Short Paper: Strategic Contention Resolution in Multiple Channels with Limited Feedback



Christodoulou, George, Melissourgos, Themistoklis ORCID: 0000-0002-9867-6257 and Spirakis, Paul G ORCID: 0000-0001-5396-3749
(2018) Short Paper: Strategic Contention Resolution in Multiple Channels with Limited Feedback. .

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Abstract

We consider a game-theoretic setting of contention in communication networks. In a contention game each of n ≥ 2 identical players has a single information packet that she wants to transmit in a fast and selfish way through one of k ≥ 1 multiple-access channels by choosing a protocol. Here, we extend the model and results of the single-channel case studied in [2] by providing equilibria characterizations for more than one channels, and giving specific anonymous, equilibrium protocols with finite and infinite expected latency. For our equilibrium protocols with infinite expected latency, all players, with high probability transmit successfully in optimal time, i.e. Θ (n/k).

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Unspecified)
Uncontrolled Keywords: Genetics
Depositing User: Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited: 24 Sep 2018 10:24
Last Modified: 17 Mar 2024 00:40
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_22
Related URLs:
URI: https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3026583