Chapter 4. The Silence of British Nuclear Culture

Jonathan Hogg

**Introduction**

Nuclear weapons “are here, and they won’t go away with a wave of a magic wand.” In September 1984, BBC television viewers who tuned in to an exclusively male *Newsnight* discussion that followed the screening of the anti-nuclear films *Threads* and *On The 8th Day*, would have heard General Farrar-Hockley say this.[[1]](#endnote-1) This awkward display of competing nuclear narratives is a neat encapsulation of the divide in nuclear opinion during the 1980s, and a convenient example of ‘British nuclear culture’, a term that will be explained and explored in this chapter.

*Threads*, a docudrama directed by Mick Jackson, powerfully demonstrated the horrendous human and environmental effects of nuclear war. As a work of fiction it must be understood in the broader context of the nuclear 1980s, when nuclear deterrence was a strategic reality beyond the living rooms of the viewing public, and the decision was made to replace Polaris with the Trident missile system at the start of the decade.[[2]](#endnote-2) In this context, some people might have been especially nervous after viewing *Threads*. Indeed, it is not unusual to hear vivid recollections of the experience of watching *Threads* in the 1980s.[[3]](#endnote-3) Yet, plenty of people believed that nuclear weapons capability was a necessary and, perhaps, permanent part of British life, especially due to broader international tensions at the time.[[4]](#endnote-4)

Of course, Farrar-Hockley was right, in one respect: after all, Britain still has nuclear weapons in 2016, as do many other countries.[[5]](#endnote-5) But, the team behind the production of *Threads* were also correct to point out the limitations of nuclear civil defence and the likely consequences of nuclear war, albeit in dramatic form. On one hand, Farrar-Hockley was an individual representing the ‘official’ mind-set towards nuclear deterrence, thinking through how best to manage the existence of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, an ‘unofficial’ form of cultural expression sought to root out the menacing potential of nuclear politics, and the quick and slow violence that nuclear weapons can inflict.[[6]](#endnote-6) These are different ways to imagine nuclear weapons and their purpose, and different ways to acknowledge their future meaning. In this one moment, we see two conceptualizations of nuclear responsibility, two positions on the legitimacy of deterrence, and two deeply politicized nuclear imaginaries. This was a war of ideas rooted in the polarized climate of the Cold War, yet this intellectual framework has proven surprisingly strong, with some powerful voices still happy to reiterate aggressive, highly masculinized and militarized pro-nuclear assumptions in historical scholarship.[[7]](#endnote-7)

Thinking through fragmentsof historical evidence in relation to the nuclear weapons state might lead us to trace broader historical trends. But, of what consequence are these traces of the past, and how might historians treat them? How can we try to relate these to contemporary issues such as Trident renewal? Can there be a decisive statement on the validity of different disciplinary or methodological approaches to our nuclear past in relation to the nuclear present? This Chapter offers some thoughts on the validity of social and cultural approaches to the nuclear past, reminding us that decisions about the future of nuclear weapons have the potential to shape the lives of all British citizens in the most drastic forms imaginable.

The following Chapter focuses on some of the ways in which nuclear weapons and nuclear war have been represented in British culture, arguing that while in the 1980s representations that resisted dominant nuclear politics were relatively common, it is harder to find such examples of nuclear resistance in contemporary culture. A brief examination of nuclear texts, and the nuclear language and assumptions that are mobilized within them, will show that perceptions of risk towards nuclear weapons, alongside the ‘politics of vulnerability’ widely invoked in the 1980s, now rarely appear on the public agenda.[[8]](#endnote-8) I suggest that this constitutes a diminishment of the ‘cultural devaluing’ that is necessary to put pressure on the ‘powerful regime of value’ that sustains the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence.[[9]](#endnote-9) Renewed efforts to deconstruct and challenge dominant nuclear vocabularies and assumptions might mean that it would be more common for the nuclear weapons nation-state to be the subject of critical examination, thus aiding a process of ‘public moral evolution’[[10]](#endnote-10) in relation to the existence of nuclear weapons.

**Studies of nuclear culture and International Relations**

Historians have argued that ‘British nuclear culture’ has been an active, diverse and dynamic part of wider British culture for over one hundred years.[[11]](#endnote-11) Through the long twentieth century, the social impact of nuclear technology proved, at times, to be significant, and there have been many attempts to trace this beyond elite culture into the wider story of the twentieth century.[[12]](#endnote-12) We can think of nuclear culture as the

… distinct corner of British culture characterized by the development of the nuclear state and the complex and varied ways in which people controlled, responded to, resisted or represented the complex influence of nuclear science and technology, the official nuclear state and the threat of nuclear war [...] the range of ‘control, response, resistance and representation’ and the influence of the nuclear state, including its material, psychosocial and spatial consequences, were considerable.[[13]](#endnote-13)

This approach to nuclear culture is intended to be normative and critical, identifying different narratives that combine to create nuclear knowledge. Of course, nuclear culture is largely shaped by those official narratives that are intended to control nuclear knowledge, and offer explicit or tacit support for the nuclear nation-state.[[14]](#endnote-14) However, this chapter is interested in the role of ‘unofficial’ narratives that articulate forms of resistance to the nuclear nation, or how such narratives can serve to democratize the nuclear nation. These narratives have the power to de-normalize the dominant ‘official’ narratives on the nuclear nation-state. Elsewhere, I have argued that if we interpret the nuclear century in terms of a large range of ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ narratives we might get closer to understanding the diverse ways in which nuclear knowledge was both mobilized by the state and resisted by individual citizens.[[15]](#endnote-15)

Viewed reductively or quantitatively, it could be argued that the ways in which people resisted and represented the nuclear nation-state during the twentieth century were insignificant, because nuclear policy was not changed or influenced in any great measure by anti-nuclear argument, or nuclear representations on film, for example.[[16]](#endnote-16) Yet, aspects of nuclear culture can serve to educate citizens about nuclear issues, provide alternative nuclear knowledge, or challenge nuclear orthodoxy. Nuclear culture has produced checks on nuclear policy and cultures of secrecy, enlivened nuclear politics, provided counter-narratives to the nuclear weapons state, and illuminated the ways in which ‘nuclear subjectivity’ may be experienced.[[17]](#endnote-17)

This section will briefly explore some studies of nuclear culture that argue the nuclear nation-state has been contested, resisted, and protested against vigorously in many forms, and that the lives of some citizens were significantly altered by the existence of the nuclear nation-state, or perceptions of nuclear threat.[[18]](#endnote-18) Scholars of nuclear culture often look beyond, in Nick Ritchie’s words, the ‘tightly controlled and secretive’ culture of policy-making and formal elite structures of government.[[19]](#endnote-19) Disciplinary cross-over might mean understanding and absorbing different nuclear vocabularies and conceptualizations, leading to studies of nuclear culture helping break down established dichotomies, for instance between realists and idealists in nuclear debate.[[20]](#endnote-20) We are reminded about the complex manifestations of the nuclear nation, the potential impacts of nuclear policy and decision-making, the reality of nuclear legacies such as radioactive contamination, the possibility of nuclear accidents, and the underappreciated role of nuclear anxiety in the lives of citizenry.

Paul Boyer’s *By the Bomb’s Early Light*, first published in 1985, has proved inspirational for a generation of nuclear scholars. Boyer argued that a ‘nuclear consciousness’ held sway over American life in the years following 1945, and that the advent of the atomic age was a pivotal moment. As an author, Boyer admitted his own political and spiritual stance on nuclear America, making it clear that he was both fascinated with and critical of the social impact of the American nuclear nation-state.[[21]](#endnote-21) This ground-breaking work influenced a number of other similar works that served to chart the social and cultural contours of the nuclear age.[[22]](#endnote-22) Scholarship on nuclear culture really picked up pace in the mid to late 1990s. This second wave was shaped by analysis of the ripple effects created by the end of the cold war, and a number of historiographical branches emerged at this time.[[23]](#endnote-23) The latest wave of scholarship has been characterized by increased specialization, seeing nuclear studies in the humanities branch out in new directions, encompassing sophisticated methodological approaches best displayed by Gabrielle Hecht and Joseph Masco.[[24]](#endnote-24) Although nuclear historians have become involved in policy related work, perhaps most notably Peter Hennessy’s involvement in the Trident Commission Report in 2014, it is sometimes difficult to see how nuclear culture studies can have an impact on nuclear policy. One of the genuine difficulties is how to link social and cultural analyses of the nuclear state to elite networks, and elite nuclear discourse.

There has been cross-over work between International Relations and nuclear culture scholarship, for instance critical thinking about contemporary nuclear weapon decisions that introduce the importance of historical trends.[[25]](#endnote-25) Van Munster and Sylvest offer “historical analysis aimed at recovering, re-evaluating and synthesizing an important yet generally overlooked body of critical thinking about nuclear weapons in the central decade of the thermonuclear revolution.”[[26]](#endnote-26) They do this to bring to our attention the ‘nuclear realists’ of the 1950s and 60s, arguing that “revisiting nuclear realism questions received disciplinary narratives and prompts contemporary critical security studies to re-examine its political and theoretical commitments.”[[27]](#endnote-27) They continue, “for nuclear realists, [political] imagination thus served the decisive political objective of keeping the future open, of seeing options other than the all-consuming demands of a deadly nuclear stalemate.”[[28]](#endnote-28) Columba People’s work calls for an expanded form of ‘nuclear critique’ drawing together recent work in IR with work from the broader field of nuclear studies.[[29]](#endnote-29) An examination of nuclear culture can remind us of the historic disconnection between nuclear policy and public opinion. For instance, the distance between official nuclear rhetoric and democratic participation in nuclear decision-making is highlighted through examining diverse forms of resistance and participation.[[30]](#endnote-30) In this sense, studies of nuclear culture might contribute to the articulation of difficult political questions or challenge nuclear orthodoxy, and nuclear assumptions. Furthermore, these assumptions need to be challenged systematically. Richie describes the deep-seated ways in which notions of British identity were mobilized as part of elite nuclear weapons discourse, stating,

… if Britain is to relinquish nuclear weapons the powerful conceptions and the causal relationships and interests they generate will have to be transformed, and the meanings assigned to British nuclear weapons reconceptualised.[[31]](#endnote-31)

So, perhaps nuclear culture approaches are the most helpful to present day policy debates when they help reconceptualise nuclear debates or approaches to nuclear history in a way that might ‘destabilize’ existing narratives, or challenge commonly held assumptions. Also, nuclear scholarship has the effect of devaluing the social and cultural worth of nuclear weapons, describing as it does the serious physical and psychological effects that nuclear weapons culture can inflict on individuals and communities. Nick Richie’s persuasive work in IR studies on ‘devaluation’ of nuclear weapons relies to some extent on knowledge of historical trends, demonstrating how knowledge of our nuclear past can suggest ways to imagine or achieve particular nuclear futures. For the remainder of this chapter we will look at the ways in which nuclear weapons and nuclear war were represented in the early 1980s in comparison with the early 2010s in order to demonstrate the changing politicization of nuclear culture, and the implications this may have for the debate on Trident renewal.

**Nuclear culture: 1980-85**

The 1980s was a period of undeniable nuclear tension.[[32]](#endnote-32) Membership of anti-nuclear protest groups was relatively high, impacting upon broader cultures of nuclear resistance in British life.[[33]](#endnote-33) Dan Cordle has argued that the nuclear 1980s can be defined by the ‘politics of vulnerability’ that, in part, shaped and defined modern British culture.[[34]](#endnote-34) In a way that was unique to the 1980s, extreme nuclear narratives emerged that placed individual citizens at the heart of a nuclear dilemma that seemed urgent and real. Some of the language and assumptions mobilized in this era pushed to the forefront the possibility of nuclear war, and the absurdity of nuclear diplomacy.

The early 1980s saw a significant number of fictional narratives that critiqued the nuclear state directly. In part due to bad publicity surrounding the government civil defence pamphlet *Protect and Survive*, nuclear culture was especially politicised due to increased levels of distrust and scepticism around nuclear civil defence. The television docudrama *Threads* (1984) was arguably the bleakest, and most realistic, example of this scepticism. The viewer was taken through the unthinkable horror of nuclear war and its aftermath, with the survivors plunged into a dark, chaotic and violent world eventually divested of technology, moral codes, and language itself. Genetic mutation, violence, illness and scavenging were the new norms that shaped human life after nuclear war. Nuclear victimhood was made real for a British audience. First shown on television as part of a week of programmes commemorating Hiroshima and Nagasaki, *Threads* was a political text. It humanised nuclear politics in the way it represented the dehumanising potential of nuclear weapons on bodies and minds: ‘nuclear subjects’.

Beyond representation, it is clear that some people reacted in extreme ways in relation to the nuclear state in this period. Just one example was the front-page story run by the *Daily Mirror* in March 1984 under the headline ‘Mothers in A-War Death Pact’, which described a group of mothers who had pledged to end their lives along with their children unless nuclear weapons were abolished.[[35]](#endnote-35) Also, there were groups of deeply committed anti-nuclear protesters, who were routinely castigated in the national press, yet the questions posed by protestors often hinged on the fundamental issues of democratic accountability and morality in relation to nuclear weapons.On a collective level, cities, towns and communities were frequently placed in the centre of nuclear threat in the media, making potential nuclear attack both a localised and national imaginary. Subjectivities were being nuclearised in a multitude of ways.

There are many other examples of extreme and unflinching nuclear narratives in this era. Alongside these were a number of cultural works such as the *Adrian Mole* series of books, or the political satire *Spitting Image* that offered a critique of nuclear politics. In all, these broadly dovetailed with the nuclear language and assumptions that were mobilised in *Threads*,tending to emphasise the immorality of nuclear weapons, and the absurdity of nuclear brinkmanship. Viewed through the analytical lenses of ‘vulnerability’ and ‘nuclear subjectivity’, the 1980s represents a rich period of ‘cultural devaluing’ of nuclear weapons: attacks to the “establishment’s inherent conservatism, resistance to radical change and the bureaucratic and technological momentum that pushes Trident along” were common.[[36]](#endnote-36) It was a period where the existence of nuclear weapons and the ideology of deterrence was placed under scrutiny through a diverse range of cultural expression.

**Nuclear culture: 2010-15**

While the 1980s were characterised by prominent and politicised challenges to the nuclear order, the 2010s have seen few mainstream critiques of nuclear orthodoxy. There are some contextual trends to point out. In the years after 1989, the nuclear context changed drastically in Britain: reduced stockpiles and cold war enmity seemingly dissolved, which led to a new cultural politics surrounding nuclear issues. In the years following 9/11, the nuclear threat receded further in the public imagination, with the exception of discussions over nuclear terrorism.[[37]](#endnote-37)

Yet, nuclear issues have been kept in the public eye. Journalist Eric Schlosser’s popular book *Command and Control* (2013), or documentaries and films such as *The Tipping Point* (2010), *Countdown to Zero* (2010) and *The Man Who Saved the World* (2014) continued to inform the wider public about the continued dangers of nuclear weapons culture. In late 2013 Dominic Sandbrook offered a documentary series *Strange Days: Cold War Britain*, which contained nods to the cultural impact of the late cold war. In the last couple of years, examples of fiction with nuclear themes include Will Self, *Shark* (2014) and *Mad Max Fury Road* (2015), and commemorations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki filled the mainstream press in August 2015. In this period it also became more common to see the Cold War and the nuclear age treated nostalgically. *Indiana Jones and the Crystal Skull* (2008) contained a scene where Jones escapes a nuclear test site by climbing inside a fridge. Many computer games, including *Fallout 4* (2015) reference Cold War nuclear imagery as well.[[38]](#endnote-38) In general terms then, compared to the 1980s, an era defined by higher levels of nuclear skepticism and significant numbers of unofficial narratives that placed nuclear orthodoxy under scrutiny, the contemporary period may

… signal the normalization of a sanitized nuclear politics [where nuclear weapons] rarely appear as historicised or politically problematic objects [...] Bolstering well-developed assumptions around key nuclear motifs, the politics of the nuclear is relegated to the background.[[39]](#endnote-39)

To exemplify this point, it is useful to turn to the sitcom *Cockroaches*. Aired on ITV2 in 2015, the comedy is set in the aftermath of a nuclear war. Unlike the cultural products from the 1980s that dwelt on the fundamental breakdown of the liberal-democratic social contract that nuclear war would likely represent, *Cockroaches* does not remark on the underlying politics of a nuclear dystopia. Rather than satirising the futility or danger of the existence of nuclear weapons, or attending to the realities of nuclear victimhood, *Cockroaches* prefers an ironic detachment from the realities of the nuclear present, basing many of its jokes in the dry observation of post-nuclear irritations and inconveniences. The sharp focus on nuclear subjectivity or vulnerability evident in the 1980s is not visible to the viewer of *Cockroaches*. Do these types of nuclear representation render the nuclear present invisible through the reproduction of sanitised and depoliticised nuclear imagery? Are these narratives creating an illusion of nuclear unreality by accepting fictions of nuclear weapons over broader nuclear fact? Issues of possible use of and risk attached to nuclear weapons are non-existent in this kind of narrative.

Just as it can be argued that 1980s nuclear culture humanised nuclear politics with its remorseless depiction of victimhood, it can be argued that contemporary nuclear culture denies the destructive potential of nuclear weapons by dehumanising the consequences of their continued existence, while also creating the impression of a harmless nuclear permanence. As General Farrar-Hockley said in the 1985 *Newsnight* special mentioned in the introduction to this Chapter, nuclear weapons “are here, and they won’t go away”. Today, they have gone away, in the sense that they are invisible to the vast majority of the British population. Even after Jeremy Corbyn’s re-ignition of the nuclear debate in 2015, there is no evidence of a renewed ‘cultural devaluing’ of nuclear weapons, or the logics of deterrence. To what extent does this serve to sustain the “establishment’s inherent conservatism, resistance to radical change and the bureaucratic and technological momentum”, thus ensuring the continued existence of the nuclear weapons nation-state?[[40]](#endnote-40) More insidiously, does this trend point to wider conformity to popular forms of militarism, perhaps making it more likely for assumptions on nuclear value to go unquestioned? At the end of their book *The British Nuclear Experience*, John Baylis and Kris Stoddart argued that “for the time being at least, the beliefs, culture, and identity issues which have led Britain to develop and retain a nuclear capability for nearly seventy years remain firmly in place.”[[41]](#endnote-41) This points towards a broader politics of identity that has sustained the legitimacy of nuclear weapons, and also contributed to a cultural inertia when it comes to considering radical change.

One way that studies of nuclear culture are useful to contemporary concerns might be the varied ways in which the nuclear past is conceptualised. I’ve argued that a relatively uncritical nuclear culture means that perceptions of ‘risk and use’ of nuclear weapons rarely appear on the political or public agenda, and this lack of public awareness of the reality of nuclear danger is itself dangerous. This chapter has analysed a tiny number of nuclear texts, so the points made are meant to be indicative of the way nuclear culture may relate to political realities, and future political decision-making.

**Conclusions: does nuclear culture matter?**

During this chapter, we have looked at fragments of a national nuclear past. In some works of nuclear history, small fragments of elite decision-making culture are granted enormous significance, as are biographies of influential nuclear protagonists.[[42]](#endnote-42) It is understandable, and necessary: we know that a tiny group of individuals had difficult nuclear decisions to make, and their choices altered the history of the UK. Their decisions also shaped British lives in unpredictable ways, creating or sustaining forms of nuclear citizenship, or inspiring acts of nuclear resistance. We should also study the ways in which some individuals sought to represent nuclear war, or nuclear politics. The brief examples of nuclear representation used in this chapter highlight some broader trends in the last thirty years of ‘British nuclear culture’. If we are concerned with the public experience of nuclear weapons, we should be concerned with nuclear culture, and attend to the language used and assumptions mobilised when people talk about or represent nuclear weapons. Initiatives such as The Global *Hibakusha* Project are doing this work through developing new forms of educational activism and knowledge sharing. [[43]](#endnote-43) It is hard to deny that more needs to be done to educate young people and enliven debate on nuclear issues, thus encouraging the process of ‘public moral evolution’.

Although we are living through a period where narratives within nuclear culture are relatively uncritical of nuclear orthodoxy, it cannot be said with any certainty that this trend will continue uninterrupted. If studies of nuclear culture tell us anything, they remind us that committing to a long future of nuclear capability will have many unknown social and cultural consequences. So, should the social and cultural impact of nuclear decision-making influence how decisions are made? Nuclear weapons decision-making largely occurs without consultation with the British people. So, it is within histories of nuclear culture that those voices that disagree with the nuclear nation-state can be retrieved, thus democratising nuclear Britain, to some degree.

Nuclear history shows us that it is very difficult for individuals trapped within short-term political systems to enact long-term change on powerful, permanent institutions like the nuclear weapons state, or to dent powerful ideologies like deterrence. What are the consequences of a persistent nuclear state, but a silent nuclear culture? If we don’t make every attempt to “reclaim nuclear politics for a wider public”, will the likelihood of meaningful nuclear disarmament recede into the twenty-second century?[[44]](#endnote-44) The varied representations of nuclear weapons and nuclear war in the two distinct eras examined in this chapter demonstrate that general perceptions of nuclear danger differ over time. What happens if perceptions of nuclear danger fade away altogether?

An exploration of the history of nuclear culture serves as a reminder that there are narratives deliberately put in place by the political elite, and these narratives were contested. There are significant contradictions at the heart of the nuclear nation-state, and deterrence ideology: studies of nuclear culture help to illuminate these issues. Histories of nuclear culture have shown that people do care about nuclear politics and alternative nuclear futures can be imagined and created. In the contemporary period, we need to understand how normative language, dominant nuclear value systems, institutional memory, and unquestioned nuclear beliefs persist, and what political interests they legitimise. Can we afford to allow an uncritical nuclear culture to dominate? Nuclear weapons can go away, but not if we are silent.

1. *Newsnight*, BBC2, 24 September 1984. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. This Chapter does not assess the history of decision-making over Trident. See Chapter Three for discussion on this. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Peter Bradshaw, ‘Threads: The film that frightened me the most’, *The Guardian* (20 October 2014), <http://www.theguardian.com/film/filmblog/2014/oct/20/threads-the-film-that-frightened-me-most-halloween> [Accessed 15/12/2015]. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. See Melvyn P. Leffler & Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *“The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume 3 Endings”,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Farrar-Hockley preceded his comment with the wish that all nuclear weapons be abolished eventually, but he continued to express a realist position due to the unpredictable threat of the Soviet Union. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. For a discussion of ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ narratives, see Jonathan Hogg, *“British Nuclear Culture: official and unofficial narratives in the long twentieth century” (*London: Bloomsbury, 2016). [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. One example of this was offered by political commentator and historian Niall Ferguson in *“Civilisation: the West and the rest”* (London: Penguin, 2012), pp.235-6, where, in a brief but powerful statement, the fact that no ‘world war’ occurred after 1945 was used to justify the existence of nuclear weapons. In a lecture at LSE in 2011 entitled ‘Nuclear Weapons and Human Rights’, Ferguson labelled nuclear weapons the ‘supreme achievement of western civilisation.’ These generalised opinions rely on an elitist vision of national identity and a narrow ontological position that serves to legitimise and reify the continuation of the nuclear nation-state through encouraging naturalised narratives on the peaceful properties of nuclear weapons. Focusing on those who specialise in nuclear scholarship full-time, Hugh Gusterson discussed the problems attached to such hard-line positions in “The Dangerous Disregard of Nuclear Experts for One Another”, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, (25 March 2015), <http://thebulletin.org/dangerous-disregard-nuclear-experts-one-another8136> [Accessed 01/12/2015]. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Studies that have studied the importance of language in the nuclear age include S. Hiltgartner (et al), “*Nukespeak: Nuclear Language, Visions and Mindset”* (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1982); Laura Considine, “‘Back to the Rough Ground!’: A Grammatical Approach to Trust and International Relations”, *Millennium: Journal of International Relations*, 44:1 (2015), pp.107-127; Jonathan Hogg, *“British Nuclear Culture”.* [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. Nick Richie, “Valuing and Devaluing Nuclear Weapons”, *Contemporary Security Policy*, 34:1 (2013), p.159. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Paul Schulte, “The Strategic Risks of Devaluing Nuclear Weapons”, *Contemporary Security Policy* 34:1 (2013), p.202. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. See Kirk Willis, “The Origins of British Nuclear Culture, 1895-1939”, *Journal of British Studies*, 34 (January 1995), pp.59-89; Spencer Weart, “*The Rise of* *Nuclear Fear: A History of Images”* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2012). [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Jonathan Hogg and Christoph Laucht, “Introduction: British nuclear culture”, *British Journal*

    *for the History of Science* 45, 4 (December 2012), pp.479-493. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. Jonathan Hogg, “*British Nuclear Culture”*, p.7. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Tacit support for nuclear policy within popular culture is explored in Christoph Laucht , “Britannia Rules the Atom: The James Bond phenomenon and post war British nuclear culture”, *The Journal of Popular Culture* 46, 2 (2013), pp.358-377. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. Jonathan Hogg, “*British Nuclear Culture”*, pp.8-11. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. It is worth pointing out that scholarship on nuclear culture predominantly focuses on narratives that are critical of nuclear orthodoxy, or else seeks to unravel the social and cultural impact of the nuclear nation in ways that challenge traditional interpretations of the nuclear century. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. See especially Duncan Campbell, “*War Plan UK: The Truth about Civil Defence in Britain*”, (London: Burnett, 1982) on nuclear secrecy, and Brian C. Taylor, “Nuclear Pictures and Metapictures”, *American Literary History* 9, 3 (Autumn 1997), pp.567-597 on nuclear subjectivity. In Taylor’s terms, particular forms of nuclear texts serve as political counter-narratives that demonstrate the nuclear subjectivity of certain individuals. He argued that these narratives could be powerful enough to compel us to ‘revise official accounts of nuclear history’ and that official accounts of nuclear history have still, on the whole, left nuclear subjectivities hidden. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Jonathan Hogg, ‘“The Family That Feared Tomorrow’: British Nuclear Culture and Individual Experience in the Late 1950s,” *The British Journal for the History of Science*,45:4 (Dec 2012), pp.535-49. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Nick Richie cited in Tim Street, “The Politics of British Nuclear Disarmament”, *Oxford Research Group Briefing*, (October 2015), p.1, <http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers_and_reports/politics_british_nuclear_disarmament> [Accessed 20/11/2015]. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. Ward Wilson, “How Nuclear Realists Falsely Frame the Nuclear Weapons Debate”, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, (7 May 2015), <http://thebulletin.org/how-nuclear-realists-falsely-frame-nuclear-weapons-debate8306> [Accessed 17/7/2015]. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. Paul Boyer, “*By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age”*, 2nd edition (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), *preface*. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. See Weart, “*Nuclear Fear”*; Henriksen, Margot A., “*Dr. Strangelove’s America: Society and Culture in the Atomic Age”* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Scott Zeman & Michael A. Amundson, (eds.), “*Atomic Culture: How We Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb”* (Boulder, CO.: University of Colorado Press, 2004); Peter B. Hales, “The Atomic Sublime”, *American Studies* 32:1 (Spring 1991), pp.5-31 [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. Robert Jacobs, “*The Dragon’s Tail: Americans Face the Atomic Age”* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2010); Tony Shaw, “*British Cinema and the Cold War: The State, Propaganda and Consensus*” (London: I.B. Tauris: 2001); Jacob D. Hamblin, *“Poison in the Well: Radioactive Waste in the Oceans at the Dawn of the Nuclear Age”* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 2008). [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. Gabrielle Hecht, *“The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II”* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998); Joseph Masco, “*Nuclear Borderlands: the Manhattan Project in post-war New Mexico”* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006). [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. For instance, the work of Benoit Pelopidas on the Cuban Missile Crisis in ‘Remembering the Cuban Missile Crisis, with Humility’, (2014). <http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/remembering-the-cuban-missile-crisis-with-humility_2118.html> [Accessed 12/9/2015]. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. Rens van Munster & Casper Sylvest, “Reclaiming Nuclear Politics? Nuclear Realism, the H-Bomb and Globality”, *Security and Dialogue*, 45:6 (2014), p.531. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. Ibid., p.540. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. Columba Peoples, “Redemption and Nutopia: The Scope of Nuclear Critique in International Studies”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 44:2 (2015). [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. Jonathan Hogg, “Cultures of Nuclear Resistance in 1980s Liverpool”, *Urban History*, 42:4 (November 2015), pp.584-602. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. Nick Ritchie, “Relinquishing Nuclear Weapons: Identities, Networks and the British Bomb”, *International Affairs* 86:2 (2010), pp.465–87 [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. Leffler & Westad (eds.), “*The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume 3, Endings”.* [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
33. Data from Brook (*et al*) (eds.), *British Social Attitudes Sourcebook* (Aldershot: Gower, 1992), stated that throughout the mid-1980s onein three people believed Britain should ‘rid itself of nuclear weapons whiledoing the same’, at least half believed Britain was less safe due to ‘Americannuclear missiles in Britain’. [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
34. Dan Cordle, ‘Protect/ Protest: British nuclear fiction of the 1980s,’ *The British Journal for the History of Science* 45:4 (Dec 2012), pp.653-669 [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
35. “Mothers in A-War Death Pact”, *Daily Mirror*, (5 March 1984), p.1 [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
36. Tim Street, ‘The Politics of British Nuclear Disarmament’ Oxford Research Group Briefing, (October 2015), p.5 <http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers_and_reports/politics_british_nuclear_disarmament> [Accessed 20/11/2015]. [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
37. Acknowledged in the Trident Commission Report 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
38. Lovely Umayam, ‘Why the Excitement over Post-Nuclear-War Game Fallout 4?’, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, (4 November 2015), <http://thebulletin.org/why-excitement-over-post-nuclear-war-game-fallout-48849> [Accessed 21/11/2015]. [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
39. Hogg, “*British Nuclear Culture”*, p.169 [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
40. Tim Street, ‘The Politics of British Nuclear Disarmament’, *Oxford Research Group Briefing*, (October 2015), p.1 <http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers_and_reports/politics_british_nuclear_disarmament> [Accessed 20/11/2015]. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
41. John Baylis & Kristan Stoddart, *The British Nuclear Experience: The Roles of Beliefs, Culture and Identity*,(Oxford: Oxford University Press), p.217. [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
42. For instance, see the recent biographies of Winston Churchill by Graham Farmelo and Kuevin Ruane. For work on decision-making culture, see Peter Hennessy, *“The Secret State”*, (London: Penguin, 2010). [↑](#endnote-ref-42)
43. For information see <http://nuclearfutures.org/tag/global-hibakusha-project/> [Accessed 7/1/2016] and <http://bojacobs.net/Bo_Jacobs/Global_Hibakusha.html> [Accessed 7/1/2016] . [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
44. Rens van Munster and Casper Sylvest, “Reclaiming Nuclear Politics? Nuclear Realism, the H-Bomb and Globality”, *Security and Dialogue*, 45:6 (2014), p.530. [↑](#endnote-ref-44)