Bridging the asymmetries? African students' mobility to China

Obert Hodzi[*]

African students' mobility to China is growing - making China the second most popular destination for African students studying abroad, after France. Generally, due to the pervasive poverty and inequality in African states, educational mobility is a means to escape individual socio-economic challenges for the transformation of lives. However, is the African students' mobility to China able to achieve those expectations? Through a critical analysis of current scholarship in African student education mobility the paper explores the underlying material and ideational motivations of China's education support in Africa. In probing Africans' educational mobility to China, the paper pushes the boundaries of enquiry beyond the surface of affordable education. Examining the asymmetries emerging from African students' mobility to China and questioning the bridging effect of educational mobility the paper finds that education aid and development in Africa have always been a factor of external powers' domestic and foreign interests.

Introduction

Africa's youth population is booming. By 2050, a billion young Africans will be added to the global population. These young people, according to a 2018 report by the International Commission on Financing Global Education Opportunity will constitute 20 percent of the global workforce - doubling what it currently is. However, only one in ten of the young Africans will have basic secondary education. Even less will have critical skills needed for Africa's industrial and technological advancement because on average fewer Africans enroll in tertiary and vocational education. Part of the challenge is that despite African countries spending about 5% of their GDP on education, their average spending per student is the lowest in the world and the least efficient. For example, the African Development Bank (AfDB) suggests that on average, Africa has 58 percent efficiency on education spending for primary and 41 percent for secondary education. This implies that 'at the primary school level, a 58 percent efficiency score means inefficiency in education spending of around 42 percent, indicating that African countries could improve primary education by 42 percent without increasing spending'.[1] The implication is that African students are, in comparison with students from other regions poorly educated and possess the least skills to deal with current and future global challenges. Worse more, of the most educated young Africans, nearly 47% have seriously considered emigrating in search for better employment prospects.[2]

Graca Machel describes these challenges in Africa's education sector as an 'educational crisis', which 'must be a top development agenda priority'. However, most countries still lack the political will and financial resources to 'cover the costs associated with improving educational outcomes'.[3] This raises concerns that the combined effect of insufficient and inefficient government spending on education, outmoded educational facilities and scarce employment prospects are signs of 'African' education curtailing Africa's human capital development and industrial advancement.

To address this educational crisis, according to the World Bank, countries in sub-Saharan Africa have increased their primary education net enrolment rate, that is, the percentage of primary school age children actually enrolled, from 74% in 2010 to 78% in 2018. This is not much of a progress

---

[*] Obert Hodzi. Address: Department of Politics, University of Liverpool, 8-11 Abercromby Square, Liverpool L69 7WZ, UK. E-mail: o.hodzi@liverpool.ac.uk

compared to South Asia's 91% net enrolment rate in 2018 and Latin America and Caribbean's 94%. Tertiary education enrolment in Africa also trails that of other regions. In 2018, 9% of Africans enrolled in tertiary education, a double increase from the 4.5% in 2000. Meanwhile, South Asia's tertiary education enrolment increased from 8% in 2000 to 24% in 2018, and Latin America and Caribbean enrolment rate surged from 23% in 2000 to 51% in 2018. Nonetheless, the increase in tertiary education enrolment in Africa is attributable to countries such as Ethiopia expanding their tertiary enrolment by constructing tens of new universities. South Africa increased investment in doctoral education resulting in doubling of doctoral graduates within nine years from 1 420 in 2010.[4] In East Africa, private tertiary institutions have mushroomed absorbing thousands of students unable to gain admission into public universities. Still, these 'quantitative improvements in higher education are not matched by quality.'[5] For instance, the Uganda National Council of Higher Education declared 66 doctorates awarded by Kampala International University invalid.[6] In addition, as highlighted by Sawyerr in 2004 and confirmed by UNESCO in 2019 inadequate funding and lack of infrastructure, trained academic personnel, and inadequate access to international knowledge resources are persistent challenges in African universities.[7]

With limited private and public investment in tertiary education, and most importantly primary and secondary education, there is a widening gap between demand and supply for education. Accordingly, Africans, with or without support of their governments are looking for better education beyond the continent and traditional destinations such as France, UK and the United States. They are looking toward China. In many respects, across Africa, foreign education is a means to increase employment prospects, reduce social and economic inequalities, and escape individual socio-economic challenges. For most African governments, foreign education reduces pressure on their already underfunded higher education institutions while meeting their human capital needs. However, is the African students' mobility to China able to achieve those expectations? In this paper, I examine this question through a critical analysis of the current scholarship in African student education mobility. The objective of the analysis of the literature from African, Chinese and Western sources and authors is to set a research agenda and contribute to growing research on African students' mobility to China – an area that is still under-researched though it is widely covered in the Western media. I employ the concept of soft power to illustrate the underlying material and ideational motivations of China's education support in Africa. In doing that, the study pushes the boundaries of enquiry beyond the surface of affordable education to probing the efficacy of Africa-China education mobility for brain gain and development of Africa. Accordingly, the paper examines the historical educational relations between Africa and the West, and then Africa-China education relations. It argues that education aid and development in Africa have always been a factor of external powers' domestic and foreign interests. By locating the mobility of African students to China within that frame, the paper uses illustrative and probative empirical evidence to challenge the supposed bridging effect of the Africa-China education mobility.

Colonial heritage of education in Africa

Historically, the flow of African students has generally been concentrated in three destinations, namely, Britain, France and South Africa.[8] There are several factors, and in the case of Britain and France, past asymmetrical colonial relations mostly influenced the trend. First, educational systems in contemporary Africa, as was the case in Latin America and Asia are products of colonialism, and closely mirror educational systems in former colonial powers. These universities, starting with Fourah Bay College established in 1827 in Sierra Leone, Cape Town (1828) and Stellenbosch (1866) 'were implants from the European university tradition and its stocks.'[9] In other words, the education system in former French colonies mirrored France's while former British colonies modeled their education systems to resemble Britain's, and the same applies to former colonies of Portugal. For instance, the education in colonial, and largely in post-colonial Zimbabwe, was 'formulated and structured around the nineteenth century British middle-class education system.'[10]

In South Africa, both the colonial and apartheid regimes imposed the Eurocentric education models and systems but tailored black education to 'train black people to serve first the colony and then the apartheid state.'[11] The rationale is that in colonial Africa, education was an instrument of domination tailored for the needs of the colonial government and its metropole. The main objectives being to enable 'efficient exploitation'[12] and *Europeanisation* of the African as put by Azikiwe.[13] Politics, therefore, determined the nature and distribution of education and knowledge production in Africa, which according to Austin 'affected post-colonial economic development in sub-Saharan Africa.'[14]

The second factor is that African countries adopted their former colonisers' language and appropriated their culture – making language attachment the classic determiner of African student mobility.[15] As a result, English and French are the dominant mediums of instruction in Africa, particularly in African universities, whose advent is attributed by Mamdani to the colonial period.[16] Bunyi argues that in both colonial and post-colonial Africa, indigenous languages were delegitimized and devalued.[17] Thus, as put by Heleta 'European epistemology and patriarchy were exported to the colonies' enabling a hegemonic imposition of 'Eurocentric worldviews while erasing and subjugating indigenous memories, knowledges, and worldviews.'[18] Therefore, the current reality, despite the rhetoric of African languages being at par with colonial languages is that 'all official communication, formal education, sociocultural modernization and economic development in the African post-colonies must be conducted in the 'superior' languages…i.e. those of the former colonial masters… in order to meet the models provided by 'Western civilization.'[19] The effect is double-fold. Colonial languages are hegemonic in Africa's education system and that works to maintain former colonial powers as the centers and standard-bearers of Africa's education thereby legitimizing Western prescriptions and interventions in Africa's politics and economies.

The other effect is that due to the colonial legacy, African students lack language skills to pursue further education in non-Western countries such as China. In 2010, UNESCO published a report suggesting that due to its colonial past and globalization effects, 'Africa is the only continent where the majority of children start school using a foreign language'. It further argued that 'across Africa the idea persists that the international languages of wider communication (Arabic, English, French, Portuguese and Spanish) are the only means for upward economic mobility.'[20] Therefore, as rightly noted by Tikly 'colonial education was instrumental in the globalisation of English and other European languages. This has directly facilitated the commodification of and the creation of markets for Anglo-American cultural forms in the contemporary period.'[21] Consequently, Africa remains dependent on the West for best practices and validation of its education. Even in cases were Africans attain educational qualifications from non-Western countries, their education credentials are questioned and sidelined (even in their home countries) in comparison to qualifications obtained in say Britain or France, which are preferred. This means that the 'North maintains and legitimizes its continued power and hegemony in the South.'[22] Overall, the effect of Africa's colonial heritage is that France, and the five most-developed Anglophone countries (Britain, the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia) are the idyllic destinations for African students. However, the rise of China and its growing influence in Africa is challenging their dominance as prime destinations for African students. Thus, the next section explores how China is, and has challenged the West since 1956 to become the second biggest host of African students.

Africa-China education mobility

From the 1950s, China has made inroads into Africa's education - providing educational development support, technical training and scholarships for African students to study in China. This kind of Chinese educational support to Africa although wrapped in the South-South cooperation, mutually beneficial and sovereign equality narrative, was, and still is tethered to China's domestic and foreign policy objectives. As a result, shifts in the nature of China's

educational support to Africa closely mirror shifts in its domestic and foreign policy. Following Wenping He's (2010) division of Africa-China relations into three successive periods, that is, 1950-1980; the 1990s and 2000-present, Nordtveit argues that 1950-1980 was a period of China's global political alignments.[23] This was followed by the 1990s period in which China considered Africa to be a source for diplomatic and political support; and from the year 2000 onwards, the opening up and 'going out' policy, which ushered in a more pragmatic and economic-interest-oriented Chinese focus on Africa. China's foreign policy in Africa therefore transitioned from being ideology-driven in the 1950-1980 period to being pragmatic and economic-driven. These shifts in China's foreign policy, as shown below, are mirrored in its education support and broader relations with Africa.

During the period of China's global political realignments (1950-1980), it sought to achieve two foreign policy objectives. First, consolidate its role as leader of the 'Third World, particularly of the subsequent Non-Aligned Movement, which comprised of developing countries that refused to ideologically side with either the United States or the Soviet Union.'[24] Secondly, *internationalise* the Maoist revolution. The *internationalisation* agenda was enunciated in 1965 by China's Defense Minister, Lin Biao who argued that socialist countries and China should 'regard it as their *internationalist* duty to support the people's revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa and Latin America.'[25] To achieve the two objectives, Beijing provided military and ideological training and scholarships to Africans from both newly independent countries and those still under colonial governance – the condition being that they had to be ideologically aligned to China. For instance, as part of *internationalising* the revolution, China provided training to commanders and leaders of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), a liberation war movement in colonial Zimbabwe, which aligned with Mao's version of socialism. Emmerson Mnangagwa, who is now the current president of Zimbabwe received six months military training in China in 1963. Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA (*Unido Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola*), a liberation movement in Angola 'underwent military training in China in 1964 and 1965 before formal establishment of UNITA in 1966.'[26] He proclaimed Maoism as UNITA's foundational doctrine. The objective of these government-funded military and ideological training for liberation war movements in Africa was motivated by competition 'with the superpowers and especially the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc countries for short-term influence in liberation groups; [and] competition with the Soviets and Soviet-bloc states for long-term influence in post-revolutionary governments'[27] and increase its geopolitical and ideological influence in Africa. It paid off for China, because most African countries established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China soon after attaining independence. In exchange for China's support, the African countries also successfully supported China to replace Taiwan in the United Nations Security Council in 1971.

Important to note is that leaders of some liberation war movements and newly independent countries in Africa solicited for the military trainings, scholarships and educational support from Beijing. For instance, Sam Nujoma, leader of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) in Namibia visited China in 1964 and requested for military training and support. Soon after his trip to Beijing, 'seven SWAPO men were sent to the PRC for military training… these seven were collectively known as the "Chinamen".'[28] Similarly, Idris Mohamed Adem and Osman Sabbe, leaders of the Eritrean Liberation Front requested for military aid and military training when they met Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in 1966 in Beijing. In response to their request, 'twenty-six fighters were trained in China in two batches.'[29] Asias Afwerki, Eritrea's president since its independence from Ethiopia was among the first group that trained in China in 1967. These requests from African leaders established the basis of contemporary China-Africa relations and fostered notions of South-South cooperation and solidarity. In addition, the convergence of interests between China and African leaders cemented early relations between China and Africa – enabling both parties to achieve their respective domestic and external political and ideological

objectives. Invariably, these historical relations have given China considerable competitive advantage in post-colonial Africa - giving it access to African markets and primary commodities.

China also provided scholarships to Africans from newly independent countries. In 1956, when it established diplomatic relations with Egypt, the Chinese government gave scholarships to four Egyptian students to study Chinese painting at the China Central Academy of Fine Arts in China.[30] More students followed in 1957 from countries such as Cameroon, Kenya, Malawi and Uganda. By 1966, there were approximately '164 students from fourteen African countries but they all had to return to their home countries when the Cultural Revolution began.'[31] In 1973, the former president of Ethiopia Mulatu Teshome was granted a scholarship by the Chinese government to study the Chinese language at the Beijing Language and Culture University, then a bachelor's, masters and PhD degree at Peking University.[32] By the end of the 1980s, the number of African students studying in China on government scholarship had grown from just four Egyptian students in 1956 to about 2,245 students by the end of the 1980s.[33] As the pressures of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution took effect on China's domestic and foreign policy, 'from 1967 to 1972, China did not receive African students.'[34] The halting of scholarships to African students in response to domestic politics and foreign policy imperatives suggests that for China, education support was granted only to the extent that it advanced Beijing's domestic and foreign policy objectives.

The Tiananmen Square protests, which kick started the second phase of Africa-China relations reflects the instrumentalisation of education aid to Africa by China. Following the violent suppression of student protestors at Tiananmen, Beijing was widely criticized by the West. The European Union imposed an arms embargo on China, which remains effective to date. In contrast, African countries supported China, forcing Beijing to reignite its lukewarm relations with the continent. In pursuit of its modernization drive, Beijing had neglected Africa and focused on building relations with the West to aid its technological and industrial development. However, Beijing's ostracisation by the West compelled it to reconsider bolstering its relations with Africa. To do that, it increased development assistance and government funded scholarships for students in Africa to study in China. Interestingly, as the number of Africans on Chinese scholarships increased, 'the number of African students studying in China on their own means increased from two in 1989 to 1580 in 1999.[35] Arguably, education support and other development assistance initiatives were again part of China's charm offensive to gain Africa's diplomatic and political support in the face of a diplomatic onslaught by the West. Similarly, most governments in Africa exercised agency in determining the nature and kind of scholarships and training they required based on their local contexts.

Institutionalisation of China's education support to Africa: FOCAC Summits

The first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) held in Beijing in October 2000 ushered in the third phase of pragmatic and economic Africa-China relations. Among other initiatives, FOCAC institutionalized China's education, technical training and human capital development support to Africa. From FOCAC, it emerged that China's educational assistance to Africa consists of scholarships; setting up of rural schools; training of educational officers; human resource development; and establishment of Confucius Institutes to teach Chinese language and culture. At the 2003 FOCAC summit held in Ethiopia, China and African countries agreed to enhance education cooperation through teacher exchanges, collaboration between Chinese and African higher learning and Technical Vocational and Training (TVET) institutions, as well as set-up new scholarships.

At the third FOCAC summit in 2006, Beijing announced new scholarships for Africans to study in China. From 2006 to 2009, Chinese government scholarships to African students doubled from 2,000 to 4,000 per year. The number of government scholarship was further increased to 5,500 at the fourth FOCAC summit in 2009. China also pledged to 'admit 200 middle and high level African administrative personnel to MPA [Master's of Public Administration] programs in China in

the next three years.'[36] In addition, China promised, as shown on the FOCAC website in 2009, to 'promote the development of Confucius Institutes and increase the number of scholarships offered to Chinese language teachers to help them study in China, and double efforts to raise the capacity of local African teachers to teach the Chinese language.'[37] At the fifth FOCAC summit, China announced, as reported on the FOCAC website in 2012, the setting up of a US$2 million annual 'UNESCO trust fund to support education programs in Africa, particularly higher education in Africa'. The UNESCO trust fund heralded the beginning of China's attempts to cooperate with multilateral institutions in providing development assistance to developing countries, particularly in Africa. The effect is that China portrayed itself as a responsible global power that supports multilateralism and collectivism in dealing with global challenges.

The major highlight of China's education support to Africa was the sixth FOCAC summit held in Johannesburg in December 2015. The UNESCO China fund for education in Africa was extended by two years. In addition, China offered 2,000-degree education opportunities to Africa, 30,000 government scholarships, and 40,000 technical training opportunities in China for Africans. Importantly, China offered to train senior professionals on 'government administration for national development through South-South Cooperation and Development Institute.'[38] To achieve that, Beijing launched the Institute of South-South Cooperation and Development (ISSCAD) at Peking University on 29 April 2016. In its first year, ISSCAD recruited 10 students for a three-year PhD and 20 students for a one-year master's degree.

Two years later, at the FOCAC summit in Beijing in 2018, China increased the number of scholarships for African students to 50,000. In addition, 50,000 other training opportunities for African professionals, and 1,000 tailor-made programs to train 'high caliber Africans' were added. According to the PRC Ministry of Education website as of 1 April 2018, these government scholarships, professional and technical training opportunities for Africans have, 'allowed an increasing number of international students to further their professional studies and pursue higher degrees in more specialized fields.' Arguably, this has helped China to surpass the United States, Britain and France to become the largest provider of higher education scholarships and training opportunities for Africans.

The African students studying in China

Since receiving its first African students in 1956, China's relations with Africa have evolved from being ideologically driven to being economically driven. Over the same period, China has also evolved from being a closed society to being open to the world, enabling more students to consider China for their education. The nature and number of African students studying in China, either on Chinese government scholarships or as self-sponsoring students reflect these shifts in China's domestic and global outlook. From a mere four students in 1956, African students have grown to 81,562 in 2018. According to China's Ministry of Education, African students constitute 16.57% of international students in China, higher than Europe (14.96%), America (7.26%) and the Oceania (1.27%). They are only second to Asian students who constitute 59.95% of international students in China. Considering that the current phase of Africa-China relations began in 2000, in less than 15 years, the African student body in China has grown 41-fold from just under 2,000 in 2003 - making China the second most popular destination for African students studying abroad, after France, and surpassing the United States and Britain.

As diverse as the African student body in China is, their interactions with the Chinese publics also vary significantly. For instance, high-level government students from Africa are usually treated as representatives of their countries. Usually, they are enrolled in homogenous groups comprising of government officials from several African countries. With support from their host institutions and home governments, Chinese government departments regard them as representatives of their home governments. With such support, these high-level government officials studying in China on government scholarships do not face the precariousness faced by self-sponsoring students or

scholarship students who do not hold government positions. Their interactions are therefore at a higher level than those of ordinary recipients of Chinese government scholarships, who despite their financial and accommodation needs being taken care of, are largely devoid of the high-level interactions with Chinese officials that their government counterparts have. Regardless, ordinary scholarship holders form their own 'African students' communities separate from their fellow Chinese students. For instance, students from South Sudan, Burundi, South Africa, Ghana, Zimbabwe and other African countries studying at Peking University on government scholarship formed their own students' association to organise events and provide support to each other. Intermingling with Chinese students and the wider community is limited.

In addition to government-sponsored students, self-sponsoring students from Africa, attracted by affordability and program quality have increased in China. Media reports suggest that the students are mostly 'from Tanzania, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Morocco, Eritrea and Cameroon.' [39] Although the majority of the students take Chinese language courses and engineering degrees taught in English, the language barrier militates against effective interaction with other Chinese students and the wider community. Most of these self-sponsoring students usually find themselves in precarious conditions. As a coping mechanism, they use social networking sites such as WeChat to share tips and opportunities. With no further support from their home governments, they rely on other African students for support and orientation on how to survive in China. They are usually isolated and are likely to face more discriminatory experiences.[40] The discriminatory experiences of mostly self-sponsoring African students are masked by the macro-level state-to-state relations that emphasise mutuality, equality and South-South cooperation. A cross-cultural study conducted by Hashim and Yang on cultural and gender differences in perceiving stressors for foreign students in Chinese college showed that 'African students reported higher stress levels than Western students in the following situations: difficulties in reading and writing in Chinese, financial problems, change in social activities, missed too many classes, frequent changes in weather.'[41] Accordingly, the state-centeredness of Africa-China education support camouflages the challenges at the micro-level.

The effect of these challenges is that the majority of African students are likely to return to their home countries to work - contributing to the brain-gain. For African students going back to their countries, 'they expect that a degree from a Chinese institution will not only provide them with qualifications, but with useful country-specific knowledge.' [42] However, the challenge is that degrees from Chinese universities are not readily recognized in some African countries, where employers favour degrees from the West. As noted by Burgess, graduates who return home face 'the problem of explaining the value of the education they received.'[43] Added to this are the high levels of unemployment, even among graduates, in most African countries. As a result, there are growing concerns that most of the students who go for studies in China, either on government scholarship or as self-sponsoring are opting to stay in China and work as English teachers or start businesses, mostly exporting merchandise to their home countries. Some, regarding China as 'a stepping stone for entry into Europe or North America'[44] search for employment opportunities in the West. The implication is that an education in China does not necessarily result in upward mobility.

Nonetheless, foreign education has a symbolic cogency in Africa. For most Africans, studying in China is a result of imagined benefits of education as the only means to achieve social upward mobility. It is imagined that an affordable, overseas education can result in enhanced employability, status and social mobility through education. Because of these imaginings, mostly promoted by their peers, the Chinese government and their own governments in Africa, few of the students have significant knowledge of China's higher education system or the reputation of Chinese universities. When these imaginings are challenged, the potency of the Chinese acquired degrees is also put to the test. While students in professional and tailor-made training programs, or students seconded by their respective African governments easily return to their jobs in their home

countries, self-financing students or students not seconded by their employers in Africa find it difficult to have their Chinese degrees accepted. Degrees from the West are still considered across Africa to be of higher value than the Chinese degrees that are at times considered lower in ranking compared to degrees from some African universities. In that respect, Chinese degrees do not necessarily enhance the employability and social status of African students - suggesting that outbound mobility does not equal upward mobility.

Framing of China-Africa education cooperation

Regardless of the challenges faced by African students in China, the framing of China's educational support drives this growth in African students studying in China. Beijing frames education as part of South-South Cooperation and integral to advancing national development in African countries. Both China and Africa concur on this. As evidenced by the 2006 FOCAC plan, they regard education as 'a contributor to 'social development', reflecting a development view based on economic growth and the 'people'.'[45] Thus, both share the 'functionalist view that education primarily serves to equip members of society with the right qualities and skills to function in the prevailing socio-economic conditions.'[46] The implication of this 'functionalist view' is that Chinese scholarships for Africans to study in China are more state-focused, and tailored to fill perceived capacity and skills gaps in African governments. In that respect, recipient governments negotiate the number and nature of scholarships they need, and largely, nominate recipients of the scholarships. The downside is that there is no scope for non-state actors to influence China-Africa educational cooperation because the cooperation is 'predominantly engineered through intergovernmental bureaucracies.'[47]

The shortcoming of the state-centeredness of Chinese education support to Africa is that although the scholarships are awarded by China's Ministry of Education, African governments are actively involved in selecting students for the scholarships and trainings in China. The result has been widespread corruption, with scholarships being awarded to children of the well connected. In 2009, it was reported that the Namibian government kept Chinese scholarships secret, and awarded them to nine children of government officials including the daughter of former president, Hifikepunye Pohamba and relatives of the country's first president Sam Nujoma.[48] Consequently, those that are connected to ruling elites end up getting the Chinese government scholarships - making access to Chinese scholarships and an education in China a means of reproducing the ruling elite because they [Chinese scholarships] are 'major resources that those in public service can access for themselves, their children, relatives and friends.'[49] Therefore, instead of Chinese educational support empowering the less privileged in Africa, it aids social inequalities by supporting the well-resourced Africa's ruling elite.

In addition, some of the scholarships target mid-level and high-level government officials serving in African governments. For these ones, the objective is clear - they are aimed at enhancing the capacity of governments in Africa to govern effectively and achieve national development. More importantly, Beijing regards the scholarships as a means to train and socialize key African individuals able to influence government policies in their countries to China's norms, ideas, procedures and models thereby increasing its soft power. However, the effectiveness of the scholarships and high-level training have been hampered by corruption on the part of some African countries. In his study of China's educational support in Cameroon, Bjorn Nordtveit noted complaints from personnel at the Chinese embassy in Cameroon that the selection of trainees was biased, and that the Ministry of Higher Education in Cameroon sent 'their family and friends… teachers and real people don't go; only administrators. It is desperate, they go away and come back without [having learnt] anything… and they just have some pictures and souvenirs that they have brought.'[50] The implication is that, it is the government-funded trainings and scholarships, and the potential for business opportunities that scholarships and short-trainings opportunities in China

present that attract the government officials to China rather than the capacity development, policy learning and exposure to political and developmental systems of China.

Regardless of the corruption and bias in awarding government scholarships, the increase in the number of scholarships to over 50,000 per year has made it possible for some ordinary citizens in African countries to study in China. The main attraction is that unlike Britain, France, the US and other Western countries that focus on graduate and post-graduate students, China provides scholarships from undergraduate level up to PhD level. In addition, the low cost of education and living expenses in China, as well as a relatively easy visa process compared the United States, Australia and Britain whose visa regimes are considered to be biased against Africans has attracted African students to China.[51] Haugen concurs - 'the ease of obtaining visas is one of China's main advantages in the global competition to attract fee-paying students today.'[52] Accordingly, the number of self-financing students has increased exponentially. This means that African students studying in China vary in social status, and range from high-level government officials to ordinary citizens and from recipients of Chinese government scholarships to self-financing students.

Making sense of China's education support to Africa

In comparison to the West, in particular, former colonial powers, China's educational engagement with Africa differs in several ways. First, as noted above, it was, and is still demand-driven. African governments exercise agency in determining the training and scholarships they need to meet their local needs – be they revolutionary or developmental. On the contrary, former colonial powers imposed their educational system on the indigenous in order to meet the colonial powers' needs. Second, colonial education was an external imposition on Africa, transposing the European model of education to Africa and dismembering the various African educational models. Accordingly, the system of education in contemporary Africa resemble that of former colonial powers – 'and differ according to the colonizing power and style of colonization.'[53] On the contrary, there is no evidence of China imposing its educational system on African countries. The third difference is that for China, educational cooperation with Africa was according to Yu driven by three primary factors: (1) perceptions that Africa would assist China to achieve its political and ideological objectives; (2) secure international recognition as the legitimate China; and (3) gain Africa's diplomatic support in Beijing's conflicts with other global powers.[54] On the contrary, for colonial powers, education, particularly university education was 'set up and operated as "institutions of empire" that became the centers of law and administration within the colonies.'[55] In that respect, without the colonial baggage of the West, China regards its contemporary education cooperation with Africa as mutually beneficial and guided by principles of South-South cooperation.

However, a major similarity between Western education support to Africa and its predecessor, colonial education and China's educational engagement with Africa is that both aim to achieve the political, economic, cultural and ideological objectives of the benefactor. Western colonial education focused on socialising the African to European systems and culture as well as enable efficient exploitation of the colonized for the benefit of the colonial administration and its metropole. Similarly, China's educational support to Africa is tailored to meet Beijing's domestic and foreign policy objectives by training 'international personnel who are well-versed in Chinese and friendly toward China.'[56] Even the PRC Ministry of Education confirmed that the objective is to build alumni of Chinese universities to 'tell China's story and spread China's voice.'[57] For instance, in the first phase of Africa-China relations, Chinese scholarships were aimed at instilling its ideology in African students, thus advancing Beijing's ideological competition with the United States and the Soviet Union. From the 2000s, Chinese scholarships, professional and technical training opportunities for Africans have been focused on enhancing Chinese soft power,[58] and creating a conducive environment for Chinese interests in Africa. According to Wu China's objective is to use trainings, scholarships and educational assistance to export 'its knowledge, culture, and even higher education models and norms through higher education

internationalisation… primarily for the sake of status enhancement within the arena of the world culture and knowledge system.'[59] Knowledge production and educational aid is thus an instrument for Beijing to achieve its domestic and foreign policy objectives.

Beyond general scholarships, China is creating training programs tailored to meet Africa's need for professionally trained government administrators while promoting its own governance and development model. In the past, some of the people trained in China ended up occupying high-level government positions, for example, Zimbabwe's current president Emmerson Mnangagwa, Eritrea's president Asias Asfweki and the former president of Ethiopia, Malatu Teshome. Now, China is systematically training current and future government and professional elites in national development through South-South Cooperation. It is 'cultivating the next generation of African scholars and elites. The experience that these students get in China translate into a willingness to work with China and view China's internal or external policies favorably in the future'.[60] For instance, ISSCAD targets mid-level and high-ranking government officials from developing countries and train them on how to achieve national development, arguably drawing lessons from China's own development trajectory. As put by Rui Yang, 'by fostering future African leaders such as President Malatu Teshome of Ethiopia, China hopes to improve its image in Africa and to strengthen economic, scientific and technological cooperation with Africa'.[61] Broadly, as China seeks to create a conducive environment for its national rejuvenation and flagship projects like the Belt and Road Initiative, these tailor-made and specialized training programs and scholarships act as indispensable tools to socialise government officials in Africa to China's governance and development model, 'which constitute a key component of Chinese foreign policy toward Africa'.[62] This fits in with China's foreign policy in Africa, because, as described by Yuan, 'education, especially tertiary educational activities for human resource development, plays a key role in China's 'shared' and 'learning together' development agenda.'[63]

Bridging effect of Africa's education mobility to China

For Beijing, the intention is that 'support for education improves China's image, builds grassroots support in local communities, and creates a better understanding of China among the educated elite'.[64] Zhang Yanqui, who told reporters that studying in China 'offers new channels for Africans to know what's happening in the real China, also shares this expectation… The students work as a bridge between the two [African and China]'.[65] The bridging effect of African students differ with their status, what they study, positions they eventually take up, and whether the positions are in the public or private sector. Middle and high level African administrative personnel selected to study for the Chinese funded programs such as the MPA [Master's of Public Administration] and other postgraduate degrees at ISSCAD return to hold senior positions in their home government. The bridging effect of these students is highly probable because they are usually involved in policy-making and policy implementation. As noted by Nye 'powerful policy effects can be traced back to even those small numbers. Because cultural exchanges affect elites, one or two key contacts may have a major political effect.'[66] However, because the programs have not been ongoing for a sufficiently long time to determine the effect of these students on their home countries' foreign policies, these lofty objectives nay be yet to bear fruit for China. For most self-sponsoring students or students who do not take up government jobs, there would be challenges in tracking their impact because Africa-China relations remain state-centric and driven by political elites focused on achieving their objectives.

Secondly, China's education support to Africa is framed as mutually beneficial, and achieving the ideals of South-South cooperation, however, in practice, it is reproducing the asymmetries in education and knowledge production that exist between Africa and the West. The provision of education to Africa is Beijing's strategy to project its soft power in higher education, increase its status in the world knowledge system and challenge 'both the traditional and more recent explanations of the political economy of international higher education - characterised,

respectively, by North-South imbalances and asymmetries and a strong orientation for international market share'.[67] In its relations with Africa, China is assuming the role occupied by the North as producers and dispensers of superior education and knowledge. This is because apart from academic exchanges, there are no known scholarships for Chinese students to study in African universities. Furthermore, the education that Africans receive in China is aimed at fostering their understanding of the Chinese development and governance model, Chinese culture and the Chinese language. Accordingly as noted by Hopf, 'education, and especially universities and graduate schools attracting foreign students are one of the most important institutions of hegemonic reproduction'[68] - and through its education support in Africa, China is carving its role as the centre for South-South cooperation and national development education.

Third, in blending education aid, in the form of scholarships and trainings, as well as opening up to African self-sponsoring students, China is linking education with its development assistance initiatives in Africa. By framing education support as part of China's efforts to build the capacity of African countries to achieve national development and social stability, the emerging asymmetries in Africa-China relations are exposed. This is because 'recruiting international students is viewed as a form of 'charity', particularly in developed countries, because this perspective indicates that student mobility is a means to assist those considered backward, needing help, and seeking improvements'.[69] Thus, as pointed out by Yang, 'unlike Western 'aid' from the beginning, the Chinese approach is a blended model of aid, investment, trade, and technology as levers for development, and embeds education into the wider and more complex political economic context.'[70] However, without addressing the underlying socio-political inequalities within Africa and in Africa's relations with China, Beijing's education support to Africa serves its geopolitical objectives and identity as a benevolent global power. Finally, for educational support to achieve the soft power objectives Beijing intends, African students in China should in the course of their studies experience deepened social interaction, have a shared sense of community and common identity with their Chinese counterparts.[71] However, most African students complain of language and cross-cultural challenges [72] and discrimination,[73] which challenges the bridging effect of African students' mobility to China. Without a shared sense of community or identity, even though the African alumni of Chinese universities might be well versed with China, this may not translate to a positive or favorable outlook of China.

Conclusion

African students' mobility to China is not a recent a phenomenon. Beginning in the 1950s, this mobility has evolved from being ideologically driven to being pragmatic and economic-centered. This shift, mirrors shifts in Beijing's domestic and foreign policy objectives - making China's education support to Africa an instrument of its geopolitical ambitions. The expansion and institutionalisation of China's human capital development initiatives in Africa, although state-centered and state-driven, has resulted in more self-sponsoring students studying in China. The result as shown in this article is that there is an intermingling of objectives ranging from individuals seeking upward mobility through a Chinese education, to governments abdicating their responsibility to support their higher education to China, and to China that is seeking to establish itself as the provider of South-South cooperation and national development oriented education to the Global South. The complexities of these competing interests are reflected in disorientation among African students unable to solve the predicament of constrained upward mobility and social inequalities underpinned by corrupt governments; and African governments unable to guarantee return of graduates from China. Regardless, the portrayal is that China's educational aid to Africa is a result of wide consultations between China and respective African countries rather than a dictation from Beijing. It also implies that the educational support is tailored to meet actual needs of the respective African countries hence contributing to the African countries' human capital development. But again, there is the challenge that 'unintentionally' due to corruption in Africa and

its state-focus and state-driven nature, African students' mobility to China, (especially the students supported by PRC scholarships) is reproducing social inequalities in Africa.

Overall, in providing a critical analysis of scholarship on African students' mobility to China, this paper has laid the foundation for challenging the altruism of China's educational support to Africa and the bridging effect of Africa's educational mobility to China. This will entail decentering the study of Africa-China education cooperation from being state-centric to being people-centric focusing on how people-to-people relations are at times divergent from state-to-state relations. Such a decentering of Africa-China education engagement has the effect of redirecting researchers' efforts toward assessing the reproduction of North-South asymmetries in Africa-China relations. Thus, education cooperation is not neutral, amoral and altruistic but laden with geopolitical meaning and objectives.

Notes

[1] AfDB, *Africa economic outlook 2020*, 9.
[2] Sanny and Rocca, '*Updata-ing' the narrative about African migration*.
[3] Machel, "Africa's education crisis must be a top development priority"
[4] McKenna, "South Africa takes steps to assure the quality of its doctorates"
[5] Igbal, "Africa's higher education landscape"
[6] Spaull, "PhD crisis in Uganda's private universities"
[7] Sawyerr, "Challenges facing African universities"
[8] ICEF Monitor, "New study highlights shifting patterns of African student mobility"
[9] Aman and Ireland, "Introduction: Educational alternatives in Latin America", 4.
[10] Shizha and Kariwo, "The new sphere of international student education", 14.
[11] Heleta, "Decolonizing knowledge in South Africa", 52.
[12] Bacchus, "Education and Colonialism", 224.
[13] Azikiwe, "Ethics of Colonial Imperialism", 303.
[14] Austin, "African development and colonial legacies", 11.
[15] Chareix, "Nouvelle Politique D'attractivité Pour L'enseignement Supérieur Français".
[16] Mamdani, "Between the public intellectual and the scholar", 70.
[17] Bunyi, "Rethinking the place of African indigenous languages".
[18] Heleta, "Decolonizing knowledge in South Africa", 50.
[19] Wolff, "Language ideologies and the politics of language", 8,2.
[20] Ouane and Glanz, *Why and how Africa should invest in African languages,* 4.
[21] Tikly, "Globalisation and Education in the Postcolonial World", 158.
[22] Abrahamsen, *Disciplining democracy,* ix.
[23] Nordtveit, "An emerging donor in education and development".
[24] Hodzi, *The End of China's Non-Intervention Policy in Africa*, 78.
[25] Lin, "Long live the victory of people's war".
[26] Alden and Alves, "History and identity in the construction of China's Africa policy", 50.
[27] Jackson, "China's third world foreign policy", 389.
[28] Saunders, "SWAPO's "Eastern" connections", 60.
[29] Omer, *The dynamics of an unfinished African dream*, 177.
[30] Li, "African students in China", 9.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Zhang, "Ethiopian president educated in Beijing".
[33] (Nordtveit, "China's development aid to Africa", 45.
[34] Ibid, 44.
[35] Ibid, 45.
[36] FOCAC, Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan.
[37] Ibid.
[38] FOCAC, Johannesburg Action Plan.
[39] Nakkazi, "China ramps up support for African higher education".
[40] Mulvey, "Foreign students and China's soft power".

[41] Hashim and Yang, "Cultural and gender differences in perceiving stressors", 223.
[42] Burgess, "Conversations with African students in China", 85.
[43] Ibid, 87.
[44] Haugen, "China's recruitment of African university students", 326,
[45] Yuan, "Revisiting China's Africa policies", 664.
[46] Yang and Cheng, "Educational mobility and transnationalisation", 40.
[47] Obamba, "Global: The dragon's deal", 164.
[48] LaFraniere, "China helps the powerful in Namibia".
[49] Tikly, "Globalisation and Education in the Postcolonial World", 164.
[50] Nordtveit, "An emerging donor in education and development", 106.
[51] Ferdjani, *African students in China*, 12.
[52] Haugen, "China's recruitment of African university students", 330.
[53] Peters, "Manifesto for the postcolonial university", 143.
[54] Yu. "Africa in Chinese foreign policy".
[55] Peters, "Manifesto for the postcolonial university", 142-143.
[56] Kuroda, "The new sphere of international student education", 448.

[57] PRC Ministry of Education, 北京大学完善来华留学管理服务 开创留学生教育新局面

[58] Yuan, "Revisiting China's Africa policies", 664.
[59] Wu, "Three dimensions of China's "outward-oriented", 84.
[60] Breeze and Moore, "China tops US and UK as destination".
[61] Yang, "China's soft power projection through higher education", 12.
[62] Sun, "Political party training".
[63] Yuan, "Revisiting China's Africa policies", 659.
[64] Yang, "China's soft power projection in higher education", 24.
[65] Luedi, "Why African students are choosing China over the West".
[66] Nye, *Soft power*, 46.
[67] Yang, "China's soft power projection in higher education", 25.
[68] Hopf, "Common-sense constructivism", 330.
[69] Lo, "Beyond competition ", 263.
[70] Yang, "China's soft power projection through higher education", 11.
[71] Atkinson, "Does soft power matter?" 2.
[72] Bodomo, "Africans in China".
[73] Burgess, "Conversations with African students in China".

Notes on contributor

Obert Hodzi is a Lecturer in Politics at the University of Liverpool, UK. His research focuses on the politics of human rights and development, and non-Western emerging powers in global governance with empirical expertise in China and Africa. He holds a PhD in Political Science from Lingnan University, Hong Kong.

Bibliography

Abrahamsen, R. *Discipling democracy: Development discourse and good governance in Africa*. London: Zed Books, 2000.

AfDB. *Africa economic outlook 2020: Developing Africa's workforce for the future*. Tunis: African Development Bank, 2020.

Alden, C., and A.C. Alves, A.C. "History and identity in the construction of China's Africa policy." *Review of African Political Economy* 35, no. 115 (2008): 43-58.

Aman, R. and Ireland, T. "Introduction: Educational alternatives in Latin America: New modes of counter-hegemonic learning." In *Educational alternatives in Latin America: New modes of counter-hegemonic learning*, edited by Robert Aman and Timothy Ireland, 1-16. Cham: Palgrave MacMillan, 2019.

Atkinson, C. "Does soft power matter? A comparative analysis of student exchange programs 1980–2006." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6, no.1 (2010): 1–22.

Austin, G. "African development and colonial legacies." *International Development Policy | Revue internationale de politique de développement* 1 (2010): 11-32.

Azikiwe, B. "Ethics of Colonial Imperialism." *The Journal of Negro History* 16, no. 3 (1931): 287-308. doi:10.2307/2713923

Bacchus, M. "Education and Colonialism." *The Journal of Educational Thought (JET) / Revue De La Pensée Éducative* 14, no. 3 (1980): 224-226.

Bodomo, A. "Africans in China: The experiences from education and training." Paper presented at the China and Africa Media, Communications and Public Diplomacy conference of Chr. Michelsen Institute, Beijing, September 10-11, 2014.

Breeze, V., and N. Moore. 2017. "China tops US and UK as destination for anglophone African students." *The Conversation,* June 27. https://theconversation.com/china-tops-us-and-uk-as-destination-for-anglophone-african-students-78967

Bunyi, G. "Rethinking the place of African indigenous languages in African education." *International Journal of Educational Development* 19, no. 4-5 (1999): 337-350.

Burgess, L.M. "Conversations with African students in China." *Transition* 119 (2016): 80-91.

Chareix, F. 2019. Nouvelle Politique D'attractivité Pour L'enseignement Supérieur Français Quels Effets Pour Le Continent Africain? Rles Reperes No. 28. https://ressources.campusfrance.org/publications/reperes/fr/reperes_28_fr.pdf

Ferdjani, H. *African students in China: An exploration of increasing numbers and motivations in Beijing*. Stellenbosch: Centre for China Studies, 2012.

FOCAC. 2009. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012). https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/dsjbzjhy/hywj/t626387.htm

FOCAC. 2015. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Johannesburg Action Plan (2016-2018). https://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zywj/t1594297.htm

Hashim, I.H., and Z. Yang. "Cultural and gender differences in perceiving stressors: A cross-cultural investigation of African and Western students in Chinese colleges." *Stress and Health* 19 (2003): 217-225.

Haugen, H.O. "China's recruitment of African university students: Policy efficacy and unintended outcomes." *Globalisation, Societies and Education*, no.3 (2013): 315-334.

He, W. "China's Aid to Africa: Views on Chinese Aid and Trade in Africa." In *Challenging the Aid Paradigm: Western Currents and Asian Alternatives, edited by* J.S. Sörensen, 138-165. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

Heleta, S. Decolonizing knowledge in South Africa: Dismantling the 'pedagogy of big lies'. *Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies*, 40, no.2 (2018):47-65.

Hodzi, O. *The End of China's Non-Intervention Policy in Africa* Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.

Hopf, T. "Common-sense constructivism and hegemony in world politics." *International Organisation* 67, no. 3 (2013): 317-354.

ICEF Monitor. 2016. New study hghlights shifting patterns of African student mobility, 5 December. *ICEF Monitor*. https://monitor.icef.com/2016/12/new-study-highlights-shifting-patterns-african-student-mobility/

Igbal, M. 2019. "Africa's higher education landscape". *QS*, 9 October. https://www.qs.com/africas-higher-education-landscape/

International Commission on Financing Global Education Opportunity. 2016. *The learning generation: Investing in education for a changing world*. New York: The Education Commission. Available at: https://report.educationcommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Learning_Generation_Full_Report.pdf

Jackson, S.F. "China's third world foreign policy: The case of Angola and Mozambique, 1961-93." *The China Quarterly* 142 (1995): 388-422.

Kuroda, C. 2014. The new sphere of international student education in Chinese higher education: A focus on English-medium degree programs. *Journal of Studies in International Education*, 18, no.5: 445-462.

LaFraniere, S. 2009. "China helps the powerful in Namibia." *The New York Times*, November 19. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/20/world/asia/20namibia.html

Li, A. "African students in China: Research, reality, and reflection". *African Studies Quarterly* 17, no. 4: 5-44.

Lin, B. 1965. "Long live the victory of people's war". *Marxists*, September 3. https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/lin-biao/1965/09/peoples_war/index.htm

Lo, W.Y.W. "Beyond competition: a comparative review of conceptual approaches to international student mobility." *Globalisation, Societies and Education* 17, no. 3 (2019): 261-273. doi: 10.1080/14767724.2018.1525283

Luedi, J. 2018. "Why African students are choosing China over the West." *Asia by Africa*, October 15. https://www.asiabyafrica.com/point-a-to-a/african-international-students-study-in-china

Machel, G. 2018. "Africa's education crisis must be a top development priority." *Mail & Guardian*, June 4. https://mg.co.za/article/2018-06-04-how-to-pay-for-africas-education-gains

Mamdani, M. "Between the public intellectual and the scholar: decolonization and some post-independence initiatives in African higher education". *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, 17, no.1 (2016): 68-83. doi: 10.1080/14649373.2016.1140260

McKenna, S. 2019. South Africa takes steps to assure the quality of its doctorates. *The Conversation*, 6 November. https://theconversation.com/south-africa-takes-steps-to-assure-the-quality-of-its-doctorates-125774

Ministry of Education (2015) 北京大学完善来华留学管理服务 开创留学生教育新局面 [Peking University improves the management service for international students in China and creates a new situation for the education of international students]. Ministry of Education Report, February 11, http://old.moe.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/s134/201502/183957.html, accessed 10 September 2019.

Mulvey, B. 2020. Foreign students and China's soft power: The case of Uganda. *The Diplomat*, 10 January. https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/foreign-students-and-chinas-soft-power-the-case-of-uganda/

Nakkazi, E. 2018. China ramps up support for African higher education. *University World News*, September 7. https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20180907083412817

Nordtveit, B.H. "China's development aid to Africa: The case of education." In *Comparative Education Bulletin No. 9*, edited by Mark Mason and Kokila Katyal, 43-52. Hong Kong: CESHK, 2006.

Nordtveit, B.H. "An emerging donor in education and development: A case study of China in Cameroon." *International Journal of Educational Development* 31 (2011): 99-108.

Nye, J.S. *Soft power: The means to success in world politics*, New York, US: Public Affairs, 2004.

Obamba, M.O. "Global: The dragon's deal: Sino-African cooperation in education." In *Understanding Higher Education Internationalization: Insights from Key Global Publications*, edited by G. Mihut, P.G. Altbach and H. de Wit, 163-166. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2017.

Omer, M.K. *The dynamics of an unfinished African dream – Eritrea: Ancient history to 1968*. Morrisville: Lulu Press, 2020.

Peters, M.A. "Manifesto for the postcolonial university." *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 51, no.2 (2019): 142-148.

Sanny, J.A., and C. Rocca. '*Updata-ing' the narrative about African migration*. Afrobarometer and Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019. https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Publications%20conjointes/partenaires/afrobarometer-moibrahim-updata-ing-the-narrative-about-african-migration.pdf

Saunders, C. "SWAPO's "Eastern" connections, 1966-1989." In *Southern African liberation movements and the global Cold War 'East': Transnational activism 1960-1990*, edited by L. Dallywater, C. Saunders and H.A. Fonseca, 57-76. Oldenbourg: De Gruyter, 2019.

Sawyer, A. "Challenges facing African universities: Selected issues." *African Studies Review*, 47, 1 (2004): 1-59.

Shizha, E., and M.T. Kariwo. *Education and development in Zimbabwe: A social, political and economic analysis*. Leiden: Sense Publishers, 2011.

Spaull, J. 2015. "PhD crisis in Uganda's private universities." *SciDev*, 5 February. https://www.scidev.net/global/education/feature/phd-crisis-uganda-private-universities.html?

Sun, Y. 2016. "Political party training: China's ideological push in Africa?" *Brooking Institution*, July 5. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2016/07/05/political-party-training-chinas-ideological-push-in-africa/

Tikly, L. "Globalisation and Education in the Postcolonial World: Towards a conceptual framework." *Comparative Education* 37, no. 2 (2001): 151-171. doi: 10.1080/03050060124481

UNESCO.2019. Education in Africa. http://uis.unesco.org/en/topic/education-africa

Ouane, A and Glanz, C. *Why and how Africa should invest in African languages and multilingual education: An evidence- and practice-based policy advocacy brief*. Hamburg: UNESCO, 2010.

Wolff, H.E. "Language ideologies and the politics of language in postcolonial Africa. " *Stellenbosch Papers in Linguistics Plus* 51 (2017): 1-22. doi: 10.5842/51-0-701

Wu, H. "Three dimensions of China's "outward-oriented" higher education internationalisation." *Higher Education* 77 (2018): 81-96.

Yang, P., and Y. Cheng. "Educational mobility and transnationalisation." In *Higher education in the era of the fourth industrial revolution*, edited by Nancy W. Gleason, 39-64. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.

Yang, R. "China's soft power projection in higher education." *International Higher Education*, no. 46 (2015): 24-25. doi: 10.6017/ihe.2007.46.7938

Yang, R. "China's soft power projection through higher education: A preliminary assessment." In *The rise of China-U.S. international cooperation in higher education: Views from the field,* edited by Christopher J. Johnstone and Li Li Ji, 3-22. Leiden: Brill, 2018.

Yu, G.T. "Africa in Chinese foreign policy." *Asian Survey* 28, no.8 (1988): 849-862.

Yuan, T. "Revisiting China's Africa policies and educational promises: towards a global convergence of development in the post-2015 era?" *Globalisation, Societies and Education* 17, no. 5 (2019): 658-673. doi: 10.1080/14767724.2019.1595534

Zhang, J. 2013. "Ethiopian president educated in Beijing." *This is Beijing,* October 24. http://beijing.china.org.cn/2013-10/24/content_30387833.htm