

Christopher Tuplin\*

# Xenophon, Isocrates and the Achaemenid Empire: History, Pedagogy and the Persian Solution to Greek Problems

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Among surviving fourth century Athenian authors Xenophon and Isocrates stand out as the ones interested in Persia.<sup>1</sup> Their degree of investment differs, and by one way of reckoning that of Isocrates is not actually very large across his whole surviving corpus (nor is Xenophon's uniformly spread over his output), but Persia was part of what defined the environment of late classical Athens (and Greece) and any exercise in comparing and contrasting Isocrates and Xenophon must engage with the Persian dimension.

## 1 Persian Material: Extent

Determining how large a proportion of the two *corpora* is devoted to Persia depends on how one defines the dataset. There is a sense in which *Panegyricus*, *Philippus* or *Anabasis* are each entirely about Persia, but to say that without qualification is plainly misleading. If one chooses to be more discriminating, it turns out that explicit Persian material accounts for only about 11% of the surviving Isocratean corpus, while the figure for Xenophon is a little over 40%. Including *Cyropaedia* (the only work in either *corpus* entirely devoted to Persia) arguably makes the comparison misleading, but even excluding that work 20% of the

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<sup>1</sup> The quantity of material in Plato or Aristotle is, by contrast, not huge, and scholars do not normally think of them as writers or thinkers for whom Persia is a *Leitmotif* in the way it is for the panhellenist Isocrates. In the case of Plato there is, perhaps, a little more to be said, and there are at least two celebrated passages in *Laws* and *First Alcibiades*. On the other hand, there is a case for regarding both of those as having an intertextual relationship with Xenophon, so we may not be dealing with an entirely independent literary/philosophical phenomenon. See Tuplin 2018, an essay for which the present one may be regarded as a companion piece. In this article all dates are BCE.

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\*Corresponding author: Christopher Tuplin, University of Liverpool, Archaeology, Classics & Egyptology, Liverpool, United Kingdom, E-Mail: [c.j.tuplin@liv.ac.uk](mailto:c.j.tuplin@liv.ac.uk)

Xenophon corpus is directly Persia-related. So, by any reckoning there is twice as much specifically Persian material in Xenophon and one could accurately say that there is four times as much.<sup>2</sup>

Substantial parts of the output of both authors are essentially entirely Persia-free: that is something they have in common. But the difference expressed by the statistics just rehearsed (even on the figures excluding *Cyropaedia*) might still be slightly misleading.

Loss of parts of the Isocratean corpus means that the raw figures do not capture the original situation as they do with Xenophon. Has there been disproportionate loss of items that would have been rich in Persian material? The rest of the Dionysius and Archidamus letters and the entirely lost letters to Alexander Pherae and Agesilaus would certainly have made a contribution. But the fact that *Philippus* is less rich in Persian material on a narrow definition than *Panegyricus* warns us that not all panhellenist *logoi* make the same level of contribution. Since Agesilaus had actually fought against the Persians, the work addressed to him might have been very productive; the same might go for the letter to his son. But Dionysius and Alexander are arguably more analogous to Philip, for all that Alexander's predecessor Jason had made a mark on panhellenist discourse. The Agesilaus and Alexander *logoi* get us two items closer to the lowest figure for genuine Isocratean works (25 according to Dionysius of Halicarnassus; Caecilius put the figure at 28<sup>3</sup>), but there are at least two and perhaps five works unaccounted for, and we should not assume that they were of the sort to increase the haul of *Persica*. (The fragments are unproductive.) So it can hardly be certain that the entire Isocratean corpus would have shown a figure very much larger than 11%.

Still, sheer word-count is not the only consideration. Isocrates attributes great importance to *logoi* on the panhellenic theme, as dealing with material that is the proper material of rhetoric – so in terms of the author's perception material

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<sup>2</sup> Isocrates: 2.6; 3.23, 34; 4.1–6, 15, 67–68, 71, 85–99, 115–128, 133–166, 169–170, 173, 175–180, 181–189; 5.9, 42, 62–64, 66, 76, 83–105, 115, 119–132, 137–140, 147–148, 154; 7.81; 9.20, 37–39, 54–69; 12.13–14, 49–52, 57, 59–61, 68–69, 92–93, 97, 102–107, 156–163, 187, 189, 195; 14.40–41, 57–62; 15.57, 77, 233; 16.18, 20; *Ep.* 2.7–8, 11; *Ep.* 3.3, 5; *Ep.* 9.8–18. Self-quotations in *Antidosis* recycle the Persian material of 4.67–68, 71, 85–99. This is a total of 245 chapters out of a corpus of 2245 chapters, *i. e.* 10.9%. Xenophon: *Cyropaedia* 1.1.1–8.8.27; *An.* 1.1.1–3.5.18, 4.4.1–4.5.36, 6.5.7–32, 7.1.2–4, 2.7, 8.8–24 (116 pages); *Hell.* 1.1.1–31, 1.2.1–17, 1.3.1–1.4.7, 1.5.1–19, 1.6.6–11, 2.1.8–15, 3.1.1–2.20, 3.4.1–3.5.2, 4.1.1–4.2.28, 4.8.1.39, 5.1.6–9, 5.1.25–31, 6.1.12, 6.3.12, 7.1.33–38; *Oec.* 4.5–25; *Ag.* 1.6–38, 2.26–31, 3.2–5, 4.6, 5.4–6, 7.6–7, 8.3–6, 9.1–7; *Mem.* 2.1.10, 4.2.33; *Symp.* 3.13, 4.11, 8.39; *DRE* 6.12, 8.6, *Hipp.* 1.17. This is a total of some 550 pages out of 1316, *i. e.* 41.8%. Ignoring *Cyropaedia* we have 193 out of 959 = 20.1%.

<sup>3</sup> Ps.-Plut. *Mor.* 838D.

likely to generate *Persica* had an importance that other material did not.<sup>4</sup> One cannot, of course, think that he did not value highly *Antidosis*, which (*verbatim* quotations aside) is almost devoid of *Persica*, or *Panathenaicus*, which is a relatively minor source. But the point stands. Indeed it is the impact of Isocrates' evaluation of the matter that makes it come as something of a surprise that the actual bulk of material as a proportion of the whole corpus is so modest. The view that Isocrates and Xenophon deserve to be compared as writers about Persia is certainly right, but there is no harm in underlining the fact that Isocrates wrote a lot about other things, did not (it seems) come to panhellenism as a topic until c. 380, and, even when he had come to it, could develop arguments relevant to it that had no Persian content. Only half of the text *Panegyricus* directly talks about Persian material, and in *Philippus* and *Panathenaicus* the figure falls to a third and less than an eighth. This should be no surprise: when an orator seeks to convince an audience of the merits of a particular policy or to eulogize his native *polis*, he *should* approach the task from a variety of different angles, and some of them will have no substantive overlap one with another.

## 2 Persian Material: Some General Characteristics

The prominence of Persian material in Xenophon clearly reflects one aspect of his life- experience, just as the *Socratica* reflect another. As for Isocrates, on conventional datings, Persian material is almost entirely absent until *Panegyricus* at the end of the 380s, which introduces not only an entirely new topic but an entirely new type (and length) of *logos*. Perhaps the King's Peace and its consequences genuinely got under his skin, so here too a life-experience of sorts (albeit a less personally immersive one) was the trigger. No doubt there was also a story that we cannot now tell about the way this cross-cut with developments in his pedagogic theory and practice

The Achaemenid empire had existed for over 150 years by the time either author wrote about it and more than 200 by the time they had both stopped doing so. Their engagement with the history of those long periods differs in shape.

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<sup>4</sup> The best *logoi* are those about *ta megista* (4.4): concern with such things is the hallmark of Isocratean *philosophia*. Isocrates chose to concern himself with *ta Hellēnika kai basilika kai politika*, and specifically the theme of concord, war against the barbarian and colonization of his land (12.11–13), than which there is no better topic (5.10). By comparison with the Persian crusade, *Peace* and *To Nicocles* – the two works besides *Panegyricus* which he cites at length in *Antidosis* – deal with lesser topics (15.77–78).

Like Thucydides (but also in line with fourth century tendencies<sup>5</sup>), Isocrates regarded stories from the heroic past as part of normal historical discourse. But he has no such material about Persia and evinces no interest in any other forms of pre-Achaemenid Near Eastern history, with the rule-proving exception of Egyptian Busiris. Indeed, apart from three references to Cyrus (5.66, 132, 9.37–38), his historical record of Persian matters ignores everything before the Persian Wars, says little of the *pentakontaetia* apart from the consequences of the supposed treaty with Persia, is unaware of the murder of Xerxes or the succession upheavals of 424 or 359, touches only on the last decade of the Peloponnesian War (the most precise details being prompted by forensic engagement with Alcibiades), and only becomes richer when we reach the story of the Ten Thousand, the Spartan-Persian War of 400/399–387/386 (though little is said about the time after 393), the King's Peace and the conditions it produced, and the Cypriot War and attendant disturbances in Egypt and the Levant.<sup>6</sup> For the next 40 years of Persian history there is only a scatter of material (some of it tantalizing but interesting), mostly in a few sections of *Philippus*.<sup>7</sup>

Xenophon, by contrast, gives us extensive treatments of Cyrus the Elder (*Cyropaedia*) and of the rebellion of Cyrus the Younger and its aftermath (*Anabasis*), a quite rich record of Persian involvement with Greeks 410–386<sup>8</sup> but only spasmodic hints of anything thereafter (the peace conference of 368/7 in *Hellenica* 7.1.33–40, and the events of *Agesilaus* 2.26–31). The twelve decades from the elder Cyrus' death to the Decelean War are almost entirely absent (apart from occasional Persian Wars allusions), and outside *Hellenica*, *Cyropaedia* and *Anabasis* the corpus is largely devoid of *Persica*, the most notable exception being *Oeconomicus* 4. Here too, as in Isocrates, there is no Persian mythistory, but the pre-Persian Median and Assyrian realms are, of course, present in *Cyropaedia* –

<sup>5</sup> Atack 2018, 160. Isocrates' elevation of individual heroes like Theseus or Heracles (in place of collective Athenians or Spartans) is characteristic of fourth century developments: that is, the mythologisation is of its time.

<sup>6</sup> Persian Wars: 4.71–72, 85–98, 155, 5.147–148, 12.49–52, 92–93, 157–158, 14.57–62, 15.233, 306, *Ep.* 2.7–8. *Pentakontaetia*: 4.118, 120, 156, 9.20, 12.59–61, 68–69. Peloponnesian War: 5.99, 12.57, 103, 106, 16.18–20. Ten Thousand: 4.145–149, 5.90–92, 95–97, 12.104, *Ep.* 2.8. Spartan-Persian War: 4.115, 119, 121–122, 126, 128, 141–144, 152, 154, 175, 178, 5.62–64, 86–87, 99–100, 9.54–57, 68, 12.105–107. Post-King's Peace conditions: 4.120–124, 137, 12.60. Cypriot War and attendant matters: 4.124, 134–135, 140–141, 153, 161–162, 5.101, 9.57–69.

<sup>7</sup> 3.34, 5.99–104, 12.159–160, 162, 14.41.

<sup>8</sup> *Hell.* 1.1.1–31, 1.2.1–17, 1.3.1–1.4.7, 1.5.1–19, 1.6.6–11, 2.1.8–15, 3.1.1–2.20, 3.4.1–3.5.2, 4.1.1–4.2.28, 4.8.1.39, 5.1.6–9, 5.1.25–31.

albeit in a rather distinctive form – and (in the Median case) very briefly in a few lines of *Anabasis*.<sup>9</sup>

Naturally enough, Xenophon offers continuous narrative to a degree that Isocrates does not: the nearest to an exception is *Evagoras*, but, even so, it is rhetorical narrative, always formulated for proving points rather than merely conveying a story. In this respect a comparison of the two authors is a comparison of incommensurables.

Both authors provide a lot of institutional material simply because it is entailed by narrative of or allusion to specific historical events. Xenophon also produces some in passages that are more explicitly engaged in describing institutions (this is true of parts of *Cyropaedia* VIII and of *Oeconomicus* 4), whereas Isocrates hardly ever does this, though the persistently evaluative way in which he writes can mask this at first sight. In fact, it is arguable that the only exception is 4.150–152, a generic (negative) description of Persian characteristics that initially presents itself as the explanatory coda to a long disquisition on historical events, but turns out to be the core around which two such disquisitions are arranged, so that it is as much an explanatory prelude to the second as coda to the first.<sup>10</sup>

### 3 Historical Data

Xenophon's importance as a source of both *histoire événementielle* and institutional characteristics is well known, and I shall not rehearse it here. How does Isocrates stand in that regard? Many readers will be inclined to say not very high at all. Perhaps they are right. But there are several items worth comment, some of which may deserve respectful attention, while others perhaps do not (appreciation of the existence of the former provides at least a context for the latter).

There is rather little that is punctually in disagreement with all other salient evidence, as distinct from e.g. being simplified or exaggerated or merely not directly paralleled. In terms of those categories the position of the story of the Ten Thousand deserves immediate attention in our context.

Read literally, Isocrates' evocation of events after Cunaxa is hardly Xenophonic, Ctesianic or Diodoran, except (in the latter two cases) inasmuch as the

<sup>9</sup> 3.4.7–8, 11–12. See Tuplin 2003.

<sup>10</sup> 4.150 stands at the middle of 133–166 (the longest continuous Persian passage in the corpus), there being 17 sections before (133–149) and 16 after (151–166).

figure of Xenophon is absent.<sup>11</sup> But it is doubtful whether it represents an actual distinct narrative of the story: the various elisions (of time, of the figures of the King and Tissaphernes, and of Xenophon<sup>12</sup>) and exaggerations (representation of the retreat as a walk in the park: 4.148) are not unnatural ones if one is spinning the story as Isocrates was – though one might wonder whether the suggestion it had all been very easy would seem rather offensive to those who actually lived through it. As for Cunaxa itself, the categorisation of Cyrus' death as due to *propeteia* (5.90) most immediately recalls Plutarch (*Artoxerxes* 8: *propetōs*) and Deinon F17 (cited in Plutarch *Artoxerxes* 10: *propetōs*), and may have been echoed in Ctesias.<sup>13</sup> The facts that Cyrus was warned by many people to keep out of the front line (*Anabasis* 1.7.9: Clearchus is perhaps implicitly one of them) and that Clearchus would not relocate the Greeks to fight the king directly (1.8.13) are also in Xenophon, but he avoids an explicit judgment of recklessness. But any difference between Isocrates and Xenophon is in the end evaluative, not factual. One *might* judge him to be criticizing Xenophon's presentation – but he is primarily adopting the interpretation of what happened that best suits his argument. His explicit assertion (in *Philippus*, *Peace* and *Panathenaicus*) of official Spartan collusion with Cyrus does recall Diodorus, where it is explicit in 14.19.4 in relation to the fleet of Sam(i)us and the presence of Cheirisophus, more sharply than Xenophon, where it is not highlighted, though arguably implicit.<sup>14</sup> But the information (the arrival of ships and hoplites in North Syria) is the same (*Anabasis* 1.4.2–3), so

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**11** 4.145–149, 5.90–92. Diod. 14.24–31 (this covers the trip to Byzantium. Xenophon does appear in 14.37, which relates to activities in Thrace). The only direct salient fragments of Ctesias are FF16 (65), 23, 27 (68–69).

**12** Both of Isocrates' versions give an impression that the arrest of generals followed almost immediately after Cunaxa and that the King himself carried out the arrest, and the one in *Philippus* ignores Tissaphernes entirely. Giving the army's size as 6000 (4.146) is a rhetorically-inspired underestimate proper to the end of the story, and the assertion that Tissaphernes harried their whole journey (4.148) a brazen elision of time and space. In *Philippus* there is no reference at all to the time after the generals' arrest. These elisions are a proximate reason for Xenophon's absence from the story, though, had Isocrates wanted to include him, he could have arranged things otherwise. The appearance of *Anabasis* between 380 and 346 evidently made no difference on this point. If the Diodoran version of the story was created directly from *Anabasis* but with Xenophon left out (Stylianou 2004) and if what we read in Diodorus was what appeared in Ephorus, we should have to say that an Isocratean pupil displayed some hostility to Xenophon. But it is a very hypothetical conclusion, and does not necessarily entail anything about Isocrates himself.

**13** In *Artox.* 8 the issue is part of a debate about the responsibility for Cyrus' defeat (as between Cyrus and Clearchus) at which *apeithountos Klearkhōi* in 688 F16[63] surely hints.

**14** 5.95, 8.98, 12.104.

again it is an evaluative rather than a factual contradiction.<sup>15</sup> In the end, then, it is hard to believe that Isocrates' remarks presuppose a genuinely distinct version of the story that is actually out of line with the rest of the source-material.

There are various other points at which Isocrates' contribution is valuable precisely because it is in line with other sources: the arrival of Phoenician ships at Aspendus in 411 (16.18), Conon's cash-flow problems in 397 (4.142, 153), the Persian use of Greek troops in Cyprus<sup>16</sup> and the sufferings of all of their troops in the same campaign (4.153), Jason of Pherae's visibility as a would-be panhellenist warrior (5.120), Athenian ravaging of the king's land in post-478 Anatolia (4.118), Artaxerxes III's first and unsuccessful attack on Egypt:<sup>17</sup> in some of these cases Isocrates parallels the Ephoran tradition (as seen in *Hellenica Oxyrhynca* and Diodorus), but there are also echoes of Thucydides (Aspendus, post-478 Anatolia) and Xenophon (Jason). A rather different and more important case is provided by the scale of the war with Evagoras. Some will feel that Isocrates exaggerates the seriousness of this episode, but its appearance in a historical notice in a Babylonian astronomical text gives the lie to this: the fighting in Cyprus and disruption in south-east Anatolia and the northern Levant were significant enough to impinge on observers in Mesopotamia and this will be a reflex of the importance attached to it by the King.<sup>18</sup> The specific claim that the Persians spent over 15000 talents on the war (9.60) is impossible to verify, but it is not simply inappropriate. On the other hand, the outcome supplies a notable conflict between Isocrates and a source-tradition with which, as we have seen, he is often in agreement. In Diodorus the war is eventually settled by negotiation and Evagoras succeeds in his demand that the deal be made as between kings, not as between master and slave (15.8–9). Of this there is no trace in *Evagoras* 63–64, where it would surely have been in place, and one seems bound to infer that this particular spin on what had happened had not yet been devised (could its emergence perhaps have been a by-product of the later Cypriot conflict of the 340s?).

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15 Ctesias' view is hard to deduce from 16 (63), and we cannot be certain that the report that Clearchus was under official Spartan orders in Plut. *Artox.* 6 represents Ctesias' view. That the mercenaries were *ouk aristindēn epeilegmenoi* (4.146) is also a value judgment not strictly speaking contradicted in *Anabasis*, though their alleged *phaulotēs* is (*An.* 6.4.8).

16 4.134–135 is explicit (cf. Diod. 15.2.2); cf. 4.124 Greeks forced to flight alongside Persians against those seeking freedom and 4.168 mercenaries fighting friends.

17 5.101. This is particularly valuable because of inclarities in Diodorus' treatment. There may be an allusion in *Ep.* 8.8 as well, if Diophantus' absence "in Asia" refers to the campaign (cf. Diod. 16.48). One might expect "in Egypt", but the precise date of the latter (after 354) is uncertain, and it might coincide with the preparation of invasion forces in the Levant rather than the actual invasion.

18 Sachs/Hunger 1988, 59 (no. -440), van der Spek 1998, 240–251, Tuplin forthcoming a.

Cyprus figures in other cases where Isocrates offers novel information. Some real events must lie behind the report in 3.33–34 that, at the time of Nicocles' accession (in 374/3, according to Diodorus 15.47), “we” were being robbed on all sides, the rest of island was hostile and the King, though supposedly reconciled, was actually ill-disposed – a situation Nicocles dealt with by helping the King and behaving justly to islanders. Did Nicocles perhaps contribute to the 373 Egyptian expedition and/or preparations underway in the later 370s for another expedition?<sup>19</sup> A more straightforward case is the Phoenician seizure of Salamis in the fifth century (9.19–20): our independent knowledge of Salaminian history is not so good as to render this anything but novel and valuable information.

Nor is this the limit of Isocrates' contribution of new information. He is the earliest purveyor of the claim (which many continue to believe) that Athens and Persia made a peace in the mid-fifth century,<sup>20</sup> and is the only source for a three year campaign against Egypt in the 380s by Pharnabazus, Abrocomas and Tithraustes (4.140),<sup>21</sup> a clause in the King's Peace saying that the King could do with the Greeks of Asia as he wished (12.106),<sup>22</sup> Draco's use of 3000 peltasts to devastate the Mysian plain (4.144), and the Persians' distribution of 100 talents to the captors of Cisthene (4.153).<sup>23</sup> This last item is slightly puzzling, but the capture of Cisthene at least must be a real event.

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**19** 373: Diod. 15.29,41–43, Trogus *prol.* 10, Plut. *Artox.* 24, Nep. *Iph.* 2.4, Polyæn. 3.9.25, 38, 47, 56, 59, 63, Polyb. 38.6.2, Isae. 4.7. Later 370s: Nep. *Dat.* 3, Dem. 49.28–30,60.

**20** 4.117–118,120. Repeated in 7.80, 12.59.

**21** Other texts draw attention to Egypt being in revolt at this time and to the connections between Achoris and Evagoras as well as to the activities of Chabrias, but that is different.

**22** Thuc. 8.58.2 makes this plausible and Cawkwell 1981, 72 apparently accepts the testimony. He does not comment on or accept the claim that Sparta made an eternal alliance with the king, though he appears to accept that alliance is an appropriate concept.

**23** Who the captors were is unstated (the event is treated as though well-known in its own right), but contextually they are apparent enemies of the Persians who are nonetheless funded by them. One view is that it is another way of alluding to what is mentioned just before, viz. eight months of funding allegedly given to Agesilaus, a proposition that parallels but much exceeds Xenophon's report of Tithraustes giving Agesilaus 30 talents to cover provisions during his march to Hellespontine Phrygia (*Hell.* 3.5.26). If Agesilaus reached Thebes Pedion (*Hell. Oxy.* 24) in 395 by the coastal route he passed by Cisthene, and an attack could be part of the unlocated ravaging of land south of Thebes Pedion mentioned in *Hell. Oxy.* 1.c. (an unlocated fragment of Ephorus [70 F235] had people fleeing to Passanda, near Adramyttium and Cisthene, which might be relevant). But even if Agesilaus' soldiers are the captors of Cisthene, 100 talents would not pay many people for eight months, so simply identifying the two propositions does not work: the 100 talents would have to be a distinct benefaction. It is possible, of course, that the eight months' funding is an Isocratean chimaera: Tithraustes gave Agesilaus money to go away (perhaps 30

Other putative events are more elusive. The beneficiaries of Diodotus' service in or before c. 340 to *dynastai* in Asia in counsel, action and risk-taking cannot be precisely identified.<sup>24</sup> It is hard to know how much lies behind complaints about razing of cities and the fortification or occupation of *acropoleis* in post-King's Peace Asia Minor (4.123, 137, 163) or the assertion in the *Letter to Archidamus* (8–10) that mercenaries are plaguing the Greek cities of Asian seaboard (already harmed by being surrendered under the King's Peace and now exposed to destruction, political interference, theft and the mistreatment of women and children) but doing only small damage to the king's land or the airy statements in 5.99–100 about Artaxerxes III failing to defeat armies that were damaging his land or maintain control of the cities surrendered to him (by the King's Peace): negatively evaluative rhetoric drenches such passages (in the final one Isocrates wonders whether it is because the King has given the cities up because of cowardice or because they have learned to despise Persian power), but are there *no* real-world events involved? Is the claim that there are satraps who would respond to offers of freedom conjured out of absolutely nothing? Are there allusions to genuine post-386 diplomatic events in 4.120–121?<sup>25</sup> What, if anything real, are the defeats sustained by the Persians in 4.145?<sup>26</sup> The most tantalizing item in this category is probably 5.103: Idrieus must desire the overthrow of the empire "which outraged his brother, made war on him, and is continuously plotting and wishing to get control of his body and all his money". Is the brother Mausolus or Pixodarus? What war is in question and was it against the brother or Idrieus?<sup>27</sup> In truth, nobody knows.<sup>28</sup>

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talents, perhaps more, perhaps even 100 talents) and Isocrates transformed this into ongoing support for the whole 395–394 campaign.

**24** *Ep.* 4.7. The term *dunastai* is far too elastic to admit of precise interpretation.

**25** The king is *ho dioikōn ta tōn Hellēnōn*, ordering what is to be done, virtually putting *epistathmoi* in Greek cities and *epistatēs tōn parontōn pragmatōn*. We go to him as master with our complaints against one another, call him *megan* as though we were *dorihalōtoi*, and regard him as a hope of salvation in our mutual wars (a similar idea in longer perspective in 12.158 is definitely post-386).

**26** Before Cyrus' death the Persians were in *stasis* and did not wish *prothumōs pros ton adelphon ton basileōs diakindunein*, so the many defeats they suffered can be put aside. The general idea of *stasis* chimes perhaps with the Orontas story, suspicions about Abrocomas, the wavering of Arbaces, the punishment of Arbarius and general remarks in *Anab.* 1.7.2, 1.9.29, Ctes. 16 (63) about defections to Cyrus, but the defeats are puzzling.

**27** Editors since Baiter/Sauppper (1839) emend the MSS *auton to hauton*, thus making it a war with Idrieus.

**28** Some (Hornblower 1982, 217; Debord 1999, 352 n. 383) see an allusion to the events of 362/1 (in Diodorus' dating) and a (welcome) confirmation that Mausolus was involved – though in the long term he emerged unscathed. Weiskopf contents himself with being sceptical (1982, 232–235,

But, although there are puzzles of this sort, there are few uncomplicated contradictions of the universal testimony of other sources. When Isocrates declares that the fifth century Athenian-Persian peace set the boundary between the empires on the Halys (7.80, 12.59),<sup>29</sup> this is (from my point of view) simply a variation on a fantasy; but even for those who believe in a peace it must be no more than a rather transparent rhetorical exaggeration (in the spirit of, if well exceeding, Agesilaus and the ex-Cyreans conquering “nearly everything within the Halys” in 4.144). In fact, arguably the only potential examples are two statements about Cyrus the Elder – that he killed his grandfather (9.38) and was exposed on the roadside by his mother when a baby (5.66,132).<sup>30</sup> Both serve rhetorical purposes, the first to ensure that Evagoras outdoes Cyrus (as he committed no such impious act), the latter to underline both the extraordinary changes of fortune that can occur (5.66)<sup>31</sup> and the shame involved in the Greeks permitting the descendants of a bastard foundling to be so prosperous (5.132).<sup>32</sup> Whether either is a version of Persian history that existed separately from Isocrates’ inventive imagination is hard to say: although the second is plainly related to the exposure story familiar from Herodotus, it is unlikely to be part of any of the alternative versions of Cyrus’ history that he rejected – assuming that they did ultimately come from a Persian background – but that still does not guarantee that it was not already invented in some other more hostile milieu.

Finally, there are occasional interesting remarks of an institutional nature. Although the observation that Egypt is “fortified by the immortal Nile”, both a continent and an island, and a place hard to conquer but good for trade (11.13–

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237–239). Nafissi 2015, 38–39, takes the war to be with Idrieus, and notes that we know nothing of it. If the war is with Idrieus, Isocrates is making a distinct and rather specific claim.

<sup>29</sup> The broadly equivalent Cilicia-Sinope line occurs as a potential limit of panhellenist conquest in 5.123, an idea prefigured in *Hell. Oxy.* 25 (Chambers). There is a curious reflection of this idea in 4.162: the statement that there are Greek cities from Cnidus to Sinope is a curious amalgam of the Cilicia-Sinope trope with the status of Triopium (near Cnidus) as the SW corner of Anatolia.

<sup>30</sup> The second of these has recently been discussed by Haussker 2017.

<sup>31</sup> Does the specification that he was found by a Persian woman hint that Cyrus was not even Persian – making his emergence as founder of a Persian empire even more of a change of fortune and the prosperity of the Persian empire even more of an affront? That the discovery was made by a woman (and presumably a respectable one, perhaps even a high-class one, thus explaining Cyrus’ later history) apparently presupposes an environment in which such a woman might be travelling autonomously – so not a stereotypical Greek environment? Is this a faint indication that the story was of non-Greek origin?

<sup>32</sup> The deployment of the same story for two nearly diametrically opposed purposes within the same *logos* is a charming example of the flexibility of rhetoric – a nice lesson for those reading the speech for educational purposes (see below).

14) shows awareness of something salient to fourth century Persian history, one should perhaps not make too much of it, since the context is entirely unrelated to Persia; and it might be optimistic to regard his rhetorical anonymization of the King as a conscious perception of the empire as a system in which the office is more important than the holder, for all that he affirms the Persians' exceptional honour for *basileia* as a source of strength (3.23).<sup>33</sup> But, when he says that the King's letters show the barbarians' contempt for Athens (7.81), he captures a characteristic of the king's communication with the *outside* world (letter, not just ambassador), even if he is not the only one to do so, any more than he is the only one to use *dasmos* (an appropriate correlate to OP *bāji-*) rather than *phoros* of Persian imperial tribute.<sup>34</sup> His picture in 4.166 of the king controlling the people of the continent by having a larger force than each of them individually – a force the Greeks collectively could outnumber – suggests a sensible view of the nature of the Persian military system that does not attribute to it the sort of unfeasibly large numbers of soldiers we encounter in some Greek literary environments. The concept of the *peripolousa stratia* (the army that goes round with the king) is arguably part of a similar view – that there is a core Persian army, and it is not particularly large.<sup>35</sup> There might also be a military overtone to the idea of Per-

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**33** The king is generally unnamed, and the title sometimes plainly elides more than one ruler (12.104, 157–158). Comparable (without anonymity) is 5.42: we were enemies of Xerxes but now value his friendship (Lys. 2.27 is a reverse example of this, speaking as though Xerxes were the ruler at the time of Marathon). A distinction is drawn between Artaxerxes II and III in 5.99–100, but the name Artaxerxes is not used.

**34** 4.123. That said, he also uses it of tribute given to fourth century Athenians (8.46, 125), the children sent to Minos (10.27; also called *phoros*), the taxes levied by bad tyrants (*Ep.* 7.4) and Spartan impositions on Aegean islanders (4.132). In other words, its Persian association give it negative overtones that can be exploited for literary effect. Xenophon perhaps does the same in *An.* 5.5.10, where the statement that Cotyora, Cerasus and Trapezus give *dasmon tetagmenon* to Sinope is arguably part of the negative characterization of the speaker Hecatonymus.

**35** 4.145. The *peripolousa stratia* is contextually distinct from (a) forces in the west and (b) forces assembled from the entire population of Asia to fight at Cunaxa and looks like the king's homeland (cf. *hupo tois basileiois*: 149) protection force. The association of the word with Athenian homeland protection (*Xen. Por.* 4.52, *Ath. Pol.* 42.4) will be pertinent. Less respectable associations were available – street-walking (*Phryn. Com.* 33), fugitive religious criminals (*Eur. IT* 84, 1455), madness (*Soph. OT* 1254), the potentially unruly companions of Ares (*Plat. PhDr.* 252C) or Bacchus (*Soph. Ant.* 1150) – but whether Isocrates wants them to be heard is uncertain. Xenophon (*Cyr.* 8.6.16) speaks of an annual circuit of inspection by *ephodoi* with an army to support, humble or correct good, arrogant or inefficient satraps. These *ephodoi* are the people whose anticipated arrival leads to talk about the king's son or king's brother or king's eye (this calls to mind *Oec.* 4.4–25, which speaks of inspection by king or by people acting for him but does not say that the inspector travels with an army). These armies are not with the king, and should be

sians “examined at the palace” (*exetazomenoi pros autois tois basileiois*: 4.151); alternatively it merely captures something akin to Xenophon’s perception of the king’s control of his court. Something not shared by Xenophon is the assertion in the same passage that the Persians address their king as *daimōn*. Taken literally, this is not the commonplace Greek view, and we should perhaps conclude that Isocrates has here allowed himself to overstate the conclusion that *proskunēsis* entailed the king being regarded as divine – which does not necessarily mean it is an overstatement peculiar to him.<sup>36</sup> In any case, his use of *daimōn*, not *theos*, does link the statement with other Greek texts about the king’s *daimōn*.<sup>37</sup> Finally, two other pieces of terminology, this time human. First, 4.152 speaks of “those who come to the sea, whom they call satraps”, as though the term were unfamiliar: and, in fact, unlike *satrapeia/satrapeiē*, it is not attested until the fourth century, and the present case might (depending on the date of *Oeconomicus*) be earlier than any Xenophontic use, if not than its appearance in Ctesias. Second, there has been dispute about the date at which the Carian dynasts started to be called satraps (and the significance of their being so), but Isocrates produces another title, labelling Hecatomnus *epistathmos* of Caria (4.162). The term recurs in 4.120, where we are told that in the King’s Peace dispensation the king all but installs his *epistathmoi* in the (Greek) cities. This is not a common word or root, and its overtones are hard to seize – (billeted) lodger? overseer of a *stathmos* (*i. e.* road-stop: cf. the *katagōgai* of Herodotus’ Royal Road description)? guardian? a combination of one or more of these? – but it is certainly not merely a bland alternative to satrap, *hyparchos* or *arkhon*: on the contrary Greek readers would find it a little strange, and perhaps even faintly derogatory.

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distinguished from the *peripolousa stratia*, even though the association of *ephodeuein* with military patrols (Ar. *An.* 1160, Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.24, 5.3.22, Polyb. 6.35–36; and by extension in Theophr. *Char.* 6, Timocl. 32) puts it in a similar semantic space to *peripolein*.

**36** Xenophon offers a distinctive (slightly tongue-in-cheek?) take on this in *Cyr.* 8.3.14 (*proskunēsis* is a Persian response to Cyrus’ quasi-divine epiphany) and in *Ages.* 1.34: Agesilaus caused Greeks who previously had to perform *proskunēsis* to be honoured by those who had insulted (*hubrizein*) them, and forced those who claimed divine honours (*tous axiountas kai tas tōn theōn timas karpousthai*) to be unable to look a Greek in the face – a piece of wordplay that (in context) deflates any royal divinity by extending it to the Persian elite in general. The apparent hypocrisy of Isocrates’ criticism of Persian behaviour given what we find in *Evagoras* (see below) and his addresses to Philip (5.140–143, *Ep.* 3.5) is perhaps mitigated by the later date of those works. But Isocrates doubtless also thought different rules applied to the rhetoric of literary praise.

**37** Tuplin 2017a, 102, 104. King’s *daimōn*: Theopomp. 115 F124 = Athen. 252AC, Plut. *Artox.* 15, Plut. *Them.* 29. I discuss these references in more detail in Tuplin forthcoming b.

## 4 Contrasts and Contacts

Exploring the historical material underlines and documents one area of contrast between Isocrates and Xenophon and raises the question whether one author ever specifically responds to the other. That gives us the two topics to which we turn next: the contrasts and contacts between the two and the possibility of inter-textual reference – in each case insofar as they have a Persian dimension.

The two men started life as scions of well-to-do families from the same deme, though official deme-affiliation may not guarantee they spent their childhoods in the same bit of eastern Attica. Isocrates' patrimony fell victim to the Peloponnesian War (15.161), and Xenophon's pursuit of Cyrus' friendship suggests something similar happened to him. Decades later Isocrates was one of those who wrote an encomium of Xenophon's son, killed in the Mantinea campaign of 362:<sup>38</sup> that presupposes some sympathetic engagement between the two (one wonders what impact the disputes sparked by Aristotle's *On Rhetoric, or Gryllus* had on their relationship, assuming they began within Xenophon's lifetime<sup>39</sup>). But there are many contrasts to set against these points of contact. Xenophon's distinctive formation was in the Socratic circle; Isocrates attended the lectures of Prodicus of Ceos, Gorgias of Leontini, Teisias of Syracuse, and the orator Theramenes (Pseudo-Plutarch 836F). Isocrates married the widow of Hippias of Elis and acquired the tragic poet Aphareus as step-son (*ibid.* 838A); Xenophon had no such philosophical-literary family links. Isocrates' known experience of the outside world stretched to Chios, Halicarnassus and unidentified places visited with Timotheus.<sup>40</sup> Xenophon's ranged further, both in the Persian Empire and the Peloponnese.

Both were writers, not speakers, but this point had much more significance for Isocrates.<sup>41</sup> Isocrates was embedded in a real professional pedagogic environment in Athens into which he attracted foreign pupils. Xenophon was an exile and quasi-foreigner,<sup>42</sup> embedded in a non-professional pedagogic environment, albeit one that sometimes had an Athenian focus. Isocrates trained real political and literary figures. Xenophon trained nobody that we can identify. Xenophon wrote history, Isocrates at best allegedly taught some who wrote history.

<sup>38</sup> Diog. L. 2.55, citing Hermippus on Theophrastus.

<sup>39</sup> Aristotle: Diog. L. 2.55, Quint. 2.17. Cephisodorus *Against Aristotle*: Athen. 60DE, 122B, 354c(?), Dion. Hal. *Isoc.* 18, *Ad Amm.* 1.2, *ad Pomp.* 1(?), Themistius 285C, Euseb. *PE* 14.6.

<sup>40</sup> Ps.-Plut. 837B (Chios), 837C (Timotheus), 838B, Theopomp. 115 F345 (Halicarnassus), Suda s.vv. *Isokratēs*, *Theodektēs*.

<sup>41</sup> 5.25–29, 12.9–11, 15.81–83.

<sup>42</sup> And actually a foreigner if he became a Scilluntian citizen: cf. Tuplin 2004a, 267.

Xenophon had once been a general and politician in the real world (even if it was the world of a moving *polis*), Isocrates was never either of these things – a fact to which he often alludes (in one lapidary summary, “not *demēgorōn* or *stratēgōn* or otherwise *dunastēs*” [5.81, *Ep.* 1.9], almost evoking Xenophon’s *oute stratēgos oute lokhagos oute stratiōtēs* [*Anabasis* 3.1.4]), ascribing it to lack of voice and confidence (12.9–10) – qualities that the Xenophon of *Anabasis* has in fair abundance. Still, as a political adviser who had never been a politician, Isocrates resembles the Xenophontic Socrates,<sup>43</sup> while, on his return from Asia, Xenophon effectively joined the category of “those who have stepped out of politics” (*hoi exestēkotes tōn politikōn*: 4.171) to which Isocrates ascribes himself, and his pedagogy was not unpolitical, even if, unlike Isocrates, he rarely wrote works giving explicit political advice. Interestingly the nearest to an exception (*Poroi*) shadows Isocrates’ *Peace*: this gives us an unusually close parallel between the two authors, but (characteristically) it is one conjoined with a complete contrast in structure, length and type of solution.<sup>44</sup> Xenophon’s life-story gave him a distinctive connection with Sparta. Isocrates had no such experience and is unwaveringly hostile to Sparta – as befits a good Athenian,<sup>45</sup> especially one who differed from some intellectual rivals in being disinclined to seek a counter-cultural identity in affectation of regard for the place.<sup>46</sup> Of course, in terms of a capacity to find Sparta(ns) problematic, Xenophon was not as far away from Isocrates here as traditional readings of his corpus would suggest.

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43 Cf. Tamiolaki 2017, 189: “Socrates is an odd leader figure, since he constantly gives advice about politics (like other Xenophontic leaders), but nevertheless abstains from it”.

44 It also involves no significant Persian perspective (8.20 is explicit about accepting the King’s Peace terms while *Poroi* ignores issue; *Poroi* does mention satraps as among the category of people whom Athens could woo). For Xenophon’s completely different realization of a subject parallel in type to an Isocratean one, see below on *Agésilas* and *Evagoras*.

45 On Isocrates and Sparta, see recently Richer 2016. Isocrates was a good Athenian, notwithstanding many complaints and vivid comparisons of the city with a flood (15.172) that throws things into such confusion that people get the opposite reputation to the one they deserve or a *hetaira* (Isoc. *ap. Ael. VH* 12.52) – on the ground that, just as people like to associate with *hetairai* because of their beauty, but nobody is so mad as to want to live with one, so Athens is fine to visit, but dangerous to live in because of sycophants and demagogues.

46 Intellectual rivals: Attack 2018, 172 (overlap of Sparta and Academy in Isocrates’ mind), Jordović 2014 (Sparta as identity-tool). *Archidamus* poses challenges but there are intellectual and rhetorical games being played that put it in a special place (see recently Azoulay 2006a, Attack 2018, 167–169) – and it does affirm Athenian superiority (Attack 2018, 161). The letter to Archidamus is too poorly preserved to let us see how it dealt with the issue (though *Agésilas* is criticized). Meanwhile, even for those who reject Gray’s rather persuasive treatment of *Panathenai-cus* (1994), that work leaves at best a question mark over Sparta.

In terms of intellectual affiliation, Isocrates was generally at odds with the Socratic-Academic tradition (for all that Praxiphanes claimed Isocrates and Plato were friends and had discussions about poetry), whereas Xenophon was heavily marked by it. The fact that Isocrates was involved in intellectual and professional feuds distinguished him from Xenophon (it is, of course, a side-effect of Isocrates' status as a pedagogical professional). At least in non-forensic items, Isocrates has a clear and consistent authorial *persona*; Xenophon's works arguably lack that characteristic (McCloskey 2017): concomitantly, Isocrates' works contain a good deal of internal commentary on his own literary activity,<sup>47</sup> whereas Xenophon's do not. Yet Xenophon had literary and philosophical aspirations at least as serious as those of rhetoric-teacher who described his discipline as *philosophia* and, by contrast with other practitioners of rhetorical *philosophia* (5.84), claimed to promote moral improvement (15.274). They certainly had similar attitudes to so-called *sophistai* and agreed in not distinguishing rhetoric from dialectic.<sup>48</sup> And, most strikingly, both authors were creators of literary novelties, of which the most obvious are *Anabasis* and *Cyropaedia* on the one hand, and *Evagoras* and *Antidosis* on the other.<sup>49</sup> And here, at least, there is a shared Persian angle: Xenophon's great innovations are both Persia-related; the same goes for *Evagoras*, while *Panegyricus* is (as noted above) a new development within the Isocratean corpus – and perhaps a novelty as a “literary” panegyric oration disconnected from any actual *panegyris*. In Xenophon's case these novelties are certainly an epiphenomenon of life-experience. At some level that is analytically true of Isocrates too – he himself observed that one's whole life affects how something is written (4.14) and he may have allowed that the reverse is true: everything one writes comes in some degree from what one has lived – but, more specifically, *Evagoras* probably reflects a pre-existing connection with the Cypriot ruler (a by-product of Isocrates' connection with Timotheus and therefore Conon), while *Panegyricus* may well be a genuine response to the making of the King's Peace. Of course, Xenophon's trigger experience was more vivid and immersive.

<sup>47</sup> 2.42–49, 4.1–17, 74–75, 5.9–29, 5.84–85, 93–94, 129, 149, 9.1–7, 73–81, 10.1–15, 12.5–35, 88–90, 172, *Ep.* 9.1–19. *Antidosis*, where it occurs *passim*, is, of course, a special case.

<sup>48</sup> Tuplin 2017b, 348.

<sup>49</sup> *Evagoras*: see below. *Antidosis*: 15.1 is a very blunt assertion of novelty (so *mutatis mutandis* is the opening of *Panegyricus*, a work that will treat its theme with such unprecedented skill that it will be as though earlier treatments never existed: 4.3–4, 10). Other interesting Isocratean items include (i) the unusual inter-relation of *To Nicocles* (in which Isocrates affects both to affirm and deny novelty: 7, 41–49) to *Nicocles* and (ii) the final section of *Panathenaicus*: even if that exemplifies existing tropes of argument (Gray 1994), it is an innovatively complex example.

I shall come back to *Evagoras* and literary innovation at the end of this essay. For the moment, I turn to other Persia-related contacts and contrasts.

Although the achievements of Cyrus the Elder can be deployed as an example to stimulate Philip to yet greater things and elevate Evagoras' deeds to a super-human level (see also below), there is still an element of disdain, and in general Isocrates is as unwaveringly hostile to Persia as he is to Sparta – indeed more so, for there is nothing Persian to correspond to the enigmas of *Panathenaicus* or *Archidamus* (the apologists for Persia attacked in *Panegyricus* are not strictly parallel to those for Sparta<sup>50</sup>). That Xenophon's attitude to things Persian (as to things Spartan) is more nuanced is plain: the life of the Elder Cyrus is a tool to think with about education, leadership and the building of an empire, while the younger Cyrus has admirable characteristics and there are other Persians too who can sometimes give the lie to negative stereotypes. On this broad canvas, then, there is a plain contrast between our two authors: direct experience and the inclination to write history not rhetoric makes Xenophon a more discriminating spectator of things Persian than the Isocrates of the written *logoi* could ever be. This being so, the most profitable way to compare the two authors' evaluative engagement with Persia is in relation to certain larger themes. Given that Isocrates' primary interest in Persia derives from his belief that Greek concord and prosperity are dependent upon war with Persia and that his primary function in life (on his own presentation) was as a teacher of *philosophia*, the obvious larger themes to be considered are panhellenism and education.

## 5 Education

The potential for education to intersect with a Persian dimension lies in the linkage between education and imperial power that we see in the Periclean Funeral Speech and Ephorus' remarks on the failure of Thebes as a hegemonic power (the linkage is, of course, a by-product of the general upsurge of interest in the content and power of education that set in from the middle of the fifth century). The actualization of this potential lies in *Cyropaedia*, which relates to an empire in the past, though one with present existence as well, and in the role of education in Isocratean Persia-related *logoi*, which are more heavily focused

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<sup>50</sup> 4.138 (in awe at Persian power), 143 (vaunting Persian achievements), 146 (praising Persian courage), 175 (believing the King cares for Greece as guardian of the peace). These people are simply taking a different line on a prime political issue. There is no sign that they regard Persia as institutionally superior.

on the present and future than the past. There is in both authors a potential wider topic of the relationship between education and political power or success. But the present context is about Persia, so there is no call to pursue that wider issue in great detail.

Ephorus F119 is relatively simple. Boeotia was geographically suitable for hegemony, but the city and its leaders did not bother with training and education (*agogēi kai paideiai*), disdained *hoi logoi kai homilia hē pros anthrōpous*, and were only concerned with *hē kata polemon aretē*.<sup>51</sup> So the taste of hegemony in Epaminondas' time was brief. The reference to *agōgē* makes one think of Sparta, and that is confirmed by the criticism of over-concentration on military virtue: the imputation is that the Boeotians shared that problematic Spartan characteristic but, defective in *agōgē*, could not achieve the results Spartans once enjoyed. Meanwhile the reference to *paideia*, *logoi* and *homilia hē pros anthrōpous* surely entail a contrast with Athens.<sup>52</sup> Other sources indicate that occasional Boeotians were capable of seeking philosophical or rhetorical education,<sup>53</sup> so the perceived problem is that this had no (or inadequate) bearing on the character of the state. Athenian contempt for “Boeotian pigs” sits in the background here – something Ephorus would have picked up as a pupil of Isocrates – but in any event the inclination to explain hegemonic success and failure in terms of education and trai-

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51 There is a slight textual uncertainty in the source-text (Strab. 9.2.3), which does not affect the basic point. On one sort of reading (Jacoby 1961, Radt 2004) Ephorus stresses that *not even* the leaders of the state were interested in training and education (so much less so the generality of citizens), on another (Baladié 1996) he says that the leaders were uninterested in careful (*epimelei*) training and education, thus allowing that there was *some* engagement with such things, but not enough to make a difference.

52 Parmeggiani 2011, 569 lets *homilia hē pros anthrōpous* evoke “l'intelligenza della diplomazia pacifica”, not least because he sees this as a strength of Epaminondas (the leader who briefly permitted Boeotia a taste of hegemony). That may be part of it; but there is a resonance with Isocrates' observation that all the *didaskaleia* put together produce very few top-rate professional speakers (*agōnistai*) but do produce teachers and private citizens who are *en tais homiliais khariesteroi* and can judge *logoi* well and counsel well (15.201, 204). A good educational environment (*paideia* properly pursued) produces a citizen-body with good communication skills and habits that will help in various settings: charm in *homiliai* benefits diplomacy because it already has an effect on all human interactions (is there also perhaps another contrast here with Spartans? There might also be a reminiscence of the relaxed social intercourse of Athens as evoked by Pericles in the text discussed below).

53 Simmias, Cebes and Phaedondas were Boeotian Socratics. Cebes heard Philolaus in Thebes (schol. Pl. *Ph.* 61E = DK 44A1a), Proxenus studied with Gorgias (Xen. *An.* 2.6.16), Epaminondas with Lysis (Nep. *Epam.* 2, Plut. *Mor.* 578D, Aristox. 68 Wehrli, Cic. *Off.* 1.155, *De or.* 3.139; Diog. L. 8.6, 10.11.2, Dio Chr. 49.5, Greg. Naz. *PG* 36.994, Iamblich. *VP* 250).

ning strikes an Athenian note, not least because of the contrasting precedent in the Periclean Funeral Speech.

In that text the view that each individual Athenian is self-reliantly versatile and that the whole city is a *paideusis tēs Hellados* summarize an argument including assertions that (i) the Athenian *politeia* (with its democratic egalitarianism) is a example to others, (ii) Athenian *paideiai* (sic) – quite different from the laborious training (*epiponos askēsis*) of Sparta and co-existent with a relaxed way of life – make Athenians just as able to face danger and more able to fight unsupported on foreign soil, and (iii) Athenian *philokalia* and *philosophia* match a world of talk, rational decision-making, ambition, civic responsibility and liberal generosity, in which courage is not the product of ignorance (*amathia*). The proof of all this is Athens' international power. A unique socio-educational-political environment has produced unique dominance – and justified it too: for no subject can complain that they are being ruled by those who do not deserve to be rulers (2.41.3).

The educational perspective is two-fold, inward and outward: inwardly the manners of the city involve (military) education, enable intellectual activity and foster informed courage, while outwardly the resulting imperial city is an education for Greece. But it is an odd education, since the Athenians hardly wished everyone else to benefit to the extent of being in a position to curb or destroy Athenian power and prosperity. So what is the lesson that is being taught? That there is nothing to be done about Athenian power? That Athens is far superior to Sparta and other Greeks should wake up to this? That there is a merely intellectual benefit in contemplating and analysing the Athenian success-story? Or could it even be that the phrase is a rhetorical flourish emerging out of the inward perspective on education in what precedes but having no clear real content of its own? One thing is clear, however: this is a broadly politico-military proposition not a predominantly cultural one. That Athenian *philosophia* and *philokalia* are not detrimental to their moral and politico-military health is more a secondary sign than a primary cause of the system's quality – *i.e.* its capacity to make Athens powerful.

Whether Ephorus was consciously assuming a different model on this issue is not easy to tell from Strabo's brief summary of a passage about the absence of *paideia*. But the two passages document a thematic whose application to the Persian Empire is worth considering in a comparison between Xenophon and Isocrates.

The first point to make is that Isocrates was professionally invested in education in a way that Xenophon was not and that this makes a difference to the way that his *logoi* (including Persia-related ones) sit in relation to an actual educational process.

Xenophon educates his readers (a rather ill-defined audience) only in the sense that he writes works that invite readers to take a particular view about certain things or understand how certain things are achieved or appreciate better the problems that certain things present; the closest approach to a simple teacher-pupil process is in *Horsemanship* and (the bulk of) *Cynegeticus*. But Isocrates educated people more directly. We see something of the process in the interchange with pupils and ex-pupil in *Panathenaicus* or the remarks at the start of *Philippus* about winning over pupils who had criticized the venture. On a larger scale the framing of *Helen* or *Evagoras* evokes the idea of teaching through presentation of paradigm *logoi*;<sup>54</sup> and the fondness for internal commentary and inclination to formal experimentation suggest that other *logoi* always have a technically exemplary character alongside the apparently primary politically or morally symbouleutic one.

Of particular interest here are the complaints in 5.83–85, 93–94 about other people using his *logoi* as teaching tools.<sup>55</sup> This makes it likely that Isocrates saw them in that light as well; indeed that is part of the pleasantries involved in saying that he is not going to invent new material about the war against Persia when he can imitate what he has already written, since he is not engaged in mere display but in the arguing of a case that is substantively important. This allows him simultaneously to advertise *Panegyricus* (to which there is also allusion in 5.9–10, 129, 149), remind the reader of his status as a philosophic orator (5.17–29 has already established that the *logos* passes muster as the product of a professional), distance himself from sophistic treatments of the war-with-the-barbarians theme, and claim a seriousness of purpose that others lack.

So Isocrates' treatments of Persia-related topics not only do the job but also show how it should be done and stake out a position against professional rivals.<sup>56</sup> This is not something that would naturally be said about Xenophon. The contrast is mitigated by *Cynegeticus* (which is both practical instruction and commentary on types of education – but, of course, has nothing to do with Persia) and by generic innovations and fluidity of authorial *persona* in the wider corpus – Xenophon is persistently trying out different ways of dealing with the topics that interest him. But, if mitigated, it is not wholly removed, for there is no reason to see

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<sup>54</sup> *Helen*: Vallozza 2016. *Evagoras*: see below.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. 5.11, 12.16, *Ep.* 9.15. The fact that war with Persia was already a favoured topic of *sophistai* before *Panegyricus* (4.4) helps explain why rhetoric-teachers exploited the work, but also supplies one motivation for Isocrates writing it.

<sup>56</sup> We see something similar in the way that *Ep.* 9.15 casts disagreement about political advice to Archidamus as a squabble among educators. See Azoulay 2009 for a seductive discussion of the phenomenon.

this *variatio* as a pedagogic enterprise in its own right: Xenophontic invention is arguably stimulated by the idea of the paradigm-*logos* but he is not trying to teach others to do the same, merely provoking them to think about (broadly) moral and political questions.

Alongside this formal or presentational point (for Isocrates talking about Persia is an specifically educational undertaking in a way that it is not for Xenophon), there is also the substantive role of education in their treatments of the Persian theme and its relationship to the thematic established in Thucydides and Ephorus.

The idea of those two authors that education has a bearing on imperial success is certainly upheld in *Cyropaedia*. Xenophon tells a story in which two different types of education underpin an individual's acquisition of imperial power: exceptional education produces an exceptional result just as is the case in Thucydides. That is a brilliant testimony to the power of education. But just as the final pronouncement in Thucydides leaves us perplexed (what does it really mean to call Athens *paideusis tēs Hellados?*), so the culmination of *Cyropaedia* leaves us at least a little bit uncertain about what has been achieved. Cyrus' achievement turns out to trade quite heavily on the educational strand that the first book of the work rather encourages us to regard with suspicion: however much we tell ourselves that Cyrus has tamed the Median model by an infusion of Persian discipline and egalitarianism, the end result is alien to that latter model – a fact underlined by the retention of Persia as a distinct space. Moreover, the education and natural talents of Cyrus do not ensure the long-term stability of his creation. Education can empower empire and indeed be its prerequisite (in the spirit of Pericles and Ephorus) but it does not guarantee imperial quality or longevity.

Perhaps this was inevitable (the same happened to Pericles' Athens, and in a much shorter time span), and perhaps that is part of Xenophon's point. The centrality of Cyrus as interventionist moral example (the *blepōn nomos*: 8.1.22) makes the system vulnerable in his absence.<sup>57</sup> The effect of the charismatic ruler only lasts so long: good institutions can stretch it beyond his lifetime, even if his immediate successor is inadequate, but without further charismatic figures the system will fail. Where is such a figure to come from? Perhaps there is no telling: nature will provide – or not. But a message of *Cyropaedia* on the face of it should be that education is part of the deal. Yet, despite the importance of the educational experiences in Book I and despite the fact that the title of the work might seem to be invitation to see the whole as a display of the hero's *paideia* (passive and active), the bulk of the text has a strikingly weak ongoing educa-

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<sup>57</sup> Tuplin 2010, 217 n. 77.

tional agenda. Cyrus' exercise of leadership, verbally articulated and explicated at every turn, is not consistently figured as an educational process, and it is not until we get to the establishment of the new imperial order that education reappears as a topic. On this there are two points to observe.

First, there is the question of education in the literal sense. At 7.5.85 we read that, just as in Persia the *homotimoi* spent their time at the *arkheia*, so in Babylon “we *homotimoi* must behave here as we did there and you must be present and keep an eye on me”; but this turns out (8.1.6) to mean that the *entimoi* (no longer *homotimoi*) will attend at the palace and (as we shall shortly see) will be taught or forced to do so: in other words the Persia-model is *not* quite what is going to happen. So, when we are then told that the boys will be educated “here”, in order that that they can observe Cyrus and the courtiers as good examples (and those they watch will benefit by being good examples), this means that they are not being educated in Persia and, since the nature of the education is unspecified, it (again) may not be quite what it had been in the old setting. That is confirmed by 8.8.13, which (looking back from the contemporary era of corruption) indicates a mixture of Median (horsemanship) and Persian (resolution of court-cases) elements, as well as underlining the role played by example. The *paideia* of the empire shadows the distinctive educational experience of the man who created it, and that is logical enough. It may nonetheless seem odd that that the text does not dwell on the matter rather more fully: in fact, nothing more is said, save that children should be educated at satrapal courts in the same way as at the royal one (8.6.10).

Secondly, the characteristics of the new order depend on Cyrus' educational experience and in articulating it he does at last become a metaphorical educator – or at least a teacher. What is remarkable here is the combination of *tropos didaskalias* and *tropos anankēs* in achieving the control Cyrus wishes to have (8.1.19). The association of teacher and violence was not foreign to the social environment of classical Greece, and it is possible that what strikes us as a dissonance was less obvious as such to contemporary readers. All the same, it is hard not to find the passage disconcerting. Elsewhere Xenophon takes it as axiomatic that children have the relationship to a teacher that soldiers had to the uncharming and rather brutal Clearchus (*Anabasis* 2.6.12): the allusion to the *tropos anankēs* reduces the plausibility of claiming that Cyrus the *didaskalos* is an unsterotypically amiable one. The new order has some disturbing features (however logical they are made to seem: indeed that they are logical is one of the disturbing features) and among them is a new educational strand – and one in which *paideia* has been replaced by (mere) *didaskalia*.

If the failings of education by Cyrus within the text resemble Thucydides' *paideusis Hellados* as a cause of perplexity, there is also an apparent contrast in

another sense, for, unlike Athens, Cyrus' imperial state is not explicitly figured as itself a cause of education to others either within the world of the text (which would be the most direct analogy) – we are told nothing about what people beyond the borders of his empire think of it – or within the world of the reader. Treatment of Cyrus' life is presented as an exercise in solving a historical problem (how did he contrive to become the acknowledged ruler of so many disparate nations?) not in describing an educative entity. Of course, like any other historian Xenophon undoubtedly intends the reader to learn from contemplation of this story from the past and its interaction with the present sketched so contemptuously at the very end of the text, but that is at best metaphorical education. Nonetheless there *is* a way of finding an analogy to the Thucydidean slogan: we could read the title as containing a subjective genitive, acknowledge that (as we have seen) Cyrus does not do much educating within the text, and conclude that the reference is to his paedeutic effect upon the reader. Since ruler and state are effectively identical, this is tantamount to making imperial Persia a *paideia* for those who consume it in the form presented by Xenophon. Melina Tamiolaki has proposed just such an analogy,<sup>58</sup> but I do not think most readers would have taken this as the initial and obvious reading. Faced with a text called *Kurou paideia* whose first book is all about Cyrus being educated, they would take it as read that the genitive is objective, and been no more uneasy that so much of the text is not apparently about Cyrus being educated than they were uneasy that most of *Kurou anabasis* is not only not about *anabasis* but is not about Cyrus either. But it is not perhaps impossible that some readers, conscious of the Thucydidean parallel (whose currency in the thought-world of the fourth century is, as we shall see, guaranteed by Isocrates), might have seen a secondary meaning. If so, the perplexity about what lesson Cyrus' empire teaches us matches nicely the perplexity of the *paideusis Hellados*.

Isocratean education was not, of course, aimed at turning individuals into makers of empire: Nicocles (an abiding proponent of Isocratean *philosophia*: 3.1–9, cf. 9.78<sup>59</sup>) presents himself as unconcerned to acquire the territory of others (3.34), while Timotheus neither founded an empire nor pursued an imperial-

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**58** Tamiolaki 2017, 187, sees an analogy between Athens as *paideusis Hellados* and *Cyropaedia* as “an educational paradigm intended for Greeks”.

**59** The spectacle of Nicocles defending *philosophia* and eloquence in 3.1–9 in Isocratean fashion is striking – and until 11 we do not strictly know that the speaker is not Isocrates. Note that 9.78 says that Nicocles is a trailblazer and (still) unique among *hoi en turannidi kai ploutōi kai truphais ontes* in engaging in *philosophēin kai ponein*; envy of his *paideusis* will lead other rulers to follow his example and abandon the pursuits they currently take too much pleasure in. 3.1–9 is constructed in accordance with the same idea.

ist agenda on Athens' behalf,<sup>60</sup> and in this they were certainly not failing their master (Timotheus' failings as a pupil lay in his inability to manage political relations within Athens). But he did have some interest in the interaction of education and empire, and he was certainly aware of the Thucydidean passage, for he talks about Athenian *paideusis* in relation to the Hellenic world (4.50) and does so in a wider context which echoes other themes in the Periclean Funeral speech.<sup>61</sup> This makes it important, of course, that what he says about Athenian *paideusis* is somewhat different.

As we have noted, the nature of Thucydides' *paideusis Hellados* is a bit perplexing. The Isocratean text, by contrast, is perfectly lucid. The context is *philosophia*, that is the skills of *phronein kai legein*, and Athenian excellence in that matter has resulted in "Hellene" being a term that connotes *dianoia* not *genos* and designates someone who shares Athenian *paideusis*. We are definitely in the (intellectual) cultural discourse that is rather elusive in Thucydides, and the lessons involved are lessons in rhetoric, taught to the rest of the world by the pupils of Athenian teachers. And another contrast with Thucydides is that, whereas for him the term *Hellados* is an uninspected given, for Isocrates Athenian *paideusis* has the theoretical ability to extend the boundaries of *Hellas*. He is probably more interested in affirming that Hellenic culture is Athenian culture than that Atheno-Hellenic culture could turn barbarians into Hellenes, but his stance is nonetheless well removed from that of Thucydides. Indeed one might say that *paideusis* has become a quasi-imperial weapon.

Still, that is perhaps to run beyond the text. We should rein back and consider what are the more explicit connections between education and empire in Isocrates.

Isocrates' primary view is, I think, that poor educational values are a source of criticism and of weakness for states that suffer from them (the Ephoran view on Thebes) – this is true of Persia (as is plainly affirmed in 4.150–152: *paideusis* specifically in 151) and also of Sparta, whose people are explicitly worse than barbarians in this regard (12.209) – but that good ones are of more value for their formation of the individual's intellectual and moral qualities than as a valid basis for international dominance.<sup>62</sup> Rhetorical education is the essence of Athens as war is of Sparta and horsemanship of Thessaly (15.298), and in *phronēsis* and *logoi*

<sup>60</sup> Or so Isocrates says. The Samians might have disagreed.

<sup>61</sup> The remarks about Athenian *philoxenia* – which perhaps primarily have in mind commercially valuable metics – correspond to Thucydides' contrast of Athens and Sparta in the matter of *xenēlasia*, even though the point Thucydides is making is to do with military espionage.

<sup>62</sup> The concession that Persia's success in 386 was a victory in *phronēsis* (12.159) should not be accorded too much weight. It was also a sign of Greek folly (4.137), so the intellectual bar was not

Athenians are as much superior to non-Athenians as men to animals and Hellenes to barbarians (15.294), and (as we have seen) it is her pupils who teach everyone else (4.50). Athenian *paideusis* is what defines a Hellene (4.50) and is thus one of the benefactions of Athens to the Hellenic world that entitles the city to Hellenic honour: that honour is the freely bestowed hegemony of a morally and practically justifiable war against an external and inferior enemy, but it not the acquisition of empire. Empire might be a necessary evil to curb Sparta (12.114–118), but it is an evil, and although great figures of the fifth century past, including those who might be seen as architects of empire, were educated men (15.306–308) – and Isocrates would certainly not argue in favour of political leaders *not* being educated men – empire is not actually justified by the exceptional educational quality of the imperial state or its leaders (the prosperity of fifth century Athens argues in favour of the importance of a rhetorical education, but that is a different matter).

So in practical terms the beneficial impacts of education upon the Persian agenda are that a proper Greek (Isocratean) education entails exposure to and acceptance of the view that attacking Persia is axiomatically good in both moral and practical terms and that the feasibility of this axiomatic good is rooted in the poor habits, upbringing and education (*epitēdeumata*, *trophē* and *paideusis*) of the enemy. Education is about damaging or destroying empires, not about making them. The young Alexander of Macedon, to whom Isocrates wrote about the merits of *philosophia* and (within limits) eristics, turned into someone who fulfilled the first half of that disjunction but only at the expense of not obeying the second half. But, then, he was not a pupil of Isocrates, and Isocrateans who were so minded could have blamed Aristotle. Isocrates liked to speak of the glory a state or an autocratic ruler might win by fulfilling the panhellenic agenda. Others (doubtless Aristotle included) knew that destruction leaves a vacuum. In fact, Isocrates himself had lived through this happening in 404 and so probably knew it too – but preferred to look the other way.<sup>63</sup>

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high; and Persia's original acquisition of power was due not to *phronēsis* but to the exceptional honour they accorded to kingship (3.23).

**63** Might he have thought that a panhellenic champion from outside the city-state world such as Philip could acquire empire (or more empire) in the non-Greek lands of the east, while the *poleis* of Greece (and any new Greek colonies in the east) remains autonomous entities – almost as Cyrus has an empire, while Persia remains a royal republic? He says that it is shameful that no Greek has had to vision to try to make the Greeks “masters of Asia” (5.124), *i.e.* succeed to the power of the Great King. But this is an incitement to action rather than a blueprint for a future order, and he is prepared to envisage much more modest outcomes (5.120–123, which ends almost bathetically with at least freeing the Greek cities of Asia).

In the end, then, Xenophon and Isocrates sit in the middle of a web of inter-connections on the theme of education and empire, neither singing from an exactly similar song-sheet nor yet playing from a entirely different score.

## 6 Panhellenism

We habitually call the proposition that the problems of Greece can be cured by war with Persia panhellenism and, although this is not an ancient term, it is not inconvenient, since it captures the fact that it is about benefits for Greeks at large. We do have to be clear that it is about tangibles (prosperity) and well as intangibles (peace and concord) and that, although Isocrates surely believes that a successful outcome is only what Greeks at large deserve because of their superiority to barbarians, it is not aggressively marketed as a cultural crusade.<sup>64</sup> *Paideusis* is part of the justification for Athens being the hegemon of the war, but it is not the war cry. Although Athenian *paideusis* is Hellenic *paideusis*, it does not follow that all Hellenes are as fully invested in it as Isocrates would like – Spartans surely were not in his view. The Athenians, elected as hegemonic power on the grounds that they are the best Greeks (because the ones who have most benefited Greece), would be leading people who might all be Hellenes but were not necessarily true *pepaideumenoi*. *Paideusis* may potentially trump *genos* and *koinē phusis*, but some of the Greeks who needed to be reconciled so they would stop disturbing peace and concord only had *genos* and *koinē phusis*. The same might, if one was honest, go for other potential hegemons: whatever the aspirations of the young Alexander, what did Isocrates really think about Philip in this regard?

Isocrates' crucial claims were (a) that peace, concord, prosperity and pushing back the boundaries of the Persian empire were reciprocally entailing *desiderata* and (b) that the empire suffered from weaknesses that meant that the package was achievable, if all parties were prepared to make the appropriate act of faith together. Nothing in the actual historical record either falsifies (a) or validates (b). Attention tends to be concentrated on the second proposition, but perhaps one should pause long enough to note the first one: Isocrates might actually have been right about this, even if being right means little more than having devised a useful thought-experiment. The fact that it was not a socially revolutionary thought experiment (prosperity was conceived in terms of existing patterns of

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<sup>64</sup> See Pownall 2007. If anything the references to *theōria* and *eusebeia* in 4.182–184 construct the crusade as a religious one.

wealth in Greek cities), does not diminish its value and is unlikely to have been a ground on which contemporary dissenters would have rejected it.

Still, feasibility is the sticking point. Our concern here is with the comparison of Isocrates and Xenophon, not with objective assessment of proposition (b), so not much needs to be said. Where Isocrates stands on the topic is clear, even if emphases change, so it is really largely a question of Xenophon's position.

Isocrates is not much concerned with the idea of Persian decline. The moral failings outlined in 4.150–156 are the product of customs and *paideusis* that are treated as an unchanging given.<sup>65</sup> An empire created by a foundling is presumably a poor thing from the outset, and (for all their arrogance: 4.85–98) the Persians were already feeble (*malakoi*), militarily inexperienced and ruined by *truphē* (5.124) in the days of Darius, so there does not seem to have much change – the anonymous kings trope is one sign of this (above n.33) – and, if anything, it is Greek decline he is more concerned about (12.156). If Persia is now defeatable, this is more dependent on a change-to-come in Greece than on the proposition that Persia has become much weaker for other than contingent and possibly temporary reasons<sup>66</sup> – a category in which I would include the contrast drawn in *Philippus* (5.99–100) between Artaxerxes II and III. It is symptomatic that Isocrates is happy to warn that the *kairos* for attack may pass because the troubles currently besetting the King have been resolved (4.5, 160–167, 5.137) and that, although he comments on Persian dependence on Greek mercenaries (at least in later works), unlike Plato and Xenophon, he does not spell out that this is a change and so potentially viewable as a sign of decline.<sup>67</sup>

Xenophon, by contrast, articulates an idea of decline very clearly in the final chapter of *Cyropaedia* – and with due acknowledgement of the implications of

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**65** Lenfant 2001, 408 n. 2, cites the wider passage of which this is part (138–156) as evidence for Isocrates seeing a decline, but the fact that Isocrates speaks of contemporary signs of weakness is simply a product of the fact that he is urging contemporary action.

**66** The escape of the 10,000, Dercylidas, Dracon's and Agesilaus' successes in 398–394, Evagoras' revolt (and disturbances in the Levant), continuing Egyptian independence and the Cypriot-Phoenician rebellions of the early 340s. Isocrates was not interested in succession-crises or very much in satrapal revolts: there is no sense of a concerted satraps' revolt, even to the extent that Ephorus-Diodorus postulated, and the only dissident satraps he mentions are Hecatomnus and Idrieus: 4.162, 5.104. That matches his tendency to see the king's loss of control in terms of ethno-geographically defined areas.

**67** 4.136 remarks that the most useful part of Tiribazus' army is Greek (though some of it is fleet, not infantry mercenaries – not that rowers were exempt from the sort of judgment passed on mercenaries: 8.79), but the idea of dependence is not quite as firmly articulated as in 5.125. In 8.47 Greeks employ mercenaries just as the king does, and contextually this is a bad practice: theoretically, then, Isocrates judges Persian mercenary-employment to be a sign of *malaise*.

mercenary use. Which makes it all the more remarkable that, despite a real stress on the military consequences of moral collapse, no conclusion is drawn that the empire is vulnerable to destruction, and there is no inclination even hypothetically to say “if a serious force came against them they would be in bad trouble”. Indeed the almost parodically satirical tone adopted to denounce contemporary Persia (Gruen 2011, 53–65) arguably reflects an uncomfortable awareness of Persia’s continuing status as a powerful force: in order to insist on the distinction between his historical paradigm and a contemporary national enemy, Xenophon outdoes the colourful denunciations of the latter by politicians and pamphleteers – but, even so, does not slip into panhellenism.

This makes sense if we reckon that, although he might appreciate the thought-experiment of proposition (a), Xenophon was not in the business of urging proposition (b). But some adjustment of an earlier adumbration of that view so far as it derives from *Anabasis* is perhaps called for.<sup>68</sup>

Mercenaries and the possibility of Anatolian colonization are notable features of the *Anabasis* story and also of Isocratean pronouncements.<sup>69</sup> Since the Xenophontic treatments are less optimistic than the Isocratean ones, it seems natural to feel that Xenophon is at least problematising the sort of view espoused by Isocrates. But mercenaries as agents (as well as beneficiaries) of the Persian campaign are more prominent in *Philippus* (after *Anabasis*) than in *Panegyricus* (before) – indeed they are essentially absent in the latter: the existence of wanderers driven to mercenary service is noted, but they are only part of the problem, not part of the solution (4.168), and, while the proposition that we shall not have to cause grief to the cities by levying troops (4.185) is consistent with mercenaries being used, the primary imputation is probably that the war will be so popular that citizen armies will be forthcoming without problem. The closest we get in *Panegyricus* to mercenaries as agents of the crusade is an earlier passage which assumes that the war will be fought by (and benefit from the experience of) those who fought the intra-Greek wars of the past (4.174): as of c. 380 that was already a mixture of civic and mercenary forces.

This being so, Xenophon’s display of the failings of mercenaries in *Anabasis* might be thought to be answering a case that Isocrates had not (yet) made. Of

<sup>68</sup> Tuplin 2004b, 182. Other discussions of *Anabasis* in relation to panhellenism include Dillery 1995, 59–98, Rood 2004.

<sup>69</sup> Mercenaries: 5.96, 122. The problem of the wandering destitute who turn into mercenaries is already found in 4.168 and recurs in 5.120, 122, 8.24, *Ep.* 9.8–10. They are the common enemy of mankind for Isocrates (8.46) as for Demosthenes (23.130). Colonization: 5.5, 120, 12.14, 47. The idea is at best implicit in 4.132. There is great stress on Athens’ historical role as colonizing city (4.34–8, 99, 12.43 ff., 116, 164 f, 190), but no explicit marriage between that and the aims of the crusade.

course, we do not know that he or someone else had not already made it in a work now lost – and it must be stressed that the issue here is not in the first instance whether Xenophon is arguing with Isocrates personally. The perception that the peace of 375/4 released enough mercenaries into the King’s employment for it to have been worth his while to promote that peace in the first place (Diodorus 15.38) suggests that the market had developed to such a point that any proponent of the panhellenist thesis should have been explicitly envisaging a substantial mercenary component: and the more it was a commonplace that the Persians employed Greek mercenaries, the more tempting it would be to argue that such people would surely rather take money to fight *against* the Persians.

As an account of a set of events that Isocrates was already using in c. 380 as a proof of Persian military vulnerability (while according as little actual praise as possible to what he regards as bunch of reprobates<sup>70</sup>) and one that alluded explicitly both to strategic weaknesses and the prosperity that might be derived from occupation of Persian land, *Anabasis* could hardly *not* be read as having a bearing on the panhellenist thesis. But that it is specifically mercenaries who display sad signs of lack of concord as soon as the real crisis of survival is (or appears to be) over and who are hostile to the idea of Anatolian colonization – another theme that is prominent in *Philippus* but essentially absent in *Panegyricus* – may not deserve quite as much stress as I have claimed in the past.

But that they are Greeks is already good enough. The *Anabasis* narrative of the army’s achievements in Mesopotamia does not set out to invalidate Isocrates’ claims about the capacity of Greeks to defeat Persians in the right circumstances, but pretty much everything else in the book encodes precisely that world of inter-Greek conflict that the panhellenist message was trying to eliminate. No one could read it and be encouraged to believe that the synchronised leap of faith to which I referred earlier (p. 37) was terribly likely to happen. And to anyone with any sense of history, the work’s ending in which (figuratively) the army marches off into the sunset to join Thibron is pregnant with the eventual King’s Peace – the event that turned Isocrates into a panhellenist but also created a closed space west of the Anatolian seaboard in which the wars and *staseis* of which Isocrates complained could flourish all the more. What, if anything, Xenophon thought was the bright hope for the future is hard to say. But his only explicit blueprint for a better future

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70 4.146–149 concedes only that they did confront the crisis *kalōs*; 5.89 notes that the fate of those who fight the King is *ex adoxōn men genesthai lamprois, ek penētōn de plousiois, ek tapeinōn de pollēs chōras kai poleōn despotais* – but then (90–92) adduces Cyrus and Clearchus “who are reckoned to have failed” as an *alternative* kind of example; he thus avoids actually praising the mercenaries, and uses them as an *a fortiori* argument. Allusions in *Anabasis* to praise of the 10,000 are often counter-factual or contextually problematised (2.1.17, 5.5.8, 5.7.33, 6.1.16, 20–21).

is the one in *Poroi* – which has nothing to do with Persia – and I do not think we can legitimately read any implicit indications as suggesting that he was of the same mind as his fellow Erchian. Here, as elsewhere, he looked at the world as a historian and his view was too discriminating to admit of Isocratean certainties.

## 7 Intertextual relations

Discussion of education and empire raises the issue of intertexts: *Cyropaedia* may intertext with Thucydides (and *Panegyricus* certainly does), Plato intertexts with *Cyropaedia* (Tuplin 2018) and *Philippus* may do so (in general, though, I am inclined to think the education material in Isocrates and *Cyropaedia* is not specifically interactive; intertexts with other Socratic Cyrus works are probably more important for Xenophon). The question returned in connection with panhellenism. It is now time to address it more directly. Various claims have been made over the years, often as a means of establishing the date of Xenophontic texts relative to the objectively somewhat clearer chronological framework of Isocrates' *oeuvre*. That is not my concern: on the contrary, I start with certain assumptions about dating and consider possible intertextual links on that basis. My business is also, of course, only with Persia-related material. If the Socratic veneer of *Antidosis* has any specifically Xenophontic implications, they are not my concern.<sup>71</sup> The haul of salient items is not, I think, large.

The game of framing an internal self-critique in *Panathenaicus* broadly recalls *Cyropaedia* (and, on a smaller scale, *RL*). But that would be at best a case of Xenophon inspiring Isocrates to try something novel rather than a strict intertext in which *Panathenaicus* has to be read against *Cyropaedia*, and I see no other clear sign of creative response to *Cyropaedia* in Isocrates' later works, though anyone familiar with it would not doubt be amused at Isocrates' deployment of a version of Cyrus' origins in *Philippus* that is about as far removed from *Cyropaedia* as it could be. I have already remarked that *Poroi* and *Peace* are two almost entirely dissimilar responses to the same political situation. Pierre Pontier (2016, 51) speaks of the texts "competing with one another": if one is a reaction to the other, my feeling is that the respondent is likely to be Xenophon, as *Poroi* is briefer and more eccentric both in the nature of its recommendations and in relation to the sort of thing Xenophon normally writes. But that might be dismissed as a subjective judgment, and I am by no means sure that the two works were not essentially

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<sup>71</sup> People tend to see allusions to Plato's *Apology*: 15.15–16, 21, 26–27, 33, 89, 95, 100, 145, 154, 179, 240, 321. Nightingale 1995, 28–29, 42, 43; Too 2008, 24; Murphy 2013, 343, 348.

independently prompted by the situation of post-Social War Athens. In any case, there is little or no explicit Persian content (n. 44), even though part of what made the post-Social War situation problematic was the Great King's threat of intervention.

By contrast, it seems pretty certain that *Hellenica* 5.1.36 reflects *Panegyricus* 139. Isocrates writes that the *pragmata* of whichever side the King supports are *epikudestera*, Xenophon that Sparta and her adversaries were evenly matched in the war, but that the King's Peace made the Spartans *polu epikudersteroi*. These are the only two pre-Polybian attestations of the word in *TLG*: they are surely interconnected. Xenophon applies a general proposition to a particular situation (the one that underpins *Panegyricus*). Whether this amounts to a creatively interesting intertextual response is perhaps debatable, but the reminiscence does underline the King's responsibility: the "so-called Peace of Antalcidas" is actually "the peace sent down by the King" (Tuplin 1993: 84), and those who remember the Isocratean context may ask themselves whether the events of 387/6 were really a sign of the weakness that Isocrates is there concerned to attribute to the King. His Spartan beneficiaries did not prove able to retain the advantage he had given them, but from his point of view the King's Peace was a fairly definitive success: he no longer needed to switch his support back and forth between Athens and Sparta, and Xenophon's version of the history of the next quarter-century was played out within the boundary established by the peace and largely ignored him. The events in 7.1.33–40, the King's only substantive re-appearance in *Hellenica*, tend to reinforce the message. His new potential beneficiaries achieved nothing, but that was their problem, not his, and the complaints of Athenians and Arcadians, though strong enough to scupper Theban aspirations, were otherwise essentially impotent.

It has often been noted that *Anabasis* 2.4.4 – the king will not want us report at home in Greece that we defeated him *epi tais thurais* (on his doorstep, but also at his palace) and then got away, after laughing him to scorn (*katagelasantes apêlthomen*) – recalls Isoc. 4.149, where the Ten Thousand made the Persians *katagelastoi* right in front of the palace (*hup' autois tois basileiois*).<sup>72</sup> The fact that both passages are the final flourish of an argument reinforces a suspicion that Xenophon is echoing Isocrates,<sup>73</sup> and the likelihood that both also recall Hero-

<sup>72</sup> Isoc. 9.58 speaks of Artaxerxes II disdaining Cyrus so much that the latter was almost under the gates of his palace before Artaxerxes noticed him (*mikrou dein elathen auton epi to basileion epistas*). This shows that a trope Isocrates used in c. 380 still appeals to him later, but adds nothing more of any certainty

<sup>73</sup> In the case of Isocrates it is the final flourish of the whole first part of 133–166, immediately before the pivotal commentary on inherent Persian weakness (see above, n. 10). The root

dotus 8.100.4 does not tell against this. Mardonius urges Xerxes not to make the Persians *katagelastoi* in the eyes of Greeks by carrying on with his campaign in its current form; he should go home and leave a picked army to finish the task.<sup>74</sup> In this case the defeat – Salamis – is at the opposite extreme from *epi thurais*, and Mardonius' claim is that, since it was sustained by Phoenicians, Egyptians, Cilicians and Cypriots, it casts no light on the imperial heartland. Isocrates can certainly be seen as in dialogue with this passage, because he is precisely concerned with drawing a contrary conclusion about the weakness of the heartland, while Xenophon's speakers (anonymous critics of Clearchus) resemble Mardonius in being interested in the interaction between Greece and the heartland and in the King's reaction to it. What is remarkable is that the conclusion for which Xenophon's speakers are arguing, namely that the mercenaries should break the truce agreed with Tissaphernes and set off home immediately, is plainly wrong,<sup>75</sup> so, in echoing the Isocratean reworking of Herodotus, Xenophon is suggesting that contemptuous laughter does not always go with correct analysis. It was premature of Clearchus' critics to talk of rendering the Persians contemptible until they had actually safely got home, something that was not going to happen if their advice was taken. And, even when they *had* got home safely, it was still perhaps premature of Isocrates to declare that what had happened proved the king's weakness. Mardonius had been wrong that proper soldiers (as he sees it) would save Xerxes' face, but the empire had not fallen; *mutatis mutandis* the same was true about the Ten Thousand and the empire of Artaxerxes II.

Nor is the end of the matter. The speech of Clearchus' critics also includes the statement that the reason they are being made to wait for Tissaphernes is that the king needs to get his scattered army together before destroying them totally, the thing he needs to do to avoid embarrassment (2.4.3): so the context of the *katagelastoi* passage also includes the idea of the king being weak because of dispersal of forces. What this recalls is (a) the famous observation in *Anabasis* 1.5.9 that Cyrus marched quickly to exploit the fact that the length of the roads and dispersal of forces made the empire weak in face of rapid attack and (b) the principle articulated by Isocrates (4.165) that “when one is at war with people who

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*katagel-* is not generally rare in either Xenophon or Isocrates, so the claim of interconnection here very much depends on *epi tais thurais // hup'autois tois basileiois* and on position within the text.

<sup>74</sup> In saying this Mardonius is already echoing his own advice in 7.9.1 that Xerxes must not let the Greeks of Europe deride him (*katagelasai*). That underlines the effect of 8.100.4 and makes it all the more understandable that later authors would pick up on it.

<sup>75</sup> The fact that it turned out that the Persians would not in the long run be inhibited from breaking oaths and that Clearchus was wrong on that point (2.4.7) does not mean that it was sensible for the Greeks to break their undertakings at this stage.

are being gathered together from many places, one should not wait for them to be upon one but make an attack while they are still scattered” – a principle adduced in justification of a pre-emptive Greek invasion of Anatolia. Given that we have identified a possible allusion to *Panegyricus* in 2.4.4, it is quite tempting to think that the first part of what Clearchus’ critics say also evokes that work: the intrinsic argument is weaker than in the case of 2.4.3 // 4.149 in the absence of a significant precise verbal echo (for *diesparmenois/diesparthai* is not perhaps lexically striking enough to count), and I am quite sure that Xenophon was capable of observing the tactical point spelled out in 1.5.9 for himself. But reference to dispersal of forces is actually irrational in the narrative context, since the king had already had a very much larger army *in situ* at Cunaxa, and that encourages the idea that the critics are to be seen as reaching for Isocratean panhellenist rhetoric here as well – albeit, ironically, as an argument for running away, not an argument for launching an attack. Once again the point would be to associate a proposition about the empire that might be valid enough in itself with speakers who misuse it in support of a contextually wrong-headed conclusion. Problematisation has an analogy in the case of *Anabasis* 1.5.9: for the invitation to see a systematic weakness in the empire is followed shortly by a spectacular demonstration of that lack of Greek *homonoia* which both prompts panhellenist aspiration and renders its fulfilment so very difficult.

So, the argument is that 2.4.3–4 is special because it contains allusions to two separate pieces of *Panegyricus* and these give the speech reported in those two sections a particular and (in context) interestingly inappropriate flavour. In the end, the accusation of subjective judgment may again be reasonable,<sup>76</sup> and the passage, read as deliberately intertextual, adds only a small twist to the larger and much more broad-brush business of reading the detailed narrative of Greek and Persian behaviour in *Anabasis* in the light of the panhellenist ideas of which Isocrates is our principal surviving representative. *Anabasis* inevitably deals with

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<sup>76</sup> One might attempt to bolster the argument by claiming further signs of Xenophon’s interest in the particular bits of *Panegyricus* from which 4.149 and 4.165 come, viz. the speculation in 3.2.24 about the King building roads and giving Mysians chariots in order to get them out of his realm (read as a rather baroque response to the idea in 4.148 of the Cyreans going home under escort [*propempomenoi*]) and the claim in 6.4.8 that the Cyreans were not driven *spanei biou* and hoped to go home with money for their children (read as a response to the assertion in 4.146 that they were 6000 men not picked *aristindēn* but people who *dia phaulotēta en tais hautōn oukh hoioi t’ēsan zēn* and the picture in 4.168 of people wandering with women and children or compelled by lack of daily necessities to serve as mercenaries). But these are not particularly compelling claims, and would do nothing to diminish the accusation of wishful thinking.

panhellenism, but the extent to which it does so in an intertextual relationship to specific Isocratean utterances can perfectly well be very limited.

What about an Isocratean response to *Anabasis*? Isocrates' later explicit treatments of the story of the Ten Thousand disclose no obvious sign that *Anabasis* has had an effect, but can we find an implicit allusion?

A young man (who might not be expected to be doing such a thing) addresses an assembly at a time of crisis connected with a treaty. He urges his audience not to yield to the enemy's orders or to defeatism in its own ranks but to fight for its survival, with the gods as allies and in accord with ancestral example. Deserted by human allies, they must abandon superfluous property, leave their city and fight alone, accepting that honourable death is better than being derided (*katagelastoi*) and that small numbers can be victorious. A decision to be quasi-mercenaries (denizens of a moving *patris* trying to secure benefits for absent women and children) will have great impact when reported among the Greeks. After a spell of nomadic warfare, they will fight a decisive formal battle. This description of *Archidamus* echoes *Anabasis*.<sup>77</sup> But is there a deliberate substantive link?

What prompts the idea is the spectacle of a Spartan prince saying that Spartans should become like mercenaries. Without the associated thought-experiment (which is what it is: 6.86), a call to resist one's enemies in defence of fatherland, historical super-power status and a just territorial claim would have no special resonance with the story of the Ten Thousand. And, as it is, there is still a contrast. The morally good quasi-mercenaries of *Archidamus* deliberately exchange their city for a stronghold and hit-and-run fighting that will put enemies within a relatively limited geographic space under a sort of siege (6.73–79), whereas the real mercenaries of *Anabasis* make a very long linear journey back to their generic homeland (Greece), fighting along the way: they are indeed defending their integrity against enemy threat, but their integrity is as an accidental army and as ethnic Greeks. If there is a genuine pay-off in reading the *Archidamus* scenario against *Anabasis*, it is presumably that the escape of the Ten Thousand is an

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<sup>77</sup> Young and unexpected speaker: 6.1–5,15, *An.* 3.1.3, 14, 25. Treaty: 6.11, 13, 51, 57, 74, 87, 96 (peace treaty requiring surrender of Messenia); *An.* 2.3.28, 2.5.38, 3.1.19–25, 3.2.4 etc. (the deal broken by the arrest of the generals). Orders: 6.2, 8, 39, 47, 51, 70, 74, 87, 94 (order to abandon Messenia); *An.* 2.1.8, 3.1.27 (order to surrender weapons). Defeatism: 6.2, 34, 49, 54, 87, *An.* 3.1.2–3, 26–32, 40. Gods: 6.59, *An.* 3.1.21–23, 42, 3.2.3, 6, 9–10, 14. Ancestors: 6.8, 90, 94, 99–100, *An.* 3.2.11–16. Allies: 6.11–14, *An.* 2.4.2, 3.2.2, 5 (Ariaeus). Property: 6.74, *An.* 3.2.27–28. Honourable death: 6.89, 91, 109, *An.* 3.2.3. *Katagelastoi*: 6.89, *An.* 2.4.4 (see already above). Small numbers: 6.40, 60, 82, *An.* 3.1.42. Non-standard *patris*: 6.43, 76, *An.* 1.3.6, 3.1.4. Impact in Greece: 6.72, 77, 106, *An.* 2.1.17. Women and children: 6.73, 110, *An.* 6.4.8. Formal battle: 6.80, *An.* 6.5.7–32. Some of the parallels are, it must be said, a little artificial.

implicit *a fortiori* argument for the success of a group of more admirable people (Spartans with fine *epitēdeumata* and *politeia*, not disparate soldiers-of-fortune) in achieving a more admirable result (the literal recovery of a city-state *patris* of great repute and historical power, not just the return to Aegean Greece). The phenomena are perhaps just about strong enough for the hypothesis not to be disprovable, but (not least because of internal references: 6.42–43, 83) the more obvious analogy to Archidamus' thought-experiment is the Athenian abandonment of Athens in 480, and by the 360s the Greek military was generally so awash with mercenaries that figuring the military-camp city (6.81) in such terms is an idea that *could* surely arise without a particular prompt from the Cyreans. On the other hand, the Cyreans *were* in part a Spartan story (Spartan collusion with Cyrus, Agesilaus' employment of the mercenaries on their return, the role of individual Spartans in the *Anabasis*) and the dissemination of *Anabasis* gave that particular set of mercenaries a special prominence. My (subjective) inclination to be sceptical could well be wrong.

*Anabasis* and any Isocratean *logos* one cares to pick are generically speaking chalk and cheese: generic incommensurability does not, of course, preclude intertextuality but may impose limits. I turn now, finally, to a case where there is decided generic convergence.

There are clear reasons for speculating about a substantive intertextual relationship between *Agesilaus* and *Evagoras*.

The dates make it possible, and the fact that Xenophon undoubtedly had personal reasons for write about Agesilaus is not a counter-indication: we do not have to claim that he *only* wrote in response to Isocrates. *Evagoras* is presented as a literary novelty:<sup>78</sup> it is therefore something that could reasonably be expected to provoke a reaction, not least from an author with his own taste for literary novelty. Isocrates' involvement in the celebration of Gryllus (see above) makes it impossible to imagine that Xenophon wrote *Agesilaus* without even thinking about the wider generic setting or about Isocrates.<sup>79</sup>

There are some immediate similarities, formal and substantive. *Agesilaus* and the encomium proper in *Evagoras* (the text within the frame: see below) both open with the word *oida* and the statement of a difficulty faced by the author – though their difficulties are different (matching Agesilaus' virtue

<sup>78</sup> 9.8–11, 36, 40, 65, 72–73.

<sup>79</sup> Bouchet 2016, 33, speculates that, if Isocrates did indeed write an encomium for Mausolus, this might in turn have provided the opportunity for a “response” to *Agesilaus*. It is certain that in *Philippus* (5.86) and *Letter to Archidamus* (*Ep.* 9.13–14) he criticizes Agesilaus for the inconsistency between wanting war with Persia and a determination to support his friends – a topic not alien to *Agesilaus* (see below).

in words; using prose rather than poetry). Agesilaus' deeds were performed before numerous witnesses and require no proofs (*tekmēria*: 3.1).<sup>80</sup> This recalls Isocrates praising Evagoras "among those who know" (*en eidosi*: 9.5), rejecting birth-portent stories not because they are untrue but because they are not widely known (9.21), starting his narrative from agreed facts (*homologoumena*) and immediately summoning witnesses (22). Both texts have a strongly Persian flavour. The narrative of Evagoras' life is framed by the subjection of Salamis and Cyprus to Great King (20) – indeed his life itself is so framed, since he was born after the establishment of that situation (21); his seizure of Salamis is compared favourably with Cyrus' acquisition of Persian kingship (37–38) and, after an interlude about Evagoras' intellect, rulership qualities and Hellenism, we hear at length about Conon and Cnidus (an episode of Persian history, albeit one in which Greeks solve problems that Persians by themselves could not) and the Cypriot war, in which Evagoras survives conflict with the Great King and is compared with another Cyrus (58). As for *Agesilaus*, more than half of its narrative section is Persia-related, Persian stories are prominent in its analytic section, and a comparison between Agesilaus and the Persian king is the culmination of that analytic section.<sup>81</sup>

Alongside similarities of this sort, there are also a number of striking dissimilarities not only in length (*Agesilaus* is half as long again as *Evagoras*), but in structure and content.

*Agesilaus* is a praise-*logos* about the Spartan king that (so far as explicit indications go) does nothing but describe and praise the actions and virtues of its subject. The only (very slight) suggestion of internal commentary about what the author is doing is the assertion in 10.3 that the work is an *enkōmion* not a *thrēnos*. *Evagoras*, by contrast, is a praise-*logos* (9.8–72) within a frame that presents that *logos* as an incitement to the study of *philosophia*.<sup>82</sup> Isocrates' enterprise is assem-

<sup>80</sup> Contrast the use of *tekmēria* to prove the presence of virtues in the analytic section of the work.

<sup>81</sup> Narrative: 1.6–38, 2.26–31. Analytic section: 3.2–5, 4.6, 5.4–6, 7.6–7, 8.3–6, 9.1–7.

<sup>82</sup> The opening of *Evagoras* is a bit structurally fluid. Noël 2014, 259–261, rightly makes 8–11 the prologue of the enclosed encomium. But the purported novelty of the enterprise among practitioners of *philosophia* (8) picks up the theme of 5–7 as well as being explicitly linked to remarks about *philosophia* in 72–81. So the role of the encomium as an example of what *philosophia* can achieve is advertised within it, not just in the paraenetic frame, and is indeed the hinge on which the frame and body are attached. Contrariwise the contrast between words and monuments/rituals (in 1–4) would not be inappropriate to the body of an encomium. There is a similar fluidity at 72–73 as we pass from the encomium back into the frame, with the issue of what poets do already re-introduced at 65 (implicitly) and 72 (and already in 36, 40); but the renewed address to Nicocles does act as a clear marker of transition.

bling and adorning Evagoras' *aretai* so that they can be an object of inspection and study (9.76). But the purpose of that inspection and study is to encourage the pursuit of (Isocratean) *philosophia*. At the start and end of *Evagoras* Isocrates is interested in the power of words (as against that of physical monuments or celebratory events) – and the power of words is what *philosophia* is all about. So 9.8–72 stand as an example of the power of words, in this case the power to achieve the best possible celebration of an individual (4–7). The encomium is about virtue (8) and has the power to promote it (because it can guarantee satisfaction of the desire for praise: a rather mercenary conception of the desirability of *aretē*?), but this particular one is eventually sold to its recipient as an example of something that has this power rather than as something that actually exerts that power: what Nicocles will learn is to work harder at *philosophia* not at being as good a king as Evagoras – a lesson to which he will be particularly receptive because he and his family as much as anyone (77) know the *logos* captures and broadcasts the virtues of Evagoras as well as one could. There is an ingenious interweaving here of praise of the honorand and (bluntly) praise of the author – even advertisement of the author's professional skill – to which *Agesilaus* offers no analogue whatsoever.

The two encomia are structured differently. Both begin within sections on what happened before the honorand became king (though they are rather different: see below), but from that point (*Agesilaus* 1.6, *Evagoras* 33) the two texts adopt an entirely different structure. In *Agesilaus* we have narrative (1.6–2.31), analytical comment arranged in terms of specific virtues, though morphing at the end into a comparison with the Persian king (3–9), and two distinct concluding summaries (10–11). In *Evagoras*, by contrast, we have a rhetorical-evaluative narrative of the honorand's deeds (47–69), preceded by comment on exceptionality of his achievement (34–39), the desirability of *tyrannis* (40) and a bald list of virtues (41–46) and followed by an assertion of his quasi-divine status (70–72). The relationship between narrative and evaluation as structural elements is entirely different.

Contrasts in content, whole or partial, come in various forms. *Agesilaus* is implicitly an object of criticism in *Evagoras* (54): the Anatolian campaigns of the 390s exemplified Spartan greed (*aplēstia*) (the negativity about Sparta corresponds to the positivity about Athens). The effect of the structural difference is that Xenophon lays much more emphasis on virtues (indeed on virtue *tout court*) as such than Isocrates does: what one might call the philosophy of praise is different. The prominence of Nicocles in the framing of *Evagoras* (and presence of Pnytagoras in the main text) contrasts with the complete absence of Archidamus in *Agesilaus* – an absence that is underlined by the presence of references to *Agesilaus*' daughter (8.7) and sister (9.6), both adduced as proofs of the hero's

avoidance of public signs of wealth.<sup>83</sup> Given the stress on Agesilaus' love of and service to his city, it seems odd that he is not praised for leaving behind a worthy successor. Did Xenophon feel that to bring in the son and comment on his qualities would distract attention from the father's virtues? (an anonymous daughter on a wicker carriage and a named sister who is *not* an example of *andragathia* might seem less dangerous in that respect). Is it conceivably relevant that, on a conventional dating, Isocrates' *Archidamus* is also in the literary background? Or might it actually be a counter-response to the prominence of Nicocles in the framing sections of *Evagoras*?

Both heroes have mythological ancestors (Ag.1.2–4, Isoc.9.12–19), but Agesilaus' were notable for never having lost rule in Sparta, whereas that is precisely what happened to the Salaminian Teucridae. This gave Evagoras the chance to display virtue by recovering his ancestral rights – and this is why we hear so much about his birth (complete with portents) and life before he was king (19–32), whereas a brief account of the succession-dispute after Agis' death suffices in *Agesilaus*: its outcome proves recognition of Agesilaus' qualities but no further evaluative comment is made that might correspond to Isocrates' excited judgment that Evagoras' coup surpassed all historical examples (it would, of course, been hard to celebrate the displacement of Leotyichidas in such terms). Agesilaus is effortlessly a king, whereas Evagoras is not. At the other end of life, Agesilaus' timely death (*thanatos hōraios*: 10.3) and other references to his great age (10.4, 11.14–16) contrast with the evasive remarks in 9.71 about Evagoras' death (even Isocrates could not make assassination a source of praise). Isocrates concludes his encomium by saying that Evagoras is one of those who have been made *athanatoi* and more or less calling him *theos en anthropois* and *daimōn thnētos* (70,72), and earlier he wrote that Evagoras' co-conspirators were *hōsper theōi sunakolouthountes* (29). Xenophon has no truck with such extravagance: he merely speaks of “immortal memorials of virtue” in relation to Coronea (6.2) and at the very end of the text (11.16), where, moreover, a quiet allusion to *aidios oikēsis*, *mnēmeia aretēs* and *basilikē taphē* are all that correspond both to the funerary monuments, music, competitions and so forth in the framing section of *Evagoras* (1–7, 72–81) and to the climactic quasi-deification of the Cypriot king. Agesilaus' acquisition of kingship did not have to exceed anything in human history and his lifetime achievement did not need, even metaphorically, to burst the bounds of humanity. He was, after all, a “perfectly good man” (*teleōs anēr agathos*: 1.1): that

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<sup>83</sup> Both proofs, oddly enough, involve wheeled vehicles, a *politikon kannathron* in one case, racing chariots in the other. I hesitate to link the latter to the hippic element in the funerary celebrations organised by Nicocles (Isoc. 9.1).

is a big claim, but, by contrast with *Evagoras*, Xenophon's encomium still has a pleasing element of modesty.

In the light of all of these considerations it seems to me that we are entitled not just to place *Evagoras* and *Agesilaus* side-by-side as fourth century examples of ruler-encomium but to read *Agesilaus* in the light of *Evagoras*. If we do so, what are pay-offs?

First, Xenophon is responding to Isocrates' explicit presentation of a praise-*logos* as a literary novelty and an example of *philosophia*-inspired encomium by offering (without what might be seen as self-regarding comment) an entirely different example of how an encomium could be written. There are contrasts or contrasting parallels in content that keep the *Evagoras* before the reader's eye, but this is essentially an intertext of form. The absence of framing comment means that it is left to the reader to decide whether Xenophon is saying that this could also exemplify Isocratean *philosophia* or rather that it proffers a distinct intellectual model. That Xenophon rather naughtily affects Isocratean antithesis in the work's final chapter (Pontier 2016, 54) is interesting here, especially since that final chapter can seem almost to have the flavour of an alternative ending. The presence of this further rehearsal of virtues is, of course, consistent with Xenophon's special stress on virtue as such. Chapter 11 accentuates that *Agesilaus* is about virtue, as much as a particular individual, even though his virtue be an example for those who practise *andragathia* (10.3). Remembering the *epainos* is a matter of being clear about the virtues it rehearses (11.1), rather than remembering the specific deeds. Read against Isocrates' packaging of a praise-*logos* as an example of the sort of thing that *philosophos* can produce (which is the corresponding exhortation at the end of *Evagoras*), this is, as Noël says, a rather polemical position (2014, 254). One may add that, back at the start, the re-use in *Agesilaus* 1.1 of the *oida* trope from *Evagoras* 8 underlines the contrast between his interest in *aretē* and *doxē* and Isocrates' interest in prose and poetry. In these circumstances the Isocratean colour of the language may actually be intended to draw attention to a gulf between the two author's positions and to indicate that *Agesilaus* is different in encomiastic philosophy as well as in form.

Second, the content of the same chapter also articulates a slightly different view of kingship from that in *Evagoras*. This has been discussed in Pontier 2016 (starting from a comparison with the contents of *Evagoras* 41–46) and I shall not rehearse the matter in further detail, though I note (because it will be relevant shortly) that in the main body of the encomium *sophia* (6.4) and patriotism (7.1) are distinctively marked as qualities that informed *all* of Agesilaus' actions. In this context too the framing of material in chapter 11 in quasi-Isocratean style is piquant.

Thirdly, the passive consumer of an encomium just takes it all at face value. Any other reader is to some degree watching what the author is doing and noting (even enjoying) the selectivity and slanting that the genre entails. In a case like *Evagoras*, which is actually packaged as an *exemplum* of rhetorical *philosophia*, this is specially true. But it is also true where there is no packaging, especially in a text that starts with the extreme observation that the honorand is too “perfectly good” a man to praise other than inadequately (1.1; repeated at 10.1). If that text is also read against *Evagoras*, the fact that it arrives without setting or commentary underlines that we only have the text to determine our reaction and invites us to assess it carefully. The modesty mentioned earlier is potentially a point in its favour, but the fact that comparison with *Evagoras* has drawn it to our attention as a tactical decision about how to conduct an encomium means that care remains appropriate.

Fourthly, Pontier (2016, 56) has argued that, in writing *Agesilaus*, Xenophon was expressing a political view-point opposed to that of Isocrates inasmuch as *Evagoras*, as a supporter of Conon and recipient of Athenian honours, was an anti-Spartan figure. The *Evagoras*-Athens / *Agesilaus*-Sparta contrast is certainly part of the story. But to my mind the principal effect of reading *Agesilaus* in the light of *Evagoras* is to emphasize the Persian dimension, which is the one they most substantially have in common.

*Agesilaus* is a Persia-related figure who also has a role in panhellenist discourse – as is established *inter alia* by his appearance in *Panegyricus* and his status as addressee of an Isocratean *logos*. So as a topic for an encomium intended to be read in relation to an encomium by a panhellenist author he invites thought about panhellenism. This is no less so because *Evagoras*, though hellenist in colour, is not itself particularly *panhellenist* (*Evagoras* had once sided with the king and the circumstances of his fighting against the king are not elucidated) *and* because it contains criticism of *Agesilaus* as an agent of Spartan *aplēstia* (55). Xenophon’s *Agesilaus* is certainly not presented in *those* terms. But is he presented uncomplicatedly in panhellenist ones?

The *Agesilaus* narrative is rather exactly a game of two halves, one potentially panhellenist and the other not, the first dominated by the battle at Sardis in 395, the second by that at Coronea in 394, the hinge between the two coming with *Agesilaus*’ departure from Asia.<sup>84</sup> *Agesilaus*’ deeds split almost evenly

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**84** Of 64 sections of narrative (1.6–38, 2.1–31), 33 sections deal with the Asian expedition of 396–394 (1.6–38) and 31 with everything else (2.1–31). The first part climaxes with the Ephesus-Sardis campaign and aftermath (1.25–35). The very middle of the narrative is 1.36–2.1, *Agesilaus*’ departure from Asia to march home twelve times faster than Xerxes. The second part falls into two halves (2.1.1–16 and 17–31), the first ending with Coronea (2.6–16). The bulkiness of the Coronea

between a war of conquest against Persia and the patriotic struggle to re-establish and maintain Spartan power in Greece, and his final anti-Persian action is actually undertaken to make money for his city. In these circumstances (and in the light of what is said above about the justification for sceptical reading of the work), even the mildly expressed criticism of Agesilaus' support of friends (*philhetairia*) in 2.21 attracts attention and serves as an invitation to interpret the split between panhellenist war and city-centred patriotism critically.<sup>85</sup> One view of Agesilaus was that from 386 onwards he effectively sided with Persians (as Evagoras had done). Xenophon does not endorse that view, but the panhellenist thesis saw the problem and potential solution for the Greeks in terms of city-centred patriotism and its elimination, and *Agesilaus* encapsulates the absence of that solution.<sup>86</sup> Inasmuch as Isocrates came to believe that the crusade required a champion who was abstracted from usual *polis*-loyalties,<sup>87</sup> Agesilaus was precisely *not* an appropriate champion. Isocrates later makes this very observation (5.87, *Ep.* 9.12–14), and it is arguably the message that is already encoded in *Agesilaus*. Stress on Agesilaus' loyalty to his city – which is not *eo ipso* a bad thing – protects him from the accusation of complicity with Persia (it was a case of the King laconising, not Agesilaus medising), but it does so at the cost of making him in panhellenist terms part of the problem not the solution. *Agesilaus* is the story of great virtue and (nonetheless) failure against Persia and can be read as an *a fortiori* argument for scepticism about the feasibility of what Isocrates said in works other than *Evagoras*. So Xenophon is using a genre-related response to

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narrative is remarkable (11 sections) – no single event earlier has been treated at greater length (the whole Ephesus-Sardis operation occupies the same space) – and it is rounded off in 2.16 with an allusion to Agesilaus' preference for lawful rule at home over being the “greatest in Asia”: that takes us back at 1.36 (at the hinge point of the narrative), and specifically the king's obedience to the ephors. Agesilaus' switch from fighting Persians to fighting Greeks and its connection with civic patriotism are thus underlined.

**85** In a similar spirit, the alert reader may feel that (i) 2.12–14 (also with a hint of criticism at 2.12), on the slaughter at Coronea, sits ill with Agesilaus' reported discontent at the death toll at Corinth (7.4–6) and (ii) 4.1–4 sits slightly oddly with the enrichment of friends in 1.18–19: nothing in 4.1–4 postulates a virtue absent in 1.18–19, but manipulating public money for individual, even if not personal, benefit seems not quite in the right spirit – especially when attitude to friends is a separate ground for unease.

**86** Isocrates' own (doubtless inevitable) inability to free himself of the *polis* mindset (cf. Dillery 1995, 54–58) meant that he too was part of the problem rather than the solution. Genuine non-hierarchical city-state co-operation sat ill with the politico-cultural conditions of classical Greece (Tuplin 2007).

**87** In the spirit of 5.13–15: it is no use talking to *panēgyreis*, one must find a champion who has power and free agency. See Azoulay 2006b, 145, 147.

*Evagoras* to address what Isocrates says in generically distinct texts (which is a nice intertextual twist) and, substantively, the implicit message here is the same as that in *Anabasis*.

## 8 *En envoi*

Isocrates and Xenophon did not see eye to eye on the Persia: it is impossible to imagine Isocrates using Persia to think with in the way that Xenophon does in *Cyropaedia* or Xenophon displaying the simple (negative) certainties that came naturally to Isocrates' pen when he sat at his writing desk. This is a product of different life-experiences and (above all) different intellectual temperament. But Persia mattered to the Greek world in the fourth century, and they were right to think it a topic that deserved on occasion to be the focus of literary activity.

Persian material is more voluminously present in Xenophon's *oeuvre* than that of Isocrates, though the latter's special valuation of discourse about the panhellenist crusade perhaps slightly redresses the balance. As purveyors of historical information, they differ in the quantity of what they have to offer, though not by quite as much as the raw bulk of *Cyropaedia* might suggest to the unwary reader. As to quality, Xenophon's value is well-known, but Isocrates does also make a distinctive contribution, even allowing for the uncertain status of some of his more allusive observations: problems are more likely to be due to manipulation than casual error (that is, careless misreporting of information he took to be true). At no point does Isocrates express a significantly favourable view of Persians or things Persian, which puts him in a quite different place from Xenophon. But for both of them Persian material can intercut with literary novelty, and their shared interest in education does mean that, perhaps not surprisingly, they converge in finding Persian dimensions to the overlap of education and imperial power, albeit (also not surprisingly) rather different ones. They may have differed less on the theoretical desirability of curbing Persian power than on the feasibility of achieving this in the real world: of course, one does sometimes catch oneself wondering whether Isocrates' treatments of the topic were, like Archidamus' vision of a quasi-mercenary Spartan war of liberation and Peloponnesian *riconquista*, more in the nature of analytical thought-experiment than genuine agenda for action. How far either of them responded creatively to what the other had written remains a rather subjective question. Xenophon's intertextual acknowledgment of Isocrates seems to me more in evidence than the reverse – but Isocrates' encomium on Gryllus is actually a remarkable acknowledgment of a different sort in the reverse direction. They were both in the end good Athenians, though Xenophon had had

much more (self-inflicted) cause not to be, and, despite the disdain they have suffered in modern times, they both made self-consciously clever contributions to the Athenian republic of letters: those who fail to see this are approaching fourth century cultural history with blinkered vision.

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