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Title:

Government nation building and memetic reactions: Different visions of the UK in
Covid related communication

Lyndon C. S. Way and Kay L. O'Halloran

Abstract:

The UK government uses news conferences, press releases, official websites, mainstream and social media to provide advice and information about the COVID-19 pandemic. This information has become 'source material' for social media users to react to government announcements in 'digital popular culture'; that is, memes and short videos shared on social media. Close examinations of both reveal how different views of the nation are articulated whilst giving and reacting to pandemic information and advice. Here, we analyse a sample of official government webpages on COVID-19 announcements and reactions to these in digital popular culture. We employ Multimodal Critical Discourse Studies to understand how the modes of lexica and images work individually and together to articulate views on the nation. Through such an analysis, we reveal not only what the public 'receive' from the government, but also broadly held ideas and beliefs by the public on the nation.

Key words: UK government, COVID-19, digital popular culture, multimodal critical discourse studies, memes, nation building

Introduction

Throughout the pandemic, the UK government has communicated advice and information about COVID-19 through news conferences, press releases, official websites, and mainstream and social media. Much of this has become source material for 'digital popular culture', including memes and short videos shared on

1
2
3 social media. Whilst offering COVID-19 advice, information and reactions to these,
4
5 both government information and digital popular culture articulate discourses about
6
7 the nation. In this study, we analyse a sample of UK government announcements
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9 and public reactions to these in digital popular culture. A close critical analysis of
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11 government announcements reveals what the public 'receive' in terms of
12
13 representations of the nation. Likewise, an analysis of memes and short videos that
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15 react to these announcements demonstrates how the public feel about the nation,
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17 digital popular culture being 'intrinsically linked to the logic and rhythms of ...the
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19 ways a society expresses and thinks of itself' (Denisova, 2019: 2). In other words, in
20
21 this chapter we use digital popular culture as a barometer to understand the public's
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23 broadly held ideas and beliefs about the nation, or as Raymond Williams (1963)
24
25 would say, a society's 'structure of feeling'. Previous studies in a number of contexts
26
27 reveal how digital popular culture articulates views about the state, nation and
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29 nationalism (Papacharissi, 2015; Denisova, 2019; Wiggin, 2019; Merrin, 2019; Way,
30
31 2016). In this study, we directly link views about the nation in digital popular culture
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33 to governmental COVID-19 announcements.
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40 **Digital popular culture, politics and the nation**

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43 The nation is not a natural, timeless entity, but a relatively recent 'imagined political
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45 community' (Anderson, 1991: 5) or mental construct (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and
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47 Liebhart, 1999; Hobsbawm, 1993; Billig, 1995). Each nation is imagined as a
48
49 community with shared interests and characteristics, despite their evident
50
51 inequalities. Though the nation may feel rooted in the remote past, 'what makes up
52
53 the modern nation is made up of fairly recent symbols, or national histories and
54
55 invented traditions' (Hobsbawm, 1993: 14), such as the Scottish tartan or mythical
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57 stories of an Irish past (Trevor-Roper, 1993; Mac Laughlin, 2001). All this 'imagining'
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1
2
3 and 'mental constructing' involves language and affect to create 'feelings' of national
4 pride, communicated not only by politicians, but also by the media and felt by the
5 public (Moores, 2000; Billig, 1995; Hobsbawm, 1993). The media represent the
6 nation in 'political' news and in the seemingly mundane, such as weather reports
7 (Billig, 1995), sports (Bishop and Jaworski, 2003), opinion letters (Flowerdew and
8 Leong, 2007) and symbolism on mastheads of newspapers (Higgins, 2004). It is
9 here we see national identities become "a routine way of talking and listening" (Billig,
10 1995: 109).

11
12 Digital popular culture plays a key role in imagining the nation, given it is an integral
13 part of our lives, transforming how we inform, communicate and entertain (Way,
14 2021; KhosraviNik, 2017). Some scholars are sceptical about its political role,
15 viewing social media as a site where 'gossiping is far more common and interesting
16 to people than voting.... [and] embarrassing videos and body fluid jokes fare much
17 better than serious critiques of power' (Boyd, 2008: 243-4). Social media is also
18 characterised as misinformation, jokes, commercialisation and polarisation where we
19 engage in 'scroll culture', guided by our thumbs, skimming, reading, liking and
20 commenting on a constant flow of artefacts that entertain and inform (Way, 2021a).
21 Furthermore, producers' ideas and those who share memes may be misunderstood,
22 with parodic voices being 'mistaken for, and (re)posted as, sincere voices (and,
23 potentially, vice versa: sincere acts could be deemed parodies)' (Dyner, 2021: 191).
24 All the same, much of this is highly ideological, digital popular culture being 'infused
25 with ideas and values, with discourses about how we should run our societies, what
26 we should prioritise, how we should communicate, and judgements about identities
27 and actions' (Bouvier and Way, 2021: 345).

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2
3 Much research has focused on the political roles of memes. They offer a 'public
4 commentary' on our lives (Milner, 2018: 2357), a place where 'a society expresses
5 and thinks of itself' (Denisova, 2019: 2). Memes deliver a range of voices to users
6 with 'discussions on socio-political topics, airing their views on the current events...
7 and provide insight into current social and political issues, being vessels for public
8 sharing of serious information and opinions' (Dyner, 2021: 176). However, memes do
9 not communicate ideas using well-constructed logical arguments. Rather they
10 amplify feelings and affect (Way, 2021b; Denisova, 2019; Merrin, 2019; Wiggins,
11 2019; Vásquez, 2019; Papacharissi, 2015). It is through satire, parody, affect and fun
12 that memes criticise those in power, positing 'an argument, visually, in order to
13 commence, extend, counter, or influence a discourse' (Wiggins, 2019: 11).

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There are a number of studies which investigate the role of memes in national
politics in relation to various issues, such as Egyptian water problems, Chinese
censorship, and a Ugandan online anti-guerrilla political campaign (El Khachab,
2016; Kligler-Vilenchik and Thorsaon, 2015; Wallis, 2011). Other studies have
examined the role of memes in constructing American nationalism. For example,
Wiggins (2019) examines how memes construct distinct and sometimes disturbing
ideas of American nationalism, and Way (2021), Denisova (2019), Merrin (2019) and
Glasser (2017) consider the role of memes in Donald Trump's America. Therefore,
there is recognition that different media 'draw upon slightly different nationalistic
discourses', suiting the interests of producers (Way and Akan, 2012: 22; Way, 2011).
This becomes evident in our analysis of the UK government communications about
COVID-19 and the public response in digital popular culture.

COVID-19 and (digital) popular culture

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2
3 COVID-19 has been described as an unprecedented global pandemic, impacting all
4 aspects of life, medically, psychologically, economically and socially (e.g. Weatherall
5 et al., 2022). Humour can play important roles in times of crisis such as these, by
6 being used as a collective defence mechanism and offering solidarity to those who
7 are affected (Dyner and Poppi, 2018, 2020; Dundes, 1987). During the pandemic,
8 humour has offered 'psychological relief' (Dyner, 2021: 176) and acted as a 'coping
9 mechanism to deal with the difficult circumstances of home quarantines' (Aslan,
10 2021: 10). For example, memes have made light of how we cope with lockdowns,
11 attitudes to work, masks, social distancing, public events, and stockpiling of supplies
12 like toilet paper and soap (Aslan, 2021; Dyner, 2021). Memes have also played more
13 negative roles as 'superspreaders' when (mis)information is shared or amplified by
14 social influencers or accounts with large followings (Green et al., 2021). The spread
15 of information (and misinformation) via memes has occurred in tandem with
16 government daily briefings around the world.

17
18
19 Some studies have considered how COVID-19 relates to nationalism and 'the nation'
20 in popular culture. For example, Martikainen and Sakki (2021) examine Finnish news
21 coverage of Sweden's response to COVID-19. They examine images and headlines
22 and reveal how news media coverage is shaped by nationalism through 'moralizing,
23 demonizing, and nationalizing' (Martikainen and Sakki, 2021: 388). In another study,
24 Tao (2021) examines how Chinese Weibo social media users encounter two
25 dominant discourses about the nation when confronted with COVID-19 information:
26 that is, 'cyber nationalism and binary opposition between China and the rest of the
27 world' (Tao, 2021: 622). Weibo users use parody, rhetorical questions and
28 constructed dialogues to praise those who contribute to the national COVID-19
29 campaign while those deemed unpatriotic are seen to be 'damaging the national
30

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3 image of China' and 'collaborating with foreign anti-China forces' (Tao, 2021: 627-
4
5 629). Our study of UK government COVID-19 communications and digital popular
6
7 culture adds to this under-examined area of study.
8
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10 **Sample**

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13 Our two samples are taken from a larger ongoing project that examines how digital
14
15 popular culture responds to UK government announcements throughout the
16
17 pandemic since 16 March 2020. We mapped several major government
18
19 announcements about the pandemic (16 in total) and then accessed the original
20
21 press conference scripts from the GOV.UK website.¹ In this present study, we
22
23 analyse the webpage for these announcements which include the scripts read by
24
25 Prime Minister Boris Johnson. We chose our sample of memes and short videos
26
27 from the 'best of' lists from *The Tab*, *Mail Online* and *The Handbook* online
28
29 newspapers and magazines. These lists were chosen as they provide 292 memes
30
31 and short videos that are widely distributed and shared, viewed by audiences both
32
33 on 'best of' websites and elsewhere on social media.
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39 For this study, we chose two governmental announcements: The introduction of the
40
41 three tier system to replace the second lockdown on 2 December 2020 and the
42
43 introduction of Tier 4 and the tightening of Christmas Mixing Rules on 19 December
44
45 2020.² These two announcements were chosen as they are temporally close to each
46
47 other (17 days apart) at a time when the pandemic was firmly a part of life in the UK
48
49 (9 months since the first government announcement). Furthermore, the first
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55 ¹ The URL for the UK government's covid information is <https://www.gov.uk/coronavirus>.

56 ² The URL for 2 December 2020 is [https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-statement-on-](https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-statement-on-coronavirus-covid-19-2-december-2020)
57 [coronavirus-covid-19-2-december-2020](https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-statement-on-coronavirus-covid-19-2-december-2020) and 19 December 2020 is
58 [https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-statement-on-coronavirus-covid-19-19-](https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-statement-on-coronavirus-covid-19-19-december-2020)
59 [december-2020](https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-statement-on-coronavirus-covid-19-19-december-2020)
60

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3 announcement includes the removal of some restrictions while the second
4
5 introduces more restrictions for some people.
6
7

8 Memes that directly respond to the 2 December announcement were harvested from
9
10 *The Tab*'s 'Shed a tear for these 24 quality tier announcement memes'³ whilst
11
12 memes responding to the 19 December announcement were taken from *The*
13
14 *MailOnline*'s 'How the Grinch stole Christmas... starring Boris Johnson!'⁴ and *The*
15
16 *Handbook*'s '20 Memes That Got Us Through The Tier 4 News'⁵. This search
17
18 produced 56 memes which make up our sample. Like previous work in Multimodal
19
20 Critical Discourse Studies (MCDS), a deep analysis of the whole dataset (i.e. 56
21
22 memes) is not undertaken due to constraints of space (see Kress and van Leeuwen,
23
24 2001; Machin, 2007; Way, 2021). To reveal patterns within the 56 memes and
25
26 construct a representative sample, an initial quantitative content analysis is
27
28 undertaken to determine how nationalism is expressed in terms of representations of
29
30 place, social actors and other symbols of the nation. This initial examination is a
31
32 strategy adopted in seminal work using discourse analysis (van Dijk, 1991). These
33
34 findings inform our selection of nine memes for deep analysis.
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41 Approach

42
43 In communication, imagery has 'always been with us' (Mitchell, 2005: xiv) with its
44
45 importance in communication ever-increasing (Ledin and Machin, 2018). By its very
46
47 nature, social media is multimodal, characterised by a 'rich combination of text,
48
49 picture, audio, video that digital media make possible' (Aslan, 2021: 9). MCDS
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54 ³ URL is <https://thetab.com/uk/2020/11/26/shed-a-tear-for-these-24-quality-tier-announcement-memes-184176>

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57 ⁴ URL is <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9072355/How-Grinch-stole-Christmas-starring-Boris-Johnson-Social-media-users-mock-PM-Tier-4.html>

58
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60 ⁵ URL is <https://www.thehandbook.com/memes-that-got-us-through-the-tier-4-news/>

1
2
3 examines not only texts, but 'texts in context'. MCDS finds its origins in Critical
4 Discourse Analysis and Halliday's (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2014) functional
5 grammar which investigates how linguistic and visual choices reveal broader
6 discourses articulated in texts (Kress and van Leeuwen, 2001). MCDS usefully
7 reveals how each mode with their unique 'affordances', and in conjunction with other
8 modes, articulate discourses (Ekwall, et al., 2021; Machin and Mayr, 2012).

9
10 Discourses can be thought of as views of the world which project certain social
11 values and ideas and contribute to the (re)production of social life. The aim of
12 analysis is to reveal what kinds of social relations of power, inequalities and interests
13 are perpetuated, generated or legitimated in texts both explicitly and implicitly (van
14 Dijk, 1991). Here, we consider how each mode (language and images) in
15 government websites, memes and short videos, play a role individually and with
16 other modes articulate discourses about the nation (Way, 2021; Milner, 2016; Yus,
17 2019).

18
19 We examine how participants are represented linguistically, following van Leeuwen
20 (1996, 1995) and Fairclough's (2003) seminal work, which has been used
21 extensively to reveal how certain representations are constructed and maintained to
22 serve certain political interests (Wodak and Weiss, 2005; Bishop and Jaworski,
23 2003; Wodak et al., 1999). We consider how participants are named and how their
24 actions are represented, including who does what to whom and whether participants
25 are represented as active or passive. We apply social actor analysis to images,
26 following the approach developed by Kress and van Leeuwen (2021, 2001) and
27 Machin (2007). These scholars define three broad analytical categories for analysing
28 the visual representation of social actors: positioning, participants, and actions.
29 Choices in relation to the composition of images are also analysed, taking into
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3 account the internal 'flow' or organisation of an image and salience. Not all visual
4 elements are analysed for each website image, meme or short video. Instead, we
5
6 use a selection of analytical tools from Kress and van Leeuwen (2021) and Machin
7
8 (2007) based on their usefulness in revealing discourses about the nation.
9
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13 **Analysis**

14 **Press Conference webpages**

15
16 Each announcement in the press conference webpage includes a title, contextual
17
18 information, photograph and the announcement 'exactly as it was delivered' (see
19
20 Figure 1). Alongside information of COVID-19, the webpages were found to
21
22 articulate the following discourses in relation to the nation: (a) The UK is an
23
24 important part of a global order that is victim to COVID-19; (b) The economy is an
25
26 important aspect of the nation, though other aspects of the nation are defined
27
28 (geography, culture/ family relations); (c) The UK government, headed by an all-
29
30 powerful Johnson is strong, active and successful; and (d) To succeed, 'you' must
31
32 follow Johnson's advice. We now examine how these discourses are articulated on
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34 webpages.
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Speech

Prime Minister's statement on coronavirus (COVID-19): 19 December 2020

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Prime Minister Boris Johnson gave a statement at the coronavirus press conference.

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From: [Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street](#) and [The Rt Hon Boris Johnson MP](#)

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Published 19 December 2020

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Location: **10 Downing Street**
Delivered on: **19 December 2020 (Transcript of the speech, exactly as it was delivered)**



Figure 1: 19 December 2020 webpage⁶

The UK is an important part of a global order that is victim to COVID-19

Announcements represent a disempowered world victimised by COVID-19. Consider these extracts from 2 December:

⁶ URL is <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-statement-on-coronavirus-covid-19-19-december-2020>

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2
3 'It is almost a year since humanity has been tormented by COVID.'

4
5
6 'Across the world, economic output has plummeted and a million and a half
7
8 people have died.'

9
10
11 The subjects 'humanity' and global 'economic output' in each dominant clause (van
12
13 Dijk, 1991: 216) occur in sentence constructions that emphasise the temporal and
14
15 spatial scale of the pandemic: 'It is almost a year and Across the world'. Victimisation
16
17 is emphasised in lexical choices of humanity being 'tormented', economies
18
19 'plummeted' while people 'die'. Pronouns also play a pivotal role in articulating
20
21 discourses of victimhood. For example in passages that articulate global
22
23 victimisation, the pronouns 'we', 'our' and 'us' sit alongside lexica 'across the world'
24
25 and 'humanity'.

26
27
28
29
30 Scholars point to the vagueness and fluidity of pronouns such as 'we' used by
31
32 politicians to suit their interests (Billig, 1995; Fairclough, 1989). Johnson uses 'we' to
33
34 construct not only a global victimisation group, but also a UK government that is a
35
36 legitimate part of the global order, and a united British population. Consider these
37
38 excerpts from 19 December:

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40
41
42 'I want to stress we are not alone in this fight – many of our European friends
43
44 and neighbours are being forced to take similar action.'

45
46
47 'The Chief Medical Officer last night submitted our findings so far to the World
48
49 Health Organisation and we will continue to be totally transparent with our
50
51 global partners.'

52
53
54 In the first sentence, 'we' constructs a united British population who 'are not alone in
55
56 this fight'. Echoing pro-Brexit government discourses, 'we' are distinct from 'our
57
58 European friends and neighbours' and 'our global partners' (second sentence).
59
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3 Unpopular actions are legitimised because 'we' are 'being forced' to do so, though by
4 who is unclear due to the absence of an agent responsible for this action.
5

6
7
8 Alternatively, the government, named as 'we' in the second sentence is represented
9
10 as an active, cooperative member of the global order submitting 'our [governmental]
11 findings', while 'we' are 'totally transparent'. In fact, the UK is represented as a global
12 leader in:
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15

16
17 'The U.K. has by far the best genomic sequencing ability in the world, which
18 means we are better able to identify new strains like this than any other
19 country.'
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24
25 Here, the UK is 'by far the best' in genomic sequencing. This sense of UK
26 importance can be seen in Johnson's 2 December claim that vaccines are 'an idea
27 that was pioneered in this country by Edward Jenner in 1796'. Jenner was an
28 English scientist who pioneered the concept of vaccines and created the world's first
29 vaccine (for smallpox). Though an important 200 year old medical breakthrough,
30 Johnson excludes mentioning that present COVID-19 vaccines have been created
31 and developed by scientists and pharmaceutical companies from around the world,
32 including China, Germany and the US. As such, speeches give us a sense of UK
33 nostalgic importance alongside present greatness.
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46 *The economy is an important aspect of the nation, though other aspects of the nation*
47 *are defined (geography, culture/ family relations)*
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49

50
51 Announcements map out geographic areas of the UK like 'London', 'the South East'
52 and the 'East of England', 'these areas', and 'the rest of the country'. There are also
53 lexica used to suggest unity in mapping out the whole nation in 'around the country',
54 'this country', and 'the 350,000 people across the UK who have already had their first
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1
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3 dose'. Cultural, family and economic aspects of the nation include 'retail, indoor
4
5 gyms and leisure facilities, and personal care services', 'communal worship',
6
7 'households', 'grandparents', 'grandchildren', and 'families'. The economy, and
8
9 aspects of it, are mentioned more than other cultural or social aspects of the nation
10
11 and its importance is emphasised. Consider these excerpts from Johnson's 2
12
13 December announcement:
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15

16
17 'Today in England we have ended national restrictions, opening up significant
18
19 parts of the economy in doing so; but also replacing them with tough tiers to
20
21 keep this virus down.'
22
23

24
25 'Across the world, economic output has plummeted and a million and a half
26
27 people have died.'
28
29

30 The economy is mentioned near the beginning of both sentences and phrases
31
32 connote its importance. Health and deaths are de-emphasised at end of sentence
33
34 positions, with the former only suggested in 'keep this virus down'.
35
36

37 *The UK government, headed by an all-powerful Johnson is strong, active and*
38
39 *successful*
40
41

42 In the introductory titles and contextual information on both sample pages, Johnson's
43
44 name appears five times (2 December) and four times (19 December), a clear case
45
46 of emphasising Johnson through overlexicalisation (Kress, 1985). In the headings,
47
48 his power is emphasised being named functionally as 'Prime Minister' and 'PM' (van
49
50 Leeuwen, 1996). 'Prime Minister Boris Johnson' and 'The Rt Hon Boris Johnson MP'
51
52 in the contextual information see a combination of semi-formal naming with
53
54 honorifics, the former suggesting closeness with the latter connoting legitimacy and
55
56 power (van Leeuwen, 1996: 56). Johnson is active in '[he] gave a statement at the
57
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1
2
3 coronavirus press conference', an act associated with those in power. The location
4
5 marker 'Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street' reminds readers the place of
6
7 power in UK politics, similar to 'the White House' in the US.
8
9

10 On both pages, we see an image of Johnson in a shoulder shot with a serious facial
11
12 expression directly addressing viewers in an empowering 'demand image' (Kress
13
14 and van Leeuwen, 1996: 127-128). He wears a navy blue jacket, white shirt and tie,
15
16 suggesting seriousness, formality and respect. On 19 December, Johnson stands
17
18 behind a podium, hands outstretched connoting knowledge, power but also passion.
19
20 Two British flags in the background suggest national importance, while a background
21
22 of a book cabinet on 2 December suggests knowledge and 'following the science'.
23
24
25

26
27 In Johnson's announcements, he names institutions and people directly associated
28
29 with the government including 'the government', 'Our advisory group on New and
30
31 Emerging Respiratory Virus Threats – NERVTAG', 'Our experts', 'Kate Bingham and
32
33 the Vaccines Task Force', 'Your Prime Minister', 'Joint Committee on Vaccination
34
35 and Immunisation', and 'Cabinet'. Functional namings suggest the importance of
36
37 specific people (example: 'The Chief Medical officer'), more generic names
38
39 (example: 'ministers on the Covid Operations Committee') and institutions (example:
40
41 'Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency'). Namings emphasise the
42
43 importance of Johnson's government. Furthermore, they are active in they
44
45 'announce', 'accept', 'approve', 'prepare', 'celebrate', 'analys[e]', 'improve', 'know
46
47 enough' and hold meetings. This is an active government connoting power and
48
49 positivity.
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54
55 Johnson represents the government and nation headed by an all-powerful Johnson.
56
57 Consider these excerpts from 19 December:
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59
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1
2
3 'As Prime Minister, it is my duty to take the difficult decisions, to do what is right
4
5 to protect the people of this country.'

6
7
8 'As your Prime Minister, I sincerely believe there is no alternative open to me.
9
10 Without action, the evidence suggests infections would soar, hospitals would
11
12 become overwhelmed and many thousands more would lose their lives.'

13
14
15 In both, Johnson emphasises his position and power through functional namings and
16
17 dominant sentence position (van Leeuwen, 1996). He uses singular first person
18
19 pronouns to connote that it is he alone who makes correct decisions 'to do what is
20
21 right'. All the while, he deflects blame on introducing a fourth tier by claiming it is his
22
23 'duty to make difficult decisions', having 'no alternative open to me'. Excluded from
24
25 this representation are alternative courses of action that he did not consider
26
27 throughout the pandemic which led his critics to point out that he acted 'too little, too
28
29 late, too flawed' (BMJ, 2020). As such, Johnson represents himself as righteous and
30
31 powerful by 'protect[ing] the people of this country' from infections, death and
32
33 overwhelmed hospitals.
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39 *To succeed, you must follow Johnson's advice*

40
41
42 In both announcements, new measures are introduced, arranged after a sense of UK
43
44 success has been articulated. On 2 December, Johnson justifies the move to the tier
45
46 system in:
47
48

49 'We've got to stick to our Winter Plan, a comprehensive programme to
50
51 suppress the virus...'

52
53
54 Here, 'our' governmental regulations are not represented as 'We have decided...' but
55
56 justified through 'our Winter Plan', an anonymous 'plan' that de-couples Johnson
57
58 agency from these unpopular rules. These are further legitimised through the plan
59
60

1
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3 being a 'comprehensive programme' implemented to keep society functioning.

4
5 Throughout each announcement, 'we', 'our' and 'us' are overlexicalised (18 times on
6
7
8 2 December and 41 times on 19 December). Pronouns change to second person
9
10 'you' and third person 'they' when regulations are announced. We find 'you',
11
12 'community', 'your area', 'yourselves and those you love' collocated with negativity
13
14 such as 'those tiers', 'continued hardship', 'continue to be tough', 'sacrifices', 'rules',
15
16 'restrictions' and 'burden'. So, unlike an active and successful UK government, 'you'
17
18 sits alongside negativity and struggle.
19
20

21
22 Both announcements end on a feeling of hope in 'as we do all this ... we will
23
24 succeed: and together reclaim our lives and all the things about our lives that we
25
26 love.' So, 'our' success depends on following Johnson's regulations and suffering
27
28 hardships that Johnson has the power to invoke, yet dissociates himself from. These
29
30 final words have very low modality, the only modal lexica used is 'will'. By using low
31
32 modality, Johnson emphasises positivity around the nation led by himself and his
33
34 successful government in 'defeating' COVID-19.
35
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38 39 **Memetic responses**

40
41 Meme producers respond to these announcements in comical ways whilst
42
43 articulating discourses about the nation. In the 56 meme dataset⁷, we find visual
44
45 representations of place play a limited role in constructing the nation. The vast
46
47 majority of memes are situated indoors or have indistinguishable backgrounds.
48
49 There are only a limited number of 'British' national 'place' markers such as the
50
51 Queen sitting at a desk with photographs of her family, Boris Johnson standing in
52
53 front of a British flag, and a Cornish flag superimposed on an unidentified person.
54
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59 ⁷ At the time of performing our quantitative examination on 01.11.2022, nine of the 56 memes were no longer
60 available.

Three memes have no social actors, these being a map of the UK, an advent calendar and a cat. Nationalism becomes far more obvious in choices of social actors, and therefore dominates our MCDS analysis. Table 1 is a summary of the number of visual representations of social actors. Boris Johnson is the most represented individual (19%) whilst UK celebrities are the most common type of represented person (38%). The few non-UK celebrities are animated characters with The Grinch being the most popular (6%). Non-celebrities also make up a large proportion of represented people (26%).

Social actors (categories)	Percentage	Most commonly represented individuals	Percentage
Celebrities/ well-known people (UK)	38 %	The queen Ant and Dec Emma Thompson	4 % 4 % 4 %
Non celebrities	26 %	Man with Christmas tree School girls	4 % 4 %
UK Government figures	23 %	Boris Johnson Matt Hancock	19 % 4 %
Celebrities/ well-known people (non-UK)	15 %	The Grinch The Simpsons The minions	6 % 4 % 4 %
Total	100 %		57 %

Table 1: Visual representation of social actors (rounded to the nearest percent)

In lexica, differences are evident in how the nation is expressed. Place is much more clearly established with the UK named as ‘The whole UK’ and ‘Britain’, the home nations of ‘Scotland’, ‘Wales’ and ‘Northern Ireland’ identified, as well as the county of ‘Cornwall’, the cities of London, Manchester, Birmingham, Preston, Hull, Newcastle, Wolverhampton and the London area of ‘Kings Cross St Pancras’. We also find aspects of the nation represented in references to Tiers and the Tier system, (National) lockdowns and pubs.

All the same, social actors again dominate how the nation is represented in lexica, with UK people dominant, as displayed in Table 2. As is the case with the imagery, Boris Johnson (57%) is the most represented individual. Celebrities and famous people are represented less in lexica, though again UK-based people (27%) far outnumber the only non-UK celebrity ‘The Grinch’ (13%).

Social actors (categories)	Percentage	Most commonly represented individuals	Percentage
UK Government figures	60 %	Boris Johnson ‘Boris Johnson’ ‘Boris’ ‘#BorisJohnson’ ‘@BorisJohnson’ ‘PM’ the government	57 % (20 %) (17 %) (7 %) (7 %) (3 %) (7 %)

Celebrities/ well-known people (UK)	27 %	The queen Chris Rea	10 % 6 %
Celebrities/ well-known people (non-UK)	13 %	The Grinch	13 %
Total	100 %		86 %

Table 2: Lexical representation of social actors (rounded to the nearest percentage)

The above examination confirms the emphasis of social actors, and specific social actors in the sample of 56 memes. To reflect these numbers in our MCDS sample of 9 memes, we select three memes with visuals of Johnson (one as the Grinch, one with non-celebrities, one on his own), two of television celebrities, one of the queen, two of non-celebrities, and one with no social actors. We analyse this smaller sample using MCDS to demonstrate how a sense of the nation which is very different than government announcements is articulated. We examine these memes through the lens of the four dominant national discourses seen in government announcements.

The UK is an important part of a global order that is victim to COVID-19

Unlike government announcements, memes do not represent the UK as part of a global order. They either represent an aspect of the UK (example, TV celebrity Ant and Dec or a flag) or something/ someone of international recognition (example, The Simpsons). However, similar to government announcements, memes articulate universal victimisation from COVID-19, though these are in a British context.

1
2
3 This can be seen in Figure 2. Here, like the rest of the nation (and beyond) Queen
4 Elizabeth is represented as a victim. The tweeter asks ‘Annus Horribillis #2 Ma’am?’
5
6 Annus Horribillis was how the Queen described 1992, the year a fire damaged
7
8 Windsor Castle and three of her children’s marriages ended. The screenshot and
9
10 #QueenSpeech suggest this is a parody of the Queen's forthcoming 2020 ‘Christmas
11
12 Message’. These are usually personal, reflected in her reported speech: ‘Well....
13
14 Where do we f## start?’ This common expression, including the profanity, is not the
15
16 language we expect from the Queen. These choices not only emphasise negativity,
17
18 but also how normal she is by ‘letting her guard down’.
19
20
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22
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24 In the image, her facial expression accentuates victimisation. But the image also
25
26 confirms her power. She stares at viewers in a demand image, with photographs of
27
28 (powerful) members of the British Royal family in clear view. Her clothes and
29
30 surroundings of gold and opulence suggest economic power. Furthermore, power is
31
32 connoted by naming her ‘Ma’am’ in the title alongside three functional namings.
33
34 Though she was restricted in her social and work activities due to COVID-19 and
35
36 restrictions, this meme suggests that she is one of us despite her life being anything
37
38 but ‘normal’. As such, represented as being a victim of COVID-19 restrictions
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40 accentuates the idea that this was universal within the UK.
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Figure 2: The Queen and universal victimisation

The economy is an important aspect of the nation, though other aspects of the nation are defined (geography, culture/ family relations)

Memes do not share government announcements' emphasis on the economy, though they map out the nation geographically and culturally in both lexica and imagery (see above). Figure 3 is one such example.



Figure 3: Literal mapping of the nation

Throughout governmental announcements, the pronoun 'we' is used to suggest UK unity in fighting and defeating COVID-19. This meme criticises both the idea of UK unity and the 2 December introduction to the tier system by referencing the *Hunger*

1
2
3 *Games* film (2012). In the film (and 2008 book), contestants from districts fight to the
4 death. Though alliances are made, it ultimately depends on disunity to win. In the
5 meme, we see only parts of the UK represented visually with Scotland and Northern
6 Ireland excluded, though Scotland is referenced in the meme's creator
7
8
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11
12 'scottishlucylocket'. Colours and text map out 'districts' of the UK, with the caption
13 linking the film to a dystopian UK which is not unified due to the tier system.
14
15
16

17 Unlike government announcements, there is an abundance of representations of UK
18 culture throughout the sample. Memes include British cultural icons such as Harry
19 Potter, Sir Bruce Forsyth in the *Generation game*, Jeremy Clarkson, Richard
20 Hammond and James May from *Top Gear*, television presenting duo Anthony 'Ant'
21 McPartlin and Declan 'Dec' Donnelly, and singer-songwriter and guitarist Chris Rea.
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Though the economy is not represented directly, working class people are represented in the sample as truth sayers who are ridiculed for their simplicity, a phenomenon seen in reality television (Eriksson and Machin, 2017; Eriksson, 2015; Skeggs and Wood, 2012). Studies reveal how the working class are for the most part represented as crude and morally problematic, but also during 'times where social unity is required.... all working class people were represented as honest and hard-working with simple pleasures' (Eriksson and Machin, 2017: 2). Similar discourses are found in Figure 4.

1
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3
4 the government deciding how the tiers
5 work
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25 Figure 4: Ridiculed simplicity

26
27 This image is taken from the British sitcom *Gavin and Stacey*,⁸ that ran from 2007
28 until 2010 and centred around relations and family differences between Gavin from
29 Billericay, Essex and Stacey from Barry, Wales. Stacey's best friend Nessa appears
30 in the meme. Her character includes many stereotyped traits of working-class
31 women: that is, she has a strong local accent (Welsh), works in menial jobs
32 (including an arcade), sports tattoos, engages in one-night stands, and has a baby
33 out of wedlock. Her character is whimsical, unconventional but frank, evident by her
34 reported speech 'I make a lot of it up'. However, the caption turns her simplicity into
35 criticism, crediting 'the government' with the reported speech. The government's
36 impersonal naming makes criticism and 'othering' easier (Fairclough, 2003: 149)
37 while the mental process 'deciding' is an action with no agency connoting less power
38 than if agency was represented (Fairclough, 1995). Together, reported speech and
39 caption articulate a discourse of governmental haphazard decision making.
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⁸ For a description of 'Gavin and Stacey' see https://www.comedy.co.uk/tv/gavin_stacey/

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3 Imagery further articulates this discourse. Nessa's facial expressions suggest disgust
4 and a lack of caring, not dissimilar to Nessa's television character. She acts as a
5 metonym for the government that disregards the people's feelings, thoughts and
6 wishes. All the while, we laugh with Nessa and the working class for being able to
7 articulate things simply and honestly.
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15 *The UK government, headed by an all-powerful Johnson is strong, active and*
16
17 *successful*
18

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20 Memetic responses contradict governmental representations of an active and
21 successful government. One common criticism of Johnson is **he is** a clown and
22 memes represent the government as such. In the caption of Figure 5, the
23 government is credited with 'coming up with the tiers'. Though represented as active,
24 this verbal phrase carries connotations of making things up as you go along, unlike
25 the government 'developing', 'formulating' or 'discussing'.
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34
35 live scenes of the government coming up with the
36 tiers [#tiersystem](#) [#tier3](#)
37



50
51
52 Figure 5: Government clowns
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54 The image features a clown, salient through positioning in the centre of the image
55 and bright clothes. He is active typing whilst looking directly at the viewer. Though
56 these are empowering characteristics, the clown looks over his shoulder, his painted
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1
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3 face wears a concerned look and his computer screen is off. These suggest he has
4
5 been 'caught in the act' of being incompetent, pretending to work when in fact he is
6
7 just a clown. As such, the meme articulates the idea that the government is
8
9 incompetent and without a plan.
10
11

12
13 The government is also represented lacking sympathy for 'the people' while
14
15 announcing restrictions. We see this in Figure 6, a memetic response to the
16
17 beginning of the 2 December tier system. The caption is reported speech
18
19 announcing that Jane is in tier one, the tier with the least severe restrictions. The
20
21 image makes clear it is Johnson who is announcing and deciding tiers, both
22
23 empowering acts. However, the seriousness of the announcement is subverted by
24
25 inclusions and exclusions. Though tier one included regulations on sixteen aspects
26
27 of life including education, work, accommodation, large events and leisure, these
28
29 restrictions are excluded, with pub openings being the only inclusion. This plays into
30
31 Johnson's image of being 'one of the people' who likes going to the pub. However, it
32
33 also connotes a lack of sympathy for UK residents by only including this less serious
34
35 aspect of life (going to the pub), accentuating Johnson's frivolous handling of
36
37 COVID-19. The inclusion of 'enjoy' and 'happy' further adds to this discourse.
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4 "You're Tier 1, Jane. Enjoy the pub. I hope it makes
5 you happy"
6

7 #Pressconference #tiersystem
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Figure 6: Uncaring government

In the image in Figure 6, Johnson is salient, his head superimposed onto another's body. He is actively speaking. However, his wide open mouth and tucked in chin suggests that he is yelling, a negative representation. Johnson does not look 'respectable', his shirt too tight, sleeves rolled up and the top few buttons of his shirt undone. He is holding a piece of paper that has been rolled up, connoting a lack of care. He does not look at viewers or other participants, connoting disengagement with us all (Kress and van Leeuwen, 2021). Three adults sit on a couch listening. A lack of power is connoted through the vertical angle of interaction that looks down on them (Kress and van Leeuwen, 2021). They look up to Johnson with clasped hands and lean forward, disempowered, their fate in his hands. Excluded are all the other decision makers and stake holders in deciding restrictions, including Chief Medical Officer Chris Witty, the science community, business owners, and economic interests. So, like government announcements, we have an empowered Johnson

1
2
3 leading the nation. But unlike the announcements, he is an uncaring, disengaged
4 clown while 'the people' are powerless, subjected to his fanciful whims.
5
6

7
8 Though restrictions were represented in government announcements as necessary
9 duties for the health and wealth of the nation, memes suggest that the government is
10 uncaring to the point of laughing at 'us', as suggested in Figure 7. In this meme's
11 caption, 'Boris' is not represented announcing measures to control COVID-19, but
12 'cancelling Christmas'. This represented act emphasises negatively, along with the
13 prepositional phrase 'with 5 days to go', reminding viewers of changed and cancelled
14 Christmas plans.
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25 Boris cancelling Christmas with five days to go:

26
27 #coronavirus #tier4 #Lockdown3



44 Figure 7: Laughing at 'us'

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46
47 The image features two girls in school uniform. The crest on their lapels, panelled
48 walls and a heavy framed hanging picture suggest this is a school of good standing,
49 perhaps with reference to the private schooling most Tory MPs are privileged to
50 receive. Though privileged, they are uncaring and whimsical, articulated in the
51 reported speech assigned to the girl in the centre of the image. She faces the
52 camera, though she does not look at viewers connoting a lack of engagement with
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3 viewers, a metaphor for disconnected politicians. She smiles, though the hand on the
4 side of her face suggesting that she even surprises herself at times. In her reported
5 speech, 'I' is used three times in the ten word monologue, active although no agency
6 or details of her actions are represented. She describes herself as 'random', a direct
7 criticism of Johnson and his decisions being made 'on the hoof'. She says she 'can't
8 believe I just did that', though what she has done is unsaid and a surprise to herself,
9 emphasised by the hand gesture to her face. Sentence structure and lexica like so
10 'random' and 'I can't believe...' mimic teenage casual talk and gossip, trivialising
11 decisions made by Johnson. As such, this meme leans on a discourse of whimsical
12 decision-making by a government which impacts on the general public.
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26 Three memes in our sample represent Johnson as Dr Seuss's *Grinch*⁹, a character
27 popularised in book form, animated film and feature film. The Grinch is a callous and
28 physically ugly outcast who hates Christmas. One year, he steals Christmas
29 presents and ornaments from a village, only to find that the villagers still enjoy the
30 holiday. Figure 8 is a manipulated poster from the feature film which articulates a
31 discourse of a villainous government.
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⁹ For a summary of the Grinch see https://christmas.lovetoknow.com/How_the_Grinch_Stole_Christmas



Figure 8: Villainous government

The written red and green text is the original title of the Ron Howard (2000) film.¹⁰

This text presupposes that the Grinch stole Christmas, a presupposition being a 'taken-for-granted, implicit claim embedded within the explicit meaning of a text or utterance' that reinforces ideologies without questioning them (Richardson, 2007: 63). This is important when we consider the added text 'featuring Boris Johnson'.

Here, Johnson is named semi-formally with no honorifics, omitting connotations of power and legitimacy. His name appears at the end of the title suggesting a lack of emphasis, though what is presupposed is he is a thief. Bold black lettering connotes the seriousness of Johnson's decision, unlike the colourful, slanted and variable sized font of the original.

This same 'thieving' discourse is articulated in the image. Johnson's face is salient through size and lighting, superimposed on to the Grinch. He faces the viewer so we

¹⁰ Original poster can be seen here https://www.amazon.co.uk/Grinch-DVD-Jim-Carrey/dp/B00061RZWO/ref=asc_df_B00061RZWO/?tag=googshopuk-21&linkCode=df0&hvadid=309924738384&hvpos=&hvnetw=g&hvrnd=10267706205888805165&hvpone=&hvptwo=&hvgmt=&hvdev=c&hvdvcmdl=&hvlocint=&hvlocphy=9046552&hvtargid=pla-563550815033&psc=1

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3 have a point of identification, though eye contact is avoided, suggesting he is
4
5 untrustworthy. He wears a serious facial expression, quite different from the normal
6
7 joyous connotations of the season. The Johnson creature is bent over in a crouching
8
9 position suggesting he is sneaky. Though he holds a tree ornament, through cultural
10
11 knowledge, viewers know he is stealing this. Overall, this meme suggests that the
12
13 government headed by Johnson is powerful and callous enough to 'steal our
14
15 Christmas', contradicting discourses of a caring and successful government
16
17 articulated in government webpages.
18
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21
22 *To succeed, you must follow Johnson's advice*
23

24
25 Memes do not represent Johnson's rules as the road to success. Many represent the
26
27 struggles people had in following rules (see queen meme in Figure 2), as well as
28
29 reluctance to rule following and consequences if rules were broken. A five second
30
31 reality show excerpt with a voice over exemplifies this reluctance, whilst using the
32
33 working class as a source of ridicule (and pride) for their 'down to earth' truth saying
34
35 (Figure 9). The public's frustration at the tier system is articulated in all three modes.
36
37
38 The caption empowers Johnson in 'tak[ing] you' to tier three. However, this is a
39
40 negative action, tier three having the most restrictions, while naming Johnson 'Boris'
41
42 connotes a lack of respect. Furthermore, viewers are invited to share in the feeling of
43
44 disempowerment suggested by the pronoun 'you'. The woman's reported speech is
45
46 one of power and resistance. Johnson is named using the third person 'he' and
47
48 'himself' three times, distinct from 'I' and 'you' in the dialogue and caption. Her
49
50 colloquial language ('ain't', 'nah') and slang ('messin' about') suggest she is
51
52 uneducated. This is accentuated with the lack of capitals and punctuation in the
53
54 subtitles. The profanity 'f***' emphasises her anger at the government, while her
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suggestion that 'he can f*** himself' suggests she will not cooperate, emphasised in the final phrase where she claims 'I ain't messing about'.




Figure 9: Reluctance to following rules by the working-class

We sympathise with the woman through shot choices. She is in a close up allowing us a point of identification and a chance to see her anger and frustration. All the same, she is represented less powerful than she could be by looking off camera in an offer image. What makes this funny is her frankness expressed in a strong cockney accent, an accent associated with London's working-class. She is fed up with government regulations and claims she will not cooperate. Ironically, though there were fixed penalties given out to those who broke lockdown rules, it later emerged in 2021, that the government engaged in a large number of lockdown breaches in Downing Street.

Though neither announcement in our sample referred to rule breaking sanctions, these were part of government discourse at the time. Memes tackle this issue, emphasising Johnson's power and victimisation of 'the people', as seen in Figure 10. In the caption, Johnson is named as 'Boris' again activated with negative power

1
2
3 'circling your house' and 'giving the order to snipe you down'. Though Johnson's
4 order is ridiculous, to give an order connotes great power which in this case involves
5 victimising 'the people'. Using the second person pronouns 'you' and 'your' directly
6 addresses viewers, creating a closeness to those being victimised.
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13 Tier 10 will just be Boris circling
14 your house, giving the order to
15 snipe you down if you put the bins
16 out
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Figure 10: Power and victimisation

The image features Johnson seated in a helicopter, a vehicle used by those with power, such as the rich or the military. Though suit and tie connote authority, he slouches in his seat, not an 'upright' politician. He looks off camera in an offer image whilst pointing his finger in the shape of a gun, as children do when playing. These suggest a lack of respect for Johnson, whilst empowering him as he victimises 'us'. Memes such as these contradict governmental discourses.

Conclusion

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2
3 National interests around the globe have determined responses to the pandemic,
4 including vaccination distribution which has seen poorer nations and 'minorities
5 account[ing] for a significantly greater share of deaths' than more advantaged
6 populations (Erni and Striphas, 2021: 226). Our analysis of government webpages
7 reveal how the UK government maps out the nation in ways that mirror governmental
8 policies. This supports findings from seminal work on how dominant discourses echo
9 those of the powerful in society (Hall, 1997; van Dijk, 1991). On government
10 websites, the UK is represented as a key global player, important and distinct from
11 Europe, borrowing from the government's 'Global Britain' post-Brexit discourse. Both
12 historically and presently, it is 'world leading'. Johnson is represented as a powerful
13 leader of a very successful, active UK government that is defeating COVID-19, with
14 the economy being one of its top priorities. In order to succeed, people in the UK
15 must obey Johnson and his government's advice.

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33 Our analysis of memes reveals how meme producers react to these ideas. Though
34 memes do not articulate discourses of the UK being part of a global order, they
35 share the idea of universal victimisation at the hands of COVID-19 through the lens
36 of UK culture. Like government announcements, the nation is mapped out
37 geographically, though unlike the government, disunity is suggested. Memes
38 emphasise cultural mapping far more than the government. Though the government
39 emphasises the economy, memes lean on dominant discourses of the working class
40 as being simplistic yet speakers of the truth. This cultural mapping in memes is
41 skewed favouring people who are white, male and famous, echoing previous studies
42 (Matamoros-Fernández and Farkas, 2021). Similar to government announcements,
43 memes represent Johnson as an all-powerful leader. However, memes depict the
44 government as incompetent, led by Johnson, a clown with no plan.

1
2
3 Studies demonstrate how different media can represent various versions of the
4 nation, aligned to political and economic interests (Way and Akan, 2012; Way,
5 2011). Other studies have revealed the importance of the seemingly mundane in
6 articulating nationalist discourses (Billig, 1995; Bishop and Jaworski, 2003; Higgins,
7 2004; Flowerdew and Leong, 2007). This study has extended these areas of
8 research by revealing how both government announcements and memes in
9 response to these announcements articulate various forms of nationalism. In a
10 politically polarised nation such as the UK (Fletcher 2021), different forms of
11 nationalism are notable though most memes emphasise white, male and celebrity
12 culture and criticism of the government. This latter point again expands on current
13 research. Scholars tell us that memes are a space for public commentary, where
14 society can express its ideas (Milner, 2018; Denisova, 2019: 2). They highlight and
15 promote discourses that are in circulation in society, influencing awareness and
16 uniting people around 'issues of common grievances' (Denisova, 2019: 20). In our
17 study, we find memes react cynically to government announcements, whilst
18 concurrently constructing a nation very different from government communications.
19 The political potential of memes have limits. They are 'another move away' from
20 rational, communicative debate that 'deliver highly charged satirical critiques that
21 damage opponents and their positions and that inflict a telling ideological burn upon
22 them. They are part of a new politics of affectivity, identification, emotion and
23 humour' (Merrin, 2019: 222). However at the same time, they act as a barometer that
24 measure how the public feel about not only COVID-19 restrictions, but the
25 government and the nation as a whole. This is important seeing as our engagement
26 with memes is 'central to our political life, constituting, for many people, their most
27 common mode of political expression, participation and activism' (Merrin, 2019: 219).

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