Unknown pleasures

Bramble, B ORCID: 0000-0003-1752-9667 (2019) Unknown pleasures. Philosophical Studies, 177 (5). pp. 1333-1344.

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01255-7

Abstract

© 2019, The Author(s). According to attitudinal theories of (sensory) pleasure and pain, what makes a given sensation count as a pleasure or a pain is just the attitudes of the experiencing agent toward it. In a previous article, I objected to such theories on the grounds that they cannot account for pleasures and pains whose subjects are entirely unaware of them at the time of experience. Recently, Chris Heathwood and Fred Feldman, the two leading contemporary defenders of attitudinal theories, have responded to this objection, in very different ways. In this paper, I reconstruct and evaluate these responses. My conclusion is that neither response succeeds.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Pain Research, Chronic Pain
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	30 Apr 2019 08:33
Last Modified:	17 Mar 2024 03:23
DOI:	10.1007/s11098-019-01255-7
Open Access URL:	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01255-7
Related URLs:	Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3039010