Grandi, Umberto, Grossi, Davide 
ORCID: 0000-0002-9709-030X and Turrini, Paolo
(2015)
Equilibrium Refinement through Negotiation in Binary Voting.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (IJCAI), 2015-J.
pp. 540-546.
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Abstract
We study voting games on binary issues, where voters might hold an objective over some issues at stake, while willing to strike deals on the remaining ones, and can influence one another's voting decision before the vote takes place. We analyse voters' rational behaviour in the resulting two-phase game, showing under what conditions undesirable equilibria can be removed as an effect of the prevote phase.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Depositing User: | Symplectic Admin |
| Date Deposited: | 05 May 2016 15:46 |
| Last Modified: | 16 Dec 2022 02:04 |
| Related URLs: | |
| URI: | https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3000636 |
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