Group-size-dependent punishment of idle subordinates in a cooperative breeder where helpers pay to stay

Fischer, Stefan ORCID: 0000-0001-8811-7518, Zoettl, Markus, Groenewoud, Frank and Taborsky, Barbara (2014) Group-size-dependent punishment of idle subordinates in a cooperative breeder where helpers pay to stay. PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B-BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, 281 (1789). 20140184-.

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Abstract

In cooperative breeding systems, dominant breeders sometimes tolerate unrelated individuals even if they inflict costs on the dominants. According to the 'pay-to-stay' hypothesis, (i) subordinates can outweigh these costs by providing help and (ii) dominants should be able to enforce help by punishing subordinates that provide insufficient help. This requires that dominants can monitor helping and can recognize group members individually. In a field experiment, we tested whether cooperatively breeding cichlid Neolamprologus pulcher subordinates increase their help after a forced 'idle' period, how other group members respond to a previously idle helper, and how helper behaviour and group responses depend on group size. Previously, idle helpers increased their submissiveness and received more aggression than control helpers, suggesting that punishment occurred to enforce help. Subordinates in small groups increased their help more than those in large groups, despite receiving less aggression. When subordinates were temporarily removed, dominants in small groups were more likely to evict returning subordinates. Our results suggest that only in small groups do helpers face a latent threat of punishment by breeders as predicted by the pay-to-stay hypothesis. In large groups, cognitive constraints may prevent breeders from tracking the behaviour of a large number of helpers.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	Cite as: Fischer S, Zo¨ttl M, Groenewoud F, Taborsky B. 2014 Group-size dependent punishment of idle subordinates in a cooperative breeder where helpers pay to stay. Proc. R. Soc. B 281: 20140184. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2014.0184
Uncontrolled Keywords:	conflict, cooperation, helping, territory defence, eviction, cichlids
Subjects:	?? Q1 ?? ?? QL ??
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	26 Jan 2016 16:00
Last Modified:	16 Dec 2022 02:27
DOI:	10.1098/rspb.2014.0184
Related URLs:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/2048775