Why Externalist Representationalism is a Form of Disjunctivism Laura Gow

ABSTRACT

Externalist representationalism is touted as a superior rival to naïve realism, and yet a careful analysis of the externalist representationalist's analysis of our ordinary perceptual experiences shows the view to be far closer to naïve realism than we might have expected. One of the central advertised benefits of representationalist views in general is that they are compatible with the idea that ordinary, illusory and hallucinatory perceptual experiences are of the same fundamental kind. Naïve realists are forced to deny the 'common fundamental kind claim' and adopt disjunctivism. However, I argue that externalist representationalism is also a version of disjunctivism. Consequently, one of the main rivals to naïve realism turns out not to be a rival at all.

Perception, Perceptual Experience, Representationalism, Disjunctivism, Naïve Realism

1. INTRODUCTION

Naïve realists hold that perceptual experience involves an essential relation between the perceiver and the physical objects in their environment. (Brewer, 2006; Campbell, 2002a) For naïve realists, the phenomenal character of our perceptual experiences is constituted by our standing in such a relation to these objects.¹ Since hallucinations do not involve essential relations between the perceiver and the physical objects in their environment, these experiences do not qualify as perceptual experiences. In other words, naïve realists endorse disjunctivism, which is the view that ordinary perceptual experiences, illusions and hallucinations do not form a common fundamental kind.

For representationalists, the distinctive feature of perceptual experience is its capacity to represent the local environment of the perceiving subject. The phenomenal character of our perceptual experiences is grounded in (or constituted by, or identical to) their representational

¹ Naïve realists allow that other factors may play a role in determining phenomenal character. Brewer, 2011; Campbell, 2011a; Logue, 2012; Martin, 1998; Soteriou 2013.

content.² Representationalism developed as an alternative to naïve realism, with the ambition of giving a unified account of ordinary perceptual experiences, illusions and hallucinations. Representationalists claim that the possibility of hallucinations which are subjectively indistinguishable from ordinary perceptual experiences is best explained by upholding the common fundamental kind claim.³ They hold that ordinary perceptual experiences, illusions and hallucinations and hallucinations all have representational content, and if the representational content is the same, then the phenomenal character of the experiences will also be the same. This brief characterisation of representationalism applies to both the internalist and externalist versions of the view. For internalists, our capacity for having representationalists, subjects must bear certain historical or functional relations to their environment (for example, causal covariation, teleofunctional or tracking relations) in order to be capable of undergoing representational states. (Dretske, 1995, 2000; Tye, 1995, 2000, 2015a. Also see Millikan, 1984; Papineau, 1984.)

At first pass, naïve realism and externalist representationalism seem to be very different views; indeed, a large part of the literature on perceptual experience is taken up with the debate over which of these two rival theories is correct. (See, for example, Brewer, 2006; Campbell, 2002a; Martin, 2002.) However, in section two I will argue that a closer look at the externalist representationalist's analysis of the metaphysics of ordinary perceptual experiences reveals a view which is very similar indeed to naïve realism. This is significant in itself, since externalist representationalism is one of the main rivals to naïve realism, yet it has an even more significant consequence: it turns out that externalist representationalists cannot uphold the claim that perceptual experiences, illusions and hallucinations form a common fundamental kind. Despite its insistence to the contrary, externalist representationalism is a form of disjunctivism. This will be the subject of section three. In section four I conclude that externalist representationalism cannot

 $^{^{2}}$ The precise nature of the relationship between phenomenal character and representational content does not bear on the point I wish to make in this paper.

³ I will remain neutral regarding whether common fundamental kind views are to be preferred to disjunctivist views. What is important for my aim in this paper, is that *externalist representationalists* claim that their view is to be preferred to naïve realism because it avoids disjunctivism, and *they* believe that disjunctivist views fail to respond satisfactorily to the hallucination issue. If I can show that externalist representationalism is itself a version of disjunctivism, then their claimed superiority over naïve realist disjunctivism is significantly undermined.

be thought of as an interesting rival to naïve realist disjunctivism, and I explain the implications of this conclusion.

2. EXTERNALIST REPRESENTATIONALISM AND ORDINARY PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE

Externalist representationalists claim that the representational content of our perceptual experiences is fixed by *the properties represented by the experience*, which is ambiguous between two very different readings. The italicized phrase admits of an ontologically non-committal reading, according to which representing a property does not consist in standing in a two-place relation to that property (one can represent a property in this sense even if it turns out that the property does not exist). Tim Crane has pointed out that the appeal of representationalism in general comes from its allowing a sense in which we can represent objects and properties without being committed to the existence of those objects and properties. (Crane, 2006)

As we will see in the following section, one of the main problems surrounding perceptual experience is the fact that we can have hallucinations that seem to involve essential relations to objects and properties in our environment when there are no (relevant) objects and properties present. The benefit of representationalism is that it can acknowledge that all perceptual experiences *seem* to be essentially relational without claiming that they actually are, thus avoiding the need to posit non-physical relata. What is more, disambiguating the phrase 'the properties represented by the experience' in the ontologically non-committal way explains why it is that our perceptual experiences have correctness conditions. The representational content of our perceptual experiences involves a claim (perhaps in the form of a proposition) about the way the world is that may or may not be correct. It is because the representational content is not constitutively world-dependent that it is able, not only to 'say' things which get the world 'right', but also to say things that get the world 'wrong'.

On the alternative reading, the phrase 'the properties represented by the experience' commits its user to the existence of the properties in question.⁴ It is clear from the way externalist

⁴ Brad Thompson (2008) points out a related equivocation between what he calls 'content representationalism' and 'vehicle representationalism'. Content representationalists will disambiguate the phrase 'the property represented by the experience' in the second, ontologically committing way, whereas vehicle representationalists will disambiguate the problematic phrase in the first, non-ontologically committing way. Thompson accuses representationalists of switching between these two ways of understanding representationalism, emphasising the content reading to avoid the 'veil of perception'

representationalists interpret and use the claim that perceptual experience is 'transparent' that they understand the phrase in the second sense. Externalist representationalists appeal to the transparency of perceptual experience in their long-standing debate with qualia theorists, who argue that we cannot successfully account for the phenomenal character of our experiences without recourse to non-representational phenomenal properties or 'qualia'. (See Block, 1996, 2010; Boghossian & Velleman, 1997/1989; Kind, 2003.) The function of the transparency claim, as it is used by externalist representationalists, is to show that the representational content (and phenomenal character) of each token perceptual experience is constitutively determined by the property which is represented by that experience – the actual property instantiated in the world.

[T]he key transparency claims are as follows: in a case of normal perception, if we introspect:

(1) We are not aware of features of our visual experience.

(2) We are not aware of the visual experience itself.

(3) We cannot attend to features of the visual experience.

(4) The only features of which we are aware and to which we can attend are external features (colors and shapes of surfaces, for example) (Tye, 2014, p40)

[W]e normally "see right through" perceptual states to external objects. (Lycan, 1996, p117)

I experienced blue as a property of the ocean not as a property of my experience... It was the color, blue, not anything else that was immediately accessible to my consciousness and that I found so pleasing. (Tye, 2002, p448)

When we introspect, we are aware of the external things and their properties but not of any internal experiences, nor any properties of those experiences, nor any related properties of ourselves.... the phenomenal character of my experience, what it (the experience) is like, how it feels, is a matter of the properties my experience represents. So, phenomenal character is out there in the world. (Tye, 2015b, p484)

problem, and emphasising the vehicle reading to substantiate the claim that ordinary and hallucinatory experiences form a common kind.

These quotations commit the externalist representationalist to a very specific, and rather surprising account of the metaphysics of ordinary perceptual experiences: phenomenal character is ultimately constitutively dependent upon essential relations to externally located, instantiated properties. Two (interrelated) worries arise: first, it is difficult to establish the sense in which perceptual experiences are *representational* on this framework, and second, externalist representationalism does not seem to be significantly different from naïve realism.

If the properties represented by the experience are simply the properties out there in the world, then the *representational* aspect of perceptual experience seems to have been analysed away. There must be something more to the representational content of a perceptual experience than simply externally located properties for us to be able to assess our experiences for accuracy or veridicality, but the externalist representationalist's transparency claim seems to leave no room for anything but the externally located properties. It is significant that naïve realists also hold that the phenomenal character of our perceptual experiences is constitutively determined by the perceiver's standing in a two-place awareness relation to entities in her environment, yet they *deny* that perceptual experiences are representational.⁵

The externalist representationalist could respond by claiming that being aware of the properties instantiated in one's environment *just is* to represent those properties. In which case the view would differ from naïve realism over whether awareness is sufficient for (or the same thing as) representation – externalist representationalists holding that it is, and naïve realists holding that it is not. However, this response would only be successful if it was coupled with a good explanation of why we should think that awareness is sufficient for, or the same thing as, representation. As things stand, these two views would seem to agree that metaphysically speaking, the phenomenal character of our perceptual experiences is ultimately constituted by awareness relations to one's local environment; it seems to be a simple awareness relation doing all the work.

It is clear that externalist representationalists and naïve realists give very similar accounts of ordinary perceptual experiences, however, there is one respect in which the views do seem to

⁵ It is not altogether clear that naïve realists must deny that perceptual experiences have representational content. While it is true that most naïve realists (eg. Campbell, 2002a; Brewer, 2006; and Travis, 2004) deny that perceptual experiences are representational, it has recently been argued that this need not be an essential feature of naïve realism. (See Schellenberg, 2011a and Nanay, 2014. Also see McDowell, 2013 who holds a view according to which perceptual experiences are relational and representational.)

differ. For the most part, naïve realists emphasise the fact that the subject is aware of an *object*, whereas, for the externalist representationalist, the subject is aware of *properties*. (Naïve realists typically lay such importance on objects because they think that this explains our ability to have demonstrative thoughts about the things we perceive. See in particular Campbell, 2002a, 2002b, 2011b.) In fact, I am not sure whether there really is a difference here. In the first place, it is worth pointing out that since an awareness of objects necessarily involves an awareness of their properties (we are aware of objects by being aware of their colours, shapes and locations, for example), naïve realists must hold that we are aware of propertied objects rather than 'bare particulars'. Similarly, it is clear from the externalist representationalist's particular way of understanding the idea that perceptual experience is transparent that, in fact, they hold that the phenomenal character of token ordinary perceptual experiences is constitutively determined by the properties which are instantiated by the objects in the perceiver's local environment. Externalist representationalism was devised in order to provide a thoroughly naturalistic account of representation (which could solve the 'hard problem' of consciousness by grounding phenomenal character in representation). Since the analyses of representation offered by externalist representationalists depend on relations like causal covariation or tracking, the properties involved in these relations will have to be concrete, spatiotemporal, instantiated properties. Again, the externalist representationalist's view turns out to be closer to naïve realism than we might have expected.

It seems to me that in their haste to dismiss the idea that perceptual experiences require non-representational qualia, externalist representationalists have embraced a type of transparency claim which commits them to an unnecessarily strong form of externalism. This is unfortunate since it is avoidable; it is possible to appeal to the idea of transparency in defence of representationalism without locating phenomenal character in the world. In previous work (Gow 2016) I have argued that there are two very different ways of understanding transparency which are standardly conflated. Perceptual experiences are (what I call) 'phenomenologically transparent' if they *seem* only to involve externally located objects and properties, and they are 'metaphysically transparent' if they *in fact* only involve externally located objects and properties. It is clear from the quotations above that externalist representationalists understand transparency in the latter sense, and consequently, their view slides dangerously close to naïve realism. However, one can dispute the qualia theorist's claim that some features of perceptual experience

are non-representational simply by arguing that perceptual experience is *phenomenologically* transparent – it only involves properties which *seem* to be externally located.

In this section I have described the externalist representationalist's account of token ordinary perceptual experiences and explained how their interpretation of the idea that perceptual experiences are transparent raises two difficulties with the view. First, it is unclear why ordinary perceptual experiences qualify as representational states on the picture that has emerged, and second (and relatedly), it is unclear whether externalist representationalism is really significantly different from naïve realism. In the next section I will argue that the similarity between externalist representationalism and naïve realism has an important consequence: like naïve realism, externalist representationalism.

3. EXTERNALIST REPRESENTATIONALISM AND DISJUNCTIVISM

Before I explain why externalist representationalism should be regarded as a disjunctivist view, it will be helpful to consider briefly those accounts of perceptual experience which are *not* disjunctivist.⁶ First we have the sense-data theory, which (in its standard formulation) analyses all perceptual experiences as being relations to mind-dependent sense-data. (Russell, 1912; Price, 1950; Robinson, 1994; Jackson, 1977) In ordinary perceptual experiences we are indirectly related to the mind-independent world by being directly related to sense-data. This view tends to be rejected for having an inflated and decidedly non-physicalist ontology.

Adverbialism is another 'common fundamental kind' view. (Kriegel, 2007; Chisholm, 1957) On this account, perceptual experiences are to be analysed as subjects experiencing in certain ways rather than as involving a two-place relation to objects – so seeing a red round thing becomes 'seeing-redly and roundly'. This view has been criticised for failing to account even for the apparent relationality of perceptual experience (Crane, 2006), and for being unable to distinguish between certain experiences – for example, an experience of a red square and a green circle on the one hand and an experience of a red circle and a green square on the other. It seems the adverbialist must give the same analysis of both: seeing redly and squarely and greenly and roundly. (Jackson, 1977)

Lastly, an internalist version of representationalism according to which the content of a perceiver's experience is determined by their internal features is also non-disjunctivist. (Crane,

⁶ I would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that this would be helpful.

2013) The content of an ordinary perceptual experience and a hallucination will be the same if the subject's internal state is the same in both situations. Of course, the cause of the experiences will be different, but the internalist will not permit the cause of an experience to enter into the identity conditions of that experience.⁷

It should be noted that all three non-disjunctivist positions are internalist views and have been criticised for putting us in a sceptical position with respect to the mind-independent world. It is here that externalist representationalists have claimed a significant advantage. Because externalist representationalism emphasizes the historical relations perceivers have with their environment (such as evolution by natural selection) it claims to be a common fundamental kind theory without the epistemological drawbacks.⁸ However, in the remainder of this section I will argue that externalist representationalism cannot uphold the common fundamental kind claim. If this is right, then the whole structure of the perception debate has shifted – we will have internalist common fundamental kind theories with their arguably sceptical consequences on the one hand, and disjunctivist views on the other.

We saw in the previous section that both the naïve realist and the externalist representationalist analyse ordinary perceptual experience as consisting in an essential relation to externally located objects, or properties instantiated by objects in the local environment (which I have suggested comes to pretty much the same thing). But of course, in the hallucinatory case there are no relevant objects or instantiated properties present in the subject's environment. Since naïve realists simply define perceptual experience as being object-involving, hallucinations fail to qualify as genuinely *perceptual* experiences. Externalist representationalists on the other hand, claim to be able to uphold the common fundamental kind principle. Their claim is based on their official analysis of all perceptual experiences: perceptual experiences are representational states which can have the same representational content whether they are ordinary perceptual experiences or hallucinations. However, in this section I will argue that this claim is only superficially true.

⁷ There are variants of these views which I have not gone into here since it would take me too far away from my main concern, which is that externalist representationalism does not qualify as a common fundamental kind view.

⁸ It is outside the scope of this paper to comment on whether internalist views really do have undesirable sceptical consequences, and whether externalist views really have an advantage here.

Since there are no relevantly instantiated properties for the perceiving subject to be aware of during a hallucinatory experience, and so no instantiated properties are 'immediately accessible to consciousness', one option that is open to the externalist representationalist is to claim that the subject is aware of *uninstantiated* properties, or universals. This move is now quite popular and is endorsed by many philosophers (and not just externalist representationalists). (Bealer, 1982; Bengson *et al.*, 2011; Dretske, 2000; Forrest, 2005; Johnston, 2004; McGinn, 1999; Pautz, 2007; Sosa, 2007; Tye, 2014a.) Here is Dretske's account:

Hallucinations are experiences in which one is aware of properties (shapes, colors, movements, etc.) without being o-conscious [object-conscious] of objects having these properties.... Hallucinating about pumpkins is not to be understood as an awareness of orange pumpkin-shaped objects. It is rather to be understood as p-awareness [property-awareness] of the kind of properties that o-awareness of pumpkins is usually accompanied by....Awareness (ie. p-awareness) of properties without awareness (o-awareness) of objects having these properties may still strike some readers as bizarre. Can we really be aware of (uninstantiated) universals? Yes, we can, and, yes, we sometimes are. (Dretske, 2000, p163)

And Tye says:

[Y]ou cannot attend to what is not there. But on my view there is an un-instantiated quality there in the bad cases... an un-instantiated quality is present in hallucination. (Tye, 2014b, p51)

Let us consider the metaphysical picture we are being offered here. Recall that the phenomenal character of an ordinary perceptual experience is constitutively determined by the properties out there in the world – the blueness of the ocean, for example. According to the uninstantiated property view of hallucination, if Tye's blue ocean experience had been hallucinatory, then he would have been aware, not of the blueness of the ocean – an instantiated property – but of the universal 'blue'. Now, there are two main ways of understanding universals. One can agree with Aristotle that universals must be instantiated. This option is metaphysically modest; universals are nothing over and above their physical instantiations. The alternative is to agree with Plato that

universals exist independently of their instantiations, and are abstract (that is, non-spatiotemporal) entities. A commitment to 'Plato's Heaven' is an unlikely component of a physicalist view, and yet it is clear that the externalist representationalist has this latter understanding of universals in mind.

To begin with, on the Aristotelian framework, any relation a subject has with a universal has to be a relation to an instantiated universal (this is for the simple reason that there are no uninstantiated universals). For the externalist representationalist to qualify as an Aristotelian about universals, they would have to say that hallucinations are relations to universals that are instantiated, but need not be instantiated locally. That is, the universal needs to be instantiated somewhere, but the perceiver can be aware of the instantiated universal even if it is not instantiated in their immediate environment. This is problematic because the relation appealed to is one of awareness. While it may be possible to *think* about instantiated red (say) when red is not locally instantiated, it is difficult to understand the idea that one can be *aware* of instantiated red when it is not locally instantiated.

Another reason why externalist representationalists must endorse a Platonic conception of universals is that it is possible to have hallucinatory experiences of properties that are not instantiated anywhere. Brad Thompson makes this point by describing a situation where every red thing in the world has been painted another colour. Even though there would no longer be any actual instantiations of red, it would still be possible for a subject to hallucinate red. (Thompson, 2008) Let me add another, less far-fetched example. In his 2007, Paul Churchland describes (and indeed provides) a method by which we can experience 'impossible colours'. By staring at a yellow circle on a grey background and then looking at a maximally black stimulus one will experience an impossibly dark blue. The experienced blue will be as dark as the maximally black stimulus, which is impossible for any objective blue. (See Churchland, 2007 for other examples.) If these experiences consist in the subject being aware of uninstantiated universals, then the universals in question must be of the Platonic variety.

This has a significance beyond general metaphysical concerns. By subscribing to a Platonic conception of universals, the externalist representationalist is left with a disjunctivist account of perceptual experience. Although ordinary perceptual experiences and hallucinations seem to have the same structure (they both have a representational content which grounds their phenomenal character), it turns out that the similarity is merely superficial. On the one hand we have an

experience whose representational content (and phenomenal character) depends essentially on instantiated, physical properties; and on the other we have an experience whose representational content (and phenomenal character) depends essentially on abstract objects which exist outside the concrete, spatiotemporal realm. These are very different kinds of states.

Perhaps the externalist representationalist will be tempted to revise their account of ordinary perceptual experiences, and say that they too are constituted by relations to abstract universals.⁹ That is, all perceptual experiences constitutively depend on relations to abstracta. It is important to note that this would require an extensive *revision* to their account of ordinary perceptual experience. I explained in section two the reasons for ascribing the view that ordinary perceptual experiences are relations to concrete, spatiotemporal, instantiated properties to externalist representationalism; it would certainly be very strange for a naturalistic programme to *start out* by positing essential relations to non-physical, non-natural abstracta.

What is more, this response would constitute a rather extreme form of Platonic Realism. As I understand this view, abstract universals are entities which exist over and above their concrete, spatiotemporal instantiations. They play an explanatory role (they explain the similarity relations between property instantiations, for example) but they are not what we are perceptually aware of when we are perceptually aware of property instantiations. Even Russell, who thought that we could be acquainted with abstract universals, did not think that we could be *perceptually* aware of them. (See Russell, 1912, Chapter X.) When we are perceptually aware of red (say) in our everyday experiences, we are perceptually aware of concrete instances of red in the spatiotemporal realm, and these instances of red are themselves (somehow) related to the abstract universal red (they 'exemplify' red). The externalist representationalist is already pushing the boundaries of Platonic Realism by saying that in hallucinations we can be aware of the abstract universals themselves, but I think it would be going *too* far for the Platonic Realist to say that we are *always* aware (indeed, *perceptually* aware) of the abstract universals themselves.

As an alternative to the uninstantiated property view, the externalist representationalist could take up the idea that hallucinations have gappy contents.¹⁰ (See Schellenberg, 2011a, 2011b,

⁹ I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this interesting suggestion.

¹⁰ There are different ways of explicating this idea of content – an ordered pair with a gap as one of the constituents, identifying the gap with the empty set, employing concepts where some of the concepts are empty. My criticism applies across the board; it is independent of any particular way of analysing the gap.

and Tye, 2007, 2009. Tye has now abandoned this position 2014a). Tye offers the following way of understanding gappy content:

Perhaps we should think of the content of a visual experience as being like a mailbox. In the veridical and illusory cases, there is a structure (the mailbox) containing an object the letter placed in the slot). In the hallucinatory case, there is the same structure but no object (letter in the slot). (Tye, 2014a, p6)¹¹

The key claim of the gappy content view is that veridical and hallucinatory experiences have the same structure; it is just that in the ordinary case the content 'slot' ultimately gets filled by an object instantiating various properties, whereas in the hallucinatory case the content slot remains empty. Now, it is true that these states can be *described* in the same way; they are all representational states with a 'slot' which can contain objects and their properties. Yet, *metaphysically speaking*, hallucinations and ordinary perceptual experiences would seem to be very different.¹²

It is difficult to unpack the metaphor of the mailbox and work out what exactly the structure is (which in one case contains objects and properties and in the other contains nothing). We saw in section two that the externalist representationalist's transparency-driven analysis of ordinary perceptual experience only seems to leave room for properties instantiated by objects in the local environment. But even if we allow that there is something in common between ordinary and hallucinatory experiences in virtue of their having the same structure, the difference between a structure containing objects and properties and a structure containing nothing at all still seems to

¹¹ Note, this version of externalist representationalism specifically allows objects as well as properties into the content of the perceptual experience. As such, it is more obviously similar to naïve realism than the standard view (according to which it is properties rather than objects which are essential to phenomenal character).

¹² Ordinarily, disjunctivism is defined as the view that ordinary and hallucinatory perceptual experiences are fundamentally different kinds of state. (Martin, 2004, 2006; Johnston, 2004; McDowell, 1982) This is the way I understand disjunctivism in this paper. However, I should point out that Schellenberg (along with Hinton, 1973; Campbell, 2002b) defines disjunctivism as the view that ordinary and hallucinatory perceptual experiences share no common element at all. Since, on her view, the phenomenal character of ordinary and hallucinatory experiences involves the subject's employing the same conceptual or analogous non-conceptual structures (Schellenberg, 2011b) her view does not qualify as disjunctivist according to her own criteria.

be considerable enough to make ordinary perceptual experiences and hallucinatory experiences count as fundamentally different kinds of state on this proposal.¹³

Perhaps the proponent of the gappy content view will attempt to reify the gap and claim that the subject stands in a relation to the empty set (say) in the hallucinatory case. Of course, this will not release them from a commitment to disjunctivism. It simply means that their account is disjunctivist for the same reason that the uninstantiated property version of externalist representationalism is disjunctivist. Namely, that in ordinary perceptual experiences the subject is (essentially) related to something concrete (instantiated properties) and in hallucinatory cases the subject is (essentially) related to an abstract entity (the empty set).

4. CONCLUSION

I have argued that a careful analysis of the externalist representationalist's account of the metaphysics of ordinary perceptual experiences reveals a view which is extremely similar to naïve realism. This has some important consequences: first, it makes it difficult to see how we can think of perceptual experiences as being representational states at all. The 'representational' nature of content seems to disappear if content is simply a matter of being aware of properties instantiated by objects in the local environment. Second, when we compare the externalist representationalist's account of ordinary perceptual experiences with their account of hallucination, we find that they are unable to preserve the common fundamental kind principle. Neither the uninstantiated property view of hallucination, nor the gappy content proposal enable the externalist representationalist to justify their claim to be able to offer the same analysis of all kinds of perceptual experience. And so, like naïve realism, externalist representationalism turns out to be a version of disjunctivism. This is a significant finding; externalist representationalism can be regarded as the original representationalist position, and it is still a popular and widely-held view. However, its popularity rests on its ability to provide a unified account of all perceptual experiences – it is the obvious view for anyone who wants to avoid disjunctivism without encountering the epistemological objections to other common fundamental kind theories. Now that externalist representationalism has been revealed to be a disjunctivist view itself, we have lost the only non-internalist common fundamental kind view, and naïve realist disjunctivism has lost a rival.

¹³ I should point out that Tye accepted that his own gappy content view was disjunctivist, and so embraced disjunctivism for the time he held the view. (Tye, 2007)

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