**Wayn al-Dawla?: Locating the Lebanese State in Social Theory**

***Jamil Mouawad and Hannes Baumann***

***This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: “Wayn al-Dawla?: Locating the Lebanese State in Social Theory”, Arab Studies Journal, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2017, which has been published in final form at http://www.arabstudiesjournal.org/pages/issues/699/spring-2017. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes***

Social scientists usually characterize the Lebanese state as irrelevant, weak, broken down, or absent. Taking the state’s weakness for granted has prevented them from pursuing a comparative approach or using critical theories of the state to analyze Lebanese politics. The recent wave of scholarly interest in the Lebanese state is thus a welcome corrective. This article demonstrates how social-theoretical approaches to the state can be applied to Lebanon, and how Lebanon can in turn contribute to state theories. We challenge the dominant assumption that the Lebanese state is weak by two principal means. First, we unpack how the older literature on the Lebanese state understood weakness, and second, we critique how more recent literature challenges the concept of state weakness using mid-range theories such as “hybrid sovereignty.” We will define more clearly what we mean by mid-range theories below. While this literature advances the study of the Lebanese state, we argue that it relativizes state weakness without successfully countering or disassembling it. We argue that it is imperative to move beyond mid-range theories and rethink the state by returning to “grand theories.” We pursue both a Marxist approach, examining the neoliberal state’s centrality in accumulation, and a Foucauldian approach, contending that the state’s absence and weakness are an effect of state-society relations. To make these theoretical interventions, we draw upon our extensive field research on two Lebanese institutions: the central bank and the army. These institutions’ significance in security and economy make them essential cases with which to theorize the Lebanese state. They allow us to challenge how scholarly accounts of state weakness interpret the laissez-faire economy and the army’s inability to dominate the territory. Rather than formulate a monolithic theory of the Lebanese state, we propose two alternative lenses to understand the Lebanese state and politics.

This article is divided into four sections. First, we discuss how scholars have understood state weakness and highlight the limitations of these approaches. Second, we discuss how a newer literature relativizes state weakness by employing mid-range theories, a term we will define when we discuss this literature below. Third, we illustrate the value of a Marxist approach by looking at the central bank’s key role in reproducing Lebanese capitalism. Finally, we pursue a postmodern approach to explain the state as an effect is produced by the army’s roles in Akkar, a region state institutions have historically marginalized.[[1]](#endnote-1)

**Weberian Tropes of State Weakness**

For decades, two closely related approaches dominated analyses of Lebanese state weakness: a Weberian approach, which considers the state’s internal position vis-à-vis other societal actors, and a Westphalian one, which considers it weak in relation to external actors. In the Weberian approach, the Lebanese state appears to be clearly defective in both Weberian and Westphalian terms. It represents the archetypal “weak state,” unable to penetrate society and impose its will,[[2]](#endnote-2) lacking the “infrastructural power” necessary to ensure its autonomy over society.[[3]](#endnote-3) The state’s failure to successfully position itself above society and the axis of societal conflicts attests to its weakness.[[4]](#endnote-4) This structural weakness allows non-state actors to independently emerge and take control of the state. Foreign powers are free to meddle in Lebanon’s internal affairs.

This understanding of weakness consists of four main tropes. First, Lebanese society is primordially segmented into discrete sociocultural units, which have transformed into political actors and captured the state and its institutions.[[5]](#endnote-5) Second, the state fails to meet the Weberian standard because it cannot claim “the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory.”[[6]](#endnote-6) The Lebanese army is weak and cannot exert its sovereignty over the entire Lebanese territory. This allows non-state groups—Hizballah in particular—to act “with the responsibility of a sovereign,”[[7]](#endnote-7) fulfilling the main criteria of the Weberian state by constituting a “state within a state”.[[8]](#endnote-8) Third, regional actors’ interference in domestic politics signals weakness, particularly the Syrian regime and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)’s involvement in the Lebanese civil war. Pro- and anti-Syrian classifications continue to serve as the shorthand when locating actors on the political spectrum.[[9]](#endnote-9) Studies of the civil war-era state emphasize the question of its “survival” in an unstable regional context under the menace of “Arabism” and the Palestinian “revolution.”[[10]](#endnote-10) Even after Syria’s 2005 military withdrawal, scholars argue that “Lebanon might be considered as a state with limited sovereignty.”[[11]](#endnote-11) Fourth, the laissez-faire economy, built on minimal state intervention in the market or resource redistribution, in which a clientelist system fills the vacuum left by the state. Businesses, traditional landowners, and *zu‘ama’* – political bosses - in turn block any attempt to expand the role of the state in resource redistribution, which led to the failure of the more interventionist Shihab regime.[[12]](#endnote-12) Lebanon fits the mould of the neo-patrimonial developing state in which the rational legal separation of public and private realms is a mere façade hiding the continuation of premodern patrimonial authority. These four interrelated tropes continue to inform perceptions of Lebanon as “one of the Middle East’s chronically weak states. Lebanon was born weak, with the institutional design of its state having sentenced it to a life of weakness.”[[13]](#endnote-13)

**Weakness Relativized: Mid-Range Theories and Hybridity**

More recent works recognize that the state actually intervenes extensively in society. For example, Melani Cammett notes that “in 2006, Lebanon spent about nine percent of its GDP on health, a level equivalent to total health care spending in the Scandinavian countries but with far inferior health outcomes.”[[14]](#endnote-14) Since the war, the state’s role in markets and property rights has expanded enormously, evident in its decision to peg the exchange rate to the US dollar and its forced transfer of property rights within Beirut’s central district to a single private development company, Solidere. In addition, the number of state employees has expanded significantly, rising from seventy-five thousand in 1974 to 175,000 in 2000.[[15]](#endnote-15) The state lies at the intersection of multiple societal and elite dynamics. Informal networks and social service allocation structures are embedded in public institutions. The same parties who have dominated state institutions since the civil war’s conclusion regulate the distribution of services.[[16]](#endnote-16) Both private and public actors pursue private gains through public institutions.[[17]](#endnote-17) Perhaps even more importantly, successive governments have legitimized Hizballah, albeit indirectly through ministerial statements.[[18]](#endnote-18)

These transformations have led social scientists to question the weakness paradigm and rethink the Lebanese state. They have begun interrogating the boundaries and interplay between public and private realms, sects and public institutions, and state and non-state actors. This reveals how the state coexists with non-state groups, and how hybrid actors engage in state-like practices of power, such as security or foreign policy. This new research relies on mid-range theories that seek to reconcile the state with other societal actors in order to unpack and understand politics. Mid-range theories do not place the concepts they develop into the “great debates” of social theory that ask the “big questions” about modernity or capitalism.[[19]](#endnote-19) These mid-range concepts provide effective critiques of Weberian tropes. While this is useful, we argue that asking the “big questions” of “grand” social theory about the Lebanese state can yield new insights into the country’s politics. While exploring “urban geopolitics,” Sara Fregonese rejects the notion of a fixed boundary between state and non-state actors, instead tracing interconnections between them to argue for “hybridity.” Hybrid sovereignties result from “cross-contamination” between state and non-state actors.[[20]](#endnote-20) Waleed Hazbun takes up the concept of “hybrid sovereignty” and the “plural governance” of security. Rather than bemoaning the state’s lack of a monopoly over violence, Hazbun looks at “security assemblages” created by the multiple actors, such as the army and Hizballah.[[21]](#endnote-21) Najib Hourani points out that “hybrid sovereignty” is not confined to Hizballah’s interaction with the state, but also describes the relationship between President Amin Gemayel and the Kata’ib party in the early 1980s, or the Internal Security Forces reception of US aid since 2005. The Internal Security Forces were foreign-sponsored and a formal part of the state, but closely associated with billionaire politician Saad Hariri.[[22]](#endnote-22) Nikolas Kosmatopolous considers how expertise reproduces a Hobbesian conception of the Lebanese state as a “failed Leviathan.” He inquires into the “social life” of the failed state concept through the lens of peace expertise, creating a typology of practices associated with Lebanon’s failed state.[[23]](#endnote-23) Sami Hermez similarly examines the reproduction of the “*za‘im* state” and determines that its existence would be impossible without widespread popular cynicism.[[24]](#endnote-24) Despite such cynicism, as Michelle Obeid points out, Lebanese citizens continue to search for the “ideal face of the state” which can fulfil its security or welfare needs.[[25]](#endnote-25) Nora Stel analyzes governance in the Palestinian camps and argues that public authority is generated in “twilight institutions,”[[26]](#endnote-26) the amalgamation of state and non-state institutions. Other scholars reveal the ruling elite’s continuous attempts to undermine state public institutions while simultaneously relying on private networks to expand their power and control over society. In this vein, Reinoud Leenders draws attention to the fluidity of the public/private sector. For him, the public state is central to achieving private gains. People pursue these aims through an institutional design that “[defies] a clear distinction between the state and the private sector.”[[27]](#endnote-27)

These accounts represent a major step forward in analyzing the Lebanese state. Rather than dismiss the state from analysis, they relativize its weakness by revealing how public institutions are crucial to informal networks’ functioning. State weakness does not explain how politics works. Rather, state and non-state actors mutually constitute and feed on one another in order to operate. For example, ruling elites often secure representation in public institutions and informal networks in a simultaneous “dual game.” This is comprised of an electoral game, in which they aim to gain vote share, and a “regime game,” in which they struggle over the basic rules of allocating power.[[28]](#endnote-28) In his study on personal status law and family legal cases, Samer Ghamroun argues that despite the state’s apparent withdrawal and lack of centralized policies, it remains essential for the persistence of the sectarian political system .[[29]](#endnote-29)

Hybridity is an illuminating means to capture the way power operates in Lebanon, in which “the Lebanese political terrain is itself constituted by such hybrid sovereignties.”[[30]](#endnote-30) One major implication of hybridity is that it dissolves the state into a wider field of power with a larger plurality of actors, and does not take the state’s weakness for granted. However, this mid-range theory fails to explain why scholars, critics, and the public qualify the state as weak. Weakness not only goes unexplained, but also unopposed. If the state is not weak, then what is it? The study of the Lebanese state thus remains isolated from the general theories we use to explain state power.

We propose going beyond mid-range concepts that criticize Weberian sovereignty by deploying Marxist and postmodernist grand theories of the state. These approaches prompt distinct and unanswered research questions. In the Marxist vein, we ask, what is the state’s role in reproducing Lebanese capitalism? Then, adopting a Foucauldian approach, we ask, what is the army’s role in protecting the state? These approaches allow us explore alternative definitions of the state: Poulantzas’s notion of the state as “condensation of class forces” and Mitchell’s description of the state as “effect.” These definitions better reflect the complexity of state-society relations during and after the civil war by attending to class struggle and the discursive construction of state absence, respectively. We pursue these theories by considering the central bank’s role in the economy and the army’s role in security and in producing a “state effect” in Akkar.

**A Marxist Approach: The Central Bank and Lebanese Capitalism**

How does the state reproduce capitalist social relations? One Marxist approach pioneered by Poulantzas and developed by Jessop answers this question by conceptualizing the state as a social relation. The state is the site where class struggles are “condensed” and hence where they can be “deciphered.”[[31]](#endnote-31) The state possesses “relative autonomy” from society. It creates order and alleviates class conflict so that competing economic interests do not “consume themselves.”[[32]](#endnote-32) The main role of the state is to manage the frequent crises of capitalism.[[33]](#endnote-33) Social struggles shape state institutions, which persist over time, even when the nature of the struggle changes.[[34]](#endnote-34) State institutions are not merely weathervanes of social forces, but artefacts of previous social struggles. The state’s “materiality” partly enables it to manage capitalist crises with relative autonomy. The wider methodological point is that the history of state institutions is worth studying.[[35]](#endnote-35) Recent works historicizing the Lebanese state evince the value of this pursuit, most importantly the work of Hicham Safieddine, Najib Hourani, and Ziad Abu-Rish.[[36]](#endnote-36) While they are not Marxist authors, their pioneering research into the state’s role in the Lebanese economy informs our argument.

Much of the existing scholarship assumes that the “weak” Lebanese state plays no role in shaping the country’s laissez-faire capitalism.[[37]](#endnote-37) However, the history of Lebanon’s central bank evinces the contrary. This section examines the foundation of the central bank in 1964, its role in managing the 1966 Intrabank crisis, its non-collapse during the civil war (1975-1990), and its postwar policy of anchoring the currency. The central bank’s important role in managing Lebanese capitalism belies assertions of state absence. While we recognise that the Lebanese state did not achieve the same level of “relative autonomy” as Western industrial nations, we argue that the central bank’s role in managing capitalist crises presents a research puzzle not yet addressed in studies of Lebanese political economy.[[38]](#endnote-38)

In the 1950s and 1960s, during the “merchant republic” period, a few families monopolized finance and trade and dominated politics.[[39]](#endnote-39) Lebanon’s oligarchs maintained a laissez-faire economy to prevent state challenges to their monopolies. Former army commander Fu’ad Shihab challenged their political control when he became a consensus president after the brief civil war of 1958. The new president and his technocrats sought to build a “developmental state” focused on planning and greater state control over capitalism, and thus confronted the bourgeoisie. The intelligence apparatus was a key Shihabist power center; another was the central bank, founded in 1964.[[40]](#endnote-40) The bankers had tried to fend off the state’s incursion into their affairs by founding the Association of Banks of Lebanon (ABL) in 1959.[[41]](#endnote-41) This network of technocrats and politicians would influence Lebanese politics and the economy for the next half century. Scholars have not sufficiently appreciated the significance of this network, with the notable exceptions of Hourani and Leenders.[[42]](#endnote-42)

The 1966 Intrabank collapse was a defining moment of Lebanese prewar capitalism. Banks had become overly reliant on short-term deposits from other Arab countries. They were in turn providing long-term credits to borrowers. The risk of bank runs was therefore very high. The crisis also had a political dimension. Lebanon’s bourgeoisie considered Intrabank’s Palestinian-Lebanese chairman a dangerous upstart, leading the government to refuse assistance to the bank.[[43]](#endnote-43) The crisis rocked the Lebanese economy, and the central bank intervened.[[44]](#endnote-44) The central bank took a major shareholding in Intrabank’s successor, Intra Investment Company, and expanded its regulatory power at the expense of the financial oligarchy. In 1963, the bank implemented the Code of Money and Credit despite opposition from Lebanon’s banks, and founded a supervisory Banking Control Commission (BCC). It shuttered ten banks, permitted four others to go into voluntary liquidation, and supported a moratorium on new banking licenses.[[45]](#endnote-45) The central bank did not rule supreme: the ABL managed to water down the Code of Money and Credit. However, the bank’s regulations spurred a major restructuring of Lebanese banking.[[46]](#endnote-46) Foreign banks took a more direct role in Lebanese finance at the local bourgeoisie’s expense.[[47]](#endnote-47) Central bank governor Elias Sarkis was a Shihabist. He picked economics professor Salim al-Huss as the head of the BCC. The two men became crucial players in state restructuring during the civil war.

Despite these changes, the bank did not manage to end destabilizing lending practices.[[48]](#endnote-48) Nor did it prevent the biggest crisis of all, the outbreak of civil war in 1975. The outbreak of war was not merely the result of a sectarian altercation, but also of a “crisis of Lebanese capitalism”: Western-owned banks’ increasing dominance in local banking and even greater monopolization of trade, combined with a rural crisis that led to rapid urbanisation and conflict.[[49]](#endnote-49) The alliance between Palestinian factions and the Lebanese left presented an armed challenge to the status quo, which rightist militias defended. Lebanon lost its role as financial intermediary. Militia funding from outside backers, migrant remittances, and exports kept the economy afloat until 1982. Despite the rise of a “militia economy,” the state did not actually collapse. The government still paid salaries. The central bank continued to function throughout the war, and its network of Shihabist technocrats gained control of key levers of the rump state between 1976 and 1982. Their institutional legacy and their facilitation of Gulf contractors’ entry into Lebanese finance shaped postwar capitalism.

Central bank governor Elias Sarkis was elected President of Lebanon in 1976. He represented the return of Shihabism after Sulaiman Franjiyya, a member of Lebanon’s traditional political class, had captured the presidency in 1970. In 1976, Sarkis appointed his collaborator at the BCC, Salim al-Huss, as his prime minister. Michel al-Khuri, a Shihabist and the son of Lebanon’s first president Bishara al-Khuri, became the new central bank governor.[[50]](#endnote-50) Fu’ad Siniura, al-Huss’s former student, became the new BCC chairman.[[51]](#endnote-51) Siniura later significantly shaped postwar economic policy. In 1982, Siniura fell victim to a power struggle between the BCC and Lebanon’s banks. After Siniura ordered an investigation into several banks’ accounts, the bankers pushed for his resignation.[[52]](#endnote-52) Then-prime minister Shafiq Wazzan obliged by failing to renew Siniura’s contract, causing central bank governor Khuri to threaten resignation.[[53]](#endnote-53)

The 1981 oil price collapse in the Gulf countries reduced remittances. The 1982 Israeli invasion reduced militia funding. Coordinated rounds of speculation against the currency hastened the subsequent collapse of the Lebanese currency.[[54]](#endnote-54) Militias sought to restructure the state in order to capture rents from finance and trade and use the state’s meagre welfare functions as a source of patronage.[[55]](#endnote-55) Lebanese banks turned to speculation. While ordinary people saw the value of their salaries and savings wiped out, those who participated in this speculative cartel grew very rich. The central bank tried to rein in speculation by selling treasury bills to “mop up” Lebanese pound liquidity and raising reserve requirements.[[56]](#endnote-56) Edmond Na‘im succeeded Michel al-Khuri as central bank governor in 1985. He was a compromise candidate of various militia leaders and politicians in the national unity government.[[57]](#endnote-57) The central bank continued its efforts to rein in speculation, despite its lack of autonomy.[[58]](#endnote-58) The institution limped on and managed to rebuild itself after the civil war.

The final group to join this struggle over the Lebanese state were Lebanese émigrés to the Gulf who had grown wealthy as contractors in the 1970s oil boom.[[59]](#endnote-59) The 1981 oil price collapse forced them to look for investment opportunities elsewhere.[[60]](#endnote-60) The central bank and its personnel facilitated their return to Lebanon. In 1978, the central bank lifted a ten-year moratorium on new banking licenses, allowing Gulf contractors to buy up ailing banks.[[61]](#endnote-61) In 1983, ‘Issam Faris founded Wedge Bank and hired Elias Sarkis as its chairman.[[62]](#endnote-62) Lebanese-born Faris had grown wealthy through a controlling interest in the Dutch-owned Ballast Nedam company, which enjoyed lucrative contracts in Saudi Arabia.[[63]](#endnote-63) After obtaining a string of government contracts throughout the late 1970s, Rafiq Hariri opened Saudi Lebanese Bank in 1981.[[64]](#endnote-64) Hariri installed Sabah al-Haj as chairman on the recommendation of Salim al-Huss.[[65]](#endnote-65) Hariri also bought Banque Méditerranée in 1981 and took full control in 1983.[[66]](#endnote-66) He made former BCC chairman Fu’ad Siniura chairman and general director. Siniura had been Hariri’s school friend in Sidon, and in their youth both participated in the same cell of the Arab Nationalist Movement.[[67]](#endnote-67) These men, intimately connected to the central bank, eased the Gulf contractors’ entry into the Lebanese banking system.[[68]](#endnote-68) The central bank’s Shihabists were no socialists. They likely saw Gulf capital as an ally to help build a more efficient capitalist system. Rafiq Hariri held greater political influence than other Gulf contractors because he acted as Saudi King Fahd’s representative in Lebanon’s civil war diplomacy.[[69]](#endnote-69) In 1988, Hariri reportedly supported Michel al-Khuri’s failed bid to succeed Amin Gemayel as president, illustrating Gulf capital’s proximity to the central bank management.[[70]](#endnote-70)

Khuri resumed his position as head of the central bank from 1991 to 1993. He initiated the “currency anchor” policy, the second signature policy of Rafiq Hariri’s premiership (1992-1998 and 2000-2004), after the more famous reconstruction of central Beirut. The Lebanese pound rose from LL 2,420 to the US dollar in September 1992, immediately prior to Hariri’s premiership, to LL 1,507 in December 1997, where it remains fixed.[[71]](#endnote-71) High interest rates on government debt attracted Lebanese pound deposits to the banks that lended to the government, producing high returns for both banks and depositors. The highly concentrated bank ownership and deposit base led to highly concentrated wealth.[[72]](#endnote-72) Government debt exploded to 185 percent of GDP in 2006. This crowded out private sector credit, while economic growth remained sluggish.[[73]](#endnote-73)

As one of the main holders of government treasury bills, Hariri’s Banque Méditerranée was among the largest beneficiaries of this situation. It received approximately one billion dollars in interest on these bills between 1994 and 2000 alone.[[74]](#endnote-74) The bank initiated the currency anchor policy in May 1993 by beginning weekly auctions of treasury bills.[[75]](#endnote-75) Michel al-Khuri handed over the bank’s reins to Riyadh Salama that August. Beirut newspapers reported that Salama had previously managed Hariri’s personal finance portfolio at Merrill Lynch in Paris.[[76]](#endnote-76) The finance ministry was another central institution controlling government borrowing. Formally, Hariri headed the ministry himself, but put Fu’ad Siniura in charge as minister of state. In regular meetings, Hariri, Siniura, and first Khuri and later Salama coordinated monetary and fiscal policy. According to Siniura, he, Hariri, and Salama took the decision to stabilize the exchange rate.[[77]](#endnote-77) Hariri’s allies and former employees thus enacted policy that would accrue considerable profits to Hariri’s banks.

Although Hariri benefited financially, the currency anchor policy was not merely a get-rich-quick scheme. The Hariri team argued a wider rationale for the policy. Hariri argued that “the stability of the Lebanese lira represents a critical component of the confidence in the Lebanese economy both domestically and internationally.” This stability led to capital inflows and low inflation.[[78]](#endnote-78) The end of the gold standard in 1973 produced high currency movement volatility. Many developing countries adopted currency anchors to signal stability to international capital. However, currency anchors are also extremely costly to maintain and can produce macroeconomic instability.[[79]](#endnote-79) This is precisely what happened in Lebanon, where public debt skyrocketed to one of the highest levels globally. In 1993, initial macroeconomic forecasts indicated that debt-fuelled spending on reconstruction would kick-start economic growth and debt would eventually be repaid.[[80]](#endnote-80) Hariri’s economists, including Siniura, likely never predicted that the currency anchor would lead them into a debt trap. The central bank’s institutional history helps explain this policy. In 1982, politically connected bankers drove Siniura from his chairmanship of the BCC. In 1993, he teamed up with his former boss at the central bank, Michel al-Khuri, and instituted the currency anchor. Khuri and Siniura bought off banks with profits from high interest rates, their value secured through dollar parity to disincentivize speculation. This directed profits into the coffers of Lebanon’s banks, including Hariri’s Banque Méditerranée. Salim al-Huss saw this clearly. When he replaced Hariri as prime minister from 1998 to 2000, he tried to restrict his former colleagues’ policies. This difference of opinion between two former central bankers demonstrates that the Shihabist central bank network did not follow a unified ideological project.

The central bank is no twilight institution,” but an essential part of the state. The concept of hybrid sovereignty cannot account for the bank’s history. The central bank stabilized Lebanese capitalism throughout its crises due to its relative autonomy. Without this relatively autonomous institution, the history of Lebanese capitalism would have been very different. The central bank’s capabilities grew after the Intrabank crisis. During repeated wartime currency crises, the bank ensured the Lebanese pound’s survival. While surviving the civil war, the bank facilitated Lebanese-born Gulf contractors’ return to Beirut. One of these Gulf capitalists became prime minister in 1992, and enacted the central bank’s currency anchor policy. The currency anchor benefited the prime minister financially, but followed its own policy logic, which can be understood by examining the central bank’s wartime experience.

**A Postmodern Approach: The State Effect in Akkar**

Many social scientists theorize the state as an autonomous or semi-autonomous structure vis-à-vis the society. From a liberal perspective, it is neutral, and from a Marxist perspective, it is pivotal and central in the reproduction of capitalist and liberal hegemony. By contrast, postmodern approaches do not take for granted the state as a locus of power. Foucault did not develop a theory of the state. He argued that the state does not wield power, but rather power is diffused throughout the social body and reproduced in social relations. For Foucault, the state does not have “unity, individuality, and rigorous functionality.”[[81]](#endnote-81) He invites us to move away from examining the state’s nature and identity and towards studying its practices.[[82]](#endnote-82) From this perspective, the state loses all its past privileges, epitomized by Marx and Engels as “a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.”[[83]](#endnote-83) It becomes one contingent site of power among many others.[[84]](#endnote-84) This postmodern inquiry does not invalidate the preceding Marxist approach. By pursuing both in turn, we seek to widen the theoretical arsenal social scientists deploy to analyze the Lebanese state.

Timothy Mitchell takes the postmodern state model to its “logical culmination,”[[85]](#endnote-85) the complete dismissal of the state. Mitchell considers the state as a pure “effect” or “metaphor.”[[86]](#endnote-86) He advises us to abandon the state-society dichotomy and instead consider how modern techniques and discursive processes give rise to this seemingly omnipotent abstraction. Rather than examine the state as an actual structure, we must examine it as a “powerful, metaphysical effect of practices that make . . . structures appear to exist.”[[87]](#endnote-87) Joel Migdal’s empirical interpretation of Mitchell’s argument led him to study the “state in society” by “bring[ing] the state down to earth” to explore how state and society are mutually constituted.[[88]](#endnote-88) An obvious extension of this approach is to move beyond a liberal weak-strong state categorization.

This postmodern approach undermines the idea of the state as a sovereign body. It is thus pertinent to empirically examine the state effect by both considering the state as a subjective construct without material basis and by exploring how concrete actions performed on the ground by state agents—in this study, the army—constitute the state.[[89]](#endnote-89) The army is an ideal lens through which to identify the state effect and understand how it operates. Vincent Geisser argues that we must move beyond understanding the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as weak and instead reexamine the army historically and sociologically. For Geisser, the slogan “the people want the army . . . expresses not so much a militarization of society but rather a claim for greater civility in the state.”[[90]](#endnote-90)

The army is the most dominant component of the state’s ethos. The 1989 Ta’if Agreement granted special attention to the LAF as a neutral institution capable of unifying the country.[[91]](#endnote-91) The agreement thus equated rebuilding the army with reviving state sovereignty. The state allotted 25.9 percent of its budget in 1992 and 22.9 percent in 1993 to rebuilding the army, the largest budget share dedicated to any state institution.[[92]](#endnote-92) The army continues to present itself as a neutral institution above the political arena and sectarian societal conflict, and a protector and guarantor of national unity.[[93]](#endnote-93) It thus bars its members from voting in elections.[[94]](#endnote-94)

Despite the army’s discursive neutrality, recent literature portrays the institution as deficient, unable to act with full autonomy, and a power repository that does not ensure state monopoly of violence over a bounded territory. This literature accounts for the LAF’s weakness and deficiency in several ways. Some highlight that Syria’s Ba‘thist regime designed and dominated the LAF’s restoration while subordinating both the army and police to its hegemony over the Lebanese “dominion state.”[[95]](#endnote-95) Others argue that the sectarian composition of Lebanese society translated into the consolidation of a “multi-confessional army.”[[96]](#endnote-96) Soon after the civil war, certain dynamics within the army took on a sectarian guise. The institution purged or marginalized a number of Christian officers due to their involvement in former LAF Commander Michel Aoun’s war against Syria in 1990. Later, it marginalized certain Sunni officers as a result of political tensions between the LAF Commander Émile Lahoud and former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.[[97]](#endnote-97) Both external Syrian domination and internal tensions produced the division of the security state apparatuses between the army—allied with Syria and, by extension, Hizballah— and the Internal Security Forces (ISF), allied with Hariri.[[98]](#endnote-98)

Other scholars have recently contended that the army has fallen under Hizballah’s influence.[[99]](#endnote-99) They argue that the army is unable to enforce the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence over its territory, particularly the Syrian border, citing the regular flows of Hizballah soldiers illicitly crossing to fight alongside Bashar al-Asad’s regime.[[100]](#endnote-100) Critics frequently mobilize these issues to evince the Lebanese state’s weakness. Some note an emerging resentment towards the army among the Sunni community, which generally empathizes with the Syrian opposition, although the majority of political parties in the country officially support the army.[[101]](#endnote-101) This context signals the significance of our study of the army in Akkar, North Lebanon, a Sunni-majority region where locals condemn the state’s absence and weakness, and openly voice resentment towards the army.[[102]](#endnote-102)

Weberian analyses posit the army and state as a bounded organization with specific objectives. The state’s capacity to penetrate society and the army’s capacity to protect society determines Weberian classifications of state weakness and strength. According to this perspective, the army is weak in Akkar because it is under the influence of Shi‘i Hizballah, and Akkari Sunnis thus tend to oppose and protest against it. However, adopting a postmodern approach leads us to ask a fundamentally different question: how does the state effect actually unfold from below?

Exact figures on the number of Akkaris in the army are unavailable. However, there exists a common perception that large numbers of Akkaris serve in the LAF, which is both extremely revealing and indicative of their significance in the army. The popular adage, “Where is the army? In Akkar. Where is Akkar? In the Army,” expresses the close relationship between the army and the people of Akkar. In his 2009 study, Oren Barak reveals an increase in the number of officers from Lebanon’s peripheral regions. The proportion of officers from both South and North Lebanon increased from thirty percent to forty-four percent between 1945 and 2004.[[103]](#endnote-103) Conversely, officers from Mount Lebanon decreased from 42.7 percent to 26.4 percent. Other recent studies indicate that low-ranking officers from North Lebanon suffered the most casualties during the 2008 fighting between the LAF and Fatah al-Islam in Nahr al-Barid, compared with other regions.[[104]](#endnote-104)

In 2008, the people of Akkar provided unconditional support to the army against the Islamist Fatah al-Islam group. However, in May 2012, the Lebanese army shot dead a religious cleric and his companions at an Akkar checkpoint. The victim’s furious supporters blockaded roads with burning tires and called upon the army to withdraw from the area. Reactions to the incident fell along the lines of the country’s two major political coalitions, March 8 and March 14. The latter considered the incident a targeted assassination of Lebanese opponents of the Asad regime, while the former contended that the army simply fulfilled its duty by preserving peace and asserting its authority. Nevertheless, both coalitions’ leaders unanimously agreed on the importance of maintaining the army as the only institution that asserts state sovereignty over Lebanese territory.

Mu‘in Mur‘abi and Khalid Dahir, the two Akkari members of parliament, both on the Future Movement’s electoral lists, responded to the killing. They publicly accused the army secret services of planning the killing, rather than the army itself, and called for the army’s withdrawal from Akkar to be replaced by the ISF. Some called to establish a “Free Lebanese Army” inspired by the Free Syrian Army, which defected from the state’s Arab Syrian Army and launched the uprising against the Asad regime in 2011[[105]](#endnote-105). These calls seriously alarmed politicians, leading Future Movement head and former Prime Minister Saad Hariri to appeal to maintain the army’s unity.

In 2013, the army undertook a massive military operation against the Sunni shaykh Ahmad al-Assir’s stronghold in ‘Abra, near Sidon. This operation put the army at odds with parts of the Sunni community yet again. During the fighting, Assir called on his supporters and other Sunni soldiers to defect and join him in the fight against the army and Hizballah. This call did not generate any significant supportive response. However, critics assailed the army with allegations that Hizballah was fighting alongside them against Assir and his group. Mainstream Sunni parties, particularly the Future Movement, have everything to lose in such instances of internal conflict, especially access to state patronage, which explains the lack of support for Assir’s call. Moreover, the Islamists are not ready to renounce their legal existence in Lebanon, where most remain able to operate politically.[[106]](#endnote-106)

Despite growing resentment towards the army, these incidents reveal that while many believe that the army is allied with Hizballah, this frustration has not led Sunnis to abandon the army. Despite feeling left out by the state, the people of Akkar continue to defend the state, albeit indirectly, through their attachment to the army. This was not a concerted decision taken by the leaders of the Future Movement or Islamist groups. Rather, it speaks to the army’s role in society. This is not a story of sectarian leaders mediating between a sectarian society and a weak state. It is a story that depicts the production of a diffuse state effect.

While some Akkaris praise the LAF—often referred to as *al-mū’asasa al-‘askariya* (the military institution)—and express their readiness sacrifice themselves for its sake, they complain that they do not “receive anything in return” from the state. The fact that no Maronite Akkari officer has risen to the rank of general commander, a position historically reserved for Maronites, epitomizes Akkaris’ marginalization in the LAF.[[107]](#endnote-107) Members of several towns and villages complain about the lack of jobs (*waẓā’if*) in the army. They condemn the corrupt practices of high-ranking officers, mostly based in the Akkari village of ‘Akrum, who guarantee army jobs for members of their own village at the expense of others. In turn, ‘Akrum residents complain that they are losing their privileges within the army. One stated: “In ‘Akrum, our children are smart and have competencies . . . that’s why we have many officers in the army. Three years ago, however, of the usual five to enter the army, only three are entering. The reason is another influential officer in the army from a neighbouring village—al-Bira—who is working hard to get his ‘sons’ into the army.”[[108]](#endnote-108) Meanwhile, in Wadi Khalid, residents complain that the state is neglecting them intentionally. The state only naturalized these residents in 1994, and this newly acquired citizenship enabled them to hold public office and join the army. Recently, the mayor of Wadi Khalid protested against a new NGO, Humat al-Diyar (Protectors of the Homeland). Humat al-Diyar seeks to recruit and train young people in order to support the army, but critics consider it a militia.[[109]](#endnote-109) The mayor called upon the “Wadi’s young population not to join it because the army remains the sole legitimate authority.”[[110]](#endnote-110) Although access to the army varies from locale to locale, a shared popular sentiment raises the army above society and portrays Akkar as the army’s reservoir.

Despite the dominant perception of state absence, the army provides an important source of income for the region. If one family member is employed in the army, other family members can secure access to social security and raise their economic fortunes, particularly through army housing loans. A recent socioeconomic study of several areas in Akkar reveals that the army constitutes a more significant economic resource for the people of Akkar than agriculture. While agriculture produces 28.33 percent of annual household revenue, the fixed employment sector, particularly the LAF and the military sector more broadly, accounts for 27.85 percent, with additional social security and education benefits.[[111]](#endnote-111)

Some commentators argue that enrolling in the army does not necessarily entail a rational intention to build a relationship with the state. On the contrary, enrolment results from state negligence in an area where the absence of educational services leaves young uneducated men “without any option” but to join “the army to make his living.”[[112]](#endnote-112) Many Akkari residents thus question the army’s integrity, suspect its political links with Hizballah, condemn corrupt recruitment practices, and bemoan the state’s absence, while simultaneously serving in the army and indirectly defending and supporting the state.

Following the army’s murder of the Akkari religious cleric in May 2012, the local population did not revolt against the army, and soldiers did not defect. Despite their criticisms of the army, some Akkaris do not see the army as an oppressive tool. Rather, they consider soldiers to be *ahl* (family members). For example, the father of a soldier stated,

They cannot put us face to face with the army. Does one go and fight against himself? I am retired and still feel the need to follow the commands of the army. I am the first one to defend the army. We voted for the parliamentarians in the elections. What do they want? No. The army is a ‘red line’. Mur‘abi and Dahir come and go, but the institution (*al-mū’asasa*) remains.[[113]](#endnote-113)

This account signals a “language of stateness”, whereby people invoke the state’s presence “situationally by appropriating language, rituals and symbols they associate with it.” [[114]](#endnote-114) In other words, the “state-idea” is not only evoked by the discourse and practice of “non-state actors” such as the Palestinian Popular Committees in their attempt to reinforce their authority by emulating the Lebanese state institutions, but it is also essential to people’s imagination.[[115]](#endnote-115) While Akkaris feel the state’s absence, it remains present in their everyday talk.

André Burguière summarizes Foucault’s conceptual intervention, which urged scholars to approach the state not as “autonomous apparatus standing over society and human consciousness, but rather through the process by which they become incorporated into society. The state does not live enclosed in its ministries and barracks. It lives inside us, invading our ways of thinking and reshaping the forms of our consent to reality.”[[116]](#endnote-116) Accordingly, our postmodern approach avoids considering the army from “above,” as an institution that penetrates society and provides security, but rather explores it “from below,” through the mutual constitution of army and society. By contrast, while Hazbun’s analysis of security assemblages is productive, he concentrates on the actions of sectarian leaders, particularly Hizballah.[[117]](#endnote-117) Similarly, Fregonese and Hourani’s work on hybrid sovereignties focuses on militias and sectarian leadership.[[118]](#endnote-118)Analysts typically understand security through dynamics of negation (strong armed groups versus a weak army) or hybridity (state and non-state actors performing state-like roles). These categories fail to encompass the language of stateness, epitomized by the army as *ahl*,and the material implications of the army’s presence in Akkar. This language of stateness and political economy highlight that the state effect challenges a weak-strong state categorization. Examining the state effect in Akkar reveals that the army is neither isolated from society nor simply existing in parallel to non-state actors. Rather, it is incorporated in society. Despite widespread resentment towards the army, it is present in society. Society defends the army, and thus indirectly protects the state.

**Conclusion**

We presented two alternative Marxist and postmodern theoretical approaches to the state. Instead of evaluating state weakness, we consider the state’s management of economic crises and the creation of the state effect in Akkar. We do not argue that Lebanon should be recategorised as a strong state. Rather, we argue that analyses of state weakness and absence hide more than they reveal. State economic institutions can play a strong role in reconfiguring capitalism, as the central bank did after the Intrabank crisis in 1966 and during the 1990s reconstruction. The army may not monopolize legitimate force, but it does represent the face of the state in Akkar, producing the state effect.

Social scientists have recently begun questioning tired notions of state weakness, absence, and failure. We urge researchers to go even further, and to ask big questions about the Lebanese state. Lebanon has much to contribute to wider theorizations of the state and to comparative state studies. For example, how do state institutions in supposedly weak states in Africa, Asia, or Latin America live up to the Poulantzian ideal of the capitalist state that manages capitalism’s crises? What are the limits of this relatively autonomous capitalist state? How is the state effect produced in these weak states? Tackling these questions can integrate Lebanon into wider inquiries into state-society relations.

Jamil Mouawad is a researcher at the Institut Français du Proche-Orient (IFPO) and a lecturer at the Saint-Joseph University in Beirut, Lebanon. This research was made possible in part through the support of the Arab Council of the Social Sciences by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

Hannes Baumann is a Leverhulme Early Career Fellow and lecturer at the University of Liverpool. His research for this paper was supported by a Leverhulme Trust “Study Abroad” studentship and a “Jamal Daniel Levant Postdoctoral Fellowship” at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

1. NOTES

   The section on Akkar is based on a fieldwork conducted in Akkar in the framework of a larger project on state-society relations in the area. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results,” *European Journal of Sociology* 25, no. 2 (1984): 185-213. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Tom Najem, *Lebanon: The Politics of a Penetrated Society* (London: Routledge, 2012). [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Antoine Messarra, *Théorie générale du système politique libanais: essai comparé sur les fondements et les perspectives d'évolution d'un système consensuel de gouvernement* (Paris: Cariscript, 1994). [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. MaxWeber*,* *The Vocation Lectures* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2004), 33. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. Boaz Atzili, “State Weakness and ‘Vacuum of Power’ in Lebanon,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 33, no. 8 (2010): 757-782. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Waddah Sharara, *Dawlat Hizballah: Lubnan Mujtama‘an Islamiyyan* (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 2007); and Hussain Abdul­Hussain, “Hezbollah: A State Within a State,”*Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 8 (2009), <http://www.hudson.org/research/9801-hezbollah-a-state-within-a-state>. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. Rola El-Husseini, *Pax Syriana: Elite Politics in Postwar Lebanon* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2012). [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Farid El-Khazen, *The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967-1976* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000). [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Elizabeth Picard, “Lebanon in Search of Sovereignty: Post-2005 Security Dilemmas,” in *Lebanon: After the Cedar Revolution*, ed. Are Knudsen and Michael Kerr (London: Hurst, 2012), 159. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Stéphane Malsagne, *Fouad Chéhab (1902-1973). Une figure oubliée de l'histoire libanaise* (Paris: Karthala, 2011). [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. Mehran Kamrava, “Weak States in the Middle East,” in *Fragile Politics: Weak States in the Greater Middle East*,ed. Mehran Kamrava (London: Hurst, 2014). [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Melani Cammett, “Sectarian Politics and Social Welfare: Non-state Provision in Lebanon,” in *The Politics of Non-state Welfare*, ed. Melani Cammett and Lauren M. MacLean (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), 149. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. Salim Nasr, “The New Social Map,” in *Lebanon in Limbo*, ed. Theodor Hanf and Nawaf Salam (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002), 153. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Melani Cammett, *Compassionate Communalism: Welfare and Sectarianism in Lebanon* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014)*.*  [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. Reinoud Leenders, *Spoils of Truce: Corruption and State-building in Postwar Lebanon* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012). [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Ministerial statements in postwar Lebanon have acknowledged the right of Lebanon to resist Israel. Hizballah alone performs this resistance. The dictum of the Army, People, and Resistance implicitly sanctifies Hizballah as the main party. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. See for instance David A. Lake, “Theory is dead, long live theory: The end of the great debate and the rise of eclecticism in International Relations”, *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (2013), 567–

    587. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. Sara Fregonese, “Beyond the ‘Weak State’: Hybrid Sovereignties in Beirut,” *Environment and Planning* 30 (2012): 655-674. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. Waleed Hazbun, “Assembling Security in a ‘Weak State’: The Contentious Politics of Plural Governance in Lebanon Since 2005,” *Third World Quarterly* 37, no. 6 (2016): 1053–1070. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. Najib Hourani, “Lebanon: Hybrid Sovereignties and U.S. Foreign Policy,” *Middle East Policy* 20, no. 1 (2013): 39-55. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. Nikolas Kosmatopolous, “Toward an Anthropology of ‘State Failure’: Lebanon’s Leviathan and Peace Expertise,” *Social Analysis* 55, no. 3 (2011): 115-142. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. Sami Hermez, “When the State is (N)ever Present: On Cynicism and Political Mobilisation in Lebanon,” *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 21 (2005): 507-523. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. Michelle Obeid, “Searching for the ‘Ideal Face of the State’ in a Lebanese Border Town,” *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 16, no. 2 (2010): 330-346. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. Nora Stel, “Languages of Stateness in South Lebanon’s Palestinian Gatherings: The PLO’s Popular Committees as Twilight Institutions,” *Development and Change*, 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. Leenders, *Spoils of Truce.* [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. Melani Cammett and Sukriti Issar, “Bricks and Mortar Clientelism: Sectarianism and the Logics of Welfare Allocation in Lebanon,” *World Politics* 62, no. 3 (2010): 381-421. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. Samer Ghamroun, “Effets d'État,” *Gouvernement et action publique* 4*,* no. 4 (2014): 57-82. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. Hourani, “Hybrid Sovereignties,” 39-55. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. Nicos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes* (London: New Left Books, 1978), 45; Nicos Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism* (London: New Left Books, 1978), 123-160; Bob Jessop, *State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place* (Cambridge: Polity, 1990); and Bob Jessop, *State Power: A Strategic Relational Approach* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), 21-53. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. Poulantzas, *Political Power*, 48. [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
33. Jessop, *State Power*, 28-29. [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
34. Jens Wissel, “Die Transnationalisierung der Bourgeoisie und die neuen Netzwerke der Macht,” in *Poulantzas lesen: Zur Aktualität marxistischer Staatstheorie*, ed. Lars Bretthauer, Alexander Gallas, John Kannankulam, and Ingo Stuetzle (Hamburg: VSA Verlag, 2006), 241. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
35. Poulantzas is famous for his debate with Miliband over the merits of studying the state through its elites. Clyde Barrow argues that Poulantzas misread Miliband as “voluntarist.” Poulantzas engaged in histories of the state, although historians have lamented the his cavalier attitude toward historical fact. Clyde W. Barrow, “Plain Marxists, Sophisticated Marxists, and C. Wright Mills’ ‘The Power Elite,’” *Science & Society* 71, no. 4 (2007): 400-430; and Jane Caplan, “Theories of Fascism: Nicos Poulantzas as Historian,” *History Workshop* 3 (1977): 83-100. See also Bob Jessop, “Dialogue of the Deaf: Some Reflections on the Poulantzas-Miliband Debate,” in *Class, Power, and the State in Capitalist Society: Essays on Ralph Miliband*, ed. Paul Wetherly, Clyde W. Barrow, and Peter Burnham (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007), 132-157. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
36. Hicham Safieddine, “Al-Lubbi al-Masrafiyyi fi Lubnan: al-Juzur al-Mu’assasatiyya li-Sultat al-Mal,” *al-Adab*, 15 October 2015; Hourani, “Hybrid Sovereignties”; Hourani, “Transnational Pathways and Politico-economic Power: Globalisation and the Lebanese Civil War,” *Geopolitics* 15, no. 2 (2010): 290-311; and Ziad Abu-Rish*, Conflict and Institution Building in Lebanon, 1946-195* (PhD diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 2014). [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
37. Toufic Gaspard, *A Political Economy* *of Lebanon, 1948-2002: The Limits of Laissez-Faire* (Leiden: Brill, 2004). [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
38. An important exception is Reinoud Leenders’ book on post-war corruption. However, Leenders does not theorize the bank’s autonomy. Leenders, *Spoils of Truce*. [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
39. See for instance Hrair Dekmejian, *Patterns of Political Leadership: Egypt, Israel, Lebanon* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975), 22-23; and Fawwaz Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon* (London: Pluto, 2007), 115-118. [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
40. Malsagne, *Fouad Chéhab*. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
41. Safieddine, “Al-Lubbi al-Masrafiyyi.” [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
42. Leenders, *Spoils of Truce*; and Hourani, “Hybrid Sovereignties.” [↑](#endnote-ref-42)
43. Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon*, 149-150. [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
44. Ibid., 149-152. [↑](#endnote-ref-44)
45. Clement Henry Moore, “Prisoners’ Financial Dilemma: A Consociational Future for Lebanon?,” *American Political Science Review* 81, no. 1 (1987): 205. [↑](#endnote-ref-45)
46. On ABL lobbying, see Safieddine, “Al-Lubbi al-Masrafiyyi.” [↑](#endnote-ref-46)
47. Salim Nasr, “Backdrop to Civil War: The Crisis of Lebanese Capitalism,” *MERIP Reports* 73 (December 1978), 4. [↑](#endnote-ref-47)
48. Moore, “Prisoners’ Financial Dilemma,” 205. [↑](#endnote-ref-48)
49. Nasr, “Backdrop to Civil War.” [↑](#endnote-ref-49)
50. Kamal Dib, *Warlords and Merchants: The Lebanese Business and Political Establishment* (Reading: Ithaca, 2004), 224. [↑](#endnote-ref-50)
51. Interview with Fu’ad Siniura, London, 30 November 2010. [↑](#endnote-ref-51)
52. Dib, *Warlords and Merchants*, 223. [↑](#endnote-ref-52)
53. Interview with Fu’ad Siniura, London, 30 November 2010; and Dib, *Warlords and Merchants*, 223. [↑](#endnote-ref-53)
54. Gaspard, *Political Economy*, 202-207. [↑](#endnote-ref-54)
55. Hourani, “Transnational Pathways.” [↑](#endnote-ref-55)
56. *Al-Nahar Arab Report and Memo (ANARAM)*, 30 April 1984, 2-6; *ANARAM*, 19 July 1985, 2-3; and *ANARAM*, 17 December 1984, 6. In March 1986, subscription to T-bills became compulsory. Samir Makdisi, *Lessons of Lebanon: The Economics of War and Development* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 72, 196; *Middle East Economic Survey* (*MEES)*, 24 August 1987, B1; *MEES*, 26 October 1987, B4; and Gaspard, *Political Economy*, 203-204. [↑](#endnote-ref-56)
57. Dib, *Warlords and Merchants*, 231. [↑](#endnote-ref-57)
58. *ANARAM*, 21 January 1985, 3; and George Corm, *Le Liban contemporain: Histoire et société* (Paris: Découverte, 2005), 208. [↑](#endnote-ref-58)
59. Hannes Baumann, “The ‘New Contractor Bourgeoisie’ in Lebanese Politics: Hariri, Miqati, and Faris,” in Knudsen and Kerr, *After the Cedar Revolution*, 125-144. [↑](#endnote-ref-59)
60. Adam Hanieh, *Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). [↑](#endnote-ref-60)
61. Hourani, “Transnational Pathways.” [↑](#endnote-ref-61)
62. *ANARAM*, 4 June 1984, 7. [↑](#endnote-ref-62)
63. *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*, November 2003, 12-17. [↑](#endnote-ref-63)
64. According to the chairman and general manager of Saudi-Lebanese Bank. Interview with Sabah al-Haj, Beirut, 8 November 2008. [↑](#endnote-ref-64)
65. Interview with Sabah al-Haj, Beirut, 8 November 2008. [↑](#endnote-ref-65)
66. *ANARAM*, 7 February 1983, 4-5. [↑](#endnote-ref-66)
67. Nicholas Blanford, *Killing Mr. Lebanon: The Assassination of Rafik Hariri and Its Impact on the Middle East* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 17. [↑](#endnote-ref-67)
68. For a more detailed discussion, see Baumann, “New Contractor Bourgeoisie,” 125-144. [↑](#endnote-ref-68)
69. Blanford, *Killing Mr. Lebanon*, 25-6. [↑](#endnote-ref-69)
70. ‘Abdallah Bu Habib, *al-Daw’ al-Asfar: al-Siyasa al-Amrikiyya Tujah Lubnan* (Beirut: Sharikat al-Matbu’at li-l-Tawazi’ wa-l-Nashar, 2007), 178. [↑](#endnote-ref-70)
71. Banque du Liban, http://www.bdl.gov.lb/edata/index.asp. [↑](#endnote-ref-71)
72. On concentration in banking see Gaspard, *Political Economy*, 218. On concentration in deposits, see United Nations Development Programme, *National Human Development Report—Lebanon 2001-2002: Globalisation: Towards a Lebanese Agenda* (Beirut: UNDP, 2002), 77. [↑](#endnote-ref-72)
73. Samir Makdisi, *The Lessons of Lebanon: The Economics of War and Development* (IB Tauris: London, 2004), p. 54 [↑](#endnote-ref-73)
74. Freddie Baz, *Bilanbanques: Liban* (Beirut: Bankdata Financial Services, various years[Add years I’m afraid I have the data in an excel sheet and did not note down the exact years of the reports that I consulted. If this is a problem, I suggest deleting the $1 billion figure and the reference]). [↑](#endnote-ref-74)
75. Sam Hakim and Saad Andary, “The Lebanese Central Bank and the Treasury Bills Market,” *Middle East Journal* 51, no. 2 ( 1997): 230-241. [↑](#endnote-ref-75)
76. *MEED*, 4 June 1993, 27. [↑](#endnote-ref-76)
77. Interview with Fu’ad Siniura, London, 30 November 2010. [↑](#endnote-ref-77)
78. Rafiq Hariri, *Statesmanship in Government: Emerging from War and Entering*

    *the Future* (Beirut: Arab United Press, 1999), p. 51. [↑](#endnote-ref-78)
79. Nouriel Roubini and Brad Setser, *Bailouts or Bail-Ins? Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging Economies* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2004), 39. [↑](#endnote-ref-79)
80. Wassim Shahin, “The Lebanese Economy in the Twenty-first Century,” in *Lebanon’s Second Republic: Prospects for the Twenty-first Century*, ed. Kail Ellis (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002), 190. [↑](#endnote-ref-80)
81. Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-78* (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 109. [↑](#endnote-ref-81)
82. **Pierre** Lascoumes, “La Gouvernementalité: de la critique de l’État aux technologies du pouvoir,” Le Portique 13-14, (2004): 169-190. [↑](#endnote-ref-82)
83. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Manifesto of the Communist Party* (Utrecht: Open Source Socialist Publishing, 2008), 8. [↑](#endnote-ref-83)
84. Andreas Kalyvas, “The Stateless Theory: Poulantzas's Challenge to Postmodernism,” in *Paradigm Lost: State Theory Reconsidered,* ed. Stanley Aronowitz and Peter Bratsis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2002), 111, 105-142. Poulantzas specifically criticized Foucault for knocking the state off its pedestal and for marginalizing class analysis. Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism*, 147-148. [↑](#endnote-ref-84)
85. Kalyvas, “Stateless Theory,” 115. [↑](#endnote-ref-85)
86. Timothy Mitchell, “The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics,” *American Political Science Review* 85, no. 1 (1991): 77-96; Timothy Mitchell, “Society, Economy, and the State Effect,” in *The Anthropology of the State: A Reader*,ed*.* Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 169-86. [↑](#endnote-ref-86)
87. Mitchell, *Limits of the State*, 94. [↑](#endnote-ref-87)
88. Joel Migdal, *State in Society: Studying how States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). [↑](#endnote-ref-88)
89. Alexandra Kowalski, “State Power as Field Work: Culture and Practice in the French Survey of Historic Landmarks,” in *Practicing Culture*, ed. Craig Calhoun and Richard Sennett(London:Routledge , 2007), 83. [↑](#endnote-ref-89)
90. Vincent Geisser, “‘The People Want the Army’: Is the Lebanese Military an Exception to the Crisis of the State?,” in *Lebanon Facing The Arab Uprisings: Constraints and Adaptation*, ed. Rosita Di Peri and Daniel Meier (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 93-113. [↑](#endnote-ref-90)
91. Hubert Dupont, “La nouvelle armée libanaise: Instrument du pouvoir ou acteur politique?,” *Confluences Méditerranée* 29 (1999): 57-71. [↑](#endnote-ref-91)
92. Nayla Moussa, “L’Armée libanaise: un état des lieux,” *Affaires Stratégiques*, 27 May 2009, www.affaires-strategiques.info/spip.php?article1326. [↑](#endnote-ref-92)
93. Eduardo W. Aboultaif, “The Lebanese Army: Saviour of the Republic?,” *The RUSI Journal* 161, no. 1 (2016): 70-78. [↑](#endnote-ref-93)
94. In 2008, parliament discussed the possibility of granting the army members the right to vote in the elections, but this was rejected. Walid Jumblatt, a prominent opponent of this proposition, has insisted that the army should be kept away from political struggles. [↑](#endnote-ref-94)
95. Picard, “Lebanon in Search of Sovereignty.” [↑](#endnote-ref-95)
96. Nayla Moussa, “Loyalties and Group Formation in the Lebanese Officer Corps,” *Carnegie Regional Insight*, 3 February 2016; and Aboultaif, “The Lebanese Army.” [↑](#endnote-ref-96)
97. Moussa, “Loyalties and Group Formation.” [↑](#endnote-ref-97)
98. Picard, “Lebanon in Search of Sovereignty.” [↑](#endnote-ref-98)
99. Joseph Bahout, “Sectarianism in Lebanon and Syria: The Dynamics of Mutual Spill-Over,” United States Institute for Peace, Peace Brief 159, 15 November 2013. [↑](#endnote-ref-99)
100. International Crisis Group, “Arsal in the Crosshairs: The Predicament of a Small Lebanese Border Town,” *Crisis Group* *Middle East Briefing* 46, 23 February 2016, <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/b46-arsal-in-the-crosshairs-the-predicament-of-a-small-lebanese-border-town.pdf>. [↑](#endnote-ref-100)
101. Tine Gade, “Lebanon on The Brink,” Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Policy Brief 23, 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-101)
102. Michael Gilsenan, *Lords of the Lebanese Marches: Violence and Narrative in an Arab Society* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996); and Rola el-Husseini, “The Current Status of Lebanon’s Sunni Islamists,” Middle East Institute, 9 December 2014, [http://www.mei.edu/content/article/current-status-lebanon’s-sunni-islamists](http://www.mei.edu/content/article/current-status-lebanon's-sunni-islamists). [↑](#endnote-ref-102)
103. Oren Barak, *The Lebanese Army: A National Institution in a Divided Society* (Albany: State University of New York, 2009). [↑](#endnote-ref-103)
104. Aram Nerguizian, “The Lebanese Armed Forces: Challenges and Opportunities in Post-Syria Lebanon,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10 February 2009, <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090210_lafsecurity.pdf>. [↑](#endnote-ref-104)
105. Akkar sheikhs threaten to establishing “Free Lebanese Army”, *NowLebanon*, 20 May, 2012. https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/archive/akkar\_sheikhs\_threaten\_to\_establishing\_free\_lebanese\_army1 [↑](#endnote-ref-105)
106. Gade, “Lebanon on the Brink.” [↑](#endnote-ref-106)
107. Michel Hallak, an-Nahar correspondent in Akkar, places this in the broader context of the marginalization of Akkar, arguing that in 1990 just after the end of the civil war, Mikhael Dahir, a Maronite MP from the region, “slept as a President and woke up as a normal citizen,” because he is from Akkar. Interview, Akkar, January 3, 2013. [↑](#endnote-ref-107)
108. Fieldwork notes, 28 May 2015. [↑](#endnote-ref-108)
109. Mustafa al-‘Awik, “‘Humat al-Diyyar’ Lubnaniyya: Milishiyat Jadida . . . li-l-Jaysh?”, *al-Mudun*, 28 August 2016, goo.gl/nRFWHJ. [↑](#endnote-ref-109)
110. Interview with Fadi al-Assad, Wadi Khaled, 12 August 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-110)
111. Hachim Hachim, “al-Bahth al-Ijtima‘i al-Sari‘” (Council for Development and Reconstruction, 2005), 127, <http://www.cdr.gov.lb/study/CDP_RSA/Akkar.pdf>. [↑](#endnote-ref-111)
112. Ghassan Sa‘ud, “Fi Akkar al-Jaysh ‘Allam ‘Ammar wa-Kabbar,” *al-Akhbar*, 24 May 2012, <http://al-akhbar.com/node/93945>. [↑](#endnote-ref-112)
113. Fieldwork notes, 2 January 2012. [↑](#endnote-ref-113)
114. Judith Beyer, “There is This Law . . . Performing the State in the Kyrgyz Courts of Elders,” in *Ethnographies of the State in Central Asi*,ed.Madelaine Reeves, Johan Rasanayagan, and Judith Beyer (Indiana: Indiana University Press), 99. [↑](#endnote-ref-114)
115. Stel, “Languages of Stateness. [↑](#endnote-ref-115)
116. André Burguière, *The Annales School: An Intellectual History* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 213. [↑](#endnote-ref-116)
117. Hazbun, “Assembling security.” [↑](#endnote-ref-117)
118. Fregonese, “Beyond the ‘Weak State’”; and Hourani “Hybrid Sovereignties.” [↑](#endnote-ref-118)