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Collaborative public procurement: institutional explanations of legitimised resistance
Abstract
This paper reports on the barriers to regional collaborative procurement developed from an action research study of five UK public authorities in the emergency services sector. Despite political pressure to procure collaboratively, strategic avoidance responses of institutional logics and symbolic tick boxing legitimise stakeholder resistance to isomorphic forces and entrench operational barriers. The prevailing institutional logics are that regional collaborative procurement is unsuitable and risky, derived from procurements lack of status and the emotive nature of the emergency services. Symbolic tick boxing is seen through collaboration that is limited to high profile spend categories, enabling organisations to demonstrate compliance while simultaneously retaining local decision-making for less visible, but larger areas of spend. The findings expose choice mechanisms in public procurement by exploring tensions arising from collaborative procurement strategies within, and between, organisations. Multiple stakeholders perspectives add to current thinking on how organisations create institutional logics to avoid institutional pressure to procure collaboratively and how stakeholders legitimise their actions.
Keywords: Collaborative procurement, public procurement, strategic resistance, legitimacy, action research, institutional theory
Acknowledgements
The Economic and Social Research Council and the Technology Strategy Board supported this work
1.0 Introduction
The UK public sector spent 109billion on the procurement of goods and services in 2013 ADDIN EN.CITE HM Treasury2013161(HM Treasury, 2013b)16116127HM Treasury,Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses 20132013London( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_44" \o "HM Treasury, 2013 #161" HM Treasury, 2013b). Major external events such as the global financial crisis and subsequent shifts in institutional configurations have caused significant effects on the environment for public procurement, including austerity, changes to financial governance and the need to generate large scale efficiency savings ADDIN EN.CITE Prowle2014213(Prowle and Harradine, 2014)21321317Prowle, MalcolmHarradine, DonAusterity and financial governance: a UK case study of the National Health ServiceInternational Journal of Public Sector ManagementInternational Journal of Public Sector Management212-22427320140951-3558( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_68" \o "Prowle, 2014 #213" Prowle and Harradine, 2014). The 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review saw the UK government embark on a reduction of public sector spend and the implementation of a period of austerity that underlined the centrality of financial resources in the public sector ADDIN EN.CITE Kioko2011125(Kioko, Marlowe, Matkin, Moody, Smith and Zhao, 2011)12512517Kioko, S.N.Marlowe, J.Matkin, D.S.T.Moody, M.Smith, D.L.Zhao, Z.J.Why Public Financial Management MattersJournal of Public Administration Research and TheoryJournal of Public Administration Research and Theoryi113-i12421suppl 120111053-1858( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_50" \o "Kioko, 2011 #125" Kioko, Marlowe, Matkin, Moody, Smith and Zhao, 2011). Public sector collaboration is seen as an imperative to deliver value for money ADDIN EN.CITE Treasury2013170(HM Treasury, 2013a)17017027HM Treasury,Managing public money2013London( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_43" \o "HM Treasury, 2013 #170" HM Treasury, 2013a) but gaps exist in understanding its origins, prevalence and impact on organisational performance ADDIN EN.CITE ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA ( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_24" \o "Dunleavy, 2006 #130" Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow and Tinkler, 2006; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_96" \o "Wright, 2010 #131" Wright and Pandey, 2010). Collaborative procurement is increasingly on the public policy agenda ADDIN EN.CITE Walker2013159(Walker, Schotanus, Bakker and Harland, 2013)15915917Walker, HelenSchotanus, FredoBakker, ElmerHarland, ChristineCollaborative procurement: a relational view of buyerbuyer relationshipsPublic Administration ReviewPublic Administration Review588-59873420131540-6210( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_92" \o "Walker, 2013 #159" Walker, Schotanus, Bakker and Harland, 2013) as it can deliver savings, promote financial transparency, rationalise specifications and simplify evaluation processes ADDIN EN.CITE Gobbi2015167(Gobbi and Hsuan, 2015)16716717Chiara GobbiJuliana HsuanCollaborative purchasing of complex technologies in healthcare: implications for alignment strategiesInternational Journal of Operations & Production ManagementInternational Journal of Operations & Production Management430-4553532015( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_32" \o "Gobbi, 2015 #167" Gobbi and Hsuan, 2015). Despite the government rhetoric of the benefits and importance of collaborative procurement, uptake across the public sector is low, exacerbated by a lack of quality, consistent spend data ADDIN EN.CITE HM Treasury2009215(HM Treasury, 2009a)21521527HM Treasury,Operational Efficiency Programme: Collaborative procurement2009MayLondon( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_41" \o "HM Treasury, 2009 #215" HM Treasury, 2009a). A number of studies have explored collaboration with public service providers ADDIN EN.CITE ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA (c.f, HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_50" \o "Kioko, 2011 #125" Kioko et al., 2011; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_39" \o "Hefetz, 2012 #122" Hefetz and Warner, 2012; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_54" \o "Lamothe, 2012 #120" Lamothe and Lamothe, 2012) but there remains a paucity of research on the barriers and enablers of collaborative public procurement within member organisations ADDIN EN.CITE Walker2013159(Walker et al., 2013)15915917Walker, HelenSchotanus, FredoBakker, ElmerHarland, ChristineCollaborative procurement: a relational view of buyerbuyer relationshipsPublic Administration ReviewPublic Administration Review588-59873420131540-6210( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_92" \o "Walker, 2013 #159" Walker et al., 2013).
The paper presents an exploration of how public procurement organisations respond to institutional pressures ADDIN EN.CITE Oliver1991129(Oliver, 1991; Pache and Santos, 2010)12912917Christine OliverStrategic Responses to Institutional ProcessesThe Academy of Management ReviewThe Academy of Management Review145-1791611991Pache201015115115117Pache, A.C.Santos, F.When worlds collide: The internal dynamics of organizational responses to conflicting institutional demandsAcademy of Management Review Academy of Management Review455-47635320100363-7425( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_63" \o "Oliver, 1991 #129" Oliver, 1991; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_64" \o "Pache, 2010 #151" Pache and Santos, 2010). Institutional theory explains how the institutional environment influences and establishes an organisations structures, norms and rules, and how these become resilient, legitimatised guidelines for social behaviour ADDIN EN.CITE ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA ( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_56" \o "Meyer, 1977 #102" Meyer and Rowan, 1977; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_21" \o "DiMaggio, 1983 #25" DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_98" \o "Zucker, 1987 #104" Zucker, 1987). Institutional theory is a useful lens to explore the challenges of implementing collaborative procurement in practice because it highlights the tensions between achieving legitimacy and achieving efficiency ADDIN EN.CITE Ashworth200921(Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge, 2009)212117Rachel AshworthGeorge BoyneRick DelbridgeEscape from the Iron Cage? Organizational Change and Isomorphic Pressures in the Public SectorJournal of Public Adminstration Research & Theory165-1871912009doi:10.1093/jopart/mum038 ( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_5" \o "Ashworth, 2009 #21" Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge, 2009). Collaborative procurement policies create tensions between cost, compliance and quality considerations across intra-organisational stakeholder groups, and between inter-organisational collaborating authorities, where different social values, rules and rationalities may exist. For example, collaborative regional procurement may provide scale economy benefits ADDIN EN.CITE Gobbi2015167(Gobbi and Hsuan, 2015)16716717Chiara GobbiJuliana HsuanCollaborative purchasing of complex technologies in healthcare: implications for alignment strategiesInternational Journal of Operations & Production ManagementInternational Journal of Operations & Production Management430-4553532015( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_32" \o "Gobbi, 2015 #167" Gobbi and Hsuan, 2015) but reduce devolved decision-making control or compromise the delivery of locally-appropriate solutions ADDIN EN.CITE CLGC2014177(CLGC, 2014)17717727CLGCLocal government procurement: Sixth report of session 2013-142014LondonHouse of Commons, Communities and Local Government Committee( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_11" \o "CLGC, 2014 #177" CLGC, 2014). Institutional theory provides a deeper understanding of why, and how, internal decision makers can resist external pressures to implement collaborative public procurement.
There have been calls for public procurement research to focus on behavioural aspects of collaboration ADDIN EN.CITE ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA ( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_39" \o "Hefetz, 2012 #122" Hefetz and Warner, 2012; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_54" \o "Lamothe, 2012 #120" Lamothe and Lamothe, 2012; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_92" \o "Walker, 2013 #159" Walker et al., 2013). Research centred on behaviours and resistance is relevant given the apparent low uptake of collaborative public procurement strategies ADDIN EN.CITE HM Treasury2009215(HM Treasury, 2009a)21521527HM Treasury,Operational Efficiency Programme: Collaborative procurement2009MayLondon( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_41" \o "HM Treasury, 2009 #215" HM Treasury, 2009a), despite potential commercial benefits that these can deliver ADDIN EN.CITE Schotanus201131(Schotanus, Bakker, Walker and Essig, 2011)313117F SchotanusE BakkerH WalkerM EssigDevelopment of Purchasing Groups during Their Life Cycle: From Infancy to MaturityPublic Administration ReviewPublic Administration Review265-2757122011doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2011.02337.x( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_76" \o "Schotanus, 2011 #31" Schotanus, Bakker, Walker and Essig, 2011). Using a longitudinal (2 year) action research study of five public authorities in the UKs emergency services sector we build on work that suggests that full compliance with institutional demands is neither realistic nor possible and in some cases pressure is ignored by decision-makers ADDIN EN.CITE Pache2010151(Pache and Santos, 2010)15115117Pache, A.C.Santos, F.When worlds collide: The internal dynamics of organizational responses to conflicting institutional demandsAcademy of Management Review Academy of Management Review455-47635320100363-7425( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_64" \o "Pache, 2010 #151" Pache and Santos, 2010). Action research provides a method for deep understanding of the actors, interactions and behaviours over time ADDIN EN.CITE Woodside2003216(Woodside and Wilson, 2003)21621617Woodside, Arch GWilson, Elizabeth JCase study research methods for theory buildingJournal of Business & Industrial MarketingJournal of Business & Industrial Marketing493-508186/720030885-8624( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_95" \o "Woodside, 2003 #216" Woodside and Wilson, 2003), and reveals issues on which action can be taken ADDIN EN.CITE Coughlan2002200(Coughlan and Coghlan, 2002)20020017Coughlan, PaulCoghlan, DavidAction research for operations managementInternational Journal of Operations & Production ManagementInternational Journal of Operations & Production Management220-24022220020144-3577( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_13" \o "Coughlan, 2002 #200" Coughlan and Coghlan, 2002).
The iterative nature of the action research study developed two core research questions:
1) What are the barriers preventing collaborative procurement in the emergency services of the UK public sector?
2) How is resistance to collaborative procurement legitimised in the emergency services of the UK public sector?
The results are expected to provide a deeper understanding of how internal stakeholders resist and legitimise pressures to collaborate through exposing the underlying determinants of strategic responses to institutional pressures. Covert strategic responses ADDIN EN.CITE Oliver1991129(Oliver, 1991)12912917Christine OliverStrategic Responses to Institutional ProcessesThe Academy of Management ReviewThe Academy of Management Review145-1791611991( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_63" \o "Oliver, 1991 #129" Oliver, 1991) entrench overt operational barriers through the use of institutional logics and symbolic tick boxing. Strategic responses to collaborative procurement requests need to display external legitimacy whilst simultaneously protecting autonomous decision-making at local levels. The focus on stakeholder resistance in this study is a response to a call by institutional researchers to further explore the role of people and how they make sense of their decision-making relative to their contexts ADDIN EN.CITE Hallett2006181(Hallett and Ventresca, 2006)18118117Hallett, TimVentresca, Marc JInhabited institutions: Social interactions and organizational forms in Gouldners Patterns of Industrial BureaucracyTheory and SocietyTheory and Society213-23635220060304-2421( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_37" \o "Hallett, 2006 #181" Hallett and Ventresca, 2006). The multi-stakeholder perspective supports the move in the institutional literature from research focused on unitary views of organisations towards a consideration of heterogeneous functions within an organisation ADDIN EN.CITE Greenwood1996207(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Pache and Santos, 2010)20720717Greenwood, RoystonHinings, Christopher RUnderstanding radical organizational change: Bringing together the old and the new institutionalismAcademy of Management ReviewAcademy of Management Review1022-105421419960363-7425Pache201015115115117Pache, A.C.Santos, F.When worlds collide: The internal dynamics of organizational responses to conflicting institutional demandsAcademy of Management Review Academy of Management Review455-47635320100363-7425( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_33" \o "Greenwood, 1996 #207" Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_64" \o "Pache, 2010 #151" Pache and Santos, 2010).
A new model is presented in the paper that identifies the barriers, pressures and resistance in collaborative public procurement. The model focuses on and extends one component of resistance presented by Oliver (1991): avoidance. The results show how the interactions of external institutional demands and internal stakeholder responses result in a legitimised avoidance of collaborative procurement. We identify symbolic tick boxing and institutional logics as two legitimised avoidance tactics to collaborative procurement. Through an exploration of the dimensions of these avoidance tactics we explain the conditions for resistance to collaborative procurement against other more powerful political groups (such as national Government), showing how stakeholders maintain legitimacy for their avoidance even against a prevailing discourse of austerity, value for money, and public sector reform. The results contribute to public procurement research and practice through a deeper understanding of how stakeholders resist external forces to procure collaboratively.
2.0 UK public procurement
The UK public procurement landscape is fragmented with approximately 50 professional procurement organisations as well as individual public bodies operating framework agreements for goods and services ADDIN EN.CITE National Audit Office201016(National Audit Office, 2010)161627National Audit Office,A review of collaborative procurement across the public sector2010MayLondonNational Audit Office and the Audit Commission( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_59" \o "National Audit Office, 2010 #16" National Audit Office, 2010). Framework agreements are subject to EU procurement rules and they set out terms and conditions under which specific purchases (call-offs) can be made throughout the term of the agreement ADDIN EN.CITE OGC2008166(OGC, 2008)16616627OGCFramework Agreements: OGC Guidance on Framework Agreements in the Procurement Regulations2008LondonHM Treasury( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_62" \o "OGC, 2008 #166" OGC, 2008). In the UK emergency services, individual authorities are responsible for their own procurement and they use some framework agreements at sector, regional or national levels with call-off ordering from these contracts locally retained. Collaborative procurement between authorities can bring significant operational benefits through lower prices, reducing transaction costs, exchange of knowledge, quality management and improvement to procurement processes ADDIN EN.CITE Schotanus201131(Schotanus et al., 2011)313117F SchotanusE BakkerH WalkerM EssigDevelopment of Purchasing Groups during Their Life Cycle: From Infancy to MaturityPublic Administration ReviewPublic Administration Review265-2757122011doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2011.02337.x( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_76" \o "Schotanus, 2011 #31" Schotanus et al., 2011) and can reduce the duplicated hierarchies of procurement functions ADDIN EN.CITE Dunleavy2006130(Dunleavy et al., 2006)13013017Dunleavy, PatrickMargetts, HelenBastow, SimonTinkler, JaneNew Public Management Is DeadLong Live Digital-Era GovernanceJournal of Public Administration Research and TheoryJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory467-4941632006July 2006http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/content/16/3/467.abstract10.1093/jopart/mui057( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_24" \o "Dunleavy, 2006 #130" Dunleavy et al., 2006).
Maintaining integrity in decision-making is a fundamental pillar of public procurement ADDIN EN.CITE Schooner20021(Schooner, 2002)1117S L SchoonerDesiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract LawPublic Procurement Law Review103-1101032002( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_75" \o "Schooner, 2002 #1" Schooner, 2002), and in some jurisdictions is viewed as the primary goal of competitive bidding ADDIN EN.CITE Dekel2008169(Dekel, 2008)16916917Dekel, OmerThe legal theory of competitive bidding for government contractsPublic Contract Law JournalPublic Contract Law Journal237-26837220080033-3441( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_18" \o "Dekel, 2008 #169" Dekel, 2008). The achievement of value for money is at the heart of UK public procurement policy ADDIN EN.CITE House of Commons2014168(House of Commons, 2014)16816827House of Commons, Public Procurement. Public Procurement Standard Note SN/EP/6029.2014London( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_45" \o "House of Commons, 2014 #168" House of Commons, 2014). Value does not necessarily suggest the cheapest price, and the government define value for money as securing the best mix of quality and effectiveness for the least outlay over the period of use of the goods or services bought ADDIN EN.CITE HM Treasury2013170`, A4.6(HM Treasury, 2013a, A4.6)17017027HM Treasury,Managing public money2013London( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_43" \o "HM Treasury, 2013 #170" HM Treasury, 2013a, A4.6). To ensure value for money as defined, procurement require life cycle assessments of costs, quality and performance of goods and services purchased. Despite the clear mandate to deliver value for money in its widest sense over a product/service life cycle, the need for public bodies to comply with the European Union Public Procurement Directives can result in propriety and transparency requirements taking precedence over more commercial goals ADDIN EN.CITE Erridge20075(Erridge, 2007)5517Andrew ErridgePublic Procurement, Public Value and the Northern Ireland Unemployment Pilot ProjectPublic AdministrationPublic Administration1023-10438542007doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9299.2007.00674.x( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_25" \o "Erridge, 2007 #5" Erridge, 2007). In the case of the emergency services, the concept of value for money ensures (low) cost considerations do not override operational responsiveness and resilience of the products and services procured.
2.1 Collaborative public procurement
Public procurements role is to ensure regulatory compliance, prudent use of the public purse, and third-party delivery of contracted goods and services ADDIN EN.CITE Russell2014176(Russell and Meehan, 2014)17617617Russell, ColetteMeehan, JoanneExploring legitimacy in major public procurement projectsJournal of Public ProcurementJournal of Public Procurement419-46114420141535-0118( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_71" \o "Russell, 2014 #176" Russell and Meehan, 2014). The centralisation of public procurement is a growing worldwide trend to achieve efficiencies ADDIN EN.CITE Albano201049(Albano and Sparro, 2010; Walker et al., 2013)494917Gian Luigi Albano Marco SparroFlexible Strategies for Centralized Public ProcurementReview of Economics and Institutions1-321220102038-1379DOI 10.5202/rei.v1i2.4Walker201315915915917Walker, HelenSchotanus, FredoBakker, ElmerHarland, ChristineCollaborative procurement: a relational view of buyerbuyer relationshipsPublic Administration ReviewPublic Administration Review588-59873420131540-6210( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_1" \o "Albano, 2010 #49" Albano and Sparro, 2010; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_92" \o "Walker, 2013 #159" Walker et al., 2013) and requires a level of collaboration between authorities. We define collaborative procurement as two or more buying organisations working together, pooling knowledge and purchasing power, to increase buyer-side leverage in the market and/or to deliver other economies. Economies of scale provide commercial benefit through combining purchase volumes ADDIN EN.CITE Gobbi2015167(Gobbi and Hsuan, 2015)16716717Chiara GobbiJuliana HsuanCollaborative purchasing of complex technologies in healthcare: implications for alignment strategiesInternational Journal of Operations & Production ManagementInternational Journal of Operations & Production Management430-4553532015( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_32" \o "Gobbi, 2015 #167" Gobbi and Hsuan, 2015) coupled with product rationalisation and standardisation ADDIN EN.CITE Joyce200653(Joyce, 2006)535317W JoyceAccounting, purchasing and supply chain managementSupply Chain Management: An International Journal202-2071132006( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_48" \o "Joyce, 2006 #53" Joyce, 2006). Economies of process reduce duplications in tendering and provide supplier management efficiencies ADDIN EN.CITE Trautmann200952(Trautmann, Bals and Hartmann, 2009)525217G TrautmannL BalsE HartmannGlobal sourcing in integrated network structures: the case of hybrid purchasing organizationsJournal of International Management 194-2081522009( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_88" \o "Trautmann, 2009 #52" Trautmann, Bals and Hartmann, 2009). Knowledge sharing between collaborators provides economies of information through the development of purchasing expertise ADDIN EN.CITE McCue200057(McCue and Pitzer, 2000)575717C McCue J PitzerCentralized vs. decentralized purchasing: current trends in governmental procurement practicesJournal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management400-4201232000( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_55" \o "McCue, 2000 #57" McCue and Pitzer, 2000).
In the UK, public sector organisations share similar goals, regulatory environments, structures and procurement needs, all of which arguably increase their potential for collaborative procurement ADDIN EN.CITE Schotanus201131(Schotanus et al., 2011; Walker et al., 2013)313117F SchotanusE BakkerH WalkerM EssigDevelopment of Purchasing Groups during Their Life Cycle: From Infancy to MaturityPublic Administration ReviewPublic Administration Review265-2757122011doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2011.02337.xWalker201315915915917Walker, HelenSchotanus, FredoBakker, ElmerHarland, ChristineCollaborative procurement: a relational view of buyerbuyer relationshipsPublic Administration ReviewPublic Administration Review588-59873420131540-6210( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_76" \o "Schotanus, 2011 #31" Schotanus et al., 2011; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_92" \o "Walker, 2013 #159" Walker et al., 2013). In the emergency services, operational co-operation between authorities is essential particularly for front-line cross-border incidents and despite operational challenges, organisations can work together effectively at the local level without higher-order legal harmonisation ADDIN EN.CITE Princen2014178(Princen, Geuijen, Candel, Folgerts and Hooijer, 2014)17817817Princen, SebastiaanGeuijen, KarinCandel, JeroenFolgerts, OddyHooijer, RagnaEstablishing cross-border co-operation between professional organizations: Police, fire brigades and emergency health services in Dutch border regionsEuropean Urban and Regional StudiesEuropean Urban and Regional Studies1-16Mar20140969-7764( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_67" \o "Princen, 2014 #178" Princen, Geuijen, Candel, Folgerts and Hooijer, 2014). Unfortunately, collaboration can be notoriously conflict-ridden and challenging to manage ADDIN EN.CITE Amirkhanyan2009133(Amirkhanyan, 2009)13313317Amirkhanyan, Anna A.Collaborative Performance Measurement: Examining and Explaining the Prevalence of Collaboration in State and Local Government ContractsJournal of Public Administration Research and TheoryJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory523-5541932009July 1, 2009http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/content/19/3/523.abstract10.1093/jopart/mun022( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_3" \o "Amirkhanyan, 2009 #133" Amirkhanyan, 2009). The specific challenges of collaborative public procurement are identified in empirical research from the UKs public healthcare sector and include; the lack of standardised product coding, a lack of strategic buying, resistance from suppliers, reliance on suppliers data and a lack of market consideration ADDIN EN.CITE Walker2013159(Walker et al., 2013)15915917Walker, HelenSchotanus, FredoBakker, ElmerHarland, ChristineCollaborative procurement: a relational view of buyerbuyer relationshipsPublic Administration ReviewPublic Administration Review588-59873420131540-6210( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_92" \o "Walker, 2013 #159" Walker et al., 2013). Despite the political rhetoric there is currently no mandatory commitment for public procurement collaboration in the UK. The government bodies charged with promoting collaborative procurement recognise the complexities of enforcing compulsion and the potential negative side-effects of collaborative that can compromise the delivery of locally-appropriate and locally-accountable solutions are recognised ADDIN EN.CITE CLGC2014177(CLGC, 2014)17717727CLGCLocal government procurement: Sixth report of session 2013-142014LondonHouse of Commons, Communities and Local Government Committee( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_11" \o "CLGC, 2014 #177" CLGC, 2014).
2.2 Institutional theory and legitimacy
Institutional theory is one of the most dominant approaches to understanding organisations across disciplines ADDIN EN.CITE Greenwood2008223(Greenwood, Oliver, Kerstin and Suddaby, 2008)2232235Greenwood, RoystonOliver, ChristineSahlin KerstinSuddaby, RoyGreenwood, RoystonOliver, ChristineSahlin KerstinSuddaby, RoyIntroductionThe SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism2008LondonSAGE Publications( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_34" \o "Greenwood, 2008 #223" Greenwood, Oliver, Kerstin and Suddaby, 2008) and has been applied at micro-level to macro and global levels ADDIN EN.CITE Scott2005119(Scott, 2005)1191195W R ScottM A HittInstitutional theory: Contributing to a theoretical research programGreat Minds in Management4604842005Oxford, UKOxford University Press( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_77" \o "Scott, 2005 #119" Scott, 2005). Institutional theory stresses that organisations are influenced not just by their activities but by their environmental context seen through rules or myths representing social values and ideas ADDIN EN.CITE Meyer1977102(Meyer and Rowan, 1977)10210217J W MeyerB Rowan Institutionalized organizations: formal structure as myth and ceremonyAmerican Journal of SociologyAmerican Journal of Sociology340-3638321977( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_56" \o "Meyer, 1977 #102" Meyer and Rowan, 1977). The importance of cultural and situational norms shows how higher-level factors regulate and shape patterns of individual and collective behaviour ADDIN EN.CITE Schneiberg2006184(Schneiberg and Clemens, 2006)18418417Schneiberg, MarcClemens, Elisabeth S.The Typical Tools for the Job: Research Strategies in Institutional AnalysisSociological TheorySociological Theory195-2272432006American Sociological Association07352751http://www.jstor.org/stable/25046721This is a very interesting, useful paper. The authors make a significant effort in draeing together much of the research tradition in studies of institutional theory. Much of the paper is less relevant to the studies I am currently undertaking, and it is very wordy throughout making it a difficult read. However, it is critical to understanding how linkages between nations and their polity, organisational fields and insitutions are researched, with a rationale for different approaches to their study. Significantly, the authors draw out the presence of isomorphism on institutions.( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_74" \o "Schneiberg, 2006 #184" Schneiberg and Clemens, 2006). These institutionalised practices are typically taken-for granted, widely accepted and resistant to change ADDIN EN.CITE Meyer1977102(Meyer and Rowan, 1977)10210217J W MeyerB Rowan Institutionalized organizations: formal structure as myth and ceremonyAmerican Journal of SociologyAmerican Journal of Sociology340-3638321977( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_56" \o "Meyer, 1977 #102" Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Practices and behaviours are considered institutionalised by three indicators: that they are widely followed, accepted without debate and exhibit permanence ADDIN EN.CITE Tolbert1983164(Tolbert and Zucker, 1983)16416417Tolbert, Pamela SZucker, L.Institutional Sources of Change in the Formal Structure of Organizations: The Diffusion of Civil Service Reform, 1880-1935Administrative Science QuarterlyAdministrative Science Quarterly22-39301983( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_86" \o "Tolbert, 1983 #164" Tolbert and Zucker, 1983).
By conforming to institutional norms, organisations gain legitimacy and improve their prospects of survival ADDIN EN.CITE Powell1991224(Powell, 1991)2242245Powell, Walter WPowell, Walter WDiMaggio PJExpanding the scope of institutional analysisThe new institutionalism in organizational analysis183-2031991ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_65" \o "Powell, 1991 #224" Powell, 1991). Legitimacy can insulate an organisation from external pressures such as scrutiny or questioning of its conduct ADDIN EN.CITE Meyer1977102(Meyer and Rowan, 1977)10210217J W MeyerB Rowan Institutionalized organizations: formal structure as myth and ceremonyAmerican Journal of SociologyAmerican Journal of Sociology340-3638321977( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_56" \o "Meyer, 1977 #102" Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Conforming to shared norms enhances the perceived legitimacy of organisations, protects them from external pressure and scrutiny, and enhances their potential for survival ADDIN EN.CITE Meyer1977102(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995)10210217J W MeyerB Rowan Institutionalized organizations: formal structure as myth and ceremonyAmerican Journal of SociologyAmerican Journal of Sociology340-3638321977Suchman199517417417417Suchman, Mark CManaging legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approachesAcademy of Management ReviewAcademy of Management Review571-61020319950363-7425( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_56" \o "Meyer, 1977 #102" Meyer and Rowan, 1977; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_81" \o "Suchman, 1995 #174" Suchman, 1995). Legitimate activities resonate with the shared understanding among stakeholder groups of acceptable standards of performance, and in regulated environments legitimacy can take a more dominant role than enhancing economic performance ADDIN EN.CITE Deephouse199624(Zucker, 1987; Deephouse, 1996)242417David L. DeephouseDoes Isomorphism Legitimate? The Academy of Management JournalThe Academy of Management Journal1024-10393941996Zucker198710410410417L G ZuckerInstitutional theories of organizationAnnual Reviews in SociologyAnnual Reviews in Sociology443-464131987( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_98" \o "Zucker, 1987 #104" Zucker, 1987; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_17" \o "Deephouse, 1996 #24" Deephouse, 1996).
To acquire or maintain legitimacy, organisations respond isomorphically to their institutional environments ADDIN EN.CITE DiMaggio198325(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983)252517Paul J DiMaggioWalter W Powell The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational FieldsAmerican Sociological ReviewAmerican Sociological Review147-160 4821983Meyer197710210210217J W MeyerB Rowan Institutionalized organizations: formal structure as myth and ceremonyAmerican Journal of SociologyAmerican Journal of Sociology340-3638321977( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_56" \o "Meyer, 1977 #102" Meyer and Rowan, 1977; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_21" \o "DiMaggio, 1983 #25" DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Isomorphism refers to the degree of homogeneity between organisations caused by the internalisation of external influences ADDIN EN.CITE Ashworth200921(Frumkin and Galaskiewicz, 2004; Ashworth et al., 2009)212117Rachel AshworthGeorge BoyneRick DelbridgeEscape from the Iron Cage? Organizational Change and Isomorphic Pressures in the Public SectorJournal of Public Adminstration Research & Theory165-1871912009doi:10.1093/jopart/mum038 Frumkin200420202017Peter FrumkinJoseph GalaskiewiczInstitutional Isomorphism and Public Sector OrganizationsJournal of Public Adminstration Research & Theory283-3071432004doi:10.1093/jopart/muh028( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_29" \o "Frumkin, 2004 #20" Frumkin and Galaskiewicz, 2004; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_5" \o "Ashworth, 2009 #21" Ashworth et al., 2009) and much of the extant organisational research focuses on the propensity for conformity and similitude ADDIN EN.CITE ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA ( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_97" \o "Young, 2000 #185" Young, Stedham and Beekun, 2000; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_29" \o "Frumkin, 2004 #20" Frumkin and Galaskiewicz, 2004; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_46" \o "Irvine, 2007 #186" Irvine, 2007). Isomorphic responses are classified as: coercive, referring to convergence of responses driven by compliance or legislation; normative, seen through adherence to professional standards; or mimetic, where an organisation copies the structures and/or practices of others that are seemingly successful ADDIN EN.CITE DiMaggio198325(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983)252517Paul J DiMaggioWalter W Powell The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational FieldsAmerican Sociological ReviewAmerican Sociological Review147-160 4821983( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_21" \o "DiMaggio, 1983 #25" DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).
Strategic responses to institutional pressures have been classified on a passive-active scale of resistance from acquiescence, compromise, avoiding, defying, through to manipulation ADDIN EN.CITE Oliver1991129(Oliver, 1991)12912917Christine OliverStrategic Responses to Institutional ProcessesThe Academy of Management ReviewThe Academy of Management Review145-1791611991( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_63" \o "Oliver, 1991 #129" Oliver, 1991). Acquiescence and compromise represent passive responses to external forces for change and compliance, whereas avoidance, defiance and manipulation represent active forms of resistance. Strategic resistance is set against conditions that may elicit one form of resistance over another, but these strategies should not be divorced from the extreme external environment that many organisations operate in ADDIN EN.CITE Pache2010151(Pache and Santos, 2010)15115117Pache, A.C.Santos, F.When worlds collide: The internal dynamics of organizational responses to conflicting institutional demandsAcademy of Management Review Academy of Management Review455-47635320100363-7425( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_64" \o "Pache, 2010 #151" Pache and Santos, 2010).
Rather than taking for granted that institutional pressures will result in isomorphism, individuals have the ability to create change, even when institutional constraints persist. Organisations, and decision-makers within organisations, are active rather than passive in their responses ADDIN EN.CITE DiMaggio198325(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983)252517Paul J DiMaggioWalter W Powell The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational FieldsAmerican Sociological ReviewAmerican Sociological Review147-160 4821983( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_21" \o "DiMaggio, 1983 #25" DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) enabling the exercise of strategic choice ADDIN EN.CITE ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA ( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_10" \o "Clemens, 1999 #209" Clemens and Cook, 1999; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_78" \o "Seo, 2002 #210" Seo and Creed, 2002; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_22" \o "Dorado, 2005 #187" Dorado, 2005). The austere economic climate may change the desire for regional procurement collaboration if organisational or personal positions are threatened. Individual organisations are unlikely to seek collaborative solutions if a consequence might involve the loss of their own resource ADDIN EN.CITE Flynn200746(Flynn, 2007)46466Norman Flynn Public Sector Management5th2007LondonSage( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_28" \o "Flynn, 2007 #46" Flynn, 2007), creating dilemmas for collaborative procurement between optimising outcomes for individuals, departments, organisations, service users and taxpayers.
Resistance to collaboration can arise across institutions and at the institution-individual interface leading to legitimising behaviours that portray goal congruence yet conceal incompatible goals ADDIN EN.CITE Oliver1991129(Oliver, 1991; Vangen and Huxham, 2011)12912917Christine OliverStrategic Responses to Institutional ProcessesThe Academy of Management ReviewThe Academy of Management Review145-1791611991Vangen201113613613617Vangen, SivHuxham, ChrisThe Tangled Web: Unraveling the Principle of Common Goals in CollaborationsJournal of Public Administration Research and TheoryJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory731-7602242011December 21, 2011http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2011/12/21/jopart.mur065.abstract10.1093/jopart/mur065( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_63" \o "Oliver, 1991 #129" Oliver, 1991; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_90" \o "Vangen, 2011 #136" Vangen and Huxham, 2011). The effects of legitimacy tend to be classified as pragmatic, moral or cognitive forms ADDIN EN.CITE Suchman1995174(Suchman, 1995)17417417Suchman, Mark CManaging legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approachesAcademy of Management ReviewAcademy of Management Review571-61020319950363-7425( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_81" \o "Suchman, 1995 #174" Suchman, 1995), acknowledging which processes dominate legitimacy-seeking behaviour (be they stakeholder, norm or cognitively derived). A sense of legitimacy forms through social processes between individual and group activities that promote goals and shared norms The socially constructed patterns of practice, and the assumptions, beliefs and values that underpin the meaning of legitimate practices are referred to as institutional logics ADDIN EN.CITE Thornton1999165(Thornton and Ocasio, 1999)16516517Thornton, Patricia HOcasio, WilliamInstitutional logics and the historical contingency of power in organizations: Executive succession in the higher education publishing industry, 1958-1990American journal of SociologyAmerican Journal of Sociology801-843105319990002-9602( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_85" \o "Thornton, 1999 #165" Thornton and Ocasio, 1999). Individuals can gain access to and mobilise key resources to enable divergent change ADDIN EN.CITE Aldrich2011188cf. (cf. Aldrich, 2011)18818817Aldrich, H.E.Heroes, villains, and fools: institutional entrepreneurship, not institutional entrepreneursEntrepreneurship Research JournalEntrepreneurship Research Journal1-4122011( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_2" \o "Aldrich, 2011 #188" cf. Aldrich, 2011) through institutional logics. Institutional logics are important as they provide mechanisms to drive change, and crucially, also enable changes to be resisted through sustaining the legitimacy of current practice and shared values ADDIN EN.CITE Suddaby2005175(Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005)17517517Suddaby, RoyGreenwood, RoystonRhetorical strategies of legitimacyAdministrative Science QuarterlyAdministrative Science Quarterly35-6750120050001-8392( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_82" \o "Suddaby, 2005 #175" Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005).
Although there is no mandatory requirement to collaborate, there is government pressure to move public authorities towards collaborative procurement ADDIN EN.CITE Walker2013159(Walker et al., 2013)15915917Walker, HelenSchotanus, FredoBakker, ElmerHarland, ChristineCollaborative procurement: a relational view of buyerbuyer relationshipsPublic Administration ReviewPublic Administration Review588-59873420131540-6210( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_92" \o "Walker, 2013 #159" Walker et al., 2013). Under this pressure, and in a tough environment of severe budget cuts that may directly (and adversely) affect the quality of key services, public organisations could find it difficult to enact strategies of resistance particularly as the government reports stress the potential cost savings to be gained through collaboration ADDIN EN.CITE HM Treasury2009215(HM Treasury, 2009a; Roots, 2009)21521527HM Treasury,Operational Efficiency Programme: Collaborative procurement2009MayLondonRoots200982828227W RootsReview of arrangements for efficiencies from smarter procurement in local government2009LondonCLG( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_41" \o "HM Treasury, 2009 #215" HM Treasury, 2009a; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_70" \o "Roots, 2009 #82" Roots, 2009). Conflicting demands restrict compliance as satisfying one pressure can defy the competing other(s); this situation is more likely to result in avoidance tactics ADDIN EN.CITE Pache2010151(Pache and Santos, 2010)15115117Pache, A.C.Santos, F.When worlds collide: The internal dynamics of organizational responses to conflicting institutional demandsAcademy of Management Review Academy of Management Review455-47635320100363-7425( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_64" \o "Pache, 2010 #151" Pache and Santos, 2010). Avoidance attempts to dampen the perceived need to change by symbolic compliance, decoupling activities to buffer against the pressures or by leaving the environment that exerts the pressure ADDIN EN.CITE Oliver1991129(Oliver, 1991; Pache and Santos, 2010)12912917Christine OliverStrategic Responses to Institutional ProcessesThe Academy of Management ReviewThe Academy of Management Review145-1791611991Pache201015115115117Pache, A.C.Santos, F.When worlds collide: The internal dynamics of organizational responses to conflicting institutional demandsAcademy of Management Review Academy of Management Review455-47635320100363-7425( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_63" \o "Oliver, 1991 #129" Oliver, 1991; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_64" \o "Pache, 2010 #151" Pache and Santos, 2010).
Institutionally-adept organisations are able to meet, or least placate, pluralistic demands ADDIN EN.CITE Kraatz2008208(Kraatz and Block, 2008)2082085M KraatzE BlockR GreenwoodC OliverK SahlinR SuddabyOrganizational implications of institutional pluralismThe SAGE handbook of organizational institutionalism245-2752008LondonSage( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_53" \o "Kraatz, 2008 #208" Kraatz and Block, 2008). The emotive nature of emergency service organisations may provide isomorphic-resistant qualities as the general public accepts the uniqueness of the service provided in vulnerable and dangerous situations ADDIN EN.CITE Guy2014220(Guy, Newman and Mastracci, 2014)2202206Mary E GuyMeredith A NewmanSharon H MastracciEmotional Labor: Putting the Service in Public Service2014OxonRoutledge( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_36" \o "Guy, 2014 #220" Guy, Newman and Mastracci, 2014). The legitimacy of public sector collaboration reflected in the extant literature rests on its commitment to public justification through open, inclusive and credible processes of wide stakeholder engagement ADDIN EN.CITE Johnston2011138(Johnston, Hicks, Nan and Auer, 2011)13813817Johnston, Erik W.Hicks, DarrinNan, NingAuer, Jennifer C.Managing the Inclusion Process in Collaborative GovernanceJournal of Public Administration Research and TheoryJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory699-7212142011October 1, 2011http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/content/21/4/699.abstract10.1093/jopart/muq045( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_47" \o "Johnston, 2011 #138" Johnston, Hicks, Nan and Auer, 2011), yet there is little known to date of the legitimacy of not collaborating and how such resistance is normalised within an organisation. The governance of collaboration rests on principles of stakeholder inclusion in the decision-making ADDIN EN.CITE Ansell2008214(Ansell and Gash, 2008)21421417Ansell, ChrisGash, AlisonCollaborative governance in theory and practiceJournal of public administration research and theoryJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory543-57118420081053-1858( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_4" \o "Ansell, 2008 #214" Ansell and Gash, 2008) although resistance to collaboration lacks the same transparency and scrutiny as it is internally retained if not pursued.
3.0 Empirical context
This research is set in the emergency services sector and covers five neighbouring authorities (anonymised) in the UK. Each authority has a separate procurement team and different organisational structures. One authority outsources procurement and another outsources their accounts payable function. Regional and national collaborative structures exist and a regional management board was tasked with delivering integrated collaborative procurement services. A National Procurement Board (NPB) provides a forum to promote collaborative benefits nationally and at regional/sub-regional levels.
Collaborative procurement was a key strand of the UK governments 2008-9 Operational Efficiency Programme (OEP) ADDIN EN.CITE HM Treasury2009158(HM Treasury, 2009b)15815827HM Treasury,Operational Efficiency Programme: final report2009London( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_42" \o "HM Treasury, 2009 #158" HM Treasury, 2009b). The second National Procurement Strategy (2009-12) specifically focused on collaboration. The OEP recommended that 80% of common central government spend and 50% of all available wider public sector spend should be channelled through collaborative frameworks. Authorities were strongly encouraged, but not mandated, to coordinate requirements through the NPB. Other collaborative mechanisms existed through a regional working group consisting of the heads of procurement and numerous technical collaborative groups at a regional level. Despite high-level support for collaborative procurement, in all five organisations the uptake was low.
3.1 Methods
The research team was commissioned by the regional management board to complete the two-year action research project and were granted unique access across all five authorities that allowed for deep understanding of the actors, interactions and behaviours over time ADDIN EN.CITE Woodside2003216(Woodside and Wilson, 2003)21621617Woodside, Arch GWilson, Elizabeth JCase study research methods for theory buildingJournal of Business & Industrial MarketingJournal of Business & Industrial Marketing493-508186/720030885-8624( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_95" \o "Woodside, 2003 #216" Woodside and Wilson, 2003). The project design required the research team to develop and agree with the five organisations joint goals and outputs for the action-based research project. Team-based approaches are important in action research projects ADDIN EN.CITE Nslund2010201(Nslund, Kale and Paulraj, 2010)20120117Nslund, DagKale, RahulPaulraj, AntonyAction research in supply chain managementa framework for relevant and rigorous researchJournal of Business LogisticsJournal of Business Logistics331-35531220102158-1592( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_58" \o "Nslund, 2010 #201" Nslund, Kale and Paulraj, 2010) and the research team was contracted explicitly to act as change agents ADDIN EN.CITE Gummesson2000205(Gummesson, 2000)2052056Evert GummessonQualitative Methods in Management Research2nd2000LondonSage Publications( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_35" \o "Gummesson, 2000 #205" Gummesson, 2000) to deliver regional collaborative procurement. Project coordinators were appointed in each of the five organisations, and at a regional level an overall project lead and an executive project sponsor were appointed. An action research case study of the geographical region was the focus of the analyses. Case research displays the duality criterion ADDIN EN.CITE Ketokivi2014199`, p234(Ketokivi and Choi, 2014, p234)19919917Ketokivi, MikkoChoi, ThomasRenaissance of case research as a scientific methodJournal of Operations ManagementJournal of Operations Management232-24032520140272-6963( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_49" \o "Ketokivi, 2014 #199" Ketokivi and Choi, 2014, p234) by being grounded in the empirical context and also seeking broader theoretical generality. The complex management and operational issues inherent in collaborative procurement make case research appropriate ADDIN EN.CITE Voss2002202(Voss, Tsikriktsis and Frohlich, 2002)20220217Voss, ChrisTsikriktsis, NikosFrohlich, MarkCase research in operations managementInternational Journal of Operations & Production ManagementInternational Journal of Operations & Production Management195-21922220020144-3577( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_91" \o "Voss, 2002 #202" Voss, Tsikriktsis and Frohlich, 2002). There is a growing call for more action research in the supply chain field to increase practical relevance ADDIN EN.CITE Nslund2002203(Nslund, 2002)20320317Nslund, DagLogistics needs qualitative research-especially action researchInternational Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics ManagementInternational Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management321-33832520020960-0035( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_57" \o "Nslund, 2002 #203" Nslund, 2002) through exploring real-world institutional and managerial problems ADDIN EN.CITE ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA ( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_35" \o "Gummesson, 2000 #205" Gummesson, 2000; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_13" \o "Coughlan, 2002 #200" Coughlan and Coghlan, 2002; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_58" \o "Nslund, 2010 #201" Nslund et al., 2010).
Action research is a powerful method for revealing deep issues on which action can be taken ADDIN EN.CITE Coughlan2002200(Coughlan and Coghlan, 2002)20020017Coughlan, PaulCoghlan, DavidAction research for operations managementInternational Journal of Operations & Production ManagementInternational Journal of Operations & Production Management220-24022220020144-3577( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_13" \o "Coughlan, 2002 #200" Coughlan and Coghlan, 2002). The iterative nature of action research is particularly appropriate to explore responses over time to an unfolding series of actions ADDIN EN.CITE Coghlan2001206(Coghlan and Brannick, 2001)2062066D CoghlanT BrannickDoing Action Research in Your Own Organization2001LondonSage Publications( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_12" \o "Coghlan, 2001 #206" Coghlan and Brannick, 2001). The initial starting point of the project was to provide consultative research on standardising procurement processes to facilitate regional collaborative procurement. The driver for change was the UK Governments 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review that led to significant budget cuts for the authorities and collaborative procurement was seen as a solution to achieving the cost savings demanded. As discussed later, the iterative nature of the action research project saw this project change from process standardisation to deliver regional collaborative procurement, to an identification of the barriers to collaborative procurement, through to a much deeper exploration to uncover how resistance to collaborative procurement was being legitimised.
One researcher was seconded to work fulltime with each of the five authorities for the projects duration. Researchers were given open access to individuals and internal information providing contextually-rich data ADDIN EN.CITE Barratt2011111(Barratt, Choi and Li, 2011)11111117Barratt, MarkChoi, Thomas Y.Li, MeiQualitative case studies in operations management: Trends, research outcomes, and future research implicationsJournal of Operations ManagementJournal of Operations Management329-342294Case studiesResearch methodsInductiveDeductiveQualitativeTheory buildingTheoryTesting20110272-6963http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S027269631000046X10.1016/j.jom.2010.06.002( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_6" \o "Barratt, 2011 #111" Barratt, Choi and Li, 2011). The access gave opportunities to attend operational meetings, observe, map and explore decision-making processes, engage with key decision-makers and influencers and interrogate supporting documentary evidence of spend data, strategy documents and internal communications. The multi-stakeholder approach addresses the risk of homogeneity of responses noted in previous studies that only gathered data from procurement staff ADDIN EN.CITE Walker2013159(Walker et al., 2013)15915917Walker, HelenSchotanus, FredoBakker, ElmerHarland, ChristineCollaborative procurement: a relational view of buyerbuyer relationshipsPublic Administration ReviewPublic Administration Review588-59873420131540-6210( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_92" \o "Walker, 2013 #159" Walker et al., 2013). As illustrated in Figure 1, the overarching unit of analysis was the region with multiple embedded units of assessment at organisational, departmental, individual and workstream level ADDIN EN.CITE Barratt2011111(Barratt et al., 2011)11111117Barratt, MarkChoi, Thomas Y.Li, MeiQualitative case studies in operations management: Trends, research outcomes, and future research implicationsJournal of Operations ManagementJournal of Operations Management329-342294Case studiesResearch methodsInductiveDeductiveQualitativeTheory buildingTheoryTesting20110272-6963http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S027269631000046X10.1016/j.jom.2010.06.002( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_6" \o "Barratt, 2011 #111" Barratt et al., 2011). The strategies and structures for regional collaborative procurement are broadly consistent across the five organisations but they have diverse operational considerations as some service metropolitan areas while others are predominantly rural.
Figure 1: Units of analysis
Six representative spend workstreams were selected as the empirical focus based on the significance of aggregated spend, potential for collaboration and potential impact of collaborative procurement. The workstreams selected were two revenue categories (operational equipment and maintenance spares) two capital categories (vehicles and ICT) and two service categories (consultancy and training). Collectively these six areas had a combined annual spend of circa 30M. Internal stakeholders (N=70) participated in interactive discursive workshops (one for every workstream in every authority; 30 in total) to collect primary data on the baseline operations through process mapping, capture embedded knowledge ADDIN EN.CITE Tuggle200477(Tuggle and Goldfinger, 2004)777717F D TuggleW E GoldfingerA methodology for mining embedded knowledge from process mapsHuman Systems Management 1-132312004( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_89" \o "Tuggle, 2004 #77" Tuggle and Goldfinger, 2004), assess levels of collaboration and highlight opportunities, constraints and barriers.
Process maps were used at the start of the workshops, initially to explore process standardisation opportunities. The maps created subsequently provided a focus for discussion for participants. Workshops and process maps identify problem areas as the issues are visible and transparent ADDIN EN.CITE Klotz200871(Klotz, Horman, Bi and Bechtel, 2008)717117Leidy Klotz Michael HormanHenry H BiJohn BechtelThe impact of process mapping on transparencyInternational Journal of Productivity and Performance Management623-6365782008 ISSN: 1741-0401DOI: 10.1108/17410400810916053( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_51" \o "Klotz, 2008 #71" Klotz, Horman, Bi and Bechtel, 2008) and are suited to projects requiring cross-functional collaborations, tangible cost reduction ADDIN EN.CITE Wang200972(Wang, Zhao and Zhang, 2009)727217Harry Jiannan WangJ Leon ZhaoLiang Jie ZhangPolicy-Driven Process Mapping (PDPM): Discovering process models from business policiesDecision Support Systems267-2814812009ISSN 0167-9236DOI: 10.1016/j.dss.2009.08.006( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_93" \o "Wang, 2009 #72" Wang, Zhao and Zhang, 2009) and change ADDIN EN.CITE Fenton200776(Fenton, 2007)767617Evelyn M Fenton Visualising Strategic Change:: The Role and Impact of Process Maps as Boundary Objects in ReorganisationEuropean Management Journal,104-1172522007ISSN 0263-2373DOI: 10.1016/j.emj.2007.02.003( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_27" \o "Fenton, 2007 #76" Fenton, 2007). Stakeholders were classified generically as; Users (departmental heads, technical staff, requisitioners, budget holders, end users); Procurement (procurement officers, buyers, procurement managers, procurement directors); and Executives (finance executives, accounts payable managers, finance heads).
Each workshop lasted two-three hours and typically comprised of a procurement manager, requisitioner, technical manager, budget holder, buying assistant, stores supervisor (if a stocked item), finance officer and systems manager. Process maps took 30-45 minutes and were constructed using colour-coded cards to signify activities, outputs and decision points. Participants wrote key activities on the cards and placed them on a large template, pre-printed with generic functional areas (horizontally zoned) and generic stages in the purchasing cycle (vertically zoned). Participants used their own wording to describe the stages of the activity ADDIN EN.CITE Powney198884(Powney, 1988)848417J Powney Structured eavesdroppingResearch Intelligence10-12281988British Educational Research Foundation( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_66" \o "Powney, 1988 #84" Powney, 1988). Participants walked through completed maps as a group and they identified and discussed the barriers to collaborative procurement from different stakeholder perspectives. This holistic view of the procurement process facilitated interactions between individuals and allowed them to build on each others responses ADDIN EN.CITE Stewart199085(Stewart and Shamdasani, 1990)85856D W StewartP N ShamdasaniFocus Groups: Theory and Practice1990Newbury Park, LondonSage Publications( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_80" \o "Stewart, 1990 #85" Stewart and Shamdasani, 1990). The rest of the workshop consisted of traditional focus group discussions to explore broadly the issues and opportunities of collaborative procurement. The research team took extensive notes throughout the workshops and photographed the maps for reference. Process maps were input into Microsoft Visio process mapping software. Copies were circulated with the discussion notes to the participants for their sign off to ensure accuracy.
Workshop data were supplemented with forty 1:1 open interviews with key decision-makers (procurement heads, budget holders) who held specific regional roles related to collaboration and with influencers who did not necessarily interact directly with operational actions (for example, executives, departmental managers, standards and policy technicians). Interviews explored the barriers raised in the workshops capturing the strategic and political dimensions influencing collaborative procurement in addition to the rational and technical elements often prioritised in management literature ADDIN EN.CITE Hefetz2012122(Hefetz and Warner, 2012)12212217Hefetz, A.Warner, M.E.Contracting or Public Delivery? The importance of service, market and management characteristicsJournal of Public Administration Research and TheoryJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory289-31722220121053-185810.1093/jopart/mur006( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_39" \o "Hefetz, 2012 #122" Hefetz and Warner, 2012). Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and two hours. Extensive internal sources were used iteratively over the two-year timeframe to provide challenge and documentary evidence for triangulation. Internal sources include observational participant data ADDIN EN.CITE Silverman1993204(Silverman, 1993)2042046David SilvermanInterpreting Qualitative DataMethods for Analysing Talk, Text, and Interaction1993LondonSage Publications( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_79" \o "Silverman, 1993 #204" Silverman, 1993) from 21 regional workstream and/or functional collaborative meetings, organisational documents, policy statements, internal communications, spend and contract databases, minutes and regional strategy review documents.
Interview data, documentary evidence, process maps and accompanying notes were systematically compared and analysed to inductively identify the relationships between activities, people, data and policies ADDIN EN.CITE Biazzo200270(Biazzo, 2002)707017Stefano BiazzoProcess mapping techniques and organisational analysis: Lessons from sociotechnical system theoryBusiness Process Management Journal42-52812002ISSN: 1463-7154DOI: 10.1108/14637150210418629( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_7" \o "Biazzo, 2002 #70" Biazzo, 2002). The barriers to collaborative procurement identified were logged onto a stakeholder map and grouped by generic role. Barriers were clustered, sorted and coded to identify salient themes, patterns and concepts ADDIN EN.CITE Saldaa2012217(Saldaa, 2012)2172176Saldaa, JohnnyThe coding manual for qualitative researchers142012LondonSage Publications1446247376( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_72" \o "Saldaa, 2012 #217" Saldaa, 2012). A cyclical approach was used to theme the barriers into higher-level categories and explore linkages ADDIN EN.CITE Dey1999218(Dey, 1999)2182186Dey, IanGrounding grounded theory: Guidelines for qualitative inquiry1999BingleyEmerald Group Publishing Limited0122146409( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_19" \o "Dey, 1999 #218" Dey, 1999). The research team completed the coding analysis, both individually and collectively at various stages throughout the project to enable interpretative discussion, recoding, challenge, and organisation of the data and emergent categories. Disconfirmation examples were sought and considered to provide challenge to the emergent themes and to minimise researcher preconceptions ADDIN EN.CITE Glaser1992219(Glaser, 1992)2192196Glaser, B.Emergence vs forcing: Basics of grounded theory analysis1992Sociology Press1884156002( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_31" \o "Glaser, 1992 #219" Glaser, 1992). Cyclical grounded analysis of the data was reviewed against institutional theories to locate the underpinning values, beliefs and behaviours related to the espoused barriers. The analysis identified operational-level barriers between stakeholder groups (see figure 2) and the isomorphic pressures and strategic resistant responses used (figure 3).
4.0 Results and discussion
Results of the coding and analysis are presented, discussed and critiqued in light of the extant literature. Sections 4.1-4.2 discuss the isomorphic pressures and stakeholders perceptions identified from initial data coding; the emergent categories and themes are explored in 4.2.1-4.2.4; and the iterative model development is presented in sections 4.3-4.3.3.
4.1 Isomorphic pressures
Coercive pressures for collaborative procurement stem from a range of sources including most significantly, the UK governments value for money policy, strong political rhetoric on the wastefulness of public procurement across the press and media, and through formal policies and commissioned reports extoling the virtues of collaborative procurement ADDIN EN.CITE Gershon200480cf. (cf. Gershon, 2004; Roots, 2009; National Audit Office, 2010)808027P Gershon Releasing Resources to the Front Line: Independent Review of Public Sector Efficiency2004NorwichHM Treasury, HMSONational Audit Office201016161627National Audit Office,A review of collaborative procurement across the public sector2010MayLondonNational Audit Office and the Audit CommissionRoots200982828227W RootsReview of arrangements for efficiencies from smarter procurement in local government2009LondonCLG(cf. HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_30" \o "Gershon, 2004 #80" Gershon, 2004; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_70" \o "Roots, 2009 #82" Roots, 2009; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_59" \o "National Audit Office, 2010 #16" National Audit Office, 2010). Although not mandatory, these coercive pressures need to be viewed in the context of increasingly aggressive budget cuts in a period of austerity that created real fears for funding front-line service delivery. A problem in the government reports is the lack of evidence of savings, acknowledgements of data quality and a heavy reliance on rhetoric.
Normative pressure was evident through two sources, front-line operations and procurement. Professional codes of cross-border working in front-line operations capture cooperative behavioural expectations ADDIN EN.CITE Ashworth200921(Ashworth et al., 2009)212117Rachel AshworthGeorge BoyneRick DelbridgeEscape from the Iron Cage? Organizational Change and Isomorphic Pressures in the Public SectorJournal of Public Adminstration Research & Theory165-1871912009doi:10.1093/jopart/mum038 ( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_5" \o "Ashworth, 2009 #21" Ashworth et al., 2009) and create normative forces to collaborate ADDIN EN.CITE Princen2014178(Princen et al., 2014)17817817Princen, SebastiaanGeuijen, KarinCandel, JeroenFolgerts, OddyHooijer, RagnaEstablishing cross-border co-operation between professional organizations: Police, fire brigades and emergency health services in Dutch border regionsEuropean Urban and Regional StudiesEuropean Urban and Regional Studies1-16Mar20140969-7764( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_67" \o "Princen, 2014 #178" Princen et al., 2014). Normative pressure in the technical professions encourages collaboration generally, but concerns arise for collaborative procurement specifically, as it is deemed to reduce local control. Procurement are generally pro-collaboration as it is viewed by buyers as best practice procurement and the savings it can generate align with their departmental targets and goals ADDIN EN.CITE Nollet200355(Nollet and Beaulieu, 2003)555517J NolletM BeaulieuThe development of group purchasing: an empirical study in the health care sectorJournal of Purchasing & Supply Management3-10912003( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_60" \o "Nollet, 2003 #55" Nollet and Beaulieu, 2003). Procurements push for collaboration creates normative pressure on other stakeholders yet their lack of status compared to technical stakeholders minimises this pressure.
Mimetic pressure is seen through documents that signal the moves towards collaborative procurement in the wider public sector, ranging from housing to highways ADDIN EN.CITE Roots200982(Roots, 2009)828227W RootsReview of arrangements for efficiencies from smarter procurement in local government2009LondonCLG( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_70" \o "Roots, 2009 #82" Roots, 2009). The Roots review was carried out by a former chief executive of the UKs Westminster City Council on behalf of the government to examine councils procurement. The clear message in the Roots Review is that collaborative procurement is becoming the norm in the wider public sector and that it delivers significant benefit, although beyond identifying a range of collaborative procurement strategies and rhetoric by various public departments, no tangible evidence that demonstrates the benefits are reported. The need to deliver commercial efficiencies, relative to the desire to retain local control of procurement decisions and operational impacts, creates conflicting institutional pressures that affect how authorities respond to collaborative procurement.
4.2 Stakeholder perceptions
Table 1 illustrates the range of collaborative procurement barriers identified by participants. There is some overlap in perceived barriers and also some clear differences between stakeholder groups. Procurements concerns relate to the supply market and stem from their lack of strategic control over frameworks and management of the routes-to-market. Users echo concerns of local supplier management with other barriers relating predominantly to internal inconsistencies. Executives recognise the problems of misaligned strategic plans and identify threats to local relationships and community commitments. All stakeholder groups identify two barriers; inappropriate national sector specific frameworks and protectionism by individuals and departments.
Table 1: Stakeholders perceived barriers to regional collaborative procurement
BarriersProcurementExecutivesUsersLack of supplier strategyxAggregated spend increases workxNeed for bespoke contract termsxLack of dataxToo many suppliersxToo many frameworksxUnsuitable frameworksxBetter deals for bespoke contractsxContract standing ordersxxApproval sign-off procedurexxDifferent systemsxxProtectionismxxxNational sector specific frameworksxxxLocal suppliers for fast responsexxLack of supplier managementxxDifferent life cycles for productsxLack of standardised equipmentxStock condition surveys not alignedxHigh level plans not alignedxxSupporting 'local' businessxLocal members' objections x
The range of constraints identified represent four emerging themes of; national, regional, institutional and individual level barriers. Across all four themes, the barriers are operational in nature and overt. The four themes conceptually illustrate conflicts between protecting professional role authority and demonstrating compliance to coercive pressures. The tensions create conflicts between functions and between organisations and can prevent the delivery of best value for taxpayers. Goal conflict between stakeholders is more likely to result in avoidance or defiance strategies ADDIN EN.CITE Oliver1991129(Oliver, 1991; Pache and Santos, 2010)12912917Christine OliverStrategic Responses to Institutional ProcessesThe Academy of Management ReviewThe Academy of Management Review145-1791611991Pache201015115115117Pache, A.C.Santos, F.When worlds collide: The internal dynamics of organizational responses to conflicting institutional demandsAcademy of Management Review Academy of Management Review455-47635320100363-7425( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_63" \o "Oliver, 1991 #129" Oliver, 1991; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_64" \o "Pache, 2010 #151" Pache and Santos, 2010). Adept organisations can manage pluralistic and competing demands ADDIN EN.CITE Kraatz2008208(Kraatz and Block, 2008)2082085M KraatzE BlockR GreenwoodC OliverK SahlinR SuddabyOrganizational implications of institutional pluralismThe SAGE handbook of organizational institutionalism245-2752008LondonSage( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_53" \o "Kraatz, 2008 #208" Kraatz and Block, 2008) although avoidance may not have long-term viability if visible stakeholder divergence can affect an organisations legitimacy ADDIN EN.CITE Pache2010151(Pache and Santos, 2010)15115117Pache, A.C.Santos, F.When worlds collide: The internal dynamics of organizational responses to conflicting institutional demandsAcademy of Management Review Academy of Management Review455-47635320100363-7425( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_64" \o "Pache, 2010 #151" Pache and Santos, 2010). Critically, decision-makers throughout the procurement process use various means to legitimise their resistance to numerous isomorphic forces, as detailed in figure 2 and discussed through the following sections. The legitimatisation of resistance, even against a prevailing discourse of austerity, value for money, and public sector reform, further heightens the operational barriers.
4.2.1 Theme 1: National-level operational barriers - inappropriate national solutions
All stakeholders feel existing national frameworks, particularly sector specific frameworks, frequently fail to provide optimal solutions and as expressed by one technical operations manager for larger requirements, the proposed efficiencies dont materialise. This view is common across all stakeholder groups, including procurement, and drives a perception that collaborative procurement is not beneficial. Users express concern that large-scale frameworks limit innovation resulting in supplier complacency, supporting the view that rewarding suppliers for volume not excellence can stagnate market innovation ADDIN EN.CITE Caldwell200513(Caldwell, Walker, Harland, Knight, Zheng and Wakeley, 2005; Walker et al., 2013)131317Nigel CaldwellHelen WalkerChristine HarlandLouise KnightJurong ZhengTime WakeleyPromoting competitive markets: The role of public procurementJournal of Purchasing & Supply Management242-251115-62005doi: 10.1016/j.pursup.2005.12.002Walker201315915915917Walker, HelenSchotanus, FredoBakker, ElmerHarland, ChristineCollaborative procurement: a relational view of buyerbuyer relationshipsPublic Administration ReviewPublic Administration Review588-59873420131540-6210( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_8" \o "Caldwell, 2005 #13" Caldwell, Walker, Harland, Knight, Zheng and Wakeley, 2005; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_92" \o "Walker, 2013 #159" Walker et al., 2013). Users raised concerns that highly leveraged frameworks have irreversibly damaged markets and some SMEs no longer traded as a direct consequence. Although frameworks are not mandatory, and despite the problems aired, counter-intuitively all authorities use these for major sector-specific requirements owing to significant political pressures to do so, and a perceived pressure to be seen to be using them.
Executives believe national and even regional procurement conflicts with sustainable public procurement as it hinders the opportunity to use local SME suppliers in their immediate communities, thus supporting extant research in local government contexts ADDIN EN.CITE Walker2013159(Walker et al., 2013)15915917Walker, HelenSchotanus, FredoBakker, ElmerHarland, ChristineCollaborative procurement: a relational view of buyerbuyer relationshipsPublic Administration ReviewPublic Administration Review588-59873420131540-6210( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_92" \o "Walker, 2013 #159" Walker et al., 2013). Users believe the removal of local suppliers damages relationships and affects service delivery, particularly for areas requiring regular on-site interaction. A cautious approach is evidenced through a lack of procurement collaboration. Not collaborating also reduces spend per contract and can often allow users to stay under EU regulation and contract standing order spend thresholds. Staying under threshold spend enables authorities to retain control of which suppliers are invited to bid and supports research on tensions between socioeconomic opportunities and cost savings ADDIN EN.CITE Knight200736(Knight, Harland, Telgen, Callender, Thai and McKen, 2007)36366L A KnightC M HarlandJ TelgenG CallenderK V ThaiK E McKenPublic Procurement; International Cases and Commentary2007LondonRoutledge( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_52" \o "Knight, 2007 #36" Knight, Harland, Telgen, Callender, Thai and McKen, 2007).
4.2.2 Theme 2: Regional-level operational barriers the lack of intra-regional alignment
The outsourcing of most, or part, of procurement operations by some authorities has led to varying levels of control and difficulties in making regional decisions. Different structures create conflicts over whom to collaborate with, particularly for general goods and services (for example, stationery, travel, office equipment) with the choice of routes-to-market and potential collaborative partners described by one buyer as overwhelming. The numerous frameworks available for items of common spend across the whole of the public sector can dilute volume-based benefits so they lose their natural efficiencies. An added complication is the lack of detailed and regionally consistent procurement data. Different specifications, product coding and reporting systems prevent sharing of prices, as products are very difficult to compare. The culture within individual authorities is insular; thus, while collaborative procurement is acknowledged by most as potentially beneficial, as it is not mandatory the coordination of spend is not high on the agenda. Pressures to conform are ignored more easily when regulatory pressure is weak ADDIN EN.CITE Quirke2013183(Quirke, 2013)18318317Quirke, LindaRogue resistance: sidestepping isomorphic pressures in a patchy institutional fieldOrganization StudiesOrganization Studies1675-1699341120130170-8406( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_69" \o "Quirke, 2013 #183" Quirke, 2013). Collaborative procurement is viewed to add time to the process and the perception is that theres no way it would be delivered on time, adding to the reticence to align. For technical products that are emergency-service specific (for example, emergency vehicles, protective personal equipment), procurements pre-tender design phase is extensive (12months+) to consider specifications, locations and operational risk control. Adherence to operational performance standards is crucial in the design of these solutions and users deemed collaboration to be operationally too risky for complex products.
For capital workstreams procurement derives from an integrated risk management plan, typically covering a 6-10 year period. While these tend towards emergency service-specific products, other high spend areas including IT, are also included in these plans. Operational requirements are embedded within each authoritys integrated risk management plans limiting collaborative flexibility. Integration relates to internal consistency of operational planning rather than being indicative of regional collaboration. Authorities have different timeframes and different review points in these budgetary cycles that limit operational alignment. Although the various review points are known across the region and users could align these, there is no compelling reason or pressure to do so. Procurement provides normative pressure to collaborate but they are generally excluded from operational planning decisions and meetings limiting the reach of their pressure. Plans are continuously reviewed but users are reluctant to align these - It would mean more complications, more delays, extra committees and meetings, and wed end up with a compromised solution for everyone.
The regional barriers are not insurmountable and there are pockets of successful collaborative procurement across the region. Numerous stakeholders referred to a regional personal protective equipment contract as best practice collaborative procurement. A regional solution was deemed better value for money than either individual or national agreements and was subsequently adopted. Operational plans were aligned and different authorities came on-line to the new contract at various stages. Interestingly, the driver for this regional collaboration was in response to coercive pressure to align to a national framework.
4.2.3 Theme 3: Institutional-level operational barriers - perceived need for bespoke solutions
Operational autonomy has led to a lack of standardised equipment across the different authorities in the region. The specifications of products purchased are dependent on usage patterns of urban/rural locations making regional standardisation a low priority over safety and operational effectiveness. The operational safety priorities are understandable in front-line operational products used in emergency situations. However, a lack of standardisation persists even in less emotive workstreams (e.g. ICT) where operational risks are negligible. As an example, across the five authorities, 20 fast-moving generic common consumable stores items were analysed; the data identified 56 main suppliers and 94 different prices despite all suppliers being available to all authorities, demonstrating a lack of collaborative knowledge sharing. Information is shared across technical collaborative forums but procurement is not involved in many of the technical forums, and technical staff are not involved in regional procurement meetings, limiting opportunities for collaborative procurement options in the exploration phases. While consensus on complex products and services is not necessarily achievable or desirable, procurements lack of involvement in the working groups reduces the commercial challenge in procurement processes.
4.2.4 Theme 4: Individual-level operational barriers - resource pressures
The fragmented procurement options via national, regional and sector level tendering portals result in numerous potential routes-to-market. Where the best deal sits is largely untested and buyers do not focus on providing a comparative analysis of these, making the decisions malleable to changing political pressures and partner allegiances. The increased time commitments needed to run Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) tenders are perceived to cause operational issues in fast-paced supply environments where the products may be changing faster than the procurement cycle. Budgetary constraints are stretching resources making it increasingly difficult to invest time in commercial assessments of frameworks and markets. As pointed out by a buyer, frameworks are a quick route to market - we use them when the timescales are tight.
There is a strong view that scale alone does not always provide the best outcomes and that single source contracts with nationally consolidated volumes damage supply chain innovation, particularly for workstreams with safety implications. Users spoke of their moral obligation and guardian role to get the best technical products often with minimal commercial attention. Users considered it inappropriate and dangerous to pass this accountability to other authorities or central buying groups that lack local context-specific knowledge. This strong professional core of operational staff is valued internally within authorities but is an area for tension and competition between authorities. The locally-grounded expertise provides unique attributes enabling isomorphic pressure for regional standardisation to be resisted ADDIN EN.CITE Hefetz2007121(Hefetz and Warner, 2007)12112117A HefetzM WarnerBeyond the market versus planning dichotomy: Understanding privatisation and its reverse in US citiesLocal Government StudiesLocal Government Studies555-5723342007( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_38" \o "Hefetz, 2007 #121" Hefetz and Warner, 2007).
4.3 Iterative model development
The four thematic barriers provide operational-level explanations for the lack of progress in implementing a regional collaborative procurement strategy. Yet, from an action research perspective, it was deemed that these barriers alone were not sufficiently powerful to counter the institutional forces pressing for collaborative procurement and that deeper resistance strategies were also at play. The ability to show counter examples that overcome the barriers, as seen in the regional personal protective equipment contract, adds further weight to this position. A model is developed (see figure 3) that focuses on and extends one component of strategic resistance presented by Oliver (1991): avoidance. The two micro-processes at play in resistance to collaborative procurement are symbolic tick-boxing and institutional logics. These explain the conditions for avoidance against other more powerful groups (such as national government) that enable stakeholders resistance to maintain legitimacy even against a prevailing discourse of austerity, value for money, and public sector reform.
4.3.1 Legitimised strategic resistance
The nature and length of the action research project inductively exposed the strategic defensive routines employed and demonstrated how these techniques gain legitimacy. As the four operational barriers are more rationally orientated, the participants refer only to these barriers and do not openly discuss their actions in terms of resistance. Interestingly, strategic resistance by stakeholders is in direct response to the isomorphic pressures encountered, rather than a response to the more overt operational barriers that they themselves identify. This is explained as the operational barriers, whilst significant, are not insurmountable. The legitimised resistance heightens the operational barriers, or at least ensures they persist, and there is little positive action to remove these. Figure 2 illustrates the operational barriers, isomorphic pressures and strategic responses.
Figure 2: Barriers, Pressures and Resistance in Collaborative Procurement
4.3.2 Institutional logics
Institutional logics focus decision-makers attention on issues and solutions consistent with their views ADDIN EN.CITE Ocasio1997145(Ocasio, 1997; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999)14514517Ocasio, WilliamTowards an Attention-Based View of the FirmStrategic Management JournalStrategic Management Journal187-20618S11997John Wiley & Sons01432095http://www.jstor.org/stable/3088216Thornton199916516516517Thornton, Patricia HOcasio, WilliamInstitutional logics and the historical contingency of power in organizations: Executive succession in the higher education publishing industry, 1958-1990American journal of SociologyAmerican Journal of Sociology801-843105319990002-9602( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_61" \o "Ocasio, 1997 #145" Ocasio, 1997; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_85" \o "Thornton, 1999 #165" Thornton and Ocasio, 1999). In this case, the institutional logics that prevail across the organisations are that regional collaborative procurement is unsuitable and too risky to implement. These logics are evidenced as avoidance strategies to counter normative and mimetic pressures to conform. For collaborative procurement, these logics derive from the interplay of two elements, 1) procurements lack of status relative to other stakeholders and 2) the emotive nature of the emergency services.
Lack of authority is evidenced when procurement decisions fall to operational or financial roles ADDIN EN.CITE Schiele200693(Schiele and McCue, 2006)939317Joseph J SchieleClifford P McCueProfessional service acquisition in public sector procurement: A conceptual model of meaningful involvementInternational Journal of Operations & Production ManagementInternational Journal of Operations & Production Management300-3252632006( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_73" \o "Schiele, 2006 #93" Schiele and McCue, 2006). The process maps highlight that of all decisions taken in the procurement process, 60% were by users, 19% by executives and only 21% by procurement. For complex workstreams procurements role is limited further to solely checking process compliance. Key activities including sourcing and interfacing with suppliers are dispersed to functional areas, particularly in technical workstreams. Only exceptionally did supplier management become the responsibility of procurement. The majority of stakeholders, including procurement themselves, predominantly see procurements value in ensuring process compliance, supporting previous research on legitimacy in decision-making ADDIN EN.CITE Erridge20075(Erridge, 2007)5517Andrew ErridgePublic Procurement, Public Value and the Northern Ireland Unemployment Pilot ProjectPublic AdministrationPublic Administration1023-10438542007doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9299.2007.00674.x( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_25" \o "Erridge, 2007 #5" Erridge, 2007). One user referred to procurement as the process police. The largely administrative role of procurement provides insight into how pressures for collaborative procurement are strategically resisted. At an organisational level, procurement builds normative pressures to collaborate, yet their hierarchical position leads to a low degree of internal social legitimacy that increases other functions ability to resist these changes ADDIN EN.CITE Townley1997117(Townley, 1997)11711717Townley, BarbaraThe Institutional Logic of Performance AppraisalOrganization StudiesOrganization Studies261-2851821997March 1, 1997http://oss.sagepub.com/content/18/2/261.abstract10.1177/017084069701800204( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_87" \o "Townley, 1997 #117" Townley, 1997), who are deemed more powerful and legitimate ADDIN EN.CITE Dhalla2013180(Dhalla and Oliver, 2013)18018017Dhalla, RuminaOliver, ChristineIndustry identity in an oligopolistic market and firms responses to institutional pressuresOrganization StudiesOrganization Studies1803-1834341220130170-8406( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_20" \o "Dhalla, 2013 #180" Dhalla and Oliver, 2013). Legitimacy embeds at the start of the user-led procurement process, and elected members who oversee the governance of procurement decisions exert authority at the end of the process. Procurement joins mid-process once the decisions to collaborate (or not) are made.
It is extremely difficult for procurement to break the chain of compliance and provide challenge in the process, particularly when they perceive others legitimacy (e.g. technical officers) to be high. The legitimacy of other stakeholders relative to procurement limits procurements ability to add value to the process and provides window-dressing for transparency and compliance. Procurements lack of status emanates from their hierarchical position. Structurally, procurement reports to a Finance Director/Executive that is perceived internally as a lack of status, influence and authority.
The emotive nature of the emergency services is the second element driving the institutional logics of the unsuitability of collaborative procurement in the emergency services. The dominant institutional logic from technical staff is that collaborative procurement requires standardised products that could dilute their professional, legitimised expertise and potentially compromise safety. Emotional arguments were observed in internal meetings to counter commercial challenges, with the inference from technical staff being procurement save money, but we save lives. These logics provide a professional justification for bespoke solutions that non-technical staff including procurement and elected members find difficult to challenge, particularly given the sensitive nature of the emergency services. Technical personnel with backgrounds in front-line operations dominate user and executive groups that provide credibility and legitimacy to these institutional logics. Views are encoded in the deep-rooted mission and culture of the emergency services enabling defensive routines to resist change ADDIN EN.CITE Ocasio1997145(Ocasio, 1997; Thornton, 2002)14514517Ocasio, WilliamTowards an Attention-Based View of the FirmStrategic Management JournalStrategic Management Journal187-20618S11997John Wiley & Sons01432095http://www.jstor.org/stable/3088216Thornton200214614614617Thornton, P.H.The rise of the corporation in a craft industry: Conflict and conformity in institutional logicsAcademy of Management JournalAcademy of Management Journal81-10145120020001-4273( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_61" \o "Ocasio, 1997 #145" Ocasio, 1997; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_84" \o "Thornton, 2002 #146" Thornton, 2002). Over time local norms emerge relating to product specifications that limit options deemed acceptable ADDIN EN.CITE Ashworth200921(Ashworth et al., 2009)212117Rachel AshworthGeorge BoyneRick DelbridgeEscape from the Iron Cage? Organizational Change and Isomorphic Pressures in the Public SectorJournal of Public Adminstration Research & Theory165-1871912009doi:10.1093/jopart/mum038 ( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_5" \o "Ashworth, 2009 #21" Ashworth et al., 2009).
Procurement teams have relevant business qualifications, but none have backgrounds in frontline operations. As one buyer stated, I have all the CIPS [Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply] qualifications and procurement experience but thats not enough if youre not [frontline] operational your voice isnt heard. Through creating and embedding a legitimate differentiation from other public sector contexts, stakeholders effectively resist mimetic isomorphic pressures to collaborate. The day-to-day culture is entrenched with emotive life-saving logics. The institutional logics of we save lives are understandable, and indeed desirable in workstreams directly responsible for frontline service delivery. Yet, these repertoires were frequently used, albeit more subtlety, in non-frontline operations (for example IT) as a reason for non-collaboration, demonstrating their depth of acceptance across the organisations. To illustrate, the deep-rooted acceptance of a were different culture was evidenced through each Authority buying bespoke goods and services across all spend areas, which was not challenged by procurement, budget holders, executives or finance.
4.3.3 Symbolic tick boxing
Symbolic tick boxing represents strategic responses to resist coercive government pressures for collaborative procurement and normative forces of professional communities. The strategy is seen through selected use of collaboration in high profile, yet limited, spend categories, to demonstrate compliance, while simultaneously retaining local decision-making for other less visible, but larger areas of spend. Protectionism is inherent in this avoidance strategy demonstrating the tensions between resistance and conformity. Protectionism is displayed at multiple embedded levels - organisational, departmental and individual, and relates to a perceived threat that collaboration could make individual roles redundant through economies of process ADDIN EN.CITE Trautmann200952(Trautmann et al., 2009)525217G TrautmannL BalsE HartmannGlobal sourcing in integrated network structures: the case of hybrid purchasing organizationsJournal of International Management 194-2081522009( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_88" \o "Trautmann, 2009 #52" Trautmann et al., 2009). When faced with job redundancy threats, people heighten operational barriers and downplay potential benefits. In regional collaborative meetings, people openly aired their concerns about their future job security, although this was often shrouded behind the emotive veil of compromising front-line operational resilience if jobs were centralised and numbers of staff reduced.
There was evidence that the lack of regional alignment is artificially retained in some instances, supporting the view that individual organisations are unlikely to seek collaborative solutions if this reduces their own resource ADDIN EN.CITE Flynn200746(Flynn, 2007)46466Norman Flynn Public Sector Management5th2007LondonSage( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_28" \o "Flynn, 2007 #46" Flynn, 2007). One user stated, Im happy to be involved as long as we lead and others align to us. People raised concerns of where would collaboration end? creating a climate of suspicion that regional collaboration could lead to, as one user stated super-regions with no geographic identity and further loss of control and impact on individuals job security. When individuals sub-optimise overall performance because of these conflicts of interest at a personal versus organisational level, they legitimatise their decisions by increasing the saliency of operational barriers (see table 1) coupled with strategic responses that create additional barriers or sustain existing ones.
Using the active-passive resistance scale, there was no outright defiance rather low-level yet persistent avoidance and resistance ADDIN EN.CITE Oliver1991129(Oliver, 1991)12912917Christine OliverStrategic Responses to Institutional ProcessesThe Academy of Management ReviewThe Academy of Management Review145-1791611991( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_63" \o "Oliver, 1991 #129" Oliver, 1991), that infused suspicion towards collaborative procurement. Despite the concerns voiced over inappropriate national solutions these issues are not formally raised with the contracting bodies, which was viewed as a futile exercise, and the frameworks are still used, albeit reluctantly in many instances. There was a higher usage of collaborative contracts in sector-specific workstreams that were visible politically, for example specialist emergency vehicles. This echoes findings of other studies exploring isomorphic pressure in public organisations where actions were found to be pursued for political as well as technical reasons in high performance management environments ADDIN EN.CITE Ashworth200921(Ashworth et al., 2009)212117Rachel AshworthGeorge BoyneRick DelbridgeEscape from the Iron Cage? Organizational Change and Isomorphic Pressures in the Public SectorJournal of Public Adminstration Research & Theory165-1871912009doi:10.1093/jopart/mum038 ( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_5" \o "Ashworth, 2009 #21" Ashworth et al., 2009). Symbolic tick boxing conveys legitimacy through complying with some coercive pressures for collaborative procurement while simultaneously retaining local decision-making for other less visible spend.
Institutional theory suggests that the inherent legitimacy of national procurement frameworks (as perceived by government stakeholders) ensures that their use is not questioned and it is in the best political interest of the organisation (and the individual) to demonstrate compliance. Indeed, when describing the benefit of collaborative frameworks, participants predominantly used the word compliant rather than identifying any commercial or technical benefits. The desire for organisational effectiveness and legitimacy sees a less confrontational resistance where change is promised but delayed ADDIN EN.CITE Townley1997117(Townley, 1997)11711717Townley, BarbaraThe Institutional Logic of Performance AppraisalOrganization StudiesOrganization Studies261-2851821997March 1, 1997http://oss.sagepub.com/content/18/2/261.abstract10.1177/017084069701800204( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_87" \o "Townley, 1997 #117" Townley, 1997). In workstreams with a degree of external control and regulatory monitoring the response is more likely to be strategic ADDIN EN.CITE Scott2005119(Scott, 2005)1191195W R ScottM A HittInstitutional theory: Contributing to a theoretical research programGreat Minds in Management4604842005Oxford, UKOxford University Press( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_77" \o "Scott, 2005 #119" Scott, 2005). Procurement felt similar coercive pressures to use existing frameworks as they are compliant processes, even though they felt they were commercially inferior. Procurement decision-making centres largely on ensuring procedural adherence that often obscures other commercial decisions and challenge. Consequently, while both users and procurement feel that existing collaborative frameworks are not meeting their needs, the legitimacy they provide through regulatory compliance drives their use but creates a vicious cycle through further damaging perceptions of the benefits of collaborative procurement.
Symbolic tick-boxing is evidenced through regional structures that buffer and shield internal practice from scrutiny through decoupling ADDIN EN.CITE Hefetz2012122(Hefetz and Warner, 2012)12212217Hefetz, A.Warner, M.E.Contracting or Public Delivery? The importance of service, market and management characteristicsJournal of Public Administration Research and TheoryJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory289-31722220121053-185810.1093/jopart/mur006( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_39" \o "Hefetz, 2012 #122" Hefetz and Warner, 2012). Regional and national infrastructure facilitates collaborative procurement through technical and functional forums to share knowledge and forums are well attended. Most participants identified these groups as evidence of their support of collaboration. Despite espoused support, there is little tangible evidence of collaborative procurement attributed to the groups suggesting only lip service or resistant responses to normative pressure ADDIN EN.CITE Scott2005119(Scott, 2005)1191195W R ScottM A HittInstitutional theory: Contributing to a theoretical research programGreat Minds in Management4604842005Oxford, UKOxford University Press( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_77" \o "Scott, 2005 #119" Scott, 2005). The number of regional collaborative contracts registered highlights low levels of activity (see Table 2), mirroring the very low (p.23) uptake of collaborative procurement strategies in the wider public sector ADDIN EN.CITE HM Treasury2009215(HM Treasury, 2009a)21521527HM Treasury,Operational Efficiency Programme: Collaborative procurement2009MayLondon( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_41" \o "HM Treasury, 2009 #215" HM Treasury, 2009a). Notwithstanding the lack of quality information of public procurement spend, much of which is unclassified and/or not centrally reported, estimates suggest only 13% of common spend across government departments is channelled through collaborative professional buying organisations (e.g. OGC Buying Solutions, NHS Purchasing and Supply Agency) ADDIN EN.CITE HM Treasury2009215(HM Treasury, 2009a)21521527HM Treasury,Operational Efficiency Programme: Collaborative procurement2009MayLondon( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_41" \o "HM Treasury, 2009 #215" HM Treasury, 2009a).
Table 2: Contract Classifications
Type of ContractNumber% of TotalIndividual Authority Agreement12880%Regional Framework 138.1%National/Government Framework106.3%Other Partner Framework95.6%
The use of collaborative structures, separate to the decision-making processes, demonstrates this decoupling ADDIN EN.CITE Duimering1998108(Duimering and Safayeni, 1998)10810817P R DuimeringF SafayeniThe role of language and formal structure in the construction and maintenance of organizational imagesInternational Studies of Management and OrganizationInternational Studies of Management and Organization57-852831998( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_23" \o "Duimering, 1998 #108" Duimering and Safayeni, 1998). While there is infrastructure and some use of collaborative frameworks there is a persistent lack of engagement and support for these arrangements. All stakeholders frequently made distinctions between a tick box approach to collaborative procurement and effective collaborative procurement. The broad conceptualisation of collaborative procurement provides opportunities for organisations to maintain the pretence of conformity through loosely maintaining collaborative structures to provide sufficient ambiguity to evidence compliance to government, taxpayers and regulators.
5.0 Conclusions
In controlled and regulated fields, such as the public sector, a high degree of isomorphism between regional organisations should be expected ADDIN EN.CITE ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA ( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_21" \o "DiMaggio, 1983 #25" DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_15" \o "D'Aunno, 1991 #196" D'Aunno, Sutton and Price, 1991; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_16" \o "Dacin, 1997 #194" Dacin, 1997; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_29" \o "Frumkin, 2004 #20" Frumkin and Galaskiewicz, 2004). Our results help our understanding of the problems of developing and implementing collaborative procurement strategies through exposing how stakeholders resist external forces to collaborate. The data suggests that the barriers to collaborative procurement are many, complex and deeply engrained. This study contributes to public procurement research by exploring where, and why, tensions and conflicts occur in collaborative public procurement strategies, both within internal supply chains, and between organisations.
The results show how managers reconcile conflicts to procure collaboratively and how they legitimise resistance through symbolic responses to coercive and normative pressures. Institutional theory enhances the papers explanatory power, principally by way of framing our explanation of inter- and intra-organisational resistance to collaborative procurement. The results add to current institutional research that explore the flaws in the idea of a slow but certain structural isomorphism between organisations ADDIN EN.CITE Heugens2009193(Heugens and Lander, 2009)19319317Heugens, P.P.Lander, M.W.Structure! Agency!(and other quarrels): A meta-analysis of institutional theories of organizationAcademy of Management JournalAcademy of Management Journal61-8552120090001-4273( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_40" \o "Heugens, 2009 #193" Heugens and Lander, 2009). We counter the dominant view in the extant research that focuses on the propensity for conformity ADDIN EN.CITE ADDIN EN.CITE.DATA ( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_97" \o "Young, 2000 #185" Young et al., 2000; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_29" \o "Frumkin, 2004 #20" Frumkin and Galaskiewicz, 2004; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_46" \o "Irvine, 2007 #186" Irvine, 2007) through identifying micro-processes of institutional logics and symbolic tick-boxing at play in resistance to normative pressure for collaborative procurement and exposing how these avoidance tactics are legitimised.
The results bring public procurement into institutional theory debates through identifying the social processes embedded in procurement decision-making processes. By focusing on different internal stakeholder perceptions and their motivations, we shed light on how public organisations legitimise avoidance to government pressure to collaborate through their use of institutional logics. The degree of institutional resistance indicates the strength of embedded agency, even when coercive pressures from economic austerity is present. Embedded agency, seen in this study through institutional logics of legitimised internal decision-makers, is a key feature in the contested shaping of institutional norms, as well as resistance to pressures towards conformity. Consequently, agency enforces resistance to institutional prerogatives even when the established order has legitimate grounds to expect conformity. The identification of collaborative procurement barriers and stakeholder avoidance tactics contribute to a deeper understanding of how national procurement policies impact public organisations corporate agency and culture.
Operational barriers to collaborative procurement persist at national, regional, institutional and individual levels. Although these are not insurmountable, multiple stakeholders are able to create strategic responses to isomorphic pressure through institutional logics, protectionism and symbolic tick boxing. The identification of micro-processes of resistance adds supports to studies that identify the role of individuals rhetorical strategies in developing resistance as they help to construct counter-institutions that articulate opposition to prevailing norms of practice and disrupt institutional pressures ADDIN EN.CITE Symon2008197(Symon, Buehring, Johnson and Cassell, 2008)19719717Symon, G.Buehring, A.Johnson, P.Cassell, C.Positioning qualitative research as resistance to the institutionalization of the academic labour processOrganization StudiesOrganization Studies1315-1336291020080170-8406( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_83" \o "Symon, 2008 #197" Symon, Buehring, Johnson and Cassell, 2008). The results highlight that failure to provide sufficient evidence while applying pressure at a political level leads to tick box approaches to collaborative procurement risking long-term damage and sub-optimised performance. Given the tensions between regulatory, commercial and socio-economic goals ADDIN EN.CITE Erridge200239(Erridge and McIlroy, 2002)393917Andrew ErridgeJohn McIlroyPublic Procurement and Supply Management StrategiesPublic Policy and Administration52-711712002doi: 10.1177/095207670201700105( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_26" \o "Erridge, 2002 #39" Erridge and McIlroy, 2002) the evidence for the benefits of collaborative procurement needs to be beyond dispute for institutional pressures to prevail.
Legitimacy in decision-making within public procurement reflects the political and strategic pressures to demonstrate rationality. In line with institutional theory, if particular courses of action enhance perceptions of legitimacy, norms of behaviour emerge that limit choices available ADDIN EN.CITE Ashworth200921(Ashworth et al., 2009)212117Rachel AshworthGeorge BoyneRick DelbridgeEscape from the Iron Cage? Organizational Change and Isomorphic Pressures in the Public SectorJournal of Public Adminstration Research & Theory165-1871912009doi:10.1093/jopart/mum038 ( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_5" \o "Ashworth, 2009 #21" Ashworth et al., 2009), even in the face of considerable pressure to reduce costs. A challenge for policy makers and individual authorities is the lack of consistent procurement data ADDIN EN.CITE Cox20058(Cox, Chicksand and Ireland, 2005; Walker et al., 2013)8817Andrew CoxDan ChicksandPaul IrelandSub-Optimality in NHS Sourcing in the UK: Demand-Side Constraints on Supply-Side ImprovementPublic AdministrationPublic Administration3673928322005Walker201315915915917Walker, HelenSchotanus, FredoBakker, ElmerHarland, ChristineCollaborative procurement: a relational view of buyerbuyer relationshipsPublic Administration ReviewPublic Administration Review588-59873420131540-6210( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_14" \o "Cox, 2005 #8" Cox, Chicksand and Ireland, 2005; HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_92" \o "Walker, 2013 #159" Walker et al., 2013). The evidence base and spend data used in public procurement demands urgent attention both from policy makers and academics.
Institutional theory is usually applied to organisations operating in competitive markets, where isomorphic forces have an inherent motivation; replication of successful practices minimises risk and contributes to organisational survival, stability or growth. Whilst this might lead to a homogenised iron cage (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), this is at a field level rather than targeted at individual decision-makers so the consequences are diffused and take time to impact. In public sector contexts there is little motivation to comply with isomorphic pressures and indeed many disincentives. The consequence of collaboration is not risk minimisation but a contraction of resource required therefore the threat of redundancy increases. While operational barriers are used overtly as a rational defence, covert strategic responses of institutional logics and symbolic tick boxing protect individual positions, legitimise decisions made, and further entrench operational barriers. The iron cage of homogeny (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) still emerges but around individual organisations and at a micro level around departments. Thus, this research highlights the criticality of understanding underpinning motivation in behaviour in institutional theory and the links between operational and strategic processes in public procurement policy. From an applied perspective, for purchasing managers and public policy makers the results highlight the impact of legitimised resistance to operational outcomes, adding insight into the challenges of delivering collaborative procurement for reducing the UKs financial deficit.
As a final reflection, the action research method combined with the lens of institutional theory provided opportunities to unpick and challenge the barriers related to collaborative procurement to enable implementable solutions to be sought, and to distinguish degrees of resistance. The method was iterative, immersive and stakeholder-engaged and uncovered deep nuances and dynamic interactions between beliefs and behaviour over time ADDIN EN.CITE Woodside2003216(Woodside and Wilson, 2003)21621617Woodside, Arch GWilson, Elizabeth JCase study research methods for theory buildingJournal of Business & Industrial MarketingJournal of Business & Industrial Marketing493-508186/720030885-8624( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_95" \o "Woodside, 2003 #216" Woodside and Wilson, 2003). Interestingly, throughout the project participants revealed that they had not previously questioned their behaviours, institutional logics, thought processes and assumptions, and the methods allowed these to be surfaced, allowing them to see and hear their own behaviours ADDIN EN.CITE Christensen2002221(Christensen and Olson, 2002)22122117Christensen, Glenn LOlson, Jerry CMapping consumers' mental models with ZMETPsychology and MarketingPsychology and Marketing477-50119620020742-6046( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_9" \o "Christensen, 2002 #221" Christensen and Olson, 2002), and those of others, from which they were able to begin a process of sensemaking ADDIN EN.CITE Weick1995222(Weick, 1995)2222226Weick, Karl ESensemaking in organizations31995LondonSage080397177X( HYPERLINK \l "_ENREF_94" \o "Weick, 1995 #222" Weick, 1995). The use of engaged action methods have a broader application to a range of procurement and organisational research situations where the contexts are complex or behaviours seemingly irrational. The weight of political and cultural influence in public procurement is a potentially fruitful area of future research using similar approaches and institutional theory, particularly around the relational landscape with suppliers.
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