Abstract:

This article situates the subject of the academic-practitioner (AP) exchange within an International Relations-orientated critique of the imperial dynamics of counterterrorism practices and racial subjugation. Applying an analytical framework that upholds the significance of racial hierarchy to knowledge production, the main argument of this paper is that in present policy debates concerning the existence of systemic racism, one of the mechanisms enabling counterterrorism practitioners to regulate the AP exchange is that of institutionalized whiteness. The key contribution of this paper is to situate this nexus within the circumstances of liberal democratic counterterrorism regimes to demonstrate how race becomes meaningful to the knowledge that is produced about Islamophobia Using two examples of AP exchanges in the UK and Canada, where counterterrorism practitioners were challenged to reconcile with academic explanations of Islamophobia as a systemic issue, this article uses colour-line inspired critiques of white logic to identify instances where anti-racist knowledge was subjugated in the name of imperialism. It explains the relevance of these findings to the politics of knowledge production in international affairs.

Introduction

> *Knowledge…is neither value free nor neutral…but is derived and reproduced, historically and contemporaneously, in the structural relations of inequality and oppression that characterize established social orders.*[1]

Today, academic analyses of racial inequality are becoming more and more influential in international politics. This is because the knowledge claims they bring forth continue to challenge how political violence has traditionally been understood in the public eye. Outside the walls of higher education, language, concepts, and ideas familiar to discourses of black, postcolonial, and sociological studies continue to spark debates in government policy spaces. Recent examples include the alleged 'war on critical race theory', an intellectual movement cross-examining the existence of race and racism in law, government, and society. In September 2020, former US President Donald Trump issued an executive order prohibiting 'race sensitivity training' in US federal agencies, and all government 'spending related to any training on critical race theory'.[2] Following suit, the British government also condemned the public application of critical race theory and its tenets, such as the theorized existence of white privilege – 'the differential treatment and socio-political advantages accrued to white/European persons due to their assumed transparent competence and humanity'– in modern society.[3] More recently, in response to United Kingdom (UK)-based Black Lives Matter protests, the Johnson government also negated the existence of another tenet of critical race theory. This being systematic racism, a term that captures the idea that racism may result in collective unintentional actions where 'policies and practices that appear neutral on the surface can have the effect of disadvantaging certain racial or ethnic groups'.[4] The British government argued that systemic racism was no longer an issue

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[1] Phil Scranton, 'Speaking Truth to Power', in Researchers and Their 'Subjects': Ethics, Power, Knowledge, and Consent, ed. Marie Smyth and Emma Williamson (Bristol: Policy press, 2004), 179.

[2] Russell Vought, 'Training in the Federal Government', MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES (Washington: Executive office of the President of the United States, 4 September 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/M-20-34.pdf.

[3] Robbie Shilliam, 'Race in World Politics', in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, ed. Patricia Baylis, Steve Smith, and John Baylis, Seventh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 293.

[4] Sherene Razack, 'The Impact of Systemic Racism on Canada's Pre-Bombing Threat Assessment and Post-Bombing Response to the Air India Bombings [2007]', in Remembering Air India: The Art of Public Mourning, ed. Chandrima Chakraborty, Amber Dean, and Angela Failler (Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press, 2017), 86–87.

in present-day British society using the findings of its 2021 Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities. [5] These aforementioned policy moments each speak to the immense practical importance of anti-racist theorising in the current global political moment. Particularly, as anti-racist debates continue to intersect with transnational government efforts to maintain order within and the security of their populations.

This article evaluates the question of how and why specific anti-racist knowledges are allowed to be influential in counterterrorism policy spaces. It explores the power dynamics which may determine whether academics or practitioners are successful in their capacity to assert their understandings of counterterrorism and race in the political realm.[6] Here, counterterrorism is defined broadly as the wide-ranging effort by state actors and those they sponsor, to sustain the cohesion of existing political, social, and economic structures.[7] The focus of this article is on anti-racist debates that conflict with the strategic and operational policies of Western states. With this understanding, public concern with capturing all trajectories of terrorism at the earliest possible stage 'however varied or embryonic' (e.g., counter-extremism, counter-radicalisation), are also seen as being derivative of counterterrorism.[8]As are previous instances of counterinsurgency, since experts of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency studies alike continue to observe how historic struggles against anti-colonial resistance in Ireland[9], Algeria[10], India[11], and elsewhere have directly influenced modern-day counterterrorism strategies. In this paper, I focus on the Anglo-American scheme of government officials cooperating with police and intelligence officers to battle, monitor, and regulate potential enemies within.

This paper emanates from an International Relations (IR) theory-orientated empirical study of how racial structures –the social formations that precede actions and that consist of systematizing rules, norms, and values – have regulated knowledge production within British and Canadian counterterrorism regimes. It explores how counterterrorism practitioners restrict how knowledge of racism is legitimized and performed. [12] This investigation was built upon a triangulation of document analysis (e.g., of government legislation, parliamentary proceedings, Hansard documents); participant observation at the Palace of Westminster and on Parliament Hill, and thirty-five semi-structured interviews with national counterterrorism practitioners in the UK and Canada. Terrorism studies expert, Martha Crenshaw, inspires this paper's broad definition of practitioners, with her argument that actors, inside and outside government set the implementation of counterterrorism policy into motion, and that counterterrorism practices involve 'government institutions, the media, interest groups, and the mass publics'.[13] It is for this reason that Members of Parliament (MPs), officers of law enforcement and ex-intelligence services are cast as practitioners in this study. Academics

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[5] Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities, 'Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities: The Report', Government study (London: Palace of Westminster, 2021), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/974507/20210331_-_CRED_Report_-_FINAL_-_Web_Accessible.pdf.

[6] To capture the complexity of the capacity of different peoples, cultures, and traditions to be racialized, I recommend that race be understood as 'the hierarchical adjudication of human competencies through the categorizing and essentializing of group attributes'. The source of this definition is p.286 of Shilliam, 'Race in World Politics'.

[7] Martha Crenshaw, 'Counterterrorism Policy and the Political Process', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 24, no. 5 (2001): 329–37.

[8] Anthony Richards, 'From Terrorism to 'Radicalization 'to "Extremism": Counterterrorism Imperative or Loss of Focus?', *International Affairs* 91, no. 2 (2015): 373.

[9] Jonathan Gantt, *Irish Terrorism in the Atlantic Community, 1865–1922* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

[10] Oliver Lewis, 'Conceptualizing State Counterterrorism', in *THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY AND WAR* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 3–39.

[11] Priyamvada Gopal, *Insurgent Empire: Anti-Colonial Resistance and British Dissent* (London: Verso, 2019).

[12] Here, the 'state' refers to both the government and its institutions as a complex but single autonomous entity or system.

[13] See Crenshaw, 'Counterterrorism Policy and the Political Process', Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24, no. 5 (2001): 335.

are also seen as engaging as practitioners when they choose to '"bridge the gap" between the academy and the world of politics, policy, and advocacy'.[14] However, those who are strictly seen as academics, are those who perform as intellectual sources of expertise for concepts, ideas, and knowledge that scrutinizes political norms; seeking to educate rather than safeguard state affairs. In this paper, Islamophobia is the subject of said academic expertise, with Islamophobia being defined as anti-Muslim racism, a system generating practices, institutions, narratives, and inequities based on the perceived to be non-whiteness of Muslimness, as an ethnic category.[15] According to this same expertise, the distinction between phenotype (e.g., skin colour) and faith as the basis of what constitutes racism is argued to be a false dichotomy. With Islamophobia, expressions of racial difference use culture as their vector and still result in the same corporeal violence familiar to anti-Semitism and anti-blackness.[16]

As the focus of this special issue is the significance of the academic-practitioner (AP) exchange to international affairs, the key contribution of this paper is to situate this nexus within the circumstances of liberal democratic counterterrorism regimes to demonstrate how race becomes meaningful to the knowledge that is produced about Islamophobia, and more broadly, racism. To illustrate this, two empirical case studies are offered. The first of these cases is the 2019 British Islamophobia-definition debate, and the second is the Canadian Islamophobia inquiry of 2017. In each case study offered, practitioners defended their state-affirmed understandings of Islamophobia at the expense of important academic expertise which supported the existence of systemic racism, specifically Islamophobia, in these settings. Throughout this article, I argue that AP exchanges can be characterised through the mechanisms of whiteness advanced by counterterrorism practitioners.

According to theories of race and racism within IR– a diverse field comprising of anti-racist intellectual traditions emanating from sociological, legal, and postcolonial studies – whiteness is a mode of thought which centres being phenotypically white (e.g., European, British, Anglo-Canadian) as a constitutive element in the boundaries of socio-political imagination. Upholding whiteness allows a specific socioeconomic experience to dictate how politics should be performed, conceived, and organised.[17] Structures or mechanisms of whiteness are distinct from phenotypic presentation. Whiteness is derived from ways of knowing the world 'that are normalised, all the while that such norms are held to have derived from people with a particular racial phenotype, and that act to abnormalise people who do not act according to these (White) norms of social behaviour'.[18] The term white does not imply the existence of a categorical group of indistinguishable individuals. It instead refers to a social positioning and the existence of 'an unstable category' which gains its meaning only through social, political, and epistemic relations of domination and encompasses a diverse set of persons.[19] In this article, mechanisms of whiteness are argued to become apparent when academic understandings of Islamophobia are offered but subsequently rejected or evaded because they do not conform to the white logic that British and Canadian counterterrorism

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[14] Aaron Ettinger, 'Scattered and Unsystematic: The Taught Discipline in the Intellectual Life of International Relations', International Studies Perspectives 21, no. 3 (2020): 341.

[15] Steve Garner, Racisms: An Introduction (London: SAGE publications, 2010).

[16] It is beyond the remit of this article to fully explore the debates surrounding Islamophobia as a form of racism. I understand that this is contentious. For more on the history of anti-Muslim racism and the intersections of faith-based and racial violence, see: Cemil Aydin, The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017). For more on Islamophobia as racism see: Steve Garner, Racisms: An Introduction (London: SAGE publications, 2010). For more on the racialization of Muslims, see: Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, 'The Racialization of Muslims', in Thinking through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives (London: Hurst & Company London, 2010), 69–85.

[17] Clive Gabay, Imagining Africa: Whiteness and the Western Gaze (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 4.

[18] Gabay, Imagining Africa: Whiteness and the Western Gaze, 14.

[19] Ian Haney Lopez, White By Law, 10th Anniversary Edition (New York, New York, United States: New York University Press, 2006).

practitioners maintain. Here, "logic" calls attention to the foundation of techniques that those practising politics use to assess their empirical reality, including the existence of Islamophobia as an intersectional type of systemic racism. The term 'white logic' refers to a circumstance where whiteness has determined 'the techniques and processes of reasoning about social facts'.[20]

It is with the above concepts in mind, that this paper begins with a discussion locating the AP exchange within the politics of counterterrorism and subjugated knowledge. In the first section, I contextualise the AP nexus within the colour line, an analytical framework first attributed to political theorist WEB Du Bois. I explain that this framework now continues as an IR research agenda where numerous scholars identify and critique the racial artefacts of imperialism with international politics.[21] Imperialism refers to the strategy of extending a country's power and preservation through ideological, discursive or material control. This strategy is tied to whiteness in how it encompasses a project of defining a society and its people in accordance with a specific racial imaginary that dictates how world happening can and cannot be understood. As will be discussed, a modern example of imperial strategising that is pertinent to current counterterrorism-anti-racist deliberations, is the continued act of practitioners perpetuating a specific knowledge of subject peoples' experiences of racism in order to authorize prolonged patterns of imperial rule. Particularly, when this way of knowing validates the instalment of racial differences and enables governments to continue to produce their racialized subjects as entirely knowable. I will be returning to Du Bois in greater depth later in the paper, but it is important to understand that mechanisms of whiteness serve the purpose of ensuring that imperialism continues in how counterterrorism practitioners retain ideological, discursive, and material control through regulating what knowledge is legitimised in the name of anti-racism. Demonstrating empirical instances of this process is the focus of section two.

In section two, I offer two instances where counterterrorism practitioners negated and evaded academic expertise concerning the existence of Islamophobia as systemic racism, as empirical scenarios that elucidate mechanisms of whiteness. In the third section, I assess each British and Canadian AP exchange and illuminate how they exemplify a conflict of practitioners contesting academic expertise of Islamophobia. The two exchanges I investigate are exchanges where counterterrorism practitioners demonstrate trajectories of white logic by validating the suitability of anti-racist knowledge on the basis of racial hierarchy and self-aggrandisement. By hierarchy, I am referring to an epistemic/knowledge hierarchy in which ideas and, by association, experiences of racial violence, are ranked one below the other in accordance with what is deemed most permissible by practitioners. By self-aggrandisement, I am referring to the act of inappropriately underscoring one's self- importance in a process. In this section, the ideas to be discussed are that of Islamophobia and the process to be discussed is that of collecting data concerning systemic racism. The last section of this article consists of a concluding discussion, contemplating what these findings concerning whiteness, counterterrorism, and race, mean for the future of AP exchanges grounded in anti-racist endeavours.

Counterterrorism and the colour line: A research agenda for the politics of knowledge exchange

Since the tragic events of 9/11, the far-reaching consequences of national counterterrorism procedures enforced by liberal democracies have received significant attention within IR. New technologies of counterterrorism that persist throughout North America and Western Europe, such as arbitrary visa regimes, militarized policing, and policies of pre-emptive incarceration in the name of countering terror, not only

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[20] Eduardo Bonilla-Silva and Tukufu Zuberi, 'Toward a Definition of White Logic and White Method', in *White Logic, White Methods: Racism and Methodology*, ed. Tukufu Zuberi and Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 17.

[21] Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda, and Robbie Shilliam, 'Confronting the Global Colour Line: An Introduction', in Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line, Interventions (Oxon: Routledge, 2015).

demonstrate a trend of exclusionary practices erected at a global scale, but also a trend of political institutions playing a crucial part in shaping how citizens of the West come to know who they are and understand the security crises they are in. Counterterrorism's definition is inherently political. Nonetheless, at the level of international politics, academics continue to work with definitions of counterterrorism that generally summarise it as a practice geared towards the alleviation of threats to cherished systems, societies and values. For instance, Stampnitzky observes how in their operation, state institutions like that of counterterrorism convey knowledge through policy and dialogue, reinforcing government-sponsored assessments of those who may potentially perpetrate illegitimate non-state violence.[22] The issues/concerns that are decided to be consequential (e.g., religion, socio-economic status, citizenship) and questions that are asked—are all part of a technology of knowledge production, developed in a collaborative process between a series of actors and backed by government institutions with incentives. In the case of counterterrorism, a major incentive is to identify and combat those who seek to change the status quo through violence and subversion.[23] Yet, what Jackson calls 'subjugated knowledge', silencing and dismissal of certain forms of knowledge as 'non-knowledge', is a direct result of the capacity of certain knowledge experts to challenge the status quo that actors within institutions like that of counterterrorism work so hard to maintain.[24] When academics use certain forms of testimony in their work, scholastic evidence may become caught in the crosshairs of political expression and political repression when these same academics present their work within spaces regulated by larger doctrines of power and influence. It is in this context that we are examining the AP exchanges in question. One reason academics may wish to challenge the knowledge which is enforced by counterterrorism regimes, as Kapoor[25] and Gentry[26] discuss, is because the ways of knowing that facilitate these regimes exhibit qualities of white supremacy.

In practice, counterterrorism has been historically bound to white supremacy, a national and international system of formal and informal rule which facilitates the 'differential distribution of material wealth and opportunities, benefits and burdens, rights and duties predicated on a contract by those who have designated themselves as white'.[27] Decades before Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism became a viable national security threat to the United States (US), counterterrorism institutions were already modelled by the imperial and racial attitudes of the British. As a historian of Irish terrorism, Gantt discusses how British explanations for anti-imperial resistance, ranging from individual insanity to group pathology, were previously instrumentalised to denigrate colonized peoples who were often classified as non-white. Before the twentieth century, when Irish peoples who resisted British occupation were openly racialized as non-white and situated well below Anglo-Saxon and other Western European groups, 'Fenians came to be synonymised as terrorists'.[28] Amidst this racialization, the violence of British occupation became associated with the ideals of a 'rightful order' and 'civilisation' in British military campaigns, while Fenian uprisings against British occupation provoked racialized analogies concerning the similar 'disorderly nature of Irish and Black' agitators.[29]

Propagating an extremist Irish stereotype was one part of an effort by British practitioners to use 'racial constructions to undermine the credibility of Irish agitators and to reinforce the superiority of Anglo-Saxon

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[22] Lisa Stampnitzky, Disciplining Terror: How Experts Invented 'Terrorism' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

[23] David Kilcullen, 'Countering Global Insurgency', The Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 4 (2005):604.

[24] Richard Jackson, 'Unknown Knowns: The Subjugated Knowledge of Terrorism Studies', Critical Studies on Terrorism 5, no. 1 (1 April 2012): 13, https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2012.659907.

[25] Nisha Kapoor, Deport, Deprive, Extradite: 21st Century State Extremism (London: Verso, 2018).

[26] Caron E. Gentry, Disordered Violence: How Gender, Race and Heteronormativity Structure Terrorism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2020).

[27] Charles Mills, The Racial Contract (United States of America: Cornell University Press, 1997),3.

[28] Kapoor, Deport, Deprive, Extradite: 21st Century State Extremism, 43. For a visual discussion of the racialization of the Irish as non-white also see Richard Dyer, White (London: Routledge, 1997).

[29] Robbie Shilliam, RACE AND THE UNDESERVING POOR: From Abolition to Brexit (Newcastle upon Tyne: Agenda Publishing, 2018), 39.

civilization'.[30] The ideologies that filtered through counterterrorism practice inherently supported a British attitude toward race where a white establishment was determined to maintain a long-established social order. Here, explanations and practices of counterterrorism were both grounded in white-imperial reasoning which legitimised British hegemony. As postcolonial studies expert Monaghan explains, in the process of state preservation, 'a colonial functionary' (e.g., a state practitioner), only sees the activities that are of interest to him, 'largely through simplified approximations' where a complex reality is 'reduced to schematic categories' that affirm their state-centric world view.[31]Reframing knowledge in this way is essential to the assurance of imperial rule in how it reifies a position where white peoples are all-knowing and the formerly colonized remain entirely knowable. As shall be discussed in the third section, reframing knowledge in this way also simplifies the complex and often non-figurative actualities of the non-white experience of political violence. This is a problem in scenarios where the end goal of dialogue is to resolve issues of systemic racism since doing so requires prioritizing the experiences of racialized people.

Although the arguments offered by Gantt and Monaghan are both specific to archival studies of the colonial politics of the British-North American transatlantic community, this same relationship between imperialism, counterterrorism, and white supremacy, has been noted to persist in the present. Across Western societies, institutional discourses and practices of counterterrorism continue to be infused with 'strikingly similar motifs of a threat to nation and civilization'.[32] As Thobani explains, the War on Terror has continued to reconfigure historic 'practices that constitute whiteness' through their definition of the West as 'endangered by the hatred and violence' of an enemy within. [33] This time, targeting the Islamist Other. With the US and its allies each deploying discourses of vulnerability, discourses with a narrative which maintains that 'Muslims, and the "terrorist" politics they espouse'– are the ultimate threat, what is problematic is how this same discourse foregrounds, the experience of the (white) American/British/Canadian subject in contrast to the alternative experiences put forward by those people who are disallowed access to whiteness , and who are disproportionately affected by such discourse.[34]A political subject who is backed by institutions with the capacity of absolute force, has 'suddenly and graphically discovered its own vulnerability'.[35] What continues to remain problematic, in the effort to repel, for instance, Daesh-Inspired extremism, is the lengths that this white subject is willing to go to reclaim their invulnerability. This includes the knowledge they are willing to espouse regardless of its racialized subjectivity, ramifications, and potential ties to centuries of colonial dispossession.

The way state counterterrorism continues to be observed as a practice that racializes populations as part of its imperial objectives attests to how counterterrorism procedures continue to normalise racial inequalities that have existed at the heart of Western nations since their conception. One way of accounting for this process is by adopting an understanding of counterterrorism, where it as an institution represents 'a set of historically conditioned interrelationships' between individual 'communities, states, and the international sphere' where race remains a structuring principle.[36] This understanding of IR is put forth by Dubois with his infamous *Foreign Affairs* piece titled 'Worlds of Colour'.[37] Here, Du Bois offers an analysis of World War One, arguing that Western imperialism has divided the entire world into blocs of light and dark races and that a white supremacist imagination was an organising principle of international politics. Du Bois

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[30] Gantt, *Irish Terrorism in the Atlantic Community, 1865–1922,*99.

[31] Jeffrey Monaghan, 'Settler Governmentality and Racializing Surveillance in Canada's North-West', *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 38, no. 4 (2013):502–503.

[32] James Carr and Amanda Haynes, 'A Clash of Racializations: The Policing of "Race" and of Anti-Muslim Racism in Ireland', *Critical Sociology* 0, no. 0 (2013): 1.

[33] Sunera Thobani, 'White Wars: Western Feminisms and the "War on Terror"', *Feminist Theory* 8, no. 2 (2007): 169.

[34] Thobani, 'White Wars', 176.

[35] Thobani, 176.

[36] Cox and Charbonneau, 'Introduction: Locating Global Order'.,11

[37] WEB Du Bois, 'Worlds of Color', *Foreign Affairs* 3, no. 3 (1925): 423–44.

'provided some of the earliest theoretical arguments on the role of 'national imperialism' in modern war, as well as theses of cultural change and its impact on international relations'.[38] With his argument of the colour line, Du Bois reasoned that there was a direct relationship between the racial violence (e.g., anti-black racism and anti-Semitism) that was occurring in North American and European democracies and the violent legacies of political, social and cultural domination by Europeans in the colonies. According to Du Bois, the foundation of this relationship was an ideology that validated 'the exclusivity of a white man's world', specifically, in how white people maintained abstract (e.g., ideological) and material control (e.g., economic) over the reality of non-white people.

Being regularly adopted as in contemporary critiques of race relations at the national and international level, Du Bois' writings continue to inspire intellectual traditions of anti-racism, traditions which centre the constitutive role of resistance to intellectual, discursive, and material products of imperial domination.[39] Including, that of white supremacy. These traditions centre the relevance of racial positioning to political understandings of world conflict continue to be applied as analyses of twenty-first-century problems. This includes today's politics of counterterrorism, where scholars such as Razack[40] Knox[41], and Kundnani[42], continue to use Du Bois' anti-racist intellectual traditions to observe state practitioners as political actors tasked with upkeeping 'the symbolic and material arrangements of a racially ordered society'.[43] Razack utilises the colour line in her exploration of how race thinking divides Canada between the deserving and undeserving according to racial origin and accustoms Canadians to the idea that suspending human rights for people of colour is warranted in the name of national security. Knox applies this framework to show racialization is directly generated by inter-imperialist rivalries between and within states, using the examples of military incursions and legal justifications of interventions in Iraq in the 1990s and 2000s. Lastly, Kundnani explores how theories of radicalization implemented on the domestic fronts of the War on Terror in the US and UK, eschewed the role of racial circumstances in shaping how practitioners and individuals made sense of extremism and then acted upon it. A common feature is a scholastic observation of how political institutions 'may subtly inculcate ideas about the legitimacy of a social order in which material success and positions of power are enjoyed overwhelmingly by males of Northern European ancestry', males with 'similar values and understandings of the world'.[44]

The added value of examining the AP exchange in the context of a colour line-inspired perspective is the capacity that this innovative framework offers for evaluating the systemised nature of counterterrorism debates, and the capacity for the inclusion of knowledge about systemic racism that conflicts with their unspoken rules. In the following section, I offer two empirical examples where British and Canadian counterterrorism practitioners, directly and indirectly, challenged the evocation of academic expertise concerning Islamophobia. These examples will be presented in their separate contexts, and then analysed together for what their interventions suggest about institutionalized whiteness and its effect on disseminating understandings of Islamophobia. I argue that the analytical problem in each scenario is not a moral allocation of who or what isn't racist. It is instead that through their mediation of academic expertise on Islamophobia, counterterrorism practitioners are enforcing specific ways of thinking about

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[38] Errol Henderson, 'The Revolution Will Not Be Theorised: Du Bois, Locke, and the Howard School's Challenge to White Supremacist IR Theory', *Millennium* 45, no. 3 (2017): 493.
[39] Gopal, *Insurgent Empire: Anti-Colonial Resistance and British Dissent*,3.
[40] Sherene Razack, *Casting Out, the Eviction of Muslims from Western Law and Politics* (Canada: University of Toronto Press, 2008).
[41] Robert Knox, 'Race, Racialization, and Rivalry in the International Legal Order', in *Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line* (Routledge: Oxon, 2015), 175–91.
[42] Arun Kundnani, *The Muslims Are Coming!* (London: Verso, 2015).
[43] Razack, 'The Impact of Systemic Racism [2007]', 92.
[44] Razack, 'The Impact of Systemic Racism [2007]', 92.

Islamophobia, that privilege white ways of knowing systemic racism. Ways of knowing which are erroneous and hold negative implications for racialized peoples.

The great Islamophobia debates: Examining the UK and Canada

Scenario (I) The British lobby for a state-sponsored understanding of Islamophobia

In 2018, the All-Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims (APPG-BM), an informal cross-party group investigating prejudice against Muslims in the UK, organised a series of expert/public consultations about Islamophobia in Britain. For six months, the APPG-BM heard from 'academics, lawyers, local politicians, social activists, and campaign groups from across the UK, with the intent of lobbying the British government to adopt a state-sponsored definition of Islamophobia informed by British Muslim experiences. The result of the APPG-BM's efforts culminated in the creation of a policy document titled *Islamophobia Defined: the inquiry into a working definition of Islamophobia*. This document provided an academic literature review, community consultation findings, questionnaire results, and samples of oral evidence regarding Islamophobia in Britain. It also called for state recognition of the fact that 'Islamophobia is rooted in racism and is a type of racism that targets expressions of Muslimness or perceived Muslimness'.[45]

While initial awareness of the *Islamophobia Defined* lobby was low, after a white supremacist attacked two mosques and gunned down 51 people in New Zealand on 15 March 2019, British policymaker enthusiasm for the policy document was quickly invigorated. Liberal Democratic, British Labour, Plaid Cymru and Scottish assembly parties soon called for the adoption of the report and its findings. However, on May 15th ,troubles began for the *Islamophobia Defined* lobby, with media reports that anti-terrorist operations would be hampered if then Prime Minister Theresa May bowed 'to pressure to create an official definition of Islamophobia'.[46] Reportedly coming out of a written intervention that was composed by Martin Hewitt–chairman of the National Police Chiefs' Council–and leaked to the press, it was realised that senior counterterrorism practitioners were advising the government to not adopt the APPG-BM's understanding of Islamophobia for fear of it 'undermining counterterrorist policing powers'.[47] This realisation led to a public outcry, with Muslim civil advocacy groups and MPs condemning the police interference as proof of systemic Islamophobia.

On May 21st, 2019, the British government Home Affairs Committee took evidence on the proposed definition of Islamophobia put forward in *Islamophobia Defined*. Witnesses before the committee consisted of Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu, National Lead for Counterterrorism Policing; Martin Hewitt; former director of race equality think tank Runnymede, Dr Omar Khan; and the two co-Chairs of the APPG-BM. The purpose of the session was to learn about 'the potential impact of the proposed definition on policing and counterterrorism operations'; and to discuss whether Islamophobia was a form of racism.[48] Speaking before the Committee, Basu made the following statements:

> I have read the report, I read every word in the report twice …But the conclusion in
> that one very brief sentence [*Islamophobia Defined's* definition of Islamophobia], I

[45] 'APPG on British Muslims, 'Islamophobia Defined - The Inquiry into a Working Definition of Islamophobia', Report on the inquiry into A working definition of Islamophobia / anti-Muslim hatred (London: Palace of Westminster, 2019), 11.

[46] Dominic Kennedy, 'Terror Police Warn against New Rules on Islamophobia', News media, The Times, 15 May 2019, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/terror-police-warn-against-new-rules-on-muslim-hate-p2pfzbqhx.

[47] Kennedy, 'Terror Police Warn against New Rules on Islamophobia'

[48] Home Affairs Committee, 'Proposed Definition of Islamophobia Discussed', Government, www.parliament.uk, 17 May 2019, https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/83/home-affairs-committee/news/100618/proposed-definition-of-islamophobia-discussed/.

think is far too wide …it does conflate issues of race and religion…And the worst-case scenario, for me, has already happened. Which is precisely *because I can't accept that definition*, policing has been accused, particularly the techniques that I use in countering terrorism, [as being] somehow Islamophobic or racist…I think the consequence is that amongst the tiny fraction I deal with in the Muslim community who are extremists or even terrorists, would be able to use that definition to frustrate some of the powers of my officers…It is a PC at an airport strip at ten o'clock at night. It is a PC walking into a community hall in Bradford to deliver a Prevent lecture. It is those kinds of incidents that will be criticised by certain individuals because of the breadth of that [*Islamophobia Defined*] report.

Scenario (II) The Canadian motion to condemn and study Islamophobia and all forms of systemic racism

On January 29, 2017, Alexandre Bissonnette attacked the Islamic Cultural Centre in the Sainte-Foy neighbourhood of Quebec City, killing six worshippers and injuring nineteen others. Bissonnette's actions led to a national outcry in Canada, with marches consisting of thousands of people occurring to commemorate the victims and to protest the national situation of Islamophobia within Canada. On March 23, 2017, the passing of Motion 103 (M-103) in the House of Commons (HOC), calling on the Canadian government to condemn Islamophobia and work toward eliminating all forms of systemic racism and religious discrimination, was the parliamentary response to this tragic event. [49]

On April 4, 2017, the HOC Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage (SCCH) implemented a motion which stipulated that the Canadian government should: (a) recognize the need to quell the increasing public climate of hate and fear; (b) condemn Islamophobia and all forms of systemic racism and religious discrimination.[50] It additionally requested that they as a committee should undertake a study on how the Canadian government could 'develop a whole-of-government approach to reducing or eliminating systemic racism including Islamophobia, in Canada'.[51] As part of the M-103 study, numerous witnesses gave evidence before the SCCH. Witnesses consisted of representatives of civil advocacy organizations such as the National Council of Canadian Muslims, and security agencies including the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, along with civil servants, policy analysts, and academic experts on systemic racism. Witnesses spoke on 'the question of data collection', recalled instances of discrimination that impacted them', 'drew attention to legislative action that could be undertaken', and 'offered suggestions as to how [the] government should approach these issues'.[52]

What came out of the M-103 study were thirty federal recommendations. Of these thirty recommendations, what should be noted is the overall endeavour to reinstate a sustainable National Canadian Action Plan Against Racism. This plan would house a new mandate that aims to better account for religious discrimination; consult 'civil society, grassroots organizations, and interfaith groups'; and that has 'measurable targets [and] dedicated resources' alongside instituting an annual National Day of Remembrance for the Quebec Mosque shooting.[53] A key feature of this scheme is the idea that to better account for Islamophobia in Canada, the Canadian government needs to 'collect disaggregated data in all relevant ministries and departments to improve monitoring and evaluation of the implementation and

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[49] Although Liberal MP Iqra Khalid had initially tabled M-103 one month before the Quebec Mosque shooting on December 5, 2016, by the time M-103 had come to be first debated in the HOC on February 15, 2017, this attack had occurred. Canadian public reception to the mass shooting granted the political support necessary for a vote of 201 to 91 in favour of M-103.

[50] SCCH, Taking Action Against Systemic Racism, p.80

[51] SCCH, p.80

[52] SCCH, 25.

[53] SCCH,1,24, 94.

impact of policies to eliminate racial discrimination'.[54]According to the SCCH, a fundamental problem for addressing systemic racism in Canada and Islamophobia had been the issue of data collection and the reporting of hate crimes.

Identifying mechanisms of whiteness in the counterterrorism-Islamophobia debate

In *The Racial State*, Goldberg contends that 'there is something about the state apparatus, about its definition and functions, that delimits… the disposition and outlook of even the best intentioned'.[55] Similarly, in this study of counterterrorism-Islamophobia policy interventions, academic expertise becomes constrained by state agents not because of their electoral representation or departmental location but because of a reigning institutional logic where understandings of racisms accord with the whiteness upheld by the British counterterrorism officers and the SCCH. The enforcement of whiteness in empirical scenarios (I) and (11) is not a natural condition. It is the manufactured outcome of policy and legal definition set in place by these political elites to maintain the status quo. In particular, a status quo where practitioners are not held accountable for their role in facilitating Islamophobia.

Before discussing the presence of institutionalised whiteness, I would like to briefly take a moment to explain how scenarios (I) and (11) constituted examples of AP exchanges. In both instances, academics specialising in Islamophobia were physically present in policy spaces (e.g., at the APPG-BM consultations, Home Affairs Committee, and various academic witnesses before SCCH) and or drawn upon. In scenario (I), sociologists Awan and Zempi greatly contributed to *Islamophobia Defined* as authors of the '"We Are Accused of Being ISIS Terrorists"'. This briefing paper was key for the APPG-BM's highlighting of the significance of perceived-Muslimness to British Islamophobia.[56] Meanwhile, Chris Allen who wrote what is popularly deemed the authoritative text for understanding anti-Muslim racism, *Islamophobia*, is also cited throughout *Islamophobia Defined*.[57] In scenario (II), academics of legal and religious studies such as Emon, Chaudhry, and sociologist Jasmine Zine were cited repeatedly throughout M-103 study. These academics provided the most targeted explanations of Islamophobia as an extension of systemic racism[58]; drawing attention to the intersection between political leadership and media outlet narrations of Islam[59]; and calling attention to how government counter-extremism institutions problematically perpetuate a link between Islam and terrorism in the name of counter-radicalization.[60] These aforementioned examples significantly highlight only a few examples of the academic expertise that influenced these counterterrorism-Islamophobia debates.

I would also like to identify problems that were noted in this observation of these AP exchanges. In each exchange, counterterrorism practitioners obstructed the flow of academic expertise. In the British scenario (I) counterterrorism practitioners, Basu and Hewitt directly prevented the academia-informed

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[54] SCCH, 1.

[55] Goldberg, *The Racial State,*252.

[56] Imran Awan and Irene Zempi, '"We Are Accused of Being ISIS Terrorists": The Experiences of Non-Muslim Men Who Suffer Islamophobia Because They Look Muslim A Briefing Paper Prepared for the All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims', Briefing Paper, APPG on British Muslims (London: Palace of Westminster, 2017).

[57] Christopher Allen, Islamophobia (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2010).

[58] Zine writes: "The definition I use extends from 'a fear or hatred of Islam and Muslims' to acknowledge that these attitudes develop into individual, ideological, and systemic forms of oppression that shore up specific power relations". See Taking Action Against Systemic Racism,96.

[59] The SCCH highlights Chaudry's point that when racist and discriminatory misinformation is presented in the media, 'it is the responsibility of political leaders to really lead the nation and to call out Islamophobia or systemic racism when they see it and when they hear it'. See Taking Action Against Systemic Racism, 63.

[60] Anver Emon, Professor of Law and Canada Research Chair in Religion, is cited for criticising Project SOMEONE and its affiliation with the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. See Taking Action Against Systemic Racism, 56.

understanding of Islamophobia brought forward by the APPG-BM – an understanding that Islamophobia was an intersectional issue of racial and religious discrimination worthy of causing counterterrorism practitioners discomfort. In the Canadian scenario (II), the SCCH indirectly obstructed the upholding of an academia-informed understanding of Islamophobia, by not critically considering the way systemic racism would impact the way the SCCH collects data about Islamophobia in Canada. By assuming that they and the rest of the Canadian government will somehow be neutral facilitators of data collection concerning the existence of systemic racism in Canada, they are forgetting that theories of systemic racism dictate that they cannot be neutral and are part of the problem. The SCCH risks indirectly ensuring the continuation of racial inequity during their process of data collection.

Here, the primary concern is not that counterterrorism practitioners are disallowing an exchange of ideas emanating from academic experts in the British and Canadian policy scenarios. It is that these practitioners are directly and indirectly obstructing scholastic ideas which purposefully spotlight knowledges of race and racism which prioritize the needs and experiences of those who have been historically at the receiving end of racist violence. As shall be explained below, the anti-racist academic expertise offered before the British and Canadian Parliaments– expertise which argued that Islamophobia is intersectional, significant, and systemic – in each instance, was dedicated to re-centring the experiences of people of colour in a national dialogue on Islamophobia. However, in each scenario offered, counterterrorism practitioners did not just only obstruct the flow of academic expertise. They also moved purposefully to reinforce the supremacy of white logic in each AP exchange.

Hierarchy and self-aggrandisement as white logic

In the case of Britain, I would like to raise two issues concerning the practitioner responses in the discussed AP exchanges. One, the request for academics to make a clear distinction between categories of race and religion, and two, the way Hewitt and Basu openly protest a definition of Islamophobia for fear of this disrupting counterterrorism operations, as instances of white logic, in order. Each of these mechanisms serves the purpose of subjugating expert knowledge informed by Muslim experiences in the UK.

In the case of making epistemic claims about the nature of religion and race, it is important to note how the process of practitioners making knowledge claims about British Muslims is akin to making a claim of ownership over them and their experiences. By contesting the APPG-BM's report, Basu, is suggesting that he knows British Muslims better than the experts who have contributed *to Islamophobia-Defined*, opposed him on the Home Affairs Committee, and collected data directly from British Muslims. He is expressing a claim to authority over the British Muslim experience, and understanding of Islamophobia, despite not being an expert on systemic racism or Islamophobia in the context of an AP exchange. An analogy can be made comparing Basu's boldness to observations made by postcolonial critic Edward Said in his archival research observing how British colonial officials formerly operated in Egypt in the early twentieth century. In *Orientalism*, Said famously writes that 'England knows Egypt; Egypt is what England knows'.[61] Here, Said is using an idiom to illustrate how British officials validated their authority over their colonial subjects, by valorising British knowledge over in this instance, Egyptian knowledge of Egypt. By centring the British experience, as a regulating factor, Egyptian affairs and in turn, Egyptian people were controlled according to a worldview held by then Prime Minister Arthur James Balfour and his government's notions about Oriental civilization. [62] In the case of Basu and the APPG-BM, an analogous scenario is evident where white logic is being employed so that a practitioner may use his positioning to establish a *hierarchy* between different understandings of Islamophobia that do and do not benefit imperial aims. Basu is asserting that

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[61] Edward Said, *Orientalism*, Vintage Books (New York: Random House, 1979), 34.
[62] Said, *Orientalism*, 34–36.

his understanding of Islamophobia is equivalent to, if not more important than that which is being offered by the APPG-BM. It may not be the intention of the British counterterrorism officials involved to devalue the significance of this APPG's direct consultation with British academics and Muslims. Still, the fact that police interfered in an AP exchange, aiming to encourage the government to acknowledge the experiences of people of colour, does adequately represent anti-racist critiques of white Westerners who believe it is their prerogative not only to manage the non-white world but also to relentlessly police non-white experiences. This falls in line with a theme of people in power rationalising racial inequity in a manner where those accused of perpetrating structurally racist actions can continue to undermine a victims' sense of reality.[63]

As Stoler posits, 'imperial formations thrive on the capacity to assign innocuous appellations to their systems of demarcation' so that colonial systems remain unearthed in public discourse.[64] Understanding the intersectional nature of racial and religious discrimination is important to anti-racist action and intellectualism because it draws attention to the need for reflexivity when attributing people to categories in conflict mediation. Especially, when the enforcement of said categories is alleged to further enable the oppression and dehumanization of a people by denying their access to claims of inequality. This paper takes the stance that Islamophobia constitutes a form of systemic racism – a stance that remains contested by those who continue to maintain that a distinction between phenotype and culture is a real dichotomy. However, it is important to consider who this delineation between race and religion is more important to, particularly when it is being argued to misrepresent the nature of Islamophobia experienced by British Muslims. Who does this reluctance to complicate conceptual understandings of this type of racism predominantly serve? If the answer is not British Muslims, then what is the purpose upholding understandings of racism that do not accurately embody the British racial experience?

A second example of hierarchy, is when state practitioners are allowed to differentiate between the value of the nation and the value of Muslim livelihood in relation to counterterrorism operations. The attitude is that their, British Muslim, violence is not "our" violence since Islamophobia is not considered to be an equivalent problem of the nation or the apparatus tasked with serving the nation. Paraphrasing Razack, what is captured in the understanding that Muslims 'are not like us' is a mutual idea where the Muslim suspension of rights is secondary and normal, particularly when Muslim rights are being suspended for the purpose of safeguarding a white non-Muslim majority.[65] White logic is evident with Hewitt and Basu prioritizing the wellbeing of other counterterrorism officers who may be endangered by academic expertise which may be used to critique counterterrorism practices, particularly practices which infer the validity of race management as a security precaution. With this logic, practitioners dealing with claims of racism and Islamophobia remain empowered to argue that: 'the problem is their [race/] culture not our politics', all the while continuing to contribute to the very conditions which normalise colonial assumptions about racial difference.[66]

In Canada, it is the self-aggrandising nature of the SCCH-orientated AP exchange, that is so poignant with regard to white logic in scenario (II) with the. As has been previously discussed, counterterrorism practices facilitate ideologies immersed in histories of racial dominance. It is because of this that counterterrorism practitioners cannot be objective data aggregators. Any government-enforced interpretation of data concerning Islamophobia will likely be afflicted with the logics that prevail in Canadian institutions responsible for making decisions for what kinds of question should be asked about Islamophobia, and how information about Islamophobia is to be analysed. The application of science to a societal phenomenon can bring clarity to deep-seated political issues. But this can only happen in so far as a hegemonic culture is not

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[63] Mills. *The Racial Contract*.
[64] Ann Laura Stoler, 'Colonial Aphasia: Race and Disabled Histories in France', *Public Culture* 23, no. 1 (2011): 155.
[65] Razack, *Casting Out*,24–25.
[66] Kundnani, *The Muslims Are Coming!* 59.

allowed to wield this same science to fortify 'epistemologies of ignorance that reproduce existing social hierarchies'.[67] While it is positive that the SCCH proposed that the Canadian government should continue to consult civil society, grassroots organizations, and interfaith groups about systemic racism, the SCCH's choice to task Canadian ministries and departments with the job of collecting data that is so easily affected by subject positioning is concerning. Such a move may ultimately prevent actors and institutions of the Canadian government from ever having to fully come to terms with their complicity in systemic racism. Acknowledging systemic racism:

> begins with understanding the institutional nature of racial matters and accepting that all actors in a racialized society are affected *materially* (receive benefits or disadvantages) and *ideologically* by the racial structure. This stand implies taking responsibility for your unwilling participation in these practices.[68]

Yet, problematically, white logic 'assumes a historical posture that [still] grants eternal objectivity the views of elite Whites and the views of non-Whites to perpetual subjectivity', often despite their best intentions.[69] In this regard, it must be considered how the knowledge basis of Whites, unconsciously guides them to produce racial order, as part of an entrenched urge to epistemic impose European temporalities and accounts upon understandings of postcolonial culture.[70]To be clear, the SCCH studies, the policies, and programs of the Department of Canadian Heritage, and the diverse ethnocultural membership of its MPs do physically reflect Canada's very multicultural society. However, phenotypically "non-white" people can also uphold whiteness. My critique is directed at the potential presence of a shared worldview where it is believed that the government is not part of systemic racism and that its members are individuals with unique intentions who are not socialised into groups. And finally, that government engagement is objective and non-raced. On this basis, the practitioners who are exercising power– particularly that of data collection and interpretation—are unlikely to challenge prevailing assumptions about 'who belongs where' and 'what racism is and isn't', assumptions that again stem from historical constructions of race. Even when academic evidence from the AP exchanges indicates that there are problems with their state platform (e.g., by drawing attention to the intersection between political leadership and media outlet narrations of Islam) the SCCH still cannot see it. Entities like the SCCH will continue to view these issues through the lens of partisan politics, before concluding that they are issues of systemic racism.

Four years on from the Quebec Mosque Shooting, across Canada, Muslim civic advocacy organizations continue to complain that federal government responses to their disenfranchisement have involved limited action and that any targeted focus on addressing Islamophobia appears to have evaporated since the passage of M-103. Entities such as the Canadian Council of Imams[71] and the National Council of Canadian Muslims[72] have even gone so far as to maintain that the continuous failure of the Canadian government to

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[67] Celine-Marie Pascale, 'Epistemology and the Politics of Knowledge', *The Sociological Review* 58, no. 2_suppl (1 December 2010): 157, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954X.2011.01967.x.

[68] Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, *Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States*, Second (United States of America: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 15.

[69] Eduardo Bonilla-Silva and Tukufu Zuberi, 'Toward a Definition of White Logic and White Method', in *White Logic, White Methods : Racism and Methodology*, ed. Tukufu Zuberi and Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 17–18.

[70] Shilliam, Robbie, and Olivia U. Rutazibwa. 'Postcolonial Politics :An Introduction'. In Routledge *Handbook of Postcolonial Politics*, edited by Olivia U. Rutazibwa and Robbie Shilliam, 1–16. Oxon: Routledge, 2018, 8.

[71] Imam Abdulrashid Mohamed, 'CRA Case Shows M103 Motion Has Failed to Address "Islamophobia" in Government', News Media, Global News, 19 April 2021, https://globalnews.ca/news/7152981/m103-islamophobia/.

[72] National Council of Canadian Muslims and Institute of Islamic Studies, 'UNDER LAYERED SUSPICION: A REVIEW OF CRA AUDITS OF MUSLIM-LED CHARITIES', Under Layered Suspicion, National Council of Canadian Muslims, 29 March 2021, https://www.layeredsuspicion.ca.

hold its law enforcement agencies accountable demonstrates how the M-103 study has failed to address Islamophobia in government. No single factor can account for the discontent of the aforementioned groups. However, it should be considered how the limits of white imagination may have played a part. To the extent that data concerning Islamophobia is aggregated by, for instance, a Canadian counterterrorism official who holds a denial concerning the existence of systemic racism, this will inevitably influence the capacity of hypotheticals and numbers to provide knowledge of a complex political phenomenon such as Islamophobia. Especially, when data concerning Islamophobia is stripped of its context, history, and meaning.

While the discussions above have been shown to both exemplify circumstances where white logic is centred in opposition to academic expertise – the overarching issue is not just that academic expertise is being negated in the AP exchange. It is that academic expertise with the foundational purpose of directly addressing racial inequality and foregrounding the knowledge of racialized people is being dismissed and evaded in the very venues with the power to enact systemic change. Scholastic knowledge of Islamophobia, directly, and systemic racism, indirectly, is being brought to the attention of counterterrorism practitioners who have the power to create policy changes concerning these issues at the national level, but they are instead re-enforcing its subjugation through the imposition of hierarchy and self-aggrandisement. Colouring the logics of counterterrorism practitioners in the UK and Canada is not just about adding race into the conversation about knowledge exchanges in policy spaces. It is also about offering ways of identifying and challenging the hegemonic structures that keep systematic racism in place.[73] It is important to argue that racial experience should ultimately dictate how racial politics should be understood, because it is people of colour who ultimately bear the greatest cost of the unrelenting perpetuation of erroneous understandings of racism that further structural relations of inequality and violence within the Global North.

Final thoughts: On academic-practitioner exchanges and an anti-racist future

Quoting Salter et al., 'people in dominant groups can deploy individualist, egalitarian, meritocratic, or otherwise colour-blind-laden discourses that appear to be 'race neutral' but have racism-legitimizing consequences'.[74] In the above sections, I have argued that one of the mechanisms allowing counterterrorism practitioners to regulate the AP exchange is that of institutionalized whiteness and how the practical influence of this world view obstructs the capacity of academic expertise on systemic racism to authentically inform government policy. I have located my analysis of the politics of AP exchanges within contemporary debates of counterterrorism and Islamophobia. I have identified this phenomenon as a problem of why and how knowledge is subjugated amidst counterterrorism regimes, in particular regimes with imperial histories using the IR research agenda of the colour line. I have offered empirical cases of AP exchanges being impacted on this basis in the UK and Canada, analysing the 2019 British lobby for a state-sponsored understanding of Islamophobia and the 2017 Canadian motion to condemn and study Islamophobia and all forms of systemic racism. With these cases, I have identified how the logic imposed by mechanisms of whiteness side-stepped important academic expertise in two ways. Firstly, by disavowing the fact that racism is intersectional and equally important as national security, and secondly by evading the fact that governments are part of the problem of systemic racism and cannot provide impartial knowledge. It is on this basis that I would like to conclude by discussing how AP exchanges on counterterrorism and systemic racism should continue if one, it is agreed upon that systemic racism is real and that counterterrorism practices facilitate white logic, and two, it is agreed upon that something should be done about this.

Gloria Ladson–Billings, 'Racialized Discourses and Ethnic Epistemologies', in *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, ed. Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, 2nd edition (London: SAGE Publications, 2000), 271.

[74] Phia S. Salter, Glenn Adams, and Michael J. Perez, 'Racism in the Structure of Everyday Worlds: A Cultural-Psychological Perspective', Current Directions in Psychological Science 27, no. 3 (7 December 2017), 152, https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721417724239.

A major problem is that unfortunately for many, in British and Canadian policy spaces, there is yet to be a consensus in 2021 that systematic racism is real. There is not a consensus that knowledge emanating from people who experience racial violence should be the deciding factor in public determinations concerning what constitutes racism. And there is not a consensus that the occurrence of systemic racism, including Islamophobia, should be a priority in considerations of national security. The two empirical cases illustrate a lack of willingness by counterterrorism practitioners to revisit their role in systemic racism, as they are only willing to engage when it is understood that the ability to perform security takes precedence and/or when they have a definitive role in aggregating and interpreting what constitutes Islamophobia. The violence afflicted upon predominantly non-white citizens is wrongly made to be subsidiary to keeping harmful understandings of racism intact, where those who are subject to racial violence do not have pioneering agency. This is fortunately not what anti-racism is. Anti-racism is not holding a position where: *I will only agree with accounts of Islamophobia if they do not inconvenience me, or if I am in control of how they are accounted for*.

The reality of an anti-racist future requires reconciling with how although state practitioners may be empathetic to addressing matters of social injustice, they may still only accommodate knowledge that does not inherently undermine their position. For analysis, the dialogues of the British and Canadian debates broached in this paper were deliberately streamlined. Not all of the nuances were able to be captured. This includes the participation of experts emanating from think tanks, law firms, and other examples of civic society. The information offered in this article also does not contest the fact that academics can engage in processes of negating anti-racist knowledge or suggest that they cannot facilitate mechanisms of whiteness/imperialism in policy spaces. However, in the empirical cases selected, academia geared towards producing a synergy between knowledge production and anti-racism notably evoked a reaction from counterterrorism practitioners that is worthy of investigation. The recent examples of British and American administrations rejecting tenets of systemic racism offered at the beginning of this paper, show that the obstruction of anti-racist knowledge production is not just an issue of counterterrorism. It is a broader concern of political institutions clinging to the seeming truths of the epistemes of dominance. It is therefore necessary to continue to draw explicit descriptive attention to the happenings of these "truths", naming whiteness in order to disrupt any attempts to forget how these contestations of counterterrorism and racism first came to be.