Trust-repair strategies in crisis rhetorical (sub-)arenas: an argumentative perspective.

This paper extends the rhetorical arena approach to crisis communication with an argumentative perspective. A rhetorical activity in which reasons are communicated to justify and obtain acceptance for a claim, argumentation plays a crucial role in (re)legitimising corporate trustworthiness following a crisis episode. Arguments supporting or rejecting trust claims do not only pervade the corporate crisis response message (e.g. an apology), but also the public reactions in the rhetorical arena, i.e. the multivocal conversational space that opens up in a crisis context. Therefore, rhetorical arena crisis communication takes the form of an *argumentative polylogue* in which corporate trustworthiness features as the main issue. We develop a method for the analysis of trust-related polylogues occurring in rhetorical (sub-)arenas. Unlike existing methods, like tone analysis of online comments, our approach enables to examine, more specifically, the reasons organisations and stakeholders present for or against trust. This, in turn, provides an enhanced method to assess the effectiveness of a crisis response strategy. In order to illustrate our approach, we elaborate a case study based on an apologetic article published by Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg and a sample of public reactions appearing on media articles and on subsequent online discussion websites.

Introduction

In recent years, the study of crisis communication has experienced a multivocal turn. Rather than focusing on what organisations do say or should say when responding to a crisis situation, some scholars have examined also how publics react to a crisis response strategy (Coombs & Holladay 2014; Crijns, Cauberghe, Hudders, & Claeys, 2017; Johansen, Johansen and Weckesser 2016; Zhang, Marita, Veijalainen, Wang, & Kotkov, 2016). This research stream emerged as a natural response to the increasingly online and digitised environment in which strategic communication occurs, which has created unprecedented communicative affordances for organisational publics to intervene and to gain attention and listening. A very significant theoretical contribution in this regard is Frandsen and Johansen's concept of *Rhetorical Arena* (Frandsen & Johansen, 2017), which refers to "the social space that opens up

when a crisis breaks out" (p. 143). As they further explain, this notion entails two metaphors - voice and arena - to suggest the idea that (a) a crisis event features a dispute regarding the way a crisis should be interpreted and handled with; (b) this dispute involves numerous voices reflecting the diversity of stakeholders (or publics) who communicatively interact as message senders and/or receivers. The Rhetorical Arena Theory (or RAT) has been further developed by Coombs and Holladay who suggest that "the rhetorical arena is actually composed of a number of sub-arenas where people discuss the crisis. Sub-arenas consist of "spaces" where crisis publics may express and hear ideas about the crisis" (Coombs & Holladay, 2014: 41). Rhetorical sub-arenas are typically digital spaces where a specific segment of publics (e.g. the fans of a sport athlete) discuss a crisis event, including the trust issues entailed by it. For instance, in Starbucks's 2018 racial bias crisis (Czarnecki, 2018), the online reddit of Starbucks' employees constituted a rhetorical sub-arena (see Kandil, 2019).

Existing multivocal studies in crisis communication have focused their analysis on the themes and tones characterising stakeholders' reactions. They do not examine, instead, the *reasons* given by publics to support their claim on the crisis event and on the corporate response to it. In other words, there is scarce, if any, acknowledgement of the presence of argumentation in crisis-related discourse. As a matter of fact, argumentation is an under-recognised and under-investigated feature in crisis communication research at large (see Palmieri, 2009; Palmieri & Aakhus, 2015). The vast repertoire of crisis response strategies, such as denial, apology, mortification, transcendence, etc. (Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 1995) are generally not considered in their argumentative dimension. Yet, a closer inspection into the discursive content and structure of crisis responses would clearly reveal that argumentation is much more pervasive than what current research would suggest. Corporate leaders do make use of argumentation to justify their self-defensive claims about the crisis and thus persuade publics to (re)trust the organisation. Similarly, stakeholders react by critically discussing the organisation's trust-repair arguments, i.e. by supporting, replicating, questioning, or refuting these argumentative

moves. In a way, the rhetorical arena opened by a crisis event could be more specifically referred to as an *argumentative arena*, where competing voices express *reasons* for or against crisis-related issues (e.g. is the company to be held responsible? Are the proposed measures credible? Should the CEO be dismissed?).

Therefore, an argumentative perspective to crisis communication puts the emphasis on (i) the reasons organisations communicate in order to persuasively justify a trust-related standpoint; (ii) how these reasons are received and discussed by publics; and (iii) the reasons publics advance to defend their own supportive or attacking claims.

In this paper, we propose and showcase a systematic method for the analysis of trust-related argumentative multivocal discussions - or polylogues (Lewinski & Aakhus, 2014, 2017) - occurring in rhetorical (sub)arenas. We achieve this through an *argumentative macroscope* (Musi & Aakhus, 2017) of the trust-related public discussion which allows us to detect the trust-supporting arguments advanced by companies and to determine whether stakeholders judge these arguments as (non)relevant, (un)acceptable or (in)sufficient to justify trust. To illustrate our method, we elaborate a case study related to Facebook, including an apologetic statement made by CEO Mark Zuckerberg in early 2019 and a sample of reactions on media and online discussion fora[1].

The paper is organised as follows: in the next section, we construct the theoretical framework by integrating significant works in crisis communication and argumentation studies respectively. Subsequently we explain our method and present the analysis of the case study. We conclude by discussing the relevance of our approach for crisis communication theory and practice.

[1] A preliminary version of our analysis has been presented in a conference paper (see Palmieri & Musi, 2019). This paper develops a more systematic account of how our theoretical and methodological approach contributed to the broader field of crisis communication and, more in particular, to its multi-vocal perspective.

Theoretical framework

The rhetorical approach to crisis communication

As Millar & Heath point out, "a rhetorical approach to crisis explicitly acknowledges that the responsibility for the crisis, its magnitude, and its duration are *contestable*" (2004:5, our italic). This means that a crisis constitutes a fertile ground for arguments to grow on since crisis communicators attempt to influence people's *perceptions* about the crisis by justifying or refuting *interpretations* of the crisis event.

While management approaches to crisis communication concentrate on the strategic selection of crisis responses against their contextual appropriateness - see Coombs's *Situational Crisis Communication Theory* (Coombs & Holladay, 1996; Coombs, 1998, 1999; Massey, 2001; Dean, 2004; Huang, Lin, & Su, 2005), the rhetorical approach focuses on the content and form of a crisis response message (see Frandsen & Johansen 2017: chapters 5-6). Ware & Linkugel (1973)'s seminal paper on self-defence speech prompted the study of *corporate apologia* as a typical genre of crisis response communication (Heath ed., 2001; Marsh, 2006; Coombs, Frandsen, Holladay, & Johansen, 2010). Numerous case studies have examined the actual uses of apologia as well as other measures designed to repair images (e.g. denial, excuses, bolstering, transcendence) in public interventions of renowned corporations, politicians, or sporting athletes who have experienced a crisis (see, in particular, Ice, 1991; Benoit, 1995, 2013, 2014; Brazeal, 2008). Some of these cases have been analysed by argumentation scholars too (Tindale, 1999; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999; Jacobs, 2011), without however an explicit concern for the understanding of crisis discourse.

More recently, especially in response to the increasingly digitised and multi-vocal context of crisis communication, the effectiveness of an image repair effort has been assessed by detecting the tone (positive/negative) of stakeholder reactive messages posted on various kinds of social media channels (Choi & Lin, 2009; Coombs & Holladay, 2012, 2014; Niedermeir, 2012). This research stream addresses crisis communication in the framework of

Frandsen & Johansen's *Rhetorical Arena Theory* defined above. This theory has been further developed in particular by Coombs & Holladay who introduced the notion of rhetorical sub-arena (Coombs & Holladay, 2014) to refer to the specific social venues in which specific segments of publics discuss the crisis response, for example blogs, news readers' comments, and similar user-generated contents.

Trust repair as trustworthiness restoration

If communication scholars normally adopt the notions of image and reputation when referring to the central issue at stake in a crisis, management scholars conceptualise organisational crisis as a problem of trust(worthiness). However, the precise difference between image/reputation and trust is rarely tackled (Ingenhoff & Sommer, 2010). A few contributions do make an explicit link between the two concepts and suggest, that image is a factor favouring trust (Flavian, Guinaliu, & Torres, 2005; Xie & Peng, 2009) or that image and trustworthiness work together in building reputation which in turn builds trust (Thiessen & Ingenhoff, 2011). Even though the concepts of trust and image/reputation receive separate treatment in distinct disciplinary traditions (as signalled by rare cross-citations, different publication venues, and largely different methodologies), they could be hardly considered as unrelated phenomena. Not by chance, the typologies of response strategies referred to in the two scholarly traditions are fundamentally the same (compare, for instance Allen & Caillouet, 1994; Coombs, 1995; Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997 to Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009; Kramer & Lewicki, 2010).

There is a considerable amount of research on trust restoration within organizational studies, particularly those focusing on crisis management. While several definitions of trust exist, to reflect the multi-perspective and multi-disciplinary approach to this phenomenon (see Kramer, 1999; Lewicki, 2006), most organizational scholars consider trust as "the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or

control that other part" (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995: 712). Scholars in this field have identified a variety of response strategies organizations use in responding to a crisis event, drawing a neat distinction between verbal accounts (e.g. apology or denial) and substantive measures (e.g. compensation or new internal policies). Repairing trust in this academic tradition amounts to restoring trustworthiness, which is composed by the three constitutive elements of ability, integrity, and benevolence (Mayer et al., 1995). These three-component model of trust mirrors the Aristotelian rhetorical notion of *ethos*, which according to the Greek philosopher, is made of practical wisdom (*phronesis*), virtue (*arete*) and goodwill (*eunoia*). Taking a discourse-analytic approach to corporate communication, Fuoli & Paradis (2014) outlined a **model of trust-repair discourse**, which finds its root in Mayer et al.'s (1995) proposal to emphasize the crucial role of discourse in influencing the trustor's impressions and beliefs about the trustee's ability, integrity and benevolence.

Rhetorical arena communication as an argumentative polylogue

From a rhetorical perspective, argumentation is a type of persuasive communication characterised by the explicit commitment to give reasons that justify the claim for which persuasion is sought (see van Eemeren et al., 1996). By using argumentation, speakers invite their audience to draw an inference (see Pinto, 2001) from accepted premises to a conclusion coinciding with the claim (or standpoint). There is a dual relationship between argumentation and trust. One the one hand, trust can constitute a premise in an argument justifying a claim which is not necessarily related to trust. This is often referred to as *ethotic argumentation*, where the ethos or trustworthiness of a source is taken as a reason to believe and accept the source's claim (e.g. "We should invest in this company *because* all financial analysts recommend doing so"). As explained by Brinton, in an ethotic argument, "something like a transfer of credibility from a person to a conclusion is involved" (1986, pp.251-252).

On the other hand, argumentation can be used to justify or criticise trust. When this happens, the trustworthiness of a person or organisation becomes an *issue* on which competing *claims* or standpoints are advanced and reasons for or against these claims are expressed. From this perspective, trust is not a premise but the conclusion of an argumentative process (e.g. "This company has always listened to my concern. *Therefore*, they still deserve my trust").

The present paper deals with this second type of relationship (trust-oriented argumentation). As corporate representatives, media and a variety of publics advance arguments in favour or against the trustworthiness of the company concerned, the rhetorical arena and sub-arenas opened up by the crisis event becomes, more specifically, an *argumentative polylogue* (see Aakhus & Lewinski, 2014, 2017). An argumentative polylogue is, a multi-party discussion around the same issue (e.g. is Facebook trustworthy?) and involving different *players* or stakeholders (e.g. corporate managers, journalists, employees, investors), who within specific rhetorical sub-arenas (e.g. a press conference, an online forum discussion, a shareholder meeting, etc.) advance *reasons* (arguments) to support or attack a *claim* (e.g. Facebook is/is not trustworthy, Facebook has/had not benevolence, etc.) and/or to refute arguments made by other players.

Because existing argumentation research has largely focused on the study of trust-based argumentation (e.g. Walton 1999; Budzynska, 2013; Oswald & Hart, 2013), a method to analyse trust-oriented argumentation in rhetorical arena during a particular crisis situation is still missing. To this purpose, a polylogical analysis (Lewiński & Aakhus, 2014) of the trust-related discussion is needed in order to account for the different venues (sub-arenas), players (stakeholders/voices), positions (claims) and reasons (arguments) characterising the whole rhetorical arena of a crisis event (see Figure 1).

{insert Fig 1}

Figure 1 Crisis rhetorical arena as an argumentative polylogue

Building a macroscope for the analysis of trust-oriented polylogues

The argumentative analysis of trust-oriented communication requires to build a macroscope "for the discovery of the unique argumentative footprint that characterizes how a collective (e.g., group, online community) manages differences and pursues disagreement through argument in a polylogue" (Musi & Aakhus, 2018). Building such a macroscope involves a two-tiered analytic approach, including: (1) the *argumentation macro-structure* (network of claims, arguments and counterarguments); (2) the *argumentation micro-structure* or inferential configuration (the internal reasoning linking (counter)-arguments to claims).

Argumentation macro-structure

In order to determine the argumentation macro-structure (see van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, & Jacobs, 1993; Snoeck Henkemans 1997; von Werder, 1999; Freeman, 2011; Palmieri, 2014), the following textual elements should be identified first:

(1) The *issue* under discussion (e.g. *should Facebook shares be sold now?*);

(2) The *claims* (or standpoints) advanced by the discussants in relation to the issue (e.g. *"FB shares should be sold now"*);

(3) The *reasons* (or arguments) expressed in the text (e.g. *"because the Cambridge Analytica affair will hit the company's future profits"*).

Argumentative macro-structures can have different degrees of complexity depending on the number of premises advanced by arguers and the interrelations among them. This is especially true in polylogues reflecting online discourse, where any statement can easily become the target of further comments and challenges across different venues. Referring to a widespread tradition within informal logic and argumentation studies (Thomas, 1981; Fisher, 1988; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; Freeman, 1991, 2011), five types of macro structures can be distinguished when mapping pro-argumentation (premises supporting claims):

(i) *basic* (or single) argumentation, where one premise is expressed to support the claim;

(ii) *convergent* (or multiple) argumentation, where two or more premises independently support the claim;

(iii) *linked* (or compound) argumentation, where two or more premises support the claim only if taken together;

(iv) *serial* (or subordinate) argumentation, where the premise supporting the claim is also a sub-claim supported by a sub-premise, resulting in a potentially long chain of premise-conclusion links;

(v) *divergent* argumentation, where the same premise can become the starting point for two or more independent claims, often questioned by different audiences.

Table 1 summarises these five types of argumentation structure, with examples and diagramming method.

{insert Table 1}

Table 1. Types of argumentative macro-structures with examples

The macro-structures explained above refer to supportive (or confirmatory) argumentation. However, argumentative discussions, especially polylogical ones, often feature refutational moves too, which attack an opponent's arguments. Refutations can be of two types (Pollock, 1987; Pledszuz & Stede, 2015): (i) *Rebuttals*, graphically signalled by an oval arrow, negate the *acceptability* of a claim or premise supporting that claim; (ii) *Undercutters*, graphically signalled by a diamond arrow, question the *relevance* or the *sufficiency* of a premise for warranting the argument-claim inferential link.[2] Table 2 summarises the different types of refutation with illustrative examples and corresponding diagramming method.

{insert Table 2}

Table 2. Types of support and attack relations with examples.

[2] For the notions of acceptability, relevance and sufficiency in argument assessments, see Blair & Johnson (2000).

Micro argumentation structure (Inferential configuration)

The reason-claim patterns identified through the argumentative macro-structure can be further analysed at the micro level corresponding to the *inferential configuration* (Rigotti & Greco, 2019). This level of analysis consists in (a) identifying the general type of inferential relation (referred to as *locus* or *topos*) underlying the relation between the premise and the claim. Different types of *loci* exist, like for example definition, whole-parts, goal-means, cause-effect, analogy, authority (see Rigotti, 2009; Musi, Akhus, Muresan, Rocci, & Stede, 2018; Rigotti & Greco, 2019); (b) eliciting those implicit premises which the explicit premises found through the macro-structure analysis need to combine with to justify the claim.

Following the *Argumentum Model of Topics* (Rigotti & Greco, 2019), three main types of premises make up the inferential configuration of an argument:

(i) the *Maxim*, which is a context-independent rule of inference derived from the locus. For example, one of the maxims generated by the *Locus from goal to means* can be formulated as "if a means M is necessary to achieve an important goal, M should be adopted";

(ii) the *Endoxon*, which is a context/culture-dependent proposition, corresponding to values, principles, beliefs, and assumptions shared by all members of a community, society or organisation;

(iii) the *Datum*, a factual proposition, which normally coincides with the explicit premise identified in the macro-structure.

{insert Fig. 2}

Figure 2. The reconstruction of the inferential configuration with the Argumentum Model of Topics (our example)

Figure 2 illustrates how the inferential configuration is diagrammed according to the *Argumentum Model of Topics*. The fictitious argumentation reported above "Facebook shares should be sold now because the Cambridge Analytica affair will hit the company's future profits" is based on a causal relation, more specifically the *locus from goal to action*. In our example, the inference relies on one of the maxims deriving from this locus ("If an ongoing

action causes an undesired situation, the action should be terminated"). Through a logical procedure, we obtain the conclusion coinciding with the claim ("FB shares should be sold now"). The minor premise of this procedure (where the major premise is represented by the maxim) is, unlike the maxim, context-dependent as it derives from the combination of the endoxon and the datum. In our example, the datum coincides with the premise expressed by the arguer ("The Cambridge Analytica affair will hit FB profits"), while the endoxon refers to a generally accepted opinion, which as such tends to be left implicit as the audiences can easily reconstruct it themselves. Indeed, in our example, we can comfortably assume that all financial market actors know and agree with the principle stating that holding shares of a declining profit company does not represent a desirable investment choice.

The reconstruction of the inferential configuration of arguments according to the *Argumentum Model of Topics* allows a more precise characterisation of attack relations: rebuttals point to the *acceptability* of the datum-proposition or the claim-proposition; undercutters point either to the maxim-proposition, to show that it does not include a *sufficient* set of locus elements needed for a valid inference, or to the acceptability of the endoxon-proposition, without which the datum would lose *relevance*. Our case study analysis will illustrate these quite technical aspects with more clarity.

Case study: "The Facts about Facebook".

Context: the issue of trust in social-media companies and the Facebook case

As a case in point, we analyse a portion of the polylogue generated by the opinion article "The Facts about Facebook" written by Mark Zuckerberg and published by the Wall Street Journal on the 24th of January 2019 (Zuckerberg, 2019). The op-ed followed a series of criticisms and controversies regarding Facebook's treatment of personal data for advertising purposes, which seriously questioned the company's trustworthiness. The episode is part of a wider trust issue affecting the whole tech industry, known as *techlash*. According to the 2019

Edelman's Trust Barometer ("Trust in Technology"), "trust in social media among the general population is at 44 percent while trust in tech stands at 78 percent" (Nair, 2019). Amongst the major social media companies, Facebook is certainly one for which trust has become an urgent issue. Suffice to consider users' confidence in the company had fallen by 66% in the aftermath of the Cambridge Analytica scandal, according to a survey made in 2018 (Weisbaum, 2018).

The op-ed "The Facts about Facebook" is in our view an ideal case for the study of trust-repair strategies as it was published in response to repeated concerns expressed in the public sphere. The trust relatedness of Zuckerberg's article is further confirmed by explicit mentions of trust issues in the numerous reactions (e.g. news comments) to it. For instance, in a widely read critical article to the op-ed we find the following comment (our emphasis):

> "Yes Mark, you're right; Facebook turns 15 next month. What a long time you've been in the social media business! We're curious as to whether you've also been keeping count of how many times **you've been forced to apologize for breaching people's trust** or, well, otherwise royally messing up over the years" (Lomas, 2019).

Rhetorical arena and sub-arenas

In order to collect a relevant sample of data referring to rhetorical sub-arenas in which reactions to Zuckeberg's statements are published, we have searched on the social news aggregator *Reddit* for the most controversial threads, i.e. those containing the high number of comments, using the article's title ("The facts about Facebook") as a keyword. We found that the two out of the three most controversial threads related to two newspaper articles commenting on Facebook CEO's op-ed: (i) the abovementioned critical commentary by Natasha Lomas on *techcrunch.com* (Lomas, 2019); (ii) Catie Keck's "Mark Zuckerberg Thinks You Don't Trust Facebook Because You Don't 'Understand' It" on *gizmodo.com* (Keck, 2019).

The editorial staff of *Techcrunch* and *Gizmodo*, which includes independent writers, industry entrepreneurs and first-hand products users, regularly publish news, opinions and comments regarding the tech industry. As a result, the publication of this genre of commentary articles opens up a rhetorical sub-arena where **readers with an interest in technology** can react to both Zuckerberg's post and the critical comments made by leading news writers.

Trust-repair argumentative strategy

Let us start from the argumentative analysis of Zuckerberg's article, which is considered here as a trust-repair crisis response attempt. This can be easily inferred from the passage "We are all distrustful of systems we don't understand", which clearly points to an issue of trust while insinuating that the diffused distrust towards Facebook is unjustified and due only to a lack of information and knowledge from the public side. Hence, the "facts" announced in the headline actually constitute (counter-)arguments which intend to correct allegedly wrong opinions about the company's business and re-establish Facebook's credibility and reputation.

Except for the sentence mentioned above, the op-ed never makes of trust an explicit concept. Yet, as our analysis reveals, most of the utterances in the text have an argumentative function of justifying a trust-related standpoint, i.e. they are directly relevant to promote claims regarding Facebook's competence, integrity or benevolence or to refute opposite arguments. These claims, in turn, justify a generic trust standpoint ("Facebook is trustworthy"):

{insert Fig 3}

Figure 3. The generic structure of trust-oriented argumentation.

Zuckerberg's op-ed is formed by 16 paragraphs. The introductory paragraph, which plays the rhetorical function of *exordium* recalls the imminent 15th birthday of Facebook and what the original purpose of the company was: to build "a service people could use to connect and learn about each other", which frames the corporate mission philanthropically, thus hinting to a trust-related claim of *benevolence*. By emphasising how "billions of people have found this useful", *ability* is also argued for. In paragraph 2, Zuckerberg acknowledges the existence of trust issues ("many questions about our business model") highlighting his proactive rather than reactive approach to public criticism ("I've heard...so I want to explain"), which conveys a benevolence claim, implied by his listening and caring attitude towards users' concerns.

Benevolence claims dominate the subsequent part of the op-ed (paragraphs 3-5), which deals with one of the most widespread concerns users have about Facebook: people receive targeted advertisements based on personal information that become available while participating in the social medium.

Figure 4 diagrams the argumentative macro structure of Zuckerberg's defence in this part of the article. Zuckerberg constructs a benevolence, pro-user, framing according to which (i) ads are necessary in order to make Facebook free and therefore available to everyone (par. 3); (ii) collection of user information is necessary in order to respond to people's request for relevant ads (par. 4); (iii) Facebook provides users with transparency tools which give them control over ads and information based on which ads are targeted (par. 5). The latter aspect is rhetorically emphasised by a strategic use of personal pronouns (we-you), which suggests Facebook has intentionally designed those transparency tools ("we create categories", "our transparency tools", etc.) precisely in order to enable users ("you have control", "you can block", "you can find out", "your preferences"). Through this rhetorical device, not only benevolence but also an ability claim is conveyed as, from Zuckerberg's point of view, the control users can enjoy does not occur by chance but is actually due to Facebook's intelligent and purposeful design.

{insert Fig 4}

Figure 4. Zuckerberg's arguments for benevolence (paragraphs 3-5)

The subsequent part of the op-ed (paragraphs 6-13) is dominated by arguments oriented at *integrity*. However, rather than using confirmatory arguments which directly support integrity claims, Zuckerberg here tries to refute arguments that critics have advanced to prove Facebook's lack of integrity. Paragraph 6 introduces the problem ("still, some are concerned about the complexity of this model") with a *prolepsis* through which Zuckerberg initially concedes distrust ("this model can feel opaque") but subsequently discards it as something

merely due to a lack of understanding (we are distrustful of systems we don't understand").[3] At this point, three integrity sub-issues are discussed which can be formulated as follows:

1. Does FB sell user data for business purposes? (paragraph 7)
2. Does FB intentionally increase engagement? (paragraphs 8-10)
3. Does FB business model encourage to use and store more information than needed? (paragraphs 11-13)

{insert Fig. 5}

Figure 5. Zuckerberg's arguments for integrity (paragraphs. 6-13)

An affirmative answer to these questions would coincide with arguments justifying a no-integrity standpoint (see Fig. 5). Zuckerberg's refutational moves correspond to rebuttals, i.e. arguments which support the negation of the critics' standpoints (e.g. "Facebook does not sell user data for business purposes"), thus fending off accusations of non-integrity.[4]

It is worth noting that the defence of the integrity standpoint includes arguments in which *intelligence/ability* is presupposed and taken for granted. This becomes evident at the micro-structure level (Fig. 6) where intelligence appears as *endoxon*, i.e. a belief which is (or is assumed to be) already shared, taken for granted, and therefore left implicit in the text. The reasoning here is based on a locus from final cause (linking actions and benefits/goals) and on one of its maxims stating that an intelligent agent accomplishes a given action only if it such an action is beneficial (otherwise, the agent is not intelligent). Now, because Facebook is intelligent, as Zuckerberg assumes, it would be contradictory for them to go against their own

[3] Interestingly, here Zuckerberg changes engagement strategy from an exclusive *we* to an inclusive *we* through which he presents himself as a peer in the wider community of Internet users. This way, he signals communion and avoids the impolite effect of framing users only as ignorant, something which could be easily implied by a statement such as "users are distrustful of Facebook because they don't understand it".

[4] When rebuttals attack the opponent's argument, they do not necessarily defeat the opponent's claim but they leave it unjustified. However, other arguments could exist to prove the claim which the rebuttal has not addressed.

interest by selling people's data to advertisers and, therefore, we can exclude they did sell data to advertisers.

{insert Fig. 6}

Figure 6. Inferential configuration (micro-structure) of the argument denying FB sells data (paragraph 7)

Paragraph 8 reports criticisms that Facebook's business model creates misalignment of interests which would result in Facebook acting for self-serving purposes only. Facebook claims alignment between their interest and people's interest, which presupposes a definition of intelligence that includes benevolence. This alignment is emphasized by the notion of incentive, which is a mechanism for companies to compel themselves towards pursuing the interest of customers.

In paragraph 9, there is even a conflation of all three constituents of trust: Zuckerberg rejects claims of non-integrity ("to show this [clickbait and junk] intentionally") by appealing to Facebook's intelligence ("it would be foolish for us") which is demonstrated by their benevolent concern for users ("it's not what people want"). In this part of the article, Zuckerberg uses counter-factual arguments ("it would be counter to our business interests"; "it would reduce the unique value of our service"; "it would be foolish for us"), where the impossibility of assuming Facebook's lack of intelligence leads to exclude any integrity violation. In other words, Zuckerberg's argument could be rendered as follows: to commit these integrity violations, Facebook would need to lack intelligence; but, because we are intelligent, we cannot have done this.

In paragraph 10, an alternative explanation for the persisting presence of bad content on Facebook is offered. According to Zuckerberg, such content is not left intentionally up (something which would constitute a violation of integrity), but it is there because of a not yet perfect technology. By pointing out that "our systems are still evolving and improving",

Zuckerberg seems to intend to discourage any negative conclusion regarding the company's ability.

Paragraphs 11-12 deal with the third type of alleged violation of integrity, i.e. the unnecessary collection and storage of information, which Zuckerberg justifies with a lesser evil argument: the damages entailed by personal information being collected is lower than what would happen if security and service operations would fail.

{insert Fig. 7}

Figure 7. Zuckerberg's arguments for ability (paragraph 15)

In the last part of the op-ed (paragraphs 14-15), Zuckerberg engages in a sort of policy-influencing campaign advocating for regulation to preserve Facebook's business model. In doing so, he defends an implicit claim of ability (see Fig. 7) demonstrated by the numerous economic and societal benefits which, in his view, are produced by Facebook's specific business model. This idea is emphatically re-stated at the very end of the op-ed (paragraph 16) which, as in a typical rhetorical *conclusio*, summarises the central theme of the article and invites the readers to support such business model.

Stakeholder argumentative responses in rhetorical sub-arenas

How did the public react to Zuckerberg's trust-repair argumentation? To answer this question, we first analyse the two critical comments by online news writers. Subsequently, we consider a sample of public posts on Reddit which reacted to these two commentary articles.

1. Catie Keck on gizmodo

Catie Keck's critical comment, published online on January 25, 2019 (Keck, 2019), basically maintains that people who have withdrawn their trust in Facebook have very good

reasons to do so, as suggested in the provocative title ("Mark Zuckerberg thinks you don't trust Facebook because you don't 'understand' it") and in the very beginning of the article:

> "I think we can all safely agree that last year was not great for Facebook. User trust plummeted to record lows as the company faced scandal after scandal. At this point, there are countless reasons users can and even should be wary of Facebook" (Keck 2019).

Keck's criticisms focus on two main points made by Zuckerberg. One relates to the CEO's defence of integrity (paragraphs 7-13), mentioning a series of scandals and revelations which suggest Facebook does indeed collect and share people data unduly. The other criticism, which we analyse in detail here, relates to advertisements and to Zuckerberg's argument in paragraph 5 that Facebook is transparent (and therefore benevolent) as it gives its users control through transparency tools (see argument 1.3 in Figure 4 above):

> "Earlier this month, a Pew Research Center Survey found that users do indeed remain largely in the dark about how Facebook tracks their information in order to feed them relevant ads (and off of which it makes heaping piles of money"). Of the nearly 1,000 U.S. adults polled for the survey, some 74 percent of those who use Facebook said they had no idea about the sites "ad preferences" section where activity-based "interests" appear. Fifty-one percent of users said they were "not very or not at all comfortable" with Facebook amassing this information about them. This data shows that the company has a lot of work to do when it comes to transparency" (Keck, 2019).

As Figure 8 shows, Keck uses an undercutter against the inferential step from the presence of transparency tools (sub-argument 1.3.1.1b) to the claim that Facebook give users control (argument 1.3.1). The results of a survey made by the *Pew Research Center* suggest, however, that people are fundamentally unaware of such tools for control.

{insert Fig. 8}

Figure 8. Undercutter of Zuckerberg's argument for control and transparency

This undercutter does not question the plausibility of Zuckerberg's argument (nobody denies that transparency tools are available on Facebook), but its *sufficiency* for justifying the

claim that users do have control. The micro-structure analysis based on the Argumentum Model of Topics (Figure 9) helps clarifying the undercutter-sufficiency nature of the refutation.

{insert Fig. 9}

Figure 9. Inferential configuration of Zuckerberg's argument for control with undercutter by Catie Keck.

Zuckerberg's reasoning is based on a *locus from means to goal* where transparency tools are taken as the means to achieve control (Endoxon)[5]. As these means are available to users (Datum), they do have control (Final conclusion).

As the reconstruction in Figure 8 shows, the results of the survey cited by Keck do not attack the acceptability of Zuckerberg's premise (Datum), nor they question the relevance of such premise for the point at issue, i.e. that these tools are related to control (Endoxon). The refutation points to an element of the maxim which is left implicit and taken for granted by Zuckerberg. While the maxim underlying the CEO's argument could be formulated as "If the means to achieve a goal are present, the goal can be achieved", the results of the survey reveals the insufficiency of this inferential rule. In general, maxims are principles which operate on a *ceteris paribus* condition: *other things being equal*, the presence of the means allows an agent to achieve the goal. However, in this case, the agent (Facebook users) is not aware of the presence of such means. An extended maxim proposition must therefore be considered "If the means to achieve a goal are present and the agent is aware of their presence, the goal can be achieved". Once this more complete formulation of the maxim is adopted, a logical *non-sequitur* is created which makes the conclusion unwarranted. Zuckerberg's argument contains

[5] We observe that through this endoxon Zuckerberg strategically reframes the concepts of "transparency" and "control". Transparency would be defined not based on corporate accountability and disclosure but as the empowerment of users (control), while control would correspond to a goal secured by users' availability of transparency tools. Interestingly, such redefinition strategy is identified and criticised by the other critical comment considered in this paper: "Zuckerberg wants to redefine "transparency, choice and control" – let's not give him consent" (Lomas, 2019)

therefore a relevant and plausible but not sufficient premise to prove the presence of control, transparency and, ultimately, benevolence.

2. Natasha Lomas on techcrunch

Lomas (2019) develops a much longer and elaborated criticism in which almost all Zuckerberg's apologetic statements are attacked. Lomas does not only refute the plausibility, sufficiency and relevance of Zuckerberg's argumentation, but also tries to disguise the deceitfulness of some rhetorical tactics featuring the op-ed, such as the way the CEO strategically reframes key concepts or uses pronouns. For example, Lomas points to Zuckerberg's manipulative use of "relevant ads" which overlooks that useful ads do not need to be creepy ads; or the term "free" which could impress the idea that Facebook is "cost-free", when it is actually only "subscription fee-free".

In the attempt to refute Zuckerberg's trust-repair arguments, Lomas puts forward counter-arguments targeting claims which refer to all the three constituents of trust (ability, benevolence, integrity).

Lomas strongly and repeatedly rejects benevolence claims, starting from attacking Zuckerberg's historical review of Facebook aimed at showing the philanthropic mission of the company (paragraph 1). This is disputed by recalling the intrinsically evil nature of Facebook's original technology (*Facemash*), thus suggesting that Zuckerberg's ethos has since the beginning proven to be against people.[6]

Zuckerberg's pro-benevolence arguments, which have been reconstructed in Figure 4, receive the following refutations (see Figure 10):

(i) An undercutter-relevance to premise 1.1b.1 by which Zuckerberg's maintains that people told they want to see relevant ads. This argument presupposes an endoxon in which users'

[6] "It's also true you weren't setting out to build "a global company". The predecessor to Facebook was a 'hot or not' game called 'FaceMash' that you hacked together while drinking beer in your Harvard dormroom. […] The seeds of Facebook's global business were thus sown in a crude and consentless game of clickbait whose idea titillated you so much you thought nothing of breaching security, privacy, copyright and decency norms just to grab a few eyeballs." (Lomas, 2019).

declarations are an indicator of their desire, which Lomas question by pointing out that users have no alternative to choose from and therefore they must accept targeted ads, rather than desiring them.

(ii) A undercutter-sufficiency to premise 1.2 which would prove benevolence by the fact that Facebook is free and accessible to everyone. Lomas makes a dissociation of the meaning of the word "free" to highlight how Facebook is free from fees but not from costs, which include loss of privacy and violations of human rights.[7]

(iii) A rebuttal to premise 1.3.1 which points to the absence of important privacy tools, such as the promised but never provided "Clear History".[8]

(iv) An undercutter-sufficiency to premise 1.3.1.1, found also in Keck's comment (Fig. 8), which reveals that users do not have enough knowledge about the existence of transparency tools.

{insert Fig. 10}

Figure 10. Counterarguments to Zuckerberg's pro-benevolence arguments in C. Lomas' article.

Lomas devotes a substantial part of her article to discussing the harmful societal impact of Facebook, citing numerous damages users undergo because of the social media company's non-interventionistic approach. This set of criticisms allows Lomas to question Facebook's trustworthiness at the levels of benevolence (Facebook shows no concern for weaker parts of society), integrity (Facebook encourages violations of human rights), and ability (Facebook's model is not so smart at the end if it helps business at the expenses of users' well-being and human life). More specifically, the attack to ability includes a criticism to Facebook's algorithms, liable of not managing to ensure basic checks which would make people safer (rebuttal), and to the self-attributed merits for the prosperity of small businesses, for which according to Lomas there are common causes (undercutter). Finally, Lomas highlights how

[7] A maxim of the locus from consequences to action is here employed stating that if the side effects of an action are worse than the expected benefits, the action is not good (see Rigotti, 2008).

[8] "He also repeats the spurious claim that Facebook gives users "complete control" over what it does with personal information collected for advertising. We've heard this time and time again from Zuckerberg and yet it remains pure BS. Yo Mark! First up we're still waiting for your much trumpeted 'Clear History' tool." (Lomas, 2019).

Facebook's mission of connecting people is a purpose which, in order to be attainted, does not need the specific model Facebook operates with. In other words, Facebook's business model is criticised as being neither particularly smart nor necessary for society and the economy. For reasons of space, we do not show the diagramming of all these refutational moves.

3. Comments of users on reddit

In this section, we integrate the case study with the analysis of comments posted on the online discussion website *Reddit*, thus adding a third layer to the macroscope of the trust-related polylogue. As our goal here is not to produce statistically significant results regarding argumentative patterns but rather to develop a procedure for analysing trust-oriented polylogues in rhetorical sub-arenas, in this section we will focus on a restricted number of posts for illustrative purposes.

Some posts are *indirect* reactions to Zuckerberg's op-ed as they comment media articles such as those analysed in the previous sections. This means that comments by media writers do not only constitute an instance of stakeholders' reaction to crisis response messages, but also work as leading opinions which stimulate further reactions by other publics. More specifically, we distinguish three classes of comments.

(1) Some comments target the corporate statement with supporting or attacking claims and arguments (see Johansen et al., 2016). In example (i.), the user expresses disagreement with Zuckerberg's argument according to which distrust in Facebook is due to lack of understanding of its business model; in (ii), an argument for integrity-based distrust is made by recalling Zuckerberg's behaviour at the dawn of Facebook:

(i). "Think you got that backwards bud. We don't trust it BECAUSE we understand it"
(ii). "I understand you f*** stole your company from your "friends" and f*** them over. What in the world makes you think I'd trust a giant piece of s*** like that?

(2) A second class of comments refer to posts which target the leading opinions with supporting or attacking claims and arguments. For example, in (iii), the user seems to concede

the general assumption (endoxon) behind Zuckerberg's "because they don't understand it" argument but does not think this principle can be applied to Facebook. The author of comment (iv.) confirms Keck's opinion based on his/her own experience.

(iii). "I think it goes both ways. Facebook is not to be trusted, but many products that could be revolutionary aren't used because people don't trust it. Also some people don't trust vaccines simply because they don't understand it and don't want to learn. Do he's kinda right, just not about Facebook.

(iv). No, I understand that Facebook sells your information and stalks you across the internet to gather your data perfectly well thanks"

(3) Finally, there are posts which support or attack previous posts in the same discussion threads by supporting or attacking claims and arguments. In example (v.), we first read a comment which comes in defence of Zuckerberg: he has not insulted anyone's intelligence but just said that people may not understand Facebook due to the opacity of the business model. Another user reacts by accusing Facebook of not doing enough to make the model more transparent. This user seems to suggest that even though Zuckerberg's argument should not be qualified as an insult to people's intelligence, it still signals Facebook's passive attitude which indicates lack of benevolence towards people's needs and interests.

(v). *He references the opaque business model as a reason people may not understand, he didn't insult anyone's intelligence.*

- "Yeah his statement can be interpreted different ways. But simply put, your info sharing ways should be made clear and concise so people CAN understand them and make an informed decision. Not just wait for light to be shed on the issue and say it's too complicated for you to get."

The claims and arguments advanced by the organisation (Facebook in our case), the argumentative reactions of media writers and the further comments from users constitute three distinct layers of the polylogue. In order to diagram these layers in such a way that clearly distinguishes them, we use different grayscale colours.

As Fig. 11 shows, the white boxes contain the trust-repair argumentation made by the organisation (Facebook in our case); the light grey boxes refer to the leading opinions (C. Keck); the dark grey boxes represent public reactions (Reddit users). In this specific case, Zuckerberg's argument that distrust in Facebook is due to lack of understanding is rebutted by

Keck who defends the opposite claim: it is precisely because people understand Facebook's unfriendly and unethical business model that they do not trust it. The first user's comment, instead, gives credit to Zuckerberg's line of thought and, with an undercutter, refutes the conclusion (attributed to Keck and other critics) accusing Zuckerberg of insulting to people's intelligence. The second user's comment concedes this interpretation but adds that Facebook remains responsible for the opacity of the business model, thus supporting the critics' distrust claims.

{insert Fig 11.}

Figure 11. Three-layer polylogue analysis: corporate argumentation; leading opinions; public reactions.

Conclusions

The main goal of this paper was to propose a method based on argumentation theory to analyse multivocal crisis communication regarding trust issues. The fundamental starting point of our work is that the rhetorical arena opened by a crisis episode consists in an argumentative polylogue, i.e. a public discussion in which corporate representatives and stakeholders communicate reasons for or against claims regarding issues of trust. As a case in point, we analysed Facebook's trust-oriented discourse and critical reactions to it and showed the network of arguments and counterarguments through which issues of trust – i.e. Facebook's ability, benevolence and integrity – are discussed.

Different from most argumentation research, in which trust components (ability, benevolence, integrity) are considered as premises, our analysis focused on trustworthiness as the outcome of an argumentative process, with corporate representatives and stakeholders publicly exchanging reasons for and against trustworthy claims. From this perspective, we contributed to trust-repair discourse studies (e.g. Fuoli & Paradis, 2014) which look at how communication strategies support trust stances (e.g. ability, integrity and benevolence). Interestingly, our case study brought to light instances of trust-oriented discourse in which one trust component (e.g. ability) is part of the premises used to justify another trust constituent

(e.g. integrity). This suggests that the discursive process by which trust components are mobilised can be more complex and variegated than the standard configuration where ability, integrity and benevolence are independent stances which stand at the same level.

As for the analysis and evaluation of trust-repair strategies, our method lays the foundation for significant innovations. First of all, the reconstruction of the argumentation structures at macro and micro levels represents a more specific and granular characterisation of multi-vocal crisis communication. Indeed, our reconstruction enables eliciting the reasons for and against trust exchanged in the rhetorical arena, going beyond the analysis of stance (supportive/opposite) and tone (positive/negative/neutral).

Second, an argumentative macroscope of trust-oriented polylogues supports the assessment (or evaluation) of crisis response strategies both at the level of quality and effectiveness. The former refers to the critical evaluation of arguments against normative models of reasonableness. For example, one can be interested in assessing the extent to which trust claims are justified by factually accurate information, shared values and logically sound arguments. As for effectiveness, a polylogical argumentative analysis enhances existing methods which try to measure the effects of crisis response strategies in the rhetorical arena (see Coombs & Holladay, 2014). An argumentative macroscope allows to compare corporate and public arguments and identify with higher precision the factors which led stakeholders to confirm or change their trust stance. If we consider the case study examined in this paper, we can see very well that Zuckerberg's point that Facebook gives control and transparency was not sufficiently justified as the objection, repeatedly raised and supported by independent surveys, that people do not know about these tools was not tackled.

For strategic communication professionals, the reconstruction of a macroscope of trust-related arguments can represent a useful tool for a finer and more relevant analysis of the public conversation regarding their organisation. This analysis can, in turn, inform more contextually appropriate and persuasive trust-repair communication strategies. Moreover, we believe that

any persuasion endeavour built on an argumentative understanding of stakeholders' attitudes and behaviours is more likely to generate *reasonable communication strategies* which simultaneously achieve the ideals of participation and control (Holtzhausen & Zerfass, 2015).

In sum, we believe that this paper has multi-disciplinary relevance and significance: (1) it contributes to crisis management studies in trust-repair processes and crisis communication research by investigating the argumentative dimension of crisis response strategies; (2) it advances the Rhetorical Arena Theory with an argumentative perspective which frames and analyses discursive actions in rhetorical sub-arenas as arguments rather than as mere opinion and/or tone carriers (e.g. supportive/opposite/neutral); (3) it adds to existing argumentation studies, in which trust is predominantly considered as a premise in *ethotic* arguments (appeals to authority or expert opinions) rather than as a claim needing justification (Palmieri, 2009; Paglieri, 2014; Musi & Palmieri, 2019).

We hope, therefore, that this paper will stimulate further research taking an argumentative approach to the study of multi-vocal crisis communication. The method we have developed can be applied to case studies referring to a variety of companies and industrial sectors (e.g. the banking industry or celebrity scandals). While in this paper we have examined only a portion of a crisis episode for illustrative purposes, future studies should analyse a complete case study to identify the most effective or least effective arguments in restoring trust. Finally, our macroscope can represent the starting point for the development of argument mining techniques which automatically identify argumentative patterns over large-scale datasets (e.g. an entire industry crisis).

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
Crisis episode
Rhetorical arena
Trust issues
(Ability, integrity, benevolence)
Corporate response strategy: trust-repair argumentation
• Trust claims
• Reasons supporting trust claims (confirmation)
• Attacks to reasons supporting distrust claims (refutation)
Rhetorical sub-arenas (venues and players)
Sub-arena 1
Sub-arena 2
Sub-arena n
Reactions by publics + further corporate responses
TRUST-RELATED POLYLOGUE
• Replication or negation of trust claims
• Reasons supporting or attacking corporate arguments
• Reasons supporting or attacking arguments from publics


Endoxon
Holding shares of a declining profit company is not desirable for investors
Locus from final cause to action
Maxim
If an ongoing action causes an undesired situation, the action should be terminated
Datum
The Cambridge Analytic affair will hit FB profits
First conclusion/minor premise
Investment in FB causes an undesired situation
Final conclusion
FB shares should be sold now


Implicit trust standpoint
("Facebook is trustworthy")
Ability claim(s)
("FB has ability")
Integrity claim(s)
("FB has integrity")
Benevolence claim(s)
("FB has integrity")
• Arguments for ability claims
• Refutations of no-ability arguments
• Arguments for integrity claims
• Refutations of no-integrity arguments
• Arguments for benevolence claims
• Refutations of no-benevolence arguments


1
(FB is benevolent)
1.1a
Information FB collects through likes and clicks enable relevant ads
1.1b
People wants relevant ads
1.2
FB runs ads which enable to offer services to everyone
1.3
FB is transparent in front of users
1.1b.1
People tell us so
1.2.1a
Everyone should have a voice and be able to connect
1.2.1.b
Serving everyone requires a service affordable for everyone
1.2.1c
The best way to offer services affordable to everyone is to offer them for free
1.2.1d
Ads make FB free
1.3.1
FB gives users control on ads and personal information
1.3.1.1
On Facebook, you can block any advertiser from reaching you; You can find out why you're seeing an ad; you can change your preferences to get ads you're interested in; and you can use our transparency tools to see every different ad an advertiser is showing to anyone else.


1
(FB has no integrity)
1.1
FB sells user data
1.2
FB creates engagement
1.3
FB uses and store more info than needed
R[1.1]
FB does not sell user data
R[1.2]
FB does not create engagement
R[1.3]
FB does not use and store more info than needed
R[1.1].1
Selling data would be counter to our business interests [We have a strong incentive to protect people's information from being accessed by anyone else]
R[1.2].1
For a business perspective it is important that their time is well spent
R[1.2].2
it would be foolish for us to show this intentionally
R[1.3].1
We use and store information for security and operating reasons
R[1.1].1.1
It would reduce the unique value of our service to advertisers
R[1.2].1.1
Otherwise they won't use our service as much over the long term
R[1.2].2.1/3/1
It is not what people want


Locus from final cause
Endoxon
Facebook has intelligence
Maxim
If an intelligent agent A accomplishes action X, A is beneficial for X
Datum – R[1.1].1
FB selling people's data would be counter to their business interests
First conclusion/minor premise
FB selling people's data is an action which is not beneficial for an intelligent agent
Final conclusion – R[1.1]
FB does not sell data


3
FB has ability
3.1.
FB business model produces clear benefits for society and for the economy
3.1.1a
Billions of people get a fee service to stay connected to those they care about and to express themselves
3.1.1b
Small businesses get access to tools that help them thrive
3.1.1b.1
There are 90 million small businesses on FB and most could not afford to buy tv ads or billboards but now they have access to tools that only big companies could use before
3.1.1b.2
In a global survey, half of the businesses on FB say they've hired more people since they joined. They're using our services to create millions of jobs


1.3
FB is transparent in front of users
1.3.1
FB gives users control on ads and personal information
1.3.1.1b
On Facebook, you can block any advertiser from reaching you; You can find out why you're seeing an ad; you can change your preferences to get ads you're interested in; and you can use our transparency tools to see every different ad an advertiser is showing to anyone else.
U[1.3.1.1b]
Users do indeed remain largely in the dark about how Facebook tracks their information in order to feed them relevant ads
U[1.3.1.1b].1
74 percent of those who use Facebook said they had no idea about the sites "ad preferences" section where activity-based "interests" appear
U[1.3.1.1b].1.1
a Pew Research Center Survey found that


Endoxon
Blocking functions, ads preferences, transparency tools etc. are instruments for media users control their exposition to ads
Datum (1.3.1.1b)
Blocking functions, ads preference, transparency tools, etc. are available on FB
Locus from means to goal
Maxim
If the means to achieve a goal are available and the agent is aware of such presence, the goal can be achieved
First conclusion/minor premise
The means for users to have control over ads and information are present on FB
X
Final conclusion (1.3.1)
On FB users have control on ads and personal information


1
(FB is benevolent)
1.1a
Information FB collects through likes and clicks enable relevant ads
1.1b
People wants relevant ads
1.1b.1
People tell us so
U[1.1b.1]
Users have no alternative to accepting ads
1.2
FB runs ads which enable to offer services to everyone
U[1.2]
Facebook is not cost-free
1.3
FB is transparent in front of users
1.3.1
FB gives users control on ads and personal information
U[1.3.1]
Users do not know about the presence of transparency tools
R[1.3.1]
The “Clear History” function is not available


1
(FB does not deserve distrust)
U[U[R[1.1]]]
Yeah his statement can be interpreted different ways. But simply put, your info sharing ways should be made clear and concise so people CAN understand them and make an informed decision. Not just wait for light to be shed on the issue and say it's too complicated for you to get."
U[R[1.1]]/1.1
He references the opaque business model as a reason people may not understand, he didn't insult anyone's intelligence.
2
(MZ is insulting people's intelligence)
1.1
(Distrust is due to lack of understanding not lack of benevolence and integrity)
R[1.1]/2.1
People do not trust FB because they understand it
1.1.1a
We are all distrustful of systems we don't understand
1.1.1b
FB model can feel opaque
1.1.1c
But FB does not lack benevolence and integrity
R[1.1.1c]/R[1.1].1a
FB violates benevolence and integrity
R[1.1].1b
People understand FB violates benevolence and integrity
= Zuckerberg's arguments
= opinion leader's comment (Keck)
= public discussion comment

Macro-structure type	Description	Example (ours)	Diagramming method
Basic (single)	The arguer (A) advances one premise to support the claim.	FB shares should be sold now (1) because *the Cambridge Analytica affair will hit the company's future profits* (1.1).	
Convergent (multiple)	A advances two or more premises, each constituting a separate, independent, reason supporting the claim.	FB shares should not be sold now (1) because *the Cambridge Analytica affair has been overcome* (1.1). Moreover, *the company will announce soon a share buyback programme* (1.2).	
Linked (compound)	A advances two or more interdependent premises, which constitute a single reason supporting the claim. Linked premises justify the claim only if taken together.	FB shares should be sold now (1) because *the Cambridge Analytica affair is hitting the company's profits* (1.1a) and *will not be overcome soon* (1.1b).	
Serial (subordinate)	The premise advanced to support the claim is in turn supported by another premise (and so on).	FB shares should not be sold now (1) because the company is about to implement a share buyback programme (1.1), as *some renowned analysts have confirmed in a report published this morning* (1.1.1).	
Divergent	A advances one premise which can support two or more independent claims at the same time.	FB shares should be sold now (1) because *the Cambridge Analytica affair will hit the company's future profits* (1.1/2.1). This is also why employees are not likely to obtain a salary increment next year (2).	

Type of refutation	Description	Example (ours)	Diagramming method
Attack: rebuttal (claim acceptability)	The attacker advances an argument supporting the negation of the arguer's claim [in square brackets]	[FB shares should be sold now (1)] *FB shares should not be sold now, because the company is about to implement a share buyback programme* (R[1]).	
Attack: rebuttal (premise acceptability)	The attacker advances an argument supporting the negation of an opponent's premise (underlined in square brackets)	[FB shares should be sold now (1) because the Cambridge Analytica affair will hit the company's profits (1.1)]. *No, the scandal has now been overcome as everybody now see that the company was just an unaware victim* (R[1.1]).	
Attack: undercutter (premise sufficiency)	The attacker advances an argument questioning the arguer's premise (underlined in square brackets) as a sufficient support for the claim.	[Facebook is an attractive investment (1) because its stock price increased over the last quarter (1.1)]. *Yes, but stock price performance is not the only indicator of investment-worthiness* (U[1.1]).	
Attack: undercutter (premise relevance)	The attacker advances an argument questioning the presence of a relevant inferential connection between the arguer's premise (underlined in square brackets) and the claim.	[Facebook is an ethically responsible company (1) because its stock price increased over the last quarter (1.1)]. *Yes, but short-term stock prices say very little, if anything, about the ethics of a corporation* (U[1.1]).	