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Report:
Country-Specific Case Studies on Partnership Dynamics Among Immigrants and Their Descendants

Part 2

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Union Formation and Dissolution Among Immigrants and Their Descendants in the British Welfare State Context

Tina Hannemann and Hill Kulu

Abstract:
This study investigates union formation and dissolution among immigrants and their descendants in the UK. Although there is a growing literature on the dynamics of immigrant fertility and mixed marriages, partnership trajectories among immigrants and ethnic minorities are little studied. We use data from the Understanding Society study and apply the techniques of event history analysis. We contrast partnership trajectories of various immigrant groups and compare these with those of the 'native' British population. The analysis shows significant differences in partnership formation and dissolution among immigrants and ethnic minorities. Women of Caribbean origin have the highest cohabitation and the lowest marriage rates, whereas cohabitation remains rare among immigrants from South Asia and their descendants, as most of them marry directly. Immigrants from the Caribbean region and their descendants also show higher divorce rates than 'native' British women, whereas women of South Asian origin have a low divorce risk.

Keywords: immigrants, ethnic minorities, the 'second generation', marriage, cohabitation, divorce, separation, UK

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1. Background

European countries are witnessing increases in immigration streams and the ethnic heterogeneity of their populations (Castles and Miller 2009). Immigrants' adaptation has become an important issue and research topic among social scientists. A large body of literature has examined various aspects of immigrants' lives in Europe, including their employment and education (Adsera and Chiswick 2007; Kogan 2007; Rendall et al. 2010; Rebhun 2010), health and mortality (Sole-Auro and Crimmins 2008; Wengler 2011; Hannemann 2012), residential and housing patterns (Musterd 2005; Arbaci 2008), legal status and citizenship (Seifert 1997; Bauböck 2003; Howard 2005), and linguistic, cultural and religious diversity (Foner and Alba 2008; Gungor et al. 2011). The recent literature has also exhibited an increasing interest in the study of family dynamics and patterns among immigrants and their descendants. One stream of research examines the formation and dissolution of exogamous marriages in Europe, with the aim of deepening our understanding of the factors that influence the spread and stability of mixed marriages and their role in immigrant integration (González-Ferrer 2006; Kalmijn and Tubergen 2006; Dribe and Lundh 2012; Milewski and Kulu 2013). Another stream investigates fertility dynamics among immigrants and their descendants (Andersson 2004; Toulemon 2004; Milewski 2007; Kulu and Milewski 2007; Goldscheider et al. 2011).

The aim of the current paper is to compare the union formation and dissolution of immigrants and their descendants in the UK to those of the 'native' British population. We extend the previous literature in the following ways. First, we study various partnership transitions, including formation and dissolution of cohabitations and marriages, among immigrants and their descendants. Furthermore, we study both first and second unions. We, thus, move beyond the 'one life-event-at-a-time' approach, which is dominant in the literature on migrant families. We believe that the study of partnership dynamics over the life course provides us with much richer information about the opportunities and constraints that migrants face than does an analysis of only one (or first) marriage of the migrants.

Second, we examine family trajectories among descendants of migrants whose share significantly increased in the last several decades, particularly young adults (Sobotka 2008). Research has shown that the fate of the 'second generation' is not as rosy as we may wish. Their educational qualifications often remain below those of the majority population, and

their labour market performance is poor (Fassmann 1997; Alba 2005; Meurs et al. 2006; Aparicio 2007; Brinbaum and Cebolla-Boado 2007; Van Niekerk 2007; Kristen et al. 2008; Aeberhardt et al. 2010; Fibbi et al. 2007). The current study provides valuable information on the demographic behaviour of important population subgroups in the UK society and improves our understanding of how various factors shape the fate of the 'second generation' in the European context.

Third, to our knowledge, this is the first study on union formation among immigrants and ethnic minorities in the UK that explicitly compares their partnership trajectories to those of the 'native' population from the longitudinal and life course perspectives. Although the dynamics of mixed marriages and fertility of ethnic minorities in Britain have been examined (Coleman and Dubuc 2010; Feng et al. 2012; Hampshire et al. 2012), the topics of union formation and dissolution, and particularly the rise of cohabitations, have not been covered in the recent literature. This lack of examination is typically attributed to the lack of relevant data.

Finally, this paper focuses on union formation and dissolution among immigrants and their descendants in the UK. However, this UK case study is a first step towards a comparative study to investigate partnership dynamics among immigrants and ethnic minorities in a number of European countries. The latter can be used to examine how socio-economic, institutional and policy settings shape the family lives of immigrants and their descendants in different European societies.

1.1. Literature review: from migrant fertility to their partnership dynamics

A large share of research on migrant families focuses on fertility behaviour, which is traditionally linked to partnership formation and dissolution processes. The previous research on migrant fertility proposed four hypotheses on whether and how an individual's fertility behaviour changes following a move from one country to another (Singley and Landale 1998; Andersson 2004; Kulu 2005; Kulu and Milewski 2007; Kulu and Gonzaléz-Ferrer 2013). We briefly review these four hypotheses and demonstrate their relevance to the study of partnership dynamics among immigrants and their descendants. The *socialisation hypothesis* assumes that the fertility behaviour of migrants reflects the childbearing preferences and behaviour that are dominant in their childhood environment. Therefore, migrants show

fertility preferences and behaviour that are similar to those of 'stayers' in the country of origin. Thus, the socialisation hypothesis assumes that an individual's childbearing preferences and behaviour are relatively stable over her/his life and primarily shaped by the childhood living environment. By contrast, the *adaptation hypothesis* assumes that an individual's current living environment, rather than the childhood environment, exerts the greatest influence. The fertility behaviour of migrants eventually resembles the mainstream behaviour in the country of destination. Migrants, thus, adapt to the economic and cultural conditions of the destination country.

The *selection hypothesis* argues that people who move from one county to another are a select group in terms of their childbearing preferences and behaviour. As a result, their fertility preferences differ from those of the population in the country of origin and are more similar to that of individuals in the destination country. This selectivity may occur on the basis of individual characteristics such as education and occupation that shape and reflect an individual's life plans and opportunities. Recent research has shown that marriage-driven migration leads to elevated fertility levels after migration (Andersson 2004; Kulu 2005; Milewski 2007). Finally, the *disruption hypothesis* suggests that fertility levels are particularly low immediately after migration due to the economic costs and psychological stress related to the event of moving and changing the living environment. After a certain time of adjustment, fertility levels are expected to rise again.

While the factors of the origin and destination and those associated with the migration process interact to shape immigrants' childbearing preferences and behaviour, the fertility behaviour of the descendants of migrants is (primarily) influenced by the social environment in the country in which they were raised. However, the living environment may significantly differ for the descendants of immigrants. Some may grow up under the influences of the *mainstream society* and are, thus, socialised into the norms and behaviours of the native population. By contrast, others may grow up under the influences of the *minority subculture* (assuming that such subculture exists) and, thus, exhibit childbearing preferences and behaviour that differ from those of the native population (Katus et al. 2002; Bernhardt et al. 2007; Milewski 2010; Goldscheider et al. 2011).

These competing approaches, which were developed to study the childbearing of immigrants and their descendants, are equally relevant to the study of partnership dynamics among

immigrants and their descendants, particularly given that these two careers in an individual's life course are closely related. The key question is whether immigrant partnership trajectories follow those of the population in the country of origin or those that are dominant in the destination country. The former pattern can be interpreted as evidence that supports the *socialisation* argument, whereas the latter can provide support for the *adaptation* or potentially the *selection* hypothesis. The selection can be identified and controlled by standardising partnership patterns for the socio-economic characteristics of individuals.

Similarly, it is important to determine whether the partnership behaviour of the descendants of immigrants is similar to that of their parents (or patterns in their parents' country of origin) or to the patterns that are dominant in the mainstream society. This assumes significant differences in demographic behaviour between the baseline groups (population in the origin country and that in the destination country), which may be true in some cases (e.g., when comparing immigrants from economically less developing countries to the native population in an industrialised country) but not in others (e.g., migrants between two similar industrialised countries). The simultaneous analysis of various partnership transitions, including both first and second unions, provides an advantage in detecting potential differences in partnership behaviour between otherwise similar population groups.

Although much of the discussion on the family and fertility of immigrants and their descendants focuses on *cultural* and *economic* factors and determinants, it is equally important to emphasise the role of *welfare state setup* and *policies* in shaping partnership and childbearing patterns among immigrants and their descendants. The adaptation of immigrants and their descendants to dominant patterns are assumed to be faster in countries with a wide range of policies to reduce differences between population subgroups and promote equality in all spheres of society in comparison to the countries where market forces are expected to (mostly) dominate over an individual's life. Although these issues can only be thoroughly addressed in a comparative study with a similar design and data and with comparable population subgroups, a detailed case study can be sufficiently informative to improve our understanding of the role of state policies in shaping the partnership behaviour of immigrants and their descendants.

1.2. Historical background of immigrants and their descendants in Britain

Before World War II, the main immigrant groups in Britain were Irish and Jews from Eastern Europe. The Irish moved to England in large numbers after the 1846−47 famine; their migration continued during the entire Victorian period (1837−1901). The Jews arrived in Britain in the late 19th and early 20th century as refugees, mostly from Russia (Castles and Miller 2009). WWII brought further refugee groups to Britain, including the Polish, Germans and people from the Baltic States. The 1951 census data showed that the largest refugee groups were those born in Ireland, followed by Poland, India, Germany and Russia. The Indian group mostly consisted of the children of British service personnel from India (ONS 2013).

Similar to other Western and Northern European countries, Britain became a destination country of post-war international labour migration (Castles and Miller 2009). The British economy suffered from a labour shortage due to the economic growth and small pre-war cohorts entering the labour market after the war. The first group to arrive were workers from Caribbean countries, especially from Jamaica. Many of these workers were recruited by the London Transport and the National Health Service (NHS), which the local population viewed as unattractive places to work because of poor wages (Peach 1998). Immigration from the Caribbean region reached its peak between the mid-1950s and mid-1960s. The Caribbeans were soon followed by Indians and Pakistanis, whose migration to Britain peaked in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Many of these workers became employed in the textile industry, which was another area of hard working conditions (e.g., night-shift work) and poor wages (Peach 1998). The 1971 census data showed that Indians had became the second-largest immigrant group in the UK (after Irish), followed by Jamaicans and Pakistanis (which also included Bangladeshis at that time) (ONS 2013). Although the need for labour declined in the 1970s due to deindustrialisation and the entry of the baby-boomers to the labour market, immigration streams continued, including family reunion and refugees. The largest new groups were refugees of Indian-descent from African countries (Kenya and Uganda). The number of Bangladeshi-born people also increased significantly after the Bangladeshi war of independence in 1971 and subsequent military coup in 1975 (ONS 2013). In 2001, the largest immigrant groups were the Irish, Indians, Pakistanis, Germans, Bangladeshis and Jamaicans. The first decade of the 21st century brought along further changes, with significant migration streams from Poland. After the enlargement of the European Union in 2004, Polish-born

people became the second-largest migrant group (after Indians) by the end of the decade (ONS 2013). The share of the population born outside of the UK increased from 4% in 1951 to 13% in 2011.

The ethnic minority population has also increased in the UK over time. The 1991 census was the first to collect information on the ethnic origin of respondents. According to the census, 7% of the UK population identified themselves as other than 'White' in 1991. The largest groups were people of Indian, Caribbean and Pakistani ethnic origin, followed by those of Chinese and Bangladeshi origin. The share of ethnic minorities of the UK population increased to 13% in 2001 and to 20% in 2011 (other than 'White British': English, Welsh, Scottish, Northern Irish or British). The largest groups in 2011 were people of Polish, Indian, Caribbean and Pakistani origin. The number of those who reported mixed ethnicity, especially White and Black Caribbean or White and Asian, also significantly increased (ONS 2013).

2. Data

2.1. Understanding Society

The empirical analysis of this paper is based on data from the Understanding Society study, a large longitudinal study in the UK that was launched in 2009 (further referred to as the UoS). The main immigrant and ethnic minority groups in Britain were over-represented in the study, thus ensuring a sufficient sample size to study ethnic differences in attitudes and behaviour. The interviews for the first wave of the UoS were conducted between January 2009 and January 2010. Information was collected on approximately 50,994 individuals. Full interviews were conducted with 47,901 individuals, whereas the remaining interviews were proxy interviews for non-present household members. For the former group of individuals, information is also available on partnership history. For the current study, 306 individuals were excluded from the analysis for the following reasons: 125 cases had inconsistent event dates in their life histories; 123 cases had some missing life events in their records; 30 cases had no information on migration status; and 28 cases had no information on the start date of their current union. The final sample consists of 47,595 individuals.

This study investigates the partnership formation and dissolution of different immigrant and ethnic minority groups. The research population is divided into 'native' British, immigrants

(the ‘first generation’) and their descendants (the ‘second generation’). ‘Natives’ are individuals who themselves and whose both parents were born in the UK; they form 70% of the (unweighted) sample. Individuals who were born outside of the UK, independent of the origin of their parents, are classified as immigrants. This study does not distinguish whether the events of union formation and dissolution were occurring before or after the migration process for the group of immigrants. If a person was born in the UK but at least one of his/her parents was born outside of the UK, the individual was classified as a descendant of immigrant(s). If a descendant of immigrant(s) had parents of different foreign origins, priority was given to the father’s country of birth. Due to small sample sizes, especially for the analysis of second unions, the following aggregated regions of origin are used in the analysis: 1) Europe and other Western/industrialised countries (further referred to as Europe); 2) South Asia, containing individuals from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh; 3) Caribbean countries; and 4) all other origins. The last group contains individuals from many different countries and continents, including Africa, Far and Middle East, China and Latin America. Although this group is large in comparison to the other sub-groups, no specific origin has a sufficient size to be analysed separately.

Table 1 displays the distribution of the male and female population by migrant status. The further analysis is presented for women only.

(Table 1 about here)

2.2. Data quality

The analysis of the UoS data shows a high degree of consistency with the data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS), suggesting that the data quality is good. Figures 1 through 3 display the results from the UoS study in comparison with those from the ONS data for the following life events: ever married women (Figure 1), ever divorced for both sexes (Figure 2), and the percentage of remarried women (Figure 3), each by cohort and age. Overall, there are only minor differences between the UoS data and the ONS records, which can be explained by the fact that the ONS data include only individuals in England and Wales, whereas the UoS data also contain individuals from Northern Ireland and Scotland as part of the UK. In addition, Figure 4 shows the distribution of women who have ever cohabited by cohort and age. For cohabitations, no official data are available. However, a

comparison with the estimates obtained by Murphy (2010), using data from four different surveys, shows a high degree of similarity in cohabitation levels and trajectories.

For the older cohorts, there are few differences in the proportion of ever married women between the two data sources (Figure 1). For the younger cohorts, some differences are evident, particularly for those born in the 1970s. The results for men show similar trajectories (not shown). As expected, the analysis reveals a trend of later marriages and lower marriage levels for the younger cohorts.

(Figure 1 about here)

The comparison of the proportion of ever divorced individuals by marriage cohort also shows a high consistency between the estimates of the two data sources. The estimates differ by only a few percentage points among the various marriage cohorts (Figure 2, note a change in the scale of the graph). As expected, the proportion of ever divorced individuals has significantly increased over the last decades. Although one-fifth of the marriages that were formed in the period of 1965–74 ended in divorce before their 15th anniversary, nearly one-third of marriages experienced separation in the most recent marriage cohorts of 1995-2004.

(Figure 2 about here)

Figure 3 shows the proportion of ever remarried women. Of note, the ONS data show the proportion of remarried relative to the total population without considering whether the person was previously married and divorced. For this comparison, the proportion of remarried women is calculated in the same way using the UoS data. For the analytical part of this study, only the actual risk population (married and divorced once) is used. A slow rise in the proportion of second marriages over time can be observed in both data sources.

(Figure 3 about here)

Finally, Figure 4 shows the proportion of ever cohabitated women using the UoS data. A steady rise in cohabitation rates can be observed across birth cohorts. While one-fifth of the individuals who were born in the 1940s have ever cohabited by age 45, more than three-fifth of the women who were born in the 1960s have cohabited. Although the younger cohorts have

not yet reached age 45, the percentage of cohabitants can be assumed to be even higher among them, e.g., 70-80 percent.

(Figure 4 about here)

3. Methods

We study partnership transitions, including formation and dissolution of cohabitations and marriages, among immigrants and their descendants. Furthermore, we study both first and second unions. Thus, we move beyond the 'one life-event-at-a-time' approach, which is dominant in the literature on migrant families, and investigate partnership dynamics over the life course of immigrants and ethnic minorities. Figure 5 provides details on the partnership transitions that are analysed in this study.

(Figure 5 about here)

We use event-history analysis to calculate the union formation and dissolution rates. The basic model can be formalised as follows:

$$\ln \mu_i(t) = \ln \mu_0(t) + \sum_j \beta_j x_{ij}(t), \qquad (1)$$

where $\mu_i(t)$ denotes the hazard of union formation or dissolution for individual i, and $\ln\mu_0(t)$ denotes the baseline log-hazard, which we specify as piecewise constant. The baseline for the first union (marriage or cohabitation) and marriage (ever married) is a woman's age in months (women are considered at risk since age 16). For union or marital dissolution, the baseline is union or marriage duration. For second union or marriage, the baseline is time since first dissolution or marital separation. For the process of divorce from either first or second marriage, the individual is censored in the case of the partner's death. Furthermore, $x_{ij}(t)$ represents the values of a variable, which can be either time-constant or time-varying. We extend the basic model to a competing-risks model to study partnership formation and the outcomes of cohabitation:

$$\ln \mu_i^A(t) = \ln \mu_0^A(t) + \sum_j \beta_j^A x_{ij}(t)$$
$$\ln \mu_i^B(t) = \ln \mu_0^B(t) + \sum_j \beta_j^B x_{ij}(t) \quad (2)$$

where for partnership formation, $\mu_i^A(t)$ denotes the hazard of cohabitation for individual *i* and $\mu_i^B(t)$ is the risk of marriage in the competing risk framework. For cohabitation outcomes, $\mu_i^A(t)$ denotes the hazard of marriage and $\mu_i^B(t)$ is the risk of cohabitation dissolution.

In our modelling strategy, we first investigate partnership transitions by migrant status while controlling for birth cohort. The inclusion of the birth cohort in the analysis is critical to gain an adequate overview of the patterns by migrant status, as partnership patterns vary across cohorts and different migrant groups consist of different cohorts (e.g., the descendants of immigrants are significantly younger than 'natives' or immigrants). Then, we control for women's socio-economic and demographic characteristics to explore the extent to which these characteristics explain differences by migrant status. We include the *educational level* (no qualification, other qualification, GCSE, A-level, other higher degree and tertiary degree) of the woman, *age at union formation* (for separation and divorce), the *presence of premarital cohabitation* (for divorce) and *type of first union* (for the event of divorce and second union) in the models. The distribution of exposure time and occurrences by migrant status for various partnership transitions is provided in Table 2. The number of events for most partnership transitions is sufficient to study patterns by migrant status.

(Table 2 about here)

Figure 6 provides the number of women for each union status change to gain a first overview of partnership trajectories. Of the total number of 26,621 women, 332 started a relationship before the age of 16; these women are excluded from the analysis. Only individuals in the household who were age 16 or older were given the adult-questionnaire in the UoS project; therefore, the observation period for all first unions begins at age 16. Approximately one-third of the initially single women remain single until censored (at interview). Among those who form a partnership, slightly more women enter a marriage directly than enter a cohabitation. Of the 9,442 women who enter a cohabitation, approximately half marry. One-third of the cohabitations end in dissolution, whereas the remaining cohabitations continue until the interview date. Of the more than 17,000 women who marry in their first union, 4,241

experience a divorce. Approximately two-thirds of all women who separate from their first partner enter a second union in the UoS sample. For second unions, a high preference for cohabitation over direct marriage is observed. The remaining second union trajectories follow patterns that are similar to those of first unions. These are numbers of individuals who have experienced various events. In the analysis, we also consider duration and censoring.

(Figure 6 about here)

4. Results for partnership transitions by immigrant status

We first analysed patterns of union formation (any union). Then, we distinguished between cohabitations and marriages. Next, we studied marital separation and cohabitation outcomes. Finally, we studied the formation and dissolution of second unions.

Table 3 presents the relative risks of first union formation by migrant status. Women from South Asia have a 10% higher risk of union formation than 'native' British respondents, whereas immigrant women from the Caribbean region have a 49% and women from other countries a 36% lower risk of union formation. There are no significant differences between 'native' British women and those from other European (and industrialised) countries (Model 1). These patterns persist when we control for women's educational level (Table 3, Model 2). The descendants of immigrants have a significantly lower risk of union formation than 'native' British women. Further analysis revealed that this is largely due to differences in the timing of union formation. Most ethnic minority women start unions later, and their first partnership is often a marriage, which is typically formed at a later age than cohabitation. Furthermore, their histories are censored in their 30s; thus, our proportional hazards model shows lower union formation rates for them. However, of note, the share of women who have entered a union at least once is large among 'native' British women. The figure is as high as 95% for older cohorts.

(Table 3 about here)

To gain a better understanding of the pathways to union formation, we analysed the type of first union by distinguishing between cohabitations and direct marriages. The analysis shows that immigrants from South Asia have a 94% lower risk of cohabitation than 'native' British

women, whereas women from the Caribbean region and European countries have only a 21% and 14% lower risk, respectively (Table 4, Model 1). The levels for the descendants of immigrants are surprisingly similar to those for immigrants of the same background. The descendants of South Asian immigrants have a 85% lower risk of cohabiting than 'native' British, and the descendants of Caribbean immigrants have a 27% lower risk. Furthermore, the differences persist after educational differences are controlled (Table 4, Model 2).

(Table 4 about here)

The patterns of direct marriage formation differ. Whereas women from South Asian countries have a 2.6 times higher risk of marrying directly than 'native' British women, immigrants from Caribbean countries have a 63% lower risk of direct marriage formation (Table 5, Model 1). Again, the patterns are similar for the descendants of immigrants. Those with parents from South Asian countries have a significantly higher likelihood of marrying directly than 'natives', whereas those of Caribbean origin show relatively low direct marriage levels. Interestingly, immigrants from European countries and their descendants have a lower likelihood of marrying directly than 'native' British women. Again, the differences between migrant groups persist after we control for the educational composition of the population (Table 5, Model 2).

(Table 5 about here)

We also examined first marriage formation among the research population. We modelled time to marriage without consideration of whether women had married directly or after a period of cohabitation. The differences between the groups slightly decline, but the main patterns persist, with the highest marriage rates for South Asian immigrants and their descendants and the lowest for women of Caribbean origin (Table 6). Clearly, significant differences exist between various immigrant and ethnic minority groups in Britain. The share of women who cohabit before marriage has increased over time among British women. However, whereas the female population of Caribbean origin shows relatively high cohabitation and low marriage rates, cohabitation remains rare among immigrants from South Asian countries and their descendants. Most of these women marry directly.

(Table 6 about here)

Cohabitation is viewed as a 'trial marriage' in which a couple determines whether they wish to marry soon or end the partnership due to personal mismatch. The large number of cohabitation endings (marriage or separation) in the UoS sample supports this hypothesis. Only 1,561 of the 9,442 women who entered first cohabitation remain in their first cohabitation at the time of interview. It is likely that a large share of them will marry or separate as their relationship progresses. Cohabitation as a long-term partnership remains rare.

The analysis reveals that immigrants from Europe and South Asia are more likely to end cohabitation than are the 'native' British, although the differences between South Asian immigrants and 'natives' are not significant once control variables are included in the model (Table 7, Model 2). This is largely due to the small number of cohabitants among South Asians; only 35 women in the sample cohabit. No differences are observed between 'natives' and the descendants of immigrants, independent of their origin.

(Table 7 about here)

Cohabitation has two possible outcomes. Most immigrants and their descendants, particularly those of Caribbean origin, have a higher risk of separation than the 'native' British women. However, immigrants from South Asia have a lower (estimated) risk, although the differences are not significant (Table 8). The patterns for marriage are opposite. Immigrants from South Asia have a 1.8 times higher risk of marrying after cohabitation than 'natives'. The descendants of immigrants show lower risks, even those with South Asian origins, although the difference to the reference group is not significant (Table 9). The analysis of cohabitation outcomes shows that women from South Asia and their descendants are more likely to proceed from cohabitation to marriage, whereas those of Caribbean origin show relatively high separation and low marriage rates. Rather similar patterns, compared to the British 'natives', are also observed for immigrants from Europe and their descendants.

(Table 8 about here)

(Table 9 about here)

Another form of union separation is divorce. The risk population consists of women who either married directly or married after a period of cohabitation. Marital separation is measured as divorce or separation, whichever comes first (marital records are censored at the death of the partner). There are significant differences in the propensity of marital separation. Women from the Caribbean region have a 1.7 times higher risk of divorce compared to 'native' British women, whereas women from South Asia have a 75% lower divorce risk (Table 10, Model 1). There are no significant differences between 'native' British and immigrants from Europe after controlling for women's socio-demographic characteristics (Table 10, Model 2). The differences are smaller between the 'native' British population and the descendants of immigrants, but remain significant. Women of Caribbean origin (and those from other countries) have the highest divorce levels, whereas those of South Asian descent have the lowest levels.

(Table 10 about here)

A total of 7,378 women separated from their first partner. This group forms the risk population for second union formation. All immigrants and their descendants (except Europeans) show a much lower risk of entering a second union compared to the British 'native' population (Table 11, Model 2).

(Table 11 about here)

The patterns are similar when we analyse only entry into cohabitation (Table 12). Interestingly, both immigrants from South Asia and Caribbean countries and their descendants have a relatively low risk of cohabitation; however, the reasons for this low risk likely differ. For women of South Asian origin, the main reason for low cohabitation rates is the preference for marriage over cohabitation (even among those few who have separated from their first partner). This idea is supported by the analysis of direct marriages, as immigrants from South Asia and their descendants have a more than three times higher risk of marrying directly to a second partner than the 'native' British (after controlling for women's socio-demographic characteristics) (Table 13). The large differences can be explained by the fact that nearly all 'native' British women start a second relationship as cohabitation. In addition, a small South Asian group who separates from their first partner may be willing to

marry soon after the 'failure' of their first union in the context where the cultural pressure to form a stable relationship is high.

(Table 12 about here)

(Table 13 about here)

The prevalence of cohabitation over marriage for immigrants from the Caribbean region and their descendants is not immediately clear when investigating their second partnerships. However, given their low rates of second union formation and similarity to the 'native' British (whose second union is typically cohabitation) in the likelihood of marrying directly, the dominance of cohabitation over direct marriage is remarkable, although the sample size is insufficient for detailed interpretation.

As we progress to cohabitation outcomes, the sample size and the number of events become small, particularly for immigrants from South Asia and their descendants. Furthermore, this may be a select group, as most South Asians follow a traditional partnership formation pathway and do not leave their first union. In addition, the low average age of the descendants of immigrants suggests that many have not reached the stage in life where separation from the second partner typically takes place. Therefore, we only report the results for which the group size and the number of events are sufficient. The analysis shows little difference in the likelihood of ending cohabitation between the groups (Table 14). However, after distinguishing between separation and marriage as outcomes of cohabitation, we observe that the descendants of Caribbean immigrants are significantly more likely to separate from cohabitation than the 'native' British. Interestingly, the estimates show a higher risk for immigrants from South Asian and their descendants, but the number of events for South Asians is insufficient to detect whether this is due to sampling error or selectivity (Table 15). Immigrants from Caribbean countries have a relatively low risk of directly marrying their second partner, but the number of events is insufficient to draw final conclusions (Table 16).

(Table 14 about here)

(Table 15 about here)

(Table 16 about here)

The analysis of the second marital dissolution seems to support the previously observed patterns. The estimated risk levels are higher for the Caribbean population and lower for South Asian women; however, the number of events is insufficient to confirm the patterns (Table 17). Interestingly, immigrants from other countries and their descendants exhibit high levels of marital dissolution (and this population is sufficiently large). Whether this is related to high divorce rates of mixed marriages or other factors is a further topic to explore.

(Table 17 about here)

Finally, we also analysed the formation of a third union. Immigrants from Europe have a higher risk of forming a third union than the 'natives' British, whereas the descendants of people from the Caribbean region have a lower risk (Table 18).

(Table 18 about here)

5. Summary and discussion

We investigated union formation and dissolution among immigrants and their descendants in the UK using data from the Understanding Society study. Most women in Britain form at least one union and many also marry; however, the pathways to marriage differ across cohorts. The older cohorts of 'native' British women married directly. However, cohabitation prior to marriage has become dominant among the younger cohorts. The separation and divorce rates have also increased over time; approximately one-third of recent marriage cohorts end in divorce by the 15th year of marriage.

The analysis showed significant differences in partnership trajectories between 'native' British women and immigrants and, more importantly, across immigrant groups. The female populations of Caribbean and European origin show the highest cohabitation, the Caribbean women show the lowest direct marriage rates and cohabitation is rare among immigrants from South Asian countries and their descendants, as most of them marry directly. Similar patterns are observed for cohabitation outcomes. Marriage is the likely outcome for the South Asian

group, whereas separation is typically experienced by women from the Caribbean and European countries. These patterns extend to union dissolutions, with women from the Caribbean region and their descendants showing higher divorce rates than 'native' British women and women of South Asian origin having a low divorce risk. Although the size of some migrant groups is insufficient to study second unions and selectivity plays a role, particularly for those groups for which few leave their first unions, we can conclude that the trajectories of the formation of a second union are similar to those observed for the first union. The large differences and often opposite union trajectories for different immigrant and ethnic minority groups lead to the conclusion that ethnic minorities should not be analysed as a homogenous group in countries with a complex and diverse immigration history, such as the UK. The heterogeneity among immigrants and their descendants should also be explicitly taken into account when analysing partnership dynamics in the UK and predicting future trends (Voas 2009).

Although further research is needed to identify the factors that shape partnership formation and dissolution among immigrants and their descendants, our preliminary conclusion is that the socialisation environment plays an important role. Two immigrant groups, South Asians and Caribbeans, showed distinct patterns and pathways; however, it is difficult to measure the degree to which their patterns resemble those in their countries of origin. The results for the immigrant groups may also be influenced by the fact that we included partnership transitions that occurred both prior to and after migration in the analysis. The patterns of the descendants of immigrants resemble those of their parents. However, for some of the transitions, the descendants' patterns resemble those observed of the 'native' British population. This result supports the idea that both the 'mainstream society' and 'minority subculture' have an effect on their behaviour, although it is difficult to conclude which culture has a greater impact. We presented two models for each partnership transition, one model with and one model without socio-economic variables. The differences between the results were small. Therefore, the differences in union formation and dissolution by migrant status are not directly influenced by the individuals' socio-economic characteristics. Thus, we conclude that an individual's migration background and/or ethnic origin is force that drives the observed partnership trajectories, although the role of various factors (culture *versus* economy; choice *versus* structure) must be investigated.

The current study observed specific patterns of union formation and dissolution among South Asian and Caribbean immigrants that largely support the findings of Berrington (1994; 1996), who analysed first unions by ethnicity using large-scale cross-sectional data. Interestingly, although Berrington's research showed some convergence in marriage patterns among the descendants of immigrants towards those of the 'native' population, the current study demonstrates that significant differences persist. An issue for further research is the degree to which the migrant groups are homogeneous / heterogeneous. Our preliminary analysis showed similar trajectories for Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic minorities, thus justifying their inclusion in the analysis as one South Asian group. However, a large sample may reveal some differences between these groups.

This study was unable to test the validity of the selection and disruption hypotheses and their potential impact on the union formation of immigrants and their descendants in the UK because union formation was only compared to the British population and not to the respective populations of origin. Future research should also analyse partnership patterns by time since immigration.

Some individuals have parents from different countries; therefore, the results may be sensitive to the definition of migration background for the descendants of immigrants. In this study, we prioritised the fathers' origin. For example, an individual with a father from India and a mother from the UK was categorised as a descendant of an Indian immigrant, whereas the opposite combination of the parents' origins resulted in the individual's affiliation with the European group. We conducted a sensitivity analysis with two further options. First, the priority was given to the foreign parent if one of the parents was born outside of the UK. Second, an extra category was created for individuals with one parent who was born in the UK, independent of the origin of the other parent. The analysis showed that the main results were not sensitive to the different definitions of the descendants of immigrants.

Finally, this study presented the results for the female population in Britain. The analysis was also conducted with males (not shown). The results on partnership formation and dissolution processes by migrant status were similar for males and females, despite the well-known gender-specific effects such as men's higher age at entry into first union.

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Appendix

Table 1. Distribution of individuals by immigrant status and sex.

	Men		Women		Total	
Immigrant status	N	%	N	%	N	%
Native	14,471	69	18,700	70	33,171	70
Descendants of immigrants						
Europe	817	4	1,070	4	1,887	4
South Asia	644	3	830	3	1,474	3
Caribbean	297	1	439	2	736	2
Other	563	3	756	3	1,319	3
Immigrants						
Europe	589	3	844	3	1,433	3
South Asia	1,447	7	1,304	5	2,751	6
Caribbean	165	1	222	1	387	1
Other	1,981	9	2,456	9	4,437	9
Total	**20,974**	**100**	**26,621**	**100**	**47,595**	**100**



Figure 1. Ever married women: comparison between UoS and ONS data by cohort.



Figure 2. Ever divorced individuals: comparison of the UoS and ONS data by marriage cohort.



Figure 3. Ever remarried women: comparison of the UoS and ONS data by cohort.



Figure 4. Ever cohabited women: UoS data by cohort.



Figure 5. Partnership transitions analysed in the study.

Note: The group of separated included also widowed women.



Figure 6. Female population of UoS data and their union formation and dissolution trajectory.

Table 2. Number of events and person-months of partnership formation and dissolution events for women by migration status.

Women	**First Union**				**First Union (Cohabitation or Marriage)**					
	person-				person-		**cohabitation**		**marriage**	
Migration group	months	%	events	%	months	%	events	%	events	%
Native	1614335	67	15946	72	1614335	67	7077	75	8869	71
Descendants of immigrants										
Europe	105186	4	883	4	105186	4	453	5	430	3
South Asia	68531	3	475	2	68531	3	78	1	397	3
Caribbean	52123	2	319	1	52123	2	236	2	83	1
Other	77625	3	499	2	77625	3	333	4	166	1
Immigrants										
Europe	86922	4	707	3	86922	4	405	4	302	2
South Asia	106040	4	1134	5	106040	4	35	0	1099	9
Caribbean	31993	1	170	1	31993	1	93	1	77	1
Other	283599	12	1874	9	283599	12	732	8	1142	9
Total	**2426353**	100	**22007**	100	**2426353**	100	**9442**	100	**12565**	100
Risk population			**26298**				**26298**		**26298**	

Women	**First Cohabitation End**				**First Cohabitation End (Separation or Marriage)**					
	person-				person-		**separation**		**marriage**	
Migration group	months	%	events	%	months	%	events	%	events	%
Native	331770	76	5873	75	331770	76	2268	72	3605	76
Descendants of immigrants										
Europe	22352	5	379	5	22352	5	168	5	211	4
South Asia	3690	1	66	1	3690	1	32	1	34	1
Caribbean	12663	3	214	3	12663	3	114	4	100	2
Other	16294	4	287	4	16294	4	156	5	131	3
Immigrants										
Europe	15264	4	344	4	15264	4	143	5	201	4
South Asia	977	0	24	0	977	0	4	0	20	0
Caribbean	4412	1	86	1	4412	1	32	1	54	1
Other	27644	6	608	8	27644	6	220	7	388	8
Total	**435064**	100	**7881**	100	**435064**	100	**3137**	100	**4744**	100
Risk population			**9442**				**9442**		**9442**	

Women	**Ever Married**				**Marriage Dissolution**			
	person-				person-			
Migration group	months	%	events	%	months	%	events	%
Native	2156401	68	13194	72	2476445	76	3280	77
Descendants of immigrants								
Europe	144439	5	690	4	119360	4	173	4
South Asia	74913	2	440	2	56987	2	80	2
Caribbean	80394	3	203	1	28205	1	65	2
Other	110835	4	331	2	39043	1	87	2
Immigrants								
Europe	114553	4	553	3	81382	3	96	2
South Asia	107324	3	1120	6	199914	6	101	2
Caribbean	39412	1	134	1	23315	1	45	1
Other	329849	10	1594	9	228475	7	314	7
Total	**3158120**	100	**18259**	100	**3253126**	100	**4241**	100
Risk population			**26298**				**17309**	

Table 2. Number of events and person-months of partnership formation and dissolution events for women by migration status (continuation from page 124)

Women	**Second Union**				**Second Union (Cohabitation or Marriage)**					
	person-				person-		**cohabitation**		**marriage**	
Migration group	months	%	events	%	months	%	events	%	events	%
Native	348892	64	3959	77	348892	72	3427	81	532	73
Descendants of immigrants										
Europe	23790	4	232	5	23790	5	204	5	28	4
South Asia	5862	1	53	1	5862	1	28	1	25	3
Caribbean	15021	3	92	2	15021	3	82	2	10	1
Other	18130	3	138	3	18130	4	124	3	14	2
Immigrants										
Europe	13547	3	168	3	13547	3	152	4	16	2
South Asia	7030	1	36	1	7030	1	12	0	24	3
Caribbean	9223	2	29	1	9223	2	19	0	10	1
Other	40764	8	269	5	40764	8	204	5	65	9
Total	**541057**	100	**5142**	100	**482259**	100	**4252**	100	**724**	100
Risk population			**7378**				**7378**		**7378**	

Women	**Second Cohabitation End**				**Second Cohabitation End (separation or marriage)**					
	person-				person-		**separation**		**marriage**	
Migration group	months	%	events	%	months	%	events	%	events	%
Native	175005	81	2707	81	175005	81	945	76	1762	83
Descendants of immigrants										
Europe	10795	5	164	5	10795	5	57	5	107	5
South Asia	1169	1	25	1	1169	1	13	1	12	1
Caribbean	4265	2	74	2	4265	2	40	3	34	2
Other	5504	3	101	3	5504	3	47	4	54	3
Immigrants										
Europe	7011	3	111	3	7011	3	54	4	57	3
South Asia	797	0	10	0	797	0	5	0	5	0
Caribbean	1713	1	15	0	1713	1	8	1	7	0
Other	8944	4	155	5	8944	4	69	6	86	4
Total	**215200**	100	**3362**	100	**215200**	100	**1238**	100	**2124**	100
Risk population			**4252**				**4252**		**4252**	

Women	**Second Marriage Dissolution**				**Third Union**			
	person-				person-			
Migration group	months	%	events	%	months	%	events	%
Native	344594	84	567	78	218171	77	749	79
Descendants of immigrants								
Europe	18871	5	38	5	14040	5	44	5
South Asia	3794	1	9	1	3193	1	7	1
Caribbean	4397	1	13	2	8185	3	18	2
Other	7861	2	26	4	10484	4	33	3
Immigrants								
Europe	10377	3	16	2	8769	3	41	4
South Asia	2482	1	3	0	1223	0	4	0
Caribbean	2050	0	6	1	2771	1	1	0
Other	17225	4	47	6	15249	5	52	5
Total	**411651**	100	**725**	100	**282086**	100	**949**	100
Risk population			**2837**				**1963**	

Table 3. Relative risks of first union formation for women, UoS data.

	Women	Model 1		Model2		
		RR	p-value	RR	p-value	
First Union (marriage or cohabitation)	Native	1		1		Individuals become under risk at age 16
	Decendants of Immigrants					
	Europe	0.83	***	0.84	***	
	South Asia	0.74	***	0.75	***	
	Caribbean	0.63	***	0.62	***	
	Other	0.67	***	0.69	***	
	Immigrants					
	Europe	0.80		0.85		Censoring last interview or age 45
	South Asia	1.10	***	1.10	***	
	Caribbean	0.51	***	0.49	***	
	Other	0.64	***	0.66	***	

Model 1: controlled for the woman's age and birth cohort
Model 2: additionally controlled for educational level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4. Relative risks of cohabitation for women, UoS data.

	Women	Model 1		Model2		
		RR	p-value	RR	p-value	
First Union (cohabitation with marriage censored)	Native	1		1		Individuals become under risk at age 16
	Decendants of Immigrants					
	Europe	0.91	*	0.93	*	
	South Asia	0.15	***	0.15	***	
	Caribbean	0.73	***	0.72	***	
	Other	0.74	***	0.75	***	
	Immigrants					
	Europe	0.86	***	0.90	**	Censoring at marriage, last interview or age 45
	South Asia	0.06	***	0.06	***	
	Caribbean	0.79	**	0.79	**	
	Other	0.42	***	0.43	***	

Model 1: controlled for the woman's age and birth cohort
Model 2: additionally controlled for educational level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5. Relative risks of direct marriage for women, UoS data.

	Women	Model 1		Model2		
		RR	p-value	RR	p-value	
First Union (marriage with cohabitation censored)	Native	1		1		Individuals become under risk at age 16
	Decendants of Immigrants					
	Europe	0.77	***	0.78	***	
	South Asia	2.34	***	2.40	***	
	Caribbean	0.42	***	0.41	***	
	Other	0.50	***	0.53	***	
	Immigrants					
	Europe	0.70	***	0.76	***	Censoring at cohabitation, last interview or age 45
	South Asia	2.62	***	2.59	***	
	Caribbean	0.37	***	0.36	***	
	Other	0.94	*	0.98		

Model 1: controlled for the woman's age and birth cohort
Model 2: additionally controlled for educational level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6. Relative risks of marriage (ever married) for women, UoS data.

	Women	Model 1		Model2		
		RR	p-value	RR	p-value	
Ever married	Native	1		1		Individuals become under risk at age 16
	Decendants of Immigrants					
	Europe	0.78	***	0.78	***	
	South Asia	1.55	***	1.59	***	
	Caribbean	0.48	***	0.48	***	
	Other	0.57	***	0.59	***	
	Immigrants					
	Europe	0.82	***	0.86	***	Censoring last interview or age 45
	South Asia	2.04	***	2.05	***	
	Caribbean	0.46	***	0.45	***	
	Other	0.87	***	0.89	***	

Model 1: controlled for the woman's age and birth cohort
Model 2: additionally controlled for educational level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7. Relative risks of cohabitation end (separation or marriage) for women, UoS data.

	Women	Model 1		Model2		
		RR	p-value	RR	p-value	
Cohabitation End (separation or marriage)	Native	1		1		Individuals become at risk at cohabitation start (first union)
	Decendants of Immigrants					
	Europe	0.94		0.95		
	South Asia	1.05		1.02		
	Caribbean	0.93		0.91		
	Other	0.98		0.95		
	Immigrants					
	Europe	1.21	***	1.20	***	Censoring last interview or after 30 years of cohabitation
	South Asia	1.41	*	1.40		
	Caribbean	1.06		1.09		
	Other	1.20	***	1.18	***	

Model 1: controlled for the union duration and birth cohort
Model 2: additionally controlled for educational level and age at first cohabitation
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 8. Relative risks of cohabitation end as separation for women, UoS data.

	Women	Model 1		Model2		
		RR	p-value	RR	p-value	
Cohabitation End (separation with marriage censored)	Native	1		1		Individuals become at risk at cohabitation start (first union)
	Decendants of Immigrants					
	Europe	1.14	*	1.17	*	
	South Asia	1.28		1.28		
	Caribbean	1.44	***	1.41	***	
	Other	1.39	***	1.36	***	
	Immigrants					
	Europe	1.27	***	1.35	***	Censoring last interview or after 30 years of cohabitation or marriage
	South Asia	0.65		0.71		
	Caribbean	1.45	**	1.51	**	
	Other	1.12		1.15	**	

Model 1: controlled for the union duration and birth cohort
Model 2: additionally controlled for educational level and age at first cohabitation
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 9. Relative risks of cohabitation end as marriage for women, UoS data.

	Women	Model 1		Model2		
		RR	p-value	RR	p-value	
Cohabitation End (marriage with separation censored)	Native	1		1		Individuals become at risk at cohabitation start (first union)
	Decendants of Immigrants					
	Europe	0.82	***	0.82	***	
	South Asia	0.90		0.85		
	Caribbean	0.66	***	0.66	***	
	Other	0.72	***	0.69	***	
	Immigrants					
	Europe	1.17	**	1.10		Censoring last interview or after 30 years of cohabitation or separation
	South Asia	1.87	***	1.76	**	
	Caribbean	0.90		0.93		
	Other	1.25	***	1.19	***	

Model 1: controlled for the union duration and birth cohort
Model 2: additionally controlled for educational level and age at first cohabitation
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 10. Relative risks of first marriage dissolution for women, UoS data.

	Women	Model 1		Model2		
		RR	p-value	RR	p-value	
First Marriage Dissolution	Native	1		1		Individuals become under risk at time of first marriage (first union)
	Decendants of Immigrants					
	Europe	1.07		1.07		
	South Asia	0.60	***	0.60	***	
	Caribbean	1.33	**	1.33	**	
	Other	1.30	**	1.39	***	
	Immigrants					
	Europe	0.81	**	0.88		Censoring at last interview, after 30 years of marriage, age 60 or death of partner
	South Asia	0.25	***	0.25	***	
	Caribbean	1.71	***	1.77	***	
	Other	0.74	***	0.82	***	

Model 1: controlled for marriage duration and birth cohort
Model 2: additionally controlled for educational level, premarital cohabitation and age at first union
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 11. Relative risks of second union (cohabitation or marriage) for women, UoS data.

	Women	Model 1		Model2		
		RR	p-value	RR	p-value	
Second Union (cohabitation or marriage)	Native	1		1		Individuals become under risk at end of first union
	Decendants of Immigrants					
	Europe	0.90		0.90		
	South Asia	0.64	***	0.67	***	
	Caribbean	0.54	***	0.55	***	
	Other	0.64	***	0.63	***	
	Immigrants					
	Europe	1.02		1.05		Censoring at last interview, after 30 years of separation or age 60
	South Asia	0.42	***	0.45	***	
	Caribbean	0.35	***	0.40	***	
	Other	0.59	***	0.63	***	

Model 1: controlled for time since separation and birth cohort
Model 2: additionally controlled for educational level, type of first union and age at first union
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 12. Relative risks of second union as cohabitation for women, UoS data.

	Women	Model 1		Model2		
		RR	p-value	RR	p-value	
Second Union (cohabitation with marriage censored)	Native	1		1		Individuals become under risk at time of separation of first union
	Decendants of Immigrants					
	Europe	0.98		0.98		
	South Asia	0.46	***	0.46	***	
	Caribbean	0.76	**	0.76	**	
	Other	0.76	***	0.75	***	
	Immigrants					
	Europe	1.03		1.04		Censoring at last interview, after 30 years of separation or age 60
	South Asia	0.34	***	0.35	***	
	Caribbean	0.61	**	0.62	**	
	Other	0.77	***	0.78	***	

Model 1: controlled for time since separation and birth cohort
Model 2: additionally controlled for educational level, type of first union and age at first union
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 13. Relative risks of second union as marriage for women, UoS data.

	Women	Model 1		Model2		
		RR	p-value	RR	p-value	
Second Union (marriage with cohabitation censored)	Native	1		1		Individuals become under risk at time of separation of first union
	Decendants of Immigrants					
	Europe	0.92		0.96		
	South Asia	4.28	***	3.07	***	
	Caribbean	0.93		1.00		
	Other	0.73		0.94		
	Immigrants					
	Europe	0.92		1.05		Censoring at last interview, after 30 years of separation or age 60
	South Asia	5.23	***	3.59	***	
	Caribbean	1.26		1.31		
	Other	2.03	***	2.07	***	

Model 1: controlled for time since separation and birth cohort
Model 2: additionally controlled for educational level, type of first union and age at first union
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 14. Relative risks of second cohabitation end for women, UoS data.

	Women	Model 1		Model2		
		RR	p-value	RR	p-value	
Second Cohabitation End (separation or marriage)	Native	1		1		Individuals become under risk at time of second cohabitation
	Decendants of Immigrants					
	Europe	1.03		1.03		
	South Asia	1.28		1.23		
	Caribbean	1.07		1.10		
	Other	1.05		1.02		
	Immigrants					
	Europe	0.99		0.96		Censoring at last interview, 30 years of cohabitation or age 60
	South Asia	0.85		0.80		
	Caribbean	0.71		0.69		
	Other	1.10		1.07		

Model 1: controlled for union duration and birth cohort
Model 2: additionally controlled for educational level, type of first union and age at second union
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 15. Relative risks of second cohabitation end as separation for women, UoS data.

	Women	Model 1		Model2		
		RR	p-value	RR	p-value	
Second Cohabitation End (separation with marriage censored)	Native	1		1		Individuals become under risk at time of second cohabitation
	Decendants of Immigrants					
	Europe	0.99		0.96		
	South Asia	1.86	**	1.90	**	
	Caribbean	1.59	***	1.52	***	
	Other	1.17		1.07		
	Immigrants					
	Europe	1.24		1.23		Censoring at last interview, 30 years of cohabitation or age 60
	South Asia	1.38		2.12	*	
	Caribbean	1.30		1.04		
	Other	1.29	**	1.26	*	

Model 1: controlled for union duration and birth cohort
Model 2: additionally controlled for educational level, type of first union and age at second union
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 16. Relative risks of second cohabitation end as marriage for women, UoS data.

	Women	Model 1		Model2		
		RR	p-value	RR	p-value	
Second Cohabitation End (marriage with separation censored)	Native	1		1		Individuals become under risk at time of second cohabitation
	Decendants of Immigrants					
	Europe	1.05		1.08		
	South Asia	0.96		0.90		
	Caribbean	0.78		0.84		
	Other	0.97		0.98		
	Immigrants					
	Europe	0.83		0.81		Censoring at last interview, 30 years of cohabitation or age 60
	South Asia	0.60		0.49		
	Caribbean	0.46	**	0.51	*	
	Other	0.98		0.97		

Model 1: controlled for union duration and birth cohort
Model 2: additionally controlled for educational level, type of first union and age at second union
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 17. Relative risks of second marriage dissolution for women, UoS data.

	Women	Model 1		Model2		
		RR	p-value	RR	p-value	
Second Marriage dissolution	Native	1		1		Individuals become under risk at time of second marriage
	Decendants of Immigrants					
	Europe	1.13		1.12		
	South Asia	1.03		1.08		
	Caribbean	1.33		1.35		
	Other	1.90	***	1.87	***	
	Immigrants					
	Europe	0.87		0.89		Censoring at last interview, 30 years after second marriage, death of partner or age 60
	South Asia	0.58		0.65		
	Caribbean	2.16	*	1.97		
	Other	1.52	***	1.60	***	

Model 1: controlled for union duration and birth cohort
Model 2: additionally controlled for educational level, type of first union and age at second union
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 18. Relative risks of third union for women, UoS data.

	Women	Model 1		Model2		
		RR	p-value	RR	p-value	
Third Union (cohabitation or marriage)	Native	1		1		Individuals become under risk at time of end of second union
	Decendants of Immigrants					
	Europe	0.86		0.82		
	South Asia	0.50	*	0.54		
	Caribbean	0.55	**	0.54	***	
	Other	0.86		0.79		
	Immigrants					
	Europe	1.37	**	1.31	*	Censoring at last interview, 30 years after end of second union or age 60
	South Asia	0.99		1.13		
	Caribbean	0.14	***	0.19	*	
	Other	0.92		0.93		

Model 1: controlled for time since separation and birth cohort
Model 2: additionally controlled for educational level, type of first union and age at second union
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 19: Relative risks of Model 2 with and without weights, UoS data.

Women	**First Union** (coh. or marriage)				**First Union** (only cohabitation)			
	no weights		with weights		no weights		with weights	
	RR	p-value	RR	p-value	RR	p-value	RR	p-value
Native	1		1		1		1	
Decendants of Immigrants								
Europe	0.84	***	0.83	***	0.93	*	0.93	
South Asia	0.75	***	0.69	***	0.15	***	0.21	***
Caribbean	0.62	***	0.75	***	0.72	***	0.83	**
Other	0.69	***	0.77	***	0.75	***	0.91	
Immigrants								
Europe	0.85		0.87	***	0.90	**	0.93	
South Asia	1.10	***	0.98		0.06	***	0.07	***
Caribbean	0.49	***	0.53	***	0.79	**	0.87	
Other	0.66	***	0.74	***	0.43	***	0.53	***

Women	**First Union** (only marriage)				**Ever married**			
	no weights		with weights		no weights		with weights	
	RR	p-value	RR	p-value	RR	p-value	RR	p-value
Native	1		1		1		1	
Decendants of Immigrants								
Europe	0.78	***	0.75	***	0.78	***	0.76	***
South Asia	2.40	***	2.20	***	1.59	***	1.36	***
Caribbean	0.41	***	0.61	***	0.48	***	0.63	***
Other	0.53	***	0.56	***	0.59	***	0.67	***
Immigrants								
Europe	0.76	***	0.78	***	0.86	***	0.86	***
South Asia	2.59	***	2.20	***	2.05	***	1.71	***
Caribbean	0.36	***	0.37	***	0.45	***	0.45	***
Other	0.98		1.06		0.89	***	0.96	

Women	**Cohabitation End** (sep. and mar.)				**Cohabitation End** (only separation)			
	no weights		with weights		no weights		with weights	
	RR	p-value	RR	p-value	RR	p-value	RR	p-value
Native	1		1		1		1	
Decendants of Immigrants								
Europe	0.95		0.94		1.17	*	1.18	*
South Asia	1.02		0.87		1.28		1.03	
Caribbean	0.91		0.95		1.41	***	1.37	***
Other	0.95		1.05		1.36	***	1.42	***
Immigrants								
Europe	1.20	***	1.17	**	1.35	***	1.35	**
South Asia	1.40		1.24		0.71		0.54	
Caribbean	1.09		1.04		1.51	**	1.51	***
Other	1.18	***	1.19	***	1.15	**	1.19	*

Women	**Cohabitation End** (only marriage)				**First Marriage Dissolution**			
	no weights		with weights		no weights		with weights	
	RR	p-value	RR	p-value	RR	p-value	RR	p-value
Native	1		1		1		1	
Decendants of Immigrants								
Europe	0.82	***	0.81	***	1.07		1.07	
South Asia	0.85		0.77		0.60	***	0.55	***
Caribbean	0.66	***	0.74	***	1.33	**	1.35	**
Other	0.69	***	0.82	*	1.39	***	1.51	***
Immigrants								
Europe	1.10		1.06		0.88		1.00	
South Asia	1.76	**	1.70	*	0.25	***	0.26	***
Caribbean	0.93		0.88		1.77	***	1.78	***
Other	1.19	***	1.19	***	0.82	***	0.88	*

Model control variables correspond to Model 2 of previously shown models
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 19: Relative risks of Model 2 with and without weights, UoS data. (continuation from page 132)

Women	**Second Union** (coh. and marriage)				**Second Union** (cohabitation)			
	no weights		with weights		no weights		with weights	
	RR	p-value	RR	p-value	RR	p-value	RR	p-value
Native	1		1		1		1	
Decendants of Immigrants								
Europe	0.90		0.91		0.98		0.98	
South Asia	0.67	***	0.90		0.46	***	0.63	***
Caribbean	0.55	***	0.64	***	0.76	**	0.68	**
Other	0.63	***	0.73	***	0.75	***	0.92	
Immigrants								
Europe	1.05		1.02		1.04		1.02	
South Asia	0.45	***	0.68	**	0.35	***	0.52	**
Caribbean	0.40	***	0.42	***	0.62	**	0.59	**
Other	0.63	***	0.79	***	0.78	***	0.93	

Women	**Second Union** (only marriage)				**Second Coh. End** (sep. or marriage)			
	no weights		with weights		no weights		with weights	
	RR	p-value	RR	p-value	RR	p-value	RR	p-value
Native	1		1		1		1	
Decendants of Immigrants								
Europe	0.96		0.94		1.03		1.01	
South Asia	3.07	***	2.29	**	1.23		1.34	*
Caribbean	1.00		0.96		1.10		1.06	
Other	0.94		0.94		1.02		1.04	
Immigrants								
Europe	1.05		0.89		0.96		0.89	
South Asia	3.59	***	3.07	***	0.80		0.78	
Caribbean	1.31		1.51		0.69		0.68	
Other	2.07	***	1.83	***	1.07		1.09	

Women	**Second Coh. End** (only separation)				**Second Coh. End** (only marriage)			
	no weights		with weights		no weights		with weights	
	RR	p-value	RR	p-value	RR	p-value	RR	p-value
Native	1		1		1		1	
Decendants of Immigrants								
Europe	0.96		0.96		1.08		1.08	
South Asia	1.90	**	2.05	***	0.90		0.90	*
Caribbean	1.52	***	1.28		0.84		0.84	
Other	1.07		0.91		0.98		0.98	
Immigrants								
Europe	1.23		1.23		0.81		0.81	
South Asia	2.12	*	1.81		0.49		0.49	
Caribbean	1.04		1.07		0.51	*	0.51	*
Other	1.26	*	1.47	***	0.97		0.97	

Women	**Second Marriage Dissolution**				**Third Union (coh. or marriage)**			
	no weights		with weights		no weights		with weights	
	RR	p-value	RR	p-value	RR	p-value	RR	p-value
Native	1		1		1		1	
Decendants of Immigrants								
Europe	1.12		1.12		0.82		0.85	
South Asia	1.08		0.78		0.54		0.82	
Caribbean	1.35		1.43		0.54	***	0.64	
Other	1.87	***	1.87	**	0.79		0.93	
Immigrants								
Europe	0.89		1.03		1.31	*	1.18	
South Asia	0.65		0.76		1.13		0.83	
Caribbean	1.97		2.15	*	0.19	*	0.16	*
Other	1.60	***	1.41	*	0.93		0.96	

Model control variables correspond to Model 2 of previously shown models
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Marriage and Divorce of Immigrants and Descendants to Immigrants in Sweden

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Abstract:
This paper provides data on levels of and patterns in marriage formation, divorce, and re-marriage of people in Sweden, by their migrant status. The study is based on analyses of longitudinal register data that cover all residents born in 1951 and later who ever lived in Sweden during 1983-2007. Kaplan-Meier survivor functions demonstrate levels in nuptiality; multivariate event-history analyses demonstrate relative risks of marriage formation and divorce, by country group of origin.

Keywords: marriage, divorce, re-marriage, immigrants, Sweden

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1. Introduction

Sweden is often seen as situated at an advanced stage of the so called Second Demographic Transition of family change (van de Kaa 1987). It has also relatively high levels of immigration. Further, it possesses high-quality demographic data, which makes it possible to study some of these developments. In the present study, we take advantage of these opportunities to study patterns in marriage formation and marriage dissolution of immigrants and descendants to immigrants in Sweden. Our study is based on analyses of longitudinal register data that cover the resident population in Sweden during 1983-2007. In contrast to census data, which lack longitudinal information on civil status histories, and survey data, which most often contain too few immigrants to allow for group-specific analyses, our data allow for very detailed and accurate analyses of the nuptiality patterns of key categories of immigrants. Our study covers marriage formation and divorce: the registers provide less useful information on non-marital cohabitation. We study immigrants who arrived in Sweden as non-married persons, and follow their subsequent civil-status careers while living in Sweden. We also cover the nuptiality patterns of the descendants to immigrants in Sweden. By means of longitudinal analyses of the marriage formation and divorce behavior of immigrant and non-migrant women, we demonstrate how patterns in nuptiality differ by migration status and country of origin and how they are modified by women's socio-demographic characteristics. Our study adds insight into patterns of family demographic integration of migrants to Sweden. It also contributes to a better understanding of the role of cultural factors and the institutional setting in shaping family-demographic behavior in contemporary Sweden.

1.1 Marriage formation and divorce in Sweden

During the 1960s and 1970s Sweden was renowned for its decline in marriage formation rates (Bernhardt and Hoem 1985; Sardon 1986; Andersson 1998; Statistics Sweden 2014). The country was then a forerunner in the establishment of non-marital cohabitation as an alternative to marriage and in the evolution of the so called Second Demographic Transition of Europe (van de Kaa 1987). In contrast to this trend, a spectacular but temporary rise in marriage propensities occurred in 1989 in response to new rules concerning the (non-)eligibility for a widow's pension (Hoem 1991). In more recent years, we find a more long-lasting trend reversal in marriage-formation propensities. Ever since the end of the 1990s, marriage rates in Sweden have increased (Ohlsson-Wijk 2011). Re-marriage propensities

have increased as well (Andersson and Kolk 2011), underlying the recent development of increasing popularity of marriage. Practically all marriages are preceded by periods of pre-marital cohabitation. In a European comparison, Swedish women and men form a union at relatively early ages but are relatively late in getting married (Andersson and Philipov 2002).

In terms of marital dissolution, Sweden is a country where divorce is easy to achieve; legislation that included no-fault grounds for divorce was introduced already in 1915 (Sandström 2011). In 1974, the divorce legislation was liberalized further, which resulted in a pronounced increase in divorce risk levels (Andersson 1995, 1997). Swedish divorce risks continued to increase at a moderate pace during the 1980s and 1990s. The trends of increasing divorce risks became visible earlier in Sweden than in other countries in Europe. In the last decades of the twentieth century, divorce was more common than in most other European countries, but less frequent than in the U.S. (Andersson 2002; Andersson and Philipov 2002). However, since the turn of the century Swedish divorce risks have declined (Andersson and Kolk 2011).

In Sweden, a person's marital status brings relatively few benefits in terms of social rights. For example, since 1971 taxation is based on spouses' own individual earnings and most social benefits are based on a person's own economic status, regardless of his or her marital or family status. This could mean that there is more scope for cultural and ideational factors in creating differentials between population sub-groups in behaviors related to marriage (Ohlsson-Wijk 2011, 2014).

1.2 Immigrants in Sweden

During the last century, Sweden evolved from a country with a distinctly homogenous population into a country with a much more mixed population in terms of its national origins (Statistics Sweden 2004, 2010). In 2013, immigrants constituted some 16 percent of the population; another 12 percent were Swedish-born descendants to immigrants with at least one parent born abroad (www.scb.se). Immigrants to Sweden come from a wide variety of countries, with very different family-demographic and social contexts. In our study, we group them into the following country groups of origin.

Immigrants from *Finland* constitute the largest single foreign-born group in Sweden. Due to a shared national history up to the early nineteenth century, a visible minority of Swedish-speakers in Finland, marked economic differentials between Finland and Sweden until the 1980s, and the existence of a free Nordic labor market, labor migration from Finland to Sweden has been substantial. *Other Nordic* immigrants mainly comprise Danes and Norwegians but also a few Icelanders. As with the Finns, geographic proximity, shared culture and the existence of a free Nordic labor market have helped ease integration into Swedish society. In the case of these countries, the similarities to Sweden are even more pronounced than for Finns, as spoken Danish, Norwegian and Swedish are not much more different than dialects of the same language.

Immigrants from the *Baltic* countries mainly comprise pre- and post-Soviet migrants from Estonia. *Polish* immigrants in Sweden arrived for a variety of reasons. Some came as refugees from the communist regime, either for political reasons or as members of the persecuted Jewish minority, while others came as tied movers, in many cases as spouses to Swedish men. Migrants from *remaining East Europe* include migrants who left the region during communist time, mainly from Hungary, as well as post-communist migrants from, e.g., Bulgaria and Romania. We include the *post-Soviet states* to cover migrants from post-communist Russia and other non-Baltic post-Soviet countries; migrants from *Western Europe* and from *Southern Europe* are quite evenly spread over the countries of these two regions.

Immigrants from the *former Yugoslavia* come from all parts of the former Yugoslav state. Yugoslavian immigrants are split into two primary groups: labor migrants arriving during the 1960s (mostly Serbs and Croats) and refugee migrants arriving in conjunction with the Balkan wars of the 1990s, most of them from Bosnia.

Turkey has a varied history of migration to Sweden. During the 1960s, Turks arrived as labor migrants, but later there was a shift in character towards refugee immigration – largely dominated by ethnic Kurds. Many migrants from Turkey belong to its Syrian minority. Most *Iranian* immigrants to Sweden came as refugees during the 1980s. Iranians then proceeded to become one of Sweden's largest immigrant nationalities. Immigrants from *Mid-East Arab countries* comprise a large fraction of Iraqi immigrants. Most of them arrived in the aftermath of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. In more recent years, Syria has become the prime source of refugee migration from this region.

Immigrants from Africa are divided into those coming from *North Africa* and those coming from *Sub-Saharan Africa*. Migrants from the *Horn of Africa* is a group large enough to constitute a category of its own. Somalis constitute more than half of this group, whereas the rest are about equally split between Eritreans and Ethiopians.

Migrants from non-European *Anglo-Saxon* countries are joined into one single category. Migrants from *Central and South America* cover large fractions of Chilean refugees and tied movers to Sweden. Migrants from *South-East Asia* mainly comprise ethnic-Chinese refugees from Vietnam and, more recently, immigrants from Thailand, who often have moved to Sweden as spouses of Swedish men. *East Asia* and *South Asia* are defined as two separate regions of origin of migrants to Sweden.

2. Previous research on marriage and divorce among immigrants

Our research is motivated by the possibility to observe similarities and differences in partnership dynamics between natives and immigrants as well as across immigrant groups. Differences may remain even after controlling for observable socio-demographic characteristics, which may help us gaining insight into the role of cultural and contextual factors in shaping contemporary nuptiality patterns.

Sweden´s immigrant population is fairly heterogeneous with respect to norms and value systems in their countries of origin; immigrants come from countries and regions of the world with widely different family systems (Goode 1963, 1993). This variety constitutes one of the key mechanisms in creating differences in behavior in Sweden. Moreover, culture is portable from one country to another and can be transmitted to younger generations even outside its original geographical context (Furtado et al. 2013). This makes it relevant for us to also consider Swedish-born individuals of foreign parental origin as separate categories in our analyses. In the context of Sweden, where few legal obligations and benefits are attached to marriage, cultural factors may come out stronger in partnership dynamics than in a context where a person's civil status is a much stronger determinant of his or her social rights. Nevertheless, interpreting all differences in behavior as merely the reflection of cultural factors would be simplistic. For instance, it is likely that the very act of migration constitutes an own source of differentiation in partnership dynamics. For migrants, marriage may offer a more secure status in a new and sometimes insecure context; this context may as well create

the seeds for marital instability. Marriage and family reunification is a common motive for migration (Statistics Sweden 2008). Further, immigrants are never likely to represent a random sample of their populations at origin (Chiswick 1978; McDonald and Kennedy 2004). Selection into migration varies considerably by type of migration, migration intensity and countries of origin. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical research that specifically addresses the issue of how selection into migration affects marriage formation and divorce.

It may also be the case that the institutional context of Sweden stimulates the equalization of family-demographic behavior. Previous research on fertility and parity progressions of immigrants in Sweden has revealed striking similarities rather than differences in childbearing behavior between foreign- and Swedish-born people and between different groups of immigrants in this country (Andersson 2004a, Andersson and Scott 2005, 2007). This line of research suggests that the equal access of immigrants to formal social rights in the universalistic welfare state of Sweden may produce pronounced similarities in demographic behavior.

2.1 Marriage formation among immigrants

One of the ways in which values and norms can shape group-specific marriage risks is through their influence on the timing of union formation. Huschek et al. (2010) analyze the timing of first union formation among the descendants to Turkish immigrants in urban areas in Sweden and six other European countries. One of their main findings is that growing up in what the authors label a "traditional" family is associated with an earlier entry into first union. However, cultural factors are also at work when it comes to the acceptance of cohabitation as a temporary or durable alternative to marriage, which may also influence the risk of marriage formation. In Sweden, cohabitation is a more common living arrangement than in most other countries (Duvander 1999; Andersson 2004b). This trend is primarily dictated by a very high acceptance of cohabitation among Swedish-born natives. According to Dribe and Lundh (2012), around one half of natives in endogamous unions have their first child in non-marital cohabitation, while the corresponding share among endogamous immigrant unions is only eight percent. Bernhardt et al. (2007) study the transition to adulthood among children of Turkish and Polish immigrants in Sweden and find that these groups, the former in particular, differ from natives in terms of the propensity for non-marital cohabitation. Given these

findings and considering that most immigrants originate from countries where marriage has a more dominant role in partnership dynamics than in Sweden, it should be expected that the foreign-born on average are relatively more likely to enter formal marriage. The findings by Ohlsson-Wijk (2011) indicate that this indeed is the case. Her study shows that non-Nordic European and non-European women, particularly those younger than 30, have a higher risk of marriage formation than Swedish-born women. However, her classification of immigrant groups was far less detailed than ours as the native-immigrant differentials in family behavior were not the primary focus of her study. Nekby (2012) studied broad country groups of descendants to immigrants in Sweden and found that, with the exception of those of Nordic origin, they are often more likely than natives to be married at young ages. The propensity to be married at young age is especially pronounced among the descendants of immigrants from Asia.

Evidently, the migration event itself may have a role to play in shaping the aforementioned results. Marriage-related migration by definition increases the marriage risk for immigrants – if the marriage formation occurs after the migration rather than the other way round. That is, for a non-negligible share of immigrants the decision to leave the country of origin was motivated by the desire to marry a person living in Sweden. To illustrate, the most common reason for granting residence permit in Sweden is family reunification; in the period 2002-2006 three out of four of these permits were issued to "newly formed marriages" (Parusel 2009). In many such cases, the event of marriage precedes that of registered migration. Although an increasing number of marriage migrants arrive to Sweden to marry a native Swede (Niedomysl et al. 2010; Haandrikman 2014), the average impact of international marriage migration on marriage patterns for those who already live in the country is clearly more pronounced among immigrants. In contrast, if not motivated by marriage, the act of migration may instead postpone the entry into marriage. As discussed in Sobotka (2008) and Adsera and Ferrer (2014), the international migration is a stressful event and in some cases also entails entering a less familiar marriage market. There is no empirical research on this issue for Sweden, but we cannot discard the possibility that this mechanism contributes to depress the marriage formation rates of adult migrants to Sweden.

In general, research on re-marriage among immigrants is very scarce and this topic has not attracted much interest in Sweden either. The prevailing view in the general literature on repartnering is that the same factors that affect the entry into a first union also affect the entry

into second and higher order unions, although the relative importance of some factors may change across union orders (Dewilde and Uunk 2008). Cohabitation is a prominent alternative to marriage also when repartnering, both in Sweden and elsewhere (Blanc 1987; de Graaf and Kalmijn 2003; Wu and Schimmele 2005). Therefore, we may expect any (unobserved) country-specific levels of acceptance of cohabitation to produce native-immigrant differentials in remarriage as well. In addition, under certain conditions, marriage market constraints can matter more for second and higher order unions than for first marriages. For instance, the remarriage market may be quite thin for a foreign-born divorcee with a strong preference for cultural endogamy who originates from a country group with a low divorce propensity.

2.2 Divorce among immigrants

Based on Swedish register data for 2005, Nekby (2012) studies seven broad categories of immigrants in Sweden and finds that the probability of being divorced generally is higher among the foreign-born than among native Swedes. The propensity of being divorced was highest among Asian and South American immigrants, whereas it was lowest among Western European immigrants. Statistics Sweden (2012) report higher divorce risks on average among immigrants than among native Swedes. Nekby (2012) further finds that the descendants to immigrants are more likely to be divorced than are natives, but this difference was less pronounced. Previous literature has dealt with the possible link between culture and divorce (e.g., Furtado et al. 2013) and cultural factors remain a strong candidate in explaining group-specific differentials in divorce also in our study. For instance, one of the findings that emerge from the study by Dribe and Lundh (2012) on intermarriage in Sweden is that endogamous immigrant couples originating from different value contexts also differ in their divorce risk.

However, there are good reasons to also consider other mechanisms when interpreting the results of our analyses. For example, homogamy theory predicts that a higher degree of dissimilarity in marriage in terms of values and lifestyle is related to a higher divorce risk (Kalmijn et al. 2005). This argument matters because some immigrant groups may be characterized by a substantial degree of intra-ethnic cultural heterogeneity, partly due to differences in the length of exposure to the host society. Homogamy theory should thus predict elevated divorce risks for socio-demographically more heterogeneous immigrant couples and populations, even after controlling for partner´s country of birth. For example,

Lestaeghae and Surkyn (1995) identify a considerable degree of heterogeneity and heteropraxis among Turkish and Morrocan immigrants in Belgium and argue that marriage migration is an important source of such intra-community cultural variation. Eeckhaut et al. (2011) study the same immigrant groups and find that marriage migration, as hypothesized, is associated with increased divorce risk. They also argue that, due to higher degree of social support, divorce risks should be lower in more closely knit immigrant communities. Obucina (2014) finds that in Sweden, immigrant endogamous marriages in which one partner is a marriage migrant have higher divorce risks than immigrant endogamous marriages in which both partners were established in Sweden at the start of marriage. This pattern is particularly pronounced if the marriage migrant is a man.

Previous research also suggests that the interplay between migration and the exposure to different gender norms in society may matter for divorce risks among immigrants. The main argument is that men and women from countries with gender norms that are very different from those prevailing in Sweden may benefit from their migration to different extents. While for many men the move to Sweden entails downward social mobility and transition into unemployment, the increased opportunities for women may strengthen their resources in the family. According to Darvishpour (2002), post-migration change in power relations within the family is one of the principal sources of family instability for Iranian couples in Sweden. Although in our study we consider only the divorce risks of couples who have married in Sweden, we cannot discard the possibility that divergent attitudes of immigrant women and men towards prevalent gender norms in the host society can create family conflicts for these couples (Lewin 2001).

3 Data and methods

Like in all Swedish data, the definition of being an immigrant refers to a person's own country of birth: an individual born in another country than Sweden and currently residing in this country is an immigrant. In addition, by means of recorded linkages between children and parents we are able to single out the descendants to migrants to Sweden: these are the resident offspring to one or two persons that were born in another country and that made a migration to Sweden. As a reference category, we use Swedish-born women with two Swedish-born parents (*Swedish-born parents*). We further distinguish between Swedish-born women with two foreign-born parents (*Descendant to immigrants*; these are sometimes referred to in the

literature as the "second generation" of immigrants), and Swedish-born women with one foreign-born and one Swedish-born parent (*One parent Swedish-born*). The immigrants themselves are divided between women born abroad who arrived in Sweden during childhood (*Immigrant as child*, while aged 15 years or less; these migrants are sometimes referred to in the literature as the "*Generation 1.5*"), and women born abroad who made a migration to Sweden at adult ages (*Immigrant as adult*). The immigrants are also classified by their country groups of origin, as specified in our previous section.

Swedish register data provide full information on civil-status changes of all persons with legal residence in the country. Linkages to other administrative registers provide background data on other socio-demographic characteristics of these individuals. There is no formal registration of non-marital cohabitation and the place of residence of an individual cannot be linked to single dwelling units of multi-family houses so it cannot be used to infer non-marital cohabitation. Our study thus is restricted to changes in formal civil status. For all non-married migrants to Sweden and never-married residents in Sweden, we study (i) the transition to first marriage formation. For those who married in Sweden, we study (ii) the transition to first divorce. For those who experienced a divorce, we study (iii) the transition to remarriage. We present our results in terms of univariate Kaplan-Maier estimates of the fractions ever married at ages 25, 35, 45 and 55; the fractions divorced at durations 5, 10 and 15 years after first marriage formation; and the fractions re-married at durations 5 and 10 years after divorce. The analyses are based on women with a de jure residence in Sweden. In a next step, we carry out event-history analyses of the relative risks of first-marriage formation, divorce and re-marriage, respectively. These are based on multivariate analyses where our main variable of interest is the country group of a woman's origin. For first-marriage formation, we provide additional estimates with a more detailed specification of the descendants of immigrants to Sweden. The analyses are based on an un-weighted five-percent sample of women with two Swedish-born parents and the entire resident population of immigrants and descendants to immigrants in Sweden. We control for the following covariates: current age, educational attainment, and metropolitan/non-metropolitan residence (Stockholm, Göteborg, Malmö with suburbs vs. rest of Sweden). The divorce analyses additionally consider duration of marriage and husband's country of origin. The remarriage analyses consider duration since divorce. All analyses are based on women born in 1951 and later who ever lived in Sweden during 1983-2007. They cover patterns in nuptiality during 1983-2007. The analyses are carried out in STATA.

4 Results

4.1 First marriage formation of immigrants in Sweden

Estimates of the cumulative fractions ever-married at different ages (Table 1) show that about two thirds of Swedish-born women had been married at least once when reaching age 55. These statistics cover a synthetic cohort with decreasing as well as increasing period trends in marriage formation (see Ohlsson-Wijk 2011); the relatively low levels of estimated ultimate marriage formation reflect that the study period was marked by strong postponement in marriage formation[17]. The statistics in ultimate levels of marriage formation do not differ tremendously between native- and foreign-born women but immigrants who arrived to Sweden during childhood marry somewhat earlier than others. Our estimates for specific country groups of immigrant women in the lower section of Table 1 cover all immigrants regardless of age at migration to Sweden. Again, differences between country groups are not extremely large; immigrants from Turkey, North Africa and the Mid-East have higher levels of ultimate marriage formation than women from other countries; a few country groups, including Turkey, the Arab Mid-East and the former Yugoslavia stand out with patterns of early marriage formation. In contrast, immigrants from Western and Southern Europe display relatively low levels of marriage formation in Sweden.

[17] For women born during the 1950s, the ultimate level of ever-marriage reached about 80%. For women born during the 1960s it was above 70%. Later cohorts have not finished their nuptial careers but may reach similar or higher levels of marriage formation than those born during the 1960s (see also Ohlsson-Wijk 2011 and Statistics Sweden 2014).

Table 1: Cumulative percent married at ages 25, 35, 45 and 55, by country group of origin. Non-married women in Sweden, 1983-2007

	25	35	45	55
Swedish-born parents	13	52	63	67
Descendant to migrants	19	53	63	67
One parent Sw-born	13	49	61	65
Immigrant as child	26	56	66	70
Immigrant as adult	12	45	59	64
Finland	15	48	58	62
Other Nordic	10	43	58	64
Former Yugoslavia	32	59	68	71
Poland	14	48	60	65
Western Europe	7	39	53	60
Southern Europe	11	42	54	62
Baltic	9	40	54	65
Eastern Europe	16	49	62	66
US/Aus/NZ/Can	9	45	59	67
Central/South America	14	45	60	66
Horn of Africa	21	47	60	64
Sub-Saharan Africa	16	47	61	70
North Africa	23	57	73	80
Arab Mid-East	41	69	80	84
Iran	16	53	69	75
Turkey	49	75	82	83
East Asia	8	47	66	73
South-East Asia	12	44	64	73
South Asia	17	51	64	67
Post-Soviet States	12	44	61	70

Note: Swedish register data, authors' own calculations

The same patterns are reflected in the first-marriage formation intensities presented in Tables 2a-b, where we are also able to control for the role of a few socio-demographic covariates. Table 2a provides relative risks of marriage formation for our five aggregated categories of migration status; it confirms that immigrants who arrived to Sweden during childhood marry earlier than others while adult migrants on average have somewhat depressed marriage formation intensities. Descendants to immigrants also have slightly elevated risks of marriage formation but children with one foreign- and one Swedish-born parent have reduced marriage formation intensities. Table 2b provides the relative risks for finer country groups of immigrants; it high-lights the elevated relative risks of marriage formation for foreign-born women from the former Yugoslavia, North Africa, the Arab Mid-East and Turkey and the depressed relative risks for women from Western Europe.

Table 2a: Relative risk of first marriage formation, by broad country group of origin and other socio-demographic variables. Non-married women in Sweden, 1983-2007

Swedish-born parents	1
Descendant to migrants	1.08***
One parent Sw-born	0.86***
Immigrant as child	1.31***
Immigrant as adult	0.91***
Primary School	1.04***
Secondary Education	1
University	1.01
Metropolitan	0.95***
Non-metropolitan	1

Note: Swedish register data, authors' own calculations. *** = significant at the 1-percent level.

Table 2b: Relative risk of first marriage formation, by finer country groups of origin. Non-married women in Sweden, 1983-2007

Swedish-born parents	1
Descendant to migrants	1.08***
One parent Sw-born	0.92***
Finland	0.92***
Other Nordic	0.82***
Former Yugoslavia	1.55***
Poland	0.99
Western Europe	0.69***
Southern Europe	0.80***
Baltic	0.76***
Eastern Europe	1.04**
US/Aus/NZ/Can	0.85***
Central/South America	0.92***
Horn of Africa	1.06***
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.97
North Africa	1.44***
Arab Mid-East	2.38***
Iran	1.12***
Turkey	2.77***
East Asia	0.83***
South-East Asia	0.94***
South Asia	1.05**
Post-Soviet States	0.95**

Note: Swedish register data, authors' own calculations. Model also includes controls for age, educational attainment and metropolitan/non-metropolitan residence. *** = significant at the 1-percent level, ** = 5-percent level, * = 10-percent level.

Table 2c provides additional information in terms of relative risks of first-marriage formation for Swedish-born women only, including the descendants to immigrants to Sweden. In this case, the country categories represent the birth country of a woman's parents: if only one of her parents is foreign-born she is assigned the category of her foreign-born parent, if both parents are foreign-born but from different origins she is assigned the country group of her mother. The tabulation reveals that Swedish descendants to immigrants from Turkey and the Arab Mid-East have elevated marriage formation intensities, very much in line with the patterns observed for their parents. For other groups of descendants differences in patterns are generally much less striking than for the migrant generation.

Table 2c: Relative risk of first marriage formation for women born in Sweden, by their parents' country group of origin. Never-married women in Sweden, 1983-2007

Sweden	1
Finland	0.93***
Other Nordic	1.04***
Former Yugoslavia	1.19***
Poland	0.86***
Western Europe	0.97**
Southern Europe	0.90***
Baltic	0.99
Eastern Europe	0.96**
US/Aus/NZ/Can	0.96
Central/South America	0.80***
Horn of Africa	0.71***
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.77***
North Africa	1.07*
Arab Mid-East	1.98***
Iran	0.80***
Turkey	2.71***
East Asia	0.85***
South-East Asia	0.76***
South Asia	1.19***
Post-Soviet States	1.02

Note: Swedish register data, authors' own calculations. Model also includes controls for age, educational attainment, and metropolitan/non-metropolitan residence. *** = significant at the 1-percent level, ** = 5-percent level, * = 10-percent level.

4.2 Divorce risks of immigrants in Sweden

About 30 percent of Swedish-born women had divorced at the duration of 15 years since marriage formation. Practically all groups of immigrant women who had formed a marriage in Sweden had higher levels of dissolved marriages (Table 3). Immigrants who arrived in Sweden during childhood had higher divorce rates on average than those who arrived as adults and later married in Sweden. Foreign-born women from Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe, Central & South America, Iran, South East Asia, and the three regions of Africa all have more than 40 percent dissolved marriages at the duration of 15 years since marriage formation.

Table 3: Cumulative percent divorced at durations 5, 10 and 15 years since marriage formation, by country group of origin. First-married women in Sweden, 1983-2007

	5	10	15
Swedish-born parents	10	20	28
Descendant to migrants	15	27	37
One parent Sw-born	14	27	36
Immigrant as child	19	33	42
Immigrant as adult	15	28	36
Finland	15	28	37
Other Nordic	14	28	38
Former Yugoslavia	16	27	34
Poland	22	36	46
Western Europe	12	23	32
Southern Europe	12	22	30
Baltic	14	25	36
Eastern Europe	21	35	44
US/Aus/NZ/Can	10	22	31
Central/South America	25	43	52
Horn of Africa	31	49	58
Sub-Saharan Africa	25	44	53
North Africa	23	38	45
Arab Mid-East	17	28	34
Iran	25	41	48
Turkey	13	22	28
East Asia	14	26	34
South-East Asia	18	33	41
South Asia	17	31	37
Post-Soviet States	26	44	55

Note: Swedish register data, authors' own calculations.

The multivariate analyses provide a similar but more concise overview of patterns in divorce risks (Table 4). Immigrants and descendants to immigrants on average have slightly higher divorce risks than native Swedes; the divorce risk for immigrants who arrived to Sweden during childhood is about 25 percent higher than for women with two Swedish-born parents (Table 4a). As in our previous presentation, our models for the finer country groups of origin (Table 4b) do not distinguish between migrants who arrived during childhood and those who moved to Sweden as adults. Foreign-born women from Poland and other Eastern Europe, Central & South America, Iran, and the three regions of Africa all have strikingly high divorce risks. In contrast, women from Southern Europe and Turkey have very low divorce risks, substantially lower than that of the Swedish-born population.

Table 4a: Relative risk of divorce, by broad country group of origin and other socio-demographic variables. First-married women in Sweden, 1983-2007

Swedish-born parents	1
Descendant to migrants	1.03*
One parent Sw-born	1.04***
Immigrant as child	1.25***
Immigrant as adult	1.08***
Primary School	1.21***
Secondary Education	1
University	0.66***
Metropolitan	1.24***
Non-metropolitan	1
Age (Years)	0.91***
Partner same nationality	0.75***

Note: Swedish register data, authors' own calculations. *** = significant at the 1-percent level, ** = 5-percent level, * = 10-percent level.

Table 4b: Relative risk of divorce, by finer country groups of origin. First-married women in Sweden, 1983-2007

Swedish-born parents	1
Descendant to migrants	1.04**
One parent Sw-born	1.05***
Finland	1.08***
Other Nordic	1.06***
Former Yugoslavia	1.02
Poland	1.50***
Western Europe	0.90***
Southern Europe	0.74***
Baltic	1.13
Eastern Europe	1.43***
US/Aus/NZ/Can	0.90**
Central/South America	1.86***
Horn of Africa	2.21***
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.84***
North Africa	1.58***
Arab Mid-East	1.09***
Iran	2.10***
Turkey	0.69***
East Asia	1.07
South-East Asia	1.15***
South Asia	1.16***
Post-Soviet States	2.32***

Note: Swedish register data, authors' own calculations. Model also includes controls for duration of marriage, age, educational attainment, partner's country background, and metropolitan/non-metropolitan residence. *** = significant at the 1-percent level, ** = 5-percent level, * = 10-percent level.

4.3 Re-marriage propensities of immigrants in Sweden

Close to four in ten first-divorced Swedish native women had re-married at the duration of ten years since marital dissolution. Immigrants and their descendants re-marry to a somewhat larger extent than the Swedish-born majority population. Immigrants from the Arab Mid-East, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and East Asia have higher re-marriage rates than others.

Table 5: Cumulative percent re-married at the durations of 5 and 10 years since divorce, by country group of origin. First-divorced women in Sweden, 1983-2007

	5	10
Swedish-born parents	22	38
Descendant to migrants	25	42
One parent Sw-born	23	41
Immigrant as child	29	44
Immigrant as adult	27	41
Finland	23	37
Other Nordic	27	42
Former Yugoslavia	23	35
Poland	27	39
Western Europe	27	41
Southern Europe	24	37
Baltic	31	40
Eastern Europe	27	42
US/Aus/NZ/Can	34	45
Central/South America	24	38
Horn of Africa	29	44
Sub-Saharan Africa	34	50
North Africa	37	53
Arab Mid-East	35	51
Iran	24	39
Turkey	32	47
East Asia	39	55
South-East Asia	29	44
South Asia	38	57
Post-Soviet States	31	47

Note: Swedish register data, authors' own calculations.

The multivariate analyses bring controls for the age distribution of divorcees. They largely confirm the patterns from our univariate analyses; however Swedish-born women with one or two foreign-born parents no longer display elevated re-marriage intensities once we bring in our controls (Table 6a). As before, foreign-born women from the Arab Mid-East, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and East Asia have the highest standardized re-marriage rates (Table 6b). Immigrants from overseas Anglo-Saxon countries also display high re-marriage risks.

Table 6a: Relative risk of re-marriage, by broad country group of origin and other socio-demographic variables. First-divorced women in Sweden, 1983-2007

Swedish-born parents	1
Descendant to migrants	1.00
One parent Sw-born	1.02
Immigrant as child	1.07***
Immigrant as adult	1.12***
Primary School	1.00
Secondary Education	1
University	1.02
Metropolitan	0.97***
Non-metropolitan	1
Age (Years)	0.78***

Note: Swedish register data, authors' own calculations. *** = significant at the 1-percent level.

Table 6b: Relative risk of re-marriage, by finer country groups of origin. First-divorced women in Sweden, 1983-2007

Swedish-born parents	1
Descendant to migrants	1.02
One parent Sw-born	1.03
Finland	0.96**
Other Nordic	1.18***
Former Yugoslavia	0.92***
Poland	1.05*
Western Europe	1.14***
Southern Europe	0.89**
Baltic	1.17*
Eastern Europe	1.12***
US/Aus/NZ/Can	1.39***
Central/South America	1.00
Horn of Africa	1.17***
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.44***
North Africa	1.55***
Arab Mid-East	1.44***
Iran	1.07**
Turkey	1.21***
East Asia	1.81***
South-East Asia	1.21***
South Asia	1.73***
Post-Soviet States	1.33***

Note: Swedish register data, authors' own calculations. Model also includes controls for duration since divorce, age, educational attainment, and metropolitan/non-metropolitan residence. *** = significant at the 1-percent level, ** = 5-percent level, * = 10-percent level.

5. Conclusions

In this study, we produced a detailed overview of patterns in marriage formation and divorce for immigrants in Sweden. By means of access to large scale longitudinal register data, we were able to distinguish between and provide statistics for some twenty country groups of immigrant women. In addition, we produced comparable data for the descendants of immigrants in Sweden. A contribution of our study was that we are able to distinguish between descendants with two foreign-born parents and those with one foreign-born and one Swedish-born parent. We were also able to distinguish between immigrants who arrived to Sweden at adult ages and those who arrived with their parents during childhood.

We showed that Swedish-born descendants of immigrants do not differ radically in their nuptiality behavior from women with a full Swedish background. Women with two foreign-born parents on average have slightly higher marriage formation rates but women with one Swedish-born and one foreign-born parent have somewhat lower rates of marriage formation than women with a full Swedish background. The divorce risks of descendants to immigrants are marginally higher than those of the majority population. We also demonstrated clear differences between immigrants who arrived to Sweden as adults and those who arrived during childhood. The latter group is distinguished by relatively high rates of all civil status transitions: first marriage formation, divorce and re-marriage. Immigrants who arrived as un-married to Sweden at adult ages have somewhat reduced marriage formation rates but slightly elevated rates of divorce and re-marriage.

However, these averages mask clear differences between immigrants depending on their country of origin. A key contribution of our study is that we were able to break down the immigrant population into a fairly large number of country categories, representing a wide variety of migrant backgrounds in terms of the societies and family systems they come from. Although it is impossible to make any causal claims of associations we can distinguish some patterns that fit with knowledge on how family system appear in different parts of the world (e.g., Hajnal 1965; Goode 1963, 1993; Jones 1997; Lesthaeghe et al. 1989; Tabutin and Schoumaker 2004; López-Gay et al. 2014; Yüksel-Kaptanoğlu et al. 2012). We note for example, that immigrants from Southern Europe have low levels of marriage formation and divorce also when living in Sweden. Immigrants from some regions seem to experience relatively high “churning rates” of marriage, with elevated levels of first marriage formation

as well as high rates of divorce and re-marriage formation. Immigrants from Turkey differ from those of other countries in the Mid-East by the combination of elevated rates of marriage formation and low divorce risks. The main differences in patterns remain also when we control for the socio-demographic characteristics of immigrants and non-migrants in Sweden.

Our study suggests that cultural and ideational factors indeed seem to matter for nuptiality behavior in Sweden. These factors may come out even more strongly in a context where an individual's civil status brings few or no consequences in terms of his or her social rights. To some extent, this may reflect that immigrants often resemble rather than deviate from the behaviors that hold for the Swedish majority population. Previous research on marriage formation in Sweden suggests that Swedish people sometimes seem to take the decision to marry relatively lightly and that they are easily influenced in their behavior by temporary trends and ideational change (Ohlsson-Wijk 2011, 2014).

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Partnership Formation and Dissolution in Spain

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Abstract:
This paper analyzes partnership formation and dissolution of a population of immigrant origin in Spain, in comparison to natives. It combines three different data sources (Fertility and Values Survey 2006, National Immigrant Survey 2007 and Chances 2011) to identify variations in timing and incidence of partnership formation across generations. The results provide support for the selection and disruption hypotheses in the case of first generation immigrant women, who tend to marry less and later than comparable natives, and also to separate more. However, in the case of Latin American and EU15 women some socialization effect cannot be ruled out. Among adolescents of immigrant origin preferences concerning type and timing of union reveal a strong effect of socialization into their parents' family values, which in the case of individuals who migrated to Spain aged older than 5 is not completely counterbalanced by the adaptation. These results are in line with the hypotheses formulated in the framework of the intergenerational transmission of values' approach, which emphasizes that family values and family-related attitudes remain important in parental socialization and are quite effectively passed on to the 1.5 and second generation.

Keywords: immigrants, second generation, marriage, cohabitation, separation, Spain

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1. Union formation and dissolution in Spain over the last decades

The evolution of union formation in Spain over the past three decades has been marked by a decline in marriage rates and an increase in the age of first entry into this type of union. While both processes became manifest in the 1980s, they intensified considerably throughout the 1990s. Indeed, Spain showed the highest age at marriage within the European context by the end of the decade (Muñoz-Pérez & Recaño-Valverde 2011). In fact, age at first marriage has continued to increase after the turn of the 21th century (Domínguez Folgueras & Castro-Martín 2011). Illustratively, the mean age of entry into the first marriage in 2000 lied at 28.1 years in the case of women, and at 30.1 years in the case of men. In 2012, the equivalent figures were 31.7 and 33.8, respectively (INE 2013).

In addition, as far as marital unions are concerned, it should be noted that in 2009 and for the first time there were more civil than religious marriages (53.3 vs. 45.7%) (INE 2012); the incidence of civil marriages has more than doubled over the past two decades - from 21% of all marriages in 1991 to 60% in 2011 (INE 2012).

The retreat from marriage did not automatically go hand in hand with an increase in cohabitation, in contrast with the typical development in other European countries. From the early 1980s to the mid 1990s, the prevalence of this type of co-residential union increased at a fairly slow pace. From that point onwards, and particularly after year 2000, the diffusion of cohabitation has gained momentum and this type of unions has become increasingly common among younger cohorts. Accordingly, cohabitation can no longer be regarded as a marginal phenomenon in Spain. As Castro-Martín and Martín-García (2013) have shown, approximately 40 percent of Spanish women born in the seventies are currently in cohabitation.

In fact, the marked increase in childbearing rates registered within cohabitating couples comes to confirm the spread of cohabitation in Spanish society as an alternative to marriage, rather than merely as a transitional phase towards the latter (Domínguez Folgueras & Castro-Martín 2013). In 2009, as many as 24% of all first births in Spain took place within cohabitating unions (Castro-Martín 2010).

Further evidence of the growing diffusion of cohabitating unions is the fact that whereas one decade ago there was a marked positive educational gradient of cohabitation, nowadays it is equally spread across all educational strata. The most recent analyses of the socio-demographic correlates of cohabitation in Spain show nonetheless that the phenomenon is still comparatively more widespread among individuals with particular characteristics - in the case of women, employment participation, a secular identity and a political left orientation show a greater association with the probability of opting for cohabitation as an alternative to marriage. So do experiences of previous childbearing or independent living (Domínguez-Folgueras & Castro-Martín 2013).

Spanish society has also experienced considerable changes in union dissolution over the past thirty years. In fact, marital disruption was a fairly rare occurrence until the legal ban on divorce was lifted in 1981. Ever since, it has become increasingly common, to the extent that one of six unions ended in dissolution in the late 2000s (Bernardi & Martínez-Pastor 2011). For every 100 marriages, 31 separations or divorces were registered in 1991. In 2010, the figures had risen spectacularly to 75 (INE 2011). In accordance with this picture, the probability of marital dissolution - which had traditionally lied at low levels - has been documented to have significantly raised among recent marriage cohorts (Bernardi & Martínez-Pastor 2011). Crude divorce rate substantially increased in the early 2000s (Figure 2) due to changes in the regulation of separation and divorce in 2005 (Law 15/2005, July 8), especially relevant for cases in which separation was mutually agreed.

Furthermore, it is not only the incidence but also the socio-demographic correlates of divorce that have changed over time. For women who had married before 1981, higher divorce rates were primarily associated to higher education and labour market participation, as well as to the experience of union dissolution within the family of origin or the presence of children from a previous relationship. For those married after 1981, the level of education is no longer a significant correlate of divorce, and the importance of employment status has in turn declined. In contrast, having children within the couple has been consistently linked to a decreased risk of divorce (Bernardi & Martínez-Pastor 2011).

Since the mid-nineties large inflows of immigrants have entered Spain, which are likely to have contributed to the ongoing transformations in Spanish family patterns in different ways. The main goal of this study consists precisely of identifying similarities and differences in

patterns of partnership formation and dissolution between individuals of immigrant and non-immigrant origin in Spain, and changes over immigrant generations. In section 2 we briefly review the theoretical framework on related issues. In section 3 we describe the context and profile of international migration to Spain, and provide a detailed account of the heterogeneity by age, sex, origin and marital status present in the current population of immigrant origin living in Spain. Section 4 describes the advantages and limitations of the available data sources, section 5 compares the partnership dynamics of first generation immigrant women to that of natives; and section 6 compares preferences concerning timing and type of union among adolescents of immigrant and native origin; section 7 summarizes the obtained findings and discusses their implications.

2. Theoretical framework and previous research

Immigrants who arrive to their country of destination as adults formed their family values and preferences concerning family forms in their country of origin. However, they will look for a partner, and will date potential spouses in a context different from the one where their socialization process took place, a new context with its own social norms and constraints. Accordingly, if dominant patterns of family formation, including gender roles and household arrangements among others, largely differ between origin and destination, the disruptive effect of migration on partnership patterns is likely to be strong. Such a disruption may result in some delay in the age of entering into partnership and also in a higher likelihood of dissolution. However, the relative importance of partnership formation patterns in which migrants were socialized during their childhood and adolescence is also likely to vary across individuals. Migration is a strongly selective process, especially in their initial stages; migrants tend to be more educated, more resourceful and more risk-takers than the average individual in the sending areas. Thus, it may be the case that they are also selected from a group more prone to deviate from dominant family behaviors in their places of origin.

Assuming that entry into partnership tends to happen earlier in most immigrants' countries of origin than in Spain, if socialization forces dominate, first generation women are expected to still marry earlier and more than comparable natives. However, the disruptive effect of migration (social networks are broken) as well as potential selectivity into migration might delay the expected age of entry into partnership of those who were already in marriage ages at arrival. An example of such a joint effect of disruption and selection can be found, for

instance, in the historical pattern followed by the rate of mix-marriages for immigrants arrived to Germany since the early sixties. As several authors suggested (Kane & Stephen, 1988; Klein, 2001), the U-shaped pattern shown by the figures of mix-marriage rate with high rates in the initial stages of the migration process was due to the interaction between the disruptive effect of the marriage market constraints (few potential partners from the same origin group) and stronger selection of migrants at the beginning of the migration flows, who will tend to be drawn from most open-minded individuals. Later on, the increase of co-nationals available in the marriage market and even the importation of partners from the country of origin would reduce the rate of mix-marriage until the increasing cultural convergence and integration later on would explain a new upturn in mix-marriages.

The previous explanation makes sense to account for the observed pattern at the aggregated level. At the individual level, however, it is more complicated to distinguish between selection, disruption and adaptation as competing explanations. Only by running a triple comparison between immigrants, natives at destination and non-migrants in origin countries would it be possible to discriminate between each other. Moreover, some selection, some adaptation and some disruption might have occurred but not be enough to completely suppress the immigrant-native gap.

The previous reasoning applied mostly to first generation immigrants. However, some of the aforementioned hypotheses are likely to play a weaker role in explaining the behavior of descendants of immigrants, including both middle and second generation. Adaptation is more likely to take place for them, since they all have spent at least part of their childhood in the country of destination, whereas the time available to find a partner (and adapt to dominant behavior in destination) is clearly shorter for migrants who were older than 16 at arrival. Obviously, socialization into origin values and patterns will still play a role for descendants through the intergenerational transmission of family values, which is known to remain particularly strong among immigrant communities (Nauck 2001; 2007; Phalet & Schönpflug 2001; Schönpflug 2001; De Valk & Liefbroer, 2007). In contrast, selection and disruptive effect of migration weaken as reasonable explanations for differences in partnership patterns between descendants of immigrants and comparable natives, especially for the second generation but only partially for 1.5 immigrants, who did not decide to migrate themselves but suffered the obvious disruption that changing school, classmates, friends and even language of everyday life implies.

The previous discussion makes clear that the analysis of partnership formation and dissolution among immigrants needs to distinguish across generations, both theoretically and empirically. Accordingly, we will first look into the partnership trajectories of the first generation, including not only entry into partnership/marriage but also dissolution. Next, we analyze entry into marriage for migrants who came during their childhood (at age 15 or younger) but are now of legal marriag age (16 or older). And, finally, we will also analyze the preferences of 1.5 and 2nd generation migrants who are still younger than 16 concerning forms and timing of partnership formation.

3. Immigration to Spain and immigrants' family dynamics

The foreign-born population increased from 1.2 million in 1998 to 5.65 million in 2011, representing 12.1 percent of the total population (INE Census 2011)[18]. Approximately 750,000 of them (2 percent) are descendants from one or two Spanish emigrants (groups 6 and 5 in Tables 1 and 2); the remaining 10 percent are all foreign-born individuals with two immigrant parents (groups 1 and 2 in Tables 1 and 2). Namely, in 2011, there were almost 4 million first generation immigrants who arrived at age 16 or older (hereinafter 1st generation) to Spain, and approximately one more million are descendants of two immigrant parents who arrived at age 15 or younger (the so-called 1.5 generation or middle generation). These figures are large in the European context and clearly reflect the size of recent migration inflows to Spain. Moreover, the number of individuals born in Spain to couples made of one immigrant parent and a native-born one (mixed-nativity parents) amounted to almost 1.2 million in 2011. This figure suggests a large degree of mixing between the native and the immigrant-origin population in the process of family formation.

In contrast, the size of the second generation in strict terms (Spain-born descendants of two immigrant parents) remains still relatively small (less than 800,000 individuals) compared to the previous two groups, and also compared to the second generation's size in other European countries, due precisely to the recent arrival of most immigrants to Spain.

[18] Most undocumented immigrants are also included in these numbers since the sampling frame for Census 2011 was the Municipal Population Registers (Padrón), in combination with other data sources, and legal status is irrelevant for registration. Moreover, registration in Padrón is required to gain access to public schools and all social services in the municipality, and also utilized as proof of length of residence in Spain for regularisation processes. The police and immigration authorities have, as yet, never used this register for detecting and deporting unlawful residents.

(Table 1 about here)

In fact, as Table 1 summarizes, first generation and 1.5 generation immigrants have been residing in Spain, on average, between 9 and 10 years, and most of them arrived after 2000. Moreover, they are still very young: 18 and 11 years old, on average, respectively. This is a crucial aspect for the subject of interest here; it implies very few descendants of immigrants are of adult age, and even fewer have started the process of family formation: only 10 and 7 percent of 1.5 and 2nd generation, respectively, were married in 2011. In contrast, by that time, approximately 20 percent children born in Spain to mixed parental couples (one parent born in Spain and one parent born abroad) had already married. Unfortunately, most sources do not include information on parents' nativity and, therefore, potential particularities in the partnership behaviour of descendants of mixed couples remain largely unknown.

By regions of origin, immigrants (including second generation) are mostly linked to Latin America, the Maghreb and Eastern Europe. However, people born in EU15 countries or with a mother and/or father born in EU15 countries (excluding Spain) still make a large fraction of immigrant-origin population in Spain. As can be seen in Table 1, for first generation Romanians (716,687), Moroccans (690,502) and Ecuadorians (412,382) are the largest groups. Among their descendants, however 1.5 and 2nd generation individuals of Moroccan origin are the largest group, followed by Romanians and Ecuadorians, which is consistent with the earlier start of Moroccan migration to Spain. In contrast, the proportion of people of EU15 origin is much larger among individuals with at least one parent born in Spain: 40 among children born in Spain to mixed-nativity couples, and 42 percent among children born abroad to mixed-nativity couples. In addition, 29 percent of foreign-born individuals with two parents born in Spain were born in some EU15 country, although countries like Argentina and Morocco are also important for this group. In sum, groups 1, 2 and 3 in Table 1 are largely related to the most recent immigration flows to Spain coming mostly (but not only) from Morocco, Ecuador and Romania, whereas groups 4, 5, 6 present a more mixed origin profile with larger numbers of people born or with some parent born in EU15. Given the different patterns of family formation in their (or their parents') respective countries of origin, it is important to bear this distinction in mind when analyzing their partnership behaviour instead of merging people with some immigrant origin altogether.

Apart from diversity in their origins, the three largest groups among 1st, 1.5 and 2nd generation - that is, groups 1, 2 and 3 - also differ in some important dimensions like sex composition or length of stay, which are likely to both reflect and affect their family formation patterns. For instance, in 2011, among people with some Moroccan origin there were 74 men for 100 women; this ratio increased up to 96 among people with some Romanian origin, to 102 among the Ecuadorian one, and to 119 among Colombian - the fourth largest group in 2011. Variation in their sex ratios reflects, first, different selection patterns by gender in emigration from their countries of origin; and second, also variation in the incidence and speed of their family reunification process in Spain. González-Ferrer (2008, 2011a, 2011b) has shown that reunification of immigrant couples in Spain has been particularly quick in comparison to what is usually expected: approximately 80 percent of immigrants living in Spain in 2007 and who had married before migrating took less than two years to reunify her/his spouse in Spain.[19] Moroccan couples took the longest time in reunifying their partners in Spain, while EU15 and Ecuadorians were the quickest. In other words, the process of couples' reunification in Spain was largely completed before the crisis started.

However, what happened to those who were still not in partnership at the time of their arrival to Spain? In 2007, approximately 42 and 35 percent of first generation (arrived at age 16 or older) males and females had not married yet, respectively (ENI 2007 in González-Ferrer 2011b). Four years later, in 2011, corresponding percentages had reduced to 31 and 27, which suggests that many first generation immigrants entered into marriage in a relatively short time (see Table 2).

(Table 2 about here)

4. Data sources available. Advantages and limitations

Unfortunately, most socio-demographic surveys carried out in Spain lack of dated information. This limitation seriously restricts the possibility to analyze the process of family formation and dissolution from a life-course perspective not only for the recently arrived migrants but also for the native-born population. Just to give an idea of the extent of this limitation, it seems important to mention that the 2011 Census, for instance, did not collect

[19] However, official residence permits figures do not reflect this phenomenon as many of these couples reunified de facto, that is without following the legal procedure for family reunification.

any date other than date of birth and date of arrival to Spain. The Labour Force Survey, which is periodically taken and has a very large sample with good coverage of immigrants, has never included information about the date of marriage or separation of the interviewees. Finally, the National Immigrant Survey, which was carried out by the National Institute of Statistics in 2007 with a very large nationally representative sample of immigrants, gathers some retrospective information but in the area of family formation and dissolution only asked about the date of marriage, and only for those individuals who were married at the time of the survey.

In this situation, the Fertility and Values Survey (FVS) carried out by the Centre for Sociological Research in 2006, offers the best possibilities for exploring the type of phenomena this case-study focuses on. FVS2006 collected quite detailed partnership and fertility histories, with dated information; however, FVS2006 does not include men and did not over-sample immigrant populations. As can be seen in Table 3, the subsample of immigrants in FVS2006 is only 745 immigrant women, of whom approximately 13% are 1.5 generation (arrived at age 15 or younger). Median age at migration is 26 years old, their median duration of residence in Spain by the time of the survey (2006) was 9 years, which guarantees a quite good coverage of the life period when first partnership transitions (cohabitation, marriage and separation) happen. Approximately 30 per cent of the FVS2006 immigrant sample had married before migrating to Spain (which coincides with the percentage provided by the much larger sample of the National Immigrants Survey taken in 2007), and 6 percent had even separated at the time of arrival. It is not possible to exclude this part of the sample of immigrant women without imposing a substantial bias in the results. In addition, by excluding them, any intergenerational comparison will be distorted since all descendants of migrants would be compared against the behavior of only one part of their parents' generation. For these two reasons, we decided to include in our analyses all first generation women, regardless of where they marry (at origin or destination).

(Table 3 about here)

In addition to these analyses on first generation women, we will exploit also the information on partnership type and timing preferences among adolescents of both native and immigrant origin, collected in the recently released survey Chances 2011. This dataset collected information on life-course preferences and expectations of approximately 3,000 youth in the

municipality of Madrid, and their parents, including preferences and expectations regarding living arrangements after leaving the parental home, and type and timing of entry into union[20]. Forty-six percent of surveyed students were of immigrant origin, mostly Latin Americans. The overall parental response rate was approximately 45 percent; 48.5% among non-immigrant origin children and 37.5% among immigrant origin children. Children to mixed parental couples in Spain and abroad are not a very large group, as well as second generation. Accordingly, we decided to merge together all children born to mixed couples regardless of their country of birth, as well as to include as part of the 2nd generation individuals who immigrated to Spain at age 5 or younger. Table 4 summarizes the students sample by sex according to this classification. In addition, comparison with the proportion of surveyed parents for each category of students shows the higher response rate achieved among parents of non-immigrant students.

(Table 4 about here)

As both student and parental questionnaires replicated the wording of a large number of relevant questions, pair-wise comparisons of students and parental answers to similar indicators[21] are allowed, which will permit us to analyze the strength of intergenerational transmission of family and life-style values, which is the main channel through which dominant patterns in their (parents') country of origin takes place.

[20] The survey randomly sampled 30 schools (15 public and 15 private) in the municipality of Madrid out of the whole universe of private and public schools in the city. The sample of schools was constructed in two stages. In the first stage we selected 24 neighborhoods from four different strata constructed by combinations of three indicators: 1) the total number of immigrant origin children from the 10 largest immigrant groups living in the city in 2011, 2) the percentage of immigrant origin in the neighborhood and, 3) the socio-economic profile of the neighborhood according to the official classification provided by the City Statistical Office. The 24 selected neighborhoods included 120 schools with secondary education from which we randomly selected our 30 schools in the second stage.

[21] All students enrolled in the 3rd and 4th grades of secondary education (Educación Secundaria Obligatoria–ESO) in the selected schools completed a questionnaire during one of their 55 minutes classes. In addition, one of their parents (the mother or the father, whoever they decided) also completed a parallel questionnaire during the following two weeks. Parental questionnaires (translated into Chinese, Arabic and Romanian when needed) were handed to the parents by their children. Between one and two weeks later, teachers collected the completed parental questionnaires in the classroom.

5. Partnership formation and dissolution patterns among first generation women and native women in Spain

5.1. Descriptive results from FVS2006

In order to guarantee a minimum number of events for the different family transitions only first cohabitation, first marriage, first separation and transitions from first cohabitation to either first marriage or separation will be analyzed for the Spanish case.

As KM survival estimates show in Figures 1, 2 and 3, immigrant women enter into their first union somewhat earlier than native women. In fact, the proportion of married women in both groups converges around age 23, and then it seems to be a slightly larger for native women. Overall differences, thus, are not large with the exception of participation in cohabitation, which is much more frequent for immigrant women. At age 24, approximately 25 percent of immigrant women had entered into cohabitation versus only 10 percent of native women. In addition, it seems that the risk of entering into cohabitation continues being an option for immigrant women longer time than for native ones: survival function becomes almost flat at age 28 or 29 for natives but only at age 32 for immigrants, which might be reflecting the disruptive effect of migration as well.

(Figures 1 about here)

(Figures 2 about here)

(Figures 3 about here)

Obviously, differences in the incidence of cohabitation are likely to be strongly related to the different age profile of native and immigrant populations living in Spain at the time of the survey. As Table 3 indicates, while almost half of native women in our sample were born before 1960, the corresponding percentage among immigrant women was only 15 percent. Conversely, more than 30 percent of immigrant women were born in 1980 or later, while the corresponding percentage for native women is only 17 percent. For these reasons, birth cohort is one of the main control variables we will introduce in our multivariate models to check whether differences between immigrant and native women remain as they look in the survival functions once the appropriate comparison group is utilized (see section 5.2).

In the case of partnership dissolutions, we can see that the incidence of separation is substantially larger among immigrant women than natives. Several reasons are potential explanations for this: apart from the obvious cohort effect, the disruptive effect of migration on couple relationship, as well as the well-known association between separation/divorce and international migration among women, they are all potentially contributors to this result. In addition, as can be seen in Figure 4 and 5, even after controlling for education immigrant women continue being more likely to separate. In fact, the effect of education does not seem to be too strong in explaining differences in the propensity to separate/divorce for immigrants during the first fifteen years of the union.

(Figures 4 about here)

(Figures 5 about here)

5.2. Multivariate models for first generation and native women

Discrete-time multivariate analyses (logit link), which include duration variable (age and union's duration for formation and dissolution, respectively), birth cohort, region of origin and education, do not give us too many surprises.

First of all, the likelihood of entering into a union (no matter which type) decreases with age. The probability of entering into a union, namely into marriage, substantially decreased for cohorts born after 1970 in comparison to the previous ones (table 6). Conversely, the probability to enter into cohabitation has substantially increased for the same cohorts with some stagnation in the cohort born in the first half of the eighties (table 7). However, even after controlling for birth cohort and age, the likelihood of cohabitation continues being significantly higher for immigrant women, with the only exception of the Africans (mainly Moroccans), who are not significantly different from natives in this regard. When focusing on direct marriage, the observed differences between immigrant and native women are not significant. Finally, the effect of education, as we expected, show opposite signs for entering into marriage and entering into cohabitation: more educated women are more likely to start a union through cohabitation and less likely to married directly. However, no significant

differences in the effect of education for immigrant and native women was found (interaction effect is not significant).

(Table 5 about here)

(Table 6 about here)

(Table 7 about here)

The results obtained clearly suggest that selection is at work at least for Eastern European (mostly Romanians) and Others immigrant women, since they are more likely to cohabit than comparable native women, despite that cohabitation rate is not higher in their respective regions of origin than in Spain, on average (see Hoem *et al.* 2009 for the Romanian case). Moreover, there is no significant difference in their likelihood of entering into first marriage compared to natives once that different composition by cohort and educational levels across groups are taking into account. Latin Americans and EU15 immigrant women are also more likely to cohabit and do not differ in their likelihood of entering into first union. However, in both cases, it is not easy to know whether the observed results are reflecting selection or socialization since in many of their respective countries of origin rates of cohabitation are similar or even higher than in Spain. In the early 2000s, the percentage of cohabitating women over total women in couples in Dominican Republic (63.6 percent), Colombia (57.7 percent) and Peru (47.7 percent), for instance, were substantially higher than in Spain at that time. However, in other countries with also large number of female migrants in Spain the corresponding figures were lower like in Argentina (30.6 percent), Bolivia (30.6) and Ecuador (36.4), but still larger than in Spain (Cortina *et al.* 2010). Unfortunately, the small sample sizes do not allow us to distinguish by country of origin and consequently is not possible to reject or confirm the selection hypothesis in these two cases.

(Table 8 about here)

In the case of dissolution of first unions, we observe that the likelihood of separation/divorce increases with union's duration and birth cohort (Table 8). By origin, immigrant women are substantially more likely to separate from their first partner/husband than native women, and these differences remain after controlling for education, which is not significant. Women who

cohabited before marrying and especially women who only cohabited are more likely to separate than women who experienced direct marriage. The positive effect of (transitory and permanent) cohabitation on separation is larger for native than for immigrant women, as indicated by the negative sign of the interaction effects included in model 4 (Table 8). These results again support the disruption and selection hypotheses against the socialization and adaptation ones, in this case for all origin groups.

6. Preferences concerning partnership formation among adolescents of immigrant and native origin in Spain

6.1. Descriptive results

In this paper we will utilize the adolescents and their parents' responses to the following questions in order to analyze the partnership - related preferences among youth of both immigrant and non-immigrant origin, as well as the influence of their parents' preferences on them.

Would you like to cohabit with your partner without being married?
Would you like to marry someone in the future?
At which age would you like to marry someone?

In Figure 6 we have summarized the answers given to two questions about preferences regarding cohabitation and marriage as two forms of partnership formation, and the corresponding living arrangements. As can be seen, 70% of natives said they wanted to both cohabitate and marry someone, which suggests they understand or plan for their lives marriage and cohabitation as potentially compatible living arrangements instead of perfect substitutes. The corresponding percentage for non-natives is approximately 57 percent. Only 10 percent of adolescents among natives, 1.5 and 2nd generation conceive cohabitation as an alternative to marriage (they would like to cohabit with a partner but reject the idea of marrying someone); in contrast, the corresponding percentage among children born to mixed-couples is almost double.

(Figure 6 about here)

Adolescent who expressed their wish to marry in the future were asked at what age they would like to marry: children of mixed couples were the ones more prone to delay marriage, until age 28.5, whereas 1.5 generation expressed, on average, their wish to marry two years earlier. Natives and second generation adolescents lie somewhere in between (27.2 and 27.7 respectively), as shown by Figure 7.

(Figure 7 about here)

An exploratory analysis of the data shows that gender is a crucial variable concerning these issues. Accordingly, all the multivariate models estimated in the next section will be separated by gender.

6.2. Multivariate analyses

In order to confirm whether the cross-group differences observed in preferences concerning the way and timing of entering into partnership remain unchanged, or not, when composition effects related to sex, parental education, students' educational performance and plans, migrant status and region of origin, residential preferences and parental preferences are controlled for, we have run several multivariate models. In table 9, we analyzed their preferred way of entering into partnership taking their entire life course as the relevant time frame. Three potential outcomes were considered: marriage without previous cohabitation, marriage with previous cohabitation and only cohabitation without ever marry. In models 1 and 2 the entire sample is utilized, in models 3 to 6 only the sample of students whose parents completed the questionnaire. Since this is a select sample of the entire population, we first fit the models for this subsample without including parental preferences in models 3 and 4 and then re-estimate the models including them, in order to distinguish changing effects that might be due to the reduced sample size and changing effects related to the additional controls introduced in models 5 and 6.

(Table 9 about here)

Both 1.5 and 2nd generation adolescents, male or female, are more likely to prefer direct marriage than only cohabitation or marriage preceded by cohabitation. However, it is interesting that Latin-Americans are systematically more likely to prefer cohabitation than

young people from other origins, while adolescents from Moroccan origin show precisely the opposite effect. In addition, the results for the subsample of students whose parents completed the questionnaire suggest that a large part of the observed differences between descendants of immigrants and comparable natives work through socialization occurred within the family. Once parental preferences regarding children's future partnership decisions are controlled for, differences between second generation adolescents and natives disappear for both boys and girls, and a reduced but still remain for 1.5 generation.

Finally, students were asked about the age they would like to enter into marriage if they have chosen marriage as one desired option for their future. As shown in Table 11, boys and girls from 1.5 generation and 2nd generation girls wish marrying at a younger age than comparable natives. However, adolescents from Latin American origin again prefer marry later than other origin groups, including natives, once the effect of being a migrant is controlled for. In addition, girls that have a strong wish to go to the university prefer to delay marriage, while girls that ever repeated a school year are more likely to wish to marry earlier.

(Table 10 about here)

In sum, adolescents born abroad tend to express a stronger preference for marriage than comparable natives, and also for marrying at a younger age. Across regions of origin, however, adolescents of Latin American origin are more likely to prefer cohabitation and later marriage than other immigrant groups, while Moroccan girls tend to show the opposite pattern. Differences between second generation adolescents and their native counterparts decline but do not completely disappear, especially for females. A large part of the declining gap between native in immigrant youth concerning their partnership preferences is observed once their parental preferences are controlled for.

7. Conclusions

Taking an intergenerational look at the process of partnership formation among people of immigrant origin in Spain, and comparing it to that of similar natives, it has become clear that both selection and socialization effects interact to explain differences between native women and immigrant women in Spain. The preferences of adolescents of immigrant origin

concerning partnership type and timing seem largely dominated by strong socialization into their parents' values. However, differences between 1.5 and 2nd generations' preferences also provide evidence of clear adaptation over time, although the pace of adaptation is substantially slower among females than among males. Accordingly, the hypotheses formulated in the framework of the intergenerational transmission of values approach improve the understanding of why convergence with dominant family forms in countries of destination is not necessarily a lineal process across immigrant generations.

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Appendix

Table 1. Size and characteristics of the resident population in Spain by own and parental place of birth combined, 2011

Group	Own and parents' place of birth	Size	Total %	Female %	Age	3 first origins
0	NB to two NB parents **Native**	38,947,733	84		43	Sp
6	FB to two NB parents **Children of two Spanish emigrants born abroad**	476,044	1	51	41	Arg, Fr, Mor
5	FB mixed-nativity parents **Children of one Spanish emigrant born abroad**	275,868	1	49	35	Fr, Germ, Venez
1	FB to two FB parents & agemig>15 **1st gen**	3,830,496	8	50	41	Rom, Mor, Ecu
2	FB to two FB parents & agemig<=15 **1.5 gen**	1,066,777	2	45	18	Mor, Rom, Ecu
3	NB to two FB parents **2nd gen**	797,289	2	46	11	Mor, Rom, Ecu
4	NB to mixed-nativity parents **Children of mixed couples in Spain**	1,180,519	3	49	24	Fr, Mor, Germ
	Total	46,574,725	100			

Source: Census 2011. Weighted results. Note: the abbreviations NB and FB denote native-born and foreign-born individuals, respectively

Table 2. Marital status by group and sex, 2011 (row percentages)

		Single		Married		Widowed		Separated		Divorced	
		M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W
0	**Natives**										
6	**FB to NB couple**	40	35	50	48	2	7	2	2	5	7
5	**FB to mixed-nativity couple**	56	49	37	38	1	5	2	2	4	6
1	**1st generation**	31	27	61	59	1	4	2	3	5	7
2	**1.5 generation**	90	86	8	12	0	1	0	1	1	1
3	**2nd generation**	91	91	7	7	0	1	0	0	1	1
4	**NB to mixed-nativity couple**	79	75	18	18	1	5	1	1	2	2
	Total	56	49	39	40	1	4	1	2	3	5

Source: Census 2011. Weighted results. Note: the abbreviations FB and NB denote foreign-born and native-born individuals, respectively.

Table 3. Main characteristics of the sample of women interviewed in FVS2006, by nativity

		1Gen	Native
Birth Cohort	till 1960	15	49
	1960-69	22	18
	1970-79	32	17
	1980-85	20	9
	1986-	12	8
Educational level	Tertiary	21	15
Origin	Spain	0	100
	Eastern Europe	13	0
	Latin America	55	0
	EU15	15	0
	Africa	11	0
	Other	4	0
Partnership trajectory	Ever cohabited	0	0
	Ever married	1	1
	Ever separated	0	0
	Ever widowed	0	0
	Age at first cohabitation	21	23
	Age at first marriage	22	23
	Age at first separation	27	32
	Age at first widow	41	61
Migration trajectory	Years since migration	9.1	NA
	Age at migration	26	NA
	Married before migration	0	NA
	Separated before migration	0	NA

Source: FVS2006. Weighted percentages.

Table 4. Sample size by group, sex and availability of parental questionnaire

	Students		Parents	
	Male	Female	Total	Total
Native				
N	749	640	1389	818
%	53	48	51	64
NB/FB mix parents				
N	101	50	151	59
%	7	4	5	5
FB with FB parents				
N	420	505	924	322
%	30	38	34	25
NB with FB parents				
N	139	148	287	84
%	10	11	10	7
Total				
N	1408	1343	2751	1284
%	100	100	100	100

Source: Chances 2011. Weighted data.



Figure 1. Survival estimates of entry into first union by migrant status.



Source: FVS2006.

Figures 2. Survival estimates of entry into first marriage by migrant status.



Source: FVS2006.

Figures 3. Survival estimates of entry into first cohabitation by migrant status.



Source: FVS2006.

Figures 4. Survival estimates of union dissolution by migrant status



Source: FVS2006.

Figures 5. Survival estimates of union dissolution by education

Table 5. Transition from single to first union, regardless of type of union (odd ratios)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	0.93***	0.93***	0.93***
Ref. Before 1960			
1960-69	1.08**	1.10**	1.10**
1970-79	1.18***	1.20***	1.21***
1980-85	0.77***	0.79***	0.79***
1986-	0.25***	0.25***	0.25***
Ref. Native			
Eastern Europe	1.45***	1.44***	1.41**
Latin America	1.24***	1.23***	1.20**
EU-15	1.18*	1.20*	1.15
Africa	1.17	1.15	1.14
Other	1.24	1.25	1.21
Ref. Less than tertiary			
Tertiary		0.900**	1.01
Tertiary*Native			0.88
N	226865	226865	226525

Source: FVS2006.
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001.

Table 6. Transition from single to first marriage (odd ratios)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	0.93***	0.93***	0.93***
Ref. Before 1960			
1960-69	0.95	0.98	0.98
1970-79	0.77***	0.80***	0.80***
1980-85	0.31***	0.32***	0.32***
1986-	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***
Ref. Native			
Eastern Europe	1.22	1.20	1.16
Latin America	1.01	1.01	0.97
EU-15	0.99	1.01	0.95
Africa	1.24	1.20	1.19
Other	0.94	0.96	0.91
Ref. Less than tertiary			
Tertiary		0.81***	0.98
Tertiary*Native			0.80
N	226865	226865	226525

Source: FVS2006. Exponentiated coefficients;. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001.

Table 7. Transition from single to first cohabitation (odd ratios)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	0.96***	0.96***	0.96***
Ref. Before 1960			
1960-69	2.64***	2.56***	2.54***
1970-79	6.28***	6.00***	5.95***
1980-85	7.54***	7.17***	7.07***
1986-	4.10***	4.13***	4.11***
Ref. Native			
Eastern Europe	1.94***	1.98***	2.05***
Latin America	1.82***	1.85***	1.92***
EU-15	1.77***	1.71**	1.83***
Africa	1.14	1.19	1.21
Other	2.00*	2.05*	2.11*
Ref. Less than tertiary			
Tertiary		1.22**	1.07
Tertiary*Native			1.17
N	226865	226865	226525

Source: FVS2006. Exponentiated coefficients. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001

Table 8. Transition from first union to first separation, regardless of type of union (odd ratios)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Union's duration	1.07***	1.07***	1.08***	1.08***
Ref. Before 1960				
1960-69	3.89***	3.80***	3.53***	3.40***
1970-79	6.20***	6.00***	4.69***	4.38***
1980-85	13.98***	13.59***	8.88***	8.07***
1986-	23.57***	23.83***	11.63***	11.98***
Ref. Native				
Eastern Europe	1.11	1.11	1.04	2.53
Latin America	3.07***	3.20***	2.73***	6.67**
EU-15	2.69***	2.64***	2.44***	5.48**
Africa	1.96**	2.01**	2.06**	3.96**
Other	4.06**	4.10**	3.40**	8.62**
Ref. Less than tertiary				
Tertiary		1.19	1.08	1.05
Ref. Direct marriage				
Cohab+Marriage			1.39**	1.59**
Only cohabited			2.35***	3.23***
Direct marriage*Inmig				0.69
Coh+Marr*Inmig				0.36
Only cohab*Inmig				0.20**
N	190789	190789	190789	190485

Source: FVS2006. Exponentiated coefficients. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001.



Source: Chances 2011. Weighted data.

Figure 6. Would you like to cohabit with your partner without being married? Would you like to marry someone in the future? Combined answers.



Source: Chances 2011. Weighted data.

Figure 7. At what age would you like to marry someone?

Table 9. Multinomial logit coefficients for preference between marriage, cohabitation and marriage and only cohabitation over the life course (odds ratio)

Ref. Marry_no_coh	**male**	**female**	**male**	**female**	**male**	**female**
Coh_marr (Ref. Natives)						
Children to mixed parents	0.58	0.91	0.21**	1.23	0.17**	1.14
1.5 generation	0.35**	0.20***	0.23**	0.27**	0.29*	0.35**
2nd generation	0.48*	0.34**	0.23*	0.39	0.30	0.50
Parents'Educ. Level (Ref. Less)						
Secondary	1.04	1.19	0.57	1.31	0.56	1.30
Tertiary	0.82	0.93	0.49	1.18	0.51	1.28
Wish to go to University	0.96	0.95*	1.00	0.93	1.01	0.93
Repeated school year	1.36*	0.88	1.28	0.99	1.24	0.97
Wish to live in Sp when adult	0.62	1.03	0.57	0.98	0.60	0.94
Inter wishSP*non-native	1.20	1.16	1.68	0.77	1.77	0.75
Ref. Other						
Latino origin	2.14**	1.75**	1.92	1.91*	1.73	2.00*
Moroccan origin	0.34**	0.29**	0.45	0.15**	0.48	0.18**
Ref. No						
Wish child cohabitate					1.69**	2.12**
Indiferent/child's pref.					3.96*	6.25*
Coh_no_marr (Ref. Natives)						
Children to mixed parents	0.39*	1.32	0.30	0.74	0.16*	0.67
1.5 generation	0.14***	0.15***	0.05**	0.07**	0.11**	0.19
2nd generation	0.12***	0.29**	0.07**	0.12*	0.15	0.27
Parents' Educ. Level (Ref. Less)						
Secondary	1.53	1.96	1.60	1.46	1.50	1.63
Tertiary	1.73	1.12	1.87	0.50	1.93	0.76
Wish to go to University	0.93**	0.86***	0.86**	0.84**	0.87**	0.85**
Repeated school year	1.92**	0.50**	2.05*	0.37**	1.84	0.31**
Wish to live in Sp when adult	0.22***	0.52*	0.20**	0.56	0.23**	0.53
Inter wishSP*non-native	3.06**	1.31	3.38	0.93	4.01	0.85
Ref. Other						
Latino origin	3.27**	3.41**	5.02**	15.19**	3.62	13.53**
Moroccan origin	0.00	0.26	0.00	2.14	0.00	3.81
Ref. No						
Wish child cohabitate					4.59***	5.58***
Indiferent/child's pref.					29.40***	73.13***
N	1238	1175	429	545	429	545

Source: Chances 2011. Exponentiated coefficients. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001

Table 10. Linear regression estimates for preferred age at marriage

	male		female	
Ref. Natives				
Children to mixed parents	-0.55		-0.29	
1.5 generation	-1.62	**	-1.34	**
2nd generation	-0.91		-1.20	**
Parents' highest ed. Level (Ref. Less)				
Secondary	-0.14		0.09	
Tertiary	-0.06		0.29	
Wish to go to University	0.04		0.10	**
Repeated school year	0.38		-0.49	**
Wish to live in Sp when adult	-0.74	*	-0.24	
Inter wishSP*non-native	0.03		0.03	
Ref. Other				
Latino origin	0.94	**	0.87	**
Moroccan origin	-1.24		-1.38	**
Cons	28.62	***	26.63	***
N	1018		1007	

Source: Chances 2011. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001