Stable Matching Games



Garrido-Lucero, F and Laraki, R ORCID: 0000-0002-4898-2424
(2022) Stable Matching Games. .

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Abstract

Gale and Shapley introduced a matching problem between two sets of agents where each agent on one side has an exogenous preference ordering over the agents on the other side. They defined a matching as stable if no unmatched pair can both improve their utility by forming a new pair. They proved, algorithmically, the existence of a stable matching. Shapley and Shubik, Demange and Gale, and many others extended the model by allowing monetary transfers. We offer a further extension by assuming that matched couples obtain their payoff endogenously as the outcome of a strategic game they have to play in a usual non-cooperative sense (without commitment) or in a semi-cooperative way (with commitment, as the outcome of a bilateral binding contract in which each player is responsible for his/her part of the contract). Depending on whether the players can commit or not, we define in each case a solution concept that combines Gale-Shapley pairwise stability with a (generalized) Nash equilibrium stability. In each case, we give the necessary and sufficient conditions for the set of stable allocations to be non-empty, we study its lattice structure, and provide an algorithm that converges to its maximal element. Finally, we prove that our second model -with commitment- encompasses and refines most of the literature.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Unspecified)
Divisions: Faculty of Science and Engineering > School of Electrical Engineering, Electronics and Computer Science
Depositing User: Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited: 15 Aug 2022 13:11
Last Modified: 18 Jan 2023 20:53
URI: https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3161053