McKenna, Robin ORCID: 0000-0001-5129-7850
(2014)
Normative scorekeeping.
SYNTHESE, 191 (3).
pp. 607-625.
Text
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Abstract
Epistemic contextualists think that the truth-conditions of ‘knowledge’ ascriptions depend in part on the context in which they are uttered. But what features of context play a role in determining truth-conditions? The idea that the making salient of error possibilities is a central part of the story has often been attributed to contextualists, and a number of contextualists seem to endorse it (see Cohen (Philos Perspect, 13:57–89, 1999) and Hawthorne, (Knowledge and lotteries, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004)). In this paper I argue that the focus on salience relations is a mistake. On the view I defend, the relevant features of context are facts about what error-possibilities and alternatives those in the context have a reason to consider, not facts about what error-possibilities and alternatives those in the context actually consider. As I will argue, this view has certain advantages over the standard view.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | Contextualism, Epistemology, Edward Craig, Scorekeeping, Reasons, Philosophy of language |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Admin |
Date Deposited: | 13 Sep 2018 08:13 |
Last Modified: | 19 Jan 2023 01:17 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s11229-013-0293-1 |
Related URLs: | |
URI: | https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3026180 |