Gow, Laura 
ORCID: 0000-0002-7521-8480
(2021)
Perceptual Experience and Physicalism.
In:
Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception.
Oxford University PressOxford, pp. 127-146.
ISBN 9780191887956, 019885353X
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Perceptual Experience and Physicalism.pdf - Author Accepted Manuscript Download (293kB) | Preview |
Abstract
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>Although there is much disagreement within the philosophy of perception, there is one thing that the majority of philosophers agree on: our philosophical account of perceptual experience should be compatible with physicalism. The aim of this paper is to explore the impact this has had within the philosophy of perception, and to point out some of the problems a physicalist approach must face. Representationalism is the leading account of perception, and was developed precisely to meet the physicalist’s criteria. This chapter supports and expands on an existing argument that representationalism fails in this aim. It then points out a problem with the new view—non-relationalism—which has arisen as a result of the failure of standard representationalism to qualify as a genuinely physicalist view. Non-relationalist accounts have difficulty doing justice to the idea that our perceptual experiences are assessable for accuracy or veridicality.</jats:p>
| Item Type: | Book Section |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Perception (Philosophy) |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of the Arts |
| Depositing User: | Symplectic Admin |
| Date Deposited: | 24 Jan 2022 16:33 |
| Last Modified: | 26 Apr 2024 09:54 |
| DOI: | 10.1093/oso/9780198853534.003.0007 |
| Related URLs: | |
| URI: | https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3147550 |
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