Thinking the Prison Affectively:
A Critical Discourse Analysis of Official Prison Reports from Three English Prisons

Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy by *Madeleine Rungius*.

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Abstract

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This thesis explores the theoretical and methodological possibilities for understanding the prison as an affective institution. Central to this affective exploration of the prison is to challenge the idea of the *rational* institution that assumes *rationality* to be non-affective. On this basis, the prison is often officially narrated as a pacifying and benign institution of state punishment and, as such, is reflected in the official reports of inspection into the contemporary prison in England and Wales.

In contrast, this thesis seeks to re-read these officially sanctioned prison narratives using an affective framework, and feminist and imaginative epistemologies. Drawing on Foucauldian *Critical Discourse Analysis*, prison reports of three English prisons, HMP Birmingham, HMP Liverpool and HMP Pentonville, over a 40-year period (1982-2019) are investigated. This thesis presents a reading of these reports as textual and visual artefacts of official state discourse. The Critical Discourse Analysis of them enables a tracing of *affect* in a threefold analysis. First, the affective exploration of the prison proceeds from the discursive basis of affect in the textual body of prison reports. Second, the thesis interrogates the imagined prison that transpires through the researcher's imagination and their creative engagement with prison reports. Third, the discursive analysis engages in a critical visual reading of official state photographs of the three prisons. The analysis aims to establish a critical counter reading of prisons in England and Wales through an affective lens.

Theoretically, this thesis is situated in Durkheimian and cultural affect studies which form the basis for the conceptual framework, or what I call the *affective moral fact*. Establishing this concept seeks to offer an explanatory framework that renders affect more visible in the life of state institutions like the prison. Integral to this tracing of affect is the epistemological foundation in standpoint feminist scholarship that embraces a critical sociological imagination, with the aim of including creative and imaginative ways, for affectively researching the prison and emphasising the situatedness of knowledge.

The thesis works towards the conclusion that the prison can be researched and theorised affectively through the critical deconstruction of official prison narratives. Related to the *affective moral fact*, the *rational* prison can be seen as promoting a form of state power that is affect-saturated and driven at all times; as a sociocultural representation of dominating affect and values specific to time and place. A central outcome of this thesis is a stress on the importance of research that embraces imagination and emphasises the significance of *affect* for more nuanced understandings of the *rational* power and violence of the prison institution.

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Chapter I: Introduction

The exploration of the prison as an affective institution is not one that imposes itself on the sociological researcher in an obvious way. Rather, the need and motivation to do so grew out of a yearlong critical engagement with research and theories around central sociological topics within state theory and political sociology (e.g. Bauman, 1989; Parsons, 1949,1967; Elias, 1998, 2000; Foucault, 1977; Giddens, 1991; Beck; 1992; Reemtsma, 2013; Sofsky, 1996; Weber, 2002), criminological accounts of the prison (e.g. Cohen, 1985; Cohen & Taylor, 1972; Davis, 2003; Scott, 2018; Scott & Codd, 2010; Sim, 2009), and an in-depth examination of how emotions and affect are predominantly understood in sociology (e.g. Barbalet, 1998; Goffman, 1959, 2005; Hochschild, 1979, 1983) and affect studies (e.g. Ahmed, 2010, 2014; Berlant, 2009; Sedgwick, 2003). My research on the prison as an affective institution has been equally informed by the embrace of feminist epistemologies (Ahmed, 2006; Berlant, 2005; Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983; Jaggar, 1989; Smith, 1974) which offer the opportunity for engaging critically and imaginatively with reified knowledge claims in Western thought with the purpose of challenging and disrupting those, and to offer more nuanced understandings.

Regarding popular accounts in state theory and political theory (e.g. Parsons, 1949,1967; Giddens, 1991; Wagner, 2003; Beck, 1992; Pinker, 2012, 2018), as well as official state discourse on the English prison as presented in prison reports by HM Inspectorate of Prisons, state violence in the form of imprisonment is narrated as *rational*, on which basis the prison is portrayed as a predominantly pacifying and civilised institution. This stands in contrast to the abolitionist literature (e.g. Davis, 2003; Davis, et al., 2021; Scott, 2018, 2018b; Scott & Codd, 2010; Sim, 2009, 2017) describing how prisons can be understood as anything but civilised given their harmful regime which expresses itself in architecture, bureaucratic processes, insufficient health care, and even deaths. The *rational* and *civilised* imagination of Western punishment can be identified as based on the Enlightenment argument that assumes *rationality* to be non-affective (Williams, 2001; Seifert, 1992; Stoler, 2007). Simultaneously, emotions are given some consideration as it is suggested that they

play a role in the constitution and continued existence of states and institutions as *rational* entities of power (Arendt, 1970; Bauman, 1989; Collins, 1974; Elias, 1998, 2000; Foucault, 1977; Weber, 2002). However, emotions are conceptualised as that which should be controlled through *rationality*.

A decidedly affective understanding of the prison remains absent in all these bodies of work. Yet, they prompt a paradoxical observation that is worth exploring: the framing of the prison as civilised based on the idea of a non-affective *rational* institution of state punishment, while simultaneously suggesting emotions do play a part in constituting and sustaining this institution. It ultimately motivates the theoretical and methodological exploration within this thesis of the prison as an affective institution. Accordingly, the sociological problem that constitutes this research is consolidated by (i) a political and moral necessity that demands a more nuanced understanding of the continued state legitimisation of the prison as a supposedly more civilised institution based on a *rational* argument that claims to be non-affective, and (ii) explanatory limitations in theoretical models in state theory, political sociology, and criminological research that offer limiting frameworks for *thinking the prison affectively*.

It is to emphasize that central to researching the prison as an *affective* institution is problematising and questioning the idea of the prison as a *rational* institution; *rational* in the Enlightenment sense that assumes *rationality* to be non-affective (Barrett, 1992; Gatens, 1992; Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983; Meštrović, 1988, 1998; Stoler, 2007; Whitford, 1988; Williams, 1998, 2001). This thesis therein critiques the idea that *affect* would not play a central role in the development and continued existence of prisons. This leaves this PhD with the task of establishing *rationality* as an elusive idea that is problematic when it is not questioned. The notion of the *rational* prison, however, is seldom questioned – one could even argue evades criticism – because the idea of the *rational* prison is reified based on the sociocultural value ascribed to *rationality*, which does not easily surrender to being interrogated (Ahmed, 2006; Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983; Seifert, 1992; Stoler, 2007). As will become apparent in due course, it is an intricate endeavour to trace the idea of the '*rational* prison' back to one definite argument or body of work. Rather, the idea of *rationality*, in the Enlightenment sense, reveals itself in subtle ways in theoretical approaches, and the official discourse on the English prison. Therefore, carefully

dissecting rationalising accounts as portrayed in theoretical accounts, and officially sanctioned prison narratives, will be the subject of this research for the purpose of exploring the prison affectively.

Critically regarding the concept of *rationality* brings awareness to how research and theory around institutions like the prison are epistemologically shaped, as it shows that conceptual ideas around state, punishment and institutions carry cultural-philosophical ideals. As this thesis challenges the idea of the *rational* prison, *thinking the prison affectively* is reliant on a paradigmatic shift. This is pursued by drawing on feminist epistemologies (Ahmed, 2006; Berlant, 2005; Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983; Jaggar, 1989; Smith, 1974) that enable the critical interrogation of the Enlightenment idea of *rationality* and set the tone for the Critical Discourse Analysis of prison reports as an artefact of the official discourse on prisons. As will be outlined shortly, the feminist position adopted in this research allows for the critical contention of *rationality* as a non-affective concept that gained and continues to reproduce popularity in academic and political discourses since the Enlightenment, and which is equally all-encompassing yet inconspicuous in the discourses around the English prison.

The destabilization of *rationality* along feminist epistemologies equally informs the theoretical approach this research takes. The affective exploration of the prison draws on a re-reading of Durkheim (Barnwell, 2018; Durkheim, 1953, 1957, 1958, 1973; Karsenti, 2012, 2013; Meštrović, 1988; Mukherjee, 2006; Weiss, 2012; Weyher, 2012, 2012a), and cultural affect studies (Ahmed, 2014; Sedgwick, 2003). These two bodies of work build the foundation on which the concept of the *affective moral fact* will be developed with the aim for it to serve as an explanatory framework for theorising the prison as an affective institution in conjunction with the methodological exploration that embraces Critical Discourse Analysis in creative and imaginative ways.

Aiming to clarify the positioning of this research as well as my own feminist standpoint as a researcher (1.1), this introduction commences with briefly outlining the epistemological convictions this thesis bases itself in (1.1.1). This aims to make transparent under which lens this research has been established and should be engaged with. Followed by the epistemological delineation this thesis positions itself in, the 'affective' prison is briefly positioned within contemporary criminological accounts

(1.1.2) exemplifying further why it is the prison that should be researched as an affective institution. Establishing the theoretical gap this PhD situates itself in (1.1.3) is then subsequently followed by outlining how the affective exploration of the prison is approached (1.2) along the central research question and objectives (1.2.1) and aims (1.2.2). Finally, an overview of the thesis is provided (1.3). Within this, the introduction aims to offer a brief navigation of the rather complex argument that is to follow, as it provides a summary of central ideas underlying this thesis as well as a sketch of key concepts – such as: *affect*, *rationality*, *affect/rationality dichotomy*, *prison*, *affective moral fact* – that carry the thesis in its goal to explore the prison as an affective institution.

1.1 Positioning the Research and the Researcher

Following Foucault (1977), prisons are understood as official institutions of punishment that are confined places, in which bodies of those incarcerated are disciplined. Qualified through their strict management of time and place, and a prison regime that reserves the legal right to discipline bodies with violence, bodies are expected to institutionalise the many rules and disciplinary measures of the institution with the purpose to create *docile bodies* (Foucault, 1977). In this fashion, prisons have come to dominate the punitive landscape since the end of the 18th century in Western Europe (Foucault, 1977).

What makes English prisons of particular interest for exploring them as an *affective* institution is their continued reliance and use of violence legitimized through a *rational* argument. Thereby the argument proclaims prisons to be non-affective in an Enlightenment tradition which simultaneously elevates an idea of civility, as violence is facing particular pressure when it comes to its legitimisation (e.g. see Latour, 1993; Reemtsma, 2013; Sofsky, 1996; Stoler, 2007; Williams, 2001). In the following, the central argument of those *rational* academic accounts that initially motivated the affective exploration of the prison will be briefly outlined and problematised. They will be challenged under a critical lens that is informed by feminist epistemologies.

For this purpose, the epistemological standpoint in which this thesis positions itself will be briefly sketched out before being returned to in more detail later in the methodological discussion, where it is presented as a *Paradigmatic Shift Towards Seeing the World Affectively* (Chapter IV).

Positioning the epistemological convictions of the researcher in this opening chapter ultimately serves as a pivotal point for positioning the prison along criminological accounts (see 1.1.2) that again turn our attention to why the exploration of the prison as an affective institution is a worthwhile endeavour. This is followed by briefly introducing the theoretical body of work (see 1.1.3), whose arguments are challenged yet taken forward for the purpose of theoretically and methodologically exploring the prison.

1.1.1 The Affective Exploration of the Prison: A Feminist Endeavour

Rational accounts of the state and its institutions attend to emotions to varying degrees as they address precedent-setting questions in Western sociology around power and social order. Therein, Hobbes' contractarian ideas ([1651]1960) on how social order is possible have been adopted as an unquestioned status quo in sociology (Filippov, 2013), as the Enlightenment idea of *rationality* became central in explaining the monopolisation of power and violence through the state. Highly rationalised understandings that emphasise the control of emotions through *rationality* as the driving force leading to civilisation processes under a social contract, have been developed and promoted in the works of Parsons (1949,1967), Giddens (1991), Wagner (2003), Beck (1992) and Pinker (2012, 2018). These agenda-setting sociologists have been criticised for their favouring of positivist, functionalist and over-rationalising accounts that write emotions out of academic discourses (Filippov, 2013; Karsenti, 2012; Meštrović, 1988, 1998; Turner, 1993; Weiss, 2012; Weyher, 2012a; Williams, 2001). Critically engaging and re-reading Hobbes' work ([1651]1960) suggests however that the central motivator for the cohesion of society under a social contract has been affect – predominantly fear. Yet, *rationality* as the capacity to judge independent of emotions has been celebrated as that which fuelled supposed civilisation processes in the West, as it takes centre stage in highly rationalised explanatory frameworks like the ones mentioned above.

These accounts rely on *rationality* as an explanatory framework but also as an epistemological standpoint that carries the philosophical heritage of the Enlightenment. While the works of Filippov (2013), Meštrović (1988, 1998) and Williams (1998, 2001) critically address the role and meaning of *rationality* somewhat more directly in its sense-giving and structuring capacity, it is feminist epistemologies (Ahmed, 2006; Barad, 2003; Barrett, 1992; Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983; Jaggar, 1989; Rose, 1983; Smith, 1974) that succinctly place *rationality* as a patriarchal concept that holds particular notions of being and feeling. Standpoint feminist accounts as represented in the works of Haraway (1991), Harding (1986) and Hartsock (1983) destabilise the idea of *rationality* as a non-affective concept. They argue and identify the non-affective understating of *rationality* as a Cartesian construct, in which the idea of non-affective rationality is produced through a division to emotions. Thereby, the Cartesian bracketing off of affect manifests the portrayal of what rationality ought to be imagined as in popular Western discourses. The idea of *rationality* as a non-affective concept that opposes affect, is established as the *affect/rationality dichotomy* in this thesis, since it seems to be this dichotomous thinking that informs theorising and researching the prison to varying degrees. The epistemological dissection therefore becomes essential in the affective exploration of the prison.

Just like *rationality* itself, the idea of the *rational* prison is hardly ever challenged, since a patriarchal understanding of *rationality* as a non-affective construct depicts a valued reification that is not only dominant in academic discourses of the West, but also in popular political and quotidian accounts of life (Barrett, 1992; Gatens, 1992; Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983; Jaggar, Meštrović, 1988, 1998; Stoler, 2007; Whitford, 1988; Williams, 1998; 2001). Since *rationality* is ascribed central sociocultural value, on which basis Western states claim to be civilised, especially in the context of their relationship to violence, *rationality* becomes reified as a non-affective concept that needs careful tracing and dissection for it to be critically interrogated (Ahmed, 2006; Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983; Seifert, 1992; Stoler, 2007). Feminist epistemologies allow us to excavate *rationality* as a reification and to problematise it as a patriarchal concept. This ultimately opens the debate: what has hitherto been seen as *rational* – for instance the prison – can and should be explored as *affective*.

Critically regarding *rationality* along feminist epistemologies, equally demonstrates that this thesis operates along two different ideas of *rationality*: one that follows an Enlightenment tradition that emphasises a supposed non-affective essence of rationality through the anchoring of *rationality* in a Cartesian dualism to affect, and one that positions *rationality* as a patriarchal and affective way of being and thinking. One ultimately challenges the other. Throughout the thesis it will be clarified, if not obvious in the context of this argument, which idea of *rationality* is referred to. Succinctly put: This thesis aims to apply the feminist understanding of rationality as an *affective* and patriarchal concept in its exploration of the prison as an affective institution to develop more nuanced understandings of it.

Following a feminist epistemology in this endeavour demands challenging theory and research that continuously rely on rationalised and patriarchal accounts of the state and its institutions. Next to challenging the idea of *rationality* as a non-affective concept, feminist epistemologies help to destabilise the notion that sociological research is detached from the situatedness of those that operationalise a non-affective conceptualisation of *rationality* in their work (Ahmed, 2006; Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983). As they allow us to see that rationalising arguments apply a patriarchal lens on the world, feminist epistemologies equally demand that we transparently place the research and the researcher. Accordingly, centring the affective exploration of the prison in feminist epistemology, in a way that fundamentally challenges rationalising and patriarchal accounts along a standpoint feminist approach (Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983), also means embracing my situatedness as a white, cis-gendered, sapphic, middle-class woman as a vantage point to consider rationalising and patriarchal accounts of the state and its institutions.

It is this epistemological pivot that allows us to decidedly address the academic and moral necessities that have been earlier addressed as key motivators for researching the prison as an affective institution, since this paradigmatic shift offers the opportunity to unpack the paradoxical basis of prisons and to unravel the challenging complexities of exploring the prison affectively.

1.1.2 The 'Affective' Prison in England in Contemporary Criminological Accounts

The epistemological pivot helps to navigate the paradoxical characteristics of the prison which are the point of departure of this research. To recap: As suggested in popular academic and official discourse, the prison is narrated as an institution in which affect does not play a central role, when simultaneously prisons seem to be essentially characterised by it. To further problematise the idea of the *rational*, non-affective prison and carve out the critical perspective this thesis adopts, the Guillotine is introduced as a brief example to illustrate this argument further.

Considering the Guillotine as a once newly established form of legitimate state punishment, demonstrates how a purely rationalised argument became a blueprint for the legitimisation of state violence until the present day. Just like the prison, the Guillotine was built on the pillars of the Enlightenment and legitimised new violent practices based on rationality, utilitarianism, positivism and the growing influence of science (DiMascio, 2009; Foucault, 1977; Garland, 1991; Ignatieff, 1978; Schlieper, 2008; Spierenburg, 1984; Traoré, 2012). The technical machinery of the apparatus promised efficient, less emotional and sanitised state killing. A critical view on this state punishment however discloses that it became a matter of aesthetics (Garland, 1991), of a changing façade of how state violence was constructed and portrayed. Public decapitations became a spectacle where vengeance, fear and morbid fascination dominated the atmosphere (Schlieper, 2008). Therein, the Guillotine became a public stage which had approving and legitimising effects on punishment through the sentiments of bystanders, just as much as it became an institution to control the emotions of the crowd and beyond. Infamously, the practice descended into the *Reign of Terror* where thousands of citizens were beheaded in the name of the newly established *rationality* of the modern state (Schlieper, 2008). Thus, the Guillotine does not mark a pivotal point for the more civilised use of state violence in modern history. Instead, it heralded continued barbaric measures under a rationalising narrative of the state (Garland, 1991; Meštrović, 1993; Traoré, 2012). This rationality thereby depicts a particular orchestration of affect around state violence. That this orchestration is dangerous was already recognised by the infamous Marquis de Sade who offered a sobering view on the Enlightenment and cautioned against its conceptualisation of rationality (Sade, 2009). As he watched how Paris struggled to make graves for the

thousands of bodies the *Reign of Terror* left behind, he deliberated that the new morality of the Enlightenment – driven by rationality – nurtures vice and sophistry (Airaksinen, 1995; Schaeffer, 1999). Accordingly, *rationality*, or the practice of rationalisation, became a moral practice that served to mask human desires.

Taking this slight detour via the Guillotine accentuates the paradoxical relationship between civility, rationality and affect. Seeing that the *rational* prison was born out of the motivation to punish differently, more efficiently, and less emotionally, the *birth of the prison* was driven by the same Enlightenment philosophy as the Guillotine was (Foucault, 1977). The point is that the prison, just like the Guillotine, does not seem to find its origin in *rational* affect-averse convictions, but was a new and different portrayal and orchestration of the sentiment of the masses that shifted and reflected popular social sentiments. This suggests that prisons were born out of an affective desire that is inherent in the *rational* argument. This example equally demonstrates that *rational* punishment is neither less harmful nor less emotional. The civility of the prison has been fundamentally questioned in critical criminological and abolitionist works (Burton & Carlen, [1979]2013; Cohen & Taylor, 1972; Carlton & Sim, 2018; Coleman & Sim, 2013; Davis, 2003; Davis, et al., 2021; Scott, 2018, 2018a, 2018b; Scott & Codd, 2010; Sim, 2009, 2015, 2017, 2019; Sim & Tombs, 2009). There, prisons in England and Wales are proven to be continuously harmful and dangerous institutions of punishment.

Critical approaches illustrate how the 'punitive turn' from the mid-1970s onwards provoked encompassing rationalisation processes that expanded and intensified state punishment (Cohen, 1985; Coleman & Sim, 2013; Sim, 2009) which can be traced to the present day (Howard League of Penal Reform, 2021; Prison Reform Trust, 2021). These measures are continuously defended and justified within official government discourse on the basis of *rationality*, that finds its expression in the progressing proliferation of bureaucratic processes and policies (Burton & Carlen, [1979]2013; Cohen, 1985; Coleman & Sim, 2013; Sim, 2009). The state narrative amplifies the official imaginary of state punishment as more measured, less brutal and harm-reducing because of its celebration as a *rational* way of executing state violence (Garland, 1991, 2001). In contrast, critical criminological and abolitionist accounts create a counter narrative to official state discourse demonstrating that prisons are

failing institutions (Burton & Carlen, [1979]2013; Carlton & Sim, 2018; Sim, 2017; Sim & Tombs, 2009). Far from being 'civilised' or a symbol of pacifying processes of state violence, they illustrate how those that are under the direct care of the state in prisons are neglected with dangerous and harmful consequences. As such, prisons have exacerbating effects that intensify inequalities (Davis, 2003; Wacquant, 1999, 2001), violence, harm and suffering (Carlton & Sim, 2018; Coyle & Scott (eds.), 2021; Scott, 2018b; Sim, 2015, 2017, 2019).

This has been recently emphasised, as research shows how the Covid-19 pandemic disproportionally affects prisoners with higher infection and death rates compared to the rest of society (Grierson, 2021) as the virus can spread easily in the overcrowded prisons in England and Wales constituting further security and health risks (Ismail, 2020; Heard, 2021; Sturge, 2020). And whilst the critical and abolitionist body of research evidently shows that prisons are harmful institutions that are not effective, the state continually legitimises its existence and plans for the expansion of the prison complex based on further rationalising accounts (Scott, 2018a). These legitimising narratives have been otherwise addressed as essential for declaring the prison a patriarchal institution (Britton; 2000), whose critical investigation is necessarily seen as feminist work (Davis et al., 2021) which directly links to the previously outlined epistemological argument.

Rather than repeating the expert insights of critical and abolitionist accounts on the harmful character of prisons, this PhD pursues an implicit argument of this body of work that further motivates the affective exploration of the prison. Studying these accounts, it became clear that the harms of imprisonment cannot be understood or gleaned separately from affect. That emotions play a significant role in the prison on an interactional level has been directly addressed in another body of criminological work (Andersen & Jacobsen, 2019; Crawley, 2004; Crewe, et al., 2014; Laws & Crewe, 2015) which concerns itself with topics such as the emotional management of prisoners and prison staff, demonstrating that emotions play a central part in the quotidian life of imprisonment. And, in carceral geographies affect is made the central point for researching the built environment of prisons attesting that prisons are emotional places (Jewkes & Moran, 2017; Moran, et al., 2016).

Whilst there is no decisive discussion of the *affective* prison in the above accounts, they highlight that affect is involved when it comes to imprisonment, indicating that there is good reason to explore the prison affectively on an institutional level. They equally steer further attention to how prisons can be recognised as violent and harmful institutions in *rationalised* structures and how states orchestrate the state imaginary of being 'civilised' along a *rationalised* argument of punishment that is reliant on the idea of a *rational*, non-affective relationship with violence (Reemtsma, 2015; Sim & Tombs, 2009; Sofsky, 1996).

When prisons are discussed, approaches ultimately address violence. The discussion of violence is not central in this thesis, as the focus lies on the affective exploration of the prison. Yet, the conceptual understanding of violence is briefly outlined to position the prison and its various practices as violent practices of the state. Violence is an amorphous and contested concept across disciplines (Koloma Beck & Schlichte, 2014; Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois (eds.), 2003). The state's relationship with violence is a central topic in popular sociological theory of the historiography of Western states (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991; Parsons, 1949,1967; Pinker, 2012, 2018; Wagner, 2003) and in state theory and political sociology where a narrow, somatic understanding of violence dominates (Popitz, 1992; Reemtsma, 2013; Schinkel, 2010; Sofsky, 1996). The works of Collins (1974, 2008), and Scheff and Retzinger (2001) directly address violence with respect to emotions. While they conceptualise this on a societal level to some extent, the majority of work on emotions and violence remains on the interactional level.

This PhD conceptualises violence on an institutional level, since it explores the prison as an affective institution. The conceptualisation is informed by the understanding of violence as structural as outlined in Galtung's (1969) and Schinkel's (2010) work, by the feminist delineations on violence most prominently discussed by Cockburn (2012) and Kelly (1988), as well as the works of those that recognise that emotions play a central part in being violent (Collins, 1974, 2008; Scheff & Retzinger, 2001).

Galtung (1969) problematises a narrow and purely physical understandings of violence as presented in over-rationalised accounts of society based on the limitations they pose towards more complex understandings of the harms done in society. Instead, Galtung (1969) centres social injustice, and sees violence as a barrier for someone to achieve

their full potential. Schinkel (2010) argues that whilst Galtung has discussed violence on a structural level, his conceptualisation offers itself to be applied on an institutional level. In addition, Galtung (1969) recognised imprisonment as a violence that hinders people in pursuing their interests through their confinement. Further to this, the prison offers itself to be understood as an institution of Galtung's *structural violence* since violent experiences cannot be traced back to one or a group of individuals, rather violence is built into the structures of this very institution (Schinkel, 2010). This is more directly addressed in the works of feminist scholars in commentary on sexual and gender-based violence (Cockburn, 2012; Kelly, 1988). There, violence is thought as a continuum that is expressed through various practices of institutions and institutionalisation of patriarchal knowledge. This body of work accounts for the various forms of violence and focusses on shedding light on their impact. In prisons this continuum of violence finds for instance expression in the psychological burdens and self-harm of prisoners (Cohen & Taylor, 1972; Sim, 2017, 2019). Following this conceptualisation helps to further position the prison as a violent institution. It equally allows for prisons to be seen as more than a *rational*, non-affective and, therefore, more civilised version of state violence, whilst it further opens the discussion towards seeing this form of state punishment as relying on and expressing *affect*.

1.1.3 Theoretical Approaches for Affectively Exploring the Prison

So far, the positioning of the research outlined how over-rationalising approaches cannot account for a sufficient framework that allows for an affective exploration of the prison. This limitation seems to be owed to an epistemological basis that forecloses the centring of affect in thinking and research, and thereby limits a more critical engagement with the popular Enlightenment understanding of rationality. This thesis therefore turns to a body of work in state theory and political sociology (Arendt, 1970; Bauman, 1989; Collins, 1974; Elias, 1998, 2000; Foucault, 1977; Weber, 2002) that gives emotions more serious considerations as they simultaneously offer a more critical engagement with an over-rationalising narrative.

The works of Arendt (1970), Elias (1998, 2000), Bauman (1989), Foucault (1977) and Weber (2002) provide central impulses for researching the prison as an affective institution. Central to these accounts is the critical discussion of rationalisation processes. There, they allude that it needs more than the mere following of imagined,

non-affective rationalised state processes to continuously reproduce state violence. In this capacity, affect is addressed in varying degrees. Therein, this body of work helps to stress that there is more to the prison than over-rationalising accounts suggest in their emphasis on purely rational means of punishment within a bureaucratic apparatus. As this more critical body of work (Arendt, 1970; Bauman, 1989; Collins, 1974; Elias, 1998, 2000; Foucault, 1977; Weber, 2002) carries implications for the affective understanding of the prison, these deliberations have been thought of as potentially promising for providing a theoretical framework for *thinking the prison affectively*. However, considering this body of work under the feminist epistemological lens shows that emotions, or affect for that matter, are not considered a real point of investigation, even though their arguments suggest that emotions hold explanatory potential. What seems to prevail in most of these accounts is an Enlightenment understanding that stresses apparent controlling powers of a non-affective understanding of *rationality* over affect. This effectively ascribes affect a subordinate role in rationalisation processes in states and state institutions along an *affect/rationality dichotomy* that structures the theoretical argument. In this sense, these accounts try to find an answer to the prevailing of harmful rationalisation processes in a paradoxical account of *rationality* which brings the continuance of violence as well as a taming of it through an apparent non-affective *rationality*.

When looking at existing approaches within state theory, political sociology, and criminological research, it becomes apparent that there is no suitable explanatory framework that can fully capture the discrepancy between the imaginary of the *rational* prison and the implied affective qualities of the institution, let alone conceptualise the prison as an affective institution. Yet, they (Arendt, 1970; Bauman, 1989; Collins, 1974; Elias, 1998, 2000; Foucault, 1977; Weber, 2002) offer critical arguments this research aims to contribute to and develop further.

It is believed that the theoretical basis for pursuing an affective exploration of the prison lies in a particular re-reading of Durkheim (Barnwell, 2018; Durkheim, 1953, 1957, 1958, 1973; Karsenti, 2012, 2013; Meštrović, 1988; Mukherjee, 2006; Weiss, 2012; Weyher, 2012, 2012a), and cultural affect studies (Ahmed, 2014; Sedgwick, 2003). Tending to these accounts offers to position *affect* in the centre of sociological research.

Cultural and affect studies (e.g. Ahmed, 2004; Berlant, 2005; Hunter, 2015; Stoler, 2007) discuss the importance of affect in politics, governance and culture, and in this way deliver substantial impulses for the affective exploration of the prison. It is their conceptualisation of *affect* (Ahmed, 2010, 2014; Berlant, 2005, 2009, 2011; Sedgwick, 2003) that is of particular importance.

Affect is perceived as an elusive concept which has been emphasised as the reason why sociological research does not pursue a vaster interest in it (von Scheve, 2016), even though not tending to it generates limitations in research (Barnwell, 2018). In this thesis, *affect* is conceptualised along the central works of Ahmed (2010, 2014), Berlant (2005, 2009, 2011) and Sedgwick (2003). Therein, *affect* is understood as socioculturally constructed as it is a relational force between animate and inanimate bodies. The key here is that *affect* stresses the material aspects of *feeling* which means that it recognises and includes bodies. This remains mostly absent in dominating understandings of emotions that prominently conceptualise emotions as abstract, as not necessarily anchored in the body and as potentially controllable through non-affective *rationality* (e.g. Goffman, 1959, 2005; Hochschild, 1979, 1983). This thesis favours *affect* as a concept that goes beyond understandings of *emotions,* as it captures that *affect* cannot be controlled through detached *rationality*. This allows us to understand *affect* as sense-givers and sense-makers in society (Ahmed, 2010, 2014; Berlant, 2005, 2009, 2011; Sedgwick, 2003) emphasising their epistemological value.

The conceptualisation of *affect* is embedded in the previously outlined feminist epistemologies (Ahmed, 2006; Berlant, 2005; Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983) that problematise the *affect/rationality dichotomy*. As *affect* does not rely on the patriarchal *affect/rationality dichotomy*, it is believed that over-rationalising accounts can be further critiqued as the affect-centric argument is explored. How exactly this Cartesian dichotomy represents a patriarchal way of thinking, will be discussed along the standpoint feminist argument as presented in the work of Harding (1986), Hartsock (1983) and Smith (1974) later in the thesis (see 4.1).

This understanding of *affect* (Ahmed, 2010, 2014; Berlant, 2005, 2009, 2011; Sedgwick, 2003) will be paired with a re-reading of Durkheim (1953, 1957, 1958, 1973) that aligns itself with a body of work (Barnwell, 2018; Lemert, 2006; Meštrović, 1988; Mukherjee, 2006; Weiss, 2012; Weyher, 2012, 2012a) in which Durkheim is

positioned as a sociologist that is invested in researching emotions, morality and the risks rationalising processes bring for the 21st century. Indeed, as Durkheim (2001, p. 156, original emphasis) pointed out:

> "The problem for sociology – if it can be said that there is *one* sociological problem – is to search through the various forms of external constraint for the various kinds of corresponding moral authority, and to discover their causes."

Durkheim paid close attention to social sentiments for exploring the state of morality in society, yet mainstream sociological accounts claim him to be a functionalist and positivist (Meštrović, 1988, 1998). Whilst sentiments did not experience serious considerations in state theory or political sociology of the last century, more recent works emphasise that emotions, and affect to some extent, are given more attention (Clough, 2007; Weyher, 2012a). However, *affect* has not been central to understanding institutions like the prison.

It is believed that Durkheim's deliberations (1953, 1957, 1958, 1973) offer themselves to work in conjunction with an understanding of affect as discussed in cultural affect studies. This has been equally pointed out in the work of Barnwell (2018) in which Durkheim is argued to be an affect theorist. Whilst this will be established in more detail in *Chapter II: Theorising Affect in Sociological Accounts of the State and its Processes*, it is pertinent to note here that Durkheim (1953, 1957, 1958, 1973) is equally believed to break with the *affect/rationality dichotomy* as addressed in affect and cultural studies, and feminist epistemologies. Therefore, Durkheim's work and affect studies seem to lend themselves to investigating the theoretical gap the affective exploration of the prison places itself in. In particular, they form the foundation for developing the concept, the *affective moral fact*, with the aim that it should serve as an explanatory framework for theorising the prison as an affective institution.

1.2 Towards Researching the Prison Affectively

So far, this introduction excavated the sociological problem this thesis addresses. This will be fully addressed and thoroughly dissected in the following three chapters (Chapter II, III and IV). It has been established how an affective exploration is missing

from, and owed to, an epistemological basis that seems to dominate accounts in criminology, state theory and political sociology. This Enlightenment heritage is believed to be the key factor in a missing affective exploration of prisons as it brings a patriarchal, non-affective understanding of rationality. Therefore, for exploring an affective understanding of the prison, the thesis adopts a standpoint feminist approach which marks an epistemological shift towards seeing and understanding the world affectively. This intends to open the discussion towards an affective exploration of the prison and informs theory, methodology and methods.

1.2.1 Research Question and Research Objectives

Accordingly, the research question is:

What are the theoretical and methodological possibilities to explore the prison as an affective institution?

The prison will be explored as an affective institution by pursuing the following research objectives:

(i) Excavating the research gap the thesis positions itself in through the exploration of how the prison has been addressed affectively in state theory, political sociology, and criminological works.

(ii) Critically investigating the epistemological basis, that accounts in state theory, political sociology, and criminology base themselves in while establishing a feminist-epistemological lens this thesis embraces.

(iii) Developing a theoretical framework that centres *affect.*

(iv) Establishing a methodological and analytical framework that allows for the affective exploration of the official discourse on the prison in England and Wales along feminist epistemologies.

Whilst objectives (i) and (ii) have been addressed above (see 1.1), objective (iii) is pursued in this thesis by developing the theoretical concept the *affective moral fact*, and objective (iv) is addressed through developing a *Critical Discourse Analysis* framework for investigating official discourse on the prison in England.

The *affective moral fact* is developed along the conceptual understanding of *affect* as presented in cultural and affect studies (Ahmed, 2010, 2014; Berlant, 2005, 2009, 2011; Sedgwick, 2003) and a re-reading of Durkheim (Barnwell, 2018; Durkheim, 1953, 1957, 1958, 1973; Lemert, 2006; Meštrović, 1988; Mukherjee, 2006; Weiss, 2012; Weyher, 2012, 2012a), in particular his deliberations on the *moral fact* (1953). In brief, the *affective moral fact* aims to anchor affect in the critical-sociological considerations on the prison, as it allows us to recognize affect as playing an essential part in how institutions are developed and structured around dominating sentiments and moral convictions in a particular time and place. It thereby aims to provide a theoretical frame through which the prison can be explored affectively.

The epistemological shift taken in this thesis facilitates the development of a methodological and analytical frame for researching the prison through an affective lens. This is achieved through undertaking a Foucauldian *Critical Discourse Analysis* (Jäger, 2015) of the official discourse of prisons in England and Wales, by means of an interrogation of prison reports by HM Inspectorate of Prisons. In particular, prison reports of HMP Birmingham, HMP Liverpool and HMP Pentonville covering a period of nearly 40 years (1982-2019) will be discursively analysed. As will be established in *Chapter IV: A Paradigmatic Shift Towards Seeing the World Affectively*, official prison reports seem to emphasise non-affective, *rational* characteristics of the prison along the same narrative that has been identified as dominating in state theory, political sociology, and criminological approaches. Informed by previous research that point out the challenges over-rationalised, bureaucratic language in official discourses pose (Burton & Carlen, [1979]2013), the *Critical Discourse Analysis* is extended through a threefold framework that: (i) places a particular affective focus on language (Koschut 2017, 2017a), (ii) embraces imagination for critical and creative research of rationalisation processes (Mills, 2000), and (iii) places official prison photographs under analysis employing the works of Barthes (2000), Berger (2013) and Sontag (1978, 2003).

1.2.2 Research Aims

Pursuing the theoretical and methodological exploration of the affective prison as outlined above, this thesis intents to achieve the following aims:

(i) Developing a critical counter reading of the official discourse on the prison in England and Wales through the Critical Discourse Analysis of official prison narratives under an affective lens.

(ii) Establishing a conceptual framework with the *affective moral fact* that allows to effectively theorise the prison as an affective institution.

(iii) Demonstrating that there is value in embracing feminist epistemologies as well as imaginative and creative approaches to sociological research for the purpose of generating more nuanced understandings.

In general, this thesis aims to provide a unique contribution to a more complex understanding of the prison through the exploration of the prison as an affective institution.

1.3 Mapping out the PhD

The thesis opens up the exploration of the prison as an affective institution by reviewing sociological accounts of the state and its processes in lieu of their addressing of *rationality* and *affect*. *Theorising Affect in Sociological Accounts of the State and its Processes* (Chapter II) thereby critically reviews predominantly sociological works (e.g. Bauman, 1989; Elias, 1998, 2000; Foucault, 1977; Weber, 2002) to further carve out the research gap in which the thesis is positioned. It is also within this second chapter that the re-reading of Durkheim's work (Barnwell, 2018; Durkheim, 1953, 1957, 1958, 1973; Meštrović, 1988; Weiss, 2012; Weyher, 2012, 2012a) is introduced. This becomes central in offering a sketch of the *affective moral fact* that conflates Durkheim's *moral fact* (1953) with *affect* (Ahmed, 2014; Sedgwick, 2003). The following chapter, *Positioning the 'Affective Prison' in Contemporary Criminological and Sociological Debates* (Chapter III) reviews prison and criminal justice system research with a particular focus on emotion (e.g. Andersen & Jacobsen, 2019; Bergman Blix & Wettergren, 2018; Karstedt, 2002, 2015; Laws & Crewe, 2016), explores the possibilities of understanding the prison affectively by discussing

research on the affectivity of prison design (e.g. Jewkes, 2012, 2013; Jewkes & Moran, 2017; Moran, et al., 2016), and outlines central arguments of critical and abolitionist prison research (e.g. Burton & Carlen, [1979]2013; Carlton & Sim, 2018; Cohen, 1985; Cohen & Taylor, 1972; Davis, 2003; Garland, 1991; Scott, 2018b; Scott & Codd, 2010; Sim, 2009) to further position the research. It is also within this chapter that an understanding of the prison as a patriarchal institution (Acker, 1990; Britton, 2000; Nagel, 2013) is established which illustrates that *rationality*, and the *rational* institution for that matter, depicts a specific vantage point which dominates many sociological and criminological accounts.

This argument leads into the following chapter – *Chapter IV: A Paradigmatic Shift Towards Seeing the World Affectively* – in which the limiting epistemology of seeing the prison within an *affect/rationality dichotomy* is shifted towards seeing the world affectively on the basis of feminist scholarship (e.g. Ahmed, 2006; Berlant, 2005; Flax, 1992; Haraway, 1991; Hartsock, 1983). This further exposes the gendered nature that is supposedly hidden beneath *rationality*, as feminist critiques of knowledge production recognise the (re)production of a limited, patriarchal view that asserts the claim of generalisation through the imposition of *rationality*. Undermining *rationality* from a standpoint feminist approach reveals the importance of researching affect as well as researching *with* affect. On this basis, the methodical and methodological framework is outlined as a Foucauldian *Critical Discourse Analysis* (Jäger, 2015) which permits for the critical and imaginative reading of the textual and visual content of prison reports. Prison reports are therein discussed as official state documents that are illustrative of the Enlightenment origin of rationalised narratives, which is also reflected in the dominating academic discourses.

The findings chapters (Chapters V, VI and VII) then trace affect in three ways. First, the thesis discursively analyses the textual body of prison reports. Second, it embraces imagination to creatively question the state narrative. Third, this thesis visually analyses official photographs for the purpose of establishing a counter narrative that will elevate the affectivity of the prison. These are followed by *Theorising the Prison as an Affective Institution Alongside the Affective Moral Fact* (Chapter VIII) where the research question – *What are the theoretical and methodological possibilities to explore the prison as an affective institution?* – is addressed by discussing *rationality*

as an *affective moral fact.* This allows us to further position the prison as an affective institution and to illustrate the explanatory scope of the concept. The concluding chapter, *Conclusion – Situating the Prison as an Affective Institution (Chapter IV)*, evaluates what it means to understand the prison affectively and places the research within wider sociological debates. It is also here that the potential, as well as limitations, of the research are addressed.

Chapter II: Theorising Affect in Sociological Accounts of the State and Its Processes

This chapter carves out the theoretical ideas and concepts that this thesis grows within and out of. Here, the thesis will begin to outline and develop the conceptual framework of the *affective moral fact* which guides the affective exploration of the prison throughout this research.

As has been outlined in the *Introduction*, exploring the prison affectively arises out of a twofold problematic: a political and an academic one. The former emanates out of the political motivation to understand the role of the *rational* argument for the continued existence of prisons in England and Wales. While the political and academic necessity for the affective exploration of the prison are related, here the primary focus is on the latter as this chapter explores limitations in state theory and political sociology in the first part.

Sociological accounts that rely on an over-rationalising approach to state violence, seem to have a limiting explanatory merit when it comes to understanding what constitutes the continuous justification of state violence (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991; Parsons, 1949, 1967; Pinker, 2012, 2018; Wagner, 2003) as they argue Western democratic states as benevolent and peaceful projects under the umbrella of *rationality*. Works like these, implicitly deny affect a central role in modern states through their unquestioned reliance on a *rational* argument. These accounts simultaneously overlook that it is *rationality* that becomes the legitimator for the continued state violence and atrocities, whilst it is equally used to classify said states as civilised (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1989; Bauman, 1989; Latour, 1993; Meštrović, 1993). As they do not recognise rationality as a dangerous narrative to manifest state power (Flax, 1992), these approaches replicate narratives of rationality as a non-affective idea that legitimise the continuance of state violence and produce explanatory blind spots.

To accentuate the theoretical gap, this chapter discusses those accounts in predominantly sociological theory which implicitly or explicitly address emotions as they are critical towards rationalisation processes of the state, its processes and institutional forms (e.g. Arendt, 1970; Bauman, 1989; Collins, 1974; Elias, 1998, 2000; Foucault,

1977; Reemtsma, 2013; Weber, 2002). Discussing these theoretical accounts opens the debate of how an affective exploration of imprisonment offers itself for potentially more complex understandings of state violence as it shows the limitations as well as chances that develop out of this theoretical critique.

These important impetuses are then further explored in the second part of this chapter where the conceptual frame of the *affective moral fact* will be sketched out. The *affective moral fact* relies on Durkheim's sociological deliberations (1957, 1958, 1973), in particular his *moral fact* (1953), and an extension thereof through the conceptualisation of *affect* that is situated in cultural and feminist studies (Ahmed, 2010, 2014; Berlant, 2005, 2009, 2011; Sedgwick, 2003). There the chapter seeks to develop theoretical ideas that will be returned later in the thesis.

The purpose of this chapter is to directly approach the research question – *What are the theoretical and methodological possibilities to explore the prison as an affective institution?* – by seeing to how prisons can be affectively understood based on the existing theoretical literature, and what framework allows us to approach the prison affectively.

2.1 Emotions and Rationality in State Sanctioning

In Foucault's work, the birth of the modern prison is discussed as a marker of new trajectories in state power where rationality is used to legitimate modern violence and discipline (Foucault, 1977). Therein rational, non-affective qualities like the prison's apparent more humanitarian approach and utilitarian purpose are questioned to the extent that Foucault (1977) problematises the existence of the institution in itself. These disciplining processes in modern states are bound to a particular power-knowledge relationship that reproduces discourses on the rational state that suffuse society beyond the prison's walls as power is abstractly diffused and only manifested in relationships (Foucault, 2003).

As such, these new relationships meander their way into politics and other state institutions, and leave none of the social untouched as they are manifested in government processes. Respectively, Foucault has argued in his famous *Tanner Lecture "Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Criticism of 'Political Reason'"*:

> "[R]eason of state is not an art of government according to divine, natural, or human laws. It doesn't have to respect the general order of the world. It's government in accordance with the state's strength. It's government whose aim is to increase this strength within an extensive and competitive framework." (Foucault, 1981, p. 246)

This captures the constructivist character of *rationality* and enables us to explore how that what is seen as *rational* in states only has specific validity in a specific time and place. This argument also shines through in the concluding remark in Foucault's lecture. It is made clear that these rational and positivist frameworks in government delineate just one way of doing politics, and Foucault seems to insinuate that what can be constructed can be deconstructed:

> "Political rationality has grown and imposed itself all throughout the history of Western societies. It first took its stand on the idea of pastoral power, then on that of reason of state. Its inevitable effects are both individualisation and totalisation. Liberation can only come from attacking, not just one of these two effects, but political rationality's very roots." (Foucault, 1981, p. 254)

In this way, Foucault has exposed rationality as a disciplining framework in Western states that creates discourses of power-knowledge (Foucault, 2003) that, in turn, legitimise the continuance of violence (Foucault, 1977).

Weber's work similarly addresses the state's all-encompassing rationalisation processes with the concept of the *iron cage* (Weber, 2002). Placing these processes as the result of the revolution of the church, the rise of capitalism and a shift in human reasoning, the *iron cage* becomes a conceptual metaphor for our captivity within rationalisation processes. These processes are described as central to the legitimatising power of the state and the formation of a bureaucratic system that makes social practices measurable, predetermined, utilised and instrumentalised in order to achieve set goals in the most profitable way within a conglomerate of rationalised rules.

Similar to Foucault, Weber has criticised such developments however in a different tone and perhaps in a less strident manner. In Weber's work (2002), the concept of *disenchantment* conceptualises the fear that incessant rationalisation processes would depersonalise, routinize and eventually cause the fading of the legitimacy of the state that Weber has also seen in a potential emotional or 'pure' charismatic leadership (Weber, 2002). Whilst he has seen a growing rationalised apparatus as problematic, and shown that leadership in and outside of states can have an emotional and charismatic legitimacy, he has equally ascribed rationalised bureaucratisation processes high value on the basis that they can control emotions. In that way – in contrast to over-rationalised accounts of Weber that suggest a linear and normative celebration of rationality throughout his work (Cohen, et al., 1975) – Weber's ambiguous account leaves questions for the role of emotion and affect in the generation of state power and rationality itself, as he weaves in and out of emphasising the dangers of the disappearance of emotions (Barbalet, 1998; Goldman, 1992), whilst simultaneously celebrating bureaucratic accounts (Weber & Kalberg (ed), 2005). As such, Weber has equally embraced and rejected the Enlightenment heritage in his approach. This discrepancy has not been resolved in Weber's work, which maintains traces of this philosophy in ascribing rationality a continual controlling power over emotion.

One way to think of *disenchantment* slightly differently is to consider it as an affective social phenomenon in itself that does not capture the disappearance of charisma and emotions but an enchantment elsewhere. Just as Foucault argued that rationalisation processes did not pacify state violence but rather gave it a different form in a particular time and place (Foucault, 1977), *disenchantment* can be seen as shaping and portraying state emotions differently, or simply as changing attitudes and emotions. This argument is also supported somewhere else, where it is argued that rationalisation processes do not diminish emotions but rather portray emotions differently (Williams, 1998, 2001).

Whilst Weber does not explicitly unravel the meaning of emotions in his work, it seems that Foucault's account expects an implicit understanding of the central importance of emotions in society. More precisely, it is Foucault's conceptualisation of power that is thought with emotions in mind (Heaney, 2011). Heaney argues a

subtextual emotional theme in Foucault's work, as well as other classical works (Heaney, 2013), and makes the implicit emotionality of discipline and knowledge explicit, as he places them as central pillars of Foucault's concept of power. For Heaney (2011), power transpires in Foucault's approach as a specific emotional behaviour that is built within the person through the structural discipline that impacts the individual. What can be abstracted is that the prison relies on an imagination of how it must feel to experience the particular discipline and power that pervade the prison environment.

That prisons ought to have a particular atmosphere which is also constructed through the built environment has been emphasised in Bentham's deliberations on the *Panopticon* (Bentham, 1791) which famously offered the blueprint for Foucault's (1977) reflections on power and discipline. Contemporary works within carceral geographies (e.g. Jewkes & Moran, 2017; Jewkes, et al., 2017) mirror essential ideas of Bentham (1791) as they further explore the built environment of prisons in reference to emotion and affect. This is further addressed in the following *Chapter III: Positioning the 'Affective Prison' in Contemporary Criminological and Sociological Debates.*

Foucault however does something else that is elementary: he addresses the body (1977). In his work, he illustrates how punishment is always reliant on the corporeality of those that experience it. Whilst invasive punishment over a short amount of time has changed into state violence stretched over longer periods, that is imprisonment, state violence has not disappeared but rather appears differently from previous periods. With the *birth of the prison* (Foucault, 1977) violence has remained continuous yet manifested in a built structure that conceals state violence behind prison walls unable to be penetrated by the public, but still remain in the public sphere as a visible artefact of state violence. Foucault's conceptual understanding of power as a diffused entity in discourse therefore helps to reveal the newfound relationship between body and power. The disciplining of bodies through the microphysics of power in panoptic institutions and in the *carceral society* more generally, is irrevocably tied to knowledge; the knowledge of how bodies need to be disciplined to achieve a desired outcome: *docile bodies* (Foucault, 1977).

Along Foucauldian lines, knowledge of bodies and emotions can be argued as intricate parts of the so-called rationalisation processes of modern states. And yet, over-rationalised arguments deny the body a central focus at the expense of a shift in punishment that apparently only targets the mind.

This is reflected in Reemtsma's (2013) work in which modern state sanctioning becomes an instrumentalised form of physical violence. The purely physical understanding of violence is seen separate from psychological or social facts, or construction of meaning such as motivation, power relations, terror or lust etc. (Reemtsma, 2013: 106). There, incarceration is conceptualised as violence that is consummated on the body of the sanctioned, however with the emphasis that the state has no actual interest in the body as sanctioning is seen as pursuing a goal that lies outside of the violent act itself, which is what makes it *rational* violence that is justifiable (Reemtsma, 2013). Whilst Foucault's work emphasises that rationalised states continue to anchor punishment to the body which makes it a necessary focus of state violence (Foucault, 1977), Reemtsma (2013) pursues a line of argument that negates the central role of the corporeality of violent experiences, as he argues that modern state sanctioning is characterised through a disinterest in the body, which Reemtsma equally stresses as a key criteria of a modern state's relationship to violence. This rationalised understanding of state violence omits the continuously central role of bodies in modern sanctioning and the implicit role of emotions that has been carved out by Foucault (1977). Consequently, it can be said that rationalising accounts of state sanctioning like Reemtsma's (2013) limit more complex understandings of the continued violence of states, whilst they simultaneously support harmless and violence-averse ideas of states. The confrontation of the rationalised argument with Foucault's work (1977) emphasises that that there is a need to explore state sanctioning through bodies and emotions, to explore the prison affectively.

Foucault (1977) has addressed the state's reliance on bodies for the perpetual and continual use of violence as a guarantor for the stability of modern states as follows:

> "But a punishment like forced labour or even imprisonment – mere loss of liberty – has never functioned without a certain additional element of punishment that certainly concerns the body itself: rationing of food, sexual deprivation, corporal punishment, solitary confinement. […] There remains, therefore, a trace of 'torture' in the modern mechanisms of criminal justice – a trace that has not been entirely overcome, but which is enveloped, increasingly, by the non-corporal nature of the penal system." (Foucault, 1977, pp. 15-16)

This expounds that the relationship the state has with incarcerated bodies – its reliance on them and the simultaneous depersonalisation of punishment processes – is idiosyncratic if not paradoxical. In short: Rationalisation processes cannot rid themselves of bodies either as the objects or subjects of rationalised power.

Therefore, the works of Foucault (1977, 1981) and Weber (2002) invite us to think of prisons as a rationalised technique of state violence in an increasingly bureaucratic state apparatus; one that creates the imaginary of the prison as an emotionless, and therefore fairer and more rational, way of modern punishment as it simultaneously continues to rely on the corporeal dimension of it. Whilst both do not offer more detailed accounts of the role of emotions, their work directs the argument towards recognising that it is a special Enlightenment foundation that gives rise to and justifies rationalisation processes. This provides further reasons to interrogate underlying philosophical assumptions for rationalised forms of power and violence.

2.1.1 The Dangers of Rationalisation Processes

Both, Foucault, and Weber, have recognised that rationalisation processes are dangerous. For Weber, the particular danger lies within the bureaucratic orchestration of the state. Epitomised through the *iron cage,* rationalised processes become resistant to moral direction and ethical argument that lie outside of the rationalised framework of the state (Weber, 2002), so that the *iron cage* itself can be understood as having the potential to continuously reproduce rather harmful state practices. This line of argument is more explicitly discussed by Bauman (1989) and Arendt (1970) whose

works on political theory and philosophy likewise attend to central sociological questions of power, the state and the motivation behind state violence. They explicitly discuss to what kind of atrocities rationalisation processes, that argue in an overt absence of emotions, can lead to.

With the metaphor of a gardener who designs a 'flawless' and 'perfect' garden, who controls this plan with relentless measures, Bauman has illustrated the rationale behind the atrocities of Nazi Germany (Bauman, 1989). For the gardener to succeed, the gardener needs to annihilate anything that is proclaimed 'weed'. This analogy parallels modern Western states' aspiration of comprehensive control of nature and the social, for which rationalised narratives are instrumentalised to legitimate state violence. Bauman summarises:

> "When the modernist dream is embraced by an absolute power able to monopolize modern vehicles of rational action, and when that power attains freedom from effective social control, genocide follows." (Bauman, 1989, pp. 93-94)

Accordingly, violence, atrocities and even genocides become legitimised under a rational argument (Bauman, 1989). And it is this *rational argument* that proceeds in midst of Western democratic states and therefore portrays a potential breeding ground for violent acts that can be justified. What is missing in Bauman's (1989) gardener analogy is that this *rationality* describes a *certain desire to control*, as it actually points to an affective component or driver of rationality itself. This affective component of rationality has been emphasised in the works of Durkheim (1953, 1958, 1984, 2002), and nearly a hundred years later, Williams (1998) has argued *desire* at the centre of rationality. At the expense of disregarding the apparent affective qualities of rationalised state violence, Bauman continues to rely on the Enlightenment conviction of a more civilised society that is based in the same rational argument that manifests itself in rationalisation processes, which Bauman himself has evidently ascribed a dangerous potential (Bauman, 1989). Whilst the gardener analogy allows us to draw another conclusion on *rationality*, Bauman has ascribed rationality a pacifying potential because of its apparent controlling powers over emotions.

Arendt (1970) makes a clearer argument concerning how barbaric desire is solidified in rationalised, bureaucratic killing machineries. In *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (1970), Arendt does not discuss the bureaucratic system behind

the Holocaust affectively, but her work offers a clear insight into the explanatory shortcomings and the dangers of the rational argument when it comes to legitimized state violence. As she reveals how the state becomes a murderous machinery through a bureaucratic apparatus that is a rational structure and technological motor for unmatched cruelties, Arendt's (1970) work alludes that it needs more than an apparently emotion-void, rational apparatus for such state violence. Arendt (1970) has addressed sentiments indirectly as she has referred to a particular moral entrenchment that is needed to approve and commit killings in the name of the state. For Arendt (1970), the bureaucratic machinery of the state seems to rely on a moral foundation that is not neutral and rational in an Enlightenment sense but represents the particular desires of the state.

In her famous work on the Eichmann trial, Arendt (1970) describes how Eichmann defended his role and actions as chief orchestrator of the Holocaust by arguing he merely followed rules and procedures of the bureaucratic state apparatus. In this way, Eichmann has aligned a sense of duty and obedience with rationality which emanates into a rationalised duty to the killing apparatus, in which the individual agency is minimised. On this basis, he tried to evade responsibility for the deportation and killing of millions (Arendt, 1970). Arendt's argument rebuts Eichmann's depiction, as she has outlined how his actions require a sort of moral entrenchment; a conviction and will to follow through with such a murderous process. Arendt (1970) has illustrated the dangers of rationalised processes as she has shown how cruelties give the impression of being 'benign' in rationalised state discourses. As such, they silence suffering as they simultaneously downplay the role of desires, emotions or moral convictions that seem to be the actual motivator behind state violence.

Atrocities are made to appear 'normal', or even 'banal'. Arendt attributes the 'evil' in the title of her work (1970) to 'banality' which captures the illusion of a lack of affect under a bureaucratic and rationalised machinery. Usually referring to something that has no deeper meaning, something that is not important, that happens casually and is not given much emotional investment, the phrase 'the banality of evil' (Arendt, 1970) has a revelatory factor: the state narrative of Nazi-Germany made the atrocities appear

benign along a rationalised discourse that portrayed the cruelties as a justified necessity, a kind of duty, when actually the politics in Nazi-Germany were driven and entrenched with emotions (McLaughlin, 1996; Scheff, 1994).

In reference to the danger of rationalisation processes, Arendt has addressed a philosophical argument of morality. During the trial, Arendt has noted how Eichmann explained that he used to live by Kant's *categorical imperative* until he started work in the Nazi-regime (Arendt, 1970). Arendt, a Kantian herself, notes:

> "This was outrageous, on the face of it, and also incomprehensible, since Kant's moral philosophy is so closely bound up with man's faculty of judgment, which rules out blind obedience." (Arendt, 1970, p. 136)

This observation of Arendt is an interesting one, as it enables to partially reveal the paradoxical character of the role of *rationality* in bureaucratic processes, which, as will become apparent, is central to exploring the prison affectively. Kant's moral philosophy proclaims that it is 'pure' *rationality* in the form of the *categorical imperative* – which excludes emotions or any kind of propensities – that facilitates moral acting. Conversely, anything that is seen as immoral is understood as *irrational* and seen as acts that emanate out of desires, emotions or affect (Kant, [1786]2014).

To summarize Arendt's point (1970): Arendt's argument allows us to see bureaucratic processes as dangerous machineries, as they profess to be justified and neutral when they actually represent desires of the state that can obfuscate atrocious intentions. Therein, *rationality* has been addressed in respect to its affective merit. Interestingly though, it seems to be the Kantian thought of *rationality* that is firmly anchored in the Enlightenment construction of such bureaucratic processes. It is also the same Kantian idea of the Categorical Imperative (Kant, [1786]2014) that Arendt has used to stress Eichmann's responsibility whilst she has equally emphasised that Eichmann misunderstood Kant (Arendt, 1970).

What becomes obvious here, is that the argument around *rationality* in Kantian philosophy and its efficacy in bureaucratic processes is layered. Whilst there is certainly value in entangling and further investigating it, this cannot be done within this thesis. However, this sketch of this intricate argument points towards the complex and paradoxical character of *rationality* in state processes as it shows that *rationality* in itself cannot be thought without *affect*, and that what is addressed and judged to be

either moral or immoral is a matter that seems to be deeply connected to emotions. It further substantiates the above Foucauldian argument (1981), that insinuates *rationality* as a construct standing for particular ideas around affect and morality, and therefore more than the well-known idea of rationality as emotion-void. Arendt's work (1970) shows how *rationality* helps to create and support narratives that can lead to atrocities at the back of *rationality* as an emotion-void idea, when it actually seems to have affect at its centre, and how this narrative is equally used to claim morality for bureaucratic processes.

Whilst Arendt's work (1970) is situated within philosophy and political theory, it here also offers another important insight for sociological research, that is further pursued in a Durkheimian argument (Durkheim, 1953, 1957, 1958, 1973, 1984) which builds the conceptual foundation for exploring the prison affectively. Arendt has not explicitly researched the role of morality in society. Her work (Arendt, 1970), however, stresses how interlinked philosophy and sociology are. A close reading demonstrates that morality must be a built-in component in state machineries, which seem to be carried through affect. Durkheim was convinced that it is the practical research of morality in society that distinguishes sociology from philosophy (Meštrović, 1988). As he outlines in a Kantian rebuking way that people do not act, or act morally because of emotionless duty but because there is an actual emotion driven will to do so (Meštrović, 1988), Durkheim (1953, 1958) has emphasised the research of emotions as a way to gain insight in the moral state of society. The central understanding of emotions in Durkheim's work is further addressed and conceptually developed for this thesis in *2.2 Filling the Theoretical Gap: Taking Affect Seriously.*

2.1.2 Emotions in Rationalisation Processes

The above accounts on the dangers of rationalisation processes offer an implicit discussion of emotions which has been excavated. The following works directly address emotions in the context of state violence and therein give further impulses for the affective exploration of the prison.

For Sofsky (1996), it is not by pure chance that Western governments find their origin in rational contracts as they give rise to the changing appearance of violence as a legitimate resource the state can make use and sense of. As rationality is recognised as

carrying normative weight because of its ascribed values in Enlightenment thinking, Sofsky explains that it is the rationalisation of such contracts that permits state violence. Simultaneously, the special position rationality holds in Western states functions as a defence mechanism for critically challenging state processes that are evidently harmful. This equally makes state rationalised violence difficult to critique while only non-state violence is declared emotional, 'pathological' and/or pre-modern. And it is along these lines that Sofsky remarks that the barbarity modern states pretended to overcome never ended (Sofsky, 1996, p. 26).

Collins' work (1974) parallels this insight and further excavates the role of emotions as he claims that emotions never vanished in rationalised processes. Rather than pacifying society, they mobilise and structure violence, which he sees as the reason why violence as a social construct cannot be tamed in rationalisation processes. Collins (1974) therefore does not fear Weber's *disenchantment* (Weber, 2002). For him, rationalisation processes do not equal the gradual dissolving of emotions, but instead represent new and changing sentiments, as well as sentiments that are deemed undesirable but that are occluded by rationalisation processes (Collins, 1974). Hence, Collins concludes that rationalisation processes do not pacify society but symbolise a specifically modern dimension of cruelty (Collins, 1974). Whilst Collins' approach seems to criticise ideas of emotion-void rationalisation processes, and seemingly sets impulses for an affective discussion of the prison, he equally embraces arguments that seem to conceptualise rationalisation processes as emotion-supressing *and* controlling. Collins argues that violence becomes a "cruelty without passion" (Collins, 1974, p. 432) as the technological evolution makes it possible to depersonalise and de-empathise destruction and killing, "callous cruelty is maximal" (Collins, 1974, p. 432). Similar to Weber (2002), Collins' argument around rationality and emotions remains unresolved and ambiguous. However, it still further moves the focus on to the idea that state sanctioning cannot be thought without affect.

Meštrović equally discusses that rationality cannot tame violence. In contrast to Collins (1974) however, Meštrović (1993) anchors his argument in the deliberation that the Enlightenment could never tame barbarism in the first place as the imposed new norms did not reflect the actual desires of society. He outlines how states promote brutality and violence as they foster particular political or economic interests which

are narrated as legitimate aspirations on the basis of rational narratives (Meštrović, 1993). For him barbarism prevails as interests prevail (Meštrović, 1993). Attacking these rationalising accounts, Meštrović (1993) argues that society is not driven by rational ideas but by irrational desires that are anchored in the barbaric tendencies that remain in the structures of modernity. For Meštrović (1993), structures retain aspects of violence and brutality under rational, emotions-controlling and artificially introduced norms. It is on this basis that Meštrović (1993) declares barbarism very much alive, and modernity not civilised:

> "What the politicians (as well as many intellectuals) fail to see is that society cannot exist solely on the basis of social control. No amount of policing can act as a substitute for the spontaneous goodwill that makes citizens *want* to obey the law and preserve the social order." (Meštrović, 1993, pp. 62-63)

As Meštrović sees rationality as something that is artificially introduced, that is abstracted from real experiences and emotions, he argues a discrepancy between what society might feel about something and what a rationalised government does. Thus, he imparts the idea that rationality is somewhat detached from emotions while an actual understanding of rationality remains vague and unclear in his work (Meštrović, 1993). Even though Meštrović's argument recognises the central position of emotions in society, it limits an understanding of the state and its institutions as affective as he seems to partially rely on the Cartesian dichotomy between rationality and emotions. This finds expression in Meštrović's (1993) reliance on the 'rational' description of the state and the 'irrational' attribution to the desires of society. Although Meštrović (1993) emphasises the dangers of the continuance of violence grounded in rationalised state narratives, and thereby demonstrates the necessity to critique *rationality*, his work remains indefinite in relation to how emotions are made sense of in states and their processes.

Elias' (2000) work is an exception in this regard as he has discussed modern, bureaucratic states as continuously reliant on emotions and has ascribed emotions a central role in the development of Western states. For Elias (2000), sentiments are the motor for the change of practices that have become institutionalised through coercion. Elias (2000) has provided a framework through which punishment can be connected

to changing sensibilities. Whilst a shift in sentiments has also been recognised by Foucault (1977), Elias (2000) offers an explanatory frame through which the processes of changing sentiments can be understood.

For Elias (2000), it has been a growing bourgeois disgust in the early modern period along with new sentiments towards violence that fuelled the *civilizing process*. In this process, Elias (2000) has made violence the reference point from which modern 'civilised' societies distance themselves. Therein, Elias has emphasised that violence is a pre-modern human affect that needs to be suppressed through coercion by the state. Thereby, state violence is conceptualised as 'coercion' that ought to control and contain non-state violence. As such, Elias' coercion (2000) is the "the cosh of pacification" (McGarry & Walklate, 2021, p. 19).

The control of affects through coercion finds its conceptualisation in Elias' (2000) *figuration*, which describes a mesh of interdependency of psychogenesis and sociogenesis that bridges – as Koloma Beck and Schlichte describe (2014, p. 147) – the historical transitions of human structures of affect and their relation to structural changes of society. What makes civilised societies pacifying in Elias' account (2000) is the control of expectations through the coercion of emotions which makes life more reliable and calculable. This coercion is an ongoing rationalisation process of affect that is supposed to liberate humans from their innate emotions through their control (Elias, 2000). Whenever humans cannot control their emotions, episodes of war and violence would follow, which would become moments of weaknesses, which Elias (2000) called *decivilizing spurts* (Fletcher, 1995). Interestingly though, Elias (2000) did not connect state violence with emotions, let alone outbursts of sentiment, like he does when talking about violence that is not committed by the state. Instead, one of the few things he says about state violence is:

> "Through the formation of monopolies of force, the threat which one man represents for another is subject to stricter control and becomes more calculable. Everyday life is freer of sudden reversals of fortune. *Physical violence is confined to barracks*; and from this store-house it breaks out only in extreme cases, in times of war or social upheaval, into individual life." (Elias, 1998, p. 57, my emphasis)

Elias' description (2000) of the civilising process therein creates the impression that violence is not only controlled in the ways it can be used but also spatially organised

by and through the state. It thereby somewhat ignores that violence outside of state-controlled violence continues to happen. In Elias' account, emotions around state violence seem to be swallowed in rational processes of the state, and silenced in the 'barracking of violence', which essentially describes what prisons do. The obfuscation of emotions involved in the rationalisation of state violence seems to permit the approval of state violence under a civilising ideal, which Elias describes through the rationalisation of emotions in *The Civilizing Process* (2000). As such, rationalisation processes endorse certain forms of violence as much as they allow for the approval thereof. Elias' work encourages positive sentiments towards state violence, when he writes that the monopolisation of violence minimises the fear for violence in everyday life – which becomes 'pacified' – as expectations of citizens are controlled (Elias, 2000). Simultaneously, Elias (2000) devalues non-state violence as pre-modern bursts that are affect driven and uncontrolled through the absence of rationalisation.

Whilst it is Elias' (2000) central argument that emotions motivate the civilising process, he equally promotes the idea of the civilising process through an argument emphasising that emotions can be controlled through rationality. In consequence, it ascribes emotions a lesser status than rationality, despite their attributed importance and functionality. In Elias' work (2000), violence becomes approvable when executed by the state, and condemnable when not orchestrated by the state. Defining element for this value judgement seems to be the role of emotions and how they are addressed. What seems to make state violence approvable in Elias' account (2000) is that emotions take the backstage in the legitimising argument for state violence, whereas emotions in non-state violence are declared to be the decisive point for its condemnation. It prompts us to think in which ways rationalisation processes – and the way the state presents itself – hides those feelings that would be deemed 'uncivilised', and highlights those that enables state violence to be approved. As will become apparent, this thought is substantial for exploring the prison affectively.

More recent works on state violence describe that those that execute state violence can find themselves in the so called 'tunnel of violence' and 'forward panic' (Collins, 2008) which illustrates how state agents are entrenched and overcome with emotions when being violent. This has also been pointed out more directly within work on contemporary punishment (Pratt, 2000) where Elias' idea of *decivilizing spurts* has

been used to theorise changes in punishment in more recent history as an uncontrolled flow of emotions that lead to violent actions. This further motivates looking into the affectivity of state violence represented and manifested in prisons to explore an affective understanding of the institution.

2.2 Filling the Theoretical Gap: Taking Affect Seriously

Following the discussions in the previous section, it becomes clear that when *emotions* are addressed in the literature, they are addressed as a companion to *rationality.* For researching the prison as an affective institution of state violence, a framework is needed that centres *affect* at the heart of the theoretical conceptualisation and *rationality.*

Exploring the prison as an affective institution, this thesis suggests inverting the argument that all the above accounts have, to varying degrees, in common: instead of talking about the rationalisation of emotions, we should venture the idea that rationalisation processes eventually describe a particular way of being affective, and that this way of being affective is not controlled through abstracted rationalised rules but through affect itself. What follows aims to bridge the theoretical gap that, broadly speaking, consists of the overemphasis of rationality at the expense of emotions in the sociological literature. In particular, I will introduce the framework of the *affective moral fact* that aims to form the kernel of my thesis and bridge some of the gaps in the literature I have explored up until this point.

2.2.1 Framing the Affective Moral Fact

Framing the *affective moral fact* will broadly be done in two steps. First, Durkheim's deliberations on emotions and society will be outlined. Thereby, particular focus is given to how he addressed the state and punishment in reference to emotions and how he makes sense of morality in society through the *moral fact* (Durkheim, 1953). This will be done based on a re-reading of key works of Durkheim (1953, 1957, 1958, 1973, 1984) which positions his work opposite the popular reading as positivist and functionalist. Instead, his work is situated as a sociology that is deeply concerned with the emotional state of society and clearly argues against rigid ideas of 'facts'

(Barnwell, 2018; Karsenti, 2012, 2013; Meštrović, 1988; Shilling, 1997; Weiss, 2012; Weyher, 2012a). Furthermore, Durkheim's deliberations on the *moral fact* are united with a conceptual understanding of affect from cultural and affect studies (Ahmed, 2010, 2014; Berlant, 2011; Sedgwick, 2003), which eventually enables to offer a sketch of the *affective moral fact*.

The *affective moral fact* will be discussed at length and is believed to provide a conceptual framework through which the prison can be explored affectively. As it is first developed in this chapter, it sets out a particular viewpoint under which the prison is explored in relation to its affectivity in contemporary criminological and sociological works (Chapter III), before the crucial epistemological implications it embodies are further addressed in *Chapter IV: A Paradigmatic Shift Towards Seeing the World Affectively.* As such, the *affective moral fact* is believed to provide a framework and lens through which the affective prison can be further explored through Critical Discourse Analysis (Chapters V, VI and VII), before its explanatory merit is addressed in *Chapter VIII: Theorising the Prison as an Affective Institution Alongside the Affective Moral Fact.*

2.2.2 Durkheim on Sentiments, the State and Punishment

Durkheim's work had great influence in the sociology of emotions (Weyher, 2012a). There, however, Durkheim has been understood differently in comparison to how his sociology is made sense of in this thesis. In contrast, the re-reading and re-studying of Durkheim reveals that his work does not rely on an *affect/rationality dichotomy*, on which basis it seems to be used as a functionalist approach to emotions in sociology (Meštrović, 1988). Instead, a re-engagement with Durkheim's sociology suggests that his idea of *rationality* has always already been an emotional (Weyher, 2012a) and an affective (Barnwell, 2018) one which makes the dichotomy between rationality and affect not tenable.

Durkheim's deliberations on emotions are particularly present in his work on morality. For Durkheim, thinking about society meant thinking about morality, which gives sociology the purpose to research the moral character of society (Durkheim, 1953), and the possibilities of a moral society in a time of rapid social change, rising inequalities and injustices that Durkheim associated with his idea of *anomie*

(Durkheim, 1984). Within his research, Durkheim centres social sentiments at the heart of his work (Durkheim, 1953, 1957, 1958). This builds a contrast to popular and domineering accounts in sociology that focus on rationality to explain social developments and Western states (Meštrović, 1993). A re-reading of his works suggests that public sentiments and moral convictions would ideally structure society and fuel the desires of the masses (Durkheim, 1984), which contrasts rationalised versions of the state where non-affective reasoning has been determined the motor of society. In particular, the work of Meštrović establishes Durkheim as one of *the* critical voices at the beginning of the 20th century that has contested Enlightenment values by placing emotions and morality in the centre of his research (Meštrović, 1988).

Found in Durkheim's writing (1953, 1957, 1958, 1973, 1984) is a conceptualisation of rationality for what it actually is: a construct or, if we wanted to use a Durkheimian term, a particular *representation* of social sentiments. Even more so, *rationality* appears to be discussed as a particular framework for emotions and moral practice, a *social fact* (Durkheim, 1958) or a *moral fact* (Durkheim, 1953), that are ascribed validity in a particular context, time and place. This reading of Durkheim has also been suggested by Weyher who poses the idea that "'[r]ationality' itself may thus be seen as an 'institutionalized' mode of thought, or, again, a 'social fact', contextually grounded in the emotions of social relationships and practice" (Weyher, 2012a, p. 373). Reading Durkheim along this line, adds further momentum to exploring the prison as an affective institution that *represents* a particular affective way of existence through its processes and narratives that are based in *rationality*.

Durkheim's work (1953, 1957, 1958) helps to unveil the ambiguities that surround rational narratives of the state. As sentiments are understood as directing and forming the social, it can be assumed that they ultimately construct what *rationality* is and what we understand as *rational*. Accordingly, the enforcement of rationality can be read as an enforcement of particular sentiments whilst paradoxically rationality, qua its self-definition, avoids being labelled emotional, as it is upheld as a non-emotional master over emotions, as has been addressed previously in this chapter. This will become much clearer when looking at how emotions become a central point for sociological

inquiry in Durkheim's work. Whilst Durkheim has not delineated a full theory of punishment, his deliberations have been recognised as promising to explain penal regimes (Garland, 1991a).

The reproduction of the *collective conscience* through the power of the state is central in Durkheim's (1958) ideas on punishment. Ideally, in modern and pre-modern society the collective conscience would reflect the dominant moral convictions in a specific time and place, guided by social sentiments, within which the emotional approval of punishment is seen as a strengthening of moral bonds between members of society (Durkheim, 1958). Sanctioning as degradation therefore becomes the elevation of a particular morality. This necessitates crime in society, as Durkheim has famously argued:

> "Crime is then, necessary; it is bound up with the fundamental conditions of all social life, and by that very fact it is useful, because these conditions of which it is a part are themselves indispensable to the normal evolution of morality and law." (Durkheim, 1958, p. 70)

Durkheim outlines that these moral bonds (Durkheim, 1973) are becoming increasingly abstract in societies characterised by complex divisions of labour and emotions, and are made more diverse due to an increasing fragmentation of social ties and the formation of world religions (Durkheim, 1984, 2002). Punishment, therefore, has the potential to become a symbol of common values reaffirmed through shared social emotions in politics and culture. Therefore, following Durkheim (1984, 2002), punishment can be seen as rooted in social sentiment which has the potential to successfully translate into a collective moral representation as *affective* punishment under the label *rational*. Accordingly, punishment appears *rational* in an Enlightenment tradition, as it creates the imaginary of being without emotions when it is actually grounded in them, for it is the public expression of emotions that gives punishment practices its approved shape and direction (Durkheim, 1957).

This further indicates that what is seen as *rational* – in accounts that substantially rely on an Enlightenment framework that pre-dominantly excludes emotions (Parsons, 1949, 1967; Giddens, 1991; Wagner, 2003; Beck, 1992; Pinker, 2012, 2018), or in works that see *rationality* as unsuitable to tame violence because of its apparent artificiality (Meštrović, 1993) – is neither artificial nor void of emotions in the first place. A Durkheimian approach offers to see that rationality, rationalising rules,

processes, and institutions could not and cannot tame violence because they are not meant to. Instead, they can be recognised as representing sentiments towards punishment, society can predominantly approve of. The *conscience collective* therefore does not only impact if punishment happens, but also how punishment is exercised. This emphasises that the role of sentiments in punishment needs to be considered throughout all sociological levels of analysis as punishment is not just a practice that is manifested on an interactional level, but is something that gets continuously reproduced on an institutional and macro sociological level. As sentiments are reproduced throughout all sociological levels of analysis it suggests itself to be considered in relation to broader structuring components of society, like morality. Even though this thesis focuses on an institutional level by exploring the prison affectively, punishment needs to be recognised as an expression of collective emotion in Durkheim's work which thereby opposes a Kantian construction of morality (Meštrović, 1988) as a rigid framework of 'rational principles' as expressed in the *categorical imperative* (Kant, [1786]2014). This echoes some aspects of the previous argument made in reference to Arendt's (1970) understanding of emotions and morality in rationalisation processes by example of the Eichmann trial. In various of Durkheim's works (1953, 1957, 1973, 1984), he addresses that in order to be *moral*, one has to want to be moral out of an emotional conviction. This reverberates in the re-reading of Durkheim's sociology (Meštrović, 1988) where Durkheim's philosophical understanding of the *human will* is outlined as a vessel of powerful emotions which animate moral behaviour because it is intrinsically felt. This is similarly accentuated in Weiss' account of Durkheim's morality (Weiss, 2012), where it is delineated that understanding and discussing morality is dependent on recognising it as a representation of the bundled effervescence of emotions in society. As such, morality in an ideal society cannot be anything but an expression of society's essential desires.

And this is exactly what Durkheim's work outlines. He depicts how sentiments make the *conscience collective* that represent morality, and therein suggests a coherence between them (Durkheim, 1953, 1958, 1973, 1984, 2002). There has been some criticism levelled against an apparent overbearing focus on sentiments that would over-simplify the social when it is believed that they would just continuously reproduce a *conscience collective* (Garland, 1991). Although Durkheim (1958, 1984,

2002) has recognised that the *conscience collective* can be understood as reflecting dominant moral conviction of the time, in a specific place and particular culture, the conceptualisation of the *conscience collective* does not allow for recognising the plurality of sentiments within a specific context as it focusses on the domineering one. However, researching the multitude of morality has never been Durkheim's (1953) intentions as he has clearly outlined under *The Determination of Moral Facts* in his work *Sociology and Philosophy*:

> "Moral reality appears to us under two different aspects that must be clearly distinguished: the objective and the subjective. … there is a general morality common to all individuals belonging to a collectivity. Now, apart from this morality there is an indefinite multitude of others. Each individual moral conscience expresses the collective morality in its own way. … No individual can be completely in tune with the morality of his time, and one could say that there is no conscience that is not in some ways immoral. Each mind, under the influence of its milieu, education or heredity sees moral rules by a different light. … I shall deal with objective moral reality, that common and impersonal standard by which we evaluate action. The diversity of individual moral conscience shows how impossible it is to make use of them in order to arrive at an understanding of morality itself. Research into the conditions that determine these individual variations of morality would, no doubt, be an interesting psychological study, but would not help us to reach our particular goal." (Durkheim, 1953, p. 40)

As this thesis is interested in researching how the state reproduces a particular narrative of the prison within the domineering and popular idea that prisons are *rational* institutions of punishment, Durkheim's approach to emotions, morality, the *moral fact* and the *conscience collective* lends itself to do so. Since the prison is a state institution that is of particular interest in this research, it is necessary to see how Durkheim understands the state.

Durkheim's conceptualisation of the state remains ambiguous, in particular regarding the role of the state in the reproduction of popular sentiments and morality in society. He stresses the significance of the state as a moral institution, an organ of the social that is equally an entity in itself (Durkheim, 1957). Durkheim deliberates:

> "It is not accurate to say that the State embodies the collective consciousness, for that goes beyond the State at every point. In the main, that consciousness is diffused: there is at all times a vast number of social sentiments and social states of mind *(états)* of all kinds, of which the State

> hears only a faint echo. The state is the centre only of a particular kind of consciousness, of one that is limited but higher, clearer and with a more vivid sense of itself. There is nothing so obscure and so indefinite as these collective representations that are spread throughout all societies … The representations that derive from the State are always more conscious of themselves, of their causes and their aims. These have been concerted in a way that is less obscured. The collective agency which plans them realizes better what it is about. There too, it is true, there is often a good deal of obscurity. … The State, like the individual, is often mistaken as to the motives underlying its decisions, but whether its decisions be ill motivated or not, the main thing is that they should be motivated to some extent. … the *State is a special organ whose responsibility it is to work out certain representations which hold good for the collectivity. These representations are distinguished from the other collective representations by their higher degree of conscience and reflection."* (Durkheim, 1957, p. 50, my emphasis)

As such, Durkheim (1957) has delineated that the state manifests the *conscience collective* as it is simultaneously recognised as being more than that, as he sees the state as an organ that is in the position to orchestrate its own narrative. Accordingly, the state is described as a kind of moral navigator that – in ideal terms – ought to be reflective of the sentiments of the masses but can, through its specific position as part of society, also influence moral thought and therefore the *conscience collective*.

Durkheim's (1957) idealistic view of the state makes the state an orchestrator as much as the thing being orchestrated, through the moral sentiments which are valid in a specific context, time and place, and therefore flexible. The ambiguous character of Durkheim's view on the state has been recognised elsewhere (Horowitz, 1982; Nisbet, 1952). There, it has been noted that it is this ambiguous character of the state that makes it possible to conceptualise Durkheim's idea of the state as non-rational. And whilst Durkheim's conceptualisation of the state still awaits to be researched in more depth, this ambiguous character lends itself to contrast domineering ideas of Western states which are formed around Enlightenment ideas that over-emphasise the rational utilitarian thinking of the individual (Kant, [1786]2014; Rousseau, 2002) which Durkheim himself has addressed as such (Durkheim, 1957). As for Durkheim, society is more than the sum of its parts (Durkheim, 1958, 1984). This is seen in his emphasis on the social that contains and constrains individualistic, over-rationalised and utilitarian thinking, and his emphasis on emotions that carry the *conscience collective*.

This, however, does not mean that Durkheim has ignored individuals' intrinsic will, but stresses that this will – ideally – would be constrained and regulated by moral ideas that find their emotional expression in *collective representations* (Durkheim, 1957).

Briefly taken, all of the above delineations on Durkheim's sociology and emotions together, we can say that the social is a carrier of sentiments that reflect moral ideas which makes these sentiments equally sense-making and sense-giving in society for a particular time and place. This particular relationship between emotions and morality extends itself to understanding punishment, and further questions *rational*, non-affective arguments to state violence. It also alludes to emotions being an epistemological foundation in Durkheim's work which opposes an Enlightenment tradition that has been elsewhere (see 2.1) identified as structuring for accounts on the state, state institutions and emotions. Durkheim's *moral fact* (1953) seems to contain these ideas as much as it gives insights for how we can actually research emotions in the social. Hence, the *moral fact* will now be introduced and further discussed.

2.2.3 Durkheim's 'Moral Fact'

Durkheim (1953) argues sociology can and ought to focus research on the moral state of society. As such, sociology is advantaged in comparison with philosophy as it can research what *practical philosophy* cannot (Karsenti, 2012). Durkheim's concept of the *moral fact* calls attention to the moral component of social sentiments that have a validity for a particular time and place (Durkheim, 1953). By researching and looking at the sentiments of society, sociological research has the capability to research and understand morality as an empirical phenomenon. As such, researching the *moral fact* gives us an insight in the role of emotion in making society. Transferred to exploring the prison affectively, it promises to give insight into the role of affect within the institution, its origin and development.

Durkheim's (1953) *moral fact* can be understood as a further development of his *social fact*. In the standard (mis)interpretations of Durkheim, his sociology is construed as static, functionalistic, objective and positivistic (Merton, 1934; Meštrović, 1988; Parsons, 1967). Karsenti (2012) similarly outlines how domineering interpretations of Durkheim's 'facts' are contingent upon an understanding of 'facts' that suggest determined objective truths within a positivist and rationalised framework.

Durkheim's fundamental conviction of social life as a multitude of representations forecloses this (mis)interpretation (Durkheim, 1953). Durkheim defines *social facts* as "ways of acting, thinking, and feeling, external to the individual, and endowed with a power of coercion, by reason of which they control him" (Durkheim, 1958, p. 3). These social facts account for a changing character of sentiments and morality, and "[b]y their very nature they tend toward an independent existence outside the individual consciousness, which they dominate" (Durkheim, 1958, p. 30). As such, they are more than the individual's consciousness as society has its own will, an existence *sui generis* (Durkheim, 1958, 1984). This gives the social its own complex life with its own state of morality, in a particular time and space, that can be studied. Therefore, the *moral fact* incorporates an understanding of the social and emotions as non-static, as something that is elastic and changes.

Durkheim's *moral facts* (Durkheim, 1953, 1957) can be determined through the study of morality that makes society, in particular by researching emotions, which ultimately speaks to what he thought was the principal goal of sociology: seeing how this moral character is represented through culture and society more broadly.

The question of how morality and emotions relate with one another is a subject area philosophy is predominantly concerned with, where the discussion is divided over the particulars of this relationship (Bagnoli (ed), 2015; De Sousa, 2001; Nussbaum, 2012; Williams, 1973). In sociology, with few exceptions like Nunner-Winkler's work (1998) – where emotions are conceptualised as somewhat subordinate to morality as they would solely function as reactions of engaging with an overriding moral norm – the question of how morality and emotions relate has not proven popular in sociology. It is a unique characteristic of Durkheim's sociology to make this a central point of inquiry. Instead of a one-sided relationship between emotions and morality, Durkheim (1953, 1957, 1973) has thought them as entangled and complex. This quality of Durkheim's work is supported in more recent interpretations of his scholarship and argued as especially present in Durkheim's *moral fact* (Karsenti, 2012, 2013). It is also within the re-reading and re-studying of Durkheim's contributions, where embracing the study of emotions and morality is emphasised as a valuable endeavour for sociological research (Weiss, 2012; Weyher, 2012a).

Durkheim's *moral fact* (1953) offers itself to be applied to the research of affect in state institutions like the prison. As Durkheim does not anchor the *moral fact* in Enlightenment thinking (Durkheim, 1953), it seems especially promising in questioning the *affect/rationality dichotomy* (around which the imaginary of the prison as a *rational*, affect-averse institution is constructed). This has also been noted by Barnwell (2018) who highlights that Durkheim's theoretical framework lends itself to question long established dichotomies. For her, dichotomies like corporeal/cognitive, or nature/culture are resolved in Durkheim's recognition of the bodily existence of every being in a socially manufactured world that ultimately influences our biological existence, which subsequently influences culture (Barnwell, 2018).

2.2.4 Embracing the Theoretical Vagueness of the 'Moral Fact'

The re-readings of Durkheim's work by Meštrović (1988) and Karsenti (2012, 2013) focus on the particular dichotomy between emotion and rationality that is of special interest in this research. On the basis of Durkheim's philosophical origin, they illustrate how the *moral fact* transcends this divide. While they are divided over the philosophical origin of Durkheim's work – Karsenti (2012, 2013) is convinced of Durkheim's Kantian heritage and argues that he develops it further, whereas Meštrović (1988) sees Durkheim as a scholar who followed the teachings of Schopenhauer – they seem to be in agreement that Durkheim's conceptualisation of the *will* is indicative for his conceptualisation of the *moral fact*.

Meštrović (1998) describes in his work that Durkheim understood the world, just like Schopenhauer, as *will and idea*, whereas Karsenti (2012, 2013) understands the *will* as opposition to Kantian *duty*. In both accounts this *will* is described as a form of creativity or destruction, spontaneity, emotional effervescence, as a passion to act. Accordingly, the *will* is seen as the emotional wherein the origin of human life and organisation lies, including the origin of what is commonly known as *rationality*. Whilst we can try to control emotions, the control ultimately lies within the human's *will* to practice constraint and regulation, since we cannot think and cannot act without creativity and emotions. Accordingly, Durkheim argues that human behaviour needs to come out of our own motivation and cannot be found in abstract constructs that are not felt (Durkheim, 1953, 1957; Meštrović, 1988).

Yet, the role of *rationality* in Karsenti's (2012, 2013) and Meštrović's (1988) reading of Durkheim remains somewhat obfuscated. Even though Meštrović (1988) suggests that *rationality* can be seen as an expression of the will, the account equally suggests that rationality is no motivator and has no real agency over behaviour as the will essentially guides ways of thinking and acting.

Re-reading Durkheim's central works on emotions, morality and the *moral fact* – *Rules of Sociological Method* (1958), *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals* (1957), and *Sociology and Philosophy* (1953) – suggests that *rationality* can be understood as an emotion-cultural expression. This follows and resembles Weyher's (2012, 2012a) and Weiss' (2012) argument that delineates *rationality* as a label for a set of emotions and moral convictions dominant for a specific time and place in Durkheim's work. It is along these lines, that *rationality* can be assumed a *moral fact* and will be further explored.

Admittedly, the *moral fact* seems to be a messy concept, which is possibly also owed to the circumstance that Durkheim's main argument for it has been published posthumously (Durkheim, 1953). However, it is vague in the best sense as it does not assume rigid dichotomous guidelines for understanding how the *conscience collective* transpires through emotions and morality, but rather allows us to think social phenomena as determined through particular feelings. Consequently, this enables us to think prisons and the development thereof as products of sociocultural sentiments and morality, the *conscience collective*, which are expressed in a specific way in a specific time and place which constitutes the *moral fact.*

Researching the prison affectively through the theoretical frame of the *moral fact* means looking at how emotions and moral values associated with the state narrative on prisons are represented and, ultimately, how these are culturally and emotionally enacted and symbolized in the institution.

Whilst Durkheim's *moral fact* offers some significant insights into the structuring qualities of emotions and morality for society (Durkheim, 1953), it falls short on a conceptualisation of emotions which began to occur as 20th century sociology progressed (Bericat, 2015). At the same time Durkheim's work lends itself to be distinctively discussed as affective (Barnwell, 2018). What follows, therefore, is a

discussion of the *moral fact* that is developed alongside a conceptualisation of affect, grounded in cultural studies and feminist scholarship (Ahmed, 2010,2014; Berlant 2005, 2009, 2011; Sedgwick, 2003). The purpose of framing *affect* along this body of work is to accentuate the affective qualities of society and institutions, and to develop a conceptual framework that lends itself to the affective exploration of the prison.

2.2.5 Carving out 'Affect' in the 'Affective Moral Fact'

In sociology *affect* has been ignored for a long time (von Scheve, 2016). Especially precognitive, pre-social and transgressive conceptualisations of affect are argued as reason for the reluctance to engage with it, which eventually lead to "present unnecessary limitations for social inquiry" (Barnwell, 2018, p. 21). As will become apparent, even pre-cognitive conceptualisations of affect are of interest for sociological research.

This thesis specifically relies on *affect* and not *emotions* as *affect* is seen as mitigating the limitations prevalent in understandings of emotion and feelings within sociological research. Most conceptualisations of emotions in research – as will become more apparent in the following *Chapter III: Positioning the 'Affective Prison' in Contemporary Criminological and Sociological Debates* – rely on traditional theories on feelings, sentiments and emotions (e.g. Barbalet, 1998, Goffman, 1959; Hochschild, 1983). The majority of *emotional* and *feeling* frameworks (Bericat, 2015) – with Durkheim's work as an exception (1953, 1958, 1973) – incorporate an *affect/rationality dichotomy* this thesis tries to overcome. Consequently, dominating understandings of *emotions* and *feelings* in sociology limit researching the prison as an affective institution, as they ascribe *rationality* controlling powers over *affect*, and rarely take the body – which has been argued as vital along Foucault's work (1977) – into consideration.

Affect is a contested concept and area of study (Clough & Halley (eds), 2007; von Scheve, 2016). Whilst one strand in affect studies assumes affects to be a pre-cognitive response to the world (Sedgwick, 2003) that enforces the structure/affect divide and even declares structure to be an explanatory vacuum (Massumi, 2002), another strand grounds affect in culture and wider social structures (Ahmed 2010, 2014; Berlant 2009, 2011).

The conceptualisation of the latter enables us to think affect along structuring qualities which has been equally emphasised in the philosophical work of Nussbaum (2013) who explores how a moral society is dependent on emotions; in the anthropological studies of Stoler (2007) where affect has been addressed in the context of colonisation processes; in Hunter's work (2015) on racially and sexism driven inequalities that continue to be fundamental to today's society despite governmental policies that are supposed to tackle these issues within which she explores the role of affect in public agencies; and in Berlant's work (2005) which discusses the governance of public feelings with and through affect and actively contests the idea of non-emotional rationality as a guiding principle of democratic politics in the United States. Therein, Berlant (2005) illustrates how emotions are essential in justifying the declaration to war on terror and demonstrates how emotions are an essential part of meaning making in other spheres of the state machinery, in context of the arguably moral politics of Western democratic states. As such Berlant's epistemological argument echoes some of Durkheim's (1953, 1957, 1958) deliberations on how emotions structure and provide meaning for the social as well as the state. The epistemological aspect of the Durkheimian argument is further dissected in *Chapter IV: A Paradigmatic Shift Towards Seeing the World Affectively*. Focus here is how these structuring qualities of emotions in Durkheim's work lend themselves to be further developed along *affect.*

It can be argued that Durkheim is sensitive to the structuring qualities of affect in society, when he delineates how there is a *force* in the social that has coercive powers over individuals over which individuals not necessarily reflect upon (Durkheim, 1958).

Sedgwick's (2003) pre-conscious approach to affect mirrors certain qualities here, as affect can be experienced as non-reflective, spontaneous and as being overcome by it. Whilst it remains somewhat vague how affect is understood as social in Sedgewick's (2003) work, studying her work in reference to Durkheim's deliberations on the social emphasises yet again how the social forms a *conscience collective* through *moral facts* that are – as mentioned before – "external to the individual, and endowed with a power of coercion, by reason of which they control him" (Durkheim, 1958, p. 3). As such, the social is affective and can unconsciously and pre-cognitively manifest itself. In more recent research these *social currents* have become a starting point for Barnwell's

deliberation on *Durkheim as affect theorist* (Barnwell, 2018). Barnwell (2018) outlines Durkheim's *social currents* as contagious social emotions. Recurring to Rose's work that states "human beings are not individuated, conscious, rational, but rather are enmeshed in sensations and contagious, shaped by affective and non-cognitive force fields" (Rose, 2013, p.11 in Barnwell, 2018, p. 25), Barnwell continues that:

> "Durkheim's work on social currents gives us the best of this argument, a sociological challenge to the Enlightened, sovereign, rational individual, without the division between questions of being and knowing" (Barnwell, 2018, p. 25).

This highlights once more that Durkheim's theory offers a framework to question long-held dichotomies but also stresses how powerful and central affects are in society. Barnwell (2018) therein deliberates that Durkheim's work offers itself to be situated with feminist affect studies, since the latter recognise affect as a cultural and structuring force.

In the feminist affect studies of Ahmed (2010, 2014) and Berlant (2005, 2009, 2011), by contrast with Sedgwick (2003), affects are not understood as mere pre-cognitive qualities but as essential to the development of the social and values attached. This means that practices and objects originate and develop in affectively determined relationships. Thus, sense making processes are not guided by rational decision-making processes but by affects as sense makers of the world, which points towards the epistemological conviction amalgamating this thesis, which will be further addressed in *Chapter IV: A Paradigmatic Shift Towards Seeing the World Affectively.*

Accordingly, affects are inscribed by and inscribe ways of relating to our surroundings and therefore values and morality, objects and other bodies. The works of Berlant and Ahmed outline a structural approach to affect, which is condensed in their concepts of *affective economies* (Ahmed, 2010) and *affect worlds* (Berlant, 2011). These describe how affective structures guide the subject into specific scenarios and not others, thereby emphasising the cultural construction of affect (Ahmed, 2010; Berlant, 2011). Here, affect is understood as connecting objects and bodies in a diffused and complex way, which eventually materializes the world we live in (Ahmed, 2014). So, affect is complex as it is visceral and social, embodied and materialised, as well as abstracted.

These attributes mirror Durkheim's understanding of sentiments as pre-individual but not pre-social, which rightfully lends itself to recognise him as a sociologist who is also an affect theorist (Barnwell, 2018).

Affect is clearly not a narrow concept and offers itself to be researched creatively. Affect can be positioned in the midst of society and understood as a motivating force; acting as a force that circulates between bodies and objects that holds and carries social norms and values. Affect also embodies the social and individual interactions as they are inscribed in ways of relating to our surroundings. Expanding the *moral fact* with *affect* means seeing the social with all its bodies and objects as relational sense-makers, in a world that is essentially carried by its affects and cannot be separated into its individual parts. In this way, affect also encompasses notions of power as it allows us insight into why we are dragged into certain directions and not others. This power relationship can be described as relational in the Foucauldian sense (Foucault, 2003) as affect is always relational between bodies and objects and in this way signifies broader social structures.

Developing Durkheim's *moral fact* (1953) into the *affective moral fact* captures the social force affects have which gives our being and practices direction and meaning, and thereby emphasises that *affect* needs to be embraced in sociological studies beyond the interactional level. Barnwell argues in unison that structure and affect cannot be looked at separately but as one: "volatile and processual" (Barnwell, 2018, p. 27).
The *affective moral fact* therefore offers itself to be used as a theoretical framework to explore the prison as an affective institutions of state violence as it positions affect at the heart of society in a Durkheimian tradition.

2.3 Summary

This chapter positions the conceptual framework of the *affective moral fact* in the theoretical gap that has been carved out in the first part of this chapter (see 2.1). Concentrating on sociological theory that addresses emotions (e.g. Arendt, 1970; Bauman, 1989; Collins, 1974; Elias, 1998, 2000; Foucault, 1977; Weber, 2002) – implicitly or explicitly – in reference to the state, its institutions and processes, this critical body of work has shown that a fully affective theorisation of them remains

absent. Whilst the literature reviewed provided essential impulses for the argument developed above, there remains a dependence on dichotomous thinking that ascribes *rationality* controlling powers over *affect.* The conceptual framework of the *affective moral fact* promises to counter these limitations.

Developing the *affective moral fact* through a re-reading of Durkheim's work (Barnwell, 2018; Durkheim, 1953, 1957, 1958, 1973, 1984; Karsenti, 2012, 2013; Meštrović, 1988; Shilling, 1997; Weiss, 2012; Weyher, 2012a) and an extension through an understanding of *affect* that is situated in feminist and cultural studies (Ahmed, 2010, 2014; Berlant, 2005, 2011; Sedgwick, 2003), illustrates that *affect* needs to be thought socially, as something that draws people in, or to put it in Barnwell's words: there is an "affective capacity of social structure" (Barnwell, 2018, p. 22). As such, the *affective moral fact* lends itself to research affect beyond an interactional level. Consequently, it will be employed to explore an affective understanding of the prison.

This conceptual framework is believed to further critique what has been raised throughout the theoretical review above and thereby provides an understanding out of which sociological perspective, the mostly criminological literature on prisons and affect is approached from in the following *Chapter III: Positioning the 'Affective Prison' in Contemporary Criminological and Sociological Debates.*

Throughout this thesis, the *affective moral fact* ought to help

(i) Further critiquing the dangers of rationalised narratives and rationalisation processes that expedite violence.
(ii) Showing the explanatory limitations of an argument that is critical of such rationalisation processes when narrated along rational narratives.
(iii) Addressing what it means when we talk about *rationality*.
(iv) Breaking with an over-rationalised argument that shows overemphasis and favouritism of rationality at the expense of affect within an *affect/rationality dichotomy*.
(v) Offering a framework that centres *affect*, and therein stresses the importance of making the body and built environment an essential focal point next to more abstracted ideas of affective experiences in and understandings of institutions.

(vi) Breaking with the obfuscated role affect is ascribed in the rationalising accounts of institutions, as it offers further exploration of how affect can be seen as essentially structuring for institutions.

In addition to providing a conceptual framework, the *affective moral fact* equally delivers vital epistemological and methodological impetuses, as it facilitates to question the dichotomous relationship between affect and rationality. This epistemological heritage of the Enlightenment will be deconstructed in *Chapter IV: A Paradigmatic Shift Towards Seeing the World Affectively* to think, theorise and research the prison affectively. It therein draws upon certain aspects that have already been pointed out within this chapter and the sketching of the *affective moral fact*. Before the epistemological and methodological discussion, the subsequent *Chapter III: Positioning the 'Affective Prison' in Contemporary Criminological and Sociological Debates* reviews research in reference to its discussion of the prison as an affective institution.

Chapter III: Positioning the 'Affective Prison' in Contemporary Criminological and Sociological Debates

Whilst the previous chapter has primarily addressed sociological theory in reference to affect and state violence, this chapter addresses the political aspect this thesis is motivated by more overtly. This interdisciplinary chapter reviews critical-liberal and abolitionist approaches of the prison within criminological debates and carceral geography in respect to their discussion of affect.

As prisons are one of the last resorts for state violence in Western democracies, prisons face particular pressure to demonstrate legitimacy conditioned by an idiosyncratic if not paradoxical relationship with it: whilst states rely on violence for the continued manifestation and monopolisation of power, they equally denounce any form of violence as illegitimate if it is not committed and justified by the state (Christie, 1977; Sim, 2000, 2017; Sim & Tombs, 2009;). Thereby, the legitimisation of state violence is fabricated through a rational argument (Corrigan & Sayer, 1985; Garland, 1991; Playfair, 1971; Sim, 2009). Garland captures this twisted relationship poignantly:

> "The conflict between our civilized sensibilities and our often brutal routines of punishment is minimized and made more tolerable. Modern penality is thus institutionally ordered and discursively represented in ways which deny the violence which continues to inhere in its practices." (Garland, 1991, p. 243)

Accordingly, this chapter will interrogate how criminological and carceral geographical debates address emotions and affect in relation to the prison; an institution that is situated at the crossroads of a twisted and paradoxical narrative and relationship with violence. This chapter seeks to explore what this literature has to offer in terms of a conceptual understanding and framework that this thesis can reflect and reinforce, as well as develop out of in relation to the affective exploration of the prison.

The first part of this chapter reviews three bodies of work – critical-liberal accounts, works within carceral geographies, and abolitionist debates – before placing the prison as a sociocultural institution that is essentially gendered. As such, it expands on theoretical and epistemological insights that have already been discussed to a certain extent in the previous chapter.

3.1 Liberal Accounts on Emotions and State Institutions

Within contemporary liberal approaches to imprisonment, a body of work focusses on the emotional micromanagement of the prison experience and the role of emotions in the wider justice system. Those that concern themselves with the management of emotions within prisons, research how prisoners and staff regulate their emotions to fit prison's quotidian life (e.g. Andersen & Jacobsen, 2019; Crawley, 2004; Crewe, et al., 2014; Laws & Crewe, 2016). For this, explanatory frames that originate from the sociology of emotions, like Arlie Hochschild's *feeling rules* (1979, 1983) and Goffman's ideas on the performance of emotions (1959) and interactional ritual chains (2005) are used frequently. As such, liberal accounts rely on ideas that explore emotions along sociocultural rules that dictate the appropriateness of certain emotional behaviour above and in preference to other less desired ones, applying a micro level of analysis. The 'rules' are thereby regarded as abstracted ideas that are imposed on behaviour that should be modelled against the expected emotional performance prescribed by the rule (Goffman 1959, 2005; Hochschild, 1979, 1983).

An institutional focus on emotions is given in the works of Karstedt (2002, 2015), Freiberg and Carson (2010), and Bergman Blix and Wettergren (2018). Their work demonstrates how emotions are a constant companion in the criminal justice system as they show how emotions are part of policy making processes and the law itself, as well as in courtrooms and sentencing. Freiberg and Carson's work (2010) outline how emotions are believed to be absent in policy making processes and counter this observation with advocating for the conscious recognition of emotions in policy making processes as they are always already part of it. In a study of emotions in the court, Bergman Blix and Wettergren (2018) similarly outline how professionals assume that emotions are not and ought not to play a part in the court process which is seen as objective and neutral. Through their research they suggest emotions as an additional level of analysis along a theoretical discussion that draws on Barbalet (1998). Along these lines, they ascribe emotions explanatory qualities for social phenomena as they emphasise that emotions are needed to be rational and objective in court.

Barbalet's work (1998) delineates that rationality can never fully control emotions as they rather accompany each other, and emotions are necessary for rational behaviour. Amongst other things, Barbalet (1998) critiques the strict divide between rationality and emotions and discusses the role of emotions in reference to what is seen as rational behaviour. This work is invaluable in recognising emotions in the workings of criminal justice process (Bergman Blix & Wettergren, 2018), but Barbalet's approach (1998) does not question the divide between emotions and rationality. This leaves the dichotomy largely unaddressed and consequently, the idea of *rationality* is not critically investigated in works that adopt Barbalet's framework (1998) for researching state institutions. This is equally reflected in other central works in the sociology of emotions (Flam, 1990). There the focus on emotions is argued as valuable for broadening traditionally rational and normative understandings of corporate actions, political parties, and other state processes where actors are not as resistant to emotions like rationalised accounts suggest. Instead, emotions are understood as motivators for behaviour in rationalised settings, in which emotions become predictable as rational constraining rules are imposed on natural and spontaneous emotions (Flam, 1990). Accordingly, "formal organisations can be analysed as a set of legal-rational rules for emotion management *and* a substitute for authentic feelings" (Flam, 1990, p. 225, original emphasis). This suggests that the rational management of emotions in institutions is rooted in an emotional motivation to orchestrate emotions that are seen as unwanted or dangerous in the administrative structure of the institution. As such, this literature draws attention to the reliance of institutions on emotions for their continued stable existence as certain emotions could have destabilising effects to the order of the institution when they are not controlled through an institutional narrative. In this way, this work gives decisive impulses for the affective exploration of the prison despite their undissolved reliance (Barbalet, 1998; Flam, 1990) on the *affect/rationality dichotomy* as it predominantly addresses emotions as complementary to rational models of explanation.

This line of argument pervades other work that concerns itself with the research of state institutions and emotions. Karstedt (2002) recognises emotions in its fundamental capacity and argues that emotions have been reappropriated in the justice system in two ways:

> "The emotionalization of public discourse about crime and criminal justice, and the implementation of sanctions in the criminal justice system that are explicitly based on – or designed to arouse – emotions. Both developments corresponded to the changing space of emotions and the emotional culture of late modern societies, and it can be assumed that these processes have fuelled one another." (Karstedt, 2002, p. 301)

Karstedt (2002) advocates for the re-emotionalization of the justice system, however only in an instrumental and measured way. The argument of re-emotionalization imposes the idea that emotions have been somewhat absent in rational and emotion-controlling versions of the justice system. Karstedt thereby draws on Pinker's Enlightenment inspired work (2012) that assumes rationalisation processes pacify institutions in Western states, which again relies on Elias' deliberations in the *Civilizing Process* (2000). Drawing on this framework, Karstedt (2012, 2015) addresses the prison as an institution that is more violence-averse in democratic regimes as emotions are understood as subordinate and deferential to rules and expectations that govern them through specific institutional administrative procedures. The overbearing power that is here ascribed to rationality is given the role of 'master narrative' that subsequently dismisses emotions as the lesser component as it structures thinking and arguments around state institutions along a dichotomous understanding of rationality and emotions. Whilst these accounts discussed so far offer the useful and insightful points that emotions are always part of institutions that control emotions through their rationalised and administrative structures, they equally rely on an Enlightenment tradition that echoes the argument made in the previous *Chapter II: Theorising Affect in Sociological Accounts of the State and Its Processes.* There, the *affect/rationality dichotomy* has been identified as the central limitation in understanding the prison affectively. Even though the above accounts on state institutions directly acknowledge emotions, they foreclose the potential of researching them as essentially affective places as they are portrayed as institutions where emotions can be rationally managed.

3.2 Prison Architecture and Emotions

So far, emotions have been addressed within rationalised bureaucratic and administrative processes of the state. By brief recurrence to Bentham's (1791) work in the context of Foucault's (1977) discussion of punishment, it has been noted in the previous chapter that modern practices of punishment unfold in the built environment of prisons. This environment is specific and symbolises and materialises state violence in its design and architecture (Jewkes & Moran, 2017; Jewkes, et al., 2017). Therefore, the built environment of the prison ought to be included in the affective exploration of the prison.

That prison design is essential part of the punishment process has been outlined in Bentham's Panopticon (Bentham, 1791). In a series of letters from 1787, Bentham had outlined a first and foremost architectural model that has been designed for a manifold of different areas like the factory, hospital, schools but also prisons. Since then, Bentham's idea has been translated into the built environment of prisons across England and Wales and is incorporated in the design of the researched prisons in this thesis; HMP Birmingham, HMP Liverpool and HMP Pentonville.

The Panopticon can be understood as a visualisation of Bentham's philosophical and moral convictions materialised in design. Influenced by the Enlightenment philosopher of his time Cesare Beccaria ([1756]2008), Bentham has similarly argued for a humanitarian approach and the abolishment of harsh punishment and a uniform system of sanctioning (Draper, 2000). In turn, his work has informed modern thinking on measured and proportionate punishment (Ignatieff, 1978), and became a framework for analysing the mechanisms of power, discipline, and knowledge in Foucault's work (1977).

Bentham's idea was to design an institution for emotion management in the form of the Panopticon that would facilitate omnipresent surveillance that would be *felt* by the people incarcerated at any given time

> "Not only so, but the greater chance there is, of a given person's being at a given time actually under inspection, the more strong will be the persuasion the more *intense*, if I may say so, the *feeling*, he has of his being so." (Bentham, 1791, p. 23, original emphasis)

In this way, the feeling of being watched at any given time becomes the crucial denominator for the effectiveness of the Panopticon. It is a place that has been deliberately designed to provide an emotional bedrock for discipline in the prison. Accordingly, Bentham's architectural design is a design with purpose, where the emotionality of the built prison environment is anchored in the moral philosophy to reform prisoners. The attention lies on the coercion through the design that ought to facilitate behavioural change. Bentham however has also realized the limitations of this design:

> "It [the panopticon] *does* give every degree of efficacy which can be given to the influence of *punishment* and *restraint.* But it does nothing towards correcting the oppressive influence of punishment and restraint, by the enlivening and invigorating influence of *reward."* (Bentham, 1791, pp. 109, original emphasis)

As part of the utilitarian movement at the time (Ignatieff, 1978), Bentham seems to have been concerned about how to calculate and measure the emotional experience of the Panopticon. Wondering what kind of affective atmosphere such a built environment would provide, he asked: "Would *happiness* be most likely to be increased or diminished by this discipline?" (Bentham, 1791, pp. 112, original emphasis). Whilst there is no distinct answer in his work, it becomes clear that these questions and design were driven by moral concerns. Even though he has declared to not offer an argument on moral philosophy in the *Panopticon: or, the Inspection House* (1791), Bentham has noted that the answer to the question of morality lies with who the master of the Panopticon is, highlighting that design is important but can only do as much as the prison regime is making use of. Looking at how Bentham discusses the Panopticon, he can be understood as an Enlightenment thinker with a utilitarian bent, attempting to subject the emotional to a new form of reason, a sort of recalibration of the emotional, which suggests that rationality in itself can be thought differently. Instead of thinking Bentham's philosophy as contributions to an emotion-expunging rationalised account of morality, his utilitarian principles can be thought of as an affective utilitarianism (Davies, 2016; Müller-Schneider, 2013) that becomes tangible in Bentham's panoptic design of harm reduction and the aspiration to make them

places of happiness (Bentham, 1791). Thereby, Bentham's Panopticon (1791) illustrates that the birth of the modern prison is grounded in moral convictions that relies on the affective effects of imprisonment that are also manifested in the built environment.

Whilst Foucault's understanding of the prison (Foucault, 1977) has been decisively influenced by the Panopticon, his work does not overtly pursue Bentham's argument in regard to the affectivity of the place any further. However, his concept of *heterotopias* (Foucault, 1986), which is applicable to prisons, suggests a particular atmosphere of the place that is characterised through the specific ambiguities also manifested in the built environment of the institution. Prisons are ambiguous places (Johnson, 2006) as they are neither public nor private, they are part and also not part of society. They are places of othering. They are visible from the outside through their particular design yet invisible, as prison walls hinder to render visible what lies beyond them. According to Foucault (1977), they punish but also 'produce' deviancy, in prisons, people are 'in the care of the state' and neglected by the state at the same time. Prisons are ambiguous places where two worlds collide. They are

> "counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted." (Foucault, 1986, p. 24)

Foucault (1977) provides a reading of prisons that makes prisons places of legitimate state violence as well as places where barbaric traditions of the past continue albeit in an Enlightenment form. In works such as *The History of Madness*, Foucault writes:

> "The prison and the asylum become a source of fascination, a forbidden place of secret pleasures, an imaginary landscape reflected most intensely within Sade's images of 'the Fortress, the Dungeon, the Cells, the Convent.'" (Foucault, 2006: 362, quoted in Johnson, 2006: 85)

Referring to Sade's description draws attention to the specific atmosphere these buildings have as they are designed and calculated along emotional imaginaries (Bentham, 1791). Foucault (1977) has argued that prison architecture provides for disciplining the soul which informed ideas of prison reformers like John Howard on the built environment (Ignatieff, 1978).

In their different ways, Bentham's (1791) and Foucault's (1977, 1986) work brings awareness to the material existence of the place of the prison and its affective attributes. As such it invites us to think about the prison as an institution that materialises affect in its built structure.

Contemporary works (Jewkes & Moran, 2017; Jewkes, et al., 2017) within carceral geographies mirror essential ideas of Bentham (1791) as they further explore the built environment of prisons in reference to emotion and affect. Within this body of work the design of the prison is discussed in regard to the everyday experience of the place, as well as in the broader context of a growing punitive state from the late 20th century to the present (Jewkes & Moran, 2017; Moran, 2017; Moran, et al., 2016). As these works think about how architectural features materialise and facilitate the emotional atmosphere of the prison, they draw on the above liberal approaches to understanding emotions, next to the works of Foucault and Agamben (Moran, 2017). Therein a conceptualisation of space is developed, not as a mere backdrop for social interactions, but as a reciprocal product and vehicle for structural processes and quotidian practices:

> "Carceral geography has tended towards an interpretation of prisons as fluid, geographically anchored sites of connections and relations, seeing them as connected to each other and articulated with wider social processes through mobile, visual, haptic and embodied practice." (Moran, 2017, p. 90)

Thus, they go beyond the idea of incarceration as simply the control of space and refer to philosophical ideas that are reflected in prison design. Accordingly, prisons are seen as products of our time that develop with and through cultural norms and values, and "are explicitly intended to promote the values of the state, and its dominant ideologies of justice and punitivity" (Moran, 2017, p. 93). This body of work makes important interventions in our understanding of prisons and punishment in its recognition that prison design reflects publicly desired sentiments towards punishment – whether supportive of 'harsh' or more 'rehabilitative' types of punishment. In this sense:

> "Prison environments represent both an 'overt' agenda that seeks to provide adequate, measurable and reasonably consistent living and working conditions for those individuals sentenced to imprisonment; and a 'covert' agenda that reflects what or who prisoners 'are' in the minds of those who commission prisons and in the wider society". (Jewkes & Moran, 2017, p. 542).

This analysis again accentuates the ambivalent, even paradoxical nature of the prison as a *heterotopia* (Foucault, 1986) where barbaric measures of violence are continuously manifested in the prison experience under an Enlightenment narrative which emphasises an apparently more pacifying character of the institution (Foucault, 1977). The body of work within carceral geographies expands on this ambivalence to include emotions surrounding the institution (Moran, 2017). As it draws our attention to the ambivalent and contrary sentiments surrounding punishment, it illustrates that prisons are institutions that are far more complex than official narratives on the prison, as rational and humanitarian project of punishment, suggest (Beccaria, [1756]2008; Dockley & Loader (eds.), 2013; Howard, 2013; Ignatieff, 1978; Roberts, 1985; Ryan, 1978).

As such, carceral geographers aim to

> "discuss why the public appear to want prisons to *feel* like nineteenth-century places of severe and unremitting punishment, while *looking* like the kinds of buildings that populate twenty-first-century business parks and modern industrial states." (Jewkes & Moran, 2017, p. 542, original emphasis)

These authors stress that what seem like undesired emotions, like feelings of revenge, are persistently present even when they are not overtly addressed as motivating factors for punishment. This offers us an important insight and critical tone that allows us to focus on the paradoxical emotional entanglement, which is represented in the prison architecture. This has been elsewhere addressed as present in state discourses and policies which govern the prison regime especially in times of popular punitiveness (Sim, 2009, 2015).

A visual analysis by Jewkes and Moran on the outside of HMP Pentonville illustrates how the architecture carries emotions (Jewkes & Moran, 2017). Their study demonstrates that regardless of the difficulty accessing the prison, the outside of a prison offers valuable information in regard to its emotionality. Jewkes and Moran describe the prison walls of HMP Pentonville as deliberately intimidating and dramatic, and argue that it is part of the pains of imprisonment to experience the crude design on the inside and outside (Jewkes & Moran, 2017). Whilst HMP Pentonville is a Victorian prison, it seems it continues to have an effect on inmates and the public alike. Carceral geographies do offer key critical insights for the affective exploration

of the prison, as they show how punitive vengeance that has re-emerged in recent decades (Sim, 2017) continues to suffuse the architecture of prisons (Jewkes & Moran, 2017).

This critical view on the pains of imprisonment through architecture has been set alongside a framing of Weber's *iron cage*, *disenchantment* and *enchantment* (Weber, 2002). Hancock and Jewkes (2011) use *enchantment* to describe those aesthetics of the prison architecture that mobilise affect, while *disenchantment* outlines the idea of a conscious and rational implementation of an aesthetic design that ought to deaden certain emotions. This line of argument is further pursued in Jewkes' work where she discusses anaesthetics as a form of *disenchantment* (Jewkes, 2012, 2013). There she states that "for most prison inmates, penal aesthetics might more accurately be described as anaesthetics, whereby the senses are blunted or depressed" (Jewkes, 2013, p. 11), whilst also discussing that aesthetics operate "on a level beyond the cognitive and rational" (Jewkes, 2012, pp. 27-28):

> "If we accept, then, that architecture has mimetic properties, and that aesthetics function as cultural 'technologies of enchantment', facilitating the capacity to feel, it seems logical to conclude that a purposeful absence of aesthetics constitutes 'technologies of disenchantment'." (Jewkes, 2012, p. 30)

Jewkes (2012) thereby ascribes aesthetics sensual qualities of an affective nature that, qua her own argument, are not influenced by cognition or rationality. Jewkes (2012) simultaneously recognises conscious decisions are made for 'doing anaesthetics' in prisons (Jewkes, 2012). In line with the argument made in the previous chapter, Weber's idea of *disenchantment* (2002) offers itself to be understood as something more than the suppression of sentiments. Therefore, it can be suggested that architectural *disenchantment* is not just the suppression of certain emotions as it is suggested in the works above (Hancock and Jewkes, 2011; Jewkes, 2012, 2013), but as an *enchantment* of other sorts, as an emphasis of bringing new desired emotions to the prison experience. As much as the works in carceral geographies provide for crucial impetuses for thinking and researching the prison as an affective institution, the argument also prompts questions when looking at the conceptual framework used to theorise the findings.

As has been outlined previously, the idea of *disenchantment* (Weber, 2002) can be seen as the control of charisma and emotions through bureaucratic processes which here amalgamate in the prison design, or it can be thought as an *enchantment* of different sorts. Following the latter, another way to think *anaesthetics* and *aesthetics* is to both conceptualise them as an affective architectural phenomenon, where both display affect, however, in different forms. Therein, desired aspects of the prison are emphasised along what could be assumed a hierarchy or orchestration of affect in the institution. This reading of *anaesthetics* and a*esthetics* would equally permit to counter a dichotomous understanding of affect and rationality that has been identified as dominating in accounts on state violence, and equally limiting for the affective exploration of the prison (Chapter II).

As carceral geographies offer critical views on the built environment and discuss the pains of imprisonment, they emphasise that a change in design and architecture contributes to reforming prisons, since architecture of prisons integrate punishing and rehabilitative elements which can have positive effects on the rehabilitation of prisoners (Jewkes, 2013; Jewkes & Moran, 2017; Jewkes, et al., 2020; Moran, 2017). This mirrors Bentham's Enlightenment and humanitarian ideas (Bentham, 1791; Ignatieff, 1978) insofar as imprisonment should not punish beyond the deprivation of freedom, and that the built prison environment should provide for rehabilitation. This is, however, not how English and Welsh prisons work in practice as suggested altercations of design are not recognised as potentially beneficial to rehabilitation (Jewkes & Moran, 2017).

Carceral geographic work gives this thesis decisive insights for exploring the prison affectively as it offers insight into how architectural features not only veil state violence behind high prison walls but how the built environment orchestrates the affectivity of the prison. It also emphasises that prisons materialise norms and values, and that this kind of academic work is in its infancy (Moran, 2017). That prisons are designed with affect in mind delivers inspiration for further and more critical discussion of the prison as an affective institution. As such, it draws attention to architecture and design being as much a part of the state's narrative on prisons as

official political speech and documents – a thought that, as will become apparent, informed the Critical Discourse Analysis of official state documents for the affective exploration of the prison (Chapters IV, V, VI and VII).

3.3 Critical Criminological Accounts of the Prison

So far, I have discussed critical, liberal-reformist approaches in criminology in which emotions are addressed on an interactional and institutional level (see 3.1), and the emotionality of the prison architecture (3.2). As has been pointed out, these approaches concern themselves with how their particular findings can be incorporated in reforming the prison complex and, therefore, see "the prison as a reinventive institution" (Crewe & Ievens, 2019, p. 568).

In contrast, critical criminological approaches and abolitionist work question the institution in itself as they take a critical view of the relationship between prisons and the Enlightenment, and question their claim to be humane and civilised progressive institutions under rationalised politics (Burton & Carlen, [1979]2013; Carlen, 1983; Carlton & Sim, 2018; Cohen, 1985; Cohen & Taylor, 1972; Coleman and Sim, 2013; Davis, 2003; Davis et al., 2021; Morris & Morris, 1998; Rusche & Kirchheimer, 2017; Sim, 2009; Sykes, 2007; Wacquant, 2001). This body of work primarily focusses on the prison as an institution, which is equally the level of analysis in this PhD research. Thereby, critical criminologists interrogate the nature of the institution as embodying power relations, on which basis new architectures of violence are invoked for those at the margins of established power relations to dominate and continuously oppress based on class, gender and race. Their critical argument illustrates how the ongoing barbarity in prisons has not diminished under new rationalised practises of state punishment as prisons continue to be cruel and dangerous places, which mirrors the previous argument on the *Dangers of Rationalisation Processes* (2.1.1). Next to analysing the prevalent power dynamics that surround the prison complex, abolitionist studies place suffering and harm at the centre of their argument about the nature and direction of the prison complex. These approaches attempt to render visible what is otherwise concealed behind impenetrable prison walls.

Whilst rationalised arguments for imprisonment highlight the denial of freedom as 'the punishment' (Reemtsma, 2013), critical approaches demonstrate that punishment goes beyond the deprivation of freedom and continues in various forms behind the prison walls. In taking this approach, the Enlightenment narrative of proportionate and humane punishment is challenged. In an interview, Foucault gave shortly after the publication of *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault, 1977), he states:

> "Prison is a recruitment center for the army of crime. That is what it achieves. For 200 years everybody has been saying, 'Prisons are failing; all they do is produce new criminals.' I would say on the other hand, 'They are a success, since that is what has been asked of them.'" (Doit, 1975, no page number)

This sobering insight emphasises that prisons punish and produce deviancy, and reproduce what they are supposed to prevent. In his work, Foucault (1977) critiques Enlightenment ideas of the modern prison and delineates that they serve the purpose to continuously manifest power relations in society. The Enlightened prison can therefore be understood as an illusion of more humane and less brutal state violence. Even though capital punishment and the overt portrayal of punishment has vanished from the public eye behind prison walls, Western states cannot deprive themselves from violence and continue to manifest barbaric measures (Meštrović, 1993) through the many practices that are linked to imprisonment.

With 'the punitive turn' in the UK, starting from the mid-1970s and fermenting into the 1990s up until today, the rationalisation processes that encompass modern punishment have further expanded (Sim, 2009). Instead of the taming of state violence punishment has intensified, broadening the web of exclusionary social control with more and more people being caught in the mesh of punishable offences which eventually has made the state become more punitive; whether through the institution of the prison or the vehicle of 'the community' (Cohen, 1985). In Cohen's thought-provoking work *Visions of Social Control* (1985), he has demonstrated how the state uses particular narratives and language to describe and justify their violent actions, and how those official organised narratives do not fit the actual experiences of imprisonment. He argues that the Enlightenment has enabled and enforced new ways of being violent which are less openly moral, as the justification for them is veiled in a particular language and policies which are positivist and measurable tools of the

state. Consequently, Cohen (1985) has unmasked new ways of punishment under Enlightenment ideals that proclaim more humane forms of punishment whilst simultaneously producing intensified versions of state violence. As noted already in this thesis, there is a paradoxical relationship between how the state punishes and how the state talks about punishment. Cohen (1985) has recognised this as an *Orwellian doublethink*, and his work critically reads state narratives on punishment. It seems that this interrogation offers an insight what the real motives for punishment are and therein allows us to explore the prison affectively through critically exploring rationalising narratives of the state. That this is a fruitful endeavour has also been demonstrated by Burton and Carlen's work ([1979]2013), in which they discursively analyse official state narratives and lay open how a specific state narrative is continuously recreated, even though the actual experience the state writes about is very different from their discourse. Looking at political discourses and policy development around imprisonment, the critical work of Sim (2009) shows how vengeance and fear are central and underline the 'new punitiveness'. Therefore, imprisonment is understood less as a civilised and rationally calculated response to crime, and more as technologies, practices and policies built on sentiments.

Within bureaucratisation processes, with its routine rationalisation and justification narratives, the state takes on the role of the victim that makes revenge part of its narrative to atone broken ideals and norms with state violence (Christie, 1977). The state's imaginary as the victim again highlights the paradoxical situation, *Orwellian doublethink*, where fear and vengeance become part of a government narrative, that simultaneously seeks to deliver measured and rational punishment that is irreconcilable with pre-modern forms of punishment, where retaliation was a central part of the punishment discourse. Whilst this idea is not further explored in critical criminological research, it motivates us to further investigate the affectivity of the prison as a site of these paradoxical convergences within the state; seemingly encompassed in moral convictions in support of intensifying state violence in a specific ideological context that serve the powerful (Davis, 2003; Scott & Codd, 2010; Sim, 2017).

Critical research around imprisonment also shows that while prisons are clearly failing, there is a desire in current policies to not only defend and legitimate the existence of

prisons but to build more and bigger prisons (Scott, 2018a). Even though these studies do not address emotions within the prison per se, their conclusions are indicative for the prison as an emotion imbued state institution. The research suggests the prison to be an institution that manifests a desire to punish harshly and cruelly, despite any claims to 'humanitarian' and 'civilised progress' in the field of punishment.

By focussing on the sufferings prisoners have to endure (Scott, 2018b; Sim, 2015, 2017), abolitionist arguments are implicitly addressing the emotional foundation of punishment, as emotions simply cannot be avoided when talking and thinking about suffering and our responses to it. This is exemplified in the abolitionist research of Cohen and Taylor (1972) that, like critical-liberal approaches described earlier, displays concerns with the micro-management of emotions in the quotidian experiences of imprisonment. However, in contrast to the less critical liberal approaches, Cohen and Taylor (1972) describe how men that are incarcerated for life emotionally manage and navigate the sufferings of imprisonment in the confines of time and space they find themselves in.

Whilst more implicit, the work illustrates through its discussion of violence and suffering that the existence and continuance of prisons are, in part, driven by emotional politics and a desire for punishment and violence (Garland, 1985) which bring us again to the central assumption of this thesis: that affect is at the core of the prison institution.

As these critical accounts oppose over-rationalised versions of state violence, they put focus on violence and the sufferings of imprisonment that imply emotions. This echoes essential aspects of this thesis' conceptualisation of violence as *structural* (Galtung, 1969; Schinkel, 2010), as a continuum (Cockburn, 2012; Kelly, 1988) and as one that recognises affect as a central part (Collins, 1974, 2008; Scheff & Retzinger, 2001) which has been earlier outlined (Chapter I). The critical and abolitionist research equally points to how rationalising accounts of the prison foreclose arguments that are critical towards the institution, and therein limit the research of affect as essential in the continuance of prisons. Whilst these approaches lack an explicit discussion of affect, and a theoretical framework through which it can be further understood, they contribute to how the prison can be understood affectively by their implicit reference to it.

3.4 Prisons as a Sociocultural Institution

All the above approaches indicate that prisons are anchored in the sociocultural landscape of Western states, in which ideas about punishment are grounded in culturally prevalent ideas that denote Enlightenment thinking. In general, Enlightenment thinking is seen as foundation for Western forms of rationalised punishment which, as critical scholars acknowledge (Garland, 1991; Meštrović, 1993), continues and variegates forms and techniques of state violence in institutional practice (Cohen, 1985). The prison has been positioned as an instrument of the *Punitive Obsession* (Playfair, 1971) under rationalised policies and politics, which are illustrative of broader cultural sentiments that are reflected in punishment structures in Western states (Garland, 1991). The recognition of emotions as a central element to understanding punishment has been given greater attention in recent criminological work (Chamberlen & Carvalho, 2019), where emotional narratives around punishment are recognised as a signifier for wider social norms in Western democracies. However, it is Garland's work (1991) that addresses the sociocultural developments of punishment and the narratives that structure modern thinking about state punishment. This is focused on in this section.

For Garland (1991), prisons have a structuring quality for society as the official narratives they create produce classifications that function as orientation in the world. This world is for Garland traversed by emotions and morality. He outlines that there is no public awareness of the continued dependency on violent punishment as the experiences of imprisonment are impenetrable for public eyes, as the violence is confined behind prison walls. With the beginning of the 20th century, and even more so in the 1980s, Garland (1991) argues that the discourse around punishment does not show that violence still is central to punishment, and continues to be practiced and forms part of the experiences of imprisonment. Therein, Garland ascribes the role of the media and specific criminological research with responsibility for stigmatising offenders. As a result, the paradoxical relationship Western states have with violence – the continued reliance and practice of brutal forms of violence and the simultaneous condemnation of it – is discursively organised through an institutional narrative of the prison that writes violence out of the official imaginary of the state (Garland, 1991).

Garland (1991) understands prisons as culturally determined social institutions that incorporate rational and emotional aspects. Penality is thereby recognised as "an expression of collective feeling, a moral action, a ritual event, or an embodiment of a certain sensibility" (Garland, 1991, p. 281) that is likewise controlled within rationalised technologies and procedures that come with the development of modern state institutions. This is echoed in other research where emotions are argued to control civilising and de-civilising processes around punishment (Pratt, 2000). Similar to Cohen (1985), Garland (1991) levels criticism on over-rationalised processes as he recognises rational processes as complimentary to emotional processes in punishment. Thus, Garland (1991) identifies emotions as an element of rationalised institutions of punishment which are, however, overshadowed by state narratives that uphold Enlightenment perspectives on the prison along with a formalised marginalisation of emotions. This is equally recognised in the work of Meštrović (1993), who reasons that modern state barbarism presents itself in rationalised language and culture, which reflect and reinforce a civilised view of the state. Garland (1991) argues further that the institution itself governs the critical dialogue as it organises dominant and prevailing narratives of itself. Accordingly, institutions "develop interests and powers of their own, and the emergence of a powerful penal bureaucracy has done much to remake modern punishment in its own image" (Garland, 1991, p. 188). And, as Burton and Carlen ([1973] 2013) have shown, official inquiries are one aspect of this self-projected image. Therefore Garland's (1991) argument encourages further research into official state narratives. As the institution constructs an image of the prison as a more humane form of punishment based on rationality, a deconstruction of such narrative promises to give insight into how these rationalised accounts can be understood differently.

Garland argues that Enlightenment inspired narratives are deployed to justify the actions of the punitive apparatus and make them appear benign and socially acceptable. Under a rational pretence, the state creates a narrative of "the victimized state" (Sim, 2000, p. 26) that encourages a view of punishment having little to do with emotion which, at the same time, render state punishment to appear necessary and benign (Garland, 1991). The moral dimension of the rationalising argument to punishment is also discussed within the work of Reemtsma (2013). There, it is suggested that these narratives rationalise state violence as a civilised response to

breaking the law, because the state instigates itself as the victim whose rules and norms were violated. Punishment ought to correct the breach that is in over-rationalised terms 'symbolically consummated' with incarceration, which is consequently ascribed functionality in repairing and upholding the state's moral convictions (Reemtsma, 2013).

Whilst both, Garland (1991) and Reemtsma (2013), recognise punishment as a moral reaction, there is a decisive difference in their argument which is based on their addressing of emotions. Reemtsma (2013) does not address emotions within his moral argument and instead represents rationality as an achievement of Western states, giving rationality a deeper meaning. Though in a later article he advocates for the inclusion of researching affect, as he recognises its potential for debates on states and its practices (Reemtsma, 2015). Not addressing emotions is arguably dangerous as it aids the legitimacy of the state and its administrative procedures, norms and practices that generate unbridled state violence and atrocities (Arendt, 1970; Bauman, 1989) which has been addressed in the previous chapter (see 2.1.1).

Whilst Garland (1991) acknowledges sentiments as indicatory for the development of punishment and recognises the limitations of ignoring or minimising the importance of them, his argument preserves emotions and rationality at opposing ends of a continuum, and although the significance of emotions in the prison is highlighted, it is not further interrogated. Garland's (1991) work however draws attention to the structuring effects of the institution and relates these to moral convictions. As such he acknowledges a relationship between emotions and morality that has been a central focus in the work of Durkheim (1953, 1957, 1958), which has been theoretically explored for its potential to help understand the prison as an affective institution in the previous chapter (see 2.2).

Garland (1991) argues that liberal criminological research on prisons concerns itself with topics that address the efficiency of punishment, which he recognises as arguments that stand in the tradition of the controlled official narrative of prisons. As these accounts move within the parameters of the official discourse, they are resilient towards fundamental criticism. The criticism that is levelled against the institution by liberal accounts is answered with reform approaches that incorporate Enlightenment ideas of efficiency, rationality, and utilitarianism.

Following Garland (1991), we can explore how modern penal institutions create an imaginary that confirms their power and authority, and ultimately causes fundamental criticism to be marginalised. Garland – like Foucault (1977, 2003) – sees it as the responsibility of the researcher to

> "make visible the brutality and suffering which is hidden in penal institutions – to bring violence out from behind the scenes, thus allowing it to impinge upon public consciousness and disturb the public conscience." (Garland, 1991, p. 246)

The previous chapter, that primarily focussed on sociological theories on state violence and emotions (Chapter II), and the further discussion of prisons and emotions in this chapter accentuate the clear need, academically and politically, to critically question rationalised state narratives in regard to the construction of their argument. What has not been addressed so far, is that prisons must be recognised as gendered institutions in patriarchal states (Britton, 1997, 2000, 2003). Whilst the criminological literature addresses the prison as a regulating institution that oppresses and enforces inequalities along a rationalised argument, the majority of literature fails to recognise the gendered currents that are a central part of the institution. Britton's work outlines how looking at the development of the prison reveals how gender, class and race structure practices and the institution itself (Britton, 2003).

3.5 Gendering the Prison

The *Corston Report* (Baroness Corston, 2007) and other critical criminological approaches (Bosworth & Carrabine, 2001; Carlen, 1983; Carlen & Worrall, 2004) explain how prisons shape gendered experiences for staff and prisoners, and demonstrate that prisons do not account for the specific needs women face in society. Therein, it is emphasised that the majority of the incarcerated people in women's prisons experience criminalising practices of the wider justice system that targets them based on patriarchal ideas of gender, race and class. Bosworth (2003) argues that prisons are hyper masculine places in which prisoners face particular expectations to perform and build identity around their gender, race and sexuality. Once in the system, their experience is characterised through a lack of support for them and their potential

dependants outside of the prison. Along these lines, Carlen (1983) argues that prisons can be understood as another institution within wider social structures that controls women.

Whilst it is not an aspiration in this thesis to further discuss the gendered experiences of imprisonment, it is important to mention, since it indicates that experiences of imprisonment are linked to the organisation of the prison whose origin is inherently gendered. As the focus of this thesis is to understand the prison as an affective institution, we need to think about how the institution, abstracted from microlevel experiences, can be understood as gendered and how this links to affect.

Nagel argues that addressing the prison as gendered means recognising it as an institution that is part of "the male, white, capitalist dominated injustice system that perpetrates crimes against those who fall outside normed categories" (Nagel, 2013, p. 147). Critical feminist accounts argue that for a long time the discussion of what it actually means to position an institution as gendered has been absent (Britton, 2000). In reference to the standpoint feminist approach of Smith (1974), Britton (2000) delineates how discourses on organisations are discourses dominated by the 'male gaze'. These discourses are presented as abstracted from gender so that they come across as neutral and objective, when they are actually not. The gendered nature is therefore difficult to identify unless it is critically investigated, and a brief reflection of central sociological and criminological debates makes obvious that within the discussion around rationality, emotions, and state violence (Chapter II and above), gender remains absent. Britton (2000) draws on Acker's body of work and outlines how organisations can be understood as gendered. Acker writes:

> "To say that an organization, or any other analytic unit, is gendered means that advantage and disadvantage, exploitation and control, action and emotions, meaning and identity, are patterned through and in terms of a distinction between male and female, masculine and feminine." (Acker, 1990, p. 146)

Britton recognises the gendered nature within traditional sociological work on bureaucratic states (Weber, 2002) and applies this in her research on prisons (Britton, 1997, 2003). Therein, she discusses along Acker's work that the gendered nature of organisations transpires through in the narratives they create, and the theories written about them (Acker, 1990). Accordingly, prisons consistently reproduce patriarchal

ideas of state violence through its narratives. Britton (2000) emphasises in the article, aptly titled, *The Epistemology of the Gendered Organization* that the legitimisation and justification of prisons is grounded in patriarchal structures and reasoning, which anchors the development of the institution, and positions thinking and researching the prison in a particular epistemological tradition, which is the Enlightenment inspired school of thought this PhD thesis intends to challenge in its consideration of the prison as an affective institution.

Considering over-rationalising arguments around prisons and state violence that have been discussed in this and the previous chapter, I adopt the position that the gendered nature of the prison is interlinked with the rationalised reasoning for prisons and their continuous existence. Accordingly, rationalised versions of the prison can be understood as a particular male view on state punishment. And it lies within this tradition of thinking that emotions are somewhat cancelled out or are not given the attention in understanding the institution that they ought to be given. This shows that the rationalised argument around prisons is simultaneously a gendered argument of the institution. Therefore, acknowledging the prison as a gendered institution, as it is explored as essentially affective by someone who is not a cis man, comes with its own challenges but also chances as it allows us to see the institution differently (Schlosser (ed), 2020). And whilst affect was not given particular attention in the discussion of prisons as institutions that are infused with patriarchal ideas and manifested in patriarchal culture, it becomes apparent that gaps in the analysis of gender and affect is both owed to an epistemological heritage based in the Enlightenment era. This again highlights that the particular relationship between affect and rationality is equally subverted by gender. This epistemological interlacing is further illustrated and subsequently deconstructed in the following chapter (Chapter IV), wherein the argument is pivoted in an epistemological direction that enables us to think prisons differently from over-rationalised accounts. What is already becoming obvious at this point, however, is that if prisons are understood through a critical frame of reference, that does account for the gendered and affective qualities of the institution, the argument of rationalising accounts of the prison start to crack. It thereby further indicates, what has already been pointed out multiple times, that the institution itself is a manifestation of a particular philosophical tradition that structures dominating political narratives and academic research on the prison, which are rationalising and

male accounts that in consequence produce limiting understandings of the institution. Placing the prison as a gendered institution also stresses that rationality itself is a cultural form and mode of affective representation which has been pointed out in the previous chapter (2.2). It emphasises that investigating rationality from a critical vantage point is a promising endeavour.

3.6 Summary

The examination of the literature in this chapter further stresses the need to explore the prison affectively as it delivers impulses for understanding it as an affective institution of state violence. The literature review on liberal accounts on the prison illustrates that it is imperative to think about emotions when we want to make sense of prisons (3.1). By pivoting attention to the built environment of the prison, research within carceral geographies emphasises that interrogating design and architecture allows us to make claims about the institution's affectivity (3.2). And, critical criminological approaches demonstrate how the inherently violent prison is constructed, governed and represented as a relatively benign institution in a rationalising official discourse (3.3). Together, these three bodies of work clearly allude to – even though they do not specifically discuss the prison as such – to the affectivity of the institution.

This chapter has equally substantiated the argument that rationalised accounts of the state, and rationalised conceptualisations of emotions rely on an Enlightenment foundation, the *affect/rationality dichotomy,* which hinders a more critical understanding of the complex relations that imbue the prison. As such, it accentuates the potential of generating a more nuanced understanding of the prison when affect becomes a central point of interrogation, as has been pointed out and conceptualised through the *affective moral fact* in the previous chapter (Chapter II).

Recognising the prison as a sociocultural institution that reproduces an official narrative of the prison as a rational institution of punishment (Garland, 1991), guides the thesis in a direction that emphasises the value of critically researching state discourses (Burton & Carlen, [1979]2013; Cohen, 1985). The official narrative on prisons has been placed as a representation of patriarchal structures that equally

anchors rational, non-affective thinking (Britton, 1997, 2000, 2003). This further emphasises the need to question the epistemology that consolidates dominating accounts of state violence.

In short: This chapter has provided further theoretical, epistemological, and methodological impetuses that will be further explored as the thesis goes forward. The latter two will be addressed in detail in the following *Chapter IV: A Paradigmatic Shift Towards Seeing the World Affectively*.

Chapter IV: A Paradigmatic Shift Towards Seeing the World Affectively

The previous two chapters discussed some key literature in criminology and sociology in relation to how prisons and, in a broader sense, the state are addressed in reference to affect. It has been established that the prison cannot be thought as an affective institution within these existing frameworks. Even when emotions are addressed, the analysis in the previous literature relies on a dichotomous understanding of affect and rationality as an epistemological foundation to these theories, which ultimately forecloses an affective understanding of the prison.

For researching the prison as an affective entity of the state, it is necessary to lead with an epistemology that opens up the possibility of researching the institution as an affective institution in the first place. Thus, a critique of this Enlightenment tradition, and the methodological and methodical chances that develop out of the rejection of this long established and mostly unquestioned *affect/rationality dichotomy*, are subject of this chapter.

The first part of this chapter, *Pivoting Epistemology* (4.1), is built around the question how these popular accounts in state theory, political sociology and criminological research do not permit for investigating the prison as an affective institution and addresses what needs to change in order to do so. In this pivotal point of this thesis, it is outlined how the *affect/rationality dichotomy* is central within broader patriarchal patterns of thinking which is reflected in the majority of mainstream sociological accounts, in which the predominantly white, cis-male depictions of the state and state institutions are elevated as the norm. This is followed by outlining the paradigmatic shift that relies on a feminist epistemology (Ahmed, 2006; Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983; Jaggar, 1989; Smith, 1974) that aligns with the previously sketched theoretical frame of the *affective moral fact* (Chapter II). The crux of this epistemological shift lies within breaking with its patriarchal lineage and deconstructing the *affect/rationality dichotomy*.

This epistemological shift becomes central in discursively analysing prison reports which are addressed and defined in the second part of this chapter. This will be discussed before the third part of this chapter outlines the Critical Discourse Analysis

(Jäger, 2015; Koschut, 2017) approach used in this thesis to establish a counter reading to the official narrative found in official prison reports.

In short, this chapter does three things: (i) it argues for an epistemological shift on the basis of feminist scholarship without which understanding the prison as affectively is seen as impossible, (ii) it demonstrates how prison reports offer themselves, as official narratives of the state, to be researched for understanding the prison affectively and putting the epistemological shift into practice, and (iii) it outlines the methodical framework that is developed in convergence with the epistemological shift.

4.1 Pivoting Epistemology

This section commences with outlining the central epistemological problem and limitation of over-rationalised, non-affective thinking that has been identified as consolidating popular accounts in sociology as well as the works that have been discussed in Chapter II and III. It aims to illustrate why it is necessary to break with an Enlightenment lineage that is manifested in dichotomous thinking, and to outline the feminist epistemological basis that provides for the paradigmatic shift towards seeing the world affectively.

4.1.1 Rationality – A Popular and Obfuscating Idea

All previously discussed criminological approaches and sociological theory outlined in Chapters II and III connect a central theme. They each address fragments of an essential sociological question: How is social order possible? The answers to this precedent-setting question in Western sociology are shaped by contractarian ideas of the social, the so-called *social contract* whose origin arguably lies in Hobbes' *Leviathan or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil* (Hobbes, [1651]1960). Therein Hobbes ([1651]1960) described how humans found themselves in a state of nature where rivalry, distrust and thirst for glory drove human behaviour, with constant fear for violence leading the way until the *sovereign*, a superior authority, tames violence on the basis of a social contract that monopolises the legitimacy to violence in the power of a state. Accordingly, it is assumed that Western states have formed themselves around a central problem: the fear for violence

and its use in maintaining order. Rationality and utilitarian interests are depicted as the driving force leading to the monopolisation of violence in the social contract, under which individuals freely renounce their sovereignty in exchange for guaranteed security through the state (Hobbes, [1651]1960). This is a defining moment as it accentuates that states cannot dispense without violence, since their power is also founded in violence as a viable and justifiable resource. As has been illustrated previously (Chapters II and III), this *monopolisation of violence* (Weber, 1977) finds its expression in institutions like the prison, in bureaucratic systems and laws that are justified based on a rationalised argument. And whilst these practices have been criticised for the harm they cause (Arendt, 1970; Bauman, 1989; Burton & Carlen, [1979]2013; Garland, 1991; Scott, 2018b; Scott, 1998; Sim, 2017), the rational argument on which basis state violence is justified is seldom challenged.

However, a re-reading of Hobbes' work ([1651]1960) suggests that the *social contract* rests on anything but rationality. Hobbes' ([1651]1960) *sovereign* – today we would say *the state* – has been modelled by reference to a biblical creature that is anything but what could be considered as *rational* and affect-averse. It is a dragon-like creature with eyes as fiery red as lava stone, dressed in invincible scales, a sea monster that lives and breathes sparks and fire. It is a beast that creeps under the water, lurks in the shadows, plays with ships like cats play with mice, a monster that has no fear and only angst to spread. It is called *Leviathan* (Job 40:25-41:26). Looking at these attributes the state is supposed to embody, it becomes clear that it is not rationality that tames violence but affect materialised in an entity, *the state,* that symbolises greater fear than the fear for violence from others. Even though Hobbes ([1651]1960) has ascribed affect a central role in social order and the formation of states, popular sociological discourse on the state in sociology clings to a blueprint that understands modern states as contractarian, rational/affect-averse formations. Whilst it is difficult to trace such reified convictions back to one specific source as they form an unquestioned echo in the hallways of sociology, *the last modernists*, as Meštrović (1998) would call them, like Parsons (1949,1967), Giddens (1991), Wagner (2003), Beck (1992) and Pinker (2012, 2018), continuously reproduce highly rationalised versions of social order. Meštrović (1988, 1998) critically questions these rationalised explanations of Western societies, like Giddens' account, and establishes the argument that agenda-setting sociologists like Parsons have re-written earlier sociology, taken out its references to

emotions, in favour of a positivist, functionalist reading that reflects a desire for spreading over-rationalised accounts of the sociological endeavour. Parsons' (1949, 1967) work in particular has reproduced a rationalised reading of Hobbes ([1651]1960) that has become the unquestioned status quo in sociology (Filippov, 2013). This re-writing has been shown in relation to Weber (Turner, 1993) and with Durkheim (Karsenti, 2012; Meštrović, 1988; Weiss, 2012; Weyher, 2012a). Despite critical accounts that provide re-readings of such early sociological accounts, a celebration of rationality remains in much social science at the expense of emotions and affect (Barbalet, 1998), even in works that do acknowledge them and criticise rational accounts to some extent (Chapters II and III).

What the above argument implicitly suggests is that theory and epistemology cannot be separately discussed. Instead, the connections between theory and epistemology need to be acknowledged and made transparent. The first section of this chapter aims to demonstrate this by challenging the Enlightenment understanding of rationality along feminist epistemologies (Barad, 2003; Haraway, 1991; Hartsock, 1983; Jaggar, 1989; Rose, 1983). That there is a need to illustrate the entanglement of theory and epistemology arises out of the use of *rationality* as an (i) explanatory framework for social order as well as the (ii) epistemological origin in rationalised understandings of the state and its institutions in the above accounts. There, *rationality* is argued (i) as affect resolving and controlling through a state that justifies its dependency on violence through rationality. Thereby, the overemphasis on rationality as an Enlightenment idea and frame of thinking does not allow for the acknowledgment of *affect* in explanatory models as well as in (ii) processes of knowledge production, where neutral, objective and positivist qualities are celebrated and ascribed value. The outcome of this has been the prioritisation of rationality over affect within the *affect/rationality dichotomy* which, as addressed in Chapters II and III, also guides approaches that do address emotions within the state, its practices, and the prison. However, the epistemological basis in theories of the state and its institutions is seldom further interrogated or questioned in sociological research. As will become apparent shortly, not recognising the intricate connections of epistemology and theory, not acknowledging the structuring powers of the *affect/rationality dichotomy*, hinders the development of more nuanced and complex understandings of society, the state, and its institutions.

4.1.2 Establishing Feminist Epistemology: Against the Affect/Rationality Dichotomy

The *affect/rationality dichotomy* has been questioned and rendered redundant within feminist epistemologies (Barad, 2003; Haraway, 1991; Hartsock, 1983; Jaggar, 1989; Rose, 1983). As they have addressed the intricate problems of dichotomies, feminist scholars demonstrate how these can be questioned and interrogated to the point of their collapse. Indeed, the reified idea of the *affect/rationality dichotomy* is conveyed as a product of patriarchal thinking.

Drawing on a standpoint feminist approach (Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983; Smith, 1974), knowledge is understood as always situated. Accordingly, the apparent neutral, objective and value-free rationalised accounts of states and state institutions, are argued as offering partial and incomplete knowledge (Haraway, 1991). These accounts are generated from a white, cis-male and heterosexual standpoint which depicts a specific situated account of the world. Consequently, rationalised accounts ignore viewpoints and bodily experiences of women (Smith, 1974) as well as other genders, classes, races and sexualities (Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983), which makes the *rational* argument a *male* argument. Paradoxically though, the limiting rationalised accounts veil this male vantage point in the Enlightenment argument, that *rationally* acquired knowledge is generalisable (Barrett, 1992). Historically, the Enlightenment set its own benchmark of what can be understood as *rational* (Stoler, 2007; Williams, 1998). This heritance is manifested in the reified, patriarchal view that associates *rationality* with abstract *male* reasoning.

The *affect/rationality dichotomy* concurrently signifies other dichotomies that are intricately interlaced. Rationality does not only depict a male view but, through its separation from the material world and its claim to generalisability, manifests itself in the abstract world (Hartsock, 1983). Hartsock writes poignantly:

> "This experience of two worlds, one valuable, if abstract and deeply unattainable, the other useless and demeaning, if concrete and necessary, lies at the heart of a series of dualisms - abstract/concrete, mind/body, culture/nature, ideal/real, stasis/change. And these dualisms are overlaid by gender: only the first of each pair is associated with the male." (Hartsock, 1983, p. 297)

Critically interrogating the *affect/rationality dichotomy* reveals dichotomous distinctions as normative claims which exist in a value ascribed hierarchy in which *rationality*, *cognition* and *male viewpoints* are celebrated at the expense of *affect*, *body* and a *female viewpoint*. Therefore, the *affect/rationality dichotomy* is a gendered dichotomy (Gatens, 1992; Whitford, 1988) that represents conflicting qualities that are fundamental to Western patriarchal societies. Constructing and appropriating rationality as a male, abstract and valuable viewpoint in patriarchal accounts of knowledge production deny understanding bodily experiences as structuring qualities to knowledge production (Hartsock, 1983) and, in consequence, produces research and theories that are far from generalisable. Therefore, standpoint feminism argues for overcoming such dichotomies by writing ourselves as researchers back into our work (Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983; Smith, 1974).

But still, white, cis-gendered male researchers continue to appropriate rationality and objectivity to narrate a narrow and oversimplified version of the world, that does not reflect the complexities of the social and varieties of identities. The work of Wagner (2003) is indicative of a rationalist position as he appropriates a standpoint feminist argument to defend his patriarchal viewpoint on Western societies. Referring to the work of Harding (1986), he acknowledges that modernity would have been narrated differently if different gender perspectives were considered, whilst reassuring himself of his 'superior' view on society as a man. He misconstrues the standpoint feminist account as follows:

> "While this [Harding's point] is generally true, it must also be granted that the 'male' social identities in modernity, as based on nation and class, have decisively shaped our common history – maybe exactly because gender has been excluded." (Wagner, 2003, p. 207)

This epitomises the epistemological problem inherent within this thesis: by ascribing value to the male vantage point as neutral and objective, Wagner (2003) frames rationality as genderless when it actually depicts a particular vantage point (Phillips, 1992). Simultaneously, he devaluates other accounts whilst also implicitly illustrating how sociological theory is also always gendered (Sydie, 1987), as he elevates the male perspective as the one that should be regarded as valuable in academia and research. Wagner (2003) establishes the male identity in research as one that has no past, no

present, no gender, no body, no affective experiences that could interfere with the research, when in reality it represents a particular situated vantage point (Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983; Smith, 1974).

Hence, the dichotomy between affect and rationality relies on an understanding of rationality that brackets off affect in the portrayal of what rationality ought to be understood as. In this way, rational/affect-averse approaches absolve themselves from normative evaluation as they create the imaginary of rationalised accounts of the world as impartial and innocent, when they are anything but (Flax, 1992). Indeed, the rationalised claim to violence through imprisonment is far from harmless as many studies on imprisonment show (e.g. Cohen & Taylor, 1972; Scott, 2018b; Sim, 2017), and as demonstrated in prior chapters within this thesis (Chapters II and III). Feminist epistemologies therefore suggest recognising rationality as a patriarchal concept in explanatory frameworks, and allow us to recognise rationalised versions of the world as particularly situated narratives that are subverted by power relations. This mirrors the conceptual argument made based on a re-reading of Durkheim (Weyher, 2012a) which informs the conceptual framework, the *affective moral fact*, developed in Chapter II. There, it has been suggested that rationality can be positioned as a *social fact* that describes a dominating sociocultural way of feeling and being in the social structure in a specific time and place. This not only implies that feminist epistemologies build the framework for the development of the *affective moral fact*, they also encourage an epistemological shift that sees and reads the world as essentially affective.

Seeing the world as affective implies the recognition of affect as meaning-creating and knowledge-producing – "life without any emotion would be life without any meaning" (Jaggar, 1989, p. 161) as "feelings are a route to truth: they both provide us with our beliefs about the world and also provide a basis for assessing these beliefs" (Griffiths, 1988, p. 148). That emotions are ascribed pivotal importance in everyday interactions as well as wider social structures is not new. Within the sociology of emotions, it is the interrogation of the role of emotions in society and sense making of the world that is central focus (Barbalet, 1998; Hochschild, 1983). However, popular approaches remain within a dichotomous relationship of affect/rationality, and often argue emotions as necessary in order to be rational (Barbalet, 1998; Goffman, 1959;

Hochschild, 1979, 1983). Rationalising accounts in sociological research therefore mostly subscribe to patriarchal reasoning and arguably distance researchers, who are not white and cis men, from their own work. This has been understood as the alienation of the researcher by Smith (1974). Smith thereby relies on a re-reading and further development of Marx' concept of alienation. Here, it is understood as the consciously writing out of emotions from research through putting on "'cognitive' blinders against the seeing of emotion" (Weyher, 2012, p. 342). Consequently, this alienates us from our research and further stretches the importance of embracing situatedness in research to include affect for creating complex and more nuanced accounts through research.

Indeed, embracing emotions is argued as essential to epistemology, and their recognition in research living proof to question gendered undertows of the *affect/rationality dichotomy* (Jaggar, 1989). Outlining how emotions are constituted by race, class and gender, Jaggar reveals that rational and value free knowledge is a myth:

> "The ideal of dispassionate inquiry is an impossible dream, but a dream none the less or perhaps a myth that has exerted enormous influence on Western epistemology. Like all myth, it is a form of ideology that fulfils certain social and political functions." (Jaggar, 1989, p. 163)

This asks us to position ourselves, our affect, at the heart of epistemology. Jaggar (1989) demands we embrace our so-called *outlaw emotions* as a feminist act in research. She thereby describes emotions that are conflicting and critical of domineering and popular viewpoints:

> "Outlaw emotions are distinguished by their incompatibility with the dominant perceptions and values, and some, though certainly not all, of these outlaw emotions are potentially or actually feminist emotions." (Jaggar, 1989, p. 166)

Embracing *outlaw emotions* can be understood as part of being a *feminist killjoy* (Ahmed, 2017) in academic debates: to commit to pointing out, critiquing, and practically changing narratives within a sociological landscape that still popularly relies on patriarchal dichotomies. Critiquing and dissecting patriarchal accounts, pivoting epistemology, and narrating theory epistemologically enable us to gain insight into thought processes and makes knowledge production transparent. This is

what makes this thesis a feminist piece of research that openly *takes a side* (Becker, 1967), a political stance (Seller, 1988), on which basis popular and domineering views can be disputed, and through which critical accounts in sociological research can be offered, like an affective exploration of the prison.

4.1.3 Bringing 'the Self' Back into Research

Therefore, the recognition of my own situatedness as a researcher – as a white, cis-gendered, sapphic, middle-class woman – and valuing my own affective experiences whilst establishing my arguments, brings a vantage point that essentially differs and distances itself from rationalising and patriarchal accounts of the state and its institutions. Indeed, this offers a gateway for research to understand institutions like the prison as affective in that "a feminist standpoint can allow us to understand patriarchal institutions and ideologies as perverse inversions of more humane social relations" (Hartsock, 1983, p. 284).

Therein, it is to emphasise that knowledge is always embodied, as the situatedness of the researcher is always anchored in their bodily existence, which connects this feminist epistemology with the framing of *affect* as discussed in Chapter II. In classical standpoint feminist approaches (Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983; Smith, 1974), it has been pointed out that bodily experiences have a decisive influence on knowledge production. Affect studies extend this understanding and highlight that knowledge develops in affectively determined relationships constructed in the sociocultural, between humans but also objects and the built environment (Ahmed, 2014; Berlant, 2005), and can be automated and spontaneous (Sedgwick, 2003). Therefore, situatedness is also always affective. Studying affect, like exploring the prison as an affective institution, is therefore in itself an affective endeavour (Hutchison & Bleiker, 2017), as affect, that naturally infuses things and living beings, is always part of studying affect. Feminist epistemologies therefore encourage to actively write our affect back in, in contrast to rationalised research that actively encourages us to write ourselves out for the illusion of objective knowledge (MacKenzie, 2011).

Thinking of knowledge as affective, as always embodied, this thesis inevitably argues against a distinction between epistemology and ontology, that can be understood as another dichotomous understanding that oftentimes subverts research (Ahmed, 2006;

Barad, 2003; Rose, 1983). That a neat distinction is untenable is disclosed by briefly looking at Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological ontology that centres the overcoming of the Cartesian separation of mind and matter, which is equally echoed in feminist philosophical approaches (Hodge, 1988):

> "Insofar as I have hands, feet, a body, and a world, I sustain intentions around myself that are not decided upon and that affect my surroundings in ways I do not choose. These intentions are general in a double sense, first in the sense that they constitute a system in which all possible objects are enclosed … and second in the sense that these intentions do not belong to me, they come from farther away than myself and I am not surprised to find them in all psycho-physical subjects who have a similar organization to my own." (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 465)

Merleau-Ponty's (2012) understanding again substantiates that knowledge is always embodied and equally emphasises certain qualities of affective relationships that are recognised in the conceptual framing of affect, theoretically and epistemologically. Suchlike is also pointed out in standpoint feminism. There, Hartsock argues her point in recurrence to Marx as she writes that "human activity has both an ontological and epistemological status, that human feelings are not 'merely anthropological phenomena', but are 'truly ontological affirmations of being'" (Hartsock, 1983, p. 306). That we cannot clearly separate between *what we can know* and *how we can know* is emphasised in Ahmed's work *Queer Phenomenology* (2006), where she argues that we think and see through the body which is always a historical object. Supposed boundaries between epistemology and ontology are therefore as questionable as any other dichotomy that has been sketched out till this point.

So far, the discussion has shown: the *affect/rationality dichotomy* brings limitations to understanding the world and therein states and institutions like the prison, which, as has been addressed, predominantly relies on an Enlightenment tradition. When the discussed rationalised accounts attempt to convey the image of objective and neutral research, they equally represent different variations and intensities of patriarchal viewpoints on the state and institutions that feign to be free of affect or any situatedness, or at least do not make their ways of knowledge production transparent. Durkheim's sociology (1953, 1957, 1958) offers an antithesis to these rationalising accounts of the state and state institutions. The re-reading of his work emphasises (Barnwell, 2018; Meštrović, 1988; Weiss, 2012; Weyher, 2012a) that he never

anchored his deliberation in the *affect/rationality dichotomy* in the first place (Chapter II). As the *affect/rationality dichotomy* has been recognised as the reified gold standard in Western popular theories, the feminist epistemologies demand to question this foundation and call to embrace the situatedness, and therein affect, of the researcher.

This epistemological discussion likewise shows that we need to think, critique and develop theory epistemologically. Briefly looking back at Chapter II illustrates this. There, Durkheim's *moral fact* (1953) has been further developed and extended with recurrence to *affect* as it is discussed in feminist cultural studies (Ahmed, 2006, 2010, 2014; Berlant, 2005, 2009, 2011, 2020; Sedgwick, 2003). This understanding of *affect* is grounded in the feminist scholarship outlined above. Consequently, the *affective moral fact* and feminist epistemologies question the same *affect/rationality dichotomy* that is seen as fundamental to limiting accounts which are situated and, therefore, deliver partial understandings of institutions like the prison. Critically questioning this dichotomy on the basis of feminist scholarship shows how rationality is a patriarchal invention which simultaneously denotes a hierarchical relation between the two, where power is exercised through the appropriation of apparent rational/affect-averse narratives and practices over, and at the expense of, affect; signalising that dichotomies rely on a power imbalance. In conversion with the recognition of situated knowledge, it imposes the interrogation of state institutions like the prison as a situated, and essentially affective entity of power (Berlant, 2005), as this shift of epistemology facilitates to make clear the connection between how we talk, know and think about states, and how we learn and recognise them for what they are. Therefore, putting this epistemological shift into practice, necessarily means destabilising theory and research that are couched in or are continuously dependant on rationalised and patriarchal accounts of the social.

With the epistemological position of this thesis now in view, the preceding two chapters (Chapters II and III) can be seen as a theoretical discussion and destabilisation (to a certain extent) of over-rationalising, non-affective theory in sociological and criminological accounts on the state and state institutions. Next, we turn our attention to describe the main analytical foci of this research in the form of prison reports that seem to embody the same Enlightenment origin as dominating works on state violence.

Doing so allows us to bring attention to the importance of these items as sociological and political artefacts that enable the *affect/rationality dichotomy* to be practically investigated.

4.2 Investigating Prison Reports

As outlined in Chapter III, prisons are some of the last resorts where state violence is continuously legitimised within Western democratic states. As state violence is facing a particular pressure to be legitimised (Reemtsma, 2013; Sofsky, 1996), prisons need to continuously demonstrate their legitimacy (Burton & Carlen, [1979]2013; Corrigan & Sayer, 1985; Garland, 1991). This is done through rationalisation processes of the state, as discussed in Chapter II, and official narratives, as addressed in Chapter III. There, it has been shown how such rationalist vantage points have justified imprisonment as a 'civilised' punishment based on a larger Enlightenment narrative (Beccaria, [1756]2008; Bentham, 1791; Ignatieff, 1978), anchored in an argument that relies on an *affect/rationality dichotomy* (Chapters II and III).

Prison reports produced by HM Inspectorate of Prisons are textual and visual artefacts that are produced with the purpose to document the apparent independent and 'objective' audits of prisons (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, no date). In this research, prison reports will be established as official discourse that equally embodies rationalised, non-affective and positivist qualities to narrate a state discourse on the *rational* and 'civilised' prison in England and Wales. As they are believed to have central attributes in common with the reviewed theories and approaches (Chapter II and III), the prison report is re-appropriated for the Critical Discourse Analysis for the purpose of exploring the prison as an affective institution.

What makes them of particular interest to research the prison as an affective institution is what seems a complex use of the *affect/rationality dichotomy* in this official discourse on the prison. Accordingly, their interrogation promises to illustrate how the intricate relationship of *affect* and *rationality* is deployed and presented for creating the prison imaginary of *rational* punishment. Therein, the Critical Discourse Analysis

promises to further question the *affect/rationality dichotomy* which is central in the affective exploration of the prison, that intends to understand and think prisons differently to previous accounts.

4.2.1 Positioning the Prison Report – The State Talks

The continuous reproduction of official narratives through the state is aptly captured in the phrase "'the State' never stops talking" (Corrigan & Sayer, 1985, p. 3). Drawing on Durkheim, Corrigan and Sayer (1985) outline how the state constantly normalises a specific moral order through a continuous stream of 'talk' that disperses the state's narrative. Accordingly, the prison report is understood as one of such 'talk' that is part of morally regulating and orchestrating the social in the imaginary of the state. This thesis depicts a critical reading of prison reports, which has been recently proven as a valuable point of further interrogating and exposing the abysmal state of prisons (Sim, 2019; Travis, 2018). Here, however, the critical reading will centre itself around the affective exploration of the institution.

Prison reports are drawn up after announced or unannounced prison inspections by the HM Inspectorate of Prisons which was initially founded in 1981, and officially established by the Criminal Justice Act in 1982. Its mandate and responsibilities are outlined in section 5A of the Prison Act 1952 as amended by section 57 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, no date). On their website, the HM Inspectorate of Prisons issues a statement of self-conception, which starts as follows:

> "Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons for England and Wales (HMI Prisons) is an independent inspectorate which reports on conditions for and treatment of those in prison, young offender institutions, secure training centres, immigration detention facilities, police and court custody suites, customs custody facilities and military detention.
>
> HMI Prisons' role is to provide independent scrutiny of the conditions for and treatment of prisoners and other detainees, promoting the concept of 'healthy establishments' in which staff work effectively to support prisoners and detainees to reduce reoffending and achieve positive outcomes for those detained and for the public." (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, no date a)

HMI Prisons' statement puts particular emphasis on the independent character of the institution as it describes itself as an "independent inspectorate" that provides

"independent scrutiny of the conditions for and treatment of prisoners" (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, no date a). This evokes the appearance that the Inspectorate operates autonomously from any other entity, like the state or state institutions. It gives the impression that the Inspectorate is not limited in regard to their degree of scrutiny and should be seen as a truthful and accurate source of information. Following this, they are not bound to abide by any political agenda of any other party but their own, which they see in "promoting the concept of 'healthy establishments'" (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, no date a). A close reading of their statement of independence, however, highlights a discrepancy within their narrative of the "independent institution" as it outlines that the Inspectorate exists at the behest of the state and is overseen and governed in the periphery of it:

> "HM Chief Inspector of Prisons is appointed by the Justice Secretary from outside of the Prison Service. The Chief Inspector reports directly to the Justice Secretary and Ministers on the treatment of prisoners, conditions in prisons, young offender institutions, court custody and other matters in England and Wales as directed by the Justice Secretary. The Chief Inspector also has a statutory responsibility to inspect and report to the Home Secretary on conditions for and treatment of detainees in all places of immigration detention in the United Kingdom." (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, no date a)

Rather, HMI Prisons needs to be seen as existent at the behest of the state. Sovereignty over the Inspectorate lies with the state. Whilst the HM Inspectorate of Prisons is asked to practice scrutiny in their work, they none the less remain an institution that is overseen and governed in the periphery of the state, which makes their accounts of the prison not independent but an official state discourse.

Therefore, the critical reading offered in this research will oppose the idea of prison reports as a document that is free of the 'talk of the state' (Corrigan & Sayer, 1985), as it positions prison reports as state artefacts of official prison discourse, because they are crafted by the HMI Prisons, a fragmented part of the wider state apparatus.

In this thesis, I follow the conceptualisation of the state as a moral entity after Durkheim (1957), which has been already outlined in Chapter II. Recognising the *state* as a contested subject that has differing understandings across the social science – from the state as mainly being concerned with the legitimisation of its own violence (Weber, 2002), or as a continuous project of legitimisation around the physical and symbolic

violence that underpins the accumulation of different forms of capital (Bourdieu, 2014), to the state as embroiled in hegemonic processes that seek to exercise leadership in civil society through cultivating aspects of politico-cultural domination (Gramsci, 1971) – here, Durkheim's (1957) ambiguous conceptualisation of the state as a moral entity is embraced. Following this line of argument allows us to recognise the state and its institutions, like the prison and the HMI Prisons, as a reflector of the *affective moral fact*, or as Corrigan and Sayer (1985) argue on the basis of Durkheim, the state's mission of *moral regulation*:

> "a project of normalizing, rendering natural, taken for granted, in a word 'obvious', what are in fact ontological and epistemological premises of a particular and historical form of social order. Moral regulation is coextensive with state formation, and state forms are always animated and legitimated by a particular moral ethos." (Corrigan & Sayer, 1985, p. 4)

As artefacts that represent the official imaginary of the prison, prison reports can therefore be understood as part of a rationalising and patriarchal endeavour of the state (Sim & Tombs, 2009). This in turn indicates the epistemological grounding of prison reports in Enlightenment thinking which has been argued as foundation to patriarchal knowledge in the above epistemological discussion, where the prioritisation of rationality over affect is intricately linked with an equally gendered dichotomy. Accordingly, prison reports can also be situated as artefacts of official discourse that reflect the gendered and patriarchal nature of the institution that has been addressed in Chapter III, through which the idea of rational knowledge and rational institutions is reified.

4.2.2 Research Rationale and Aims

Interrogating the prison report offers the opportunity to further explore the theoretical framing of the *affective moral fact* by questioning the epistemological heritage of over-rationalising approaches which facilitates the affective investigation of the prison. Accordingly, the purpose of this thesis is to expose selected prison inspection reports on HMP Liverpool, HMP Birmingham and HMP Pentonville to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), an explanation for which is given below.

This will enable the exploration of the central research question:

What are the theoretical and methodological possibilities to explore the prison as an affective institution?

As has been outlined in the introduction, this thesis pursues the following objectives to address the research question:

(i) Excavating the research gap the thesis positions itself in through the exploration of how the prison has been addressed affectively in state theory, political sociology, and criminological works.
(ii) Critically investigating the epistemological basis, that accounts in state theory, political sociology, and criminology base themselves in while establishing a feminist-epistemological lens this thesis embraces.
(iii) Developing a theoretical framework that centres *affect*.
(iv) Establishing a methodological and analytical framework that allows for the affective exploration of the official discourse on the prison in England and Wales along feminist epistemologies.

By doing so this research pursues the following aims:

(i) Developing a critical counter reading of the official discourse on the prison in England and Wales through the Critical Discourse Analysis of official prison narratives under an affective lens.
(ii) Establishing a conceptual framework with the *affective moral fact* that allows to effectively theorise the prison as an affective institution.
(iii) Demonstrating that there is value in embracing feminist epistemologies as well as imaginative and creative approaches to sociological research for the purpose of generating more nuanced understandings.

As stated above, a central aim of this thesis lies within the epistemological and theoretical framing of the *affective moral fact* – through the re-reading of Durkheim (Barnwell, 2018; Durkheim, 1953, 1957, 1958, 1973, 1984; Karsenti, 2012, 2013; Meštrović, 1988; Shilling, 1997; Weiss, 2012; Weyher, 2012a), affect theory (Ahmed, 2010, 2014; Berlant, 2011; Sedgwick, 2003) and feminist epistemology (Ahmed, 2006; Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983; Jaggar, 1989; Smith, 1974) –

that pivots the debate around state and state institutions in sociology. Along this framing, an overall purpose is to establish a rich reading of how the prison estate reasons punishment in this institutional form and to explore how the state narrative orchestrates affect in a project of state power, and how this official narrative communicates sensemaking of punishment through affect in the prison.

4.2.3 Genealogical Selection of Prison Reports for Research

The prison will be researched via an analysis directed through two key ideas put forward by this thesis: (i) the conceptual framework, the *affective moral fact*, and (ii) a feminist epistemology that challenges the *rationality/affect dichotomy*. Based on a Foucauldian Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of prison reports of three English prisons, HMP Liverpool, HMP Birmingham and HMP Pentonville, spanning from 1982 to 2019, as well as photographs of each prison from the Ministry of Justice website, the prison will be further explored as an affective institution.

The three prisons were specifically chosen for their richness of data as presented in official prison reports. Whilst the textual data is not different from reports on other prisons in England and Wales, it is the rich visual data included in these prisons' reports that sets them apart. Since prison reports on HMP Liverpool, HMP Birmingham and HMP Pentonville present a visual official discourse next to a textual one, this research focusses on these institutions and not others.

Initially the official photos taken by HM Inspectorate of Prisons were planned to be discussed in context with photographs taken by myself. I intended to take photos of the outside of these institutions for the purpose of sociologically researching (Heng, 2017) their sociocultural symbolism represented in their built environment, as well as how these prisons are manifested in the cityscape. However, the Covid-19 pandemic hindered this research to take place. Instead, the textual and visual official discourse of the three prisons is looked at following Foucauldian Discourse Analysis which has been creatively and imaginatively developed for the purpose of exploring the prison affectively in official discourse. This will be outlined in due course (see 4.4), and further discussed later in the thesis (see 6.1 and 7.1)

These three selected prisons are male prisons. It has been a conscious decision to research these institutions in this thesis that positions itself as feminist through its epistemological grounding. As pointed out earlier in this chapter, it is the feminist epistemology that facilitates offering a critical vantage point on patriarchal institutions like the prison, as it offers a fundamental critique on the *affect/rationality dichotomy*, the *rational*, and therein *patriarchal*, narrative the prison is built on. Further to this, the research here looks at prison reports of male institutions, as prisons have been designed for and developed by men which constitutes them as patriarchal institutions (Britton, 1997, 2000, 2003). Since this thesis focusses on the institutional level of analysis of the prison, the gendered experiences that are structured through the institution on an interactional level (Baroness Corston, 2007; Bosworth & Carrabine, 2001; Carlen, 1983; Carlen & Worrall, 2004), cannot be included for the affective exploration of the institution at this point, since it would add another layer of analysis that cannot be accommodated for in this PhD. This, however, does not make this thesis any less relevant for feminist studies as the critique of patriarchal structures, institutions and narratives is a feminist act. As has been pointed out by Davis, Dent, Meiners and Richie (2021) in *Abolition. Feminism. Now.*, essentially critiquing and critically researching the prison is *always* feminist as it *always* critiques a patriarchal institution in its essence, which necessarily draws attention to a complex entanglement of struggles and therein power structures. Following this, this thesis can be further positioned as feminist as it essentially explores how *affect* expresses itself in the official narrative of the prison which always involves the analysis of power relations.

The prison reports chosen for analysis have been selected according to Foucault's (2003) genealogical principles, whereby tracing discourses through time offers insight into how these discourses are framed and reproduced through power relations. Foucault (2003) rejects over-rationalised understandings of history and morality as linear and logical developments. Instead, he emphasises the value of researching the development of morality through a genealogical approach that embraces sentiments in history. For Foucault (2003), this embrace can counter domineering narratives as well as unravel and question those truths that seem to have no past and no present. He states:

> "it [genealogy] must record the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality; it must seek them in the most unpromising places, in what we tend to feel is without history – *in sentiments, love, conscience,*

> *instinct;* it must be sensitive to their recurrence, not in order to trace the gradual curve of their evolution, but to isolate the different scenes where they engaged in different roles." (Foucault, 1977a, pp. 139-140, my emphasis)

Accordingly, investigating the prison as an affective institution can be pursued by deconstructing the rational official discourse on the prison by tracing and embracing affect in prison reports. Following Foucault's (1977a) plea, that we need to look at narratives in the midst of historical accounts, those prison reports are analysed that were published in times of crisis and change in state legitimacy, state policy and state authority, because it is those times that form and direct the prison (Burton & Carlen, [1979]2013; Newburn, 2007; Sim, 2009).

The prison reports are therefore chosen according to the following genealogical rationale:

(i) At the beginning of the 1980s, under the conservative government of Margaret Thatcher, Her Majesty's Inspectorate for Prisons of England and Wales was established and with this came the introduction of prison reports. As being part of a punitive turn (Sim, 2009), prison reports highlight and stand for the idea that punishment, and the environment in which it happens, can be assessed. Also, the British Crime Survey has been established in 1981 (Newburn, 2007), which again suggests an overall new approach to the measurement and documentation of crime and punishment. Therefore, the first prison report published of each prison will be analysed.

(ii) The early 1990s recorded a high increase in prison numbers. This has been the result of legislative punitive reforms allowing judges to take past offences into consideration for sentencing that eventually has led to longer terms of incarcerations as well as punishing minor offences with prison sentences. This has eventually affected prison conditions to deteriorate under the rising numbers of prisoners (Cohen, 1985; Sim, 2009). Whilst a conservative government under John Major has tried to level rising imprisonment numbers with very little success through policy measurements like "the introduction of bail information schemes, time limits for bringing cases to trial, and issuing advice to sentencers on restricting remands in custody" (Newburn, 2007, p. 434) in 1993/1994, the New Labour government of Tony Blair in the late 1990s halted these policies

leading to a constant increase of imprisonment numbers. As a result, prison numbers have grown by two-thirds in a decade whilst simultaneously crime rates fell (Newburn, 2007). Critical criminological research (Garland 1991, 2001; Newburn, 2007; Scott, 2018; Sim 2009; Wacquant, 1999) identifies the ever-growing neo-liberal state as fertile soil for this growing punitiveness. On this basis, prison reports that have been published in the mid-1990s will be researched.

(iii) This punitive shift has had ongoing effects permeating the 2000s till the present. With growing prison numbers, England and Wales has become the prison jurisdiction in Western Europe with highest numbers of incarceration by 2005 (Newburn, 2007). With imprisonment numbers at a new peak, prison reports from the mid-2000s will be analysed for each prison.

(iv) As past punitive shifts and their effects pervade present forms of imprisonment and the prison environment, the most recent prison reports up to 2019 will be analysed (Sim, 2017, 2019).

(v) From the mid-2010s onwards prison reports increasingly use photographs as evidential artefacts. This is a new form the state uses, next to the traditional textual presentation in the reports, to narrate their official discourse. Accordingly, all prison reports of the three prisons that include photographs are chosen to see how they become part in the official state narrative.

An overview of the prison reports selected for analysis are tabulated below; the shading indicates reports that include both textual and visual information:

Rationale	HMP Liverpool	HMP Birmingham	HMP Pentonville
(i)	1988	1982	1988
(ii)	1999	1998	1997
(iii)	2007	2009	2006
(iv)	2017	2018	2019
(v)	2015, 2017	2017, 2018	2015

All prison reports are public documents and protected by the Crown copyright and fall under the *Open Government Licence for public sector information* (The National Archives, no date). All prison reports post-2000 are digitised and accessible through

the web archive of the National Archives, which draws the reports from archived web pages of the Government Justice webpage and the website of the HM Inspectorate of Prisons. All reports published prior 2000 have been provided through the library of the Ministry of Justice as they are not digitised and not accessible through the website of the National Archive. Whilst I had to contact the Ministry of Justice library and specifically ask for the documents to be digitised, there is officially no gatekeeper for accessing them.

To the best of my knowledge, these prison reports are an untapped resource of important sociological and criminological information that have hitherto not been analysed as one coherent corpus of data in a research project. This thesis is therefore embarking upon an original study of a unique publicly accessible data source that holds considerable promise for critically researching and understanding the prison differently.

4.3 Critical Discourse Analysis: Bringing Theory and Epistemology Together in Research

As has been established above, prison reports are official narratives of the state which are created in the imaginary of the institution (Foucault, 1971; Garland, 1991). Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is generally recognised as a suitable approach for interrogating discourses and the power relations that make them (Jäger, 2015). This is of prime importance in this research as it is the aim to investigate how prison reports frame the official discourse in respect to the affectivity of the prison complex. As will become apparent, CDA enables researching the prison under the above outlined epistemological shift and thereby facilitates putting feminist scholarship into research practice. Therefore, CDA lends itself to research the prison as an affective state institution and directly addresses the purpose and aims of this research.

Using CDA to critically investigate official state narratives is equally inspired by Burton and Carlen's ([1979] 2013) work *Official Discourse: On Discourse Analysis, Government Publications, Ideology and the State,* in which they discursively analyse official state narratives and provide a critical counter reading of them through their

analysis. Their approach is further developed here through thinking of CDA creatively and extending it through the affective lens in the following analysis chapters (Chapter V, VI and VII).

As CDA is not a ready model that can be simply applied to research but needs to be developed in unison with epistemological convictions and theoretical framing (Fairclough, 2009; Hammersley, 2002; Jäger & Maier, 2009), CDA is seen as a chance to develop a methodical framing that allows us to creatively research the prison through an affective lens. Relying on a Foucauldian understanding of discourse (Foucault, 1971) and the development of a Foucauldian CDA in the work of Jäger (2015), it is believed that the affectivity of the institution can be gleaned in an innovative and creative way by interlacing CDA with *affect research*, *imagination* and *visual methods* as a unique undertaking of this thesis. Each one of these extensions of CDA will be presented in one of the three findings chapters that commence with addressing the official discourse on the prison in a more traditional way of deconstructing language regarding its affective content (Chapter V), followed by its creative extension through incorporating critical imagination (Chapter VI), and the extension of CDA to include the visual analysis of official photographs (Chapter VII).

Discourse itself, and therefore by extension *(Critical) Discourse Analysis*, is a contested concept with an amorphous character (Wodak, 2001; Wodak & Meyer, 2009). Within Foucault's body of work, there is not a linear and definite narrative of what discourse is. Since this is not a thesis addressing a discursive analysis of 'discourse' in Foucault's work, it shall suffice at this point to understand discourse as a conglomerate of practices, artefacts and language acts, if spoken or textual, that domineer the social in a specific time and place, and consistently reproduce knowledge and thereby specific relationships of power through them (Foucault, 1971). Or in other words, discourses can be understood as follows:

> "Discourses are more than ways of thinking and producing meaning. They constitute the 'nature' of the body, unconscious and conscious mind and emotional life of the subjects they seek to govern." (Weedon, 1997, p. 108)

The fluid character of discourse is understood as a chance to critique notions of stable hard facts which is seen as a strength within this thesis. After all, the idea of measurable results and findings of eternal truth in the social sciences is part of the Enlightenment, rationalised and positivist epistemology this thesis shifts away from.

The epistemological shift towards seeing the world affectively in theory and research is translated into the research approach of this thesis and unites qualities of the *affective moral fact* with the Foucauldian approach. Foucault's understanding of *discourse* (Foucault, 1971) and Durkheim's *moral facts* (Durkheim, 1953) intersect as they both proceed on the argument that moral values in society change over time and are not stable. *Discourse* and *moral facts* have creative as well as illustrative qualities that reflect moral values, and their interrogation enables researchers to see how the construction of the social is possible. These conceptual tools help develop an explanatory framework to affective realities and thereby place moral convictions in a specific time and place. Moreover, Foucault's (1971) conceptualisation of discourse permits a framing of CDA that serves the purpose of this thesis. In contrast to more classical understandings of CDA, that advocate for putting focus on the written and spoken word and treating it as a practice (Fairclough, [1989]2015), the Foucauldian approach to CDA after Jäger (2015) widens its focus to include broader text blocks rather than singular words or phrases, and offers itself to be extended to research affect (Koschut, 2017, 2017a) which also incorporates non-textual components such as visuals (Friedrich & Jäger , 2011). This makes CDA a suitable research framework to analyse prison reports for investigating the prison as an affective institution.

CDA is recognised for being in a position to capture broader socio-political structures and the power relations that generate the discourse (Fairclough, 2001). For Foucault (1971, 1977), it is the social that directs the discourse. This insight arises out of his abstract conceptualisation of power which is conceptualised as dispersed in the social rather than bound to specific subjects (Foucault, 1971, 1977). This Foucauldian understanding of power resonates with theoretical claims of the *affective moral fact* discussed in Chapter II. Therein, affect is understood to possess qualities that go beyond a manifestation in an object or living being, as affect also brings attention to the relationality between entities (Ahmed, 2014). This diffused quality of Foucauldian power and affect permits researchers to assume that power and affect can be thought

as intertwined as “emotions are the very means by which the power game is played” (Heaney, 2013, p. 358), or as Koschut delineates: “the affective component in discourse can account for the fact that some discourses become more powerful than others” (Koschut, 2017, p. 487). This emphasises again the suitability to trace affect in official narratives on the prison through CDA.

Therefore, CDA is recognised for researching complex social phenomena (Wodak, 2001; Wodak & Meyer, 2009) as it allows us to see which epistemological traditions are prevalent within a wider sociocultural context (Foucault, 1971). It is a strength of CDA to reconstruct how epistemological convictions inform and influence thinking, how knowledge claims are translated into practices that are shaped by and shape institutions (Foucault, 1971, 1977). As such, CDA is a framework that equips this thesis with the ability to critique a discursive status quo as and when it presents itself publicly (Fairclough, 2009; Wodak & Meyer, 2009). In doing so, it aids this thesis in critically constructing a counter narrative to the official prison discourse, which has the potential to counter and deconstruct a narrow and limiting over-rationalised understanding of the prison. And, importantly in view of the feminist epistemological argument that undergirds this thesis, CDA is equally a political undertaking that demands the researcher to position themself (Jäger, 2015; Jäger & Maier, 2009).

4.3.1 Researching Affect Through CDA

The practical application of CDA follows Jäger’s (2015) Foucauldian approach to discourse, and is guided by Koschut’s (2017, 2017a) work for specifically researching affect through CDA. Koschut’s (2017, 2017a) extension of discourse analysis positions itself in the field of international studies where the value of the incorporation of emotions in discourse has been emphasised. He and other researchers within his field “argue that textual and verbal utterances provide us with a promising way to make emotions empirically accessible for researchers” (Koschut, 2017, p. 485).

Therefore, researching emotions are argued as helpful for interrogating and questioning power structures due to emotions being understood as “sociocultural phenomena that transcend individuals and powerfully support and conceal the particular values that underpin political orders” (Hutchison & Bleiker, 2017, p. 502). Hutchison and Bleiker also state that it is worth looking at how emotions are used to

organise the political arena and inform "boundaries of what is visible and invisible, thinkable and unthinkable, seemingly rational and irrational" (Hutchison & Bleiker, 2017, p. 502). These boundaries are recognised as reified notions within the social, wherein emotions are understood as central to power relations which can only be understood when emotions are taken into consideration in discursive research (Hutchison & Bleiker, 2017). Accordingly, Foucauldian CDA lends itself to incorporate the study of affect and helps further researching the *affective moral fact,* because Foucault argued "the part of ourselves which is most relevant to morality, is our feeling" (Foucault 1984, p. 352, quoted in Katriel, 2015, p. 57).

4.4 Putting Critical Discourse Analysis to Work in this Thesis

So far, it has been established how the Foucauldian Critical Discourse Analysis, following the work of Jäger (2015) and Koschut (2017, 2017a), provides for a framework that enables us to put the feminist epistemology into practice, to test and use the conceptual framing of the *affective moral fact* and to ultimately explore the central research question – *What are the theoretical and methodological possibilities to explore the prison as an affective institution?* – by analysing prison reports of three English prisons. In the following, the method of exploring affect through the discursive analysis of text, imagination, and the extension of CDA through a visual analysis will be sketched out.

4.4.1 CDA of the Textual Artefact

The CDA of the prison report as a textual artefact is divided in two cycles. It starts with reading the selected prison reports under the epistemological viewpoint outlined above, or in short: under an affective lens. The Foucauldian approach of Jäger (2015; Jäger and Maier 2009) outlines how text should be interrogated with questions that address the epistemology of the researched text. Following this, questions that accompany the reading of prison reports are those such as: *How is the argument structured? Does it follow a particular logic? In which ways does or doesn't the text*

assume a dichotomous relationship between affect and rationality? Does the text rationalise/justify/legitimise the institution and its practices? Is there a particular style the reports are written in?

Whilst Jäger (2015) offers an overall framework for CDA, Koschut's (2017, 2017a) approach delineates guidance on how to interrogate discourses emotionally. Therefore, during this first phase of analysis the critical reading of prison reports needs to pay attention to linguistic characteristics that portray affect. Koschut outlines how the reading focus should lie on "emotion terms, connotations, metaphors, as well as comparisons and analogies" (Koschut, 2017, p. 483). *Emotional terms* could, for example, name feelings directly as a noun, verb, adjective or adverb (Koschut, 2017). He also alerts the researcher to be aware of cultural concepts of emotions that are implicit part of words. *Emotional connotation* "contains a context-invariant value judgment or opinion that conveys the emotional attitude of the speaker" (Koschut, 2017, p. 483). As an example, Koschut refers to words like 'rogue state' or 'outlaw' which are associated with emotions like 'anger' or 'hate' whilst words such as 'peaceful' or 'hero' are linked to emotions like 'joy' or 'pride' (Koschut, 2017). The researcher should also be sensitive towards intensifiers of such emotions, words such as 'endless' or 'never-ending' that signify the temporality of an emotional state, or 'very', 'utterly', or 'lightly' that signify the intensity of the emotion (Koschut, 2017). At the same time the researcher should watch out for words that try to allude from "negative emotional connotation, for example, by coding them as *ethnic cleansing* instead of *genocide* or *collateral damage* in order to trivialize the killing of innocent civilians" (Koschut, 2017, p. 484, original emphasis). This becomes an interesting point in the context of the prison. Considering the critical prison studies discussed in Chapter III, which refer to the everyday harms of imprisonment, the analysis in this thesis needs to focus on *if* and *how* these harms are addressed in an affective context. The next thing to pay attention to during the first phase of my analysis are *emotion metaphors, comparisons, and analogies* (Koschut, 2017). Koschut outlines that a "typical characteristic of affective language is that it is highly figurative" (Koschut, 2017, p. 484). The researcher should be aware of "metaphors, comparisons, and analogies" that refer to an "emotional state" (Koschut, 2017, p. 484). As an example,

Koschut (2017, p. 484) uses ‘floods of refugees’ that “produces fear through a linguistic dehumanization of refugees”. He equally points out the moral sphere some metaphors like ‘feel like in heaven’ or ‘problem from hell’ entail, which implicitly links morality with affect (Koschut, 2017).

Whilst the researcher closely reads the prison reports under this affective lens, particular codes and themes are identified. These codes and themes are catalogued for each prison report in a table that also contains information on the year of publication and date of the inspection and any other observation made during the reading. This allows for sharpening the focus and identifying key passages in the prison reports that are of special interest for researching the institution (Jäger, 2015). A simplified version that identifies codes and themes which emerged throughout the research, and how they were translated into the themes addressed in the following analysis chapters, can be found in the *Appendix*.

In the second phase those sections of the inspection reports that are especially rich in carrying codes and themes in reference to the affectivity of the institution are analysed further (Jäger & Maier, 2009). The exploration of codes and themes is a frequent and ongoing process throughout the CDA. It is anticipated that further codes and themes will be identified when passages that have been identified as especially meaningful are further interrogated. In general, the process of coding and identifying themes will be seen as complete, once the themes and codes repeat themselves (Jäger & Maier, 2009), which makes meticulous and repeated reading an essential part of CDA.

Once all codes and themes are identified, the analysis places the narrative in a wider context. This means looking at how the particular themes are connected and how the argument can be abstracted on the next level of analysis (Jäger, 2015; Jäger & Maier, 2009). Part of this process is to level the theoretical framework against the counter narrative that is produced through CDA. During the CDA, the *affective moral fact* aims to provide an analytical lens whilst it is simultaneously tested for its explanatory powers, as it also lies within the CDA to test and further develop the theoretical framework being used (Jäger & Maier, 2009). This entails abstracting the affective meanings to a different analytical level which allows the analysis to position the institutional narrative into a broader social context. For this, Koschut suggests focussing on potential *emotional othering* and *performativity and interpellation of*

emotions (Koschut, 2017). The first one delineates how narratives have moral cues and exemplifies this by reference to the establishment of the Nazi identity through the emotional and moral defamation of Jewish people. Translating this into the prison context means looking out for how prisoners are addressed in the narrative, as it could offer insights into the moral foundation underlying the institution. *Performativity and interpellation of emotions* describes how emotional states can be created through the emotional discourse. Koschut (2017) thereby refers to Ahmed's understanding of affect (Ahmed, 2010) – which is central to the framing of the *affective moral fact* – as he makes the argument that text in itself carries affect. The idea of affectivity of text has also been discussed in literature studies (Wehrs & Blake (eds), 2017) however not in sociology. The idea Ahmed outlines in *Happy Objects* (Ahmed, 2010) refers to the argument that objects and artefacts are affective and can evoke a feeling that is not just a disembodied but a corporeal experience of emotions that is contagious and transferable from objects and artefacts to bodies. Whilst textual research has limitations through its very nature, which is constituted by the dependency on language and the boundaries of what can be communicated, Koschut (2017) implicitly refers to the epistemological argument outlined above. By arguing that text can carry affect, it highlights that the reader can get affected by it and therein emphasises the situatedness of affect; as researchers we are always affected by and through our research data which ultimately influences the production of knowledge through CDA.

4.4.2 CDA and the Power of Critical Imagination

As affect is more than what can be captured in language (Ahmed, 2014; Sedgwick, 2003), language, if in text or speech, can represent fractions of what is actually going on. This insight lends itself to the prison reports that will be analysed. It is therefore important to counter a limitation of text based CDA with a method that further embraces and enables us to research the affectivity that is attached to language – which reflects Koschut's (2017) observation from above – and experienced when critically engaging with these artefacts.

Burton and Carlen's ([1979]2013) research on official documents shows that arguments are narrated in a bureaucratic style that needs decoding under a critical lens. It has therefore been expected that affect will not convey itself freely through the careful and critical reading of prison reports. Reflecting on my research practice, I

acknowledge that my imagination and being affected by the research has played a central role in researching the prison as an affective institution of the state. As I was reading the reports, affect and images spontaneously started to carry the narrative in my imagination. They clearly contoured what was already present but silenced in the bureaucratic style the reports are written in. Therefore, it has been imagination that allowed us to further strengthen the focus on the affective exploration of the prison. Accordingly, embracing imagination in CDA is seen as giving the potential to research and include corporeal aspects of the prison. It prompts us to think about what lies beyond the language and textual body of the prison report that stands as a representation of the material world it aims to portray. Consequently, imagination can help to explore the affective qualities of the prison further, as it permits identifying research themes related to the textual analysis in more detail and takes us beyond the textual artefact of the prison report.

Embracing imagination and affect in research stands in line with the epistemological shift outlined above. There it is argued that the researcher needs to situate themself to make the production of knowledge transparent. This is part of breaking with an Enlightenment tradition that does not account for the specific vantage point research and theories are developed out of. As affect can be unprompted (Sedgwick, 2003) but is also always situated (Ahmed, 2014), it is seen as part of the feminist epistemology to explore imagination that is evoked throughout the research process.

As a concept, *imagination* is understood in Mill's tradition who has emphasised in *Sociological Imagination* (2000) that it should be embraced in a critical and creative way, especially when states, bureaucratic processes, and institutions are researched, as it allows us to gaze behind the façade of official narratives. As the role of imagination and the incorporation of such in CDA has grown throughout the textual analysis, the particularities of the framing of imagination are outlined in *Chapter VI: Tracing Affect with Imagination* as I do not intend to forestall the argument made in the first findings chapter (Chapter V). There, it will be addressed how imagination should be embraced in an unfettered way in sociological research, and how it supports to break with the Enlightenment lineage of thinking in line with the feminist scholarship that undergirds this thesis.

4.4.3 CDA and the Photograph

Approaching the research of affect in a creative and imaginative way (Mills, 2000; Nisbet, 1962), this CDA also incorporates the study of photographs that are included in the official prison reports and on the website of the Ministry of Justice. Whilst CDA is classically informed by its textual focus, it has been recognised that discourses are made of "words, phrases, narratives, expressions, and representations that in some way symbolically refer to emotion and anything that is *visual such as photographs, artwork, and images*" (Koschut, 2017, p. 482, my emphasis). On this basis, some approaches explicitly advocate for including the research of visuals in CDA (Jäger, 2015; Jäger & Maier, 2009), as the particular focus under which the text is interrogated is transferable to the analysis of photographs in official narratives. Consequently, photographs are not solely considered as supportive material for text but are recognised as an autonomous source for interrogation in their own right (Friedrich & Jäger, 2011).

Sontag's understanding of photographs as artefacts of a specific time and place (Sontag, 1978) mirrors qualities of the Foucauldian CDA (Jäger, 2015) outlined above:

> "Photographs are perhaps the most mysterious of all the objects that make up, and thicken, the environment we recognise as modern. Photographs really are experience captured, and the camera is the ideal arm of consciousness in its acquisitive mood. To photograph is to appropriate the thing photographed. It means putting oneself into a certain relation to the world that feels like knowledge – and, therefore, like power." (Sontag, 1978, pp. 3-4).

As will become apparent in *Chapter VII: Tracing Affect Through Photographs*, the visual analysis of photographs facilitates the further investigation and exploration of themes that have been previously established in the textual CDA (Chapter V) and its extension through imagination (Chapter VI). It is also within Chapter VII where the photograph will be positioned conceptually by drawing on the works of Barthes (2000), Sontag (1967, 1978, 2003) and Berger (2013).

It shall suffice at this point to shortly highlight the sociological significance and value of photographs which has been formally recognised in the late 1980s (Harper, 1988). A long time before its formal recognition in sociology, photography documented and critically questioned society, as famously found in the works of, for example, Lewis Hine (Walther, 2018), Diane Arbus (2012) or Nan Goldin (2019). The value of taking

photographs for research purposes has been emphasised (Heng, 2017, 2020; McGarry, 2019) especially when researching affect (Cartwright & Wolfson, 2018). It has also been emphasised that the analysis of already existing photographs is especially helpful for analysing material cultures and emotions (Harper, 1988), and Rose has recognised that institutions organise their narrative as much through language as they do through the visual (Rose, 2016). As prisons are material and tangible places in society, and prison reports include official photographs, these photographs volunteer themselves for the purpose of exploring the prison as an affective institution. Their analysis promises to give further insight into how affect is part of the architecture, corporeality and atmosphere of the place as discussed in carceral geographies (Hancock and Jewkes, 2011; Jewkes, 2012, 2013; Jewkes & Moran, 2017) (Chapter III).

4.5 Summary

In a threefold, this chapter unites several strands of argument within this thesis as it (i) establishes the epistemological tradition this thesis positions itself in, (ii) delineates the methodology behind researching prison reports for the purpose of exploring the prison as an affective institution, and (iii) outlines how CDA is used as a tool for this research endeavour.

In a first step (4.1), the underlying Enlightenment tradition that informs and dominates sociological and criminological discussions on state processes and the prison has been addressed as the crux for patriarchal and over-rationalised understandings of the prison. On the basis of feminist scholarship (Ahmed, 2006; Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983; Jaggar, 1989; Smith, 1974), the limitations and dangers of accounts that rely on an *affect/rationality dichotomy* have been outlined, critiqued and deconstructed, on which basis the epistemology has been shifted towards seeing the world affectively. This is a crucial point in this thesis as it is on the basis of standpoint feminism (Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983), that prisons can be explored as affective in the first place. Crucially, this paradigmatic shift has outlined that *rationality* cannot be seen as separate from *affect* but needs to be recognised as a patriarchal and affective concept. Recognising rationality as a patriarchal construct that denotes a particular way of being affective, asks for making knowledge processes

transparent and for researchers to write themselves back into the research process for opening the discussion to other viewpoints that promise more expansive understandings. The here outlined feminist epistemology mirrors essential qualities of the conceptual framework, the *affective moral fact*, highlighting that theoretical concepts always develop dependant on an epistemological tradition. Therefore, it has been crucial for exploring the prison affectively to not merely critique relevant literature (Chapter II and III) but to discuss their epistemological heritage.

This epistemological shift serves as a vehicle to question and unthink long held dichotomies in prison reports which have been positioned as part of the official discourse on prisons (4.2). Pursuing a feminist vantage point on prisons by researching them affectively, it has been outlined how methodological convictions translate into methodically exploring the prison through Critical Discourse Analysis (4.3 and 4.4) in an imaginative and creative way. Informed by the embrace of affect in a feminist tradition and imagination after Mills (2000), it has been outlined how the textual basis of prison reports will be affectively explored, how imagination offers a creative vantage point for further investigating the official discourse on prisons, and how photography can be embraced in CDA to research affect. Accordingly, the following three chapters will trace affect in text (Chapter V), imagination (Chapter VI) and photographs (Chapter VII) in the official discourse on prisons presented in prison reports.

Chapter V: Tracing Affect in Text of Official Prison Reports

This chapter explores the central research question – *What are the theoretical and methodological possibilities to explore the prison as an affective institution?* – by researching the textual body of prison reports through Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).

Research object of this thesis is a total of fifteen prison reports of HMP Birmingham, HMP Liverpool and HMP Pentonville, in the period of 1982-2019. As outlined in the previous chapter (4.2), the official discourse of the prison is anchored in prison reports. There, it has also been established that prison reports are official narratives of the state that embody positivist and rationalising elements to present an apparent neutral and objective viewpoint. To that effect, they stand in an Enlightenment epistemological tradition that relies on a Cartesian understanding of rationality and affect, which this thesis argues to be obstructive for understanding the prison as an affective institution of the state. Discursively analysing the reports whilst embracing a feminist epistemology (Chapter IV), and thinking along the concept of the *affective moral fact* (Chapter II) allows for viewing the reports through an affective lens. Therein, the CDA is employed to establish a counter reading to the official discourse with the aim to further deconstruct a rationalising narrative of the prison and therein investigate the prison affectively.

Drawing on a Foucauldian perspective of discourse (Foucault, 1971), discourse is understood as a plethora of domineering narratives that are fabricated through a specific relationship between power and knowledge in a specific time and place. Therein, institutions are discourse-determining as they occupy a place in society that consistently guides the discourse as they continuously re-imagine and reproduce domineering narratives (Foucault, 1971). Discourses are anchored by institutions and the narratives which are created through them (Jäger, 2015). Accordingly, Foucauldian discourse analysis is concerned with how knowledge is shaped and continuously reproduced through power relations (Foucault, 1971; Jäger, 2015). Applying this to the exploration of the prison as an affective institution, CDA can reveal how the official discourse on prisons is shaped including involved sentiments and moral values, which was famously demonstrated in Foucault's genealogical work *Discipline and Punish* (1977). It is on this Foucauldian basis that Jäger (2015) stresses the potential

for researching institutions as representing moral values in society. Jäger outlines that it is the task of Critical Discourse Analysis to initially ask if the morality of society, as it can be traced in constitutions or declarations of human rights, equate to the moral claims a society makes, or: the critique of Critical Discourse Analysis is initially specific and immanent to society (Jäger, 2015, p. 156).

As such, this Foucauldian approach to CDA (Foucault, 1971; Jäger, 2015) represents central qualities the conceptualisation of the *affective moral fact* aims to provide an explanatory framework for. This makes CDA especially promising to further test and develop the *affective moral fact* not just because testing, shaping, and developing explanatory frameworks is recognised as a particular strength of discourse analysis (Hammersley, 2002; Wodak & Meyer, 2009), but because CDA can be linked with the research of affect (Koschut, 2017, 2017a). This has been pointed out previously (Chapter IV). In particular, Foucault's understanding of power (Foucault, 1971, 1977), where the social governs discursive narratives as power is not bound to a specific person but rather a diffused entity, mirrors certain qualities of the conceptual understanding of *affect* (Ahmed, 2010, 2014; Sedgwick, 2003). Affect has been earlier delineated (Chapter II and IV) as object-, body- and space-imbuing, but also as the powerful force the social is understood to be in Durkheim's work (1957, 1958, 1984). Therefore, CDA of prison reports has the potential to show how affect shapes the institution, as CDA is deconstructing and demystifying apparent objective truths (Jäger, 2015). It is the aim of this chapter to outline a counter-reading of the prison as an affective institution based on a critical reading of prison reports.

In general, the chapter will illustrate how prison reports construct an over-rationalised narrative of the prison (Foucault, 1977; Garland, 1991; Ignatieff, 1978) through its apparent neutral, objective and positivist approach, through which a bureaucratic, rationalising and statist language emerges to eschew emotion. This is done by discussing the main theme that has emerged from the Critical Discourse Analysis of the textual body of prison reports: 'orchestration of affect'. The theme 'orchestration of affect' discusses how prison reports are designed to highlight particular affective qualities of the institution at the expense of others. As such, the prison reports are discussed as navigating the official narrative of the prison via a selective representation of affect. The theme is discussed along four identified subthemes. The first subtheme

(subtheme 1a) ‘structure and organisation of the prison report’ addresses how the specific framework of the reports reflects an epistemological tradition that translates into the construction of mostly affect-averse language. This forms the basis for the discussion of a special hierarchy within the representation of affect (subtheme 1b), which is subsequently followed by discussing how this hierarchy portrays itself in a more critical account of prisons in the reports (subtheme 1c). The last subtheme (subtheme 1d) discusses the affective nuances of how the official discourse uses the terms *violence* and *force.*

A table listing identified codes and themes which emerged throughout the research, and how they were translated into the themes addressed in this analysis, can be found in the *Appendix*.

5.1 Theme: Orchestration of affect

In their 1979 published work *Official Discourse: On Discourse Analysis, Government Publications, Ideology and the State* (2013 [1979]), Burton and Carlen demonstrate how state and administrative narratives are written in a very specific language that represents a particular challenge for analysis. They emphasise that official reports are, just like any other text, written out of a specific perspective, and that it is the researcher’s task to deconstruct the narrative for making obvious what lies beneath the abstracted language of government institutions. Moreover, Burton and Carlen’s work (2013 [1979]) demonstrates that it is necessary to challenge long-established dominating narratives of state institutions like the prison and their self-representation as rational and emotion-free agents as an element in their legitimacy. Carlen (2016) later advocates for researchers to write ourselves back into our work for undertaking critical research. This acknowledges that research is undertaken and written within a specific situatedness that can demystify the idea of official discourse as neutral and objective accounts. Therein, Carlen (2016) re-iterates a central point of the standpoint feminist argument made in the previous chapter (Chapter IV) and emphasises how CDA is a political approach that can benefit feminist research.

Departing from Burton and Carlen (2013 [1979]), it is not surprising that affect is not more obviously availed within official prison reports, especially when it is

acknowledged that the choreography of affect through language is of prime importance to navigate power relations and public sentiment (Martin, 2013). The analysis will demonstrate that it is not astounding that the official discourse does not more overtly show the various affective qualities of the prison, as laying bare those qualities provide for an essentially critical account of the prison that does not live up to the Enlightenment idea of state violence as a civilised measure of punishment (Foucault, 1977; Garland, 1991; Ignatieff, 1978).

Accordingly, initially set guiding questions and codes (see *Appendix*) for the discursive analysis of prison reports were only partially helpful. As will become apparent, prison reports do not employ a clear *affect/rationality dichotomy*. Not even once, to the best of my knowledge, is the word 'rational' used in any prison report analysed here. Prison reports scarcely address social values, norms, moral convictions or emotions in a clear manner, which is why it has become clear rather quickly that in order to magnify the affectivity of the official narrative, I had to look for traces of affect in the textual body of each report; starting with tracing affect in the structure and organisation of the reports.

5.1.1 Subtheme 1a: Structure and Organisation of the Prison Report

The prison reports of the 1980s and 1990s employ thematic reviews of specific topics that have been framed by timely policies like 'Fresh Start' or the 'European Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners' (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 1982, 1988, 1988a, 1999; HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 1997, 1999a). None of these prison reports mention a specific research procedure for the inspections or writing of the report. However, all prison reports from 2006 onwards employ criteria of the so called 'Healthy Prison Test' (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2015, 2015a, 2017, 2017a, 2018, 2019). These reports refer to an Inspectorate's document called 'Suicide is everyone's concern' first introduced in 1999 that outlines a framework through which the inspectorate aims to measure the efficiency of the place under review, which effectively streamlines the structure of the reports.

In all prison reports from 2006 onwards (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2015, 2015a, 2017, 2017a, 2018, 2019), the 'Healthy Prison Test' is described as encompassing four main categories: *Safety*, *Respect*, *Purposeful activity* and

Resettlement. The judgment of the inspectorate is then classified into four different kinds of outcomes: *good, reasonably good, not sufficiently good* and *poor*. The categorization of the outcomes as well as the main categories the performance of the prison is evaluated on, are rooted in elements of positivism assuming that 'evidence' for a particular performance can be found and measured against standards that were previously decided on. This makes apparent that the Inspectorate itself presumes an objective and neutral inquiry within a rationalised framework for the inspection. As such, it gives insight into the positivist and Enlightenment inspired epistemological conviction prison inspections are based in. Prison reports are then 'translating' the prison inspection into an equally rationalised prison report framework, which in turn creates the official narrative of the prison.

Reading all 15 prison reports that encompass the last 40 years, it becomes apparent that they employ and share a specific tone, style, and a certain set of terminologies. For the first time in the 2015 prison reports on HMP Liverpool (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2015) and HMP Pentonville (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2015a) the reader has been referred to the 'Guide for writing inspection reports' on the website of the HM Justice Inspectorate (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2018). This guideline asks to mirror the terms and language used in the inspection framework of the 'Healthy Prison Test' for the written assessment.

Discursively analysing this terminology within Koschut's framework (2017) that draws the researcher's attention to a word or phrase which "contains a context-invariant value judgment or opinion that conveys the emotional attitude of the speaker" (Koschut, 2017, p. 483), allows us to identify the term 'healthy' as emotionally connoted word. Accordingly, it can be argued that calling a test 'healthy' and asking the inspectorate to reflect the language in the reports, the positively connoted 'healthy' creates the notion of care. As such it implies that if a prison was not to perform as a 'healthy prison', measures would be taken to rectify the situation. It would be expected that the assessment of HMI Prisons would be used as a basis for making the prison more 'efficient' and 'healthier' as it is measured against the parameters that reflect and reinforce Enlightenment principles. One could also expect that language and

terminology used would reflect when a prison would not perform to this standard. Interestingly though, the framework for the assessment of the 'Healthy Prison' report does not quote or use the word 'un-healthy' or the attribute 'not healthy' in the assessment when a prison is not performing up to standard.

In addition, the prison report guidelines (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2018) offer a glossary that clarifies specific terminology and abbreviations used in inspection reports and outline specific language and terminology restrictions. As such, they suggest specific terms that should be used, how long each section of the prison report should approximately be and give guidance to the specific number of recommendations that should be made. One guidance section reads:

> "•The words 'good', 'reasonable', insufficient' or 'poor' should carry the same sense as the healthy prison assessment grade descriptors, whenever they are used.
> •The number of deaths in custody or self-harm incidents (or other similar incidents) should never be described as 'reasonable'.
> •When we use words like 'high' or low' we should be clear what we are comparing them with. Although the level may be the same as elsewhere, it could still be too high.
> •If we say something is 'unacceptable' we should mean it has to stop, and we should include an appropriate recommendation."
> (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2018, p. 13)

A specifically interesting instruction, due to its similar meaning to *rationality*, is the note to not use the word 'reasonable' when referring to incidents of harm. It signifies awareness towards the specific meaning the word conveys and is another example of an emotionally connoted word (Koschut, 2017). If harm was to be described as 'reasonable', it rationalises it, which in consequence gives the impression that it is justifiable, legitimised and therefore tolerable. As such, using the word 'reasonable' suggests a level of denial in regard to the suffering of prisoners. This reminds of Cohen's work *States of Denial* (2001) in which he describes how violence, harm, and indifference to the sufferings of imprisonment are swallowed by the state's denial which renders language a neutralising tool in official discourse. Thus, instructing the Inspectorate to not use the word 'reasonable' in reference to harm, even if they feel that harm is 'reasonable', helps to write suffering and violence out of the prison discourse. *Denial* can therefore be seen as expressed through administrative language and style which controls the official discourse. Therein, it seems to help creating a

desired imaginary of the prison. The discursive contestation of 'reasonable' and its contextualisation within the prison discourse demonstrates that it is a term which is in contrast to its general conception as a-emotional, an affective term. Paradoxically, though the common use of 'reasonable' allows us to construct a narrative as the opposite: a detached a-emotional value judgment. This shows that there are clear parameters in place which confine what can and cannot be said within a prison report. These restrictions manifest themselves in the specific display of certain vocabulary and style which are streamlined under a rationalised approach that "conveys the emotional attitude of the speaker" (Koschut, 2017, p. 483). Interrogating consciously chosen words like 'reasonable' therefore offers an insight into the affectivity of the institution.

This argument is further supported through the following statement in the guidelines: "One of the most important aspects of creating a consistent look and feel to all the Inspectorate's publications is to ensure that they all follow the same style rules." (HM Inspectorate of Prisons , 2018, p. 21) The Inspectorate here directly refers to 'feeling'; the very practice of being affected and experiencing it. Koschut conceptualises how emotional states are created through emotional discourses as *practice and interpellation of emotions* (Koschut, 2017). It is interesting that the Inspectorate uses the word 'feel' when stating their aim for consistency as it signifies the Inspectorate's awareness that rationalised and streamlined prison reports can evoke affect whilst bureaucratic language is equally used to silence aspects of the institution. As such, it seems an implicit recognition from the Inspectorate that official documents like the prison report carry affect and that affect needs careful management. It thereby suggests that the rationalised official discourse on the prison orchestrates affect to portray a desired imaginary of the prison.

5.1.2 Subtheme 1b: Hierarchy of Affect

Departing from the idea that prison reports organise affect, the following argument discusses how affect seems to be orchestrated along a hierarchy in the official discourse. The close reading of the prison reports conveys this hierarchical orchestration by differences in how individual contributions of staff are reported on in an elevated positive manner, whilst the description of the work environment, which is

portrayed as difficult and challenging, appears cut short. The emphasis that is given to the positive praise of staff seems absent in the negative evaluation of the prison.

In the earliest prison report analysed in this thesis, the Inspectorate notes:

> "This grave situation has not arisen because of some failing on the part of the management or staff at Birmingham; indeed it is their loyalty, good humour and resilience that has made life bearable for many of their charges." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 1982, p. 16)

This statement resonates with similar observations that span over the period of 40 years. The Inspectorate noted that "there were few incidents due to staff good will and prisoner input" (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 1999, p. 27), or "Prisoners told us that some staff would unlock them in the evening so they could use the telephones, but this was not part of the published regime." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2006, p. 67). Equally stressed was the commitment of staff of health services. There, the Inspectorate summarises their impression as being "struck by the cheerfulness and commitment" (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 1999, p. 161). Drawing on emotional terms, connotations, and metaphors (Koschut, 2017) like 'loyalty', 'good humour' or 'good will' creates an image of a place that fosters a prosperous work attitude despite the difficulties staff face. However, these attitudes, which are reported as having a humanising affect, seem to rely on the agency of individuals and are not part of the official institutional regime as has been pointed out above.

The portrayal of such positive affectivity relies on a hierarchy of affect. This can be seen when looking at examples like "Despite a well-intentioned and capable Training Officer, we concluded that staff training was in need of revitalisation." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons , 1988, p. 14), or "This report will be disappointing for the many staff and managers within the prison who are committed to improvement and working hard to achieve a decent environment." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2006, p. 6). For as much as the positive impact of individual agency is emphasised, the evaluation of the institution seems somewhat cut short or avoided through the particular phrasing. Terms like 'revitalisation' imply that something is not working whilst simultaneously disguising it, which results in avoiding a negative value judgement. This can also be seen in the following statement in which the Inspectorate uses a particular form of affective language to describe the state of the prison that, however, is not directly addressed making the critical evaluation seem cut off:

> "This inspection found a prison that was delivering weak outcomes for prisoners in most areas and unacceptably poor outcomes in safety. At our last inspection in 2017, we had similar concerns but noted early signs of improvement – evidently a false dawn. It will be no surprise therefore that at this inspection very serious consideration was given to invoking the Inspectorate's Urgent Notification protocol, although after careful consideration we have decided against taking this step. … Importantly, HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) had ensured a recent influx of new staff to bring the prison close to its full complement – this is self-evidently critical to decent outcomes and, like many other establishments, Pentonville has suffered the consequences of inadequate staffing for far too long. We left the prison with no illusions about the scale of the task ahead and with ongoing concerns about decency and safety for prisoners. The depressing cycle of promise and further decline cannot be allowed to continue." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2019, p. 6)

Apart from using emotional connoted metaphors like 'false dawn' and referring to the word 'depressing', the inspectorate adheres to 'guideline language' when talking about 'weak' or 'poor outcomes' in their introductory summary. In this way the Inspectorate reproduces the jargon it is asked to apply according to the 'Healthy Prison Test'. It again becomes obvious that it is a framework to tone down negative encounters whilst simultaneously using words like 'healthy' as a self-ascription for a testing framework emphasising something positive in an institution that otherwise faces challenges as can be discerned from the example.

Following Koschut (2017), the framing of prison reports relies on *emotional connotation.* The above extracts from prison reports illustrate a specific discrepancy between how affect is talked about when it promises a positive connotation, and therefore evaluation for the prison, and how affective terminology is used to stop descriptions that would depict a more critical judgement about the institution. That this hierarchy is able to portray the prison in a positive light, despite the problems addressed in the reports, becomes clear when looking at the following two extracts from a prison report on HMP Pentonville from 1988:

> "It was equally widely agreed that Pentonville had maintained its tradition of being a relaxed and friendly place in which to work, with good and flexible relationships between all categories of staff. The corollary of this was that the traditions of humane, caring and skillful management of inmates had survived." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 1988a, pp. 14-15)

> "The Governor had inherited a paternalistic management structure which relied heavily upon informal relationships. As a matter of personal style, and also of professional conviction, he had maintained it. We had no reason to doubt that it had served well when Pentonville carried out the same task year in and year out. We also believe that it had a great deal to do with the preservation of the relaxed relationships and the caring ethos. We were not persuaded, however, that it matched the need for fundamental change." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 1988a, p. 125)

This opening and closing statement in the prison report disguises rather sober statements that have been made within the report, such as "The regime at Pentonville is impoverished." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 1988a, p. 103), with a particular orchestration of affective language.

Whilst the Inspectorate recognises that 'fundamental change' is needed, it nonetheless leaves somewhat open what this would entail and instead emphasises the positive qualities of the governor and an informal regime. Reading it critically shows that individual agency is limited through the restricted framework of the prison institution that ultimately creates inhumane conditions. The emphasis of these individual qualities through openly affective praise, however, averts from the addressed problems within the institution, whilst simultaneously offering positive feedback to the prison as an institution providing space for this kind of positive agency. It balances out the deteriorating state of prisons a close reading of the reports offers, and creates and enforces an official discourse of the prison that depicts an institution that is reflective of its practices through frameworks like the 'Healthy Prison Test', which simultaneously provides for an imaginary of the institution as *rational*, in the Enlightenment sense, and therein less harmful.

The importance of emphasising the staff's agency for creating the state narrative is further illustrated when looking at the following example in which the Inspectorate counters a point made by prisoners in a group interview. The inspectorate summarises and quotes part of what was said. One point that was recorded by the Inspectorate was "the staff were confrontational and the wing was run by intimidation '..there are more bad staff than good' (we disagreed, see 3.05)" (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 1999a, p. 16).

The Inspectorate counters this with:

> "The general relationships we observed between prisoners and wing Officers appeared to be good. There was evident rapport despite obvious frustrations from staff and prisoners about the lack of regime and resources, although we were concerned at the high number of assaults on staff (32 recorded in the last nine months)." (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 1999a, p. 23).

Instead of investigating the prisoner's testimony, the Inspectorate highlights violence against staff which makes the official narrative appear dismissive of the prisoner's experience. As such, the example demonstrates who controls the official narrative: the Inspectorate. The Inspectorate here creates a particular imaginary of the institution as they deny critical accounts and experiences of prisoners. Looking at this in context of praising individual agency, it illustrates not only a hierarchy of affect, but a 'hierarchy of credibility' (Becker, 1967) as only certain voices are prioritised and given prominence to be taken seriously for creating the official discourse. That these hierarchies interconnect is further substantiated when the following statement is critically read:

> "We were told that Liverpool prison had suffered from poor media coverage in the past but that relations had considerably improved recently. The Governor had a policy of praising staff where he could and giving higher priority to examples of good news so that the media were able to gain a more balanced picture. There was evidence that this policy had been successful in feedback from staff and their families." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 1999, p. 117)

What becomes obvious is that emphasising individual agency through the demonstration of positive affect helps to somewhat take the focus off more critical accounts of the prison, which equally allows the institution to guide the narrative and claim credibility for itself through this special orchestration of affect. Accordingly, the continuous silencing of certain affectivity is impelled through the usage as well as avoidance of specific words and terminology in prison reports. This hierarchy does not only illustrate that the way affect unfolds in the narrative is complex, it also demonstrates that within the official discourse favoured sentiments exist. They are portrayed through the particular language style and use of terminology without, however, calling into question the imaginary of the prison as a rationalised/affect-averse institution of state punishment.

5.1.3 Subtheme 1c: Exploiting Affective Latitudes

Following the themes above, it is obvious that prison reports offer some criticism. However, they are limited in their scope due to the parameters of the prison report as well as the nature of HMI Prisons as an institution that only exists at the behest of the state. Yet, there seems to be space within the report that permits for a more critical and emotionally overt language: the preface. Here, the HM Chief Inspector summarises the inspection and raises concerns. In its style, the preface gives the impression to not be as regulated or standardised like the rest of the report.

Under Sir Ramsbotham as HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, the prison reports on HMP Birmingham (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 1999a), HMP Liverpool (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 1999) and HMP Pentonville (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 1997) stand out due to their more critical nature in comparison to all other prison reports analysed here. Whilst other reports equally use, as illustrated above, affective terms, the prison reports under HM Chief Inspector of Prisons Sir Ramsbotham embrace emotional language to a wider extent. They describe the state of the prison in a way which appears more critical in comparison with the rest of the prison reports as the tone of Sir Ramsbotham's prison reports does not resemble the administrative language employed otherwise.

Sir Ramsbotham starts off one of his prefaces with the succinct verdict: "The keyword of this report is 'impoverished'." (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 1997, p. 3). Elsewhere he cynically questions the supposedly humane character of the prison with: "The last meal of the day is served at 3.45 p.m. – treating people, particularly the sick, with 'humanity', the word used in the Prison Service Statement of Purpose?" (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 1999a, p. 6). In this way, Sir Ramsbotham's prefaces convey a level of cynicism and grievance about lacking support of decision-making state agencies which simultaneously highlights the Inspectorate's missing capacity to make or cause any meaningful changes to the prison complex.

> "I hope that this report will be read with some concern by Ministers and Prison Service Headquarters alike, because it is on yet another grossly overcrowded 'local' prison in which the treatment and conditions of prisoners falls far below the acceptable, for reasons to which I have drawn

> attention over and over again, in many other 'local' prisons throughout my time as HM Chief Inspector. I emphasise Ministers because they alone have influence over the resources needed." (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 1999a, p. 5)

By asking for the Headquarter's 'concern', Sir Ramsbotham is appealing to their conscience but also empathy. The above appeal indicates that there seems to be a lack of care about those that have to endure imprisonment whilst they are in the direct care of the state, or a denial of prisoners' experiences. This level of critique and scrutinisation does not compare to any other prison report before or after as they all followed the more prevalent bureaucratic tone in their preface.

In another preface, Sir Ramsbotham criticises the rationalised and quantified nature of the inspection itself since it does not offer much insight about the actual quality of the living conditions (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 1999), and goes even so far as to question the purpose of the institution, as the prison is not adhering to the idealised state narrative of a humane institution that provides a framework for the rehabilitation of people (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 1997). In this way, Sir Ramsbotham implicitly questions the official state discourse as he partially reveals some of the affective qualities of the prison through his critical account that are otherwise swallowed by a rigid bureaucratic style of the reports, through which the imaginary of the prison as a rational institution of punishment seems to be partially upheld. In addition, it exposes what a prison report is and how the results of the inspection should be portrayed. Contrasting Sir Ramsbotham's reports with the insights presented in the previous subtheme exposes that a bureaucratic and rationalised narrative forecloses the portrayal of certain affective language, which consequently influences the level of criticism brought to the institution. Therefore, Sir Ramsbotham's reports seem to break with the 'code' of the official discourse.

Soon after these reports, Sir Ramsbotham has been, according to his statement, pushed out of the role as HM Chief Inspector of Prisons (The Guardian, 2001). This leads to the surmise that the rather critical tone his reports are written in, and the more overt affective terms used, do not reflect the desired language and therefore imaginary of the prison, the official state discourse desires to portray. Therefore, it can be said, that Sir

Ramsbotham has politicised the prison in his accounts. He breaks with a rationalising and bureaucratic narrative and makes obvious that a particular imaginary of the institution and political powers stand behind and orchestrate the official discourse on prisons.

This brings into view how the previous established hierarchy of affect limits what can and cannot be said within the official discourse as certain affective terms and style, like Sir Ramsbotham's, jeopardise the state's narrative of the prison as a rational/affect-averse institution. It again illustrates that the official narrative is reliant on the portrayal of certain affect that is, for example, conveyed in the 'Healthy Prison', whilst undesired affect that expresses the deteriorating state of the institution is silenced or seemingly avoided. It equally shows that the rationality of the prison itself, or the rationalisation of the prison report, relies on a particular orchestration, a hierarchy of affect. Sir Ramsbotham's accounts illustrate that the idea of the rational and affect-detached prison is compromised when the hierarchy of affect is questioned through a more overtly affective portrayal of negative qualities of the institution. It would further disillusion the everyday cultural understanding of rationality as harmless, which is anchored as deeply in our society as it is dangerous (Flax, 1992). The immense value rationality is ascribed from the Enlightenment onwards allows harm to be legitimised by reference to it. This has been outlined in the discussion of sociological and criminological works and how state violence like imprisonment is addressed in reference to affect (Chapters II, III and IV). The reified 'truth' about *rationality* as an innocent ideal will be further addressed in the discussion chapter (Chapter VIII) as it seems to be a key factor of how Western democracies like the UK self-ascribe their continued legitimisation of prisons via rationalised civility. What Sir Ramsbotham's account also shows is that affect seems to have a revelatory effect. The restrictions of the prison report however place a limit to a more critical inspection of the institution through prison report guidelines, and what seem unwritten institutionalised understandings of the hierarchy of affect.

5.1.4 Subtheme 1d: Different Loading of Affect – Violence vs Force

Burton and Carlen ([1979] 2013) pointed out that official discourses are created through special bureaucratic narratives that portray the institution's vantage point and therefore their desired imaginary of the institution. Focus of this section is how the

official narrative presents its violent practices in an affective context. In their work, Burton and Carlen ([1979] 2013) demonstrated that official narratives are used to legitimise activities that maintain the imaginary of a benevolent and civilised state. This is conveyed in prison reports with the terms *force* and *violence*. This section addresses how the term *force* affectively hides the brutal nature of prisons by being orchestrated in a hierarchical relationship with the term *violence*.

Closely reading prison reports of HMP Birmingham, HMP Liverpool and HMP Pentonville, it has become clear that the prison institution reserves the term *force* for the institution's violence whilst *violence* is reserved for violent behaviour of prisoners. Sociological and criminological accounts covered earlier in the thesis (Chapter II and III), demonstrate that states rely on violence as a resource for maintaining the monopoly of power. Therein, the state reserves the right to legitimise the use of violence, which is notable in the state's capacity of imprisonment. As Western states, like the UK, propel violence to the verge of society to claim their civility based on a proclaimed restricted and rational use of violence, it is of interest to investigate how this relationship is reflected and narrated in the official discourse.

How prison reports make use of the terms *force* and *violence* becomes clear in the following example:

> "Most prisoners felt unsafe; levels of violence were much higher than in similar prisons and had almost doubled since the last inspection. … With such a high number of violent incidents it was not surprising that the number of incidents where staff had to use force and the number of adjudications had also increased." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2015a, p. 5)

This illustrates that the state's violent answer to prisoners' *violence* is termed *force*. Therein, the official report creates a juxtaposition between the two terms that, as will become apparent, attaches meaning to them which gives the impression that they are different when actually both describe violent accounts. This juxtaposition permeates the prison reports and features frequently, like in the following examples:

> "Violence was high and the management of violence reduction work was inadequate. Use of force was high and governance was very poor." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2019, p. 12)

> "Violence in the prison had increased markedly. It was driven by a variety of factors, including gang affiliations, drugs, debt and a high proportion of relatively more volatile younger prisoners who were given no targeted support. … In keeping with the level of violence, use of force had increased significantly, yet oversight and accountability were lacking." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2019, p. 5)

What we can see is that *force* is deployed as a word only in response to *violence*. Continuously referring to the state's use of violence as *force* has legitimising capacities that render the prison in the imaginary of a rational institution that is supposedly humane and civil.

Along Koschut's (2017) emotional approach within CDA, *force* and *violence* can be understood as *emotional othering* and *performativity and interpellation of emotions*. Their interrogation as such helps to trace affect in the discourse. By ascribing *force* exclusively to the actions of the state and *violence* exclusively to prisoners, these terms create an *emotional othering* within the official discourse. As *violence* is 'bad', *force* is constructed as the necessary reaction to its existence. Their affective connotation is dichotomous and sits within the official narrative, where the representation of the prison and its practices as 'measured' and *rational* violence, expressed in the word *force*, maintains the imaginary of 'civility' of the prison. Simultaneously, it *emotionally others* prisoners by reference to their violent actions exclusively with the word *violence*, whilst *force* is continuously reserved for state violence. This reinforces a civilisational juxtaposition between the two terms that places them on opposing ends of a civilisation/barbarism continuum.

This imbalance between *force* and *violence* is furthered by the official discourse, and is frequently reported on as follows:

> "Use of force had increased significantly since our last inspection and was higher than comparator prisons. Managerial oversight was inadequate, with no routine scrutiny of use of force documentation or video footage. Batons had been drawn 14 times and the use of batons was not investigated." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2019, p. 19)

> "The recording of use of force was weak and oversight was inadequate, making it difficult to assess whether force was justified on all occasions. We identified some concerning practice including the use of balaclavas." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2015, p. 17)

Whilst in the previous examples, *force* has been used to describe legitimised state violence as a reaction to prisoners' violence, here *force* is used to describe *state violence* even though its legitimacy is implicitly questioned. Even though the Inspectorate emphasises the insufficient paperwork that functions as canvassing the legitimacy of the state violence and questionable practices, the Inspectorate continuously refers to the state's violence as *force* as can be seen in the following account:

> "A significant amount of recent use of force paperwork was incomplete and did not provide assurance of proportionate and necessary use. Fire-retardant hoods that looked like balaclavas were still worn by staff during incidents without obvious reason. In at least one instance, the drawing of a baton had not been recorded or investigated. Some completed records also indicated that excessive force had been used by staff, but managers were not aware of this. Monthly use of force meetings were not held routinely and not all use of force incidents were reviewed." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2017, pp. 12-13)

In the above extract it clearly states that 'excessive force' was used next to other illegitimate practices. The continuous reference to these acts as *force* and not *violence* seems to have legitimising affects as it enables the official discourse to not critically question the prison and its practices. Hence, using the term *force* evades the kind of scrutiny the description of the behaviour as *violent* would have.

Continuously calling such state violence *force* also reveals a power dimension that subverts this juxtaposition. Going back to Burton and Carlen's work ([1979]2013) and the feminist epistemological insight (Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983) that emphasise that any written work, and therein also official discourse, is offering a specific vantage point, dissecting the prison report makes obvious what lies underneath the orchestration of the narrative through terms like *force* and *violence*. The different affective connotations of *force* and *violence*, in 'good' and 'controlled' and 'bad' and 'illegitimate' has a political dimension. It shows that every discourse is political in its core (Jäger & Maier, 2009).

The official narrative of prisons around the juxtaposition of *force* and *violence* has structuring qualities as it expresses a political claim to violence and power by the state. By exclusively relying on the terminology *force* and the affective connotation that comes with it, the official narrative avoids self-ascribing itself with affective qualities

that are different and much more negative if it relied on the term *violence*. Abstracting from the discursive analysis, the words *force* and *violence* embody different affective sociocultural connotations, which are reproduced through the official narrative. Koschut calls this *performativity and interpellation of emotions* (Koschut, 2017). And it seems that *force* carries affect that helps to constitute the imaginary of a rationalised and therefore civil institution of state violence; *force* therein 'performs' the idea of the *rational prison*. Accordingly, this juxtaposition between *force* and *violence* can also be recognised as a dichotomy in which *force* is understood as *rational* in a Cartesian tradition – even though it carries affect – and *violence* is positioned with *affect*. This allows us to see how the official discourse of prisons is dependent on a complex framework that is built on an affective hierarchy between *force* and *violence*, that also paradoxically stands for the *affect/rationality dichotomy* as it pins *force* to *rationality* and *violence* to *affect*. This highlights the paradoxical case that even though *force* is an affective concept, the institution does not compromise its image as neutral, affect-averse and *rational* with the use of it. As the prison deflects from the fact that violence is and continues to be at the heart of the institution it simultaneously perpetuates the *affect/rationality dichotomy* as a foundation for making sense, and narrating the prison in the official discourse. This intricate connection between *force* and *violence*, subverted by the *affect/rationality dichotomy*, will be discussed in more depth along the conceptual framing of the *affective moral fact* in the discussion chapter (Chapter VIII). The power that seems to equally subvert the portrayal of affect in official discourse will be further illustrated throughout the subsequent chapters (Chapters VI and VII).

5.2 Summary

This chapter has explored the prison through an affective lens by discursively analysing the textual body of prison reports. The careful tracing of affect through the administrative and bureaucratic framework of prison reports (5.1.1), the reliance on a hierarchical orchestration of affect for reproducing the imaginary of the prison as a rational, in the Enlightenment sense, and therefore civilised institution (5.1.2), the critical reading of more overtly affective language in some prison reports (5.1.3), and the exploration of the different words *violence* and *force* in context of exploring the

prison affectively (5.1.4) has allowed for establishing a counter reading to the official discourse on the prison represented in prison reports.

The counter narrative to the official discourse questions the supposed neutral and objective qualities of the prison report as it allows us to recognise prison reports as constructed artefacts that portray a desired imaginary of the prison through a particular organisation of *affect*. The alternative reading illustrates that *affect* can be traced to the core of the institution as the official discourse relies on *affect* to create the imaginary of the prison as a *rational* and measured institution of punishment in England and Wales. The official narrative of the prison however does not compromise the illusion of a more civilised yet affect-averse institution, since the continuous rationalisation, through the particular style and language of prison reports, obfuscates affective qualities of the institution.

However, the dissection of the rationalising discourse, through an affective interrogation of style and language of the official report, enables the researcher to explore what lies beneath this rationalisation and its specific mode of portraying affect. This signals that affect seems to be always present in the official discourse and cannot be completely controlled or eradicated through rationalised language.

As the rationalised language has been deconstructed by elevating its affective components, a counter reading has been established that has a revelatory effect. The tracing of affect in the official discourse ultimately provided for a more critical reading of the institution than the official discourse depicts at first sight. It gives the impression that the obfuscation of affect equally mitigates a more critical evaluation of the prison. This has also been illustrated through the analysis of Sir Ramsbotham's reports that have provided for more scrutiny through its overt display of undesired affect in his judgement of prisons in the official discourse. As a fragmented part of the wider state apparatus, HMI Prisons is legitimised to provide criticism. However, the criticism is limited as the framework of prison reports restricts the intensity of scrutiny. The hierarchy of affect and its orchestration in the textual artefact of the official discourse provides for some criticism that, however, does not put into question the official imaginary of the prison.

The chapter outlines how this official narrative of the prison is essentially reliant on promoting certain affects whilst mystifying others and, therein, suggests that official discourse on the prison needs a careful orchestration of affect for the prison maintaining its sense of power and believability. In brief: This chapter substantiates an understanding of the prison as an affective institution.

This chapters stands as a first analysis chapter in a layered approach in investigating the prison affectively. As such, it has provided the basis for the two subsequent chapters in which the affectivity of the prison is equally traced through a discursive framework that is advanced in a twofold: the discursive analysis of the researcher's imagination (Chapter VI), and the visual analysis of official photographs (Chapter VII). Therein, this chapter gives vital impulses for further investigating a central idea of this thesis: that *rationality* is an affective concept. This has been discussed theoretically (Chapter II) and epistemologically (Chapter IV) and will be further investigated in the following analysis chapters, before it is conceptually discussed in *Chapter VIII: Theorising the Prison as an Affective Institution Alongside the Affective Moral Fact.*

Chapter VI: Tracing Affect Through Imagination

Departing from the textual analysis of prison reports in the previous chapter, this chapter is dedicated to the analysis of my imagination. Following Mills (2000), the Critical Discourse Analysis (Jäger, 2015; Koschut, 2017, 2017a) is extended through an understanding of *imagination* which emphasises the value of embracing imagination for the creative and critical research of the state, its institutions, and bureaucratic and rationalised processes. As such, *imagination* lends itself to the interrogation of the official prison discourse for exploring the possibility of understanding the prison affectively.

The discursive analysis of the textual body of prison reports excavated the affectivity and sociocultural meaning within the bureaucratic, often sterile, and controlled language. Therein, the analysis positions the language, style and framing of the reports as rationalising elements that help to orchestrate affect within the official discourse. This has the paradoxical effect of perpetuating the official imaginary of the prison as an Enlightenment, *rational* institution through a particular display of affect. Motivated by Burton and Carlen's insight ([1979]2013) that official discourses portray the institution's perspective, which should be deconstructed and critically interrogated by the researcher, and putting to practice the standpoint feminist epistemology that undergirds this thesis (Chapter IV), my imagination and affect that has been intuitively engendered through the close reading of the prison reports become the point of inquiry in this chapter.

In the previous chapter, it has been discussed how abstracted language, and what seem unnatural stops in the Inspectorate's description of critical accounts of the prison, obfuscate undesired affect in the official discourse that, in consequence, seem to serve the rational imaginary of the prison. Following Lewis and Lewis (1980), this can be understood as *negative evidence.* Departing from a Sherlock Holmes detective story that could only be solved by paying attention to what is missing – in this case it was the missing bark from a dog that indicated the intruder was familiar – they make a case for "significance of a thing's absence" (Lewis & Lewis, 1980, p. 545). Therefore, these 'absences' are becoming point of departure for the *imaginative* discursive interrogation of prison reports.

The chapter will commence with *Framing Imagination* (6.1). Following Mills' (2000), it will be discussed how *imagination* is methodologically understood in the context of this sociological research, and how it is seen as beneficial for interrogating the *negative evidence* (Lewis & Lewis, 1980) for an affective exploration of the prison. The second part of this chapter is dedicated to the discursive exploration of the corporeality of the prison through imagination. Therein, the textual basis of prison reports becomes a steppingstone for the discussion of the themes *The Built Environment* (6.2) and *The Atmosphere* (6.3). The analysis of these themes will create an imagined tour through the prison that leads us to the prison estate, the main buildings and ends in the cell.

In short, this chapter (i) aims to demonstrate how imagination is of methodological value for Critical Discourse Analysis as it takes us beyond the classical analysis of text. It equally (ii) seeks to further substantiate the critical counter reading of the prison report – as established in the previous chapter – by further exploring the prison as an affective institution through the embrace of *imagination*. Accordingly, this chapter incorporates *imagination* to further interrogate the overall research question: *What are the theoretical and methodological possibilities to explore the prison as an affective institution?*

6.1 Framing Imagination

Sociological and criminological research has been influenced by Mills' *Sociological Imagination* (2000) to varying degrees. Building on Mills' deliberations on *imagination,* critical criminology emphasises its analytical potential for the interpretation of meaning in an ever-changing society (Young, 2011). There, Mills' concept (2000) is adopted as 'imaginative criminology' which "refers to attempts to make new connections between the diverse conditions of existence of contemporary crime and justice" (Carlen, 2016, p. 18). Therein, imagination is discussed as creative enrichment of research (Seal & O'Neill, 2019) as it is seen as a creative tool and crucial point of reflexivity (Wakeman, 2019). Just like Mills outlines in his work (2000), the value of imagination is recognised on the basis that it enables us "to move between the abstract and concrete" (Frauley, 2010, p. 78). Simultaneously, this body of work talks about "disciplined imagination" and "disciplined creativity" (Frauley, 2010, p. 73)

which imposes restrictions on the use of *imagination* in research. The idea of *discipline* in this context implicitly suggests that *imagination* is a skill that can be somewhat consciously applied or consciously left out by the researcher. This *control of imagination* reminds of accounts where the controlled embrace of the researcher's emotions is used as an untapped resource for questioning dominating ideas (e.g. Gammerl, 2015; Kleres, 2011; Wettergren, 2015) and for broadening our knowledge about institutions like the prison (Jewkes, 2011).

In this thesis, my *affect* and *imagination* are equally embraced, although in a slightly different way. The way they are embraced results from the feminist epistemologies this thesis is rooted in (Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983; Smith, 1974) and the reading of Mills' *Sociological Imagination* (2000) as a methodological guidance for critical research on bureaucratic states and its institutions.

One of the central arguments in Mills' *The Sociological Imagination* (2000) questions the Enlightenment philosophy and epistemology as suitable and valuable for research in the social sciences. Originally written in 1959, Mills argues that these frameworks do not offer convincing explanations for present time phenomena, as he describes *rationality* as some kind of castigation that together with bureaucratic systems try to form people into "cheerful robots" (Mills, 2000, p. 171). *Imagination* then is outlined as that what stimulates critical thinking and allows us to question the rational system that surrounds us. According to Mills (2000), *imagination* is about crafting our own methodology and methods according to the needs of the research, because only the creative mind prevents sociological research from stagnation and helps to question standardised and rationalised ways of institutionalised methods. The latter are described by Mills (2000) as thwarting academic and research development:

> "For social, technological, or bureaucratic rationality is not merely a grand summation of the individual will and capacity to reason. The very chance to acquire that will and that capacity seems in fact often to be decreased by it. Rationally organized social arrangements are not necessarily a means of increased freedom – for the individual or for the society. In fact, often they are a means of tyranny and manipulation, a means of expropriating the very chance to reason, the very capacity to act as a free man." (Mills, 2000, pp. 168-169)

Nisbet's deliberations on the importance of treating sociological research as an art form in the early 1960s (Nisbet, 1962) echoes Mills' (2000) argument.

> "Nisbet carefully stipulates that nothing he says is intended to imply that sociology is not a science, but insists that there must be an element of art in every science that does not succumb to sterile methodological ritualism." (Adler, 2014, p. 13)

Therein, Nisbet (1962) positions the role of creativity as central and emphasises the importance of engaging with emotions throughout the research practice as they are essential for art and science.

Mills' (2000) and Nisbet's (1962) deliberations resonate with a central argument in the standpoint feminist approach that fundaments the epistemology in this research (Chapter IV). As Haraway (1991) asks us to imagine the cyborg as an epistemological vessel to question deep rooted patriarchal understandings that dominate society, she illustrates how creative thinking can assist in questioning and breaking down dichotomies. This is of particular importance in this thesis, as the prison is argued a patriarchal institution (Chapter III) whose imaginary as an Enlightenment, *rational* and therefore civilised institution is seen as reliant on an *affect/rationality dichotomy* (Chapter II and IV). In those previous chapters, it is equally outlined how breaking with this epistemological dichotomy is central for exploring the prison as an affective institution, which is why creative and imaginative ways of thinking and doing research are embraced.

Mills' (2000) idea of *imagination* resonates further with the standpoint feminist approach in this thesis. Earlier (Chapter IV), it has been argued that researchers need to be cautious to not alienate themselves from their own research which is why researchers need to embrace their situatedness and affect that is evoked during research, and write themselves back into their work (Smith, 1974). As Mills argues against conventional Enlightenment inspired methodologies (Platt, 2013), he counters a positivist tradition in sociology that tries to adopt research standards from natural sciences (Brox, 2013), and argues for creative endeavours in sociological research (Mjøset, 2013). He equally advocates for understanding sociology as a political task (Brewer, 2013) which ultimately asks us as researchers to embrace our situatedness (Hartsock, 1983; Haraway, 1991) and make transparent *whose side we are on* (Becker,

1967). As such, Mills' idea of stop being "cheerful robots" (Mills, 2000, p. 171) converges with the idea of being a *feminist killjoy* (Ahmed, 2017). Accordingly embracing *affect*, *imagination*, and *creativity*, actively writing *imagination* back into our research, can be seen as part of a political and feminist framing of research and further places this thesis as a feminist work.

What needs to be emphasised, is that this research advocates for an unfettered embrace of imagination. This does not mean that my *imagination* and *affect* are not reflected upon but that they are not controlled along institutionalised rational guidelines which Mills pointed out as hindering for creative development in sociology (Mills, 2000). This echoes an argument that has been made earlier (Chapter IV), where it has been outlined along feminist scholarship that affect cannot be controlled through rationality as an affect-averse entity, as *rationality* in itself depicts a particular way of thinking and being (Barad, 2003; Gatens, 1992; Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983; Jaggar, 1989; Rose, 1983; Whitford, 1988). For not alienating ourselves from our own research, we need to be careful to not merely see *affect* and *imagination* as functionalistic tools as this carries the notion that when they are not actively engaged, research can be detached from it. This, again, suggests that knowledge could be created from nowhere when affect and imagination are not engaged; an idea that is deeply rooted in rationalised and patriarchal accounts. Therefore, embracing imagination means writing ourselves back into research (Aldridge, 1993; Wakeman, 2019), to acknowledge that the particular vantage points that are presented in official discourse are equally critiqued from a particular perspective (Carlen, 2016).

To summarise: Based on Mills' (2000) deliberations and the feminist epistemological basis, *imagination* and *affect* are seen as intuitive companions in research that offer to engage with research creatively and critically. *Imagination* is seen as floating around the boarder of realism; it can bring wonder as much as clarity as it elevates what is already there. In this research, *imagination* sharpens the epistemological, methodological, and methodical foundation as it allows us to creatively interrogate how textual artefacts of the prison report spontaneously evoke affect and translate into images. On this basis, it permits prison reports to be read critically and imaginatively for their textual and visual content (the latter is done in the following Chapter VII).

6.1.1 Exploring Negative Evidence Through Imagination

The close reading of prison reports intuitively engendered my imagination which I have experienced as a spinning away through thought, affect and visualisation. As such, my imagination provides for another point of interrogation of those parts of the prison reports that have been described above as *negative evidence* (Lewis & Lewis, 1980), where affect is concealed by the administrative language and style in the official narrative.

Especially the descriptions of the built environment, but also some recommendation of the Inspectorate that alluded to the everyday experiences, triggered my imagination, and took me beyond the textual basis of the prison report. Therein, it has been the corporeality of the place as *negative evidence* (Lewis & Lewis, 1980) that unfolded through imagination. Analysing the prison as an institution that is manifested in its built environment, that equally manifests itself in the lived experiences of those that inhabit the space is of special importance. Following Foucault's argument (1977) earlier (Chapter II), it has been outlined that the prison cannot deprive itself of the bodily existence of the punished, as the deprivation of freedom through incarceration is always anchored in the bodily experience of those that have to endure it. Accordingly, Foucault (1977) argues that imprisonment will always carry traces of pre-modern, overtly physical forms of punishment. This corporeal aspect of the prison seems however blurred in the administrative language used. Going back to the argument made about the different loading of affect in *force* and *violence* exemplifies this (Chapter V). There it is argued that the different affect ascribed to *force* and *violence* are relied upon for creating the official narrative of the prison as a rational institution of punishment. Following the argument above (6.1), that outlines how *imagination* and *affect* are connected, it can be argued that *force* and *violence* are not only used to orchestrate affect in the official narrative but that they also rely on what is typically imagined when being confronted with these terms. Arguably, the imagination these terms prompt is different. At least, they are different for me. As *force* is argued a rational response to prisoner's violence, it eludes the reference to the bodies the harm is done to. In contrast, the way *violence* is portrayed evokes the imagination of an uncontrolled harmful incident that leaves obvious traces on someone's body. This indicates that the official narrative not only relies on *affect* but also *imagination* to create the desired imaginary of the prison.

Equally, reading the recommendations of the Inspectorate has prompted my imagination. Every prison report analysed in this research finishes with a list of recommendations. Typically, these lists state in a sober and matter of fact manner that prisoners should be out of their cells daily, that they should be addressed with respect, that all state *violence* – vis-à-vis *force* – should be complete in its documentation, or they recommend that prisoners should have regular access to showers, that living conditions should be clean, and prisoners should have a sufficient amount of food. These are just a few examples from lists that are far longer and continuously repeat, over the period of nearly 40 years (1982-2019), the same kind of recommendations. Whilst this indicates that in this time period only very little changed – which is supported and demonstrated in the extensive research of critical and abolitionist prison studies (e.g. Davis, 2003; Scott, 2018; Sim, 2009; Wacquant, 2001) – it is the actual wording that is of interest for exploring the prison imaginatively.

A typical recommendation is: "All prisoners should be offered daily association. … All prisoners should have at least 10 hours out of their cells every day." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2007, p. 99) Closely reading the reports, I have intuitively found myself writing next to them that which my imagination rendered significant, and the *negative evidence* (Lewis & Lewis, 1980) obvious. My physical copies of the prison reports are therefore annotated with comments such like: "Prisoners not having daily association. Confined in their cell for majority of the day.", "Feeling of hunger – prisoners not receiving enough food.", or "Lack of care, indifference, justice." My imagination therein gives impulses for establishing a critical counter reading. As it has taken me beyond the textual basis of prison reports, an imagined visualisation of the quotidian life of imprisonment has been created and placed in the built environment of the prison.

Focussing on the corporeality of the prison, its architecture and design, has been argued and demonstrated as valuable research object for discussing and expanding our knowledge on the prison (Jewkes & Moran, 2017; Jewkes, et al., 2017). Following this body of work within carceral geographies, this chapter expands the study of the corporeality of the prison through *imagination.* This means departing from the textual basis of the prison report and creatively reconstructing *The Built Environment* (Theme 1) and *The Atmosphere* (Theme 2) through the Critical Discourse Analysis of

imagination. Investigating the corporeality of the prison through imagination promises to make explicit what is otherwise obfuscated through language and style of the official discourse. As such, this thesis aims to demonstrate that the official narrative is also reliant on how it recites the corporeality of the prison, and that interrogating the materialised aspects of the prison through imagination can elevate what seems already there: the affectivity of the prison.

6.2 Theme 1: The Built Environment

As outlined above, the textual basis of the prison report becomes a steppingstone for imaginatively and creatively accessing the corporeality of the prison which is discursively analysed in respect to exploring the prison affectively. The analysis therein provides for an imagined tour of the prison which starts with the approach of the prison estate.

In the earliest prison report analysed in this thesis, the inspection team describes what they see as they drive up to the prison.

> "Birmingham prison was built in the mid-nineteenth century to the radial pattern typical of that time. It is located in a particularly run-down area of the city, so that the approaches to the establishment are depressing, and the establishment itself, built of unrelieved Midland brick and exposed to 120 years wear and tear in the heart of the Industrial Midlands, presents a forbidding appearance. Within the perimeter, there is little open space because of the jumble of buildings which has grown up over the years." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 1982, p. 4)

Describing the prison's position in the cityscape with *emotional terms* (Koschut, 2017, 2017a) like 'run-down', 'depressing' and 'forbidding' does not only influence how the prison estate is imagined but foreshadows what lies behind the prison walls and brick and mortar of the prison buildings.

The description of the architectural design of HMP Pentonville in a prison report of the late 1980s illustrates how the built environment is supposed to carry a specific feel to it.

> "Pentonville stands within a walled enclosure of some 9 acres in Islington, North London: its four wings radiate in an arc of 180·around the centre.

> The rows of large single cells rise in galleried tiers. Because of the slight slope of the site two wings have four landings and two have five. The architect, Colonel (later Sir Joshua) Jebb had based the design on the East Penitentiary in Philadelphia but had drawn on such diverse sources as Bentham's Panopticon, the London Hospital and the Maison de Force in Ghent. Refinements to prevent convicts communicating with each other included a lavatory in each cell and a downward-flow warm air heating system. The lavatories were removed some years later. It is not certain whether this was through faulty design, damage by prisoners or tapping on pipes by prisoners as a form of communication. We suspect faulty design. The air heating system was an elaborate, costly and not very efficient way of heating cells without using pipes on which convicts might tap out messages to each other. The tall chimney-like vents on the roofs make so many prisons of this period instantly recognisable." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 1988a, p. 6)

What unfolds is an image of a prison that was designed with a specific purpose in mind. HMP Pentonville, just like HMP Liverpool and HMP Birmingham, embody essential design aspects of Bentham's *Panopticon* (1791) which, as has been discussed earlier (Chapter III), has become the template for many architectural designs of prisons with the purpose to create a regime of punishment that is manifested in its built environment. In Chapter III, it has also been discussed that carceral geographies pay particular attention to the built environment in their exploration of the role of emotions in prisons (Moran, et al., 2016; Jewkes & Moran, 2017; Jewkes, et al., 2019, 2020; Liebling, 2005) and therein mirror to some extent Bentham's idea (1791), that the architectural design of the *Panopticon* aims to nourish specific affective qualities that are seen as beneficial in teaching particular moral ideas and/or provide for a rehabilitative environment. Carceral geographies emphasise that prisons carry a particular affectivity and that they are designed with emotion on mind. In one of such analysis, Jewkes and Moran (2017) point out that HMP Pentonville's architecture was built to intimidate and break prisoners due to the solitude and silence that was created through its design.

Dismounting the pipe system in HMP Pentonville (as described above) limited ways of communication within a building whose design already aims for the limitation of any contact between prisoners. Picturing this built environment, the pipe system can be imagined as a sort of backbone prisoners could rely on for communication. Physically removing this unofficial system of communication from the built

environment amplifies an atmosphere of loneliness and sadness. Unable to communicate or relate to others over long stretches of time forms an imagination of the prison in which the solitude seems suffocating. Whilst reasons for the specific architectural design were rationalised along what seemed good intentions, like the need for silence in order to contemplate (Bentham, 1791), it becomes clear that prisons are harmful through their built environment as they deprive people of the essential need to connect.

Whilst being deprived of something like a pipe system might not seem noteworthy at first, seeing it as a means or even last resort for communication changes its value. Imagining it as such shows that it is not just a component within a building functioning as a standard for desired living conditions. The pipe system becomes a desirable means for communication amongst prisoners, as much as it becomes an undesirable feature of the built environment for the prison institution. As prisons are designed to punish through the peculiar features of the built environment (Moran, et al., 2016), the dismounting of the system renders obvious that the built environment embodies an imaginary of the prison that is reflected in its design which aims to evoke and orchestrate affect in a particular way. Critically imagining the pipe system emphasises that the deprivation of communication has more complex desires at work than Enlightenment ideals of repentance through solitude (Bentham, 1791), and signifies that prisons punish beyond their denial of freedom as they enhance harms through violence that seems to be manifested in the built environment of the prison.

What we can see already at this point is that the prison, in its corporeality as well as its bureaucratic practices, is built on an imaginary of what the institution ought to be. In the previous chapter it is demonstrated how this imaginary of the prison as a rational, non-affective and therefore civilised institution is consistently reproduced through the textual basis of the prison report. Here, it seems that the rationalised prison architecture is equally part of narrating this official discourse. Similar to the particular style and language of prison reports, the design of prisons seems to obfuscate certain affective qualities of the prison under its rationalised corporeality.

6.2.1 Subtheme 1a: The Prison Building

After approaching the prison from the outside and imaginatively discussing the role of the pipe system, this subtheme focuses on the built environment behind the prison walls. A prison report on HMP Liverpool from 1988 offers the following description:

> "The main prison building is of heavy brick construction with a pitched roof of typical early Victorian design. The cove building and the projecting custodial wings are three storey above ground level; the brickwork is plain and completely unembellished. There are, however, single bays of full height and of heavy sandstone construction on the end of each wing. The sandstone has begun to erode and the bay on one wing had, regrettably, been replaced as a single square unit. This treatment was, fortunately, not to be continued and the remaining bays were being carefully restored. Roofs were slate-covered but with the total refurbishment of the building now proceeding, the slates were being replaced with lead, formed with rolls in the traditional manner and on multiple decking. … The main entrance wing houses the C of E chapel above the ground floor and was an impressive Grade III listed building." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 1988, p. 68)

Whilst this description of the prison's particular design features, like sandstone and slate, creates the imagination of a near stately built environment, the simultaneous report on the decay and repairs of the building creates a juxtaposition. This juxtaposition seems to highlight what the prison ought to be – an institution whose strength of the built environment symbolises its disciplinary power through architecture – and the prison as an institution that faces particular difficulties which are resolved through temporary repair of that which is 'broken'. This typifies a critical abolitionist argument in which it is emphasised that reforming policies for prisons do not tackle the actual problems of the institutions as they only 'repair' the symptoms of a much deeper-rooted institutional crisis (e.g. Davis, 2003; Scott, 2018b; Sim, 2009).

A prison report drawn up some ten years later of the same prison mirrors the above, and reports that roofs on the prison estate are continuously leaking:

> "The Health Care Centre was a two storey Victorian building which had been greatly extended 20-30 years ago using the poorest construction; it will always remain a substantial maintenance load. Some slates and ridge tiles were missing allowing rain to enter the upper rooms and the extensive areas of flat roofing were leaking badly. There were areas of cracked brick work indicating movement. The original single pipe heating system

> installed lacked effective control, overheating the building and wasting fuel. […] Like the rest of the prison the cells were not clean and many needed redecorating." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 1999, p. 125)

This observation of the Inspectorate was elsewhere complemented with: "The exercise yard, which was frankly, the smallest we have seen, had a metal gridded roof which further exacerbated its claustrophobic nature." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 1999, p. 62) These descriptions evoke the visualisation of the built environment and allows us to go beyond the textual foundation of the prison report as I see the shapes, materials and derelict buildings in front of my inner eye. As I imagine the space, it elevates what is already there and contours how the built environment carries affect. As an inner picture gets drawn, the textual artefact the prison report is translates into my imagination and affective experience of the space as 'uninviting', 'cold', 'bleak', 'grim', just to name a few. *Affect* can therein be traced beyond the written word of prison reports and enables us to further explore and unpack the prison as an affective institution. The above-mentioned exercise yard will be returned to in the following *Chapter VII: Tracing Affect Through the Photograph*, where the photographic documentation of this yard will be further interrogated. It shall suffice at this point to note that the tracing of affect through imagination seems to be a promising approach, as the visual interrogation happens to reiterate central observations that are made through the embrace of imagination in this chapter.

Going back to the textual basis of the prison report, a dense imagination of the institution unfolds as the official narrative reverberates the above descriptions of HMP Liverpool across institutions. In a prison report from 1988 on HMP Pentonville, the Inspectorate notes:

> "Pentonville is of early Victorian design and construction with heavy, brick walls and mostly pitched roofs. The elevations within the perimeter are in plain face brickwork, the only embellishment being over-sailing and dog-tooth courses at eaves and high windows with stone, or rendered surrounds and mullions at the ends of the wings. The elevation to Caledonian Road is of the heavy, daunting fortress-style typical of the era. The prison was built on the radial principle and the wings have been extended in length and height since they were built." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 1988a, p. 111)

Equally to HMP Liverpool the estate underwent some remodelling. Whilst it did not replace the typical prison design, the altercations and maintenance repairs were done with materials that are inferior to the original Victorian building:

> "The pitched roofs were almost certainly covered, originally, with high quality Welsh slates but these were eventually replaced with asbestos slates or corrugated asbestos sheeting. These are now being replaced with continuous metal sheeting with an insulation layer, an appropriate material as it is virtually impenetrable, cannot be broken up to form missiles, and the surface provides a poor foothold. The re-roofing of A and B wings had been completed and the remainder were to be similarly re-roofed as part of general refurbishment projects." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 1988a, p. 111)

Thinking about how these repairs integrate in the built environment makes for the imagination of a hostile environment. The altercations described are made under the assumption that prisons are potential places that need to withhold a missile attack. The material that 'provides a poor foothold' could be justified within the official narrative as rational means to hinder prisonbreaks and to protect the public. However, this design feature can also be imagined as preventing prisoners taking to the roof to protest the conditions of prisons in the UK as it happened on numerous occasions during the 1980s and 1990s (Baron Woolf, 1991; Independent Committee of Inquiry Into the Protests at Peterhead Prison, 1987; Sim, 2009). Therein, the material of the roof becomes an object through which the institution can also orchestrate the official narrative. It can be imagined that the continuous display of protesting prisoners on the institution's roof has the potential to undermine and question the official narrative of a civilised form of punishment. The design and materials used therein embody certain qualities that allow for the presentation of a desired prison imaginary which is reliant on how the prison estate is perceived to the public. Following the previous chapter in which it is established that the prison report orchestrates affect in the official narrative through text, it can be observed that this official narrative is equally reliant on a corporeality of the prison that represents a desired affective display of the institution. Accordingly, it can be assumed that the prison orchestrates affect in the official narrative through architecture and design for that purpose.

Also, in a more recent prison report on HMP Pentonville, the Inspectorate addresses the security of built environment of the prison in regard to its steadfastness:

> "Although the general condition of the prison was old and worn, we found no obvious weaknesses in the perimeter walls and fences. Regular checks and routine searches of the perimeter took place at appropriate times during the day, along with adequate searches of communal areas and activities buildings. However, some security netting outside residential areas was damaged and some had fallen down. Outside areas near to fences and gates were cluttered with rubbish, and wooden pallets and large pieces of debris were left lying close to outer fences and compound gates." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2015a, p. 24)

The above statement documents in a more matter of fact style that the walls are intact and points to the missing or broken security netting. The same prison report notes in the Inspector's opening words, in a more critical tone, that the built environment constitutes a potentially existential problem for the prison:

> "At the end of the last inspection we noted that Pentonville was struggling and without investment in its physical condition, adequate staffing levels to manage its complex population, and effective support from the centre, consideration should be given to whether it has a viable future." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2015a, p. 6)

This indicates again, as discussed in the previous chapter, that the preface of prison reports provides the opportunity for more overtly affective critique. Here, with the focus on the corporeality of the prison, the above examples from 1988 and 2015, reveal that over the past 40 years the built environment changed only marginally. The core of the prison estate is formed by Victorian buildings that were designed and constructed in the mid-19th century. One would believe that almost 20 years later, those buildings would be refurbished and improved to a contemporary standard, especially given the critical assessment of the places in the late 1980s. Instead, the descriptions translate into an imagined state of the buildings that shows deterioration and, as such, resemble on the outside what the previous chapter already outlined: the progressing deterioration of inner prison processes. Extracts that describe building features as 'unembellished' note that without an improvement in the built environment the prison would continue

to struggle suggesting that there is an awareness of the Inspectorate that design matters. This is substantiated in recent studies on prison design that emphasise design features improve living conditions and make for a more rehabilitative atmosphere (Jewkes, et al., 2020).

Imagining the corporeality of the prison through the official discourse evokes the visualisation of a failing institution. The built environment seems stuck in Victorian times, however, is faced with 21st century problems which creates a dismal image of the prison complex. The imagination-based analysis highlights again that textual based efforts around the 'Healthy Prison' (Chapter V) in prison reports portray an imaginary of an Enlightenment institution that translates into an *unhealthy* prison reality when researched critically. Descriptions like 'daunting fortress-style' architecture or the description of an outside exercise yard of 'claustrophobic nature' because of its metal gridded roof, create an image of the prison as an institution where even the sky is barred. Reading prison reports imaginatively for affectively researching the corporeality of the prison evokes affect throughout the research process. This helps to further question the official discourse that clings to an Enlightenment imaginary of the prison as a rational and therefore civilised institution. Just like the concept of the 'Healthy Prison' has been critiqued as an affective framework under the label *rational*, the built environment cannot be imagined without affect, since the built environment manifests and reflects a particular affectivity that makes the institution. Therefore, it has been suggested that prisons orchestrate the official discourse through the affectivity of its built environment. Jewkes and Moran (2017) argue that prison architecture "provides a common (and 'common sense') visual vocabulary for current political, economic, social, cultural, and spatial understandings of incarceration" (Jewkes & Moran, 2017, p. 555). Whilst this 'visual vocabulary' will be further explored through the visual analysis of official photographs in prison reports (Chapter VII), imagining the prison shows how the corporeality stands vicariously for dominating sociocultural feelings which are also reflected within the official discourse. This resonates with the conceptual framing of the *affective moral fact*, outlined in Chapter II, where it has been argued that dominating affect in society and state institutions, like the prison, represent and likewise form our sociocultural reality. This will be further explored in the discussion chapter (Chapter VIII).

Whilst here we have imagined the physical space of the built environment of the prison, next we move into the intimate space of the prison cell to further explore the prison as an affective institution through imagination.

6.2.2 Subtheme 1b: The Cell

In the prison report on HMP Pentonville from 1988, the Inspectorate addresses the state of the cells, and the headquarters' reluctance to make any significant changes that would improve the living conditions for prisoners. The Inspectorate notes:

> "Headquarters briefing for our inspection recorded that Pentonville was not a priority establishment for the installation of integral sanitation in spite of its future which was admitted to extend well into the next century, and would probably continue for much longer. The cells were large, having been provided, originally, with a primitive form of integral sanitation plus a working area, and there would appear to be ample space for the provision of sanitary facilities in each cell. The hospital was a Victorian provision and the accommodation generous. The staff and inmate facilities there were satisfactory but in view of the large size of the cells, there was scope to provide integral sanitation. We find the absence of a plan for integral sanitation in refurbishment here in the 1980's extraordinary and unacceptable." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 1988a, pp. 113-114)

Despite the building's architectural foundation and planning to have HMP Pentonville open for a prolonged period of time, there is resistance to install sanitation in the cells. This statement also conveys that it lies outside the Inspectorate's power to prompt such a cell alteration as the reluctance to do so is formalised through a 'briefing' from 'headquarters'. This again evidences that the Inspectorate is managed at the behest of the state, without legislative rights. More importantly here though, it illustrates how prisons are governed through the built environment that structures the experiences of imprisonment.

How these decisions about architecture and design influence the experience of imprisonment becomes even clearer when the cell's environment is imagined through statements such as: "The cells were cheerless and equipped with very dilapidated cardboard furniture." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 1988a, p. 77). The *emotional terms* (Koschut, 2017, 2017a) "cheerless" and "dilapidated" facilitate the imagination of a space with a particular affectivity to it. This imaginary is further fortified on the

basis of similar statements that saturate all prison reports analysed in this thesis. In a prison report about the same prison some 20 years later it says:

> "Nearly all the single cells were shared by two prisoners. Screens for the in-cell toilets were very low and offered no privacy. The cells were also too small to fit two tables, chairs and cupboards, and many prisoners were sharing one or more of these items. Some cell windows had been fitted with polycarbonate screens and others had new windows with restricted openers. Prisoners in these cells had very little ventilation on hot days." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2006, p. 31)

Another 10 years later and the state of the average cell has further deteriorated:

> "Almost all cells originally designed for one were now shared by two people. The living conditions were cramped, toilets were dirty and privacy screening was poor. Many cells were in poor condition with windows and observation panels broken (see main recommendation S53), and much of the furniture was in a poor state. We saw many cells with longstanding plumbing and electrical problems." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2019, pp. 31-32)

Analysing the prison reports from 1982 to 2019 on HMP Birmingham, HMP Liverpool and HMP Pentonville creates a counter reading to the official discourse that cannot be separated into distinct narratives for each prison. Instead, critically reading the reports has made clear that all three prisons are facing nearly identical problems. In consequence, imagining the corporeality of the institution through these prison reports fused them into one imagined counter narrative of the built environment. This imaginary draws a picture – just as described above – of cells that are cramped because two people live in a space designed for one, too small to accommodate essential items for two so that these items and furniture, which are often broken, must be shared. These cells offer no safe haven, not even for intimate and personal moments. They are described as "austere" and "shabby" (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2017, p. 21) despite the attempt to clean them, which is possibly owed to the often-mentioned lack of access to cleaning materials but also fresh bedding and eating utensils. In addition, cells only offer restricted views to the outside, since new windows are made of material that does not allow for a clear vision, or broken windows are makeshift repaired with opaque materials. As their visualisation unfolds in front of me through imagination it affects me, brings discomfort and malaise by the thought of being confined to this space even for the shortest time. Embracing these affective experiences throughout the

analysis brought focus on the *negative evidence* (Lewis & Lewis, 1980), that which is not described or discussed in more detail in the official narrative: the affectivity of the built environment of the prison, and therein the institution.

6.3 Theme 2: The Atmosphere

Imagining the built environment of the prison accentuates prisons as places whose material existence is infused with affect. It has been alluded to how this corporeality creates a particular atmosphere of the prison. How the imagination of the prison as an institution that is infused with affect conjures a particular atmosphere distinctive for the prison is subject of this theme.

Prison reports seldom address how life unfolds inside the prison, nor do they actually represent the voices of prisoners. This is not surprising as prison reports are official discourses representing the voice of the institution, which operates at the behest of the state. Critically imagining the official discourse illustrates how affective qualities of the built environment and the prison regime orchestrate the experience of prisoners. Moran, Jewkes and Turner (2016) address this in their work, in which they let Hassine speak, a person who experienced imprisonment as he faced a livelong incarceration. By doing so they not only demonstrate that rendering the experiences of prisons obvious is to let those speak that have to endure it, but they also provide a compelling testimony for the particular atmosphere in prisons. Hassine has poignantly captured the prison environment as follows:

> "To fully understand the prison experience requires a personal awareness of how bricks, mortar, steel, and the endless enforcement of rules and regulations animate a prison into a living, breathing entity designed to manipulate its inhabitants. ... Prison designers and managers have developed a precise and universal alphabet of fear that is carefully assembled and arranged – bricks, steel, uniforms, colors, odors, shapes, and management style – to effectively control the conduct of whole prison populations." (Hassine, 2010, p. 7, quoted in Moran, et al., 2016, p. 120)

Burdened with the experiences of imprisonment, Hassine committed suicide (Moran, et al., 2016). Whilst Hassine has described this particular atmosphere in the context of prisons in the USA, Moran, Jewkes and Turner's work (2016) demonstrates that this

atmosphere can be transferred to prisons in the UK. This is equally supported by critical criminological research, in which it is emphasised that UK prisons, their atmosphere and regime, impact the wellbeing of prisoners which can lead to a deterioration of health and surging cases of self-harm (Fairweather, 2000; Sim, 2017, 2019). Whilst this research could not rely on testimonies of prisoners since access to the prison has been denied – which will be further addressed in the *Conclusion* (Chapter IX) – the above statement illustrates that the creative and imaginative research of prison reports allows for an insight into the atmosphere, and ,therein, affectivity of the institution which resemble expert-testimonies. This again indicates that the critical imagination of the researcher is beneficial for exploring the prison as an affective institution.

Proceeding with *visualising* and *thinking* the prison affectively through critical imagination, the attention is further tended to previous accounts that pointed out the ill-decorated overcrowded cells with 'dilapidated' and 'cheerless' furniture. Over the period of 40 years (1982-2019), the prison reports of all three prisons, HMP Birmingham, HMP Liverpool and HMP Pentonville, have created an image of the cell that is identical throughout the different estates. Often, prisoners would get a taste of what they can expect from their cells when they are in the reception area of the prison:

> "The cells were no more than dark boxes, with a low level of lighting at the time of inspection one bulb had blown. As rooms for inmates, whether causing trouble or not, they were, in our view, unsuitable. They seemed at least as likely to aggravate some inmates as calm them down. We recommend that these two cells be fitted with alarm bells and that the illumination should be improved." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 1988a, p. 42)

These extracts let us imagine the cells as hostile where the needs of someone actually living in the place are not accommodated for. One of the few prison reports captures this atmosphere as follows: "inmates kept their possessions in cardboard boxes under their beds, which only added to the 'transit camp' atmosphere of the place." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 1988, p. 22). It is also within the same report that the Inspectorate refers to the experiences of prisoners, which is not the ordinary. There it reads:

> "Those who were kept at Liverpool for a long time became very bored after spending so long locked up in a small cell with other inmates. They complained bitterly about many aspects of the prison." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 1988, pp. 27-28)

The same prison report also states: “They [prisoners] took for granted the poor living conditions and saw them as part of their punishment” (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 1988, p. 27). The above extracts further illustrate the atmosphere that is inherent in the prison. They are especially interesting as they convey the reflection of prisoners who recognise how the atmosphere is affective and tinges their experience of imprisonment, and that this atmosphere is understood as part of the punishment. This is insofar interesting as affect – the affect that is orchestrated through the corporeality of the prison – becomes recognised as essential to the prison. This insight, and the Inspectorate’s report on it, implicitly challenges the idea of a rational, in the Enlightenment sense, institution that distances itself from affective approaches to punishment (Foucault, 1977; Ignatieff, 1978). This echoes what has been suggested at the very outset of this thesis: that *affect* never really vanished with the *Birth of the Prison* (Foucault, 1977), but that affect is orchestrated differently through the new measures of punishment which are manifested in the built environment.

This hostile, harmful and dangerous atmosphere seems to permeate the prison for the following 30 years, as the subsequent extract from a prison report from 2017 illustrates:

> “Some of the most concerning findings were around the squalid living conditions endured by many prisoners. Many cells were not fit to be used and should have been decommissioned. Some had emergency call bells that were not working but were nevertheless still occupied, presenting an obvious danger to prisoners. There were hundreds of unrepaired broken windows, with jagged glass left in the frames. Many lavatories were filthy, blocked or leaking. There were infestations of cockroaches in some areas, broken furniture, graffiti, damp and dirt. In one extreme case, I found a prisoner who had complex mental health needs being held in a cell that had no furniture other than a bed. The windows of both the cell and the toilet recess were broken, the light fitting in his toilet was broken with wires exposed, the lavatory was filthy and appeared to be blocked, his sink was leaking and the cell was dark and damp. Extraordinarily, this man had apparently been held in this condition for some weeks. The inspectors had brought this prisoner’s circumstances to the attention of the prison, and it should not have needed my personal intervention for this man to be moved from such appalling conditions.” (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2017, p. 5)

This description translates into an atmosphere of brutality and negligence. One might think that the dismal character of the prison is owed to broken furniture or missing window panels, in short: to circumstances that can be fixed. As we will see shortly, part of the atmosphere of prisons is precisely created through certain improvements within the design and built environment of the prison cell. A prison report from 1999 captures the following situation:

> "[T]here had been continuous lock up for the two weeks before Christmas and there was no association on Christmas day … prisoners had to eat, sleep and go to the toilet in the same place (this was the effect of in-cell sanitation in prisons without dining 'in association') … prisoners had to wait three months for a towel change" (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 1999, p. 21).

Earlier in this chapter, it has been outlined how missing in-cell sanitation is seen as not fit for a prison in a report from 1988. In another report some ten years later, the in-cell sanitation, which is arguably an improvement of the cell, continues to cause harm, however, under a different design (Scott, 1998) as it justifies longer in-cell times. The imagined cell, that is characterised by overcrowding, insufficient hygiene and a lack of privacy, illustrates a morbid and violent atmosphere which enables harmful practices through its design. This suggests that the affectivity of the prison is manifested in its corporeality which in consequence affects the experience of imprisonment.

This morbid and uncaring atmosphere can be envisioned through imagining the space and is further reinforced through the lack of hygiene and rodent infestation in prisons. One of the most recent prison reports analysed here states:

> "Communal areas in most wings were filthy and access to cleaning materials was problematic. Rubbish was not always removed promptly and there were problems with fleas, cockroaches and rodents. Vomit had been left overnight on the landing of one wing. External areas and most exercise yards were stark. Debris that had been thrown out of cell windows in older wings was gathering in gullies and on lower rooftops. Many showers were dirty and poorly maintained." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2018, p. 14)

Another report that has been published around the same time mirrors this and draws an image of a contaminated living environment:

> "The prison was generally untidy and in many places there were piles of rubbish. During the course of the inspection, efforts were made to clear

> some of it, but there was simply too much. I saw piles of rubbish that had clearly been there for a long time, and in which inspectors reported seeing rats on a regular basis. I was told by a senior member of staff that it had not been cleared by prisoners employed as cleaning orderlies because it presented a health and safety risk. It was so bad that external contractors were to be brought in to deal with it. In other words, this part of the jail had become so dirty, infested and hazardous to health that it could not be cleaned." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2017, p. 5)

The imagination of the prison unfolds in further detail, when the lack of natural light is envisioned. A prison report states:

> "A number of windows, especially at ground and lower ground floor were very grubby on the outside. … The effect was to cut down very considerably the amount of daylight admitted to the wing making it needlessly gloomy and creating a somewhat dismal environment." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 1999, p. 126)

The rodent infestation, the mentioned debris, overcrowded cells with malfunctioning plumbing, and overall insufficient lighting equally provokes the imagination of the olfactory characteristics of the place. Whilst the Inspectorate does not directly comment on odours, it has been noted in one report:

> "We often smelt cannabis on the wings. Shockingly, staff were too often ambivalent and accepting of such incidents." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2018, p. 13)

> "I have inspected many prisons where drugs are a problem, but nowhere else have I felt *physically affected* by the drugs in the atmosphere – an atmosphere in which it is clearly unsafe for prisoners and staff to live and work." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2018, p. 75, my emphasis)

As this description adds to the imagination of the institution, it offers to envision how the built environment translates into atmosphere, which also works upon the senses and therein *affects* people that inhabit the place. As the Inspector has described being '*physically affected'* by an olfactory characteristic of the atmosphere, *affect* found its way into the reports. This is to the best of my knowledge the only time that *affect* has been directly used as a term or has been directly addressed in one of the fifteen analysed reports. Whilst this can be considered rather meagre. considering the near

1800 pages of official discourse, the interrogation of the *negative evidence* (Lewis & Lewis, 1980) through the embrace of *imagination* has demonstrated how *affect* can be explored in official discourse without its literal presence in the textual artefact.

6.4 Summary

In this chapter, the corporeality of the prison has taken centre stage as the prison is further explored as an affective institution. Central to this second part of the Critical Discourse Analysis (Jäger, 2015; Koschut, 2017a) – which has previously been used to interrogate the textual basis of prison reports (Chapter V) – has been the embrace of *imagination*. Here, my *imagination*, the visualisation and affect that spontaneously and naturally has become part of critically engaging with the textual basis of the prison report, has advanced as the point of interrogation to further substantiate the counter narrative that questions the Enlightenment origin of prisons as rational and affect-averse institution.

One of the central aspects to this chapter is the demonstration of the methodological value of the practical application of Mills' critical *imagination* (Mills, 2000). As the textual artefact has become a steppingstone for my imagination and affect, their unfettered embrace – motivated by the feminist epistemology this thesis positions itself in (Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983; Smith, 1974) – has allowed us to see the prison from a vantage point that is not permissively revealed in prison reports. As *imagination* takes us beyond the language and style of the official narrative, it offers an opportunity to discursively analyse the *negative evidence* (Lewis & Lewis, 1980) that is rendered visible through it. It elevates what is already there and brings clarity to what is otherwise obfuscated in the textual body of the prison report. *Imagination* therein accentuates the affectivity of the prison as it simultaneously assists in unpicking the official imaginary of the prison as a rational, affect-averse and therefore civilised institution. Imagining the prison beyond the state narrative illustrates how the institution manifests affect in its built environment, how the atmosphere is affect-imbued and how this organises and impacts the lived experience. In that sense, this chapter draws attention to the material basis of the prison and indicates that the affectivity of the prison is not only embodied in official textual

documents but in its corporeality. This chapter also suggests that the imaginary of the prison is equally relying on the idea of a rational, in the Enlightenment sense, built environment of the prison. Tracing affect in the corporeality of the prison, however, once more indicates that what is called or seen as *rational* architecture is in fact a particular *affective* built environment, that reflects desired and dominating social affects. This will be further discussed in *Chapter VIII: Theorising the Prison as an Affective Institution Alongside the Affective Moral Fact.*

To conclude here: The official imaginary of the prison can be critiqued and questioned through *imagination*. This illustrates a central point in Mills' *Sociological Imagination* (2000): that imagination is necessary, of creative importance and should be embraced for critiquing rationalised bureaucratic systems. As *imagination* has been employed in a freer sense in this chapter, it stresses certain aspects, like the *orchestration of affect*, that have been discussed in the previous chapter along a textual analysis. Here, affect has been traced and recognised through the institution's organisation of design and architecture that makes for the prison's affective atmosphere.

Departing from interrogating visuals that unfolded through imagination in front of my inner eye, the following chapter will trace affect through the visual analysis of photographs of HMP Birmingham, HMP Liverpool and HMP Pentonville which are included in prison reports and on the official government website.

Chapter VII: Tracing Affect Through the Photograph

The first analysis chapter (Chapter V) has explored the prison as an affective institution along a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (Jäger, 2015; Koschut, 2017, 2017a) of the textual basis of 15 prison reports of HMP Birmingham, HMP Liverpool and HMP Pentonville over a 40-year period (1982-2019). Departing from there, the second analysis chapter (Chapter VI) has embraced *imagination* (Mills, 2000) as a methodological chance to provide further critical reading that goes beyond the textual foundation of prison reports. As such, these chapters have established a counter narrative to the official state discourse. As they question the prison's rational, affect-averse essence, the analysis suggests that the rationalised language and style in prison reports and the built environment orchestrates *affect* along desired and less-desired affectivity, insinuating that *rationality* itself is an affective concept.

This chapter visually analyses official photographs. The selection of photographs this chapter relies upon have been included in the prison reports of HMP Birmingham, HMP Liverpool and HMP Pentonville since the mid-2010s onwards, or are representational photographs that are used for each prison on the Ministry of Justice website to introduce key information about each prison. Following the works of Barthes (2000), Berger (2013) and Sontag (1967, 1978, 2003), this chapter further develops the analysis already undertaken in the previous two chapters and completes the threefold analysis as it embraces another set of imaginative and creative methodological concerns.

Here, photographs are looked at as discursive artefacts (Friedrich & Jäger , 2011) that, following Sontag's (1978) and Berger's (2013) work, are understood as capturing a specific moment in time and place, something that is real within a bigger narrative, that gets its meaning through the context within which it is used. Appositely, Sontag wrote:

> "Photographs are a way of *imprisoning reality*, understood as recalcitrant, inaccessible; of making it stand still. Or they enlarge a reality that is felt to be shrunk, hollowed out, perishable, remote." (Sontag, 1978, p. 163, my emphasis)

As prisons are hallmarked through their specific architectural design with impenetrable walls that shield not only the view from the inside out but also block off

curious looks from any passer-by (Bentham, 1791; Dunbar & Fairweather, 2000; Jewkes & Moran, 2017), the photographs found within the prison reports mostly depict scenes from the inside of the institution and, therefore, offer a glimpse over the prison walls. Or, if we want to follow Sontag's analogy (1978), then these photographs are offering an 'imprisoned reality' of imprisonment.

Seeing life on the inside of prisons is not new or special, a quick search for photos or prison documentaries proves this. However, these photos here are of special interest as they are photographs taken by the state, incorporated in a documentary style in prison reports by HMI Prisons, or in a representational style on the Ministry of Justice website. They are special in the sense that it is the state that offers a look inside the prison and thereby makes these photographs part of the official state discourse on prisons. This stresses that photos are an essential part of discourses that cannot be overlooked in the analysis. Accordingly, photographs are recognised as discursive artefacts that need to be integrated in the CDA (Friedrich & Jäger , 2011).

Extending CDA through the visual analysis of photographs renders obvious how the photograph is contextualised (Becker, 1995), how these photographs are used to create a state narrative of the prison and what their specific meaning within the state narrative is. In short: it enables us to see how institutions organise their gaze and attempt to collude subjects into a state imaginary of the prison (Rose, 2016). A critical reading of photographs found within prison reports, therefore, promises to 'answer back' (Rose, 2016) to the way the state makes use of images, and thereby further develops the counter reading to the state narrative that is established over the past two chapters (Chapters V and VI). Framing the photographs along Sontag's work (1978) illustrates how their interrogation allows for the further exploration of the prison as an affective institution since photographs offer an insight into affective and moral facets of society.

Sontag has captured this as follows:

> "Because each photograph is only a fragment, its moral and emotional weight depends on where it is inserted. A photograph changes according to the context in which it is seen … As Wittgenstein argued for words, that the meaning *is* the use – so for each photograph. And it is in this way that the presence and proliferation of all photographs contributes to the erosion of the very notion of meaning, to that parceling out of the truth into relative truths which is taken for granted by the modern libera; consciousness." (Sontag, 1978, pp. 105-106, original emphasis)

In that sense, the analysis of photographs directly speaks to the research question: *What are the theoretical and methodological possibilities to explore the prison as an affective institution?*

Accordingly, this chapter aims to (i) use the photograph to further manifest the previous insights gained into the affective character of the prison institution. Moreover, it seeks to (ii) emphasise the methodological value of researching affect through photographs and, therefore, demonstrates the value of incorporating the analysis of photographs in social research.

This chapter commences with delineating the conceptual use of the photograph (7.1). In particular, Barthes' (2000) way of regarding the photograph through the *studium* and *punctum* is outlined as the framework that extends the CDA for the visual analysis in this research. This is followed by contextualising the photograph in the official discourse (7.1.1), and outlining how the photograph can be used to research affect (7.1.2). What follows for the remainder of this chapter is a presentation and analysis of the photographs employing Barthes' (2000) framework of *studium* and *punctum*, to differently illuminate the presence of affect within the prison, as visually presented. As will become apparent, the discussion of the photographs – from *The 'Studium'* (7.2) over *From 'Studium to Punctum'* (7.3) to *The 'Punctum'* (7.4) – analyses a selection of official photographs along an increase of affective intensity experienced whilst regarding the photographs. As will become apparent, this chapter further addresses the central themes – *The Built Environment* and *The Atmosphere* – that have been discussed in the previous chapter.

7.1 Regarding the Photograph

In this section, the CDA is extended for the benefit of incorporating the analysis of photographs. Jäger, whose work has significantly shaped the CDA for this thesis, stresses the potential for the inclusion of photographs and encourages an interrogation of the photograph with the same scrutiny we interrogate a text-based analysis (Jäger, 2015; Jäger & Maier, 2009). The increment value of the analysis of photographs lies in the acknowledgement that not everything can be expressed through language, and that photographs can make visible what otherwise cannot be captured in words (Friedrich & Jäger , 2011, p. 15). Therefore, including photographs expands the conventional conceptualisation and application of discourse analysis that primarily focusses on language and the dissection thereof (Fairclough, 2001, [1989]2015).

As this thesis relies on an understanding of *affect* that sees it as so much more than what can be conveyed through language (Ahmed, 2006, 2010, 2014; Sedgwick, 2003), it imposes itself to further extend CDA – as has been already done through the embrace of *imagination* in Chapter VI – through the photograph. As there is no ready-made framework for incorporating the photograph in CDA, this thesis extends the framework through the work of Barthes (2000) to account for the particular properties of photographs.

In detail, the CDA is extended with Barthes' (2000) concepts of the *studium* and *punctum.* Barthes understands the *studium* as the entity that draws the spectator into a photograph based on their cultural, political, and social background:

> *"Studium*, which doesn't mean, at least not immediately, 'study', but application to a thing, taste for someone, a kind of general, enthusiastic commitment, of course, but without special acuity. It is by *studium* that I am interested in so many photographs, whether I receive them as political testimony or enjoy them as good historical scenes: for it is culturally (this connotation is present in *studium*) that I participate in the figures, the faces, the gestures, the settings, the actions." (Barthes, 2000, p. 26, original emphasis)

He goes on to state that "[w]hat I feel about these photographs derives from an *average* affect, almost from a certain training." (Barthes, 2000, p. 26, original emphasis) Hence, being affected by a photograph is grounded in cultural knowledge, and it is this affect

that draws us in. Barthes' insight of seeing and regarding images thereby converges with an earlier argument of this thesis: that affectivity, imagination and situatedness should not only be acknowledged but should be recognised as intrinsic, valuable, and valid in knowledge production processes (Chapter IV and VI). This means regarding the photograph, seeing what stands out for the researcher and interrogating the meaning in the context of exploring the prison as an affective institution. Barthes (2000) conceptualises this as *punctum*. It is what tears the image apart and requests the attention of the spectator. The *punctum* is unintended or uncontrolled and gets lost in language, just like affect can. Barthes describes the *punctum* as follows:

> "The second element will break (or punctuate) the *studium*. This time it is not I who seek it out (as I invest the field of the *studium* with my sovereign consciousness), it is this element which rises from the scene, shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me. A Latin word exists to designate this wound, this prick, this mark made by a pointed instrument: the word suits me all the better in that it also refers to the notion of punctuation, and because the photographs I am speaking of are in effect punctuated, sometimes even speckled with these sensitive points; precisely, these marks, these wounds are so many *points.* This second element which will disturb the *studium* I shall therefore call *punctum*; for *punctum* is also: sting, speck, cut, little hole – and also cast of the dice." (Barthes, 2000, pp. 26-27, original emphasis)

The *punctum* can be seen as that which 'speaks' to the spectator. It is either there or not there. As some photographs remain in portraying the obvious, the *studium*, it is the *punctum* that leads the spectator to see beyond the obvious.

To see beyond what is visible at first sight is imperative in this research, as it is this continuous embrace of thinking with creativity, imagination and affect that frames the methodological exploration of the prison as an affective institution. To go beyond the obvious is equally crucial for preventing a mere repetition of insights that were already made elsewhere. Whilst the previous analysis chapters (Chapters V and VI) also demonstrate how prisons are unwelcoming, unhygienic, desolate places that are infested with violence and do not provide for a safe environment – which is continuously discussed with expertise in abolitionist accounts and critical criminology (e.g. Burton & Carlen, [1979]2013; Carlton & Sim, 2018; Cohen & Taylor, 1972; Davis, 2003; Davis, et al., 2021; Scott, 2018, 2018a, 2018b; Sim, 2009, 2017; Wacquant, 2001) – the focus here continues to lie on *affect*. To reiterate: the analysis

presented within this thesis does not intend to repeat what has already been discussed elsewhere. Instead, this chapter shows what lies beyond the obvious portrayal of the official photographs – which, as will become apparent, document some of the dismal conditions of the prisons – to see how we can further understand the prison as an affective institution.

Accordingly, this chapter will pre-dominantly focus on photographs that convey a *punctum* (Barthes, 2000) since it is the *punctum* that takes us beyond the obvious. Barthes captures this poignantly: "Photography is subversive not when it frightens, repels, or even stigmatizes, but when it is *pensive*, when it thinks." (Barthes, 2000, p. 38, original emphasis). Accordingly, the selection of photographs for this chapter has been guided by my affective response whilst regarding them through the lens of the research question which ultimately makes the photo 'think' and 'speak' to the affective exploration of the prison.

7.1.1 Contextualising the Photographs

In total, five of the fifteen analysed prison reports included photographs. All five of these reports were published between 2015 and 2018 and included between two to ten photographs in their appendices (31 photographs in total). The specific use of photographs in official prison reports is addressed in the official guidelines for writing a prison report (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2018). There it states:

> "Many inspection reports now include an appendix of photographs to illustrate conditions that cannot be adequately described or to emphasise or provide evidence for a finding. Photographs to be used for publication should be selected with discretion, should not be extensive in number (ideally a maximum of six) as they add to the size of Word documents, prohibiting emailing them in some cases. They should always be referred to in the text." (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2018, p. 9)

What can be abstracted from this is, that the Inspectorate recognises that photos can express what otherwise cannot be captured in language and that photographs fulfil the purpose to document observations of the Inspectorate. The selection process for photographs seems equally dependant to technical restrictions like file size which can be restraining for what can be seen. The guideline equally provides motivation to choose photographs with discretion. Previously (Chapter V), it has been outlined how

prison reports have restrictions in regard to language and style. Similar restrictions apply to the use of photographs.

The guideline outlines a number of agreements the Inspectorate has with the Her Majesty's Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2018). This includes things, such as, that no photo should include an identifiable persona, that they should be a factual representation of the situation captured, and photos should not be published if they could cause distress to victims. The latter two are interesting as they insinuate that photographs can evoke an affective response and that photographs for documentary purposes are assumed to be without affect. In addition, the guideline includes the following two points:

> "Photographs that are not published are destroyed or stored securely and should not be released under any Freedom of Information requests, using the appropriate Freedom of Information Act exemptions. … Governors will be asked to comment on the suitability of pictures before they appear in the published report. HMPPS will convey any objections to individual pictures being published as part of the factual accuracy checking process." (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2018, p. 10)

Consequently, the choice of imagery underlies control outside of the Inspectorate's authority. It lies with the HMPPS. This again indicates that the Inspectorate is not an independent institution in the position to freely inspect the prison critically, but is answering to a ministry that censors and chooses particular photographs that are desired within a specific state narrative of the prison as a rational and civilised institution. The level of control over the images becomes exemplified in the agreement that a release of any additional material under the Freedom of Information Act will not be granted. It therefore seems that the photos analysed here, despite their intended documentary purpose, are curated to represent the imaginary of the prison which ultimately limits the level of scrutiny in the official discourse.

Nonetheless, these photographs hold tangible gravitas as Sontag poignantly states: "Photographs furnish evidence. Something we hear about, but doubt, seems proven when we're shown a photograph of it." (Sontag, 1978, p. 5). This resonates with Berger's argument stating that especially photographs that are contextualised in written word are seen as evidential and meaning giving (Berger, 2013):

> "In the relation between a photograph and words, the photograph begs for an interpretation, and the words usually supply it. The photograph, irrefutable as evidence but weak in meaning, is given a meaning by the words. And the words, which by themselves remain at the level of generalization, are given specific authenticity by the irrefutability of the photograph. Together the two then become very powerful; an open question appears to have been fully answered." (Berger, 2013, p. 66)

Given the fact that the photographs in prison reports are cross referenced in the main body of text, the written word is providing a meaning to the photographs, which, in short, underlies the documentary purpose in the official discourse. In this context, Berger's following recognition becomes of interest:

> "When photographs are used in a control system, their evidence is more or less limited to establishing identity and presence. But as soon as a photograph is used as a means of communication, the nature of lived experience is involved, and then the truth becomes more complex." (Berger, 2013, p. 71)

This again emphasises the importance to research these photographs beyond the official narrative that is provided in text and to regard the photographs beyond the meaning they are accompanied by. Consequently, this chapter takes a different approach. Instead, it foregrounds a selection of photographs from the prison reports and makes them the centrepiece of consideration, scrutiny and, therefore, analysis. Recent work supports reading artefacts and visuals imaginatively in this way, allowing something new to be brought to extant debates regarding imagination and visual work, rather than producing descriptive reflections of what can be seen (Seal & O'Neill, 2019). As this chapter will make apparent, the photographs selected for analysis add both visuality and materiality to how the prison atmosphere and built environment has been addressed in Chapter VI.

7.1.2 Tracing Affect in Photographs with No Human in Sight

No person is featured in any of the analysed photographs. This section addresses how the prison can be explored as an affective institution as it is argued that the human body is visible despite its obvious absence. Central to this argument is the idea that we can trace affect through the visual analysis, because photographs present human-made traces manifested in the built environment, design and objects they feature. Or, in

short: as photographs include traces of humans, they have traces of affect. Therefore, the prison, as a human made institution stands in an affective relationship with its spectator and offers itself to be researched through the embrace of the researcher's affect in the visual research process.

Sontag (1967) advocates for embracing affect in the photograph as only this makes obvious what it actually is, in contrast to thick interpretations that according to Sontag renders the photograph somewhat meaningless. Whilst Sontag's (1967) argument encourages us to embrace affect when regarding the photographs, her approach cannot fully be incorporated as this thesis is reliant on my argument that is manifested in text. It however highlights that *affect* cannot fully be captured in language (Ahmed, 2010, 2014; Sedgwick, 2003) which ultimately represents a limitation of any research of affect that is reliant on the production of a textual artefact. Viewers of photographs, such as those used within this chapter, are therefore invited to equally regard and consider them differently, alongside how they are herein interpreted and discussed.

As such, this chapter is equally written in Sontag's defence of the sensual and affective experience of regarding a photograph, as she warns us of the deafening of our sensual experiences and pledges for the embrace of authenticity (Sontag, 1967):

> "We must learn to see more, to hear more, to feel more. Our task is not to find the maximum amount of content in a work of art, much less to squeeze more content out of the work than is already there. Our task is to cut back content so that we can see the thing at all." (Sontag, 1967, p. 14)

Accordingly, embracing affect when regarding the photograph in prison reports elevates what is otherwise rendered unimportant or silenced through the evidential character the official discourse ascribes to them. Again, tracing affect through the visual analysis of official photographs offers to question the official discourse, as one in which the harms of state punishment are apparently mitigated through rationalised practices of state violence and obfuscated through an official discourse that further rationalises through its style and language.

As illustrated in the previous chapter (Chapter VI), prisons manifest affect in their built environment and atmosphere, which ultimately affects those that have to endure imprisonment, and therefore anchors the experience of imprisonment in their body. This thesis is challenged by a difficulty: neither could prisoners be interviewed in

regard to their experience nor do photos include human bodies that could avail affect in more obvious ways. This difficulty is however not a limitation as it is possible to see affect through regarding the pains of imprisonment materialised in the prison environment. Barthes writes in reference to Sontag:

> "The photograph is literally an emanation of the referent. From a real body, which was there, proceed radiations which ultimately touch me, who am here; the duration of the transmission is significant; the photograph of the missing being, as Sontag says, will touch me like the delayed rays of a star." (Barthes, 2000, pp. 80-81)

What this quote implies, in a rather poetic way, is that the traces of the body are visible in the photograph. This anthropocentric observation makes it possible to see *affect*, to 'regard the pain of others', if using Sontag's analogy (Sontag, 2003), even without the actual body present. As we live in a time where nearly nothing is left unaffected by human touch, the visual becomes important in tracing affect for making sense of past and present (Bloom, 2018). And whilst affect is not researched in a historical context, there is value in pointing out that researching prisons as affective institutions through a visual analysis of photographs offers the opportunity to further critique the rationalised official discourse on the prison, since photographs inevitably confront us with traces of affect in an institution that continues to manifest barbaric qualities of the past (Foucault, 1977), and embody desired affect in its built environment (Bentham, 1791; Jewkes & Moran, 2017; Moran, et al., 2016), as has been addressed in the previous chapter.

7.2 The *Studium* of the Prison

Before diving into the visual analysis of official photographs that are included in the prison report, I want to look at two photographs that feature the outside of HMP Birmingham (Image 1) and HMP Pentonville (Image 2). These photographs are presented on the official website of the Ministry of Justice, where each prison is introduced with one photograph and a few key information about the institution. The purpose of showing these two photographs is to illustrate how else prisons are depicted by the state, and more importantly for this analysis, how the official photographs of

prison reports represent a particular value for the analysis, as it is the institution itself that permits an insight into the prisons over the prison walls.

The following two photographs position the beholder at the outside of the prison. In both cases, for HMP Birmingham (Image 1) and HMP Pentonville (Image 2), the images reveal little more than part of the prison wall and an entrance point to the prisons. Whilst one (Image 1) reminds more of a factory with an entrance framed by two silo-like constructions and dark blue pipes that arise from what seems a long-winged construction of glass and steel, the other (Image 2), which seems rather dated, features the main entrance that with its heavy stone reminds more of an entrance to a chapel or a window of the Medici palace in Florence.

Image 1: Photo of HMP Birmingham on Website of Ministry of Justice (HM Prison & Probation Service, 2019)

Image 2: Photo of HMP Pentonville on website of Ministry of Justice (HM Prison & Probation Service, 2019a)

Regarding them gives us an interesting insight: there is not much to see. However, Rose points out that "*invisibility* can have just as powerful effects as visibility" (Rose, 2016, p. 213, original emphasis) in the discursive construction of the domineering state narrative. Berger formulates a similar thought as follows:

> "What varies is the intensity with which we are made aware of the poles of absence and presence. Between these two poles photography finds its proper meaning. (The most popular use of the photograph is as a momento of the absent.) A photograph, while recording what has been seen, always and by its nature refers to what is not seen. It isolates, preserves and presents a moment taken from a continuum." (Berger, 2013, pp. 19-20)

Accordingly, these photographs of the outside of HMP Birmingham (Image 1) and HMP Pentonville (Image 2) do not tell us anything about what lies behind the façade of the building as they keep prying eyes out as the walls keep things in. That it does not let us 'regard the pains of others' (Sontag, 2003), or allow us to surmise what is hidden behind prison walls and entrance gates, is not coincidental.

As has been discussed previously (Chapter III), a body of recent work within human geography and visual criminology argue that the specific aesthetics of prison buildings are chosen with the purpose to evoke certain sentiments (Hancock and Jewkes, 2011; Jewkes, 2012, 2013). Whilst the outside from prison to prison slightly differs, they are all recognisable as such. Their factory like appearance shields the violence of the state from the onlooker, deafens emotions (Jewkes, et al., 2017) towards that what lies invisibly behind the walls and symbolically stands for the loss of empathy (Moran, et al., 2016) for those that have to endure imprisonment. That this design is not coincidental is argued by Jewkes and Moran:

> "The affective dimensions of spectatorship in relation to the prison built in the nineteenth century are frequently rousing, sensate experiences, but the buildings that administer contemporary criminal justice are 'neither forbidding nor overly welcoming … [but are] simply there, like everything else in the neighbourhood'. … It is arguable, then, that an anaesthetizing aesthetic extends beyond the affective power to deaden the senses of those who inhabit prison buildings and permeates the wider, collective conscience as well …." (Jewkes & Moran, 2017, p. 556)

However, as argued before (Chapter III), this thesis suggests that prison architecture can be thought as orchestrating affect in a complex way, which does not necessarily "deaden the senses" (Jewkes & Moran, 2017, p. 556) but evokes a desired affect that

makes prisons and the symbolism of them more palatable to society, as it diverts criticism and undesired affect through shielding the prison from prying eyes through its design. Accordingly, the images above (Image 1 and 2) are equally part of establishing an official narrative of the prison in the sense that 'there is nothing to see, there is nothing to worry about'.

What we can and cannot see by regarding those two images (Image 1 and 2) from the outside of the prisons, becomes more obvious when they are juxtaposed with photographs that are included in prison reports. Here, it is important to note that in contrast to the above images, who are freely displayed at the top of the government website and therefore immediately visible for those that seek information about the prisons, the photographs in prison reports are positioned in the appendix. Whilst this might be owed to some style and formatting guidelines, it ultimately places them in the margins of the report. As such, they not only loose some of the contextualisation given in the body of text but they are also not prominent to the reader, unless they are actively looked for, which makes them slightly more difficult to access than the photographs of the outside of prisons that are so readily portrayed on the website.

The difference between the photographs on the website and those from the prison report, that take us inside the prison, becomes most obvious when they are juxtaposed with a place that is considered most private for most people: the toilet.

Image 3: HMP Pentonville 2015 (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2015a, p. 100)

Although Image 3 depicts a filthy and disgusting toilet and stands in contrast to the façade of the prison that does not permit to see the inside (Images 1 and 2), the above photograph is as little shocking as the ones from the outside of the prison are, because there is nothing unexpected that captures my attention. Following Barthes (2000), these photographs illustrate the *studium*, that which we can expect to be confronted with. It does not disguise anything that we are not meant to see. To illustrate the *studium* further: This photograph (Image 3) is captioned with "A toilet in an occupied cell on G wing." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2015a, p. 100) in the prison report. And whilst we can also see the corner of a chair close by and little bits of paper that could be salt sachets, and the sight of this filthy toilet is nauseating and sickening, there is nothing surprising about it. It shows a dirty and repulsive toilet, and in doing so visually delivers the textual description of it as referred to over and over again in the prison reports, that remark the low hygiene standards in the prisons.

Another example of the *studium* (Barthes, 2000) is the following Image 4 which shows dried blood meandering its way down the metal frame. In the prison report it is contextualised as follows:

> "On one occasion we found prisoners located in a cell with blood on the walls and door, and on another occasion with blood on the bunk bed (please see Appendix V); on neither occasion was the blood cleaned up when we raised our concerns with staff." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2015a, p. 31)

Image 4: HMP Pentonville 2015 (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2015a, p. 102)

Again, this is an example of the *studium*. There is nothing that pierces through this image. It rather illustrates what we already know: That prisons are places of violence as evidenced in critical criminological and abolitionist studies (Chapter III), and exemplified and substantiated through the critical and imaginative reading of prison reports in the previous two chapters (Chapters V and VI). In a way these photographs do what Berger captures as follows: "[A]s soon as photographs are used with words, they produce together an effect of certainty, even of dogmatic assertion." (Berger, 2013, p. 66). And whilst captions or contextualisation substantiate the images, some images are torn apart despite and beyond their "dogmatic assertion" (Berger, 2013, p. 66) as can be seen in the following.

7.3 From *Studium* to *Punctum*

The subsequent images differ from the ones above as we approach a more affective reading of the photograph, or: as we approach the *punctum* (Barthes, 2000). The following Image 5 is contextualised in the prison report with the words: "One young man, new to custody, was about to be located in a flooded cell until inspection staff intervened (see Appendix V, … and paragraph 2.7)." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2018, p. 23)

Image 5: HMP Birmingham 2018 (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2018, p. 111)

On first sight, Image 5 illustrates exactly what has been described in the prison report as we can see the wet spots on the floor. However, regarding the image shows something beyond the contextualisation of the prison report. The obvious observation, the *studium* (Barthes, 2000), would include the pointing out of the damp blanket lying in front of an unscreened toilet, sheets lying on a bed next to a broken toilet bowl that again just emphasises the dismal character of the prison. What catches my eye is the juxtaposition between the sharp broken edges of the toilet bowl lying against the softness of sheets and pressing against the mattress. Therein, this bed, this very personal space, becomes something different. Rather than offering comfort, it symbolises danger, disgust, something you would rather run away from. This is what draws me in and affects me, this is the *punctum* (Barthes, 2000).

A similar observation, one that takes us again beyond the "dogmatic assertion" (Berger, 2013, p. 66) can be made when regarding this image.

Image 6: HMP Birmingham 2018 (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2018, p. 114)

This photograph (Image 6) is accompanied with the caption "Unscreened toilet in a cell" (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2018, p. 114). It can be assumed that the Inspectorate took this photo with the purpose to document exactly this: an unscreened toilet. What cuts through Image 6 for me is the fabric, the sheets, bedding and clothes that dominate the cell. In particular, the light blue sheets take over the cell as they are duvet covers, used for a makeshift curtain, as well as hanging between sink and bed.

The same blue fabric features in the previous picture (Image 5) as it is lying unwanted next to the broken toilet bowl. What cuts through these images and intensifies my affective experience whilst regarding them, is the particular association of those sheets to hospital beds. These sheets are the *punctum* (Barthes, 2000). As such, the blue colour as well as the pale turquoise fabrics (Image 5) remind me of hospitals which, for me, relate to the idea of people being unwell. Thinking this *punctum* in context to the previously discussed 'Healthy Prison Test' (Chapter V), in which the Inspectorate measures the efficiency of prisons and thereby draws on emotionally connoted terms to demonstrate the prison's effort for creating a 'positive' and 'healthy' institution, these photographs help to contrast the official discourse as they convey a particular affective atmosphere. Critically reading the photographs demonstrates what lies beneath the Inspectorate's purpose of documenting their observations. The analysis elevates an affective atmosphere that makes for an 'unhealthy' place.

The above images (5 and 6) evoked an affective response whilst regarding them and allowed for seeing the *punctum* (Barthes, 2000) in them. The following section attends to photographs that evoked an intensified affective reaction to them and inhabit a *punctum* that tears the image apart enabling to further accentuate the affectivity of the prison.

7.4 The *Punctum*

In the above section, the blue and turquoise fabrics have been pointed out as drawing me in. These fabrics as well as prison issued clothing and blankets, items that should have a designated place on the inside of the cell are in the following photograph (Image 7) clinging to a ledge outside the prison.

Image 7: HMP Pentonville 2015 (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2015a, p. 99)

What pierces through in this photograph (Image 7) is the particular composition. Regarding the photograph imaginatively allows us to see a building that spews out these fabrics. As these fabrics equally travers the cells in the previous photographs (Images 5 and 6) in which they feature as prominent, even essential and needed items in the prison cell, they seem unwanted, as something that is unbearable, and therefore spewed out. It is a sad sight. As the *punctum* draws us in, the Inspectorate's documentation of a pile of clothes and fabric transforms into something more than it vicariously stands for. It captures a particular atmosphere in prisons that seems to be so insufferable that everything wants to leave.

That nothing can leave the prison that easily is owed to its specific built environment. It is hard to imagine the prison without bolt and lock. It is that mechanism which cuts through the following photograph. It is the *punctum* that draws me in as I am affected by critically regarding the image.

Image 8: HMP Liverpool 2017 (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2017, p. 74)

The Inspectorate captions Image 8 with “Cell covered in graffiti” (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2017, p. 74). At first sight there is nothing more to the photographs than an illustration of what we already know: cells are run down and do not provide for an adequate living space. In addition, here, the inspectorate draws attention to the graffiti which seems to be seen as a particular problem. What pierces through for me however is something different. It is the big and heavy bolt that protrudes the frame of the cell door. Imagining the sound it makes when it opens and locks and knowing that the ones inside the cell have no control over when and for how long this door opens, makes me feel suffocated as it transpires a gloomy and depressive atmosphere.

Being confined to such a small space and the feeling of suffocation, that transpires through imagining and critically interrogating the cell through photographs in prison reports, has intensified for me when regarding the following image whose caption reads: “Unscreened toilet where prisoners ate their meals” (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2017a, p. 81).

Image 9: HMP Birmingham 2017 (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2017a, p. 81)

Again, this photograph (Image 9) has been taken with the purpose to document a missing privacy screen making the intimate space of a toilet something that is consistently intruded. Appropriating the photograph for critically exploring the prison as an affective institution, however, draws our attention to more than this.

It is hard to picture how anyone could even use the toilet as it offers no leg room and is cramped right next to a small self-built station that seems to function as food preparation area, table, and place for personal hygiene. It is unsanitary and looking at it makes me feel claustrophobic. At the same time, it seems that whoever lives in this cell has tried to improve the conditions by creating space and storage with a reversed vegetable box on top of which a dishrag functions as surrogate for a tablecloth. What cuts through the image is an affective experience by looking at the cramped arrangement of the cell and the objects it inhabits. In particular, it (Image 9) offers some insight into the diet. There are cans, some condiments, bread and instant noodles, very little fresh products in addition to the banana and onion lying in a little red basket. These items have not caught my attention at first sight, but they became prominent when regarding the following image.

Image 10: HMP Pentonville 2015 (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2015a, p. 99)

The Inspectorate has initially taken this photograph for evidential purposes showing the degree of littering outside the prison. These piles of rubbish (Image 10) as well as the fabric hanging outside the window (Image 7) are contextualised as follows:

> "Outside areas were appalling and prisoners complained of an infestation of vermin and cockroaches (see Appendix V for a photograph of the area outside J wing). Despite a clean-up early in the inspection, some areas remained in a dreadful state, and there were extensive amounts of food debris and piles of clothing on ridges and security wire (see main recommendation S58, and Appendix V for a photograph of piles of clothing on ridges outside D wing)." (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2015a, p. 31)

What caught my attention was not primarily the pile of discarded items and waste. What tears it apart are the items that are so prominent in the cell (Image 9) which are mirrored within this pile (Image 10). There is a *punctum* that cuts through multiple photographs. It allows us to tell a counter narrative to what is documented in the prison reports.

This pile is a conglomeration of what could be considered essential items for living in the prison: clothes, sheets, complete rolls of toilet paper, intact prison dishes and untouched items of food like a loaf of bread that sits enthroned on top of the pile dart through the dismal photograph when it is regarded beyond their documentary purpose.

There seems to be an uncountable number of empty plastic bottles of water and soda and cans of fish that make up not only the foundation of this mountain of litter, but also the foundation of the diet within prisons as it reflects the same products from inside the cell. Essential items that are neatly piled up in the makeshift storage area in the prison cell (Image 9) are pushed to the outside and discarded. And I wonder why unbroken objects like plates and what seems an untouched loaf of bread that is only set up to rot from the inside are thrown out. Again, it seems that everything just wants to leave the prison and rather rot on the outside than stay in the confines of the prison building as these objects are spewed out in the open.

That what tears these photographs apart – the fabric (Image 7), the loaf of bread (Image 9 and 10) and other objects that were not captured for documentary purposes but just happen to be included in the photograph – makes the affectivity of the prison tangible. The *punctum* lets us see the photographs in a way that goes beyond what is offered in prison reports, and it is within the *punctum* that these images become shocking and unfold their potential for questioning the official state narrative critically. It illustrates that the official discourse of the rational institution has a material basis with a particular affective feel to it.

The following photograph of a broken window captures this affectivity once more. This broken window (Image 11) seems to be tentatively attended to with fabric and other filling material, giving the impression that it was not professionally seen to. Next to the danger broken glass poses, mending with material that is not translucent does not only darken cells – which are frequently described as cramped and without sufficient lighting throughout the prison reports – but also invites us to imagine how it affects temperature inside the cells and how it equally restricts the view to the outside. As windows are usually mediums that connect the inside to the outside world and frames what lies beyond the built environment, the broken window adds a layer of confinement to imprisonment. The only view to the outside world from within is restricted and broken through the very destruction of that what allows us to connect to the outside from the cell: the window. Regarding the following photograph (Image 11) brings about feelings of suffocation and gloom as the broken glass and opaque mending darkens the cell.

Image 11: HMP Liverpool 2017 (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2017, p. 75)

What is not mentioned in the prison reports, but becomes explicit in regarding this broken window (Image 11) and seeing the large pile of rubbish (Image 10), is that these windows seem to be broken from the inside out. This is peculiar as most broken windows are arguably broken from the outside in. It manifests the reading of these photographs as a testimony of a built environment and atmosphere that makes everything want to leave the place and that for this, even windows are broken. Therefore, the *punctum* of the above photograph (Image 11) cannot be pinned down to a particular object, but rather to affect that transpires through it. The interplay of broken glass, insufficient mending, faded light and again the blue and pale turquoise fabric which seems to be used as fixing material for the window – as well as makeshift curtain (Image 6 and 11) and bedding (Image 6) – reiterates their necessity and prisoners' reliance on them, whilst equally the piles of fabric spewed out of the prison building (Image 7) illuminate their unwantedness. Imaginatively regarding these photographs manifests an affective experience of hopelessness and intensifies the impression of suffocation further. It equally substantiates the necessity to understand the prison as an affective institution.

The photograph which has evoked the strongest affective experience whilst regarding it, is the photograph of an outside exercise yard (Image 12). In the previous *Chapter VI: Tracing Affect Through Imagination*, this yard has been creatively visualised in reference to a prison report statement from 1999, describing the exercise yard as

having a “claustrophobic nature” (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 1999, p. 62). As the textual basis of the prison report evolved into an ‘inner’ picture, the outside exercise yard has been imagined as a metal gridded cube where even the sky is barred. The following photograph (Image 12) demonstrates the value of critically interrogating my imagination as it illustrates how the imagined yard resembles its corporeality. Now we can actually see that the sky is barred. As imagination has already contoured how this built environment carries affect, the visual interrogation takes the analysis further as it also reiterates central observations that have been made through the unfettered embrace of imagination.



Image 12: HMP Liverpool 2015 (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, 2015, p. 105)

This photograph has been taken some 15 years after the Inspectorate referred to this yard in the textual body of the prison report. There the yard is documented as a tangible artefact in the official discourse. Whilst the *studium* (Barthes, 2000) can be seen as simply documenting the exercise yard, what draws me in, the *punctum*, are the shadows that are cast against the concrete and brick walls of the exercise yard as the sun cuts through the steel cube.

Whilst there are no prisoners in this yard, I cannot help but imagine how the small bars of the mesh would naturally throw a shadow of confinement onto a prisoner’s body and face, like a stamp when gazing towards a sky that seems endlessly broken up. As

I follow the sun and zoom out of the shadows of the photograph, the sun blocks out part of the grit of what cannot be described differently than a cage. And whilst it makes part of the cage disappear for a second, the full character of the cage unfolds as I regard the rusty frame of it just underneath a blue railing that seems to invite someone to stand there and observe anything going on inside the cage as some kind of spectacle. It shows again that the specific built environment of the prison makes for a particular affective atmosphere, showing that affect is not just visible in the many practices of the institution but is engrained and manifested in the built environment, and certain objects and materials that make the prison. As my affective experience draws me in, the photograph (Image 12) is further creatively and imaginatively regarded. This allows me to elevate what is already there: an *iron cage*. This cage can be imagined as a photographic illustration of Weber's concept of the *iron cage* (Weber, 2002) which prominently features in his discussion of bureaucratic states and the dangers attached to it (Chapter II). This idea will be further discussed along the conceptual framing of the *affective moral fact* in the following *Chapter VIII: Theorising the Prison as an Affective Institution Alongside the Affective Moral Fact.*

However, making this connection to the *iron cage* equally reminds me of the harms and pains of imprisonment that are documented in critical criminological and abolitionist research (e.g. Burton & Carlen, [1979]2013; Cohen & Taylor, 1972; Carlton & Sim, 2018; Davis, 2003; Davis, et al., 2021; Scott, 2018, 2018a, 2018b; Sim, 2009, 2017; Wacquant, 2001). As such, it elevates the argument made at the outset of this chapter, that affect can be traced in visuals without having a human in sight and, therein, brings us back to how it permits for 'regarding the pain of others' (Sontag, 2003).

7.4.1 Embracing the Punctum for Critical Reflection and Exploration

Sontag delineates that a "culture of spectatorship neutralizes the moral force of photographs of atrocities" (Sontag, 2003, p. 94) as photographs depicting violence are providing a consistent and relentless stimulant which ultimately hinders the spectator to truly engage. Sontag writes:

> "A more reflective engagement with content would require a certain intensity of awareness – just what is weakened by the expectations brought

> to images disseminated by the media, whose leaching out of a content contributes most to the deadening of feeling." (Sontag, 2003, p. 95)

That it needs a particular awareness for seeing the pain is equally stressed in Sontag's earlier work *On Photography* (1978):

> "What determines the possibility of being affected morally by photographs is the existence of a relevant political consciousness. Without a politics, photographs of the slaughter-bench of history will most likely be experienced as, simply, unreal or as a demoralizing emotional blow. The *quality of feeling*, including *moral outrage*, that people can muster in response to photographs of the oppressed, the exploited, the starving, and the massacred also depends on the degree of their familiarity with these images." (Sontag, 1978, p. 19, my emphasis)

We can only speculate why there is no *moral outcry*. However, Sontag (1978) draws our attention to how *affect* is related to *morality*, which is a central argument in Durkheim's work (1953) as he outlines that we can research the state of morality in society by looking at the dominating social sentiments. This thought is equally reflected in the conceptual framework the *affective moral fact*, through which the prison will be further discussed in the following chapter. In this thesis, however, the focus remains on the methodological and theoretical possibilities for exploring the prison as an affective institution. Accordingly, it is Sontag's argument on *moral outcry* (1978) that again draws our attention to the affective experience of the beholder of the photograph as she points out that their awareness influences their affective experience of the image. Consequently, it can be argued that I saw a *punctum* (Barthes, 2000) that speaks to the exploration of the prison as an affective institution because I, as a researcher of this topic, am aware of the theoretical and political problems this very thesis arises out of (Chapters I, II, III and IV) – the theoretical gap that hinders an affective understanding of the prison and the continued existence of prisons justified by a rational argument, on which basis the harms of imprisonment are continued. In short: I already have an awareness. The feminist epistemology this thesis relies on equally stretches the importance for embracing this situated knowledge (Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983).

Sontag's argument has reminded me of a comment I received after a paper presentation on the value of interrogating photographs of the built environment of prisons, for the purpose of understanding them affectively. The audience member has described how

each day they would cycle past a prison and how they would not feel particularly annoyed or question the prison and its practices because of their daily confrontation with it in the cityscape. I answered that this absent outrage is likely owed to a missing awareness for the political problems around imprisonment which leads to the silent approval of the institution. The scholar who researches emotions in sociology has seen the prison walls for nothing more than prison walls. As such, all they have seen is the *studium* (Barthes, 2000).

This brings us back to the beginning of this chapter, to the outside of the prison (Images 1 and 2). The outside of the prison is not telling of what lies behind prison walls. It is only my awareness through which I can see these walls differently, as a built environment that also orchestrates affect in a way that people can approve of the institution, exactly through their non-telling exterior. It, however, has taken the interrogation of official photographs of the inside to allow for a richer affective exploration of the prison. And again, it is my awareness, my situatedness, my imagination and my affective experience that has guided the reading of the photographs, to see what cuts through the photograph, to see the *punctum* (Barthes, 2000). Tracing affect through the photograph equally highlights the chances for further theoretical developments for the exploration of the prison as an affective institution when the outside yard (Image 12) has been recognised as the manifestation of Weber's *iron cage* (2002), which will be addressed in the subsequent chapter.

7.5 Summary

This chapter is centred around the visual analysis of photographs in the official discourse on prisons. Thereby the photographs in prison reports, narrated through the intended evidential use of photographs by the Inspectorate, have been regarded along the conceptual framing of Barthes (2000), which emphasises the beholder's affective experience as essential for 'reading' a photograph. Along this conceptual framing, the affective qualities of the prison, in particular in its built environment and atmosphere, have been further accentuated. It has been demonstrated that interrogating the official images with careful consideration enables us to 'cut' through the often impenetrable walls of prisons and the documentary style of the Inspectorate's photographs.

As such, the analysis goes beyond the obvious in the photographs and questions the official discourse of prisons by elevating the affective qualities in the built environment and prison atmosphere. The visual analysis therein elevates and further develops a counter reading of the prison that questions the rationalising official discourse. Accordingly, this chapter complements the CDA of text (Chapter V) and critical imagination (Chapter VI) in building a full cycle of analysis that demonstrates the affectivity of the prison institution.

Therein, this chapter shows that the official discourse of the prison is not only dependant on a controlled written narrative, but also on a controlled image demonstrative of the imaginary of the prison as a form of state power that is diffused yet manifested in the symbolism and affect it spreads. Therefore, photographs offer themselves to be included in CDA. This chapter equally demonstrates the methodological value of visually analysing photographs with the purpose of researching affect, whilst further embracing my situatedness and imagination as essential companions for sociological research.

As this chapter concludes the threefold analysis of prisons, the following Chapter VIII, *Theorising the Prison as an Affective Institution Alongside the Affective Moral Fact*, will address the key findings within the conceptual framework.

Chapter VIII: Theorising the Prison as an Affective Institution Alongside the *Affective Moral Fact*

This chapter addresses the central research question – *What are the theoretical and methodological possibilities to explore the prison as an affective institution?* – by conceptually discussing *rationality* as an *affective moral fact.* As such, this chapter approaches central findings of the previous analysis chapters and argues them along the conceptual framing of the thesis, which ultimately allows for the theoretical exploration of the prison.

For addressing the theoretical part of this research question, this PhD has pursued the stated objectives outlined in *Chapter I: Introduction*. Specifically, this thesis has reviewed how literature in state theory, political sociology and criminology discusses the prison or state organised violence in reference to affect (Chapters II and III). Out of this critique a conceptual framework, of what has been termed the *affective moral fact*, has been developed out of a re-reading of Durkheim's work (1953, 1957, 1958, 1973), a body of work that re-reads Durkheim as a scholar who is deeply concerned with social sentiments and affect (Barnwell, 2018; Karsenti, 2012, 2013; Meštrović, 1988; Weiss, 2012; Weyher, 2012, 2012a), and an understanding of *affect* from cultural affect studies (Ahmed, 2014; Sedgwick, 2003). In contrast to domineering theorisations of the state and its institutions, this conceptual framework is not based on an *affect/rationality dichotomy* that has been identified as the central reason to why criminological and sociological accounts are offering limiting accounts for understanding the prison as an affective institution (Chapter IV). Based on feminist epistemologies (Ahmed, 2006; Berlant, 2005; Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983; Jaggar, 1989; Smith, 1974), the otherwise dominant Enlightenment epistemology has been pivoted towards seeing the world affectively, as *rationality* has been deconstructed as a patriarchal concept that in itself suggests being an affective construct. This paradigmatic shift has established a basis for researching the prison through an affective lens. This informed the threefold Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of prison reports from three English prisons, on which basis a creative and critical counter reading to the official state discourse of prisons – as *rational*

institutions of punishment – has been provided (Chapters V, VI and VII), and which has given decisive impulses for the further development of the *affective moral fact* presented in this chapter.

The first part of this current chapter summarises central findings of the Critical Discourse Analysis (8.1). In this synopsis those aspects of the research are highlighted that will be addressed within the discussion of *rationality* as an *affective moral fact,* which ultimately allows us to reconsider the prison as an affective institution. This is followed by outlining key qualities of the *affective moral fact* (8.2) which has been introduced and discussed in more detail in Chapter II: *Theorising Affect in Sociological Accounts of the State and its Processes*. In the subsequent conceptual discussion, *rationality* will be excavated as an *affective moral fact* (8.2.1). This is followed by discussing how the framing of *rationality* as the *affective moral fact* can shed light on the orchestration of affect in the prison (8.2.2), how *rationality* is anchored in the material existence of the body (8.2.3), and how *rationality* is a dangerous and patriarchal concept (8.2.4).

To summarise, this chapter does three things: (i) It discusses the key findings of the Critical Discourse Analysis of prison reports within the conceptual framework of the *affective moral fact*, and therein further develops the concept throughout the chapter as it equally illustrates the explanatory scope of it. (ii) It demonstrates how the epistemological shift, that has firmly shaped the research and theory, facilitated the development of a different narrative that fundamentally critiques the rationalising and patriarchal official discourse of the prison and decisively shaped the development of the *affective moral fact*. (iii) By directly answering how the prison can be theoretically explored as an affective institution, this chapter provides an essential discussion on which basis the prison can be firmly positioned as an affective institution and the research question directly answered in the following *Chapter IX: Conclusion – Situating the Prison as an Affective Institution*.

8.1 The Affective Counter Reading of the Official State Discourse on the Prison

In the threefold analysis of prison reports of HMP Birmingham, HMP Liverpool and HMP Pentonville, prison reports have been positioned as textual and visual state artefacts generated by HMI Prisons. As such, they are part of an official state discourse that expresses positivist and rationalising characteristics, and are a component in creating an official discourse on prisons as civilised institutions of punishment in England and Wales. The CDA of these artefacts has proceeded from the discursive analysis of affect in the textual body of prison reports (Chapter V), to the interrogation of the imagined prison that transpired through the creative engagement with prison reports (Chapter VI), and has been completed with a critical visual reading of official state photographs of the three English prisons (Chapter VII). Throughout the three analysis chapters, a critical counter reading to the official narrative of the prison has been established that illustrates that affect suffuses the prison in its processes, atmosphere and built environment.

According to the HM Inspectorate of Prisons (no date, no date a), prison reports are documents that summarise the key findings of prison inspections. As such, they should inform about the state of the prison and offer an independent evaluation of the prison conditions. Along the works of Burton and Carlen ([1979]2013), and Corrigan and Sayer (1985), prison reports have been positioned as the official state narrative of prisons through which "'the State' never stops talking" (Corrigan & Sayer, 1985, p. 3) as they convey the imaginary of the prison as a rational, proportionate and therefore civilised institution of punishment in an Enlightenment tradition (Beccaria, [1756]2008; Garland, 1991; Ignatieff, 1978).

In contrast to the prison reports' original purpose (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, no date, no date a), this thesis has reappropriated this textual and visual artefact with the intention to discursively analyse the official narrative on prisons for exploring the prison as an affective institution. Following Burton and Carlen ([1979]2013) – who have established that the particular framing and style of state narratives depict the central challenge for their critical reading and contestation – prison reports have been read for how affect is conveyed in this official discourse on prisons. The critical

investigation and deconstruction of text and visuals facilitates a way of seeing beyond the surface of 'state talk' (Corrigan & Sayer, 1985; Sim & Tombs, 2009) and have offered a way to develop a counter reading of the prison as an affective institution which is however obfuscated in complex ways in the prison report.

The central finding of the analysis chapter is that the official state discourse on prisons is orchestrated around the idea of *rationality* as an affect-averse construct that guides the organisation of the institution. Crucially, the analysis has established that this *rationality* is an affective construct in itself.

Now, prison reports do not serve the purpose to create an overtly visible imaginary of the prison as a *rational*, in the Enlightenment sense, institution, neither are they expected to question this *rationality*. The point is that they do not have to, because its *rationality* is not in question. As has been noted in the outset of this thesis (Chapter I), the idea of the prison as a *rational* institution is reified, and therefore not frequently questioned. As the prison report has been reappropriated to provide a critical reading of the official discourse under an affective lens, it has been established that the official discourse neither relies on an argument that defends this imaginary, or better *illusion*, nor does it even depend on using the label *rational* in its account.

Instead, it continuously reifies this imaginary by reproducing that, which is perceived as *rational* in more subtle ways: Through a particular style and language and use of photographs in prison reports. Therefore, the idea of the *rational* prison is not created by eradicating affect, which in itself is not possible, but by relying on a particular expression of affect through which the institution conveys itself as *rational*, without questioning the idea of a calculated affect-averse institution. It is therein that the idea of the *rational* prison is manifested in the official discourse.

Creatively and imaginatively analysing the rationalising elements of the prison report has allowed for establishing a counter narrative that questions the prison as a rational and civilised institution. Therein, the counter narrative mirrors observations and critical arguments within abolitionist work that emphasises the dismal state of the institution in England and Wales (see e.g. Carlton & Sim, 2018; Scott, 2018, 2018a, 2018b; Scott & Codd, 2010; Sim, 2009, 2015, 2017, 2019). This is not to say that the prison report does not provide criticism of the institutions they are reporting on. As

illustrated in the previous analysis chapters, the reports allow for the critical evaluation of the prison to some extent, but they do so in a measured and rationalised way that ultimately does not question the institution in itself. This limited scrutiny can at last be recognised as part of the official discourse as the criticism evokes the idea that the institution has an authentic interest in reproducing and readjusting the institution to civilised punishment standards. And whilst the CDA of prison reports can offer further illustration of the abolitionist argument, as it reveals more about the abysmal state of the prison, it needs to be emphasised again that it is the affective reading of the prison that is of central importance in this PhD.

Proceeding from the essential finding that *rationality* in itself is an affective concept, one of the main insights developed throughout the threefold analysis is that affect is orchestrated in the official narrative. This orchestration of affect is the obvious portrayal of what seems desired affect and the obfuscation of other affective aspects of the prison, which enables the official discourse to create the imaginary of the prison as a *rational* institution in an Enlightenment tradition. The official discourse does this through language that conveys an affective symbolism (Chapter V), through narrative gaps, *negative evidence* (Lewis & Lewis, 1980), in the scrutiny of prisons that consequently obfuscates undesired and negative aspects (Chapter VI), and the documentary style use of photographs which is supposed to illustrate observations of the inspection (Chapter VII). The CDA of prison reports, therefore, illustrates how the official discourse is shaped and reproduced. Therein, it allows us to deconstruct further the rationalised argument and illustrates how the rationalisation in prison reports attenuates a more critical view on prisons as it moderates the affective display along a hierarchy of affect.

Having a closer look at the orchestration of affect, the analysis has demonstrated that the orchestration is anchored in a dichotomous understanding of *affect* and *rationality*. Previously, the *affect/rationality dichotomy* has been argued as the underlying epistemological assumption in dominating criminological and sociological accounts on the state, state institutions and bureaucratic processes (Chapters II, III and IV). There, this dichotomy has been identified as the main obstacle in thinking, understanding, and theorising the prison as an affective institution. The *affect/rationality dichotomy* has been questioned and deconstructed through feminist

epistemologies that have facilitated the pivoting of epistemology towards seeing the world affectively enabling the analysis of prison reports through an affective lens. Critically regarding these textual and visual artefacts under this respect has made apparent that affect is inherent part of the prison. Thereby, the hierarchical orchestration of affect along desired and undesired affect under the concept of *rationality* is paramount for the continued reproduction of the official discourse of prisons as institutions of 'civilised' punishment in England and Wales. The textual and visual analysis has demonstrated that this orchestration is complex and paradoxical as the orchestration relies on a particular display of affect. This establishes the state imaginary of the prison as a *rational*, affect-averse institution, whilst it simultaneously obfuscates the central role of affect. Consequently, *rationality* needs to be recognised as an affective concept for situating the prison as an affective institution.

The analysis of prison reports has established that *rationality* in itself describes a particular way of being, embodying and representing affect, that has structuring qualities to the institution. This echoes a central theoretical claim that has been established along a re-reading of central works of Durkheim (1953, 1957, 1958, 1973) in Chapter II, which has been poignantly captured by Weyher nearly ten years ago:

> "'Rationality' itself may thus be seen as an 'institutionalized' mode of thought, or, again, a 'social fact', contextually grounded in the emotions of social relationships and practice." (Weyher, 2012a, p. 373)

Accordingly, the prison's *rationality* offers itself to be explored as an affective concept. Following what has been outlined in Chapter II, here *rationality* will be discussed along the thesis' conceptual framing, the *affective moral fact*. The *affective moral fact* incorporates qualities of Durkheim's deliberations on the role of emotions in society (Barnwell, 2018; Durkheim, 1957, 1958, 1973; Karsenti, 2012, 2013; Meštrović, 1988; Weiss, 2012; Weyher, 2012, 2012a), in particular his *moral fact* (Durkheim, 1953), and equally condenses an understanding of affect as it is discussed in feminist and cultural studies (Ahmed, 2010, 2014; Berlant, 2005, 2009, 2011; Sedgwick, 2003) in one conceptual framework.

8.2 The *Affective Moral Fact* – A Conceptual Framing for Understanding the Prison Affectively

Moving forward, this section will briefly recap the more detailed conceptual discussion of the *affective moral fact* previously outlined in *Chapter II: Theorising Affect in Sociological Accounts of the State and its Institutions*.

Drawing on the re-reading of Durkheim's central works, that position him as a sociologist who has been deeply invested in researching sentiments and emotions in society (Barnwell, 2018; Durkheim, 1953, 1957, 1958, 1973; Karsenti, 2012, 2013; Meštrović, 1988; Weiss, 2012; Weyher, 2012, 2012a), Durkheim's theoretical framework of the *moral fact* (Durkheim, 1953) has been further developed through a decidedly affective understanding of what he refers to as *sentiments* or *emotions* in his body of work (Durkheim, 1953, 1957, 1958, 1973). Barnwell (2018), who argues Durkheim an affect theorist, has pointed out that Durkheim's work lends itself to be further developed through an affective framing. Cultural affect studies (Ahmed, 2010, 2014; Berlant, 2005, 2009, 2011; Sedgwick, 2003) mirror Durkheim's central idea that sentiments are suffused and contagious in the social, as these works address affect – notwithstanding differently in their individual approaches – as pre-individual but not pre-social, as visceral and social, as abstract and materialised. Durkheim's deliberations on the *moral fact* (1953) resemble these qualities, as Durkheim's *facts* are anything but static and objective but evolve through time and place, and are in flux in society (Karsenti, 2012, 2013). Therefore, *facts* are understood as socially evolving and embroiled in changing affective forces of society. These ideas are condensed in the *affective moral fact.*

Drawing further on Ahmed's (2010, 2014) understanding of *affect* as a relational force between objects and bodies that materialises sociocultural symbolism of objects and language, the *affective moral fact* incorporates an affective understanding that offers a conceptualisation of the affective interplay of animate and inanimate objects. The *affective moral fact* therein incorporates an understanding of affect as a force that is inscribed by, as much as it inscribes modes of relating to our surroundings. This is of

special importance when researching the prison as an affective institution as it permits to theoretically explore how the built environment and atmosphere are part of constructing the official imaginary of the prison as much as understanding the prison as an affective institution.

To summarise: the *affective moral fact* allows us to understand the social as a force that is bigger than its individual parts and, therefore, the *affective moral fact* comprises an understanding of power. In this sense, an *affective moral fact* can deliver insights into how we are moved in certain directions and not others. Understanding *rationality* as an *affective moral fact* in the context of the prison can therefore give us insight into what constitutes the prison's existential foundation.

8.2.1 Excavating Rationality as an Affective Moral Fact

Following the above, *rationality* is now excavated and conceptually discussed as an *affective moral fact.*

The threefold analysis has demonstrated how the official narrative is dependent on the orchestration of affect to create the imaginary of the institution. In the textual analysis (Chapter V) of prison reports, this has been exemplified through the critical interrogation of the guidelines for writing a prison report (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2018). These guidelines instruct the Inspectorate to rely on particular terminology and outline how each prison report should follow "a consistent look and feel" (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2018, p. 21). The findings of this first analysis chapter have implied what manifests itself through the remaining analysis that traces affect through imagination (Chapter VI) and the photograph (Chapter VII): that the prison can indeed be understood as an affective institution along a counter reading of the official discourse which is essentially reliant on affect to create the imaginary of the prison as a *rational* institution. This is however not readily availed but rather unfolds through the critical reading and careful tracing of affect in the prison reports. Therein, affect is orchestrated around a particular understanding of *rationality*, which is constructed based on the reliance on the *affect/rationality dichotomy*, which helps to uphold the idea of rationality as a non-affective concept. This thesis has demonstrated that framing *rationality* as an *affective moral fact* can help to incrementally unravel this dichotomy (Chapters II and IV) and illuminate the prison as an affective institution.

One of the examples, where this *affect/rationality dichotomy* presents itself clearly, is the usage of the terms *violence* and *force* in prison reports. In *Chapter V: Tracing Affect Through Text*, it has been discussed how *force* is exclusively used to conceptualise the violent actions of the state whilst the word *violence* is reserved for the violence that proceeds from prisoners. It has been revealed that these terms stand in an opposing relationship towards each other: *force* being the rationalised and legitimised state violence, while *violence* is uncontrolled and illegitimate. What underlies this terminological orchestration is the *affect/rationality dichotomy* in which *force* is associated with *rationality*, and *violence* related to *affect.* This juxtaposition of *force* and *violence* is equally sense-giving and sense-making within the official discourse. Therein, it becomes obvious that the official discourse relies on the dichotomous relationship between *violence* and *force* as the affective meaning of *violence* is dependent on the sociocultural affective ascription of *force* and vice versa.

In *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, Ahmed (2014) establishes a similar argument. There Ahmed outlines how the sociocultural meaning of *hate* is reliant on what we consider *love* to be. And these two words, *hate* and *love* have distinct affective meanings. These affective meanings are circular and relational. Accordingly, it is the dichotomous use of *violence* and *force* that equally creates a circular and relational connection between them. The official discourse uses this affective relationship of *violence* and *force* to narrate the story of a rational and therefore more civilised institution of violence. Following Ahmed's analogy (2014), *force* can be further positioned as an affective concept in the official discourse even though it is rationalised in an Enlightenment tradition in prison reports. By rationalising *force*, the prison does not compromise its sociocultural imaginary as a *rational*, non-affective, and civilised institution as it deflects from the fact that affective *violence of the state* continues to be central in the institution. *Force* therein offers an affective concept of violence that we can approve of. This approval of state violence has been somewhat addressed by Durkheim (Mukherjee, 2006) who, although commentating very little about violence, acknowledged that punishment can bring cohesion to society and strengthen moral bonds. Both these aspects, Ahmed's (2014) argument of affect as a circular and relational entity and Durkheim's (1953, 1957, 1958) idea of social cohesion through shared affective experiences, are represented in the *affective moral fact*. Seeing *force* through this conceptual idea shows how it carries an Enlightenment tradition and

therein the reified sociocultural heritage of *rationality*. Thus, looking at *force* through the *affective moral fact* means addressing *rationality.* In the context of this thesis, conceptualising *rationality* as an *affective moral fact* then enables us to see how the official discourse is orchestrated through affective meaning that is attached to *force.* The term *force* therefore carries affect and sociocultural symbolism of *rationality*, on which basis the construction of the prison as a 'civilised' institution is based. Furthermore, this conceptual discussion of *force* supports the argument that *rationality* is in itself an affective concept.

This links to a central argument in this thesis. As outlined previously (Chapter II and IV), the *affect/rationality dichotomy* is argued the dominating epistemological foundation in theories and research on the state, state institutions – like the prison – and bureaucratic processes. In this dichotomous relationship *rationality* is ascribed controlling powers over *affect* as well as it is ascribed pivotal value in Western states because of rationality's apparent affect-averse qualities. The *affect/rationality dichotomy* has been repelled through the epistemological shift in this thesis that beds itself in a feminist tradition (Barad, 2003; Gatens, 1992; Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983; Jaggar, 1989; Rose, 1983; Stoler, 2007; Whitford, 1988). Accordingly, recognising the term *force* as a way to orchestrate affect along its dichotomous relationship to *violence*, which is attributed to *affect* in the dichotomy, and recognising *force* as an expression of *rationality*, illustrates again how the official narrative is dependent on the Cartesian *affect/rationality dichotomy.* Recognising *force* as a representation of *rationality*, and *rationality* as an *affective moral fact* illustrates how *rationality* is essentially affective and therein sense-giving and structuring for the institution. This further demonstrates the epistemological component of the *affective moral fact* rejecting the *affect/rationality dichotomy*.

Likewise, the theoretical foundation of the *affective moral fact* alludes to the rejection of the *affect/rationality dichotomy.* The re-reading of Durkheim's work helps to illustrate that an *affect/rationality dichotomy* has not been central in Durkheim's work as he has discarded the Enlightenment idea of the rational individual and instead has centred sociocultural sentiments in midst of his sociology (Meštrović, 1988; Weiss, 2012; Weyher, 2012a). His ambivalent delineations on the role of the state do not clearly suggest such a dichotomy necessarily, but leave freedom to also explore state

institutions within an affective understanding (Durkheim, 1957; Horowitz, 1982; Nisbet, 1952). The *affective moral fact* embraces this theoretical vagueness and has been further developed along the above-mentioned feminist epistemological insight which allows for a clear rejection of the *affect/rationality dichotomy*. That the prison's exploration as an affective institution ultimately relies on an epistemological shift that needs to be equally reflected in explanatory frameworks will be further illustrated in this chapter as this directly addresses the central research question: *What are the theoretical and methodological possibilities to explore the prison as an affective institution?*

8.2.2 Rationality and the Hierarchical Orchestration of Affect

It has already been mentioned above that the orchestration of affect relies on a hierarchical display of affect. How this hierarchical orchestration can be understood along the *affective moral fact* is focus of this section.

The tracing of affect through the textual discourse analysis of prison reports (Chapter V) has illustrated how affect is hierarchically orchestrated in the official discourse. There, it has been demonstrated how a selective representation of affect is used to create the imaginary of the prison as a rational and civilised state institution. This hierarchical orchestration allows for the emphasis of positive features of the prison whilst also addressing some negative aspects through emotion connoted language (Koschut, 2017, 2017a). As mentioned previously, this hierarchical orchestration of affect, paradoxically, does not put into question the imaginary of the prison as a rational institution in an Enlightenment sense. Looking at the hierarchy of affect therefore demonstrates how the prison is affective in different ways and that *rationality* unfolds in a complex manner in the official narrative.

When talking about a hierarchical orchestration, power is implicitly addressed. As has been outlined previously, the *affective moral fact* incorporates a Foucauldian understanding of power as relational (Foucault, 2003). This understanding of power is implicit in the framing of affect (Ahmed, 2014) as well as in Durkheim's work that emphasises the coercive forces emotions have in society (Durkheim, 1958). Simultaneously, emotions are embedded in Foucault's understanding of power (Heaney, 2011). The CDA that relies on a Foucauldian framework (Jäger, 2015),

which traditionally interrogates specific power relations, therefore implicitly offers itself to trace affect. This has been acknowledged within CDA research, where affect has been reasoned to be the crucial factor for the domineering power of some discourses over others (Koschut, 2017). How powerful sentiments are in society has been stressed in Durkheim's understanding of the *social facts* that lay themselves on us out of an individual's control. This not only emphasises the spontaneous character affect can have (Sedgwick, 2003) but also that affect is so strong because of its social interweaving beyond the individual (Durkheim, 1958). The understanding of affect as a circular or relational entity has been emphasised within cultural and affect studies (Ahmed, 2010, 2014; Sedgwick, 2003) as something that imbues us and our animate and inanimate surroundings, as something that is materialised and abstract. Accordingly, power and affect can be understood as inextricably intertwined, which makes power a concept that is already part of the *affective moral fact*. As has been already emphasised before, affect in its relationality is sense-giving and sense-making (Ahmed, 2006, 2014). With reference to the implicit understanding of power in the *affective moral fact*, it can be said that the official discourse is controlled through a hierarchy of affect, in which some affective display is weighed more powerful than another for creating the imaginary of the prison. Positioning *rationality* as an *affective moral fact* therein offers to understand the prison as an institution that spreads a desired sociocultural symbolism through an affective narrative. That the institution of the prison controls the narrative is not new of course (Garland, 1991; Rose, 2016). However, the dissection of how this is done through affect, is one of the unique contributions this thesis has to make.

8.2.3 Rationality Has a Body

Whilst the previous sections excavate *rationality* as an *affective moral fact* and discuss the orchestration of affect in the official discourse along key findings of the textual analysis, this section focusses on the corporeality of the prison as it has been addressed in the Critical Discourse Analysis of imagination (Chapter VI) and official photographs (Chapter VII). These two chapters have demonstrated that affect is

manifested and suffused in the built environment and atmosphere. This however has only been accessible in the CDA of prison reports through the embrace of critical imagination, and the interrogation of photographs beyond their actual purpose as an evidential document of the prison inspection.

As has been addressed previously (Chapters IV), language has limitations when it comes to the expression of affect. Whilst language can anchor the affective sociocultural symbolism to some extent (Ahmed, 2010, 2014), the textual CDA of prison reports has evoked affective responses from me as a researcher and evoked my imagination, which lies outside of the control of those that create the state narrative through language. My situated response has been embraced to interrogate the narrative gaps, the *negative evidence* (Lewis & Lewis, 1980), in prison reports. As delineated in *Chapter VI: Tracing Affect Through Imagination*, the built environment and atmosphere of the prison unfolded through imagination which has been investigated through CDA. Following Mills (2000), imagination has been embraced in a creative and critical way to question and interrogate rationalised arguments of the state. This has been further carved out through the interrogation of official photographs by extending the analytical framework through the work of Barthes (2000), Sontag (1978, 2003) and Berger (2013) in *Chapter VII: Tracing Affect Through the Photograph.* Thereby, the visual analysis illustrates how official photographs tangibly manifest what has been in part creatively visualised through an unfettered embrace of imagination. As such, it has been demonstrated how imagination can elevate and contour what is already there, emphasising imagination as a valuable part to research. These chapters show how affect is materialised in the built environment of prisons and suffused in the atmosphere. As such, the analysis offered within this research mirrors to some extent the debates of prison architecture within carceral geographies (e.g. Jewkes, 2012, 2013; Moran, 2017). Combined, these ideas help illustrate that *the birth of the prison* (Foucault, 1977) rests on affect as prisons were and are continuously designed with affect in mind. Thus, there is a direct link between the built environment and the affective experience of it, which also plays out on a bodily level of those that inhabit the prison. This argument is implicit in Foucault's work (1977) and can be further developed along the analytical findings and the conceptual framework of the *affective moral fact*.

A central point in Foucault's work (1977) is that punishment cannot free itself from bodies that have to endure it, if it is through the many practices of the bureaucratic state, the direct physical impact through another person's violence or through the built environment. Together with the analytical findings (Chapter VI and VII) it can be illustrated that rationality is not an abstracted Cartesian idea, but an embodied reality that binds state violence not in an abstracted punishment of the mind, but in a holistic punishment that ties together the body and the spirit in an inseparable bind. Accordingly, it can be said that *rationality* is manifested in the built environment and atmosphere of the prison as an *affective moral fact*.

The *affective moral fact* draws on an understanding of *affect* in cultural affect studies (Ahmed, 2010, 2014; Sedgwick, 2003) that emphasises the embodiment of our felt experiences. This understanding of affect equally positions itself in the previously outlined feminist epistemologies (Chapter IV) that emphasise how knowledge is always situated, embodied and materialised. Therefore, the corporeality of *rationality* can be addressed through the *affective moral fact*. This again takes us beyond an abstracted understanding of *rationality* which is anchored by the *affect/rationality dichotomy* (Hartsock, 1983). Recognising the corporeality of *rationality* allows us to see how affect is manifested in the prison environment and how it relationally affects (Ahmed, 2010, 2014) those that are situated in the prison. In this way, it further helps to question the *affect/rationality dichotomy* which relates the body, or anything materialised, to *affect*, and the abstract to *rationality* (Hartsock, 1983).

Consequently, the built environment of the prison cannot be understood as ways of diminishing the role of affect under *rationality* but as a particular portrayal of it. This links to the previously made argument (Chapter II, III and VII). Drawing on Weber's concept of *disenchantment* (2002), works in carceral geographies (Hancock and Jewkes, 2011; Jewkes, 2012, 2013) argue the suppression of certain affect through prison design. Rather than understanding the built environment as a *disenchantment*, it has been suggested to see it as an *enchantment* of different sorts, meaning that affect is complexly orchestrated along a hierarchy. This illustrates that what has been outlined above by reference to the textual analysis of prison reports (Chapter V) can be transferred to the built environment.

That *rationality* has a material existence that affects bodies, has unfolded clearly when the official photographs in prison reports have been critically regarded and interrogated. One particular photograph (Chapter VII, p. 173, Image 12) symbolically questions the idea of the rational, affect-averse prison. This photograph of the fenced off outside courtyard can be regarded as the allegorical manifestation of the *iron cage* (Weber, 2002). Unlike Weber (2002), who used this expression to symbolise the relentless machinery of bureaucratic states, critically regarding the photograph provided a reading of a dense affective atmosphere that is created through the orchestration of affect in the built environment. It illustrates that rationalisation processes within state punishment do not succumb to rationality (as a non-affective idea), but that *rationality* itself creates affective ways of punishment which ultimately makes the prison an affective institution.

A similar observation can be made for the photographs capturing the outside of the prison (Chapter VII, p. 160, Images 1 and 2). As has been argued in *Chapter VII: Tracing Affect Through the Photograph*, the images are relatively unrevealing as there is nothing to see apart from the high and impenetrable walls hindering a view behind the prison walls. Whilst they are arguably also there for security reasons, this thesis has argued that they are equally part of an orchestrated narrative from the state; one that organises how we see and how we relate to the prison as a spectator from the outside (Jewkes, 2013). In this context the thesis has referred to Sontag's work *Regarding the Pain of Others* (2003), in which she describes a certain numbness that evolves through the observation of certain images. Using Andy Warhol's famous mushroom cloud print of the atomic bomb, that once became a renowned image in mass media, Sontag illustrates how the inflation of shocking images minimises the alarming affect they have once carried (Sontag, 2003). Sontag poignantly captures this as follows:

> "The argument that modern life consists of a diet of horrors by which we are corrupted and to which we gradually become habituated is a founding idea of the critique of modernity – the critique being almost as old as modernity itself." (Sontag, 2003, p. 95)

As Sontag delineates a process of desensitisation, in which things become banal in the eyes of the spectator due to its omnipresence, she reminds us of Arendt's (1970) argument that captures the risks and dangers of encompassing rationalisation processes. Arendt's argument will be further addressed in the following section.

Bringing Sontag's (2003) argument in context to exploring the prison as an affective institution can give insight why prisons contain the imaginary of the rational institution. As both images of the outside of the prison reveal very little, it takes a particular awareness (Sontag, 1978) of what lies behind the prison walls to see the affectivity in the built environment of the outside of the prison. This has been addressed in the previous chapter. The circumstance that there are no human bodies or social interactions to observe, which would be the obvious focus around which sociological research on affect evolves, has guided this research to creatively research the affectivity of the prison. The official images, like those of the outside of the prison, have been argued as having sociological relevance as the anthropocentric traces can be critically and imaginatively investigated. Their analysis highlights that the affective orchestration manifested in the built environment is part of controlling the official narrative of the prison. It shows that the control of the built environment, the control of what can be seen from the outside of the prison is reliant on affect. As the pains of imprisonment become hidden behind the prison walls (Foucault, 1977) and prison buildings resemble factories more and more (Jewkes, et al., 2017), the built environment embodies sociocultural affective meaning in the form of *rationality* as an *affective moral fact* on which basis the prison can be positioned as an affective institution.

8.2.4 Rationality: A Dangerous and Patriarchal Concept

As has been discussed in *Chapter IV: A Paradigmatic Shift Towards Seeing the World Affectively*, the state narrative relies on an *affect/rationality dichotomy* which is based on an abstracted Cartesian idea of rationality, that places the mind on the side of *rationality*, and the body on the side of *affect*. Within this dichotomous construction, rationality is dissociated from the body in an Enlightenment reading of rationality. The feminist deconstruction of this epistemological foundation (Chapter IV), the CDA of prison reports (Chapters V, VI and VII), as well as the framing of *rationality* as an *affective moral fact* brings to our attention that *rationality* depicts a particular way of

being affective. As outlined in the previous section, rationality needs to be recognised as having a body, as being materialised. As imprisonment continues to be reliant on the body (Foucault, 1977), it is interesting and important to note that prison reports do not directly address the body. Whilst it took imagination and a critical reading of photographs to elevate the body by its tracing through affect, it shows that the body cannot be rationalised away. However, the official discourse on prisons obscures the body to a certain extent through its style and bureaucratic construction, through which the state imaginary of the prison as a rational, non-affective and therefore 'civilised' institution is reproduced.

This becomes especially clear when the thesis examines how the terms *force* and *violence* are used in the official discourse. Looking at this through the *affective moral fact* shows how the term *force* affectively hides the brutal nature of the prison. This is done, as mentioned above, through the particular affective sociocultural connotations (Ahmed, 2014) attached to *force* and *violence* which are frequently reproduced through the official discourse and have legitimising effects for state violence.

When the affect-averse conceptualisation of *rationality* is not questioned, and it is not availed that *rationality* is also anchored in the bodily experiences of those that have to endure imprisonment, harms of imprisonment will go unnoticed. This insight brings us back to the conceptual understanding of institutional violence, as briefly outlined in the *Introduction* to this thesis.

There, it has been delineated how Galtung's (1969; Schinkel, 2010) concept of *structural violence* and the idea of violence as a *continuum* (Cockburn, 2012; Kelly, 1988) allow us to position the prison as a violent institution. The Critical Discourse Analysis exemplifies how the prison's violence is expressed through the various *rational* measures inherent to the built environment as well as the institutional processes. Rather than just acknowledging *physical violence* as *violence* – like the prison does in some respect with the concept of *force* – the conceptualisation here (Cockburn, 2012; Galtung, 1969; Kelly, 1988; Schinkel, 2010) acknowledges the dangers that lie with *violence* that go unnoticed when it is normalised in the quotidian institutional context.

The Critical Discourse Analysis showed that, just like affect, the institutional violence of the prison needs careful tracing. This is not at last owed to the narrow, purely physical understanding of violence as presented in the official discourse. That state narratives rely on a narrow understanding of violence comes as no surprise, since it avoids broader questioning of harmful practices (Schinkel, 2010; Sim & Tombs, 2009). Accordingly, the *rationalisation* of state violence in official discourse on the prison, obfuscates the inherently violent nature of the institution. The intentional construction of state violence as rather harmless, is topic in Benjamin's (2001) work. He delineates that legal law reproduces violence, which is why there is no innocence in the state's violence, albeit its portrayal as innocent through rationalised processes of punishment. Benjamin (2001) understands the law as a representation of particular moral ideas. In consequence, only violence that happens outside of the state's legitimacy – when it enters and possibly breaches a moral code – is recognised as such. Accordingly, the law helps to identify violence that breaches the state's moral codes, whilst it is not accommodating for identifying and critiquing its own reliance on violence. Therefore, violence is and intrinsic part of the law and justice system, and therein the prison. For Benjamin (2001), it is this intricate connection that makes it challenging to critique state violence in the first place. This thought is similarly reflected on in Arendt's work *On Violence* (1970a), which first and foremost questions the prolonged stability of political power that is reliant on violence. Her work draws attention to the necessity to critically interrogate that kind of violence, which is no longer easily recognised as such, as it becomes normalised in state institutions like the prison (Cooper & Whyte, 2017). This relates to Schinkel's (2010) argument on Galtung's *structural violence*. Schinkel argues that Galtung's conceptualisation of violence holds similarities to Durkheim's *social fact* as violence is understood as appearing in a specific form and specific time as an inherent part of the social, which can be argued as reflected in the prison. Whilst Durkheim does not directly discuss violence, he addresses punishment in the context of morality (Mukherjee, 2006) and argues somewhat similar to Arendt's argument on political power and friendship (Chiba, 1995) that societies are strong because of a sense of love and compassion and not because of a continued reliance on violence. However, Durkheim discusses how in times of *malaise*, when society is in moral distress, state punishment serves to bring social cohesion (Mukherjee, 2006). This again indicates that *affect* is central for mobilising the approval of state punishment, like imprisonment.

Positioning the prison as a violent institution along the works of Galtung (1969) and Schinkel (2010), and the feminist delineations on violence, most prominently discussed by Cockburn (2012) and Kelly (1988), as well as works that recognise affect to play a central part (Collins, 1974, 2008; Mukherjee, 2006; Scheff & Retzinger, 2001) offers a conceptualisation of institutional violence that accounts for a more complex understanding of the harms done. Most interesting for exploring the prison as an affective institution, this understanding of *institutional violence* further opens the discussion towards seeing the prison as relying on and expressing *affect*. It signifies that *rationality* as an *affective moral fact* is the dominant state of feeling about state punishment.

Returning to the official prison reports, this conceptualisation helps to further problematise the state imaginary of the prison as a 'civilised' institution based on the deconstruction of the *rationalising* argument, as presented in official discourse on the prison. Just as illustrated before, the *rationalisation* of *violence* as *force*, and the rationalisation of other violent practices that affect those that have to endure imprisonment, make the institution appear rather harmless and civilised, since the term *force* has legitimising effects. This is owed to the sociocultural value ascribed to *rationality* which is equally reified through the official discourse on prisons through frameworks like the 'Healthy Prison', that stands for the continuously progressing rationalisation under Enlightenment ideas (Chapter V). Looking at *rationality* through the *affective moral fact* illustrates how rationality obfuscates violent aspects of the prison through an equal obfuscation of *affect*. In short: as the reification of *rationality* as an affect-averse, and therefore civilised, idea does not permit to see the extent of violence in prisons, the framing of *rationality* as an *affective moral fact* helps to question this reification, for it elevates the affectivity of the prison and thereby its essentially violent aspects. As such, the institution's idea of *rationality* becomes dangerous when it is not questioned. This emphasises once again the political necessity to research the prison as an affective institution.

That *rationality* is dangerous has been addressed in state theory and political sociology (Chapter II). Bauman's gardener analogy outlines how, within the desire to control everything, the state's narrative of rationality is used to justify even the most atrocious state violence (Bauman, 1989). And Arendt (1970) discusses how rationalised

bureaucratic structures justify and fuel a state rationalised killing machinery. Closely reading Arendt's work (1970) indicates a central position of emotions and moral convictions in the bureaucratic machinery as she declares them essential for committing state violence. Her approach also recognises that they are however obfuscated or portrayed as insignificant in the official discourse. And it is this what makes *rationality* dangerous, because it disguises the actual motivations behind state driven violence which makes them appear *banal* (Arendt, 1970). Thus, Arendt's argument provides an understanding that a *rational* state argument can endorse acts of cruelty and an overt "irrational passion for dispassionate rationalisation" (Rief, 1979, quoted in Williams, 1998: 748), while simultaneously proclaiming to be free of affect.

Thinking *rationality* through the framework of the *affective moral fact* shows that the Enlightenment construction of *rationality* makes it possible to claim rationalised violence as moral, as the idea of *rationality* is tied to ideas of being 'civilised', exactly because *affect* is denied in the sociocultural meaning ascribed to *rationality*. Shining light on this paradoxical relationship is a key quality of the *affective moral fact*. Accordingly, rationalised state violence evades responsibility for the harm done on the very basis of *rationality*. It creates the imaginary of state violence as *banal* (Arendt, 1970), and it is within this that the danger of non-affective understandings of *rationality* lies. This has been exposed in the CDA of prison reports. Without the critical analysis of the prison reports as textual and visual structures of the official state narrative, the reports could be merely seen as evidential material that documents what the Inspectorate observed. The critical interrogation undertaken by this thesis – through an affective lens – establishes a counter reading that elevates the harms of imprisonment beyond those that are addressed in the reports.

A particular danger of rationality has been outlined in the work *The End of Innocence* by Flax (1992). She critiques the Enlightenment morality that she outlines as deeply influenced by Kant's philosophy and argues that this rationalised morality is responsible for harm. It is here that Flax' argument diverges from Arendt's account. As argued previously (Chapter II), Arendt, a devout Kantian, did not see the fundamental dangers within this philosophy and instead saw it as a chance for civilised togetherness, even though she pointed out the dangers of it (Arendt, 1970). The *affective moral fact* follows a different, a feminist epistemological approach (Barad,

2003; Gatens, 1992; Haraway, 1991; Hartsock, 1983; Jaggar, 1989; Rose, 1983; Whitford, 1988) which critiques this Enlightenment epistemology that is based in an *affect/rationality dichotomy*, which allows for the construction of *rationality* as affect averse in the first place.

Flax (1992) argues in this regard that the Enlightenment tradition in Western states teaches that there is an objective reality 'out there', where we can find, with the right tools and rational thinking, static truths. As such, these truths are constructed as *innocent knowledge* (Flax, 1992) as they are found through apparent normative-free and objective research. Flax argues:

> "Those whose actions are grounded in or informed by such truth will also have their innocence guaranteed. They can only do good, not harm to others. They act as the servant of something higher and outside (or more than) themselves, their own desires and the effects of their particular histories or social locations. The discovery of such truth would enable political theorists and philosophers to solve a central philosophic and social problem: how to reconcile knowledge and power (or theory and practice)." (Flax, 1992, p. 447)

Flax recognises the danger of the non-affective understanding of rationality. By recurrence to rationality, power and any action that is exercised in the name of it can be justified. This has been addressed to some extent in the epistemological discussion (Chapter IV). However, the point becomes elevated through the CDA of prison reports and in thinking *rationality* through the *affective moral fact*, which can be positioned in relation to Flax's (1992) ideas as follows:

> "A central promise of Enlightenment and Western modernity is that conflicts between knowledge and power can be overcome by grounding claims to and the exercise of authority in reason. Reason both represents and embodies truth." (Flax, 1992, p. 447)

Flax (1992) thereby recognises the paradoxical character of rationality that, as has been already outlined elsewhere (Chapter IV), can be described as embodying particular affective qualities and normative ideas whilst it simultaneously denies those qualities when it ascribes itself as an Enlightened vehicle to objective truth. What this shows is that when rationality is not positioned and revealed as an affective concept, as an *affective moral fact*, and accordingly critiqued in its epistemological heritage, theoretical and political use, it can become a dangerous tautology. As rationality is

held equal to civility and therefore symbolises particular values in Western states – and is consistently elevated as such in state narratives as the findings of this thesis clearly demonstrate – the status of rationality is re-legitimised each time reference is made to it. Consequently, as my exploration of official narratives of the prison demonstrate, there is no innocence in rationality.

The dangers of rationality as depicted here have been acknowledged, perhaps most prominently, in the colonisation studies of Stoler (2007) where rationality is recognised as a patriarchal tool to justify actions and govern for a desired outcome that includes the orchestration of affect, and elsewhere (Berlant, 2005; Hunter, 2015; Jaggar, 1989). By drawing on this feminist critique of rationality, this thesis further adds to a critical reading of *rationality* in state theory and political sociology.

How mainstream sociological accounts run the risk of recreating particular epistemological convictions and limiting theoretical accounts, because of the missing evaluation of rationality, has been addressed in previous chapters (Chapters II and IV). In this thesis, the dangerous tautology of the Enlightenment construction of rationality is further exposed by positioning *rationality* as an *affective moral fact*. Accordingly, the *rational* prison can be recognised as essentially affective driven.

This thesis contributes to the view that the positioning of *rationality* as an *affective moral fact* challenges a non-affective conceptualisation, that writes affect and the body out of the understanding, of modern institutional life. In consequence, this discussion highlights aspects of the prison, such as those experiences of enduring imprisonment which are justified and rendered 'civilised' by reference to the Enlightenment construct of *rationality,* as harmful. The argument works against a dangerous tautology where harmful practices can be justified by recurrence to rationality. This thesis argues that it is the particular philosophical and epistemological construction of *rationality* as an affect-averse illusion, that allows for the continued existence of the prison institution since it silences the affective qualities of the prison.

Another layer which subverts the dangerous, Cartesian understanding of affect and rationality is gender. As has been discussed previously (Chapter IV), standpoint feminist approaches and affect theory demonstrate that the obscuring of the body and affect is a patriarchal product that finds its origin in the *affect/rationality dichotomy*,

which is equally a gendered dichotomy (Ahmed, 2006; Gatens, 1992; Griffiths, 1988; Harding, 1986; Haraway, 1991; Hartsock, 1983; Jaggar, 1989; Smith, 1974; Whitford, 1988). In this dichotomy, *female* is related to *affect*, and *male* to *rationality* as abstracted and detached from bodily experiences (Hartsock, 1983). The sociocultural construction of the *affect/rationality dichotomy* is therefore owed to patriarchal power structures that subvert this dichotomous understanding and orchestrate the narrative of rationality. Whilst in official discourse, rationality is argued as genderless, a critical dissection of the underlying epistemological convictions in state theory and political sociology show that rationalised arguments of the state and its institutions are inherently gendered perspectives (Sydie, 1987). The critical analysis of prison reports illustrates that the official narrative is reliant on the *affect/rationality dichotomy* which equally structures the institution. Accordingly, prisons can be positioned as inherently patriarchal institutions that orchestrate affect through *rationality*.

Prisons are inherently patriarchal institutions that ultimately produce gendered experiences and, therefore, do not account for the needs and lived experiences of people that are not cis men. This has been illustrated in several works of research (Baroness Corston, 2007; Bosworth & Carrabine, 2001; Carlen, 1983; Carlen & Worrall, 2004; Davis et al., 2021; Jewkes & Laws, 2020). As has been pointed out in Chapter III, Nagel (2013) and Britton (1997, 2000, 2003) discuss how the apparent rational and objective research on the prison on an institutional level represents a particular male gaze in criminological and sociological accounts. Official discourse that is created out of these institutions equally embody this patriarchal view (Acker, 1990). This body of work therein substantiates situating prison reports as patriarchal narratives of the state, that embody and reproduce patriarchal structures of reasoning along the *affect/rationality dichotomy.* Accordingly, the official discourse on the prison creates a narrow and simplified understanding of the prison, in which the layered nuances of the *affect/rationality dichotomy* are not recognised which ultimately reproduces the dichotomy. The rationalising argument therefore depicts another layer of dangerousness of *rationality*, since writing bodies and gender out of the discourse ignores and silences viewpoints. In consequence, less-complex understandings of the prison are created by pre-dominantly presenting a male viewpoint. Recognising *rationality* as an *affective moral fact* therefore shows that

rationality embodies a particular affective and gendered perspective that is manifested in the prison imaginary. It illustrates that exploring the prison as an affective institution cannot simply bypass the discussion of Enlightenment thinking and discourses as patriarchal.

Seifert (1992) points out that *rationality*, even in its terminology, has such a stronghold in debates, that countering debates are faced with the challenge of having no reciprocal suitable vocabulary that could be used to easily sketch out a feminist frame for understanding institutions. In that respect, Seifert (1992) argues that labelling an approach or argument *rational* does not permit for the presentation of a more nuanced perspective as it reproduces much of the same. As such, it links to Smith's (1974) previously made standpoint feminist argument (Chapter IV) that argues the alienation of researchers from their own work if they continuously rely on patriarchal reasoning and do not make the process of knowledge production transparent. As *rationality*, as a non-affective construct, has a stronghold within state theory and political sociology, it needs to be carefully dissected as an epistemological foundation which is reflected in rationalising theoretical accounts and research of institutions like the prison. This critique enables the development of frameworks like the *affective moral fact* that embody this feminist epistemology.

The *affective moral fact*, as developed by this thesis, provides a way of seeing that the prison and the official narrative of this institution are produced out of a particular perspective which is sense-giving and sense-making. It is therefore a theoretical framework that offers an opportunity to break with the *affect/rationality dichotomy* and the various layers – *body/mind* and *female/male* – that are part of it. Acknowledging that *rationality* signifies situated knowledge, the notion of an *affective moral fact* provides a way to highlight this by rendering the prison as a patriarchal affective institution. As this thesis has aimed to foreground the situatedness of knowledge, and attempted to demonstrate how processes of knowledge production can be made transparent, it breaks with the patriarchal vantage point on the prison and establishes a counter reading that situates the prison as affective.

8.3 Summary

This chapter has demonstrated that we can explore the prison as an affective institution when *rationality* is positioned as an *affective moral fact*. Along this discussion, this chapter has pre-dominantly answered the first part of the research question – *What are the theoretical and methodological possibilities to explore the prison as an affective institution?* – whilst the latter part has been more directly addressed throughout the previous chapters. They have outlined the methodological approach based on pivoting the epistemology towards seeing the world affectively (Chapter IV), traced affect through the Critical Discourse Analysis of the textual basis of prison reports (Chapter V), discursively explored imagination (Chapter VI) and visually analysed official photographs (Chapter VII) for the purpose of exploring the prison as an affective institution.

Crucially though, the methodological and theoretical possibilities for exploring the research question cannot be separately answered. This has been illustrated in this chapter as the findings of the analysis provided for a counter narrative of prisons, on which basis *rationality* has been positioned as an affective concept. Positioning *rationality* as such then facilitated for the prison's further exploration as an affective institution under the framework *affective moral fact*, which has been initially outlined in Chapter II.

The *affective moral fact* allows us to see how the prison is structured around and through affect. The conceptual discussion has demonstrated that the affectivity of the prison is orchestrated in complex ways. Understanding *rationality* as an *affective moral fact* enables to shed some light on how *rationality*, as an affective framework, shapes punishment through imprisonment in England and Wales for the researched period of 1982-2019. As such, it reiterates a central argument in Durkheim's work (1953, 1957, 1973): that we can research the affective state of society which allows us to assess the moral state of it.

The conceptual discussion also provides for an epistemological argument. Following the feminist epistemologies, the *affective moral fact* beds itself in (Ahmed, 2006, 2014; Berlant, 2005; Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983), the discussion provides further insight into the affective foundation the prison is built on. Ultimately,

the *affective moral fact* has enabled us to recognise that *rationality*, as an Enlightenment construct, is not the opposite of affect but is in itself affective. Consequently, the prison can be understood as an affective institution.

The conceptual discussion has illustrated how the prison appropriates the idea of *rationality* as an affect-averse concept as a means for 'civilised' punishment, following a moral imperative in a Kantian tradition that is inextricably linked to the *affect/rationality dichotomy.* This dichotomy has also been identified as the basis to explanatory frameworks within prominent reviewed theory (Chapters II and III), as well as the foundation for state conducted research which is presented in the form of prison reports (Chapters V, VI and VII) which profess to summarise official findings in an independent, neutral and objective manner. As such, the discussion of *rationality* as an *affective moral fact* shows how the *affect/rationality dichotomy* consolidates the epistemology, theoretical approaches as well as the basis for moral claims, which have been translated into the prison. The research demonstrates that it is on this basis that prisons in England and Wales claim to be 'civilised'.

Pivoting this Enlightenment epistemological basis towards a feminist epistemology, and framing *rationality* as an *affective moral fact* show how the narrative around the prison and the prison itself, is fundamentally shaped and orchestrated through affect in complex ways, whilst the official discourse simultaneously denies affect a central role. This helps to reassert the dangers of the prison through being able to legitimise the prison's violence on the basis of a conception of *rationality* that is seemingly devoid of affect. Crucially, this thesis shows by means of the *affective moral fact* that the many ways prisons punish – if it is through their built environment, atmosphere, or use of *force*, to name a few – are reliant on affect. Following Durkheim (1953, 1957, 1973), this *affect* is seen as resembling dominating social sentiments that are indicative for the institution's approval, or at least for not essentially questioning their existence. *Rationality* therein grounds the imaginary of the prison as a 'civilised' institution. The sociocultural value ascribed to *rationality* helps to justify prisons in a tautological manner which, consequently, makes prisons dangerous as they can be approved of. On this basis, this thesis shows that what is depicted as a rational institution is inherently affective.

The affective exploration of the prison along the *affective moral fact* equally has epistemological and theoretical implications. As the thesis has contributed to a body of work that allows for critical questions to be asked of *rationality* as a notion that carries, rather than is devoid of, affect, the prison can be positioned as an affective institution. This essentially differs to how the prison can be understood along existing frameworks within state theory and political sociology. The particular implications for critical research that evolved throughout this PhD thesis as well as limitations of it, will be outlined in the following conclusion chapter. There, the research question will be further addressed and answered, and the value of the contribution will be assessed.

Chapter IX: Conclusion – Situating the Prison as an Affective Institution

The theoretical and methodological exploration of the prison as an affective institution undertaken in this thesis ends with the observation that researchers can think the prison affectively using refined theoretical frameworks, Critical Discourse Analysis and imagination as tools brought to the reading of official prison reports. This critical deconstruction of official state discourse presents a reading which renders *rationality* an affective concept. Pivotal for this affective exploration of the prison is the embrace of a sociological imagination (Mills, 2000) and creativity (Nisbet, 1962) to inform a critically reimagining, re-reading, and reorienting of the researcher to the official discourse around the prison. This kind of reading of the affective institution is further understood through rethinking *rationality* as an *affective moral fact*. This conceptual approach makes *affect* a direct point of analysis for understanding the prison differently as it renders affect more visible in the life of the state and state institutions like the prison. Ultimately, *thinking the prison affectively* shows how the institution is organised around, and reflects, popular affect and values regarding the perpetuation of state violence in society.

The first section of this concluding chapter positions the prison as an affective institution (9.1) and addresses the counter narrative that has been developed through the *Critical Discourse Analysis* of prison reports (9.1.1). This is followed by placing the *affective prison* in state theory, political sociology, and criminological debates along an epistemological argument (9.1.2), and the *affective moral fact* will be discussed as a ready framework for thinking the prison affectively (9.1.3).

The second section of this chapter attends to *Implications for Critical Thinking and the Prison* (9.2). Therein, limitations of this thesis (9.2.1) and theoretical (9.2.2) and methodological contributions (9.2.3) as well as political implications (9.2.4) are addressed before this thesis concludes with some final remarks (9.3).

9.1 The Prison – An Affective Institution

The critical counter narrative and the *affective moral fact* have been developed by answering the research question: *What are the theoretical and methodological possibilities to explore the prison as an affective institution?* The affective exploration of the prison has been done in multiple steps and is summarised in what follows.

The thesis has commenced with a critical review of literature in state theory, political sociology, and criminological research in regard to their discussion of affect in the context of the state, state institutions and rationalised state processes (Chapters II and III). Out of this critique, the conceptual framework of this thesis, the *affective moral fact* has been developed (Chapter II). This has been followed by a paradigmatic shift in epistemology that opened the possibility for creatively exploring a methodological framework for researching the prison as an affective institution (Chapter IV). Critical Discourse Analysis has then been outlined as the framework that facilitates the affective exploration of the prison through a textual analysis that has a distinct affective focus. The framework has been further extended through the embrace of critical imagination and the incorporation of the visual analysis of photographs. This has been followed by the discursive analysis of official discourse on the prison in England and Wales as represented in prison reports on HMP Birmingham, HMP Liverpool and HMP Pentonville (Chapters V, VI and VII) which enabled us to develop a counter narrative that positions affect as central in the prison. Then, key findings of this analysis have been addressed along the conceptual frame, the *affective moral fact*, which allowed for further development of this concept and the theoretical exploration of the prison as an affective institution (Chapter VIII).

The following argument analytically illustrates how we can *think the prison affectively* along the research aims (as outlined previously in 1.2.2 and 4.2.2). This thesis achieved:

(i) Developing a critical counter reading of the official discourse on the prison in England and Wales through the Critical Discourse Analysis of official prison narratives under an affective lens.

(ii) Establishing a conceptual framework with the *affective moral fact* that allows to effectively theorise the prison as an affective institution.

(iii) Demonstrating that there is value in embracing feminist epistemologies as well as imaginative and creative approaches to sociological research for the purpose of generating more nuanced understandings.

9.1.1 Tracing Affect through the Critical Discourse Analysis of Text, Imagination and Photographs

The *Critical Discourse Analysis* of prison reports presented in this thesis, made the prison 'real' as the abstracted and official version of the prison has been critically interrogated through the embrace of imagination and creativity in the sociological analysis. As such, the research elevated and rendered visible what has already been there in the first place: the *affectivity* of the prison that unfolds in its official processes, quotidian life, built environment and atmosphere.

The Critical Discourse Analysis offers an affective counter narrative of the prison in England and Wales. It challenges the idea of the *rational*, in the Enlightenment sense, and therefore civilised prison as it reads and thinks the prison differently to how the institution is presented in official prison reports, as well as dominating understandings in state theory, political sociology and criminological debates (Chapters II and III). The affective exploration shows us what lies beyond the obvious of the official discourse as the critical counter narrative established *rationality* as an affective concept.

For the careful tracing of *rationality* as *affective*, Mills' (2000) conceptualisation of *imagination*, and *creative* thinking (Nisbet, 1962) have been embraced throughout the discursive analysis. Mills (2000) emphasised the value of *imagination* for critically researching rationalisation processes in states and its institutions and argued that methods should be developed according to the research project, and warned of rigid, narrow and standardised methods as they would limit the scope of what we can research. Equally, Nisbet's idea (1962) of treating sociology as an art form, for preventing it to become a monotonous discipline, influenced the development of a Critical Discourse Analysis that provides a framework for researching *affect* in text, the researcher's imagination and photographs. As there are not ready-made frameworks for researching affect in sociology, Mills' (2000) and Nisbet's (1962) work provided central impulses for embracing my research in an explorative and

imaginative way. It is believed that it is this *creative* and *imaginative* approach to researching the prison that facilitated the establishment of a unique counter reading of the prison as an affective institution.

The affective exploration of the official discourse has been done based on a threefold analysis. First, the textual body has been discursively analysed with a particular focus on affect (Koschut 2017, 2017a). Second, my own affective experiences (Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983; Smith, 1974) and imagination (Mills, 2000) have been embraced as a point of reference for a further critical reading of the prison as a rational institution. And third, the prison has been read visually through the analysis of official photographs following Barthes' (2000), Berger's (2013) and Sontag's (1978, 2003) work, which has provided for an extension of Critical Discourse Analysis to research discourses affectively through visuals.

While critically engaging with the prison reports, it became apparent that the affective exploration of the official discourse meant the *tracing of affect* throughout the textual and visual artefact. That affect did not reveal itself freely through overtly affective language came as no surprise as official discourse relies on a particular language and style that needs to be decoded (Burton & Carlen, [1979]2013). That affect needs to be traced also links to the epistemological heritage of the prison report that situates itself in a paradoxically affectless understanding of *rationality* that is common in masculine reasoning and patriarchal domination (Barrett, 1992; Gatens, 1992; Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983; Stoler, 2007; Whitford, 1988). To the best of my knowledge, not a single prison report analysed within this PhD thesis resorts to any form of the word *rationality.* Yet, the way the official discourse narrates the prison cannot be described as anything but a *rational* institution of punishment in an Enlightenment tradition. This emphasises a central argument this thesis makes; that our sociocultural understanding of what *rationality* is, is constructed through an official discourse that relies on *affect*.

Following on from this, this thesis could not have attained this insight without *imagination*. It is therefore necessary to underline the value of embracing *imagination* and *affect* in the research process. Over the course of the three-staged analysis, the state narrative of the prison as a rational and affect-averse institution of punishment – and, therein, the idea of *rationality* as being non-affective – has been challenged and

deconstructed, as my *imagination* has been embraced as 'data' and guidance for creatively reading prison reports. Thinking back to the use of the terms *force* and *violence* in the textual analysis (5.1.4) and their further critical interrogation through *imagination* (6.1.1) illustrates how state violence can be portrayed as rather benign in English and Welsh prisons through a *rational* argument. Along the *affective moral fact*, *force* and *violence* are argued as representations of socioculturally accepted values expressed through the *affect* attached to them (8.2.1). This illustrates that the Critical Discourse Analysis and the counter narrative established through it, is helpful for testing conceptual frameworks in their explanatory merit, it also accentuates that *imagination* can be indicative for conceptual development and theoretical critiques. The latter became clear when the imagined outside exercise yard (6.2.1) became 'real' in the visual analysis (7.4), which allowed for it to be recognised as a tangible metaphor of Weber's *iron cage* (8.2.3) in the conceptual discussion of the affective prison. These instances illustrate how *imagination* elevated what was already there – *affect* –, as a resource for critiquing the *rational*, affect-averse prison and informing the conceptual development of the *affective moral fact*.

Accordingly, the embrace of *imagination* and *creativity* as well as feminist epistemologies have been formative for developing and operationalising a Foucauldian *Critical Discourse Analysis* in this thesis (Jäger, 2015). The Critical Discourse Analysis equipped this thesis to critically investigate the textual and visual content of official prison reports of HMP Birmingham, HMP Liverpool and HMP Pentonville that have been published over the course of nearly forty years. This allowed for positioning prison reports as rationalised, patriarchal artefacts that are produced by an Inspectorate that embodies these ideas in the narrative structure of the wider state apparatus through which "'the State' never stops talking" (Corrigan & Sayer, 1985, p. 3). The creative and imaginative deconstruction of the prison report transformed this otherwise two-dimensional official document into an artefact that allowed for the prison to become 'real' through the tracing of affect.

9.1.2 Critically Placing the 'Affective Prison' in State Theory, Political Sociology and Criminological Debates

The critical literature review on state theory, political sociology and criminological debates has shown that an affective understanding of the prison has been marginal (Chapters II and III), until now. However, accounts on the prison or state organised violence reviewed in the earlier chapters did provide inspiration and decisive theoretical insights for researching the prison in this thesis.

It has been shown how most sociological theory addresses emotions to some extent in its critical contestation of rationalisation processes in modern states (e.g. Arendt, 1970; Elias, 1998, 2000; Bauman, 1989; Foucault, 1977; Weber, 2002). In this way, attention has been drawn to the fact that affect is an inherent part of punishment within a bureaucratic apparatus, since it takes a particular emotional involvement, and not just the unquestioning acceptance of rationalised processes, for the continuance of state violence. Whilst these accounts do not think of *affect* as a central point of departure for their deliberations, these accounts indicate that it is worth pursuing to understand the prison affectively. Critical and abolitionist researchers have equally indicated through their work (e.g. Cohen & Taylor, 1972; Cohen, 1985; Burton & Carlen, [1979]2013; Carlton & Sim, 2018; Davis, 2003; Garland, 1991; Scott, 2018b; Scott & Codd, 2010; Sim, 2009) that prisons cannot be thought about without affect, as the violence and harms simply cannot be imagined or understood without it. Contemporary prison and criminal justice system researchers do directly address emotions in their accounts (e.g. Andersen & Jacobsen, 2019; Bergman Blix & Wettergren, 2018; Karstedt, 2002, 2015; Laws & Crewe, 2016). Just like the theoretical accounts in sociology, their limitations are, however, constituted by what this thesis has called an *affect/rationality dichotomy*: namely, that *affect* is seen as being organised through *rationality*. For example, their conceptualisation of emotions relies on frameworks (Goffman, 1959, 2005; Hochschild, 1979, 1983) that ascribe *rationality* controlling powers over emotions. And it is this overemphasis on *rationality* as an apparent controlling affect-averse counterpart to *affect* that does not permit for the essentially affective understanding of the prison. Therefore, this thesis argues that the explanatory scope of this contemporary research is confined by this dichotomy. As this thesis theoretically emanates from insights and critique of these works, it can be positioned as a further development of their arguments around the

relationship of affect, the state, and its institutions. As such, the thesis hopes to contribute to a more nuanced affective understanding of the prison and opens the discussion for further theoretical explorations of the state and its institutions.

In the literature review and epistemological discussion, it was shown how *rationality* is argued as responsible for pacifying processes within Western states, and simultaneously central for the continuance of violence (Chapter II, III and IV). This enabled insight into the paradoxical qualities of *rationality* and the dangers of *rationality* as a legitimising concept, which makes state violence like imprisonment appear harmless, by pure reference to it. This dangerous tautology has been further discussed and deconstructed in the epistemological discussion of this thesis which has helped to challenge the *affect/rationality dichotomy* theoretically (Chapter IV and VIII).

Therefore, it has been central for the development of an affective reading and thinking of the prison to critique this Enlightenment tradition of thinking. Subsequently, this thesis has argued a paradigmatic shift of epistemology towards seeing the world affectively. Questioning the *affect/rationality dichotomy* from within feminist scholarship (Ahmed, 2006; Berlant, 2005; Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983) has revealed that *rationality* and *affect* cannot be understood as irreconcilable opposites but that they are two sides of the same coin. Critically questioning *rationality* has shown that it portrays a particular male vantage point which is equally subverted with affect making *rationality* an affective concept in itself. As such, the feminist discussion has further supported the indicative argument made in the theoretical discussion (Chapters I and II) showing that *rationality* is affective in its origins and has allowed for positioning *rationality* as a patriarchal concept.

The *Critical Discourse Analysis* (Chapters V, VI and VII) demonstrated how the official discourse on prisons relies on the *affect/rationality dichotomy* as it practically deconstructs this 'state talk' (Corrigan & Sayer, 1985; Sim & Tombs, 2009). Therein, this thesis adds to the critical body of work within criminology that directly discusses the prison as a fundamentally patriarchal institution (Acker, 1990; Britton, 2000; Davis et al., 2021; Nagel, 2013) (Chapter III). It has also provided illustration of how official

narratives of the prison, as well as some sociological and criminological work, reproduce patriarchal accounts to a certain extent when the concept of *rationality* is uncritically adopted to address the prison.

Therein, deconstructing *rationality* using standpoint feminism (Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983; Smith, 1974) makes obvious that dominating *rational* accounts of state violence and the prison remain limited in their explanatory scope. because they always portray and reproduce a partial view. This thesis acknowledges the importance of situatedness and the value of making knowledge production processes transparent through embracing *imagination* and *affect* during the research process. In this sense, the thesis contributes to understanding the prison differently with its affective exploration of the prison, and adds a valuable perspective to be considered in understanding this institution.

In conclusion, pivoting epistemology towards seeing the world affectively and deconstructing the *affect/rationality dichotomy* is of central importance for this research endeavour. Crucially, the discussion demonstrates that *rationality* obfuscates *affect* in its patriarchal conceptualisation that is founded in Cartesian thinking. Therefore, rendering visible that *rationality* is inherently *affective* is a feminist critique of the prison as a patriarchal institution. Conceptualising *rationality* as *affective* critiques the *affect/rationality dichotomy*. It further illustrates how the dichotomy represents a power relationship in which the affect-averse idea of *rationality* dominates *affect*, which in consequence ascribes value to an affect-averse understanding of *rationality*. Therefore, questioning the dichotomy within the official discourse on prisons, means embracing a feminist orientation to research as it challenges the power basis that fundaments the prison institution as we know it.

9.1.3 The Affective Moral Fact – a Conceptual Model for Thinking the Prison Affectively

The Critical Discourse Analysis demonstrates how affect can be traced in the rationalising official discourse on prisons, which allows to establish an affective counter reading. Understanding *rationality* as an *affective moral fact*, further positions the prison as an affective institution.

The *affective moral fact* has been developed with the intention to anchor *affect* in an explanatory framework suitable to address sociocultural complexities on an institutional level. The *affective moral fact* has been established in roughly two steps: (i) the theoretical discussion as presented in *2.2 Filling the Theoretical Gap: Taking Affect Seriously*, and (ii) the further shaping of the framework through the Critical Discourse Analysis as argued and outlined *in Chapter VIII: Theorising the Prison as an Affective Institution Alongside the Affective Moral Fact*.

Conceptually, the *affective moral fact* has been framed along a re-reading of Durkheim (Barnwell, 2018; Durkheim, 1953, 1957, 1958, 1973; Karsenti, 2012, 2013; Meštrović, 1988; Mukherjee, 2006; Weiss, 2012; Weyher, 2012, 2012a) and, in particular, the extension of Durkheim's *moral fact* (1953), with an understanding of *affect* as presented in cultural affect studies (Ahmed, 2010, 2014; Berlant, 2005, 2009, 2011; Sedgwick, 2003).

As *affect* is conceptualised along the central works of Ahmed (2010, 2014), Berlant (2005, 2009, 2011) and Sedgwick (2003), it is understood as socioculturally constructed as it is a relational force between animate and inanimate bodies. Thereby, this conceptualisation recognises the material aspects of feeling as it includes bodies and objects. This body of work equally sees *affect* as sense-giver and sense-maker in society (Ahmed, 2010, 2014; Berlant, 2005, 2009, 2011; Sedgwick, 2003) emphasising its epistemological value.

Developing this framework along Durkheim's *moral fact* (1953) captures the coercive powers of society which are reflected in affective relationships that can sway individuals. This affective force is anchored in the social, pre-cognitive, but never pre-social, *conscience collective* (Durkheim, 1958, 1984, 2001) that reflects the affective state of society. Thereby, Durkheim's *moral fact* mirrors essential ideas on *affect* as presented in cultural affect studies (Ahmed, 2010, 2014; Berlant, 2005, 2009, 2011; Sedgwick, 2003).

Accordingly, the *affective moral fact* is a theoretical framework that captures and signifies popular sociocultural values and morality that are expressed through affect in a particular time and place. The *affective moral fact* represents the dominant way of being, thinking and feeling, which is understood as affectively represented in material

and immaterial affective relationships. Thereby, the framework highlights that the built environment and objects must not be left unattended for sociological research.

Embracing the *affective moral fact* in the Critical Discourse Analysis of official prison reports equally points out that these rationalising state imaginaries are essentially reliant on *affect*. This affectivity can be recognised as manifested in the prison's bureaucratic processes and built environment, as much as it pervades its atmosphere, relationships and impacts the bodies of those experiencing the prison. Thereby, the research under an affective lens demonstrates how the imaginary of the rational, affect-averse prison is constructed through the intricate and even paradoxical layers in its narrative. This finds expression in the orchestration of official discourse along a sociocultural symbolism and hierarchy which has been exemplified through the conceptualisation of *force* and *violence* (8.2.1).

Crucially, the discussion of theoretical accounts and the discursive research under a feminist epistemological lens, draws attention to the epistemological, explanatory, and moral implications of rationalising works. This eventually allowed to establish *rationality* as an *affective moral fact.*

Thinking the prison affectively through this framework facilitates to draw a more nuanced picture of the sociocultural complexities constituting and sustaining the *rational* prison institution. It clarifies the paradoxical and reified imaginary of the prison in an Enlightenment tradition, as it positions *rationality* as a sociocultural dominant way of being and thinking. Specifically, *rationality* can be understood as representing patriarchal ideas that are ascribed immense value in Western states. This has been established along feminist scholarship (Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983; Smith, 1974) which helps to challenge and destabilise reified notions of *rationality* (see 4.1). The *affective moral fact* embodies these feminist epistemologies and operationalises them in a tangible framework that proved itself suitable for the affective exploration of the prison. It allows to further excavate theoretical gaps as represented in state theory, political sociology, and criminological research, and to develop critical readings of official discourse on the prison. Recognising *rationality* as an *affective moral fact*, the *rational* prison can be seen as promoting a form of state power that is affect-saturated and driven at all times; as a sociocultural representation of dominating affect and sociocultural values specific to

its time and place. Accordingly, it allows researchers to see that punishment is inherently affect-driven. This encourages to further question state imaginaries and academic discourse that make prisons approvable and justifiable under a rationalising narrative.

Conceptualising *rationality* as an *affective moral fact* stops replicating rationalising, affect-averse versions of state violence and instead, establishes the *rational* prison as an *affective* institution, since *rationality* depicts a particular way of being and thinking. As the *affective moral fact* allows us to develop a more nuanced understanding of *rationality*, it equally facilitates more complex understandings of institutions that adopt this label. Conversely, not dissecting *rationality* in academic and official discourses risks reproducing limiting understandings.

The *affective moral fact* is the theoretical framework for *thinking the prison affectively*. As it anchors affect in the critical-sociological considerations, it allows to recognise *affect* as an essential part in developing and structuring institutions around dominating sentiments and moral convictions in a particular time and place. Thereby, the *affective moral fact* offers itself to be applied beyond the prison context, as it seems suitable to be used as a framework to explore other institutions, e.g. educational, economical or religious institutions. Its value lies in generating nuanced understandings of how institutions are informed and shaped by sociocultural values which are always seen as anchored in the affect they portray (Durkheim, 1953). Embracing an understanding of *affect* as relational sense-givers and sense-makers in this world, situates the *affective moral fact* along feminist epistemologies (Ahmed, 2010, 2014; Berlant, 2005, 2009, 2011; Sedgwick, 2003). Therefore, the *affective moral fact* is a suitable framework for generating more complex understandings of institutions, since it draws attention to the complex entanglement of theoretical and official discourses and their epistemological fundament that necessarily needs to be addressed for more nuanced understandings.

Crucially, the *affective moral fact* shows how *affect* can be operationalised in sociological research. *Affect* is perceived as an amorphous concept in a cluttered theoretical landscape which makes sociological research hesitant to engage with it (von Scheve, 2016). Following Barnewell's (2018) call to embrace *affect* in sociology to counter limitations in research and theoretical understandings, *affect* has been conceptualised along the works of Ahmed (2010, 2014), Berlant (2005, 2009, 2011)

and Sedgwick (2003). This has allowed to cut through some of the perceived messiness of the concept. Embracing *affect* in the *affective moral fact* has allowed for the imaginative (Mills, 2000) construction of the conceptual framework that has enabled the creative interrogation of the sociological problem the thesis basis itself in. This demonstrates that *affect* holds analytical value for sociological research. Recognising its significance brings affect in the realm of sociology. Therefore, the *affective moral fact* constitutes an original contribution of this thesis.

9.2 Implications for Critical Thinking and the Prison

As has been outlined in the *Introduction* of this thesis, the motivation for exploring the prison affectively grew out of the moral and political desire to understand how prisons in England and Wales can be continuously legitimised and framed as 'civilised' along a rational argument when the evidence of their harmful nature is overwhelming. It equally grew out of an academic problem, which has been constituted by a missing explanatory framework that could theoretically capture and understand the discrepancy between the continued rationalisation of prisons as a civilised form of state punishment. The latter justifies prisons based on their apparent affect-averse approach to punishment but, as this thesis shows, is underpinned by affect. The theoretical and methodological exploration of the prison as an affective institution clearly addresses and offers a way of comprehensively addressing this sociological problem; as the Critical Discourse Analysis of prison reports and the conceptual discussion of *rationality* as an *affective moral fact* provide for a nuanced reading of the prison as an affective institution. Accordingly, *thinking the prison affectively* has theoretical, methodological and political implications. These, as well as limitations of this research, are addressed in the following sections.

9.2.1 Limitations of the Thesis

In this research, 15 prison reports of three English prisons – HMP Birmingham, HMP Liverpool and HMP Pentonville – over the period of 1982-2019 have been discursively analysed. Researching the prison as an affective institution through a Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (Jäger, 2015) was decided upon when it became clear that I would

not get access for an ethnographic and visual study of a prison in Berlin, Germany. This became apparent after a lengthy ethics process of about six months in 2019, after my research has been discussed with the Central University Research Ethics Committee by the University of Liverpool. Following Ethics Committee protocol, I could only contact the gatekeepers of the German institution once the Ethics Committee cleared my project. The gatekeepers there informed me that access for researching the prison as an affective institution would not be granted. As there are funding and time constraints on PhD research, I have not been in a position to apply for getting access to a prison in England and Wales. What at first seemed a possible limitation for my research project, motivated me to think of other creative ways that do not depend on access to a prison. And whilst the methodological exploration of the affective prison through Critical Discourse Analysis represents a unique contribution of this thesis, it is worth noting that being physically immersed in the built environment of the prison as a researcher, and to interview those that experience the institution on an everyday basis would have offered a unique situation for the affective exploration of the institution. It would have allowed to fully immerse in the atmosphere of the prison and to research how the affective institution is represented in the smells, sounds and materiality of the institution. It would have given the opportunity to render the voices of prisoners visible, which are otherwise not given much attention in official documents. Prisoners' voices would shed further critical light for how they make sense of the *rational* prison. Therefore, it would be a worthwhile endeavour to see how this discursive analysis compares to research on site, and how the affective exploration of the prison can be further pursued when access to the prison is granted.

Another limitation of this research is owed to its geographical focus. This *affective* exploration speaks to how prisons can be read differently in England and Wales. Further research could be meaningfully undertaken to see how the *affective prison* represents itself differently in other countries.

The imaginative development of Critical Discourse Analysis allowed for drawing on my imagination as research data and for the creative reading of photographs. This has illustrated that the official discourse on prisons is not just orchestrated through the text-based corpus, but relies on visual communication and the sociocultural affective symbolism attached to language that evokes affective responses by those that engage

with it. This is important to note as affect renders itself visible beyond that which can be captured in and conveyed through language (Ahmed, 2010, 2014; Sedgwick, 2003) (Chapter IV). Whilst this methodological framework mitigates some of the restrictions of language-based research on affect, it still has limitation since this PhD is reliant on a text-based portrayal of an argument. As *affect* cannot fully be captured in language, it ultimately represents a limitation of any research of affect that is reliant on the production of a textual artefact. It, however, inspires us to think about how else sociological research can be expressed when we know that what we research goes beyond language.

Throughout this research, I embraced a feminist standpoint approach (Chapter IV) that argues for making the processes of knowledge production transparent, with the purpose to prevent the reproduction of rationalising versions of the prison, and to contribute a different vantage point on the institution. I want to emphasise that it is my awareness, my situatedness, my imagination and my affective experience that has guided the research process. Whilst this provides a distinctive perspective on the prison, it does not – just like any other perspective offered in state theory, political sociology, and criminological debates – provide for a generalisable reading of the prison.

Critical criminological debates and the epistemological discussion (Chapters III and IV) emphasised that any critique on the prison can be understood as a feminist critique, since it necessarily challenges a patriarchal institution. Developing a feminist counter narrative through the Critical Discourse Analysis of prison reports of three male prisons, highlighted the need to focus upon the gendered dimension of the institution for expanding on the more nuanced understanding of the prison presented in this thesis. Whilst there is a body of work on how women experience the quotidian life within prisons (Baroness Corston, 2007; Bosworth & Carrabine, 2001; Carlen, 1983; Carlen & Worrall, 2004), it seems necessary to draw further attention to how the institution is an embodiment of the patriarchy, like it has been done in the research of Britton (1997, 2000, 2003), and to explore this further in context of an affective reading of the prison.

9.2.2 Theoretical Contributions

As mentioned above, the theoretical contribution of this thesis finds expression in the conceptual framing of the *affective moral fact.* This framework has helped articulate ways of reconsidering rationalising debates on the state towards a more complex and critical understanding of the prison as an affective institution. As such, the *affective moral fact* depicts a model on which basis institutions can be researched affectively. Framing *rationality* as an affective concept within state theory and political sociology has illustrated how the *affective moral fact* can help explore the institution from different vantage points compared to the dominating accounts in the discipline. Therefore, the *affective moral fact* can offer more nuanced understandings within theoretical accounts. Specifically, the *affective moral fact* represents a framework that can be used to conceptualise a counter narrative to official state discourse – in this circumstance related to prisons – on the basis of seeing the world affectively.

The study of Durkheim's sociology (1953, 1957, 1958, 1973) and its re-reading, away from its positivist and conservative misinterpretations (Barnwell, 2018; Karsenti, 2012, 2013; Meštrović, 1988; Weiss, 2012; Weyher, 2012, 2012a), have been an integral component in the development of the *affective moral fact*. This research therein contributes to this body of work that emphasises the value of re-studying the works of early sociologists like Durkheim for re-evaluating how their contributions can deliver decisive impulses and frameworks for understanding and researching present-day sociological phenomena, with the purpose of re-enchanting sociology as a discipline that should concern itself with affect and morality. This research has demonstrated this by incorporating Durkheim's *moral fact* (1953) into this thesis' conceptual framework for the purpose of affectively researching the prison and in so doing offers a unique contribution of this thesis.

The *affective moral fact* demonstrates how epistemological convictions are always reflected within theoretical frameworks. As previously discussed, prison reports also operate out of a particular philosophical conviction, which is in the case of the prison in England and Wales the Enlightenment understanding of *rationality*, that is equally present in dominating theories. Recognising this has been pivotal in this research as the critical argument, central to the thesis, emanates out of this. Not recognising this conceptual problem, risks the alienation of the researcher and the subsequent re-

production of explanations of state institutions depicting only one particular – in the case of *rationality* – patriarchal viewpoint. It has therefore been central for this research to recognise that the *affect/rationality dichotomy* serves a patriarchal power structure (Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983; Smith, 1974), which has necessitated the development of a concept that is sympathetic to this, for the purpose of creating a critical reading of the *rational* prison. With the embrace of situated knowledge – the embrace of the researcher's experiences, affect and imagination (Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983; Smith, 1974) – the production of alienated knowledge (Smith, 1974) has been prevented. This has been done by clearly stating epistemological convictions the thesis is founded in, and making the process of knowledge production transparent, exemplified through the description of imagination and affect that has been evoked through the critical engagement of the textual and visual basis of prison reports. Simultaneously, this feminist viewpoint helps to further position *rationality* as a paradoxical, patriarchal, and dangerous concept (Flax, 1992) as it contributes to a feminist reading and conceptualisation of the institution (Acker, 1990; Britton, 2000; Davis et al., 2021; Nagel, 2013).

As *rationality* is a valued approach within explanatory models, it is powerful in legitimising harmful practices and institutions by mere reference to it. It also justifies the continuance of violence on the basis of a dangerous tautology. Embodying this epistemological viewpoint in the *affective moral fact* therein allows this research to further add to the body of work on the prison as a failing and brutal institution of punishment (e.g. Carlton & Sim, 2018; Davis, 2003; Davis, et al., 2021; Scott, 2018, 2018b; Sim, 2009, 2019).

Consequently, the *affective moral fact* offers a framework that stimulates a conversation about how we can think of state institutions – like the prison in England and Wales – differently when *affect* is taken seriously. That there is analytical value in doing so has been recently illustrated in the edited collection *Sensory Penalities: Exploring the Senses in Spaces of Punishment and Social Control* (Herrity, et al. (eds.), 2021), in which creative and artistic approaches are embraced in criminological research that focuses on the exploration of affect and sensory experiences. As this

thesis sets theoretical impulses with the *affective moral fact* and draws on creativity and imagination in its approach, this thesis adds to this innovative body of work within criminology.

As the *affective moral fact* emphasises the importance of thinking *affect* within explanatory models, the thesis motivates us to think about in which ways *the state* in itself can be thought of as an affective entity. Since the prison is one institution of the state, that is built and orchestrated through the state's imaginary, the *affective moral fact* offers itself to be tested beyond the analytical level of the institution to investigate, what claims can be made in regard to the state's and society's *state of morality.* Researching this is beyond the remit and scope of this thesis. Whilst this has not been discussed in detail within this research, researching the affectivity of the prison suggests that morality is reflected and can be traced through affect. However, what this thesis does do successfully is to start a conversation about how thinking the prison affectively can offer broader implications for thinking about morality in sociological research.

The *affective moral fact* offers itself to be further explored in this regard due to its theoretical grounding in Durkheim's sociology (1953, 1957, 1958) that deliberates that we can explore the state of morality in society by researching affect within it. This conceptual point is central in Durkheim's work, in which he makes sociology the discipline that can practically research the moral state of society (Durkheim, 1953, Karsenti 2012), which – as interpreted by this thesis – he never thought of as being able to be grounded within a rationalised Kantian moral imperative. Instead, Durkheim's work considered, people follow moral rules because they intrinsically want to follow them, which is due to an affective motivation that is carried within the affective currents of society (Weiss, 2012). This *affective* and *moral* exploration would also offer the opportunity to further investigate Arendt's (1970) argument, in which she emphasised that people must be intrinsically convinced to do the 'right' thing to commit forms of state violence, and therein delivered decisive impulses for theoretically exploring the prison as an affective institution.

The *affective moral fact* also has further theoretical implications that grow out of the limitations of this research. Throughout this PhD, it has been repeated that the limitations of discussions of the prison as affective are constituted by the

affect/rationality dichotomy. Whilst this dichotomy has been deconstructed, it leaves room for exploring in which dichotomy affect positions itself in, or if affect needs to be thought of within a dichotomy at all. Whilst this point might rather fall into the realm of philosophy, it highlights again the connections between sociological research and philosophy, something Durkheim (1953, 1957, 1958, 1973) has been aware of when he decisively shaped sociology at the beginning of the last century.

9.2.3 Methodological Contributions

The Critical Discourse Analysis has facilitated the development of a counter reading of the official discourse on prisons in England and Wales. In particular, the CDA offers an insight into how official narratives constitute themselves and reveal how the prison is narrated as *rational* through the complex and intricate orchestration of affect along the *affect/rationality dichotomy.* The analysis and the subsequent discussion of the findings through the *affective moral fact* has demonstrated how discourses depict power relations that are essentially dependant on, and subverted by, affect.

Central to the discursive exploration has been the reappropriation of official discourse, in the form of prison reports, for questioning the *rational* foundation prisons are built on, with the purpose of affectively researching the prison. Specifically, this research has shown, how the affective counter reading of official prison discourse has been developed out of a rationalising, neutral and objective official document which is part of creating the imaginary of the prison as a *rational*, and therefore 'civilised', institution. Following Burton and Carlen's ([1979]2013) critical work on official discourse, this thesis has illustrated how the affective reading of the prison can disrupt 'state talk' (Corrigan & Sayer, 1985; Sim & Tombs, 2009). As such, the Critical Discourse Analysis enabled the development of a counter narrative that demonstrates that official discourse represents a state imaginary of the prison that can be challenged through critically imagining the prison, which allows us to read official discourses differently. As such, *thinking the prison* affectively adds to this critical body of work since it reorients researchers to critically engage and imaginatively read official state discourse.

Accordingly, the critical reading of official prison discourse has revealed that the institution orchestrates affect through a particular style, language, and photographs,

showing that *rationality* cannot be thought of without affect. The thesis shows that Critical Discourse Analysis should necessarily go beyond the textual point of interrogation. As has been pointed out earlier, the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis for this research has been creatively (Nisbet, 1962) and imaginatively (Mills, 2000) developed. Arguably, it has been the distinct development of this Critical Discourse Analysis framework, through its extension with *imagination* and the incorporation of the visual analysis of photographs, that have been essential for undertaking the affective exploration of the prison, and represents a unique undertaking of this thesis. Using the researcher's imagination as a basis for critical interrogation and the reading of photographs through which the state communicates its narrative, helped to illustrate how the affectivity of the prison unfolds in rationalised processes and in the physical space of the institution, where architecture is translated into affective experiences and atmospheres of imprisonment. Approaching Critical Discourse Analysis creatively illustrated how the state imaginary of the prison is reproduced beyond that what official artefacts like prison reports can portray.

The analysis has shown (Chapters V, VI and VII) that *affect* does not portray itself in an obvious way in prison reports which is why affect needed to be carefully *traced* throughout the textual analysis using my imagination and the visual analysis of official photographs. During the research process it became clear that *imagination* has been and needs to be embraced as a valuable methodological component. Accordingly, this research advocates for an unfettered embrace of imagination and affect as an automatic, situated, and valuable part of the research process that allows for the creative development of research methods and methodology. Engaging with Mill's (2000) notion of *imagination*, the research did not succumb to rigid method but actively developed a framework suitable to critically research the official state narrative of the prison. This research therein further motivates us to think about how sociological research can benefit from the imaginative and creative engagement with research topics.

The embrace of imagination has been especially valuable to research the built environment of the prison in regard to its affectivity. As such, it brought clarity to aspects of the prison that are otherwise obfuscated by the specific style and confines the prison reports operate within. Imagination therein helps to establish a counter

narrative to the official discourse that provides a window to what lies beneath the surface of the institutional narrative, that goes beyond the written word. As such it elevates the affectivity of the place and helps to unpick a state narrative that relies on the rationalisation of the institution that is manifested in text and the built environment. Consequently, *imagining* the built environment of the prison has helped to recognise that the prison is anchored in a tangible reality that is affective. *Imagination* makes the corporeality of the prison accessible and thereby offers the opportunity to be critically analysed. The embrace of imagination and the visual analysis of photographs, for the purpose of affectively researching the prison, allowed us to actively interrogate the built environment of the prison, that was otherwise not accessible due to research restrictions or could not be accessed through traditional text based CDA. As it has invited us to think about the sensate dimension of the prison, the creative extension of CDA through *imagination* and the visual analysis of photographs offers the opportunity to research the affective foundation of the institution.

Embracing imagination in this research has allowed for the idea of neutral *rationality* to be questioned and has enabled us to see official state narratives otherwise. Instead, it offered to see them as affective artefacts which facilitate the legitimisation of state violence via incarceration, and showed how the state imaginary manifests itself in the practices of imprisonment and infuses the built environment. In doing so, *imagination* and *affect* have brought to the surface the affectivity of the institution, helping to recognise that prison reports operate within a distinct patriarchal epistemological tradition, which is guided by *rationality* that in itself must be understood as an affective construct, that comes with its own imagination of what the prison ought to be. As such, embracing affect and imagination provides for a situated vantage point that challenges rationalised and patriarchal accounts of the state institution, which positions this thesis as feminist work. Therein, this thesis contributes to a body of work that demonstrates the value of embracing imaginative and creative thinking for understanding and researching complex sociological and criminological problems (Jacobsen & Walklate (eds.), 2016; Scott & Nilsen (eds.), 2013; Seal, L. & O'Neill, M., 2019).

9.2.4 Political Implications

As this research positions the prison as an affective institution, the thesis offers a critical counter narrative on which basis the *rational* and therein 'civilised' imaginary of the prison can be further questioned. As such, this research has political implications and demonstrates that the theoretical and methodological gap this thesis positions itself in cannot be gleaned upon separately from political problems.

As has been addressed before, problematising the prison's *rationality* necessitates an excavation of *rationality* as harmful, which is not an obvious argument as the idea of *rationality* is reified as a 'civilised' approach (Barrett, 1992; Gatens, 1992; Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983; Meštrović, 1988, 1998; Stoler, 2007; Whitford, 1988; Williams, 1998) which is reflected in the official discourse on the prison in England and Wales. Therefore, there is no imperative to research the prison affectively, even though a consideration of the famous line attributed to Dostoevsky "The degree of civilization in a society can be judged by entering its prisons." (Vinitsky, 2019) could have prompted a critical investigation into the concept of *rationality* in the context of prisons in England and Wales sooner. Essentially, understanding the prison as an affective institution provided for a critical reading of the prison.

The thesis shows how bureaucratic machineries are effective in the way that they can bring harm under a rationalising official discourse that has legitimising effects on state violence, that permits for the portrayal of the prison as a 'civilised' institution of state punishment. Critically reading the prison along *affect* elevates the violent essence of prisons. It makes the prison 'real' in a way which cannot be communicated through the pure quantification of the prison, illustrated merely in relation to high numbers of people incarcerated in England and Wales (Howard League of Penal Reform, 2021).

Whilst the affective interrogation's primary purpose was not to illustrate the violent character of prisons, it nonetheless emphasises the dangerous aspects of the prison through the critical reading of the official discourse. By outlining how the imaginary of the prison is continuously reproduced on the basis of *rationality* as an *affective moral fact*, the thesis questions the origin on which the prison is declared 'civilised'. As the research breaks with the dangerous tautology of rationality as benign, the research follows the footsteps of critical and abolitionist works (e.g. Carlton & Sim,

2018; Davis, 2003; Davis, et al., 2021; Scott, 2018, 2018b; Sim, 2009, 2019) that question the imaginary of prisons as being rather harmless places of punishment. and critique the Enlightenment pillars on which prisons in England and Wales are built. Thinking the prison affectively lays bare how prisons represent dominating affect and values in society, and enables us to see how *affect* is central in the orchestration of power and politics. The *affective* prison disrupts the official state discourse and helps to critically question power relations.

Consequently, this PhD shows that thinking through affect necessarily provides for a more nuanced viewpoint of the prison. This demonstrates that engaging and embracing my affect, imagination and situatedness throughout the research process offers a critical vantage point that ultimately allows for questioning the prison institution in itself. As such, the affective argument can further critique reasoning in politics and state theory, pin down carceral logics and question the continuity of harm and violence when it recognises *rationality* as an affective concept, that embodies an ideological operation that oversimplifies and obfuscates actual motivations behind punishment that nurture the interest of the very few.

The research equally shows that critical reformist accounts on the prison, that manifest itself in Enlightenment thinking, will always nurture the harmful essence of the prison, even though approaches can certainly have positive impacts on prisons in England and Wales. However, the impact can be limited because reformist approaches rely on an *affect/rationality dichotomy* in which *rationality* remains celebrated and mostly unquestioned, which imposes structural limitations as reformist accounts are confined in structures that nurture the dangerous tautology of rationality.

This tautology uncritically treasures and continuously legitimises practices and institutions as long as they can be rationalised, which consequently renders harms of rationalisation processes somewhat invisible, fuels the *structural* violence (Galtung, 1969; Schinkel, 2010) that finds expression as a *continuum* in the many institutional practices (Cockburn, 2012; Kelly, 1988) of prisons, and simultaneously re-establishes *rationality* as valued guidance for institutions like the prison. Thinking the prison affectively enforces the argument that prisons in England and Wales cannot be considered ‘civilised’ because what this idea of ‘civilised’ is based in – the construction of *rationality* as affect-averse – is not existent.

There is no innocence in rational punishment. Understanding the prison affectively, therefore, puts cracks in its legitimisation along rationalising narratives as it simultaneously shows opportunities for change in the penal landscape. As has been addressed earlier, the *affective moral fact* embodies the idea that values are not static but prone to change. Whilst currently, prisons in England and Wales stand for a punitive approach under a rationalised argument, there is a chance for change when the revelatory aspects of the *affective* exploration of the prison are embraced. Acknowledging that *affect* guides punishment practices, makes room for researching how values could be changed towards the motivation of more compassionate and caring approaches within state punishment as outlined in abolitionist work (Scott, 2013; Scott & Gosling, 2016).

The affective exploration of the prison also has feminist implications. As previously argued in this concluding chapter, embracing affect and situatedness offer a vantage point on the prison that necessarily critiques the prison as a patriarchal institution. This thesis offers a perspective that differs to the predominantly cis-male viewpoint, that is prevalent in studying the state and its institutions, and challenges it as the dominant reading in practical state narratives like prison reports, as well as sociological theory. It has been argued that critiquing *rationality* is a feminist act which extends itself to the critical exploration of the *rational* prison as an affective institution. This thesis shows that embracing affect in research – as part of the situatedness of the researcher or as an object of study –creates vantage points that can politically question dominating official discourse. Most recently Davis, Dent, Meiners and Richie (2021) have pointed out in their work *Abolition. Feminism. Now.* that critiquing the prison is a feminist statement as it inevitably investigates the patriarchal fundaments of the institution. Researching the prison on an institutional level, grounded in feminist epistemologies, along a critical discursive reading of prison reports and a conceptual framing of the *affective moral fact*, that reflects this feminist philosophy, therefore shows how sociological research is always political, if overtly stated or not.

9.3 Final Remarks

The thesis concludes that the prison can be researched and theorised affectively. The theoretical destabilisation of dominating rationalising accounts in state theory, political sociology, and criminological approaches, and the Critical Discourse Analysis of official prison reports under a feminist epistemological lens enables to think the prison as an institution that is developed and sustained through affect. Crucially, the theoretical and methodological exploration established *rationality* as an *affective moral fact*. This places the prison as an institution that represents sociocultural values through its affectivity. The nuanced reading and theorisation of the *rational* prison as *affective* is a central contribution of this thesis.

The thesis succeeded in critiquing rationalising accounts on the prison by employing feminist epistemologies (Ahmed, 2006; Berlant, 2005; Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1983; Jaggar, 1989; Smith, 1974) which ultimately challenge the epistemological fundament of dominating approaches on the prison and state violence, as presented in state theory, political sociology, and criminological research. Pivoting the epistemological viewpoint enabled to excavate theoretical gaps, and ultimately allowed to think the prison differently. Accordingly, the thesis highlights that research is at all times influenced and reflective of epistemological tradition, which makes it a necessity to address the intricacies of underlying philosophical and political convictions and their influence on theory and research.

It has been this paradigmatic pivot towards seeing the world affectively that allowed for the development of a theoretical framework that centres affect, and the establishment of a methodological approach that embraces imagination and creativity in sociological research for the purpose of an affective theoretical and methodological exploration of the prison.

The *affective moral fact* signifies a clear shift from rationalising, Enlightenment frameworks in state theory and political sociology, since it effectively theorises the prison as an affective institution. This theorisation positions the research as a nuanced approach to institutions in the landscape of state theory and political sociology. It

thereby signifies that centring affect in sociological scholarship holds broader theoretical value. Therein, the *affective moral fact* constitutes an original contribution of this thesis.

The Critical Discourse Analysis developed here equally highlights how the embrace of feminist epistemologies, as well as imaginative and creative approaches, is indispensable for establishing methodological frameworks that are suitable for researching affect. This is what ultimately enabled the critical and affective counter reading of the officially sanctioned prison reports of three English prisons. This discursive approach depicts an original methodological contribution.

As the research evidences how and that the affective exploration of the prison is a worthwhile endeavour for sociological research, the thesis stresses that epistemology cannot be regarded as separate from theory and methodology, but that they must be transparently considered and developed as one. Crucially, this thesis demonstrates the importance of embracing creativity and imagination for developing more nuanced understandings of *rational* institutions. Thereby, this PhD stands for an end to cathecting rationalising accounts, and instead for embracing *rationality* as an affective concept in research. This appreciation of *affect* has been pursued throughout this work as it has been translated into the theoretical framework, epistemology, as well as methodology and methods which eventually enabled an affective reading and thinking of the prison. Thereby, the thesis more generally establishes *affect* as a valuable concept for sociological research.

This PhD concludes with an encouragement: as we surround ourselves with affect, and everything that moves us or moves others is entrenched with it, sociological scholarship needs to offer *affect* serious consideration – or better even: position *affect* at the centre of its concerns – for enriching our thinking and research, and for producing morally and politically meaningful work on the complex sociocultural world we live in.

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Appendix

Throughout the Critical Discourse Analysis of the textual body of prison reports (Chapter V) and the expansion of CDA through *imagination* (Chapter VI), codes and themes have been catalogued for each of the fifteen prison reports. The following table gives an overview of identified codes which translated into the themes discussed in Chapter V and Chapter VI.

Codes	**Subthemes**	**Themes**
Administrative language, framework, bureaucratic process, denial, efficiency, terminology/language rules	Structure and Organization of the Prison Report (5.1.1)	Orchestration of Affect (5.1)
Emotive language, positive emphasis/praise, 'unnatural' stop to critical argument, state narrative/public image	Hierarchy of Affect (5.1.2)	
Critique on prison, emotive language, negative connotation	Exploiting Affective Latitudes (5.1.3)	
Discipline, force, force vs violence, legitimization for the use of violence, othering, missing record on state violence, violence, staff-prisoner relationship	Different Loading of Affect – 'Violence' vs 'Force' (5.1.4)	
Architecture, architectural symbolism, built environment, construction/refurbishment, design, deterioration, estate, material, prison building, punitive environment, yard	The Prison Building (6.2.1)	The Built Environment (6.2)
Cramped/crowded, design, deterioration, dirt, essential objects/interior, hygiene, missing privacy, spatial organization	The Cell (6.2.2)	
Claustrophobic, dirt, emotive language, haptic, harm, hygiene, lack of resources, living conditions, long in-cell time, missing light, no privacy, overcrowding, prison regime, punitive environment, staff-prisoner relationship	-	The Atmosphere (6.3)