The essentiality of money in a trading post economy with random matching

Marchesiani, Alessandro ORCID: 0000-0002-1866-6279 (2023) The essentiality of money in a trading post economy with random matching. OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES. gpad038-.

Text LP OEP final.pdf - Author Accepted Manuscript Access to this file is embargoed until 10 September 2025. Download (313kB)

Abstract

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>This article studies how the structure of centralized markets can affect efficient allocation in anonymous decentralized trades. In line with previous studies, we show that efficiency in decentralized markets can be sustained in a moneyless finite-number-of-agents setting if agents are patient enough and the price is observed with noise. We additionally show that, if there are no gains from trade, then the price associated with an inactive centralized market is zero irrespective of the noise. Thus, the non-essentiality-of-money result is a more robust phenomenon when the centralized market acts only as a coordination device.</jats:p>

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	C72, C73, D80, E00
Divisions:	Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Management
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	23 Aug 2023 08:24
Last Modified:	14 Mar 2024 18:43
DOI:	10.1093/oep/gpad038
Related URLs:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3172269