

Cash Crops and Clichés

Agriculture, Contact Zones, and Afterlives of Belgian Colonialism

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Imperialism after all is an act of geographical violence through which virtually every space in the world is explored, charted, and finally brought under control.¹

The writing of new spatial relations (territorialization) was, ultimately, tantamount to the production of boundaries and hierarchies, zones and enclaves; the subversion of existing property arrangements; the classification of people according to different categories; resource extraction; and, finally, the manufacturing of a large reservoir of cultural imaginaries. These imaginaries gave meaning to the enactment of differential rights to differing categories of people for different purposes within the same space; in brief, the exercise of sovereignty. Space was therefore the raw material of sovereignty and the violence it carried with it.²

In a chapter entitled ‘Land Reforms in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)’, Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo traces land rights and land reforms from the precolonial to the postcolonial period and writes, on the impact of Belgian colonial occupation of the Congo, that ‘[l]and, as an integral element of the process of production, was a structuring element of the “colonial modernization”’.³ He goes on to demonstrate how, ‘[t]his so-called modernization is referred to as the beginning of the system of deconstruction of the Congo through Europeanization of the system of control and production, as well as the introduction of the new religious and capitalistic value systems’.⁴ In doing so, Lumumba-Kasongo emphasises the centrality of land for the exercise of civilian and economic control – under the pretext of ‘modernisation’ – for Belgian colonial rule, both during the so-called Congo Free State and the Belgian Congo.⁵ With the renewed rise in interest in questions of decolonisation within and beyond the academy, questions of land use and land rights, reparations and restitution (also of land) have moved to the forefront of discussions about the long-term impact

of European colonialism again, and it is specifically within the national context of the present-day Congo that these issues resonate. Against the background of the kleptocratic Mobutu rule (1965–97), and this regime’s continuation of colonial policies under the guise of a decolonisation through ‘Africanisation’ and ‘authenticity’, Lumumba-Kasongo’s call for putting the land issue at the centre ‘of Congolese debates and research activities on and/or about political decolonization’ registers as particularly pertinent.⁶

While issues of land use are crucial considerations in all colonial contexts, agriculture appears as a significant issue to understand the long-term detrimental impact of Belgium’s colonial occupation of the present-day DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi. Focusing on agriculture in the Belgian Congo between 1930 and 1960, this chapter highlights agriculture and agrarian science’s unique function for the Belgian colonial system and the central part it has played for its harmful post-colonial legacies. Analysing its complex role as applied science and means of control enables us, first, to gain a more accurate understanding of exploitation of both human labour and non-human resources and the successes and failures of exercising hegemonic control in the last decades of the Belgian Congo. Second, departing from Lumumba-Kasongo’s notion above that land was a ‘structuring element of [...] “colonial modernization”’, this chapter argues that colonial agriculture emerges as an important element in Belgium’s aspiration to be acknowledged as a ‘modern’ coloniser by other imperial powers, as one that had ‘moved on’ from the atrocities of the ‘Free State’ era under King Leopold II.⁷ ‘Modernisation’, as well as its intellectual dimension of ‘modernity’, are, of course, always already fraught categories, particularly in a (post)colonial context. ‘Modernity’ is a contested and vaguely defined term, as Pierre-Philippe Fraiture argues with reference to Anthony Giddens.⁸ In this discussion, Fraiture identifies conversion to Christianity, new modes of capitalist production, and the imposition of the European idea of the nation-state as the hallmarks of Belgian colonial modernity.⁹ Colonial agriculture becomes part and parcel of this coercive modernising process, as the practical dimension of ‘modernity’ that can be seen as the infrastructures, tools, and processes elicited by Belgian colonialism. In the post-colonial period, this process continues under a different, even more extended guise, from ‘foreign aid’ to global commodity chains, as I discuss later in this chapter.

Agriculture also appears as a particularly visible site that demonstrates the ongoing detrimental impact of Belgian colonialism in Central Africa. While the continuing conflict in Kivu (eastern Congo) is inextricably connected to land issues, in colonial ‘Ruanda-Urundi’ in particular, colonial land management and agricultural policies appear as a contributing factor to the developments that led to the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. For example,

Koen Vlassenroot and Chris Huggins explain how unequal access to land in the border region of Eastern Congo, a 'result of a longer historical process of colonial land reforms and post-colonial patrimonial rule', has led to 'intensified local competition', which 'was transformed into disputes and violence between ethnic communities when local elites from the early nineties started to mobilise entire communities on the basis of ethnic belonging and collective land rights'.¹⁰ Part of colonialism's legacy is the connection between ethnic conflict and conflict over land: Jan Vansina explains specifically for Rwanda that, while the distinction and conflict between Hutu and Tutsi already existed by the time the first Europeans arrived in the region, the German colonisers were unable to understand the conflict in terms other than inflexible and simple ethnic categories and falsely attributed the notion of 'racial hatred' to it, which was subsequently adopted by the Belgians after Ruanda-Urundi became a Belgian League of Nations mandate following World War I. This demonstrates how this inability to comprehend a conflict outside of the prism of European racism fundamentally shaped the policies and practices of subsequent colonial occupation.¹¹

While Osumaka Likaka has already pointed to the link between racist ideologies, colonial (agricultural) policies, and 'myth making', to which I return at a later point, I consider agriculture as an integral colonial contact zone, to use Mary Louise Pratt's oft-quoted term.¹² Pratt describes the contact zone as treating 'the relations among colonizers and colonized [...] not in terms of separateness or apartheid, but in terms of copresence, interaction, interlocking understandings and practices, often within radically asymmetrical relations of power'.¹³ Reinvestigating the agricultural contact zone offers a range of insights into the country's colonial cultures: namely, into the way in which the colonial state perpetrated violence not only through a forced-labour system, but also in a geographical and epistemological sense, by overwriting indigenous knowledge and knowledge systems about land use.

The Belgian Congo constituted an immense occupied territory in Central Africa, including people of several hundred different ethnicities, languages, religious, and cultural practices; many different forms, epistemologies, cosmologies, and traditions of agriculture, land use, and land rights. This chapter does not claim in any way that this plethora of indigenous knowledge systems can be represented in a unified way, nor that the Belgian colonial occupation had the same impact and was experienced in the same way across these vastly different regions. Instead, it is important to deconstruct the colonial state's multitude of clichés and myths to better understand colonialism's complex contact zones. These stereotypes produced oppression and violence, while, at the same time, they opened up opportunities for resistance and change. Likaka has described the colonial state's manufacturing of stereotypes as part of a larger process of

integrating African subjects into colonial administration and economy.¹⁴ Analysing harmful, ethnicity-based stereotypes of Africans, such as the idea of the ‘gift of imitation’ that denies all African creativity, he demonstrates how this discourse played an equally important role for the colonial state’s recourse to violence as economic factors, such as the lack of capital.¹⁵ What is more, Likaka identifies agriculture, which integrates most Congolese into the colonial economy, as a crucial site for the fabrication of stereotypes:

the agronomists of the territory collected information from the agricultural supervisors [...] and the African chiefs who attentively observed [other] Africans. Each agronomist or administrator interpreted the information obtained from an African chief or agricultural instructor according to his [own] ideology, his class [background] and his conception of society and this mediation often gave rise to clichés.¹⁶

Before moving on to analysing the use of stereotypes in the work of Edmond Lep-lae (1868–1941), agronomist and director general at the Belgian Ministry of the Colonies, who was described by Likaka as the ‘architect of forced cotton cultivation’, Likaka insists on the important aspect of mediation in the Belgian colonial administrators’ production of clichés, through the projection of their horizon of experience onto the indigenous population.¹⁷ I am taking a lead from Likaka here and argue that this production of clichés can also be considered on a much larger scale: Belgian agriculture – as seen from abroad, by other European imperial powers, such as Britain – allow us to consider colonial clichés about both coloniser and colonised in conjunction. These ‘other’ imperial perspectives enable us to complicate any easy assumptions and stereotypes about Belgian colonialism such as its ‘belatedness’ vis-à-vis Europe’s ‘more established’ imperial powers that ignore both earlier colonial ambitions under Leopold I and modernisation efforts that characterised both the Congo Free State and the Belgian Congo.

This chapter suggests how to use these stereotypes to read archival material ‘against the grain’ to pay attention to the voices of ‘hidden’ actors, such as Congolese agricultural labourers who opposed directives within the colonial system.¹⁸ I join Benoît Henriët, who, in his work on rural resistance in the interwar Belgian Congo, has emphasised the possibility to highlight ‘workers’ agency [...] through the strategies implemented by the Europeans to achieve their own goals, be they profit maximisation or territorial control’ when studying imperial archival sources.¹⁹

In the second part, I draw more directly from materials on Belgian colonial agriculture produced between the 1930s and 1960. However, its origins, and ‘natural’ sciences more broadly, reach back further, as some examples from earlier texts

show. Marc Poncelet connects the development of colonial sciences in Belgium to the country's struggle for 'legitimacy' to be taken 'seriously' as an imperial power on the world stage but also by its own citizens. This is important for two reasons: first, while there is little doubt that Belgium's status as a 'serious' imperial power was certainly established by the erection of the Congo Free State, Belgian imperial expansionism started significantly earlier, with Leopold I, for example during the short-lived Belgian colonial presence in Santo Tomás de Castilla in Guatemala (1843–54).²⁰ While the scope of this chapter does not allow for an in-depth analysis of Belgium's early colonial ambitions, it is important to consider the struggle that Poncelet describes as part of a longer development of establishing, maintaining, and promoting an empire with the support of scientific research.

Second, Poncelet identifies what he calls – not unproblematically – a 'brief golden era of colonial science' that he locates loosely in a period stretching from the 1930s until after the end of World War II and that is tied up with the myth of the 'model colony'.²¹ He mentions this 'golden age' several times in the introduction to his book on Belgian colonial sciences and eventually locates it 'at the end of the crisis of the 1930s and extended until the end of the Second [World] War'.²² This is quite surprising given the intensification and, indeed, professionalisation of colonial cadres in the last decades of Belgium's colonial occupation of the Congo and specifically after World War II. This was provided by institutions that had been formed after the end of World War I, particularly in the 1920s and 1930s, such as the Université Coloniale de Belgique (1920),²³ the Institute of Tropical Medicine (1923), as well as the Académie royale des Sciences d'Outre-Mer [Royal Academy of Overseas Sciences] (1928), but also the establishment of research institutions in the Belgian Congo, such as the Institut national pour l'étude agronomique du Congo belge (INEAC) [National Institute for Agronomic Studies of the Belgian Congo] in Yangambi in 1933. In his chapter on the INEAC, Poncelet states that the first organised research missions of the Congo Free State were in the field of botany and that agronomic research tools did not exist prior to 1895.²⁴ However, according to Poncelet, they develop rapidly, and in 1908, the agricultural services already include 113 engineers and technicians, five veterinarians, and about ten thousand 'collaborateurs africains' [African co-workers].²⁵ While these numbers still suggest a certain 'belatedness' of Belgium 'catching up' in erecting agriculture as an effective means of colonial exploitation and control, the development of agrarian science appears accelerated in comparison to other European imperial powers, such as Britain.²⁶ When we consider the last couple of decades of Belgian colonial occupation of the Congo, this view of Belgium 'catching up' is then rendered a lot more complex.

The external acknowledgement of Belgium's 'modern' colonial rule represents a direct consequence of the support of agrarian research and education

in the Belgian Congo, spearheaded by the aforementioned Edmond Leplae.²⁷ Yet, at the same time, this increased investment in agriculture and attempts at augmenting productivity, combined with the well-documented racist policies, led to growing resistance and radicalism in rural areas.²⁸ While at first glance, these momentary 'slippages' in colonial control might seem insignificant, they can help to uncover the voices of actors erased from the colonial archive. For instance, Henriët shows how studying imperial sources, such as letters written by local administrators, enables us to get a better understanding of the colonial state's inability to control palm-fruit cutters' migratory movements in the largest palm-oil concession during the interwar period and how this allowed the workers to avoid 'administrative surveillance'.²⁹

Coming back to Leplae, Poncelet briefly mentions the 'scientific tensions' of the 1920s between him and Emile Auguste de Wildeman (1866–1947), the influential botanist and director of the botanic garden in Brussels.³⁰ He describes these 'tensions' as rooted in their different approaches to exploiting the colony's natural resources – that of a botanist, who is interested in the cataloguing and categorisation of plants and that of an agronomist, whose primary concern is the maximising of agricultural export profits.³¹ While their disagreements are certainly fuelled by their different functions in the colonial system, this chapter problematises the binary ideological opposition between these two figures to arrive at a better understanding of the long-term resonance of their work in the postcolonial period.

Paying attention to Belgium's (self)representation as a 'modern' coloniser makes it possible to better articulate how the centre of power becomes dependent on its 'others' to know itself.³² Pratt writes:

While the imperial metropolis tends to understand itself as determining the periphery [...] it habitually blinds itself to the way in which the periphery determines the metropolis – beginning, perhaps, with the latter's obsessive need to present and re-present its peripheries [...] to itself.³³

In the case of Belgian colonial agriculture, this appears as one of the primary areas that the colonial state weaponises. This is done not only for power and profit but also to represent itself to the nation 'at home' and to the outside world as an 'innovative' imperial force at the forefront of optimistic post-war progress, culminating in the 1958 Brussels World Fair, the first major post-war world fair. Indeed, this more abstract notion of 'modernity' that figures in the Belgian state's self-representation clearly overlaps with the infrastructures, tools, and processes of 'modernisation' deployed by the colonial regime. By focusing on agriculture and the way it is narrated by scientific and political discourses alike,

I highlight its crucial role for the Belgian colonial regime's production of stereotypes and their impact in the post-colonial era.

Indeed, these stereotypes, such as its 'delay' to enter the imperial competition and the ideological caesura in 1908, underpinned Belgium's rule and played an important role for the contested space that the colonial period occupies in Belgian public memory.³⁴ Re-reading the writings by colonial-era scientists like de Wildeman enables us to better understand the link between violent epistemological and cultural consequences generated by the introduction of 'modern' agriculture and how colonialism generated these specific stereotypes in the field of agriculture – as analysed in Likaka's work. I continue to build on Likaka by arguing that a new 'contact zone' emerges here: there are echoes and traces of Leplae's and de Wildeman's ideologies that can be perceived in the academic works by Poncelet, Lumumba-Kasongo, and Likaka. They speak from different epistemological standpoints, disciplines, institutions, and have different approaches to agriculture, yet their critical engagement with colonial-era scholarship and the dialogue across time they create shows how colonial viewpoints and principles still resonate now in the twenty-first century.

Tensions and Tropes of Empire

Poncelet describes the argument between Emile de Wildeman and Edmond Leplae, whose professional careers began during the 'Free State' era and continued well into the administration of the Belgian Congo, as being rooted in de Wildeman's role as the 'father of Congolese botany' and 'tireless advocate of the development of indigenous cultures on indigenous soil, a *global option* reinforced by the idea of prioritising the maintenance of the vegetation cover'.³⁵ Poncelet's phrasing here is interesting for several reasons. First, he illustrates two apparently fundamentally different scientific ideologies of the interwar period. Already in 1910, Leplae had become the director general of the agricultural service at the Ministry of the Colonies. According to Jean Lebrun:

Over the course of the next 23 years, Leplae implements a fruitful policy through which science is used to benefit the economic productivity of the colony. This policy is based on large-scale farming and, from 1917 onwards, on forced crop growing and forced labour of indigenous people.³⁶

While the 'forced labour of indigenous people' was not a phenomenon exclusive to the Belgian empire, less than ten years after the end of the Congo Free State, such policies in the name of agricultural 'development' and 'improvement'

evoke memories of its abject violence. The Cessation of the CFS in 1908 and its 'conversion' into the Belgian Congo does *not* represent a total caesura in terms of policies and practice and appears rather as a continuation of certain forms of violence under a different guise. The differentiation between the two periods was part of a significant propaganda effort to present the 'Free State' to the international community as an aberration to be then contrasted with the new 'model colony'.³⁷ For instance, the 'notes of an address at a meeting of the Royal African Society' of Maurice Lippens, former governor general of the Belgian Congo, state that '[s]ince 1908, that is in 30 years, we may boast of having abolished the most barbaric customs of the country [the Congo], entirely pacified it, and put a curb to the epidemics which reigned there'.³⁸ Interestingly, Lippens immediately ties his praises of Belgian colonialism to presumed successes in medical sciences. It is important to carefully nuance these continuities and to be precise of where certain forms of violence prevailed in agriculture and where they did not (or to a lesser degree). For instance, the small-scale introduction of the 'paysannat indigène',³⁹ and the full application of the scheme in the 1940s and 1950s is assessed by Reuben Loffman as representing a significant improvement of 'peasant household income', while also having 'substantial downsides'.⁴⁰ And while there is a hiatus in rubber production after the official end of the Congo Free State and a 'less brutal' return after World War I, the introduction of the violent system of forced cotton cultivation has had a long-term impact on Congolese farming that still continues today: Sara Lowes and Eduardo Montero show how the use of violence and forced labour, and the appropriation of local systems of governance within the CFS's rubber concession economy, still cause wealth inequality and stifled physical development among present-day inhabitants of historical concession areas.⁴¹

Coming back to Lebrun, he highlights here the colonial state's instrumentalisation of science in service of maximising the colony's profits through the deliberate exploitation of human workforce and unfree labour as key to Leplae's 'modernization' of the agricultural service.⁴² Sven van Melkebeke has identified 'agronomical science and coerced labor [...] [as] entangled dimensions' of cotton cultivation in the Belgian Congo.⁴³ Contrary to Leplae's position, de Wildeman opposes the introduction of European crops and methods of farming, as well as, more generally, the clearing of the soil for (European) cultivation purposes.

Second, while Poncelet does not define what he means by his rather opaque notion of a 'global option', especially in connection to the 'developing indigenous cultures on indigenous soil' – which might have been a universally applicable option, even favoured by colonial administrations across the globe – this invites further questioning of de Wildeman's approaches. They represent a divergent

insight into the colonial state's employment of different fields of science in the Congo more broadly, rather than simply a quarrel between two researchers in two different disciplines.

This does not mean, however, that de Wildeman did not have a strong interest in agriculture: in 1908, two years before Leplae would become the director general of the Ministry of the Colonies' Agricultural Service, de Wildeman published a new version of his 1902 *Les Plantes tropicales de grande culture* [Tropical Agricultural Crops], aimed at agronomists and Belgian settlers in the Congo. The title is reminiscent of the French agricultural botanist Henry Lévêque de Vilmorin's 1892 work *Les Plantes de grande culture: céréales, plantes fourragères, industrielles et économiques* [Agricultural Crops: Grains, Fodder, Industrial and Economic Crops]. De Vilmorin is well known for his contributions to research into the 'modernisation' (i.e. the modification) of wheat through breeding to 'enhance' its qualities for a rapidly growing population during the Industrial Revolution. It is no coincidence, then, that de Wildeman describes the purpose of his book in much the same utilitarian terms:

We can only hope for industrial development, especially in the tropics, after a long agricultural period. The mere exploitation of plant wealth is not sufficient, as is unfortunately too often believed, to bring about the lasting prosperity of a colony. If, for centuries, the native plants of a country have been abundantly sufficient for the needs of its inhabitants, they will not be able to satisfy for a long time an intensive export trade, unless, by artificial means, by cultivation, we do manage to increase and especially to regularise the output.⁴⁴

With his opposition to the introduction of non-native plants or other non-sustainable forms of farming, de Wildeman might at first glance appear as an advocate of 'modern' agricultural sustainability *avant la lettre* and it is important to note that he will later move away again from this stance favouring industrial development in the Congo.⁴⁵ However, what becomes clear when looking at his writing published before the end of the CFS is that his earlier view of agriculture's function for the colonial system is quite similar to Leplae's. While his scholarly approach might differ, botany and agronomy are not depicted as rivalling disciplines; he simply describes 'tropical agronomy' and 'colonial botany' as 'new and difficult fields'.⁴⁶ De Wildeman presents agriculture as an instrument of the colonial 'modernisation' effort, the aim of which is the European-style industrialisation and exploitation of natural resources and human labour for exclusively European gain. He, too, advocates a dismissal of indigenous epistemologies and practices, because he does not consider them to be 'scientific', which is also why

he opposes the 'mere exploitation of plant wealth' and promotes 'cultivation'. He thus considers European science a necessary accelerator for the introduction of the Congo into global trade as part of the Belgian colonial project of 'modernity', a perspective very much in line with Leplae's policies and rooted in evolutionism and its particular vision of 'history'. According to Anthony Giddens, evolutionism's view of history 'can be told in terms of a "story line" which imposes an orderly picture upon the jumble of human happenings' and considers 'the emergence of modern societies in the West' as a logical conclusion of the development from 'isolated cultures of hunters and gatherers [...] to the formation of agrarian states'.⁴⁷ This 'totalising' vision of history also implies the impossibility of coexisting different 'histories'.⁴⁸ Giddens's take on evolutionist history also connects with Dipesh Chakrabarty's analysis of Western historical narratives, who pointedly notes that

Crudely, one might say that it was one important form that the ideology of progress or 'development' took from the nineteenth century on. Historicism is what made modernity or capitalism look not simply global but rather as something that became global over time, by originating in one place (Europe) and then spreading outside of it. [...] Historicism thus posited historical time as a measure of cultural distance (at least in institutional development) that was assumed to exist between the West and the non-West.⁴⁹

The absence of anything other than the 'master narrative' and the "first in Europe, then elsewhere" structure of global historical time' that Chakrabarty describes, then resonate strongly with colonialism's 'civilizing mission' and the relegation of the colonised (and their histories) to a place 'outside' of time.⁵⁰ Coming back to Poncelet's passage mentioned above, it draws attention to a commonly employed stereotype in the historiography about Belgian colonialism's presumed 'belatedness' and that Poncelet himself employs: '[t]his social history of colonial knowledge in Belgium is a very localised exercise regarding the *belated and limited fate of a small country*'.⁵¹ This cliché, an oversimplified shorthand, is rooted in Belgium's comparatively brief colonial presence in Africa. I argue, however, that this perspective of Belgium 'catching up' with other European powers is falsely limited. It does not account for the specific history of Belgian colonial (agricultural) ideologies of 'improvement' and 'development' against the backdrop of the CFS and its reckless exploitation of human life, labour, and natural resources. It thus ignores the fact that the Belgian Congo did not emerge out of a vacuum but a longer process of 'modernisation' that had started decades earlier during the 'Congo Free State' period and which resulted in the 'nervous state' diagnosed by Nancy Rose Hunt in her

landmark study, which carefully unpacks the afterlives of Free State violence in the Belgian Congo, resulting in a coexistence of ‘modern’ medical infrastructures and punitive colonial state.⁵² Moreover, this perspective also obscures the long-term impact of these ideologies. For example, de Wildeman’s belief in the linear development from ‘pastoral’ farming to industrialised agriculture that partakes in global capitalism with the aid of scientifically ‘enhanced’ cash crops still resonates within a broad variety of contemporary discourses. As Robert Young wrote in 1991 on ‘neocolonialism’:

The means of administration may have often moved from coercive regiments to regimes supported by international aid and the banking system, the ‘white man’s burden’ may have been transformed by the wind of change into the TV appeal for famine in Africa. But the burden of neocolonialism remains for all those who suffer its effects; and responsibility cannot be ignored by those who find themselves part of those societies which enforce it.⁵³

Young’s framing of post-Cold War neocolonial practices mentioning the ‘TV appeal for famine in Africa’, implying agricultural shortcomings, such as crop failure, is of particular importance here, as it refers to the exploitative marketing of Western charity organisations that regularly depict malnourished Africans as having no agency. Beyond representation as well, there is little reckoning with the West’s role in many postcolonial armed conflicts on the African continent – such as the precarious situation of the ethnic minority of Batwa following the expulsion from their ancestral lands in Virunga National Park in 1952 – as well as the calamitous impact on climate change that European industrialisation and colonialism have had (see Matthias De Groof’s chapter in this volume).⁵⁴ What Elizabeth Fortin calls the ‘globalization of agriculture’, the ‘increasing technological industrialization of food production with the growing integration of international, or global, production structures’ is a direct product of colonialism and shaped by ‘interventions’, such as the policies of the World Bank.⁵⁵

At the same time, this transnational perspective that is required to understand present-day agricultural globalisation is, in turn, already necessary to deal adequately with colonial legacies and to grasp Europe’s shared complicity in colonialism in Africa and its long-term political, social, and environmental impact. Moving beyond the centre–periphery binary and applying a ‘transcolonial’ perspective, to employ Olivia Harrison’s use of the term, opens up broader contexts, which have received relatively little academic attention so far.⁵⁶ Transcolonial practices of agriculture can thus be considered a multilayered contact zone: between different colonial empires and scientists, between coloniser and colonised, between different epistemologies and practices, between

different ideologies of colonialism, between colonial state and citizens 'at home' and narratives of benevolent and technical 'improvement'. It is through these transcolonial contact zones that we can better comprehend the resonances of ideologies like de Wildeman's and Leplae's in the continuing exploitation of the Congo by multinational corporations, unethical academic research and 'charity' work, and international policymaking.

'Sustainable' Stereotypes

As initially mentioned, to improve our understanding of Belgian colonialism's ideologies and stereotypes, such the ones discussed here, its perceived 'belatedness' or the myth of the 'model colony', its transcolonial intersections, and afterlives in the postcolonial era, this second part turns our attention to developments in the last three decades of Belgian occupation. Leplae's lasting impact on the final phase of Belgian colonial agriculture is marked by the inauguration of the INEAC. INEAC itself consisted of a number of different research divisions, which, in turn, maintained several research centres. For instance, by 1955, the Division Forestière included seven separate research centres and employed, according to the visiting British ecologist H. C. Dawkins of the Uganda Forest Department, '100 to 150 indigenous workers of all grades'.⁵⁷ The institute played a central role not only for Belgian agricultural research activities, but was also of international significance: for instance, a *Semaine Agricole* [Agricultural Week] was held here (1947), which brought together scientists from all over colonial Sub-Saharan Africa.⁵⁸ Just a year later, a follow-up event, the *Conférence Africaine des Sols* [African Soil Conference] was held in Goma in eastern Congo. It was attended by 150 participants from Belgium, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and what was then Rhodesia, the Union Française, and the South African Union. The institute thus became an important international hub of knowledge exchange and gained a favourable reputation abroad, further highlighting the need for transcolonial approaches. This is apparent, for instance, in a 1950 article on 'The Agricultural Development of the Belgian Congo' in *The World Today*, the magazine published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs (today better known as Chatham House):

An international meeting of comparable interest was the 'Semaine Coloniale', held in 1949 at the Université Coloniale de Belgique at Antwerp, which enabled visitors to see for themselves the strong current of interest in colonial affairs in the motherland, reflected in the very thorough training given to recruits for the Colonial Service at this institution.⁵⁹

This article, providing a British perspective on the period of most intensely practised agriculture in the Congo, offers some interesting insights into agriculture's role for the Belgian colonial project in its 'last phase', but also as a 'concern' about what there is to come. First, this is reflected by mentioning the rising interest among the general population in Belgium in the colonial territories overseas – a point that is also frequently being made in more recent historiographies.⁶⁰ The article goes even further by explicitly tying this cliché of the Belgian populations' perceived 'disinterest' in their country's colonial endeavour to a development in understanding Belgium as a 'national' coloniser:

Right up to the recent war the Belgian public at home remained in the mass apathetic about their colonial possession; but since the war there has been a tremendous revival of interest, apparent in many directions, not least in the sphere of agricultural research and development.⁶¹

The remits of this chapter do not allow for a discussion of the development that led to the Belgian population's rising interest in its 'empire' after World War II, including an analysis of propaganda, exhibitions, and school curricula. However, the increased investment into scientific research and practice, initiated by Leplae's policies, which forms part of this larger propaganda endeavour of representing the colonial project to both 'home' and international audiences, can certainly be considered a factor for this intensified interest.⁶² This is the case as late as 1958, at the World Fair in Brussels, which has become notorious as a late example of featuring a so-called human zoo.⁶³ Matthew Stanard notes, quoting from the fair's catalogue, that "[t]he creators of the agriculture pavilion drew a contrast between the "condition of the primitive native" and his ancestral tools and utensils displayed under glass and the Belgian activities which had "brought Congolese agriculture to its current state of development"⁶⁴ From de Wilde's 'tropical crops' to the 'Expo 58', this imperial logic of agricultural 'modernity' pervades the Belgian Congo throughout its fifty-two years of existence.

Interestingly, the *World Today* article also employs the stereotype of Belgium's 'belatedness' amid the more 'advanced' imperial nations of Europe. It criticises the Belgian colonial state overall as an outdated, top-down administrative structure:⁶⁵

While it is quite typical of their [Belgian] system that coffee-planting has been enforced by administrative order rather than encouraged by agricultural extension services, it must be remembered that similar methods were quite frankly employed in developing early exports in several British territories when at a similar stage of development.⁶⁶

At the same time, this common cliché of Belgian ‘belatedness’ in the article is somewhat countered when it identifies Belgian agricultural *science* as advanced in comparison to other colonial empires’ endeavours in the same field:

The Dutch, formerly the most painstaking of tropical agricultural scientists, have seen their technical activities in Indonesia sadly curtailed by political events; but their mantle seems to have fallen in no small measure upon their neighbours the Belgians. It is with surprise and envy that visiting British agriculturists, used only to tiny staffs for research work, find, as at Yangambi, an experimental station staffed by over a hundred university graduates of first-class calibre.⁶⁷

Finally, the article offers a brief glimpse into how a focus on indigenous agricultural practices and property relations can function as a way to read archival material ‘against the grain’ – as a way of working towards a decolonial methodology that recovers, reassesses, and amplifies the voices and agency of those not included in the Western archive. Nathan Sowry suggests that ‘[t]his practice of reading archival records against the grain has a large impact on archival practice as well, as it enables archivists and users to re-think and re-interpret the documents in their care.’⁶⁸ While Sowry invites a renewed assessment of the presentation (and contextualisation) of archival materials, I suggest that this method not only requires institutions once celebrating the ‘achievements’ of empire to do the same, but also that assuming a transcolonial perspective aides to uncover the ‘slippages’ of colonial rhetoric and control. The *World Today* article describes the introduction of ‘corridor settlements’ by the Belgians as method of growing crops. On the one hand, the author notes that

[t]he system has been claimed to combine ingeniously the advantages of collective farming with those of individual tenure; certainly it is of the greatest interest to British administrators experimenting with various forms of “group farming” to find the method best suited to African conditions

and that ‘[s]uch advantages appeal to the Belgians, who in some parts of the Congo have long grouped the cultivators compulsorily in villages for administrative reasons.’⁶⁹ On the other hand, however, the author states that tensions in implementing this new policy have arisen due to, for example, ‘[...] the problem as whether a bachelor should be given the same sized holding as a man with two wives.’⁷⁰ It is useful to engage with Likaka’s work again at this point; he demonstrates how these moments of rural resistance, which he analyses within the context of cotton cultivation, can also function as a resource for the

administration's 'fabrication' of clichés about the indigenous population.⁷¹ In particular, he mentions Leplae's involvement and demonstrates how the latter employed stereotypes to facilitate control and the production and distribution of propaganda materials via the *Bulletin Agricole du Congo belge*.⁷² Likaka traces the evolution of Leplae's stereotypes and how they change according to the latter's agenda. For instance, Likaka quotes Leplae as describing Africans as 'indigenous farmers endowed with sufficient qualities [...] and capable of relatively rapid development' in front of a budgetary commission in 1914,⁷³ while the reduced purchasing power and growing resistance following the Great Depression in 1929 prompt him to use a very different vocabulary and paints them as 'incapable' and that 'the authorities have to think in their place'.⁷⁴

The agricultural contact zone thus emerges as a space of 'myth making', from which various clichés emerge, both racist and harmful when targeting the indigenous population or to aggrandise the colonial state and its 'achievements' in an attempt to fashion the Belgian colonial project as an ostensibly 'modern' one. In the case of Belgian colonialism, that is the persistent stereotype of the 'model colony'. Agriculture, as a means of control, provided the Belgian colonial administration with a large repository of imaginaries of 'modernity', an asymmetrical space where ideologies and epistemologies converged, with usually brutal consequences for the Congolese farmers and labourers. However, as Likaka reminds us, agriculture and land issues also represent key issues and opportunities for (anti-colonial) resistance. It is here that the colonial state had to concede to local legislation, such as the division of cultivable land to avoid social conflict, and change its policies resulting from what the *World Today* article describes as 'the problem as whether a bachelor should be given the same sized holding as a man with two wives'. From decolonial resistance to contemporary rural activism and locally founded NGOs focusing on land rights and refugees in the DRC, such as Solidarité des Volontaires pour l'Humanité in the South Kivu region, a genealogy of defiance emerges, which warrants further research to continue troubling the colonial archive. In this way, a focus on 'reading against the grain' also helps challenge what Hunt has described as the

reduction of Congo's history in public memory [...] [that] suggests a single trajectory with two hinges: first 'red rubber,' then Lumumba's assassination (now often extended by a third point: terrible rape and war in Congo's east since 1996). Such a storyline of continuity and repetition has history moving from violence to violence, malfeasance to malfeasance.⁷⁵

Moving away from a focus on 'the horror, the horror' and instead towards these genealogies of defiance that testify to the importance of understanding

resistance as a constant across the colonial and postcolonial periods – and not just reduced to those moments that have received academic attention thus far. Instead, paying attention to those ‘slippages’ in control and sovereignty challenge received understandings in existing historiography of Belgium’s colonial occupation of Central Africa.

Conclusion

Focusing on Belgian colonial agriculture and agrarian science, its practices, scholarship, and evaluation from afar (both from imperial contemporaries and from the vantage point of the late twentieth- and early twenty-first century) invites us to revisit and to question repetitive stereotypes of Belgian imperialism and its legacies after 1960. For instance, the cliché of Belgian ‘catching up’ in erecting a ‘modern’ colonial empire like other European imperial powers is challenged by the Belgian state’s support for agrarian research and research activity in the Belgian Congo (and which is recognised from abroad), as the analysis *The World Today* article has shown, while forced cotton cultivation and the mixed results of the ‘indigenous peasantry scheme’ raise questions about the received idea of the Belgian Congo as ‘model colony’ and further reinforces Hunt’s work on the ‘afterlives’ of Free State violence.⁷⁶ Most importantly and pressingly, however, as Osumaka Likaka’s path-breaking work has shown, research in critical cultural and historical studies into agriculture and agrarian science (and by extension into any other area of colonialism) needs to focus on those voices left out of the official colonial archive. For instance, as I suggest, by engaging with the already developed method of reading sources ‘against the grain’ to uncover moments of resistance and rebellion for which agriculture has emerged as a primary site. Focusing on the ‘culture’ in ‘agriculture’, what emerges is also its long-term (and multifaceted) impact on present-day diasporic Belgium: from contemporary armed conflict and grassroots activism for land rights to Belgium’s ban on halal and kosher slaughtering practices that disproportionately impacts the country’s postcolonial and diasporic communities. Discourses like these show how important a focus on colonial agriculture is, even for life in the ex-imperial metropolis of the twenty-first century.

Notes

- Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (London: Vintage, 1994), p. 271.
- Achille Mbembe, 'Necropolitics', trans. by Libby Meintjes, *Public Culture*, 15.1 (2003): pp. 11–40 (pp. 25–26).
- Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo, 'Land Reforms in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): A Study of the Political Economy of Underdevelopment and Nation-State Building', in Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo (ed.), *Land Reforms and Natural Resource Conflicts in Africa: New Development Paradigms in the Era of Global Liberalization* (New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 150–79 (p. 170).
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo, 'Land Reforms in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)', p. 156. See also for example Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, *From Zaire to the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute, 1999) and *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History* (London: Zed Books, 2002); Frank van Acker, 'Where Did All the Land Go? Enclosure and Social Struggle in Kivu (D.R. Congo)', *Review of African Political Economy* 32.103 (2005), 79–98.
- Importantly, Lumumba-Kasongo points out that '[p]hilosophically, there are no essential differences between the administration of the Congo Free State and that of the Belgian colony with regard to how the land was conceived and how the land policy was formulated. The land practice used by Leopold II was also adopted into the colonial dogmas' (p. 169).
- Namely: Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990).
- See P.-P. Fraiture, 'Modernity and the Belgian Congo', *Tydskrif vir Letterkunde*, 46.1 (2009), 43–57 (43).
- Koen Vlassenroot and Chris Huggins, 'Land, Migration and Conflict in Eastern D.R. Congo', in Chris Huggins and Jenny Clover (eds.), *From the Ground up: Land Rights, Conflict and Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), pp. 115–94 (p. 116).
- See, in particular, Jan Vansina, *Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom*, trans. by Jan Vansina (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), p. 138 and Timothy Longman, 'Identity Cards, Ethnic Self-Perception, and Genocide in Rwanda', in Jane Caplan and John Torpey (eds.), *Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State Practices in the Modern World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 345–57 (p. 351).
- See O. Likaka, 'Colonialisme et clichés sociaux au Congo Belge', *Africa: Rivista trimestrale di studi e documentazione dell'Istituto italiano per l'Africa e l'Oriente*, 52.1 (1997), 1–27 (2–3).
- Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 7.
- See Likaka, 'Colonialisme...', p. 1.
- Ibid., p. 3.
- Ibid., p. 8; my translation. All translations are mine unless otherwise stated.
- Osumaka Likaka, *Rural Society and Cotton in Colonial Zaire* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1997), p. 61.
- See, for instance, Osumaka Likaka, 'Rural Protest: The Mbole against Belgian Rule, 1897–1959', *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 27.3 (1994), pp. 589–617; Benoit Henriët, "'Elusive Natives': Escaping Colonial Control in the Leverville Oil Palm Concession, Belgian Congo, 1923–1941', *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue canadienne des études africaines*, 49.2 (2015): pp. 339–61; Benoit Henriët, *Colonial Impotence: Virtue and Violence in a Congolese Concession (1911–1940)* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021).
- Henriët, "'Elusive Natives'..." (2015), p. 340. Due to the constraints imposed on producing this chapter by the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic and the resulting restricted access to archives and fieldwork, examples of applying this method are limited but hopefully demonstrate its importance for future research.
- The critical analysis of Leopold II's colonial ambitions remains an under-researched area. See, for example: Jan Anckaer, *Small Power Diplomacy and Commerce: Belgium and the Ottoman Empire during the Reign of Leopold I (1831–1865)* (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2013); Robert R. Ansiaux, 'Early Belgian Colonial Efforts: The Long and Fateful Shadow of Leopold I' (doctoral thesis, University of Texas, Arlington, 2007) <<https://rc.library.uta.edu/uta-ir/handle/10106/382>> [accessed 12 August 2021]; André Lederer, 'La colonie belge au Guatemala', *Collectanea Maritima*, 6 (1968), pp. 243–59; n.a., *Expansion Belge/Belgische Expansie 1831–1865* (Brussels: Académie Royale des Sciences d'Outre-Mer/Koninklijke Academie voor Overzeese Wetenschappen, 1965); Albert Duchesne, *A la recherche d'une Colonie belge: Le Consul Blondeel en Abyssinie (1840–1842) – Contribution à l'Histoire précoloniale de la Bel-*

- gique (Brussels: Institut Royal Colonial Belge, 1953).
21. See Marc Poncelet, *L'Invention des sciences coloniales belges* (Paris: Karthala, 2008), p. 17.
 22. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
 23. Renamed the *Institut universitaire des territoires d'outre-mer* (INUTOM) [University Institute for Overseas Territories] in 1949.
 24. See Poncelet, p. 312.
 25. See *Ibid.*
 26. *Ibid.*, p. 2–3.
 27. Osumaka Likaka, *Rural Society and Cotton in Colonial Zaire* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1997), p. 61.
 28. *Ibid.*, p. 56, and Osumaka Likaka, 'Colonialisme...'
 29. See Henriët, "Elusive Natives"...', p. 340.
 30. See Poncelet, p. 312.
 31. *Ibid.*
 32. See Pratt, *Imperial Eyes*, p. 7.
 33. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
 34. See, for instance, Goddeeris, 'Postcolonial Belgium: The Memory of the Congo'; Matthew Stanard, *Selling the Congo: A History of European Pro-Empire Propaganda and the Making of Belgian Imperialism* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011); Sarah Arens, 'Memory in Crisis: Commemoration, Visual Cultures and (Mis)representation in Postcolonial Belgium', *Modern Languages Open* 1 (2020): n.p. <<http://doi.org/10.3828/mlo.voio.328>> [accessed 20 May 2021].
 35. Poncelet, p. 312; my emphasis.
 36. Jean Lebrun, 'Leplae (Edmond)', in *Biographie Nationale, 1967–68*, Vol 34, col. 565–71. Forced labour was briefly banned and then quickly re-introduced in the Colonial Charter; on this issue, see Julia Seibert, 'Travail forcé', in Idesbald Goddeeris, Amandine Lauro and Guy Vanthemsche (eds.), *Le Congo Colonial: Une histoire en questions* (Waterloo: Renaissance du Livre, 2020), pp. 141–54 (p. 143).
 37. See, for instance, Matthew Stanard on the effort made at the 1910 World Fair to distance the Belgian Congo 'from its EIC forebear' (Stanard, *Selling the Congo*, p. 52).
 38. Count Lippens, G.C.V.O., 'The Belgian Congo', *African Affairs*, XXXVIII.CLIH (1939), 419–26 <<https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a101237>> [accessed 20 May 2021].
 39. The 'indigenous peasantry scheme' was developed following Crown Prince Leopold's study visit of the Congo in 1933, which aimed to improve the economic position of impoverished families or clans. Piet Clement assesses that, '[o]n paper, it looked as if the indigenous peasantry scheme would offer the Congolese rural population, for the first time since the onset of coloniza-
 - tion, the freedom to adopt a government-sponsored agricultural system that would allow it to improve its relative income position on a permanent basis' (Piet Clement, 'Rural Development in the Belgian Congo: The Late-colonial "Indigenous Peasantry" Programme and its Implementation in the Equateur District (1950s)', *Bulletin des Séances de l'Académie Royale des Sciences d'Outre-mer*, 60.2 (2014), 251–86 (259)). Interestingly, Clement highlights that '[f]or the colonial administration the project was also a matter of prestige, as it was meant to demonstrate to the Congolese and to external observers such as the United Nations that rural development was being taken seriously' (*ibid.*, 265).
 40. Reuben Loffman, *Church, State and Colonialism in Southeastern Congo, 1890–1962* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), p. 208.
 41. Sara Lowes and Eduardo Montero, 'Concessions, Violence, and Indirect Rule: Evidence from the Congo Free State', *National Bureau of Economic Research – Working Paper 27893* <<https://www.nber.org/papers/w27893>> [accessed 1 August 2021].
 42. Likaka points to the fact that Leplae was indeed very well aware of the human cost of exploitation (see Likaka, *Rural Society*, p. 19).
 43. Sven van Melkebeke, 'Science as the Handmaiden of Coerced Labor: The Implementation of Cotton Cultivation Schemes in the Eastern Congo Uele Region, 1920–1960', in Johan Heinsen, Martin Bak Jørgensen and Martin Ottovay Jørgensen (eds.), *Coercive Geographies: Historicizing Mobility, Labor and Confinement* (Leiden: Brill, 2020): pp. 169–91 (p. 169).
 44. Emile de Wildeman, *Les Plantes tropicales de grande culture* (Brussels: Maison d'édition Alfred Castaigne, 1908), p. v.
 45. See Poncelet, p. 312–13.
 46. De Wildeman, *Les Plantes*, p. vi.
 47. Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, p. 5.
 48. *Ibid.*
 49. Dipesh Chakrabaty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 7.
 50. *Ibid.*, p. 7–8.
 51. Poncelet, p. 14; emphasis added. For a substantial overview on the historiography of Belgian colonialism, see Guy Vanthemsche, *Belgium and the Congo, 1885–1980*, trans. Alice Cameron and Stephen Windross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). See also: Matthew G. Stanard, *The Leopard, the Lion, and the Cock: Colonial Memories and Monuments in Belgium* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2019).
 52. Very much in the sense of Nancy Rose Hunt's 'nervous state', the long-term effects and after-

- lives of the Congo Free State in the Belgian Congo, see Nancy Rose Hunt, *A Nervous State: Violence, Remedies, and Reverie in Colonial Congo* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016).
53. Robert Young, 'Neocolonial Times,' *The Oxford Literary Review*, 13.1 (1991), 2–3 (p. 2).
 54. See n.a., 'New Law in DRC to finally protect Indigenous Peoples Land Rights', *International Land Coalition* <<https://africa.landcoalition.org/en/newsroom/new-law-drc-finally-protect-indigenous-peoples-land-rights>> [accessed 10 August 2021]. See also, for instance, Mark Langan, *Neo-Colonialism and the Poverty of 'Development' in Africa* (London: Palgrave, 2018); Meera Sabaratnam, *Decolonising Intervention: International Statebuilding in Mozambique* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017); Eyal Weizman and Sheik Fazal, *The Conflict Shoreline: Colonialism as Climate Change* (Göttingen: Steidl, 2015); Jason C. Young, 'Environmental Colonialism, Digital Indigeneity, and the Politicization of Resilience,' *Environment and Planning E: Nature and Space*, 4.2 (2019), pp. 230–51; Phoebe Okowa, 'The Pitfalls of Unilateral Legislation in International Law: Lessons from Conflict Minerals Legislation,' *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 69 (2020), 685–717.
 55. See Elizabeth Fortin, 'Reforming Land Rights: The World Bank and the Globalization of Agriculture,' *Social & Legal Studies*, 14.2 (2005), 147–77 (149).
 56. Olivia Harrison, *Transcolonial Maghreb: Imagining Palestine in the Era of Decolonization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), p. 2. I have made the argument for a broader perspective before, see Sarah Arens, 'Memory in Crisis...'
 57. See H.C. Dawkins, 'INEAC in the "Forêt Dense", Impressions of some High-Forest Research in the Congo,' *Empire Forestry Review*, 34.1 (1955), 55–60 (56). See also J. Sémal, 'Camille DONIS,' *Bulletin des Séances – Académie Royale des Sciences d'Outre-Mer/Mededeelingen der Zittingen – Koninklijke Academie voor Overzeese Wetenschappen – Jaarboek – 1990 – Annuaire*, 36.1 (1990), 57–60.
 58. *Comptes rendus de la Semaine Agricole 1947: Yangambi, Congo* (Brussels: Institut national pour l'étude agronomique du Congo belge, 1947).
 59. G.M.B., 'The Agricultural Development of the Belgian Congo,' *The World Today*, 6.8 (1950), 348–54 (354).
 60. See, for example, Vanthemsche (2012) and Stanard (2019), who both demonstrate the long-lasting effect Belgium's colonial activities have had on Belgium itself, socially, politically, economically, and culturally.
 61. G.M.B., p. 348.
 62. This, together with Leplae's notoriety in Britain is also echoed by Leplae's obituary in *Nature*: see E.J. Russell, 'Prof. Edmond Leplae,' *Nature* 147 (1941), 738–39.
 63. See, for instance, Pascal Blanchard and Maarten Couttenier, 'Les Zoos humains,' *Nouvelles Études Francophones*, 32.1 (2017), 109–15; Pascal Blanchard et al, *Human Zoos: Science and Spectacle in the Age of Colonial Empires* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2008); Sarah van Beurden, "'Un panorama de nos valeurs africaines": Belgisch Congo op Expo 58', in Bambi Ceuppens, Vincent Viane, and David Van Reybrouck (eds.), *Congo in België. Koloniale cultuur in de metropool* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2009), pp. 299–311. Another notorious example of or at least very closely reminiscent of a 'human zoo' took place in Yvoir, Belgium, in 2002.
 64. Matthew G. Stanard, "'Bilan du monde pour un monde plus déshumanisé': The 1958 Brussels World's Fair and Belgian Perceptions of the Congo,' *European History Quarterly*, 35.2 (2005), 267–98 (274).
 65. See G.M.B., p. 349; however, not without referring to the inhabitants of the Congo area as 'a very primitive population whose development over large areas is behind that of most of the rest of the continent' (ibid.).
 66. Ibid., p. 350.
 67. Ibid., p. 348.
 68. Nathan Sowry, 'Silence, Accessibility, and Reading Against the Grain: Examining Voices of the Marginalized in the India Office Records,' *InterActions: UCLA Journal of Education and Information Studies*, 8.2 (2012) <<http://dx.doi.org/10.5070/D482011848>> [accessed 14 August 2021].
 69. Ibid., p. 350.
 70. Ibid., p. 354.
 71. See Likaka, *Rural Society*.
 72. See Likaka, 'Colonialisme,' pp. 8–9.
 73. Edmond Leplae, *Documents relatifs à l'agriculture du Congo Belge: L'agriculture coloniale dans la discussion du budget du Congo Belge pour 1914; Le programme colonial agricole de l'institut Solvay* (Louvain: F. Ceutrick, 1914), n.p., qtd. in Likaka, 'Colonialisme,' p. 8.
 74. Edmond Leplae, 'Les cultures obligatoires dans les pays d'agriculture arriérée,' *Bulletin agricole du Congo Belge*, 4 (1929): p. 458, qtd. in Likaka, 'Colonialisme,' p. 9.
 75. Hunt, p. 3.
 76. See Hunt, p. 3.