The Division of Normativity and a Defence of Demanding Moral Theories

Ventham, Elizabeth ORCID: 0000-0002-8759-5339 (2023) The Division of Normativity and a Defence of Demanding Moral Theories. ETHICAL THEORY AND MORAL PRACTICE, 26 (1). pp. 3-17.

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-022-10320-w

Abstract

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>Morality, according to some theories, demands a lot of us. One way to defend such demanding moral theories is through an appeal to the division of normativity; on this picture, morality is only one of the normative domains that guides us, so it should be expected that we often fail to follow that guidance. This paper defends the division of normativity as a response to demandingness objections against an alternative: moral rationalism. It does this by addressing and refuting three arguments: the argument from blameworthiness, the argument from agency, and the argument from authority. In turn, I show that none of these arguments work as responses to the division of normativity – if normativity generally is divided, so too must be blameworthiness, agency, and authority.</jats:p>

Item Type:	Article
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	01 Dec 2022 15:14
Last Modified:	02 Jun 2023 11:45
DOI:	10.1007/s10677-022-10320-w
Open Access URL:	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-022-10320-w
Related URLs:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3166472