

Pyrrhonism as depicted by Sextus Empiricus

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ABSTRACT

Sextus Empiricus has been described a positivist, an empiricist, a pragmatist and as a phenomenalist. Sextus describes himself as a Pyrrhonian which for him means that he does not subscribe to any definite doctrine. It is argued in the present thesis that Pyrrhonian Scepticism can only be superficially identified with other 'isms'. The Pyrrhonian way is radically different from the various standpoints which may appear to share much in common with it. I have addressed myself to the question 'what is the Pyrrhonian way as portrayed in Sextus' writings?'

I argue that Sextus cannot be correctly said to have an epistemological or ethical position. Interpreters who set out with a view to determining what Sextus' standpoint is error from the start since they begin by assuming that he has a standpoint -- that he is a dogmatist. Sextus may be said to have a method by which he can show the Dogmatists that they must suspend judgement. He may also be said to have a way of attaining ἀταξία . The present thesis investigates his Sceptical methods and the Pyrrhonian way of life. It argues against interpretations which portray Sextus as subscribing to definite doctrines.

In the second chapter I examine the evidence and various interpretations of the evidence on Sextus' life. I do this because I believe the interpretations of Sextus' writings have been significantly influenced by commonly accepted views of his life and times. I argue that the evidence is so scanty and contradictory that it is not possible to establish with reasonable certainty any significant biographical 'facts'.

In Chapter Three through to and including Chapter Seven I examine Pyrrhonism as depicted by Sextus. The general conclusion which is reached through this study is that Sextus is remarkably consistent both in the form in which he presents his material and in the coherence of the various aspects of his method and argument.

In Chapter Eight, which consists of a series of appendices, I examine the various interpretations of Sextus' writings which I wish to oppose. In general the conclusion is reached that the tendency in modern scholarly literature is to evaluate Sextus' works according to criteria which may be appropriate to a Dogmatist but which are inappropriate to a Pyrrhonian.

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ABBREVIATIONS

- D.L. Diogenes Laertius
- M. Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Mathematicos*
(Against the Dogmatic Philosophers)
- P.H. Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrrhoneioi Hypotyposeis*
(Outlines of Pyrrhonism)

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Man, as Aristotle says, philosophizes in order to escape from ignorance. Man by nature desires to know. It is not difficult to understand why a man, who is perplexed and thinks himself ignorant, would wish to study at the Old Academy or Lyceum or Garden or Porch. He might reasonably enter these schools with the hope of escaping from ignorance and of becoming a possessor of wisdom and not merely a lover of wisdom. He might hope to satisfy his desire to know by mastering the teachings of the philosophers. He would find that the members of these schools share the same aspirations as he does and that they believe that they have a great deal to teach him. He would persist in his studies with the hope that the nature of the universe, which is at first hidden and concealed from him, may someday be revealed to him. He would be encouraged and reassured that his labours are not in vain by the fact that his teachers are regarded as being men of great learning and wisdom.

The man, who entertains these hopes, would meet with a very different experience if he were to go to study with the Pyrrhoneans. His instructors, if they should be called that, would make no pretense of being men of wisdom. They would

declare that they know nothing -- not even that they know nothing -- with a peculiar sort of delight. The student would become disheartened because he would find that all his instructors have to offer him are seemingly insurmountable obstacles to block him in his escape from ignorance. They would show him that there is no point in fleeing to the Dogmatists because those vain and puffed up men will only try to deceive him with rash and arbitrary arguments. To make matters still worse the Pyrrhoneans would announce that they do not even assert that the truth is inapprehensible because they cannot establish that with certainty. Thus the student of the Pyrrhoneans would not even be able to declare that the apprehension of truth is beyond human reach and abandon his pursuit to escape from ignorance and turn to other matters.

The Pyrrhoneans would have only one encouraging word to offer. They would tell the student that they began with the same hope and met with the same despair but that upon despairing of discovering the truth they experienced a complete calm and freedom from disturbance. The student would naturally want them to explain rationally why despairing of determining what is true and false should have such a wonderful effect on the inquirer. The Pyrrhoneans would offer no such explanation. They say that it happens, as if it were by chance.

The student, then, is left with only one question which he can ask the Pyrrhoneans and expect them to answer. What is the Pyrrhonian way? This is the question which the present thesis is primarily concerned with.

It is customary when writing on the works of a philosopher to attempt to determine what his position or teaching is. Most scholars have approached the works of Sextus Empiricus in this fashion and have concluded their inquiry with the curious result that Sextus, who determines nothing, who claims that he does not assert any proposition more than any other, and who does not assent to any criterion is a positivist and/or a phenomenalists and/or an empiricist and/or a pragmatist. It is my view that Sextus, strictly speaking, does not have a position. He may be said to have a method or a way but not a definite standpoint. Sextus' students could question him from dawn to dusk and they would not progress one step closer to satisfying their desire to know. He would show them time after time that it is necessary to suspend judgement and to leave the question at issue unanswered.

Sextus depicts the Pyrrhoneans as being men who are of unmatched honesty and integrity. They do not make any pretentious claims. The Pyrrhoneans, in Sextus view, are more men of science than are any of the Dogmatists because they refuse to be tricked into believing and asserting things which cannot be unquestionably established. The Pyrrhoneans do aid the student in his attempt to flee from ignorance by making it difficult for him to settle for a mere semblance of truth. The truly ignorant man is the man who vainly and rashly claims that he has discovered truth but who has really only fallen prey to persuasive though unfounded arguments.

The Pyrrhoneans, one might say, served the valuable

function of acting as mediators. They, in a sense, brought all the Dogmatists into one room and gave each one of them an opportunity to stand up and tell the others what the true nature of things really is. The Pyrrhoneans, being the only ones in the room who are not occupied with presenting and defending their own particular case, are able to listen attentively and critically to all of the different points of view and to weigh each against the other. Each particular argument seems to them to be counterbalanced by a conflicting, equally credible argument. The Pyrrhoneans, one might say, cast themselves in the role of the dispassionate judge. They withhold their verdict because they are not able to come to any definite decision until further evidence is presented. They, therefore, suspend judgement and say that they will persist in their investigation.

The Pyrrhoneans, to complete the picture, are in the remarkable position of not being involved in the battle of opinions. They are spectators to the whole affair. They witness the torment which the Dogmatists suffer because they are devoted to definite beliefs and convictions on how man and the world ought to be or is by nature but which never seems to be realized in experience. The Dogmatists seem to be perpetually striving to realize their ideals but they also seem to be doomed to never realize them. The Pyrrhoneans do not have any ideals which they positively assent to and believe in so they are freed of many of the causes of perturbation which the Dogmatists are prey to. The Pyrrhoneans are content

simply to yield to the dictates of tradition and to follow appearances. They obey but they do not respect the dictates of custom and of religion.

This thumb-nail characterization leaves many questions unanswered. Does the Pyrrhonean, as depicted by Sextus Empiricus, truly desire to know? Does he hope to escape from ignorance or is he perfectly content to remain in a state of complete ignorance? Does he, in fact, believe that the man who is truly wise cannot attain to happiness with the same degree of perfection as the Pyrrhonean? Does he show an interest in determining the limits of human knowledge with a view to proposing a new and positive direction which philosophical inquiry can pursue? Does he hope to show the futility of inquiry into the intrinsic nature of things with a view to turning man's attention and concern to the empirical arts and to the affairs of daily life? Can he, who does not make any assumptions, show that it is necessary to suspend judgement? Why did Sextus write and give lectures if he had no doctrines or opinions which he wished to assert? I attempt to answer these and other questions.

The present thesis is strictly limited. It is a study of Pyrrhonism as depicted by Sextus Empiricus.

I do not attempt to determine which passages originated with Sextus and which passages he borrowed from his predecessors. There is no doubt that Sextus borrowed a great deal from his predecessors. However, what he chose to adopt from other texts he selected because it suited his purpose.

The fact that he used the writings of others does not detract from the fact that he presented Pyrrhonism as he saw fit. I have included an Appendix in the thesis in which I quote and comment on the important passages in which Sextus expressly indicated how he regarded his predecessors in the Pyrrhonian School.

I have not attempted to determine whether or not Sextus has accurately represented the various positions he attacks; nor have I examined in detail his criticisms of the Dogmatic positions. I believe that to do justice to this topic one would have to devote as much space to clarifying and presenting the positions he attacks as one would have to devote to his criticisms of them. I do deal in some detail with Sextus' polemical methods and with the tropes which he used in his polemical treatises.

I am not concerned with trying to determine whether or not Sextus' account of Pyrrhonism is an accurate account of what Pyrrhonism is according to Pyrrho, Timon, Aenesidemus, Agrippa or Menodotus. Rather I am interested in answering the question 'What is Pyrrhonism according to Sextus Empiricus?' This question is sufficiently difficult to answer in a work of this length.

Fortunately, it is not necessary to attempt to discern what Sextus said on the basis of fragments and comments by other ancient authors. His works, for the most part, have been preserved. One is able to determine the philosophical import of Sextus' texts. By limiting the scope of the present

study precisely to that task I believe that it is possible to devote the largest part of the thesis to matters which are of philosophical interest. No doubt a study such as this would benefit greatly if the basic facts of the history of Pyrrhonism were clearly known. However, I think that much can be learned about Pyrrhonism which is of philosophical importance by studying the text of Sextus despite the fact that many relevant historical questions remain unanswered and perhaps unanswerable.

I have devoted a chapter to re-examining the evidence which is available on the life of Sextus Empiricus. Many of the interpretations of Sextus' thought are partly based on so-called facts. It is necessary to see what can really be said with reasonable certainty about the life of Sextus.

The appendices are primarily devoted to the consideration of interpretations which I wish to oppose. I have found it necessary to repeat many arguments in the appendices which I use in the main body of the thesis.

It is extremely difficult to write on Pyrrhonism without becoming as repetitious as Sextus is since each aspect of Pyrrhonism is connected with every other aspect. The problem is made more difficult than is usually the case in examining philosophical works because Pyrrhonism does not contain a variety of theories of its own. Sextus is primarily occupied with expressing and justifying the Pyrrhonian way which, on the surface, is very simple.

I hope that the limits which I have placed on the scope

of the present thesis will be justified by the fact that it has enabled me to treat Sextus' own exposition of Pyrrhonism with special care. He deserves the attention and care which is due any philosopher. He is not merely a copist or a historian of Pyrrhonism. He is a Pyrrhonean. I have approached Sextus' text as I would the text of any other important philosopher.

CHAPTER TWO

The Life of Sextus Empiricus

(i)

Sextus Empiricus does not reveal anything of himself as distinct from 'the Sceptic' except in a passing and incidental way. He does not refer to his contemporaries, nor to his country, nor to any personal experiences, in such a way as to provide a definite picture of his life and times. The few references he makes to his involvement in the medical profession are as perplexing as they are enlightening. The only attachments which Sextus strongly identifies with in his extant writings are the demands of the Pyrrhonian philosophy.

The present chapter indicates the most important evidence that one can draw upon for determining the details of Sextus' life and critically examines this evidence and some interpretations others have given it. This has not been done since the turn of the century.¹ As a result of a lack of attention to this evidence, there is a tendency to allow mere conjectures or probabilities to be treated as facts which ultimately influence the interpretation of Sextus' thought.

Scholars usually place Sextus late in the second century A.D..² It is argued that by the third century A.D. Stoicism had ceased to be the sort of influential power which would provoke such an impassioned polemic as one finds Sextus

involved in. Stoicism, they argue, is attacked by Sextus as being the dominant corrupting force of the day. This argument has played a deciding role not only in determining when Sextus lived but also where he taught.

The passage which scholars call upon to prove that the Stoics of Sextus' own time were his chief opponents occurs at P.H. i 65.³ Before quoting this passage it is important to define clearly what the matter at issue is. No one would dispute the fact that Sextus considered the Stoics to be the chief opponents of the Sceptics. What requires demonstration is that the Stoics whom he is attacking are his contemporaries. The fact that he is attacking Stoicism does not by itself show that he is living at a time when Stoicism is flourishing. A large part of Sextus' writings consists of impassioned attacks on the Pre-Socratics, who, obviously, were not flourishing at the time he wrote.⁴

Was Sextus writing from the standpoint of one caught up in a spirited polemic with contemporary Stoics? Or, was Sextus presenting the position of Pyrrhonism against Dogmatism from the standpoint of one whose attention is not so much focused on a contemporary controversy as directed towards the problem his school had been involved in for centuries? This question is made particularly difficult to answer by the fact that it was a common practice amongst later Greek philosophers not to mention their contemporaries regardless of their relation to them.

P.H. i 65 occurs as a part of Sextus' outline of the Stoic

theory of logos, and more particularly of internal reason (ἐνδίαθετος) which he ridicules at length in the paragraphs that follow.

ἴδωμεν οὖν πρότερον περὶ τοῦ ἐνδιαθέτου.
 οὗτος γάρ τινιν κατὰ τοὺς μάλιστα ἡμῶν
 ἀντιδοξοῦντας νῦν δογματικούς, τοὺς ἀπὸ
 τῆς στοᾶς, ἐν τούτοις ἔοικε σαλεύειν...⁵

Translations:-

Bury: ...according to those Dogmatists who are, at present, our chief opponents - I mean the Stoics...

#1 ...according to the present day Dogmatists, who are most strongly of a contrary opinion to us, those from the Stoa...

#2 ...according to the Dogmatists who are, at present (i.e. in our present discussion; now: in respect to the question at hand which the Stoics historically have held a strong position on), most strongly of a contrary opinion to us, those from the Stoa...

I have proposed two very different translations of P.H. i 65. The second one agrees with Bury's in that it treats the "νῦν" as an adverb. The first translation treats the "νῦν" as an adjective modifying Dogmatists.

If Bury's translation (or, the second one I have proposed) is acceptable, this passage cannot be regarded as providing very strong evidence that Sextus was involved in the sort of polemic with the Stoics that would necessitate his having had to have lived at a time when Stoicism was flourishing. The fact that the Stoics are said to be presently the Sceptics' chief opponents does not tell us very much about the state of Stoicism in Sextus' day. Sextus could reasonably have said that Chrysippus represented in the past and still represents

at present the main opponent to the Sceptics. It is important to note that the Stoics who said that internal reason is occupied with what Sextus indicates in P.H. i 65 were originally the Stoics from the Early Stoa.⁶ The Stoics of his day would have followed in their tradition and thus repeated these views. The Stoic Sextus specifies by name in the attack that follows is Chrysippus.⁷ He speaks of Chrysippus as though he were living in the present though he does refer to him as the old one (ὁ ἀρχαῖος) when he quotes him.⁸

One might reasonably imagine Sextus having before him as he lectures the texts of the Dogmatists from the Early and Middle Stoa while the contemporary Stoics whom he confronts in his daily life are but faint shadows of the Stoics we find him addressing by name in his works. His contemporary Stoics would be his main opponents in that they are a part of the tradition Pyrrhonism is most strongly opposed to.

One might have certain reservations about Bury's translation and the proposed #2 because the "νῦν" comes before "δογματικούς" and not "ἀντιδοξοῦντας". P.H. i 65, however one might translate it, does not reveal very much about the state of Stoicism in Sextus' day. It is remarkable that such an obscure and nondescript passage is the best testimony that scholars can call upon to prove that Sextus was deeply immersed in a polemic with his contemporaries.

Sextus' arguments generally are not explicitly directed against his contemporary Stoics. The Stoics he names and the theories he examines are from the Early and Middle Stoa.

His reference to Basilides the Stoic (M. vii 258), which was once taken to be the Basilides who taught Marcus Aurelius, is more likely referring to the Basilides mentioned in a fragment of Diogenes Laertius.⁹ Zeller takes the latter position because there is not one other author in the whole work (M. vii - xi), in which this reference appears, later than the middle of the last century B.C. with the possible exception of Aenesidemus whose dates are uncertain.¹⁰

His attack is directed against all Dogmatism for all time. Each of his polemical treatises begins with a survey of the views which have been expressed on the matter in question going back to Homer. His attacks on Epicurus are as impassioned as his attacks on any Stoic.¹¹ It is only with respect to questions related to logic that the Stoics are given special attention. This is as one would expect since the Stoics were the most prominent in logic. Even if Stoicism had been completely extinct, which, of course, it was not, Sextus would have still regarded it as absolutely necessary to refute their position in order to establish exhaustively the need to practice ἐποχή.

Sextus may have lived at a time when Stoicism was flourishing. However, one cannot determine this from the way in which Sextus addresses the Stoics.

If the dates of Diogenes Laertius could be determined with certainty the most decisive evidence one could call upon in trying to date Sextus would be the following reference

Diogenes makes to the otherwise unheard of Saturninus:-

Σέξτου δὲ διήκουσε Σατορνίνος ὁ
Κυθηνᾶς, ἐμπειρικός καὶ αὐτός.¹²

Unfortunately, we neither know when Saturninus lived nor how long the gap was between Saturninus and Diogenes. Beyond this Diogenes' dates are at least as difficult to determine as are Sextus'. One is able to say with reasonable certainty that Diogenes lived before the middle of the third century A.D. because he never speaks of Neoplatonism. On the basis of this mention of Saturninus by Diogenes one is only able to say rather tentatively that Sextus may have lived a generation, more or less, before Diogenes who probably lived before the middle of the third century.

Galen of Pergamum frequently speaks of an Herodotus who certain scholars identify with the Herodotus who Diogenes Laertius says was the teacher of Sextus.¹³ However, Galen never makes a mention of Sextus despite the fact that he discusses in great detail both the Methodical and the Empirical Medical Sects and names all those involved of any importance. Galen also speaks of the Sceptics in sufficient detail that were Sextus known to him he would have been mentioned. Mary Patrick concludes:-

As Galen died about 200 A.D. at the age of seventy, we should fix the date of Sextus early in the third century, and that of Diogenes perhaps a little later than the middle, were it not that early in the third century the Stoics began to decline in influence, and could hardly have excited the warmth of animosity displayed by Sextus.¹⁴

If one is not convinced by the argument that Sextus must have

written at a time when Stoicism was flourishing, all the evidence points to the early part of the third century A.D..¹⁵ If one accepts this argument one must place Sextus late in the second century and either assume "that the climax of his public career was reached after Galen had finished those of his writings which are still extant",¹⁶ or suppose that for some reason Sextus was unknown to Galen even though they were contemporaneous with each other.

It is not possible to determine where Sextus was born. In the Suda, a historical and literary lexicon which was compiled towards the end of the tenth century A.D., there is a mention of a Sextus of Chaeronia and a Sextus of Libya.¹⁷ The reference indicates that they were both Sceptics and that the Sextus of Chaeronia was the author of the writings of Sextus Empiricus. Because the Suda is notoriously unreliable, this evidence has not been given much importance by most scholars.¹⁸ But Haas maintains that this testimony is too precise and consistent with the internal evidence to be dismissed.¹⁹ There is only one reference to Chaeronia in the whole of the extant writings of Sextus.²⁰

There is no evidence which would give any other choice strong support.²¹ Sextus displays a detailed knowledge of the laws and customs of many countries. His knowledge of any one country does not stand out in a way that would justify one to identify it as his home land. Sextus shows a detailed knowledge of the peculiar practices and traits of Egypt,²² Libya,²³ Athens,²⁴ Alexandria²⁵ and Rome²⁶, which he could

have acquired from travelling or living in these places or from some written source. He writes from the indifferent standpoint of a spectator when he discusses the different cultural traits. It is this fact which is most striking and most helpful to the person trying to see his thought reflected in his life or vice versa.

Mary Patrick, in her book Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism, has presented an exhaustive discussion on the question "where was the Sceptical School located when Sextus taught?"²⁷ It should be said before considering Patrick's position that it may be quite inaccurate to speak so formally in terms of an organized school. A part of the difficulty in locating the Pyrrhonian School may be that it consisted of little more than one individual and whatever following he may have acquired. Thus, the "school", if it should be called that, may have not had any fixed location or organization apart from its teaching itself. Scholars tend to treat the Pyrrhonian as being far more of an organized sect than the evidence would justify. The present study follows Patrick's analysis closely though it raises doubts about the conclusions she reaches.

The information which is available indicates that Alexandria was the seat of Pyrrhonism from the time when Timon brought the teaching of Pyrrho there until some time after Aenesidemus.²⁸ However, Sextus indicates that he is teaching at some place other than Alexandria or than Athens when he is presenting his Outlines of Pyrrhonism.²⁹ Further he indicates

that he is teaching where his master taught.³⁰ It would appear that the School was moved from Alexandria during or before the time of Sextus' teacher.

Where was the School moved to? Pappenheim believes it was moved to some unknown city in the East. He notes that one finds frequent references to Pyrrhonism and to Sextus in particular in the literature of the East but that Sextus is never mentioned in Roman writings. It is difficult to imagine what Roman texts Pappenheim thinks one should expect to find Sextus mentioned in. Further he argues that it would have been idiotic of Sextus to move the School to Rome where Stoicism had the favour of the Emperors.³¹

Haas, on the other hand, argues that the Outlines of Pyrrhonism were delivered in Rome. His argument for Rome is primarily based upon a study of the references Sextus makes to Rome and to the Romans.³² He argues that Sextus never opposes Rome to where he is speaking from and that the definition of law³³ and the particular laws Sextus identifies with are Roman.³⁴ Also he maintains that once Alexandria and Athens are ruled out, Rome is the only remaining location where there was sufficient Stoic influence to provoke Sextus and an adequate library to account for the many references he makes to other texts. Haas identifies the Herodotus, who Galen says taught in Rome, with the Herodotus who Diogenes Laertius says was Sextus' teacher.³⁵

Patrick asserts against Zeller that Sextus could not have been quoting from other books when presenting information

about the customs of Alexandria and Rome but that he must have been reflecting upon the personal experience of having lived in these places. She offers no argument for this but takes it to be obvious though Zeller and Pappenheim saw the matter quite differently.³⁶ There is not any definite evidence which would rule out the possibility that Sextus is copying from another text though one must agree with Partick that Sextus seems to be able to call upon this knowledge of these peoples' customs at will as though it were 'his knowledge'. However, it is far from evident that he would actually have had to live in these places in order to acquire a knowledge of them. One would expect an ancient Sceptic to make a special effort to be versed in as wide a range of conventions as possible in order to be able to show that what is taken to be a law of nature is merely an arbitrary contrivance.

Patrick accepts Haas' hypothesis that the Herodotus, who Galen speaks of, is the Herodotus, who Diogenes Laertius later mentions.³⁷ Diogenes only gives us the following information:-

...Menodotus was the instructor of
Herodotus of Tarsus, son of Arieus, and
Herodotus taught Sextus Empiricus...³⁸

Galen does not speak of his Herodotus as the "Herodotus of Tarsus" nor does he indicate that he was teaching or had taught Sextus. Sextus never makes a mention of any Herodotus. The only factor that connects them is that they were both physicians. Herodotus belonged to the Pneumatic Medical Sect.³⁹ Sextus clearly did not belong to the Pneumatic Medical Sect.

He was either an Empirical or Methodical doctor. If one is ready to accept with Patrick and Haas that Galen's Herodotus is one with the Herodotus Diogenes mentions and if one is further prepared to suppose that Herodotus taught only in Rome, for which there is no solid evidence, it follows that Sextus taught in Rome since he says that he taught where his teacher taught.

Patrick notes that Sextus refers to Asclepiades by name ten times in his extant writings.⁴¹ Asclepiades had made Rome one of the centers of the medical profession. This fact does 'speak in favour of Rome' but it certainly cannot be regarded as strong evidence. There can be little doubt that the medical school in Alexandria would have been very interested in and informed about the activities and doctors of the school in Rome.

With Haas, she asserts as obvious that he must have written the Outlines of Pyrrhonism in one of the centers of Stoicism.⁴² Since Alexandria and Athens are ruled out, one is left with Rome. As was earlier noted, Pappenheim argues that it is obvious that for the very reason that Rome was the stronghold of the Stoics and thus that the Stoics had the favour of the Emperors, that Sextus would have cautiously avoided Rome. If one accepts the argument that the Hypothesis had to have been presented where Stoicism was thriving, Rome is one's only choice. If one rejects this argument, one may reasonably suppose that he taught in some unknown city in the East.

May we not then conclude, that Sextus was at the head of the school in Rome for a short time...but that he also taught in Alexandria, where the real home of the school was certainly found?⁴³

No. The evidence is too inconclusive to admit of such a definite conclusion. Sextus may have presented his Hypothesis in Rome as Haas maintains or he may have gone to some unknown city in the East as Pappenheim argues. The testimony supporting either proposal is at best suggestive.

Certain interpreters have attached a great deal of significance to Sextus' having been a physician. They have regarded the Scepticism of Sextus as having the function of serving as a kind of prolegomena to the positive research of the empirical sciences.⁴⁴ Thus the association of the Pyrrhonians with the Empirical Medical Sect has been emphasized. It is, therefore, also important to look at how Sextus regarded the medical sects and spoke of them in regard to Scepticism and himself. To do this it is necessary not only to look at what Sextus said but also the context in which he said what he said. If there was a close working relationship between Sextus the Sceptic, and Sextus the medical practitioner and researcher, one would expect some indication of it in his extant writings.

One can establish the fact that Sextus was a physician on the basis of the following internal evidence. In an argument in which Sextus is showing that it is only the experts in each particular art, and not the dialecticians, who are able to refute sophisms of the kind that would be

useful to expose, he gives a medical example. In giving this example Sextus changes, in one clause, from using the third person to the first person plural.⁴⁵ The only other internal direct evidence that reveals that Sextus was a medical doctor is his mention of Asclepius, the hero and God of healing, as "τὸν ἀρχηγὸν ἡμῶν τῆς ἐπιστήμης".⁴⁶ Sextus' reference to Asclepius appears in the context of an example which illustrates the point that historians are not to be trusted because they invent facts about historical personages. These are the only two texts in which Sextus directly identifies himself as a physician.

In the context of a discussion, in which the various views concerning the criterion are being considered, the views of Asclepiades the physician comes up. Sextus says that there is no need to consider Asclepiades' views in the present work because he has been considered "ἐν τοῖς ἰατρικοῖς ὑπομνήμασι".⁴⁷ On another occasion, Sextus makes a reference to what might be the same medical treatise in a lecture concerned with defining what γραμματικὴ is. He refers to an argument which he had made "ἐν τοῖς ἐμπειρικοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν" concerning the use of the terms ἐμπειρία and τέχνη.⁴⁸ Sextus' medical writings are no longer extant. Apart from what might be surmised from the above two references, nothing is known of their contents. It is possible that in his medical writings he did not approach the methods and doctrines of the medical physicians from the point of view of 'the Sceptic'; but rather, from the standpoint of a physician expounding the results of his research

and the doctrines of his school. However, there is no evidence to support such a supposition.

Sextus makes an abundant use of technical medical examples in illustrating his arguments of the sort that one would only expect from a physician. However, it must be said that, in a similar manner, his esoteric knowledge of a number of other subjects is in evidence throughout his treatises.⁴⁹ Sextus freely draws upon any fact that may serve to aid his argument, whether, it be that the Ethiopians tattoo their children,⁵⁰ or, that the sufferer from a headache finds myrrh unpleasant.⁵¹ In illustrating his arguments, Sextus never explicitly makes any mention of his own experiences as a physician; nor, does he ever directly identify himself with any particular medical sect when he expresses their methods and findings.⁵²

Most scholars maintain that Sextus was a member of the Empirical Medical Sect.⁵³ It is worth examining in some detail the three passages in which Sextus actually comments on the medical sects in order to see whether there is any internal evidence to support the view that he had this attachment.⁵⁴

The final division of book one of Sextus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism consists of six chapters in which the six philosophic standpoints or sects most closely identified with Scepticism are distinguished from it.⁵⁵ In the last of these chapters Sextus considers the medical sect which is called Empiricism.⁵⁶ This chapter is the only extant text in which the question, concerning which medical sect the Sceptic might appropriately belong to, is directly raised.

The following passage provides the most complete and definite statement by Sextus on the matter presently being considered:-

Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τῇ ἐμπειρίᾳ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ἰατρικὴν αἰρέσει τὴν αὐτὴν λέγουσιν οἱ τινες εἶναι τὴν σκεπτικὴν φιλοσοφίαν, γνωστόν ὅτι εἴπερ ἡ ἐμπειρία ἐκείνη περὶ τῆς ἀκαταληψίας τῶν ἀδήλων διαβεβαιούται, οὔτε ἡ αὐτὴ ἐστὶ τῇ σκέψει οὔτε ἀρμόζουσι ἂν τῷ σκεπτικῷ τὴν αἴρεσιν ἐκείνην ἀναλαμβάνειν. μᾶλλον δὲ τὴν καλουμένην μέθοδον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, δύνατο ἂν μετιέναι. ⁵⁷

Bury translates "τὴν αἴρεσιν ἐκείνην" (as underlined above) as "that doctrine". This is a misleading rendering because it might give the reader the impression that Sextus is saying that the Sceptic should not embrace that particular doctrine ("περὶ τῆς ἀκαταληψίας τῶν ἀδήλων") while he is still leaving the possibility that one could attach oneself to the Empirical Medical Sect. The word αἴρεσις is not used to mean this or that doctrine within a body of doctrines but rather means "system of philosophic principles, or those who profess such principles, sect, school". "τὴν αἴρεσιν ἐκείνην" refers back to "ἡ ἐμπειρία ἐκείνη" which in turn refers back to "τῇ ἐμπειρίᾳ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ἰατρικὴν αἰρέσει". ⁵⁸

Sextus indicates that he is arguing against an opinion which is actually held by certain people. One can only guess at who these people may have been. Patrick suggests that there may have been a division in the Pyrrhonian School over the

question of what its relation to the Medical Sect is which could have been the reason why the Pyrrhonian School was moved from Alexandria. In refuting the opinion which those people held, Sextus is not content with merely indicating the theoretical difference between the epistemological standpoint of the Empiricism of the Medical Sect and the Sceptical Philosophy. He explicitly states what the practical consequences of the fact that the Empirics rashly maintain a dogma are upon the individual Sceptic who may be contemplating joining the Empirical Medical Sect. "It would not be appropriate for the Sceptic to attach himself to that sect."⁵⁹

Without making any definite qualifications Sextus argues, in some detail, through the remainder of the chapter, that the Methodic Sect embraces the Sceptical standpoint in its theory and practice.⁶⁰ He concludes that the Methodic Sect is more akin to (οἰκλιότητα ἔχειν) Scepticism than any other medical sect.⁶¹ However, Sextus does not identify himself, as distinct from 'the Sceptic', with any particular sect in this discussion; nor, does he reveal any more of an involvement in the problem of distinguishing the Empirical Medical Sect from Scepticism than shown in distinguishing Scepticism from the non-medical systems in the previous five chapters.

On another occasion, Sextus repeats the distinction which he had made between the Empirical Sect and Scepticism in P.H. i 236.⁶² In order to show that ἀπόδειξις is non-evident by showing that it is in dispute he indicates the

conflict of opinion between the Dogmatic philosophers and logical physicians who affirm it, the Empirical doctors who deny it, and the Sceptics who cautiously suspend judgement.

The only other passage⁶³ in which Sextus comments on the Medical Sects is one in which the interpreters say that he is contradicting the position which he expressed in the two passages discussed above.⁶⁴ It is argued that in M. viii 191 Sextus is classing the Sceptics and Empiricists together, whereas in P.H. i 236 and M. viii 327 & 328 he is maintaining that they hold conflicting positions.⁶⁵

The argument in M. viii 191 is the following:-

If non-evident things are able to be apprehended (καταληπτά), then the sign is sensible and then all non-evident things are apprehended (καταλαμβάνεσθαι) by everyone since the sensible affects everyone alike.

But non-evident things are not apprehended by everyone.

Therefore, the sign is not sensible.

Sextus establishes the premise -- 'But non-evident things are not apprehended by everyone' -- with this example:-

ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν φασιν αὐτὰ μὴ καταλαμβάνεσθαι,
ὡσπερ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἰατροὶ καὶ οἱ
ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως φιλόσοφοι, οἱ δὲ κατα-
λαμβάνεσθαι μὲν, οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ.⁶⁶

What the Sceptics and Empirical Doctors are being classed together on in this argument is in their agreeing that

non-evident things are not apprehended (μή καταλαμβάνεσθαι); not, however, in their holding the dogma that non-evident things are inapprehensible (ἀκατάληπτος). It is assumed in this argument that non-evident things are apprehensible (κατάληπτος). This assumption is never brought into question in M. vii 191. The Sceptic, indeed, is happy to say with the Empirical Doctors that non-evident things are not apprehended (μή καταλαμβάνεσθαι). This is why it is necessary for the Sceptic to suspend judgement.

The Sceptic, however, upon saying that non-evident things are not apprehended goes on searching. He therein recognizes the possibility that they may be apprehended at some future date. The Empirical Doctors assert that non-evident will not be apprehended and that they are not able to be apprehended. This is to make a definite assertion concerning the nature of cognition which the Sceptic, according to Sextus, is not willing to make. The Sceptic only comments on how things seem to him but not on how they are by nature. It is this conflict of doctrines which is being put forward in P.H. i 236 and M. viii 327 & 328. Thus these three passages are quite consistent with one another. Sextus' statement in M. viii 191 cannot be used as evidence against those who maintain that Sextus actually held the view he expressed in P.H. i 236 and M. viii 327 & 328. The comments which Sextus makes indicate that he did not regard the doctrines of the Empirical Sect of Medicine as being compatible with Pyrrhonism. However, he does not indicate that either he was

an Empirical Doctor or that he was not. It must also be said that Sextus does not say that he belonged to the Methodical Sect.

The external evidence supports the view that Sextus belonged to the Empirical Sect. In the Isagoge, a text which was falsely attributed to Galen, Sextus is included in a list of Empirical Doctors.⁶⁷ Diogenes Laertius indicates that Sextus was an Empiricist. Unfortunately Diogenes and Pseudo Galen do not indicate what information led them to believe that Sextus was an Empirical Doctor.⁶⁸

The only conclusion which one can come to from all this is that if Sextus belonged to the Empirical Sect he did so contrary to his position as a Pyrrhonean. His views on what medical school a Sceptic ought to belong to are quite clear. Whether or not Sextus acted contrary to his convictions is a question which does not appear to be answerable.

(ii)

If a biographical note which occurs in the Suda could be shown to be reliable the uncertainty regarding most of the disputed details of Sextus' life could be cleared up.⁶⁹ W. Vollgraff, in his article, La Vie de Sextus Empiricus, which appeared in 1902, argues that the Suda renders an accurate account. It is now necessary to examine Vollgraff's thesis at some length because he is at variance with the

positions which have already been discussed on almost every point. Jean-Paul Dumont, in his book Le Scepticisme et le Phénomène, considers Vollgraff's article to be the most authoritative work on Sextus' life available today.⁷⁰ Dumont writes:-

W. Vollgraff, dénonçant les excès de la critique Pappenheim, Zeller, Haas et Mary Mills-Patrick, trouvent des arguments convaincants pour montrer qu'il convient de faire confiance aux témoignages de Suidas et de Marc-Aurèle. Sextus Empiricus cesse pour nous d'être un parfait inconnu... 71

Vollgraff's article is more than due for a critical examination.

In the first part of Vollgraff's essay, it is argued, on the bases of the evidence which is available apart from the Suda, that Sextus was the head of the School from 115-135 A.D..⁷² This dating agrees with that of the Suda.

Vollgraff attempts to work out Sextus' dates by establishing the dates of his predecessors in the School who are indicated in a list given by Diogenes Laertius.⁷³ Therefore, it is necessary to see whether Vollgraff's chronology is consistent with the evidence and whether there is sufficient evidence to go by.

Nothing is known of the first four people mentioned by Diogenes apart from their names.⁷⁴ Vollgraff argues, that Heraclides, the fifth in the list, must be referring to Heraclides of Tarentum.⁷⁵ The reason he gives for arguing this is that Heraclides of Tarentum, though trained in the Dogmatic

School of Herophilus, later became an Empirical Doctor. Brochard notes that there is no evidence to support the view that the Pyrrhonian School had any connection with the Empirical Medical Sect in the early part of its history.⁷⁶

It should also be mentioned that neither the fragments of his works, nor the fourteen titles of his treatises, nor the way in which Galen, Soranus, and Caelius Aurelianus spoke of him reveals any attachment to Pyrrhonism.⁷⁷

Vollgraff places Heraclides of Tarentum in the second half of the second century B.C. because Celsus reports that he lived before Asclepiades of Prusa who Pliny the Elder reports was a contemporary of Pompey. How much earlier than Asclepiades did Heraclides live? The evidence is so obscure that one finds Daremburg saying that he lived from 250 to 220 B.C. while Sprengel places him around 276 B.C..⁷⁸ Vollgraff does not offer any new evidence to explain why he rejects the above dating of Heraclides and places him as head of the Pyrrhonian School from 130 to 100 B.C..

Vollgraff then says that, on the assumption that he has correctly dated Heraclides of Tarentum, one can see Heraclides of Tarentum lived when Heraclides the Sceptic was about by simply assuming that each head of the Pyrrhonian School had a term of thirty years and calculating from Diogenes' list when this Sceptic lived. On the basis of this argument, Vollgraff believes, it is clear that the two Heraclides were really the same person.⁷⁹ Vollgraff's argument also rests on the assumption that Diogenes' list is complete. His whole

argument, if it can be called that, is based more on conjectures and assumptions than reliable evidence.

On the basis of this unconvincing argument Vollgraff fixes Aenesidemus' dates by adding the assumed thirty year term in office to when Heraclides' ended.⁸⁰ Since nothing is known of Zeuxippus, next in Diogenes' list, he is also credited with thirty years as head of the School.⁸¹ Therefore, Aenesidemus was head of the School from 100 to 70 B.C. and Zeuxippus came after him from 70 to 40 B.C..

After Zeuxippus, Zeuxis appears on the list. Galen speaks of a Zeuxis who was an Empirical physician, and Strabo makes note of a Zeuxis who was a member of the Herophilean School of Medicine. Vollgraff maintains that Zeuxis the Sceptic, Zeuxis the Empirical Doctor, and Zeuxis of the Herophilean School are one and the same person. Brochard argues quite exhaustively and conclusively against such a possibility.⁸²

For the sake of the present discussion it is only necessary to note that Galen says that Zeuxis is the most ancient of the Empirics; and Erotian, a doctor of the Neronian age, says that Zeuxis had lived before Zeno, 250 to 220 B.C.. This would place Zeuxis the Empiric before Heraclides of Tarentum.⁸³ Vollgraff makes no mention of this evidence in his paper. Strabo informs us that Zeuxis was succeeded by Alexander of Philaether while Diogenes says that he was followed by Antiochus.⁸⁴ It is possible that he was head of both the Medical School and the Pyrrhonean School and his successors were from the respective Schools. However, apart from their

sharing a common name, the evidence is against their being the same person. The Herophilean School was a dogmatic sect. Zeller raises sufficient problems against the identification of Zeuxis the Sceptic and Zeuxis of Laodicea that it is surprising that Vollgraff did not feel the need to argue his case more fully.⁸⁵

Next in the list of Diogenes are Antiochus, Theiodas, and Menodotus.⁸⁶ There is no evidence upon which to fix dates for these Sceptics. Vollgraff credits Antiochus and Menodotus each with a thirty year term and Theiodas with fifteen years in office.⁸⁷

Herodotus of Tarsus, Sextus' predecessor, is identified by Vollgraff with the Herodotus who Galen speaks of as belonging to the Pneumatic School.⁸⁸ There is no strong evidence either to prove or to disprove this. Vollgraff also identifies Herodotus of Philadelphia with the Herodotus who was a Sceptic.⁸⁹

Vollgraff states his argument as follows:-

En réalité, si l'on admet notre hypothèse concernant le siège de l'école sceptique, il est facile de se rendre compte comment Hérodote peut être porteur de deux ethniques différents; étant devenu directeur de l'école de médecine de Mên Karou, Hérodote de Tarse s'était établi à demeure dans la grande ville la plus voisine du sanctuaire après Laodicée, c'est-à-dire, à Philadelphie de Lydie. Les conséquences du tremblement de terre de l'an 60, qui avait détruit Laodicée de fond en comble, ont pu déterminer Hérodote à choisir son domicile ailleurs que ses prédécesseurs.⁹⁰

This hypothesis, at best, is possible. There is not

sufficient evidence either to prove it probable or to refute it.

Vollgraff, on the basis of the fact that Sextus was Herodotus' successor says that Sextus Empiricus was head of the School from 115 to 135 A.D..⁹¹

He can hardly be said to have established the dates of Sextus with sufficient certainty that he can argue that independent evidence shows that Sextus lived at the time when the Suda says he did.

The evidence is so sparse and inconclusive that almost any number of conjectures and hypotheses are possible. However, it must be said, that the scholars whose views were considered in the first part of this chapter made a far better effort to take account of all the evidence that is available than did Vollgraff in his paper. Indeed, Vollgraff cannot even be said to have shown that it is possible that Sextus was head of the Pyrrhonean School from 115 to 135 A.D. because his account is inconsistent with what evidence is available on several points.

Vollgraff directly defends the testimony of the Suda in the second part of his paper. He begins by attempting to discredit the three main considerations which have led scholars to believe the Suda has mixed up Sextus Empiricus with another Sextus.⁹²

One finds the following information in the Suda:-⁹³

#1 Σέξτος Χαιρωνεύς ἀδελφιδου Πλουτάρχου
γεγονώς κατὰ Μάρκον Ἀντωνῖνον τὸν

Καίσαρα φιλόσοφος μαθητής Ἡροδότου τοῦ
 Φιλαδελφαίου. ἦν δὲ τῆς Πυρρωνείου
 ἀγωγῆς. καὶ τοσοῦτον πρὸς τιμῆς τῷ βασι-
 λεὶ ἦν ὥστε καὶ συνδικάζειν αὐτῷ. ἔγραψεν
 ἠθικὰ ἐπὶ σχεπτικὰ βιβλία δέκα.

#2 Σέξτος Λίβυς· φιλόσοφος· σχεπτικὰ ἐν
 βιβλίοις ἰ, πυρρώνεια.

#3 Ἀφρικανός· ὁ Σέξτος χρηματίσας·
 φιλόσοφος Λίβυς...

The first problem this report presents is that both the Sextus of Chaeronea and the Sextus of Libya are said to have been Pyrrhoneans and are credited with what would appear to be the works of Sextus Empiricus. Patrick believes the Sextus of Libya to have been Sextus Empiricus because Sextus displays a familiarity with Libya in his writings. Patrick seems to have accepted Haas' argument without examining the evidence herself because she says that the Suda mentions two men called Sextus but only attributes the works of Sextus Empiricus to one of the two. In fact, the Suda attributes the works of Sextus Empiricus to both men called Sextus. Vollgraff maintains that the Sextus of Libya is Sextus Empiricus. Though Patrick's book, The Greek Sceptics, appeared after Vollgraff's article, she does not consider his position when presenting an account of Sextus' life.⁹⁴

Vollgraff says that the Sextus of Libya is known from other sources but he does not elaborate further except to refer to H. Gelzer's Sextus Julius Africanus und die Byzantinische

Chronographie.⁹⁵ It is unfortunate that Vollgraff did not develop his argument further than this assertion because it is altogether unclear that the Sextus of Libya is Sextus Julius Africanus who was a Christian philosopher of Aelia Capitolina. It is also far from clear that Sextus Empiricus is necessarily either the Sextus of Libya or the Sextus of Chaeronea. However, it is certain that a part of the biographical note attributed to both men called Sextus belongs to Sextus Empiricus.

The second difficulty which has caused scholars to distrust the Suda's testimony is the fact that Herodotus of Tarsus is said to be Sextus' teacher in Diogenes Laertius' list while the Suda says Sextus was taught by an Herodotus of Philadelphia.⁹⁶ Vollgraff merely repeats his unconvincing conjectural argument that Herodotus of Tarsus is Herodotus of Philadelphia which has already been discussed. There is no evidence indicating that Herodotus of Tarsus moved to Philadelphia.⁹⁷ Even if he had moved to Philadelphia it is probable that he would still have been known as Herodotus of Tarsus since that is where he is from.

The third consideration which has led scholars to question the biographical note in the Suda is a passage in which Julius Capitolinus indicates that Sextus of Chaeronea is a Stoic.⁹⁸ Vollgraff shows that Capitolinus is a very unreliable biographer and that even with the text in question he lists Junius Rusticus with the Stoics and immediately after this lists him with the Peripatetics.⁹⁹ This piece of

evidence cannot be trusted. It is curious that Vollgraff should so quickly discount Capitolinus' testimony while readily accepting the even more confusing evidence of the Suda.

In the final part of Vollgraff's article he attempts to show that the Suda's testimony "...ne contient pas un seul fait qui ne soit confirmé et corroboré par d'autres témoignages".¹⁰⁰ Whether Sextus of Chaeronea was Aurealius' teacher, nephew of Plutarch, and so on does not concern us here unless it is established that he is also Sextus Empiricus the Sceptic. Therefore, what does concern us is whether this Sextus of Chaeronea can be shown to have been a Pyrrhonean, the author of ten books on ethics and Scepticism and the pupil of Herodotus of Tarsus on the bases of evidence outside the Suda.

Vollgraff's comments on the line "φιλόσοφος... ἦν δε τῆς πυρρωνείου ἀγωγῆς" are quite baffling.¹⁰¹ He says that Plutarch was a Platonist and Sextus was a Sceptic. Then he says that Platonism and Scepticism are different but were not radically opposed. To support this he refers to P.H. i 222, which is a passage where Sextus argues that Plato was not a Sceptic but a dogmatist and concludes that Plato's teaching is quite alien to Scepticism. Then Vollgraff says that philosophy had been a tradition in the Plutarch family and that the inscription of Chaeronea cites two philosophers, one of whom is expressly called a Platonist. He continues on in the same paragraph to try to determine what medical sect

Sextus belonged to about which, he notes, the Suda says nothing. This curious discussion would hardly seem to collaborate and confirm the fact that the Sextus of Chaeronea was a Pyrrhonean.

Similarly, Vollgraff does not provide any convincing evidence to confirm his thesis that Sextus Empiricus was the pupil of Herodotus of Philadelphia. He merely assumes it as a fact and elaborates upon it and says a few words about Saturninus who succeeded Sextus as head of the school.¹⁰²

When he comments on the line in the biographical note in the Suda which says in reference to Sextus of Chaeronea:-

"Ἐγραψεν ἠθικά ἐπὶ σχεπτικὰ βιβλία δέχα,
and: σχεπτικὰ ἐν βιβλίοις ι, πυρρώνεια.

Vollgraff writes:-

"Nous lisons encore les ouvrages de Sextus que nomme Suidas, savoir:
#1 Les Esquisses pyrrhoniennes;
#2 Les Commentaires sceptiques, en dix livres, auxquels la tradition de manuscrits rattache comme onzième livre les ἠθικά." ¹⁰³

This certainly does not help to convince one that the Suda has not confused Sextus Empiricus with another Sextus. No one had doubted that the Suda is referring to Sextus Empiricus when it speaks of a Pyrrhonean and an author of sceptical treatises. What has been the question is whether the Suda has mistakenly identified Sextus the Sceptic with another Sextus.

"S'étonnera-t-on de trouver parmi les professeurs de Marc-Aurèle un adversaire déclaré des stoïciens? Qu'on se rappelle que Marc-Aurèle, comme Renan l'a fort bien dit', n'a pas eu, à proprement parler, de philosophie; quoiqu'il dût presque tout au

stoïcisme, le bon empereur n'était d'aucune école, et n'avait pas eu dans sa jeunesse que des professeurs stoïciens, puisque Claudius Severus était péripatéticien. D'ailleurs, d'après Eutrope, Sextus était chargé d'enseigner au jeune prince, non la philosophie, mais les lettres...¹⁰¹

According to Vollgraff's dating of Sextus, Sextus would have already have served six years as head of the Pyrrhonian School at the time when Marcus Aurelius was born. By the time Marcus Aurelius would have come of age to be a pupil of Sextus, Sextus would have established a name as a Sceptic whose lectures on grammar, rhetoric and so on would have been known to be strongly critical of generally accepted authorities in these fields. It would seem that Sextus would have been an unlikely candidate to teach the young prince Greek grammar.

Though Marcus Aurelius could have been innocent of his Greek teacher's true interests as a youth, he could not have been when he wrote his dedication to Sextus in his Meditations. It is important to note at this point that Sextus never makes a mention of the Emperor, or of his supposed uncle Plutarch, and that he only mentions Chaeronea once in a passing manner.¹⁰⁵ The Emperor offers unqualified praise to Sextus whom he would have known as one of the most prolific and outspoken critics of the philosophic views he valued above all else. Marcus Aurelius' dedication to Sextus would seem perfectly appropriate if Sextus had been a Stoic. It was the Stoics, not the Sceptics, whose precept is τὴν ἐνγολαν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν. It is the Stoic, not the Sceptic, who grasps the dogmas

necessary for life by discovering and ordering them in a rational, methodical way. The Emperor does not make any reference to Sextus which would indicate the fact that he was a Sceptic. He writes:-

παρὰ Σέξτου τὸ εὐμενές· καὶ τὸ
 παράδειγμα τοῦ οἴκου τοῦ πατρονομου-
 μένου· καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν
 ζῆν. καὶ τὸ σεμνὸν ἀπλάστως· καὶ τὸ
 στοχαστικὸν τῶν φίλων κηδεμονικῶς·
 καὶ τὸ ἀνεκτικὸν τῶν ἰδιωτῶν καὶ τὸ
 ἀθεώρητον οἰομένων· καὶ τὸ πρὸς
 πάντας εὐάρμοστον, ὥστε κολαχείας μὲν
 πάσης προσηνεοτέραν εἶναι τὴν ὀμιλίαν
 αὐτοῦ, αἰδεσιμώτατον δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις
 παρ' αὐτὸν ἐκείνον τὸν καιρὸν εἶναι καὶ
 τὸ καταληπτικῶς καὶ ὁδῶ ἐξευρετικόν
 τε καὶ τακτικὸν τῶν εἰς βίον ἀναγκαίων
 δογμάτων· καὶ τὸ μηδὲ ἔμφασιν ποτε
 ὀργῆς, ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς πάθους παρασχεῖν,
 ἀλλὰ ἅμα μὲν ἀπαθέστατον εἶναι, ἅμα δὲ
 φιλοστοργότατον· καὶ τὸ εὐφήμον καὶ
 τοῦτο ἀψοφητί· καὶ τὸ πολυμαθὲς
 ἀνεπιφάντως. ¹⁰⁶

CHAPTER THREE

(i)

Sextus Empiricus' Division of Philosophy

In the first chapter of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, which may be regarded as the preface to all the treatises which follow it, Sextus first lays down the three possible results any philosophical investigation can reach and then observes that these three results do in fact appear in the history of philosophy. He writes:-

Τοῖς ζητοῦσι τι πρᾶγμα ἢ εὕρεσιν
ἐπακολουθεῖν εἰκὸς ἢ ἄρνησιν εὐρέσεως
καὶ ἀκαταληψίας ὁμολογίαν ἢ ἐπιμονὴν
ζητήσεως. διόπερ ἕως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ
φιλοσοφίαν ζητουμένων οἱ μὲν εὐρηκέναι
τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔφασαν, οἱ δ' ἀπεφάναντο μὴ
δυνατὸν εἶναι τοῦτο καταληφθῆναι, οἱ δὲ
ἔτι ζητοῦσιν. ... ὅθεν εὐλόγως δοκοῦσιν
αἱ ἀνωτάτω φιλοσοφίαι τρεῖς εἶναι, δογ-
ματικὴ Ἀκαδημαϊκὴ σκεπτικὴ.¹

This classification appears to Sextus to be both logically and historically exhaustive.² Sextus uniquely characterizes the Pyrrhoneans by saying that they have not determined anything but remain searching. Implicit in this is the fact that the Pyrrhoneans have not been able to find any view expressed in the history of philosophy altogether convincing.

Their polemic is not merely against a particular school of thought but against anyone who claims that he has determined anything.³ When Sextus speaks of the *δογματικοί* he is usually referring to all those who are not Sceptics or Academics.⁴

Sextus makes several cut and dry distinctions in the passage quoted above. Philosophy is characterized by Sextus as being divided with dogmatism and scepticism each existing in separation from the other. The Sceptics, in this analysis, are not dogmatic. The Dogmatists are not sceptical. The Academics are not portrayed as being 'sceptical' in the sense in which Sextus uses the term. The word '*σκεπτικός*' means thoughtful or reflective. This word is used by Sextus to indicate that the Pyrrhoneans are open minded and disposed to inquiry. They are disposed to inquiry, it will be seen, because they have not been able to affirm or deny anything.⁵ The Pyrrhonian is no more optimistic that he will discover the object of his inquiry than he is pessimistic. To say that he is open minded is to say nothing other than that he suspends his judgement as to what future inquiry may result in. Thus the Pyrrhonian is not sceptical -- disposed to inquiry -- in the sense that a scientist is who believes in his science because he has repeatedly had the experience of discovering what he set out to find. The Pyrrhonian has had no such experience. He has found that all his inquiries have ended inconclusively and resulted in his suspending judgement rather than either with a denial of the possibility that the object

of the inquiry is inapprehensible or with a discovery of the object. Philosophy, then, appears to Sextus to be divided into three mutually exclusive groups -- those who are not disposed to inquiry because they believe that they have discovered the object of their inquiry and thus have concluded their investigations, those who are disposed to inquiry because they have no reason not to be disposed to inquiry, and those who are not disposed to inquiry because they are convinced that the object of inquiry is inapprehensible.

Historically it would be an easy task to show that the Dogmatists and Academics did not formulate a set of dogmas at a certain point in time and thereafter rigidly held to them without any further inquiry into them. The fact that the Academic and Dogmatic schools had a history which involved the altering, revising and abandoning of various doctrines indicates that they remained actively open to the need for continuing inquiry. Scepticism was not the private property of the Pyrrhoneans.

However, one can speak of a Dogmatic position (or of the history of a Dogmatic school) -- whether it be Stoic or Epicurean or whatever -- only to the extent that it has certain definite basic philosophical doctrines. The Academics, as Sextus understood them, did assert that truth is inapprehensible. One cannot speak of Pyrrhonism in terms of its fixed and determinate doctrines since it does not have any except, possibly, to say that it does not have any. Sextus can legitimately speak of the Dogmatists, in contrast to the

Pyrrhoneans, as believing that they have found what they originally set out to discover just to the extent that they have formulated a definite position.

Sextus informs his listeners on the first page of the Outlines that the Pyrrhoneans have neither discovered the object of their inquiry nor have they declared the object inapprehensible and given up in their investigations. Why, then, is Sextus presenting his audience with hundreds of pages of discourse which he says at the beginning reach no definite conclusions? The Dogmatists claim to have wisdom and truth to offer to anyone who is able to master their teachings. The Academics at least promise to be able to show their gifted students that they need not frustrate themselves in the pursuit of absolute knowledge and thus may be able to indicate where their time and energy could best be spent. Sextus makes no such promises to his listeners. What then is the method and nature of Sceptical inquiry? What is its purpose?

(ii)

Method and Nature of Sextus Empiricus' Sceptical Inquiry

In P.H. i 1 to 5 Sextus distinguishes two sceptical schools and the dogmatic school. The Pyrrhoneans share with the Academics the practice of ἐποχή but are distinctly characterized by Sextus by these words: ἐπιμονὴν ζητήσεως,⁶ ἔτι ζητοῦσιν,⁷ ζητοῦσι δὲ οἱ σκεπτικοί.⁸ What meaning and significance one should attach to the fact that someone says that he is disposed to search and inquiry (ζητητικός) is determined by what the particular object of his inquiry is and by what method he uses to attempt to discover this object.⁹

Sextus clearly states what the Pyrrhoneans set out with a view to discovering in their inquiry:-

ἄρξάμενος γὰρ φιλοσοφεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὰς
φαντασίας ἐπικρίναι καὶ καταλαβεῖν τίνες
μέν εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς τίνες δὲ ψευδεῖς,
ὥστε ἀταρακτῆσαι...¹⁰

He continues on to indicate how their investigation proceeds:-

ἐνέπεσεν εἰς τὴν ἰσοσθενῆ διαφωνίαν,
ἣν ἐπικρίναι μὴ δυνάμενος ἐπέσχευ' "

What Sextus is expressing in the first part of this passage is how Scepticism originates. How it originates and what it ultimately becomes are at once closely bound up with each other and distinct from each other. By choosing to present the Pyrrhonean as setting out with the hope of determining what is true Sextus is being careful to show that Scepticism comes about not as a result of the Pyrrhonean dogmatically

rejecting scientific inquiry but rather because the Pyrrhonian is forced to take the sceptical position contrary to his original expectation. Scepticism, one might say, does not mysteriously spring up but rather appears as a logical development in the history of philosophy itself.¹² Sextus wants to make it clear that what the Pyrrhoneans claim to show is that philosophical investigation itself, properly carried out, leads to Scepticism. The Pyrrhonian is portrayed by Sextus as being driven to Scepticism by his unwillingness to be dogmatic.

However, when Sextus considers Pyrrhonism as an established standpoint with its own methods and means of attaining its end he speaks quite differently than when he is expressing how Scepticism originated.¹³ He no longer speaks of the Pyrrhoneans as searching for truth. The Pyrrhonian, as distinct from what might be designated the student of philosophy who ultimately becomes a Sceptic, begins his inquiry sceptically -- by opposing to every proposition an equal proposition and in this way deems himself to be undogmatic. What the Pyrrhoneans seek, according to Sextus' account, are ways of forcing one to suspend judgement.¹⁴ The search for truth would seem to be altogether ignored once the student of philosophy has come to be a Pyrrhonian.

συστάσεως δὲ τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ
 μάλιστα τὸ παντὶ λόγῳ λόγον ἴσον ἀντι-
 κείσθαι· ἀπὸ γὰρ τούτου καταλήγειν
 δοκοῦμεν εἰς τὸ μὴ δογματίζειν.¹⁵

It is important to note that not only do the Pyrrhoneans

suspend judgement but in order to be able to do it undogmatically they attempt to show the necessity of their suspending judgement. They thereby recognize the need for demonstration of some sort and actively search for ways to establish ἔποχῆ and bring into question any doctrines which are held to be true.

The Ancient Dogmatists were well aware of the fact that the Pyrrhoneans, in attempting to justify the Sceptical Way, are forced into a paradoxical position since the very basis upon which any sort of justification can be based is what Scepticism questions.¹⁶

The Pyrrhoneans cannot be said to be disposed to search and inquiry (ζητητής) in the sense of inquiring into the true nature of things. However, in so far as the Pyrrhoneans attempt to show that one is forced to suspend judgement by the very nature of the evidence and arguments that one can call upon to determine the underlying nature of things they can be said to be searchers.

Do the Pyrrhoneans remain searching (ἐπιμονὴν ζητήσεως) Or, is their claim that they do not assert the impossibility of κατάληψις merely a theoretical postulate which they never put into practice? The solution to this question entails the answer to many other even more crucial ones. Do the Pyrrhoneans in fact determine nothing? Does Sextus either claim to have found a basis upon which to make a definite judgement or has he done so in practice without acknowledging it? Is it his intention either in practice or in theory to establish

unambiguously any assertion -- even the proposition that κατάληψις is impossible?

Arguments can be put forward to support both an affirmative and a negative answer to the questions indicated above. In order to present an accurate picture of Sextus' position it is necessary to discuss the considerations which would support Sextus' own claim that he determines nothing -- not even the impossibility of κατάληψις -- and therefore remains searching.

It is important to not separate particular arguments or statements which Sextus makes from the general context and methodological structure in which they appear. Sextus clearly defines the general method which he uses throughout his writings and indicates the end which the method is intended to reach:-

Ἔστι δὲ ἡ σκεπτικὴ δύναμις ἀντιθετικὴ
 φαινομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων καθ' οἷον-
 δήποτε τρόπον, ἀφ' ἧς ἐρχόμεθα διὰ τὴν
 ἐν τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις πράγμασι καὶ
 λόγοις ἰσοσθένειαν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς
 ἐποχὴν, τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰς ἀταραξίαν. 17

He must, if he is to remain faithful to his definition of his position, attempt to make the seemingly most discreditable propositions credible and the most credible propositions discreditable. The 'Sceptical argument' is not to be found in any particular argument but rather is to be found in all of the opposing arguments taken together.

More particularly, the Sceptic must argue as convincingly as possible against the possibility of κατάληψις when he is confronted by Dogmatists who assume the possibility of κατάληψις as a beginning point and devote themselves to showing how it is possible and to determining the underlying nature of things. It takes one dogma to counteract another; in this case, the one dogma is well represented by the Dogmatists while the other must be taken up by the Sceptics. So it must be said from the start that one would expect Sextus to be forced into the role of arguing against the possibility of κατάληψις. It must also be said that one would expect him to be doing this with a view to establishing the need to suspend judgement as to whether κατάληψις is possible or impossible if he is to be true to his definition of Pyrrhonism. Conversely, if Sextus argues for the impossibility of κατάληψις per se, he will be arguing in a manner and for a proposition contrary to the main precepts of Pyrrhonism: οὐ μάλλον, οὐδὲν ὀρίζω.¹⁸

What the Sceptical arguments are intended to lead to is not a discovery concerning the nature of things or of cognition but rather to a certain state of mind or soul -- ἐποχή and ἀταραξία. This is reflected in their terminology. The Sceptic, according to Sextus, only makes non-assertions (ἀφασία), as distinct from assertions about the way things really are, which leads to a mental condition rather than to objective knowledge. It is worth quoting Sextus' own formulation of this fact in order to notice the careful wording he

uses:

ὅθεν δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι καὶ τὴν ἀφασίαν
 παραλαμβάνομεν οὐχ ὡς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν
 τοιούτων ὄντων τῶν πραγμάτων ὥστε
 πάντως ἀφασίαν κινεῖν, ἀλλὰ δηλοῦντες
 ὅτι ἡμεῖς νῦν, ὅτε προφερόμεθα αὐτήν,
 ἐπὶ τῶνδε τῶν ζητουμένων τοῦτο πεπόνθαμεν.¹⁹

Sextus says that he uses such expressions as τάχα and οὐ
 τάχα and ἔξεστι and οὐκ ἔξεστι and ἐνδέχεται and οὐκ
 ἐνδέχεται in order to make it clear to his listeners that he
 is also implicitly affirming the opposite of what he is seem-
 ingly assenting to in a statement.²⁰

One other observation which should be made at this point
 is that Sextus restricts even statements made about mental
 conditions to what appears to him at a particular moment or
 up until a particular moment. The matter at issue is
 sufficiently important to merit giving several illustrations
 since it is not only pertinent to the present problem but
 also to the more general question concerning how one should
 interpret Sextus' method of argument and of exposition:-

1. concerning the Pyrrhonian statement:

“πάντα ἐστὶν ἀκατάληπτα”
 τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν οὐ διαβεβαλουμένου περὶ
 τοῦ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς ζητούμενα
 φύσεως εἶναι τοιαύτης ὡς εἶναι ἀκατ-
 ἀληπτα, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πάθος ἀπαγγέ-
 λοντας, καθ' ὃ, φησὶν, ὑπολαμβάνω ὅτι
 ἄχρι νῦν οὐδὲν κατέλαβον ἐκείνων ἐγὼ διὰ
 τὴν τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἰσοσθένειαν.²¹

2. ὅταν οὖν εἴπῃ ὁ σκεπτικὸς "οὐδὲν ὀρίζω,"
τοῦτό φησιν "ἐγὼ οὕτω πέπονθα νῦν ὡς
μηδὲν τῶν ὑπὸ τῆν ζήτησιν τήνδε πεττωκότων
τιθέναί δογματικῶς ἢ ἀναλεῖν."²²
3. Καὶ ἡ "ἀκαταληπτῶ" δὲ καὶ ἡ "οὐ κατα-
λαμβάνω" φωνὴ πάθους οἰκείου ἐστὶ
δηλωτικῆ, καθ' ἃ ἀφίσταται ὁ σκεπτικὸς
ὡς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν τοῦ τιθέναί τι τῶν
ζητουμένων ἀδήλων ἢ ἀναλεῖν, ὡς ἐστὶ
δῆλον ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ἡμῖν περὶ
τῶν ἄλλων φωνῶν.²³

Sextus also prefaces many of his arguments with the statement that he merely states what appears to him to be the case at the time and that, in fact, he might be in error.²⁴ He makes such remarks for a more legitimate reason than merely using it as a ploy to leave himself free to disclaim responsibility for what he writes when he is attacked by his critics.

When the Pyrrhoneans say that they determine nothing they are admitting to a total and unqualified ignorance.²⁵ The Pyrrhonian, according to this view, finds himself in a position whereby he can only speak of how things appear to him at the moment. Nothing is grasped of such a determinate nature as to enable him to speak with certainty of the truth or falsity of any assertion he or anyone else might make. He can merely try to show the need to suspend judgement given the contradictory and arbitrary nature of the opinions he considers on a given question. Sextus does not claim to have determined anything concerning either the nature of human cognition or the

underlying nature of things such that he would have any bases upon which to speak of the limits or possibilities or impossibilities of κατάληψις .

It is clear from what has already been said that Sextus claims he would not unambiguously declare the impossibility of κατάληψις and that to do so would be contrary to both the spirit and letter of Pyrrhonism. One can safely say from this that the polemical treatises are intended to cause one to suspend judgement without actually bringing one to the point of declaring the impossibility of κατάληψις as a certain and unquestionable fact. It is necessary now to consider Sextus' sceptical method in order to determine whether it is of such a nature as to enable him to arrive at ἐποχή without reaching any definite conclusions concerning the possibility or impossibility of κατάληψις such that he remains, in theory at least, disposed to search and inquiry.

Sextus does not set out to prove anything. The Sceptics suspend judgement as to whether or not it is possible to prove anything or whether proof itself exists.²⁶ What he is trying to do is to persuade or induce the Dogmatists and uninitiated students into a mental condition (ἐποχή - ἀταραξία) by whatever means possible. The best testimony to support this statement is to be found in the last chapter of P.H. iii in which Sextus compares the Pyrrhonean's activity of curing the Dogmatists of their rashness by various methods of persuasion to a doctor curing an ailment with different sorts of remedies.²⁷ For the moment it is sufficient to note that the present

problem is to determine Sextus' sceptical method of persuasion and not of proof. A person can be persuaded of the need to suspend judgement without anything having to have been proven about the underlying nature of things or of cognition.

Sextus describes his own method of presentation as being like that of a chronicler who simply records each fact as it appears to him at the moment.²⁸ This statement, taken quite literally, gives a very accurate picture of how Sextus does in fact proceed in his exposition. The order in which a chronicler presents his material is usually determined externally by the order of the events he describes. In Sextus' case one finds he says that he follows undogmatically the order of the divisions of philosophy and of the divisions within the divisions which others have used and which appear reasonable to him.²⁹ He rather randomly considers the views of the philosophers, poets, historical personages, and attitudes of different peoples as they appear relevant to the topic at hand.³⁰ What is important to notice in this is that, like a chronicler, the method by which Sextus proceeds in his exposition cannot strictly be said to spring out of the intrinsic logical structure of the matter in question; rather his method consists of a mixture of following the practice of others undogmatically, of more or less randomly selecting evidence and arguments from a variety of sources which fall under the topic under discussion, and of following the method that appears to him at the time to be most suitable.³¹

Sextus' image of the chronicler is also strikingly instructive in that the chronicler is thought of as somehow being detached from what he is observing and as expressing what it appears like to him from his external vantage point. Sextus has before him a whole host of warring sects to whom he feels no allegiance. He regards them as mere phenomena.

The tropes and other particular methods of persuasion will be dealt with separately in another context. It is necessary first to get a general picture of how Sextus proceeds in his exposition.

The first stage in his inquiry is to gather as varied and numerous a collection of sense data and dogmas as seems reasonable on the matter in question. This is how each of Sextus' polemical treatises begins. He then sees whether the matter of the inquiry admits of being brought under one or more of the tropes of Aenesidemus or of Agrippa. As it turns out, he discovers that the particular matter in question does fall under the tropes and is thus said to be inconclusive. It, therefore, becomes necessary to suspend judgement as to which, if any, of the views he has considered is true. This, generally, is how Sextus proceeds.

This method certainly leads to ἐποχή. However, because ἐποχή arises as a result of observing disparity or faulty arguing in particular views expressed on any question he must constantly justify ἐποχή by pointing out this disparity or faulty arguing in every new argument that comes along. He must remain inquiring because the basis upon which he

establishes ἐποχή does not rest in the discovery of a universal and necessary principle as such, but rather in the recognition of such a principle as it appears to him at the time in a phenomenal or empirical form.³² The phenomena being the history of philosophy or poetry or culture or medicine or whatever. The fact that Sextus only states what appears to him at a given moment and does not make any universal and final assertions has already been made clear. He determines nothing; not even that he determines nothing. Hence he does not establish as a principle which he openly assents to that sense perception and thinking are merely relative. One might say, Sextus endlessly rediscovers this principle in inquiry and is coincidentally endlessly brought to ἐποχή.³³ His task, in practice, would last as long as the history of the phenomena he is inquiring into goes on changing. He would always be open to the possibility that the truth may be grasped at some future date.

Is the 'still searching doctrine' held because Sextus is not as deeply sceptical as he would have been had he completely denied the possibility of true apprehension or was it held because he is even more sceptical? It has already been shown that the answer is in the latter. One finds a view expressed in the scholarly literature on Sextus regarding this doctrine which is quite baffling. Mary Mills-Patrick says the Pyrrhoneans:-

advocated a spirit of progress -- forever seeking. The seeking of the Pyrrhonists was in the direction of scientific research, particularly of empirical or inductive research.³⁴

One cannot find any grounds for imagining that Sextus has the activity of positive scientific research in mind when he says that the Pyrrhoneans remain searching. Janáček is much closer to the truth than Patrick or Hallie when he views the matter in its proper contexts and relates the 'still searching doctrine' to Sextus' desire to distinguish the Pyrrhoneans from the Academics on the question of the possibility of *κατάληψις*. If this doctrine is considered in the context in which it occurs, it can only be understood as an expression of the fact that the Pyrrhoneans have determined nothing without declaring the impossibility that something can be determined. One cannot find Sextus speaking of the positive empirical research of the Pyrrhonist in any clear and direct way. Once Sextus' position has been more fully determined it will be possible to discuss the widely held view of Sextus as an empirical scientist.

CHAPTER FOUR

Sextus' General Critique of Dogmatic Ethics

Whenever Sextus takes up the task of presenting the Pyrrhonian way (ἀγωγή) he begins by indicating why the Dogmatic philosophies in general are doomed to lead to unhappiness.¹ This provides a most reasonable introduction to the Pyrrhonian end and to the way in which it is realized in practice.

What might be called, for want of a better term, the objective side of the picture, has already been indicated.² Namely, that the Pyrrhonian finds he is unable to determine what is good and bad and this forces him to suspend judgment which in turn leads to ἀταξία. In presenting the Pyrrhonian way in this manner Sextus shows that the Pyrrhonian is driven by necessity to the Sceptical standpoint. Seemingly, it is by mere accident and good fortune that the path along which he is driven leads him to the end he originally set out to realize when he was entertaining the hope of achieving it by determining what is good by nature.³

The distinction which was made earlier between how Scepticism originates and what it ultimately becomes must be introduced into the discussion again.⁴ Although Sextus presents the Pyrrhonian as originally setting out with the hope of determining what is good by nature the position the

Pyrrhonian ultimately takes is that it would be undesirable to determine what is good by nature even if one could. Pyrrhonism is not presented as the second best possible position. Even if the Dogmatists did succeed in their pursuit they would still, according to Sextus, not realize their end as perfectly as the Pyrrhonian do.⁵ It is necessary to consider this in some detail.

Sextus presents a lengthy polemic against the Dogmatists showing that it is necessary to suspend judgement as to whether a good or bad by nature exists.⁶ The present discussion is not concerned with these arguments. What it is concerned with are the arguments in which Sextus does not bring into question the veracity of Dogmatic teachings on what the good is or on whether it exists or not but with the consequences that maintaining this or that good has on the life of the person who maintains it.⁷ These arguments do not reveal, as the former do, how Sextus arrives at his position but they are quite useful for determining the nature of the position he arrives at.

The distinction implicit in this is quite important. The arguments which are concerned with the practical consequences of the Dogmatic position occur after the Sceptical standpoint has already been established through a detailed logical refutation of the various dogmatic doctrines. First Sextus has a chapter entitled "Do Good and Evil really exist?"⁸ in his treatise Against the Ethicists and then the chapter called "Assuming that Good and Evil exist by Nature", is it

possible to live happily?"⁹ The important point in this is that it is not as a pragmatist or utilitarian that Sextus primarily comes to his position. He considers the Dogmatic position in terms of its practical consequences as an additional argument which is almost superfluous to his main argument.¹⁰

Sextus writes:-

Φαμέν δὲ ἄχρι νῦν τέλος εἶναι τοῦ
σκεπτικοῦ τὴν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν
ἀταραξίαν καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατηναγκασ-
μένοις μετριοπάθειαν. ¹¹

The present discussion is only concerned with the ethicist's end as it relates to matters of opinion. The consideration of things unavoidable will be considered under a separate heading.¹²

Sextus approaches the question of how happiness (εὐδαιμονία) can be obtained negatively. He writes:-

Πᾶσα τοίνυν κακοδαιμονία γίνεται
διὰ τινὰ ταραχήν. ¹³

What he is concerned with is the determining of the causes of perturbation (ταραχή) and with showing how one can attain happiness by avoiding the causes of perturbation.

Sextus observes that

...πᾶσα ταραχή παρέπεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις
ἢτοι διὰ τὸ συντόμως τινὰ διώκειν ἢ καὶ
διὰ τὸ συντόμως τινὰ φεύγειν. ¹⁴

According to Sextus, the person, who is continually pursuing what he believes to be good by nature and shunning what he

supposes to be evil, will find himself in the following predicament. If he is without what he deems to be good he will be perturbed on account of his desire to gain it (διὰ τὴν τοῦ τυχεῖν ἐπιθυμίαν).¹⁵ If he acquires the good that he is seeking he will be perturbed because of the excess of joy (διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς χαρᾶς) it will cause him and as a result of the anxiety involved in keeping watch over his acquisition (διὰ τὴν φρουρὰν τοῦ κτηθέντος).¹⁶

It would be useful to formulate the content of what Sextus is saying in a more abstract way in order to bring out its full import. In deeming certain things good by nature one is opposing to oneself an object which is in some way other than oneself and yet related to oneself in such a way as to cause one to desire it and to feel imperfect or incomplete without it. That it is in some way other than oneself is indicated by the fact that one does not immediately have it but must pursue it. The reason one must pursue it is because one believes that one is related to it in such a way that in having it one has what makes one good and thereby happy. The problem inherent in this is that the source of one's happiness is placed in something which is in some way outside of oneself. Thus one is dependent upon something which is external to one's immediate self over which one does not have complete control. One can deem something good and desirable by nature but not be able to have it or have it and either be overwhelmed by it or uncertain as to whether one can maintain it.¹⁷

If one assumes for the sake of argument, as Sextus has done, that things good and bad exist by nature, then why are things good and bad more of a source of perturbation for the Dogmatist than they are for the Sceptic?¹⁸ In answering this question Sextus quotes Timon's statement "ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ταῦτα γόῳ κέκριται" which Bury renders as "But by judgement of men Sentence upon them is pass'd."¹⁹ According to Sextus, what moves the Dogmatists to pursue certain things and avoid others is their belief that certain things are good by nature while others are bad.²⁰ The source of perturbation, it follows from this, is not in the objects themselves which exist but in the attitude that one has towards those objects.²¹ Although one may not have any power in determining what exists and what does not exist, one does have, according to Sextus, the power to decide what one believes or does not believe. It is important to note here that in Sextus' polemical writings he shows that the Dogmatists are not lead by necessity to believe what they do but by arbitrary and rash reasoning. Looked at from Sextus' point of view, the Dogmatists arbitrarily choose to believe that certain things are good by nature and others are bad, which makes them dependent on something outside of themselves over which they do not have complete control for their source of happiness. They are themselves their own source of perturbation because they freely choose to maintain certain beliefs which cause them to suffer perturbation. After quoting the passage of Timon given above Sextus writes:-

τὸ δέ γε διδάσκειν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἴδιον
τῆς σκέψεως. ταύτης ἄρα ἦν τὸ
εὐδαίμονα βίον περιποιεῖν.²²

Sextus illustrates his teaching with a number of examples which may help to show that the interpretation which has thus far been argued is accurate. In M. xi 121 to 124 Sextus observes that the supposition that money or fame or pleasure are desirable and good by nature in each case serves to generate a great evil -- φιλο-αργυρία, φιλο-δοξία, φιλο-ηδονία.²³ Sextus does not bring into question the goodness or badness of money or fame or pleasure as such in this discussion. However, he takes it as self-evident that the love of these is bad because it results in a certain depraved condition (τινὰ μοχθηράν).²⁴ The zealous capitalist, for example, never has all the money he loves but is constantly seeking more because he deems all money desirable by nature. Hence he is always perturbed because of his belief in the desirability of money.

Sextus then argues that even if one acquires what one regards as goods one will still be troubled by the fact that one is not alone in possessing them. He will be infected with envy and ill-will towards his neighbours. Also he would be in constant fear of losing his goods. And if he did lose them he would not only be tormented with the hardships that come with it but also by his own belief that he is not having them in a bad state which would cause him to feel shame and self-disdain.²⁵

But, possibly, the cause of one's perturbation is a result of taking the wrong things to be good by nature and one needs the assistance of dogmatic philosophy to show one what one should really pursue. Sextus replies to that suggestion as follows:-

...ὥστε νόσον ἀντὶ νόσου ποιεῖν τὸν τοῦ φιλοσόφου λόγον, ἐπεὶ περ τὸν ἐπὶ πλοῦτον ἢ δόξαν ἢ υἰείαν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὀρμῶντα ἀποστρέφων εἰς τὸ μὴ ταῦτα διώκειν ἀλλὰ τὸ καλόν, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ τὴν ἀρετήν, οὐκ ἐλευθεροῦ τῆς διώξεως ἀλλ' ἐφ' ἑτέραν μετατίθησι διώξιν.²⁶

The philosopher "introduces one perturbation in place of another" like the physician who "removes brain-fever but in its place introduces lethargy."²⁷

In summary, one can conclude that, according to Sextus, the originative cause of pursuit and avoidance is the belief that there exists what is good and desirable by nature and what is bad and undesirable by nature. Pursuit and avoidance are the cause of perturbation. The activity of pursuing what one deems good by nature and avoiding what one deems bad by nature is the activity of seeking imperturbability by trying to harmonize oneself with something which is in some way other than oneself (i.e. is good by nature and thus has a nature of its own irrespective of my particular nature). This something which is other than oneself, according to Sextus' analysis, is nothing other than one's belief in the good and bad by nature or one's conception of how things

ought not to be. No matter how persistent one is in seeking to come into harmony with what one deems good by nature one will be in some degree of disharmony with it. To express this more abstractly, experience is not adequate to the idea of the good or of a perfect order of things; the conflict between one's idea or belief and one's experience is the cause of perturbation.

The most appropriate way to end the present analysis is to let Sextus speak for himself:-

τὸ γὰρ εἶναι τινα βίου τάξιν κατὰ τεχνικὸν
 λόγον ὠρισμένως εἰρημένην εὐχῆ μᾶλλον
 ἕοικεν. πᾶς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος πρὸς τὰς τῶν
 ὑποπιπτόντων πραγμάτων διαφορὰς καὶ
 ποικιλίας ἀρτιζόμενος οὐδέποτε
 δύναται τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν φυλάττειν,
 καὶ μάλιστα ὁ ἔμφρων τό τε ἄστατον τῆς
 τύχης καὶ τὸ ἀβέβαιον τῶν πραγμάτων
 ἐννοούμενος. 28

CHAPTER FIVE

(i)

The Sceptical End as Regards Matters of Opinion

It is possible now to see Sextus' position in its proper perspective and to determine its true import.

Sextus begins his chapter, called 'Is he who suspends judgement regarding the Nature of Things Good and Evil happy in all respects?', by characterizing the life of the happy man as follows:-

Εὐδαίμων μὲν ἔστιν ὁ ἀταράχως διεξάγων
καὶ ὡς ἔλεγεν ὁ Τίμων, ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ καὶ
γαληνότητι καθεστώς·
πάντη γὰρ ἐπειχε γαλήνη
καὶ τὸν ὄντως ὡς οὖν ἐνόησ' ἐν
νηνεμίῃσι γαλήνης.¹

Timon's image of the calm that comes when there are no disturbing winds, indicates the nature of the Pyrrhonian end quite clearly. The 'winds' that Timon speaks of have already been seen to be the idea of or belief in the existence of a perfect order of things or a good by nature which one is in disharmony with in one's immediate state and which one must endlessly strive to conform to.² One's calm is disturbed if the state one is in does not conform to one's conception of the state one ought to be in. The happy man, therefore, must

be in a state which is not contradicted by or in conflict with his conception of how he ought to be. Moreover, if there are no winds to disquiet him he must not hold any conception of how he ought to be which could conflict with how he is.

What is important to notice at this point about the Dogmatic position is that happiness is identified with the soul's being in a certain state -- having a certain definite character and content. Happiness is not simply conceived of negatively -- as not being perturbed -- but also positively -- as being in harmony with what is good by nature. The sceptical view of happiness is best understood in contrast to this.

How does Sextus characterize the state of happiness of the happy man? In the above quoted passage the happy man is said to live without perturbation, in quietude, in a state of repose and freedom from turmoil or agitation.³ Sextus' happy man can be said to be happy to the extent that he is not unhappy.

In P.H. i 10 he defines the state the happy man is in as follows:-

ἀταραξία δέ ἐστι ψυχῆς ἀοχλησία
καὶ γαληνότης. ⁴

Ἀοχλησία may be defined as 'freedom from disturbance' which has the same import as the second quotation of Timon in the above passage. The state of the happy man is negatively defined here as being a state in which none of the things which might be opposed to him are able to disturb him. One might

legitimately substitute the word 'disturb' with the word 'alter' or 'affect'. It has already been observed that disturbance results from an excess of joy (διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς χαρᾶς) as well as from sorrow or grief.⁵

That the happy man is in a calm (γαληνότης) state is expressed in the first statement of Timon in the above passage. One might say that calmness is simply the state which results from the freedom from disturbance. Or, to speak in the allegorical language of Timon, the calm of the lake is the result of the complete absence of wind.

It would be very useful to indicate provisionally the full import of this. Until the nature of ἐποχή has been firmly determined it will not be possible to demonstratively justify the following statement.⁶ The ultimate end Sextus sets out to realize is the state of unopposed immediate (i.e. unmediated) self harmony. The harmony is 'unopposed', in contradistinction to the dogmatic position, because one does not attempt to be in harmony with a good by nature or a perfect order of things but simply with oneself.⁷ The harmony is an 'immediate' harmony of the self with the self, in contradistinction to the dogmatic position, because Sextus does not seek to harmonize with or conform to an idea of how he ought to be or is by nature; rather, he suspends judgement as regards how he ought to be or is by nature and therein finds himself in an undisturbed or immediate self harmony.⁸ Sextus' end is 'self harmony', as is the dogmatic end according to Sextus, in that it is the untroubled and tranquil state of

the soul.

This position logically follows from Sextus' critique of the dogmatic position. His conception of the nature of happiness is such that the activity of pursuit and avoidance is abolished since he suspends judgement as to whether there exists a good and bad by nature. He, thereby, does away with any possible source of perturbation.⁹

But can Sextus legitimately distinguish Scepticism from Dogmatism according to his own account of Scepticism? Does he in fact abolish the activity of pursuit and avoidance? Does the Sceptic not value anything as good and desirable by nature? Or, is Scepticism merely another form of Dogmatism?

Sextus gives the following definition of the word telos:-

ἔστι μὲν οὖν τέλος τὸ οὐ χάριν πάντα
πράττεται ἢ θεωρεῖται, αὐτὸ δὲ οὐδενὸς
ἕνεκα, ἢ τὸ ἔσχατον τῶν ὀρεκτῶν.¹⁰

This is essentially the same definition of telos that Aristotle and Cicero give." What is interesting to notice about it is that it makes perfect sense in the context of the Aristotelian philosophy but that it is less readily intelligible as the definition of telos appropriate to the Pyrrhonian standpoint. It is appropriate to the Dogmatic philosophies, as understood by Sextus, because they maintain that there is an activity of pursuit and avoidance for the sake of something and that there is an ultimate object of appetency.

The Pyrrhonian, one might say, realizes his telos precisely by not determining what is good or true by nature, by not

valuing anything as "τὸ ἔσχατον τῶν ὀρεκτῶν", and by not being involved in the activity of pursuit and avoidance.¹²

This statement would seem to be in one sense true and in another sense false. The sense in which it is true has already been made quite clear.¹³ The sense in which it is false is that the Sceptic acts when he opposes the objects of sense and thought and when he suspends judgement. He carries out this activity for the sake of attaining a certain state of the soul. It would appear from this that the above definition of telos does apply, in a peculiar way, to Pyrrhonism. However, the matter is not so easily resolved.

One can scarcely find a page in Sextus' writings without a statement to the following effect:-

ὁ δὲ ἀοριστῶν περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὴν φύσιν
καλῶν ἢ κακῶν οὔτε φεύγει τι οὔτε
διώκει συντόμως.¹⁴

Sextus, in the above passage, is setting out the Pyrrhonian position against that of the Dogmatists. Would Sextus say that the Sceptic does not eagerly pursue εὐδαιμονία as desirable and good by nature? He does not directly address himself to this question. Sextus frequently makes remarks such as:-

Ἀρχὴν δὲ τῆς σκεπτικῆς αἰτιώδη μὲν
φάμεν εἶναι τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῦ ἀταρακτήσειν.¹⁵

in which ἀταραξία is recognized to be desirable and that for the sake of which sceptical inquiry is carried out. "ἀταραξία δὲ ἐστὶ ψυχῆς ἀοχλησία καὶ γαληνότης."¹⁶ It would seem that Sextus is committed to treating ἀταραξία as the ultimate

Good. If this is the case, Sextus' definition of telos is appropriate to Pyrrhonism.

However, this would appear to present a greater problem than it solves. Pyrrhonism, according to the above interpretation, would simply be another form of Dogmatism. One might reasonably conjecture that Sextus would respond to this charge by saying that ἀταραξία is a condition of the soul which appears to him to be good and desirable but which he would not positively affirm to be good by nature. In this case the distinction between indicating what appears to one and stating what is by nature is less acceptable than when he uses it on other occasions. When Sextus says that there appear to him to be equally strong arguments for conflicting sides of a question he acts consistently by suspending judgment and by proclaiming the need to search further which indicates his uncertainty. That ἀταραξία is "τὸ ἔσχατον τῶν ὀρεκτῶν" is assumed by Sextus as a beginning point which is never questioned. The whole of his inquiry is directed to the realization of ἀταραξία. Thus, in practice, the Pyrrhonian enters into philosophical inquiry in order to avoid παραχῆ and to pursue ἀταραξία. In theory, the Pyrrhonian deems ἀταραξία desirable and the man who has attained to ἀταραξία to be in the most desirable state.

It is necessary now to consider this whole matter in another way by showing how ἀταραξία comes about as result of ἐποχή. It is only by doing this that the notion of ἀταραξία can be demonstratively understood and the problems raised thus far can be properly grasped.

(ii)

The Sceptical δύναμις

Ἔστι δὲ ἡ σκεπτικὴ δύναμις ἀντιθετικὴ
 φαινομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων καθ' οἶον-
 δήποτε τρόπον, ἀφ' ἧς ἐρχόμεθα διὰ τὴν
 ἐν τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις πράγμασι καὶ
 λόγοις ἰσοσθένειαν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς
 ἐποχὴν, τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰς ἀταραξίαν.¹⁷

What is the nature of the Sceptical δύναμις? The Dogmatist or the religious man or the citizen who believes in the substantiality of the political institutions of his country each have certain convictions or beliefs about the way things are by nature which, in some measure, guide and determine how each acts and feels. Philosophical, religious, and political conviction or, more generally, the conception of how things are by nature, viewed from the standpoint of Pyrrhonism, rule over man's life tyrannically. In the section on 'Sextus' general critique on Dogmatic Ethics' it was seen how Sextus regarded any belief in a good by nature as an inevitable source of perturbation.¹⁸ Just as the Ancient gods once ruled over man because of man's conviction in the substantiality and authority of the gods, so man, in Sextus' view, is now the enslaved victim of Dogmatic belief. Rashness and self-conceit fool the Dogmatists into thinking that they can determine the nature of things and show man how he ought to live. Sextus writes:-

Ὁ σκεπτικὸς διὰ τὸ φιλόνητος εἶναι

τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν οἴησίν τε καὶ προ-
πέτειαν. κατὰ δύναμιν ἰᾶσθαι λόγῳ βούλεται.¹⁹

It is, in Sextus' view, the unique task of Pyrrhonism to liberate man from all forms of dogmatism and from the rashness and vanity inherent in them. Sextus does not restrict himself to the dogmas of the philosophical sects. He attacks the dogmas of common sense²⁰, of religious²¹ and political belief²², and of the grammarians²³, astrologers²⁴, mathematicians²⁵ etc... The Sceptical *δύναμις* is the power or means by which the Sceptic is able to liberate man from his dogmas.

The Sceptical *δύναμις* is the ability or power by which the objects of sense perception (*αἰσθητά*) and of thought (*νοητά*) are able to be shown to not appear to provide a source of certain knowledge of how things really are or as providing for man a source of authority according to which he can guide and determine how he ought to act.

By opposing a belief in 'x' with a belief 'contrary to x' and showing that each belief is equally credible the believability of either is discredited. Sextus writes:-

ἀντικειμένους δὲ λόγους παραλαμβάνομεν
οὐχὶ πάντως ἀτόφασιν καὶ κατάφασιν,
ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς ἀντὶ τοῦ μαχομένους.²⁶

Judgements which are contradictory, of course, conflict with each other although conflicting judgements are not necessarily contradictory. The Sceptical *δύναμις* discredits the belief in the certainty of judgement by opposing " *φαινόμενα φαινομένοις ἢ νοούμενα νοουμένοις ἢ ἐναλλάξ* " in any

way whatsoever.²⁷ Sextus illustrates this with the following examples:-

...οἷον φαινόμενα μὲν φαινομένοις, ὅταν λέγωμεν "ὁ αὐτὸς πύργος πόρρωθεν μὲν φαίνεται στρογγύλος ἐγγύθεν δὲ τετράγωνος" νοούμενα δὲ νοουμένοις. ὅταν πρὸς τὸν κατασκευάζοντα ὅτι ἔστι πρόνοια ἐκ τῆς τάξεως τῶν οὐρανίων, ἀντιτιθῶμεν τὸ τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς δυσπραγεῖν πολλάκις τοὺς δὲ κακοὺς εὐπραγεῖν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτου συνάγωμεν τὸ μὴ εἶναι πρόνοιαν· νοούμενα δὲ φαινομένοις, ὡς ὁ Ἀναξαγόρας τῷ λευκῇν εἶναι τὴν χιόνα ἀντετίθει ὅτι ἡ χιῶν ὕδωρ ἔστι πεπηγός, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ἔστι μέλαν, καὶ ἡ χιῶν ἄρα μέλαινά ἐστιν.²⁸

It is extremely important to note that Sextus does not make any claim that every argument can be opposed to an equally credible one; Sextus does not conclude from his experience that because he has not thus far found any argument that cannot be discredited by opposing it to another that all arguments can be discredited. Sextus' method is simply to consider each particular argument as it comes to his attention and to respond to it by seeing whether it can be opposed by an equally credible conflicting one. His intention is always to merely counterbalance the pro-argument with a contra-argument and not to refute the one and establish the other.²⁹ It is for this reason that one finds large sections of Sextus' writings which consist of one feeble argument being feebly opposed by another.³⁰ Sextus deals with each argument separately and according to its own peculiar merits. It has already been

noted that this method logically follows from the fact that he does not hold to any universal principles but experimentally considers each new argument with an openness to the possibility to it might be irrefutable but always searching for a way of discrediting it.

It should be said, in anticipation of the discussion which is to follow concerning ἐποχή, that it follows from the above that Sextus suspends judgement with respect to veracity of particular arguments as each is considered in turn.³¹ That is to say, he does not arrive at ἐποχή and thereby to ἀταραξία at a certain point in time and remains there forever. Rather, he must always return to the first stage of his inquiry and re-establish the need to suspend judgement by considering new arguments and evidence. It is by doing this that the Sceptic avoids becoming dogmatically sceptical.

The Pyrrhoneans formally set out a number of tropes (τρόποι) or arguments (λογοί).³² They include ten tropes which classify the general forms under which particular objects of sense perception and thought conflict with each other with respect to the same object and five tropes which discredit belief by showing that the arguments upon which belief is founded are arbitrary and dogmatic. The former are the tropes of Aenesidemus which readily conform to the definition of the Sceptical δύναμις thus far considered.³³ The latter are the tropes of Agrippa of which only the first one involves the opposing of conflicting views; the other four deal with particular arguments taken by themselves and discredit them

by showing that they are not based upon anything necessary and known with certainty to exist.³⁴ These four tropes of Agrippa fit into Sextus' description of the Sceptical δύναμις because the credibility of each particular determination must be tested in order to be able to oppose it to an equally credible one. The above mentioned sets of tropes and other sets will be considered under a separate heading. It is sufficient, for the moment, to have merely indicated the place of the tropes in the general scheme of things.³⁵

Sextus does not attempt to abolish the φαινόμενα or the νοούμενα. That I have certain αίσθητα and νοητά is an unquestionable fact given in experience. Sextus writes:-

ὅταν δὲ ζητῶμεν εἰ τοιοῦτον ἔστι τὸ
ὑποκείμενον ὁποῖον φαίνεται, τὸ μὲν ὅτι
φαίνεται δίδομεν, ζητοῦμεν δ' οὐ περὶ
τοῦ φαινομένου ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκείνου ὃ λέγ-
εται περὶ τοῦ φαινομένου· τοῦτο δὲ δια-
φέρει τοῦ ζητεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ φαινομένου.³⁶

What is brought into question is the veracity of any judgement made about external underlying realities (περὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν ὑποκειμένων).³⁷

Sextus states the Pyrrhonian position as regards the present matter as follows:-

τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ἐν τῇ προφορᾷ τῶν φωνῶν
τούτων τὸ ἑαυτῷ φαινόμενον λέγει καὶ τὸ
πάθος ἀπαγγέλλει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἀδοξάστως,
μηδὲν περὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν ὑποκειμένων
διαβεβαλιόμενος.³⁸

The objects of sense perception and thought, according to the standpoint of Pyrrhonism, are to be regarded as merely being relative and subjective (what seems to me to be the case); they are not to be regarded as having any fixed and determinate content in themselves.³⁹ What is perceived and thought is largely determined by the particularity of the person (whether he is suffering from brain-fever or jaundice etc. or not) and by the external conditions under which he perceives and thinks (whether he is in fear of something etc. or not). The Pyrrhoneans express their position with such phrases as οὐδὲν ὀρίζω or οὐδὲν μᾶλλον which indicate that they hold no fixed and determinate convictions.

What the Sceptical δύναμις consists in is the capacity to dissolve what is believed to be fixed and determinate by cancelling out each particular determination or dogma with one which is in conflict with it. The Sceptic usually does not have to create a new philosophical theory in order to refute the Dogmatists but rather is able to let them refute each other. Sextus frequently finds it necessary to make up an argument of his own in order to counterbalance the position of the Dogmatists but he does not any more assert the credibility of the argument he makes up than of the one opposed to it.

(iii)

Ἐποχή

The Sceptical δύναμις, which causes one to be uncertain about the veracity of any of the fixed determinations of thought and sense perception, leads to ἐποχή. Sextus defines as follows:-

ἐποχή δέ ἐστὶ στάσις διανοίας δι' ἣν
οὔτε αἰρομέν τι οὔτε τίθεμεν.⁴⁰

Ἐποχή, or suspension of judgement, is not to be confused with our word 'doubt'. The doubter is in the relation to what he doubts of doubting it. The person who suspends judgement has, one might say, reached a degree of uncertainty such that he is no longer doubting the credibility of an argument or whatever but has completely given up in the attempt to determine what to believe. To be in doubt about something is to be in a state of uncertainty and perplexity in which one is still, in some measure, torn between the pros and cons of the matter at issue.

The fact that the Pyrrhonian is able to suspend judgement rather than stay at the inquisitive stage of doubt indicates that he finds himself in a perplexity of such a nature that it appears to him to be certain that his perplexity can never be resolved. Were this not the case the Pyrrhonian would go on searching without ever suspending judgement. If he were simply in a state of irresolute, indecision, and uncertainty he would remain in the unhappy state of unrest

passing to and fro between the conflicting arguments and evidence. The act of suspending judgement rather than being an act of indecision and irresolution is a decisive act taken at the particular point at which one feels certain that one cannot determine what is the true judgement. The reason the Pyrrhonian, in theory at least, does remain searching is that his Scepticism is so complete that he even doubts what appears to him to be certain. What appears to him to be certain in deciding to suspend judgement is not based upon any apprehension of the true nature of cognition or of reality but merely upon how it appears to him at the time of his inquiry. Sextus is completely consistent in his maintaining of the 'still searching doctrine' while saying that the Pyrrhonian suspends judgement.

Ἐποχή, then, is the standing still or cessation of the thought process (στάσις διανοίας) which results from the inability to determine how things really are or how one ought to act. All determinate principles and criteria, whether they exist or not, cease to be an object of consciousness for the Pyrrhonian when he suspends judgement. The Sceptic becomes convinced of the nullity of all that is derived from the senses, thought, habit, tradition, and so on when he sees that every conception of what is true stands opposed by its opposite. Without making any positive assertion as to whether in reality this or that sensuous datum or thought is true or not the Sceptic reaches the point whereby nothing holds true for him. What must be firmly grasped in order to understand Pyrrhonism,

as presented by Sextus, is that the ultimate concern is to determine what holds true for me, or more generally, what holds true for consciousness, and not with what is true in and for itself. Sextus' position is that 'I' am unable to determine what 'is' and 'is not'; and not, that what 'is' and 'is not' is indeterminable. Therefore, 'I' suspend judgement. In suspending judgement 'I' cease to judge or deem any object of sense or thought desirable by nature whether it be pleasure or wisdom or virtue or power or whatever.

(iv)

Ἀταραξία

Sextus says that ἀταραξία follows from ἐποχή "ὡς σκιά σώματι". Ἀταραξία comes about as if by chance from ἐποχή just as ἐποχή comes about as if by chance since the Sceptic has no reason to expect that an equally credible contra-argument can be opposed to a pro-argument in any given case.⁴¹

Sextus says that the Sceptic had the same experience as the painter Apelles who was painting a horse and wished to represent the horse's foam. He attempted unsuccessfully to carefully paint it on and in utter frustration took the sponge which he used to wipe the paint off his brushes with and threw it at the canvas which left a mark on his picture producing the effect of a horse's foam.⁴² Although the Sceptic refuses to assent to arbitrary and dogmatic judgement, he cannot be said to arrive at his end through a deliberate and conscious logical or empirical method. It all happens, as it were, by chance. He would suspend judgement as to whether his method in fact has some underlying logic. Sextus is cautious to maintain the purity of his Scepticism with remarkable consistency.

The most important passages, in which Sextus indicates that the nature of ἀταραξία is, have already been either quoted or discussed. I would now like to indicate what I believe to be the nature of ἀταραξία and the reason that it follows from ἐποχή. Sextus, as was noted above, limits his

comments to expressing what his experience as a Sceptic has been and does not attempt to give a rational explanation of why his experience took the form it did. He, of course, must restrict himself to speaking in that way if he is to remain faithful to his Sceptical position. The Sceptic is very much like the person who finds he can eat and digest food without requiring any knowledge of the chemical characteristics of the food he digests or of the anatomy and physiology of his digestive system. I think it is a legitimate question for the interpreter of Sextus' thought to want to know why ἐποχή leads to ἀταξία and what the nature of ἀταξία is, not merely as expressed in the cautiously indefinite Sceptical manner. However, it must be emphasized that what follows is my explanation and not Sextus' or a necessarily definitive account.

Ἀταξία involves not only the suspension of judgement but also the suspension of the will to be anything in particular (wealthy, virtuous, hedonistic, etc.). At the stage of ἐποχή the Pyrrhonian does not determine anything or have a will to be or become anything determinate. It is important to distinguish determinate being (being virtuous or wealthy or whatever) from indeterminate being. It has already been noted that the general form Sextus' arguments take is: either 'x' is 'y', or 'x' is 'z'; that 'x' is 'y' is equally credible as 'x' is 'z'; therefore it is necessary to suspend judgement as to whether 'x' is 'y' or 'z', or neither 'y' nor 'z'. This form of argumentation leads to suspension of judgement as to

whether any determinate notion of being can be known to be any more than not to be in reality. However, that Being is, is never brought into question. This is because one can only oppose what is fixed and determinate (being this to being that); indeterminate Being simply is and as such cannot be predicated of conflicting predicates.

What the Pyrrhonian finds through becoming uncertain about what externally is and is not -- whether this or that is in reality -- is his own imperturbability. A crucial element in his own imperturbability would clearly seem to be that his own Being cannot be made a matter of doubt. Sextus never suspends judgement as to whether or not he suspends judgement. Indeed, upon suspending judgement he rests his case because he has found what he was looking for in the first place. What he was looking for turns out to be nothing other than self-certainty. This self-certainty comes about as a result of finding that he is not in and through another (through being virtuous or wealthy or whatever), but that he is in and through himself. I think ἀταραξία is the uniformity of mind with itself or, to express this in another way, the unopposed immediate (i.e. unmediated) harmony of self with self. The mind or self not as determinate being but rather as pure indeterminate Being which is in and for itself. It is not as an individual, whose individuality is determined by what he believes and feels concern and affection for, that one attains to ἀταραξία; rather, it is only by ceasing to be an individual -- by ceasing to have any beliefs or attachments --

that one can attain to ἀταραξία. One can only do this in respect to matters of belief. This, I believe, is the great principle which the Pyrrhoneans experienced and discovered. Sextus indicated how one could come to experience ἀταραξία without rationally explaining why suspending judgement leads to ἀταραξία. The Pyrrhonian merely assures his audience that if they follow the Pyrrhonian way faithfully they will, as it were by chance, have the same experience as they have had.

οὕτω γὰρ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τὴν τελείαν καὶ
σκεπτικὴν ἀπολαβὴν διαθέσειν κατὰ τὸν
Τίμωνα βιώσεται

ῥήστα μεθ' ἡσυχίης
αἰεὶ ἀφροντίσως καὶ ἀκινήτως κατὰ ταῦτα,
μὴ προσέχων αἰνοῖς ἡδυλόγου σοφείης.⁴³

It is possible now to determine whether Sextus' definition of telos given in P.H. i 25 is appropriate to Pyrrhonism.

1. Is ἀταραξία "τὸ ἔσχατον τῶν ὀρεκτῶν" for the Pyrrhonian? When he is at the stage of having attained to ἀταραξία he neither longs for anything nor deems anything desirable. This would logically include ἀταραξία itself since it is simply the state of soul which results from ἐποχή. However, the Pyrrhonian who is at the first stage of the Pyrrhonian way -- Pyrrhonian qua ζητητής -- is not as yet properly a Sceptic but rather, as Sextus says, starts out with exactly the same hopes and intentions as the Dogmatist.⁴⁴ Namely, he hopes to attain to ἀταραξία by determining what is true

and what is not. Thus, the Pyrrhonian qua ζητητής does deem ἀταραξία "τὸ ἔσχατον τῶν ὀρεκτῶν". He sets out, one might say, with the dogmatic assumption that there is an ultimate object of appetency and precisely at the point in the inquiry whereat it becomes necessary for him to suspend judgment regarding this original assumption he realizes the object of the inquiry in practice.⁴⁵

2. Is ἀταραξία "τὸ οὐδὲν χάριν πάντα πράττεται ἢ θεωρεῖται, αὐτὸ δὲ οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα" in Pyrrhonism? Again, at the stage at which the Pyrrhonian has attained to ἐποχή or ἀταραξία nothing practical or theoretical is done for the sake of ἀταραξία. As was already shown, it is not by being or doing or knowing anything that the Pyrrhonian is able to realize and sustain ἀταραξία. However, the Pyrrhonian who is at the first stage of the Pyrrhonian way -- Pyrrhonian qua ζητητής -- actively pursues ἀταραξία in every way possible. Clearly, ἀταραξία is not for the sake of anything. Thus the definition Sextus gives of telos applies to Pyrrhonism in so far as the Pyrrhonian is no longer in the Sceptical frame of mind.

(v)

Μετριοπάθεια

Thus far the discussion has been limited to Sextus' position as regards matters according to opinion (ἐν τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν). The essential characteristic in respect to matters of opinion is that the individual is free to determine for himself what he believes or whether he affirmatively believes anything at all. What must now be considered is the class of things which affect the state of the soul which are not introduced by belief or by any act of will but by a sort of external necessity over which one is powerless. The distinction between the former and latter may be provisionally said to be between the state of the soul as self determined and the state of the soul as externally determined.

Sextus first makes the above indicated distinction in P.H. i 25-26:-

φαμέν δὲ ἄχρι νῦν τέλος εἶναι τοῦ
σκεπτικῆς τὴν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν
ἀταραξίαν καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατηναγκασ-
μένοις μετριοπάθειαν. ⁴⁶

What is the precise import of the phrase "ἐν τοῖς κατηναγκασμένοις" which Sextus contrasts with the phrase "ἐν τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν"? This contrast might be taken to be a contrast between things which occur by necessity in the sense that it is externally and objectively necessary that they occur and things which occur by chance in the sense that their occurrence

is wholly dependent upon whether or not I happen to opine them. It becomes evident that this does not accurately and fully indicate the true import of this contrast when one considers Sextus' later formulation of this distinction in M. xi 147-148:-

ὥστ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν νομιζομένοις
ἀγαθοῖς τε καὶ κακοῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς τούτων
αἰρέσεσι καὶ φυγαῖς τελῶς ἐστὶν
εὐδαίμων, ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατ' αἰσθησιν καὶ
ἀλόγοις κινήμασιν μετριάζει. ⁴¹

Here one finds the grammatically complete phrase "ἐν μὲν τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν νομιζομένοις" is contrasted with the phrase "ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατ' αἰσθησιν καὶ ἀλόγοις κινήμασιν" instead of simply with the phrase "ἐν τοῖς κατηναγκασμένοις" as in P.H. i 25-26. Sextus goes on to clarify the import of this distinction:-

τὰ γὰρ μὴ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου διαστροφὴν
συμβαίνοντα καὶ τὴν φαύλην δόξαν, ἀλλὰ
κατὰ ἀκούσιον τῆς αἰσθήσεως πάθος,
ἀμήχανόν ἐστὶν ὑπὸ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν σκέψιν
λόγου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. ⁴²

The distinction here is between what affects one voluntarily and is able to be altered by reason and argument and what affects one involuntarily and cannot be altered by reason and argument.

The question at issue here is whether Sextus draws any distinction between saying that one is affected by something involuntarily (ἀκουσίως) and saying that it happened according to necessity (κατ' ἀνάγκην). Or, to express it more

directly, is it true to say that Sextus only means that one is involuntarily affected by certain things when he says that certain things affect one *κατ' ἀνάγκην* ? Does the notion of necessity as used by Sextus in regard to involuntary affections have the restricted meaning that certain things affect one which are not contingent upon one's willing them or opining them but affect one regardless of what one wills or opines? Or, does Sextus explicitly have natural and/or logical necessity in mind when he says that certain things affect one *κατ' ἀνάγκην* . Does Sextus in fact suspend judgment as to whether or not the soul is affected according to natural and/or logical necessity as distinct from being affected by chance or accident?

Although it may at first appear otherwise, Sextus does not deal with questions concerning how or why involuntary affections occur -- whether by chance or by necessity or whatever. It is contrary to the most basic principles of Pyrrhonism to make assertions indicating that things or affections occur by necessity or by chance or to make any such assertions which are intended to express their underlying nature. Sextus accepts as a phenomenon given in experience that the state of the soul is affected by what man desires, opines or, more generally, by what he wills and determines, and by involuntary affections of the senses. One can report on whether one voluntarily willed or determined something, or whether one was affected by something involuntarily without making any assertion about what is non-evident. This is

precisely what Sextus does. When Sextus says that the soul is affected by matters according to necessity he is simply indicating that the soul is affected by matters which occur whether one wishes them to or not. Nowhere does Sextus explicitly state that a certain class of things or affections occurs by necessity, in the sense that it is objectively (naturally or logically) necessary that they occur. To make such an assertion as that would be to make a positive judgement about what is non-evident. It is necessary now to look at Sextus' argument more directly.

Sextus cites thirst, hunger, and chills as examples of affections "κατ' ἀνάγκην". He states the obvious fact that it is easy to provide remedies for these.⁴⁹ Clearly, such affections as hunger and thirst need not necessarily afflict one unless, by chance, one does not have access to food and drink. However, if one goes without food or drink, suspending judgement or wishing that one's appetite for food and drink was satisfied would not aid in warding off hunger and thirst.

One might argue that Sextus has natural necessity in mind. For example, if one goes without water one will necessarily become thirsty. Obviously, Sextus is aware of this. However, Sextus does not explicitly recognize any universal and necessary laws as such, whether logical or natural, since to do so would make him guilty of dogmatizing. Rather, Sextus observes that if one goes without drink one becomes thirsty as a mere phenomenon about which he does not determine

any necessary causal connection. He accepts it undogmatically as something which happens as though it were by chance.

It must be said that Sextus believes that there is an inevitability that during the course of any person's life he will be afflicted by various involuntary affections of the senses on numerous occasions.

οὐ μὴν ἀόκλητον πάντη τὸν σκεπτικὸν
εἶναι νομίζομεν, ἀλλ' ὀχλείσθαι φάμεν
ὑπὸ τῶν κατηναγκασμένων· καὶ γὰρ
ρίγουν ποτὲ ὁμολογοῦμεν καὶ διψῆν καὶ
τοιουτότροπά τινα πάσχειν.⁵⁰

It is essential to note here that Sextus does not speak in terms which would suggest that it is logically or naturally necessary that a person suffer involuntary affections of the senses. Rather he merely states that the Sceptics are not wholly free of such affections.

The sense in which Sextus says that certain perturbations occur κατ' ἀνάγκην is simply that they occur whether one wishes them to or not. Further, that when they occur they persist or go away irrespective of what one wishes or opines. Sextus writes:-

...οὐ γὰρ παρ' αὐτὸν γίνεται ἢ διὰ τὸν
πόνον ταραχὴ ἀλλ', εἴαν τε θέλη εἴαν τε
καὶ μὴ, γίνεσθαι κατ' ἀνάγκην ὀφείλει...⁵¹

It is evident to anyone who has suffered pain that he neither wished it upon himself nor is able to simply wish it away. What is not readily evident is that the pain occurred by

necessity or necessarily occurred. Sextus' choice of the expression "κατ' ἀνάγκην" or "ἐν τοῖς κατηναγκασμένοις" seems to be unfortunate. The contrast which appears to be appropriate here to "ἐν μὲν τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν νομιζομένοις" is best expressed by Sextus with the phrase "ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατ' αἰσθησιν καὶ ἀλόγοις κινήμασι". Similarly, it is more suitable to contrast "κατὰ δόξαν" with "κατὰ ἀκούσιον τῆς αἰσθήσεως πάθος" than with "κατ' ἀνάγκην". It is necessary to consider the reason for this more closely.

Sextus expresses how the Sceptic regards the involuntary affections of the senses quite clearly and indicates the merit of his position:-

ὡς μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος αἰσθητικῶς πάσχει,
μὴ προσδοξάζων δὲ ὅτι τοῦτο ὁ πάσχει
κακόν ἐστι φύσει, μετριοπαθεῖ. τὸ γὰρ
προσδοξάζειν τι τοιοῦτο χεῖρόν ἐστι καὶ
αὐτοῦ τοῦ πάσχειν, ὡς ἐνίοτε τοὺς μὲν
τεμνομένους ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτο πάσχοντας
φέρειν, τοὺς δὲ παρεστῶτας διὰ τὴν περὶ
τοῦ γινομένου δόξαν ὡς φαύλου λελποψυχεῖν.⁵²

The Sceptic, according to Sextus, uses the same method for attaining to μετριοπάθεια as he does for realizing ἀταραξία. It should also be noted that μετριοπάθεια and ἀταραξία are not two distinct ends which differ in kind. As regards both ends the Sceptic seeks freedom from disturbance and calm; in respect to the latter he is able to realize it perfectly while in respect to the former he is only able to realize it up to a certain point. He is able to realize a perfect calm so far

as regards his attitude towards involuntary affections goes by means of the Sceptical argument. However, the very nature of involuntary affections is that they are a source of perturbation regardless of how one views them. Thus, in so far as the Sceptic is able to determine and actively pursue an end his end is ἀταραξία ; but, in so far as the Sceptic is merely passive and is acted upon involuntarily he is forced to draw a compromise with his ideal and settle for μετριοπάθεια. It is worth noting in regard to this that in his chapter 'What Scepticism Is' Sextus only mentions ἀταραξία and omits mentioning μετριοπάθεια.⁵³ Indeed, in so far as Sextus is a Sceptic, and as such is free to determine for himself his own end, his end is ἀταραξία. Sextus regards himself as being forced, as if it were by Nature, to put up with μετριοπάθεια rather than ἀταραξία. Sextus regards this as the natural condition of human life which must simply be endured as such.

... (οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυὸς ἐστὶ παλαιφάτου,
οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης,
ἀλλ' ἀνδρῶν γένος ἦεν)...⁵⁴

Involuntary affections appear as a sort of residue which the Sceptic can only accept as given without saying or doing very much about. He is in the difficult position of having to admit that pain and hunger and so on are a source of perturbation and distress and yet he must suspend judgement as to whether they are good or bad by nature. Sextus quite openly states that the Sceptic guards himself as best he can

against perturbation caused by an involuntary affection of sense and he freely speaks of such perturbation as being an evil (κακος). The following passage merits quoting at this point:-

τί οὖν, φασίν, ὄφελος ὑμῖν, οἱ δογματικοί, πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἐκ τῆς ἐποχῆς, εἰ ταραττεσθαι πάντως δεῖ καὶ ταραττομένους κακοδαιμονεῖν; μέγα, φήσομεν, ὄφελος. καὶ γὰρ εἰ ταραττεται ὁ περὶ πάντων ἐτέχων κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀλγύνοντος παρουσίαν, ἀλλ' εὐφορώτερον παρὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν δογμάτων φέρει τὴν ὄχλησιν, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσον ἄπειρα τῷ πλήθει τὰγαθὰ διώκοντα καὶ περιστατάμενον τὰ κακὰ ὡς ὑπὸ Ἐρινύων ἐλαύνεσθαι τῶν κατὰ τὰς διώξεις καὶ φυγὰς ταραχῶν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν μὴ πάσχειν, ἐν δὲ μόνον ἐξ ἀπάντων ἀποτεμνόμενον κακὸν τοῦτου τὴν ἐκκλίσειν καὶ φυλακὴν πραγματεύεσθαι. δεῦτερον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὅπερ φεύγουσιν οἱ ἐφεκτικοὶ ὡς κακόν, οὐκ ἄγαν ἐστὶ ταρακτικόν.⁵⁵

The Sceptic, according to this, is in precisely the same position as the Dogmatist is in respect to involuntary affections except that the Sceptic does not suffer from perturbation caused by the conviction that they are bad by nature.

Sextus admits that such affections appear to him to be bad.⁵⁶ Although Sextus does not say that involuntary affections are bad by nature he does explicitly state that it is Nature who is to be blamed for their occurrence.

...οὐχ ἡμᾶς αἰτιῶσθαι δεῖ τοὺς ἀκουσίως
καὶ κατ' ἀνάγκην πάσχοντας, ἀλλὰ τὴν
φύσιν...⁵⁷

By saying that it is not due to himself that he experiences pain but due to nature Sextus is able to free himself of guilt but he is doing so at the cost of acknowledging something which he recognizes as being caused by nature and which he says is pain and is bad and undesirable. He does not deal with the epistemological problems that are implicit in his ethical treatises because they can be more appropriately dealt with in relation to the general problem regarding how the Sceptic treats the phenomena. To say that honey appears to me to be sweet and that I find sweetness a desirable taste is essentially the same as regards epistemological problems as saying that boiling water, for example, appears to me to be hot and painful to touch and that I find this painful sensation undesirable. In each case one is dealing with an involuntary affection or appearance which appears to be caused by some underlying object and there is a judgement made about what appears or the involuntary affection and not about the underlying cause. Although it is important to point out this problem in respect to Sextus' ethical position it is most appropriately considered when his views regarding appearances are examined.

The following conclusions may be drawn from what has been said. Sextus cautiously avoids dogmatically asserting that man is in a fallen state in so far as he is condemned to suffer

through all sorts of involuntary affections which are due to his very nature and the nature of the finite world. He avoids saying that by suspending judgement as to whether what clearly appears to him to be bad and to be avoided whenever possible is bad and undesirable by nature. Sextus goes so far as to say that man is not to be blamed (αὐτιᾶσθαί) for suffering the affections he suffers but that Nature is to be blamed. The very notion that someone or something is to be blamed suggests that whatever or whoever is responsible for man's suffering affections is guilty of wrong doing. Sextus comes very close to taking a dogmatic position.

I have argued that Sextus is on safer grounds in maintaining the purity of Scepticism when he says that man suffers involuntarily (ἀκουσίως) than when he says that man suffers according to necessity (κατ' ἀνάγκην). The notion that man suffers affections according to necessity is suggestive of a dogmatic view of the nature of man and of the nature of the world -- that man is externally governed by some objective force or whatever. However, merely to say that man involuntarily suffers certain affections does not so obviously indicate that implication since one is only commenting on one's immediate relation to the affections (i.e. that I did not voluntarily cause myself to be affected in this way). The Sceptic would suspend judgement as to whether he was affected according to necessity or accident or whatever.

I have further argued that Sextus does not use the phrase κατ' ἀνάγκην to mean 'according to natural and/or logical

necessity' but simply to indicate that certain things affect one 'which are not contingent upon one's willing or opining them' (i.e. certain things affect one 'involuntarily').

Sextus does not draw any distinction between saying that 'one is affected κατ' ἀνάγκην' and saying that 'one is affected ακουσιώς'. However, the phrase 'κατ' ἀνάγκην' can easily be understood to imply more than what Sextus intended it to. Sextus comes very close to asserting that man's life is governed by natural necessity in respect to involuntary affections and that he must endure what is bad and undesirable by nature in this respect.

CHAPTER SIX

(i)

The Sceptical Attitude towards Pursuit and Avoidance in Respect to Daily Life

The problem that arises is that if the Sceptic, as regards matters of opinion, neither deems anything more desirable than anything else nor pursues or avoids anything then he will be reduced to leading the life of a vegetable. Is not the practical consequence of Sextus' position as thus far expounded that the Sceptic will either have to be inactive (ἀνενεργησία) or, if he should act, inconsistent (ἀπέμφασις)? Sextus formulates the problem as follows:-

...εἰς ἀνενεργησίαν μὲν ὅτι τοῦ βίου παντὸς ἐν αἰρέσει καὶ φυγαῖς ὄντος ὁ μήτε αἰρούμενός τι μήτε φεύγων δυνάμει τὸν βίον ἀρνεῖται καὶ τινος φυτοῦ τρόπον ἐπέχειν, εἰς ἀπέμφασιν δὲ ὅτι ὑπὸ τυράνῳ ποτὲ γεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἀρρήτων τι ποιεῖν ἀναγκαζόμενος ἢ οὐχ ὑπομενεῖ τὸ προσταπτόμενον ἀλλ' ἐκούσιον ἐλείπεται θάνατον, ἢ φεύγων τὰς βασάνους ποιήσει τὸ κελευόμενον, οὕτω τε οὐκέτι "ἀφυγῆς καὶ ἀναίρετος ἔσται" κατὰ τὸν Τίμωννα, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἐλείπεται τοῦ δ' ἀποστήσεται, ὅπερ ἦν τῶν μετὰ πείσματος κατεληφότων τὸ φευκτόν τι εἶναι καὶ αἰρετόν. '

Sextus replies to this by saying that those who make such a criticism do not understand that the Sceptic is capable of desiring some things and avoiding others according to a non-philosophical criterion (κατὰ τὴν ἀφιλόσοφον τήρησιν).² He concedes the point that the Sceptic is inactive as regards conducting his life according to philosophical theory (κατὰ τὸν φιλόσοφον λόγον). Before going on to consider what Sextus means by this it would be useful to show how the above quoted criticism applies to Sextus' position in a way which he does not explicitly discuss and in a way which brings out the spirit of Scepticism.

Sextus depicts the Sceptic's notion of a perfect and ideal state of soul as being a state in which nothing is longed for and nothing is possessed which is deemed desirable or necessary to that perfect state of the soul. It may not be true to the letter of Pyrrhonism to speak of a 'perfect and ideal state of the soul' though it is true to its spirit. Sextus, in fact, does frequently use such expressions as "τὴν τελείαν καὶ σκεπτικὴν ... διάθεσιν".³ The peculiar nature of the highest Sceptical end or notion of the perfect state of the soul is its pure negativity. The Sceptic is calm and free from disturbance precisely because he suffers through nothing and is affected by nothing as regards matters of opinion since he views all moral and ontological determinations as if they were nothing. Upon suspending judgement the Sceptic finds he is neither opposed to the doctrine or principle which was in question nor is he affirmatively bound by

it; rather it ceases to be an object of concern to him. He is left at rest with himself in the purely negative calm of the uniformity of self with self. This is the ideal that Sextus holds up.

It has already been noted that his ideal state is only possible as regards matters of opinion and will. He is forced, as it were, by Nature to suffer affections. When Sextus says that certain affections are bad he means little more than that they are painful which he is forced to admit. The Sceptic becomes involved in the activity of avoiding painful things not by choice or out of a desire for what he affirmatively values as good but in order to free himself from what is undeniably bad (i.e. painful). Although Sextus speaks at considerable length about the avoidance of what is painful he does not portray the Sceptic as actively pursuing pleasure. Indeed, it has already been noted that he says that the love of pleasure leads to a certain depraved condition. The Sceptical ethic is to avoid affections whenever possible and to bravely accept whatever affections involuntarily befall one ("τὸ... κατ' ἀνάγκην συμβαίνον γεννικῶς δεχόμενος").⁴

The Sceptic, as depicted by Sextus, is forced to make certain choices.⁵ The measure by which he makes his choice is more accurately expressed by saying that he finds certain things less undesirable than others rather than by saying that he considers certain things positively desirable and others undesirable. That this is undoubtedly the case is

proven by the fact that Sextus regards ἀταραξία as the perfect state of the soul and only involuntarily steps down from his calm to take part in the activity of finite life and experience. It would not, therefore, be too extreme an assertion to say that the Sceptic would not involve himself in the activity of pursuit and avoidance at all if it was not unavoidable. However, since "...he is not sprung from a rock or an oak primeval but of the race of men..." he must accept his fate and act with as much detachment as possible.⁶ Life itself, in so far as it constantly involves decision making and the active pursuit of ends, does not allow the Sceptic to maintain his standpoint of ἐποχή and ἀταραξία in its simplicity and purity and thus is, in a way, contrary to the spirit of Pyrrhonism.⁷

The fact is that the Sceptic cannot reject life and act consistently. To do so would mean that he would make a dogmatic judgement that life itself is bad and either commit suicide or fall into some form of dogmatic cynicism. Equally, the Sceptic cannot assert that life itself or any particular way of conducting life is good by nature and act accordingly without falling prey to one kind of dogmatism or another. Rather, the Sceptic must accept his fate that he is human and all that this entails as involuntarily given and conduct his life undogmatically.

As regards matters of opinion, the Sceptic seeks suspension of judgement which leads to a complete freedom from any involvement in the theoretical activity of philosophy; as

regards the unavoidable activity of living the Sceptic seeks a detached involvement. He is involved in living whether he likes it or not but he is able to limit his involvement to what is practically necessary.

(ii)

Fourfold Rules of Conduct

In the following passage Sextus summarily indicates the fourfold criterion that the Sceptic follows in conducting his life:-

Τοῖς φαινομένοις οὖν προσέχοντες κατὰ τὴν βιωτικὴν τήρησιν ἀδοξάστως βιοῦμεν, ἐπεὶ μὴ δυνάμεθα ἀνεέργητοι παντάπασιν εἶναι. ἔοικε δὲ αὕτη ἡ βιωτικὴ τήρησις τετραμερῆς εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὲν τι ἔχειν ἐν ὑψηλήσει φύσεως, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἀνάγκῃ παθῶν, τὸ δὲ ἐν παραδόσει νόμων τε καὶ ἐθῶν, τὸ δὲ ἐν διδασκαλίᾳ τεχνῶν, ὑψηλήσει μὲν φυσικῇ καθ' ἣν φυσικῶς αἰσθητικοὶ καὶ νοητικοὶ ἐσμεν, παθῶν δὲ ἀνάγκῃ καθ' ἣν λιμὸς μὲν ἐπὶ τροφήν ἡμᾶς ὀδηγεῖ δίψος δ' ἐπὶ πόμα, ἐθῶν δὲ καὶ νόμων παραδόσει καθ' ἣν τὸ μὲν εὐσεβεῖν παραλαμβάνομεν βιωτικῶς ὡς ἀγαθὸν τὸ δὲ ἀσεβεῖν ὡς φαῦλον, τεχνῶν δὲ διδασκαλίᾳ καθ' ἣν οὐκ ἀνεέργητοὶ ἐσμεν ἐν αἷς παραλαμβάνομεν τέχνας.⁸

This passage illustrates Sextus' chronicler-like undogmatic method of exposition which is congruous with his position. He merely reports on how the Sceptic actually lives without suggesting that this is how man ought to live.

The reason Sextus gives for the Sceptic's having to have a criterion (...*ἐπεὶ μὴ δυνάμεθα ἀνεέργητοι παντάπασιν εἶναι*...) indicates the sort of involvement he considers the Sceptic has in the affairs of daily life.⁹

Although Sextus is able to defend Pyrrhonism against the charge that its adherents would have to be totally inactive to be consistent with its basic principles he would not wish to argue that the Sceptic would freely choose to participate in affairs which necessitate the active pursuit of ends and in decision making if he could choose to remain inactive in the perfect calm of ἀταραξία.

Of the four guides which the Sceptic follows the most difficult to define on the bases of what Sextus says is the one which lies in the guidance of nature ("έν ύφηγήσει φύσεως").¹⁰ Sextus' definition of the guidance of nature ("ύφηγήσει μὲν φυσικῇ καθ' ἣν φυσικῶς αἰσθητικοὶ καὶ νοητικοὶ ἔσμεν") is so general that it is not readily clear what role the natural faculties play in the regulation of life.¹¹ It would seem very reasonable to suppose that what Sextus means by the natural capacity of sense and thought is to be found in his discussions on how the Sceptic regards the phenomena and associative signs.

The Sceptical 'doctrine' on the phenomena and on associative signs is most appropriately considered in the context of the Sceptical views on the non philosophical guidance of life. The reason for this is that one gets a very distorted view of Sextus' position if one considers these matters in isolation as if he maintained an 'epistemological theory' for its own sake rather than because it is necessary to have some sort of guide to enable one to carry on in the affairs of daily life.¹²

It is only possible to give an accurate account of Sextus'

teaching concerning the phenomena by taking into consideration what he said about the nature of cognition generally. It is questionable whether Sextus can be said to have 'an epistemological position'. However, it is necessary to take account of the various texts in which he made definite, or at least, suggestive statements concerning the nature of cognition. The following question is of particular importance. Are the statements which Sextus makes about such matters as the origin of ideas, the epistemological status of the phenomena and so on consistent with his position as a Sceptic? Is Sextus accurately described as an empiricist? a phenomenalist? a pragmatist? a positivist?¹³

(iii)

Guidance in the Natural Faculties
and in Constraining Affections

a) Sensation and Perception¹⁴

Sextus makes the following assertions as part of an argument intended to discredit the views of Democritus and Plato who he says rejected the senses and abolished the sensibles:-

πᾶσα γὰρ νόησις ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεως γίνεται
ἢ οὐ χωρὶς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἢ ἀπὸ
περιπτώσεως ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ περιπτώσεως.¹⁵

πάσης οὖν ἐπινοίας προηγείσθαι δεῖ τὴν
διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως περίπτωσιν, καὶ διὰ
τοῦτ' ἀναιρουμένων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐξ
ἀνάγκης συναναλεῖται πᾶσα νόησις.¹⁶

On another occasion Sextus takes the same position as indicated above:-

παντὸς γοῦν πράγματος αἰσθητοῦ ἢ
νοητοῦ γίνεται κατάληψις ἢτοι κατὰ
ἐνάργειαν περιπτωτικῶς ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ
τῶν περιπτωτικῶς πεφηνότων ἀναλογ-
ιστικὴν μετάβασιν, καὶ ταύτην ἢτοι
ὁμοιωτικὴν, ... ἢ συνθετικὴν, ... ἢ
κατὰ ἀναλογίαν, ...¹⁷

Again in M.vii 293-294 he repeats the position he took in M.viii 56 to 61 and in M. xi 250-251 almost word for word. In M.viii 356 Sextus writes:-

...εἰ πᾶν νοητὸν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχει καὶ
πηγὴν τῆς βεβαιώσεως ἐξ αἰσθήσεως, ...¹⁸

Here Sextus is cautious to say "if...". This might be taken to indicate that Sextus has reservations about the view that all ideas have their source in experience and derive their confirmation from sensation. However, this does not appear to be the case. Probably 'εἰ' in the above passage means 'since it is the case...'.

Sextus never assumes the truth of the theory of innate ideas in order to overthrow another position. Quite consistently with the notion that all concepts are derived from sense experience, or not apart from it, he argues that the geometrical concept of length without breadth is inconceivable (ἀνεπινοήτων).¹⁹ The examples Sextus gives to illustrate the relation of ideas or concepts (ἐπίνοια, νόησις) to sense experience are all concerned with physical or empirical objects (i.e. honey, Socrates, Cyclops). The evidence strongly suggests that Sextus identifies conceiving of something with forming an image of it. Concepts are formed either through sense experience or by way of inference from sense experience. A concept is a concept of something or an image of something.²⁰ Sextus' polemic with the Dogmatists frequently takes the form of his arguing that the Dogmatists have no way of knowing whether their concepts correspond with external underlying objects. That is to say, they have no way of knowing whether their image accurately represents what really is externally and independently of anyone perceiving it.²¹

One might summarize what has already been said thus far as follows. Sextus, it seems, assumes that the material of

knowing is present on its own account as a ready-made world quite apart from thought. Thinking on its own is without any content. Through sense experience thinking, which is merely an empty indeterminate form, derives its content from the external realm of what really is. Truth consists in the agreement of my thought with what externally and really is. This agreement comes about by my thinking conforming to and accurately imaging what is externally the case. Sextus, of course, as a Sceptic, doubts whether the external underlying object is ever imaged accurately or whether one can know with certainty that one has imaged it accurately even if one actually has. Sextus makes many remarks which suggest more precisely what his views on cognition are.

The senses, in suffering an affection, are purely passive. They are acted upon by something external to them.

αἰσθητὰ γὰρ πάσχουσι μόνον καὶ κηροῦ
τρόπον τυποῦνται, ἄλλο δ' ἴσασιν οὐδέ
ἐν, ἐπεὶ τα εἰάν ζήτησίν τινος αὐταῖς
γείμωμεν, οὐκέτ' ἄλογοι γενήσονται ἀλλὰ
λογικαὶ καὶ διανοίας ἔχουσαι φύσιν.
ὅπερ οὐχ οὕτως εἶχεν.²²

We cannot doubt the fact that we are suffering an affection because the affection itself leads us to assent involuntarily ("ἀβουλήτως ἡμᾶς ἄγοντα εἰς συγκατάθεσιν ") to its being present to us.²³ Sense impressions (αἰσθητὰ, φάντασμα) are simply given in experience.

To have a sensation or sense impression of white, for example, is "to be moved in a whitish way" (κινεῖσθαι

λευκαντικῶς). This does not by itself involve the perception of anything. In suffering an affection one is simply in a certain immediate state.²⁴ The senses are ἄλογοι and thus do not make any connection between themselves as being affected in such and such a way and some external object so as to be able to apprehend that 'this is white'.²⁵ Furthermore, the senses in being moved are not able to recognize themselves as being moved since this would require them to be active and to have a λογικὴ δύναμις.²⁶

It is only at the level of sensation that one may be said to actually have an experience of, or contact with, (περίπτωσις) the external. The mind (διανοία, νόησις) is only able to contemplate what is given in sensation.²⁷

Each sense is limited to being affected in its own particular way.²⁸ Thus, since the object of perception is somehow a unified whole and not simply colour or sound or odour the particular senses cannot apprehend a concrete or physical object. Nor, of course, can the senses grasp incorporeal objects.

Sextus uses the same word (αἴσθησις) for perception as he does for sensation. There is no other Attic term available which might be used to indicate the distinction we make in by using the words 'sensation' and 'perception'. However, for the sake of clarity, it would be useful here to limit the reference of the word 'sensation' to what the particular senses experience. Perception involves the putting together of something with something (τὸ συντιθέναι τι μετὰ τίνος).

The capacity to do this is a rational capacity (λογικὴ δύναμις). The λογικὴ δύναμις is able to unite the data given by the particular senses into one object and to relate a particular sensation to a concrete object.²⁹ Thus, at the level of perception, one is able to perceive that 'this page is white'.

What is being indicated by 'this page' in the statement 'this page is white'? The senses, according to Sextus, do not grasp the external object.

οὐ γὰρ δι' ἑαυτῆς ἐπιβάλλει τοῖς ἔκτος
καὶ φαντασιούται ἢ διάνοια, ὡς φασίν,
ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, αἱ δὲ αἰσθήσεις
τὰ μὲν ἔκτος ὑποκείμενα οὐ καταλαμβάνουσι,
μόνα δέ, εἰ ἄρα, τὰ ἑαυτῶν πάθη.³⁰

The mind, therefore, does not have before it an externally existing page but only the image that has been formed of the page by the λογικὴ δύναμις from sense affections which are in turn different from the external object. Sextus illustrates this as follows:-

ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἀγνοῶν μὲν Σωκράτην εἰκόνα
δὲ τούτου θεασάμενος οὐκ οἶδεν εἰ ὅμοιά
ἐστὶν ἢ εἰκὼν τῷ Σωκράτει, οὕτω καὶ ἡ
διάνοια τὰ μὲν πάθη τῶν αἰσθήσεων
ἐποπτεύουσα τὰ δὲ ἔκτος μὴ θεωροῦσα
οὐδὲ εἰ ὅμοιά ἐστὶ τὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων
πάθη τοῖς ἔκτος ὑποκειμένοις εἴσεται.
οὐδὲ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν ἄρα δυνήσεται ταῦτα
κρίνειν κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν.³¹

'This page' in the statement 'this page is white' cannot be referring to the externally existing page according to Sextus' analysis.

In M. vii 346 Sextus says that there is a need of combination (σύνθεσις) and of memory (μνήμης) for the perception of such objects as man, plant and the like to be possible.³² He does not explain what function memory has in perception beyond the assertion that it serves a necessary function. One might reasonably conjecture that Sextus regards memory as necessary in order to account for the fact that the united whole put together by the λογικὴ δύναμις is recognized as belonging to a general class (i.e. is recognized as being a plant, a man, or whatever). If this interpretation is correct then the image I form of this particular page before me is recognized with the aid of memory to correspond in some way to previous images which I have formed which I collectively call as a class 'page'. In saying 'this is a page', it follows from what has been said, I am really saying 'this image or appearance I am experiencing now I designate 'a page'', because it shares certain basic characteristics with images I can recall which I have come to call collectively 'pages'. Thus, when I say 'this page is white' I must not assume that the external page is white; however, I can assent to the fact that this image which I call page appears to me to be white. It is clear from what has been said thus far that, according to Sextus, the only guide that the natural faculties provide is the phenomena -- what appears.

When the ten tropes of Aenesidemus are considered it will be seen that Sextus argues that different people and the same person under different conditions or at different times are

affected differently by what is apparently the same object.³³
 The guide which the phenomena provide, therefore, must be further restricted to mean -- what appears to me at this moment.

b) The Phenomena

The phenomena are identified by Sextus with sense impressions which are in turn understood as merely being the feelings and affections which one suffers through the senses.

κριτήριον τοίνυν φαμέν εἶναι τῆς
 σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς τὸ φαινόμενον, δυνάμει
 τὴν φαντασίαν αὐτοῦ οὕτω καλοῦντες· ἐν
 τείσει γὰρ καὶ ἀβουλήτῳ πάθει κειμένη
 ἀζήτητός ἐστιν. ³⁴

However, Sextus also uses the term phenomena (φαινόμενα), as has been noted earlier, in a more unrestricted sense to include what appears to him to be the case at the time he is speaking whether it be his opinion regarding the credibility of an argument or whatever.³⁵ In the latter sense the term phenomena is used by Sextus merely to denote that he claims no certainty, truth, validity or objective existence for the assertion he is making. It is necessary now to consider more closely what Sextus means by saying that the phenomena are the Sceptical criterion.

The phenomena do not provide for Sextus an epistemological criterion -- a criterion of truth, validity, certainty or existence. They do not even provide a basis for determining what is probable or reasonable. Sextus distinguishes the

Pyrrhonian standpoint from that of Carneades because he distinguished between probable (πιθανή) and improbable (ἀπίθανος) impressions and from that of Arcesilaus because he maintained a rule of 'the reasonable' (εὐλόγος).³⁶ These criteria share with the Pyrrhonian criterion the fact that their application is limited to the practical guidance of life. However, they differ from the Pyrrhonian criterion in that they are epistemological criteria.³⁷ Carneades' criterion is essentially a means by which one can check to see whether a sense impression accurately represents what is externally and objectively the object. Although he does not claim that one can know with absolute certainty that what appears to one actually is such as it appears he does maintain that one can reach a degree of certainty whereby nothing is capable of controverting one's conviction that a presentation is trustworthy. Arcesilaus' criterion of the reasonable (εὐλόγος) is a criterion by which one can make value judgements. He asserts that 'that which is done rightly' (κατόρθωσα) is that which it is reasonable (εὐλόγος) to do. Arcesilaus' criterion provides a standard by which to distinguish what is right from what is wrong. Arcesilaus, according to Sextus, makes statements of fact (πρὸς τὴν φύσιν) such as that suspension of judgement in itself is good while assent is bad.³⁸ Sextus rejected the criteria of the probable and of the reasonable because of their dogmatic nature. Sextus writes:-

Εἰ δὲ καὶ πείθεσθαι τισιν οἷ τε ἀπὸ τῆς
Ἀκαδημίας καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως

λέγουσι, πρόδηλος καὶ ἢ κατὰ τοῦτο
 διαφορὰ τῶν φιλοσοφιῶν. τὸ γὰρ πείθεσθαι
 λέγεται διαφόρως, τό τε μὴ ἀντιτείνειν
 ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς ἔπεισθαι ἄνευ σφοδρᾶς
 προσκλίσεως καὶ προσπάθειας, ... ἅπαξ
 δὲ τὸ μετὰ αἰρέσεως καὶ οἰονεὶ συμπα-
 θείας κατὰ τὸ σφόδρα βούλεσθαι
 συγκατατίθεσθαι τι, ...³⁹

The Sceptic regards the phenomena with complete neutral-
 ity.⁴⁰ Sextus does not even regard the phenomena as providing
 a criterion of subjective truth or good. The Cyrenaics
 positively affirmed pleasure to be their end.⁴¹ The Sceptic's
 end is quietude. The Cyrenaics, like the Sceptics, asserted
 that only involuntary affections could be grasped.⁴² However,
 the Cyrenaics went a step further than the Sceptics did by
 identifying pleasant affections with goods and painful af-
 fections with evils.⁴³ That is, the Cyrenaics regarded in-
 voluntary affections as being more than merely immediate
 sensations. According to the Cyrenaic position, when one is
 having a pleasant sensation one is thereby experiencing what
 is good for one. Thus phenomena themselves, in so far as they
 involve pleasant, painful, and indifferent sensations, are
 regarded as providing a criterion for determining what is
 good, bad and indifferent.⁴⁴ In contrast to this view the
 Sceptic seeks quietude which comes about more through the
 cessation of involuntary affections than through their pres-
 ence. The Sceptic only speaks of an affection as being bad
 in the sense that it causes perturbation and not in the sense
 that the affection is in itself bad. Sextus does not speak

of any affections as being good whether pleasant or indifferent. His suspensive attitude towards the phenomena is indicated by the fact that in respect to irrational and sensible affections he tries to preserve a due mean which might otherwise be expressed by saying that he tries to maintain a state of neutrality.⁴⁵ The Sceptic does not find his end revealed to him in the phenomena, nor does he find that the phenomena provide him with a criterion by which he can realize his end. He realizes his end through the suspension of judgement even as regards involuntary affections.⁴⁶ Sextus makes the following remark concerning the difference between the Sceptical position and that of the Cyrenaics:-

διαφέρει δέ αὐτῆς, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνη μὲν
τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὴν λείαν τῆς σαρκὸς
κίνησιν τέλος εἶναι λέγει, ἡμεῖς δὲ
τὴν ἀταραξίαν, ἣ ἐναντιοῦται τὸ κατ'
ἐκείνους τέλος· καὶ γὰρ παρούσης τῆς
ἡδονῆς καὶ μὴ παρούσης ταραχὰς
ὑπομένει ὁ διαβεβαλούμενος τέλος
εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ...⁴⁷

Sextus dismissed the opinion of the many (τὴν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς δόξαν) or 'that which convinces the many' (τὸ πολλοῖς περὶθον) both as a criterion of truth and as a guide in the conduct of life.

As regards the latter Sextus makes the following comment when characterizing the superior character of the Pyrrhonian:—

οὐ γὰρ τῷ πεπαιδευομένῳ καὶ πολυτε-
ρότεροι παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ὑπάρχειν

φιλοσόφους ἔτι καὶ ἀδιαφόρως ἔχουσι
πρὸς τὴν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς δόξαν. ⁴⁸

This is an important passage because it clearly shows that the Pyrrhoneans did not regard themselves as being the proponents of the common people's dogmatism against the arrogance of the Dogmatists. It has already been noted that in M. xi, the chapter concerned with the causes of perturbation, Sextus devotes a large part of his polemic to attacking the commonly held values such as money, fame, pleasure and so on. He then says that one would not gain assistance by taking the road of Dogmatic philosophy. Sextus and Pyrrho regarded Homer with special fondness because they found in his works an expression of the nullity of human aspirations and vanity.⁴⁹ Homer, in recognizing the futility and vanity of human aspirations, therein transcended it himself and represented for Pyrrho and Sextus a truly cultured and wise man. The Pyrrhonean, one might say, while actively taking part in the political and social life of his community differs from his fellow members of that community in that he sees the futility in all that he does whereas they positively believe in the ends they pursue and the means by which they attempt to realize them. The superiority in culture and breadth of experience that Sextus deems the Pyrrhoneans to have consists in their recognition of the rashness and vanity of the opinion of the Dogmatic philosophers and of the masses and not in the Pyrrhoneans' having any special claim on truth.

Sextus rejects the opinion of the majority as a criterion

of truth on several occasions. The most instructive passage, in respect to the present matter under consideration, occurs at M. viii 53 where Sextus rejects 'that which convinces many' as a criterion of truth even in respect to trying to use the phenomena in order to establish subjective truth -- that 'x' appears as 'y'.

...τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ πιθανόν ἐστὶν ἀληθές.
 ἔκτος εἰ μὴ τι τὸ πολλοὺς πείθον, τοῦτ'
 ἐροῦμεν ἀληθές· τὸ γοῦν μέλι πολλοὺς
 μὲν πείθον ὑγιαίνοντας ὡς γλυκύ, καὶ
 ἓνα μὴ πείθον ἰκτερικόν, ἀληθῶς λέγομεν
 γλυκύ. ὅπερ ἦν ληρώδες. ὅταν γὰρ περὶ
 ἀληθείας σκεπτώμεθα, τότε οὐκ εἰς τὸ
 πλῆθος τῶν συμφωνούντων δεῖ ἀποβλέπειν
 ἀλλ' εἰς τὰς διαθέσεις. μιᾷ δὲ διαθέσει
 κέχρηται ὁ νοσῶν καὶ μιᾷ κατασκευῇ
 πάντες οἱ ὑγιαίνοντες. οὐ μᾶλλον οὖν
 τῆδε τῇ διαθέσει ἢ τῆδε πιστευτέον
 ἐστίν, ...⁵⁰

Truth, for Sextus, consists in the agreement of a proposition with the underlying external object and in the apprehension of that in a way that can be known with certainty and seen to be known. Phenomena taken by themselves, according to this view, cannot be spoken of as either being true or false. They are simply manifestations. Thus it does not even occur to Sextus to regard his certainty that appearances appear as being or providing any bases upon which to speak of truth or falsity. Sextus never speaks as a phenomenalist because he always has before him the real and existent on one side and the phenomena on the other and truth as being their

agreement. Since it is not possible ever to stand in between what is and what appears and to see whether or not they are identical it is necessary to suspend judgement. Although Sextus says many things which are suggestive of many doctrines, he is, seen in his proper perspective, at all times a Sceptic.

Sextus' statement that the Sceptic does not abolish the phenomena must be accurately interpreted. He writes:-

Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες ὅτι ἀναιροῦσι τὰ φαινόμενα
οἱ σκεπτικοὶ ἀνηκοοὶ μοι δοκοῦσιν
εἶναι τῶν παρ' ἡμῶν λεγομένων· τὰ γὰρ
κατὰ φαντασίαν παθητικὴν ἀβουλήτως
ἡμᾶς ἄγοντα εἰς συγκατάθεσιν οὐκ ἀνατρέπομεν...⁵¹

All Sextus is saying here is that they do not deny that appearances appear. He underlines this by saying that what they question is the account given of the phenomena. The fact that the Sceptics were accused of abolishing the phenomena speaks against any interpretation which would describe them as being 'phenomenalists'.

In declaring a phenomenon a phenomenon one is declaring the nothingness of it -- that it is a manifestation, given, an effect, nothing in itself. One is acknowledging that it is a manifestation of something. Sextus grants that the underlying object appears and that it appears to him. He recognizes the fact that what appears to him is as much conditioned by his perceiving it as it is by the underlying object. When he says that honey appears now sweet, now bitter, and so on he is declaring that what is one and identical with

itself appears to us in differing and conflicting manifestations. He writes:-

αἱ γοῦν αἰσθήσεις ὑπεναντίας κινούνται
 ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκτός, οἷον ἡ γεῦσις ὑπὸ τοῦ
 αὐτοῦ μέλιτος ὅτε μὲν πικράζεται ὅτε
 δὲ γλυκάζεται, καὶ ἡ ὄρασις τὸ αὐτὸ
 χρῶμα ὅτε μὲν αἰματώδην ὅτε δὲ λευκὸν
 εἶναι <δοκεῖ>... πότερον οὖν πάσας
 τὰς φαντασίας ἀληθεῖς εἶναι φήσεται,
 ἢ τάσδε μὲν ἀληθεῖς τάσδε δὲ ψευδεῖς,
 ἢ καὶ ψευδεῖς ἀπάσας, εἰπεῖν ἀμήχανον...⁵²

In what sense then does Sextus speak of the phenomena as providing the Sceptic with a criterion? Sextus says that the word criterion (κριτήριον) is used in two senses. The Sceptic does not have a criterion in the first sense --

"...τό ...εἰς πίστιν ὑπάρξεως ἢ ἀνυπαρξίας λαμβανόμενον..."⁵³

He says that they do have a criterion in the second sense --

"...τὸ ...τοῦ πράσσειν, ᾧ προσέχοντες κατὰ τὸν βίον τὰ μὲν
 πρᾶσσομεν τὰ δ' οὐ ...".⁵⁴ The phenomena, of course, provide the Sceptic with such a criterion.

The phenomena appear involuntarily (ἀβουλήτως and ἀζήτητως) unlike any determinations regarding what is good or probable or reasonable.⁵⁵ The phenomena are simply given in experience. Thus the Sceptic does not have to make any determinations or assent to anything which would require an act of judgement. He assents to the self evident fact that what appears appears. Apart from this immediate certainty the Sceptic determines nothing; he does not even determine that the phenomena appear since he is purely passive in respect to

its appearing, apart from affirming the fact that he is being affected.

The Sceptic, according to Sextus, follows the phenomena as a guide in conducting his life in the sense of simply yielding to them without any consent as regards their validity or being or truth. The Sceptic simply yields to the dictates of the phenomena without giving any assent ("...κατὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς εἶκειν ἄνευ προσταθείας ").⁵⁶

The way in which the Sceptic is guided by constraining affections in practice has been discussed in the section on matters κατ' ἀνάγκην.⁵⁷ It is difficult to go into greater detail because Sextus does little more than indicate that the Sceptic seeks moderation in respect to constraining affections and therefore avoids what appears to him to cause him perturbation which are such things as cause pain or excessive pleasure.

The guidance which the Sceptic receives from constraining passions would be limited to that whereby hunger drives one to food, exhaustion to sleep, thirst to water, sexual drives to mating, loneliness to seeking companionship, being cold to the acquisition of clothes and shelter and so on. In general, one might say, one is guided by the constraint of the passions to take care of the needs of natural necessity. Both the natural faculties and a training in the practical arts would enter in here as providing the means whereby the desired ends of the passions can be realized.

The natural faculties would provide a guide in daily life

by determining what to pursue and avoid on the bases of what is given in the phenomena. The Sceptic would treat what appears to him to be such and such a thing as if it really were that thing. Thus he would go about the daily affairs in life in much the same way as would any ordinary person or any Stoic or Platonist or Epicurean or whoever. That is simply to say he goes from place to place despite the fact he suspends judgement as to whether motion exists and treats honey as though it were really sweet and generally is guided by the phenomena. It is incorrect to speak of Sextus as, on the one hand, being a Sceptic, while, on the other hand, being a phenomenalist or empiricist or a pragmatist.⁵⁸

Sextus merely yields to what appears to him as if it really were the case in order that he may not be altogether inactive (ἐπει μὴ δυνάμεθα ἀνεέργηται παντάπασιν εἶναι).⁵⁹ He is guided by what seems practical in a given situation and what experience has taught him to be the case not because he positively believes in the practical or in induction or whatever but simply because the activity of living involves decision making which in turn requires that he yield to some criterion by which to make the decisions. Sextus, as has already been made clear, is quick to point out that he does not conduct himself according to philosophical theory. Sextus would be no more willing to assent to the truth of the criterion of the practical or empirical or of the phenomena than he would be to assent to the truth of a criterion of guidance on the ancestral laws and customs of his country.

The Sceptic follows what appears to him in a much wider sense than merely following what lies in feeling and involuntary affection ("ἐν τεισέει ... καὶ αβουλητῷ πάθει").⁶⁰ The most striking example of this is the fact that the Sceptic suspends judgement when confronted by an assertion because it appears to him that its contrary is equally credible. The Sceptic would have to follow what appears to him to be the case in his daily life in a way which does not strictly conform to his definition of the phenomena. For example, he would have to vote since he follows the traditions of his country. By what criterion would the Sceptic determine which candidate to vote for? Sextus, no doubt, would answer that he would undogmatically follow the dictates of his culture and habits in so far as they were of use and what seemed to him to be best at the time. He would not make any claim that he would choose rightly. If Sextus was charged with making his decision arbitrarily he would reply that he never claimed that his decision was not arbitrary and that it is precisely in not making such a claim that he differs from the Dogmatists, the defenders of common sense, the empiricists, and the conservatives. He would merely claim that his decision was based upon what seemed to him at the time to be best and not upon what he would assert as in fact to be the best, or, as probably best, or, as what the evidence indicated was best, or, as what was pragmatically best. Sextus would suspend judgement as to what in reality the evidence indicated, or what in reality was the most practical

choice or whether such a criterion as that which the empiricist or pragmatist or whoever would use is in fact the true criterion for making the choice.

c) Signs

Sextus does not propound his own theory of signs. Rather in outlining the Stoic theory of signs he indicates that the Sceptics do not reject one kind of signs (commemorative signs) which the Stoics mention while they do reject another kind (indicative or probative signs).

The Stoics, according to Sextus, distinguished between what is immediately evident or apprehended (πρόδηλον ἐναργές) and what is non-evident (ἄδηλον).⁶¹ This distinction might be more accurately expressed as being between what is immediately in full view of the perceiver and what is not immediately in full view of the perceiver. What is πρόδηλον or ἐναργές is simply what is immediately apprehended or that which comes to be known through itself (τὰ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν εἰς γνῶσιν ἡμῖν ἐρχόμενα).⁶² It is somewhat misleading to translate the words πρόδηλον and ἐναργές by the word 'evident' or 'pre-evident'. For an object to be deemed πρόδηλον or ἐναργές it must be of such a nature as to come to be known through itself and it must also be physically in full view of the perceiver so as to be actually perceived. Although the Greek word 'πρόδηλον' may be literally rendered 'pre-evident' it does not have this meaning in the context of the Stoic theory of signs since it denotes

what is immediately evident and not what is clear before hand. The term 'pre-evident' may be taken as being an accurate rendering if it is taken to mean 'clear before syllogistic proof or alteration in external circumstances takes place'. In the present discussion πρόδηλον and έναργές will be translated as 'immediately evident' and ἄδηλον as 'non-evident'.

The non-evident was divided into three distinctive classes.⁶³ Firstly, there are things which are altogether (καθάπαξ) non-evident. Sextus cites as an example of this class the question of whether the stars are even or odd in number.⁶⁴ Secondly, there are those things which are occasionally (πρὸς καιρὸν) non-evident which are rendered non-evident due to external circumstances. He cites as an example of this class the fact that Athens is non-evident to him at the time that he is lecturing because he is separated from Athens in space.⁶⁵ Thirdly, there is the class of objects which are non-evident by nature (φύσει) which are of such a nature as to never fall within our perception of themselves but which may be thought to be apprehensible through another thing. For example, intelligible pores (οἱ νοητοὶ πόροι) are inapprehensible of themselves but their existence is said by some to be indicated by the fact that the human body perspires.⁶⁶

The sign (σημεῖον) is that which is itself immediately evident (πρόδηλον) and which indicates or suggests what is non-evident either by nature or temporarily.⁶⁷ What is altogether non-evident cannot be said to have a sign since it is

inapprehensible.⁶⁸ What is immediately evident, of course, does not require a sign.⁶⁹ The sign which reveals what is temporarily or occasionally (πρὸς καιρὸν) non-evident is called 'τὸ ὑπομνητικὸν σημεῖον' and the sign which reveals what is naturally (φύσει) non-evident is called 'τὸ ἐνδεικτικὸν σημεῖον'.⁷⁰

d) Probative Signs

It may be more accurate to translate 'τὸ ἐνδεικτικὸν σημεῖον' as 'the probative sign' than as 'the indicative sign' which is the most commonly accepted rendering. Sextus quotes the following definition of 'τὸ ἐνδεικτικὸν σημεῖον':-

... "σημεῖόν ἐστιν ἐνδεικτικὸν ἀξίωμα ἐν ὑγιεῖ συνημμένῳ προκαθηγούμενον, ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τοῦ λήγοντος." ⁷¹

Both 'τὸ ὑπομνητικὸν σημεῖον' and 'τὸ ἐνδεικτικὸν σημεῖον' are 'indicative' of what is non-evident. However, 'τὸ ἐνδεικτικὸν σημεῖον' is uniquely characterized by the fact that it indicates what is non-evident by virtue of its own peculiar nature and constitution (ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως καὶ κατασκευῆς). That is to say, it is indicative of what is non-evident because it logically implies by its own nature what is non-evident.

Sextus argues that it is necessary to suspend judgement as to whether the indicative or probative sign exists or not.⁷² It has already been seen that he suspends judgement concerning what, in the Stoic theory, is regarded as being immediately evident. It is necessary, according to Sextus, to suspend

judgement as to whether motion or smoke or such like exist or not. This, in itself, precludes for Sextus the possibility that signs can be positively asserted to exist since nothing, as regards what really is, is immediately evident. There can be no real distinction in Sextus' view between the evident and the non-evident since nothing is any more evident than non-evident.

Sextus presents a number of arguments against the existence of the probative or indicative sign. Possibly the most important one to mention for the purpose of determining his own position is the one based upon the fact that signs must be relatives ($\pi\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma\ \tau\epsilon$) in order to be indicative of anything. If a sign is to be indicative of what is non-evident by nature it must be grasped as being implicitly related to what is non-evident so as to reveal it.⁷³

Sextus maintains that it is impossible to be aware of one relative without at once perceiving with it what it is relative to.⁷⁴ According to this the sign itself is not apprehensible apart from or before what it is a sign of. Thus the sign cannot serve to indicate what is non-evident any more than what is non-evident can serve to indicate the sign. The fact that signs must be relatives nullifies the distinction between what is immediately evident and what is non-evident since the sign and the thing signified are mutually dependent upon each other for their apprehension. If either is apprehensible both must be immediately and coincidentally apprehensible just

as the apprehension of 'left' coincidentally involves the apprehension of 'right'. Thus the indicative or probative sign cannot be immediately apprehensible while the thing signified is non-evident.¹⁵

Sextus is ready to grant by way of concession that certain things are naturally non-evident.¹⁶ The consequence of this concession is that the sign is not indicative of what is naturally non-evident. If one grants the proposition 'Bodily motions exist' one will then find that it is a highly disputable matter as to whether or not that proposition is indicative of the non-evident proposition 'the soul exists'. The very nature of the non-evident by nature is that it is non-evident -- is not itself at any time present to us as an object either of sensation or of intellection. On what bases can one justify a belief in the dictates of the probative or indicative sign if one can never test it against what really is?¹⁷

The problem is two-fold. Firstly, since the thing signified is not itself directly apprehensible there can be no certain grounds upon which to justify deeming that this immediately evident fact signifies this rather than that. Secondly, even if one grants that the sign signifies this rather than that there is no way of knowing with certainty that the non-evident is related to the immediately evident in such a way as to be of such a nature as the nature and constitution of the immediately evident suggests or signifies it is. One can only dogmatically assume that it is. If one were

to argue that it is rationally necessary that the soul exists in order to account for bodily motions Sextus would reply by saying that it is a matter of doubt as to whether what is rationally necessary is in fact what is really the case. The claim that one can apprehend what is naturally non-evident is based upon the assumption that the immediately evident is indicative of the naturally non-evident. This assumption can never be tested since it is only on the basis of this assumption that one can even make the claim that the non-evident by nature is apprehensible.

In this argument Sextus attempts to show that the distinction between the immediately evident and naturally non-evident places the naturally non-evident in a sphere which falls outside the realm of what one can be conscious of in more than an accidental way. The following quote illustrates this quite clearly:-

ταῦτά γέ τοι καὶ σφόδρα χαριέντως
ἀπεικάζουσιν οἱ σκεπτικοὶ τοὺς περὶ
ἀδήλων ζητοῦντας τοῖς ἐν σκότῳ ἐπί
τινα σκοπὸν τοξεύουσιν· ὥσπερ γὰρ
τούτων εἰκὸς ἐστὶ τινὰ μὲν τυχεῖν
τοῦ σκοποῦ τινὰ δ' ἀποτυχεῖν, τὸ δὲ
τίς ἐπέτυχεν ἢ ἀπέτυχεν ἄγνωστον,
οὕτως ἐν βαθεῖ σχεδὸν σκότῳ τῆς
ἀληθείας ἀποκεκρυμμένης ἀφίενται
μὲν ἐπὶ ταύτην πολλοὶ λόγοι, τὸ δὲ
τίς ἐξ αὐτῶν σύμφωνός ἐστιν αὐτῇ
καὶ τίς διάφωνος οὐχ οἷόν τε
γινώσκειν, ἀρθέντος ἐκ τῆς ἐναργείας
τοῦ ζητουμένου. ¹⁸

e) Commemorative Signs

The difference between things which are non-evident by nature and things which are temporarily non-evident, according to Sextus' account, is that the former are imperceptible by nature and therefore can never be perceived in conjunction with their immediately evident sign while the latter are clearly perceptible but are imperceptible on occasion due to external circumstances and thus can be perceived in conjunction with their immediately evident sign.¹¹ Since one cannot empirically observe that this immediately evident exists in conjunction with that naturally non-evident existent, one must be able to show that the determinate nature and existence of the latter is necessarily implied in the very nature and constitution of the former. In order to be able to do this one must be able to grasp the implicit or underlying nature of what is immediately evident and be able to show that such an apprehension logically implies the existence and nature of what is other than it and implies it necessarily. Even if one could do this one would still have to convince Sextus that what is logically necessary must be the case in reality.

One cannot hypothetically assume that the existence of this immediately evident existent implies that naturally non-evident existent and test the hypothesis empirically. Sextus acknowledges the fact that a hypothesis can never be shown to be true empirically or inductively but can only be shown to be false.⁸⁰ However, such a hypothesis as the above

can neither be shown to be true or false empirically. Thus one must either show once and for ever that the existence of this immediately evident existent implies necessarily that naturally non-evident existent or merely assert it dogmatically or not involve oneself in such matters at all.

In the case of things temporarily non-evident there is an alternative to making either an assertion of necessity or a dogmatic assertion. One can suspend judgement completely regarding the connection between what is immediately evident and what is temporarily non-evident and still act on the undogmatic hypothesis that there is a definite connection between the two while remaining open to the possibility that the hypothesis may be proven wrong at any moment.

The words 'τὸ ὑπομνηστικὸν σημεῖον' have been variously rendered as 'the suggestive sign', 'the commemorative sign', 'the recollective sign', and 'the associative sign'. An adequate translation of this phrase would have to contain the import of all of these translations. Sextus gives the following account of 'τὸ ὑπομνηστικὸν σημεῖον':-

καὶ δὴ τὸ μὲν ὑπομνηστικὸν συμπαρατηρηθὲν τῷ σημειωτῷ δι' ἐναργείας, ἅμα τῷ ὑποτεσεῖν ἐκείνου ἀδηλουμένου, ἄγει ἡμᾶς εἰς ὑπόμνησιν τοῦ συμπαρατηρηθέντος αὐτῷ, νῦν δὲ ἐναργῶς μὴ προσπιπτοντος, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ καπνοῦ καὶ τοῦ πυρός·⁸¹

Smoke, for example, comes to have the status of being a sign as a result of its having been perceived in conjunction with fire. Upon having seen smoke rising from a fire on a number

of occasions one comes to associate smoke with fire. The association of the two does not spring out of a recognition of their being logically or by nature connected but merely by virtue of the fact that one has seen them together before. The perception of smoke itself suggests to one that fire is present with it by awakening a memory of past experiences in which one has seen smoke and fire in conjunction with it. The perception of smoke, then, suggests to one that fire is present even when fire is imperceptible because smoke is associated with fire in memory.

In this example smoke, of course, is the sign. Smoke is suggestive of fire. However, it is not by itself suggestive of fire. Past perceptions must be recollected in order that it may be suggestive of anything. These past perceptions of smoke and fire must have come to be associated with one another and held in memory as being associated with each other in order for the perception of smoke to be suggestive of fire. Smoke, then, is suggestive of fire in the sense that the perception of smoke provokes one to recollect its association with fire.

For the sake of convenience I will adopt the translation 'the commemorative sign'.

Perhaps the most instructive comment that Sextus makes with regard to his acceptance of commemorative signs is to be found in his rejection of induction (ἐπαγωγή). This passage merits quoting in full because it is crucial to Sextus' whole position and is his most definite statement on

induction.

Εὐπαραίτητον δὲ εἶναι νομίζω καὶ τὸν
περὶ ἐπαγωγῆς τρόπον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ
τῶν κατὰ μέρος πιστοῦσθαι βούλονται
δι' αὐτῆς τὸ καθόλου, ἦτοι πάντα
ἐπιόντες τὰ κατὰ μέρος τοῦτο ποιήσουσιν
ἢ τινα. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τινα, ἀβέβαιος ἔσται
ἡ ἐπαγωγή, ἐνδεχομένου τοῦ ἐναντιοῦσθαι
τῷ καθόλου τινα τῶν παραλειπομένων
κατὰ μέρος ἐν τῇ ἐπαγωγῇ· εἰ δὲ πάντα,
ἀδύνατα μοχθήσουσιν, ἀπείρων ὄντων
τῶν κατὰ μέρος καὶ ἀπεριορίστων. ὥσθ'
οὕτως ἐκατέρωθεν, οἶμαι, συμβαίνει
σαλεύεσθαι τὴν ἐπαγωγήν.⁸²

One can conclude from this that according to Sextus commemorative signs are not verifiable. Regardless of how many times one might see smoke in conjunction with fire one will still be no closer or further away from the position whereby one can positively assert that 'wherever there is smoke there is fire' than before one first observed fire in conjunction with smoke since there will always remain an infinite or indefinite number of cases of smoke that one has not seen. Thus the conviction, regardless of how certain one might be about it, that this commemorative sign is suggestive of that, is completely without a principle to ground it on. It is precisely for this reason that Sextus is able to accept commemorative signs.

Commemorative signs, like the phenomena, are necessary to life.⁸³ In daily life when a man sees smoke fire is signified to him or when he sees a scar he is ready to say that

there was a wound where the scar is now present or when he observes that a person's heart has been punctured he will confidently predict that person's death.⁸⁴ The Sceptic would act in the same way. However, in the same way that the Sceptic observes that ἀταραξία follows upon ἐποχή over and over again and yet is cautious to say that this happens as if it were by chance (τυχλικῶς) so also he would be cautious not to say that this commemorative sign signifies that by necessity. The Sceptic acts 'as if' smoke indicates fire while suspending judgement as to whether or not it really does. The commemorative sign is followed by all mankind, including the philosophers, in daily life.⁸⁵ Sextus is not assenting to empiricism or pragmatism in saying that he accepts commemorative signs. When the city bell tolled in his home town it signified that the streets were being watered to everyone and not just to the Sceptics or Empirical doctors or ordinary folk.

(iv)

Guidance in the Instruction of the Arts

It is necessary now to attempt to determine what Sextus has in mind when he says that the Sceptic finds guidance in the instruction of the arts (τέχνη). He does not state in so many words which arts the Sceptic regards as providing a guide to conducting his life though he does make scattered remarks which indicate his position in a general way.

In P.H. i 18 Sextus addresses himself to the question "Should the Sceptic deal with physical problems?". His answer to this question, which he puts into practice in his treatise Against the Physicists, is that the Sceptic should not deal with physical theory as regards making any firm and positive assertions. However, he says that the Sceptic should treat physical problems with a view to inducing ἐποχή and thereby ἀταραξία in the same way as he does in ethical and logical matters.⁸⁶ Physics, logic, and ethics are regarded by Sextus as being parts of philosophy.⁸⁷

Sextus takes essentially the same position towards the cyclical studies -- astronomy, geometry, arithmetic, music, grammar and rhetoric -- as he did towards physics. M. i-vi is a series of treatises directed against the cyclical arts. These treatises are polemical in nature and differ in topic though not in spirit from his treatises against philosophy. Sextus prefaces his treatises on the cyclical arts with the

following comment:-

...ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτόν τι ἐπὶ τῶν μαθημάτων
παθόντες ὅποιον ἐφ' ὅλης ἔπαθον τῆς φιλο-
σοφίας. καθὰ γὰρ ἐπὶ ταύτην ἦλθον πόθῳ
τοῦ τυχεῖν τῆς ἀληθείας, ἰσοσθενεῖ δὲ
μάχης ἀνωμαλίᾳ τῶν πραγμάτων
ὑπαντήσαντες ἐπέσχον, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
μαθημάτων ὀρμήσαντες ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνάληψιν
αὐτῶν, ζητοῦντες καὶ τὸ ἐνταῦθα μαθεῖν
ἀληθές, τὰς δὲ ἴσας εὐρόντες ἀπορίας,
οὐκ ἀπεκρύψαντο.⁸⁸

It is not necessary to consider Sextus' treatment of each of the arts separately in order to determine what sort of benefit he considers the Sceptic can gain from them. He states his position most clearly in his treatise Against the Grammarians. Sextus says that grammar is two-fold -- the one part teaches the bare knowledge of reading and writing and the other is concerned with the origin, nature, structure and so forth of language and literature.⁸⁹ Sextus controverts the latter view but he accepts the former. He writes:-

ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ γραμματιστικὴ διὰ τῆς τῶν
γραμμάτων ἐπινοίας ἴσται μὲν ἀργότατον
πάθος, τὴν λήθην, συνέχει δὲ ἀναγκαλο-
τάτην ἐνέργειαν, τὴν μνήμην, τὰ πάντα
ἐπ' αὐτῇ κεῖται σχεδόν, καὶ οὔτε
ἄλλους τι ἔνεστι τῶν ἀναγκαίων
διδάσκειν, οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου μαθεῖν τι
τῶν λυσιτελῶν χωρὶς αὐτῆς δυνατὸν
ἔσται. οὐκοῦν τῶν χρησιμωτάτων ἡ
γραμματιστικὴ.⁹⁰

The general principle which seems to be implicit in this is

that the Sceptic is critical of any inquiry into the nature of things which goes beyond what is obviously necessary to daily life. Although Sextus does not expressly state that a knowledge of simple arithmetic is useful to mankind in his dealings in the market place and simple geometry to carpenters and so on, one might reasonably assume that he would assent to such forms of knowledge as providing useful guides in conducting life. He vigorously attacks any form of inquiry which goes beyond what is useful to life in the most practical and simple sense. One can infer from this that, in Sextus' view, the cyclical arts had reached full maturity long before his own day and that further inquiry in them would be of no value. All that they can reasonably provide for man, in Sextus' view, are the simple skills that a school-boy may be said to have mastery over.

This cannot be said of the more immediately practical arts such as medicine, navigation, agriculture and so on.

...πάσης τέχνης τὸ τέλος εὐχρηστόν ἐστι τῷ βίῳ, φανερόν. τῶν δὲ τεχνῶν αἱ μὲν προηγουμένως ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ὀχληρῶν ἐκκλίσεως παρήλθον, αἱ δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ὠφελίμων εὐρέσεως. καὶ ἔστι τῆς μὲν πρώτης ἰδέας ἰατρικῆ, παιωνίς οὖσα καὶ λυσίπονος τέχνη, τῆς δὲ δευτέρας κυβερνητικῆ· τῆς γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἔθνων χρείας μάλιστα δεόνται πάντες ἄνθρωποι.⁹¹

In the cases in which Sextus cites examples of arts in order to illustrate the true nature of an art he takes navigation, medicine, and agriculture for his examples. These arts are

eminently serviceable arts.⁹² The pilot, the doctor, and the farmer are practitioners of their trades in the same sense that the cobbler and the carpenter are. The farmer may not know or care to know why putting manure in the soil produces more vegetables. He may still be regarded as a good farmer despite the fact that he knows nothing about the chemistry of his soil and its effect on the organic structure of plants so long as he has found out what to do to make the plants flourish. One may assume that Sextus would regard as meritorious any discoveries or refinements in such practical arts as medicine or agriculture.

Sextus does not provide any clear discussion on what method these arts should use. In medicine, as noted in the chapter on his life, Sextus says that the Sceptics are in agreement with the method of the Methodical School.⁹³ The Methodical doctors, according to Sextus, refused either to affirm or deny non-evident causes of things.⁹⁴ They followed the guidance of appearances.⁹⁵ Sextus compares their methods to those of a dog who proceeds to remove a thorn if it is pricking him in the foot or to a person who is perspiring after a hot bath and thus seeks relief by rushing off into the cold air.⁹⁶ Their method was simply to follow what experience has shown to work and what appears to one to make sense. It would be quite misleading to conclude from this that they were empiricists in any more significant a sense than any human being or animal is in conducting his life. Sextus accepts the method of observing the phenomena and using a

trial and error method in trying to determine what works because it is the least dogmatic method of conducting oneself in these matters. If upon running out into the cold air one finds that one is perspiring more than when one was in the warmth of the house one would simply return back into the house. The Sceptic is not so much interested in answering the question why and how things work the way they do as finding how to cope with the things that are necessary for conducting life. Rather than being inclined to being scientists they are more inclined to being practitioners. If Sextus must be compared to moderns, which scholars on ancient Scepticism seem to think he must be, he would be closer to the man who is content to know how to switch on his light in the living room without even wondering how it works, than with the modern scientist working in his laboratory.⁹¹

Sextus shows no more interest in the practical arts than would anyone who acknowledges the fact that man benefits by agriculture, medicine or by being literate. 'The useful' for Sextus is what best serves the needs of man and thereby frees him from perturbation. 'The useful' is not in the highest sense an end in itself. Nor are the ends the practical arts serve to realize properly Sceptical ends. The Sceptical end is ἀταραξία . Health, farm produce, literacy, and so on are at best useful to the person attempting to realize the end of ἀταραξία .

(v)

Guidance in the Tradition
of Laws and Customs

Finally, the Sceptic finds guidance in regulating his life in the tradition of laws and customs (ἐν παραδόσει νόμων καὶ ἑθῶν) of his country. Sextus does not regard the laws and customs of his country either as being true according to nature or as being true for him in the sense of being binding upon him as a member of a particular state. The Sceptic accepts and follows the laws and customs of his country without in any way assenting to their veracity. That is, he suspends judgement regarding their veracity and thus is neither opposed to them as being false nor affirmatively bound by them as being true, nor in a state of doubt as to whether they are true or false.⁹⁸ He freely chooses to obey the laws and to practice the customs of his country. He regards this as his moral duty. This is precisely the same attitude which the Sceptic has towards the phenomena, commemorative signs, and the dictates of the arts. By suspending judgement totally the Sceptic makes himself a disinterested spectator of himself as being affected by natural affections and as having to live a life in the world.

Sextus does not reduce the institutions of the state to the status of a vehicle or medium through which the individual can realize his own private interests as, it might be argued, the sophists did. The Sceptic, according to Sextus,

passively yields to what the dictates of the laws and customs of his country appear to him to demand of him without yielding his assent to their validity in any sense whatsoever.⁹⁹ The Sceptic does not positively maintain that anything is either a private or a public good.

The reason why Sextus chose to yield to the laws and customs of his country and to the phenomena and to the dictates of the arts and associative signs is because he was not able to be inactive and some criterion of conduct was necessary. To yield to what is given in experience and in tradition without giving assent to its validity is not to act dogmatically, whereas to reject what is given and to replace it with something else involves dogmatically preferring one thing over another.

The following passage, in which Sextus explains why and how the Sceptic comes to believe in the existence of God, serves to illustrate what has been said above.

τάχα γὰρ ἀσφαλέστερος παρὰ τοὺς ὡς
 ἑτέρως φιλοσοφούντας εὐρεθήσεται ὁ
 σκεπτικός, κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάτρια ἔθη καὶ
 τοὺς νόμους λέγων εἶναι θεοὺς καὶ πᾶν
 τὸ εἰς τὴν τούτων θρησκείαν καὶ εὐσέβειαν
 συντείνον ποιῶν, τὸ δ' ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ
 φιλοσοφῷ ζητήσῃ μηδὲν προπετευόμενος.¹⁰⁰

Sextus, of course, suspends judgement as to whether the gods exist or not and as regards the veracity of his ancestral laws and customs. Thus in declaring that the gods exist because tradition says that they do, Sextus is not saying what he

himself truly believes or thinks probable but is simply yielding to what tradition would have him believe. In his practical life he attends to all of the demands that his ancestral laws and customs place upon him including those of a religious nature. If Sextus was to be moved to some part of the world where tradition had it that the gods do not exist he would then declare that the gods do not exist. The criterion by which the Sceptic conducts his life is maintained by them simply because it is necessary to have some criterion by which to make decisions. The Sceptic is an unfaithful servant of each of the fourfold rules of conduct that he observes. He yields to what they prescribe for him but does not feel bound and constrained by them because he regards them as if they were nothing. They do not rule over him tyrannically as an absolute law. Rather he suspends judgement as to their veracity and then freely consents to adopt them as criteria by which to determine how he shall conduct his life. The Sceptic's great freedom in his activities in the world lies in the fact that he does not really believe what he believes. He is like an actor who portrays a character with disinterest and detachment. The actor does not have to suffer through what the character he is portraying does. Similarly, the Sceptic while carrying out the ritual and practices of his country's religion does not suffer through the joy and despair involved in it as would a true believer. Nor would he feel the same concern in a debate as would a true conservative if the traditional

values of his country were being threatened by some corrupt faction. Though he would be acting in the same manner as his fellow citizens he would at once be a detached spectator to the whole affair.

The Sceptics, in conclusion, had to find some way in which they could undogmatically conduct themselves in their daily life in which they found it necessary to make definite judgement and to pursue particular ends. The four-fold rules of conduct were intended to provide a solution to this problem. One, no doubt, can find elements of empiricism, subjectivism, pragmatism, phenomenism, positivism and a host of other dogmatic 'isms' in their rules of conduct. Sextus was profoundly aware of the fact that to act -- to live -- immediately involved one in the activity of making judgements and that to do or to choose this instead of that meant that one was following some sort of criterion whether one acknowledged it or not.¹⁰¹

"Philosophy", David Hume wrote, "would render us entirely Pyrrhonian, were not nature too strong for it".¹⁰² Sextus agrees that no one is able to remain inactive and suspensive at all times. However, Sextus maintains that this does not overthrow Pyrrhonism or force the Sceptic to turn Dogmatist. The Pyrrhonian finds that he is forced to make judgements and he makes them. He does not conclude from the fact that because he is forced to make a judgement that he is qualified to make a judgement. Nor does he believe that he is committed to assenting to something simply because he

feels convinced of it. Sextus characterizes the Pyrrhonian as a humble and cautious soul who does not rashly assume that such and such is the case because it seems to him to be so. The Pyrrhonian conducts himself in his daily life in much the same way as anyone else does with one absolutely important qualification. Namely, the Pyrrhonian, while, for example, acting in much the same manner as an empiricist or pragmatist, views himself in so acting not as an empiricist or pragmatist but as a Sceptic. The Pyrrhonian, one might say, is condemned by nature to have to make definite judgements but he is free to suspend his judgements as regards their truth or falsity. He does not attempt to justify the veracity of his own actions and judgements by pointing to empirical evidence, or by saying that it only stands to reason or common sense, or by declaring that what he did worked therefore it must be right.

The Pyrrhonian rules of conduct, seen from Sextus' point of view, are the rules which a person can follow who determines nothing. They serve the function of providing the Sceptic, who does not identify the empirical or the rational or the practical or the phenomenal or his own subjective states with what is actual and real, with a practical criterion for conducting his life.¹⁰³

CHAPTER SEVEN

(i)

Introduction

It is very difficult to say anything 'by way of introduction' about the Sceptical tropes. There are a number of sets of tropes each of which has its own distinctive character. The Dogmatists had methods, both logical and empirical, by which they claimed that they could apprehend the true nature of the external underlying nature of things. The tropes may be said to be the weapons by which the Sceptics refuted the claims of the Dogmatists. 'Refuted' may be too strong a word since the Sceptics only wished to show the need to suspend judgement.

Sextus introduces the tropes as follows:-

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ἀταραξίαν ἀκολουθεῖν
ἐφάσκομεν τῇ περὶ πάντων ἐποχῇ,
ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἴη λέγειν ὅπως ἡμῶν
ἡ ἐποχὴ περιγίνεται.

The tropes then are the means by which the Sceptics arrive at the suspension of judgement. The tropes are like road blocks which the Sceptics put in the path of the Dogmatists. The Dogmatist puts forward an argument. The Sceptic listens carefully and then replies by saying 'but...'. The tropes were intended to provide the Sceptics with an arsenal of

weapons by which they could counteract the arguments of the Dogmatists.

The importance of the Sceptical tropes does not lie in the originality of their content as much as in the fact that the Sceptics organized and applied them with more thoroughness than had previously been done.

(ii)

The Ten Tropes

Sextus' relation to the ten tropes is quite clear. Sextus expressly attributes the ten tropes to Aenesidemus.² His only contribution to the ten tropes is to be found in his exposition of them. He introduces arguments based on the later tropes of Agrippa and gives a more detailed and coherent presentation of the ten tropes than any other author. It would be useful to consider his discussion of each one of the tropes in turn before attempting to speak of them in a more general manner.

First Trope:-

Πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν εἶναι λόγον καθ' ὃν
παρὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ζώων οὐχ αἱ αὐταὶ
ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ὑποπίπτουσι φαντασίαι.
τοῦτο δὲ ἐτιλογιζόμεθα ἕκ τε τῆς περὶ
τὰς γενέσεις αὐτῶν διαφορᾶς καὶ ἐκ τῆς
περὶ τὰς συστάσεις τῶν σωμάτων παραλ-
λαγῆς.³

It is assumed that variant and dissimilar modes of birth produce contrariety of sense affections in both Sextus Empiricus' and Diogenes Laertius' account.⁴ What is shown to be the case in each account by numerous examples is that there is a great variety of modes of birth. This 'argument' is wanting in any real merit. What requires demonstration is not that there is a great variety of modes of birth but that creatures, who are procreated in differing manners, experience different

sense impressions with respect to a common object.

Sextus deals with each of the five senses separately.⁵ He argues that different species of creatures are affected differently by a common object because the physical structure of the sense organs of each species is different from that of the others. His arguments take the following form:-

οἱ γοῦν ἰκτεριῶντες ὠχρά φασιν εἶναι
 τὰ ἡμῖν φαινόμενα λευκά, καὶ οἱ
 ὑπόσφαγμα ἔχοντες αἱματῶ. ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ
 τῶν ζῶων τὰ μὲν ὠχροῦς ἔχει τοὺς
 ὀφθαλμοὺς τὰ δ' ὑφαίμοος τὰ δὲ λευκανθίζ-
 οντας τὰ δ' ἄλλην χροῖαν ἔχοντας, εἰκός, οἶμαι,
 διάφορον αὐτοῖς τὴν τῶν χρωμάτων
 ἀντίληψιν γίνεσθαι.⁶

Sextus' examples are all based upon what we observe in our experience as human beings. It is inferred from this what other creatures must experience.

Sextus also bases arguments upon the difference between creatures with respect to what is pleasurable and beneficial to them. He cites numerous examples such as the fact that salt water is disagreeable and poisonous to men while fish drink and enjoy it.⁷

Sextus introduces into his discussion of the first trope, as he does in his exposition of the third, fourth and fifth tropes, arguments, based upon the five tropes of Agrippa, which show that there is no way of determining which, if any, sense impression is indicative of the essential nature of the external object.⁸ Arguments of such a nature do not occur in

Philo's or Diogenes Laertius' account of these tropes.⁹ Their accounts of these tropes merely bring one to the point of recognising the fact that one cannot naively trust in the veracity of one's own sense impressions because the same object produces different sense impressions in different subjects and under different circumstances. The question of whether or not there is a criterion by which one can decide which or whose sense impressions should be trusted is not properly raised in their accounts.

Sextus raises it. He writes:-

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπικρίνειν αὐτοὶ δυνησόμεθα τὰς
φαντασίας τὰς τε ἡμετέρας καὶ τὰς τῶν
ἄλλων ζώων, μέρος καὶ αὐτοὶ τῆς
διαφωνίας ὄντες καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ
ἐπικρινούντος δεησόμενοι μᾶλλον ἢ αὐτοὶ
κρίνειν δυνάμενοι.¹⁰

He then goes on to show that we are not able to accept our own impressions with or without proof.¹¹ One cannot simply assert without proof that what is apparent to one is so in reality because what is apparent to one frequently differs from what is apparent to another (in the case of the first trope another person and so on). Nor can one prove that what is apparent to one is the case in reality. For one cannot establish that what is apparent to one is the case in reality by means of what is apparent because that involves circular reasoning. Nor can one establish it by means of what is non-apparent since that is not acceptable to anyone. Sextus, of course, concludes that it is necessary to suspend judgement.

Second Trope:-

ὁ παρὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφορὰν¹²

The first and second tropes are not related to each other in such a way that the one is dependent on the other for its validity. One can grant that one of them may be inconclusive without at once questioning the conclusiveness of the other. Sextus writes:-

ἵνα γὰρ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν καὶ συγχωρήσῃ τις
πιστοτέρους εἶναι τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων τοὺς
ἀνθρώπους, εὐρήσομεν καὶ ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ
ἡμετέρᾳ διαφορᾷ τὴν ἐποχὴν εἰσαγομένην.¹³

It will be seen that the ten tropes are not logically interdependent. They are rather a series of 'arguments' in which the connective link of the one to the other is best described by the word 'and'.

The method by which each of the ten tropes is established is by pointing out various phenomena which are indicative of the general proposition of the trope. The second trope shows that men differ from one another in body and in soul. The fact that one individual differs from another in body is indicated by the fact that an old wife of Attica swallowed thirty drams of hemlock with immunity and that Alexander's butler used to shiver when he was in the sun but not when he was in the shade and that Tiberius Ceasar could see in the dark and so forth.¹⁴ The observation of particular incidents in which the capacities, experiences, sense perceptions and such like of one individual conflict with those of others leads one to doubt the veracity of one's own sense impressions

and those of others.

The arguments which Sextus introduces into his discussion based on the five tropes of Agrippa, as noted above, lead one from the state at which one is simply perplexed as to what and whom, if anyone or anything, one should believe to the point whereby one finds it necessary to suspend judgement as to whether or not there exists a criterion by which one can resolve the problem which each of the ten tropes presents. The tropes, in their original form (without the arguments directed against the criterion and proof based on the later tropes of Agrippa), cause one to suspend judgement as regards the veracity of what is immediately given in experience. More precisely, they show that one cannot naively accept what is given in experience as indicative of what is in reality.

Philosophy, one might say, begins with the problem that there are many conflicting opinions and sense impressions about the same object and proceeds from that point to propose a solution. The Dogmatists would agree with the Sceptics that there is not universal agreement as regards matters of opinion and of sense perception. The Sceptics must attack the Dogmatic claim that there exists a criterion by which the true nature of things can be apprehended and distinguished from false opinions and perceptions. The ten tropes do little more than point out the difficulty of the problem that faces one who hopes to discover the real nature of things. It will become more evident that this is the case during the course

of the discussion of the tropes.

In the second part of Sextus' exposition of the second trope he points out the differences between individuals in respect to the soul. He quotes several passages from the poets to illustrate that what is abhorrent to some men is a delight to others.¹⁵ He draws the following conclusion:-

ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ αἴρεσις καὶ ἡ φυγή ἐν ἡδονῇ
καὶ ἀηδισμῷ ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ καὶ ὁ
ἀηδισμὸς ἐν αἰσθήσει κεῖται καὶ φαντασίᾳ,
ὅταν τὰ αὐτὰ οἱ μὲν αἰρῶνται οἱ δὲ
φεύγωσιν, ἀκόλουθον ἡμᾶς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι
ὅτι οὐδὲ ὁμοίως ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν κινουῦνται,
ἐπεὶ ὁμοίως ἂν τὰ αὐτὰ ἡροῦντο ἢ
ἐξέκλινον.¹⁶

This is the only conclusion that can be drawn from what is expressly stated in this trope.

Sextus presents the following argument which is based upon what this trope points out -- that different individuals are affected differently by the same thing -- but which goes beyond this conclusion to show that it is necessary to suspend judgement because it is not possible to determine whom one should believe:-

ἦτοι γὰρ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πιστεύσομεν
ἢ τισίν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πᾶσιν, καὶ ἀδυνάτοις
ἐπιχειρήσομεν καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα
παραδεξόμεθα· εἰ δὲ τισίν, εἰτάτῳσαν
ἡμῖν τίσι χρὴ συγκατατίθεσθαι· ὁ
μὲν γὰρ Πλατωνικὸς λέξει ὅτι Πλάτωνι,
ὁ Ἐπικούρειος δὲ Ἐπικούρῳ, καὶ οἱ
ἄλλοι ἀναλόγως, καὶ οὕτως ἀνεπικρίτως

στασιάζοντες αἴθις ἡμᾶς εἰς τὴν ἔτοχὴν
περιστήσουσιν.¹⁷

Sextus goes on to show that he who maintains that we ought to assent to what the majority deems to be the case is making a childish proposal. The Dogmatists claim that their opinions should be preferred to those of others; Sextus rejects this claim because the Dogmatists are a party in the controversy.¹⁸

Third Trope:-

ὁ παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους τῶν αἰσθητηρίων
κατασκευάς¹⁹

That the senses differ from one another is illustrated by the fact that honey seems pleasant to some to the tongue but that it is unpleasant to the eyes. Sextus gives numerous other similar examples to illustrate the obvious point that the same object affects each of the senses differently.²⁰

He then takes up a problem regarding the particular senses, which falls outside of the scope of this trope and which does not appear in any other exposition of this trope. Sextus writes:-

ἕκαστον τῶν φαινομένων ἡμῖν αἰσθητῶν
ποικίλον ὑποπίπτειν δοκεῖ, οἷον τὸ μῆλον
λεῖον εὐώδες γλυκὺ ξανθόν. ἄδηλον οὖν
πότερον ποτε ταύτας μόνας ὄντως ἔχει
τὰς ποιότητας, ἢ μονόποιον μὲν ἔστιν
παρὰ δὲ τὴν διάφορον κατασκευὴν τῶν
αἰσθητηρίων διάφορον φαίνεται, ἢ καὶ
πλείονας μὲν τῶν φαινομένων ἔχει ποιότη-
τητας, ἡμῖν δ' οὐχ ὑποπίπτουσί τινας αὐτῶν.²¹

The blind and deaf man, Sextus observes, would not recognize

or be aware of the existence of what is visible or audible but only of those three qualities that he is able to apprehend.²² The man with five senses may be in a similar condition since the external object may have numberless qualities which are not perceived by these five senses.²³

But one might argue that "ἡ φύσις συνεμετρήσατο τὰς αἰσθήσεις πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά".²⁴ Sextus rejects this assertion because it can only be dogmatically maintained. We are not able to be in the position to see whether or not the senses are commensurate with the object of sense since we are not able to compare the object as it is by nature apart from our perceiving it with how it appears to our senses. Therefore, it is necessary to suspend judgement concerning the nature of the external object.²⁵

Fourth Trope:-

ἔστι δ' οὗτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς περιστάσεις
καλούμενος, περιστάσεις λεγόντων ἡμῶν
τὰς διαθέσεις. θεωρεῖσθαι δ' αὐτόν
φάμεν ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ παρὰ φύσιν
ἔχειν, ἐν τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι ἢ καθεύδειν,
παρὰ τὰς ἡλικίας, παρὰ τὸ κινεῖσθαι ἢ
ἡρεμεῖν, παρὰ τὸ μισεῖν ἢ φιλεῖν. παρὰ
τὸ ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ἢ κεκορεσμένους, παρὰ
τὸ μεθύειν ἢ νήφειν, παρὰ τὰς
προδεαθέσεις, παρὰ τὸ θαρρεῖν ἢ δεδιέναι,
[ἢ] παρὰ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἢ χαίρειν.²⁶

Sextus deals with each of these conditions in turn in the order given above. In each case he shows that the same objects appear differently to people in different dispositions.

For example, air seems chilly to the old which seems mild to those in their prime, and lovers, who have ugly mistresses, think them most beautiful.²⁷

Sextus concludes his discussion of the fourth trope by introducing an argument which shows that the disagreement caused by differing dispositions does not admit of any settlement. Thus it is necessary to suspend judgement as to which disposition is preferable.²⁸

Fifth Trope:-

Πέμπτος ἐστὶ λόγος ὁ παρὰ τὰς θέσεις
καὶ τὰ διαστήματα καὶ τοὺς τόπους· καὶ
γὰρ παρὰ τούτων ἕκαστον τὰ αὐτὰ
πράγματα διάφορα φαίνεται, ...²⁹

This is shown to be the case by a series of examples -- the same oar appears bent when in water but straight when out, the necks of doves appear differently in hue according to the differences in inclination and so forth.³⁰

Sextus concludes this trope by introducing an argument which shows that it is not possible to show that one impression is more preferable than any other.³¹

Sixth Trope:-

ἕκτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἐπιμιξίας³²

He cites a number of observations to illustrate the point that none of the real objects affect our senses by themselves but always in conjunction with something else. For example, a body is light when immersed in water but heavy when surrounded by air and when the organs of taste and smell have residue substances on them the same object smells and tastes

differently than when they do not have residue substances on them.³³

Seventh Trope:-

Ἑβδομον τρόπον ἐλέγομεν εἶναι τὸν
παρὰ τὰς ποσότητας καὶ σκευασίας τῶν
ὑποκειμένων, σκευασίας λέγοντες
κοινῶς τὰς συνθέσεις.³⁴

Sextus' discussion of this trope is limited to giving examples to illustrate it. He notes that silver filings appear black when they are by themselves but that the whole mass is sensed as white and that when pebbles are scattered about they appear rough but when combined in a heap they produce the sensation of softness. Sextus also observed that wholesome things are harmful in immoderate quantities while harmful things are harmless in minute quantities.³⁵

Eighth Trope:-

ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἐστὶ πρὸς τι, ἐπελογοισάμεθα
μὲν καὶ ἔμπροσθεν, οἷον κατὰ τὸ κρίνον
ὅτι πρὸς τὸδε τὸ ζῶον καὶ τόνδε τὸν
ἄνθρωπον καὶ τήνδε τὴν αἴσθησιν ἕκαστον
φαίνεται, καὶ πρὸς τοιάνδε περίστασιν,
κατὰ δὲ τὰ συνθεωρούμενα ὅτι πρὸς
τήνδε τὴν ἐπιμιξίαν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τρόπον
καὶ τὴν σύνθεσιν τήνδε καὶ τὴν ποσότητα
καὶ τὴν θέσιν ἕκαστον φαίνεται.³⁶

What one perceives is not only determined by the external object but is also influenced by the constitution and disposition of the perceiving subject and by the accompanying circumstances under which the object is perceived. The tropes,

which have been considered thus far, specify the conditions which are external to the underlying object but which determine and influence what one perceives.

Rather than giving particular examples to show that all things are relative Sextus refers back to the other tropes since they are all indicative of the eighth trope.³⁷ Both Philo and Diogenes Laertius treat this trope in the same way that they do the others. They cite examples of things which are clearly relative such as up and down, light and heavy, and so forth.³⁸ In their expositions of all of the tropes they do not do more than cite examples to illustrate the general propositions of the tropes. Sextus regards the eighth trope as being the genus of which the other nine tropes are subordinate sub-species.³⁹

Sextus presents three arguments which are supposed to show that all things are relative.⁴⁰ In the first one it is argued that the class of objects which exists 'independently' or 'differentially' (κατὰ διαφορὰν) are relatives because this class differs from the class of relatives and what differs from something else is relative.⁴¹ In the second argument it is argued that all things are relative because all things are summa genera or infimae species or both and these are all relatives.⁴² In the third one it is argued that some existing things are apparent and others are non-evident and that the former is related to the latter as the significant is related to the thing signified. Since the significant and the thing signified are relative to each other so also are all

existing things since they fall under this class.⁴³

Sextus, in the passage quoted above (P.H. i 136), says that when the Sceptic says 'πρὸς τι πάντα ἔστιν' he means 'πρὸς τι πάντα φαίνεται'.⁴⁴ These arguments may be interpreted to be saying that 'all existing things, in so far as they appear to us, are relative.' That is to say, we conceive of all things through relative categories -- same and different (first argument), genera and species (second argument), and pre-evident and non-evident (third argument).

Diogenes Laertius and Philo make the same assumption as Sextus does.⁴⁵ They attempt to show that things are not knowable in and by themselves. They do not argue against the view that the true and real character of things consists in their inter-relation with each other; rather they assume that each thing has an absolute and independent nature of its own and proceed from this assumption to show that nothing is intelligible in and by itself. The possibility that the external objects are in reality relative and that their true nature can be indicated by expressing their relative character is not considered. The significance of this will be discussed when the five tropes of Agrippa are considered.

Ninth Trope:-

ὁ παρὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς ἢ σπανίους ἐγκυρήσεις⁴⁶

Sextus' commentary on this trope merely consists of giving examples to illustrate it. He observes that although the sun is much more amazing than a comet, the sight of the sun does not stir any excitement in us and that a person who sees the

sea for the first time is greatly excited by it whereas it does not have such an effect on those for whom it has become a customary spectacle. Similarly, gold is counted as precious because of its rarity but would not be so regarded if it were scattered over the earth in great quantities. Sextus concludes that it is necessary to suspend judgement as to what the real nature of the external object is. We are only able to indicate what the external object appears to us to be.⁴⁷

Tenth Trope:-

ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἀγωγὰς καὶ τὰ ἔθνη καὶ τοὺς
νόμους καὶ τὰς μυθικὰς πίστεις καὶ
τὰς δογματικὰς ὑπολήψεις.⁴⁸

Sextus gives numerous illustrations to show that what seems perfectly acceptable and morally correct to one person or group of people seems quite detestable and immoral to others. For example, whereas athletes covet glory while philosophers dogmatically assert that glory is a worthless thing and whereas among the Romans the man who renounces his father's poverty does not have to pay his debts, among the Rhodians he always has to pay them. Sextus concludes that it is necessary to suspend judgement about the real nature of things.⁴⁹

Conclusion:-

Sextus does not regard the order in which he presented the ten tropes as having any special significance. He writes:-

χρῶμεθα δὲ τῇ τάξει ταύτῃ θετικῶς⁵⁰

Both Philo's and Diogenes' lists differ in order from each other and from the order in which Sextus presents them.⁵¹

The connection that one trope has to the next is best described by the word 'and'. The philosophical import of these tropes would not be changed by altering the order in which they are presented. One trope does not follow out of the other or depend upon the other or others for its validity.

One might list those tropes based upon the differences in the subject first and then those based on external circumstances next and end with those based on both of these.⁵² However, this may be more misleading than it would be useful since it might be suggestive of some intended sort of dialectic connection between them which clearly does not exist nor was intended to be thought to exist. Sextus' position is clearly and correctly that not much ado should be made over their order.

Sextus does not regard the number of these tropes as being significant.⁵³ He says that it is possible that there may be more than he lists. The ten tropes are more of a random collection of empirical observations that point out the relativity of perception than a systematically organized list. They cannot be regarded as an attempt at presenting ten mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive ways in which perception is relative.

The tropes overlap each other. For example, the second trope deals with the differences between human being in a general way while the fourth trope shows that old people differ from children, brave people differ from cowards, and so on. In both cases he shows that human beings differ by showing

that they are affected differently by the same things. The eighth trope expresses the principle which the other tropes point out in a more particular and empirical way. In the fourth and sixth tropes the relativity of perception is pointed out with the same examples -- people with blood-shot eyes and those suffering from jaundice are affected by the same object differently than normal people.

Sextus observed that the ten tropes may be regarded as subordinate sub-species of three more general tropes which may in turn be regarded as species of one trope. The first four tropes are subordinate to the trope based on the subject who judges. The seventh and tenth tropes are based on the object judged. The fifth, sixth, eighth and ninth tropes are based on both the subject and the object. These four tropes are all based on the trope of relation. This expresses the logical structure of the ten tropes.⁵⁴

The ten tropes merely point out the fact that sense perception and the given laws, customs, dogmas and so forth of a people cannot be naively accepted as being indicative of the true nature of things. They force one to realize that what appears to one to be the case is not necessarily what is the case. The ten tropes bring one to this realization by empirically pointing out the various factors which are external to the nature of the object as it is in and by itself which influence what we perceive.

Is there a criterion by which one can judge between true and false presentations and laws and so forth or not? The ten

tropes are not able to provide a satisfactory answer to that question one way or another. They merely point out the fact that such a criterion is necessary if there is to be any true apprehension of the objects of sense and of thought (laws, customs, etc.) by showing that what is immediately given in experience is discordant. The question as to whether such a criterion exists or not is not raised in the ten tropes. When Sextus raises it in his exposition of the ten tropes he is going into a problem which falls outside of the scope of these tropes.

However, the ten tropes do shake one's trust in 'common sense' by showing that there is such a wide disparity between what different subjects perceive and accept as true that one cannot really say that there is such a thing as 'common sense'. These tropes point out the fact that the data given in experience is contradictory.

(iii)

The Five Tropes

Sextus does not attribute the set of five tropes to any particular author. He merely states that they have been handed down by the more recent Sceptics. However, Diogenes Laertius attributes them to Agrippa who is otherwise unknown to us.⁵⁵

The five tropes are indicative of a far more mature and developed form of Scepticism than the ten tropes. Nearly every polemical argument which occurs in Sextus' writings is based upon the tropes of Agrippa. Sextus' polemical treatises may be read as a testimony to his 'belief' that every particular matter of inquiry admits of being brought under these tropes. The essential content of the ten tropes is expressed in the five tropes. However, the five tropes have an entirely different character than the ten tropes.⁵⁶

The first trope is based on the diversitude in opinions (ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς διαφορίας) both amongst ordinary people and amongst philosophers.⁵⁷ The ten tropes point out various particular modes of discrepancy without specifically expressing the principle given in this trope which is the principle which underlies each of them.

The Sceptic, in respect to this trope, may be likened to an invalid who has been recommended by his doctor to eat fruit. The invalid is presented with cherries, plums, and pears but refuses to eat anyone of them because none of these is fruit --

some of what he is offered being cherries and the rest being plums and pears. This analogy is not altogether unfair to Sextus or to anyone who adopts this trope. The mere fact of a diversitude of opinions in respect to any matter of inquiry is asserted as adequate grounds for suspending judgement.

Sextus is frequently quite content to declare that it is necessary to suspend judgement by virtue of the fact that he finds that there is a wide diversity of equally credible (not discreditable) opinions on a matter in question. It is assumed on such occasions that the settlement of the dispute would require that one party in the controversy must be agreed by all to be right while the others admit that they are wrong. This is not possible since each of the views is equally credible.⁵⁸

The possibility that all parties could be right, though each differs from the other because each has a one-sided and partial grasp of the matter in question, does not occur to Sextus. To compare the Sceptic to an invalid is quite appropriate because he suspends judgement precisely at the point at which the true searcher after truth would recognize the need to acknowledge the positive merits of the arguments of the parties in the controversy and to attempt to discern some unity in their differences.

The Sceptic is obviously justified in bringing attention to the fact that there are a number of equally credible opinions on a given matter and that one cannot naively assert one of them as being the true opinion without taking account of

the others. Dogmatism, in Sextus' view, consists in the assertion of definite dogmas or determinate propositions. Sextus observes that one sect is committed to maintaining that proposition 'x' is 'y' while another maintains that 'x' is 'z' and still others take different positions. He also notes that each proposition is as credible as the other. Faced with this situation Sextus suspends judgement.

The Dogmatist, on the one hand, chooses to go on asserting his dogma against the others despite the fact that the other dogmas are as credible as his own. The Sceptic, on the other hand, despite the fact that he might find each dogma in turn to be credible, chooses to suspend judgement. Neither the Dogmatist nor the Sceptic has come to his position in this case by fully taking account of the force of the arguments which are present on all sides. Both are one-sided. Neither is ready to consider the possibility that there might be a unity in the differences, that the differences may be relative differences and not absolute differences. Something which is absolutely different from something else is not really different from what is other than it but is something unrelated and totally separate from it.

Thus, it may be concluded that the trope based on discrepancy does not by itself lead to suspension of judgement in the sense that the possibility of apprehension appears to be impossible. However, it does lead to suspension of judgement as regards affirmatively assenting to one of the particular dogmas as indicative of the truth as opposed to other

equally credible dogmas.

Sextus is content to show that it is necessary to suspend judgement as to which, if any, particular dogmas should be assented to and at no point in his writings attempts to solve a philosophical problem by proposing a new doctrine or whatever. He leaves the task of showing that certain and unquestionable knowledge can be obtained to others and limits himself to the task of pointing out to them their own rashness in making such a claim. Thus, one might say, Sextus uses the trope based on discrepancy quite justly in that he never asserts that apprehension is impossible but shows the need to suspend judgement as regards this or that particular teaching.

Sextus frequently uses the trope based on discrepancy in another way than that indicated above. He does not assert it as pointing out the need for the suspension of judgement but rather for the need of proof and of a criterion to decide between the conflicting views.

The second trope (ὁ εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβαλλων) shows that one cannot prove anything because the reason (the proposition) which is brought forward in order to prove any proposition in turn requires a reason and this a reason and so on into infinitude.⁵⁹

This trope does not cause one to suspend judgement as regards the possibility that one proposition may be said to imply logically another proposition. However, it does cause one to suspend judgement with respect to the possibility that

any assertion or proposition can be proven absolutely and not merely relatively since a permanent and solid ground can never be reached.

In what sense can one say that the infinite regress argument does not cause one to suspend judgement as regards the possibility that one proposition may be said to imply logically another proposition? The problem the infinite regress argument points out may be stated as follows. One cannot show that any proposition is in reality or is objectively the case. One proposition may be said to follow from another but the first proposition, in any chain of logically connected propositions, from which all of the others follow, is not grounded but merely asserted. How, then, can one know that any of the propositions which seem to imply logically one another are not merely a fiction of our minds? How can one know that reason itself is not merely arbitrary and subjective if it cannot be shown to be grounded in reality? How can one prove that what is rational is actual? Showing that 'x' rationally or logically follows from 'y', Sextus maintains, does not either show that 'x' follows from 'y' in reality or that 'x' and 'y' actually exist in reality. What is called reason or logic, in this view, may be nothing more than an arbitrary human convention or natural capacity which the creator implanted in man in order to deceive him. Sextus warns man that he should not trust in reason.

...εἰ γὰρ τοιοῦτος ἀπατεῶν ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος
ὥστε καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα μόνον οὐχὶ τῶν

ὀφθαλμῶν ἡμῶν ὑφαρπάζειν, πῶς οὐ χρὴ
 ὑφορᾶσθαι αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς ἀδήλοις, ὥστε μὴ
 κατακολουθοῦντας αὐτῷ προπετεύεσθαι;⁶⁰

The content of reason or the concepts that reason reasons about, which may be derived from experience or by recollection or by some other means, may not be indicative of the true nature of things. Thus one might be correct in saying that 'x' is logically implied by 'y' according to human reason. But is it in reality? Sextus suspends judgement on this matter.

The third trope is that of relativity (ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τι πρὸς).⁶¹ This trope, as has already been seen, makes the following point. An object may be said to have such and such an appearance in relation to the subject judging and to the concomitant percepts but one must suspend judgement as to what the real nature of the object is in and by itself.

This trope, combined with the trope of discrepancy, provides the logical basis for the ten tropes. One might say that in the ten tropes the relativity of perception was discerned by observing that the particularity^o of the perceiving subject and of the external conditions influence what is perceived. In other words, it was empirically pointed out that the same object appears differently relative to whom and under what conditions it is perceived. This trope has already been sufficiently discussed when the ten tropes were considered.⁶² Sextus does not add anything significant to his discussion of it when he takes it up in the five tropes.

It need merely be noted that this trope and the trope based on discrepancy differ from the other three tropes in that the latter are directly concerned with the problems inherent in proving an assertion whereas the former are not. The first and third tropes are frequently used by Sextus to show that one cannot merely accept an assertion without proof since what is given in perception and in belief is relative and is widely disputed. He then calls upon the other three tropes to show that it is not possible to prove anything.

The fourth trope is that of hypothesis (ὁ ὑποθετικός).⁶³ An assertion which is not established by argument is a hypothesis. Sextus notes that the Dogmatists, when being forced to regress ad infinitum, take as their starting point something which they assume without demonstration. The Sceptic shows the need to suspend judgement as regards any hypothesis by simply asserting another hypothesis which contradicts the one the Dogmatist asserts.⁶⁴ Something may seem perfectly self-evident to one person but utterly absurd to another.

The fifth trope is that of reciprocity (ὁ διάλληλον πρὸς) or of circular reasoning, or more literally, the one through another.⁶⁵ This trope is the form used when the matter in question which requires proof is itself required or assumed in order to provide a basis for its own proof. In order to avoid either starting with a pre-supposition or falling into an infinite regress one is forced to prove what one assumes on the basis of what one assumes. Since what is to be proved requires proof before one can assent to it, it cannot

be accepted as an assumption in its own proof. Therefore, an argument based on circular reasoning does not really prove anything. One must, therefore, suspend judgement as to whether the proposition which is used in its own proof is true or false.⁶⁶

Sextus shows in the following way that every matter of inquiry admits of being brought under the five tropes. Some say that only sensibles are true, others only intelligible objects, and others maintain that some intelligibles and some sensibles are true. Sextus, on other occasions, identifies the first view with Epicurus and Protagoras, the second with Plato and Democritus, and the third view with the Stoics and Peripatetics.⁶⁷ The problem is to show how one can decide which view is the true view. Sextus writes:-

εἰ δὲ ἐπικριτὴν, πόθεν ἐπικριθήσεται
 πυνθανόμεθα. οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν (ἐπὶ τούτου
 γὰρ προτέρου στήσομεν τὸν λόγον)
 πότερον ὑπὸ αἰσθητοῦ ἢ ὑπὸ νοητοῦ; εἰ
 μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ αἰσθητοῦ, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν
 αἰσθητῶν ζητοῦμεν, καὶ ἐκεῖνο ἄλλου
 δεήσεται πρὸς πίστιν. εἰ δὲ κάκεινο
 αἰσθητὸν ἔσται, πάλιν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλου
 δεήσεται τοῦ πιστώσοντος, καὶ τοῦτο
 μέχρι ἀπείρου. εἰ δὲ ὑπὸ νοητοῦ
 ἐπικρίνεσθαι δεήσει τὸ αἰσθητὸν, ἐπεὶ καὶ
 τὰ νοητὰ διαπεφώνηται, δεήσεται καὶ
 τοῦτο νοητὸν ὄν κρίσεως τε καὶ πίστεως.
 πόθεν οὖν πιστωθήσεται; εἰ μὲν ὑπὸ
 νοητοῦ, εἰς ἀπείρου ἐκπεσεῖται ὁμοίως·
 εἰ δ' ὑπὸ αἰσθητοῦ, ἐτεῖ πρὸς μὲν τὴν

πίστιν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ παρελήφθη νοητὸν
 πρὸς δὲ τὴν τοῦ νοητοῦ πίστιν αἰσθητόν,
 ὃ διάλληλος εἰσάγεται τρόπος.⁶⁸

Sextus continues on to argue that the only escape from this conclusion is to assume as granted without demonstration some postulate for the demonstration of one's argument. This, of course, is not admissible on the basis of the trope of hypothesis. Sextus says that one may just as well assume the subject of the inquiry as assume some other thing which is merely a means to establish the subject of the inquiry. In either case one is really admitting that one is forced to merely assume either directly or indirectly what requires proof.⁶⁹

The first trope based on discrepancy has the function in this argument of not leading to the suspension of judgement by itself but of pointing out the need of proof.⁷⁰

Sextus also mentions the trope based on relativity. It is not used in conjunction with the other tropes but as an addition to them. The fact that all sensibles are relative is by itself treated as pointing out the need to suspend judgement.⁷¹

Sextus more or less repeats the argument which he gave in respect to sense-objects when he considers thought-objects.⁷²

Sextus does not regard the five tropes as serving to replace the ten tropes. He writes:-

Τοιοῦτοι μὲν καὶ οἱ παρὰ τοῖς νεωτέροις
 παραδιδόμενοι πέντε τρόποι· οὗς

ἐκτίθενται οὐκ ἐκβάλλοντες τοὺς δέκα
τρόπους, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποικιλώτερον καὶ
διὰ τούτων σὺν ἐκείνοις ἐλέγχειν τῆν
τῶν δογματικῶν προπέτελαν.⁷³

Any comments which indicated that the five tropes contain the essential content of the ten tropes are based upon my observations. Perhaps his reason for avoiding saying this is that the less one says about such matters the less likely one stands to be accused of being a Dogmatist. The Sceptic does not wish to put himself in a position where he has a case to defend. He prefers to gather as many weapons as he can to use against the Dogmatists without having to take them out on parade. Sextus, no doubt, is correct in saying that the ten tropes are not superseded by the five tropes. They spell out by illustration more clearly and particularly the fact that one cannot assent to what is immediately given in experience as being what actually exists in reality. However, Sextus knows as well as anyone that the logical content of the ten tropes is contained in the five tropes. This can be clearly seen to be the case by simply noting that he hardly ever explicitly uses the ten tropes in his polemical treatises despite the fact that he believes that he is addressing himself to almost every sort of problem that can arise in the investigation of the nature of things.

It may seem that these five tropes were intended to prove once and for ever that apprehension is impossible. Sextus, I believe, would defend his position that they merely lead to the suspension of judgement on several grounds.

He could argue that these tropes do not show that this or that proposition is not true. They merely attempt to show that it cannot be proven to be true. One must suspend judgement as to whether they are true or not. The five tropes do not question the possibility that one might grasp the truth though they do attempt to show that it is not possible to know with certainty what the true nature of things is.

Sextus could also argue that although the five tropes appear to him to be conclusive that that does not mean that they really are conclusive. He was aware of the fact that the history of philosophy would go on and that there would be attempts to meet the challenge of the Sceptical arguments. He would suspend judgement as to whether or not the challenge would be met in the future. Just as the Sceptics, he might argue, had to show the Dogmatists how rash they were so also someone might show the Sceptics that the seemingly insurmountable problems that philosophy has to face can be overcome.

(iv)

The Two Tropes

Sextus further discusses two other tropes:-

Παραδιόδοι δὲ καὶ δύο τρόπους ἐποχῆς
ἑτέρους· ἐπεὶ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ καταλαμβανό-
μενον ἦτοι ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καταλαμβάνεσθαι
δοκεῖ ἢ ἐξ ἑτέρου λυπομνησκοντες
ὅτι οὔτε ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τι οὔτε ἐξ ἑτέρου
καταλαμβάνεται, τὴν περὶ πάντων ἀπορίαν
εἰσάγειν δοκοῦσιν.⁷⁴

Who the original author of these tropes is and who passed them on down to Sextus must remain unanswered. The only reference which was made to them, which has been preserved, is to be found in P.H. i 178-179.

It would seem likely that these two tropes came after the set of five tropes and of ten tropes since the two tropes pre-suppose them. The ten tropes specifically point out the fact that no object is apprehended through itself. The five tropes show that no object is apprehended through itself or through another.

Sextus makes the following remark at the beginning of his exposition of these two tropes:-

...ὅτι μὲν οὐδὲν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καταλαμβάνεται,
φασί, δῆλον ἐκ τῆς γεγενημένης παρὰ
τοῖς φυσικοῖς περὶ τε τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ
τῶν νοητῶν ἀπάντων, οἶμαι, διαφωνίας,
ἢ δὴ ἀνεπίκριτός ἐστι μὴ δυναμένων
ἡμῶν μήτε αἰσθητῶ μήτε νοητῶ κριτηρίῳ

χρησθαι διὰ τὸ πᾶν, ὅπερ ἂν λάβωμεν,
ἄπλοτον εἶναι διατεφωγημένον.⁷⁵

Whether Sextus' predecessors limited themselves to pointing out the controversy which existed amongst physicists is not altogether clear. If they did, which is certainly what the above text seems to suggest, it is still less clear why they did. In any case their rejection of the possibility of the apprehension of an object through itself is based on the discrepancy of opinions. Sextus makes it quite clear that they were familiar with the five tropes when he indicates the reasons why they asserted that nothing can be apprehended through something else. Sextus writes:-

διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδ' ἐξ ἑτέρου τι κατα-
λαμβάνεσθαι συγχωροῦσιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ
ἐξ αὐτοῦ τι καταλαμβάνεται ἀεὶ ἐξ ἑτέρου
καταλαμβάνεσθαι δεήσει, εἰς τὸν διάλ-
ληλον ἢ τὸν ἄπειρον ἐμβάλλουσι τρόπον.⁷⁶

Sextus goes on to show that one cannot assume anything (hypothesis) on the basis of the fact that nothing is known through itself.⁷⁷

Thus, it would seem reasonable to suppose that these two tropes originated after the five tropes and were intended to be a reduction of the sets of five tropes and of ten tropes to two.⁷⁸ They cannot be regarded as replacing the five tropes since the five tropes provide the logical basis for the two tropes. Sextus does not speak of these tropes as being a reduction of the five to two. He merely presents them as

another set of tropes though he does show that they are based upon the five tropes.

(v)

The Eight Aetiological Tropes

Finally, Sextus presents the eight aetiological tropes of Aenesidemus. They may be stated as follows:-

1. Since aetiology as a class deals with the non-evident it cannot derive any general accepted agreement from the phenomena.
2. When a variety of causes could be brought forward to explain a matter under investigation some investigators account for it with only one cause.
3. To orderly events some investigators assign causes which do not exhibit any order.
4. When investigators have grasped the way in which appearances occur they assume that they have also grasped how non-evident things occur.
5. Investigators assign causes according to their own particular hypothesis on the elements and not on any agreed method.
6. Investigators frequently only admit evidence which can be accounted for by their own theory and disregard any evidence which conflicts with their theory.
7. They assign causes which not only conflict with appearances but also with their own hypothesis.
8. When there is equal doubt about the seemingly apparent and about the matter in question they base their theory about what is doubtful upon what is equally doubtful.⁷⁹

Sextus' only direct comments on these tropes appear in his brief introduction to them. He writes:-

Ὡςπερ δὲ τοὺς τρόπους τῆς ἐποχῆς
 παραδίδομεν, οὕτω καὶ τρόπους ἐκτίθενται
 τινες καθ' οὓς ἐν ταῖς κατὰ μέρος

αἰτιολογίαις διαποροῦντες ἐφιστῶμεν τοὺς
 δογματικούς διὰ τὸ μάλιστα ἐπὶ ταύταις
 αὐτοὺς μέγα φρονεῖν. καὶ δὴ Αἰνησίδημος
 ὀκτὼ τρόπους παραδίδωσι καθ' οὓς οἴεται
 πᾶσαν δογματικὴν αἰτιολογίαν ὡς
 μοχθηρὰν ἐλέγχων ἀποφύνασθαι, ...⁸⁰

What is possibly most instructive in respect to Sextus' own position as regards these tropes is that apart from listing them and showing that the five tropes can suffice as against them, that he makes no further mention of them. It would seem from the above passage that Sextus does not want to appear to be critical of the eight tropes. He seems to regard them as a legitimate part of the Sceptical tradition. However, the fact remains that Sextus never chose to use them to show that the five tropes quite adequately serve the task the eight tropes were created to do. Sextus did not explicitly state why he did not use these tropes apart, perhaps, from indicating that he did not require them since the five tropes served their function. However, it is possible to see that his decision was a reasonable one.

Firstly, the eight tropes are not primarily directed at pointing out errors which are inherent in aetiology itself but in the practice of certain aetiologists. Only a dim witted or corrupt scientist would acknowledge one cause only when several other causes merit equal recognition or give a cause for something which does not account for its orderly nature or be guided by a vain attachment to a private theory so as to disregard important evidence or give causes which

conflict with their own hypothesis and with appearances. Of the eight tropes only the first one may be said to actually point out a problem in the science of aetiology itself and not in the aetiologists. The five tropes, on the other hand, point out difficulties which are inherent in science itself. These difficulties appear to be unavoidable even by the most sharp witted scientist. Sextus speaks of the Dogmatists as being men of great talent who failed in their enterprise not merely as a result of incompetence but because the enterprise itself appears to him to have been doomed to fail from the beginning. Thus, the five tropes, which stand as a challenge to science itself and do not merely pry on the fickleness and malpractice of scientists, provide a more secure basis for the suspension of judgement than do the eight tropes. The scientist could escape the threat of the eight tropes by simply doing what he is supposed to be doing properly.

Secondly, these tropes apply to only one aspect of inquiry -- aetiology. The possible implication of this is that aetiology presents a new or different sort of problem than do the other forms of inquiry and thereby must be counteracted by a special kind of weapon. Aenesidemus lived before the time when the five tropes had been developed so for him this was the case. Sextus, however, is able to show on the basis of the five tropes that the problems which the Sceptic finds in one form of Dogmatism he also finds in all the other forms. A great merit of Scepticism, as expounded by Sextus, is that

it deals with what is most fundamentally and crucially inadequate in Dogmatism. A special set of tropes is not required to counteract the aetiologists and another for the ethicists and another for the grammarians and so forth. The Sceptic, so to speak, is not in an arms race with the Dogmatists such that for every new theory or form of inquiry which they come up with the Sceptic must quickly develop a new counter-weapon. Sextus really has only one weapon -- the five tropes -- and is content to secure his suspension of judgement on the basis of them. This is to simplify his position somewhat since he does call upon other forms of argument in his polemical treatises but these are not necessary and fundamental to his position. They are usually indirectly based on the five tropes.

It is not possible to say with any certainty that Sextus chose to adopt the five tropes instead of the eight tropes for the reasons indicated above. The fact is that he did and this is all that the evidence permits one to say.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Conclusion

It is quite remarkable that Pyrrho's successors did not follow his practice of not writing anything. Sextus informs his readers in the introductory chapters of his Outlines that he has not discovered anything and that he is still searching. Sextus says that he merely announces what seems to him to be the case at the particular moment at which he is speaking. If one takes Sextus seriously, as one should, one is faced with a very perplexing problem.

Philosophers usually share their reflections with others because they believe that they have something of general, if not of universal, interest and significance to say. If they seriously believe that they are in a state of ignorance and that what they might say is merely of a subjective and momentary importance they would practice silence and persist in their studies or abandon their studies and occupy themselves with other matters. The fact that some particular individual finds the arguments of the philosophers unconvincing is not by itself a matter of great interest. The reasons why that person is not convinced may be of grave importance. If the person finds an argument unconvincing because that person is incapable of appreciating the argument or because

that person arbitrarily refuses to assent to the fact that the argument is convincing then his views do not merit serious consideration. However, if his reasons for refusing to assent are objectively sound then he deserves serious attention.

Sextus depicts the Pyrrhonian as being a man who refuses to fall prey to arbitrariness and rashness. He would not be so puffed up and vain as to think that anyone would be interested in hearing how he feels about this and that. The fact that Sextus gave lectures and recorded his reflections suggests that he believed that he had something of universal significance to say.

What Sextus hopes to show his reader is the Pyrrhonian way: the way of the man who refuses to assent to what can only be arbitrarily asserted or assumed. He is not interested in indicating how things seem to him so much as how things seem to the Pyrrhonian. The Pyrrhonian, in a sense, is not a historical personage. Rather he is anyone who demands that what is asserted as being true must be shown and seen to be true.

Sextus lectured and wrote down his reflections, it would seem, because he thought that by so doing he could show that the Pyrrhonian way is the way that mankind should adopt. This may, at first, appear to be a reasonable undertaking. But how can one show that it seems that nothing can be shown? It would seem that it is necessary to assume, at the outset, some basis upon which to argue that it is necessary to suspend judgement. If one does not make any assumptions it

would not seem possible to show anything. One could merely make bare assertions -- I determine nothing, I suspend judgement -- without showing why one makes such pronouncements.

Sextus, in point of fact, could not take one step forward against the Dogmatists without adopting the tropes. He acts as if the tropes are valid despite the fact that he says that he does not assent to them. Sextus takes the tropes in hand and proceeds to test the Dogmatic arguments against them.

He, for example, must assume the validity of the law of contradiction in order to have a basis upon which to proceed against the Dogmatists. The most fundamental polemical argument used by the Pyrrhonian is to show the need to suspend judgement with respect to one proposition by opposing it to another equally credible contrary one. If he suspends judgement as regards the law of contradiction then he cannot show that one must suspend judgement as regards any proposition. If Sextus does not assent to the law of contradiction he can merely assert without any further ado: "I suspend judgement".

The moment that he begins to adopt principles and set out tropes he is acting contrary to his most basic announcement -- I determine nothing. He hopes to avoid this by saying that he merely uses the tropes but does not assent to them. The consequence of this is that he does ^{not} even believe himself that he has shown that it is necessary to suspend judgement since he is not prepared to assent to the principles he uses to show that he is forced to suspend judgement.

If Sextus were to assent to the validity of the tropes of Agrippa he would be going a long way towards asserting what the nature of a true science must be. It must not make any assumptions. It must not be a system which consists of propositions which depend on each other for their validity since that would involve circular reason. Things must be apprehended as they are in and by themselves and not merely in their relations to each other. The true science would have to have an absolute non-hypothetical beginning point and cannot take a beginning which is established on the basis of something else and it in turn on something else and so on to infinity.

The tropes were devised as weapons to be used against the Dogmatists. They serve that purpose quite well. However, they do not serve to show why the person who does not assent to them should suspend judgement. Such a person cannot be shown why he should suspend judgement.

It is much easier for Sextus to show the Dogmatists why they should suspend judgement than it is for him to show the Pyrrhonian why he is forced to suspend judgement. The Dogmatists cannot disregard Sextus' attack on them because they accept the law of contradiction and reject arguments based on circular reason, on infinite regresses and so forth. Sextus, therefore, can show the Dogmatists that, according to their own assumptions, their arguments are inconclusive and unfounded. He can show them that it is necessary to suspend judgement because they make certain assumptions which he can

adopt as a basis upon which to refute them.

Sextus says that the Pyrrhonian finds it necessary to suspend judgement because he finds that when one seemingly credible proposition is asserted, another seemingly equally credible proposition can be asserted which is contrary to it. It is necessary to conjecture on how Sextus would respond if he were pressed further.

Question: Is it true that you do not assert anything more than anything else and that you determine nothing?

Sextus: Yes. Question: Then you do not even assert the law of contradiction more than deny it? You would not assert as a principle that "x' and 'not-x' cannot be the case'?

Sextus: No. I would not make such assertions. Question: If 'x' and 'not-x' is asserted do you assert that either 'x' is the case or 'not-x' is the case or neither 'x' nor 'not-x' is the case and that both 'x' and 'not-x' cannot be the case?

Sextus: No. Question: Then you do not suspend judgement because a seemingly credible proposition can be opposed to an equally credible proposition which contradicts it? Sextus: So it would seem. Question: Why, then, do you suspend judgement?

Sextus: I suspend judgement because I simply do not know what to believe and not for any particular reason. Question: Then you do not claim to show that it is necessary to suspend judgement? Sextus: I can only say that I find it necessary to suspend judgement because I do not know what to believe. I do not claim that I can prove that it is necessary to suspend judgement in the sense of being logically necessary.

I believe that, if Sextus was questioned in this way, he would admit that he has no grounds upon which to justify the fact that he suspends judgement. However, he would say 'I confess to my ignorance and do not claim to know anything'. The fact that I suspend judgement is simply a recognition of that fact. I am prepared to challenge anyone who claims that he has determined something. I will not refute him by simply suspending judgement myself but I will convince him that he should suspend judgement himself.

Sextus adopted the tropes but did not assent to their validity. He used them to show the Dogmatists why they should suspend judgement. He could argue against the Dogmatists on the basis of assumptions which he did not have to assent to but which the Dogmatists would have to assent to if his arguments were to be taken seriously by them. He need not take them seriously himself. He could suspend judgement as regard the validity of everything he said. Sextus did not write and give lectures in order to convince himself of the need to suspend judgement so much as to convince others. Sextus says that the Sceptic does not have any scruples about using weak and questionable arguments in order to cure the Dogmatists of their rashness. He practices the art of persuading his audience and not of proving things conclusively. Sextus adopted the tropes for the sake of argument.

Sextus' treatises take on a peculiar character if what has been said thus far is correct. They were written for the Dogmatists. Their express purpose was to convert the

Dogmatists to the Pyrrhonian way. Just as the physician uses whatever means he can call upon to cure the ailments of the body so the Pyrrhonian attempts to cure the ailments of the soul by whatever means possible. Not only do Sextus' treatises appear to have been written with this purpose in mind but the Pyrrhonian way itself is praised by Sextus because it frees its followers from perturbation. Sextus hopes to cure the Dogmatists of their self-conceit and rashness by means of argument. Once they have been cured of these depraved conditions and suspend judgement they will experience, as if it were by chance, tranquility of the soul.

Though Sextus does not claim that he can help man escape from ignorance he does maintain that he can free man from the main cause of his perturbations. He can cure man of his ignorance only to the extent that he can show man that what he takes to be firmly established and secure knowledge when examined critically turns out to be a mere pretense of certain knowledge. Sextus hopes, by means of arguments, to force the Dogmatists to abandon their false illusions and to make them accept their real condition of ignorance. He wishes to force the Dogmatists to come to terms with themselves and to stop hiding behind seductive ideas and conceptions. They must become fully self-conscious; they must become fully conscious of what they really are aware of. Man, to express it more dogmatically than Sextus would, is only aware of how he feels and what he thinks which might be little more than the stuff dreams are made out of.

Sextus does not argue that man should simply turn his inquiry from the study of metaphysical objects to the study of subjective states of the soul. Rather he argues that man should turn from making vain and empty claims of being aware of the true nature of things to the humble recognition of his own ignorance and adopt a suspensive attitude. The positive side of Sextus' teaching lies in its complete negativity. If man has courage enough to ask himself 'do I know what things are really like?', he will find that he must answer negatively if he is honest with himself. He will also find that by recognizing this and suspending judgement he will be able to accept himself for what he is and he will not be yearning after ideals which he rashly deemed desirable. The stability and harmony, which he once thought could only be realized in the pursuit and possession of wisdom or pleasure or wealth or whatever, he will discover is not something which has to be strived for. Man does not have to be naturally gifted and study long hours or win great victories in the market place and become wealthy in order to attain to quietude and tranquility. Any man can attain to this state of the soul in the highest measure that nature will permit without having to satisfy his desire to know or to become something which he is not in his immediate condition. The desire to know, in a sense, is satisfied when one suspends judgement because one ceases to ask and to wonder when one suspends judgement. Doubting differs from suspending judgement in that the former is a state of questioning and of being perplexed whereas the

latter is a state in which one has stopped trying to judge and decide. One is reconciled to the fact that one cannot judge or know when one suspends judgement and is no longer even concerned with attempting to resolve the matter in question. One yearns for or desires something because one judges something to be desirable. If one suspends judgement completely one does not desire anything. One is, in a peculiar sense, totally content. Content with what? Content with the fact that one has everything which one desires? No. One is content simply because one does not desire anything. One is in complete harmony with oneself. What is this 'self' which is in harmony with itself? It is the self which judges, opines, dreams and so forth but which, when it suspends judgement, ceases to do any of these things. But what is it? A self relating form? Perhaps, Sextus might reply, I do not know. I can only say that I am free from disturbance and calm when I suspend judgement. I suppose it is that which is calm and free from disturbance but what that is I am not prepared to say.

Sextus, I believe, would be grieved if he thought that his attack on the Dogmatists would result in the passing of the metaphysicians and the appearance of eager empiricists, positivists, phenomenologists, and pragmatists. He may not be troubled by the fact that people abandon the attempt to discover the intrinsic nature of things. However, he may detect in this fact that a new form of dogmatism has taken the place of metaphysics since the true Pyrrhonian, unlike the Empirical

Doctors or Academics, does not declare outright that the underlying nature of things is inapprehensible. He maintains a suspensive frame of mind. He would be troubled if he thought that the successors to the metaphysicians were to be just as vain and puffed up as the metaphysicians and were to differ from them only in the fact that they make more humble claims. The Sophists do not come nearer to being good Pyrrhones than do the Platonists or Stoics despite the fact that they do not make such high claims for philosophy as the latter do. How can one recognize a true Pyrrhonian? He is as little involved in the activity of pursuit and avoidance as is humanly possible. He believes that the crucial key to human happiness is the suspension of judgement and not in making new discoveries. He is a passive and obedient gentleman who carries out his duties without any fuss. He considers his role as a philosopher to be that of persuading dogmatists to suspend judgement. He may be a doctor or a cobbler, or a farmer or anything which is consistent with a suspensive frame of mind.

The Pyrrhonian, one might say, lives by the maxim 'render unto Ceasar what is Ceasar's'. He is dutiful but not partiotic, a worshipper but not an advocate of worship, a polemicist but not party to any opinions, a scientist but he determines nothing, a conservative but not an advocate of conservatism, and in general, an ordinary person but a Sceptic.

It is instructive to try to imagine what the nature of a society would be like if it were founded and populated

solely by Pyrrhoneans. This is not an ideal matter to reflect upon. It is little wonder that Sextus did not direct his attack on the social, religious, and political institutions of the day, which are as dogmatic and assertive in their nature as the Dogmatists, with the same degree of aggression as he did the philosophers. The Pyrrhoneans adopt the ideological standpoint of the government which rules his country and follow its directives and they adopt the theological doctrines which go with obeying the religious institutions despite the fact that they do not assent to them. They live within the social order. It is as if religious and political beliefs were a coat which one can put on when one goes out into the world and involves oneself in daily living but which one can take off when one comes back in and reflects. Pyrrhoneans hope to free mankind from perturbation by advocating the suspension of judgement not merely as a moment in the process of philosophical inquiry but as that which by itself brings about the final end. Man, they argue, can satisfy the desire to know not by coming to know but by suspending judgement as to whether or not knowing is desirable by nature such that one ceases to desire to know. Given the fact that functioning religious, political and social institutions are already present, individuals may be able to find tranquility by despairing of determining what is true and good but only because they can live by the dogmas of the society which they were born into. Sextus realized this and was cautious, unlike the modern positivists, to propose yielding to and obeying the

laws and customs of the state which provide a basis for individuals to live collectively as one community, rather than assuming that a well ordered society would emerge if individuals simply followed their own volitions.

APPENDIX ONE

A great danger in approaching a philosophical text with pre-conceived expectations is that one will be disappointed with what one finds. An even greater danger is that one's pre-conceived notions of what ought to be expected may be quite wrong and cause one to fail to appreciate the real merits of the text. In the present appendix I will argue that the reason Sextus has been reproached by a number of scholars for the form and manner of his exposition is because they have evaluated his works according to standards which are not appropriate to what he was really doing.

Philip P. Hallie, in his introduction to Scepticism, Man, and God, makes the following comment on the merits of Sextus as an exponent of Scepticism:-

...the writings of Plato lie before us in all their dramatic and logical power; the writings of Aristototele are before us in all their systematic subtlety; the writings of the Stoics and the Epicureans are available to us in many palatable maxims, essays, letters, even poems. But as for the Sceptics -- all we have of theirs worth sitting down with are the rather loosely, drily articulated works of a Greek doctor named Sextus Empiricus. These works have some flashes of humour and imagination, but there is also...much logomachy in them, and no dramatic or even careful logical development. !

Norman Maccoll offers a similar opinion:-

Though always a clear writer, Sextus has amassed a large amount of material, and put it together not always in good order, and often without much heed as to whether his work was internally consistent. Beyond good sense and clearness and industry, Sextus has not many of the qualifications needful to an historian of philosophy. ²

I do not think Sextus would bother to defend himself against such charges were he alive to hear them. Indeed, he may even regard them as compliments.

Sextus, one might conjecture, would say that there is little difference between reproaching Homer for not demonstrating an aptitude as an historian as there is for criticizing an exponent of Pyrrhonism for not displaying his qualifications as an historian of philosophy. Sextus never makes any pretense of being an historian of philosophy. His only interest in the history of philosophy was to show how chaotic and contradictory it was. He certainly was not interested in attempting to give a methodical and coherent account of the history of philosophy in order to provide his ancestors with a useful handbook. Sextus' treatises have been greatly valued by scholars as source material. Sextus, one might say, intended them to serve the purpose of providing source material but not for scholars but for Sceptics who wished to see what a chaos of conflicting opinions the history of philosophy is. It would be much more instructive to say that a person who is a committed Pyrrhonean does not have the necessary qualifications to be an historian of

philosophy because he is apt to not note the coherence and development of the history of philosophy than it is to say that Sextus, because of some personal inadequacy, failed as an historian. The Pyrrhonian approaches the history of philosophy with the Sceptical tropes in hand and notes the conflict of opinions, the dogmatic assumptions, the circular reasoning and so on which make up its content. Indeed, he is not qualified as an historian of philosophy.

Sextus would be content to agree that there is "no dramatic or even careful logical development" in his works. He would not feel obliged to apologize for this. The Pyrrhonian is a man without a science who makes no claims that he has a science or a system. Sextus says that he proceeds in his inquiry like a chronicler who randomly puts down in writing what appears to him to be the case at the moment. This is the only way he can consistently proceed in his inquiry since he does not determine anything. He can merely take things as they come. He does not have any criterion by which he can determine how he ought to proceed. He can only treat each particular argument on its own merit. Sextus may well agree that his treatises are "loosely, drily articulated works" with "much logomachy in them". This is largely due to the fact that one is committed to proceeding randomly and that pointing out the need to suspend judgement as regards this and that necessarily is repetitious and tedious.

Arne Naess maintains that the form in which Sextus expressed Pyrrhonism is appropriate to its content. I concur

with Naess on this. He writes:-

There is also a special reason for concentrating on Sextus's account of Pyrrhonism. As he portrays it Pyrrho's scepticism is, so far as I can judge, superior to any other variant in its consistency, its radicalness, and also in its practical importance for intellectually gifted persons with high ideals of sincerity and honesty. Thus Sextus's Pyrrhonism provides us with a yardstick and a fundamental framework by means of which all forms of less radical, less consistent scepticism may be measured and mapped out. I therefore invite the reader to try to understand this radical scepticism, and not be impatient with what at first sight can hardly fail to seem absurd or far-fetched.³

Naess, in my opinion, more than anyone else, has managed to understand Pyrrhonism without introducing external measures and criteria. It is not possible to summarize Naess arguments here. He provides a very useful discussion on the Sceptical ways of announcement in which he shows that Sextus' acts consistently as a Pyrrhonean when he depicts Pyrrhonism.⁴ If one simply acknowledges the obvious point that a Pyrrhonean cannot consistently present a methodical, systematic exposition while maintaining that he determines nothing and therefore must proceed randomly treating each argument or topic according to its own particular merits then one cannot fault Sextus for presenting Pyrrhonism in the way he did.

Perhaps the most appropriate way to conclude this discussion is to quote Naess' comments on David Hume who managed to avoid falling prey to the reproaches indicated in the first two quotes given above:-

Certainly the style of 'the greatest sceptic of modern time' is highly dogmatic in its use of extreme terms and its tendency to bring readers percipitately to far-reaching conclusions. One might have expected a publishing sceptic to tone down his antisceptical expressions, when revising his manuscripts or during proof-reading, but Hume gives little evidence of that. How, for example, could a sceptic conclude his ethical speculations with the sentence, 'Thus, upon the whole, I am hopeful that nothing is wanting to an accurate proof of this system of ethics'? 5

Indeed, Sextus could not end any of his treatises on such a promising note since none of them lead anywhere -- except to the suspension of judgement. Sextus was a Sceptic to the bitter end.

APPENDIX TWO

Charlotte L. Stough makes the following remark:-

When the questions to which Skeptics addressed themselves are elicited, their views emerge, not as self-contained bodies of doctrine to be set alongside of and measured against competing "systems" of Greek philosophy, but rather as significant attempts to come to terms with perplexing problems connected with knowledge -- problems of no less interest to philosophers today than to their ancient predecessors.¹

I would like to consider the import of this statement as regards Pyrrhonism as depicted by Sextus.² Pyrrhonism, it is correct to say, is not a 'system' in the sense of being a self-contained body of doctrine. However, it would be quite wrong to conclude from this that Sextus and the other Pyrrhoneans were primarily interested in sorting out particular "problems connected with knowledge".

The primary question which Sextus addresses himself to is 'how can man attain to ἀταραξία?' His polemical treatises may be said to be an attempt to show that the Pyrrhoneans and only the Pyrrhoneans have found an answer to this question. One must suspend judgement. It is by doing this that man can attain to ἀταραξία. This is the message which Sextus wishes to proclaim.

However, he does not want to assert this dogmatically.

Sextus' endless pre-occupation is to show that only the Pyrrhonian does not fall prey to rashness and arbitrariness. His purpose is to refute the claims of the Dogmatists in order that he may erect Pyrrhonism in the place of Dogmatism. Although, technically speaking, Pyrrhonism may not be properly said to be a 'system' which is to be measured against competing 'systems' it is a way (ἀγωγή) which is in competition with other 'systems' to the degree that Sextus hoped to destroy Stoicism, Epicureanism and all other forms of dogmatism. The Pyrrhonian is not a man without a total view on how man should conduct his life who limits himself to dealing with particular philosophical problems. He deals with particular problems with a view to showing the need to follow the Pyrrhonian way.

In a peculiar way Pyrrhonism is a system and has a teleological aspect. Pyrrhonism is systematically unsystematic and purposefully not-teleological. This can be seen more clearly by considering the following statement:-

Pyrrhonism is one of the few movements in the history of thought which, despite the fact that it had no teleological aspect, nevertheless maintained its existence for a considerable length of time. This was possible because Pyrrhonists did not oppose custom in religious observances. They constantly maintained a non-aggressive attitude, not only toward religion but also toward politics. They advocated loyalty to the governments under which they lived. Their Scepticism was to a great extent their own private affair and did not outwardly affect their relations to either religion or politics. ³

I do not think Patrick does justice to Pyrrhonism by

accounting for its longevity by saying that it was inoffensive. Pyrrhonism was very aggressive towards the social, religious and political institutions. The patrons of these institutions could hardly have been unaware of the fact that people, who do not really believe in the veracity and substantiality of the institutions of the state and who breed doubt in others, are a serious threat to these institutions regardless of how passively obedient they may be. Sextus had to answer the charges of his critics who accused the Pyrrhoneans of advocating inactivity and of destroying the basis upon which daily life depends. One could not wage war on Stoicism without at once waging war on many of the most important political figures of the day. Pyrrhonism may be described as a non-aggressive private affair in only a very external and superficial way. Pyrrhonian obedience to the laws and customs of the state was mere obedience. It lacked the conviction and devotion upon which the survival of the institutions depended.

Pyrrhonism would not have survived for so long unless it had some definite and positive aspect. Pyrrhonism has a teleological aspect in the sense that it showed a person, who was dissatisfied with the teachings of the Dogmatists, how to attain to ἀταραξία. Pyrrhoneans were not merely hard-headed critics of the Dogmatists. They were disciples of Pyrrho who believed in and expounded the Pyrrhonian way. It may be more appropriate to say that Pyrrhonism has a phenomenological aspect than a teleological aspect. Pyrrhonism taught that if one will not assent to what is arbitrary and

dogmatic one will find that one can determine nothing and one will thus be forced to suspend judgement. Ἀταραξία , one will find, follows upon suspending judgement.

Thus a person would be attracted to Pyrrhonism if he found the various philosophies of the day narrow and arbitrary. Secondly, one would hope to realize ἀταραξία by means of the Pyrrhonian way which one might have sought by studying Stoicism or Epicureanism. Pyrrhonism has much in common with the various 'systems' of Greek philosophy.

APPENDIX THREE

Sextus does not even present a brief outline of the history of Pyrrhonism. In the present appendix I have selected the passages in which Sextus indicates how he regarded his predecessors. I do not attempt to determine what position he thought his predecessors held so much as try to show how Sextus regarded them (i.e. critically, as authorities).

(i)

Pyrrho

- a) Πυρρώνειος ἀπὸ τοῦ φαίνεσθαι ἡμῖν τὸν Πύρρωνα σωματικώτερον καὶ ἐπιφανέστερον τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ προσεληλυθέναι τῇ σκέψει.
- b) Τίμωνός τε τοῦ Φλιασίου τὸν Πύρρωνα ἡλίω ἀπεικάζοντος ἐν οἷς φησὶ
μοῦνος δ' ἀνθρώποισι θεοῦ τρόπον ἡγεμονεύεις,
ὅς περὶ πᾶσαν ἑλῶν γαίαν ἀναστρέφεται,
δεικνὺς εὐτόρνου σφαίρας πυρκαύτορα κύκλον,
δόξει μὲν τοῖς γραμματικοῖς κατὰ τιμὴν αὐτὸ λέγειν καὶ διὰ τὴν περὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον ἐπιφάνειαν· ἄλλος δὲ ἐπιστήσει μήποτε καὶ μάχεται [τὰ παραδείγματα] τῷ σκεπτικῷ βουλήματι τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ Φλιασίου εἰς τὸν Πύρρωνα λεχθέντα, εἶγε ὁ μὲν ἡλίος τὰ πρότερον μὴ βλεπόμενα τῷ φωτὶ καταυγάζων

δείκνυσιν, ὁ δὲ Πύρρων καὶ τὰ προδήλως
 ἡμῖν ληφθέντα τῶν πραγμάτων εἰς ἀδηλό-
 τητα περιστάσαι βιάζεται. τὸ δὲ οὐχ
 οὕτως ἔχειν φαίνεται τῷ φιλοσοφώτερον
 ἐπιβάλλοντι, ἀλλ' ἡλίου τρόπον ἐπέχειν
 φησὶ τὸν Πύρρωνα καθόσον ὡς ὁ θεὸς
 τὰς τῶν ἀκριβῶς εἰς αὐτὸν ἀτενιζόν-
 των ὄψεις ἀμαυροῖ, οὕτω καὶ ὁ
 σκεπτικὸς λόγος τὸ τῆς διανοίας ὄμμα
 τῶν ἐπιμελέστερον αὐτῷ προσεχόντων
 συγγεῖ, ὥστε ἀκαταληπτεῖν περὶ ἐκά-
 στοῦ τῶν κατὰ δογματικὴν θρασύτητα
 τιθεμένων.²

see also M. i 305 - 306.

Conclusion: a) Sextus regarded Pyrrho as being the archetypal Pyrrhonean. b) He was prepared to defend this view of Pyrrho even when confronted by evidence which would suggest otherwise. Sextus does not display in his writings a detailed knowledge of Pyrrho's life or thought. He may have in treatises which are no longer extant.

(ii)

Timon

- a) Passages in which Sextus refers to Timon as an expounder of the teaching of Pyrrho: M. i 53 and 305 - 306 (quoted above).
- b) ... γὰρ ὁ Τίμων ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς φυσικοὺς τοῦτο ὑπέλαβε δεῖν ἐν πρώτοις ζητεῖν, φημὶ δὲ τὸ εἰ ἐξ ὑποθέσεώς τι ληπτέον. διόπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς οἰκειὸν ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνω στοιχοῦντας τὸ παραπλήσιον ποιεῖν ἐν τῇ

πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων διεξόδω.³

Passages in which Sextus refers to Timon as one would quote authority: P.H. i 223-224. M. vi 66; vii 8, 10, 30; ix 57, x 197; xi 20, 140, 141, 164, 171 - 172.

Conclusion: a) Sextus regards Timon as being a faithful follower and exponent of Pyrrho. b) He never critically questions any statement made by Timon but merely refers to Timon to give more force to his own exposition. Sextus regards himself, it would seem, to be in complete agreement with Pyrrho and Timon.

(iii)

Aenesidemus

- a) Sextus attributes the eight aetiological tropes to Aenesidemus which he distinguishes from the traditional tropes (the set of five and ten tropes). However, he is not critical of them apart from saying that the five tropes would suffice as against them (P.H. i 180 - 185). Sextus recognizes these tropes as a legitimate though not essential part of the Pyrrhonean tradition.

Sextus attributes the ten tropes to Aenesidemus (M. vii 345). The ten tropes are regarded by Sextus as being fundamental to Pyrrhonism.

- b) Passages in which Sextus incorporates into his own exposition arguments which are of a decidedly Pyrrhonean nature which he attributes to Aenesidemus: M. vii 40 - 54, 215 - 226, 234; M. ix 218; M. xi 42.
- c) Passages in which Sextus refers to dogmas maintained by Aenesidemus which he opposes to dogmas held by other Dogmatists:

P.H. iii 135; M. vii 350; M. x 38. In these passages no reference is made to Heraclitus.

- d) ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Αἰνησίδημον ἔλεγον ὁδὸν εἶναι τὴν σκεπτικὴν ἀγωγὴν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἡρακλείτειον φιλοσοφίαν, διότι προηγείται τοῦ τάναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπάρχειν τὸ τάναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνεσθαι, καὶ οἱ μὲν σκεπτικοὶ φαίνεσθαι λέγουσι τὰ ἐναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτό, οἱ δὲ Ἡρακλείτριοι ἀπὸ τούτου καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ὑπάρχειν αὐτὰ μετέρχονται...⁴

αὐτίκα γὰρ τῶν δογματικῶν φιλοσόφων φασὶν οἱ μὲν σῶμα εἶναι τὸν χρόνον οἱ δὲ ἀσῶματον, ... σῶμα μὲν οὖν ἔλεξεν εἶναι τὸν χρόνον Αἰνησίδημος κατὰ τὸν Ἡράκλειτον· μὴ διαφέρειν γὰρ αὐτὸν τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ πρώτου σώματος. ὅθεν καὶ διὰ τῆς πρώτης εἰσαγωγῆς κατὰ ἕξ πραγμάτων τετάχθαι λέγων τὰς ἀπλᾶς λέξεις, αἵτινες μέρη τοῦ λόγου πτυχάνουσι, τὴν μὲν χρόνος προσηγορίαν καὶ τὴν μονάδα ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας τετάχθαι φησὶν, ἥτις ἐστὶ σωματικὴ, τὰ δὲ μεγέθη τῶν χρόνων καὶ τὰ κεφάλαια τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐπὶ πολλαπλασιασμοῦ μάλιστα ἐκφέσθαι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ νῦν, ὃ δὴ χρόνου μήνυμά ἐστιν, ἐστὶ δὲ τὴν μονάδα οὐκ ἄλλο τι εἶναι ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν, τὴν δὲ ἡμέραν καὶ τὸν μῆνα καὶ τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν πολλαπλασιασμὸν ὑπάρχειν τοῦ νῦν, φημί δὲ τοῦ χρόνου, τὰ δὲ δύο καὶ τρία καὶ δέκα καὶ ἑκατὸν πολλαπλασιασμὸν εἶναι τῆς μονάδος.

ὡςθ' οὗτοι μὲν σῶμα ποιοῦσι τὸν χρόνον,
οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς φιλόσοφοι
ἄσώματον αὐτὸν ᾤήθησαν ὑπάρχειν.⁵

Conclusion: a) Sextus attributes two sets of tropes to Aenesidemus. b) He makes considerable use of Aenesidemus' writings as a source of Sceptical arguments. c) However, Sextus also treats Aenesidemus in the same way as he does Dogmatists and opposes his views to those of others. d) I do not wish to propose how one should interpret Sextus' association of Aenesidemus' name with Heraclites. This is a terribly difficult matter which would require lengthy consideration before anything useful could be said. It is possible to say that Sextus does not seem to regard Aenesidemus with the same degree of loyalty as he does his fellow Pyrrhoneans Pyrrho and Timon. It appears as if Sextus had the works of Aenesidemus before him and he used Aenesidemus' dogmatic assertions to oppose to others and he adopted his Sceptical argument to aid him in his own exposition of Pyrrhonism.

(iv)

Menodotus (and Aenesidemus)

Sextus makes the following comment when addressing himself to the question of whether or not Plato is a genuine Sceptic:

a) *περὶ δὲ τοῦ εἰ ἔστιν εἰλικρινῶς σκεπτικὸς
πλατότερον μὲν ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι
διαλαμβάνομεν, νῦν δὲ ὡς ἐν*

ὑποτυπώσει λέγομεν κατὰ τῶν περὶ
 Μηνόδοτον καὶ Αἰνησίδημον (οὗτοι γὰρ
 μάλιστα ταύτης προέστησαν τῆς στάσεως)
 ὅτι ὅταν ὁ Πλάτων ἀποφαίνεται περὶ
 ἰδεῶν ἢ περὶ τοῦ πρόνοιαν εἶναι... εἴτε
 ὡς πιθανωτέροις προστίθεται, ἐπεὶ προκρίνει
 ... τι κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν, ἐκπέφυγε
 τὸν σκεπτικὸν χαρακτήρα... ὅ

Conclusion: a) This is the only reference which Sextus makes to Menodotus. It does indicate that he felt free to criticize the teachings of Menodotus, as of Aenesidemus, rather than to try to justify them as he does with Pyrrho.

One can conclude, in general, that Sextus was not a slavish copier of his predecessors. He would have had only a general indication of precisely what Pyrrho taught from Timon. Sextus seems to have regarded the successors of Timon quite critically and independently. He was prepared to use them when it served his purpose and to oppose them when it seemed necessary. Sextus only refers to the Pyrrhoneans mentioned above.

APPENDIX FOUR

(i)

Sextus says that the Pyrrhonian is disposed to inquiry (ζητητική) and that the Pyrrhonian remains searching (ἐπιμονὴ ζήτησεως, ἔτι ζητοῦσι).¹ There have been two basic interpretations given to these announcements.

Firstly, there is the view that Sextus is merely being sophistic in describing the Pyrrhonian as being disposed to search and inquiry. His real position, it is argued, involves the unqualified declaration of the impossibility of κατάληψις and the complete abnegation of inquiry. Karel Janáček most forcibly argues in favour of this view.²

Secondly, there is the interpretation which essentially argues that Pyrrhonism or Scepticism, as depicted by Sextus, is really a prolegomena to positive empirical research. This is Mary Patrick's position.³ There is another position, which is in agreement with Mary Patrick's thesis as regards the interpretation of Sextus' announcement, that the Pyrrhonian is disposed to inquiry, which maintains that Pyrrhonism, as expounded by Sextus, contains two separate and distinct standpoints -- Scepticism and Empiricism. This view is maintained by Victor Brochard.⁴

(ii)

I shall begin by considering, in some detail, the first view. It is necessary to examine the evidence which Janáček puts forward.

Janáček's comments as regards the present matter are to be found in Chapter IV of his book Sextus Empiricus' Sceptical Methods. In P.H. i 1 - 4 Sextus distinguishes the Sceptics from the Academics by saying that the Academics declare the object of inquiry inapprehensible (μη δυνατόν... καταληφθῆναι) while the Sceptics remain searching (ἔτι ζητοῦσιν). Janáček correctly argues that ζῆτεῖν contrasting with ἀκατάληπτος is quite exceptional.⁵ Janáček maintains that this contrast cannot be legitimately made by Sextus since, he argues, that it is contrary to Sextus' own practice.⁶ Janáček says that the only reason that Sextus made such a distinction was in order to advocate the independence and distinctiveness of Pyrrhonism at all costs. More particularly, he argues that the division Sextus makes between the Academics and Pyrrhonnians is merely 'capricious' because it is based upon a "...theoretical postulate (which) was never put into practice".⁷ The theoretical postulate is Sextus' claim that the Pyrrhonnians do not unambiguously declare the impossibility of κατάληψις and that they, therefore, remain open to inquiry.

Janáček quotes P.H. i 232 in order to show that Sextus himself "confesses frankly" that Arcesilaus, who was head of the Academy, "πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῖς Πυρρωνείοις κοινωνεῖν λόγους, ὡς μίαν εἶναι σχεδὸν τὴν κατ' αὐτὸν ἀγωγὴν καὶ

τὴν ἡμετέραν' ..." in that he suspends judgement with respect to the reality or unreality of anything and as to what is to be preferred in point of probability or improbability.⁸ Unfortunately, he does not go on to mention P.H. i 233 which follows upon this:-

πλὴν εἰ μὴ λέγοι τις ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν
κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν ταῦτα λέγομεν
καὶ οὐ διαβεβαιωτικῶς, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ὡς
πρὸς τὴν φύσιν, ὥστε καὶ ἀγαθὸν μὲν
εἶναι αὐτὴν λέγειν τὴν ἐποχὴν, κακὸν
δὲ τὴν συγκατάθεσιν.⁹

Janáček goes on to show that ἀκατάληπτος is a characteristic feature of the Sceptical doctrine. He quotes the following statement: "πάντα ὅσα ἐφώδευσα τῶν δογματικῶς ζητουμένων ἀδήλων φαίνεται μοι ἀκατάληπτα".¹⁰ Again Janáček avoids going on to discuss or quote the sentence which immediately follows upon it in which Sextus indicates the exact meaning of his statement. Sextus says that the utterance is "...not of one who is positively asserting that the matters investigated by the Dogmatists are really of such a nature as to be inapprehensible, but of one who is announcing his own state of mind...".¹¹

Janáček then writes:-

He tries in vain to find a difference in the meaning of this term between the sceptics and the New Academy: PH i 226:

οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς νέας Ἀκαδημίας, εἰ καὶ
ἀκατάληπτα εἶναι πάντα φασί, διαφέρουσι
τῶν σκεπτικῶν ἴσως μὲν καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ
τὸ λέγειν πάντα εἶναι ἀκατάληπτα

(διαβεβαιούονται γὰρ περὶ τούτου, ὁ δὲ
σκεπτικός ἐνδέχεται καὶ καταληφθῆναι
τινα προσδοκᾷ),...¹²

He offers no reason for saying that the distinction which Sextus makes between the meaning the Academics attach to the phrase " πάντα ἐστὶν ἀκατάληπτα " and that which the Pyrrhonesians attach to it is "in vain".

It has already been shown at some length that for Sextus to make any assertion which is intended to be universally and objectively true would be contrary to what he says he is doing, contrary to the most basic principles of Pyrrhonism, and impossible given the method of persuasion he uses.

Janáček, unfortunately, does not explain why he ignores this extremely important distinction between stating what is in accordance to what appears to one and stating what is by nature. However, the fact that he ignores it does explain why he treats Sextus' division as being 'capricious' and why he cannot see how Sextus' 'theoretical postulate' is put into constant practice. It has already been adequately shown that Sextus' Sceptical inquiry can never reach a final conclusion but must go on as long as the history of philosophy because he cannot find a basis upon which to unambiguously assert the impossibility of καταληβάνω.

Janáček quotes five passages in which he claims Sextus explicitly declares the impossibility of καταληβάνω.¹³

When one examines these passages closely one can see that this simply is not accurate. Rather than quoting each passage and

then discussing them at length, it will be sufficient, for the sake of economy of space, to indicate in each case why it would be incorrect to treat them in the way Janáček has.

i) In P.H. i 26 Sextus says that because the Pyrrhonian found he was not able to decide between contradiction of equal weight he suspends judgement.¹⁴ Sextus is only stating what appeared to the Pyrrhonian at the time of the observation and is not making any positive assertion. See P.H. i 196 where Sextus explains what he means by this expression.

ii) In P.H. i 179 Sextus only says that we are at a loss (ἀπορούμεν) as to how what conflicts with itself is able to be grasped (τὸ δὲ μαχόμενον πῶς ἂν δύναίτο καταληφθῆναι).¹⁵ Declaring that you are at a loss about how something can be done and declaring that it cannot be done are radically different.

iii) The argument in P.H. iii 45 begins by showing that touch is inapprehensible and on the basis of that solidity is shown to be inapprehensible.¹⁶ One could also cite passages in which Sextus shows that God, cause, body, place, motion, time, number and so on are either non-existent or inapprehensible or both. The purpose of Sextus' polemical arguments is to persuade the Dogmatists to suspend judgement. The Dogmatists, against whom Sextus is arguing, believe that they are able to apprehend solidity. In order to induce ἐποχή it is necessary that Sextus play the role of the devil's advocate and counter-balance the dogma that solidity, body, and the other 'elements' exist and are readily apprehensible with the extreme opposite

dogma. Sextus concludes his discussion on the elements, of which solidity is one, by saying "...περὶ τῶν στοιχείων εἶναι ἔφεκτέον ..." and not with the declaration that they are ἀκατάληπτος.¹⁷ To isolate a passage to prove something, as Janáček has done, can be very misleading. At one moment, for example, one finds Sextus arguing on the basis of sense evidence in order to demonstrate one thing. At another moment, he argues from the point of view of abstract reason and proves its opposite. In each case he is stating what appears to him to be the case at the moment -- looked at in this or that particular way. However, what he is trying to do, as he states in P.H. i 18, is to show the need to suspend judgement. Sextus does not intend to prove the non-existence or inapprehensibility of solidity, body, motion and so on.

iv) P.H. iii 50 is interesting because Sextus shows that the incorporeal is inapprehensible on the basis of the ten tropes of Aenesidemus.¹⁸ Janáček says that Sextus asserts that the incorporeal is inapprehensible as an absolute and final assertion. In P.H. i 35 Sextus says that he recognizes the possibility that the tropes may be unsound. That is to say, he suspends judgement as regards the very basis upon which his whole polemic is carried out. This reveals what Sextus' position is more clearly than any isolated passage which one might choose to cite.

v) In P.H. iii 139 Janáček quotes the following extract:-

οὔτε τίνες μόν εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς τίνες δὲ
 ψευδεῖς δυνατόν καταλαβεῖν διὰ ...
 τὴν ἰσοσθενῆ διαφωνίαν...

He regards this as an example of "where the impossibility of καταληθάνω is declared unambiguously".¹⁹ Again, this is a standard Sceptical expression which Sextus was careful to explain was "...οὐ δογματικὴν ἀλλ' ἀνθρωπείου πάθους ἀπαγγελίαν, ὅ ἐστι φαινόμενον τῷ πάσχοντι."²⁰

Norman Maccoll writes:-

...Pyrrhonism is more thorough-going than any "Aufklärung"...it was not an attack on this or that philosophy: it was the offspring of despair, and its verdict was a complete abnegation of enquiry.²¹

He does not argue in favour of this view sufficiently to make it possible to comment on his reasons. I agree with Maccoll and Janáček that Sextus is not disposed to inquiry in the sense of positively seeking to discover the truth. Pyrrhonism, as depicted by Sextus, is certainly "more thorough-going than any 'Aufklärung'". However, I disagree with them because I think that Sextus is committed to saying that the Pyrrhonean remains open to the possibility that the truth may be apprehended because he does not assent to any principle upon which he could base an argument to prove that the truth is inapprehensible. In practice, Sextus would have to consider each new argument as it is presented to him. In fact, Sextus devoted years of study examining the arguments of the Dogmatists. His own writings stand as evidence to that fact.

(iii)

I would now like to consider the second view as expressed by Mary Patrick and Victor Brochard.

Patrick writes:-

The two forms of Greek Scepticism, Pyrrhonism and Academic Scepticism, continued to a certain extent distinct in their influence for many centuries, as they had been in their early teachings. Both movements based their Scepticism on the difficulty of obtaining knowledge of reality or of the nature of things. Both recognized the relativity of the ideas which are accepted as the measure of knowledge, and, in fact, the relativity of knowledge itself. Both taught the necessity of constant research in the effort to find knowledge. Denial of the possibility of finding it was not included in the platform of either, although the Academy was often accused of such denial, in the heat of discussions. Both schools advocated a spirit of progress -- the forever seeking. The seeking of the Pyrrhonists was in the direction of scientific research, particularly of empirical or inductive research.²¹

It would be useful to quote another passage which makes her position clearer:-

Pyrrhonism in modern times is found in the laboratory. The attitude of open-mindedness and dependence on scientific experiment in the search for knowledge is the modern type of the Pyrrhonic spirit. ... Pyrrhonism lives in the open-minded attitude of research -- in modern parlance it is called the scientific method of thinking.²³

Patrick does not provide any detailed arguments to justify her interpretation. She seems to think it follows from the fact that Sextus was a doctor and because he says that the Pyrrhonian adopts commemorative signs, the phenomena, the constraint of the passions and the arts as his guide in daily life.

Victor Brochard writes:-

Dans le scepticisme empirique, tel que l'expose Sextus, il y a lieu, selon nous, de distinguer deux parties que Sextus confond, mais qui sont loin d'être identiques: la légitimité de la distinction que nous proposons se justifiera d'elle-même, croyons-nous, par l'exposition des différentes thèses du scepticisme empirique. Les sceptiques sont d'abord des philosophes: ils s'attachent à ruiner le dogmatisme sous toutes ses formes: c'est la partie destructive de leur oeuvre, celle à laquelle ils paraissent avoir attaché le plus d'importance. Mais ils sont en même temps des médecins: il faut qu'ils justifient la science ou plutôt l'art qu'ils cultivent. De là un certain nombre de thèses positives, qu'ils laissaient volontiers au second plan, mais qui sont pour nous du plus haut intérêt, et qu'on peut considérer comme la partie constructive de leur système. En un mot, dans le scepticisme empirique, il convient de distinguer le scepticisme et l'empirisme.²⁴

Brochard runs into difficulties in his attempt to try to distinguish the two parts of Pyrrhonism which Sextus confounded. He offers a summary of the different comments which Sextus makes which might suggest he was an empiricist.²⁵ I have considered at considerable length this evidence in my discussion of the Pyrrhonian fourfold criteria.²⁶ Brochard concludes his brief discussion of this evidence as follows:-

Malheureusement, dans les ouvrages de Sextus que nous avons, ces préceptes ne sont indiqués qu'en passant et par allusion; son but étant principalement de combattre le dogmatisme, il n'a pas à insister sur ce sujet. Il est bien probable que si les ouvrages de médecine nous étaient parvenus, nous aurions sur ces questions de plus amples éclaircissements, et que nous pourrions nous

faire une idée à la fois plus exacte et plus précise de ce que nous avons appelé la partie constructive de l'empirisme sceptique.²¹

He then writes:-

A défaut du témoignage direct de Sextus, nous trouvons chez Galien des textes précis qui montrent avec la plus grande clarté que les médecins empiriques avaient mûrement réfléchi sur les questions de méthode, et qu'ils avaient une théorie savamment élaborée.²⁶

Brochard shows, on the testimony of Galen's De Subfiguratione Empirica and De Sectis, that Menodotus was an empiricist who expounded and practised the doctrines of Empiricism with precision. Brochard does not mention Sextus' name once during this whole discussion. However, he does when he draws his conclusions:-

Ce que nous savons avec certitude de Ménodote et des empiriques, avons-nous le droit de l'étendre à tous les sceptiques? La méthode que nous venons de résumer, et qui est celle des empiriques, est-elle aussi celle des sceptiques, et notamment celle de Sextus Empiricus? Aucun doute ne peut s'élever sur ce point. Si Ménodote est médecin, il est en même temps un des chefs de l'école sceptique. Sextus Empiricus, en même temps qu'il est sceptique, est médecin. D'après son propre témoignage, il s'inspire de Ménodote. Son nom même indique à quelle secte il appartient. S'il lui arrive de critiquer les empiriques, c'est sur un point seulement; et d'ailleurs les méthodiques ne procèdent guère autrement que les empiriques. S'il ne décrit pas la méthode empirique dans les ouvrages que nous avons de lui, c'est que ce n'était point son sujet. Très vraisemblablement ses livres de médecine, si nous les possédions, nous montreraient que, sur les questions de méthode, rien ne sépare Ménodote et Sextus.²⁹

I would like to quote the reference which Brochard gives to support his above quoted statement: "D'après son propre témoignage, il s'inspire de Ménodote".³⁰ Sextus is addressing himself to the question of whether Plato is a genuine Sceptic or not.

περὶ δὲ τοῦ εἶ ἔστιν εἰλικρινῶς σκεπτικὸς
 πλατύτερον μὲν ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι
 διαλαμβάνομεν, νῦν δὲ ὡς ἐν
 ὑποτυπώσει λέγομεν κατὰ τῶν περὶ
 Μηνόδατον καὶ Αἰνησίδημον (οὗτοι γὰρ
 μάλιστα ταύτης προέστησαν τῆς στάσεως)
 ὅτι ὅταν ὁ Πλάτων ἀποφαίνεται περὶ
 ἰδεῶν ἢ περὶ τοῦ πρόνοιαν εἶναι... εἴτε
 ὡς πιθανωτέροις προστίθεται, ἐπεὶ
 προκρίνει τι κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν,
 ἐκπέφυγε τὸν σκεπτικὸν χαρακτῆρα...³¹

This passage indicates precisely the opposite of what Brochard says it does. Incidentally, this is the only passage in which Sextus mentions Menodotus by name. I have attempted to show that Sextus indicates quite clearly that the Pyrrhonian could not consistently be an Empirical Doctor. The following passage almost seems to be addressed to Brochard and Patrick and to have been motivated by a reaction against Menodotus:-

Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τῇ ἐμπειρίᾳ τῇ κατὰ τὴν
 ἰατρικὴν αἵρεσιν τὴν αὐτὴν λέγουσιν τινες
 εἶναι τὴν σκεπτικὴν φιλοσοφίαν, γνωστόν
 ὅτι εἴπερ ἡ ἐμπειρία ἐκείνη περὶ τῆς
 ἀκαταληψίας τῶν ἀδήλων διαβεβαιούται,
 οὔτε ἡ αὐτὴ ἐστὶ τῇ σκέψει οὔτε
 ἄρμόζοι ἂν τῷ σκεπτικῷ τὴν αἵρεσιν
 ἐκείνην ἀναλαμβάνειν.³²

Sextus concludes this discussion with a very definite statement:-

Τοσαῦτα καὶ περὶ τῶν παρακεῖσθαι
δοκούντων τῇ κατὰ τοὺς σκεπτικούς ἀγωγῇ
βιεξελθόντες, ἐν τούτοις ἀπαρτίζομεν
τόν τε καθόλου τῆς σκέψεως λόγον καὶ
τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὑποτυπώσεων σύνταγμα. ³³

I think it is quite absurd to suppose on the basis of such suppositions that Sextus did not indicate his real position in the hundreds of pages that have come down to us. My whole thesis attempts to show that everything Sextus says follows quite consistently from the fact that he determines nothing, that inquiry for Sextus means to show the need to suspend judgement and that the end Sextus seeks is ἀταραξία .

Sextus is correct in saying that the Pyrrhonian goes on searching. He goes on searching in order to establish and re-establish the need to suspend judgement in order that he can attain ἀταραξία .

APPENDIX FIVE

(i)

In the present appendix I will consider the views of those scholars who maintain that Sextus is a positivist and/or an empiricist and/or a phenomenalist. It will be seen that they do not merely say that there is a close connection between modern positivism, empiricism and phenomenism, and Sextus' Pyrrhonism but that Sextus actually subscribes to the basic doctrines of these modern movements. They portray Sextus as being moved by the same concerns and as proposing the same basic solutions as the positivists. I would not deny that these modern movements in philosophy share much in common with Sextus' Pyrrhonism. However, I do maintain that the intention and significance of Sextus' Pyrrhonism is radically different from that of these modern schools of thought. It is not possible to deal briefly with this matter.

The view that Sextus is a positivist must be given special attention because he is regarded as being a phenomenalist and empiricist in the same sense that the positivists are phenomenologists and empiricists. I would like to begin by indicating in a general way what I understand 'positivism' to be and what I think it means to say that someone is 'a positivist'. I only touch upon the points which I consider to be

essential in order to distinguish positivism from Pyrrhonism. In the second part I contrast Pyrrhonism from positivism. In the third part of the present appendix I consider the views expressed in the scholarly literature which identifies Sextus' position with modern movements in philosophy. It is necessary to do this because I believe that scholars have not only distorted Pyrrhonism to make it conform to positivism but that they have also ignored what did not suit them in positivism.

(ii)

Positivism is a theory that theology and metaphysics are earlier imperfect modes of knowledge and that positive knowledge is based on natural phenomena and their properties and relations as verified by empirical science. Both the classical and logical or neopositivists adhere to this view. However, the logical positivists developed a criterion of meaning -- the principle of verifiability -- which maintains characteristically that all meaningful statements are either analytic or conclusively verifiable or at least confirmable by observation and experiment. According to this criterion metaphysical problems are meaningless and unanswerable. Metaphysical propositions are of a merely emotive value.

Positivists are in agreement about two things. Firstly, that metaphysics had failed to attain to a science and was doomed to failure. The time had come for the philosopher to abandon the attempt to discover the intrinsic nature of things. Secondly, the positivists believed that philosophy need not be

abandoned but could continue to serve a purposeful function if it were to model itself after the particular sciences and act at least in part as a handmaid to the particular scientists.

The general positivistic attitude is that the empirical sciences provide the only reliable source of knowledge about the world. The function of philosophy must be purely analytical if it is to be scientific. Philosophy cannot go beyond the particular sciences and discover scientific knowledge of the world on its own. The philosopher should occupy himself with such tasks as clarifying some of the fundamental concepts employed by the particular sciences and with problems in scientific methodology.¹

The positivist regards himself as a man of science and a man with a science. The positivist finds the model for 'scientific philosophy' already present and flourishing in mathematics and the empirical sciences. Failure (metaphysics) lies in the past and success is alive in the present (modern science). "Those who work in the new philosophy," Reichenbach writes, "do not look back."² Philosophers today, according to Reichenbach, need merely join hands with the special sciences and ripe its fruits. He writes:-

Such is the balance of a comparison between the old and the new philosophy. The modern philosopher renounces very much; but he also gains very much. What a difference between the science built on the basis of experiments and the science derived from reason alone! How much more reliable, in spite of their uncertainty, are the predictions of the scientist than those of the philosopher who claimed to have an

immediate insight into the ultimate laws of the universe! How superior is an ethics not bound by rules allegedly dictated by a higher authority, when new social conditions emerge, unforeseeable for older ethical systems! ³

The positivist, then, is an active member of a post-metaphysical movement in philosophy and is prepared to indicate what the business of philosophy is today. He has a criterion which not only enables him to reject metaphysics outright but which also enables him to establish a new positive science. The positivist looks to the social sciences -- psychology, sociology, and anthropology -- to find out about man and to the natural sciences to find out about nature. He is prepared to assert that it is a psychological or sociological or scientific fact that such and such is the case. The positivist neither finds himself in the position of possessing absolute knowledge nor in a state of absolute ignorance. ⁴

(iii)

One would be hard pressed to find a positivist who would say that he conducts his life by simply passively yielding to the dictates of the social, political, and religious institutions of his country without concerning himself with what they prescribe beyond showing the need to suspend judgement as regards their veracity. Sextus says that the Pyrrhoneans passively yield to practical criteria without assenting to it. He adopts the criteria because he needs some sort of rule of guidance by which to make decisions and not because he

positively believes that he has found an acceptable criteria. He completely suspends judgement as regards the acceptability of his criteria.

Positivists beckon man to stand on their own feet and to trust their own volitions because they are their own volitions. Man should throw away the crutches which the church and traditional customs provide. No one should dictate to us how we ought to behave.

The Pyrrhonian, in contrast, is passive, obedient and without opinion. When in Rome he does as the Romans do. Why, then, does the Pyrrhonian lack the positive, critical, and self assertive character of the positivist? The answer, I think, is quite simple and obvious. He is a sceptic through and through. He determines nothing. He does not know anything; not even that he does not know anything. He does not assert anything more than anything else. The logical consequence of this is that he does not have any convictions and beliefs which he wishes to stand up for and assert or defend against the order of the day. He does not believe that he has anything better to replace the laws and customs with. Thus, he simply yields to them without assenting. Whereas Pyrrhonism is passive and submissive, positivism is assertive and positive.

The Sceptical end is freedom from disturbance. In respect to matters in which absolute freedom from disturbance cannot be realized he seeks moderation which is to say that he seeks freedom from disturbance in so far as it can be

realized. He involves himself in those arts which free him from the disturbances caused by pain, hunger, illiteracy, and so on. I do not believe that there is any evidence in the writings of Sextus which would contradict the view that Sextus' interest in the affairs of daily life and in scientific inquiry is limited to what is practically necessary. The 'desirable', I believe, is strictly limited to what frees one from disturbance and leads to a calmness of the soul. He is not a lover of money, of pleasure or even of such ideals as justice or the good. He is a lover of man which, in his case, means that he wants to show man the Pyrrhonian way in order that he may be freed of disturbance so far as is possible.

The positivists, in contrast, are as deeply involved in solving the social ills of the day as are any philosophical movements. They actively involve themselves in debates concerning political, social, and religious issues with a view to coming to definite solutions and not merely with showing the utter futility of entering into such controversies. The positivists share in the confidence, which the modern social sciences entertain, that through careful study and research major social problems can be cured and that progress can be made. They do not advocate resignation. Sextus was not an advocate of political or social reform. The Pyrrhonian would be more apt to simply endure the evils of their day than to involve himself in the struggle of opinions in fighting for justice. He does not even discuss social or political problems. He does consider psychological problems -- causes of

perturbation -- because Pyrrhonism has a cure for them. Suspend judgement and abandon the activity of pursuing what you deem good and desirable by nature. Endure the suffering which does not result from your own beliefs and convictions in a good by nature. Sextus goes so far as to say that the source of perturbation is the activity of pursuit and avoidance. Thus one would not expect Sextus to wish to become party to any opinion or any controversy. Sextus, as one would expect of a Sceptic, is more indifferent to political and social problems and to self-fulfillment than are the positivists.

One can find evidence in the writings of Sextus which indicates that Sextus believed that certain kinds of arts are useful and that Pyrrhoneans could be practitioners of those arts which are not inconsistent with Scepticism. However, one cannot find any definite evidence which indicates that he regarded Pyrrhonism as a handmaid to any art or to the arts in general. This distinction is extremely important. The Pyrrhonean, for example, may well be a medical doctor and go about curing ailments. He may even find new methods of treating certain grievances. There is no indication in Sextus' work that he considered it a function of the Pyrrhonean to constructively and positively clarify and analyse the concepts of the particular sciences and to aid them in this manner in their progress. The fact that several Pyrrhoneans were involved in the medical profession may be accountable for by virtue of the fact that they were inclined to do something

practical and wished to earn a living and did not wish to sit around all day declaring 'I determine nothing'. Pyrrhoneans may also have been farmers, pilots, and shop keepers. Sextus' discussion of the various arts is bitterly polemical in nature. His only constructive comments are those in which he says that the Pyrrhonean accept those arts which serve an eminently practical purpose such as medicine, agriculture, and the teaching of reading and writing. One cannot conclude on the basis of this that Sextus conceived of Pyrrhonism as being a handmaiden of the arts.

Were Sextus alive today, to speculate on an interesting though perhaps unanswerable question, would he be in a research laboratory as Patrick says, or would he have been present at the meeting of the Vienna Circle as Dumont, Chisholm, and a number of others seem to suggest? If you can answer the following question you know what Sextus would be doing were he alive today. How can one attain to ἀραξία in the twentieth century?

(iv)

Roderick M. Chisholm offers the following assessment of Sextus Empiricus' contributions to philosophy:-

His most significant contributions are: first, the positivistic and behavioristic theory of signs which he opposed to the metaphysical theory of the Stoics; secondly, his discussion of phenomenism and its relation to common sense claims to knowledge; and, thirdly, his account of the controversy over the principle of extensionality in logic,

where the anticipation of contemporary doctrines is perhaps most remarkable.⁵

Chisholm, no doubt, can justly point out the fact that many statements which Sextus makes are repeated almost word for word by modern empiricists, pragmatists, behavioralists, positivists and so on. This is indisputable. How significant is this fact? Clearly Chisholm thinks it is extremely significant. He writes:-

As an empiricist, Sextus defended the commemorative sign and rejected the indicative sign. His own theory was a clear statement of the essential principles of positivism, pragmatism, and behaviorism.⁶

Chisholm argues that Sextus rejected the indicative sign because it purports to enable us to apprehend truths about non-empirical objects -- entities which transcend all possible experience. Any assertion made on the basis of an indicative sign must be rejected since it cannot be supported by an appeal to previous experience. Thus, Chisholm concludes, Sextus rejects indicative signs as an empiricist and as a positivist since he rejects indicative signs on the grounds that they cannot be verified by experience.

However, Sextus, as Chisholm notes, rejects induction as well as deduction. Sextus says that it is easy to show that one must set aside the method of induction since one can never establish the universal from the particular because the particulars are infinite and indefinite. Chisholm writes:-

This does not mean, however, that induction should be abandoned. Sextus' point is that we have no grounds for

certainty, even after adhering scrupulously (as, according to him, we must) to the principles of empiricism. In conceding the possibility of commemorative signs, he granted that we have reason for associating phenomena and preparing for some sequences and conjunctions rather than for others.¹

But does Sextus grant the "we have reason for..."? Does Sextus scrupulously adhere to the principles of empiricism? I think not. It is necessary to consider this carefully since everything depends upon it.

Does Sextus, as Chisholm argues, defend the commemorative sign as an empiricist? Or, would it not be more accurate to say that the Sceptic simply yields to the commemorative sign without assenting to it or defending or trying to justify it. The distinction I have in mind here may be made clearer by considering the difference between the Sceptic and the true believer as regards the laws and customs of the state. Both observe and obey the laws and customs. In this they are the same. However, the Sceptic simply yields to them without assenting to their veracity whereas the true believer does positively believe in their veracity and is prepared to defend them. I think that Sextus differs from the empiricist as regards the commemorative sign because he suspends judgement absolutely as regards the validity of the commemorative sign and simply yields to it without giving his assent whereas the empiricist, at least, is prepared to defend and argue the case for assenting to a commemorative sign on the basis of empirical evidence. The only "reason" Sextus gives for accepting

commemorative signs is because they are relied on by living experience. One cannot function without following commemorative signs. He does not attempt to justify the commemorative sign as providing a criterion according to which one could come to know anything. Sextus does not subscribe to any empirical doctrines any more than he subscribes to the belief in the existence of the gods.⁸ The Sceptic acts as if he believed in the existence of the gods and he acts as if induction and commemorative signs were valid. Sextus does not speak of the commemorative sign as being indicative of probability. He has no epistemological criterion whatsoever. He simply says that Pyrrhoneans follow commemorative signs in order to have some rule of guidance in daily life and is prepared to say no more. If that makes Sextus an empiricist then it follows that every human being and many animals qualify as empiricists.

But why would Sextus choose to yield to commemorative signs without giving assent and not follow indicative signs in the same way? The answer to this question, I think, follows quite consistently from Sextus' announcement that he determines nothing. Just as the Sceptic does not determine the laws which he observes but simply obeys the given laws of his state so also the Sceptic does not attempt to determine what the real nature of things is but simply follows appearances. What the indicative sign is indicative of must be determined by the inquirer whereas what the commemorative sign signifies does not have to be determined (i.e. deduced

or derived) but merely observed and recollected. When the Sceptic sees smoke he would expect fire to be present not because he has discovered a reason why they should exist in conjunction with each other but simply because he remembers that he has seen fire and smoke present in conjunction with each other before and has decided quite arbitrarily to act as if what he recalls of past experience will hold true for present and future experiences. He does not assert this as a principle or doctrine which he adheres to but rather as a rule which he will observe just as he observes the laws and customs of his state.

Sextus does not at any point in his writings attempt to set out the limits of human understanding with a view to determining what sort of science man is capable of. He does not reject metaphysics in favour of the empirical sciences. He does not assert that the empirical sciences provide a reliable -- or the only reliable -- source of knowledge about the world. To conclude that Sextus maintained such a dogmatic position on the basis of the fact that he accepted (i.e. accepted as distinct from assented to) the commemorative sign but rejected the indicative sign is quite unreasonable.

Sextus' purpose is not to lay down the foundation of a new form of philosophy or to take the side of the empiricist against the metaphysicians. His purpose is purely Sceptical -- to show the need to suspend judgement, to show how one can live an active life without assenting or denying anything and to show how man can attain to ἀταραξία in respect to matters

of opinion and to μετριοπαθεια in respect to matters according to necessity. Sextus accepts certain rules of conduct because he finds them compatible with Scepticism and not because they are consistent with the principles of empiricism and positivism. If the rules he accepts tend to be compatible with empiricism or positivism it is only because certain aspects of empiricism or positivism happen to be compatible with Scepticism. It is as a Sceptic and not as a positivist or an empiricist that Sextus says what he says.

Chisholm does not indicate in what sense 'Sextus' own theory' of signs is a clear statement of the principles of behaviorism. Sextus does not say anything which would suggest that he employed the commemorative sign in more of a distinctive way than would any human being or than any philosopher. He certainly gives no indication that he was interested in making a study of animal psychology on the basis of behavioral observation made under artificial and restricted conditions. Sextus may be said to be a behavioralist in the same sense that everyone may be said to be a behavioralist.

Chisholm argues that Sextus is a phenomenalist:-

Sextus' discussion of our knowledge of the external world suggests a purely phenomenalist epistemology. He began by acknowledging the importance of what is now called "the given" and he recognized that an adequate analysis of empirical knowledge must lead to that which is indisputably and irrevocably presented in experience. Although the true sceptic should question any proposition which refers beyond that which is immediately before him, it is impossible, according to Sextus, to be sceptical about the given itself. 9

But does Sextus limit knowledge to phenomena or maintain that phenomena provides or expresses knowledge? Naess, I believe quite correctly, argues against Chisholm. He writes:-

Chisholm remarks: 'Although the sceptic does not deny appearances, he does deny the possibility of knowledge which refers beyond them.' It is a main point of Sextus' account, however, to make us understand that he neither denies nor affirms the possibility of knowledge, but lets the question remain open. It is true that Sextus does not deny appearances, in the sense of refusing to accept them; but he neither asserts nor denies statements like 'It is hot' or 'I feel hot' or any other statement said to express what appears to him. Appearances are 'beyond question', but not in the sense of furnishing or expressing knowledge. If they are beyond question, they are also beyond answer.¹⁰

Phenomena themselves, in Sextus' view, are not verifiable. Sextus is not prepared to say what phenomena are. He suspends judgement. "Phenomena in Sextus' terminology", as Naess writes, "are indeed self-evident, but not in the sense of self-known. For we do not know anything simply in so far as something appears." " The Sceptic says 'Honey appears to me to be sweet'. He suspends judgement as to what honey and sweetness are. What, then, does he mean when he makes such an announcement? His announcement is simply an attempt to express the sensation he is experiencing. He does not try to explain or understand or give an account of the phenomena. Every human being accepts phenomena simply because every human suffers involuntary affections. The Sceptic goes no further than saying 'I am being affected in an mmm-ish way or

in an yeek-ish way.'

Chisholm writes:-

He insisted that appearances are the ultimate test of anything which purports to be knowledge and that any statement whatever, if it is significant, must be testable by reference to them. If our knowledge is expressible in propositions, there is a correspondence between the proposition and that which is found in sense experience, and this can be verified by "comparing" the propositions with the empirical facts which they are about.¹²

The ten tropes of Aenesidemus which Sextus adopts show that phenomena does not provide a test for anything. Different species of animals, different human beings, the same person under different circumstances and so on are affected differently by the same object. There is no such a thing as 'common' sense either in respect to sense affections (tropes 1 - 9) or in respect to what seems right and reasonable (trope 10).

Chisholm's argument that Sextus is a phenomenalist is based upon the fact that Sextus frequently argues that it is necessary to suspend judgement concerning any proposition which is not verified by experience. Chisholm fails to note that Sextus argues that what is given in experience must be verified by comparing it with what is in reality, which does not appear to Sextus to be possible.

Chisholm says that Sextus "appears to have been a Diodoran" and thus to have adhered to an intensional conception of logic.¹³ The only evidence Chisholm presents to show

this is that Sextus argued against the Philonian functional or extensional conception of logic. All Sextus really does is give an account of the controversy between Philo of Megara and Diodorus Cronos over the question of whether logic is intentional or extensional and draws the following conclusion which Chisholm fails to note:-

Τοιαύτης οὖν οὔσης ὡς ἐν παραδείγματος
μέρει τῆς ἐν τοῖς κριτηρίοις τοῦ
συνημμένου ἀξιώματος ὑπεναντιώσεως,
μήποτε ἄπορος γίνεται ἢ τοῦ ὑγλοῦς
συνημμένου διάγνωσις. ἵνα γὰρ μάθωμεν
τοῦτο, πρὸ παντός δεῖ ἐπικριθῆναι τὴν
περὶ τῆς ὑγλότητος αὐτοῦ τῶν διαλεκτικῶν
διάστασιν. ἐφ' ὅσον δὲ ἀνεπίκριτός
ἐστὶ, μένειν ἀνάγκη καὶ αὐτὸ ἐν ἐποχῇ.¹⁴

Again, it must be said that Sextus did not subscribe to any doctrine.

(v)

Jean-Paul Dumont writes:-

Contrairement à l'idée reçue, le scepticisme grec n'est pas un nihilisme...qui a fait du non-savoir le dernier mot du scepticisme. Qu'en revanche les sceptiques grecs anciens, comme Pyrrhon et Timon, ou plus récents, comme Sextus Empiricus, n'aient jamais mis en doute la validité de nos représentations subjectives, de nos impressions sensibles ou encore des phénomènes...precisions ici que le véritable visage du pyrrhonisme se reconnaît presque trait pour trait sous le masque du positivisme moderne.¹⁵

I agree with Dumont that Sextus is not a nihilist but for very different reasons. Nihilists deny that there is any

objective ground of truth (especially moral truth) and assert that traditional values are unfounded. Sextus, of course, does not subscribe to such a doctrine because it is dogmatic. Dumont goes much further than that and maintains that Sextus was not a nihilist because he accepted a definite criterion. "Le phénomène", Dumont writes, "devient l'équivalent de ce qu'était le pathos pour les Cyrenaïques."¹⁶

The Cyrenaics do not regard sense affections with complete neutrality. They maintain that sense affections provide a criterion for the individual -- the pleasant is desirable and good. Sextus argues that the Sceptical end (ἀταραξία) is the opposite of the Cyrenaic end because the man who positively affirms pleasure to be the end undergoes perturbation whether pleasure is present or not.¹⁷ The Cyrenaics do not seek tranquility of the mind or freedom from disturbance but positive enjoyment. Sense affections actually indicate to the Cyrenaic what his end is. One would not come to think ἀταραξία is one's end on the basis of sense affection -- using sense affections as a criterion of what is desirable. Dumont argues that Sextus is merely quibbling over words in distinguishing the Pyrrhonian end from that of the Cyrenaics. He writes:-

C'est au niveau des fins qu'apparaît chez les Cyrénaïques une différence avec les Pyrrhoniens. Dans le paragraphe très court des Hypotyposes qui leur est consacré, Sextus Empiricus s'empresse de noter qu'ils ont eu tort de remplacer l'ataraxie par le plaisir (hèdonè). En réalité le mot hèdonè a

peut-être, si le texte d'Eusèbe n'est pas altéré, constitué la fin du scepticisme pour Aénésidème. Il semble que Sextus Empiricus cherche une mauvaise querelle de mots contre les Cyrénaïques. Il dit lui-même que leur conception de la fin est parfaitement cohérente avec leur conception du pathos comme critère. Par conséquent, il devrait y avoir coïncidence entre leur conception de la vie et de l'opinion de ce qui nous semble bon, entendues comme critères de la conduite et ce que les Pyrrhoniens professent eux-mêmes, à savoir: "prendre la vie pour guide".¹⁸

Dumont's whole interpretation of Pyrrhonism is at issue here. The Pyrrhoneans, in Dumont's view, were phenomenologists and their primary intention was to be proponents of phenomenology. Their attack on metaphysics was merely intended to serve the purpose of making way for phenomenology. If one determines what one's end is by adopting phenomena as one's criterion it would follow quite reasonably that pleasure is one's end. Sextus would not be able to distinguish the Pyrrhonian end from the Cyrenaic end if both were phenomenologists. However, if the Pyrrhoneans are not phenomenologists but rather Sceptics who adopt the phenomena as a criterion in the same sense that every human being adopts such a criterion in daily life then Sextus may have grounds for drawing a distinction between the phenomenologist's end and his end as a Sceptic. It need only be remarked that Sextus realizes his end by suspending judgement and not by following phenomena.

Dumont comments on the meaning and purport of ἀταρ-
αξία as used by Sextus as follows:-

Notons bien par ailleurs, en effet, que l'absence de trouble ne s'étend pas au

domaine des choses nécessaires, comme la faim, la soif, la douleur. Il ne s'agit pas de la conquête orientale d'une impassibilité totale, mais de cette sorte d'hédonè (ou plaisir) comme disait Aristocles à propos d'Aénesidème, disons de volupté heureuse qui fait retrouver soudain tout le charme de la vie et tout le prix de l'existence, après les tourments et les fatigues que l'entendement a connus."

Dumont cannot find a text in Sextus or in Diogenes Laertius to support such an interpretation. He is correct in saying that the Pyrrhonian end as depicted by Sextus is not "la conquête orientale d'une impassibilité totale" if only for the reason that Sextus realized that ἀταραξία could not be realized perfectly in respect to matters according necessity. However, to argue that Sextus maintained that sensual happiness is the Sceptical end according to Sextus is simply ridiculous.

It should be noted that both Brochard and Dumont end up resorting to texts other than Sextus' own writings in order to find evidence to support their interpretations of Sextus' essential position. I have discussed Brochard's view that Sextus is an empiricist in Appendix Four. Dumont draws upon Aristocles' comments regarding Aenesidemus and Brochard looks to Galen's testimony on Menodotus. Sextus, in both cases, directly addressed himself to the views Dumont and Brochard propound and rejects them. The tendency in modern scholarly literature is to not rest content with the fact that Sextus is a Sceptic in the most radical sense of the word. His practical criteria are intended to be consistent with the

Sceptical announcements (οὐ μᾶλλον, οὐδὲν ὀριστέον) and to facilitate the realization of ἀταραξία in so far as it is possible in daily life.

Dumont argues that a trust and confidence in phenomena is "une constante du scepticisme de Sextus Empiricus".²⁰ What Dumont means by a confidence in phenomena is not made clear. Dumont points to the fact that he adopts phenomena as a criterion. Dumont does mention that Sextus simply yields to phenomena without assenting to it as he does to the laws and customs of the state. As regards the latter Dumont says that he must recognize the conventions in order to be able to conduct his life -- "Suivre et non respecter."²¹ Is it not the same with phenomena? Dumont wishes to make a special case for phenomena. He must if he is to justify his thesis that Sextus is a phenomenalist.

Dumont illustrates Sextus' confidence in phenomena by quoting the following two passages:-

i) Τὸ πῦρ φύσει ἀλεαίνον πᾶσι φαίνεται
ἀλεαντικόν, καὶ ἡ χιών φύσει ψύχουσα
πᾶσι φαίνεται ψυκτικὴ καὶ πάντα τὰ
φύσει κινούμενα ὁμοίως πάντας κινεῖ
τοὺς κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς φασίν, ἔχοντας.²²

ii) ... τὰ γὰρ φαινόμενα πᾶσιν ὁμοίως φαίνεται.²³

What is most remarkable about the first passage is that Sextus says "fire heats by nature" and "snow chills by nature". If this passage is to be used to reveal Sextus' position one should not, as Dumont has done, merely say that it indicates

that Sextus trusted in phenomena but one should also say that it shows that Sextus believed he had grasped the underlying nature of things -- "τὸ πῶρ φύσει ἀλεαίνων... ἢ χιῶν φύσει ψύχουσα". Dumont knows that Sextus would not positively assert what anything is by nature so he ignores this curious aspect of Sextus' assertion. But why should he accept the aspect of this assertion which suits his own argument and which contradicts what Sextus says when he is not contriving arguments to refute the Dogmatists? This passage occurs as part of an argument which shows that no natural goods exist because all things which move by nature move equally all those in a natural condition but the 'goods' do not move all men as being good. Sextus is presenting a Dogmatic argument to counteract other Dogmatic arguments with a view of showing the need to suspend judgement.

The second passage quoted above occurs as a premise in a polemical argument which shows that the apparent cannot be taught. Again, if one were to attempt to discover what Sextus' real position is on the basis of the premises he uses in polemical arguments one would end up with a rather curious picture. Sextus argues pro and con on every question which comes up and adopts premises to suit his purpose. He does not assent to any of them. At least, he claims he does not. This is very questionable evidence to call upon in order to justify an interpretation which runs contrary to the most basic announcements of Sextus. Sextus, for example, says that Pyrrhoniens oppose phenomena to noumena with equal force. He uses

this opposition more than any other when considering the views of the physicists on motion, body, and so on. He claims that he does not assert anything more than anything else. Sextus goes little further than saying that the Sceptic does not deny that appearances appear. He says that in reply to those who accused the Sceptics of abolishing phenomena.

Victor Brochard merits quoting at considerable length:-

...c'est-a-dire un véritable dogmatisme. Nous avons déjà eu l'occasion de le remarquer plusieurs fois, les sceptiques empiriques sont les véritables ancêtres du positivisme. Réduire la connaissance à l'observation des phénomènes et des séries qu'ils forment, s'interdire la recherche des causes, substituer l'induction à la démonstration et décrire l'association des idées comme ils l'ont fait, c'est bien, en ce qu'elle a d'essentiel, la thèse de nos modernes positivistes. Or, ce n'est pas faire injure aux positivistes que de les considérer comme des dogmatistes, et même comme les plus dogmatistes de tous les hommes. Non seulement ils prétendent posséder la science, mais ils ajoutent que hors d'eux il n'y a ni vérité, ni certitude. Etrange reversement des idées et des mots, et spectacle instructif entre tous! Les savants d'aujourd'hui sont les sceptiques d'autrefois: les mêmes doctrines, auxquelles on refusait jadis expressément le caractère de la certitude, sont celles pour lesquelles aujourd'hui on revendique exclusivement la certitude. Ne nous faisons pas toutefois d'illusion sur la modestie des médecins empiriques. S'ils n'ont pas osé revendiquer pour leur étude le nom de science, s'ils se sont contentés de celui d'art ou de routine, c'est peut-être parce que leurs maladroits essais pour appliquer la méthode d'observation ne leur ont donné que de jaigres résultats. Ils auraient sans doute été plus heureux si, au lieu d'appliquer leurs procédés à la médecine, la plus difficile et la plus complexe des sciences expérimentales, ils les eussent transportés dans la physique.

Très probablement le succès les aurait enhardis, et, rejetant le titre de sceptiques, ils se seraient proclamés des savants, les seuls savants, et on les aurait vus dogmatiser d'importance.

Disons donc, si on veut, que leur théorie est un dogmatisme dans l'enfance, un dogmatisme que ne se connaît ni ne se possède encore pleinement: on ne peut refuser d'y voir un dogmatisme. 24

"...c'est-a-dire un véritable dogmatisme." I have argued in Appendix Four that Brochard's thesis on the empiricism of Sextus is very questionable since it is based on the assumption that what can be said of Menodotus can also be said of Sextus. It is also assumed that despite the fact that Sextus' extant works do not provide sufficient evidence to justify Brochard's thesis that his lost works would. Sextus, one can say with certainty, would defend himself against the charge that part of his position is a true Dogmatism. If it could be shown to him, which I doubt that it could, that he does adhere to a Dogmatism he would say that he must correct himself.

"Réduire la connaissance a l'observation..." Sextus certainly does not indicate that he is limiting knowledge to a particular sphere. Rather, he says that he remains open to the possibility that metaphysical questions may be answerable though he expresses grave doubts. His intention is not to set out rigidly the limits of knowledge but rather to show the Dogmatists that they must suspend judgement. He argues for the need of practicing a suspensive attitude towards all forms of knowledge. Thus he says that the Sceptic simply yields to practical criteria, such as Brochard indicates above, without assenting or positively affirming to anything in order that

they may not be altogether inactive. Why does Brochard not mention the fact that Sextus says that the Pyrrhoneans follow the conventions of their country just as they do phenomena? Sextus makes no claim that he has ascertained knowledge whether limited or absolute. His main point is that the Sceptics do not abolish living experience but that they preserve it in that they adopt the criteria which every living human being must adopt whether a positivist or whoever. They differ from ordinary folk in that they do not assent to it. Again, Brochard only presents the evidence which suits his interpretation.

"Or, ce n'est pas faire injure aux positivistes..."

I would like to consider Brochard's statement from that point to the end. Firstly, it should be said that what Sextus most disliked about the Dogmatists was the fact that they were vain and puffed up men. Sextus regarded the Sophists and the Empirical Doctors as being Dogmatists who were vain despite the fact that they did not claim to possess absolute knowledge. The humble suspensive attitude of the Pyrrhonean, which is necessary if one is to attain to ἀταραξία, is possible only if one determines nothing. The positive attitude of the positivists runs directly contrary to the attitude which, in Sextus' view, is necessary if one is to attain to the end which Sextus, above all else, wishes to show man how he can realize it. Sextus regards the fact that he has not been able to determine anything as a blessing in disguise since this very fact is the key to happiness and not something to try to

escape from. Would Sextus be attracted to a position which shows that man does not need to suspend judgement absolutely? This is the deciding question. The answer seems to me to be quite obvious. No. The last thing which he is inclined towards is finding a way around the suspension of judgement -- a way around the Pyrrhonian way. The positive attitude of the particular sciences is quite alien and contradictory to the suspensive attitude of Pyrrhonism.

Brochard does not seem to understand why the Pyrrhonian were attracted to medicine rather than physics. It was no accident. Their interest in medicine was due to their interest in freeing man from perturbation in the most obvious way possible. The suffering, which one endures when sick, is undeniably disquieting and disturbing. It destroys one's perfect calm. The products of physics, were Sextus alive today, would seem to him to be as much a source of perturbation as a relief from it. Sextus' interest in the arts is limited to what obviously serves to free man from suffering. Sextus would pity rather than envy modern man's possession of technology and sophistic scientific knowledge. The ancients were obsessed with discovering the intrinsic nature of the universe; the moderns are obsessed with discovering the relative nature of the world. Sextus would not regard one better than the other. Watching rats in labyrinths is no more compatible with Pyrrhonism than speculating on whether the soul is simple or complex. The desire to know -- the pursuit of happiness in knowledge -- is itself contrary to Pyrrhonism.

Sextus argues that it is a freedom from desire and suffering that leads to happiness. Vanity and pride accompany success in science. Sextus could only regard the awesome triumphs of modern science as a threat to human quietude and tranquility. I believe that Sextus would even be disheartened by the tremendous successes of modern medicine because they have encouraged man to cling on to life inordinately and to occupy himself in an almost narcotic battle against the inevitable course of nature which ends in death. Tranquility, in Sextus' view, comes about when man is content to accept quite simply his lot in life and is not obsessed with the pursuit and expectation of better things. The art of medicine, as Sextus knew it, was a simple art serving an obvious need. The particular sciences, as we know them today, which inspire the positivists, are far removed from what Sextus knew. Sextus would find the writings of Henry David Thoreau far more akin to his own than he would find the writings of Comte and his successors or of Einstein or of Durkheim.

NOTES

CHAPTER TWO

1. W. Vollgraff, 'La vie des Sextus Empiricus', Revue de Philologie, (1902), pp. 195-210. This is the most recent detailed study on the life of Sextus Empiricus.
2. Patrick, Pappenheim, Haas, Brochard, Zeller and Goedeckemeyer place Sextus late in the second century. Vollgraff (p. 201) argues that Sextus was head of the Pyrrhonian School from 115 to 135 A.D.. Their views are discussed in detail in the pages which follow.
3. E. Pappenheim, Lebensverhältnisse des Sextus Empiricus, (Berlin, 1887) p. 13; M. Patrick, Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism, (Cambridge, 1899), pp. 8, 10, 14, 20; V. Brochard, Les Sceptiques grecs, (2nd ed., Paris, 1932, reprinted Paris, 1959), pp. 314-315; M. Haas, Leben des Sextus Empiricus, (Burghausen, 1882), p. 15; A. Goedeckemeyer, Die Geschichte des griechischen Skeptizismus, (Leipzig, 1905, reprinted Darmstadt, 1968) pp. 266, 274; E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, (5th ed., ed. by E. Wellman, Leipzig, 1923), vol. iii, pt. 2, pp. 10, 49.
4. Sextus Empiricus' polemical treatises all begin with a survey of the dogmas, which have been asserted by the poets and philosophers through the ages, which are relevant to the topic which he proposes to study. He does not treat them in chronological order. Sextus Empiricus appears to be solely concerned with the fact that they were dogmatists.
5. P.H. i 65.
6. see: P.H. i 69 ff.
7. P.H. i 69.
8. P.H. i 69.
9. "Les historiens insistent, pour fixer la date de Sextus, sur ce fait qu'il nomme le stoïcien Basilides (M., VIII, 258),

qu'on regarde généralement comme un des maîtres de Marc-Aurèle. Mais Zeller a montré qu'il s'agit peut-être ici d'un autre Basilides, compris dans la liste des vingt stoïciens dont un fragment de Diogène, récemment publié par Val. Rose (*Hermès*, I, p. 370, Berlin, 1866), nous fait connaître les noms. Au surplus, quand il serait acquis par là que Sextus est postérieur à Marc-Aurèle, ce fait ne jetterait pas une grande lumière sur l'époque précise de sa vie." Brochard, p. 315_g.

10. E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, vol. iii, Pt. 2, p. 10₄. M. Patrick (p. 9) notes that Zeller accepted the view that Basilides was identical with one of the teachers of Marcus Aurelius in the second edition of the above mentioned work but rejected this view in the third edition of the same work.
11. see: M. i 1-6.
12. D.L. ix 116.
13. Goedeckemeyer (p. 266), Patrick (p. 9), Zeller (p. 10), and Brochard (p. 315) take the view that the Herodotus who Diogenes (D.L. ix 116) mentions was the Herodotus mentioned by Galen (See Zeller, pp. 3₁ and 10₄). L. Robin, *Pyrrhon et le scepticisme grec*, (Paris, 1944), p. 197 disagrees with them. The evidence which Galen gives on the relation of the Pyrrhoneans to the Medical Sects is scattered throughout his works. Zeller and Brochard provide the most detailed discussion of this evidence. They do not deal with this evidence separately but rather they introduce it into their discussions of the particular Sceptics.
14. Patrick, p. 10.
15. "Dass Sextus vor 220 gelebt hat, ergibt sich daraus, dass Hippolytus ihn in seiner zwischen 220 und 230 verfassten Widerlegung der Haeresien benutzt hat..." Goedeckemeyer, p. 266₂. H. Chadwick, in *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* (2nd ed. 1970), fixes Hippolytus' dates as c. 170 - c. 236 A.D. The evidence, which Goedeckemeyer cites, would, at least, indicate that Sextus lived before 236 A.D.
16. Patrick, p. 10.
17. Suda or Suidas, *Lexicon*, ed. by I. Bekker, (Berlin 1854). The evidence in the *Suda* is quoted and examined at length when the views of Vollgraff are considered. (see pp. 27-38).
18. "Wenn Suid. IIb, 714 Bernh. in seine Angaben über den ... besprochenen Sextus aus Chaeronea, den Neffen Plutarch's, solche über Sextus Empir. und dessen Schriften einmengt, einen Theil der letzteren aber (die 3 uns erhaltenen)

Sp. 715 auch wieder einem Σέξτος Αίβυς beilegt, so beweist diess, wie längst bemerkt worden ist, lediglich, dass in diesem Fall, wie bei Suid. öfters, verschiedene Artikel durch einander gerathen sind." Zeller, p. 50, note 1 continued from p. 49. See Brochard, p. 316.

19. Haas, p. 6. Vollgraff also believes the Suda to be accurate. See: pp. 27-38.
20. M. i 295.
21. It has been argued that Libya is given special attention of the sort that would suggest it was Sextus Empiricus' home land. See: Patrick, p. 11. However, the evidence is too weak to support this view to merit serious consideration.
22. P.H. i 83; M. xi 15, 16; P.H. iii 202, 205.
23. P.H. i 84; P.H. iii 224; M. viii 147; M. ii 105.
24. P.H. ii 98; M. viii 145; P.H. iii 24; M. ix 368; M. i 87; M. i 148; M. i 228; M. i 246; M. ii 22,35,77; M. vi 14.
25. P.H. ii 221; M. x 15, 95.
26. P.H. i 149, 152; P.H. iii 211; M. i 218.
27. Patrick, pp. 12-21.
28. Patrick, pp. 12 and 13.
29. P.H. ii 98 and M. viii 145 (Athens); P.H. iii 221 (Alexandria). The evidence as regards Athens is weak. All he says is that Athens is not in his line of vision at the moment that he lectures. Whether his view of Athens is simply blocked because he is in a room or not is made clear.
30. P.H. iii 120.
31. Pappenheim, Der Sitz der Schule der griechischen Skeptiker, (Berlin, 1887), p. 4.
32. See: P.H. i 152; P.H. iii 211, 214. "οἷον νόμῳ μὲν, ὅταν λέγωμεν παρὰ μὲν Πέρσας ἔθος εἶναι ἀρρενομιξίας χρῆσθαι, παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις ἀπαγορεύεσθαι νόμῳ τοῦτο πράττειν, καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ μοιχεύει ἀπειρῆσθαι..." Haas argues that "παρ' ἡμῖν" is referring back to "παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις". The statement goes on: "...παρὰ δὲ Μασσαγέταις ἀδιαφορίας ἔθει παραδεδῶσθαι, ὡς Εὐδοξὸς ὁ Κνίδιος ἱστορεῖ..." P.H. i 152. This evidence is very weak. It could equally well be used to show that Sextus Empiricus was teaching at Persia!

33. "νόμος δέ ἐστὶν ἔγγραφος συνθήκη παρὰ τοῖς πολιτευομένοις, ἣν ὁ παραβαίνων κολάζεται." P.H. i 146.
34. Haas does not attempt to show that the laws Sextus identifies with would not conform with the Greek laws also. Were he to argue this he would find himself in great difficulty because Sextus does not speak of laws which are curiously provincial. In the late second century the general laws of Greece and Rome were almost identical.
35. Haas, pp. 14 and 15.
36. Patrick, p. 18.
37. Patrick, p. 20.
38. D.L. ix 116.
39. See: Zeller p. 50, note 1 continued from p. 49.
40. See: p. 20
41. Patrick, p. 20. See: P.H. iii 32; M. vii 91, 202, 323, 380; M. viii 7, 188, 220; M ix 363; M. x 318.
42. Patrick, p. 21.
43. Patrick, p. 21.
44. Brochard argues that Aenesidemus and his successors were purely interested in the negative end of destroying dogmatism and put nothing in place of the standpoint they destroyed. He then contrasts the period of Menodotus and Sextus with their predecessors as follows: "Les sceptiques de la dernière période sont des médecins: s'ils veulent aussi, et de la même manière, détruire le dogmatisme ou la philosophie, c'est pour la remplacer par l'art, fondé sur l'observation, par la médecine, c'est-à-dire par une sorte de science." p. 310. Patrick maintains that the ancient Sceptics "...advocated a spirit of progress -- the forever seeking. The seeking of the Pyrrhonists was in the direction of scientific research, particularly of empirical or inductive research." M. Patrick, The Greek Sceptics, (New York, 1929), p. 285. Brochard's views on this matter are discussed in Appendix Four (pp. 211-214), and Appendix Five (pp. 236-240). Patrick's views are considered in Appendix Four (pp. 209-210). However, these appendices are more appropriately referred at a later stage in the thesis.
45. P.H. ii 238.
46. M. i 260.

47. M. vii 202.
48. M. i 61.
49. Perhaps this is most obviously displayed in his discussion of the ten tropes. P.H. i 40-169.
50. P.H. i 148.
51. P.H. ii 52.
52. Sextus does not relate personal information about himself as regards any aspect of his life. However, he writes from the standpoint of a Pyrrhonean and does not ever speak as a member of the Medical Sect.
53. Brochard, p. 317; P. Natorp, Forschungen zur Geschichte des Erkenntnis Problems im Alterthum, (Berlin, 1884) p. 155; Patrick, p. 9 believes that Sextus Empiricus was, at least, an Empirical Doctor for the first part of his life and that he may have belonged to the Methodic Sect later on. Zeller, p. 50, continued from note 1 page 49, says that Sextus' view may have altered under the influence of Pyrrhonism but that he remained an Empirical Doctor.
54. P.H. i 236-241; M. ii 327-328; M. viii 191.
55. P.H. i 210-241, Chapters xxix-xxxiv.
56. P.H. i 236-291, Chapter xxxiv.
57. P.H. i 236.
58. Natorp, p. 157, thinks that Sextus is only criticizing a particular doctrine of the Empirical School in its theory of knowledge but is not condemning the School at large. He says that it is only a minor philosophical difference not concerned with medical practice.
59. "...οὔτε ἀρμόζοι ἂν τῷ σκεπτικῷ τὴν αἴρεσιν ἐκείνην ἀναλαμβάνειν. μᾶλλον δὲ τὴν καλουμένην μέθοδον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, δύναίτο ἂν μετένευε ..." P.H. i 236-237.
60. P.H. i 237-241.
61. P.H. i 241.
62. M. viii 327-328.
63. M. viii 191.

64. Patrick, pp. 4-5; Brochard, p. 317; Robin, p. 197. Robin (p. 197) proposes the following solution: "... dans le dernier chapitre du I. I de ses Hypotyposes, il considère les Méthodiques comme représentant l'orientation sceptique mieux que ne font les Empiriques, tandis qu'ailleurs (M. VIII, 191) il identifie ces deux dernières orientations. La solution la plus plausible de cette difficulté est que, les Hypotyposes étant (c'est lui-même qui nous l'apprend, M. VII, 1), antérieures à ses livres Contre les Dogmatiques, Sextus ait incliné d'abord, en tant que sceptique, vers le Méthodisme, et soit venu plus tard au pur Empirisme, dont ces derniers livres reflètent sans aucune ambiguïté la thèse." I maintain that there is not a contradiction which requires an explanation. See p. 17 ff.
65. Patrick, pp. 4-5.
66. M. viii 191.
67. Galen, Opera Omnia, ed. by Kuhn, (Lipsiae, 1826), 'Isagoge' XIV 683: "... Μηνόδοτος καὶ Σέξτος οἱ κατὰ ἀκριβῶς ἐκράτυναν αὐτὴν (s.c. τὴν ἐμπειρικὴν αἴρεσιν ...)".
68. D.L. ix 116.
69. The biographical note is quoted on pp. 32-33.
70. Dumont, p. 164¹⁶; C. de Vogel, Greek Philosophy, (2nd ed., Leyde, 1964), vol. iii, pp. 185-186, believes that Vollgraff's thesis is quite reasonable.
71. Dumont, p. 164¹⁶. In the pages which follow I attempt to show that Vollgraff has simply ignored the evidence which the scholars, named in Dumont's quote, presented.
72. Vollgraff, pp. 195-203.
73. D.L. ix 116.
74. Euphranor, Eubulur of Alexandria, Ptolemy, Sarpedon.
75. Vollgraff, pp. 196-197.
76. Brochard, p. 232.
77. See: Brochard, pp. 231-232. His discussion (pp. 228-240) on the list given by D.L. (ix 216) is excellent. I am greatly indebted to Brochard in the present discussion. Indeed, all I am attempting to do is to show that if Vollgraff had taken account of the evidence which Brochard

presented that he would have seen that his own thesis is untenable. Vollgraff never refers to Brochard.

78. Daremburg, Histoire des sciences, (Paris, 1870), p. 160; Sprengle, Versuch einer pragmatischen Geschichte der Arzneikunde, chronologische Uebersicht, (Halle, 1800); Brochard, pp. 232-233.
79. Vollgraff, p. 197.
80. Vollgraff, p. 197.
81. Vollgraff, pp. 197-198.
82. Brochard (pp. 236-239) quotes and discusses the relevant evidence given in Strabo and Galen on this matter. He argues that Zeuxis the Sceptic, Zeuxis the Empirical Doctor, and Zeuxis of the Herophilean School are three different individuals.
83. see: Brochard, pp. 237-238.
84. see: Brochard, pp. 238-239.
85. Zeller, p. 54.
86. D.L. ix 116.
87. Vollgraff, p. 200.
88. Vollgraff, p. 200.
89. Vollgraff, pp. 200-201.
90. Brochard, pp. 313-314.
91. Vollgraff, p. 201.
92. Vollgraff, pp. 201-206.
93. Quoted by Vollgraff (p. 203) from the Suda, article: Σέξτος.
94. Patrick, Gk. Scept., p. 264.
95. Vollgraff, p. 202₃. Vollgraff's reference reads: "Voir H. Gelzer, Sextus Julius Africanus und die Byzantinische Chronographie (1898), p. 1 suiv." I have not been able to obtain this work.
96. D.L. ix 116.
97. Vollgraff, pp. 202-203.

98. Vollgraff (p. 203) quotes this passage from Capitolinus.
99. Vollgarff, pp. 203-204.
100. Vollgraff, p. 204.
101. Vollgraff, pp. 205-206.
102. Vollgraff, pp. 206-207.
103. Vollgraff, p. 207.
104. Vollgraff, p. 204.
105. M. i 295.
106. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, i 9.

CHAPTER THREE

1. P.H. i-4.
2. Sextus Empiricus does not claim any statement which he makes in any way final and exhaustive; however, he does express what appears to him to be the case. He qualifies the statement quoted above with such words as: εἰκός, ἴσως, ἐυλόγως . See p. 47 ff.
3. Sextus Empiricus attacks the poets, grammarians, scientists of every variety. The only notable exceptions are those who do not assent to the truth or falsity of any proposition, who are involved in arts which are necessary for serving needs which are fundamental for normal human functioning (i.e. physicians, farmers, teachers of reading and writing, etc.).
4. The exceptions to this rule are when Sextus speaks of the Dogmatists and only one sect or certain particular sect or certain particular sects uniquely address the matter at issue. He also speaks of the Academics as being Dogmatists because they, in Sextus' view, positively assent to certain propositions. See: P.H. i 220-236.
5. see: pp. 43 ff.
6. P.H. i 1.

7. P.H. i 2.
8. P.H. i 3.
9. Sextus Empiricus, in the chapter on the nomenclature of Scepticism, writes: "Ἡ σκεπτικὴ τοίνυν ἀγωγή καλεῖται μὲν καὶ ζητητικὴ ἀπὸ ἐνεργείας τῆς κατὰ τὸ ζητεῖν καὶ σκέπτεσθαι ..." P.H. i 7. Janáček, Sextus Empiricus' Method, (Prague, 1972), chap. iv, argues that Sextus declares that the Pyrrhoneans remain searching rather than unambiguously asserting the impossibility of κατάληψις in order to distinguish the Pyrrhoneans from the Academics even though it is at the cost of capriciously misrepresenting his true position. He argues that 'theoretical postulate' (that the Pyrrhoneans remain searching) "was never put into practice". Janáček, p. 28. See: Appendix Four, pt. ii, pp. 204-209, and p. 43 ff.
10. P.H. i 26.
11. P.H. i 26.
12. Although Sextus Empiricus does not explicitly say this it would seem reasonable to say that this is what he tries to demonstrate in his polemical treatises where he attempts to show that what the history of philosophy has resulted in is an array of conflicting equally credible teachings.
13. see: P.H. i 8, 12, 14, 15, and almost any passage indicating what the Pyrrhonian way is. Perhaps, most illustrative, is the definition of Pyrrhonism (P.H. i 8) which makes no mention of the search for truth.
14. see esp.: P.H. i 8-10.
15. P.H. i 12.
16. see: P.H. ii 1-12; M. vii 440-446; M. viii 463-481. In these passages Sextus Empiricus addresses himself to the argument of the Dogmatists that the Sceptics have no basis upon which to refute the positions of others.
17. P.H. i 8.
18. P.H. i 187-209. See: Philip DeLacy, 'ὄυ μᾶλλον and the Antecedents of Ancient Scepticism', Phronesis, 3, (1958), pp. 59-71. DeLacy examines the history of the phrase 'ὄυ μᾶλλον' and concludes his discussion by considering the Pyrrhonian use of the phrase. He writes: "...the Pyrrhonists give a special meaning to ὄυ μᾶλλον, or even transform it into another kind of sentence. It is not assertive. It makes neither an affirmation nor a denial, but merely reports the speaker's failure to assent to one alternative

rather than the other." p. 70.

19. P.H. i 193.

20. P.H. i 194-195.

21. P.H. i 200.

22. P.H. i 197.

23. P.H. i 201.

24. Sextus Empiricus prefaces his Outlines by saying: "...περὶ οὐδενὸς τῶν λεχθησομένων διαβεβαιούμεθα ὡς οὕτως ἔχοντος πάντως καθάπερ λέγομεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ νῦν φαίνόμενον ἡμῖν ἱστορικῶς ἀπαγγέλλομεν περὶ ἐκάστου." P.H. i 4. Throughout his works he repeatedly indicates this. A. Naess, Scepticism, (New York, 1968) pp. 7-12, provides an excellent discussion on the Sceptical ways of announcement.

25. see: Appendix Four.

26. M. viii 470-481.

27. P.H. iii 280-281.

28. P.H. i 4. Naess regards Sextus' characterization of himself as reporting what appears to him chronicler-like as unfortunate. Naess, p. 7, writes:- "Even someone who is, in the usual sense of the word, merely a reporter of what appears to him at the moment to be the case would claim truth for his account of the appearances. He would affirm that this and not something else is how it really 'strikes him' at the moment." Naess, I believe, quite correctly points out that Sextus does not wish to be understood to be asserting how anything 'is' even that this is how such and such appears to me at the moment. Sextus, strictly speaking, uses language to indicate what appears to him without claiming to apprehend even how it is that he is being affected. He simply is affected in such and such a way and tries to indicate that without categorically stating that he has grasped how he is affected in such a way that he can accurately relate it. However, I think Naess unnecessarily reads meaning into Sextus Empiricus' phrase "κατὰ τὸ νῦν φαίνόμενον ἡμῖν ἱστορικῶς ἀπαγγέλλομεν περὶ ἐκάστου." Sextus is merely indicating how non-committal, non-judgemental attitude is in this phrase. He is not trying to indicate that he reports how things really appear to him as distinct from how things appear to appear to him.

29. P.H. ii 13; M. vii 20-26.

30. Sextus Empiricus' discussion of the first of the ten tropes (P.H. i 40-79) is a particularly good example of this. Also see the first of any of his polemical treatises.
31. see: Appendix One, pp. 187-192.
32. P.H. i 206; P.H. i 35.
33. P.H. i 8.
34. Patrick, Gk. Scept., p. 285. P. Hallie, Scepticism, Man, and God, (Middletown, Conn., 1964), p. 31, when commenting on the passage (P.H. i 4) in which Sextus says that the Pyrrhoneans remain searching writes: "A typical and crucial phrase emphasizing the progress of seeking truth that was so precious especially to medical Sceptics like Sextus...". There is not any substantial evidence which indicates that Sextus was actively involved in medical research. The inquiry and search that Sextus clearly seems to have in mind in P.H. i 4 is the search of philosophy and not the practical arts. If Sextus' own treatises are to be taken as evidence of what he means by Sceptical inquiry it must be understood to mean persisting in showing the need to suspend judgement until the truth is apprehended and conclusively shown to have been apprehended. See: Appendix Three.

CHAPTER FOUR

1. see: P.H. i 12, 26-30; M. xi 141-167.
2. see: p. 43 ff. This will be considered in greater detail. (see: p. 69 ff.)
3. "ἐπιλοχοῦσι δὲ αὐταῖς οἷον τυχικῶς ἢ ἀταραξία παρηκολούθησεν ὡς σκιά σώματι ." P.H. i 29.
4. see: p. 45 ff.
5. see: p. 63 ff.
6. P.H. iii 179-238; M. xi 42-110.
7. P.H. i 27; M. xi 110-141.
8. M. xi 42-110.
9. M. xi 110-141.

10. Sextus Empiricus introduces this argument as follows:
 "Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι φύσει ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ κακὸν
 αὐτάρκως ἐσκεψάμεθα· νυνὶ δὲ ζητῶμεν καὶ εἰ
 συγχωρηθέντων αὐτῶν δυνατόν ἐστὶν εὐρώως ἅμα καὶ
 εὐδαιμόνως βιοῦν ." M. xi 110.
11. P.H. i 25.
12. see: p. 88 ff.
13. M. xi 112.
14. M. xi 112.
15. M. xi 116.
16. M. xi 116.
17. Sextus writes: "ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοξάζων τι καλὸν τῇ φύσει
 ἢ κακὸν εἶναι ταρασσεται διὰ παντός· καὶ ὅτε μὴ
 πάρεστιν αὐτῷ τὰ καλὰ εἶναι δοκοῦντα, ὑπὸ τε τῶν φύσει
 κακῶν νομίζει ποιηλατεῖσθαι καὶ διώκει τὰ ἀγαθὰ ὡς
 οἴεται· ἅπερ κτησάμενος πλείοσι ταραχαῖς περιπίπτει διὰ
 τε τὸ παρὰ λόγον καὶ τὸ ἀμέτρως ἐπαίρεσθαι καὶ φοβούμενος
 τὴν μεταβολὴν πάντα τράσσει ἵνα μὴ ἀποβάλλῃ τὰ ἀγαθὰ
 αὐτῷ δοκοῦντα εἶναι ." P.H. i 27-28.
18. M. xi 110. Title of chapter iv "Assuming that Good and
 Evil exist by Nature, is it possible to live happily?"
19. M. xi 140.
20. M. xi 110, 140.
21. I mean psychological perturbation and not physical per-
 turbation. Physical perturbation is considered separately.
See: p. 63 ff.
22. M. xi 140.
23. M. xi 121-124.
24. M. xi 124.
25. M. xi 127.
26. M. xi 135.
27. M. xi 136.
38. M. xi 208-209.

CHAPTER FIVE

1. M. xi 141.
2. see: p. 57 ff.
3. M. xi 141; also see: P.H. i 10.
4. P.H. i 10.
5. P.H. i 27; M. xi 116; see: pp. 58 and 68.
6. see: p. 75 ff.
7. M. xi 140; M. xi 208.
8. "...ἀλλ' ἐφροντίστως καὶ ἀκλήτως κατὰ ταῦτά ..."
M. xi 1.
9. P.H. i 10; M. xi 14. Again, it must be noted that I am only dealing with matters according to opinion.
10. P.H. i 25.
11. Cicero, De Finibus, i 12, 42; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, i 1094a.
12. P.H. i 25.
13. see: p. 57 ff.
14. P.H. i 28.
15. P.H. i 12; see also: P.H. i 26 and 29.
16. P.H. i 10.
17. P.H. i 8.
18. see: p. 56 ff.
19. P.H. iii 280.
20. The ten tropes (P.H. i 40-145) may be regarded as an attack on common sense.
21. M. ix 48-195.
22. P.H. i 145-169.

23. M. i
24. M. v
25. M. iii and iv.
26. P.H. i 10.
27. P.H. i 8.
28. P.H. i 32-33.
29. Naess, pp. 21-25, provides an excellent discussion on this subject.
30. Naess, (pp. 5, 6, 29 ...) who stands out as a commentator on Sextus Empiricus because he appreciates Sextus' ad hoc method of argumentation, speaks of 'the mature Sceptic'. The notion of a Sceptic becoming a mature Sceptic runs contrary to the fact that the Sceptic cannot ever either absolutely or by degrees establish a firm basis for the suspensive attitude. He must remain open to the possibility that truth will be apprehended and seen to be apprehended and he must not regard the arguments which he has previously raised against the Dogmatists as being conclusive. The Sceptic, as distinct from the person in doubt, cannot become more suspensive since his suspensive attitude is an attitude of pure neutrality.
31. see: p. 75 ff.
32. P.H. i 36.
33. P.H. i 36-38 (listed; P.H. i 40-169 (discussed)).
34. P.H. i 164 (listed; P.H. i 165-178 (discussed)).
35. see: Chapter Seven.
36. P.H. i 19.
37. P.H. i 15.
38. P.H. i 15.
39. P.H. i 36-38, 165.
40. P.H. i 10.
41. "ἐπισχοῦσι δὲ αὐτοῖς οἶον τυχικῶς ἢ ἀταραξία παρηκολούθητεν ὡς σκιά σώματι .". P.H. i 29.
42. P.H. i 28-29.

43. M. xi 1.
44. P.H. i 12.
45. P.H. i 28-29.
46. P.H. i 25-26.
47. M. xi 147-148.
48. M. xi 148.
49. M. xi 151.
50. P.H. i 29.
51. M. xi 157.
52. P.H. iii 236.
53. P.H. i 25-30.
54. M. xi, 161. The first line is from Homer, Odyss. xix, 63.
55. M. xi 150-152.
56. M. xi 151.
57. M. xi 156.

CHAPTER SIX

1. M. xi 163-164.
2. The word 'τήρησις' means guarding, observing, observation. It is difficult to render this word in English in a way which accurately denotes Sextus Empiricus' meaning. When I say 'I observe a law or custom' I mean that 'I note and follow or obey a law or custom'. The word 'τήρησις' in P.H. i 23 denotes that which the Sceptics note and follow or observe in practice. I have found it necessary to use the words 'rule' and 'regulation' and 'practical criterion' to denote this.
3. M. xi 1.
4. M. xi 118.
5. "... ἀδοξάστως βιοῦμεν, ἐπεὶ μὴ δυνάμεθα

- παντάπασιν εἶναι . ." P.H. i 23.
6. M. xi 161.
 7. see: Appendix Four, section v, p. 230 ff.
 8. P.H. i 23-24. see: P.H. i 237-241; M. xi 162-167; M. i 5-6.
 9. P.H. i 23.
 10. P.H. i 24.
 11. P.H. i 24.
 12. see: Appendix Two, p. 194 ff.
 13. Modern interpreters of Sextus have tended to emphasize the fact that he says many things which are expressed in the modern movements in philosophy. They go so far as to speak of him as a positivist, a phenomenalist and so on. Their views are considered in Appendices Four and Five.
 14. C. Stough, Greek Scepticism, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969), pp. (106-146) provides the most detailed and useful discussion of the subject matter which I consider in sections iii - iv. Stough's treatment of this subject matter has been a great aid to me.
 15. M. viii 56.
 16. M. viii 60.
 17. M. xi 250-251.
 18. M. viii 356.
 19. M. ix 392.
 20. see: E. Brehier, 'Le mot νοητόν et Sextus Empiricus', Revue des études anciennes, XVI, (1914), p.269, Dumont, pp. 169-173, and Stough, pp. 107-115.
 21. M. vii 325-366.
 22. M. vii 293.
 23. P.H. i 19.
 24. M. vii 293-294, 344.
 25. M. vii 297-301; M. x 437; M. xi 226.
 26. M. vii 301.

27. M. viii 56; M. i 25.
28. M. viii 211.
29. M. i 22; M. vii 297, 346; M. xi 226.
30. P.H. ii 72; see: M. vii 354, 381-384, 300.
31. P.H. ii 75; see: M. vii 357, 367-368, 384-385.
32. M. vii 346.
33. see: p. 142 ff.
34. P.H. i 22.
35. see: Dumont, pp. 173-175.
36. For Arcesilaus see: P.H. i 232-235; M. vii 158.
For Carneades see: P.H. i 230-231; M. vii 166-189.
37. For Sextus Empiricus' arguments against the criterion of the probable presentation see: M. vii 435-439; M. viii 51-55.
38. P.H. i 232-235; M. vii 158.
39. P.H. i 229-230.
40. see: Appendix Five, section v, p. 230 ff.
41. M. vii 199; P.H. i 215.
42. By 'grasped' I do not merely understand or know, in the sense that what they signify is understood.
43. P.H. i 215; M. vii 199-200.
44. P.H. i 215; M. vii 199-200.
45. see: p. 83 ff.
46. This fact uniquely characterizes Pyrrhonism. My argument against the interpretation of others focuses on this point. The Sceptical criterion, if it should be called a criterion, does not serve the purpose of indicating to them what the good or true is. Sextus assumes ἀταραξία is the end and praises Pyrrhonism because it, by some mysterious process, leads to the realization of that end. The Pyrrhonean 'criterion' merely provides them with a solution to the problems inherent in living in the finite realm of pursuit and avoidance. See: Appendix Five, p. 215 ff.

47. P.H. i 215.
48. M. i 5.
49. see: P.H. i 68, 224; M. vii 128; M. ix 4, 21, 63; and especially M. i 272 ff.
50. M. viii 53-54.
51. P.H. i 19.
52. P.H. ii 51-53; see: P.H. i 87-88.
53. P.H. i 21.
54. P.H. i 21.
55. P.H. i 19.
56. P.H. i 230.
57. see: p. 86 ff.
58. see: Appendices Four (p. 203 ff.) and Five (p. 215 ff.)
59. P.H. i 23.
60. P.H. i 22.
61. P.H. ii 97-98; M. viii 141.
62. P.H. ii 97; M. viii 141.
63. P.H. ii 97; M. viii 147.
64. P.H. ii 97; M. viii 145.
65. P.H. ii 98; M. viii 146.
66. P.H. ii 98; M. viii 146.
67. M. viii 143.
68. P.H. ii 99; M. viii 147.
69. P.H. ii 99; M. viii 149.
70. P.H. ii 100; M. viii 151.
71. P.H. ii 101-102.
72. P.H. ii 107ff.; M. viii 159 ff.

73. P.H. ii 118 ff.; M. viii 161 ff.
74. P.H. ii 120; M. viii 165.
75. P.H. ii 126; M. viii 165.
76. P.H. ii 127; M. viii 169.
77. P.H. ii 127 ff.; M. viii 169 ff.
78. M. viii 325-326.
79. P.H. ii 97-99; M. viii 145-146.
80. P.H. ii 204
81. M. viii 152; see: P.H. ii 100.
82. P.H. ii 204.
83. P.H. ii 102; M. viii 157-158.
84. P.H. ii 102; M. viii 152-153.
85. P.H. ii 102; M. viii 157-158.
86. P.H. i 18.
87. P.H. ii 13 ff.
88. M. i 6.
89. M. i 49.
90. M. i 52.
91. M. i 51.
92. M. i 51; M. ii 13; M. v 2; P.H. ii 236 ff.
93. see: p. 20 ff.; P. H. i 236 ff.
94. P.H. i 237.
95. P.H. i 237.
96. P.H. i 238.
97. see: Appendices Four (p. 204 ff.) and Five (p. 216 ff.)
98. P.H. i 229-231.
99. P.H. i 229-231.

100. M. ix 49.
101. see: Appendix Five, p. 222 ff.
102. D. Hume, in an abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature, (Cambridge, 1938) p. 24. R. Popkin in 'David Hume and the Pyrrhonian Controversy', Review of Metaphysics, Vol. VI (1952-53), pp. 65-81, and in 'David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and Critique of Pyrrhonism', Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 1 (1950-51), pp. 385-407, argues in support of the statement quoted.
103. see: Appendices Four (p. 204 ff.) and Five (p. 216 ff.)

CHAPTER SEVEN

1. P.H. i 31.
2. M. vii 345.
3. P.H. i 40.
4. P.H. i 40; D.L. ix 79.
5. P.H. i 44-54.
6. P.H. i 44.
7. P.H. i 55-58.
8. P.H. i 59-62.
9. see: Philo, De Ebrietate, ed. and trans. by F. Colson and G. Whitaker, (London: Heinemann; New York: Putman, 1930), vol. iii, 171 ff., and D.L. ix 79 ff.
10. P.H. i 59.
11. P.H. i 59-62.
12. P.H. i 36.
13. P.H. i 79.
14. P.H. i 80-85.
15. P.H. i 85-87.
16. P.H. i 87.

17. P.H. i 88.
18. P.H. i 89.
19. P.H. i 36.
20. P.H. i 92-94.
21. P.H. i 94.
22. P.H. i 96.
23. P.H. i 97.
24. P.H. i 98-99.
25. P.H. i 98-99.
26. P.H. i 100-101.
27. P.H. i 101-114.
28. P.H. i 114-117.
29. P.H. i 118.
30. P.H. i 118-120.
31. P.H. i 121-123.
32. P.H. i 36.
33. P.H. i 124-129.
34. P.H. i 129.
35. P.H. i 129-134.
36. P.H. i 136.
37. P.H. i 136.
38. D.L. ix 87-88; Philo, De Ebrietate, 186-189.
39. P.H. i 38-39.
40. P.H. i 137-139.
41. P.H. i 137.
42. P.H. 138.
43. P.H. 138.

44. P.H. i 136.
45. D.L. ix 88; Philo, De Ebrietate, 186. The assumption which they make is that for something to be truly grasped it must be apprehended as it is in and by itself.
46. P.H. i 37.
47. P.H. i 141-144.
48. P.H. i 145.
49. P.H. i 145-163.
50. P.H. i 38.
51. P.H. i 163.
52. P.H. i 38.
53. P.H. i 35.
54. P.H. i 38-39.
55. D.L. ix 88.
56. Stough makes the following remark which I find quite baffling: "Agrippa attracted considerable attention as a Skeptic and as the author of five Tropes. But since these arguments add nothing new to the epistemology of Greek Skepticism, they are not included in this study. Designed to furnish the Skeptic with a set of logical tactics to be employed in refuting arguments, they are simply more sophisticated weapons to induce suspense of judgement." pp. 10-11. Stough is usually very thorough and careful to justify anything which she says. However, in this case, she simply makes the above assertion and leaves it at that.
57. P.H. i 165.
58. P.H. iii 235; P.H. iii 135; M. viii 118.
59. P.H. i 165.
60. P.H. i 20.
61. P.H. i 164.
62. see: p. 151 ff.
63. P.H. i 164.
64. P.H. i 173.

65. P.H. i 164.
66. P.H. i 169.
67. M. vii 204, 369.
68. P.H. i 170-172; M. vii 388.
69. P.H. i 173-174.
70. P.H. i 173.
71. P.H. i 175.
72. P.H. i 175-177.
73. P.H. i 177.
74. P.H. i 178.
75. P.H. i 178-179.
76. P.H. i 179.
77. P.H. i 179.
78. I have reservations about whether the two tropes came after the five because there is little evidence to go by. However, if they said what Sextus Empiricus says they said in P.H. i 179 then it would seem reasonable to suppose that the two tropes came after the five.
79. P.H. i 181-185.
80. P.H. i 180.

APPENDIX ONE

1. Hallie, p. 4.
2. N. Maccoll, The Greek Sceptics, (London, 1869), p. 87.
3. Naess, pp. 1-2.
4. Naess, p. 7 ff.
5. Naess, pp. 14-15.

APPENDIX TWO

1. Stough, p. 1.
2. This Appendix is not directed so much against Stough as against the view expressed in this quote. Stough does treat the Pyrrhoneans rather abstractly in that she only deals with their epistemology and thus does not adequately represent the spirit of Pyrrhonism -- Pyrrhonism as a way if not a system. This is perhaps the main weakness of her book. However, it was necessary for her to limit the scope of her study in this manner in order to be able to focus on the epistemological questions.
3. Patrick, The Gk. Scept., p. 386.

APPENDIX THREE

1. P.H. i 7.
2. M. i 53.
3. M. iii 2.
4. P. H. i 210.
5. M. x 215-218.
6. P.H. i 222.

APPENDIX FOUR

1. P.H. i 1-4.
2. Janáček, p. 27 ff.
3. see: pp. 209-210.
4. see: pp. 211-214.
5. Janáček, p. 27.
6. Janáček, p. 27.

7. Janáček, p. 28.
8. Janáček, pp. 27-28.
9. P.H. i 233.
10. P.H. i 200; Janáček, p. 28.
11. P.H. i 201.
12. Janáček, p. 28.
13. Janáček, p. 28.
14. P.H. i 26.
15. P.H. i 179.
16. P.H. iii 45.
17. P.H. iii 55.
18. P.H. iii 50.
19. Janáček, p. 19.
20. P.H. i 203.
21. Maccoll, pp. 93-94.
22. Patrick, p. 285.
23. Patrick, pp. 303-304.
24. Brochard, p. 331.
25. Brochard, pp. 360-363.
26. see: p. 108ff.
27. Brochard, pp. 364-365.
28. Brochard, p. 364.
29. Brochard, p. 373.
30. Brochard, p. 373.
31. P.H. i 222.
32. P.H. i 236.
33. P.H. i 241.

APPENDIX FIVE

1. see: Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York, 1967), vol.5, Art. 'Logical Positivism' and vol. 6 Art. 'Positivism'.
2. H. Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966), p. 325.
3. Reichenbach, pp. 304-305.
4. see: J. Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy (Middlesex, 1966), p. 367ff.
5. R. Chisholm, 'Sextus Empiricus and Modern Empiricism', Philosophy of Science, 8, (1941), p. 371.
6. Chisholm, p. 372.
7. Chisholm, pp. 374-375.
8. see: Appendix Four, p. 209ff.
9. Chisholm, pp. 376-377.
10. Naess, p. 21.
11. Naess, p. 20.
12. Chisholm, p. 377.
13. Chisholm, p. 381.
14. M. viii 118.
15. Dumont, in his preface to Hegel's Scepticisme et Philosophie, trans. and ed. by B. Fauquet, (Paris, 1972), pp. 7-8.
16. Dumont, Le Scept. et le phen., p. 11.
17. P.H. i 215.
18. Dumont, Le Scept. et le phen., p. 232.
19. Dumont, Le Scept. et le phen., p. 181.
20. Dumont, Le Scept. et le phen., p. 176.
21. Dumont, Le Scept. et le phen., p. 237.

22. P.H. iii 179.
23. P.H. iii 254.
24. Brochard, pp. 414-415.

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Note

The most comprehensive bibliography on Sextus Empiricus available today appears in Jean-Paul Dumont's book, Le Scepticisme et le phenomene. I have included in the above bibliography a number of studies which I have not used in my thesis in order to make available in English a more comprehensive bibliography than has previously been available.