Hansen, Kristoffer Arnsfelt, Ibsen-Jensen, Rasmus and Neyman, Abraham
(2021)
Absorbing games with a clock and two bits of memory.
Games and Economic Behavior, 128.
pp. 213-230.
Text
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Abstract
An absorbing game is a two-person zero-sum repeated game. Some of the entries are “absorbing” in the sense that, following the play of an absorbing entry, with positive probability all future payoffs are equal to that entry's payoff. The outcome of the game is the long-run average payoff. We prove that a two-person zero-sum absorbing game, with either finite or compact action sets, has, for each ε>0, ε-optimal strategies with finite memory. In fact, we show that there is an ε-optimal strategy that depends on the clock and three states of memory.
Item Type: | Article |
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Divisions: | Faculty of Science and Engineering > School of Electrical Engineering, Electronics and Computer Science |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Admin |
Date Deposited: | 26 Oct 2021 08:08 |
Last Modified: | 18 Jan 2023 21:25 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2021.04.008 |
Related URLs: | |
URI: | https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3141607 |