Strategic Obfuscation and Consumer Protection Policy

Gu, Yiquan ORCID: 0000-0002-4594-4852 and Wenzel, Tobias (2014) Strategic Obfuscation and Consumer Protection Policy. Journal of Industrial Economics, 62 (4). pp. 632-660.

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Abstract

This paper studies obfuscation decisions by firms. We show that more prominent firms are more likely to obfuscate. While prominent firms always choose maximum obfuscation, the obfuscation by less prominent firms depends on the degree of asymmetry in prominence and consumer protection policy. We evaluate the impact of a consumer protection policy that limits the scope of obfuscation. We show that such a policy may not be effective as less prominent firms may increase their obfuscation practice.

Item Type:	Article
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	26 Mar 2015 11:16
Last Modified:	16 Dec 2022 04:43
DOI:	10.1111/joie.12060
Related URLs:	Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/2009079

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