

**HITTING THE TARGET BUT MISSING THE POINT:
MERSEYSIDE POLICE'S RESPONSE TO THE BRM SATISFACTION GAP**

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By

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Abstract

Nigel Pantak: Hitting the target but missing the point: Merseyside Police's response to the BRM satisfaction gap

The study is an evaluation of how Merseyside Police attempted to narrow the Black and Racial Minority (BRM) satisfaction gap, as measured by the Home Office performance indicator. The research considers the sense with which both police officers and, more importantly, victims made of the policies and processes used. It asks whether this activity resulted in an improvement to the service being provided, therefore benefitting the victim, or in the construction of performance data thereby benefitting the organisation.

The research was undertaken between 2011 and 2015 and completed as a case study. It involved the views of those people within Merseyside Police who were responsible for the design and implementation of policy along, with some of those responsible for delivering the service to the public. The research also includes the narrative of victims who had taken part in Merseyside Police's monthly victim satisfaction survey.

The BRM satisfaction gap was initially proposed by the Macpherson Report, which had examined the murder of black teenager Stephen Lawrence. It was one of ten performance indicators intending to monitor and assess whether trust and confidence in the police was improving within BRM communities. Previous research had identified factors other than the quality of police contact as influencing a person's level of satisfaction. However, this research shows how the BRM satisfaction gap was treated as a single subject by Merseyside Police, who chose to focus purely on service delivery to improve victim satisfaction. Warnings regarding statistical relevance of the BRM satisfaction gap, along with concerns as to whether the victim satisfaction survey was fit for purpose, were ignored in their efforts to ensure the performance indicator was on target.

The research highlights how New Public Management (NPM) principles of performance management were used to produce organisational focus and develop a system which closely tracked the service provided to BRM victims by individual officers. However, it shows that although it resulted in a good knowledge amongst senior officers, this was not embedded amongst those delivering the service. Instead, reporting officers developed their own working practices to deliver Merseyside Police's required 'Gold Service' to BRM victims, whilst many victims remained confused and frustrated with the service provided.

Merseyside Police did statistically narrow the BRM satisfaction gap. However, the research highlights the influence of performance construction and questions whether the recorded improvement in performance was as result of an improved service or was manufactured by gaming techniques. Although the BRM satisfaction gap was intended to measure trust and confidence, the research concludes this was never a consideration for Merseyside Police who, instead, focussed their efforts on improving their performance indicator.

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Abbreviations

ACC.....	Assistant Chief Constable
ACPO.....	Association of Chief Police Officers
APACS.....	Assessments of Policing and Community Safety
ASB.....	Anti-Social Behaviour
BCU.....	Basic Command Unit
BME.....	Black Ethnic Minority
BRM.....	Black Racial Minority
CPS.....	Crown Prosecution Service
HMIC.....	Her Majesty Inspector of Constabularies
KPI.....	Keep Person Informed
NYPD.....	New York Police Department
OIC.....	Officer in Charge
PI.....	Performance Indicator
PPAF.....	Policing Performance Assessment Framework
SAC.....	Serious Acquisitive Crime
SPI.....	Statutory Performance Indicators
VSS.....	Victim Satisfaction Survey

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Author's Declaration

This study was partially funded by Merseyside Police and initially supported by National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA), Police Staff College, Bramshill as part of the Bramshill Fellowship scheme. However, austerity measures resulted in the abolition of the NPIA and subsequent closure of Bramshill Police College which resulted in their removal of support.

Chapter 1: Introduction

On 22 April 1993 Stephen Lawrence was murdered in Eltham, south London whilst walking home with a friend. The police investigation undertaken by the Metropolitan Police Service attracted a great deal of public attention and media criticism. The circumstances of the murder, the absence of a successful prosecution and a broad perception that the police investigation was handled incompetently, led to a campaign by the Lawrence family to seek explanations (Foster, Newburn and Souhami, 2005). On 31 July 1997 Home Secretary Jack Straw announced a public inquiry into the murder of Stephen Lawrence and the subsequent police investigation. Sir William Macpherson of Cluny was appointed chairman and specifically instructed to identify the lessons to be learned in the investigation and prosecution of racially motivated crimes (Macpherson 1999). The subsequent report produced 70 recommendations which were accepted by the New Labour Government and was said to amount to the most extensive programme of reform in the history of the relationship between the police and ethnic minority communities in the UK (Bowling and Phillips 2002).

The first recommendation of the Macpherson report stated that a Ministerial Priority should be established for all police services:

“To increase trust and confidence in policing amongst minority ethnic communities.”

(Macpherson 1999:327)

The second recommendation proposed ten performance indicators as a way of implementing, monitoring and assessing the Ministerial Priority. Recommendation five was;

(v) achieving equal satisfaction levels across all ethnic groups in public satisfaction surveys.

(Macpherson, 1999 p327)

This thesis provides an evaluation of how Merseyside Police responded to this performance indicator. It is a case study examining the policies and tactics implemented to improve victim satisfaction and thereby obtain equal levels of satisfaction between white and BRM victims. One of the main aspects of the research question is to ask what sense Merseyside police officers and victims of crime made of this process. The research establishes those policies and processes introduced by Merseyside Police to narrow the satisfaction gap between Black Racial Minority (BRM) and white victims. It then examines whether these were understood and viewed positively by both the police officer delivering the service and the victim of crime receiving it.

Victim satisfaction and the BRM satisfaction gap gained prominence within Merseyside Police as part of the Citizen Focus agenda (Home Office 2006). At that time, I was a Police Inspector who was asked to lead a small Basic Command Unit (BCU)¹ Citizen Focus team to improve the general level of victim

¹ BCU refers to a geographical area of command within a police force. At this time, Merseyside Police had six BCUs. Wirral, Sefton, Knowsley, St Helens, Liverpool North and Liverpool South.

satisfaction for the area. The problem and challenges of the BRM satisfaction gap soon became apparent, as it proved difficult to impact on the level of measured performance. Merseyside Police Citizen Focus department², provided each BCU with a system of guidance and governance along with tactics and actions which, they said, if complied with would result in the narrowing of the gap, by increasing the level of satisfaction amongst BRM victims. However, their suggestions and directions only concerned the service provided to each victim at the time of their reporting or during the investigation of the crime. My personal experience and knowledge of policing BRM communities suggested the problem was being simplified by this approach. When I questioned the Citizen Focus department, it was made clear to me that Merseyside Police had completed research which, considered empirical by them, showed service delivery was the only factor that needed to change to achieve the required improvement in performance. At that time, I was used to the organisational culture of acceptance and compliance rather than questioning policy decisions. Therefore, whilst suspecting more needed to be known about the principles of the BRM satisfaction gap, I accepted the notion that service delivery was the sole factor to be addressed.

During this time, an opportunity arose to complete post-graduate research into any police related subject that could justify further examination. This was to be supported by a Bramshill Policing Staff College Fellowship. Therefore, I successfully made a proposal for research to be conducted into establishing if

² Merseyside Citizen focus department was responsible for the force's overall performance.

there were separate factors which individual BRM communities considered important contributors to levels of satisfaction with the police service.

As will be explained, my research developed greatly from this proposal. Initially, I believed there was a need for the police organisation to look out at the communities to obtain the answers, however this view quickly reversed as the need to look in at the police organisation and their performance regime became apparent. Whilst there has been other research completed which explores how public trust, confidence and satisfaction in the police is created, this research approaches the subject differently. Due to being able to access the recordings of individual victim satisfaction surveys, it has allowed this research to explore whether the policies and practices employed improved the service provided to the victim or, instead, caused confusion and further dissatisfaction.

Curtis (2015) states that in exploring the use of targets in policing, and gaining an understanding of their effects, it quickly becomes clear that the use of numerical targets is just part of a wider issue around effective police performance management. It is the aim of this research to contribute to the understanding of how this type of performance management can impact on the victim. To that end, the following research question was decided on.

Why is Merseyside Police trying to narrow the BRM satisfaction gap?

- i) How have Merseyside Police tried to measure the gap?
- ii) How have Merseyside Police tried to reduce the gap?
- iii) What sense, if any, have police officers and 'victims' made of these processes?
- iv) Has there been improved levels of service that benefited the victim or was the performance data constructed by organisational processes?

The term BRM

It should be noted that the term BRM is specific to Merseyside whereas Black Minority Ethnic (BME) is the accepted terminology used by the Home Office. However, it was established during this research that the use of the word 'ethnic' has caused offence in Liverpool for several decades, due to the meaning of 'pagan or heathen' being attached to it. Due to this, the term BRM is used in Merseyside, which has also been accepted as the local term by the Home Office. Therefore, this research will use 'BRM' rather than 'BME'.

Outline of this thesis

Chapter two examines where the BRM satisfaction gap came from. The chapter provides background information and considers how the Scarman and Macpherson reports raised concerns regarding the style of policing which had been used towards BRM communities. The chapter explains how the BRM satisfaction gap was introduced for the police, via National Policing Plans, before being embedded as part of the Citizen Focus Policing agenda. Consideration is also given to the influence which New Public Management

(NPM) had on the performance regime of the police and explains how this contributed to the Citizen Focus agenda.

Chapter three reviews the principles of trust, confidence and satisfaction. It highlights that although these terms tend to be used interchangeably within the police, there are some very distinct differences. The chapter will highlight the theory of low and high trust communities and examines how an understanding of these can impact on the way in which police try to improve trust. The impact which public perception and bias can have on a person's assessment of police contact is also considered along with those factors, other than contact, which impact on satisfaction.

Chapter four focuses specifically on how Merseyside Police implemented the policies and tactics, they considered necessary, to narrow the BRM satisfaction gap. The issues involved in measuring trust, confidence and satisfaction with the police are examined, along with the influence of how a victim can be viewed. The chapter also introduces the principles behind the victim satisfaction survey and presents the notion of the Merseyside Police 'Gold Service' for BRM victims of crime and the use of Customer Service Recovery Opportunities (CSRO) as specific tactics employed to improve recorded performance.

Chapter five considers the qualitative methods used to gather the data for this research and explains why a case study was considered the best way of completing it. The importance that social construction has on this research is

introduced along with the reflexive and ethical issues which had to be addressed before data gathering could commence.

Chapters six, seven and eight present the findings of my research. Chapter six examines how Merseyside Police tried to deliver satisfaction to victims of crime whilst concerns being raised externally from the organisation were ignored. The chapter establishes that Merseyside Police's focus on the BRM satisfaction gap was not driven by the need to improve trust and confidence, but due to a desire to become the best police force in the country.

Chapter seven looks at how performance was constructed within the victim satisfaction survey via the CSRO process. It also examines how the gaming of data occurred by adapting Home Office guidelines to remove dissatisfied victims from data sets in order to improve levels of satisfaction. Chapter eight then considers how this activity impacted on the victim of crime and whether the policies introduced resulted in an improvement to the service being provided. The chapter also explores the attitudes of those Constables and Sergeants who were responsible for delivering the service and question whether prejudice on their part contributed to the BRM satisfaction gap. To assist with this, all three chapters contain vignettes that present the experience of individual victims of crime, as recorded by the victim satisfaction survey, to highlight specific points.

Finally, chapter nine reviews the research and considers the implications and conclusions arising from it.

Chapter 2: Where did the problem come from?

Introduction

This chapter will examine the problems experienced by the policing of BRM communities within the UK. Firstly, it will consider the Scarman Report (1981), which investigated the incidents of disorder in the Brixton area of London along with other outbreaks of unrest in Southall London, Liverpool, Birmingham and Manchester in 1981, and the subsequent recommendations it made. The chapter will then explain how the issue of a satisfaction gap, between white and BRM victims of crime, with the police service came to be identified as a contributing factor to the poor levels of trust and confidence amongst BRM communities. It will explain that recommendations contained within the Macpherson report, which examined the circumstances around the murder of Stephen Lawrence, resulted in changes in government policy. These introduced the performance indicator which challenged each police force to narrow their BRM satisfaction gap, and which came to sit under the heading of 'Citizen Focus Policing'. To that end, a time line will describe how a recommendation contained within the Macpherson report became a performance indicator for the police via a Home Secretary's action plan (Home Office 1999) and the National Policing Plans (Home Office 2002, 2003, 2004b). Finally, the chapter will consider the influence that New Public Management (NPM) had on policy implementation and explain how this was a key part of the Citizen Focus agenda. It will propose that this activity resulted in something

other than that intended of improving trust and confidence for the BRM communities.

The background

There is an acceptance that BRM communities have always had a different relationship and received a poorer level of service from police within the UK (Rowe 2004). Policing practices within BRM communities operated with the assumption that black people presented a threat to society. Therefore, policing styles developed to counter this threat and resulted in the targeting of BRM males as main criminal offenders. This resulted in the questioning of police accountability during the late 1970s and early 1980s (Cashmore and McLaughlin, 1991) as many BRM communities formed the opinion that the service provided was ineffective, inactive or indeed at times overactive towards their neighbourhoods (Hallam 2000).

During this period, it was also viewed that the police service was failing BRM communities when individuals became victims of crime. Hall et al (2009) state that crimes motivated by racial prejudice have a long history in the UK, yet official recognition of the problem can only be traced back to the 1980s. The development of victims' surveys began to reveal the extent, nature and impact of victimisation which had been previously unknown. This resulted in the acknowledgment that BRM people were collectively having a different experience with the service provided by the police from that of the white majority. This was evidenced by disproportionality at all stages of the criminal

justice system from victimisation, stop search, arrest and conviction to sentencing (Crane and Hall 2009).

Bowling and Phillips (2003) state the controversies of abuse of police powers, the failure to properly investigate crimes against people from BRM communities and the view the police were unresponsive and unaccountable to the people they served, resulted in the breakdown of trust and confidence towards the police within these communities. This was to have dramatic consequences, with the problem of racism being thrust into the public consciousness in the early 1980s by widespread public disorder within inner-city areas (Hall et al 2009).

Scarman Report

The strained relationship between BRM communities and the police was vividly demonstrated when public disorder occurred in St Pauls, Bristol in 1980, and then Brixton, London in 1981. This was followed by further disturbances in Manchester, Liverpool, and Birmingham that same year (Bowling and Philips 2003). The Brixton disturbances received widespread, high profile media coverage and in response to this the then Secretary of State, William Whitelaw, ordered Lord Scarman to:

“Inquire urgently into the serious disorder in Brixton on 10 – 12 April 1981 and to report, with the power to make recommendation”

(Scarman, 1981 p1)

Between 10th and 12th April 1981, Brixton had witnessed three days of serious disorder which Bowling and Phillips (2002) describe as an outburst of anger and resentment by young black people with the policing style employed within their communities. However, Scarman (1981) stated there were in fact two views forcefully expressed to the Inquiry as to the causes of the disorder. The first was, indeed, the oppressive policing style which had developed over a period of years, resulting in the harassment of young, black people. However, the second went beyond the remit of the police and was viewed as a backlash against society by people frustrated and deprived, who used disorder to obtain public attention for their plight.

Crane and Hall (2009) state the Scarman Inquiry was probably the most influential report into the inadequate policing of BRM communities up to that time. It stressed that contrary to the growing image of the police's role being one of crime-fighters; most uniformed police work consisted of service calls responding to incidents. The Inquiry highlighted a need for a change from the oppressive style of policing to that of a community style so that the police would be fit for purpose for BRM communities (Reiner 2010). Brain (2010) develops this, and says that by Scarman not viewing the riots as discrete events but as part of a larger pattern he was able to place the immediate symptoms of the disorder within a broader perspective of British society. Indeed, Scarman (1981) identified a problem of policing a multi-racial community in a deprived inner-city area where unemployment, especially among young black people, was high, whilst their hopes were low. This, he said, resulted in a protest against society by people deeply frustrated and deprived. He concluded that the breakdown of

trust and confidence in the police within certain communities had resulted from a lack of communication and consent. This had been identified as a problem for many years prior to the disorders but Bowling and Phillips (2003) say it was still the policing style of a police operation, Operation Swamp '81', giving police specific instructions to stop and question anyone who looked 'suspicious', which proved to be the catalyst for the subsequent disorder.

Newburn (2003) states the Scarman Report emphasised there was a need for change regarding the way the police service was being delivered to BRM communities and acted as a trigger for a reorientation of policing on a wider front. Walklate (2000) went further by suggesting it identified that action was required to address overt racist behaviour by some police officers. However, Scarman (1981) explicitly rejected 'institutional racism' within the police as an explanation for these problems. But when later questioned on this, he responded by saying that if the suggestion being made was that some practices adopted by public bodies and private individuals are unwittingly discriminatory against BRM communities, then the allegation deserved serious consideration and, where proved, required quick action to be taken (Mayberry 2008). This comment from Scarman appears to contradict, somewhat, the reports rejection of institutional racism and perhaps indicates a reluctance in Scarman to draw full conclusions from the evidence discovered. However, this rejection resulted in his report often being cited by many as the classic defence against allegations that Britain, and in particular the British police, were institutionally racist (Bowling and Phillips 2002). This, they say, resulted in the report failing

to fully explain why BRM communities were so angry with the police and how this was rooted in their experiences of oppressive policing.

Scarman in Liverpool

Lord Scarman visited Toxteth, Liverpool, an area which had also witnessed serious disorder following that experienced in Brixton. Scarman (1981, p152 - 154) noted that police relations with the community had been unsatisfactory for some time and identified it as one of the main causes for disorder. Residents highlighted lack of confidence with the local police complaints procedure, the juvenile cautioning system and the harassment of young people, as specific factors which undermined their relationship with the police. The fact that the disorder resulted in the first use of CS gas by police on the British mainland, appear to support the view that Toxteth was policed in an abrasive and heavy-handed manner. However, Scarman (1981, p11 – 12) points out that the social conditions he had witnessed in Brixton were not necessarily reproduced in other parts of the country which had experienced disorder, however there was acknowledgement that deprivation was indeed a factor in the Toxteth area. He notes that the Toxteth BRM community had two elements, one being formed by a black community that had been established in the city for several generations, and another made up of new immigrants. These, by nature, providing separate problems and challenges for the police, which had to be dealt with in order to improve confidence. However, he acknowledges his terms of reference for the inquiry did not allow him to look with any great detail outside of Brixton, and so comment appears to be restricted. He concludes by saying that a combination of a high BRM population, high unemployment, declining economic base and

physical environment, bad housing and lack of amenities combined with a high crime rate and a heavy policing style were the common factors.

Scandal and change

Newburn (2003) states it was against this backdrop of significant urban disorder in 1981 and 1985, and the bitter miners' strike of 1984 to 1985, that resulted in public satisfaction with the style and nature of policing greatly declining. To address this the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) published the, "Setting the Standards for Policing: Meeting Community Expectations" (ACPO 1990), which proposed an almost paradigm shift by promoting the police as a 'service' rather than a 'force' and reinforced the principles of neighbourhood policing. These ACPO proposals were made on the back of numerous police corruption scandals in the 1970s, such as Operation Countryman, that examined corruption in the Metropolitan Police across all the ranks and departments (Reiner 2010). When, in the 1980s, the subject matter of these scandals switched to the abuse of police powers towards BRM communities, it was viewed that the rule of law was beginning to be undermined, resulting in the image of the police as an impersonal and disciplined law enforcer being fatally damaged.

Rowe (2004) points out that although these scandals, and the resulting attempts to transform the police force into a service, were not directly related to the policing of BRM communities, they represented a point Scarman made. The doctrine of policing by consent had to be fully embraced by senior officers to repair damage being done, by their officers, within certain communities.

However, the Scarman Report continued to attract criticism from both sides for either denying racism was institutionalised within police practice or, conversely, that the report was an attack on the integrity and impartiality of the police service, which then resulted in a closing of ranks to any proposed change (Reiner 2010). Against this shifting and contested backcloth, the murder of Stephen Lawrence occurred which ensured the question of policing, racism, inequality, fairness and justice, raised in the previous decades, remained in the public eye (Bowling and Phillips 2003).

Stephen Lawrence

On 22nd April 1993 Stephen Lawrence, an 18-year-old black student, was stabbed to death whilst walking home with a friend. The local Metropolitan Police set up an investigation and in June two youths appeared in court charged with his murder (Brain 2010). However, a month later the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) dropped the charges, leaving the Lawrence family with the only remaining option of taking out a private prosecution against the suspects. However, although this subsequently proved unsuccessful, the persistent campaigning by the family kept their story in the public domain. At the coroner's inquest in February 1997, it was concluded Stephen Lawrence was unlawfully killed, following which his mother accused the Metropolitan Police of treating her family like criminals because they were black.

Even though there was mounting criticism of the police investigation during this period, the Conservative government resisted pressure for a public inquiry into the police handling of the case. However, following the General Election in

1997, which saw New Labour gain power, Home Secretary Jack Straw met with the Lawrence family. Following this he announced there would be a public inquiry (Brain 2010). Sir William Macpherson, a retired High Court judge appointed to lead the inquiry, was provided with the following terms of reference:

“To inquire into matters arising from the death of Stephen Lawrence on 22nd April 1993 to date, in order particularly to identify the lessons to be learned for the investigation and prosecution of racially motivated crimes”

(Macpherson 1999, p6)

The Macpherson Report

The first preliminary hearing of the Inquiry took place at Woolwich on 8th October 1997 with the terms of reference being split to form two distinctly, separate, parts to the inquiry. Part 1, which investigated *“the matters arising from the death of Stephen Lawrence”* sat for 59 days, whilst part 2 *“to identify the lessons to be learned for the investigation and prosecution of racially motivated crimes”* sat for 10 days. Combined recommendations and suggestions were heard from 100 people and organisations (Macpherson 1999). It was during the second stage that the report highlighted the apparently inescapable evidence of the lack of trust which existed between the police and BRM communities. This, it said, was threatening the ability of the police service to police by consent in all areas of their work, and not simply in the policing of racist incidents and crimes.

The Macpherson report made 70 recommendations, almost all of which were accepted by the government, and amounted to the most extensive program of reform in the history of relationships between police and BRM communities (Bowling and Phillips, 2003). Foster (2008) agrees and says the key message the Macpherson report wanted to convey was the importance of the differential treatment minority victims, suspects and witnesses experienced when dealing with the police and criminal justice system. It did not matter what the police thought they were doing, or how they sought to explain events, it was how their actions were perceived by the family and within the BRM communities which was important. However, the report stated the fundamental flaws resulting in the initial failed murder enquiry resulted from professional incompetence, institutional racism and leadership failure. There was an absence of confidence and trust in the police amongst ethnic minority communities stemming from disproportionality across the criminal justice system, which resulted in the BRM communities being over-policed and under-protected (Macpherson 1999, Bowling 1999, Newburn 2003).

Even though it is a mistake to conclude little had changed in the years between Scarman and the Macpherson reports (Walklate 2000), Bowling and Phillips (2002) state that it became clear during the Lawrence Inquiry that the loss of confidence and trust among BRM communities had worsened since Scarman. This resulted in the need to re-establish police legitimacy by a thorough examination of existing failings alongside appropriate remedies. However, Reiner (2010) says that although Macpherson was undoubtedly more hard-hitting as a critique of police failure, it was the Scarman Report which had a

keener grasp of how police discrimination was intimately bound up with wider structures of racial and social inequality and disadvantage.

Rowe (2004) states the Macpherson Report was a seminal moment in British race relations, which produced a collective response that reform would no longer be stifled, whilst a raft of targets, pledges and activity pointed to the process by which public trust and confidence could be secured. It required the police service to adopt a proactive and interventionist approach to recognise that minority groups had legitimate needs, not shared by the majority. The police concern with community and race relations, prior to the Lawrence Inquiry was generally focused on ensuring all BRM groups received an equal level of service delivery. However, recognition that individual BRM groups had different needs, resulted in the acceptance that the provisions of identical services, one that was designed for the majority of minority ethnic communities and assumed to be applicable to all, was no longer valid (Rowe, 2004).

The Macpherson Report was instrumental in generating and accelerating a range of changes within the police service. There was the formalisation of murder investigation reviews, the establishment of the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) and a framework for police response to 'hate crime'. It resulted in a paradigm shift within the police 'mind set' and in external expectations of what policing should be delivering (Hall, Grieve and Savage, 2009). Reiner (2010) agreed, and stated the Macpherson Report was absolutely critical in shaking police forces out of their complacency with regard to the manner in which they were policing BRM communities. However, he

warned that whilst it was tough on the police it was soft on the causes of racist policing, as the focus was primarily on the police organisation rather than the individuals within it.

Regardless, the Macpherson Report provided the police service with an opportunity to improve trust and confidence within BRM communities. Within this it set recommendations that led to the principles of the BRM satisfaction gap being introduced as a way of directly measuring trust and confidence in policing amongst BRM communities.

The BRM satisfaction gap

The Macpherson Report stated the need to improve trust and confidence in the police amongst BRM communities with its' first two recommendations;

Recommendation 1:

1. That a Ministerial Priority be established for all Police Services:

“To increase trust and confidence in policing amongst minority ethnic communities”

Recommendation 2:

2. The process of implementing monitoring and assessing the Ministerial Priority should include Performance Indicators in relation to:

- (i) the existence and application of strategies for the prevention, recording, investigation and prosecution of racist incidents;
- (ii) measures to encourage reporting of racist incidents;
- (iii) the number of recorded racist incidents and related detection levels;
- (iv) the degree of multi-agency co-operation and information exchange;
- (v) achieving equal satisfaction levels across all ethnic groups in public satisfaction surveys;
- (vi) the adequacy of provision and training of family and witness / victim liaison officers;
- (vii) the nature, extent and achievements of racism awareness training;
- (viii) the policy directives governing stop and search procedures and their outcomes;
- (ix) levels of recruitment, retention and progression of minority ethnic recruits; and
- (x) levels of complaint of racist behaviour or attitude and their outcomes.

The overall aim being the elimination of racist prejudice and disadvantage and the demonstration of fairness in all aspects of policing.

(Macpherson 1999, p327)

Recommendation 2 (v) suggests the level of satisfaction a person has with the service provided by the police can differ depending on whether the person is a member of a BRM or white community. As will be shown, it was this recommendation which set out the principles of the BRM satisfaction gap for the police service and linked it directly to the levels of trust and confidence in policing amongst BRM communities.

Implementation of the Macpherson Report's recommendations

The Lawrence Steering Group

In March 1999, the month after the publication of the Macpherson Report, the Home Secretary produced the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Home Secretary's Action Plan (Home Office 1999) with the intention of explaining how the government proposed to implement and develop the report's recommendations. It promised to set out the main program of work to be covered by the recommendations, show who would lead on each one and how the outcomes would be reviewed and assessed. The Home Secretary stated that real practical change had to be delivered and went on to say that new policies or procedures would not be enough unless they were turned into action which built trust and confidence, and helped to provide a better service. This resulted in a great emphasis on the importance of actual change to the culture and actions of the police service, rather than just a set of well-intentioned proposals (Rowe, 2004). To deliver and monitor this implementation, the action plan proposed that a Lawrence Steering Group be set up, chaired by the Home Secretary.

The Home Secretary's Action Plan (Home Office 1999) stated that the Macpherson Report's first recommendation, to set the new Ministerial Priority, would be added to the three statutory objectives for the police that had already been set by the Home Office for 1999/2000e. These concerned the policing of drugs, youth justice, and local crime and disorder strategies. To develop the performance indicators required by recommendation 2, the action plan stated that during the forthcoming year the Home Office would 'consult widely' to develop more effective indicators so that delivery of the priority could be 'rigorously assessed from next year onwards' (Home Office 1999, p5). Although in hindsight there does not appear to be a great deal of action contained within the initial Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Home Secretary's Action Plan (Home Office 1999), it should be noted it was published only a month after the Macpherson report.

For the next four years, the Home Secretary published progress reports on the action plan. After the first year, it was stated the Ministerial Priority was set and the development of indicators, by which police performance could be assessed, were well advanced (Home Office 2000). It also highlighted a further development by stating that surveys of public satisfaction, where available by different BRM groups, would be used as a performance indicator. However, it was acknowledged that further work, at force level, was needed to develop this to the required standard.

The second progress report, published in 2001, expressed a belief that the breadth and depth of change, required for the various reforms to take place,

was starting to take shape (Home Office 2001). It said that increasing trust and confidence in policing amongst BRM communities would be just one of two Ministerial Priorities for the police during 2001 – 2002. The report also stated that surveys of public satisfaction from BRM communities at a force level would, in the future, provide each local policing team with performance statistics which would then be inspected during HMIC visits. However, although this report passes comment on the improvement in police recruitment from BRM communities and the investigation of hate crime, after two years there appeared to be few outcomes from the initial recommendation to ‘achieve equal satisfaction levels across all ethnic groups in public satisfaction surveys’ (Macpherson 1999, p327). This questions the pace of change which was taking place, and whether the progress reports were reporting performance against the requirements of the Macpherson report or that contained within the action plan.

The third progress report, published in 2002, was written in the aftermath of disturbances within BRM communities in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham. It acknowledged that, amongst other issues, there was still a deep and lasting division between different communities and the police. This was characterised by a lack of understanding and trust, and a clear failure on the part of the statutory agencies to take the necessary steps to address this. The report also said there was a need for the Steering Group to ‘take into account the way in which the landscape has changed over the last three years’ (Home Office 2002a, p1). It stated the group should change and work thematically, looking at areas which were central to the Macpherson Report. This, it said, would include

training and development, racist incidents, stop and search, and issues around trust and confidence amongst BRM communities in the wider criminal justice system. Each would be examined in detail to evaluate the current situation and make recommendations for the future. Although this apparent shift to an audit and inspection approach appears a positive development, there is no assessment of the success or otherwise that had resulted from the previous three years' of the action plan. This therefore questions how successful the Home Secretary's Action Plan (Home Office 1999) had been in implementing the initial recommendations of the Macpherson Report. Indeed, it states the disturbances in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham suggested there was still much work to do but should not to be interpreted as any reflection of the success or failure of the Steering Group (Home Office 2002a)

To support this change of direction, the progress report recommended a restructuring of how business would be conducted within the steering group. It states that the Ministerial Priority was set and qualitative and quantitative performance indicators were in place to monitor the progress in the areas mentioned in recommendation 2. It explained they had been tracked in a variety of ways including Best Value reviews of Police Authorities or through the British Crime Survey, HMIC inspections, or other Home Office bulletins (Home Office 2002a). However, this strongly suggested the performance data was not being collected centrally and raised the question of how strong a grasp the Lawrence Steering Group had on any progress which the recommendations were making. The fourth progress report, published in 2003, says that the third report had set out proposals for a series of sub groups that would explore compliance with the

recommendations, and looked at conformance with the recommendations in operational delivery areas (Home Office 2003a). However, the report then stated that the new sub groups had first met in November 2002. When considering that it was the progress report of June 2002 which initially stated this intention, there is again a question raised as to the drive that was being placed behind the Home Secretary's action plan. It is interesting to note that the fourth progress report then recommends 'rather than detail what has been achieved, as with previous Annual Reports, this report will look forward to what we plan to achieve in the months ahead' (Home Office 2003a, p3). The report states the vast majority of the recommendations had been implemented and an assessment would be carried out by the London School of Economics. It goes on to confirm that the Ministerial Priority was in place with performance indicators measuring it.

No further progress reports could be found during this research. Several of the units and groups referred to in this final progress report, CJS Race Unit for example, continued their work. However, reading the progress reports leaves a feeling that although the action plan did produce change, the success it had with police organisations and their culture is questionable. The Ministerial Priority was indeed put in place. However, the content of the progress reports question how successful they were at introducing the ten performance measures, as contained within recommendation 2, as there was no apparent emphasis on the need to improve the performance they were supposed to be measuring. Rowe (2004, p155 – 157) said that if the success of the Macpherson Report was measured in terms of policy and program development, then much

had been achieved. However, the quantitative measures of performance shed little light on the qualitative issues of public trust and confidence in the police. He stated that while there had been a plethora of initiatives, with the stated aim of implementing the Lawrence agenda, it is far more difficult to assess the effect these had on policing.

Foster (2008) stated the key message the Lawrence Inquiry wanted to convey was the differential treatment of minority victims, suspects and witness's experiences across the whole of the criminal justice system, but says this message was ultimately rejected, resented, or simply not understood by the police service. Shiner (2010) agreed that the way police tried to address some of the Macpherson recommendations, at a time when automatic trust, satisfaction and confidence was lost, may not have served the broader interests of the police.

It is interesting to note that on 24th February 1999, at Prime Minister's Questions, Tony Blair stated that;

"The test of our sincerity as law makersis not how well we can express sympathy with the Lawrence family but how well we implement the recommendations to make sure this type of thing never happens again in our country"

(Mayberry 2008, p 10)

It would appear that whilst the Macpherson Report should have provided the stimulus for significant change in police practice, whilst visibly challenging a culture which had been branded institutionally racist, a step further than the Scarman Report was prepared to go, recommendations were undermined by a lack of commitment by the government and senior police officers (Mayberry 2008). Brain (2010, p279) agrees and stated the Home Secretary's action plan allowed the Home Office to step back and leave implementation to the police service. This resulted in forces having to hit performance targets without the type of legislative support that was necessary for success.

Drive for 'efficiency'

Before we consider how the BRM satisfaction gap was introduced into the police service, it needs to be placed in context with the drive for public sector efficiency which was occurring at the same time. Indeed, the principles of New Public Management (NPM) and the footprint it left within the police organisation may go some way to explain why the performance indicator became so important to some police organisations.

In the early 1980s the Conservative government found NPM an ideal vehicle for changing public services in ways that aligned to their central philosophies. NPM used private sector management techniques, driven by an intrusive performance regime, to improve organisational performance. By setting clear targets; planning and controlling systems; monitoring techniques and quality control; and by using tools such as cost-benefit analysis, performance indicators, customer satisfaction ratings and service level agreements, market

conditions were created within the public sector (Noordegraaf 2015). This was intended to challenge inefficient managers and practices and thereby increase public sector output, whilst reducing expenditure (Brain 2010).

NPM began with the introduction of economy, efficiency and effectiveness principles into the governance of public sector organisations through Home Office circular 114 of 1983 (Long 2003). This meant moving away from the 'inputs' or cost of the public sector in favour of measuring what public sector organisations produced, or 'outputs'. For this to be achieved, 'outputs' were assessed through measurement by quantifiable numerical criteria. This allowed public sector organisations, including the police, to be ranked according to the performance indicators and their relative 'success' or 'failure' could then be benchmarked. Waters (2000) states this resulted in an emphasis on market forces, and a reorganization of public sector management to resemble a more business oriented approach by promoting the principle of greater efficiency and making public agencies more consumer responsive. Butterfield et al (2004) agree that these NPM principles involved several interconnected elements such as extensive use of competitive market and quasi-market mechanisms, privatisation of public utilities, organisational restructuring, including decentralisation of management, and a heavy emphasis upon organisational performance rather than procedure. Although it is acknowledged there was a substantial body of opinion arguing that public sector organisations are very different from those in the private sector, and that NPM precepts were therefore inappropriate, support for the NPM agenda came from evidence which

proposed there was in fact no sharp difference between the public and private sectors.

Reiner (2010), however, questions the effectiveness NPM had on the police service. He states NPM involves the principle of central government ruling from a distance by devolving responsibility to local levels of service delivery whilst steering the delivery by targeting setting, performance management, league tables, competition, 'best value', financial and other instrumental sanctions. This, he says, appealed to the police manager who took over an enthusiasm for these tactics with the neo-liberal belief that private enterprise and market models work best. However, he states there is little evidence that these managerial models had the intended effect on practice, except where performance was unequivocally poor. Loveday et al (2007) warned the way NPM had been implemented was likely to produce perverse incentives that may have directed police activity away from the important but hard to the trivial but achievable.

Fitzgerald et al (2002) stated that, as a result of NPM, the complexities of police work was forgotten as public sector managerialism increasingly dominated police administration. Although this was accidental and unintended, it resulted in quantitative targets being set for the police by successive Home Secretaries which gave primacy to narrowing crime-fighting objectives. Whilst this process was intended to improve police performance, they state it had the obverse effect. Long (2003) agrees with this concern. He says that NPM placed primary emphasis on the management rather than the leadership elements of the police

officer's role. He argued that in this performance culture of continuous improvement, the dual requirements of management, leadership and partnership challenged the police service in a potentially negative manner. Butterfield et al (2004) also conclude NPM may not have resulted in improved performance for the public sector. The focus placed upon output rather than outcome resulted in the manipulation of systems and evasion of poor service delivery. This, he says, can result in the police service being unable to display the flexibility, leadership and customer focus extolled by the advocates of NPM.

The impact that NPM had on the BRM satisfaction performance indicator, and thereby trust and confidence, has never been fully considered. Foster, Newburn and Souhami (2005) state that police forces have tended to focus attention on measured performance that was most easily identified and achieved. Whilst perhaps understandable, they say this can result in problems with routine working practice and service delivery which focus on 'quick wins', whilst ignoring the more difficult issues that would need tailor made services for specific communities. The impact that such working practices can have on organisational performance and how the 'gaming' of performance data is considered, by some, as a natural consequence of NPM will be discussed in chapter four. However, if police organisations did treat the BRM Satisfaction gap as an output to be assessed through measurement according to quantifiable numerical criteria (Long 2003), then the following question remains. Did NPM assist the police to deliver success or contribute to a failure of improving trust and confidence via the BRM satisfaction gap?

National Policing Plan

As part of their drive for efficiency, the New Labour government published the first National Policing Plan in 2002 for 2003 – 06 (Home Office 2002). It aimed to provide a strategic national overview and establish a single point of contact for the government's priorities, performance indicators and plans for new developments, whilst outlining the various dimensions against which the performance of the police would be measured (Newburn 2003). This followed the key principles of NPM, as outlined by Waters (2000) and Reiner (2010), by placing an expectation on Chief Constables and Police Authorities to prepare their own local three-year strategy and annual policing plan. More importantly for this research, the plan contained a Home Office Public Service Agreement which stated:

'Improve the level of public confidence in the criminal justice system, including increasing that of ethnic minority communities, and increasing year on year the satisfaction of victims and witnesses, whilst respecting the rights of defendant'.

(Home Office 2002: 42)

However, although the Police Authorities (Best Value) Performance Indicators Order 2003 (Home Office 2003b) contained performance indicators to address the above requirement of the National Policing Plan, there was no specific performance indicator to measure the presence of a BRM satisfaction gap.

The second National Policing Plan was set for 2004 – 07 (Home Office 2003) and developed the requirement for each force to examine the service they provided to BRM communities. Within the Police Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF), that had been introduced, there was a proposal for a new statutory indicator of user satisfaction from ‘minority ethnic’ respondents for victims of racist incidents. This was set out in the statutory instruments No.644 Police Authorities (Best Value) Performance Indicators Order 2004 (Home Office 2004a) and required each police authority to:

3 (b) ‘From 1 (e), comparison of satisfaction for white users and users from visible minority ethnic groups with respect to the overall service provided’

(Home Office 2004a: 3)

This new performance indicator was further developed by the third National Policing Plan set for 2005 – 08 (Home Office 2004b). Again, in line with NPM principles it stated that work to increase the satisfaction of victims and witnesses would have a significant impact on the targets relating to confidence within the criminal justice system and those offences brought to justice.

This was the last national policing plan to be published in this way. However, their legacy appears to be the establishment of the BRM satisfaction gap as a performance indicator for the police service. The Police Authorities (Best Value) Performance Indicators Order 2008 set a comparison of satisfaction between white users and users from BRM groups with overall service provided by the police as a statutory performance indicator (Home Office 2008).

Hall, Grieve and Savage (2010) acknowledge that a paradigm shift takes time to unfold and may not be implemented evenly across the police service. However, having examined the pace of change introduced via the National Policing Plan, the question still remains if the change agenda from the Macpherson Report was indeed quick enough. For example, even though the Police Authorities (Best Value) Performance Indicators Order 2003 (Home Office 2003b) contains performance indicators to address the content of the first National Policing Plan, it was not until the second National Policing Plan was introduced, 5 years after the publication of Macpherson, that there was a specific performance indicator to measure the BRM satisfaction gap as required by the report.

Citizen Focus Policing

The term Citizen Focus Policing was introduced to the police service in the publication of 'Citizen Focus: Good Practice Guide' (Home Office 2006). The guide stated that citizen-focus policing reflected the needs and expectations of individuals and local communities in decision-making, service delivery and practice (Home Office 2006). The objectives were to improve public confidence, increase satisfaction of service users and that of public involvement in policing. However, the guide does not appear to pick up on the Macpherson Report's (1999) concerns regarding the levels of trust and confidence within BRM communities towards the police. Instead it solely highlights the BRM satisfaction gap performance indicator as being the main way to highlight disparate levels of satisfaction in different BRM communities with the police under the heading of 'fairness and equality'.

The guide reflects the NPM principles of devolving responsibility to local levels of service delivery, whilst maintaining a control by target setting, performance management and league tables. The guide stated that substantially different levels of satisfaction across the country and amongst different communities showed the police service needed to do more to improve the experience of those involved. It goes on to list a number of activities it specifically states BRM victims perceived the police performing poorly, compared to the perception of white victims.

- The police did not appear to know what they were doing
- The police did not explain what would happen next and why
- They were not given a reference number
- They were not provided with a contact name and number
- They were not referred to Victim Support
- The information they needed was not provided quickly
- The call was not returned within a reasonable time
- The police did not communicate clearly
- The police did not make an effort to understand the nature of their enquiry

(Home Office 2006: 38)

It stated that victims experiencing the highest levels of satisfaction were those shown empathy by the police service at the first point of contact. However, it pointed out that even if individual experiences are positive they may not contribute to favourable perceptions of the police if victims perceive their

experience was atypical. It concluded that, generally, BRM communities received a poor service and provided a detailed analysis of service provision by the police, with a challenge for each police service to implement their own initiatives within the philosophy of Citizen Focus policing. The 'Citizen Focus: Good Practice Guide' (Home Office 2006) listed the 'drivers of satisfaction' and said that if police officers complied with them then victim satisfaction would increase. This guide appears to adopt the approach that by police officers adopting a tick box approach to service delivery, the required increase in victim satisfaction would be achieved.

The guide states it is the responsibility of all forces, even those with small BRM communities, to take steps to ensure they are providing a fair and equal level of service. However, there is no necessity for consultation with communities to ascertain their specific needs, but states that during the research, very little evidence could be found of forces focusing on closing the satisfaction gap (Home Office 2006). Disappointingly, there is no mention of the connection between the BRM satisfaction gap and levels of trust and confidence, as suggested by the Macpherson Report. It is perhaps interesting to note that the guide, published in 2006, highlights Dorset Police as having an example of good practice in respect of their use of BRM community members to shape and deliver police training. However, in 2010 the success of this training was questioned when Dorset Police were highlighted as having some of the highest black / white disproportionality ratios in the country for stop and search, which seems to question the effectiveness of their practice (Equality and Human Rights Commission 2010).

The Policing Pledge

In 2008, the New Labour government introduced the Policing Pledge. This was intended to build on the principles of Citizen Focus policing by requiring the police to treat people with dignity and respect, whilst providing fair access to services. It said that a victim of crime would be able to specify how they would like to be kept informed of progress in their case, with an additional specific right to be kept informed of progress once a month (Keenan 2009).

Brain (2010) states it was difficult to argue with the sentiment of the Policing Pledge as it tried to deliver an antidote to the results based style of policing emanating from NPM. However, it soon became apparent that, despite the rhetoric, the police service would retain many of the existing performance targets, as well as creating new ones. The Policing Pledge said it would increase performance delivery by challenging each police organisation to improve public confidence amongst all communities. To do this it introduced a single performance target to improve levels of public confidence (Keenan 2009), even though there was acknowledgment that the link between police action and public confidence was hard to establish (Brain 2010).

In 2010 one of the first acts of the new Conservative-led coalition government was to abolish the Policing Pledge. This may have been a shrewd move as Keenan (2009) had questioned the direction some police organisations were going by developing their own initiatives to address performance indicators. He warned against the developing practice of specifically targeting the individual service provided between white and BRM victims as it raised the question over

whether police were profiling victims of crime by their ethnicity to determine the service they received. This would result in the police targeting BRM victims of crime to ensure they received a better service than a white victim of crime, for the BRM satisfaction gap to narrow. When considering Macpherson's view that the police could be considered institutionally racist; as seen in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice ignorance and racists stereotyping (Macpherson 1999), there appear to be questions as to whether such a policy would be positively accepted by both the public and the wider police organisation. This results in Keenan (2009) challenging some Macpherson Report recommendations by suggesting there may be a level where a satisfaction gap becomes acceptable for the police service as the underlying causes may be wider than the policing remit.

Summary

Chapter two has examined how the BRM satisfaction gap became a performance indicator for the police service, and shown there has been dissatisfaction in BRM communities towards the police in the UK for many years.

The Scarman Report (1981), which examined some of the most serious public disorder within the UK in recent times, provided some suggestions as to where improvements needed be made, but there is a consensus that it was left wanting with its' conclusions and therefore failed to deliver (Newburn 2003, Bowling and Phillips 2002).

The Macpherson Report into the murder of Stephen Lawrence set out 70 recommendations, with the first one being to improve trust and confidence amongst BRM communities. To achieve this, recommendation 2 proposed 10 performance indicators, with one being to achieve equal satisfaction levels across all ethnic groups in public satisfaction surveys. The Stephen Lawrence Steering Group was set up and quickly took credit for implementing the Ministerial Priority, as required by the first recommendation. However, there appears to be a question as to how effective the steering group was in turning policy into action. Little comment was made about the time it took to introduce the BRM satisfaction gap as a performance indicator.

It is questionable that the recommendations within the Macpherson Report and the desire to improve trust and confidence in BRM communities could be so simply translated into individual performance indicators. The chapter has asked whether each police organisation which developed working practices to narrow the BRM satisfaction gap may have considered it an output within the requirements of NPM whilst ignoring the more complex challenge of improving trust and confidence with the police amongst BRM communities (Loveday et al 2007).

Indeed, Crane and Hall (2009) suggest that the differing levels of measured satisfaction across communities may not be as a result of indifferent standards in service but rather a vision of success at the front, driven by the translation of the Home Office guidelines into a small number of easily measurable targets for front line officers. The desire to be efficient and effective in a business-like

manner, as required by NPM, does not always match the victim's vision of success (Eterno and Silverman 2012). Thus, despite the emphasis shifting towards more victim-focused approaches, an NPM cultural legacy may remain where police success or performance is interpreted by officers as arrest or detection, whilst the victim of crime is left dissatisfied with the service provided. Chapter three will now consider the principles of trust, confidence and satisfaction and whether these can be so easily referred as interconnecting principles for victims of crime when considering policy design and service delivery by the police.

Chapter 3: Trust, Confidence and Satisfaction

Introduction

Chapter two explained how the principles of the BRM satisfaction gap performance indicator was developed from the second recommendation contained within the Macpherson Report. The recommendation was made with the intention of it contributing to the assessment of the Ministerial Priority contained within the first recommendation. Macpherson (1999, p327) stated the overall aim was to eliminate racist prejudice and disadvantage and thereby demonstrate fairness in all aspects of policing. To achieve this, Macpherson appears to consider the improvement of trust and confidence between BRM communities and the police to be a vital component.

However, Cao (2015) warns that when considering the substantial literature concerning citizens' perceptions of the police, the terms trust, confidence and satisfaction are often used interchangeably with little recognition of any differences between them. Whereas satisfaction describes an internal state of mind of the individual based on simply formed opinion, trust and confidence are different in that they are an overall assessment, externally focused, that imply an awareness of possible risk or danger arising from the breaking of the trust or misplacing of confidence. Jackson, Bradford, Stanko and Hohl (2013) state there are a variety of measures which researchers assume indicate the perceived fairness, integrity, competence and effectiveness of the police. These include questions about public confidence and satisfaction concerning a police service's

ability to reduce crime or interact positively with the community. However, they warn no one single question will ever be enough to assess the concepts of trust and confidence, but rather a range of indicators will always be needed to capture the complexity of public opinion. Bradford, Stanko and Jackson (2009) point out that diminishing public confidence with the police over the last 20 years have been mirrored by growing dissatisfaction, thereby suggesting there is a connection between the terms for the police service to consider.

All of this presents a view that the issue of trust and confidence, as presented by the Macpherson Report (1999) recommendations, may not be straight forward to address. This chapter will examine some proposed differences between trust, confidence and satisfaction. Within this it will consider how factors such as public perception, neighbourhood conditions and legitimacy impact on them from a police context. It will conclude that the improvement of BRM victim satisfaction appears to involve more issues than just the quality of service provided to a person at a specific time.

Trust

There is an acceptance that trust is an important influence on both individuals and communities in the building of social relations, yet a lack of consensus as to how this actually operates (Sztompka 1999). Luhmann (1979) states that trust, considered in the broadest sense as confidence in one's expectations, is a basic fact of social life. In many situations, a person can choose whether to bestow trust or not, but points out that a complete absence of trust would prevent the completion of even the simplest daily activity due to the feeling of overwhelming

risk. Sztompka (1999) explains that when acting in uncertain and uncontrollable conditions, we take risks, we gamble and make best of future uncertainties. Thus, in order to deal with the risks that the future presents, we must trust.

Giddens (1991) expands on the above point and says that trust is the non-negotiable basis of ontological security. It is an essential screening off device in relation to risk, which removes individual chaos and anxiety from the surrounding setting of action and interaction. Luhmann (1979) adds that to show trust is to anticipate the future, and requires a person to behave as if the future is certain. Sztompka (1999) adds that the logical conclusion is when we are practically certain of the future, there is no need to trust. It is only when uncertainty is added does an individual need to trust in a course of action or indeed an organisation. Cao (2015) concludes by asserting trust stands between “blind faith and open-eyed confidence.”

Types of Trust

So, there is a consensus that trust is a fundamental factor in the building of social relations and in addressing risk. If this is indeed the case then consideration needs to be given into how people trust and whether this may change, depending on whom or what their trust is being placed in.

Fenton (2000) says people demonstrate three kinds of trust. These being: Characteristic-based trust; which is tied to a person’s social or cultural background. Process-based trust; that is tied to past or present exchanges, as

in reputation or gift exchanges. Institutionally-based trust; which is tied to forms of certification or legal constraints.

However, Fukuyama (1995) believes it is only the person's cultural background, 'characteristic-based trust', which influences how a person trusts. Nootboom (2006), however, views the issue slightly differently and focuses on what people trust in. For example, he states people may trust in an organisation which he calls 'behavioural trust'. This then results in a variety of aspects: trust in their competence, intentions, honesty or truthfulness. Owen and Powell (2006), appears to agree with this. They say that one can distinguish between trust in contracts between people and State, trust in friendships, trust in love and relationships and trust in foreign issues. However, they appear to question the concept of trust in the police by arguing that "the state", "the government" and "the media" are not regarded as social actors as they do not possess the agency to formulate and act upon decisions, but are controlled by other influences. They therefore conclude that with the erosion of traditional institutions and scientific knowledge, trust becomes an issue more often produced only by individual social actors.

Sztompka (1999) dismisses this view and agrees with Fenton (2000) and Nootboom (2006). Organisations, he says, can be the object of trust, in both their competence and their intentions. However, he appears to provide clarity to the opinions of Owen and Powell (2006) by pointing out that often trust in an organisation is indeed based on trust in the individual people. He goes on to state that trust within the individual can be transferred to the organisation by them

being backed by authority, position, managers and personnel. The implementation of organisational interests and rules of trustworthy conduct will then ensure organisational trust is, in return, transferred back to the person.

The practice of dividing trust between the principles of 'personal' and 'organisational or social' trust appear to be a general theme running through many writings which appear to have commonalities with Fenton's (2000) characteristic-based, institutionally-based and process-based trust. The issue raised by Sztompka and Nooteboom are relevant to the police service. The fact that trust in an organisation is ultimately underpinned by trust in the people within it, and that it is possible for this to be transferred two ways should not be lost. However, as will be seen, it is Tyler (2005) who proposes a model which captures many principles, already discussed, in a structure that is applicable to the police.

Trust in the police

Tyler (2005) proposes two types of trust in the police. The first is 'institutional trust' which is a measure of how honest an organisation is considered to be, and how it cares for the people it serves. Institutional trust in the police exists when members of the public view the police as being an honest and competent authority, who exercises their responsibilities on behalf of all citizens. Although labelled differently, this appears to mirror Nooteboom's 'behavioural trust', Fenton's 'institutionally-based trust' and Sztompka's view that organisations can be the subject of trust.

Tyler's (2005) second type of trust in the police is 'motive-based trust'. This involves inferences about the motives and intentions of the police. People place motive-based trust by how much they believe police officers possess caring intentions when dealing with the public, and show good faith when responding to requests for assistance. This appears to support Sztompka's (1999) view that trust in an organisation is based on trust in the people. Nooteboom (2006) agrees by saying trust in the police requires trust in individual officers, as well as the organisation, and the underlying institutions of law and law enforcement. He reaffirms that both competence and intentional trust, measures of how much a police service can be trusted to carry out their key functions in a proper manner, are considerations for when people place trust in the police. However, these proposals still mirror Tyler's (2005) broad proposal of 'institutional trust' and 'motive-based trust' and thus for the purpose of this research this model appears to be the most relevant for considering public trust in the police.

Why trust the police?

Jackson et al (2013) say that citizen's trust in the police is important as it will result in an individual's active and willing cooperation. The absence of this can result in aggressive interventions from the police in the face of public opposition. This appears to support the view that Tyler (2006) presents regarding the importance of police legitimacy in the eyes of the communities they police. He claims public perceptions of police trustworthiness, both institutional and motive-based, will allow the police to be viewed as a legitimate organisation and are, thus, critical for cooperation between public and police (Tyler 2006).

Put in more practical terms, public trust with the police involves the belief that police officers are nominally competent with the individual's best interest at heart. This enables one to assume they will act in predictable ways, in keeping with the role they have in society. This is highlighted by Jackson and Bradford (2010) who say that in the UK trust in police fairness, caught up heavily with trust in its commitment to community values, is the most fundamental aspect of trust.

However, Fukuyama (1995) is an advocate of the impact of culture on the ability to trust. Although his view is linked more to economics, many of his principles and observations appear relevant to the police service as he comments greatly on trust in communities. He says that economic life is deeply embedded in social life, and it cannot be separated from the customs, morals and habits of the society in which it occurs. A cultural community is formed not based on explicit rules and regulations but out of a set of ethical habits and reciprocal moral obligations. It provides members of that community grounds for trusting one another. This, he argues, results in different communities trusting differently, due to their individual culture.

Fukuyama's (1995) view therefore suggests that each community will trust the police differently, due to their culture. This attracts support from Weitzer and Tuch (2005) and Rowe (2004). Jackson et al (2013) add that low trust in the police tends to cluster in neighbourhoods which are disadvantaged, experience high crime rates, public disorder and fear of crime and low residential stability and collective efficacy. However, they go on to say that individual issues of gender, age, employment status and ethnicity makes little difference to the levels of trust

in the police. They appear to support Fukuyama when they say that trust in the police is a matter of location as it can 'cluster' in areas whereby people who share the same locality tend to share the same level of trust.

Trust within a community

Sztompka (1999) highlights that trust has important functions, not only for individuals but also for wider communities (groups, associations and organizations) within which it prevails. It encourages sociability, participation and thereby enriches interpersonal ties and enlarges the field of interactions. He says it will generally strengthen the bond of an individual with a community and contribute to a feeling of identity by providing cooperation.

Fenton (2000) states that trust is indeed the fundamental precursor for a society, whilst Fukuyama (1995) also highlights the positive impact trust has on a community. He states that trust arises when a community shares a set of moral values in such a way as to create expectations of regular and honest behaviour. However, the use of the word 'honest' appears troubling when considering the influence that crime can have on a community, he goes on to point out that the particular character of moral values, both positive and negative, is less important than the fact they are shared by the community. He therefore concludes that trust does not necessarily produce a 'positive' set of values for a community but rather a shared set. When this is considered in context with Owen and Powell's (2006) observation that a person will develop trust if a person or situation has specific characteristics, positively valued by that community, then it does raise the question as to whether trust always has a positive influence.


The ability of trust to 'bind' a community, organisation or group, regardless of the legality, does appear to be agreed upon. However, Fukuyama (1995) is clearly of the opinion there are varying degrees, and differing types of trust in a community. These are heavily influenced by culture, resulting in the creation of high and low trust(ing) communities. Depending on which community a person comes from will depend on whom and how much an individual will trust. He says that some societies have very strong families but relatively weak bonds of trust among people unrelated to one another. He observes that in these cases individuals will tend to focus on the family and be reluctant to place trust in organisations which are not related. Alternatively, some cultures may have vigorous, private non-profit organisations like schools, hospitals and charities that develop strong bonds of association and trust that go beyond the family. He says this can result in cultures trusting only people related to them or, conversely, being comfortable in trusting people outside of family and kinship group.

Sztompka (1999) highlights the work of Fukuyama and proposes there are expanding concentric circles of trust, 'radii of trust' as described by Fukuyama, that encompasses both interpersonal and social trust, the most concrete interpersonal relations, toward the institutional and motive-based trust, which is placed in the police. The narrowest radius of trust, he says, covers that placed in members of a person's family, after which comes trust toward people known personally. The wider radius embraces other members of the community whom are known indirectly, whilst the widest includes large categories of people, with whom there is a belief that individuals have something in common but who are

mostly absent, not directly encountered, and constructed as a real collective only in the imagination (compatriots, members of ethnic groups, of a religion, gender, generation or profession). Here, Sztompka (1999) says, trust in concrete persons shades off into trust in more abstract social items.


Diagrammatically Sztompka's (1999) proposal can be presented as below:

Diagram 3.1: Sztompka's concentric circles of trust




However, Sztompka's (1999) proposals may not be as straightforward as first suggested. When reconsidering Fukuyama's proposal of high and low trust cultures, the principle of measuring trust within a community via radii of trust appears not to be so straightforward as shown in diagram 3.1. The principles of 'high' and 'low' trust cultures would suggest the radius of trust would change depending on each community's individual culture, as suggested below:

Diagram 3.2: Fukuyama's high trust culture



3.3: Fukuyama's low trust culture



As Fukuyama (1995) describes the 'radii of trust', with high trusting cultures more readily prepared to trust other members of their community and those whom they believe they have something in common with, then that radius should shorten to produce smaller concentric circles (Diagram 3.2). Likewise, in the case of a low trust culture where, as he says, there are very strong families but relatively weak bonds of trust among people unrelated to one another, then the radius would increase for all groups other than family and produce larger circles (Diagram 3.3).

Within the policing context, it would appear the message from Sztompka (1999) and Fukuyama (1995) is that different communities will trust institutions and organisations, like the police, differently according to their culture. This appears to suggest that to increase victim satisfaction and thereby improve trust and confidence in the police, as required by Macpherson (1999), it may require a larger investment, than just generic service delivery being applied to all victims of crime.

Confidence

The Macpherson Report (1999) spoke of both trust and confidence when it proposed the BRM Satisfaction gap as a measure of the police's relationships with BRM communities. However, there is no further detail explaining whether this should be considered as two separate or one individual principle. Indeed, when these terms are applied to policing there appears some confusion. This supports Cao's (2015) view that 'trust' and 'confidence' tend to be used interchangeably with little recognition of any differences among them.

This confusion results in some disagreement over when the terms confidence should be used rather than trust, and whether there is such a significant difference between the two. Misztal (1996) and Luhmann (1979) state that a difference does exist and it is important to differentiate between the two, in order to understand the actions of individuals. However, Holdaway (2010) questions the importance of any difference and has the view that trust is a proxy of confidence with regards to measuring public views of the police. Jackson and Bradford (2010) argue that confidence is, in fact, a type of motive-based trust

that is rooted in a social alignment between the police and community. This, they say, is founded on public assessments of the ability of the police to secure public respect and embody community values. However, Jackson and Sunshine (2007) adopt the views of Holdaway (2010) and Cao's (2015), by stating that in Britain, the term public confidence in policing has become a short-hand for trust, legitimacy and consent.

Choice

Misztal (1996, pp 15 - 18) says that the main difference between trust and confidence is connected to the degree of certainty attached to expectations. Trust is a matter of individual determination and involves choosing between alternatives, for example a person decides to take a risk and trust the police to efficiently investigate their crime. On the other hand, confidence is more of a habitual expectation, a person is confident that the police will do a good job when investigating their crime. This appears to involve less risk if it then transpires not to be the case.

Nooteboom (2006) highlights the aspect of choice that any individual may have when comparing the issues of trust and confidence. He argues that since a person cannot choose whether they have contact with the police or which officer they would like to engage with, it is better to speak of confidence rather than trust in the police.

This, however, does appear flawed when considering victims of crime, as Nooteboom's (2006) statement that individuals cannot choose to avoid the police

does not stand up to scrutiny. There has been a great deal published regarding the issue of under reporting crime within the UK, especially related to hate crime and domestic violence (Rowe 2004, Hall et al 2009). Often the reasons given are connected to a belief that the police are incapable of effectively dealing with the crime, which may indicate a serious lack of confidence. It could be argued that, certainly with regard to the victim of crime, a decision not to report a crime demonstrates a choice between using the police and avoiding them, resulting in the level of trust becoming the issue. However, Nootboom (2006) clearly states that when the object of trust is imposed, inevitable and beyond choice, as in the case of laws of nature, higher powers as well as organisations and institutions like the police, then one should not consider the aspect of trust but rather one of confidence.

Fenton (2000) disagrees with this. She states that a society where individuals have choice and are free to make rational decisions to fulfil their personal interest would not need trust to mediate forms of uncertainty and risk. But if individuals do not have the freedom to choose, if information received is incomplete or impenetrable, they are left only with the ability to exercise caution and with caution comes the need to consider the concept of trust. Spalek (2000) also highlights the potential problem that lack of choice may have on trust and confidence. She states there may be situations where people do not have a choice over the risks they will be exposed to. This results in them being coerced into a course of trusting, regardless of their level of confidence, they would not usually choose to take.

Knowledge

Misztal (1996) states another difference between trust and confidence is connected to the degree of certainty we can attach to our expectations stemming from some level of knowledge or familiarity. Luhmann (1979) agrees, and says that for the individual to trust, they must have at least some knowledge. He says that trust is scarcely possible without any previous information as it 'overdraws' on it and rests on the individual being already au fait and informed with certain general features, even if incomplete and unreliable. There is no need for knowledge to be complete about the likely behaviour to be trusted, rather it serves as a springboard for the leap into uncertainty, although bounded and structured. However, Luhmann (1979) says if the individual has no knowledge or experience of the organisation in question, then the correct measure is one of public confidence rather than public trust. Owen and Powell (2006) agree with the importance of knowledge. They say that, unlike confidence, trust is incompatible with complete ignorance of the possibility and probability of future events. It is implied that public confidence is formed or developed from opinions not created from knowledge of the subject matter but from something else. Fukuyama (1995) says individual communities may tend to use knowledge differently as people do not always pursue utility, however defined, in a rational way but rather by considering available alternatives and choosing the one that maximises utility in the long run. Indeed, it may well be that, as with trust, it is the individual's culture which shapes the level of confidence, rather than the level of knowledge within it.

Confidence in the police

From the discussion so far, it appears that public trust in the police requires an individual to have both choice and knowledge of the service. If this is non-existent or relevant, then public confidence should be considered instead. This appears to be supported by both Jackson and Bradford (2010) and Cao (2015). Jackson and Bradford (2010) state that public trust with the police involves the belief, or knowledge, that they are at least nominally competent and have the individual's best interest at heart. This enables one to assume the police will act in predictable ways and will behave in keeping with the role they have in society. Cao (2015) states that confidence in the police represents a general support for the police as an institution and, as such, constitutes a reservoir of good will. The level of confidence at any one time reveals the strength of public sentiment, that the police are working on behalf of the community to deliver order and secure a sense of justice (Ren et al 2005).

Donovan et al (2001) say that people's views about public services are only partly formed by their direct use of them. They warn there is no simple relationship between increasing the performance and quality of the service and increasing the level of confidence. This is linked to the user's expectations of the service they will receive and their perceptions of the service they have received. Flanagan et al (2005) agree with this. They say that a person's prior views of such organisations, which could be viewed as knowledge, including an individual's expectations of them, are influenced by personal beliefs, media coverage and word of mouth experience of friends and family. The public's confidence in the police is affected not only by the media's portrayal of the police

on both documentary and drama programmes, but also by the individual's belief in the police, often based on their perception of the crime level, which is invariably inaccurate.

Stanko et al (2012) say that trusting the police to be effective is less important in predicting overall confidence than the fairness of interpersonal treatment and the sense that the police are in tune with community values and expectations. This is supported by Jackson and Sunshine (2006) who state that public confidence in the police is driven not by worries about crime rates, but by concerns regarding social cohesion. The public lose confidence in the activities of the police when community values and norms are seen to be deteriorating, not when they are worrying about their own safety.

Fleming and McLaughlin (2012) state that trust and confidence in public institutions is a function of the extent to which these institutions produce preferred outcomes. They say that high-performing public institutions, that are efficient and effective, are likely to elicit the ongoing confidence of citizens, whilst those that perform badly or ineffectively, generate feeling of public distrust and low confidence. Who judges that a public institution is efficient and effective and what this means appears to be rather subjective. However, Flanagan et al (2005) pick up on the issue of 'performance' in relation to public confidence. They state that the concept of confidence, and the need to increase public confidence, is in fact an underlying, though usually implicit, tenet of NPM. As discussed in the previous chapter, this is intended to incorporate private sector techniques into public

sector organisations to create leaner, more flexible and “customer focused” services, whilst providing better value for money.

Is there a difference between trust and confidence in practical terms for the police? Some say that a person needs choice and knowledge to express trust, whereas this is not necessary for confidence. Donovan et al (2001) and Flanagan et al (2005) argue that this evaluation of confidence is formed without direct knowledge of the organisation and is thus influenced by other factors. If this is the case, then how does a police organisation go about improving public confidence when they may have little or no direct control on these influencing factors? However, when some argue that trust could be a proxy for confidence, it raises the question of whether there is actually a need to differentiate at all between the two for the setting of police policy but rather a need to just acknowledge the importance of increasing positive attitudes whilst reducing negative ones.

Satisfaction

In their discussion paper examining satisfaction with key public services, Donovan, Brown and Bellulo (2001) state that people tend to be satisfied with a service or a product when their perceptions of what they have received matches their expectations. When it falls short there will be dissatisfaction. However, they explain that expectations are formed by many factors other than the direct customer service provided. These include previous experience, word of mouth, reputation, media, communication by the provider and, crucially, the needs and characteristics of the customer or user. Flanagan, Johnston and Talbot (2004)

agree with this definition by stating that a person's expectation of a service or product can be directly linked to their level of confidence of the provider.

Models of satisfaction

Donovan et al (2001) break down their general submission of satisfaction into three theories; equity theory, attribution theory and performance theory. These, they say, can be applied to any goods or service provided to a customer including that by the police service.

The Equity Theory says that satisfaction occurs where a consumer feels that the outcome of the purchase of goods or service provided is in balance with their inputs, such as cost, time and effort, and that of the product provider. The consumer needs to feel fairly treated in the consumption process to develop satisfaction. This theory does appear to have some relevance to the police when considering how the police service has been challenged to demonstrate their cost effectiveness with regards to public funding over the past 30 years (Brain 2010). Such a theory would suggest that police satisfaction should be measured by police solving problems and reducing fear of crime. Therefore, one easy way of increasing satisfaction with the police would be to increase the number of patrols (Dukes, Portillos and Miles, 2009). However, this does not appear to be so straight forward when considering Donovan et al (2001) and Flanagan et al (2004) who argue that there are other factors in play, regarding satisfaction with the police, other than the service provided.

Attribution theory is where people or customers try to search for reasons to explain why an event turned out the way it did. Consumers use three factors to determine attribution's effect in satisfaction. These are 'locus of causality', which is where either the service provider receives the credit or blame for a service or the consumer is deemed responsible for the product or service performance. 'Stability' refers to the reliability of the product or service and can have a major effect on satisfaction, as consumers or service users tend to only be more forgiving of product or service failure which is viewed as a rare event. Finally, 'controllability' affects attribution as satisfaction can be affected if the consumer believes the provider had the capacity or control to perform to a higher level but chooses not to.

The attribution theory appears to be relevant to satisfaction with the police service as, unlike equity theory, there are allowances which consider factors other than direct service provision. A victim's view regarding 'stability' or 'controllability' of the police on the service provided allows the influence of such factors as previous experience, word of mouth, service reputation, the media, communication by the service provider as well as the needs of the victim (Donovan et al 2001). This appears to provide a better fit in line with the views of Flanagan et al (2004).

Finally, Performance theory states that customer satisfaction is directly related to the product or service's perceived characteristics which, preferably, can be determined objectively. Therefore, should a provider increase the expectations of a consumer, then satisfaction would fall if these expectations were not

realised. A victim either confirming or disconfirming their expectations of a service by the police's perceived performance would therefore produce either satisfaction or dissatisfaction. This appears to fit in with Skogan's (2005) view that the major determinants of citizen satisfaction with police encounters can be found in the things that police do at the time, by officers being polite, fair, attentive and willing to explain what was going on. In line with performance theory, a victim's perception of the officer's actions would thereby establish their level of satisfaction.

Public satisfaction with the police

Holder (2015) questions the value of measuring satisfaction within the police since the term can hide as much as it reveals. She says that although it may be useful for policy purposes, the vague context says little about the detail an individual is being asked to assess, and ignores motivations and expectations. As discussed in the previous chapter, the use of the satisfaction measure within the UK public sector is commonly viewed as arising from a widespread shift to marketisation and of NPM. Holder (2015) states there may be a connection that during this time there was a noticeable disenchantment with, and disengagement of, the public from the public sector. She says this resulted in both satisfaction and confidence in many public institutions rapidly falling. Indeed, Brain (2010), Rowe (2004) and Newburn (2003) all agree the police service has witnessed a considerable fall in public satisfaction for the past 35 years which, as discussed in chapter two, has been linked to the style and nature of policing. As discussed, this dissatisfaction gained momentum following the inner-city disturbances of the early to mid-1980s, along with the national Miners' Strike and various high-profile

miscarriages of justice that resulted in questioning the fundamental integrity of the police (Brain 2010).

Skogan (2005) states people who ask the police for help (citizen initiated) are generally more satisfied with the service provided than those who are approached by police (police initiated). This is, perhaps, because a member of public does not choose to enter into the police initiated contact and are therefore more likely to be adversarial in nature. It has been shown by Southgate and Ekblom (1984), Rowe (2004) and Brain (2010) that in the UK being stopped by police either on foot or in a vehicle generates considerable public annoyance and dissatisfaction with the police. The word 'annoyance' seems to imply it is the general inconvenience of being stopped which then results in negative views of the police, rather than the way in which they have been treated. However, research within the UK has shown that police-initiated contacts, completed in a fair and courteous manner, giving people explanations for the stop and explaining their rights, can actually contribute to satisfaction (Rowe 2004).

Rosenbaum et al (2005) agrees with the importance of who initiates the police contact on levels of public satisfaction. However, they argue that citizen-initiated contact has a stronger influence on shaping the public's attitudes towards the police than police-initiated. This appears to place great importance on the principle of improving victim satisfaction in order to improve the public's overall opinion of the police service. Hinds (2009, p55 - 56) develops this by stating there are three factors, other than police contact, which are consistently linked to the

level of public satisfaction with the police. These are public perceptions of the police, neighbourhood conditions and police legitimacy.

Public perception

Hinds (2009) says people's perceptions about how well the police are performing in their neighbourhood is a major factor which influences a person's level of satisfaction. Hawdon (2008) expands on this by stating those who are disposed to doubting the honesty of the police are more likely to view an encounter with police as being 'unjust' and thus express dissatisfaction, regardless of the officer's actual behaviour. A person's previous attitude toward the police shapes whether he or she interprets police behaviour as just or unjust, or in other words knowledge of the police results in a level of trust which directly influences the level of satisfaction. This leads to Hawdon (2008) asking whether satisfaction is in fact a self-fulfilling prophecy, in that those who perceive the police as being trustworthy and legitimate are more likely to be treated fairly as they will act deferentially toward an officer during a police-initiated contact rather than someone who views the police with suspicion or hostility.

Both Brandl et al (1994) and Keenan (2009) support this view. They say the effect of a person's previous personal experience and their prior opinion of the police, which could be argued as being their level of trust, is a major factor to establishing an individual's level of satisfaction. This, they say, is because a person will interpret a recent experience they have had with the police based on their pre-conceived ideas and opinions. Skogan (2005) also states that a person's general view of the police can have a greater impact on their

interpretation of a recent police encounter rather than the actual performance of the officer(s) involved at the time. Individuals may read their experiences in the light of their prior expectations. Their level of trust, more than recent experiences, affect their expectations and therefore their level of satisfaction. Brandl et al (1994) states the public will stereotype the police and selectively perceive their own experiences, looking to confirm any biases they carry when having contact with them. From this it could be concluded that providing a quality service does not matter as much to a person's levels of satisfaction as does their individual views of the police. It suggests that to improve satisfaction police should focus on the public's perception of them, their trust and confidence, rather than just on the quality of service being delivered.

Neighbourhood conditions

Hinds (2009) says people's assessment of crime in their neighbourhood influence their levels of satisfaction with the police. Dukes and Portillos (2009) add to this by stating that satisfaction with the police is shaped by the type of neighbourhood and community in which people live. They propose that residents of 'socially disorganised communities' are less likely to experience community involvement in policing and are, thus, less likely to be satisfied. However, Rowe (2004) and Hawdon (2008) strongly disagree with this as they say there is, in fact, no consensus as to why attitudes toward the police can vary by neighbourhood.

Dukes and Portillos (2009) agree with Hinds' (2009) initial assessment, and highlight the impact that fear of crime and community safety can have on levels

of satisfaction with the police. They state satisfaction is shaped by citizen's victimisation experiences, feelings of safety, estimates of the ability of police to reduce crime and response to calls for service. However, an increase in policing may have a negative effect, as they state the introduction of extra police resources often produces an increased media coverage of crime. This results in people becoming more concerned about their safety and thereby increasing their fear and decreasing their satisfaction.

Reisig and Park (2000) state lower levels of satisfaction with police were reported in neighbourhoods of concentrated poverty and disadvantage. Within these communities, mistrust of the police was associated with higher levels of crime and disorder. Murphy (2009) states that examining differences of opinion with the police along demographic lines such as race, age and social class, provides useful information about who may view the police in a positive or negative light. However, Wells (2007) points out that this evidence by itself is limited, as it does not provide explanations with regards to why the differences exist.

So, people's assessment of crime in their neighbourhood influences their satisfaction levels with the police (Hinds 2009). This appears to support Donovan et al (2003) performance theory in that satisfaction is directly linked to the police's perceived performance within a certain neighbourhood. However, the way in which local conditions may affect the victim also appears to support attribution theory. While victims try to search for reasons to explain why their experience with the police turned out the way it did, some of it is attributed to the manner in

which their neighbourhood is being policed and the perceived success the police are having.

Police legitimacy

Hinds (2009) says that the third factor contributing to levels of public satisfaction with the police is the degree to which the public view the police as a legitimate authority. This is the extent to which people's judgements about the police induces an obligation to defer to and comply with police directives and decisions (Tyler 2006). Legitimacy is considered by some as the foundation of police authority and demonstrates to people why the police's access to and exercise of power is rightful, and why people have a corresponding duty to obey (Tyler 2006). Under these principles, people obey the law not because they should, or due to fear of sanction or personal morality regarding the law. Instead, they do so because they believe it is the right thing to do.

Hinds and Murphy (2007) say legitimacy is a key aspect to policing by consent, which then increases trust in the police, and thus cooperation and voluntary compliance with the law. They say institutional legitimacy as a basic social value, learned during childhood, is evidenced by the extent to which people are willing to accept the authority of individual police officers. As people grow older both direct and indirect experiences shape individual's judgements of police legitimacy. The actions of individual officers therefore have a direct impact on increasing or lowering a person's judgement of police legitimacy.

It is interesting to note that Tyler (2006) found people's satisfaction with police was not primarily related to the outcome of an encounter but, rather, whether they perceived that police treated them correctly, with procedural justice. He states treating people with dignity and respect are key aspects to positive procedural justice which thus improves legitimacy. Murphy (2009) develops this view by picking up on Rosenbaum's et al (2005) point regarding who initiates the contact. She states that with regards to police initiated contact, procedural justice is more important than police performance, whilst police performance was found to be more important to people than procedural justice in relation to citizen initiated contacts. It could therefore be concluded that Murphy (2009) would say a victim of crime will be more satisfied with a successful investigation into their crime, rather than how they were treated.

It can be argued there is a connection between procedural justice and attribution theory. A person appears to be giving the service provider, the police, either credit or blame for the service received by means of how procedures were perceived to have been followed. However, Murphy (2009) is clear this is more relevant to police initiated contact, whilst public initiated contact focuses on performance. So, aspects of procedural justice also appear to factor within Donovan's et al (2003) performance theory, as a victim tries to confirm their expectations of a service by the provider's perceived performance, which is directly related to officers being polite, attentive and willing to explain what is going on.

Summary

How does this impact on the police and the way they measure victim satisfaction?

Cao (2015) says the practice of using confidence, trust and satisfaction in the police as interchangeable concepts is more than irritating, it reflects a penchant for imprecision in terminology and carelessness in conceptualisation. Fleming and McLaughlin (2012) warn that 'public confidence' and 'public trust' are complicated and demanding concepts that are connected to a variety of other psycho-social concepts, namely, opinions, perceptions, sentiments, expectations, judgment and satisfaction. Thus, both 'confidence' and 'trust' tend to be used in an inter-changeable manner because of the difficulties associated with the two concepts.

The BRM satisfaction gap was intended to indicate the levels of trust and confidence amongst 'minority ethnic communities' (Macpherson 1999). However, this chapter has shown there is indeed a great deal of difference between confidence, trust and satisfaction and an apparent need to heed Cao's (2015) warning and acknowledge their individual uniqueness to ensure appropriate policy design within the police. The chapter also described how legitimacy and procedural justice appear to have obvious links to victim satisfaction and trust. As Sunshine and Tyler (2003) state, the police use of unfair procedures, when exercising their authority, can lead to alienation, dissatisfaction, defiance and non-cooperation from the public. However, having examined the factors of public perception, neighbourhood conditions and legitimacy, the improvement of victim satisfaction appears to involve more issues than just the quality of service provided at a specific time. This appears to be

supported by the examination of trust. There is a strong view presented that individual's needs differ, depending on their culture or neighbourhood. This suggests a police policy of using a 'one size fits all' approach towards a victim of crime may not be a viable way to improve confidence, trust and satisfaction within BRM communities.

Chapter four will examine how the BRM satisfaction gap was implemented by the Home Office and Merseyside Police. It will highlight that the Merseyside Police policy of providing a 'gold service', which was introduced as a way of narrowing the gap, did indeed appear to use a 'one size fits all' approach for BRM victims of crime.

Chapter 4. How was it implemented?

Introduction

Chapter two explained how the Macpherson enquiry built upon a legacy of dissatisfaction with the police, from some commentators, regarding the way in which BRM communities were being policed. The report departed from the accepted notion of the 'rotten apple' by expressing concerns of institutional racism within the people, policies and practices that enabled the business of policing to be done (Macpherson 1999). However, Bartkowiak-Theron and Asquith (2014) point out that the subsequent silo approach to diversity and cultural awareness, along with the quota models that emerged from the Macpherson recommendations, proved inadequate for the increasing differentiation of modern societies. Instead it, arguably, led to a practice whereby the important but hard issues were ignored by police organisations in favour of trivial but achievable ones (Reiner 2010).

The purpose of this chapter is to explore how Merseyside Police implemented the recommendations to reduce the BRM satisfaction gap set by the Home Office (2008a, 2008b). It will first look at how trust, confidence and satisfaction can be surveyed in the police and specifically examine the issue of victim satisfaction and the guidelines provided by the Home Office. These aspired to set a national common standard to enable data comparability for all police forces.

The chapter will then examine some of the policies and working practices implemented by Merseyside Police to narrow their BRM satisfaction gap. It will show that a policy of providing a 'gold service' to BRM victims of crime was introduced, even though there was opinion that such a practice may not work. It will further describe the Customer Service Recovery Opportunity (CSRO) which was used with the intention of addressing poor service that had been provided, thereby positively impact on performance data. Finally, the chapter will consider whether the performance management processes introduced by Merseyside Police produced a working practice that allowed them to positively influence performance data by way of 'reactive subversion' or 'gaming' (Bevan and Hood, 2006) or whether it was just an example of robust implementation of Home Office guidelines.

Measuring trust, confidence and satisfaction

Duffy et al (2008) state that measuring levels of satisfaction is important and relevant to the police service as public satisfaction and confidence in the police is the main driver for the public's overall view of the criminal justice system, as measured by the UK Government. However, they say there is a problem as recorded levels of confidence and satisfaction with the police tend to fall when the public have personal contact with them. This means that, according to their research, victims are less favourably disposed to the police once they have had contact with them. Duffy et al (2008) expresses concern as this pattern tends not to be the case when the public have contact with other Government departments and may suggest the police service is less effective than people expect or believe it to be.

As explained in chapter three, if satisfaction with the police service is assessed by establishing a person's opinion about how police deal with a subject specific problem (i.e. burglary, domestic violence, drugs etc.) then instrumental concerns, such as police integrity, will contribute more to an expression of their confidence with the police than views based on their immediate experience, or satisfaction, of the service provided to them (Hinds and Murphy 2007). More importantly, with regard to the BRM satisfaction gap, they propose that some BRM groups will make more negative judgements about the police than others. Although this could be explained by Fukuyama's (1995) proposal in chapter three of high and low trust communities, it could also be due to suspicion of the police due to historical problems as raised by Scarman (1981) and Macpherson (1999). Regardless, this does appear to mirror Brandl et al (1994) views on conformation biases of judging the quality of police contact. It indeed questions what is actually being measured when a person is questioned or surveyed, is it trust, confidence or satisfaction with the police?

Different ways to measure trust, confidence and satisfaction

Jackson et al (2013) state there are three general approaches to the measurement of trust, confidence and satisfaction with the police. The first treats public confidence as unproblematically related to simple concepts of satisfaction with service, general support and personal statements of confidence. This approach, as used by the, then, British Crime Survey (BCS), assumes that attitudes can be summed up by a single question around the principle of 'how good a job are they doing'.

Hough et al (2007) state that the BCS has been an invaluable source of data for research and policy development since 1982. Whilst it has served the purpose in establishing a measure of crime, which includes unreported crime, it has also incorporated a number of innovative features including the measurement of public perception with the police (Thorpe and Hall. 2009). These questions have varied over time, ranging from ratings of the local police in terms of the simplistic 'how good a job are they doing' to perceptions of specific aspects of policing. But, they say, in recent years these questions have allowed statistics to be published which show whether the public's level of confidence in the police was improving or declining year on year. However, Skogan (2007) warns that surveys which try to monitor public confidence in police performance are often based on the participant's perception rather than opinion acquired by personal experience. Although it is acknowledged that perceptions are important and real in their consequence, there is still an issue of the validity of such a question to the point that Skogan (2007) questions whether surveys examining the quality of policing, measure what they claim to.

Jackson et al (2013) say the second approach to measuring trust, confidence and satisfaction shares similar aims to the first, but tends to use a more complex set of measures. For example, constructing a level of satisfaction from a variety of items, such as police engagement with the local neighbourhood, effectiveness in dealing with crime and disorder, and response to crime victims. This approach appears to mirror what was proposed by recommendation 2 of the Macpherson Report when it set 10 performance indicators to monitor and assess the new Ministerial Priority (Macpherson 1999).

The third approach proposed by Jackson et al (2013) is, they say, a more comprehensive and theoretically informed exploration of what trust, confidence and satisfaction means. This is most strongly associated with the work of Tom Tyler under the principle of police legitimacy, as discussed in the previous chapter. Tyler (2006, 2011) says that legitimacy is the foundation of police authority and demonstrates to people why the police's access to and exercise of power is rightful, and why people have a corresponding duty to obey this. As previously explained, under these principles people obey the law not because they feel they have to, but because they believe it is the right thing to do. It is the level of this that indicates the amount of trust and confidence the community has with the police. Tyler (2006) states there are two approaches used to measure police legitimacy. The first measures overall public judgments about the police and the law. These judgments reflect the key issues of obligation to obey, trust and confidence, and feelings. The second approach measures the public's views about aspects of the police and police behaviour that are potentially related to police legitimacy in a community setting. However, Tyler (2006) states that any survey would first need a validation survey where links between legitimacy and the behavior of a community are established to produce accurate data.

The importance of police legitimacy is a principle widely accepted by many to explain why the public obey the law (Tyler 2011, Brain 2010, Hough and Roberts 2007). However, even though this may indeed be a more comprehensive and theoretically informed exploration of what trust, confidence and satisfaction means, as proposed by Jackson et al (2013), data collection is still reliant on a survey style methodology and therefore Brandl et al (1994) would argue that the

problem of confirmation bias remains. However, conversely it could also be argued that it is this bias and negative judgment of the police, which some BRM communities hold (Hinds and Murphy 2007), that police legitimacy would measure.

Public confidence surveys

Regardless of this debate, the Home Office still preferred to use Jackson et al (2013) first approach, of asking a single question, when measuring public confidence. In 2009, they introduced a single confidence target for all police organisations, with a challenge for there to be an overall national increase in the confidence rating of 12% (Brain 2010). This was intended, in part, to make the performance management process leaner by reducing the number of performance indicators to just this one. However, the confusion over what confidence is, as discussed in chapter three, appeared to question what was being measured. The data informing the performance indicator was obtained from the BCS question “How much would you agree or disagree that the police and local council are dealing with anti-social behaviour and crime issue that matter in this area?” (Hough and Roberts 2007). It is unclear whether this general question accepts the participant’s perception or bias of the police as part of public confidence or ignores it as unimportant. However, this survey question presented other data collection problems. The data collected was used to measure general ‘confidence’ in the police, but it was argued that as the question combined ‘police’ with ‘local authority’ it was questionable as to which agency the data related to. Indeed, how would a person answer if they possessed a high level of confidence

towards the police but strongly disagreed with the political views of the local authority (Brain 2010)?

Victim surveys

Types of victims: Structurally neutral / structurally informed

Walklate (2007) states there are two not mutually exclusive but nevertheless competing images of the victim of crime which inform the policy process. One is a structurally neutral image of the victim that may well apply to all. The other is a structurally informed one, which implies there are certain groups or sections of society for whom the harm done by criminal victimisation is a differential experience and has a different impact when compared to others. This image proposes that not all of those sharing the same levels of vulnerability will deal with a similar victimising event in the same way. Their needs will vary according to their own personal coping skills and those of people around them, meaning, even in the case of the vulnerable, they are not fixed entities. However, matching service delivery to an individual's needs, in any service delivery context, is fraught with difficulties, and the same is true for victims of crime.

The notion of the structurally informed victim appears to question the standard victim survey methodology where each participant is asked the same set of questions and the same inference is taken from the answers provided. Two different victims receiving the same service may judge it differently depending on their needs and the impact their victimisation experience has had on them. Thus, although matching a police service to a victim's needs may be difficult, it might be a better option than providing the same service to all and thereby

ignoring the individual victim's fears and judgements. This was the stated aim of the New Labour government when they introduced Citizen Focus policing in 2006.

Home Office guidance and Citizen Focus policing

As discussed in chapter two, the Citizen Focus Good Practice Guide (Home Office 2006) states citizen focus policing means reflecting the needs and expectations of individuals and local communities in decision-making, service delivery and practice. The objectives were to improve public confidence, increase satisfaction of service users and to increase public involvement in policing. Success, as to whether individual police organisations achieved a satisfactory level of service, was measured by the Policing Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF) with the data obtained largely from user satisfaction surveys of victims of crime along with public confidence in policing (Home Office 2006). The guide went on to detail how PPAF would group the survey data obtained:

- *User satisfaction*
 - Ease of contacting the police
 - The initial action taken
 - Being kept informed of progress
 - Treatment by staff
 - The overall experience
- *Confidence*
 - The percentage of people who think their local police are doing a good job (data extracted from the British Crime Survey)
- *Fairness and equality*
 - Satisfaction of victims of racist incidents with overall service
 - Satisfaction of black and minority ethnic groups compared to white population with overall service

- Percentage of Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) searches that lead to arrest by ethnicity
- Comparison of sanction detection rates for violence against the person offences, by ethnicity of victim.

Home Office (2006) p4

This set of measurements appear to be an example of Jackson's et al (2013) second approach to the measurement of trust, confidence and satisfaction, and had already been used as performance indicators when the Home Office published performance assessments for all police forces in October 2005 (Home Office 2006). This had the benefit of the headings being familiar to the police service, which increased the possibility of police forces having the necessary policies in place.

The guide clearly stated it would be victim satisfaction surveys which provided the data to populate the satisfaction element of the PPAF indicator. To assist with this, it provided advice on those activities it considered could make a difference to user satisfaction and public confidence. It explained that previous in-depth, quantitative analysis of user satisfaction survey data had been completed in four police forces, which had confirmed what the 'drivers of satisfaction' for a victim were (Home Office 2006). The guide went on to say that they had found relatively little evidence of individual police forces successfully focusing on closing the BRM satisfaction gap. It then encourages each police force to take a structurally informed view of the BRM victim in highlighting work by the Metropolitan Police. Focus groups had been undertaken by them within specific BRM communities which, they said, had produced a number of priorities for the force, at both a strategic and tactical

level, that was specifically important to each of the communities. This research suggested that the following components should be focused on to deliver a high-quality service to victims of racially aggravated crimes:

- A clear and consistent definition of a racist crime and a religious crime;
- Prompt response to reports of racist crimes and the victim to be informed in the event of any delay;
- Regular updates, using a method of communication chosen by the victim;
- Considering the use of designated trained officers to deal with the victims of racist crimes;
- A continuous programme of diversity training for all officers; and
- Appropriate rewards and sanctions for officers and systems that support cultural change linked to diversity

Home Office (2006) p39

Whilst this does appear to be a list of actions to ensure victims of racially aggravated crimes are not treated in a structurally neutral way, it does appear to be an almost random list of police activities and policy. However, the notion of compliance against a list of quantitative activities and policies, produced by a proposed empirical process, figured as a common theme over the coming years as the police service tried to narrow the BRM satisfaction gap.

Victim Satisfaction Surveys

In March 2008, the Home Office published Guidance on Statutory Performance Indicators for Policing and Community safety 2008/09 (Home Office 2008a). This provided technical guidance and relevant advice in respect of Police

Authority statutory performance indicators (SPI) published in The Police Authorities (Best Value) Performance Indicators Order 2008 (Home Office 2008). SPI 1.2 was stated as being:

“Comparison of satisfaction between white users and users from minority ethnic groups with the overall service provided by the service”

(Home Office 2008a p9)

In June 2008, the Home Office further published Definitions and Survey Guidance for APACS Measures of User Satisfaction Surveys (Home Office 2008b). This was intended to assist the replacement of PPAF with the Assessments of Policing and Community Safety (APACS) that used the data provided by SPI's to populate the new performance assessment framework for policing and community safety. It promised that APACS would simplify the performance landscape for the police and would align with other performance frameworks. More importantly, it emphasised that user satisfaction surveys would be the method used to measure the improvement of satisfaction within the police and criminal justice system. It said it would be achieved by comparing individual force performance with peers, identifying weak areas, highlighting the causes through the use of diagnostic questions, and providing service recovery through dialogue with dissatisfied users. To this end it highlighted three performance indicators which would measure this, with SPI 1.2 clearly showing the BRM satisfaction gap would remain important to the service police:

- SPI 1.1 Percentage of users that are satisfied with the overall service provided by the police

- SPI1.2 Comparison of satisfaction between white users and users from minority ethnic groups with the overall service provided by the police
- SPI 1.3 Satisfaction of victims of racist incidents with the overall service provided by the police

Home Office (2008b p3)

Indeed, if the intention of APACS was to simplify the performance landscape for the police, this was not immediately apparent when it came to victim satisfaction and the survey process.

User Groups to be Surveyed

The guidance gives the requirement for each force to conduct user satisfaction surveys using the same methodology and mandatory interview script. This was to ensure consistency between forces in order to create comparable data for use in APACS (Home Office 2008b). It states the user satisfaction survey would consider the full service, from start to finish, that each participant had experienced and not just the initial stage of police involvement. To do this, questionnaires were to be structured around a mandatory framework, seeking responses across the five stages of service which has been previously listed as the PPAF user satisfaction measures.

These were;

1. Initial contact
2. Actions
3. Follow up
4. Treatment
5. Whole Experience

The guidance stated that victims of the following five categories would form the 'user groups' to be surveyed (Home Office 2008b);

1. Domestic Burglary
2. Violent Crime
3. Vehicle Crime
4. Road Traffic Collisions (RTC)
5. Racist Incidents

The user satisfaction surveys would be conducted with victims between six and twelve weeks after they had reported the crime to the police. Each victim had to be at least 16 years old (Home Office 2008b).

The issue of who was considered to be an eligible respondent for the survey received further detailed guidance from the Home Office. It was stated, where possible, police forces should exclude the following victims from any data set to be surveyed.

Table 4.1: Excluded Victim Satisfaction Survey Victims

- | |
|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Where the offender was another family member e.g. sibling/parent/child• Those who have indicated that they are unwilling to be surveyed (where this is recorded) or where there is a note on the record that the case is unsuitable for research (where this is recorded). Some forces may choose to use "opposed publicity" as a proxy for cases unsuitable for survey contact.• The offender was a member of the police service or police authority• Forces and authorities retain the discretion to exclude other victims where a survey is likely to cause distress. Candidates for exclusion can usually |
|--|

be gained from crime desk, crime reports, road traffic collisions (RTC) reports and call logs.

- It is recommended the following are considered for exclusion:
 - Elderly victims who may be considered vulnerable
 - Victims who have made a formal complaint against police regarding this incident or crime
 - Victims who are considered vulnerable which could be for any logical and explainable reason i.e. victims with mental health problems, someone who has recently been a victim of domestic violence (not included in the existing sensitive exclusion)
 - Victims who have requested no further police action
 - Victims who will not co-operate with the police investigation
 - Victims already contacted several times in 12 months
 - When the incident is part of an ongoing neighbour dispute
 - When the crime involved very serious injury
 - When the burglary was of an unoccupied local authority property
 - When the victim of a vehicle crime was a business rather than an individual
 - RTC which involved police vehicle collisions or which were in any way due to the presence of a police vehicle
 - RTC where the vehicle was parked at the time of collision
 - RTC where no other vehicle was involved
 - RTC where the collision occurred in a private car park
 - RTC where the collision involved a stolen car

Home Office (2008b p2)

The guide also recommended that each force should keep a record of which victims were excluded from the sample and retain this for 12 months after the year end, for verification purposes.

Although the guide initially states it is providing a robust methodology, with the intention of producing data of a common standard that could be compared nationally, the detailed list of victims for exclusion from the survey appears to contradict this. Once a victim of the correct type of crime and age has been identified, there is then a sifting process which gives numerous reasons why a victim should be excluded from participating in the survey. The fact that a force

retains the individual discretion to exclude a victim from a survey, for the stated reason that they themselves deem it would be a distressing process for the victim, appears questionable. No advice is given as to how this discretion may be applied, it therefore appears each police force are allowed to develop their own working practices. More importantly, the exclusion of victims who have made a complaint against the police, have requested no further police action or have failed to cooperate with the investigation, is even more troubling. Chapter two has highlighted the issue of why BRM communities can have a difficult relationship with police, perceive a poorer level of service and be suspicious of policing motives (Rowe 2004, Bowling and Philips 2002, 2003). By excluding victims who have immediately expressed dissatisfaction by making a complaint, or perhaps have such a low level of trust with the police they decline further assistance, or have no confidence so choose not to cooperate with the investigation, raises concerns. No reason is given as to why victims who fall into these categories should be ignored, leaving the reader to question the motives of this.

Minimum Standards and Best Practice

In order for the Home Office to ensure comparability and validity of results from the data produced by the victim satisfaction surveys, all forces were required to conduct them via the telephone (Home Office 2008b). These interviews were required to be carried out by either trained field workers or a recognised market research company. For those organisations who wished to use a research company, the Home Office circulated a list of private service suppliers and an agreed set of costs to provide a common delivery standard for all. Forces who

already had contracts in place for out-sourced surveys were not required to curtail them, but expected to move to the national standard at the end of that contractual period. The Home Office (2008b) stated the use of a coordinated approach provided the police service with the opportunity to work with the private sector in developing processes and standards, thereby reducing costs via economies of scale. The use of such language clearly shows the influence which the principles of NPM had on this policy.

There was further guidance provided with regards to the questionnaire framework to be used for each interview by every police force to, again, ensure comparability of data. This was based around a set of mandatory core satisfaction questions (table 4.2), that mirrored the previous PPAF user satisfaction measures, with a victim's response being measured against a standard response scale (table 4.3). It was stated these mandatory questions would give each force the information to act and change policy to improve the services delivered.

Table 4.2: Standard Wording for Core Questions

<p>The following core questions, in the given order, should be asked of all users:</p> <p>INITIAL CONTACT Are you satisfied, dissatisfied or neither with how easy it was to contact someone who could assist you?</p> <p>ACTIONS Are you satisfied, dissatisfied or neither with the actions taken by the police?</p> <p>FOLLOW UP Are you satisfied, dissatisfied or neither with how well you were kept informed of progress?</p> <p>TREATMENT</p>

Are you satisfied, dissatisfied or neither with the way you were treated by the police officers and staff who dealt with you?

WHOLE EXPERIENCE

Taking the whole experience into account, are you satisfied, dissatisfied, or neither with the service provided by the police in this case?

Home Office (2008b p17)

Table 4.3: Scale of measurement

The core questions should have response options which use the 7 point scale (+ don't know) listed below:

- Completely satisfied
- Very satisfied
- Fairly satisfied
- Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
- Fairly dissatisfied
- Very dissatisfied
- Completely dissatisfied
- Don't know

The responses should be presented to respondents as follows:
"Are you satisfied, dissatisfied or neither?"

For those who say satisfied, follow-up with:
"And is that completely, very or fairly satisfied?"

For those who say dissatisfied, follow-up with:
"And is that completely, very or fairly dissatisfied?"

The telephone script will not offer the "don't know" response, but any respondents not giving a response on the 7-point should be recorded as "don't know."

Home Office (2008b p18)

In addition, police forces were given the opportunity to supplement the core questions with further diagnostic questions. Also, they were allowed to ask further questions on unrelated areas, with the caveat that it had to be done after completion of the initial user satisfaction questionnaire.

The Home Office (2008b) presents, what appears to be, a detailed and considered methodology for the victim satisfaction surveys, clearly intended to produce data allowing individual force performance to be compared nationally. However, the methodology appears to ignore the warning of Hinds and Murphy (2007) who stated that by focusing on subject specific problems, as in domestic burglary, violent crime, vehicle crime, RTC and racist incidents, it may produce an expression of confidence rather than views based on immediate experience (satisfaction). Also, this prescribed methodology appeared to take a structurally neutral stance towards the victim by asking set questions with a fixed scale of measurement. The influence of confirmation bias (Brandl et al 1994) on a victim's answer and the effect that mistrust within some BRM communities may have with the police (Hinds and Murphy 2007), do not appear to be factored into the methodology. This results in the reader questioning whether the guidance achieved the stated aim of providing a structure which obtained data of a common standard to allow comparison.

The problems of measuring performance

Bevan and Hood (2006) state the performance management of public services, which developed in the 2000s from the principles of NPM, contained a real element of terror. The regime was one of target setting against which performance was measured and then published to either reward or shame the person or organisation deemed accountable. Such a style of governance by targets assumes that the setting of targets will change the behaviour of the individual or organisation, whilst gaming, the reactive subversion of performance data, can be kept to an acceptably low level.

Eterno and Silverman (2012, p85 - 97) highlight similarities for the UK police service between this performance management style and that of Compare Statistic or 'Compstat', introduced by the New York Police Department (NYPD) in the 2000s. Compstat was a managerial system of holding police commanders personally accountable, based on a four-part mantra of accurate and timely intelligence, effective tactics, rapid deployment and relentless follow-up and measurement. It placed intense pressure on the commanders to show results, with an unwritten rule that if the number of crimes went up then careers would be finished whilst crime reduction would be rewarded with promotion. This, Eterno and Silverman (2012) says, led to an enormous temptation to examine all recorded crime reports closely and to then manipulate the data to the benefit of the organisation.

However, Bevan and Hood (2006) propose that, to some level, manipulation and gaming is inevitable as actors tend to change their conduct when they know the data they produce will be used, in return, to control them. To that end, they highlight three known gaming problems which can influence performance data. Ratchet effects refer to the practice of basing the following year's targets on the previous year's performance. This may give managers, who expect to still be in post the following year, an incentive not to exceed targets even if it was easily achievable. Threshold effect refers to the influence of targets on the distribution of performance among a range of production units. Pressure is put on those performing below target to do better, whilst those who are out performing the target are allowed to let their performance slip. Finally output distortions result

from attempts to achieve the measured target at the cost of other significant but unmeasured aspects of performance, an example of what gets measured gets done. Foster, Newburn and Souhami (2005) suggested in chapter two that police forces have a tendency to focus attention on measured performance that is most obviously identifiable and achievable. This is an example of output distortions as highlighted by Bevan and Hood (2006), who conclude that the setting of targets and performance measurement invites such working practices within service-providing units. This will always be the case unless there is a large amount of transparency embedded in the performance management process.

However, the extent to which manipulation and gaming may exist in an organisation depends on a mixture of motive and opportunity with four types of motivation being distinguished by Bevan and Hood (2006 p522-523).

1. 'Saints': may not share all of the goals of the organisation but their public service ethos is so high they voluntarily disclose performance shortcomings.
2. 'Honest triers': broadly share the goals of the organisation, do not voluntarily draw attention to their failures, but do not attempt to spin or fiddle data in their favour.
3. 'Reactive gamers': broadly share the goals of the organisation but aim to game the target system if they have reason or opportunity to do so.
4. 'Rational maniacs': do not share the goals of the organisation and aim to manipulate data to conceal their real performance.

LeGrand (2003) agrees with Bevan and Hood (2006) by stating that governance by targets, do indeed, change individuals behaviour. This may not be good for the organisation. Rewarding those who produce the right numbers for target achievement, as highlighted by Compstat, may turn honest triers into reactive gamers or even rational maniacs. Indeed, Eterno and Silverman (2012) warn that the champions of Compstat, NPM and governance by targets, tended to underestimate the ingenuity of individuals to engage in statistical chicanery, particularly when contracts and careers could be at stake.

Merseyside Police response

Victim Satisfaction Survey

Due to the lack of available documentation from Merseyside Police, it is difficult to empirically reference how the victim satisfaction survey developed. However, as later chapters show, there had been a form of user satisfaction survey in place for several years prior to the introduction of the Citizen Focus agenda. By the end of 2008 Merseyside Police victim satisfaction survey, which was being completed on a monthly basis by a private company, was deemed to be compliant with the Home Office guidance (Merseyside Police, 2008). Detailed victim satisfaction survey data, published for each BCU, was broken down into the 'stages of service' for each victim. These mirrored the standard wording for core questions, as highlighted in table 4.2, (Home Office 2008b p17) of first contact, actions take, follow-up, treatment and whole experience.

In line with Home Office guidance each stage of service was further broken down into 'critical inputs', where the victim was asked if specific actions or

activities had been completed by the reporting officer. The accepted answers were yes, no, not applicable, don't know or refused. For example, within the stage of service 'actions taken' a victim was specifically asked what the reporting officer had done:

- Did they tell you what was going to happen next and why?
- Did they make you feel reassured?
- Did they give you practical help?
- Did they give you a crime or reference number?
- Did they give you contact details for someone who would be dealing with your case?
- Did they offer contact details for Victim Support?
- Did they offer advice?
- Did they investigate the scene of the crime?

(Merseyside Police 2008b p8 -9)

Following these questions, the core question for 'actions taken' was asked which was then measured against the seven-point scale in table 4.3.

"Thinking about what the police did after they had been given the initial details, are you satisfied, dissatisfied or neither with the actions taken by the police?"

Merseyside Police (2008b p9).

The victim satisfaction survey data was published monthly, with each BCU Area Commander being held to account for their performance on both a monthly and

quarterly basis by an Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) (Merseyside Police 2008). In line with Eterno and Silverman's (2012) description of Compstat, the review of a BCU's performance was often completed in the presence of the other BCU Commanders, with detailed explanations being required to explain both good and poor performance. Within this performance management regime, data was looked at in detail and the issue of how to narrow the BRM satisfaction gap received increased focus.

The BRM Satisfaction Gap

Merseyside Police made BRM satisfaction, as measured by the victim satisfaction survey, one of the six themes forming part of the Citizen Focus Strategic Assessment for 2008 to 2009 (Merseyside Police 2008a). With the intention of improving performance, a BRM Satisfaction Action Plan was developed and a 'Citizen Focus Champion' appointed in each BCU. These 'champions' were held responsible for the implementation of the action plan, with progress being monitored by the Citizen Focus Program Board, chaired by an ACC (Merseyside Police 2009).

The BRM Satisfaction Action Plan picked up the direction set by the Home Office in the Citizen Focus guide (Home Office 2006) by targeting those individual activities which the chosen research had deemed important for BRM victims of crime. Merseyside Police believed previous analysis of the victim satisfaction data had highlighted several critical inputs which had a disproportionately positive influence on BRM satisfaction levels (Merseyside Police 2008a). These were:

Table 4.4: Critical inputs which had a positive influence on BRM satisfaction

Stage of Service	Critical Inputs
Ease of Contact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Given advice while waiting • Dealt with in a reasonable time • First person polite • First person sympathetic
Actions Taken	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Carry out an investigation of the scene • Offer advice • Reassure victim • Satisfied with arrival time • Provided practical help
Follow-up	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knew who to contact for updates • Police initiated further contact • Phone calls returned in a reasonable time • Inform victim what will be done
Treatment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Appear to take the matter seriously

Merseyside Police (2008a p8)

This list shows that it had been decided, when dealing with a BRM victim of crime, if the reporting or investigating police officer complied with each critical input then the victim of crime was more likely to be satisfied, thereby narrowing the BRM satisfaction gap. However, this plan of action appears to ignore many concerns.

Myhill (2007) found there were no obvious differences in expectations of the police service between white and BRM victims and non-victims of crime. When he had interviewed some BRM respondents he observed that cultural issues influenced the nature of contacts with the police as much as the service experienced. This would have come as no surprise to Fukuyama (1995). Myhill (2007) recommended forces should examine their user-satisfaction data to see

whether there are local issues, practical or cultural factors that may be responsible for some BRM victims experiencing a less satisfactory service.

It may be argued that Merseyside Police were taking more of a structurally informed approach towards the BRM victim, as previously described by Walklate (2007). By establishing a list of activities, they stated were important to the satisfaction of BRM victims of crime, there was acknowledgement that victimisation was a differential experience to that section of society. However, the sweeping assumption that compliance with the critical inputs would improve satisfaction with all BRM victims, clearly nullifies this argument. Also, although the guidance states they have a positive influence on BRM satisfaction levels (Merseyside Police 2008a), it does not state what effect the inputs have on non-BRM victims of crime, if this was the same then any satisfaction gap may not narrow. The recommendations appear to also ignore the issue of confirmation bias raised by Brandl et al (1994) or the negative opinions of some BRM communities as highlighted by Hinds and Murphy (2007). Thus, it can be concluded that a straight forward, structurally neutral, approach was taken to the victim, in order to narrow the satisfaction gap. However, in these circumstances it is difficult to understand how a better service for all victims would narrow the BRM satisfaction gap, unless BRM victims were receiving a service that was being perceived better compared to the white victim of crime.

Gold service

In February 2009, the BCU's of Liverpool North and Liverpool South were tasked by Merseyside Police Assistant Chief Constable for Citizen Focus, to

identify a 'premium service' for BRM victims of crime that would assist in narrowing the BRM satisfaction gap. The subsequent proposal document acknowledged that a victim of crime, from any community, required a quality service to be able to express a high level of satisfaction. However, there were also proposals as to how a BRM victim of crime could receive an improved or 'gold service' compared to white victim, and thereby narrow the satisfaction gap (Merseyside Police 2009).

The recommendations appear to acknowledge the concerns of Hinds and Murphy (2007) and Rowe (2004) regarding the suspicion that certain BRM communities have towards the police. In line with Myhill's (2007) views, it recommended that each BCU should closely monitor the police use of stop and search to ensure it was being used proportionality. It also encouraged the development of engagement opportunities within each policing neighbourhood, and recommended that there should be a detailed understanding developed of the BRM communities being policed. The purpose of the last recommendation was to establish what mattered to each community when an individual became a victim of crime. It was then intended to design a new crime reporting booklet to ensure reporting officers complied with the critical inputs highlighted as important.

One of the final recommendations stated the Merseyside Police customer service recovery opportunity (CSRO) should be reviewed. This was with the intention of increasing the amount of 'quality' contacts with BRM victims to improve satisfaction.

Customer Service Recovery Opportunity

The principle of service recovery was proposed by the Home Office (2008b) when it recommended police forces should consider establishing a service recovery protocol. This was to be offered to dissatisfied victims of crime who had been identified during the victim satisfaction survey. The protocol, they said, should provide a mechanism for reparation. An example of an interviewer having an agreed protocol to ensure a victim was quickly provided with an update of their case if the satisfaction survey had identified one was overdue, was provided. Merseyside Police developed this principle.

CSRO was defined by Merseyside Police as a customer service call to a victim of crime, made at the initial stages of the investigation to ascertain how satisfied they had been with the service so far (Merseyside Police 2009a). This, they said, provided an opportunity to put back on track any bad or poor service received, or to explain the relevant procedures to enhance understanding in relation to actions taken. It was stated the CSRO process could be used to contact any victim of crime. However, it had been specifically designed to improve the service provided to BRM victims and victims of hate crime, as it said the CSRO process was to provide an opportunity to identify reasons why BRM victims were not satisfied with the service they had received.

There were two stages in the CSRO process (Merseyside Police 2009a). Stage one took place within 48 hours of the crime being recorded so that any dissatisfaction could immediately be rectified. A stage two call took place between 4 to 8 weeks after the reporting of the crime. This was to establish how

the victim felt following further stages of service, with remedial action being taken should any dissatisfaction be expressed.

However, the CSRO calls were to be made prior to the victim being contacted by the private research company who were completing the victim satisfaction survey (Merseyside Police 2009a). This, they said, would enable any poor service recognised to be corrected, and thereby improve the overall service delivery, prior to the victim satisfaction survey. These results directly impacted on Merseyside Police's user satisfaction performance being measured nationally. However, when considering the concerns already discussed regarding how a victim may arrive at their level of satisfaction, the expectation by Merseyside Police that providing a good service on the day, or quickly repairing a poor service, would result in satisfied victims of crime, appears misplaced.

The Merseyside Police CSRO process did not comply with the guidelines set out by the Home Office (2008b). The Home Office had recommended a recovery opportunity to provide the victim satisfaction survey interviewer with a course of action should poor service be identified by them. By Merseyside Police implementing a CSRO that required a victim, specifically a BRM victim, to be called twice, the second time just prior to the victim satisfaction survey appears to be an example of reactive gaming (Bevan and Hood 2006, LeGrand 2003). The initial suggestion of a recovery opportunity by the Home Office gave Merseyside Police an opportunity to justify a process which gamed their target system.

Summary

This chapter has shown that the Home Office introduced a set of guidelines for how each police force should run their victim satisfaction surveys. The methodology informed on how the data set should be identified, which victims may be removed from the survey process, what questions should be asked and how it should all be collated. The explanation provided for this was the need to produce data of a similar standard, nationally, to allow performance to be compared by APACS (Home Office 2008b). However, the discretion allowed to each force, with regards to the removal of a victim from the survey process, appears to challenge this notion.

This chapter also examined the process through which Merseyside Police tried to narrow the BRM satisfaction gap. It has been shown they clearly believed there were specific actions being omitted by reporting and investigating officers which were resulting in the dissatisfaction of BRM victims. By ensuring these 'critical inputs' were delivered to each victim it was assumed this would lead to increased satisfaction, even though there was evidence available to suggest this may not be the case. Also, the way the CSRO was implemented within Merseyside Police, with Home Office guidelines being ignored, is questionable. The fact that CSRO was specifically made available to BRM victims suggests there was an element of gaming taking place with regards to the performance data, in an attempt to construct improved BRM victim satisfaction data. Therefore, it can be asked whether Merseyside Police's actions were focused on the improvement of trust and confidence amongst BRM communities or

more concerned with the specific performance indicator they were being measured by?

5. Methodology

Introduction

The overall aim of this chapter is to present an account of the methods employed within my research. This research has sought to explore the impact Merseyside Police's approach to narrowing the BRM satisfaction gap performance indicator had on both victims of crime and the police organisation. This has been undertaken by examining the service provided and managerial processes used, through the eyes of both Merseyside Police staff and victims of crime. The research provides an evaluation of the service provided and whether those policies employed by Merseyside Police resulted in an improved service for the victim or was more concerned with the performance data being produced.

Other studies have explored the impact of police policies and actions on public satisfaction, trust and confidence in the police. However, Hinds (2009, p58 - 59), Weitzer and Tuch (2005, p284) and Skogan (2005, p301) all used a written or telephone survey of residents, selected at random, to collect their data, whilst Brandl et al (1994) obtained their data from a panel study. By nature of these data collection approaches their research has explored public satisfaction via any incidents of contact, both public or police initiated, with the police (Hinds 2009). Therefore, their research was unable to specifically focus on the experience of the victim of crime and how that impacted on satisfaction.

The research for this thesis had direct access to the recorded interviews of victims of crime, completed by the monthly Merseyside Police victim satisfaction survey, along with further access to the officers and police staff implementing the policies. It has allowed for a unique examination of the level of victim satisfaction with a police service which had, according to Merseyside Police, been designed specifically to improve BRM victims level of satisfaction and thereby narrow their satisfaction gap.

After much deliberating, the following research question was established.

Why is Merseyside Police trying to narrow the BRM satisfaction gap?

- i) How have Merseyside Police tried to measure the gap?
- ii) How have Merseyside Police tried to reduce the gap?
- iii) What sense, if any, have police officers and 'victims' made of these processes?
- iv) Has there been improved levels of service that benefited the victim or was the performance data constructed by organisational processes?

Research aim and background

The research project was initially commenced with the intention of identifying issues and tactics which would assist Merseyside Police to narrow the BRM satisfaction gap. It was approved via a Bramshill Fellowship, by the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA), who placed an expectation that it would contribute towards the improvement of public administration and the question of what works. As explained in the previous chapter, the BRM satisfaction gap

was considered an important performance indicator by Merseyside Police. This resulted in policies being implemented that were intended to narrow the gap and thereby improve performance in comparison to other police forces. The research initially examined these policies, however, it soon became apparent that a more critical approach towards the principle and survey methodology of the BRM satisfaction gap was required. This was explained to the NPIA, via the annual progress report which I had to submit to Bramshill Police College, and an agreement was obtained to allow the research to develop in the way deemed appropriate by myself, the researcher. However, at the end of 2012, the NPIA was disbanded as part of the austerity measures (NPIA 2013), with their responsibilities being transferred to the Home Office and the newly formed College of Policing. From that date on no further annual updates were requested from me and, even though contacted, the College of Policing expressed no interest with this research. Fortunately, Merseyside Police continued to provide support and allowed access to the necessary data. An annual update was provided to them, for partial funding purposes, up until my retirement in September 2015. These updates described the progress and direction the research was taking and highlighted any issues that needed addressing. However, there was no further evaluation, direction, or indeed interference, given by Merseyside Police to this research.

Rosenbaum (2010) states there are two different approaches to research within the police organisation. The first is the critical police research approach, which has been conducted by outside institutions and academics looking inward to the organisation. This, Reiner (2010) says, can result in researchers

questioning police decision-making without having detailed knowledge of the internal and external constraints at play. The second approach is the policy police research tradition which gained support during NPM (Rosenbaum 2010). This is driven by a belief that science can, and should, improve public administration and allows researchers to increasingly apply scientific methods to answer the question of what works in policing.

The NPIA initially requested the policy police research approach be applied to this research. However, following representations to Bramshill Police College I was able to take the, more appropriate, critical police research approach to complete this thesis.

Social Constructivism

Taylor (2000) says social constructionists argue there are no 'real facts' which exist independently of systems of ideas or discourse, whilst Delanty and Strydom (2003) state social constructivism advances the claim that science is constructed by social actors. This, they say, can focus on the internal practices of an enterprise in which transactions, competition, conflict and negotiations lead to emergent outcomes. Initial data collection for this research suggested that principles of social construction may be at play with regards to the BRM satisfaction gap. When Taylor's (2000) conclusion that social constructionists focus on how certain systems of knowledge and practice can come to dominate others at times, it became apparent this research had to consider the principle of the construction of knowledge. When this was added to the views of Bevan and Hood (2006), discussed in chapter four, regarding the performance regime

resulting from NPM, it was concluded that it was a relevant consideration for this research.

However, the issue of performance construction and whether there was gaming of performance figures taking place, described as inevitable by Bevan and Hood (2006), was only identified as an issue for this research once the data gathering process started.

The researcher

When I commenced this research, I was a serving police officer within Merseyside Police. Due to the critical research approach taken, it became apparent there was a need to carefully consider my position and relationship both as a researcher and as a police officer, before the appropriate research methods could be approved by both the University of Liverpool and Merseyside Police.

Brown (1995) presents four relationships that a researcher can have with the organisation when researching the police. 'Inside-insiders' refer to in-house police research; 'outside-insiders' to former police officer academics; 'inside-outsiders' are academically qualified support staff working within police organisations research departments, and 'outside-outsiders' are external commentators on matters of police and policing. Brown (1995) states that with regards to both critical police research and policy police research approaches, both positions have their strengths and weaknesses. However, there is a need to take care in matching the correct relationship with the type of research to

reduce problems when considering the purpose of a specific piece of police research.

When considering these relationships, this research appears to have started in a somewhat unique position. As already mentioned, when the research proposal was submitted I was leading the 'Citizen Focus' team in the Liverpool North BCU of Merseyside Police. My initial proposal was connected to developing empirical evidence for increasing BRM victim satisfaction. This had been supported by the NPIA who considered the proposal of interest to them. Therefore, I was very much an insider. However, even at this stage it is questionable that the research could have been considered 'in-house' as it was being supervised by an outside academic institution. The loss of NPIA interest at the end of 2012 further supported this view. Likewise, the label of 'outside-insider' appeared initially inappropriate since, up until retirement, I was a serving police officer who was completing a piece of academic research. However, once retired and with no further interest from the NPIA or Merseyside Police, this relationship became the dominating one.

The lack of ability to initially pigeon-hole this research into one of Brown's four categories now appears unimportant. However, it did highlight the position this research was in, a fact that needs to be remembered when considering the data collected processes. Punch (1989) states the police organisation is the most difficult part of the criminal justice system to complete academic research in, whilst Reiner (2010) adds that one of the biggest challenges for a researcher of the police is to understand and account for the organisational culture. He

suggests failure to do this will inevitably result in research producing criticism due to lack of understanding. Having been part of the police organisation for 30 years it appears appropriate to assume some knowledge of police culture. However, I was aware care had to be taken to ensure inaccurate, reflexive assumptions, resulting from being exposed to this culture for 30 years, were not made to simplistically triangulate and confirm the data obtained.

Ethics and access to data

Consideration had to be given to the ethical position of this research due to the nature of the data being gathered and assessed. The use of recorded victim of crime interviews, obtained by a private survey company, had to be carefully thought through, along with the access I was given to police staff and policy and performance documentation.

Brewer (2007) states research involving participants or subjects who are, or perceive themselves as being, in a less powerful position as the interviewer or in some cases are vulnerable and open to abuse, can prove difficult to deal with as an ethical issue. This research considered four of his principles to address these risks and ensure data was used ethically.

1. Those who are particularly vulnerable should be treated with special care.

The satisfaction survey conducted by Merseyside Police ensured that vulnerable victims did not participate. Victims under the age of 18 or with an identified mental disability were excluded from the survey. Also, victims of

domestic violence were omitted from the survey process due to the risks that subsequent police contact could put them under.

2. Potential participants should be informed of the nature and purpose of the research and their consent should be obtained.

Consent from all participants was obtained prior to an interview or focus group. The satisfaction surveys conducted for Merseyside Police asked the victim at the end of the interview if they were prepared to have their findings shared and to receive further contact. If a person declined, then all their personal details remained anonymous to Merseyside Police. Therefore, the initial survey process, used by the private survey company, obtained consent from the victim of crime for the use of this secondary data.

3. If anonymity or confidentiality is offered or requested, then any such offer or request must be strictly honoured subject to any legal requirements that may enforce disclosure.

All participants were required to sign participant consent and information sheets that guaranteed anonymity and explained that participation was voluntary. No person declined to take part.

4. Research activity must be such that it will not damage the reputation of any institution, sponsor or supervisor.

Although the research produced findings that are critical of Merseyside Police, this will not result in damage to the organisation but provide a learning opportunity. The fact that this research was initially approved under a Bramshill

Fellowship indicates the organisation was prepared to learn from such academic research which has been produced by a critical research approach.

However, to ensure these issues were fully addressed I submitted a further research proposal to Merseyside Police once an initial methodology had been decided. This highlighted the access required to members of staff and documentation needed to complete the research. It was approved by the Area Commander of Liverpool North BCU, who further confirmed access to the victim satisfaction surveys was permitted, but stipulated the recordings were to remain on police premises with only pseudonyms written transcripts being removed. This was fully complied with. Once this agreement was in place, then ethical approval for this research was successfully obtained from the University of Liverpool.

Westmarland (2001) raised the problem of the researcher identifying inappropriate behaviour whilst gathering data within the police organisation. Initially I had considered this not to be a dilemma as my role as a supervisor within the police would take precedence. However, when this was fully considered I decided this initial position was not tenable as it would have to be declared to all participants prior to the commencement of the focus group and interviews. The consequences of this, and the impact it may have had on the quality of data being obtained appeared too great to produce meaningful research. Indeed, when considering the issues raised by Macpherson (1999) in relation to institutional racism and the reason for the lack of trust and confidence in the police, I decided this initial stance could not be taken. The organisationally unacceptable attitudes and views, which I needed to access to

answer the research question, may not have been forthcoming from participants. Thus, participant anonymity had to be guaranteed to obtain both quality data and ethical approval from the University.

Fortunately, any potential dilemma regarding the nature of the data being obtained never materialised with the integrity of this research being maintained. However, I acknowledge that as a police officer, disclosure of certain views and information by participants could have placed me in a difficult position.

Research approaches

Due to my place within the organisation and the type of data I had access to, the use of a case study approach was considered appropriate as it appeared to address the aims and overall requirements of the research question. Yin (2009) states the need for a case study arises out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena. It allows researchers to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events, such as individual life cycles, small group behaviour, organisational and managerial processes, neighbourhood change, organisational performance, international relations and the maturation of industries, whilst examining individual data. This appeared relevant when considering the research and the need to consider the impact of policy design and implementation, along with the impact this may have on police officers and victims of crime. May (2001) supported this by stating that a case study allows for a mixture of methods which can provide a contemporary account of social life but make no claims to be representative, as they involve the detailed examination of a single example of something. However, case

studies can still be used to develop more general theoretical statements about regularities in social structure and process by falsifying a general theory about social life.

The use of a case study approach appeared a particularly relevant way of analysing and presenting the individual victim satisfaction surveys. However, I was mindful that Brewer (2007) warns a case study may be used to construct a predetermined answer with results being presented more as a research diary than a piece of critical research. Again, I was aware that assumptions on service delivery and what the organisation believed a victim wanted were embedded within me which I needed to challenge on victim by victim process. I formed the opinion that a case study would allow me to do this.

Yin (2009) proposes four broad research approaches to complete a case study, which all include the desire to analyse the contextual conditions in relation to the case. These are:

- 1) Single-case holistic (single-unit of analysis)
- 2) Single-case embedded (multiple units of analysis)
- 3) Multiple-case holistic (single unit of analysis within each case)
- 4) Multiple-case holistic (multiple units of analysis within each case)

Having considered the research question, it was decided to adopt a single-case study approach to complete the research. This is in line with Yin's (2009) views as Merseyside Police could be considered the main unit of research that

influenced the context which, in this case, had other smaller units involved, such as the policies and intentions of Merseyside Police, the interpretation of the officer and the opinions of the victim. Therefore Yin's 'Single-case embedded (multiple units of analysis) seemed the most appropriate approach for this research.

Data Collection Process

Chapter four described the process whereby Merseyside Police used a monthly victim satisfaction survey to obtain performance data to measure the BRM satisfaction gap. At the start of this research I established that, once victim confidentiality and data protection issues were satisfied, I would be allowed access, by Merseyside Police, to the individual recorded interviews of the victims. This presented a unique opportunity to respond to the research question. After identifying the other sources of information needed to contribute to the survey interviews, it was decided that a mixed method data collection approach was required. The methods used were semi-structured interviews, analysis of secondary data and focus groups. This permitted the triangulation of data to ensure comparison between the different elements of the research. Such an approach is supported by Gilbert (2008) who agrees with the principle of using mixed methods as a way of increasing accuracy of research findings and the level of confidence in them, and agrees that triangulation is a way of ensuring this.

Semi-structured interviews

Initially I obtained copies of the policy and advisory Home Office documents, which were believed to inform Merseyside Police's decision and policy making processes. These, along with other available literature produced by Merseyside Police, referred to in chapter four, were reviewed. However, there was clearly a need to understand the context of how and why Merseyside Police decided to take certain courses of action. This required information from those people who were present when policies and initiatives were first designed and implemented. However, this also identified a problem with regards to sourcing some documents that had produced policy decisions and actions. My position as an 'insider' and my closeness to the subject matter assisted with solving most of these issues. My requests for copies of documents were complied with once it was explained why they were needed. However, a further review of this literature highlighted that the reasons why certain decisions were made had not been documented within them. Therefore, the need to conduct a series of face-to-face interviews, with the key people involved in policy making and implementation of the BRM satisfaction gap, was identified.

The interview subjects

Due to my involvement with the Citizen Focus agenda within Merseyside Police, I was aware of some individuals who had been involved with policy design and implementation. However, due to the ethical requirement of anonymity for this research, it is not possible to include too many details of the interviewees who took part. They were members of relatively small teams within Merseyside Police, comprising police officers and support staff, who obtained high profiles

within the organisation due to the work they were completing. I was concerned that due to my position within the Citizen Focus agenda, my lack of anonymity may restrict the interviewee’s honesty, as warned by May (2001), during any face-to-face interview. Consideration was given to using a more appropriate third party to complete them. However, this was quickly dismissed as any ability to probe and develop answers given by the interviewee would have been removed. Therefore, with this concern in mind, a semi-structured interview approach was decided to be the most appropriate method to obtain the required data as it would allow the flexibility to ask follow-up questions to develop the necessary lines of investigation.

Those police officers and members of police staff initially interviewed are described in the following table. As mentioned previously, the description of their role is limited to maintain anonymity:

Table 5.1: List of initial one to one interviews

	Position	Role
Supt 1	Superintendent	Responsible for designing and implementing corporate policies intended to narrow the BRM satisfaction gap. At the time of the interview the subject was retired.
Supt 2	Superintendent	Responsible for the Citizen Focus performance within a BCU and for implementing the policies set by the corporate team. At the time of the interview the subject was still a serving officer.

Interviewee 4	Support Staff	Responsible for analysing the victim satisfaction survey data, challenging the quality of the data and ensuring the way it was being used complied with organisational policy and Home Office guidelines.
Interviewee 5	Support Staff	Responsible for obtaining the victim satisfaction survey data from the private company. This is gathered in line with Home Office guidelines.

However, during each of the four interviews the name of another person was mentioned as being influential with policy design. Therefore, a fifth interview was completed.

Table 5.2: Subsequent one to one interview

	Position	Role
Supt 3	Superintendent	Responsible for the Citizen Focus performance within a BCU prior to the interview. At the time of the interview the subject was still a serving police officer but had moved on from Citizen Focus.

The specific key areas to be covered was decided prior to each interview, with the interviewee being asked further questions depending on the data they provided. Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1992) suggest that a major advantage of this semi-structured approach is to allow greater control over data gathering than a general conversation of the subject matter would. However, it still allows for a broader data gathering process than a fully structured interview.

The semi-structured interview allowed me to ensure respondents provided answers to questions in the appropriate sequence as it provided the opportunity to probe those answers which I believed to be insufficient. This probing ensured May's (2001) concerns regarding an interviewee's honesty was never an overt issue during the subsequent triangulation process of data analysis. However, concern was recorded during the interview of Supt 3 regarding the data he was providing me. This will be further discussed later in this chapter when the issue of reflexivity is considered.

Analysis of secondary data

Merseyside Police were interviewing approximately 240 victims of crime each month via the private market research company. Each interview was recorded, with the knowledge of the participant, by the survey company and personal details were only then passed onto Merseyside Police if the victim expressed permission. Once a monthly dataset had been received from the company by the corporate marketing team, the data was circulated to each BCU who were required to research their dissatisfied victims. This was to account for poor performance by identifying mistakes made by officers, and provide explanations, to the performance management process.

At that time, Liverpool North BCU was receiving approximately 12 dissatisfied BRM victims of crime every 6 months. This appeared to be both a meaningful, but realistic, number of victims to analyse over an acceptable period of time. Therefore, the date of 1st January 2013 was set from which all dissatisfied BRM

victims, who had agreed for the details to be disclosed to Merseyside Police, were selected until 12 victims were obtained. This took until June 2013.

Initially a baseline for the dataset was established that allowed ethnicity, age, sex and the type of crime they were the victim to be established. Table 5.4 refers to this and shows which stage of service each victim was particularly dissatisfied with. This has been graded against the scale of measurement as listed in table 5.3:

Table 5.3 List of VSS abbreviations

Completely satisfied	CS	Completely dissatisfied	CD
Very satisfied	VS	Very dissatisfied	VD
Fairly satisfied	FS	Fairly dissatisfied	FD
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	N	Don't know	DK

Table 5.4 List of surveyed dissatisfied BRM victims

No	Ethnicity	Age	Sex	Crime	E of C	Actions	Follow	Invest	Treat	Whole
1	Black or Black British	16 to 24	M	Racist	Skipped	FD	FS	FD	CS	FS
2	Black or Black British	25 to 34	M	Racist	Skipped	CD	CD	CD	CS	CD
3	Asian or Asian British	16 to 24	F	Racist	CS	CD	FD	VD	DK	VD
4	Black or Black British	25 to 34	F	Racist	FS	N	VD	VD	VS	FD
5	Asian or Asian British	35 to 44	M	Racist	FS	CD	CD	VD	CS	CD
6	Black or Black British	25 to 34	M	Racist	CS	CD	CD	CD	FS	CD
7	Black or Black British	25 to 34	M	Racist	VD	VD	CD	VD	N	VD
8	Black or Black British	25 to 34	M	Violence	Skipped	FD	CD	VD	FS	VD
9	Black or Black British	25 to 34	M	Burglary	CD	FD	FD	FD	CS	FD
10	Black or Black British	Refused	M	Racist	CD	CD	CD	CD	FD	FD
11	Black or Black British	45 to 54	M	Racist	FS	FS	FD	DK	FS	FS
12	Asian or Asian British	45 to 54	M	Racist	Skipped	CD	VD	CD	CS	CD

Once a list of dissatisfied victims had been established, then 12 satisfied victims were identified to provide a comparison. Again, the date of 1st January 2013 was selected and from there victims, with as similar demographics as possible,

were selected. There were more satisfied victims to select from and thus the dataset was completed within the first three months of 2013.

Table 5.5 List of surveyed satisfied BRM victims

No	Ethnicity	Age	Sex	Crime	E of C	Actions	Follow	Invest	Treat	Whole
1	Asian or Asian British	45 to 54	M	Racist	CS	CS	FS	FS	CS	CS
2	Black or Black British	55 to 65	M	Racist	CS	CS	VS	VS	VS	CS
3	Black or Black British	16 to 24	M	Racist	FS	CS	CS	CS	CS	CS
4	Black or Black British	16 to 24	F	Racist	VS	CS	VS	VS	CS	VS
5	Black or Black British	25 to 34	F	Racist	VS	VS	VS	VS	VS	CS
6	Black or Black British	25 to 34	M	Racist	Skipped	CS	CS	CS	CS	CS
7	Mixed White & Asian	16 to 24	M	Racist	VS	FS	CS	VS	CS	VS
8	Mixed and other Mixed	25 to 34	F	Racist	FS	FS	FS	N	VS	VS
9	Asian or Asian British	25 to 34	M	Violence	Skipped	VS	CS	CS	CS	CS
10	Asian or Asian British	25 to 34	M	Burglary	VS	CS	VS	VS	CS	VS
11	Black or Black British	25 to 34	M	Violence	Skipped	CS	VS	CS	VS	VS
12	Black or Black British	35 to 44	M	Vehicle	VS	CS	VS	CS	CS	CS

Once all 24 victims were identified and individual transcripts were made of each taped interview, based on the set Home Office script (appendix 1), I prepared a summary explaining the details behind the crime, the survey results, the victim survey experience and any issues which had been identified. Finally, once this was completed the issues that each victim had highlighted were listed and tracked across all victim surveys to establish if there were any common themes. These are presented in table 5.6 with the issues grouped into three emerging problems: the private company's survey methodology (Survey), concerns highlighted by the victim (Victim), and finally issues with the service provided (Service).

Table 5.6 Emerging themes from VSS transcripts

Issue	Theme	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7	V8	V9	V10	V11	V12	Total
Speed of interview	Survey	Y		Y					Y		Y		Y	5
Interviewer reflexivity	Survey			Y									Y	2
Not reporting what was said	Survey			Y					Y	Y	Y		Y	5
Interviewing the wrong subject	Survey						Y							1
Interviewer leads the subject	Survey	Y		Y										2
Crime not fitting the survey script	Survey							Y			Y		Y	3
Attitude of the interviewee	Victim			Y										1
Would not report a similar offence again	Victim		Y			Y					Y			3
Previous low opinion of police	Victim		Y					Y			Y			3
Interviewee does not understand the process	Victim	Y				Y	Y				Y			4
Interviewee wanted to talk	Victim			Y		Y		Y	Y		Y			5
Interviewee talking about different offence	Victim		Y											1
Need of the subject / language	Victim	Y				Y			Y		Y			4
Poor police attendance	Service		Y		Y			Y		Y				4
Not keeping victim informed / updated	Service			Y		Y	Y		Y		Y	Y	Y	7
Police not keeping promises	Service		Y					Y		Y				3
CRSO process from SIGMA	Service						Y						Y	2
Police not taking the matter seriously	Service				Y		Y							2
Good individual treatment but poor general	Service				Y					Y				2
Expectations of CCTV	Service	Y				Y	Y		Y				Y	5
General policing issues	Service					Y								1

Focus groups

Face-to-face interviews, with the key members of staff, provided data explaining how policy was designed and implemented. It also provided a narrative for the subsequent performance management process and the way in which the gaming of performance figures occurred. The victim satisfaction surveys provided data regarding how the policies had impacted on the victim of crime. However, to fully answer the research question there was a need to obtain the views of those officers who were tasked with the direct delivery of service to the BRM victim of crime.

However, to gather this data the use of the previous semi-structured interview method did not appear appropriate. To examine how police officers had delivered the stages of services, as measured by the Home Office (2008b), there were separate police departments, responsible for service delivery, which required separate research. Invariably, it was the uniformed officer who provided the initial response to a report of crime and was therefore more responsible for the 'initial response' and 'actions taken' stage of service, whereas 'follow-up' was more likely to be delivered by the Criminal Investigation Department (CID). Also, it was important to garner the views of the police officers' first line managers, Sergeants, who were responsible for ensuring policy and direction was turned into meaningful service for the BRM victim of crime.

Rowe (2004), Brain (2010) and Jackson et al (2013) all comment on police officer culture and how this can impact on the way victims of crime are treated. Likewise, Macpherson (1999) referred to institutional racism as a collective issue within the organisation. This suggested a need for this research to canvass more than an individual's view from each of the three groups in order to obtain representative data. Therefore, the research method to be used had to establish the general opinion of each group to provide comment on the service being provided. May (2001) states a focus group method can experience 'group think' whereby the group arrives at a consensus with individual contrary views being stifled. Although this can be presented as a weakness of the method, within this research context the consensus view was

the required narrative. Therefore, I decided to use focus groups to gather this third element of data, with the following sessions being conducted.

Table 5.7 Focus group participation

Type of focus groups	Number of participants
Constables: Response Officers	8
Sergeants: Neighbourhood Teams	3
CID: Investigation	6

The number of participants who took part was a result of those officers who were available and willing to take part at the given time of the focus group. I had decided there was a need for minimum figures to ensure sufficient views were obtained. I considered these to be four for the Constables and CID groups and two for the Sergeants. The actual attendance exceeded this requirement.

Data Analysis

Once the interviews and focus groups had been completed, consideration was given to how the data would be analysed. To do this a five-step process, which had been suggested by McCracken (1988) and Krueger and Casey (2008) was used. This resulted in;

1. Familiarisation: Each interview and focus group recording was transcribed and read through at least two times so I become familiar with the text.
2. Identifying a thematic framework: I then noted ideas and concepts in the margin of each transcript to develop possible categories.

3. Indexing: The ideas and concepts from the interviews and focus groups were separately grouped under headings and compared. This resulted in three categories being identified.
4. Charting: I then lifted the quotes from the original text and re-arranged them under three themes which had been identified.
5. Analysis: The quotes were then compared against the key issues discussed within the literature review, and the three themes highlighted by the victim satisfaction survey data, to identify specific themes or groupings which would contribute to answering the research question.

The three themes identified by this process were: knowledge which related to that of the individual officer and organisation; performance which highlighted how the focus on performance within the organisation influenced policy; and tactics and attitude of those dealing with victims of crime and service; which is related to how the police organisational activity impacted on the victim and whether it lead to an improvement in trust and confidence. These stood alongside the three themes of survey, victim and service which had been identified by analysis of the victim satisfaction survey and all six contributed to the three analysis chapters of this thesis.

Reflexivity

Throughout the data collection process, the issue of my own reflexivity needed to be considered. Delanty and Strydom (2003) warn that reflexivity is a concern for the social scientist as it can greatly taint the data which is gathered. As a

serving police officer, this warning appeared relevant as the research involved interviewing staff of both higher and lower rank to myself. To address this, at the start of each interview and focus group I emphasised the research was being completed for academic purposes and, although initially it had been sponsored by a Bramshill Fellowship, there was no requirement for the data to be shared with Merseyside Police. Each participant was also supplied with a participant consent form and information sheet which explained the voluntary nature of their participation and guaranteed anonymity. However, I remained aware that the rank structure of the police organisation could still have an influence on the quality of the data gathered from each participant.

On reflection, some issues did arise during the data gathering stage. The Sergeants focus group appeared to start as a job interview process, with those present trying to impress or compete by providing all of their knowledge on the subject matter. This resulted in the group making errors on key principles of the BRM satisfaction gap. However, the nature of the focus group method allowed me to ask further questions which clarified some of the confusion they initially created. Likewise, the interviews with the three Superintendents highlighted another reflexive issue. I was aware that in these interviews I was the junior officer, even though at the time of the first interview the participant had recently retired. However, two of the three interviews created an impression of an expectation for me to accept the information they provided without question. I noted this may not have been the case had the participants been interviewed by an independent researcher. The interview with the final Superintendent commenced with a sense of an assumption on their part that I lacked

knowledge regarding the subject matter compared to them, and resulted in a feeling being talked down to. However, this did change as the interview developed and will be commented on again in chapter six.

Thus, although reflexivity was a constant consideration during these two aspects of data collection, it did not prove to be a big problem. Adkins (2002) questions the proposed importance of certain aspects of reflexivity as concern for this can destabilise the relations between text and reader, author and text and researcher and social life. Thus, although accounted for, the question of reflexivity did not hinder the data gathering process for this research.

Summary

This chapter has looked at the methods used to carry out this research and explained how it was completed as a single-case study with multiple units of analysis. These units were face-to-face semi structured interviews, focus groups and the analysis of secondary data and were selected as being deemed the most appropriate way of obtaining the necessary data to answer the research question.

The chapter has further described the consideration given to problems of conducting research within the police organisation and the position I found myself in when completing this piece of critical research whilst still being part of the police organisation. The careful consideration given to the ethical issues involved in the research were further discussed, along with the unique opportunity of completing the research by accessing both victim satisfaction

surveys and serving police officers. The chapter also considered the dilemma which a serving police officer may have whilst completing academic research and the necessity to provide anonymity for the participants was highlighted. Finally, this chapter considered the problem of reflexivity and concluded that an awareness of, and personal reflection on, reflexivity addressed those concerns which were present.

Chapter six will now look at how the BRM satisfaction gap became an important performance indicator for Merseyside Police. It will question whether this was as result of the Macpherson Report (1999) or whether the focus came from other organisational requirements. It will conclude that the warnings received regarding the validity of the performance indicator were ignored, thereby allowing for the implementation of questionable policies for the BRM victim of crime.

Chapter 6: Delivering ‘satisfaction’ or the ticking of boxes?

Introduction

Previous chapters have shown that it is possible to track the development of the BRM satisfaction gap performance indicator (PI) via Home Office Secretary’s Action Plans (1999, 2000, 2001, 2002a), National Policing Plans (Home Office 2002, 2003, 2004a) and the Citizen Focus good practice guide (Home Office 2006) back to the Macpherson report (1999). Such an apparent clear line of policy development would suggest that a similar process should be identifiable within Merseyside Police’s policy design and implementation. This chapter will consider whether Merseyside Police policy was driven by knowledge, evidence and governmental direction or whether other motivations were evident. It will further examine how Home Office guidance produced a victim satisfaction survey which did not necessarily deliver quality data which measured the BRM satisfaction gap. The chapter will conclude that it was the improvement of performance figures rather than a desire to improve victim satisfaction which was the motivating factor for Merseyside Police.

Why did Merseyside Police focus on the BRM satisfaction gap?

Chapter two pointed out that Bowling and Philips (2003) labelled the recommendations contained within the Macpherson Report as the most extensive program of reform in the history of relationships between police and BRM communities. Likewise, Rowe (2004) described the Macpherson Report as a seminal moment in British race relations which produced a collective

response that showed reform would no longer be stifled, with a raft of targets, pledges, and activity. This then pointed to a process by which public trust and confidence could be secured (Rowe 2004). The apparent enormity of these recommendations were added to by former Prime Minister Tony Blair when during Prime Minister's Questions, he stated the Government's sincerity as law makers was not how well sympathy to the Lawrence family could be expressed, but how well they implemented the recommendations to make sure such a crime never happened again (Mayberry 2008). Such strong words from both academics and politicians would suggest there was clear direction given to each police force as to when and how the recommendations should be implemented. Indeed, as table 6.1 shows, a clear time line can be developed to illustrate how the BRM satisfaction gap performance indicator was developed as policy and came to the attention of Merseyside Police. When considering this along with the guidance provided by "The Citizen Focus Good Practice Guide" (Home Office 2006) regarding how the individual citizen or victim, and the increase in their confidence, would be a focus for the police, an assumption can be made that policy design and implementation was carefully planned.

Table 6.1**Key events for the BRM Satisfaction Gap Performance Indicator**

Year	Event
Feb 1999	Publication of the Macpherson report
March 1999	Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Home Secretary's Action Plan
1999 / 2000	The Ministerial Priority is added to the 3 statutory objectives for the police
2000	Home Secretary Action Plan progress report published stating the Ministerial Priority was set
2001	Home Secretary Action Plan progress report published which stated that increasing trust and confidence in policing amongst BRM communities would be one of only two Ministerial priorities
2002	Home Secretary Action Plan progress report published and proposed the group should change and work thematically in an "audit and inspection" style
2002	National Policing Plan 2003-06 published containing the Home Office Public Service agreement to improve confidence with the Criminal Justice System including that of BRM communities
2003	Home Secretary Action Plan progress report published which decided not to focus on what had been achieved but to 'look forward'
2003	National Policing Plan 2004-07 introduced PPAF and proposed a statutory indicator of user satisfaction from BRM victims of racist incidents
2004	Statutory instruments No 644: Police Authorities (Best Value) Performance Indicators set a comparison of satisfaction for white users and users from visible minority ethnic groups
2004	National Policing Plan 2005-08 stated work to increase satisfaction of victims and witnesses would have a significant impact on targets relating to confidence in the Criminal Justice System
November 2004	Building Communities, Beating Crime. A better police service for the 21 st Century is published by the Home Office
April 2006	Citizen Focus Good Practice Guide published stating the need of individuals and communities would be reflected in policing
March 2008	Statutory Instruments No 659: Police Authorities (Best Value) Performance Indicators established SPI 1.2 from 2008 /09
March 2008	Guidance on Statutory Performance Indicators for Policing and Community Safety: 2008 / 09 published
June 2008	Definitions & Survey Guidance for APACS Measures of User Satisfaction 2008 / 09 published
July 2008	Policing Pledge introduced intending to build on the principles of Citizen Focus Policing
2009	Introduction of single confidence figure
2010	Introduction of austerity and abolition of Policing Pledge

Merseyside Police Citizen Focus Team

In 2005, the report from Her Majesty Inspectorate of Constabularies, A Review on the 'Fitness for purpose' of the Current Structure of policing in England and Wales (O'Connor 2005), was published to examine the feasibility of merging police forces across the United Kingdom. The intention of the report was to ensure the UK police service was 'fit for purpose' in the 21st century. Many of the principles contained within it were then adopted by the New Labour government, which tasked every police force to examine the possibility of organisational mergers with suitable neighbouring forces (Brain 2010, pp 364 - 373).

To progress this, Merseyside Police formed a project team, led by an Assistant Chief Constable (ACC), to examine the options available to the organisation. However, due to certain failings with the initial report and a change in political appetite, the programme was cancelled in the summer of 2006 making the Merseyside Police project team, along with the ACC, without a meaningful role. As Supt 1 explained, this proved important in Merseyside Police for the subsequent BRM satisfaction gap:

"This force mergers fell off the perch and there was this team of people there who had nothing to do. You had an ACC who basically didn't have a portfolio and (at a Merseyside Police ACPO away day) the ACC said one of the areas that they thought we were vulnerable was looking at victims, victim satisfaction isn't good. They fought their corner, cause there were people there who were

against it, but in the end they persuaded (the Chief Constable) to say right you can have a Citizen Focus portfolio.”

(Supt 1)

If the proposals by the ACC were as a result of knowledge of government direction then it seems strange why other ACC's were against the proposal. This interview placed this meeting at some stage during 2006 and as table 6.1 shows, the Citizen Focus Good Practice Guide was published in April 2006. Therefore, regardless of Supt 1 citing the term 'Citizen Focus portfolio' it is not possible to definitively say whether the ACC's suggestion was a personal opinion or driven by knowledge of future government direction. The described reaction of other ACPO members may suggest it was the former. Supt 1 explained the ACC had become aware that for several years previously, Merseyside Police had been producing and collating victim satisfaction survey data in response to the requirements of the ACPO Quality of Service committee and the then government's Citizens' Charter of 1991 (Brain 2010, p188). However, although this survey data was still being circulated on a regular basis across the organisation, Supt 1 stated it was not generating any meaningful activity to improve service delivery. Supt 1 also pointed out that the ACC had formed an opinion there was no visible work being completed by any police organisation on a national level to address the specific subject of improving victim satisfaction. Therefore, this resulted in the disbandment of the 'force mergers team' being viewed as an opportunity for Merseyside Police to take a national lead on the subject of victim satisfaction. However, when Citizen Focus

policing was introduced, was there clear direction provided by the Home Office to implement this policy within Merseyside Police? Supt 1 admits:

“We stumbled across it and what happened was that it was more by good fortune that we had a dedicated ACC, that was the key, having a dedicated ACC who had a dedicated team of people”

(Supt 1)

Supt 2 expressed the view that the ACC who introduced Citizen Focus policing had a real desire to understand the issues involved with victim satisfaction and improve the service being provided. Interviewee 5 agreed and acknowledged that no one was taking any interest in the victim satisfaction survey until this ACC did. However, the above narrative questions the way the subject was introduced. The previous Home Office publications “Building Communities, Beating Crime” (Home Office 2004a) and “Citizen Focus Good Practice Guide” (Home Office 2006) suggests the issue of citizen focus policing, and that of victim satisfaction, would have some profile amongst the senior officers in Merseyside Police. However, the narrative provided suggests this was not the case, but instead was reliant on good fortune and an individual ACC seizing an opportunity. So how did Merseyside Police develop their policy design and implementation?

How did Merseyside Police respond?

It is apparent from the interviews completed with the three Superintendents that once it was decided to invest in Citizen Focus policing there was a need

identified, within the organisation, to develop an understanding and improve knowledge of the principles of citizen focus and victim satisfaction. It was accepted that Merseyside Police were starting from a position of ignorance. The new Citizen Focus department completed a 'strategic analysis' which identified six key areas that could hinder the improvement of victim satisfaction. These were Traffic, Anti-Social Behaviour, Actions Taken, Further Contact, Call Handling and finally the BRM Satisfaction Gap. Supt 1 explained that each area was allocated a lead, with the BRM satisfaction gap being given to Supt 3, who had already introduced a 'customer service recovery opportunity' (CSRO) process for victims of crime in their own BCU. The principles behind this will be discussed at length in chapter six, however Supt 3 stated that they were unsure about how the task related to victim satisfaction:

"The thing (BRM satisfaction) was to manage disproportionately if one accepts the premise that the BRM person is always going to be less satisfied or likely to be less satisfied than a white person because of history of racism, discrimination in society, and I am not just talking about the police, a feeling of being less."

Supt 3

Supt 3 view seems to agree with Rowe (2004), Hinds and Murphy (2007) and Skogan (2005) who suggest satisfaction amongst BRM communities is produced by influences other than the service provided as a consequence of being a victim. However, Supt 3 did not go so far as to agree with Keenan's (2009) view that the satisfaction gap amongst BRM communities may become

acceptable for the police service due to the underlying causes being wider than a policing remit. Even though, Supt 3 still had concerns that were not formally expressed within the organisation. Therefore, policy activity relating to victim satisfaction in general continued to focus only on the immediately deliverable service to the victim. This resulted in Merseyside Police being solely reliant on the performance figures produced by the monthly VSS, and thus had to trust the accuracy of the methodology provided by the Home Office (2008b), to provide them with a measure of victim satisfaction.

A performance regime was introduced in Merseyside for the Basic Command Units (BCU) which focused on the whole Citizen Focus agenda, with victim satisfaction performance forming a major part. This will be discussed in more detail in chapter seven, however it should be noted that during 2008 and 2009, victim satisfaction performance, as measured by Merseyside Police, improved across all crime types and stages of service to the point where everything was in fact on target, 'in the green' (Supt 1). Except for the BRM satisfaction gap.

During this time, Interviewee 5 describes how it was Merseyside Police's marketing team who took ownership of the victim satisfaction data being collected by the private customer survey company. Work was completed with their current processes being reviewed. This resulted in the monthly performance reports, that were informing individual BCU's of their performance levels, being adjusted to make them more understandable and 'interactive' for the general police constable. The aim was to ensure all staff could understand

the stages of service and critical inputs as stipulated by the Home Office (2008b).

There then followed a period of intense activity within Merseyside Police, resulting in the setting of policies and working practices that continued up until the end of the research's data gathering phase. All three Superintendents described force wide operations being implemented to address poor performance within the 'actions taken' and 'follow-up' stages of service. The details of these will be discussed in chapter eight. However, it was agreed by the Superintendents that these operations set the tone for how victim satisfaction would be dealt with in Merseyside.

In 2010, Supt 1 explained there was a reshuffle of Merseyside Police's ACC portfolios and a new ACC, with a different approach to victim satisfaction, took over the Citizen Focus department. This apparently resulted in a change of focus for the team and the performance regime, from overall victim satisfaction towards a focus solely on the BRM satisfaction gap. It was said that this became the team's one and only concern, to the apparent cost of all other Citizen Focus performance measures. An opinion formed within the department that the new ACC did not fully understand the organisational processes used to measure victim satisfaction, confidence or other citizen focus matters and thus the stated strategic direction was flawed. However, these concerns were not openly expressed as this change of direction appeared to produce the intended results for the BRM satisfaction gap. Supt 1 stated that by December 2011 this performance indicator was on target for the first time. However, this was to the

detriment of all the other victim satisfaction performance indicators which failed to hit their targets.

Supt 1 stated the change of ACC and subsequent change of focus had resulted in a complete turnaround in organisational performance. This view is important to note. Chapter three proposed an opinion that BRM victim satisfaction is driven by factors other than the service provided by the police at the time of reporting and investigation of the crime (Brandl et al 1994, Skogan 2005, Hinds and Murphy 2007, Hinds 2009). However, all Superintendents described activity within Merseyside Police that focused solely on the stages of service of a crime victim to improve their level of satisfaction. Regardless of the operational or ethical implications of this focused approach, the change in victim satisfaction performance, as described by Supt 1, appears to challenge the view that other factors are at play. How could the performance indicator be turned around if this was not the case? This view will be challenged in chapter seven.

Austerity

The introduction of austerity measures saw Merseyside Police having to implement budget cuts of £64 million between 2010 and 2014 (Liverpool Echo 2014). This resulted in the Citizen Focus department being disbanded in 2012 and victim satisfaction being centralised within the organisation. Both Interviewee 4 and 5 described a process whereby the focus on performance remained, with management processes being adjusted to allow for these changes. The data produced by the victim satisfaction survey continued to be

gathered. However, each BCU was no longer able to rely on central direction from a Citizen Focus department, instead they were required to develop their own tactics in response to the monthly performance figures being produced by the Marketing Department. However, Supt 2 describes this as a period where the BRM satisfaction gap remained as a PI for Merseyside Police but working practices and policies failed to respond and develop from those which had been previously implemented. With the subsequent retirements of several people within the Citizen Focus department and redeployment of others to more 'front line' roles, the Citizen Focus subject knowledge, that Supt 1 stated they had worked hard to obtain, appeared to have been lost.

Merseyside Police and the BRM satisfaction gap

This chapter has so far described how Citizen Focus policing was introduced and implemented within Merseyside Police, and how a change of ACC then produced a dramatic change in recorded performance for the BRM satisfaction gap. However, prior to this, it had been problematic for Merseyside Police. According to Supt 2, this resulted in the BRM satisfaction gap becoming a high-profile performance indicator for the organisation even prior to the change of ACC portfolio in 2010.

Supt 1 explained that in 2008 Merseyside Police Citizen Focus team entered the National Customer Service Awards and won 'Customer Service Team of the Year – Public Service and Education'. The ACC was able to present the award to the Chief Constable at the 'Strategic Leaders', for all of Merseyside Police, the following day. Supt 1 stated the Chief Constable was "gobsmacked"

they had won the award as they were the only police organisation to enter. The ACC then used this opportunity to present organisational data to the Chief Constable that showed performance in relation to all victim satisfaction was, in fact, not good:

“To say the Chief was not a happy chicken is a big under statement and what he said to (Named; Citizen Focus ACC and Force Operations ACC) was I want this sorted.”

(Supt 1)

“Remember his mantra (The Chief Constable) was that we would be the best police force in the country. Well actually if we say we are 6 out of 6 (with regards to victim satisfaction) in our most similar family (of police forces) that flies right in the face of what he was trying to achieve.”

(Supt 1)

Supt 1 further explained that during the planning phase of trying to turn this ‘mantra’ into policy it was identified that Merseyside Police’s performance regarding the BRM satisfaction gap was deemed to be extremely poor and in effect ‘in the red’. This further threatened the Chief Constable’s aim which could not be realised until the gap was addressed. Thus, the Citizen Focus department was tasked with narrowing the BRM satisfaction gap as a contribution to making Merseyside Police the best force in the country.

This narrative presents a view that the BRM satisfaction gap became an important performance indicator, subsequently receiving a great deal of management performance focus, not due to any strategic direction regarding improving the trust and confidence of BRM communities but because it was a performance indicator that was 'in the red' and needed to be turned 'green' in order to be 'the best police force in the country'. Supt 1 agreed with this assessment.

"But that's all we were interested in. We were only interested in the performance survey.... it was never about trust and confidence."

Supt 1

But regardless of this the Citizen Focus department experienced difficulties

"The BRM satisfaction gap was one that we just couldn't make any impression on. At the end of, I think 2008 to 2009, we hit all of our targets apart from the BRM satisfaction gap....so we realised that we had to have a focus on that, we had more or less done the others but we had to have a focus on that."

(Supt 1)

The Citizen Focus Good Practice Guide (Home Office 2006) had proposed drivers of satisfaction for victims following, what they described as, an in-depth quantitative analysis of user satisfaction survey data in four police forces. They stated that forces wishing to improve overall satisfaction should focus efforts and attention on:

- Reassuring the victim;
- Adequately answering the victim's questions;
- Providing any information that is asked for quickly;
- Appearing interested in what the victim says; and
- Returning telephone calls within a reasonable time

Merseyside Police agreed that the principle of targeting 'actions taken' and 'follow up' stages of service, previously discussed as the way of improving overall victim satisfaction, was the appropriate tactic to narrow the BRM satisfaction gap. To assist with this Supt 1, Supt 2 and Interviewee 4 state it was proposed that all BRM victims should receive a 'gold service' from the reporting and investigating officers. Chapter eight will discuss this in detail but, suffice to say, this principle was one of taking a structurally neutral view of the BRM victim, who would then receive a service in relation to 'actions taken' and 'follow-up' which was deemed by the service provider as being faultless and of a 'gold' standard.

Concerns that were ignored

In an effort to further understand their business, Supt 1 explained that in 2009 the Citizen Focus department sought advice from people outside of the organisation;

“(Named academic) who at the time was a Doctor who worked at (Named University) ...and we also bought in (Named) from (national market research organisation) both of which said, the BRM satisfaction gap is a complete and

utter waste of time, don't even bother with it, it doesn't have any statistical significance what so ever. How can you compare victim levels in Merseyside with Northumbria, when Northumbria has hardly got a BRM community?"

(Supt 1)

Supt 1 went on to explain that they further advised him;

"it's just a Government tool to be able to use as part of their spin process. It has no statistical significance what so ever. All the effort that you are putting into this is a waste of time. Why focus on the BRM community when you are doing all this work around victim satisfaction?"

(Supt 1)

Their visit was intended to be more of a reassurance process regarding the policies and tactics already implemented, as the Citizen Focus department believed they had followed the correct course of action by basing them on Home Office guidance. However, it resulted in both parties warning that, in their opinion, the BRM satisfaction gap was a government tool being used to deliver a political message. However, these warnings went unheeded, by both the ACC and the Citizen Focus department, and no consideration was given to any change in policy, even though there was an acceptance of the point being made.

However, other concerns regarding the BRM satisfaction gap and how Merseyside Police tried to narrow it were present and expressed during all of the interviews:

“The Home Office say, it’s a load of bull most of the time, but that’s what they said to me and so my understanding was, ok we are never going to have parity, and I still don’t believe we are going to have parity”

(Supt 3)

“My fear is, and was at the time, that it became more about where we were in league table terms visa vis other forces, rather than really making a difference.”

(Supt 2)

“. it’s (the way the BRM satisfaction gap is measured) biased, it’s trying to make the figures, it’s fudging figures, I understand that completely.”

(Interviewee 5)

“.to me is it because they are ticking a box, not trying to tackle the underlying issues, so are we ticking a box so when it comes back that your BRM gap is this wide, yeah but these people are getting more calls (from the police), what’s that proving, we are not identifying, we are not investigating and identifying the problem, all we are doing is putting things in place which haven’t stopped it.”

(Interviewee 4)

That being said, no interviewee could provide an example of when they escalated their concerns to line managers. Instead there appears to have been

a general acceptance that it was their job to ensure the performance indicator appeared healthy and to ignore their concerns, regardless of how grounded they were with regards to the difference they would make for victims. Indeed, a quote from a focus group appears to sum up the general attitude:

“(What) the Command Team want is the same thing as doing the job properly. The Command Team have their instructions and what they deem is doing it properly is what the Command Team want so it’s the same thing.”

(Sergeant’s Focus Group)

So, the BRM satisfaction gap became an important performance indicator for Merseyside Police. When reading the recommendations contained in the Macpherson Report (1999) along with the tone of the Home Secretary’s action plan (1999) and considering the performance management direction the National Policing Plans (Home Office 2002, 2003, 2004b) and Best Value Performance Indicators (Home Office 2008) took the police service in, this should have been no surprise to the observer. However, the interviews presented a narrative whereby the profile of the performance indicator was increased due to the performance threatening the Chief Constable’s aim of making Merseyside Police the best police force in the country. This is an understandable and admirable goal, which surely every Chief Constable should set. However, when considering the interview content, it appears that a caveat should be added to the end of his aim of “as measured by Home Office performance statistics”. This may seem acceptable to some, and indeed the Sergeant’s focus group presented such a view. However, when the

interviewees are unanimously presenting previously identified concern, but declining to express it to their managers, then the actual effectiveness of those policies being implemented for the victim of crime need to be questioned.

The need to produce quality data

It can be argued that it does not matter how or why the BRM satisfaction gap became important, so long as this was being narrowed and the impact was improving trust and confidence then the outcomes were acceptable. Chapter four explained that the Home Office needed to set common standards nationally to ensure the data being obtained from the victim satisfaction surveys were compatible. This was to enable a national comparison of individual police organisation's performance in line with NPM principles. The 'Guidance on Statutory Performance Indicators for Policing and Community Safety' (Home Office 2008b) provided a methodology for each organisation to follow. This established the user groups to be surveyed, the timing and reporting of each survey, the questionnaire framework and how data should be analysed. The data obtained by each police force would then populate the new APACS, which had replaced PPAF, with the intention of simplifying the performance landscape and aligning the key performance frameworks of community safety partners such as local government and the health service (Home Office 2008b).

Both Interviewee 4 and Interviewee 5 described a process in which there was compliance with Home Officer guidelines. Monthly surveys would be completed on victims of violence, burglary, vehicle crime, racial incidents and, initially, road traffic collisions. From initial data supplied by Merseyside Police, the private

market research company would identify suitable survey participants after ensuring stated Home Office reasons to exclude a victim were applied (Table 4.1). All results were categorised into crime types and stages of services. The marketing department then filtered these into individual BCU performance which populated the monthly report, which was circulated across the organisation.

The Home Office (2006) had stated that this approach provided the police service with the opportunity to work with the private sector in developing processes and standards and reducing costs via economies of scale. However, this appears to ignore the warning provided by Eterno and Silverman (2012) when they state that the desire to be efficient and effective, in a business-like manner, does not always match the victim's vision of success.

Indeed, Interviewee 5 questioned the opportunity provided by the Home Office direction that private sector market research companies should be used;

“There has been issues with every research company that we have had... from basically not checking the data...not having the correct data parameters...when I have gone in and done spot checks (I have) realised that there have been questions missing.... instead of getting a month's worth of data, maybe I have got 7 weeks of data, fields not filled in. There have been various issues.

(Interviewee 5)

This challenges the view that the survey process was producing data of a standard which could be compared nationally, unless all police forces were using the same company which they were not. Interviewee 5 expressed further concern with regards to the initial tendering process used to identify the suitable private sector company to fulfil the contract:

“When we put it (the contract) out to tender, because the survey is worth X amount of money, we have to put it out to tender. So, when they come in and we decide it’s based, more heavily weighted on cost. So, for instance (the current survey company) were the cheapest at the time. They are based down the south so quite a lot of the accents are southern. Obviously, we are based in the North West, so there is an issue with an accent there.”

(Interviewee 5)

Interviewee 5 went on to say that the previous company used by Merseyside Police had been based in Wales. The regional accent of the interviewers was a major issue, resulting in victims not understanding what was being asked. However, as a contract had been correctly tendered for there was no possible way of cancelling it. Therefore, confidence in the accuracy of the data being obtained was reduced, but Merseyside Police had to accept it as the measure of their victim satisfaction performance.

Such problems with the quality of data being obtained from the victim satisfaction survey was apparent within many of the 24 victim interviews analysed. Regardless of whether the victim expressed satisfaction or

dissatisfaction, the delivery and communication skills of the interviewee appeared incredibly important to obtaining accurate data from which the BRM satisfaction gap could be measured.

Table 5.6 showed 8 out of the 12 dissatisfied victims analysed appeared to have some issue with the survey process. This included the speed that the interviewer asked their questions, reflexivity of the interviewer, not reporting what was being said or the crime not fitting the set interview script. This resulted with some interviews being rushed and the interviewer looking for an appropriate brief answer that could be placed in the respective 'drop down box,' which needed to be completed before moving onto the next question. It was observed that one interviewer, who completed 7 of the 24 interviews sampled, had a very strong regional accent not from the North West. This hindered the interview process with the delivery appearing rushed with the script, provided by the Home Office via Merseyside Police, being rigidly followed. The following victim story highlights some of these points;

Satisfied Victim 11:

The victim was walking in Liverpool city centre late in the evening after finishing work when he was approached by two men who asked if they could borrow his mobile phone. On being refused one male head butted the victim. The victim was taken to hospital and the matter reported to the police. CCTV was examined but no witnesses or suspects were identified. The victim was kept updated but the crime was filed as undetected pending further

investigation. The VSS stated the victim was either very or completely satisfied with every stage of service.

The interviewer's style sounds rushed and impatient. She appears to have poor listening skills and often interrupted the victim. This appears to result in the listener struggling to keep up with the interviewer and the victim sounding confused and needing regular recaps of questions.

Some of the data recorded appears questionable. The victim stated that he was 'completely satisfied' with actions taken by the officers. The following exchange then took place between the interviewer (I) and the victim (V):

- (I) "Why do you say that?"
- (V) "Because I am still waiting for (pause), the police has called and they say they want to get the picture from this fella and I am going to ring you but no one ring me."
- (I) "You're still waiting for what, sorry?"
- (V) "I am waiting for CCTV, I don't know, I am still waiting, I don't know?"
- (I) "Sorry?"
- (V) "Till now nothing is happening, the Police send me letter at my home...."
- (I) "But they have sent me a letter."

The last comment was spoken by the interviewer as she is typing the answer, which was recorded on the data for Merseyside Police's attention as, "I am still waiting for CCTV and until now nothing is happening but they have sent a letter."

Whilst it could well be argued that the summary was factually correct, the listener is left wondering how satisfied the victim actually was, what was his understanding of what satisfaction is and what really were his concerns with the service provided.

This victim survey highlights an issue that was apparent in many of the interviews with victims. Any narrative had to be condensed to a maximum number of words due to limits set in the contract between Merseyside Police and the survey company.

“The problem with the report, because they are in an Excel format, and again it’s money that’s the issue, the characters can only offer 250 characters. So quite often you get a taste of what they (the victim) are saying.”

(Interviewee 5)

Again, this questions’ the benefit of using a private market research company, who work to a set contract, to produce qualitative data that a police organisation is then measured by. It was noted that in all the 24 interviews analysed, narrative and information provided by the victim was omitted from the survey company’s monthly report supplied to Merseyside Police. This also appeared to highlight a reflexivity issue as the interviewer added their own interpretation of what the victim had said for brevity and speed.

Dissatisfied Victim 12:

The victim was working as a sub-post master and was serving a customer who was making a withdrawal. The victim had to interrupt their service due to a phone call. This resulted in the customer becoming annoyed and subjecting the victim to racial abuse. The matter was reported to the police and, although there was CCTV evidence, enquiries established that the

person making the withdrawal was not the named account holder. After 6 months, the crime was filed stating there were no further lines of investigation.

When surveyed the victim expressed dissatisfaction with all stages of service apart from arrival times.

Throughout the whole survey the interviewer is rushed and appears to interpret the victim's words to summarise what is being said:

- (I) "Did they investigate the scene of the crime, e.g. look for fingerprints or other evidence?"
- (V) "There was no fingerprinting, no."
- (I) "Oh, they didn't need to".

The interviewer recorded the answer for Merseyside Police as "They didn't need to." Also, when asked why he was completely dissatisfied with the service provided the victim says:

- (V) "Because they told it was a racist incident and they have a unit called Sigma which should be dealing with the case, but having dealt with this Sigma, this section I would say is not fit for the purpose."

After some typing the interviewer says:

- (I) "And you say I do not see the purpose of it?"
- (V) "It is not fit for purpose, yes of course. I think they are trying to fool the person to say they are doing this and that and in fact they are doing nothing."

This was recorded in the data sent back to Merseyside Police as "They dealt with Sigma and I do not see the purpose of it."

Due to the nature of the contract in place there is a requirement for the interviewer to condense the information provided. This creates the need for interpretation of the survey answers. In the above case, it resulted with the

message provided by the victim regarding the Sigma Unit, which may have been the real cause of dissatisfaction, being lost. There is concern expressed about this Merseyside Police hate crime unit, but this is never received by the organisation. Likewise, it would appear the victim is saying that no fingerprinting took place, which may or may not be an issue, however again this fact is not accurately reported in the write-up of the data.

It was highlighted by Interviewee 5 that each interviewer of the private company had to complete a certain number of interviews each day. It was their opinion this resulted in many interviews being rushed. From the interviews analysed this again was an issue which impacted on the quality of the data being obtained and recorded.

Dissatisfied Victim 1:

The victim was in a Liverpool nightclub when he was 'violently ejected by door staff. During this he was subjected to racial abuse. Two suspects were identified and interviewed by the CID. An evidence file was submitted to the CPS who instructed 'no further action'.

There is a sense that the whole survey is a rushed process. Once an answer of 'yes' or 'no' was provided then the interviewer moved onto the next question, ignoring any further qualitative data the victim wanted to provide.

When asked if the reporting officer provided 'practical help' the victim asked what was actually meant by this. The interviewer stated, "like getting you home." The victim, who in fact lived more than 200 miles away from

Merseyside, then focused on the issue of transport home. He replied that he did not get practical help and when the follow up question of “do you think they should have” is asked, he replies that as he has only been living away for seven months then the police should have assisted with transport home. It would appear the interviewer influenced this answer by providing an example of ‘transport home’.

The methodology set by Merseyside Police followed the interview script provided by the Home Office. This required an interviewer to ask the question and record the answer. However, the interviewers who complied with the script rigidly did not necessarily produce the quickest interview. More importantly the recording of each answer separately, without the interviewer referring to previous answers, contributed to the production of questionable data, with contradictory answers being left unchallenged. However, when an interviewer was prepared to venture from the script then accuracy was improved.

Satisfied Victim 10:

The victim was subject of a burglary at his home whereby entry was gained by smashing a window and his laptop and television were stolen. Police attended and fingerprints obtained at the scene resulted in a person being arrested and convicted at Crown Court.

The victim’s initial response to the question “since the initial police response, have the police contacted you in any way, including latter, in relation to this incident?” was answered with “No”. Due to various comments, the victim had

already made, this appeared to be an incorrect answer. On this occasion, the interviewer took time to probe and repeat the question resulting in the victim changing the answer and allowed the recoding of accurate data.

The way Merseyside Police obtained this victim satisfaction data from a phone survey was questioned during both interviews and focus groups.

“The way the questions were phrased was creating confusion. The length of the questionnaire as well (interviews analysed lasted between 18 and 31 minutes), people were just answering yes and no probably still thinking about the previous question when the next ones on...to a certain extent the gap may well have been slightly artificial, artificial because of the survey method”.

(Interviewee 4)

“It all depends on what you ask and how you ask the questions...if you ring someone up and say are you happy with the police, the likelihood answer is no, cause they have been a victim of crime and they are not happy, and it’s not so much a reflection of the police, it’s a reflection that they are unhappy because they are a victim. If you ask the right questions, did the officer tell you about this, yes, and this, yeah. Then you say you are satisfied with the way the officer behaved and what happened.”

(Sergeant’s Focus Group).

Indeed, concern was expressed by four out of the five people interviewed regarding the accuracy of the Home Office guideline regarding how the PI

should be measured (Home Office 2008a) and the quality of the data produced by the victim satisfaction survey. However, regardless of this there was still a willingness to accept the data produced as a valid reason to change working practices and organisational policy. The apparent questionable nature of the survey data appears to only be considered for a short while before policy and direction was complied with. When questioned over their concerns, they were willing to express them with an apparent assumption that the issue was commonly known. However, these concerns are quickly forgotten when the survey data was presented as the benchmark for performance improvement.

It is perhaps not surprising that no one in the Constable's focus group expressed any concern over the accuracy of the methodology of the victim satisfaction survey. As mentioned, the Sergeants did pass comment over the way questions were asked of the victim; however, there was an apparent acceptance across all three groups that the data produced was accurate. Regardless of any representations they could have made, the organisation itself was accepting the quality of the data and thus there developed an apparent focus of ensuring performance data results, produced by the market research company, improved. However, in contrast Supt 2 stated he was still totally unconvinced by the methodology used by the victim satisfaction survey. But this concern was dismissed with an apparent shrug and an explanation that any survey method will have flaws. However, it is interesting to note the reply of Interviewee 5 when asked what they believed their work with the victim satisfaction survey had achieved:

“Complying with Home Office requirements. If I’m honest I don’t think anything, it all became performance led and (Data Analyst) will agree with me, it’s become about figures and it shouldn’t be about figures. The survey was never designed about figures, it was about addressing the problems and people are just getting ticks in boxes”

(Interviewee 5)

Summary

This chapter has described how the BRM satisfaction gap became an important performance indicator for Merseyside Police. Although previous chapters have explained this was grounded in the Macpherson Report (1999), and intend as one of ten measures to assess the improvement of trust and confidence within BRM communities, this chapter suggests this was not the case for Merseyside Police. It has been said the focus came from a goal for Merseyside Police Chief Constable to be the best police service in the country. However, this begs the question “according to whom?” The provision of a set survey methodology by the Home Office was provided with the intention of obtaining data that could be comparable and used to make this assessment. However, regardless of warnings received from outside of the organisation this was accepted as accurate and, although concerns were expressed privately, no one interviewed appeared to have had the motivation to challenge it in a meaningful way. This resulted in the data obtained being used to influence policy for those officers dealing with victims of crime and acting as the parameter from within which the challenge of narrowing the BRM satisfaction gap was required to be made.

Indeed, this does then question whether the Macpherson Report did transpire to be such a seminal monument, as stated by Rowe (2004). Supt 1 explained:

“Our focus (within the Citizen Focus department) was on the performance indicators, it was driven by the PI’s, it was not driven by the content of the Macpherson report.... the links through to the Macpherson report and levels of satisfaction and confidence weren’t there. The whole focus was on the performance indicator.”

(Supt 1)

The next chapter will consider how the direction given by the Chief Constable, to focus on the performance indicator developed into a performance management regime of the BRM satisfaction gap for Merseyside Police.

Chapter 7: Turning red to green: Performance Construction?

Introduction

Chapter six considered how Citizen Focus Policing came to prominence within Merseyside Police and thereby resulted in the BRM satisfaction gap performance indicator gaining a high profile. As indicated in that chapter, the motivation for this was not to improve trust and confidence within BRM communities, but instead to assist Merseyside Police in achieving the goal, set by the Chief Constable, of becoming the best police force in the country. The chapter concluded that the activities employed by Merseyside Police to narrow the satisfaction gap focused on the performance figures and missed the larger picture that had been proposed by the Macpherson Report (1999).

This chapter considers the issue of performance management and how it influenced the way in which Merseyside Police tried to narrow the satisfaction gap. It will consider this in three sections. The initial discussion focuses on the performance management regime used and will consider those parallels which can be drawn with Compstat (Eterno and Silverman, 2012). The chapter will then examine the principles of the 'Customer Service Recovery Opportunity' (CSRO), which was initially proposed by the Home Office (2008b), and how Merseyside Police developed this to directly influence the data being obtained by the victim satisfaction survey. Finally, the chapter examines the issue of gaming, as previously highlighted by LeGrand (2003) and Bevan and Hood (2006), and concludes that although there was improvement recorded in the

BRM satisfaction gap, this could be attributed to activity other than the quality of service being delivered to the victim.

Performance Management

Chapter four showed how Merseyside Police developed a performance structure that used 'Citizen Focus Champions', within each BCU, who were held responsible for implementing the actions set by the Citizen Focus department. The progress of these actions were then monitored by the Citizen Focus Programme Board, which was chaired by the ACC Citizen Focus (Merseyside Police 2009). However, this structure was designed and implemented by the Citizen Focus department to ensure their initiatives and directions were being complied with across the force area. As chapter six then explained, there was a further performance regime introduced in Merseyside Police, because of Chief Constable direction, which focused on the whole Citizen Focus agenda within the BCU. Victim satisfaction performance formed a major part of this with the performance regime intended to hold Area Commanders to account and ensure there was sufficient performance improvement to enable positive national comparisons.

However, Supt 1 confirmed it was the performance focus, which the Home Office placed on the BRM satisfaction gap being one of the measures they would use to assess efficiency and effectiveness, that resulted in this organisational attention. This presented the Citizen Focus department with a challenge when competing with the performance management regime that the ACC Operations was using to reduce crime and increase crime detection rates.

“You have got to remember that the organisation was steeped in this performance culture, driven by Crimefighters, driven in this brutal and humiliating regime and we (Citizen Focus department) had to get on a par with it, we had to get people to think about (it). Well, if you recall (the Chief Constable) introduced Total Policing. Total Care for Victims; Total War on Crime; Total Professionalism. We had to get Total Care for Victims on a par with Total War on Crime to garner any interest at all. And we never managed it, never ever managed it.”

(Supt 1)

Crimefighters

It was explained, by all three Superintendents interviewed, that ‘Crimefighters’ was Merseyside Police’s quarterly to monthly performance meeting. The format, style and frequency changed over the years but it always required the Area Commander and members of the Command Team, from each BCU, to attend a meeting where the ACC Operations would question them over their previous month’s performance. This mirrored the ‘Compstat’ style, as described by Eterno and Silverman (2012), where police commanders were held personally accountable for their area’s performance. Supt 1 description of a brutal and humiliating regime appears to agree with the view of Bevan and Hood (2006) that these performance management processes contained an element of real terror.

Once the Chief Constable had instructed the ACC’s for Citizen Focus and Operations to ensure performance improved for victim satisfaction and the

BRM satisfaction gap, as explained in chapter four, 'Crimefighters' became the main way of tracking this. However, Supt 1 explained the Citizen Focus department experienced difficulties with designing a performance structure for the meeting process. The victim satisfaction survey was completed for victims whose crimes were around eight to twelve weeks old, with the performance figures being published a further three to four weeks later. This time lag did not dovetail naturally into the 'Crimefighters' monthly performance review style, being used at that time, therefore Supt 1 says they were always set to fail.

"Our data only comes out monthly; the rest of the stuff (for Crimefighters) comes out daily. But not only does it come out monthly, its two months behind....so to garner any interest it was really, really difficult".

(Supt 1)

Therefore, to support the monthly performance process it was decided the BCU's needed support from the Citizen Focus department to improve the Command Team's knowledge and develop interest. To do this a series of workshops were arranged.

"We showed them that this is what victim satisfaction is, this is what you can do. The Marketing team did some analysis and identified that there are two key things. One within 'Actions Taken' and one within 'Further Contact'. If you just do those two things it has a disproportionate impact on the levels of victim satisfaction as measured by the company."

(Supt 1)

This confirms the approach, initially described in chapter four, of targeting specific stages of service for the victim, with the expectation it would then have a positive impact on performance. However, this approach appears to ignore the wider issue of how legitimacy, as raised by Tyler (2005, 2006), can impact on a victim's satisfaction level. However, Foster, Newburn and Souhami's (2005) have already stated that police forces will tend to focus attention on performance most obviously identifiable and achievable. The data produced from the victim satisfaction survey allowed the Citizen Focus department to graphically track each BCU's stage of service performance, for each crime type. The data was also broken down into the individual 'critical inputs' that made up each of the stages. A fall in a stage of service performance could then be explained by a failure to deliver a specific critical input, within that stage of service, to the victim of crime. This then allowed the Citizen Focus department to highlight where the officers were going wrong and action plan the BCU with the required improvement. However, this again appears to also highlight Foster, Newburn and Souhami's (2005) concerns. Such an approach can cause problems with routine working practices focusing on the service delivery which delivers quick wins. This in turn encourages police to ignore the more difficult issues which require a victim to be considered in a more structurally informed fashion and thereby need a tailored made service, delivered for specific victims and communities, to increase trust and confidence.

Problems of priority

Supt 1 explained that due to the management structure of Merseyside Police, the ACC Citizen Focus was always struggling to obtain full cooperation and

compliance from each BCU. To try and address this, a quarterly inspection process for each BCU was introduced whereby citizen focus “mimicked” the process used by the ACC Operations to drive performance. For this, the Citizen Focus department researched each BCU’s performance from the previous quarter and compiled a portfolio which they would then audit and inspect each BCU with.

“The ACC (Citizen Focus) is trying to influence a whole organisation....and (the ACC) is not their (the BCU) boss. The (ACC) wasn’t in charge of the BCU’s, that came under (ACC) Ops (Operations) so they had to influence them somehow. So, the option was we can either go there and shout and ball and say this, that and the other, like (ACC Operations) did, (that) regime was described to me as brutal. Or we can go and we can convince them (The BCU command team) that it’s the right thing to do and use powers of persuasion in order to get them to do it”

(Supt 1)

Although this appears to acknowledge the application of the ‘Compstat’ style of performance management to Citizen Focus and the BRM satisfaction gap was not necessarily the right approach, the motive for this change is unclear. Was this done as a result of a critique of the performance management process questioned by Eterno and Silverman (2012) and Bevan and Hood (2006)? Supt 1 said this was not the case. Instead, it was a desire to present the BCU’s with an alternative, compassionate approach in the hope it would result in compliance and better performance for the Citizen Focus portfolio.

This research has been unable to ascertain how successful this approach was. However, Supt 2 does describe a more supportive quarterly inspection style being adopted by ACC Citizen Focus, but again it is not clear how this influenced the support of the BCU for the Citizen Focus agenda. Instead, Supt 1 described further problems the Citizen Focus department experienced at the monthly Crimefighters when trying to hold the BCU's to account within that forum. The meeting was chaired and run by the ACC Operations, and they often found there was a fight for time and priority with regards to their portfolio.

“ACC Citizen Focus wasn't there, one famous one, something like two and a half, three-hour meeting.... I was representing (ACC Citizen Focus) I got seven minutes at the end. I had a lot of slides to go through and I got seven minutes at the end. That was the focus of victim satisfaction that was coming from (ACC Operations).

(Supt 1)

How successful was the performance management approach?

The Citizen Focus department failed in raising the profile on a par with ACC Operation's focus on crime reduction and detection rates within Crimefighters. However, their quarterly inspections provided a captive audience within each BCU to enable a focus on performance management. That being said, Supt 3 questioned how successful the whole performance management process was in producing an increase in victim satisfaction and narrowing the BRM satisfaction gap. Indeed, he appears to believe it encouraged a process inconsistent with service delivery.

“I don’t think there’s that many people, police officers that actually; one, understand it completely and two, constantly think about it. I just think that they are so busy trying to do the right thing, hopefully.... it’s only when senior officers kind of ask them, and when your graph in the BCU, the gaps’ widening that pressure is put on police officers, that they even pay attention to be honest.... when you get an inspection coming, a quarterly inspection and they would say your gap’s too big, close it. I would then go on parades and people would say, “oh it’s difficult to actually close and blah, blah blah. I don’t think there’s much attention paid to it to be honest.”

(Supt 3)

Likewise, Supt 2 expressed concerns and felt the approach was to negate Merseyside Police from being highlighted by the Home Office as a poor performer, which then resulted in Merseyside Police never fully investing in the principles surrounding the BRM satisfaction gap.

“It was almost like a nod to the fact well we’ve got to do this and to keep away any wider scrutiny from like HMIC (Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabularies) or whatever, cos you knew that if you showed out in the league table, as in below the line in terms of your most similar forces, you know there would be loads of questions being asked and you will get snap inspections etc. So, I think some of that, some of what we did was motivated towards keeping that away.”

(Supt 2)

Supt 1 disagreed with this sentiment as he was clear that performance management was employed to establish improvement and thereby become the best police force in the country. However, it appears questionable as to whether this message was cascaded to those delivering the service. The Constables questioned the whole performance management process used by Merseyside Police.

“Somebody had identified something and its changes for changes in the police as you well know. This month’s flavour of the month will be this and next month it will be that. And next month you won’t hear anything about this month’s, and what was six months ago, you will never hear about that again, and next month it’s something else.”

(Constable’s Focus Group)

To support this, the Constables confirmed that in their experience the BRM satisfaction gap had been focused on a few years previously when there were presentations given to them and visible marketing material, such as posters, displayed at the police station. However, since then there was a consensus that there had been no further update on performance or reminders as to what they should be doing to narrow the gap. One Constable supported the view previously provided by Supt 3.

“Only if it went horrifically bad, and someone said right this has gone horrifically bad, would there be a push.”

(Constable’s Focus Group)

The Sergeants took a slightly more managerially supportive view to the performance process.

“I know we look at red and greens, but we try and reduce problems but we still encourage everyone to report crime. And it’s not just the BRM groups cause we need to establish what your (the victim) problems are.”

(Sergeant’s Focus Group)

The term ‘red and greens’ refer to how the performance data was presented in the monthly performance management charts. If a performance indicator was on target then it was shown with a green background. If not, then red was used. This phrase appears to be stated whenever someone wanted to imply that performance management took the quantitative approach of ensuring all performance indicators were on target, rather than giving consideration for qualitative matters.

So, following on from the direction given by the Chief Constable, the Citizen Focus department introduced a performance management process that they believed would deliver the required performance. However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, it was acknowledged these measures were designed purely to improve the published performance figures. There was no consideration of the possible influences on victim satisfaction other than ways of positively influencing the data produced by the survey.

At that time, it was said by participants that, Merseyside Police had an embedded performance culture that focused on the quick, obviously identifiable and achievable, monthly wins, as predicted by Foster, Newburn and Souhami (2005). However, this performance culture appears to have hindered the Citizen Focus department as their ACC jockeyed for position with the ACC Ops for BCU priority. However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the BRM satisfaction gap performance did improve. Either the performance management process was delivering what it was intended to do or other tactics were being used by Merseyside Police to influence the data.

Customer Service Recovery Opportunity

Chapter four explained that the principle of service recovery was proposed by the Home Office (2008b) when it recommended that police forces should consider establishing a service recovery protocol. This was to be offered to suitable dissatisfied victims of crime by the interviewers of the victim satisfaction survey. The protocol, they said, should provide a mechanism for reparation, however, Merseyside Police developed this principle.

Merseyside Police used the Customer Service Recovery Opportunity (CSRO) to call a victim of crime at the initial stages of an investigation to ascertain how satisfied they currently were with the service provided (Merseyside Police 2009a) and then “put back on track” any bad or poor service received. This, they believed, would lead to a victim being more likely to express satisfaction when surveyed. It was further said that the CSRO process could be used to provide an opportunity to identify reasons why BRM victims were not satisfied

with the service provided. This appears to be a fundamentally different process to the one suggested by the Home Office.

CSRO the Merseyside way

Chapter five explained that it was not the initial intention to interview Supt 3. However, having been cited by all the interviewees as being the person who introduced the CSRO process within Merseyside Police, it appeared important to gather their view. Supt 3 provided the following explanation.

“It wasn’t borrowed from somewhere else. It came from professional experience that BRM victims, I wasn’t convinced, and to a degree still aren’t. Wasn’t convinced at the time that their needs were adequately being considered and taken care of... we would ring back initially racist crimes, but then I would look and there are very few BRM victims in general actually, so I said actually let’s do more.”

(Supt 3)

But Supt 3 went on to explain that the idea came from a phone call received from a garage, after a car had been repaired, which asked if the service provided had been satisfactory. This formed the belief that adopting a similar approach for crime victims would allow for dissatisfaction to be identified and addressed at an early stage.

This new Merseyside Police approach proactively sought out dissatisfied victims, whilst the Home Office (2008b) recommended a need for a reactive

process if dissatisfaction was identified as part of the victim satisfaction survey. Supt 1 explained that ACC Citizen Focus became aware of the system and requested each BCU to replicated it for their BRM victims. However, this practice was then developed even further.

Chapter four explained that CSRO calls were to be made prior to the victim being contacted by the private research company conducting the victim satisfaction survey (Merseyside Police, 2009a). It was said this was to enable poor service to be corrected and thus improve overall service delivery prior to the victim satisfaction survey. However, Supt 3 confirms this was carefully designed to have maximum impact on the data collection of the victim satisfaction survey.

“It (the CSRO call) was set at 9 or 12, 6 and 12? Whatever, I followed the (survey company) model for the CSRO.”

(Supt 3)

Supt 2 stated that another important part of the CSRO was for the person updating the victim to run through the actions that had already been completed during the investigation. It had been highlighted by the Marketing Department that often the victim was unaware of a lot of detail of their crime, whether CCTV had been checked or house to house enquiries had been completed. Therefore, it was believed that when asked the direct question, during the victim satisfaction survey, a negative answer was creating further dissatisfaction. A

reminder to the victim, just prior to the possible victim satisfaction survey, was thought to increase the chances of a positive view being expressed.

The reality of the CSRO

Merseyside Police, then implemented a policy whereby every BRM victim of crime would get a phone call, not necessarily from the reporting or investigating officer, a week after reporting the crime and again prior to week nine. This was intended to put right any poor service identified and to remind the victim what actions had so far been completed as part of the investigation. It was concluded that this would result in higher levels of satisfaction.

However, analysis of dissatisfied victims appears to question how well the CSRO policy was complied with. Table 5.6, which tracks the emerging themes of the twelve dissatisfied victims analysed, shows that seven out of the twelve victims state they were not kept informed of their investigation, whilst two directly questioned the call back process of the CSRO, as highlighted below.

Dissatisfied Victim 6

The victim was crossing the road with her young child when a taxi drove past her. The driver shouted, "You black bastard, where have you come from". The victim stated she was very distressed and went home as quickly as possible where she called the police.

An investigating officer was allocated to the crime. He initially contacted the victim five days after the incident was reported. However, Victim Support then phoned the officer two days later, in an attempt to get an update for the victim.

The investigation revolved around CCTV evidence, which ultimately proved unsuccessful. However, it this enquiry took 6 weeks to progress, whilst the victim had no documented update. When the crime was finally filed undetected, the contact phone call to the victim informing her of this went unanswered. There were no further attempts made to inform the victim.

When surveyed the respondent was completely dissatisfied with the actions taken, follow-up and whole experience of the service provided.

“No one rang me back, I had to ring them back every single time to see where they are up to. All I got was a phone call asking for a survey. I got a letter saying they looked at CCTV and found nothing. It was not worth me reporting it because no one took it seriously”

“When I reported it and the way it was dealt with I did not get a good service from the police. I do not think they took it seriously and I had to phone them to check if they had looked at CCTV”.

The victim further describes an experience of never being able to speak to the investigating officer and always being put through to an answer phone which then took two to three days for an officer to respond to. This resulted in a feeling that the police did not take the matter seriously. When asked if they would report a similar incident he states, “Not anymore after today cause I lost confidence”.

About six weeks after reporting the incident, the victim states they had a call from police, which was described as a survey. This was the CSRO but it would appear the victim did not appreciate the call and stated that feedback was not good as he had not been given any updates. It appears that at that stage it was too late to recover the poor service that had already been provided.

It is interesting to note that the interviewer did not recognise they were not speaking to the victim, who was a woman, but instead was speaking to the victim's husband. He answered the questions as the victim and states 'I showed them where the incident took place, I told them where the CCTV is, I told them what time it was'.

It is not possible to establish why this happened. Throughout the crime investigation the Investigating Officer was only able to provide updates to the husband who would appear to have been the point of contact. From the husband's point of view, it is impossible to say if his dissatisfaction is also that of his wife's or not. However, the issues he raised were valid, whilst the listener can only speculate as to whether it was due to culture or other reasons as to why this took place.

The above example appears to question the effectiveness of the CSRO. The victim viewed it as another survey which questions the way in which the call was being made. Although it would appear policy was complied with and the CSRO

call was made in time, it is apparent that at that stage the victim was already dissatisfied with the service provided and no general calls could recover it. The cause for the dissatisfaction appears to agree with Skogan's (2005) view that a major determinant of satisfaction with police encounters are found in the things that police do at the time, by officers being polite, fair attentive and willing to explain what was going on. This then questions the validity of the Merseyside CSRO and its ability to recover dissatisfaction once embedded.

However, there were also examples of the CSRO apparently contributing towards satisfaction.

Satisfied Victim 5

The victim was in her house when she heard a bang against a window. She immediately checked and could see it was cracked and two men were walking away. She believed she was being targeted due to her ethnicity and so the crime was recorded as racially motivated.

There were few lines for the investigation to follow and after initial contact the victim was not re-contacted for a month until a CSRO call was made. This noted that the victim was never informed that the crime had been effectively closed and filed.

When surveyed the victim stated she was very satisfied with actions taken, follow-up and whole experience.

“I am happy with the way the Police dealt with the incident and they are still dealing with things now”.

“The Police have been coming back to us and letting us know what is happening”.

Throughout the interview there is a sense that the victim is confused as to the purpose of the satisfaction survey. It appears that the CSRO process assisted in providing them with a feeling that some activity was taking place as a result of the crime report. However, it is interesting to note that when asked the question “did you expect to be contacted by the Police” the victim replied “No”. 17 of the 24 victims stated this.

Although this appears to provide an example of where the CSRO has improved a victim’s satisfaction, it does also raise a question of how high the victim’s expectations were in the first place. This issue will be explored more in the next chapter.

Merseyside Police (2009a) stated every BRM victim would get a CSRO call. This was intended to be above and beyond any update provided by the investigating officer. However, the victims included in this research, question how well this guideline was complied with. Seven of the twelve dissatisfied victims stated they had not been kept informed of progress with their investigation. How could this be if there was a CSRO process in place? Some victim’s stories question whether this was indeed the case.

Dissatisfied Victim 10

The victim was working as a security guard in a supermarket when he saw a man hide meat in his coat and try to leave without paying. The security guard stopped the man outside the shop and was subjected to a barrage of abuse, including being called a “Nigerian monkey” and “You black monkey, you fucking Nigerian”. He was able to persuade the man to go back into the store where the police were called. Whilst waiting the man become more abusive and punched the guard in the face.

The man was arrested and after initially being bailed for further enquiries, he was charged with theft and racially aggravated common assault. He subsequently pleaded guilty at court and amongst other things received a three-year restraining order to stay away from the victim and the supermarket.

Police say the victim was provided with two updates via email. However, it is unclear if the victim provided an email address for this purpose and remained dissatisfied with the service provided. He said;

“They told me they would do something about it, but I did not hear anything”.

“They never did keep their promises or contact me”.

“They never did take it seriously”.

It is interesting to note the victim further stated;

“He punched me in the face, and the manager there told me that the police would never take it seriously....and the police come, you explain everything and they write everything down, they never take it serious, never”.

This crime resulted in an arrest, a guilty plea at court with a three-year restraining order. This appears to be a positive result, yet the victim is dissatisfied as the police failed to keep him updated at any stage. It appears the warning given to him by his manager had a major impact as he repeated it on several occasions throughout the survey.

This story supports the view of Merseyside Police that providing victims with updates is vital to securing satisfaction. However, it also questions the robustness of the CSRO process. The victim worked in several stores across Merseyside, however neither the investigating officer nor the person completing the CSRO took the time to find out where he was working. Instead they contacted the store where the crime took place and recorded that the victim was unavailable. This resulted in the victim never being informed of the positive result of the police actions and confirming the opinions placed in him by his manager.

Skogan (2005) stated that a person's view of the police can have a greater impact on their interpretation of a recent police encounter than the actual performance of the officer. When considering this, the expectation of Merseyside Police that providing a good service on the day or quickly repairing a poor service with a phone call would result in satisfied victims appears misplaced. However, there were opinions that this approach was a success;

“There was less CSRO bought to our attention because we were getting it right, the initial actions at scene, the ease of contact. So, because we were

concentrating on the key stages of service delivery then we had less and less recovery opportunities.”

(CID Focus Group)

Others also considered the CSRO an effective tactic to improve satisfaction.

“There you’ve got an opportunity to do your Customer Service Recovery Opportunity at the point of contact. So, you’re immediately getting better answers to our questions.”

(Supt 1)

Although Merseyside Police’s CSRO process did not comply with the guidelines set out by the Home Office (2008b), this matter was overlooked in the interests of improving performance. The CSRO process required a BRM victim to be called twice, with the second call taking place just prior to when the victim satisfaction survey was likely to make contact. This, therefore, appears to allow for an allegation that reactive gaming was taking place. Merseyside Police broadly shared the goals of the Home Office but used the CSRO as an opportunity to game the target system (Bevan and Hood 2006, LeGrand 2003). This poses the question that if this was the case, then what other measures were being used?

Gaming

In chapter four it was highlighted how Bevan and Hood (2006) consider the manipulation and gaming of performance figures to be, at some level,

inevitable. This, they said, was because the setting of targets and performance measurement invites such working practices within service-providing units. This will always be the case unless there is a large amount of transparency embedded in the performance management process.

It has already been shown by Supt 1 that the working practices employed by Merseyside Police to gain a narrowing of the satisfaction gap was always focused on the quick win of changing performance data rather than the, apparently, more complicated issue of improving trust and confidence. This can be evidenced by the way the CSRO was developed to directly influence the victim satisfaction survey results by making calls to victims between six to eight weeks after the crime had been reported. It should be noted there was no evidence presented to show that a CSRO call was ever made to a victim after this time, even though many crimes were still being investigated. Once there was no further likelihood of a victim being surveyed, there was a distinct lack of interest in keeping the victim of crime informed. However, Supt 1 is very clear about this;

“But that’s all we were interested in. It was never about trust and confidence, we were only interested in the performance on the survey.”

(Supt 1)

Unintentional screening process

The Home Office (2008b) provided each force with a draft user satisfaction questionnaire that their survey process was expected to implement. This

provided a preamble for the interviewer to follow that informed the victim of the purpose of the call, the identity of the caller and how the victim could confirm, with Merseyside Police, that the call was legitimate. At the end of this process the victim was asked if they were prepared to take part in the survey. Interviewee 5 highlighted a problem with this;

“With different ethnicities the less trust, some of them are less trusting of the police so you might find quite often you might not have had enough victims to interview (within the raw data of victims supplied to the survey company) as they refused to take part in the survey. When they have cleansed the sample, validated the sample, they didn’t want to be interviewed. So, you need to take that into account. What we use to have coming back from the Crimefighters was, well there was twenty victims, why did you only interview three?”

(Interviewee 5)

Asking a victim if they are prepared to take part in a survey is an appropriate question. However, the nature of trust within BRM communities towards the police appears to make this a little more complex. Interviewee 5 proposed the satisfaction questionnaire provided an initial screening process that benefited Merseyside Police. If a victim is so distrustful of the police, they may well refuse to take part in the victim satisfaction survey. Thereby they never express their dissatisfaction which then went unreported in the monthly data. Indeed, chapter three has shown that Fukuyama (1995) would agree with this conclusion. A victim from a low trust community, with strong families but relatively weak bonds of trust amongst people unrelated, who are reluctant to place trust in an

organisation, may be less willing to take part in the victim satisfaction survey for the police organisation, which they do not trust. However, a victim from a high trust community that develop strong bonds of association and trust beyond the family may well be more likely, as they are more likely to trust the police. When considering this in tandem with Brandl et al (1994) and Keenan's (2009) view that prior opinion contributes greatly in forming a person's view of satisfaction, it is possible to conclude that the satisfaction questionnaire provided an unintentional screening out process of, potentially, the most dissatisfied victims. A person with low trust in the police would be more likely to express dissatisfaction about the service provided compared to a victim with high trust.

It would be unfair to present this 'screening process' as an example of gaming by Merseyside Police, but it does appear to have been an identified issue that was not addressed. Indeed, when considering the numbers proposed by the Marketing Officer, this screening may have removed a substantial number of dissatisfied victims from the victim satisfaction survey process and thereby incorrectly narrowed the BRM satisfaction gap for Merseyside Police.

The removal process

The Home Office (2008b) provided a list of victims they said should be excluded from the victim satisfaction survey (Table 4.1). Chapter four has expressed concern that this allowed a police force to retain their individual discretion as to when a victim should be excluded from a survey, whilst no advice was given as to how this discretion should be applied. The guidelines also allowed a police

force to exclude victims who had immediately expressed dissatisfaction by making a complaint against the police or showed a lack of confidence so did not cooperate with the investigation. However, Interviewee 4 suggested Merseyside Police developed this removal process to the benefit of their performance figures with little regard to Home Office guidance;

“Now the removals can be if they don’t understand the questionnaire.... I will look to see what they have answered to one question say they are very satisfied and the next they totally contradict themselves or they haven’t understood the question, they are generalising...we are asking them about the service on this occasion.... The fact that we have it removed is because, you know, it’s not a true reflection of what we are asking, all be it we should do something about it.”

(Interviewee 4)

Interviewee 4 described a working practice whereby each BCU was encouraged by the Citizen Focus department to investigate every one of their dissatisfied victims, on a monthly basis, to understand why they were so dissatisfied. However, part of this process involved a consideration of whether the dissatisfied victim’s response could be removed from the data, under the pretext of complying with one of the Home Office guidelines as in table 4.1 (Home Office 2008b). This resulted in the BCUs proactively using the removal process to benefit their performance data. The fact that both Interviewee 4 and Interviewee 5 confirmed this was never applied to any surveys which related to satisfied victims, supports this view. Such a process appears to be a clear example of reactive gaming, as highlighted by LeGrand (2003) and Bevan and

Hood (2006). The removal process, as outlined by the Home Office, was used as an opportunity to unfairly improve performance data. However, when questioned further, Interviewee 4 justified the practice;

“Yes, but that’s what the survey is for. The survey is for on this occasion do you think the actions that the Police took, and if they start talking about treatment, how I was treated, well we are not talking about actions. You are not listening.”

(Interviewee 4)

This is the participant’s interpretation of the guidelines. Interviewee 4 saw the victim satisfaction survey purely as measuring performance of a specific crime report, with the surveyed dissatisfied victim having to provide information in the exact order for their views to be included. It was not viewed as a way of measuring the wider issues of trust and confidence and those diverse contributing factors which have already been discussed at length. Indeed, if a victim expressed such a view unconnected to that crime being surveyed, then Interviewee 4 would deem this a reason to remove the survey from the database, but of course only if they were dissatisfied.

“You have got a set of questions in actions taken and they (the victim) say yes to all the questions. We have got a positive answer and it gets to the satisfaction level question, well are you satisfied and you are expecting someone who has said ‘yes’ all the way through that section to be satisfied, and they go completely dissatisfied. Why do you say that? Oh, they didn’t go and check CCTV so it

was lost. Well that questions not on the survey. So, all those question to me are made redundant...”

(Interviewee 4)

However, it would appear at times the BCU's tried to apply the removal process too broadly for the organisation to accept.

Dissatisfied Victim 7

The victim was walking through a park with his girlfriend when a group of up to 20 young people shouted abuse at him including the words “Jaffa” and “Gay”. He believed this was due to his ethnicity. Police were called, but he did not want to make a formal crime report as he stated police could not do anything to help. This was, however, recorded as a hate incident and allocated an investigating officer who after three days stated there were no lines of investigation. The victim was informed of this via letter after phone calls went unanswered.

“Mainly it just turns out to be like when I reported the first incident, nothing was done this time round. I was promised a personal alarm and they were not sent to me, I had to go and collect them. There are not any patrols around as they promised and there are still violent people around”.

“In both cases of me reporting hate crime, they have not taken enough evasive action. They did not keep their promises of patrolling the area and monitoring the area”.

After the victim was surveyed and it was established he was dissatisfied with all the stages of service, the investigating officer's supervisor reviewed the case. He requested that the survey be removed from the performance figures

as all the points the victim stated he was dissatisfied with had been covered during the investigation. On this occasion, this apparently cynical attempt to remove the survey was unsuccessful.

However, it should be noted the victim's dissatisfaction stemmed from a previous incident which, he said, resulted in him having an extremely low opinion of Merseyside Police. On that occasion, he made a statement of complaint which, in his opinion, resulted in no action. This perception was reinforced during this second incident as he had previously been promised extra patrols in the park during key times. The fact that he had seen no visible evidence of this taking place resulted in him concluding that these 'broken promises' showed the police was not taking the matter seriously. This appears to be an example of confirmation bias (Brandl et al 1994) influencing satisfaction.

Even though the above example shows the removal process was not an apparent 'free for all' to remove any dissatisfied victim, it appears to be a clear example of how people within Merseyside Police were trying to construct performance for the benefit of their own BCU. Such working practices appear to have been commonly accepted. Both Supt 2 and Supt 3 were aware of the practice but believed it to be a way of ensuring only appropriate data populated performance tables. However, Interviewee 5 had a different view;

"It's biased, it's trying to make the figures, it's fudging the figures, I understand completely." (Interviewee 5)

Summary

Chapter two stated the impact that NPM had on the BRM satisfaction performance indicator, and thereby trust and confidence, has never been examined. When considering Bevan and Hood's (2006) point that the performance management aspects of NPM provided a regime of target setting against which performance was published, then it is possible for this research to comment on the possible impact.

Chapter six described how the change of ACC Citizen Focus in 2010 resulted in a new focus for the team, from overall victim satisfaction to one looking solely at the BRM satisfaction gap. This resulted with it being on target for the first time, but to the apparent detriment of all other victim satisfaction performance indicators which were still being measured.

This research has been unable to identify a connection between this change of focus towards the BRM satisfaction gap and the use of the removal process or CSRO to influence the recorded levels of performance. However, the timeline of when the CSRO became embedded within the organisation, as described by Supt 1 and Supt 3, and the development of the removal process does correlate with the improvement of performance. To that end chapter six suggested the success of Merseyside Police purely focusing on the BRM satisfaction gap challenged the views of Brandl et al (1994), Skogan (2005) and Hinds and Murphy (2009) that satisfaction is driven by factors other than service delivery. However, it is this chapter's conclusion that such a view cannot be drawn by the change in performance due to the apparent influence of corrupted

performance data. Bevan and Hoods (2006) explained that one type of gaming is output distortion, where the measured target is achieved at the cost of other significant but unmeasured aspects of performance. In this case victim satisfaction was still being measured but it was decided to distort performance to the benefit of the BRM satisfaction gap, as it had been decided this was the priority. It would appear that gaming, to a lesser or greater extent, contributed to this.

The Macpherson Report (1999) stated trust and confidence needed to improve between BRM communities and the police. Even though chapter six and seven questions the motives for implementation and tactics used, if it still resulted in a service which benefited victims then it can be argued these actions were appropriate. Chapter eight will examine this from the victim's point of view and see what sense they and the officers providing the service made of the BRM satisfaction gap process.

Chapter 8: What about the victim: 'Never mind the quality, feel the width'

Introduction

The previous two chapters have explained why the BRM satisfaction gap became an important performance indicator for Merseyside Police, along with the performance management structure and tactics used to improve the measured performance. Chapter seven described how the Citizen Focus department tried to use the established performance management process of 'Crimefighters' to deliver this change. However, this proved challenging due to publishing times of the victim satisfaction data, along with the embedded performance culture installed by the ACC Operations. Therefore, the Citizen Focus department introduced a quarterly inspection process which afforded them the undivided attention of each BCU. Again, they borrowed an established process that was being used by the ACC Operations in the hope that familiarity would garner support.

Throughout this process, it was apparent the Citizen Focus department was looking for a way of delivering the results the organisation required, in the quickest and most straight forward way possible. However, it should be noted that Eterno and Silverman (2012) stated the desire to be efficient and effective, in a business-like manner, does not always match the victim's vision of success. This chapter will examine how those measures introduced by Merseyside Police to narrow the satisfaction gap impacted on the victim of crime. It will also consider the sense Constables and Sergeants, the

people directly responsible for delivering the service, made of the process. It will conclude that the victim satisfaction survey was far removed from the principles of citizen focus policing and left the victim of crime often confused and frustrated.

Critical Inputs on the service provided

The Home Office (2008b) provided a questionnaire framework for each police organisation to use. This allowed for the victim survey to divide the service provided to each victim into stages of service from initial contact, actions taken, follow-up, treatment to whole experience. Within these stages the survey then asked the victim about those 'critical inputs' delivered by the individual officer (Merseyside Police 2008b). Table 4.4 highlighted those 'critical inputs' believed by the Citizen Focus department to have a positive influence on BRM satisfaction (Merseyside 2008a).

These inputs highlighted activities such as carrying out an investigation at the scene, offering advice, initiating further contact and informing the victim of what would be done. Some may consider this as a standard service, which should be provided to all victims. However, this approach of purely concentrating on the service delivery to improve satisfaction ignored the views of Brandl et al (1994) and Hawdon (2008) who suggested that to improve satisfaction, police should focus on the public's perception as well as the quality of service being delivered.

Regardless of this, both chapter six and seven explained how the Citizen Focus department used the structure of stages of service and critical inputs as a way of measuring how well police officers were delivering the service to the victim. Supt 1 previously explained that research, completed by Merseyside Police marketing department, highlighted the 'actions taken' and 'follow-up' stages of service had a disproportionate impact on the levels of victim satisfaction as measured by the survey company.

Due to this, Merseyside Police introduced two force wide operations to raise the importance of these critical inputs. Supt 2 explained that Operation Morewood was designed to improve 'follow up'. It required each BCU to provide an investigation update to as many victims of crime as possible within a set period of time. Each BCU's performance was measured against the number of updates provided, to establish success. However, Operation Morewood was never benchmarked against the subsequent victim satisfaction surveys that were completed and therefore the ultimate success of it was never fully established.

Operation Dauphine was intended to improve the actions, taken by the reporting officer, by measuring the compliance with the officer issuing a 'victim contact sheet'. This sheet was a carbonated form which was to be completed at the time of reporting a crime and required the officer to tick off certain 'critical inputs' which had been completed. The form included the relevant reference numbers with a carbonated copy being left with the victim, intended to act as a

reminder of the actions which had been taken. However, again the motives for this appear to be organisational performance rather than victim needs driven.

So, if they (the victim) had the slip of paper in front of them they could go 'did the officer conduct a crime prevention survey of your premises?', yes they've ticked the box, yes they did. Are you happy with that? Yes. So, we were introducing the wording from that used by the (survey) company into the front-line policing."

(Supt 1)

The success of this operation was measured by compliance with the form being scanned onto the computer record of the crime and not against the subsequent satisfaction data. Again, success with regards to how it influenced the victim satisfaction survey was not established by the Citizen Focus department.

These operations tried to take a qualitative approach, to victim satisfaction and the BRM satisfaction gap, by appearing to focus on the service being delivered. But did they improve the actions taken and follow up which was being delivered to the victim? The following victim's story would question this.

Dissatisfied victim 2

The victim was walking in a street when a car drove passed him and he heard someone shout "Hey, Nigger". Two men then approached him from the car, grabbed and punched him, after which they took some of his belongings. The victim went home before reporting the incident to the police. However, it then

took over five days for police to attend and take the initial report. It was stated to him that no officers were available and the victim expressed complete dissatisfaction with actions taken, follow-up and the whole experience.

The victim said;

" I reported the incident and the police never came to investigate or to look for my belongings that were stolen. They have not till even now come to see me or to check the CCTV. They just never came".

"They never kept to their promises. They said someone would come to see me at least twice and they never even came out to the scene even up until now".

"I am dissatisfied with the way they responded to the matter. I was robbed and they took my jacket and passport and they never came out to help me look for it. They did not take it seriously. They did not even come to view CCTV"

"I do not like the way they responded to the issue and maybe it was not an emergency, but it was serious. I was robbed before and I reported everything and last time they came after 5 days. This time they did not attend".

The main cause for dissatisfaction is due to police failing to attend when they said they would. However, it is only at the end of the interview it becomes apparent that the victim may well be talking about a more recent incident than the crime he was being surveyed for. The surveyed crime did indeed take the police five days to report and, it appears, this is the crime that the victim refers to at the end of the survey as an example of another time the police failed to attend on time. This issue is not picked up by the interviewer, who should have either started the interview again or reflected these issues in the narrative box available.

From the victim's survey, it appears he had been robbed twice in a matter of weeks, after which on both occasions the police provided either a poor or

non-existent response. He stated the police were unhelpful by not keeping their promises and did not take the matter seriously. The listener is left wondering how much of an influence the first incident had on his judgement of the second.

At the end of the survey the victim states that if a similar thing happened again he would definitely not report it to the police. It would appear that he had lost trust in the police.

The victim's experience highlights several issues and questions the success that Operation Morewood and Operation Dauphine had on the service being delivered. The victim's story also questions the ability of the satisfaction survey process to produce data of an acceptable standard, as it was not able to pick up on the individual characteristics of the case. This will be considered further at the end of the chapter.

The narrative describes a victim experience which appears unacceptable to most. It is clear the dissatisfaction stemmed from a poor police response to report the crime. The guidance at that time, from the Citizen Focus department, was for BCU's to focus on the stages of service their research had stated would have a disproportionate impact on performance. However, the fact that the victim has been victimised in a similar way on a recent occasion, and experienced a poor response to both, appears to put his dissatisfaction beyond the recovery of either Operation Dauphine or a CSRO. Indeed, the poor

response times resulted in critical inputs within 'actions taken', such as investigating the scene or taking the matter seriously, becoming unachievable.

Even more concerning is the language used by the offenders towards the victim. Comparing this to the murder of Stephen Lawrence (Macpherson 1999), it questions whether much had changed for the BRM victim. It has already been established in chapter six and seven that Merseyside Police was performance driven, with the amount of focus on improving trust and confidence being questioned. The fact it took this research half the time to identify the data set for satisfied victims of crime, January to March, compared to January to June for dissatisfied victims, may suggest there was some quality service being delivered to the BRM communities. However, the subsequent description of performance management, and the gaming which took place, casts doubt on the ability of the victim satisfaction survey to highlight any quality in the service that were a product of the policies from the Citizen Focus department. As can be seen from the below victim, satisfaction was sometimes present even when the service provided was questionable.

Satisfied Victim 6

The victim was working as a security guard in a supermarket when he stopped a person leaving the store suspected of stealing. As he escorted the man back to the shop's office, his girlfriend approached him, called him a "Black cunt" and kicked him in the leg. She was detained and police attended and arrested her.

The woman was bailed for CCTV enquiries to be made. The victim was informed of this but did not receive a further call until a month later when he was told there were difficulties in obtaining a copy of the CCTV. The victim received two further updates; however, it is unclear whether he was informed of the final result. The suspect was subsequently charged after the survey had been completed and found guilty at court. The victim stated he was completely satisfied with all stages of services.

“They reassured me that the way I had been dealt with was not acceptable and they gave me a contact number if I needed anything”.

“They have been updating me they must have contacted me at least three times. They have done more than enough”.

The victim appears a supporter of the police and gives the impression it would take a great deal of poor service to change his opinion. However, it should be noted that although there was a positive outcome to the investigation, at the time of the interview this had not yet been resulted. Thus, the listener is left wondering whether the victim’s assessment is totally reflective of the service provided at that stage.

The satisfaction within the above example does not appear to reflect the service provided. There was a month’s delay in providing an update, even then this was to say difficulties were being experienced. The survey questions whether victim satisfaction reflects the service provided or is driven by opinion, previous experience and confirmation bias (Skogan 2005).

The Gold Service

Chapter four explained that Merseyside Police introduced a 'Gold Service' for BRM victims of crime with the intention that it would narrow the BRM satisfaction gap. This was done even though there was an acknowledgement that a victim of crime, from any community, required a quality service to be able to express a high level of satisfaction (Merseyside Police 2009). Yet again the Citizen Focus department focused this initiative on the principles of stages of service and critical inputs.

"It was introduced on the back of two things. One was actions taken, our performance wasn't good...I sat in a meeting in (named BCU) and I asked them to show me the letters they sent to victims when their crimes were being written off. They gave me two different letters, they had different force crests, different content, different telephone numbers...we also recognised through a series of focus groups that the bobbies had no idea of the process that happens in crime investigation."

(Supt 1)

From this it was decided that all BRM victims should receive a 'Gold Service' from the initial reporting officer, to address 'actions taken' stage of service, and the investigating officer, to address 'follow up', to secure their satisfaction. However, there was never a definition provided by Supt 1 of what a 'Gold Service' would look like and, more importantly, what it would include above and beyond the normal service provided to any victim of crime. Regardless the principle attracted support;

“We need to make sure that we give a good a service to the person of colour or protected characteristic person as possible.”

(Supt 3)

However, there was also concern expressed within Merseyside Police. Chapter six highlighted the views of a visiting academic and a representative of a national market research company with regards to the waste of police resources by focusing attention purely on the BRM community. There were also other concerns expressed with regards to the consequences of the ‘Gold Service’.

“I think there was almost a backlash (from Police Constables), but in a subtle way of saying, ‘well why should we have to do something different for BRM victims. You know I am not being discriminatory, I’m giving the same service to all victims’ and I think this is where the lack of understanding will come.”

(Supt 2)

However, the Constables did not support this but instead provided a view that questions whether the ‘Gold Service’ ever existed other than in a name or the minds of more senior officers;

“I think what you find is you go to a job and everyone gets what they need. If you go to an assault.... regardless of his BRM group and he was like ‘no I’m alright, I have had a bit of a kicking but I’m alright’...he gets that level of care. But if you went there and a victim is like ‘Oh I’m traumatized by this assault’ but

it was the same level of assault then they might get a bit more in relation to...what do you think we can do for you. But if someone is 'I have been assaulted, I'm not bothered. I don't want to do anything' then they get a certain level of care.... it's got to be nothing to do with what sort of ethnic or BRM...you just go and you see to what they need."

(Constable's Focus Group)

Initially, the Constables appear to have taken a structurally informed view of the victim. There seems to be an agreement that certain groups or sections of society, for whom the harm done by criminal victimization, is a differential experience with not all sharing the same levels of vulnerability (Walklate 2007). However, when considering the issue of trust, as explained by Fukuyama (1995), the Constables' approach may present a problem. Unlike, Supt 3 there appears to be no acceptance that the organisation needs assurances that a BRM victim of crime is given a good service. Rather, the victims' attitude to the police will dictate the service provided to them. If there is an unwillingness to cooperate or a dismissive attitude shown for whatever reason, this appears to be judged on face value by the officers and their service tailored accordingly. However, such an attitude could be displayed due to the victim having a lack of trust in the police (Fukuyama 1995) or failing to view the police as a legitimate organisation (Tyler 2005). Indeed, if a victim had a similar experience as dissatisfied victim two, previously referred to in this chapter, then such an approach by the Constables could have fueled a feeling of dissatisfaction and lack of trust.

However, the Constable's comments do question whether a 'Gold Service' existed in practical terms. This is further highlighted by the following victim.

Dissatisfied victim 4

The victim was at work in the city centre during her lunch break and having a cigarette in a public area. She was approached by a man who asked her for a cigarette. When she said no she was subjected to racial abuse of 'Go back to your own country, go back on the banana boat, you're over here taking all our jobs'. The police were contacted by another woman but the man had left before they arrived.

A report was taken and an investigating officer allocated. He contacted the victim and checked CCTV. However, after a couple of weeks it was decided there were no further lines of investigation and the crime was filed as being undetected. The victim was then informed of this.

The victim said;

"I have seen the person that committed the crime against me on numerous occasions. When this happens, I have called the police but it has not been taken as a high priority".

I thought the police would take the case more seriously as they told me of the actions they would take. Since then I don't think the incident has been taken seriously or followed up".

The grounds for the dissatisfaction stems from the police failing to respond whenever the victim phoned up to provide the location of the suspect. This

impacted on her views of the investigation, the follow up service and her whole experience.

The victim is more than happy with how she was initially treated and states the officers communicated well, were sympathetic and treated her with respect. This could be a good service. However, the explanations and promises made at the time of reporting appear to be a source of the subsequent dissatisfaction;

“I thought they would take it more seriously as they explained to me before the actions they would do. From the actions after I had contacted them, I don't feel it's been taken seriously or followed up completely”.

The victim's experience does suggest that a good service was initially provided. However, this may have raised expectations of the service which resulted in the subsequent poor contact producing even more dissatisfaction.

The principles of providing a 'Gold Service' to BRM victims could be considered appropriate when reflecting on the views of Supt 3, regarding the need to provide a good service to the person of colour or protected characteristic. However, this appears to pose the question of whether it is achievable? What is different or added to the 'Gold Service' which ensures it is better than a service provided to other victims? Perhaps, more importantly, what is missing from the service provided to other victims? It is interesting to reflect on this whilst considering another point Supt 3 made. On discussing how the BRM

satisfaction gap was measured, it was noted that one way of narrowing the gap was to 'just make white victims less satisfied'. Whilst this was said somewhat tongue in cheek, this may have been a principle behind the 'Gold Service'. However, Supt 2 raised other concern as to why the 'Gold Service' was needed and in turn why it may fail;

"Racism or racist views is extreme, but I think along that spectrum towards racism. I think there will be officers with certainly strong prejudices, I would say, against BRM and prejudiced on resistance to what we were trying to do (introducing the 'Gold Service') as being seen as making BRM victims special really. 'Why should they get special treatment' you know, and I have heard that said."

(Supt 2)

Who gets the 'Gold Service'?

Like the Constables, the Sergeants also presented a view that questions whether the 'Gold Service' existed in practical terms:

"Some of the crime(s) don't warrant anything further than a phone call cause they don't want to co-operate with the police, and some of it (the requirement for a 'Gold Service') is not relevant. The victims don't want anything more cause the nature of the crime, whatever. But those who are relevant will get, will potentially get a reassurance visit, or target hardening, whatever is needed really."

(Sergeant's Focus Group)

The Sergeants went on with regards to the application of a 'Gold Service';

"We get a lot of crimes, not just BRM, we get a lot of crimes where you look on the history, they are an offender more than they are a victim and they would never, they are not interested in the police. They are not interested in confidence in the police, they hate the police because we are the opposition and you get the same ...but your genuine victim...I believe yes we do improve on theirs (quality of service provided)."

(Sergeant's Focus Group)

They continued:

"We do the minimum premium (Gold) service of a call back to establish that, but it then depends on the individual's circumstances when we ring up as to what they get next."

(Sergeant's Focus Group)

However, the Sergeants went on to explain that BRM victims may not be the sole beneficiaries of the 'Gold Service.'

"There are only certain victims of crime that get that service, where it doesn't matter what crime you are a victim of you get, you're from a BRM group you get the same service. Which others would only get if they are an ASB or a burglary victim or like a robbery victim. Like SAC (Serious Acquisitive Crime) offences, we will go round and sort of."

(Sergeant's Focus Group)

The principle of ensuring a victim was provided with a quality or 'Gold Service' had also been introduced for victims of other crimes, such as burglary, robbery and SAC. This was not connected to the citizen focus agenda, but instead introduced when each crime presented itself as a performance issue for Merseyside Police. However, like the Constables, their reply questions what the term 'Gold Service' means. They introduced a notion of 'minimum premium' which amounts to a phone call to allow the officer to make an assessment on the victim needs. When considering this in context with the term 'proper victim' there appears to be a concerning issue that the person making the contact call is the one who decides what service the victim will receive based on their own opinion. Chapter two stated that the Home Office (2006) said Citizen Focus policing reflected the needs and expectations of individuals and local communities in decisions-making, service delivery and practice. The service described by the Sergeants appears to be far removed from these principles, with the victim potentially receiving anything but a 'Gold Service'. The possible implications of the term 'genuine victim' will be further considered in the concluding chapter, however was there a 'Gold Service' being provided? They next victim's story would question this.

Dissatisfied victim 9

The victim lived in a bed-sit with some shared, communal areas. During late evening, he heard a bang on the front door and thought nothing of this until he saw his door handle move. The door was locked from the inside so a short while later he went out into the corridor where he confronted a burglar. The man ran off and the victim chased him for a short while but stopped when the

burglar indicated that he had a weapon. The victim stated that he would recognise him again.

The matter was reported immediately to the police and house-to-house enquiries, along with a forensic examination were initially completed. However, it took a month before an investigating officer was allocated the crime, after which a statement was taken from the victim. During this, it was established that the victim could identify the burglar. The investigating officer explored the possibility of the victim completing an e-fit impression of the burglar but was informed it was no longer a viable option due to the time delay.

During the survey, the victim stated he was fairly dissatisfied with the actions taken, follow-up, investigations and the whole experience. He said:

“The police always said they would send someone when I was off and nobody came, it kept being put off”.

“The police are taking too much time in keeping me informed. It takes like two weeks or more before I get another call about what is happening”.

“It seems like the police are not taking it seriously”.

There are two areas of dissatisfaction. Initially it took four days for Merseyside Police to formally report the crime. They continued to ‘Keep Person Informed’ (KPI) whenever an appointment was broken. This was in line with policy and intended to improve communication regarding promises being made and

thereby improve satisfaction. However, in this case it would appear the number of times the victim was put off resulted in dissatisfaction.

The victim was also dissatisfied with the fact he was unable to provide an e-fit, even though officers had promised this would happen. He appears to be unaware that the delay in the investigation resulted in the evidential worth of the e-fit no longer being valid. The victim's experience clearly questions the existence of a 'Gold Service'.

Chapter two stated that police concern with community and race relations, prior to the Macpherson Report, was generally focused on ensuring BRM groups received an equal level of service (Rowe 2004). However, recognition that needs of individual BRM groups differ resulted in the acceptance that a structurally neutral view of the BRM victim was no longer valid to improve levels of trust and confidence. However, the above description of the supposed 'Gold Service' does not provide reassurance that this was the case. The policy implies all BRM victims require or deserve the best service possible, but this ignores the principles of Citizen Focus policing (Home Office 2006) which says the needs of the individual should be considered. The Constable's focus group initially gave an impression that organisational policy was being ignored in order to provide an individual service as required by each victim. However, when considering the general assumptions made by them towards the possible behaviour of a victim, this becomes questionable. Likewise, the views presented by the Sergeants regarding how they decided on the quality of service to be provided to a victim, also casts doubt on whether the 'Gold

Service' ever existed other than in policy form or in the minds of senior officers within Merseyside Police.

Victim Satisfaction Survey

As explained by Supt 1, the policies and practices employed to narrow the BRM satisfaction gap were directed at the victim satisfaction survey and to influencing the data being produced by it. However, the methodology was set by the Home Office (2008b), as was the survey questionnaire structure and wording. Chapter seven has highlighted some ways in which Merseyside Police tried to game the data being produced, for their own benefit. However, this did not address those problems identified with the data being produced by the private customer service company that resulted from their working practices. Chapter six highlighted that the regional accents of the interviewer could have an impact on the quality of data being produced. These concerns appear valid and question the Home Office (2008b) stated benefits of using private sector companies. This is, in part, due to the restrictions placed by the tendering process, as described by Interviewee 5, that required Merseyside Police to accept the more cost effective, rather than the most fit for purpose.

There were further issues identified with the victim satisfaction survey process. The Sergeants were clear that the structure of the questionnaire was responsible for creating both satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Others agreed with this;

“Does the gap actually exist, or have we in a way manufactured it, because we are doing the phone backs and surveying satisfaction? And the way that the questions were phrased was creating confusion, the length of the questionnaire as well. People were just answering ‘yes’ and ‘no, probably still thinking about the previous question when the next ones on....to a certain extent the gap may well have been slightly artificial, artificial because of the survey method.”

(Supt 2)

There were further issues highlighted;

“People (victims) didn’t make a connection because of the language that was used in the survey. So, the Bobbie might go and say, ‘I have checked your doors and your windows, everything seems to be ok’. And then they would be asked (during the victim survey) did the officer conduct a crime prevention survey of your premises, and they (the victim) would go, ‘well no’ so you’re not satisfied.”

(Supt 1)

“I phoned them (dissatisfied victim)’no we weren’t, we weren’t dissatisfied, we just didn’t understand the process of something. We didn’t tell (survey company) that we weren’t, we just didn’t understand the process. (The survey company) ticked that as dissatisfied. What’s that all about..... I would question sometimes the validity of (the survey company).

(Supt 3)

These views question the validity of the victim satisfaction survey to produce data which accurately indicates a victim's satisfaction level. They also highlight further practical problems experienced with data quality. It is probably unsurprising, due to the performance management focus, that these concerns are directed to the data being produced. There was no concern expressed with regards to the impact that such a poor satisfaction survey process may have on the victim involved. It appeared that so long as satisfied data was being produced, then no further examination was warranted.

The victim's experience

Interviewee 5 has already highlighted problems that some victims experienced, as a result of the private company's working practice. The emerging themes from the victim satisfaction survey transcripts (Table 5.6) show that five out of the twelve victims experienced problems with the interviewer speaking too quickly. There were also five examples of the interviewer not recording what was said and a further two examples of the interviewer directly influencing the data being recorded. As highlighted with the next victim's story, this resulted in apparently questionable and frustrating experiences for the victim whilst being surveyed;

Dissatisfied Victim 3

The victim was in the female toilet of a Liverpool nightclub in the early hours when she was approached by a man who had tried to attract her attention earlier in the evening. He put his arm around her at which point she pushed him away. She left the toilet and told security staff in the premises what had

happened. Later, when she left the nightclub, the male was waiting for her after apparently been ejected. He called her a 'Paki grass' and stated 'Everybody hates Pakis' and as she turned away he pulled her hair back causing her to fall to the floor. He then stole her mobile phone. Police were called who took her home and reported the matter. It took over a week for the victim to be contacted by the investigating officer.

The victim expressed dissatisfaction with the actions taken, follow up, investigation and whole experience.

"Instead of asking me how I was he asked me if I was on drugs".

"It happened 7 weeks ago and I do not know if they have found the culprit".

The interviewer speaks fast and gives the impression that they are rushing the victim. When the victim points out that she is on her lunch break and later asks how much longer the interview will take, the interviewer ignores this and carries on with the survey. At one stage, the victim appears to be ordering food but there is no acknowledgement from the interviewer that it might be a poor time to complete the survey. As the interview progresses so there is a sense that the victim becomes impatient. She quickly answers 'yes' and 'no' to some questions and gives the impression that she has not really heard them but wants the interview to finish.

However, the victim appears to have a story she wishes to tell, but due to the speed of the interviewer and the victims desire to speak much detail is lost.

Answers provided by the victim are not in the order the interviewer needs to record them in, so the interview becomes disjointed with several questions having to be asked twice. For example, the question “Did the police do anything to dissuade you from reporting the incident” is asked during the initial reporting stage. The question is an attempt to identify if the victim may be dissuaded by police from making an initial report. The victim expresses a view that they did when a reporting officer said, “Well stuff like this happens all of the time”. However, the interviewer only appears interested in what was said to the victim on the phone as they were then in the ‘follow-up’ section of the survey. When she confirms no attempt to dissuade her was made over the phone the interviewer moves onto the next question. It is also apparent that the victim is not happy with the actions and behaviour of one officer. However due to the survey structure this information is lost and never presented in the written report to Merseyside Police.

The victim also appears to focus on those prompts that the interviewer provides. For example, when asked if the police gave any practical help, the prompt from the interviewer was, “such as helping you to get home”. The victim focuses in on this and replies, “Yeah, initially when the incident happened they gave me a lift home”. However, when asked if the police investigated the scene of the crime, the prompt given was “did they look for fingerprints”. The victim replies “No, they just looked at the CCTV”. This results in the interviewer saying, “Oh they did then ok” and recorded that the police had investigated the scene. It is unclear from this which is the correct answer.

The above survey response shows the victim can focus on the directions being given by the interviewer to explain a question which, in turn, can influence the data being recorded. The question regarding practical help turned into a reply concerning transport home. With a little more time and explanation, which did not strictly follow the prescribed script, then perhaps a more accurate narrative may have been produced. Likewise, there was an issue of the interviewer guiding the victim towards an answer suitable for the survey methodology. This occurred on other occasions. Dissatisfied victim 2 was asked if he had been a victim of another crime in the last month. When he said he had, he was questioned as to how many times? He replied he was unsure but it was more than two. He was then asked if it was more than likely 2 or 3 times. This limited the victim's choice and he replied three; however again it is unclear if this answer is correct.

Dissatisfied victim 3 appeared to have a story she wanted to tell the interviewer. If a victim is dissatisfied due to lack of contact from the police, even though the CSRO policy would say this should not happen, then the need to tell the first person who asks about their experience is understandable. However, the victim satisfaction survey does not lend itself to providing this quality as shown by the next victim;

Dissatisfied Victim 8

The victim was in a bar in Liverpool city centre during the early hours when his friends were asked to leave. A woman, who was in his party, got into an argument with security staff who then slapped her. The victim stated he went

across to assist his friend and he too was assaulted by security staff, resulting in a bloody nose. They were all then escorted out resulting in more pushing on behalf of the security staff. The victim then approached a police officer outside the club who recorded the incident and asked the victim to contact police the following day.

An investigating officer was allocated and he says that although he tried to contact the victim he was initially only ever able to leave a message on the answer phone. A copy of CCTV footage was obtained from the licenced premises which contradicted the victim's story and showed both the victim and his friend assault the security staff first before they then responded. The Investigating officer took the view that the force used by the security staff was reasonable and made in self-defence. The incident was subsequently reported as a 'no crime' and the victim was informed of this by a letter.

The victim expressed dissatisfaction with actions taken, follow up, investigation and the whole experience and said;

"From the very first day I was not kept informed properly".

"I was not treated in a helpful manner".

The subsequent survey was disjointed and proved to be a struggle, for both the victim and the interviewer, throughout. Most of the preambles to each section were rushed and required the victim to ask for them to be repeated. Likewise, the victim spoke fast and with a heavy accent that made it difficult for him to be understood by the interviewer.

It quickly became clear that the victim was dissatisfied with the service and wished to tell the interviewer the full story. Due to the questionnaire structure, this often resulted in the victim providing information that the interviewer could not record at that time and then having to repeat himself when the relevant question was asked. This appears to result in the victim disengaging with the interviewer towards the end of the survey and just providing one-word answers. This assisted in speeding up the data collecting process but leaves the listener wondering if the answers provided are indeed accurate.

It is not possible to fully assess what sense the victim made of the survey process. However, it is possible to detect frustration at it was not allowing the victim to tell their story and get any issues they may have off their chest.

Such problems during the interview were not just noted with dissatisfied victims of crime. Again, when they occurred the listener is left wondering what long-term effect the survey may have had on the trust of the victim with regards to Merseyside Police as shown by the following victim;

Satisfied Victim 9

The victim became involved in an argument with a housemate resulting in him being punched in the face whilst hitting out in self-defence. He then called the police as he was in fear.

Police attended and ascertained that neither the victim nor suspect wished to make a formal complaint. The officer at the scene reported it as a racially aggravated incident and filed it as 'undetected'. There was no further contact with the victim after this initial response.

During the survey, the victim stated he was either very or completely satisfied with each stage of service.

The interviewer's style was rushed and it is initially unclear to the listener whether the victim understands what is going on. He mumbles his first answers and it is not clear what he is saying. This does not put the interviewer off who ploughs on with the questions resulting in her missing some detail that the victim is trying to provide. On several occasions, she summarises what the victim has said, apparently for brevity, and does not record everything that the victim says.

The interviewer then gets confused with an abbreviation the victim uses. In reply to why he was completely satisfied with the investigation the victim starts to explain about a previous experience with the police and gives the listener the impression that he is about to compare the two experiences. Within this he uses the term ISB. The following conversation takes place:

Interviewer (I) "Why do you say that?"

Victim (V) "Because I had something else to do with the...."

(I) "I am sorry; I don't understand what you are saying."

- (V) "Because, I had something else, another issue that ISB worked ..."
- (I) "Which I?"
- (V) "Madam, can I explain please because I think there is a problem, a line problem...."
- (I) "I think I, I don't understand what you are saying."
- (V) "I am saying that I have another issue that ISB of Liverpool..."
- (I) "Which I what?"
- (V) "Madam, ISB...Intelligence Service Branch."
- (I) "Oh, the CID, sorry."
- (V) "No, not the CID...ISB."
- (I) "ISP?"
- (V) "I...S...B. B for brother."
- (I) "I am sorry I can't understand what you are saying."
- (V) "I, I for India. S, S for Sugar. B for brother."
- (I) "ISB.... what does that stand for?"
- (V) "It stands for Intelligence Service Branch."
- (I) "Is this to do with the incident we are talking about?"
- (V) "No, it's to do with something else but I am waiting for them to come back to me, they haven't."
- (I) "I cannot put that in because I am dealing with the date I gave you now."
- (V) "I just want to let you know that there is another issue that, regarding me, that I am waiting...."
- (I) "Right, but why are you satisfied to date with the way they have investigated your crime?"

- (V) "My crime, yeah I was satisfied."
- (I) "And why are you satisfied? Why are you completely satisfied to date with what they have done to investigate your crime?"
- (V) "It was ok, yeah."
- (I) "Did they investigate your crime?"
- (V) "Yeah, they ask a lot of questions and yeah."

The above example highlights other problems with the victim satisfaction survey. The victim refused to make a complaint of an assault and thus the matter was correctly recorded as an 'incident'. Due to the victim being BRM this was included in the victim satisfaction survey process (Home Office 2008b) However, in such cases the interview script is not adjusted and thus several questions were included that did not make sense to the victim. The interviewer asks whether the victim negotiated with the police about how often they would be kept informed of the progress of the case. The victim sounds confused and replies "No, because I didn't take it further". However, the rushed style of the interviewer causes further confusion and this, combined with an apparent unwillingness to listen, creates an exchange that could grace the script of a 1970s situation comedy. It is impossible to assess what sense the victim makes of this experience.

Summary

The Home Office (2008b) presented each police force with a victim satisfaction survey process that broke down the victim's experience into sections, or stages of service, which permitted further managerial examination. This allowed the performance culture of Merseyside Police to focus on the quantitative issues of how often a particular critical input was completed, rather than the qualitative aspect of whether police interactions with a BRM victim of crime was a positive experience and thereby was improving trust in the police.

It would appear from Supt 1 that, as an organisation, Merseyside Police approved of this system as it provided a tangible framework to show activity in addressing the problem. Based on unsubstantiated research from their Marketing Department, a focus on two stages of service, actions taken and follow-up, was developed. This resulted in force wide operations that counted the quantitative number of phone calls made and victim contact sheets scanned into their system. These were presented as performance that would improve victim satisfaction. Reassured by the fact the policy was based on research, at no time did there appear to be any concern as to whether this type of contact was addressing the needs of the individual victim.

However, Merseyside Police were totally reliant on the victim satisfaction survey to produce the performance data that measured their success. As chapter six and seven described, organisational activity solely focused on changing this data. According to Interviewee 5 any concerns regarding the methodology and working practice of the survey company were overlooked. No

explanation has been found for this, but it can be noted that addressing the quality of the survey would not have necessarily improved the performance data being produced.

It would appear this resulted in victims who, having been surveyed, were unsure of the process they had taken part in and therefore became frustrated. Victims often wanted time to tell their story and explain the reason for their dissatisfaction. Having apparently not been listened to for weeks, it appears they viewed the survey as providing them with an audience. However, the nature of the survey process did not allow for this. Due to the need for surveys to be completed in a set time, some became rushed, with interviewers summarising a victim's narrative to fit into the software data box. There are examples of rich data being provided to the interviewer regarding how the service provided to the victim could be improved. However, most of this quality information was lost. Instead, there was a victim survey in place that sought out appropriately quick answers, in the precise order required by the questionnaire. This was inflexible and unable to be adjusted to examine the individual victim's story but was completed quickly enough for the company to move on to the next survey and thereby comply with the contract they had agreed with Merseyside Police.

It has not been possible to show how this process impacted on the victim of crime. However, it has been shown to be far removed from the intended outcomes of Citizen Focus policing (Home Office 2006). As for the impact on

trust and confidence? This appears to have never been a consideration for Merseyside Police when trying to narrow the BRM satisfaction gap.

The concluding chapter will consider the key issues highlighted by this research in relation to performance gaming, survey methodology, organisational culture and, ultimately, how this may relate to trust and confidence amongst BRM communities.

Chapter 9: Research review and implications

Introduction

This concluding chapter will look back over the previous chapters that comprise the thesis. Whilst I do not intend to discuss further the topics raised within these, this chapter will highlight four issues that the research has highlighted. These are organisational and officer culture, the gaming of performance data, victim satisfaction survey methodology and the effect Merseyside Police policies which related to the BRM satisfaction gap had on trust and confidence. The chapter will give consideration as to how these issues impacted on victims of crime, the organisation and police officers and will consider some further implications they may still have on policing.

Context for this research was provided in chapter two which explained how the principles of the BRM satisfaction gap were introduced, via the Macpherson Report (1999). Following an inquiry into the police response and investigation of the murder of Stephen Lawrence, the subsequent report proposed that improving trust and confidence, amongst BRM communities with the police, should be a ministerial priority. The report then provided the ten performance indicators which would assist in the measurement of this. The chapter explained how one of these proposals developed into the BRM satisfaction gap performance indicator.

The fact that the Macpherson Report (1999) highlighted the need for a ministerial priority as the first recommendation, created an expectation that this

would be an important, overarching principle that would be the driving influence of any subsequent organisational activity resulting from it. However, it was shown that the Home Secretary's Action Plan (1999), failed to live up to this expectation. Indeed, the annual reports on progress (Home Office 2000, 2001, 2002a, 2003a) showed no identifiable concern as to whether trust and confidence was improving between the BRM communities and police.

Chapter three examined the issue of trust, confidence and satisfaction in further detail. It pointed out that it is usual within police literature to find these terms to be used interchangeably, with little recognition of any difference between them all (Cao 2015). However, it was shown that a lack of understanding of their differences, when drafting and implementing policy, can result in ineffective actions for the police service. Chapter three concluded that Tyler's (2005) proposal that there are two types of trust placed in the police, that of institutional trust and motive-based trust, appeared to be the most relevant model for this research when considering public trust in the police.

Chapter four explained how the victim satisfaction survey process, introduced by the Home Office (2008a), provided a performance management tool which produced statistical data for each critical input, within each stage of service. This was a national standard which, in line with NPM principles, allowed the Home Office to compare individual force performance against the targets they set. It was discussed how such a style of governance must assume that the setting of targets will change the behaviour of both the individual and the organisation to achieve the required outcome. Another proposed effect of the NPM governance

by target is the manipulation and gaming of data by those who may be directly affected by the success or failure of the performance being measured (Bevan and Hood 2006). In line with this, chapter four discussed the CSRO and how Merseyside Police introduced a policy whereby, under the justification of providing the victim with an update, a positive influence on victim satisfaction data was gamed (Merseyside Police 2009a).

These chapters describe a process, driven by clear Home Office policy, underpinned by a public enquiry report, that provide an apparent strategic sign post for the police service. However, Merseyside Police was only concerned with the requirements of the performance indicator and applied their established performance management processes and culture as the way of gaining an improvement in it. This research has highlighted four main issues that has resulted from this process, the implications of which are now discussed.

Organisational and officer culture

Organisational Culture

It was explained that both a visiting academic and the representative of a market research company warned Merseyside Police against the investment of resources and effort into trying to narrow the BRM Satisfaction gap. They believed it had no statistical significance and was being used for political spin which, therefore, deserved no further consideration by the police. However, this advice went unheeded, whilst individuals within Merseyside Police failed to express their own personal concerns with it. Instead, the organisation worked to the direction provided by the Chief Constable, whilst citing research

completed by their own communication and marketing department as empirical justification for their policies and actions.

Merseyside Police had an established organisational performance culture which was applied to the problem of the BRM satisfaction gap. This provided a performance management process of regular meetings involving the command team of all BCUs, which examined detailed data changes to identify non-compliance and thereby provide an explanation to any changes in performance figures. It has been shown that this is comparable to the Compstat process, described by Eterno and Silverman (2012), and used by various police organisations across the world. The fact that the Merseyside Police process was described as a brutal regime, appears to highlight the concerns of Bevan and Hood (2006) regarding those performance management systems which developed from NPM. The need to obtain improved performance data, whilst using fear and intimidation toward individuals, is a reasonable conclusion of the Merseyside Police process, as it explained how senior police officers were held to account with relentless follow-up and measurement of their team's performance outputs.

There was an acknowledgment from the Citizen Focus department that a more supportive style of performance management could be used. However, it is unclear whether this resulted from an acceptance that measured performance would benefit from it or from the difficulties they experienced in being heard within the established performance culture. Indeed, the narrative regarding the difficulties they experienced, during some of the performance meetings,

questions the motives of individuals. A case was presented that suggested the performance culture encouraged each ACC to focus on the performance of their individual portfolio, rather than considering the impact on the whole organisation.

This established performance management culture focused on outputs that could be easily measured and tracked, with the stages of service and critical inputs providing an ideal vehicle. This clearly highlights the concerns expressed by Foster, Newburn and Souhami (2005) when they state that police forces tend to focus attention on easily identified and achieved performance, whilst ignoring the more important but difficult issues that need addressing. This performance culture encouraged Merseyside Police to measure and track simplistic actions completed by the reporting officer, such as whether a crime number was provided or they appeared to take the matter seriously, rather than try to measure whether trust within a particular community was increasing or not.

This research produced no data that showed Merseyside Police acknowledged such a performance culture could result in 'quick wins', whilst ignoring the difficult issues. The impact this culture had on policing, within Merseyside, during times of austerity was not examined by this research. However, it is possible to conclude that if such a preferred focus on quick wins continued, whilst resources reduced, then a further reduction of trust and confidence towards the police may have resulted.

Officer Culture

This research explained how Merseyside Police used the principle of providing a 'gold service' to each BRM victim to try and improve victim satisfaction data. Such a process provided the Citizen Focus department tangible actions to measure and audit, as required by the performance management regime. However, it can be concluded that such an approach contributed to the simplistic belief that the actions of the reporting and investigating officers were the sole contributors to a victim's satisfaction level. This ignored the views of those who believe there are other influences, which are just as important, when considering issues of trust, confidence and satisfaction with the police, Skogan (2005), Tyler (2006) and Fukuyama (1995).

However, as previously discussed, the organisational performance culture required such activity to allow the measurement of officer's actions to graphically evidence performance. This research highlighted issues, that can be attributed to individual officer culture, that was a consequence of this approach.

There was a general consensus, amongst those interviewed, that there were problems with regards to the BRM satisfaction gap. However, instead of voicing them, there was an acceptance of compliance with the direction given to them by the ACC. The Sergeants commented on this with a belief that what senior officers wanted would also provide the required benefits to the victim. However, the 'gold service' required each BRM victim to be provided a service that was labelled as being of a higher quality than that provided to other victims. Even

though it was never explained what constituted a 'gold service', and more importantly what was removed when providing one that was not, the principle that a BRM victim receiving a different level of service was an appropriate and acceptable course of action, may have created a negative influence on officer culture. The research identified an environment where officers felt comfortable to vary the service provided to the victim, based on their judgement of the victim's needs.

It can of course be argued that police officers will always do this when dealing with any member of the public. However, this research highlighted some concerns which resulted from this. The Constables described a working practice whereby the victim's needs, and the service they received, was established by an officer assessment of how much help they thought the victim wanted, or indeed deserved. There was no acknowledgment or acceptance that a victim may not wish to cooperate with police due to issues that impact on their level of trust in them. It appears reasonable to conclude that if the Constables believed they were not dealing with a worthy victim, then a lesser service was provided. BRM communities can have lower trust in the police compared to white communities (Rowe 2004), such an approach could easily lead to a poor service being provided to victims of BRM communities as a result of this.

The principle of the 'proper victim' was highlighted in stark terms by the Sergeants. They expressed a belief that it was correct to differentiate between 'proper victims' and the 'others', when deciding the type of service to be provided. This is concerning. The context they placed on the 'others' was one

of repeat offenders or someone who had no 'interest' or trust in the police. When considering Fukuyama's (1995) view of high and low trust communities, resulting from culture, then a connection can again be drawn between a low trust community and a reduced police service the Sergeants believe those members deserve. Indeed, it appears they viewed a victim who did not wish to cooperate as breaching a moral contract with them, as gratitude should be expressed for the service they offered (Waddington et al, 2006).

It is reasonable to conclude, from the attitudes expressed by both Sergeants and Constables, of the presence of an officer culture that permitted individuals to vary the service provided to a victim, based on their individual judgements and, therefore, prejudices. However, the Citizen Focus department dismissed the impact of any external issues, such as trust and legitimacy, can have on victim satisfaction levels. If this is correct, then it is reasonable to state that the existence of the BRM satisfaction gap is produced as a direct result of the service provided by police officers. However, this research did not obtain an explanation from the Citizen Focus department as to why the service being provided to BRM victims created disproportionate dissatisfaction and required such a direct managerial focus on the actions of the individual officer. Supt 2 provided, perhaps, the obvious explanation.

"I think in the widest context then we must have had that type of officer with views of racism. Racism or racist views is extreme but I think along that spectrum towards racism. I think there will be officers with certainly strong prejudices I would say against BRM and prejudiced on resistance to what we

were trying to do as being seen as making BRM victims special really. ‘Why should they get special treatment’ you know, and I have heard that said.”

(Supt 2)

There is no acknowledgement from Citizen Focus department that this could be a relevant issue. However, as discussed, both the Constable’s and Sergeant’s focus groups presented a culture that support the view that, to some lesser or greater extent, the system and processes employed to narrow the BRM satisfaction gap allowed discretion and, thereby, individual prejudice to affect the service being provided to a victim of crime.

It is not possible to draw any sort of empirical conclusion relating to racism within the police service from this research. However, it is possible to say that an acceptance by the Citizen Focus department to the possibility that officer’s behaviour and prejudice may have been contributing to the BRM satisfaction gap, would have resulted in a more informed policy design for service delivery. Rather, it seems reasonable to assume this culture may still be having an influence on any service provided to the victim of crime.

The gaming or corruption of performance data?

Bevan and Hood (2006) considered the manipulation and gaming of performance figures to be inevitable when dealing with performance management. This research found clear examples of this, at play by Merseyside Police, towards the BRM satisfaction gap with the use of the CSRO and removal process. Bevan and Hood (2006) identified three different types of gaming problems, that being the

ratchet effect, threshold effect and output distortions, that can influence performance data being gathered within an organisation. Indeed, it can be argued that the manner in which the CSRO was used was, although perhaps cynical, an example of output distortion. The CSRO attempted to achieve the measured target, as produced by the satisfaction survey, at the cost of other unmeasured aspects of performance. No concern was identified by this research regarding the need to provide a victim with an investigation update once the chances of a satisfaction survey being completed had passed.

However, it is difficult to apply one of Bevan and Hood's examples to the way in which the removal process was applied. This process was allowed by the Home Office (2008b) to provide guidance for each police force regarding who would be considered an eligible respondent for a satisfaction survey call. This list (table 4.1) was shown to be questionable as each force was advised, amongst other things, not to survey victims who had made a formal complaint or refused to cooperate with the investigation. However, it was the intention of the Home Office for this to be applied to the data set prior to the survey taking place, to produce comparable data across all police forces. However, Merseyside Police decided to apply this list after victims had been surveyed. The fact it was only ever applied to remove dissatisfied victims is evidence that it was intended to improve the performance data for Merseyside Police. Although senior officers were aware this practice was going on, the ethical nature of it was never questioned as it delivered the results which their performance culture demanded.

Had this process been equally applied to satisfied as well as dissatisfied victims, then perhaps the practice may have sat easily within the heading of 'gaming.' However, within the data highlighted by this research, the ethics of the working practice appear highly questionable, to the point of corrupt. If this practice is still ongoing then the implications could be severe, although this does require further research and investigation before an empirical conclusion can be made.

Victim satisfaction survey methodology

Concern regarding the data quality being produced by the victim satisfaction survey was expressed by all parties. This was supported by the analysis of the twenty-four victims, completed for this research.

The Home Office (2008b) stated that the provision of a set questionnaire and the use of a private customer survey company would produce data that could be compared nationally. However, this was not apparent. Concern was identified with regards to the private companies being employed by Merseyside Police. It had been identified that regional accents from the interviewer were an issue for victims in Merseyside, however due to the national tendering process, such issues could never be taken into consideration when awarding a contract.

The quality of the data produced by the survey company has also been questioned. A narrative was given that some dissatisfied victims were not, in fact, dissatisfied but had been confused by the survey process. It is not possible to confirm whether this was correct or was rather an excuse provided by a victim who did not have the trust to express dissatisfaction directly to the police.

However, analysis of the victim interviews did further highlight issues of interviewers speaking too quickly, leading the victim when providing examples to clarify a question, surveying the wrong crime and surveying a person who was not the victim. It can be concluded that this presents a victim satisfaction survey that did not produce accurate data.

Many of these issues was explained as being due to the constraints placed by the contract, which stipulated that only a maximum of 250 characters could be recorded for each interview. This resulted in a great deal of rich data, which could assist with the improvement of the service, being omitted as the narrative was summarised. Also, each interviewer was required to complete a set number of interviews each day. This was presented as a reason why some interviews were rushed. The analysis of the twenty-four victims supported this as the victim appeared to be treated as a commodity, from which information needed to be obtained from, rather than a victim of crime.

Merseyside Police and the Citizen Focus department were aware of the problems with the victim satisfaction survey, however this was ignored. It was stated that the process was always about performance. Therefore, the victim satisfaction survey was accepted as the way of measuring it, with the process going unchallenged whilst they found ways of influencing the data being produced, for the benefit of the organisation. There are clear warnings highlighted by this research with regards to the use of satisfaction surveys. Whilst it appears correct to try and establish how satisfied a victim was with the service provided, there is a need to acknowledge the limitations of a survey

methodology and a requirement not to view it as empirical evidence with regards to quality of service being provided.

Trust and Confidence

Chapter three highlighted that Tyler's institutional and motive-based trust appeared to be the most relevant model for this research to consider public trust in the police (Tyler 2006). Within the dissatisfied victim who have been analysed, there were examples of people having low institutional trust due to a belief that their crime had not been taken seriously. In line with Tyler, it appears they did not view the police as an honest and competent authority, who exercised their responsibilities on behalf of all citizens. However, as explained, the victim satisfaction survey only asks limited questions regarding the service provided. Therefore, this research did not identify any examples of victims expressing concerns that could be related to motive-based trust, such as a victim's judgement of the officer's intentions and motivations when dealing with them. However, had the victim satisfaction survey provided an opportunity to further probe a victim about an officer's actions, then it is reasonable to conclude that motive-based trust may well have been considered and discussed. Therefore, this research does support Tyler's (2006) view of public trust in the police as being relevant.

However, this research does question whether Merseyside Police's attempt to narrow the BRM satisfaction gap ever considered the impact it was having on public trust and confidence within BRM communities. No organisational knowledge of any connection between the BRM satisfaction gap and the

Macpherson report could be found. Instead, the organisational focus was very much fixed solely on the performance indicator, with trust and confidence being an unconnected issue on the periphery.

Did it really matter if there was no connection between the BRM satisfaction gap and trust and confidence? If this research had identified many cases of excellent service being provided to victims of crime, then it could be strongly argued this was not an issue. However, the analysis of the twenty-four victims of crime has suggested this was not the case. Instead, it was shown that Merseyside Police's policies and processes were not focused on impacting on public trust, whether institutionally or motive-based. Rather, there was a need to show activity, as required by the performance management culture, which resulted in the construction of activities. However, it can be argued much of this activity was an illusion. When terms such as 'minimum premium service' are used to describe a phone call being made to a victim to ascertain whether the officer believes they deserve a further service, then there was clearly never a focus on trust and confidence within Merseyside Police when trying to narrow the BRM satisfaction gap.

Summary

This research was initially intended to identify activities the police service could deliver to various BRM communities, to improve their level of satisfaction. However, the thesis has explained how the focus changed to that of examining the systems and processes used by Merseyside Police to narrow the satisfaction gap.

This research has examined the organisational effort Merseyside Police put into the BRM satisfaction gap. This should have resulted in some noticeable improvement in the service being provided to all victims of crime, in line with Citizen Focus policing principles (Home Office 2006). However, this activity was driven by a need to comply with Home Office policy and, thereby, improve measured performance, with little concern or benefit to the victim of crime.

This thesis highlighted the principles of improving BRM trust and confidence with the police was the reason for implementing the BRM satisfaction gap performance indicator. However, it has been made clear that within this context, trust and confidence were never considerations for Merseyside Police. Therefore, it may be possible to conclude that their efforts to narrow the BRM satisfaction gap really was an example of them 'hitting the target but missing the point.'

Appendix 1

User Satisfaction Survey

Hello, could I speak to (INSERT NAME) please. (IF NOT ABLE TO TAKE THE SURVEY NOW, TRY TO MAKE CALL BACK ARRANGEMENTS).

My name is I work for a research company called ##### and we are doing some work on behalf of Merseyside Police.

I'm calling to ask about the service you received from Merseyside Police in order to help them improve their service to others.

The interview takes about 12 minutes and anything you say is treated in confidence. Calls may be recorded for quality control purposes, also taking part is voluntary and you can withdraw at any time.

(READ OUT IF THE RESPONDENT ASKS HOW THEIR DETAILS WERE OBTAINED)

When you contacted the police about this crime you were asked for your telephone number in case they needed to get back to you. They have passed your number on to us so that you can tell us about they way they dealt with you and the service you received. Your details continue only to be used for the purpose connected with the crime or incident and Merseyside Police retains full ownership and responsibility for the information.

If you would like to confirm my identity, I can supply you with a contact name and telephone number for Merseyside Police.

(PROVIDE IF REQUESTED: #####, Strategic Analyst – Tel: #####)

Email: #####

Would you like to take part?

(IF NO, PLEASE SPECIFY REASONS IN FULL, THANK AND CLOSE).

Can I just confirm that you are aged 16 or over?

(IF NO, THANK AND CLOSE).

(RECORD CRIME/INCIDENT TYPE FROM PROVIDED DATA)

- Burglary
- Violence
- Vehicle crime
- Racist incident

READ OUT: Whilst we understand you may have experience other incidents previously, can I please ask you to think about (INSERT CRIME/REPORTED DATE) in your responses today.

Introduction

I'll be asking questions about how you got in touch with the police, what they did, how you were updated and then how you felt you were treated by the police officers/staff.

There are a few ordinary questions at the end about the overall experience.

SECTION 1: FIRST CONTACT

I'd like to start with some questions about how you first contacted the police.

ASK ALL

Q1 Firstly, did you contact the police about this incident yourself?

ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1	GO TO Q2
No	2	GO TO Q5
The police contacted me	3	GO TO Q5
Don't know/can't remember (DO NOT READ OUT)	4	GO TO Q5

ASK IF Q1=1

Q2 How did you contact the police about the incident? (PROMPT: Was it...)

ONE CODE ONLY

By 999 call	1
By the non-emergency number	2
By other telephone call	3
By a visit to a police station	4
By email	5
By text	6
Direct to an officer	7
Other (specify)	8
Don't know/can't remember (DO NOT READ OUT)	9

ASK IF Q1=1

Q3 Are you satisfied, dissatisfied or neither with how easy it was to contact someone who could assist you?

ONE CODE ONLY

Satisfied	And is that	Completely	1
		Very or	2
		Fairly satisfied	3
Dissatisfied	And is that	Completely	7
		Very or	6

		Fairly dissatisfied	5
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied			4
Don't know (DO NOT READ OUT)			8

ASK IF Q1=1

Q4 Why do you say that?

RECORD VERBATIM

Don't know (DO NOT READ OUT)

ASK ALL

Q5 After the details were initially reported, can you tell me was your incident then dealt with?

(PROMPT: Was it...)

ONE CODE ONLY

By someone being sent to your home or attending the scene of the crime (without a specific appointment)	1	GO TO Q9a
By someone visiting your home at a specific appointment time	2	GO TO Q9a
Entirely over the phone	3	GO TO Q6
At a police station	4	GO TO Q9a
Other (specify)	5	GO TO Q9a
Don't know/can't remember (DO NOT READ OUT)	6	GO TO Q9a

ASK IF **VEHICLE CRIME** AND Q5=3 (DEALT WITH OVER THE PHONE)

Q6 Was the call handler polite?

ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1
No	2
Not applicable	3
Don't know/can't remember (DO NOT READ OUT)	4

ASK IF **VEHICLE CRIME** AND Q5=3 (DEALT WITH OVER THE PHONE)

Q7 Did the call handler treat you with respect?

ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1
No	2
Not applicable	3
Don't know/can't remember (DO NOT READ OUT)	4

ASK IF **VEHICLE CRIME** AND Q5=3 (DEALT WITH OVER THE PHONE)

Q8 Was the call handler professional?

ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1
No	2
Not applicable	3
Don't know/can't remember (DO NOT READ OUT)	4

SECTION 2: POLICE ACTION TAKEN TO DEAL WITH THE INCIDENT

READ OUT: Please think about what the police did once they had been given the initial details. This could have been over the phone, at the police station, at your home or at the scene of the crime. If you had any contact with more than one member of staff, please give your overall impressions of what they did.

ASK IF VEHICLE CRIME AND Q5=3 (DEALT WITH OVER THE PHONE)

Q9 Did they explain why it was dealt with in this way?

ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1	GO TO Q10
No	2	GO TO Q10
Not applicable	3	GO TO Q10
Don't know/can't remember (DO NOT READ OUT)	4	GO TO Q10

ASK IF BURGLARY/VIOLENCE/RACIST CRIME OR (VEHICLE CRIME AND NOT Q5=3)

Q9a Did police explain what would happen next and why?

ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1
No	2
Not applicable	3
Don't know/can't remember (DO NOT READ OUT)	4

ASK ALL

Q10 Were you given the opportunity to ask questions, ask for advice or further help. For example, can I drive my vehicle, boarding-up services, crime prevention, vehicle recovery costs?

ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1	GO TO Q11
No, they didn't need to	2	GO TO Q12
No, but they should have	3	GO TO Q12
Don't know/can't remember (DO NOT READ OUT)	4	GO TO Q12

ASK IF Q10=1

Q11 Were these queries answered to your satisfaction?

ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1
No	2
Not applicable	3
Don't know/can't remember (DO NOT READ OUT)	4

ASK ALL

Q12 Were you provided with a contact number/name should you need to call back? (For example, with further information, IMEI numbers, additional stolen property)

ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1
No	2
Not applicable	3
Don't know/can't remember (DO NOT READ OUT)	4

ASK ALL

Q13 Were you given a crime/incident reference number?

ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1
No	2
Not applicable	3
Don't know/can't remember (DO NOT READ OUT)	4

ASK IF BURGLARY/VIOLENCE/RACIST CRIME OR (VEHICLE CRIME AND NOT Q5=3)

Q14 Did officers tell you what action they had taken? For example, spoke to witnesses, checked gardens, carried out house-to-house enquiries, checked for CCTV?

ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1
No, they didn't need to	2
No, but they should have	3
Don't know/can't remember (DO NOT READ OUT)	4

ASK IF BURGLARY

Q15 Did the Crime Scene Investigation (CSI) team attend?
ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1
No, they didn't need to	2
No, but they should have	3
Don't know/can't remember (DO NOT READ OUT)	4

ASK ALL

Q16 Thinking about what the police did after they had been given the initial details, are you satisfied, dissatisfied or neither with the actions taken by the police?
ONE CODE ONLY

Satisfied	And is that	Completely	1
		Very or	2
		Fairly satisfied	3
Dissatisfied	And is that	Completely	7
		Very or	6
		Fairly dissatisfied	5
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied			4
Don't know (DO NOT READ OUT)			8

ASK ALL

Q17 Why do you say that?
RECORD VERBATIM

Don't know (DO NOT READ OUT)

SECTION 3: POLICE FOLLOW-UP

ASK IF BURGLARY/VIOLENCE/RACIST CRIME OR (VEHICLE CRIME AND NOT Q5=3)

Q18 After the initial action, did you require further contact/progress reports about your case?
ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1	GO TO Q19
No	2	GO TO Q27
Don't know (DO NOT READ OUT)	3	GO TO Q27

ASK IF VEHICLE CRIME AND Q5=3 (DEALT WITH OVER THE PHONE)

Q18a After it was dealt with over the phone, did you receive a letter confirming the details of your report?

ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1	GO TO Q22
No	2	GO TO Q22
Not applicable	3	GO TO Q22
Don't know/can't remember (DO NOT READ OUT)	4	GO TO Q22

ASK IF BURGLARY/VIOLENCE/RACIST CRIME OR (VEHICLE CRIME AND NOT Q5=3)

Q19 If any appointments were made with you, were they kept?
ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1
No	2
Not applicable	3
Don't know/can't remember (DO NOT READ OUT)	4

ASK IF BURGLARY/VIOLENCE/RACIST CRIME OR (VEHICLE CRIME AND NOT Q5=3)

Q20 Were you informed you would be updated/contacted every 28 days?
ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1
No	2
Not applicable	3
Don't know/can't remember (DO NOT READ OUT)	4

ASK IF **BURGLARY/VIOLENCE/RACIST CRIME** OR (**VEHICLE CRIME** AND NOT Q5=3)

Q21 Have you been updated every 28 days?

ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1
No	2
Not applicable	3
Don't know/can't remember (DO NOT READ OUT)	4

ASK ALL

Q22 Have you called the police since regarding this matter?

ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1	GO TO Q23
No	2	GO TO Q27
Don't know/can't remember (DO NOT READ OUT)	3	GO TO Q27

ASK IF Q22=1

Q23 Why did you call?

RECORD VERBATIM

Don't know (DO NOT READ OUT)

ASK IF Q22=1

Q24 Did you find it easy to contact someone?

ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1	GO TO Q26
No	2	GO TO Q25
Don't know (DO NOT READ OUT)	3	GO TO Q26

ASK IF Q24=2

Q25 Why do you say that?
RECORD VERBATIM

Don't know (DO NOT READ OUT)

ASK IF Q22=1

Q26 Were your further calls/queries resolved to your satisfaction?
ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1
No	2
Not applicable	3
Don't know/can't remember (DO NOT READ OUT)	4

ASK ALL

Q27 Have the police contacted you in any way since about this incident?
(Prompt: letter, email, text etc)
ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1
No	2
Not applicable	3
Don't know/can't remember (DO NOT READ OUT)	4

ASK ALL

Q28 Are you satisfied, dissatisfied or neither with how well you were kept informed of any progress?
ONE CODE ONLY

Satisfied	And is that	Completely	1
		Very or	2
		Fairly satisfied	3
Dissatisfied	And is that	Completely	7
		Very or	6
		Fairly dissatisfied	5
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied			4
Don't know (DO NOT READ OUT)			8

ASK ALL

Q29 Why do you say that?

RECORD VERBATIM

Don't know (DO NOT READ OUT)

SECTION 4: TREATMENT

ASK ALL

READ OUT: Thinking about the attitude and manner of all the police officers and other police staff you had contact with, do you think they:

ASK ALL

Q30 Took the matter seriously?

ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1
No	2
Not applicable	3
Don't know/can't remember (DO NOT READ OUT)	4

ASK ALL

Q31 Communicated clearly with you?

ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1
No	2
Not applicable	3
Don't know/can't remember (DO NOT READ OUT)	4

ASK ALL

Q32 Dealt with you sympathetically?

ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1
No	2
Not applicable	3
Don't know/can't remember (DO NOT READ OUT)	4

ASK IF **BURGLARY/VIOLENCE/RACIST CRIME** OR (**VEHICLE CRIME** AND NOT Q5=3)

Q33 Were the officers professional in the manner in which they dealt with you?
ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1
No	2
Not applicable	3
Don't know/can't remember (DO NOT READ OUT)	4

ASK IF **BURGLARY/VIOLENCE/RACIST CRIME** OR (**VEHICLE CRIME** AND NOT Q5=3)

Q34 Treated you with respect?
ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1
No	2
Not applicable	3
Don't know/can't remember (DO NOT READ OUT)	4

ASK ALL

Q35 Thinking about the attitude and behaviour, are you satisfied, dissatisfied or neither with the way you were treated by the police officers and staff who dealt with you?
ONE CODE ONLY

Satisfied	And is that	Completely	1
		Very or	2
		Fairly satisfied	3
Dissatisfied	And is that	Completely	7
		Very or	6
		Fairly dissatisfied	5
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied			4
Don't know (DO NOT READ OUT)			8

ASK ALL

Q36 Why do you say that?
RECORD VERBATIM

Don't know (DO NOT READ OUT)

SECTION 5: THE WHOLE EXPERIENCE

ASK ALL

Q37 Prior to this experience, was your overall opinion of Merseyside Police?
ONE CODE ONLY

Generally high	1
Generally low	2
No opinion	3
Don't know (DO NOT READ OUT)	4

ASK ALL

Q38 As a result of your contact with the police on this occasion, please tell me if...
ONE CODE ONLY

Your opinion has not changed	1
You now have a better opinion	2
You now have a worse opinion	3
Don't know/ No comment (DO NOT READ OUT)	4

ASK ALL

Q39 Thinking about everything we've talked about, taking the whole experience into account, are you satisfied, dissatisfied or neither with the service provided by the police in this case?
ONE CODE ONLY

Satisfied	And is that	Completely	1
		Very or	2
		Fairly satisfied	3
Dissatisfied	And is that	Completely	7
		Very or	6
		Fairly dissatisfied	5
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied			4
Don't know (DO NOT READ OUT)			8

ASK ALL

Q40 Why do you say that?
RECORD VERBATIM

Don't know (DO NOT READ OUT)

SECTION 6: GENERAL

ASK ALL

Q41 If a similar thing happened to you again, would you report it to the police?

ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1
No	2
Don't know/no comment (DO NOT READ OUT)	3

ASK ALL

Q42 Are there any other comments about the service you received, or an individual officer you want to mention?

RECORD VERBATIM

No/nothing (DO NOT READ OUT)

Don't know (DO NOT READ OUT)

ASK IF RACIST CRIME

Q43 Have there been any similar incidents, which you have not reported to the police?

ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1	GO TO Q44
No	2	GO TO Q45
Don't know (DO NOT READ OUT)	3	GO TO Q45

ASK IF RACIST CRIME

Q44 What were the main reasons for not reporting this/these incidents?

MULTICODE

Police will not take seriously	1
Potential racist reaction from officer	2
No chance of being able to talk to an officer of the same race	3
Others may find out I have been a victim through courts, press, etc	4
Other (specify)	5
Don't know (DO NOT READ OUT)	6

DEMOGRAPHICS

READ OUT: Finally, just a couple of questions about yourself for classification purposes

ASK ALL

Q45 Gender (DO NOT READ OUT)

ONE CODE ONLY

Male	1
Female	2

ASK ALL

Q46 What age were you on your last birthday?

ONE CODE ONLY

16 to 24	1
25 to 34	2
35 to 44	3
45 to 54	4
55 to 64	5
65 to 74	6
75 or above	7
Refused	8

ASK ALL

Q47 What is your ethnic group? Are you Asian, Black, Chinese, mixed background, White or another ethnic group? And is that.... (READ FROM LIST)

ONE CODE ONLY

Asian or Asian British	Indian	7
	Pakistani	8
	Bangladeshi	9
	Any other Asian background (Please specify below)	10
Black or Black British	Caribbean	4
	African	5
	Any other Black background (Please specify below)	6
Chinese	Chinese	15
Mixed	White and Black Caribbean	11
	White and Black African	12
	White and Asian	13
	Any other mixed background (Please specify below)	14
White	British	1
	Irish	2
	Any other White background (Please specify below)	3
Other ethnic group	Other ethnic group (Please specify below)	18
Do not wish to say (DO NOT READ OUT)		17

Please specify.....

ASK ALL

Q48 Do you consider yourself to have a disability?

IF RESPONDENT UNSURE READ OUT: The Disability Discrimination Act defines a person as having a disability if he or she ‘has a physical or mental impairment, which has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on his or her ability to carry out normal day to day activities’.

ONE CODE ONLY

Yes (Please describe the nature of the disability below)	1
No	2

Please specify.....

CONSENT AND FURTHER ACTION

ASK ALL

Q49 Do you consent to us passing back your individual responses to Merseyside Police?
ONE CODE ONLY

Yes	1
No	2

THANK AND END INTERVIEW

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