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**Corruption in Caribbean Politics -
Examining Cultural Tolerance**

Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the
University of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy

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Dawn Allison De Coteau

March 2021

Supervisor: Dr Stuart Wilks-Heeg

Declaration

I, Dawn Allison De Coteau, declare that this thesis is my original research and has not previously been submitted in consideration for any other degree or qualification of the University of Liverpool, or any other educational institution. All published and unpublished works are duly cited, referenced and acknowledged.

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Dawn Allison De Coteau

Abstract

This thesis examines the issue of corruption in modern Caribbean politics. It adopts an interdisciplinary approach that seeks to place contemporary political and legal debates about corruption in their socio-cultural and historical context. In particular, the thesis identifies the long-term impacts of colonialism, slavery and indentureship on socio-economic conditions in the Caribbean and on its political systems and political cultures, and it explores the consequences of these issues for the dynamics of corruption in the Caribbean today. The central hypothesis is that these conditions have facilitated the emergence of a 'cultural tolerance' of corruption. In other words, customs and behaviours that form part of daily practices, while questionable, have become accepted, and tolerated and therefore normalised.

The thesis draws on a range of secondary and primary data collected and analysed using qualitative methods. These sources include official reports, legislation, media coverage and semi-structured interviews with lawyers, politicians, journalists and academic specialists. The findings underline two key points of significance. First, acts of 'corrupt' practices are not necessarily viewed as such by those who undertake them. Second, the failure of international organisation to factor in Caribbean history has resulted in ineffective systems being introduced to address issues of corruption in the Caribbean.

The original contribution made by this thesis derives both from its contextualisation of corruption with reference to history and culture and the empirical detail provided by the case studies and fieldwork findings. The resulting reframing of the study of corruption in the Caribbean has important political and legal implications. Caribbean

countries are continuously perceived as having high levels of corruption and are criticised for failing to implement what are deemed, by 'outsiders', to be appropriate 'good governance' arrangements. A core contention of this thesis is that if Caribbean countries are to meaningfully address corruption in modern times, it will only be possible to do so if the realities of the Caribbean history and its impact are recognised—otherwise what has been done to the Caribbean in the past will continue to limit its scope to determine its own future.

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I embarked on this journey some eight years ago, with the determination to complete it at some stage during that period. Indeed, it has been a journey, with the last two years being filled with mixed emotions as I soldiered through this lonely, but interesting passage. Notwithstanding, there are a number of people, consisting of family and friends who have supported me along the way, whom I must acknowledge.

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Finally, I dedicate this thesis to my late dad – Everest Sylvester Edmund.

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List of Abbreviations

AICACBCC – The Association of Integrity Commissions and Anti Corruption Bodies in the Commonwealth Caribbean

CARICOM – The Caribbean Community

CBI – Citizen by Investment

CCJ - Caribbean Court of Justice

CIRI – Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Data

CPI - Corruption Perception Index

DLP - Dominican Labour Party

EEA – European Economic Area

EIP – Electoral Integrity Project

EU – European Union

DDP - Director of Public Prosecutions

FHI - Freedom House Index

FIFA - Fédération Internationale de Football Association

FIU – Financial Intelligence Unit

FTAA – Free Trade Areas of the Americas

GCB – Global Corruption Barometer

GULP – Grenada United Labour Party

IACC – Inter American convention against Corruption

IACMACM – Inter American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters

IC – Integrity Commission

ICAC – Inter American Convention against Corruption

IO – International Organisations

IMF – International Monetary Fund

LAPOP – Latin American Public Opinion Project

LISREL – Linear Structural Relations

LONASE – Senegalese National Lottery

MESICIC – Inter American Convention Against Corruption Mechanism for Follow Up on Implementation

NAFTA – North American Free Trade Agreement

NDC – New Democratic Congress

NDP - New Democratic Party

NNP – New National Party

NGO – Non Government Organisation

NISCC – The National Integrity Systems Caribbean Composite Study

NFM – Norwegian Financial Mechanism

OAS – Organisation of American States

OAG – Office of Auditor General

OECD – The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OECS – Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States

OSCE – Organisation and Security and Co-operation in Europe

St. Kitt's – St Christopher & Nevis

SVG – St Vincent & the Grenadines

TI - Transparency International

TI CPI – Transparency International Corruption Perception Index

UN – United Nations

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UWP - United Workers Party

WB - World Bank

WEFGCI – World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index

WGA – World Governance Assessment

WGI – World Governance Indicator

WTO – World Trade Organisation

CHAPTER ONE

General Introduction

‘Corruption is the enemy of development, and of good governance. It must be got rid of. Both the government and the people at large must come together to achieve the national objective’. - Pratibha Patel

1.0 Introduction

Being born in the United Kingdom to parents of Grenadian heritage and more specifically from Petite Martinique, one of the tri island states of Grenada, I along with my four siblings were provided with the opportunity to visit Grenada regularly as children. As I developed and grew into in my late teenage years and early twenties on my very many visits to the Spice Isle of Grenada, I found myself on many occasions starting to question some of the practices and behaviours that I had witnessed and heard in conversation from family members and friends pertaining to persons being 'corrupt'. These practices and conversation were more prevalent during an election campaign, when it was common to hear that a politician or political party was corrupt. This would be more so as a result of persons being given support by a political party to build, yards of road, replace a roof, or build a house, having been without the same for years. As I progressed in life into various professions in the United Kingdom and more recently as a Barrister, Attorney and Management Consultant in the United Kingdom and Grenada, I became more intrigued about this issue of corruption in Grenada and wider Caribbean. I wanted to better understand the various factors contributing to Caribbean corruption.

This thesis therefore provides a different perspective as to why corruption occurs in contemporary Caribbean politics. The approach adopted is to examine the impact of colonialism, slavery and indentureship over 500 years, and its impact in regards to

the socio - economic conditions in the Caribbean over the last fifty years, and explore the consequences of these issues in regards to corruption in the Caribbean. As a result the overall aim, as can be discerned from the title of this thesis to the to examine, whether corruption in Caribbean politics is culturally tolerated.

Examining this question was assisted by collection of both secondary and primary data collection through qualitative methods. My original contribution in this thesis therefore derives from both case studies and fieldwork findings; analysing the data and responses from the semi - structured interviews. The retrieval, review and analysis of data and my subsequent findings represent my original contribution to knowledge in the field of corruption in the Caribbean, and highlight the significance that both history and culture plays in this regard.

1.2 Research Methodology

As alluded to above the methodology applied for this thesis was a qualitative approach, applying secondary source through case studies, and primary source through semi - structured interviews. I had to give great consideration to the most suitable methods to apply to this thesis, and concluded early in the process that due to the nature and sensitivity of the topic of corruption, qualitative methods in both case studies and semi - structured interviews would be the most appropriate for obtaining the data for this thesis. Also of importance is that I wanted to understand as far as possible, peoples' views, perception and experience in relation to political corruption in their society. Therefore using qualitative method was ideal for my research as it enabled me to apply research samples, which is a key element of qualitative research, as opposed to quantitative methods (Bryan, 2004), which primarily focus on quantity as opposed to quality when collecting and analysing data. Furthermore the deductive approach is applied when collating and analysing data (Norman et al, 2008).

In undertaking the research I gave consideration to the fact that it is impossible to conclusively and definitively undertake research through a one time project. As a result it is fundamentally important for any researcher to ensure that they narrow down any research to specific elements and focus in the study. (Thomas, 2003). Further in any research of this nature it is important that the ethnography should consist of three key elements, depth, context and intensity (Fielding, 2015). In taking these factors into account I ensured that the research was comprehensive, with depth and breadth across the subject matter of corruption in Caribbean politics. However, the research is not just about the corruption element per se, but the focus is on examining whether corruption in Caribbean politics is culturally tolerated.

1.3 Structure of the Study

This structure of this thesis consists of nine chapters. The study commences with the Introduction in Chapter One which provides a general overview of the thesis. The chapter gives a background for the origins of the study and reasoning for embarking on this thesis. The chapter goes on albeit briefly to my chosen methodology, followed by mention of how ethnography was applied.

Chapter Two presents the first of the literature reviews and commences by examining various definitions of corruption, establishing that there is no definitive definition for corruption. Thus what may be corrupt in one country, may not be deemed corrupt in another. The chapter moved onto looking at how corruption is measured, with emphasis on the performance of Caribbean countries against the Transparency International-Corruption Performance Index. Some of the problems and solutions pertaining to levels of corruption are discussed against the literature, which also identified some of the challenges for Caribbean countries. The fourth section of the chapter examines political corruption, exploring definitions and the rationale as to why

political corruption exists. The final section of the chapter looks at theories and models of corruption, from the beginning of the twentieth century to recent times.

The third chapter is the second literature review, with emphasis on providing a historical, political and cultural overview of the Caribbean. The historical sections goes back 500 years to slavery and indentureship to illustrate how the authoritarian style approach adopted by colonial officials created a personal and patron client relationship, which saw corruption being introduced and allowed due to enrichment and political gain. The second section examines how corrupt practices during slavery resulted in colonies introducing anti- corruption legislation and measures. The third section addresses some of the political and economic conditions of the Caribbean after Emancipation, with former colonies taking an authoritarian approach to governance. The economic conditions during this period are also addressed, with emphasis placed on key activities championing the rights for former slaves. The failure of the West Indies Federation, establishment of CARICOM and the consequence of the imposed Westminster style of politics are also examined, making the linkage between how they all contribute to the cultural tolerance of corruption. A comparison of American Boss politics and Caribbean patronage is addressed in the final section.

The methodology of the thesis is set out in Chapter Four. The chapter commences by setting out the research approach along with the advantages and disadvantages of qualitative and quantitative methodologies. The chapter moves on to incorporate commentary on inductive and deductive approaches in research. The third section focuses on the ontological and epistemological position, which is broken down to look at constructivism, theoretical perspectives and philosophy, interpretivism and phenomenology. The research methodology is discussed in the fourth section, detailing the rationale for selecting qualitative methods by way of case studies and

semi - structure interviews to conduct this research. Commentary is provided on both case studies and semi - structured interviews. Section six discusses how I went about selecting the countries to undertake the research, along with setting out some challenges along the way, which resulted in having to limit my fieldwork countries to two. This is followed by the research sample in section seven. Key to this research was ensuring I factored in how issues of sensitivity would be dealt with and this is captured in section eight, whilst validity, reliability, triangulation and reflexivity are addressed in section nine.

Chapter Five turns to focus on the governance arrangements relied upon by countries globally to address corruption. The chapter commences by defining good governance and examining some of the models used to implement good governance initiatives globally with a view to addressing corruption, with particular focus on the World Governance Indicators (WGI). The reliance on definitions and models derived from the West is highlighted. I argue that these approaches have limited understanding of some of the historical, cultural and social context which are crucial to comprehending the current fabric, make up and functionalities of Caribbean countries. Failure to factor these in risks misconceptions in some current approaches to good governance and corruption in the modern Caribbean. The chapter moves on to look at CARICOM as a regional approach to implementing good governance. Here I address CARICOM's poor performance which I advance is due to issues of sovereignty and insular nationalism exacerbated by the failure of the Federation of the West Indies. Further I argue that decolonisation was compromised by neo-colonialism and other initiatives addressing underdevelopment including globalisation, which has resulted in many Caribbean micro-states being left behind. The final section examines the legislative framework for addressing corruption. Here the evidence suggests that, although

Caribbean countries have enacted a raft of anti-corruption legislation and ratified conventions, the impact of these has been minimal.

Chapter Six is the first of two case study chapters. This chapter examines and analyses good governance data from the Voice and Accountability dimension of the WGI across five case study Caribbean countries: Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and St. Vincent. This is achieved through accessing several WGI data sets pertaining to freedom of speech, freedom of the press and open, fair and balanced elections, as well as Freedom House Index (FHI) and Electoral Integrity Project (EIP) data. To cross check the findings of these various data sets I undertake cross-checks through accessing media reports via BBC monitoring. From this analysis, I illustrate that, for the WGI data, the case study countries are assessed on far fewer data sets than other countries globally. This, I argue, is flawed, placing the case study countries at the disadvantage of limited and questionable evaluation criteria. The FHI and EIP demonstrate that elections in each of the case study countries are free and fair overall. This outcome reflects general consensus that the case study countries operate as liberal democracies, in which freedoms are guaranteed and protected. This, I suggest, should provide a safeguard against corruption, if reliance is placed on the numerous international organisations who define methods for addressing corruption.

Chapter Seven is the second case study chapter and focuses on the five case study countries' performance in addressing corruption through analysis of the WGI Control of Corruption dimension and the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (TICPI). In analysing the data from these two sources, what we see is that the case study countries appear to be performing in the top 30 percentile. In an attempt to verify the data findings, an analysis is undertaken of media reports pertaining to

corruption across the case study countries through accessing BBC Monitoring. This analysis reveals that in each of the case study countries there are concerns pertaining to the level of corruption. From this analysis, it is apparent that although the five case study countries operate as liberal democracies and have implemented formal governance arrangements, these have not had a successful impact in assisting the countries to address corruption meaningfully. The chapter concludes by arguing that the position the case study countries find themselves in relation to corruption is to be expected, as it is flawed to expect these countries, all former colonies, to simply adapt and implement an externally imposed agenda for addressing corruption, without factoring in the core history of colonisation and its impact.

The eighth chapter provides an overview of the data following the semi-structured interviews conducted in Grenada and St. Vincent & the Grenadines (SVG). The objective of the chapter is to determine the extent to which interviewees' perspectives correspond to, or contradict, the findings from the data analysis set out in the case study chapters. The interviewees' perspectives evidence that although they are aware of the behaviours and practices which constitute corruption, overall the mechanisms for addressing the problems through legislation, commission and initiatives are ineffective.

Chapter Nine concludes the thesis. It presents the key themes arising from the research and argues that the research has evidenced both that corruption remains a problem in the Eastern (and wider) Caribbean and that the solutions advanced to date have failed to grapple with issue[s] in a meaningful manner. In order to address these shortcomings, it must first be accepted that the Caribbean's 500 year history of exploitation compounded by socio- cultural and economic factors has resulted in corruption being culturally tolerated.

CHAPTER TWO

Examining Corruption – Definitions and Behaviours

'Those who corrupt the public mind are just as evil as those who steal from the public purse'.
Adlai Stevenson

2.1 Introduction

Research on any subject cannot be undertaken in isolation (Aveyard, 2011). A review of current literature is fundamental as it illustrates what has already been written about the subject matter under research, thus enabling the researcher to identify gaps, offer new thinking and contribute to the production of new knowledge. Over the last hundred years, much has been written on corruption, and the last half-century has seen interest in the topic gathering momentum. In the past two decades, innovative projects such as the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (TI CPI) have been

established,¹ and their data has contributed to a wide range of macro and micro-level studies (Mauro 1995, Johnston 2005).

This chapter will examine some of the existing literature on corruption, commencing with various definitions of both the generic term and its types. This initial exercise provides an overview of contrasting perceptions of the behaviours that constitute corruption in support of a fundamental position in the thesis that there is no blanket definition applicable across all social systems. Examining how corruption is measured is the focus of the second section of the chapter, which discusses the roles of Transparency International (TI) and the Latin American Public Opinion Project² (LAPOP) in measuring corruption levels and perceptions in some detail. Here the different areas of corruption and perception that both organisations analyse for their respective indices are examined. At the same time some of the indices' limitations (specifically the failure to address cultural tolerance) are highlighted.

The third section focuses on the Caribbean perspective, with specific emphasis on what is known about corruption in the region, examining some of the causes and highlighting the solutions advanced for addressing the problems to date. Here, I argue that one of the limitations of efforts to address corruption in the region relates to the limited understanding of cultural behaviours and practices and their links to corruption. Theories and models of corruption are reviewed in the fourth section, with one of the aims being to illustrate the various views of corruption from an economic, political,

¹ Transparency International is a non-profit organisation based in Berlin, with more than 60 chapters worldwide. Its international focus is on corruption in international business transactions and, through its national chapters, fighting corruption at the domestic level.

² LAPOP is the premier academic institution carrying out surveys of public opinion in the Americas, with over thirty years of experience. Every two years, it carries out the Americas Barometer survey, which currently covers 26 nations including all of North, Central and South America, and the Caribbean. Each year, it publishes dozens of high-quality academic studies and policy-relevant papers.

social and cultural perspective. Essentially, the point is made that both the literature and the approaches for addressing the problem fail to incorporate and factor in some of those cultural tolerances which are linked to corruption. The key findings from the review are set out in the conclusion.

The definition of cultural tolerance that the researcher applies throughout is her own: Cultural tolerance occurs when questionable customs and practices have become everyday, acceptable and tolerated behaviours. Since these practices are embedded in the culture, any change in them will require long-term intervention. The hypothesis founded on the preceding definition, proposes that, 'cultural tolerance' is a main contributor to corruption in the Caribbean. Therefore, this thesis rigorously analyses the hypothesis throughout, with specific emphasis on the Eastern Caribbean through case studies and through field work in Grenada and St Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG).

2.2 Defining Corruption

This section aims to illustrate the various contributions that theorists, academics and international organisations have made towards providing a global definition of corruption. Analysis will demonstrate although there is no definitive definition, there are indeed similarities between the definitions. Early definitions derived from social phenomena have been highlighted by the historian Waquet (1991, 91), who argues that earlier definitions of corruption had a wider significance to 'the entire moral life of mankind'. More recent definitions have concentrated on an abuse of power by those in office. For example, Fredrich (1972) concludes that corruption is a kind of behaviour whereby one deviates from the norms prevalent or believed to prevail in a given context, such as the political.

Similarly, Nye (1967), Heidenheimer (1978) and Johnston (2005) viewed corruption as the abuse of public power for personal gain, through bribery, where an illegal payment is made to a government official in return for a governmental or state-sanctioned act that requires some form of selective process. This results in collective goods being illegitimately converted into privately rewarding payoffs. Similarly, Akindele (1995) defines corruption as forms of reciprocal behaviour or transaction where holders of power and office can use rewards to induce each other to grant preferential treatment or favour, against the principles and interests of other organisations within the society.

These definitions and understandings of corrupt behaviour have been accepted by international organisations and others, including CARICOM,³ the European Union⁴ (EU) and the World Bank,⁵ (WB) which agree that corruption is therefore an abuse of entrusted power for personal gain or for the benefit of a group to which one owes allegiance.

³ CARICOM. The Caribbean Community emerged in 1973 from the break-up of the West Indies Federation (1958–62) and the dissolution of the Caribbean free trade agreement of 1968. Fourteen states (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Monserrat, St Kitts and

Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago) are full members. Nine states (Aruba, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, the Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico and Venezuela) have observer status. The Bahamas is a member of the community but not of the common market.

⁴ An economic and political union established in 1993 after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by members of the European Community and since expanded to include numerous Central and Eastern European nations. The establishment of the European Union expanded the political scope of the European Economic Community and led to the adoption of a common currency, the Euro.

⁵ The World Bank is one of the world's largest sources of funding and knowledge, supporting governments of member countries in their efforts to invest in school and health centres, provide water and electricity, fight disease and protect the environment. This support is provided through project or policy-based loans and grants as well as technical assistance such as advice and studies. The goal of the World Bank is to reduce poverty and to improve the living standards of people in low- and middle-income countries.

The numerous definitions of corruption demonstrate commonalities, but it is clear that the definition most referred to focuses on the abuse of power for individual benefit or gain, or,

‘The abuse of public office for private gain. This includes situations where public officials accept, solicit, or extort bribes; and where private actors offer bribes to subvert or circumvent public policies for competitive advantage and profit. Corruption can however occur in the absence of bribes. For example, the World Bank considers patronage or nepotism by government official, theft of state assets, or the illegal diversion of state revenues as corruption’ (Enweremadu, 2009: 448).

To gain a better understanding of why it is not possible to have a universal definition for corruption, we must appreciate that what constitutes corruption in one social system may not be viewed as corruption in another. Heywood (1997) highlights this point, submitting that it is hard to apply one meaning to political corruption due to the variations in different political systems. Political corruption in a democratic society may take a different form to that in a non-democratic society and, therefore, the circumstances and climate in which corruption may exist will depend on the political system in place. Similarly, referring to political corruption, Johnston (1996) argues that it is impossible to advance one general and uncontested definition for political corruption.

According to Heywood (1997), one of the reasons for this is that what is viewed as corrupt and even illegal in one country may not be in another. As such, an act can be defined as ‘corrupt’ or not, depending on where it takes place. Heywood gives the example of political parties’ financing rules. In some countries, voluntary private

contributions to political party campaign funds would result in an investigation, as would remunerated directorships for sitting members of parliament, but in Britain these practices are acceptable.

The definition of corruption as 'Abuse of power for individual benefit or gain' (Nye, 1967; Johnston, 2005) is broad, and to understand its meaning we must examine the practices that are deemed to constitute corruption. A good starting point is to examine the difference between grand and petty corruption, where actors operate at different levels. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2008), petty corruption, also known as administrative corruption, takes place at street level and involves 'everyday' corruption at the lower end of political interaction between citizens and public officials. This occurs where an individual comes into direct contact with state officials and a bribe is offered in return for preferential treatment or services. For example, a customs officer may accept a small amount of money to turn a blind eye to a consignment of heavy-duty goods. Over time, these small amounts of money amount to a significant loss to the public.

Tearfund (2010) describes grand corruption as that which takes place at the higher end of the political spectrum and decision-making. He concludes it may involve the appropriation or embezzlement of government funds, tailoring public laws, codes and regulations to benefit favoured' groups in return for bribes, or maintain political support and power. Examples of this behaviour can be seen among senior politicians and officials. Elements of grand and petty corruption are linked to both bribery and corruption through kickbacks. Morris (2011) argues that kickbacks operate similarly to bribes, but the illegal payment is made following services being undertaken and is usually taken from a portion of the funds or benefit awarded by the government. Bribery and kickbacks usually involve interactions between civilians and [a]

government official. Graft and embezzlement, on the other hand, involves public officials appropriating public funds or diverting their use. Fraud refers to schemes devised by officials to appropriate public funds by deception, often with the assistance of civil accomplices, for example by establishing fake companies, creating ghost workers and placing them on payroll, and manipulating figures to falsely account for public funds. Other forms of corruption include nepotism, favouritism and conflict of interest, where public-sector jobs are illegally steered to friends and family or to benefit officials' personal interests.

Systematic corruption occurs when it forms an integrated and essential aspect of the economic, social and political system, and when it is embedded in a wider situation that helps sustain it (Byrne, 2007). Legal and moral corruption occurs when the law is clearly broken, 'If an official's act is prohibited by laws established by the government, it is corrupt: if it is not prohibited, it is not corrupt even if it is abusive or unethical' (Gardiner, 1993).

The above demonstrates there is no one definitive definition of corruption, but rather several definitions with some similarities. This is also evident when looking at some of the behaviours that constitute corrupt practices. Having reviewed various definitions of corruption, along with some of the practices that are viewed as corrupt, the focus now shifts to examining how corruption is measured.

2.3 How corruption is measured

To understand how corruption is measured, the work undertaken by Transparency International (TI) over the last three decades is examined. Central to TI's work is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), established in 1995 to measure and rank the

prevalence of corruption in any given country. To achieve this, over the years TI has undertaken surveys to determine levels of corruption perceived by business analysts, expert assessments and opinion surveys. TI also concludes that no region or country is immune from public-sector corruption, a point highlighted by the data of the 2015 CPI, which ranked countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector was perceived to be through a combination of polls, drawing on corruption-related data collected by a variety of institutions. More specifically, the questionnaires and surveys used incorporate questions relating to bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement, and the strength and effectiveness of public-sector anti-corruption efforts.

The data from the 2015 CPI illustrates that corruption remains a global problem, and the Caribbean is not immune. According to TI, 'The CPI reflects the views of observers from around the world, including experts living and working in the countries or territories evaluated' (Transparency International, 2015). The assessment methodology scores countries on a scale of 0–100, with 0 signifying the highest perceived high levels of corruption, and 100 indicating the lowest possible levels. The CPI 2015 included 167 countries and territories and concluded that the six least corrupt countries in the world were Denmark, Finland, Sweden, New Zealand, the Netherlands and Norway. The six countries or territories viewed as the most corrupt were Somalia and North Korea (tied for most corrupt), Afghanistan, Sudan, South Sudan and Angola. Overall, the 2015 CPI rankings show that the Scandinavian countries are perceived as the least corrupt, while African, Eastern European and Caribbean countries are viewed as the most corrupt. However, it must be noted that the CPI focuses on perceived levels of corruption, as opposed to actual corrupt

practices and behaviour taking place. Moreover, analysis of the TI data for Caribbean countries demonstrates significant variation in rankings as illustrated in Table 2.1 below. In the 2015 index Caribbean countries were ranked⁶: Jamaica (69), Trinidad and Tobago (72), Suriname (88), Guyana (119) and Haiti (158).

⁶ The lower the number given for a country ranking reflects a country being least corrupt.

Table 2.1: CPI Ranking 2012–2015

Country	Ranking (score) 2012 Total countries (176)	Ranking (score) 2013 Total countries (173)	Ranking (score) 2014 Total countries (175)	RANKING (SCORE) 2015 Total Countries (167)
Barbados	15 (76)	15 (75)	17 (74)	
Belize				
Dominica	41 (58)	41 (58)	39 (58)	
Grenada				
Guyana	133 (28)	136 (27)	124 (30)	119 (29)
Haiti	165 (19)		161 (19)	158 (17)
Jamaica	83 (38)	83 (38)	84 (38)	69 (41)
St Lucia	22 (71)	22 (71)		22 (71)
St Vincent and the Grenadines	36 (62)	33 (62)	29(67)	36 (62)
Suriname		94 (36)		88(36)
Trinidad and Tobago	80 (39)	83 (38)	84(38)	72 (39)

Source: Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015

Barbados (ranking 15 in 2012 and 17 in 2014) is ranked the highest and least-corrupt Caribbean country, followed by St Lucia (ranking 22 in 2012, 2013 and 2015), and St Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG) (ranking 36 in 2012 and 2015). On the other hand, Haiti (ranking 165 in 2012 and 158 in 2015), Guyana (ranking 133 in 2012 and 119 in 2015) and Jamaica (ranking 83 in 2012 and 69 in 2015) are viewed as the most corrupt of the CARICOM countries.

It is important to highlight that the CPI data presented in Table 1 is not intended to illustrate the changes in actual corruption in the countries over the 2012–2015 period. This is not possible due to the CPI data being based purely on perceived levels of corruption, coupled with the fact not all CARICOM countries have been included in the CPI each year and the number of countries included in the index changes annually. However, what the CPI data can demonstrate is consistency (or lack thereof) in

rankings and scores of the Caribbean countries included in the CPI over the last four years.

Ten CARICOM countries have been included in the CPI between 2012 and 2015. Belize and Grenada were not included in the CPI over this four-year period. Suriname was not included in 2012. There were no entries for Haiti in 2013, St Lucia in 2014, Barbados or Dominica in 2015. From Table 2.1 it can be seen the majority of these countries have remained consistent in their ranking positions, with most fluctuating within five ranking points. The two most consistent countries are St Lucia and Barbados. In the 2012, 2013 and 2015 entries, St Lucia remained at a ranking of 22, while Barbados remained at 15 in 2012 and 2013, and dropped to 17 in 2014. St Vincent and the Grenadines, in the four years, had rankings of 36 in 2012, 33 in 2013, 29 in 2014 and 36 in 2015, showing a slight drop in 2013 and 2014.

The two CARICOM countries with the highest improvement in their rankings were Guyana and Jamaica, which both rose 14 ranking points. In 2012, Guyana ranked 133; it then rose to a ranking of 119 in 2015. Jamaica ranked 83 in 2012 and 69 in 2015. It also warrants noting that all CARICOM countries except Barbados have increased their ranking between 2012 and 2015. Some of the reasons given for the increase in rankings are addressed in this chapter. However, at this stage it should be noted that both Jamaica and Guyana have local Transparency International chapters in place, working to implement the principles of Transparency International to raise awareness of corruption's impact. This may have some bearing as to why they have higher rankings than other Caribbean countries.

To further understand how these rankings are assessed requires more detailed analysis of Transparency International's approach and methodology. The CPI ranks

countries and territories based on how their public sector is perceived. Perceptions are derived from a composite index consisting of various polls, which draw on corruption-related data collected by recognised and reputable institutions in a country or territory (CPI 2012). Countries or territories are only included in the index when three or more of the sources of information Transparency International relies upon for the Corruption Perception Index are available. Where fewer than three sources are available, countries cannot be included. Hence, we see countries are not always included in the TI index, from 2012 to 2015 Grenada and Belize were not included; whilst in 2005 Dominica and Grenada were not included and in 2010 Belize, Grenada and Suriname were not included.

Though many international organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) rely significantly on the CPI, when assessing countries' applications for grants, loans, development projects and initiatives, CPI methodologies have been criticised. One of the main criticisms is that the surveys are undertaken by third parties, which results in the data varying quite widely depending on the number of surveys completed and methodologies used. In addition, it is not possible to compare data year-on-year as the methods and samples change annually (Global Integrity, 2008). Thompson and Shah (2005) further argue that CPI data is unreliable because the sources it is based on are aggregated or averaged and use various definitions of corruption. Also, the large standard errors of the aggregate corruption indices are problematic, which is compounded by the lack of precision of the scores, leading to questions about the feasibility of compiling meaningful rankings across countries.

Cobham (2013) argues that as the CPI is based on perception, there is a danger of data distorting the true situation. He further submits that what is missing from the CPI is actual evidence of corruption in any of the countries included, as well as information

about how corruption actually affects citizens in a country. Further, despite widespread reliance on TI data, it does not necessarily represent a true reflection of what is happening in a country with regards to corruption. This was highlighted by Baumann (2017), when looking at how reliance on the TI resulted in the organisation underestimating the corruption taking place in Tunisia under Ben Ali. From 1998 to 2010 TI scored Tunisia 5 or above for five of the 13 years under Ben Ali leadership and therefore perceived the country as being one of the least corrupt.

‘In 2003 TI commended Ben Ali’s Tunisia for being among the countries that had improved the most compared to the previous year and it was never singled out for criticism in CPI press releases..... The scores that Ben Ali’s Tunisia received in the CPI were highly respectable and bolstered the country’s clean image’ (Baumann, 2017: 467).

This position changed rapidly following the removal of Ben Ali, resulting in Tunisia TI score dropping to 3.8 in 2011, placing it 73rd place globally, down from 59th in 2010. What was established was that Ben Ali was being supported by both the US and European governments, coupled with investors and international financial institutions for both security and economic benefits. Although TI may not have directly contributed to this, indirectly it, ‘contributed to a “mood music” of economic reports and press coverage which was favourable to the Tunisian regime which Ben Ali’s international supporters could point to, to justify their stance’ (Baumann, 2017: 468)

In addition to the CPI, Transparency International also has a Global Corruption Barometer (GCB), which was launched in 2003 and is the largest worldwide public-opinion survey on corruption. One of the main differences between the two is that the GCB focuses on people’s direct experiences with bribery and details their views on

corruption in the main institutions within their countries. It also provides some insight into how willing and ready people are to stop corruption (Global Corruption Barometer, 2013). Therefore, it attempts to take a broader representative group of citizens to ascertain and chart the experience of corruption in their country (Cobham, 2013). Since its introduction, the GCB has conducted surveys in 2003–2007, 2009, 2010/11 and 2013. For each year, the number of countries included in the survey varied, from 44 in 2003 to 69 in 2005, 62 in 2007, 86 in 2010/11 and 107 in 2013. However, the first inclusion of a CARICOM country in the barometer was Jamaica, in 2013. As a result, it is not possible to analyse the GCB data in relation to CARICOM as part of this chapter.

Another mechanism for measuring corruption is the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) Americas Barometer surveys, which conducts surveys across the Americas biennially.⁷ In 2012, the survey covered 26 countries across North, Central and South America, and the Caribbean.⁸ The LAPOP survey focuses on public opinion and behaviour across various fields, using a range of methodologies at pre-survey, implementation and post-survey stages. In 2010, part of the LAPOP survey focused on measuring people's experience of involvement in bribery or attempted bribery by officials including police officers, government employees and local-government

⁷ LAPOP is a project directed by Professor Mitchell A. Seligson, Centennial Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University. LAPOP functions as a consortium of academic and non-governmental institutions and individuals across the Americas. LAPOP's principal survey project is a biennial regional survey of the Americas called the Americas Barometer.

LAPOP surveys measure citizen views on system support, political tolerance, citizen participation, local government, corruption, and authoritarianism, and many other topics related to democratic politics and opinion.

⁸ Countries included in the 2010 LAPOP survey were Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina, Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Suriname, Uruguay, Colombia, Haiti, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Chile, Dominican Republic, United States, Brazil, Canada, Honduras, Trinidad & Tobago, Belize, Panama, Jamaica and Guyana. Trinidad & Tobago and Suriname entered for first time.

officials. The survey included five CARICOM countries: Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Belize and Haiti. The main finding from the five CARICOM countries was that only 8% of Jamaica's population and 9% of Trinidad and Tobago's population reported having experienced bribery at an official level, making them among the lowest of 25 Latin American and Caribbean countries studied. Belize and Guyana are at 17% each, with Haiti being the highest at 54% (Seligson et al. 2010). In relation to the LAPOP data, Munroe (2011) makes reference to the 2010 GCB and specifically to the experience in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago of corruption and victimisation, stating that it is three times lower than the global average, where one in four people in 86 countries reported paying bribes.

However, when looking at the actual perception levels of corruption, the data provides a different view. Of the 25 countries included in LAPOP, Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago and Guyana measured poorly, with citizens viewing corruption as a key problem in their country. Why is the perception level different to levels of personal experience? Making reference to the gap between high perception levels and lower levels of actual experience of corruption, Munroe (2010) suggests three factors for the difference in data. First, there is the media's role in exposing allegations as well as proving corruption. Second, there are likely to be reduced bribery incentives, due to public agencies' increased efficiencies, removal of delays and disciplinary action against officials accepting bribes. The third reason Munroe suggests is that while low-level corruption involving the 'man in the street' may be declining, corruption among people in office, whom Munroe refers to as 'untouchables', is becoming endemic across the region. People see and hear about these officeholders and believe they are getting away with their corrupt practices unchallenged.

This section has attempted to illustrate that corruption is a global problem experienced by all countries at different levels. While some countries across the Caribbean have been assessed as being corrupt, Barbados and St Lucia, have ranked within the top 25 least corrupt countries in the world. Of those CARICOM countries assessed in the index, over the years only two countries, Jamaica and Guyana have significantly improved their ratings while the remaining countries' rankings have generally remained consistent. This apparent failure to tackle corruption is despite implementation of initiatives and conventions, and enactment of legislation some of which are explored in the next section.

2.4 The Caribbean Perspective

This section turns to examine the literature to ascertain what is advanced as the causes and consequences of corruption in the Caribbean, along with some of the solutions for addressing the problem.

2.4.1 Problems and Solutions

In examining some of the causes and consequences of corruption in the Caribbean, a good starting point is to look at the role of CARICOM and some of the arguments advanced as to why corruption exists. Key to understanding CARICOM's role is Nazario (2007), who contends that corruption does not exist because of the underpaid taking bribes and entering into corrupt practices, as such practices are evident in both rich and poor countries. The starting point, when looking at corruption and its link to poverty, is that poverty is a result of corruption rather than the cause of corruption. Nigeria is an example of this position, being an oil-rich exporting country, with high levels of poverty and corruption.

In addressing the challenges faced across the Caribbean, Nazario (2007) recognises the urgency for CARICOM to work cohesively and transparently in partnership with other countries and agencies on a national and international scale, applying and implementing systems and processes as a collective. The opportunity to undertake collaborative work presents itself in a globalised world, as international donors and agents remind CARICOM that corrupt practices cannot be ignored. In particular, there is concern that there will be negative consequences for the single market and economy that CARICOM countries committed to implementing in 2007. In devising a strategy to address corruption, Nazario (2007) reiterates some of the key arguments made about the impact of abuses in public office, especially in relation to the judiciary and security forces, and how these undermine public trust and confidence. Lack of trust has severe consequences for investment in the region, as where there are high or perceived high levels of corruption, the cost of doing business or making investments becomes an impediment. As such, an association can be identified between corruption levels and the level of social, economic and political development within a country or across a region. It is no coincidence that those countries or regions with high or perceived high levels of corruption also have lower levels of development.

Nazario's (2007) strategy proposes a five-point anti-corruption plan. First, preventing, detecting and sanctioning corruption are to be included as one of CARICOM's key policy decisions, having the full force of the law behind it. Second, there should be a requirement for all CARICOM members to sign the various anti-corruption initiatives and take advantage of the support and technical assistance offered. Third, governments should take responsibility for implementing and monitoring compliance with such anti-corruption initiatives. Fourth, CARICOM should establish and publish standards for democratic, transparent and participatory governance. The fifth point is

quite bold, as it would require CARICOM to grant legal status to the Charter of Civil Society (Girvan 2006), which would provide the vehicle for wider civil-society engagement in policymaking decisions and in monitoring each country's anti-corruption initiatives. Due to the detrimental economic and social effects of corruption, CARICOM cannot afford to ignore the issue. Rather, it should recognise that corruption is a major problem for the region, a point illustrated when looking at Caribbean countries' overall poor ranking in the Transparency International Corruption Index and the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Index.⁹

In recognising the urgency of addressing the problem, some Caribbean countries have responded by implementing policies and procedures, with Jamaica, Grenada and Antigua implementing anti-corruption and/or integrity legislation. The Bahamas, Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts and Nevis, and St Vincent and the Grenadines have gone further by implementing effective money-laundering initiatives, resulting in these members being removed from the OCED Financial Action Task Force¹⁰ list of non-cooperating countries. As most CARICOM countries are members of the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the United Nations (UN), most have signed and ratified the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (IACC) and the IACC Mechanism for Follow-up on the Implementation (MESICIC),¹¹ which entails making a commitment

⁹ World Economic Forum. The Global Competitiveness Report assesses the competitiveness landscape of 140 economies, providing insight into the drivers of their productivity and prosperity. The Report series remains the most comprehensive assessment of national competitiveness worldwide.

¹⁰ The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is an intergovernmental organization founded in 1989 on the initiative of the G7 to help administer the Marshall Plan. The Financial Action Task Force (on money laundering) (FATF) is an intergovernmental organisation founded in 1989 on the initiative of the G7.

¹¹ Organisation of American States, "Mechanism for Follow-up of the Implementation of the Inter American Convention against Corruption (MESICIC)" (2006); Committee of Experts Hemispheric Report.

to introduce mechanisms to prevent and eradicate corruption, as well as promoting the benefits that effective measures and actions bring to this process.

A more recent initiative is the establishment of the Commonwealth Caribbean Association of Integrity Commissions and Anti-Corruption Bodies, which was launched at the first Commonwealth Regional Conference for Heads of Integrity Commissions and Anti-Corruption Bodies in the Caribbean, hosted by the governor general and prime minister of Grenada. The association's objective is to support integrity, address corruption and deliver practical benefits to members for knowledge sharing and co-ordination (The Commonwealth, 2015).

As CARICOM members are all classified as small to medium countries, it is essential for them to recognise some of the economic challenges the region faces as a reason to address corruption. Collier (2001) emphasises this first by examining why some of the independent states and territories in the region have not achieved higher levels of economic development, and submits that for many people across the Caribbean, economic development is retarded by the legacy of imperialism and slavery, an observation aligned to dependency theory. In dependency theory, which derives from structural Marxism, the world capitalist system is seen to fail to give Caribbean countries a fair wage for their labour or a fair price for their exported natural resources and agricultural and manufactured products. The blame for dependency is levelled at the governments of developed countries and at international organisations including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

One of the major challenges in addressing some of these problems is that Caribbean countries fail to make the connection between political corruption and the misuse of

power, as a key factor that hampers their country's economic growth. Collier (2001) submits this is due to the lack of empirical, data-based evidence available to support the argument from either a socio-economic or purely economic perspective.

Notwithstanding, it is necessary to recognise the problems that need to be addressed to move forward. These include the consequences of political corruption on the rule of law in the Caribbean and its relationship to the transnational trade in illegal drugs. Almost every country in the Caribbean is affected by the narcotics trade, and the mixture of corruption and drugs leads to a vicious circle with profound consequences for the small countries of the Caribbean (Collier, 2001). Corruption allows for the illegal drug trade to flourish, and drug money is used, 'to pay off government officials, police officers, and justice system officials, causing these officials to 'look the other way' as the drug gangs go about their business in many Caribbean states' (Collier, 2001:6).

Crime and security are also key concerns in the Caribbean, especially in relation to the impact on tourism, on which most CARICOM countries are reliant. The National Integrity Systems Caribbean Composite Study (NISCC) conducted in 2004 and joint report of the UN and World Bank report on drugs and crime in the Caribbean (2007) set out some of the challenges faced by Caribbean countries in addressing this problem. A key priority highlighted is the need to address the considerable issue of narcotics trafficking in the region. According to NISCC analysis of the integrity systems for eight CARICOM states,¹² narcotics trafficking diverts much-needed resources from other activities, undermining and corrupting social institutions. Supporting this position,

¹² Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent & the Grenadines.

Maingot (2009) reiterates that bad practices such as narcotics trafficking will not be reversed unless levels of corruption in the Caribbean are addressed.

Contrary to Nazario, Bernard (2005) argues that the inadequate salaries paid to judicial employees have consequences, including leaving them open to undertaking unofficial tasks to supplement their salaries. Bernard finds this unsurprising, as across most developing countries, judicial personnel are underpaid, living on salaries that can barely meet day-to-day living expenses, but are still expected to carry out their duties to a high moral standard. Further corruption in the judiciary is compounded by problems with drugs in developing countries, which have been instrumental in the rise of corrupt practices in the court system. A conflict arises where law-enforcement offices try to prosecute drug offenders while insiders in judicial offices are induced by the narcotic fraternity to undertake practices that hamper criminal court proceedings.

Bernard (2005) also refers to the relationship of the judiciary to, and the separation of powers between, the executive and legislative arms of government, questioning whether the judiciary can actually be independent. Though it is recognised that the relationship between any government and judiciary is crucial, and that neither can stand alone, at the same time their close and sometimes conflicting relationship compromises each branch's independence and violates the doctrine of separation of powers. Bernard (2005) refers to the Report of the American Bar Association Commission, which, recognises one key to developing positive relationships between the executive and judiciary, is the need for the executive branch to accept and acknowledge that in most situations the judiciary, is far better placed to determine the resources necessary to administer an efficient and effective court system. The role of the executive is to ensure the needs of the judiciary are adequately provided for, to enable them to carry out their roles effectively.

Bernard (2005) also contends another critical issue is that public trust and confidence needs to be regained. To eradicate corruption in the court system, it is necessary to address poor practices, and justice must not only be done, it must be *seen* to be done. To achieve this, Bernard suggests that Commonwealth countries implement the findings from the Limassol Colloquium (2002) and the Latimer House Guidelines,¹³ in which a number of recommendations were made with a view to improving bad practices across the Commonwealth judiciary. These include:

- i. Introducing a code of conduct applicable to all personnel.
- ii. Developing effective capacity-building and training to ensure personnel have the tools and skills to undertake their roles to the required standard.
- iii. Introducing an anti-corruption initiative, with the onus being on members of respective bar associations to promote it.
- iv. Putting processes in place to ensure personnel undertaking administration duties are appointed by the same body, or, in the alternative, establish a commission responsible for making judicial appointments.
- v. Undertaking a concerted initiative to raise public awareness about how the court system operates, amending the public view of the court system as some form of mysterious operation that is too complicated to fully understand. Courts need to become more user-friendly, and to support this change, they need to encourage visits to the courts so the public can better understand their mechanics.

It must be acknowledged that CARICOM has made some progress in addressing and combatting corruption with the support of international organisations. However, it still has some work to do if it is to meaningfully address problems with corruption, especially as it does not appear to be a core priority for the region. At the tenth meeting

¹³ Commonwealth principles formulated at Latimer House. 1998 United Kingdom.

of CARICOM's Council of Foreign and Community Relations, in May 2007, the issue of corruption was not raised. CARICOM leaders tend to overlook the issue of corruption and the opportunity to address it, though they know the significance it plays at all levels of development across the region. This indeed could be as a result of the manner in which CARICOM was created and the lack of trust within its members then and now, resulting in a lack of strategic application over the last twenty years in relation to addressing corruption meaningfully. This issue is addressed further in Chapter Three.

Robinson (2009) who looked at corruption in Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago and Guyana, submits Caribbean states do not necessarily overlook the issue of corruption, but rather that the research undertaken to date (Mauro 1995, Johnston 2005, Collier 2001) is biased due to the way corruption across Caribbean countries is viewed by affluent Western countries. A key contributor to this is the approach that views the Caribbean clustered together as a whole, failing to understand that Caribbean countries, though similar, are not the same. The corruption challenges each Caribbean nation faces are different and have changed over the years. Robinson demonstrated this by examining the origins and different types of corruption in Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana.

In Jamaica, Robinson (2009) found corruption evolved as a result of the negative impact it left behind in Caribbean countries. Until the 1830s, the economy was based on a system of slave labour and sugar crops; this period saw rapid economic growth due to changes in colonial policies and the advent of self-government, but post slavery did not allow for economic development for the Jamaican people. Some of the long-term consequences, Robinson argues, are that it allowed for the drug trade to boom, as Jamaican people found a new economic outlet, resulting in high levels of corruption

developed among the Jamaican police force, which later could also be found across customs, transit and housing.

With regards to Trinidad and Tobago Robinson (2009) points out that CARICOM countries have been suffering from endemic police corruption and high murder rates as a result of the drug trade, with the Transparency International Index between 2001 and 2008 showing a decrease in scores from 5.3 to 3.6 respectively, representing increased levels of perceived corruption. This change is substantiated by a (2005) Caribbean Net News article that concludes both public- and private-sector corruption in Trinidad and Tobago had increased in volume though the types of corruption remained the same. In Guyana, corruption had been mainly confined to port and customs officials, also as a direct result of the drug trade. However, corruption in the country has changed over the years, coming to involve the police force (Robinson 2009). In the three countries Robinson recognises the root cause of corruption lay in the drug trade and the use of countries as transshipment points, but there remain substantial differences in how each of the CARICOM countries is affected.

Having examined the literature on corruption in the Caribbean, along with possible solutions and major challenges the focus is now narrowed to examining the literature in regard to the impact of political corruption.

2.4.2 Political Corruption

This section of the chapter concentrates on understanding political corruption, a fundamental aspect of the thesis and research. In their recent study examining

corruption and political participation, Bonifacio and Paulino (2015) identified five distinct types of political participation which could have an impact on political corruption. These are: contact with political and governmental actors, community activism, partisan and electoral activism, voter turnout and protest activism. They conclude that there is a clear link between corruption and political participation, and that where corruption is tolerated and there is experience with corruption, there are high levels of participation.

Marcusson and Cloarec (2013) argue that elements of political corruption result from a 'temptation structure', which occurs when rules about what is acceptable are not clear or prescribed. As a result, the temptation to acquire assets with significant profit, with limited risk of being exposed is high, with even 'principled' individuals succumbing at times. To substantiate this point Mocan (2008) argues that high income individuals are more likely to be asked to engage in behaviour which constitutes bribery by a government official. Dong and Torgler (2009) however, found that an individual's political interest matters when it comes to bribery, with a higher level of political interest being associated with a lower justifiability of corruption, along with a lower perceived level of corruption. Chang and Huang (2016) contend that low and declining levels of trust in governance within institutions is a direct result of corruption. They further submit that corruption breeds personal connections and, as a result, makes institutions personal instruments of politicians, leading to institutions losing both their autonomy and credibility. The impact of this malfeasance is that governmental performance is impeded, and economic development is hindered.

While the literature addresses some of the major challenges facing the Caribbean in addressing corruption, there is clearly a gap, as the material available does not make a connection between corruption and cultural tolerance.

Fundamental to this thesis is the question of how and why political corruption has become tolerated in the Caribbean. For clarity my definition of cultural tolerance is, 'The phenomenon in which customs and practices that form part of daily practices, although questionable, have become acceptable tolerated behaviours'. My hypothesis is that 'cultural tolerance' significantly contributes condition to the emergence of corruption, a hypothesis which is comprehensively analysed throughout this thesis.

2.5 Theories and Models

Various theories and models have been submitted to explain different aspects of corruption, including why it exists, the consequences it has and the possible solutions to it. This section examines some of these theories by looking at traditional, modern and specifically Caribbean contributions to the discourse. This section commences by examining three models: those centred on public office, the market, and public interest.

The public-office-centred model relates to the concept of the public office and deviations from the norms that bind those who hold it, as highlighted by Bayley (1978), McMullan (1978) and Nye (1978), who looked at corruption and associated problems in developing countries. They all concluded that corruption involved deviating from normal public duties for private gain, and that corrupt acts included bribery, nepotism and misappropriation. The market-centred approach relates to the norms governing public officials, where these norms are not clearly articulated or are non-existent and public office becomes a business. This is illustrated by Klaveren (2002), who argues that a corrupt civil servant regards their position in public office as a business and will seek to maximise income as far as possible. Klitgaard (1998) illustrates this point through his equation that corruption equals monopoly, plus discretion, minus accountability. Other examples include groups of officials performing similar services

in the marketplace and collectively agreeing to the same fees, resulting in collusion that undercuts market processes.

To decide whether any of the above models apply to a given situation, one must consider the norms that distinguish a corrupt from non-corrupt act. Heidenheimer (1989) submits that the norms and rules to be applied to public office or the public-interest centre, are not straightforward, as it is not clear which norms are to be applied to distinguish between corrupt and non-corrupt acts. Though the market-centred model appears at first glance to avoid this problem, on closer examination it is apparent it does not, as it takes the approach that there is an authority distinguishing between rules applied to public officials and those applicable to businessmen operating in the free market, or that there are certain characteristics that distinguish between the black market and the free market.

Other models of corruption include those of the early theorist Bryce (1921), who submitted corruption was linked to legal rules and statutes and, as such, behaviour was judged to be permissible or corrupt in accordance with the prescription of legislators and judges. This position was criticised by political scientists who argued that legal definitions alone were not enough to support a concrete definition of corruption. As Brookes (1910) contended, definitions of corruption are not sufficiently broad to cover the whole concept from the viewpoint of political science or ethics.

In examining the norms and actions viewed as corrupt from within or outside a political system, we see that there are a number of possible exchanges that can be defined as corrupt. According to Heidenheimer, these transactions create kinds of “specificity of obligations” on the parts of the exchanger, of which one of the most common is bribery,

due to the links that are established as a result of the specific obligations incurred by the officeholder who accepts a bribe.

Heidenheimer's (1989) theories of public opinion, public office and public interest have in recent years been criticised for being too traditional. Kurer (2005) argues that Heidenheimer's theories are traditional concepts, which are too narrow in approach, and submits an alternative impartiality principle that focuses on equal treatment to those who deserve to be treated equally. The public-opinion definition of corruption fails because it is difficult to pin down what is meant by public opinion. Similarly, the public-interest definition is flawed in presupposing a general understanding of what constitutes the public good or interest. Regarding Heidenheimer's public-office definition, Kurer (2005) argues that though defining corruption as violating formal rules of office works, it fails to cover cases where the legislation itself is corrupt. As an alternative, Kurer (2005) suggests there is an older concept based on distributive justice, which he refers to as the 'impartiality principle', determined by specific rules based on what might be called norms of non-discrimination, which nevertheless allow for certain types of discrimination.

To better understand the application of the impartiality principle, Kurer (2005) looks at corruption in traditional societies, and at contemporary political corruption involving violations of non-discrimination norms. Key to his analysis is the notion that corrupt acts are characterised by a holder of public office violating non-discrimination norms to gain a private advantage, which occurs in every society and is in fact enabled by the impartiality principle. Rose Ackerman (1999) takes a similar view, reiterating that within the private sector, the giving of gifts is both pervasive and highly valued, and that it is normal to provide jobs and contracts to a circle of friends and family members.

In further discussing public and private corruption, Kurer (2005) refers to studies undertaken by Beck (1999) relating to the patrimonial nature of accountability, which examined the Senegalese National Lottery (LONASE) skimming scandal. At the time of the scandal, Beck (1999) was in the company of male and female villagers and noticed that, on hearing the news, none of the villagers were actually surprised that the deputy, whom they had supported, was accused of embezzlement. However, they did take issue with the opposition candidate making accusations about the deputy in public. In fact, the villagers' view were that 'Any transgression by the deputy was justified by the jobs he provided as the director of the Lottery Commission' (Beck, 1999:209). According to Kurer (2005), this demonstrates one of two things, both plausible. First, though the villagers were upset their dealings had been exposed in the public domain, whether this was an instance of the patrimonial nature of accountability is questionable. Second, in relation to the villagers being aware of the public-private distinction, as they had benefited from their connected patron, their reaction may have been due to their own moral dereliction being publicised.

The issue, then, is that although the term corruption is readily understood and applied, it can be difficult to agree on the boundary between corrupt and non-corrupt acts, which may be more obvious in some cases than others. For example, if a British Prime Minister were to literally sell honours and pocket the money, it would be seen as corrupt. However, if a Prime Minister gave an honour to someone who had once donated money to his party, with no evidence of a formal agreement being made in exchange, it would be difficult to view this as corrupt (Transparency International UK, 2012). Therefore, it could be argued that there is a conflict between the theory and praxis in relation to corrupt acts, as one can theorise from a moral standpoint, however from an immoral position corruption is conscientiously rejected and from an amoral

standpoint although there is an awareness of morals which one has a lack of concern for when acting.

In addition to the models of corruption, the role that values and attitudes play within the political system is also significant and relevant. Almond and Verba (1989) examine how values and attitudes worked in participatory democratic institutions, exploring how individuals from within a polity viewed their relationship with others in a way that advanced their own interest. In this study, the authors explored the notion of 'civic culture', which they viewed as pluralistic, based on communications and persuasion, a culture of consensus and diversity, a culture that permits change but at the same time moderates it. The authors refer to the attitudes towards the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system. As such, the political culture is formulated as the link between micro and macropolitics.

The study identified three broad types of political culture. First, parochial, whereby 'political specialisation is minimal', and there is no differentiation between political roles and expectations among the actors. Second, 'subject', where there is institutional and role differentiation in political life, though citizens take a passive role. Third, 'participant' which in many ways is self-explanatory, in that relationships between specialised institutions, citizen opinion and activity are interactive. Almond and Verba (1965) submit that a combination of all three of the above characteristics, are present in all societies.

Similarly, Inglehart (1988), in his study looking at politics and democracy across Europe, found that, among citizens, there is a basic level of satisfaction with their lives and political circumstance, and that levels of interpersonal trust are strongly correlated with the existence of relatively long-lived and stable democratic institutions, and with

the relative affluence of the populace. After examining economic, political, and cultural variables for several European polities over the 20th century, Inglehart (1988) contends that viable democracy reflects the interaction of economic, political and cultural factors. However, McKoy (2011) contends that though there have been several theories of corruption, they do not explain what a state needs to do to address the problem. The theories do not suggest what legislative or administrative regimes should be introduced to reduce corruption. Therefore, McKoy argues that a reconstructed agency cost theory needs to be applied to examine, understand and identify solutions for dealing with corrupt practices in the Commonwealth Caribbean. This would go some way to addressing the limitations of other theories, in that it would make actual suggestions and recommendations towards reducing the problem and preventing corruption over a period of time.

Political culture warrants further discussion, especially as this thesis examines whether corruption in Caribbean politics is culturally tolerated. According to Gale (2008) political culture consists of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behaviour in the political systems. Similarly, Elazar (1972) defines political culture as what people believe and feel about government and how they think people should act towards it. To determine this, it is necessary to examine what individuals believe about themselves and government. The definition of political culture has resulted in various conceptualisations of it being formed over the years, including Almond and Verba's (1965) four political cultures—parochial, subject, participant and political subculture—and Elazar's (1972) moral, individual and traditional political cultures. An example of how political culture has affected society is Aluko's writing about political corruption in Nigeria (2002). He argues that corruption is now a

permanent feature of the Nigerian polity, having been institutionalised and incorporated in the culture and value system. As a result of political culture, we see that there is transgressive acceptance of political corruption in society.

This section has given an overview of the various theories of corruption. Most, if not all, of these theories have been taken as a starting point for addressing corruption, with millions of pounds spent on numerous projects and initiatives by various international and non-governmental agencies. Yet corruption remains a problem globally of which various explanations have been advanced as to why this is the case. However, in order to address corruption across the Caribbean, a better understanding is required of the various cultural tolerances of it across the region. The absence of analysis of the role of cultural tolerance in political corruption is clearly a gap in the literature and providing such an analysis is this thesis's primary contribution to new knowledge.

2.6 Conclusion

Though corruption has been a long-term global problem there are still shortcomings in the solutions proposed and employed to address it. The definition of corruption that has been used relates to 'a private gain', and existing theories are very much aligned with this definition. By measuring corruption, we see that no country is immune from it, but some are more prone to it than others. Further, what constitutes corruption in one country will not necessarily be viewed as corrupt in another. Therefore, when examining corruption in a country, it is important to understand that country's political systems.

The TI CPI which measures a country's perceived level of corruption has included several CARICOM countries over the years, while others, such as Grenada, have not

been entered in over eight years. From the index, we see that CARICOM states generally have not performed well since 2012; with most remaining at the same level or falling in levels, while only Jamaica and Guyana have improved their rankings in recent years.

As the CPI is based on perception, caution must be applied when examining rankings given to countries. When comparing the rankings of CARICOM countries in the CPI to those in the LAPOP which is based on public opinion and behaviour we see that Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana rank relatively high. Therefore, it is important to ensure that the context is given when referring to the various corruption measures.

This chapter has shown that corruption remains a problem across CARICOM countries, and various explanations have been given as to why, eg, undermining of trust and confidence in the judiciary (Nazario 2007); lack of economic development (Collier 2001); lack of adequate salary remuneration across the public sector (Bernard 2005), and the position that the problem stems from treating all Caribbean countries as the same, when their problems relating to corruption are different (Robinson, 2009). Various theories of corruption advanced over the years (Heidenheimer 1989, Kurer 2005, Inglehart 1988) have helped us better understand why corruption exists, but these theories fail to offer any solutions. McKoy (2012) attempts to provide a solution through introducing his reconstructed agency cost theory. However, the issue remains that corruption continues to be a problem for Caribbean countries and the Caribbean region collectively.

Throughout this chapter I have noted that gaps remain in the approach to addressing corruption. One such gap, I submit, is in the failure to look at what I have termed

'cultural tolerance' as a key factor in enabling corruption in the Caribbean. Looking at the Caribbean as a whole is not the answer. It is necessary to acknowledge the differences among CARICOM countries and the role that 'cultural tolerances' play in their day-to-day lifestyle. In an effort to do this, I will continue to examine 'cultural tolerance' and its connection to corruption throughout this thesis. Chapter Three examines this notion of cultural tolerance further through looking at the historical context of the Caribbean.

CHAPTER THREE

Overview of Caribbean Historical, Economic and Cultural Context:

'Masa Day Done'
-Eric Williams

3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the Caribbean historical, political, economic and socio-cultural contexts within which cultural tolerance has evolved. This Caribbean 'insider' focus provides data and evidence necessary for deconstructing and analysing my hypothesis that cultural tolerance is a major contributor to corruption in contemporary Caribbean politics. De-centring metropolitan or Western perceptions of corruption and privileging a Caribbean analytical framework is fundamental to this process.

On the grounds of logic and empiricism, employing Caribbean epistemology and positioning is essential for any meaningful analysis of a Caribbean phenomenon - given that one woman or man's perception of corruption was another's perception of survival or simply a fact of life. We could usefully refer to the relatively recent controversy over homophobia and sexism/sexploitation in Jamaican dancehall culture to gauge the divide between western and Caribbean perceptions. The

dancehall debate juxtaposes two narratives: a sound clash as it were between a still dominant western narrative and peripheral Caribbean narratives (Cooper, 2004). When we review the Caribbean historical context we need to take into consideration Caribbean ontology and historiography, much of which is oral rather than written. We can read Caribbean socio-politico-cultural history in cultural expressions like Creole religions, music, dance and song (Price-Mars 1928, Ortiz 1947, Benitez-Rojo 1990), as much as in literary attempts to record unwritten histories like Chamoiseau's *Texaco*, regional Creole folktales or in topical song forms like calypso¹ and belé². Yet despite the recent 'history from below' trend, Caribbean ontology still struggles with the silences and invisibility assigned to it as representative of a culture long denigrated and regarded as in need of western tutelage in order for it to join the ranks of civilisation and progress.

While corruption is as universal a phenomenon as power, local manifestations and perceptions of these vary. Variations are shaped by a set of unique local factors which cannot be measured or interpreted by utilising external criteria, otherwise the square peg/round hole syndrome inevitably results in distortion and misperception.

¹ A kind of West Indian (originally Trinidadian) music in syncopated African rhythm, typically with words improvised on a typical theme.

² Bele is a folk dance and music from Martinique, St. Lucia, Dominica, Haiti, Grenada and Trinidad & Tobago. It may be the oldest Creole dance from Dominica, and it strongly reflects influences from African fertility dances.

Even definitions of 'culture' and 'tolerance' will vary according to different epistemologies. In summary, this chapter examines the unique 'culture' which has produced the 'tolerance' I premise my hypothesis on.

Viewed historically, the Caribbean worldview differs radically from either the Judeo-Christian model introduced by the Spanish, or the later Enlightenment worldview with its emphasis on human rather than divine supremacy, rationalism and individualism. Both of these imported worldviews supported European 'progress' - projects of expansion, early mercantilism and, later, nascent capitalism. European worldviews maintained ambiguous links to notions of civilising/saving savages, whether noble or cannibal, (Las Casas, 1552) or the enslaved Africans who replaced them as coerced labour and who were largely regarded as soulless beasts or mere chattels (Martin 2012).

The Amerindian worldview, informed by animism and spiritism valued the communal rather than the individual and was driven by surviving harmoniously with the environment rather than profiting from it. Although hierarchical, the Amerindian societies early European arrivals encountered shared neither the interlopers' monotheistic religious outlook nor their concepts of individual land and property ownership. Similarly enslaved Africans brought a worldview with them which put community first, as did the East Indian indentured labourers of the nineteenth

century, with their extended family model. Significantly all three groups (Amerindian, African and East Indian) came from rural rather than urban-based societies.

The first section of the chapter examines the impact of slavery across the West Indies, with specific emphasis on the wealth and economic benefits accrued by the Europeans throughout the colonial period. Also addressed in this section are some of the corrupt practices (and measures taken to curtail them) adopted by those in power across the New World from the fifteenth century onwards. Many of these corrupt practices are still evident today throughout the Caribbean basin, a legacy of European colonization, its exploitative systems and authoritarian leadership.

Postcolonial and post-independence English Caribbean territories inherited political and civil systems along with these systems' deficiencies, thus ensuring continuity of corruption. The Caribbean adage 'same old khaki pants' (which translates well as the French idiom 'plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose') provides a better lens to view this continuity through, rather than Eric Williams' (1961) famous anti-colonial address and rallying cry of 'Massa Day Done'. The ethnicity of the pants' wearer may have changed, but the pants themselves, the structure of plantation society, still permeates contemporary Caribbean societies, regardless of the relatively recent grafting of western political systems onto Creole systems following

independence. Caribbean commentators from CLR James (1963) to Frantz Fanon (1952) noted this phenomenon back in the twentieth century and even now we see in Caribbean political leadership styles more of the plantation Massa and overseer, rather than a democratically elected leader answerable to his or her constituents.

The second section of this chapter focuses on the political and economic climate after Emancipation, with a view to charting the political and economic landscape left behind for Caribbean societies to move forward. Here I highlight how post-colonial officials adopted an authoritarian style, resulting in personalism and patron-client relationships, allowing them to engage in corrupt practices that benefitted themselves, to the exclusion of European settlers, their descendants and the entire indigenous population.

While the first two sections examine the historical context from which a culture of tolerating or accepting political corruption emerged, the final section focuses on those culturally specific influences which have shaped this 'tolerance'. The final section explores the importance of socio-economic factors, family, kinship and patronage in the Caribbean, and their relevance to both the authoritarian style of politics and corruption in the contemporary Caribbean. Here reference is made to the 'Boss Politics' model that emerged in the United States, a model which offers more productive insights into postcolonial and post-independence Anglo-Caribbean

political systems than comparisons with the 'Westminster' model. This is followed by the conclusion.

3.2 Historical Context

As there is yet no documentary or even oral evidence of corruption before European incursion, it could be argued that corruption, or the conditions for it, crossed the Atlantic with Columbus. Gold lust, acquisition of territory and resources combined with the distance from metropolitan control led to Spanish, English and Dutch Crowns all raising concerns about the abuse of public office in the administration of the new colonies (Collier, 2005).

In relation to the Spanish, during the fifteenth century under the Spanish Roman Law, the Spanish Crown declared itself as the sole proprietor of the territories discovered by Columbus (Borah, 1964; Crow, 1982) including The Bahamas, Jamaica, Hispaniola, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Trinidad, Aruba, Curaçao and Bonaire. Spain introduced a number of anti-corruption measures during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries to curtail some of the corruption which was an issue between the aristocracy and the merchants.

Some of the anti-corruption measures introduced included a number of social and financial restrictions on senior colonial officials who were required to declare their

net worth prior to being appointed (Haring, 1947). The terms of engagement were limited to no more than five years, and officers were prohibited from engaging in personal social business in the territories to which they were assigned, accumulating any property, or undertaking any business that would generate additional income. With regards to social relations senior officials were prohibited from marrying, undertaking the role of godfather, receiving personal gifts, or engaging in private celebrations (Crow, 1992). At the end of their assignment senior officials were subject to an independent review of their finances (Collier, 2005).

In addition, the Spanish Crown introduced a number of checks and balances which applied to colonial offices. These included the introduction of the Spanish courts, which ran alongside the executive policy making powers and supervisory functions of the viceroys, governors and captain generals, with the key objective of checking the power of individual executives. Officials responsible for collecting and disbursing revenues on behalf of the Crown worked autonomously. Colonial investigators were also dispatched to further enhance the check and balance process.

Despite these anti-corruption initiatives, corruption remained rampant across the Spanish colonies from the fifteenth to nineteenth centuries. This was due to several factors including the distance between Madrid and the colonies, inadequate

communication systems and colonial officials' laxity in enacting and enforcing rules. Consequently colonial officials' collusion and practices of theft were commonplace (Collier, 2005:65).

Similarly, corruption amongst colonial officials in the English colonies of Jamaica, Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, Grenada and St. Christopher & Nevis, is well documented (Parry et al, 1987, Peck, 1978, Miller, 1976). The early English sugar plantations and their slave labour were privately financed, with the English Crown only receiving tariff and tax revenues from Caribbean possessions. Government institutions were positioned to support the plantation societies through the governor and legislative council appointed by the Crown. Local assemblies were introduced, elected from a small cohort of white plantation owners and merchants (Parry et al, 1987), guided by legislation enacted by the English Parliament and overseen by the colonial governor, the most powerful figure in the English colonial system, with all Crown responsibility resting on him.

Peck (1978) highlights, that as a result of mismanagement and theft of English Crown property, coupled with the lack of resources throughout the seventeenth century, there were serious problems with the sale of public office. Further, as a result of there being no professional English Civil Service, the public offices were transacted, and Royal property used by officials as their own. This resulted in the

accepted practice of officials being paid for doing little, if any work, as, 'seventeenth century Englishmen believed there was nothing immoral or illegal in an official accepting... or soliciting graft or bribes. Corruption in fact was the lubricant that greased the wheels of the nation's administrative machinery' (Miller,1976:3).

In the ensuing culture of nepotism English colonial governors used their positions and powers to pay friends, family, clients and supporters to pursue their self interests. For example, the governors controlled colonial land grants, which enabled them to allocate new parcels of land to those who could best reward the governor. In many instances this resulted in the governor awarding land to himself or family members. Governors' control of importation and exportation enabled them to devise rules for tariffs and taxes, beneficial to friends and family. As Miller (1976) notes, piracy, buccaneering and contraband provided endless opportunities for corruption with governors turning a blind eye to goods landing and sale of goods via bootleg.

From the establishment of the Dutch West India Company in 1621, the Dutch took the lead in challenging Spanish monopoly of Caribbean settlement and colonization (Beckles and Shepherd 2004). After unsuccessfully attacking Brazil in 1624 they were luckier with Aruba, Curacao and Bonaire off the coast of Venezuela and the tiny Windward islands of St Eustatius, Saba and St Martin. Surinam was seized from the British in 1667 and ceded by treaty in exchange for what was then New

Amsterdam. The Dutch soon recognised that senior colonial officials had introduced corrupt practices in their Caribbean colonies. As a result the Crown sent a governor to administer each colony, which was managed through local representation via a local assembly or a council elected from the white merchants and planters. The Dutch colonies were ruled by laws enacted by the Dutch government and by local laws, subject to ratification by both the government and The Dutch West India (DWI) company, with the latter taking control of colonial commercial trade (Swart, 1949). Notwithstanding the Dutch arrangements, prior to the nineteenth century corruption was common in the Dutch West India Company, with the men being, 'underpaid and exposed to every temptation that was offered by a combination of a weak.....organization [colonial governments], extraordinary opportunities in trade, and an absence of checks from home.....'(Smith, 1971: 425).

The French arrived in the Caribbean as early as the English (St. Kitts 1623) and Dutch to challenge Spanish New World monopoly. Their 'Exclusif' trading system resulted in considerable corruption. Often blockaded during European conflicts which played out in the Caribbean, French colonists had little option but to trade with whoever they could, as they did with America during the Seven Years War 1756-63. Despite much recent archival research (Dubois 2004, 2011), to date there are no statistics available on corruption in St Domingue, France's jewel in the Antilles from the mid seventeenth century until the outbreak of the Haitian

Revolution in 1791. CLR James (1938) notes that in 1789 St. Domingue supplied two thirds of France's overseas trade, was the largest market for the slave trade and 'the greatest colony in the world...and the envy of every other imperialist nation'. We can deduce that corruption was commensurate.

While the above establishes that corrupt practices were introduced by senior colonial officials what is important to explore further is whether these practices have continued in the Caribbean following colonisation and contributed to a culture of tolerance. In attempting to explore the continuity of corruption, it is necessary to chart some of the solutions adopted by the Spanish, English and Dutch colonisers, and the impact of their actions.

Despite the Spanish court system and its anti-corruption measures, bribery and corruption flourished, as the attempt to separate public officials' duties from personal interest never actually materialised. Further, despite the growing momentum of the independence movement throughout the Spanish colonies in the nineteenth century, the 300-year tradition of corruption was well rooted, As Collier (2005) notes, theft of Spanish Crown wealth was commonplace.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century British attitudes to corruption and mismanagement of finances changed. This resulted in the enactment of legislation

in 1809 prohibiting the sale of public office, followed by 1827 legislation, prohibiting the offer and acceptance of bribes by government officials (Finer, 1952). However, these measures did not result in addressing the issue of corruption. Although the separation of public office duties from private interests was introduced in the British government, this measure was not implemented in the British colonial service. As a result, throughout the nineteenth century colonial governors and other officials were appointed by political patronage developed through the Colonial Office. This remained the case up to the 1930s, with appointments of British Colonial officers based on patronage, and governors appointed from the British upper class, while administrative positions were assigned predominantly to Oxbridge graduates (Collier, 2005).

The Dutch Crown soon established that DWI officials became rich from stealing, and towards the end of the nineteenth century new arrangements were put in place to address corruption, similar to those introduced by Britain. This resulted in the DWI taking on a lesser role in colonial management by the end of the nineteenth century, and by the middle of the twentieth century Dutch colonial rule was exercised by local representatives.

What is evident is that the anti-corruption measures aimed at addressing issues of bribery, mismanagement, nepotism and other corrupt practices mainly consisted of

the implementation of legislation and local rules, which were clearly ineffective. The objective of many of the senior Crown officials was to maximise their wealth. There is an interesting parallel here, as today we see concerns about corruption involving officials in the Caribbean mirror those directed at senior officials of the colonial era. The main proposed solution then and now has been enactment of legislation, which has proved equally ineffective if we review prosecutions, or lack thereof.

What does this tell us in regard to past and present corrupt practices in the former colonies? We see that corruption was prevalent among senior colonial officials and the process of corruption was left as part of their legacy, for those in the post-emancipation, indentureship and independence eras.

labour made major contributions to the development of modern Europe. As Uslaner (2014) argues, corruption is an integral part of political systems based on inequality and exploitation. Since 'Discovery' the Caribbean has endured such systems. Few would dispute the appalling transgression of human rights Europe perpetrated in the New World. The genocide of the indigenous population followed by slavery and the brutal plantation system are well documented (Las Casas, 1552). Likewise there is consensus that European colonies were originally established exclusively for the economic benefit of the mother countries (Martin, 2012). Recent reparations discourse and expressions of regret (which calculatedly stop short of apology) are

only official recognition of what Caribbean historians like CLR James and Eric Williams long highlighted – that Caribbean revenue derived from slave labour made major contributions to the development of modern Europe (Higman, 1986).

However, 500 years on from the inception of the New World project, as Creole societies have developed, it is virtually impossible to disentangle the genealogy of current political corruption. This is due to the process of creolization: the mixing of different elements to create new models, a fundamental dynamic of Caribbean development. Political corruption may have arrived with the Europeans but it has been creolised; many of the influences shaping its current Caribbean manifestation have non-European roots, as I demonstrate in the last section of this chapter.

What links colonial to post- or neo-colonial corruption is the continuity of systems of inequality and exploitation. Genocide cleared the way for a plantocracy using free slave labour to sow and reap its harvests. Post-Emancipation societies in the Anglophone Caribbean perpetuated both the inequality and exploitation of colonisation. The failure to effectively decolonise has left microstates, in particular, vulnerable to the inequality and exploitation of neo-colonialism, which we can also read as a manifestation of globalised neo-liberalism (Ritzer, 2015).

It is necessary at this stage to highlight some of the significant economic financial and economic benefits slavery created for European colonisers through their participation and corrupt practices. This will illustrate the colonisers' growth of economies and the wealth accrued. Later in the chapter it will help to explore whether the social relations adopted by them have not only been inherited, but also form the basis of contemporary Caribbean social structure, facilitating corruption.

Analysing the historical context, we see that over the last 500 years the region has been adversely affected by Spanish, French, Dutch and British colonialism, slavery and the plantation system along with consistent influences from external forces outside the region. In addition, there were several significant wars between the Spanish, French, Dutch and British resulting in the colonies frequently changing hands during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The introduction of the plantation system by Dutch colonizers circa 1640, heralded the 'sugar revolution', transforming the agricultural sector along with the demographic and socio-economic make-up of the Caribbean, resulting in the enhancement of its economic and strategic value (Hillman and D'Agostino, 2009).

As previously mentioned, this period of colonisation is significant, as it ushered in the Trans-Atlantic slave trade, resulting in millions of Africans being enslaved to assist in the economic productivity of Europe and America, while the colonisers

doubly benefitted from free labour and by engaging in corrupt practices. It is important at this stage to set the context with some statistics of the enslaved transported by the various European countries, as this will give some idea of the economic contributions they made.

Table 3.1 below provides some data in relation to the trans-Atlantic slave trade from 1501 to 1875. From this we see that Portugal/Brazil transported a total of 5,848,266 slaves, followed by Britain who transported 3,259,441 slaves. The country transporting the least number of enslaved persons was Denmark/Baltic with 111,040, followed by USA with 305,326. Overall the estimate of slaves transported is 12,521,337.

The figures in Table 3.1 demonstrate the significant numbers of enslaved transported to the Americas from the 16th to the 19th centuries. In the light of these statistics we must assess the considerable contribution made by the enslaved to both colonial and metropolitan economies and highlight the economic benefits enslavement brought to the colonisers. The iniquitous slave trade provided a lucrative environment in the Caribbean, far from metropolitan scrutiny, for corruption to take root. Officially banned but tacitly endorsed and therefore culturally tolerated, corruption has continued to evolve.

The roles undertaken by the enslaved from the 16th to 19th centuries are well documented, as the European colonies became dependant on the African slave labour in order to survive, due to the fact that the lands which they had 'discovered' were of no benefit without labour to exploit them. This exploitation resulted in significant economic benefit as,

Table 3.1 - Trans-Atlantic Slave figures

Period	Spain/ Uruguay	Portugal/ Brazil	Great Britain	Netherlands	USA	France	Denmark/ Baltic	Totals
1501-1525	6,363	7,000	0	0	0	0	0	13,363
1526- 1550	25,375	25,387	0	0	0	0	0	50,762
1551-1575	28,167	31,089	1,685	0	0	66	0	61,007
1576 -1600	60,056	90,715	237	1,365	0	0	0	152,373
1601-1625	83,496	267,519	0	1,829	0	0	0	352,844
1626-1650	44,313	201,609	33,695	31,729	824	1,827	1,053	315,050
1651-1675	12,601	244,793	122,367	100,526	0	7,125	653	488,065
1676-1700	5,860	297,272	272,200	85,847	3,327	29,484	25,685	719,675
1701-1725	0	474,447	410,597	73,816	3,277	120,939	5,833	1,088,909
1726-1750	0	536,696	554,042	83,095	34,004	259,095	4,793	1,471,725
1751-1775	4,239	528,693	832,047	132,330	84,580	325,918	17,508	1,925,315
1776-1800	6,415	673,167	748,612	40,773	67,443	433,061	39,199	2,008,670
1801-1825	168,087	1,160,601	283,959	2,669	109,545	135,815	16,316	1,876,992
1826-1850	400,728	1,299,969	0	357	1,850	68,074	0	1,770,978
1851-1875	215,824	9,309	0	0	476	0	0	225,609
Totals	1,061,524	5,848,266	3,259,441	554,336	305,326	1,381,404	111,040	12,521,337

Source: Slavevoyage.org

The Negroes were purchased with British manufactures, transported to the plantations, they produced sugar, cotton, indigo, molasses and other tropical products, the processing of which created new industries in England; while the maintenance of the Negroes and their owners on the plantations provided another market for British industry, New England agriculture and the Newfoundland fisheries (Williams, 1944:52).

France, England and Holland ventured into the slave trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, forming a triangular trade whereby commodities would be traded on the West Coast of Africa for men, women and children captured from slave traders or purchased from African chiefs. The enslaved would be shipped to the West Indies to work the plantations and undertake other labour. As a result of the triangular trade, the populations of participating European coastal cities and ports increased from the seventeenth century onwards, with Britain leading, as highlighted by Williams (1944) and Nunn and Quinn (2011), and further illustrated in Table 3.2 below. These triangular trade entrepôts expanded along with trade demands, investing profits in infrastructure for such services as banking, insurance, commodities trading, shipbuilding, provisioning and repairs. Increased labour demand accelerated further population growth. Europe's progress was incontestably financed by continued systemic inequality and exploitation in the Caribbean.

Across the Americas, Brazil initially dominated sugarcane production, resulting in the production of juices, molasses and rum. Saint Domingue (Haiti) succeeded to this

position during the 18th century, with a slave population of 500,000 at the height of production, twice the number of slaves imported to the United States, which led in tobacco production.

Following Emancipation, most Caribbean countries remained colonised, with systems of government and local councils of senior officials intact. This political system and its appointments were based on patronage affiliation with colonial

Table 3.2: Average log city populations in slaving and non-slaving coastal cities³

Year	Non slave trading	Slave trading
	Europe	
1600	8.735593	10.08126
1700	8.565579	10.06487
1750	8.929687	10.27573
1800	8.978466	10.15872
1850	9.353326	10.80642
	UK	
1600	8.172439	10.52987
1700	7.875931	9.648853
1750	8.830146	9.938923
1800	9.019231	10.07458
1850	9.942948	13.08968
	UK minor towns	
1600	8.158924	8.853665

3

Average log city population for slave trading and non-slave-trading coastal cities in different European and UK samples. Coastal cities are defined as being within 65km of the coast, the farthest distance from the coast for any slave-trading city in the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database.

1700	7.875931	9.06514
1750	8.830146	9.306883
1800	9.019231	9.703859
1850	9.942948	

Source: Derenoncourt, E (2018).

governors appointed from the British upper class, those with distinguished military or other public careers, or those having served long periods with the Colonial Office (Collier, 2005:73). Patronage affiliation only functions in systems of inequality and exploitation. Caribbean colonisation was premised on both. After Emancipation exploitation continued in 1845 with the importation of thousands of East Indian indentured labourers, though nominally free, lived under the same appalling barrack yard conditions as the slaves had. The ‘Coolies’ were equally reviled by their colonial and plantation master and what is apparent was the appalling treatment of the East Indian indentured labourers was compounded by the negative stereotypes, as highlighted by Carter and Torabully (2002) who chart the experiences of ‘coolies’ during this period.

‘As the indenture system expanded and flourished over the nineteenth century, stereotypes of the ‘helpless coolies as victim’ gained a wide circulation. Transmuted to the sugar estates of the British Empire, the ‘docility’ of the Indian coolie, and his relative lack of ambition, became the official explanations for the seemingly smooth running of what was deemed an essentially coercive institution. How else could officials square the myth

of 'kidnap' with the evidence of re-indenture and remigration..... On the sugar estates, the coolie was seen to have little free will, and to be trapped as effectively as if it were a prisoner' (Carter and Torabully: 2002, 51).

We can trace the continuity of the inequalities of the plantation system along with its attendant corruption from slavery through indentureship to self-governance and the modern era. Self-governance was compromised before inception by the economic and cultural devastation left by more than three centuries of exploitation.

3.3 Political and Economic context

In continuing to set the historical and cultural context, I will now turn to examine some political and economic issues of relevance, following the end of slavery as it is vital that we understand the make-up of the economic and political landscape post emancipation and in the contemporary Caribbean. Examining the politico-economic systems these former colonies inherited or had imposed on them, including some of the corrupt practices in the postcolonial era, is crucial to our understanding of corruption and cultural tolerance.

Emphasis will be placed on the post-World War II period, to demonstrate that the political and economic conditions of the Caribbean today are a direct result of post-1945 development, when new or revised constitutions were written and economic structures were developed, with a view to integrating the region into the world economy. Key to this development was the legacy of colonialism and US interventions, as these shaped and defined the social rule structure inherited by the Caribbean elite

in the post war period. Another important factor of post-war development was the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention, allowing Caribbean countries to develop and build their institutions with very little interference (Collier, 2005). This, I argue, has allowed for corrupt practices to further take root in former Caribbean colonies.

The former colonies of Spain, France, Britain and Holland all took different approaches in political and economic development after World War II. The Spanish territories established a number of authoritarian-dictatorial governments by military coup, regularly citing government corruption as a rationale for taking power (Collier, 2005). British colonies including Grenada, Dominica, St. Christopher and Nevis achieved independence in the post-World War II era and went on to build their own unique brands of liberal or authoritarian democracies. Haiti, a former French colony experienced a number of different regimes including authoritarian-dictatorial, quasi-democratic start-up regimes, and authoritarian military rule. The remainder of the former French colonies became socialist autonomous regimes and were assimilated as French Overseas Departments. Similarly, the former Dutch colony of Suriname received independence, whilst the semi-autonomous Netherlands Antilles and Aruba were incorporated into the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Following the authoritarian dictatorial regimes of the former Spanish colonies in the 1960s and 1970s, there was a shift during the 1980s to the authoritarian democratic model of politics. This can be seen as a regime whereby 'government remains a racket dominated by the powerful and well connected' (Payne; 1994, 26). As the authoritarian democratic model of politics appears to be so powerful in today's Caribbean, its origins and elements are discussed further below.

The authoritarian democratic model represents a weak representational democracy. Elections in such models are usually not free and fair, with interferences from government, politicians and external influencers. The emphasis during elections is to elect the top political leaders. However, post-election there is limited citizen engagement with politicians, with decisions made by a small cohort of the political elite across the executive branch of government. The role of the legislatures and judiciaries is also limited and peripheral, in undertaking the checks and balances amongst its autonomous branches. Caribbean countries which established rules for their presidential elections following the post war period, deliberately chose to adopt authoritarian democratic regimes, which as Collier (2005:87) observes were rooted in the region's colonial and post-independence traditions of caudillo (strongman) or oligarchic rule.

To maintain their central rule Caribbean states adopted this presidential style of governing, which placed the decision making in the hands of a few senior officials in the executive branch of government. This can be seen in the decree powers Caribbean states have incorporated into their political systems, which allow for Prime Ministers to bypass their legislatures, legislate outright and control their judiciaries which negate effective check and balances on executive power, and thus foster the emergence of the authoritarian decision-making process (Collier, 2005: 88). These strategies are similar to those employed by previous colonial officials. In addition, presidential veto powers were incorporated along with an exclusion right given to the executive, which allowed initiation of legislation on key policy areas, restricting their legislative powers (Shugart & Mainwaring, 1997).

Unlike the former Spanish colonies, the former British colonies took a different approach, implementing a 'tutelary democracy', compromised from inception, by elements of authoritarianism, inherited from the colonial officials. Some of these adopted authoritarian democratic structures were introduced following the Great Depression and World War II, amid deteriorating socio-economic conditions. These were some of the pressures which forced Britain into transitioning the colonies, first by introducing local self-government, followed by independent statehood, with a view to introducing some form of democratic stability (Hillman & Agostini, 2009).

However, the objective of establishing democratic stability was not achieved, as the Westminster parliamentary system was introduced to facilitate the transition to local self-government and, ultimately, independent statehood, which has not necessarily guaranteed democratic stability (Knight, 1993). What materialised were imposed, ostensibly democratic institutional structures designed for those societies that had experienced a protracted period of highly centralised, semi authoritarian governance under crown colony administration (Hillman & Agostini, 2009). What came thereafter was a period of institutional realigning, which consisted of a Westminster parliamentary system being Caribbeanised and adapted to fit the various the socio economic, political and cultural circumstances across Anglo-Caribbean countries (Payne, 1993).

Regardless of questionable democratic intentions, the reality was that political systems evolved operating on the basis of personalism, patron-client relationships and the exclusion of the popular classes, which was a key element in facilitating corrupt

practices amongst the political elite. Colonial plantocracy oligarchies readily morphed into postcolonial oligarchies as a direct result of an unplanned transition from an authoritarian political system to democratization. The end of colonial rule and authority left these new independent states being confronted with a 'vacuum of power in societies devoid of any viable political institutions and democratic traditions' (D'Agostino, 2009: 98).

This vacuum of power was compounded by a number of factors, including the failure of the short-lived West Indian Federation, which was established in 1958, through the British Caribbean Federation Act, to establish a political union across its members. Some of the reasons for the failure of the Federation in 1962 included the lack of Britain's support and the divisions between the countries due to geographical, social, economic and political factors. As Wooding acutely noted: 'there was such rivalry between the islands as to breed intense jealousies and suspicions (...) As a result, when regional activity began, the jealousies and suspicions nevertheless persisted' (Wooding, 1996: 258).

The imposition of the Federation on these countries, coupled with a lack of resources and commitment demonstrates the Federation was doomed to fail from the outset.

As soon as the Federal Government took up the reins of government, it had to face the possibility that the whole basis of its existence was still under discussion in all the units of the Federation. It was something like trying to build a house on shifting sand (Adams, 1962:11).

With the collapse of the West Indian Federation, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago gained independence in August 1962, followed by Barbados in 1966, Dominica, St Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia and Antigua in 1967, St. Vincent and the Grenadines in 1969, Guyana in 1970 and Grenada in 1974. On independence each of these countries inherited and adopted the Westminster style political system.

The history and indeed the collapse of the West Indian Federation is illuminating in understanding and illustrating the cultures of the Caribbean countries. Wooding (1996) and Adams (1962) allude to some of the complexities relating to the failure and subsequent collapse of the Federation, including lack of trust amongst its Federation members. Reviewing post-Federation development of the political landscape, especially in Eastern Caribbean micro-states, it becomes apparent that mistrust was generated by Federation members wanting to remain in control of their own states, for economic benefits, including inherited corrupt practices. Even today with the regional forum (Caribbean Community and Common Market) CARICOM, we see member countries mostly operate independently, coming together only in times of need such as the recent hurricanes, Irma, Maria and Karen. But the reality is the day-to-day operations in each of these countries, are regulated solely by each country.

A critical factor was the economic conditions in these countries at the end of colonisation, and indeed at independence. Although, it is clear slavery and indentureship contributed significantly to the industrialisation of both the colonies and metropolitan countries, at Independence there were minimal financial resources to support progress and development. As Dr Eric Williams declared in relation to Trinidad & Tobago,

The offer is quite unacceptable, and we would prefer not to have it...The West Indies are in the position of an orange. The British have sucked it dry and their sole concern today is that they should not slip and get damaged on the peel (Williams, 1944).

I contend that this dearth of financial resources at the dawn of Independence created an opportunity for corrupt practices to continue within political systems and processes. The limited financial provision made available during this period was well documented by the Moyne Commission of 1945, an official inquiry into the numerous disturbances across the British territories in the Caribbean throughout the 1930s. The final report was extremely critical of social and economic deficiencies in the colonies and recommended,

the establishment ...of a West Indian welfare fund to be financed an annual grant of £1,000,000 from the Imperial Exchequer for a period of 20 years, and a special organisation to administer this fund under the charge of a Comptroller (Moyne Commission, 1945: 428).

Besides the economic challenges of the Depression and the post-World War 2 era, as the decolonization of the British Empire got underway in the 1950s, British Caribbean territories had little input into the form postcolonial state systems would take. It is useful to view this transitional period in the light of what was happening in the rest of the Empire. As Jackson (2013) points out:

Democratic institutions and practices were installed haphazardly and rapidly into societies incapable of operating them effectively... All of which makes the boast that the British Empire gave democracy to its former colonies rather threadbare, quite apart from the fact that such claims ignore the decades of authoritarian, non-democratic rule that preceded independence (Jackson, 2013: 111).

Jackson goes on to expose just how haphazard and ill-conceived decolonisation and 'democratisation' were. Both systems were developed by one of the most advanced nation states of the time, which ignored the origins of colonies never intended to be nation states. Consequently, rapid decolonisation created nations, which resembled the Emperor's new clothes: there was state symbolism without an infrastructural body to hang it on. Fledgling nation states were further burdened with the inherited economic problems of monocrop economies and the absence of a tradition of statehood due to colonial rule (Jackson, 2013:113).

Consequently the transition from colonies to independent states proved far from seamless. The full practice of the Westminster model remains illusory, although some of its trappings survive. As Laban (2014) notes whilst the House of Commons has evolved, certain Commonwealth legislatures, including some in the Caribbean have retained archaic traditions, especially in relation to traditional regalia, wigs and gowns.

A key principle of Westminster model is that while a majority party controls the executive and parliament, it is held to account by the opposition. With an effective opposition, when confidence is lost in Parliament, then a vote of no confidence is

advanced, and if carried, requires a new government to be formed through general elections. However, the reality across the English-speaking Caribbean is the Westminster model has resulted in a form of executive dominance, where

hyper-personal politics, extreme forms of polarisation, and widespread patron client networks also produce an environment in which the government assumes a dominant role vis à vis other social and political institutions (Veenendaal & Corbett, 2019:73).

Consequently, an election victory empowers government rule without constraints posed by other institutions. An example of this executive dominance was seen in Grenada in 2012 when the then Prime Minister Tilman Thomas, used the Constitution to avoid a vote of no confidence from the Leader of the Opposition, Dr Keith Mitchell. The constitution provides that any Parliament must meet a minimum of once per year, and with no more than six months passing between each sitting. As a result, Tilman Thomas side-lined Parliament, and delayed parliamentary business, including the vote of no confidence (Stapenhurst et al, 2018).

Corbett and Veenendaal (2016) argue that executive dominance stems from the British colonial heritage and the influence of Westminster institutions on democratization in the Caribbean. While executive dominance was certainly a feature of colonial administrations, democracy played little part (even in local assemblies largely composed of planters) as the colonies were directly regulated by the Colonial Office in London. However, the influence of Westminster institutions highlights the

inherent dangers of transposing an old political system with a long historical tradition to much newer societies.

Although Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados and, to a lesser extent, Guyana have been able to function with a two-party system, micro states like Antigua, St Kitts & Nevis, Dominica, St Lucia, St Vincent and Grenada all lack viable (if any) opposition. Executive power, enshrined in the original Westminster model tempered by effective opposition, therefore goes unchecked in what might now be termed 'autocratic democracies'. Strikingly evident in Eastern Caribbean micro-states is a failed Westminster model in which there are a small number of parliamentary members, who generally also have a ministerial portfolio. This scenario is well illustrated by the case of Grenada following the 2017 election when the New National Party won all 15 seats, resulting in 13 of the 15 elected MPs being assigned ministerial portfolios. Similarly, in Antigua and Barbuda, the 2018 general election resulted in the governing Antigua and Barbuda Labour Party, led by Gaston Browne, winning 15 of the 17 seats, with most of the members of parliament being assigned ministerial portfolios. This imbalance results in an absence of 'backbench parliamentarians who sincerely scrutinise the actions of government. As Corbett & Veenendaal (2016:22) observe, smallness weakens parliament's autonomy and its authority in relation to the executive. Further, we see the Prime Minister and cabinet actually constituting the majority of votes in the parliament itself. This is a situation which, as Collier (2005) notes, allows them to set parliamentary agendas, control parliamentary and public debate, and pass any legislation agreed within their small inner circle.

Westminster model politics is most effective when citizens are informed and have influence via their Member of Parliament, through parliamentary oversight of the government's agenda, and the opposition being ready to take office in the event they are voted into power at a subsequent election (Birch, 1990). However, this model does not pertain in the Anglo-Caribbean. Here the reality is one of systems that generate extreme partisan polarisation, top down authoritarian leadership, the victimisation of political opponents, and the exploitation of state resources to finance clientelism and patronages (Peters, 1992:21). A dire consequence of adopting the Westminster model, has been the failure to ensure an opposition. This is now the case in Barbados and Grenada, where there are no opposition Members of Parliament, the government having won all seats at recent elections.

As a result of this democratically sanctioned dominance we see government reneging on formal engagement with the public on key programmes, most recently in Antigua and Grenada, where government increased taxes in a number of areas, including passports and imported motor vehicles, by 200%. The concept of an opposition is intrinsic to the Westminster model of politics, which is why some have asked whether it is time to change the model from first past to the post, to proportional representation (Emmanuel, 1993).

The direct consequence of having no effective opposition is the opportunity for authoritarian democratic regimes to operate, resulting in the continuation of corrupt practices. Some outsiders will contend the Westminster model has survived 60 years in the English speaking Caribbean, with the two political party system, political institutions that are representative, elections which are time and time again declared

as being 'free and fair', civil societies that are not too active, all markers which suggest democracy in the Caribbean is healthy. 'Yet beneath the surface there is a strong undercurrent of corruption, lack of transparency and persistent democratic deficits that continue to pose a challenge for the post independent states' (Barrow-Giles, 2011:287). D'Costa (1998) argues that Westminster authoritarian democratic systems have created 'elected dictatorship' in the Caribbean which, as Collier (2005) notes, creates corrupt practices through the restriction of elite competition, limiting accountability and mass participation. Archer (2008: 94) highlights the inherent danger implicit in a system where Cabinet ministers protect salary and status by unquestioning support of the prime minister, effectively resulting in one man rule.

However, the origins of present Caribbean authoritarian style politics cannot entirely be attributed to the recently imported Westminster model. The Westminster model evolved over a long period of time under historical, economic and cultural circumstances entirely different from those in the post-Columbian Caribbean. It is naive at best to assume that a system of democracy, developed over the course of more than 1,000 years in one place can be grafted onto other much smaller places lacking in resources and civil institutions and a learnt culture of democracy. The only real precedent for authority has been the plantation system and colonial rule, enforced by the mother country through its agent, the governor. Rather than the fallacy of 'tutelary democracy' we should examine the continuity of colonial authoritarianism as, 'what leaders in the Eastern Caribbean have done is essentially replace the "European colonialist" with the local colonialist – only the colour of these individual leaders has changed' (Peters, 1992: 26). The impact of authoritarian politics and its links to

clientelism and patronage in contemporary Caribbean politics is discussed in more detail in the following section.

3.4 Influence of Boss Politics, Political loyalty and their relationship to Family & Kinship

As discussed above, colonialism introduced autocratic politics and corrupt practices which have since remained part of the fabric of Caribbean government and politics. At this juncture it is important to consider, other phenomena which may have been influential in relation to corruption in postcolonial Caribbean politics. The American model of 'Boss man' politics and its relationship to patronage, loyalty, family and kinship provides a useful comparative perspective, as it is used to benefit and contribute to the wider community, socially and economically in a similar fashion to Caribbean political patronage.

'Boss Politics' originated in nineteenth century America after the Civil War, following a massive influx of immigrants and migration from rural areas to rapidly expanding cities, which created chaos as politicians were unprepared for the level of demographic change. This resulted in the creation of the 'political boss', who while engaging in corruption, also brought some form of order to the chaos.

A trademark of every one of these bosses was his concern for the poor and underprivileged. In a period of growing urban poverty, when the federal government declined to assume responsibility, politicians from working-class neighbourhoods built their own welfare programs (Lythgoe, 1983:12).

Boss Politics was a reciprocal arrangement, a form of organised crime, managed and controlled by political machines, which involved securing votes from people who were indebted to the bosses and their associates at the polls. Fundamental to boss politics is a form of loyalty and solidarity, whereby the community remains supportive of the boss, due to what he has given to individuals and communities by way of kickbacks, as opposed to any political manifesto or good governance.

Analysing Boss Politics, we see functional key elements are patronage, clientelism and the reciprocal loyalty given to the bosses. We can find strong parallels and similarities in both the origins and focus of Boss Politics and postcolonial Caribbean politics. They are both exploitative, survival systems built from below, to address the needs of the working and underprivileged classes with no access to mainstream political entitlement. Both systems rely on patronage, loyalty, family and kinship, rather than any political ideology. This model I argue, strongly resembles what has been adopted in some Caribbean states today, where the figure of the caudillo, the strong man or charismatic leader, is far more familiar than that of the impartial statesman. Supporting my claim, I cite two recent examples of Boss Politics in the Eastern Caribbean. First, in the 2019 Dominica general election, when Roosevelt Skerri's Dominica Labour Party was re-elected with a larger majority despite Aljazeera News reports of allegations against Skerri and other senior politicians of corruption pertaining to the selling of diplomatic passports. Second, in the Grenada 2018 general election, where Keith Mitchell won all 15 seats.

However, before proceeding further we must remember that patronage and clientelism was introduced by the colonial officials and lasted for hundreds of years pre- and post-

slavery. This position has been reinforced by academics (Duncan and Woods, 2007; Veenendaal and Corbett, 2019) over the years, who argue that pre- and post-slavery, 'an entrenched system of patronage directed the flow of resources from colonial administrators to plantation owners and (enslaved) workers' (Duncan and Woods, 2007).

Following the end of slavery, came the issue of inequality in relation to the distribution of economic resources and political power.

The rigid stratification of Caribbean societies by race and class persisted, with the white minority planter still in control. Nevertheless, it began a long process of enfranchisement that ultimately challenged the political dominance of elites, who opposed any measures that would open political systems to the non-white majority (D'Agostino: 90).

During this period, one strategy white elites employed to maintain control and restrict enfranchisement was making literacy a requirement in order to own property, as only property owners were eligible to vote. This stipulation put many former slaves, their descendants and indentured coolies at a disadvantage leading to the development of the patron-client links which shaped 'relations between citizens and politicians after the introduction of universal suffrage and the onset of party politics' (Veenendaal and Corbett, 2016:65).

There was significant socio-economic change at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries due to high levels of export benefitting both the

working and middle classes. At the same time political consciousness developed among the predominantly non-white working and middle classes, who recognised they had a mutual interest in reforming what was viewed as the anachronistic demanding immediate change, and the middle class seeking constitutional reform, through protest and 'a plethora of violent disturbances, including the water riots in Trinidad in 1903 and the 1905 Ruimvelt riots in British Guiana.' (D'Agostino, 2009:96). At the same time in Britain, the white working class and demands for better women's equality was advancing, which made a major contribution to the abolition movements at the time.

This kind of civil unrest would be compounded by the Great Depression and working-class ongoing concern over migration, due to the ever increasing and high levels of unemployment (Knight and Palmer, 1989), resulting in the 1938 riots in Jamaica and British Guiana. Comparing working class socio-economic conditions in America in the period when Boss Politics emerged with conditions in the Caribbean during the early twentieth century reveals some pertinent parallels in formative political systems, with the caveat that Boss Politics evolved in strictly urban contexts as opposed to the rural Caribbean context.

The origins of contemporary Caribbean politics can be found in the trade union movement which developed in response to the civil unrest of the 1930s. Many strong charismatic Labour leaders (Vere Bird in Antigua & Barbuda, Grantley Adams in Barbados, Eric Gairy in Grenada and Robert Bradshaw in St. Christopher and Nevis) later transitioned into political leaders championing the cause of the black working classes and taking control of the political arena. However, all of these leaders adopted the autocratic, patron-client' style of leadership, which as Veenendaal and Corbett

(2019) note, they had inherited from previous white colonial government officials. This patron – client relationship is relevant to Gramsci's (1971) organic ideology, in which that status quo and legitimacy in politics is challenged. In Jamaica, Alexander Bustamante formed the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union in 1938, while Norman Manley founded the People's National Party which had strong links to the Trade Union Council. Both founders and their political parties relied heavily on trade union support. As D'Agostino, (2009) notes, trade union loyalty to these parties resulted in an elaborate system of patron-client relations with political parties giving employment and other material benefits in exchange for the support of the masses. Consequently the Jamaican ruling class have been able to muzzle popular discontent with clientelism although this has become increasingly difficult 'as the resources needed to sustain this patron-client relationship have been considerably reduced' (Barrow-Giles, 2011:291).

A significant dynamic in foundational Caribbean politics was the 'big personality' syndrome which resulted in party loyalty for both Bustamante and Manley, who as Barrow-Giles (2011) points out, fought to keep the beneficial patron-client system. This unwavering leader support has been a prominent feature of politics in the English-speaking Caribbean since the postcolonial and Independence eras and still persists in the contemporary Caribbean. In their struggles for survival and systemic change, the masses have had to lean on key political personalities, in the hope that they would challenge the system to make it somewhat fairer, balanced and indeed equitable. Championing workers' rights and conditions was fundamental to both Boss Politics and nascent political parties in the Caribbean.

While Bustamante and other champions including Captain Cipriani in Trinidad did not share the working class roots of the American boss politicians, there were working class heroes like Eric Gairy in Grenada, who could capitalise on class and even race loyalty. Both Gairy and the Bird family are prime examples of leaders who, for many, could do no wrong. If we look at the leadership of Eric Gary (popularly known as 'Uncle') in Grenada from the 1950s onwards, we see that he was able to galvanize support and patronage from his supporters through organizing the Grenada Manual and Mental and Workers Union in the early 1950s. Gairy mobilized union support for strike actions against the big sugar estates, out of which he formed his political base, the Grenada United Labour Party (GULP). As Nolte, (1969) indicates, Gairy used his union and its political arm to gain political power like many other union leaders who came to power in the late fifties.

Gairy formed the 'Mongoose Gang', which like Papa Doc's Tonton Macoute in Haiti, focused on intimidating and brutalizing opposition supporters. As a result, Gairy was arrested. However, for his loyal supporters, Gairy was still a hero, and his popularity increased, resulting in his victory at the 1951 election when he was elected Chief Minister, remaining in power until 1957, when he was ousted by the Grenada National Party. In 1961 Gairy led GULP to victory, serving as Chief Minister until 1962. This ministerial role in office was cut short due to allegations of corruption levelled at him by the British who found he had no regard for laws and regulations pertaining to government expenditure and public funds, and that he had basically spent funds recklessly. This led to the accusation of misappropriation of funds. One example of reckless spending was the purchase of a grand piano costing \$3000.00 (Nolte, 1969). The British responded by suspending the constitution and dismissing Gairy.

Beckford attributes Gairy's authoritarian leadership style to the authoritarian plantation system, which continues to cast a long shadow over the entire region. Its legacy has resulted in

an individual psychology of authoritarianism which pervades plantation societies in general so that anyone with the slightest degree of power over others exercises this power in a characteristic exploitative authoritarian manner (Beckford, 1972:206).

Gairy's dismissal by the British did not terminate his career, as he returned to office in 1967 when the GULP party won seven of the ten seats. Thus, despite allegations of corruption, Gairy was able to remain a political force in Grenada for decades. Even when he returned to Grenada after the USA invasion of Grenada in 1984, 'Gairy proved that his support, concentrated among poor farmworkers, was remarkably resilient' (Black, 2007: 1). This was probably due to Gairy's early championing of the poor, resulting in the same kind of long term loyalty enjoyed by the American 'Boss' politicians. Gairy's autocratic, authoritarian style of leadership facilitated his engaging in corrupt activity. As Singham, (1968:174) points out, Gairy was careful to preserve singular control, spurning an inner circle in his party and discouraging viable constituency organisations in favour of his own direct personal contact, seen through his preference being meetings in which he was always the principal speaker. Here, Gairy used the platform to boost his reputation amongst the masses, which was a crucial element of the Caribbean value system, which was a different approach from inherited respectability value imposed by the colonisers. (Wilson, 1973).

In the case of the Bird dynasty in Antigua and Barbuda, we can again see similarities to Boss Politics: politicians obtaining patronage from the masses, enabling them to abuse their position for decades. Vere Bird used his connections in the trade union movement as a springboard to political power. As Henry (1991:19) notes, starting in the 1940s Bird and his inner circle manipulated conflicts within the Antigua Labour Party Union and consolidated their power by expelling rivals. The Bird faction was able to monopolise power within the union from 1943 to 1967, undoubtedly aided by resources made available for impending decolonisation.

In 1939 he was elected onto the executive of the Antigua Trades and Labour Union, which was formed to lead the struggles of the working-class against oppression and exploitative working conditions in the sugar industry. He became president of the Antigua Trades and Labour Union in 1943, and during World War II led sugarcane workers in strikes for higher wages. Additionally he pressured plantation owners to give their land plots and home sites to the sugar harvesters who had been tenants for decades (Kaufman, 1999), and established the principle that no worker could be dismissed without compensation, thus galvanising support from union members.

Under his leadership the union established the right to negotiate contracts with management. In 1951 the union representatives, led by Bird, won all the elective seats in the legislature, resulting in Bird being elected Chairman of Committees in the Executive Council. Much of Bird's support stemmed from his establishment of the Peasant Development Scheme and his campaign for housing which resulted in over 1230 houses being built and made available under an aided self-help scheme.

Vere Bird was appointed Chief Minister from 1960 to 1967, Premier 1967 -71, 1976 – 81, and Prime Minister from 1981 until 1984. By 1967 he was both the Premier of Antigua and leader of the Antigua Labour Trade Union, and his loyal executives were both ministers and executives on the union. Now with a virtual monopoly on political power Bird and his inner circle, were then able to dominate the political arena in Antigua for decades. In doing so, Henry (1991: 25) contends that Bird changed the style of politics from the anti-colonial politics of advocacy and confrontation to machine politics based on control, exploitation and administration of state power thus enabling the emergence of large scale clientelism. As Paget (1991: 26) specifies, this system rewarded supporters with jobs, recognition of civil rights, speedy services, protection of union rights and cheap access to land, to the exclusion of non-supporters.

Although Bird is viewed as one of the most successful Caribbean leaders having led Antigua into unprecedented growth and being credited with turning a poor British dependency into one the Caribbean's most fashionable resorts (Noblet, 1992), throughout his premiership numerous allegations of corruption were levelled against him. These include misappropriating health care funds in the early 1980s and incident whereby he was involved in harbouring fugitive Robert Vesco, 'an American financier who defrauded American investors of 224 million dollars and who was wanted for an illegal donation of 200,000 dollars to the 1972 re-election campaign of President Nixon' (Stabroek News, 1999). Despite these allegations of corruption, Bird remained in power for well over five decades, and when he resigned from office, handed it over to his son, Lester. Throughout his leadership he was supported by union members and had a loyal patronage base, vital in his re-election to various leadership positions, including Prime Minister. What this tells us, is that patronage and loyalty have played

an important role in Caribbean politics and have been key drivers for successful politicians and prime ministers in some countries, including Antigua & Barbuda, Grenada and Jamaica. As highlighted by Payne above, this patronage model shares some obvious similarities with Boss Politics: working class and under-privileged support for big personality political leaders and patrons.

In order to explore this further it is important to analyse patronage, loyalty and their links to family and kinship in the Caribbean. The aim here is to provide an overview of the different cultural aspects of the family and kinship, and the importance of both in understanding family and community relationships in Caribbean society, which I argue are directly linked to political patronage or clientelism. According to Weingrod (1966; 377), patronage is based on the reciprocal relations between patrons and clients. The 'patron' uses his influence to assist and protect someone, who then becomes his 'client', providing services for his patron in return. In order to examine the link between political patronage and the Caribbean family, it is crucial to highlight the close bonds of the Caribbean family unit and how, over time the Caribbean family has maintained the wider association outside of the European-imposed nuclear family model. Caribbean kinship functions across communities, providing not only a sense of belonging but also, on a fundamental level, security and survival. A good starting point is to highlight the kinship patterns in Caribbean societies which have existed for centuries, stemming from the interpersonal relationships developed amongst Caribbean people mainly through the line of marriage and via descent. From the pre-Columbus era such relationships were determined by a number of factors including: the social group, class or strata one belonged to, and by extension one's position in society, measured by where one lived, rights, responsibilities and access

to resources or goods. It was these principles which framed the development of small Caribbean societies (Ramos, 2011). When the European colonisers arrived, unsurprisingly they viewed the well-established culture and the family and kinship communities they encountered as uncivilised. However, even early commentators like Long (1774), reporting on the Creole Blacks of Jamaica, noted the strong bonds which existed outside of the European model of marriage.

This kinship and wider participation within communities is critical in better understanding some of the cultural tolerances which operate in the contemporary Caribbean; family and kinship remain fundamental aspects of its development and survival. To illustrate: the family household consists not only of mother, father and children, but also extended family members, nieces, nephews, grandparents, or a person who belongs to another family from the village. The saying that 'It takes a village to raise a child' still retains its currency in Caribbean society. This despite narco-gang warfare, an exponential rise in murder rates and small states' inability to contain these and other local aspects of globalised organised crime and corruption which has led to a growing outcry against the 'loss of a sense of community'.. What we see, as a result of this, is a village and community approach; families and persons within the community bonding together, which results in a form of patronage and a loyalty base, which in many ways is adopted throughout the family, village and community. Here we see political patronage loyalty, whereby voting is not necessarily undertaken based on what a candidate can offer through principles or a manifesto, but moreso on who the village and community endorses, as a result of what a candidate can offer the community in return for votes.

Both as concept and practice, patronage in the Caribbean has developed under entirely different circumstances from those pertaining in the west. It is important to remember the historical and economic context of the former Caribbean colonies following the end of slavery and indentureship, pre- and post-independence. What we saw during these periods are the working classes being treated inequitably, with poor wages, working conditions, and housing being just some of their grievances. The trade union movements across the Caribbean, were instrumental in fighting for working class betterment. In so doing over the years these leaders gained patronage support, by giving much to their communities first by fighting for their rights as union leaders, but after transitioning into politicians and Prime Ministers, they gave to individuals, families and communities. Gifts ranged from employment and the awards of contracts, purchasing electrical household items or funding scholarships. In return these individuals, family members and communities paid back their politician through votes at the ballot box..

When an individual was assisted, this would in many instances benefit the wider extended family. Therefore, loyalty and patronage would be reciprocated not just by the individual, but the whole family and sections of a community. This, I argue, provides a level of comfort, as in many cases those in receipt of patronage, want to feel secure and part of the wider community as Sives illustrates,

‘the political party provides a sense of community in which other identities such as class, ethnicity, and religion have not developed... The existence of a political dimension to the relationship explains why, although economic marginality remains at its core, many clients do not receive tangible economic rewards’ (Sives, 2002:70)

Beyond the exigencies of survival, human beings anywhere in the world need a sense of dignity and self-worth. For many this is their only asset and is not reliant solely on income or lack of it. To be acknowledged, is to be made visible, to claim a presence in 'the kingdom of this world'. This is crucial for the impoverished underclasses of the Caribbean, perennial victims of systems of inequality since slavery, still marginalised even on the periphery. Consequently although it is common during election time for patrons to be given a jersey and a twenty-dollar bill, as Gunes-Ayaya (1994:22) points out, continuity of clientelism is dependent on hope and the expectation of protection. Hope is another of the intangibles which cement patronage.

While the Boss Politics model provides a more relevant comparative perspective for examining Caribbean perceptions of corruption than the Westminster model, there are additional cultural factors to consider in addressing patronage in today's Caribbean. From a western position, patronage is technically corrupt. In the Caribbean that 'technicality' is subsumed under the priorities of poverty and survival: both the poor and their patron(s) survive, albeit in conditions of extreme inequality of power relations. Undoubtedly with the Caribbean patronage model, which has successfully grown and prospered over the last 50 years, individuals, families and communities have benefitted socially and/or economically.

This issue of loyalty is of crucial significance in relation to this thesis, when examining cultural tolerance and evaluating whether it is a key factor when researching corruption in Caribbean politics. I submit that this is of relevance as, before analysing corruption, we have to look at the historical and economic factors to assist in understanding corruption within a particular society.

At this point it is necessary to unpack/deconstruct the notion of cultural tolerance of corruption in the light of all the above and some additional factors. Whether through denial or necessity, patronage is not generally perceived as corruption in the Caribbean – hence the idea that it is culturally tolerated. Given the history of the region where barbarity and profit – always at the expense of the majority non-European populations was a long time norm – patronage/corruption understandably occupies a complex and highly nuanced position, which is advanced further below.

Universal suffrage, independence, ‘tutelary’ or autocratic democracies are all recent episodes. Conquest, genocide, slavery, indentureship, racism have all left residual post-traumatic stress. Beyond the justifiable tropes of victimisation and brutalisation there are also long traditions of resistance, marronage, rebellion, sabotage and subversion. The Caribbean term ‘bobol’ (public or private sector fraud - Oxford Dictionary of Caribbean English Usage) is not entirely derogatory; admiration is often expressed, adjustable to the size of the ill-gotten gains. Bobol can be read as subversion/sabotage in the tradition of slaves burning canefields, poisoning cattle; or of the Afro-Creole trickster Anansi outwitting creatures more powerful than he.

To continue with this psychological reading, a dependence syndrome shaped initially by slavery and plantation authority dynamics has evolved so that despite Emancipation, real de-colonisation has never happened (see Fanon, 1959 James, 1963). Just as we see the continuity of slavery /plantation brutality in social relations, (which many outsiders find offensive/racist/sexist/homophobic) so we can also see a continuity in behavioural patterns. Authority is still monolithic and those with authority (social, ethnic, financial, spiritual as well as political) are addressed as ‘Boss’. Outside

of the boss circle, the majority are accustomed through socialisation to deferring to orders and directives from above.

3.5 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to set the historical and cultural context necessary to assist in examining whether corruption in Caribbean politics is culturally tolerated. It was therefore premised on a Caribbean position. Unfortunately, in terms of scholarship and the issue of measuring/evaluating corruption, much of the data and analysis have originated outside of the region, through interrogation of external ideas to assist in locating my arguments within a framework. Consequently the chapter sought to privilege Caribbean views, rather than those of the still dominant west, whose presence is now marginal but whose influence survives disproportionately in the neo-colonial landscape.

The chapter commenced by providing a historic overview of slavery and the early traces of corrupt practices introduced by senior colonial officers. These corrupt practices were a legacy of colonisation, a legacy the former colonisers remain silent on. When the colonisers left, their corrupt practices remained. In the postcolonial period the working classes continued to be treated inequitably, and it is here we saw union leaders (Bustamente, Gairy and Bird), lead the fight for better conditions and rights for the underprivileged. In fighting for the under classes, these union leaders, (and later politicians) established loyalty bases among their members and later constituents. Later we see allegations of corrupt practices being levelled at these same leaders. These corrupt practices were examined through the comparative perspective of Boss Politics and the nuances of the Caribbean experience.

The economies of many of the former British colonies have had their challenges, and in such circumstances the whole country suffers. What this chapter has attempted to do, is examine why some aspects of patronage may be accepted in the Caribbean, especially when looking and linking them to loyalty, family and kinship, all of which remain important in the Caribbean today. For centuries the Caribbean family has been an extended family set up, which extends to the village and community. Therefore, when an individual is in receipt of patronage, then there are, in many cases, several beneficiaries. Each of these beneficiaries then pays back through the ballot boxes. In many ways therefore it could be viewed as a 'win win' situation.

One of the key themes addressed in the early section of this chapter -namely the ineffectiveness of anti-corruption legislation- is examined in much greater detail in the following chapters on governance and legislation and the two case studies chapters. Likewise, the issue of systems originating outside the region, whether the Westminster model or World Governance Indices, receives both global and local data-driven analysis is also explored. This will assist in supporting the main thrust of this chapter's argument- that a comprehensive assessment of Caribbean political corruption must rely on a nuanced interpretation of local historical and socio-economic conditions.

CHAPTER FOUR

Research Methodology

‘What people fail to appreciate is that the currency of corruption in elective office is, not money but votes’.

James L. Buckley

4.1 Introduction

This chapter gives an overview of the research methodology employed throughout the thesis. It commences by setting out the research approach. The second section discusses the epistemological and theoretical perspectives adopted, including phenomenology. The research methodology is discussed in detail in section 4.4, which includes a section on the rationale for choosing qualitative method and case studies to illustrate some of the documented problems with corruption in Caribbean politics.

A key point in the methodological discussion is that case studies and semi-structured interviews were used to test the hypotheses, due to the fact that it was felt that semi-structured interviews were the most appropriate method for obtaining information from interviewees, particularly in examining whether corruption is culturally tolerated in Caribbean countries.

The data for this research was collected by a combination of document-analysis case studies and semi-structured interviews covering two Caribbean countries: Grenada and SVG. The section on the research sample discusses the approach including face to face interviews via Skype and Zoom. The next section covers how sensitive concerns were handled throughout the

interviews, followed by a detailed section on trustworthy strategies including validity, reliability, triangulation and generalisation. The penultimate section discusses the research limitations and delimitations, which is followed by the conclusion.

4.2 Research approach

4.2.1 Qualitative and quantitative research methods: Advantages and disadvantages

Bryman (2008) proposes that qualitative methods consist of a research methodology with emphasis on words as oppose[d] to the quantification in the collection and analysis of data. They give researchers the opportunity to seek answers by examining social settings and the individuals who inhabit them.

Further, according to Devine qualitative research can be defined as:

a generic term that refers to a range of techniques including observation, participant observation, intensive individual interviews and focus group interviews which seek to understand the experiences and practices of key informants and to locate them firmly in context. (Devine 2002, 97).

Berg (2007) argues that qualitative researchers are most interested in how humans arrange themselves and their social settings, and how in these settings they make sense of their surroundings through symbols, rituals, social structures, roles and so forth. Qualitative methods do not try to prove or disprove a hypothesis. Rather, they look for themes, theories and patterns that emerge from the data. Qualitative research is concerned with the process of discovering how the social element is viewed and places emphasis on the

relationship between the investigator and the area or topic studied (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). Further, Strauss (1990) argues qualitative research questions need to be articulated to gather what the researcher wants to know about the intentions and perspectives of those involved in social interactions.

In many of the Social Sciences qualitative methods tend to be given more respect than quantitative methods (Dabbs, 1982, 2). It is recognised that qualitative methods are not necessarily associated with 'high-tech society' in the way that quantitative research has been, but Bogdan (1972) argues qualitative research has left its mark on the Social Sciences both conceptually and theoretically, through its enduring contributions and the vast numbers of social thinkers who have contributed to knowledge using qualitative methods. Halfpenny (1979), Bryman (1988) and Hammersley (1992) have all made distinctions between qualitative and quantitative methods. Among these is that quantitative researchers are more preoccupied with applying measurement procedures to social life, whereas qualitative researchers tend to use words in presenting social analysis. Also the quantitative researcher is better placed to lead research as their investigation is structured by the concerns they bring to it. This is not the case with qualitative methods, which focuses on those who are being studied; their perspective plays a significant role in shaping the research. Quantitative research is more structured enabling the researcher to examine precise concepts, whereas qualitative research allows the researcher to adopt a less-structured approach.

Further contrasts between quantitative and qualitative methods are illustrated in Table 4.1 below.

Table 4.1: Contrasts between quantitative and qualitative research

Quantitative	Qualitative
Numbers	Words
Point of view of researcher	Points of view of participants
Researcher distant	Researcher close
Theory testing	Theory emergent
Static	Process
Structured	Unstructured
Generalisation	Contextual understanding
Hard, reliable data	Rich, deep data
Macro	Micro
Behaviour	Meaning
Artificial settings	Natural settings

Source: Bryman (2008, 393)

Quantitative and qualitative methodologies have both been criticised for their limitations. Qualitative studies come under fire for being too subjective and difficult to replicate, lacking transparency and presenting problems with generalisation. On the other hand quantitative research has been criticised for failing to distinguish people and social institutions from what is going on in the natural world. Further, the measurement process can be seen as giving quantitative research a spurious, artificial sense of precision and accuracy. It can also be argued that its reliance on instruments and procedures divorces research from everyday life, while the analysis of relationships between variables creates a static view of social life that is independent of people's lived experience (Bryman, 2008).

After investigation and reflection I decided that qualitative methods were the most appropriate for this project, and would best ensure that the research questions would be answered thoroughly. Having considered the criticisms of qualitative methodologies discussed above, it was nevertheless decided that a qualitative methodology was more valid for the thesis, as it was more suited to the overall aims and objectives of the study and would enable a more systematic and rigorous method of empirical investigation. As the focus of the research is examining corruption in Caribbean politics – and specifically whether is corruption culturally tolerated, it was felt that the research questions required exploration. According to (Stake 1995), qualitative research is suited when the research being undertaken is exploratory in nature.

It is accepted that qualitative research tends to focus on ‘how’ and ‘what’ questions, as this allows the researcher to get a detailed in depth understanding of what issues are related to the research theme (Patton, 2002). This was also a factor for this research as the study entailed exploring interviewees’ views and lived experiences in relation to corruption in Caribbean politics by asking a number of ‘how’ and ‘what’ questions as set out in the semi structured interview schedule in Appendix One.

Qualitative methods enabled me to have a better understand the issues relating to corruption in Caribbean politics by allowing interview questions to be answered in detail, facilitating the collation and analysis of a large amount of data during fieldwork, case studies and semi-structured interviews. The amount of data collected was due to the large amount of data and material collated through the case studies and the opportunity to conduct semi-structured interviews in a place of the interviewee’s choice. This provided a

level of comfort for interviewees to feel freer to open up and answer questions honestly and comprehensively.

Having undertaken the detail literature review in the early chapters and examined the impact of legislation, initiatives and governance arrangements in chapter 5, this assisted to identify gaps in the available and accessible literature. From the information gathered, analysed and further reading I was able to develop a hypothesis and analytical structure to examine whether political corruption in Caribbean politics is culturally tolerated.

After deciding to undertake semi-structured interviews, an interview schedule was devised which consisted of nine questions (see Table 4.1). The first three questions focused on awareness of corruption, and the remainder concentrated on addressing corruption. A total of 24 interviews, 12 in Grenada and 12 in SVG. Initially, the plan was to include Trinidad and Tobago, but this was ruled out due to political challenges relating to the FIFA scandal. However, this proved to be beneficial, as it enable[d] me to focus on the Eastern Caribbean region, where there has been limited research on political corruption. The thesis' conclusions have been drawn from the case studies and the interviewees' perspectives.

4.2.2 Choosing the inductive approach over the deductive

In any research, it is important to set out whether the researcher applies an inductive or deductive approach. It is fruitful to explore the relationship between a qualitative methodology and the inductive approach. Bryman (2008) argues

when the research mainly follows qualitative methodology, the approach tends to be inductive rather than deductive; the inductive approach allows the researcher to collate relevant data and analyse it from various perspectives. This research was deliberately designed with an inductive approach involving collating and analysing data from multiple sources, (both primary and secondary sources including academic textbooks, reports, indexes and analyses of legislation and initiatives) as well as conducting case studies.

4.3 Ontological and Epistemological position


The approach adopted was informed by Marsh and Furlong's (2002) who positioned those students of political science need to recognise and understand the ontological and epistemological positions assumed by their research and further must be in a position to defend these positions against critiques. Understanding one's ontological and epistemological position is complicated by the fact that the terminology applied to them is often inconsistent and in some cases contradictory. Which definitions are most appropriate may depend on the methodology chose[n] which in turn will be influenced by the theoretical perspectives adopted by the researcher, which in turn is influenced by the researcher's existing epistemological position. (Gray, 2009).

Crotty (1998) explains that epistemology is the way we understand and explain how we know what we know. Further Easterby-Smith et al (2002) argue that an epistemological perspective is important for several reasons, one of them being it can help to clarify issues of research design, which means more than just the design of research tools. Having a knowledge of research philosophy also helps the researcher to recognise which designs will work and which will

not. As a set of views about what we can know and how we can know it, the epistemological position is in other words, a theory of knowledge.

In contrast the ontological position is a theory of being: it reflects on the nature of existence and what constitutes reality (Gray, 2009). However, although ontology and epistemology are linked they can be separated. The ontological position concerns our theory about 'what is' but does not necessarily determine, our epistemological position (Marsh and Furlong, 2002). Nevertheless, in undertaking research on the ontological position, writers have had difficulty separating the two concepts. (Crotty, 1998). For an investigation of cultural tolerance of corruption in the Caribbean, I decided the most appropriate theoretical approach would involve a constructivist epistemology, an interpretivist theoretical perspective, and a qualitative methodology involving case studies and semi-structured interviews. Each element of this theoretical approach and the justification for using it is discussed below and further illustrated in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.2: Epistemology, theoretical perspective, methodology and methods



Adapted from Crotty (1998)

4.3.1 The constructivist view

The constructivist view is that reality is socially constructed. One constructivist argument of importance to this thesis is that problems of increasing complexity associated with the decline of the nation state must be understood as part of a set of political projects associated with responses to perceptions of external and internal constraints (Marsh et al., 2002).

Social constructivism, also referred to as constructivism, is a theory of knowledge that is concerned with how phenomena develop in social context. It thus emphasises the importance of culture and context in understanding what occurs in society and constructing knowledge based on this understanding. (Derry, 1999).

Shadish (1995) contends social constructivism is more concerned with the construction of knowledge than with actual reality. Therefore, constructivism

rejects the objectivist perspective, which according to Bryman (2008) is an ontological position taking the view that social phenomena and their meanings are independent of social actors and that the social phenomena that are the subject of everyday discourse have a bearing that is independent or separate from those actors.

Therefore, constructivists focus less on individual agency and preferences than on how individual differences come to be formed within a social system by social actors (Bryman, 2008). This is the epistemological position the researcher adopted in interviewing individuals to obtain their views and construct a view of social reality in relation to corruption in Caribbean politics. This epistemology contributed to the selection of interviewees based on their social roles and positions in Grenada and St Vincent.

4.3.2 Theoretical perspectives and Theoretical Philosophy

According to Crossman (2017) a theoretical perspective mainly consists of a set of assumptions which focuses on the reality that inform the questions we ask and the kinds of answers we arrive at. Therefore, the theoretical perspective could be understood as a lens through which we look serving to focus or distort what we see. Similarly, Crotty (1998) highlights that the theoretical perspective is about the theory of knowledge, which is then embedded into the research methodology.

Theoretical philosophy is similar to theoretical perspective as it is concerned with, 'a system of beliefs and assumptions about the development of knowledge' (Saunders, 2009: 124). A number of different research

philosophies which have been beneficial to the researcher include positivism, post-positivism and interpretivism. Some of the theoretical philosophies are outlined below.

4.3.3 Interpretivism

Interpretivism looks for 'Culturally and historically situated interpretations of the social world', (Crotty,1998:67), and sees no direct relationship between ourselves and the world as our object. Instead, the world is interpreted through the classification schemas of the mind (Williams and May, 1996). Gray (2004) argues that the social world is far too complex to be interpreted purely on the basis of a set of observable laws and as such is not interested in the generalisability of social observations, but more in understanding the issues that reality raises:

Our interest in the social world tends to focus on exactly those aspects that are unique, individual and qualitative, whereas our interest in the natural world focuses on more abstract phenomena, that is, those exhibiting quantifiable, empirical regularities (Crotty, 1998, 68).

For interpretivists then, the key objective is to obtain a firm understanding of the meaning of the social situation for those who have had the actual lived experience. This is examined to better understand what meanings are actually embedded in people's behaviours and the process through which those meanings have been constructed. (Schwandt, 2003).

4.3.4 Phenomenology

Edmund Husserl¹ formulated several theories on phenomenology establishing it as a specific discipline focussing on describing events and things without employing any metaphysical and theoretical speculations. He concluded that the phenomenological method aids in removing all biases of real existence, and facilitates the researcher's bracketing of existence. (Famous Philosophers, undated). Similarly, C.S. Peirce² organised and systematized his philosophy in terms of other areas of knowledge, and placed his philosophy within a hierarchical classification of sciences. This resulted in Peirce classifying numerous disciplines including history, biographical study and art criticism as science. Peirce created sub divisions, of which philosophy was viewed as a formal science of discovery.

More recently Titchen and Hobson define phenomenology as, 'The study of lived, human phenomena within the everyday social context in which the phenomena occur from the perspective of those who experience them'. (Titchen and Hobson, 2005: 121). This is similar to Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) which is a qualitative method applied in research to obtain detail examination of a personal lived experience which is achieved by producing, 'an account of lived experience in its own terms rather

¹ Edmund **Husserl** was the principal founder of phenomenology—and thus one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century. He has made important contributions to almost all areas of philosophy and anticipated central ideas of its neighbouring disciplines such as linguistics, sociology and cognitive psychology.

² C.S. Peirce was a scientist and philosopher best known as the earliest proponent of **pragmatism**. An influential thinker and polymath, Peirce is among the greatest of American minds.

than one prescribed by pre – existing theoretical preconceptions and it recognises that this is an interpretative endeavour as humans are sense-making organisms' (Smith and Osborn, 2015).

Therefore, the phenomenological approach enables the researcher to explore how individuals perceive phenomena. To achieve this, the researcher needs to undertake in-depth interviews with people who have lived experience of the phenomena under investigation. (Patton, 2002). This approach was adopted for the research methodology undertaken in this study.

4.4 Research methodology

Crotty suggests research methodology can be defined as:

The strategy, plan of action, process of design lying behind the choice and use of the particular methods and linking the choice and use of methods to the desired outcomes (Crotty, 1998:3).

According to Gray (2009), the research methodology is determined by multiple factors, including the theoretical perspective adopted by the researcher and the way the data will be used. Further, a researcher should set out the reasons for selecting a particular methodology for a study (Crotty, 1998). My rationale for selecting both case studies and semi-structured interviews to address the research hypothesis is explained in detail below. Further, Table 4.2 below illustrates different aspects of the methodology selected.

4.4.1 Rationale for the chosen methodology

Before submitting the research proposal for this thesis, I gave considerable thought to the methodology that would be applied. At one stage, consideration

was given to focus groups, which could increase efficiency given that I was contemplating undertaking fieldwork across a wide range of Caribbean countries. Focus groups, interview-style interactions designed for small groups of unrelated individuals, guided by a researcher leading discussion on a particular topic (Schutt, 2003), seemed likely to make the fieldwork more manageable.

Table 4.2: Research methodology

Aim	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To determine whether corruption in Caribbean politics is culturally tolerated.
Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To explore whether corrupt practices in Caribbean politics are viewed as being culturally tolerated, and identify whether such practices form part of day-to-day business.
Application	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Case studies. • Devise interview questions to use during semi-structured interviews. • Undertake 14 semi-structured interviews with participants in Dominica, Grenada and St Vincent, to examine whether corruption in Caribbean politics is culturally tolerated.
Methods	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Qualitative • Case studies: documents and archival records • Semi-structured interviews

This approach allows for simultaneous interviews with several people at one time, saving on time and resources and was seriously considered as the research was conducted part time with limited financial resource. However, due to the nature and sensitivity of the thesis topic, and the fact that interviewees would be drawn from a range of positions, some high-profile, I decided early on in the process that it would be more beneficial to undertake case studies and one-to-one, semi-structured interviews.

4.4.2 Case studies

Recognising that the research was a sensitive topic a decision was made early on to incorporate case studies as part of the research methodology. The case study differs in an important way from the experiment in purpose, focus and method. Experimental research exists to test hypotheses and contribute to theory. The case study, on the other hand exists to systematize evidence so as to suggest a hypothesis for testing and pending that, to provide a basis of fact and insight for possible application to decision making. (Schramm, 1971). It was felt undertaking case studies would add value to the overall research by collating evidence on Eastern Caribbean progress in addressing corruption, along with evidence demonstrating what the corruption issues actually are.

Yin (2009) points out that one of the benefits of the case study is its unique ability to deal with a full variety of evidence—documents, artefacts, interviews and observations—that is not available to the same degree in other studies. Through the case studies I was able to examine a range of documents to ascertain what issues of corruption had affected the studied countries in recent years, along with the actions that have been taken over the years to address corruption. Another benefit of using case studies was that I could look at information from a wider area than that covered by the fieldwork. This was one way of overcoming financial constraints that prevented me from visiting more Eastern Caribbean countries for fieldwork.

Yin (2009) identified six main sources of evidence used in case studies: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant observation and physical artefacts. All of these have their strengths and

weaknesses. Details of the main elements of each source are illustrated in Table 4.3 below.

Table 4.3: Six sources of evidence – Strengths and weaknesses

Source of evidence	Strengths	Weaknesses
Documentation	Stable – can be reviewed repeatedly Unobtrusive – not created as a result of the case study Exact – contains exact names, references and details of an event Broad coverage – long span of time, many events and many settings	Retrievability – can be difficult to find Biased selectivity, if collection is incomplete Reporting bias – reflects (unknown) bias of author Access – may be deliberately withheld
Archival records	(same as documentation) Precise and usually quantitative	(same as those for documentation) Accessibility due to privacy reasons
Interviews	Targeted – focuses directly on case-study topics Insightful – provides perceived casual inferences and explanations	Bias due to poorly articulated questions Response bias Inaccuracies due to poor recall Reflexivity – interviewee gives what interviewer wants to hear
Direct observations	Reality – covers events in real time Contextual – covers context of ‘case’	Time consuming Selectivity – broad coverage difficult without a team of observers Reflexivity – event may proceed differently because it is being observed Cost – hours needed by human observers
Participant observation	(same as above for direct observations) Insightful into interpersonal behaviour and motives	(same as above for direct observations) Bias due to participant-observer’s manipulation of events
Physical artefacts	Insightful into cultural features Insightful into technical operations	Selectivity Selectivity Availability

Source: Yin 2009

There are also a number of disadvantages of using case studies in research which are now addressed. Flyvberg (2006) identified five disadvantages and misunderstandings of case studies. First, he points out that theoretical knowledge provides more value to research than practical knowledge. Second, that it is not possible to generalise from one case study. Several case studies have to be undertaken to enable the research to contribute to scientific development. This is justified in this research as a key objective is not to focus on the specifics, but on generalisable cultural phenomena to understand the behaviour. Third, case studies are very useful for generating hypotheses, whereas some of the other research methods are more suitable for testing hypotheses and theory building. The fourth disadvantage is that the case study contains a bias towards verification, and fifth according to Flyvberg is that it can be sometimes difficult to summarise case studies.

I used a documentation methodology to undertake the case-study element of the research. For Corbetta (2003), documents provide information about the area of investigation and are independent of researchers' actions. Although documents are produced for specific purposes, they can be used in research for cognitive purposes. The documentary information compiled in this study consisted mainly of reports, internal records, email correspondence, news clippings and other relevant accessible material. Yin (2003) cautions that for document analysis to be effective, it should be corroborated and tested against other sources. Once this is achieved, there are advantages of using document analysis as a research method. For example, it is not reactive and therefore not subject to distortion by the researcher, it provides data on past issues, and is cost-effective (Corbetta 2003).

For the research I used a number of accessible documents and data sources for the document-analysis case studies, including reports, newspaper articles, websites and online articles. All these were analysed thoroughly, allowing for examination of political corruption in the Caribbean from a range of different perspectives, broadening understanding of past and current issues. The document analysis also enabled identification of ambiguities and inconsistencies in accounts of political corruption, which raised questions that could be examined further in the semi-structured interviews.

As a number of the documents accessed for the research were online, I ensured Berg's (2007), strategy for evaluating websites was adopted. See Table 4.4 below.

Table 4.4: Strategy for evaluating websites

Whose Website is it, and what is the URL (uniform resource locator)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check the URL to get a sense of the authenticity and source of material. Additional checks should be made against personal websites.
Check the nature of the domain name?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The domain should be checked to establish the logical and sometimes geographical venue of a Web page. This will also enable the researcher to check whether the web site is well known or that of a reputable organisation. Websites operated by private groups or individuals should be checked, as the information presented may sound like reports of scientific studies, but may prove to be biased and designed to be self – effacing deliberately to sway readers.
Is the information current or dated?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Check to see whether the website is updated frequently. Where a website is not regularly updated then the researcher is advised to question how reliable the source is

Can the information be corroborated?

- If the material that is found on a website seems odd or unusual, and further investigation reveals that it may not be truthful, then advice is not to use.

Source: Berg 2007 (28)

In applying Berg strategy I was able to ensure the material used throughout the thesis was authentic. This was also applied through triangulation as discussed in section 4.9.3 below. However, Berg (2007) cautions that even after applying all of the above there are no absolute ways to safeguard against inaccurate information getting into the research.

3.5 Semi-structured interviews

Devine (2002) argues that, 'Qualitative methods have been aligned with an interpretive epistemology that stresses the dynamic, constructed and evolving nature of social reality' (Devine, 2002: 201). Edwards and Holland examined the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of interview-based studies and found,

the structured interview is at the quantitative end of the scale, and more used in survey approaches (on the other hand) the rest of the scale, semi-structured and unstructured, is the area occupied by qualitative researchers, with the interviews characterized by increasing levels of flexibility and lack of structure. Many of the terms applied in qualitative interviewing include in-depth, informal, non-directed, open-ended, conversational, naturalistic, narrative, biographical, oral or life history... (Edwards and Holland, 2013:3).

As highlighted by Hammersley, Berg, Bryman, there are three types of qualitative interviews undertaken: structured, unstructured and semi-structured. The structured interview is found mainly in quantitative research, with,

the approach structured to maximise the reliability and validity of measurement of key concepts ... (this type of interview) ..is also more structured because the researcher has a clearly specified set of research questions that are to be investigated (Bryman, 1998: 437).

For qualitative research, two interview approaches are available: unstructured and semi-structured. In the unstructured interview, 'the researcher uses at most an aide-memoire as a brief set of prompts to him or herself to deal with a certain range of topics'. (Bryman 1998, 438). Similarly, Berg (2007) characterised the semi-structured interview as involving a number of predetermined questions and special topics. While questions are typically asked systematically in a consistent order, interviews are allowed to digress and interviewers are expected) to probe far beyond the answers to their prepared standardized questions.

In addition, the researcher wanted to ensure that questions reflected the key theme of the research overall and added value, reflecting Maxwell's prescription, 'The function of your research questions is to explain specifically what your study is about' (Maxwell, 2005: 67).

To ensure the fieldwork added value to the study, the researcher undertook 24 semi-structured interviews, 12 in each of the fieldwork counties – Grenada and

SVG. Interviewees included politicians, representatives and personnel from non-governmental, statutory organisations, attorney's and religious leaders. As I was residing in Grenada during the latter part of the PhD research accessing interviewees there was quite straightforward. On the other hand as I had a limited number of contacts in SVG, I used existing contacts' networks and the snowballing technique to identify enough suitable interviewees. Once identified potential interviewees were invited to participate in the interview process. By the time I received ethics approval to undertake the fieldwork five interviewees from Grenada and three from SVG had indicated their consent to participate

Having looked in detail at all the research methods available, I decided on a qualitative methodology supported by semi-structured interviews, for a number of reasons of which I explain below. The most significant factor was that qualitative interviewing allows for a flexible approach where the interviewer leads the direction of the interview, adjusting as appropriate throughout the process in response to the interviewee's input. Quantitative interviewing does not allow for this, as each interview needs to follow the same, standardised format. In addition, qualitative interviews allowed for a more general approach to the formulation of research ideas, and inclusion of more of the interviewees' perspectives. This would not have been possible in quantitative research, which requires a more rigid interview structure to ensure the consistency, reliability and validity of measurements (Bryman, 2008). Another key reason for selecting a qualitative methodology was that it afforded the opportunity to test the central hypothesis, (whether corruption in Caribbean politics is culturally tolerated), by posing questions and listening to interviewees'

responses to capture their points of view. Quantitative interviews would not have allowed for this in the same way.

Using a qualitative methodology allows the interviewer to build a general discussion with the interviewee. This was crucial for the fieldwork, as allowing for discussions to flow naturally made it easier to understand the logic of the interviewee's argument and their thinking that led them to their conclusion (Devine, 2002). In addition qualitative research also gives the interviewer the opportunity to depart from the schedule of interview questions, using it purely as a guide. New questions may be posed throughout the interview if the interviewer feels they are relevant or necessary, particularly to clarify further points being made by the interviewee, which may not have been anticipated by the question schedule. Quantitative methodology does not allow for such departures.

The final advantage of qualitative interviews is that the researcher may interview the interviewee on more than one occasion if necessary. Although this was not necessary during the fieldwork it was reassuring to know that if there was a need to conduct more than one interview the methodology provided the opportunity. With a quantitative approach there is only one chance to interview and no scope to revert and address gaps or points requiring clarification.

4.6 Selecting countries for fieldwork

To keep the fieldwork manageable within the timeframe I initially considered undertaking research in the following countries: Grenada, Jamaica, St Vincent,

and the Grenadines (St Vincent), and Trinidad & Tobago. The rationale for selecting these four countries was that they are all English-speaking CARICOM and Commonwealth members, easily accessible from each other, thus facilitating fairly easy travelling to undertake the fieldwork and interviews. Some preliminary research showed that existing research on corruption in some of the larger countries (Jamaica and Haiti) had been undertaken (Munroe, 2011). Consequently I decided to focus on Caribbean countries where limited research on corruption in politics had been conducted to date and to which she could make a valid contribution. On this basis the I narrowed the fieldwork countries to Grenada, SVG Grenadines Trinidad & Tobago (TT).

A few months before the fieldwork was due to commence a major Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) scandal broke, implicating Trinidadian politician Jack Warner and then Vice President of FIFA, resulting in FIFA imposing lifetime ban in 2015 (Rumsby, 2015). It was felt that undertaking fieldwork during an international scandal with serious political repercussions in Trinidad could result in too many challenges in finding interviewees prepared to participate. Consequently TT was removed from the list of fieldwork countries and replaced with Dominica. This change allowed for narrowing fieldwork countries further to focus on Eastern Caribbean countries, which shared commonalities including use of the Eastern Caribbean dollar (EC\$ or XCD) and the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court. Further, the academic research undertaken relating to corruption across the Eastern Caribbean appeared to be limited so with this in mind, I planned to commence the fieldwork in three Eastern Caribbean countries: Dominica, Grenada and SVG with a view to widening my scope of investigation to other Eastern

Caribbean countries on completion of her doctoral studies. However, due to the severe flooding experienced in Dominica in November 2016 I reluctantly was forced to further narrow the fieldwork countries to Grenada and SVG.

4.7 Research sample

The research sample consisted of subjects identified through both purposive and snowball sampling. The purposive sample enabled me to adopt a strategic approach by attempting to establish contact with potential interview participants who were relevant to the research question. Initial results of applying this approach showed it would be insufficient in identifying enough suitable interviewees. As a result, I applied snowball sampling whereby I made 'initial contact with a small group of people who I deemed as relevant to the research topic and then used these to establish contact with others' (Bryman, 2008:184). Employing this approach allowed for me to contact sufficient relevant interviewees in both Grenada and SVG.

The sample represented a cross-section of participants from different fields including politicians, attorneys, representatives of NGOs, community activists and religious leaders. Once an interviewee was identified contact was made via phone and or email, introducing myself, explaining the purpose for contacting and giving the background to the research project. (See Appendix 2).

Overall a total of 24 interviews were conducted each lasting between 45 minutes to an hour. Thirteen semi-structured interview questions were devised in the interview schedule (see Appendix 1) to ascertain participants' views on whether corruption in Caribbean politics is culturally tolerated. In addition the

interview questions were also concerned with examining participants' interpretation and understanding of corruption in their country. Interviews were conducted using face to face and via skype or zoom. All interviews in Grenada were conducted face to face whilst the interviews in SVG were conducted via Skype or Zoom. Due to time constraints and cost factor in travelling to SVG I decided that Skype or Zoom would be the most prudent method for the interviews in SVG. However prior to conducting the interviews via these methods consideration was given to some of advantages and disadvantages associated with Skype and Zoom interviews.

According to Deakin and Wakefield (2013) Skype and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) provide researchers with the opportunity to interview participants for their study who may otherwise not be accessible. In addition Lo lacono et al (2015) highlights using both Skype and VoIP platforms provides the researcher with the opportunity to undertake a more democratic research process, as it removes the barriers associated with the distance of the researcher and interviewee in qualitative interviews. Another advantage is that it saves financially and logistically as interviews can be conducted from any location providing there is internet connection and Skype facilities available to both interviewer and interviewee. This approach clearly saved on funding to travel to conduct interviews and a suitable interview venue.

There are however disadvantages and limitations associated with using Skype and VoIP. Lo lacono et al (2015) point out that some communities do not have access to a computer or the necessary software or the ability or will to use information technology. Further Sullivan (2012) raises the barrier information

technology has for elderly people as they are less likely to embrace information technology, in the same way that young people do. However Lo lacono et al (2015) highlights that in their research information technology did not present a barrier for elderly people. However, this did not present any challenges for interviewees irrespective of their age.

Skype may not allow for the same rapport as face to face interviews so it is important for the interviewer to make the interviewee feel as comfortable as possible, King & Horrocks (2010). However, Deakin & Wakefield (2010) found in their research that building a rapport with Skype interviewees did not prove to be challenging and a good rapport was developed more quickly than in the face to face interviews. I established a good rapport through exchanging a number of email communications before the actual interview, as recommended by Seitz (2015) to strengthen rapport during the interview. In order to ensure that a rapport was built before each Skype interview, the interviewer contacted each interviewee beforehand, via email and telephone call, to discuss the interview and send information pertaining to the research topic. Further, the researcher invited interviewees to raise any questions they had before the interview.

The face-to-face interviews were conducted at various locations and venues determined by the participants' availability and preferred location. Venues included local library, private rooms within conference suites, interviewees' offices and my office. I adopted the same approach for each interview beginning by introductions, explaining the research I was conducting and reconfirming with the interviewee that they were happy to participate and had

signed the consent form (see Appendix 3). The participant was then asked to read and sign the consent form, which required participants to confirm that:

- They understood the study that the researcher was undertaking.
- They understood their participation was voluntary and they could withdraw at any time.
- They could ask to have access to the information they provided.
- Their data would be anonymised.
- They agreed to take part in the study.

Since the interviews were to be recorded I asked each participant whether they had any objections. Each participant confirmed they had no objection to being recorded.

4.8 Dealing with sensitivity

As the focus of the research is corruption in Caribbean politics I was aware, from early in the study of the potential sensitivity surrounding the research and how this could affect both myself as the researcher and the interviewees. McCosker (2001) argues whether research is 'sensitive' depends on cultural norms and values. Lee (1993) sees three main issues creating concerns about sensitivity first there are matters considered private, stressful or sacred, such as sexuality or death. Second there are matters that, if revealed could cause stigmatisation or fear. Third, there may be a political condition that makes researchers' topics of investigation subject to controversy or social conflict.

All of the above were potential issues in this research and as a result I took a number of actions to ensure that they were addressed throughout the fieldwork these included: ensuring that interviewees did not pose a threat to by undertaking checks before engaging with them, ensuring all interviews were conducted in locations that were not too remote, and at times and locations which felt quite safe. Throughout the fieldwork I kept in contact with my supervisors, updating them on my movements and research progress. In addition I kept a detailed log of all interview dates, time and locations.

I was also aware of the psychological impact the research could have due to its sensitive nature. As a result I recognised that while conducting the interviews, it would be appropriate to pause if matters became too sensitive and an interviewee became too distressed. Although the researcher took the sensitivity aspect of the topic into consideration, none of the potential difficulties anticipated were actually encountered during the research.

3.9 Trustworthy Strategies - Research validity, reliability, triangulation and reflexivity

3.9.1 Trustworthy Strategies

In any research it important that the research presented is credible, reliable and ethical. In order to ensure that the research meets these important criteria Shenton (2004) suggests that researchers consider using a combination of trustworthy strategies as illustrated in Table 4.5 below:

Table 4.5: Trustworthy Strategies

Adoption of well established research methods	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The specific procedures employed, should be derived, from those involved in previous comparable projects
Early familiarity with participating organisations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This may be achieved via consultation of appropriate documents and preliminary visits to organisations themselves to determine whether corruption in Caribbean politics is culturally tolerated.
Random sampling of individuals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A random approach may negate charges of researcher bias in the selection of participants
Triangulation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • May involve the use of different methods, especially observation, focus groups and individual interviews
Tactics to ensure honesty in informants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Each person approached should be given opportunities to refuse to participate in the project so as to ensure data collection sessions involve genuine participants
Iterative Questioning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use of probes to elicit detailed data and iterative questioning, in which the researcher returns to matters previously raised by an informant and extracts related data through rephrased questions • The researcher refining a hypothesis until it addresses all cases within the data
Negative Case Analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Between the researcher and his or her superiors, such as a project director or steering group
Frequent Debriefing Sessions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Opportunities for scrutiny of the project by colleagues, peers and academics should be welcomed, as should feedback over the duration of the project
Peer Scrutiny of the Research project	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To explore whether corrupt practices in Caribbean politics are viewed as being culturally tolerated, and identify whether such practices form part of day-to-day business.
Researcher's reflective commentary	
Background, Qualifications Experience	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The credibility of the researcher is especially important in qualitative research as the person who is the major instrument of data collection and analysis (Patton).
Member Checks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Checks relating to the accuracy of the data may take place 'on the spot', in the course, and at the end, of the data collection of dialogues. • Detailed description in this area can be an important provision for promoting credibility as it helps to convey

Thick description of phenomenon under scrutiny	the actual situations that have been investigated and, to an extent, the context that surrounds them.
Examination of previous research findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To assess the degree to which the project's results are congruent with those of past studies.

Source: Shenton 2004

Therefore I ensured the research was trustworthy and credible by adopting a number of the strategies suggested by Shenton (2004). These included: using member checks, informing interviewees they could have a copy of their interview transcripts to check accuracy. In addition iterative questioning was used where necessary to check the accuracy of the information provided by the interviewee. Peer scrutiny of the project was conducted throughout the research by presenting interim progress and findings to peers and academics at the University, which enabled valuable on going feedback. In addition I also applied a reflective commentary throughout, allowing her to continuously evaluate the thesis as it progressed and capture initial thoughts after each interview. The various strategies applied enabled the research findings and data to be confirmed (Stake, 1995, Yin, 2009).

4.9.2 Validity

Bryman describes validity as, 'The integrity of the conclusions that are generated from a piece of research.' (Bryman (2008, 32). Similarly, Gliner & Morgan (2000) submit that research validity is concerned with assessing the quality and merit of a study, to determine whether the research measures what it originally set out to measure. Winter (2000) argues that validity is primarily concerned with two main things: first whether the tools used to undertake the

research are accurate, and second whether the measurements undertaken are actually of what they intended to measure.

Problems can often arise with validity as measurement is generally indirect, and as such, researchers can never be clear that they are measuring what they intended to (Nachimas 1990). Bryman (2008) identified four types of validity: measurement, internal, external and ecological. Measurement validity is associated with quantitative research and focuses on whether a measure that is devised of a concept actually reflects what one intended to measure. Internal validity is about ensuring research reflects intentions. External validity is concerned with whether the results of the study can be generalised beyond the context of the research, that is whether the same research conducted in a different place or with different people would result in the same results (Campbell and Stanley, 1963). However external validity has been widely rejected by Dobberts, (1982) and Kirk & Miller (1986), as unachievable in qualitative research. This position is supported by Denzin,

The interpretivist rejects generalization as a goal and never aims to draw randomly selected samples of human experience... Every topic.... must be seen as carrying its own logic, sense of order, structure and meaning (Denzin, 1983: 133-4).

Finally, ecological validity is concerned with whether social-scientific findings are applicable to people's everyday and social settings, or 'Do our instruments capture the daily life conditions, opinions, values, attitudes, and knowledge base of those we study as expressed in their natural meaning? (Cicourel, 1982: 15).

Denscombe (1998) contends the best way to ensure validity and rigour in research is to use a range of methods in the examination. The goal is to ensure that one observation or fact is independent of what the research was trying to investigate, as this increases confidence in their validity.

As part of this project I aimed to increase the study's validity by using multiple methodologies to investigate the phenomena. Case studies ensured a range of issues was analysed before fieldwork was undertaken. This ensured all issues related to the research were taken into account. As part of the semi-structured interviews, I devised questions which focused on the research subject topic. All the material and data collated, which included material from the case studies and interviews were carefully analysed.

4.9.3 Reliability

Garmines and Zeller (1979) posit reliability is concerned with the extent to which an experiment test or measurement yields the same results on repeated trials. Similarly, Bryman (2008) submits that measurement validity means whether a measure of a concept really does reflect the concept and therefore, whether similar results would follow from using the same methods in similar research. However whether similar results are possible is questionable; as 'In practice, it is impossible to compute directly the true score independently of the amount of error that occurs in any particular measurement' (Nachimas, 1990:145).

To ensure that the research was as reliable as possible I applied rigour by reflecting on the implications of the study's methods, values and biases (Bryman, 2008). All interviews were recorded and verbatim transcripts of the

interviews were produced to ensure that the interview data was reliable and it produced a record from which other researchers could theoretically examine the same data at a later date. Since semi-structured interviews often contain open-ended questions, and discussions may diverge from the interview guide, it is generally best to tape-record interviews and later transcribe these analysis. While it is possible to take detailed notes to capture respondents' answers, it is difficult to focus on conducting an interview while doing so. The approach will result in poor notes while also detracting from the development of rapport between interviewer and interviewee (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 2008).

The researcher also ensured that all questions were written clearly and concisely, to ensure interviewee understanding. Where interviewees did not understand, the researcher repeated the question. Interviewees were given the chance to answer the questions freely and openly, from their own perspectives and beliefs, with limited interruption, if any. This ensured that there was limited to no influence from the interviewer. Finally, careful consideration was made to ensure that all interviews were conducted in a venue suitable for the interviewee.

As highlighted above the same results may not materialise if a similar study were undertaken in the future, but throughout the study, the researcher aimed for rigour by following a methodology developed after substantial reflection on the approaches available and their benefits and shortcomings.

4.9.3 Triangulation

Triangulation in the study of social phenomena entails using more than one method or source of data. Webb et al (1966) developed triangulation as an approach to the development of measures of concepts, whereby more than one method would be employed, producing greater confidence in the findings. Triangulation also presents an opportunity to eliminate biases in the research. Denzin (1970) identified four triangulations that can be used in research investigations: data-source, investigator, theory and methodological triangulation. The purpose of each is set out in Table 4.6 below.

Table 4.6: Denzin's methods of triangulation

Data-source triangulation	When the researcher looks for data to remain in different contexts
Investigator triangulation	When several investigators examine the same phenomenon
Theory triangulation	When investigators with different viewpoints interpret the same results
Methodological triangulation	When one approach is followed by another to increase confidence in the interpretation

Source: Tellis 1997

Berg (2007) contends triangulation allows for a more substantive picture as well as a richer more complete array of symbols and theoretical concepts while providing a mechanism to check and verify many of the elements coming from the data. Similarly, Goetz and LeCompte (1984) submit that triangulation is a process which can be used to refine, broaden and strengthen conceptual links.

In the present study I applied triangulation by using various methodologies and data sources. This included analysing available material from the case studies and semi-structured interviews for similarities. Through the use of multiple sources, I was able to confirm emerging findings from the case studies to ensure the results reflected participants' understanding and views which then formed the findings.

4.9.4 Generalisation

Scholfield (1994) argues that generalisation in qualitative research can be applied with credibility providing two main issues are addressed. The first is the precision of interpreting and capturing the phenomenon through the actual quality of the fieldwork, analysis and interpretation, whilst the second issue is the extent to which the sample is representative of the population.

Generalisability in qualitative and small-sample-size research can be accomplished by studying a case and or case studies. With both of these approaches the information and evidence gathered has credibility as it is not based on a single study or on what can be conveniently gathered. Kalof et al (2008) submit that generalisation can be achieved by ensuring there is a clear description of the sample-selection criteria and the research site. I ensured the research had a clear description of the actual sample-selection criteria along with a detailed explanation of the case-study application.

4.9.5 Reflexivity

Throughout research I was mindful of reflexivity considerations related to this thesis. Berg describes reflexivity as, 'A termed used in research methodology to refer to reflectiveness among social researchers about the implications for

the knowledge of the social world they generate of their methods, values, biases, decisions, and mere presence in the very situation they investigate' (Berg, 2008:698). I addressed the reflexivity by thinking through how the questions could affect the interviewees whilst at the same time giving thought to how I posed questions to the interviewees.

4.9.6 Positionality

Positionality can be described as the view taken from the individual researcher's viewpoint or position that they adopt throughout the research (Savin-Badin and Major, 2013). According to Sikes 2004 the individuals view, is concerned firstly with where the researcher is coming from – the ontological assumptions, which focuses on the social reality; second the epistemological assumption which focuses on the nature of the knowledge and assumptions about human nature.

Researcher ontological and epistemological assumptions are affected by a number of other factors including: values and beliefs, religious views, gender, sexuality, race social, class and others (Wellington, Bathmaker et al. 2005). This does not necessarily mean that the researcher will come to any particular view of perspectives. Altheide & Johnson (1994) emphasise that as the researcher is the primary source for collating and analysing data it important that any researcher incorporates their biases and views towards the research as this will assist those engaging with the research study. In order to ensure all biases, views and personal experience were documented the researcher provides her position below.

I am a practising Barrister & Attorney Called to the Bars of England & Wales, Grenada, St. Vincent and St. Kitt's. In addition, I am the Founder and Director of an active management consultancy in Grenada and Founder and President of Transparency Action Grenada – a non governmental organisation in Grenada whose aims to promote anti corruption initiatives. Familiarity with Grenada and parts of the wider Caribbean including Dominica, Jamaica and St. Vincent have given me a broad insight and access to data from different sources relating corruption in Caribbean politics.

In addition it is important to set out the personal context. I am British-Grenadian citizen born in the United Kingdom to Grenadian parents and currently residing in Grenada. By the age of 21 I had visited Grenada ten times with family. Over the years the I have accessed various sources of data where numerous politicians have been allegedly accused of corruption especially during periods of election campaigning. In addition I have seen behaviour of this nature at first hand in Grenada. Having seen such behaviours first hand I am aware that this may constitute a bias in this research.

4.10 Limitations and Delimitations

In any research there are limitations and delimitations of which the researcher must be aware. Simon (2011) describes limitation as potential weaknesses in a study which are out of the researcher's control. Studies conducted over a period provide only a snapshot, dependent on the conditions during the period of research. Therefore, it is important that the researcher is able to explain how they deal with the limitations to ensure the outcome of the study is not affected.

Cresswell (2012) explains that delimitation is about narrowing the scope of any study. As a result researchers must be aware of the delimitations in their study.

The limitation to this study includes the fact that the research was only conducted in two Eastern Caribbean countries. A further limitation is that the interviews conducted and data collected were from a small sample of 12 interviewees in each in each country. As a result it is not possible to apply the results from this research in similar contexts or make assumptions about other Caribbean countries from this research. In regard to the delimitations, and how the research was narrowed in scope the first thing to mention is that the case study was conducted mainly from documentation consisting of secondary sources i.e. reports, internal records, and news reports. A further delimitation is that the questions asked during the interviews could have been wider in scope potentially creating the opportunity to obtain more data on some of the complexities related to addressing political corruption in the Caribbean especially in regard to the historical and economic element.

4.11 Conclusion

In this chapter I set out the theoretical and practical approaches applied throughout the thesis and provided detailed explanations for the decisions taken. I explained the rationale for adopting an inductive approach, deciding on a constructivist epistemology and employing a qualitative methodology—entailing both document-analysis case studies and semi-structured interviews—to achieve the aims of the research.

The latter part of the chapter discussed how the researcher factored sensitivity into her research methodology and how I ensured the research exhibits validity, reliability and triangulation.

CHAPTER FIVE

Examining Effectiveness of Governance and Legislation Anti – Corruption Arrangements

'A politician thinks of the next general election; a statesman thinks of the next generation'.
- James Freeman Clarke

In widening the discussion to incorporate 'good governance', which stems from the concept of 'governance', Matthews (2010) productively argues that good governance means different things in different countries and organisations. Andersson and Heywood (2009) describe good governance as, 'improving political accountability, strengthening civil society, promoting competition via markets and the private sector, imposing institutional restraints on power and reforming public sector management'. Moreover, Bukovansky (2006) argues good governance can be seen as some form of corruption control, as it 'becomes a technical matter of effectively manipulating incentive structures'.

What we learn from the definitions of 'good governance' is what is generally required are a set of political systems and associated processes which will go some way towards building better societies (Andersson and Heywood, 2009); and provide one of the solutions for addressing corruption (Bukovansky, 2006). How Caribbean countries have reacted over the years to implementation of good governance systems, tools and processes is discussed throughout this chapter.

Despite being widely and implicitly accepted, the above definitions represent an arguably simplistic and unrealistic solution, especially with regard to addressing issues of corruption. Indeed, Rothstein (2011) argues it is naive to believe all that is required is to fix the incentive, through the reform of structures, such as legal systems, institutions of governments, and the role of the media, to improve governance and reduce corruption levels. The challenge is far more complex than merely implementing incentives, especially when the prerequisite is the establishment of adequate institutional frameworks, a qualification few within the Caribbean would claim. Furthermore, implementing good governance arrangements also requires capacity and resources, which many countries, especially in the Caribbean, simply do not have (Norris, 2010).

Instead, a shift away from prescriptive universal solutions is needed, with much more of a focus on improving the quality of governance, through the development of sets of possible remedies that are adapted to fit local conditions and circumstances (Hough, 2011). I submit, that these local circumstances are a significant factor when looking at good governance in the Caribbean. Over the years many indicators have been introduced to look at the quality of governance, which in some instances also incorporate corruption. However, many of these indicators take the same approach when measuring corruption, in that the governance scores are based on the perceptions of Western and First World experts.

With reference to the Caribbean, many of the experts are First-World based and have limited understanding either of the region's complex past or the

compromised institutions of postcolonial micro-states. This is important as a familiarity with the last five hundred years of Caribbean history, is critical in understanding the region's current social, economic and political issues.

This position accords well with Uslaner (2017) who argues, systemic corruption is rooted in socio-historical political structures and that 'the theory of Path Dependence proposes that "Once a country's trajectory is set, it is difficult to change' (Uslaner (2017: 3). Logically then any assessment of a country will review its historical trajectory; this requires 'insider' knowledge and experience. It is therefore illogical to rely on the integrity of indices constructed by those lacking an understanding of the issues in Caribbean countries and compiling indices at remote distances. Consequently, I argue that there are serious limitations in the current indicators.

The good governance indices have been subject to criticism due to their limitations and biases and the fact that they rely on small numbers of national experts for the majority of their data. The emphasis of the indices generally tends to focus on the views and opinions of business leaders and excludes other stakeholders. In addition, the various indices have been criticised for either under-estimating, or simply not being transparent about, the scope and the extent of the variations in country coverage across the different indices (Behnke, 2002).

Whatever the general benefits of the indices, problems inevitably arise in terms of specific country data, as in many instances those experts' compiling data

lack a balanced understanding of historical and cultural factors. Their model devised in the First World, addresses First World countries with their own trajectories. Consequently, the WGI and others have been criticised for being too simplistic. The developers of the World Governance Assessment (WGA) argue that projects which rank countries through a single index are unhelpful, as they fail to get a true understanding of what is really happening in regard to governance on the ground. This is important as this approach risks stigmatising countries on the perceptions of external experts, (Hayden, et al: 2003). Similarly, Harttgen and Klasen (2012), advance country level indices are unable to comprehensively capture the critical variations in governance that exist at the sub national levels.

Why does this matter and what is the relevance here? I advance this is a significant factor as more recently connections have been made between 'governance' and 'good governance' and the benefits it brings to assisting countries and institutions in addressing corruption. This can be further evidenced when looking at the anti-corruption good governance regimes introduced over the years in countries and international organisations, for example, the European Economic Area, the Norwegian Financial Mechanism 2005, and the Organization and Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which state as part of their criteria:

'Of the elements that threaten good governance, corruption is seen by the donor states as among the most destructive. Corruption and mismanagement cripple economic growth and development. The

donor states adhere to a strict zero-tolerance policy on corruption’,
(OSCE, 2019: 4).

Similarly, the World Bank (1991) concludes that good governance is concerned with the activity and organisation of any government, with emphasis on the measurable targets achieved by government in relation to economic, human and institutional development, and on the benefits and outcomes to the overall population, which includes promotion of literacy levels and employment opportunities.

Therefore, it becomes apparent that if the international ‘good governance’ regimes are applied universally, as appears to be the case, then they become a tool of less value in assessing a country’s governance arrangements. This is more so the case for Caribbean countries due to the indices being compiled by organisations which are positioned outside the region. This point is developed in examining the World Governance Indices (WGI) below.

One of the most frequently used indices internationally, the World Governance Index (WGI) is managed and overseen by a team at the World Bank Institute led by Daniel Kauffmann and Aart Kray. So here and in support of my argument we see an international indicator whose origins and authors are both positioned in Washington DC. The WGI measures perceived levels of governance quality across six specific dimensions: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. The data compiled in the World Governance Index reflects the views and perceptions of various stakeholders which include: ‘informed

stakeholders', country experts, households, representatives from NGOs or member of the business community' (Hough, 2013:38). Prior to examining the dimensions, a moot point for reflection is whether during compilation consideration was given to the differences in different regions and countries globally, and specifically the Caribbean. The details of what each dimension consists of are set out in Table 5.1 below.

Table 5.1: World Governance Indicators – Dimensions

Dimension	
Voice and Accountability	This captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting the government, how free they are to express their own feelings and attitudes in public, to what extent freedom of association is permitted and finally how free and open the media is.
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism	This dimension aims to capture perceptions of likelihood that a government will be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means. This includes both politically – motivated violence and terrorism.
Government Effectiveness	This captures perceptions of quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and how independent it is perceived to be from political pressures. It also captures perceptions of the quality of policy formulation and implementation, as well as the credibility of the government's commitment to carrying such policies through.
Regulatory Quality	This dimension captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and to develop regulations that permit to promote private sector development.
Rule of Law	This captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in, and abide by, the rules that govern society. In particular, this dimension looks at the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts as well the likelihood of being affected by either crime and /or violence.
Control of Corruption	The final dimension captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 'capture' of the state by elites and private interests.

Source: Kaufmann et al, 1999

Four key limitations in both the methodological and theoretical approaches adopted to construct these indices can be identified. First, there are issues about the manner in which the scores of the indices are calculated and what the indices claim to measure against what they actually measure in reality. Second, as individual data sets are computed using different data sets over time, this could mean that the indicators do not reflect a reliable comparison of governance over a defined period. Third, questions have been raised about whose opinions are represented in the data sets, with Knack (2007) claiming that the perceptions of business people are more likely to be more prominent, resulting in the voices of ordinary citizens having limited, if any weighting. (Arndt and Oman, 2006). Fourth, criticisms have been expressed about the transparency and accessibility of the WGI. Some of the sources are only available to paying customers, and there are some sources which are not available at all. Arndt and Oman (2006) argue that some of the WGI sources are complex and unclear as to what they represent. Similar reservations led Thomas (2010) to suggest that that the WGI are in fact interpretable and therefore would not survive any peer review.

In addition to these shortcomings, I also advance the WGI may not be a tool that is applicable to, or of true value for, Caribbean countries. The historical, cultural and economic factors advanced in Chapter Three find no obvious expression in the WGI. Moreover, in taking my position further, I turn to analysing the origins of some data sources used to compile the WGI, which

further highlights their lack of cultural and historical understanding in examining the issue of corruption and cultural tolerance.

The WGI for 2000 and 2001 covered 175 countries, and used the results to interpret the relationship between income and governance, focusing on Latin America and the Caribbean region. Data from a total of 17 sources or institutions was used, in the form of publications or surveys. From these various sources only one was positioned in Latin America, the Latinbarometro Surveys, and none were located in the Caribbean. The majority of the sources and institutions were based in the First World, located predominantly in America and Europe, for example the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Freedom House and the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal. Further details setting out all the sources used are illustrated in Table 5.2 below.

Focusing on the Eastern Caribbean, I further analysed the WGI data sources used for the WGI 2018, and found the data sources again predominantly comprised of first world and international organisations located in the West, as illustrated in Table 5.3 below. For example, the data source mostly relied on across the Caribbean countries was the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data, which concentrates on providing data about how government addresses human rights in nearly all countries in the world. The least consulted data source was the Bartelsmann Transformation Index (used in Jamaica and Haiti), which comprises an international collaboration of some 300 experts in leading academic institutions globally. The objective is 'to share the goal to detect strengths and weaknesses by comparison and to find good examples for successful political steering' (BTI, 2019).

Table 5.2 Sources of Governance Data, 2000-01

Source/Institution	Publication/Survey
Business Environment Risk Intelligence	Business Risk Service
Columbia University	State Capacity Project
Economist Intelligence Unit	Country Risk Service
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	Transition Report
Freedom House	Nations in Transition
Freedom House	Freedom in the World
Gallup International	Gallup Millennium Survey
Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal	Economic Freedom Index
Institute for Management and Development	World Competitiveness Yearbook
Latinobarometro	Latinobarometro Surveys
Political Economic Risk Consultancy	Asia Intelligence
Political Risk Services	International Country Risk Guide
Price Waterhouse Coopers	Opacity Index
Standard and Poor's DRI McGraw-Hill	Country Risk Review
World Bank	Business Enterprise Environment Survey
World Bank	World Business Environment Survey
World Economic Forum	Global Competiveness Report

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This further supports my argument of the lack of primary data contained within the WGI that is reflective of Caribbean countries. The data sources used are far removed from the Caribbean region, with necessarily limited insight into those cultural and historical contextual factors that I argue are crucial in understanding the current fabric, make up and functionalities in Caribbean countries. Failure to take these factors into account risks misperceptions of some of the current practices and behaviours in relation to good governance, and by extension corruption, in today's Caribbean. Assessing governance, cannot be deemed to be comprehensive and accurate when based on abstract data sets.

There are problems in terms of scale when attempting to apply the WGI to Eastern Caribbean micro-states. In small populations where the majority of citizens have limited education and are reliant on political bosses for survival, perception of any of the six dimensions may be compromised. In terms of Voice and Accountability we

must remember that much of the media in these micro states is controlled by the ruling political party, to the extent that government or official news may differ radically from the actual facts. The recent incident in Grenada where a female journalist was pushed to the floor and then verbally abused exemplifies the problem. With social media footage of the incident virally available a cabinet minister made a TV statement denying the incident had occurred and affirming the constitutional recognition of Freedom of the Press.

Table 5.3 Sources of Governance Data by Caribbean Countries, 2018

Source/Institution	BB	AG	BS	BZ	DM	GD	GY	HT	JM	VG	LC	KN
Bartelsmann Transformation Index								•	•			
Cingrannelli Richards Human Rights Data Index	•	•	•	•	•	•				•	•	•
Economist Intelligence Unit	•		•	•			•	•	•			
Freedom House	•	•	•	•	•	•			•	•	•	•
Gallup World Poll								•				
Global Insight Business Conditions	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom	•		•	•	•			•		•	•	
IFAD Rural Sector Performance Assessment				•		•	•	•			•	
IJET Country Security Risk Rating	•	•	•	•		•		•	•	•	•	•
Institutionales Profiles Database								•	•			
Latin America Public Opinion Project					•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•

Consequently, WGI corruption assessment is at risk of painting a picture of governance based on flawed information and data. If an index similar to the WGI or indeed TI Index were to be produced in the Caribbean and incorporated countries outside the Caribbean, there can be little doubt it would be challenged and critiqued with regards to the value and accuracy of the data compiled. There is a clear hierarchy to international assessments of this nature, but the assumptions underpinning this hierarchy, and their implications for how 'good governance' or 'effective anti-corruption measures' are defined and measured, are very rarely explored.

To elaborate and illustrate these criticisms of governance indices, I now turn to examine how governance regimes have been applied across CARICOM and Caribbean regional organisations over the years and evidence their failure to give due consideration to the Caribbean's complex history, its social and economic positions.

5.3 CARICOM and the Regional Approach to Governance

Having examined both governance and good governance and their link to the anti-corruption agenda, this section examines the approach adopted by CARICOM and other regional organisations in implementing 'good governance' regimes over the last 20 years. The objective here is to highlight the approach adopted by CARICOM, and other organisations, as the community developed to create a single market and single economy for the region; and build on its four main pillars of economic integration, foreign policy co-ordination, social development, and security.

A collective approach to dealing with governance and more specifically the anti-corruption agenda in the Caribbean has proved highly problematic. According to Farrell (1986), up until the mid 1980s, Caribbean States had not been successful in implementing good governance, and he submitted five key factors as to why. The first relates to the challenges with red tape bureaucracy, which hampers commerce due to the time wasted between the embryo stages and implementation of projects. The second concerns nepotism, resulting in individuals being appointed due to their political connections as opposed to their skills. The third factor relates to bad decisions, following complex bureaucracy, business inefficacy, coupled with the projects which lack creativity. The fourth concerns the large losses following failed enterprise projects, on establishing they are no longer viable. The fifth and final factor is clientelism, whereby government and politicians enter into special interest relationships with clients that are sometimes conducted in secret, and result in informal backdoor deals, which undermine transparency. Notably, all these factors replicate the features of Boss Politics (Lythgoe, 1983) and the effects of patron client linkages (Veenendall and Corbett, 2019) discussed in Chapter Three.

Similar criticisms have been made by others including Ryan (1999), whose report for the World Bank submitted that, due to poor governance, investors actually perceived both Latin American and Caribbean States as suffering from poor quality bureaucratic systems, credibility deficiencies within their governments, and poor judiciary systems which hamper public trust and brought into question whether citizens were afforded the expected guarantees for their personal security.

The debate regarding CARICOM's effectiveness, or indeed ineffectiveness, in relation to good governance has been much discussed. Gilbert- Roberts has been critical of the lack of good governance development across the Caribbean region due to crisis within CARICOM and argues,

'Stark deficiencies in the regional governance framework have impeded efforts towards the achievement of shared development outcomes, including the establishment of a Single Economy...' (Gilbert-Roberts, 2011:1).

This indeed was the case even though regional political leaders purportedly recognise that economic integration is one of the solutions for overcoming any shortcomings and limitations of 'structural context by building shared capacity, through institutions, for better governance' (Gilbert-Roberts, 2011:1) A similar point was advanced pre CARICOM by Demas, who recognised the importance of integration and argued that there would only be greater economic independence for each Caribbean country collectively through adopting a meaningful economic integration approach regionally. In other words, for these countries to gain effective sovereignty, then it would be necessary for them to surrender some of their formal sovereignty (Demas, 1965).

While the economic benefits of regional integration may be obvious objectively, a popular consensus in the Caribbean is that CARICOM has proved to be a 'pappyshow' – a Creole term denoting 'a nonsensical state of affairs', only intended to 'mamaguy' –'to fool, trick or deceive' (Dictionary of Caribbean English Usage). This perception is justified by the reality that, due to inadequate CARICOM governance structures,

regional governance processes remain weak. Deficiencies in the regional governance framework have impeded efforts at collaborative working on development outcomes, including the long-awaited Single Economy, first proposed in 1989. Other deficiencies include: a lack of effective consultation and inclusion of 'non-political stakeholders in the decision-making process and an implementation deficit – a failure to realise development outcomes' (Gilbert-Roberts, 2011).

Although the need for closer integration was recognised from 1965, collective governance has been viewed as, 'inimical to national security and contrary to a political culture that seeks to guard and preserve the purity of the sovereignty' (Gilbert-Roberts, 2011). In order to understand this longstanding insular antipathy, one has to view it in the light of the region's historical trajectory.

The relationship between Caribbean States was already fragile as there were, strongly rooted in '(m)utual mistrust and suspicion, frequently bolstered by little knowledge or total ignorance on each side' (Serbin, 1996:2). This resulted in it taking, 'some two decades before the English-speaking Caribbean would partially evolve beyond the political, cultural and economic barriers erected by colonialism' (Byron, 2004:3). (Examples of these barriers are also discussed in depth in Chapter Three). Further, these feelings of mutual mistrust and suspicion are well documented through the West Indies Commission reports, which highlight the mistrust between Caribbean political leaders:

'The temper of the times made the founders protective in the extreme of individual territorial sovereignty. Consensus yes, submission to the majority

no. Agreement yes, but with all the opportunity in the world for second thoughts. Cooperation and coordination yes, but only as far as it might suit the individual cause. Deadline yes, but no sanctions for slippage. Decision-making yes, but for the decision – implementation only a grudging maybe. It would not matter, therefore, how many far reaching any new goals might be. If means to match them in practice were unavailable then the Treaty [of Chaguaramas]¹ would remain a child of its times and the region would be stuck in the lower gear of a former era' (West Indian Commission, 1993:47).

This mistrust amongst CARICOM members is not surprising, especially when looking at the origins of CARICOM, following the failed West Indies Federation, discussed in the previous chapter. Moreover, it is evident that the problems which presented themselves at the embryonic stage of CARICOM in 1973, are very much present today, resulting in a lack of progress generally with regards to the single economy, but also, and more specifically, in relation to the meaningful development of governance arrangements. As Mia Motley, Chair of CARICOM and Barbados Prime Minister, recently argued: if the Caribbean region is to progress meaningfully, then it requires a Caribbean Single Market and Economy that is fit for purpose. She further suggested that if the region is to prevent itself from being marginalized, then CARICOM's governance structure needs to be critically looked at, with a view to convening more meetings between CARICOM heads of state and their various ministerial sub-committees, to enable them to progress implementation of the structure. She further

¹ The Treaty of Chaguaramas established the Caribbean Community and Common Market, later known as CARICOM. It was signed in July 4th 1973 in Chaguaramas, Trinidad and Tobago. It was signed by Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.

suggested that her fellow leaders should look to follow the European Heads of Government in this regard (The Caribbean Council, 2019).

Under colonialism there were no autonomous regional political or legislative institutions. The failure of the Federation of the West Indies foreshadows CARICOM moribundity. The absence of regional democratic institutions allowed for the perpetuation of the colonial system of exploitation and inequality at a time of rapid change and unprecedented challenges. In the immediate post-independence period small island states were overwhelmed by the challenges of de-colonisation, developing political systems for self-governance and forging a nation states and national identities. Given the economic handicaps inherited, it is unreasonable to assume that these same small island states could collapse the extensive time frame European powers had to develop viable nation states into the space of a couple of decades.

CARICOM's deficiencies have compounded the region's failure to leverage globalisation, highlighting a missed opportunity across CARICOM states to come together as a meaningful collective in the interests of their respective economies. This failure of Caribbean governance to the latest wave of globalisation can be viewed from the long-term perspective of Path Dependency theory, rather than as an isolated episode. In this mode, we can observe a repeating pattern of inequality inherited from globalised systems originating outside the region, namely: colonialism, imperialism and decolonisation. As Thomas and Thompson point out, following the legacy of colonialism,

...environmental degradation and cultural denigration...The quest for post-colonial relationships...mirrored the cultivation of preferred elites before independence ...The anti-colonial turn in the UN and in international opinion...fostered the growth of neo-colonial clientelism as a replacement for the rigidities of formal empire (Thomas and Thompson, 2014: 159).

If decolonisation was compromised from inception by neo-colonialism, other initiatives to address underdevelopment (North-South dependency, the World System) and indeed globalisation itself, have left Caribbean micro-states strictly on the periphery. There is a valid case for equating the contemporary fragility of these states with the legacy of exploitative capitalism in the colonial period, continuing in a postcolonial climate of neo-liberal economics.

Globalisation has recently been referred to as 'global society, global economy, global governance, global warming and the global war against terror' (Magee, 2011: 1-6). We can now add the global affliction of Covid 19 to this list, which echoes the perception that globalisation has conveyed a sense of living in an age of transformation or unprecedented change (Giddens, 1999). While the roots of globalisation are found deep in history, the beginning of modern-day globalisation commences with the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in late 1989, which was the driver for converting trade and finance into a global project. Indeed, the globalisation era of the 1990's consisted of, 'a coherent political, institutional, theoretical and ideological basis, a set of prescribed practices and a convenient and easily-recognised label'. (Bissesar, 2014, 12). Some of these key features of globalisation have been documented by Girvan including:

- A world economic order centred on the Triad of the US-EU-Japan, under the political and military leadership of the US.
- The World Trade Organisation (WTO) dominated by the Triad, as the chief global institution for negotiating, codifying and enforcing neo-liberal practices in interstate economic relations.
- The construction of regional blocs or free trade zones by each member of the Triad in order to strengthen its position vis a vis the other two, the strongest being the European Union.
- In regional North-South trade agreements (NAFTA, FTAA, Lome), replacement of the principle of non-reciprocal preferences to assist the development of the weaker partners with that of reciprocal trade liberalization to promote trade expansion and market-led growth in line with WTO provisions.
- Promotion of a package of neo-liberal policy measures which assumed universal applicability. These include privatisation, financial deregulation, trade and rate liberalization, fiscal and monetary orthodoxy and labour market reform and social welfare reform.
- The attainment of 'global competitiveness' as the benchmark by which all countries and producers, regardless of their resources or level of development are to be evaluated through participation in the global market.
- The consolidation of huge concentrations of private capital – transnational corporations and institutional investors – as the dominant players in world production and trade.

(Girvan, 1999:3)

These key features of globalisation obviously favoured the larger developed countries while negatively impacting smaller countries unable to reorganise themselves to compete on what was definitely not a level playing field.. The universal approach (n.b.attainment of 'global competitiveness' as the benchmark by which all countries and producers, regardless of their resources or level of development are to be evaluated) confirmed existing power relations, with the centre continuing to ignore the periphery. Handicapped by history, neither individual states nor the regional institutions purporting to represent them were in any position to benefit meaningfully, as Bissesar notes with reference to the Caribbean and Central America:

For example, it was apparent both under the NAFTA agreement and now the impending FTAA, there has to be a re-examination of a whole range of regulatory framework involving governmental policies and practices. However, with this re-thinking the countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean and Central America would face a formidable task (Bissesar, 2014:13).

As Nye and Donahue (2000) note, what globalisation presented was the need for countries to get organised, with a view to them working in collaboration with a number of different agencies including private, non-governmental organisations, government, and others to work in partnership. Adopting such an approach would result in these countries having to change their behaviours,

so that any emerging pattern of governance will have to be networked rather than hierarchical and must have minimal rather than highly ambitious

objectives. Because of what may now be referred to as 'cross-sectorial partnerships' of government, therefore, more nuanced approaches to transparency and accountability of both institutions and networks will have to be introduced' (Bissesar, 2014:14).

Deficiencies in regional integration are undoubtedly partially responsible for the Caribbean's poor response to the most recent wave of globalisation. Yet historically it is clear that the Caribbean

'has had a longer and more direct relationship with the modern world economy than any other part of the poorer world and its distinctive characteristics as a region derive in large part from the extensity, intensity, velocity, and impact of its interactions with the core countries of the world system over the last five hundred years' (Payne, 2007:1).

So, we can contrast the period of globalisation in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when the region was central to the triangular trade, to its peripheral position now. We can also suggest a more nuanced focus in assessing whether path dependence accounts for many of the current obstructions to regional and country response to globalisation. Regardless of the historically imposed limitations we see that the Caribbean region has actually capitalised on a number of globalised initiatives over the last twenty to thirty years. These include Tax Havens in the British Virgin and Cayman Islands; the Citizen by Investment Programme (available in Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitt's and St. Lucia) – whereby persons are able to purchase citizenship for a fee of

approximately \$ US200,000, and a passport which gives them visa free access to some 130 countries. For the Caribbean countries involved in this \$US2billion dollar a year business, the CBI is extremely attractive with St. Kitt's, and Nevis having sold in excess of 10,000 passports at \$US 250,000 and Dominica selling 2,000 passports per year at \$US 100,000 per time. For many Caribbean countries the CBI programme has proved a vital survival strategy developed through globalisation. In 2017 the Dominican UN ambassador acknowledged \$US148 million dollars of the country's \$340m budget was raised by the CBI programme, while Prime Minister Gaston Browne of Antigua stated that without the CBI programme the country would have defaulted on its debt. (Economist, 2017).

The CBI programme may well be a financial lifeline for some Caribbean countries. However, participating countries have been severely criticised for failing to undertake the necessary due diligence against applicants and knowingly engaging in acts of money laundering. (The Financial Express, 2018). Despite these justifiable objections the CBI is viewed by governments as a new and significant source of income. This source of income is continuously scrutinised by Governments in North America and Europe as,

'a small but growing number of incidents have raised concerns about who passports are being issued to and the robustness of due diligence checks on applicants..... More recently, the Canadian Government announced that it would impose visas on all citizens from St. Kitt's...due to its "concerns about the issuance of passports and the identity management practices" by

the St. Kitt's authorities in relation to its Citizenship by Investment programme". (Caribbean Council, 2014).

It would seem from these concerns that the Caribbean has in fact responded to globalisation, as another opportunity for corruption involving state officials at the highest level. Having illustrated some of the issues of CARICOM and individual Caribbean countries to with regard to globalisation, in order to set the context further it is important to take into account some critical historical, economic, and social issues, in the light of path dependency theory.

Recently, historians and sociologists have argued that path dependence is an important consideration when undertaking social research. (Mahoney,2000). Aminzade (1992) and Griffin (1992), advance that many social phenomena cannot be fully understood without giving consideration to path dependency. 'The importance of the path dependency in world systems theorising leads to the expectation that the Caribbean's historical dependency is an ongoing situation' (Potter et al, 2014:388).

Uslaner's interpretation of path dependency theory provides a relevant comparative analytical framework for addressing CARICOM's 'pappyshow', which accords with my hypothesis about the formation of a Caribbean culture which tolerates political and other corruption. It is doubly apt in that it is constructed on the historical roots of corruption. Viewed historically, regionalism, even within the linguistic sub-regions has never developed beyond the late nineteenth century visions of Joes Marti's 'Nuestra America' or Antenor Firmin's 'Creole Confederacy', both of which defined themselves in opposition to American expansionism. What regional consciousness exists is

cultural rather than political: Afro-Creole religions (Vodou, Santeria, Orisha) and cultural expressions (music dance, carnival). In the Anglo-Caribbean even the regional cricket team 'The Windies', has been a site for inter-territorial dispute and it is telling that, given the enormous economic possibilities of 'the beautiful game,' there is no regional football team. We can juxtapose this failure to capitalise on the globalisation of football with the fact that Jack Warner, a former FIFA vice president and former Trinidad cabinet member and Minister of National Security, is still legally embroiled over the massive corruption scandal which has resulted in prison sentences in America for several former FIFA executives, the enforced resignations of the president and other executives and universal disgrace.

What we now see in the Caribbean, 'represents yet another round of powerful influences for a region historically shaped by exogenous decisions and events' (Potter, 2014:388), and a continuation of external imperialism. The Caribbean's historical relationship with different external countries and agencies, has clearly resulted in a dependency which is extremely difficult to contest. Thus, although the Caribbean region is now mostly independent from Europe politically, what we see is the historical colonial, post- colonial and independence legacies still present, through its dependency on outside authorities, suppliers, markets and geopolitical agendas, as the World Trade Organisation's tariffs placed on export of bananas in the Caribbean aptly illustrate (Payne and Sutton, 2001). This is further argued by Potter et al (2014),

'The Caribbean's extreme trade dependency primarily involving the trade imbalances with the United States, is an important current manifestation of the continuity of external dependency. Now that the entire world has

entered the present era of (US-dominated) globalisation, the Caribbean long-term predicament offers a chronicle of the impacts of exposure to many previous rounds of transformation of global capitalism, and the valuable lessons for other economically peripheral regions'. Potter et al, (2014:388)

Therefore, it is arguable that for all the criticism made at the lack of progress by CARICOM and the wider Caribbean in regard to globalisation, one must remember that ever since Columbus' encounter with the New World at the end of the fifteenth century the Caribbean has laboured under some form of dependency. This dependency is one facet of the ongoing inequitable power relations endured by Caribbean countries. Consideration of all these relationships (with colonialism, imperialism, post and neo colonialism) is central to examining meaningful solutions to a positive response to globalisation in the 21st century and beyond.

In Chapter Two I set out some of the economic benefits experienced by colonisers; However, it is equally important to emphasise the negative economic impact colonialism has left on the Caribbean, a point highlighted by Acemoglu et al,

'The immense economic inequality we observe in the world today didn't happen overnight, or even in the past century. It is the path-dependent outcome of a multitude of historical processes, one of the most important of which has been European colonialism. Retracing our steps 500 years, or back to the verge of this colonial project, we see little inequality and small differences between poor and rich countries (perhaps a factor of four). Now

the differences are a factor of more than 40, if we compare the richest to the poorest countries in the world...' (Acemoglu et al, 2017: 1).

The above supports the argument which I make in relation to the negative economic and social impact as a result of colonisation and its legacy that is present today through path dependency. As a result of this path dependency, we see the progress made by CARICOM 'good governance' arrangements, is limited as illustrated below.

CARICOM 2013 Crime and Security Strategy overall aim was to significantly improve security in the region, by creating a safe, just and free Community, with a key commitment from member states to disrupt, dismantle and defeat crime within their borders, with particular attention to corruption and money laundering. One specific strategy was establishing legal frameworks to address money laundering and corruption.

In addition, in July 2014 CARICOM set out its four year (2015-2019) strategic plan for the Caribbean Community. Of the plan's five key goals, Goal Three is 'Develop Governance Arrangements for Community Institutions'. The goal was incorporated as CARICOM recognised the importance that good governance plays in the various fields, which mirrors the world governance indicators dimensions, in the 'rule of law, democratic governance, effective citizen participation, and efficient public services in the context of a diverse region. (Williams, 2014). The objective of this goal clearly has governance arrangements at its core. See Table 3 below.

Table 5.3: Goal 3. Develop Governance Arrangements for Community Institutions.

Objective	<p>This strategy will focus on reviewing and developing governance arrangements for the Community Institutions in order to create an enabling environment for coordinated management across the Regional Integration Architecture. The objective is to ensure that the Community Institutions are best positioned to contribute to the effective implementation of the resilience building agenda with the context of the Strategic Plan. The strategy will address:</p>
	<p>Strengthening of accountability mechanisms and harmonization of institutional arrangements</p>
	<p>Development and application of a shared performance framework based on Community Strategic Plan</p>
	<p>Mechanisms for greater collaboration, coordination and accountability e.g MOUs. Service Agreements</p> <p>Use of ICT tools to support information sharing, and development and implementation of collaborative programmes and functional initiatives.</p> <p>The development of governance arrangements will occur in the wider review of the Institutions to be conducted in the plan period</p>

Source: William, CARICOM. 2014

The outcome of the 2013 and 2014 CARICOM initiatives are yet to be fully seen across the Caribbean region. However, one interesting development in relation to good governance was the Caribbean Integrity Commissions coming together in 2015 to form a new body to enhance transparency and help fight corruption. The Association of Integrity Commissions and Anticorruption Bodies in the Commonwealth Caribbean (AICACBCC)² was formed at a conference convened by the Commonwealth Secretariat in Grenada and hosted by the Integrity Commission of Grenada. The aim of the Association of Integrity Commissions is to ‘deliver practical benefits to members

² A total of twelve Commonwealth CARICOM countries, Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago make up the AICACBCC.

as a forum for knowledge sharing and co-ordination. The intention is also to help countries learn and exchange with other Commonwealth countries' (Maharaj, 2015).

Demonstrating its commitment to addressing corruption, the Commonwealth Caribbean Integrity Commissions and Anti-Corruption bodies made a commitment to share and gather information at its annual conference in Kingston. One initiative that is being considered is the introduction of their own Transparency Index following discussions at AICACBCC conference and as a result of the 2017 Transparency Index publication, in which most of the Caribbean countries were assessed as having high levels of perception (see Table 1 in chapter one). As a result, AICACBCC criticised Transparency International for failing to present more balanced perceptions of corruption in the Caribbean and argued there is a need for a regional anti – corruption index to,

‘ensure that our side of the story, the work, the efforts, the data we have, must also be released to the public, we need to share it, so that the public can have an objective picture of what is happening..... across region. If we don't, then a perception index will not tell the story for us and all the efforts that we are making...’ (Trotman-Joseph, 2017).

To date there does not appear to be any progress in the development of a more localised Transparency Index. However, I argue such an initiative is required in developing a localised Index which focuses, captures and measures governance arrangements in the Caribbean, based on more meaningful and relevant criteria that factor in Caribbean history, culture, economics and path dependency. This may well

be a good starting point for introducing a tool that is culturally appropriate for the Caribbean, with a view to making meaningful change. Something we await patiently to see progress.

A crucial element of good governance arrangements in relation to anti-corruption is the relevant legislation, since legislation is one of the key mechanisms supposedly used by all Caribbean countries for addressing corruption. As such the next section of the chapter examines the most significant anti-corruption legislation.

5.5. Anti-Corruption legislation of influence in the Caribbean

There is no profit in the best of laws...if the citizens themselves have not been attuned by the force of habit and influence of teaching, to the right constitutional temper (Aristotle, *Politics V*, 9, 1310a 12–181962).

As one of the six dimensions of the World governance Indicators is Control of Corruption, the objective of this section of the chapter is to provide an overview of the legislative arrangements put in place, either through enactment or ratification, in individual Caribbean countries and regionally.

In examining the various pieces of anti-corruption legislation enacted and initiatives implemented over the years, this section highlights influences from the USA and UK. These influences are of particular importance as many CARICOM countries still adopt or mirror their legislation based on common law, anticorruption legislation instituted in the UK during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and initiatives from international organisations. These initiatives include the Inter-American Convention against

Corruption, the OECD Convention Against Bribery of Public Officials in International Business Transactions, (McKoy, 2012), and the Integrity in Public Life Act, a piece of legislation based one of the Commonwealth's fundamental principles of good governance.

Further, Mckoy (2012) submits anti-corruption legislation in the Commonwealth Caribbean can be broken down into three categories. First, there are territories including Belize and the Bahamas which have enacted legislation in regard to bribery and misconduct in public office. Second, is the replication of late nineteenth century and early twentieth century United Kingdom anti-corruption legislation, including the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889, which introduced corruption as a crime and outlawed the bribery of public officials. The Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 and the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916, both placed the presumption on the defendant, beyond reasonable doubt or on the balance of probability, whereby if any person, or agent of a person, holding or seeking to obtain a contract gives a gift to a public official, that gift shall be presumed to be corrupt unless the accused person can prove otherwise. Third, is a series of modern United Kingdom legislation adopted by CARICOM states over the last three decades. These include the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and Anti-Terrorism and Crime Act 2001, (influenced by the Inter American Convention against Corruption); and more recent UK anti-corruption legislation, the Bribery Act 2010, (a response to becoming a signatory to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation (OECD) Anti Bribery Convention. Whilst these pieces of legislation aim specifically at curbing corruption, some such as the Proceeds of Crime Act 2003 emerged from the prevalence of receipts from the drug trade.

With regards to USA anti-corruption legislation, this is less coherent than in the UK (Henning, 2001). However, a central piece of legislation is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977, a federal law that introduced two key offences, the first relating to accounting transparency requirements under the Securities Exchange Act 1934 and the second to the bribery of foreign officials.

UK and US anti-corruption legislation has had a direct impact on some CARICOM states such as Antigua, Barbuda and Jamaica which have repealed and replaced some of their earlier corruption legislation to align with current UK legislation.

In addition to anti-corruption legislation, there are several international anti-corruption conventions, which Commonwealth CARICOM states are either signatories to or have ratified.

The United Nations (2014) provides that on becoming a signatory to a convention the signatory is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval. However, it is important to note that the signatory is not bound by the convention. Therefore, until a signatory ratifies a convention there is no requirement placed upon them to take actions to implement the objectives of the convention or treaty. This may of course be understandable as corrupt officials are both resilient and adaptable in offsetting anti-corruption efforts and where there is little trust in the state these efforts, 'have little credibility.... And may appear to be – indeed may be – just another way for a political faction to gain or keep the upper hand'. Olen and Pana (2012).

An overview of key pieces of legislation and conventions of influence in Commonwealth CARICOM countries is illustrated below in Table 4 and an overview

of legislation enacted, ratified or signed by CARICOM countries is highlighted in Table 5. The information used to illustrate legislation enacted and conventions ratified was obtained from various sources including Commonwealth Caribbean States governments, Organisation of American States, UN websites and individual country websites.

Table 5.4: Key Legislation and Conventions

Legislation	Objectives
<p>Integrity in Public Life Act</p>	<p>The Integrity in Public Life Act was introduced in small Commonwealth countries following a request made by law ministers and various Attorney Generals in October 2007, from these countries to the Commonwealth Secretariat to develop a model code of conduct for public official.</p> <p>One of the main principles of the Integrity in Public Life Act is based on ‘good governance’, one of the Commonwealth’s fundamental values, <i>‘we reiterate our commitment to promote good governance through the rule of law, to ensure transparency and accountability and to root out, both at national and international levels, systemic and systematic corruption’</i></p> <p>The model Integrity in Public Life Act provides for Ministers and non – elected officials to abide by terms of the Code of Conduct and make written declarations of interest</p>
<p>The Prevention of Corruption Act</p>	<p>An Act to make provision for the protection practices by public offices in the performance of public functions, to give effect to the provisions of the OAS Inter – American Convention Against Corruption</p> <p>The overall aim is for countries to take a proactive approach establishing an Integrity Commission, and to ensure that public officials are held to account through having to declare their assets which includes property and monies held by officials both in and outside of their residing Caribbean country.</p>

<p>Inter American Convention against Corruption (ICaC)</p>	<p>ICaC adopted from the Organisation of American States (OAS) in 1996, was the first international anti-corruption treaty established to: set the legislative framework for the Americas to prevent and combat corruption and to provide for criminalisation of certain acts of corruption, a series of provisions to strengthen the co-operation between its State Parties in areas such as mutual legal assistance and technical co-operation, extradition and identification, or asset recovery. (OCED, 2014).</p> <p>ICaC sought to establish a uniform framework to defining acts of corruption (Article VI) and establish mechanisms to prevent further acts of corruption (Article III). In addition, the convention recognise state sovereignty and encourage governments to develop and enforce the necessary legislation to curb corruption (Article VII).</p>
<p>Inter American Convention against Corruption Follow Up Mechanism (MESICIC)</p>	<p>In 2002 ICaC established the Inter American Convention against Corruption follow up mechanism (MESICIC) to support State Parties implementation of the provisions of the Convention. This was achieved through MESICIC four main objectives which focussed on; promoting the implementation of the Convention, following up on the commitments assumed by the States Parties and analysing the manner in which they are being implemented; facilitating technical cooperation activities; the exchange of information, experiences and best practices; and the harmonisation of the legislation of the State Parties (OAS, 2011).</p> <p>The aim of MESICIC is for the reviews of both civil society and state party reports from each of the MESICIC territories to play a major role in eradicating corruption. A number of processes are available to support this including; reciprocal evaluation, providing appropriate feedback, and making necessary recommendations to State Parties.</p>
<p>United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCaC) 2005</p>	<p>Another Treaty of significance is UNCaC, which is an international treaty aspiring to universal participation that obliges signatory states to take a large variety of measures to fight corruption. The convention has a broader scope than ICaC as its focus is on both public and private sector</p>

	<p>corruption. Similar to ICaC, UNCaC sets a framework for state parties to curb corruption while respecting individual state sovereignty.</p> <p>It approaches corruption in four broad interlocking areas; preventative measures, the establishment of criminal offences, the encouragement of international cooperation and the recovery of assets. While ICaC uses a similar approach, it stops short of the recovery of assets or proceeds used or gained through corrupt acts. Signatories of the convention commit to prevent and criminalise corruption, to openly co-operate with one another in cases of cross border corruption activities and to return stolen assets to countries of origin (OECD, 2014).</p>
<p>Inter America Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (IACMACM) 1996</p>	<p>IACMACM was introduced to enable State Parties to work in collaboration and provide mutual assistance with each other in relation to criminal investigations, prosecutions and proceedings (Organisation of American States, undated).</p>

TABLE 5.5 - LEGISLATION, CONVENTIONS AND INITIATIVES IMPLEMENTED BY COMMONWEALTH CARICOM STATES

Key: ICaC = Inter American Convention against Corruption

MESICIC = Inter American Convention against Corruption – Follow up Mechanism

UNCaC= United Nations Conventions against Corruption

IACMACM = Inter American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters

FIU – Financial Intelligence Unit

IC – Integrity Commission

OBM – Office of the Ombudsman

OAU – Office of Auditor General

The information represents some of the key legislation and initiatives implemented, and is not a definitive exhaustive list.

Country/ Member State	ICaC	MESICIC	UNCAC	IACMACM	Integrity in Public Life	Proceeds of Crime	Prevention of Bribery/ Corruption	Money Laundering	OAU	FIU	OBM	IC
Antigua & Barbuda	2004	2010	2006	2014	2004	1993/2003	2004	1996/2008/ 2009/2010		✓	✓	✓
Bahamas	2000	2001	2008	2009		2000	2013		✓			
Barbados			2003 (sig only)						✓	✓	✓	
Belize	2002	2003					1994/2007	1996	✓	✓		
Dominica	2004		2010	2004	2003			2000		✓		✓
Grenada	2001	2002		2001	2007		2007			✓	✓	
Guyana	2000	2008	2008							✓	✓	
Jamaica	2001	2002	2008	2004			2000	1988/1999	✓			✓
St. Lucia	2003		2011					2010		✓	✓	

Country/ Member State	ICaC	MESICIC	UNCAC	IACMACM	Integrity in Public Life	Proceeds of Crime	Prevention of Bribery/ Corruption	Money Laundering	OAU	FIU	OMB	IC
St. Kitt's & Nevis	2001	2010				2000/2008		2000	✓	✓	✓	
St. Vincent	2001	2002				2001			✓	✓	✓	
Suriname	1996	2002		2008								
Trinidad & Tobago	1998	2001	2006	2004	2000	2014	1987/2001		✓			✓

What we see from both Tables 4 and 5 above, is that most of the legislation originates outside of the Caribbean, with influence from international organisations such as the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the UN. Legislation in the 1980s and 1990s consisted mainly of Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Acts, with the Bahamas enacting The Prevention of Bribery Act in 1976. At the turn of this century there was a focus on Integrity in Public Life and Money Laundering; with Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada alongside others enacting Integrity in Public Life and Money Laundering legislation.

From Table 5 we see that Barbados has been slow in implementing anti-corruption legislation. There remains the Prevention of Corruption Bill 1929 drafted during colonisation, and revised in 2012 to mirror the UN Convention against Corruption of which Barbados is a signatory. However, there is no modern-day anti-corruption legislation on statute. This has resulted in the government of Barbados being challenged to enact the legislation by Integrity Group Barbados, 'We are calling on the government of Barbados to have the Prevention of Corruption Act that they passed proclaimed by the Governor General...'. (Caribbean Life, 2017). Worth noting here is that although Barbados has implemented the least anti-corruption legislation they are perceived by TI as being the least corrupt of the Caribbean countries. (See Table 1 – chapter 1).

Of further, significance is that none of the main pieces of legislation have been driven by the Caribbean as a region, a similar position to that discussed earlier in the chapter in relation to the governance indicators. Therefore, what we have seen is CARICOM

countries adopting anti-corruption legislation and ratifying conventions over the years deriving from outside the region, with limited impact.

Once again path dependence is relevant here. The legacy of the inequality of exploitative colonialism and slavery has stalled Caribbean micro states in developing political systems capable of delivering equitable self-government. With no tradition of self-government or the institutions to enable this, neo-colonialism partners with clientelism, to maintain the profits of inequality.

So, it may not be cynical to suggest that adopting anti-corruption legislation may be closing the stable door after the horse has bolted. This problem is compounded by CARICOM's adoption of anti-corruption legislation and ratified conventions framed by outsiders with little understanding of the dynamics of Caribbean corruption.

In illustrating this point further, we see the response to date of CARICOM states in addressing corruption has been mainly through the legislative route, predominantly influenced by UK legislation and international organisations as discussed above, with all CARICOM states enacting anti-corruption laws over the past thirty years, as highlighted in Table 5 above.

What we see is that International and regional anti-corruption conventions have been influential across CARICOM states. On ratifying the UNCaC members are expected to take pro-active steps to enact legislation in line with the principles of the conventions and develop and implement anti-corruption initiatives. For most CARICOM states this has resulted in introducing further legislation to strengthen existing laws and

developing new initiatives including: the Financial Intelligence Unit in Dominica and the Auditor General Office in Jamaica. Further details of some of the initiatives introduced over the years are illustrated in Table 5

While Table 5 is not an exhaustive list of anti-corruption legislation and initiatives introduced across CARICOM, it aims to illustrate the raft of legislation enacted in the region and the initiatives developed to address corruption in the region. Generally, legislation is enacted to prevent, reduce or stop specific actions or behaviours. Anyone found to be breaking the law should expect to be prosecuted, irrespective of their position within society. The scope and remit of many of these anti-corruption agencies are broad and supposed to enable them to assist in the detection and successful prosecutions of those who enter into alleged corrupt activities. However, although Caribbean countries have been successful in enacting anti-corruption legislation, overall that success has not been replicated in prosecutions, as evidenced in Chapter Six Case Studies.

5.6 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to provide an overview of the good governance arrangements and legislation available for addressing corruption in the Caribbean. The various definitions of good governance cited above all derive from the First World and fail to factor in historical, social and cultural factors in a country or indeed region.

Examining the various tools available for assessing good governance performance, the World Governance Indicator was found deficient for Caribbean purposes due to the majority of the data source organisations' First World positioning and the failure to

factor in some of the critical historical, social, cultural and economic trajectory of Caribbean countries. It is not possible to meaningfully assess these said countries' good governance performance by adopting an arm's length or universal approach. In order to do this meaningfully it is important to factor in path dependency and accept that empirically the Caribbean's colonial history has and continues to have a negative economic impact on these countries in modern times, especially in relation to globalisation.

History also provides an essential analytical tool for examining CARICOM's shortcomings in regard to implementing good governance. The absence of regional governance systems and a tradition of inter-island antipathy are both direct legacies of colonialism; together they have compromised this regional body since inception. Attempting to implement good governance arrangements using the WGI's universal approach has proved inappropriate, as we see CARICOM has not implemented any significant good governance arrangements to date.

The same problem of relying on inappropriate external sources applies to anti-corruption legislation and initiatives adopted over the last thirty years. The majority of legislation derives from international conventions, UK and or USA, with Caribbean countries taking a mirror image approach and replicating legislation. Yet despite the enactment of legislation Caribbean countries, with the exception of Barbados, do not appear to be making a progress in relation to their positioning on the TI Corruption Index. In exploring this further, chapter 6 turns to examining how five Eastern

Caribbean countries have individually responded to implementation of good governance and enactment of legislation.

In conclusion two fundamental issues emerge from reviewing good governance and anti-corruption initiatives in the Caribbean. First, that historical conditions have dictated a lack of any tradition of regional integration or political systems capable of delivering good governance or effectively implementing anti-corruption initiatives. There is a strong element of 'mamaguy', or trickery and ticking the required boxes, in Caribbean governments' response to international initiatives. This is largely aimed at meeting external expectations and requirements with a view to accessing funding. Secondly, we note a pattern of reliance on organisations and agencies outside the region, mostly from the First World, to address regional-specific challenges, whether in actually measuring perceptions of corruption or the measures to control it. Neither the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court nor judiciaries in individual territories have enacted anti-corruption legislation. So far, the Caribbean has not seen fit either to effectively address colonial legacies or take the initiative in developing its own solutions.

CHAPTER SIX

Case Study – One: Analysing Governance Arrangements – Freedom of Speech & Press and Elections

‘When corruption is the priority, honesty becomes evil’.

— Kangoma Kindembo

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter focused on governance arrangements and anti-corruption legislation that has been implemented to date with a view to addressing corruption in the Caribbean. This is the first of two chapters which extends the analysis in Chapter Five by using case studies of five Eastern Caribbean countries: Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Vincent and St. Kitt’s to illustrate how they have responded to the governance agendas and the pressures to enact legislation and conventions previously outlined. Moreover, and of greater significance to the thesis overall, it analyses what impact, if any, the adoption of World Governance Indicators and other measures has had in addressing corruption. As such, the case studies will help determine whether the adoption of World Governance Indicators (WGI) and other measures has had any meaningful impact. As a result, this chapter, being the first of two case study chapters, will assist in further testing my hypothesis of whether corruption in the Caribbean is culturally tolerated.

The case studies involved examining a range of sources. According to Graycar et al (2013, 35) there are three generations of tools available for measuring corruption. First generation corruption measurement tools are ‘awareness-raising activities that in some cases guide policy makers, investors and donors’ including: the World Governance Indicators and Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Second generation tools are those which ‘sought to benchmark progress over

time and to examine experiences of people exposed to corruption, and also to measure how systems set the processes to minimize corruption'. Third generation tools are used, 'where components are identified, broken down and then re-aggregated to give a bigger picture' (Graycar et al, 2013 p.35), including the United Nations Convention against Corruption. For this case study, a combination of first, second and third generation tools were drawn on, including the Electoral Integrity Index, reports of electoral observer missions, BBC Monitoring and media reports.

The emphasis of the case studies in this chapter is on the Voice and Accountability dimension of the World Governance Indicators (WGI). The case studies rely heavily on secondary reporting since there is limited primary data available to evidence the level and impact of corruption in any country. This lack of primary data is due not only to the fact that corruption is, inevitably, kept hidden by the perpetrators, but also compounded by the fact that there have been limited efforts by official bodies to document the extent of alleged or proven corruption (Cheeseman et el, 2018).

The Voice and Accountability cluster focused on three areas as illustrated in Table 6.1 below:

Table 6.1

Clusters for the WGI used for case studies

WGI	Cluster
<p style="text-align: center;">Voice and Accountability</p>	<p>Free speech of citizens</p> <p>Freedom of the press</p> <p>Open fair and balanced elections</p>

The case studies adopt a comparative method, enabling each dimension to be examined across the five Eastern Caribbean countries. This approach also provided for triangulation, as the diverse range of sources used, allied with the other methods of research deployed in this thesis, assisted in assuring the validity of the findings.

This first case study chapter commences by providing an overview of the WGI scores and rankings given to the case study countries over a period of time. The objective here is to contextualize countries' WGI positions. The second section of the chapter turns to examining the Voice and Accountability dimension of the WGI, whereby several data sets are analysed to assist in illustrating the position in the case study countries with regard to: freedom of speech, freedom of the press and open, fair and balanced elections. This is achieved firstly by analysing the data from the WGI with regard to Voice and Accountability with emphasis on the rankings awarded to the five case study countries, plus the number of and actual data sources used. Further analysis is then undertaken by examining data from the Freedom House Index and Electoral Integrity Project. In this section reference is also made to the CARICOM Electoral Observer Mission¹ along with Organisation of American States Electoral Observation². The final element of this section focuses on undertaking a detailed analysis of media reports of relevance during a defined period, to determine whether the reports correlate with some of the data findings in the section.

¹ Representatives from CARICOM member states who observe elections across the CARICOM region

² Electoral Observation Missions (EOMs) are a technical and political cooperation tool that the Organization of American States (OAS) utilizes to help strengthen the hemisphere's electoral processes, while enhancing professional and technical capacities within the organization.

The focus in this chapter is therefore on the extent to which the range of available sources, compiled by academic experts, election observers, NGOs, international organisations and journalists, indicate that the five case study countries are following liberal democratic norms. While the chapter demonstrates that, almost universally, the five countries are held to be adhering to international democratic standards, it also highlights several problematic issues underlying these findings. Firstly, in a global context there is a clear discrepancy in the number of sources used to evaluate the case study countries and much larger countries which also meet international democratic standards. Secondly, the WGI Voice & Accountability scores and rankings demonstrate the need for a far more nuanced understanding of the intricacies of Caribbean variants of liberal democracy, if for example Dominica can score 93 out of a possible 100, while Austria also scores 93 and the UK 94. As will become clear in the following chapter, the same conclusion cannot be reached with regard to their performance in preventing corruption. As such, a clear tension emerges with respect to the widespread assumption that corruption is best tackled through the promotion and monitoring of liberal democratic norms. This apparent contradiction highlights the need for a far more nuanced understanding of the intricacies of Caribbean variants of liberal democracy and provides further evidence of the flawed assumptions underpinning anti-corruption initiatives designed by organisation situated outside of the Caribbean basin.

6.2 Overview of WGI – Case Study Countries

Before proceeding further, it is important to give an overview of the WGI and how each

country is assessed³. The WGI are based on the aggregate and individual governance indicators for over 200 countries across six dimensions. All countries are ranked from 0 to 100, (with 100 being a high rank and therefore representing a highly positive assessment, whilst 0 is a low rank and deemed very poor), and then all countries are placed in percentiles based on their rank.

In examining the WGI Voice and Accountability data we see that all the case studies countries have been included in this dimension since 1996. In the following review each country's highest and lowest percentiles are presented: Antigua & Barbuda: 68.97 - 2018, 58.21 - 2002/2003. Dominica: 83.08-2002, 75.37 – 2016/17. Grenada: 73.40 – 2014, 64.42 – 2005. St Kitts & Nevis: 86.70 – 2014, 70.19 – 2004. St Vincent: 87.50 – 2007, 62.04 – 20004 (See Figure 6.1 for further details).

What is evident from this data is that the case study countries are generally in the two top quartiles, which would suggest according to the WGI, they are perceived as implementing good governance arrangements.

In addition to the scores it is also important to examine the number of data sets and actual data sets used during the period 2008, 2012, 2018 (see Table 6.2). Here for each of the three years 2008, 2013 and 2018 Dominica was assessed on four data sources, whilst the other case study countries were assessed on three data sources. In 2018 the case study countries were assessed on two or three data sources only, a

³ **The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project** reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for over 200 countries and territories over the period 1996–2019, for six dimensions of governance: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness, Control of Corruption. These aggregate indicators combine the views of a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. They are based on over 30 individual data sources produced by a variety of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms. <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/>

considerable shortfall when compared with other countries like Australia, United Kingdom and the United States of America which were assessed on 11 and 12 data sources. In terms of empirical evidence, I argue rankings based on so few sources are questionable, undermining the credibility of WGI assessments for the case study countries.

This demonstrates that there are clearly inconsistencies with the data used to assess each country, as at times in the same year we see that some countries are assessed on more data sources than others. This may be due to the fact that the case study countries have small populations, mostly under 100,000. This, in itself, is arguably a shortcoming of the WGI which warrants highlighting further at this point. The data sources used to compile the WGI are used across all countries irrespective of size. For example, Global Insight and Freedom House are two data sources used to assess large countries such as Australia, Spain, the United States and United Kingdom, as well as small countries such as the five case study countries. This could mean that consideration is not given to some countries against a particular data source which potentially means that the data does not reflect the true picture in specific countries. Further as some countries are given an aggregate score based on the number of data sources, there is risk that assessing a rank on two as opposed to four data sources obscures the data and for small states could mean the results are far less robust. (See Table 6.3 for further details).

Figure 6.1: Voice and Accountability: Percentile Rank, Eastern Caribbean, 1996-2018
 (Source: World Governance Indicators)




Table 6.2: Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI): Score Data Sources 2008 | 2013 | 2018

Country	Year	Sources	<i>Cingranelli-Richards</i>	Freedom House	HIS Markit World Economic Service	World Justice Project	<i>IFAD's Rural Sector Performance Assessment</i>
<u>Antigua & Barbuda</u>	2008	3	•	•	•		
	2013	3	•	•	•		
	2018	2		•		•	
Dominica	2008	3	•	•	•		
	2013	3	•	•	•		
	2018	2		•		•	
Grenada	2008	4	•	•	•		•
	2013	4	•	•	•		•
	2018	3		•		•	•
St. Vincent & The Grenadines	2008	3	•	•	•		
	2013	3	•	•	•		
	2018	3		•		•	
St. Kitts	2008	3	•	•	•		
	2013	3	•	•	•		
	2018	2		•		•	

6.2.1 Overview of Data

The first dimension of the World Governance Indicators, Voice and Accountability, captures and monitors the extent to which citizens in any country are able to engage in ‘freedom of speech’ in a context in which ‘freedom of the press’ and ‘fair and balanced elections’ are guaranteed. In order to analyse data across these three elements, more detailed analysis was undertaken of the Freedom House⁴ data across the five case study countries.

Freedom House have compiled its index for last four years 2017 to 2020. The Index puts countries into 3 categories: Free, Partially Free and Not Free. These categories are assigned on the basis of a Civil Liberties Score out of 60 and a Political Rights Score out of 40, giving a maximum possible score of 100. To qualify as ‘Free’, a country needs a combined Civil Liberties and Political Rights score over 60.

Each of the case study countries included in the Freedom House index 2017 -2020 scored high in both Civil Liberties and Political Rights, resulting in high positions in the ‘Free’ category (see Figures 6.2 and 6.3 below). Dominica consistently scored over 90, with its highest score of 95 in 2017, and scores of 93 from 2018 to 2020 whilst the country with the lowest score was Antigua with scores in the lower to middle 80s.

⁴ The scores are assigned each year through evaluation by a team of in-house and external analysts and expert advisers from the academic, think tank, and human rights communities. The 2014 edition involved more than 60 analysts and nearly 30 advisers. The country analysts, who prepare the draft reports and scores, use a broad range of sources, including news articles, academic analyses, reports from nongovernmental organizations, and individual professional contacts. The analysts score countries based on the conditions and events within its borders during the coverage period. They are guided by the main 25 questions, as well as supplemental questions designed to provide more detail on the types of issues covered under each indicator. The analyst’s proposed scores are discussed and defended at annual review meetings, organized by region and attended by Freedom House staff and a panel of the expert advisers. The final scores represent the consensus of the analysts, advisers, and staff, and are intended to be comparable from year to year and across countries and regions. The advisers also provide a detailed review of and commentary on a number of key country reports.” <https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%20Methodology%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf>

Dominica's highest score of 95 actually placed it within 5 points of the highest scored countries Sweden, Norway and Finland and on par with or within one to two points of Austria (93), Germany (94), UK (94) and just below Switzerland and Portugal (both 96) Each of the countries was assessed as being 'free' overall.

All five countries are therefore comfortably within the Freedom House thresholds for being 'free'. However, there are distinctions between them. Dominica (37/40; 56/60), St Kitts (36/40; 53/60) and St Vincent and the Grenadines (36/40; 55/60) are all in the top quadrant where the 'mature democracies' are typically found. Their scores are better than some EU countries. Grenada (37/40, 52/60) scores slightly lower on civil liberties, but is only in the next quadrant down by one point (52 rather than 53+). Antigua and Barbuda (33/40; 52/60) scores slightly lower than the others on both, but most notably on political rights (33), whereas the others all have 36/40 or 37/40). It is also only 1 point short of the top bracket on civil liberties, with 52, like Grenada. Even so, none of the five case study countries are out of line with many advanced western democracies. For instance, Italy scores 36-53, France 38-52, Spain 38-54, and USA 33-53.

However, in order to determine whether the data here is helpful, it is important is to look at how the case study countries' scores compared to some of the larger countries in the world. When examining this further we see a total of 83 countries have been assessed as being 'free'. These include: UK (94), Germany (94), Switzerland (96), Dominica (93), Austria (93) and Portugal (96) who all are score in the middle to high 90's and positioned at the top, with very little distinguishing them. The scores suggest that each of these countries have essentially the same levels of freedom and democracy. The question therefore is how can the same criteria be applied to the

larger countries, as it is for some of the smaller countries including the case study countries, to determine whether these countries assessment in relation to freedom of speech, press freedom, and freedom of elections?

The data from Freedom House is assessed further by looking more closely at the scores given to each of the countries in relation to political rights and civil liberties (see Table 6.3 below). These two elements are of significance as they deal specifically with free and fair elections and freedom of speech. The political rights element consists of three questions and civil liberties consist of four questions as follows:

Political Rights – Electoral process Questions:

1. Was the current head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections?
2. Were the current national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?
3. Are the electoral laws and framework fair, and are they implemented impartially by the relevant election management bodies?

Civil Liberties:

1. Are there free and independent media?
2. Are individuals free to practice and express their religious faith or non-belief in public and private?
3. Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free from extensive political indoctrination?
4. Are individuals free to express their personal views on political or other sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution?

From the Freedom House political rights scores, we see that the case study countries receive scores for this component of between 3 and 4 over the last four years. This indicates that each of the five case study countries is held to have free and fair elections.

From the Freedom House data we see each of the case study countries received scores of 3 and 4 for Political Rights – Electoral Process, which suggest that the electoral process is generally free and fair. This corresponds closely with the findings from the reports of various electoral observers overseeing the electoral process in each case study country over the last 10 years, discussed later in the chapter. Here we see that although observers found concerns pertaining to the elections, from observing the process mainly on election day, the elections were declared as being ‘free and fair’. However, what is not clear from the Freedom House data is whether any consideration is given to the longer-term operation of electoral processes and procedures in the case study in the periods between elections. This is a significant factor as the data from the various electoral observers reports, as discussed later in this chapter, suggest that the interference with the election procedure and process happens well before election day and thus it might be premature to base the outcome of elections purely on what happens on election day.

The above is supported by Cheeseman et al (2018) who argues that election vote rigging takes place months before election day resulting in observers viewing issues differently,

...Effective rigging ensures that you win and that you get away with it without losing legitimacy. Such tactics include manipulating the electoral register, blocking certain candidates from running in elections, and playing

with electoral boundaries to maximize partisan gains. What all of these tactics have in common is that they can be deployed months in advance of an election when observers are likely to be thin on the ground, and they can be presented as technical or legal decisions as opposed to political skullduggery (Cheeseman et al, 2018: 33).


6.2.2 – Freedom of Speech

In looking more closely at the Freedom House data for Freedom of Speech from Table 6.4 we see that all the case study countries have received scores of three and four out of four. Notably, each of the countries under consideration consistently scores four out of four on the final dimension of civil liberties: “Are individuals free to express their personal views on political or other sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution?” However, what is also interesting to note in relation to the civil liberties scores is that, over the four-year period of the index, the scores awarded to each country, have remained the same for each year, as illustrated with Antigua & Barbuda awarded scores of 3 for question 1, and 4 for questions 2 to 4 from 2018 to 2020. Similarly, St. Vincent was awarded scores of 3 for question 1, and 4 for questions 2 to 4 from 2018 to 2020. The Freedom House Index provides general information, with the data suggesting that, across the case study countries, there are generally no major issues pertaining to freedom of speech, as would be expected in liberal democratic countries.

Table 6.3 Freedom House Data


Country	Year	Overall Results (from 100)	Political Rights (out of 40)	Civil Lib (out of 60)
Antigua	2017	83	33	50
	2018	83	33	50
	2019	84	33	51
	2020	85	33	52
Dominica	2017	95	38	57
	2018	93	37	56
	2019	93	37	56
	2020	93	37	56
Grenada	2017	89	38	51
	2018	88	37	51
	2019	89	37	52
	2020	89	37	52
St. Christopher & Nevis	2017	89	36	53
	2018	88	36	53
	2019	89	36	53
	2020	89	36	53
St. Vincent & The Grenadines	2017	91	37	54
	2018	90	36	54
	2019	91	36	55
	2020	91	36	55

Figure 6.2: Political Rights Scores



Source: Freedom House Index

Figure 6.3: Civil Liberties Scores



Source: Freedom House Index

In order to validate the FH data presented, an analysis of media reports pertaining to freedom of speech in the respective case study countries was conducted.

In order to undertake a detailed analysis using a robust and systematic research approach it was decided to access BBC Monitoring⁵ to undertake a themed search over the period 1999 to 2020. The searches undertaken were related to Freedom of Speech and Censorship for each country i.e. using Boolean operators such as “Freedom of Speech AND Antigua” and “Censorship AND Antigua”. The search results for Freedom of Speech identified no relevant reports. The censorship search resulted in a small number of reports being produced for each country, however none of the reports were deemed to be relevant to the issue of censorship.

6.2.3 Freedom of Press

The second element of Voice and Accountability is Press Freedom. In order to examine the scores awarded to the case study countries an analysis is required of the civil liberties cluster which deals with press freedom. (See Figures 6.3 above).

Looking at the scores over the four year period 2017 to 2020, the five case study countries have all been awarded scores of 3 out of 4 in relation to free and independent media, as reflected in Freedom House – civil liberties cluster under question 1, as illustrated above.

In order to validate the Freedom House civil liberties cluster conclusions it was decided to examine the World Press Index to ascertain whether its assessment and scores of

⁵ Experienced regional team tracks, translate and analyse local sources to make sense of what is happening on the ground, particularly in parts of the world where reliable news and information is in short supply.

the case study countries had any similarity to Freedom House. A relevant factor in choosing the World Press Index is that it is not one of the WGI data sources and thus offers a further cross reference perspective.

Reporters Without Borders compiles the World Press Freedom Index , an annual index measuring the freedom of journalists across 180 countries. The index is assessed through pooling the responses of experts to questionnaires devised by the organization across seven categories: pluralism, media independence, environment and self-censorship, legislative framework, transparency, infrastructure and abuses. The Eastern Caribbean countries are assessed as one cluster under Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), as opposed to an assessment of each country individually. Although clustered into one grouping, the data from the OECS will assist in verifying whether there are any patterns or trends similar to those observed in the Freedom House press freedom data.

The OECS index scores countries from 0 to 100, with 0 being the highest and 100 the lowest, and gives a global rank. Over the last five years the scores and ranking awarded to the OECS cluster were: 2016 – 18.9/30, 2017 – 22.10/38, 2018 – 22.11/35, 2019 – 26.04/50, 2020 – 23.78/44 (see Table 6.4). As such, in this period, the OECS Caribbean countries' ranking trended downward with their scores continuously dropping from 2016 to 2019, with a slight uptake in 2020. (World Press Freedom Index, 2020), albeit being ranked in the top quartile for the all the years, excluding 2019 where the ranking placed the them in the second quartile. From these scores we can observe that they are generally consistent with the Freedom House scores of 3 or 4 and place these countries in a similar position globally in terms of their rankings. From the RWB data we can see there has been some deterioration in recent years, as illustrated from

the 2016 score of 18.9 and rank of 30 out of 180 respectively, to the 2020 score of 23.78 and rank of 44 out of 180 respectively. With the reduction in scores what needs to be determined is whether one or more of the issues relating to press freedom in the OECS countries are having a negative impact resulting in the lower scores more recently. This is discussed later in the chapter through case study reports.

Table 6.4: Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) Score and Global Ranking - World Press Freedom Index

Year	Score	Global Rank
2016	18.91	30/180
2017	22.10	38/180
2018	22.11	35/180
2019	26.04	50/180
2020	23.78	44/180

Source: Reporters Without Borders <https://rsf.org/en>

In 2019 RWF reported that journalism across the OECS was not valued, lacked financial and human resources, and was influenced by political interference. Journalism is not a prestige profession in the countries that are members of the Organization of East Caribbean States. Journalists receive little training and often abandon media work because it is so badly paid, an issue that particularly affects female journalists in the region. Many media outlets are under the direct

influence of politicians, especially during elections, because officials can withdraw state advertising at any time and deprive them of income they depend on. In some of the Islands, political parties even own or have major shares in media companies, compromising journalistic independence.....In 2018, reports of editorial censorship by the general manager of the Grenada Broadcasting Network brought into question the journalistic independence enjoyed by reporters working for Grenada's largest media network (Reporters without Borders, 2020).

The above statement suggests there are significant issues in some Caribbean countries in relation to freedom of the press. The fact that it was made by a source outside the region, with a global reputation for impartiality and extensive international coverage, renders it even more compelling. Consequently, further examination of media reports on the case study countries will assist in ascertaining what if any issues and concerns have been reported in relation to the case study countries.

6.2.4 – Press Freedom – BBC Monitoring Reports

In order to try to cross-check RWF findings as illustrated in Table 6.4 above, a search was undertaken to ascertain whether the reports from BBC monitoring could provide validation of the scores recorded in both Freedom House and Reporters Without Borders data, and to further identify what concerns, if any, had been reported in relation to Press Freedom over a 20-year period.

Using BBC Monitoring, searches were undertaken for each of the case study countries as follows:

Press freedom AND Antigua & Barbuda

Press freedom AND Dominica

Press freedom AND Grenada

Press freedom AND St. Kitts & Nevis

Press freedom AND St. Vincent & the Grenadines

After full search results were obtained for each case study country, an analysis was undertaken to identify the reports of relevance from the period 1999 to 2020. In order to manage the data, the 20-year period was divided into four periods: 1999–2005, 2006–2010, 2011–2015, 2016–2020 (see Table 6.5 below). The reports of relevance were clustered into the following themes as follows:

- Defamation/Libel/Legislation (DLL)
- Freedom of Press/Expression and Interference, (FEI)
- Censorship and Boycott, (CB)
- Denied Access to Country/Broadcasting/Deportation, (DBD)
- Protest (P)
- Education & Training (ET)
- Accusations/Prosecutions (AP)
- Crimes against Journalists (CAJ)

A summary of the reports and their relevance to the themes are set out in Table 6.5 below. Each report was graded either high, medium or low. The grade was applied based on the severity or concern of the report, thus if the report was serious in nature, e.g., murder of a journalist, this was graded high and commitment to education and

training was graded low. An overview of the reports identified is discussed below.

Antigua & Barbuda

The search revealed 81 entries relating to press freedom for the period 21/9/1999 to 1/7/20, of which 12 reports were relevant to one or more of the themed clusters. No reports were identified for the period 2015 to 2020. For 2000 to 2005 the reports were relevant to three themes. Three reports were relevant to DLL with two of these related to the government proposal to enact legislation to curtail freedom of the press in its reporting and therefore viewed as issues of high concern. In addition, there was one report relevant to education and training which was viewed as low.

For 2006 to 2010 there were four themes which reports related to. DLL had two off which one was viewed as low and one medium. One report related to a journalist being denied access to the country and viewed as a high concern, whilst the other report related to accusations against freedom of speech, viewed as medium.

Defamation, libel and legislation had three reports for 2011 to 2015, all viewed as medium. Freedom of Press/Expression/Interference had one report viewed as medium. (See Appendix D Table 1 for further analysis).

Table 6.5: Case Study Countries – Press Freedom -2000-2020

Key	
● (Red)	High
● (Amber)	Medium
● (Green)	Low

CONCERN	Defamation Libel Legislation	Freedom of Press/ Expression/ Interference	Censorship Boycott	Denied Access to country/ Broadcasting/ Intimidation	Protest	Education Training	Accusations/ Prosecution/ Deportation	Crime against journalist
Antigua								
2000-2005	●● ●					●		
2006 - 2010	● ●			●			●	
2011- 2015	●●●	●						
2015 - 2020								
Dominica								

2000 - 2005	●		●					
2006 - 2010		● ●					● ●	●
2011 - 2015								
2016 - 2020	●							
Grenada								
2000 - 2005	● ●	● ●	●	●●●●			●●	
2006 - 2010	●●	●●		●●●●		●	● ●	
2011 - 2015	●●	● ●●●●●						
2016 - 2020								

Dominica

Dominica had eight reports of relevance from a total of 66 entries. Reports for the period 2000 to 2005 revealed one reference to the Defamation, Libel and legislation cluster and one for the Censorship and Boycott cluster which were both coded low. For the period 2006 to 2010 two reports had relevance to Freedom of Press, Expression and Interference with one coded low and the other a medium issue. There were also two reports related to Accusations, Prosecutions and Deportations, of which one was coded as medium and the other high as it related to the government deportation of a journalist. In the same period one report related to the murder of journalist and as a result coded high. There was one low coded report for Defamation in 2016-20. (See Appendix D Table 2 for further analysis).

Grenada

The search for Grenada revealed the most reports with 22 from a total of 90 entries. Ten reports were identified for the period 2000 to 2005, from these six were coded as high. One related to freedom of press, expression and interference, four in relation to journalists being denied access or intimidated by government officials, and two related to journalists being deported. In addition, there were two reports which had medium reporting issues, one for freedom of press the other for censorship and boycott. For this period one report was coded low relating to defamation and libel.

For the period 2006 to 2010 there were four high coded reports for Denied Access, Broadcasting intimidation and one high coded report for Deportation. There were two medium coded reports for both Defamation, libel and legislation and Freedom of the

Press and one low coded report which related to government suggestions for training journalists.

There were six relevant reports for the period 2011 to 2015 relevant to Freedom of Press, Expression, and Interference, two reports relating to Defamation, Libel and Legislation, and one for Education and Training. All the reports were coded medium, except for one report relating to freedom of press which was coded high. (See Appendix D – Table 3).

St. Kitts & Nevis and St. Vincent & the Grenadines (SVG)

Of interest is that there were no reports of relevance for both St. Kitts and St. Vincent, possibly due to small population and size coupled with the lack of media outlets in both these countries over the years.

6.2.5 Overview of Press Freedom Data

From the BBC monitoring reports it emerges that there were significantly more for Grenada – 21, followed by Antigua with 12 and Dominica with 8. The most serious report was for the murder of a journalist in Antigua during the 2006-2010 period. Another observed pattern in the data reports is the reduction in all cases during the most recent period 2016-2020.

In relation to the RWB statement in regard to the Caribbean islands, what we see from the analysis of the reports is that there are clearly some issues and concerns in relation to press freedom. However, it appears from the reports that these issues are more prevalent in Grenada and Antigua & Barbuda than in the other case study countries. Nonetheless, overall the analysis of BBC monitoring reports implies that there are no major issues in the case study countries suggesting that freedom of speech or press

freedom have been jeopardized or under threat. These findings therefore provide further grounds to support the designation of each of the case study countries as liberal democracies in which such freedoms are largely guaranteed and protected.

6.3.4 Free and Fair Elections

The second theme examined under Voice and Accountability was free and fair elections. Several relevant data sources were accessed: Freedom House, the Electoral Integrity Index, CARICOM Electoral Observer Missions and Organisation of American States Electoral Observation Missions. From these sources only the Freedom House data is a World Governance Indicator source. The other sources therefore provide a means of undertaking independent cross-verification of the WGI assessments, since they all comprise data pertaining to elections.

Commencing by looking closely at the Freedom House – Political Rights and Electoral Process data we see that this cluster contains three questions as follows:

1. Was the current head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections?
2. Were the national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?
3. Are the electoral laws and framework fair, and are they implemented impartially by the relevant election management bodies?

The scores awarded to the case study countries have remained the same throughout the three years 2018 to 2020. In illustrating the above further we see that Antigua and Dominica were awarded 4 for each of the three questions for each year

respectively, whilst Grenada, St. Kitts and St. Vincent were awarded 4 for questions 1 and 2, and 3 for question 3 (See Figures 6.2 and 6.3).

Overall, the Freedom House data indicates elections are free and fair in the case study countries. However, it is important to determine whether the Freedom House data provide an accurate assessment of the situation pertaining to free and fair elections across the case study countries. The following sections therefore examine whether the Freedom House conclusions are replicated across the other relevant data sources.

The first additional sources examined was data compiled by The Electoral Integrity Project (EIP).⁶ The EIP datasets is 'drawn from a rolling survey of 3,861 expert assessments of electoral integrity across 337 elections in 166 countries around the world' (Electoral Integrity Project: 2019: 4). Only two of the case study countries, Antigua & Barbuda, and Grenada, are included in this dataset. Antigua and Barbuda have a total electoral score of 48 and Grenada 56 out of 100.

The highest score across the dimensions awarded to Antigua and Barbuda was 4.0 (out of 5 with 1 being the lowest and 5 the highest) for both the 'campaign media did not spread hate speech' and 'Cyberattacks on official voting records did not occur during the election', dimension. Whilst Antigua received 2.0 for the 'foreign interest

⁶ The **Electoral Integrity Project** is an academic project based at [Harvard University](#) and the [University of Sydney](#) which seeks to quantify the [integrity of elections](#) worldwide. The project freely publishes its Perceptions of Electoral Integrity dataset for scholarly use.

did not interfere in the campaign’, ‘campaign news generally reflected a diversity of views and interests’ and ‘journalists were often not partisan in their campaigning reporting’, it was awarded its lowest score, of 1.0, for ‘campaign media allowed informed voting choices’.

Grenada’s scores were slightly better, with the highest score awarded being 4.0 for ‘Cyberattacks on official voting records did not occur during the election’, followed by a score of 3.6 for ‘campaign media did not spread hate speech’. Whilst the two lowest scores received were 2.3 for ‘journalists were often not highly partisan in their campaign reporting’, and 2.8 for ‘foreign interest did not interfere in the campaign’.

These assessment scores indicate there are some concerns relating to the manner in which elections are conducted in both Grenada and Antigua. The data suggest that when looking at elections in these two countries there are critical issues of concern which have an impact on the manner in which elections are conducted. Their global rankings from the FH data tend to suggest these concerns do not critically affect their status as holding free and fair elections.

As the EIP data suggests concerns pertaining to free elections in at least two of the case study countries; detailed scrutiny of each case study country’s election observation reports from the CARICOM and/or OAS electoral observation missions was undertaken. The objective here is to ascertain whether the findings from the EIP data are reflected in any of the case study countries. While election observer commissions regularly highlight minor concerns regarding the conduct of elections in countries across the world the aim here is to identify whether any irregularities identified could have an impact on the overall outcome of elections.

Antigua & Barbuda

The last election in Antigua and Barbuda in 2018 was declared free and fair by the CARICOM Election Observer Mission who concluded 'while there were issues related to the electoral process for which recommendations will be made, the voters were able to cast their ballots without intimidation or harassment and the results of the Elections reflect the will of the people of Antigua and Barbuda'. (CARICOM - Election Observation Mission, 2018:2).

These issues and concerns raised by the mission include; the Constituencies Boundaries Commission failing to propose amendment to the constituencies, given that since 1984 there have been significant population growth and natural shift in demographics, resulting in large disparity in voter population. In addition, there were concerns raised pertaining to their being no polling facilities in Barbuda resulting in individuals residing in Barbuda having to travel to Antigua to cast their vote. (Commonwealth Observer Group, 2018).

Dominica

Although the OAS observers overseeing the Dominican 2019 elections had some reservations pertaining to the lack of electoral reform coupled with the government's failure to issue voters with identification cards; overall they had no major reservation with the manner in which the elections were conducted, and therefore congratulated the government on its newly elected term in office. In its preliminary report the OAS made a number of recommendations for consideration by the Skerritt government. These included: issuing of ID cards to voters; amending legislation to authorize the Electoral Commission to collect and use voters' biometric data; establishing

permanent, physical locations for Returning Officers at constituency level and the introduction of an electronic system, which collects, processes, tabulates and transmits results to the central electoral office (OAS, 2019).

It remains to be seen whether these 2019 recommendations receive any more attention than those of the OAS report conducted after the 2014 Dominican elections, when a number of concerns were voiced. These included: the fact the electoral voters registration list register consisted of more names than the population of Dominica; that a voter identification system had not been implemented; concerns about travel assistance being provided to Dominicans living abroad to return to vote and the cost of the election campaign, with state resources being used to fund the government's campaign, which led to suggestions of an 'uneven playing field' among opposition parties. (OAS, 2014).

Grenada

With regards to the free and fair elections in Grenada, we see a similar situation as discussed above pertaining to Dominica.

The last election in Grenada was held in 2018, when the New National Party (NNP), under the leadership of Dr. Keith Mitchell, won a landslide 15 – 0 victory against the opposition National Democratic Congress led by Nazim Burke. This was a replica of the 2013 election results. The 2018 elections were overseen by the OAS and the CARICOM Election Observer Commission who both expressed concerns regarding the lack of campaign finance regulations and other issues, yet still deemed the polls credible.

Significantly, in the run up to polling day there was some confusion as to whether

electors needed a voter identification card in order to vote. As a result, the CEOM stated that through their observation and from questioning electors, they found that some voters did not appear with their voter's card, even though they had claimed to have been issued with one previously. They further observed that there was no robust system in place to identify electors who presented at the polling station without a card as the person whose name appeared on the voters list (CEOM, 2018).

The CEOM report goes on to describe some of the approaches used in dealing with electors on election day, 'There were different approaches in dealing with electors who did not present a card, varying from the immediate issue of the ballot without a single question being asked by the Presiding Officers to asking a few [leading] questions. In one instance observed, the questions were put to the elector to lead the elector to respond in a particular manner for example, 'Your middle name is Derrick, is it?' or 'You are a driver by occupation?' instead of 'What is your middle name?' or 'What is your occupation?'.

Concerns were also raised about the lack of campaign funds for the opposition party, coupled with boundary changes favourable for the government in certain districts. However, despite these serious irregularities, the CEOM declared the elections free and fair. This clearly casts doubt on the credibility of the CEOM, which had serious concerns about the 2018 elections, yet still declared the election a transparent process.

St. Kitts & Nevis

The last elections in St. Kitts and Nevis were held in 2015, when the Team Unity coalition party led by Dr. Timothy Harris won, terminating a 20-year Labour government. As on previous occasions, the election was also subject to irregularities.

On 16th January 2015, the National Assembly and Government passed a resolution which approved changes to the various constituency boundaries, which proceeded to be gazetted⁷. This resulted in the National Assembly being dissolved on the same evening, with a view to the elections being based on the new boundaries. This decision was swiftly challenged by the opposition, who obtained an injunction from the High Court preventing application of the boundary changes in the upcoming elections. Following further appeals and injunctions on 12th February 2015 the Privy Council ruled in favour of the opposition and determined that the list to be used in the general election 2015 was the one existing prior to the proclamation issued and published by the Governor General (OAS, 2015:18).

Irregularities in the actual voters' register were also reported, 'As observed in previous elections, some political parties brought to the attention... That the voters list included names of people who had either died or did not reside in the constituencies in which they were registered. A variety of actors raised questions about voters who came from abroad to vote on Election Day but who may have been improperly registered in a constituency in which their vote would have the most positive impact for a specific party' (OAS, 2015:21).

Election Day also resulted in concerns being raised regarding returning officers receiving last minute directives to report to the Police Commissioner's office with ballot boxes at the close of polling, only having to return to the respective constituencies thereafter. The rationale for such directives was unclear. Yet, despite these anomalies

⁷ A Government **Gazette** is the official publication of the government and almost all governments have gazettes for this and other purposes of disseminating information. This **gazetting** means, here is the law that has been passed.

the elections, unsurprisingly were declared free and fair.

St. Vincent & the Grenadines

The last election in St. Vincent was held in December 2015 and overseen by the Commonwealth Election Observer Team, which concluded that, 'the elections were generally peaceful and relatively well conducted. The shortfalls noted by the Team 'were not significant enough to put in question the credibility of the outcome'. (Commonwealth Election Observer Team, 9). However, it warrants charting some of the concerns raised, to demonstrate the commonalities in election reports conducted in the other Eastern Caribbean countries.

The first concern was over the independence of the Supervisor of Elections, whose department was a subsidiary of the Office of the Prime Minister (also minister responsible for elections), in the recruitment of returning and presiding officers. The Supervisor mainly recruited from current or retired public officers and teachers, ignoring provision in the Representation of People Act, that 'The Governor General may in consultation with the Supervisor of Elections appoint returning officers'. (Commonwealth Election Observer Team, 9). Another concern was the unexplained early closure of the 15-day special registration period, during which individuals could make corrections on the voter list. This may have resulted in some being denied the right to vote.

Again, despite these anomalies, the 2015 elections were declared free and fair with the United Labour Party led by Ralph Gonsalves winning the election and a third consecutive term in office.

The case studies revealed that in each of the countries, issues were raised pertaining to the elections being conducted in a fair, open and transparent manner. In each country the observers noted various concerns over irregularities in relation to the elections. A noticeable pattern emerges: confusion over voter ID cards (Dominica 2019, Grenada 2018); problems with the voters' list (Dominica 2014, St Kitts 2015, St Vincent 2015) with more names than the total population appearing on 2014 Dominica's electoral register and the names of dead people on St Kitts' 2014 electoral register. Additionally, there were issues relating to constituency boundary changes in both St Kitts and Grenada. Yet in each case the observers declared the elections to have been conducted freely and fairly, and as a result none of the elections results have been subject to further scrutiny or declared null and void.

In addition to the obvious pattern of electoral irregularities noted by all data sources, another issue of relevance which remains unaddressed, but which must constitute part of any criteria for measuring liberal democratic status is consideration given to the longer-term operation of electoral processes and procedures in the periods between elections. This is a significant factor as the data from the reports and the fieldwork suggest that the interference with the election procedure and process happens well before election day and thus it might be premature to base the outcome of elections purely on what happens on election day.

The above is supported by Cheeseman et al (2018) who argues that election vote rigging takes place months before election day resulting in observers viewing issues differently,

...Effective rigging ensures that you win and that you get away with it

without losing legitimacy. Such tactics include manipulating the electoral register, blocking certain candidates from running in elections, and playing with electoral boundaries to maximize partisan gains. What all these tactics have in common is that they can be deployed months in advance of an election when observers are likely to be thin on the ground, and they can be presented as technical or legal decisions as opposed to political skullduggery (Cheeseman et al, 2018: 33).

6.3.1 – Media reports – BBC Monitoring – Free and Fair Elections

Further evidence relating to the conduct of elections in the case study countries was sought via extensive searches of BBC Monitoring reports, again using Boolean operators such as “Elections AND Antigua”. An analysis of the results is set out in Table 6.6 below.

Table 6.6 BBC Monitoring - Overview of Issues – Free and Fair Elections - Case Study Countries 2000 -2020

Key	
● (Red)	High
● (Amber)	Medium
● (Green)	Low

CONCERN	Boundaries	Election Observers Concerns	Electoral Reform	Free/Fair Elections	Fraud/ Election Irregularities	Funding Electoral Com	Legal/ Prosecutions / Civil Claims	Protest	Reg of Voter
Antigua									
2000 -2005				●● ●●	● ●	●●	● ●	●	●
2006 - 2010									●
2011- 2015									
2015 - 2020									
Dominica									

2000 -2005									
2006 - 2010									
2011 -2015									
2016 -2020									

Grenada

2000 -2005									
2006 - 2010									
2011 - 2015									
2016 - 2020									

St. Kitts									
2000 -2005				●	●●	●●			●●
2006 -2010				●			●		
2011- 2015									
2016 -2020				●					
St. Vincent									
2000 -2005	●			●●●●●●●	●			●	●
2006 - 2010				●	●●				
2011- 2015				●	●			●	
2016 -2020							●		

Antigua & Barbuda

The search “Free Elections AND Antigua” in BBC Monitoring produced 116 results from 9/7/1999 to 3/8/2020, from which 14 relevant reports were identified. (See Appendix E – Table 1). The majority of the reports were from the period 2000 to 2005. Four of the reports related to free and fair elections of which two were viewed as medium and two as low. The two low reports related to the announcement by the Prime Minister of the general election, whilst the medium reports related to the opposition intensifying its efforts for international observers to observe election and the other related to The Free and Fair Election League⁸ calling for an investigation into the voters list, which aligns with the concerns discussed above pertaining to electoral registration.

There were two reports that were viewed as high. One related to fraud and election irregularities, whereby the Director of Public Prosecutions was being asked to investigate allegations of fraud allegedly committed in the Office of the Supervisor of Elections, whilst the other related to Registration of Voters and the court upholding a legal challenge brought against the Antiguan Electoral Commission for wrongful dismissal of more than 450 names on the official voters list. See Appendix B – Table 1 for details of reports.

Dominica

In relation to Dominica the equivalent search resulted in a total of 115 entries for the period 4/5/1999 to 3/8/2020. From these 115 entries a total of six were viewed to have

⁸ The Free and Fair Election League are an NGO registered in Antigua & Barbuda

relevance to one or more of the eight cluster themes.

Between 2000 and 2005 there were two reports relevant to legal prosecutions and civil claims and registration of voters which were viewed as medium. The period containing the most reports was 2006–2010, with reports relevant to eight themes. There was one report viewed as high as it related to fraud and elections irregularities which concerned the High Court ruling that the Prime Minister and other Ministers would face trial over charges that the December 2009 elections were null and void. A claim that was not founded. Medium concerns were across four themes, with one relating to electoral reform, two relating to free and fair elections, one relating to funding and one pertaining to registration of voters. For the same period there were two reports relating to free and fair elections and viewed as low, as they were both in relation to commentary on election day. See Appendix B – Table 2 for details of reports.

Grenada

In looking at the data for Grenada there are a total of six relevant reports from a search between 16/9/1997 to 4/8/2020, which identified 135 reports in total using the search terms. Similarly, to Dominica there were no relevant reports identified for the 10-year period 2011 to 2015 and 2016 to 2020. There was one report for 1999 to 2005 under free and fair elections which was viewed as low as it is related to reports of the general elections and the Prime Minister's commitment to free and fair elections. For the period 2006 to 2010 there were two reports for free and fair elections viewed as low and one for fraud also viewed as low. In addition, there were two reports for registration of voters which were also viewed as low, as one reported related to the government calling on then opposition Senator Chester Humphrey to retract his alleged statement accusing the government of interfering with the voters registration list, whilst the other related to the Supervisor of Elections, Victor Ashby that the elections were free and

fair. (See Appendix E – Table 3 for details of reports).

St. Kitts

The search undertaken for St. Kitts revealed a total of seven reports of relevance from a total of 120 from the period 11/3/1998 to 14/8/2020. There were no reports of relevance for the period 2011 to 2015, and only one report for 2016–2020 which related to free and fair elections and was viewed as low. For the period 2000 to 2005 there were four reports of relevance, which were related to four themes. Two reports related to fraud and election and funding electoral commission. One was in relation to the CARICOM Electoral Observer Team recommending more attention being paid to transparency in the electoral process and providing funding for the opposition party, while the other concerned the Prime Minister making a commitment to undertake consultation in relation to electoral reform. Both reports were deemed medium. For the period 2006 to 2010 the reports related to two themes: legal prosecution and civil claims and boundaries. There was a high coded report relating to the high court ruling that the government's attempt to change the electoral boundaries was unconstitutional. The other report for this period related to free and fair elections and was viewed as low. (See Appendix E – Table 4 for details of reports).

St. Vincent

Of the five case study countries, the St. Vincent search registered the most reports, with 15, from 132 BBC monitoring entries from the period 10/6/1998 to 7/8/2020. The highest number of significant reports was recorded between 1999 and 2005: a total of 8, which were relevant across four themes. Seven reports, viewed as low, related to free and fair elections. Three reports related to fraud and election irregularities of which two were deemed low and one medium. There was one report for protest which was

viewed as medium, and one report for registration of voters which was coded as low. There was one report for the period 2006 – 2010 under free and fair elections and viewed as low. For 2011 to 2015 there were three reports, two of which related to free and fair elections, one viewed as medium and the other low. For 2016 to 2020 there was one report pertaining to legal prosecutions and civil claims which was viewed as high as it related to a high court ruling to dismiss the application by the government to throw out an application filed by the main opposition party to throw out two election petitions. (See Appendix E – Table 5 for details of reports).

What the BBC monitoring reports demonstrate is that there was more reporting on issues pertaining to ‘free elections’ in the Eastern Caribbean countries during the 1997 to 2010 period, than in the last 10-year period, 2011 to 2020. Most significantly however, while the BBC monitoring reports provide no clear evidence that the case study countries should not be classed as liberal democracies, they do echo the issues raised by other sources, particularly those concerning electoral irregularities whether in voter registration or constituency boundaries.

6.3.2 Local Media

The final stage in the examination of the electoral process comprised research into online local media reports across the five case study countries. The objective of this additional research is to examine whether the data obtained from sources outside the region are comparably reflected in what is being reported locally in relation to free and fair elections. This exercise was undertaken to further cross-validate the initial findings and to assess whether any issues identified from the other sources appear to be serious and persistent concerns in the case study countries.

The local media searches were conducted for the period 2010 to 2020. The search

period was narrowed due to time factors, as to search through media reports over a longer period would have required far greater research time than is feasible for a PhD student. An overview of the reports identified from the searches and whether they were deemed high, medium, or low is set out in Table 6.7 below.

Antigua - Observer

In relation to Antigua, the Antiguan Observer online (antiguaobserver.com) was selected to undertake the search for Antigua & Barbuda. The publication is part of the Observer Media Group, which comprises two operating companies, and it is non-political. The Antiguan Observer is viewed as remaining true to the principles of free speech, its motto being, 'Let there be light'.

TABLE 6.7

Overview of Issues – Free and Fair Elections – Local Media -Case Study Countries 2010 -2020

Key	
● (Red)	High
● (Amber)	Medium
● (Green)	Low

CONCERN	Boundaries	Election Observers Concerns	Electoral Reform	Free/Fair Elections	Fraud/ Election Irregularities	Funding Electoral Com	Legal/ Prosecutions/ Civil Claims	Protest	Reg of Voter
Antigua									
2010- 2015									
2015 - 2020		●	●●	●●●●●●	●●	●●●	●●●●		●
Dominica									
2010 -2015			●●	●	●		●●		
2016 -2020			●●●●	●●●●●●	●●	●	●●	●	●

Grenada										
2010 - 2015				●	● ●					
2016 - 2020				●	●●		●		●● ●●	
St. Kitt's										
2010- 2015	●●●● ●● ●	●		●	●●●●●●●●		●●●●● ●		●●●	
2016 -2020	●		●●	●● ●●	●●●		●●●●●● ●		●	
St. Vincent										
2010- 2015										
2016 -2020		●● ●●●		● ●	●●●●● ●● ●●●●●		●● ●●		● ● ●	

On accessing the online paper, a search was undertaken using the word 'election'. From this search a total of 23 relevant articles were revealed.

In analyzing these reports there were no reports for the period 2010 to 2015. Most of the reports for the period 2016 to 2020 related to free and fair elections. Several of these reports were in relation to election observers being invited to oversee elections in Antigua and Barbuda and were generally deemed as being of low concern. Two reports pertaining to free and fair elections were viewed as medium, one report related to the observer commission stating that there were glitches in the voting system and the second related to the Antigua Barbuda Labour party stating they did not consider acceptance of gifts during elections as an attempt to bribe individuals. In regard to registration of voters there was one article which was deemed as medium due to the context of Barbudan investors being influenced. One article pertaining to legal issues was viewed as medium due to the High Court ruling that it was premature for an individual to challenge the electoral process regarding where Barbudan constituents should vote. (For further details see Appendix F – Table 1).

Dominica

The search for reports in Dominica was undertaken using Dominica News Online (dominicanewsonline.com), a paper owned by Andrews Publishing Co Limited and viewed as a non-party political.

A search was undertaken with the word 'election' over a ten-year period 2010 -2020, which resulted in 22 relevant media reports being identified. There were 8 reports for Electoral Reform which was reflected nine times, two of which were for the period 2010

to 2015 (both viewed as low) and six for the period 2016 to 2020, three of which³ were viewed as low, two medium and one high. Most of the reports related to the government's failure to undertake electoral reform as promised some five years previously after winning the last election. Despite reneging on its promise to undertake electoral reform prior to the next General Election, the Prime Minister announced the date of the general election for December 2019.

For Free and Fair elections, a total of eight reports was identified, three of which were viewed as low, four medium and one high. These reports generally concerned the government making a commitment to holding free and fair elections, whilst the opposition were alleging that elections were not free and fair and marred by numerous irregularities. The government relies on the report of the OAS Electoral Observers, who concluded the elections were free and fair and reflected the 'will of the people'. The least reported theme was protests with one report which was viewed as low, followed by Fraud and Election Irregularities with two reports of relevance, one being medium concern and the other a high concern. (For further details see Appendix F – Table 2).

Grenada

The search for Grenada was undertaken online by using the Grenada Informer Newspaper, which was selected due to it being non-political and non-partisan, and known as a newspaper that reports accurately, 'telling a story as it is'. The search resulted in a total of 10 reports three of which were for the period 2010 to 15. One report related to free and fair elections and was viewed as low, whilst two reports related to fraud and election irregularities, one viewed as low and the other medium.

For the period 2016 – 2020 one report related to free and fair elections and was viewed

as medium; two reports related to fraud and election irregularities and were viewed as medium, whilst one report relating to legal prosecutions and civil claims was viewed as low. One of the reports addresses whether the forthcoming referendum should be conducted on the same electoral provisions as per the general elections. The report goes on further to raise specific concerns pertaining to the conduct of general elections, and why these should be addressed prior to the constitutional referendum.

Two reports related to registration of voters, viewed as low, concerned the Parliamentary Election Office which disagreed with the opposition in relation to allegations leveled at the government regarding voter registration concerns. (For further details see Appendix F – Table 3).

St. Kitts & Nevis

There was a total of 28 reports identified for St. Kitts & Nevis through undertaking an online search of the St. Kitt's & Nevis Observer, a non-political publication, whose motto is, 'Covers news and views in a politically non - biased way'.

For the period 2010 to 2015 the reports were relevant to six themes. Most of these reports relate to the 2015 general election when the then Election Supervisor halted the count on the eve of the general election and failed to declare the elections for two days, without reason. Reports linked the former Prime Minister to involvement in electoral irregularity, following allegations that he of visited his office at 4.00am during the election count to remove documents that could incriminate him. These allegations lead to the former supervisor of elections being charged for misconduct in public office.

Seven reports were related to boundary disputes, one of which viewed as low and two medium. There were four high reports which concerned the Prime Minister's attempt

to change the electoral boundary days prior to dissolving Parliament in preparation for the general election. This followed legal challenge and claims against the government, which is reflected in the six reports for legal issues and prosecutions, five of which reports were viewed as high and one as low.

The reports for 2016 to 2020 were also relevant to most of the themes. There were nine high reports, six of which related to legal issues and prosecutions which were linked to the former Supervisor of Elections being prosecuted following his failure to declare the 2015 elections. One report related to funding and electoral commission was viewed as medium, whilst two reports related to electoral reform and free and fair elections were viewed as low. (For further details see Appendix F – Table 4).

St. Vincent

For St. Vincent the online search was undertaken using iWitness News, a non-political and non-partisan publication, which resulted in retrieving 22 relevant reports. There were no reports identified for the period 2010 to 2015. The theme with the most relevance was Election Irregularity and Fraud with 10 reports. Most of the reports in this theme were in relation to the opposition party challenging the results of the 2015 general election, and accusing the then Supervisor of Elections of irregularity. This resulted in the then Supervisor being charged and then vindicated in 2019. Nine of these reports were of high concern and related to free and fair elections, fraud election irregularities, funding electoral commission and registration of voters.

Three reports were of medium concern and related to free and fair elections and registration of votes. There were a total of 13 entries that were low across 5 themes. (For further details see Appendix F – Table 5).

6.4 Conclusion

The objective of this chapter was to examine how various data sources measured liberal democratic status by focusing on civil liberties and political rights across the case study countries and to determine how realistic these sources are in assessing them on their performance. The chapter commenced by looking in detail at the WGI Voice and Accountability dimension. Here we saw that the case study countries are ranked in the top quartile, which gave the perception that by global standards the case study countries are implementing the good governance arrangements for the dimension.

The WGI data sources assisted in contextualising case study countries' global positions and rankings in the three Voice and Accountability themes: freedom of speech, freedom of press and free and fair elections. These positions and rankings were validated by Freedom House scores and rankings, which basically told us that all the case study countries have liberal democratic processes in relation to freedom of speech and freedom of elections.

In relation to the freedom of press data which was looked at from the Reporters without Borders data for the five-year period 2016 to 2020 we see that the rankings applied to the OECS countries was quite high, with 30 out of 180 in 2016 to 44 out of 180 in 2020. This data implies that the five case study countries included in the OECS Eastern Caribbean bloc are within the top 25% in the world, which suggests that there are no major concerns in these liberal democracies in relation to press freedom. When examining the BBC monitoring reports the position we see that there is very limited reporting on the issue of press freedom for the period 2016 -2020 and these reports

overwhelmingly do not reflect issues of significant concern. While there were some issues highlighted in relation to the freedom of journalists, overall these suggested that press freedom was high. Here an obvious pattern emerges: that a range of data sources consistently rank the case studies countries around the top 25% globally, in regard to press freedom.

In relation to free and fair elections the BBC monitoring report data generally implies that although there have been issues in the past, especially with Antigua (1999 -2005) and Dominica (2005–2010), there are no serious concerns pertaining to election processes. However, this was not replicated when looking more closely at local media reports for the period 2010-2020, as here we see that there are numerous reports across each of the case study countries pertaining to free and fair elections, with issues relating to electoral reform, legal prosecutions and civil claims, fraud and election irregularities present across all the case study countries. This is reflected in Reporters Without Borders' concerns, where they highlight issues pertaining to transparency and openness of elections in these countries. Of interest here is the fact that there are clearly issues with the manner in which elections are conducted in the case study countries, yet throughout the years the various electoral observer missions have overall declared all the elections as being free and fair and in many ways being dismissive of the irregularities they witness.

What this chapter also evidence is that both BBC monitoring and local media reports confirm issues raised pertaining to free and fair elections. Most of the reports relate to election irregularities raised by opposition parties and their members. A significant

concern was the situation in St. Kitt's during the 2015 elections where the election result was delayed for some four days, due to the conduct of the then Supervisor of Elections. However, this was clearly an isolated incident and not replicated in all the case study countries.

The chapter illustrated that overall, each of the case study countries functions as a liberal democracy, insofar as freedom of speech, freedom of press and free and fair elections are concerned. All sources drawn on consistently rank the five countries high globally in terms of both civil liberties and political rights. That is not to say that there are not issues raised, pertaining to the election process, as is the case in almost every election globally. However overall, the election reports evidence that the process is transparent, free, and fair. What may be problematic however, is whether criteria used across the board – for developed countries with huge populations in the millions to micro-states like the five case study countries- can truly reflect the reality of Eastern Caribbean political processes.

Whether the data pertaining to corruption, generated using the same approach adopted in this chapter, replicates the conclusion that the case study countries function as liberal democracies, is the focus of the following chapter.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Analysis of Governance Arrangements for Controlling Corruption and their Effectiveness

‘A man who has never gone to school may steal a freight car; but if he has a university education, he may steal the whole railroad’.
— Theodore Roosevelt

7.1 Introduction

This second shorter case study chapter aims to examine the Control of Corruption dimension of the World Governance Indicator (WGI). Given that the tenets of liberal democracy are viewed as a primary tool in combatting corruption, on the grounds that public officials who know that they are accountable to voters are supposedly more likely to operate honestly and transparently (V-Dem Institute, 2016), this chapter examines whether the supposition holds for the five case study countries.

The previous chapter evidenced that, overall, the case study countries meet international democratic standards for freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and free and fair elections. Therefore, with these governance arrangements in place, it might be presumed that each of the five case study countries would face no major issues pertaining to political corruption within their societies. However, in order to examine this position further, an analysis is undertaken on the WGI Control of Corruption and the TI CPI across the five case study countries. Here emphasis is placed on the scores and, more importantly, the ranks given to the case study countries over a period of time. In order to determine whether the scores and rankings awarded are as a direct result of specific issues in these individual countries, a review of media reports during a defined period is also undertaken.

This data section is significant as it aids in examining whether there is indeed a disconnect between the perception of liberal democracy and the reality of corruption in the five case study countries. The objective here is twofold: first to ascertain whether the data is reflective of the data analysed across the control of corruption dimension of the WGI and TI CPI data; and second to determine whether the reports and articles retrieved validate the data findings in this section. A major instance of discrepancy between perception and reality occurs in the 2016-20 period, when BBC monitoring failed to make any report on allegations of corruption in the Dominica Citizen by Investment (CBI) programme, in contrast to a total of 39 local media reports following an Al Jazeera News expose. CBI, available in all the case study countries except for St Vincent, grants citizenship for an investment of approximately US \$150,000. CBI has also been scrutinised recently in Grenada and St Kitts over concerns with applicants' criminal records and the granting of diplomatic passports. The analysis of data and media reports is followed by the conclusion.

7.2 Overview of Corruption Data

It is unquestionable that the five case study Eastern Caribbean countries have enacted a vast amount of anti-corruption legislation, ratified conventions and implemented governance processes and systems with a view to addressing political corruption, as illustrated in Table 7.1 below. These include: IACAC, MESICIC, Prevention of Corruption Act, and the establishing of agencies such as the Financial Intelligence Unit and Office of the Ombudsman. However, what needs to be examined is whether the legislation enacted and initiatives developed have assisted these countries to control corruption.

TABLE 7.1

CASE STUDY COUNTRIES - LEGISLATION, CONVENTIONS AND INITIATIVES IMPLEMENTED

Key: ICaC = Inter American Convention against Corruption

MESICIC = Inter American Convention against Corruption – Follow up Mechanism

UNCaC= United Nations Conventions against Corruption

IACMACM = Inter American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters

FIU – Financial Intelligence Unit

IC – Integrity Commission


OBM – Office of the Ombudsman

OAU – Office of Auditor General

The information represents some of the key legislation and initiatives implemented, and is not a definitive or exhaustive list.

Country/ Member State	ICaC	MESICIC	UNCAC	IACMACM	Integrity in Public Life	Proceeds of Crime	Prevention of Bribery/ Corruption	Money Laundering	OAU	FIU	OBM	IC
Antigua & Barbuda	2004	2010	2006	2014	2004	1993/2003	2004	1996/2008/ 2009/2010		✓	✓	✓
Dominica	2004		2010	2004	2003			2000		✓		✓
Grenada	2001	2002		2001	2007		2007			✓	✓	
St. Lucia	2003		2011					2010		✓	✓	
St. Kitts & Nevis	2001	2010				2000/2008		2000	✓	✓	✓	
St. Vincent	2001	2002				2001			✓	✓	✓	

Figure 7.1: Control of Corruption: Percentile Rank, Eastern Caribbean, 1996-2018
 (Source: World Governance Indicators)



In order to examine this point further an overview of the WGI control of corruption data and the TI CPI data in relation to the rankings assigned to the Eastern Caribbean case study countries over a defined period is provided above. However, before proceeding it is important to provide a reminder of how the WGI scores and ranks are assigned. The WGI are based on the aggregate and individual governance indicators for over 200 countries across six dimensions. All countries are ranked from 0 to 100 (with 100 being a high rank and therefore representing a highly positive assessment, whilst 0 is a low rank and deemed very poor), and then all countries are in percentiles based on their ranks.

The five Eastern Caribbean case studies countries have been included in the WGI rankings for over 15 years, with Antigua & Barbuda, Grenada and Dominica included since 1996, whilst St. Kitts and (SVG) have been included since 1998, as illustrated in Figure 7.1 below. The data from Figure 7.1 further illustrates that, each of the case study countries are in the top half of the WGI league table for corruption control, where overall the average ranking for each of the case study countries is 80.25 for Antigua, 72.6 for Dominica, 70.9 for Grenada, 73.0 for St. Kitts and 74.7 for St. Vincent. From this data we see that for each of the case study countries there is some interesting variation over the period in which the countries are included in the WGI. For example in the case of Antigua & Barbuda we see that the ranking during the period 2006 to 2013 rose quite significantly to the mid to high 80s; however from 2013 to 2018 the ranking dropped steadily from 74 in 2014 to 63 in 2018. There are similar patterns for both St. Kitts and SVG, with both countries seeing an increase

between 2008 to 2013 in the low 80s. Both Dominica and Grenada have had steady ranking from the high 60s to low 70s, with the exception being a rank of 80 in 1996.

The above demonstrates that although there has been some movement and variation the percentile scores across each of the case study countries, their percentile has been quite high overall, especially when comparing to other countries globally. For example in 2006 and 2013 some of the countries in the highest percentiles were Australia (95.12, 93.83), Canada (95.61, 95.26), Sweden (98.53, 98.57), Switzerland (96.58, 97.63), and the United Kingdom (92.68, 93.36). Whilst some of the lower percentile countries for the same period 2006 and 2013 were as follows: Argentina (42.93, 40.28), Brazil (54.15, 55.92), China (37.07, 44.53), Panama (43.41, 45.50) and Turkey (58.05, 61.14). Thus, the percentiles for the case study countries suggests that they each have relatively effective good governance arrangements in place for controlling corruption.

In order to undertake a comparison of the findings of the WGI control of corruption data above, a comparison was undertaken with the TI CPI data to determine the scores and ranks of the case study countries over a period of time. The TI CPI rankings are based on the assessment of each country following observers' views, and the perceptions of experts living and working in any one of the countries. These assessments result in each country being given a score between 1 to 100, in which 100 equates to little or no corruption, while 0 is highly corrupt. From the scores each country is then ranked from the total number of countries included. The total number

of countries for each year from 2010 to 2019 varied as illustrated in Table 7.2. From this we see the lowest number of countries was 167 in 2015 and the highest was 183 in 2011. For the years 2017 to 2020 the total number of countries was 180.

From analyzing the TI CPI the first thing to note of significance is that only three of the case study countries, Grenada, Dominica and St. Vincent, have been included in the index over a 10-year period from 2010 to 2019 (See Table 7.2 below). The mean percentage scores for each of the three Eastern Caribbean case study countries are: Dominica 44.7¹, Grenada 50.2² and St. Vincent 56.6. More significant than the scores were the comparative world rankings, in which all three countries placed in the top third. Another observable trend is that the three countries have also dropped in ranking 2016-19, with the sole exception of Dominica's slight rise from 57 to 55 in 2019 (Grenada: 46,52,52,53; SVG: 35,40,58, 59; Dominica: 38, 42, 57, 55).

What the TI CPI illustrates is that corruption perception levels in the case study countries remain relatively low, with world rankings in the top third. St. Vincent ranked highest of the three (ranging from 29th-36th) during the period 2011 to 2016. However, the recent trend of falling world rankings suggests that after the initial period 2000-10 when much of the anti-corruption legislation, measures and initiatives were adopted, perceived levels of corruption have been increasing since 2016, casting doubt on the effectiveness of all those measures. This observed trend is corroborated by media reports (see below) and interviewee responses in Chapter Eight. In undertaking a comparison with the same countries used to compare the WGI control of corruption

¹ Dominica was not included in the CPI in 2015
the CPI from 20

ranks above we see for the years 2006 and 13 the following: Australia ranked 9 in both years, Canada ranked 14 and 9 respectively, Sweden 6 and 3, Switzerland 7 in both years, whilst the UK ranked 11 and 14 respectively. Whilst some of the lowest ranking countries performing were Argentina with ranks of 93 and 106, Brazil 70 and 72, China 70 and 80, Panama 84 and 102, and Turkey 60 and 53 respectively.

From the WGI and TI CPI indices data what we see are similarities in regard to the assessment score and ranks of the five case study countries, in that their scores on the surface reflect that their performance in controlling corruption is good and the perception of corruption also good. This corroborates with the conclusion in Chapter Six, that the case study countries operate as liberal democracies which hold transparent, free and fair elections. Here the data from both the WGI and TI CPI suggests the case study countries are perceived as relatively free of corruption, consistently ranking in the top third of countries worldwide.

Chapter Two highlighted criticisms pertaining to the CPI surveys being undertaken by third parties and the WGI datasets comprising agencies and organisations based in the West. In response to these limitations, this chapter therefore seeks to undertake a cross-check of both the WGI and TI CPI data.

Table 7.2 – Case Study Countries Ranks/Scores Transparency International – Perception Index

Country	Ranking (score) 2010	Ranking (score) 2011	Ranking (score) 2012	Ranking (score) 2013	Ranking (score) 2014	Ranking (score) 2015	Ranking (score) 2016	Ranking (score) 2017	Ranking (score) 2018	Ranking (score) 2019
	Total countries (178)	Total countries (183)	Total countries (176)	Total countries (173)	Total countries (175)	Total countries (167)	Total countries (176)	Total countries (180)	Total countries (180)	Total countries (180)
Grenada							46 (56)	52 (52)	52 (53)	53 (51)
St. Vincent & The Grenadines		36 (58)	36 (62)	33 (62)	29 (67)	36 (62)	35 (60)	40 (58)	58 (41)	59 (39)
Dominica	46 (52)	44 (52)	41 (58)	41 (58)	39 (58)		38 (59)	42 (57)	57 (45)	55 (48)

7.2.1 Control of Corruption - BBC Monitoring Reports

The search for BBC monitoring was conducted for each country by undertaking a search with the word 'corruption' under each country i.e. Antigua AND Corruption, Dominica AND Corruption. Once the reports were retrieved an analysis was undertaken against each report to ascertain whether they were of relevance. Each report was then clustered into one or more of the themes, which were identified as relevant to this section of the chapter. The clustered themes were: prosecution/corruption charges, corruption allegation, money laundering, education/capacity building, commitment to transparency legislation, with the last theme being corruption commission investigation. An overview of the themes and results are set out in Table 7.3 below.

Antigua & Barbuda

The search for Antigua & Barbuda revealed a total of 146 reports from the period 2001-20, of which 24 reports were of relevance to issues pertaining to political corruption. In looking further at these reports we see that, overall, the themes with the most reports were commitment to transparency/legislation with 16 reports, 14 of which were viewed as being of medium concern and two of low concern. The 14 reports of medium concern were from the period 2000 to 2005 and consisted mainly of governments and opposition making commitments to enact anti – corruption legislation, with a view to addressing issues and allegations of corruption coming from both government and opposition politicians. Significantly, it was during this period that many of these same commitments were made. There were a total of 8 reports for corruption allegations, with 8 reported during the period 2000-05, two of which were deemed high concern,

Table 7.3

Overview of Issues – Case Study Countries – Political corruption

Key	
● (Red)	High
● (Amber)	Medium
● (Green)	Low

CONCERN	Prosecution Corruption Charges	Corruption Allegation	Money Laundering	Education/ Capacity Building	Commitment To Transparency Legislation	Corruption Commission Investigation
Antigua						
2000 -2005		●● ●●●●● ●			●●●●●●●●●● ●●●● ●●	●●●
2006 - 2010	●		●	●		
2011- 2015	●	●				
2016 - 2020						
Dominica						
2000 - 2005		● ●● ●			●●	●
2006 - 2010	●●	●●●				

2011 -2015		●●●● ● ●				
2016 -2020		●				
Grenada						
2000 - 2005		● ● ●●●			●● ●	● ●
2005 - 2010		● ●●●	●		● ●●	●●●●
2011 - 2015		●		●	●	
2016 - 2020						

both relating to ministers in the Bird administration moving a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister, citing rampant corruption, as one of the reasons.

The theme prosecution, corruption and charges had two relevant reports in 2006-10 and 2011-15, both viewed as high. The 2006 report related to the former chief information officer James Rose, having corruption charges dismissed against him. The charges came at a time when Rose was a fierce critic of the then Baldwin Spencer government. The 2011 report concerned the reappearance in court of the former Speaker of Parliament, D. Gisele Isaac, charged with conspiring to defraud the Board of Education. (See Appendix G – Table 1 for further details).

There were no reports of relevance identified for the period 2015 to 2020.

Dominica

In relation to Dominica, a total of 17 reports was retrieved for the period 2000 to 2020. In 2000 to 2005 commitment to transparency and legislation had two reports which related to government commitment to enacting anti-corruption legislation. Both reports were viewed as being of low concern. In the same period there were four reports pertaining to corruption allegations, one of which was viewed as low, two viewed as medium concern and one viewed as high concern.

There were five reports overall in the period 2006-2010, three of which related to corruption allegations being made, mainly by the opposition party, about the government and all viewed as low concerns. The other two reports, both in the prosecution corruption charges category, dealt with the High Court order that PM

Roosevelt Skerritt and Education Minister Peter Saint Jean would face trial on charges relating to elections irregularities and the claim that the elections were null and void. Consequently, both were viewed as high concerns.

In 2011 to 2015 there were five reports relating to corruption allegations, three of which were viewed as high concern. All these reports related to allegations made against PM Skerritt by Opposition leader Lennox Linton, pertaining to the issuing of a diplomatic passport under the Citizen by Investment programme to a former Nigerian Minister, Diezani Alison-Madueke, who was under investigation by Nigerian authorities for alleged corruption whilst in office. There was one report pertaining to corruption allegations made by the leader of opposition against the government which was viewed as medium concern, and one low concern report in relation to the Prime Minister's response to allegations made by the opposition (See Appendix G – Table 2 for further details).

Grenada

Pertaining to Grenada, there were 99 reports retrieved from the BBC monitoring search, 21 of which were of relevance. For the period 2000 to 2005 there were eight reports. One report, classed as of high concern, related to corruption allegation made by Foreign and Legal Affairs Minister Dr. Raphael Fletcher, against the Keith Mitchell administration. Two other reports in this cluster were viewed as being of low and medium concern. The report viewed as medium related to a radio address by Opposition Senator Arley Gill urging CARICOM to closely monitor developments in Grenada pertaining to Offshore Alert allegations made against Prime Minister Keith Mitchell of corrupt activity.

For the same period two reports concerned corruption investigations and both related to the Commission inquiry into the allegations against the Prime Minister Keith Mitchell for involvement in corrupt activities. The report confirming the Commission of Inquiry was deemed to be of a high concern, whilst the report regarding the opposition raising issue with the appointed Chair of Commission – Richard Cheltenham, was viewed as medium concern.

The largest number of reports (13) was made in the period 2005-2010. Of the five for corruption allegation, one was viewed as a low concern while the three medium concern consisted of opposition allegations levelled at the Keith Mitchell government regarding the rationale for severing relationships from Taiwan. The other two reports related to the arrest of Jamaican lawyer Hugh Wildman for his alleged involvement in the collapse of the offshore First International Bank of Grenada which was viewed as high. Other reports for this period include four for corruption commission investigation, all of which were viewed as being of medium concern.

There were three relevant reports for the period 2011 to 2015. One for corruption allegation was viewed as a medium concern, the others for education and capacity building along with commitment to transparency and legislation were both viewed as low. Again, as with Dominica there were no relevant reports for the period 2016 – 2020. (See Appendix G – Table 3 for further details).

St. Kitts and St. Vincent & the Grenadines

Interestingly, there were no reports identified on BBC monitoring for either St. Kitts or St. Vincent. While this gap cannot conclusively be accepted as proof that there were no concerns over corruption allegations, it does reflect the lack of BBC monitoring reports for these two countries, already observed in Chapter 6.

What the reporting data from BBC monitoring demonstrates is that most of the reports concern Prime Ministers and Ministers making commitments to enact anti-corruption legislation. The next set of relevant reports concerned allegations of corruption made mainly by opposition party members against the Prime Minister and/or his Ministers in the various governments across the case study countries. However, most of these reports are historic and not current, as evidenced by the 16 reports for Antigua in 2000 to 2005, eight reports 2000 -2010 and one report in 2011 to 2015 for Grenada.

On analysing the various media reports, we see that overall, the case study countries have performed well in relation to good governance arrangements for controlling corruption. This is not to say, that there were no reports of concern, but rather that these reports were minimal.

7.2.2 Media Reporting of Corruption in the Local Press

In order to undertake further cross checking, and with a view to understanding whether there were any recent issues of political corruption across the case study countries, further research of local media reports from online newspapers was conducted using the same newspapers as in the previous chapter. Another reason for reviewing local

reports were the gaps in BBC monitoring, with minimal reports of relevance in the last five years and no relevant reports for either St. Kitts & Nevis or St Vincent. Consequently, BBC monitoring cannot be relied on for an accurate picture of the issues on the ground in these countries. The results from the local media searches were clustered and themed in the same groups as those for the BBC monitoring data. (See Table 7.4 below).

Antigua & Barbuda

In relation to Antigua and Barbuda there were a total of 8 reports of relevance identified over the search period, all during 2016 to 2020. Five of these reports were coded as being of high concern and two of these reports related to prosecution charges brought against former Ministers and government officials.

The first related to prosecutions brought against former Cabinet Ministers, including the former Finance Minister, on charges of alleged corruption. The second report related to the commencement of trial against the former Executive Secretary of the Board of Education in relation to corruption charges.

The other three high concern reports related to MP Ascot Michael having abused his power and contacting the Chief Magistrate in order to have a magistrate with whom he had disagreed removed from the Magistracy. This action by the MP resulted in both the Antigua Bar Association and Prime Minister Gaston Browne openly criticising MP Michael. Three reports were deemed as low, one related to comments made by a political advisor who stated corruption had become normalised, whilst the other two

reports were in relation to government commitment to enacting legislation. (See Appendix H - Table 1 for further information).

Dominica

Dominica has the most reports of relevance totalling 48, with only three reports for the period 2010 to 2015 and the remainder between 2016 and 2020. Of these only one report was deemed as high concern; it related to an Aljazeera News allegation that government ministers were involved in corruption and misconduct pertaining to the Citizen by Investment (CBI) programme. There were 13 reports that were deemed as low, nine also related to corruption allegations and four related to commitment to transparency legislation.

From the total of 31 reports viewed as medium concern, 29 concerned allegations of corruption. The majority of the reports were in relation to an Aljazeera News report alleging and implicating both government and opposition in involvement in corrupt practices relating to the Citizen by Investment programme (CBI). This route to citizenship is available in all the case study countries, except for St Vincent, enabling individuals to purchase citizenship by investing approximately US \$150,000 per applicant, in the country. There were also further concerns pertaining to individuals who have been granted diplomatic passports through the CBI programme. Two reports related to the allegations made by the Public Service Union pertaining to their members being victimised by government supporters, due to standing up and speaking out against corruption in the government. See Appendix H - Table 2 for further information.

A recent report which warrants noting is the March 2021 judgement of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) who dismissed an appeal filed by Prime Minister Skerritt and other members of the Dominica Labour party (DLP), and reinstated the complaints filed against them for charges of treating³ during the 2014 election of which the DLP won. The criminal complaints were filed by three members of the United Workers' Party (UWP) who alleged that the objective of the DLP members was to corruptly entice persons to vote for them. The matter has taken nearly eight years to reach this juncture following a magistrate issuing a summons to Prime Minister Skerritt and associated members, however, they then served a judicial review arguing the magistrate had no authority to summons them to appear before such court, as the offence of treating concerned validity of the election and such matters are dealt with by the the High Court. The High Court subsequently agreed declaring the summons was invalid. The UWP members successful appealed this decision however the PM Skerritt appealed to the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court and then to the CCJ who both dismissed the appeal. It will indeed be interesting to track the development and outcome in this case. (Loop New, 2021).

³ Treating is a criminal offence. It refers to directly or indirectly providing food, drink, or entertainment to a person, during or after an election, with the aim of corruptly influencing that person's vote. The law in Dominica is that a person convicted of treating is disqualified from sitting in the House of Assembly and cannot run for elections for seven years.

Grenada

There were a total of 18 reports of relevance identified for Grenada, with none identified for the period 2016 to 2020. There were six reports each for corruption allegations, five being of low concern and one of medium concern, which mainly concerned allegations made against the opposition regarding alleged corruption activities undertaken by the government. Commitment to transparency legislation also had six reports (one low and five medium), which related mainly to government commitment to enact anti-corruption legislation.

Education/capacity building had three reports, all deemed to be of medium concern, as they related to initiatives to be implemented by the Integrity Commission. In addition there were three reports for corruption commission investigations, all deemed as medium concern, and related to a commission's enquiry into allegations of corruption in the Marketing and National Importing Board (MNIB) of Grenada. (See Appendix H – Table 3 for further information).

Table 7.4

Overview of Issues – LOCAL MEDIA
Case Study Countries –corruption

Key	
● (Red)	High
● (Amber)	Medium
● (Green)	Low

CONCERN	Prosecution Corruption Charges	Corruption Allegation	Money Laundering	Education/ Capacity Building	Commitment To Transparency Legislation	Corruption Commission Investigation
Antigua						
2010 - 2015						
2016 - 2020	●●	●●● ●			●●	
Dominica						
2010 – 2015		●●			●	
2016- 2020	●	● ●●●●●●●●●● ●●●●●●●●●● ●● ●●●●●●●●●●			● ●●●●●	
Grenada						
2010-2015		● ●●●●●		●●●	●●●●● ●	●●●

2016 - 2020						
St. Kitts						
2010- 2015		●●●●● ●●			●	
2016 - 2020		● ●				
St. Vincent						
2010- 2015		● ●				●
2016 -2020		●● ●●●				

St. Kitts & Nevis

There were ten reports in total for St. Kitts & Nevis, eight for the period 2010 to 2015 and two for the period 2016 to 2020. The reports for 2010 to 2015 comprised seven under corruption allegations, five of which were deemed of medium concern and two low concern. All these reports related to the opposition alleging government involvement in corrupt activity. There was one report in the same period for commitment to transparency legislation, relating to the Premier of Nevis (head of the Nevis autonomous governing body in the Federation of St Kitts and Nevis) making a commitment to establish an integrity commission, viewed as medium. For 2016 to 2020 there were two reports under corruption allegations both relating to allegations being levelled at the government by the opposition. (See Appendix H - Table 4 for further information).

St. Vincent

There were nine reports of relevance for St. Vincent, four for the period 2010 to 2015 and five for 2016 to 2020. There were two reports under allegations of corruption, one viewed as low and the other medium. Similarly to reports for the other countries, these reports related to allegations being made by opposition politicians against the government. One report was identified for commitment to legislation and one for corruption commission investigation; both were deemed as low concerns.

The five reports for 2016- 2020 all related to allegations of corruption, three of which were viewed as low and three medium concern. (See Appendix H - Table 5 for further information).

From these local media reports we see that there are some differences in the numbers, concerns raised, and the severity of some of those concerns in relation to corruption. By way of example Antigua had 5 reports which were viewed as red and a high concern, whilst Dominica, had 29 reports pertaining to corruption allegations which were viewed as medium. These reports were not captured in the BBC monitoring reports. This tells us that the reports and information which are used to assist in illustrating evidence of corruption or indeed anti-corruption from external sources reflect differently to the reports and information that is available locally.

The 2017 Aljazeera News report implicating both the government and opposition of Dominica in corrupt practices relating to the CBI programme, did not register in BBC monitoring, yet there were 39 local media reports (1 high concern, 29 medium and 9 low). This BBC omission reflects waning interest in the region even though in 2015 it had reported on a similar CBI corruption case in Dominica. PM Roosevelt Skeritt not only granted citizenship to Former Nigerian Petroleum Minister Diezani Alison-Madueke, indicted and subsequently prosecuted in a multi-million corruption case in Nigeria but also made her Trade and Investment Commissioner. Her diplomatic passport, issued before she left office in Nigeria, contains a restraining order effectively shielding her from arrest.

The absence of reports from external sources, particularly covering recurrent issues with irregularities in CBI programmes, presents a misleading picture of corruption perception and control across the case study countries. The reasoning behind the

absence of the reporting is not addressed in this research, however it warrants questioning whether this is as a result of the organisations such as the BBC's lack of interest in investigating and undertaking further in-depth analysis of some of the issues resulting in corruption in the Caribbean, which is clearly a different approach adopted by Al Jazeera as illustrated above. Limited or non-existent data (St Kitts & Nevis, St Vincent) can compound the misperception that corruption is minimal, whereas local reporting indicates a very different situation. Once again, these discrepancies emphasises the problem of using incomplete external assessment to measure Caribbean political culture.

7.3 Conclusion

The objective of this chapter was to examine how the various corruption measurement tools are applied across the case study countries and to determine how realistic they are in assessing the case study countries on their performance in relation to the anti-corruption agenda.

The first part of the chapter looked at the WGI corruption dimension, which evidenced that the case study countries have implemented a raft of anti-corruption legislation and initiatives over the years with a view to assisting in addressing corruption. The section also demonstrated that the case study countries are all included in WGI Control of Corruption and are assessed as performing comparatively well. Similarly, the TI CPI places the case study countries as being ranked relatively high in relation to perception of corruption.

The concerns pertaining to both the data sets of the WGI and CPI have been discussed previously, notably in relation to their reliance on sources being located outside of the Caribbean basin. This tendency was potentially also captured in the BBC monitoring reports, which highlighted a number of reports of concern. but generally affirmed the WGI position that control of corruption is relatively effective by global standards. However, looking at local reports over the 10-year period 2010 to 2020, substantially more reports concerning allegations of corruption were catalogued, with a total of 29 reports identified for Dominica for the period 2016 – 2020. As discussed previously in the chapter a significant number of the reports pertaining to Dominica concerned the alleged government involvement in corrupt practices linked to the controversial Citizen by Investment programme. Yet, despite these seemingly damaging reports, the government won the last election, held in 2019.

Overall, what we see from the data analysis relating to corruption is a different position to the findings in Chapter Six. In this instance, local media reports suggest that there are problems in regard to corruption overall, and this assessment seems to contradict the WGI and TI CPI positions for the case study countries. It is evident that the case study countries have all implemented formal governance arrangements and international norms, whether through enacting anti-corruption legislation and/or implementing various initiatives to support the anti-corruption agenda. Yet, local media reports suggest that these have not necessarily been successful in assisting the case study countries to meaningfully address the issues of corruption in their countries. Enacting legislation and adopting initiatives has not so far translated into effective corruption control, a reality supported by the hard evidence of a total lack of prosecutions.

The above, I argue, is to be expected. It is unrealistic to expect the case study countries to simply adapt to an agenda for combatting corruption imposed externally without taking into account the region's history of colonisation. An awareness of the social, economic and cultural factors, as discussed in detail in Chapter Three, is critical in understanding how the case study countries function. To continue to disregard these factors is a key reason, I argue, why the case study countries and, by extension, countries across the wider Caribbean, have made limited progress with minimal, if any, impact in addressing corruption meaningfully. This position is further examined in chapters 8 using interview data from the fieldwork conducted in two of the case study countries.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Corruption the Lived Experience – Interview Participants’ Perspectives

‘In any discussion of corruption..... it is important to start with our people, their experience, their perceptions, and how these perceptions fit into to the experience and perceptions of others in this increasing globalised world’

Professor Trevor Munroe

8.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to set out the views of interviewees from data collated through the semi structured interviews, with a key objective being to further test my hypothesis and examine whether corruption in Caribbean politics is culturally tolerated. The data from the interviews is important to undertake a cross check of the data obtained in the earlier chapters and determine whether there is any correlation with the data in these earlier chapters, against the views of interviewees. Therefore the chapter focuses on several key themes, based on key discussion and data presented in the previous chapters. The chapter commences by examining interviewees’ views in relation to definitions and understanding of corruption, then moves to look at the historical and cultural context, followed by analysis of interviewees’ views in relation to governance. The fourth section examines addressing corruption, which is followed by the final section analysing potential solutions. Presenting the data through these positions is intentional, as these are overall the main areas of discussion in the previous chapters of the thesis. In order to illustrate how the data was analysed, the chapter also incorporates a section setting out how grounded theory coding was utilised, and the process by which data was then grouped into clusters.

8.2 Sample Size

The sample size for the research consisted of a total of 24 participants: twelve from each of the fieldwork countries, Grenada and St. Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG). Table 8.1 provides an overview of the participants, who gave permission, on the basis that in participating in the interview for this research, their personal information and data would be confidential and remain anonymised. A total of nineteen males and five females from various professions and NGO organisations were interviewed – including academics, attorneys at law, members of churches, community organisations, civil society, and politicians. The breakdown by gender and professions of each participant is provided in Table 8.1 below:

Table 8.1: **Sample of Participants**

Country - Grenada	Profession
Interviewee 1	Politician
Interviewee 2	Politician/attorney at law
Interviewee 3	Academic/Attorney at law
Interviewee 4	Civil society/politician
Interviewee 5	Civil society
Interviewee 6	Civil society
Interviewee 7	Churches
Interviewee 8	Academic
Interviewee 9	Civil society
Interviewee 10	Churches
Interviewee 11	Attorney at Law
Interviewee 12	Attorney at Law
Country – St. Vincent & the Grenadines	Profession

Interviewee 13	Attorney at law
Interviewee 14	Public officer
Interviewee 15	Attorney at law
Interviewee 16	Attorney at law
Interviewee 17	Politician
Interviewee 18	Civil society
Interviewee 19	Civil society
Interviewee 20	Church
Interviewee 21	Public officer
Interviewee 22	Attorney at law
Interviewee 23	Attorney at law
Interviewee 24	Civil society

8.3 Methodology

The methodology adopted for the fieldwork interviews was one-to-one semi-structured interviews, conducted between the period of April to December 2018. In order to ensure all data was captured, each interview was recorded whilst the researcher took brief notes and subsequently transcribed to ensure all relevant data was noted.

The interviews were semi-structured, based on 12 predetermined questions. The interviews in Grenada were conducted face to face in various locations across the tri-island state, of the interviewees' convenience and choosing. However due to the challenge of accessing SVG for all interviews, most of the interviews with Vincentians participants were conducted via Zoom or Skype, with three being undertaken face to face, directly in SVG. All interviews allowed the interviewees to respond in a narrative format, enabling the interviewer to

'generate detailed accounts rather than brief answers or general statements' (Riessman; 2008:23), with the interviewer making minimal interruptions where necessary. The interviewer asked each interviewee three direct questions as an icebreaker, with the intention of putting interviewees sufficiently at ease to speak freely throughout the interview, thus providing the opportunity for the interviewer to 'open up topics, and allow respondents to construct answers in ways they find meaningful' (Riessman; 2008: 24 – 25). The interviewer only used further probing questions, as was felt necessary.

As mentioned above, 24 semi-structured interviews were conducted and recorded on audio files, resulting in approximately 20 hours of recorded interviews, with each interview recording being approximately 45 to 60 minutes in length. Following each interview, the interviewer transcribed each audio file into full transcripts within one month of each interview. This process assisted the researcher in the grounded theory methodology applied. Each transcript was then printed and the interviewer undertook a cross reference of the transcripts against each audio file to ensure that there was thematic analysis of the data, and coding to ensure the information obtained from the interviews was accurate. This procedure was followed throughout to ensure that there was a continuous application of analysing the collated data, to maintain the systematic recording, coding and analysis of data (Henderson, Bedini & Hecht, 1994: 75).

Systematic recording was applied through the researcher's use of grounded theory framework to analyse the data through coding, 'Whereby data are broken down into component parts, which are given names' (Bryman; 2008:

542). The researcher devised coding sheets, which were used to analyse the data from each of the interviews. When analysis revealed emerging themes in the data, these would be noted first on post it notes, and then transferred onto the relevant coding sheet. Through the coding sheets the researcher was able to identify some of the emergent key themes, which she was then able to compare and contrast with the themes of all the other data sets. This process enabled the researcher to devise short summaries of each of the key themes from each interviewee, which were broken into sub themes which the researcher thought was relevant and useful. Details of the final list of the focussed codes used are set out below in Table 8.2.

Table 8.2 Focussed Codes Used

a) Definition	b) Historical	c) Governance	d) Politics	e) Addressing Corruption
A.1 Legal Definition A.2 Behaviours	B.1 Culture B.4 Tolerance	C.1 Governance C.2 Press Freedom C.3 Free and Fair Elections	D.1 Influence D.2 Involvement	D.1 Legislation D. 2 Prosecutions D.3 Initiatives

Details of the how and when the data collection and analysis was undertaken during the research is set out in Table 8.3 below:

Table 8.3 – Data collection and analysis stages

Dates	Data Collection	Theme Data	Coding	Analysis Methodology
April 2015 to December 2018	Conduct and transcribe interviews			
September 2015 to December 2018		Theme data and Group		
March 2016 to August 2017			Devise Codes	
September 2018 to December 2018				Detailed analysis of data

8.4 Interviewees' Perspective

As discussed in the previous chapters, the overall aim of the research is to examine corruption in Caribbean politics and explore whether it is culturally tolerated. Consequently, the semi-structured interviews were undertaken to determine how interviewees defined corruption and secondly, to assess their awareness of corruption, through their responses to the 12 questions, as illustrated in Table 8.3 below:

Table 8.3 – Interview Schedule

Awareness of Corruption
1. How would you define corruption?
2. What does corruption look like to you?
3. To what extent would you define Grenada/St Vincent and the Grenadines as a corrupt society? And why?
Addressing Corruption
1. What attempts have been made to address corruption in the country?
2. To what extent have the attempts to eradicate corruption been successful?
3. What is your view of the effectiveness of implementing anti corruption initiatives?
4. What is your view on the effectiveness of enforcing anti corruption legislation?
5. What role does politics play in addressing corruption in Grenada and SVG?
6. Do you think culture has a role to play in relation to corruption?
7. Do you think corruption is culturally tolerated, forming part of day to day business? If yes, how do you think cultural tolerance towards corrupt practices could be changed?
8. Do you have any thoughts on how corruption could be addressed?
9. Do you have any comments you would like to make?

8.5 Definition

8.5.1 Defining Corruption

From the above, we see the first research question examines interviewees' definition of corruption. The overall responses from the 24 interviews demonstrate that the majority of interviewees' understanding of corruption was quite similar. From their responses the researcher was able to see an emerging pattern of words and terminology used to define corruption at an early stage in the interview process. Some of the words and terminology used are captured below:

<i>dishonesty</i>	<i>back door dealings</i>	<i>breach of ethical codes</i>
<i>misleading the public</i>	<i>using public office for private gain</i>	<i>selfish act of greed</i>
<i>nepotism</i>	<i>bribes</i>	<i>using political office for private gain</i>

Although the vocabulary used by interviewees to describe corruption necessarily varied, there was some commonality. For instance, when asked to define corruption, two interviewees responded in a single sentence. Interviewee 3's response was 'The use of public office for private gain', while interviewee 7, from Grenada, gave the following definition: 'Politicians in positions of power, abusing that position for their own benefit'. However, at the same time some

interviewees used single words to describe corruption, for example. 'dishonesty', 'nepotism' and 'bribes'. Nonetheless, the definitions provided by interviewees are generally similar to those submitted by Nye (1967), Heidenheimer (1978) and Johnston (2005), in relation to the abuse of office for personal gain.

8.5.2 Behaviour

This sub-section turns to look further at the behaviour's interviewees deemed to constitute corrupt practice or corrupt behaviour. For some interviewees this question was unclear, resulting in the researcher having to both rephrase and ask additional probing questions. From the data analysis, the main answers to the question could be themed into five areas as follows:

<i>Authority</i>	<i>Personal Gain</i>	<i>Contracts</i>	<i>Levels</i>	<i>Elections</i>
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The theme of authority was highlighted by three interviewees, who referred to politicians exerting authority when in office, to get things done the way they want to, which is usually to their personal advantage and financial gain. This includes taking under the counter bribes or kickbacks from awarding government contracts. Interviewee 5 explained that this personal gain is very much commonplace:

From a government perspective a lot of the times government enters into a transaction with an investor, and there is a lot of under the counter, back door dealings.

In relation to personal gain, several interviewees referred to the fact that politicians' abuse of their position for personal advantage went unchallenged. One interviewee in Grenada referred to the issue of procurement when government departments are charged with tendering, selecting and issuing contracts. Although there are supposedly procurement processes, the reality is that a significant number of contracts are awarded outside of an open competitive contractor selection process. The relevant Minister awards the contract to a friend at an inflated rate, enabling him or her to receive a personal financial kickback. Where there is an open competitive process it is due to the project or programme of work being managed by external agencies locally, regionally or internationally.

Similarly, as highlighted by interviewee 14 in St. Vincent & the Grenadines, corruption is regularly engaged in by politicians, as they 'have both selfish and ulterior motive(s) to gain for themselves and themselves alone, without thinking of the consequence of the wider citizens'.

Another example given by Interviewee 9 in Grenada, was that regular kickbacks are given to contractors through involvement of political officers at various levels:

In terms of the government workers, the Permanent Secretaries and so forth, they work along with the politicians. Let's say that a

grant has been allocated to that Ministry. The Permanent Secretary gets his or her cut and the Minister get his or her cut. So what the specific grant has been located for, whether it's roads or (what) have you all the monies do not go there. (The) Minister gets his, (the) Permanent Secretary gets his or hers and so forth and it trickles down. So by the time the road is ready to build you only get 100ft of what should have been a 200ft road.

Interviewee 9 elaborated further on this point and made reference to the fact that these are corrupt acts, directly related to both the definition of corruption and awareness of corruption.

These interviewees' responses are reflective of the position of iacrc.org (2018), which contends that such kickbacks are common in influencing contract awards, as discussed in the literature review in Chapter Two.

The data from these interviewees reveals several important factors. First that there is no difficulty in understanding what corrupt behaviour actually looks like, which is reflected by the fact that interviewees gave examples of actual corrupt practices, and in some instances offered several examples of what corruption looked liked. Secondly, we see that there is a view that when politicians take office they both exert and abuse their power for personal and financial gain. In these views of contemporary political culture and practice we can observe a degree of historical continuity from the authoritarian approach of colonial officials who dictated how business would be conducted and who would be assigned positions. The award of posts was based on a number of factors

including class, military rank, public careers and period in public office. This patronage model resulted in a small elite controlling and dominating, as it continues to do so today. Third, we continue to see a continuity of this domination and patronage model across the Caribbean, where we regularly hear about kickbacks in procurement of contracts - as highlighted by the interviewees above. Further analysis may suggest that adoption of the inappropriate Westminster model of government has contributed to authoritarian leadership style. Another issue which interviewees share related to the scale and small populations of the Grenada and SVG, allowing Prime Ministers and their governments to dominate the political landscape. Opposition parties, where they exist, have minimal, if any, influence in holding the government of the day to account. As a result ministers can engage in corrupt kickback practices, as the reality is they are answerable to no one.

An example of the above position was seen recently in Grenada in June 2020, since the conclusion of both the case studies and interviews, when this same issue was raised by Tobias Clement¹ the new Opposition Leader of Grenada, whose secretary had EC700.00 stolen from her bag in the Parliament building. While Clement stated he intended to report the matter to the Clerk of Parliament and the Royal Grenadian Police Force, he also gave his reservations as to whether the matter would be taken seriously or investigated as:

¹ Tobias Clement was a member of the New National Party and remains a Member of Parliament for his Constituency St. George's North East. As a backbencher he was well known for questioning government decisions. In December 2019 Clement resigned from the Party and indicated that he would not abandon the people of his constituency. On 14th April 2020 Clement took Grenada's House of Representatives' vacant seat as the Leader of the Opposition.

The Clerk of Parliament cannot do anything about these security companies linked to the ruling New National Party (NNP) as they are being hired through the Works Ministry run by the Number Two man in government, Gregory Bowen..... He reiterated that the current situation in Grenada is sad as under the Mitchell-led government there is no separation of powers with the Executive, which is the Cabinet of Ministers, virtually running all the independent state institutions. (New Today. 2020).

Therefore, what we see here is the alleged involvement of government ministers placing blockages on the separation of powers, resulting in corrupt practices to be carried out.

While all the interviewees had a clear understanding of what behaviour constitutes a corrupt practice, one interviewee was able to elaborate further by giving examples of what was termed 'sophisticated corruption' in relation to awarding of contracts, by government administration over the years. These included several corruption scandals in Grenada all under the New National Party administration. The first scandal involved the government decision to establish a chicken farm, through a government facilitating project. As part of the project a Jamaican consultant was engaged as a project manager to oversee the programme and was remunerated quite substantially. However, as of to date there has never been a 'chicken or feather' produced, and no accountability by government as to where the monies have been channelled.

A further example of corruption in contracts was given by Interviewee 15 from St Vincent, who stated that corrupt practice was very much involved in the award of high value contracts in the country. Interviewee 15 referred to alleged incidents involving the PM's wife who has been awarded several contracts. She was awarded EC\$1.2m for decorating a hotel, which recently filed for bankruptcy. Additionally she was given the contract to decorate the new international airport.

What these incidents demonstrate is a form of elected dictatorship, whereby it is common for politicians to engage in corrupt behaviour and practices, without any consequences. A contributing factor is the deliberate restriction on elite competition, which as Archer (2008) notes results in minimal accountability from politicians and limited citizen challenges. This being deliberate by those in power to maximise their personal financial gain.

8.6 Historical

The two themes which were relevant in this section from the interview data were culture and tolerance, both of which relate directly to the focus of the thesis on patterns of 'cultural tolerance'.

8.6.1 Culture

In regard to culture there was some interesting data obtained from interviewees, that gave different perspectives on this issue. Interviewee 3, from Grenada, stated the culture in Grenada does not condone corruption:

‘I am not aware that culture in Grenada condones corruption at all.... I think that most Grenadians reject abuse of office, public office or private office, or any sort of abuse because most Grenadians have a sense of justice derived from their grounding of the Ten Commandments’.

Interviewee 7, from St. Vincent, explained that he did not think that culture had a role to play in corruption, due to the fact that people were not necessarily aware of what constituted a corrupt act.

‘I mean, your culture is your way of life, so if you’re accustomed doing something in a particular way, you will continue, so until such time that you change.... I think the issue is that that people don’t understand what is corruption so if you are not aware of what it is, then how can they address it.... So you may be corrupt as hell. I don’t know that you’re corrupt – so you’re offering me something, and I’m thinking oh, you’re just trying to be helpful to me – so I’m none the wiser’.

This comment actually speaks volumes about the whole issue of Caribbean cultural tolerance. First it corroborates that what constitutes corruption in one place, would not necessarily constitute corruption in another, as discussed in chapter two. As the interviewee says: ‘culture is your way of life, so if you’re

accustomed doing something in a particular way, you will continue'. The patronage system has been established for so long, it goes as unquestioned as corruption. For the interviewee, like so many others caught in the client/patron trap, the patron may indeed 'be corrupt as hell' but as far as the client is concerned 'you're just trying to be helpful to me.' Poverty or dependency does not allow for the kind of introspection which might lead to the survival threatening realisation that the client is complicit in the patron's corruption. Therefore for the client, unacknowledged patron corruption is a necessary survival meal ticket.

8.6.2 Tolerance

Differing views on whether there is some of kind of tolerance of corruption in Grenada and St. Vincent were advanced by interviewees.

Interviewee 9 explained that he did not feel that corruption was tolerated in Grenada as people are anti-corrupt, for sure. He contended that 'those people that are aware of corrupt practice and behaviour that politicians are alleged to have engaged in, will interject and speak out against it, and say no.... and I have found in recent years people are speaking out a lot about it'. Similarly, interviewee 9 from Grenada explained that he did not feel that corruption was culturally tolerated and gave his reasoning,

'I am not aware that culture in Grenada condones corruption at all ...As a result of this government tend to be cautious of how it is perceived as to try to make political mileage out of anti-corruption

provisions by homing down its opponent and trying to use corruption as a means of getting on’.

Yet interviewee 5 had a different view,

‘I would say yes, the culture in Grenada kind of breeds corruption. Because even if a politician is perceived to be corrupt, you hear people defending them saying it politics you know, these things happen; no man is perfect’.

However, what emerged from the St. Vincent perspective also reflected that the perceived levels of corruption are tolerated, as highlighted by interviewee 11 who stated,

‘You really do not have to look far to see that for Vincentians they accept that their politicians may be corrupt, and accept that this is O.K.’.

From the above, we see that while there is some reluctance to accept that culture ‘condones’ corruption, most interviewees accepted corruption as forming part of the culture in both Grenada and SVG.

8.7 Governance

8.7.1 Free and Fair Elections

The issue of election campaigns was discussed by four interviewees, two from Grenada and two from St. Vincent. The interviewees shared their experience

of corrupt practices that politicians engage in during election campaigns, some of the issues had similarities to the discussions in both Chapters Two and Three.

Interviewee 8 in Grenada spoke about corruption at the highest level of government during election time. Referring to New National Party (NNP) administration led by Prime Minister Keith Mitchell, which has been in government for some 16 years, the interviewee explained that he had witnessed NNP corruption leading up to election. This included the buying of votes, either by paying various sums of monies to constituents or by making promises to constituents about services/assistance to be rendered in exchange for their vote. This practice, the interviewee explained, was also commonly used to entice opposition supporters to change their political affiliation and vote for the NNP. In giving an example, the interviewee stated:

Look at Mr. X, a hard core, long standing NDC supporter over the years. In fact not just him, but his father, uncles and whole family have been NDC supporters for decades. At the last election, we see he jump ship to support the NNP. A lot of people were surprised by Mr. X actions. But when I asked him personally, what going on – why he jumped ship? He told me the money NNP giving him to fix up his house and build a road to his house, he could not turn that down. Yet he told me, it's only a vote – next time I going back to NDC'.

This position correlates with the discussion in Chapter Three pertaining to patronage and the issues of both poverty and survival amongst the disadvantaged in society.

Furthermore, interviewee 8 shared his recollection of an issue of corruption during the 2008 election campaign. The New National Party (NNP) under the Keith Mitchell's leadership lost the election to the New Democratic Congress (NDC) which came to power under Prime Minister Tilman Thomas. It is alleged that, during the campaign, the NNP government transferred 21 acres of prime land situated in Grand Beach to Lewis Hamilton, the Formula One driver (whose father is Grenadian) without any monies being exchanged. Consequently, when the NDC government came to office and attempts were made to acquire the Grand Beach property, it was found that the procedure dealing with acquisition of land had not been followed. No public acquisition notice had been posted. As a result, when the NDC lost the election in 2013, the new government under Prime Minister Mitchell stated that as procedure had not been followed, the acquisition was not lawful. According to the interviewee the failure to place the acquisition notice publicly was a blatant example of government corruption at the highest level and demonstrates the corrupt practices politicians are prepared to engage in during election time for their own personal gain.

The issue of engaging in corrupt activity for personal gain has been discussed throughout this thesis. The case study chapters also demonstrate that politicians are engaging in corrupt practices. However, another pertinent question is whether politicians view their position in government as a business,

and therefore take the opportunity to maximise their wealth as far as possible, as highlighted by Klavaren (2002). As a result there is an equation that corruption equals monopoly, plus discretion, minus accountability (Klitgaard, 1998). This equation neatly fits the instance of the proposed sale of property to Lewis Hamilton's family.

Further, Interviewee 8 explained that during election time 'corruption' is used as an issue by one political party, usually the opposition, against the governing party, to win votes, 'that is open to political purposes meaning one government can always use corruption to home down opponents'.

This is a common factor that is seen as a theme in the last twenty years in election campaigns across the Eastern Caribbean, as seen by the analysis of the local media reports in the Chapters Six & Seven. From this it is arguable, that it is accepted by politicians in the region that corruption is an issue of concern across the political spectrum.

Interviewee 12 shared an account and made specific reference to the former Prime Minister James Mitchell, who as the leader of the New Democratic Party (NDP) in St. Vincent, won four elections between 1984 and 1998, and spent almost seventeen years as Prime Minister. However, prior to his electoral victory James Mitchell campaigned against the then government on an anti-corruption platform. In his book entitled 'Caribbean Crusade our Rights of Passage' Mitchell, details what must be undertaken in St. Vincent to avoid corruption at the core of government. As Interviewee 12 explained:

‘The book was crafted by Mitchell to enable him to plan and practice all the corrupt acts that he would undertake when in office. As, once he was elected into office, all the things he wrote about concerning corrupt practices, is exactly what he did when he got into office’.

Here a pattern emerges: that political parties, especially when in opposition, include anti-corruption strategies in their election campaign. However, the reality is that once they are elected into office, it appears that they fall prey to the ‘temptation structure’ and renege on manifesto commitments, as evidenced through the actions of Prime Minister Mitchell, discussed above. Despite this recurring tendency, allegations pertaining to corruption during elections are rarely investigated. The case studies revealed that when opposition leaders raise issues of corruption during election campaigns, as was the case with Lennox Linton in Dominica in 2019, they are not heard or taken seriously. This situation is made more problematic by the fact the various election observers, despite finding irregularities with political parties and governments during election campaigns, fail to publicly declare any of these irregularities sufficiently to declare elections voidable. This I argue makes it more tempting for politicians to engage in corrupt activities during election campaigning.

8.8 Politics

This section captures the views of interviewees in relation to political influences and involvement in corruption. The interviewees in both Grenada and St. Vincent gave significant insight into these issues.

Influence

Some perceptions of influence were confused and even tautological, reflecting lack of information in the public domain. Interviewee 4 in Grenada, stated, 'So some politicians may be corrupt, but are also using their positions to address corruption'. This kind of statement is as illogical as Orwell's famous 'All animals are equal but some are more equal than others'. It is also indicative of a regime based on inequality, where trust in the state is minimal and the poor become trapped in the patronage system. As Uslaner (2014) notes corruption can only be fought successfully when combined with economic reform to which an education policy is central. This is clearly not the case in the Eastern Caribbean microstates, where neo-colonial oligarchies have entrenched themselves.

Interviewee 16 gave a similar perspective pertaining to St. Vincent seeking investors. She stated that inviting investors and giving them tax breaks should not be viewed as corrupt, but more as an incentive. This after all is what we want politicians to do, to bring betterment to the country. However, this is as long as the monies that investors bring into the country are spent on the country and not the politicians.

'Something that needs to be addressed, is when we invite the investors to come. People are still not happy. A lot is promised to these investors, a lot of tax incentives. The man on the ground is not understanding why incentives are important for investors. Not understanding the dynamics – and the man on the ground would view this as corruption, but this is not corruption'.

Involvement

One manner in which politics becomes involved in corruption is campaign financing. The Eastern Caribbean islands do not have campaign financing policies, and as a result there are no checks and balances in place to monitor how elections are financed by such donors. Indeed this was highlighted in the case studies in Chapter Three and documented by the various electoral commissions. Further Interviewee 6 stated,

‘A problem here in Grenada, unlike some other Caribbean countries we don’t have campaign financing policies. So, there is no checks and balances in terms of the amount of money that is coming into a party to run a campaign. So when the party wins, there is a saying that goes, who pays the piper calls the tune. They fund you, with the expectation that when you win, something is coming back to them’.

Another issue pertaining to political involvement in Grenada, is how politicians actually control issues of corruption by ensuring these issues do not reach the public domain until a politician may have moved on. For example we encounter the following when reviewing government finances in Grenada:

‘The Public accounts committee are reviewing accounts from 09/10 and we are now in the financial year 2016/17. So by the time any malpractice or corrupt acts are identified, time has passed, some may have left Grenada or died’.

Further, interviewee 3 raised concerns about the politician's involvement in the controversial Citizen By Investment programme in Grenada. The interviewee explained that she is fully aware that politicians' direct involvement in selling passports to applicants who are fugitives from other countries, or engaged in money laundering activity, has resulted in their exposure. The interviewee further advanced that while politicians are aware of such criminal activities, their scope to make personal gain leads them to turn a blind eye to rogue applicants.

8.9 Addressing Corruption

The issues for this final section of the chapter were broken down into four themes: legislation, initiatives, commissions and prosecutions. For each of the clusters interviewees had a depth of information to share, with commonalities evident in each of the responses.

8.9.1 Legislation

Legislation, featured quite significantly in most of the interviewee responses. The data demonstrated that most interviewees in Grenada were aware that while there had been some anti-corruption legislation over the years, there was limited enforcement and implementation. This was also the position of Vincentian interviewees, with one interviewee explaining that this was deliberate strategy of the Gonsalves administration. He contended that enactment of more anti corruption legislation might put politicians at risk of being further exposed of engagement in corrupt activity and of being prosecuted.

As highlighted by Interviewee 5, 'We hear about government talking about addressing corruption, however what we don't see is any laws to support this'.

A similar position was also offered by Interviewee 19 who explained from what they knew anti corruption legislation in St. Vincent is extremely limited. There is the Prevention of Corruption Act 2004, however it is not enforced. Therefore:

'You have to question the objective and purpose of enacting legislation in the first place, it's like a tick box, maybe to look good'.

Interviewee 22 stated that she was not aware that anti-corruption legislation even existed in St. Vincent as it is clear that politicians in power, do exactly what they want as they are not accountable.

The responses received are not surprising, as throughout the research it has been quite clear that anti-corruption legislation is very limited, with some of the most significant being implemented following countries becoming signatories to conventions such as United Nation Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). This echoes Interviewee 19's perception of legislation as 'a tick box' as opposed to a meaningful exercise, which is supported by limited corruption prosecutions brought against state officials in Eastern Caribbean countries, as discussed in the prosecution section below.

Exceptionally, one Grenadian interviewee felt that although Keith Mitchell may have previously been embroiled in corruption allegations, the government appeared to be making some inroads with anti-corruption legislation: 'When they came into office, they passed the Integrity in Public Life Act. So now you

have ministers who have to give account of their assets. So that is a good thing'. However, the issue remains what difference has enactment, as opposed to the enforcement, of legislation made in combatting and addressing corruption?

8.9.2 Commissions and Initiatives

The data gathered for anti corruption initiatives revealed that, as with legislation, interviewees did not feel the anti-corruption initiatives implemented were effective in assisting countries address corruption meaningfully. Interviewee 5 had reservations about the composition of the Grenada Integrity Commission and its objectivity due to the fact that its Chair was the wife of the then Attorney General,

If the Chair of the Commission is the wife of the Attorney General, how objective is the Commission? People will not and does not take it seriously because of these open conflicts. So, if we see malpractice taking place, we report it to the Integrity Commission, but what recourse is there? What recourse have we seen to date since the implementation of the Integrity Commission? None to date as far as I am aware.

This lack of objectivity and conflict of interests has serious implications regarding integrity in public office and corruption – who will guard the guards? It should be added that besides being the wife of the Attorney General, the Chair of the Grenada Integrity Commission has a legal practice representing foreign investors in the CBI programme, signing documents on behalf of both

clients and state. Additionally, the Grenada government has come under fire over the years, following approval of CBI applications to individuals who have been found to be engaged in criminal activity including money laundering and corruption.

In contrast to Grenada, St. Vincent participants had little to offer in regard to information about anti-corruption initiatives or commissions in the country. However, one interviewee did mention that there are no anti-corruption agencies in the country. In his view this was a deliberate omission as both political parties are corrupt, and oppose introducing any form of anti-corruption commission as this would mean that they would have to be accountable. As noted in Chapter 5, this lack of an Integrity Commission is in line with St Vincent having implemented the least amount of anti-corruption legislation of all the Eastern Caribbean countries.

8.9.3 Prosecutions

Although both Grenada and St. Vincent have enacted some anti-corruption legislation over the years, the issue remains that the legislation is not being enforced. There have been very few prosecutions brought against politicians for their involvement in corrupt practice, and even when there have been prosecutions these have been dealt with haphazardly with political interference.

As part of this research I wrote to the Director of Public Prosecutions in each of the Eastern Caribbean islands, enquiring how many state officials had been charged with corruption offences in the last fifteen years and, where charged, how many had actually been prosecuted. To date the only response received was from the DPP in St. Vincent. This lack of response may well be due to the fact that as all my research suggests, prosecutions against state officials for corruption are almost non-existent.

Interviewee 3 from Grenada, stated,

‘What is interesting is that time and time again we read about politicians being accused of engaging in corrupt acts. But once you read about it in the paper at the time nothing comes of it, as there are no charges brought on these politicians and no prosecutions. I believe this is deliberate as they are all in it together.’

Interviewee 11 from St. Vincent and Grenadines reiterated this point in reference to the case involving Gibson-Marks, the former High Court Registrar, who was fined EC \$10,500 following charges of theft, abuse of authority whilst serving in public office and being accused of corruption. The interviewee suggested that politicians intervened and as a direct result Gibson-Marks pleaded guilty to the charges of theft and abuse of office, which was dealt with at the Magistrate Court level. The more serious charge of corruption relating to falsification of certificates was dropped. Had this charge not been dropped then

the matter would have been transferred to the High Court, a situation the politicians resisted by blocking it.

8.10 Solutions

8.10.1 Change

The issue of change in addressing corruption emerged in the interviews when some interviewees gave their views as to what is required in order to enact change.

Interviewee 2 from Grenada stated,

‘I think from the Head of State, right down to Prime Minister and Ministers, need to start talking about what corruption is... and talk about what their plans are for addressing corruption. The different agencies and commissions need to start prosecuting people and making it public why, so setting examples, to make more people aware. Once you have a few high profile results, people will become more mindful and aware’.

Interviewee 7 in Grenada suggested that in the absence of enforcing legislation, there is a role for the various commissions, which may be more effective,

‘It is something you have to keep talking about all the time. Other than that you have a prosecution here and there when warranted of course. Then these Commissions, like the Integrity Commission, they are playing a role, and there is a role for them. Meaning that it

may be sometimes we don't have the hard evidence to bring a criminal prosecution, but if you can do an enquiry it can make life a little uncomfortable for some.... This is something that you are not going to fix once and for all.... You have to keep working at it'.

Two Vincentian interviewees suggested that an integrity commission and a local transparency international chapter would be two mechanisms by which politicians and citizens, could start looking differently at corruption and how it is dealt with.

Interviewee 17 was the sole respondent who observed that change would only come about,

'When politicians from all political parties accept that they are both aware of the corrupt practices..., as that is part of survival. However, they both have to come up with solutions on weaning themselves from engaging in corrupt practice, as it not sustainable'.

8.11 Conclusion

The data from the interviews generally corroborates the evidence presented throughout the thesis. Interviewees had no difficulty in providing definitions of corruption, which aligned to the abuse of power for personal gain. Furthermore, interviewees were able to give clear examples of what they viewed as constituting corrupt practices and behaviours of politicians. These examples evidenced that politicians engage in such practices for their own personal benefit, at the expense of others.

In the section of the chapter which looked at culture and tolerance, some participants failed to see culture's role in corruption, with one interviewee categorically stating that culture did not play a role. Another interviewee contended that culture could not have a role to play in corruption, as people were not aware of what constituted corruption in the first place. However, the consensus among interviewees suggests that there is a culture which while it does not condone corruption accepts it as commonplace and everyday behaviour, 'I would say yes, the culture in Grenada kind of breeds corruption. Because even if a politician is perceived to be corrupt, you hear people defending them saying it politics you know, these things happen; no man is perfect'. And 'You really do not have to look far to see that for Vincentians they accept that their politicians may be corrupt and accept that this is O.K'. This consensus, regardless of any confusion over what actually constitutes corruption, certainly supports my hypothesis of cultural tolerance. While no interviewees made references to history, culture and the interconnectivity with corruption, this is most likely due to the limitations of questions posed rather than lack of awareness.

The governance section data evidenced that overall interviewees are aware of the lack of transparency in relation to elections. The responses indicate that there are concerns pertaining to free and fair elections, with ministers involved in what interviewees viewed as corrupt practices. These responses are indeed aligned to some of the data from the case study media reports, where several reports made reference to politicians' interference in the election process, and through the various electoral observers reports.

The final section focussed on participants' awareness of mechanisms for addressing corruption. Analysis of Grenadian interviewees' responses indicates some awareness that legislation had been enacted and commissions and initiatives adopted, although these were not viewed as being effective in addressing issues of corruption. However, one interviewee acknowledged that Keith Mitchell's administration had recently made some progress. In SVG there was less awareness of existing legislation, with one interviewee commenting that they were unaware of any commissions or initiatives to deal with corruption. Given that SVG has enacted the least amount of anti-corruption legislation in the case study countries, this position is understandable. When it came to evaluating the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures, SVG interviewees were as sceptical as their Grenadian counterparts, The positions relating to the ineffectiveness of legislation and commissions are a reflection of the discussions in the chapters throughout the thesis.

In regard to solutions for dealing with the problem, the areas discussed by interviewees related to government being more open and discussing their strategy to enact change. Besides advocating transparency in areas like procurement, tendering, award of contracts, the cogent point was also made that enactment is not enforcement and that without the precedent of successful prosecutions, politicians will continue with their abuses of power and position as they are accountable to nobody. This lack of reliable accountability mechanisms, allied with lack of transparency directly contradicts those outsider perceptions of the case studies performing to democratic norms, as discussed in Chapter Seven.

Reviewing the interviewee perspectives, it becomes apparent that there is little awareness of path dependency, continuity of authoritarian and corrupt colonial practices or the economic vulnerability of micro states in the postcolonial world. To meaningfully address political corruption in the Caribbean will require taking all those issues into consideration when constructing a social and legal framework relevant to the contemporary Caribbean. Whether interviewees are aware of the raft of adopted anti-corruption measures or not does not render the legislation and measures ineffective in themselves. However, the combination of a culture of tolerating the status quo and an unfounded reliance on outsider assessments, data and solutions allows the worst to continue. These points will be developed further in the conclusion.

CHAPTER NINE

Discussion of Findings and Conclusions

'Corruption and hypocrisy ought not to be inevitable products of democracy, as they undoubtedly are today'.

Mahatma Gandhi

9.1 Introduction

The primary objective of this thesis is to examine whether corruption in Caribbean politics is culturally tolerated. This hypothesis has been framed and interrogated using a variety of strategies. These include: reviews of definitions of corruption and governance; providing an historical and socio-cultural background to contemporary Caribbean political culture and an overview of anti-corruption measures adopted. Case study chapters, utilising approaches discussed in the methodology chapter, sought to analyse perceptions of Caribbean political corruption from global and regional perspectives. Chapter Six presents data in relation to the WGI Voice and Accountability dimension and media reports to assess the five case study countries in relation to freedom of speech, freedom of press and free and fair elections. Chapter Seven examines data pertaining to the case study countries' assessment in relation to the WGI Control of Corruption dimension and media reports, while Chapter Eight presents an analysis of the findings undertaken in the two fieldwork counties Grenada and St. Vincent. Overall, analysis of the case studies and the resultant findings strongly suggests that the problems Caribbean countries face in addressing corruption can be attributed to the application of models introduced by organisations and countries in the West, which are unattuned to the specifics of Caribbean political culture. The responses of interviewees and a virtual total absence of prosecutions all demonstrate, political corruption in the Caribbean continues, largely with a default

setting of cultural tolerance, which can be summarised in the adage: If better can't be done, let the worst continue.

The thesis is wide ranging in scope and as such makes several contributions: First, to empirical data and second a contribution to theory. In addition to contributions made to knowledge throughout the main body of the thesis, the conclusion suggests areas for further research and offers insights into lessons learnt for policy and practice in addressing political corruption in the Caribbean. The chapter commences with a summary of findings followed by a review of their importance (9.2). Contributions to knowledge are elaborated in 9.3, while the final section addresses limitations in my research, recommendations for future research and developing effective corruption control in the Caribbean.

9.2 Summary and Significance of Findings

There are several key findings arising from the research. First, the failure of international first world models, whether applied for assessment purposes or implementing anti-corruption strategies in the Caribbean, to have a meaningful impact. This failure can be attributed to the second key finding: that international organisations do not recognise or factor in path dependency, the colonial and post/neo-colonial projects along with specific cultural factors when assessing the region. And third that there is a mismatch between outsider perceptions of Caribbean democracy and corruption control and lived experience/reality on the ground, reflected in local media reports and some of the interviewee responses in Chapter Eight.

The findings are important for highlighting limitations in the WGI data sources and data. These limitations result in inaccurate assessments, placing the Eastern

Caribbean countries higher in world rankings for both political rights and corruption control than reality on the ground warrants. For example WGI assessment of democratic norms (Chapter 6) places Dominica on a level with or very close to the UK, Germany and Portugal. Such inaccuracies call into question the validity of the WGI in regard to the Caribbean. They also create a false picture both within and outside the region, resulting in such misperceptions as the Caribbean's democratic robustness and relative freedom from corruption. These misperceptions are compounded by the international analysis of corruption control where there is a discrepancy between WGI findings, local media reports and interviewee responses, once again undermining the validity of WGI assessments. Logically these outsider assessments cannot be reconciled with the evidence of local media reports. The first key finding is vital for altering perceptions within the region, as currently politicians can ignore criticism or allegations of corruption by pointing to legislation and measures adopted, lack of prosecutions and indeed their legitimacy as 'democratically' elected leaders.

The second key finding that outsider assessment agencies fail to factor in the Caribbean's historical and cultural background and path dependency into their measurement criteria is equally important. This creates a blind spot, allowing for incorrect rankings and evaluation of democratic norms/corruption control, because as is argued both in Chapter Two and Three, while corruption is universal it has widely divergent local variations. The lack of knowledge about the region's specifics also creates misperceptions about its democratic status and a totally unfounded belief that the Westminster model functions well in the Eastern Caribbean. As has been argued throughout the thesis, a model of governance developed over a long period of time in a society with a far greater population than that of the entire Eastern Caribbean cannot successfully be grafted onto micro states, operating at an economic disadvantage due

to a long history of exploitation and with no democratic tradition. The plantation system and Boss politics are far more relevant to current Caribbean political culture than the Westminster model, which we have seen politicians subverting, obstructing or exploiting for their own ends.

The third key finding supports the first two and is crucial in providing a local counter-narrative. Local media and some interviewee responses contradict outsider perceptions of both democratic norms and corruption control. While the research demonstrates there is limited local data available on corruption across the case study countries, placing serious constraints on realistic analysis of Caribbean political culture, the local narrative is an important indicator. It demonstrates more awareness of corruption (as evidenced by the current scandal in the British Virgin Islands and recurring irregularities in the CBI programmes in the Eastern Caribbean) than there is of anti-corruption legislation and measures. Highlighting this local narrative can be used to leverage both greater transparency and accountability.

9.3 Contributions of the thesis

The thesis presents both theoretical and empirical approaches with the objective of incorporating the concept of cultural tolerance in assessing and addressing the anti-corruption agenda, mainly in the Eastern Caribbean. This thesis therefore aims to make several contributions to the development of new knowledge and current research in the field. First is the contribution to theory of 'cultural tolerance' and examining its relevance to corruption in the Caribbean. The findings of this thesis were crucial to testing the theory of cultural tolerance by developing and utilising both the data and findings to present original knowledge supported by evidence. Chapter Three is significant as a case is made that to deconstruct the concept of Caribbean 'cultural

tolerance' and grasp the dynamics of Caribbean political culture, an understanding of the region's history and culture is absolutely necessary.

In addressing the shortcomings in the current literature examining Caribbean countries' performance in relation to corruption this thesis makes a significant contribution to the existing empirical literature by gathering data essential for a comprehensive overview. This represents a significant empirical contribution and one which will benefit future research as well as helping shape sustainable solutions to corruption in Caribbean political culture.

9.4 Future Research and possibilities

As it stands this thesis will be of interest to a number of stakeholders, including policy-makers, NGOs, international organisations, campaigners, politicians, regulators and others. It will assist in looking at the tools used to assess Caribbean countries performance in relation to the anti – corruption agenda and create a better understanding of political culture and specifically the role tolerance plays in it. The thesis can be valuable in terms of future research. Similar research could be undertaken across the wider Caribbean basin to examine and analyse other Caribbean territories' political culture and corruption control. In the Eastern Caribbean, studies of Trinidad & Tobago and St Lucia would add both depth and data for comparison, as would research in other countries in the English-speaking Caribbean (Barbados, Jamaica) as well as UK dependent territories (Montserrat, the British Virgin Islands, Turks & Caicos, Cayman Islands. A comparative analysis of how the Westminster model functions throughout the Caribbean could provide a basis for reviewing its effectiveness and developing institutions and political processes more suited to the Caribbean.

Future research could allow for more extended and in-depth responses by formulating more specific questions, for example: The Prime Minister has been accused of corruption in the issuing of diplomatic passports. What is your view on the allegations? Or: Is corruption in election campaigns accepted as a necessary evil in order to survive? Or again: What measures would you suggest to make politicians and particularly PMs accountable? The topic of corruption is complex and from interviewee responses in Chapter Eight, we see that interviewees were either unaware of the historical background or did not feel it relevant to their responses. Future research could pose more open-ended questions which allow for fuller interviewee response, producing richer data.

9.5 Concluding Thoughts

The long process of researching, writing and editing this thesis has been a challenging, edifying, frustrating but ultimately rewarding experience. It has taken me out of my comfort zone as a Barrister, Attorney and management consultant and plunged me into the complexities of my ancestral homeland. It has enabled me to move beyond legal practice to making a contribution to analysing Caribbean political culture and creating a more equitable society. I am immensely grateful that my research necessitated wide reading in Caribbean history and culture, which has resulted.

On reflection, if I had to do it again I would definitely spend more time over semi-structured interviews and capturing responses to the issue of corruption from a much wider range of respondents than I managed this time. As my hypothesis of cultural tolerance relates especially to the disadvantaged who currently have little option in terms of survival than to accept the status quo, I would ensure that their voices, opinions and life experience were captured. My target groups were mostly composed

of professionals or members of the middle class, but as my reading of the region's history and my own experience has shown me, it has been the rural and urban poor who consistently suffer the abuses of corruption. I would ensure that I factored my hypothesis of cultural tolerance into questions for all interviewees. Some experimentation and mock interviews would aid in framing questions which elicited deeper, nuanced responses.

In conclusion, I am confident that this research will contribute to and have a life beyond the academy. It presents a new way of conceptualising corruption, which is relevant both to the Caribbean and the wider world. It is an addition to legal, sociological and political science studies in the region, which will hopefully inform and inspire a new generation of scholars and researchers. Most significantly for me it contests outsider assessments and misperceptions of the region and challenges dominant western narratives, with Caribbean complexities. As the Jamaicans say – we small but we talawa (strong) or as the Honourable Bob Marley sang: If you are a big tree we are a small axe. Hopefully this thesis can not only help unravel the dynamics of the Caribbean cultural tolerance of corruption but in doing so assist us regionally in recognising that the way forward from path dependence and the ravages of a violent history is not in the hands of outside agencies but our own.

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