

Temporality, Subjectivity, Capitalism:  
The Kantian Grounds for Deleuze's Theory of the Subject

A Thesis submitted to  
The School of English, University of Liverpool  
In partial fulfilment of the requirements for  
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
By  
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September 2021

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# Acknowledgements

I would like to extend my sincere thanks to Dr Will Slocombe for guiding this project from inchoate ideas to finished product as well as his patience and reassurance during difficult times of many varieties. His counsel and direction have been of great assistance and I am deeply grateful. I would also like to thank Dr Gareth Abrahams for his technical expertise and stimulating discussions and Dr Daniel Whistler for his valuable guidance and input at the beginning of this project.

Thank you to the residents of PGR-1 - Hannah, Madelaine, Morven, Ollie, Rio and Tom - for your friendship and support, for providing times for decompression and a camaraderie unfortunately truncated by Covid-19.

Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for support and encouragement, both material and immaterial.

# Abstract

This thesis traces the theme of subjectivity across the work of Gilles Deleuze, using the theory of Kantian temporality as a grounding idea through which to link together the potentially-disparate periods of Deleuze's work. Derived from Kant's three syntheses of the imagination in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze proposes a genetic theory of time as a foundation on which to build a theory of the subject. I argue that this Kantian idea is evident also in Deleuze and Guattari's description of both the genesis of the subject in *Anti-Oedipus* as well as their theory of the state in *A Thousand Plateaus*, which I read as constituting a problem ultimately given the name 'control'. I read Deleuze's *The Fold* and *Cinema 2* in light of his theory of control societies, as well as a reaction to the work of Foucault as both a contemporary but also somewhat of a rival working in the post-Kantian tradition. In these latter works, I see Deleuze attempting to construct a solution for the problems generated in the Guattari collaborations and through encounters with Foucault, where Deleuze returns to concerns around the subject and its emancipation from the strictures engendered by being a subject in a capitalist world.

# Introduction: Problems, Solutions, Immanence

This thesis is about subjectivity, temporality, capitalism and the interaction thereof. That is, it is about the subject of capitalism and the temporality of the subject, the ways in which our external world structures our internal world.

There are several paths one could take when attempting to engage with this topic. A political science approach would provide a descriptive account of political behaviour, or rather activity grouped under the banner of the political, but this such an approach may only yield data that is comparative or interpretive. That is, quantitative judgments such as 'many working-class white people voted for Trump' provide an account of a past situation, but do not necessarily account *for* the situation. Similarly, a psychological or behavioural-science view of the subject, while possible in predicting or explaining the causes of the subject's actions, nevertheless does not provide an account of the constitution of the subject that would make these choices itself. This is to say that while such approaches are hermeneutic and even prescriptive in their approach, what is needed in order to fully explain or interpret what may be called the political subject today is a genetic account, which would explain at the ground level a system of the subject.

The dominant theoretical approach to the problem of the relation between capitalism and the subject appears at this point in time to be indebted to the Frankfurt School, or to give it another name, a Freudo-Marxist approach. Attended to in the third chapter of this thesis, the problem with adopting this approach, while at first appearing satisfyingly complementary, are significant. Perhaps most glaringly, such a discourse presupposes in advance a subject, albeit as a lack or a negativity. This, in essence, also transcendentalizes the subject by positing this void as prior to the other mechanisms of subjectivity and therefore also prior to knowledge. If the subject is unknowable and at a remove from capitalism we need go no further. This would keep psyche and world separate or force a position wherein we would have to settle with a priority of one over the other, that psychic problems arise due to capitalism or capitalism arises due to something within our own subjectivity. It therefore also presupposes a remedy in advance of the problem: applying

psychoanalysis to the subject and Marxism to the world, or indeed applying Marx to Freud in order to 'proletarianize' our already too-bourgeois psyche.

This thesis, however, will engage with the problem through the work of Deleuze. The advantage of Deleuzianism is that it considers the subject from the point of view of genesis - that is, it takes into account the factors governing the composition of the subject, those inhuman processes that flow together to make up a life - the foremost of which is time. In other words, it is not concerned with the result of subjectivity but of its production.<sup>1</sup> This then flows into the problem of politics and of the reciprocal relation between the body politic and the organs which make it up; or, to formulate the problematic as a question, do the people make politics or does politics make the people? Deleuze thinks the composition of the subject and world coextensively, which is to say immanently, in which neither term is given priority. As such, methodologically, Deleuze has two important pairs which will always factor into how he engages with philosophical material: transcendence and immanence; and problems and solutions.

## **Transcendence and Immanence**

The most important move in Deleuze's methodology is to continually insist upon immanence. This is to oppose transcendence or eminence. It would be pertinent, at the outset, to briefly sketch these concepts and how they relate.

A is said to transcend B when it can be placed prior to it. Put differently, if B emanates from A, then A transcends B. This means that A is external to B and as such is not limited by it - and further, that this relation is unilateral. For example, a traditional theistic argument may state if A is 'God' and B is 'the world', then God is not limited by the world even though the world is limited by God. God transcends the world and subsequently makes it without being in turn affected by the world. That is, a transcendental argument for the existence of B would claim that, because A is the necessary cause of B, given that B is already granted or presupposed, it necessitates A. The argument is a self-supporting, regressive defence of a

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<sup>1</sup> Further, in not presupposing a subject it leaves open the possibility of no subjectivity at all, or the nihilism of the automata.

particular proposition. For example, say a sceptic doubts the existence of time; a transcendental argument to prove the reality of time would go something like:

1. Phenomena exist
2. All phenomena are in time
3. Therefore, time exists.

Therefore the defence states that because time exists as a prior condition of the existence of phenomena, it therefore transcends it - and the existence of phenomena flows or emanates from a prior cause, which is in this case time. Of course, what is critical to the success of such an argument is that the first premise is also accepted by the sceptic; a transcendental argument does not explain the genesis of its terms, it argues back from the given or that which appears self-evident. There is, then, within such an argument an appeal to common or good sense and an implied objectivity, which is often that which an attempt is made to salvage.

On the contrary, A is said to be immanent with B when it cannot be placed prior to or after it. In other words, A does not flow from B but exists coextensively with B. As such, an immanent argument must describe first and foremost the relation between A and B, as it is the relation that is constitutive of the terms. In order to make such an argument, the philosopher is placed immediately within the realm of temporality; as evidenced by the above example, immanence and transcendence are ontological terms that are invoked mainly in the field of causality, insofar as they describe a causal relation between two terms and that causation necessarily involves time as a component. Terms that are immanently related emerge at the same time.

This does not mean, however, that cause and effect are collapsed into indistinction. Cause A can still be constitutive of effect B, but in order for A to constitute B *immanently* it must not be exhausted in the immanation or be at a remove from that which is constituted. In other words, the effect must remain within the cause - the cause maintains the capacity to be affected by what it, in turn, effects. That is, there is a reciprocal feedback loop or relay established between the terms when they are related immanently - and it is this loop itself that we may call immanence. An important consequence of this is that, contrary to

transcendental relations which maintain an exclusivity and distance between cause and effect, immanently related terms are deformed and remade by the virtue of the fact that they are related as such. Deleuze and Guattari often talk of a 'plane of immanence', which is a conceptual surface upon which ideas are reciprocal and related without mediation or interference. Such a space, when brought about, refuses the transcendence of its elements; Deleuze will even go as far as to declare the plane of immanence as the "absolute ground of philosophy"<sup>2</sup> itself, from which its concepts will emerge.

Insisting upon a strong principle of immanence as such thus lays the ground for a theory of the reciprocal influence and constitution of the subject and capitalism. Those forces that make up the world (our world, which is neoliberal capitalism) are active within the processes that constitute the subject and the subject is deformed and remade by these reciprocal processes.<sup>3</sup> As Deleuze and Guattari write: "[i]n contrast with the ancient empires that carried out transcendent overcodings, capitalism functions as an immanent axiomatic of decoded flows (of money, labor, products)."<sup>4</sup> It then follows that the subject is decoded in the same manner, but what this relation precisely means requires investigation. Such a statement, of which Deleuze made many, takes on the form of a problem for which a solution must be constructed. This is a philosophical, but also a political principle, one which structures the general outline of Deleuze's oeuvre.

## Problems and Solutions

Such an oeuvre, or the philosophical activity of Deleuze, is often summarised under the umbrella of the activity or vocation of creating concepts. Or rather, this is often cited as his answer to the question "what is philosophy?" and broadly considered to be the practical mode of the methodology of his philosophical project. This claim is evidenced most emblematically through remarks made in the appropriately-titled *What is Philosophy?*, the

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<sup>2</sup> *What is Philosophy?* pg.41

<sup>3</sup> Although these processes may be reciprocal, in the sense that the assemblages and machines of subjectivity will inevitably in turn affect those of capitalism in some way, the true problem, as will hopefully become evident going forward, is in the *asymmetrical distribution* of those forces and the massive leveraging of power in favour of the mechanics of capital and the emaciation of the potency of a given subject.

<sup>4</sup> *What is Philosophy?* pg.104



final work co-authored with Félix Guattari, in which the doing of philosophy is defined as the work which gives rise to the creation of concepts.<sup>5</sup> What is a concept? It is "a set of inseparable variations that is produced or constructed on a plane of immanence insofar as the latter crosscuts the chaotic variability and gives it consistency."<sup>6</sup> In order to make sense of chaos, which is only intensified in the current moment's intensification of methods of communication and demands to communicate, thought must construct and plan tools with which to make sense of the noise.<sup>7</sup>

Its relation to philosophy becomes evident when the authors state that the philosopher is the "friend" and "potentiality of the concept", as one who "has [the concept's] power and competence" and as such stands as, in effect, the vessel for the concept through which it is born. True concept creation will deterritorialize doxa, it will break down the dogmatic image of thought from which philosophy proceeds. "Only friends can set out a plane of immanence as a ground from which idols have been cleared."<sup>8</sup> This is a staunchly anti-Platonic stance in which "[c]oncepts are not waiting for us ready-made, like heavenly bodies. There is no heaven for concepts. They must be invented, fabricated, or rather created and would be nothing without their author's signature."<sup>9</sup> A concept is then a frame for a piece of chaos, selected from the flux of experience; "chaos rendered consistent, become thought".<sup>10</sup>

But while this may be Deleuze's answer to the question of *what* philosophy is, it is not an answer to *how* philosophy functions or what it *should* do. Philosophy may be the process of the invention of concepts, but how they come into being is an open question, as is the nature of what they produce and the efficacy thereof. In the preface to *Difference and Repetition*, when discussing the task and ostensible normative purpose of philosophy, Deleuze states that "concepts, with their zones of presence, should intervene to resolve local situations" and that, by virtue of the encounter with a given situation, "[t]hey themselves change along with the problems."<sup>11</sup> Such concepts are only a function of and

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<sup>5</sup> *What is Philosophy?* pg.5 It is notable that D&G discuss concepts qua subjectivity in the opening pages of *What is Philosophy?* pp.15-19

<sup>6</sup> *What is Philosophy?* pg.208

<sup>7</sup> Note the ambiguity in French of 'plan' as both a blueprint and a surface.

<sup>8</sup> *What is Philosophy?* pg.43

<sup>9</sup> *What is Philosophy?* pg.5

<sup>10</sup> *What is Philosophy?* pg.208

<sup>11</sup> *Difference and Repetition* xx

given form by the field of a problematic, which is always prior to and necessary for the creation of a concept. Concepts are not universal or eternal, insofar as they are containers for chaos they are malleable - and so while 'philosophy is/as the creation of concepts' is serviceable as a manifesto-like general descriptor, more attentive Deleuzian scholars tend to frame his philosophy as an encounter between problematics and solutions.<sup>12</sup> This is because, as intimated above, 'the concept' is always secondary to and in some way at a remove from 'the problem.' For example, in the opening pages of *What Is Philosophy?* the relation between problem and concept is articulated within the capacity of the problematic of subjectivity:

There are several subjects because there is the other person, not the reverse. The other person thus requires an a priori concept from which the special object, the other subject, and the self must all derive, not the other way around. The order has changed, as has the nature of the concepts and the problems to which they are supposed to respond.<sup>13</sup>

Even though "[a]ll concepts are connected to problems without which they would have no meaning and which can themselves only be isolated or understood as their solution emerges"<sup>14</sup> the very nature of this connection, bearing in mind Deleuze's principle that 'the ground does not resemble that which it grounds',<sup>15</sup> means that there is no 'natural' direct correlation between a problem and its concept, it must be made; the process of absolute opposition and eventual sublimation of fixed identities, as in Hegelianism, cannot give a solution. Simply applying that which is negative within the same genus will not give rise to an integrated solution - true concepts are diagonal to or cannot be made identical with their corresponding problem. Deleuze is much closer to Kant insofar as a consistent part of his method is to seek the genetic conditions of a given problematic, which he locates within the realm of the virtual, that are not immediately accessible within the given, or the actual

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<sup>12</sup> See James Williams *Deleuze and the Three Syntheses of Time*

<sup>13</sup> *What is Philosophy?* pg.16

<sup>14</sup> *What is Philosophy?* pg.16

<sup>15</sup> Or, in other words, (and this is Deleuze's main critique of Kant) it is an error to derive the transcendental from the empirical, to conflate the actual and the transcendental rules that condition the actual. For example, the unconscious does not resemble the subject, even if it may structure it. For Deleuze, philosophy is not and should never be merely a defence of the natural order of things.

alone.<sup>16</sup> A chaotic and differential field always-already exists before its integration as a solution.

The function of concepts, then, is to exist as a means to map out a given problem and create the conditions for its eventual solution: philosophy is then not just a blind production of concepts for the sake of creation alone, but the discipline of "knowledge *through* pure concepts" - that is, a kind of pedagogy.<sup>17</sup> This is in distinction to the project of the "post-Kantians" in which they sought to make a "universal encyclopedia of the concept"<sup>18</sup> ultimately rendering the concept as purely philosophical and as such ghostly and immaterial, allowing no room for the chaotic movements of art or science. Only a pedagogy of the concept can safeguard against both this totalising impulse and the vacuity of "commercial professional training" which is the current and hegemonic mode of the concept today. Indeed, Deleuze takes pains to dissociate the creation of concepts from what he names 'marketing', or that which has the veneer of conceptual novelty in the service of commercial capitalism.

Certainly, it is painful to learn that *Concept* indicates a society of information services and engineering. But the more philosophy comes up against shameless and inane rivals and encounters them at its very core, the more it feels driven to fulfil the task of creating concepts that are aerolites rather than commercial products.<sup>19</sup>

This latter moment is, in no uncertain terms, "an absolute disaster for thought" - a moment that shares filiation with what Deleuze terms the 'communication of opinion', where opinion names a kind of unreflective, unphilosophical consensus and thus shares a vicinity with stupidity. Philosophy, for Deleuze, is "useful for harming stupidity, for making stupidity shameful"<sup>20</sup> and for articulating concepts that depart from states that generate shame and stupidity, as well as harming those nodes and routes of communication that would facilitate its spread. "Nor does philosophy find any final refuge in communication, which only works

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<sup>16</sup> Indeed, Deleuze himself gestures towards situating himself in this tradition when he writes: "The post-Kantians [...] are the philosophers who paid the most attention to the concept as philosophical reality..." *What is Philosophy?* pg.11

<sup>17</sup> *What is Philosophy?* pg.7 (my emphasis) Against the interpretation of Peter Hallward, in which the subject is subject to concepts such that they have no agency at all, the subject actively creates concepts within a given situation

<sup>18</sup> *What is Philosophy?* pg.12

<sup>19</sup> *What is Philosophy?* pg.12

<sup>20</sup> *Nietzsche and Philosophy* pg.106

under the sway of opinions in order to create 'consensus' and not concepts."<sup>21</sup> Therefore, a political and ethical stake may be extracted from the methodological approach, which is in turn coextensive with Deleuze's metaphysics writ large.

As such, in Deleuze's metaphysics, a problem is of the order of the virtual and concepts are a means towards its actualisation. Or, to switch to a Kantian vernacular, in the same way that the manifold always exists prior to its conceptualisation in and through the intuition, the problem exists as a differential outside to thought insofar as it is a transcendental idea waiting to be synthesised in and through the understanding. In order to bring it 'inside' thought, one must form a concept in order to actualise the problem. Once fully actualised, the problem has become a solution; and it is in this sense that knowledge arises only as the solution to problems. In this way, problems for Deleuze are nothing more than the transcendental conditions of experience themselves and as such this sense of concept-formation is Deleuze's remoulding of the enterprise of Kantian transcendental reason. In the final analysis, concepts give us access to experience itself, insofar as they aim to be the maps of actuality - and, therefore, our knowledge, as far as it can be said that we have it, is knowledge of the real itself.

Yet in the same way that the actual folds back into the virtual, the conditions and potentiality for new problematics are constantly being generated. Arising problems require new solutions and new concepts in order to engender such solutions - as either end of a relation is formed and deformed by nature of that which they are connected to. As such, a work of philosophy according to Deleuze should be a kind of 'detective fiction', in which the writer engages with an enigma in order to illuminate it, with a problem in order to develop a solution; and so it is simultaneously a kind of 'science fiction' in which, in order to write "of those things of which one doesn't know, or knows badly" one must necessarily "write only at the frontiers of our knowledge, at the border which separates our knowledge from our ignorance and transforms one into the other."<sup>22</sup> Such philosophical writing is that which aims towards the actualisation of virtual problems through the creation of concepts. This frontier or threshold is the liminal zone penultimate to a change in assemblage, existing before the crystallisation of knowledge, bordering that ignorance which is the outside of thought. This folding of the outside within is also a critical component of subjectivity; the

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<sup>21</sup> *What is Philosophy?* pg.6

<sup>22</sup> *Difference and Repetition* xxi.

epistemic adventure, in Whitehead's sense of the word, is also that of the subject and the formation thereof.

In the same way as speculative philosophy, detective novels and sci-fi often begin with an enigma, something alien or unknown that must be investigated or discovered. Left uninvestigated, enigma breed stupidity, create zones which thought cannot access. Thus there is in fact a twofold task of philosophy - a positive aspect: to build concepts, to illuminate, to articulate a means by which the outside of thought can be spoken of; as well as a negative, destructive or deconstructive aspect: to impede the stupidity wrought by enigma and opinion. The pertinent question now is: which is the problem that this present work aims to be a solution for? What is the enigma within our current situation that induces thought to writing?

In chapter 1, I discuss Deleuze's concept of the 'control society'. Deleuze derives this idea from Foucault; I read Deleuze's development of the concept of control societies as an extrapolation and continuation of Foucault's work on discipline, specifically, Deleuze seeks to deflate the transcendental aspect of Foucault's Kantianism while appending an immanent logic to his analysis. As such, I briefly summarise Kant's theory of the subject as it is found in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, paying attention to the way temporality functions in his account, which frames the subtle differences between Deleuze and Foucault as well as lays the ground for the second chapter.

In chapter 2, I explore Deleuze's immanent account of subject-formation. To do so, I return to Kant and the problem that arises in his philosophy because of an insistence on a unitary subjectivity. I then show how Bergson critiques this account through the articulation of the concept of duration which allows for the development of a disunitary self and, for Bergson, free will. In providing an exposition of Bergson's philosophy, I also show how important this theory is for Deleuze; I describe and analyse Deleuze's three syntheses of time from *Difference and Repetition* with a view to providing an account of the ground of subject-formation in Deleuze's thought.

In chapter 3, I show how this theory of the subject is both at work and also problematised in *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*. In the former book it functions as a tripartite

synthesis of desire, whereas in the latter it inheres in the description of the Apparatus of Capture and the state. In providing an exposition of these key concepts, the problem that emerges is an isomorphy of state-formation and subject-formation, which is one facet of a control society.

In chapter 4, the majority of the chapter is devoted to Foucault and Agamben and how they develop the concept of apparatus. I show that for Agamben, this concept completes a trajectory of Foucault's thought that remained unfinished, that of the implementation of powers of governance. I read Agamben's theological account as his interpretation of control, specifically the implementation of a modular power of management at a distance. I claim that this problem for Foucault originates with his attempt to encounter Christian mysticism as a technology of the self through a frame of interior and exterior, which is to say through a transcendental lens. At this point, I reintroduce Deleuze and show that the latter's concept of the fold finds its genesis in the problematic generated by Foucault here.

In chapter 5, I contend that in developing the concept of the fold, Deleuze is attempting to get himself out of the impasse signified at the end of *A Thousand Plateaus* by creating a way in which subjectivity can actively break from the given material conditions within which it comes about. I then show that the concepts of New Brain from *Cinema 2* and New Earth from *What is Philosophy?* are further attempts to create the means by which such a break may occur. These concepts are read in a political register alongside the work of Agamben, with special attention given to his work *The Coming Community*.

I conclude by summarising the discussion and offering a perspective on the general state of Deleuze scholarship today, as well as sketch vectors of future engagement on the topic.

# 1: Discipline, Control, Transcendence

## **Introduction:**

This entire thesis can perhaps be thought of as a response to Deleuze's short article 'Postscript on the Societies of Control', published towards the end of his life. In it, an elegiac voice summarises the contemporary political situation, while speculating about the future, thought through a commentary on Foucault's work on disciplinary societies. I contend that, although brief, this article contains in condensed form all the major problems that would animate Deleuze's work - including temporality, subjectivity, politics and logic - and is therefore an important and perhaps summative work in his oeuvre. It also, I contend, provides an unfortunately-truncated example of an instance of Deleuze translating a problem from transcendental into empirical terms: a modification of the problem from 'how something can be given to a subject, and how the subject can give something to itself' to 'how the subject is constituted within the given.' As such, while this thesis at points engages with themes from classical metaphysics and even theology, it should be read as always oriented towards the problematic of the subjectivity of a control society.

## **Grammar of World**

Before analysing the article more closely, it is critical that attention be brought to its closing lines. In just three sentences Deleuze gestures towards a problematic the stakes of which have yet to be attended to adequately by contemporary philosophy and theory. The final line of the postscript is as follows: "The coils of the serpent are more complicated than the burrows of a molehill." ("Les anneaux d'un serpent sont encore plus compliqués que les trous d'une taupinière.")<sup>23</sup> While the 'molehill' has been recognised as a reference to Marx's 'old mole of history,' a metaphor for that which paves the way for a global revolution, silently burrowing underground only to emerge and reemerge in different places. Originally a

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<sup>23</sup> 'Postscript on the Societies of Control' in October Vol. 59 (Winter, 1992), pp. 3-7

reference to Hamlet's father made by Hegel in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, punning on the sense of 'geist', as in the ghostly spirit of Old Hamlet and the famous Hegelian zeitgeist, the spirit of the age, the mole remains underground "until grown strong in itself it bursts asunder the crust of earth which divided it from the sun."<sup>24</sup> For Marx, the revolution itself embodies the zeitgeist, Marx's old mole is the eventual movement that "Europe will leap from its seat and exult: Well burrowed, old mole!"<sup>25</sup>

The reference to the 'coils of the serpent' is more enigmatic. To what do the 'coils of the serpent' refer? I will argue that it is an image deployed by Deleuze designed to encapsulate the nature of temporality under capitalism, our contemporary situation, and a gesture towards that which is more complex than Marx's analysis has the capacity for. Essentially, these 'coils' signify a profound problematic that will expand to eventually encompass the themes of subjectivity, time and being. The actual task of engaging with this problematic is sketched in the penultimate lines of the piece: "Many young people strangely boast of being "motivated" [...] It's up to them to discover what they are being made to serve, just as their elders discovered, not without difficulty, the telos of the disciplines." Such is the task that this thesis orients itself towards, the discovery of what we are being 'made to serve', or in other words, what we are subject to. We can see that Deleuze, in bequeathing this task to the current and future generations, is still resolutely within the post-Kantian mode of problems, concepts and solutions and by moving beyond Marx in this way, these lines can be read as a plea for a concept adequate to the problematic of capitalism or, more specifically, to the problematic of subjectivity under capitalism. This requires, as will be seen in the following sections, an analysis of temporality. There is too, therefore, an ethical challenge in these lines to complement the epistemic aspect: "not be unworthy of what happens to us."<sup>26</sup> The task of discovering the new 'telos of the disciplines,' no longer a tunnel but now serpentine, is to simultaneously become 'worthy of' the situation in which we find ourselves, a situation that Deleuze terms the 'societies of control'.

As well as acting as a coda to Deleuze's own corpus, *The Postscript on the Societies of Control* is a commentary on Foucault's social theory. The article is polyvalent and ominous, opening out into several disciplines, but in the final analysis, what Foucault's theory and

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<sup>24</sup> See Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, 'Section Three: Recent German Philosophy', E. Final Result. Available at <<https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hp/hpfinal.htm#n1>>

<sup>25</sup> See Marx 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte' Section VII

<sup>26</sup> Deleuze *Logic of Sense* pg.169



Deleuze's commentary thereon speak is what the authors perceive to be a change in the *grammar of a world*. Nietzsche famously once mused that perhaps "we're not rid of God because we still believe in grammar"<sup>27</sup> - and by grammar he meant a connective tissue of reason through which we structure our world. Such a conception of grammar describes a mode of relation and organisation of content or, in Kantian vernacular, the transcendental logical conditions of a world. That is, if the most fundamental elements of any transcendental ontology are, on the one hand, categories and, on the other, the rules which govern those categories, the grammar that these works speak of - that is, Deleuze and Foucault in their Kantian modes - is in some way the relation between the category and the laws which govern these categories, which is to say a shift in the forms of knowledge engendered within and through these relations.

This is, of course, what Foucault's concept of the episteme hopes to capture, the given configuration (or in Marxist terms, a conjuncture) of thought within a historical moment or positivity. This notion sits alongside Foucault's concept of the historical a priori<sup>28</sup> that of the transcendental conditions behind a given episteme to which they give form. The historical a priori engenders an episteme, which is a crystallisation of the rules of sense, or in other words the classification and codification of those beliefs and opinions such that they are considered legitimate, in a similar way to Thomas Kuhn's postulate that a paradigm is characterised by 'normal science' which emerges from a shared common 'disciplinary matrix', and simultaneously an exemplary image of a given time.<sup>29</sup> But where Kuhn's concept is purely scientific, Foucault is concerned with the social formations that emerge from and are conditioned by said scientific paradigm and the ways in which certain modes of subjectivity are included in or excluded from 'legitimate' ways of living. Whereas an aspect of legitimation confers a conformity to values within the disciplinary matrix given as a pre-established unity, Foucault, like Kuhn, is interested in moments in history which diverge from such a paradigm, of a break from what which is dominant and established in the domain of sense, where sense means the grounds of subjectivity and a field of possible emergences thereof. We can see a direct structural progenitor of such a claim in Kant's transcendental schema, which will be discussed below, although Foucault's modification of

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<sup>27</sup> Nietzsche *Twilight of the Idols* pg.21

<sup>28</sup> If there is any doubt that Foucault may be called a 'Kantian', this citation - as well as the autobiographical nomination of himself as such, see below - ought to function as proof positive that his project is, fundamentally, Kantian in nature.

<sup>29</sup> See Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*

Kant is that rather than these rules being necessary and universal, Foucault's episteme is contingent, that the a priori rules are dependent upon a history that is subject to the progression of time.

Similar to the Kuhnian notion of a paradigm shift, Foucault's project, at least in its early stages, concerns itself with the location of points in history in which a significant shift in social formations occurs and with discerning the 'transcendental' conditions thereof, divergences from the established grammar of the world. On the contrary, the grammar that Kant intends to buttress with his transcendental philosophy is one that would vouchsafe a kind of 'good sense' without which, he claims, we would fall into irrationality and illegitimate thought, unable to pass the judgement of his tribunal of reason. The grammar that gives structure to the world thus transcends the world itself, working to make the world articulable only in and through its frame. What I hope to show, going forward, is that Deleuze, in insisting upon a principle of immanence, is involved in a process of refusing the grammar of the world; his philosophy uses a kind of faltering, 'stuttering'<sup>30</sup> voice which does not adhere to the codes bequeathed to the world by any kind of transcendental authority. In order to examine this notion of codes, grammar and world, it is worth examining both Foucault and Kant to get a sense of, first, a robust theory of world designed with a particular kind of grammar and, second, the transcendental philosophy from which this theory derives.

### **Foucault's Disciplinary Grammar**

It is clear that Foucault saw himself, if not as a doctrinaire Kantian per se, as working within the Kantian tradition.<sup>31</sup> This is evident in both an autobiographical dictionary entry he wrote pseudonymously in 1984 and in his late essays on the Enlightenment in which he can be seen to align his project with that of Kant. In the former, he writes:

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<sup>30</sup> See the article 'He Stuttered' in *Essays Critical and Clinical*

<sup>31</sup> Indeed, I would venture that Foucault is best defined as a Marxian-Kantian, in which a fusion of the two thinkers would describe a transcendental methodology which necessitates constant attention to that which works 'in the background' of the world and is attended to and is instantiated in a sociopolitical register, such that a term such as 'discipline' is indebted to both a Kantian transcendental subjectivity and a Marxist 'false consciousness.'

If Foucault is indeed perfectly at home in the philosophical tradition, it is within the critical tradition of Kant, and his undertaking could be called 'A Critical History of Thought'. This is not meant to imply a history of ideas that would be at the same time an analysis of errors that could be measured after the fact, or a deciphering of the misunderstandings to which they are related and on which what we think today might depend. If by thought is meant the act that posits a subject and an object in their various possible relations, a critical history of thought would be an analysis of the conditions under which certain relations between subject and object are formed or modified, to the extent that these relations are constitutive of a possible knowledge.<sup>32</sup>

Foucault clearly sees the interrogation of the conditions under which subjectivity and objectivity are formed to be a crucial aspect of his theoretical undertaking. These codes and practices of knowledge are perhaps the closest thing to an outright definition of Foucault's sense of grammar, as the discursive space within which reason is codified and formalised. As such, this is Foucault's response to Kant's question about the Enlightenment, which Foucault interprets as "the question of the present, of the contemporary moment."<sup>33</sup> Foucault interprets Kant's sense of the enlightenment as negative, as a question about 'exit' or 'escape' from the contemporary, or more precisely from the state of "immaturity" - by which "[Kant] means a certain state of our will that makes us accept someone else's authority to lead us in areas where the use of reason is called for."<sup>34</sup> In other words, immaturity is a kind of unreasonable self-deception, but Foucault is interested in the means by which such deception may be externally applied, a process given the name 'discipline'. Discipline may be said to be the case in which such a state of will is imposed upon us, when authority disempowers us of our maturity, which is to say a sense of autonomy, and inculcates within us a sense of obedience; whereas enlightenment is then a use of reason, or for Kant a duty to use such reason, that "is defined by a modification of the preexisting relation linking will, authority, and the use of reason" itself, which would lead us out of immaturity and those rules which have been imposed upon us. The exigencies of this question, for Foucault, necessitate his turn to transcendental conditions as those forces

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<sup>32</sup> Original French: Dictionary of Philosophers (1984), [eds.] Denis Huisman, 2nd revised and augmented edition, Paris, PUF, 1993. Available here: <[https://www.puf.com/Auteur:Michel\\_Foucault](https://www.puf.com/Auteur:Michel_Foucault)> English in: *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault* pp. 314-320 By Maurice Florence, Catherine Porter [eds. Gary Gutting] (Cambridge University Press, 2001)

<sup>33</sup> *Was ist Aufklärung?*

<sup>34</sup> *Was ist Aufklärung?* Discipline and immaturity are explicitly linked in this essay.

which make up that which he means to interrogate, "the determination of a certain element of the present that has to be identified, distinguished, deciphered from among all the other material that surrounds it."<sup>35</sup>

In that spirit, one of the most famous cases of a description of the grammar of a world is indeed that of Foucault's panopticon. For example, by looking at a shift in the way in which criminals were punished, Foucault is able to extrapolate to the organisation of society as a whole: he traces a move from a violent and public display of sovereign power - as in the torture and drawing and quartering of a regicidal criminal - to a more humane mode of social conditioning he calls 'discipline'. What this term refers to is, in summary, on the one hand, a system of "hierarchical surveillance, continuous registration, perpetual assessment and classification;"<sup>36</sup> which eventually enables and configures, on the other, a "bodily rhetoric" "constituted by a whole set of regulations and by empirical and calculated methods relating to the army, the school and the hospital, for controlling or correcting the operations of the body."<sup>37</sup> Such a system of codes would theoretically delineate the grammar within which the present world is formed. In order to discern and describe what discipline is and how it functions, Foucault attempts to diagnose, as would a physician, a symptom of the system of discipline in order to discern the underlying disease. It should be noted that Foucault's point, rather than stating that these changes in penal legislature caused a cataclysmic shift in society, he posits that it is an invisible shift in the transcendental conditions of society allowed for the actualisation of these prisons - and as such, the disciplinary logic of these prisons is *already present* in the societies in which they are built, and as such there is the clear lineaments of a transcendental argument in the following:

It would not be true to say that the prison was born with the new codes. The prison form antedates its systematic use in the penal system. It had already been constituted outside the legal apparatus when, throughout the social body, procedures were being elaborated for distributing individuals, fixing them in space, classifying them, extracting from them the maximum in time and forces, training their bodies, coding their continuous behaviour, maintaining them in perfect visibility,

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<sup>35</sup> *Was ist Aufklärung?*

<sup>36</sup> *Discipline and Punish* pg.220

<sup>37</sup> *Discipline and Punish* pg.135-136

forming around them an apparatus of observation, registration and recording, constituting on them a body of knowledge that is accumulated and centralized.<sup>38</sup>

This diagnostic method isolates within the present a given *synchronic* moment which can then be used to illuminate a subsequent *diachronic* process within which it is situated. Foucault chooses the opening of the Mettray penal colony, as a moment in which the concentration of disciplinary technology becomes most visible, in order to perform a diagnosis of how this situation came to be and what, therefore, its legacy is (in other words, its genetic conditions and that which it later effectuated). The technologies of the management of bodies deployed at Mettray exist as arising coextensively with and as an exemplar of a 'society of discipline' which Foucault goes on to describe primarily in the capacity of an organisation of space through which bodies move; a model of society as specific but interconnected enclosed cells, each with their own grammar and specific mode of discipline. In Mettray there were designated spaces that were, in effect, a school, a barracks, a courthouse, a church and a gymnasium, among others, with inscribed hierarchies (teacher-pupil; private-sergeant-corporal; judge-defendant, and so on).<sup>39</sup> The delinquent, as part of their rehabilitation and conditioning, moves from one space to another and through a process of desubjectification, defined by the specific codes of each area, becomes a *docile body*. "A body is docile that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved."<sup>40</sup> The production of this empty subject is accomplished by an application of power the effect of which is threefold: to concentrate forces upon the docile body; to distribute it in space, that is, within the delimited confines of each enclosure; and to order in time.

Through monitoring the interned individual as they inhabit each enclosure and adopt its codes, a body of knowledge was constantly being built, allowing for the honing of an "[i]nstrument of perpetual assessment"<sup>41</sup> the technologies of which, Foucault purports, were eventually adopted - "reactivated, rearranged"<sup>42</sup> - by governing bodies in order to generalise the punitive application of these technologies within the wider social body. Ultimately the modes of concentration, spatial distribution and temporal ordering come to be seen in

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<sup>38</sup> *Discipline and Punish* pg.231

<sup>39</sup> *Discipline and Punish* pp.293-295

<sup>40</sup> *Discipline and Punish* pg.136

<sup>41</sup> *Discipline and Punish* pg.294

<sup>42</sup> *Discipline and Punish* pg.297

society writ large genetically or by contagion, rather than by active conspiracy - indeed they are informed by the codification of these vertical sovereign rules. The disciplinary society proper begins with the transmission of these technologies into the sphere of public governance and social management and fully takes hold when it becomes the *nomos*<sup>43</sup> of the social; these are "minor procedures, as compared with the majestic rituals of sovereignty or the great apparatuses of the state. And it is precisely they that were gradually to invade the major forms, altering their mechanisms and imposing their procedures."<sup>44</sup> Thus the person within the disciplinary society is subject to perpetual, micrological and asymmetrically-distributed assessment and surveillance derived from the experiment of carceral technologies, the nature of which finds its exemplar in the symbol of the panopticon. This symbol is deployed because it exemplifies the method by which discipline is applied, perpetually and unilaterally, such that the criminal that is always aware of being seen but being unable to see for themselves by whom they are being surveilled, or indeed even if they are being watched at all, in which case they will ostensibly assume, or that the safest wager, is that they are. Ultimately this analogical model is the mode in which the technologies of discipline are delivered and applied and as such how the desubjectified docile body is then re-subjectified through the process of discipline.

One result of this is the production of a class of people, the delinquent, in two ways: firstly as a result of the disciplinary process but also as a target for it; the image of the delinquent is produced as a symptom of the disease which has ostensibly been cured by discipline, retroactively applied:

Although it is true that prison punishes delinquency, delinquency is for the most part produced in and by an incarceration which, ultimately, prison perpetuates in its turn. The prison is merely the natural consequence, no more than a higher degree, of that hierarchy laid down step by step. The delinquent is an institutional product.<sup>45</sup>

What is at stake then in Foucault's analysis is the production of subjectivity, which is a problem that is inherently important to Deleuze as well. Deleuze responds to this theme by stating that "[i]t is necessary to distinguish what we are (what we are already no longer), and

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<sup>43</sup> That is, the law that governs a social space; custom, consensus.

<sup>44</sup> *Discipline and Punish*. pg.170

<sup>45</sup> *Discipline and Punish* pg.301

what we are in the process of becoming."<sup>46</sup> We are already no longer in the disciplinary society, we have evolved into a society of control and therefore it is incumbent upon us to consider what our situation now is and what subjectivity is taking shape. While we may have a diachronic account of the shift from one society to the other, as far as we might endorse the absolutism of such a representation, what is lacking is a synchronic account of our present moment and the emergence of subjectivity happening now, of what processes are acting upon us and producing us. Thus it is an ineluctably temporal question and, as such, in the following section the latter aspect of Foucault's triad of discipline will be examined - the temporal mode in which power organises time. Therefore, distribution in space is eventually secondary to being ordered in *time*. It is ultimately the latter category which, as we will see, determines the mode and manner of the production of subjectivity within a given society. The problematic explored in Deleuze's *Postscript* is the extent to which social management and the production of subjectivity interact - however this presupposes another, ontologically prior, problem: that of the antecedent temporality which already conditions both the social and the subject. In order to address this problem, I now turn to Kant.

### **Kant's Transcendental Philosophy**

Deleuze undoubtedly admires Kant as a philosopher. In his opinion "a great philosopher is someone who invents concepts" - a metric by which Deleuze measures the originality of a thinker - and that "in Kant's case [...] there functions a [...] sort of creation of concepts that is absolutely frightening."<sup>47</sup> Indeed there is something particular about these concepts that, according to Deleuze, mark a point in Western philosophy that diverges from the Platonic lineage it inherits, creating a "radically new atmosphere of thought" and leading Deleuze to claim, such is Kant's influence on Western philosophy, that "in this respect we are all Kantians."<sup>48</sup> Such is the weight of Kant's prowess and novelty as a thinker and yet, Deleuze cites Kant as "an enemy."<sup>49</sup> If Kant's repertoire of concepts has been adopted by the

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<sup>46</sup> 'What is a Dispositif?' in *Michel Foucault, Philosopher* pg.164

<sup>47</sup> All references from *Kant, Synthesis and Time* accessible: [Kant: Synthesis and Time, Lecture 02, 21 March 1978 | The Deleuze Seminars](#)<12/09/2019>

<sup>48</sup> *Kant, Synthesis and Time*

<sup>49</sup> *Negotiations* pg.6

philosophical establishment such that certain aspects of his thought have become presuppositions, exerting an influence on thinkers as diverse as Rudolf Carnap and Jean-François Lyotard, then there is a case to be made that Kantianism writ large is the current majoritarian environment of Western philosophy. As such we can read Deleuze's project as an undertaking in becoming-minor, as an attempt to disempower and détourn, while still remaining in relation with, the Kantian lineage.

However, we must be precise in defining the term 'Kantian'. To many readers, the term 'Kantian' may read as denoting a follower of Kant, someone who endorses, extends or aims to complete the [project of Kant], such as Ernst Cassirer (who is often called a post- or neo-Kantian) and others in the Marburg school, Hans Vaihinger, Peter Strawson, Wilfred Sellars, Robert Brandom or countless others, especially in the analytic tradition.<sup>50</sup> However, in order to treat this genealogy of Kant's influence with fidelity, such a family tree must include thinkers often openly hostile to, yet nevertheless engaging with and shaped by, Kantian ideas; among this set we might include F.H. Jacobi, Schopenhauer, Jean-François Lyotard, Jean-Luc Nancy, Adorno, Horkheimer and of course the long shadow cast by Hegel. Unfortunately, unlike the terms Marxist and Marxian - where the former generally signifies an active support and advocacy of the ideas of Marx, where the latter is a more neutral descriptor of an academic school or field of knowledge (as in 'Marxian economics') - Kant does not nominally have two terms ascribed to him and as such a possible distinction is collapsed into a single word. The difference between the two, then, is the degree of normativity inherent or implied in its usage - or to put it another way, the degree of support and endorsement awarded a given thinker as opposed to working purely within the theoretical or philosophical field their work creates, while not necessarily sharing their goals or objectives. As such, the manner in which the term 'Kantian' is deployed in this thesis signifies a more neutral or ambivalent correspondence with Kant, or more precisely a project that is responding to and often arguing against the philosophical axioms and presuppositions engendered by Kant while nevertheless remaining within said axioms, which is to say the "radically new atmosphere of thought" referenced above. This does not necessarily include any normative endorsements of Kant's morals, ethics or politics, but rather that the thinkers under discussion are engaged in the same metaphysical thematics

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<sup>50</sup> Indeed such is the weight of Kant's influence that one may imagine a case being made for almost anyone doing philosophical work after Kant as reacting to his work or its influence in some form or other; therefore we must not deride Deleuze's remark that, in some way, "we are all Kantians".



as Kant, most notably the relationship between a subject and a set of transcendental conditions of some sort. In fact, many of the thinkers under discussion in this thesis, the three foremost being Deleuze, Foucault and Heidegger, are often actively critical of Kant; even so, this does not negate the fact that their philosophies are moulded by and react to Kant's project - and it is in this manner that they may be considered Kantian. Indeed, as we will see in the next chapter of this thesis, Deleuze and Heidegger explicitly use philosophical structures and mechanisms, most notably the model of tripartite synthesis, in order to correct or uproot other parts of Kantian philosophy, but this in no way invalidates the source of their intervention.<sup>51</sup> Deleuze especially notes this problem, that by remaining within a tradition of thought while at the same time attacking it, thinkers are conditioned by that which they critique. This issue will be considered in chapter three, using the intervention of *Anti-Oedipus* into the tradition of Freudo-Marxism as an example.

In the following I will claim that the impetus behind Deleuze's enmity towards Kant turns on what Kant's philosophy does to the concept of the subject and attempt to show that the early Deleuze's work can be seen as an attempted corrective to the transcendental elements of Kantianism - albeit a correction which at the same time maintains several core mechanisms of critical philosophy that were inaugurated by Kant. The goal of such corrections aims at a new ontology which in turn entails a new way of conceptualising subjectivity, which Deleuze will elaborate through the encounters he stages between Kant and the *dramatis personae* of his selected interlocutors.

This entails a methodological or even ideological decision privileging Kant over, for example, Spinoza or Nietzsche. Why is this the case? Indeed, Claire Parnet asks Deleuze why he chose to write on Kant when he seems furthest from Deleuze's thought and has no obvious relation to Spinoza or Nietzsche, to whom his philosophy appears to owe a larger debt.<sup>52</sup> Deleuze denies that these thinkers are unrelated, that his interest in Kant is primarily on account of his originality and thoroughness as a thinker, especially with regards to the installation of the tribunal of reason, which Deleuze regards with a kind of horror. His philosophical project takes from Kant an ethos of exactitude, internal consistency and

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<sup>51</sup> There are communist punk bands and there are far-right punk bands - even though their ideas of what constitutes the ethos of 'punk rock' will differ wildly, they both use the same instrumentation (guitar, bass, drums) and similar compositional structures (power chords, fast tempi): as such it would be absurd to claim that either is not a punk band purely on the basis of their ideology.

<sup>52</sup> *Deleuze A-Z: K for Kant*

completeness that cannot be said of Nietzsche and a general comportment towards the critical method that cannot be said of Spinoza; rather, these influences are mobilised in an attempt to remove the system of judgement that Kant erects, that Deleuze is drawn to problems of how to be done with the judgement of God rather than to be the lawyer advocating for and defending these judgements, as in the case of Leibniz. Indeed, as Deleuze notes, Kant developed several “astonishing reversal[s] of concepts”, a method from which Deleuze draws influence, attempting a reversal of Kant which unseats human reason as the self-sufficient axis mundi of experience, which is ultimately to say an application of the critical method to Kant’s own philosophy itself, insofar as critique is an a priori inquiry into the bounds of reason and the limits thereof. Therefore it is with Kant’s importance to *Difference and Repetition* in mind that we must turn to the former work. One simply could not formulate a valid reading of the book without referring to Kant and the *Critique of Pure Reason* specifically - and while Deleuze makes frequent reference to them, the internal structure, broader aims and overall themes of *Difference and Repetition* conform far more closely to the *CPR* than to the *Ethics* or *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. As such, when investigating Deleuze’s notion of the subject, of which *Difference and Repetition* is the first substantive engagement in Deleuze’s “own voice”, we must interrogate Kant’s influence on Deleuze over those other thinkers that may justifiably be said to confer an influence.

In order to do so, we need to first examine the moment in Kant that Deleuze says “will be decisive for all that happened afterwards” in Western philosophy, namely the event of Kant’s reconceptualisation of time. Indeed, “[w]e can try to say that all of the creations and novelties that Kantianism will bring to philosophy turn on a certain problem of time and an entirely new conception of time”<sup>53</sup> including that of subjectivity, our eventual object of inquiry. In order to summarise the theme of temporality in Kant, we must first situate it within the broader field of his critical metaphysics.

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<sup>53</sup> *Kant, Synthesis and Time*

## Kant: The Critique of Pure Reason

In a single sentence, I summarise Kant's project in the *Critique of Pure Reason* as an attempt to ground the objectivity and reality of the world in a subjectivity which is composed of certain irreducible elements, with a view to establishing a proof of an objective nature of cognition. Methodologically, Kant's project can be thought of as an attempt to reconcile Humean empiricism with the Leibnizian rationalism to which he was previously beholden, before Hume famously woke Kant from his so-called 'dogmatic slumbers.' In order to do this, Kant has to balance that which is immediately intuited through sensation alone and that which is only purely intelligible through reason. For example, the rays of the rising sun and the heat that one feels from it are within that which is given in experience and intuited through the senses, but the causal determination that it will rise again tomorrow is not given in this way, it must be reasoned - in other words, experience is that which reveals the particular and contingent while reason reveals that which is necessary and universal. Kant's project is to unite contingent experience and universal reason such that it gives a picture of the totality of existence by showing that experience itself is intrinsically and necessarily rational.

By virtue of this balancing act, perhaps the emblematic move of Kant's self-named 'Copernican Revolution' is that it enacts what Alfred North Whitehead termed "the bifurcation of nature,"<sup>54</sup> which has resonances in several philosophical registers. First, in a logical capacity, Kant creates a formal distinction which will form a caesura between the sortal concepts 'analytic' and 'synthetic', between a concept that is self-contained and one that is combinative; that 'all bodies are extended [in space]' is an analytic judgement because extension is a necessary property of bodies, whereas "all bodies are heavy" is synthetic, as heaviness is not necessarily contained within the concept of bodies, it is added to it.<sup>55</sup> This distinction and the resultant terms will give Kant the vocabulary with which he will describe the features of nature by way of an epistemological register, the order of the *a priori* and *a posteriori*, that which is given in experience and that which is not, that which exists innately before any experiential encounter. One can see the immediate mereological correspondence with the logical register, a dualism between a transcendental and an empirical feature. This vocabulary eventually allows for a third ontological capacity

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<sup>54</sup> See Whitehead, *The Concept of Nature* pp.29-31

<sup>55</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* B4

in which the world as the subject receives it divides into two modes of the faculty of cognition - phenomena: as in, that which appears, that which is synthetic and *a posteriori*; and the transcendental, the *a priori* rules that govern such synthesis. There therefore also exists, outside of all possible access, a realm of things-in-themselves (qua raw unintelligible matter) and of transcendent noumena which escape human reason entirely, such as God and the soul, that which are analytically inconceivable.<sup>56</sup>

The first move of Kant's project is then concerned with delimiting the bounds of human reason and simultaneously expanding what is possible within the enterprise of reason, such that knowledge attains its maximal efficacy but is also never illegitimately deployed. In order to do so, in Kant's view, reason then has the theoretical possibility of giving sense to existence in its totality, insofar as it has the capacity to deduce transcendental categories that are attributable universally to all objects, which are both analytic and *a priori*. These categories of metaphysical predicates include 'reality', 'necessity', 'possibility' and so on, each denoting a fundamental and irreducible aspect of the faculties of the understanding.<sup>57</sup> For example, if a thing is judged to be singular, the corresponding category is that of 'unity', if it is judged to be universal, the category assigned is that of 'totality'. These categories organise and synthesise that which is given in experience and, as a result, give us knowledge, but are simultaneously logical operations applied immanently (by subjective understanding) to that which is given in experience, remaining within experience as constitutors, while, in effect, producing it. This is the crux of the chiasmus between reason and experience in the ontological register; phenomena that are given in experience are reasoned into intelligible data and then this knowledge is used to, in turn, understand and represent this experience to ourselves. All knowledge that we have access to is then a form of representation, it is first presented to us in a manifold of sensation, reasoned by the subject and then re-presented as an understandable concept. In this way the rationalism of Leibniz and the empiricism of Hume are brought together; as Deleuze explains, the faculties of reason are actually the source of all experiential representations; "we no longer need to define knowledge as a synthesis of representations. It is the representation itself which is defined as knowledge, that is to say *the synthesis of that which is presented*."<sup>58</sup> This rational synthesis that produces a representation occurs in three distinct modes which will be

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<sup>56</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* A239 / B295

<sup>57</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* A77/B102

<sup>58</sup> Deleuze *Kant's Critical Philosophy* pg.8 Emphasis in original

discussed in more detail below, but can be summarised as follows: there exists first, the synthesis of apprehension in the faculty of intuition, second, the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination and third, the synthesis of recognition in the concept. Taken as one, these syntheses and the corresponding faculties make up what Kant refers to as the understanding. "The understanding does not, therefore, find in inner sense such a combination of the manifold, but produces it, in that it affects that sense"<sup>59</sup> and thus provides the ground for the subjective representation of experience. In this way, reason and experience become intractably linked; experience for Kant is a structuration of the raw data of the given and as such the act of experiencing is itself a rational act. The ground of this combination is the subject, which is foregrounded in a way that, as Deleuze reads it, is totally new.

A secondary but no less important result of this bifurcation of nature is that the appearance or representation itself is now treated as that which is empirically real. As we have just seen, the understanding produces experience as an inner process rather than interpreting an outer process. Where this diverges from the familiar Platonic theme of the binary between appearance and reality, or between ideal form and particular object, is in what Deleuze describes as the switch from a disjunctive pair of ontological descriptors - 'appearance-essence' - to a conjunctive pair - 'apparition-conditions of apparition', moving from a system based on the opposition of identities to a synthetic causal system. Furthermore, according to Kant, one can only have legitimate knowledge of appearances and there is a proscription upon epistemic access to noumena, unlike in Plato where the philosopher can have direct access to the eternal forms through the cultivation of reason. These conditions of apparition, as we will see, are, first and foremost, space and time, with a stress upon the import of time, and, second, the mechanics of the understanding. Deleuze comments: "[t]he difference is enormous because when I say the word apparition I am no longer saying appearance at all, I am no longer opposing it to essence. The apparition is what appears insofar as it appears."<sup>60</sup> Thus, in Kant, the hermeneutic emphasis in philosophical investigation shifts from an attempt to reveal the true essence behind the appearance to an attempt to reveal the sense of the apparition itself: or in other words, the enemy of thought appears no longer from the outside but from within.<sup>61</sup> This then opens out

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<sup>59</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* B155 Emphasis in original

<sup>60</sup> Deleuze, *Kant, Synthesis and Time*

<sup>61</sup> In the allegory of the cave, the misunderstanding is imposed from without; the world is an illusion in Kant, misunderstanding comes from a disharmony within the faculties of the subject.

into the field of phenomenology, which deals with the apparitions as such, but is not our concern here. How does Kant then eventually manage to connect the heretofore mutually-incompatible positions of rationalism and empiricism and therefore also arrive at being able to treat the apparition as real, which is a necessary precondition of securing the objectivity of cognition? This is accomplished by the development of the synthetic *a priori* concept.

If, as mentioned above, an analytic concept is that in which the definition is self-contained, then a synthetic concept is that in which the latter predicate cannot be discerned from the former. A synthetic *a priori* proposition would then be something like '5+7=12', a combination of the logical (the *a priori* operators of mathematics, which are necessary and universal) and the factual (the resultant *a posteriori* number, empirically learned) joined in a synthesis (it is not analytic because 'twelveness' cannot be produced within 'fiveness' or 'sevenness'). I already, before any experience, have to hand the rules for constructing number, therefore the representation of 12, through synthesis, is generated. A triangle, analytically, is that which has three sides, but it can only be judged empirically the resultant angles add up to 180°. The rule of construction in these examples is the *a priori* which relates heterogeneous elements in synthesis. This is the logical register of the synthetic *a priori*, which can be defined as the joining together of conceptual elements - on the one hand, the three faculties, on the other space and time - and heterogeneous material elements. What "underlies the necessary relation between the concepts is a group of spatio-temporal determinations by which one of the concepts is put into a necessary relation with the other."<sup>62</sup> Space and time, then, are a special case that occupy the form of the synthetic *a priori* because they are both a universal rule of construction and, Kant claims, a contingent experiential aspect of the subject. I do not glean from experience an empirical concept of space and time, they are forms I already have access to, which, when used in conjunction with the three syntheses of the understanding give rise to structured experience. Why then are they not simply *a priori* categories? Because any object, as well as its material *a posteriori* determination (i.e. its colour) will always have a concomitant spatiotemporal determination. Therefore to have any concept of an object it must necessarily be spatialised and within time; even two objects that are identical in their concept must, according to Kant, occupy different places within space and time.

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<sup>62</sup> Kant, *Synthesis and Time*

Spatiotemporality then also necessarily has an experiential aspect. As a result of this, time and space are irreducible to the conceptual order or conceptual determination, as in idealism, and therefore must occupy a separate space in Kant's schema. The *a priori* synthesis is absolutely necessary here because it is that which links a concept constructed by the interaction of the understanding and the empirical givens of spacetime, generating a correspondence between a thing's transcendental ideality and its empirical reality. Time is then an *a priori* rule governing subjectivity, but also is owned and is a synthesis enacted by the subject. As such, Deleuze states that by virtue of Kant's reformulation, "space and time will acquire a constitutive power (*pouvoir*) which will be the constitutive power of all possible experience"<sup>63</sup> being now a predicate of the development of all conceptual determinations. Space will give form to outer experience, while time will form the fundamental ground on which inner experience, or subjectivity, is formed. Deleuze illustrates the enormity of this reconceptualisation of spatiotemporality with reference to subjectivity: now, the subject is no longer condemned to misinterpret an essential reality as in Platonism, indeed it is no longer even a hermeneutic question, but is in fact "constitutive of the conditions under what appears to it appears to it."<sup>64</sup>

Kant's argument needs to show that our subjective and ideal time is universalisable such that it gives form to and is the ground of the mechanisms of the understanding that enable perception and reason to function in each subject. If this is shown to be the case, it is another step towards his goal of grounding objective reality in the faculties of subjective experience. His argument, following the transcendental form, is that all phenomena (qua internal representation) are necessarily in time and phenomena objectively exist, therefore time exists, but only as a function which "is thus prescribed in advance of any representation as the necessary condition, the *sine qua non*, for it to be a representation at all"<sup>65</sup>: and as such "[t]ime is the formal condition *a priori* of all phenomena whatsoever."<sup>66</sup> If, in order to form a concept of an object, both time and space need to be added to the manifold of perception, internal sense only requires time, therefore it structures both objective and subjective concepts, while space - according to Kant - is only required for the outer, objective sense. In other words, Kant presupposes a pre-established and universal harmony via attempting to establish the objective validity of phenomena with time as its *axis*

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<sup>63</sup> *Kant, Synthesis and Time*

<sup>64</sup> *Kant, Synthesis and Time*

<sup>65</sup> *Heidegger Kant and Time* pg.56

<sup>66</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* A34

*mundi*. However as a result of this, the empirical reality of phenomena is ultimately relegated to an ideality present in the mind only and, in an event which will eventually reveal itself to be the crux of the problematic, as the mind does not admit of extension, time becomes the absolute and direct constitutor of the subject. Deleuze comments that, in Kant, "time is the form of interiority. It's the form under which we affect ourselves, it's the form of auto-affection. Time is the affection of self by self."<sup>67</sup>

### **Kant's Two Subjects**

There are then, in a way, two subjects in Kant: an empirical subject to which phenomena appear - and a transcendental subject that precisely *is* the faculties (time, space, syntheses, categories) or, more exactly, is the unity of these elements, their "conditions of apparition". Deleuze describes this cleavage succinctly when he says: "the formal conditions of all apparition must be determined as the dimensions of a subject which conditions the appearing of the apparition to an empirical self; this subject cannot itself be an empirical self, it will be a universal and necessary self."<sup>68</sup> The result of this, as aforementioned, is that the order of the spatiotemporal is irreducible to the order of the concept, i.e the categories and the apparitions they condition, because of the synthetic *a priori*, as discussed above; one can always distinguish two, even conceptually identical, things by their mutually-exclusive *a posteriori* contingencies.

This splitting of the subject, while a constitutive principle in Kant, is also the germ of the problem of subjection in Foucault, insofar as it signifies the construction of a subjectivity for the inhabitant of a society of discipline: the subjectivity that is made through technologies of discipline is constructed according to universal standards that accord to the strictures of reason. However, the point of divergence between Deleuze and Foucault, as we will see towards the end of this chapter, is that while Foucault insists upon the transcendental lineage of such a subjectivity, Deleuze attends to the break between this universal structural subject and the subject of immanence, which amounts to a debate about the grammar of worlds.

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<sup>67</sup> *Kant, Synthesis and Time*

<sup>68</sup> *Kant, Synthesis and Time*



So far, in the capacity of sensation and the synthesis thereof, we have in effect only been discussing the empirical subject - it is this subject that has the capacity to participate in transcendental reason while still maintaining a kind of relation to the empirical world. This dual image of subjectivity will become an important problem later, as it is a central facet in Deleuze's critique of Kant. As such, two questions arise at this point: first, what is the import and consequence of subjectivity being given in this way? Second, what is the link between time and this *transcendental* subjectivity? At the very least, we know that it is a component necessary for the experiential self in its interpretation of that which is given in sensibility, but it is unclear how time functions within the transcendental form of the self. It is worth, at this point, quoting Kant at length:

Time is nothing else than the form of the internal sense, that is, of the intuitions of self and our internal state. For time cannot be any determination of outward phenomena. It has neither to do with shape nor position; on the contrary, it determines the relations of representations in our internal state. And precisely because this internal intuition presents to us no shape or form, we endeavour to supply this want by analogies, and represent the course of time by *a line progressing to infinity*, the content of which constitutes a series which is only of one dimension; and we conclude from the properties of this line as to all the properties of time, with this single exception, that the parts of the line are coexistent, while those of time are successive. From this it is also clear that the representation of time is itself an intuition, because all its relations can be expressed in an internal intuition.<sup>69</sup>

From this we can discern that time and subjectivity have, in Kant, a coeval relationship: time constitutes the subject but only exists in and is created by the subject. Kant presupposes a unity of all time insofar as it is "nothing but the form of inner sense, that is, of the *intuition of ourselves* and our internal state"<sup>70</sup> and since we all universally and necessarily have inner states its objective validity is, at least ostensibly, secured. In the final analysis, the form of time (qua subjectivity) allows for the utilisation of the transcendental: it then allows reason to access the *a priori*, that which is outside of time, hence the image of the line proceeding

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<sup>69</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* A33/B50

<sup>70</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* A33/B50

to infinity, and so secures, for the subject inevitably within time, the capacity to participate in transcendental (atemporal, universal, necessary) reason. Time is then *why* there is a split in the subject, it is at the same time that which constitutes the empirical subject and is also simultaneously a transcendental aspect of it. This is further evidence of what, at this point in the exposition, has been only implicit - that in Kant's metaphysics there are several aspects that must remain heterogenous to one another, that there is a difference in nature in the faculties, between space and time, between sensibility and reason and so on. The problem of how these disparate elements are related to and within a single subjectivity must be put to one side for now, because in order to address that question, what must be discerned, going forward, is the nature of the *result* of this reconfiguration of the relationship between subject and time, or rather, of the relation of time to the split and dual self. In order to do so we will begin with how Kant reconceptualises time and then proceed to the consequences of this move for the subject; it is almost as if the unforeseen consequences of this experiment in temporality introduce novel aporia into the discourse on the subject we have inherited.

### **Kant's Tripartite Synthesis**

The above is, to some extent, a sketch of the Kantian subject, but Kantian *subjectivity* as a process needs to be more concretely defined. What does it mean to say that time is the form of self-affection? If the subject comes to understand the world through the empirical syntheses complemented by the categories we can infer that in order for an object to be perceived by a subject, the subject utilises the temporal (or temporalising) faculty of its capacity to experience to, in effect, *form the object* and, in doing so, ground external objectivity in internal subjectivity. This is the eventual meaning of 'synthesis', the combination of the empirical percepts and transcendental concepts. In order to qualify time as the mode in which the subject affects itself, and therefore that there is indeed a subjective consequence to time being rethought, however, it needs to be shown that there is some kind of synthetic reciprocity between the subject and this process of object-formation, of the embedding of the perceived object within time. Indeed, if this were not the case, time could stand as an objective criterion in which to ground the nature of

reality *independently* of the subject and so undermine Kant's critical project by reinstalling mind-independent empirical categories. Deleuze writes that: "[t]he fundamental idea of what Kant calls his 'Copernican Revolution' is the following: substituting the principle of a *necessary* submission of object to subject for the idea of a harmony between subject and object."<sup>71</sup> This notion of harmony has a Platonic tenor,<sup>72</sup> for Plato the wise man was he who was in balance or accord with the always-already harmonious nature, subject *to* nature, but for the Kantian subject, the world of phenomena necessarily conforms to their faculties of cognition - and it does this in two ways: actively and passively. The passive mode of the self concerns only the types of receptivity, such as intuition, while the active and spontaneous mode of the self organises the data received through intuition via three distinct syntheses. We have already seen that this split in the self occurs through and because of the line of time and that the two modes of the self correspond to the greater transcendental-empirical duality in Kant's philosophy.<sup>73</sup> In order to account for this line of time, the following is an account of the three active syntheses of the transcendental subject in and through which time is made for the subject.

One of the most fundamental aspects of Kantianism is the notion that phenomena appear to the subject as a *representation*. A representation is that which is the result of a synthesis of what is given in experience. Therefore synthesis is this process of forming a sense report, a reception of a flux of data from the manifold of sensation, into a representation by combining it with spatiotemporal information. The three main forms of synthesis in Kant each occur in a particular mode of the understanding: the synthesis of apprehension in intuition, reproduction in the imagination and recognition in the concept. These concepts will become a centrepiece of the conceptual apparatus when Deleuze begins to form his own theory of time in response to and as a means to critique Kant. The former synthesis pertains to the empirical sensibility, the latter to conceptual understanding, with the synthesis of reproduction acting as a kind of bridge between the two.

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<sup>71</sup> *Kant's Critical Philosophy* pg.14

<sup>72</sup> See *The Republic*, specifically the section on the isomorphy between a harmony between inner soul and outer state; on a cosmological level, see *Timaeus*.

<sup>73</sup> The second poetic formula that Deleuze mobilises - 'I is Another' - is attributed to Rimbaud and pertains to the direct effect of this new temporality on the subject, namely a splitting of the subject into empirical and transcendental divisions and a concomitant active and receptive facets.

Apprehension is the process by which manifold sensory impressions are differentiated through the application of a spatiotemporal determination.<sup>74</sup> As we have seen, Kant posits that it is impossible for two things to hold the same position in space and time, even if conceptually identical; apprehension therefore selects from the manifold and orders in space and time. In doing so, it also generates a representation of space and time - but what is crucial here is that time is primary and that this synthesis *unifies* the perceptual manifold within time. Kant writes:

Every intuition contains in itself a manifold which can be represented as a manifold only in so far as the mind distinguishes the time in the sequence of one impression upon another; for each representation, in so far as it is contained in a single moment, can never be anything but absolute unity. In order that unity of intuition may arise out of this manifold (as is required in the representation of space) it must first be run through, and held together. This act I name the synthesis of apprehension because it is directed upon intuition, which does indeed offer a manifold, but a manifold which can never be represented as a manifold, and as contained in a single representation, save in virtue of such a synthesis.<sup>75</sup>

The synthesis of recognition<sup>76</sup> then applies *a priori* categories to this spatiotemporalised sense-impression: the categories of quantity, quality, modality and relation, such that we recognise in them discernable characteristics. However, in order for the synthesis of recognition to work, these discrete sense impressions must be held in the mind in order to be related to the categories. This is how I can picture in my mind a unicorn - that is, if I am told that a unicorn is the name of the image of a horse with a horn on its head - having previously encountered both the concepts of horse and horns independently of each other, without necessarily having either a horse or a horn within my immediate empirical sensation. Without this second synthesis I could not think of anything without that object being present. There are, then, in fact two moments of the synthesis of reproduction: an empirical moment in which previously-experienced intuitions are recalled and held in the mind and a transcendental or pure moment in which the derived object is, in effect, produced in my mind by recalling a previous empirical intuitions and combining them. We

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<sup>74</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* A99

<sup>75</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* A99

<sup>76</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* A103

can see that this second synthesis is a mediation between the other two moments and corresponds to the synthetic *a priori*, a 'purely spontaneous activity' and also pertains to both a historical and futural orientation; we can both recall from the past and project into the future with the imagination and indeed are necessarily doing so when bringing to mind speculative objects such as unicorns (which do not currently exist but someday might).

The synthesis of reproduction in the imagination<sup>77</sup> has a privileged place in relation to subjectivity because of the crucial role of time. Whereas the first synthesis merely adds a spatial and temporal determination to a given sensory intuition in order to distinguish it within the manifold, it is in the second synthesis where the process of the imagination allows for an apprehension of temporal continuity. Indeed, the synthesis only works *because of* temporal succession. When attempting to imagine the synthetic concept 'heavy cinnabar' Kant states: "Suppose that cinnabar were sometimes red, sometimes black, sometimes light, sometimes heavy, or suppose that a man appeared sometimes in one and sometimes in another animal shape, or that, on the longest day, the land were sometimes covered with fruit and sometimes with ice and snow. Then, when I have the presentation of red, my empirical imagination would never have an opportunity to imagine heavy cinnabar."<sup>78</sup> Because a temporal instance of heavy cinnabar can be related to another temporal instance of heavy cinnabar there is a correspondence and continuity when thinking of heaviness and cinnabar, they are situated within a temporal sequence. Space and time are *already* subject to the productive synthesis of the imagination, they are both logically necessary - in other words, there is an immanent relation between the two.

"Synthesis defined in this way does not bear only on diversity as it appears in space and time, but on the diversity of space and time themselves. Indeed, without it, space and time would not be 'represented.'"<sup>79</sup> Space and time, as given within the manifold, must be synthesised and in doing so ground the synthesis itself. The imagination then has a crucial role in subjectivity, but it must function in harmony with the other syntheses.

When these three moments of synthesis are working together harmoniously, we perceive legitimately. However these processes must be related to a self; an 'I think', a cogito, must be added to these processes in order to account for subjectivity. These processes must be

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<sup>77</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* A101

<sup>78</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* A101

<sup>79</sup> *Kant's Critical Philosophy* pg.15

'mine.' In order to do this, Kant invokes a mechanism he calls 'the transcendental unity of apperception' - however, in doing so he puts the whole enterprise of the *Critique of Pure Reason* at risk, and it is at this point that the germ of Deleuze's coming criticism can be discerned.

### **The Transcendental Unity of Apperception**

The three syntheses are brought together in what Kant calls 'apperception'. This layer is extremely important as it is the most elevated and sophisticated portion of Kant's theory of subjectivity and indeed the entire enterprise of reason, as Kant himself - and commentators no less than Adorno and Heidegger - note.<sup>80</sup> Pertaining to the subject, there are two primary reasons why apperception is of critical importance, first and obviously because it involves the process of self-recognition and second because it pertains to the recognition of the passing of time. Systematically and methodologically, the principle of the transcendental unity itself is the place in which all of the other elements of Kant's theory of the subject cohere - and as such, it is the fulcrum at which the theory is most vulnerable to criticism.

Apperception can be thought of in a non-technical register as something like 'self-consciousness' or an awareness of the 'I'. The term originates in Leibniz and is used in the *Monadology* to hold the Cartesian cogito to account for not considering unconscious perceptions; Leibniz chastises Descartes for not taking into account that animals clearly perceive and yet have no self to relate to these perceptions.<sup>81</sup> Apperception is, according to Leibniz, "[t]he transitory state which enfolds and represents a multiplicity in a unity",<sup>82</sup> a state which the perceiver is conscious of and that is distinct from 'perception' in which sensations are received immediately and unconsciously. This definition is partially preserved when Kant adopts Leibniz's term, which broadly maps onto the faculties of intuition and understanding, in order to argue that there needs to be an awareness of representations as 'mine' in order to have knowledge of them, that they need to be at a deeper level attached

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<sup>80</sup> 'The synthetic unity of apperception is therefore that highest point to which we must ascribe all employment of the understanding, even the whole of logic, and conformably therewith, transcendental philosophy.' *Critique of Pure Reason* B134

<sup>81</sup> See *Principles of Nature and of Grace* Section 4

<sup>82</sup> *Monadology* section 14

to some form of a subjective ownership. This has an obvious correspondence with Descartes' cogito, insofar as there is an anti-Humean unity invoked, but Kant needs to ensure that there is an objective validity to Descartes' ostensibly all-too subjective principle. Kant's version of apperception then has, as we have by now come to expect, a transcendental and an empirical aspect, that correspond to these two features; taken literally, Leibniz's definition is what Kant terms the empirical apperception, for which he then develops his own transcendental counterpart.

Empirical apperception is also known as what has been referred to until now as 'inner sense.' The inner sense is the aspect of subjectivity that is in flux and contingent upon the outside world. Kant writes that "...through inner *experience* I am conscious of *my existence* in time [...] It is identical with the *empirical consciousness of my existence*."<sup>83</sup> Being conscious of myself is necessarily being conscious of myself *as temporal*; this is what Kant means when he states that time is the form of the inner sense, that time structures the mechanisms that form, as content, cognitions to which the cogito is then appended. Kant takes it as given that we are *a priori* conscious of ourselves as being within time and thus conscious of anything at all because temporality is a necessary feature of the perceptual faculty, the aforementioned form of inner sense. Because it is subject to time in this way, "[c]onsciousness of self according to the determinations of our state in inner perception is merely empirical, and always changing. No fixed and abiding self can present itself in this flux of inner appearances. Such consciousness is usually named inner sense, or empirical apperception."<sup>84</sup> If empirical apperception is how we recognise ourselves as within time, it follows that it is from within empirical apperception that we come to form the outer world as being within time - or, rather, we become aware of representations following one another in time because the outer world is *in conformity* with our inner sense. This is a facet of one of the most important arguments in Kant's philosophy, the goal of which is to ground the empirical objectivity of the world within subjectivity, his Copernican revolution, and as such almost all of the aspects of the preceding discussion are involved here. We can see how each aspect of the three transcendental syntheses is invisibly in effect in empirical apperception; recognition holds representations within time, apprehension orders within a temporal sequence, reproduction binds a conceptual determination to the representation. This is the key to self-affection and the objectivity of the self, in which the objectivity of the

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<sup>83</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* B.xl

<sup>84</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* A107

world can then be grounded; "the self, structured by time, affects itself by constituting the possibility of becoming aware of objects in temporal terms."<sup>85</sup> Empirical apperception is the synthetic reciprocity between the subject and this process of object-formation, but as such, produces an aspect of the self that is, in a way, subject to the world; the subject may bring space and time to what is given in experience as methods of structuration, but the content of that which is given is still very much from the world. In order to establish a subject which is at a remove from the world - that is, in harmony with, rather than subjected to the world - there needs to be a lawful causality from which coherent temporal knowledge can arise. These categories must derive their function transcendently because they cannot be discerned from the meaningless things-in-themselves. As such, because it is "in itself diverse and without relation to the identity of the subject"<sup>86</sup> Kant develops a transcendental partner to the system of empirical apperception.

Transcendental apperception is an *a priori* system that works, as it were, in the background - a self we are not empirically conscious of that provides the ground for the passive, empirical self. It is nevertheless the transcendental mode of apperception which is the active and spontaneous form of thought that accompanies each individual's consciousness. We have already seen that transcendental processes are active on the stage of empirical apperception; Kant states that this transcendental apperceptive self is necessary for *all thought*, otherwise, without this awareness, a representation could arise within me that I could not think. It is that which produces the 'I think' which then joins with a sense report, given form by the faculty of intuition, in order to produce knowledge; in this way, the transcendental synthesis of apperception develops a correspondence between a conceptual determination and an empirically-derived intuition. Because of this, the function of this combination itself cannot be reducible to the concept and therefore must be a transcendental function that precedes it. It is in this way that transcendental apperception is a necessary *a priori* condition for the presentation of all objects.

However, in conformity with Leibniz's original definition of apperception as the 'enfolding of multiplicity in a unity' Kant then claims that transcendental apperception *unifies* the other modes of synthesis; there are two arguments that Kant puts forward to demonstrate the unity of the transcendental apperception, an analytic argument and a synthetic argument,

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<sup>85</sup> Heidegger, *Kant & Time* pg.207

<sup>86</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* B133



which must each be attended to and outlined. This move to secure the unity of transcendental apperception is crucial because Kant exports this argument to several other places in his system in order to ensure a cohesion and unity of schematism. There is therefore a distinction to be drawn between transcendental apperception and the principle of the unity thereof. This doctrine of unity is a complex issue for several reasons, not least of which is that it is a prerequisite of Kant's immanent form of critique.<sup>87</sup> As we have seen, all elements in Kant's schema share some form of reciprocity with each other part, and therefore eventually will form a unified whole, and it is from the development of the argument for the unity of transcendental apperception that he develops a principle of the unity of his system as a whole. As such, this is a crucial part in the philosophical scaffolding in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

It is also worth situating the problem of unity within the critique of Hume that Kant develops in the *Critique*. In positing a doctrine of mental unity, Kant is primarily responding to David Hume's denial of precisely that. Hume famously stated that there is no reason to believe in a Cartesian thinking self as a simple substance and that certainly we cannot perceive this thing. While Kant concedes this point, that "no fixed and abiding self can present itself in this flux of inner appearances", he only does so qua empirical apperception; the argument for transcendental apperception begins with the claim that if we had only an empirical self, we "should have as many-coloured and diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious".<sup>88</sup> Compounding this issue is the aforementioned quality of the heterogeneous nature of the faculties - if each aspect of cognition is distinct from the others, how is it then that they are combined and reciprocal? Kant needs to posit a principle of higher unity to avoid this Humean presupposition that selves are merely bundles of unrelated perceptions; in order for any experience to happen, he must posit an unchanging and atemporal transcendental ego.

The first argument for the unity of the apperception, the synthetic argument, proceeds as follows: to represent an object to myself, I must synthesise diverse sense reports into a single unified perception, thereby creating a unity of content that is produced via this synthesis. This connection unifies both the states of perception as well as the contents of the sense report and is thus therefore necessary for cognition. Kant's argument, then, is

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<sup>87</sup> That is, 'immanence' insofar as his critical enterprise aims to be self-positing and self-sustaining.

<sup>88</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* B133-134

that because synthesis unifies in this way, it must inherit this unity from a more originary or fundamental state. We can see then, that the possibility of any synthesis at all presupposes a concomitant unity of transcendental apperception and so from a synthetic principle there can be derived an analytic one; the rules governing this unity of synthesis are obviously transcendental and so for Kant the unity of apperception is absolutely fundamental to any thinking self. Indeed, "[t]he analytic unity of consciousness belongs to all general concepts, as such. If, for instance, I think red in general, I thereby represent to myself a property which (as a characteristic) can be found in something, or can be combined with other representations; that is, only by means of a presupposed possible synthetic unity can I represent to myself the analytic unity."<sup>89</sup>

As we have seen, Kant considers the transcendental unity of apperception necessary for the presentation of *all objects*, and he does not expand upon this axiom: "[the] principle of the necessary unity of apperception is itself merely an identical and hence an analytic proposition."<sup>90</sup> All things that Kant deems to be analytic judgements are essentially, in his view, tautologous - and so the whole of perception and of the mind is unified in the same way that a body is extended in space, it simply is a fact. Kant posits this analytic unity in order to explain how diverse mental states can be joined in synthesis and also to provide a ground from which the unity of these mental states derive; this doctrine of unity is quite simply *a priori* and unanalysable, indeed precisely because it is unanalysable (i.e. cannot be split) it must be singular and uniform. Mereologically, it then cannot be the case that any single aspect in Kant's diagram of the mind is non-uniform; if aspect *A* has the possibility of entering into synthesis with aspect *B* under one consciousness, it cannot be the case that one is uniform and one is not, because the resultant state must itself also be uniform, and it is unclear how a unified and non-unified aspect could be brought together in synthesis. The transcendental apperception, *as uniform*, then grounds each other aspect as uniform. Like the interlocking spheres of the Platonic cosmos, each unique facet in Kant's system is grounded by and receives its coherence from a transcendental rule of unity. This unity is found even at the very end of Kant's work, where it is called 'common sense', Deleuze writes: "Kant will never give up the subjective principle of a common sense of this type, that is to say, the idea of a good nature of the faculties, of a healthy and upright nature which

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<sup>89</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* B134

<sup>90</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* B135

allows them to harmonise with one another and to form harmonious proportions."<sup>91</sup> As such, with this principle of unity in place, the grammar of Kant's world is that of the harmonious music of the spheres, all acting in accordance with the tribunal of reason.

## Unity and Unicity

This account of self-consciousness and the necessary unity thereof is extremely problematic and raises several non-trivial questions. The first is why the self is *necessarily* unified and what kind of unity inheres in it. It is not immediately obvious that 'the self is unified' is an analytic judgement in the same way that 'all bodies are extended' is. At first it seems that this difficulty can be resolved by resorting to the table of categories, in which 'unity' is the first of the categories of quantity. The 'form of judgement' that corresponds to unity is singularity, therefore a simplistic argument could be inferred here in which, because every person is singular they are also necessarily a unified whole.<sup>92</sup> However it is not at all clear that Kant makes this claim. In fact, Kant goes to great lengths to prove that the kind of unity that the transcendental unity of apperception has is of a different nature to that of the first type of the category of quantity in the table of the pure concepts of the understanding. In several places, Kant qualifies the transcendental unity of apperception and the unity of his system as a whole as having the *identity* of unity; without this, he would be left with the problem of how a discrete part of the system (categorical unity) could simultaneously be the nature of the whole. Kant states explicitly that this extra-categorical sense of "unity, which precedes *a priori* all concepts of combination [i.e. synthesis] is not the category of unity" and that it is "already thought", that is, presupposed in order to provide the ground for and establish the process of synthesis. For Kant, for something to be conceptualised at all, it necessarily must possess a conceptual unity, otherwise it is incoherent. A clue as to why this is the case can be found in [B113-114] in which Kant discusses the Scholastic maxim "*quodlibet ens est unum, verum, bonum*", 'whatever is one is true is good', that is, the three propositions are convertible. He intends to reduce this maxim to the category of quantity (unity, plurality and totality); indeed this reduction of extra-categorical ontological

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<sup>91</sup> *Kant's Critical Philosophy* pg.21

<sup>92</sup> 'Einheit' renders in English as 'Oneness'

transcendentals into logical transcendentals that condition the subjective mind is precisely what Kant names his 'Copernican revolution'.

Yet despite this, Kant retains this extra-categorical sense of unity that subtends his entire system; in order for a judgement to be *true* it must have *unity*, or as Kant puts it, "in all knowledge of an object there is unity of concept". This clearly has no relation to quantity and is a mereological proposition; we can see this when Kant writes: "[s]imilarly, the criterion of an hypothesis consists in the *intelligibility* of the assumed ground of explanation, that is, in its unity (without any auxiliary hypothesis)".<sup>93</sup> The sense of 'one' and 'unified' is collapsed here. We can see here too evidence of the necessary communicability of knowledge that engenders common sense also depends upon this unity, simplicity or oneness. Thus for a proposition to be communicable it must be true, good and unified. As such, Deleuze charges Kant with having reinstalled a pre-established harmony, no longer between the subject and object but between the faculties which make up the subject. "Doubtless this transposition is original. But it is not enough to invoke a harmonious accord of the faculties, nor a common sense as the result of the accord; the Critique in general demands a principle of the accord, as a genesis of common sense."<sup>94</sup> Deleuze will deem this feature of Kant's philosophy a 'supreme finalist and theological principle' which, in the final analysis, conforms both to the Scholastic position and to the Leibnizian mode from which Kant strove to create distance. Indeed, Kant does not end up far at all from Leibniz's position, that: "God has originally created the soul, and every other real unity, in such a way that everything in it must arise from its own nature by a perfect *spontaneity* with regards to itself, yet by a perfect *conformity* to things without."<sup>95</sup> Further to this, if we recall that Deleuze renders the temporality of Kant's critical project as a straight line and that this constitutes his novelty and overturning of Platonism, we can see here a moment in which the geometry of Kant's project is still resolutely *cyclical* and thus precritical; returning to the *Timaeus* qua an exemplar text of cyclicity or of a circularity, there is an irrevocable correlation insofar as Kant has, through the doctrine of unity, equated truthfulness and communicability with a unity or oneness. Indeed, the perfection and emendation of rationality that Kant, at least in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, could be defined adequately with a cursory reading of Plato's dialogue:

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<sup>93</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* B115

<sup>94</sup> *Kant's Critical Philosophy* pp. 22-23

<sup>95</sup> Leibniz 'New System of the Nature and Communication of Substances' section 14

And when reason, which works with equal truth, whether she be in the circle of the diverse or of the same - in voiceless silence holding her onward course in the sphere of the self-moved - when reason, I say, is hovering around the sensible world and when the circle of the diverse also moving truly imparts the intimations of sense to the whole soul, then arise opinions and beliefs sure and certain. But when reason is concerned with the rational, and the circle of the same moving smoothly declares it, then intelligence and knowledge are necessarily perfected. And if any one affirms that in which these two are found to be other than the soul, he will say the very opposite of the truth.<sup>96</sup>

The crux of this is that maintaining a consistent and dogmatic principle of unity means that Kant retains certain precritical presuppositions that undermine the entire purpose of his project. The very nature of critical philosophy demands that such presuppositions be investigated and Deleuze's project in *Difference and Repetition* will pick up from this cue; a truly critical project would be that in which no *a priori* presupposition is left unchallenged, such that any last remnant of the tradition of the Platonic eternal forms is finally discarded.

### **Transcendental Subjectivity and Time**

Such a problematisation of the notion of unity in Kant's philosophy raises several questions when returning to his notion of time and the subject. First, what is the ultimate consequence of this doctrine of unity situated within Kant's system conceived as broadly as possible? Second, how are the two aspects of the self, the empirical-receptive and the transcendental-spontaneous, as two discrete elements of the self, related within this unity with regards to time? In order for any experience to happen, Kant must posit an unchanging transcendental ego that, essentially, acts as a tunnel through which the transcendent is manifested within the subject. The transcendental ego is not in time because it provides machinery for the subjective time-forming faculty in a prior moment, "it is time itself and [...] only as such in its very essence is it possible at all."<sup>97</sup> Kant is able to posit the ego as

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<sup>96</sup> Plato *Timaeus* trans. Benjamin Jowett <"<https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1572/1572-h/1572-h.htm>">

<sup>97</sup> Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* pg. 198

transcendent precisely because there must be, in his schema, some site at which the transcendental categories are manifested within the subject, an instantiation of the infinite within the finite. In a passage that is very charitable towards the Kantian position, Sherover in *Heidegger, Kant and Time* explains:

These predicates ['abiding', 'unchanging', 'permanent'] in view of the Paralogisms cannot refer to the ego as some sort of mental substance. They can only signify that the self can form a horizon of possible experience insofar as it sees itself as more or less permanent through the changes in the experiences it gives to itself. The predication of some sort of enduring through change is a transcendental requisite for the possibility of an experiencing finite self - just because it enables the self to be a continuing centre of experience. Only as such can a finite self engage itself in "forming time."<sup>98</sup>

Time is then only the form of the empirical 'I', not the transcendental ego, yet the two are somehow joined in a prior transcendental unity. This opens out into a further problem, which pertains to freedom; if our empirical self is merely at the whim of the flux of the manifold of sensation and our transcendental self works invisibly in the background, to what extent can it be said that we are either aware of our actions and to what extent are those actions of our own volition? This is compounded by the fact that Kant seems to hold the position that I am only aware of my mental *activity* and not of myself as such; specifically, Kant's uninspiring answer is that all that we are aware of in cognition is the act of syntheses that connects the various faculties of the inner sense. We may then justifiably charge Kant with the 'supreme finalist and theological principle' in which this transcendental aspect of the self is simply another name for an eternal soul, which, by Kant's own admission, is numinous and unknowable. The transcendental self is bequeathed by a higher power and is acted through, the empirical self remains passive.

Foucault's model of the disciplinary society is based upon this Kantian account of the subjectivity and adheres to the main contours of Kant's argument. Discipline is the set of transcendental rules generated for us by the institutions and is in turn internalised by us; what we are left with, by implication, is the passive empirical self which merely acts out

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<sup>98</sup> Sherover, *Heidegger, Kant & Time* pg.208

these dicta from above. We can perhaps see the motivation for Deleuze to suspect the transcendental logic inherent within Foucault's concept of a disciplinary society. Perhaps it is too nihilistic to conceive of our horizon of possible experience as that of the prisoner, forever incarcerated without hope of freedom. More likely is the obsolescence of hierarchical, top-down modes of governance and the transcendental moulding of subjectivity thereof. With the emergence of the dominance of global capitalism and liberal democracy also emerges the society of control and its free-floating, modular protocols of management. As we will see in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis, this particular society generates modes of governance that are immanent with the modes of subject-formation that inhere in its organisation. This makes such modes all the harder to both analyse and resist. The sovereign no longer reigns at an absolute distance from its subjects, but within them.

Finally, an issue that will be explored in greater depth in the following chapter, is the complex relationship between unity, the self and time, or rather a question as to the priority of such. As in, does the unity of the self ground time as unitary? If so, with time as that which constitutes the subject, how does time, given in the manifold of intuition, where it is presumably heterogenous and ununified, become objectively unitary? In short, which comes first?

To summarise, in this section I have been attempting to trace the relationship between time and subjectivity in Kant's critical philosophy. As succinctly as possible; time is the form of the inner sense; this inner sense is made up of a variety of particular mechanisms which, through time, affect each other. Time allows for the synthesis or connection of these heterogeneous mechanisms, through three transcendental syntheses which then connect with empirical sense reports from the outer world. These mechanisms and processes are held together by an apperceptive unity, the ground of which is simply presupposed, or 'analytic'. Ultimately, the self is unitary in Kant because its proof requires it to be. That is, in attempting to create a system grounded in subjectivity, while still adhering to both the Scholastic maxim (truth = goodness = unity) and certain Platonic heredities, alongside Kant's insistence on the innate harmony of the legitimate use of reason, Kant has committed what could be termed a genetic-compositional fallacy: he has assumed the nature of a thing from the nature of its causal genesis. The urge to avoid such a fallacy will

lead Deleuze to adopt, as a methodological principle in *Difference and Repetition*, the maxim that a ground must be different in kind from that which it grounds.

Deleuze therefore argues that Kant has merely taken the form of time for granted - and taken a specifically *linear* notion at that. This plays into his larger criticism of Kant in general, in that while Kant is to be commended for searching for the genetic preconditions of phenomena, he is to be condemned for stopping at certain preconceptions (time, space) and merely assuming their form as given, in effect installing them as eternal and unanalysable hypostases. As a result, experience can only occur as the subsumption of particular empirical givens under these transcendental universals. These conditions of experience are then static and unchanging and necessarily external to that which they condition. Because these conditions are static, however, knowledge is only legitimate, according to Kant, if a particular facet of the given (or a sense report from the manifold of intuition) conforms to a particular transcendental concept of the understanding. Most egregiously, Kant will install a tribunal of reason which will select and decide upon the legitimacy of knowledge according to his own categories, the ultimate consequence of which is the homogenising of all thought and elimination of difference. Deleuze then argues that this is a form of dogmatism in Kant, that knowledge only then occurs as recognition and confirmation of Kant's own schema and that in appealing to universality in this way the genetic conditions of these unchanging concepts of the understanding are overlooked. Indeed, where Kant's project founders is where it becomes subject to his own logic: if there are *a priori* transcendental conditions for certain features and structures of reality, why not others? Deleuze, in his investigation of the subject, will then seek the genetic conditions of time itself. In this way, for Deleuze it cannot be determined in advance what an idea will be like: the 'transcendental' preconditions of an object must arise from experience first and not follow from the use of reason alone. This is how Deleuze justifies the seemingly-paradoxical name of his own philosophical project, 'transcendental empiricism'; the genetic preconditions of objects must be within the given and not outside of time and space as are Kant's categories. As such, the conditions for time, as it is within the given, need to be discerned.

Before we can approach the problem of time under the control society, as a unique set of experiential preconditions, we must survey the problem in general, which means addressing



three interrelated questions: is it true that our subjectivity is necessarily unified, easily communicable and conforms to sense? Are we free? And, what are the genetic conditions of time itself? In order to lay the groundwork or even approach an answer to these problematics, and to do so not from a transcendental perspective, but from a transcendental-empiricist perspective, which is to take as a methodological principle that the conditions of our transcendental rules that govern subject-formation are to be found within the given, we must return to these set of givens, our world as we experience it. Deleuze gives this world the name of 'the societies of control' and it is there that we must look for our conditions of subjecthood.

### **Conclusion: The Postscript on the Societies of Control**

I have suggested that Deleuze, with this small article, is attempting to describe a shift in the grammar of a world. Writing in 1990 and declaring an end to the societies of discipline, Deleuze announces that "[w]e are in a generalised crisis in relation to all the environments of enclosure."<sup>99</sup> If "Napoleon seemed to effect the large-scale conversion from one society to the other"<sup>100</sup> from the sovereign to the disciplinary, Deleuze now repositions Foucault's question: he posits that we have now moved into what he calls a 'control' society. While it would be straightforward here to assume that the term names a concept of governmentality in the same manner as Foucault's discipline, I claim that, with the language of coils, loops and cyclicity that Deleuze also has in mind the physical concept of a control system - specifically that of an automatic and self-modulating feedback loop. Conceptualising the term in this way secures its gravity: while travelling on a freeway may not at first seem to warrant the designation of control, it is this very semblance of freedom, while remaining encoded within a system of regulation, that gives control its power. One may retain for oneself the capacity to rebel against discipline, especially if it is implemented by a cold authority figure, whereas control is not the imposed modification of variables, but the internal regulation of variables - the very parameters of such regulation are in fact dependent upon the output that it produces, which is to say that the process of regulation

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<sup>99</sup> 'Postscript on the Societies of Control'

<sup>100</sup> 'Postscript on the Societies of Control'

is internalised. Whereas discipline pertains to space (prison, barracks, school), control pertains to time, the time it takes for a process to complete or begin anew.

Norbert Wiener, in his seminal work *Cybernetics: or, Communication and Control in the Animal and Machine* prefigures Deleuze's theory. He writes:

If the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries are the age of clocks, and the later eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries constitute the age of steam engines, the present time is the age of communication and control. There is in electrical engineering a split which is known in Germany as the split between the technique of strong currents and the technique of weak currents, and which we know as the distinction between power and communication engineering. It is this split which separates the age just past from that in which we are now living.<sup>101</sup>

After the advent of World War 2 and the invention of mass media technologies, if we follow Weiner and Deleuze in believing that "types of machines are easily matched with each type of society,"<sup>102</sup> while not being exhaustively descriptive, an event of the magnitude and complexity as the invention and wholesale domestication of the computer merits a new conceptual understanding of the kind of society we inhabit. It has been proposed that the year 1989 designates the event of a threshold-crossing, which is to say a point at which there can be no return to the society of discipline, a year which saw the fall of the Berlin wall and thus the last gasp of the communist project of the 20th century, the first proposal of a 'world wide web', the first mobile phone text message and the first global positioning satellite - as well as the year in which the infamous 'tank man' stood in protest in front of a column of Chinese military tanks in Beijing, a protest which was syndicated immediately by media around the world.<sup>103</sup>

If this is the point at which the control society takes hold then it is also the point at which temporality itself crosses a threshold and becomes a different kind of entity. The oxymoron of a 'generalised crisis' is the exemplar phrase of the "limitless postponement" that recalls the analysis of the capitalist mode of production in *A Thousand Plateaus* and that which is

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<sup>101</sup> *Cybernetics* pp.56-57

<sup>102</sup> 'Postscript on the Societies of Control'

<sup>103</sup> Maus, John *Communication and Control* pp.1-3

its distinctive signature. That the social institutions remain in a constant state of reformation ensures that the control society remains in a fundamental filiation with Capitalism insofar as the completion of these projects is endlessly deferred, always heading to the limit but never being able to cross the threshold, folding back in on themselves in a feedback loop. It is then no huge leap to suppose that the forms of subjectivity instantiated within such a society must also itself have a fundamental link to the capitalist mode of the organisation of the economy - a subjectivity that is no longer always starting over again in each new enclosure ("start from zero") as in the disciplines, but is in fact subject to a constant flux of a mixture of these enclosures. For example, it is commonplace to talk of the military-industrial complex or even the military-entertainment complex, but less so of the corporation-university complex or perhaps even the military-corporation-university complex, into which a control citizen could be immersed. "Even art has left the spaces of enclosure in order to enter into the open circuits of the bank" - even that which was once a gesture antithetical to the corporate landscape has been fully integrated. Indeed, we might keep in mind that already in the '60s filmmaker Jean-Luc Godard's *Masculin Féminin* featured intertitle on-screen text referring to 'les enfants de Marx et de Coca-cola', signifying the collapse of heretofore oppositional spaces, announcing a whole generation reared within what Guy Debord calls 'the spectacle.' This is, ultimately, what has happened to us and what we need to become worthy of.

Wiener's notion of control-as-feedback system is therefore instructive when engaging with the Postscript - however, this alignment with Wiener must not be overstated; on the issue of the control society and technology Deleuze is closer to his profound philosophical inspiration Gilbert Simondon, who not only had close dialogue and dispute with Wiener, but whose metaphysics, specifically the concept of individuation, is important to Deleuze's philosophy in *Difference and Repetition*. Deleuze stated that he designed his philosophy to be adequate to the contemporary sciences and this impetus is drawn from Simondon, whose philosophy of individuation conforms to that of thermodynamics and energetics and is directed towards the interrogation of the problem of individuation, or the emergence of specific being(s).

Whereas Wiener's notion of control is that of a system designed to produce a stable state of equilibrium, Simondon argues that this sense is too static to stand as a proper ontology and

that individuation must be predicated upon a metastable environment, because it must include some sense of becoming. There needs to be space, he argues, in which forces may be actualised: if a situation is totally controlled, no possible energy transfer can take place because all possible energy transfers have already happened, that “stable equilibrium excludes becoming, because it corresponds to the lowest possible level of potential energy”.<sup>104</sup> We can see how such an insight would be inspirational to Deleuze and his theory of the virtual as a field animating that of actual processes. Simondon expands this point to include the transfer from inorganic matter to organic beings, that in order for the vital to emerge from the inert, the degree of energy involved in the process must be far from equilibrium, but not such that it is pure chaos. Such a theory extends beyond the horizon of information theory and is in effect positing an ontogenetic precondition; individuation of things is a dynamic process of becoming, but it occurs within and through certain structures or orders. The difference is between static being and dynamic becoming, rather than form and matter, that there are forces proper to the organisation of matter that are subject to flux and variation and in turn so is that which they compose.

This is arguably a common feature of Deleuze’s philosophy throughout his career; repeated but metastable forms are deployed in new contexts, indexing and processing new information and content depending upon the milieu, the interior and exterior. Using Simondon in this way links together the Postscript and *Difference and Repetition*, as in the earlier book Deleuze is concerned with precisely this process of emergence, where in the latter he is concerned with the enforced or coerced regulative strictures upon such a process. Therefore, the crucial point is that the defining characteristic of the *societies* of control is precisely this meshing and interweaving of processes of regulation such that they become increasingly complex and thus indistinct and hard to grasp: “the corporation is a spirit, a gas”, “ultrapid and free-floating” which is eventually symbolised as ‘serpentine.’ Thus the augury once warned by Marx and Engels, “all that is solid melts into air”<sup>105</sup> seems to have been manifested, that capitalism has decoded and deracinated all of those disciplines that we had previously been analysing. What hope does the old mole of history, as all too subterranean, have against such rarefied problematics? The distribution of power

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<sup>104</sup> *Individuation in the Light of Notions of Form and Information* pg.5

<sup>105</sup> See Marx & Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*

<"<https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Manifesto.pdf>">

is no longer sovereign or hierarchical, with the victory of global capitalism, power and the forms of subjectivity it engenders are asymmetrical, uneven or serpentine.

Deleuze, qua Foucault's panopticon, proposes his own exemplar analogy for the societies of control in the form of an access swipe-card, albeit one in which the protocols could be changed at whim and at a distance, which unlike a key designed to fit a single lock, is a modulation of accessible spaces and, further, a concomitant assimilation of the user into the very system which manages these variables of accessibility. Thus the 'Postscript' contains a challenge to Marxist analyses, in effect asking how absolute opposition to the system of governance is possible when we are always-already subsumed by, generated within and inexorably subject to this system? Deleuze perhaps articulates this challenge most clearly when he writes:

The old monetary mole is the animal of the spaces of enclosure, but the serpent is that of the societies of control. We have passed from one animal to another, from the mole to the serpent, in the system under which we live, but also in our manner of living and in our relations with others. The disciplinary man was a discontinuous producer of energy, but the man of control is undulatory, in orbit, in a continuous network.

It may have at one time been the case that the old mole formed a decisive worry to the "distinct castings" of the disciplinary society, whose contours could have been mapped and eventually known and plotted against. But now that the structure modulates itself we need "new weapons." The construction of these new weapons will primarily consist of the creation of a new subjectivity, one which is not isomorphic with or assimilable by the control societies. But this very act of self-construction, what Foucault refers to as an 'aesthetics of existence', requires a philosophical and conceptual understanding of the situation within which we are currently embedded which cannot be gleaned through transcendental philosophy. The foremost of these considerations must then be an immanent analysis of temporality, as, firstly, subjectivity is primarily constituted by the time within which it is embedded and, secondly, the mode in which temporality is instantiated is contingent upon the organisation of the social.

In raising the issue of temporality, we may then ask why Deleuze felt the need to expand upon and, it could be inferred, critique Foucault in this way, effectively announcing the ineffectuality of any further adherence to the disciplinary model and positing his own analysis as superseding that of Foucault. It perhaps makes more sense to see the procession of societies as iterative rather than dialectical; the control society does not negate the disciplinary but exists alongside, it is still subject to the telos of the disciplines and yet also contains the new modulations afforded by surveillance technologies such as digital access cards. What is new is that these disciplinary procedures have mutated such that they now contain protocols for regulating metastable banks of that which they previously disciplined.<sup>106</sup> Deleuze thus conceives of the problem as a dynamic system rather than an arborescent genealogy.

In this vein, another possible answer might be ventured in claiming that *Discipline and Punish* was written in Foucault's self-proclaimed 'archaeological' period and as such retains the hallmarks of a transcendental argument, that Deleuze seeks to amend Foucault's thesis with a transcendental-empirical logic. For Foucault, an archaeological layer is a set of transcendental conditions that invisibly ground and power an episteme. If Mettray is the exemplar of a disciplinary society, insofar as it exhibits pure disciplinary concepts, then the model of the disciplinary society emanates from that of the prison. This, in consequence, hypostasizes these concepts as static concrete axioms which structure society in the manner of a transcendental rule. Deleuze's corrective, in the form of the control society, is to bring the transcendental down into the empirical and to insist that the empirical in turn conditions that which is transcendental in a given situation. This move, which will come to define Deleuze's philosophy, will be explored in more depth throughout this thesis.

Foucault saw himself as a Kantian insofar as he sought to discern the transcendental conditions of a particular contemporary event or social structure, and so while Deleuze is evidently inspired by Foucault's theory and his desire to discern the present moment, his commitment to immanence and multiplicity<sup>107</sup> necessitates a move away from a transcendental structure in which information is donated vertically and unilaterally (a model

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<sup>106</sup> This point is discussed at greater length in the third chapter, in the capacity of the apparatus of capture and its propensity to create stockpiles.

<sup>107</sup> While it would be easy to attribute this methodology entirely to Spinoza, we cannot forget the influence that the self-grounding nature of the *CPR* had on Deleuze - as such, we might see this as the first step in turning Kant against himself in Deleuze's work.

that Deleuze and Guattari will later call 'arborescent') to a model in which the historical element is malleable, reflexive and subject to change from the influence of the present and future (a 'rhizomic' model). As such, in the movement from discipline to control, ethical and political concerns are bound up with methodological concerns, which in turn depend on metaphysical principles, the foremost of which is temporality and the specific nature of the Deleuzian conception thereof. As such, in order to understand the motivating cause behind and why Deleuze's article advances yet at the same time problematises Foucault's theory, insofar as it is an immanent critique of a transcendental theory, we must turn to Deleuze's philosophy of time.

## 2: Time, Synthesis, Subjectivity

### Introduction

In this chapter, my aim is to faithfully provide an account of Deleuze's three syntheses of time - however, in order to do so, significant preparatory exposition must take place. That is, first: providing the context within which Deleuze makes his intervention by framing his early work as an attempt to radicalise Kant's critique of Aristotle. In doing so, second: Deleuze also responds to Heidegger by providing a new account of being, namely the univocity thereof. Third: Bergson's philosophy of time, being so critical to Deleuze's own, must be summarised.

Deleuze responds to Heidegger's account of ontotheology by establishing his own account of ontological difference, that is: he develops a concept of difference that would be the difference between Being and beings. Like Deleuze, Heidegger's own account of time is based on Kant's syntheses, as well as Augustine's notions of protension and retention, although he uses these resources to develop an account of time that is transcendental, humanist and singular. Drawing from the same Kantian resources, but using Bergson to critique Heidegger, Deleuze develops a differential, inhuman and multiple account of time that is grounded in difference rather than being. This allows Deleuze to account for the processes that make up being rather than attempting to, as Heidegger could not, describe and explain being itself.

### Kant's Critique of Aristotle

It could be argued that *Difference and Repetition* is an attempt to rewrite the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and to do so by completing or fulfilling the potential of Kant's critique of



Aristotle.<sup>108</sup> Kant, like Aristotle, created a system of categories with which to assign and divide up the primary substance that makes up the world. Things are individuated through their difference from each other within a genus, that 'persian' differs from 'maine coon' within the genus 'cat'. However, while for Aristotle these categories were objective parts of reality, Kant relegated the Aristotelian categories to a subjective faculty, which is to say that Kant gives the subject the means for individuating objects. Instead of the concept of a prime substance, Kant attempts to establish objective validity as the ground from which individuation, as a process of differentiating discrete objects, proceeds. This is expressed most clearly in Kant's synthesis of recognition in the concept, in which the concept, having been constructed, is now re-presented to consciousness. What this ultimately means is that Kant erases the ontological reality of identities and establishes instead a principle of subjective construction of identities, where the world becomes the difference out of which objects are made.

Deleuze continues this trajectory, but goes further; while Deleuze also describes a world of difference, he refuses a static or eternal system of types within which to fit such difference. Indeed, such types are now only repetitions of the ontological difference that arises within and composes sensibility. Repetition is a necessarily temporal concept and one that, due to the passing of time, secures the fact that identities, even constructed ones, are ultimately illusory, that repetition degrades fixed identities. Deleuze exchanges the classical philosophical terms 'structure' and 'genesis' for 'repetition' and 'difference', and in the transition from one to the other the changed variable is the exigencies of time.

As such, Deleuze extends the Kantian critique of Aristotle into the domain of temporality. Kant gives the subject the means for creating time, yet holds onto the Aristotelian notion of time as a succession of now-moments. These moments, for Aristotle, exist 'within time', that time is the measure of movement of such moments. This ultimately implies that time is a number, or rather is contained within number insofar as it is countable qua its quantity of units. A thing is only temporal, that is 'within time', if it is subject to measure and movement, thus as the succession of moments moves, these moments are therefore within time. This is true of both Kant and Aristotle, with the exception that Kant's critique relocates the process

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<sup>108</sup> Such a reading, however, would bring Deleuze closer to Kant and foreground his Kantianism; it must not be forgotten that *Difference and Repetition* is primarily a critique of Kant, an 'enemy' of Deleuze.

and gives the apparatus for constructing this container to the subject; Deleuze then argues that the subject is itself encased by time, or rather that the ontogenesis and psychogenesis of time occurs in both the subject and the world in the same manner, but that the ontogenesis of time in the world is prior. On this reading, Deleuze completes Kant's critique of Aristotle by again subjecting time to a critique: its place moves from transcendental category of the measure of movement to a priori subjective faculty to, finally, the conditions for the genesis of the subject itself - which was Kant's original goal in the *Transcendental Aesthetic*.

### Heidegger's Ontotheology

However, there is another somewhat hidden interlocutor in *Difference and Repetition*, specifically in the first chapter - that of Heidegger. In the short 'Note on Heidegger's Philosophy of Difference', Deleuze briefly characterises the book as an intervention in light of Heidegger's work.<sup>109</sup> Characteristically, Deleuze reformulates the negative aspect of Heidegger - that Being is *not* beings - into a constitutive principle, that Being is that which moves difference and causes it to differentiate, to give it an 'unconditioned power'<sup>110</sup>, exemplified in the substitution of the formula  $(-x)$  for  $(dx)$ . This is accomplished via articulating the difference between Being and beings as difference-in-itself, the concept that Deleuze claims has been overlooked by philosophers in favour of a representation or identity of difference. There is then also a secondary motive to Deleuze's treatment of Heidegger within *Difference and Repetition*, which is to rehabilitate metaphysics insofar as Heidegger's theory of ontotheology abandons it, precisely because, Heidegger claims, metaphysics collapses this distinction between Being and beings.

In Heidegger, as another Kantian<sup>111</sup> philosopher, his theory of temporality shapes the whole project of his metaphysics. However, Heidegger famously abandons metaphysics because of its necessary structuration via a principle of 'ontotheology'. He instead attempts to do

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<sup>109</sup> See *Difference and Repetition* pg 65

<sup>110</sup> Such a power would be the principle of immanent causation itself, that of the cause remaining immanently within the effect.

<sup>111</sup> Again, in the same way as Foucault and Deleuze, this nomination does not necessarily confer or connote an endorsement of Kant's morals, ethics or politics, but merely acknowledges that Heidegger's thought is enmeshed within, responds to and is ineluctably conditioned by Kant's work.

pure 'ontology', purged of the theological vestiges that, Heidegger claims, function as an overarching frame and cage for metaphysics.

Far too broad a question to consider fully here, we can caricature science as the discovery of what is, if what is can be called nature. The Greek φύσις ('phusis' or 'physis'), from which we get our 'physics', named that which is natural or nature more generally. It derives from φύω ('phúō') meaning to grow or arise from, which speaks to the English verb 'to be'. In Heideggerian terms, we could then think that the task of physics is to discern the being of the world or, to risk a tautology, the nature of nature. Metaphysics, related to physics in this way, would be that which is beyond or alongside nature. In this sense, the object of metaphysics is the being of that which is unnatural or that which escapes enclosure by the purely physical. Obviously these two categories are coextensive and cannot be fully decoupled, given that their shared object of inquiry appears to be the being of the world. But having a coterminous object of inquiry does not necessarily require a similar mode of inquiry and metaphysics is distinguished by the fact that it proceeds by thought alone and is thus not empirical. Indeed Aristotle, Kant and Heidegger saw metaphysics as preceding physics as 'first philosophy', a "natural tendency" of man - the task of metaphysics therefore is to determine the relation to the being of the world as such, an objective which Heidegger claims it does not accomplish. In the lecture 'What is Metaphysics?' Heidegger states that: "first, each metaphysical question always encompasses the whole of metaphysics; second, every metaphysical question implicates the interrogating Dasein in each case in the question." As such,

[m]etaphysics thinks about beings as beings. Wherever the question is asked what beings are, beings as such are in sight. Metaphysical representation owes this sight to the light of Being. The light itself, i.e., that which such thinking experiences as light, does not come within the range of metaphysical thinking; for - metaphysics always represents beings only as beings. Within this perspective, metaphysical thinking does, of course, inquire about the being which is the source and originator of this light, but the light itself is considered sufficiently illuminated as soon as we recognise that we look *through* it whenever we look at beings.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>112</sup> 'What is Metaphysics?'

For Heidegger, the entire discipline of metaphysics necessarily conceals Being or reduces it to a mixture of Being proper and beings. The subject is always encased within a particular domain of presence, be it narrative, simulation, text or language, of which there is no outside. Or rather, the outside of this domain can only be conceived as an absence or lack. What one has to do to manifest this absence is to establish a method of effectuating the presence of the absence within and through a particular medium. This is the basic structure of ontotheology: the establishment of a unitary field of experience and a mediator to render this field intelligible.

In whatever manner beings are interpreted [...] every time, beings as beings appear in the light of Being. Wherever metaphysics represents beings, Being has entered into the light, Being has arrived in a state of unconcealedness.<sup>113</sup>

For Heidegger then, metaphysics can only think beings *through* Being and cannot access Being-in-itself, which is a task delegated to what he calls ontology; "[b]ecause metaphysics inquires about beings as beings, it remains concerned with beings and does not devote itself to Being as Being." Heidegger then abandons metaphysics because it lacks this scientific character; it is not science, following Laruelle, 'that which is immanent with the Real'. However, Heidegger's abandonment of metaphysics reveals something about the structure of metaphysics itself. To reiterate, his claim is that metaphysics cannot access Being-in-itself, but only beings *through* Being-in-itself. In other words, it requires a medium in order to get at its object. This abandonment speaks to the establishment of an immanent mode of metaphysics, or a moment in which transcendental logic is resisted in favour of an encounter with difference.

In order to bridge between Kant and Deleuze, it will be useful at this point to consider, very briefly, a lecture of Heidegger, 'The Concept of Time', written before his more substantial engagement on the theme in *Being and Time*, a comprehensive analysis of which is outside the scope of the present discussion. However, Heidegger's work is too seldom read as an attempt to relocate Kant's three syntheses from an epistemological register into an ontological register with time at its foundation, with commentators in general preferring to

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<sup>113</sup> 'What is Metaphysics?'

focus on the ethical or phenomenological dimension of the philosophy.<sup>114</sup> Deleuze's project undertakes a similar goal, albeit with strikingly different results and as such the differences between the two projects are themselves instructive when interrogating this particular strain of the post-Kantian philosophical lineage.

Famously, Heidegger attempts to interrogate the meaning of being, but cannot do so without an analysis of temporality within which to ground being. The task of creating such an account without falling afoul of his own critique of ontotheology ultimately is something Heidegger could not achieve; in this instance, the subjective phenomenology of time-consciousness is subordinated to an image of time as derived from eternity. Insofar as philosophy knows nothing of eternity, in the same way that the intellect knows nothing of the true nature of god, claims Heidegger, then time qua derivative of eternity is itself, on this view, incomprehensible. This type of argument is a critique of a false problem: if contradiction resides within the predicates of the question, it will also reside within the answer. Heidegger writes:

If our access to God is faith and if involving oneself with eternity is nothing other than this faith, then philosophy will never have eternity and, accordingly, we will never be able to employ eternity methodologically as a possible respect in which to discuss time. Philosophy can never be relieved of this perplexity.<sup>115</sup>

In order to think time as time, Heidegger, like Bergson, attempts to decouple time from any universal grounding. However, whereas Bergson seeks to re-ground time on a subjective time-consciousness, Heidegger will foreground the synthesis of time itself as primary in his philosophy. However as Deleuze's critique (implicit within his second synthesis of time) will show, in the final analysis, while Bergson's theory made significant advances within the realm of a subjective time, it ultimately retains a faith in a kind of eternity, whereas Heidegger goes further in this regard, making subjectivity substantially coextensive with temporality. While Bergson responds to Kant in a critical mode, Heidegger is much more sympathetic to Kant and, in a sense, sees himself as attempting to fulfil the Kantian project of articulating time as a facet of subjectivity - while at the same time foregrounding the idea

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<sup>114</sup> See, for example, *On Heidegger's Being and Time* by Simon Critchley and Reiner Schürmann, in which a primarily phenomenological account is put forward.

<sup>115</sup> *The Concept of Time* pg.1e

of the future within temporality. Indeed, Heidegger writes, "[w]ith regard to time, [...] *the fundamental phenomenon of time is the future*"<sup>116</sup> - a theme which will eventually culminate in what many have discerned as the fundamental 'message' of *Being and Time*, the ethical programme of the being-towards-death of *dasein*. Such a recognition of one's own being-towards-death, as *dasein* 'runs ahead of itself' towards its ultimate state, is when *dasein* is individuated most 'authentically'.<sup>117</sup> Thus there is, through the recognition of one's own temporal and subjective finitude, a making-immanent of temporality and subjectivity, such that the question Heidegger originally asks - "what is time?" - only becomes askable in the form: "who is time?" - and it must be asked, as it were, in the future tense.

We can see when we return to the Heideggerian position that 'every metaphysical question implicates the interrogating *Dasein* in each case in the question', that to pose the question of the nature of the subject under capitalism is to do so as a subject under capitalism. We can see that it is a metaphysical question as Heidegger has described it, insofar as it is double-articulated; we need to ask in the same instance what is the ontological nature of the subject and the theological nature of capitalism. In the same way that ontology reveals the fundamental ground and theology reveals the highest being of nature, to ask what it means to be under this particular political moment is to ask an ontotheological question: what is the nature of a particular entity as such and the nature of the principle of structuration of those entities?

### **Heidegger's Three Extases**

Heidegger's philosophy of time is ultimately a fusion of Aristotle and Saint Augustine, in which the instant is stretched out or retained, a transcendental account of the protension and retention of the present moment stretched out across a line of time. However, the part of Heidegger's account that interrogates the tenses of time and their interaction with the subject, as well as their mutually-constitutive nature, bears a distinctly Kantian provenance. *Dasein* interacts with time through three 'extases' which correspond to the three tenses of

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<sup>116</sup> *The Concept of Time* pg.14e

<sup>117</sup> What this means exactly is unsure, see for example Walter Benjamin critique of 'the authentics' in *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction*

time. As we have seen, Heidegger privileges the future tense in which dasein 'runs ahead of itself', always projected into the future as a being-towards-death. Death is the ultimate possibility of dasein, through which it becomes authenticated. However, the future in Heidegger is an 'extasis' in which the future is ultimately an awareness of our past coming towards us, or in other words a return to what we always-already are, that our facticity is merely reaffirmed through a negotiation with our ontological indebtedness - or 'gewesenheit' - in the present. It is at this point that we may grasp our present, in the moment of the 'augenblick', when dasein, taking into account its temporality as a unity of the three tenses, becomes properly authentic. Despite its emphasis on futurity and the moment of action in the present, such a theory of time is evidence of the fundamentally conservative nature of Heidegger's existentialism, in which Dasein must dwell within facticity, within its own rootedness by developing a sense of care ('sorge') towards the state that one already inhabits.<sup>118</sup>

The subject transcends itself through projecting itself forward in time, a process that then falls back on those past experiences which are already retained. In this way, Heidegger's account undoubtedly makes several advances on the Kantian theory of time, primarily in decoupling the image of time from a dyad of transcendental eternity and empirical linear time. That dasein is the site of the unification of the three tenses of time is the justification for the question "who is time?"; time is the way in which dasein transcends and individuates itself and as such makes up the subject in a more primordial way that Kant accounted for in his philosophy. This transportation of the model of Kant's tripartite synthesis into the field of temporality is influential for Deleuze, as we will see, but is one which is ultimately incompatible with Deleuze's ontology.

The fundamental challenge to Heidegger's thought that Deleuze develops is twofold: firstly through the rejection of the negative and secondly replacing the transcendence of being with a univocity of being. In other words, while for Heidegger Being is not reducible to beings, or vice versa, in Deleuze there is merely a difference between the two; beings express Being without being subsumed by the category. Difference, for Deleuze, is that which cleaves Being and beings; Being is the 'differenciator of difference'. Following this

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<sup>118</sup> Indeed it could be ventured that this notion is a precursor of the contemporary conservative-reactionary praxis, in which a response to a perceived extinction is to reaffirm tradition, rootedness and broad appeals to 'heritage'. In fact, the political stakes are even more suspect here, as it is only the properly-authentic, individuated (read: elite) Dasein that truly realises this insight

insight in the first chapter of *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze, while evoking a similar theme of a tripartite synthesis of time corresponding to the past, present and future, will seek a future that is radically open and undecided, a present that is constantly changing and a living past that feeds the other two. In order to fully develop this conception of the three modes of temporality as irreducible to one another, he mobilises the work of Henri Bergson against Heidegger and the Kantian lineage from which he descends.

### **Bergson's Concept of Time**

In the previous chapter we saw that Kant maintains a strong mereological principle of unity that subtends his metaphysics and diagram of the inner workings of the subject. This idea was problematised through what is essentially a Kantian question: *quid juris?* On what grounds can Kant secure a specifically unitary subjectivity? The conclusion drawn was that the principle of unity was an artefact of Kant's architectonic structure and that no definitive proof of its ontological reality was forthcoming. However, this is but one half of the problem that results from the idea that time constitutes the subject. In this chapter, the nature of the unity of time itself will be brought into question by turning to the work of Henri Bergson, who posits a differential time in direct opposition to Kant's unitary time. This relates to the primary aim of this thesis, namely an investigation into the constitutive powers of capitalism and the control society insofar as it demonstrates that Bergson and Deleuze's model of the subject, that is a disunitary subject constituted by nonlinear temporal syntheses, is a better model with which to understand our situation than that of Kant's transcendental and temporally-linear system which gives rise to a unitary self. We can see, then, that from what at first may look like a perhaps dry scholastic point follows a debate that is of direct concern for theories of the subject.<sup>119</sup>

In departing from both Plato and Aristotle as part of his critical project, Kant claims to have discerned a pure form of time distinct from space and from the other concepts of the understanding. Yet this is precisely the grounds on which Bergson launches his attack,

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<sup>119</sup> Relatedly, for Deleuze, this argument is the first step towards the foundation of a differential ontology, directly opposed to Kant's integral ontology, where synthesis and unity are the privileged terms.



claiming that Kant's model of time fails to isolate time in-itself and is actually dependent upon and reducible to space; that time needs to be thought on its own terms, as 'pure' time per Kant's original intent. In doing so, Bergson's wager is that the workings of the inner sense must be reconceptualised without recourse to either spatialisation or mathematisation, indeed that Kant has fatally erred in doing so; this allows for the development of a new way of talking about phenomena and mental content such as emotions and other inner states with a view to creating a more realistic picture of the life of the mind. Bergson's method, in this sense following from Kant, is one of exactitude in isolating particular metaphysical elements, of unmixing what he sees as erroneous conflation of propositions and poorly-analysed concepts that, according to Bergson, should be distinct and self-sufficient. No better summary of Bergson's intention for targeting Kant could be given than his own preface to *Time and Free Will*:

We necessarily express ourselves by means of words and we usually think in terms of space. That is to say, language requires us to establish between our ideas the same sharp and precise distinctions, the same discontinuity, as between material objects. This assimilation of thought to things is useful in practical life and necessary in most of the sciences. But it may be asked whether the insurmountable difficulties presented by certain philosophical problems do not arise from our placing side by side in space phenomena which do not occupy space, and whether, by merely getting rid of the clumsy symbols round which we are fighting, we might not bring the fight to an end. *When an illegitimate translation of the unextended into the extended, of quality into quantity, has introduced contradiction into the very heart of the question, contradiction must, of course, recur in the answer.*<sup>120</sup>

Bergson's charge here is that Kant has essentially created a false problem, that the very foundations of Kant's argument are unclear and as such his whole argument that follows proceeds from confused premises. With regards to time, the above is the axiom of Bergson's argument: he argues that, contrary to Kant, time is unextended and qualitative, and that in Kant it has mistakenly been construed as extended in space and quantitative i.e. subject to measure. By reconfiguring the terms on which Kant's argument stands, Bergson hopes to recontextualise and subsequently address the problem on better terms. The

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<sup>120</sup> *Time and Free Will* i. My emphasis

ultimate consequence of such a move, as I hope to demonstrate in the proceeding section, is that by subordinating time to space, bearing in mind that, as we have seen in the previous chapter, in Kant's analysis time is the prime constitutor of the subject, that for Kant humans are then necessarily subject to a natural causality in which one moment follows the other in a defined and linear sequence. This essentially forecloses any true free will, arguably for the entire subject but certainly for Kant's partitioned empirical subject, leaving the nature of the relation of free will to the transcendental subjectivity as an open question. This Bergsonian unmixing is a process of differentiation, which is why his project is often defined as an 'inverse Kantianism': while both seek to ground subjectivity on a temporal inner sense, Bergson's subject finds its foundation not in a unitary apperception, but in a differential duration. As such, Bergson's critique of Kant, if we accept its results, has three important outcomes for the reconceptualisation of subjectivity:

1. If time is not spatial, bearing in mind that A. number is a spatial concept and B. unity is a numerical concept - as in, it must always ultimately refer back to a oneness - then it is unlikely to be the case that the subject, if it is constituted by duration, is unitary.
2. If time is no longer unitary but in fact a multiplicity, then a multiplicity of times may allow for multiple ways of or grounds for subjects being made; if subjectivity and subjectification are grounded in a differential duration, no universal or categorical framework for the creation of subjects can exist, or at the very least, this notion is expanded dramatically.
3. If freedom is a fact, then it becomes untenable to hold a strongly deterministic causality. This point however is accompanied by the caveat that true freedom is a very rare occurrence. Its rarity is due to the enervating effects of the outside world on the subject, thus in a sense disempowering the subject from free and uncoerced action. This gestures towards the position, that will later become explicit in Deleuze, that the subject is necessarily embedded within a network of relations with the outside world, a network that is *coercive*.

## Time as a Straight Line

In the previous chapter, we saw that Kant's subject is grounded and constituted within time. Before continuing, however, we need to establish the fact that Kant indeed *does* take time to be unitary and successive. As it happens, an explanation of the nature of succession in time in Kant also necessitates a discussion of his notions of freedom, spontaneity and autonomy, which will prepare the ground for an analysis of Bergson. It is worth, at this point, turning to the work of Robert Paul Wolff, specifically to his book *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity*. The aim of this work is to prove that the *Critique of Pure Reason*, specifically exemplified by the Transcendental Analytic therein, contains a coherent and simple central argument, which is: a proof of the Humean casual maxim.<sup>121</sup> That is, Wolff attempts to show that the aim of the Analytic is to validate an objective causal order of events from within a subjective perspective - or, in other words, to assign an objective validity to the temporal aspect of the Copernican revolution. This amounts to a proof of the claim that time exists, for us, as a linear succession, as well as validation that "[s]ubjective times are actually part of the same one objective time".<sup>122</sup>

The foundational premise of the argument validating the causal maxim is that consciousness is unitary - or, to be more specific, that the contents of my consciousness are bound up in a unity. This premise has already been shown to be, at best, a formal principle necessitated by Kant's architectonic, but what is important here is that it becomes perfectly clear that the nature of successive, linear time is in direct relation to subjective unity, and that by undermining the former we have in some sense undermined the latter. Whether or not this is a unilateral process remains to be seen in turning to Bergson.

For something to be objective, according to Kant, it must imply a necessity of connection without which it could not be perceived. Synthesis, acting upon the manifold of sensation, imputes this necessity of connection and therefore, through reproduction in the imagination, generates an objective order of events. That is, if it were to happen otherwise, we could not produce a representation from the manifold via synthesis: "the manifold of appearances is always generated in the mind successively."<sup>123</sup> Following naturally from this, because there

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<sup>121</sup> That is, everything that exists necessarily has a cause. Hume, of course, denied the causal maxim.

<sup>122</sup> *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity* pg.253

<sup>123</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* [A191, B236]

is an objective order of internal representations, it can be posited that there is in some sense a 'pure' order of events which causes this. Because these are inner representations, the type of this order is a temporal one and because there is an order in which synthesis must act in order to generate a representation there needs to be, for any experience whatsoever, an objective temporal sequence. Such a sequence will necessarily have previous components, which when reduced, become a chain of indivisible atoms consisting of a temporal unit. "The apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive. The representations of the parts follow upon one another."<sup>124</sup> Even a sceptic such as Hume needs to perceive within time and a temporal order. Wolff summarises: "Thus, any mental content, in order to be treated as a representation with objective reference, must be reproduced in a temporal sequence of representations according to a rule, which is to say: everything which happens, that is, begins to be, presupposes something upon which it follows (temporally) according to a rule, and, there is an objective order of happenings (events)."<sup>125</sup> Therefore, it has been shown that causality is a necessary component of experience and the causal maxim, contra Hume, has been validated thanks to reference to an objective, linear temporal sequence. Clarified by Wolff in this way, statements made by Kant, such as the below given when discussing the subjective faculty of time, seem less mysterious:

And precisely because this internal intuition presents to us no shape or form, we endeavour to supply this want by analogies, and represent the course of time by a *line progressing to infinity*, the content of which constitutes a series which is only of one dimension; and we conclude from the properties of this line as to all the properties of time, with this single exception, that the parts of the line are coexistent, while those of time are successive.<sup>126</sup>

Because the beginning of a moment is predicated upon the previous moment ending an objective and linear temporal order can be established. Or, in other words, time uncurves and becomes a straight line.

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<sup>124</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* [A190, B235]

<sup>125</sup> *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity* pp.278-279

<sup>126</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* [A30]

For Deleuze, this does not in any way signify a clarification or a simple model of time. Quite the opposite; in his Kant seminars he remarks "[i]t reminds me of Borges, the true labyrinth is the straight line."<sup>127</sup> This oblique reference is to Borges' story 'Death and the Compass', in which a labyrinth modelled upon Zeno's paradoxes of motion is described; the single straight corridor of the labyrinth is divided up infinitely and as such no sense of location may be discerned. The problem that Deleuze finds in Kant's Aristotelian model of time concerns precisely this sense of dividing - if time is a linear sequence of moments, at what point may we designate the beginning and ending of a given moment? The line invites infinite division of the interval between any two points and as such we will get lost within this straight line, without, as it were, a compass with which to navigate. This problem, as a description of time as a homogeneous medium, will motivate Deleuze's turn to Bergson when it comes to reconceptualising our image of time, as it is this linear notion that Bergson challenges explicitly.

### **Bergson's Concept of Free Will**

As we can see from the above argument, for Kant, time is made up of a collection of discrete and quantitative present moments that follow one another *in sequence*. This assertion is the ultimate consequence of Kant's move to unite the empirical atomism of Hume and the monadology of Leibniz, the point at which his thinking-together of the two begins; for Leibniz, simplifying in the extreme, we perceive the succession of monads because of a preestablished causality guaranteed by God, the aforementioned universal harmony that Deleuze claims is still latent in Kant. For Hume's part, he simply states that knowledge of the successive nature of time is naturally, to use Kantian language, given in intuition.<sup>128</sup> As mentioned in the previous chapter, the three syntheses of the imagination are responsible for time-formation, but of the three it is apprehension that is privileged and is responsible for ordering time as such. It is privileged because in order to represent the manifold of sense impressions at all, claims Kant, they must be both ordered successively

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<sup>127</sup> *Kant, Synthesis and Time*

<sup>128</sup> Being generous to Hume - and, again, using a Kantian vernacular - we could say that he treats the succession of sense impressions as an *a priori* when he writes: "After the most accurate and exact of my reasonings, I can give no reason why I should assent to it; and feel nothing but a strong propensity to consider objects strongly in that view" *Treatise of Human Nature* I pt. iii section 2

and presented unitarily, 'run through and held together', which is the job of the synthesis of apprehension. In the A Deduction, Kant writes:

Every intuition contains in itself a manifold which can be represented as a manifold only in so far as the mind distinguishes the time in the sequence of one impression upon another; for each representation, in so far as it is contained in a single moment, can never be anything but absolute unity. In order that unity of intuition may arise out of this manifold (as is required in the representation of space) it must first be run through, and held together. This act I name the synthesis of apprehension because it is directed upon intuition, which does indeed offer a manifold, but a manifold which can never be represented as a manifold, and as contained in a single representation, save in virtue of such a synthesis.<sup>129</sup>

Two points of interest that are pertinent to the discussion arise at this point. First, the reason that time is sequential is directly predicated upon the fact that it is unitary. Second, the unity of the subject is prior to the unity of time, which receives its unity from the unifying, rule-giving (that is, transcendental) power of subjective synthesis. Time changes, and indeed is the form of change, but the unity that inheres in it flows from a changeless transcendental category, as the succession of time within the manifold of phenomena cannot even be grasped by thought without the other forms of changeless, transcendental and unified structures of the understanding. This brings us back to the dichotomy between a free, transcendental self and an unfree, empirical self. The activity of the various transcendental components of his schema is said by Kant to be spontaneous and free - and, as such, the transcendental side of the self is said to be spontaneous and free. What does this mean?

Kant has different conceptions of freedom that change throughout his writing,<sup>130</sup> but the fundamental logic that follows from his epistemology is that freedom is only possible through fidelity to, or through the workings of, the transcendental. Kant states that "freedom is [a] pure transcendental idea."<sup>131</sup> However his account of freedom and autonomy is actually indebted to the classical dichotomy between positive and negative freedoms.

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<sup>129</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* [A99]

<sup>130</sup> The spontaneity of the concepts of the understanding, for example, are different in kind to the transcendental freedom of the form of law.

<sup>131</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* [A533/B561]

Positive freedom is defined here as the ability to self-legislate, to give the law to oneself, and is therefore closely linked to spontaneity. Negatively, freedom is a kind of independence, that is, freedom from the flux of empirical determinations and linear temporal succession. Spontaneity must then embody both senses of freedom insofar as it must both be independent of empirical determination (in order to synthesise sense reports) and donate its transcendental freedom to the other mechanisms of the inner sense. This argument enables Kant to claim that the transcendental self is the active and spontaneous mode of the self, opposed to the receptivity of the empirical self. This duality allows the concepts to converge immediately and simultaneously on the manifold of intuition at the same time and give rise to a representation. It is in this way that spontaneity is the theoretical counterpart to and a precondition for practical freedom, an unmoved mover that creates the potential for action without being itself determined. This is then how the transcendental self moves the empirical self, by imposing a series of rules upon it, what Kant calls the 'form of law' in the second critique, insofar as he distinguishes between the content of a law and its pure form, which is to say the possibility of a law being followed; this possibility is the ground of the free choice which is transcendental, free and independent of the determined content of the choice itself.

Yet the relation between the transcendental and empirical sides of the self is problematised immensely when the doctrine of freedom (qua the *a priori* transcendental workings of the mind) is placed alongside the principle of unity. Because, surely, unity is in the final analysis a numerical concept - which, as Bergson will show, means that it is necessarily also a spatial concept - and yet freedom cannot be within space, because A) it is transcendently derived and B) schematically, it must be alongside and separate from the three syntheses in order for the syntheses themselves to operate: the syntheses are necessarily spontaneous and (time and) space, as separate concepts derived from receptivity, are added to them in order to produce knowledge. The implication that here arises is that freedom and spontaneity only occur within a unitary space, a consequence which would then impinge upon the very definitions of these concepts. The question of the origin of unity reemerges; if it is transcendental it cannot be spatial, if it is empirical then it cannot affect the *a priori* mechanisms of the mind. Kant needs both the freedom and spontaneity of the mind and the unity of rational judgement - and it is not at all clear how these schematic exigencies relate to time.

In the philosophy of phenomenology that followed Kant, as exemplified in Edmund Husserl, the doctrine of unity takes on a more fundamentally constitutive role, eventually becoming a foundational tenet of phenomenology.<sup>132</sup> That is, especially for Husserl but generally a rule for post-Kantian phenomenology as a genus, it is often uncritically accepted that the multiplicity of phenomena is always reduced to a unified consciousness that beholds it. Indeed, a multiplicity is only formed by a function of combination, a process of the addition of a combinative relation between discrete atomic units. For the mathematically-inclined Husserl, this process is exemplified in the image of the mathematical set, where a collection of 'ones' are synthesised together under the subsumption of a principle or name. Crucially, Husserl takes this act of combination to be a psychological process enacted by the perceiver and as such there can be two kinds of unity that result from matter being combined subjectively in this way: physical and psychological.<sup>133</sup> The former is when unity is simply a part of the object that is immediately knowable in the mental representation of the object, while the latter is a case in which the unity is imposed upon the object after the fact by the perceiver. Now, while there is an immediate and obvious question raised by the distinction Husserl draws - i.e. if a multiplicity of phenomena is always related back to a perceiving subject, how could we tell if we are imposing a unity on an object or not? - it is the way Husserl differentiates between these two types that is of interest when discussing Bergson. Husserl answers the objection by claiming that there is a particular type of unity exclusive to essences that is given to the perceiver immediately in intuition.<sup>134</sup> In line with Kant, Husserl imposes a logical finitude on legitimate descriptions of what constitutes an essence: a thing is a unified essence if it does not exceed the limit of a reasonable and logical description of the concept of unity. Something such as time is an innate part of human consciousness - that is, a specific time-consciousness that structures all other aspects of the mind. It is through this immediate process of intuition that Husserl claims there is a sensible essence of time, moving from a subjective cognisance to an absolute knowledge, that is: the essence of time is given in intuition as an innate time-consciousness.

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<sup>132</sup> See Husserl's *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* § 38. Unity of the Flux of Consciousness and the Constitution of Simultaneity and Succession

<sup>133</sup> *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* Appendix IV

<sup>134</sup> Husserl calls this 'primordial association', where Bergson calls it the immediate data of consciousness.



We can see here that this is where Husserl breaks with Kant; for Kant the unity of time is a product of the three syntheses of the understanding, yet for Husserl it is a "primary synthesis" that is given immanently. In this way, Husserl makes even more forcefully the claim that time is the direct constitutor of the subject but simultaneously has to affirm and reaffirm the notion of unity both formally and contentually, that "the continuity of the temporal flux provides unity".<sup>135</sup> This is in some respects, like Bergson, an inversion of Kant, insofar as it is a rejection of one of the fundamental 'Copernican' edifices - that time is a mode created by the subject - but one that ultimately usefully amplifies the potential implications of Kant's problematic transcendentalism, whereas Bergson will seek to deflate such ambitions in favour of a more scientific rationale. While Bergson also grounds subjective constitution in temporality, it is a *disunitary* time that is at the foundation of subjectivity and in this sense absolutely opposes Husserl and a phenomenological project.

### **Bergson's New Subject**

The summative gesture of Bergson's critique of Kant is that in conceiving of time as a linear succession, Kant has essentially subordinated time to a fourth axis of space and therefore spatialised temporality. He posits that

Kant's great mistake was to take time as a homogeneous medium. He did not notice that real duration is made up of moments inside one another, and that when it seems to assume the form of a homogeneous whole, it is because it gets expressed in space. Thus the very distinction which he makes between space and time amounts at bottom to confusing time with space, and the symbolical representation of the ego with the ego itself.<sup>136</sup>

As we can see, the metaphysics of temporality are profoundly imbricated within that of the subject and the ego; thus when Bergson then founds a new idea of time in opposition to Kant he is also founding a new idea of subjectivity, one in which the freedom of the subject is rehabilitated. This is a critical move for Deleuze, one which he will expand upon in his

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<sup>135</sup> *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* Appendix IV

<sup>136</sup> *Time and Free Will* pg.232

own account of the subject - and indeed is the entire impetus for Bergson's critique of Kant to begin with. Deleuze's philosophy of the subject aims at a free subject within a duration and yet the difficulty in accounting for the genesis of such a subject turns on how to account for precisely such a freedom without making freedom itself a transcendental or unitary category.

Bergson's initial insight is that to refute Kant's idea of a determined subjectivity that is only transcendently free one must, in the spirit of metaphysics as the study of first principles, reconceptualise the temporality that is its constitutor. The so-called 'reversal' circles around Bergson's famous concept of duration in which time is not a linear succession of moments, but a qualitative multiplicity of heterogeneous and ontologically-distinct states.<sup>137</sup> This dispute concerns the distinction between qualitative and quantitative magnitudes that Kant discusses in the 'Anticipations of Perception' section of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in which he seeks to resolve the tension in his theory of perception between a multiplicity of sensation given all at once in a manifold and our ability to enumerate and therefore unify perceptions *a priori*.<sup>138</sup>

This is related, ultimately, to the question of apperception, of which, we recall, the original Leibnizian definition was 'the subsumption of a multiplicity under a unity' or the relation of a diversity of perceptions to a single perceiver. Kant's definition holds fast to its Leibnizian heritage, as Kant shows in statements such as: "And as in every number we must have a unity as the foundation, so a phenomenon taken as unity is a quantity, and as such always a continuous quantity."<sup>139</sup> That is, in order to generate a representation of ten I must hold in mind a series of single units, of ones external to each other, such that the multiplicity of ones is subsumed under the unity of the representation 'ten'; the parts are gathered into a whole. Kant states very clearly that "[s]pace and time are *quanta continua* because no part of them can be given without enclosing it within boundaries (points and moments)" and that "these quantities [are] a progression in time, the continuity of which we are accustomed to indicate by the expression *flowing*."<sup>140</sup> If that which is subject to measure is called a magnitude, then it is clear that Kant regards space and time as quantitative magnitudes: we gather centimetres into metres and minutes into hours.

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<sup>137</sup> What is duration?

<sup>138</sup> A167-176 B208-218

<sup>139</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* A170 B212

<sup>140</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* A170 B212

The above, taking in mind the definition of extension as the externality of parts, can be called an extensive magnitude. It is not quite enough to say that time, for Kant, is a linear succession of moments, as it is in Aristotle, it is also a magnitude of the type 'continuous extensive quantity': that is, a succession of countable moments that we ultimately relate back to a unity. However, there is another kind of magnitude; a magnitude can either be qualitative or quantitative and can be intensive or extensive. For Kant, an *intensive* magnitude is the extent to which a certain feature inheres in a thing, for example: a single red square could be more or less intensely red while still remaining numerically singular. Therefore an intensity is a degree of quality; Kant evokes this distinction in order to try and express degrees of reality in phenomena such that the degree of reality in phenomena can be called an intensive magnitude - some things are more real than others, but reality is an absolute state, is singular and therefore unitary.

Bergson's argument begins with the idea that our common-sense thinking around quantity and quality is flawed, that it is in fact a mistake to say that a change in a thing, such as when we say a square is 'more red than' another, or that one moment of despair is more sad than another, is a quantitative change when it is in fact qualitative. Secondly to this, if a thing is subject to measure and quantification then it necessarily becomes a spatial property. At the beginning of *Time and Free Will* he writes "If a quantity can increase and diminish, if we perceive in it, so to speak, the less inside the more, is not such a quantity on this very account divisible, and thereby extended?"<sup>141</sup> By Kant's own definition, extension - specifically he means geometric, spatialised matter and more precisely, consciousness coming to fill that space - is subject to counting and measure, but intension - qua thoughts, emotion, the inner life of the mind - is subject to degrees of quality. Yet, for Bergson, intractable problems arise when this logic is applied to the unextended, the most important of which are the inner sense and, its constitutor, time. For Kant's schema to hold, these two states must remain heterogenous to space - there must be some difference in kind between space and time as two of the fundamental syntheses of the understanding, as they have been defined as *a priori* unanalysable grounds, or in other words, as first principles which undergird the whole of Kant's philosophy. Bergson's argument will eventually encompass

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<sup>141</sup> *Time and Free Will* pg.3

the eponymous categories of matter and memory, which can be seen in larval form in his more polemical early work *Time and Free Will*.

Bergson's argument, regarding the inner sense, is as follows: first and foremost is the principle that inner states do not admit of extension; anger, as an example of an emotion and therefore an inner state, is not extended in space. When we perceive an increase in an inner state, for example anger, rather than one having a single sensation of anger that gets quantitatively 'more angry' through the addition of hypothetical atomic units of anger, he claims that actually feeling an 'increase' in anger at any one given moment is a multiplicity of interconnected but distinct psychic states; what increases is not the intensity (as we normally understand it) of a simple sensation but the degree to which various psychic elements involved in the sensation are mixed. It must be stated clearly, however, Bergson is substituting qua qualitative change a difference in degree for a *difference in kind* - and as such, any reference to the increase or decrease in the amount of psychic states should be taken as a change in type of the multiplicity of sensation as a whole. The reason we think of a sensation changing in intensity is due to a defect in language in attempting to account for an infinitely changeable mental state with finite words, dependent upon spatial analogies.<sup>142</sup> The red square that we perceive is not actually 'more red' than the other, but is in fact a completely different sensation making an impression upon us. When holding a hand over a flame, it takes a while for the heat to become unbearable, not because the temperature of the flame has changed, but because a greater number of individual nerves are becoming involved in the sensation. In these examples, it is the degree of the involvement of different sensations within the mind that changes, rather than its quantity, "we are dealing with [...] qualitatively distinct sensations, so many varieties of a single species"<sup>143</sup> - which, ultimately, is a difference in kind.

Thus, if psychic states are not reducible to number or quantitative measuring then they cannot adequately be represented in Kant's idea of time, conflated as it is, Bergson claims, with space, that is, qua extensive magnitude. Time cannot be, as it is in Kant, a quantitative succession because number and numbering is necessarily exclusive to an extensive magnitude i.e. specifically space defined by the postulates of Euclidean geometry: indeed

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<sup>142</sup> *Time and Free Will* pg. 122

<sup>143</sup> *Time and Free Will* pg.42

Kant states that "[w]e cannot even cogitate time, unless, in drawing a straight line"<sup>144</sup> and, Bergson argues, it does not make sense to talk of inner states in this way, that is, quantitatively. The doctrine of time-as-inner-sense is thus problematised.

Bergson's next move is to qualify what he means by multiplicity. In his quest to purge his analysis of any vestige of spatially-derived language, he defines what number is and how it is, in his analysis, an intrinsically spatial concept. In conceiving of ten things, we have two courses available: we either subsume distinct units under a unitary identity (the number 10) or place them in a spatially-contiguous sequence (1+1+1...). The unifying identity '10' contains or synthesises multiple units under a single sign and is such a multiplicity - yet a countable and therefore quantitative multiplicity. If numbers are a quantitative multiplicity, mental states are then a qualitative multiplicity. It is impossible to make mental states subsume to number, argues Bergson, because they are always-already blended with each other - and if they are not numerical, then neither are they spatial.<sup>145</sup> We only consider '10' divisible because we mentally arrange its constituent parts in space - as Bergson asks: "How could we split [the unit] up into fractions whilst affirming its unity, if we did not regard it implicitly as an extended object, one in intuition but multiple in space?"<sup>146</sup> and that "[a]ll unity is the unity of a simple act of mind. Units [are] divisible only because [they are] regarded as extended in space."<sup>147</sup> Multiplicity is directly opposed to unity and unity is only an aggregative act of mind that in effect is a hidden mode of synthesis that Kant does not account for; congruent with this, a determinist view of temporality is then only possible through a retroactive application of rationality which arranges temporal points linearly and therefore spatially. This leads Bergson to conclude that in fact the multiplicity of mental states of phenomena we encounter cannot then be of this type but must be qualitative, that is: without symbolic representation in space. They must instead be viewed from the vantage of pure time. This is not to say that space is therefore unitary, on the contrary it is also a multiplicity, but a numerical multiplicity of the type described above, "a multiplicity of

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<sup>144</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* pg.89

<sup>145</sup> A physicalist may interject here that we could, perhaps, measure the concentration of, for example, serotonin in the brain to account for a quantifiable notion of a particular emotion or pleasure. As Bergson will go on to show in *Matter and Memory*, however, he does not deny that the brain is a physical and analysable system. He merely states that this physical element must not be denied what he calls a 'spiritual' supplement, which we may call here 'memory'. Indeed, the body feeds back into such memory, such that a brain with serotonin amount  $p$  at time  $A$  is necessarily qualitatively different from the same brain experiencing  $p$  at time  $B$ .

<sup>146</sup> *Time and Free Will* pg.81

<sup>147</sup> *Time and Free Will* pg.80

exteriority, of simultaneity, of juxtaposition, of order, of qualitative differentiation, of difference in degree."<sup>148</sup> Using this new sortal typology allows for a description of reality that was impossible in Kant, it opens up new possibilities of description in which coexistence, reciprocity and interpenetration may inhere in an object without necessary reducibility to brute unity.

### **Bergson's Duration**

In the next step of his argument, Bergson establishes his idea of duration, which is a qualitative concept of temporality that foregrounds memory in the synthesis of experience, which he calls the state of the ego "when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states,"<sup>149</sup> such that each new impression of the senses on consciousness is continuously and necessarily blended with that which already exists in memory. Because of this, an account of psychological experience that is founded on duration is now "a becoming, but it is a becoming that endures, a change that is substance itself."<sup>150</sup> Similar to Husserlian time-consciousness, duration is given as an 'immediate datum' of sensation, such that it leads Bergson to claim that the self that is absolutely attentive to duration then has both absolute knowledge of itself and also is acting in total freedom.<sup>151</sup> Time and the inner sense "is an internal multiplicity of succession, of fusion, of organisation, of heterogeneity, of qualitative discrimination, or of difference in kind; it is a virtual and continuous multiplicity that cannot be reduced to numbers."<sup>152</sup> Bergson's own Copernicanism is to depose Kant's systematic quantitative unity for qualitative multiplicity as a foundation of time, which Bergson will come to call 'duration'. The idea of duration as a multiplicity then explicitly challenges Kant's idea of time-as-linear and does so on the topic of temporal succession, a succession that is now purely internal and without recourse to space, whereas space has an exteriority without succession. Being both heterogeneous and continuous, in order to become aligned with a homogenous time that admits of

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<sup>148</sup> *Bergsonism* pg.38

<sup>149</sup> *Time and Free Will* pg.100

<sup>150</sup> *Bergsonism* pg.37

<sup>151</sup> *Time and Free Will* pg.235

<sup>152</sup> *Bergsonism* pg.38

measure, duration must be divided - and this is done, Bergson claims, by infusing it with space:

In short, when the movement of my finger along a surface or a line provides me with a series of sensations of different qualities, one of two things happens: either I picture these sensations to myself as in duration only, and in that case they succeed one another in such a way that I cannot at a given moment perceive a number of them as distinct; or else I make out an order of succession, but that case I display the faculty not only of perceiving a succession of elements, but also of setting them out in line after having distinguished them: in a word, I already possess the idea of space. Hence the idea of a reversible series in duration, or even simply of a certain *order* of succession in time, itself implies the representation of space, and cannot be used to define it.<sup>153</sup>

In other words, there is a homogenous and spatialised time abstracted from an heterogeneous pure time that is not amenable to succession. This distinction between time and duration will later inform a dualism Bergson establishes between an inert, determined system and a vital or creative system. The former is an abstraction drawn from the latter for the sake of measurement: when thinking time, it is a chronology superimposed over the becoming and emergence of real time. Real time, as qualitative and intensive, cannot have any true chronology because any point of origin or beginning is always interrupted by the influx of memory, which always-already displaces the origin.

As such, in duration, there is an asymmetrical distribution of past and future, but the present, rather than being an empty or intemporal moment, becomes a living flux that is intersected with a heterogeneity of times. There is a kind of fullness and complication (literally, as in a folding-together of various temporal lines) within the present moment for Bergson which is broader in scope than the Heideggerian fusion of the three tenses past, present and future; memory and processes of thoughts inhabiting their own multitudinous durations coexist and are folded together. Duration is then congruent with Bergson's theory of subjectivity; subjectivity is always evolving and is not based on arbitrary or indeterminate cognitive categories. Real time is the way in which novelty enters the universe<sup>154</sup> and as

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<sup>153</sup> *Time and Free Will* pg.102

<sup>154</sup> *Studies in the Philosophy of Creation* pg.55

such the subject that is attentive to real duration is aware of its becoming and, as a result, their own freedom. Any theory of determinism is therefore discarded; indeed, at what point could the causal sequence be determined if the subject is in a state of becoming at each given moment? Time is no longer subordinate to space but rather what takes precedence is the (unconditioned) movement through space; the *movement itself* becomes the basis for time and thus a duration that is in constant becoming. Ultimately this conception of duration as real time leads Bergson to conclude that "the free act takes place in time which is flowing and not in time which has already flown. Freedom is therefore a fact and among the facts which we observe there is none clearer."<sup>155</sup> For Kant, freedom is ultimately merely an idea - that is, we cannot confirm its existence for certain but it is a catalyst through which other concepts and functions are thought. Therefore we must maintain a kind of pragmatic faith in the idea of freedom in order to remain rational, as freedom is a prerequisite of spontaneity and, for Kant, we require spontaneity as a characteristic of the elements of synthesis for it to occur at all. What this amounts to in Kant is that freedom has a virtual character, it is *as if* freedom is a fact. What Bergson's efforts attempt is to *actualise* freedom, to prove its factual and necessary nature.

### **Bergsonian Politics and Ethics**

Assuming that the attainment of freedom is a virtue, there is then an implied ethics in Bergson, one which will become important to Deleuze's theory of the subject. Against Kant, Bergson puts forward an embodied and anti-representational ethics of pure action, in which "our body is an instrument of action, and of action only. In no degree, in no sense, under no aspect, does it serve to prepare, far less to explain, a representation."<sup>156</sup> Indeed, when engaging in rational deliberation, which requires representationalism in order to function, the act resulting from such deliberation is highly unlikely to be free in Bergson's sense of the word; a free act would be "in defiance of what is conventionally called a motive and this absence of any tangible reason is the more striking the deeper our freedom goes."<sup>157</sup> Free acts, against the universality of reason, are entirely singular "because the relation of this

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<sup>155</sup> *Time and Free Will* pg.221

<sup>156</sup> *Matter Memory* pg.225

<sup>157</sup> *Time and Free Will* pg.170



action to the state from which it issued could not be expressed by a law, this psychic state being unique of its kind and unable ever to occur again."<sup>158</sup> Consequently, the less an act is free, the more it adheres to conventional reason and habit, the less an act is vital the more it is inert. This is the moment in Bergson which will become important in a political register, that the vital and free component of human experience is pressurised and contained by inert systems of habit, that truly free acts are then very rare, coming to pass only when the actor acts from the perspective granted by duration, that of "dynamic unity and wholly qualitative multiplicity."<sup>159</sup> These moments appear to be reserved for artists and mystics, for moments of seemingly divine inspiration - and are those which escape the established regimes of habit imposed upon the subject. As acts within pure duration, these moments are quite literally of a different temporality.

In attempting to reassert the possibility of true freedom, Bergson can only wrest from determinism a minimal degree of agency and even then only by great effort. Only by acting from the vantage of duration, with one's whole soul, as it were, is one truly free. The act must then embody one's entire person such that the whole of the soul is reflected in each part; this monadic notion of ethics will become important in Deleuze's later theory of subjectivity when he returns to Bergson in the *Cinema* books, as well as in *Foucault and The Fold*.

## **Matter and Memory**

Having established, in *Time and Free Will*, the kind of temporality that the subject is built on, in *Matter and Memory* Bergson seeks to describe the kind of subject which can only fully be conceptualised within and through this temporality. While the former book describes the psychological implications of a metaphysics of duration, the latter makes duration an ontological principle, of which Bergson places the subject at the centre. The most fundamental aspect of Bergson's subject is that it is embodied, or rather that the body is privileged insofar as it is known both subjectively and objectively, in both realist and idealist

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<sup>158</sup> *Time and Free Will* pg.239

<sup>159</sup> *Time and Free Will* pg.239

terms, "from without by perceptions, from within by affections"<sup>160</sup> and is distinctly opposed to representation of the Kantian type. The body is foremost a vehicle for action around which the other images given in perception revolve and to which they are aggregated<sup>161</sup>; if I simply close my eyelids the whole of my perceptual universe is changed - and indeed there are many reasons why my body may automatically and unthinkingly perform this action due to an external stimulation. The body without mind is merely at the whim of the network of forces acting upon it and is purely reactive, without action. There is then, at the outset of *Matter and Memory* a tripartite structure established that maps onto the larger classical mind-body problem: on the one hand there is the body and its sensations (realism), on the other the representations of the mind (idealism) and between the two are indeterminate images, of which the body - and specifically the brain - is a special case, because it is both object and that in and through which subjectivity is instantiated. Bergson's unique reformulation of the problem, then, is that consciousness, being as it is always-already imbricated with the brain as a physical organ, is then also always-already in objectivity, and perception only becomes for-us when it selects from that which is given by a contraction and concentration of mental images.

Between external phenomena and bodily reactions are affections, emotions etc. which act as a kind of delay mechanism between stimulus and response and generate an indeterminacy - as we have seen, emotional states, for Bergson can never be totally conceptualised and exceed language and number - and which in turn condition the manner in which the phenomena are presented to the body. Such indeterminacies are another way in which Bergson complicates theories of determinism; as they are not reducible to number or space, emotional states as zones of indeterminacy disrupt the linear temporal flow, in the same way that the appearance of Proust's madeleine interrupts, for his narrator, the course of their daily life with a reverie. Consciousness, for Bergson, is in this way always interstitial, injecting itself between matter and body, forming a blockage or interruption. Such a process is precisely the titular memory, which effectuates itself in two ways, either as an impedance against brute instantaneous action brought about by external stimulation or as an apparatus of selection, in which images are drawn out of the impersonal manifold and

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<sup>160</sup> *Matter and Memory* pg.31

<sup>161</sup> *Matter and Memory* pg.229

are made into images for-us. This is done not via a different kind of mental activity, but through a "more or less high degree of tension in consciousness."<sup>162</sup>

This idea of tension is central to Bergson's thought in both *Matter and Memory* and, retroactively applied, to *Time and Free Will* and is of huge importance to Deleuze's theory of time. We saw that freedom for Bergson was only achievable through a concerted mental effort, which is recoded in the later work as a 'tension'. The move from *Time and Free Will* to *Matter and Memory* is to extend this heretofore only mental tension into matter itself, along with concurrent processes of detention, distension or relaxation. Memory is already fully involved in this process: such a contraction is brought about by infusing memory into matter; a lamp only becomes a light source for us when we contract our memory of its potential for luminosity into the matter of its physical object. Memory actively feeds into the present which we then contract and the more mental energy one expends in doing so, the greater degree of tension in thought, the more structured and the more meaningful a thing may be said to be.<sup>163</sup> Such a doctrine thus justifies Bergson's statement in *Time and Free Will* that only when acting with one's whole soul i.e. with a great deal of mental energy and labour is one truly free, that is: at a remove from the purely physical reactive world and capable of active, vital artistic or mystical creation. Memory and the infusion of it with images drawn from matter is essentially what Bergson means by consciousness itself:

the function of the body is to receive stimulations and to elaborate them in unforeseen reactions, but the choice of a particular reaction amongst those provided by the nervous system lies outside the body. [...] It is past experience that inspires it and, if this is so, images perceived must be preserved in memory.<sup>164</sup>

This latter point is important for the development of Bergson's theory and requires some explanation. There is an equivalence drawn between perception and memory which appears to be unique to Bergson - the past, in this sense, memory, is always already functioning alongside the present. There is always an ambient or preconscious field of memory from which actions are drawn; for example, when we go to turn on our lamp, we

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<sup>162</sup> *Matter and Memory* pg.238

<sup>163</sup> Re-enchantment of the world, such that, lying dormant within Bergsonism as a possibility, is a re-enchantment of the world through mental labour - echoing his contemporaries in Weber and presaging the advances of the existentialists

<sup>164</sup> *Bergson* pg.33

draw from memory the mental image of the light turning on. In this way, the whole of the past in general and the particular present moment coexist - and it is in this way that all of perception, for Bergson, is actually memory, that the image we have of the present is composed of memories in the similar way that a digital image is composed of thousands of unique pixels.<sup>165</sup> The common-sense view of memory is in this way reversed, that the "truth is that memory does not consist in a regression from the present to the past, but, on the contrary, in a progression from the past to the present."<sup>166</sup>

The ultimate import of Bergson in the history of philosophy is that his work marks a point in which the classical realism-idealism binary is potentially collapsed; it is no longer a case of being trapped in a purely physical or purely mental world, but rather that everything is one process that admits of degrees, a flow of matter into which memory both cuts and forms blockages. If everything is ultimately reducible to an intensive process of duration, reality becomes absolutely evental - in which a thing existing is only a degree of concretion, of an increase in tension in the internal consistency of the object. Organic compounds come together to create a rock, which is eventually washed away by the sea until only sand remains, until the tension inherent within our image of a rock slackens and dissolves. The matter that at one time formed the object is still there, but the event of its concretion has passed. "All activity of consciousness consists in 'immobilizing'"<sup>167</sup> of interrupting the ceaseless flow of matter by drawing virtual memory into the present: this is the sense in which memory acts as a barrier against or blockage to the flow and flux of matter. Thus, in summary, all events have a duration in which they take place, which is qualitatively unique in each instance, each event existing as an intensity within the real experience of subjectivity. Duration is what remains when all else has been subtracted. Deleuze gathers the above into a synopsis when he states: "Duration is essentially memory, consciousness and freedom. It is consciousness and freedom because it is primarily memory"<sup>168</sup> and it is from this insight that Deleuze begins to develop his own theory of time.

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<sup>165</sup> *Matter and Memory* pg.150

<sup>166</sup> *Matter and Memory* pg.239

<sup>167</sup> *Matter and Memory* pg.42

<sup>168</sup> *Bergsonism* pg.51

## Deleuze's Three Syntheses

Understanding Bergson's theory of temporality is critical to understanding the Deleuzian account. Indeed, the first two syntheses of time are a reinterpretation of Bergsonian duration through the Kantian syntheses. The third synthesis of time is a collection of different processes that include a Nietzschean eternal return and a description of a pure and empty form of time that Deleuze finds in Kant and post-Kantians such as Hölderlin. The first synthesis of time revolves around the concept of habit. This is a Mediaeval scholastic term ('habitus') that Hume adopts and that Deleuze analyses out into two constituent processes: contraction and contemplation. Before moving to Deleuze's deployment and characteristic creative modulation of these terms, it is worth describing the Humean concept of habit and how it fits within Deleuze's philosophy and particularly the first synthesis of time. It is within the form of habit that the terms difference and repetition are first found and as such habit can be thought of as the gateway through which the central concepts in Deleuze's theory of time emerge.

While traditionally Hume's empiricism has been seen to entail a sceptical naturalism implying a foreclosure of the world to all but that which we receive through the senses, Deleuze takes up the mantle of a 'transcendental' empiricist, again with a view to a critique of Kant, with the wager that the advantage of adopting a Humean empiricism is the ability to have knowledge of the world that is given immanently within experience and that, crucially, does not rely on any transcendental category - rather that the transcendental occurs only within the empirical. The result is a principle that holds that the constitutive elements of subject formation have to inhere in nature and that the emergence of a self-conscious subject has to be accounted for in empirical terms alone.<sup>169</sup> Hume's concepts of association and habit, then, are just such an account of an immanent unifying principle of knowledge which will give rise not only to the subject, but eventually to society as a whole.

Association is the passive act of applying a force of structuration to simple ideas in order to produce knowledge; in a manner not dissimilar to Bergson's critique of the naming of

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<sup>169</sup> This does not mean that the subject does not then contain conceptual elements, nor that the rules governing this emergent are not, in a sense, transcendental, but merely that the emergence itself can be accounted for empirically, that is, within experience.

emotions, heterogeneous sense data are associated or 'bundled' together and synthesised in order to produce a concept. These associations of resemblance and causality eventually give rise to beliefs, such as whether or not the sun will rise tomorrow - we are justified in assuming that it will because we associate the event with its previous iterations. In this way, the relations between things are *external* to the things themselves and produce the subject as a result of their interaction. In other words, the entire critique of unity and transcendence can be summarised as a *critique of interiority*; Deleuze's turn to Hume is animated by a desire to describe a situation in which the subject is immanent and coexistent with its causes rather than needing a transcendental supplement - and thus avoids the self splitting into the transcendental ego and the empirical 'I'.

The repetition and subsequent association of these causes are known habitually. That which Hume calls habits then make up the subject; ultimately, the subject is the result of the *repetition of habits*. These habits are not truly rational and are in fact often driven by passions, which are external forces acting within a network on bundles of matter. The action of the passions on the subject decide which collections of associations the subject selects, but these are not necessarily rational or reasoned. Therefore the task of knowledge is to govern or control the passions. This notion exceeds individual subjective considerations and also applies to society at large. As such, Hume's political philosophy locates a homology between individual sub-rational consciousness and the society in which the subject exists; such a relation will later be taken up by Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus* when they delineate the realm of the social unconscious. First, we must turn towards an explication of this concept of the 'repetition of habits' as it is central to Deleuze's first synthesis of time.

### **Deleuze's Concept of Repetition**

The syntheses of time are presented in the second chapter of *Difference and Repetition*, which concerns 'repetition for itself'. Habit is closely linked to repetition: repetition for itself is the process that causes habit - indeed, causes time to flow - that is not itself affected by habit. Repetition is contrasted with generality; the difference between the two is predicated

upon time: a generality does not take time into account, it is an eternal constant. Repetition, however, is modified by the time in which it takes place. Each time something repeats, it does so in an entirely new time which has never been before, like Bergson's principle of memory. Therefore, for something to repeat, it must differ. That is, that which makes a thing repeat (difference for itself) exists outside of (and prior to) that which is repeated - and a repetition only becomes conceptulisable if there is a difference between the two repetitions, otherwise, like Kant's example of the two superimposable hands, the two instances would be indiscernible. Yet at the same time, the object repeated must remain the same: it cannot be two separate objects. This is, of course, paradoxical: if 'repetition' can cautiously be read as synonymous with 'structure', in Deleuze's philosophy of time, it is because the notion of the question of repetition raises the issue of where repetition is located. This is why the exemplar image of repetition, for Deleuze, is Pierre Menard's *Quixote*, an exact repetition of Cervantes' novel, but in a different time. Where can we locate the difference between the two texts? Only in the minds of those who interpret it: "Repetition changes nothing in the object repeated, but does change something in the mind which contemplates it"<sup>170</sup> - which is to say that difference is internal to the idea; the mind draws something new from the object each time it perceives it. It is this internal difference that generates a 'clothed' representational difference, which is the type of difference, Deleuze claims, that is usually attended to by philosophers while ignoring difference-in-itself or confusing it with its conceptual counterpart. In remaining at the purely conceptual level there is a radical power of thought that is ignored; the differential power that Deleuze is concerned with at this point in his argument, then, is temporal difference, which he sees as having three distinct modes.

### **The First Synthesis of Time: Habit**

The first synthesis of time is a reformulation of Kant's synthesis of Apprehension in the Intuition and as such concerns the application of spatiotemporal determination to the content of sensation. Deleuze begins with the idea that in this synthesis the manifold must be 'run through and held together', that there must be some force that synthesises empirical elements that are different in kind. However, so as to not fall into the same pitfalls

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<sup>170</sup> *Difference and Repetition* pg.70

as Kant, the governing repetition, even though it is located within the mind, cannot be reducible to an organising activity of the subject. The syntheses take place within the mind but are not an activity of it. They must be, then, a principle organising experience, but an unconscious function that is nonetheless part of the mind. As such, Deleuze will render the concept of habit as a 'passive synthesis', that which takes place 'underneath' active processes of the mind (rational thought). This is opposed to the Kantian syntheses which actively mold the manifold of sensation into a world for-us through the activity of judgement. The passive self, for Kant, is, as we have seen, merely the capacity for receptivity, the brute capacity for creating a representation of space and time.

If above the passive syntheses is active, rational thought, below them are material or organic syntheses, that of contractions of matter. The passive syntheses exist between these two positions in which they are prior to any structure imposed by judgement and yet still function as processes of structuration for the subject. Indeed, Deleuze will inscribe habit on an ontological level as that which organises matter itself. As such, habit, as it is rendered here, is an inhuman repetition, where what is repeated is a process of contraction upon which time is then grounded.

We are made of contracted water, earth, light and air - not merely prior to the recognition or representation of these, but prior to their being sensed. Every organism, in its receptive and perceptual elements, but also in its viscera, is a sum of contractions, of retentions and expectations. At the level of this primary vital sensibility, the lived present constitutes a past and a future in time.<sup>171</sup>

This process of contraction is obviously deeply indebted to Bergson; a simultaneous drawing-out-of the past and condensation within the present. In a similar way to Kant's manifold of sensation, it is upon duration that Bergson's memory, as a form of synthesis, is enacted - that is, upon a living differential present. Deleuze isolates two modes of memory that act simultaneously: recollection-memory, which is the primary and perhaps common-sense form of memory, and contraction-memory. The former draws images from past memory into the present as perceptions, which we experience in a way that is as real as any other perception, while the latter performs the aforementioned synthesis of

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<sup>171</sup> *Difference and Repetition* pg.73



contraction and selection of objects, which is also a futural projection. Contraction is necessarily a synthesis bound futurewards by the arrow of time, from the past into the present. As with Hume's associationism, "[c]ontraction is not an action but a pure passion, a contemplation that preserves the before in the after"<sup>172</sup> it is a force or, as Deleuze occasionally refers to it, a faith, in and of repetition.

Contraction is also an essential component of the subject's capacity for sensation: "[s]ensation contracts the vibrations of a stimulant on a nervous surface or in a cerebral volume", "[s]ensation itself vibrates because it contracts vibrations", "[s]ensation is the contracted vibration that has become quality, variety."<sup>173</sup> In this way, like Bergson, the synthesis is both psychological and ontological, it effectuates within matter and memory alike. Yet contraction is only brought about in the mind of the subject through the act of contemplation, such that "[s]ensation is pure contemplation, for it is through contemplation that one contracts".<sup>174</sup>

Contemplation should then be read as a kind of expectation, or an imagination of what is to come. The imagination extracts the difference from the repetition brought about by habit. Fusing Kant, Hume and Bergson, Deleuze writes:

The imagination is defined here as a contractile power: like a sensitive plate, it retains one case when the other appears. It contracts cases, elements, agitations or homogeneous instants and grounds these in an internal qualitative impression endowed with a certain weight. When A appears, we expect B with a force corresponding to the qualitative impression of all the contracted ABs. This is by no means a memory, nor indeed an operation of the understanding: contraction is not a matter of reflection. Properly speaking, it forms a synthesis of time. A succession of instants does not constitute time any more than it causes it to disappear; it indicates only its constantly aborted moment of birth. Time is constituted only in the originary synthesis which operates on the repetition of instants. This synthesis contracts the successive independent instants into one another, thereby constituting the lived, or living, present. It is in this present that time is deployed.<sup>175</sup>

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<sup>172</sup> *Difference and Repetition* pg.73

<sup>173</sup> *What is Philosophy?* pg.211

<sup>174</sup> *What is Philosophy?* pg.212

<sup>175</sup> *Difference and Repetition* pg.70

Discrete instants are not in themselves time, they are merely the content of time. That which contemplates draws the instants together in a process of contraction, such that if an AB AB sequence is drawn in and enveloped by the present, it projects futurewards a subsequent AB. In doing so, it both ensures and is conditioned in turn by the arrow of time; it moves from the particular to the general (from 'the sun has risen' to 'the sun will rise daily') because the process is asymmetrical and irreversible.

This is the first step towards the constitution of a subject. "[Empiricism's] force begins from the moment it defines the subject: a *habitus*, a habit, nothing but a habit in a field of immanence, the habit of saying I."<sup>176</sup> In no uncertain terms, then, does Deleuze remain within Kant's problem of the temporal constitution of subjectivity, but the self that is created in this first synthesis is absolutely disunitary and is in fact composed only of an assembly of passive or larval selves, which each contract time in their own duration depending on a specific need. Deleuze writes:

The repetition of need, and of everything which depends upon it, expresses the time which belongs to the synthesis of time, the intratemporal character of that synthesis. Repetition is essentially inscribed in need, since need rests upon an instance which essentially involves repetition: which forms the for-itself of repetition and the for-itself of a certain duration.<sup>177</sup>

If everything is a contraction of matter, including time itself, this means that there are a multiplicity of selves infused within the world. A beating heart contracts a repetition, so in that sense the heart is a self - there are, then, a multiplicity of larval selves which each own a present and their habits compose the time of which we are in turn composed. An organism's potential for contraction is bounded and circumscribed by fatigue, or rather the stores of energy available to it, such that

Two successive presents may be contemporaneous with a third present, more extended by virtue of the number of instants it contracts. The duration of an organism's present, or of its various presents, will vary according to the natural

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<sup>176</sup> *What is Philosophy?* pg.48

<sup>177</sup> *Difference and Repetition* pg.77

contractile range of its contemplative souls. In other words, fatigue is a real component of contemplation.<sup>178</sup>

Need creates the moment of contraction and fatigue delimits it. In order to synthesise a plurality of presents, the first synthesis 'runs through and holds together' the various presents of the larval selves, condensing them into an experience of the living present. This process is what constitutes the first synthesis of time in-itself.

### **The Second Synthesis of Time: Memory**

The second synthesis of time is the temporal process in which the past is taken as primary, that is as opposed to a dimension of the present. We saw that in the first synthesis of time, the past is an ever-growing repository that is constantly feeding into the present. However, this only described the past as an aspect of the present, contained within and considered as a dimension of the living present. "[T]he present alone exists."<sup>179</sup> Deleuze's second synthesis of time concerns the 'pure past', that is the past in-itself, independent of the present or future. Such a description is motivated by the exigency that the present must pass, it cannot be static. How it comes to pass is due to the active synthesis of memory which exists alongside that of the first synthesis, creating a simultaneity of past and present.

The past pushes inexorably into the present, feeding and conditioning it. This is counterintuitive to how one normally thinks of the past and memory: common sense dictates that the past is static and if one were to remember something they would reach back into this repository and draw the remembered content forth, into the present. According to Deleuze, this common sense idea is but one aspect of the past; while the pure past is an archive and it is subject to processes of contraction, it necessarily exists alongside the present precisely because, as we have seen in the first synthesis, each present has a past aspect which is part of contraction and thus part of habit, it is just not reducible to the present. Such a reaching-back would be an active synthesis and so

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<sup>178</sup> *Difference and Repetition* pg.77

<sup>179</sup> *Difference and Repetition* pg.76

necessarily implies a grounding passive synthesis - it is this passive synthesis of memory that constitutes the pure past, the repository of past experiences which nevertheless remains separate from its instantiation within the present; the past that exists concurrently with the present, when taken as primary in the second synthesis of time, must then be the whole past, with an autonomous existence from the past that inheres in the present.

Yet, even though they coexist, Bergson maintains a principle of ontological heterogeneity between the past and the present - they are different in kind. How, then, do they interact in Deleuze's diagram? If the present can only be conceptualised as an interval or interstitial that divides the past from the present, it is then through duration, qua a process of contraction and decontraction, that allows movement among these various levels of memory "at a stroke"<sup>180</sup> - Deleuze describes this movement as a 'leap'<sup>181</sup> between a virtual inactive level and an actual active level or degree of tension of consciousness. In fact the inactive virtual level that is the past is profoundly similar to Kant's transcendental rules - indeed, Deleuze makes the case that the past, for Bergson, is an ontological element, or rather the place in which pure ontology lies, whereas the present is the domain of psychology, the place in which the transcendental rules of the past are brought forth and applied.

## **Time Crystals**

With the introduction here of the virtual and actual levels or streams of time, before continuing on to the third synthesis, the concept of the crystal needs to be outlined. The notion of the time crystal is only developed by Deleuze in his later work, specifically in the *Cinema* books - and will be attended to contextually in chapter 5 of this thesis - however, sketching its mechanism here will be useful in providing a coherent account of the pure and empty form of time. It should be made clear, however, that not only is this concept developed only when Deleuze returns to the problems of *Difference and Repetition* in *Cinema 2*, but also that Deleuze credits Guattari with the production of the concept in his *Machinic Unconscious*, which is then later incorporated into *A Thousand Plateaus* as the

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<sup>180</sup> *Matter and Memory* pg.239

<sup>181</sup> *Bergsonism* pg.56

concept of the 'refrain'.<sup>182</sup> Guattari often talks of the crystal in terms of potential and possibility, as the point at which a possible process, before being actualised, is frozen and can be glimpsed in an often-temporary moment. This occurs between two poles in a series, for example, Guattari defines the concept of the abstract machine as a "[p]ure quanta of potential deterritorialization, abstract machines are everywhere and nowhere, *before* and *after* the crystallisation of the opposition between machine and structure, representation and referent, object and subject."<sup>183</sup> When the authors formally define the refrain, they do so in a geological capacity:

So just what is a refrain? *Glass harmonica*: the refrain is a prism, a crystal of space-time. It acts upon that which surrounds it, sound or light, extracting from it various vibrations, or decompositions, projections, or transformations. The refrain also has a catalytic function: not only to increase the speed of the exchanges and reactions in that which surrounds it, but also to assure indirect interactions between elements devoid of so-called natural affinity, and thereby to form organised masses. The refrain is therefore of the crystal or protein type.<sup>184</sup>

We are told that "the crystal forms by interiorizing and incorporating masses of amorphous material"<sup>185</sup> and that this occurs from the inside proceeding to the outer limit. In it we may see frozen moments of processes that normally might be too small or fast to grasp, interior processes are externalised; "the crystalline stratum, and physicochemical strata, wherever the molar can be said to express microscopic molecular interactions ("the crystal is the macroscopic expression of a microscopic structure"; the "crystalline form expresses certain atomic or molecular characteristics of the constituent chemical categories")."<sup>186</sup> The refrain in *A Thousand Plateaus* is exemplified in birdsong, a repetition that establishes a territory, where the repetition becomes a territorial motif and as such wards off the forces that might attack from outside the territory. The child hums a tune to itself in order to protect against what might be lurking in the darkness, extracting safety from insecurity by establishing a home, or expressing a connection between virtual safety and actual threat, or vice versa.<sup>187</sup>

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<sup>182</sup> See *Cinema 2* pg.295 note 25 and pg.296 note 34

<sup>183</sup> *Machinic Unconscious* pg.166

<sup>184</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.349

<sup>185</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.49

<sup>186</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.57

<sup>187</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.311

In *Cinema 2*, the crystal is defined as the point at which virtual and actual are indistinguishable, through which an image of time can be seen. The crucial difference between Deleuze's account of time and that of Heidegger, both being based on Kant, is that Deleuze joins the three syntheses of time in a univocal plane of immanence. In this context, immanence means the inseparability of virtual and actual, that neither can be placed prior to the other. These two ontological modes exist on the plane of immanence, alongside the constitutive processes of actualisation and the relay back to the virtual. The first and second syntheses of time constitute a relay of virtual processes and actual expressions and re-expressions - and through this a crystal can form. This is not to say that virtuality conforms to the first synthesis or actuality to the second, each synthesis has both a virtual and actual layer, but rather that the two taken together constitute a relay or reciprocal function, where habit becomes memory and memory feeds habit. The crystallisation of these processes allows for a view of a third process, the third synthesis of time:

What we see in the crystal is no longer the empirical progression of time as succession of presents, nor its indirect representation as interval or as whole; it is its direct presentation, its constitutive dividing in two into a present which is passing and a past which is preserved, the strict contemporaneity of the present with the past that it will be, of the past with the present that it has been. It is time itself which arises in the crystal, and which is constantly recommending its dividing in two without completing it, since the indiscernible exchange is always renewed and reproduced. The direct time-image or the transcendental form of time is what we see in the crystal<sup>188</sup>

The crystal is the means by which we can see a pure and empty form of time, but also the point at which time itself merges with the world, the point at which the virtual and actual, or ideal and real images of time, become married. Even if this process is nascent in *Difference and Repetition*, the manner in which Deleuze describes the third synthesis of time presupposes it; indeed, that which the crystal reveals may only be grasped after the crystal-image has decomposed - what we see in *Difference and Repetition* is the seed of the crystal, the virtual idea that contains all the elements necessary for its actualisation and yet remains dormant. The third synthesis will crack this crystal and shred the subject, which

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<sup>188</sup> *Cinema 2* pg.274

is to say it reveals difference-in-itself and mutilates beings, dividing them up into the inorganic elements of which they are composed.

### **The Third Synthesis of Time: Pure and Empty Time**

Why does Deleuze say that with Kant there is an inauguration of "an entirely new conception of time", a "modern consciousness of time in opposition to a classical or ancient consciousness of time"?<sup>189</sup> We can glean a clue through the spatial images used to illustrate these concepts; we have already seen that Kant talks of a 'line progressing to infinity' - this image of time is opposed to an ancient or premodern understanding of time as circular or cyclical. What will emerge in the course of Deleuze's interrogation of this problem is that the fundamental ontological difference between the cyclical image of time as it is found in the Greeks and the linear time of Kant is that, in an ontological capacity, cyclicity describes a demarcation of the limit of the world, while linearity is a traversal of or continuous postponement of the limit of the world. Indeed, simultaneously the notion of 'limit' is itself rethought through this shift; the limit is no longer a terminal point but a movement towards a frontier or extremity. While the limit of cyclical time encloses within a temporal perimeter, linear time never ceases tending towards this limit, indeed this movement towards the limit *is* time itself, it is the force that continually postpones the end of time. While the effects of this shift may at first seem merely programmatic or a necessary complement to the Copernican revolution, the consequences of this reconfiguration for a theory of the subject grounded in the constitutive powers of temporality are not at all trivial.

By what means does Kant manage to perform a reconfiguration of such magnitude? In *Kant's Critical Philosophy*, Deleuze proposes to illustrate Kant's novelty through four 'poetic formulae', the first two of which pertain to time and subjectivity. The first formula put forward is Hamlet's phrase 'time is out of joint'. Deleuze, aiming to utilise the theoretical content of the quote as philosophical rather than literary material, states that this "signifies the reversal of the movement-time relationship"<sup>190</sup> in Kant. We can, for now, leave considerations of space per se somewhat to one side, because as we have seen Kant

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<sup>189</sup> *Kant, Synthesis and Time*

<sup>190</sup> *Kant's Critical Philosophy* vii

argues that our inner subjectivity is not extended in space, only in time, and therefore ultimately that "[t]ime is the a priori formal condition of all appearances in general",<sup>191</sup> whereas space only conditions outer apparitions. However, what follows will be a short consideration of time-as-space, of the two major shapes of time in the philosophical imaginary.

Contrary to ancient philosophy which conceived of time as the measure of movement, in Kant "[i]t is now movement which is subordinate to time."<sup>192</sup> In Aristotle, motion was defined relationally, as changes occurring in space, for if no change occurs in a space then there is no time; time does not exist as separate from the events taking place within it. Even if this view emerged from a critique of the Platonic position, in which time is like an empty receptacle into which things are placed and thus exists separately from the objects within it, in both of the major temporal theories of Western philosophical antiquity, the image of time is spatially-derived. For example, in Plato time is seen as a thing which can be entered; in the *Timaeus* the concentric cycles of the planets demarcate spaces which are an "image of eternity"<sup>193</sup> from which both the concept of years is derived and which will define the shape of the universe, which is the domain of time. In Aristotle, by contrast, time is tied to the external object and it is only when such an object has been moved within space can it be said to have entered into or been enveloped by time, or rather, its movement can be timed qua being measured across the space it has travelled. But now, as Kant construes time as both the medium in which space and movement occur and that which conditions the phenomena that are moved, there is a reversal effected. Motion is now, in Kant, derived from the passage of time because time is a necessary subjective exigency which is a precondition of our cognisance of a moving object, indeed of any perception at all. As time arises internally from the subject it therefore opposes both the Platonic and Aristotelian view, in which time exists independently of the subject and is dependent upon a spatial concept such as the container or the relations of motion. Kant, at least in his intention alone, has posited a concept of pure time independent of space as one of the pure concepts of the understanding.

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<sup>191</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* p.174-175

<sup>192</sup> *Kant, Synthesis and Time*

<sup>193</sup> *Kant, Synthesis and Time*



To illustrate the Platonic mode from which Kant purportedly departs, Deleuze gestures towards certain cosmogonical passages in the *Timaeus* in which time, measured by celestial rotations, is described in a manner consonant with eternity, unity and circularity, which are themselves all discussed within the capacity of perfection and wholeness; the image of the world is described as a harmonious arrangement of interlocking spheres, ascending from the soul to the universe as a whole. As such, we can read the *Timaeus* as a continuation of the tradition of the 'harmony of the spheres' inaugurated by Pythagoras, indicating a symmetrical, ordered and uniform universe:

When the Father who begat the world saw the image which he had made of the Eternal Gods moving and living, he rejoiced; and in his joy resolved, since the archetype was eternal, to make the creature eternal as far as this was possible. Wherefore he made an image of eternity which is time, having an uniform motion according to number, parted into months and days and years, and also having greater divisions of past, present, and future. These all apply to becoming in time, and have no meaning in relation to the eternal nature, which ever is and never was or will be; [...] [*t*]hese are the forms of time which imitate eternity and move in a circle measured by number.<sup>194</sup>

These great circles demarcate the universe and the absolute limit thereof, within which time exists and outside which is the eternal. Deleuze lucidly illustrates this idea through the image of a revolving door; ancient or pre-Copernican time moves cyclically around a central hinge, that is, the earth around which the universe revolves, where cyclicity and sphericity is representative of and consonant with perfection and wholeness. These uniform wholenesses are then subject to measure by number which divides up the circle in the same manner as days divide a year, the intersection of a smaller circle being the criterion for such divisions e.g. an annual solar cycle intersected by a monthly lunar cycle. The dialogue even goes as far as to describe the shape of this creator-craftsman, through the image of the world-soul which is again spherical and necessarily symmetrical: "he was made in the all-containing form of a sphere, round as from a lathe and every way equidistant from the centre", demarcating a space in which all of the Demiurge's actions take place; such that "[A]ll that he did was done rationally in and by himself, and he moved

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<sup>194</sup> Plato's *Timeaus* <<https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1572/1572-h/1572-h.htm>> Accessed: 09/09/19

in a circle turning within himself, which is the most intellectual of motions." Secondary to this, the human soul is modelled after this spherical cosmos, or world-soul, which eventually comes to diffuse throughout the body; however, even as these celestial cycles are in some way embodied, the natural functions of the body interfere with the soul's participation in the *musica universalis* such that the human must, through anamnesis, transcend this imperfect embodiment and recall the arché in which the perfect forms exist.

Such a harmonious and cyclical universe is, for Deleuze, what Kant disrupts when he subordinates time to a capacity of the subject. Deleuze's true impetus for focusing attentively on this idea of cyclical time comes from his reading of Hölderlin's translation and reinterpretation of Sophocles' tragedies. We may understand Deleuze's position to be that through Hölderlin - a close contemporary of and taking great inspiration from Kant - and his reconfiguration of the Oedipus plays in particular, that we can see the moment in which circular time becomes uncurved, straightens and the import thereof.

The axiom of Hölderlin's analysis is the 'caesura' or a pause in time which both joins and separates the beginning and ending of the plays, a "counter-rhythmic rupture" effecting a "tragic transport"<sup>195</sup> which recontextualises the beginning of the play in the light of the now-inevitable ending. This is what, for Deleuze, embodies that "there is a certain sense of the tragic for the Greeks which is the tragic element of cyclical time",<sup>196</sup> that the beginning and the end rhyme such that the reader could enter the cycle at any point and end back where they began. The caesura in *Oedipus (Rex)*, the exemplar of the 'tragic law', and in *Antigone* is the appearance of Tiresias, who "enters the course of fate as the custodian of the natural power which, in a tragic manner, removes man from his own life-sphere, the center of his inner life into another world and into the excentric sphere of the dead."<sup>197</sup> Tiresias, as a kind of demigod, represents the incursion of the infinite into the finite in a near-exact application of the analytic of the sublime that Kant develops in his third critique. Hölderlin, however, interprets this sublimity as an essential facet of the tragic: "[t]he presentation of the tragic rests primarily on the tremendous - how the god and man mate and how natural force and man's innermost boundlessly unite in wrath [... and] on the boundless union purifying itself through boundless separation."<sup>198</sup> Because of Tiresias'

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<sup>195</sup> Hölderlin, *Essays and Letters on Theory* pp.101-116

<sup>196</sup> Kant, *Synthesis and Time*

<sup>197</sup> *Essays and Letters on Theory* pg.101

<sup>198</sup> *Essays and Letters on Theory* pg.107

prophecy, Oedipus is unable to free himself from his tragic destiny and he is from the very first moment consigned to his fate, and as such the beginning and the end form a cycle, or in other words they rhyme. The tragic fate *limits* Oedipus, it demarcates the expanse of his possibilities such that, in *Oedipus at Colonus*, he has already fully accepted his fate and merely looks for a way to fulfil his prophesied death in the most appropriate manner. Yet the caesura, on Hölderlin's Kantian reading, also forms the moment at which the end breaks with the beginning and a new mode of temporality begins. Of this profane and anthropocentric moment, Hölderlin writes that "[a]t such moments man forgets himself and the god and turns around like a traitor" and that "[i]n the utmost form of suffering, namely, there exists nothing but the conditions of space and time."<sup>199</sup> The tragic moment, which is on this reading also a moment of sublime revelation, reveals a pure and empty time reduced to its most basic conditions, divorced from the grand history of cyclical time. Hölderlin writes that

Inside [empty time], man forgets himself because he exists entirely for the moment, the god [forgets himself] because he is nothing but time; and either one is unfaithful, time, because it is reversed categorically at such a moment, no longer fitting beginning and end; man, because at this moment of reversal he has to follow and thus can no longer resemble the beginning in what follows.<sup>200</sup>

This empty moment creates a rupture between measured or mathematised time (that which Deleuze will later term 'chronos' and will be an important facet of Bergson's critique of Kant) and an atemporal divine time (or 'aion') uncovering a pure present. Hölderlin's return to Sophocles, with Kant's linear temporality to hand, the temporal line which man "has to follow", allows for the creation of a temporal relay between the point of caesura and the cycle. At such a moment the limit demarcated by the circle is transgressed and time can no longer recur into cyclicity because the beginning and the end no longer fit together, where a fitting-together would be an atonement for the transgression and a restoration of the original condition (*apokatastasis*). Such is the magnitude of the tragic event that befalls Oedipus, he is constantly within a state of pure time; Deleuze parses Hölderlin: "there will no longer be any atonement, even if only in the form of a brutal death. Oedipus is in

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<sup>199</sup> *Essays and Letters on Theory* pg.108

<sup>200</sup> *Essays and Letters on Theory* pg.108

perpetual suspension, he will travel his straight line of time. In other words, he is traversed by a straight line which drags him along."<sup>201</sup>

A similar event occurs in the 'On Several Regimes of Signs' chapter of *A Thousand Plateaus*, with Deleuze and Guattari's reading of the biblical story of Cain. Using different terminology (although the Kant lectures and *A Thousand Plateaus* are roughly contemporaneous) they write, pertaining to 'faciality' that at the moment in which God hides his face from his subject, the same logic of double-abandonment occurs, thus generating a line of flight. "The god averts his face, which must be seen by no-one; and the subject, gripped by a veritable fear of the god, averts his or her face in turn. [...] It is this double turning away that draws the positive line of flight."<sup>202</sup> In this double-abandonment Cain is famously marked as being unable to be killed and therefore his death indefinitely postponed; he sets out along a line of flight which has its own temporality, that of a constant suspension of threshold-crossing, of continually pushing back the limit. Deleuze and Guattari claim that this logic repeats throughout the Bible, in the stories of Moses, Jonah and Jesus and elsewhere, but finds an exemplar in the figure of Oedipus.

For Deleuze, Hölderlin's return to Sophocles marks the end of the cyclical conception of time by bringing it to completion, in effect closing the circle and beginning the line that traverses it. It is at this point that time has come loose from its hinge, its cardinal point, as Deleuze says:

Everything happens as if time "deployed itself" [se déployait], but we must take "deployed itself" in its strict sense, which is to say unrolled itself, which is to say lost its cyclical form. What does that mean that time becomes a pure straight line? It's exactly as if you were holding a coiled spring and you let it go.<sup>203</sup>

In Kant, an opposition between the transcendent and the transcendental is developed; the rules for *a priori* synthesis are necessarily *within* time, which means that the human can indeed transcend time, insofar as accessing the universal and necessary, but does so only within and through time. The subject that is capable of reason can utilise reason to access

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<sup>201</sup> *Kant, Synthesis and Time*

<sup>202</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.123

<sup>203</sup> *Kant, Synthesis and Time*

that which is not merely given in experience - indeed the entire enterprise of Kantian rationality is an attempt to vouchsafe the ability to think transcendental ideas, but to do so as a finite being, subject to time. Anything that is not accessible in this way is transcendent, or noumena. Deleuze summarises: "[time] is not an eternal form, but in fact the form of that which is *not* eternal, the immutable form of change and movement."<sup>204</sup> This is Kant's novelty and it is in this sense that 'time is out of joint,' time has come loose from its hinge around which the cycles turned and from which they were formed.<sup>205</sup> The result of this dislocation is that time ceases to be 'coiled', "[e]verything happens as if, having been *coiled* up so as to measure the passage of celestial bodies, time unrolls itself like a sort of *serpent*, it shakes off all subordination to a movement or a nature, it becomes time in itself for itself, it becomes pure and empty time."<sup>206</sup> Kant himself states the reversal as so: "[w]e cannot even cogitate time, unless, in drawing a straight line (which is to serve as the external figurative representation of time), we fix our attention on the act of the synthesis of the manifold, whereby we determine successively the internal sense, and thus attend also to the succession of this determination. Motion as the act of the subject (not as a determination of the object)."<sup>207</sup> Taken in this way, time is a straight line heading towards infinity: towards the transcendental which is outside of time.

In recounting Deleuze's discussion of Hölderlin, there was a caesura which 'caused the beginning and end to no longer rhyme', or in other words is that which "distributes an asymmetrical before and after", with the caesura existing as a moment of the pure present.<sup>208</sup> This moment is the formation of a crystal, the empty moment is seen within such a crystal, albeit briefly and indistinctly. What causes the caesura to appear? Some event of huge personal or societal significance, which recontextualises the before and the after, something that puts time out of joint. In Hamlet, such a moment - indeed the moment that quite literally puts time out of joint in the temporal sequence of the play - is the sea voyage; the first half of the play is when Hamlet famously pauses and the second half is when he becomes adequate to the task bequeathed to him, to kill his uncle. Firstly, we see the

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<sup>204</sup> *Kant's Critical Philosophy* viii

<sup>205</sup> Heidegger also refers to the categories as the hinges [Fugen] of transcendence in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* pg.61

<sup>206</sup> *Kant, Synthesis and Time* - my emphasis. While we can see an immediate correspondence with the 'Postscript...' here, the image of the serpent should be thought of as 'coiled' only insofar as it is a single coil or ring. Indeed, the symbol of the 'ouroboros', a cyclical serpent denoting cosmic or natural repetition, is clearer.

<sup>207</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* pg.89

<sup>208</sup> *Kant, Synthesis and Time*

distribution of time in the caesura of the sea-voyage after which the beginning and end no longer rhyme; secondly, we see a dramatic hero who is not immediately and inexorably subject to the fate that befalls him, but instead must think it over in order to become worthy of what happens to him. In this sense Hamlet embodies a different temporality to Oedipus and other tragic figures who are always-already subject to the cyclical tragic law before they are even born, their beginning and end always rhyme, whereas Hamlet must rise to the task of identifying himself with this law - and such a process of becoming-worthy takes place during the caesura in which time is out of joint. To be out of joint is then to be divorced from representational coordinates, to be within the immediacy of the real and at a remove from transcendental signifiers, which is what Kant discovers when time ceases to be subordinated to movement. For Deleuze, the caesura evidenced the formation of a linear time because the caesura was an empty moment, neither past nor present - yet, the third synthesis of time is actually a ground (or unground) for both the synthesis of habit and memory; it both cuts into and orders the linear progression of time. It is in this way neither active nor passive, merely 'empty', without the determinations and content given to it by cardinal points.<sup>209</sup>

In the introduction, Deleuze recounts the problem of incongruent counterparts in Kant's philosophy, or in other words the problem of precisely how faculties that differ in kind may be related to one another, as in the faculty of time differing from that of the understanding. In Deleuze, memory and habit are different in kind and the problem of their relation is the same as Kant faced. Deleuze's argument is that memory and habit are two modes or expressions of time, which necessarily implies a pure or non-modal form of temporality. In the same way, the succession of presents and the coexistence of multiple presents (as in the first synthesis) are attributes of these modes. This pure form of time is then intensive and ontologically prior to both others, which is to say responsible for their expression. The eternal return of difference is what animates the first two syntheses. As such, insofar as the first synthesis constitutes a space of individuation (all of the different kinds of contraction and that which they generate) and the second the relations between these 'fields of individuation' (repetition of characteristics brought about by memory) then this third synthesis is a type of difference-in-itself, or a differentiator of difference, or the dark

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<sup>209</sup> This thus links the third synthesis of time to Bergsonian pure duration, insofar as it is not amenable to measurement by number, which is to say not quantitative.

precursor. This process is dark because it is pre-representational and not ordered - indeed, time is given order through the passive processes of habit and memory.

Deleuze reintroduces the concept of the eternal return at this point, but rather than as a return or repetition of eternal forms or of actual experience, what repeats is difference itself in the pure and empty form of time - difference always returns, which is to say it engenders new possibilities. As such, this form of time is also the future - as a field of possible differences that may be actualised. Simultaneously, it relates habit and memory; when we act we draw the pure past into the present which conditions a field of possibilities which in turn establishes future potential actions. The future exists in excess of the present, the present cannot contain it and is constantly being injected with new potential futures. Deleuze's concept of the eternal return then has two modes: difference-in-itself and the pure and empty form of time. What we call the third synthesis, then, is the process that relates habit and memory, the components of which are the pure form of time and the expression of which is the eternal return of difference-in-itself.

Such a synthesis is not constitutive of the subject in the same way that the previous two are. Indeed, as the first two syntheses of time are either active or passive, the third synthesis is neither - it is simply indifferent. For Deleuze - and absolutely unlike Kant - synthesis does not require or presuppose a subject and allows Deleuze to discard entirely the notion of a transcendental unity of apperception, because the pure and empty form of time now takes this role, albeit in a radically indifferent as opposed to active capacity. What is important to note is that the caesura, being empty of content and determination, is the site at which the new emerges, or rather that in which it inheres. This is also why the caesura, the crystal and the third synthesis of time itself are antithetical to an identity of the subject, they inject a (necessarily-futural) novelty which is disruptive of fixed identities, but this novelty is inhuman and indifferent. This indifference also reveals the inexorable arrow of time and as such invites the challenge of the eternal return. In turn, because the eternal return breaks free of the repetition of time, it reveals the pure and empty form of time. That is, it reveals Hamlet's pause, or the intemporal moment of Hölderlin. It is in this sense that the pure and empty form of time 'ungrounds' habit-memory and the subject qua a product of temporal synthesis. Time does not care about you - it marches forward and tends towards chaos and destruction, entropically undoing all that was previously structured.

This, as well as unifying the other two aspects of the tripartite synthesis is in effect the apex of Deleuze's critique of representation: nothing may maintain a fixed identity over time because of time, time ungrounds or removes the foundation of identity in this way. This is the true challenge of the eternal return, it annihilates that which will not change; Hamlet was charged with the task of killing his uncle and changing the world and the pause dramatises his rise to become worthy of the challenge. Those who do not have the power to become worthy, which is to say responsive to change, are discarded; as Deleuze writes: "those who repeat identically will be eliminated."<sup>210</sup>

## Conclusion

To recap: Kant provides a model of the mind based upon syntheses of the imagination, one faculty of which is time-formation. Time structures the inner sense, which is a unified and rational whole, it forms judgements by unifying the manifold of sensation with the understanding, giving a representation of the world.

Bergson reversed Kantianism by changing in kind the form of time that constitutes the subject. Duration, which is to say a qualitative and intensive form of time, is now the principle of ontological structure that makes up a subject. As such, the subject is itself non-quantitative and non-extensive, which is to say not spatial or amenable to measure. Yet it is still a subject created by time and as such is not unitary, as unity is a spatial and numerical category.

In articulating a threefold synthesis of time, Deleuze has also created a threefold synthesis of the genesis of the subject. This account will be central to his work going forward, in both his collaboration with Guattari and in his own late work, albeit in modified form. Such syntheses make up an account of repetition-for-itself, the return of structures in a new time, infused with difference. Repetition draws the pure past into the present, where the past is a set of transcendental rules which feed the present, which itself is a contraction of mental, organic and inorganic elements. This reciprocal relay is grounded and yet interrupted by a

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<sup>210</sup> *Difference and Repetition* pg.381



future that is in excess of the present and adheres to the arrow of time. The future allows us to relate the past and the present because it acts as a cut that injects difference and therefore novelty into the two previous syntheses, conditioning them from the viewpoint of the future.

The tripartite synthesis of time describes the genesis of Deleuze's subject because it describes the genesis of time, which is to say that Deleuze thinks the Kantian notion of time-as-inner-sense immanently. The ontogenesis of time and the psychogenesis of mind arise in a single stroke. Yet this does not mean that, as it was for Kant, time is reducible to a faculty of the subject. Quite the opposite: the passive syntheses that give rise to both time and the subject are independent expressions of a prior process of repetition-in-itself. This indifference is shown most clearly in the pure and empty form of time, which is ultimately revealed to be the very same labyrinth that Deleuze claimed Kant discovered, the straight line heading towards the infinite. The subject, when beholding directly such a form of time is opened to the outside, encountering its own dissolution and challenged to become worthy of the challenge of the eternal return.

It could be argued, however, that Deleuze does not necessarily provide a synthesis of the subject, but merely of the organism. If flowers contract and hearts contemplate, where does the subject, which is much more than just its organs, emerge? What of the psyche? It is such a question, I suggest, that is at stake in Deleuze's collaboration with Félix Guattari and is attended to through a repetition of the tripartite synthesis, first in the psyche and second in the formation of the state, which is to say the environment with which the subject is immanent. This is the problem that concerns the next chapter of this thesis.

## 3: Capitalism, Capture, Agency

### Introduction

In investigating the conditions for time in *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze developed a robust metaphysical account predicated upon a system modelled after the Kantian syntheses to explain the genesis of time. However Deleuze's three syntheses of time appear to be of an ontological, worldly or cosmic scale, in effect pertaining to the whole of reality. This would make them 'transcendental' in the sense of necessary and universal, that they apply to all things within time. It is only when Deleuze comes to collaborate with Guattari that these questions of time and subjectivity take on a more local, or as they call it, 'micrological' scale. Specifically, this entails an encounter with the current mode of capitalism, that which has been given various appellations, such as global, communicative or late capitalism. Having recounted the path by which Deleuze ends up at such a conception of time, which is necessarily also a description of the constitution of the subject, what we see in *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus* is a repetition of these syntheses, albeit slightly differently. First, we see the three syntheses at work in the construction of the psyche, secondly they are at work in the construction of the apparatus of capture, the model that the authors develop to explain the emergence of the state. The syntheses that we have been describing, then, are the link between the two halves of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, but must not be seen as a universal, rather a repetition of a constant of structuration, instantiated in various ways.

### Freudo-Marxism

The question of a singular mode of specifically 'capitalist' subjectivity is a problem that has only relatively recently been attended to by philosophers. This is perhaps as a consequence of the failure of the 20th-century communist experiment and with a recognition that

capitalism has indeed incurred a final victory, contemporary critical theory has begun to focus with greater intensity on the subject living under the yoke of the capitalist paradigm. The pertinent question then is: what sort of people does this particular economy - this singular stage in history - make us into?

The primary theoretical approach to this problematic up until the advent of poststructuralism was a fusion of Marx and Freud. Emblematically deployed by the Frankfurt school thinkers, particularly Herbert Marcuse, as well as Wilhelm Reich, this strategy entailed grounding political praxis in the pursuit of a liberation or revolution of desire, its primary targets being the various fascisms of the early 20th-century as well as the more vulgar or dogmatic strains of Marxism, seen as restrictive disciplines that demand a particular subjective rigidity and a restriction of fluctuations of desire. These disciplines are not as incompatible as it seems at first; both descend from a Hegelian dialectical tradition and are anti-ideological insofar as they purport to access an undifferentiated pure state - the materiality of labour, the id - beneath layers of mystification - alienation, neurosis or psychosis - and aim at the subjective emancipation thereof. Both discourses are diagnostic of a particular disease, psychic repression and political oppression, respectively and illuminative of the symptoms of said disease - false consciousness or fetishism, whether of commodity or otherwise. Furthermore, each theory appears to complement the other at a time where a crucial lacuna appears; what is the use in psychoanalysis if the 'cured' analysand is freed from his mental illness and returns to work, but in an unjust society that engenders the illness in the first place? In Marxism, where it appears to lack a concrete analysis of how false consciousness becomes a material force affecting the movement of labour, psychoanalysis can posit the id, the ego, the unconscious and the psychic drives as a motor and intermediary between consciousness and world.

In pursuit of an answer to this question of why the masses desire their own oppression, a question redolent of both Marxist and psychoanalytic language, Reich identifies the psychoanalytic preconditions of the emergence of fascist society as a repression of sexuality; his discovery is that there is a structural analogy between psychosexual stricture and political conservatism, both seek to restrict, constrict and control.<sup>211</sup> In a sense, fascism was already there in the psychosphere before entering into the political. The very namesake

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<sup>211</sup> *The Mass Psychology of Fascism* pp.19-21

of fascism, the *fasces* - an Etruscan-Roman symbol of wooden rods tightly bound around an axe, signifying unity, law, strength, rigidity etc. - already points towards a psychological tightening, an increase in pressure or a hardening, which when practised by a whole society of people the teleological conclusion is such that the advent of political fascism is effectuated as a widespread social ideology, but one that crucially is instantiated within the subject. Using formal similarities between the Freudian unconscious and the Marxist material infrastructure as a springboard, Reich develops the dialectical concept of 'sex-economy' in which the concept of libido is found to be coextensive with the concept of political economy.<sup>212</sup>

The problem at the heart of Reich's *The Mass Psychology of Fascism* describes a situation in which the masses actively sought out a fascist government despite such a situation being actively against their better interest. The logic of his argument is, in summary, that because of the sexual repression in German society circa 1930, any unfulfilled and unexpended desire is converted into anxious energy and neuroses. Since social control maintains the appearance of quelling anxiety - and the political consequences of anxiety such as instability and revolution - therefore the German citizen desired a strong form of social control upon which to expend their energy and thus have it managed for them. In embracing the symbolism of strength and control, the German masses strengthen those very forces active within the psyche; repression finds its primary form in the oedipal triangle of the family and is then instantiated in the state and the people and a subsequent turn towards 'mysticism', which in this context is a fantasy of a Teutonic folk-religion. Nazism gives an entire cosmos to its people in which they may sublimate their anxiety. Reich's suggested cure is advocacy of a sexual revolution that he calls work-democracy, in that freeing psychic energies like workers from their chains the political economy will follow the economy of desire. In this sense Marx is applied to Freud in a confrontation in which Marx overthrows his bourgeois master that we need "work democracy to harmonise the conditions and forms of work with the need of and enjoyment in work, in other words, to eliminate the contradiction between joy in life on the one hand and work on the other."<sup>213</sup>; this is seen by Reich as an exercise in rationality, in which the irrational, anxious energy is freed and expended 'harmoniously'.<sup>214</sup>

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<sup>212</sup> See *The Mass Psychology of Fascism* pg. 30 for the description of this concept

<sup>213</sup> *The Mass Psychology of Fascism* pg.124

<sup>214</sup> See Chapter X 'Work Democracy' pg.133 for Reich's discussion of his concept of harmony.

While Deleuze and Guattari agree with Reich insofar as they see desire as requiring liberation, they seek to develop a Reichian emancipatory politics but rather than proceeding unilaterally through psychoanalysis to the masses, emerges in the mind and the socius coextensively. This is to say that while they retain certain facets of his analysis they seek to reevaluate the Hegelian negativity at the heart of Freudo-Marxism, insofar as this approach still maintains a strict distinction between the two economies; on the one hand a political economy, on the other a libidinal economy; a political subject and a psychoanalytic subject. Secondly, they seek to collapse this distinction; such a fusion maintained both a rigid theoretical praxis and a dichotomy or dualism between two kinds of subjectivity and as a result at the same time, it reifies Marxism and psychoanalysis as modes of discourse that theoreticians would adhere to with increasing militancy. These schools of thought were eventually seen by some to engender in their followers a kind of incipient fascism, as if Marxism were a Party or a religion with a strict orthodoxy, as if psychoanalysis were an unquestionable Father whose commandments could not be transgressed. The problem here is that, as per Lacan's infamous remark to the young protesters of May 1968: "What you aspire to as revolutionaries is a new master. You will get one."<sup>215</sup>

### **Anti-Oedipus: Desiring-Production**

It is unsurprising that post-1968, with the failure of such revolutions and the emergence of new masters, there emerged works that challenged the philosophical edifice of Freudo-Marxism. Foremost among the immediate wave of poststructuralist response were *Libidinal Economy* by Jean-François Lyotard and *Anti-Oedipus* by Deleuze and Guattari. This latter volume was the first part of a pair of books which are collectively known as *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Even in this subtitle alone we can see the lineaments of this particular wave of theory, moving from neurosis to psychosis; capitalism *and* schizophrenia, the 'and' making economy coextensive with or immanent to subjectivity. The result of this is that, for the first time, a theory of the subject constituted by the particular economic machinery and resulting social nomos of capitalism emerges. As a response to this philosophical environment and their milieu, Deleuze and Guattari "postulate one and the

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<sup>215</sup> See Lacan's 'Seminar 17' in *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis* [trans. Russell Grig]

same economy, the economy of flows. [...] Behind every investment of time and interest and capital, an investment of desire, and vice versa."<sup>216</sup> In this monist view, there can be no separation between the political sphere and the psychosphere, they are made immanent to each other rather than remaining in opposition or contradiction. Indeed, in this sense, they could be seen as turning these modes of discourse in on themselves, applying Marx to Marxism, Freud to psychoanalysis. That is, as Deleuze attempted with Kant, they rediscover the radical and critical aspects of these thinkers that have been occluded in the process of these names becoming a dogmatic image of thought.

Yet, Deleuze and Guattari go further than Reich could, insofar as he remains within the realm of comparison and contradiction between matter and psyche. While Deleuze and Guattari accept that Reich is correct in discovering the relation between desire and the social, they disagree with his conclusion on the grounds that it merely rephrases the question: if there was something irrational in the way that the masses desired fascism then there is no use in proclaiming that there is an irrational component to desire itself. This merely reinscribes the supposed irrational aspect without explaining it. Deleuze and Guattari instead posit a collapse of this dualism with their infamous slogan "there is only desire and the social and nothing else."<sup>217</sup> The force of desire needs mediation to affect the economy, desires are built and manipulated by the forces of social production, there is no separation. In reducing this binary they move beyond Reich: they propose the fusional concept of desiring-production as the common-denominator of desire and the social, in which the social is merely the effects of desire under certain circumstances and desire is itself the result of the historical determinations of the social. As such, the idea that lack is central to desire's functioning is dispelled; this is the formula of Deleuze's critique of Heidegger, a substitution of (-x) for (dx), of negativity for a differential generation of (x).

The philosophical import of this move is important: the wager asserted is that the central aspect of the break with Freudo-Marxism must revolve around positivity and negativity. Perhaps unsurprisingly, as both discourses stem from Hegel, Marxism and psychoanalysis posit an essential negativity at the heart of their subjects. The former/the latter - each approach must universalise the negativity of the subject to maintain the autonomy of the subject. Negativity is associated with freedom - as such, the subject can always be

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<sup>216</sup> *Anti-Oedipus* xviii

<sup>217</sup> *Anti-Oedipus* pg.29

extracted or subtracted from the capitalist situation and maintain their essential freedom through ontological negativity, (-x). Such a privileging of negativity is the genesis of the - for lack of a better term - 'vitalist' critique, which denies a place for negativity in their ontology.<sup>218</sup> In the final analysis, Deleuze and Guattari remain alongside thinkers such as Reich and Lyotard, with one critical modulation: within desire they effect a binary modification, they change the zero of lack to a one of fullness. The difficulty, as we will see going forward, is articulating an alternative account of freedom and agency from within this paradigm of ontological fullness.

Contemporary Freudo-Marxism (and derivative philosophies such as Badiou's Lacanian-Maoism or the work of Žižek) sees the advances of vitalist critique as merely complicit with the mechanisms of capital; if capitalism is a creative, reproductive enterprise, then a weaponised negativity needs to be brought to bear against it - affirming a productive vitality will merely exacerbate capitalism's worst excesses. Against this, the vitalist critique posits that this very negativity is itself the cause and kernel of capitalism's dissolution of the social bond and rampant individualism, inculcation of moral vacuity, need for accumulation and unmitigated reproduction, amongst other problems. The thrust of philosophical projects such as *Anti-Oedipus* is, in Foucault's words, to "[w]ithdraw from the old categories of the Negative (law, limit, castration, lack, lacuna)" in the service of defeating "the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behaviour, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us"<sup>219</sup> which is that which floods into the subjective void brought about by capitalism. If fascism causes us to love power, negativity, considered politically, is then a hatred of power, a state defined oppositionally to forms of power.<sup>220</sup> This makes sense insofar as the subject is negative and therefore free, while power is a force of control and restriction. The problem is to what extent forces of the same order have the possibility to effect a change that is not already of the order in question. Dialectical negation eventually folds together with its opposite in synthesis. When considered from a purely mechanical perspective, too, opposition tends towards the stabilisation of a feedback loop in the form of negative feedback. Discussing the early steam engine, Weiner writes:

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<sup>218</sup> Where vitalism is a name for a machinic unfolding and ontological fullness, forces of composition, or a lack of lack.

<sup>219</sup> *Anti-Oedipus* xiii

<sup>220</sup> The conception of 'power' that I am referring to here is that of 'pouvoir',

Notice that the feedback tends to oppose what the system is already doing, and is thus negative. [...] The information fed back to the control center tends to oppose the departure of the controlled from the controlling quantity, but it may depend in widely different ways on this departure. The simplest control systems are linear: the output of the effector is a linear expression in the input, and when we add inputs, we also add outputs.<sup>221</sup>

Negative feedback - which is to say a process of the same order - serves to establish homeostasis of the system: if a system is overheating the feedback controller will seek to reduce heat, perhaps by fans injecting cool air, that which is a lower temperature, into the system. Hot is thus countered by cold, both of the order of temperature. The vitalist critique then posits that capitalism and the state are able to incorporate direct, oppositional threats into its form.

Furthermore, there is a sense in which these two discourses are ultimately not radical but in fact their efficacy is dependent upon the capitalist system of relations. Marxism relies upon its labour theory of value to vouch for its theory of subjectivity, whereas psychoanalysis could be read merely as a reaction to the alienation brought about in the capitalist social world, serving as little more than a salve for the neurosis of being a member of the capitalist-bourgeois class. A thorough analysis of these criticisms is outside the scope of the present discussion, but needless to say that Deleuze and Guattari sought a total break with this system, that which they call Oedipus; the becoming-representation of the manifold psychic and labour processes which exist in excess of their conceptualisation in these discourses. Oedipus is perfectly part-and-parcel with capitalism and poses no threat at all and, indeed, is brought about in and through capitalism; such a participation in the logic of capitalism is the target of Deleuze and Guattari's analysis, which takes place at the infinitesimal and even unconscious level. This 'microanalysis' is ostensibly enacted in the name of specificity; on more than one occasion Deleuze expresses his distaste for abstractions, including 'the subject', preferring instead to analyse processes of subjectification.

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<sup>221</sup> *Cybernetics* pp.133-134



A process is primarily a series and as such the subject must always be linked to what it processes, what it is processing and what is processing it. In claiming that a subject is immanent with its causes and in a reciprocal relation with that which constitutes it is to also claim that the subject is a control system, albeit a closed system. Weiner, when discussing feedback loops within the animal, corresponds with Deleuze and Guattari's analysis:

The information fed into this central control system will very often contain information concerning the functioning of the effectors themselves. These correspond among other things to the kinesthetic organs and other proprioceptors of the human system, for we too have organs which record the position of a joint or the rate of contraction of a muscle, etc.<sup>222</sup>

In this sense to call a subject an individual, indivisible entity is not satisfactory. A subject is always-already linked to a force being enacted upon it by some other entity, which we have already seen in the analysis of time and temporality. In other words, a subject is nothing but a mixture of heterogeneous elements and forces that is produced by virtue of these interactions, which take the form of a control system or feedback loop. We can see, then, why the capitalist-subject is often said to lack autonomy if it is contingent upon external affects that produce it; the question is to what extent the nomos sublates the autonomous, the extent that the space of capitalism impinges upon and conditions the space of the self. On the surface it would seem that post-Freudo-Marxist thought privileges the former, perhaps to the extent of the total effacement of the latter. Deleuze even goes as far as to state that there are only processes of subjectification: "[t]here's no subject, but a production of subjectivity: subjectivity has to be produced, when its time arrives, precisely because there is no subject."<sup>223</sup> The process of the emergence of subjectivity extends to several connected elements rather than a singular, universal entity and is brought about through a constitutive process of production. As such,

opposed to Reich, schizoanalysis makes no distinction in nature between political economy and libidinal economy. Schizoanalysis merely asks what are the machinic, social, and technical indices on a socius that open to desiring-machines, that enter

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<sup>222</sup> *Cybernetics* pg.61

<sup>223</sup> *Negotiations* pp.115-116

into the parts, wheels, and motors of these machines, as much as they cause them to enter into their own parts, wheels, and motors.<sup>224</sup>

Therefore, while remaining with Reich on the question of thinking libidinal and political economy as constitutive of the subject and, potentially, liberatory, Deleuze and Guattari break with and succeed Reich in their collapsing of the very distinction between the libidinal and political itself, instead providing an account of an immanent process of production that encompasses both.

### **Logic of Sense: Communication of Events**

While it is true that the model of the tripartite synthesis first emerges in Deleuze's work via the syntheses of time in *Difference and Repetition*, an extended discussion on the logic that informs these processes (specifically conjunction and disjunction) is to be found in the latter half of *The Logic of Sense*, published only three years before *Anti-Oedipus* (1969 and 1972 respectively). In order to prepare our discussion of *Anti-Oedipus*, it is worth considering how this argument is presented in the earlier book in order to first further elucidate the devices themselves and to map their deployment in the latter. While these two books may seem disparate at first, with the earlier volume often seen as a structuralist vestige that Deleuze abandons to make way for the Guattari collaborations, there are in fact a continuity of themes and concerns between the two books - not least of which is the concept of the Body without Organs. Most overtly, especially when considering the opening section of *Anti-Oedipus*, the two works are concerned with surfaces and the connections that may occur on such surfaces in the service of mapping out or diagramming facets of subjectivity. Secondly, they both confront the concepts of nonsense, schizophrenia, psychoanalysis and the psychogenesis of thought - although often with varying degrees of normativity. Indeed, one of the biggest differences between the two books is that in the *Logic of Sense* aside from style is that schizophrenia and nonsense are seen as regressions or complications in thought, whereas in *Anti-Oedipus* schizophrenic production occupies a generative place in

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<sup>224</sup> *Anti-Oedipus* pg.381

the genesis of subjectivity; in Kantian terms, a switch from a regulative structure, that is a determination of the limit, to a constitutive principle.

Speaking reductively, the basic argument of *The Logic of Sense* is that meaning is constructed through the making of series; series of words or events. Such series can be constructed in different ways, via three types of connection. Deleuze defines the form of these logical operators in the 'Twenty-Fourth Series of the Communication of Events'<sup>225</sup> where he invokes a 'connective', 'conjunctive' and 'disjunctive' mode of synthesis. This is also the series in which Deleuze invokes Kant and Borges, the straight line of time, subjectivation and the decentred self; as such this section acts both as an extension of some of the concepts discussed in *Difference and Repetition* and as prelude to their return in *Anti-Oedipus*.

It should be borne in mind, however, that these structures and ideas do not flow genealogically, they do not proceed by slippage and mutation, but rather are repeated in new configurations and different milieu. For example, each time a tripartite synthesis is evoked in the work of Deleuze and Guattari it is to ensure a robust account of a self-contained and self-grounding emergence of a given thing; although Deleuze repeatedly deploys the model of the three syntheses in his work, it would be an oversimplification to conclude that there is a direct genetic or chronological relation between each use of the concept in his work. For example, the model of the tripartite synthesis when it appears in *Logic of Sense* bears no real relation to that of *Difference and Repetition* or to its later use in *Anti-Oedipus* other than its formal arrangement. In the same way, it is not the case that Deleuze continues a tradition or custom the practice of which could be said to have evolved or developed throughout history; Deleuze does not receive the tripartite synthesis in modified form through a lineage of post-Kantians, each of which have subtly added to or amended its makeup - and as such the deviations and digressions from the original could be mapped genealogically - but rather returns to Kant in order to directly take up its structural and logical components for deployment in his own philosophical projects. Rather, then, it should be viewed machincally, or as the repetition of a machine of functional philosophical material utilised when it is necessary to secure an argument for the immanent ontogenesis of a concept, which is to say its self-grounding emergence. Thus we cannot

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<sup>225</sup> *The Logic of Sense* pp.169-176

say that when the tripartite synthesis appears in *Anti-Oedipus* its form has changed from what it once was in *Difference and Repetition* or *Logic of Sense*, but rather that in each instantiation of the concept within a new assemblage it is modified by that which it encounters, connects with and is in turn modified by. As such, while the form of the argument remains consistent throughout Deleuze's work, the content is subject to change - as we will see in *Anti-Oedipus* when the third term in the diagram is occupied by a different machine, consummation. This is why the shape and underlying architecture of Deleuze's project remains the same throughout his career, even though the terms ornamenting this architecture may change; transcendental field of the virtual, the powers of differentiation, the product of actualisation. The first part of this process always concerns the production of the actual, before it folds back into its virtual conditions. In *The Logic of Sense*, the tripartite model of sense, alongside that of the three modes of synthesis, informs a new model of the emergence of subjectivity and a ground that is chaos and nonsense, a differential field which through the connection of events or elements of a series enables the emergence of subjectivity.

Deleuze appears to draw these modes of synthesis from Leibniz and his discussion of compossibility and impossibility; roughly speaking, the idea that individuated things that are impossible cannot coexist within the same world. In *The Fold*, Deleuze writes:

Compossibles can be called (1) the totality of converging and extensive series that constitute the world, (2) the totality of monads that convey the same world [...].  
Impossible can be called (1) the series that diverge, and that from then on belong to two possible worlds. and (2) monads of which each expresses a world different from the other [...]. The eventual divergence of series is what allows for the definition of impossibility or the relation of vice-diction.<sup>226</sup>

He draws on this notion in order to contrive a theory in which divergence of points does not entail negation, that causally-independent events may nevertheless be in correspondence: or, in other words, are univocal. For Leibniz, all events in actuality were selected by God to be the case - therefore the reciprocal negation of events becomes impossible, rather events become compossible or impossible. For Deleuze, the way in which these events

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<sup>226</sup> *The Fold* pg.60

become differentiated is important, but they must remain within a flat ontology of surfaces - as such, all actuality is in communication and there are three ways in which events communicate: the connective syntheses (typified by an 'if, then' logic) construct a series; the conjunctive ('and') joins the elements of a series together; and disjunction ('either, or') is when events that are impossible diverge in a series. That they still exist on a surface or plane secures their possibility of correspondence, but their distance from each other allows a specific difference to be maintained. Furthermore, this latter synthesis undermines the idea of the self composed as a unity, as disparate modes of selfhood may still be related across a surface.<sup>227</sup> Earlier in the book, Deleuze claims that truth and meaning is formed by a tripartite system of the interrelation between denotation, manifestation and signification - but that this triad cannot give rise to anything other than nonsense unless grounded by a fourth unconditioned term, which he calls 'sense'. Sense is neither mental or physical, but rather, Deleuze claims, drawing on the Stoics, an incorporeal event that subsists within the propositions and states of affairs in which it is expressed.

Using this argument as grounding, Deleuze proposes that, classically-speaking, "the self is the principle of manifestation, in relation to the proposition, the world is the principle of denotation, and God the principle of signification."<sup>228</sup> However, Deleuze's theory of the emergence of sense is predicated on its emergence from nonsense, a 'chaosmos' rather than ordered cosmos. As all events are affirmed, even those disjunctive events that would split and rupture the self, there is within the self the possibility of its own dissolution. At this point, Deleuze reintroduces the theme of the line of time, that which in *Difference and Repetition* cuts across and divides up the self; here it is called 'Aion' after the Stoic conception of eternity, the pure and empty form of time which is intensive and incorporeal. Aion gives rise to the development of language and psychogenesis because its mode of expression is that of the instant, the present moment - as such, it retains notions of the first and third syntheses of time from *Difference and Repetition*, as the mode of the present that acts as a quasi-cause, which is to say the incorporeal relation between events. Events communicate across surfaces via the affirmation of disjunction, or disjunctive syntheses.

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<sup>227</sup> This prefigures the more in-depth discussion of the BwO in *Anti-Oedipus* and the surface across which machines are connected in series.

<sup>228</sup> *Logic of Sense* pg.176

The instant is the 'nonsense' point that nonetheless allows for language to escape its corporeal nature (the primary order of language) and become incorporeal (allowing for abstract phrases).

Proceeding directly from this and perhaps most relevant to *Anti-Oedipus* is the 'Twenty-seventh series of Orality'<sup>229</sup> where Deleuze discusses the modes of synthesis in relation to the work of Melanie Klein and infant psychology. According to Klein, for the infant the world is split up into many partial objects which must be joined up, joined with, sorted or excluded - in other words the partial objects must be synthesised into a sensible world. The infant may place a toy into its mouth only to discover that it does not afford a flow of milk, after which it is discarded and is no longer seen as a simulacrum of the mother's breast.<sup>230</sup> This, for the infant, is a profoundly anxious affair in which the introjection of the outside is accompanied with fear and anger, which they then project back into the outside through screaming. Klein refers to this stage as the 'paranoid-schizoid' state of development, in which the child is wary of bodies and engaged in a process of splitting and joining partial objects in order to defend against harm and accept that which is healthy - which primarily involves a negotiation with the forms of penetration of the boundary between body and outside, as in the case of delivering milk through the mouth.

As the infant does this, for Deleuze, it proceeds through levels of dynamic genesis of sense, from the primary order of language (noise from within one's own body, vocalising nonsensical syllables) to a secondary order of the pre-existing language of the parent (external, foreign language that pre-exists the child) and finally to the tertiary organisation (abstract thought, moving from the physical to the metaphysical). This signifies a movement from "depth to the production of surfaces"<sup>231</sup> from 'orality', qua the mouth as a depth in the body, to the surface of the body itself. Synthesis concerns the coordination of the organs with their functions and with the projection of phantasms onto these zones, where 'phantasm' designates the lingering "result of an action or passion"<sup>232</sup> that interfaces with the ego and language. This is how sexuality emerges in the subject, with the identification of zones of the body with partial objects that convey pleasure or pain. In other words, this

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<sup>229</sup> *Logic of Sense* pp.186-195

<sup>230</sup> This notion of the conjugation of flows is central to both *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*

<sup>231</sup> *Logic of Sense* pg.186

<sup>232</sup> *Logic of Sense* pg.210

describes a libidinal economy; this problem becomes all the more pressing when libidinal economy becomes coextensive with political economy.

The phantasm, for Deleuze, marks the movement from the bodily stage of development to the level of language. Rather than an illusion, it occupies a connective and ultimately generative role in producing thought itself, existing as a metastable medium (that which gives rise to the possibility of dynamic genesis) between the field of pre-individual singularities and that which they individuate. As such, it occupies a semi-intentional status, “neither an action nor a passion”<sup>233</sup> acting as both a scene or background and the willed action that takes place within the scene. It is in this way opposed to the Oedipus complex, which by subordinating the events taking place within the psyche to representation, blocks access to these primordial scenes. By attending to these phantasms, proceeding from the realm of abstract thought back down into the depths of the psyche, we can address the “movement by which the ego opens itself to the surface and liberates the a-cosmic, impersonal and pre-individual singularities which it had imprisoned.”<sup>234</sup> James Williams puts it succinctly: “In entertaining nonsense, irregularity and paradox in the phantasm, we do not draw that nonsense or paradox into actuality, but instead we draw the actualities determining things as nonsense, or transgression, or perversion into a realm which connects them differently and makes space for new potentials.”<sup>235</sup> Deleuze draws on Pierre Klossowski’s reading of Nietzsche as an example, that Nietzsche’s oscillation between good and poor mental and physical health afforded a creativity antithetical to the organisation of society as it stood. The phantasm is then that which ultimately animates the connected series and charges thought with dynamic energy, moving it away from the inertial equilibrium that does not have the capacity for generation. It is Deleuze’s way, in schema of *The Logic of Sense*, of assuring that the effect remains within the cause, It “has the property of turning back on its author”<sup>236</sup> that the cause is folded back upon its origin and thus split in a disjunction.

However, Deleuze breaks with Klein insofar as he sees in the child in the ‘schizoid’ mode not a desire to reject bad partial objects, but a more originary desire to not be subject to this process of selection at all. He writes:

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<sup>233</sup> *Logic of Sense* pg.210

<sup>234</sup> *Logic of Sense* pg.213

<sup>235</sup> See Gilles Deleuze’s *Logic of Sense* pg. 191

<sup>236</sup> *Logic of Sense* pg.212

What the schizoid position opposes to bad partial objects - introjected and projected, toxic and excremental, oral and anal - is not a good object, even if it were partial. What is opposed is rather an organism without parts, a body without organs, [sic] with neither mouth nor anus, having given up all introjection or projection, and being complete, at this price.<sup>237</sup>

Whereas a depressive mode would entail an attempt to block or seal off such depths through which the painful energies of the outside may enter, in schizophrenia, the process of the coordination of the organs is disrupted leading to a bodily surface without differentiated zones for organs. Rather, this surface becomes saturated with holes, opening out onto the depths of the subject;

Of course, the fixation or the regression to the schizoid position implies a resistance to the depressive position, such that the surface would not be able to be formed. In this case, each zone is pierced by a thousand orifices which annul it; or, on the contrary, the body without organs is closed on a full depth without limits and without exteriority.<sup>238</sup>

Through these gaps in the membrane or surface, the primary order of language can be glimpsed from the depths of subjectivity: "And then the first stage of the dynamic genesis appears. The depth is clamorous: dappings, crackings, gnashings, cracklings. explosions, the shattered sounds of internal objects, and also the inarticulate howl-breaths (cris-souffles) of the body without organs which respond to them".<sup>239</sup> Therefore, the Body without Organs is identified with the primary order of nonsensical sounds and also that of the space of the quasi-cause and as such in *Logic of Sense* is also identified with a "regression". Deleuze cites Antonin Artaud's guttural noises in which the "dual function of orality"<sup>240</sup> (to eat/to speak) is confused and the nonsensical phrases that appear in *To be done with the judgement of God*. However, it still maintains the quality of the potential emergence of generative processes in the sense that the primary order of language is

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<sup>237</sup> *Logic of Sense* pg.188

<sup>238</sup> *Logic of Sense* pg.198

<sup>239</sup> *Logic of Sense* pg.193

<sup>240</sup> *Logic of Sense* pg.86



evoked, leading to novel concatenations of syllables that do not conform to sense as it currently stands.

However the process of phantasmal oscillation and the return of the self to a state of spontaneous generation is by no means always positive. Rather this problem of psychogenesis becomes a political problem insofar as we must bear in mind that there are always forces acting upon and influencing the conditions, speeds and magnitudes of such a process. These outside forces, the energy of the outside constantly permeate the surface of the subject and necessitate a negotiation between that which is permitted and that which is rejected. Klossowski, in *Living Currency*, makes explicit the intensification of this process with the rise of capitalism and industrial society. He writes:

The industrial regime, by contrast, because of its massive consumption, has managed to standardize the mechanized instruments of suggestion, just as it standardized the instruments of knowledge in general. As a result, communication became devalued as its nature and intention began to change. The powers of suggestion provided by stereotypes became increasingly 'gratuitous' or free in their effects, while prototypes remained outside the realm of price. The reversal was total: the felt sensation is now worth more than its suggestive image. However, the resulting tension has created a massive terrain of exploitation: the stereotyping of suggestion has allowed industry to intervene in the genesis of individual phantasms in order to redirect them toward its own ends. Industry is capable of rejecting or manipulating phantasms in order to make them profitable for its own institutions.<sup>241</sup>

The industrial machine channels the energy of oscillating phantasms through the fixed images of stereotypes in order to further profitable scenarios for said regime. The stereotype is then the result of the exteriorisation of the phantasm, of what happens when the libidinal enters into the realm of the market. It is what remains of phantasms when they become majoritarian and fixed images; they are therefore necessarily group hallucinations and ultimately empty of content. What this signals is the commodification of desire in capitalism and the assimilation of phantasy by the material forces guided by market forces. For Klossowski, this allows for a new type of subject, the 'industrial slave', whose life is

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<sup>241</sup> *Living Currency* pp.50-51

subject to measure, comparison and appropriation - or, in other words, to the straight line of time, which shares much affinity with the rise of capitalism and the industrial revolution.

Once the bodily presence of the industrial slave is included in appraising her productive yield (her physiognomy being inseparable from her work), it is specious to draw a distinction between the person and her activity. Bodily presence is itself already a commodity, independently of (and in excess of) the commodities its presence helps to produce. The industrial slave can either establish a strict relationship between her bodily presence and the money it brings in, or else she can substitute herself for the function of money, since she herself is already money: at once the equivalent of wealth and wealth itself.<sup>242</sup>

'Living currency', then, in light of Deleuze, names the problematic of the immanence of the libido and the market under capitalism. But for Deleuze, as we have seen, desire is the environment in which thought is born, and as such the commodification of desire has greater consequences. The collapse of libidinal and political economy is brought about precisely through this process of the manipulation of phantasm, which is to say a general effort to confine within a controlled space of equilibrium the possibilities of the emergence of novel subjectivities.

It is this generation of novelty that remains a perennial concern for Deleuze, such that what we see here in the latter half of *The Logic of Sense* is essentially a prelude to the discussion of the emergence of subjectivity in *Anti-Oedipus*, in which subjectivity emerges from and is grounded on a Body without Organs and schizophrenic production of production, which now assume a more primary constitutive role. The precondition of thought (synthesis) is desire (the organs expressing drives, the search for pleasure on a surface).<sup>243</sup> It is precisely this concern that animates the opening of *Anti-Oedipus*.

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<sup>242</sup> *Living Currency* pg.76

<sup>243</sup> Philip Goodchild in *Deleuze and Guattari: An Introduction to the Politics of Desire* is very clear on this point - and discusses the theme of psychogenesis as a link between early Deleuze and the collaborations with Guattari in more depth than is possible here, and with the benefit of significant exegesis of *Anti-Oedipus* having already taken place. See pp.

## Anti-Oedipus: Three Syntheses of the Transcendental Unconscious

What we see in the opening paragraph of *Anti-Oedipus* is another repetition of the three syntheses from *Difference and Repetition*, which are in turn repetitions of Kant and Freud. As in the latter book - and, to an extent, in *Logic of Sense* - this philosophical mechanism is repeated in order to ground the self-emerging genesis and production of a concept. In *Anti-Oedipus*, this production, like that of time, takes place in three modes or syntheses again which interrelate and are co-constitutive of each other. However, rather than time, these syntheses are primarily processes of production - or in other words, while the syntheses in *Difference and Repetition* produced time, the syntheses in *Anti-Oedipus* produce production itself or modes thereof. This is a primary concept of the book, indeed the first three sections of the first chapter of *Anti-Oedipus* are devoted, in part, each to a respective synthesis. The first synthesis is the connective synthesis or production of production; the second synthesis: the disjunctive synthesis or production of recording; the third synthesis: the conjunctive synthesis or production of consumption-consummation. Like the processes of *Difference and Repetition* before it, these syntheses are passive, they are constitutive without being active - and in *Anti-Oedipus* what they constitute is the unconscious itself.

Needless to say, the introduction of these syntheses at the very opening of the book is indicative of their importance. Following Kant and the three syntheses of time, the processes of production speak to the formation of subjectivity. These syntheses are nominally of the unconscious, but part of a 'materialist psychiatry' which simultaneously describes the processes acting upon matter; there is a reciprocity and homology between the organisation of matter and of the psyche. Or, as Reidar Due writes, "the same forces that structure the world are active on the stage of consciousness."<sup>244</sup> This is, in fact, one of the core tenets of Freudo-Marxism insofar as, for example, the psychological strictures of fascism become manifest in the material world as a mode of politics. Yet the relation between mind and matter here is unilateral, with the world remaining as a cause of the organisation of the mind or minds. However, Deleuze and Guattari then also describe a 'social unconscious' or a movement of desire which eliminates any opposition or distance between a political economy and a psychic economy, making them co-constitutive and

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<sup>244</sup> Deleuze pg.35

immanent with one another. In order to do this, they must form an argument that reconceptualises desire, removes the absence or lack at its core and replaces it with a fullness, closing the distance between desire and its always-inaccessible object with an immediacy and a connectivity. In order to do so, they introduce the argument of the three syntheses of desiring-production.

The first synthesis is a productive process of appropriation and connection, a 'conjunctive synthesis'. It should be noted that the first two syntheses of *The Logic of Sense* - connection and conjunction - are collapsed into a single process here; this process is expressed in the basic function of desire, which is to assemble, to make machines. It is therefore a process of addition and connectivity that recalls the synthesis of habit in *Difference and Repetition* in which a soul contemplates and as a result draws things together in a contraction, whether mental or material. The image that accompanies this synthesis in *Anti-Oedipus* is that of the rhizome, perhaps Deleuze and Guattari's most famous concept. Yet this process is not reducible to the image of the rhizome, it is that which constructs it on the plane of immanence, it is the force of endless conjugation itself.<sup>245</sup> The process also therefore corresponds to and is based upon Kant's synthesis of apprehension in intuition, in which the manifold is 'run through and held together' and corresponds insofar as the latter is a process of connection and a process of arrogating these connected elements within a matrix. The sensible components are gathered up and related to one another such that they become sensible. Necessarily, then, we can also see similarities with Deleuze's synthesis of habit, insofar as desiring production is an agglomeration of bundles of machines linked to one another in a linear chain, not dissimilar to the collections of habits that are synthesised in the moment of habit. In *Anti-Oedipus*, this first synthesis causes continual processes of connection of machines in an unbroken series of additions. The authors write:

Desiring-machines are binary machines, obeying a binary law or set of rules governing associations: one machine is always coupled with another. The productive synthesis, the production of production, is inherently connective in nature: "and..." "and then..." This is because there is always a flow-producing

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<sup>245</sup> Another point of difference is that in a rhizome each point is connected to each other, whereas the first synthesis of production is a creation of a binary chain of 'ands', i.e. the rhizome is not 'linear in every direction'.

machine, and another machine connected to it that interrupts or draws off part of this flow (the breast—the mouth). And because the first machine is in turn connected to another whose flow it interrupts or partially drains off, the binary series is linear in every direction. Desire constantly couples continuous flows and partial objects that are by nature fragmentary and fragmented. Desire causes the current to flow, itself flows in turn, and breaks the flows.<sup>246</sup>

As this is a ‘materialist psychiatry’, there is an obvious corollary here in this description of an ostensibly psychic process with capitalism: the growth, production, expansion for the sake of growth production and expansion alone. This conjunctive synthesis when it repeats within capitalism is the phase of primitive accumulation, when the labourers and workers are gathered and welded to a means of production; or, in terms of finance, a stock or commodity when it appreciates in value on its own, draws money to itself, conjugates with money machines, increases merely by virtue of its existence. There is a kind of blind stupidity in this first synthesis, before it is interrupted or joins with the subsequent two, in which even the binary between producer and produced is collapsed - or in other words, the machine only exists by virtue of the flows that traverse it and the processes that constitute it:

The schizophrenic is the universal producer. There is no need to distinguish here between producing and its product. We need merely note that the pure "thisness" of the object produced is carried over into a new act of producing.<sup>247</sup>

In Kant, this function is named intuition and pertains to the province of sensibility, which are in effect automatic processes of information accumulation. This is renamed in *Anti-Oedipus* as the ‘paranoiac machine’, that which is hypervigilant and exploratory, constantly contemplating and therefore contracting. While we are undoubtedly operating within the same terrain as Kant, there are enough substantial differences between the syntheses of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and *Anti-Oedipus* that Kant should only act as a rough guide or general form. Furthermore, in the second chapter of *Difference and Repetition*, after the initial exposition of the three syntheses of time, each is repeated through Freud in the capacity of ‘energies’ and the circulation thereof. Such a discussion obviously prefigures the concerns of *Anti-Oedipus* such that it may be more appropriate to read the syntheses of

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<sup>246</sup> *Anti-Oedipus* pg.5

<sup>247</sup> *Anti-Oedipus* pg.7

*Anti-Oedipus* as Freudian rather than Kantian. Deleuze introduces the discussion of these Freudian syntheses in *Difference and Repetition* in order to undermine the Kantianism that may be inferred from his argument; in showing the repetition of the syntheses in Freud, not only is he demonstrating an instance of repetition, but fortifying the presubjective nature of these syntheses. Like the unconscious, they exist before any subject and categorical system that may give rise to such a subject, but they are constitutive of it nonetheless.

In what we might call the 'first Freudian synthesis', Deleuze describes a general economy of energy and the investment thereof in psychic structures. Such a contraction and containment of energy into the structures of the psyche is essentially a Freudian model of subjectification as well as organic constitution; the digestive system of an animal is built to harness the energy gained from food, the eye contracts light into itself. As well as this, in Freud there is the unrestrained circulation of energies that are not incorporated into the psychic apparatus, which cause distress to the subject by exciting and therefore destabilising the structures of the psyche. Whereas Freud sees such circulation as essentially harmful and in need of reconciliation with the psyche, if not control, Deleuze and Guattari see this energy as the site of freedom itself. Where Deleuze departs from Freud is in claiming that the subject, rather than being the system which contains excitations, is only the excitations, is only the energy that travels through the systems of the psyche. In order to justify this claim, however, we first need to clarify the other syntheses in *Anti-Oedipus*.

*Anti-Oedipus*' second synthesis is a process of recording or inscription, in which the chains of connected machines are inscribed, or in other words, memorised. As such, this second process pertains to Kant's synthesis of reproduction in the imagination and the synthesis of memory which in turn owes so much to Bergson. If the first synthesis was productive, the second is antiproduktive, it "involve[s] an unengendered nonproductive attitude, an element of antiproduction coupled with the process, a full body that functions as a socius."<sup>248</sup> This is a 'disjunctive synthesis', which at first appears paradoxical, insofar as 'synthesis' names primarily a combinatory process, whereas disjunction speaks to a binary on / off switch, a place of 'either, or', which is an interruption in the synthetic production process.<sup>249</sup> However, recalling the concept from *The Logic of Sense* shows how, for Deleuze, events cleaved in

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<sup>248</sup> *Anti-Oedipus* pg.10

<sup>249</sup> Agamben has developed a related concept of 'inoperativity', a moment of suspension between the either/or, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

this way can still correspond across a surface, the highest form of which is total univocity. For subjectivity, this speaks to the production of binaries and dialectical oppositions, including that of the difference between the organised body and undifferentiated matter; machincally it is an input or output operation, where the flow can be halted or made non-productive. Antiproduction, then, is a moment of suspension, a place in which the flows cease to move along the circuits of production - as in the Body without Organs. This may be a good thing, in the sense that it reveals an innate plasticity at the core of the subject, the capacity to break free of desiring-production, however it is coded, and allows for variation and novelty to emerge. However, this also means that these antiproduktive sectors are liable to be rerouted onto or hijacked by the circuits of capital or indeed be assimilated and coded by the state machine, insofar as it itself contains an antiproduktive element, which will be discussed below. These antiproduktive flows are often recoded onto pre-established structures, such as the nuclear family, which initiates the titular Oedipalization. Antiproduction is then also a refusal to be produced, the pain Antonin Artaud felt from his body being 'organised'. As such it speaks to the notion of the individual, a concept which is perfectly assimilable within capitalism, especially the current neoliberal strain, insofar as the Body without Organs speaks to the productive or emancipatory potential latent within the ideology of capitalism, or more precisely the lure for the subject to invest in such potentials. In making the pragmatic choice, in choosing capitalism because there is in fact no other option, the subject is divorced from a collectivity and undergoes a becoming-individual - but, as we will see more clearly when it comes to the Apparatus of Capture, this is precisely what the marketing arm of the capitalist apparatus targets and affords.

Pertaining to function, of this second synthesis they write:

The law governing the latter was connective synthesis or coupling. But when the productive connections pass from machines to the body without organs (as from labour to capital), it would seem that they then come under another law that expresses a distribution in relation to the nonproductive element as a "natural or divine presupposition" (the disjunctions of capital). Machines attach themselves to the body without organs as so many points of disjunction, between which an entire

network of new syntheses is now woven, marking the surface off into coordinates, like a grid.

The Body without Organs forms a recording surface which attracts the machines that the first synthesis and desiring production make. These machines become embedded on the surface of the Body without Organs, forming long chains of connections along which flows can pass. This shows that desiring-production takes place within the pattern or circuit of the connected machines; as such, within the Body without Organs, there is no desire per se, only pure flow. This is what the authors call catatonia, or when the desiring machines 'break down' and are no longer productive, or antiproduktive. As with the previous synthesis, this is a process that is effectuated within and upon both the subject and the world, such that the surface that is formed is both the outer layer of the Body without Organs, which is effectively memory<sup>250</sup> as well as a social surface, the 'socius', which is a form the Body without Organs takes under the conditions of history, that on which production is inscribed: "In a word, the socius as a full body forms a surface where all production is recorded, whereupon the entire process appears to emanate from this recording surface."<sup>251</sup>

If the first synthesis dealt with production, then the second deals with reproduction. That is, when the Body without Organs draws the chains of machines to itself, it is the Kantian faculty of reproduction which takes place in the imagination, the new model of which is the Body without Organs. The process of production falls back on recording:

But the essential thing is the establishment of an enchanted recording or inscribing surface that arrogates to itself all the productive forces and all the organs of production, and that acts as a quasi cause by communicating the apparent movement (the fetish) to them.

That this process takes place on the surface of the Body without Organs is to preserve its intensive and undifferentiated status; it is a conceptual space of free flowing interaction, a space in which flows can circulate without obstruction. Deleuze and Guattari liken the Body

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<sup>250</sup> Both memory as in the noun of a memory and the inscription process of making memories, of qualitatively modifying the mental archive of the past

<sup>251</sup> *Anti-Oedipus* pg.10



without Organs to an egg because the intensity (intensive spatium) within the Body without Organs has the ability to potentiate and organise itself, like larvae. This is essentially a new concept of the imagination, but an imagination which is prior to all differentiation. If the Body without Organs is antiproductive, it is because it resists precisely this demand to become organised, to be produced. The example given that is pertinent to the authors' argument is that capital is the Body without Organs of capitalism, that with the decoding and deregulation of the finance markets, money circulates smoothly, it draws machines to it.

The third synthesis pertains to enjoyment, use and consumption. It is at this point in the account of syntheses that the authors introduce a notion of subjectivity, which they term the 'nomadic subject.' This subject wanders the surface of the Body without Organs, peripheral to the chains of desiring-machines and is constructed, or rather is the effect of, forces acting upon it. The moment of the third synthesis happens when this subject attempts to reconcile the two previous syntheses - and their respective forms of desire, free and controlled - and in doing so 'recognises' itself. However, the authors note that this recognition can only ever be a misrecognition, as it is, following Kant, analogical identity with a concept, not a self as it actually is. What is of particular interest at this point in the exposition is that the authors introduce the notion of types of energy, namely the libido and two corresponding energies which are given the name of 'numen' and 'voluptas', which are involved at each level. Whereas libido is what causes desire to flow, numen is the energy of recording and voluptas is the name of the energy of consummation, which function as the powers of sampling or taking, detachment and a residual energy, respectively. It is within this third set that the subject exists, only for a moment in this residual energy, the 'so that's what it was' of the conjunctive synthesis, where the subject recognises itself as the forces acting upon and through it in a kind of consummation. It does this through the pleasure experienced from release of forces, the resolution of the tension generated by the opposition between free and fixed flows; this interplay of attraction and repulsion on the surface of the Body without Organs produces subjective states in what the authors call a 'celibate machine'. Following the paranoiac machine of the first synthesis (because it is always moving, searching) and the miraculating machine of the second (because it 'magically' draws the desiring machines to the surface of the Body without Organs), the third synthesis is named the 'celibate machine', but the precise reason for this designation

appears almost arbitrary and remains mysterious. Nevertheless, the celibate machine produces 'intensive qualities' or affects, which is the process which gives rise to a 'new humanity', which is - insofar as the authors describe the schizophrenic process - how vast changes in subjectivity come to take place, such as the schizophrenic person thinking, or rather *feeling*, that they are an emperor or a god.<sup>252</sup>

## Subjectivity and Control

My argument at this point is that there is a fourth repetition of these syntheses to be found in *A Thousand Plateaus*, however this time it is to account for the genesis of the state. There are two primary points of importance to be kept in mind going forward: that again the account we are presented with is one in which the subject is absolutely immanent with the processes that form them and that these processes are passive, active within the mind and also in the world.

Such a model of the subject is profoundly problematic, in the sense that it is generative of a philosophical problem: from a subject that was already disempowered in the sense of being constituted by the passive syntheses of time, now only existing as a mere residuum of the functions of desiring machines. The authors write: "This subject itself is not at the center, which is occupied by the machine, but on the periphery, with no fixed identity, forever decentered, defined by the states through which it passes"<sup>253</sup> where even this identification is a misrecognition. Such a subject is particularly at risk of processes of control - and as such the question of agency, or lack thereof, within such a control mechanism becomes all the more pertinent.

What is the relation between a genetic tripartite synthesis and control? In a sense, synthesis *is* control: or more precisely, establishing an immanent and reciprocal synthesis acts as a closed control mechanism for that which it synthesises. When Deleuze constructs the three syntheses of time, the system described is a feedback loop, where habit affects memory

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<sup>252</sup> Deleuze and Guattari then identify this recognition with Nietzsche's names of history, such that passing through each stage is a point of recognition for the subject, which simultaneously generates the image of the subject with which it self-identifies.

<sup>253</sup> *Anti-Oedipus* pg.20

and vice-versa. If it seems at this point that the argument emerging in this thesis has two poles, that of the metaphysical and the political, then this principle is the link between the two, that as well as describing the genesis of subjectivity (constituted through time and the transcendental unconscious) these syntheses are also models of control qua feedback loop. Furthermore, this shows how social control has two modes, psychic and physical and thus its particular threat. In the fourth and fifth chapters, the theme of interpreting and channelling chaos or the outside of thought, which appears in Deleuze's late work, emerges and explores in more depth the limits of the control system, its outer bounds and what it synthesises. Moving forward, the following section is particularly indicative of the relation between tripartite synthesis and control, capture and governance and describes the repetition of the syntheses in the formation of the state.

### **The Apparatus of Capture**

If there is a homology between subject and its environment, indeed if the subject is immanent with its causes, can it be said that there is a specifically 'capitalist' subject - and coevally, a time of capitalism? Would this violate Deleuze's prohibition on fixed identities? If there is to be some sort of similarity between the subject and the world, this similarity cannot be found within the identity of either, but rather in the processes that constitute either side of the equation. It therefore needs to be shown that the forces that constitute the subject are also constituents in the organisation of the world.

Indeed, in *Capital Times*, Deleuze's student Eric Alliez suggests that the uncurved line of time is precisely one of these forces, that between cosmic Aristotelian time and Marxian labour-as-time is the Kantian straight line - and that it is constitutive of the latter. Holding as a maxim the phrase "time is money", Alliez reads "Marx, on the other side of the great Kantian reversal, [a]s a full partner in this history"<sup>254</sup> that after Marx, the straight line of time becomes a material force which constitutes a process of "exploitation and subsumption of the socius under the regime of equivalence (time is this regime's very matter), [which] is undoubtedly opposed to every idea of a creative duration", that the organisation of time

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<sup>254</sup> *Capital Times* xvii

within capitalism is antithetical to a kind of Bergsonian freedom. This process is not at all purely theoretical, but concretely material and, it is suggested, world-historical:

What happens between Aristotle and Marx is the scientific revolution, which subordinates movement to time, now an independent variable; the industrial revolution happens, which no longer conceives the laborer as anything but labor time personified, as the quantitative determination of labor.<sup>255</sup>

This homogenising temporality, however, contains within it the possibility of its own disruption, “[t]his is the ordinary time of the most aberrant movement, the crushing ensemble of dailiness itself, the most pitilessly straight line that splits the ego, equalizing it to the unequal in itself, revealing it in its finitude by a burst that disperses and reassembles It,”<sup>256</sup> that the pure and empty form of time upon which this measured labour-time is founded remains within. Such a temporality is intrinsic to the capitalist nation-state and arises coextensively (along with its powers of comparison and appropriation) with the apparatus of capture and the state itself.

In *A Thousand Plateaus*, the chapter ‘7,000 BC: Apparatus of Capture’ deals with the formation of the state as such.<sup>257</sup> However, as per the unique structure of the book, any attempt at explaining a single plateau will necessitate diversions into other chapters. Due to the nature of the book, it is in a sense impossible to deal with a single plateau independently of any other, but space restraints necessitate a narrow focus.<sup>258</sup> Why this plateau in particular is important to the topic of subjectivity is, I suggest, in its explication of the notion of limit and the state and the interactions thereof with the problem of the subject. On my reading, it expresses eloquently the problem of the intractable torpor of the political atmosphere of postmodernity and sketches in outline why there is no possible political change within the horizon of neoliberal capitalism.

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<sup>255</sup> *Capital Times* xvii

<sup>256</sup> *Capital Times* xx - Alliez however follows Hardt and Negri (and also Agamben) in naming this form of time ‘kairos’, the opportune moment, the instant or the slow time. A full discussion of such a concept has been purposefully elided in this thesis, as it is not a part of the Deleuzian schema and seemingly reopens the door onto transcendentalism, rather than immanence.

<sup>257</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pp.424-473

<sup>258</sup> In a prosaic sense, it is the plateau which has the most mentions of the term ‘capitalism’, but is also the one which attempts to define capitalism as such.

The first task is to provide a synopsis of the plateau entitled Apparatus of Capture and secondly to fold into it that which was discussed in the previous chapters of this thesis. What is 'capture'? Capture is a process which begins at the moment whereby the state 'encasts' the war machine and arrogates its powers to itself, where the war machine here is a process of smoothing. To smooth is to efface all previous strata, to reconfigure the already-existing codes such that they are vulnerable to modification - like a nomadic army tearing down the walls of a city, when the state encasts and deploys the war machine it generates new powers for itself insofar as new territory is designated as appropriable for the state. Capture is then the essence of the state; it is the control of signs, social codes and physical territory. What does it mean to describe the nation state primarily in the capacity of capture? To explain this requires a focus on a particular example that Deleuze & Guattari posit as the exemplar of the apparatus of capture - rent - before moving on to delineate the concept as a whole. At the end of this chapter, then, we should have a working model of both apparatus and its functions of capture - in which case the investigation will proceed towards dealing with subjectivity and its interaction with the apparatus of capture insofar as apparatuses are vehicles for the production of subjectivity.

Firstly, two things need to be outlined: the process of overcoding and the limit-threshold distinction as described in *A Thousand Plateaus*. Defining 'code' is not dissimilar to defining apparatus, insofar as the term is necessarily abstract. A code is a degree of structuration; the more coded something is the more it coheres, is bound together and/or moulded into a representation. If something is decoded it decoheres, loses its rigour or unity of composition; conversely the more something is coded the more stringently it is confined within a particular relation. The process of overcoding is a modification of these relations such that the code itself is changed. In terms of flows, coding is then a channelling or restriction of flows. Deleuze, in the Postscript cites several examples of overcoding such as "extraordinary pharmaceutical productions," "molecular engineering" and "genetic manipulation", the latter case being a particularly lucid example of code-alteration. He uses the example of a highway: "[y]ou do not confine people with a highway. But by making highways you multiply the means of control [...] people can travel infinitely and "freely" without being confined while being perfectly controlled."<sup>259</sup> A highway is structured or coded such that a flow of traffic enters and exits it at determined points and travels at a

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<sup>259</sup> 'Postscript on the Societies of Control'

particular speed. Imagine, then if someone were to reroute the highway, to change perhaps its entrances and exits so that the flows were displaced elsewhere. This would constitute an instance of overcoding. These controls can be enacted on any number of flows such as language, information or even rivers. Another name of overcoding is translation, as in the move from one language as structured sign-regime to another, so when, for example, French is translated into English it is overcoded and fits within a different regime of codes. However, certain flows always escape this coding process; if we were to translate the French word 'experiment' into the English 'experiment' we lose the resonance the French has of 'expérience', which can only be grasped prior to its overcoding. Indeed this very distinction ('experiment has two resonances in French') does not exist prior to the process of overcoding.

For Deleuze and Guattari, this is precisely what society or the appearance of social formations is: the coding of flows. A social institution such as marriage practises come about through and because of the structuration of the flow of sexuality, which then sediments itself as an institutional feature of that society. How capitalist societies differ in this regard, however, is that rather than having coding as its primary means of operation in the way that, say, primitive societies do, capitalism primarily proceeds via decoding, by decoherence and destructure. As such, flows are constantly becoming freed - think for example of the general decline in the West of marriage: it is much more common now that people cohabit in ways that are other than legal or holy matrimony, thus the freeing up of the flow of sexuality from the binary code of marriage. This would seem to be a good thing, but capitalism subsequently operates upon these decoded flows a massive enterprise of commercialisation in which these flows are brought into equivalence with and comparison to the flow of money, or in other words are priced and given a monetary value.<sup>260</sup> This commercialisation takes place outside of the coded flow itself, necessarily so; the commodity cannot have value if it is totally within a particular code regime. What is crucial here is that the process of decoding that exemplifies capitalism has no limit.<sup>261</sup> Indeed a limit, as we shall see below, is itself a kind of code and as such the limit of capitalism is always being decoded such that the limit is never actually reached and a threshold of transformation is never crossed.

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<sup>260</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.459

<sup>261</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.462

The abstract structure of the apparatus of capture is as follows: it is a process of, on the one hand 'comparison' and on the other 'appropriation'. The aim of this process is the creation of a stock, which occurs simultaneously alongside the comparison and appropriation of material e.g. land. To compare material, there must first be a homogenisation or smoothing which allows it to be exploited (these two processes combined are called deterritorialization, as in: making territory non-territory and into land). Appropriations thereof are then the creation of a stockpile, a subset of which is money.

An example that we are given is the one of a landowner and their rent. The landowner stakes a claim on a piece of territory, a space of "pure availability"<sup>262</sup> or "nonpossession and non-wealth", unmaking it as 'territory' it and reterritorializing on it insofar as it becomes 'land' - this is accomplished via the creation of a "general semiology that overcodes the primitive semiotic systems"; in other words, this simultaneous de- and reterritorialization is accomplished via a homogenisation that results from an act of comparison of various territories i.e grouping together two or three fields with varying crop yields. This homogenisation and comparison are codependent, or rather two faces of the same operation of deterritorialization. Once this has been accomplished and the land is deemed appropriable (indeed it cannot be subject to comparison if it is not appropriable; appropriation is a precondition of comparison in this way; as we can see, certain aspects of this description are circuitous and must be described as such), the land is now a stock, "stockpiled territory", "the State constitutes a form of expression that subjugates the phylum",<sup>263</sup> or in other words it appropriates natural resources for its own sake and creates striations of the earth. The flow of the earth, the machinic phylum (e.g. the production of seeds and the growth cycle thereof, its fecundity as an exploitable resource) has been channelled by the striae instituted via reterritorialisation and its heterogeneous activity has been homogenised.

As noted, the stock in this instance is land; land is stockpiled territory. It cannot be said, though, that rent is extracted from the land as if it were mined, but is another assemblage placed on top of territories that are successively exploited, an assemblage that necessitates stockpiling: "a stock is what permits the yields to be compared." This is a process of translation and overcoding: capitalism is a process that overlays itself on the state that is

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<sup>262</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.445 and pg.438 for the limit-threshold distinction.

<sup>263</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.445

formed via capture. Rent, then, is the apparatus of capture in this instance: the whole process of comparison, homogenisation and exploitation. Deleuze and Guattari summarise:

Ground rent homogenises, equalises different conditions of productivity by linking the excess of the highest conditions of productivity over the lowest to a *land-owner*: since the price (profit included) is established on the basis of the least productive land, rent taps the surplus profit accruing to the best lands; it taps "the difference between the product of two equal amounts of capital and labour." This is the very model of an apparatus of capture, inseparable from a process of relative deterritorialization.<sup>264</sup>

Rent, as the apparatus of capture is then both an assemblage and its function - it creates its own conditions. It's worth here remembering Deleuze's claim that the effect remains in the cause no less than it remains within itself; the effect of the apparatus (rent) therefore remains within the cause, immanent within it rather than emanating from it. The body of the apparatus of capture cannot be separated from its various effectuations and therefore rent is also an (instantiation of the) apparatus of capture. It codes the appropriated earth for and in the name of capital; rent is the apparatus of capture at work upon the earth itself.

Rent is only one head of the tripartite full image of the apparatus of capture, there also exists modes of profit and taxation and their correlate stocks: money and labour. Labour is captured activity; indeed, it is an instance of translation insofar as labour only exists as captured activity - labour does not exist outside of the state. This proposition is a challenge to Marxism insofar as it collapses the distinction between labour and surplus labour, indeed under state capture, all labour is surplus and therefore exploitative. Labour is then a stockpile of human activity, which in archaic and imperial states is exemplified in the trading of slaves. Money is the condition which allows state capture in the form of taxation and allows for the processes of comparison to occur. This mode of capture draws the other two together by allowing for a unit of measurement and comparison, which in effect is a capture of the process of exchange itself. Money imposes an abstract equivalence between objects or processes that are necessarily different.

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<sup>264</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.441



Rent, money and labour at the three heads of the state's apparatus of capture, or the state's three modes of creating stockpiles.<sup>265</sup> And yet, even as the state creates these stockpiles, it enacts further modes of capture upon them. This is what allows Deleuze and Guattari to claim that the state arises 'in a single stroke', already fully-formed. This is the authors attempting a reinscription of Dumézil's tripartite state, but with the identity and categories at each point disempowered, no longer sovereign but passive. Furthermore, by this point, any triangle of immanent and interrelated processes should put us in mind of Kant. While I will not venture another comparison between the Kantian syntheses and that of the constitution of the state directly, insofar as these processes bear an isomorphy with those of *Anti-Oedipus* there is a direct shared lineage functioning at each point.

So we can see now how the general structure of capture relates to the threshold; what capture does is overcode and therefore force threshold-crossings on other assemblages, stratifying them such that they become an extension of the state. The three heads of capitalism - land, work and money - are threshold-crossings (overcodings) of territory, activity and exchange respectively. Only after this takes place can a stock be created, such that the aim of the apparatus of capture can be said to be to effectuate as many overcodings as possible. Stockpiling does not happen in primitive societies; it only takes place after a primitive society has been captured by the state and thus becomes a different assemblage. As with every process of overcoding, though, flows escape capture: an elegant example with regards to the state is the construction of private property by independent labourers.

Therefore, now the concepts of limit and threshold need to be stated and outlined. The limit is not an impassable blockade from one state to another, rather it is the penultimate event in a series before a threshold. This threshold is crossed when the elements of an assemblage reach a certain intensity such that the assemblage itself undergoes a transition. This idea is linked to the relation between singularities and multiplicities (the latter of which could be argued is a synonym for assemblage) insofar as, for example, a marble is a singular entity but a bag of marbles is a multiplicity - one could add or remove marbles from it and it would remain a 'bag of marbles' until the last marble is removed, causing a phase shift in the

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<sup>265</sup> This argument is essentially the translation of Marx's 'Trinity Formula' into a Kantian tripartite synthesis - seemingly in an attempt to provide a solution to the problem posed in the same chapter of *Capital Volume III*, that capital appears as a "very mystic being". See *Capital Volume III*, chapter 48.

entity after which it no longer remains what it was. Deleuze gives a surprisingly personal example in *A Thousand Plateaus*:

There is a conceptual difference between the "limit" and the "threshold" [...]) What does an alcoholic call the last glass? The alcoholic makes a subjective evaluation of how much he or she can tolerate. What can be tolerated is precisely the limit at which, as the alcoholic sees it, he or she will be able to start again (after a rest, a pause...). But beyond that limit there lies a threshold that would cause the alcoholic to change assemblage [...] It is of little importance that the alcoholic may be fooling him – or herself, or makes a very ambiguous use of the theme "I am going to stop", the theme of the last one. What counts is the existence of a spontaneous marginal criterion and marginalist evaluation determining the value of the entire series of "glasses"<sup>266</sup>

The limit, like the apparatus, is an aspect of knowledge before it is an ontological entity. Exchanges happen within and across assemblages until one undergoes a phase transition and exchange is no longer possible. "It is an economic given of every enterprise to include an evaluation of the limit beyond which the enterprise would have to modify its structure."<sup>267</sup> This knowledge of the eventual modification of structure serves as a prophylactic against the modification itself: e.g. the knowledge of a proposal of marriage and the commitment that that requires (a fundamental change in assemblage) and a calculation of risk (your partner could say no) often withholds the act of asking the question itself. Thus "it is the evaluation of the last as limit that constitutes an anticipation and simultaneously wards off the last as threshold or ultimate (a new assemblage)."<sup>268</sup> This is, Deleuze and Guattari claim, the economic model of the primitive society, a negotiation of risk and exchange between stockpiled resources within specific parameters demarcated by a limit. "[T]he limit designates the penultimate marking a necessary rebeginning, and the threshold the ultimate marking an inevitable change."<sup>269</sup> This notion of limit will become important when it comes to the concept of the apparatus as a multiplicity and the transformations thereof. However, there is a tension in between the mutable apparatus and the notion of a specific apparatus *of capture*, which Deleuze and Guattari describe in singular and unitary terms; that "the

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<sup>266</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.438

<sup>267</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.438

<sup>268</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.439

<sup>269</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.438

State must have only one milieu of interiority; in other words, it must have a *unity of composition*, in spite of all the differences in organisation and development among States.<sup>270</sup> Indeed this unity of composition is necessary as the state appears already formed: "We are always brought back to the idea of a State that comes into the world fully formed and rises up in a single stroke, the unconditioned *Urstaat*."<sup>271</sup>

What Deleuze and Guattari term the *Urstaat* is the protean image of the state-in-general, that which occurs when capture is totalised, when the social flows have been coded absolutely. It is an abstract but necessary condition for a state to be posited and through which the state must be thought, imposed upon societies as a regulatory idea. In this sense, the *urstaat*, as the exemplar of what a state must be, is then also its limit concept - it is that case which marks the demarcation between a state and a stateless society. The Apparatus of Capture, Deleuze and Guattari argue, is the form of the archaic imperial state that lies dormant within the current-day nation state - its function is to actualise, as far as it can, the *urstaat* "in other figures and under other conditions."<sup>272</sup> The *urstaat*, even as an idea that has never been actualised, still functions in some way in every state - and as such it permeates the social field, working to freeze flows and stratify movement as much as possible. It is in this way that it can be seen as a forerunner of Deleuze's idea of control.

### **Subjection and Machinic Enslavement**

There are two processes that seem to be protean forms of Deleuze's concept of control discernable here: subjection and machinic enslavement. These are two separate forms of subjective control, which align to molecular and molar processes respectively. However, it should be borne in mind that these two forms are transcendental modes of overcoding, whereas the problematic specific to capitalism is that it continually develops axiomatics that function immanently on decoded flows

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<sup>270</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.427

<sup>271</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.427

<sup>272</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.221

We distinguish machinic enslavement and social subjection as two separate concepts. There is enslavement when human beings themselves are constituent pieces of a machine that they compose among themselves and with other things (animals, tools), under the control and direction of a higher unity. But there is subjection when the higher unity constitutes the human being as a subject linked to a now exterior object, which can be an animal, a tool, or even a machine. The human being is no longer a component of the machine but a worker, a user. He or she is subjected to the machine and no longer enslaved by the machine.<sup>273</sup>

Machinic enslavement is the molecular control of the unconscious or pre-individual aspects of the subject and as such necessitates a participation of the subject within its mechanisms. Whereas in the archaic imperial state, subjection was the primary mode of social control - evidenced by presence of the sovereign or the emperor - the opposite is true of contemporary city states or control societies, in which machinic enslavement is much more prevalent. Such a phenomenon has been observed in the collapse of the traditional binary between production and consumption, such that we are all now 'prosumers', contributors to the growth of capitalism, already merged with the machine. One of the main ways this occurs is through the harnessing of affect, the pre-individual forces that compose the subject, its energies. This issue will be explored thoroughly in the next chapter.

Revisiting the previous chapter and speaking in a tentative, structuralist capacity - indeed, even representationally, which as we know Deleuze always warned against - we might describe the relationship of subjection to state by mapping Deleuze's critique of Kantian temporality back onto spatial metaphors with a view to broadly differentiating our current moment from those that have come before. Classically, we could speak of a cyclical world, exemplified in the society of the Greeks; this becomes the linear world of the moderns and eventually the serpentine world of the postmodern, which we now inhabit. In the cyclical world of the Greeks, the socius is arranged into circles of internal enclosure and external exclusion within which each social caste must remain. Indeed, this is the true meaning of the term hubris, to attempt to cross into a zone one from which one has been excluded, exemplified in the figure of Icarus crossing the boundary between humans and the gods. If

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<sup>273</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.457

the world of modernity is linear, then it is a line that extends vertically as well as horizontally: hierarchy and sovereignty are the watchwords of subjection - and capitalism exacerbates the quantity and degrees of rivalry between free men. The postmodern era does not annul or negate these modes of subjection, but rather incorporates them like matryoshka dolls, complicating and periplicating the various lines that are folded back upon each other. The postmodern moment is one in which the torsions of capitalism exist alongside that of vestiges of the imperial state and its twin despots. In describing the movement from modernity to postmodernity, which is also to describe the rise of capitalism and its eventual symbiosis with the modern state form, Deleuze and Guattari write:

It is indeed another pole of the State that arises, one that could be defined in summary fashion as follows. The public sphere no longer characterizes the objective nature of property but is instead the shared means for a now private appropriation; this yields the public-private mixes constitutive of the modern world. The bond becomes personal; personal relations of dependence, both between owners (contracts) and between owned and owners (conventions), parallel or replace community relations or relations based on one's public function. Even slavery changes; it no longer defines the public availability of the communal worker but rather private property as applied to individual workers. The law in its entirety undergoes a mutation, becoming subjective, conjunctive, "topical" law: this is because the State apparatus is faced with a new task, which consists less in overcoding already coded flows than in organizing conjunctions of decoded flows as such. Thus the regime of signs has changed: in all of these respects, the operation of the imperial "signifier" has been superseded by processes of subjectification; machinic enslavement tends to be replaced by a regime of social subjection.<sup>274</sup>

What then is the relation between capitalism and the state? It appears that the two forms of capture or social control - machinic enslavement and social subjection - map broadly onto capitalism and the state form, respectively. However, these two forms are inherent within the state form only, descended from imperial and feudal societies. As described, the contemporary state still contains the image of the *urstaat*, which insinuates itself on the *socius* at each point. Capitalism is even antagonistic to the enterprise of coding,

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<sup>274</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.451

destabilising and freeing up flows as it seemingly deconstructs the transcendental authority of institutions such as the church and the monarchy - and yet, Deleuze and Guattari claim, there exists within capitalism an even more recalcitrant and intractable mode of authority: that of the axiomatic. An axiomatic is a function that does not justify its conditions or compromise with the relations within which it shares a domain, it merely adds axioms (components which specify a command or dictum to be obeyed).<sup>275</sup> Because of its inability or refusal to be conditioned by its relations, axiomatics function immanently on flows through a model of application - and as such are a third mode of capture unique to capitalism. One such model of application is state or 'royal' science, which serves to stratify and code otherwise unruly flows, where they are deterritorialized through a nomadic science:

What we have, rather, are two formally different conceptions of science, and, ontologically, a single field of interaction in which royal science continually appropriates the contents of vague or nomad science while nomad science continually cuts the contents of royal science loose. At the limit, all that counts is the constantly shifting borderline. In Husserl (and also in Kant, though in the opposite direction: roundness as the "schema" of the circle), we find a very accurate appreciation of the irreducibility of nomad science, but simultaneously the concern of a man of the State, or one who sides with the State, to maintain a legislative and constituent primacy for royal science.<sup>276</sup>

Royal science reinforces the state upon which the capitalist axioms are inscribed. If the state is a model that realises the capitalist axiomatics, then capitalism and the state have a perfectly symbiotic relationship: capitalism decodes, the axiomatic acts immanently upon the decoded flows, the state organises the decoded flows. This vicious circle, while constituting a society within its limit - a vestige of the imperial state form of the Greeks - and even though nomadic science, spoken of below in the capacity of subjectivity, may be able to free flows from the state, capital is ready to recode them:

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<sup>275</sup> A notable recent example of an axiom is the phrase 'Black Lives Matter'; it is a self-contained proposition. If one attempts to modify the axiom in any way (by, for example, adding predicates such as 'all lives matter') they are attempting to negate the whole. This is not to imply that the example is an intrinsic component of capitalism; indeed, it may be a pertinent example of an anticapitalist use of axiomatics.

<sup>276</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.376

Circulation constitutes capital as a subjectivity commensurate with society in its entirety. But this new social subjectivity can form only to the extent that the decoded flows overflow their conjunctions and attain a level of decoding that the State apparatuses are no longer able to reclaim: on the one hand, the flow of labour must no longer be determined as slavery or serfdom but must become naked and free labour; and on the other hand, wealth must no longer be determined as money dealing, merchant's or landed wealth, but must become pure homogeneous and independent capital. And doubtless, these two becomings at least (for other flows also converge) introduce many contingencies and many different factors on each of the lines. But it is their abstract conjunction in a single stroke that constitutes capitalism, providing a universal subject and an object in general for one another. Capitalism forms when the flow of unqualified wealth encounters the flow of unqualified labour and conjugates with it.<sup>277</sup>

This process is a reinscription of the three passive syntheses of desire as they are found in *Anti-Oedipus*; money as the Body without Organs of capitalism is the place of free and unencumbered flux before it finds its investiture in a commodity or circuit of desire. That capitalism decodes flows is to necessarily get them into a place whereupon capital can enact an enterprise of coding and recoding upon these flows - to get to a place of liquidity in order to secure new investments in commodities. This is particularly evident in a financial crisis, with investors cashing out on stockpiled resources in order to move to a position of greater flexibility, thus allowing them to reterritorialize on new assets in the future. This ensures capitalism's survival and the constant postponement of the threshold. We can see then the synthesis of connection at work here in the form of a 'primitive accumulation' of labour; the synthesis of disjunction in investment in commodity; and the synthesis of conjunction is the release of forces, when capital returns to a liquid state. This is the isomorphy of the passive syntheses within capitalism, on the one hand, and the subject, on the other.

Capitalism arises as a worldwide enterprise of subjectification by constituting an axiomatic of decoded flows. Social subjection, as the correlate of subjectification, appears much more in the axiomatic's models of realization than in the axiomatic

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<sup>277</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.452-453

itself. It is within the framework of the nation-State, or of national subjectivities, that processes of subjectification and the corresponding subjections are manifested. The axiomatic itself, of which the States are models of realization, restores or reinvents, in new and now technical forms, an entire system of machinic enslavement.<sup>278</sup>

We can see, then, that what originally appears to be a liberatory vector within capitalism - that of its power of decoding, its apparent dismantling of machinic enslavement - actually reemerges and invigorates a new regime of enslavement within and because of its complicity with the nation state. The danger here is that capitalism has hijacked subjectification, the aspect of subjectivity which is self-constituting and subordinated it to subjection, the aspect of subjectivity which is applied from the outside. This is what Deleuze and Guattari mean when they say that "capital is a point of subjectification par excellence"<sup>279</sup> that subjects volunteer to yoke themselves to the capitalist axiomatic, which is not at all far from Reich's analysis that, in some way, the masses wanted fascism and desired their own oppression.

## **Subject and State**

In attempting to draw together the above, we might propose the following equation: the state creates what it captures; the subject is immanent with its causes. The subject, with its syntheses of the transcendental unconscious, is always-already embedded in a state which appears to be constituted through the same set of syntheses. How might the state, then, produce a subject? It does so by appropriating, for lack of a better term, the means of production of subjectivity and as such is constantly in a state of negotiation and combat with the subject. First synthesis of appropriation: the Body without Organs draws chains of machines to its surface, which is to say it 'appropriates' them, but at the same time the state deterritorializes the surface of the Body and appropriates for itself these chains. Second synthesis of recording: once this has occurred, the state may compare subjects with others and therefore homogenise and form a stockpile, a stockpile of the subject's labour or activity. The Body without Organs resists such a process, which is essentially a

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<sup>278</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.458

<sup>279</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.130



production of subjectivity, attempting to suspend being produced and reproduced, and attempts to become a full body. Third synthesis of consumption: this requires flows of energy, energy of enjoyment and consummation, which are constantly being directed and channelled by the state through profit, a capture of labour, which works in conjunction with capitalism to bring about a state of both machinic enslavement and social subjection.

In thinking together these two propositions, we can come up with an adequate summary of the problem put forward in both *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*.

The State, its police, and its army form a gigantic enterprise of antiproduction, but at the heart of production itself, and conditioning this production. Here we discover a new determination of the properly capitalist field of immanence: not only the interplay of the relations and differential coefficients of decoded flows, not only the nature of the limits that capitalism reproduces on an ever wider scale as interior limits, but the presence of antiproduction within production itself. The apparatus of antiproduction is no longer a transcendent instance that opposes production, limits it, or checks it; on the contrary, it insinuates itself everywhere in the productive machine and becomes firmly wedded to it in order to regulate its productivity and realize surplus value - which explains, for example, the difference between the despotic bureaucracy and the capitalist bureaucracy.<sup>280</sup>

What hope is offered for the subject of a capitalist state? There is hope expressed in the power of minorities and war machines to exceed the axiomatic of capitalism, but these are both appropriable by the state and capital and cannot solely be relied upon without caution. Smoothing may level the security apparatus of oppressive regimes or it may raise communities to make way for a stripmall; becoming-minor may shake the subject out of their dogmatic slumber, or it may create a catatonic body, unable to escape from a black hole. It all depends on the degree of power involved, which is to say a Spinozan or Nietzschean sense of ethics, the appropriate use of power. Approaching an ethico-political programme, in the conclusion to *Anti-Oedipus*, they write:

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<sup>280</sup> *Anti-Oedipus* pg.235

The actualization of a revolutionary potentiality is explained less by the preconscious state of causality in which it is nonetheless included, than by the efficacy of a libidinal break at a precise moment, a schiz whose sole cause is desire—which is to say the rupture with causality that forces a rewriting of history on a level with the real, and produces this strangely polyvocal moment when everything is possible. Of course the schiz has been prepared by a subterranean labour of causes, aims, and interests working together; of course this order of causes runs the risk of closing and cementing the breach in the name of the new socius and its interests. Of course one can always say after the fact that history has never ceased being governed by the same laws of aggregates and large numbers. The fact remains that the schiz came into existence only by means of a desire without aim or cause that charted it and sided with it. While the schiz is possible without the order of causes, it becomes real only by means of something of another order: Desire, the desert-desire, the revolutionary investment of desire. And that is indeed what undermines capitalism: where will the revolution come from, and in what form within the exploited masses? It is like death—where, when?<sup>281</sup>

We can discern a reference to Marx's old mole, the 'subterranean' virtual conditions of revolution, but it is the schiz or split that forces history, or linear narrative time, to be in-line with the real. This can only be read as the third synthesis of time from *Difference and Repetition*, where the split is a caesura or pause and aligned with the Freudian death drive. The order of causes, which is an aggregate, not a qualitative duration, does not threaten capitalism, indeed it appears to be an allusion to the counterrevolutionary forces which enable totalitarian governments; rather where the threat lies is in the 'desert-desire', the nomadism in intensity, brought about through the opening of the schiz. We can also see in this passage the advocacy of a generalised minoritarianism - and yet, in a theme which is far more common in *A Thousand Plateaus* than the accelerationists would admit, the authors advise caution, always aware of the convertibility of decoded flows into the service of repressive or fascist powers. The urstaat is always-already functioning, threatening to hijack these flows and to reterritorialize on any so-called 'revolutionary' space. What will this consist of?

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<sup>281</sup> *Anti-Oedipus* pg.378

It will be a decoded flow, a deterritorialized flow that runs too far and cuts too sharply, thereby escaping from the axiomatic of capitalism. Will it come in the person of a Castro, an Arab, a Black Panther, or a Chinaman on the horizon? A May '68, a home-grown Maoist planted like an anchorite on a factory smokestack? Always the addition of an axiom to seal off a breach that has been discovered; fascist colonels start reading Mao, we won't be fooled again; Castro has become impossible, even in relation to himself; vacuoles are isolated, ghettos created; unions are appealed to for help; the most sinister forms of "dissuasion" are invented; the repression of interest is reinforced—but where will the new irruption of desire come from?<sup>282</sup>

The question is left hanging. "It therefore remains for us to see how, effectively, simultaneously, these various tasks of schizoanalysis proceed."<sup>283</sup>

### **Does the Subject Have Agency?**

*Capitalism and Schizophrenia* and the encounter with Guattari mark, for Deleuze, an era of problematization. That is, they mark a break with the earlier work in the tradition of classical metaphysics, which is to say a more detached, abstract mode of thinking. In *Anti-Oedipus* psychoanalysis and economics become immanent, such that the two positive tasks of schizoanalysis, as outlined at the end of the book, are to first discover the mechanics of the subject's personal desiring-machines, what circuits they plug into - and second, discover how these machines are invested in and react with the socius. This is not, however, an interpretive or hermeneutic task: far more than 'what does it mean?' the pertinent question is 'what does it do?' As such, the final sentence of *A Thousand Plateaus*, a single word, is 'mechanosphere'. Interpreted pessimistically, this neologism opens onto the grim vista of a world of interlocking machines, endlessly forming territories, smoothing or stratifying spaces, coding and recoding. This mechanosphere seems to foreshadow the modulations of the pure control society and its capacity for serpentine social control. It is in this sense

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<sup>282</sup> *Anti-Oedipus* pg.378

<sup>283</sup> *Anti-Oedipus* pg.382

that we can view the two books as being the construction of a problem rather than a programme for its solution.

But what about the subject? Does this mean that the subject is condemned to live within an ever-expanding and self-improving world of machinic discipline? It is worth noting that the conception of the 'Deleuzoguattarian' subject changes even in the time between *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus* - indeed, the notion of the 'desiring machine' is absent from the latter volume. This is perhaps, in part, due to Foucault's critique of 'The Reichians', a critique which, it may seem, Deleuze and Guattari took seriously.<sup>284</sup> Furthermore, in the latter volume the concept of machinic enslavement is brought to the fore, further downplaying the notion of desire in favour of the mechanosphere. There has always been the potential, in Deleuze's philosophy, for a diminishment and even an erasure of the agency of the human subject. This pressure is intensified in *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*. If the state apparatus can appropriate the war machine, that which smoothes and creates smooth space, if this process is effectuated upon the socius, the social surface, then bearing in mind the principle of homology that I have been attempting to establish in this chapter, then could this operation - a specifically capitalist operation - also be at work within the subject as a process of *desubjectification*?

The enigma that follows, is that the model of capitalist-subjectivity that appears - which at first appears to be and is read by many as a kind of vitalism of desire on this reading, seems to be one that disavows the possibility of individual subjectivity itself (especially subjectivity qua agency). More specifically, that which was individual (or indivisible) in this new formulation of subjectivity becomes divided and comes to be seen in relation to the forces which act upon, mediate and manipulate it; as Foucault says "no longer that of man, but what is nonhuman in man, his desires and his forces."<sup>285</sup> Second, a theoretical gravity is lent to the concept of creativity in both positive and negative connotations. Creativity and its cognates productivity, production et al, while seemingly being extolled as virtues of the vitalist-desire approach are simultaneously identified as intrinsic characteristics of capitalism. If, as is suggested, capitalism creates the subject, then the subject is bound to or thrown from (*pro-ject*-ed from) a creative fullness that is prior to them as subjects. Focus

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<sup>284</sup> See Foucault's 'The Mesh of Power', <<https://viewpointmag.com/2012/09/12/the-mesh-of-power/>> Accessed: 05/06/21

<sup>285</sup> *Anti-Oedipus* xxi

shifts away from the cogito; no longer 'I think' but now 'thought thinks me', or rather that the subject becomes nothing but a predicate of that which creates it. In order to do proper philosophical analysis of that subject, it follows that it must be divorced from this mediation; Peter Hallward, summarising such contemporary philosophical methods, writes: "[t]he subject of representation, the subject bound up in relations with objects, the subject as ego, tends to yield here in favour of a subject without object, a subject "subjectivised" as the facet of a radically singular or non-relational principle." He continues:

Such a principle not only acts freely or creatively, it creates the very medium in which it acts. As a result, an absolute subject can never be known through conformity to a model or norm, as the object of knowledge or representation; it can only be accessed through immediate participation in what it does, thinks, or lives.<sup>286</sup>

There was, perhaps at one point, hope in the possibility of a progressive use of the powers of deterritorialization and decoding afforded by capitalism hinted at by Deleuze and Guattari. Indeed, contemporary scholarship often places great import on the so-called accelerationist tendencies of Deleuze and Guattari's collaborations, perhaps exemplified in the following passage:

But which is the revolutionary path? Is there one? To withdraw from the world market, as Samir Amin advises Third World Countries to do, in a curious revival of the fascist 'economic solution'? Or might it be to go in the opposite direction? To go further still, that is, in the movement of the market, of decoding and deterritorialization? For perhaps the flows are not yet deterritorialized enough, not decoded enough, from the viewpoint of a theory and practice of a highly schizophrenic character. Not to withdraw from the process, but to go further, to 'accelerate the process,' as Nietzsche put it: in this matter, the truth is that we haven't seen anything yet.<sup>287</sup>

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<sup>286</sup> 'The One or the Other: French Philosophy Today' in *Angelaki* Volume 8 number 2, August 2003

<sup>287</sup> *Anti-Oedipus* 239-240. Considering the amount of attention this passage has drawn in recent years, this 'perhaps' should be read in a very speculative capacity. Many scholars take these few lines as a wholesale endorsement of absolute deterritorialization and decoding brought about through capitalism and even an endorsement of capitalism itself.

But as can be seen, this is far from an endorsement of capitalism's power of deterritorialization, nor is it a prescriptive political programme. Indeed, as Deleuze and Guattari state in several places, any deterritorialization is accompanied with a subsequent reterritorialization, absolute deterritorialization is never a possibility; if a smooth space is opened up, there is ever greater potential that it will be re-stratified and remade into a stratified and controlled surface, as can be seen with the Body without Organs. In fact, things are much more intractable than scholars advocating an accelerationist approach make out. As Franco Berardi in *Heroes* writes:

In Guattari's parlance, a refrain (*ritournelle*) is the link between the subject of enunciation and the cosmos, between a body and the surrounding environment, between the consciousness of a social group and its physical and imaginary territory. Deterritorialization breaks the chains, and jeopardises the relation between subjectivity and its environment. As a reaction, the refrain tends to harden, to become stiff in order to dam the process of deterritorialization. In the case of neurotic identity in refrain is embodied in hardened representations, as an obsessional ritual or an aggressive reaction to change.<sup>288</sup>

Regressive powers are fed and empowered in turn by this decoding; take for example the Reaganite programme of both financial deregulation and a simultaneous advocacy of traditional and family values, of which Trumpism is merely a new strain. I claim it would be doing much less of a disservice to the overall message of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* to take as an exemplar phrase: "Capitalism has reawakened the Urstaat, and given it new strength."<sup>289</sup> In doing so, the problem then seems to be this: if capitalism continually postpones a threshold crossing by expanding its limits and within its vicinity de- and re-territorialization constantly play out, how to move on from the horizon of capitalism, how does the new subjectivity sought by and hinted at by Deleuze and Guattari emerge?

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<sup>288</sup> *Heroes* pg.217

<sup>289</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.460

## Responses to Deleuze and Guattari's Subject

It is at this point in the discussion, with the Deleuzian and Deleuzoguattarian theory of subjectivity problematised in such a way, that it is worth considering some other prominent critiques of Deleuze's model of the subject. Indeed, while some of the critiques contain a metaphysical element to their argument and take umbrage with points laid out in *Difference and Repetition*, almost all are motivated by some sort of political divergence or ethical concern with the outcomes or consequences of the analyses afforded by *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*. To conclude this chapter, I will conduct a survey of critics, namely: Alain Badiou, Peter Hallward and Manfred Frank. If we were to tentatively group these criticisms under a theme, it would be that of 'agency', or the worrying potential of a lack thereof. In effacing the essential negativity or absence at the heart of the subject which would in some sense be the guarantor of its freedom and in positing in place of this absence an account based on the fullness or plenitude of machines and the production of desire, have Deleuze and Guattari also effaced any possible subjective agency?

When examining these objections we will start with the most extreme criticisms, the ones that dismiss Deleuze *in toto*, and then move on to more moderate responses. Alain Badiou and his follower Peter Hallward fall into the former camp, constructing attempts which aim to undermine Deleuze's entire metaphysical project. They do this by framing Deleuze's ontology in terms of the One and the multiple. The latter term is somewhat foreign to Deleuze's work; while he often speaks of multiplicity (rather than the multiple, and insists upon its distinction) and univocity rather than oneness - indeed, as is seen in chapter two, for Deleuze oneness as such is not simply reducible to univocity.

Badiou's criticism of Deleuze is predicated on the argument that Deleuze's principle of univocity is translatable with the classical philosophical concept of oneness and therefore that Deleuze is a 'philosopher of the One', which allows Deleuze's entire philosophy to fit into Badiou's own vernacular and the philosophical heritage that Deleuze was trying to escape. In fact, Badiou centralises this concept of oneness and makes it the object of his attack. This move, against the central principle of the immanence of actual and virtual, implies and imposes a transcendence in Deleuze (between the one and the multiple) that, it is claimed, was always there but that he was unaware of or unable to escape. Against

Badiou's Maoist reading of oneness, that 'one (dialectically) divides into two', he claims that Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy implies a 'one becomes two', that the effect remains within the cause and as such their thought is merely a reaffirmation of unity. This ontology then, Badiou claims, negates the absolute break needed for the mobilisation of a politics based upon class struggle. In the article 'The Fascism of the Potato', a contemporaneous review of *Anti-Oedipus*, Badiou takes the authors to task for insisting upon rather than an absolute break, a becoming-minor;

To say that the grandeur and virtue of things lies in their being the 'minus' of (that is, in their external coexistence with) that which is antagonistic to them: that is ultimately all there is to it.<sup>290</sup>

Badiou here is targeting precisely the political ethics advocated by Deleuze and Guattari, which is to say the empowerment of minorities and the imperative of a general becoming-minor for all subjects. The critique advanced in the article reveals an intractable conflict between Deleuze's principle of the univocity of being and Badiou's theory of subjectivity and parent ontology, in which, following the Freudo-Marxist tradition discussed above, there is an essential negativity at the core of the subject. Simplifying, if Deleuze posits that all beings exist in the same way, qua his principle of the univocity of being, then Badiou differs by granting a special type of existence to subjects; or rather, Badiou sees Deleuze's univocal Being as a singularity grounded on an infinite plenitude against which he posits an ontological multiplicity grounded on nothingness. The way he gets to this nothingness, or 'Void' in his terminology, is by deploying mathematical set theory and that in set theory a set or multiple is not distinguished by what it contains but rather by what it does not contain. For example, to return to a previous example, a bag of marbles is a multiplicity; one can add or remove a countable amount of marbles from the bag and it still remains 'a bag of marbles'<sup>291</sup>; it makes no sense to define its 'bag-of-marble-ness' on how many marbles are in the bag, but the definition functions purely by virtue of the fact that it is *marbles* that are in the bag, it is a set defined by this name. While this is a model of the world, Badiou claims, the subject is only ever subtracted from this structure, because all subjects have being - and therefore are part of the void. For Badiou, being is not a

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<sup>290</sup> 'Fascism of the Potato' in *Adventure of French Philosophy* pp.

<sup>291</sup> Until, as Deleuze notes, one removes all marbles from the bag - at which point the multiplicity (or assemblage) has crossed a threshold and no longer remains what it once was.



countable element of a particular set so therefore it has to be that which the set does not contain - and since all beings *are*, that which is outside all sets (and is therefore a void) is being itself. Therefore, in Badiou's ontology, there are no ones, only multiples; the only One is Being and therefore "the One is not". We can see then the fundamental disagreement with, almost wilful inversion of, Deleuze in which there is only One, in which Being is said univocally across all its modes. Using set theory in this way Badiou secures the negativity inherent in subjectivity that is present in the Hegelian line of philosophy that cuts through Marx, Freud, Lacan et al, and can therefore construe subjects as something in absolute contradiction to the world. As such, Badiou can appeal to the multiple while still vouchsafing the negativity he claims is essential to class struggle. His is fundamentally, then, a political ontology.

However, if Badiou's critique here rests upon the presumption that the outside of the subject is nonidentical with and therefore naturally antagonistic to the subject, he then begs the question concerning Deleuze's fully-worlded machinic subjectivity. As we have seen - and as will be explored thoroughly in the coming chapters - for Deleuze, nonhuman forces are constitutive of and remain within the subject. While Badiou hypostasises subjectivity as nothingness, there can be no such nothingness for Deleuze; the void is always-already a multiplicity. The critique of Deleuze is done from within Badiou's own theory. Even the most bewildered reader of *Anti-Oedipus* could perhaps extract the central tenet of the book, namely that the subject is machinic - meaning that it is constructed by, traversed by and dissolved by external forces and not, as is Badiou's subject, existing in irreducible antagonism to what it is not. The critique therefore cannot just be that Deleuze and Guattari do not conform to Badiou's own theory by positing a subject that is necessarily imbricated in the world (incorrect) while Badiou's subject is necessarily extrinsic to the world (correct). Rather the reader of 'Fascism of the Potato' and *Clamour of Being* is aware of an ethical motivation to Badiou's challenge: the result of framing Deleuze in this way, for Badiou, entails the effacement of subjective agency - which is an issue that has been haunting Deleuze since his early work on Hume. Badiou writes:

All those who believe that Deleuze's remarks may be seen to encourage autonomy [...] are [...] mistaken. They do not take literally enough the strictly "machinic" conception that Deleuze has, not only of desire (the famous "desiring-machines")

but, even more so, of will or choice. For this conception strictly precludes any idea of ourselves as being, at any time, the source of what we think or do. Everything always stems from afar - indeed, everything is always "already-there," in the infinite and inhuman resource of the One.<sup>292</sup>

Certainly Badiou is correct to say that Deleuze's philosophy does not 'encourage' autonomy. But this is not so different from Badiou's own ontology - indeed, it is unclear as to why a machinic subjectivity would afford any less agency than a subjectivity grounded in nothingness and the void.<sup>293</sup> In his metaphysics, subjects only have agency when seized by an event, when they are following a truth procedure. Badiou's events are huge, molar happenings which cannot be synthesised by the current set of sets. In Deleuze, the issue that emerges is that events are so numerous and micrological that they are in essence happening at infinite speed and at a remove from the subject, within passive syntheses that act upon it. Badiou's events add to the world, whereas he argues that in Deleuze events and the subjectivity predicated upon these events are subtracted from the world, insofar as the virtual is at a remove from the actual.<sup>294</sup> He argues that there is an error in attempting to subtract the subject from the One. The Hegelian (and, by virtue of inheritance, Freudian and Lacanian) conception of selfhood is that of lack, 'manque-à-être' of being that in its essence is at total remove from the positivity of the world, and therefore of capitalism. The subject = (-x). Therefore when the subject is revolting against the world, they appear as subjects and thus have agency, they are not subsumed by a set. Rather than attempt to formulate a Deleuzian (or Deleuzoguattarian) answer at this point, I will pressurise this issue further by considering the rebuttals of other thinkers.

This issue of agency is again subject to pressure in the work of Peter Hallward. Hallward's critique is derivative of Badiou's in the sense that it construes Deleuze as a 'philosopher of the One', which Hallward radicalises to deprive Deleuze's theory of subjectivity of any agency whatsoever. Yet in a virtuosic article for Angelaki<sup>295</sup> Hallward claims to have discovered a general ontological principle that underscores not only Deleuze but all of contemporary French philosophy's leading figures; in short, that ontologies in French

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<sup>292</sup> *Deleuze: The Clamour of Being* pp.10-11

<sup>293</sup> The concept of the Body without Organs is also elided here

<sup>294</sup> This is of course a misreading, the virtual is immanent with the actual and immanence is the relay between the two; the virtual is conditioned only by virtue of the actual and that which is actualised, it does not exist alone from it or before it, it is not an absolute nor an *a priori*.

<sup>295</sup> 'The One or the Other: French Philosophy Today'

philosophy continually posit a singular substance that grounds unilaterally while being unaffected in itself, a creative plane of existence that is non-relational. For Deleuze, this is the virtual; for Badiou, the void; for Laruelle, the One and so on. The subject can then only be mediated through this substance and as such loses individual agency, as it is contained and lives within a Real or actual mode of existence that is not that which the subject is essentially. Not only this, but it can never be epistemically accessed as the subject and the plane of its creation proceeds beyond understanding, such as is the case for Badiou and Lacan. For Deleuze, the virtual is trapped within the actual and flows back towards its source, freeing up the subject as it does so. This ontological structure then, according to Hallward, normativises an ethics of return to or participation in this posited absolute, to the eventual detriment of immediate ethical concerns in the here-and-now. Of particular concern to Hallward are the religious - specifically Islamic - heritages he locates in contemporary French philosophy, something he appears to see as highly antithetical to not only political but also subjective agency. Indeed his project appears to be to map as closely as is possible contemporary French theory onto Sufi or Islamic mystical principles. It is worth summarising this objection at length:

Philosophies oriented around a singular principle can only cohere, in the end, as philosophies of the subject in what is again a supremely metaphysical sense of the term – a subject that is itself self-grounding, self-causing, a subject modelled more or less directly on the paradigm of a sovereign actor or creator God. If recent French philosophers have often attacked the philosophical foundations of the Cartesian *cogito* this has most often been in favour of a Neo-Spinozist *cogitor*: they have cast doubt on the ontological implications of the "I think" in order to clear the way for the still more absolute implications of a passive "I am thought" or "I am being thought." Thought thinks through me. Illuminated by the absolute, the knowing subject ceases to be a subject in relation to an object. The subject of representation, the subject bound up in relations with objects, the subject as ego, tends to yield here in favour of a subject without object, a subject subjectivised as the facet of a radically singular or non-relational principle. Such a principle not only acts freely or creatively, it creates the very medium in which it acts. As a result, an absolute subject can never be known through conformity to a model or norm, as the object of knowledge or representation; it can only be accessed through immediate participation in what it

does, thinks, or lives. As [Henry] Corbin explains with particular clarity, absolute creativity, or God, "cannot be an object (an objective given). He can only be known through himself as absolute Subject, that is, as absolved from all unreal objectivity," from all merely "creatural" mediation.<sup>296</sup>

Such an argument is essentially akin to charging contemporary French philosophy with ontotheology, that the particulars of any given philosophy may only be interpreted through a transcendent field or principle, which Hallward defines as an absolute. Further to this, he interprets the ethics of such philosophies in terms of participation in this absolute, an essentially mystical sense of union, or 'theosis'. As such an absolute is transcendent and mystical, it is at a remove from the world and the subjective participation therein is itself indifferent in the same way. This may be summarised in the following: "Subjective participation in the absolute proceeds in an equally absolute indifference to the world, or at least to the principles that shape the prevailing 'way of the world'."

While Badiou may be read as criticising Deleuze's subject for being 'too within' the world, that the events that constitute the subject are so thoroughly accounted for that there is no room for subjective agency to arise within these complex processes, Hallward arrives at the same conclusion by claiming a radical indifference in Deleuze through a distance from the world. Having designed a general model for French philosophy in this way, Hallward construes Deleuze as conforming to this model by characterising the non-relational or immediate ground of his philosophy, in other words 'the absolute', as the virtual.

Access to the absolute is not arrived at through some process of approximation or progression, it is not the result of a dialectical revaluation of trends in the world. It is not the culmination of some complex process of mediation. It is instead a point of departure, an original or pre-original affirmation, a sort of axiom, which opens the field of its subsequent effects as a series of essentially internal consequences or implications. Preoccupation with the world or concern with the orderly representation of the things of the world inhibits any such affirmation, which is "extreme" by definition (non-conditional, non-relative, non-derivative).<sup>297</sup>

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<sup>296</sup> 'The One or the Other: French Philosophy Today'

<sup>297</sup> 'The One or the Other: French Philosophy Today'

However, like Badiou, Hallward appears to target Deleuze either as an exemplar of this perceived logic or as a matter of political difference. He launches a sustained and vociferous critique of Deleuze across a series of articles, culminating in his book *Out of this World* in which the above claims are repeated, with the virtual standing in as this conditioning absolute. Because the virtual, on Hallward's reading, is so removed, Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari becomes a philosopher of contemplation and actively opposes action, especially political action based on personal agency. He writes: "[a]s Deleuze understands it, living contemplation proceeds at an immeasurable distance from what is merely lived, known or decided. Life lives and creation creates on a virtual plane that leads forever out of our actual world."<sup>298</sup> This is obviously a misreading that ignores the immanence of the virtual and actual and simultaneously overstates the importance of the virtual in Deleuze's philosophy.

If we were to sketch a defence of Deleuze at this point, we may cite the fact that both Badiou and Hallward misconstrue the concept of the virtual. The idea that the virtual is either at a remove from the world or is some form of absolute is a misreading - and the reader gets the sense that it is a deliberate or 'creative' misreading at that. The counter-defence usually raised by Badiou and Hallward when confronted with their contortions of Deleuze and his philosophy often refers to the fact that Deleuze, by his own admission, births through his interlocutors a monstrous offspring<sup>299</sup> by adapting and appending their own work to his own. If Deleuze can do this to those he writes on then he should be subject to his own method. However this process can only proceed unilaterally; that is, when an author is inspired by another writer and selects aspects of their forebears' work to build upon, improve and incorporate into their own system, this is the natural progression of writing and philosophical inspiration - but when one does so negatively in order to criticise a position, the only outcome can be the building of strawmen, begging the question and arguing from false premises. As much as the introduction to *Clamour of Being* states that "the fact that the history of philosophy is a history of successive appropriations, which can take the form of malevolent mistreatments or violent perversions, of timorous transmissions, vapid incomprehension, or uninspired reproduction, of congenial encounters, revigorating regeneration, or marriages of true minds"<sup>300</sup>, in the final analysis this rhetorical

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<sup>298</sup> *Out of This World* pg.164

<sup>299</sup> See *L'abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze*

<sup>300</sup> *Deleuze: The Clamour of Being* xvi

movement, when deployed in the negative, simply is not an equitably reversible process. One cannot criticise an author for the monstrous offspring that they did not themselves birth.

The other voices raised in clamour against Deleuze's philosophy of subjectivity are perhaps familiar to most scholars invested in debates around poststructuralism and its value, but Manfred Frank is a lesser-known yet important contributor to this conversation, particularly in Germany. This could, in part, be due to his nomination of the work of Deleuze, Guattari, Foucault, Derrida et al as 'neostucturalism' - because Frank sees the movement as a continuation of the structuralist project rather than an overcoming of it - and thus is not included in the contemporary conversation around 'poststructuralism'. Nevertheless, Frank's critique is sustained, thorough and erudite and deserves comment in two regards; crucially, it approaches the issue from the vantage of German hermeneutics and therefore avoids the usual binary opposition of Anglo-American Analytic philosophy versus its French poststructural and deconstructive nemeses.<sup>301</sup> Second, it's primary contention with and thus the locus of its critique of neostucturalism pertains to the dissolution of the subject which is at odds with hermeneutics' tendency towards universalisation and construction of subjectivity.<sup>302</sup> Frank is in agreement, to some extent, with the other authors here when he charges *Anti-Oedipus* with a "tendency toward a dangerous form of thought; [an] incapacity to distinguish itself from a fascistoid anarchism."<sup>303</sup> Considering that the book is famously prefaced by Foucault as being an 'introduction to the non-fascist life' Frank's critique requires investigation. Frank's critique is similar to Badiou and Hallward insofar as he focuses on what could be called the inhuman or asubjective angle of Deleuze's thought, which he identifies with an irrationality, or rather 'antirationalism'.<sup>304</sup> Along with other French 'neostucturalists', Frank bemoans the popularity of this irrational philosophy and the rise of what he sees as 'neovitalism', with the diminishment of the life of the subject and a concomitant invigoration of the life of machines - and which he characterises as indicative of a "the symptoms of a crisis"<sup>305</sup> a general lack of meaning.

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<sup>301</sup> Specifically, the book seems to restage the debate between Gadamer and Derrida concerning on the one hand the interpretation of signs to form meaning and the endless deferral of meaning on the other.

<sup>302</sup> Insofar as interpretation necessitates the construction of an identity for that which is interpreted i.e. Gadamer's hermeneutics of understanding.

<sup>303</sup> *What is Neostucturalism?* viii

<sup>304</sup> *What is Neostucturalism?* xvi

<sup>305</sup> *What is Neostucturalism?* pg.317

This meaninglessness has two aspects; first Frank claims that by following Deleuze and Guattari, "the absurd imperative surfaces, one that demands that one uncover truth in delirium,"<sup>306</sup> which he interprets as a literal delirium as opposed to a critique of identity and representation. Second, that in lieu of the construction of meaning, Deleuze and Guattari seek only desire, which again he interprets literally as "anarchist craving"<sup>307</sup> and is opposed to agency. Frank presupposes that agency is grounded in rationality, where "[i]ntentionality and directedness at a goal are characteristic features of rationality, be it in the form of logic, in the form of grammar, as control of actions in the name of reason, or as an order of whatever sort."<sup>308</sup> Following this, he also interprets the ethics of the book to be the inculcation of an aimlessness or an anarchic desire without boundaries or limits, without much discussion of, were this the case, why the authors might advocate such meaninglessness.

Frank's treatment of *A Thousand Plateaus* is less rigorous, quoting only from the first plateau 'Rhizome' and mainly consisting of lamentations as to its incoherence - for a philosopher situated within the tradition of hermeneutics, his response reads as challenged or perhaps even defensive. The argument is similar to 'The Fascism of the Potato',<sup>309</sup> insofar as Frank interprets the rhizome as the image of chaotic multiplicity invoked to critique unity.<sup>310</sup> Like Kant, for Frank unity is part and parcel of understanding in a rational manner - as such, Deleuze and Guattari miss the 'legitimate target' of the code and invoke meaningless desire for the sake of irrationality alone. Not only this, but in doing so, Frank claims, the authors miss an opportunity to carve out some agency for their subject, instead preferring to attend to the coercive capacity of the code:

In other words, the description of any code whatsoever as an instrument of coercion or (as Foucault expresses it) of torture fundamentally presupposes that a code (and not the human beings that attend to it) is capable of coercing. In order to assume this, one has first of all to conceive - and be it only in order to contradict this view

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<sup>306</sup> *What is Neostructuralism?* pg.343

<sup>307</sup> *What is Neostructuralism?* pg.339

<sup>308</sup> *What is Neostructuralism?* pg.339

<sup>309</sup> *The Adventure of French Philosophy* pg.197

<sup>310</sup> Frank's literal interpretation is at its most extreme here, with many words spent criticising the theory wholesale because it does not apply to all types of rhizome, a remark that includes an extensive list of plants and Latin binomials.

afterwards - the code just as structurally or generative-grammatically as the linguists and systems do who are ridiculed by Deleuze and Guattari. According to this, then, the theoreticians linguist and systems theoretician would simply be correct. Even those who call for the "decoding" of a code or the "exploding" of the order of discourse have to face the consequence that such a code, such an order, first of all has to be viewed as actual. As a matter of fact, if one hopes to show the individual "the exit from the flytrap," as Wittgenstein put it, then one also has to challenge the idea of the code - as Derrida does - and not only its existence.<sup>311</sup>

Frank seems to have a narrow, again near-literal, view of a code here, almost exclusively as a semiotic code, perhaps ignoring phenomena such as DNA. Nevertheless, These criticisms of agency in Deleuze and Guattari's work do not take into consideration the import of the Body without Organs. As I suggest in the conclusion to this chapter, the Body without Organs is the inverse of the networks of machines that condition and enable action. The Body without Organs is what escapes, what is not shown in the code and what is not produced. At this point, we can suggest that this is at least a sign of the possibility of negative freedom, if not positive. Frank, however, interprets this concept as a dissolution of subjectivity:

It is true that traditional ethics appeals to a theory of subjectivity, and there are noteworthy reasons [...] for suspending the concepts of the "subject" and of "self-understanding," at least until their function in the text of philosophy, of psychoanalysis, and of the social sciences is illuminated. But that cannot mean that we should liquidate the subject (the actually existing industrial societies and the institutions of the "administered world" are far more adept at this; why compete with them on the level of theory?); rather it can only mean that one has to explain subjectivity better and in a more adequate way than has been done by philosophy up to now.<sup>312</sup>

Ironically, Frank is at his closest to Deleuze and Guattari at this point; one could describe the style of *Anti-Oedipus* as a more adequate way of explaining subjectivity than has been done so far by philosophy - and yet this is exactly that which Frank critiques from the angle

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<sup>311</sup> What is Neostructuralism? pp.357-358

<sup>312</sup> What is Neostructuralism? pg.343 - 344



of academic philosophy. While he agrees that society administers the dissolution of the subject, he reads Deleuze and Guattari as being complicit with this dissolution, rather than mirroring it at the level of discourse.

Although there are reasonable defences of Deleuze and Guattari to be made against these charges, due to the general thrust of numerous concerns appearing under the same banner there are undoubtedly also legitimate concerns here. They can perhaps be grouped into two main charges, posed as questions:

1. In diminishing the subject so absolutely, is there any agency at all to be found?
2. In disempowering the subject so absolutely, have Deleuze and Guattari empowered capitalism - and further, is this what the authors endorse?

## **Conclusion**

To conclude the discussion, it is worth formulating a speculative answer to the charges posed. To address the first point, it should be noted that while the three criticisms listed here, regardless of the fact that they are all misreadings, have a similar target of attack, they each seem to address different concepts, namely: agency, freedom and autonomy. Badiou's critique targets political agency, Hallward's ontological freedom and Frank's rational autonomy; which is to say, three separate concepts. While the spirit of these criticisms points to the same thing, in order to address these critics a defence must cut across these three terms and yet provide a reply that addresses all three.

The temptation when attempting to locate an autonomy-concept in Deleuze's work is to see such a concept as a thing constructed by processes, machines and forces. However, we might alternatively posit that agency, like time in Deleuze's philosophy, is self-generating - or in other words, that its ontogenesis is spontaneous. There is a precedent for this: just as it is for Kant, time for Deleuze is the form of the inner sense, the affection of self by self, or auto-affection.<sup>313</sup> Subjectivity appears in the space in which this self-affection occurs - and

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<sup>313</sup> *Foucault* pg.118 Deleuze here calls 'self-affection' a "conversion of far and near."

such a self-affection is the result of forces acting upon one another within the enclosed interiority of the subject. In the same way, it is reasonable to posit that autonomy, too, self-generates - it is not necessarily constructed by external forces, and if it were it would be hard to discern how this would be an autonomous process.<sup>314</sup> It seems also reasonable to posit, then, that freedom is not absolute, nor a category, but rather there are moments of freedom which are effectuated in various degrees - and that such effectuations are as different in kind as the virtual is from the actual. Freedom or autonomy is not a simple substance, or indeed a substance at all, but an unconditioned agent of metamorphosis; freedom is necessarily futural and the third synthesis of time brings "a future which affirms at once both the unconditioned character of the product in relation to the conditions of its production, and the independence of the work in relation to its author or actor."<sup>315</sup>

If agency occurs in a similar way to time, which is to ask if a conscious mode of the self is generated in a similar way to the unconscious mode, then in the same way as the three syntheses of time a transcendental condition for its self-emergence must also be posited. Time is ordered because of the first two syntheses, which is to say that the pure form of time is effectuated within these two modalities. The pure and empty form of time grounds the syntheses which passively make up the subject - following the same line of argument, it is not a huge leap to suggest that the Body without Organs, when it appears in the second synthesis of the unconscious, is the transcendental condition for agency within the psyche. Not only this, but in each repetition of the tripartite synthesis Deleuze makes space for an unconditioned power, the power that causes the expression of the modes said of univocal substance, that which allows him to claim that the effect remains within the cause and, simultaneously, that the ground does not resemble that which it grounds.<sup>316</sup> This is how the Body without Organs may donate degrees of freedom, a power of autonomy, to the subject.

Both Badiou and Hallward argue against freedom in Deleuze's philosophy in the capacity of the event, the ontological dice-roll, "[t]he throws [of which] are formally distinct, but with regard to an ontologically unique throw, while the outcomes implicate, displace and recover their combinations in one another throughout the unique and open space of the

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<sup>314</sup> Indeed, this seems to be the consequence for Deleuze of erasing the void in his philosophy: of having to provide an account of freedom within a 'mechanosphere' without referring to negativity

<sup>315</sup> *Difference and Repetition* pg.94

<sup>316</sup> *Difference and Repetition* pg.297 This unconditioned power is that which returns in the eternal return

univocal."<sup>317</sup> This is to say that for Deleuze chance is a whole, that at each moment of actualisation the whole of the virtual is involved in making such an event. But an event is already an actualised proposition, insofar as it happens, is happening or has happened. "Beneath [the event] rumbles another, Nietzschean, repetition: that of eternal return. Here, a different and more mortuary betrothal between the dead God and the dissolved self forms the true condition by default and the true metamorphosis of the agent, both of which disappear in the unconditioned character of the product."<sup>318</sup> It seems to be a contradiction to attempt to posit a freedom-event, to try and locate this in the actual. It matters little that there are an infinity of events happening all at once, the transcendental condition of freedom has nothing to do with events occurring. The Body without Organs donates its freedom unilaterally to the other forms of the self without itself being conditioned in turn; it resists the judgement of God and of the organs, a principle of un-organisation inheres within it.

Is this just a transcendental argument, the kind we have already argued against in the first chapter? It would be, were the Body without Organs not also itself constructed by synthesis and embedded within machinic processes; it is a transcendental-empiricist argument. The Body without Organs is not pre-given or self-evident, it is made - and furthermore not exhausted in the immanation of its effect or at a remove from that which is constituted or effectuated. In the second chapter, we saw that Kant's doctrine of transcendental freedom was problematic because it related to a unified self. This is not the case with Deleuze and Guattari, indeed, Deleuze himself, in the Postscript on the Societies of Control, decries the term 'individual' meaningless, opting instead for the neologism 'dividual'.<sup>319</sup> The unified self was not free precisely because of its unicity; the dividual self has the possibility of freedom, but is beset and encumbered by machines that would direct, control and fatigue it.

Caution is required here, because this is not an argument that Deleuze explicitly makes. Indeed, even if this argument holds, it merely demonstrates the possibility of a condition of freedom in Deleuze and Guattari, not that it affords a particularly generous conception of freedom and subjective autonomy. In their collaborative work, agency is brought about within the assemblage, which faces the Body without Organs (transcendental freedom) and

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<sup>317</sup> *Difference and Repetition* pg.304

<sup>318</sup> *Difference and Repetition* pg.95

<sup>319</sup> 'Postscript on the Society of Control'

the strata (codes, institutions, cultures). In the next chapter, we will explore this notion of assemblage and its relation to freedom or the lack thereof and how Deleuze, in his solo work, after the era of problematization, begins to search for possibilities for the rehabilitation of subjective agency. This takes place through the positing of various ways of making for oneself; the fold, the time-image and the new brain - this latter topic will concern the fifth and final chapter of this thesis.

## 4: Apparatus, Fold, Outside

### Introduction

In the previous chapter, I argued that Deleuze's conception of subjectivity is problematised through the encounter and collaboration with Guattari. This is not to say that Guattari's own image of the subject is somehow at odds or incompatible with Deleuze's, nor that Deleuze maintained a particularly stable or singular image of subjecthood, but rather that through their conjunction they bring the subject into alignment with forces that pressurise and complicate its foundation. The ultimate conclusion of this project, according to the critics cited at the end of the chapter, is that in the face of these forces the subject is profoundly disempowered. In this chapter, I will explore this issue of agency through the concept of the apparatus and the related concept of the assemblage. I contend that it is in the conflict and negotiation between these two terms and the concept of the subject that the issue of agency in Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari's philosophy is most at stake. If the formation of the capitalist state shares a resemblance with the process of subject formation and if it is the apparatus of capture that is at work within this former process, then it is worth exploring more deeply this term 'apparatus', as for such a critical idea within various thinkers' work, it is a polyvalent and often ill-defined concept.

The term 'apparatus' has a Marxist and, later, Foucauldian heritage and indeed it is through this line that the term most likely enters Deleuze's thought; Deleuze considered the term important enough to choose it, over many potential other themes, as his topic for the international conference organised by the Michel Foucault Centre in January 1988.<sup>320</sup> Foucault's concept also influenced and was taken up by Giorgio Agamben such that the latter wrote a book on the genealogy of the apparatus, wherein Agamben locates a theological heritage of governance that the term names throughout history.

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<sup>320</sup> See *Michel Foucault: Philosopher*

What I aim to draw out in the course of this chapter is that enduring interest in this concept is primarily due to its proximity to and potential to influence the process of subjectivity. The term apparatus is used in this capacity as far back as Althusser, although primarily used as a dimension of the concept of ideology in the influential concepts of the Repressive and Ideological State Apparatuses; Althusser has a very particular conception of 'ideology' which differs from that of Deleuze and Guattari.<sup>321</sup> Indeed Althusser's usage of 'apparatus' is distanced from our preoccupation here merely on account of its intrinsic connection with ideology; not only do Deleuze and Guattari repudiate the concept of ideology as an abstraction in *Anti-Oedipus* but they explicitly remark that "[literature] has nothing to do with ideology. There is no ideology and never has been."<sup>322</sup> They also impugn the concept multiple times in *Negotiations*: "(we don't have any time for concepts like ideology, which are really no help at all: there are no such things as ideologies)"; "They're singularities [...] It's got nothing to do with ideology."; "having an idea, isn't about ideology, it's a practical matter."<sup>323</sup> We sense then even at this early stage that there is some qualitative difference to their respective concepts of apparatus even if the terms are similar. Deleuze and Guattari describe a non-ideological apparatus, but a concept that is machinic.

The initial matter is, therefore, to situate the term 'apparatus', to get a firm grasp on the particular etymology of this word and discern the manner of its usage by Deleuze and Guattari. Why did they choose this particular term to use here, especially when they already have near-homonyms such as 'assemblage', or perhaps even 'machine'? We assume that there must be some qualitative difference they wish to express between these concepts, but the distinction itself is not immediately transparent. This is not a frivolous or merely academic question; to quote their own *What is Philosophy?*: "in each case there must be a strange necessity for these words and for their choice, like an element of style."<sup>324</sup> Indeed, this is the kind of statement that Agamben has in mind when, in an apparent reference to Deleuze he writes: "As a philosopher for whom I have the greatest respect once said, terminology is the poetic moment of thought."<sup>325</sup> In the original French we have 'appareil', which translator of *A Thousand Plateaus* Brian Massumi renders as 'apparatus'. In a non-philosophical register, in everyday French usage 'appareil' of course means 'camera', a

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<sup>321</sup> 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses' in *Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays*. pp. 121–176.

<sup>322</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.4

<sup>323</sup> *Negotiations* pg.38

<sup>324</sup> *What is Philosophy?*, pg.8

<sup>325</sup> *What is an Apparatus?* pg.1

machine which captures light and images. We are also in the vicinity of the machinic with resonances of 'device' and etymological proximity to 'appliance'. This photographic or cinematographic register perhaps hints at their intention in deploying the term; a photo is 'taken', video is 'captured', both are suffixed with -graph (γράφειν (graphein), to re-cord: as in that which ties, binds or nets). This provides us with a very different sense to 'agencement', which is rendered in English as 'assemblage', but which has resonances with 'organisation' or 'arrangement', as in a piece of music. Crucially, however, what must be borne in mind with reference to agencement is the *agence* - the agency that is inherent within it and its lexical proximity to *pouvoir*, the power of the subject. In order to unearth this, we must differentiate its usage from that of apparatus. By means of such inspection, we must turn to the work of Althusser and his seminal article on Ideological State Apparatuses. By coming to understand Althusser's usage and the broader intellectual history in which the term is situated we will be in a better position to understand Deleuze and Guattari's version of 'apparatus'.

## **Apparatus of Ideology**

Ideology has always shared a close kinship with subjectivity, as that which has the potential to control and influence human behaviour. In his own work, Althusser reformulates the idea of 'common sense' and gives it the name 'ideology'. Ideology is that which mediates between systems of power and those subject to power that allows the reproduction of hegemony within individuals thus incorporating them within said power structure. Through the application of processes of ideologies, subjects come to exist within a typology, that is typed designated by institutional powers. Crucially, subjects only recognise themselves as *subjects* through ideology, a process Althusser names 'interpolation', which is administered by the Ideological State Apparatuses such as schools, the media and government institutions. Indeed as Althusser states: "[w]hat the bourgeoisie has installed as its number-one, i.e. as its dominant ideological State apparatus, is the educational apparatus, which has in fact replaced in its functions the previously dominant ideological State apparatus, the Church."<sup>326</sup> One of the primary obstacles to overcome when considering

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<sup>326</sup> 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus' in *Lenin and Philosophy* pg.85

ideology then is public or general opinion, which is constituted by a variety of sociological functions (which are not necessarily explained). Therefore one is always-already immersed in ideology until one formulates a rupture with it, taking one into the realm of 'science'.

This concept of ideology is closely related to the idea of the epistemological rupture, which Althusser locates in Marx's later work. This is in turn derived from Gaston Bachelard; Althusser derives his concept of ideology from Bachelard's notion of the 'epistemic rupture' (rupture / coupure épistémologique). The term is Althusser's invention and does not appear in Bachelard's work but names a particular procedure of knowledge production and procedure that is generally regarded as intrinsic to his work, even if Bachelard never brought it to light as such. Bachelard's thesis is that common sense "has a tenacious hold on our thought, tending surreptitiously to infect scientific theorising",<sup>327</sup> which ultimately halts its progress, forming an epistemological obstacle. To overcome this, science has to break with common sense and its empirical content and become something otherwise - this overcoming is what is named as the rupture. Bachelard contends that scientific history progresses not by linear and continuous passage but by this type of rupture and discontinuity, which in turn is a practice that influenced Foucault's own historical methodology. Althusser's idiosyncratic mobilisation of this concept pertains to the development of Marx's mature thought constituted a break with Hegelianism and humanism and became instead a true science of dialectical materialism. Althusser maintained that this moment in Marx itself provided the grounds by which an epistemological rupture can be achieved, escaping from ideological thought. Ultimately this would take one from the world of common sense or images into the world of scientific thought or concepts. Therefore in both Althusser and Bachelard we have a politicised account of scientific progress which synthesises well with dialectical Marxism. Bachelard writes: "The scientific mind can only be constituted by destroying the non-scientific mind"<sup>328</sup> and later that "new experience says *no* to the old experience; without that, by any measure it is not a question of new experience." There must be some form of a break for knowledge to progress. So we see a development in the thought of Althusser from a means to describe an epistemic modulation in Marx's thought to a structural and technical principle in his own philosophy.

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<sup>327</sup> Mary Taft in *Bachelard: Science and Objectivity* pg.12

<sup>328</sup> See Bachelard *The philosophy of No: A Philosophy of the New Scientific Mind*



We can perhaps see even in this brief synopsis what Deleuze and Guattari might object to - in a word: negativity. There is a clear binary established between science on the one hand and common sense or ideology on the other. Considering that their method throughout *A Thousand Plateaus* is one of collapsing binary concepts into polyvalent and often-asymmetrical processes rather than particular and discrete objects, we sense why they may think that ideology in this sense is a dualist oversimplification. Guattari in *Lines of Flight* writes that "Althusser has made ideology into a category that is too general, which includes and conflates semiotic practices that are radically heterogenous."<sup>329</sup> Indeed not only is there no ideology, but there is no science per se: "We [Deleuze and Guattari] are no more familiar with scientificity than we are with ideology; all we know are assemblages."<sup>330</sup> Thus the concept of ideology is not sufficient to explain all the multiplicities that must be analysed.

Further, there is a methodological issue at stake. Keeping in mind their broader approach in *A Thousand Plateaus*, which is to say that Deleuze and Guattari think that any postulation of a binary, especially in an ontological capacity, necessarily sets up its antithesis in opposition; we can infer a criticism that because Althusser so vehemently criticises capitalist ideology he by the very nature of his critique establishes a Marxist 'science' in opposition. As we have seen, for Deleuze and Guattari, ideology is an oversimplification named as a "most execrable concept obscuring all of the effectively operating social machines"; that "misconstrues the nature of organizations of power, which are in no way located within a State apparatus but rather are everywhere."<sup>331</sup> Indeed ideology in its sweeping generality tends towards making everything not only a binary but an in fact only another ideology, which as we have seen from the above is not a place from which to begin an analysis and makes the concept of a science indistinct: "[w]e can define different kinds of line, but that won't tell us one's good and another bad. We can't assume that lines of flight are necessarily creative, that smooth spaces are always better than segmented or striated ones"<sup>332</sup> In positing the concept of ideology as a molar binary, Althusser has already fallen afoul of this assumption before he has even begun his scientific analysis.

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<sup>329</sup> *Lines of Flight* pp.99-100

<sup>330</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.2

<sup>331</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.68 - see also remarks in *Negotiations*: "(we don't have any time for concepts like ideology, which are really no help at all: there are no such things as ideologies)." pg.19; "They're singularities [...] It's got nothing to do with ideology."pg.32; "having an idea isn't about ideology, it's a practical matter." pg.38

<sup>332</sup> *Negotiations* pg.35

In Althusser the dispensation and maintenance of ideology is the prime mode of the State apparatus, and as Jeffrey Bussolini writes of Foucault:

[a]s in Althusser, the apparatus maintains a tie to the State and its exercise of power. Although Althusser's concept was itself a move to expand and make more diffuse, or encompassing, the operations of power, Foucault's archaeology of the dispositive [sic] goes much further still in looking at diffuse and multiplicitous power relations, and he much more circumscribes the role of the State.<sup>333</sup>

So while there can be no formal agreement on a philosophical level we can still glean some terminological insights, most importantly the relation of 'appareil' to 'dispositif'. In Foucault's work the actual French term deployed is 'dispositif', often considered an untranslatable but nevertheless frequently translated into English as 'apparatus'. For example, in the English published version of Deleuze's lecture 'What is a Dispositif?' every instance of the term 'dispositif' is rendered by translator Timothy Armstrong as 'social apparatus' and followed with a square-bracketed '[*dispositif*]' in order to highlight this lexical impasse. From even a cursory survey of the associated literature we can see the intractable nature of the relation between these terms. Complicating matters, Althusser uses the terms *appareil* and *dispositif* as distinct in his essay. There, dispositive [sic] seems to be an analytical subset of apparatus. On page 125 of *Sexualité*, Foucault further distinguishes between 'the groups who control the apparatuses of the State,' and the 'comprehensive dispositives.'<sup>334</sup> So even while Althusser maintains the distinction between 'appareil' and 'dispositif', we can assume, then, that Deleuze and Guattari are aware of this and are following Foucault in distancing themselves from Althusser's purely Marxist application of the term, while retaining a semblance of its original meaning. They, instead of ideological, deploy the term in a machinic register.

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<sup>333</sup> "What is a Dispositive?"

<sup>334</sup> "What is a Dispositive?"

## Foucault's Concept of Dispositif

For Foucault, the apparatus is "literally anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions or discourses of living beings."<sup>335</sup> This could be anything from television to cigarettes to the internet to literature. As such, we must first recognise that we are always-already captured by some apparatus, that "we belong to social apparatuses and act within them", including "language itself, which is perhaps the most ancient of apparatuses - one in which thousands and thousands of years ago a primate inadvertently allowed himself to be captured, probably without realising the consequences he was about to face."<sup>336</sup> The above quotes are taken from the essay 'What is an Apparatus?' by Giorgio Agamben, which in turn is indebted to the aforementioned conference talk of the same title given by Deleuze some years prior. Both comment upon Foucault's ideas but diverge radically in approach: Agamben performs a genealogical tracing of the concept while Deleuze describes the concept with a cartography of forces, mapping out the various functions inherent in Foucault's diagram. It is indicative of the import of this concept that both philosophers chose to focus on the apparatus in their signature styles and at non-trivial length.

Firstly it is incumbent upon us to examine what Foucault himself said about the term, before turning to Agamben and Deleuze's somewhat-idiosyncratic treatments in turn. Agamben points to a 1977 interview in which Foucault justifies his use of and gestures towards a definition of 'dispositif'. He defines the concept in three moves:

[F]irstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions - in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the *elements* of the apparatus. The *apparatus itself* is the system of relations that can be established between these elements.<sup>337</sup>

Important in this first paragraph is the distinction made between the elements of the dispositif, (the *relata*) and the dispositif proper, that is that which relates the elements. The

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<sup>335</sup> *What is an Apparatus?*

<sup>336</sup> *What is an Apparatus?*

<sup>337</sup> *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, pp.194-198. Emphasis in text from this volume quoted here is mine.

apparatus is immaterial but is inseparable from the material that it indexes and the forces that circulate within its capacity. As we have seen when we examined Deleuze and Guattari's treatment of the state as an apparatus of capture, the question of 'which comes first?' is irrelevant here, the apparatus is constituted not because of its relata - it is not dependent upon them - but arises by virtue of the fact that it causes these things to relate. For example, to borrow another illustration from Deleuze and Guattari, there is no intrinsic or necessary connection between an arrow, a bow, a warrior or a horse, but once assembled in a particular way there arises the concept 'mounted-archer'. The apparatus always arrives, as it were, fully-formed. This then relates to the secondary point about the said and the unsaid: Foucault's list of examples are inherently linguistic. As such apparatuses encompass the concrete elements (in this case, words) as well as the non-concrete. There is the temptation here to refer to classical debates around abstracta and concreta, but it seems rather that the apparatus - or the implementation of it as such - would deconstruct this distinction: the apparatus itself, or any given instantiation of it, would be both an abstract and concrete property, both the particular given mounted-archer and the abstract conception that is gleaned from this particular.

There will always be, then, some sort of mutilation of the material involved in using apparatus in theory, which is to say an abstraction, but we can think of this as a useful fiction; indeed its very abstraction may be what is of primary interest as this is what enables conceptualisation of the abstracta. Finally of note is the typically-Foucauldian non-binary, heterogenous nature which is not necessarily reducible to scientific knowledge. Merely invoking both scientific statements and simultaneously 'the unsaid' implies that Foucault hopes his concept can account for this hidden knowledge that science cannot yet grasp. He continues:

Secondly, what I am trying to identify in this apparatus is precisely the nature of the connection that can exist between these heterogeneous elements. [...] In short, between these elements, whether discursive or non-discursive, there is a sort of interplay of shifts of position and modifications of function which can also vary very widely.

Therefore the second part of the definition pertains to what the dispositif can do. It can connect elements and decide upon the manner of connection. It can disconnect and reorder the elements within its horizon. If we take the building as an example of an apparatus, we can imagine its corridors regulating a flow of people, its doors opening or locking to provide or deny viable pathways. An illustration is given Deleuze in the Postscript which raises this apparatus to the level of an imaginary city, a paradigm of a control society: "a city where one would be able to leave one's apartment, one's street, one's neighborhood, thanks to one's [...] electronic card that raises a given barrier; but the card could just as easily be rejected on a given day or between certain hours..."<sup>338</sup> The apparatus can rearrange and modulate itself such that new connections are made and dismantled. There is often talk that the internet is a rhizome,<sup>339</sup> but this is a hermeneutic error: it is plain to see that any given point an internet page is not necessarily connected to all others; rather, the internet is an apparatus, full of controls, gates, locks, effacements, overcodings and paths that are constantly entering into new connections with one another, as well as web pages that are being updated or going offline. It makes much more sense, then, to talk of the internet as an apparatus and, by means of a demonstration of Foucault's idea, one that is also subject to forces, can enter states of becoming, is multistable rather than static. He continues:

Thirdly, I understand by the term 'apparatus' a sort of - shall we say - formation which has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need. The apparatus thus has a dominant strategic function. This may have been, for example, the assimilation of a floating population found to be burdensome for an essentially mercantilist economy: there was a strategic imperative acting here as the matrix for an apparatus which gradually undertook the control or subjection of madness, mental illness and neurosis.

It is implicit in this third point that crises bring about new apparatuses. If we see capitalism as a generalised crisis it gives credence to Agamben's statement that "[i]t would probably

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<sup>338</sup> 'Postscript on the Society of Control'

<sup>339</sup> See, for example Ian Buchanan - Deleuze and the Internet available here: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ACCK1mDHgE0> in which a summary of such views are discussed, along with Buchanan's refutation of the rhizome-as-internet

not be wrong to define the extreme phase of capitalist development in which we live as a massive accumulation and proliferation of apparatuses."<sup>340</sup>

The urgent need that necessitates this growth is perhaps the need for growth itself, that capitalism - in constantly contesting and surpassing its own limits - constantly brings inside its horizon that which was previously outside or unconvertible. Crucial here then is the idea of 'assimilation' or an incorporation within the apparatus, or as Deleuze and Guattari might say a becoming-strata. Assimilation is preceded by a selection - an enclosure and simultaneous exclusion of the elements that are to be assimilated or rejected; this is close to Deleuze and Guattari insofar as this is precisely what they call a process of territorialisation and is apparent both in Foucault's work on discipline and Deleuze's expansion in his own work on control. Mental illness here is then an exemplary instance of subordination which moves from the polymorphous or chaotic to the stratified; the unconstrained, erring stroll of the schizo suddenly confined within the white walls of the clinical apparatus. Finally there is a 'strategic function'. Strategy is necessarily a matter of planning and action; apparatuses then must be directed toward something, here a lack or unsayable lacuna brought to light via crisis, within which the network can take shape. We know that a network is a tangle of lines or cords and the operation by which they come to be lined or corded. This meshing effect is a constituent part of what Deleuze intimates when defining control: "controls are a modulation, like a self-transmuting molding continually changing from one moment to the next, or like a sieve whose mesh varies from one point to another."<sup>341</sup> This strategic process of netting eventually, then, somehow leads to processes of subjection or subjectification, in the sense that the subject is always following these lines or pathways. Foucault concludes:

With the notion of the apparatus, I find myself in a difficulty which I haven't yet been properly able to get out of. I said that the apparatus is essentially of a strategic nature, which means assuming that it is a matter of a certain *manipulation of relations of forces*, either developing them in a particular direction, blocking them, stabilising them, utilising them, etc. The apparatus is thus always inscribed in a play of power, but it is also always linked to certain coordinates of knowledge which issue from it but, to an equal degree, condition it. This is what the apparatus

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<sup>340</sup> *What is an Apparatus?* pg.15

<sup>341</sup> *Postscript on the Societies of Control*

consists in: strategies of relations of forces supporting, and supported by, types of knowledge.<sup>342</sup>

This 'difficulty' is a significant one for Foucault: the impasse that is the relation of force to knowledge essentially means a lack of a mechanism for the implementation of processes of governmentality. However, it is precisely this lacuna that Agamben's account aims to address, through the genealogical method which is itself designed by Foucault. Whereas nominally historical analysis proceeds by tracing continuity and lineage, often through a dominant ideology, as when Marxism reifies capitalism as a period within historical materialism - genealogy proceeds by locating points of discontinuity and fracture that break with the dominant power structures of the given time, which would be the emergence of novelty. Indeed, defining the objective shared by both he and Foucault, Deleuze says:

We weren't looking for origins, even lost or deleted ones, but setting out to catch things where they were at work, in the middle, breaking things open, breaking words open. We weren't looking for something timeless, not even the timelessness of time, but for new things being formed, the emergence of what Foucault calls "actuality." Perhaps actuality or novelty is *energeia*, almost Aristotelian, but closer still to Nietzsche (even though Nietzsche called it the untimely).<sup>343</sup>

Such an objective is exemplified in the concept of the apparatus which seems to be historically contingent and have meaning only in and through its particular actualisation. Agamben's project interrogates the moments at which the term apparatus underwent a fracture, broke down and generated some form of novelty.

### **Agamben: What is Apparatus?**

For Foucault, by his own admission, the project concerning the apparatus is unfinished within his own work. The point of the impasse, or that which marks the place of a philosophical enigma, is the relation of force to structures of knowledge. For Agamben, an

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<sup>342</sup> What is a *dispositif*?

<sup>343</sup> *Negotiations* pg.86

enigma can be said to induce thought by marking the limit of any specific philosophical investigation. Such a limit may only be designated as limit and not transformed into a threshold because it cannot be grasped by said philosophy. As such, the enigma opens to posterity the task of transforming this limited notion (perhaps irrational) into a threshold.<sup>344</sup>

We can see that Deleuze, too, saw the concept of the apparatus as an enigma and as such took it upon himself to articulate what Foucault only sensed. In doing so, he also brings Foucault's concept closer to his own project and marks the point at which Deleuze begins to search for and create solutions to the problematic sketched in *A Thousand Plateaus*. The line of subjectivity is foregrounded as a potential vector of creativity that escapes from the rest of the bounded and interlinked apparatus, which is involved at least in some way with governance of subjects, insofar as power may affect and curve or rectify the other lines. While Deleuze engages only briefly with the concept on Foucault's terms, the most comprehensive engagement with the terminology of the term 'apparatus' is taken up by Agamben, first in his lecture 'What is an Apparatus?' and secondly in his book *The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government*. It is in this work that he attempts to address exactly that problematic which Foucault could not, the relation of power to knowledge, and does so through a genealogy of the concept itself. Agamben's claim is that the term 'apparatus' derives from the Greek 'οἰκονομία', or 'oikonomia', from which we derive the term 'economy'. The ultimate import of this derivation is that the form that power takes in the West, that of the government of humans, has assumed the form of an oikonomia.<sup>345</sup>

While at first this decision to interrogate at length a concept from Agamben may seem like a deviation from the main core of this thesis, I hope to show that by expanding this concept, albeit on different terms, we will glean a richer understanding of the manner and form of the use of power in a control society, which is to say a diffused and modular application of methods of control. Although it is important to see how Agamben's argument develops, we should not infer that Deleuze's philosophy nor the development of his theory of the subject should be read genealogically, where this would entail an arborescent history of concepts;

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<sup>344</sup> The exemplary incidence of this, for Agamben, is Heidegger's failure to complete division 3 of *Being and Time*. This limit-threshold distinction also evidences Agamben's seldom-acknowledged Deleuzianism, which functions as a structuring principle in *The Kingdom and the Glory*.

<sup>345</sup> *The Kingdom and the Glory* xi



in the same way that the tripartite synthesis is deployed as a conceptual repetition over time,

Nor should we infer that by considering Agamben in this way that he and Deleuze are compatible without qualification: while both thinkers are influenced by and respond to Foucault and Heidegger, on the level of their engagement with Aristotle there are profound incompatibilities, specifically circling around the difference between Agamben's concept of potentiality and Deleuze's virtuality.<sup>346</sup> Nevertheless, we may enter into this encounter in the Deleuzian spirit of concatenation, of what positive and productive connections may emerge between these two thinkers.

For Agamben, there must first be a great bifurcation of entities "into two large groups or classes: on the one hand, living beings (or substances), and on the other, apparatuses in which living beings are incessantly captured - and, between these two as a third class, subjects. [Agamben] call[s] a subject, that which results from the relation and, so to speak, from the relentless fight between living beings and apparatuses."<sup>347</sup> This aligns with the distinction between *bíos* and *zoe*, between bare or animal life and politicised subjective life. On the one hand we have life as pure being and on the other the form that life takes when subjected to a politics. In this instance, the fissure of being and the world produces a relationality called the subject. Agamben summarises:

The fact is that according to all indications, apparatuses are not a mere accident in which humans are caught by chance, but rather are rooted in the very process of "humanization" that made "humans" out of the animals we classify under the rubric *Homo sapiens*. In fact, the event that has produced the human constitutes, for the living being, something like a division, which reproduces in some way the division that the *oikonomia* introduced in God between being and action.<sup>348</sup>

The synoptic of his argument is as follows: the Greek term 'oikonomia', meaning the management of the household, is translated into Latin as 'dispositio', from which we get the terms 'positivity' and 'dispositif', which eventually becomes 'apparatus'. However, this

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<sup>346</sup> An extensive engagement on this issue is outside the purview of this thesis.

<sup>347</sup> *What is an Apparatus* pg.13

<sup>348</sup> *What is an Apparatus?* pg.16

transformation primarily takes place within a theological context and Agamben's argument is that the term 'economy' (and therefore 'apparatus') has a hidden theological lineage which inflects upon its normative contemporary political usage. What this amounts to, for Agamben, is the uncovering of an occluded technology of governance which brings to light the relation between forms of knowledge and forms of power that were unobtainable for Foucault.

In a theological capacity the term 'oikonomia' was introduced by Christian church fathers into discourse as an attempt in reconciling the debate regarding the perichoresis of the triune God, which is to say the relationship and relationality of the persons of the father, son and holy ghost in one deity, how and in what manner they are both one and three. In other words, this concept was developed in order to "to avoid a fracture of monotheism that would have reintroduced a plurality of divine figures, and polytheism with them."<sup>349</sup> What was needed was a device of knowledge that could reconcile triplicity with oneness, "the threefold nature of the divine figure"<sup>350</sup> with an absolute unity and explain how a singular deity could have three aspects and still avoid a polytheistic nature by maintaining some kind of core indivisibility.

'Oikonomia' was a preexisting Greek term pertaining to the administration or governance of the home, the *oikos* - particularly in a prudent or well-executed manner. Liddell and Scott's *Greek-English Lexicon* has it as "the management of a household or family: generally, administration, governance of a state."<sup>351</sup> The usage of the term and the subsequent debate forms the first fracture. Agamben writes:

Their [the church fathers'] argument went something like this: "God, insofar as his being and substance is concerned, is certainly one; but as to his *oikonomia* - that is to say the way in which he administers his home, his life, and the world that he created - he is, rather, triple. Just as a good father can entrust to his son the execution of certain functions and duties without in so doing losing his power and his unity, so God entrusts to Christ the 'economy,' the administration and government of human history."<sup>352</sup>

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<sup>349</sup> *The Kingdom and the Glory* p.53

<sup>350</sup> *What is an Apparatus?* pg.9

<sup>351</sup> *Greek-English Lexicon* pp.478-479

<sup>352</sup> *What is an Apparatus?* pg.9

Note that here we see a distinction between the being of God and the economy of the world, which is described in terms of 'disposition', 'management', 'administration', and 'government', specifically in the capacity of the state. The history of translation of the central 'oikonomia' reveals the transition from political to purely theological language into a theopolitical mixture: from the original Greek we then get the Latin 'dispositio', the German 'positivität', the French 'dispositif' and finally the English 'apparatus'. By this point the term is an emulsion of the two discourses such that one can speak of a 'divine economy' having resonances of both providence in a theological register and governance in a political register. Agamben shows us that in the genealogy of oikonomia there were multiple points at which a Bachelardian fracture occurred, leading to a reconfiguration of the term and the processes of management that were developed in and of the discourse within which this term emerges. The relationship of governance and the power of subjection to the epistemic shifts is mapped through a comprehensive reading of the Christian trinitarian canon.

Thus the term oikonomia was introduced into theological discourse in order to paper over a potential doctrinal inconsistency which would allow a division between God and the three hypostases - which, at worst, would be heretical. The epistemological rupture, however, occurs as a consequence of the relocation of the place of that which is triple, from being to economy, from *ousia* to *oikos*. As Agamben writes: "It is in order to elude this extreme consequence of the Trinitarian thesis that Hippolytus is careful to repeat that God is one according to the *dynamis* [the energies] (that is, in the Stoic terminology he uses, according to the *ousia* [the essence]) and triple only according to the economy."<sup>353</sup> The being of God therefore is not split, only the actions (or energies) of the being can be said to be triple. This move essentially establishes the category of the divine economy, separating the acts of God from the deity itself.

However, argues Agamben, this very manoeuvre produces a second fracture between the being of god and the economy of which it is a part. If the being of God is one yet his actions are triple then surely this is a violation of the principle of omnipotence and therefore merely another heresy. Agamben continues: "[t]he caesura that had to be averted at all costs on the level of being reemerges, however, as a fracture between God and his action, between

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<sup>353</sup> *The Kingdom and the Glory* pg.53

ontology and praxis. Indeed, distinguishing the substance or the divine nature from its economy amounts to instituting within God a separation between being and acting, substance and praxis.<sup>354</sup> What emerges, then, is a fundamental division between being and acting, between *ousia* and *dynamis*; this is the important second fracture. If we remember that 'oikonomia' is the progenitor of 'apparatus' then we glean an insight into Agamben's later claim that: "[t]he term 'apparatus' designates that in which and through which one realises a pure activity of governance devoid of any foundation in being."<sup>355</sup> What this means is that there will always be a division between an apparatus and the beings it encounters and captures - there is no necessary principle for government of people, it is anarchic in the sense of *an-arkos*, being without an origin. This, Agamben claims, is the hidden consequence of the development and implementation of trinitarian doctrine; while there was originally no division between being and action in the concept of the Christian God, "[t]he doctrine of the oikonomia radically revokes this unity. The economy through which God governs the world is, as a matter of fact, entirely different from his being, and cannot be inferred from it."<sup>356</sup>

Why does the development of the trinity mean that divine governance takes the form of oikonomia? Because it is Christ, who assumes the form of the Son in the divine economy - which is to say exists as the Son only because of the development of the Christianized concept of oikonomia - who is entrusted with the salvation of the world. The same mechanism of oikonomia is at work in both principles, the analogy between the divine household and the earthly household is ensured through the figure of Christ, who is through the incarnation the link between man and divinity. Why this is an anarchic form of governance, at least in the West, pertains to the *filioque* controversy, a full discussion of which is outside the scope of this thesis. In short, the debate revolved around whether Christ was born 'from the Father' or was, like the Father, without origin or anarchic.<sup>357</sup> Such a debate caused the schism between Western and Eastern churches, but needless to say the latter doctrine prevailed in the West; therefore, Christ governs and does so through an anarchic economy without foundation in being.<sup>358</sup>

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<sup>354</sup> *The Kingdom and the Glory* pg.53

<sup>355</sup> *What is an Apparatus?* pg.11

<sup>356</sup> *The Kingdom and the Glory* pg.54

<sup>357</sup> In Greek: ἀναρχος (anarchos) - without beginning or origin (arché), often translated as 'unoriginateness'.

<sup>358</sup> For a lucid discussion of the Trinitarian theology surrounding the filioque, see J.A. McGuckin in *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review* Volume 39, No. 1, 1994 pg.7 Available:

How then do anarchy and government coexist? This constitutes a significant ontological obstacle for theologians who want to maintain a divine right of management of the world: divine governance is transcendentalized, divine sovereignty is a power that does not act, or maintains itself without actual execution (what Agamben calls the 'glory', the pure spectacle of governance). As such there needed to be a way in which to reconcile the transcendental and immanent aspects of governance, the *ordinatio* and the *executio*. The attempted solution takes the form of a doctrine of divine providence - that is, the declaration that God *provides* for the world, but does not govern it. The split between being and action is then again reproduced in a split between the Kingdom and the Government, two poles of the governmental machine, transcendental and immanent, that are analogous to Deleuze and Guattari's concepts of the jurist-king and the magician-emperor, the latter of which magically appropriates and binds to himself the state war machine.

Providence represents, in the same sense and to the same extent, an attempt to reconcile the Gnostic splitting between a God who is foreign to the world and a God that governs, which Christian theology had inherited through the "economical" articulation of the Father and the Son. In the Christian *oikonomia*, God as creator faces a corrupted and extraneous nature, which God as savior - who was entrusted with the government of the world - needs to redeem and save for a kingdom that is not, however, "of this world." The price to be paid by the Trinitarian overcoming of the Gnostic splitting between two deities is the fundamental extraneousness of the world. The Christian government of the world consequently assumes the paradoxical figure of the immanent government of a world that is and needs to remain extraneous.<sup>359</sup>

This figure of providence is the evolution of the doctrine of *oikonomia*, that which attempts to bring together the transcendence of the Father with the immanence of the Son. In doing so this technology collapses the transcendent-immanent binary into a 'zone of indistinction'. Such a logic is found throughout Agamben's work, most notably in the concept of the state of exception. The concept describes the imposition of a supposedly temporary time in

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<<https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/161440274.pdf>>. The line of argument, essentially a mereological debate, culminates in Gregory Palamas' distinction between divine essence and divine energy, an argument not dissimilar from Deleuze's use of Spinozan 'emanation'.

<sup>359</sup> *The Kingdom and the Glory* pg.140

which the normative law of a state is suspended and the government acts with special measures: examples may be the imposition of martial law after a riot or an extension of detention durations following a raising of the terror threat level. Both cases name "states of perpetual metastability"<sup>360</sup> in which a specific political moment - a crisis nominally being a very particular, often brief, stretch of time - encounters its negative and is thus, rather than negated, prolonged. Indeed a crisis is always an exception and a state is always general and as such we may as well talk of an exception to the state and a crisis of the general. The perpetual nature of this logic also speaks to a disintegration of telos insofar as there can be no final synthesis or reconciliation, just a further and larger societal transition into control. Agamben writes:

The question of borders becomes all the more urgent: if exceptional measures are the result of periods of political crisis and, as such, must be understood on political and not juridico-constitutional grounds [...] then they find themselves in the paradoxical position of being juridical measures that cannot be understood in legal terms, and the state of exception appears as the legal form of what cannot have legal form.<sup>361</sup>

If we take as suggested the date of 1980 as the moment in which the control society began to take shape<sup>362</sup> then we cannot say that the state of exception is unique to it - Agamben identifies several instances of the state of exception throughout modernity, with Nazi Germany being the exemplar of this idea.<sup>363</sup> However by drawing this parallel it is to say that the logic inherent in the state of exception is a primary characteristic of both theological providence and its instantiation in the control society. If the state can now organise and mobilise its own exception then the political result of the osmotic effect inherent in control societies is that, just as the home-work and the general-exception enter into metastable relationality, so too does the political-legal. The state can use its very antithesis to sustain itself; violence is used in the name of peace, surveillance in the name of privacy, control in the name of freedom. Thus the state of emergency becomes an exceptional generality, diffuse such that it can no longer be said to occupy a single stretch of time and is in fact the

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<sup>360</sup> 'Postscript on the Society of Control'

<sup>361</sup> *State of Exception*, pg.1

<sup>362</sup> See John Maus *Communication and Control*

<sup>363</sup> *State of Exception*, pg.6

mode in which we constantly exist. Supposedly temporary forms of discipline and control can now be enacted at any time and need not be tethered to the nominal values of the state. Rather than a fence demarcating a zone of enclosure, control becomes an indistinct cloud or fog in which we are enveloped.

What is then required is an office through which to administer the "government of souls" The *oikonomia* is then the administration of the pastorate (close to what Deleuze and Guattari call the *ecumenon*) according to an analogical understanding of the divine model. This expands on Foucault's insight that "[t]his great continuum from sovereignty to government is nothing else but the translation of the continuum from God to men"<sup>364</sup> within the realm of politics. It is angels, as the messengers of and mediators between the sovereign and men, that are tasked with the administration of the household "in which a sovereign decision determines the general principles of the organization of the cosmos, and then entrusts its administration and execution to a subordinated, yet autonomous, power"<sup>365</sup> - which would become the angelic ministry, the administration and mediation of the divine rule through the office of angels. Agamben designates this mode of governance as the opposite pole of the same machine, the direct and immanent instantiation of the sovereign's power. "From this fundamental bipolar articulation of God's power over the world also derives the other essential character of the divine activity of government, that is, its being split between a power of rational deliberation and an executive power, which necessarily entails a plurality of mediators and "ministers."<sup>366</sup> Such ministers guide and coerce rather than force, which maintains a semblance of freedom for the subjects they oversee, while the objective of their ministry is to effectuate God's plan for predestination. What, then, is the *oikonomia* and therefore the apparatus? It is a mode of governance which is immanent, decentered, distributed and administered by mediators and interlocutors - and, crucially, it manages to govern while maintaining a semblance of freedom for its subjects. This definition is almost precisely what Deleuze appears to mean by the term control, free-floating and modular.

I have been defining the apparatus as a 'mode' of governance, a form the power of governance takes when acting in a molecular form. Rather than a thing in itself, it is a

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<sup>364</sup> Foucault 'Security, Territory, Population' pg.234

<sup>365</sup> *The Kingdom and the Glory* pg.128

<sup>366</sup> *The Kingdom and the Glory* pg.134

property of things that appears when the object enters a relation with governance, that is when it gains the capacity to govern and be governed. When something gains the properties of an apparatus this means it gains a transcendental aspect, insofar as transcendental means relational to that which is prior or at a distance. This transcendental supplement is what enables the *oikonomia* insofar as it names an immanent, micrological administration - of the household rather than of the *polis* - it extends beyond, or indeed below, the realm of the political, such that even our personal lives are controlled and administered at a distance.

The legacy of the *oikonomia* as a mechanics of knowledge is that it becomes a perennial technology of western metaphysics that is eventually, through the theological lineage which donates it to politics, instantiated as the paradigmatic instance of governance, mutating from a constituent part of the Kingdom of God and finding effectuation in the state of exception. Agamben summarises the relationship:

the modern State inherits both aspects of the theological machine of the government of the world, and it presents itself as both providence-State and destiny-State. Through the distinction between legislative or sovereign power and executive or governmental power, the modern State acquires the double structure of the governmental machine. At each turn, it wears the regal clothes of providence, which legislates in a transcendent and universal way, but lets the creatures it looks after be free, and the sinister and ministerial clothes of fate, which carries out in detail the providential dictates and confines the reluctant individuals within the implacable connection between the immanent causes and between the effects that their very nature has contributed to determining. The providential-economical paradigm is, in this sense, the paradigm of democratic power, just as the theological-political is the paradigm of absolutism.<sup>367</sup>

Agamben's account treats the historical and genealogical aspect of apparatus, attending to the term's modulation through time. This is to encounter the apparatus in its molar formation; Deleuze's treatment of the same Foucauldian concept grapples with the micrological or molecular aspects of the apparatus.

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<sup>367</sup> *The Kingdom and the Glory* pg.142



## Deleuze: What is a Dispositif?

In his own analysis of Foucault's dispositif, Deleuze locates five types of line that make up a social apparatus: lines of visibility, lines of enunciation, lines of force, lines of subjectification and lines of fracture. Deleuze, motivated by a similar exegetical desire as Agamben, asks the same question of Foucault's work in 'What is a Dispositif?' The way in which these two philosophers answer the same question is indicative of their wider philosophical praxes: Agamben performs a genealogy while Deleuze describes the forces and relations internal to the concept. He writes:

But what is an apparatus? In the first instance it is a tangle, a multilinear ensemble. It is composed of lines, each having a different nature. [...] Foucault talked of lines of sedimentation but also lines of 'breakage' and of 'fracture'. Untangling these lines within a social apparatus is, in each case, like drawing a map, doing cartography. [...] One has to position oneself on these lines themselves [...] The different lines of an apparatus divide into two groups: lines of stratification or sedimentation, and lines leading to the present day or creativity.<sup>368</sup>

Sketching, drawing and planing have a privileged place in *A Thousand Plateaus*, indeed lines are described by Deleuze as "the basic components of things and events."<sup>369</sup> For Deleuze, the line is always related to the concept - and a concept is constructed on a plane of immanence or consistency. Deleuze plays on the polyvalence of 'plan', in French having cognates in 'plane', 'blueprint', 'design' and is a close synonym of 'dispositif'. The term thus sits at the intersection of a variety of Deleuze's research interests as well as being a method of description.

What I want to suggest at this point is that Deleuze's treatment of Foucault's concept of apparatus is his attempt to finesse or reconfigure his and Guattari's concept of the assemblage that appears in *A Thousand Plateaus*, and - further to this - it is a way to afford more agency to the subject. This is not to say that Deleuze adopts the theory of the apparatus for himself, but rather that through his engagement with the Foucauldian term, it allows Deleuze to think about subjectivity in a broader way which develops a groundwork

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<sup>368</sup> 'What is a Dispositif?' pp.159-165 translation modified

<sup>369</sup> *Negotiations* pg.33

for his work in *The Fold*. What is an assemblage? The first thing to note, which has not gone unnoticed by other commentators, is that ‘assemblage’ is a translation of ‘agencement’ that does somewhat of a disservice to the original French term. The word ‘assemblage’ also exists in French and it is not this that the authors use; ‘agencement’ is closer to the English ‘arrangement’ as in a musical score, it names something that is constructed. An agencement is made on the plane of immanence by a subject, requiring subjectivity as a constituent part. An agencement has three components that are common to all even where the content may differ: abstract machines, concrete assemblages and a persona.<sup>370</sup>

Abstract machines are the conditions that enable the agencement to take shape, in effect creating the possibility for the emergence of a particular formation. This does not mean that the abstract machine decides in advance or directs the concrete assemblages, but merely allows for the conjunction and relation of the concrete components. The abstract noun ‘Marx’ may be that which allowed for the emergence of the Russian revolution, but the revolutionaries themselves, their bodies and rifles are the concrete elements that are effectuated by the abstract name of Marx. Concrete assemblages are then the elements that make up the agencement, but change alongside and are coextensive with their conditions on a plane of consistency. By *What is Philosophy?* the concept has become the correlate of the “concrete assemblages, like the configurations of a machine, but the plane is the abstract machine of which these assemblages are the working parts.”<sup>371</sup> This is Deleuze’s principle of immanence of cause and effect: a change in the distribution of the concrete assemblage will feed back to the abstract machine that conditions it. They are the working parts of an abstract machine, but do not necessarily confer an organic unity, which allows for the possibility of transformation or breaking down into another assemblage. Finally, personae are the agents of the agencement.<sup>372</sup> The persona that operates the assemblage is a fraction of a subject but does so ‘in the third person’. As the name suggests, personae are images of the subject that are immanent with the abstract machine - like the state and the apparatus, the persona and the abstract machine arise at the same time and condition each other. The persona at stake in the assemblage is not a return to any unified subjectivity, but it does allow for agency in the sense that it operates and modifies the assemblage by acting as an interlocutor between concrete and abstract. This

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<sup>370</sup> See *A Thousand Plateaus* pp.510-514

<sup>371</sup> *What is Philosophy* pg.36

<sup>372</sup> *What is Philosophy?* pp.61-84

is very close to what Agamben means by his tripartite division between beings, apparatuses and subjects.

The Deleuzoguattarian assemblage then shares filiation with, but is not reducible to, Foucault's *dispositif*. To re-state: Deleuze claims that the *dispositif* is primarily composed of lines; curves of visibility, enunciation and lines of force; "lines of subjectification, lines of splitting, breakage, fracture, all of which criss-cross and mingle together, some lines reproducing or giving rise to others, by means of variation or even changes in the way they are grouped."<sup>373</sup> Further, these lines can be subdivided into two groups: "lines of stratification or sedimentation, and lines leading to the present day or creativity."

Lines of visibility structure light; they decide what is seen or highlighted and what is hidden or occluded. The example given by Deleuze here is the image of Foucault's famous panopticon: "the prison apparatus as an optical machine, used for seeing without being seen."<sup>374</sup> It is in this prison that the regime of visibility discerns the relationality between two groups of subjects, engendering a power hierarchy and controls on behaviour - merely because the prisoner cannot see his captor and therefore assumes that he is always being-seen they are dissuaded from acting in a manner counter to the captor's desires. The captor controls the prisoner through lines of visibility alone. As we know, Foucault expands this idea to apply to the whole of what he calls the disciplinary society. Another example of visibility at this level is the play that Deleuze elsewhere highlights between majoritarian and minoritarian sociality, for example the continual elision of media representation of at-risk peoples such as refugees.

Enunciation, the second kind of line, is dependent upon and therefore closely related to visibility. Any given enunciation in a linguistic field is part of a line, which when traced ultimately makes up a regime of enunciation. The frequency of a certain enunciation will constitute the type of regime it is. These regimes "are neither subjects nor objects, but regimes which must be defined from the point of view of the visible and from the point of view of that which can be enunciated..." What cannot be seen cannot be spoken of, thus lines of enunciation and the frequency of content follows lines of visibility; the more visible something is, the more it is spoken about. This is exactly what Agamben has in mind when

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<sup>373</sup> 'What is a *Dispositif*?'

<sup>374</sup> 'What is a *Dispositif*?'

he talks of the 'glory' of divine power and is the point at which both he and Foucault are in debt to the *Society of the Spectacle* - 'doxa' may mean both glory and opinion.

A line of force "comes about 'in any relationship between one point and another' and passes through every area in the apparatus."<sup>375</sup> Being distinct from visibility (seeing) and enunciation (saying) it is "invisible and unsayable" but rather curves the other lines in the apparatus such that it can bring about modulations in other lines. Lines of force make up the 'dimension of power', which is "internal to the apparatus, variable to the apparatus." When the state media chooses to ignore a political event in favour of some other, lines of force are curving visibility and enunciation, modifying the communicability of events.

We have already seen instances of the line of fracture in the apparatus: Agamben shows us that in the apparatus of *oikonomia* there were multiple points at which a line of fracture was drawn out, leading to a reconfiguration of the apparatus. Fracture is Foucault's reinscription of the epistemological rupture which itself is the foundation for his theory of genealogy. If we recall the above discussion about Bachelard and Althusser we get a good example of these lines: there are some aspects of the apparatus that will fork or diverge from the confluence of other lines as when trinitarian doctrine split the being and the actions of God.

Finally - and specifically of importance to the current discussion - is the line of subjectification. Distinguishing these lines from the other lines of the apparatus, "[l]ines of subjectification are particularly capable of tracing paths of creation"<sup>376</sup> as opposed to becoming stratified or sedimentary. Deleuze writes that the line of subjectification "arose out of a crisis in Foucault's thought, as if it had become necessary for him to redraw the map of social apparatuses", in order to allow for a greater degree of agency within his theory of the subject. This re-drawing enables a second mode of subjectivity: there is subjection (how the subject is constituted) and subjectification (how the subject is self-constituted). If the subject was merely a product of discursive practices, as was implied in Foucault's early work, there would be no need for this line in the apparatus, it is only in the later work that Foucault develops concepts such as 'care of the self' and constituting oneself as a work of art that indicates the necessity of such a line in the apparatus. This is to say that within any apparatus there is, alongside the processes of control and

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<sup>375</sup> 'What is a Dispositif?'

<sup>376</sup> 'What is a Dispositif?'

management, the potential for transformation of the subject, or a repository of 'technologies of the self' - indeed, the process of subjectification, as 'optional rules of self-mastery'<sup>377</sup> occurs only by folding the line of subjectivity back on itself, through the application of force. As Deleuze renders the task: "in each apparatus it is necessary to distinguish what we are [...] and what we are in the process of becoming..."<sup>378</sup> and, further, that "in every apparatus, the lines break through thresholds," indeed "[e]ach apparatus is thus defined by its newness content and its creativity content, this marking at the same time its ability to transform itself, or indeed to break down in favour of a future apparatus..." The line of subjectification calls into question the nature of the apparatus of which it is a part because it can bypass the line that circumscribes an apparatus - in other words it can aim beyond, through or in-between the apparatus. The space into which the vector then points is creativity.

All of these lines then split into two groups: sedimentation and stratification, or creativity. "Here again, a line of subjectivation"<sup>379</sup> is a process, a production of subjectivity in a social apparatus: it has to be made, inasmuch as the apparatus allows it to come into being or makes it possible."<sup>380</sup> What would stratification be in this context? Even though subjectivity is produced, however, the apparatus befriends or encircles this production and permits it to grow, guides it rather than censors; this is what Deleuze will later refer to as 'control'. The line of subjectivity is at the mercy of lines of force which rectify it even while it attempts to fold the line back on itself, such that subjectivation (as the process of self-mastery) may occur. At its most extreme possibility the line of subjectivity leaves the apparatus entirely and enters into an outside of creativity: "It is a line of escape. It escapes preceding lines and escapes *from* itself."<sup>381</sup> This obviously bears filiation with the line of flight, a pure movement that carries the subject along its trajectory and is explicitly identified with creativity.

Creativity is not part of the apparatus itself, but it is the event of that which occurs when the line bypasses the limit of the apparatus, the degree of the potential to change relies upon

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<sup>377</sup> See Foucault's *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*

<sup>378</sup> 'What is a Dispositif?' in *Michel Foucault: Philosopher* pg.164

<sup>379</sup> Subjectivation is Foucault's term, Deleuze and Guattari use subjectification, but the context is the same, a self-constitutive process of subjectivity, as opposed to subjection which is imposed from the outside.

<sup>380</sup> 'What is a Dispositif?'

<sup>381</sup> 'What is a Dispositif?'

the degree to which the line between the inside and outside of the assemblage is permeable - thus it is a property of the other lines. Lines become creative or stratified depending on the extent to which they reinforce the interior or explore the exterior. Considered in this way, creativity is not simply antithetical to capture: as an operation of smoothing, the creativity that the war machine engenders is at work within capitalism and indeed works to destratify the earth; globalisation qua smooth space allows for greater degrees of interpenetration between nations, industries and cultures, the cooperation of intelligence agencies, a continuous stock exchange and so forth. Even though we may praise the war machine and creativity for accessing inhuman or inorganic forces, they also enable functions of capitalism in exactly the same way, by exceeding the bounds of processes that would nominally be limited by the exigencies of the human body, most notably fatigue and sleep.

The apparatus of capture has, then, a privileged relationship with these kinds of space, particularly insofar as it makes such spaces or transforms other spaces into striations and sediment. Crucially, the apparatus of capture is involved in the generation of a topological line that would demarcate an inside and outside. That which is inside the zone of capture is subject to coding, whereas that which is without retains the potential to disrupt these regimes, a potential that Deleuze often discusses in the capacity of novelty and creativity. Yet this line is not always easy to discern: to do cartography is to begin from the middle; to begin from the middle is to start to follow a line, to see where it leads and to trace its conjunctions with other lines, to discern which are the lines leading to creativity specifically we need to untangle the particular apparatus in which we have been caught. This is why the plateau 'Apparatus of Capture' is where such a cartography must begin: it is where Deleuze and Guattari describe the nature and function of capture and of the State. Deleuze suggests that there is something about creativity that is antithetical to stratification and history. If "history is always written from the sedentary point of view and in the name of a unitary State apparatus..."<sup>382</sup> then creation is opposed to stratification and is opposed to the State apparatus. This does not mean, however that we can ignore history in the diagnostic of the apparatus: to repeat Deleuze's quote from above, this time unabridged: "in each apparatus it is necessary to distinguish what we are (what we are already no longer), and what we are in the process of becoming: the historical part and the current part." Therefore when

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<sup>382</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.23

attempting to consider a creativity of or from the outside we cannot grasp this concept independently of its context, namely the archaeology of the State, which in the present day has the modal formation of democratic parliamentarianism coupled with neoliberal capitalism. To repeat: our subjectivity is always *in media res*, conditioned by various apparatuses - and, complicating the matter significantly, "[c]apital is a point of subjectification par excellence."<sup>383</sup> Capitalism affords its subjects many optional rules of self-mastery - be it entrepreneurship, land ownership or a plethora of other vocations that are perfectly compatible and congruent with its objectives. On this problem, Deleuze writes:

Foucault agrees with Burroughs, who claims that our future will be controlled rather than disciplined. The question is not whether this is worse. For to ask this would be to make appeal to ways of producing subjectivity which would be capable of resisting this new form of domination, ways which would be very different from those which were formerly exercised against disciplines. Would this mean a new light, new enunciations, new power, new forms of subjectification? In each apparatus we have to untangle the lines of the recent past and those of the near future: that which belongs to the archive and that which belongs to the present; that which belongs to history and that which belongs to the process of becoming; that which belongs to the analytic and that which belongs to the diagnostic. If Foucault is a great philosopher, this is because he used history for the sake of something beyond it: as Nietzsche said: acting against time, and thus on time, for the sake of a time one hopes will come.<sup>384</sup>

Untangling or deconstructing a given apparatus will reveal "[t]he newness of an apparatus in relation to those which have gone before is what we call its actuality, our actuality." It is at this point, once we know where we are, that we can begin the Deleuzian programme of ethics: that of becoming worthy of what will happen to us. This topic will be explored in more detail in the following chapter.

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<sup>383</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.587

<sup>384</sup> 'What is a dispositif?'

## Mysticism and Folding

The first two lines of the apparatus that Deleuze located were enunciation and visibility: grouped together, we might call these lines of 'communication'. When the line of subjectivity veers outside of the apparatus, into creativity, what happens to communication?

A precise definition of all that could be called mysticism is difficult and a comprehensive treatment of the field is outside the scope of this thesis; it is a term that cuts across cultures and disciplines. Speaking very broadly and primarily in the capacity of Abrahamic religion, there are two currents of the theology of the mystical: cataphatic and apophatic. The former term pertains to knowledge of divinity attained through affirmation, through the positive assignment of features or characteristics to a deity, such as in the Quranic ascription of 99 names of God. However, it is the latter that is most commonly associated with mysticism: if cataphasis pertains to the affirmation of qualities of a deity, apophatic theology is concerned with the negation of qualities, properties or names. It is not simply the case that one might list categories that God is not, for that would imply a cataphatic positive affirmation for the opposite term. Rather, apophatic mysticism aims beyond the ontological positivity denoted by language itself and as such often involves the invocation of opposites, "God is good and not good." The truly apophatic moment happens off-page, as it were: the binary statement 'X + not-X' produces an invisible contradiction in which the epistemic content within a given category, here existence, exceeds the category itself. This is the point at which the knowledge becomes apophatic proper; it is so beyond comprehension that it no longer adheres to the rational and linguistic categories that condition it and appears as a ghostly or virtual third superpositional category that escapes the binary opposition, which will always be bonded precisely through this principle of opposition. As Denys Turner writes: "The apophatic is the linguistic strategy of somehow showing by means of language that which lies beyond language. It is not done and it cannot be done by means of negative utterances alone which are no less bits of ordinarily intelligible human discourse than are affirmations."<sup>385</sup> In Kantian terms, this third position is transcendent, beyond all human knowledge. The difficulty in writing apophatically is to signal this transcendent beyond through language, which is very much actual.

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<sup>385</sup> *The Darkness of God* pg.34



Foucault's relationship with mysticism is complicated - on the one hand it is a natural topic of interest for a thinker so concerned with speech, knowledge and subjectivity. On the other, it seems far removed from the contemporary political problems that concerned Foucault and Deleuze. Yet, Foucault's engagement with the topic is not insubstantial - and he returns to the topic in his later work when examining 'technologies of the self' and 'optional rules of self-mastery' that were adopted by Christian mystics and ascetics. For subjectivity in the theory of apparatus, considering mysticism elucidates several themes: that of the inside-outside distinction, threshold-crossing and what Foucault would term 'subjectivation', the aforementioned technologies of the self. Further to this, mysticism or negative theology writ large potentially has several common objectives with what could broadly be called the poststructuralist project: the rejection of representation, negation of nomination and an insistence on ontological difference. However, the topic is never explicitly thematized in either thinker and Deleuze seems to explicitly distance his own project from a mystical reading at several points; for example the use of the term 'soul' in the first synthesis of habit:

soul must be attributed to the heart, to the muscles, nerves and cells, but a contemplative soul whose entire function is to contract a habit. This is no mystical or barbarous hypothesis. On the contrary, habit here manifests its full generality: it concerns not only the sensory-motor habits that we have (psychologically), but also, before these, the primary habits that we are; the thousands of passive syntheses of which we are organically composed.<sup>386</sup>

That being said, as was discussed in chapter two, one of the most fundamental facets of Deleuze's ontology that we can see as far back as the Hume book is that 'relations are *external* to their terms.' In the capacity of the subject, the processes that engender the composition of a subject - such as contraction, habit, memory - are not internal to it and do not exist independently of it. Exteriority or 'the outside' is imagined by virtue of the way that it produces the inside, which is to say that for Deleuze the boundary between the two is essentially meaningless and always-already porous. As we will see going forward, however, in Deleuze there is always a tension between the inside and outside, particularly a concern about the extent to which the forces of the outside may break down a given thing by

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<sup>386</sup> *Difference and Repetition* pg.74

crossing the threshold and causing a change or phase shift in the nature of the inside. To the extent that a subject may have a degree of control or influence over such a process, in *Anti-Oedipus* this deconstructive approach is advocated more effusively than in later works, where the enthusiasm is tempered with recommendations of caution.

The final chapter in Deleuze's book on Foucault is titled 'Foldings, or the Inside of Thought (Subjectivation)'. Deleuze gave the talk 'What is a Dispositif?' in 1988, the same year that his book on Leibniz titled *The Fold* came out. We can see, then, that Deleuze brings these two thinkers into alignment through this concept of the fold. Or rather, we could say that Deleuze brings his own thought to bear on Foucault and Leibniz, folding his own philosophy into theirs. In order to understand this final line of the apparatus we need to first grasp this notion of folding and how it relates to subjectivation. In order to conclude the discussion on the apparatus, a concept so concerned with the demarcation of spaces, it is worth investigating Foucault's idea of the outside, its relation to subjectivity and Deleuze's eventual reconfiguration and critique of the concept. It is a murky area in the work of both thinkers and one which does not necessarily reveal concrete lines of thought, but rather serves as the site of a problematic which must be worked through.

In the final chapter of *Foucault*, 'Foldings, we are told that "Foucault continually submits interiority to a radical critique" and that as such Deleuze assigns the fold - or as Deleuze formulates its other name, 'doubling' - as a long-held, if unnamed preoccupation of Foucault. Interiority, or the inside of thought is part of a philosophical dyad that necessarily connects it to the outside; Foucault, in his early analyses of discourse, writes of his attempt to access without mediation what will become known as the line of enunciation in the apparatus under his wager that "the being of language only appears for itself with the disappearance of the subject."<sup>387</sup> This is a profoundly mystical supposition, that in the negation of language, between a predicate and its opposite, a reality emerges; that a knowledge or union with the deity (theoria or theosis) is only accessible after the denotative language of the subject has been annulled.

In a text named 'Thought from the Outside', Foucault praises the work of Maurice Blanchot with achieving something similar to this kind of access; he credits Blanchot with "[t]he

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<sup>387</sup> *Blanchot: Thought from the Outside* pg.15

breakthrough to a language from which the subject is excluded, the bringing to light of a perhaps irremediable incompatibility between the appearing of language in its being and consciousness of the self in its identity."<sup>388</sup> However, his archaeology (not yet genealogy at this point) finds this thought of the outside appearing not with mystics such as Pseudo-Dionysius, but with the writings of the Marquis de Sade, through Hölderlin, to the - what Deleuze might call the 'minor' writing of - Nietzsche, Mallarmé, Artaud, Bataille and Klossowski, but that finds its exemplar in Blanchot:

A thought that stands outside subjectivity, setting its limits as though from without, articulating its end, making its dispersion shine forth, taking in only its invincible absence; and that at the same time stands at the threshold of all positivity, not in order to grasp its foundation or justification but in order to regain the space of its unfolding, the void serving as its site, the distance in which it is constituted and into which its immediate certainties slip the moment they are glimpsed - a thought that, in relation to the interiority of our philosophical reflection and the positivity of our knowledge, constitutes what in a word we might call "the thought from the outside."<sup>389</sup>

What this 'thought from the outside' consists of is unclear, but the process of its acquisition mirrors almost exactly the apophatic procedure. A speculative thought from the outside would then use language, that which is within epistemic positivity, to signify a negation which would be beyond it. On this link between Foucault and Blanchot, in *Negotiations* Deleuze says:

Lastly, there's the theme of the Outside: the relation, and indeed "nonrelation," to an Outside that's further from us than any external world, and thereby closer than any inner world. And it doesn't diminish the importance of these links to emphasize how Foucault takes the themes and develops them independently of Blanchot: the dislocation between seeing and talking, most fully developed in the book on Raymond Roussel and the piece on Magritte, leads him to a new determination of the visible and the utterable; the "one speaks" organizes his theory of utterance; the interplay of near and far along the line Outside, as a life-and-death experiment, leads

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<sup>388</sup> Blanchot: *Thought from the Outside* pg.15

<sup>389</sup> Blanchot: *Thought from the Outside* pg.15

to specifically Foucauldian acts of thought, to folding and unfolding (which take him a long way from Heidegger too), and eventually becomes the basis of the process of subjectification.<sup>390</sup>

Foucault refuses to give this unfolding the name of mysticism, as it would be easy to do. Here he is reading the tradition of mysticism as inherently dialectical, in which the voyage outside of the self into gnosis or the absolute is always translated or remediated back into a unitary experience; that the mystical experience somehow bolsters and reifies the image of selfhood that it strove to deconstruct. Or, in the language of *A Thousand Plateaus*, for Foucault it seems that mystical deterritorialization is doomed to reterritorialize, every potential smoothing becomes striated and unified again. "Any purely reflexive discourse runs the risk of leading the experience of the outside back to the dimension of interiority."<sup>391</sup> Mysticism, Foucault says, is inherently synthetic and serves to foster a "central, unshakeable certitude" whereas the thought of the outside is disjunctive; the former is a negative relation while the latter is a nonrelation.<sup>392</sup> He continues:

Hence the necessity of converting reflexive language. It must be directed not toward any inner confirmation - not toward a kind of central, unshakable certitude - but toward an outer bound where it must continually contest itself. When language arrives at its own edge, what it finds is not a positivity that contradicts it, but the void that will efface it. Into that void it must go, consenting to come undone in the rumbling, in the immediate negation of what it says, in a silence that is not the intimacy of a secret but a pure outside where words endlessly unravel.

The obvious problem here is that Foucault, by preserving the binary relation between inside and outside, is subject to his own critique: surely by maintaining an opposition between inner and outer Foucault cannot truly grant Blanchot access to an asubjective 'great outdoors' because of the dialectic he sets up, which is in the same structure as the Christian mysticism he criticises; to phrase it simply, he cannot take up the mystic inside-outside binary if he seeks to properly subvert it. By this logic, one cannot grant to the outside such properties precisely because one is as a result necessarily inside. In the same

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<sup>390</sup> *Negotiations* pg.97

<sup>391</sup> *Blanchot: Thought From the Outside* pg.21

<sup>392</sup> Foucault's reading will suffice for the rest of this chapter, despite its obvious limitations (cf. Pseudo-Dionysius *Mystical Theology*)

manner as his famous critique of Cartesian rationalism that posited a forced exile of madness from rationality's inside, a rationality as such is presupposed in his argumentation. This is, of course, Derrida's famous argument in 'Cogito and the History of Madness'; that the very act of maintaining an empirico-transcendental distinction means that the transcendental is conditioned by that empirical category which it provides rules for - in other words, that rationally engaging the outside conditions its outside in rational terms. As mentioned earlier, there are pairs, then, in the early Foucault's metaphysics: rationality and madness, silence and speech, inside and outside - the latter and former in each instance forming a kind of corollary such that we could speak of an even greater partition between on the one hand 'rationality-speech-interiority' and on the other 'madness-silence-exteriority'. How can Foucault even speak of the latter category whilst interned, by his own admission, in the former? This marks for Foucault another enigma, a moment that is uncharacterisable in and of his philosophy at this point in its development.

### **Deleuze: The Fold**

Foucault's distinction between interiority and exteriority is another concept that Deleuze is both compelled to write about and to critique. Especially of interest to Deleuze is the confrontation between thought, which is usually conceptualised as an interiority (the Kantian 'inner sense') and a destructive or deconstructive outside of thought, which when encountering thought problematizes its image. The outside poses a problem for Deleuze, because he is interested in the challenge to the dogmatic images of our thought and the power that the outside affords us to fuel such a challenge, and yet such a power or space must be articulated within an ontology of immanence, whereas nominally it would signify some form of transcendence. When pushed on the nature of line that divides inside from outside, he says:

It's difficult to talk about. It's a line that's not abstract, though it has no particular shape. It's no more in thought than in things, but it's everywhere thought confronts something like madness, and life something like death. [...] They're lines that go beyond knowledge (how could they be "known"?), and it's our relations to these

lines that go beyond power relations (as Nietzsche says, who could call it "a will to control"?). [...] it's the line Outside. The Outside, in Foucault as in Blanchot from whom he takes the word, is something more distant than any external world. But it's also something closer than any inner world. So you get an endless switching between closeness and distance. Thinking doesn't come from within, but nor is it something that happens in the external world. It comes from this Outside, and returns to it, it amounts to confronting it. The line outside is our double, with all the double's otherness.<sup>393</sup>

What is different in Deleuze here is the addition of the concept of the Fold. The Fold is a way of conceptualising an inside-outside boundary without either transcendence or binarism and it is through his encounter with Foucault's grappling with mysticism and his critique of interiority that Deleuze comes to fully develop this concept which will be important in his later philosophy. That being said, the first instance of the concept of the fold is glimpsed in *Difference and Repetition*, in reference to Heidegger. As we saw in chapter two, Deleuze reforms Heidegger's Being-beings distinction from a negative 'not' to a 'difference between', which is to say a fold ('zwiefalt') of the same surface or plane of being.<sup>394</sup> Rather than the pleat itself, the fold is that which produces the pleat, the curving of the line between the two levels of matter and soul. Speaking of this line, Deleuze returns to the imagery of the linear labyrinth:

A labyrinth is said, etymologically, to be multiple because it contains many folds. The multiple is not only what has many parts but also what is folded in many ways. A labyrinth corresponds exactly to each level: the continuous labyrinth in matter and its parts, the labyrinth of freedom in the soul and its predicates.<sup>395</sup>

This line between inside and outside, because it delineates the boundaries of subjectivity it is also an ineluctably temporal concern. The labyrinth is also a problem, it is a puzzle to be solved - this is why the maze that is a straight line is the absolute form of the labyrinth, it is a problem of folding time itself, or rather is it that time is folded that is the problem.

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<sup>393</sup> *Negotiations* pg.110

<sup>394</sup> See *The Fold* pp.10-11

<sup>395</sup> *The Fold* pg.3

The fold is not only a subjective concern: this concept is in a sense intrinsic to the idea of the processes of territorialisation in *A Thousand Plateaus*, that both mind and matter are folded, unfolded and refolded; this is not to say that the concept of the fold overwrites that of territory, rather that the process that animates the becoming of the boundary of the territory can be expressed as folding. When a pigeon takes a branch from a tree in order to make a nest, the tree is unfolded outwards into the world and the branch is pleated within the folds of the birdnest. A fold in matter must be made, or rather, matter is made to express itself; the fold is as much of an aesthetic principle of becoming as it is an ontological or psychological one.

Deleuze's claim is that the fold is to be seen most frequently and obviously in the Baroque, which is considered less as a period or style and more of a function; the function of the Baroque is to fold, to make folds in matter. Baroque architecture signals this in two ways: the Baroque house is divided into two floors, a lower floor with windows and an upper floor without. This upper floor represents the soul, without windows and closed in on itself as if invisible, "it is a dark room or chamber decorated only with a stretched canvas diversified by folds. as if it were a living dermis"<sup>396</sup> - while the lower floor is open and invites light, representing the visible world of matter. The interiority of the upper floor folds outwards into the exteriority of the ground floor while itself remaining a monad, its enclosure giving it a world: "[t]he monad is the autonomy of the inside, an inside without an outside."<sup>397</sup> Secondly, the Baroque church or cathedral is composed of arches supporting domed ceilings painted with heavenly images, which manifest folding the material outwards into the infinite, denoting the presence of celestial spheres and the spiritual firmament. Inherent to both the house and the church is a state of chiaroscuro, insofar as the dark upper floors and bright lower floors of the house are comparable to the shaded alcoves and brightly-lit altars of the church, which for Deleuze speaks to Leibniz's concept of the clarity or visibility of monads.<sup>398</sup> For Leibniz, a being is simply made up of its monads, each of which is a point of view; any given being only has a finite amount of monads and therefore perceives the world imperfectly, whereas God has access to all monads and perceives with absolute clarity and light. As such, finite beings, with their dark and self-enclosed soul, grasp for knowledge of divine light, but can only do so with a limited perspective.<sup>399</sup>

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<sup>396</sup> *The Fold* pg.4

<sup>397</sup> *The Fold* pg.28

<sup>398</sup> *The Fold* pg.90

<sup>399</sup> See *The Fold* pg.27

In describing the Baroque house in such a way, allegorically and in the capacity of Leibniz and visibility, Deleuze is also simultaneously invoking a return to the virtual-actual relationship and the metaphysics of *Difference and Repetition*. In that book, Deleuze borrows two Leibnizian phrases to describe the character of the virtual and the actual, if they are attended to in isolation from each other: 'distinct-obscure' and 'clear-confused'. To understand the world in a distinct-obscure way, that is to grasp the transcendental conditions and pre-individual processes (the virtual) gives us an obscure picture of the world (these processes are not actual and thus we do not understand the world as it is given); whereas to understand the world in a clear-confused way, which is to structure our analysis of the world in terms of how it is given to us (as in phenomenology) gives us a confused picture of the actual, as we do not understand how this picture arises. In order to bring the two lines of visibility together, they need to be thought simultaneously, folded into one another or pleated together. This would then describe the processes of actualisation, where Ideas are reified in actual terms.<sup>400</sup> Like Deleuze will do with the *Cinema* books, he gives us a concrete example which opens out into philosophical problems, which here is the necessity of the concept of the fold.

Like other concepts he developed, we can see that the fold is spoken of in different registers; in a subjective capacity Deleuze explicitly identifies the fold with Foucault's concept of subjectification, or more precisely the folding movement from the inside outwards; "[s]ubjectification, that's to say the process of folding the line outside."<sup>401</sup> Whereas, like Althusser's notion of interpolation, subjection is the external application of rules to the subject with which it later identifies, subjectification occurs when the subject chooses to apply strict rules to itself. Deleuze sees this process as when the line of subjectivity in the apparatus folds back upon itself, to use force to bend the line to the outside that is *internal* to the subject.<sup>402</sup> This is very different to how Foucault considers such a process, who considers it as a process in the exercise of freedom and autonomy.

If subjection emerged in Ancient Greece as the relationship of rivalry between free men, subjectification is a use of the same power for oneself, in the service of the subject. This

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<sup>400</sup> *Difference and Repetition* pg.213

<sup>401</sup> *Negotiations* pg.114

<sup>402</sup> *Foucault* pp.96-97



affords the subject some sense of agency, a use of powers of discipline upon oneself which enables an autonomous subject. This is of course similar to the Kantian form of law in which the possibility of freedom is seemingly only realised through the regulative constraints placed upon the actor, or, precisely, the validity thereof. However, this 'line' only emerges in Classical Greece when a man commanded other men - only in this way is the line rectified and the man then seen as possessing a mastery over himself, which is to say an inversion of the dialectic of discipline, owning for oneself the same powers at play in the process of subjection. Foucault attempts to relocate this line in service of the individual; Deleuze, perhaps aware of the connotations of such a dialectic, wonders "[c]an one not think of apparatuses where subjectification does not come about through aristocratic life or the aestheticised existence of the free man, but through the marginalised existence of the 'outsider'?"<sup>403</sup>

Deleuze's concept of an outside must then be very different to Foucault. "The outside is not a fixed limit but a moving matter animated by peristaltic movements, folds and foldings that together make up an inside: they are not something other than the outside, but precisely the inside of the outside."<sup>404</sup> In this sense, the fold "resembles exactly the invagination of a tissue in embryology, or the act of doubling in sewing: twist, fold, stop, and so on."<sup>405</sup> There is then a convertibility or movement of bilateral influence between the organic and inorganic, mediated by a fold between the matter and 'the soul'. Deleuze sees in Foucault a model of subjectivity in which "the inside is merely the fold of the outside"<sup>406</sup> the interior being formed purely in virtue of its relations with the outside. This is without doubt a reconfiguration on behalf of Deleuze; he is describing a plane of immanence or a plane of consistency of desire rather than a void.

A plane of immanence is something that is constructed, before doing so that which would be an 'outside to thought' is merely chaos, an absence of any consistency at all. Chaos is the field of difference which is opposed to the field of representation and it is in this sense that it is the outside of thought, not as a lack but as a disorganised fullness. As it is both interior and exterior to representational thought, chaos can both be generative of and destructive to thought as it deprives it of its consistency. The efficacy of such a process is

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<sup>403</sup> What is a Dispositif?

<sup>404</sup> *Foucault* pg.97

<sup>405</sup> *Foucault* pg.98

<sup>406</sup> *Foucault* pg.97

dependent upon how it is harnessed - and folding the line outside is a way of capturing such chaos through the creation of concepts that might impose a consistency upon it, whilst maintaining its vital forces. After Deleuze, we can now see that this folded outside-thought is a thought that is *at* and not beyond the limit, where a limit denotes only the penultimacy of change before a threshold-crossing in the assemblage. A limit, then, is contested by the outside both from within and without:

This is why thought, as power which has not always existed, is born from an outside more distant than any external world, and, as power which does not yet exist, confronts an inside, an unthinkable or unthought, deeper than any internal world. In the second place, there is no longer any movement of internalization or externalization, integration or differentiation, but a confrontation of an outside and an inside independent of distance, this thought outside itself and this un-thought within thought.<sup>407</sup>

Deleuze's Foucault does not posit an absolutely alien or transcendental speculative thought that proceeds beyond being, but merely that breaking-down which happens when language and thought approaches its limit because of the introduction of chaos, the capacity to transform.

If "this folding of the line is precisely what Foucault eventually comes to call the 'process of subjectification', when he begins to examine it directly"<sup>408</sup> then this then reopens the question of agency. Does the subject own its capacity to fold, or does folding happen to the subject? If the latter, then we have not significantly escaped the criticisms of Badiou and his allies. There is a destructive and desubjectivating aspect to chaos and to the eternal return (the differentiation of difference) that happens within it, when the return selects and carries extreme values to the limit it runs the risk of transforming the subject who fails the test into one of the "dreary parade of sucked-dry, catatonicized, vitrified, sewn-up bodies,"<sup>409</sup> from the sixth plateau of *A Thousand Plateaus*. The inherent risk of communication with the outside of thought must be balanced by the quality of the membrane of the fold, which is created, in effect, by layering it (folding it back upon itself) with memory, or rather

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<sup>407</sup> *Cinema 2* pg.278

<sup>408</sup> *Negotiations* pg.113

<sup>409</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.150

technologies of the self grasped and synthesised by memory. In *Anti-Oedipus* the synthesis of recording "fall back" on itself, inscribing on the surface of the Body without Organs, producing a surface that is stratified in a particular way. Memory and habit exist on a single plane which is punctured by pleats of the outside or pockets of chaos and stratified in a way related to the subject's life; this is Deleuze's version of an aesthetics of existence, making oneself a work of art - and also the practical side of 'becoming worthy of what happens to us'. Such a production is accomplished through the creation of concepts, which is to say philosophical thinking, and is one aspect of subjective agency in Deleuze.

### Communication and The Outside

These themes - the outside, creativity, non-communication - are thematised in a virtuosic essay by Quentin Meillassoux, in which the problems of *What is Philosophy?* are read back onto Deleuze's work on Bergson. Concerning the destructive powers of thought, it describes a response to crossing into the outside that Foucault wrestled with in two registers, first a kind of ascetic contraction and closing-down and second a kind of opening-up and becoming passible to fluxes. The former is identified with the figure of a reactionary priest, while the latter is a "deadly becoming of communication"<sup>410</sup> with the power to drive one mad. The communicator, then, aligns creativity and thinking with an irreconcilable chaos which ultimately becomes antithetical to life itself, an emissary of the black hole from *Anti-Oedipus*. Meillassoux writes: "[t]o die is to become a pure point of passage, a pure centre of communication of all things with all things. It will be seen, then, that the living being is not the emergence of pain in an atrophied world, but on the contrary a diminution of madness in a becoming-terror of chaos"<sup>411</sup> - Deleuze and Guattari in *What is Philosophy?* advocate the construction of 'chaoids', frames for selections of chaos that might buttress us against the deleterious effects of *too much* of the outside being folded inwards. The stakes of such a defence mechanism are exacerbated by and entangled with the current moment of capitalism, insofar as there exists the social imperative for everyone to become a communicator, to always be producing, creating and communicating the results of such creations. Communication is the handmaiden of control; Deleuze's claim that

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<sup>410</sup> 'Subtraction and Contraction' pg.104

<sup>411</sup> 'Subtraction and Contraction' pg.104

we should open up what he calls "vacuoles of non-communication" as a means of resistance to control is called for in the article 'Control and Becoming' and articulated in 'Mediators', where such spaces may signify that in which the control society, predicated as it is on communicativity, cannot operate or is eluded. Responding to Antonio Negri, Deleuze writes:

You ask whether control or communication societies will lead to forms of resistance that might reopen the way for a communism understood as the "transversal organization of free individuals." Maybe, I don't know. But it would be nothing to do with minorities speaking out. Maybe speech and communication have been corrupted. They're thoroughly permeated by money - and not by accident but by their very nature. We've got to hijack speech. Creating has always been something different from communicating. The key thing may be to create vacuoles of noncommunication, circuit breakers, so we can elude control.<sup>412</sup>

Here we can see another break with political praxis as it is advocated in *A Thousand Plateaus*, which was so concerned with minoritarian regimes of enunciation and signification. Expanding, Deleuze says:

So the problem is no longer getting people to express themselves, but providing little gaps of solitude and silence in which they might eventually find something to say. Repressive forces don't stop people from expressing themselves, but rather, force them to express themselves. What a relief to have nothing to say, the right to say nothing, because only then is there a chance of framing the rare, or ever rarer, the thing that might be worth saying.<sup>413</sup>

Deleuze here is making a normative political claim, but it could also be read ontologically in the capacity of Bataille; that the very nature of the world itself, as the world under capitalism, is constituted by and itself produces affects or forces which elicit communication; or rather, that these very forces *are* communication. Since communication is permeated by money, the act of communicating becomes like capital and subject to its flows. Deleuze knows that both money and communication are subject to a certain circuitry

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<sup>412</sup> 'Control and Becoming' in *Negotiations* pp.174-175

<sup>413</sup> 'Mediators' in *L'Autre Journal* 8, 1985

and that to enter into this stream is to embody it, to become like it and the forces it is subject to.

The 'vacuole' is a space of "solitude and silence" but the utterance that comes from such a zone is unaccounted for; we might speak of the 'non-communicative utterance' as mere unintelligibility or understand it as a kind of priestly silence, but the usage of the term 'vacuoles' implies a spatiality and an embodiment which is not only purely linguistic. The fold, for Foucault, exists in between the lines of visibility in the apparatus and the lines of enunciation. In fact, as suggested above, any communicator is so thoroughly interpellated and suffused with communication that any question of non-communicativity necessarily concerns the whole subject, their body as well as their language. If we were to push this thought, insofar as one might feasibly say that the entire world is communicative, then the non-communicative subject would necessarily have to be something other than the world as it currently stands. Deleuze's provocation, the call for vacuoles of non-communication, is then a wager of the highest stakes for us that live under communicative capitalism. Concurrently, if communication is the world, then the world is also an apparatus, indeed perhaps the most primary apparatus, then how do we engage with such an entity that necessarily captures our subjectivity? Agamben talks of language itself as being an apparatus and, further, that there is 'no free use' of an apparatus at an ontological level, that the subject is always captured by the apparatus they are using. Perhaps it is appropriate, then, that Agamben's example of the apparatus par excellence is the 'cellular telephone', that beacon of communicativity. We might ask here if communication is really a commodity; all one needs to do is look at the rise of Apple, Google and other corporations whose *raison d'être* is to produce smartphones, web browsers and other apparatus of connectivity, or the algorithms contained within the very webpages that these apparatuses agglomerate, which construe your clicks as a vote, an endorsement of and participation in whatever ideology they espouse in particular and connectivity itself in general. These are drains for our immaterial labour and the products thereof.

Communication, as we have seen however, is not just the way in which the product is made, the act of labouring, but also the commodity that is produced, that which is communicated. Therefore and ultimately, the question that needs to be asked: is there a way of communicating that breaks with communication itself so as to be something other

than merely reducible to the movements of capital? A final quote from Agamben:

It is clear that ever since Homo sapiens first appeared, there have been apparatuses; but we could say that today there is not even a single instant in which the life of individuals is not modelled, contaminated, or controlled by some apparatus. In what way, then, can we confront this situation, what strategy must we follow in our everyday hand-to-hand struggle with apparatuses? What we are looking for is neither simply to destroy them nor, as some naively suggest, to use them in the correct way.<sup>414</sup>

Thus a new problem emerges: we are caught in a dialectic between, at either extreme, an absolute passibility to the event or a nihilistic rejection of the world. It cannot be the case either, then, that one must seek nihilistic envelopment in communication, to accelerate the proliferation of apparatuses destructively. On the one hand there is the white wall of the immured priest that might disconnect from all apparatuses and block out all external fluxes, on the other those who are too passible to affects that might deterritorialize the subject. For a thinker like Jean-François Lyotard, postmodern art contains the capacity for a rejuvenation of Kantian sublimity: he advocates for a more intense *aisthesis*, a passibility to the event. In Bergsonian terms, this would indicate a less rational or contracted receptivity, or an encounter with the event in which the conditioning power of memory is resisted - a pure aesthetic sensation. Such an event is equated with a vitalist sublime; Lyotard's reinterpretation of nihilism is then that moment in which rationality is allowed to legislate absolutely over the event and no libidinal passibility is forthcoming. In complete contrast, if nihilism is an insensitivity or a lack of passibility to the event, in Deleuze and Guattari, the figure of the schizophrenic is one who embodies the opposite problem, an extreme oversensitivity to the event, a body that is too passible to the flows of matter. This is the figure that Meillassoux names 'the communicator', and who worryingly encompasses the capacity for creativity: too much passibility, or a lack of a vacuole signifies the dissolution of the self into the environment of capital, flows of affect directed by capital, and a becoming-schizophrenic;

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<sup>414</sup> *What is an Apparatus?*

One tends towards chaos when one invents, when one creates, but there is nothing one intends less than actually catching up with it. It is at once a tendential and anti-regulative model: we must continually approach the chaos which governs the propensity to create, and continually guard against falling into it.<sup>415</sup>

In the 'Postscript...' Deleuze is concerned about the hijacking of creativity by market forces precisely because of its power to direct and control vital forces of creativity. Meillassoux ends his essay, which is worth quoting in full, with a description of the delicate balance that must be struck between the two modes of thought, the nihilistic, calcifying thought of the priest and the annihilative, schizophrenic thought of the communicator:

In short, we have two deaths, one of which is worse than the other - and this is indeed why to think with Deleuze - really to think - is something as rare as it is difficult: because to think is to become a neighbour to the worse of the two, and to risk the becoming-chaos of life, its infinite becoming-creative. To think is twice victorious to cross the Acheron: it is to visit the dead, or rather death, and above all to succeed in returning; to remain a structured living being, having tested oneself against the nascent deconstruction of new fluxes; to maintain oneself in the Outside, but to hold oneself close, thus to some degree closed, and thus to discipline into writing a chaotic experience. Or again, to say it even better, no longer with Nerval but with Deleuze: to think is *thrice victorious* to cross the Acheron. For it is to have the courage to *set out once again* towards the worst of two deaths, after having escaped at least once before: it is to return to the worst, knowing all the while that it is the worst - because, after all, how could one do otherwise?<sup>416</sup>

## Conclusion

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<sup>415</sup> 'Subtraction and Contraction' pg.106

<sup>416</sup> 'Subtraction and Contraction' 107

Transcendence is a fundamental part of mysticism; both Foucault and Agamben are concerned with this theme and the transcendental aspect. Mysticism demarcates a space of interiority and the boundary-crossing thereof - Foucault critiques interiority but maintains the distinction between inside and outside as part of his theory of subjectivity, instead turning to a Kantian regulative ideal in order to create a principle of subjective agency and transformation. In rejecting any sort of transcendence, ultimately this secular mysticism only describes the threshold - it cannot cross it. However, Deleuze negates this interior-exterior binary altogether: the outside is to be found everywhere, as the interstices between the pleats of matter. The categories of the *outside* and *silence* are remoulded into that of the nonhuman and noncommunication. In this sense it is not reducible to any debate about Kantian 'correlation', but rather is a rejection of the correlation as such: there can never be a dualism or a binary opposition here because the subject is constantly being folded and refolded by its outside - which is to say the nonhuman components that constitute its being. While Foucault posits a distinction between a rational interiority and an irrational exteriority, this is based upon a misreading (or, if not a misreading a less-than-charitable reading) of the mysticism Foucault himself rejects. Contrary to the transcendental threshold crossing that Foucault appears to want the outside to be, for Deleuze "as long as the outside is folded an inside is coextensive with it, as memory is coextensive with forgetting."<sup>417</sup> For Deleuze, the Outside is not something absolute, there are degrees of intensity of 'outsidedness', multiple powers of inorganic becoming. The human is merely contracted elements of the nonhuman and the inorganic and to deterritorialize the self is to enter into a becoming with these nonhuman elements.

While it at first appears to be a technical term or prosaic methodological device, the concept of the apparatus affords a surprisingly fecund debate and another point of tension between Deleuze and Foucault. Deleuze consistently resists the finitude of the apparatus and the interpretation of it as a trap, as per Agamben's more alarmist comments; while Foucault and Agamben interpret the apparatus as a process of desubjectification or subjection, Deleuze continually insists upon the transformative capacity of the apparatus and the subject's ability to exit out from under its horizon. Nevertheless, Agamben's genealogy of the apparatus provides a convincing argument by which we might claim that control is enacted from a distance and upon the micrological aspects of our lives. It is a

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<sup>417</sup> *Foucault* pg.108 Foucault himself talks of the 'thought of the outside' as "Not reflection, but forgetting..."



molecular form of governance to complement the molar forms that were the sites of contest in the 20th century. Its danger lies in its imperceptibility and its ability to effectuate itself through apparatuses that are seemingly mundane or harmless, especially apparatuses of communication. Coding acts directly on matter which makes individuals.

Yet, a blind affirmation of the powers of movement and creativity is too dangerous to prescribe as a political programme. Throughout *A Thousand Plateaus*, caution is continually advised. What would, then, a cautious programme of creative subjective transformation look like? The next and final chapter will consider the ideas of the New Brain from *Cinema 2* and the New Earth as possible answers to this question.

## 5: Image, New Brain, New Earth

### Introduction: The Problem of Unbelief

Lucien Febvre's work *The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century* asks whether it was possible that Rabelais could have been an atheist. Rather than a question about counterfactual speculation, Febvre is asking a question about the limits of intellectual and conceptual apparatus; whether, at that particular historical conjuncture, atheism was conceivable. For the purposes of the current thesis, I am not interested in the answer to this question of Rabelais' atheism per se, but rather the means by which Febvre delimits the intellectual possibilities of the sixteenth century. This is because I want to extrapolate from this historical question an ontological and political stake for our own current situation which pertains to Deleuze's theory of subjectivity: if atheism qua 'a thinkable alternative to the hegemony of the common sense' in the sixteenth century (i.e. that God exists) was not conceptually accessible to Rabelais, then to which intellectual possibilities that are counter to our situation (i.e. global neoliberal capitalism) do we, at current, not have access? Or rather, if these possibilities are truly inaccessible to us, then how do we bring about the conditions for their emergence? This is, in fact, the precise question that Deleuze engages with in his work on cinema.

What Rabelais did not achieve, according to Febvre's book, is an epistemic catastrophe - something akin to Nietzsche's proclamation that "God is dead", which ultimately is not a negation of God's existence ("God does not exist") but a subordination of God to a product of man's imagination.<sup>418</sup> For the madman in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* it is 'we' who have buried God, relocating the position of the deity from an ontological to a psychological presupposition. Such a demotion is also an affirmation of the power of human imagination, that humans may incorporate within their dreams and thinking a principle of existence itself. Further to this, Nietzsche's proclamation is a call to imagine differently: to imagine a world in which our possibilities are no longer only within the horizon of God and the church. To use

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<sup>418</sup> This reading is indebted to Daniel C. Barber's *Deleuze and the Naming of God*

one's imagination in this way is to develop a tool, a conceptual apparatus with which to envisage a new political world - perhaps the hammer with which Nietzsche topples the idols of philosophy. The stakes of this wager are imbricated in what Febvre and the Annales school of which he was a part call 'mentalité': the mental life of the age in which a given person lived or a particular mode of subjectivity is instantiated. He writes:

Every period mentally constructs its own universe. It constructs it not only out of all the materials at its disposal, all the facts (true or false) that it has inherited or acquired, but out of its own gifts, its particular cleverness, its qualities, its talents and its interests - everything that distinguishes it from previous periods.<sup>419</sup>

This includes ways of thinking, the mental tools available and, crucially, the 'sense of the impossible'. As Febvre puts it: "No religious thought - no thought of any kind - however pure and disinterested is unaffected by the climate of a period. Or, if you prefer, by the hidden operation of the conditions of life that a particular period creates for all the conventions and all the manifestations that meet on its common ground..."<sup>420</sup> In other words, a historical conjuncture's intellectual peculiarities and particularities are predicated upon its specific given materialities. The way in which one thinks and even that which one can possibly think is predicated upon the world in which one is. This "hidden" relationship - between thought and materiality - must be coextensive, or appear already-connected as such: we should recall Marx's comment that "Capital thus becomes a very mystic being since all of labour's social productive forces appear to be due to capital, rather than labour as such, and seem to issue from the womb of capital itself."<sup>421</sup> Our possibilities of thought and therefore what we can conceive of are limited by our material world. The problematic, then, has an apophatic register to it; it is not a question of what we know, but what we do not (yet) know, or what we cannot know. "As Febvre puts it, some thoughts and feelings were not possible in the sixteenth century. The content of men's minds was affected by the material conditions under which they lived, the ideas they inherited, and the ways in which they organized their thoughts." What emerges again is the question of negative theology that haunted Foucault, perhaps even a gnostic question: how do we - mere creatures - gain knowledge of that which creates us - our creator?

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<sup>419</sup> *The Problem of Unbelief* pg.2

<sup>420</sup> *The Problem of Unbelief* pg.5

<sup>421</sup> See Marx, *Capital Volume III*, Chapter 48

One might, after reading Febvre, frame the issue in terms of 'mental tools': "Every civilization has its own mental tools. Even more, every era of the same civilization, every advance in technology, or science that gives it its character, has a revised set of tools, a little more refined for certain purposes, a little less so for others." Indeed, in the section entitled 'Mental Tools: Missing Words'... Febvre lists concepts and phrases that, during the sixteenth century, have not yet emerged into French lexicon and therefore cannot function conceptually in the thought of the period, as well noting the absence of an as-yet fully-functioning algebra, arithmetic or calculus in a section titled 'The Lack of Tools and of a Scientific Language'. Among these terms are "absolute", "relative", "abstract", "concrete", "confused", "complex" and so on. This list functions as an inventory of missing conceptual tools, or the components that might make up a new apparatus of thought. One had to resort to Latin if one were to philosophise and Latin does not have at its disposal all the tools that one might require. Think, for example, of the introduction of Arabic numerals in the West which eventually came to replace the Roman system - which, crucially, included a numerical sign for zero that was missing in Latin numerals. The development of such a sign enables new trajectories of thought in the same manner as the creation of calculus or a new lexicon; Febvre's point, which is not one to which we need necessarily to subscribe, is that Descartes, by bringing these terms into French created a *new way of thinking*. Or, if we do not want to go that far, rather that philosophising in the newer language of French affords cognitive possibilities that were not available to Latinate thinkers.

Deleuze, in his interview with Foucault 'Intellectuals and Power' seems to align with Febvre when he states: "That's what a theory is, exactly like a toolbox... A theory has to be used, it has to work... A theory won't be totalized, it multiplies. It's rather in the nature of power to totalize, and you [Foucault] say it exactly: theory by its nature is opposed to power." So the question facing us, then, is: if theory is a tool and in any given time we are necessarily without the totality of tools, which methods of opposition to power are we without? This summons another question: how do we develop a theory adequate to that with which we are faced in our contemporary existence? If it is true that, as Deleuze and Guattari claim in *A Thousand Plateaus*, "there is no longer a tripartite division between a field of reality and a field of representation and a field of subjectivity", then how best to write about our contemporary situation? What is the best language for discussing something the objectivity

of which is always and necessarily compromised? How can a theory adequate to the situation of capitalism be brought to bear?

In this chapter, I will show how Deleuze's late work attempts to tackle this problem, first by adapting the theory of the fold into the theory of the New Brain in *Cinema 2* and how this idea both develops and problematizes the machinic theory of *A Thousand Plateaus* and the image of the New Earth found in *Anti-Oedipus*, *A Thousand Plateaus* and *What is Philosophy?*. I will then show how the theory of the New Brain directly interacts with the temporal subject and allows for the emergence of new subjectivities. Whereas in *A Thousand Plateaus* the world is described as the interconnectedness of machinic processes and in *The Fold* the reciprocal relation between folding and unfolding, in the *Cinema* books, Deleuze's primary concept of interest is the crack or break, which is instantiated in multiple ways and registers. This is not to say that the concept of fissure or discontinuity is new in these late works, indeed it is a constant facet of Deleuze's oeuvre, rather only that he is particularly concerned with developing this aspect here, whether it be a crack in the time crystal, or a break in the sensory-motor apparatus.

## **Cinema 2: The Time Image**

The cinema and the spectacle that it generates is very amenable to a theory of ideology.<sup>422</sup> But as we have seen in the previous chapter, Deleuze sees ideology as too broad a concept that papers over the actual mechanics of events taking place at the infinitesimal level. Yet the pure power of the cinema and its potential for coding behaviour and sociality on a mass scale is a problem for Deleuze nonetheless. Deleuze deals with both sides of this issue, that of cinematic overcoding and of the emancipatory possibilities brought about through cinema. This latter concept in no way refers to an ideological emancipation, but rather a subjective one, brought about through a new form of image developed by post-war cinema.

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<sup>422</sup> Of note, Žižek and Badiou have written extensively on cinema in the capacity of ideology and from primarily a Lacanian perspective; this differs from Deleuze on the grounds that such an approach is concerned with the coercive potential of representation rather than the generation of subjectivity.

What is the image? We have already encountered concepts named 'the image' in Deleuze's thought, most notably the 'dogmatic image of thought' that was developed in *Difference and Repetition*. However it is in the *Cinema* books, which are subtitled the 'Movement-Image' and the 'Time-Image' respectively, that Deleuze redevelops the concept of the image in his work through a return to Bergson. We recall from the second chapter that the Bergsonian image is both a representation and a thing-in-itself, or more accurately "a certain existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a representation, but less than that which a realist calls a thing"<sup>423</sup>, both matter and memory, both real and ideal. For Deleuze, there is already an image of thought on the plane of immanence as a sort of precondition for thought proper to occur; in this way, philosophy already has a structure from which it begins and structures that which proceeds from it. This sense of the term image is criticised in *Difference and Repetition* and in *What is Philosophy?* as being guilty of inculcating a kind of good sense or common doxa, which is in no small manner a component of Deleuze's critique of Kant. In the third chapter of *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze postulates eight features of what might constitute the image of thought that serves as the target of his critique, which is to say a formal description of the notion of interiority that we discussed in the previous chapter. In order, these are:

- the postulate of the principle, that of the presupposed reasonableness of the thinker and the unity or 'health' of thought in general;
- the postulate of the ideal, a reliability of good sense, a concord of the faculties working together to produce a reliable result;
- the postulate of the model, that of the same recognition in a concept amongst different faculties of the thinker, that the concord of the faculties is shared among subjects and constitutes objects in the same way, thus producing a reliable model;
- the postulate of the element, which is the subordination of difference to the categories of representation, namely similarity, analogy and opposition;
- the postulate of the negative, in which errors of thought are represented as taking place outside of the space of reason, which is to say an interiority;
- the postulate of logical function,

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<sup>423</sup> *Matter and Memory* xii

- the postulate of modality, where a problem is stated in terms of its already-discovered solution, the fallacy of begging-the-question, or the false problem;
- and the postulate of the end, or that thought is defined as the teleological result of an experiment in knowledge, as opposed to a free exercise of sense.<sup>424</sup>

This list forms a general description of the Kantian system of judgement (as an exemplar of conventional philosophical thought) against which Deleuze argues. Because the system of judgement includes as a presupposition the image of a subject, it is unable to account for such a subject which is constituted via processes that are not articulable within the representations that judgement produces. The image of thought is then a synonym for a representation of thinking rather than pure thought itself; such an image of thought is closely related to interiority, the boundaries of which are demarcated by processes often defined by the state or royal science, an apparatus of public opinion or doxa. "The image of thought implies a strict division between fact and right: what pertains to thought as such must be distinguished from contingent features of the brain or historical opinions."<sup>425</sup> This interiorising function groups together disparate elements, relates them to and interprets them in the light of a transcendental signifier, an abstract object such as a nation or royalty. The image of thought is complicit in the generation of representations whereas pure thought is without representation, including without subjective representation: it is not 'mine' as in the Cartesian cogito, but rather must become adequate to the inhuman processes which make up a subject, the larval selves or microbrains, to the 'I' that is another which is 'outside'; "It is the brain that thinks and not man - the latter being only a cerebral crystallization."<sup>426</sup> For Deleuze, there are moments in Bergson's philosophy that achieve such a thought - and the reconceptualization of the image is one such moment.

As we have already seen in chapter two, for Bergson matter is already an image, which is to say not a representation produced by the brain, but that which is both real and ideal, yet neither entirely one or the other. Images contain other images within them, form linkages and are both organic and inorganic. The brain is a privileged image insofar as it is the membrane between the inner world (the imaginary) and the outside as well as the organ of

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<sup>424</sup> See *Difference and Repetition* pp.167

<sup>425</sup> *What is Philosophy?* pg.37

<sup>426</sup> *What is Philosophy?* pg.210

perception of imagery, both inner and outer. The image is in the brain in the same way that the brain is a real structure that is nevertheless always-already within consciousness. The brain is itself, then, an image, which is engaged in a process of selection, between that which should elicit a response and that which is tuned-out. This process of selection, which exists between stimulus and response, reveals Bergsonian duration, insofar as duration is "the inadequacy of thought to action", which is to say the gap between sensation and the body's motor response to that sensation. The longer we can exist in the delay between stimulus and response is the degree to which we are within duration; as we saw in chapter two, for Bergson free will emerges only when one acts within duration, which is achieved by a kind of self-conscious reflection called intuition. When one uses intuition with a certain degree of intensity, claims Bergson, one can access without mediation pure duration itself. The degree of intensity of duration then constitutes the delay between stimulus and response - and it is in this space where one is neither affected nor reacting to the affect that one is free. It is in this way that the image opens out into the temporal and subjective concerns under discussion here. The Bergsonian image then contains a triad of parts: perception, affection and reaction.

Such a triad makes up a movement-image, which can be perceived in the present moment. In the same manner, memory, too, is composed of virtual images that feed into and make up the present: "The virtual image (pure recollection) is not a psychological state or a consciousness: it exists outside of consciousness, in time, and we should have no more difficulty in admitting the virtual insistence of pure recollections in time than we do for the actual existence of non-perceived objects in space."<sup>427</sup> This sense of memory and opinion is inherent to the movement-image insofar as, Deleuze claims, the movement-image is indicative and generative of cliché and relies on stock visuals and characters in order to stimulate affect. However, the stakes here are higher than merely a critique of the art of cinema as these definitions and descriptions of images are also speaking to matter itself, the universe as a machinic composition of linked images. We must not forget when interrogating this concept that a Bergsonian image is an epistemological and ontological concept and it is this sense of the term that Deleuze is using in *Cinema 2* alongside the conventional sense of pictures on a screen; indeed there is a sense in which Deleuze is using the Bergsonian image, qua a contraction of pure matter and sensation, against the

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<sup>427</sup> *Cinema 2* pg.80



dogmatic image of thought, qua a state capture of thinking through interiorisation. As such, the primary thinkers Deleuze engages with in *Cinema 2* are Bergson and Kant and the book is therefore a return to the Bergsonian critique of Kantian temporality that animated *Difference and Repetition* - Deleuze even invokes the 'formulae' of his Kant book, that 'time is out of joint', that 'I is another' and includes lengthy excurses on the concept of the three syntheses of time. In this way, *Cinema 2* must be read with *Difference and Repetition*, not necessarily as a return but at least as a further engagement with the temporal and subjective concerns described therein.

Deleuze credits Bergson with the discovery of the movement-image in *Matter and Memory* but finds its exemplary instantiation in the cinema. Structurally, the movement-image is a kind of unity that joins together both pure movement and the interstices between moving images. It is ultimately an indirect, representational image of time because what is foregrounded is the movement of images rather than time itself. In other words, the movement-image concerns the linking together of the sensory-motor mechanism into a unified whole. It then contains at its core an Aristotelian concept insofar as time, for Aristotle, was the measure of movement, time is subordinated to the movement that occurs within it. Mirroring Bergson's triad, the movement-image has three constituent images that exist under its sign: the perception-image, the action-image and the affection-image. The perception-image is the point at which a new form of perception is created for the viewer; the action-image is the display of movement; and the affection-image, like the other synthetic triads we have seen from Deleuze, joins the other two, it is created in the gap between action and perception. It is the affection-image that, in *Cinema 1* Deleuze identifies with subjectivity - more specifically with a kind of power that surpasses individual subjectivity and appeals to a more distant unifying function. Depending on its context, this power may be individuating or be at work in the creation of 'dividuals', that ambivalent concept from the 'Postscript...' which could be a crowd of people or a data bank. As opposed to the individual, which "is a whole that can be identified in space and time, a one which is composed in a specific way; it is individual through the complete fullness of its substantial and accidental properties, a fullness that divides nothing"<sup>428</sup>, Gerald Raunig defines the dividual as a power of dispersion:

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<sup>428</sup> *Dividuum* pg.67

As the name says, dividuality first means "dividedness," "divisibility," although oddly enough, not in relation to a whole. In the narrower sense of the word there is already a connotation of "dispersedness." Dividuality implies not (only) the dividedness of entire single things, but rather an extension, a distribution which moves, scatters, disperses, spreads through diverse single things.<sup>429</sup>

As such, "[e]ven though *dividuum* is in diverse single things, it does not one-sidedly stand opposite the *individuum* as a universal." A subject may be an individual, but cannot be a dividual - rather the dividual is a power or function which is effectuated upon and within the individual, in a manner which may be both subjectifying and desubjectifying. The affection-image then has a normalising function, a means towards the state of 'being-One' and unity of movement achieved through emotional overcoding which finds its expression in a display of faciality. The paradigmatic instance of this is in the close-up of a crying or fearful face, with a gaping mouth or enlarged pupils juxtaposed against the surface of the cheeks and forehead.<sup>430</sup> The affective face is a point of subjectification, where the viewer invests their own affect, perhaps the energies of recording and consummation known as *numen* and *voluptas*, either in the black hole which acts to draw in the viewer and in which they may become lost, or in the white wall, which reflects affective energies back at the viewer. The movement-image carries within it a potential to code and overcode and if used by the state is emblematic of the despotic signifier.

It is here that we can suggest a break with the ethics of the political subject as it was construed in *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*, insofar as the political imperative in those books was concerned with an advocacy of movement, desubjectifying lines of flight, lodging oneself on a strata, pushing deterritorialization - whereas in *Cinema 2*, the paradigmatic instance of subjection in the movement-image for Deleuze is the montage, which suggests the presentation of an organic whole of history and as such is amenable to a presentation of state ideology. Films such as those of Sergei Eisenstein present a national myth or narrative of a people; "the movement-image is necessarily the expression of a whole; it forms in this sense an indirect representation of time."<sup>431</sup> Here the action-image joins with the affection-image to produce a mass sensation or mass of sensation:

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<sup>429</sup> *Dividuum* pg.65

<sup>430</sup> See *A Thousand Plateaus* pp.167-171

<sup>431</sup> *Cinema 2* pg.138

Action-thought simultaneously posits the unity of nature and man, of the individual and the mass: cinema as art of the masses. It is for this reason that Eisenstein justifies the primacy of montage: cinema does not have the individual as its subject, nor a plot or history as its object; its object is nature, and its subject the masses, the individuation of mass and not that of a person. What theatre and especially opera had unsuccessfully attempted, cinema achieves (*Battleship Potemkin, October*): to reach the Individual, that is, to individuate a mass as such, instead of leaving it in a qualitative homogeneity or reducing it to a quantitative divisibility.<sup>432</sup>

The individual watching such a montage is subject to a homogenising process where the action-image gathers shots of heterogeneous times under a single sense of affect, whether that be tragedy or triumph. Such a montage is an exercise of narrativization, of linkage and unification. Deleuze writes:

On one hand, the movement-image constitutes time in its empirical form, the course of time: a successive present in an extrinsic relation of before and after, so that the past is a former present, and the future a present to come [...] But time as unity or as totality depends on montage which still relates it back to movement or to the succession of shots. This is why the movement-image is fundamentally linked to an indirect representation of time, and does not give us a direct presentation of it, that is, does not give us a time-image.<sup>433</sup>

This empirical form of time is related to the Kantian model of time as a straight line in the capacity of the relegation of time to movement. As such, embodying the empirical form of time, these processes can be identified with the first two syntheses of time from *Difference and Repetition*, the syntheses of habit and memory, insofar as the synthesis of habit contains within it the contraction of sensation and the synthesis of memory contains the mobilisation of the emotions. The cliché is the repetition of emotions or passions that we have experienced before, drawn from memory and re-encoded in the present, finding form in a medium such as the face. The face of the actor contracts affect, the screen of the

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<sup>432</sup> *Cinema 2* pg.162

<sup>433</sup> *Cinema 2* pg.171

cinema acting as a "nervous surface" or "cerebral volume"<sup>434</sup> upon which these affects are inscribed and reflected.

The movement-image then contains a specific, if not problematic, process of subjectification. In the following volume, Deleuze contrasts such a process with a desubjectifying image. As such as early as the preface of *Cinema 2*, Deleuze reopens the temporal concerns that motivated his encounter with Kant, specifically Kant's critique of Aristotelian time and a discovery of time's pure and empty form:

Over several centuries, from the Greeks to Kant, a revolution took place in philosophy: the subordination of time to movement was reversed, time ceases to be the measurement of normal movement, it increasingly appears for itself and creates paradoxical movements. Time is out of joint: Hamlet's words signify that time is no longer subordinated to movement, but rather movement to time. It could be said that, in its own sphere, cinema has repeated the same experience, the same reversal, in more fast-moving circumstances. The movement-image of the so-called classical cinema gave way, in the post-war period, to a direct time-image.<sup>435</sup>

Deleuze detects a crisis in the movement image post-World War II which involves a complication or even an effacement of the affection image in the cinema being produced, particularly in auteur and arthouse cinema. When this occurs, or because of its gradual effacement, there is a rupture in the sensory-motor apparatus; this opens up new directions for thought insofar as the breakdown of the movement-image allows time to surface directly in a crystallised form. This is a practical instantiation of the stakes involved in the metaphysics of time developed in *Difference and Repetition*. It would be tempting to read the two cinema books and their eponymous images against each other, as if the time-image is the more radical or productive of the two, but Deleuze writes that

There are many possible transformations, almost imperceptible passages, and also combinations between the movement-image and the time-image. It cannot be said

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<sup>434</sup> *What is Philosophy?* pg.221

<sup>435</sup> *Cinema 2* i

that one is more important than the other, whether more beautiful or more profound. All that can be said is that the movement-image does not give us a time-image.<sup>436</sup>

As we have seen above, the movement-image also contains processes of subjection, of making and coding subjectivities. These images are not aesthetic, they are machinic. The movement-image may not contain a time-image, but rather produces one as a residue of its breakdown. In a similar manner to how the present cannot contain the third synthesis of time, that it exists in excess of it, the time-image exists as a non-representational substratum of the movement-image. Deleuze writes:

For, on the other hand, the movement-image gives rise to an image of time which is distinguished from it by excess or default, over or under the present as empirical progression: in this case, time is no longer measured by movement, but is itself the number or measure of movement (metaphysical representation). This number in turn has two aspects, which we saw in the first volume: it is the minimum unity of time as interval of movement or the totality of time as maximum of movement in the universe. The subtle and the sublime. But, from either aspect, time is distinguished in this way from movement only as indirect representation. Time as progression derives from the movement-image or from successive shots. But time as unity or as totality depends on montage which still relates it back to movement or to the succession of shots. This is why the movement-image is fundamentally linked to an indirect representation of time, and does not give us a direct presentation of it, that is, does not give us a time-image.<sup>437</sup>

What then is the time-image and why is it incompatible with the movement-image? Whereas the movement-image functioned as a contraction of sensation and a mobilisation of emotional memory, which pertains to the first two syntheses of time, the Time-Image pertains to the third synthesis of *Difference and Repetition*, the pure and empty form of time. Taken together, the first two syntheses give an empirical image of time insofar as it gives rise to a phenomenology of the passing of time, while the third synthesis is a transcendental ground for the other two. It forms a caesura or pause in movement which in

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<sup>436</sup> *Cinema 2* pg.270

<sup>437</sup> *Cinema 2* pg.271

its antiproductivity reveals the conditions for such a pause, the empty caesura. Deleuze describes the difference between the two images:

But in modern cinema, by contrast, the time-image is no longer empirical, nor metaphysical; it is 'transcendental' in the sense that Kant gives this word: time is out of joint and presents itself in the pure state. The time-image does not imply the absence of movement (even though it often includes its increased scarcity) but it implies the reversal of the subordination; it is no longer time which is subordinate to movement; it is movement which subordinates itself to time. It is no longer time which derives from movement, from its norm and its corrected aberrations; it is movement as false movement, as aberrant movement which now depends on time. The time-image has become direct, just as time has discovered new aspects, as movement has become aberrant in essence and not by accident, as montage has taken on a new sense, and as a so-called modern cinema has been constituted post-war.<sup>438</sup>

Whereas the movement-image is a unitary synthesis of parts which bears an indirect relationship to time, the time-image is a slice of pure time; like duration, it exists in between stimulus and response, in the interstices of what Deleuze calls the sensory-motor apparatus. It is at this point, like in *Difference and Repetition*, that time crystallises, because the virtual and actual images meet in immanence. Or rather, that in the circuit between virtual and actual, the crystal is the moment of the smallest possible difference between the two. When we can no longer tell the difference between virtual and actual, we have encountered immanence. Clayton Crockett defines this process:

The crystalline form of the time-image is crucial, but this zone of indiscernibility constitutes the passage to the time-image proper. Deleuze says that the crystal is an expression, which means an articulation or a layer in the terms of *A Thousand Plateaus*. But it is the smallest possible layer, and it shows the formation of time in its structure (mirror) and genesis (seed). [...] The pure virtuality of the past is a pure recollection that exists outside of consciousness and time. The recollection-image carries the sign of the past as pure virtuality.<sup>439</sup>

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<sup>438</sup> *Cinema 2* pg.271

<sup>439</sup> *Deleuze Beyond Badiou* pg.94

The time-image directly presents the third synthesis of time and the crystal represents a time image. In interrupting the flow of the movement image, it puts time out of joint. We may now recall the effects of the third synthesis of time on the subject: it creates empty spaces in the psyche, it returns thought to the brute inorganic and asubjective conditions of creation and injects futurity, which Deleuze names a 'forgetting'. The challenge of rising to the eternal return freezes the subject beholding the time-image, and yet there is a kind of clarity in its emptiness and immobility.

### **The Brain, The Outside, The Crystal**

At the end of *Cinema 2* the brain becomes a screen. All of the cracks in the crystal reveal an interstice that connects everything together. "The interval is set free, the interstice becomes irreducible and stands on its own. The first consequence is that the images are no longer linked by rational cuts, but are relinked on to irrational cuts."<sup>440</sup> This screen inserts itself between the inside and outside of thought; like a cinema, the outside is projected onto it, while the observer inside the theatre watches the obverse. The brain is the membrane, which is to say the interstice, between inside and outside, as it was for Bergson when it was characterised as an image both in matter and mind. The brain is itself a kind of crystallisation or crystal image where the virtual and actual meet - the folds in the cerebellum are folds in matter and in mind. Screen and fold, or the folded screen is the new image of subjectivity and a brain is such a folded screen:

The screen itself is the cerebral membrane where immediate and direct confrontations take place between the past and the future, the inside and the outside, at a distance impossible to determine, independent of any fixed point [...]  
The image no longer has space and movement as its primary characteristics but topology and time.<sup>441</sup>

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<sup>440</sup> *Cinema 2* pg.277

<sup>441</sup> *Cinema 2* pg.125

In this passage Deleuze shows that the screen is the surface on which the convergence between the third synthesis of time and the subject takes place, modified such that the outside is the indifference of the death-drive or return to the inorganic. The brain of the subject acts as mediator between inside and outside, the folded permeable membrane which is also flat, a surface. The folds may be read as intensive qualities (in the soul) and as such the screen still remains as a filter between the internal and external. Deleuze writes of the time-image:

We are in fact no longer in the classical regime where a whole would internalize images and be externalized in images, constituting an indirect representation of time, and being able to receive from music a direct presentation. What has now become direct is a time-image for itself, with its two dissymmetric, non-totalizable sides, fatal when they touch, that of an outside more distant than any exterior, and that of an inside deeper than any interior, here where a musical speech rises and is torn away, there where the visible is covered over or buried.<sup>442</sup>

"It is the brain that says *I*, but *I* is an other."<sup>443</sup> Construction of a time-image exemplifies Deleuze's nullification of the inside-outside binary. In the first Freudian synthesis from *Difference and Repetition*, contraction takes place in order to establish an interior that is safe from too much excitation. In the same way that an assemblage faces the plane of consistency and the Body without Organs, the Freudian psyche faces nervous excitation from both inside and outside - both of which are out of the grasp of the understanding. For Freud, when this nervous energy is incorporated into the psyche (Oedipus) there is a decrease in the agitation felt by the subject, as these energies have the potential to destabilise the psyche.<sup>444</sup> In order to effect a maximum pleasure (or rather, a minimum displeasure) the organism organises itself in such a way as to minimise interference from these excitations from both inside and outside. Against external stimuli an organism develops a corresponding inorganic defence - such methods of protection are correlated with the sophistication of the organism: a eukaryote protects its nucleus with a simple cell wall, whereas a human protects its brain with a skull.

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<sup>442</sup> *Cinema 2* pg.261

<sup>443</sup> *What is Philosophy?* pg.211

<sup>444</sup> See *Difference and Repetition* pp.105-107 on 'Primary Repression'



When the time-image emerges, like the Body without Organs, it interrupts the production of sense that the movement-image makes. How does this work within the time-image?

In erasing the boundary between inside and outside, the very distinction between the two no longer applies.

The new images no longer have any outside (out-of-field), any more than they are internalized in a whole; rather, they have a right side and a reverse, reversible and non-superimposable, like a power to turn back on themselves. They are the object of a perpetual reorganization, in which a new image can arise from any point whatever of the preceding image. The organization of space here loses its privileged directions, and first of all the privilege of the vertical which the position of the screen still displays, in favour of an omni-directional space which constantly varies its angles and co-ordinates, to exchange the vertical and the horizontal. And the screen itself, even if it keeps a vertical position by convention, no longer seems to refer to the human posture, like a window or a painting, but rather constitutes a table of information, an opaque surface on which are inscribed 'data', information replacing nature, and the brain-city, the third eye, replacing the eyes of nature. Finally, sound achieving an autonomy which increasingly lends it the status of image, the two images, sound and visual, enter into complex relations with neither subordination nor commensurability, and reach a common limit in so far as each reaches its own limit. In all these senses, the new spiritual automatism in turn refers to new psychological automata.<sup>445</sup>

It appears that Deleuze is suggesting here that images themselves gain a power not dissimilar to that of subjectification, that in turning back on themselves they grant themselves a power of self-constitution, that the image gains an inhuman subjectivity. Such a subjectivity is like duration insofar as it is free, not measurable or bounded by spatial coordinates. Such passages demonstrate that the time-image is not just an aesthetic or phenomenological account of a cinematic process, but rather an attempt by Deleuze to describe that meeting point of subjectification and desubjectification, inner sense and outside, or the simultaneous deterritorialization through aesthetics and the construction of a new brain. The passage to this new brain is achieved through the time crystal:

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<sup>445</sup> *Cinema 2* pp.265-266

It is time itself which arises in the crystal, and which is constantly recommending its dividing in two without completing it, since the indiscernible exchange is always renewed and reproduced. The direct time-image or the transcendental form of time is what we see in the crystal; and hyalosigns, and crystalline signs, should therefore be called mirrors or seeds of time.<sup>446</sup>

The pure and empty form of time in *Difference and Repetition* becomes visible within the time-image of *Cinema 2*. What change has occurred here? Whereas the third synthesis of time is an indifferent synthesis that irrupts uninvited into one's life, a time image can be made or constructed. It is a percept. This is both a political and ethical principle. The crystal is a refrain and the refrain holds chaos at bay; "[c]rystalline perfection lets no outside subsist."<sup>447</sup> This is, in a significant way, the apogee of Deleuze's line of thought that pertains to problems and solutions, or the creation of concepts. The construction of time-images will in turn engender the production of a New Brain. This is an open-ended process:

Everything can be used as a screen, the body of a protagonist or even the bodies of the spectators; everything can replace the film stock, in a virtual film which now only goes on in the head, behind the pupils, with sound sources taken as required from the auditorium. A disturbed brain-death or a new brain which would be at once the screen, the film stock and the camera, each time membrane of the outside and the inside?<sup>448</sup>

If the 'man' is only a 'cerebral crystallisation' of the brain, which is to say a specific folding of matter, a New Brain may be developed for a people to come, who can be brought into existence, which in itself requires philosophy, or the creation of concepts and art, or the creation of percepts. The percept is the aesthetic counterpart, then, to the concept:

the brain, under its first aspect of absolute form, appears as the faculty of concepts, that is to say, as the faculty of their creation, at the same time that it sets up the

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<sup>446</sup> *Cinema 2* pg.274

<sup>447</sup> *Cinema 2* pg.83

<sup>448</sup> *Cinema 2* pg.215

plane of immanence on which concepts are placed, move, change order and relations, are renewed, and never cease being created. The brain is the *mind* itself.<sup>449</sup>

This diagrams how the brain becomes a mind for the subject, how the objective physical brain becomes the conceptual subjective correlate; and reciprocally “[a]t the same time that the brain becomes subject [...] the concept becomes object as created, as event or creation itself; and philosophy becomes the plane of immanence that supports the concepts and that the brain lays out.”<sup>450</sup> It is in this way, Deleuze and Guattari claim, that thought has the ability to affect matter itself. The reality of neuroplasticity dictates that such a presupposition be held as a basic tenet of thought. In this way, we have another relay between virtual and actual and a process of actualisation, where specifically the actuality of percepts affects the virtual plane of immanence through the brain.

This is, in effect, an answer to Manfred Frank’s challenge as to the coercive potential of codes and overcoding. A code becomes actual in the same way that a concept becomes an object, through a process of actualisation. What Frank neglects is that it is a coded *flow* which has the capacity to affect matter and not merely the code itself. Secondly to this, but no less indicative of a misunderstanding, is that capitalism is an enterprise of decoding flows and yet still maintains the ability to govern and control behaviour. Indeed, capitalism contains the potential for absolute decoding, or absolute deterritorialization - it is the state which is the primary force of coding. This is all to say that the powers of control within communicative capitalism are not at all entirely contained within the realm of semiotics, but rather there is an effect upon and a governance of the real and matter itself. This includes, but is not limited to, a modulation of temporality which allows for new subjectivities to be created.

The time-image allows for the generation of new subjectivities because it enacts the third synthesis of time, which shreds the old subject, shattering the dogmatic image of thought by injecting the challenge of the future. If the time-image opens out onto the third synthesis of time, then it necessarily also encounters the eternal return and the ethical challenges implied within. One of Badiou’s criticisms of Deleuze was that in his later work, Deleuze retreated into aesthetics and remained apolitical. Yet, from what on the surface may appear

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<sup>449</sup> *What is Philosophy?* pg.211

<sup>450</sup> *What is Philosophy?* pg.211

to be a phenomenology of cinema or of aesthetic perception, there is a political ethics to be discerned - and one that is consistent with Deleuze's philosophy writ large. That is, the creation of a new brain - for a people to-come but do not yet exist - which would enable the creation of a new subjectivity. That one should act now for a time one hopes will come, in a way such that it could be willed to eternally recur. This is a very different political programme from Badiou and even Agamben, who emphasise waiting for an event to take place. For these thinkers, as well as in Žižek, the proper ethics of the political event lie in Pauline and messianic Jewish theology, which emphasise a patient waiting for the arrival of the messiah, which is re-encoded as some form of political revolution or awakening.<sup>451</sup> Deleuze, at least, offers a speculative answer to Lenin's question: what is to be done?

### **Meditation as Time-Image**

What might it mean to construct a time-image in the hopes of making a new brain? The idea is obviously not purely relegated to the cinema - indeed, it would be hard to take seriously the claim that political emancipation lies only in us becoming a director and making films which contain a very particular kind of shot. Rather, there are other ways of making a time-image and subsequently a New Brain for ourselves and others, certain moments in the history of cinema being merely exemplary of such an image. By means of an example, I want to suggest that the practice and teaching of meditation is one possible way of constructing and accessing a time-image, insofar as a time-image is a kind of gateway to immanence; the cracking of the crystal and the interstice in the sensory-motor apparatus are both ways in which this gateway can be made. The following is meant to be merely an illustrative and not exhaustive or exemplary account, but only one of many ways of making a time-image.

The name meditation is necessarily broad and can apply to a huge swathe of practices and traditions; for brevity here I will be referring to what is commonly called 'mindfulness' meditation for two primary reasons: its popularity and its clinically-proven efficacy.<sup>452</sup> This

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<sup>451</sup> See Agamben's *The Time that Remains*, Badiou's *Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism*, Žižek's *The Ticklish Subject* and *The Puppet and the Dwarf*

<sup>452</sup> See Simkin DR, Black NB. 'Meditation and mindfulness in clinical practice' in *Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Clinics of North America* 2014 23(3) pp.487-534. See also: 'Research Review: The effects

type of meditation, arguably a secular or desacralised version of techniques found in traditions as diverse as Mahayana and Zen, has entered into assemblage with Western clinical practices, the foremost of which is Cognitive Behavioural Therapy, and found both psychologically therapeutic and physically analgesic applications. When one meditates in a certain way, a sense of mindfulness is said to arise, which is to say that mindfulness is a cognitive state that is experienced subjectively as a result of practicing a form of meditation, the manner of which may vary. As such, a generic account is invoked here, but one which is specific and restricted in scope: the following does not necessarily apply to, for example, transcendental meditation.

To momentarily adopt phenomenological nomenclature and speaking abstractly, in meditation what happens is the bifurcation of the noesis-noema correlation. In other words, noesis (qua intentional, directed thought) is split from noema (qua the sense-data content of thought) such that the mind experiences itself immanently, it thinks only that it is thinking. One may focus their attention on a certain phenomena (a mantra or the sensation of the breath) and merely observe the passing of noema through time, as a thought arises in the mind and subsequently disappears. The meditator withdraws from or withholds the intentional aspect of consciousness, a relaxation in the tension-contraction of consciousness - and passively observes the automatic production of noematic content without appending egoic statements to this flow of thoughts. When this intentionality towards noema arises in consciousness, the subject is taught to return one's focus to that which is acting as an anchor for their thought; this constant application of intentional thought to interoceptive phenomena is the method of generating a mindful state, which is to say experiencing with a maximal degree of intensity, or in Bergsonian terms, with one's whole soul. In certain traditions, such as those which emphasise an ontology of nonduality, the goal of meditating is that cognitive awareness may learn to drop this intention towards noema entirely, such that awareness is only aware of itself without separation or transcendence - noema folds in upon itself and creates an immanent relay at the point in which virtual and actual encounter each other. Such practitioners often report a sense of time-consciousness itself falling away and a feeling of a momentary loss of the identity of the self. All that remains at this point is pure duration, or the pure and empty form of time,

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of mindfulness-based interventions on cognition and mental health in children and adolescents – a meta-analysis of randomized controlled trials' *Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry*. 2019 Mar; 60(3): 244–258.

outside of thought and ego. Successfully engaging in mindfulness meditation, then, is an attempt to produce a time-image, to experience for oneself a slice of pure time.

There are several platitudinous remarks we could make about those who practice meditation: that they report feeling calmer, more peaceful or more equipped to deal with the tribulations of everyday life. However, it would be asinine to attempt to develop a political principle based on these observations alone, of some conceited idea of world peace or harmony. Indeed, the latter observation could be interpreted as a kind of theodicy of capitalism; many have commented on meditation's propensity for co-option by neoliberal individualism insofar as it emphasises a detachment from the condition of the world and a simultaneous acceptance of the present moment. This is, in fact, Badiou's criticism of Deleuze's work circa *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, that the rhizome describes but does not challenge capitalism, that the true message of a rhizomatic politics is that one should "play quietly in your corner."<sup>453</sup> Rather, a radical use of meditation would be that which resonates on a more profound level - and one that bears similarity to Deleuze's thinking. The real import of meditation and the philosophy thereof is that it promotes and demonstrates the impermanence of mental content, the illusory nature of images of thought and the refusal of transcendental structures and ideas. What is the Body without Organs of cognition itself if not the construction of this space of unencumbered flow? Establishing the conditions of a sensory-motor break must involve, in some way, a process similar to the above in which an interstice is opened up or a clearing is made. At the very least, on a purely practical level, the nonproductive, quietist nature of meditation might create such an interstice in the constant flow of capitalism and would symbolically gesture towards a rejection of its imperative to communicate, enjoy and produce. The hope is that, in doing so, a vacuole of non-communication, a place in which thought that is not assimilable to the dogmatic image of thought may start to germinate.

To momentarily speak like a Foucauldian, using this technology of knowledge exemplifies the adoption of an optional rule of self-mastery, choosing to construct a new selfhood and, in the same breath, caring for the self. However, as implied above, this is not a political programme in and of itself - indeed, it is likely that such a method of making a time-image should enter into an assemblage with other methods of construction. Indeed, as we have

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<sup>453</sup> 'Fascism of the Potato'

seen, the creation of the New Brain is primarily a selection of images and the true task of its construction will be in selecting the correct or most productive images. As with many other technologies of the self, mindfulness and asceticism as subtractive disciplines always have the potential to lead us into a black hole; rather than an individualist principle, care must be taken that such technologies of the self and mental tools be directed towards a common use, rather than sacralised; Agamben's distinction between sacred and profane is helpful here, that to make an object sacred is to remove it from the sphere of the commons, whereas to profane is to return the object to common use.<sup>454</sup>

An important question for Deleuzian politics, then, is what this common use might look like. If the philosopher is responsible for the creation of concepts and the artist is responsible for the creation of percepts, which both may become actual objects, what of those subjects who are neither? Are those who do not have the leisure to pursue such pursuits, whose lives are bounded by fatigue, merely a lost cause? At the other end of the spectrum are those who dive too far into concepts and art at the risk of rejecting the world. The desire to escape from the strata entirely is a kind of *ressentiment*, a line of flight that ends in a black hole precisely because there is nothing to stem the flow of chaos from the outside. There is no outside for liberated desire, rather it folds back upon itself and begins to enjoy itself for its own sake, which is to say to nomadically enjoy in intensity. Deleuze evokes the image of the typhoon which he describes in the capacity of power and joy:

There is no bad power (*puissance*), what is bad, we should say is the lowest degree of the power (*puissance*). And the lowest degree of the power (*puissance*), it is the power (*pouvoir*). I mean, what is malice? Malice consists in preventing someone to do what he can, malice consists in preventing someone to do, to effectuate his power (*puissance*). Therefore, there is no bad power (*puissance*), there are malicious powers (*pouvoirs*). Perhaps that all power (*pouvoir*) is malicious by nature. Maybe not, maybe it is too easy to say so... [...] Power (*pouvoir*) is always an obstacle to the effectuation of powers (*puissances*). I would say, any power (*pouvoir*) is sad. Yes, even if those who "have the power" (*pouvoir*) are very joyful to "have it", it is a sad joy; there are sad joys. On the contrary, joy is the effectuation of a power

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<sup>454</sup> Agamben develops this distinction through the figure of the *Homo Sacer*, he who may legally be sacrificed but not killed. Thus he is transferred from the profane to the sacred, removed from the sphere of the commons and has the power of decision over his life reserved for the powers that be.

(puissance). Once again, I don't know any power (puissance) that is malicious. The typhoon is a power (puissance), it enjoys itself in its very soul but...it does not enjoy because it destroys houses, it enjoys because it exists. To enjoy is to enjoy being what we are, I mean, to be "where we are". Of course, it does not mean to be happy with ourselves, not at all. Joy is the pleasure of the conquest as Nietzsche would say. But conquest in that sense, does not mean to enslave people of course. Conquest is for example, for the painter to conquest the color.<sup>455</sup>

Given the talk of power, it is unsurprising that this idea is derived from Spinoza. Agamben, in *The Coming Community* echoes this thought:

The root of all pure joy and sadness is that the world is as it is. Joy or sadness that arises because the world is not what it seems or what we want it to be is impure or provisional. But in the highest degree of their purity, in the 'so be it' said to the world when every legitimate cause of doubt and hope has been removed, sadness and joy refer not to negative or positive qualities, but to a pure being-thus without any attributes.<sup>456</sup>

The subject that experiences the greatest joy are those who are 'where they are', that pure joy is found in the world being 'thus', which is to say without predication. The same logic allows Deleuze to claim that "the majority is never anybody"<sup>457</sup> because the majority is not an identity, everyone is always-already singular, "the minority is everyone". Being on the left, for Deleuze, means "never ceasing becoming a member of the minority", which is to say refusing the standard that would reproduce this empty majority; the man who thinks he undergoes a becoming-man is empty, the police or bully who reproduces violence against the trans person has no existence. They do not appear as subjects, they merely disappear within the machines acting through them. Being-thus, becoming-minor or being on the left, these are expressions of subjectivity that might make a new brain, or rather those expressions that a new brain may engender.

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<sup>455</sup> *L'Abecedaire*, J for Joy

<sup>456</sup> *Coming Community* pg.90

<sup>457</sup> *L'Abecedaire* 'L for Left'



But the problematic these subjectivities need to deal with is control, which works with communication in order to create an extensive enterprise of coding, which is absolutely antithetical to this joy, where joy is also a kind of empowered freedom. An exemplary instance of this is the numerous communications services and applications that encourage us to talk and connect with others and yet at the same time are collecting our data and information in order to coerce us into taking an action that we may not have taken otherwise. We may then, quite justifiably, question just how optional our optional rules of self-mastery really are. This is not to say that control is primarily responsible for coercion or force, rather its diminishment of our agency pertains to the delimitation of our options, or in other words, the blocking of our power. When technology companies collaborate in order to market to the user a gym membership, an offer which, if accepted, would require a donation of time, money and mental and physical energy - this is no less than an attempt to modify your subjectivity through a modification of your possible uses of time and modes of temporality.<sup>458</sup> The real opposition between subjection and subjectification is that the latter is when one makes a subject for oneself (a becoming-minor) - and the former is when a subject is made for you (becoming-major). If the making of a subject concerns the synthesis of temporality then this is how capital makes you a new person - these are the coils of the serpent.

The true task is to create a New Brain for oneself and for the future. The future necessarily concerns an uprooting or undoing of the present and the past. The time-image presents the pure and empty form of time, which is the straight line pointing towards the future, but at the same time injects novelty and a differential power into the present.

## **New Earth**

To summarise the above: time images enable the creation of new brains; these new brains are matter folded differently; to fold is to modify the relation between inside and outside, to capture and internalise chaos, which is to say to bring it within the subject. This should not

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<sup>458</sup> Recall that the process of contraction in the synthesis of habit is limited by fatigue, or the stores of energy an organism has.

be seen as a kind of communication; for Deleuze, communication is coextensive with control and indeed the means by which it operates:

We do not lack communication. On the contrary, we have too much of it. We lack creation. We lack resistance to the present. The creation of concepts in itself calls for a future form, for a new earth and people that do not yet exist.<sup>459</sup>

The risk is that a new brain which would harbour or be amenable to microfascisms would occur, that the people-to-come, which, we should remember, are those reared within the society of the spectacle, the children of Marx and Coca-cola, are majoritarian. In the resistance to the present there is a dual danger, that of the future of control on the one hand, perhaps exemplified by the emerging Chinese state security apparatus and of a return to the past on the other, best showcased in the reactionary thought of the radical right wing. The new earth is inseparable from the aforementioned 'mental life' of the age, the concepts that are invented will have an effect on the material itself.

If the mental life of an age is predicated on its materiality, then the construction of new minds must exist coextensively with a reorganisation of material conditions and vice-versa. If a New Brain would be the subjective correlate of the material reorganisation, then what specifically is the New Earth? The folds in the soul must find a partner in the pleats of matter, especially across the face of the earth, which has been so striated by the machines of capital. To pose such a question is to revisit the concerns of the third chapter of this thesis, namely the homology Deleuze and Guattari posit between the emergence of subjectivity and the formation of the state. In this way, the concept of the earth and geophilosophy in *What is Philosophy?* is closely related to land and territory in *A Thousand Plateaus*. Earth, land and territory each name a way in which space is organised; land is made via the capture of the State apparatus, it is made through coding and striations of the earth. Afterwards, it becomes a stockpile, which makes the land appropriable for exploitation through rent, as discussed in chapter three. On the other hand, territory is made, remade and unmade by the procedure of the war machine, especially when encasted by the state apparatus. Earth in *A Thousand Plateaus* is the terrestrial correlate of the Body without Organs in the subject: it is undifferentiated and prior to any stratification. It

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<sup>459</sup> *What is Philosophy?* pg.108

is a virtual plane of consistency upon which strata are imposed. Strata are captures of intensities which become molar aggregates, they "operate by coding and territorialization upon the earth"<sup>460</sup> - in the same way that the organisation of the body is a 'judgement of god', strata are organisations of the earth. Strata are "thickening[s] on the Body of the earth"<sup>461</sup> and as such are opposed to the freedom of the Body without Organs - between the two are assemblages, which face each in turn, having both characteristics of structure and transformation. In the same way that the Body without Organs is present within assemblages, Earth is then the intensive aspect of the strata, that which lies within stratifications.

The New Earth is related to the process of the positive aspect of absolute deterritorialization. Positive absolute deterritorialization is when the strata lose all consistency such that all that remains is the condition of their consistency itself, which is to say a plane of immanence. The constitution of such a plane affords a pure genetic condition, or in other words the means of production of concepts, or as John Protevi defines it:

the becoming-virtual of intensive material. Put differently, the 'new earth' is the correlate of absolute deterritorialization (the leaving of all intensive territorial assemblages attain the plane of consistency) it is the tapping of 'cosmic forces' (the virtual seen from the point of view of the abstract machines composing it, not the machinic assemblages that actualise selection of singularities).<sup>462</sup>

What, then, would a New Earth consist of? A rediscovery of the means of production appears both in the realm of the political and the social; the New Earth is not an actual condition but a return to the intensive and virtual; in other words, it is a new relation between the subject and the strata. This, like so much else in *A Thousand Plateaus* and *Anti-Oedipus*, must be approached with caution because of the destructive or negative side of absolute deterritorialization. We must not forget that the primary operation of the war machine is smoothing, in destratifying;

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<sup>460</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.40

<sup>461</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.502

<sup>462</sup> *The Deleuze Dictionary* pg.84

Every undertaking of destratification (for example, going beyond the organism, plunging into a becoming) must therefore observe concrete rules of extreme caution: a too-sudden destratification may be suicidal, or turn cancerous. In other words, it will sometimes end in chaos, the void and destruction, and sometimes lock us back into the strata, which become more rigid still, losing their degrees of diversity, differentiation, and mobility.<sup>463</sup>

We may clearly see, then, the error in Hallward's reading on Deleuze's politics in statements such as: "[b]y posing the question of politics in the starkly dualistic terms of war machine or state - by posing it, in the end, in the apocalyptic terms of a new people and a new earth or else no people and no earth - the political aspect of Deleuze's philosophy amounts to little more than utopian distraction."<sup>464</sup> This is a misreading that is so incorrect that it is in turn instructive. Rather than an apocalyptic, revolutionary politics (Year Zero) this new relation between virtual condition and actual circumstance will take place under the sign of the creation of concepts and percepts and that which they engender.

A conspiracy joining together art and science presupposes a rupture of all our institutions and a total upheaval of the means of production. [...] In this perspective, art and science would then emerge as sovereign formations that Nietzsche said constituted the object of his countersociology - art and science establishing themselves as dominant powers, on the ruins of institutions.<sup>465</sup>

Does this mean a huge terraforming of the planet, a levelling of cities or some other apocalyptic event? These are extensive, macropolitical ideas. A micropolitics of desire on the contrary is concerned with intensive change, qualitative duration and the virtual conditions involved in effectuating states of affairs. While Hallward derides Deleuze and Guattari on both fronts, charging one approach as ineffectual and 'out of this world', the other mere 'utopian distraction', he ignores the pragmatism involved with the authors' political considerations. The precise nature of a threshold-crossing is not supposed in advance, a phase shift will be predicated upon the forces acting upon its components, whether or not the limit will be transgressed. One can only hope that the forces acting upon

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<sup>463</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.503

<sup>464</sup> *Out of This World* pg.162

<sup>465</sup> *Anti-Oedipus* pg.368

a situation effect an advantageous outcome - and the pragmatism comes into play in the hard work of experimenting and planning to force the hand in one's favour.

In the final episode of the TV show *Twin Peaks: The Return*, the main characters Dale Cooper and Diane cross a threshold: in attempting to bring the character Laura Palmer back from the dead, the two enter some sort of mysterious liminal zone in the desert and drive across an invisible line which causes strange distortions of reality. When Cooper wakes up the next day, while maintaining the same appearance and apparently retaining knowledge of his mission to find Laura, he is now called Richard and Diane is nowhere to be seen. He goes to meet the character we have previously known as Laura Palmer, however, while wearing the same face she insists that that is not her name, that she is someone else and even provides her life history as this new person. Cooper/Richard drives Laura to her old home, where an unknown family opens the door and again proceeds to give a detailed history of previous families who have lived in the house, none of which are the Palmers. A bemused Cooper, seemingly sensing something is wrong, stumbles into the street and asks: "What year is this?" Upon hearing this, Laura lets out a scream and the screen fades to black.<sup>466</sup>

Such a sequence dramatises intensive change. While the ending is open to interpretation, the final question implies a phase shift in temporality. Nothing has extensively changed here, but the entire intensive order is out of joint, which is not necessarily a pleasant thing. We might relate this episode to a passage in *The Coming Community* in which Agamben cites Walter Benjamin relaying a tale about the coming of the Judaic messiah:

The Hassidim tell a story about the world to come that says everything there will be just as it is here. Just as our room is now, so it will be in the world to come; where our baby sleeps now, there too it will sleep in the other world. And the clothes we wear in this world, those too we will wear there. Everything will be as it is now, just a little different.<sup>467</sup>

These comments are situated within a discussion of the concept of 'whatever-singularity', which is the name of Agamben's subject, that which is a zone of indistinction between

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<sup>466</sup> 'What is Your Name?' *Twin Peaks: The Return*, (Showtime, September 2017)

<sup>467</sup> *Coming Community* pg.52

actuality and potentiality. Any single subject is absolutely unique and as such resists predication, it appears 'thus' and yet has the capacity to become 'whatever', opening potentiality within actuality, or indeterminacy within the determinate. The tale about the coming of the messiah is the worldly or ontological correlate of the subjective notion of 'being-thus' discussed above in the capacity of joy, the new earth for the new brain.

Reading this passage alongside Deleuze and Guattari, one cannot dissociate Agamben's whatever-singularity from the Body without Organs and the problem of destratification. In the plateau 'One or Many Wolves?', in a passage on the nature of the relation of multiplicity to singularity, they write:

[I]t does not suffice to attribute molar multiplicities and mass machines to the preconscious, reserving another kind of machine or multiplicity for the unconscious. For it is the assemblage of both of these that is the province of the unconscious, the way in which the former condition the latter, and the latter prepare the way for the former, or elude them or return to them: the libido suffuses everything. Keep everything in sight at the same time - that a social machine or an organized mass has a molecular unconscious that marks not only its tendency to decompose but also the current components of its very operation and organization; that any individual caught up in a mass has his/her own pack unconscious, which does not necessarily resemble the packs of the mass to which that individual belongs; that an individual or mass will live out in its unconscious the masses and packs of another mass or another individual.<sup>468</sup>

This is the process of dividuality, that the individual becomes a mass and the mass becomes an individual. We have already seen the majoritarian aspect of this concept at work in the movement-image, but dividuality, or the positive aspect thereof, . The Body without Organs rejects and resists predication, the judgement of God even while maintaining a space for itself, the limit of its experimentation. Agamben, assigning an inexhaustibly political meaning to this subject, writes:

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<sup>468</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.35

Whatever singularity, which wants to appropriate belonging itself, its own being-in-language, and thus rejects all identity and every condition of belonging, is the principal enemy of the State. Wherever these singularities peacefully demonstrate their being in common there will be a Tiananmen, and, sooner or later, the tanks will appear.<sup>469</sup>

Both Deleuze and Guattari and Agamben speak of this specific-generality in terms of love, that one does not love another singularly nor generally. Agamben writes that “[i]ove is never directed toward this or that property of the loved one (being blond, beingsmall, being tender, being lame), but neither does it neglect the properties in favour of an insipid generality (universal love): The lover wants the loved one with all of its predicates, its being such as it is.”<sup>470</sup> This is to say that it does not appeal to an identity but to a ‘thus’ or ‘such as it is’, it appeals immanently to the subject. In the same manner, Deleuze and Guattari ask:

What does it mean to love somebody? It is always to seize that person in a mass, extract him or her from a group, however small, in which he or she participates, whether it be through the family only or through something else; then to find that person's own packs, the multiplicities he or she encloses within himself or herself which may be of an entirely different nature. To join them to mine, to make them penetrate mine, and for me to penetrate the other person's. Heavenly nuptials, multiplicities of multiplicities. Every love is an exercise in depersonalization on a Body without Organs yet to be formed, and it is at the highest point of this depersonalization that someone can be named, receives his or her family name or first name, acquires the most intense discernibility in the instantaneous apprehension of the multiplicities belonging to him or her, and to which he or she belongs.<sup>471</sup>

The full Body without Organs is a space in which the maximum amount of experimentation can occur, with the least obstruction to flows while still maintaining the vacuole that establishes the spatium. If malice consists of preventing someone effectuating their

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<sup>469</sup> *Coming Community* pg.86

<sup>470</sup> *Coming Community* pg.2

<sup>471</sup> *A Thousand Plateaus* pg.35

maximal power and if joy consists of being 'where we are', of being-thus, then loving consists of creating the conditions to be maximally 'thus'. To reiterate, Agamben writes: "Seeing something simply in its being-thus - irreparable, but not for that reason necessary; thus, but not for that reason contingent - is love."<sup>472</sup> To make this singular principle (one's own particular conditions for joy) the general (everyone has maximal power and minimal obstructions) is the endgame of ethics. However, this is to describe an intensive change. The coming world, after the arrival of the messiah, remains as it was in the extensive order of things, but there is an intensive difference which must be accounted for. Agamben relates this discussion to that of the scholastic debate around haloes, of whether a halo signifies perfection in an entity and, if so, what the nature of its addition to an already-perfect being means. Although he gives it the name 'halo', Agamben is clearly very close to the concept of the Deleuzean crystal when he writes:

One can think of the halo, in this sense, as a zone in which possibility and reality, potentiality and actuality, become indistinguishable. The being that has reached its end, that has consumed all of its possibilities, thus receives as a gift a supplemental possibility. This is [...] a fusional act, insofar as specific form or nature is not preserved in it, but mixed and dissolved in a new birth with no residue. This imperceptible trembling of the finite that makes its limits indeterminate and allows it to blend, to make itself whatever, is the tiny displacement that every thing must accomplish in the messianic world. Its beatitude is that of a potentiality that comes only after the act, of matter that does not remain beneath the form, but surrounds it with a halo.<sup>473</sup>

In a profane mode, Agamben here is discussing the possibility of change both in the world and for the subject. The decay of the crystal only reveals its effects after it has passed. Acting now for a time one hopes will come may engender the creation of chains of machines the effect of which will not be felt until later. Because the third synthesis of time exists in excess of the present and yet is contained within it (or contracted in order to become the present) it is like this halo - that which adorns an already perfect deity and so cannot quantitatively or extensively add to its perfection, but is a qualitative and intensive modification. In the messianic world, then, every thing and every subject wears a halo.

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<sup>472</sup> *Coming Community* pg.105

<sup>473</sup> *Coming Community* pg.55



## Conclusion: Control and the New Earth

The transition into a control society is a philosophical problem. As we have seen from the discussion in *What is Philosophy?* the solution to a problem requires the construction of a device with which to frame chaos, the construction of a conceptual or mental tool with which to build something out of the chaos of the outside. In this capacity and as a way to draw together the threads of the preceding discussion, we might sketch the outline of a very provisional and speculative account of a 'synthesis of control'.

In the first pole is *opinion*; in the second is *communication*. In the register of mind, where opinion might designate an unphilosophical and dogmatic image of thought, communication describes a function of proliferation and connection. The two are mutually-constitutive insofar as a general opinion is formed by that which is communicated most frequently and what is most frequently communicated is generality, those structures of thought which are most commonly accepted and are challenged least. In the register of matter, opinion may be the sense of the world as it stands, where communication is the encouraged movement of the situation; like a control system, opinion tends towards homeostasis and the excision of that which would threaten it; such a homeostasis is maintained through the control of flows in a particular way.

The third position, the link between the two poles, is *apparatuses*. Apparatuses may serve communication by providing a means for its effectuation; apparatuses express opinions through communicating them and condition the frequency by which an opinion is communicated. In turn, opinion is reinforced by its communication, by the repetition of its image through the apparatus. As literally anything that has the capacity to influence behaviour, apparatuses may be both an object and a concept. Yet like the third synthesis of time, as well as relating the two poles it has the capacity to unground them. Apparatuses have the potential to break down and change form, thus modifying what they may index and the manner in which they do so. This would, in turn, modify the nature of the connection of the poles on either side.

The society of control would then be that social formation which regulates communication and opinion on both physical and mental levels, but in a constantly shifting modulation of

positions and connections. This is why Deleuze is drawn to the concept of the apparatus, because it signals an attempt to describe processes in a way that accounts for metastability without recourse to universals. Rather, he sees in the apparatus a negotiation between constants and variables<sup>474</sup> an epistemic diagram which is better-suited to grappling with the modulations of control, the coils of the serpent.

The true task is the selection of images: how to choose the correct concept to construct? What can be done to ensure that communication and opinion are refused and yet there still remains a membrane between inside and outside substantial enough to ward off destructive chaos? In the parlance of *Anti-Oedipus*, this is called schizoanalysis, the liberation of flows of desire in a way that is not assimilable to capitalism or the capitalist organisation of time. In a non-exhaustive manner, we might suggest three points:

1. Focus on the immanence of the human, bring to visibility the existence of a person - that which is so often occluded in capitalism.
2. Challenge that opinion which would give rise to individualism. The violence of the bully may be nothing compared to the indifference of the bureaucrat. A becoming-minority brings to bear the power of a non-denumerable set, a person in their whatever-singularity, the place at which virtual and actual meet - in a sense, treat each person as a time-image.
3. Reject historical time: the pure and empty form of time glimpsed in the crystal is antithetical to origin and narrative. Transcendental ideas such as hierarchical identity, nation and state are abstractions, and those who resist the test of the eternal return "those who repeat identically will be eliminated."<sup>475</sup>

To summarise,

Philosophy takes the relative deterritorialization of capital to the absolute; it makes it pass over the plane of immanence as movement of the infinite and suppresses it as internal limit, turns it back against itself so as to summon forth a new earth, a new people. But in this way it arrives at the nonpropositional form of the concept in which communication, exchange, consensus, and opinion vanish entirely.<sup>476</sup>

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<sup>474</sup> What is a dispositif? Pg.166 Interestingly, Deleuze formulates this as a response to Manfred Frank

<sup>475</sup> *Difference and Repetition* pg.381

<sup>476</sup> What is Philosophy? pg.99

The way to establish a new earth is then to generate it in the mind such that it may be actualised in the real. If 'the forces that structure the world are active on the stage of consciousness' then after the rectification of these forces in the psyche should follow the material reorganisation of the earth. The mode that this should take, according to Deleuze's ethical statements, is one that minimises the possibilities of control. This involves the harnessing of chaos and the forces of the outside; a situation is controlled when the amount of chaos that has the potential to occur or be injected into the situation is regulated. This regulation occurs when a membrane and therefore a limit is established which blocks flows of power [puissance]. However, the subject may construct a vacuole of non-communication for themselves using the folded screen to make a new brain. These screens are also membranes; the vacuole is constructed by the stitching together of membranes with which to hold back chaos. The call to make a vacuole of non-communication for oneself is a call to contemplation in the sense of the first synthesis of time, to make new habits and new refrains, a new link between the subject and the cosmos:

Between the two sides of the absolute, between the two deaths - death from the inside or past, death from the outside or future - the internal sheets of memory and the external layers of reality will be mixed up, extended, short-circuited and form a whole moving life, which is at once that of the cosmos and of the brain, which sends out flashes from one pole to the other.<sup>477</sup>

All of the above are multiple ways of constructing an interiority; interiority is always linked with subjectivity, minds and brains; each of these ways are ways of making a new subject. Further to this, these are all methods of subjectification, ways of making a subject *for oneself*. Contrary to these processes, control is when these spaces of interiority are composed for you and the imperative to communicate is when you are encouraged to circulate within these enclosures. The final ethics of Deleuze's project - and the point at which processes of subjectivity and temporality meet - is in the construction of new modes of time which would make subjects who are not assimilable within capitalism's emerging mechanisms of control, "acting against time, and thus on time, for the sake of a time one hopes will come."<sup>478</sup>

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<sup>477</sup> *Cinema 2* pg.209

<sup>478</sup> What is a dispositif?

# Conclusion

In this thesis I have attempted to think together the concept of subjectivity, using the philosophy of Deleuze as a map, the coordinates of which have been the Kantian theory of temporality. At the intersection of subjectivity and capitalism is the notion of control, the concept of an advanced and dynamic diminishment of subjective agency, which I have sought to draw out, explain and suggest some modes of resistance.

I claimed that Deleuze's philosophy affords an account of subjectivity as a process that arises coextensively with temporality and as such is well-suited to interrogating the problem of control. I provided an account of such a process by describing the three syntheses of time in *Difference and Repetition*, through preparatory work with Kant and Bergson's theory of subjectivity and time. I then claimed that the mechanism by which this process takes place repeats in both the unconscious and the state, or the apparatus of capture. This signals what I have been calling a 'homology', that is a similarity in logic between two positions, in the formation of the subject and that of the state in which the subject is created. Through investigating the terminology of 'apparatus', I drew upon Agamben's account of economy, which served to compliment Deleuze's notion of control and Deleuze and Guattari's idea of machinic enslavement, which is to say an immanent mode of governance. Simultaneously, in exploring term apparatus, a debate around the mapping and interpretation of the world takes place; the idea of apparatus opens out into considerations of interiority and the outside - and the often unstable boundary between them. Finally, Deleuze theorises the means by which to modulate this permeable membrane, to actively construct points to harness and control the chaos from the outside, which was read against Agamben's book *The Coming Community* in order to suggest some political trajectories that could be derived from such an encounter.

As well as providing this narrative of continuity from *Difference and Repetition* through to the 'Postscript', I have attempted to insinuate several arguments throughout the discussion:

1. To suggest that the relationship between Deleuze and Foucault, while nominally seen as

amicable, was often fraught with disagreement. Such disagreements, I suggest, animated Deleuze's philosophical development - perhaps even to the point of Deleuze attempting to overcome Foucault.

2. To defend Deleuze and Guattari from charges that they deny subjective agency, through providing a speculative argument of the Body without Organs as a source of freedom.
3. To use the work of Agamben to compliment and amplify Deleuze and to draw attention to Agamben's Deleuzian influence, which is scarcely acknowledged.
4. To downplay any possible accelerationist reading of Deleuze and Guattari by reiterating their frequent and consistent advocacy of caution.

As such, there has been a degree of concision employed in selecting what to discuss in this thesis. I have attempted to trace a Kantian line in Deleuze and his encounters with other Kantians such as Foucault.<sup>479</sup> I have therefore avoided straying into extended discussions of Spinoza and Nietzsche, even at points at which they have a profound effect on Deleuze's thought. This is because 1) their philosophy is so different in kind from Kant that significant expository passages would be needed, which would have distracted from the discussion being undertaken 2) Deleuze often mobilises these influences against Kant in a critical capacity and such exposition would necessitate an interruption in tracing Deleuze's Kantianism; 3) Deleuze's Kantianism is still in effect when it comes to the later works and as such forms a line from his earliest thought to his latest; indeed in the first chapter I attempted to show that the Postscript demonstrates Kantian sensibilities and in the second that the same factors are at work in and inherited from *Difference and Repetition*. Similarly, I have for the most part avoided the semiotic aspects of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* in particular, even though they feature in processes of what could be called subjectification. This is because the semiotic aspects form a layer of coding that articulates itself upon a subject that is already constituted by other processes; I have chosen to focus on these more primordial aspects of subject-formation: temporal syntheses, the actualisation of concepts in the brain, and so on.

There are, of course, still a number of more practical problems affecting discourse around Deleuzian politics, affected by both the proliferation of misunderstandings and misreadings

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<sup>479</sup> Where 'Kantian' here refers to less an endorsement of Kant's ethics, politics or morals - indeed, these factors are often the object of critique - but names an inherent debt to several mechanisms or machines of Kant's metaphysics, especially the transcendental and the tripartite synthesis.

from academia and the public reception (sedimentation?) of his work. I contend that Deleuze is most appropriately read as a libertarian-leftist, perhaps exemplified in the claim that "[w]e require just a little order to protect us from chaos."<sup>480</sup> This does not at all mean that the ideal society is a meaningless rhizome of aimless desire, as per Manfred Frank's criticism - quite the contrary; being on the left, for Deleuze means to "create the law,"<sup>481</sup> an enterprise absolutely contrary to the decoding wrought by capitalism. Focusing on the more sensational and progressive aspects of Deleuze, concepts such as the war machine, the destruction of a dogmatic image of thought, critique of the state and the creation of a people-to-come are in no way irreconcilable with an aristocratic or even fascist worldview. The rhetoric of the contemporary far-right, especially the libertarian right, often apes the language of progressivism in order to clothe a reactionary agenda - no doubt fuelled by the para-academic influence of Nick Land and enabled by many, perhaps well-meaning, 'accelerationists' as well as those thinkers that may have jumped ship from Deleuze studies to align themselves with the more *du jour* French philosophy doyens Badiou or Laruelle, both of whom are critical of Deleuze. He has on occasion been co-opted by radical right-wing thinkers, often with the critical excision of Guattari's contributions in an ironically similar gesture to Deleuze's supposed 'rehabilitation' by more stoic or communistic leftists such as Badiou.

Future work on this topic may benefit from a clarification of the incompatibility of Deleuze's philosophy with reactionary or far-right politics; a delicate task which may consequently alienate many potential allies, especially those invested in the construction or maintenance of a particular identity or subject-position. In Deleuze, personal identity and freedom is not privileged, rather the inculcation of impersonal becomings that traverse and deconstruct identity are encouraged to flow. This is antithetical to traditionalism, racial identitarianism and oligarchical social organisation of all kinds; and yet it is also critical of molar movements, or macropolitics, the likes of which aim at social emancipation but often end in revolution as opposed to evolution. Deleuzian politics aims at a non-molar, anti-authoritarian Marxism ("finding worldwide assemblages")<sup>482</sup> that would establish a community without a unitary identity, that the only unifying bond between discrete subjects would be difference itself.

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<sup>480</sup> *What is Philosophy?* pg.201

<sup>481</sup> *L'Abecedaire*, L for Left. In the same way, the freedom of flow gained by making a full BwO is only accomplished through the hard work of preparing the limits and regulative procedures of such.

<sup>482</sup> *L'Abecedaire* 'L for Left'

Finally, while it could be argued that Deleuze is an aristocratic and academic thinker, as his ultimate ethics can be read as 'thinking philosophically will save you', the creation of philosophical concepts through which to structure chaos is, in the final analysis, an altruistic enterprise. Philosophers and artists are often sickly, Deleuze himself included, and "[w]hat little health they possess is often too fragile, not because of their illnesses or neuroses but because they have seen something in life that is too much for anyone, too much for themselves, and that has put on them the quiet mark of death. But this something is also the source or breath that supports them through the illnesses of the lived (what Nietzsche called health)."<sup>483</sup> These creators of concepts and percepts often sacrifice their physical and mental health in order to be traversed by a cosmic 'health'. They become containers and interpreters for chaos which has deleterious effects on their bodies and minds. Provided that this is done in the name of a people and not to reinforce and reaffirm the majoritarian then philosophy may be of use in bringing the new earth to bear.

Becoming is always double, and it is this double becoming that constitutes the people to come and the new earth. The philosopher must become non philosopher so that non philosophy becomes the earth and people of philosophy. Even such a well-respected philosopher as Bishop Berkeley never stops saying, "We Irish others, the mob." The people is internal to the thinker because it is a "becoming-people," just as the thinker is internal to the people as no less unlimited becoming.<sup>484</sup>

Aristocratic philosophy must deterritorialize itself, remove itself from the sphere of the sacred and be returned to the profane, common use.<sup>485</sup> Philosophy must donate its concepts to the people.<sup>486</sup> In this capacity, it is my hope that the preceding thesis be a map for my future work, with the - perhaps utopian - vision that it may be of use in alleviating those mental or material strictures that would impede another from effectuating their power and being where they are.

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<sup>483</sup> *What is Philosophy?* pp.172-173

<sup>484</sup> *What is Philosophy?* pg.109

<sup>485</sup> Deleuze and Guattari admit that they attempted to write *Anti-Oedipus* for sixteen year olds.

<sup>486</sup> In the *Abecedaire*, in the section 'L for Left' Deleuze explicitly aligns the concept of people-to-come with the proletariat.

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Edition 2nd ed. / prepared by Hedi El Kholi.