**The ‘badlands’ of the ‘Balkan Route’: policy and spatial effects on urban refugee housing**

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Abstract (150-200 words)

Refugee camps and Reception and Identification Centres (RICs) have long been imagined as ‘the best’ or ‘most suitable’ places for displaced people by states and border management authorities. In contrast, informal housing often provided by activist groups, are frequently framed as a part of the urban ‘badlands’. Drawing on research carried out between 2015 and 2019 in key spaces in Greece and Serbia along the so-called ‘Balkan Route’, this article engages with the concept of the ‘badlands’ as a lens through which to consider the different types of housing made available for refugees in key urban centres. Following Dikeç (2007), Neely & Samura (2011), and Shabazz (2015), we examine how sites of refugee accommodation are imagined through the lenses of place, space and race and how this shapes policy responses. We ask: what are the main divergences and variations between formal refugee housing and informal sites? Why, given the poor conditions of most refugee camps, are they still viewed as the ‘best’ solution to housing? What role do policy decisions play in ‘othering’ spaces, places, groups and individuals? We examine the spatial effects of multiple policy levels and interventions (EU, national, local, grassroots) on refugee accommodation.

**Policy recommendations**

Overcrowding is one of the main factors affecting quality of life in all types of refugee housing. Mainland camps and informal housing provision such as squats, are often able to manage the numbers of residents, unlike island RICs. Regulating numbers on the islands through the use of transfers and a quicker more efficient asylum process which recognises individuals’ rights to seek refuge and to cross borders is a key priority.

Refugees are driven towards informal housing such as squats and makeshift settlements for two main reasons: poor camp conditions or overcrowding, and uncertainty over the asylum process, including long waits for asylum interviews in Greece. We recommend improved conditions in formal housing provision, as well as a change in policy that avoids vilifying alternative forms of accommodation.

There is a lack of formal support for people living in informal accommodation, particularly healthcare, food and sanitation- this needs to be overcome and the focus on having a fixed official address for access to non-emergency healthcare needs to be altered.

EU funding should not only be focused at the state level. Doing so creates the dichotomy of ‘good’ formal housing and ‘bad’ informal housing and leads to implications for healthcare, access to amenities, and ‘othering’ of communities.

**Introduction:**

How do assumptions about space, place, and spatiality, shape European Union (EU) and national level policies on refugee accommodation and support? Within this article we interweave Dikeç’s, (2007, p. 4) conceptualisation of the ‘badlands’, with questions of race, space and place (Neely & Samura, 2011; Shabazz, 2015) as well as our own empirical research carried out between 2015 and 2019 along the so-called ‘Balkan Route’. We engage with the concept of the ‘badlands’ as a lens through which to consider the different types of housing made available for refugees in key urban centres in Greece and Serbia. We examine the relationships between refugee camps, Reception and Identification Centres (RICs) and urban, informal housing, paying particular attention to how formal camps and informal housing are imagined, conceptualised, ordered and othered (Neely & Samura, 2011). Following Dikeç, we ask: how do policies which envisage camps and RICs as the ‘best place’ for refugees, and urban hubs as spaces of criminality, constitute spaces of intervention? In doing so we challenge the naming policies that construct concepts such as the ‘Balkan Route’ and ‘reception centres’, suggesting these are used as ways of avoiding European historical imaginaries of the 'camp’.

Refugees arriving in Greece and Serbia are primarily from Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Pakistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (UNHCR 2019; UNHCR 2020). Throughout the so called ‘refugee crisis’, European public discourse relied on ‘racist and Islamophobic language’ (Rexhepi 2018:2219), whilst policies such as suspension of search and rescue operations were based on racialised and racist assumptions about ‘valuable’ and ‘invaluable’ lives (Mavelli 2017). But, as Rexhepi (2018:2219) notes, the purportedly ‘colour-blind decision-making language of EU border bureaucracies’ are also implicit in othering; assumptions about race are similarly enacted through the EU’s approach to refugee camps, which sees the newly arrived  housed in remote locations, separated from local populations and prevented not just crossing borders and reaching Western Europe, but also entering urban centres.

Expanding upon the badlands theory, we argue that it is not just urban policy that shapes the relationship between refugee camps and informal housing; rather, broader policies related to migration at national and EU levels, shape ideas about camp locations and their conditions. We expand on Dikeç’s conceptualization of the ‘badlands’ to recognise the effect of the regional, the national and the supranational, as an effect of policy-making on multiple levels. In making use of the term ‘badlands’ we see a duality within this paper- recognising both the role of policy in imagining a space as ‘bad’, and as a term to understand the horrific conditions of camp-like spaces imagined by policy as ‘good’.

Throughout Europe, there is a tension between spaces designated as official refugee accommodation - primarily, ‘reception centres’ - and other, informal spaces in which many refugees end up living. Whilst EU and national level policies and funds are dedicated to ensuring refugees are contained within official accommodation spaces, the reality is that many do not or cannot, for a range of reasons. National and local authorities (often in receipt of EU funds for official camp-like accommodation) disrupt or discourage informal housing. These choices often create and maintain public spaces where refugees are unseen, ‘fictitious absences’ (Zoppi, 2019, p.2) that enable Member States (MS) and EU rhetoric to underplay the failures of housing policies.

During 2019, Greek police raided and evicted a number of central Athens squats - occupied, self-managing and autonomous housing which often also houses refugees. Following the election of New Democracy in July 2019 evictions increased as an attempt was made to ‘clean up Exarcheia’, a neighbourhood in central Athens (Bird, 2019). The evictions of these informal housing providers led to destitution of a number of people, including refugee families, some of whom had been left with no options, but to sleep rough in the central Syntagma Square. The evicted squats were just some of dozens of informal housing locations which exist as an almost (but not wholly) parallel system of accommodation to official RICs and camps. Many such squats were located in Exarchia, which Apoifis describes as the ‘occupied ground for the anarchist and antiauthoritarian community’ (Apoifis, 2017, p. 48). Squats are frequently the target of local interventions such as inspections, evictions, demolitions and raids, sometimes aimed at pushing the squat residents towards formal, refugee RICs and camps (Obradovic-Wochnik, 2018). Such policy decisions are usually premised on how both formal and informal refugee accommodation types are imagined: camps and camp-like spaces are often presented as the ‘best place’ for refugees (see e.g. Johnson 2016), a view echoed by staff working in Serbian asylum reception centres (author interview, reception centre staff, Serbia, June 2018). In contrast, squats and informal housing are often presented by the media and Government officials as unsafe and as sites of drug dealing, violence and crime (see e.g. Katherimeni 2016; Iefimerida, 2019) an archetype of the ‘urban badland’ (Dickeç, 2007).

We argue that the narratives of ‘urban badlands’ (c.f. Dickeç, 2007) and the purported criminality of places such as Exarcheia, are used to legitimise encampment policies, as well as police raids on squats, often conceptualised as the removal of refugees and other squat residents from unsafe living conditions. The imagined dichotomy implied by policy and practice of refugee accommodation in Europe - where camps are seen as ‘safe’ and ‘appropriate’, and urban spaces as the ‘badlands’ - are a means of shifting focus away from substandard RICs and camps themselves, and particularly, from national and EU level responsibility for those conditions. As we discuss in this article, a large number of official, EU funded RICs fall far below minimum international standards (Bird & Beattie 2019; interview, aid worker, July 2018 Athens; interview, NGO, Samos 2019) but nonetheless, camps - as systems of control and enclosure (Martin et al 2019) - continue to be supported as the main policy option for housing refugees.

Existing literature gives us detailed insights into EU policy on asylum, migration, border outsourcing and the ‘hotspot’ approach but it does not always consider how policies themselves shape spaces. For instance, a number of recent works analysing policy consider how the EU member states manage the migration ‘crisis’ at supranational level (Niemann and Zaun 2018), return ‘unwanted migrants’  (Slominski and Trauner 2018) or ‘burden share’ in terms of refugee protection (Bauböck 2018). National-level policies, particularly those of Greece, and how they intersect with EU asylum and migration policies have also been explored in depth (Afouxenidis et al 2017; Cabot 2014)

Despite the policy literature largely focusing on implementation and contestation, there is an emerging literature which traces the interactions between policy and space. Kalir and Razakou (2016) examine the implementation of border policies in the Moria hotspot. Tazzioli and Garelli (2018:1-2) consider  how the ‘hotspots’ policy creates ‘channels of forced movement’ as migrants are forcibly moved from cities to hotspots, and how it is used to ‘control and contain’ migrants. Similarly, Stojic Mitrovic and Vilenica (2019:553) highlight how EU policies enacted upon the ‘Western Balkans’ imaginary, have converged with domestic policies to create zones of ‘forced circular movement from camp to camp’. They examine the role of different types of housing in bordering and circulator movements as a form of ‘mobile detention’ (2019:549, 553) that leads people away from the EU.  We contribute to the ongoing discussions on intersections of policy and space, by drawing on Dickeç (2007) and considering how policies themselves imagine different types of refugee housing, and subsequently act upon those spaces.

In setting out our arguments, we draw on our primary research from cities (Belgrade, Thessaloniki, Athens) and towns on the Aegean Islands of Lesvos, Chios and Samos, gathered in different fieldwork trips between 2015 and 2019. In each of these locations, there is an identifiable ‘core’ or urban centre, with an RIC or camp normally located in its periphery (the island of Samos is the exception, where the town of Vathy and the camp are neighbours), with limited (or non-existent) transport links and other infrastructure. In some of these locations, there is also an emergent (or established in the case of Athens) informal housing network, where activists and refugees are challenging the notion of the camp or RIC as the most suitable, or only, means of accommodating displaced people. These alternative approaches to housing include squatted buildings but also alternative camps built on the premise of solidarity and dignity drawing on different approaches to thinking through residency within the space (Bernet, 2017; interview with grassroots NGO, 2019).

The paper proceeds as follows. We first set out the theoretical framework in which we discuss how we draw on the work of Mustafa Dikeç, as well as scholarship on race, space and place (Neely & Samura, 2011; Shabazz, 2015) to make sense of policy interventions and how they constitute spaces. We then discuss our methods before exploring the context of the ‘Balkan Route’ and the way in which this label itself acts as a process of articulation (c.f. Dikeç, 2007), of distancing and ‘othering’ (Trakilović, 2019). Finally, we present more specific qualitative data on RICs in Serbia and Greece, as well as informal refugee accommodation in urban hubs, and discuss the policy interventions which constitute and perpetuate the ideas of the ‘badlands’, as a racialised and othered space (Neeley & Samura, 2011), presented against the camp, the ‘most suitable accommodation’.

**Conceptualising the ‘badlands’**

Dikeç’s *Badlands of the Republic* (2007) articulates an alternative imagination of the relationship that links space and politics, paving the way for his concept of the ‘urban badlands’. He challenges pre-existing, constructivist, narrations of the space/politics relationship allowing him to explore ‘the problems of social housing neighbourhoods in banlieues of French cities’ (Dikeç, 2007:4) beyond fashioned realities of urban ‘badlands’. He establishes the ways in which policies frame narratives about spaces and refers to the inclusion of ‘sensible evidences’ and language such as policy documents, special designations, mappings, categorizations, naming and statistics to inform this debate (Dikeç, 2007, p. 6). The banlieue programmes, rather than improving the situation in these neighbourhoods, increases the negative images associated with them; a negativity that is invoked via discussions of colour, violence, criminality, and their reporting in the media. Neely and Samura (2011, p. 1934) recognise the complexity of this process, ‘by which racial difference and inequality are organised and enacted’ through policy making decisions. We explore these forces in our discussion of the spaces and places of migration policy. For example, the choice to situate camps and RICs outside of urban hubs has an impact on the movement of individuals in specific, yet subtle, ways. In this case directions that are then given to refugees often focus on moving them from urban centres to periphery locations. As Bulley (2016) argues people are often governed, channelled or managed in subtle ways away from public or commercial spaces which allows governments to make often racialised decisions about who is and is not seen in the public sphere (Zoppi, 2019). We find that with regards to refugee populations, this management is often carried out through selective mapping or partial representations of the city and its services (Obradovic-Wochnik & Bird, 2019).

Dikeç’s work provides a framework for exploring how policy both feeds into and is affected by space. As he develops his concept of the ‘badlands’, he points out that French policy eschews community. He states that any negotiation of the individual/community relationship is overtly side-stepped owing to the deep seated Republican tradition that informs French politics and its political institutions. To speak of a community, and invoke the British, or indeed, North American notions of individual liberty challenges the republican ideal of a ‘common culture and identity’ and implies, as Dikeç writes, ‘separatism’ which flies in the face of the ever important ‘one and indivisible republic’ (Dikeç, 2007: 4). Invoking notions of community, we argue, challenges traditional ‘badland’ spaces, revealing that spaces built on community, such as squats, are often not the ones that see overcrowding, violence and poor quality of food and housing.

Dickeç (2007) argues that spaces are not a given, but are rather ‘produced through various practices of articulation’ (Dickeç, 2007, p. 4). As Shabazz notes ‘geography play(s) an important role in identity’ especially for people raised in ‘environments built to contain them’ (Shabazz, 2015, p.3). It is through a process of naming embodied within policy discourses that spaces and places come to be designated and understood as either ‘bad’ or ‘good. Similarly, racialised interactions and processes ‘are also about how we collectively make and remake, overtime and through ongoing contestations, the spaces we inhabit’ (Neely & Samura, 2011, p.1934). In the context of *Badlands of the Republic* this refers to the policies aimed at improving the Parisian banlieues which he argues that, through a process of naming, were constituted ‘no-go’ zones. This also resonates in the context of our work. Despite overcrowding and deteriorating, substandard conditions in the Greek Islands’ RICs, the accepted policy narrative imagines this type of accommodation (and detainment) as ‘suitable’ for refugees, and donor (EU) funds continue to pour in (European Commission, 2019a). Thus, we recognise in this environment Dikeç’s argument that policies do not *act* on given spaces, rather they *constitute* them as spaces of intervention.

Importantly, Dikeç also argues that policy programmes are guided by particular ways of imagining space (Dikeç 2007, p. 5), suggesting that these two processes are in fact cyclical. Spaces can be constituted by policies, but policies can also be effected and imagined through an articulation of certain spaces: made and remade (Meely & Samura, 2011). Dikeç focuses on urban policy and the role it plays in constituting spaces of intervention. He talks about the ‘associat[ed] problems with them [policies]’, how they ‘legitimiz[e] particular forms of state intervention’, but also, importantly, ‘how alternative voices formulated in such spaces challenge official designations’ (Dickeç, 2007, p. 4). We apply this in the context of refugee provision in two corresponding ways. Firstly, we recognise that policies designating certain spaces as being ‘bad’ or ‘good’ can justify interventions on both a state and EU level, enacting policies that racialise, securitise and ‘other’ groups. For example, the evictions of squats referred to in the introduction and the focus on official housing in EU funding decisions. Secondly, that voices exist, outside of policy discourse that challenge the designation of spaces as being bad: activists supporting refugees within informal housing.

Like Dikeç (2007), we recognise that interventionist policy decisions claiming to improve a specific area, can negatively impact upon the spaces themselves. We identify two convergent trends: (1) EU border ‘closures’ and the EU-Turkey deal which directly led to overcrowding on the Aegean Islands; coupled with (2) the presence of EU financing available at state-level for refugee reception centres, which aim to intervene by diverting people away from urban centres (Obradovic-Wochnik 2018), thus enabling a process of ‘fictitious absence’ (Zoppi, 2019) of refugees in urban centres. Coupled with this, we argue, are national and city level policies in which countries like Greece and Serbia intervene into informal, urban settlements as a means of not just deterring refugees from urban hubs, but also as a means of drawing on EU financing for RICs (see Obradovic-Wochnik, 2018).

**Methods:**

We draw on Richardson’s (2003) notion of ‘being in the place’ to gather our empirical evidence. We make use of ethnographic approaches recognising that whilst a longer uninterrupted period in the region was not possible as a result of work commitments and family responsibilities, sustained visits over a number of years enabled us to build embedded connections with actors in the region and to monitor and understand a situation that is constantly in flux. Such an approach relies on ‘an organic process of making connections, tracing webs of relations embracing chance meetings, letting the social maps of the ordinary everyday unfold’ (Selimovic, 2018).

We couple this approach with a combination of elite interviews, semi-structured interviews, and observations gleaned from time spent in the region. Our observations of spaces and places included public parks, squats, informal housing, formal and informal aid provision sites, drop-in day centres for refugees, and entire neighbourhoods, such as Exarchia in Athens. Being present in these spaces allowed us to examine vital sensory material, and ephemeral intensities beyond the logic of representation encountered during interviews. Overall, our research includes audio and visual material (including over 3500 photographs) and more than sixty interviews and conversations gathered between 2015 and 2019. The research team has spent, collectively, a period of 40 weeks on the ‘Balkan Route’, across multiple visits. We conducted research in the Northern border regions of Serbia, RICs, camps and squats in Belgrade, Thessaloniki, Athens and the Aegean Islands of Lesvos, Chios, Samos and Kos. Interviews were conducted with policy makers, local authority staff, national/ministry level staff, officials in camps and RICs, NGO staff, large international aid organisations, housing officers and social workers, activists and volunteers and with individuals travelling on the route(s).

In focusing on camp spaces and policy-making elites, we respond to Cabot’s (2019:270) challenge to researchers: the need to ‘de-exceptionalise refugee voices’, given that academic engagement with refugees is not always beneficial, harm-free nor useful to refugees themselves. We follow this view, and recognise that displaced peoples’ stories are not ours to tell. We share Cabot’s (2019:270-271) view that one way of ‘disrupting tropes that render suffering spectacular and capture and domesticate refugee “voice”’ is to engage instead with elites and policy makers, to ‘document the ethical-moral, bureaucratic and political complexities of these worlds.’  We see our focus on policies, spaces and infrastructures in this paper as contributing to a deeper knowledge of the ‘complexities’ and systems encountered by people on the move.

We further recognise the value and importance of long-term commitment to and engagement with research sites, to void inaccuracies and misrepresentations that can result from short-term engagement (Cabot 2019). Whereas camps can often be seen in isolation to their surroundings, we thus ‘de-exceptionalise refugee voices’ (Cabot 2019:270) by locating RICs and camps as embedded within local and national politics, contestations and policies (Obradovic-Wochnik, 2018). In what follows we interweave our theory with our methods to showcase the ways in which spaces were shaped by policy interventions, whilst  playing a role in shaping policy.

**Policy Interventions and the ‘Balkan Route’**

*Imagining the ‘Balkan Route’*

In this section we speak to Dikeç’s focus on spaces as being ‘produced through various practices of articulation’ (Dickeç, 2007, p. 4), of a spatial and racial process (Neeley & Samura, 2011) and the cyclical response that policy programmes are guided by particular ways of imagining space (Dikeç 2007, p. 5).  We also show how the language of accusations of racialised criminality flows throughout the daily lives of the refugee population. Like Shabazz (2015) recognises in the policy treatment of areas of Chicago, camps too are often ‘prisonized…(drawing on) techniques and technologies of prison punishment- policing, containment, surveillance’ (Shabazz, 2015, p.2) to spatially separate groups along lines of age, nationality and vulnerability.

The geographic region which incorporates Greece and the former Yugoslav republics, notably Serbia, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Croatia (with Montenegro and Slovenia to a lesser extent), sits on one of the main migratory routes used by displaced people attempting to reach Western parts of the EU. This is often referred to as the ‘Balkan Route’, a label which implies a single, unified path, but constitutes multiple converging and diverging routes across this space (Obradovic Wochnik, 2018); moreover, they are fluid, and highly responsive to EU border ‘closures’.  People crossing borders in this region often take a combination of routes, and indeed, places like Greece lie on the convergence of multiple routes as imagined by the EU.



*Figure 1 Map of the Balkan Route(s)*

As Rexhepi (2018:2218) notes, the ‘Balkan Route’ ‘constitutes a major geopolitical corridor of transitional and transient sites of migrant mobility’ but also one in which multiple actors, including the EU, enact ‘containment and controls.’ It is also a construct of EU and Frontex policy (El-Sharaawi and Razsa, 2019), which imagines and represents the ‘Western Balkan Route’ as a straightforward line linking Turkey, Greece, North Macedonia and Serbia with the EU. As El-Sharaawi and Razsa (2019) point out, labelling this route as the ‘Balkan Route’ draws on the region’s imagined criminality.

The articulation of this geographic space as the ‘(Western) Balkan Route’ is not therefore accidental. Rather, it constitutes - following Dikeç’s theory - both the space itself, as well as policy interventions directed towards it. For instance, Frontex has a different label for what it sees as different routes ‘to’ the EU including the Central Mediterranean, Eastern Mediterranean, Western Mediterranean or Western Balkan (Frontex, 2019). As Trakilović (2019:49) suggests, the designation of these routes suggests that they are routes ‘to’ Europe, thus positioning the Balkans as ‘Europe-adjacent’ (and indeed, as a region whose racialisation as ‘white but not quite’ is always conditional; see Baker 2018) an area where ‘notions of Europeanness are unstable and unstraightforward (Trakilović, 2019, p.49). However, the naming of the routes also obscures the fact that most routes take people *through* the EU; one must enter the EU first through Bulgaria or Greece, in order to be on the ‘Western Balkan Route’ as it is currently mapped by Frontex.

Articulating the routes as distinct geopolitical spaces, allows for the application of different policies and management strategies specific to each country (Dimitriadi, 2017). The Balkans, as Rexhepi (2018:2222) notes, are ‘perceived as a zone of vulnerability requiring constant surveillance’, and subsequently, EU intervention, particularly in terms of how borders are managed. For instance, not only was the movement of people through South Eastern Europe ‘governed’ through the ‘formalisation and de-formalisation of the so-called ‘Western Balkan Route’, it was also shaped through the EU’s ‘migration/enlargement government assemblage’ (Neuman Stanivukovic & Neuman 2019:380-281). Thus, financial aid for accommodating refugees and strengthening the border control has been linked to EU enlargement for aspiring member states such as Serbia (European Commission, 2018a; CoE, 2018; Neuman Stanivukovic & Neuman 2019).

This imagining of South Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean as ‘routes’, gives the impression of an onward trajectory, and obscures the numerous obstacles, infrastructures and bureaucratic procedures designed to prevent movement. Upon entering the space conceptualised as the ‘Balkan Route’, displaced people are routinely detained on the Greek islands in the so-called ‘hotspots’ (see Kalir and Razakou 2016), where waiting times for the asylum process exceed two years (Bird & Beattie, 2019; interview with NGO Samos, 2019). In other locations along the route, refugees are frequently trapped in - or returned to - Serbia and Bosnia, or ‘pushed back’ violently from EU spaces on the Croatian or Hungarian borders, back onto the ‘Balkan Route’. In fact, what would be understood as forward movement is an exception; a far more common pattern of movement is a circular process in which refugees find themselves, stuck, pushed back or returned across borders into non-EU spaces (Stojic Mitrovic and Vilenica 2019).

*Asylum and migration policies*

Supranational policies such as EU asylum rules, border management and financing, shape local spaces of migration and incarceration, often converging with local/national and MS policies. Whilst Serbia has been an EU accession country since 2013, the EU engagement in Serbia on migration policies dates back to 2007 and the Law on Asylum. Implemented in 2008 it has been a trade-off agreement between the EU and Serbia. Serbia had to fully incorporate the definition of asylum seeker and migration as used in the EU aquis (Stojić Mitrović 2014), followed by the new Law on Migration Management in 2012 (Serbian Parliament 2012). Serbia receives EU support for tackling migration issues. In 2019, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) signed a status agreement with Serbia, which allows for EU assistance in border management and joint operations including deployment of teams along Serbia’s borders with the EU (Consillium 2019). Similar agreements were signed with other countries of the ‘Western Balkan Route’: Albania and North Macedonia. As such, the region now forms a part of the EU’s ‘legal and moral outsourcing of migration and border control’ (Ferrer-Gallardo and Van Houtum 2014:299).

In Greece, the EU policy on migration has three strands. The Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (1.3EUR billion), the Internal Security Fund (397.6 EUR million), and the Emergency Support Instrument (643.6 EUR million). The funding available within the first two funds is managed and implemented by the Greek authorities through the national programme agreed with the European Commission. The emergency funding was initially awarded to NGOs and Greek authorities but now focuses predominantly on Greek national authorities (interview data, Athens 2017). Some of the initiatives include: Border Surveillance Officers, support for the management of ‘intense migration’; provision of security services for RICs; ensuring a fair and efficient asylum process, and the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement. With minor exceptions, all funding awarded goes to national authorities or large, established international organizations rather than grassroots groups: Greek ministries of defence, interior, migration, or UNHCR/UNICEF and IOM, thus creating notions of ‘insider/outsider’ aid providers, and by extension, ideas about which types of housing supported by these organisations are to be deemed suitable/ unsuitable or ‘good’/ ‘bad’.

EU policies towards Greece and the post-Yugoslav space (as well as individual member states’ policies towards migration, and the region more generally), should not be seen in isolation from national and local level policy interventions towards migration. These three policy levels interact and are co-dependent; not least because local and national level policy is often implemented largely because of the availability of EU funding. For instance, some of Serbia’s existing reception centres (housing mostly displaced people from Croatia and Kosovo) were improved significantly with the arrival of EU and donor funds in 2015. Similarly, whilst the hotspot system in Greece is relatively new (emerging in the context of the EU 2015 European Agenda on Migration), there have always been detention facilities and pre-removal facilities in the country. What the hotspots represent, in a post EU-Turkey environment, is significant. As Dimitriadi (2017) argues, the space of migration management was transformed as the idea of a facility, with specific characteristics, was taken over by an entire island that functioned to curtail the mobility of the refugee population.

In order to achieve this particular end the legal framework within Greece had to be adjusted. With the introduction of Law 4375/2016, the legal criteria under which hotspots operated was formalized. This included, but was not limited to, the imposition of immobility and the processes through which individuals were judged to be admissible or not. Indeed, this experience was reflected in our interviews with volunteers on the islands (interview with NGOs on Samos and Lesvos 2018 and 2019). Camps on Lesvos and Samos, are routinely referred to as an ‘open air prison’ (Figure 2) relying, like in Shabazz’s work on Chicago, on ‘mechanisms of constraint built in to architecture’ (Shabazz, 2015, p.2), on barbed wire fencing, locked gates and a heavy presence of police and private security firms.

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*Figure 2:  ‘Welcome to Prison’*

The adoption of this legislation had implications on EU border management and the mobility of the refugee population on the islands has been curtailed. As Dimitriadi (2017) writes, the EU borders have ‘multiplied internally’ as the common asylum policy is put into practice by the Greek Ministry for Migration. Dimitriadi (2017) suggests that space acts as a punishment for those who have sought entry into the EU via the ‘Balkan Route’: through the curtailment of individual mobility, the policy is acting as a deterrent to others seeking to migrate. Following Dikeç, Camps, RICs and other forms of detention ‘consolidat[e]...negative images associated with them’ and encourage a certain way of thinking about them (Dikeç, 2007, p. 4). As Trakilović observes, this form of political control is ‘exercised through a bordering process that is both material (consisting of the implementation of ‘actual’ borders and border mechanisms) and discursive (symbolic process of othering)’ (Trakilović, 2019, p.59). As such, places like camps and island detention whose aim is to detain and deter onward movement, also contribute to othering. The idea that these spaces are used as a form of deterrent was denied by our interviewees (interview with RIC officials, January 2019). Yet, here, as with the broader framing and othering of the ‘Balkans’, we find material practices associated with criminalisation and othering that shape the ‘racialised figure of the migrant as culturally inferior, and therefore exterior to Europe’ (Trakilović, 2019, p. 60).

**Policy Interventions: Reception and Identifications Centres**

Refugees claiming asylum in the region often find themselves housed, at least initially, in Reception and Identification Centres, or, in Serbia, Asylum Centres and Reception Centres. RICs may share the same name, but in different locations (both within a country and between different states), the experiences of people living within them differ greatly. Following Dikeç (2007) this section explores the situation in which policy decisions claiming to improve a specific area can in fact negatively impact upon these spaces, isolating people spatially and creating ghettoisation over time (Massey & Denton, 1993). We problematize, in both this and the ensuing section, the policy narratives that position living conditions in RICs and informal housing as dichotomous.

*‘Reception Centres’ in Europe*

The naming choices of RICs, First Reception Centres, Hotspots or Asylum Centres, is intentional and politicised. Dikeç (2007) suggests that naming and articulating is important in constituting spaces (and policies towards them). The naming of the ‘hotspots’, by EU policy as ‘first reception’ centres at the EU’s external borders (Mentzelopoulou and Lutyen 2018), draws on the language of risk and urgency. ‘Hot’ is often associated with policy making (Andersson 2019), as well as the ‘crisis and emergency discourse’ which has marked EU and national policy on migration (Stojic Mitrovic 2018). Despite the camp-like conditions of many ‘hotspots’ (see e.g. Kalir and Razakou 2019) and other infrastructure housing refugees along the ‘Balkan Route’, official EU and national level policy names these facilities reception (and identification) *centres.*

In Serbia, for instance, officials working in the migration system told us that they avoid the use of the word ‘camp’ (interview, Belgrade June 2018): rather, Serbia runs asylum, reception and transit centres. This resonates with Europe-wide practices, whereupon ‘refugee camps’ are located outside of Europe, and ‘centres’ in Europe. Germany, for instance, operates arrival centres (*Ankunftszentren)* and ‘collective accommodation’ (*Gemeinschaftsunterkünfte*) (Asylum in Europe, n.d), whilst the UK runs, in addition to housing, ‘immigration removal centres’ and ‘short term holding facilities’ (Gov.uk n.d.). Indeed, as Martin et al (2019) suggest, the notion of a camp is deeply connected to European colonial history, as well as concentration camps run by totalitarian states. Further, the European history of camps shows that they have been employed to different purposes, such as territorial expansion, oppression of enemies or housing of refugees - but what draws them together, is that they are invariably systems of control or governance (Martin et al, 2019). Against this background, we see the naming of current reception centres in Greece and Serbia (mostly financed by the EU) as a conscious avoidance of the term *camp*, and its historical implications.

Beyond official policy making, the word *camp* is used frequently by refugees who live in these spaces, activists, aid workers and even some RICs’ staff (interview with a volunteer, Belgrade, July 2019). The term ‘reception’ suggests temporality, that these spaces are only intended to house people for short periods of time, rather than multiple years, now the norm in Greek island RICs (Bird & Beattie, 2019; interviews with RIC officials 2018). As the Greek case shows, the indefinite amount of time people are now having to spend in RICs, defies the notion of both reception and temporality. Likewise, it correlates with the broader global trends by which seemingly temporary camps often become permanent fixtures (Martin et al 2019). People living in Greek island RICs do not see their living arrangements in terms of *reception*; but rather incarceration, as well as the removal of mobility rights, and a lack of safety and security (Figure 2). The lack of mobility and the invoked imagery of imprisonment not only challenges the idea of temporality but also invokes ideas surrounding criminality, ‘prisonisation’ (Shabazz, 2015) and punishment. The island RICs rely heavily on barbed wire fences, policing and private security firms, to contain people in what is described currently as an open centre.

*Camp conditions*

The EU funding for RICs available to the Greek authorities through the Internal Security Fund suggests that it supports initiatives that ‘provide shelter and accommodation, catering, health care, transportation at hotspots, ensuring… healthy and safe living conditions for the target group’ (European Commission, 2019b). Similar narratives are also present in a more general EU document constituting the European Refugee Fund and national action plans. There, while explaining the goals of the fund (initiatives supporting resettlement and integration of persons whose stay is of a lasting nature), RICs are presented as areas where minimal living standards are expected, supporting fast processing of applications (European Commission, 2018b). These ideas are further mirrored in Greek policy documents that present ‘a modern reception system with accommodation facilities that provide at a very good level, meals, healthcare, education, training and recreation spaces to asylum seekers’ (Ministry of Digital Policy and Ministry for Migration Policy, 2018). EU financial support alongside descriptions set out in policy documentation presents these spaces, clearly inadequate for housing refugees, positively and as a short-term solution: a ‘first’ response. These policies define a broader understanding of spaces as being an ‘appropriate’ type of refugee accommodation (c.f. Johnson 2016) even when the reality is very different.

Border, migration and financing policies at multiple levels have spatial effects that shape living conditions along the ‘Balkan Route’. There is a great variation between camps along the Route, with some providing reasonable accommodation and others overcrowded to such an extent that they cannot meet minimum standards (Bird et al, 2019; author interview, Athens July 2018). For instance, as of January 2020 there were over 7,000 refugees accommodated in Vathy RIC on Samos, which has an official capacity of 648. Similarly, the population of Moria, on the Island of Lesvos, and its surrounding area (the Olive Grove) grew from 7,467 people in July 2017 (Kinglsey, 2018) to 20,000 in January 2020. Vathy and Moria are supported through the EU Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund; nonetheless, in both centres accommodation is supplemented with unsuitable tents, containers and makeshift shelters. Despite being framed by policymakers as a suitable type of accommodation (Ministry of Digital Policy, and Ministry for Migration Policy, 2018), volunteers and NGOs working with refugees, see camps themselves as violent, unsafe and unsuitable forms of accommodation, given their lack of facilities, security and basic amenities (Interviews with NGOs, 2019).

A group of people sitting on top of a mountain

Description automatically generated

*Figure 3: Conditions in Vathy RIC, Samos*

Camp conditions are also shaped by broader policies such as mobility restrictions in the island RICs (following the EU-Turkey settlement). Islands are overcrowded as refugees are not able to make their way forwards to emptier camps with somewhat better conditions, elsewhere in Greece and Serbia (see also: Bird et al 2019). Given that camps, just like ‘hotspots’, contribute to a ‘dividing and disciplining of unruly mobility’ (Tazziolli 2018:2754), they can be said to contribute to a ‘complex processes by which racial difference and inequality are organised and enacted’ (Neely & Samura, 2011, p. 1934).

Following Dikeç (2007), policies themselves define spaces; in this case, the ‘archipelago of encampments’ (Minca 2015) along the route defines South East Europe (and the popular imaginary of the Balkan ‘badlands’) as a space ‘good enough’ for racialised others to be detained in, and in which they can be prevented from reaching the ‘real’ Europe (Trakilović, 2019). Poorly managed, overcrowded camps did not emerge as an accidental by-product of peoples’ arrival in to Europe; rather, their continued financing suggests systematic policies aimed at controlling and governing (Martin et al 2019) people on the move at a broader, European level.

**Policy interventions: housing locations**

The isolated locations and unwelcoming aesthetics of formal housing suggest that people residing here are not wanted in central areas, and that peripheral, unsuitable sites are ‘good enough’ for them to live in. Skaramagas camp, for example, is located 11 km west of central Athens in the open and unprotected space of a working cargo port, next to a busy main road. Variations of this trend repeat across the route. Authorities in the town of Bihac, Bosnia, removed all displaced people from an official reception centre in the city and relocated them to a ‘new camp’ on the site of an abandoned landfill, deep into the isolated mountainside. In Serbia, local authorities actively removed displaced people from the central city areas once their presence impeded the development of a new urban ‘regeneration scheme’ (Obradovic-Wochnik, 2018). On the island of Kos the abandoned Hotel Captain Elias close to the main town was initially repurposed by UNHCR to respond to emergency arrivals (Lisle & Johnson, 2018) in 2015 and 2016 but was soon replaced by a more formal ‘hotspot’ located outside of the tourist areas. The placement of formal housing adds to the criminalisation and othering of refugees presented as being unsuitable to live in the centre, ‘defined, confined, regulated...through the control of space’ (Nelson, 2008, p.28). All of these are deliberate and strategic forms of segregation through the use of space and local policy (Trounstine 2018) which, in turn, create narratives of fear for the citizen population who see people as being housed in separate areas, kept at a distance and ‘securitised’ (Zoppi, 2019). Location in a city determines the kind of life a person will have (Shabazz, 2015) and their role (or lack thereof).

This focus on relocating towards isolated areas actually contradicts policy documents produced by the European Asylum Support Office (2016) which provides guidance for common standards of reception expected across MSs: for those applicants requiring international protection, including those with special needs, the expected standard on location of centres is that MS authorities should 'ensure effective geographical access to relevant services, such as public services, school, health care, social and legal assistance, a shop for daily needs, laundry and leisure activities' (EASO, 2016: 14). As an alternative, distance to services is not an issue if they are provided within the housing facility, 'the facility is located at a reasonable walking distance from relevant services and the available infrastructure is safe for walking' (EASO, 2016: 14), relevant services are available by public transport and the duration of the journey is reasonable, or services are accessible through organized transport provided by the MS. EASO (2016) also provides examples of good practice, which a MS should aim at, but do not have to fulfil: the housing should be near the local population to enhance integration, to limit the travel journey to services to 1.5h, and to involve locals in the definition of the location of facilities.

Yet other than Vathy RIC, formal housing is generally located outside of urban hubs and away from amenities and support, particularly from volunteer networks and NGOs. The separation of camps from urban centres consolidates questions of social order, suggesting that some areas of the city or town are not intended for refugees, ‘that they do not have the right to the city… (that they are) people who do not belong’ (Rajaram, 2018, p.632). The delineation of the space looks to define ‘who does and who does not have the power to define and control the space’ (Neely & Samura, 2011, p. 1939) and in defining this level of control spatial policies such as this one become raclialised as they separate refugees from the local, predominantly white population. Segregations enacted through policy (Trounstine 2018) create a hierarchy between who does and who does not belong, and they do so along the lines of race and othering. Suggesting that in one part of a city life looks one way, for one group of people, and in another area it looks different for a different group (Shabazz, 2015).

**Informal housing in the urban ‘badlands’**

If, as the previous section suggests, refugee camps and RICs are presented – through policymaking – as ‘safe’ and ‘appropriate’ spaces for refugees; informal housing, or squats, are often represented as components of the urban ‘badlands’ (Dikeç 2007). In this section, we challenge this representation of informal housing as the ‘badlands’, demonstrating how some settlements, specifically squats, can become sites of relative safety (Squire, 2018) and community building.

By financially supporting RICs as the only type of ‘official’ refugee accommodation in the region, the EU, national and local authorities simultaneously ban or curtail aid provision outside of these spaces. Refugees who are unable to access formal camps (or for whatever reason are unable to live in them) are left entirely reliant on informal networks and housing options (Obradovic-Wochnik, 2018). In urban hubs, such as Athens, the most prominent form of informal accommodation is normally a squat, usually found in parts of cities that are popularly seen as the ‘urban badlands’. This kind of accommodation is most prevalent in Greece, where there are deeper links between refugee squats and antiauthoritarian movements (Apoifis, 2017). The system of squats is nascent in Serbia and it lacks the political organisation of squats in Greece, particularly in Athens. As a result, the squats that do exist in Serbia often house displaced people in destitute conditions, such as without running water, walls or electricity (Obradovic-Wochnik, 2018). In fact, further along the route, destitution is by far the most common type of ‘informal housing’, especially outside of formal camps in for instance, Bosnia. Similarly, travelling further away from Athens, and into the islands, the presence of squats diminishes. On Lesvos in 2015 the Better Days camp was set up to provide housing and support for people unable to find space in Moria. This activist led camp was run on the premise of solidarity and worked with the beneficiary community to provide a higher standard of living than its RIC neighbour (interview with NGO, 2019). Even further away from Athens, on Samos for example, opportunities to live in alternative camps or squats do not exist. As such an area’s history and association with squatting and solidarity movements plays a role in determining the prevalence and quality of alternative housing options.

Whilst formal camps are almost always a top-down project organised by a larger authority (Martin et al 2019:12), informal housing is usually organised and implemented from the grassroots. Some informal housing can also provide safer places to live (Squire, 2018; author interview with NGO, 2019), and many operate their own security arrangements and barriers to entry. As our research suggests, many such housing options are designated for specific groups. In Athens, there are for instance women only houses or squats that will accept only Kurdish residents, whilst some accept only people belonging to specific political movements. This has meant that groups of single men are usually the most visible refugees in public spaces in Greece and Serbia, which often plays into the gendered and racialized media representations of ‘urban badlands’ (Damon et al., 2017; Darling, 2017), as well as assumptions made about who is and who is not vulnerable (interview with NGO, 2019).

There are many practical differences between formal and informal housing provision, one of these is flexibility. Informal housing can be organised quickly unlike formal camps and large NGO initiatives (author interview with grassroots NGO, 2019). The latter are subject to multiple levels of regulation and governance. Whilst most makeshift camps and settlements rely on volunteers for basic services, in some cases local authorities indirectly support them through a lack of intervention or providing additional services such as waste disposal. In Athens, there was (prior to July 2019) a perception that city authorities and police tend to leave specific squats alone because they are located in public buildings and host several hundred refugees which the city would then need to house (interview, squat volunteer, Athens July 2018). Interviews with residents and volunteers from two different squats seemed to support this view, as all had reported that there were no police visits or eviction attempts in the several years that those specific squats had existed (Athens, July 2018). Yet, this situation has changed in the second half of 2019 with the change of government in Greece (Bird, 2019).

The difference in attitudes and approaches towards squats further problematises the idea that squats, in general, could be understood as being the ‘badlands’ because they are outside of the formal systems of rules, regulations and procedures. However, they do share a number of problems, many of which are directly related to policies which govern refugees’ mobility and access to space. For instance, some services such as non-emergency access to the Greek healthcare system do not accept squat addresses as a ‘proper’ address for registration (interview with officials, Athens, 2019). Residents of squats also have no access to services that refugees would normally have when they are registered with the asylum service, such as financial support, meals and utilities. We see in this example not only the idea that policies alter and racialize spaces (Neely & Samura, 2011), but also that space has a defining influence on policy, with those individuals living within a squat being treated differently to those within a camp. Further highlighting the cyclical relationship of policy and space presented by Dikeç (2007).

Conditions in squats vary, and residents have a range of different opinions on life in these types of housing. Whilst Squire (2018) shows a relatively positive experience of residents in the City Plaza squat, our interviews with residents in other similar Athenian squats, suggest this is not always the case. Mirroring the situation in camps, many urban squats have sewage, heating or structural problems, and rely on volunteers or residents with carpentry or plumbing skills to resolve them. Interviewees have suggested that some squats cooperate with others to find accommodation for people who turn up at a place that is already full, and similarly, there are initiatives to share food, resources and skilled labour between the squats (Interview, Athens July 2018). Thus, squats run informal management policies, even though they are informal and have no requirement to do so. As we note elsewhere, they also operate safeguarding, health and safety policies and emergency evacuation procedures on a fairly regular basis (Obradovic-Wochnik & Bird, 2019). This level of organisation is in place partly because squats – as the urban ‘badlands’ - need to avoid giving any reason to the local authorities for eviction or a raid, and so must maintain the housing situation such that numbers are under control and manageable, and living conditions sanitary. These standards, whilst not always at a level that we would hope for do challenge the idea that they, rather than RICs and camps, make up the urban ‘badlands’.

**Conclusions:**

We have argued throughout this article that policies are both framed by and contribute to the framing of spaces. Like Dikeç’s discussion of the Parisian suburbs and Shabazz’s discussion of spatializing Chicago we recognise the role of policy in peripherising refugee housing away from urban hubs. Such policies, focused on location, space and othering, have additional effects. For example, business owners refusing access to their premises, or treating refugees badly when they do allow access, thus leading to deeper racialized and othering behaviours beyond those set out in the policies themselves.

Questions of location, space and materiality further enhance the image of vilification, criminalisation and fear borrowed from Dikeç’s (2007) work, and of the racialisation of space and place discussed by Neely and Samura (2011). Camps and camp-like spaces, differ between locations- the implementation of a standardised EU policy looks very different depending on the country and spatial location. Tazzioli’s (2018) discussion of Moria on Lesvos reminds us that images from the RIC could actually be understood as the 'badlands’, thus challenging a system that names RICs as the best and safest form of housing for refugees. In contrast, Krnjaca camp in Serbia suffers less from overcrowding with proper shelters and space to hang washing lines between housing structures (research data, 2018). As such we recognise that all camps are not the same, that whilst commonalities may exist in thinking about geographical location, camps and RICs themselves differ greatly in how they vilify, criminalise and ‘other’ their residents.

This article has sought to engage with Dikeç’s discussion of the ‘badlands’ and to apply it to a new discussion outside of French policymaking. Whilst Dikeç focuses on the level of the state this paper has expanded his work to consider policy interventions on a local, state and EU level and their effect on the imagination of spaces and the people housed within them. We have sought throughout this article to engage with, and problematise, what can be understood as the ‘badlands’ in urban policy discourse surrounding refugees. Whilst official rhetoric argues that camps and RICs offer a safer, better, housing space for those seeking asylum in South East Europe we argue that this is in fact often not the case. That, whilst squats and alternative, activist led camp initiatives do indeed face their own issues, the reality of understanding them in terms of the ‘badlands’ and official RICs as a ‘good’ solution is flawed. That in many cases official spaces suffer from overcrowding, poor conditions, bad sanitation and are located geographically in areas that do not meet the regulations intended to guide member states approach to reception accommodation. On this argument, based on location, provision, and the effects of racialisation and ‘othering’ that are the consequences of these policies, official camp-like spaces would often be better understood as the ‘badlands’, whilst alternative housing solutions such as squats can (and in some cases) do provide a safer, better located environment for their residents. Overall, engagement with these experiences, challenges a commonly held understanding of where the ‘badlands’ is located in discussions of refugee housing provision and urban policy.

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