2012).

2.3.2.1 THE CURRENT GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN, MAGHREB AND MIDDLE EAST

The largest Secretariat of State is that of Foreign Affairs and Latin America; the General Directorate of the Mediterranean is included in this unit. During Zapatero's first term, the name was General Directorate of Foreign Policy for the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Africa; however, in 2005-2006, it was decided that greater prominence would be given to the latter through the Africa Plan, thus, the Africa Plan received its own General Directorate. According to Hernando de Larramendi, "this reorganisation has allowed the General Directorate of Foreign Affairs for the Mediterranean, Maghreb and Middle East to gain consistency and expertise" (Hernando de Larramendi

et al, 2009, in Hernando de Larramendi, Mañé, 2009: 70-83). The General Directorate of the Mediterranean has two General sub-directorates. The first sub-directorate, whose function is to work on bilateral relations, includes the Maghreb. Also, initiatives such as the 5+5 Dialogue are dealt with here, given its sub-regional focus. The second general sub-directorate is for the Middle East. The Mediterranean region is also the focus of three special envoys or special ambassadors: one for the Mediterranean, another special envoy for Muslim communities, and a special mission focused on fostering relations with the Jewish community and its organisations. The latter does not belong to the General Directorate of the Mediterranean, although it clearly supports the team of special envoys (see figure 6).

Figure 6. General Directorate Mediterranean, Maghreb, and Middle East (2011)



Source: Self-elaboration from Real Decreto 1124/2008 (B.O.E, 2008) and interviews

At the moment of writing, there are five people working for the Union for the Mediterranean (interview with Spanish diplomat, 10 February 2011). This number may vary if the mission has some sort of extra assignment, such as during Spain's Presidency of the European Council in 2010. During that Presidency, the unit had an ad hoc advisory board, and it was expected to continue its operations if a second summit of heads of state were to take place. Overall, the team has three career diplomats, an

expert collaborator, and one administrator. In addition, think tanks occupy a certain place within the team, given that experts from CIDOB constituted the advisory board, and the IEMed contributes on a regular basis by providing a research fellow who works with the team. In any case, the team has been enlarged in recent years, specifically the diplomatic staff. When Fidel Sendagorta or Juan Prat i Coll were the Ambassadors on Special Mission, they were the only ones in the UfM holding diplomatic posts. Sometimes they had another diplomat and an office manager assisting them, but that was it. The expert collaborator was not part of the team, therefore, the overall size comprised three to four people. Now, it ranges between five and six people, but with three fixed diplomats—still well behind the French Interministerial Mission, which serves as a point of reference when requesting further resources (interview with Spanish diplomat, 10 February 2011). Hernando de Larramendi also points to the increase of staff when comparing the nine people working in 2001 and the 13 in 2008 in the General Directorate (Hernando de Larramendi *et al*, 2009, in Hernando de Larramendi, Mañé, 2009: 85).

But, is this mission comparable to the *Mission interministérielle de l'Union pour la Méditerranée*? The answer is no. Firstly, because the Spanish Mission is just one unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not a Ministerial Mission itself. Secondly, because Spain has not held the co-presidency of the Union for the Mediterranean and, hence, it has not had the same workload or responsibilities as the French team. Thirdly, because there are no units based on policy sectors as in France. This does not mean that there are no other people involved or working for the UfM; rather, they are not formally assigned to it. This is the case of participants in sub-regional projects or staff belonging to other Ministries who cooperate with the UfM team. The Spanish team meet once a month with staff from other Ministries. It might be considered as a “mini-cell” that gathers for one day and then dissolves until next month (interview with Spanish diplomat, 10 February 2011).

However, as mentioned before, not all issues related to the Mediterranean are conducted from the General Directorate. There are some initiatives that deal with EU affairs, and it is the Secretary of State of the European Union, or more exactly, the Sub-directorate General of General Affairs who is in charge, although this occurs in close

collaboration with the General Directorate for the Mediterranean, Maghreb and the Middle East. The European Neighbourhood Policy, or the Permanent Representation of the European Union falls under the responsibility of this sub-directorate (Hernando de Larramendi, *et al*, 2009, in Hernando de Larramendi, Mañé, 2009: 84).

Like France, Spain is also part of the 5+5 Dialogue, NATO and its two Mediterranean initiatives, the Alliance of Civilizations, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OCDE) programs on the Mediterranean. Also, just like France, Spain has been the promoter of some of these initiatives and plays a considerable role within all these institutions.

In spite of the existence of specific structures and resources in Spain, there is the general perception that France has greater capacity and more powerful machinery in the service of diplomatic efforts focused on the region. “France is France” said some officers before adding that it is important to be aware of the resources that Spain has at its disposal. Interestingly, the optimistic tone of those who worked on the Barcelona Process and who were more confident about Spanish capabilities contrasts with a more prudent attitude among those who are currently working in the Union for the Mediterranean, whose statements are more cautious.

2.4 CONCLUSIONS

If we were to ask which of the two countries is best placed to exercise leadership in the Mediterranean as a closed-ended question, most likely the answer would be France. However, does this answer reflect the reality? After having presented some general factors and some other specific ones relating to the Mediterranean structures, the results suggest that at least in relation to this region, both countries have become equally relevant following the remarkable rise of Spanish diplomacy (although with a slight superiority of French diplomacy insofar as influence). The greater French weight can be argued on the basis that there have been two phases of French leadership compared with one Spanish phase with Madrid assuming the role of entrepreneur. During this Spanish preponderance, France became its main partner acting in a sort of co-entrepreneurship—an incident that will be explained in further detail in the

following chapter. While the economic crisis has damaged the Spanish economy, there is little doubt that Spain had established itself as a leading regional player by 2008. After having considered various intervening factors, some preliminary conclusions can be drawn.

First, the data show that there are many common features between the two countries. Coinciding areas of interest may encourage collaboration, but also competition. Overall, France has more resources to invest in leading the Mediterranean region, but Spain has certain specific qualities that make it a key regional actor. Despite the prominence of Paris, the country is deep in thought about what role it should and can play in the world. Spain, on the other hand, has seen its international reputation improve significantly. This improved reputation generated an optimistic climate both inside and outside the country's borders. While self-perception and other countries' perceptions are difficult to assess, these are relevant factors of interest when a country intends to gain regional credibility and pursue its ambitions pro-actively. In 15 years, Spain has gone from being a secondary player to participating very actively in Mediterranean region-building. However, as stated earlier, the economic crisis may diminish this credibility. The French role, on the other hand, is taken for granted—this could have a negative impact on France's self-perception, considering the absence of a significant increase of French weight in external affairs. The arrival of new regional actors that force a more collaborative role may affect the French public's attitude and increase the sense of that France's influence at the international level is decreasing. This loss of power calls to mind the adjusted balance of power that Paris has been compelled to adopt, forcing alliances with other partners in order to pursue its national or regional strategies.

With regard to geography and population, France stands out over Spain—a fact that has a direct impact on each country's respective representation at the European level. Furthermore, French centrality favours a more active European role, but it also entails diverse use of resources. Spain, as a peripheral country, may not be that active in other European areas, but at least can focus the resources in specific regions. The Mediterranean, and especially the Maghreb, are presented as natural areas for potential influence, and one of the reasons is due to migration flows. In France, almost

two million people are from MPC countries. In Spain, the MPC population is significantly lower: 700,000, and more than half come from Morocco. It is estimated that the Muslim community in France and Spain also differs significantly: 5 million vs. 1.6 million. These elements favour a local approach in the Spanish case, with Morocco as a privileged partner. France, on the other hand, ideally needs a regional or subregional strategy.

Turning now to energy and economic issues, France and Spain have many points in common, although French capabilities appear more solid. However, there are many elements of competition, especially in sectors like tourism or green energy. Mutual investment is high—a fact that has intertwined the two economies from the very moment of the Spanish transition to democracy; therefore, certain cooperation is also necessary. On energy, Spain is more dependent upon the Mediterranean and the Middle East than France is; France has managed to diversify in types of energy as well as in suppliers for it intends to reduce its reliance on this region. Consequently, Spanish strategy may require a regional approach given the impact that certain unstable situations like the Arab Spring put on the economy. Regional formulation is, therefore, not just a matter of ideology or mythology, but also has its *raison d'être* in certain sensitive areas of interest.

Concerning regional pro-activeness prior to the launch of the Barcelona Process, some conclusions may be inferred. It is necessary to distinguish between two distinct stages. The first one was when France was operating at regional level in Europe and the Mediterranean, and Spain was formally part of the Mediterranean but not part of the EEC. At this time, it is not possible to compare the processes of regional influence, for the two states did not belong to the same international organisations. The second stage began in 1986, when Spain joined Europe and developed a highly Mediterranean and European profile. From that moment on, both countries assumed a leading role by taking turns. This research indicates that the period of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership sees the beginning of a sort of Franco-Spanish axis, with France acting as the main entrepreneur at times, and Spain being the main voice at others. This trend, however, was sort of disrupted with the UfM, ensuing in a departure from the traditional entrepreneurial style established in the BP.

Some significant features should be highlighted: a strong preference for bilateralism and sub-regional frameworks in the case of France (Foromed, or the 5+5 Dialogue would be two examples), while Spanish trends include a multilateral approach and a greater European presence (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership). In the case of France, this is a paradox and the UfM is likely to reflect this compromise where regional approach is the goal, yet in practice, such an approach is designed to promote sub-regional collaboration. This initial preference does not mean a lack of activity in the other forums or initiatives.

There are a number of factors that suggest a more individualistic perception of France; one of these is how institutions are set up, beginning with a highly centralised and important role of the President which strengthens the image of a more autonomous France. This strong preference for a highly centralised organisation fosters a greater tendency toward bilateralism given that it is the President who is directly involved in foreign policy. Spain, which is often considered a highly multilateral actor, is also favoured by its very decentralised system. For both countries, the personality of the Prime Minister is an important factor. Focusing now on the Union for Mediterranean, certainly there has been an increase in the amount of resources contributed by both countries. The two diplomatic units differ primarily because France has an interministerial mission; therefore, it has provisions for different functions and commitments. The UfM mission is more complex and is tailored to the needs of the Union for the Mediterranean. In contrast, the Spanish team reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. Functions are divided between various Ministries; consequently, the Spanish team cannot be considered as an Interministerial Mission. Some cross-agency coordination exists, yet it is not at an advanced level. However, despite the regional approach that both countries currently have in their foreign policy strategies, neither has a Mediterranean General Directorate. France, in fact, does not distinguish the region as such, as shown in the *Quay d'Orsay* organigram. This is contradictory to the concept of the Mediterranean that both countries try to transmit, especially in the case of France.

Turning now to global resources, in terms of staff it is reported that France has around 15,500 agents compared with Spain's 10,500 foreign affairs staff members. France's

resources greatly exceed those of its neighbour, especially following the crisis of 2008-2009. However, Spanish cultural investment carried out in recent years has been remarkable. It has ranged from being almost non-existent to becoming a point of reference. Spanish cultural investment has even become a major tool of Spanish foreign policy, rivalling that of France, which has highly institutionalised and extremely effective cultural programs. The rivalry here is difficult to reconcile, leaving little room for diplomatic cooperation, and it may be one of the areas where the two countries may clash in the future.

On the basis of the aforementioned information, we can now point out the main factors that affect France and Spain's Mediterranean policy. These factors are summarised in three charts created from the data in this chapter, and they serve as a basis for the analysis of both countries' involvement in the Barcelona Process and the Union for the Mediterranean (See Appendix 1, Appendix 2, and Appendix 3).

To conclude, although an initial analysis seems to support the hypothesis that France has greater capabilities and stronger foreign influence, there are certain elements that lead us to think that Spain has been in a position to act as the regional leader, especially after the initiation of the Barcelona Process. Further resources, cultural investment, and an ambitious strategy are elements that encourage a new Spanish *entrepreneurship*. France, on the contrary, has witnessed how the Mediterranean now has more non-European actors that may affect French strategy in terms of regionalisation and cooperation. Finding new partners to collaborate with, especially those with greater capacity to mobilise resources of the EU, may become a new French strategy. It is against this backdrop that the strategy carried out during the Barcelona Process and the Union for the Mediterranean will be presented in the following chapters.

CHAPTER 3

The Barcelona Process

INTRODUCTION

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), also known as the Barcelona Process (BP), represented a break with the past: a new regional design based mainly on a mix of multilateral and bilateral actions that attempted to go beyond a traditionally economic approach. The structure of the EMP focused on three issues encompassing (1) security and political concerns, (2) economic and financial subjects, and (3) social, cultural, and human matters. Following the 2002 Valencia ministerial meeting, a fourth dimension was integrated, justice and home affairs (JHA). This revised policy formation was much more ambitious than previous initiatives of cooperation launched during the first half of the 1990s.

This chapter examines the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership from an analytical perspective, focusing on the role played by France and Spain since the signature of the Barcelona Declaration in 1995 until 2007, when Nicolas Sarkozy proposed the creation of the Mediterranean Union (MU). The type of leadership, as well as the dynamics of competition / collaboration presented in the theoretical framework will be used to explain France and Spain's input and strategies. Section one covers the negotiation preceding the EMP, where Spain had a prominent role as a broker-entrepreneur and demonstrated some elements of strategic leadership. Madrid's collaboration with Paris will be outlined to identify those elements that facilitated the road to the Barcelona Process. Section two deals with the BP's institutional structure and how it is rationally used by member states, especially France and Spain, to promote their own national agenda. Section three presents the evolution of the Partnership as a result of the Foreign Ministerial conferences organised by Madrid and Paris. This section will focus on the Mediterranean context, in which both a window of opportunity and a lack

of effective policy entrepreneurship occurred, and how this led to a situation of a virtual regional paralysis. Finally, section four examines the interaction between the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the latter of which was an initiative put forward by the European Commission (instead of the member states) and that was closely related to the Barcelona Process. However, France and Spain saw the initial design of the ENP, conceived with a strong bilateral dimension and the intent of including the Eastern partners, with concern. The chapter will present the attitudes of both countries vis-a-vis the Commission and their preferences regarding this new regional initiative.

1.1 THE ROAD TO BARCELONA: SPAIN AS POLICY ENTREPRENEUR

On 27-28 November, 1995, the heads of 27 Mediterranean and European governments met in Barcelona. The choice of the Catalan capital may be interpreted as a reward for Spain's active involvement in the negotiations, and the lobbying efforts exerted by its diplomats and politicians to host the foundational conference (Gillespie, 1999: 153; Gomez, 2003: 71). Spain welcomed the 27 government representatives, and it emphasised the Iberian country's link to the initiative by placing Barcelona in the informal name of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. For Barbé, the Barcelona Conference was "an act of political recognition of the Euro-Mediterranean dimensions of socio-economic realities and security concerns. For Spain, the conference was also an opportunity to revive the government's domestic political fortunes and to repay Catalan nationalists for parliamentary support" (Barbé, 1996: 25).

Senen Florensa identifies three events that favored the emergence of the BP (Florensa, 2010, in Beneyto *et al*, 2010: 53): the progressive construction of the EU, especially in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the existence of a European Pact between Northern and Southern countries, chiefly through Madrid-Bonn channels, by which northern countries supported the creation of an ambitious European Mediterranean policy in exchange for Southern support in bringing the countries of Central and Eastern Europe closer to Europe and, finally, the Oslo agreements that contributed to peace in the Middle East. In addition to the events pointed out by Florensa, the European Council Presidencies of France, Spain and Italy should be

included, for they were key to establishing an effective European lobby, enduring over time. In other words, there was a favorable policy window to launch the new Euro-Mediterranean project.

The underlying reason for adopting this new project was, mainly, the pursuit of regional balancing between the North and the South as well as the East and the South, a growing worldwide trend toward regionalisation (NAFTA, MERCOSUR, etc.), and the need to stabilise the socio-economic situations of the Southern Mediterranean countries (Derisbourg, 1997: 9). However, although not openly acknowledged, increased concerns regarding immigration were a significant motivation behind the decision to strengthen North-South regional integration (Joffé, 1997: 16). The proposed solution to the aforementioned issues was to adopt a new approach under the formula of a partnership, although under the European Union's guardianship. The assumption was that greater economic regionalisation would improve relations between Southern Mediterranean countries. This may be seen as a novelty occurrence having roots in the Mediterranean dimension of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the Euro-Maghreb Partnership that never came into being (Barbé, 1996: 26).

Despite the widespread acknowledgement of the need to allocate further resources to the Mediterranean and put forth initiatives, the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was not simple. For Spain, the Mediterranean region had become a priority, but this was not the case for all European partners. The progressive enlargement eastward endangered the resources devoted to Southern Europe; France shared this concern with equal intensity. This mutual understanding of the regional needs fostered closer trans-Pyrenean collaboration with the aim to act as the voices of the Mediterranean. The link between European security and Mediterranean prosperity was already an important topic in Spanish political discourse (Bicchi, 2007: 149), and Felipe González took an active role in raising Spanish national concerns to Europe in a dynamic of bottom-up Europeanisation.

The prevailing mood of optimism for talks between Palestine and Israel brought about a renewed interest from Northern European partners to the region. This positive, factor together with the close collaboration of Paris and Madrid, created a propitious

situation where the two countries developed the role of policy entrepreneurs hand-in-hand. According to Gillespie, collaboration was the dynamic that prevailed, yet sometimes conflicts arose in those areas where certain elements of rivalry existed. Nonetheless, since the two countries were interested in positioning the Mediterranean in a relevant place on the European agenda, the latent rivalry was relegated to the background so as to not weaken the Mediterranean lobby (Gillespie, 1997: 38).

Moreover, the situation in Algeria, with the rise of the FIS as the majority party and the subsequent *coup d'état*, indirectly favoured the Europeanisation of French Mediterranean interests. France thus emerged as a key international player. A turbulent situation did not favour French interests, but France certainly could not ignore such instability in Algeria. Nonetheless, its status as former colonial power limited its political and diplomatic possibilities. Relations between the two countries became tense, and several public statements made clear that French intervention was not welcome, but French remembrance of the 1994 terrorist attacks on its territory made it difficult to not intervene.

For France, the problem was whether to mediate or not, and if so, to identify the best way possible. The solution was to involve Europe. By putting Algeria on the EC agenda, France could prevent accusations of interference. Multilateralism, especially if conducted from Brussels, was seen as the best solution because France could do much more acting through Brussels than if it addressed the situation from a purely bilateral perspective (Holm, 1998: 109-114). The Europeanisation of national interests by transferring them to Europe was the best approach for French diplomats, and it represented an opportunity to act more appropriately in the eyes of the Algerians.

If Europe was the means for French action in its former colony, Spain also benefited from its European status during the negotiations with Morocco, especially in relation to the fisheries agreement. A constant latent tension, with periods of relative calm and others of acute diplomatic conflict, have historically marked Hispano-Moroccan relations. In the years prior to the EMP, these relations were especially tense due to competition in agricultural trade and the renewal of the fishing treaty (see Chapter 5). However, in relation to the fishing agreements, the situation was completely different. Spain, at the time of its accession to Europe, had the largest fleet of the EEC. This may

not be a surprise, as Spain was the third largest consumer of fish in the world, and therefore this area was a matter of “high politics.” Until Spain was incorporated into the EEC, agreements with Morocco were negotiated at the bilateral level. However, since 1996, the European Commission has been in charge of these kinds of agreements. This could lead one to think that this situation would reduce the level of conflict and the exchange of heated discussions that usually preceded any accord in this area. Reality proved that this was not the case. The weight of the member states in EEC decision-making and the high diplomatic activity to create the bottom-up Europeanisation of the Spanish fishing interests put significant pressure on the Commission to defend the interests of the Iberian country in a very aggressive way and in a context that clearly favoured Spanish interests (Vaquer i Fans, 2003; Damis, 1998).

As shown, due to the EC’s role in policy development, it is not easy to define Paris and Madrid’s input in the European Mediterranean policy. On one hand, *la Moncloa* and *l’Elysée* primarily defended their national interests which, on many occasions, are in conflict with the regional ones. On the other hand, these two countries sought to create a better regional integration with strong institutions and enough resources to be functional. At the European Council of Corfu in June 1994, the influence of France and Spain was visible in the final conclusions document, where there was an attempt to address the Mediterranean under a multilateral and multisectoral formula (European Council, 1994b). The Council invited the European Commission to start working in this direction and, in October, the Commission presented a statement where the proposal to hold a Euro-Mediterranean conference in 1995 was raised. The Franco-Spanish lobby managed to include topics such as “the pre-accession strategy with the CEECs (Central and Eastern European Countries) in no way interferes with the Community’s commitment towards the Mediterranean region”, or the increasing of “Euro-Mediterranean interdependence, notably environment, energy, migration, trade and investment”, and the establishment of an institutional framework to regulate these relationships (European Commission, 1994: 2-3).

The road to the Essen Council, however, was long and complicated. Yet again, this process was influenced by national interests that prevailed over regional ones. Spanish diplomats acted as veto-players and threatened to block the accession of Austria,

Finland, and Sweden to the EEC. The friction was, once again, regarding the fishing industry.³⁶ The day before the summit, the Spanish attitude endangered the smooth progression of the meeting, inspiring Delors to define the Iberian attitude “as a taking of hostages act (...) a government says that they do not approve a point if the one where they are particularly interested is not solved first”³⁷ (El País, 8 December 1994). This was a rather sensitive moment, for the European Council was going to discuss the process for enlargement towards the eastern countries: a key element for German foreign policy at the time and who was in charge of the rotating Presidency (it was also in this very same EU Council where the proposals previously presented by the Commission in Corfu got the necessary support). Spanish activism was behind Kohl’s decision to accept a better redistribution of the European aid. However, despite this blocking attitude, Spain and Germany had already come to an agreement over the structural funds earlier. Conversely, the French worked hard to put pressure on northern countries and collaborated with Spain to lobby other southern member states. This division of roles may be one of the best examples of Franco-Spanish partnership, as both acted as broker-entrepreneurs to convince more reluctant countries to accept the idea of a new and ambitious regional policy.

Spanish diplomats took advantage of their rotating EU presidency expected in the second half of 1995 by offering to host the Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conference. During its EU presidency, which preceded the Spanish one in 1995, France made the smooth execution of this conference its main priority. The final document containing the fundamentals of the Barcelona Declaration was presented (European Council, 1994). Furthermore, negotiation on Euro-Mediterranean agreements opened with Tunisia and Morocco. These association agreements are not just agreements—they also brought about the creation of bilateral structures to monitor and manage them.

³⁶ In the Spanish treaty of accession to the European Communities, it was established that the access in the Common Fishing Policy would be in 1993, but later this was moved to 1996. Nevertheless, Ireland, the UK, and at some points France, blocked this access. For Spanish diplomacy, the fact that the countries of the fourth expansion were to be accepted in the PCP before those of the third expansion (i.e. Spain and Portugal) was perceived as an insult. This conflict, primarily with the UK, was not solved until the end of December, after lengthy negotiations in which the UK was in the minority in the final vote.

³⁷ My translation

At the Cannes EU Council 1995, the European countries agreed upon the budget that would be allocated to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: ECU 4.6 billion over a five-year period (1995-1999). Negotiations to secure these funds were complex, even with the active role of the Commission where Marín, Commissioner for the Mediterranean, was a key figure. Despite the support of France, Spain, and Italy, the most skeptical northern countries did not grant all the funds that were originally requested. This is to say, ECU 1.6 billion less than expected (Gomez, 2003: 108). Yet, González's efforts to convince Kohl of the need to balance different European regional initiatives had a direct impact (Barbé, Mestres, Soler i Lecha, 2007: 40). The Cannes Summit was the last milestone before the meeting held in Barcelona, although it was not the last negotiation before the 27 stamped their signatures in what was going to be the regional framework for the next 13 years.

Similarly, the Mediterranean countries' success in establishing the groundwork for the Mediterranean policy depended upon a good window of opportunity; the rotating EU Presidency was in the hands of Mediterranean countries for several years, bringing about a strong Mediterranean troika. Prior to and after the launch of the EMP, the troika relied upon the presence of Mediterranean countries that were willing to raise the voice of the South. Not only had favourable institutional settings created a good environment to develop a new regional policy, but also, the composition of the Santer Commission contributed to successful negotiations and created a strong group of commissioners who were highly motivated to set a new Mediterranean agenda. The efforts of González to keep Marín in charge of the external relations with Southern Mediterranean countries, the Middle East, and Latin America were based in the idea that a certain geographical balance should exist in the commission. In this sense, the Spanish conservative party and the socialist party had made an agreement and appointed one Commissioner each. The Socialist Party appointed Manuel Marín, and the Conservative Party appointed Abel Matutes (interview with Spanish diplomat, 7 February 2011). This balance would be helpful at a later date during the changing of government establishing continuity in the regional approach to the Mediterranean (see Chapter 6). Nonetheless, the Spanish government was not the only one that sought to have a strong representative in the new team. The French government of

Édouard Balladur proposed Yves-Thibault de Silguy to manage the economic and financial portfolio. Whether or not this portfolio repartition helped the development and implementation of the Barcelona Process is clearer in the Spanish case than in the French one, but there is little doubt that by having these two posts covered, the Franco-Spanish team could count on having a privileged position from which to exert their influence.

The weeks leading up to the signature of the EMP were an obstacle race. Negotiations with Southern Mediterranean partners proved to be more complex than expected, especially in those areas where subregional subjects clashed. Much energy and resources were invested in the wording of the documents—a complicated issue considering the implications of this new regional framework of cooperation. The documents were first negotiated in Europe and were intended to be presented afterwards to the MPCs (interview with Spanish diplomat, 15 August 2013). Right up until the very last minute, the documents needed to be modified in order to meet certain requirements on some controversial issues. Finding compromises at these two levels, European and Mediterranean, required huge diplomatic efforts, and the conference was not certain to occur until the very last moment (see Chapter 5).

After reviewing the diplomatic efforts that resulted in the Barcelona Process, one can see that that collaboration between France and Spain was the rule and not the exception; yet, some divergences emerged during the process of negotiation and implementation. Gillespie calls attention to some issues that demonstrate both countries' sometimes diverging interests. One of these was French opposition to grant the United States observer status, with Spain attempting to develop a formula that would allow the US to participate. Another subject of divergence was the inclusion of Libya in the EMP—a possibility both entirely unacceptable for the United Kingdom and unwelcome by France. Perhaps the most noteworthy event occurred during the Barcelona conference itself, when French Minister Hervé de Charette proposed the name "Euro-Mediterranean Committee" to avoid any reference to the Catalan capital, and, consequently, the inherent recognition that Spanish would receive (Gillespie, 1997: 38). As we will see later in this study, the 'Barcelona' name has been a recurrent topic only addressed with the Union for the Mediterranean.

Three factors were key to the EMP successful launch: (1) a favourable window of opportunity based on an optimal international context, combined with a European institutional configuration that gave France and Spain direct influence in the policymaking process; (2) a strong collaboration and coordination between the two countries, with each carrying out an efficient distribution of roles based on broker-entrepreneurship instead of structural leadership; and (3) a policy agenda and French and Spanish internal priorities that favoured a strong external action.

Most of the literature indicates that Spain was the main leader, but it is more realistic to admit that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership owes its success to closer collaboration between France and the European Commission; in other words, Spain acted as entrepreneur. As Gillespie declares, "If a country had to be assigned the title of protagonist' of the Barcelona Process, on the European side this was clearly Spain. However, such a title obscures the reality that it was often Spain and France [working] in tandem, often supported by Portugal and Italy" (Gillespie, 1999: 152). Spain considered the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership a diplomatic success. Moreover, there was an additional reward: a strong international image and further prestige for the country among its European, Eastern, and Mediterranean partners (Barbé, Mestres, Soler i Lecha, 2007: 40). For France, this meant having a new powerful actor in the Mediterranean, but also a new partner to count on when calling for greater European attention toward the region. Elements of competition and collaboration would continue to occur during the next few years following the establishment of the Barcelona Process.

1.2 THE INSTITUTIONAL FIT OF THE BARCELONA PROCESS

A few years after the launch of the EMP, few analysts doubted its potential. However, the policy's lack of remarkable achievements was noted. The original enthusiasm was followed by more critical analyses in which the need to reinvigorate, redesign, or reinvent was proposed. As time passed, the critical vision was the most extended, and by the end of the Barcelona Process, all scholars seemed to arrive to the same conclusions: The EMP was a process full of ups and downs that globally did not satisfy

any of its goals (Amirah-Fernández, Youngs, 2005; Nuñez, 2005; Schmid, 2002; Delgado, 2008).

The main objectives of the Barcelona Process were threefold: to create an area of peace and stability through a reinforced political and security dialogue; the construction of a zone of shared prosperity through the creation of a free trade zone by 2010; and the creation of closer social, cultural and human rights expectations between participating societies. Although there is not an officially established hierarchy between the different priorities of the BP, there was an intense debate about focusing primarily on the political and security basket aspect at the expense of the other issues. This was mostly the French position; however, the Spanish government believed that all three chapters should receive the same status, for any attempt to establish new codes of conduct for international relations in the Mediterranean could bring an adverse impact on the Middle East Peace Process (Gomez, 2003: 74).

In order to make good progress, the partnership was designed to provide the most economic support on the second priority, because the EMP was based on the same logic of the European Union; in other words, an area is stable when it is economically prosperous. It is precisely because the political and security chapter of the EMP dealt with “high politics” issues within a complicated institutional structure that it would soon be blocked, thus affecting the full realisation of the initiative. Nevertheless, the EMP survived and continued in place because diplomats managed to by-pass the blockages and concentrate on other forms of cooperation.

As mentioned above, although the economic and financial aspect of the EMP was going to be the tool that would fund the development of the first policy’s first priority, ultimately, the second aspect became the most active one (Kienle 1998: 3) To Joffé, this is not surprising, considering that “this area, incidentally, has acquired such importance because, on the one hand, it is a topic on which European Union member states find it easiest to agree”(Joffé, 1997: 17). This view is shared by Monar, who noted that “low politics” are less exposed to controversy (Monar, 1998: 52).

The third policy priority focusing on social and cultural cooperation was a novelty, as it recognised the importance of the civil society as a relevant actor and helped to promote democracy and mutual cultural understanding. Although several projects were proposed from the first moment, few were implemented; thus, it took years to create an institution that would carry out the third priority. Still, as time passed, there were progressive developments, including actions such as the Civil Forum of Naples (2003), and the establishment of the Anna Lindh Foundation (2005).

The institutional configuration of the Barcelona Process was complex because it was both developed from a bilateral and multilateral approach and also faced the challenge of being developed by the European Union. In such a scenario, member states attempted to keep their *status quo* in certain issues by influencing the European Union. Although institutionalists have emphasised the capacity of the European Union to promote regional policies, the extent to which the EC and European Parliament operated independently is not very clear. In principle, the partnership included: a bilateral element, whose main task was developing the association agreements; a multilateral approach comprised of a networking association and governance bodies; and the unilateral dimension, which was responsible for negotiating the MEDA funds. Also, the EMP had its own institutional framework to make the policy's implementation possible; however, the institutions within this framework did not replace existing EU structures, and instead became part of or worked in coordination with them. This amalgam of institutions was not easy to conceptualize or to manage.

3.2.1 THE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS: THE BILATERAL DIMENSION

One of the tools at the service of the Barcelona Process was the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAs). These agreements, however, did not progress as fast as it was desired. In five years, only five agreements were signed, and many of them were not ratified by the 15 member states immediately (see Chart 5). The situation was even more striking, considering that the European Neighbourhood Policy was introduced even though some EMAs had not yet begun.

Chart 5: Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements


COUNTRY	DATE OF ENTRY
TUNISIA	01.03.1998
MOROCCO	01.03.2000
ISRAEL	01.06.2000
JORDAN	01.05.2002
EGYPT	01.06.2004
ALGERIA	01.09.2005
LEBANON	01.04.2006
PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (Euro-Mediterranean interim Association Agreement on trade and cooperation)	01.07.1997

Source: European External Action Service

The division of competences between the EEC/EU and the member states was problematic when it came to negotiating the partnership agreements with third countries, as seen previously in the Spanish and Moroccan case (see Figure 7). In Jordan's case, France, Spain, Italy, and Portugal forced the Commission to reopen the negotiations by blocking the EMA in order to protect their agricultural interests. The member states made it clear that the European Commission "went further in the negotiating mandate given by the EU" (El País, 5 September 1997).³⁸ This was a clear example of member states exercising their weight to protect their interests, even when it was the EC that was in charge of negotiations.

³⁸ My translation

Figure 7: The bilateral dimension: the Mediterranean Association Agreements



Source: Philippart (2003)


3.2.2 THE EMP INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: THE MULTILATERAL DIMENSION

The EMP's multilateral approach, which was perceived as the ultimate goal, had many levels ranging from ministerial conferences to technical meetings with senior officials. Moreover, in the framework of the partnership, several entities were established and funded with the MEDA program; some of them are still in place, despite having not been very visible to the civil society (e.g. EuroMesCo, FEMISE network...).

Although the institutions of the Barcelona Process were officially not intended to be permanent entities, they closely interacted with the EC / EU (see figure 8). The two main control boards were the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs" and "the Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process", also known as the Euro-Med Committee. The EU troika and one representative of each Mediterranean partner country formed the latter. However, since the second Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in 1997, all EU member states also sent a representative and attended as observers. With the launch of the "Barcelona Process:

Union for the Mediterranean” and the creation of a Joint Permanent Committee, the Euromed Committee, which prepared the ministerial meetings and set the work program, was dissolved.

Figure 8: The multilateral dimension: the EMP institutional framework



Source: Philippart (2003)³⁹


3.2.3 THE MEDA PROGRAMME: THE UNILATERAL DIMENSION

Before the MEDA being replaced by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) under the European Neighbourhood Policy, the role of the European Commission was also relevant although the MEDA program guidelines had to be adopted with by EC with qualified majority, at the commission’s request (See figure 9).

³⁹Note: in 2003, the Euro-Med Parliamentary forum was replaced by the Parliamentary Assembly.

However, the Commission's decisions were controlled by the Med Committee (management committee), whose negative opinion (adopted by a qualified majority) allowed the Council to replace its own measures with those of the Commission (Monar, 1998: 55). Gomez acknowledges that "this institutional configuration ensured that the national governments closely monitored both the technical side of the proposed projects and their political context" (Gomez, 2003: 109).

Figure 9: The unilateral dimension: MEDA programme



Source: Philippart (2003)

3.3 THE WEIGHT OF EU MEMBER STATES WITHIN THE EURO MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP

After having briefly seen the institutional configuration of the Barcelona Process, the question is how member states found a way to project influence over the institutions that were supposed to have a leading role? To Monar, the EMP was formally an intergovernmental process (Monar, 1998: 54). Schmid, however, thinks otherwise, and notes the EMP's hybrid nature, being neither strictly intergovernmental nor communitarian in the sense of the Maastricht Treaty's first pillar (Schmid, 2002: 12).

This interpretation is more consistent with the theoretical approach presented in the first chapter, although this study highlights how member states tended to control the process of decision-making and, ultimately, had a more prominent role than the European institutions did. It was the member states who signed and ratified the agreements, and the meetings at the highest level were conducted by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (at least until 2005).

This does not mean that the European role was nonexistent, especially that of the Commission. Member states delegated extensively in the EC, which was responsible for preparing, monitoring, and coordinating the partnership. For Gomez, the European Commission began the negotiation process with an advantage over individual member states, as it was the only European representative in the two main steering committees. This fact helped the Commission “in setting the agenda and articulating the EU’s interests” (Gomez, 2003: 108). Nevertheless, the events refuted this assertion. The conclusions of the Malta Conference of April 1997 suggested that states found a mechanism to offset the EC’s initial advantage, as was reflected in the document where those attending the meeting “also agree[d] that the role of the (Med) Committee would be enhanced by the presence of the representatives of all member states of the European Union” (European Commission, 1997).

The European Parliament’s role in the EMP was very limited. In the past, the Parliament had a certain amount of power over the EMP budget approval, and it tried to use the budget to introduce some elements of political conditionality. For some analysts, this added an extra element of complexity, for the European institutions might have been tempted to set their own priorities in foreign policy via budgetary adjustments (Monar, 1998: 58). With the introduction of the MENA funds, the parliament’s role was reduced; the regulatory framework of the budget stated that the parliament was only to be informed about developments and had no capacity to act upon the budget (Article 15, MEDA regulation). One wonders whether the limitation of the parliament’s capacity for action was a preemptive move to simplify the process, an effort to not jeopardize member states’ power, or to further exercise control over the European Union’s ability to act externally.

3.4 FROM EUPHORIA TO INDIFFERENCE: THE MEDITERRANEAN FACING OBLIVION

During the years following the signing of the Barcelona Process, a worsening situation not favourable to the good development of the partnership developed. When referring to an adverse context, one might think of the Arab-Israeli conflict; however, the Mediterranean region is a sea of many shores, and the partnership was confronted by many breaking waves. Some of these events include: the accession of Turkey; constant conflicts in the Aegean Sea; the destabilization of the Arab Mediterranean countries; the '11/9' followed by the 11M and the 7J; the war in Iraq and European division over it; and, on top of all these, the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the other hand, due to the lack of a window of opportunity, there was the need for an entrepreneur capable of exercising certain leadership at a multilateral European level. This role—that *a priori* could have been played by the European Commission considering the multilateral dimension—only happened to a certain extent, as member states maintained good control of the commission's initiatives, as seen in the previous chapters. Instead, member states—especially Spain—played an important role during their EU presidencies (or on the anniversary of the Barcelona Process) to try to reactivate the Partnership. In this sense, leadership roles were equally shared between the EC and EU member states.

3.4.1 THE MEDITERRANEAN WITHOUT A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY AND WITHOUT ACTIVE ENTREPRENEUR

In 1995, when all partners gathered in Barcelona, the regional distribution was 15 European countries + 12 non-EU Mediterranean partners. However, 10 years later, the situation was completely different. To begin with, the number of countries present changed from 15+12⁴⁰ to 27+10, as Malta and Cyprus became part of the European Union. Turkey, benefitted from its official candidature for EU membership, and Israel benefitted from a different financial and trade regime than did the rest of the MPCs. To Khader, the EMP became a Euro-Arab partnership, even though it was not openly

⁴⁰The 15 countries plus the 12 Mediterranean ones (Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and The Palestinian Authority), with Mauritania, The Arab League, and the Union of the Arab Magrheb as observers.

recognised (Khader, 2009: 17). Although the number of the countries remained the same, the weight and distribution was substantially different.

From the beginning, some scholars questioned whether the AEM could truly be considered a partnership. Gillespie wondered, "Can the Euro-Mediterranean process be described meaningfully as a 'partnership', which implies sharing and compromise, or have certain countries, or a certain bloc of countries, imposed their will on the rest?" (Gillespie, 1997: 34). Years later, when analysing the results of eight years of the initiative, Philippart pointed out that "the EMP suffers from asymmetries in the multilateral structure that contradict the partnership spirit. Partnership is more an objective than a reality. In line with the strong dependence of the Med partners and the unfavorable power distribution, the nature of the relationship often corresponds more to a soft form of hegemony than to a partnership" (Philippart, 2003: 11). This fact was relevant for two reasons: (1) it supported those arguments coming from Mediterranean partners regarding the lack of ownership in the initiative; (2) it would be one of the arguments later used by France to redefine and replace the Barcelona Process.

The Southern European countries attempted to offset the progressive loss of power between the North and South. Spain welcomed the enlargement of the EU to include Bulgaria and Romania. Foreign Minister Ana Palacios declared, "in the Union's interest, the enlargement should not result in a shift to the North and East of its center of gravity. Geographical balance is essential and for its continuity, the Europeans have to ensure that Bulgaria and Romania, and eventually Turkey, would be ready to join up as soon as possible" (Congreso de los diputados, 2002).⁴¹ To Spain, the admission of the two countries meant a better redistribution East to South.

The enlargement would also mean that the Mediterranean countries' EC presidencies would be less frequent. Thus, after the Italian presidency in 1996, there would not be another opportunity for Mediterranean countries to lead until 2000, when Portugal and then France would again be at the head of Europe. But is this fact significant enough to explain the loss of regional activity? An analysis of the presidencies proves otherwise. Some Northern countries like the Netherlands or Germany had been very

⁴¹ My translation

active in the framework of the partnership and had invested heavily during their presidencies to make the ministerial meetings possible—sometimes under very difficult diplomatic situations. From 2000 to 2003, Europe had up to five Mediterranean countries holding the EC presidency; with the exception of the Valencia Conference of 2002 under the Spanish Presidency, none of the Mediterranean countries succeeded in rejuvenating the EMP. For the Spanish diplomacy, the Valencia summit was a success that proved that the Mediterranean is important for all governments of *la Moncloa* (interview with Spanish diplomat, 6 May 2010). Furthermore, the UK had been sensitive to the southern countries' demands; it agreed to organise two Mediterranean meetings on UK territory during its EC presidencies, tradition dictated that all meetings were to be conducted either in the country holding the presidency or in Brussels. Therefore, it is questionable to blame the lack of Mediterranean presidencies as the cause for not creating the momentum to breathe new life into the Barcelona Process. This hypothesis is hardly acceptable, especially if it is not addressed with consideration of other factors.

Another reason often highlighted to explain the lack of leadership from Mediterranean countries was the change in diplomatic teams. This is also debatable. While it is true that the change of officials in *la Moncloa* had an impact on the Spanish team, shortly after, the socialist Mediterranean leaders were again appointed to high political positions with the approval and support of the conservative party. Until 1999, Manuel Marín continued to be responsible for Mediterranean affairs at the European Commission, and for a short period of time, he served as acting President of this institution after the Santer Commission was forced to resign in March 1999. Miguel Ángel Moratinos was the Spanish ambassador to Israel, although not for long. Moratinos was proposed to be the new EU special envoy to the Middle East—a role he held until 2003. In 1999, Javier Solana became the first High Representative for the CFSP until the Lisbon Treaty began. With his extensive experience in Brussels and his involvement in the Mediterranean regional development, Abel Matutes became the new Foreign Affairs minister. Filling in Matutes' previous position was Josep Piqué, who had a Mediterraneist profile: this fact gave certain policy continuity at the multilateral level. It is perhaps due to the appointment of Ana Palacio during the final

two years of the conservative government's tenure that the differences in perspective were more remarkable (interview with Spanish diplomat, 02 February 2011).

One might argue that since 1999, neither France nor Spain have had a commissioner responsible for enlargement or in charge of foreign relations with neighbouring countries. However, both countries had obtained the portfolios of economic matters and internal markets, the latter of which was widely desired by France. More recently, the French diplomat Pierre Vimont was appointed executive secretary general at the European External Action Service (EEAS). Another Frenchman, Hugues Mingarelli, assumed responsibility over the DGs for Middle Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood, and Claude-France Arnould became the current chief executive of the European Defence Agency. Ultimately, it is difficult to argue that both France and Spain did not have key positions at European level that would enable them to lobby at the regional level.

However, two elements changed significantly, when compared with those that paved the road to Barcelona: the reorientation of Chirac's and Aznar's foreign policies,—both of which adopted a different approach. Chirac returned to the traditional Arab policy based more on bilateral actions, leaving the concept of the Mediterranean to be addressed under the EMP yet without investing great energy. Aznar also brought about change compared to the previous government that was more centred in strengthening relations with Morocco. The conservative party continued with the same strategy at the bilateral level, although there were big differences at the bilateral level when compared with the previous government's position (interview with Spanish diplomat, 02 February 2011). In addition, the lack of understanding between the two governments led to episodes of diplomatic tensions. This discord caused some politicians to think that Aznar was "anti-French" (interview with Catalan politician, 14 May 2010). Cooperation was limited to technical actions in which Spain and France continued to work together, but politically, the two governments did not show the same degree of understanding and coordination.

Moreover, the fact was that for France, the EMP was no longer a priority, leaving the policy practically in the hands of Spain after the signature in Barcelona. This fact is a key element to understand the why the partnership had such poor results. France's

position was especially relevant, considering that the Spanish diplomacy recognised that “France today is an irreplaceable country in the Mediterranean (...) and Spain alone cannot pull ahead with a major initiative such as the Barcelona Process” (interview with Spanish diplomat, 23 July 2010).

Regarding the Mediterranean regional context, if there were a conflict that was constantly present in all negotiations, it was certainly the Middle East conflict. During the first years of the Barcelona Process, the favourable policy window after the conference of Madrid seemed to come to an end with the election of Netanyahu in 1996. When Ehud Barak won the Israeli elections three years later in 1999, this was seen as a positive factor that would not last long. The failed Summit of Camp David in 2000 preceded the second intifada that contaminated all regional actions. All ministerial conferences were heavily impacted by the relations between the Arab countries and Israel; on some occasions, Israel either vetoed the Arab countries’ ability to host the meetings (none of the ministerial conferences could be celebrated in a Southern Mediterranean country), or refused to attend the summits. The Dutch presidency, for instance, was unable to get a strong mandate to organise the Second Conference of Foreign Ministers. Furthermore, the French council presidency had to give up its plan to conduct the first summit at the level of head of states, and the 2002 Spanish Council Presidency was forced to act in the frame of the Quartet instead of acting as the European representative.⁴²

Situations of boycott by Israel or the Arab countries arose in which meetings were organised without informing the Hebrew country (Youngs, 1999: 3-5). The EMP agreements advanced very slowly, and the negotiations on agriculture, human rights, and European funds were a constant source of setbacks. These topics were often mingled with both the peace process and national political preferences. For example, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly suspended the ratification of the EMA with Israel because of Netanyahu’s strategy, and it only was approved after 1999 when Ehud Barak was elected. On the other hand, Israel firmly refused to recognise the legitimacy of the EMAs with the Palestinian Authority.

⁴² A good example is the non-authorization of the Israeli government to let Josep Piqué and Javier Solana visit Arafat in Ramallah in April 2002 (El País, 08 April 2002).

The Charter of Peace and Stability was the impossible project. The charter was the means through which the first priority of the Barcelona Declaration would be implemented; it aimed to enhance political dialogue and, therefore, to prevent security risks. The document would have been politically yet not legally binding, but still it proved to be very difficult to apply. The High Representative and the Secretariat of the Council were the actors more involved in this negotiation, and the European Commission kept a low profile (Philippart, 2003: 2). A first attempt at achieving a compromise occurred in 2000, but in Marseille, the implementation was delayed until the conditions of the peace process would be more appropriate: a fact that remained in all subsequent meetings.

The peace process was not the only regional conflict that the BP faced. One of the events that further jeopardized the Barcelona Process for a while was Turkey's prospective accession to the EU. The well-known opposition of countries like France and Germany, and the sentiment that the Partnership might be used by European partners to influence the negotiation in course, was present especially at the beginning of the partnership; this was the main framework of negotiation between Ankara and Brussels.

For Barcelona, the '11/9' was the return to the "Clash of civilizations" debate similarly described in Huntington's book. One of the major consequences was the reorientation of US strategy in what was called the war against terror. The Mediterranean, suddenly, became a relevant area for the Bush Administration, which increased its presence and diplomatic efforts in the region. This fact was especially sensitive for the French, who historically had sought to counteract US weight in international affairs, and saw the Mediterranean as an area for its own projection. For a certain amount of time, the Barcelona Process—the only framework where the US was not present—became again an initiative of special interest.

The '11/9' and the Iraq war, the war of Syria and Lebanon, or the latent conflict between Morocco and Algeria moved the Mediterranean region higher in the European priorities again. Unfortunately, however, the old continent was not yet ready to act with a single voice, contributing only with a beautifully designed initiative, extremely imperfect and exposed to blockage when faced with regional tensions.

3.4.2 THE MINISTERIAL CONFERENCES AND OTHER MEETINGS: THREE LOST OPPORTUNITIES

The EMP came into being with feverish activity. As with any other initiative, this was quite normal; but, the Mediterranean was particularly sensitive to those kinds of ups and downs of great political and media attention. At the beginning, this tension all but faded away as fast as it started. 1995 was the year of the Mediterranean in this sense, but the regional impulse partially disappeared from the political discourse and the academic research.

After the BP was signed, one may not say that the Mediterranean was not in the core of the European agenda. The period beginning after the signing was very promising: the creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMesCo) in 1996, and more than 50 events, ministerial meetings, and senior official workshops occurred. However, the MPCs political context had a negative impact upon regional development, having direct consequences for the partnership. The favorable environment that paved the way for the peace process talks had completely disappeared by 1997. The Arab countries and Israel were, once more, the epicenter of regional conflicts. Furthermore, relations between Turkey and Greece were not helping to keep the Mediterranean waters calm. Months after the launch of the BP, Greece blocked the MEDA funds, arguing that Turkey was not respecting human rights; of course, this decision was strongly influenced by the ongoing dispute for the islands in the Aegean Sea. This decision brought the delay in the expenditure of the funds allocated for the first period of the policy period: a fact that was strongly debated in the Spanish and French parliamentary control sessions (Congreso de los diputados, 1996). Furthermore, if part of the success of the BP was due to the good coordination and communication among the different countries' rotating EU presidencies, these optimal relations seemed to disappear after the initial BP launch. Spanish opposition was particularly critical of the Italian presidency, as the opposition considered that there was a lack of activism to prevent the blockage of the MENA funds (Congreso de los diputados, 1996b).

3.4.2.1 THE CONFERENCE OF MARSEILLE

The European Commission was not oblivious to the difficult situation, and it produced a document called “Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process” (European Commission, 2000) at the initiative of British Commissioner Christopher Patten. In this paper, the EMP was seen as a high priority. Although the document recognised the difficulties encountered with the peace process in the Middle East and noted the delay in the ratification of the association agreements, it also pointed out: the lack of “sufficiently frank and serious dialogue on issues such as human rights, prevention or terrorism or migration”; the slow progress in economic reforms “to meet the obligations contained in the Association Agreements”; the lack of south-south economic cooperation where “the association agreements provide opportunities, not guarantees”; the difficulty of the implementation of the MEDA funds by cumbersome procedures but also by problems “in meeting conditions because of hesitation over reform”; and, finally, it called attention to the “insufficient awareness of the opportunities and benefits of the process in society at large.” These excerpts from the document show a rather critical text with particularly strong wording, in contrast to previous papers that were much less assertive, especially when addressing the particular situations of the Southern Mediterranean partners. Despite this straightforward phrasing, the document also provided concrete proposals to advance south-south regionalisation; according funding to those that met the objectives of the association agreements and had the ability to present mature projects. The text paved the way to the Marseilles conference in a manner that was unusually harsh yet conscious of the difficulty of the context.

In the second half of 2000, France assumed the rotating EU Presidency. The situation for France was not easy at either the national or international level. Jacques Chirac was ruling in cohabitation with the socialist government of Lionel Jospin. The socialists Pierre Moscovici and Hubert Védrine were Jacques Chirac’s co-pilots. The initial intention was to have cooperation among different political parties to achieve a strong European presidency, and therefore, three axes were agreed upon: first, to focus on job creation following the Lisbon agenda; second, to bring Europe closer to the citizens by achieving progress on issues such as food safety, preparation for the adoption of

the Euro, or the chart of the fundamental rights of the Union. The third axis was the European Institutional reform (Jospin, 2000), and it was precisely that point which would stand out over the rest of measures carried out by the French presidency. However, the President of the European Parliament, Frenchwoman Nicole Fontaine, concluded that France's tenure was not a good presidency, partly due to the inter-party commingling, with a very difficult relationship between different political sides. Fontaine herself recognised that the fact that she was French remained a secondary issue with no relevant impact, and that regarding the negotiations that would lead to the Treaty of Nice, there was no real political will to reach a compromise between the 25 states (Fontaine, 2008). Spaniard MEPs Barón Crespo shared this same view, arguing that an agreement was reached after complex negotiations, culminating in "a pull out compromise reached in night hours and a mix of national interests that [would] hinder further the community decision-making" (Barón Crespo, 2000).⁴³ Chirac, in his 2000 speech before the European Parliament, recognised that the treaty did not completely satisfy the parliament, but that it was the best agreement that could be reached without proclaiming winners or losers (Chirac, 2000). This statement shows the difficulties encountered by the President during negotiations between different actors and countries that were carried out from a national point of view.

Regarding the Mediterranean, the Marseille Ministerial Conference of foreign affairs of 1997 did not bring about significant changes regarding the EMAs or, generally speaking, in relation to the economic priority of the EMP. Its achievements that stood out were the renewal of the *Forum Euroméditerranéen des Instituts de Sciences Économiques* (FEMISE) network, the announcement of the MEDA II, the limited progress in the definition of the Security Charter, and the adoption of certain changes in the administrative structure to avoid some conflicts that had occurred in the past (European Commission, 2000b). France sent senior officials from the presidency, the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the Council to meet with the partner countries in order to prepare the ministerial meeting and to have better insight and understanding of each country's problems. Paris aspired to hold a Mediterranean summit after the ministerial conference where the heads of

⁴³ My translation.

government would be present in order to put the region at the forefront again. As it was expected that the charter would be adopted in this conference, French diplomats sought to accord greater relevance to this fact by making this the first summit of heads of states, but finally this was not possible (Daguzan, 2000: 52). To Daguzan, this fact was predictable. The preparatory document presented by the Portuguese EU presidency, in which very general goals were listed, revealed the little leeway that the commission and the council had to act under difficult regional circumstances (Daguzan, 2000: 53). In this sense, the author was right to point out the lack of specific content, with Annex 5 of the presidential conclusions being a good example (European Council, 2000).

However, the fact that the European Commission also presented the paper “reinvigorating the Barcelona Process” (European Commission, 2000) in September 2000, showed a degree of awareness and willingness on the part of the commission to play a greater function than the one described by Daguzan. In this case, it was the commission that adopted an entrepreneurship role, proposing solutions to undo the situational gridlock, although the limited success suggested that without the support of a member-state acting as a broker-entrepreneur, there was little that the institution could do. In this case, France defined the Marseille meeting as one of its priorities, but the truth is that its role within the partnership was already in question: “in 2000, the Euro-Mediterranean dossier, traditionally regarded as a priority for the French, did not benefit from all the attention planned during the French presidency of the EU” (Schmid, 2002: 19).⁴⁴ Although the EC presidencies have some constraints in terms of time, agenda-setting abilities, and resources to implement regional policies, the difficult negotiations of the Treaty of Nice—itsself conducted from a national perspective and with a highly individualistic style— monopolized part of the EU rotating Presidential semester (Schwarzer, 2008, 367)

Despite the activism from the *Quai d’Orsay*, the boycott from the Arab countries and the convulse regional situation was not enough to materialize French ambitions. The second intifada heavily affected the Marseille conference. At that time, neither Syria nor Lebanon participated in the meeting and both refused to share a table with Israel;

⁴⁴ My translation

contrary to what happened in Malta, adopting a joint statement proved to be a chimera. At the end, only the formal presidential conclusions were presented. In reality, months before the conference, this situation was anticipated by French diplomacy. The Foreign Minister himself stated that “for a Summit to be usefully held in Marseille, it is necessary that the state of the peace process in the Middle East could not be used by some participants as an excuse for them to block the work” (Védrine, 2000: 1666).⁴⁵

For the French senate, the fourth ministerial conference held under the French presidency was “*l’ambition déçue de Marseille.*” (Le Pensec, 2001). This poor result, together with the Council of Nice’s outcomes, resulted in the French EC presidency’s imbalance. Advances in some fields were easily measurable and not always fairly pondered, but these did not offset the disappointing results in Europe and the Mediterranean: such disappointing outcomes were proof of Paris’ difficulty in maintaining its influence in a new Europe with multiple actors and poles.

3.4.2.2 THE CONFERENCE OF VALENCIA

A combination of factors prompted a renewed interest in the *Mare Nostrum*. The 2001 attacks in New York on September 11t put the region back on the European (and the world) agenda. Equally important was the situation in Iraq, which was gradually degraded; the war served as a test of European cohesion—a test that Europe failed. On a different level, several EU countries, including France, were distracted by their own presidential elections: a fact that tended to prioritize national approaches over the European one. National elections especially had an impact on the Mediterranean, where failure at the regional level had great media significance. Moreover, unlike in 1995, political bilateral relations between France and Spain were distant and there was not an efficient division of roles. Although research does not show lack of cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean framework, the approach was mainly carried out individually rather than with both countries acting in tandem, seeking an active broker-entrepreneurship. In this context, Spain assumed the presidency of the European

⁴⁵ My translation

Council; the third in the country's history and the first of the conservative party under the leadership of José María Aznar. Catalan Josep Piqué was Minister of Foreign Affairs. The EU agenda priorities were divided into 6 axes that were not particularly imaginative yet in line with the European concerns.⁴⁶ Spain began with an exceptionally good situation, for it had three important political roles at the head of Europe: Josep Piqué as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Javier Solana as High Representative for the CFSP, and Miguel Ángel Moratinos as Special Envoy for the Middle East. The importance that the conservative government granted to the rotating EU presidency was evident when one examines Spain's careful planning: the establishment of an organising committee; more than 72 scheduled council meetings; seven summits on the agenda; and the call of all Spanish ambassadors to Madrid for a coordination meeting which until then had never been carried out (Closa 2001: 45).

Vuillemin defined the Spanish presidency as "a liberal orientation in economic matters, resolutely Atlantic in its strategic approach, but convinced about the benefits of a strong Europe in which Spain inscribes its present and future" (Vuillemin, 2001).⁴⁷ The European orientation that had characterized Spain ever since its entry into the European Communities was still palpable in the third council presidency. Moreover, the good relations between Aznar and Bush included, for the first time, an unusual Atlantic dimension in the Spanish strategy. However, as stated by Mestres, "with the balance between national and European interest that any presidency should look for, the development of the Spanish presidency suffered a slight bias towards their own interests. Proof of this was its preference for topics such as the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration, or, in the classical external relations, the focus on transatlantic relations and the reactivation of the Barcelona Process." (Mestres, 2002: 30).⁴⁸

Regarding the Mediterranean, there was no surprise at this point. Spain again acted as "sponsor" (Baert, 2003: 106). Despite the unfavorable regional context, a claim for greater regional activity brought about a temporary reactivation. The conference in Valencia was the Spanish diplomats' most visible action, demonstrating some signs of

⁴⁶ These axes are the fight against terrorism, the implementation of the Euro, the Lisbon process, the European enlargement, strengthening Europe's role in external relations and the debate on the European future.

⁴⁷ My translation

⁴⁸ My translation

the old broker-entrepreneurship spirit exercised during the road to Barcelona. The conference was defined as one of the most important activities of the semester. Montobbio asserts that the Spanish Presidency was seen as the tool to make the partnership progress toward a qualitatively lesser dependence of individual actions. The rotating EU presidency prioritised the EMP and transformed relations in which Spain held a bilaterally a privileged position (Montobbio, 2002: 13).

While there were no great photographs resulting from this conference, the groundwork for what became the Anna Lindh Foundation was laid. Most importantly, an Action Plan was agreed upon to carry out all the policy's priorities in a more effective and realistic way. In the political priority, terrorism was the predominant theme, and a final statement calling for cooperation among all members was proposed. Additionally, Justice, Security and Immigration (JHA) were high on the agenda: a fact of continuity after the Valencia meeting that continued in Naples, Dublin, and The Hague. Although the context was propitious for reaching a common declaration after the 11S, Spain was also influenced by its own domestic political priorities, especially regarding the fight against the ETA. This scenario is a good example of the convergence of national and European agendas.

In order to promote the continuity of the partnership and to have better monitoring methods, the Valencia ministerial conference put in place an Action Plan, which was the first document since 1995 that was signed by all attendees in a clear gesture of commitment to the region and the Partnership. The action plan was signed despite not demonstrating any real progress in the Security Chart and possessing vague references to human rights and democracy. Some very imprecise statements such as "to work to promote investment through concrete measures" (European Commission, 2002) were included. To complete the action plan, intermediate ministerial meetings were proposed between the official ones. The first intermediate meeting took place in Crete and proved to be very positive (Johansson-Nogués, 2003). However, not everything about the meeting was positive. The Spanish proposal for the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Bank was finally not adopted. The establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Investment Fund managed by the EIB was adopted instead.

The success of the Valencia Ministerial Conference does not obscure the difficulty encountered organising it. To begin with, the Arab-Israeli conflict was strongly present in all areas of negotiation. Similarly, Syria announced that it would not attend the meeting, and Lebanon, only days before, requested to have more time for signing its association agreement and threatened to respond in a manner similar to that of Syria. Spanish officials had to increase diplomatic contacts to save the meeting (ABC, 20 April 2002), and did not succeed in their objective. However, at the end of the Spanish presidency, both Algeria and Lebanon had sealed their EMAs, with Syria being the last country to come to an agreement with.

The months following the Valencia Conference were particularly difficult for the Mediterranean. The difficulty was due to the military intervention in Iraq without a resolution from the United Nations and the strong division within the European Union over this matter. In this context, the European Commission introduced the ENP, which was part of the Naples agenda. Several countries decided to develop a preparatory document for the ministerial meeting,⁴⁹ for which the countries provided a series of propositions. Furthermore, a committee of wise who would follow up the proposals and work on medium- and long-term objectives was created. The variable geometry to avoid having the partnership blocked and the notion of co-responsibility is already present in this paper: an idea that would be recovered later for the Union for the Mediterranean. Also, the document recognizes that the Barcelona Process had not substantially benefited from the renewed interests after the 11S and the war in Iraq (Document préparatoire à la 6ème conférence des Ministres des Affaires Etrangères, in Blum,R., Guibal, J.C. 2002: 86-91).

3.4.2.3 THE BARCELONA SUMMIT OF 2005

The summit in Barcelona—the first meeting in which all heads of state gathered in accordance with the framework of the Barcelona Process—was conceived to celebrate the 10 partnership’s years. However, in general terms, there was little progress to commemorate. The British presidency wanted to secure an ambitious agenda for

⁴⁹The countries that worked on this document called “Europe élargie, voisinage, proposition pour la relance de partenariat euro-méditerranéen” were France, Spain, Germany, Cyprus, the United Kingdom, Greece, Malta, Poland, and Portugal.

reform and cooperation, looking to approve a Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism and seeking to identify clear priorities and objectives with dedicated financial support (Asseburg, 2005: 2). In other words, the United Kingdom wanted something more realistic rather than vague declarations: a desire also in line with its priorities following the events in Madrid and London, but highly sensitive considering the context with a “war on terror” in place. Spanish diplomacy intended to revitalize the initiative, accordingly, and sought to prevent a climate of increasing regional xenophobia and mistrust. Hosting this event, which had then been upgraded to the category of summit, was a risky move from the socialist party. The road to Barcelona+10, as seen so far, contained a history of clashes and difficult negotiations, and promoting the meeting to the level of heads of states seemed to present even greater challenges than the traditional ministerial conferences would. However, it is true that compared to other periods, the context was relatively calm: Iraq and Palestine had elections; Syria announced the withdrawal of its troops from Lebanon; and in 2004, Egypt had started a process of economic reform. Nevertheless, Madrid relied too much on the experience of its diplomats, now back under the government of Zapatero, and who were previously known as the “fathers of the initiative.”

With the new Spanish government, some of the officials involved in the negotiation of the Barcelona Process were appointed to new posts, which gave the new government a sense of continuity and ownership. These individuals were Miguel Ángel Moratinos as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alberto Navarro as Secretary of State for the European Union, Manuel Marín, President of the Spanish Parliament, and Juan Prat i Coll, Spanish Special Ambassador for Mediterranean Affairs. At the head of European diplomacy was Javier Solana, who was directly involved in the 1995 signature of the Barcelona Process. If there were an actor capable of exerting leadership, this was Spain, but Spanish capacities were overestimated. France itself had failed in the past to organise such an event; therefore, everything seemed to indicate that the meeting could end in a fiasco. However, the truth is stranger than fiction, and the summit was worse than expected. Although the meeting produced some progress like the adoption of a work program in education, judicial, and home affairs for the next five years and included the approval of the Code of Conduct (without an agreed definition on the

concept of terrorism),⁵⁰ this summit was not going to be remembered for the progress or achievements in the framework of the partnership, but for the audience; to be more precise, it would be remembered for its lack of attendants in Barcelona.

All European heads of state accepted the invitation of the Spanish diplomacy, including Turkey and the Palestinian Authority. In the Turkish case, this was due to the good relations that Zapatero's Spanish government had with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, who had the co-ownership of the Alliance of Civilizations. Regarding Palestine, the socialist government had shown a favorable attitude toward an independent state, helping to uncover the uncomfortable truth: that all other Mediterranean Partners refused to attend the meeting in what was known as the "Arab boycott." These absences needed to be qualified, as some like Bouteflika from Algeria were actually in poor health. Others that had confirmed their attendance decided the same day to stay at home due to domestic problems (Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdullah of Jordan). Gillespie explains that "there is of course a tradition of North African rulers declining to attend summits whose outcomes are uncertain, and defensiveness in the face of international criticism of human rights violations is another factor" (Gillespie, 2006: 272). Consequently, Southern Mediterranean countries had other representatives. For example, Israel sent its deputy prime minister and finance minister; Egypt and Morocco sent their prime ministers; Syria, Tunisia, and Algeria sent their foreign minister; and Jordan was represented by Prince Faisal, the king's brother. This lack of attendance by heads of state was an undeniable fact of the current malaise among the southern countries. If 10 years before the Catalan capital had witnessed a family photo, the more recent meeting only testified an amalgam of regional tensions softened by institutional politeness.

Barbé and Soler i Lecha identified three coinciding elements with the Spanish politics of 1995: first, the previously mentioned continuity of the main diplomats and officials; second, the fact that the socialists were ruling the country in minority and with the

⁵⁰ The Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism did not include any definition on what terrorism was (European Commission, 2005). This was a delicate issue where it was difficult to reach an agreement.

support of a Catalan party;⁵¹ and third, that both González and Zapatero expected to gain national and international recognition by organising a high level summit, although the authors pointed out that the circumstances for both leaders were substantially different for one was already well known, and the other had still a long way to go. (Barbé, Soler i Lecha, 2005: 91).

Yet why was the outcome so different? Everything seemed to indicate that the main difference laid in the strategy and the partners that Spain depended upon. In this case, Spain acted following a more individualistic strategy, despite the fact that it was the co-organiser (at that time, the UK held the EU Presidency). In 1995, there was the consolidation of an effective tandem, in which Spain used its enthusiastic pro-Europe attitude, combined with the experience and diplomatic capacity of French officials. During the years that followed the conference in Barcelona, both countries, under conservative governments, adopted a remarkable bilateral strategy for the Mediterranean and an intergovernmentalist approach at the European level. An example of this strategy was the Aznar-Blair-Chirac (ABC) initiative promoted that reinforced the European Council and kept an intergovernmental approach within the EU: a fact that was regarded with concern by Finland and Belgium (Cameron, 2003: 67). Although their negotiation behaviour clearly followed the definition of broker-entrepreneurs ready to assume changes and act as mediators, Spain relied mainly upon its own resources instead of on a division of shared roles with another major partner. Although France expressed its predisposition to support the summit (El País, 14 September, 2004), especially after the return of the prodigal son to the heart of Europe, Paris was not the co-responsible this time. Therefore, a relative policy window and the actor ready to adopt an entrepreneurship action were present, but the element of close collaboration with the other bigger regional actor was not as obvious as in the past.

Scholars agree, in a more or less assertive way, that the conference was a failure. For Asseburg, the anniversary summit “makes the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership look pathetic” (Asseburg, 2005: 8). Gillespie, on the other hand, considered that the

⁵¹ In 1995, the González government ruled in minority with the support of Jordi Pujol who, as seen, pushed to host the Barcelona conference. In 2005, it was the *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* party who sided Zapatero.

conference was merely a “partial failure”, as it produced some advances like the “a formidable Work Programme, a general outline (though hardly a road map) for further activity, including a number of projects” (Gillespie, 2006: 277). But perhaps Khader’s assertion that the one that more appropriately represented the long road from Barcelona to Barcelona: “while the Partnership does not arouse deep emotions, it is not questioned by any states nor is it abandoned. (...) The most surprising aspect of this process is that it is perpetuated by its own inertia” (Khader, 2005:100).

France and Spain differ in their interpretations of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. For France, *la manière de faire du Barcelona Process* was not the right approach (interview with French official, 26 October 2010), while for the Spanish, the French political leaders did not have a good understanding of the partnership to begin with (interview with Spanish diplomat, 02 February 2011). Neither of these two positions is surprising, considering that Spain saw itself as the ‘father of the initiative’ and the Union for the Mediterranean was a French initiative conceived to replace the EMP.

In conclusion, after eight formal ministerial conferences, hundreds of meetings at occurring at different levels, and several other informal events, the Barcelona Process—the only forum where Israel and the Arab countries met—could not overcome regional tensions. It was also highly vulnerable to the European Council presidencies, as the defining priorities established by such presidencies were mostly based on national priorities. However, it is fair to note that many Nordic and Eastern countries showed great interest in the Mediterranean partnership, and despite the importance of the states in the EMP implementation, the parliament and the commission sought proactively to increase their role and act when there were opportunities for national or regional leadership.

3.5 THE ENP AND THE EMP: TWO SIDES, SAME COIN?

The introduction of the European Neighbourhood Policy, or the wider Europe as it was initially known, involved a series of changes that had an impact on the EMP. Southern European partners looked at the ENP with suspicion, as it was originally conceived for the Eastern enlargement. When the Mediterranean was included, it was announced that the ENP was complementary to the Barcelona Process; however, the new

European initiative could also be read as an attempt to correct certain deficiencies already well established in the partnership after eight years of existence. In 2003, the European Commission proposed to go a step further, and, quoting Romano Prodi's well-known slogan, to give to the European neighbours "all but the institutions." The proposal document clearly stated that this program was for those states not eligible to join the European Union family. There was no space for doubt in this regard, but the document also excluded all countries in the process of accession such as Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. Or at least this was the original idea, but it was less clear cut as time went on: the ENP itself was later opened to Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia, all of which had European aspirations.

The Eastern dimension was visible from the beginning. When ENP program was only in its infancy, it was directly linked to the DG for enlargement, and the DG for external relations, which was the one in charge of relations with the Mediterranean, was not included in the design and implementation of this new wider Europe. Furthermore, the officials in charge of designing the new initiative were those also in charge of enlargement, although this was intended to be corrected later (Del Sarto, Schumacher, 2005: 27). Despite good intentions, a closer look at the composition of the new commissioners responsible for enlargement shows that since 1999, no European Mediterranean country has held this position.

When the European Commission presented its communication in March 2003, it proposed an offer of integration into the four freedoms of the internal market. The objective was "to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union." (European Commission, 2003: 4). For the EU, creating greater interdependence in the so-called "ring of friends" would result in a more stable and secure region that would also ensure a sustainable development, but with no major changes in the existing framework of relations between the EU and the different regions. (European Commission, 2003: 15). For the Mediterranean, this would be carried out through the Barcelona Process (European Commission, 2004, 6). It stands out that this proposal was presented when the association agreements had not yet been ratified for all

countries.⁵² However, the nature of the ENP generated a series of overlapping actions for, on many occasions, its bilateral nature was mixed with multilateral activities, as with the actions carried out with the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation.

For Spain, the implementation of the ENP was not good news. Spanish diplomats were not particularly active in the implementation, and they had little input in the wider European proposal, contrary to what happened with the Barcelona Process. Therefore, Madrid was not predisposed to warmly accept an initiative that could overshadow the EMP, and its best performance was reserved for the actions carried out in the framework of the BP, especially during the Valencia conference in 2002 and Barcelona in 2005. This attitude changed once it was confirmed that the Mediterranean would be included. At the beginning, there were internal disagreements within the different units of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the lack of understanding on how the ENP interacted with the BP, but this disagreement was soon left behind (interview with Spanish diplomat 02 February 2011). This confirms the findings of Barbé, Mestres, and Soler i Lecha, who identify three different states of the process of adaption of the Spanish diplomatic discourse and action: (1) a low low-profile stage where it was requested that the Mediterranean would be included in the new regional framework and where it was asked that the new approach would be based on the principle of differentiation; (2) a period of extreme scepticism for fear that the ENP would compete with the EMP; and (3) an acceptance and assimilation of the discourse of what the actors identified as a clear case of top-down Europeanisation (Barbé, Mestres, Soler i Lecha, 2007: 42-45). However, despite the low profile, its two main objectives were included in what was later the ENP configuration.

The case of Spain is, if anything, more striking, considering that the Iberian country even had the chance to create a partnership with Poland to participate in the development of the ENP. Warsaw sought the division of labour in which Poland would have had an active role with the Eastern countries, while Spain would deal with southern countries as it was considered to be the regional specialist (Copsey, 2008). This represents a good example of balancing alliances to counteract the significant

⁵² When the document “wider Europe” was presented, the association agreements of Egypt, Lebanon, and Algeria were not yet ratified, and the EMA with Syria was still in the negotiation phase.

weight of France and Germany, who were the traditional regional actors. Yet such collaboration was never established: a fact that illustrates that the priority of Madrid was far from the ENP.

France's opposition was, again, strongly influenced by its loss of weight in the later years and the role it wanted to play in an enlarged Europe, although the ENP did not have a great impact on the political debate. France's reluctance to the enlargement has been amply explained, and any policy that entailed or contemplated widening without deepening Europe had to face the initial opposition of French elites; as this concept was highly rooted in French society. However, this departing unwillingness is seen by scholars such as Brincker as a positive factor, for France would actively seek alternatives and new methods that did not include membership in the package. This produced interesting alternatives and the possibility of becoming an active member in the policy's design. This was the case for the ENP, for which France insisted on including the Mediterranean region. However, the limited influence of the member states compared to the power of the EC was a source of criticism for French political actors (Brincker 2009: 1-3). These demands were in line with the Spanish view of the initiative, and just as Madrid, Paris stressed the importance that the ENP did not substitute the BP.

French diplomacy was not so successful in requesting the distribution of funds that were allocated according to regional criteria. Despite the rejection of its proposal, Paris received a political commitment from the European Commission in which the initial allocation would keep the existing proportions: two-thirds assigned to the South (excluding Turkey and Cyprus), and one-third to the East, excluding Central Asia (Lefebvre, 2006: 22, in Overhaus, Maull, Harnisch, 2006). France and Spain clashed precisely at this point. For Spain, it was important that the distribution was conducted under what is known the Regatta model.⁵³ This difference in opinion was due to the French influence in the Mediterranean as a whole compared to Spain's influence, which was more limited to sub-regional level (Barbé, Mestres, Soler i Lecha; 2007: 45-49).

⁵³ The "regatta" model states that those options for funding shall compete in equal terms, and the funds will be awarded to those who present the best project.

Spanish and French interests converged regarding the ENP, although it was not clear whether the countries collaborated or whether it was just a matter of coincidence. It appears, however, that certain collaboration prevailed during the ENP definition. France lobbied the Commission to include the Mediterranean in the ENP and coordinated with Spain to support this inclusion (interview with Spanish diplomat, 15 August 2013). Both countries made clear that the wider Europe had to be applied to the South, giving the same treatment to the Mediterranean as to the Eastern countries, but in this case, it was France who was more active in assuring the redistribution of resources.

The ENP name was, again, controversial, although this time there was more consensus among the “club med.” They all agreed in rejecting the German proposal that established a distinction between the “European neighbours”; that is, the countries that were neighbours of the European Union, and “Europe’s neighbours”—a concept used to name those countries that are not exactly neighbours in the strict sense. This definition mainly affected the Mediterranean partners, and this was the reason why all of the Mediterranean member states rejected it. However, there was yet another reason for the French veto of the German proposal. The ambiguous wording of the denomination “European neighbours” could have produced a certain association of ideas that would lead to membership. French diplomats actively sought to reduce this vagueness of terms proposed by other countries when drafting the action plans (Lefebvre, 2006: 18, in Overhaus, Maull, Harnisch, 2006). On one hand, this time with a collaboration more oriented toward a specific country, France and Spain actively sought to grant Morocco an advanced status in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and both countries attended numerous meetings and kept multiple contacts at the bilateral and multilateral levels in the hope of achieving this objective (interview with Spanish diplomat 02 February 2011).

The ENP saw the light in a time where Paris and Madrid were re-establishing relations after a tense period between the governments of Aznar and Chirac. These facts did not seem to have a direct impact when claiming for certain concessions towards the South. Nevertheless, levels of cooperation seemed to be lower than in other moments of the regional construction, and the literature makes few references to a real coordination

or lobbying attitude to influence the design of the ENP. This may be explained by the minimal impact that the ENP had in the political discourse, as it was not seen as a priority for Madrid or Paris; also, the preferences for acting seemed to follow in line with the profile adopted after launching the Barcelona Process: a more individualist role. It is not possible to know whether the ENP would have been different if both countries had lobbied to tie the ENP strongly to Barcelona. However, in those areas where France and Spain shared a common interest, even if it was from a purely national perspective, the demands were integrated in the new regional instrument. This suggests that greater collaboration could have reinvigorated the EMP.

At first sight, it can be concluded that the ENP challenged the realist and intergovernmentalist approach adopted in this study. In a way, the ENP was an interesting case in which the EU showed that it had “developed some modes of governance in order to adapt itself to the constraints of the decision-making process” (Wolff, 2012: 23). However, a closer look shows that the initiative was not totally opposed. Once the Mediterranean member states were reassured that the ENP would not entail certain notions or actions that they were not willing to accept, the initiative achieved the general approval to be enacted. For Spain, it was extremely important to include the Mediterranean in the new initiative and to be reassured that the initiative was not only designed for the East. French diplomats shared this very same concern, and they pushed to avoid documents and declarations with language that could have been interpreted as pre-adhesion conditions. Once these areas were covered, both countries assumed a more positive perspective about the ENP. In this case, France and Spain adopted a balancing alliance approach to counteract the initial idea that the ENP was a tool to serve the enlargement. This was a red line to France, and the European Commission had to react in order to not get blocked by the Mediterranean member states.

3.5 CONCLUSIONS

The road to Barcelona was not easy, but there were several elements, acknowledged in one way or another by scholars and political leaders, that led to the signature of a new regional framework. First, there existed: a favorable window of opportunity based

on a relatively calm regional context; an advantageous European environment that facilitated negotiations towards the establishment of a regional policy; and a favorable European configuration that included several council presidencies in the hands of the Mediterranean countries.

Second, France and Spain, as two big Euro-Mediterranean lobbies highly interested in Europeanising their Mediterranean foreign policy, collaborated. The reasons were twofold: on one hand, national concerns were at the core of this decision, as Europe turned out to be a solution in areas where acting at the bilateral level seemed to be counterproductive; on the other hand, a successful summit and regional approach were a matter of international recognition for the Spanish and French governments. This was especially the case of Spain, considering the difficult internal situation of the socialist government.

Third, Spain and France adopted a high profile as broker-entrepreneurs. Political leaders were highly motivated to exert a coordinated leadership, acknowledging the importance of the other as a partner and projecting their influence at all levels, including Europe and the Mediterranean and at bilateral and multilateral negotiations.

Finally, there was an effective collaboration and division of roles at political and diplomatic levels between France and Spain that entailed the maximum use of resources. Although both countries were interested in projecting influence in the same area, in the case of the Mediterranean, *la Moncloa* and *l'Élysée* bandwagoned to counteract the increased attention to the East and to face the reluctance from Northern and Central European countries.

Unfortunately, these four elements disappeared soon after the 1995 summit in Barcelona. The regional context worsened significantly, the European Union continued to not have a single voice in the international arena, and the EU enlargement meant more members to deal with and new areas of interest more focused on the East than in the Mediterranean basin. In addition, the innovative institutional configuration conceived to deal with issues of the 20th Century turned out to be ineffective, easy to block, and not well suited to European institutional framework. The lack of resources and the limitation of the European Commission or the parliament highly influenced by member states were only partially corrected with the Amsterdam Treaty and the

introduction of the ENP. Perhaps the most visible change was the new attitude of the EMP founders.

Both France and Spain continued placing the Mediterranean high on their national agendas, although each country employed a different strategy. Chirac's government was more interested in a return to the Arab policy and prioritizing bilateral relations. The Europeanisation of the Mediterranean continued in the hands of the EMP, but the new president was more interested in turning to bilateralism. Spain followed the same path. Although it continued to highly invest in Barcelona, Spain also changed its bilateral relations significantly. Diplomatic relations with Morocco worsened considerably following Aznar's election in 1996 and his more assertive external policy in Ceuta, Melilla, or with the Persil incident. Different national considerations also affected the relations between the two countries and did not produce the right understanding between the two leaders that was necessary for collaboration.

Ultimately, the new ideological and strategic orientation coming from the *Elysée* and *la Moncloa* may explain the decline of the Mediterranean policies in Europe to a certain extent. This fact suggests the existence of some correlation between the diplomatic orientation of the newly elected governments and the development of the regional Mediterranean policies, but that by itself is not sufficient to explain the hampering of regional construction. A combination of factors, including the appointment of the regional leaders in key areas, the European governance configuration, and the lack of understanding between Paris and Madrid best explains the lack of a clear entrepreneur capable of exercising the motivation needed in a difficult region.

In general terms, Spain and France's low profile at some of the ministerial conferences was particularly significant, despite being completely unnoticed by the media and academia. In these matters, there were very worrisome elements such as the lack of public political discourse during the years that the initiative was in place. Even in the interviews conducted for this study, there were few references to cooperation between France and Spain, despite cooperation always being described as right and necessary, and even very effective at the local level. Technical collaboration existed at all times, and as shown throughout the chapter, Madrid and Paris successfully carried out numerous proposals. However, looking closely, these proposals were mainly

operational, and certainly did not entail a high political level of cooperation or even a clear tandem as it existed prior to Barcelona.

CHAPTER 4

The Union for the Mediterranean

INTRODUCTION

The *Mistral* is a strong and very cold wind that comes from the North and mainly affects the Languedoc, Provence, and Toulon. This wind often causes sudden storms in the Mediterranean between Corsica and the Balearic Islands. Sarkozy's then-newly proposed Mediterranean policy in 2007 may have been influenced by these air currents that, in the end, brought new notoriety to the region. However, much like a passing storm, Sarkozy's policy efforts did not produce much quantitative or qualitative progress.

In a short period of time, French diplomats introduced a new framework for Euro-Mediterranean relations, convincing not only the Mediterranean partners, but also European member states to adopt the policy through a process of negotiation and compromise that changed some very important aspects of the initial proposal. The abrupt proposal took Spanish diplomacy by surprise, but their capacity to introduce changes was very limited. Nowadays, the UfM is largely institutionalised, and most of its features were based on French ideas put forth during the presidential campaign. Furthermore, France managed to retain the co-presidency of the Union for the Mediterranean until mid-2012, notwithstanding the views of other EU actors who thought that this role should have been transferred at the end of France's EU Presidency. Yet again, a tandem with Spain was the main trend. The process of how the UfM has been managed has differed greatly from the previous *époque*; however, the countries' cooperation was informed by the *primus inter pares* formula. There is a strong French component in the UfM that cannot be denied, but ultimately, it was negotiation and not imposition (or perhaps an imposed negotiation) that led to the union's establishment. Therefore, can France be regarded as a leader? This question cannot be answered in a straightforward manner. This chapter will explain the rise of a new strategic French leadership style, which will be contrasted with Spain's more

passive role. In addition, the differing multilateral and region-building approaches of the two countries will be discussed, including the implications these differences brought to bear upon the negotiation process. The countries' trend in collaborating will be examined in relation to the instatement of the UfM policy to determine whether the establishment of the collaboration that was present in the road to Barcelona was able to survive the challenges involved in creating the UM/UfM.

Section one explains the reasons behind the French interest to launch a new Mediterranean policy and demonstrates how the propitious window of opportunity that existed in the time leading up to the policy's proposal was occurred only at a national level. Section two presents the institutional body of the Union for the Mediterranean as well as what results the new organisation entailed for the countries' relationship. Co-ownership and a new intergovernmentalist approach will receive special attention in this section, considering that these had been the driving force for not only justifying the change, but also the main reason for today's paralysis in regional cooperation. Finally, section three analyses French diplomatic action, which went from a purely strategic leadership to a broker-entrepreneurship under the formula of *primus inter pares*. Spain, which adopted a *wait-and-see* attitude, acted slowly and unwillingly. Adopting a more collaborative role in which it attempted to gain some national concessions based on increased national visibility (such as the Secretariat), Spain employed a questionable strategy. The incorporation of the Union for the Mediterranean benefits into Spanish discourse, combined with Moratinos's activism, showed some trends of the old Franco-Spanish collaborative style—albeit with a paternalistic French attitude. Although I intended to research the period between 1995-2010, it was inevitable to mention some recent events that would reinforce some of the ideas of this research.

4.1 CREATING A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN

If there is a country concerned about its loss of influence, it is certainly France. This situation is not new; the Gaullist obsession with maintaining France's *grandeur* still echoes in the heart of society and is manifested in the works of academia. No other country has generated such an extensive self-examining literature of this kind. The

well-known book *La France est-elle encore une grande puissance?* (Boniface, 1998) is the first on a long list. Titles such as *La France qui tombe* (Baverez, 2003), *Adieu à la France qui s'en va* (Rouart, 2005), *L'Arrogance française* (Saint-Martin, Gubert, 2003), and *France in Crisis* (Smith, 2004) constitute part of a huge catalogue impossible to detail in its entirety here. One may think that this is just a phase in academic history—a passing craze for this kind of literature. But this period has lasted for more than 20 years, having reached its height in 2005-06 under Chirac's unpopular government. Despite society's perception that the social model had been stagnant, "leaders keep a discourse about power dissociated from its means of influence" (Ayache, 2006: 53-54).⁵⁴ At that point, as if it were an artistic movement or a school of philosophy, the phenomenon described above was given a name: *déclinologie*.

Vaïsse argues that while France went through a "phase of euro-pessimism," Germany and the UK had a very positive 2005 in general terms (Vaïsse, 2009: 161).⁵⁵ The success of France's neighbours made France's sense of hopelessness seem even more acute. For France, it was the year of the social revolts that extended across Europe,⁵⁶ rapidly increasing unemployment, and Presidential involvement in allegations of corruptions. As a result, French society became growing disenchanted with their national politics and the European Union and rejected the European constitutional project,⁵⁷ resulting in Europe plunging into a big crisis that continued for the next two years. For Chirac's government, this fact was also a strong setback.

Déclinologues helped Nicolas Sarkozy get elected to office in the hope that France would recover its former status. Sarkozy was determined to introduce changes in national and international politics—some of which were announced during his electoral campaign. Meanwhile, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin asserted that *déclinologues* were the "prophets of doom" (The Sunday Times, 12

⁵⁴ My translation

⁵⁵ It was the year when the UK took both the presidency of the European Union and that of the G8. Tony Blair was re-elected for the third time, and London defeated Paris in the race to host the 2012 Olympic games. On the German side, the election of a new chancellor (Merkel) improved the country's relations with the rest of its partners; a German Pope was appointed; and the good results in the football World Cup seemed to be a good omen for the country.

⁵⁶ Although Sarkozy's political career represented a good opportunity, as he earned both certain notoriety and popularity in the way he managed the social unrest in the *banlieu*.

⁵⁷ The French rejected the European constitution with 54.87% against its adoption.

February 2006). He underestimated French society's disenchantment with its political class.

This is not a trivial point. The feeling that France was descending the pyramid of power was the reason for its foreign policy reorientation. Sarkozy's new government introduced larger than normal changes: a new white book on security and defence (2008); a new white book on foreign policy (also 2008); and the *rapprochement* with the USA have been some of the measures taken to reinforce France's presence in the world in an effort to reverse this trend. As a consequence, France has adopted the popular saying: you have to change with the times.

Upon taking office, there were three key strategic concerns informing the activity of the new President. The first one was the West-East dimension that was again a relevant topic when Sarkozy first announced his new Mediterranean project. The second one was the European decision-making process, which was becoming more complicated in a wider Europe which was expanding to the East; and third, the traditional Franco-German axis had become unbalanced as Berlin had a stronger economy and a bigger territory under its direct influence. While Europe was (and still is) the natural area for French international projection, this Europe was now less willing to follow Paris without questioning why—a lesson that Sarkozy learned at the very beginning of his Presidential tenure when he put forward his 'Mediterranean Union' idea.

Was France, despite the so-called decline, capable of exerting a protagonistic role or even of becoming a regional leader? It was the *déclinologie* background that fostered the pro-activism toward the region, with the Mediterranean being the card played by France to counteract its relative loss of influence. When Sarkozy proposed a Mediterranean Union, there was a window of opportunity that favoured the change. This policy window existed at all levels: international, European, and national. At the international level, trends included: the Mediterranean's progressive economic marginalisation (Khader, 2009: 181), a deteriorating political and social situation particularly in the Middle East (Rapport Avicenne, 2007: 5-6), and a worsening of relations between Israel and Palestine, which acted as an epicentre of regional frustrations (Rapport Avicenne, 2007: 10). These factors helped to reinforce the idea

that Mediterranean policies needed to be strengthened using a new means of going forward, based on an economic approach similar to that of the European Community during its early years. At European level, the stagnation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and its disappointing results favoured this window of opportunity. Finally, at a national level, there were determining factors such as a feeling of losing influence in a more competitive and interconnected world: perceptions that France's Mediterranean policy needed strengthening (Khader, 2009: 181); the social unrest during Chirac's government; and the tacit promise that the new President represented a change—a break from the past. Together, these factors created a propitious moment. All these events generated a type of policy window based on policy uncertainty, and this uncertainty gave impetus to what the *déclinologues* postulated.

However, although there were objective reasons that created this window of opportunity, it was not so evident at the time. In 2005, new goals were adopted within the EMP, yet some member states saw the ENP, with its bilateral emphasis, as a fitting replacement for the EMP. The year for further policy re-evaluation would have been 2010, but France prompted the re-examination of objectives three years earlier than expected. Electoral rhetoric and high-powered activity by French diplomacy expedited an event that was going to happen sooner or later, although not immediately. Other actors who had initially been unwilling to abandon the Barcelona Process for the UfM accepted, following a period of negotiation. French action "forced" the timing and adjusted it to France's convenience: the Presidential change.

4.2 EMPOWERING THE STATES: THE UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN'S INSTITUTIONAL BODY

The institutional structure of the UfM was conceived to reinforce the sense of co-ownership and the intergovernmentalist approach (see figure 1).⁵⁸ The aim of this new body was to bypass potential politicisation of the EMP, and to improve the sense of ownership and encourage the participation of the southern partners of the Mediterranean. In the long run, it did not produce any of the two results, as the institution continues to suffer from serious design problems; among them, the

⁵⁸See Johansson-Nogués' work for a complete description of the UfM's institutional structure

capacity of the states to act as veto players, producing constant blockages of the initiative.

Although there have some elements of continuity with the development of the Barcelona Process, such as forums or practices, the main approach considerably changed. The UfM left behind the strict concept of multilateralism encouraged by the partnership and adopted a strong intergovernmentalist practices, emphasising the role of the states and, especially, the governments of the different states (Schlumberger, 2011: 140).⁵⁹ By giving all actors the same level of influence, the initiative involves a purely intergovernmental approach in which states are not subordinated to any supranational body. That may be why the UfM seeks to be a renationalisation project. It was the EU that sponsored the EMP, whereas, as Aliboni says, “the primary ‘driving-force’ of the UfM is to overturn this unequal balance of power with a shift towards an organisational structure based on the principle of ‘parity’” (Aliboni, 2009: 3). This feature was present from the first day the UfM was announced. All states would be operating under equal conditions and would have the same weight. Co-ownership or symmetry in international relations, however, does not mean uniformity. Establishing a co-ownership *de facto*, does not prevent other actors from exercising leadership. Co-ownership “in fact involved an assertion of French leadership as much as a relaxation of EU hegemony” (Gillespie, 2012: 16).

In addition, the European states would not be subjected to the European Union’s constraints; all countries would be given more leeway, gaining independence. After the Marseille conference in November 2008, the new UfM structure consolidated this dynamic, weakening the role of the EU compared to the function that it had in the original EMP. Recently, with the inclusion of the European Union, the intergovernmental approach is not so clear-cut.

The UfM design reinforced a trend that was already present in the EMP that would become even more visible with the new initiative. In relation to the EMP, Attina argued that “the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is a region-level process of building mechanisms and institutions to settle the local aspects of global trends and problems.


⁵⁹Many governments, particularly those of Southern Mediterranean countries, did not represent their civil society; instead, such governments represented their own political interests.

There is wide consensus on this explanation of the EMP as a case of new regionalism in terms of coordinated intergovernmental reactions to the problems of the current globalisation process” (Attina, 2003: 184). As seen in chapter 3, there has been no consensus on defining the EMP exclusively as an intergovernmental process. In contrast, defining the UfM has been easier, especially during the first *époque* before the European Commission assumed the co-presidency. This seems to confirm Attina’s analysis that, currently, new region-building strategies are addressed under the terms of coordinated intergovernmentalism. What is more debatable is whether the Mediterranean and its complex situation can be exclusively dealt with under an intergovernmentalist framework without the support of a relevant institution such as the EU, as seen with the UfM.

The new organisational structure is driven by the principle of identifying projects and implementing them (see figure 10) and, for so doing, there are a set of institutions and established regular meetings. The co-presidency is a two-headed body composed of one member of the EU and another from the Southern Mediterranean area. This has recently changed (March 2012) with France passing the baton to the European External Action Service. This agency is in charge of calling and chairing all meetings at the highest level (summits, ministerial and senior official meetings). In opposition to the co-presidency, the UfM Secretariat has had a more project-oriented dimension, as it is in charge of identifying concrete projects and the funding to make them possible. Initially, this institution was going to be in a Southern Mediterranean country. However, disputes among members and the strong Spanish lobby, combined with the trade-for-support understanding between Madrid and Paris, brought the institution to Barcelona. However, ever since the beginning, it has been source of constant conflict. In addition to being the country to host the institution, Spain has engaged in the constant strategic bargaining to appoint Deputy Secretaries-General in the different project areas.⁶⁰ In addition, up to three Secretaries-General have been appointed at the head of the Pedralbes palace. None of these lasted long.

⁶⁰The UfM was to have only one deputy secretary-general, but given the controversial appointment, it was increased up to six. The price: Israel’s acceptance of the Arab league in exchange for having a deputy secretary-general. Complex and diverse deals were made to negotiate this composition; France led all the negotiations (Personal communication with Gillespie).

Figure 10. The UfM institutional structure



Source: Johansson-Nogués (2011)

The representatives of the different countries have convened at different levels. The heads of state and government were supposed to meet biennially. Thus far, only the foundational summit of Paris has taken place, and ever since it has been impossible to organise a second summit of this nature. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs are supposed to meet annually, but this is not the case either; even if this requirement was an element of continuity vis-à-vis the Barcelona Process, under normal circumstances, the Ministers' role would be reduced as a consequence of the involvement of the heads of state and government (Johansson-Nogués, 2011: 27). This fact goes in line with the strong role of the President in French Foreign Policy for in the Barcelona Process, the heads of state were secondary. Finally, sectoral and senior official meetings also continue in a manner similar to that of the Partnership.

This complex and highly unwittingly politicised intergovernmental configuration was designed to encourage co-ownership and to provide a sense of symmetry between the two Mediterranean shores. However, far from boosting southern involvement, it has produced two unexpected results: (1) a debatable sense of co-ownership in the South

vs a lack of involvement of Northern European countries; and (2) no new entrepreneurs, but rather more veto-players and unhappy followers.

4.2.1 THE TRAP OF CO-OWNERSHIP

Concerning the first point, co-ownership was already in the agenda of the Valencia ministerial conference in 2002. As seen in the previous chapter, the concept of partnership did not correspond with eventual reality. The aim of the UfM was to avoid EU dominance, although such good intentions finally became the main problem of the new initiative. The concept of co-ownership is not new, though; during the Valencia conference in 2002, co-ownership was already contemplated as a strategy. French diplomats, on the other hand, had demanded on several occasions that the Barcelona Process should be more institutionalised. With a Secretariat however, they did not managed to introduce such changes (interview with French diplomat 19 April 2010). Ultimately, when Sarkozy announced the new policy, Spanish diplomats saw it as a premature step forward and expressed their disagreement with the French approach. Simply, they considered that the region was not ready for this kind of institutionalisation (interview with Spanish diplomat 02 February 2011). According to Calleya, “regional dynamics in the different sub-regions of the Mediterranean remain[ed] too asymmetrical to be put into a single institutional framework” (Calleya, 2009: 50). However, the French believed that Southern Mediterranean countries had enough economic resources to be co-responsible for a Mediterranean initiative and would not need to depend on European Union funding; receiving EU funding would subsequently make these countries proposition forces, not only passive actors (interview with French diplomat 26 October 2010).

Quite often, the Barcelona Process was accused of having a framework within which EU member states could act with a single voice because they had Europe to agree common positions. This unequal structure entailed that the meetings produced a joint statement that was not necessarily shared by all partners, but at least all partners’ consent. That, it was argued, made it virtually impossible for the Southern Mediterranean partners to counteract European will. However, southern regional conflicts were, in practice, a strong element that prevented these countries from

acting with a unique voice; this discord constituted the main reason for Europe's subsequent stronger influence.

If co-ownership were a noble philosophical value suitable and desirable for healthy international relations, reality sometimes proved different in terms of practical functioning. Several events made co-ownership virtually impossible. French diplomats introduced the concept of variable geometry to counteract the following problems—who do not want to be involved and who did not need to be involved—and the projects could continue without interference. This was a positive element, in principle. But institutions are not projects, and collaboration and ownership in an area of contrasted interests do not work under the *“laissez faire”* current of thought.

Co-ownership has been primarily used to accomplish two kinds of actions: on one hand, to protect national interests in the composition of the institutions and in the light of future developments, and on the other hand, to obtain political gains from the stronger players. For instance, for the Arab countries, co-ownership meant an opportunity to pressure Europe and its member states “to become more assertive over the Palestinian question” (Gillespie, 2012: 13). What did not happen was what France actually expected to happen when proposing the full co-ownership idea: to foster greater national involvement and regional proactivity. The concept of co-ownership was defective in this sense. The main consequence was that despite the technical nature of the UfM, the initiative was inevitably politicised. As Aliboni points out, “in the EMP, the Arab states were house-guests; in the UfM they are the owners. Therefore it is evident that the UfM is even more vulnerable to external factors than the EMP” (Aliboni, 2009: 3).

The strengthening of the southern co-ownership had the opposite result from that of the northern countries. A switch in perceptions occurred: the South's representation was increased in exchange for that of the northern countries, who held no relevant positions within the Secretariat (interview with a Spanish diplomat 02 February 2011). The budget came from the European side for the most part, but none of the Northern and Eastern countries were active members of the initiative; all posts within the UfM have been assigned to Mediterranean members. Spanish diplomats' acquiescence regarding which country was supposed to succeed France in the Union's co-presidency

did not Europeanise it. The adoption of the Northern co-presidency by the EEAS service in March 2012 as a decision adopted by the EU Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Brussels in February of the same year was in response to the lack of Northern representation (Efe, 27 February 2012). This is an interesting challenge, as currently the UfM is a very confusing hybrid that mixes practices of intergovernmentalism and regionalism—especially if the European Commission gains weight considering member states’ increasing apathy toward the policy. Now that the EU has occupied the co-presidency, it is represented in a variety of configurations involving the President of the European Council, the High Representative, the rotating Presidency, the European Commission, and the EEAS.

The Southern co-presidency also did not bring an improved sense of representation on the part of Southern Mediterranean partners. For instance, the bad relations between Egypt and Israel brought about a boycott which was reinforced by the fact that Egypt had the role of the co-presidency of the UfM and claimed to be the voice of the Arab countries. However, this time, there was not consensus among the North African partners (Bicchi, 2011: 13). In a very fragmented area, a Southern co-presidency raised many questions regarding its capacity to represent all Southern Mediterranean partners. Finally, this co-presidency was seen by some diplomats as a “double-edged sword” that permitted more Southern Mediterranean involvement, but it was also a vulnerable point when facing northern and southern divergences (interview with Spanish diplomat 10 February 2010).

4.2.2 THE RISE OF VETO-PLAYER ACTORS AND THE LACK OF ENTREPRENEURS

In regard to the second consequence, the most visible example of the emergence of strong veto-players actors was the Arab boycott that followed the crisis in Gaza in 2008. Despite some attempts to resume activity, the UfM was not back on track until July 2009, when finance Ministers met in Brussels (Sénat, 2009). Even then, the UfM was not fully functional. One may not argue that this was unusual behaviour. On the contrary, this reaction seemed to be a highly extended means to act. Israel was the first to block all meetings as a sign of discrepancy by the Arab League observer statutes within the UfM. Tel Aviv acted as favour-exchanger and obtained a Deputy Secretary-

General in a sort of trade-off for lifting its veto. The same kind of outcome faced Turkey, which received another Deputy Secretary-General as compensation for the confrontation in the framework of the debate about the Turkish accession to the EU. The initial UfM proposal was directly linked to the addition of Turkey to the European Union and was presented as an alternative to Europe. This was not acceptable for Ankara, resulting in one of the first changes that were introduced in the UfM. In addition, the French decided to create a sixth post, but this brought about new conflicts with Cyprus and Greece and paralysed the adoption of the Secretariat statutes for a long time (Sénat, 2009).

The institutional setup established that the heads of state and governments would meet biennially. Thus far, the 43 members have only gathered once: the day they signed the Paris Declaration. The issue was addressed during the French presidency, which finally agreed to politicise the planned summit by including the Arab-Israeli conflict as a gesture to the Arab countries (interview with French official 26 October 2010). The Spanish Presidency also tried hard to hold the summit that would bring about change in northern co-presidencies, but circumstances did not permit to hold this event. Finally, in an exercise of coordination, French and Spanish Foreign Ministers joined forces and travelled together to achieve a minimum consensus that would permit the second summit to be held. All diplomatic actions were useless, however, and the summit was finally cancelled.

The co-presidency also suffered from the same malady as did the meeting dynamics. Egypt was seen as one of the few states that could hold the co-presidency position, for it was one of the few states that recognised Israel. From the beginning, finding Egypt's replacement was a quixotic task. Even Egypt wanted to waive its role (El País, 22 January, 2012), but it was not until June 2012—almost 4 years later—that a “favourably and unanimously accepted” decision was adopted: Jordan was going to take over the southern co-presidency (ANSAméd, 29 June 2012). Following the problems within the internal organisation, the Secretariat also went through similar painful circumstances. Ahmed Massadeh was the only candidate for the Secretary and yet his appointment was not as straightforward as desired. Finally, in a meeting between five Ministers of Foreign Affairs (France, Egypt, Spain, Morocco, and Tunisia)

in January 2010, the decision was finally adopted by a small number of member states and then ratified by the rest (Sénat, 2010: 2).⁶¹

The French conceived the Union for the Mediterranean in an attempt to equalise the decision-making process: *“on peut pas imposer notre vision des choses”* (we can't impose our view) (interview with French official, 26 October 2010). French good intentions, however, failed, but not because of the European Union (that, in practice, saw its role reduced to be merely symbolic). The veto-player strategy was so extensively used that a sort of Southern imposition has emerged and has marked the timings and the content of the UfM. Since the Arab Spring, the European Union showed its concern over regional development. In March 2011, the European Commission issued a communication on “partnership for democracy and shared prosperity”, and two months later, another called “A new response to a changing neighbourhood.” After the EU took over the Northern Presidency of the UfM, certain actions at the European level have attempted to reinvigorate the initiative and avoid the UfM to fall flat. For instance, Commissioner Fule announced new support for a programme that is intended to improve the logistic sector and facilitate trade among certain Southern Mediterranean countries. European Parliament President Martin Schulz called for a meeting where the Presidents of the 42 national Parliaments would meet.

4.3 THE BARCELONA PROCESS: CHECKMATE

The Mediterranean Union was a project that went through different stages leading to its ultimate transformation. The transition from a “Mediterranean Union” to the “Union for the Mediterranean” was also accompanied by a transformation of French discourse and the country's role. After a first phase in which the country demonstrated

⁶¹Jordanian Ahmed Massadh resigned after one year in office. Over a period of time, Italian Lino Cardarelli had to assume the role on an interim basis. Shortly after, Moroccan Deputy Foreign Minister Youssef Amrani replaced him, but Amrani's tenure did not last long either, and his compatriot Fathallah Sijilmassi was appointed as new Secretary-General on February 2012. However, the facts do not hide the difficulties in maintaining institutional stability. In addition, another Moroccan candidate substituted Amrani as he was appointed number two in charge of Morocco's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, the situation was not easier in providing more favourable circumstances, but rather because it did not entail a real change.

strong traits of leadership, French diplomats adopted a collaborative attitude while trying to maintain their status as *primus inter pares*.

After Sarkozy took the helm of French government, he strived to show that France was as European as ever. However, some of his initial actions were interpreted as ambiguous declarations; this included the Mediterranean proposal. In 2007, Sarkozy announced his idea of a Mediterranean Union. As Barbé points out, it was not the first time that EU member states and the Commission had evaluated the state of Euro-Mediterranean relations. The first was in 2005, on the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process (Barbé, 2009: 21). However, it was in 2007 that a proposal questioned the essence of the EMP. What started out as a slogan in an electoral campaign would transform and, ultimately, replace the EMP. The Barcelona Process had given rise to a framework in which other partners could overshadow France, notably Spain and Italy (Rubio Plo, 2008: 3). Consequently, Sarkozy was quick to announce a new initiative that involved a more active presence for Paris and that meant a different approach vis-à-vis his predecessor in terms of Sarkozy's style, ideological reorientation, and Mediterraneanist approach (compared with the pro-Arab policy of the previous government) (Schmid, 2009b: 1-3).

The French role during the early stages of the UfM's development can be divided into three different phases: a first one from February 2007 to December 2007, where the major feature was the exercise of traditional leadership based on a pronounced unilateralism, rigid proposals, and a certain grandiloquent attitude embodied in the President, who also adopted an overly individualistic style; a second from December 2007 to March 2008, where there were some signs of transition—although France's role changed in form, it kept the main features of a strategic leadership; finally, from the European Council in 2008, France's strategy evolved toward a more cooperative role. Following the UfM's introduction, France became a genuine entrepreneur with some elements of strategic leadership.

France's role in the design and subsequent evolution of the UfM is examined below, and in so doing, the discussion addresses three main questions: 1) what kind of protagonistic role has France played? 2) is France's present cooperative attitude the final objective of French diplomacy, an adaptation to circumstances, or a result of

pressure from other actors? 3) to what extent can France make its will prevail after having had to modify its original plan?

4.3.1 AN UNPOPULAR STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

At a rally in Toulon on 7 February, Sarkozy announced the need to prioritise the Mediterranean. Sarkozy concluded that the Barcelona Process had not met its objectives, which was in part because of the attention that the EU was giving to the East. Traditionally, Mediterranean policies have been viewed, in one respect, as a means of counter-balancing the Eastern weight within the EU, and once more, the Mediterranean Union seemed to serve this purpose by emphasising the importance that the region has for Europe, or in Sarkozy's words: "*car l'avenir de l'Europe est au sud*" (the future of Europe is in the south) (Sarkozy, 2007). However, he subsequently asserted the need to create a new regional entity that would exclude direct EU involvement. It was argued that Northern member states were not as interested in the Mediterranean as were in the littoral countries (Gillespie, 2011: 1210), and this lack of attention affected regional development. For instance, German EU presidencies in 1999 and 2007 hardly mentioned the Mediterranean, and the neighborhood policy is still associated with Central and Eastern Europe (Schumacher, 2011: 81). This is a very partial reading, as many initiatives within the EMP had been achieved with the full cooperation of Northern and Eastern countries, or with Northern countries as entrepreneurs (the Anna Lindh Foundation was an initiative from Sweden and Spain in 2007), but the alleged lack of regional activity from the non-Mediterranean partner was to become an important reason for policy reorientation.

This Union would be inspired by Jean Monnet's approach, focusing on practical projects and leaving out political issues that might jeopardise their success. In practice, this meant that the conditionality requested by the European Union would be left out of the agenda. According to the President-to-be, the future of Europe was in the South, but non-Mediterranean Europe had no place in it. This postulation was not only contradictory, but also quite surprising, as Sarkozy himself presents France as "*européenne et méditerranéenne à la fois*" (both, European and Mediterranean). This was one of the many contradictions that the proposition presented. How Sarkozy was

going to resolve them is still today unclear, leaving the suspicion that there was an inconsistent design behind his electoral proposal. The project put forth in Toulon was very vague and idealistic, and for some analysts it called to mind the 'civilizing mission' of France (Khader, 2009: 175; Rubio, 2008). This language was very controversial. The constant references to the colonial *époque* in a direct and uninhibited way caused astonishment among the countries where certain wounds remained open (Bowen, 2007: 12).

However, the first Sarkozy reference to a Mediterranean Union was on 14 January 2007 during an investiture congress of the UMP. The idea was already raised (Bauchard 2008, 51), although it was not until later in Toulon that Sarkozy's proposal gained international attention. The Mediterranean Union, as proposed, was conceived not by a government in place, but rather for a candidate whose main ambition was returning France back to the core of the international arena. This fact raises an interesting point. Typically, when an idea arises in a national electoral campaign, it is not designed for the well-being of other countries, as this does not provide direct political gains (votes). More often than not, it is intended to reinforce the position of a candidate who competes at the national level. In other words, the Sarkozy proposal was a French idea conceived to represent French interests.

It was not surprising that the project was met with initial reluctance from the other European member states and the EC, mainly because the initial proposal left out the EU. In addition, Spain felt that French domestic interests were the reason behind the initiative. Spain's perception was that the BP was alive thanks to the results obtained in the Valencia meeting, and it was Spain who was pulling ahead without much involvement from other countries. Therefore, the renewed French interest was welcomed by the Spanish diplomacy, although many parts of the UM did not have Madrid's support, such as the lack of European involvement (interview with Spanish diplomat, 02 February 2011). Without expressing an explicit opposition, in a very informal way, Moratinos announced Spain's main concern: the inclusion of the European Union in the future Mediterranean policy. Spain proposed to create a Euro-Mediterranean Union instead (El País, 2 August 2007). However, this proposal had no impact. According to Gillespie, "the lack of new EU funding mean[t] that any new

institutions [would] be 'light', or at least less elaborate than the architecture proposed by Spanish foreign minister Miguel Ángel Moratinos in August 2007" (Gillespie, 2008: 281).

On the other hand, France's other European partners reacted with equal disaffection, as did some of the Mediterranean partner countries. Germany openly declared its opposition to a project that was tailored to fit French interests but planned to make use of European funds. The UK, on the other hand, backed Chancellor Merkel arguing that they were not going to invest more resources on the project. Poland and other Eastern countries acted with equal disaffection, and Ankara accused Sarkozy of putting forward the Mediterranean Union to prevent Turkey from becoming a full member of the European Union. The excessive unilateralism of the French President, together with the nature of a project that seemed to compete directly with existing EU Mediterranean policy, the exclusion of the non-Mediterranean European partners, the unilateralism in the design and presentation, and the grandiloquence with which it was outlined, all brought fears of a return to a more individualistic Paris.

During the following months, Sarkozy visited Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco with the intention of seeking partners to support his project. However, his proposal was still not clarified. The tone and content were ambiguous and raised many questions. For the Arab countries, the new initiative was seen as a change in the traditional Arab Policy that Chirac had encouraged; turning toward a broader initiative would force them to have closer relations with Israel (Echeverría, 2008: 3). The then-elected President undertook an intense level of activity which, together with the vague information offered in his public appearances, reinforced the impression that the French project was an attempt to re-nationalise the EMP (Schmid, 2009: 2).

During this phase of the project design, France demonstrated certain characteristics of a unilateral and individualistic actor. This was a time of presentation, not interaction. The main actor, if not the only one, was France, and the rest were mere spectators. Despite French diplomats' acknowledgement that France did know from the beginning that it could not act all alone (interview with French diplomat, 26 October 2010), it was at that point a strategic leader. There were no components of entrepreneurship in France's leadership style, because there were no other actors in

the design of the initiative. Spain, on the other hand, acted as an unhappy laggard: more of a disconcerted observer than a real actor. The feeling that Spain could not openly oppose the project and that Spanish interests in cooperating with France on other issues besides the Mediterranean were elements that made the Spanish privilege bilateral relations over the regional policy (Gillespie, 2011b: 65).

Contrary to information about the BP that was articulated among diplomats, the UM was conceived at political level and driven by the French President himself, in line with the most strict interpretation of the French Constitution (*le domaine réservé*). However, Sarkozy's team was a mix of members of the *Elysée* and the *Quay d'Orsay*, with constant exchanges between the two groups that worked in tandem. Once the UfM was negotiated at European level and included among the priorities of the French rotating Presidency in 2008, this interrelation became more evident with the appointment of Jouyet as Secretary of State for European Affairs a well-know Europeist. Nevertheless, as it will be explained later, disagreements between some diplomats and the government were a matter of discussion.

The question remains as to whether the Mediterranean Union was really necessary and why it was designed to leave out the European Union. In Sarkozy's speech in Tangier, he acknowledged that the EU had made progress in relation to Mediterranean concerns. Furthermore, despite the implicit criticism, Sarkozy admitted that the Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy had contributed to a *rapprochement* between the two shores (Sarkozy, 2007b). This tacit recognition suggests, once again, that the motivation was influenced by a national strategy. Leaving aside the EU, France presented itself as the mediator between Europe and the Mediterranean without having to compete with players such as Germany or the European Commission.

Also present in Sarkozy's Tangier speech was the functionalist idea of the Schuman proposal of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) that brought theories of the spillover effects that explain European integration. This functionalist approach contrasted with the intergovernmental framework that Sarkozy was also introducing. The functionalist idea is in Sarkozy's claims for a regional integration, where the states cede their power to a supranational institution while the UfM privilege the states over

the institutions in the decision-making process. Additionally, as Calleya (2000) and Attina (2002) have pointed out, there was a lack of homogeneity in the Mediterranean that makes regional integration complicated based on the principles of functionalism. Furthermore, employing Monnet's principle was also unique, as he was departing from scratch while the Euro-Mediterranean relations had been in place for several decades (Emerson, 2008: 2).

4.3.2 FIRST SIGNS OF TRANSITION

So far, the French attitude had generated strong negative responses, forcing a change in style (although not so much in content). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through Secretary of State for European Affairs, Jean Pierre Jouyet, tried to reconcile the Mediterranean Union with the EU (Schmid, 2009: 2), in opposition to Guaino's (and Sarkozy's) speeches. Differences became noticeable among the French team concerning the role that Europe might have in the new proposal (see Chapter 5). Ambassadors Huntzinger and Le Roy tried to reconcile tensions with France's European allies while promoting the initiative to Southern Mediterranean states. Le Roy, who became the Special Ambassador for the Union for the Mediterranean, tried to convince sceptics while acting as a bridge between France and the rest of the member states and partners.

Countries involved in the project were asked to appoint a contact diplomat who would receive information on the Mediterranean Union and who was asked to contribute with ideas. Up to 10 countries did so before the European Council on March 2008 (Soler i Lecha, 2008: 12). Although France's discourse was less individualistic and more inclusive at that point, "French political leadership during these months was unquestionable, the motor of the initiative was in Paris alone, and the structures which would have allowed decisions to be taken jointly with European and Mediterranean partners, were not set in motion" (Soler i Lecha, 2008: 12).⁶² In the process of promoting the Mediterranean Union, the French ambassador in charge of the EMP was not part of the UM team,⁶³ thus reinforcing the idea of separation between

⁶² My translation

⁶³ François Gouyette was the French Ambassador of the EMP, who would be replaced by Serge Telle.

Europe and the Mediterranean that was indicative of France's lack of desire to include the EU. Moreover, during the whole process of negotiation, the intense activity of Sarkozy and of his close-knit team showed once more the centrality of the Presidential role in French foreign policy.

In December 2007, when Sarkozy, Rodríguez Zapatero, and Romano Prodi met in Rome, some small compromises were made without changing the core of the project. For Spain and Italy, the inclusion of the EU in the project was a necessary condition for its support. Spain's reluctance was even greater, given that Madrid saw itself as the father of the Barcelona Process. The Italian and Spanish Prime Ministers ultimately supported the initiative on the condition that the name would change, becoming the Union for the Mediterranean. The use of language was important because the earlier name, Mediterranean Union, implied a political union, while a Union for the Mediterranean limited the reach of the project (Gillespie, 2008: 277). According to the agreement reached with Spain and Italy, the EU was to be fully involved and the UfM was to complement and not replace the Barcelona Process. Also, the three governments agreed to increase their coordination in order to prepare the summit that was expected to take place in Paris in July 2008. This coordination included project development and diplomatic contacts with the other partners of the Mediterranean although, in the end, this contribution was more symbolic than real.

Spain and Italy tried to work hand-in-hand with France, but French diplomats were not willing to share ownership of the initiative; therefore, the run-up to Paris differed greatly from the previous cooperation that had been established on the road to Barcelona. However, this cooperation would be reestablished to a certain extent at a later stage. For Bicchi, both countries were relegated to the role of low-profile supporters or favour-exchangers (Bicchi, 2011: 7).

In this second phase, although the tone was adapted and a component of collaboration emerged, the truth is that Paris conducted almost all negotiations with the support of other countries, but without making concessions to their ideas. France was in the driver's seat, not allowing other actors to become co-entrepreneurs. The huge amount of diplomatic resources invested by the French, combined with their weak disposition to cooperate with other EU actors, continued to suggest that Paris

still would be acting as a strategic leader. On the other hand, the reasons for the change in Spain's perspective were not entirely clear. It is argued that bilateral relations with France were privileged (Barbé 2009, 30)⁶⁴ and, also, that the Spanish situation of being placed comfortably in a reactive role prevailed over assuming a proactive one (Soler i Lecha 2008, 28).

In the end, it was Germany that forced the whole readaptation of the UfM after having asked Spain to mediate with France to include the rest of the European Union (Interview with Spanish diplomat, 2 February 2011). Germany even put on the table the threat of a veto, acting as a *veto-player de facto*. Although no country openly asked Germany to act as the opposition front, in the end, it was the German Chancellor who raised Northern and Eastern European concerns. Europe is a game of alliances and balances, and according to Schumacher, "the rationale underlying this strategy was to prevent France from becoming *primus inter pares* in European foreign policy matters, and thereby undermining Germany's role as the leading actor within the EU" (Schumacher, 2011: 84). Although Spain and Italy had strongly supported the inclusion of the EU, it was not until the meeting in Hannover in March 2008 that its full participation was finally secured. The Spanish press reflected this moment as the reactivation of the Euro-Mediterranean politics, indeed; however, it also stressed the absence of Zapatero in this meeting, showing the minor role played by Spain, as opposed to the strong German involvement (El Periódico de Catalunya, 13 March 2008). French press, on the other hand, described Germany's strong capacity and how France (and its President) had to adapt the Mediterranean initiative. For Sarkozy, this was a considerable step backward. The UfM was subordinated, at least on paper, to the Barcelona Process, taking its name. From that moment on (until the Marseille meeting in November 2008), it was 'Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean'. However, there was a positive side to this change, as it then seemed clear that the project would go ahead.

The rapid development of the initiative, from the electoral proposal in 2007 until the meeting in Hannover in March 2008, was the result of intense diplomatic activity

⁶⁴The fight against terrorism, the infrastructure, security, and immigration were key points for the Zapatero Administration, and these might have influenced Spanish support.

conducted mainly by France. This left some doubt as to exactly where the project was headed. Henry claims that in 2008, “the French actors, beginning with the President himself, fell prisoner to a hastily thought-out formula that failed to take account of contradictions, and an exhibitionist style of communication” (Henry, 2008: 41). French leadership, softened after the Rome meeting, might have employed a strategy to force change upon other actors such as the European Commission and the Northern countries. Similarly, the collaboration between France and Spain/Italy was calculated and in practice never existed very meaningfully. When collaboration did exist, France still managed to take the lead and direct future activity. The moment when France turned into an entrepreneur was after the Hannover meeting. From that point on, although France was still the visible head actor, it would be by means of co-operation with other actors that decisions would be taken. This was also the moment that the Union for the Mediterranean was, finally, Europeanised, at least in theory.

The development of the “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean” confirmed for the functionalists the weight of European institutions. The role of the EU was crucial in several areas: first, the EU Council directed the new project firmly within the existing Barcelona acquis; and second, the European Commission developed the project through its communications and within known parameters. For Reiterer, “these features highlight the independence of EU institutions from the member states. The institutions fostered the integration process according to their preferences (European interest) in making use of their autonomy from member states (agency)” (Reiterer, 2009: 329). However, this is debatable, or at least requires some clarification. The goal of keeping the UfM linked to the Barcelona Process was also demanded by Spanish diplomats, especially in the first and second phases (interview with Spanish diplomat, 2 February 2011), in an attempt to keep the spirit of what was considered a Spanish initiative. Furthermore, it remains uncertain whether it was the EU institutions that managed to change the Mediterranean Union orientation, or rather another state/coalition of states. Therefore, it is questionable whether the EU played such an important role, at least in the first phase. This would change in more recent configurations of the UfM, in which Europe would regain further weight in keeping the initiative alive. What it is true and goes in line with institutionalists rather than

functionalists is that the European member states and an important part of the French diplomacy, as it will be presented later in this chapter, preferred to work on region-building (including within the European Union).

4.3.3 FRANCE AS (FORCED) BROKER-ENTREPRENEUR UNDER THE FORMULA OF PRIMUS INTER PARES

As of 13 March 2008, France began working in conjunction with the European Union. The European Council invited the European Commission to develop the new proposal and change the name to "Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean." This fact was viewed favourably among the Spanish public, linking it to diplomatic activity of Madrid (La Vanguardia, 14 March 2008). In May of the same year, the Commission presented a report that highlighted an institutional structure that still left many open questions that were not to be resolved until the meeting in Marseille. For France, the new initiative was conceived to "bring some coherence to all the existing cooperation initiatives in the Mediterranean, (...) in this framework, the Secretariat could act as a co-pilot for Mediterranean regional programmes" (Balfour, Schmid, 2008).

However, the EU Presidency would test France's readiness to co-operate with others. Typically, Presidencies are used by member states to promote their own priorities; consequently, it represented a new opportunity for French *protagonismo* and an excellent window for Sarkozy to include the proposed UfM in a privileged position on the agenda.⁶⁵ The Europeanisation bottom-up was going to be the dynamic that would prevail during the next months, especially in some areas like the co-presidency status.

Beginning in the second half of 2008, France's Presidency featured an important change: Alain Le Roy, the ambassador in charge of the UfM, was appointed as the new Deputy Secretary-General for peacekeeping operations at the United Nations. Le Roy knew about his UN assignment several months beforehand; however, media suggested that differences between Guaino and Le Roy were behind this decision (EurActiv, 10 September 2008). The natural choice to replace Le Roy was Serge Telle, for he was the ambassador in charge of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, but it was Guaino who was appointed as head of the mission while Telle kept his existing post as ambassador

⁶⁵ The French presidency of the EC will be addressed separately in Chapter 5, although there are some references to its mandate due to the nature of this chapter.

in charge of the Euro-Mediterranean process (see Chapter 2). The appointment of Guaino, a close advisor to the President, ensured that the new interministerial mission would stay in line with the presidential strategy; yet again, Sarkozy's governing style demonstrated the centrality of the *Elysée* in terms of foreign policy.

In order to guarantee the success of the Paris summit on 13 July, the French government had to use all possible resources. During the preparation of this meeting, France acted as an entrepreneur, contacting other states to ensure their participation and contribution to the UfM. The presence of the Syrian President at the summit and the rumors of an eventual resumption of Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations provided good examples of the kind of entrepreneurship action carried out by Paris in order to ensure its success. Almost all of the countries in the UfM attended: only the Libyan leader and the kings of Morocco and Jordan refused to attend (see Chapter 5). The absence of King Mohamed VI was surprising given the good relations between France and Morocco. Additionally, there was controversy in the final instatement, as Palestinians reported that they were not informed about the content of the declaration; they disagreed upon the fact that there was no mention of the need to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict (Vasconcelos, 2008: 41-42). The summit ended with a sense of continuity with the Barcelona Process but with a greater role for the intergovernmental dimension, much to the detriment of the European approach. This intergovernmental approach was in the institutional design, the details of which were left to be decided at the subsequent Foreign Ministers' meeting. Such a design was compatible with the original idea of the project. In this game of relations, French diplomatic efforts and the country's capacity for action in the region exceeded by far the mobilization of resources by other countries included in the project.

It was in Marseille that the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean left behind the reference to Barcelona. Holding this Foreign Ministers' meeting was not as easy as holding the one in Paris. To begin with, Israel had opposed the idea of Arab League participation in all UfM meetings as an observer. Also, during the months that preceded the ministerial meeting, several countries competed to host the UfM's Secretariat. It was a race of diplomatic contacts and declarations. France itself presented the candidature of Marseille for the 'capital' of the Mediterranean, but it

would have been surprising had the Secretariat been allocated to that city, considering that France was already sharing the co-presidency. In principle, the Secretariat should have been placed in a Southern country in the interests of co-ownership; however, Southern countries could not agree on a candidate, and it was Barcelona that was finally chosen. Spain gained the physical placement and, in return, allowed France to remove any reference to the UfM that sounded too Spanish. Spain exchanged the prefix for French support for the Catalan candidacy (Gillespie, 2011, 1212). Prior to the Marseille meeting, Spanish diplomats had pushed to keep the Barcelona name in the title of the new initiative in an attempt to remind that the UM was not created from scratch but based on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Reiterer, 2009: 319); however, Spanish diplomats admit that this was a lost cause, for it was not possible to keep such a long name (interview with Spanish diplomat, 02 February 2011).

Nevertheless, following Soler's line of argument (Soler i Lecha, 2009: 172), "to ensure that the Ministerial (meeting) ended with agreements, and with the aim of satisfying the maximum number of countries, the declaration of Marseille is an exercise in balance and ambiguities that significantly affects the Secretariat." As a result, two things stand out from the preparation of Marseille meeting: on the one hand, France consolidated its role as a genuine entrepreneur, making concessions and showing a less rigid and more cooperative attitude. On the other hand, France did not renounce to the role of *primus inter pares*. Paris got back the name and the institutional design by consolidating its intergovernmental approach.

The Gaza invasion from December 2008 until January 2009 caused the first great crisis of the UfM. Israel, which claimed that its main intention was to stop rockets being fired towards Israel, attacked the Gaza strip in a hard offensive. The three-week war poisoned the environment and paralysed the UfM for almost a year. During this year, ministerial meetings were postponed indefinitely. French officials, with the President at the forefront, used their influence to reactivate the UfM, sometimes acting in parallel with the EU Presidency. In the first half of 1999, it was the Czech Republic that held the rotating Presidency. However, Sarkozy conducted a 'parallel' mission in the Middle East, in which he met with the leaders of Israel, Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon. The EU was virtually excluded from the process, with the latter having the token role

of issuing statements without playing the important role of mediator (Král, et al, 2009: 64). This attitude was in line with the old French objective of achieving a more relevant role in the Middle East Peace talks.

This hyperactivity was regarded, again, with suspicion, especially when Paris began to insist on maintaining its co-presidency of the UfM beyond the six-month term of its EU Presidency in order to be in post the same amount of time as the Southern chair. Spain, on the other hand, adopted a lower profile but also contributed to help unblock the initiative. Miguel Ángel Moratinos personally took the lead; in June 2009, Moratinos acting as a Spanish ambassador, gathered all representatives from the different countries in Barcelona to work on the statutes of the future Secretariat. All countries sent a representative, although they rejected to define the meeting as “official” (El País, 19 June 2009).

Overcoming the obstacles created by Israel’s move against Gaza proved almost impossible. Paris mobilised to condemn the invasion but, at the same time, insisted on the security of Israel. This balance was consistent both with French foreign policy and also with France’s role as a co-president of the UfM. The EU used technical meetings to bring the Arab countries back to the table, and in late November 2008, there were some signs of progress: it was announced that Jordanian Ahmad Massadeh would head the Secretariat. Finally, ministerial meetings were able to resume, but not everything was resolved. It became clear that side-stepping the Arab-Israeli conflict was simply not possible. In this first *époque* there were already some signs of the institution’s limitations. To start with, there was not a good confidence environment. French officials argue that if the 5+5 Dialogue took a long time to begin having this kind of positive atmosphere; it was still too early for the UfM to have the same positive environment.

Besides, not all countries were willing to invest in the UfM. For instance, the French delegation was only once received by the Italian team, and the Spanish never sent a team to visit the UfM team in France. Egypt appointed a project coordinator, although the mission (in 2010) had not seen much activity in proposing projects (interview with a French official, 26 October 2010). In addition, technical collaboration has not always been efficient. The coordination among different countries has depended most of the

time on the Ministers, and it is not as well-organised as one may think, even within each country. The French ministerial mission has faced the challenge of having a dearth of information from different ministers within the same government when holding a project meetings, which makes things more complicated (interview with French diplomat, 26 October 2010).

The 2010 Spanish EU Presidency was a propitious moment to test French entrepreneurship. It was also a good opportunity to relaunch the Mediterranean initiative. This seems to be a turning point at which France gave some leeway in order to establish an effective cooperation and a clearer role definition compared to other EU Presidencies. For instance, Moratinos visited several Mediterranean (e.g., Lebanon, Israel) countries to personally invite the heads of state to attend the Barcelona Conference, and in the case of Israel, to ask directly for further support for the UfM (Arutz Sheva, 23 April 2010). During the Spanish Presidency, Moratinos took the lead when facing the regional problems encountered during the six months. This is not surprising considering the regional experience of the Spanish diplomat. After France, Spain was the second Mediterranean country to hold the Presidency of the European Council. Furthermore, the enactment of the Lisbon treaty in 2009 brought more complexity to the structure of Euro-Mediterranean relation, requiring even more entrepreneurial action during the Presidencies. Besides, in addition to the Presidency tasks, Moratinos had to mediate between Libya and Switzerland in the crisis of visas,⁶⁶ in an event that for a while affected European interests as Libya unofficially suspended visa distributions to EU citizens (El País, 15 February 2010).

For Spain, this was the opportunity to gain some relevance and place itself next to France as its main partner. Previous Spanish Presidencies of the EU proved to be very successful, and despite the different constraints, 2010's Presidency was expected to produce the same good results in terms of European implications, especially considering the existing political consensus that gave further stability to the

⁶⁶ The crisis between Libya and Switzerland started in July 2008 when the son of Colonel Kadhafi was arrested in Geneva for mistreatment of domestics. Switzerland prohibited entry or transit to Colonel Kadhafi and other Libyan nationals. In response, Libya detained two Swiss businessmen in the Swiss Embassy for 19 months. In February 2009, the visa crisis exploded when Switzerland restricted visas to Libyan nationals. In response, Libya denied visas to nationals of Schengen member states.

government. However, the difficult economic situation was a factor that could not be ignored. Yet, despite prior positive experiences, a certain sense of losing relevance vis-à-vis France in the Mediterranean, and more generally speaking in the new European Union, was viewed with concern (Martín, 2009: 2). The lack of clear strategic vision, political ambition, and belief in the Mediterranean region-building compared to previous years affected Spanish regional capabilities (Gillespie, 2011b: 60). This vision was partially shared by the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which recognised that it was taking longer for Madrid to adapt to the new European circumstances, like the Eastern enlargement or the introduction of the Lisbon treaty, while other bigger European countries have been able to adapt faster (interview with Spanish diplomat, 02 February 2011). Ultimately, the context played a more important role than expected and produced unequal results.⁶⁷

The main Spanish task for the Mediterranean was coordinating the UfM summit scheduled for June 2008; finally, the summit did not occur. However, France and Spain worked together in an attempt to find an acceptable solution for all UfM participants, and the unsatisfactory outcome was not due to a lack of understanding between the two neighbours, but because of complicated circumstances that, once again, affected the Mediterranean's efficient functioning. This time, French energy and Moratino's good relations with Israel and Palestine were not enough. In addition to the summit delay and the incident with the ministerial conference on water,⁶⁸ the Association Agreement with Syria was not signed, Israel and Algeria expressed frustration regarding their Agreements, and the framework Agreement with Libya suffered an unexpected setback. On a more positive note, Spain managed to set up the Secretariat

⁶⁷The economic and financial crisis affected Spanish capacity to maneuver. The new European Treaty also reduced the role of the Presidency somewhat, although the Spanish government encouraged further European protagonism. In the new configuration, the Spanish Presidency was part of the trio of presidencies, which for the first time was composed of Spain, Belgium, and Hungary. For many analysts, the Spanish Presidency was seen as a transitional one. It is because of this new configuration that the Spanish Presidency suffered delays in starting its preparations—a fact that was compensated with informal contact with the rest of the member states (González Sanchez, 2010: 7).

⁶⁸ The 4th Ministerial conference of water took place in Barcelona on April 2010. The aim was to manage water supplies, but ended in failure due to disagreements between the Arab countries and Israel regarding how to make reference to the 'occupied territories', a term that Israel opposed. The EU proposed 'territories under occupation', which was not acceptable for the Arab partners.

of the UfM, and the first EU-Morocco summit took place in Granada in March 2010. Therefore, the Spanish Presidency was a mix of good results despite regional setbacks.

After the Spanish Presidency, Belgium inherited a difficult situation to manage; the strategy adopted in Brussels was, precisely, to delegate to France, which was the co-president of the UfM. In other words, the degree of implication was lower than in previous EU presidencies, and this became a continuum in the subsequent presidencies in a context where the Mediterranean had substantially changed after the Arab Spring. This fact is, however, somewhat understandable. The lack of Northern EU states in the UfM allowed for a project shaped by and for the Mediterranean countries, and other EU member states may have felt that they were not sufficiently represented.

The EC assumed the co-presidency in a gesture of goodwill after having being denied such a role during the early years of the UfM. This brought further representation for the Northern countries and a bigger implication of the EU's role as a whole. For instance, EU representation was to lie with the High Representative at the level of Foreign Ministries, the HR, and a Commission representative for ministerial meetings on matters of exclusive EU competence. For matters of member-state competence, the representation lay in the rotating Presidency of the Council of Ministers. The Commission, in cooperation with the rotating Presidency, was the representative for meetings dealing with mixed competence, and the EEAS for meetings of senior officials (Gillespie, 2012: 19). Ironically, the complexity of the EMP organisation that caused difficulties in delimiting EU institutions' responsibilities and representation was seen one of the main problems of the Partnership (Monar, 1998: 55); this complexity seemed to be even bigger in the new UfM institutional setup.

The new European co-presidency was able to produce some progress, and finally, the two co-chairs were able to meet in Jordan in what Guigou called "an inter-institutional" meeting (Guigou, 2013). In addition, the EU appointed Spaniard Bernardino León in the new post of EU Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean. León's task was to enhance the EU's political dialogue with Southern Mediterranean countries and act in response to the Arab Spring events by trying to strengthen democracy, in accordance with the objectives of the ENP. Nevertheless, the "lack of political leadership," as stated by Martin Schulz (EurActiv, 04 April 2013) was a worrisome issue

that the European institutions worked to counteract. Schulz, in an attempt to steer the implementation of projects in the framework of the UfM, took the initiative to convene the parliament speakers of the 42 countries.⁶⁹ It was partly thanks to Europe that the UfM is still alive today, but in the absence of a clear leadership, especially in an initiative where intergovernmentalism prevailed over other forms of governance, there has not been much the EU could do to lead the way.

Close co-ordination between France and Spain seemed to be the relationship dynamic within the UfM (interviews with French, Spanish diplomats). This cooperation, however, suffered certain technical setbacks. French officials complained of Spain's deficiency in terms of project proposition, the absence of a clear interlocutor for technical projects, or the lack of an equivalent mission similar to the French interministerial one (interview with French official, 26 October 2010). Fieldwork seems to confirm that Spain has been more interested in gaining political visibility and improving its image (like by hosting the headquarters of the Secretariat) than by contributing active projects. This lack of resources was "denounced" by the French, in contrast with the situation in Madrid compared to previous *époques*. The Spanish Minister had a bigger team at the service of the UfM than in the time of the Barcelona Process, including a special unit only for this initiative. However, Madrid did not have an interministerial mission similar to the French one. Also, both countries argued that they had a smaller team because they were not a partner in the co-presidency. In any case, some measures would have been adopted to increase the resources in the event of an eventual appointment (interview with Spanish diplomat, 10 February 2010).

France and Spain had a common position on most of the projects, but when divergences arose, French did not know whom they should address. This made the cooperation at a technical level virtually inexistent (interview with French official, 26 October 2010).⁷⁰ This fact contrasted with France's high diplomatic coordination and collaboration. Constant exchanges took place during the months that followed the

⁶⁹Media suggest that this Schulz's initiative was related to his possible aspiration to become the next president of the European Commission in 2014, therefore, his actions were part of a strategy to position himself above national politics (EurActiv, 04 April 2013)

⁷⁰ French and Spanish conception of the project relative to financial protection and arbitration differs. It is reported that there should have a very easy solution, as there were not big divergences. Nevertheless, French officials have never been able to meet with the Spanish Ministry of Justice, Industry, or Commerce (interview with French official, 26 October 2010)

Summit in Paris; this was also the case for political and diplomatic exchanges. Guaino and Moratino met on several occasions to discuss diplomatic affairs. They worked in close collaboration with the *Elysée* and the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and regional cooperation seemed to work reasonably well (interviews with French, Spanish diplomats and Spanish regional officials).

Political coordination continued beyond the Spanish Presidency. Moratinos and Kouchner, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited Israel, Palestine, and Jordan together in October 2010 in an attempt to overcome the difficulties that were blocking the organisation of the second meeting of heads of state, which had already been delayed once (*El País*, 7 October, 2010). Months later, Trinidad Jiménez, who substituted Miguel Ángel Moratinos as Minister of Foreign Affairs in October 2010, also tried to rejuvenate the UfM in her own visit to the region (*El País*, 16 March 2011). Jiménez showed that Spain was an active regional player committed to the UfM. This situation suggests that collaboration existed at high level exchanges, being qualified as good or even very good, but the different Spanish institutional structure and fewer resources led to some abnormal functioning in a collaboration that, otherwise, seemed to be in good health. Consequently, until the EU began substituting for member states in the co-presidency, there were some reasons that hinted at the progressive establishment of co-entrepreneurship. It seemed implicit in French support for Spain to succeed France in the co-presidency of the UfM, which some observers were expecting to happen (Aliboni, 2009: 6).

In this third stage, France combined both a high and a low profile in its entrepreneurial action. Its high level of activity during the Gaza conflict showed commitment to the region, but its activity also overlapped with the country's role of the European Union and the EU Presidency, creating some confusion. In this sense, it can be argued that there was a sort of regression to the previous structural leadership style. While France may have been justified in its function as co-president of the UfM, co-ordination between the EU Presidency and France on certain subjects did not seem to be very effective, showing some trends of the country's initial individualism. In addition to the grandiloquent discourse of the first *époque* Guaino adopted a "whoever is not with me, is against me" form in his public declarations in response to what he considered "*les*

petites manoeuvres bureaucratiques, politiciennes, journalistiques pour essayer de discréditer ce projet” (small maneuvers from bureaucrats, politicians and journalists in an attempt to discredit this project) (Guiano, 2009). Some members of the UfM team still consider that after the inclusion of the European Union, the initiative became a hybrid institution that lost its original purpose and, therefore, lost strength (interview with French official, 26 October 2010).

This attitude contrasts with a less intrusive profile within the UfM, leaving room for other actors to take the lead in certain areas and project development. Yet during the first years of the UfM, France had shown an “omnipresence” in all Mediterranean events (Martin, 2009: 7) and a stronger activism than any other partner has been able to achieve. After the summit in Paris, Spanish strategy seemed to have gone through two phases. Gillespie points out that Spanish objectives within the UfM have been restricted to the institutional domain (Gillespie, 2011b: 61). However, further developments suggest that there has been an evolution and Spain has broadened its interests after the Spanish European Presidency, adopting a higher political implication in order to secure a meeting that, in the end, never took place. This is also visible in the adoption to the discourse of the UfM’s benefits and the efforts to try to breathe new life into the initiative. Spain has not been the most active partner in terms of project proposition, as mentioned above, but it has actively participated in solar energy project with Germany and France. Together with Italy, Spain has proposed the creation of an agency to promote the development of medium and small enterprises; there is also the project to promote entrepreneurship among young female university students together with Morocco, Palestine, and Jordan.

France sought co-ordination with all of the Mediterranean partners, especially Spain. Spain was seen as a reliable associate, and one that even asked for greater commitment on the part of certain Southern Mediterranean partners who, thus far, had not been especially proactive in this regard. This coordination sought out key partners, which was at odds with the invocation of equality among the 42 members involved in the UfM. Within the UfM, it seems that France has acted as a broker-entrepreneur, creating a political space for co-entrepreneurship although its governing tendency could change quite easily into a strategic leadership style. However,

resources and involvement of other partners would also be a necessary condition for the successful development of an effective co-entrepreneurship. In this case, Spain's capabilities made it look more like a "junior partner" (Gillespie, 2011b: 60).

Holden, after analysing the institutional configuration and its initial operation, concluded that "the UfM ethos does accord with functionalist principles in its approach to development and regionalisation. The development element is, in principle, strongly focused on facing up to practical challenges to the welfare of the citizens of the Mediterranean. The degree of flexibility in terms of project management, funding and participation are very much in line with a functionalist ethos". Holden also noted that the institutional form does not "follow function", for it is highly politicised (Holden, 2011: 164-165). Research shows that Holden's conclusions may be in line with the aims of the Union for the Mediterranean, although the difficult reality contradicted the functionalist approach. For instance, Holden's assertion is in accordance with projects focused on creating new jobs. This is an ongoing area of special interests for the southern countries, and despite regional setbacks, these forums and activities are often propitious in generating huge interest (interview with French diplomat, 26 October 2010). However, despite France's hopes of incrementing integration by means of practical projects, the current situation is that Southern countries continue to privilege national policies over the southern regional ones (interview with French diplomat, 26 October 2010).

4.4 CONCLUSIONS

The Union for the Mediterranean brought more changes than merely the titular adjustment. Designed to satisfy national interests and based on ideas expressed in the past, this French initiative raised huge expectations, medium support, and unspoken scepticism. However, it also had Spanish support. A policy window existed, although it was latent. The questionable outcomes of the Barcelona Process and the extended disenchantment with the initiative provided a latent favourable context for policy changing. French leadership evolved from demonstrating strong components of unilateralism to acting as a genuine entrepreneur while keeping some features of the former style. However, this entrepreneurship adopted the form of certain paternalism,

leaving Spain as the junior partner. It is, nevertheless, debatable if this secondary role was only due to France's overwhelming diplomatic energy or the lack of reactivity and clear strategy adopted by the Spanish. The sorry state of the Spanish economy by 2010 was an important factor as well. Facts seem to suggest that further resources and a stronger leadership attitude led France to this position... with Spanish acceptance. In Bicchi's words, "the UfM was launched because a very small group cajoled an uninterested majority into yet another initiative for the Mediterranean" (Bicchi, 2011: 8).

But, how effective was Sarkozy's style? The proactive President succeeded in changing the orientation of Euro-Mediterranean initiatives. Also, he succeeded in shaping the UfM to suit France's interests. Sarkozy put on board a lot of unwilling members, among them "the father of the Barcelona Process" and the very reticent Germany. He prospered in keeping an intergovernmental approach even when the EU was part of the UfM, and he held the co-presidency more than 2 years, as he had initially hoped. Therefore, French leadership has been unquestionable. In a mix of strategic leadership and broker-entrepreneurship, depending on the areas and the stages of negotiation, France managed to build a new regional initiative. However, where French leadership has failed is in reproducing the same French political structure for Mediterranean policy in other countries and in spreading the enthusiasm and willingness to the other regional partners. The strong component of unilateralism and the dynamics and setbacks of the UfM have failed to breathe new life into the Euro-Mediterranean policy.

Today, the UfM suffers from the same problems as the Barcelona Process, but inverted: there is a lack of co-ownership, although on the part of the Northern/Eastern European countries. The problem is that under the Barcelona Process, the initiative was not blocked; the EU acted as the guardian, and therefore the Barcelona Process "*sufre una mala salud de hierro*" (suffers from a weak robust health" (interview with Spanish diplomat, 02 February 2010). With an intergovernmental approach, on the contrary, blockage is the norm, and not the exception. In addition, the introduction of the notion of co-proprietorship has not increased the level of implication from the southern partners, which continue to act as unhappy laggards more often than not but which,

on the contrary, have become veto-players in a dynamic that has only poisoned the good development of the initiative. With the Arab Spring, the EU adopted a more active role and finally took over the co-presidency, leading to a new phase that would be interesting to monitor in the future.

After an initial period marked by a lack of communication, this trend looks to have been corrected, at least between France and Spain. For Spain, cooperation is the main and only option. Spain openly recognises that France is its main partner and that it is the first to be informed when Madrid decides to take action in the Mediterranean. First Spain addresses ideas with the French, and then they present their proposals to the rest of the partners (interview Spanish diplomat, 02 February 2011). On the French side, this collaboration at the diplomatic level is also acknowledged, and facts seem to suggest that Spain has become the main partner, as has been presented during this chapter. All in all, besides certain competition regarding each country's international relevance, the UfM has confirmed the Franco-Spanish tandem—although the countries have shifted their driving roles.

Is the Mediterranean today a European priority? Probably more than ever, considering the regional problems encountered after the Arab Spring. But today, the regional approach is a weaker approach, and many European partners seem to have lost interest in addressing this issue in the framework of an initiative that is condemned to be “new”, “renewed”, “reinvigorated”, “rejuvenated”, “revitalised” or “resuscitated” every now and then. The Union for the Mediterranean is today a highly ambitious initiative that has a clear father, a dedicated godfather, many aunts and uncles, but a highly unstable house to live in.

CHAPTER 5

Mediterranean leadership in France and Spain through the rotating presidencies of the European Council

INTRODUCTION

There is constant disagreement among diplomats and researchers as to whether or not the EU Council's rotating Presidency can be an influential platform from which to effect policy change. Both, the capacity for projecting influence during a short amount of time and the strategies that the countries holding the rotating Presidency use are recurrent topics among those who attempt to shed light on this debate. As it will be presented in this chapter, some view nationality as an insurmountable obstacle in a country's efforts for assuming a neutral stance. Others see constraints in the short amount of time—only six months—of the rotating Presidency, and still others observe that the State's role is diminishing while the one of the European institutions is progressively increasing. Nevertheless, despite the Treaty of Lisbon, the rotating Presidency is a function that has not disappeared.

This chapter examines the extent to which France and Spain were influential during two periods in EU history: the Spanish Presidency of 1995 and the French Presidency of 2008. The EU was substantially different in 1995 and 2008. When Spain assumed the rotating Presidency, the EU had only 12 member states: a fact that favoured Spain's ability to influence the outcomes. In 2008, however, France assumed the role in an EU composed of 27 member states. Nevertheless, the reason for having selected these two cases is linked to the main objective of this research: the comparative approach, which is based on employing the "most similar method", as presented in the theoretical framework. Assuming that there were remarkable differences in terms of objectives, context or capacities, these two presidencies represented an important moment of Mediterranean policy development. Both countries succeeded in launching a new Euro-Mediterranean initiative, both had two notorious Premiers with a very

specific leadership style, and during both presidencies, the Mediterranean was presented as the greatest priority that required national and international attention.

This chapter builds upon current theoretical debates. An overview of these debates will be presented, along with an attempt to identify the functions and means by which the presidencies of 1995 and 2008 set each respective country's priorities. The aim of this chapter is not to provide an alternative theoretical explanation, but rather to identify those actions where France and Spain effectively (or ineffectively) used the Presidency to advance their national interests.

5.1 THE EUROPEAN PRESIDENCIES AS OPPORTUNITIES FOR POLICY ENTREPRENEURSHIP REGARDING THE MEDITERRANEAN

As suggested earlier in this dissertation, the EU is a combination of intergovernmental and supranational bodies. In foreign policy, the mix of these two dimensions has been a constant source of debate and discussion. For Monar, one of the reasons is that the EU's institutional framework allows countries and the Commission to "channel" their different aspirations through an exercise in compromise. However, the EU's institutional framework is also a limitation "because of its essential function as a clearing-house of interests" (Monar, 1998: 51). Monar's conclusion is echoed by Sanges D'Abadie, who also points out that "each of these contending visions of the new Europe seeks to pull the EU towards its focus by shifting the EU's attention and collective actions towards the respective terms of reference on its agenda" (Sanges D'Abadie, 1998: 85-86).

Some examples of regional agendas are: the German one, which focuses on Central and Eastern Europe; the Spanish, French, and Italian agendas, which are more interested in the Mediterranean; and finally, the UK orientation, which contains a wider and more comprehensive vision instead of a purely regional approach. Nonetheless, the historical recurrence of these agendas should not imply that, on occasions, other member states do not try to reorient them; an example of this was in 2005 when Sweden assumed a more active role in the Mediterranean. Another example was in 1998, when the UK, which held the rotating Presidency, paid limited attention to the cultural and social focus area of the Barcelona Process; at that time, the UK opposed trade liberalisation, which was much more relevant to the UK's own

Mediterranean agenda (Youngs, 1999: 13). This is understandable, considering the UK's traditional politics toward the region. The UK has been more concerned over economic trade or security than cultural issues—⁷¹ a topic not as focused upon in Southern European countries for historic, cultural, and geographic reasons. However, the Middle East was a high priority for the United Kingdom, which helps to explain the moderate British interest in the Barcelona Process, although there was, admittedly, less interest at that time in the Middle East than there was in the Maghreb.

The European Council may be defined as a hybrid institution. On the one hand, it is a body of collective EU task forces; on the other hand, it is the product of the desires of member states' governments. The European Council's main assignment consists of negotiating proposals for the EU; proposals which, very often, come from the European Commission. Proposal negotiation may occur either because the Commission takes the initiative, or because the Council has asked the Commission to draft a document in a particular subject area. When the Commission takes the lead, the process of deliberation is shared between the Council and the European Parliament, leaving room for negotiations among coalitions existing among or across different institutions and member states.

Commonly, task participants are not the heads of state, but rather ministers of the subject areas of the initiative at hand. However, over time, several specialised and thematic groups have emerged within the Council of the European Union that deals with foreign, economic, and financial affairs (Ecofin), justice and home affairs (JHA), agriculture, etc. The number of "working groups" has been considerably reduced over time; today, under the Lisbon Treaty, where important modifications have been introduced, 10 different constellations exist (European Council). If a hierarchy existed, the General Affairs Council (GAC), composed of Foreign Ministers, would be the senior council. The reason for this preeminence lies on the assumption that Foreign Ministers have a coordinating role inside their respective governments. Foreign Ministers cannot always dictate policy decisions for Prime Ministers, but they have become more

⁷¹ Gillespie points out that cultural activity was seen as quite important, but it was believed that this was being addressed through the British Council. There was enough scepticism that multilateral cultural cooperation would be just a talking shop, of which there were plenty already (Personal communication)

involved, and in some areas they remain the main decision-makers (Wallace, 2000 in Wallace, Wallace, 2000: 16-17). As outlined in previous chapters, this seniority is consistent with the idea that member states are still reticent to cede their sovereignty in foreign affairs matters.

In order to prepare ministerial meetings, a number of committees and working groups are involved; the most important of these is the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). It is composed of representatives of the member states who have the rank of ambassadors to the European Union. COREPER is a very important decision-making group, as it is a forum for dialogue, political control, and preliminary scrutiny of thematic dossiers.

Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the rotating President spoke on behalf of the Council when dealing with EU institutions and other European and international partners. In practice, this meant that the European Commission and the rotating EU President often worked together in those areas in which Europe and member states share sovereignty. This interaction has been the subject of numerous academic debates, many of which raise the question of how much national governments influence the EU during their short presidencies. While the Council is commonly defined as an intergovernmental framework, some authors claim that although it “may not (yet) be a supranational institution in its own right, it certainly has moved on from being purely a site of decision-taking and the forum for bargaining among representatives of national governments” (Christiansen, 2001: 136). This is particularly clear in the period following the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. The visibility and capacities of the rotating Presidency have been significantly diminished since then. Nevertheless, for the two case studies in this chapter, the rotating Presidency of the EU had an important and active role.

A certain pattern of socialisation based on insider relations and constant European exchanges helps the top-down Europeanisation in some areas where dealing with certain decisions would have been difficult to accept for some countries at the national level. Ultimately, the ministers are first and foremost officials in their own national governments; thus, and its main task is, generally, pursued in line with their national priorities (Wallace, 2000, in Wallace, Wallace, 2000: 19). However, the Brusselisation is,

then, an element to consider, for “while loyalty shifts have not occurred, diplomats’ efforts to maintain their credibility and reputation within the group and to follow the ‘rules of the game’ might still lead to deviations from the original mandate” (Juncos, Pomorska, 2011: 1110). Therefore, member states’ fear of overcoming the intergovernmental approach and establishing a permanent bureaucracy in Brussels is, to certain extent, real. Unsurprisingly, these dynamics of bargaining have led some authors to think that the “Council not only lacks transparency, but has positively embraced secrecy as part of its routine work practice” (Christiansen, 2001: 136).

The weight of EU member states can be compared by examining certain aspects or features of EU operations. Perhaps one of the most obvious features to consider is the voting system. With the introduction of the qualified majority vote (QMV) in 1997, the weight of the member states was measured according to their population, and this influenced coalition-building between member states. For instance, Spain has 27 and France has 29 votes out of 352 votes. As the European Union has been enlarged, this system has been constantly challenged by the member states that were losing power. From De Gaulle to Aznar, the struggle to keep a good representative level has been a matter of high politics, especially in the case of Spain, which has often sought to achieve the same influence as the “big ones” (El País, 10 December 2000). This has created the conditions to introduce a new debate among those who believe that smaller member states have increased their leadership capacities and are increasingly gaining influence (Dennison, 2013), and those who argue that larger member states tend to set the framework in European Council negotiations—especially in the case of France, Germany, and the UK (Tallberg, 2008: 691). These countries either set the terms within which agreements must be pursued, or if they reach a common understanding, it is extremely difficult to achieve different outcomes.

The rotating Presidency is the only European office that is strictly egalitarian because the rotation exists no matter the size or the weight of the country (Magnette, Nicolaidis, 2003: 7). This is in terms of assuming the assignment of the rotating Presidency, although each country’s capacities and resources may greatly differ. However, considering the egalitarian starting point, some small member states were not happy with the introduction of a permanent President that would hamper the

equality among member states (Bunse, 2009: 28). For the then Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, giving up the rotating Presidency was also a risk, as “it [was] not so good to concentrate so much on one person and to establish such strong centralisation. After all, we are a Europe consisting of many individual states, and I think this should be taken into account” (BBC News, 16 January 2003). In opposition, the biggest countries, led by Aznar, Blair, and Chirac (the ABC proposal which later became the Franco-German proposal), defended the idea of a permanent President. The appointment of a Permanent President finally occurred pursuant to the Lisbon Treaty, and all member states have lost part of their responsibilities and functions.

Generally speaking, and although there is no direct mapping, “big states tend to favour the Council where they can more easily wield their power. By contrast, small states tend to champion the Commission as the guardian of the ‘common interest’” (Magnette, Nicolaidis, 2003: 2). This concept of balance is closely linked to the capacities to influence the developments during the rotating Presidency, and one of the most visible tools is the capacity to set the political agenda. Agenda-setting was a collaborative process between the different EU institutions and the rotating Presidency. Before the Lisbon Treaty was enacted, the country holding the rotating Presidency had the opportunity to put their national priorities at the forefront of EU politics. A complicating factor was that each country’s semiannual Presidency could not truly set an agenda from scratch, instead relying to a great extent on the work of the previous administration. The continuity was, therefore, assured by means of the troika, composed by the previous and subsequent Presidency of the Council. This fact has been reinforced after Lisbon with the introduction of the Trio. However, certain actions that require the participation of both a head of state and the permanent President “create a certain ambiguity with regard to the division of responsibilities between the permanent and rotating chairs” (Batory, Puetter, 2013: 98). It should be noted that before and after the troika, the rotating Presidency had its critics. For Everts, it was increasingly an obstacle to developing a more robust common foreign policy (Everts, 2001), and for others, the trio “is a joke” at least when three very different countries with no common agendas coincided in this group, like with the second trio formed by Poland, Denmark, and Cyprus (EurActiv, 21 December 2011).

When specialists have addressed the concept of European Council leadership, there has been a debate over assessments of the extent of its influence. Most of the analysts have viewed the Presidency as an opportunity for countries to project their preferences, but scholars have also suggested that room for influence was very limited due to constraints such as the short term of the post or the administrative charge (Nugent, 1995; Verbeke and Van de Voorde, 1994). Dewost defined the rotating Presidency as the '*responsabilite sans pouvoir*' (responsibility without power) (Dewost, 1984: 31). In opposition, other analysts have observed that the Presidency, in fact, had great potential to influence EU agenda-setting (Bunse, 2009; Tallberg, 2003, Thomson, 2008).

Although agenda-setting capabilities have been the area receiving the most academic attention in terms of analysing Presidential priorities (Alexandrova, Timmermans, 2013; Princen, 2007; Pollack, M.A., 1997), there are two other equally important types of influence that will be investigated in this research. These are: agenda-structuring, or who deals with issues already on the agenda; and agenda exclusion, which is the process of deliberately removing topics from the agenda (Tallberg, 2003: 2; Thomson, 2008: 597-599).

In addition, Bunse identifies different functions that the rotating Presidency had to assume prior to the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty. The functions related to leadership are: submit monthly, annual, and multi-annual work programmes, set Council agendas, initiate policies/debates, mediate diverse viewpoints, and initiate the voting process (Bunse, 2009: 36). In the next section, the analysis of the Spanish Presidency of 1995 and the French Presidency of 2008 will focus on three of these tasks: agenda management (including agenda-setting, structuring, and exclusion), the ability to mediate diverse perspectives, and the capacity to initiate policies or debates. The reason to focus solely on these three areas pertains to the study's research objectives: to examine leadership styles and the strategies used to execute them.

The country holding the rotating Presidency was asked to act as a neutral broker actor;⁷² however, the policy entrepreneur approach, as defined in the theoretical

⁷² The country holding the presidency had to broker consensus among the different member states. However, it was not supposed to take sides; instead, there existed an expectation of neutrality.

framework, was often employed by each country to develop its preferences and its own initiatives. Therefore, the concept of neutrality was challenged (Bunse, 2009: 43-47). While the country holding the rotating Presidency may have brokered in a more impartial way, in other areas where strong national interests were involved, the Presidency may have been strongly biased in its agenda-setting. Bigger countries were seen as less willing to adopt a neutral broker-entrepreneurship (Schwarzer, 2008: 367): a fact that may have been interpreted as a perverse practice, for “too often, incoming presidencies [could not] resist adding their pet priorities to the CFSP work programme. Finland, for example, insisted during its 1999 Presidency that the EU develop new policies for the Baltics and Russia through the “Northern Dimension.” (...) Spain has already signaled that in 2002 it wants to revive the flagging Euro-Mediterranean partnership” (Everts, 2001).

However, not all issues were the same when countries defined their agendas. Some were part of existing European policy contexts and might have come up automatically, yet others required more planning. This was linked to the sitting President’s capacity to raise awareness on a given topic that might have led, in the end, to a new debate or even a policy reorientation. Such campaigns usually commenced before a country assumed the role of the Presidency—sometimes even years before (Peters, 1994: 10). Hence, the introduction of these topics, the control of information that would help structure the EU-wide agenda, and the proliferation in producing documents were very important diplomatic tools. Nevertheless, member states succeeding in placing an item on the European agenda in a form that was not the preferred one or even acceptable, must be counted as a defeat for a policy entrepreneur (Peters, 1994: 12).

The aim of the case studies in the next section is to identify those areas where France and Spain acted as policy entrepreneurs rather than as neutral parties, and to recognise those tools and capacities for influencing the agenda in the framework of the presidencies. This ability for agenda-setting will be also evaluated together with the capacity of a country to prevent something not in line with a country’s national interests from happening, as presented in chapter 1. In addition, the consistency and agenda-setting of the rotating Presidency will be examined in order to identify if the policy orientation was “only its pet” or there were other elements that made the

policy prevail. The framework of time researched herein will not only cover each country's respective Presidential terms but, when relevant, the months/years prior to these.

To conclude, assuming the rotating Presidency was an important moment for any country, this chapter will identify the different tools that each Presidency had at its disposal and how both countries used these tools in the presidencies of 1995 and 2008. The orientation and strategies may have varied from one country to another, but as pointed out by Kirchner, "the Presidency represent[ed] an opportunity to either raise the profile of a country, government or leader, or to make a significant political impact on Community policies. But there are also risks that expectations cannot be fulfilled within the limited time available, or that other member states and EC institutions will be antagonised by the conduct of the Presidency" (Kirchner, 1992: 86).

5.2 THE SPANISH PRESIDENCY OF THE EU COUNCIL IN 1995

The Presidency of 1995 was the second for Spain since its adhesion to the European Union. Former Prime Minister González had to deal with many different crises: the EU-fisheries agreement that was being negotiated in Europe, which had a direct impact on the Spanish economy; an unpopular administration affected by several corruption cases; governing with the support of the nationalist party *Convergencia i Unió* (CiU); or the economic crisis and subsequent high unemployment rate were only few of the many open battles that González had to fight at home. The international arena was seen as the only scenario where the experienced Prime Minister could achieve some political redemption. This predisposed the government to set a European agenda in line with Spanish national interests.

The González government had the main responsibility for agenda proposal and implementation at the national level. The administration had the highly regarded Javier Solana as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Miguel Ángel Moratinos as General Director for Africa within the MAE. The creation of a special committee composed of 22 members and headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs represented a novelty compared to the Presidency of 1989 (Ruiz, 1995: 5). Spain, as a highly decentralised country, coordinated its European policy with the different regional governments,

although formally, the *Comunidades Autónomas* did not have any capacity for decision-making. Nevertheless, and considering the tense situation, the Catalan government played an important role in contributing to the agenda and in providing political support. However, during the EU Presidency, this support was formally broken, and González had to deal with yet another internal crisis.

On 12 July 1995, Solana presented to the European Parliament the Spanish priorities, which were articulated around 4 axes: European economic recovery in a socially integrated framework, citizen participation, external relations, and the planning of the 1996 intergovernmental conference. In practical terms, actions included EMU, working for a single European market, improving European competitiveness, the CAP, the fishing agreements, and the industry agreement, among others. In its external relations, Spain focused on negotiating Association Agreements with Morocco, Israel, Egypt, and Jordan, the southern enlargement of the EU, the organising and hosting of the Euro-Mediterranean conference, working on the progress of the Customs Union with Turkey, the transatlantic agenda, and strengthening relations with Latin America (Presidencia Española del Consejo de la UE, 1995). This was a very ambitious and charged programme, probably in the hope that this would bring political gains for the socialist Prime Minister. At the end of the term of the rotating Presidency, the Spanish had chaired 1,699 meetings in Brussels (Barbé, 1996: 29)—an ambitious agenda that demonstrated the country's commitment to and interest in European affairs.

The work carried out with the EMU and the intergovernmental conference was not part of a new policy. In contrast, Spanish international relations efforts were more prolific. During the second Spanish Presidency, the Dayton Agreement was signed in Paris which, officially, put an end to the war in Yugoslavia. Spain also successfully negotiated the transatlantic agenda and a joint action plan between the European Union and the United States. The diplomatic activism also yielded benefits with Latin America, where a new interregional framework was signed between the EU and Mercosur. This was a substantial success, considering that it was the first agreement of this kind in the history of the European Union. In Mauritius, the Lomé Agreement was reviewed and titled the Lomé (IV), signed between Europe and the ACP countries. Another step forward in EU-Turkey relations was achieved during this Presidency, as

the European Parliament gave its consent to the Customs Union. Last but not least, the most visible initiative was the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in Barcelona, which will be examined in more detail in the next sections (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación, 1995: 2-3).

The Spanish success was partially due to the progress on its European foreign policy. Spain moved from a domestic agenda to traditional European areas of Spanish international politics (Barbé, 2000: 46-47; Morata, Fernández, 2002: 182). The Mediterranean occupied a big part of the agenda: the Association Agreements, the predisposition to work toward the adhesion of Malta and Cyprus, the Euro-Mediterranean conference, and the will to progress on the Customs Union with Turkey reflects the strong Mediterranean dimension of the Spanish Presidency. However, does this mean that this agenda-setting was 'imposed' by the Spanish diplomacy? This is debatable. Barbé writes with reference to the Mediterranean region, that the "convergence between the Spanish and European agenda is considerable, given that it is a zone of priority interest both for Spain and for the European Union" (Barbé, 2000: 52). This convergence took place because of the events preceding the Barcelona Process and the arguments presented by Spain and other actors during previous years of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

The second Spanish Presidency was the last one for González as Prime Minister. As pointed out by Powell, "Spain is undoubtedly amongst the member states for which holding the EU Presidency has had the greatest domestic political value, and the 1995 edition probably had and ever higher internal component than that of 1989" (Powell, 2002: 8). But regardless of big efforts to achieve prestige and successful results that, in turn, would improve its internal image, all was in vain. Despite the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, the signing of the fishery treaty with Morocco, the adoption of a transatlantic agenda, and the adoption of the naming of the European single currency, the Spanish public decided that it was time to have a new Prime Minister after 14 years of a socialist government. The domestic agenda had bigger weight for the Spanish public, although the achievements during the Presidency may explain why Aznar only had a narrow victory in the elections of 1996.

5.2.1 SPANISH AGENDA MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES

The complex internal situation had an impact at European level, as Europe was seen as the solution for González's unpopular leadership at home. This turmoil predisposed the government to set a European agenda in line with Spanish national interests. The Spanish Presidency is commonly cited as an example of the use of the EU Presidency to develop regional policies (Tallberg, 2003; Evert, 2001; Fernández 2005). Yet, the truth is that the European Council rotating calendar also was positive for the development of the Mediterranean agenda of the EU, as Spain took the baton from France, which had held the Presidency during the first half of the year. The French also saw Spain as their main partner, for they were aware that the Mediterranean context needed further attention than a few months (interview French diplomat, 19 April 2010).

The Euro-Mediterranean agreement is a clear example of agenda-setting strategy and capabilities, as it was first proposed at the Corfu Summit in June 1994. As presented in chapter 3, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was a proposal of France and Spain working in conjunction with the European Commission. The objectives and institutional configuration were designed at the supranational level. It was in Corfu that Spain volunteered to host the Mediterranean meeting during its Presidency in the second half of 1995: a fact that demonstrated the agenda-setting power of the co-presidency (Gomez, 2003: 70). The Spanish veto ability was once more exerted in González's threat of blocking eastern enlargement if there were not a more balanced approach towards the South (See chapter 3). In the case of agenda-shaping, Spain mainly contributed to the negotiations prior to the signature that will be explained later in this section, and drafted hand-in-hand with France the Declaration of the Barcelona Process (Gomez, 2003:76). In areas such as the proposal of streamlining the three baskets, France did not share Spain's view, instead preferring to privilege the political focus area but, finally, the three of them remained aligned.

Internally, the EU Presidency was also seen as an opportunity for regional governments to take a more active role. The Catalan position was important in this sense, as the *Generalitat* pushed to host the Barcelona Conference in the Catalan capital and to include the Mediterranean as one of the main priorities in the agenda. When the new minority socialist government had to come to terms with the

government of CiU in 1993, Jordi Pujol asked for some concessions in exchange; among these was to strengthen the Mediterranean policy—something that the Catalan President had previously tried at different levels and with different interlocutors, but without much success (interview Catalan politician, 14 May 2010).⁷³ Pujol and González agreed to work internally to reinforce the Mediterranean policy, although this did not present major complications as González shared the same view of what a Mediterranean policy should be. Later, the EU Presidency was seen as the opportunity to materialise these strategic national priorities.

Another clear example of Spain's capacities to set the EU agenda was the inclusion of the Association Agreements in the priorities of the Spanish Presidency. While this is logic, considering that the Barcelona Conference was the privileged initiative of that particular rotating Presidency, there was another important reason for introducing the Association Agreements with Morocco as a high priority. As explained, the internal context of domestic lobbies representing fishing and farming interests was threatened by tense relations with Morocco and played a significant role during the road to Barcelona. This tension was especially visible during the weeks before the policy was signed. Gillespie explains that "these pressures could hardly be ignored by González's Socialists, who from 1993 until they lost power in March 1996 were in a minority in the Congress of Deputies and thus had to be more sensitive to the electoral consequences of their policies than they had needed to be during the 1980s" (Gillespie, 1997: 41). The strong Spanish fishing lobby put pressure on González's government, and the diplomatic team had to look for new methods to obtain the desired agreement. Although the fishing treaties were negotiated by the European Commission, Spanish influence in the negotiation process was clear, as diplomats in Madrid took advantage of the timing of the EU Presidency. The European Commission, as a measure of pressure, insisted on maintaining the sequence order of negotiations: first reaching an agreement in the fisheries area, and then certain flexibility could be introduced in the Association Agreements (Damis, 1998: 66). This was a clear example of Spain's agenda structuring. The linkage between the two initiatives was so evident that once the

⁷³ Jordi Pujol, in his role as President of the *Generalitat*, approached the region of Valencia to try to strengthen the Mediterranean policy, but the *Generalitat Valenciana* was not interested. He also presented his idea to some regions in Southern France, but for different reasons, this idea did not work until the pact with Felipe González (interview with Catalan politician, 14 May 2010)

fishing treaty was signed, Spain became the main partner of Morocco in pushing for an agreement with the rest of the 15 European member states (El País, 14 November 1995).

Regarding agenda exclusion, the literature does not indicate any particular area that was deliberately removed from the agenda. With only 15 states, the European context was different; this helped to have more streamlined programmes than are possible today, and the Commission had a greater influence. A Spanish diplomat recognises that all countries make rational decisions in choosing one topic over others when designing the European agenda. However, in 1995, Spain planned its agenda by prioritising topics rather than by removing them. At that time, any particular European issue of friction was intentionally ignored (interview Spanish diplomat, 15 August 2013).

5.2.2 CAPACITIES IN RAISING DEBATES AND ABILITIES TO INITIATE POLICIES

The following section will present the ability of Spain to introduce new policies in the Mediterranean and to initiate debates at the European level. These two actions are not just specific to the rotating Presidency, but it is during this moment that they are fully implemented. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is a good example of a project that was initiated by raising a debate at the European level, as it will be presented further in this section.

5.2.2.1 INTRODUCING NEW POLICIES

According to Barbé, Spain progressively assumed a role of “manager of diversity” rather than “policy creator” (Barbé, 2000: 50). This “gradualism” was easily perceived in the European Union, where the Spanish proposals tended to be presented as a stage of a much longer process. For instance, this feature was clear in the preparation of the intergovernmental conference of 1996 or the EMU’s implementation, where each of these assignments was only part of a larger project, and in the signing of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the MERCOSUR agreement. All of these innovative initiatives had a genesis going back several years.

The concept of gradualism, of being “a stage in the gradual development of the European Union” (MAE, 1990, quoted in Barbé, 2000: 50), is shared by a Spanish diplomat. The diplomat pointed out that Spain has never been “rupturist” and has always tried to advance ongoing policies as much as possible, or at least leave them ready to pass to the next Presidency (interview with Spanish diplomat, 15 August 2013). However, some initiatives show otherwise. Contrary to Barbé’s claim, Spain has often adopted an innovative attitude where it has tried to introduce new policies with a Spanish twist. In 1995, for instance, the main innovative proposal was the transatlantic agenda. Carlos Westendorp, Spanish Secretary of State for the European Union, proposed this idea in the COREPER, where it was accepted (interview with Spanish diplomat, 15 August 2013). This acceptance meant a leap forward in the relationship between the EU and the United States. Furthermore, as previously presented, the EMP was an exercise of policy implementation and agenda-setting. Spain was not the only entrepreneur, but by influencing the European agenda, Spanish diplomats made sure to shape its content, thus obtaining prestige.

5.2.2.2 INITIATING DEBATES

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was the result of a long process in which Spain had played an important role in both raising awareness of Mediterranean problems and putting forward new ideas and innovative foreign policy designs. Spain, together with other Mediterranean partners, was very active in producing European reports in order to propose more ambitious programmes for the Mediterranean. The CSCM proposed with Italy is a good example of how the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership did not start from scratch; although the CSCM was never implemented, some aspects of this initiative can be seen in the Barcelona Process. Later, Commissioner Matutes was given the task to produce a report on how relations between Europe and the Maghreb could be improved. Matutes, with the input of González, suggested the creation of a partnership with the Maghreb states and suggested the establishment of regular meetings (Gomez, 2003: 53). This report also noted that the fundamental goal of the Maghreb countries should have been further economic integration, and that the European Community should have encouraged this integration by means of financing projects or providing technical assistance (European Commission, 1992: 9).

Many of these suggestions were later incorporated, either as part of the Association Agreements or as an influence upon the design of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. In 1994, the debate was revived at the Corfu summit. For the first time in a while, the summit's conclusions included a section on "relations with the Mediterranean Countries," and the European Council gave the Council the mandate to prepare a "global policy" for the Mediterranean region together with the Commission (Bicchi, 2007: 165). This report was prepared by Commissioner Marín, who presented the results in October 1994 (European Commission, 1994). A new document, produced by the Commission in March 1995 and presented to the European Council and the European Parliament, suggested new proposals for implementing the EMP and identified the main priorities that the partnership should cover (European Commission, 1995b).⁷⁴

From 1989 to 1994, Spain, together with France and Italy, tried to promote the idea that a global geographical and multidimensional approach was needed, but it was not until 1994 that the European Union was convinced of this idea. France and Spain lobbied to explain their understanding of the Mediterranean. This confirms that Spain was effective over the long term. As stated in the previous sections, sometimes a number of years must pass before a proposed debate can be included in the agenda. This diplomatic task, encouraged mainly by González and including a strategic diplomatic team in the European institutions (see chapter 3), started years earlier and paved the way to the introduction of the new regional policy: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

5.2.3 MEDIATING DIVERSE POINTS OF VIEW

Spain acted as a mediator in the second half of 1995. However, for the EMP, it did not adopt the role of a neutral entrepreneur, but rather the strategic leader. A good example of Spain's biased attitude is the Association Agreements—one of the main tools of the Barcelona Process—although they were not created by it.

In 1992, Morocco and the EU signed a fishing treaty by which Spain was the main country affected. This agreement included a clause indicating that the treaty would be

⁷⁴ For a complete vision on the policy process leading to Barcelona, see the work of Bicchi, 2007.

reviewed at the half-term validity period, i.e., in 1994. However, considering the importance of this sector to the Moroccan economy, the fishing lobby put pressure on the government to include some conditions in the next agreement such as the length (not to exceed three years) and the renewal (the last possible prolongation). During the same period, Rabat also started negotiations on the Association Agreement with the EU, which was a fact that Spanish diplomats did not overlook. Soon this became a three-part negotiation with many ups and downs. On one hand, the Spanish fleet was forced to stay out of Moroccan territorial waters, sparking numerous strikes by adding more pressure to the already tense Spanish internal situation. Moreover, the Commission managed to link both negotiations and exerted great pressure on all parties (Vaquer i Fans, 2003: 64; Damis, 1998: 67). Emma Bonino, the fisheries Commissioner, stated that “it is difficult to reach an accord in the Association Agreements without reaching another in fishing first” (El País, 20 August, 1995).⁷⁵

Prudence is required, however. A Spanish diplomat contends that Spain never put pressure on the Commission to link both negotiations, but this diplomat also agrees that Spain usually sought the support of Brussels to negotiate such agreements (interview with Spanish diplomat, 15 August 2013). Nevertheless, Madrid was holding the rotating Presidency at the time and had already stated that one of its priorities was precisely the negotiation of the EMAs. The weeks that preceded the meeting in Barcelona were hectic. There were bilateral meetings with Rabat, and Brussels held several meetings with the 15 member states. In addition, Bonino visited Hassan II in July 1995, and she also met Felipe González and José María Aznar, the latter of which was the opposition leader at that time (Damis, 1998: 69). There were many sides in this conflict, and two of them were holding decisive decision-making posts.

In addition, the individual responsible for the Mediterranean region at the European level was Spanish Commissioner Manuel Marín; therefore, he had great influence in the Mediterranean dossier. Solana, as a part of his role in the administration of the rotating Presidency, assumed the role of President of the Council. At that point, the situation was blocked, and the Commission sent a private “strongly-worded” message at the highest levels of the Moroccan government. The content of this message was

⁷⁵ My translation

not made public, but according to Damis, “it reportedly said that the stalemate could not go on indefinitely and that Morocco had nothing to gain by maintaining its present position. Further, the message reportedly warned Morocco that, as the weaker party, this was not a war it could win” (Damis, 1998: 69). Only in September were negotiations unblocked, and Spain saw parts of its demands included in the new agreement. On 10 November 1995, the negotiations ended and on the 27-28 November, all member states signed the Barcelona declaration.

Undoubtedly, the Europeanisation of the fishing policy and the rotating Presidency was a positive strategy, according to Madrid. The neutral role expected during the rotating presidencies was compromised by the importance of this dossier. However, the outcomes of the Spanish negotiation need to be examined from a more nuanced perspective. In general terms, they were positive in the sense that they may have been the best result Spain could expect given the circumstances, yet the agreement did not completely satisfy Spanish lobbyists. Nevertheless, the capacity to structure the European agenda and control the timing and information were tools that the Spanish used effectively in the negotiation process.

On the other hand, one must consider Spain’s more collaborative role. Felipe González did the traditional tour, visiting all European capitals prior to the European Council in Madrid on 21 November 1995. The Prime Minister justified this dedication, considering the important milestones that Europe would face in the months to come: the single currency, the intergovernmental conference, the future European enlargement, and the financial pact, among other issues. However, the candidature of Javier Solana for the head of NATO was the other main subject addressed during the meetings (Cidob, 1995). The only country that González did not visit was Greece, given that Papandreu was in poor health (Barbé, 1996: 19).

The preparation of the Barcelona Process required all possible energy from the diplomatic team. Spain acted as broker-entrepreneur, mediating with different countries in order to ensure the success of the Barcelona conference. Spain was fully coordinated with the Commission, which was in charge of the technical, financial, and institutional matters, and Madrid took over the political negotiations. In political terms, the Commission was more limited, but it controlled the funding, which was an area of

real influence. For a Spanish diplomat, the Commission had real authority, unlike now, where the weakened Commission has become more of a supporter of the Council. In 1995, the Commission was a managerial institution that worked in harmony with the Spanish Presidency (interview Spanish diplomat, 15 August, 2013).

A remarkable triumph was persuading Syria and Lebanon to participate in the conference together with Israel. For this to occur, Spanish diplomats had to intercede to avoid a boycott from the Arab partners. A Spanish diplomat directly explains that the road to Barcelona presented many diplomatic challenges. Algeria, which in 1995 was very motivated by the BP, was the coordinator of the southern member states,⁷⁶ including Israel and Turkey. The Israel situation and the complexity of the text, however, required parallel negotiations between the EU and Israel—the latter of which was very exigent. Egypt and Turkey also tested Spain's ability to mediate. Negotiations with Egypt became one of the most complicated acts. The talks on the Association Agreements also took place with Cairo at the same period, and Egypt frequently merged the two topics to put some pressure on the negotiations. Turkey, on the other hand, had an extra complication, for there were talks about its eventual adhesion and the proposal of the Customs Union that finally was offered instead⁷⁷ (interview with Spanish diplomat, 15 August 2013).

Yet this was not the only friction point. Up to eight Arab-Mediterranean countries requested Libya to attend the meeting, arguing that if Israel could join the conference when it was technically still at war with two of the partners, Libya should benefit from the same treatment (Gomez, 2003: 75, 89). Spain played a more amicable role compared with that of France (Barbé, 1996b: 34) but this was probably due to the fact that Spain needed to act as a mediator and that national interests did not clash with the idea of having Libya onboard. Spanish diplomats conducted an internal negotiation between the European institutions and the European member states, but, finally,

⁷⁶ Afterwards, the role was assumed by Egypt.

⁷⁷ The Commission was working on a report about the suitability of Ankara's adhesion to the EU. In order to avoid filtrations that could make the member states try to influence the Commission's opinion that would be presented the day after, they met late at night and presented a report recommending to postpone the adhesion for a later stage, although they proposed the Customs Union. Within the Commission, a French diplomat finally conducted the Customs Union's negotiations with Turkey in a way that made possible to reach an agreement before the end of the Spanish Presidency.

Marín's point of view and the will of the British and French prevailed over Arab demands.

Other challenges were posed by Germany, which was concerned about the migration readmission agreements; they feared the illegal immigration that might have come from the Mediterranean. Agriculture was a major concern for Spain. It was expected to act as a neutral mediator considering its role holding the rotating Presidency, but it was also one of the most biased on issues surrounding Southern Mediterranean agriculture. As a result, the MPCs opted for 'balancing'⁷⁸ with non-Mediterranean member states to counteract the position of the Southern Europeans. All in all, a test of Spain's mediating capabilities (interview with Spanish diplomat, 15 August, 2013).

The good division of roles between the Commission and Spain was visible during the drafting of the policy's documents. The Commission prepared the work programme document, and it collaborated together with France and Spain in creating the Barcelona Declaration (interview with Spanish diplomat, 15 August 2013). However, the terms of the political and security chapter of the Barcelona Process raised strong objections, and it was necessary to reword the document several times before it was possible to ensure the meeting (Gomez, 2003: 75; Barbé 1996: 21). Shortly after the Barcelona Conference, Miguel Ángel Moratinos confessed that "*nos lo hicieron pasar fatal*" (we had a rotten time). The Syrians did not accept one specific paragraph addressing the right to self-determination; furthermore, they wanted to add a phrase that would acknowledge "the rights of people under foreign, colonial, or other domination." Additionally, Syria wanted to add the principle of "land in exchange for peace." Israel did not agree with the inclusion of language such as "territorial integrity of states"—a position that might have been related to the country's ongoing issues with Southern Lebanon. Furthermore, Israel sought to escape its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation if this principle were not also applied to Iran and Iraq—a request made by Egypt and Syria... all three days away from the meeting (El País, 29 November 1995, Gomez, 2003: 75).⁷⁹

⁷⁸ As stated in the theoretical framework, the 'balancing' coalition is making an alliance with other states to counteract the stronger states.

⁷⁹ The quotes come from the article in El País. The translation is mine.

But not everything was problematic. One of the most enthusiastic participants were the Palestinians, who saw the EMP as a sort of recognition by not only some member states but also by Israel, which agreed to participate in the initiative and accepted that Arafat was present as the Palestinian representative (interview French diplomat, 19 April 2010).

France and Spain disagreed on some points such as which partners to invite and the notion of prominence of some chapters over others (see chapter 3). However, French diplomats argue that the cooperation during the French and Spanish Presidency between the *Quay d'Orsay* and Moratinos, existed at all levels (interview with French diplomat, 19 April 2010). This is also confirmed by Spanish diplomats, who say that there were no contradictions and that even the aforementioned differences were more about different sensibilities than real divergences (interview with Spanish diplomat, 15 August 2013).

During the 1995 Spanish EU Presidency, Spain's position and international action most often reflected what was expected from the country, both on account of its position as a large Mediterranean country, and because of the expected attitude that a presidential administration should have when acting on behalf of the European Union. However, as previously seen, Spain was difficult to negotiate with, and in certain areas where national interests were endangered, its supposed neutrality was debatable. Fortunately, this was not the general trend of the Presidency. The roles of Solana and Marín were highly appreciated by the Algerians and Western partners (Gillespie, 1997: 44), and the EMP is a good example of the success of their mediation capabilities.

5.3 THE FRENCH PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL IN 2008

France assumed the Presidency of the European Union in the second half of 2008. This period was characterised by some unexpected events that modified the original plan: the conflict in Georgia, the global financial crisis, and the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty. The literature generally confirms that the French Presidency was a success (Andreani, 2009; Dehousse, Menon, 2009). However, the excessive personalisation of French foreign policy became apparent, although this does not necessarily mean that such personalisation was counterproductive; the Presidency had to face some

challenges that required its full involvement, such as the economic crisis or the Georgia crisis.

The initial programme included four major topics, all of which were in line with French national priorities, plus the Union for the Mediterranean. The main axes were immigration, defence, climate change and energy, and agriculture. The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty was high on the agenda as well, especially because one of the tasks was to conduct negotiations regarding the representatives who would assume the Presidency and the Head of Foreign Policy. In order to carry out this ambitious agenda, Sarkozy appointed a good number of diplomats and officials with extensive experience in European affairs and, most importantly, understanding of the previous French presidential administrations (Lefebvre, 2008: 3).⁸⁰

As a way to counteract the European perception of arrogance, Sarkozy appointed Jean-Pierre Jouyet as Minister of State for the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs in charge of European Affairs. This was seen as a decision to adopt a low profile in the Presidency of the EU, as Jouyet was a more open and collaborative diplomat (Lequesne, 2008: 2; Schwarzer, 2008: 368). The presidential interest in putting forth a different image was expressed during the XVI Ambassador conference in 2008, where Sarkozy thanked the European team by preparing a methodical and ambitious Presidency with the “willingness to listen and to dialogue without which success is impossible. Today France is once again at the heart of the European game, and we are playing as a team!” (Sarkozy, 2008: 11). However, the subsequent events of constant crisis made clear that a higher profile was needed to ensure the French presidential success. The crisis of Georgia or the Irish rejection required strong leadership, and controversial as was Sarkozy’s hyperactivity, he was capable of mediating among the different actors. Scholars seem to concur that finally, the French style was useful under certain circumstances of crisis (Dehousse, Menon, 2009: 100).

There were high and low points during Sarkozy’s presidential tenure. Overall, the Lisbon Treaty was a success. Having learned from past experiences, and in an attempt

⁸⁰ The team included Michel Barnier, Minister of Agriculture; Jean-Pierre Jouyet, Secretary State for European Affairs; Pierre Sellal, Permanent Representative for France in Brussels; Christine Roger, ambassador for the political and security committee in Brussels; or Gilles Briatta as General Secretary for European Affairs.

to avoid the same mistakes made during the 2000 Presidency, Sarkozy carefully prepared and planned his negotiations. French diplomats worked hard to reconcile different points of view, first by convincing Merkel to abandon the constitution idea in favour of a reduced Treaty, and then by maintaining close contacts with European partners. Jouyet played a fundamental role in this process, as he was instructed to spend two days a week in Brussels (Dehousse, Menon, 2009: 101).

Another major interest was the security and defence policy. Before his Presidency, Sarkozy expressed an interest in reinforcing the operational capabilities of the EU in order to strengthen the European role in the world, mainly vis-à-vis NATO. During the French Presidency, European Ministers of Defence met informally on 1-2 October in Deauville, and some progress was made in terms of sharing important elements of military capacities (European Council, 2008). However, there were few steps forward on the European security strategy, leaving this area as an ongoing issue for the next presidencies to address (Howorth, 2009: 10).

One of the areas in which France had to adopt a high mediator profile was energy and climate change. In January 2008, the Commission presented climate directives that were highly controversial, especially in a context of the economic crisis. These directives entailed important changes for the member states, like being more efficient in energy use, increasing use of renewable energy, and reducing emissions substantially. Central and Eastern European states expressed concerns considering the impact that this may have on their economies. In practice, this meant a confrontation with the “old” member states; although some concessions were agreed, these were not as generous as desired (Buchan, 2010: 7-11). French mediation capacities were challenged again during the European Council in October 2008, as Italy and Poland reacted by threatening the use of veto. Despite all the opposition that the French rotating Presidency had to face, the heads of state and government reached an agreement. Nevertheless, this seems to confirm the perspective of those scholars who suggest that the will of the states with greater weight prevailed, for they could use their superior resources to their benefit (Hopmann, 1996: 99-111; Tallberg, 2008: 688-692)

The migration policy and the Union for the Mediterranean will be addressed separately as they are two cases that are closely linked to the Mediterranean region. Generally speaking, in the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, French diplomats managed to sign the pact first in the JHA Council in September 2008, and second, in the European Council the following month. As will be described in the next sections, this was only a partial success given that the results did not completely satisfy all the French expectations. The Union for the Mediterranean, on the other hand, represented a temporary EU presidential success. Certainly, France had to make many concessions, but the Marseille meeting corrected some parts where France strongly disagreed (the name of the Euromed committee for instance). Nevertheless, with hindsight, this temporary success turned to be a failure in the long run, for it was a fragile consensus that did not bring motivation to all the partners and ended in the paralysis of the initiative. French diplomacy mastered the *agenda-setting*—the capacity to introduce new policies and the ability to mediate in a highly conflict-laden context. However, France’s neutral entrepreneur role is less clear.

When Sarkozy’s party was over, the French public was in shock when the Senate Finance Committee presented the accounts of expenditure for the entire Presidency. Auditors were clear; the program was excessively dense and too expensive. In the centre of the controversy was the summit of Paris that cost € 16.6 million, with no return on investment (Sénat, 2009: 24): a fact that raised strong criticism from many politicians, the Sénat, and public opinion (Le point, 28 October 2009). While the rotating Presidency was a success in many areas, internally it received much criticism for the style, the excess, and the costs. Paris organised 489 events, including 25 interministerial meetings, 182 events at the ministerial level, and 9 international summits.

5.3.1 FRENCH AGENDA MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES

The enactment of the Lisbon Treaty meant that all EU legislative procedures that were not concluded by the time of the Treaty’s implementation would have to go through the legislation process again. This entailed that areas like migration policy would suffer a delay if they were not dealt with during the three rotating presidencies to come. However, the Treaty of Lisbon was not yet ratified when the French assumed the

rotating Presidency, and this brought a degree of uncertainty. Many MEPs did not want some dossiers to be closed, for this was a good opportunity for the European Parliament to influence and amend them following the adoption of the co-decision procedure that would be adopted in January 2009 (Schwarzer: 2008: 362). This had little impact on the UfM, but for other areas of French national interests, an active Presidency was not only desirable, but also highly important if the French government wanted to be the main driver.

Regarding the Mediterranean, evidence suggests that France made an efficient use of the three ways of projecting influence presented in section 5.1. The first example was France's agenda-setting capabilities, of which the Union for the Mediterranean is the best example. Introduced in a very short time, it went from not including Europe at all to becoming one of the EU's priorities in the second half of 2008. The second example was France's capacity for structuring the agenda on policies that were already in discussion. French priorities clearly reflected their domestic interests. By choosing areas like migration or the energy-climate package during its term in the rotating Presidency, French diplomacy assured that they had the time to act as entrepreneur before other European institutions would acquire further weight. Finally, the third way, excluding topics, is more difficult to identify as it may be argued that the French agenda was already very full. However, the absence of the Polish and Swedish proposal of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) that was presented only one month earlier, did not receive much French attention.

French Prime Minister François Fillon, conscious of the debate between national and European priorities, claimed that the French Presidency was going to be "for the general interest" (quoted in Lefebvre, 2008: 4). However, the emphasis on some key areas for France was evident. During his election campaign, Sarkozy, who did not have the presidential support,⁸¹ tried to pander to public opinion. In foreign policy, his main opposition was to the Turkish adhesion to the EU, in antagonism to Chirac's support and in line with the opinion polls (EurActiv, 06 October 2004). This rejection of Ankara's adhesion was linked to fears of immigration, to an increase of Islam in France, and the rise of far-right parties such as the *Front National*. In order for Sarkozy to win

⁸¹ Jacques Chirac expressed his support to the other UMP candidate, Villepin.

the presidential elections, he had to attract the votes of those who pushed for a more restrictive policy (Pérez Llana, 2008: 67), and once in the *Elysée*, this became a matter of national politics (Lequesne, 2008: 3). The Mediterranean Union was also a proposal oriented to show a certain degree of “*maitrise de l’immigration*” (regulation of immigration) (Tardy, 2008: 2). These facts seem to confirm Tallberg’s claims when asserting that agenda-setting is only one of the forms that a Presidency has to influence the outcomes. French diplomats used both the timing and the structuring of the ongoing agenda to reach their objectives.

The French President privileged his proposal of the UfM. As with the previous initiative, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the timing of the European Presidency seemed favourable to the French project. For the good development of the initiative, it was important that France and Germany made an agreement: a fact that paved the way to the Paris summit in July 2008 and that avoided further confrontation. The date chosen for the foundational meeting at the beginning of the French EU Presidency confirmed the intention to devote an important part of the EU presidential term to the Union for the Mediterranean. Afterwards, Sarkozy had six full months to model his project with less interference.

French diplomacy greatly invested in assuring the full participation of all actors. The high number of attendees of the Paris Summit proved its mobilising capacity. France had to compromise by including the Commission and allowing it to participate in the conception and drafting of the future initiative. In so doing, France and Germany asked the Commission to prepare a document with their main proposals for shaping the Union for the Mediterranean. The final document included some concrete proposals presented in the 20 May 2008 Communication (European Commission, 2008) that put a stronger focus on projects, an enhancement of the institutions, and the proposal of a relevant role for the Euro-Mediterranean Committee. According to Balfour, some of their proposals prevailed in the final configuration of the UfM (Balfour, 2009: 100). Aliboni and Ammor, on the other hand, regret that the Euro-Mediterranean Committee that had an important role in the Commission proposition was abolished in the Marseille meeting in November 2008 (Aliboni, Ammor, 2009: 10). In parallel, France worked in order to ensure the presence of controversial figures such as the

Syrian President, or to bring together the Arab countries and Israel. This was the political victory.

The Marseille ministerial meeting in November represented a leap forward. As already seen in Chapter 4, Barcelona was chosen as the seat of the Secretariat, but France managed to remove the Barcelona Process name, establishing a strong intergovernmental framework following Sarkozy's and Guiano's preferences. This strengthened the role of the Secretariat instead of that of the Commission, removing the Euro-Mediterranean Committee and, in practice, focusing the UfM on the Mediterranean members with little participation from the EU. This was a diplomatic victory, although in the long run it had negatives consequences for the good development of the initiative. Where France did not succeed was in its attempt to put culture among the six main areas of project development. Although fieldwork confirms that this was a priority for French diplomacy and that there were constant negotiations to include the cultural dimension, it is reported that this was blocked by other states, despite the French insistence (interview with French official UfM, 22 October 2010). This represented a clear setback.

Nevertheless, although there was much work for the French Presidency in designing the institution with the input of the European Commission, Mediterranean meetings for the Barcelona process continued. There was still some ambiguity about how the two would coexist. The Commission made it clear that the BP:UfM "should build on and reinforce the successful elements of the existing Barcelona Process. Thus the Barcelona declaration, its goals and its cooperation areas remain" including the three chapters of cooperation, the work programmes, and the ministerial conclusions adopted in the last years (European Commission, 2008). It was clear that the EC adopted a continuist approach rather different of that of France.

Following the unexpected events and constant crisis during the French semester, some scholars think that "rather than setting an agenda, [the French Presidency] had to react to a series of profoundly unsettling crises" (Dimitrakopoulos *et al*, 2009: 452). However, the facts presented in this section show that, at least in certain areas, France was successful in defining a list of priorities, implementing them, and obtaining the desired results.

Finally, regarding agenda exclusion, some factors suggest that at least one topic did not receive much French attention: the Eastern Partnership. The reasons pointing to this lack of interest may be explained by the fact that: (1) the UM was an initiative to counteract the Eastern weight (Cianciara, 2008, 2); (2) the Eastern Partnership may have been considered as a competing initiative; and (3) attention to the Eastern Partnership may have decreased the prominent role of the Union for the Mediterranean. In addition, the statement of the Polish minister Sikorski that “to the south, we have neighbours of Europe. To the East, we have European neighbours... they all have the right one day to apply for EU membership” (Lapczynski, 2009: 145) may have not been well received by France, considering its traditionally prudent attitude toward enlargement.

When Europe finally accepted to go ahead with the Union for the Mediterranean, Poland tried to counterbalance this project and proposed the Eastern Partnership. Prior to the May 2008 meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers, Poland secured the support of the UK, the Czech republic, Denmark, and Germany, and made France know that its support for the UfM would be dependent on the creation of the Eastern Partnership (Cianciara, 2008, 2). Therefore, in this trade for support the initiative was presented on May 26, 2008, the draft regarding the EaP was approved, the European Council welcomed the initiative, and the Commission was invited to proceed with producing a proposal... with French approval. However, as the Presidency would start only one month later, no attention was paid to the new-born initiative, and all the efforts were focused in the Mediterranean and the Union for the Mediterranean.

It may be argued that French preferences were reasonable, considering that the Czech Republic’s Presidency would follow the French Presidency, and it became one of the priorities in the Prague agenda (Vondra, 2008), but the events that followed suggest that the French presidential administration was not really motivated to include the EaP in its own agenda. When the initiative was finally launched on March 20, 2009 Sarkozy, Zapatero, and all the bigger countries of the Western EU (with the exception of Germany’s Merkel) did not attend the meeting and sent their Foreign Affairs Ministers instead: in the case of France, Prime Minister François Fillon (Le Parisien, 07 May 2009). This was especially shocking, considering the diplomatic activity that the *Elysée* had

deployed only months earlier to make sure that all partners were present in the launch of the UfM.

5.3.2 FRENCH CAPACITIES TO INTRODUCE POLICIES AND DEBATES

During its Presidency, France was able to (1) introduce new policies; and (2) initiate a new (and controversial) debate. The Presidency was the consolidation of some actions and strategies that started before, but as previously stated, a way to influence the Presidency was to control the timing or to raise awareness in some areas of national interest. In this sense, France has been considerably successful and made use of its six months despite some limitations.

5.3.2.1 RAISING DEBATES

The Union for the Mediterranean is a good example of French capability for agenda-setting, but also of initiating Mediterranean regional-building debates. In this case, it is very difficult to separate the two areas, as the period of time from when the UfM was proposed and finally launched was very short. However, the debates generated at the institutional level as well as in academia show the capacity of Paris to raise Mediterranean awareness. The mobilisation of communication campaigns and presidential and diplomatic activism brought about a sort of “rediscovery” of the *Mare Nostrum*. One example of this was the Paris summit, which was covered by 2,000 journalists.

The UfM falls into both the agenda-setting capabilities and in the ability to generate policies and debate. In order to prioritise these topics, France needed to raise the debate and put the Mediterranean back on the European scope. This was a process that started during the Sarkozy presidential campaign and continued during the following months. The communication resources mobilised to serve the UfM suggested that a goal of French diplomats is more to control France’s image than to persuade other nations (Schmid, 2009: 11). This was particularly difficult when little information existed on the project and most of the messages were ambiguous, contradictory, and controversial. In opposition, the Ministerial Mission of the UfM confirmed that they did not have a communication policy and, as a result, few people know the Mission and what they do (interview with French diplomat, 26 October 2010).

From the Mediterranean Union to the Union for the Mediterranean, the initiatives focused on this region have constantly been in the French discourse. Sarkozy started in Toulon in February 2007 in an electoral meeting and continued in Tangier in October 2007, the latter being fully dedicated to the UM project. The monothematic approach was conceived to introduce the new initiative that Sarkozy was expecting to implement. It was supposed to launch a debate among the Mediterranean member states. Inevitably, the approach raised the debate at European level as well, even though the EU was not meant to be included.

The debate had two main topics: (1) the generally accepted need to institutionalise the Mediterranean relations—this led to a highly productive stream of academic works with different proposals of how the UM/UfM should be (Escribano, Lorca, 2008; Emerson, Tocci, 2007; Khader, 2009; Aliboni *et al*, 2008); and (2) the inclusion of the EU in the new initiative that generated a hot debate not only among the European states but also among the Mediterranean ones. The interviews with French and Spanish diplomats conducted for this thesis illustrate this division of ideas. In fact, this second debate was quite unbalanced as all parties except for France greeted the inclusion of the European Union.

But this was also a matter of internal debate in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs—a debate that continued after the launch of the UfM. Not all parties shared the official proposal of leaving the EU outside. Some officials and diplomats from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not share this strategy (interview with French official, 22 October 2010, interview with French diplomat UfM, 26 October 2010). This strategy was not shared because the diplomats thought that Mediterranean policies equally affect the European partners and the Mediterranean ones, and that the Commission played a positive role in encouraging interesting projects. Others, on the other hand, embraced the initial proposal and continued to defend it even when the UfM was already a reality (interview with French official, 26 October 2010). The main argument was that the initial idea was conceived only for the Mediterranean partners and that with the inclusion of other actors, the UfM had lost strength.

The effectiveness of this discussion is, however, debatable. Although for a certain amount of time the UfM reached an immense prestige, the effects of this awareness

have not persisted over time. Just as the Presidency showed a frenzied style, the debate seemed to follow the same pattern.

5.3.2.2 INTRODUCING NEW POLICIES

The European Pact of Migration and Asylum policy is a very interesting example of the French capacity to draft and introduce new policies.⁸² As stated before, awareness campaigns may start years before, as in this case, and although this area was on the long-term European agenda, the initiative came from Sarkozy when he was the French Interior Minister in 2006 as a response to the Spanish immigrant mass regularisation. Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero and then-Interior Minister Sarkozy exchanged bitter statements that ended with a French proposal of creating a common migration policy for all the EU countries. This policy would merge with the national policies and would prevent these kinds of actions (Europa Press, 29 September 2006). The Pact signed during the French EU Presidency was greatly inspired by French legislation dealing with immigration and integration. “The strategy of the French government has been to bring supranational legitimacy to some of its current priorities, visions and laws affecting human mobility and social inclusion and to transform them to some extent into European trends” (Carrera, Guild, 2008: 4). In this sense, France succeeded not only in setting the agenda but also in shaping it. During the following months, the French worked to include this policy into the long-term European priorities. When France assumed the Presidency, the initiative was finally adopted.

However, the result was only a partial entrepreneurship success. France managed to put the topic on the agenda, to negotiate it, and even to reach an agreement with the rest of member states. French diplomats acted as broker-entrepreneurs, presenting their concerns and negotiating them at European level, looking for consensus, and profiting from a propitious window of opportunity. However, the fact that the provisions were declaratory and, therefore, have no legal force, and the Spanish lack of support regarding the compulsory “integration contracts” that forced its removal from the final document, goes in line with Peter’s claims that it is not only important to place an item on the agenda but also to control the way it is introduced

⁸² This case study will be seen with more detail in chapter 6

5.3.3 FRANCE AS A MEDIATOR

Shortly before the French assumed the European role, Maxime Lefebvre advised that the Presidency should be ambitious but also modest and always willing to hear its partners, especially considering the perception of arrogance reinforced by the individualistic character of the French (Lefebvre, 2008: 5). The main suspicion from its European partners was whether France was capable of acting as a neutral broker-entrepreneur (Schwarzer, 2008: 367). Under Chirac's government, France held a very controversial EU Presidency in 2000. Not only the results were unsatisfactory for almost all parties, but also the chair was often accused of being too individualistic, biased, and highly French-oriented; Sarkozy was willing to change this image.

The unexpected events and the declarations of the main leaders, however, did not help to soften this image. Sarkozy style "was also associated with what Brussels has traditionally considered to be France's main fault – arrogance." Yet, the scope of the events that followed and the strong implication of French diplomacy helped to soften the "messianic self-perception" (Lequesne, Rozenberg, 2008, 6-9). In other words, the excessive activism of Sarkozy was considered useful in a context of constant crisis. Nevertheless, the ambitious agenda that included potentially conflict-laden topics needed a France engaged in conducting negotiations and in mediating in those areas where the 26 different partners had different points of view. For instance, the negotiation in the Energy and Climate change dossier required the French to mediate between Italy, Poland and, to lesser extent, Germany. Berlin disagreed with a substantial part of the proposal and preferred a less drastic change. Not all parts opposed the French initiative though, and the Commission and the Parliament were in favour. Another example is the case of the Migration pact where Brice Hortefeux, the French Minister for migration, integration, national identity, and co-development, visited the 26 capitals during the semester in order to come to an agreement. The final text had to be substantially modified to accommodate the Spanish requests, as Madrid opposed the measure on several points (see chapter 6).

The ambivalence between clear allusions to leadership and a more cooperative role are constant before and during the French Presidency. Again, Lequesne and Rozenberg exemplified this feature in Sarkozy's speech; Sarkozy claimed that during his

Presidency, he would advance the common immigration policy, defence, energy, and environmental concerns. This would have not been so striking if this statement were not made on 8 January, 2008, while Slovenia was at the beginning of its presidential term and presenting its own objectives. The caustic and ironic Slovenian response was that his Presidency would not be "so great" but more centred on specifics. Jouyet had to clarify the situation and quickly tried to water down the unilateralist image of the French President (Lequesne, Rozenberg, 2008: 17; Lefebvre, 2008: 5)

For the Union for the Mediterranean, the rotating Presidency of the EU coincided with a more cooperative role, and France acted as a broker-entrepreneur. Prior to the Paris summit, French diplomats started to work very actively and visibly before assuming the Presidency. After reaching an agreement with Germany in March 2008, the efforts were concentrated in defining the EU's role, assuring EU economic contribution, and preparing the Paris summit in July 2008. The Commission prepared a communication in order to present its preferences regarding the new institutional design (European Commission, 2008). This document was presented to the Parliament and included some of the principles of what later was agreed upon in Marseille. It is at this point that France adopted a broker-entrepreneurship role and mediated between the different actors.

Following the Brussels European Council meeting on 14 March, Sarkozy announced that the UfM "[would] be financed by the Commission's usual methods (...) we (Barroso and Sarkozy) discussed the role of the Commission, because he too has to account for the use of the billions of euros invested" (European Council, 2008b). This further involvement of the Commission in the funding was not the preferred option in the initial UM proposal. On the other hand, Sarkozy also had to compromise in order to reassure Turkey that the UfM was not an obstacle for its accession to the European Union, ensure the participation of the Arab countries from the Middle East once Israel had already expressed its interests in becoming involved in the new regional framework, and mediate between the Maghreb countries to guarantee their participation. Perhaps the most difficult part was to mediate with Syria when France had very tense relations with Damascus. After the summit, French diplomats had to

deal with Israeli opposition to the involvement of the Arab League in the UfM, the location of the Secretariat, or the work programme.

France also had to face another situation that required a certain capacity of negotiation. Marseille established that the co-presidency had to be compatible with the Lisbon Treaty. However, Sarkozy insisted on keeping the Presidency for two whole years (see chapter 4). French diplomats pushed the Czechs (and later the rest of the rotating presidencies) to accept their request (Král et al, 2009: 39). The strategic leadership of France entailed little flexibility and the refusal to accept what all members in Marseille agreed. Equally significant was the unspoken and bilateral agreement between France and Spain to pass the torch to Madrid after the two French years of co-presidency that, in the end, never happened. This was not the only clash with the Czech Presidency. The mediation role adopted by Sarkozy in the Gaza war, despite being justified in his role as co-president of the UfM, in practice overlapped with the functions of the European Union and downgraded the role of the Czech rotating Presidency.

To conclude, as Lequesne and Rozemberg assert, “A certain lack of cooperation with other member states, particularly Germany, has been the price to be paid for such activism.” The fact that in the previous Presidency Chirac was personally accused of not acting as an entrepreneur and instead “sought to bully other member states’ leaders and representatives into agreement, rather than finding a way of persuading, or influencing them to do so” (Drake, 2001: 361), seems to support scholars who note the difficulty for bigger countries to act as a neutral broker-entrepreneurs, and reinforces the idea that the Presidency was a period that presented opportunities for strategic leadership.

5.4 CONCLUSIONS

After having presented the two Presidencies of France and Spain that led to the introduction of new Euro-Mediterranean policies, it is possible to identify some common strategies and distinctive characteristics as well as some major differences in the way they have conducted these two Presidencies.

Both Presidencies were an evolution vis-à-vis their previous one, and this is an important factor to understand certain patterns of behaviour. The Spanish Presidency of 1995 was a new phase in the evolution of Spanish foreign policy. In 1989, Spain was the “newcomer” and had to prove that it deserved to be there, but the Presidency of 1995 left behind the naivety and adopted a more ambitious and pragmatic international profile (Barbé, 1996; Morata, Fernández, 2002). France, on the other hand, saw the EU-Presidency of 2008 as an opportunity for redemption. Under Chirac’s government in 2000, France held a very controversial Presidency and was accused of an overly individualistic style. Therefore, Sarkozy appointed an experienced diplomatic team that was well-known for reaching consensus at the European level, although political figures like Guaino continued to comment in a noted nationalist and Eurosceptic fashion which was difficult to reconcile with the willingness to build European consensus. Both presidencies had charismatic leaders with strong international personalities (and both of which were contested at the national level).

In light of the above, the agenda was shaped to fit the national and personal requirements, prioritising those areas that were already on the European agenda and including those that needed to be “pushed.” In both cases, Spain and France put the Mediterranean high on the list of priorities and designed a calendar according to this regional approach. Nevertheless, as stated in the theoretical framework, the agenda-setting required the input of different EU institutions and had continuity with the Presidencies held before. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is a good example of these elements, despite being prioritised by Spain. Furthermore, it is possible to conclude that both agendas were greatly ambitious and required a hectic level of diplomatic activity. The French rotating Presidency was highly influenced by the context of the time period, but it was also highly planned, as seen with the Union for the Mediterranean or the migration policy.

An element of concern was that these were “shorter” semesters, for they took place in the second half of the year which included summer and Christmas holidays and in which these presidencies had to deal with major European issues. However, in the case of France, Paris managed to continue exerting influence during the Czech Presidency, and this fact challenged those who saw the short presidential term as a

constraint to projecting influence. Certainly, Europeans greeted the renewed French involvement in European affairs, but the question remained as to whether the diplomatic team would succeed in addressing polemical issues that often required longer negotiations.

Functionally speaking, the two presidencies cleverly addressed the three areas that were to be compared in their Mediterranean strategies: (1) the agenda management (agenda-setting, structuring the agenda and agenda exclusion); (2) the ability to mediate and, (3) the capacity to initiate policies or debates. However, here there are major differences between the two countries. Among the areas where Spain and France showed more similarities was in the use of the agenda. The ability to set the content (agenda-setting) and the structure of the existing topics were expertly used in the presidencies of 1995 and 2008. This is especially the case of the Barcelona Process and the Union for the Mediterranean that benefitted from the timing, the content, the resources, and the attention, even before the Presidency started. Spain was especially successful when managing the presidential timing, the Commission pressure, and the order for negotiating the Association and fishing Agreements. This research has not found evidence of agenda exclusion in the case of Spain in 1995. France, on the other hand, succeeded in launching the Paris summit at the very beginning and organising a second Ministerial meeting in Marseille where French diplomacy could provide additional input. By organising two high level meetings during the same Presidency, France projected further influence in the newborn initiative.

Turning now to the second function, the mediation role, both countries acted in a combination of broker, strategic, and neutral entrepreneurship. The first two attitudes were clearly linked to national interests and were especially evident in the negotiation of the EMP and the UfM in their initial stages, prior to the Presidency. However, during the Presidency, it was also possible to distinguish this entrepreneurial behaviour in areas like the fishing treaty with Morocco in 1995, or when France insisted in maintaining the co-presidency of the UfM for two years. Nevertheless, in the framework of the Barcelona Process and the Union for the Mediterranean, both roles were a mix of broker and neutral entrepreneur. Both Spain and France conducted negotiations under very difficult circumstances, trying to reconcile different points of

view with partners that were very hostile to the idea of having to compromise. This was one of the most successful attributes of both presidencies. In the case of the UfM this was, however, a temporary success for it ultimately failed to generate real consensus that lasted over time and, as a result, the initiative suffered from constant obstructions. The EMP, preceded by long negotiations with many different actors and supported by the European Union, managed to survive longer despite the many conflicts.

It is possible to identify some differences between France and Spain regarding each country's ability to raise debates and introduce policies. In terms of encouraging Mediterranean debate, both countries were reasonably similar. Madrid and Paris have invested enormous diplomatic resources to propose innovative approaches between Europe and the South. This has led them to produce institutional documents and propose different sub-regional initiatives in the hope to provide a more propitious regional framework for collaboration. In this journey, both have tried to convince their European and/or Mediterranean partners to join the debate. However, when adding the style component, the French Presidency presented a more public approach. The Mediterranean debate was a matter of national politics, starting in the electoral campaign and the subject of an intense debate in the academia and in the media... at least for a while. This has never been the case of Spain, for which the Barcelona Process occupied newspaper front pages on the day of the signature and afterwards was relegated to the elites (see chapter 3).

Regarding the capacity to or preference for introducing new policies, France and Spain adopted different profiles. Both were capable of effecting policy changes; but, as seen in the Presidency of 1995, in the general agenda, Spain was comfortable with acting as a "transitional" Presidency in certain areas (i.e. the intergovernmental conference or the EMU) while France had a more active profile in terms of "pushing" the for introducing a new policy (e.g. the migration policy and the UfM). Nevertheless, the Spanish Presidency of 1995 was particularly active in concluding major agreements in international relations.

Lastly, the Presidencies of 1995 and 2008 were both very fruitful and effective and represented a good opportunity for the Mediterranean to gain weight and take a new

step forward in Euro-Mediterranean relations. They also showed that despite some important differences, France and Spain shared a non-negligible number of attributes and strategies when organising the rotating presidencies.

To conclude, since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the opportunities for member states to influence the EU agenda via the rotating Presidency have been considerably reduced. With the introduction of the 'Trio', the three countries that assume the rotating Presidency meet once every 18 months and prepare a host of activities for the whole period. This is done in coordination with the Commission. The combination of the permanent posts (President and High Representative) and the requirements to organise the rotating presidencies within a Trio formula means the decline of the importance and visibility of individual Council Presidencies.

CHAPTER 6

Thinking nationally, acting internationally: France and Spain compared

INTRODUCTION

After having explored the roles of France and Spain in the development of Euro-Mediterranean policies over the last 18 years, now the theoretical framework informing the thesis will be addressed in relation to the analyses of both countries. Before presenting conclusions, a brief comparison of the two countries will be offered, and parallels and divergences between Paris and Madrid's actions will be noted. It is not the aim of this chapter to evaluate how effective the Barcelona Process or the Union for the Mediterranean have been. While some references to these are inevitable as they are related to the roles played by their sponsoring countries, the aim is to present a research-based analysis that summarises the previous chapters and highlights areas of policy or institutional consistencies, contradictions, styles, and regional approaches to determine whether one country has been potentially more influential and effective than the other.

The first section will present how consistent the different governments of *la Moncloa* and the *Elysée* have been in implementing their Mediterranean strategy, notwithstanding changes of government. In this sense, an analysis of France presents a greater difficulty given the dual nature of its Mediterranean policy (the Arab and Mediterranean policy). I argue that this distinction that *a priori* seemed to be an exclusively academic debate has definite political implications, which will be explained in the next section. The second section will analyse the multilateral styles and the methods of leadership exerted by France and Spain according to the categories established in the theoretical framework (broker-entrepreneurship and strategic entrepreneurship); this discussion will also review the multilateral and bilateral preferences of these two member states. Finally, the third section will address the

difficult topic of projecting national influence by following the research questions defined in the theoretical framework. These are (1) how influential were France and Spain in creating a window of opportunity; (2) did they build coalitions and collaborate with other members, or did they pursued their objective alone?; and (3) were France and Spain capable of making other members engage actively with the initiative once it went live?

A case study will be included in this chapter in order to bring together all the elements and see them in the context of a more concrete policy: the migration policy of the European Union. The focus will be in France and Spain and their collaboration and differences in their inputs into this EU policy. The focus is on two concrete policy areas where Madrid and Paris acted as policy entrepreneurs and managed to influence the policy development. These are: the external border management and the creation of Frontex where Spain had a relevant role, and the Pact on Migration and Asylum of 2008 where France was the main sponsor. Their degree of collaboration and involvement as entrepreneurs, and the existence (or not) of a policy window will be the other elements that will be presented in the case study.

This chapter has to be read bearing in mind that none of the elements included in the different sections are independent and, sometimes, it is difficult to separate them. These elements should be considered individually, as the combination of consistency, style of leadership, and regional approach are what ultimately make a country's strategy more or less effective or influential. What makes a strategy effective and influential is a combination of different features.

Nevertheless, following Drucker's famous words, "no institution can possibly survive if it needs geniuses or supermen to manage it. It must be organised in such a way as to be able to get along under a leadership composed of average human beings." That is the drama of the regional policy of the Mediterranean: that it depends on superheroes to rejuvenate it every now and then.

6.1 STRATEGIC CONSISTENCIES OF THE DIFFERENT LEADERS OF THE ELYSEE AND LA MONCLOA SINCE 1995

In order to measure a policy's effectiveness, it is important to evaluate its consistency. Gauttier distinguishes between consistency, which encompasses the absence of contradictions within the external activity in different areas of foreign policy; and coherence, the establishment of a synergy between these aspects (Gauttier, 2004: 25-26). Policy effectiveness is intimately connected to political determination to act and the will to use all available policy instruments in a strategic fashion (Olsen, 2008: 160). All governments of the *Elysée* and *Moncloa* have implemented their Mediterranean policies in a certain way. While some notable differences among the governments have existed, these dissimilarities may be consistent or bring contradictions that ultimately affect the policy's effective application. The degree of consistency in Euro-Mediterranean policies in the Spanish governments of Aznar and Zapatero on one hand, and on the other, French Chirac and Sarkozy administrations, will be comparatively analysed.

6.1.1 CONSISTENCY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN STRATEGY OF AZNAR AND ZAPATERO

The government of Felipe González established some priorities that became the main guidelines of Spanish foreign policy. In the Mediterranean, this meant a multilateral approach in the framework of the European Union, a privileged relationship with Morocco, institutionalised relations such as meetings between heads of state and government, strong bilateral relations with the Maghreb countries, and a pro-Palestinian attitude yet managing to maintain good relations with Israel since 1986.

The literature review and research contained herein indicate that generally speaking, there has been continuity between the governments of González and Aznar at multilateral level with important changes in bilateral relations. Most of the literature points out that the *Partido Popular* (People's Party) continued to prioritise the Barcelona Process (Soler i Lecha, 2004; Barbé, 2008), but there are some differences in how this prioritisation was manifested in policy actions. Nuñez contends that "the election of the Aznar government ushered in a period of hibernation" (Nuñez, 2001: 141, in Gillespie, Youngs, 2001). In contrast, there is more agreement that Spain's

bilateral relations with the Maghreb countries changed considerably: the most visible example being the political and diplomatic relations with Morocco, which suffered constant setbacks (Soler i Lecha, 2004; Lemus, Amirah-Fernández, 2009, in Hernando de Larramendi, Mañé, 2009: 93).

Two of Aznar's three ministers of foreign affairs had an important pro-Mediterranean profile. Abel Matutes was directly involved with the launch of the Barcelona Process. Josep Piqué was the minister of foreign affairs during the Valencia conference and transformed the *Institut Català de la Mediterrània* originally created by the *Generalitat de Catalunya* under Pujol's government into an international think tank with a bigger scope: the *Institut Europeu de la Mediterrània* (IEMed). In contrast, Ana Palacios, the third foreign affairs minister in Aznar's government, was less involved in Mediterranean issues (interview Spanish diplomat, 7 February 2011).

Aznar's government engaged in a mix of consistencies and contradictions. There were consistencies at the multilateral level, but as relations with Morocco were jeopardised, there was no room for synergies between the multilateral strategy and the bilateral one. Therefore, the government's strategy lacked overall coherence in this sense. The multilateral dimension and the bilateral relations constituted the Mediterranean strategy of Spain, but by neglecting political relationships with the main partner, the general impression was that the Aznar's government did not have a high Mediterranean profile; however, as noted above, this is not entirely accurate.

The tense relations with Morocco were not the only cause of change in Spain's bilateral relations. Feliú (2005: 6) and Fernández Molina (2007: 58) contend that the new conservative government adopted an economist strategy and reconciled with Algeria and Libya, which was a novelty when compared with the actions of González's government. Madrid and Alger signed a good-neighborhood treaty in 2002, and in 2010 Aznar's was the first European government that visited Algeria since 1992. Feliú argues that this was a strategy aimed to show Rabat that it could lose its status as privileged partner (Feliú, 2005: 4). Aznar also supported the progressive integration of Libya into the international system and was one of the first European leaders to visit Tripoli after the lift of international sanctions.

While the development of these relations with other Mediterranean partners represented progress and, therefore, was consistent with an ambitious Mediterranean agenda, the agitated diplomatic relations with Morocco,⁸³ especially during the second legislature (2000-2004), had a negative impact on Spanish sub-regional development. Two main reasons stand out for explaining this change of attitude regarding Rabat: 1) in 2000, Aznar won the elections by absolute majority, and 2) in 2002, Ana Palacios, who did not pay much attention to the Mediterranean, became minister of foreign affairs. During this second legislature, the relations with Paris were also in jeopardy due to the constant clashes between the governments of Aznar and Chirac in many areas. Among these clashes was the France's explicit support of Morocco. The Spanish government did not feel supported by their European partner in these conflicts (interview Spanish diplomat, 15 August 2013) and this perceived abandonment was interpreted as another example that the PESC was inefficient when trying to act as a single voice (interview Spanish diplomat, 03 February 2011). Therefore, we may distinguish a partial contradiction during the first legislature of Aznar's government that became more evident as the term progressed.

There was consistency during Aznar's government when it came to the Barcelona Process. In addition, the BP's institutional design fit better with the traditional Spanish multilateral style. Spain had Europeanised its Mediterranean foreign policy (Torreblanca, 2001), and although it also had features of strong presidentialism (Lemus, Amirah-Fernández, 2009, in Hernando de Larramendi, Mañé, 2009: 92), all governments have shown preference for dealing with the multilateral Mediterranean policy within the EU; this became Spain's region-building strategy. Furthermore, the partnership was a good mix of intergovernmental negotiations where Spain (and other countries) could continue to influence the initiative, yet where the European Union is formally in charge of its development. This meant further European resources for the Mediterranean and a better balance between North and South, which was one of the main concerns of Spanish foreign policy.

⁸³ Several conflicts arose during that legislature: the fishing agreement that Morocco did not want to renegotiate (April 2001); the accusations by the Spanish government regarding illegal immigration (2001), Madrid's blockage in the EU about the Plan Baker I about the Western Sahara that benefited Rabat (2001); and the Persil incident (2002) were just some of the many tensions of that time.

In 2004, the government of José María Aznar was replaced by the socialist José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero. There was little doubt that the new government had a strong Mediterranean ambition. The Barcelona Summit of 2005, the creation of the Alliance of Civilisations, the reestablishment of the good relations with Morocco, and the appointment of Miguel Ángel Moratinos as the new foreign minister were actions that proved that the *Mare Nostrum* was high on the list of priorities.

When France proposed the MU/UfM, the Spanish government attempted to influence the initial Mediterranean Union project and involve the European Union. The Spanish government also pushed to keep the *acquis* of the Barcelona Process and even to maintain the name in a very strange fashion. These actions were consistent in the sense that by including the European Union, the link to the Barcelona Process would be more easily made, and it would create synergies between the EMP and the UfM. At the end, it was Germany who forced this reorientation (see chapter 4). The actions carried out by the Zapatero administration did not present any contradictions, although they did lack decisive influence and forcefulness. It is not clear whether or not Spain was in the position to oppose France considering the renewed interest of Zapatero to collaborate with France after a period of tense relations, and this collaboration was far more important than the Mediterranean ambition (Gillespie, 2011b: 65).

However, not everything was consistent in Zapatero's Mediterranean strategy. The Formentor forum was a private initiative conceived and proposed by Repsol following an informal conversation with José María Aznar in 1999. The aim was to establish an important international forum in Spain that might have been an international reference when addressing the problems related to the Mediterranean. Therefore, the Formentor forum had a regional approach that was consistent with the Barcelona Process. Although *la Moncloa* agreed to give diplomatic support to the forum, the government expressed their will that the initiative should be depoliticised. Spain adopted a strict neutral approach in order to ensure continuity among different governments. Technically, this approach was conceived to ensure permanency, but this was not the result.

With the change of government, the meeting was cancelled despite the organiser's perception that it should continue. The new government was not willing to provide their support anymore (interview Spanish diplomat, 14 February 2011). It met on six occasions from 1999 to 2004, and Prime Minister Aznar attended five of them. José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero, who was also invited in 2004, cancelled at the last minute and was substituted by Miguel Ángel Moratinos, who had also actively participated in all of the previous meetings in his role as EU special envoy for the Middle East. It is suspected that the reason behind this cancellation was that the government was already planning to launch the Alliance of Civilisations, and the Formentor forum was perceived as having a different orientation, ultimately leading to its cancellation in 2005 (interview Spanish diplomat, 14 February 2011). On several occasions, Repsol contacted Spanish foreign minister Moratinos to keep the forum alive, and despite the fact that the minister was interested in maintaining the forum, it was finally cancelled; this suggested that Zapatero did not want to continue with this initiative. This shift represented a contradiction with the Mediterranean strategy, for Zapatero defended the EMP from the UM but also withdrew support from a forum that was in harmony with the Barcelona Process. Instead, Zapatero launched his own initiative, the Alliance of Civilisations, which had a more global orientation.

6.1.2 CONSISTENCY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN STRATEGY OF CHIRAC AND SARKOZY

Since the foundation of France's Fifth Republic, there has been continuity towards the Mediterranean region, as presented in chapter 2. Mitterrand was the first who introduced the concept of the Mediterranean policy (Chérigui, 1997; Schmid, 2009). From that point, the Arab policy and the Mediterranean policy coexisted (interview French official, 22 October 2010). During Chirac's government from 1995 to 2007, the two values coexisted, but there were a preference for nurturing bilateral relations. Therefore, Chirac adopted a strategy based on developing the Arab policy of France, especially focusing on the three states of the central Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia), Lebanon,⁸⁴ and the Barcelona Process, the last of which represented how the

⁸⁴ Chirac focused two legislatures on deepening France's political relations with its Arab partners. In October 1996, Chirac made his first big tour as President and visited Syria, Egypt, Israel, the West Bank, Jordan, and Libya. The French President also visited Israel and the West Bank in February

Mediterranean approach was subordinated to the more traditional Arab Policy of France.

In April 1996 at the University of Cairo, Chirac stated his will to return to the Arab policy. He asserted that it was an essential dimension of French foreign policy and he would like to give a new impetus based in the principles established by its founder, General de Gaulle (Chirac, 1996).⁸⁵ It is interesting to note that Chirac himself admitted that “contrary to what it is often said, the Mediterranean is a new idea in politics”. Chirac offered the Barcelona Process as the framework for multilateral relations among the entire Mediterranean basin and the European Union, which present some contradictions with the return to the bilaterally natured Arab Policy. On the other hand, by acknowledging that the Mediterranean conception was a relatively new idea in politics, his will to return to the Arab Policy was coherent with French traditional foreign relations. This was what made the French Mediterranean/Arab policy so difficult to qualify, for both policies presented continuity, and both may have been consistent or presented contradictions. For the purposes of this study, Chirac’s new strategy was inconsistent with the multilateral approach of the Barcelona Process that France had launched together with Spain only a year before.

Another element of inconsistency between the governments of Chirac and Sarkozy was their different position regarding Turkey and Europe. Traditionally, France has been concerned with EU enlargement and has especially opposed Turkey’s accession. However, Chirac, in a very risky movement, expressed his support to Turkish membership in July 2004 (BBC News, 20 July 2004). This favorable position was far from being shared by the political class or the public opinion, although some analysts think that France had been progressively Europeanised and was gradually coming to

2000, and hosted the failed peace conversations in October 2000, where he was accused of interfering in favour of Arafat (JTA, 11 October 2000). The relationship was particularly good with the Lebanon, where Chirac had personal relations with Rafik Hariri and thus assumed an important role in the negotiations between Lebanon and Syria. After having consulted with Vladimir Putin and Gerhard Schröder, Chirac sent Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, his diplomatic adviser, to Damascus to mediate in this conflict, and later he proposed to the President of the United States, George W. Bush, to mediate together between the two countries (Filiu, 2013: 207-208, in Lequesne, Vaïsse, 2013). Condoleezza Rice, the national security advisor from the White House, and Gourdault-Montagne coordinated these efforts. In September 2004, the UN Security Council called upon foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon.

⁸⁵ As established in Chapter 2, De Gaulle never used the “Arab Policy” name. It was first used by Pompidou and later by Giscard d’Estaing.

terms with this idea, which explains Chirac's open support (Rieker, 2005: 10). Nevertheless, as Lequesne puts it, one of the main causes for conservative voters to reject the proposed European constitution in the referendum of 2005 was the prospect of a European Turkey (Lequesne, 2007: 7). In February 2005, although Chirac asked (3 months before the European referendum) the French parliament to review the constitution and introduce a clause where all eventual European enlargements had to be approved in referendum, this was not enough for the French electorate. During the presidential electoral campaign of 2007, Sarkozy was quick to express his objection to the Turkish adhesion. This was more consistent with the traditional French policy and especially with the public opinion; it was also consistent and coherent with Sarkozy's proposal of a Mediterranean Union.

Sarkozy's Mediterranean policy continued to place the Mediterranean as one of its main priorities. However, some analysts saw his new proposal as the end of an active Arab policy (Boniface, 2007), or the adoption of a pro-Israeli approach (Khader, 2009). Following the Arab Spring and the Syrian civil war, a group of diplomats accused the government of "lack of coherence" where the French Middle East policy had become illegible, embroiled in deadlock; in turn, this paralysis was strengthening Syria (Le Monde, 22 February 2011). This lack of coherence was explained by Sarkozy's clear condemnation to Kadhafi's regime and the military intervention in 2011 where France was fully involved. This reaction stood in contrast to the ambivalence of the Al-Assad regime, at which point the President considered that the situation "is complex, it (Syria) has an important role in the region" (L'express, 26 April 2011), and he refused to intervene without an international mandate. This presented an inconsistency with Chirac's policy, despite not breaking off diplomatic relations and having a cold relation with Al-Assad, who he suspected was behind the killing of the Lebanese Prime Minister and close friend, Rafiq Hariri.

The declarations made by this group of diplomats were a good example of the lack of consistency that the French political system displayed. The group of diplomats, called the "Marly group", published a series of articles in *Le Monde* denouncing the divergences between the *Quay d'Orsay* and the strategy followed by the *Elysée*. This publication generated an exchange of declarations between another collective that

defended Sarkozy's foreign policy, *le Rostand group*, which published an article in *Le Figaro* (24 February 2011), and Michèle Alliot-Marie, French minister of foreign affairs, who replied to their accusations arguing that "French diplomacy has a roadmap: the one fixed by the President of the Republic. It is perceptive, it is clear. It is part of a coherent vision in a global world"⁸⁶ (*Le Nouvelle Observateur*, 25 February 2011). The fact that the main actor who was choosing the strategy for international relations was the President himself reinforces the perception of the French individualism; this may have raised additional contradictions.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to say that Chirac and Sarkozy adopted a rupturist attitude in this sense once they became President; for example, there has been continuity and consistency in the French position on the pro-Arab or pro-Israeli debate. Sarkozy and Mitterrand's public discourse shared some parallel ideas, and both of them asked the creation of a Palestinian State in the Knesset despite having been "accused" of adopting a pro-Israeli attitude (interview French diplomat, 19 April 2010). Furthermore, the *Quay d'Orsay* and Sarkozy had publicly declared their support of dividing Jerusalem and their stance against colonisation (Herscho, 2011: 75). It is highly unlikely that there were big inconsistencies in this regard, considering that France had and still has the two largest Arab and Israeli communities in Europe; hence it has had to adopt a balanced role between the two positions. However, there were small changes that made French policy more consistent with the Mediterranean approach yet represented a change from Chirac's previous strategy. The first were the constant declarations of France's commitment to Israel and its security, especially with the increasing tensions between Iran and Tel Aviv. In addition, by presenting himself as friend of the Israel, he put himself in a good position to mediate between Israel and Syria (Cahen, 2009: 187) and became a relevant regional actor. It is interesting to note that in the elections of 2012, Sarkozy obtained the 92.8% of the 10,000 French voters in Israel, compared with the 7.2% of votes for Hollande. Conversely, Sarkozy only obtained 18% of the vote in Palestine, compared with of Hollande's 82% (*La información*, 07 May 2005); this reinforces an interpretation of a pro-Israel Sarkozy.

⁸⁶ My translation

France's ongoing attitude toward the Union for the Mediterranean's presented fewer contradictions within the French political system compared to French perspectives surrounding the Barcelona Process. In the French system, the President is not the head of government, but the head of state. The role of the Premiers in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was not as significant as it was in a more intergovernmental framework like the Union for the Mediterranean, and for a political system like the French one, where foreign policy is the *domaine réservé* of the President, the UfM was better suited to France's governing style.

To conclude, as seen, Mitterrand introduced the Mediterranean policy of France in terms of regional formulation and gave his full support to the Barcelona Process. Chirac, who formally continued working to establish the partnership, changed the region-building focus, preferring to adopt a new strategy based on regional bilateralism and taking advantage of the good personal relations he had with some Arab leaders. Sarkozy's decision of returning to Mediterranean region-building would mean that there was a return to the Mediterranean idea of Mitterrand. Nonetheless, Sarkozy put forward an initiative of regional integration based on strong intergovernmentalism. In practice, this initiative was neither very consistent with the Barcelona Process nor with Chirac's regional foreign policy, although it was designed following some patterns of French foreign policy preferences. Therefore, although there was continuity in terms of placing the Mediterranean high on the agenda among all different countries, the many changes in the last 18 years of French Euro-Mediterranean policies presented many contradictions when evaluated collectively. Furthermore, these changes between different policy orientations did not appear to be related to the regional context, but rather were more about presidential will and national domestic policies.

6.2 HOW MULTILATERAL ARE THE MULTILATERAL INITIATIVES OF FRANCE AND SPAIN?

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was a shared success for Spanish diplomats and included several actors that contributed to making it possible. There was a close collaboration with France, and an active role of the European institutions, especially the European Commission, which was willing to contribute to strengthen the external

dimension of the EU. Although it was Spain that ultimately linked its name to the partnership and the design and development were closely associated to the work of Spanish diplomats who occupied relevant positions at national and European levels, the fact was that the contribution of France and the Commission were equally important (see chapter 3). In addition, France and Spain saw Europe as the solution to some of their Mediterranean national concerns. Therefore, the multilateral approach was the answer for national and international strategies.

Despite some initial contradictions and setbacks where France and Spain defended first and foremost their national interests (agriculture or structural funds, for example), both countries lobbied the Commission, the Northern and Southern European partners, and the MPCs in order to raise awareness of the need for an ambitious Mediterranean policy (see Chapter 3).

There was a set of strategies put in place, including the use of tough negotiation techniques, like at the European Council of Cannes when negotiating for European resources allocated towards the South (Barbé, 1996b: 32). Ultimately, the whole process was conducted at the European level, although the driver was often Spain in collaboration with France. All European institutions were involved. The Council and the Commission presented statements in order to draft a proposal for the new Mediterranean policy, in which Spanish commissioner Abel Matutes played a relevant role. The cooperation leading up to Essen, Corfu, and Cannes were good examples of synergies between the diplomacy of Spain and France at the national and European level and demonstrated both countries' capacity to influence other more reticent member states (Bicchi, 2007: 164-168; Gomez, 2003: 72-76). Paris and Madrid effectively lobbied at all levels by means of raising awareness, presenting projects, collaborating with the European institution, and reaching agreements with other member states. They became an effective tandem and adopted a broker-entrepreneurship profile that sought the consensus of all participating entities. This was in coordination with the Delors Commission. For a Spanish diplomat, the key was that there would be a convergence between the Spanish-French proposals and the president of the Delors Committee, which had a strong Commission with real influence,

and the Delors Commission agreed that the Mediterranean should receive more European attention (interview with Spanish diplomat, 17 August 2013).

Another important protagonist was the Spanish Prime Minister. All interviews with Spanish diplomats acknowledged the influence of González but also highlighted his collaborative and Europeanist desire to create an ambitious European policy where Spain would occupy a privileged position. There was a national ambition embodied in a European policy. However, it is also noteworthy that the diplomatic team also had a high profile and motivated policy advisers in *la Moncloa*. In this sense, although it is inevitable to mention González, the Barcelona Process was not a personal project; instead, it represented many national ideas and governance levels, and the Catalan government also contributed with its will to provide political support and by hosting the conference in Barcelona (interview with Catalan politician, 14 May 2010).

The conception and implementation of the Union for the Mediterranean differed greatly from the practices established in the Barcelona Process. To start with, it was an initiative drafted at the political level, presented during an electoral campaign, and negotiated almost unilaterally until the moment that it was finally Europeanised. Nevertheless, the evolution of France's style is interesting. I argue that the French diplomacy underwent three phases (see chapter 4), and these three phases coincided with the progressive multilateralisation of the initiative. The first phase was when France acted as a strategic leader, introducing an incoherent and highly controversial project, providing little information and acting unilaterally in an attempt to involve the Mediterranean basin without the participation of the European Union. Despite some diplomatic attempts to explain that France already knew that it could not act all alone, evidence suggests that there was in fact little collaboration with other actors. This was mainly a phase of presentation carried out by the *Elysée*, and although it demonstrated a multilateral approach, it was presented as a multilateral initiative. It is noteworthy that this initiative did not have the full support of all French diplomats, some of which were openly opposed. An example is the response of the Marly group introduced earlier in this chapter, which defined the Union for the Mediterranean as an impulsive act "*lancé sans préparation malgré les mises en garde du Quai d'Orsay qui souhaitait modifier l'objectif et la méthode*" (launched without preparation despite the

warnings from the *Quay d'Orsay* which wanted to modify the objective and the method) (Le Monde, 22 February 2011).

The second phase presented some signs of transition. At this point, Sarkozy softened his unilateral style by appointing a diplomatic team in charge of negotiating the UfM and by holding international meetings with other states in order to explain and coordinate the next steps. In December 2007, he met in Rome with Romano Prodi and José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero to discuss some areas of the initiative such as the name change and the inclusion of the European Union. In practice, the European involvement was never secured until Sarkozy met with Angela Merkel in Hannover in February 2008. Although the strategic leadership did not change, the initiative started to display some signs of multilateralism. The meeting with Italy and Spain suggested that there was an attempt to create a coalition by “balancing” in order to counteract effects of having more reticent members.

Finally, the third stage was a combination of high and low profiles through which France finally became a broker-entrepreneur, although displaying some elements of its former attitude. This coincided with the multilateralism of the initiative. The hyperactive role exerted by the President and the effective actions carried out by French diplomats secured the Paris summit in July 2008 and the Marseille meeting in November of the same year. The European Commission proposed a draft on how the UfM should have looked. France mediated among the different members to ensure the participation of all the countries. Nevertheless, it was always France who was in the driver's seat. After the French presidency, Spain adopted a more active role, especially in the hands of Moratinos. Yet, the French President continued showing some strategic leadership trends in the conflict of Gaza, where he overlapped with the EU rotating President, (see chapter 4) and also when pushing to keep the co-presidency for two years against the will of other European countries. The Union for the Mediterranean, already in place, was taking its first steps as a multilateral initiative, although it was mainly with the participation of the Mediterranean partners.

Despite these moments of policy implementation, the different governments of France and Spain presented some differences in their multilateral negotiations. To start with, Chirac represented a change compared to Mitterrand by announcing his will to

continue with the action started by De Gaulle (Allain *et al.* 2005: 536). Chirac gave his explicit support to the implementation of the Barcelona Process, which was one of his objectives during the European Union presidency of 1995. It is often recalled that it was (also) France that proposed this initiative (Chirac, 1996). In this sense, the collaboration with Spain and other European and Mediterranean actors is presented in the literature (Gillespie, 1997: 38; Chérigui, 1997: 12) and confirmed in interviews (interview French diplomat, 19 April 2010). However, as seen, shortly after, Chirac reoriented the French strategy, prioritised the Arab one, and France adopted a passive role within the EMP (interview Catalan government official, 23 July 2010). Only after the 11S and the increasing presence of the United States did Chirac show a renewed interest in the Barcelona Process and the European multilateral approach (Schmid, 2005: 96-97), but mainly as a response to the increasing presence of the United States in the Mediterranean.

In the case of Aznar and Zapatero, both had different governing styles. For Aznar, his special relationship with the United States was conceived to grant Spain a privileged role in the world. Zapatero's approach, on the other hand, was that due to the progress of globalisation and economic interdependence, "Spain could only hope to maximise its potential for global leadership by defining a new international identity for itself" (Powell, 2009: 521). For example, Zapatero believed that values such as peace, solidarity, social cohesion or tolerance should be the new Spanish international attitude. This led the Prime Minister to adopt a collaborative and less presidentialist attitude, increasing the role of the foreign affairs minister. This was a change with Aznar, who had a higher international profile. However, regarding the Mediterranean, there were no major differences in their multilateral approaches. Aznar, by appointing Matutes, continued with the tradition of keeping the Mediterranean regional policy at the multilateral level.

Later, with Piqué as foreign minister, Aznar worked hard to make the Valencia conference a success. The government had to mediate in order to bring Southern Mediterranean countries together in a difficult context. For the first time, Aznar called all of the Mediterranean ambassadors to Madrid to coordinate with other countries and intended to make the partnership less dependent on the attention that the

different rotating EU presidencies could grant to the Mediterranean (see chapter 3). However, his participation in Iraq and his bad relations with Morocco weakened Aznar's role in the region. Zapatero, on the other hand, assumed the first rotating presidency that required sharing this role with the new President of the European Council and the new High Representative. The Spanish Prime Minister intentionally adopted an important yet secondary role in order to give further visibility to the new European representatives (Fernández, Sorroza, 2010: 2-3), which was in line with the idea of strengthening the role of the European Union and cooperating with other actors.

Evidences suggested that both, France and Spain, made efforts to transmit an image of multilateral cooperation. Perhaps, in the Spanish case, such efforts were less assertive and more action-oriented. However, the findings of this study point to a different strategy that had a direct impact on others actors' perception. The French government, when trying to soften its unilateralist style at the European level, appointed someone of a high European profile when assuming an institutional post or introducing new policies. Ultimately, this had a limited impact, as it was still France who drove the initiatives. Spain, in contrast, when attempting to adopt a more cooperative and multilateral style, permitted the involvement of other actors (the Commission leading up to Barcelona, Van Rompuy, and Ashton in the fourth presidency of the European Council under Zapatero's government). This suggests that the *Elysée* was more concerned with others' perception than with delegating functions. Did France play multilaterally? The Barcelona Process and the Union for the Mediterranean are living examples of how French diplomats mastered this kind of framework and were keen to negotiate at the multilateral level. Despite the Spanish *protagonismo* in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, without French full support and broker-entrepreneurship action, this would have not been possible. However, history and tradition also demonstrated how France was very tempted to adopt a bilateral approach when circumstances permitted it.

6.3 INFLUENCE

As established in the theoretical framework, this research covered three topics in order to shed light on France and Spain's capacity to project influence in the Mediterranean policy of the European Union: (1) the capacity to take advantage of or to create a window of opportunity; (2) the ability to build coalitions and collaborate with other members to succeed in changing policy; and (3) the competence to make other members engage actively with the initiative once it is in place.

Regarding the first element, the capacity to create a window of opportunity, research suggests that both France and Spain made good use of the context when planning to introduce a new regional policy. The Barcelona Process was launched in a context of relative regional calm after the Oslo Process. However, increasing tension in Algeria and a social unrest in the MPCs, the economic stagnation and the progression of Islamist parties motivated greater European involvement. This period coincided with a governmental continuity in Spain and France, and the European composition was propitious to the ambitions of Madrid and Paris.

To start with, the number of Mediterranean and Eastern partners was more balanced than today; therefore, the Mediterranean countries had more weight within the European Union. The existence of an influential diplomatic Mediterranean team in the Commission, good relations between González and Kohl, the rotating presidencies of the Council where France, Spain and Italy took the post consecutively, and the synergies and collaboration between France and Spain were relevant factors that created propitious conditions for introducing a new Mediterranean policy. The window of opportunity was also beneficial for Spain in at least one other factor—the French concern over whether to dedicate efforts to the East or to concentrate them on the Mediterranean—that ultimately was favorable for Madrid's ambitions (Gillespie, 2011: 61).

The case of the Union for the Mediterranean was slightly different. As presented in chapter 4, the external conditions were not particularly appealing to initiate policy changes. The Middle East context was marked by the split of the Palestinian Authority into two parts, Fatah and Hamas, bringing internal conflict in Palestine and at the

international level. Further complicating Middle East stability were the increasing tensions in Lebanon with Hezbollah several months later. There was a dormant window of opportunity based on the questionable results of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, but the moment for evaluation was 2010, when some major objectives such as the free trade area were expected to be accomplished.

Sarkozy prompted this moment three years earlier and used France's domestic window of opportunity rather than the international one: in other words, the electoral campaign where the Mediterranean Union was presented as a solution to some French concerns (immigration, Turkey). Additionally, France held the rotating presidency of the Council in the second half of 2008. As presented in Chapter 5, the French government also made good use of the EU Council presidency to introduce and shape the Union for the Mediterranean. In this sense, research suggests that France was capable of creating a window of opportunity in 2007-2008 that led to the negotiations of the Union for the Mediterranean.

The second element, the capacity to build coalitions and to collaborate with other members to succeed in the policy change, has been presented in the previous section. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that between France and Spain, it seems that a sort of partnership emerged; this was more evident in the road to Barcelona, but it also reappeared after the more individualistic phase of France in the Union for the Mediterranean (Aliboni, 2009: 8). However, there seemed to be a lack of balance in this partnership. During the Barcelona Process, there was an effective division of roles, and France accepted and encouraged the emergence of this new Spanish activism, for it was considered a good opportunity to claim further Mediterranean attention (Bicchi, 2007; Chérigui, 1997). Therefore, France and Spain opted for "bandwagoning" and established a new and relatively balanced partnership. This coalition-building capacity was not been constant during the Barcelona Process. On the contrary, it seemed that once the partnership was implemented, France and Spain stopped acting in close collaboration and adopted a more passive role. On the other hand, this was consistent with the nature of EU coalition-building, of which the durable Franco-German coalition has been the rare exception. The Barcelona+10 summit co-organised by Spain was a good example. Despite the relatively positive context and having had an experienced

diplomatic team, this summit lacked the coordination and good division of tasks with France. The result, as seen in chapter 3, was far from satisfactory.

With the advent of the Union for the Mediterranean, France went from employing an individualistic role toward fostering an unspoken coalition with Spain and the reestablishment of the old partnership between the two countries. However, at that time, Spain became the junior partner. Several facts point to this hypothesis: the tacit support for Spain to take over the co-presidency after France; French support for Spain to host the secretariat (not without concessions); Spanish activism to unlock the blockage that was preventing the implementation of the secretariat; or the tandem visits between the countries' ministers of foreign affairs to reactivate the UfM. Nevertheless, this coalition seemed to be more diplomatic and political than technical, as confirmed with interviews (see chapter 4).

Spain recognized that France was its main partner and that without French support, no Mediterranean initiative could be carried out at the regional level (interview Catalan government official, 23 July 2010). On the other hand, in the EMP, Madrid was a more active "leader", as there was a sense of ownership and because France and Italy did not participate as actively after the implementation. This changed, and Spanish diplomats now acknowledge that France is the main leader because the design and the Union for the Mediterranean proposal has French stamp (interview Spanish diplomat, 02 February 2011). Nonetheless, the existence of some degree of political competition has been acknowledged by the two countries (interview Spanish diplomat, 03 February 2013; interview with Spanish diplomat, 15 August 2013; Interview French official, 22 October 2010), but the French often mention Spain as an important partner with significant regional weight, especially in Morocco, and a reliable associate to work with in the Mediterranean.

Finally, regarding the third and last element, the capacity for making other members to actively engage with the initiative, some distinctive features were noted. The main difference was found in the degree of involvement of the European Union. The Barcelona Process was a fully European initiative and all member states were equally owners. Yet, it is a fact that not all members contributed to the same degree, and they were able to protect their own interests/priorities through potential use of their veto

powers; thus, at least nominally they could feel that they participated in the Partnership. France and Spain successfully raised awareness of the importance of the Mediterranean for the European Union (see chapter 5). On several occasions, González, Mitterrand, and Chirac paid more attention to Southern European borders, and they collaborated with the European Commission in creating documents that were discussed at the European level (European Commission 1992, SEC(92) 401; European Commission 1994, COM (94) 427 final; European Commission 2000 COM(2000) 497 final).

By involving the Commission in the drafting and implementation of the project, the initiative became interesting for those members of the EU who wanted to be active members in the Mediterranean. Sweden, Germany and the United Kingdom are good examples of countries that were active participants despite not having Mediterranean borders, although Gibraltar is under UK sovereignty. For instance, besides the Anna Lindh foundation, in 1999 the Swedish government created a Swedish institute in Alexandria with the aim to contribute to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The institute (formally in partnership with the Library of Alexandria) later became the headquarters of the Anna Lindh Foundation and remains based there. Several non-Mediterranean countries hosted and organised ministerial conferences of foreign affairs (Germany, Luxembourg, and Finland) that one Spanish diplomat noted were a “great success”, especially because this permitted other non-Mediterranean countries to feel involved in the Mediterranean (interview Spanish diplomat, 15 August 2013). This created a sense of northern ownership that has not had continuity in the Union for the Mediterranean.

When Guaino and Sarkozy presented their Mediterranean proposal, they argued that part of the failure of the Barcelona Process was due to Europe’s lack of attention. This was not a very promising start. Even when the initiative was Europeanised, the inclusion of the EU was very limited. As a result, it is not surprising that the UfM had no sympathy from or involvement of non-Mediterranean countries, as they were excluded *de facto*. One of the complaints of the French UfM team was the lack of involvement of other Mediterranean countries, and the absence of structures similar to theirs (interview French official, 22 October 2010). The team also pointed out the

disorganisation, lack of coordination, and involvement of some countries despite some improvements in specific areas (interview French diplomat, 22 October 2010). Sarkozy failed one of the most important parts of projecting influence: assuring the continuity of his proposal by spreading enthusiasm and willingness among the participants. Not even Spain has been an active member in proposing projects.

Despite the success in policy introduction, the ability to shape the UfM, and organising the two first meetings, the *Elysée* did not ensure the success of the initiative. European member states were not involved in practice—not even in the co-presidency, as was agreed in Marseille. Therefore, they have not allocated the same resources to the UfM as France or Spain. The UfM has been dysfunctional from the beginning. The adoption of the co-presidency by the EU may entail further implication from other member states or even a redefining of the initiative, but the complex structure and system of representation may also create some additional undesired complexity (see Chapter 4).

Some additional elements should be added to those presented in chapter 2: the first and most important one being the impact of the economic crisis. In 2008, Spain had greater economic resources and was one of the strong economies of Europe; since then, the crisis has left Spain in a weakened position. It has affected Spanish economic competitiveness, technology and R+D, reforms, and cuts in the external service, among other effects. Another area of French superiority in the face of the crisis was that it had the second largest diplomatic network; Spain was far from matching France's diplomatic body and networks. In terms of institutional representation at the European and international level, France had bigger weight in the main international organisation as well as in the European Council.

Both, France and Spain have been equally successful in placing diplomats in key European positions. Within the EEAS, France was able to obtain more posts of senior status, but as the EEAS developed, Spanish diplomats balanced this lack of initial success. By the end of 2011, the Spanish were at the head of 11 delegations, including Russia, Morocco, and Argentina, and occupied 55 posts in the European central services. The appointment of Bernardino León as the special representative for the

Mediterranean, and that of Luís Fernández de la Peña as one of the 16 general directors, balanced the initial frustrations (Molina, Sorroza, 2012: 6-7).

France's Arab Policy created an important political tradition that has led to individualism; yet, the tradition has been highly influential. It is difficult to ignore the weight of France in the Maghreb, Lebanon, or Egypt. Spain, on the other hand, has had a privileged relation with Morocco and close cooperation with the Maghreb, but its role is less evident in the rest of the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, even where Spain has been relatively strong, France has had a larger presence, although this greater presence has been considerably reduced over the years (interview Spanish diplomat, 15 August 2013). Finally, both France and Spain have been extraordinarily active in proposing regional initiatives, some of which are still in place. In this sense, research suggests that France has preferred bilateral or subregional frameworks like the Foromed or the 5+5 Dialogue, and Spain has preferred to act within the European Union (e.g., the abandoned CSCM or the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership). Therefore, it may be concluded that France can exert influence more effectively in the short term than Spain, and that greater influence may lead to the launching of initiatives in a more individualistic way. However, despite this individualistic tendency, France needs the Spanish's cooperation in the long run.

In spite of the above, Spain was the main entrepreneur between 1992 and 1995, serving as a very active promoter at key moments. Independently of French capabilities, Spain was an influential partner that could effectively become a broker-entrepreneur both at the sub-regional level (Maghreb) and at European one. This has perhaps been Spain's greatest capability: adopting a multilateral approach that makes it a reliable partner when developing regional initiatives, while French style and strategy is often regarded with suspicion. Thus, the cooperation of Paris and Madrid is more effective when Spain becomes a broker-entrepreneur.

6.4 CASE STUDY: SPAIN AND FRANCE IN THE MIGRATION POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

When the Barcelona Process was launched, almost all areas of policy were divided in three baskets as it has been outlined in more detail in chapter 3. It is within the third basket, the one of social, cultural and human issues that the European migration policy

of the Mediterranean has been developed, at least partially. Following Bichara Khader, the migration policy was also included in the first basket which deals with the task of creating a common space of peace and stability, but illegal immigration was placed in the third basket together with international crime, terrorism and the fight against drug trafficking, an approach which tended to “criminalise” immigration (Khader, 2005, in Amirah, Youngs, 2005: 84). During the 1990s, two security discourses on irregular migration were articulated (Lutterbeck, 2006: 64; Pugh, 2001). One was related to the traditional concept of security, which saw immigration as a “threat” to the stability of the European states. The other was articulated around human rights, human security and safety of the immigrants with the aim of preventing loss of life and introducing measures against the people smugglers. Increasingly, the EU countries were more interested in internal security co-operation or Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) issues, and despite the fact that the first basket was almost paralysed, the JHA became a priority within the EMP, with regular meetings of senior officials and interior ministries taking place (Gillespie, 2003: 27).

In this case study, the movement of citizens between the different states of the EU will not be considered as migration as was also agreed by the European member states in Barcelona. Only those people migrating from third countries and the policies addressing this phenomenon will be analysed, and the attention will be limited to France and Spain and their contribution to the Euro-Mediterranean policies despite the major relevance of Italy as an important Mediterranean member-state but also as one of gateways for southern immigration.

For states, managing migration is costly and not very effective if tackled alone; therefore, cooperation among member states, partners and the international institutions is a more effective way of adopting successful measures. The European Union and its member states learned quickly that introducing common measures to coordinate, legislate and to control the internal and external borders was necessary. However, it was not until the Tampere European Council of 1999 that a common policy for migration and asylum was adopted. It dealt with (1) a Partnership with countries of origin, (2) a common European asylum system, (3) a fair treatment of third country nationals and, (4) the need for management of migration flows (European Council,

1999). At this point, it is important to note that southern migration flows also affect North Africa countries for they are not only a country of origin but also of transit. This has become an important element to understand the flow management and the cooperation established between the EU and the MPCs.

During the first years of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the immigration issue was not a priority. The Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conferences did not give rise to ambitious projects, only vague statements. However, the increasing pressure from the south, especially in Spain and Italy, and the security concerns following the '9/11' attacks upon the United States put the immigration topic in a prominent place on the European agenda.

Spain started to show some signs of broker-entrepreneurship in Valencia in 2002, during its presidency of the European Council. Migration was included in the action plan adopted at this conference, which decided to hold a ministerial meeting specifically on migration and social integration of migrants. Also during the Spanish presidency, in the European Council meeting in Seville, it was proposed that migration flow management was one of the issues to include in EU external relations agreements with third countries. The Spanish government of Aznar, supported by Blair, tried to Europeanise this topic and to force third countries to assume commitments. Spain was going through tense political and diplomatic tense relations with Morocco, which was using the increasing immigration flows to put pressure on the Spanish conservative government. However, this represented a clash between the governments of *Moncloa* and *l'Elysée* for France rejected the possibility of penalising the country (Marquina, in Beneyto *et al.*, 2010: 132). The clash was not surprising considering the deterioration in relations between Rabat and Madrid in 2001-03, and the strong national interests and close ties that France has with Morocco. Wolff asserts that it was not surprising that Spain took the leadership in helping to develop the Plan for the management of the external borders of the Member States in Seville (Wolff, 2012: 127-128). By Europeanising Spain's migration policy, Prime Minister Aznar wanted to compensate for its poor relations with its neighbouring country and project some indirect influence that otherwise was not possible to achieve given the circumstances. The Seville European Council not only created the momentum but also counted with a

very motivated actor who acted as a broker-entrepreneur. And this idea of introducing a form of conditionality into the EU-Mediterranean agreements and establishing a more comprehensive way of dealing with immigration was to become more prominent in the subsequent ministerial conferences.

Another advantage of Europeanising Spanish migration policy was to facilitate and make use of collaboration with France in a moment when political relations between Paris and Madrid were tense and not always aligned. Therefore, Spain saw Europe as the solution for the complicated situation with two key partners (i.e. Morocco and France).

The importance of the role played by Spain in promoting action on Euro-Mediterranean migration must be put in the context of the significant but limited roles played by supranational actors such as the European Commission. Since the beginning, the Commission has been developing an active and increasing role in creating a common migration policy. It also negotiates readmission agreements and conducts operative migration control such as the actions carried out by FRONTEX. However, the Commission also has its limitations for it is the member states who grant legal migration opportunities to third countries (Colombo, Abdelkhalik, 2012: 29). Member states, as stated in the theoretical framework, still want to keep a certain degree of control in certain policy areas (Lutterbeck, 2006: 64). Moreover, as Wolff argues:

the European consensus on the necessity to manage migration in partnership with neighbouring countries, as well as on the decentralization of border management to third countries, helped member states to agree on more sophisticated tools to control their external borders. Nonetheless, in doing so, the member states ensured that they would retain control over the power they delegated to Frontex and therefore created a rather weak agency. (...) The creation of a new institution, Frontex, helped EU member states to mitigate the effects of EU integration and to lower their transaction costs by opting for the less integrationist option. Frontex is the result of the inability of the European Commission and the European Parliament to create a European corps of border guards (Wolff, 2006: 128-132).

Nevertheless, the creation of FRONTEX is a good example of the lobby exerted by the southern countries and, especially, the broker-entrepreneurship role of Spain. Southern member states opted by “balancing” and made coalitions in order to claim for further resources and European help.

6.4.1 FRONTEX AND MARITIME BORDER MANAGEMENT

The Mediterranean border of the European Union is often the focus of media attention, especially in the case of Italy or Spain this is even more frequent (Pugh, 2001). In the case of Spain, the migration policy is one of the major areas when negotiating with its main southern Mediterranean partner: Morocco. Collaboration in the area of migration and security has become an important part of the diplomatic action between Madrid and Rabat. This collaboration has not always been easy, especially during the government of José María Aznar who accused Morocco of turning a blind eye to illegal immigration but, nevertheless, it is one of the areas of greatest interest between the two countries. Today, Spanish-Morocco relations are a paradigmatic case of cooperation between a northern and southern Mediterranean country (Lutterbeck: 2006, 72).

Two of the main entry points in Europe are the Strait of Gibraltar and the Strait of Otranto, however, in the last decade we have witnessed how the immigrants adopted new routes of entry, defying the border control of the states (both, North African and European). Despite the collaboration between Madrid and Rabat with its ups and downs, between September and October of 2005 Spain experienced an escalation of the migration flow that raised an intense debate reaching the European Union.⁸⁷ The increase of the border control and the renewed collaboration between Morocco and Spain,⁸⁸ a sign of consistency in the foreign policy of Zapatero, had as a consequence the appearance of a new route via Mauritania and Senegal with *cayucos* (wooden boats) heading for Canary Islands. It is believed that from January to December 2006, about 31,000 irregular immigrants succeeded in their objective, but 1,000 lost their

⁸⁷ Almost 4,520 people found their way and entered Ceuta and Melilla. 11 immigrants were not so lucky and died.

⁸⁸ The relations between the two countries improved substantially following the election of Zapatero as the new Spanish Prime Minister.

lives in the Atlantic Ocean (Zapata-Barrero, De Witte, 2010: 87). For Spain, it became an urgent imperative to Europeanise the response.

Collaboration at multilateral level between France and Spain and other member states started with the Ulysses operation, which was especially conceived to help the Spanish authorities. The navies of France Spain, Portugal and the UK worked together with the aim of preventing undocumented migration and people smuggling across the Straits of Gibraltar and the Canary Islands (Lutterbeck, 2006: 68). Only a few months later, Greece joined the group of active members and supervised the Triton operation, which was in charge of patrolling the North-East Mediterranean. Spain, France and Italy were the main partners. Finally, in 2004 the Frontex agency was created and meant the institutionalization of European border management (Wolff, 2012: 122-123). The aim of Frontex is to coordinate the EU member states operations in EU external borders as well as national projects of ad-hoc centres on border control.

However, the increasing focus in the Mediterranean was another example of the Spanish broker-entrepreneurship action in collaboration with other southern member states to bring attention to the Mediterranean (Wolff, 2012: 123). The increasing migration flows demanded further financial and human resources. After the events of 2006 that may be seen as a policy window given the growing number of immigrants arriving to the coasts of Spain, Italy or Malta, it became evident the need of an agency to coordinate all the actions and to Europeanise the situation. This strategy was coherent with the Spanish tradition in foreign policy. In addition, Spain called for further resources for those countries that had to deal with the situation in a direct way. The Spanish Deputy Prime Minister De La Vega travelled to Brussels and Helsinki in August 2006 to raise awareness on the situation, and Prime Minister Zapatero also pushed for including the issue of immigration on the agenda of the EU at the European Council meeting in December 2006 (Zapata-Barrero, De Witte, 2010: 89).

Spain, Italy, Greece and Malta demanded further assistance and some “solidarity” from their European partners and institutions. Northern European countries, especially Germany or Sweden were not very receptive to southern demands, and as will be explained in more detail in the next section, even France was not willing to accept their claims due to the mass regularisation that the Spanish government had carried

out in 2005 and that had faced the opposition of the *Elysée*. But the increasing number of *pateras* (small boats), made northern countries more receptive to southern demands. The window of opportunity based on cognitive uncertainty together with the existence of an active broker-entrepreneur (Spain) and the collaboration between the southern member states all helped to Europeanise the migration policy.⁸⁹ Southern states chose to ally by “balancing” in order to counteract the opposition of Northern states to more resources being allocated to this policy.

In parallel, France and Spain sponsored Morocco’s call for a global approach to immigration which was visible at the Hampton Summit in December 2005 (Wolff, 2012: 140). Few months later the three countries also proposed the Euro-African conference that was held in Rabat on July 2006 which represented the first steps towards this global conception by adopting an action plan. Collaboration between these three countries has been a continuum in the last decade and shows the good predisposition of all parts to establish a win-win cooperation game. In this specific case, both France and Spain acted as the voices of southern Mediterranean countries in the EU.

On October 2009, the French President Sarkozy together with Silvio Berlusconi acting as President of the Council of Ministers, wrote to the European Council asking for further resources to be allocated to Frontex and to strengthen this agency, especially for the Mediterranean. In the letter, the two Presidents drew attention to the challenge that recent migration flows represented to the European Pact on Migration and Asylum policy adopted under the French Presidency (see chapter 5 and in the next sub-section). After proposing some concrete measures, the short letter ended by referring to “solidarity between member states, which cannot be only words but has to become a move towards a real share of responsibility” (Sarkozy, Berlusconi, 2009)⁹⁰ and asked that some concrete measures be adopted at the next European Council. This letter showed France’s commitment to the southern Mediterranean countries, as

⁸⁹ Frontex started to be articulated with the current mechanism of the European Union. The 2006 *Communication on Reinforcing the Management of the European Union’s southern Maritime Borders* introduced operational measures against illegal immigration in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, and established the partnership with third countries through the ENP, in the case of the Mediterranean (European Commission 2006: 4). Another important step forward was the creation of the Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) which is put in place in the event of an emergency situation.

⁹⁰ My translation

well as to developing the migration policy of the European Union. Collaboration with Spain and Italy has become a constant ever since Frontex was launched, both in demanding greater resources as well as by implementing operational actions.

6.4.2 THE EUROPEAN PACT OF MIGRATION AND ASYLUM

As mentioned in chapter 5, one of the priorities of France during its Presidency of the European Council was to reach an agreement on the European Pact on Migration and Asylum. On 15-16 October 2008, European leaders agreed on adopting this Pact which meant a step forward in a common approach to migration and asylum challenges. The Pact is not a break with the past as it is built upon the existing migration framework which was based on the previous Global Approach. However, the implications of the adoption of this Pact has not generated consensus in academia. Some analysts have seen it as an attempt to introduce a more intergovernmental style rather than working towards a progressive Europeanisation (Carrera, Guild, 2008), but other scholars do not completely share this point of view and see the Pact as an hybrid for it is not “an ill-defined intergovernmental attempt to reduce Europe’s influence on migration and asylum management nor a means of consolidating Europe’s ‘security approach’, which tends to pay little attention to the rights of migrants” (Bertozzi, 2008). To support this idea, Bertozzi highlights the role of the Commission in the implementation, especially in preparing a yearly report to check that all the objectives have been accomplished in time. As Carrera and Guild recognize themselves, the Barroso Commission was also becoming very interested in migration policy and met with Sarkozy on several occasions in informal meetings to prepare the strategies to implement it (Carrera, Guild, 2008: 1). Nevertheless, a good example of the intergovernmental approach is the fact that each member-state is responsible for the control of its own external border.

There were five main ideas introduced in the new Pact: (1) the establishment of an annual debate on immigration and asylum policies, (2) the principle of avoiding mass regularisation as had happened in the past, (3) to conclude bilateral agreements at EU and bilateral level with the countries of origin and transit, (4) to establish ambitious policies to foster the integration of newly arrived immigrants and, finally (5) to

establish a European Asylum Support Office (EASO) that would result in practical cooperation among the different member states (European Council, 2008c). However, none of these areas were new, as previously explained.

As briefly outlined in chapter 5, some of the ideas of the Pact on migration had been in President Sarkozy's mind since he was French interior minister in 2006, when the Spanish and French governments clashed over the recent Spanish decision to implement a mass regularization (started in 2005). It was not the first time that Spain had adopted such measure. No less than four times governments in Madrid had implemented large-scale amnesties (Kostova Karaboytcheva, 2006: 11-13). However, on this occasion, the extent of the regularisation (about 690,000 applications were presented) did not go unnoticed by other countries and, especially, France who accused Madrid of creating a pull effect that would bring further illegal immigration which, eventually, would affect all European countries. Nicolas Sarkozy explained in the French Senate that he had complained to the Italian and Spanish authorities about their actions. Italy had regularised the situation of 700,000 irregular workers in 2002, and in 2005 Spain proceeded to do the same for another 600,000 people. His predecessor, Dominique de Villepin had expressed himself in similar terms when Spain initiated the process (El Mundo, 29 November 2005). Following these actions, France proceeded to announce stricter immigration laws.

During the next months, both governments exchanged several statements on the matter. Finally, in the immigration conference between the eight European Mediterranean countries which took place in Madrid and involved their interior and foreign ministers, French activism managed to get an statement from the Commission and the Parliament, which proposed that all regularisations should first involve consultation with the all other member states until the European institutions developed a regulation to this effect, a suggestion that Spain finally accepted (El País, 30 September 2006). This was only the beginning of French broker-entrepreneurship. Sarkozy also proposed the creation of a common migration policy that would include all EU countries and that would be in place together with the national policies (Europa Press, 29 September 2006). Two years later, the Pact on Migration became one of the priorities of Sarkozy, this time as a President, and the window of opportunity to

introduce such ideas was during its Presidency of the Council. As Collet states, “if the French government is to be believed, immigration policy in Europe [was] in need of some ‘house-keeping.’ This [was] the rationale behind the pact” (Collet, 2008: 1). Or, as Carrera and Guild put it, “the strategy of the French Government has been to bring supranational legitimacy to some of its current priorities, visions and laws affecting human mobility and social inclusion and to transform them to some extent into European trends.” (Carrera, Guild, 2008: 4)

Therefore, if at national level there existed a window of opportunity, it also existed at European level for it was a time when European institutions were working on other initiatives in this policy area. Moreover, there was a degree of harmony between the Barroso Commission and the government of Sarkozy. As Collet explains, the EU was working on proposals on seasonal workers and intra-corporate transferees, as well as a forum on immigration (Collet, 2008: 2). Although Collet implies that the Pact was not really an answer and was designed to please French voters, the fact is that by recognising the existence of other initiatives that were being developed, it can also be seen as providing a policy window of opportunity. It may be argued that the Pact bore a French stamp, but Paris acted as broker-entrepreneur rather than as strategic-leader because several actors were involved in the policy development, including Spain and the Commission.

Not surprisingly, one of the elements of the new Pact is the inclusion of the principle that mass regularizations should be abandoned by member states, given that Schengen ensures that the actions carried out in one country have an impact on the rest of the member states. These regularizations should be carried out based on the situation of all those affected. Spain came to terms with this idea, as it made clear during the migration Mediterranean conference (El País, 30 September 2006). French pressure and lobbying during the preceding months had brought this topic onto the European agenda and managed to introduce it into the common Pact. Nevertheless, the importance of developing a consistent European approach in this policy area and good political relations between the governments of *la Moncloa* and *l’Elysée* prevailed over other areas of disagreement and there were no major difficulties for French broker-entrepreneurship, especially because France acted as an effective mediator.

France met with its German and Spanish partners on several occasions to prepare the final proposal which was substantially changed to include their demands.

The initial French proposal underwent extensive modifications. The original draft was French tailored and did not include the Global approach or other European proposals (Collet, 2008: 2). For instance, in the case of mass regularisations, member states insisted on including the “case-by-case” regularisation that was not originally in the draft, as well as amnesties for economic reasons and not only humanitarian ones. Where Spain was not so willing to make concessions was in the French proposal to include some sort of compulsory integration contract for all immigrants, and forced its removal from the text, leaving only the obligation on the part of the new citizen to respect the law. This contract, which was highly publicised, was based on the French immigration law where there was the *Contrat d'accueil et intégration* (CAI) and the *Contrat d'accueil et intégration pour la famille* (CAIF).⁹¹ This requires the learning of the language and values of the French Republic, to have a job and to have accommodation.⁹² Another polemical concept was the “*immigration choisie*” (selected immigration) that has been used in the French internal discourse but which made European partners feel a little bit uncomfortable. It was finally replaced by “managed immigration”. Finally, although some areas of real interest for France were accepted, the Pact “is not a legally-binding document, but rather a political statement intended to pave the way for the next five-years programme” (Collet, 2008: 2).

All these concessions show that France was willing to compromise and acted as broker-entrepreneur, using an effective mediation approach, although with the proactive role of Sarkozy who managed to change the Europeanising trend for an intergovernmental framework, and to introduce some elements that were tailored to French interests. Collaboration with Spain, in this sense, was more about reaching a consensus rather than sharing roles. This shows the degree of influence that the Elysée was capable of exerting.

⁹¹*Loi relative à la maîtrise de l'immigration, à l'intégration et à l'asile, No2007-1631, 21 November 2007.*

⁹² See the *Office Français de l'Immigration et de l'Intégration*. Consulted on January 2014.

6.5 CONCLUSIONS

There seems to be consensus in Spain at diplomatic and academic level about the loss of weight and influence in the last *époque*, especially coinciding with the government of Zapatero. As a Spanish diplomat explained, Spain in the first *époque* (following the accession to the European Communities) had more influence than the Spain of today. The reason is twofold: (1) an enlarged Europe with many new countries; and (2) successive Spanish governments have lost strength in their Europeanist style. González was a convinced Europeanist who appointed a highly Europeanist team; he managed to secure Spain's important weight within the ECC/EU. With Aznar there was continuity in the multilateral strategy while the bilateral relations adopted a new form. Morocco lost its place as a privileged political partner, and there was an economist approach toward Algeria and Libya; this made Aznar's governing style a mix of consistency at the multilateral level while presenting some contradictions at the bilateral one.

This changed with the new socialist government. José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero was welcomed as the Prime Minister who would bring Spain back to Europe; he also represented an idea of cosmopolitanism, as his initiative in the Alliance of Civilisations showed. Relations with Morocco were reestablished and Moratinos, the "father of the BP" and the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, was willing to reinvigorate the multilateral approach. But the crisis that followed when Zapatero was already in the government made Spain lose prestige and influence; ultimately, Spain had little input in shaping the UfM in its first stage (interview with Spanish diplomat, 14 February 2011).

In the Mediterranean, Spain has progressively lost weight too (Kausch, 2010: 1). There are several reasons to justify such a statement: first, in partnership with other actors, González managed to introduce the Barcelona Process. Aznar continued with the development of the initiative in a consistent way and adopted a broker-entrepreneurship profile to reinvigorate the Barcelona Process, especially in the Valencia conference in 2002. Aznar also introduced the Foro Formentor, which worked reasonably well. In the Mediterranean, as previously presented, Zapatero had shown an interest in continuing Spain's role as a relevant actor. Nevertheless, results were disappointing. The conference of 2005, despite the many efforts of part of Spanish

diplomats, ended in fiasco (see chapter 3). Additionally, the Alliance of Civilizations, although integrated into the UN and welcomed by an important number of governments, had a low profile and did not produce many tangible results. The 2nd conference of heads of state of the UfM that was to be organised during the Spanish Presidency of 2010 was finally cancelled. Finally, the Spanish government, even with the influential and experienced Miguel Ángel Moratinos at the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was not able to introduce substantial modifications to the Union for the Mediterranean, and once the initiative was in place, the diplomatic action was mainly centred on becoming the venue of the secretariat and was not concerned with substance (Kausch, 2010: 3).

On the other hand, France's regional approach had continuity, was consistent with France's actions, and held the goal of keeping the Mediterranean in a privileged position. However, there were some inconsistencies and contradictions in the implementation of the strategies of the different French governments. All Presidents emphasised their privileged relations with some Mediterranean countries, especially with France's Arab partners. However, when a government privileges the Arab policy over the Mediterranean one as Chirac did, there was overall coherence yet also contradictions. France's approach was coherent because the Arab Policy left room for creating synergies with a multilateral Mediterranean policy. The bilateral approach and good relations with the Arab partners were helpful to create synergies with the Mediterranean policy of France, but not to develop the Mediterranean regionalisation concept.

Sarkozy tried to solve these contradictions and presented a regional project based on an intergovernmental framework where France could take advantage of its privileged relations with the Arab countries. It may be argued that the UfM was one of the most coherent initiatives within the traditional French outlook. The problem was that this approach did not fit well with Spanish preferences; additionally, there was no consensus at the French domestic level. In any case, Sarkozy managed to introduce the new initiative in a short amount of time, making some concessions and shaping the initiative after it was launched. The style demonstrated strong features of strategic leadership and was progressively softened, although never completely abandoned. In

this process, the traditional coalition that emerged during the Barcelona Process was reestablished. In the long run, the influence exerted was not enough to engage the rest of the European and Mediterranean partners, nor was it sufficient to overcome the difficult context of the Mediterranean. Sarkozy and the French diplomats demonstrated an effective mediation role that made possible the launch of the UfM; yet, French mediation left little room at the political level for other European actors to feel involved.

Furthermore, it is unlikely that others sought to adopt roles without having an opportunity to exert influence. As mentioned in the introduction, in order for an institution (or initiative) to survive, it does not need to be dependent of an outstanding leadership. The Union for the Mediterranean, as was inconsistent with the foreign policy-making of the European Union, was highly vulnerable to the external context and thus condemned to a permanent state of malfunction. Whether the recent EU adoption of the co-presidency will change this fate or not, remains to be seen.

Almost all these elements of foreign policy style and strategy can be found in the case study of the migration policy of the EU. Most of the times, France and Spain acted as two partners and allies in the fight to curb immigration for both of them are sensitive to the problems of the other country. Both of them were and still are allies in most of the maritime operations, sharing the responsibility and also the cost. In addition, they share some principles in relation to what the migration policy should be. For instance, they opposed the Italian/German proposal of setting up migration and refugee detention camps in Libya and other North Africa countries to process asylum applications, leaving asylum-seekers outside the European territory⁹³ (Lutterbeck, 2006: 72-73) and have supported Moroccan calls to develop a global approach to migration policy.

However, when it comes to policy regulation, some differences did arise in the last decade. For instance, at the European Council of Seville in 2002 when the governments of France and Spain were not in tune, the Spanish proposal to introduce conditionality, which France completely rejected, was finally not adopted. Equally, the

⁹³France and Spain were not the only countries against this measure: Sweden and the EU also rejected it for considering it incompatible with the Geneva Refugee Convention of 1951.

French proposal to include in the European pact on migration and asylum an immigration contract encountered the opposition of the Spanish government and, finally, it was not adopted. Collaboration is, therefore, an important element for developing migration strategies, and an important element to make the proposals succeed. These two countries have a special weight in the development of such policies and have acted as broker-entrepreneurs to shape the European foreign policy and have managed to reflect their own national interests at least, in the border management and the Pact on Migration and Asylum of 2008.

To conclude, the migration policy, and more specifically, the creation of Frontex, is a good example of the hybrid approach presented in the theoretical framework. Member states, in order to minimize the impact of migration and reduce the costs, decide to collaborate and institutionalise the solution. However, they retain a considerable control over Frontex, leaving its role weaker than if it were fully Europeanised. In this sense, member states retain their own preferences over those of the Commission, which pushed for greater integration. The European Pact on Migration and Asylum is also a good example of the French preference to keep some degree of control over European policies, particularly those that are related to foreign affairs. The return to a more intergovernmental framework, as happened with the Union for the Mediterranean, shows the preference of member states to keep a relevant place and driving capacity for themselves.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusions

Are France and Spain friends or competitors? Collaborators or rivals? Leaders or laggards? The answer is only yes: one way or another, all of these characteristics and elements may be found in the relationship between Madrid and Paris in the last 18 years, and the Mediterranean has merely been one of the venues at which all of these attitudes have converged. After all, the Mediterranean is a complex region, as are the relations between these two old countries.

Throughout this thesis I have tried to take into account all possible contradictions that occur in foreign policy and present them in a consistent way, starting with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership of 1995. However, the road to Barcelona was a long and a successful path of collaboration between France and Spain that did not occur overnight. Thus, the aim of the second chapter was to explore the elements that France and Spain had for driving the metaphorical same car, sitting in the front seats and travelling together as co-drivers. The rest of the thesis analysed the coincidences and divergences of the Mediterranean journey in a vehicle that sometimes was too small for two drivers; at other times, the journey required the expertise of two good drivers to overcome the hazards inherent in all long expeditions.

This chapter takes a final conclusive and analytic look at France and Spain's input on Euro-Mediterranean policy. The main hypothesis was that Mediterranean policies are rationally used by the two countries to gain political weight within the European Union amidst a wider set of foreign policy objectives, and that region-building in the Mediterranean policy has become a tool that is not limited by a geographic context. Ironically, in this race to become the leaders, France and Spain found themselves driving the same car and being "forced" to leave their inherent rivalry behind.

Section one of this Conclusion will revisit the theoretical framework and will compare it against the findings of this study. Additionally, the first section will present how the hybrid structural-realist / liberal-institutionalist theory matches with France and

Spain's actual historical practices. Section two will test the hypothesis outlined in the first chapter. Different sociopolitical factors that occurred over the past 18 years will be raised to determine if they were relevant and affected final policy outcomes. It will be acknowledged that the empirical evidence and fieldwork detailed in the thesis only provided partial support for the thesis's main hypothesis, although the research has led to some conclusions of academic value.

Section three analyses the main features of France vis-a-vis Spain in relation to the Euro-Mediterranean policy and tries to identify those areas where there are bigger differences in order to explain the different results in their policy-making and the expectations from their Mediterranean strategy.

Section four will address limitations encountered during this study. In addition to the complications outlined in the research methodology, other inevitable factors may explain some of the research findings. This penultimate section will be followed by a final comment on the spirit of this research and the overall impressions that one might come away with from the study.

7.1 THESIS RESEARCH DESIGN

Is the Mediterranean a region? An accepted definition of what a region is does not exist (Fawn, 2009; Mansfield, Milner 1999). For some authors, regions have some geographical delimitation (Hurrell, 1995); for others, regions are the result of exerted political leadership (Keating, Hoogue, 2001). Braudel saw one Mediterranean of many Mediterraneans (Braudel, 1997), but for others, the Mediterranean region is a political distinction created only recently (Jones, 2006; Chérigui, 1997; Chirac, 1996). The theoretical choice of this research was to consider the Mediterranean as a single entity, and I based this decision on what I perceive to be the nature of foreign policy. Today, France, Spain, and the European Union have a Mediterranean policy, and therefore it was logical to adopt this approach of viewing the region as a single entity, despite the existence of diverse academic interpretations. However, the findings in the thesis show that the Mediterranean as singular entity approach is still contested in French foreign policy; depending on the government, France has adopted either a more pro-Mediterranean strategy, or has returned to a traditional Arab policy. This inconsistent

understanding of the Mediterranean implies a different scope to that described by the EMP. In the case of Spain or the European Union, such ambivalence is not so remarkable. The EU has faced more pragmatic considerations regarding how it frames and compartmentalises its foreign policy, and during the lifetime of the EMP, the range of Mediterranean partners expanded.

In addition, this research relied in Cantori and Spiegel's definition (1970) of core and peripheral actors, as it provided a useful distinction for understanding France and Spain when they adopted certain strategies. In the EU, Spain has been seen as a peripheral actor that has had potential to become a core member-state, especially by means of the Mediterranean policy, where it occupied a central role. This was, for instance, the case of the EMP and González's strategy of converging Spain's Mediterranean policy with that of Europe. France's strategy, on the other hand, presented no ambiguity. France is at the core of both regions, not only due to its geographic placement, but also for historical and economic reasons (see chapter 2).

The starting point of this thesis was that states are central figures in foreign policy. This brought some theoretical dilemmas, as two international relations theories share this same approach: realist or structural realism, and institutionalism. When describing Euro-Mediterranean relations, this research relied on a hybrid theory where I attempted to bridge the gaps of the structural realist tradition by including the liberal-institutionalism.

The aim of this theoretical orientation was not to create a new paradigm, but rather to build upon the rich literature and existing debates about two theoretical schools that converge more often than not. Structural-realists think that the state and critical actors occupy central positions (Hyde-Price, 2007, Gilpin, 2006, Waltz, 1979, Morgenthau, 1948). For institutionalists, the state and institutions are central and even critical, thus lending credibility to the process of coalition-building and ultimately reducing the costs of policy actions (Keohane, Nye, 2001, Keohane, Hoffman, 1989, Millner, Moravcsik, 2009). This research explicitly acknowledges the role of the institutions, especially the unique nature of those of the European Union (Krasner, 2003) and their capacity to influence policy outcomes. However, today foreign policy is an area where member states experience difficulty in delegating responsibilities and

instead continue to influence any involved institutions (Monar, 1998). One example is how member states influenced the ratification of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership's association agreements, vis-à-vis the national parliaments of the 25 member states; another was the control of the MEDA funds until it was replaced by the ENPI, or as presented in the case study, the Pact on Migration and Asylum of 2008 where the intergovernmental approach was privileged over a progressive Europeanisation. In this sense, there have been steps toward strengthening the role of the institutions, although member states have accordingly tried to reposition themselves.

However, other assertions regarding system anarchy, the maximization of security and power at the expense of other topics or areas, or the utility of force—all of which all are in the neo-realist realm—are not shared in this thesis. Instead, a liberal-institutionalist approach, with its acknowledgement of interdependence and progressive institutionalisation was employed (i.e., there are other equally important elements besides the security concerns; real cooperation exists between the states as noted in chapter 3). Structural realism is a general theory that cannot fully account for a nuanced understanding of European integration. Choosing to maximise security and power cannot provide a comprehensive explanation of how Euro-Mediterranean policies have historically unfolded. While security is certainly not irrelevant, especially considering the current unstable situation, other areas like trade or cultural diplomacy have become important issues of foreign policy.

France and Spain adopted the same strategy when forming coalitions. Both countries' involvement in Mediterranean policy has included a mix of bandwagon and balancing strategies. The bandwagon strategy refers to creating an alliance with the state or rival that represents the risk, while still opting for a balanced power relationship by aligning with other states to level the power of the strongest state. In the Mediterranean, France and Spain have opted for bandwagoning as they are potential competitors, especially in the Maghreb; yet, this orientation gave shape to a broader strategy in which the two countries 'balanced' with Italy, Greece, and Portugal in order to counteract the increasing focus of the EU on Germany's weight toward the East. This was also the case when Spain called for greater attention to be paid to the EU

southern frontier and asked for further resources, economic and operative, for border management. Spain 'balanced' with Italy, Greece, Malta and Portugal to petition for a greater implication of the northern countries, referring to the principle of "solidarity", for migration was an area that impacts on all EU member states.

7.2 TESTING THE INITIAL HYPOTHESIS

As presented in the theoretical framework, the main hypothesis was that member states are the main actors that drive Mediterranean policy development, and that only when three prerequisites at national and European levels converge can Mediterranean policy produce initiatives that generate more consensus and are capable of bypassing the regional impasses. These factors are: (1) the existence of a policy window at the national and at international level; (2) France and/or Spain adopting a broker-entrepreneur role; and (3) close collaboration between Paris and Madrid. This hypothesis has been tested against the milestones of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean. Findings suggest that these principles are only partially valid but require some re-qualification (see chart 6). As stated in the theoretical framework, this research will not ignore negative results that challenge the initial hypothesis; instead, such results lay the groundwork for further research to identify other elements that were not initially considered. One of these elements is the impact of the level of collaboration.

The two main policy events that can be compared are the launch of the Barcelona Partnership in 1995 and the Paris Summit of 2008. These two events were selected because both were actions of policy reorientation that had highly politicised surrounding circumstances, thus requiring a more active and entrepreneurship role. In this sense, after having analysed all of the elements presented in the theoretical research, the hypothesis seems to be valid.

The hypothesis needs to be redefined in consideration of those events or actions that may have involved a degree of policy renewal or the restructuring of an already ongoing initiative. In this sense, the Valencia Ministerial Conference did not support the initial hypothesis. Empirical evidence contradicted the initial general statement of this thesis regarding the element of close collaboration. This factor can be downgraded to

only close coordination when events were of a more technical nature and had a lower political profile. Indeed, since the Marseille conference in 2000, there has not been a good division of roles at the political/diplomatic level. The Valencia conference was a success, but there was no close collaboration with neighboring France. Instead, there was only technical cooperation with Paris, which at that moment had adopted a more passive role. The nature of the meeting was of strategic continuity but also policy innovation, and produced results within the framework of the Barcelona Process that were in tune with the European Commission. The results included input from other member states (see chapter 5).

Chart 6 – Hypothesis tested

	Success?	Policy window	Broker-entrepreneur	Collaboration	Hypothesis valid?
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (1995-2008)	Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> France & Spain	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Yes
The Paris Summit (2008-Present)	No	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> France	Coordination	Yes
The Marseille Ministerial Conference (2000)	No			Coordination	Yes
The Valencia Ministerial Conference (2002)	Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Spain	Coordination	No
The Barcelona+10 Summit (2005)	No	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Spain	Coordination	Yes
The 2 nd Summit UfM (Cancelled)	No		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> France & Spain	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Yes

In 2005, the situation was slightly different. Chirac had expressed more interest in the EMP, although the division of roles was ultimately not as effective as during the road to Barcelona. This situation of continuity was reassured by the European Commission's role, at least pre-Lisbon, the agenda could be driven forward during those periods when impetus from member states was lacking. Therefore, the duo of Spain and France was not that relevant. In 2010, there was a situation of close collaboration between Paris and Madrid, but this time the complicated political context made it impossible to organize the second summit of heads of state, which was finally cancelled.

When it came to the main comparable case studies, the Barcelona Process ended up being the perfect model in which all conditions existed (Chart 6). The hybrid paradigm presented in the theoretical framework would seem to account for the outcomes of this initiative: France and Spain acted as rational central players that promoted policy-making changes in the European Union; yet, the two countries acted in collaboration with other players and did not merely follow their own respective national interests. Madrid and Paris had diplomats occupying important posts at the European Union, ensuring a certain level of "ownership" in the policy process where each government could more directly influence European institutions. Nevertheless, the dynamics set the stage for an active collaboration, French direct style was balanced by Spanish entrepreneur style, and the window of opportunity was favourable, thus paving the way to discuss Mediterranean needs at the European level. The two countries pushed for a conception of the Mediterranean as a single region and for the adoption of a comprehensive approach. All of these factors produced a highly politicised and imperfect initiative with too many interlocutors. Furthermore, the initiative suffered from a certain paternalism from the EU. Despite these setbacks, the Barcelona Process was the most important Mediterranean policy initiative that occurred during the past several years.

The 2008 Paris Summit was also an event of policy introduction. For this initiative, France was the leader/entrepreneur, and Spain merely attempted to find its place within the initiative (Gillespie, 2011b). Although the UfM was formally accepted by the Spanish diplomacy, during the initial negotiation phase, Madrid did not play a relevant

role. Other actors such as the European Commission were minimally involved, and the initiative was developed so fast that there was no time or will to create consensus on major topics. The summit took place, but until the Marseille conference, the partners did not entirely understand how the institution would function.

Another element was the policy window. Although this window was propitious at the domestic level and not too complex at the international one, it did not follow the principle of cognitive uncertainty that produced European debate and involvement (Bicchi, 2007: 20). One major difference, though, was that European integration was advancing at the EU level in 1995, but by 2008 the EU was deeply divided over the question of further integration. Indeed, Europeans were “puzzled”⁹⁴, not due to certain events but rather on account of Sarkozy’s rushed proposal. France prompted the window of opportunity (see Chapter 6), which can be seen as a good example of French influence in the European context. However, the proposal’s foundations were not firm, especially because the window of opportunity did not exist in the Mediterranean; yet, France still attempted to give some Mediterranean partners a greater say in the policy-making process. France behaved as a central actor moved mainly by domestic interests (realism). Nonetheless, without the institutions and cooperation with other actors (institutionalism), the results produced only a temporary success: a nice French image in Paris. The initiative’s follow-up, however, did not yield such positive results.

The main challenge is to explain the failure of the Barcelona+10 Summit. The context was not particularly negative; although one of the conference topics dealt with terrorism concerns, that particular issue was not the one preferred by the participating Arab countries (Gillespie, 2006). The diplomatic team on the Spanish side was the same one that negotiated the Barcelona Process (see chapter 3). France, although not formally involved with the organisation of the summit, was motivated to act following the attacks on New York, Madrid and London and given the increasing presence of the United States in the Mediterranean. This explains the central message of the French administration in relation to the 2005 summit, where they expressed that the centrality of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership must be preserved at all costs

⁹⁴ Expression used by Bicchi when describing policy uncertainty

(Schmid, 2005: 99) and could not lose relevance vis-à-vis other international initiatives where the United States would have more influence. There are two factors that explain this failure: first, there was not enough evidence to demonstrate full French involvement beyond rhetorical support; and second, Spanish diplomats relied too much on their experienced team to organise it. Ultimately, Spain was unable to bring together all the participants, especially since the target was the premiers' participation. In conclusion, the member states have most often been the drivers and forces of Euro-Mediterranean policy proposition. Sometimes, their collaborative style adopted a more "realist" fashion; at other moments, a more institutionalist style was employed. The research has demonstrated that France and Spain are two rational actors when it comes to Mediterranean regional formulation, but this role is not enough once a project has been fully introduced. The participation of the European Union was a necessary variable to keep the initiative alive.

7.3 THESIS FINDINGS

Despite the fact that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was negotiated at the European level, the EMP initially received much criticism (Joffé, 1997). It was accused of being paternalist, not very understanding of the Southern Mediterranean, or not realistic in its proposed solutions. However, the Barcelona Process lasted for 13 years; since its inception, the Union for the Mediterranean has encountered many deadlocks that proved difficult to break. The Barcelona Process was the result of a long consensus between the European institutions, France, and Spain; a consensus that did not emerge overnight. It was a long process in which Madrid and Paris played an important role in raising awareness and involving all the members. As a result, the EMP, which was never truly a partnership as its title might indicate, was the result of combined Spanish, French, and European successes.

The EU's paternalist role in the EMP was often criticised, and Sarkozy, in a clever yet risky strategy, proposed a new sort of relationship. Certainly, this was more a partnership—in theory for all the parts, but in practice, only for the Mediterranean basin. The intergovernmental style, lack of real consensus, complicated Mediterranean context over the past several years, and sense of alienation of Northern and Eastern

countries resulted in a difficult punctuated by constant blockage. The European Union, having recently assumed the co-presidency, might have helped to overcome this impasse, although there was no window of opportunity and too many additional complications facing such an intergovernmental framework. The weakening of the European Commission occurred in parallel to the Council's increasing weight, and the member states in the centre of economic governance after the crisis of 2008. Puetter considers that "while policy interdependencies have grown, member states' governments have resisted to further transfer of formal competences to the EU level and did not follow the model for the Community method", causing "an integration paradox" (Puetter, 2012: 161,168).

The task for returning the Mediterranean to the European agenda was mainly taken up by France and Spain. But what differences and similarities explain the leadership styles that these two countries have adopted? This research has attempted to shed light on these distinctive features. For starters, in the past decades, Spain has emerged from international ostracism and has positioned itself as a leading regional player, capable of influencing Euro-Mediterranean policies and taking an active role in policy proposition—at least until hit by the crisis in 2008 (Bicchi, 2007; Gomez, 2003; Gillespie, 1997; Chérigui, 1997; Barbé, 1996b).

Although both France and Spain viewed the development of the regional policies as a necessary factor to balance the progressive enlargement toward the East, the style of claiming further regional attention and the kind of leadership exerted afterwards presented some important divergences. In a sense, Spain was creating its style in the early 1990s and was intent to play the role of 'good European' in contrast to Greece.⁹⁵ Whether the impact of a particular pre-established Mediterranean policy style may be attributed to France and Spain is debatable, it may be argued that France, as a former great power, suffered from a more individualistic style that made Paris more prone to act bilaterally. Historically, French foreign policy is full of examples of strategic leadership with some difficulties in delegating tasks to other countries or European institutions. The 2000 rotating EU presidency under the Chirac government or the conflicts of Gaza with Sarkozy in the *Elysée*, are just two examples on a long list. Spain,

⁹⁵ Personal communication with Gillespie

on the other hand, has tended to act as broker-entrepreneur, preferring to operate within the framework of the European Union and share the workload with other actors and institutions (see chapter 6). Throughout this dissertation, I have identified some of the causes for these trends; at least four factors might explain the different leadership attitudes: (1) a political system that concedes great relevance in foreign policy to the President; (2) preferences for regional formulation; (3) diplomatic resources and historical factors; (4) collaboration and delegation to other partners or institutions.

In regard to France's political system (see chapter 2), the centrality of the *Elysée* is almost absolute in foreign policy, and the President is thus always the main voice in French foreign affairs although other figures like the Prime Minister may have certain influence, especially in times of cohabitation. This feature makes the system highly vulnerable to the President's personality and the strategies that he adopts. The Mediterranean Union is a good example of how despite the internal division within the *Quay d'Orsay*, there were no major modifications to accommodate French diplomats' suggestions; thus, the final proposal remained Sarkozy's personal political project (see chapter 6). Furthermore, all Presidents of the Fifth Republic have been very active in the foreign affairs domain. Therefore, this particularity of the French system, which concedes more weight to the President than in other countries, reinforces the perception of individualism. The Foreign Minister has a secondary function, although depending on the foreign minister's personality and his or her relations with the President, the minister's role might acquire more weight. Yet, this is only a circumstantial fact that does not hide the President's weight and the strong presidency's limiting nature.

On the bright side, the important involvement of the President in foreign affairs might help to break deadlock under exceptional circumstances when senior officials or ministers are not capable of producing progress. These circumstances have another problem: the consistency of the policies adopted by a country's different governments over time. This study acknowledges the continuity between all the tenants of the *Elysée*, but the approach followed has not been consistent. First, Mitterrand adopted a Mediterranean regional approach; second, Chirac returned to the Arab policy of France, relegating the BP to a secondary position; third, Sarkozy agreed upon the

Mediterranean formula, although he employed a different strategy—intergovernmentalism / variable geometry (see Chapter 6).

Spain is similar to France in this aspect. Despite the fact that there is no general consensus regarding the nature of the system, where there is more accord is in a country's active and main role of the Prime Minister in foreign policy (see chapter 2). Despite some notable differences, there are similarities on this point. In Spain, the role of the Minister of Foreign Affairs is also secondary. Yet, the roles of Solana in 1995 and later Moratinos under Zapatero's government have been prominent. Other factors, like the parliamentary balance of forces and the party system differ from the French system by delimiting the Prime Minister's role. That explains the influence of Jordi Pujol, the President of the *Generalitat* of Catalonia during González's final administration. The activity of Spanish Prime Ministers has not been as remarkable as those of France, especially in the first term of their legislature. The exception was González, who had acquired a high international profile after 1982. González's work to have Spain included as a member in prominent international organisations gave him this international *savoir-faire*. Aznar and Zapatero, on the other hand, had no experience in the international arena (interview with Catalan politician, 14 May 2010), instead acquired it progressively.

Thus, if the two systems do not possess dramatically substantial operating differences, what makes appear the French more individualistic than the Spaniards? Part of the answer lies in the second factor: the preferences of regional formulation. When looking at the initiatives championed by each country, it is possible to note some inclinations and predilections. The research suggests that France feels more comfortable in projects that are based on concrete proposals and framed at sub-regional level. This is the case of the 5+5 Dialogue or the Mediterranean Union, the latter of which was based on technical projects where each country could decide which projects they became involved in. It also represented a more realist approach to Mediterranean politics (Aliboni, Ammor, 2009: 21) in the sense that the components of protection and human rights did not find a place in the new initiative. The participation of the European Union was not unanimously viewed as a necessary condition.

Spanish preference, on the other hand, has leaned toward regional building that included all countries of the Mediterranean basin. The EMP is a good example, although not the only one: others include the CSCM or the Alliance of Civilisations. Furthermore, within the Mediterranean Union, the first and main opposition from the Spanish diplomacy came from the absence of the European Union.

I suggest that this preference is due to the kind of relationship that France and Spain have with the different countries of the region. France has strong bilateral relations with the MPCs. In a smaller framework where the rationale of the initiative addressed specific areas, Paris held a stronger degree of influence and avoided the controversial issue of conditionality, which was not well-seen by some regimes of the MPCs. Spain, given its smaller scope of influence, mainly focused in the Maghreb, required a bigger initiative to reach the whole region. The European Union provided this desired framework and the resources necessary to include the entire Mediterranean. Within this framework, Spain—peripheral country—could become a core player, as presented by Cantori and Spiegel (1970) in the EU.

The third factor that influenced the leadership styles of Madrid and Paris was the combined element of diplomatic resources and the history that these two countries have had in the European integration process. France is a founding EU member and possesses the second biggest diplomatic network in the world. It is logical to suppose that the role that France has historically played in the European construction is bigger than that of Spain. With the progressive EU enlargement and the strengthening of European institutions, France saw its role reduced as new actors acquired greater weight; this generated a sort of philosophical view referred to as *déclinologie*. The search for balance in the Franco-German axis has been a continuum upon which Germany became the engine of the EU, thus gaining political relevance. Therefore, French repositioning in the EU after EU enlargement presented a challenge that explains France's negotiation attitude, which resulted from both its history and relocation on the widened terrain of the EU. Paris has had greater resources than other countries; together with a preference for sub-regional frameworks and a highly presidentialist involvement, this reinforces the individualistic attitude embodied in strategic leadership—when France was able to exert it.

Madrid entered the European Union in 1986. After long negotiations that lasted for years and several rejections from European institutions and other member states, the country was willing to adopt a pro-European role. The rotating presidencies of the European Council are good examples of how the country has used its pro-European stance to evolve as a strategic player. Little by little, Spain became more realist (see Chapter 5), as it thought it had nothing more to prove (personal communication with Fernández Pasarín). After 2004 enlargement, Spain became a potential net contributor to the EU budget, and this may have made it less of a team player over the years. In addition, Spanish diplomats have not had the same resources as France; therefore, the European Union became a necessary supranational institution that could counteract Spain's comparatively limited capabilities. The EU has served as a source of information, administrative resources, and greater economic weight able to help Madrid to arrive to regions where, working independently, it would never be able to do so. In this sense, there is a certain instrumentalisation of the EU institutions. The inclusion of the European Union in its policy efforts has helped Spain create a more homogeneous region in which the Iberian country has a privileged position and can reach the Mashreq or Middle East: areas where Spain had historically not had a direct influence.

The fourth factor was the ability to collaborate and delegate with EU institutions and other partners. France was aware of general European perceptions of its individualism. This was why during its 2008 EU Council presidency, there were constant statements to ensure partners that France would collaborate with the European institutions and other countries (see chapter 5). However, the Union for the Mediterranean and certain aspects of the 2008 presidency of the Council, both under Sarkozy's rule, projected a different idea. Although Sarkozy appointed a pro-European diplomatic team with extensive experience in European institutions, ultimately all actions continued emanating mainly from the *Elysée*. As explained at several points in this dissertation, the Sarkozy administration continued to intervene during the Czech rotating presidency (see chapter 5 and 6). Therefore, the collaborative attitude, which was certainly theoretically possible, suffered from a lack of delegation to other actors—either to other partners or to EU institutions. However, as the French system is highly

influenced by the sitting President, this feature may vary from one presidency to another.

On the other hand, Madrid had a team of strong Europeanists with González at the head. As mentioned above, Europe was Spain's solution to compensate for the country's lack of resources, and the Mediterranean was an area that Spain was willing to Europeanise. Spain offered to share the helm with other actors, and the European Commission adopted an important role by producing reports and paving the way to Barcelona. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was a success that has lasted in the memory of involved diplomats and has standardised a way of acting. Evidence suggests that Spain had no difficulty in delegating and sharing tasks as long as it was directly involved and could influence the outcomes. As a result, France has the tendency to become a strategic leader and Spain to adopt a profile of broker-entrepreneur.

7.4 LIMITATIONS ENCOUNTERED DURING THE RESEARCH

When dealing with the regional policy of the European Union, some might consider it natural to conduct research from the European institutional point of view. However, it is less common to explain policy input from member-state's perspective. This is a limitation, because by choosing to put the focus on one of the parts, the others are neglected to a certain extent. This thesis acknowledges this reductionism in order to address the contributions of France and Spain in a more effective way. Further studies might consider examining regional policies exclusively from the viewpoint of a member-state.

In addition, the European institutions have substantially evolved during recent years. During the time period covered in this thesis, three new treaties have been signed and implemented: the 1999 treaty of Amsterdam, the 2003 Treaty of Nice, and the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. The last two were also signed with a completely new Europe that included 25 and 27 member states, respectively. This study has considered all these elements as much as possible, but the aim was to explain France and Spain, not to analyse European integration. Therefore, this factor explains also the lack of detailed information on the functioning of the EU institutions and why the study has only

focused on those elements that clarify the role of France and Spain in the Euro-Mediterranean policy. However, this thesis deals with other issues like the impact of the EU enlargement on France and Spain and the limitations that the EU institutions have had regarding Euro-Mediterranean policies. The UfM is a good example of the EU being marginalised, and now the European Commission faces rivalry from the EEAS and its new assumed role as co-president.

The Mediterranean is a very fertile area for academic research. Future studies might not necessarily focus on Euro-Mediterranean policy-making, but the always-changing region is likely to continue receiving academic attention. However, there is somewhat of a vacuum in certain areas that have received little academic attention. For example, it was extremely difficult to find secondary sources that could have assisted in the preparation of certain chapters or better informed the interview questions. For instance, some of the ministerial conferences of the BP have not been well covered: a fact that may be explained by the sporadic pattern of achievement within this process and the significance of individual conferences themselves.

Another area where there is not much secondary documentation concerns the 1995 Spanish EU presidency. While many works deal with the Barcelona Process launch and the negotiation that preceded it, a certain analysis of the presidency itself is needed. This gap in the literature has been a constraint, although it definitely represents a future research opportunity. One way could be to wait until diplomatic archives will be declassified; in Spain, this used to happen after 25 years. However, Foreign Minister Miguel Ángel Moratinos cancelled this law and fixed the document classification for an unlimited period. The new Foreign Minister from the conservative Party, Minister García Margallo, has not corrected this situation. As a result, researching this area of Spanish history has become not only a challenging opportunity, but also a work of potentially substantial academic value.

Finally, regarding primary sources, due to financial constraints, I was not able to conduct interviews in Brussels. Instead, interviews were conducted in Paris, Madrid and Barcelona. It was particularly difficult to make contact with French diplomats. The complex structure of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the little information available on the UfM mission and the language constraints during the first stage of my

data collection were a challenge. In the case of the Union for the Mediterranean Mission, however, once contact was established, the team was willing to help. This proved more problematic with the Barcelona Process period, for many diplomats proved difficult to both identify and reach, both in Spain and France. I have attempted to compensate for this by conducting extensive interviews and formal exchanges with academics and experts in related fields.

7.5 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

This thesis covers a short period in the Mediterranean's long history: only 18 years. What is 18 years in a millenary sea? Despite the seemingly brief time period, these 18 years have seen multiple changes, confrontations, initiatives to build bridges, wars and peace negotiations. The European Union has wished and tried to be an important actor in the recent history of the *Mare Nostrum*, and France and Spain both attempted to occupy the driving seat. France is constantly accused of being too individualist, but even Spain recognises that without France's collaboration, no European Mediterranean initiative can be successful. This research shows that, at least during this time period, collaboration and consensus between Madrid, Paris and Brussels needed to be the engine that moved European regional policies forward.

France and Spain share the same predisposition to identify a problem, name it, receive recognition, and then step back and adopt a passive role. At least this has been the case in both the Barcelona Process and the Union for the Mediterranean, with peaked coinciding with each country's rotating presidencies or eventual initiatives (that also were orientated in such a way as to receive international recognition). But France and Spain have also demonstrated their creativity in fostering regional policy formulation. However, the Mediterranean is too complex for a single voice. The current situation of UfM paralysis requires certain criticism and efforts to introduce corrective measures. This is something that even a collaborative pair cannot accomplish alone. A well-known Mediterranean used to say that "if the blind lead the blind, both shall fall in the ditch." Perhaps it is time for this duo, Europe, and other Mediterranean partners to lead the way and help us cross old bridges.

APPENDIX

Appendix 1. Comparative Chart on General political, economic and social indicators

	FRANCE	SPAIN
CONTEXT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Déclinologie</i> ▪ Largest country in EU (land mass) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Euphoria (in 1995)</i> ▪ 2nd largest country in the EU (land mass)
GEOPOLITICS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Central ▪ Corridor of the EU 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Peripheral ▪ Corridor between Africa and Europe
POPULATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 2nd most populated country ▪ Immigrants: 3,700,000 approx. (half from MPCs) ▪ Largest foreign community: Algeria, Morocco ▪ 5 million Muslims 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 5th most populated country ▪ Immigrants: 5,700,000 approx. (705,000 from MPCs) ▪ Largest foreign community: Romania, Morocco, Latin America ▪ 1.6 million Muslims
ENERGY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 49% dependency ▪ Oil: 17% dependency on Middle East / Med ▪ Gas: 16% dependency on Algeria ▪ Nuclear power / rich in natural resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 76% dependency ▪ Oil: 37% dependency on Middle East / Med ▪ Gas: 35.4% dependency on Algeria ▪ Green energy power / rich in natural resources
ECONOMY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 6th most dynamic economy ▪ 4th country in R+D investment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 8th most dynamic economy ▪ 15th country in R+D investment. Average position
STRONG AREAS OF INTEREST	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Tourism (1st most visited country) ▪ Agriculture (coincidence by extension of territory and products) ▪ Energy (Nuclear, Green energy) ▪ Communications (Trains, electricity, etc) → Provider 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Tourism (3rd most visited country) ▪ Agriculture (large extension of territory and Mediterranean products) ▪ Energy (Green energy) ▪ Communications (Trains, electricity, etc) → Dependency on France to connect with Europe

Source : self elaboration from different sources (see chapter 2)

Appendix 2. Comparative Chart of Euro-Mediterranean historical contexts

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	FRANCE	SPAIN
CONTEXT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Founding member of the EU (provider of funds for the Med) ▪ Combination of multilateral actions (EU) and bilateralism (Arab policy) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 1951-1986: Outside the EU (user of Med-Policies) ▪ 1986-Today: full member (provider) ▪ 1951-1986: Bilateralism toward the EU (Association agreements, GMP), bilateralism toward the Med (Arab policy of Spain) ▪ 1986-today combination of multilateralism and bilateralism
ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Leadership - Entrepreneurship within the EU (Provider) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No role (User)
GLOBAL MEDITERRANEAN POLICY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Entrepreneurship within the EU. First elements of regionalisation. ▪ Activism at bilateral level, pushing for the GMP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ None (User) ▪ Internationally isolated, good relations with Arab countries, none with Israel ▪ 1975 onwards: Franco dies. Spanish transition to democracy. Spanish Miracle.
RENEWED MEDITERRANEAN POLICY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Very active role, leaves room for Spain to take initiative 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Mainly entrepreneurship role
EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP (Until its launch)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Very active role ▪ Leadership in other sub-regional initiatives: 5+5 Dialogue and Mediterranean Forum 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Broker-Entrepreneur
UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Leadership 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Junior partner

Source : self-elaboration from different sources (see chapter 2)

Appendix 3. Institutional Organisation and Political system


259

	FRANCE	SPAIN
POLITICAL SYSTEM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Highly centralised ▪ Strong role of the President in Foreign Affairs ▪ Personality of the minister matters ▪ Foreign policy influences vote 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Highly decentralised ▪ Strong role of the Prime Minister in Foreign Policy ▪ Personality of the minister matters ▪ Foreign policy usually does not influence vote
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Geographical distinction: European Union / Other regions ▪ 156 embassies ▪ 17 permanent representatives ▪ 98 consulates ▪ 135 cultural institutions ▪ No regional representation ▪ 15,500 agents (total number of diplomats unknown) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Geographical distinction: EU / Latin America / Other regions ▪ 118 Embassies ▪ 15 permanent representatives ▪ 184 consulates ▪ Cervantes institute: 74 headquarters + other cultural institutions ▪ Regional government representation ▪ 10,500 agents, among them 1,000 diplomats (2005)
GENERAL DIRECTORATE FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Cultural implications: ▪ 181 million people speak French; 82,5 million are learning ▪ Working language of EU, UN, OSCE, African Union, The Union for the Mediterranean ▪ Extraordinary weight within the MAEC ▪ Cultural units of embassies come under the DGCID ▪ €7.3 billion for development and cooperation (including other Ministries) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Cultural implications: ▪ 500 million people speaks Spanish ▪ Working language of UNESCO, FIFA, but no other major institutions ▪ Extraordinary weight within the MAEC ▪ Independent cultural centres
EUROPE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Council: 29 votes ▪ European Parliament: 74 seats 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Council: 27 votes ▪ European Parliament: 54 seats

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ One commissioner 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ One commissioner
MEDITERRANEAN TEAM AND RESOURCES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Interministerial Mission ▪ Directorate of North Africa and the Middle East (no Med. mention) ▪ 9 member team (2010) ▪ Conseil Culturel de l'Union por la Méditerranée (not linked to the Interministerial Mission) ▪ Member of: 5+5 Dialogue, OECD Dialogue for the Mediterranean, the two initiatives of NATO for the Mediterranean, Alliance of Civilizations,... 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ No interministerial Mission ▪ General Directorate of Mediterranean, Maghreb and the Middle East ▪ 5 people-team (2011) ▪ No agency such as Conseil Culturel de l'UpM ▪ Member of: 5+5 Dialogue, OECD Dialogue for the Mediterranean, the two initiatives of NATO for the Mediterranean, Alliance of Civilizations,...


Source : self-elaboration from different sources (see chapter 2

Appendix 4. Chronology of events (1957 – 1995)



- Euro-Mediterranean events
- Other relevant European events
- Spanish relevant events
- French relevant events

Appendix 5. Chronology of events (1995 – 2013)



- Euro-Mediterranean events
- Other relevant European events
- Spanish relevant events
- French relevant events

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