

A Hierarchical HAZOP-Like Safety Analysis for Learning-Enabled Systems

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Abstract

Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) is a powerful safety analysis technique with a long history in industrial process control domain. With the increasing use of Machine Learning (ML) components in cyber physical systems—so called Learning-Enabled Systems (LESs), there is a recent trend of applying HAZOP-like analysis to LESs. While it shows a great potential to reserve the capability of doing sufficient and systematic safety analysis, there are new technical challenges raised by the novel characteristics of ML that require retrofit of the conventional HAZOP technique. In this regard, we present a new Hierarchical HAZOP-Like method for LESs (HILLS). To deal with the complexity of LESs, HILLS first does “divide and conquer” by stratifying the whole system into three levels, and then proceeds HAZOP on each level to identify (*latent-*)*hazards*, *causes*, *security threats* and *mitigation* (with new nodes and guide words). Finally, HILLS attempts at linking and propagating the causal relationship among those identified elements within and across the three levels via both qualitative and quantitative methods. We examine and illustrate the utility of HILLS by a case study on Autonomous Underwater Vehicles, with discussions on assumptions and extensions to real-world applications. HILLS, as a first HAZOP-like attempt on LESs that explicitly considers ML internal behaviours and its interactions with other components, not only uncovers the inherent difficulties of doing safety analysis for LESs, but also demonstrates a good potential to tackle them.

1 Introduction

After initially developed to support the chemical process industries (by Lawley [Lawley, 1974]), Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) has been successfully and widely applied in the past 50 years. It is generally acknowledged to

be an effective yet simple method to systematically identify safety hazards. HAZOP is a prescriptive analysis procedure designed to study the system operability by analysing the effects of any deviation from its design intent [Crawley and Tyler, 2015b]. A HAZOP does semi-formal, systematic, and critical examination of the process and engineering intentions of the process design. The potential for hazards or operability problems are thus assessed, and malfunction of individual components and associated consequences for the whole system can be identified [Dunjó *et al.*, 2010].

In recent years, increasingly sophisticated mathematical modelling processes from Machine Learning (ML) are being used to analyse complex data and then embedded into cyber physical systems—so called Learning-Enabled Systems (LESs). How to ensure the safety of LESs has become an enormous challenge [Lane *et al.*, 2016; Zhao *et al.*, 2020; Asaadi *et al.*, 2020]. As LESs are disruptively novel, they require new and advanced analysis for the complex requirements on their safe and reliable function [Bloomfield *et al.*, 2019]. Such analysis needs to be tailored to fully evaluate the new character of ML [Alves *et al.*, 2018; Burton *et al.*, 2020], making conventional methods including HAZOP and HAZOP-like variants (e.g., CHAZOP [Andow *et al.*, 1991] and PES-HAZOP [Burns and Pitblado, 1993] that are respectively introduced for computer-based and programmable electronic systems) obsolete. Moreover, LESs exhibit unprecedented complexity, while past experience suggests that HAZOP should be continuously retrofitted to accommodate more complex systems [Pasman and Rogers, 2016], considering quantitative analysis frameworks [Ozog, 1987; Cozzani *et al.*, 2007] and human factors [Aspinall, 2006]. To the best of our knowledge, there is no HAZOP-like safety analysis dedicated for LESs that takes into account ML characters while preserving the simplicity and effectiveness of HAZOP (comparing to other conventional safety analysis methods [Sun *et al.*, 2022]), which motivates this research.

In this paper, we introduce a new Hierarchical HAZOP-Like method for LESs (HILLS). HILLS first stratifies the complex LESs into three levels—System Level, ML-Lifecycle Level and Inner-ML Level, then applies HAZOP separately on each level to identify safety elements of interest, namely *causes*, *mitigation*, *hazards* (or *latent-hazards* for latent levels that cannot directly lead to mishaps) and *security threats*. When applying HAZOP on the ML related lev-

els, we revise HAZOP to cope with ML characteristics, e.g., by introducing new ways of defining nodes and new sets of guide words. We also identify causes of hazards from the ML *development process* (modelled by the ML-Lifecycle level) to reflect its data-driven nature (e.g., how data is collected, processed, etc). Furthermore, we attempt to address the challenge of how to link and propagate those identified safety elements within and across three levels, then propose both qualitative and quantitative (an initial Bayesian Belief Network (BN) solution) methods to model the casual relationships. To examine the effectiveness and demonstrate the use case of HILLS, we finally conduct a case study on Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs), with discussions on assumptions adopted and extensions to real-world applications.

The key contributions of this work include:

- a) A first HAZOP-like safety analysis for LESs that explicitly considers ML characters (including security threats and the data-driven nature in the development process) and reduces the complexity by hierarchical design.
- b) New considerations of dividing nodes in the system representation and a set of new guide words that adapt the traditional HAZOP method for lower levels regarding ML models.
- c) A first attempt at linking/propagating identified *causes, mitigation, (latent)-hazards & threats* across ML levels.
- d) Key challenges identified as a set of research questions that are generic to safety analysis for LESs in future research.

2 Preliminaries: HAZOP

HAZOP is an inductive hazard assessment method that is conducted by an expert team. It systematically investigates each element in the system with the goal to find the potential situation that could cause the element to pose hazards or limit the system's normal operations.

There are four basic steps to perform the HAZOP:

- Define the project scope/aims, and form the expert team.
- Identify system elements and model the system as a system representation.
- Consider possible deviation of operational parameters.
- Identify hazards, causes and mitigation solutions.

Once the four steps are completed, team members may generate additional safety requirements if necessary to mitigate or prevent the identified issues, leading to improvement of the system. More details are given for each step of HAZOP as what follows.

Form HAZOP team

To perform HAZOP, a team of specialists is formed according to the project scope and aims. These experts have extensive experience, expert knowledge and understand the overall procedures of the system deeply, such as operations, maintenance and engineering design.

Identify system elements

The HAZOP team will formally represent the system under study by identifying the elements. Each element is called a **Node**, representing an operational function. Then, nodes and interactions between nodes (e.g., data/control flows) collectively form the system representation under analysis.

Consider deviations of operational parameters

HAZOP assumes that a problem can only arise when there are some **Deviations** from the intent design. HAZOP searches for deviations in the system representation. The deviation on a node is expressed as the combination of **Guide Words** and process **Attributes**.

Each guide word is a short word to create the imagination of a deviation of the design/process intent. The most commonly used guide words are: no, more, less, as well as, part of, other than, and so on. Guide words provide a systematic and consistent means of brainstorming potential deviations to normal operations. Each guide word has a specific meaning, e.g., *no* means the complete negation of the design intention, *early* means something occurred earlier than intended time.

Attributes are closely related to nodes, and are usually the subject of the action being performed. The definition of attributes relies on expert knowledge.

Identify hazards, causes and mitigation

Where the result of a deviation would be a danger to workers or to the production process, a potential problem is found. **Hazard (H)** is a source of potential damage, harm or adverse health effects on something/someone, while mishaps are damages or harms on something/someone. **Cause (C)** is the reasons why the deviation could occur. It is possible that several causes are identified for one deviation. **Mitigation (M)** helps to reduce the occurrence frequency of the deviations or to mitigate their consequences. Hazards, causes, and mitigation are usually assigned with their respective IDs.

3 Problem Statement

Given HAZOP was not originally designed for LESs, inevitably new problems arise when attempting to apply HAZOP on LESs. These problems are formalized as a set of research questions (RQs) proposed in this section. We first present the *rationale* behind those RQs (i.e., justification of how we have come to the RQs) and then articulate what would be the *expected solution* to each RQ.

RQ1: How to reduce the complexity of LESs so that HAZOP can be effectively applied to? HAZOP is a semi-formalised analytical method, used to identify the hazard scenarios of a defined process, and it has been successfully used on *relatively simple* systems. When facing a complex system, HAZOP often cannot play its role well. LESs exhibit unprecedented complexity, rendering directly applying HAZOP to LESs infeasible. Therefore, we need to reduce the complexity in the system representation. A simple yet effective solution is by “divide and conquer”, e.g., stratifying a complex system into multiple levels. In this regard, we believe a promising solution to RQ1 is to propose a hierarchical system representation, so that HAZOP can be effectively applied.

RQ2: How to define nodes in each level, especially for novel levels regarding ML? We assume that HAZOP can effectively handle a single level system representation, as we expect to introduce a hierarchical structure in the RQ1 solution. The second step of HAZOP is to divide nodes at each level (presuming we already have a group of experts as the HAZOP team). Past experience shows that division of

nodes can be based on the functionalities of components in the system [Slater, 2015], so we may continue using such traditional method for those non-ML related levels. However, when there are ML components in the system under analysis, it is difficult for the traditional division method of nodes to be directly applied. Therefore, RQ2 is raised to explore the novel definition of “functionalities” at ML-related levels.

RQ3: Will there be any new guide words related to ML? Guide word is one of the key compositions of a deviation. The team of experts is responsible for identifying guide words that fit the scope of their analysis, while common guide words used were **No, Less/More, Slower/Faster, Early/Late**, etc. However, the existing set of guide words is unproven for use in ML applications, so this RQ aims at determining the effectiveness and new meanings of known guide words for ML related levels, and checking whether there might be missing guide words. Although we expect most of the known guide words can still be applicable, they might miss some deviations given the new characteristics of ML. Thus, prospective new guide words may be introduced.

RQ4: How to establish the relationship between identified safety elements across levels? For simplicity, HAZOP is expected to be applied separately to each level of a hierarchical system representation. Therefore, to get the safety analysis of the whole complex system, it is necessary to study the relationship between identified safety elements—namely causes, mitigation, hazards (and latent-hazards)—across different levels. Then, based on the nature of the relationship (e.g., causal or not, quantitative or qualitative, probabilistic or deterministic), proper formalism should be used to establish and express such relationship of those hazard analysis results collected from each level.

4 Running Example




Figure 1: Workflow diagram of the running example

We present a running example from the SOLITUDE project¹, which conducts safety analysis on an AUV that autonomously finds a dock and performs the docking task. The workflow of the scenario is given in Figure 1. The robot starts

¹https://github.com/Solitude-SAMR/UWV_RAM

when received the user’s command. Once started, it uses sensors (e.g., cameras) to receive data. Data is transmitted and preprocessed before feeding into the YOLO model for object detection and localisation. The localisation result is further utilised for path planning. In addition, the above normal workflow may suffer from external attacks on some stages, including data transmission, data preparation, and path planning. We remark that, the scenario in the project is more complex, including utilising deep reinforcement learning for motion planning, but for the space limit, this paper only focuses on the perception component.

5 Proposed Method

In this section, we present the HILLS method, and compare it with HAZOP. HILLS is inheriting from HAZOP the basic structure composition and definitions of elements, with extensions that are suitable for LESs. The tables and figures presented in this section are partial for illustrative purpose only, cf. the complete HILLS analysis results based on the SOLITUDE project at the GitHub repository¹.

5.1 Hierarchical HAZOP

As shown in Figure 2, HILLS has a three-level structure, including *system level*, *ML-lifecycle level* and *inner-ML level*. We analyse each level individually in this subsection, and discuss their relations in Section 5.2. Note, the HILLS structure discussed here is generic (for illustration purpose), and may be subject to adaptation when working with specific systems.




Figure 2: The 3 level hierarchical structure of HILLS

System level

HILLS at the system level largely follows HAZOP. Hardware, software, and ML components of an LES represent different functions, and they will be categorized as different **Nodes**. Consider the running example in Figure 1, “blue blocks” represent the functional areas of the running example, which means that our nodes can be set according to these blocks. An example of setting nodes is provided in Table 1. We note, the setting of nodes is specific to the system under investigation. E.g., the node “Labeling” was not included in Figure 1.

Table 1: Nodes in each level in SOLITUDE example

Level	Node	Description
System level	Node 1	User
System level	Node 2	Hardware components
System level	Node 3	Data transmission
ML-lifecycle level	Node 4	Data collection
ML-lifecycle level	Node 5	Labeling
ML-lifecycle level	Node 6	Data preprocessing
ML-lifecycle level	Node 7	Hyperparameter setting
ML-lifecycle level	Node 8	Model deployment
Inner-ML level	Node 9	Feature Extracting
Inner-ML level	Node 10	Object Detection
ML-lifecycle level	Node 11	Localisation

Some guide words originated from, e.g., the chemical industry can still be used in LESs. Attributes related to the LES are used together with the guide words to express deviations.

Example 1. *At system level, we discovered several hazards from the running example, some of them are summarised in Table 2. E.g., one of the hazards is “erratic trajectory”, suggesting that the robot moves into an unsafe area. This hazard is associated with a deviation “no action” where “no” is the guide word and “action” is the attribute (when the AUV takes no actions in the water, the disturbance of current makes it difficult for the robot to maintain a stable trajectory). One of the causes of this hazard is “no data from sensor”, which can be mitigated with, e.g., the deployment of an acoustic guidance system as a duplicated perception component based on another sensor.*

Example 2. *Some hazards, such as “erratic trajectory”, may appear in different nodes, which suggests that they may occur more often, and thus may have the higher priority to be mitigated after considering the severity of consequences as well.*

Example 3. *One hazard can be mitigated in different ways. For example, we identified several mitigation solutions for the “erratic trajectory”, most of which focus on early prevention, such as “maximum safe distance maintained if uncertain” and “camera health monitor”.*

HILLS aims to exhaustively cover all potential hazards. In the running example, the possible causes of crashes or failing to turn directions when facing obstacles may include “no data from sensors (instantaneous or permanent)”, and “misclassification”, corresponding to the errors in hardware and software components, respectively. However, the hazards, causes or mitigation may not be fully identifiable at this level. For example, there are other mitigation solutions for the cause “misclassification” that need to consider how the ML component is trained and constructed. However, the system level alone cannot naturally include relevant nodes for this purpose. This motivates us to consider other levels (as discussed below).

ML-Lifecycle level

The key motivation for the ML-lifecycle level is to handle the complexity arising from the integration of ML components into an LES, considering mainly the human factors and security threats involved in the *development process* of ML

models. Thus, deviations from this level cannot be identified if analysis was only conducted at the system level. On the other hand, the hazards at system level may be attributed to the hazards at ML-lifecycle level, e.g., the low prediction accuracy of ML component may be caused by the polluted data in the data collection or insufficient epochs of training.

For the running example, through the analysis at the ML-lifecycle level, we know that the low accuracy of the results may be caused by inaccurate labeling. We remark that, deviations identified at non system level are called **Latent-hazards (LH)**, as they pose *indirect* hazards from latent levels with no hardware components being interacted and thus cannot directly lead to mishaps.

Table 3 presents a set of guide words that are required at this level. These guide words are redefined from the existing guide words in HAZOP. Table 3 includes both their original meanings (in HAZOP) and new meanings (in HILLS). “part of” represents a qualitative modification in the original meaning, and in HILLS it may mean the incompleteness of the structures, definitions, or settings. For “Less” and “More”, considering that we are concerned about data flow and data value, their new meanings refer to the amount of data rather than, e.g., the water volume.

Safety analysis at the ML-lifecycle level can exhibit new latent-hazards, as shown in Table 4. While ML models are subject to security issues, we believe malicious attacking behaviors should also be considered as security **Threats (T)**.

Human factors are considered because ML development is a human-centered process, which makes possible some human related errors such as labelling errors, part of operations were forgotten and the omission of data preparation. Aforementioned mistakes are direct human errors. There are also adversarial attacks that can lead to significant drop in performance, which are classified as security threats. A few examples are shown in Table 4.

Example 4. *On the node “data collection”, there is a threat “data poisoning”, which occurs because the input data is contaminated. A suggested mitigation is to deploy a detector based on data provenance.*

Example 5. *For ML components, we identified mitigation, e.g., “classifier reliability for critical objects $>X$ ” [Zhao et al., 2021a], to reduce misclassifications with safety impacts.*

Example 6. *For the latent-hazards “low prediction accuracy”, its causes include “users make mistakes on labelling”, “data itself is missing”, and “data itself is incomplete”, each of which has their suggested mitigation (cf. Table 4).*

Example 7. *There is a deviation “attack”, whose threats are various attacks, e.g., evasion attack, backdoor attack, and data poisoning attack. Their respective cause is usually that a certain entity in the training or inference of an ML model (e.g., input instance, model structure, training, dataset) is perturbed, modified, or contaminated. Their respective mitigation can be very specific (cf. Table 4), e.g., the backdoor detector in [Huang et al., 2022] for tree ensemble classifiers.*

Inner-ML level

ML components such as YOLO are composed of one or more ML models, each of which is formed of a set of functional

Table 2: System level analysis (partial)

Node	Deviation	Hazard	Cause	Mitigation
Data transmission (Flow from camera to classifier)	No action	Erratic trajectory	No data from sensor (transient)	Acoustic guidance system
Data transmission (Flow from camera to classifier)	No action	Erratic trajectory	No data from sensor (transient)	Situational awareness (route mapped and planned in advance)
Data transmission (Flow from camera to classifier)	No action	Erratic trajectory	No data from sensor (transient)	Maximum safe distance maintained if uncertain
Data transmission (Flow from camera to classifier)	No action	Insufficient energy/power	No data from sensor (permanent)	Camera health monitor (e.g. sanity check for blank images)
Data transmission (Data flow)	Part of action	Erratic trajectory	Corrupted sensor data	Reliable camera (robust to environment etc.)
Data transmission (Data value)	Wrong value	Loss of communication	Hardware breakdown	Hardware monitor
Data transmission (Data value)	Wrong value	Loss of communication	Information conflict/lag	Maximum safe distance maintained if uncertain

Table 3: Redefined guide words in the ML-Lifecycle level

Guide word	Part of
Original meaning	There is a qualitative modification
New Meaning	Incomplete structure, definition or setting
Guide word	Less
Original meaning	Too little water or additive volume added
New Meaning	A less amount of data
Guide word	More
Original meaning	Too much water or additive volume added
New Meaning	A large amount of data

layers. Even after a thorough analysis of all possible deviations (with mitigation solutions) in the ML development process modelled by our ML-lifecycle level, the ML components may not perform as expected, e.g., the convolutional layers fail to extract features accurately, and the fully connected layers fail to make reliable classifications. Thus, safety analysis on the internal structure of an ML component is required.

At the inner-ML level, HILLS takes the method of extracting basic layers of an ML component to form a model for analysis. To cater for different complexity of the ML component, two extraction methods are proposed. The first one deals with simple models with up to 5 layers. It follows the layer structure and considers each layer to represent a separate functionality. Consequently, each layer is defined as a node in the system representation. The second one deals with more complex, larger models by abstracting a model into several functional *blocks* and every block may contain a number of layers. Our analysis in the running example follows the second method.

We identified several new guide words, as shown in Table 5, which are highly relevant to the setup of the ML component and data flow. It is worth noting that the “Perturbed” is a special guide word that is needed when considering the existence of an external attacker.

Example 8. *Deviations containing “perturbed” are usually proprietary attacks, e.g., we record “perturbed dataset” as “attack” and the threat as “data poisoning” (cf. Table 4).*

As shown in Table 6, HILLS performs analysis inside an ML model, which in general is closely related to the internal structure of the model.

Example 9. *When the ML component has wrong output, we can get from the inner-ML level analysis that this may be related to the setting of the hyperparameter. Explainable AI (XAI) methods may help users to, e.g., locate which layer of neurons contribute the most to the wrong ML behaviours [Bach et al., 2015] and detect backdoors [Zhao et al., 2021b].*

Example 10. *At the inner-ML level, we focus on the ML model structure itself. E.g., unsuitable parameter setting in activation functions or pooling layers also make specific latent-hazards. It also leads to wrong outputs or losing part of information of figures (cf. Table 6).*

Further Considerations on Use Cases of HILLS

HAZOP is to provide a systematic, critical examination of the process (and engineering intent) of a new or existing facility, and should normally be done before the system is officially put into service [Jurkiewicz et al., 2015]. Nevertheless, we believe that HILLS can still be applied after the occurrence of an accident, in particular the recent technologies have enabled the recording of system executions through, e.g., direct observation, recorded video, or snapshot images. HILLS may use the recordings to identify related causes and hazards.

Moreover, we note the following points when using HILLS. First, when dealing with an LES, we focus on the workflow or the pipeline diagram of the entire system, to identify nodes according to the method we explained earlier. The analysis at the system level can help us identify the hazards sourced from the ML components, to enable the analysis at the lower levels. Second, guide words will be combined with the attributes of each node to form deviations. This will proceed sequentially following the level structure of HILLS, i.e., the deviations at the system level will be identified first, followed by the ML-lifecycle level, and the inner-ML level. Third, before looking for (latent-)hazards, causes, and mitigation at each level, we are based on a reasonable assumption that mitigation solutions of higher levels are easier than lower levels. That said, HILLS may not need to be conducted at the inner-ML level, and can stop when all hazards are found and mitigated at other levels.

5.2 Relations Between Levels

Up to now, we have identified the nodes, attributes, guide words, (latent-)hazards, threats, causes, and mitigation solutions for individual levels in the HILLS framework. We also notice that the relations between these elements can be very complicated. This calls for a formal analysis of the relations. While formalising the relations between levels is a significant challenge, and there might not be one best way, we propose to study them both qualitatively and quantitatively.

Qualitative Analysis

Qualitative analysis studies the connections between levels, with the guide words as entry points. The guide words and the deviations may have the following connections.

First of all, the same guide words at a level have strong associations, even if they are combined with different attributes.

Table 4: ML-lifecycle level analysis (partial)

Node	Deviation	Latent-hazard & Threat	Cause	Mitigation
Labeling (Manually label data)	Wrong label	Low prediction accuracy	Users make mistake with labeling	Keep classifier accuracy/reliability for critical objects >X
Labeling (Manually label data)	Wrong label	Low prediction accuracy	Users make mistake with labeling	Sanity check for ground truth and label attribute
Labeling (Manually label data)	Incapable label	Low prediction accuracy	Data itself is incomplete	Keep classifier accuracy/reliability for critical objects >X
Labeling (Manually label data)	Incapable label	Low prediction accuracy	Data itself is incomplete	Sanity check for ground truth and label attribute
Data collection	Attacked	Data Poisoning	Input data is contaminated	Detection based on data provenance
Data preprocessing	Part of data washing	Incorrect data ranges	Data washing incomplete	Consistency Check (e.g. Value range)
Hyperparameter setting	Wrong setting	Inappropriate hyperparameter	User make mistake with setting	Sanity check to hyperparameter
Hyperparameter setting	Wrong setting	Inappropriate hyperparameter	Unsuitable hyperparameter for setting	Continuing monitor to hyperparameter
Model deployment	Attacked	Robustness Attacks	Insert a calculated disturbance into the input data	Defensive Distillation
Model deployment	Attacked	Backdoor	Insert disturbance into the input data	XAI explain to input
Localisation	No Localisation	Lose estimation of position	Hardware (sensors) breakdown	Situational awareness (route mapped and planned in advance)
Localisation	No Localisation	Lose estimation of position	Hardware mismatch	Common time to synchronise data and results
Localisation	Wrong Localisation	Misposition	Slip rate too large	Situational awareness (route mapped and planned in advance)
Localisation	Wrong Localisation	Misposition	Combination miss between hardware and ML	Common time to synchronise data and results

Table 5: New guide words of ML-Lifecycle and inner-ML levels

Guide words	Meaning
Wrong	Wrong setting or data value
Invalid	Invalid data value or data flow, possibly conflicting with other components
Incomplete	Incomplete data value
Perturbed	Data was perturbed by external attackers
Incapable	Part of data can not be labeled

Second, if a guide word is the same between different levels, the one in the higher level may contribute as the main reason for the latent-hazard of the lower level.

Example 11. We use “no” as an example. We can get a deviation “no action” at the system level, and have the deviation “no localisation” in the ML-lifecycle level. Given they share the same guide word, we should consider whether the “no localisation” has a causality relation with the “no action”.

Moreover, it is assumed that there is an inclusive relationship between the guide words of the higher level and lower level, such as “no” and “part of”, or there are similar meanings, such as “invalid” or “incompatible”.

The existence of a guide word with an inclusive relationship suggests that for the latent-hazard found in the lower level, its cause may belong to the higher level.

Example 12. If we choose “No action” at system level and “Part of definition” at the ML-lifecycle level (e.g., images without defined labels), then we may establish an inclusive relationship between “No” and “Part of”.

Example 13. We use “invalid data value” and “incompatible data value” as examples, “incompatible data value” may lead to the low accuracy of output or no results, it has a similar meaning with “invalid data value”.

Selecting guide words is arguably a quite subjective activity that experts may use different guide words with similar semantics to identify the same cause. To this end, the proposed way of establishing relationships across levels can only cope with the ideal case in which identical guide words are used. Thus, alternative methods are still needed for other cases, which forms our important future work.

Quantitative Analysis

A BN is a graphical model that presents probabilistic relationships between a set of variables by determining causal relationships between them [Lee *et al.*, 2009]. It is also a powerful tool for knowledge representation and reasoning under uncertainty, visually presenting probabilistic relationships between a set of variables [Cheng *et al.*, 2002]. Actually, BN has already been used to study the relation between latent features learned by a deep neural network [Berthier *et al.*, 2021]. While using BN to express relationship of elements is not a new idea in traditional safety analysis [Thomas and Groth, 2021; Denney *et al.*, 2011; Zhao *et al.*, 2012]. We take the relationship between several elements at the ML-lifecycle level and the inner-ML level as an example to explore the possibility of using BN to represent it. This is an idea of quantitatively expressing relationships, since the higher level contains some abstract concepts, it is difficult to represent in variables. Even if we assume that abstract concepts are represented using variables, it is hard to present Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs) as a prerequisite for BN to start. All parameters used to quantify BN must be obtained based on system background and expert knowledge.




Figure 3: A BN model fragment (with illustrative probabilities)

Figure 3 shows a fragment of the BN model for the running example, considering several security threats between the ML-lifecycle level and the inner-ML level. The nodes of a BN can represent threats ($Tl.i$), causes ($Cl.i$), or mitigation ($Ml.i$), where variable $l \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ ranges over the levels in HILLS and i is the index of the threat/cause/mitigation at a level. E.g., $T2.i$ is the i -th threat at ML-lifecycle level.

Besides, we need to assign CPT to each non-leaf node of the BN, and assign a prior probability to the leaf or set the observed evidence probability node. It is noted that the expert knowledge is needed for both the construction of the basic

Table 6: Inner-ML level analysis (partial)

Node	Deviation	Latent-hazard & Threat	Cause	Mitigation
Feature extracting	Imprecise extracting	Wrong outputs	Less layers	Using deeper layers
Feature extracting	Wrong extracting	Wrong outputs	Wrong hyperparameter setting	Using Explainable AI (XAI) to locate
Feature extracting	Wrong extracting	Wrong outputs	Unsuitable kernel size setting	Kernel size need to match dataset size
Feature extracting	Wrong extracting	Dying ReLU problem	Learning rate setting too large	Choosing suitable learning rate for ReLU (activation function)
Feature extracting	Wrong extracting	Losing information of figures	Unsuitable parameter setting in pooling layer	Evaluate whether need pooling layer
Feature extracting	Wrong extracting	Losing information of figures	Unsuitable parameter setting in pooling layer	Choose an appropriate pooling type

structure and the assignment of CPTs. The probabilities used in Figure 3 are for illustrative purposes, while more enlightening examples can be found in [Berthier *et al.*, 2021].

Example 14. *For threat nodes with no incoming arrows, such as $T2.i$ and $T3.i$, we may set the probability of their occurrence to 100 percent.*

Once constructed, we can make probabilistic inference on the BN to ensure that the construction is correct w.r.t. expert knowledge. The following are two typical examples, by applying the d-separation algorithm [Koller and Friedman, 2009] (for determining dependencies of variables in a BN).

Example 15. *There may be multiple children nodes at different levels for a parent node. In Figure 3, the threat $T2.i$ has two causes, $C2.a$ and $C3.a$, at the ML-lifecycle level and inner-ML level, respectively. While the two causes may be mitigated separately as they belong to different levels, the effectiveness of their respective mitigation might affect the probabilistic inference based on each other’s CPT (under the condition that the probability for $T2.1$ is not observable).*

Example 16. *There may be multiple parent nodes for a child node. In Figure 3, the mitigation $M2.a$, has two causes, $C2.a$ and $C2.b$, representing that one mitigation may support two causes. By observing the effectiveness of the mitigation (i.e., the CPT of $M2.a$), we will infer how one cause $C2.a$ may influence the other cause $C2.b$ and vice versa.*

We note, the construction of the BN structure and CPTs, as well as the above probabilistic inference, should be discussed and accepted by domain experts and all stakeholders. We believe BN is potentially a powerful tool for the purpose of modelling probabilistic causality relationship between elements of ML related levels, while how to apply BN in practice in the context of HILLS remains an open challenge.

6 Related Work

HAZOP HAZOP is widely used in industrial domains, such as nuclear power [Rimkevičius *et al.*, 2016] and chemical industry [Tian *et al.*, 2015]. In recent years, there has been efforts on integrating HAZOP with other methods [Marhaviilas *et al.*, 2020; Danko *et al.*, 2019] to analyse common causes and system scenarios [Roche *et al.*, 2019]. A comprehensive review of those techniques may refer to recent survey papers, e.g. [Crawley and Tyler, 2015a]. The application of HAZOP on computer-based systems first appears in [Chudleigh and Catmur, 1992]. After that, the experience gained from application of HAZOP and related techniques to computer-based systems was summarised in [Kletz, 1997]. There is a recent trend of applying HAZOP-like analysis to LESSs, e.g., in autonomous driving context [Kramer *et al.*, 2020].

Hierarchical structure The concept of hierarchy is not new, but existing papers either focus on the hierarchical priority of the analysis order in the HAZOP analysis process [Othman *et al.*, 2016] or consider the direct application of the HAZOP to the hierarchical structure of traditional systems with no ML components [Németh *et al.*, 2003]. A hierarchical structure is needed for its suitability to work with ML components (black-box in general, and inside the black-box, it is a layer-structure with each layer being a simple mathematical function). In HILLS, we innovatively consider the interaction between humans and ML components and the internal structure of the ML components. Moreover, inspired by [Wallace, 2005], we investigate how to link and propagate identified safety elements at different levels.

STPA STAMP (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes) is also a very popular safety analysis method. STAMP uses three fundamental concepts from system theory: Emergence and hierarchy, communication and control, and process models [Leveson, 2011]. STPA (System-Theoretic Process Analysis) uses such techniques, being based on the STAMP model. STPA pays more attention to the overall control loop and process analysis of the system, and focuses on unsafe control actions and causal factors in a control structure. It is widely used in railway safety assurances [Yang *et al.*, 2019], cyber safety and security [Kaneko *et al.*, 2018], robotics [Adriaensen *et al.*, 2021] and driver-vehicle interactions [Chen *et al.*, 2020]. STPA is also used to explore a hierarchical structural safety analysis framework in [Chaal *et al.*, 2020]. Comparing to STPA, HAZOP is relatively easier to conduct and clearer to communicate, supported by structural decomposition of the system functions [Sun *et al.*, 2022]. We start with retrofitting HAZOP for LESSs, while STPA offers a new perspective to consider the feasibility of hierarchical safety analysis on LESSs which is our planned future work.

7 Conclusion

We propose a hierarchical HAZOP-like method, HILLS, for the safety analysis of LESSs. Being different from the traditional HAZOP, HILLS analyses LESSs in a hierarchical way, disentangling the complexity by working with three separate levels first and then establishing their relations via both qualitative and quantitative methods, e.g., BNs. HILLS is applied to a practical example of AUVs, with the discovery of new guide words as well as new causes and mitigation related to ML. HILLS complements HAZOP when working with LESSs, and is able to identify safety hazards and security threats related to ML components through its structural advantages.

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