

# Horses for courses: Plato's vocabulary and authority in the *Onomasticon*\*

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## ABSTRACT

The *Onomasticon* by Julius Pollux is more than just a word-hoard: Pollux's work actively mediates, through lexicographic appraisal, the cultural assets and anxieties of the Second Sophistic. In the light of the ongoing debate among the Imperial intellectuals and specifically Platonists about the value of style and diction as ingredients of the Platonic text, the numerous references to Plato's vocabulary from across the *Onomasticon* bespeak an essentially coherent yet ambivalent attitude. Pollux cites Platonic words both appreciatively (at times, demonstrating reasonable awareness of the philosophical content) and critically; there is a tendency to characterize Plato's lexical choices as strained and cavalier. As a case study of how Pollux deals with a famous Platonic passage that was held dear by the Middle Platonists and Imperial *pepaideumenoi* at large, his handling of the epithets used in the description of the two horses in the Chariot Allegory (*Phdr.* 253d–e) is examined.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The *Onomasticon* by Julius Polydeuces, *Latine* Pollux, is typically left out of studies of Middle Platonism and the broader response to the Platonist tradition in antiquity.<sup>1</sup> This is understandable, because Pollux's work is a thesaurus—even though there are nuggets of anecdotal narrative and/or discursive statements (e.g., 1.30–31, 1.45–47, 2.94–95, 2.226, 4.87–90, 5.22–26, 9.73), the bulk of the text amounts to a concatenation of lists of synonyms and assorted terminology. One does not expect insights into philosophical problems from this kind of *Fachliteratur*. Having said that, recent scholarship increasingly tends to view Pollux's word-hoard as an ambitious and savvily designed product of the Second Sophistic;<sup>2</sup> in an environment preoccupied with the quality of its verbal resources, lexicography proves to be a powerful interface for values, agendas, and far-reaching cultural negotiation.<sup>3</sup> Given that the reception of Plato was such a major strand of Greco-Roman intellectualism and literary activity during the Imperial era, the treatment of Platonic references in the *Onomasticon* is more layered and consequential than it may seem at first.

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. e.g. Dörrie and Baltes 1990 and 1993; Tarrant *et al.* 2018; Boys-Stones 2018; De Lacy 1974; Hunter 2012. At most, the *Onomasticon* gets mentioned in passing for the sake of a word attested therein: e.g., Dillon 1996: 357.

<sup>2</sup> Zecchini 2007; Bussès 2011; Maudit 2013; König 2016; Tribulato 2018; Conti Bizzarro 2018; Cirone and Radici 2018; Zadorojnyi 2019a.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Zadorojnyi 2019a: 324 and 2019b: 48–49, with earlier bibliography.

## 2. READING PLATO, WORD BY WORD

There can be no doubt that Pollux's target audience<sup>4</sup> are the well-educated and discursively energetic insiders of Hellenic *paideia*, whose lifelong project is to earn and legitimize their status by demonstrating intellectual-cum-textual competence vis-à-vis the legacies, benchmarks, and priorities contained within the available cultural curriculum. It is also safe to assume that these paideutic operators, while not necessarily identifying themselves as *philosophoi*,<sup>5</sup> would be nevertheless actively aware of philosophical textuality. I use the term 'textuality' on purpose: 'textuality' allows for flexible, on-demand accentuation (as well as blurring) of the dichotomy between content and style and, therefore, comes in handy when dealing with an author recognized both for stylistic merits and for unmissably important, intellectually prestigious content—such as Plato.<sup>6</sup>

The Imperial readers of Plato are repeatedly challenged to find the right balance between the philosopher's message and its beautiful literary packaging. Thus, a professional Platonist Taurus (in Aulus Gellius' *Attic Nights*) declares that Plato's *Symposium* is superior to rhetorical texts stylistically (Gell. 17.20.5), but also stresses that we ought to look beyond Plato's glamorous wordage: 'for one must penetrate to the inmost depths of Plato's mind and feel the weight and dignity of his subject matter, not be diverted to the loveliness of his phrases or the grace of his vocabulary' (*ad ipsa enim Platonis penetralia ipsarumque rerum pondera et dignitates pergendum est, non ad vocularum eius amoenitatem nec ad verborum venustates deversitandum*, Gell. 17.20.6; trans. Rolfe 1927, modified). In the eyes of Taurus, to study Plato's text for the sake of sprucing up one's own style rather than improving one's life (*non vitae ornandae, sed linguae orationisque comendae gratia*) is blatant folly (Gell. 1.9.10).<sup>7</sup> Plutarch in *De prof. virt.* 79d is similarly critical of people who 'utilize' Plato and Xenophon only for the language (*χρωμένους διὰ τὴν λέξιν*), which is of course exemplarily pure Attic, yet thereby miss out on wholesome advice.<sup>8</sup>

Plutarch and Taurus' attitude does feel moralistic and sectarian. In the *longue durée*, however, it dovetails with the fact that immersive and conscientious engagement with Plato's language was facilitated for philosophical and non-philosophical readers alike by specialized glossaries and lexica. Several such lexica are attested;<sup>9</sup> of the two extant works the epitomized *Platonic Lexicon* attributed to 'Timaeus the Sophist' is particularly noteworthy,<sup>10</sup> bearing in mind its (albeit not definite) chronological proximity to the heyday of Deuterosophistic lexicography.<sup>11</sup> To put it bluntly, lexicographic techniques and expertise constitute a sort of bridge or buffer zone between the interests of philosophical 'muggles', that is readers whose aim is to appreciate Plato's prose,<sup>12</sup> and the concerns of the committed Platonists, who promote the idea of the totalized, thought-out cohesion of Plato's macro-text, down to the vocabulary employed. In the *Table Talk* by Plutarch, his brother Lamprias argues that although Plato is wont to tease the readers ('us') on the verbal level, in the Platonic myths the lexical choices are loaded with genuine meaningfulness:

LAMPRIAS: ... Plato often pulls verbal tricks on us (*πολλαχοῦ μὲν ἡμῖν τὸν Πλάτωνα προσπαίζειν διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων*), but in those passages where he combines his argument about the soul with myth, he uses significance [sc. of the words] to the maximum (*χρησθαι μάλιστα τῷ νῷ*).<sup>13</sup> (*Plu. QC 740b*)

<sup>4</sup> Beyond the Imperial dedicatee Commodus, that is.

<sup>5</sup> On the distinctive requisites (and constraints) of full-on philosophical identity in the Imperial world, see Hahn 1989; Flaig 2002; especially Trapp 2007a, 2007b, 2014, 2017a.

<sup>6</sup> See e.g. Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.81; *Plu. Sol.* 32.1–2; *Luc. Pisc.* 22; *Apul. Pl.* 1.2, p. 185; Walsdorff 1927: 81–88; Dörrie and Baltés 1990: 116–28; Lakmann 1995: 106, 175.

<sup>7</sup> See Lakmann 1995: 168–69 and 172–78; Petrucci 2018: 154–55 and 8–10.

<sup>8</sup> Roskam 2005: 272–75; further, Zadorojnyi 2014: 305–07.

<sup>9</sup> Dyck 1985; Dickey 2007: 47.

<sup>10</sup> For thorough contextualization of Timaeus the Sophist and ancient philosophical lexicography generally, see Barnes 2007 and 2015; also Valente 2012: 53–76. The latest editions are Bonelli 2007 and Valente 2012: 17–215.

<sup>11</sup> On the date of Timaeus' *Lexicon*, see Barnes 2007: 22–30 and 2015: 264–71; Valente 2012: 56–57.

<sup>12</sup> However, it would be rash and wrong to think that there was some kind of uncrossable divide between philosophical and non-philosophical modes of reading Plato; rather, ancient readers could have absorbed Plato's text with varying degrees of epistemic trust and espousal.

<sup>13</sup> The reading τῷ νῷ is rightly defended by Teodorsson 1996: 327.

According to Cassius Longinus (quoted by Proclus), Plato's ostentatiously beautiful diction should be taken as intentional and, moreover, integral to Plato's reasoning:

Longinus says that Plato here [Ti. 19d] is putting on a display (ὠραΐζεσθαι), and shows that he is using analogies and elegant words to beautify his argument (διὰ τῶν παραβολῶν καὶ τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων χάριτος καλλωπίσαντα τὸν λόγον)—against Platonists who claim that this style comes naturally and is not supported by the philosopher through art. He says that the choice of words has been thought through by Plato: none of them has been picked at random by him (εἶναι μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἐκλογὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων πεφροντισμένην τῷ Πλάτωνι, καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὸ ἐπιτυχὸν ἕκαστα λαμβάνειν αὐτόν) ... (fr. 49 Männlein-Robert = Procl. in Ti. 1.59.1–16 Kroll; trans. Boys-Stones 2018, modified)

Longinus believes that the Platonic text needs to be approached holistically, on the premise that the lexical artistry and rhetorical flair are neither unbefitting nor adventitious to Plato's philosophical exposition, but constructively subsumed into it.<sup>14</sup>

Attention to words certainly matters for the purposes of exegesis of Plato's texts as well as for (inter-) textual mobilization of Platonic themes and imagery. But there is more. In Alcinous' *Handbook*, the theoretical stakes are raised higher when summarizing the thesis advanced early on in the *Cratylus* (387d–391b).<sup>15</sup> The notion that the correctness of words derives from the nature of the things which the words designate is hammered home as a fundamental principle applicable to any language-based teaching and, crucially, to philosophical dialectics:

For the name is an instrument corresponding to a thing, not attached to it at random, but appropriate to it by nature (τὸ ὄνομα ὄργανον πράγματος οὐχ ὁ ἔτυχεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ κατάλληλον τῇ φύσει). It is by means of the name that we teach other things and distinguish them, so that the name is an instrument which teaches about and distinguishes the nature of each thing (καὶ διὰ τούτου διδάσκομεν ἀλλήλους τὰ πράγματα καὶ διακρίνομεν αὐτά, ὥστε εἶναι τὸ ὄνομα διδασκαλικὸν τι καὶ διακριτικὸν τῆς ἐκάστου οὐσίας ὄργανον), as the shuttle does for the weaving of the cloth. It is dialectic which has the job of using names rightly (τὸ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ὀρθῶς χρῆσθαι)<sup>16</sup> ... the dialectician, once the name-giver has laid down the name, would be the one to use it properly and fittingly (κατὰ τρόπον καὶ προσφόρως). (Alcin. *Didask.* 6.10–11; trans. Dillon 1993)

Now, Pollux in the *Onomasticon* does not appear to be keen on deep semantic correctness along those lines; his criteria for including and recommending words are primarily aesthetic (1.2: εἰς κάλλους ἐκλογὴν, 3 *praef.*: τὸν καλλιφωνώτατον [*sc.* author of the source text]).<sup>17</sup> Yet Pollux is obviously conscious of the didactic tenor of his *Onomasticon* (1.30: τὸ διδασκαλικὸν εἶδος). Conceptually, then, Pollux's practice as an expert on vocabulary and synonyms and the Middle Platonic rationale for language-based instruction are, perhaps, not altogether unrelated—knowing the lexical ins and outs is what lies at the core of education and epistemic activity across the board.<sup>18</sup> The more serious question is, how favourably—or, conversely, how critically—does Pollux evaluate Platonic textuality per se?

<sup>14</sup> Further, Männlein-Robert 2001: 77–86 and 437–53; Boys-Stones 2018: 436; Petrucci 2018: 162. For the bigger picture, see Heath 2009. Yet, note Longinus' polemic against some anonymous Platonists who downplayed the linguo-stylistic aspects of Plato's oeuvre; cf. Dörrie and Baltes 1990: 394.

<sup>15</sup> On Alcinous' reading of the *Cratylus*, see Van der Berg 2008: 37–43.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Plu. *Is.* 379c: 'Hence it is very well said among the philosophers that those who do not learn the correct perception of words mishandle their affairs too' (ὄθεν ἄριστα λέγεται παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις τὸ τοὺς μὴ μαθάνοντας ὀρθῶς ἀκούειν ὀνομάτων κακῶς χρῆσθαι καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν). The tables could be turned on philosophy, of course: consider how the lexicographer Phrynichus (*Ecl.* 243) affects bewilderment that Plutarch, despite being so advanced philosophically, has used the 'disreputable' word σύγκρισις in the title of an essay (φιλοσοφίας ἐπ' ἄκρον ἀφιγμένος ... ἐχρήσατο ἀδοκιμῶ φωνῇ).

<sup>17</sup> Bussès 2011: vii, 22; Tribulato 2018: 253, 261. It has been suggested—not implausibly—that the key aesthetic factor for Pollux is euphony: Bussès 2011: 71–72; Radici 2016–17: 197–203; Conti Bizzarro 2018: 6–8, 17–18, 35–36, 93–95, 113–14.

<sup>18</sup> It may be more than a fortuitous coincidence that the assimilation of words to servants and utensils (τῶν σκευῶν) in the preface to book 4 of the *Onomasticon* is followed by clusters of synonyms centred on, respectively, knowledge and ignorance (4.7–10).

## 3. POLLUX TAKES ON PLATO

Pollux offers well over 200 Platonic references—Plato, as it happens, is the second most-cited author in the *Onomasticon*.<sup>19</sup> The range of dialogues drawn upon by Pollux reveals quite high expectations about familiarity with Plato's corpus among the *Kulturträger* of the Second Sophistic; even the more 'hardcore' philosophical texts (such as *Parmenides*, *Theaetetus*, and *Philebus*) are tapped into as a matter of course.<sup>20</sup> Pollux is also fond of injecting Platonic intertextuality into his own pedagogical procedures, notably in several prefatory epistles<sup>21</sup> or when ending a book: thus, the future infinitive ἀνερευνήσειν, "to search up" in the coda to book 1 (1.255) could be an allusion to the *Phaedo* (63a2),<sup>22</sup> while the last section of book 4 (4.208) rather suggestively focuses on midwifery, with several references to the *Theaetetus* (149d3, 149c2, 150c4, 149b10).<sup>23</sup>

It goes without saying that throughout the *Onomasticon* Pollux prioritizes Plato's lexis over Plato's arguments, yet occasionally Pollux points up Platonic words and expressions which are loaded with bona fide philosophical significance<sup>24</sup> or even slips in a bit of doxographical knowledge (2.226 the intellect 'is located either in the brain, according to Pythagoras and Plato ...'). At times Pollux adopts an interpretative viewpoint on the Platonic text, thereby exceeding his own remit *qua* prescriptive lexicographer. Thus, at the end of book 5 (5.169–70) Pollux unpacks and spells out the notions of 'the same' (τὸ ταῦτόν) and 'the other' (τὸ ἄτερον), which are at work in Plato's *Timaeus*.<sup>25</sup> At 9.111 he clarifies, if somewhat parenthetically, an idiom from the *Phaedrus* (241b4–5).<sup>26</sup> In 7.206, the drawn-out taxonomy of crafts in Plato's *Statesman* is queried—did Plato really mean (σπουδάζων ἐχρήτο) all those terms,<sup>27</sup> or is it all a hoax?

δύνατο δ' ἂν τις, εἰ βούλοιο, καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ὀνομασθείσας τέχνας ... ἐπαριθμεῖν, καὶ τὰ σὺν αὐταῖς ὀνόματα, εἴτε σπουδάζων ἐχρήτο τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εἴτε καὶ μὴ·

One might add, should one so wish ... the crafts denominated by Plato, and the related words—whether he used those words in earnest or not.

Here Pollux mirrors the view that was current in the Platonist circles (Plu. *QC* 740b), namely, that Plato may behave as a mischievous wordsmith. But whereas the Platonists are programmed to pursue favourable and sympathetic readings of Plato's text,<sup>28</sup> to Pollux the linguistic and, by extension, cultural authority of Plato is anything but absolute.

<sup>19</sup> Bethé 1937: 10–11 and Bussès 2011: 98 provide the statistics.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. e.g. 2.155 (cf. *Prm.* 149a7, etc.); 9.88 (cf. *Prm.* 144b4–5), 3.115 (imprecise reference to *Prm.* 130c6); 2.236 (cf. *Tht.* 160d2); 2.159 (cf. *Tht.* 175e6); 3.23 (cf. *Phlb.* 57d7); 3.133 (cf. *Phlb.* 44d2). See Cartledge in this volume for the similar range of Platonic references in Pollux's near contemporary, Athenaeus.

<sup>21</sup> Poll. 4 *praef.*: 'If a word occurs to you as an omission, do not be too shocked. I might have left it out with full knowledge, as I do not approve of it. And if it escaped me—well, it is a fact that at times certain things we absolutely know do not come to mind, just as sometimes the names of our slaves (cf. *Pl. Cra.* 384d5), which we cannot say we don't know, escape us when we wish to summon them. Should this be regarded as a shock, if even with domestic objects (τῶν σκευῶν) one is sometimes "searching for what they hold in their hands" [cf. *Pl. R.* 432d10–e1]? But consider whether anyone else among the Hellenes discovered so much in such a mass of material.' Poll. 7 *praef.*: 'The man who compiled these books had not only to familiarize himself (ὠμιληκέναι) with numerous poetic and prose texts—as Plato would say (ὡσπερ ἂν εἶποι ὁ Πλάτων), "in verse and free-flowing" [*Lg.* 811d2–3]—but also to impose on them some compositional structure and uniformity out of diversity, as well as to have a certain discipline in the soul for exercising cross-examination and judgement.'

<sup>22</sup> So Chiron 2013: 46.

<sup>23</sup> Impish intertextual tricks cannot be ruled out either. At 9.138 a phrase from the *Theaetetus* (144b2) is wrongly attributed to the *Phaedrus*: 'for in Plato's *Phaedrus* there is also "they come to their studies with sluggish minds" (ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο παρὰ Πλάτωνι ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ ἡνωθροὶ πῶς ἐκβαίνουσι πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις)'. Misreferences and conflation are certainly not unknown in ancient lexicography (e.g. Moeris δ 42; Pollux 4.9, 1.42, with Conti Bizzarro 2014a: 46), but considering that Pollux's entry at 9.138 addresses the subject of torpor, the mix-up is perhaps a cheeky test of the readers' alertness and memory of the Platonic text (which is also misquoted—ἐκβαίνουσι has replaced Plato's original ἀπαντῶσι).

<sup>24</sup> 2.56 'visible substance' (οὐσία θεατή), cf. *Phdr.* 247c7; 2.5 'human nature' (ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις), cf. *Tht.* 149c1 (and further *Ti.* 90c2); 4.121 'theatrocracy' (θεατροκρατίαν), cf. *Lg.* 701a3.

<sup>25</sup> Zadorojnyi 2019b: 55–56. Cf. also Poll. 2.102 and 2.236.

<sup>26</sup> Poll. 9.111: '... this type of game is alluded to by Plato in the erotic speech addressed to Phaedrus' (ὅπερ εἶδος παιδιᾶς αἰνίττεται καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τοῖς εἰς τὸν Φαίδρον ἐρωτικαῖς).

<sup>27</sup> Mapped out meticulously by Conti Bizzarro 2014b.

<sup>28</sup> Boys-Stones 2018: 3, 16, 62 incisively observes that the Platonist exegesis is teleologically driven to show that Plato is all-round wise and right.

A great deal of Plato's lexical usage is endorsed<sup>29</sup> by Pollux, yet more than once in the *Onomasticon*, a word tagged with Plato's name is brought up only to be repudiated: 'I do not like (οὐ μοι ἀρέσκει) "non-premeditation" (ἀπροβουλία) from Plato's *Laws*' (6.144, cf. *Lg.* 867b4), 'Plato's "disrelishments" in the *Philebus* are vile' (3.133 πονηρὰ δὲ τὰ Πλάτωνος ἐν Φιλήβῳ δυσχεράσματα, cf. *Phlb.* 44d2). It is not that the *Onomasticon* is invariably biased against Plato—other classics of Greek literature are treated with similar critical discrimination,<sup>30</sup> the prerogative to condemn a word from a mainstream, canonical writer is central to Pollux's strategy of empowering himself as gatekeeper of Hellenic verbal culture. Controversy over the overwrought ('poetic') and otherwise strained features of Plato's style is well established in ancient criticism.<sup>31</sup> Still, in the context of the Second Sophistic and Middle Platonism, the posture of resistant reading of Plato cannot help having more special and vibrant relevance. Like his elder contemporary Aelius Aristides,<sup>32</sup> Pollux (who himself was a practising sophist and a professor of rhetoric) has an axe to grind with Plato, in defence of rhetorical discourse. But while Aristides challenges Plato's overall stance on rhetoric,<sup>33</sup> Pollux in the *Onomasticon* exercises his authority as the master vocabularist. He whittles away at Plato's stylistic judgement by censure of individual words.<sup>34</sup> Rejection may be point-blank, as at 3.133, 6.144, or 9.137:

Some think (οἴονται δέ τινες) that τευτάζειν, in Plato [cf. *Phlb.* 56e5 τευτάζοντων, *R.* 521e4 τετεύτακεν, *Ti.* 90b2 τετευτακότι] and in other authors (παρά τε Πλάτωνι καὶ ἄλλοις εἰρημένον) means (νοεῖν) the same as 'to abide' (διατρίβειν). But I do not accept this word (ἀλλ' οὐ προσέειμι τοῦνομα).<sup>35</sup>

Alternatively, Pollux frames his misgivings as deferential acknowledgement of Plato's writerly *kudos* which is, alas, not enough for a word to receive the lexicographer's full approval: 'foreign' [ἄθνηος] is rather too poetic, although Plato has used it' (ποιητικώτερον, Πλάτων δ' αὐτῷ κέχρηται, 3.55); "connectivity" (σύνδεσις) is harsh, even if it is by Plato' (ἢ ... σύνδεσις σκληρόν, κἂν Πλάτωνος ἦ, 8.152, cf. *Ti.* 43d6).<sup>36</sup> In a sense, Plato's literary reputation is sabotaged from within.

At 2.112, Pollux ostensibly agrees that Plato is an influential stylistic model, yet he strikes a coyly ambivalent tone which, again, undermines Plato's position:

ὥσπερ καὶ θρασυφωνίαν τὸ μὲν πρᾶγμα εἶποις ἄν, οὐκ ὄν τῆς Πλάτωνος θρασυξενίας ἀηδέστερον, τὸ δὲ ὄνομα θρασύφωνος βίαιον.

You could form the action noun 'brazen-speak'. This is no more disagreeable than Plato's 'brazenness of foreigner' [*Lg.* 879e4]. The adjective 'brazen-spoken' is violent.

From this passage,<sup>37</sup> Plato emerges as an imitable yet hardly unproblematic author. The term βίαιον merits attention, because it is one of Pollux's regular evaluative labels for lexemes which he does not

<sup>29</sup> And directly recommended: *Poll.* 4.40 'the opposite type you might call "non-philosophical", taking the word from Plato's *Timaieus* [73a6] (τὸν δ' ἐναντίον τούτῳ ἀφιλόσοφον ἂν εἶποις, ἐκ τοῦ Πλάτωνος Τιμαίου λαβὼν τοῦνομα); 2.199, 9.136. More tentatively, 9.134: 'Perhaps also "to be impeded" (ἴσως δὲ καὶ παραποδίζεσθαι): Plato in book 2 of the *Laws* [652b1] has "lest we are somehow impeded", as in "deviate" or "become deceived".'

<sup>30</sup> Cf. e.g. 5.157, 6.7, and 9.142 (Thucydides); 3.134 (Xenophon); 6.130 (Demosthenes); 2.8 (Isaeus); 6.156 (Solon); 6.174 and 7.117 (Sophocles); 3.51 (Euripides).

<sup>31</sup> Walsdorff 1927: 9–41; Dörrie and Baltes 1990: 128–46 and 390–98; Wiater 2011: 310–48; Hunter 2012: 151–84; Campos Daroca 2016: 320–24.

<sup>32</sup> And, no doubt, many others: e.g. *Luc. Rh. pr.* 17; [Longin.] *Subl.* 4.4, 29.1, 32.7; cf. *Herm. in Phdr.* p. 9.14–16 Couvreur = p. 10.17–18 Lucarini-Moreschini.

<sup>33</sup> See Milazzo 2002; Dittadi 2008, 2016, and 2017; Lauwers 2013: 350–57 and 2015: 80–83; more recently, Trapp 2020.

<sup>34</sup> I am not going, for now, to take into account the instances where a word used by Plato is condemned by Pollux without explicitly mentioning Plato: see e.g. Bussès 2011: 69 on 8.136; Conti Bizzarro 2018: 74–75 on 5.130. Granted, a full across-the-board survey would be necessary in order to rationalize Pollux's grievances against Platonic vocabulary into a more or less coherent pattern.

<sup>35</sup> Here, Pollux is taking a stand against the prevalent interpretation of τευτάζειν in Atticist and Platonist lexis: see esp. Ael. *Dion. Att. onom.* τ 11 Erbse (citing Plato as well as several comedialographers) and *Tim. Soph. Lex. Plat.* 422 Bonelli = τ 15 Valente; further, Bonelli 2007: 588–90. Within the Imperial Greek *Kunstsprache* the verb τευτάζειν was perceived, it seems, as precariously over the top: Phrynichus finds use for it in a refutation of 'those who pretend to be abreast with culture' (τῶν περὶ παιδείαν δοκούντων τευτάζειν, *Ecl.* 46), which is very probably ironic; cf. *Luc. Lex.* 21.

<sup>36</sup> On 8.152, see Conti Bizzarro 2018: 33–34.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Conti Bizzarro 2018: 45–46; Zadorojnyi 2019a: 334–35.

find suitable.<sup>38</sup> Saliently, on several occasions across the *Onomasticon* Pollux brackets Plato with the idea of lexical 'violence'. The doubts about the taxonomy of crafts, at 7.206, derive from Pollux's unease about Plato's over-bold experimentation with vocabulary: 'I am saying this because some of the words are rather violent' (λέγω δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐν ἐνίοις τῶν ὀνομάτων βιαίτερον).<sup>39</sup> Plato is a great writer, but to Pollux his greatness involves exploiting diction in a cavalier and transgressive manner.<sup>40</sup> Yet Pollux's policy is not to shield his readership from the Platonic textual hooliganism—quite on the contrary, he urges the reader to give in to Plato's overbearing example:

καὶ ὕφανσιν δ' ἂν εἴποις βιαζόμενος, ἐπεὶ Πλάτων εἴρηκε [*Plt.* 310e8] 'βασιλικῆς ξυνοφάνσεως'.

You might also, per force, say 'weavingship', since Plato has 'kingly coweavingship'. (7.33)<sup>41</sup>

A modicum of lexical audacity and aggressiveness is allowable and even welcome in Pollux's trainee,<sup>42</sup> which is why Plato may be so strangely good to think with. In the discursive climate of the Second Sophistic, the Platonic corpus is not merely a cache of prestigious or flawed textualities—it is a live, dynamically responsive template for the literary imagination and creative mimesis.<sup>43</sup> At 3.56, Pollux himself cannot resist fantasizing a quotation from Plato: 'Such men might be perhaps called "neo-citizens" by Plato' (τάχα δ' ἂν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὀνομάζονται νεοπολίται ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος). Evidently, the lexicographer is entitled to enfranchise a word that was never used by Plato as operably Platonic. And this is, to all intents and purposes, a feat of intertextual brinkmanship.

#### 4. THE GOOD HORSE, THE BAD HORSE

As a maestro of verbal aesthetics, Pollux maintains a fraught relationship with the Platonic text; Plato's literary authority is both celebrated and selectively discredited in the *Onomasticon*. But is Pollux's quarrel with Plato limited to single words? What are the chances of piecing together from the *Onomasticon* a more sustained response to Plato? A case study is called for, clearly. I propose to examine Pollux's familiarity with and built-in appraisal of a particularly famous passage from one of the most popular and influential Platonic works in antiquity—the description of the Good and Bad Horses of the Soul's Chariot in the *Phaedrus* (253d1–e5), where each horse is characterized via a series of epithets:<sup>44</sup>

One of the horses, we said, is good (ἀγαθός), the other not; but we did not go into the details of the goodness of the good horse or the badness of the bad. Let us do that now. The horse on the right, or nobler, side is upright in frame and well jointed (ὀρθὸς καὶ διηρθρωμένος), with a high neck (ὑψαύχην) and a regal nose (ἐπίγρυπος). His coat is white (λευκὸς ἰδεῖν), his eyes are black (μελανόμματος), and he is a lover of honour with modesty and self-control (τιμῆς ἐραστῆς μετὰ σωφροσύνης τε καὶ αἰδοῦς). Companion to true glory (ἀληθινῆς δόξης ἑταῖρος), he needs no whip (ἄπληκτος), and is guided by verbal commands alone (κελεύσματι μόνον καὶ λόγῳ ἠνιοχεῖται). The other horse is a crooked great jumble of limbs (σκολιός, πολὺς, εἰκῆ συμπεφορημένος), with a short bull-neck (κρατεραύχην, βραχυτράχηλος), a pug nose (σιμπρόσωπος), black skin (μελάγχρωτος), and grey bloodshot eyes (γλαυκόμματος, ὕφαμος).

<sup>38</sup> Radici 2016–17: 193–95 argues that the tags βίαιον and βιαίτερον are attached to words which Pollux views as morphologically awkward. More cautious is Bussès 2011: 58–61. Conti Bizzarro 2018: 71–81 admits that the reasons behind Pollux's use of βίαιον are not entirely transparent (p. 71: 'resta incerto cosa egli intendesse con questa critica'), but eventually concludes (at 114) that the notion of lexical 'violence' in the *Onomasticon* has to do with cacophony; cf. n. 17 above. It is important to stress that outside of the *Onomasticon*, βίαιον does not seem to have been a staple evaluative term of Atticist lexicographers; cf. Matthaios 2010: 187.

<sup>39</sup> Bethé's edition of the *Onomasticon* chooses βιαίτερον at 7.206 over the manuscript variant ἀβεβαιοτέρων.

<sup>40</sup> Pollux's contemporary (and possibly rival) Phrynichus is, by contrast, generally positive about Plato: cf. *Ecl.* 24, 71, 286, 304; Walsdorff 1927: 87. For Plato's status in this period, see the Introduction to this volume.

<sup>41</sup> On this passage, see Conti Bizzarro 2018: 104.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. 1.209, where Pollux describes a word (for which Plato is not the culprit anyway) as 'rather violent (βιαίτερον), yet not outside ambitious aspiration (ὄγκ ἐξω φιλοτιμίας)'. On lexical φιλοτιμία as an element of Pollux's pedagogical and stylistic programme, see Zadorojnyi 2019a: 335–39.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. [Longin.] *Subl.* 14.1, and esp. D. Chr. 36.27: 'keeping as close as possible to Plato's liberty of expression' (τῆς τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐλευθερίας περὶ τὴν φράσιν).

<sup>44</sup> On the reception of the *Phaedrus*, see Trapp 1990; Fleury 2006: 284–323 and 2007; Hunter 2012: 151–222, and *passim*; Fowler 2018: 225; and Costantini, this volume. For intertextual harnessing of the Soul's Chariot, see e.g. *Plu. Ant.* 36.6, with Beneker 2012: 187–88; Max. Tyr. *Or.* 20.5; Laplace 2007: 288; Winkle 2013: 107–17; Almagor 2014: 8–10, 12–13.

Companion to insolence and wild boasts (ὑβρεως και ἀλαζονείας ἐταῖρος), he is shaggy around the ears (περὶ ὠτα λάσιος), deaf (κωφός), and just barely yields to horsewhip and goad combined (μάστιγι μετὰ κέντρων μόγις ὑπέικων). (trans. Nehamas and Woodruff 1995, modified)

In book 1 of the *Onomasticon* a large section (1.181–220) is dedicated to horsemanship. Pollux predictably lists the epithets suitable for praising a horse and for disparaging a horse. Throughout the *Onomasticon*, material for *enkomion* and for *psogos* would be routinely arranged back to back, but here this method is applied somewhat more elaborately. Pollux organizes the epithets into two double clusters—first, the good and, respectively, the bad aspects of the horse’s physique (ἀπὸ σώματος, 1.188) and gaze are itemized (1.188–92), then the focus shifts on to the good and bad traits of the horse’s behaviour and attitude (ἔργων καὶ γνώμης, 1.194–98). The horses of the *Phaedrus* could have been brought into play, for sure, yet Pollux does not seem to be going down that path:<sup>45</sup> only a few words correspond with the Platonic passage, and those that do come well short of indicating intertextual acknowledgement or allusive feedback. The praise of the horse’s character includes εὐπειθής (1.195), which is used about the Good Horse by Plato (*Phdr.* 254a1), but in the Greek equestrian discourse εὐπειθής is quite a run-of-the-mill epithet (cf. *X. Mem.* 4.2.25, *Smp.* 2.10). Equally if not more unremarkable are the references to the horse’s ‘tall neck’ (ὑψηλὸν τὸν ἀύχένα, cf. *Phdr.* 253d5 ὑψαύχην) at 1.218<sup>46</sup> and to ‘chariot-eering’ (ἠνιόχησιν, cf. *Phdr.* 246b4) at 1.209. Signally, the phrase ‘fiery eyes, bloodshot gaze’ (ὀφθαλμοὶ πυρῶδεις, ὕφαιμον βλέποντες) in the *Onomasticon* 1.189 belongs in the *epainos* of equine physique, whereas in Plato the adjective ‘blood-shot’ (ὑφαιμος, *Phdr.* 253e3) describes the eyes of the Bad Horse.

Such lack of meaningful contact with the very famous Platonic passage in a thematically opportune section of the *Onomasticon* is curious in itself. Can it be that Pollux deliberately eschews intertextuality with the *Phaedrus*, while expecting the reader to notice and ponder on the reasons for this non-engagement? The situation would then be analogous to the phenomenon which Eran Almagor has aptly labelled ‘the absent lions’,<sup>47</sup> that is, calculated conspicuous absence of trigger-words, imagery, or, in our case, overt intertextual markers. If this is so, what is Pollux trying to achieve by giving Plato’s arguably best-known horses a cold shoulder in the catalogue of words associated with horsemanship? It is not, I think, that the *Phaedrus* simply loses out to more hands-on coverage of the topic (by Xenophon and Simon of Athens: see n. 45) in terms of technical accuracy and reliability—after all, the *Onomasticon* is interested in lexical and stylistic highlights from the cultural angle. Tellingly, the section on horses includes some Homer (1.183, 1.196) and, at 1.182, a quotation about colts from Plato’s *Laws* (834c1–2). Why not the *Phaedrus*, then?

All things considered, it seems that Pollux is latently subverting the *Phaedrus* passage on the grounds of both reliability and structure. This may explain the reassignment of ‘blood-shot’ eyes from negative (as in Plato) to positive descriptors at 1.189. Furthermore, the emphatic division between praise and blame of the horse’s physical properties (1.188–92) and of the horse’s temper (1.194–98) could be a subtle tactic of one-upping, again, none other than Plato. The clue is provided by the fifth-century Neoplatonist commentator Hermias,<sup>48</sup> who makes a note that in Plato’s description of the two horses physical and ethical characteristics are mixed together:

λαμβάνει τὰ μορφώματα ποτὲ μὲν ἀπὸ σώματος, ποτὲ δὲ ἀπὸ ἡθῶν καὶ ψυχῆς

he takes the features now from the body, and now from the temperament and soul (*in Phdr.* p. 194.18–19 Couvreur = p. 203.11–12 Lucarini-Moreschini)

οὐκέτι γὰρ πρῶτα λέγει τὰ τοῦ σώματος, εἶθ’ οὕτως τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ συγχέει τὴν τάξιν.

For he no longer describes first the bodily aspects [of the Bad Horse], then those of the soul, but confounds the arrangement. (*in Phdr.* p. 195.14–15 Couvreur = p. 204.7–8 Lucarini-Moreschini)

<sup>45</sup> Instead, he is overtly indebted in this section to Xenophon’s *On Horsemanship*, as well as to the fifth-century BC equestrian writer Simon of Athens (1.190, 1.193–194, 1.198, 1.204; cf. 2.69); see Chronopoulos 2016: 40–43.

<sup>46</sup> Note also the “upright” (ὀρθός, cf. *Phdr.* 253d4) neck in 1.189 and 1.218.

<sup>47</sup> Almagor 2009–10: 9–11.

<sup>48</sup> For essential orientation in Hermias’ commentary on the *Phaedrus*, see Tarrant and Baltzly 2018. For an English translation of Hermias’ discussion of the two horses, see now Baltzly and Share 2022: 128–131, who translate ὑφαιμος as ‘hot-blooded’, rather than as reference to bloodshot eyes.

It is not unthinkable that Hermias' remark reflects the earlier exegetical tradition, with which Pollux was familiar and which he might be hinting at here, in order to score a point. The implicit claim would be that the *Onomasticon* delivers a more structured presentation of those equine epithets, compared to the desultory rush of the *Phaedrus*,<sup>49</sup> and so does a neater job both rhetorically and epistemically. As it turns out, Pollux has a warhorse in mind (1.195). Perhaps the lexicographer's pedantry at the level of structure could be taken also as a riposte to the example of nonsensically manipulative (if well-meant) rhetorical exhortation which Socrates comes up with later in the *Phaedrus* (260b1–c2):

SOCRATES: Suppose I were trying to convince you that you should get a horse to fight the enemies, and neither one of us knew what a horse is, but I happened to know this much about you, that Phaedrus believes a horse is the tame animal with the longest ears—

PHAEDRUS: But that would be ridiculous, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Not quite yet, actually. But if I were seriously trying to convince you, having composed a speech in praise (λόγον ἔπαινον) of the donkey in which I called it a horse and claimed that having such an animal is of immense value both at home and in military service, that it is good for fighting, and for carrying your baggage and that it is useful for much else besides—

PHAEDRUS: Well, that would be totally ridiculous. (trans. Nehamas and Woodruff 1995, modified)

For the purposes of talking about horses, the *Phaedrus* presumably did not satisfy Pollux—to the lexicographer's taste, Plato's treatment of the subject was too shambolic and irresponsible. Pollux in book 1 tacitly sidelines one of antiquity's favourite Platonic texts, so as make his own point heard.

A proper intertextual encounter between the *Onomasticon* and the horses of the *Phaedrus* takes place in 2.73, when Pollux is busy mustering vocabulary of noses:

ῥινὸς δὲ σχήματα γρυπός, ἐπίγρυπος, ὃν βασιλικὸν οἶονται, σιμός, ὃν εὐχαριν νομίζουσιν· Πλάτων δὲ καὶ σιμοπρόσωπον εἴρηκεν ἐφ' ἵππου.

Shapes of the nose: aquiline, aquilinish (which is regarded as regal), pug (which is believed to be charming). Plato also used 'snub-faced', about a horse.

Two epithets from the *Phaedrus* (ἐπίγρυπος, cf. 253d5; σιμοπρόσωπος, cf. 253e2) are cited and authenticated by way of *nominatim* reference to Plato. In fact, there is another layer of Platonic intertextuality here. Pollux's entry draws on the memorable passage from the *Republic* on the partisan language lovers use about the looks of their beloved youths:

ὁ μὲν, ὅτι σιμός, ἐπίχαρις κληθεὶς ἐπαινεθήσεται ὑφ' ὑμῶν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ γρυπὸν βασιλικὸν φατε εἶναι ...

The one who is snub-nosed will be called 'charming' and will be praised by you, another's aquiline nose you say is 'regal' ... (Pl. R. 474d7–9)

Hermias' commentary falls back on the same passage to explain ἐπίγρυπος in *Phdr.* 253d5:

<ἐπίγρυπος> ἀντὶ τοῦ βασιλικός· τὸ γὰρ γρυπὸν αἰεὶ τῷ βασιλικῷ καὶ εὐγενεὶ προσάπτει, καὶ τὸ γρυπὸν τοῦ σιμοῦ εὐμορφότερόν ἐστι.

'Aquiline': equivalent to 'regal', since [Plato] always associates 'aquiline' with the regal and noble, and an aquiline nose is more handsome than a snub nose. (p. 194.24–26 Couvreur = p. 203.18–20 Lucarini-Moreschini)<sup>50</sup>

<sup>49</sup> Whereas, to Hermias, Plato's text has scope for metaliterary cunning—the description 'imitates' (μιμῆται) the chaotic nature of the Bad Horse (p. 195.13–14 Couvreur = p. 204.6–7 Lucarini Moreschini). See Baltzly and Share 2022: 200–201.

<sup>50</sup> The ranking of noses (which is absent from the *Republic*) resurfaces in Hermias' gloss of σιμοπρόσωπος (p. 195.22–23 Couvreur = p. 204.16–17 Lucarini-Moreschini) as 'paltry, humble, and not regal' (εὐτελής, χαμαιπετής καὶ οὐχὶ βασιλικός).



Once again, for a brief second the *Onomasticon* and Hermias come near each other. It is tempting but difficult to speculate about the sources<sup>51</sup> and intellectual tradition(s) they share—the appraisal of noses could feasibly cut across philological lexicography, Platonist lexica and exegesis, and physiognomic literature.<sup>52</sup>

What is more, Pollux in 2.73 underlines that Plato turned ‘snub-faced’ (σιμοπρόσωπος) into an epithet about a horse (ἐφ’ ἵππου).<sup>53</sup> Pollux’s short, deadpan phrase could be hiding a reproachful smirk. Slightly earlier in the *Onomasticon* (2.47) he asserts that the word πρόσωπον should be ring-fenced exclusively for humans: ‘under the forehead, the face—which we use to refer only to humans’ (τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ τῷ μετώπῳ πρόσωπον, ὃ μόνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὕτω καλοῦμεν).<sup>54</sup> For animal faces there are other terms, which Pollux duly lists. I contend that the peremptory remark on πρόσωπον in 2.47 gives Pollux a vantage point for sniping at Plato’s abuse of language and, worse, at the ontological categories that Hellenism and humanity (no less!) depend on. The implicit charge against Plato in 2.73 could be that by applying σιμοπρόσωπος to a horse, he effectively commits a violation of the semantic boundary between humankind and non-human animals.<sup>55</sup> Indeed it may not be accidental that in book 2 of the *Onomasticon* a whole handful of adjectives which feature in the Platonic description of the two horses are affixed to the human body;<sup>56</sup> it takes a lexicographer to clean up, without too much fuss, the mess left behind by the philosopher ...

The critique of Plato’s hippotextuality in the *Onomasticon* 2.73 is of course muted and probably facetious (a college don in the ironic mood, as it were), yet potentially devastating too, should the reader recall that in Plato’s *Cratylus*, 385a6–10, ‘man’ and ‘horse’ are the examples illustrating the crazy randomness of nomenclature based on convention alone.<sup>57</sup>

SOCRATES: What about this? Suppose I call one of the things that are (καλῶ ὅτιοῦν τῶν ὄντων)—for instance, the one we now call ‘man’—suppose I give *that* the name ‘horse’ and give the one we now call ‘horse’ the name ‘man’ (ὃ νῦν καλοῦμεν ἀνθρώπων, ἂν ἐγὼ τοῦτο ἵππον προσαγορεύω, ὃ δὲ νῦν ἵππον, ἀνθρώπων). Will the same thing have the public name (δημοσία μὲν ὄνομα) ‘man’ but the private (ιδίᾳ δὲ) name ‘horse’? And in the other case, the private name ‘man’ but the public name ‘horse’? (trans. Reeve 1998, modified)

Conceivably, Pollux counts on his readers’ erudition<sup>58</sup> in a bid to expose a fault line in the Platonic macro-text. Having used an *a priori* ‘human’ epithet in the *Phaedrus* about a horse, Plato sleepwalks into literally the same absurdity which is outlined in the *Cratylus*.<sup>59</sup> Just as it does not make sense to simply swap ‘man’ and ‘horse’ on a whim, we should be careful with the descriptors attached to these categorical nouns, too. If my hunch is correct, Pollux is playing a sophisticated game with the *Phaedrus*

<sup>51</sup> Note οἶονται in Pollux 2.73; cf. 9.137 οἶονται δὲ τινες.

<sup>52</sup> Plato’s description of the horses in the *Phaedrus* was grist to the mill of the ancient physiognomists, even though the odds are that Plato himself had meant to sabotage physiognomy: Boys-Stones 2007: 38–41.

<sup>53</sup> The Platonist commentators, for their part, tend to flag up the fact that the *Phaedrus* passage is not about actual horses, but about horse-images: καὶ πάλιν ἵππομόρφω εἶπε, καὶ οὐχὶ ἵππους (Hermias, in *Phdr.* p. 193.22 Couvreur = p. 202.17–18 Lucarini-Moreschini), Πλάτων ἐξεικονίζει (Plu. *De virt. mor.* 44Sc), Πλάτων αὐτὸς εἰκάσας (Plu. *Quaest. Pl.* 1008c).

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Arist. *HA* 491b9–11, *PA* 662b18–22.

<sup>55</sup> Imperial literature and philosophy vigorously pursue the debate on the otherness and value of animals: see e.g. Gilhus 2006; Smith 2014; Blanshard 2021.

<sup>56</sup> Ὑψαύρη: 2.135; μελανόματος: 2.61; ὕφαμος: 2.62, 2.215 (also 4.186, 8.79); κωφός: 2.82. Pollux’s lexical speciesism at 2.47 contrasts, however, with his more generous verdict on παιδοσπορεῖν at 5.92: “to beget” is a common term for all [creatures], also for humans (κοινὸν δ’ ἐπὶ πάντων τὸ παιδοσπορεῖν, ὡσπερ καὶ ἐπ’ ἀνθρώπων). The verb παιδοσπορεῖν is found, incidentally, in *Pl. Phdr.* 250e5, which is an often-quoted Platonic passage (Plu. *Amat.* 751e; Clem. *Al. Paed.* 2.10.86.2).

<sup>57</sup> See e.g. Krentzmann 1971: 127–29; Montgomery Ewegen 2014: 23–24, 69 (‘dissolution of oneness’ is at stake). Many modern commentators, however, refuse to accept that early on in the *Cratylus* the radical conventionalist approach to naming is demolished as silly and altogether unviable: see Barney 1997 and 2001: 21–45; Sedley 2003b: 52–54; Van der Berg 2008: 3 n. 2; Ademollo 2011: 43–48.

<sup>58</sup> It is worth adding that the *Cratylus* passage cited above was on the Middle Platonists’ radar, cf. Alcin. 6.10 (trans. Dillon 1993): ‘so that the name of every object is fixed by its proper relationship to the nature of the given thing; for, after all, it is not the case that if any name is attached to anything, it yields a correct signification, as for instance if we attach the name “horse” to a man’ (ὥστε εἶναι παντὸς ὄνομα κατὰ τὸ οἰκίον τῆ τοῦ πράγματος φύσει κείμενον· οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἂν τὸ τυχὸν τῷ τυχόντι τεθῆ, σημαίνει τὸ ὀρθόν, οἷον εἰ ἵππον θεῖμεθα ἀνθρώπῳ ὄνομα).

<sup>59</sup> Also relevant could be other Platonic passages where the desirability of correct naming is thrown into relief by scenarios which entail interspecies contamination, whether biological (*Cra.* 393b7–c6) or conceptual (*Phdr.* 260b3–7).

horses.<sup>60</sup> Socrates in the *Phaedrus* declines to waste interpretative effort on the Hippocentaurs and other mythological monsters (229d–e); Pollux may be implying, in a tongue-in-cheek way, that the Platonic epithet *σιμπρόσωπος* is tantamount to a Centaur-like hybridity<sup>61</sup> and *hybris*, in terms of language and, at the end of the day, of cultural axioms. An apparently innocuous lexicographic remark at *Onomasticon* 2.73 thus unlocks a high-stakes clash over intellectual authoritativeness.

## 5. CONCLUSION

Pollux's engagement with Plato across the *Onomasticon* is geared towards displaying cultural competence on several levels. The traditional prestige of the Platonic text required any Imperial *pepaideu-  
menos* worth their salt to be well versed in Plato's diction; the *Onomasticon* manifestly ticks this box. At the same time, Pollux does not worship Platonic textuality. By pointing out Plato's problematic and outright faulty word choices, Pollux sustains and bolsters his own educational and intellectual sovereignty and superiority as grandmaster of the Greek language. It would not be surprising if Pollux also wished to be part of the Deuterosophistic 'resistance' to Plato<sup>62</sup>—there may be some shrewd taunting of the philosopher between the lines of the *Onomasticon*. Lexicography and philosophical reception proper during the Imperial era are thus not incompatible but mutually imbricated within an intertextual and conceptual continuum. The Platonic idiolect becomes a litmus test of the relationship between word and thought: while the (Middle) Platonists seek to explain and reclaim Plato's lexical behaviour as a philosophical asset, Pollux encourages his readers to reserve their right to remain quiz-zical and open-minded.

<sup>60</sup> Compare how Plutarch attitudinizes his own references to the horses of the *Phaedrus* (see Repath 2007: 55–60) by dint of the word *ὑποζύγιον*, 'yoked animal' (*Ant.* 36.2; in plural *De virt. mor.* 445c; cf. *Quaest. Pl.* 1008c *συμφύτω ζεύγει*). By making the most of *ὑποζύγιον* (which crops up as *ὑποζυγίω* in Plato's Chariot Allegory, *Phdr.* 256c2) and, by the same token, generally keeping out *ἵππος* with its more genteel connotations, Plutarch puts a negative spin on the non-rational parts of the soul (although *τῶν ἵππων* is also used, twice, in *Quaest. Pl.* 1008c–d).

<sup>61</sup> As some modern scholars suggest, Plato in the *Phaedrus* may be working precisely towards such hybridity; see Belfiore 2006: 199–205 and Boys-Stones 2007: 41 on the parallels between the appearance of Socrates and that of the Bad Horse; cf. Moore 2015: 180. On Plato's deployment of animals in philosophically stimulating ways, see further Bell and Naas 2015 (especially Montgomery Ewegen 2015 and Bell 2015).

<sup>62</sup> See nn. 32–33 above.