

**INTER-GROUP RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF POLICING FOREIGN NATIONALS
AT INTERNATIONAL FOOTBALL EVENTS**

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*To my family;
Mum, Dad, Gran, Andrew and Sophie*

ABSTRACT

The Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) maintains that police strategy and tactics that are perceived to be illegitimate by crowd members increases the likelihood of disorder. In the context of policing foreign nationals this theory is advanced as an explanation for instances of disorder. The emphasis of the model is the inter-group relations between the in-group (the crowd), and an out-group (the police). Crowd theorists also advance the hypothesis that police psychology in public order can be characterised by a 'Classical' theory of crowd psychology, meaning they perceive crowds as dangerous and irrational. Social identity research would benefit from a more thorough understanding of the dynamics surrounding the policing of foreign nationals at international tournaments. There is a consensus on the importance of accounting for the police psychology in the inter-group interactions, which relative to the dynamics of crowd psychology has been sparsely addressed.

Quantitative and qualitative data e.g., interviews, focus group, participant observation and structured observations were collected to address the relationship between police perceptions and practices and the relationship to inter-group dynamics at international football events. The methods employed are Constructed Grounded Theory Method (CGTM), ethnography and statistical analysis. The data gathering context is a naturalistic field study, in which access to the policing public order operation and participant observation field research forms the analysis. The research was conducted prior to, during and after nine international football events. A specific focus of the work is in the examination of the Austrian and Swiss police management of foreign nationals at the Euro 2008 football tournament. At which, access to structured observation data provides a valuable quantitative dynamic to the analysis.

The results develop a social identity informed interpretation of occupational police psychology. Findings also suggest the claims of the crowd psychology literature can at times be unsubstantiated. The relationship between the police tactics and the relationship to crowd disorder is more complex than is currently represented; when considered in the broader occupational and inter-group context. The organisational police structure, opposing fan groups, and audiences such as the local population, the media and the private securities are all pertinent variables in understanding inter-group relations in the policing of foreign nationals. In relation to high profile measures of policing (contrary to majority perspective in the literature), this research provides evidence that these measures can offer practical and social benefits; from a police and crowd perspective. The thesis concludes by exploring some of the wider implications of this for future research, theory, policy, crowd management and international football events/tournaments.

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The current research seeks to address the broad subject area of inter-group relations in the context of policing foreign nationals. To do so the research strategy employs an applied psychology approach, utilising social meta-theories to develop understandings of group dynamics, public order organisational considerations and risk management in the context of policing foreign nationals. Throughout the thesis a case will be presented for the value of data gathering in naturalistic field setting, meaning that all the data gathering for the project will be done so by working in conjunction with the police, the crowd and other significant inter-group audiences prior to and during the hosting of an international football event, and prior to and during the European Championship tournament 2008. The research is data driven and to account for the complexities of a rich, natural and unpredictable research setting a multiplicity of research disciplines will be drawn upon to best explain the psychology of the interactions.

The nature of the research is an investigative inquiry, seeking building upon the existing psychological literature in two ways. The first is by critically considering the currently unquestioned application of the crowd psychology Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) as a platform for informing actual police practice, political policy and education in the context of policing international football. The principle basis for this critique is the relative absence of data gathering from the police at a command level and those officers on the ground, who are facing the risks of public order policing head on. This is not to argue that the model should not be used to advance strategic and tactical models of public order policing, but rather at this tentative stage of the development caution should be taken in order to fully understand the implications for those who are performing the task.

The second of which is intimately linked to the first. The research will seek to develop of the application of the Social Identity meta-theory in a way which has not yet been explored in the literature. That is in employing the Social Identity meta-theory (the Social Identity Theory and Self Categorisation Theory), in an occupational and

organisational context to further our understandings of public order police psychology. This research will employ the social tradition in the current analysis will to develop models of understanding occupational police psychology in the context of policing foreign nationals. As a vehicle for understanding social reality of the context of international football it is advanced that social identity is key to understanding the police occupational identities, their risk and threat perception. In doing so, this research seeks to redefine the nature of crowd management from an inter-group perspective. The objective of the two introductory chapters is to define the building blocks from which one may understand the core arguments in the area, and the relevancy of the research findings presented subsequently in the empirical chapters.

The significance of the relationship between crowd psychology and police practice may not in and of itself be self-evident, as such the two introductory Chapters will seek to make the link between the two clear. Given the objectives of the inquiry, there are two distinct although closely related areas of background literature which are necessary to build upon. The first of which, is the psychological inter-group relations literature. The key role of the social identity meta-theory in advancing social theory in inter-group relations will be discussed at length in Chapter 1. This will include exploring the origins and development as a branch of social psychology, and specifically defining the concept of in the current research climate. The social identity underpins many of the insights currently offered, particularly in terms of understanding crowd psychology.

Moving on to Chapter 2, the focus will shift to explore the way crowd psychology models have acted to shape, and arguably limit, existing psychological studies of police in the public order context and specifically, in the context of policing foreign nationals. Thus, the second set of literary bodies which is important to consider are the non-empirical social science and empirical psychological studies which lend key insights to the understanding the interaction between public order police and international football fans, and importantly the contextualisation of this interaction within the broader inter-group and organisational framework. Chapter 2 will conclude with a detailed outline of the subsequent empirical Chapters of the thesis.

CHAPTER 1:

INTER-GROUP RELATIONS AND CROWD PSYCHOLOGY

1.1 Introduction

The dominant modern explanatory model of both intra-group and inter-group relations is the broad meta-theoretical constructs of the social identity tradition. The social identity research has thrived through field research in the context crowds, in which social identities guide the actions and interactions of crowd members. This has resulted in the development models of crowd psychology (the Social Identity Model and the Elaborated Social Identity Model), which provide an understanding of *how* identity informs group relations, category boundaries and the limits of collective action. Essentially, the crowd and its relations with other groups provide a platform from which to examine the relatively abstract dynamics of how group membership and identity functions can act to form and inform behaviour and action in conflict and co-operative contexts. The theoretical development has been welcomed by academics, as crowd theory has been largely dormant for the better part of the 1900s, following the ‘Classical’ theorist’s contributions.

More recently, over the past ten years, the social identity based model has taken further steps forward in stipulating the cognitive components of *why* disorder develops in protest and demonstration contexts (the Elaborated Social Identity Model). This is where the contention arises, this thesis intends to expose the limitations of this explanatory model for disorder in crowd situations, and question the recommendations which logically follow from, and have been made in practice, with respect to the appropriate tactics for crowd management. While research has continued to establish the viability of such a model, from the crowd perspective, there is a relative absence of inquiry into the police psychology to compliment the model.

Thus, the objectives in the current chapter are three fold. First, is to examine the history and development of the psychological study of inter-group relations. Second, is to explore the social identity tradition and the extension of the original models to crowd psychology. Finally, a critical analysis of this latter extension of the work will presented, largely founded on; (1) the attribution of motive to crowd members actions, given the retrospective data gathering and analysis; (2) the limitations of a reductive crowd psychology based model to provide unbiased account of the complex inter-group relations between various groups in any given crowd

situation; (3) the limited exploration of the model outside the context of protest and demonstrations, for example in application to football crowds.

1.2 Defining inter-group relations

Our social interaction is governed by inter-group relations. Inter-group relations (or, equally inter-group dynamics), informs the way we define ourselves and others, the way we behave, the way in which we treat and think about others, and how they treat and think about us. Broadly, *“whenever individuals belonging to one group interact, collectively or individually, with another group or its members in terms of their group identification we have an instance of inter-group behaviour”* (Sherif, 1966, p. 12). Inter-group relations research examines the social existence, or occurrences between two or more social groups, seeking to understand antecedents and consequences of the relations between groups in specific contexts. Not surprisingly, inter-group relations are a central subject of study in social psychology and a plethora of other disciplines which are central to this research, for example crowd psychology and occupational psychology.

Inter-group relations are more complex than the physical presence of others (Brown, 2000). A definition of a group founded on face to face interaction may well be proficient to explain smaller groups, say of a local football team or theatre group. However, as a definition for larger groups (i.e., nationality, religion or politics), it is unsubstantial as an explanation given that members of these groups are likely never to have come into contact with a substantial proportion of their group. More importantly, the group exists within an individual, guiding beliefs and behaviours in contexts which other group members are not physically present.

Perhaps the best illustration of this is the Auto-kinetic effect, which demonstrates that norms are formed in group contexts, they become internalised, and then act to construct one’s subsequent perception of social reality (Sherif, 1936). When subjects made judgements alone, estimates varied widely between the individuals. In a group situation, the individual judgements converged on an emergent social norm (e.g., a common position). Turner (1991, p. 2) defines social norms as,

“normative social similarities and differences between people”. When individuals are retested after the group judgement trials they provide estimates that reflect the consensual common position determined by the group. What this illustrates is that in situations of social ambiguity groups develop a social consensus which acts as a basis for individual judgements about reality and affects perception of the environment which then informs future behaviour. Group membership is used as a basis for perceiving and responding to reality, even when others were no longer physically present. It is well established that our social understanding and actions are determined by our group memberships.

Social psychology as a discipline must contend with an excess of assumptions and preconceptions, in addition to political and economic considerations related to any topical subject. Given that social psychology empirically addresses assumptions about human behaviour this often attends to controversial ideologies (e.g., capitalism, nationalism, injustice, and similar core values in modern society), the implications of social research has policy ramifications beyond the study of personal and group relations. Individuals, and organisations, incorporate assumptions about human nature and society into their everyday behaviours, which inform their understanding of the appropriacy of thoughts and behaviours. This *‘everyday psychology’* (Jones & Elcock, 2001) helps us understand our own behaviours, and that of others, and shapes our sense of what is possible and acceptable in day to day life.

Research in social psychology can be hampered by an array of personal, political and occupational investments surrounding any given subject matter. Heider (1958) was the first to produce a theory of the way people make causal attributions, employing the term *‘naïve psychology’* to explain the process. In this view individuals are amateur scientists, trying to understand other people’s behaviour by piecing together information until they arrive at a reasonable explanation or cause. The relevancy here is that everyone has a perspective of, and a theory about, how things do and should work. Some audiences may gain from maintaining particular understanding of the way we think about aspects of socialisation; while others may seek to challenge and change the status quo. Social psychologists are often in a difficult position. By the nature of their work psychologists may be tasked with identifying the assumptions that are disseminated primarily because they are

convenient for powerful groups. No aspect of social psychology goes unchallenged, at a theoretical or methodological level. In fact, as Reicher & Hopkins (2001, p. vii), assert, *“No one who wishes to make comment on this phenomena [identity], or many other in social psychology more generally, can expect to find a hushed and pliant audience waiting for enlightenment. Rather, much the opposite.”*

Social groups are characterised by boundaries of inclusiveness; or, put another way, those who belong to our group, and those who do not. In groups humans act in predictable ways, we copy other members of our group; we favour members of our own group over others, defer to a leader and enter into conflict with other groups. A wide variety of meanings have been associated with the word ‘group’ (Lewin, 1948; Bales, 1950; Sherif & Sherif, 1969; Rabbie & Horowitz, 1988), resulting in a lack of consensus on one accepted definition. This may be a result of the countless bases for group membership (e.g., nationality, religion, ethnicity, gender, age, recreational interests and political persuasion). To establish and define the dominant social identity based definition (to be applied in the current research), the discussion will first broadly address how the social theory of groups has developed in historical context.

1.2.1 Inter-group conflict and co-operation

Broadly, inter-group relations can be considered in terms of conflict and/or co-operation. Socially and politically, the study of inter-group relations has devoted considerable attention to understanding processes of prejudice and discrimination. Prejudice is, *“a prejudgement, an attitude formed on the basis of insufficient information, a preconception. In this literal sense, a prejudice can be either positive or negative in evaluative terms; it can be about any particular thing, event, person or idea; it can even be an aspect of a coherent work, for a hypothesis formulated on little evidence can legitimately be called a prejudice”* (Reber & Reber, 2001, p. 557). Discrimination can be founded on a prejudice, but should be distinguished from it. In social psychology, discrimination refers to an overt and observable action or behaviour that involves treating people differently to others on the basis of a group they belong too (Passer, Smith, Holt, Bremner, Sutherland & Vliek, 2009). Essentially, the difference between the two rests on whether the beliefs about a particular group are actualised in the behavioural treatment of the group (i.e.,

discriminatory behaviours) defined as explicit prejudice; or, remain cognitively contained defined as implicit prejudice.

In the study of prejudice and discrimination dominantly the processes are considered to be negative constructs. However, it is equally important to recognise that they can manifest themselves as positive distinctions between individuals on the basis of their group membership. Considered in the current context, prejudice maybe a prejudgement of dislike or negativity, or favouritism and preference for example because an individual is female or male, or belongs to one national identity or another. Discrimination arises in the circumstances under which these attitudes come to guide action in such a way that the group members are treated differentially on the basis of this group membership, compared to other groups.

The effects of negative inter-group attitudes are particularly obvious and destructive when these processes occur on a large scale. Generally, most are aware of the termination of two-thirds of the worlds Jewish population during World War II (Suedfeild, 2000), and may have a vague appreciation of the ethical cleansing of the Rwandan Genocide in 1994; during which a conservative estimate of 800,000 people met their death (Des Forges, 1999). Of course, not forgetting ethnonationalist or religious wars (e.g., Balkans, Somalia, Sri Lanka, or the Middle East), which continue to cause chaos in countries throughout the world today. There is less appreciation of the 500,000 Indonesians who were murdered between 1965 and 1966; the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975 which resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths (Dunn, 1997); the decimation of Armenian population by the Turkish between 1915-1923; several million Ukrainians exterminated through starvation by the Soviet government between 1932 and 1933; three million Bangladeshis killed by Pakistanis in 1971 (Jahan, 1997); one and a half million Cambodians slaughtered by the Khmer Rouge (Kierman, 1997). Man made death as a result of negative inter-group relations is close to incomprehensible in scale and occurrence, and is a phenomena which can be traced back to the dawn of civilisation, in so much that the inter-group conflict between the Persian and Greek Empires ultimately gave rise to democracy. The way we identify with others in terms of group membership and the consequences of this has hugely significant implications for the way we treat one another. There is no

social issue more pressing than to address than the processes of conflict, co-operation and reconciliation (Sternberg, 2003).

Social explanations to account for prejudice towards out-groups have been advanced. Amongst the most prominent is the Dehumanisation theory (for a review see Haslam, 2006). Dehumanisation is the psychological process whereby people become thought of as less than human, the rationale behind this is that ordinary people will not engage in harmful conduct until they can/have justified to themselves the morality of their actions. Bandura (1999) argues that the process of moral disengagement is influenced by; (1) moral justification, (2) diffusion of responsibility, and, (3) sanitising language (i.e., language used to dehumanise the victims, for example referring to them as cockroaches, or collateral damage). There is experimental support for this theory. Milgram (1974) observed what he termed as immediacy, meaning the social proximity of the victim to the participant, was an important factor in obedience to authority. In his seminal study, the control group who could not see the individuals to whom they were administering shocks, did so 65% of the time to a level which they understood could be life threatening. In the experimental group which could see those being shocked, life threatening administration dropped to 40%.

The emotional basis of prejudice has been offered as an explanation for extreme forms of negative inter-group behaviour, until recently where the concept has been used to explain subtle forms of emotional inter-group biases (Leyens et al., 2000; Paladino et al., 2002; Gaunt, Leyens & Demoulin, 2002). Leyens and colleagues argue that individuals reserve the 'human' essence for the in-group, and deny it to the out-group; this is the process of infrahumanization. There is growing consensus that humans have two distinct forms of emotions, primary and secondary (Ekman, 1992; Demoulin, et al., 2004; Rodriguez-Torres, et al., 2005). The theory is that primary emotions are not uniquely human, in so much that they are a product of natural selection and we share them with animals (e.g., fear, surprise, pain, pleasure, joy). Secondary emotions are thought to be socially constructed, and unique to humans (e.g., happiness, hopefulness, amazement, despair). It has been demonstrated attribution of secondary emotions in preferential to the in-group compared with the

out-group (Leyens, et al., 2003; Cortes, et al., 2005), and are even denied to the out-group (Paladino, et al., 2002).

The infrahumanization theory compliments the Machiavellian intelligence theory (Byrne, 1995), and gains further support from an evolutionary perspective as researchers indicate that primates are culturally and socially evolving in such a way which suggests they are developing emotions such as empathy (De Waal, 2001). This body of work suggests the perceived inhumanity of the out-group is an implicit and spontaneous categorisation, which is hard-wired into human processing and has a place in everyday emotional interaction between in and out-groups (Rodriguez et al., 2005).

Hate, love, disgust, and conflict are all part of human nature according to evolutionary psychologists (Laland & Brown, 2002), and they exist in the form that they do in order to solve a specific problem of survival or reproductive function over evolutionary history. Pro-social and anti-social behaviours from this perspective are part of the fabric of life. This perspective sits well with the notion that the perpetrator of 'extraordinary evil' (defined by Waller, 2002, p. 13) as "*human evil perpetrated in times of social unrest, war, mass killings and genocide*") is, typically, very ordinary. The idea of evil as banal was formulated by Arendt (1977), a journalist who covered the trial of Adolph Eichmann in 1961. Arendt reported that the most disturbing thing about Eichmann was that he had been examined by psychiatrists and pronounced perfectly sane, concluding he was simply an ambitious bureaucrat who carried out his duties (Arendt, 1977).

As unsettling as it maybe, it is not difficult to find evidence to support the banality of evil thesis. The extermination of the Jews was not conducted by the Schutzstaffel (SS) and the physicians alone, the Wehrmacht (regular Armed Forces in Germany) were involved (Waller, 2002); as were the Reserve Police Battalion 101, which was a unit of the Ordnungspolizei (German Order Police). The members of which participated in the round-up and expulsion of Jews and Poles, facilitated their deportation to concentration camps and carried out the mass shooting of tens of thousands of civilians (Browning, 1992). Browning (1992, p. 189) concludes his inquiry in the 101 involvement in the Holocaust with the harrowing question, "*If the*

Reserve Police Battalion could become killers under such circumstances, what group of men could not?" Similarly, Berkowitz (1999, p. 247), argues "*when one probes behind evils actions, one normally finds not an individual viciously forwarding diabolical schemes but instead ordinary individuals who have done acts of evil because they were caught up in complex social forces*".

Commitment and passion for one's own group, or kin, is an accepted norm and when threatened emotional responses such as hate, disgust, fear, and anger are typical. Sternberg developed a Duplex Theory of Hate, which identifies and provides a means of typifying seven forms of hate (Sternberg, 2003). At a basic level forms of hate can be generated by combinations of emotions; (1) fear/anger, (2) contempt, (3) disgust. Hate in any of the seven forms following its development it typically results in one, or more, of the following; (1) the negation of intimacy (e.g., to a leader, country, ethnic group), which develops from feelings of disgust, (2) passion, which is expressed as intense fear or anger in response to a threat, and (3) decision-commitment, which involves devaluation of the other through contempt. There is consensus that the evolution of hate is necessary to account for instances of genocide, and mass murders. Staub (2000) calls this development 'a continuum of destruction', while Darley (1999), prefers the term 'evolving nature of evil' to describe the development.

A massively researched process in the maintenance of prejudice and discrimination is the self-fulfilling prophecy (Merton, 1948; Rosenthal & Jacobsen, 1968; Darley & Fazio, 1980) or behavioural confirmation effect (Snyder & Swann, 1978; Snyder, 1992). This phenomenon is the most widely studied expectancy effect in social psychology (see Miller & Turnbull, 1986; Snyder, 1992; & Neuberg, 1994 for reviews). The basic theory is that an expectation may produce the anticipatory behaviour which creates a confirmation, which would otherwise not have occurred.

This affect can materialise through different processes. Hamilton et al. (1990) and Neuberg (1994) posit that selective attention and biased information-seeking gathering activities mediate behavioural confirmation effects. Another way by which expectation may inadvertently act to create a self fulfilling prophecy is through the process of stereotype threat. Stereotype threat is the internalising of stereotypes by the stereotyped group, as they feel that maybe judged negatively as a result of that

stereotype. Stereotype threat has been shown in many contexts, to compromise performance, be related to anxiety and deplete effort on tasks (for a review see Schmader, Johns & Forbes 2008). However popular and well-known the phenomenon of the self fulfilling prophecies are not without critics (Miller & Turnbull, 1986; Jussim, 1990). The principal objection is that the laboratory situations used in behavioural confirmation research do not map on to real-world social interactions. Jussim (1990, p. 30) argues, "*despite some grandiose claims to the contrary, there is currently no evidence to suggest that naturally occurring expectations lead to huge self-fulfilling prophecy effects or perceptual biases*". This alternative approach favours the explanation that the expectations generated are in fact not false, but true and accurate reflections of reality.

Inter-group processes can be destructive, but this is not always the case. Inter-group conflict and bias do exist, however the instances of such are rare when one considers the vast array of groups to which we as humans belong (Reicher, 2001). The fact that we are attached to many different groups and comparatively rarely engage in conflict makes it all the more important that we understand the processes which underpin these instances of conflict, as well as co-operation. This consideration raises the central, and perhaps more challenging question, of whether and under what circumstances group membership translates into conflict or co-operation. To account for the complex nature of inter-group relations there are a constellation of different variables which must be considered in any given context; including social, historical and cultural norms. However, research has generated more general cognitive and motivational factors which are thought to be universal and central aspects of inter-group relations. These more general processes and theories facilitate an understanding of the types of inter-group social tensions and conflict that can be observed on a day to day basis.

1.2.2 Social influence and group cohesion

Social psychology as a discipline grew from a desire to explain the way in which people are influenced by the actual or implied presence of others; the process of social influence. When others are around us, whatever the task may be, it seems they have an impact on our behaviour. The way others have the power to affect our

behaviour in groups (the intra-group relations), was long established by the time investigators began to consider the way others affect our behaviour between groups (the inter-group relations). World War II prompted researchers, particularly in Britain and America, to seek insight into the social processes that underpinned the widespread discriminatory treatment of the Jews in Germany. From this, the study of inter-group relations as a distinct area of research was born and theories developed over nature of social influence in an inter-group context (i.e., conformity (see Asch, 1951); compliance and obedience (see Milgram, 1964; 1974), and defining group membership.

Originally, group membership was conceptualised as cohesion. To define cohesion theorists' employed measures of inter-personal attraction as a basis for developing scientific studies on group formation (e.g., Festinger, Pepitone, & Newcomb 1952). The approach of equating group processes to inter-personal attributes of attraction has been considered a theoretical model of group psychology (Lott & Lott, 1965). Recently, Hogg (1992) has extensively critiqued the analysis of cohesion as an inter-personal characteristic which can account for a definition of group membership. There are various levels of Hogg's analysis, but it ultimately comes down to the fact that any definition of group membership must by definition account for individual level and group level considerations. Broadly, social psychology as a discipline has acted to diminish reductive explanations of collective action which rely an explanation at the level of the individual psychology. While cohesion is not considered sufficient to define a group, it is still widely accepted as central to understanding group action.

1.2.3 The Inter-group Contact Theory

Following World War II, addressing the criteria for reducing inter-group conflict became a central strand of inter-group research. Essentially, if the processes of conflict and co-operation can be understood to be functional consequences of a group, what then becomes the issue of contention is whether it is possible to alter these dynamics with interventions, and if so, how such efforts should be conducted. Allport's (1954) inter-group contact hypothesis has been influential in detailing the

specific situational conditions for the reduction of prejudice and conflict between specific groups.

Allport (1954) theorised that the positive effects of inter-group contact can only occur in situations which are marked by four key conditions: (1) equal group status, which is difficult to define and contextually specific (Pettigrew, 1998), as a result it is best defined in context; (2) common goals (i.e., a united and active effort to achieve similar goals) and shared values; (3) inter-group co-operation, in the absence of competition between groups; and, (4) is the support of authorities and laws. Inter-group contact and the reduction of prejudice are more readily accepted when sanctioned by social authorities.

The theory received attention theoretically and politically as a result of its novel approach to understanding group functions (Pettigrew, 1998). In a recent meta-analytic review of the inter-group contact theory from five hundred and fifteen studies, it was reported that inter-group contact typically does reduce inter-group prejudice between the groups in contact (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). The theory has proved to be useful in application to reduction of conflict in various settings, for example; schools (Bullock, 1978), ethnic desegregation (Emerson, Kimbro & Yancey, 2002), and employment contexts (Novak & Rogan, 2010).

1.2.4 The Boy Camp Studies

The Boy Camp Studies (BCS) are a set of three experimental studies, including the Robbers Cave, which were designed to investigate the relationship between inter-group competition and inter-group conflict. The BCS were conducted primarily to address; (1) the absence of group level theorising in models of group psychology; and (2) Allport's contact hypothesis. The 1954 Robbers cave study (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961) empirically examined the way changing group relations affected inter-group perceptions and actions. The sample was middle class boys chosen on the basis they were the least likely to engage in negative social behaviours (described as the cream of the crop by their teachers). They were invited to a summer camp at which the staff members were experimenters. The first stage of the experiment was spontaneous friendship, during which all were

treated as one group. Socio-metric tests were conducted and the boys were divided into two groups on the basis of an indicated dislike for one another. The second stage of the experiment was group formation, during which they chose group names, developed flags and symbols. Socio-metric choices at this point indicate an overwhelming in-group, and derogatory attitude towards the out-group. The third stage of the experiment was group competition, during which they competed against one another in games and tasks. Conflict and derogation between groups increased. The final stage was group co-operation, during which it was found providing information about the out-group failed to reduce conflict. However, introducing shared super-ordinate goals did reduce conflict.

Measures of peer preferences, trait ratings, and group evaluations revealed that the boys in the Robber cave study showed consistent biases favouring members of their own group. This robust in group preference tendency has received much research attention. There is an extensive literature on bias in favour of in-groups at the expense of out-groups (see Brewer & Brown, 1998). Hewstone, Rubin and Willis (2002) also review the literature and conclude that modern theories of bias highlight key motivational explanations for the phenomena as social identity, optimal distinctiveness, and uncertainty reduction. The key moderators of the bias are identification, group size, status and power, threat, positive-negative asymmetry, personality and individual differences. The point to be emphasised here, is that categorisation of others as an in-group or out-group member, is not only an outcome variable, it actively determines and shapes the way in which people think and behave subsequent to categorisation.

Sherif & Sherif (1969, p. 150) define a group as an "*interdependent network of roles and hierarchical status*". Roles and status, from their perspective, relate more to behaviours than to individuals in positions occupied by individuals. Roles are of equal worth, but status gives rise to status hierarchies. It was argued that groups naturally develop their own cultures, status structures and boundaries. Sherif and Sherif (1969) concluded that realistic conflict and competition for resources was the construct of group formation. The study demonstrates that cohesion is not necessary for psychological groups to emerge, but emphasises the power of this variable on group function. Importantly, the study recognised that group level psychology flowed

from a rational group level reality. However, it was not long before theorists contemplated the likelihood that psychological group formation may precede processes of conflict.

1.2.5 The Minimal Group Studies

The Minimal Group Studies (MGS) demonstrate that psychological category membership, rather than the physical group, is influential in determining the way in which group members will act (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; Billig & Tajfel, 1973). The objective of the MGS is to identify the exact psychological loci, or mechanism of group formation. The best known MGS is the Kandinsky and Klee experiment. The experiment involved male participants from a school in Bristol, who were shown pictures by artists and asked for their preferences. They were then divided into two groups, ostensibly based on their choices, but in reality the grouping was random. There was complete anonymity of group membership, no face to face interaction or history of interaction. Participants were asked to divide points which represented monetary value between an anonymous member of the in-group and an anonymous member of the out-group. The response involved a significant choice, but was of no value to the self. The experiment illustrates that group formation can be based on categorisation.

Merely informing individuals that they are part of a group, in the absence of any other information, or face to face contact, is sufficient to construct an in-group which impacts on behaviour, decisions, and facilitates in-group preference and bias. Billig and Tajfel (1973) went on to demonstrate that the results occur for random group categorisation but not for similarity without categorisation (i.e., attraction alone is not sufficient). Tajfel (1972), and Turner (1975), argued by categorising participants in one group or another, this defined the self in that particular situation. The MGS demonstrate that people respond with self interest when groups are made explicit but they are hardly conclusive in demonstrating that self interest accounts for the discrimination typically observed (Brown, 2000) as has been argued (e.g., Turner & Bourhis, 1996).

Ultimately, the MGS research demonstrates that we form groups instinctively, even when the criterion for membership is entirely arbitrary (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Informed by the MGSs Tajfel (1981) advanced the theory that psychological group formation must be defined by the subjective perspective of the participants of the group. Like McDougall (1920), Tajfel (1981) opted for a definition of the group as internal psychological criteria or put another way, a collection of people who feel that they are a group. This research employ a similarly subjective understanding of the psychological group in terms of self categorisation (Tajfel, 1981), or alternatively considered who 'we' are in comparison to 'them'.

1.3 Defining the self and others

A philosophical approach to the self splits the issue into the 'easy problems of consciousness' and the 'hard problems of consciousness' (Chalmers, 1996). The so-called easy problems are addressing issues such as; reaction to environmental stimuli, reporting of mental states, the ability of a system to access its own mental states, attention, control of behaviours, and the distinction between wakefulness and sleep. Chalmers (1996) considers these variables to be the nuts and bolts, the infra-structure of mind which gives rise to the self concept and are relatively easy to empirically study and theorise over. The hard problems in the study of the self are in explaining the experience; what it is to be who you are and understanding the subjective experience of concept of self. While the two are inseparably interlinked, they are two very distinct issues of self and theory.

The earliest theory addressing the hard question of the self concept was hypothesised by Rene Descartes (1596-1650). Descartes sought to address the epistemological issue of knowledge sources, by trying to establish what can be known as true beyond doubt. Using a deductive argument, he infamously claimed "*Dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum*", translated as '*I doubt, therefore I think, therefore I am*'. For the importance of the current research the key argument of Descartes is positing is that the only thing you can truly be certain of is the self concept. Underpinning his projections is the hypothesis that the mind and the body are distinct issues which demand differentiated consideration. Descartes' arguments were truly novel at the

time of their development. Moving forward five hundred years, the significance of his self related arguments can be seen to be reflected in modern social research.

1.3.1 Symbolic interactionism: the individual in society

George Simmel (1858-1918) considered society to be the association of individuals determined by interaction. He was the first theorist to argue that the self in society was not a phenomenon which could be examined using the same methods as those used to study the physical world. In other words, the study of social processes is considered more than the discovery of natural laws that govern human interaction (Frisby 1992).

The influence of Simmel's perspectives is particularly prevalent in the work Mead and other theorists at the Chicago school of sociology who formalised the perspectives of human socialisation into the theory of symbolic interaction. Symbolic interaction determines that mind and self are not part of the innate human equipment but arise through social interaction (i.e., communication with others using symbols). For symbolic interactionists, the individual engages in socialization or the modification of one's mind, role, and behaviour through contact with others. From a psychological perspective, symbolic interactionism provides a mutual or reciprocal way by which to understand the relationship between the self and society. It serves to generate an understanding of human behaviour by integrating the social reality of the individual into that of the group, and vice versa.

Any theory of inter-group psychology must be explained by a theory of interaction between the individual and the social. Society can neither be reduced to the individual, nor the group level psychology. The individual and the group are mutually dependant, and equally influential for the way in which society functions and how and why changes in society take place. The way by which the individual informs, and is informed, by the society which surrounds them can be considered the hard question of social psychology. Social identity research draws on concepts of social determinism and individualism, producing what can be understood as a general meta-theory of social interactionism in order to address the process by which this reciprocal relationship is possible (see Tajfel, 1972; 1982; Turner & Oakes, 1986;

Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987; Turner, 1991; 1996; Turner & Bourhis, 1996).

In a paper discussing what exactly meta-theory is Abrams and Hoggs (2004) provide a jargon-less, and simple explanation of what can be considered a theory about theories. They outline a meta-theory as placing specific research questions within a broader framework and using this frame as a link in order to theorise over a range of what could be considered distinct phenomena. The framework sets the parameters for predictions by allowing the encompassing model to resonate ideas into more specific theories and contexts. The openness to debate and integration of the concepts can be advantageous by the development of theory and further research questions which builds on models which have been empirically examined. They suggest the central importance of approaching issues of sociality equipped with a meta-theory, "*A lesson we have learned from our research on group processes, inter-group relations and social identity is that to embark on a quest to understand social behaviour, it certainty helps to have a meta-theory tucked away in ones backpack. A meta-theory is like a good travel guide – it tells you were to go, what is worthwhile and what is not... Meta-theoretical conviction provides a structure and direction, it informs the sorts of questions one asks and does not ask...*" (Abrams & Hoggs, 2004, p. 98)

Meta-theories can be controversial, and the arguments often become confused because of the way in which different protagonists use the key terms in different ways. Additionally, there is a key shift away from two conventional conceptualisations of the self, which are; (1) the Cartesian duality argument that the mind and the body operate distinctively; and, (2) that our human socialisation is dependent on one singular identity. Finally, variation in inter-disciplinary terminology can complicate the literatures and impact on the way meta-theories are understood.

With these limitations acknowledged, this research emphasised the importance of employing such models to provide continuity to complex social phenomena, and equally to offer a parsimonious account of aspects of social life which may otherwise require a multiplicity of different models to provide a similar level of understanding. The current research employs the dominant meta-theory of social identity to shed light

about different considerations in the inter-group context of policing foreign nationals. Social identity research is comprised of two independent, but interlinked theories, which are often confounded as one: (1) the Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979); and, (2) the Self Categorisation Theory (SCT; Turner, 1982; Turner, et al., 1987).

1.3.2 The Social Identity Theory

Social identity refers to an individuals' internalised membership to a particular social group (Tajfel, 1972), it is widely supported that when a particular social identity is salient this is a powerful motivator for social perception and behaviour (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarthy, 1994). A person may have many identities, the salience of which is determined by the particular context. Identity salience can be considered the degree to which a particular identity is activated (i.e., the importance of a particular identity in a given situation). Or put another way, *"Identity salience is conceptualized (and operationalized) as the likelihood that the identity will be invoked in diverse situations"* (Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995, p. 257). Social identity research began as a social-cognitive reaction against the individual disposition explanations as the basis for collective behaviour.

The SIT has been developed to account for the motivational aspect of in-group bias. The SIT posits that the self can be defined in two sub-systems, (1) the personal, (idiosyncratic); and, (2) the social (collective). The personal defines the self in terms of idiosyncratic personal traits or relationships (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). The social defines the self in terms of group memberships. Identity is conceptualised on a continuum from personal identity which has to do with unique individual characteristics, to social identity which is the social knowledge of groups' membership, along with the meanings associated with those memberships. The self is a multifaceted construct, for example an individual may have several social identities that are central to who they are as a person (e.g., a mother, a daughter, a recreational football player and a teacher). Identity salience shifts between the multiple identities depending on the surrounding social reality and context.

Social identity provides a bridge between the individual and the structure of social groups, within which the self is embedded. Thus, the meaning of social identity has two faces (Brewer, 2001). On one hand identity can be understood as aspects of self knowledge that are derived from membership in specific social groups, meaning identity is located within the individual self concept. On the other, social identity refers to the perception of the self as an integral or inter-changeable part of a larger social group. Social identity can either be the group within the self, or the self within the group. Although a great deal of attention has been dedicated to understanding the structure and content of identities at an individual level (for a review, see Baumeister, 1998), the focus of the current research is the social self. That is, the study of the self and identity as they are embedded in inter-personal relationships and social group memberships.

1.3.3 Social mobility and change

Tajfel and Turner (1979) originally developed the SIT to explain the minimal conditions necessary for inter-group bias (demonstrated in the MGS). By analysing the psychological consequences of in-group members which occupied different positions of status or power (high or low), and the perceived nature of inter-group status differences (secure or insecure), the SIT was developed. The investigation sought to understand the relationship between a threat to ones social identity, and the response. They predicted inter-group behaviour was a result of an interaction between positive social identity, collective group membership and the perception of social structure and inter-group relations (Turner, 1996).


The perceived permeability of social boundaries and the extent to which social change is considered possible is a central mediating factor of inter-group relations, and the way people conceptualise and actualise change. The boundaries of this existing social structure can be perceived by individuals as one of three things: (1) permeable, which reinforces the personal identity based on the status quo or notion of social mobility, thus encouraging the perception that it is possible to move beyond the social boundaries and collective action is not necessary; (2) non-permeable, dictating a social identity based acceptance for the social conditions. This, for example, could be the perception that if existing social conditions are perceived to be legitimate but

the group feels that social action is not possible, or will not change the social structure; or (3) in conditions where the boundaries are perceived as non-permeable but cognitive alternatives to the status quo can be imagined and are possible (indicating the conditions are perceived as illegitimate but an alternate world is considered possible), the collective identity challenges the status quo, and subsequently there are attempts to create social change (see Figure 1.1). Therefore, the perception of status (high or low) and the permeability (permeable or non-permeable), of the social structure will determine the nature of the social action which is considered possible and legitimate.

From the SIT it is evident that the groups (e.g., social class, family, football team), to which people belong are an important source of self-esteem. Groups give us a sense of social identity and a sense of belonging to the social world. The benefits associated with identification with an in-group include: (1) acceptance, belonging and social support; and (2) a system of roles, rules, values and beliefs which serve to guide behaviour. Group identities are as important to the self concept as the idiosyncratic personal self. When a given particular social identity is salient, the ideas, attitudes, values and behaviours tend to reflect the group and the main goal is to see the group as positive and distinct (Turner et al., 1987). According to the SIT prejudice stems from a need to enhance our self esteem. One way we can increase our self-image is by being prejudicial and discriminating against groups we do not belong to. Consequently, we favour our own in-groups compared to the out-groups and perceive them to be a threat, particularly if they have the power to impact on the in-group negatively, or if the values are contradictory to those of the in-group.

In summary, the SIT posits that; (1) the self is multi-faceted; and, (2) gives rise to the need for positive self esteem. Amongst other things, research has come to demonstrate that salient identities are the basis of social influence, social judgement, conflict and co-operation (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 1999). In order to fully account for inter-group relations the SIT was developed into a more encompassing theory of inter-group relations, the SCT.

Figure 1.1: Social identity, mobility and social change depicts the Social identity premised model of social change as it relates to high and low status groups in society.



1.3.4 The Self Categorisation Theory

The SCT uses the concept of social identity to provide a more general theory of inter-group relations which addressed inter-group and intra-group (i.e., the dynamics internal to a given in-group), processes. A distinction is made more explicitly between the different levels of identity; (1) sub-ordinate or personal identity (i.e., who I am vs. you); (2) intermediate or social identity (i.e., who 'we' are vs. 'them'); and, (3) super-ordinate identity (i.e., who we all are, at a human level). The central principles of SCT are first that psychological group formation is made possible through the stereotyping of the self and others; and, second that group formation makes group level processing possible (Turner et al., 1987; Oakes, Turner & Haslam, 1991; Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994; Turner et al., 1994; Turner & Oakes, 1997).

We make sense of the world by grouping objects, places, things and people into discrete categories. Categories are "*nouns that cut slices*" through our environment (Allport, 1954, p. 174). Socio-cultural history groupings (i.e., nationality, sex, class, religion, language) are the most commonly used criteria of classification (de la Rey, 1991). Categorisation processes provide the building blocks of coherent thought through the reduction of processing load by facilitation of the similarities between groupings, which make associations by drawing on background knowledge. It is our tendency to categorise people which provides the foundation for inter-group behaviour.

The social environment around us is hugely complex. The process of categorisation is a useful cognitive heuristic shortcut for grouping together social information, thus reducing the resources needed to coherently understand the world around us (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Reynolds & Oakes, 2000). Perceptual selectivity is not denying us valuable information or diminishing our understanding, it is an active engagement with the environment "*such that the perceiver constructs it in the most appropriately informative manner*" (Oakes et al., 1994, p. 114). Categorisation brings together stored knowledge in a form which makes sense of the world and facilitates our goals within the world.

Social categories reflect the organisation of social reality (Oakes et al., 1994), the surrounding social environment and one's place within it. Social categorisation can be considered "*The ordering of the social environment in terms of social categories, that is of groupings of persons in a manner which is meaningful to the subject*" (Tajfel, 1970, p. 98). Social categorisation is the psychological basis that makes group level interaction possible (Turner et al., 1987; Oakes et al., 1991; Oakes et al., 1994; Turner et al., 1994; Turner & Oakes, 1997). We cognitively categorise the social environment by dividing the world into 'us' (the in-group), and 'them' (the out-group). Categorisation of those around us as an in-group or an out-group member has specific consequences at the level of inter-group relations.

The more we see someone in terms of their group identity (rather than as individuals) the more likely we are to stereotype group members. Tajfel (1959) called this the accentuation effect and this tendency makes it more likely that we exaggerate the similarities within the same groups and the differences between different categories (i.e., they are all the same but we are different). Thus, we perceive out-groups homogeneously, while we tend to perceive the in-group heterogeneously. There is also a tendency to generalise from distinctive individuals, to the group as a whole, particularly in ambiguous situations where we are unfamiliar with the category (Quattrone & Jones, 1980). Thus, disproportionate or novel individuals can influence and become representative of the general image that is constructed of the out-group.

Categorisation is the basis of group consensus and cohesion. Consensus and uncertainty are not the property of objects, but are the level of agreement we find with similar others about the object. Generally speaking, we expect to agree with in-group members, and expect to disagree with out-group members, and in some cases we may even seek disagreement (Haslam, 2001). Disagreement with in-group members causes subjective uncertainty, cognitive dissonance and schism within the group (Sani & Reicher, 1998). Bystander intervention and helping behaviours are phenomena which have been demonstrated to be affected by the perception of similarity, and of relative 'in-groupings' (Levine, Prosser, Evans & Reicher, 2005). Because people tend to view the world from a perspective shared with fellow in-group members, these are the people who are most likely to influence one's behaviour, and gain our trust and co-operation, compared to those who we consider to be out-group members.

Categorisation is the basis of inter-group bias. Without the categorisation process of 'us' vs. 'them' inter-group prejudice, discrimination and conflict are not possible. Based on the categorisation understandings discussed, management of the 'us' vs. 'them' dynamic is a central tool in achieving conflict reduction in all inter-group situations.

1.3.5 Stereotyping the self and others

Stereotypes represent a shared mental representation of groups and their members. By definition they are neither good nor bad; they can include positive and negative attitudes on the basis of 'prototypes', which constitute a representation of the defining features of the group. Stereotyping occurs when we impart the prototypical characteristics of a group on an individual because that individual is a member of that group. Earlier, prejudice and discrimination has been discussed as negative attitudes which can have specific consequences at an inter-group level. Prejudice and discrimination should be distinguished from stereotyping. Stereotyping is a dynamic process through which social groups make sense of and pursue their identity-related goals within inter-group contexts (Oakes et al., 1994; Turner, et al., 1994; Oakes, Reynolds, Haslam & Turner, 1999; Haslam, Turner, Oakes, Reynolds, & Doosje, 2002).

Heuristic processes, such as categorisations and stereotyping may be beneficial, or detrimental. It is now well-established that stereotypes can become activated unintentionally and outside of awareness by the presence of the relevant group features, and act to guide or inform attention, information gathering and processing. Prior knowledge in the form of stereotypes influences the evaluation of new input (see Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Bodenhausen, Macrea & Sherman, 1999). *"The mere presentation of a stimulus person activates certain classification processes that occur automatically and without conscious intent"* (Brewer, 1988, p. 5). Stereotypes can lead to a biased way of interpreting the evidence, they can also facilitate confirmation bias, which is the tendency to seek information that confirms your expectations, and ignore disconfirming information. These processes can cause error in our interpretation of particular situations, or groups and their intentions because humans seek patterns, even in their absence, to explain or

make sense of the environment. This may create problems when associations are drawn between facts or events in the absence of any pattern or similarity (i.e., illusory correlations). Additionally, the stereotypes of an out-group are often exaggerated or wrong, particularly when the content is threatening (Stephan & Renfro, 2002).

1.3.6. Inter-group context dependency

A powerful theoretical advancement of the SCT is the emphasis placed on the importance of inter-group context. Identity is context dependant, not fixed, it is changing and dynamic. The definition of 'the out-group' is rarely fixed or a given. Instead, it changes over the course of ongoing social relations over time, and is historically bounded. Context explains why group membership can powerfully cue beliefs and actions in one setting but has little or no effect in another.

The SCT advances the hypothesis that categorisation is grounded in social comparison. Social comparison is a function of the 'meta-contrast ratio' (Turner, 1985). The meta-contrast ratio is the ratio of inter-category differences compared to the intra-category differences, and acts to determine the relative differences between groups in a specific context. Changes in context can create a change in salient social identity, and the perception of similarity to a particular group as an outcome. For example, in one context a psychologist may be conceptually very different to a sociologist; however in another frame of reference the two become more similar: 'social' science versus 'biological' science. Thus, as the context changes in a given situation the dynamic perspective of how people see themselves, and others, can also change. This means that stereotypes and the associated norms of the social group are not fixed but emerge within specific contexts (Oakes et al., 1994; Jetten, Spears & Manstead, 1996).

From a social identity perspective the construction and maintenance of identity processes have been largely unaddressed, these dynamics as they change and shape over time. Who we are, is as much an active statement as it is a use of linguistics. Social identity researchers have given the most detailed attention to the characteristics of groups that incline them towards or away from the development of conflict, rather than the construction of identity (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). The conceptualisation of

identity as something which is constructed diverts from the common assumption of the self as a unitary construct. Here, it is argued that mental life does not derive from a passive contemplation with our social environment but from an active engagement, defined by who we are, who we want to be and who we are capable of being (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).

1.3.7 Social identity: theory in practice

Social identity research is well established and has been ongoing for over thirty years, but it is not without its limitations. The approach fails to develop a dynamic account of social identity (identification is not a passive process). One of the most powerful aspects of its emphasis is the importance of contextual factors in understanding inter-group phenomena; particularly, the salience of identity which is not fixed but dynamically responsive to changes in surrounding social context. Belonging to a group does not necessarily lead to social identification with that group, since people do reject their social group. One need only look for examples to testify to this, an obvious example and one which has been immortalised by Hollywood is that of Oskar Schindler, who at great personal risk acted to save Jews during the Holocaust. On a more day to day basis, members of organisational social groups frequently adhere to values and norms not because they identify with them, but because they value the job and do not want to challenge the status quo for this reason.

The social identity theory advances individuals have multiple identities which leads to categorisation to different groups, leading to implications over who is seen as in-group and who is seen as out-group in particular situations. However, the theory says nothing of the complexity of their subjective representations of their multiple in-groups. One notable example in the literature which acknowledges this limitation is Roccas and Brewer (2002), who advance the theory of Social Identity Complexity which reflects the degree of overlap perceived to exist between groups of which a person is simultaneously a member, and the potential antecedents.

A reliance on artificially constructed groups and laboratory experiments prevent the social identity approach from examining changes to identification processes over time. Without this richness, it is difficult to apply the impact of group

membership on inter-group bias, and inter-group conflict to real world groups. Social psychology was described as a discipline several years before there was any recognition of social psychology as an experimental science (Danzinger, 2000). After WWI, the quest for social certainty began and the first systematic attempts to apply experimental methods to social psychological issues were made. In Germany by 1920 Moede used experiments were it to study crowd psychology, and Allport by 1920 in America, used them for the examination of social facilitation (Danzinger, 1992). After World War II experimentation became a methodological norm in social psychology. No longer found in isolated studies, but accepted as the common method for a coherent set of studies linked by similar research interests, research questions, and theories (Danzinger, 1992; 2000).

Another criticism that can be levelled at the social identity approach is that its cognitive and perceptual focus, leads to a consequent neglect of motivational and affective (emotional) processes. The theory gives little attention to the role of ideology, preferring to consider this motivational attribute as function of power and status dynamics. An ideology is a belief structure that confers legitimacy on a social system. Ideologies are a belief about the way the world should be; a set of beliefs which explain or justify some actual or potential social arrangement (Robertson, 1989, p. 176). Legitimacy is the *“generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions”* (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). This may be explained by a focus on processes within the social interaction, at the expense of examining the content of identities.

Finally, constructionist themes built on meta-theory of interactionism that recognize individual and collective activity through defining identities are relatively neglected. The social identity research is a meta-theory, which means it is a theory whose subject matter is other theory (i.e., it is a theory, about a different theory). This level of abstract theorising, is useful in understanding the hugely complex nature of human socialisation and relations, but simultaneously can be considered a limitation which leaves the approach open to criticism. The social identity approach can be critiqued for being overextended in its present form, making the theory difficult to falsify, or verify.

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The social identity approach is not the only theory which has been put forward to interpret the various aspects of inter-group relations, such as cohesion, in-group bias and inter-group conflict. Two alternative frameworks to the social identity approach are; (1) the Social Dominance Theory (SDT); and, (2) the System Justification Theory (SJT).

1.3.8 Social Dominance Theory

The SDT proposes that people exhibit different levels of social dominance orientation, which can broadly be understood as; (1) a desire to dominate members of other groups, and (2) a desire to maintain continued hierarchical relations between groups (Pratto, 1999; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Prato, Sidanius & Levin, 2006). SDT is based on the idea that in virtually all groups hierarchies are formed in which both dominant and subordinate member and/or groups co-exist. In particular, the SDT provides an explanation for why societies appear to be underpinned by this hierarchical structure. In accordance with this theory, institutions policies and practices function to maintain ideologies (or, legitimising myths) which provide an advantage to the dominant groups over subordinate.

Sidanius and Pratto (1999) contend that both high status and low status groups strive to sustain group-based hierarchies by the development of opposing ideologies that promote, or attenuate group inequality and domination. This motivation process is referred to by the authors as legitimising myths. The theory uses an individual differences approach to explain the extent to which people accept or reject the ideologies or legitimating myths that legitimise either hierarchy and discrimination or equality and fairness. Individuals who desire to be part of high status groups are likely to rate highly on social dominance orientation, causing them to reject equality ideologies and legitimise hierarchy and discrimination. People who rate highly on social dominance are more likely to behave in a discriminatory way to those who rate lower on social dominance orientation.

The extent to which legitimising myths are embraced by group members determines the longevity and robustness of its acceptance. The theory advances the

hypothesis that consensus tends to be more prevalent than dissonance in stable societies and systems. Those in a position of power in society are more likely to accept the myths, in an attempt to maintain their position. However, there are institutions which seek to attenuate the dominant/subordinate hierarchy, and support social change within the framework e.g., human rights organisations, councils and public figures. Sidanius & Pratto (1999) argue these institutions provide the resources and information necessary for social change.

1.3.9. System Justification Theory

The SJT (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Burgess, 2000) posits that people need and want to see prevailing social systems as fair and just. System justification theory seeks to understand how and why people provide cognitive and ideological support for the status quo and what the social and psychological consequences of supporting the status quo are, especially for members of disadvantaged groups.

The SJT is underpinned by four key arguments; (1) there is a general ideological motive to justify the existing social order; (2) this motive is at least partially responsible for the internalization of inferiority among members of disadvantaged groups; (3) it is observed most readily at an implicit, unconscious level of awareness; and, (4) paradoxically, it is sometimes the strongest among those who are most harmed by the status quo (Jost, Banji & Nosek, 2004). System justification theorists have been influenced by theories of social identification and social dominance, but suggest these theories underestimate the strength of system justification motives which lead people to endorse a given system, often serving beliefs which are contrary to their own social and political interests.

Neither the SDT, nor the SJT have received the level of attention, or support, that the social identity research has in accounting group based variation in collective behaviours. Essentially, the former theories posit that high status powerful groups will seek dominance over low status subordinate groups (for reviews see Rubin & Hewstone, 2004 and Huddy, 2004). They both adopt a static view of inter-group relations, which is difficult to reconcile with the dynamic reality of social change. The

reductive psychological reliance on an individual disposition explanation for the dynamics of inter-group behaviour has been critiqued previously as insufficient to explain collective phenomena, and the argument is equally applicable here. In order to account for inter-group relations fully it is necessary to integrate the individual level theorising to that of the group, and not rely on one level of explanation over that of the other. Social identity research has a well developed list of attributes to account for a variation in the emergence of and variation in inter-group bias, as well as a host of other inter-group phenomena.

1.4 Inter-group relations and crowd psychology

The study of inter-group relations and, in particular, collective behaviour and social identity research has thrived through the analysis of crowd action. The term “crowd” has been used in many contexts, but there is no consistent definition of crowd. In the literature, the terms “crowd” and “mass gathering” often are used interchangeably. A crowd can be characterised as a large scale gathering of people covering a broad spectrum of circumstances, or motives i.e., football matches and other sports’ events, large festivals, concerts, demonstrations, trade union pickets, protests, rallies, religious gatherings (e.g. the Orange walk) and mass celebrations (e.g. royal coronations or weddings, New Year’s celebrations or May Day). Motivationally, a crowd can be considered a gathering which has some emotional similarity, such as celebration or mourning. Crowd events take place every day and only a fraction come to be disorderly. In order to explore theories of collective behaviour and the various definitions of a crowd it is necessary to explore the social and historical development of crowd theory.

1.4.1 Classic theories of the crowd behaviour

The Classic view of the crowd is that all crowds are inherently dangerous. Traditionally, organisationally and socially the group is construed by historians, criminologists, and psychologists as pathological and irrational (Taine, 1875; Sighele, 1897; LeBon, 1895; Tarde, 1898; McDougall, 1920; Martin, 1920; Allport, 1924). The Classic theory originated preceding the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars (1789-1815), at a time when social and economic process of change exposed

ideological divisions between groups occupying differing status and power positions in society. This societal movement and the differential reactions of the social tiers are an important consideration in the construction of early theories of crowd behaviour.

The Classic understanding of the crowd has been argued to persist in modern discourse (McClelland, 1989) and in English public order officers (Stott & Reicher, 1998a; Drury, Stott & Farsides, 2003) and Italian officers (Prati & Pietrantonio, 2009) psychology, as well as influenced the United States of America military practices during World War II (Bendersky, 2007). This could be the effect of the prominent focus on instances of disorder in the study of crowd behaviour, or alternately and more simply, because crowds can and do pose a threat to order and safety.

Early Classic theory is consensual on the irrationality of the crowd, but debate the location of pathology. Le Bon (1895) suggests crowd members are engulfed by a 'collective mind' through a process involving submergence, contagion and suggestion. Submergence is the cognitive mechanism which leads to a loss of the self concept, and an increase in power. Contagion is the tendency to copy any passing behaviour. Suggestion is the emanation of ideas from the 'racial unconscious', this is conceptualised by Le Bon (1895) as a passive engagement with barbarism which is, as the quote below illustrates, he understands to be a key characteristic of crowd behaviour. *"...by the mere fact that he forms part of an organised group, a man descends several rungs in the ladder of civilisation. Isolated he may be a civilised individual; in a crowd he is a barbarian – that is a creature acting by instinct"* (Le Bon, 1895, p. 36)

The 'group mind' concept of submergence was a genesis for future understanding for crowd and group behaviour, recapitulated in the practices of political leaders, such as Hitler (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1997), and in the literature as deindividuation.

1.4.2 The Deindividuation Theory

Festinger, et al., (1952) first used the term deindividuation to describe the effect of the crowd on the behaviour of an individual. The mechanism of

deindividuation is thought to be a process which mediates a loss of the individual self in a crowd or group (Festinger et al., 1952; Zimbardo, 1969; Deiner, 1976; Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1989). The major difference in the interpretation of the mechanism between the models is whether we express primitively repressed tendencies in the group or simply lose their rationality and control.

The Deindividuation theory has led to a number of studies which suggest that anonymity within a group enhances anti-social behaviour. For example, the classic study which supports this is 1971 Prison study, which was funded by the U.S. Office of Naval research (Haney, Banks & Zimbardo, 1973). A variety of studies have since brought the assumptions of the deindividuation theory to question. The first of which does so by demonstrating that anonymity need not be present to produce anti-social behaviour (Deiner, 1976). Second, by demonstrating that deindividuation can act to increase pro-social behaviours (Johnston & Downing, 1979; Reicher & Levine, 1994). Finally, Postmes and Spears (1998) reviewed over sixty papers on deindividuation and found little support for the contentions of a loss of the self in groups.

1.4.3 Individual disposition convergence theories

In stark contrast to the beliefs of LeBon (1895), Allport (1924) believed the notion of the group mind to be a 'metaphysical abstraction'. Arguing, "*There is no psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely a psychology of individuals*" (Allport, 1924, p. 4). McDougall (1920) similarly argued that individuals do not act outside of their individual minds. From this stance, crowds and group behaviour is a social amplification of the individuals which compose them. The individualist approach which underpinned this explanation of behaviour paved the foundations for a string of convergence theories.

Convergence theories maintain that people with particular characteristics come together in a crowd and that the attributes of the individual of those comprising the group or crowd explain the nature of collective behaviour. Examples of established convergence theories are the Authoritarian Personality Theory (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), the Relative Deprivation Theory (Gurr, 1970).

1.4.4 Points of attention for Classic theory

A range of empirical, theoretical and practical issues have been raised by critics of the classic crowd theory (e.g., Reicher, 1987). It can be concluded from Reicher's review that there is a large theory-practice gap in relation to crowd psychology and the mass-gathering setting. Contemporary approaches to crowd behaviour are consensual in that crowd action should be considered: (1) in historical context (McClelland, 1989); (2) through interaction with the out-group at a collective level (McPhail, 1991); (3) as normatively structured (Turner & Kilian, 1957) as opposed to pathological; and, (4) as being determined by issues of social identity (Gaskell & Benewick, 1987).

Classical theorists' analyses were not based on data collection and analysis. Historians and social scientists have systematically examined crowd behaviours (e.g., Feagin & Hahn, 1973), and maintain two key factors. First, is that crowd action is patterned in such a way that reflects the cultures and populations in which the collective action takes place. A tidy example of this is provided by the 18th century food riots in England (Thompson, 1971; 1991; cited in Reicher, 2004). In the analysis of hundreds of examples of food riots, it became evident to Thompson that they had characteristic patterns in terms of how they started and how people behaved during them. Moreover, the patterns reflected collective belief systems (i.e., the ideologies of the rioters). The second observation is that riots create social change. This also serves to illustrate that contrary to the decontextualised accounts of classic theory, any model of social action or conflict must be embedded in a cultural and historical context.

Traditional views of crowd psychology have now been widely challenged on the basis of empirical data relating to participants motives for inciting, and involvement in riots. For example, after the 1960s inner city riots in America it was regarded empirically untrue to suggest that rioters were irrationally responding to a structural organisation of which they did not comprehend (Waddington, 1994a). Conversely, researchers reported rioters were acutely aware of the deprivation and discrimination they felt that they suffered, and that this provided the rationale and motivational grounds for behaviour (Skolnick, 1969; Folgelson 1970; Feagin & Hahn, 1973). Similarly, following the British inner city riots in the 1980s in England (i.e.,

the four main riots that occurred were (1) the Brixton riot in London; (2) the Handsworth riot, in Handsworth, West Midlands; (3) the Chapletown riots in Chapletown, Leeds; and, (4) the Toxteth riot in Toxteth, Liverpool), a consensus emerged on the rationality of the rioting in response to police brutality (Kettle & Hodges, 1982; Benyon, 1984; 1987).

1.4.5 Modern crowd psychology

Modern crowd psychology emphasises the theoretical need to differentiate between a physical crowd and a psychological crowd, which classic crowd theorists failed to do. A group of people who are socially aggregate are not a psychological crowd. Smith (1979) argues that the unity of the crowd is for the most part an illusion, the crowd only appears unified to its members because they share the same space. A crowd can be composed of many different psychological groups whereas a psychological crowd is a group of people who are united by a shared and salient social identity. There is also a shift in modern crowd theory to explain the patterns and meaning of collective behaviour in crowd contexts, rather than maintaining, as LeBon (1895) and Allport (1924) did, that the behaviours of crowds are inherently irrational. The two contemporary theories of crowd psychology, the Emergent Norm Theory (ENT), and the social identity model (SIM), will now be addressed.

1.4.6 The Emergent Norm Theory

The ENT (Turner & Killian, 1957) suggests that collective behaviour is regulated by norms based on distinctive behaviour that arises in an initially 'norm-less' crowd. Individual characteristics and interpersonal interaction are, again, central to the theory. The existence of a 'generic norm' for discriminating against the out-group explains inter-group conflict. It was hypothesised that prior to collective action a period of milling occurred involving crowd members, during which they share their accounts of the situation and deliberate the action to be taken. In the milling process some individuals are hypothesised to have a greater impact or influence than others, these people are called the keynoters. Keynoters resolve the ambivalence or ambiguity of the majority by proposing definite action forcibly and without uncertainty. As more

people come to decide on a course of action in favour of the stance taken by a keynoter the proposal is expressed more widely, and comes to be more broadly accepted resulting in the exclusion of other proposed options. The ENT hypothesises it is through this process that 'norm-less' crowds construct the norms which govern action.

The ENT certainly drove theoretical understanding of group processes forward by acknowledging the normative structure of collective action. The theory also identified a distinctive characteristic of the crowd in that there are no clear norms. Crowd action, more than that of other social groups unfolds with a high degree of novelty and ambiguity (Reicher, 1987). The theory does fall short of an explanation for the spontaneity of collective action in crowd situations, participation and social influence. The theory was quickly abandoned as the explanation was considered to be tautological. However, it did serve to emphasise an explanation of crowd behaviour which resides in understanding of how normatively structured behaviours emerge from within a crowd.

1.4.7 The Social Identity Model of collective behaviour

The SIM is based on the hypothesis that collective behaviour and social influence is only possible when a crowd define themselves through a common collective identity. The social identity model challenges the classic theories of crowd psychology, in favour of an account of collective action based on a shift from personal to social identity. In a crowd, members relate to one another in terms of their group membership and not as individuals. As crowd members, it is the fate of the group that is important; there is a sense of 'we' rather than 'I'. An attack on 'our' group feels like an attack on the individual self; we feel for fellow group members, and feel threatened when they are under attack. From this perspective, crowd action is understood as the rational acting out of one's social category (Reicher, 1984; 1987).

Reicher (1982; 1984; 1987) developed the SIM of collective behaviour through real time observations and interviews during the naturally occurring crowd behaviour in the inner city riots in St Paul, Bristol. The aim was to explain the defining features of rioting behaviour. Reicher's analysis illustrates that despite the

disorderly nature of the crowd behaviour, the actions of crowd members were neither random nor uncontrolled, but targeted at specific symbolic representations and normatively patterned; when one considers the ideological perspectives of the rioters. The salient and shared social identity amongst crowd members (and the associated understandings of the meaning of such), informed and limited their behaviours. Analysis supports the argument that social identity shapes collective action and defines the goals and priorities of the crowd members. Dimensions of identity provide a framework for understanding of crowd behaviour which explains the boundaries of collective action (i.e., what people do), and the extent of participation (i.e., who does and does not join in).

To extend the work conducted during the St Pauls riots in Bristol Reicher (1996a; 1996b) explored the so called 'Battle of Westminster', which began as a demonstration and resulted in violent confrontation between students and police in November 1988. The objectives were to examine the importance of social interaction in changing the context, the processes by which students became involved in collective conflict and subsequently the nature of the crowd identity. The account demonstrates that the police and the rioters held asymmetrical perceptions of the same actions of one another, which they then act on. In this way crowd events are arenas in which crowd inter-group perspectives and actions feed into police inter-group perspectives and actions. Thus, the way the crowd interacts with social perspectives of the police is critically important to explaining instances of disorder. Characteristically, an inter-group interaction involves an in-group (e.g., the crowd) and an out-group (e.g., the police), a point which has been virtually absent in all previous theories of crowd behaviour.

Waddington (1991) argues that while insightful, this approach fails to explain why the riot started in the first place, and at the point at which it did. In other words Waddington argues, rightfully so, that the SIM explains how disorder develops, but centrally not why disorder develops in crowd contexts. The central point about this entire body of research, and that which is to be discussed is that the theories are about rioting, and instances of disorder. Their development and application is to explain collective disorder and is limited in respects of explaining other types of crowd behaviours.

1.4.8 The Flashpoint Model of inter-group disorder

The Flashpoint Model (TFM; Waddington, Jones & Critchler 1987; 1989) provides the explanation that an otherwise insignificant incident is sufficient to provoke rioting behaviour. The incident gains significance from the symbolic representation which reflects the grievances of the oppressed. For example, the Scarman report (1981) provides practical support for the model by suggesting the searching of a Black taxi driver on suspicion of drug possession was the 'flashpoint' which caused the Brixton riots. TFM theorises six possible variables that may contribute to a riot; (1) structural (i.e., the organisational aspects); (2) political-ideological (i.e., the extent to which the out-group are regarded as legitimate); (3), cultural (i.e., the cultural background and beliefs held by the police and crowd); (4) contextual (i.e., the broader social context which the behaviours take place); (5) situational (i.e., the particular details of the specific incident); and, (6) interactional (i.e., the particular details of the relations between operational officers and crowd members). This begins to highlight the complex interplay between external and internal factors that give rise to the context in which crowd management takes place.

The SIM and TFM are consensual on the importance of recognising the specific contextual variables relating to instances of crowd disorder. Another author by the same name argues that the empirical limitation of the latter model is in understanding why a flashpoint becomes a flashpoint, arguing this makes the concept of a flashpoint redundant, and empirically useless (Waddington, 1994a). In any orderly demonstration many instances which could act as a flashpoint occur, but go unrecognised because disorder is rare, this makes the model of little use in understanding how and when disorder will develop. Specifically in relation to the current research topic, that the flashpoints model is not applicable in the context of examining football disorder, as this is a particular context of disorder which requires separate consideration from that of political or social protests and demonstrations. However, a reworked version Waddington's TFM has been applied to an incident of football violence which occurred at the Hotel Tamsa in Istanbul, the night before a European Cup game between Manchester United and Galatasaray November 1993 (King, 1995). This suggests that it does in fact offer a platform from which to understand situational conditions which precede instances of disorder, and may serve

to be a useful model from which to understand variables which inform the police perspectives of risk in this context.

1.4.9 Crowd disorder as an inter-group process

To address the limitations of the SIM, social identity research turned to addressing the specific psychological mechanisms which underpin disorder in crowd situations. Research conducted during and after the Anti-Poll Tax riot, addressed crowd and police identity dynamics and the relationship to disorder (Stott & Drury, 2000; Drury et al., 2003). The two key psychological dynamics identified which underpin a shift from orderly to disorderly (from the perspective of the crowd), are that of legitimacy and power. The definition of legitimacy used here is the perception of “*right and just*” (Habermas, 1979, p. 178). This definition acknowledges the possibility that individuals and groups might have different beliefs about the legitimacy of commonly observed situations. This being stated, it is necessary to highlight that the perspective of social legitimacy advanced by the crowd psychology literature is characteristically different from that of the legal definition. While the former deals with the social perspectives of behaviours, the latter (to which it is likely falls more in line with police understandings of the concept) considers legitimacy to be behaviours which are legal, or acceptable. To clarify, it is likely that the police perception of the concept of legitimacy is different to that of crowd members.

The Anti-Poll Tax analysis found that prior to disorder the majority of demonstrators normatively defined themselves as legitimately exercising their democratic right to protest in a non-confrontational manner. In this context the use of police force against the crowd was perceived by a large proportion of the crowd to be illegitimate and unjustified. This had the effect of re-constructing the social relations, such that the crowd psychologically united in opposition to the police (as a consequence of the perceived threat to their democratic right). This sense of unity shifted the power dynamics, empowering the crowd as a whole to retaliate against their ‘unfair treatment’. Ultimately, this served to facilitate the intentions of the trouble-seeking minority, and reinforced the police perception of the crowd as dangerous, and should be treated as such.

It has been concluded that perceived illegitimacy and empowerment are the psychological factors that draw non-violent demonstrators into confrontation with the police. Thus, police strategies that respond to the conflict, which is engaged by a proportion of the crowd, by clamping down on all members enhances the possibility of large scale disorder, as an unintentional consequence of undifferentiated use of force. If police action is not targeted directly at the source of the problem, even those who were initially opposed to violence may come to side with the minority who are intent on causing disorder and hence contribute to an escalation in the level and scope of collective conflict. This research served to develop the Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) of crowd disorder.

1.4.10 The Elaborated Social Identity Model

The ESIM draws on identity functions to provide a theory of disorder. The ESIM is based on three assumptions; (1) social identity is rooted in inter-group relations which are defined and influenced by power and legitimacy dynamics, (2) changes to the inter-group relations impact on whom, and what actions, can become influential within a crowd; and, (3) police action is implicated in the inter-group dynamics and can impact such to change the processes of social influence in such a way that conflict (minor instances or large-scale), becomes more or less likely. The dynamics have been repeatedly observed in a variety of public order contexts including: student demonstrations (Reicher, 1996b), anti-globalisation demonstrations (Drury & Reicher, 1999) and environmental protests (Drury & Reicher, 2000). Further, an ESIM analysis has been provided to explain the presence, and absence, of disorder at international football tournaments (Stott & Reicher, 1998b; Stott, Adang, Livingston & Schreiber, 2007).

The ESIM emphasises how crowd events are characteristically inter-group encounters. As such, identity processes within a crowd do not simply determine collective action in a one-way process; rather, identity processes involve the dynamics of inter-group relationships. Inter-group dynamics function to change the nature of the social relations, which in turn redefines social identity and the associated norms, thus changing the nature of collective action. Such actions, can help to maintain the perceived legitimacy of the police, and as “*when neither the police nor the crowd see*

one another as legitimate, violence is encouraged, when legitimacy is reciprocated, both sides have a common interest in minimising violence” (Waddington, 1987, p.46).

The ESIM relies on the assumption that the composition of a crowd can be differentiated into minority and majority fractions that are characterised by differences in motivation. A riot need not involve such complex processes, nor does it always result in collective conflict. Furthermore, a crowd need not only be comprised of minority of trouble seeking, but can be composed of a majority who gather and come together for the purpose of causing disorder. Thus, while a distinction between the minority and majority may be a safe assumption on occasion, this is by no means the case in all situations. The composition of a crowd can never be known with certainty, while there may be many different groups within one crowd, there equally may not be. As a result of the unpredictable nature of disorder and practical constraints of researching in the field during conflict situations the analysis of such events is generally post hoc enquiry and therefore it is impossible to determine if the crowd is one single entity or a multiplicity of distinct groups acting on different intentions.

Further, while LeBon (1895) may downplay the political and social motives of crowd action, Reicher and colleagues (Stott, & Reicher, 1998b; Stott & Drury, 2000) equally downplay those acts of crowd violence that seem to defy rational explanation (Vider, 2004). An important aspect is lacking from the SCT model, that of intentional conflict and mediation. It would be very difficult to deny that when crowd members use the black bloc tactic and come equipped with batons and weapons that the crowd as a whole, not merely fractions of this crowd, are ready and perpetrated to engage in conflict. It is premeditated, and the orchestration and planning prior to instances of conflict is evidence of this.

Additionally, along the same line the ESIM theory can be argued to justify illegal actions, by simply deeming them as ‘normative behaviour’ or a response to perceived illegitimacy. As an empirical explanation the perception of illegitimacy is not sufficient to explain rioting behaviour, as collectively groups in society feel aggrieved everyday and this does not produce rioting. Waddington (1991) recognises the justification of rioters’ behaviours through the motives of deprivation,

discrimination or police heavy handedness rests on the unquestioned acceptance of a presumed relationship between injustice and disorder.

The determination of motives is the central limitation of all crowd research. Berk (1972) argues any theory that attempts to explain crowd behaviour will be restricted by methodological difficulties, to attribute motives to a riotous crowd is almost entirely speculative since researchers are unlikely even to know who was present at the scene, never mind what was going through their minds. Examining collective disorder ad hoc (e.g., the St. Pauls' riot), allows the researcher to place meaning to the rioters actions retroactively, and thus it could be advanced that the information gathering after the event has taken place is bias towards seeking data that fit the predictions which are advanced by the model they seek to support. If they seek to construct the argument that the crowd shared a common collective identity it would be difficult to disprove this retroactively. However, whether the motives of the crowd were actually homogenous at the time cannot be proven.

1.5 Chapter summary

To summarise the nature of inter-group relations, categorisation and interpretation of the social environment is determined by subjectively determined features, which are shaped by prior expectations, goals and theories, many of which derive from group membership (Oakes et al., 1994; Oakes & Turner, 1990). While social identities are unique and context dependant, the processes which are theorised by the SIT and SCT are generic. Group identification is a way of tapping into the centrality of a particular identity to a person's background knowledge and naive theories of their place in the social world, to their model of the social world (Reicher, 1996b). As such, the governing principles can be used to inform an interpretation of police identities, norms and values as occupational group. In accordance with ESIM, the crowd perspective the perceived legitimacy of police tactics by the majority is central to minimise, or escalate instances of disorder (Reicher, 1996a; 1996b; Stott & Reicher, 1998b; Drury & Reicher, 1999; 2000). Despite the relative limitations, the ESIM has been influential in explaining collective disorder retroactively in demonstration and protest crowd situations. However, as argued here, in reality much

depends on the specific context, the objectives of policing and the social and political context in which it takes place.

Moving forward, there are three core arguments. The first is that we need to take this psychological sense of identity (i.e., who we are compared to them) and the implications of identification seriously. The second argument is that identity is neither fixed nor singular but shifts in relations to changes in social context and relations; practically, in the context of policing this suggests that the identity and category boundaries of the in-group change depending on the group being policed. And, the third is that by drawing on the theoretical frameworks of SIT and SCT, research in this field can advance theoretical understanding of police perceptions and practices informed by principles of identity and group membership in the context of policing crowds.

CHAPTER 2:
POLICING FOREIGN NATIONALS IN THE CONTEXT OF
INTERNATIONAL FOOTBALL

2.1 Introduction

Chapter 2 draws together various literatures which offer insight into defining the subject area and better understanding the interaction between police and football fans. Importantly, this chapter seeks to contextualise the interaction within the broader inter-group network of audiences and organisational framework. In doing so, the inter-group nature of international football events will be emphasised and the potential implications this may have for those tasked with policing such events considered.

The more general non-empirical public order policing literature is a useful starting point from which to do this, as it presents evaluative arguments for and against particular strategies and tactics in crowd management. Broadly, the debate surrounds high and low profile approaches, which parallels the distinction made by crowd theorists. Following this, the transition and application of the crowd psychology based model (discussed in Chapter 1), from a protest/demonstration to football context will be considered. Despite the limited empirical investigation in the specific context of policing football fans, we shall see that crowd psychology has been used to inform public order police models of good practice and political policy at the domestic and international level of football management.

Rather than drawing on crowd psychology to inform police practice, it is argued here that first and foremost a grasp of police perception is paramount; this would then facilitate an integration of the two literatures. Chapter 2 will emphasise the importance of reconceptualising and studying the police as a organisational social group. Applied psychology draws topics for investigation from real life settings, in this case the occupational task of public order management. Organisational, or occupational, social psychology is usually applied at the level of groups, or entire organisations, with an emphasis on social interaction, group norms and institutional structure. By returning to the more fundamental social identity research the literature may be progressed by understanding the nature, identities and categorisation processes of the police as an organisation. Finally, the chapter consideration how all the multiplicity of variables outlined may come together to inform police risk perception and management in the context of policing international football events.

2.2 Defining policing in the context of international football

Policing foreign nationals in the context of international football events is a public order role. The meaning of policing is ambiguous, and difficult to define. The word police has its origins in the Ancient Greek word *polis* (city), which the word 'politics' is also derived (Wright, 2002). The police are officers and/or agencies that are empowered by the government to exercise authority within a defined territorial or legal area of responsibility, to enforce the law and to ensure public order. All roles of policing are, in one way or another, a task of maintaining order in a public context. However, the use of the term 'public order policing' typically refers exclusively to the policing of crowd events (Reicher et al., 2007). There is no area in which the tension between law and order is more pronounced than in the policing of crowds. Public order involves the relatively large-scale deployment of police officers, in a formation which is more visible and obvious to the media and public than routine policing. The definition of public order is problematic and often the subject of contemporary political tensions.

Implicit in the discussion of public order policing is the assumption that public order offences can be clearly defined. The legal definition of a public order offence as determined by the Public Order Act 1986, delineates three separate forms; (1) rioting, a riot is defined as *"Twelve or more persons who are present together and use or threaten unlawful violence for a common purpose and the conduct of them taken together is such as would cause a person present to fear for their personal safety, each of the persons is guilty of a riot"*; (2) violent disorder, is defined in exactly the same way as a riot, but the number of those involved is lessened to three, *"three or more persons who are present together and use or threaten unlawful violence for a common purpose and the conduct of them taken together is such as would cause a person present to fear for their personal safety"*; and, (3) affray, which is defined *"the fighting of two or more persons in a public place to the terror of ordinary people, or threat of violence by two or more persons"*.

The key issues which underpin the legal and statutory definitions of public order offences are in the determination of what the key components actually entail. Violence for example, is loosely defined by the Public Order Act 1986 as 'violent

conduct'. The legal definition has been considered to be tautological and criticised for failing to provide an adequate framework which determines what 'violent conduct' or 'a threat of violence' can be defined as in practice (Card, 1987; 2000). Furthermore, sustaining 'the pursuit of a common purpose' can be controversial; as providing support for a common attribution of motive to crowd psychology is difficult, if not impossible to provide evidence for (see Chapter 1). In sum, Jefferson (1987, p. 48) asserts that there is "*no effective, objective guidance... as to what constitutes a potentially disorderly situation*".

The definition of a public order offence is ultimately, even by legal terms, a subjective understanding. Given that the police can justify their action under the legal sanctions they are free to use their subjective discretion in their interpretation of a public order offence. Siegel (2004) provides a definition of a public order offence as a crime which involves acts that interfere with the operations of society and the ability of people to function efficiently. This definition produces an understanding of disorder at the level of socially accepted norms; thus, what is considered socially normative, or disorderly, in one country or area, may or may not be elsewhere. From this perspective disorder is a socially based interpretation, which is essentially very similar to the legal definition.

The meaning of public order, and thus disorder, is influenced by one's political, economic and social perspective; for instance, as discussed from an academic viewpoint may differ from a police officer, those who make complaints against the police, or protesters. For this reason the policing of public order can be considered morally ambiguous (Waddington, 1994a; 1994b; 1999). Those who engage in disorderly crowd events for instance, trade unionists protests, or the animal rights transport protests of the early 1990's, can be regarded as heroes, or criminals depending on the social perspective taken (Waddington, 1994a). Given that the police are free to use their subjectivity, the degree to which they may or may not perceive behaviours to be, or share the grievances of those who are involved, in what legally can be considered public disorder may vary from instance to instance. Thus, any definition or account of public disorder must necessarily socially and politically contextualise the instance, and perspective of whom the account comes from. While the law ultimately governs the determination of an offence as one of public disorder,

it is by no means a straightforward definition, and should be recognised as an issue of contention.

There is a wealth of literature on the issue of public order policing. In light of the psychological significance of crowd management it is surprising to find that policing crowd events has only recently become subject to systematic research inquiry (Adang, 1991; 1998; Della Porta & Reiter, 1998; Adang & Cuveiler, 2000; Drury et al., 2003; Stott & Drury, 2000; Stott, 2003). The orientation of the existing theoretical public order literature broadly examines the relationship between the police and the state and the symbolic nature of the police (i.e., addresses in theory whether the police role promotes order and protection, or rather is a vehicle for state governance). The public order policing literature has broadly focused on two key issues; (1) trends in public order policing; and, (2) the efficacy of public order strategies.

2.2.1 Trends in public order policing

Broadly, strategy and tactics combine to create a 'tool box' of available options for policing crowds in attendance at public order events. The visual formation of officers is determined by the strategic and tactical approach. A strategy is defined by Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO; 2007) as 'A plan of action designed to achieve a series of objectives or a particular goal', which is implemented prior to the event. It entails what the most important objectives of the operational mission are. Tactics are the methods by which the strategic objectives are achieved on the day (e.g. deployment formation, personal protective equipment (PPE; see glossary), weaponry).

The tools in the toolbox can be considered a combination of, or emphasis on either of the following; coercion, prohibition, weapons, information/communication and/or legal structures. Police strategy and tactics can be considered as a continuum from low to high (Adang, 1991; 1998; De Lint, 2005; Waddington & King, 2005; Della Porta, Peterson & Reiter, 2006; Stott & Adang, 2008). The end points of the continuum are articulated differently, but are essentially the same (e.g., prohibitive or regulatory, exclusionary or inclusionary, democratic or autocratic, escalation or de-escalation, coercive or consensual, harder or softer). This inconsistency in terminology unnecessarily complicates the public order literature.

For the purposes of this research the definition of high and low profile approaches to public order will be utilised. This definition is the same of that used by Stott & Adang (2008) in analysing the police profile at international football events. This definition encapsulates the behavioural profile, uniform and visual deployment formation; including numbers and group sizes. This avoids discussion of organisational structure, and relationship to governance which given the varied public order approaches and cultural considerations and the fact that the data gathering for the current project is in the international context this is beneficial. The issue which is sought to be developed here is the effect particular styles of policing have on the management of crowd dynamics, and ultimately disorder and this definition facilitates an observational difference between the two styles. Furthermore, it provides a measurable, comparative observational basis from which to gather data on police deployment.

The trends and fluctuations in public order approach have been widely discussed. Until the 1970's an escalated force strategy (the use of increasing amounts of force until the crowd is dispersed) was the traditional way of controlling crowds. The 1960's riots in the black sections of many major cities in America (e.g., Los Angeles, Watts Riot of 1965; Chicago, Division Street Riots of 1966; Newark, 1967), led to government commissioned reports which assessed the public order management. The Kerner report (1968) emphasised the potential of the escalated force strategy to exacerbate conflict, and maintained that excessive force to the management of social disorder can be counterproductive. Since then there has been an emergent shift towards the low profile strategy of negotiated management. Negotiated management is characterised by a respect for the right to protest, closer communication and co-operation with the public, reduced tendency to make arrests and application of only minimum force. Indeed, there is evidence, both from the USA and the UK, that over the last few decades, that the police patrolling of crowd situations have become increasingly more tolerant and appreciative of the need to treat different sections of the crowd in different ways, with the more traditional approach of high profile reliance becoming more rare (Waddington, 1994a; Mc Phail, Schweingruber & McCarthy, 1998; Della Porta & Fillieule, 2004; Della Porta, Peterson & Reiter, 2006).

While on the one hand there is a trend towards a more conciliatory and communicative approach, and on the other there is an increasing tactical and equipment potential for high profile deployments, particularly when state police take a leading role (King, 1997; Della Porta & Reiter, 1998). What is meant by tactical and equipment potential is that the police have become increasingly endowed with powers, acts and technologies to take action in the management of crowds. The issue of whether police are more or less likely to rely on their increased tactical powers and technologies and the utility of such in managing public order is the second central strand and research in the public order literature.

2.2.2 Efficacy of public order tactics

The relationship between police strategy, tactics and the subsequent public order outcomes has been widely addressed (Adang, 1991; 1998; Della Porta & Reiter, 1998; 2008; Hall & DeLint, 2003; Jefferson, 1987; 1990; 1993; Waddington & King, 2005; Waddington, 2007; Waddington, 1987; 1991; 1993). Ultimately, the key issue considered here is whether or not particular forms (i.e., high or low profile as outlined previously), of public order policing effectively manage the task of public order maintenance. The basis of the differentiation is typically observational field studies.

The consensus argument is high profile deployment which relies on force has the capacity to exacerbate and increase the levels of disorder, and thus is less efficient than low profile at maintaining order (Jefferson, 1987; 1990; 1993; Della Porta & Reiter, 1998; Vitale, 2005; Waddington & King, 2005). Occupationally, it has been argued the high profile formation promotes a pronounced militaristic culture, and a preoccupation with danger (Kraska & Paulsen, 1997). A high profile, escalated force strategy is understood by the majority of researchers to be less consistent with the doctrine of minimal force. Socially, advocates of the low profile approach have suggested that high profile management can be inconsistent with the Human Rights Act (Stott & Pearson, 2006).

Waddington (1987; 1991; 1993) argues the contrary to the majority consensus, in so much that there is little evidence to suggest high profile approach creates disorder. Instead, he considers high profile tactical options (e.g., plastic bullets, CS

smoke and water cannons, as opposed to batons or mounted charge), less than lethal more effective in the management of order through restraint. It is argued that high profile measures are resorted to less frequently and more thoroughly, making them more consistent with the doctrine of minimum force. There is also evidence from European countries with more developed paramilitary policing systems than Britain which suggests high profile police methods need not be counterproductive (Fillieule & Jobard, 1998; Winter, 1998; Wisler & Kriesi, 1998). For example, in France the quintessential paramilitary force, the Gendarmerie, are regarded for demonstrating restraint, rather than the civil riot control unit, the Compagnies Republicanines de Securite (CRS) who are notorious from the use of robust methods of riot control (Horton, 1995).

The promotion of low profile measures of public order may be explained in part as a result of the evaluative research focus on events which have become disorderly, and at which police have been forced to use high profile measures. This means an understanding of police strategy and tactics in the public order literature is largely based upon the analysis of disorder and rioting. Thus, there is little evidence to suggest officers are more likely to rely on high profile tactics merely because they have the power to do so. It is important to emphasise here that there is much that can be learnt in the absence of disorder, both theoretically and in terms of advancing evidence based models of public order policing at events.

The public order literature addresses what methods of policing are effective in managing disorder in protest contexts, what it fails to do is address the psychological mechanisms which underpin the efficacy of particular tactics and strategies. Most recently, studies investigating crowd dynamics have begun to take in interest in the police perspective (Stott & Reicher, 1998a; Stott & Drury, 2000; Drury et al., 2003; Cronin & Reicher, 2006).

2.2.3 Introducing the police perspective in public order theory

According to Reicher (1996b) research in crowd behaviour should include the police perspective in order to gain a better understanding of the inter-group dynamics. Crowd psychology research implicates police psychology and tactical management

tools in the development and escalation of disorder dynamics. The model of crowd behaviour and perception of those being policed and their public order role and methods are invariably related to the measures that are considered to be appropriate for crowd management.

Stott & Reicher (1998a) conducted interviews with members of the Metropolitan police which revealed three main themes related to the police understanding of crowds; (1) the composition of a crowd is that of a majority and a minority, the majority are easily manipulated by a minority of trouble-makers; (2) this leads to an understanding of crowd members as potentially dangerous, and thus the crowd presents a homogenous threat; and, (3) the fear and threat perceived in policing crowds has implications for subsequent tactics.

The perceptions were found to have specific implications for the way officers understood their role in crowd management. First, if crowd members were perceived to be all potentially dangerous, officers recommended strict control and quick intervention against that crowd in case of conflict. Second, if the crowd are perceived to present a homogeneous threat, then officers provided tactical reasons to justify treating a crowd as a single unit. Finally, police officers tended to deny any possible responsibility for crowd conflict and to attribute it to outside forces. In other words, from their perspective, the irrationality of the crowd was a sufficient explanation for conflict and the role of the police tactics (e.g., use of coercion, undifferentiated intervention) in contributing to disorder were not addressed.

The perception of a homogeneously dangerous, irrational crowd who can be 'whipped up' (Stott & Reicher, 1998a) is reminiscent of the classical model understanding of crowd psychology (see Chapter 1). A police model of crowd psychology which is informed by a classic understanding can be dangerous, as it; (1) misrepresents the basic psychology of crowds; (2) suggests managing crowds in ways that will fail to manage the risk of disorder, and can conversely increase the threat of such; and, (3) impedes the development of strategies which may not only improve relations, but actually serve to reconstruct identities and transform relations between the police and the wider communities which are represented by the crowds social identity.

Importantly, managing police perceptions is not enough. The Stott & Reicher (1998a) study also begins to address the practical issues of high profile policing formations and equipment, and the relationship this may have to patterns of interaction with the crowd. A routine feature of the personal protective equipment (i.e., the high profile uniform) is that it exacerbates the ability to differentiate between the minority and the majority of crowd members. According to Stott & Reicher's data officers report that the Perspex visors are scratched from previous use and this may blur officers' vision, which can be further obstructed by the use of a shield. Tactical actions to remove a particular threat (e.g., by dispersal), often leads to the crowd being treated as one, with little or no ability for differentiation. Finally, there is no time to differentiate between people and make judgements, as if officers were to pause and deliberate what each individual on the street deserved while sweeping the street, the tactic would rapidly grind to an ineffective halt (Stott & Reicher, 1998a).

Currently, research into police perspectives on crowd psychology and their relationship to tactics rely on a single sample population and relatively small sample sizes. What is understood of police psychology in relation to models of the crowd and behaviour at public order events is largely, but not exclusively, qualitative data derived from interview and questionnaire data from sample populations of the Metropolitan Police. Additionally, the narrow perceptual focus on protest and demonstrations limit the generalisations which can be made from the public order literature and the police crowd psychology literature, to the context of policing football international football events.

2.3 Defining international football events

International football events, and indeed spectators in attendance are quantitatively and qualitatively different to the domestic associations (Giulianotti 1991; 1995; O'Neil, 2005). In the European context, international football events involve at least one live football match in which at least one EU member state is involved. Or put another way, an event to which one or more football teams visit a host foreign country in order to play a football match (es) and the supporters of the travelling team also travel to the host city or cities. A distinction is drawn between a major international football tournament and an international football match.

2.3.1 The major international tournament

A major international football tournament involves national football teams playing football games against one another (e.g., Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark and England). Thus, the foreign nationals travel to the host country, and may travel between the cities hosting the football matches, to support their national team as opposed to domestic club teams. There are two major international tournaments to which EU foreign nationals attend. First, is the World Cup (WC; see table 2.1 for hosts of the WC competition between 1982 and 2014). The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) was founded in 1904, and has hosted the WC every four years since 1930 (with the exception 1942 and 1946, as a result of World War II). Second is the European Championship tournament (the Euro; see table 2.2 for the hosts of the Euro between 1984 and 2012). The Union of European Football Associations established in 1954 (Union des Associations Européennes de Football; UEFA), is the controlling body for European football. UEFA runs the Euro international tournament every four years.

A major international tournament is logistically a large event which requires long term planning by the host nations. For instance, a Euro tournament lasts for twenty-two days, in which thirty-one football matches take place between different host cities. The individual games are decentralised (normally) across eight cities, in one large country or two smaller countries. Major international tournaments are large scale, multi-day, multi-site crowd events. These tournaments can be considered truly international determined by the scope and variety of foreign nationals that will be in attendance simultaneously, dispersed between the different cities.

During major tournaments it is common for foreign nationals to follow their chosen team between host countries and cities, for a number of matches, or even weeks, often in the absence of tickets to attend the games. The first two weeks the tournament is the time during which there are most fans are present, after the first twenty-four matches football teams are eliminated. Typically this implies foreign nationals return to their home countries.

Table 2.1: World Cup competition hosts between 1982 and 2014

Year	Host Country(s)
2014	Brazil
2010	South Africa
2006	Germany
2002	South Korea / Japan
1998	France
1994	United States
1990	Italy
1986	Mexico
1982	Spain

Table 2.2: European Championship tournament hosts between 1984 and 2012

Year	Host Country(s)
2012	Poland / Ukraine
2008	Austria / Switzerland
2004	Portugal
2000	Belgium / The Netherlands
1996	England
1992	Sweden
1988	Germany
1984	France

Camping areas are arranged for foreign nationals to stay, and activities to entertain them are frequently planned in advance. To facilitate ticketless fans UEFA have begun to organise Private Viewing Areas (PVA) which host thousands of fans; there may be two or three PVA in each host city, depending on the size. PVA originated at Euro 2004 as a large television viewing screen, in a field, with beer tents. The area was a success and continued to grow in size and popularity at the World Cup in 2006, where the arrangements became formalised; the viewing screen became an enclosure which was open to fans on non-match days, providing organised entertainment. Parallels can be drawn with large music festivals, at which there is a similar logistical set up.

2.3.2 The international football match

An international football match is qualitatively and quantitatively different to a major international tournament. International football matches take place throughout the football season every year. Typically, this is from August through to May although some domestic leagues, Denmark for example, take a break during the winter months instead of summer months. International football matches can be (1) qualifiers for the major tournaments involving national teams; (2), 'friendly' national matches; or, (3) club competitions between domestic football teams (as opposed to national football teams). UEFA host two club competitions in Europe which take place every year over the course of the football season: (1) the UEFA Champions League was first held in 1955; and, (2) the UEFA Europa League (formerly the UEFA Cup), established in 1971.

An international football match consists of one football match being played, thus the numbers and length of stay of visiting football fans to the host city is relatively short. Often due to qualification of the football teams for league games travel arrangements are also more last minute in comparison to a tournament pending on whether the football teams qualify during the season. These events have less impact from an order and management perspective, involving far fewer foreign nationals travelling to the host city and involving only two social groups of spectators (the host group and the visiting group).

The distinction between the national and domestic nature of the football match being played is an important one for the purposes of this research. The salience of national identity compared with a domestic identity can change the psychology of the supporters' social identity, social relations and analytical framework of the situation. The histories of the foreign national social groups which are travelling to the host country are entirely different to that of their domestic associations. For example, it is well known that social supporters of domestic club football in Scotland (some teams supporters more so than others), are affiliated with issues of sectarianism. Removed from this context, the same supporters when travelling abroad under the identity of the Tartan Army (collective name for the Scottish foreign nationals) have won awards from UEFA for their friendly nature, were named the best supporters during Euro 1992, and voted the best supporters in terms of fair play and sporting spirit at the WC 1998. Another example similar to this is the Danish Roligans (collective name for the Danish foreign nationals), were collectively given the FIFA FairPlay Award at the Euro 84. However, some Danish club team's supporters can be considered to pose a high risk of disorder at domestic events (e.g., F.C. Broenby and F.C. Copenhagen).

The focus for the research conducted will be on the national contingents of social groups travelling to EU football matches; specifically, in preparation for or at a major international football tournament. In particular, the research interest is the way by which police perceive and relate to groups of foreign nationals.

2.3.3 Practical considerations for policing foreign nationals

Policing crowds of foreign nationals in international football contexts, whether it is for public safety or security is standard practice at international football events. Policing foreign nationals in any organisational contexts involves managing different social groups and cultures. This can create two sets of issues in the management of foreign nationals. First, there may be language issues and potential for differences of shared norms, social values, and customs. Visiting foreign nationals may have their own perspectives on socially normative behaviour and a perspective of legitimate policing, which differ from the hosts. Secondly, there may be logistical and practical issues such as monitoring of the travel arrangements, borders, infrastructure and

accommodation. The volume of spectators in attendance at a major international tournament can mean overwhelming crowds in the host towns and cities.

The police are not the only institution which up-hold order and civil rights in the context of international football. Police function as one part of a multi-agency approach to manage the international football events and tournaments. UEFA are responsible for the security within the PVAs. The dilemmas faced by the public and police equally refer to the work of some private organisations, such as guarding companies and stewards who are responsible for keeping order in sports arenas and for a balance between peacekeeping and paramilitary approach (Wright, 2002).

The most significant practical consideration at football events and tournaments is way the way by which these authorities can/do manage disorder. The relationship between football events, disorder and the police was only mentioned on occasion (O'Neil, 2005), and until the 1990's the football literature was largely concerned with football supporters and 'hooligans' as the source of disorder at events.

2.3.4 The hooligan thesis

The majority of football related research has focused on hooliganism. 'Hooliganism' is a worldwide meme. A meme is any unit of cultural information (i.e., idea, behaviour or style), which is transmitted verbally or by repeated action from one mind to another. There is no specific legal definition of a hooligan, and what it exactly implies cannot be assumed (Coalter, 1985; Armstrong & Young, 2000; Dunning, 2002). For this reason, football hooliganism cannot be explained, but only described and evaluated (Armstrong, 1998). Football research began in the 1960's and the methods ranged from secondary source archival analysis to detailed ethnographic studies of hooligan characteristics and social culture. Many of the theories at the time focused on the negative and aggressive aspects of football culture. The schools of thought converge on the notion that football disorder is a consequence of individuals who are predisposed to disorder (Frosdick & Marsh, 2005). Psychologically, from an inter-group research perspective this is a convergence theory, (see Chapter 1).

Football has been associated with disorder since its origins in 13th century England. Young men from rival towns used football as an arena from which to address disputes (Frosdick & Marsh, 2005). Football supporters have since caused disorder inside, and outside, football grounds; in every country where the game is played around the world (Pratt & Salter, 1984; Dunning, Murphy & Williams, 1988; Dunning, 2000; Dunning, Murphy, Waddington, & Astrinakis, 2002). In theory, football disorder may be an emergent by product of a multitude of factors (e.g., arriving late to the football stadium, missing kick off, having movement's controlled or being kicked out of a bar). Melnick (1986) outlines the forms of behaviour commonly associated with football related offences as: physical assaults on opposing fans and police, pitch invasions, throwing missiles, verbal abuse, vandalism, drunkenness, theft and possession of offensive weapons. There is wide consensus that both the seriousness and frequency are over represented, and that disorder is not a frequent occurrence (Marsh, 1977; 1978a; 1978b; McPhail & Wholstein, 1983; King, 1995).

The limitations of the 'hooligan' thesis have been addressed (Stott & Reicher, 1998b; Stott, Hutchison, & Drury, 2001; also see King, 1995). Hooligan theories explain football disorder exclusively as result of hooligans (Marsh, Rosser, & Harré, 1978; Dunning, Murphy & Williams, 1988; Armstrong, 1998; Kerr, 1994), i.e., those who engage in hooligan activities do so because they are hooligans, and this is a circular argument. The hooligan explanation for disorder is limited in theoretical and practical ability to account for how conflict develops during crowd events. Nor, can it explain the conditions under which 'hooligans' will cause disorder or who is targeted; the police or other social categories (Stott & Reicher, 1998). Stott and Pearson (2006) also provide statistical evidence that the majority of those arrested in football conflict have no prior involvement in disorder at international events, suggesting the reason for their involvement is not a repeated behaviour. However, Stott & Pearson fail to provide any data regarding the involving of those arrested, or their history of other acts of criminality.

Despite this, the image of the hooligan is deeply ingrained in the popular imagination. Hardly any self-respecting football related movie would be complete without the theme of hooligan firms (e.g., Green Street, Football Factory and the

Firm). Television newscasters and newspapers perpetuate this stereotype in their reports. Even scholars seeking to dismiss the perception cannot resist the temptation to place stereotyped 'hooligan' images on the front of publications named 'football hooliganism' (Stott & Pearson, 2007).

Psychological studies seek to address the meaning of football hooliganism rather than provide a descriptive account of a hooligan. The aim is to identify the conditions under which disorder is likely to originate and develop in a collective context. The context of international football events at which the policing of crowds of foreign national's takes place provides a rich pragmatic arena from which to advance understandings of inter-group dynamics.

2.3.5 Political and social control of foreign nationals

Frequently, in the context of public order policy reform follows instances of large scale disorder and injury, and occasionally loss of life. The Heysel stadium disaster in 1984, at which Liverpool F.C and Juventus fans breached the security fences and clashed with police, left thirty-nine fans dead and hundreds more injured (Young, 1986). Heysel served as a catalyst for policy change, by reframing political and social legislation surrounding the management of international football crowd events.

Politically, the introduction of the convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events at Football Matches (Council of the European Union, 1985) outlines the appropriate co-operations between police, encouraging co-operation between public authorities and independent sports organisations to prevent violence and control the problem of violence and misbehaviour by spectators at sports events. Euro 96, which was hosted by eight cities in England, was the first tournament at which international co-operation was considered a success (Frosdick & Marsh, 2005). The role of policing at Euro 96 was innovative, seeing the introduction of the National Criminal Information Service (NCIS) Football unit, a police network and organisation, spotters and a 'hooligan' hotline. The tournament also encouraged a shift towards 'intelligence led' policing under the co-ordination of NCIS. These movements have also been accompanied by an increase in repressive social controls

(alcohol restrictions, football related offences, banning orders and travel restrictions) and CCTV surveillance. Many recommendations followed regarding intelligence, spotters, and social controls, and were quickly adopted by the EU parliament.

Socially, football supporters at an international level have been subject to legislation that strictly controls their movement, along with increased levels of police power to deal with them. Armstrong and Young (1997) argue that the increased political acts has served to perpetuate a public, police and political perspectives that football disorder is a consequence of the 'hooligans'. Armstrong and Hobbs (1994) argue that by perceiving the issue of football disorder as a disease that needs to be cured, surveillance techniques and unreliable intelligence gathering methods have become normalised for the social group. Recent legislation suggests supporters, particularly those travelling abroad, must be strictly controlled (European Parliament, 1985; Home Office, 1995; see Frosdick & Marsh, 2005). Such restrictions on movements have raised questions regarding human rights (Pearson, 1999; Stott & Pearson, 2006; Stott et al., 2007). Generally, political and social control measures in place to combat football disorder are aimed at organised offenders (e.g., intelligence and CCTV), not at preventing or managing spontaneous instances of disorder.

2.3.6 International co-operation: research, theory and practice

Practically, the increased international co-operation has facilitated the development of a relationship between research, theory and practice at international football events. The Euro 2000 (hosted by Belgium and the Netherlands) was the first international football event at which researchers sought to empirically evaluate police deployment styles and the related patterns of interaction with the crowd. This was achieved by large scale, systematic behavioural observational method which captured a quantitative relationship between police strategy and tactics, and subsequent levels of conflict (c.f., Adang & Cuvelier, 2000; Stott et al., 2008). The key finding was the relationship detected between perceived risk, the style of public order and levels of disorder. The context in which disorder was most prevalent was in actual low risk situations to which high profile police deployments were made. The lowest levels of disorder resulted in actual high risk situations to which high profile deployment were made (Adang & Cuvelier, 2000). There are two key issues which are highlighted by

this research. The first is that in low risk situations there is a relationship between high profile policing and the resulting levels of disorder. The second is that in high risk situations a high profile police deployment is markedly effective at minimising the level of disorder at the event.

The results do support the ESIM (e.g., Reicher, 1996; Stott & Reicher, 1998a; Drury & Reicher, 2000; Stott & Drury, 2000), by demonstrating that police deployment style has a measurable impact on the levels of conflict. Specifically, in low risk situations where high profile deployment is utilised crowd members perceive the police deployment as illegitimate. Social identity theorists recognised the potential research opportunities offered by the field of international football crowds and turned to developing a model to empirically test their hypothesis regarding the relationship between police practice and crowd psychology.

2.4 Crowd psychology based model for policing foreign nationals

Social identity research provides an alternative framework to that of the hooligan thesis to interpret instances of football disorder. Social identity might sound like a rather theoretical and abstract concept for dealing with foreign nationals, however an understanding of the social identity of the specific crowd one is dealing with becomes a tool of great practical use (Reicher et al., 2004), particularly to deduce principles to prevent or manage crowd disorder.

It is not simply that social identity shapes the values and standards on which we act, it also determines, amongst other things, who can influence us and how, the nature of our goals and priorities, how we view others and interpret their behaviour, and, more specifically, the conditions under which we enter into conflict with others. Failure to differentiate between factions within a crowd, can lead to the use of public order management tools which treat all members of a crowd uniformly, and this can function to create perceptions of police illegitimacy and psychologically unite the crowd in opposition to the police. It is a concern of inherent threat posed by a crowd that can paradoxically create the conditions police strive to avoid, by resulting in a police profile that is not balanced and proportional to the actual level of risk posed by the crowd.

The threat of disorder in crowd situations can never be entirely eradicated. The best that theory and practice can provide are tools to best manage the inter-group dynamics between the police and those being policed. Social identity research suggests that encouraging the crowd to self police is a powerful tool for the prevention and management of disorder. It is a misassumption to assume that anyone who calls for disorder in a crowd context will receive collective support to actualise it. If the action or behaviour is not consistent with the perception of collective standards defined by the identity of the majority, it will not be influential or receive support (Stott & Reicher, 1998a; Reicher et al., 2004).

Particularly, policing should manage the perspective of legitimacy at the group level, as it is only in a sense of collective injustice, that the cognitions necessary for conflict to develop and escalate, and potential for widespread impact is facilitated. Only in the perception of illegitimate treatment will those who differentiated themselves from social norms of disorder (i.e., characterise their identity as non-violent), and fractions of the crowd who may be willing to engage in disorder, come to support or actively contribute towards conflict. The social identity understandings of crowd psychology have been translated into a practical model for public order policing, namely; (1) dynamic risk assessment; and, (2) graded tactical deployment.

2.4.1 Dynamic risk assessment

Risk to public order is dynamic and not a static feature within a crowd or social group. Firstly, the fixed categorisations of risk were considered to be too rigid. An understanding of the inter-group dynamics surrounding conflict indicates all fans can be potentially dangerous under specific conditions. Similarly, whole crowds containing high numbers of high risk fans need not be disorderly. Risk categorisation was recommended to be conceptually considered on a continuum balanced between high and low risk and interaction is the governing principle which can shift the actual level of risk one way or the other (Stott & Adang, 2008; 2003a). Research also indicates the elements which can be considered 'predictors' of risk, namely; (1) prior history of the group, (2) categorisation, social identity and culture of the fan groups, (3) police co-operation and balance encouraging education of authorities, and (4) an explicit understanding of fans actual behaviours rather than policing expectations.

Achieving a balance and proportionality between police deployment and the perception of risk in a given situation was theorised to be the key to managing the inter-group conditions necessary for conflict to develop in international context. In doing so, psychological conditions for large scale disorder to generalise throughout a crowd theoretically cannot be achieved. Quantitative knowledge from Euro 2000 (Adang & Cuvelier, 2001) indicates that in a low risk situation low profile deployments are perceived as appropriate. This, then, should psychologically result in the isolation and marginalisation of the minority, and increase the likelihood of self policing, resulting in lower levels of conflict. In a low risk situation with high profile police deployment the perception theorised is that of inappropriateness which according to the ESIM, can result in unification of the previously distinct groups within the crowd, presenting the conditions where support for the anti-social minority is increased, as is the psychological potential for conflict. This does not imply high profile deployments are perceived as inappropriate in all conditions. In situations of increasing risk high profile deployments which are directly targeted at the actual source of the risk will also result in the marginalisation of the minority and an emergent self policing culture. When high profile deployments are untargeted in a situation of increasing risk, meaning police action impacts on non-risk members of the crowd this can create the unification process within the previously distinct groups within the crowd, described above; again resulting in increased support for the anti social minority of crowd members. The key to dynamic risk assessment is the proportional use of tactics in such a way that is balanced to the risk.

Appropriate deployment which is proportional to the risk posed at the time is the most effective practical method to manage the fluctuating dynamics of risk. A dynamic conceptualisation of risk allowed empirically informed strategic principles to be derived on how to practically best manage risk. Importantly, the operation should be tactically oriented by dynamic information gathering, as risk is dynamic (i.e. present one second and gone the next) and not always a consequence of hooligans, information informing decisions should govern tactical deployment in a graded fashion from low to high profile corresponding to the risk. This enables the deployment to be targeted and differentiated to avoid situations in which members of the crowd perceive police action to be illegitimate.


2.4.2 Graded tactical deployment

Crowd psychology understandings led to the development of an empirically based graded tactical deployment model of risk management. Characteristically the model is low visibility in relation to PPE and an emphasis on behavioural instructions towards positive interaction and facilitation of the legitimate fan behaviours. Behavioural instructions towards positive interaction, information gathering and monitoring of identified risks are in line with that of 'Friendly but firm' model (Adang & Cuvelier, 2001). With increasing risk police visibility and communication with the crowd should increase, characterised by firm communication of the limits of acceptable behaviour and validation of risk factors aided by international cooperation. In situations of increasing risk police action should be aimed at validating information of risk through police cooperation between the host and visiting police force. When required, interventions should be information led and targeted at risk factors (e.g., those perceived to be disorderly). Following intervention there must be a de-escalation process characterised by a clear commitment to graded police deployment and return to standard uniform patrol (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2).

The model recommends strategic and tactical principles for the police to minimise conflict by avoiding disproportionate policing. The implementation of the model and conceptualisation of dynamic risk is based on the principles of educate, facilitate, communicate, and differentiate (Reicher et al., 2004). Strategic police orientation should aim to facilitate the legitimate intentions of the majority, clear expression of tolerance levels and if necessary intervention must be targeted and graded in nature; with subsequent visual degrading of police resources such that the profile returns to low. The merger of theoretical and practical insights gives rise to a different perspective of the role of policing within the framework of public order.

Figure 2.1: Depicts the variable factors which are theorised to be associated with low levels of disorder and high levels of self policing at international football events


Factors associated with low levels of disorder at international football events*



*Based on model in *Understanding and Managing Risk*, Stott & Adang (2003a)

Figure 2.2: Depicts the variable factors which are theorised to be associated with high levels of disorder and low levels of self policing at international football events

Factors associated with high levels of disorder at international football events*



*Based on model in *Understanding and Managing Risk*, Stott & Adang (2003a)

2.4.3 Empirically based model policing at the Euro 2004 tournament

At the Euro 2004 football tournament (hosted by Portugal), collaboration between researchers and the Policia de Seguranca Publica (PSP) police force led to the implementation of crowd policing based on the models of dynamic risk assessment and graded tactical deployment (Stott & Adang, 2003a; 2003b). This opportunity presented a platform from which to address the implications of a low profile model of crowd policing. The strength of the analysis is in the multitude of different methods which were employed (e.g., interviews, questionnaires, structured observation data), to triangulate the research findings.

Triangulation is especially the practice of cross referencing results or findings with multiple data sources. The idea underpinning the corroboration of particular points by different audiences, or methods, is that the more sources confirm; the more confident one can be that what is being reported actually happened, or reflects the beliefs of majority/minority. Given the potential for subjective interpretation and errors of memory in the collection of data triangulation is a valuable tool in social research. If a researcher chooses only to report what they have seen and experiences there is always the potential that the information is corrupt or incorrect, the chances of this are reduced by employing triangulation as a method. Importantly, particularly in the current context the method of triangulation also allows the researcher to expose differences in perspectives and interpretation of events by different groups. The significance of triangulation as research tool will be discussed at length in Chapter 3.

Research at the Euro 2004 tournament reports there was no disorder in the PSP jurisdictions. Policing based on low profile tactics; (1) were perceived as legitimate; (2) marginalised the conflict elements within the crowd (such that the actions did not generalise to the majority); and, (3) encouraged a self-policing culture, such that confrontational elements of the crowd were managed by the social identity as their behaviours were not consistent with the collective identity (Stott et al., 2007; Stott et al., 2008). Policing had the effect of proactively managing the intra-group relations with, and intra-group processes between the fans, such that minorities of disorderly supporters are disassociated from by the majority, self policing dynamics emerged and disorder became unlikely (Stott et al., 2008).

The research also suggests that low profile policing can have an impact beyond the immediate context of that crowd. Interviews with English fans suggest that the effect of the low profile approach began to reconstruct social relations and categorisation processes more generally, such that the fans came to see themselves as more similar to the police. It has been argued that maintenance of these relations longitudinally may contribute to a cycle which perpetuates perceptions of police legitimacy (Schreiber & Adang, in press). The long term implications of this are that the development of low profile police strategies may not only improve immediate relations, but actually serve to transform relations between foreign nationals considered to pose a high risk of disorder, and the police.

The Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR), were a second police force responsible for policing the urban host cities in Portugal, but declined to co-operate with researchers (i.e., the study is not comparative). Instances of collective disorder involving the English fans did occur in GNR jurisdictions. According to interview accounts from English fans (who were present during the instances of disorder), and archival research, the GNR relied on a high profile strategy of deployment and tactical options such as high profile uniform, dogs and horses (Stott et al., 2007).

Following Euro 2004, the policing model has been used domestically, as a manual for good practice policing. Additionally, the model of crowd management has been recommended to Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) as a model for renovating national public order police training and standards (Stott, 2009), following the controversial strategies employed at crowd events in the recent past (e.g., G20). Internationally, the empirically based model of good practice has been integrated into the handbook with recommendations for international police co-operation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension (Council of the European Union, 2006) as appendices: 'dynamic risk assessment in the context of international football matches' (Council of the European Union, 2005a), and 'police tactical performance for public order management in connection with international football matches' (Council of the European Union, 2005b). Despite the considerable contribution to knowledge, in theory the inter-group research in the context of

policing international football and the recommended police model are not without limitations.

2.4.4 Limitations of the crowd psychology based model of policing

From the perspective of social identity theory there are three limitations regarding the current inter-group research at international football events; (1) the sample population; (2) issues of bounded rationality specifically in relation to the dynamic risk assessment and graded tactical deployment model; and, (3) the absence of police perspectives.

(1) Sample population

First, the empirical investigation is based largely on participant observation and interview accounts involving English fans. English fans travelling abroad have been repeatedly involved in disorder (e.g., Rome 1997, Marseille 1998, Charleroi 2000, Slovakia 2002, Albufeira 2004, Stuttgart and Cologne 2006), and subject to mass arrests at international football events (Stott & Pearson, 2007). As the social group can be described 'members of one side' it seems fair to put forward, that Stott and colleagues have examined identification with 'Englishness'. Thus, what is presented to be generalised inter-group dynamics relating to crowd psychology and police management could be argued to be aggregate traits related to the English fans' perspectives of the police methods for managing them. In other words, the findings could be artefacts of the sample population. In order to examine the generality of the relationship between police tactics and crowd psychology there is a need to examine a broader range of foreign nationals considered to pose a risk of public disorder at international football events.

(2) Bounded rationality of risk

The dynamic risk assessment and graded tactical decision model of policing relies on the assumptions of optimisation (i.e., the procedures are theorised to make the system as effective and functional as possible) and rational choice. These two

principles provide the basis for Traditional Decision Making (TDM) theories (e.g., Savage, 1954; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; 1979; 1992).

Basically, TDM models infer that when making decisions individuals make a cost/benefit analysis relating to the differing outcomes and make a judgement on the expected gains and losses. A rational and optimal decision is then made on the basis of the expected utility (Baron, 2008). Traditional theories may have focussed on more normative aspects of directed thinking, intended to identify practical strategies through logic and systematic argument, however modern cognitive theories attempt to understand the underlying psychological processes of thought and its dynamic effects on our judgment and behaviour (Sternberg & Smith, 1988).

The mental processes which underpin decisions in reality are neither wholly rational, nor entirely optimal, but are bounded (Simon, 1955; 1956). Models of bounded rationality are based on assumptions about limited time, resources and mental capacities. People facing decisions are constrained by the computational capacity of their mind (e.g., limited by perception, attention, memory, information processing abilities). Social cognitions, such as ones beliefs, values and goals are equally likely to limit processing in real situations. Because of these limitations people often rely on simple rules which exploit the structure of the environment, rather than optimising, individuals rely on simplifying rules and heuristics.

Modern approaches to risk management and decision making in the dynamic reality of real world settings have largely abandoned the concepts of optimisation, and versions of rational choice which assume that decision making is made by systematically examining all options available (Klein, 1993; Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood & Zsombok, 1993; Garland & Endsley, 1995). A wealth of literature suggests that ambiguous and dynamic natural decision making environments (e.g., policing, emergency wards, and battlefields), are non-optimally structured. Characteristics of this environment are difficult to reconcile with models which pertain to optimisation. Instead, a 'satisficing' solution is the goal, i.e., a 'good enough' outcome, rather than the best or optimal solution is the reality of operating in such environments (Shambach, 1996).

In the social sciences, two prevailing definitions of risk are that: (1) risk is a situation or event where something of human value (including humans themselves) is at stake and where the outcome is uncertain; and, (2) risk is an uncertain consequence of an event or an activity with respect to something that humans value (Avena & Renn., 2009). For the purposes of this thesis, risk refers to uncertainty about and severity of the consequences (or outcomes) of an activity with respect to something that humans value.

Any risk assessment in the context of public order must consider a multitude of risks, such as overcrowding, human rights issues, terrorist attack, crushing or tensions between fan groups or protesters, infrastructural issues, mass disorder, large scale injury and loss of life. Further, the adequacy of any risk assessment is reliant on the accessible information. Risk is dynamic, and is in no way limited to that of the behaviour of foreign nationals in attendance at international football events. In a public order context, the reality and practicalities of policing in line with the model advised by Stott & colleagues requires examination. It maybe that it is neither possible nor realistic to police public order operations in line with the 'optimal' recommendations on the basis of appeasing the crowd members.

(3) Absence of police perspective

Finally, and significantly, the inter-group research in the context of international football events lacks the police perspective in its accounts and explanations. Only one study in the context of policing international football empirically accounts for the police perspective in the context of policing foreign nationals. This is a questionnaire study conducted by crowd psychologists upon the Belgian Gendarmerie after the Euro 2000 tournament (Stott, 2003). The questionnaire sought to address the stereotypes held by the Gendarmerie of four different groups of foreign nationals who had been in attendance at the tournament. See Section 2.4.8 Stereotyping foreign nationals for a discussion of this study.

In the context of policing domestic football matches (e.g., studies involving the policing of football events in England, UK), have focused on the application of the crowd psychology ESIM model to police practices. These studies maintain that police

officers in England operate with a psychological model of the crowd similar to that advocated by Classical crowd psychology (Hoggett & Stott, 2010a; Hoggett & Stott 2010b). This exclusive focus on interpreting police behaviour in terms of a Classic understanding arguably limits the scope for understanding the different levels and functions of police identity, and by nature of the ESIM is focused on understanding disorder.

The limited accounts of police psychology in the practice of policing public order are largely due to access difficulties and logistical issues in attaining data in a context which police officers are on the ground, in operation policing events. Coupled with the well documented practical, political sensitivity and safety issues in the context of research in crowd situations it makes research access to police difficult to achieve (c.f., Stott & Reicher, 1998). The current research will broadly address how and why police manage foreign nationals in the ways which they do, from their accounts.

2.5 Defining the police as an organisational social group

Haslam (2001) argues organisational life (and thus the collective identity of police officers) should be understood as a social group. Organizations are internally structured groups that are located in complex networks of inter-group relations characterized by power, status, and prestige differentials. To varying degrees, people derive part of their identity and sense of self from the organizations or work-groups to which they belong (Hogg & Terry, 2000). The social perceptions of police officers develop through occupational socialisation processes which are shared through a common social identity.

The relevance of SIT in organizations is increasingly well established. Hogg and Terry (2000) recognise that organizational psychologists have found SIT useful in explaining a number of variables. Others have noted, "*over the last five years or so, social identity researchers have increasingly applied social identity principles to organizational contexts ...*" (Van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2001, p. 185). One area of substantial influence concerns the insights this theory provides to work on what is commonly called organizational identification. From the initial efforts of Ashforth

and Mael (1989) to introduce this work into organizational studies, SIT has proven to be a useful theory from which to understand issues of identity and identification as they relate to organizations.

Statt (1994) argues there are three key characteristics of an organisation; (1) a social identity which gives members shared meaning; (2) co-ordination of actions between the individuals, such that they act in a structured way; and (3) goal direction towards a particular outcome. Katz and Kahn (1966) define an organisation as a social system that coordinates peoples' behaviour by means of roles, norms and values. Roles relate to a specific place or function of an individual within the system. Norms relate to the attitude or behavioural associations of the roles. Finally, the values pertain to the higher order principles which are intended to guide the behaviour of the organisation as a whole. The culmination of the roles, norms and values construct a shared meaning for the group members and a collective identity. The organisational system functions to give collective identity and purpose to behaviours within its framework.

Given the contribution of the social identity theory to understanding crowd psychology processes within crowds of foreign nationals, the obvious advancement for research in the inter-group context is the application of the theory to the police. Furthermore, issues related to social identity need to be properly understood if we are to formulate a rational, evidence-based social policy for the policing of foreign nationals in Europe. By considering the police as a social group research must contend with; (1) identity processes (e.g., norms, values, and goals); (2) intra-group dynamics internal to the police social group; and (3) inter-group dynamics, which include the out-group of foreign national social groups, as well as a plethora of other inter-group audiences.

2.5.1 Norms, values and goals

The SIT and SCT provide the theoretical basis of our understanding of organizational identification (Hogg & Terry, 2000). Organisational identity emphasises a social identity whereby organizational members categorize themselves and others based on roles and membership in an organization or work unit. Social

identification is the sense of inclusive 'we-ness'. The social identity and the way this collective identity gives purpose to action will be addressed by the current research.

The police organisational social identity, in other words 'who we are compared to them' deserves consideration by investigation of the ways this identification shapes in-group processes, and relationships to the out-group. The collective norms, values and goals in this context from a social identity theorists' perspective have been spared academic attention until now. Identification with norms, values and goals is likely to have consequences from an inter-group interpretation, such as support for activities which are congruent with the identity, support for those who embody the identity (i.e., prototypical members), and stereotypical perceptions of the self and others.

Psychologists and sociologists generally agree on some broad central aspects of police culture including; (1) a sense of mission; action and excitement; (2) the us vs. them division of the social world; (3) in-group isolation; (4) prejudice perceptions; (5) conservatism; and (6) suspicion or cynicism (Reiner, 1992). Police culture has been investigated widely with a generalised finding in the literature of a norm of suspicion (Reiner, 1985; Stolnick, 1994; Kappeler, Sluder, Alpert, 1998) or what Waddington (1999) refers to as cynicism.

In a public order context on one side there is a concern for enforcing the law, and on the other, the maintenance of social order and the avoidance of confrontation; or, keeping the peace (c.f., Waddington, 1987; Fielding, 1991; Waddington, 1994a; De Lint, 2005). Reiner (1992) suggested that maintaining public order is the key objective for the police, even above protecting life and property, which is a primary police function. In critical incident management commanders identified a lack of control as the most difficult aspect to manage (Crego & Alison, 2004). Reicher & Stott (1998) argue control is a cultural norm within public order management. In agreement, Waddington (1994a) argues a general theme with policing public order is not the fear of disorder or violence per se, but the loss of control. Intervention was reportedly strongly resisted and only used to reassert control, or 'get a grip' of the situation. Thus, drawing on the broader literature identity in policing crowds' of

foreign nationals' maybe embedded in various norms and values, which require further research.

2.5.2 *Uncertainty and danger*

Uncertainty and danger are occupational hazards common to any function of policing. Paton (1997) has argued that exposure to crowd conflict constitutes a 'critical incident'. Critical incident is defined here as an individual, or collective experience involving actual or threatened death, or serious injury (Prati & Pietrantonio, 2009). The perceived danger (Stott & Reicher, 1998) and trepidation (Cronin & Reicher, 2006) associated with policing crowd events are stressors. A stressor can be defined as a variable that; (1) produces a decrement in performance; (2) a self report of stress by subject; and/or (3) physiological change (Backer & Orasmi, 1992; Flin, 1997). Stressors which are likely to impact on performance are task related stressors (work load/time pressure, ambiguity, and auditory overload) and ambient stressors (auditory interference, performance pressure and fatigue) (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2006).

The environment of policing public order is characteristically uncertain and dynamic. Uncertainty constitutes a major obstacle to effective decision making (Corbin, 1980; Brunsson, 1985). The literature offers numerous conceptual accounts of uncertainty, Argote (1982 p. 420) observes, "*there are almost as many definitions of uncertainty as there are treatments of the subject*". In a natural decision making environments (such as policing crowds), uncertainty has been considered to be the equivalent of risk (Anderson, Deane, Hammond & McClelland, 1981).

Stenning, Birkbeck, Adang, Baker, Feltes, Gabaldón, Habersfeld, Paes and Waddington (2009) undertook an investigated police perceptions of the use of force in several different international countries, and found that Venezuelan police officers in focus group discussions developed a strong sense of uncertainty, with officers frequently commented that 'anything could happen'. They theorise that in situations of uncertainty, officers employ force as a control strategy for the suspects (and the encounter). While on some occasions police officers justified the use of force in ways that are supported by the law (e.g., self-defence), on many occasions force is seen as

necessary for interrupting the continued development of events and bringing the encounter to a close, in order to control and prevent the encounter from escalating further.

The coping mechanisms to cognitively manage with uncertainty and danger are likely to have implications for the preferences of tactical management in public order contexts. For example, when the stakes are higher in a public order context, and a situation appears to becoming disorderly there is a consistency to increase the reliance on high profile tactical measures (Cronin & Reicher, 2006), in line with a control approach (De Lint, 2005). Categorical suspicion, pre-emption and containment are all strategies which are consistent with the perception of high risk in the face of uncertainty. The significance here of course, is that there is a gradual decree of decisions, meaning that that once decisions have begun to shift towards the management using high profile methods it is likely to continue and impacts on the rights of those considered to be of high risk, as well as potentially creating a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The low profile approach to public order is a relatively new strategy and there is little systematic analysis of the deployment style; on the implementation of low profile approaches or the implications for the police. Low profile strategies which involve interaction, dialogue and close proximity to those in attendance with no protective equipment could be considered to be a risk and maybe challenging to implement at a tactical, strategic, and operational level. The use of high and low profile public order tools has lacked investigation from a police perspective.

2.5.3 Intra-group relations

Indeed, just as it is wrong to talk about “the crowd” in the singular but rather acknowledge the different groups that comprise it, so it is important to acknowledge different perspectives and different priorities within the police (Cronin, 2001). Understanding these differences is essential if we want to see not only the formulation, but also the delivery of successful policing strategies (Reicher et al 2004). For example, within the super-ordinate police group there are different teams (criminal investigation, public order, dog handlers, and traffic), each may be

differentiated by their roles, norms and values but equally by power and status relations. In the task of public order, this research considers the distinction between the commanders and the operational officers on the ground to be an important one, as does the research of Drury and colleagues (2003).

In conceptualising an organisational system as different internal groups the social relations between groups, within the super-ordinate group becomes an important consideration (Turner & Haslam, 2000). The intra-group dynamics within the command team may be hampered with differences in ideology, trust, competency, conflict and co-operation that could have ramifications for the implementation of any strategy. There may also be intra-group dynamics at work between strategic, tactical and operational levels. In line with various research positions in psychology, the intra-group dynamics between public order officers tasked to manage crowds of foreign nationals is hypothesised to be an important consideration in understanding inter-group function. One area of psychology which has given considerable attention to the intra-group dynamics in organisations such as the military, police, aviation and emergency services is the critical incident management literature.

2.5.4 Command and control structure

A Gold, Silver, Bronze, Command Structure (GSBCS) can be implemented (ACPO, 2007; Stott, Livingston & Hoggett, 2008). This model allows a framework from which to delineate responsibility with regard to strategy, tactics and operational response on the ground. The Gold is responsible for setting the strategic objectives for the event. The Silver is responsible for setting the tactical orientation to achieve the strategic objectives. The Gold and Silver are typically positioned in a command and control room which enables them to maintain an over view of the operation. The Bronze(s) is in charge of operational deployment on the ground; typically positioned in close proximity to the officers they are commanding. The GSBCS facilitates communication and exchange of information between central command and those on the ground. The Gold, Silver, Bronze framework will be used to define organisational functions of the command team within the current work. Frontline officers will refer to those which are under the command and control of the Gold, Silver and Bronze.

The GSBCS is used, in part, to reduce the decision making autonomy of the police officers on the ground, who are faced with managing the crowd directly. Waddington (1987) argues the key benefit of paramilitary model of policing public order command and control structure and a centralisation of decision making. That is, co-ordinated strategy and tactics are likely to minimise the need for the police to use force in self defence. The militarised command and control structure makes it less likely for individuals to use disproportionate force and prevents officers taking uncoordinated actions (Waddington, 1994b). Also, the accountability for subordinates means commanders have more responsibility to ensure that the officers are acting accordingly. Waddington (1991) puts an emphasis on the clear lines of command and control and effective coordination, regarding them key to eradicating the inherent tendencies for officers to ‘lose it’ in the heat of battle.

2.5.5 Knowledge structures

Della Porta and Reiter (1998) make the case that in addition to; (1) the militarisation vs. community orientation of the organisation; (2) political structure; and (3) social and organisational police culture, there are other factors which influence police strategy and tactics; these are police dynamics, police ‘knowledge’, and the interaction between police and those being policed. Police knowledge is “*the police perception of external reality, which shapes the concrete policing on the ground*” (Della Porta & Reiter, 1998, p. 2). Police knowledge is the link between experience and practice and includes information, background, history of public order management and interactions between police and those being policed. Shared knowledge structures (i.e., police knowledge structures, social schemas or mental models) are a central aspect of social identity and cohesive group action.

The way in which a team functions and works together is of critical importance in all team contexts. A team is defined by Salas and colleagues (1992, p. 4) as “*a distinguishable set of two or more people who interact dynamically, interdependently, and adaptively towards a common goal/objective/mission, who have each been assigned specific roles or functions to perform, and who have a limited life-span of membership*”. The composition of a team and the shared knowledge has long been hypothesised to influence team processes (Cattell, 1948; Haythorn, 1953).

Johnston-Laird (1983, p. 10) suggest that “*people understand the world by constructing working models of it in their mind*”. Krauger and Wenzel (1997) suggest that team processes are likely to be influenced by shared mental models. Shared mental models have been offered as an explanation for successful co-ordinated performance in teams, particularly in situations of high work load (Cannon-Bowers, Salas & Converse, 1993; Rouse, Cannon-Bowers & Salas 1992). Shared mental models would suggest team members work towards common objectives and have a shared vision of how the team will function, thus facilitating co-ordination and working towards shared objectives and future states. Cannon-Bowers, Salas and Converse (1993) suggest that there are different ‘types’ of shared mental models relating to various aspects of the team’s task, for example the equipment, task and team interaction.

One important function of shared mental models and related forms of knowledge structures, such as schemas, is to fill in missing information about a person or event and to generate expectancies about what is going to happen next (e.g., Hamilton & Troler, 1986; Higgins, 1989; 1996; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Olson, Roese, & Zanna, 1996). These expectancies can then serve as a guide to behaviour during social interactions, enabling one to anticipate how the other is likely to act and be ready to respond appropriately. Alternatively, they can serve to create illusory correlations between information which leads to error.

2.5.6 Inter-group relations

Inter-group dynamics in the context of policing international football should not be limited to the concept of the out-group as the groups of football spectators, but consider the broader framework of multi-agency audiences and the impact this can have on the policing of foreign nationals.

2.5.7 Power dynamics and the use of force

The perception of threat in an inter-group context is a function of power asymmetries between groups. On the basis of the social identity theory, inter-group

threat can be defined as perceptions of power and legitimacy which are central features of the SIT and the ESIM. Power dynamics have been identified as the cause of involvement and action in crowds. The relationship between action and the antecedent feeling of empowerment has largely been addressed by the self efficacy theory (Bandura, 1995; 1997). Self efficacy is *“the belief in ones capabilities to organise and execute the courses of action required to manage prospective situations”* (Bandura, 1995, p. 2). Put another way, self efficacy is an individual’s belief about their ability to succeed in a particular event or situation. From this perspective, self efficacy and collective self efficacy are predictors of collective action rather than an outcome of involvement.

As a result of this the police can be considered the high status group in relation to those they are policing. This can be considered the case as they have the power to enforce their perspective on the crowd. Shared identity decreases threat perception, resulting in a feeling of empowerment (Rousseau & Garcia-Retamero, 2007). This agency or empowerment function has been under researched. The social aspect of power in policing foreign nationals is important practically, as the police have the power to exert their perspectives on those being policed through the enforcement of legal sanctions and the potential for use of force options.

There are no guidelines which make the distinction between necessary, proportional use of force and unnecessary, disproportionate use of force. Indeed, drawing on practical recommendations of the HIMC (2009) following a review of the police tactics during the management of the G20 in London, it is argued that there is an absence of clear standards surrounding the use of force for officers to draw on. The police operate on a doctrine of minimal force which represents an ‘engineering of consent’; it does not represent a universally accepted understanding of the use of force (for example by the public), but a general acceptance of it within police action which is supported by legal sanctions (Reiner, 1992). In line with Bittner’s (1970) contention that police force must be a product of the situation, a force continuum proposes that officers should progressively examine and react to each situation, de-escalating once resistance has declined or stopped (Adams, 1999; Smith & Alpert, 2000; Terrill, 2005).

There is only general agreement on how to subdivide the categories within the use of force continuum. While many studies of police use of force include only the use of weapons as a measurement of force, others include weapon-less tactics and verbal threats in their analysis (Garner, Maxwell & Heraux, 2002). In a public order context it would be necessary to include formation and deployment strategy and verbal conduct in any use of force continuum. Clede and Parsons (1987) determine the first category of non-lethal force on a continuum available prior to the use of lethal force, is body language (e.g., stance, posture). In a public order context, it is more relevant to begin two stages before this, the mere presence of officers (numbers, positions, spatial location in relation to the crowd) and the uniform (florescent vests, standard, half riot, full riot) should be considered as the earliest stages.

There has been no study of the relationship between high and low tactics on the injuries to public or officers in the context of public order. In routine policing research findings are inconclusive. Meyer (1992) examined police tactics and weapons and likelihood of injuries and concluded that the expanded use of non-lethal weapons could result in fewer injuries to suspects and police officers (also see; Smith & Petrocelli, 2002). Similarly, Alpert and Dunham (1999) argue the case that officers and suspects are more at risk of injury at relatively low level encounters (e.g., use of hands and legs to control subjects). Suspects were most likely to suffer injury when officers used physical force to control the situation, and officer injury is more likely when the officer uses less force relative to the suspect's resistance level. Applied to a public order context, officers may or may not be more likely to be injured through the use of low profile tactics; by demonstrating tolerance towards minor offences they may be more likely to be hurt.

Use of force continuum policy is not universal across police forces or countries. They all rely on legally and publicly acceptable responses by the police (Garner, Schade, Hepburn, & Buchanan, 1995). Indeed, the public perspective of the use and acceptance of force will be a product of the use of police force. The use of force by police may well be influenced by broader social and cultural experiences of, and attitudes towards, force, violence, the carriage of weapons, and police culture more generally. For instance, if attacks on police are considered a common occurrence, it may well be that tolerance towards police use of force is higher, and

willingness to characterise it as “excessive” or unjustified lower (Stenning, et al., 2009).

The perception of danger is likely to be accompanied with an increased preference to use force. The police understandings of, and justifications for the use of force are of great importance in understanding the intergroup dynamics at crowd events, which are central to managing the disorder dynamics. Decisions regarding when, where, and how much force to use is a cumulative process informed by understandings of risks in the crowd.

Little work has looked at police officers’ own views on the use of force, in particular the way in which they justify the decisions to increase it. Investigations into the police use of force have been conducted only by commissions and interested groups in response to specific incidents (e.g., Jean Charles de Menezes, London; Harry Stanley, London; Robbie van der Leeden, Sunset Groove, Hoek van Holland). A recent example is the Independent Police Complaints Commission and HMIC (HMIC, 2009) investigations to the police use of force during the G20, at which Ian Tomlinson died.

2.5.8 Stereotyping foreign nationals

One notable existing publication on the topic of police perspectives in the context of policing foreign nationals is an examination of the nature of Belgian Gendarmerie stereotypes of foreign national social groups (English, German and Romanian), conducted after the Euro 2000 tournament (Stott, 2003). A questionnaire survey was conducted after the tournament which examined the patterns in Gendarmerie understandings of particular foreign national social groups as represented by pre-defined stereotypes. The likert scale questionnaire asked officers to rank social groups on the presence or absence of particular characteristics or traits. The results demonstrate that the officers did not perceive all the foreign nationals similarly, and attributed different characteristics to each. The English were considered to pose the highest level of risk and affiliated with negative stereotypes. However, as the English were involved in mass disorder during the tournament it is difficult to determine whether this is a cause or effect of the findings.

The study begins to expose a relationship between police perspectives of foreign national groups and their potential role in shaping tactics employed to manage high risk foreign nationals. Tactics are typically pre-planned in organised public order management operations (such as policing football events). However, they are equally spontaneous in response to the emerging dynamics during the course of a particular event. The role of categorisations and stereotypes by the police and the relationship this may have in shaping the inter-group dynamics of conflict at international football events requires further investigation.

2.5.9 Policing national identity

Given that the central thesis of this research concerns the inter-group dynamics of policing foreign nationals, a phenomenon which cannot be side stepped, and has not yet been addressed in this context is that of national identification. Defining national identity is not straight forward as the issue, as national identity has been relatively neglected in comparison with the body of research on social identity (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). National identity can be understood in a similar light to social identity.

One of the preconceptions relating to national identity which must be challenged is that nations are comprised of singular and distinctive identities (i.e., the French are rude, the Germans are humourless, the Scottish are drunks). First, what descriptions such as this represent are the very in-group and out-group biases that were described in Chapter 1. Second, notions of singular national identities such as this are invariably discriminatory and incorrect. The issue is not what it means to be for example French, German, or English, the important consideration are the social consequences of the different ways to define a nation. Defining national and social identity is as much about a description of present, as it is a projection into the future. The stereotype threat literature adds support to this claim. National identity may shape the way a group acts, but the actions undertaken are equally defined by the boundaries of national identity. There is as much demand to understand national identity as a variable of being, as well as it is a process becoming (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).

Nationalism is not limited to the phenomenology whereby individuals or groups are prepared to die and kill in the name of their nation. If it were, one would be forced to conclude national identities have little relevance. Gellner (1994) likens nationalism to gravity, a force which exerts itself on us in an impressive and typically unacknowledged ways. Nationalism is an important aspect of the self concept, which need not lead us to kill others, but everyday it shapes the way we interpret and process information. Significantly it informs our understanding of political contexts and international relations. Who 'we' are in a national comparison to 'them' is so engrained in our self concept and socialisation, it is often taken for granted, prompting several researchers to claim that 'nationalism is banal' (Billig, 1995; Searle-white, 2001).

The key point is that in any national group different definitions of national identity jostle for priority as people seek to shape others' views about their nation's identity (i.e., who 'we' are and what 'we' care about). These in-group national identifications can vary dramatically from out-group perspectives. Importantly, the issue at hand is what national identification can inform us about the way the police perceive foreign nationals and how this acts to shape the strategies and tactics employed to police those foreign nationals. The role of perceptions held by the police and the relationship this may have in shaping the inter-group dynamics of conflict at an international football events requires further investigation.

2.5.10 The Inter-group Threat Theory

The perception of threat in an inter-group context is a function of power asymmetries between groups. On the basis of the social identity theory, inter-group threat can be defined as the experience of in-group members when they perceive that another group is in a position, or has the capability to cause them harm. Negative feelings towards out-group members or prejudice, is more likely to occur when individuals draw a large sense of identity from their group membership, the identity is threatened, and there is a conflict between the in-group and the out-group.


The inter-group threat theory (ITT; Stephan & Stephan, 2000), draws on the social identity theory to explain the psychological variables which underlay the

experience of identity threat and the possible reactions of individuals, or groups to a perceived threat to their identity through coping strategies. When identity is threatened coping strategies alleviate the threat and minimise the negative repercussions of experiencing identity threat. Accordingly, a coping strategy is defined as *“any activity, in thought or deed, which has as its goal the removal or modification of a threat to identity”* (Breakwell 1986, p. 78). The ITT is not limited to actual threat, but contents with the perception of threat; which has real implications for the way people act.

The ITT classifies threat into four types: (1) Realistic threats are posed by factors which could cause the in-group physical harm or loss of resources, and can also be represented as individual level threats causing potential physical or material harm to individual group members as a result of their membership. It involves perceptions of competition, conflicting goals, and threats to physical and economic well-being of the in-group; (2) Symbolic threats represent threats to the meaning system(s) of the in-group, such as challenges to important in-group norms and values, and at the individual level of analysis may be associated with loss of face, challenges to self identity and potential threats to self-esteem. Symbolic threat arises from a conflict in norms, values, and beliefs between in and out groups inter-group; (3) anxiety, involves feelings of uneasiness and awkwardness in the presence of out-group members because of uncertainty about how to behave toward them, which makes interactions with out-groups seem threatening (Stephan & Stephan, 1985); and, (4) negative stereotypes.

There has been debate about the role of negative stereotypes in the model surround whether they are best conceptualized as an independent threat which leads directly to negative out-group attitudes, or as an antecedent of the other types of threat (i.e., realistic, symbolic or anxiety). Stephan & Stephan, (2000) propose that anxiety and negative stereotypes should be considered forms of inter-group threat because they also reflect concerns about negative outcomes from inter-group relations. See Figure 2.3 for a depiction of the ITT, the model illustrates the basic theory underpinning the perception of threats to one’s identity.

Figure 2.3: Depicts the four different threats put forward by the Inter-group Threat Theory; the model illustrates the antecedents and consequences of the perception of such threats to one's identity.



The degree to which people experience threat is hypothesised to depend on: (1) prior relations between the groups; (2) values and goals; (3) the situations which the groups interact in; and, (4) individual variables. In the absence of prior experience groups will experience uncertainty and ambiguity, and turn to other sources (e.g., the international co-operation or media), to build social representation and expectation.

A history of conflict surrounding the out-group will lead to threat being more readily perceived, and the size of the out-group is also predicted to be significant in relation to realistic threat. The theory predicts cognitive responses to threat, for instance the avoidance of contact. Cognitive biases are also believed to be active or accentuated by the perception of threat. Affectively (inter-group anxiety) and behaviourally consequences will be determined by the actual situation and the nature of the threat. Negative feelings towards out-group members or prejudice, is more likely to occur when individuals draw a large sense of identity from their group membership, the identity is threatened, and there is a conflict between the in-group and the out-group.

The perception of threat when none exists can be argued to be beneficial. This could be considered a general bias towards the avoidance of error which may lead to harm. Thus, we may be predisposed to perceive threat from out-groups (Stephan, Ybarra & Morrison, in press). However, even in the result of non-hostile coping strategies (e.g., communication or compromise), the cognitive and affective responses to the threat are likely to be negative. Threat as a cause of negative inter-group attitudes and behaviours has not received the attention it deserves.

2.5.11 Accountability and audiences.

Accountability can be defined as both the implicit and explicit expectations that an individual maybe called upon to justify their beliefs, feelings or actions to an audience that possesses the power to exact consequences on the individual (Tetlock, 1992). Accountability determines that people never make decisions in a social vacuum but in one in which the goal of decision making is to satisfy the approval of a relevant other or others (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Keren & Bruine de bruin, 2003).

For the purposes of the current research the issue is with how accountability concerns impact police officers' ability to think and act strategically and tactically and with the way in which internal and external audiences (to which the police are accountable) influence or impact on the social representation of reality. Crego and Alison (2004) report senior commanders felt the most difficult aspect to manage during an event or incident, which impacted on their ability, was the perspective of the operation by external parties. Similarly, Cronin and Reicher (2006) found that commanding police officers are highly concerned about their accountability to a variety of audiences.

Cronin and Reicher (2006) examined the various ways in which police officers could be held to account for their decisions, and the way in which that affects their subsequent decisions and ability to act in terms of their social identity. They identified two different kinds of accountability, internal (i.e., internal enquiries, to senior officers, to peers and junior officers) and external (i.e., public enquiry, politicians, media and public). The processes are similar to those of 'in' and 'on' the job trouble discussed by Waddington (1991, 1993). Police decision making is an active process of balancing the pressures created by both audiences internally and externally to avoid error to which they may be held accountable (Cronin & Reicher, 2009). They also acknowledge the accountability concerns at different levels (frontline and command) within the police organisation are different. In relation to decision making it is affected by various audiences and has the ability to impact on police tactics in such a way that increases reliance on high profile, undifferentiated intervention against the crowd (Cronin & Reicher, 2006).

Accountability factors may impact on the reluctance to adopt a low profile model and be implicated in the decision to move away from 'traditional' crowd management techniques to that of low profile. Anderson (2003) argues that decision avoidance results from rational reasoning and emotional processes, and proposes the rational-emotional model of decision making avoidance. He provides several examples of rational reasoning; (1) believing the avoiding actions outweigh the benefit of action, (2) the decision maker may want to maintain the status quo and thus chooses not to act, or (3) at its most basic the decider opts for a longer time period to make the decision. Additionally, anticipated regret caused by selection difficulty which can play a role in decision avoidance and emotional processes. Decision

avoidance, maintenance of the status quo, and anticipated regret may be cognitive factors which must be addressed in the implementation of low profile public order approach. There is a lack of systematic investigation of the constraints which impinge on police judgement and decision making, it is crucial to understanding how to implement low profile policing.

2.5.12 Media and policing foreign nationals

External audiences (i.e., public, politicians, media and public), have been argued to be audiences which highly concern the police in actualising their roles. While the media has been largely emphasised in sociological studies relating to football disorder and the football hooligan literature, the impact of the broader array of external audiences has escaped academic attention.

Expectations of violence can be popularised by the media, which has been theorised to play a role in police management of international football events (Weed, 2001; Crabbe, 2003). Dunning (2002), maintains that hooliganism is a construct of the media and politicians. Prior to the Euro 2000 tournament, the British media emphasised that English were intent on travelling with a view to cause disorder. This perspective was reinforced by the NCIS spokesperson, Mark Steels, who commented on the England vs. Turkey game in Charleroi, Belgium; *“People should be rightly anxious about this game. It’s got all the elements which we recognise as making it potentially a high risk game with trouble”* (cited Weed, 2001, p. 411). During the tournament, 965 British supporters were arrested for involvement in disorder of which 474 were deported (Stott, 2003). The largest instance of a conflict situation was the mass arrest of 200 English fans in the central square in Charleroi, during the England vs. Turkey match. Analysis of the incident suggests that several factors contributed to the disorderly outcome, notably the attitudes and the tactics of the Belgian police and their understanding of the English social identity (Weed, 2001; Crabbe, 2003).

Newspapers generally report on football using the sort of language which seems to derive more from the world of war than it does from sport (Hall, 1978). The availability heuristic refers to the way individuals predict the frequency of an event based on how easily an example can be imagined. The logic behind this is, if an

example is easily brought to mind, that is 'available', the single example is considered as representative of the whole; rather than as just a single example in a range of many. In Stott & Reicher's (1998a) study, officers' reported that when they are policing public disorder, the death of Keith Blakelock (police officer killed by a crowd during the Broadwater Farm riot) is on their mind, and they are concerned about their safety, suggesting there may be a role for availability reasoning.

Evidence suggests the media may serve to heighten rivalries between opposing fan groups, and construct the social representation of the police. The media role in creating the expectation or frequency of disorder, acting as a self fulfilling prophecy, deserves consideration from a psychological perspective, particularly in the construction of social identities and inter-group relations at international football tournaments.

2.6 Chapter summary

The current chapter has sought to explore the relationship between crowd psychology, police psychology and the inter-group and organisational context in which these interactions take place in policing international football. The chapter has begun to explore the possibility that crowd psychology models have acted to shape, and arguably limit, existing psychological studies of police in the public order context and specifically, in the context of policing foreign nationals. International football events and tournament are massive, frequently occurring, multi-agency industries which are deserving of the research attention necessary to facilitate the health and safety of all those in attendance. The policing of such invariably involves consideration of a multiplicity of variables which may interact with strategies and tactics employed to achieve this. In order to better understand the dynamics of police psychology in this context it has been put forward that there is value in applying social identity related and organisational group dynamic understandings to the police as an occupational group. Additionally, it is put forward there is much to be gained by integrating a police perspective of the management of these events, which is not exclusively based on a research interpretation through crowd psychology models and focused on disorder. Given the rationale underpinning the research objectives outlined here, the specific aims of the thesis will now be addressed.

2.7 Aims of the thesis

Crowd management is an inter-group interaction and there is a demand to investigate the sparsely addressed police psychology; as a significant group in this context. Thus, first the current research is to develop an organisational account of public order police social identity. Another consideration is that the crowd psychology literature puts forward the hypothesis that in policing international football; (1) the police approach to policing high risk fans increases the actual level of disorder through a self-fulfilling prophesy; and, (2) policing approach to high risk fans creates the social conditions where negative inter-group interaction is increased. This research seeks to test the extent to which these arguments can be sustained from evidence which will be gathered at Euro 2008 tournament.

The aims of this research are broad and exploratory, seeking to; (1) to understand social identity of police officers in a public order context; (2) to understand the police perspective of risk management and threat to order and safety (as defined by the officers themselves), and the relationship this has to public order strategy and tactics; and, (3) to test the hypothesis put forward from the crowd psychology literature relating to the interaction between police tactics and crowd relations/levels of disorder.

Drawing on the theoretical frameworks of the social identity tradition (e.g., SIT, SCT and ITT), this research will examine the development and construction of police social identities. The qualitative officers' perception of the characteristic and defining attributes of in-group category members, variations in category content, boundaries, and prototypical elements will be investigated. The research seeks not only to understand the police as one social group in relation to out-groups in the context of international football events; but also to explore the relationship which this has to the police perception and practice in the management of foreign nationals (e.g., perceptions of threat to identity, out-group homogeneity, and coping mechanisms). To do this, officers' identification with their role and other social groups, and police strategy and tactics will be examined using qualitative and quantitative methods.

This research will explore the perception and construction of the 'self/us' vs. 'others/them' dimensions of identity processes. Among other variables, the central issues which are to be addressed by the research questions are: (1) norms, values, goals and power dynamics of social identity in the context of policing foreign nationals; (2) attitudes towards foreign nationals, national identity and the relationship to threat and risk perception; (3) actualising identity and willingness to engage in inter-group contact; (4) what happened and why (a multi-method account of the inter-group relations the match perceived to pose the highest level risk during the Euro 2008 tournament; (5) the influence of the mass media on police perceptions and inter-group relations; (6) managing negative inter-group perceptions; a commanders perspective; and (7) conflict reduction strategies and practical recommendations.

2.7.1 Structure of the thesis

Chapter 4 uses the framework of the SIT from an organisational perspective to explain norms, values and goals of commanders and frontline officers in the task of policing public order. The aim here is to understand the way officers define themselves and their inter-group relations, and indeed the way they view others and their relationship with them. The Chapter then considers the way identity processes can feed into strategy, tactics and inter-group relations. This will provide an in-group founded account of public order police identity, such like none other in the literature.

Chapter 5 draws on the theoretical framework of the ITT to explain the relationship between pre-event threat perception and the relationship to risk management and operational outcomes. Given that Chapter 4 begins to draw upon identity in the sense of what it means to be a public order officer, Chapter 5 then addresses how senior commanding officers, as the leaders of the organisational group, perceive threat to their identity. In the literature currently, empirical studies of risk and threat in public order policing has been neglected. There has however been a model of 'Dynamic risk assessment' put forward as a recommendation from crowd psychologists to practicing police officers. This model seems to emphasis a static perception of risk by public order officers, very much founded on nationality of those being policed which then in turn informs the strategies and tactics employed to manage them. The aim of this Chapter is to adopt a broader conceptualisation of risk

and threat informed by the general categorical threats to identity posited by the ITT. By exploring the nature of risk and threat perception empirically one may better understand the rationale underpinning the strategic and tactical decisions.

Chapter 6 explores the police perspectives of the academically and politically supported model of graded tactical deployment in the management of foreign nationals at international football events. As has been discussed, crowd psychologists make particular recommendation regarding the beliefs, actions and attitudes of public order police officers however these proposals have are being pushed through at a academic and political level in the presence of little empirical support, and in the absence of investigation of the potential implications for the officers being tasked to implement the graded tactical deployment models. This Chapter will draw on knowledge-based understandings to address the utility of the theoretical graded tactical deployment model in practice.

Chapter 7 is the only Chapter in the thesis to draw upon quantitative structured observation data, which was gathered during Euro 2008. While qualitative data presented until this point provides a rich contextual detail to a participants identity and relationship to action, it lacks the ability to draw statistically provide evidence of relationships and to test specific hypotheses. Chapter 7 utilises data gathered during Euro 2008, the method is systematically identical to that employed during the Euro 2000 and Euro 2004 tournaments. The aims are first, to explain broad patterns of the police deployment and the relationship to positive and negative inter-group interactions in Austria and Switzerland. Second, is to test specific hypotheses which have been put forward by crowd psychologists about the interaction between particular forms of policing and the theorised outcomes; in terms of inter-group interaction between police/crowd and crowd/crowd.

Chapter 8 is a follow up study which is intimately linked to Chapter 7. It involves developing a richer understanding of the policing and the inter-group relations at Euro 2008 by using qualitative methods to present an ethnographic case study of the police management of high risk foreign nationals at the Euro 2008 tournament. The analysis begins to illustrate considerations for crowd psychologists which are inconsistent with the ESIM model, and furthermore to present a case study

which illustrates the importance of variables over and above the form of police style employed which can contribute to inter-group tensions present at high risk international football events.

Finally, Chapter 9 consists of a general discussion which will explore the theoretical and practical implications of the current research and consider options for future research.

To understand the police psychology from an applied occupational perspective it has been necessary to gain a high level of unrestricted access to police participants, and emergence into officers' social environment before, during and after operational international football events. Thus, before turning to the empirical results chapters' the impending Chapter 3 will outline the general methods of data collection and design which will be employed to gain such access to the police in an occupational capacity.

CHAPTER 3:

RESEARCH METHOD, DESIGN AND ANALYSIS

3.1 Research method and design

This research will address the inter-group environment of policing a major international football tournament. In doing so the study may contribute to modern discussion and recommendations on the topic of police strategy and tactics in crowd management. In order to establish a sound understanding of the social reality from the perspective of an acting officer, examination of the phenomena in its naturally occurring state is considered an important component in accordance with contemporary social method. The objectives are defined in Chapter 2, and can be broadly summarised as; 1) an examination of the public order police identity as it relates to risk perception and management; 2) an examination of the police perspectives (pre-tournament), of the formal '3D' crowd psychology based model of risk management specifically enforced for the Euro 2008; and, 3) the actual delivery of the risk management strategy and tactics on the ground at Euro 2008. In order to address the objectives the research project has been conducted in three distinct 'phases'.

More generally, Sherif et al., (1961) delivered a novel and classic insight which shaped the form and orientation of subsequent social research; that is, the situation and not only the personal characteristics of individuals should be considered to determine the behaviour of groups. In terms of research principles to understand inter-group dynamics one must study the reality of those who comprise the group, and not rely on laboratory constructions of such. Any exploration of a dynamic, 'real life' naturalistic setting (particularly so in a broad manor of the current investigation), should characteristically responsive to the emerging dynamics of the environment. To investigate police and inter-group psychology it was necessary to adopt a methodology that allows for flexibility in a natural environment, and provides data which is rich and detailed. Good science provides explanations that are rooted in a sound empirical account of the phenomena, and in order to explain something you must first establish what that something is.

As identity is a comparative process which varies depending on the given social context (Oakes, 1987; Oakes et al., 1991), and any data pertaining to

understanding identity must be embedded in a naturalistic environment and be sensitive to changing dynamics and understandings in the social relations. Through description, the aim of this research becomes the production of meaningful accounts which integrates multiplicities, variations and complexity of participant's realities (i.e., the construction of inter-subjective meaning), to understand the reality of policing foreign nationals.

From an inter-group relations perspective, the crowd and the police were not considered the only significant inter-group relation in the context of policing foreign nationals (e.g., multi-agency relations and the media), so the methodology needed to permit access to these audiences and sources. An emphasis was also placed on triangulating the research findings from consensual accounts of researchers, practitioners, and data sources to avoid the potential for misrepresentation. Consequently, it has been necessary to access a broad array of perspectives on the real time events and developments being investigated. Additionally, research sought to employ quantitative (in phase three), to illuminate patterns before exploring them in rich detail of qualitative data. In order to address these broad objectives comprehensively the CGTM (Charmaz, 2006) was considered appropriate, and several research designs were considered necessary.

In terms of design, the aim was to make comparisons not only across time but between different police forces and groups of foreign nationals. Thus, research required access to police psychology pre, during and post tournament in order to examine identity processes and risk perception in relation to foreign nationals. In order to examine these processes, researchers were required to be embedded in the police operations, prior to the tournament and have first hand access to: (1) command and control information; (2) risk assessments; (3) tactical and strategic decision making; and, (4) police psychology as it relates to policing foreign nationals. In the context of a major international tournament the research objectives were to understand factors that influenced the policing of foreign nationals, and how actual policing constructed inter-group relations during the tournament. Post tournament aimed to address learning points and key experiences from the tournament from the

perspective of commanders who played a key role. Thus, access, flexibility and the construction of sustainable contacts were considered of paramount importance.

Identity and inter-group research has, over the past thirty years, come to value the deviation from methodological orthodoxy of empiricism. Social research generally differentiates itself from the traditional mainstream empirical principles, however it is not absent of measures to increase the reliability of the findings. Principles of empiricism (e.g., reliability, rigorous control), are replaced with equally valid but alternative quality assurances which are sensitive to social practices (e.g., integrity, external validity). Any scientifically sound research should adhere to particular practices and principles; or possibly more aptly described as 'the rules of engagement'. Hence, before turning to the specific methods employed in this three phase research project the constructionist approach to knowledge underpinning the current work and the research ethics and values will first be discussed.

3.1.1 Constructionist approach

Giambattista Vicco (1668 - 1744), infamously denoted that *verum esse ipsum factum* ('truth itself is fact'), a proposition that has widely been taken as an early example of a constructionist epistemology. Constructionism rejects the objectivism principle of empiricism in favour of the perspective that the only reality we can be sure of is that which is represented by human thought. In contemporary debate the contestations of the past are embodied by social constructionist meta-theory of science. Social constructionism is essentially the doctrine that there is no objective reality, we construct it predominantly (although not exclusively), through the language we use. "*Social constructionism views discourse about the world not as a reflection or a map of the world but as an artefact of communal interchange*" (Gergen 1985, p. 266). Linguistic descriptions are reflections of social reality, and discourse is considered to be employed to perform social functions, rather than being merely descriptive (i.e., to excuse or endorse behaviours). As a result, linguistic understandings and actions should be the primary focus for investigating our knowledge of the social world.

Constructionists maintain that scientific knowledge is built by scientists, and not discovered from the natural world. By viewing knowledge as socially constructed the approach values that multiple realities are possible for different people, within the confines of their mind. In order to acquire an understanding of the various and diverse realities, multiple methods of searching and data gathering are necessary. *“The notion that theoretical propositions can provide a description independent of reality is dismissed as there is no way of comparing reality with our descriptions or concepts of it”* (Kuhn, 1970, p. 206). Constructionism holds that there is no single valid method to gain scientific knowledge and alternative methodologies to quantitative designs are important for the study of social science. By engaging in a combination of different research methods (e.g., observation, interviews and recordings), it is argued that this will lead to more valid and reliable construction of reality.

In qualitative research approaches, such as ethnography validity is considered whether the research examines that which it was intended to, and the integrity of the results (Winter, 2000). Validity is generally determined by asking a series of questions, and looking for support for ones answers by examining others findings. From a quantitative perspective the reliability is the extent to which the findings can be replicated in future examinations, and thus generalised inductively. The question of reliability and generalisability does not concern qualitative researchers’ instead the precision and the integrity of their findings more significant. The idea of discovering knowledge through measures of reliability and validity is replaced by the idea of trustworthiness (Mishler, 2000), which is *“defensible”* (Johnson 1997, p. 282). For a full review of the distinctions see Golafshani (2003).

There are various approaches to construct empirical investigations into social phenomena, typically guided by what it is that you seek to examine. In this case, the research sought for the officers to define themselves, in their own way, and as a result the participants then define the theoretical issues (not the researcher). Thus, a method which allows the researcher to understand what the key issues are from the perspectives of the participants was considered necessary.

3.1.2 Constructionist Grounded Theory Method (CGTM)

The CGTM is a qualitative research method that uses a systematic set of procedures, but is flexible in its data gathering approach. It is most accurately described as an emergent research method through which the theory is developed from the data, rather than the other way around. CGTM in a sense, counter intuitive. An imperative stipulation of the method is that research questions are broad and general, as opposed to formulated as specific hypothesis. Rather than beginning with a hypothesis CGTM begins with a research situation (in this case; police perspectives of inter-group dynamics and risk, and how this relates to strategy and tactics to manage foreign nationals). The approach facilitates emergent theory development, which accurately accounts for the research situation. The approach also acts to guide the focal nature of theoretical understanding. The researcher uses insight gained by direct observations of the phenomena to develop the theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).

The goal of CGTM is not to find a 'truth', but instead to conceptualise what is going on by using empirical methods. The primary objective as a researcher in undertaking a grounded theory thesis is to understand what is going on in the research situation, and how the key players manage and understand their roles. *"The researchers' job is to investigate the socially constructed meanings that form the participants' realities and the behaviours that flow from those meanings"* (Milliken & Schreiber, 2001, p.180). A useful tool the researcher can use to do this is by asking themselves repeatedly: (1) what is going on here; (2) what are the main problems; and, (3) how are the participant group trying to solve the problems. The first step in developing a CGTM analysis is data collection, through a variety of methods.

Interviews and observations are frequently the main cited source of theory development within this methodology. However, any qualitative data collection methods can be used. Focus groups and informal conversation are also useful. Glaser (1998) recommends against recording or taking notes during an interview or other data gathering situations, primarily as a result of the time taken to listen and transcribe the taping. It was assumed in the context of a thesis acknowledging this

recommendation would open the research to vulnerability and critique, so all data gathering in the current thesis was recorded and transcribed.

Retrospective errors may occur in employing a retrospective approach, which can bias data interpretation and/or subsequent data gathering. Retroactive association can occur in learning, where the researcher may perceive a relationship between one item and another preceding item of data. While this cannot be avoided, the CGTM method does acknowledge the researcher as an active agent in understanding the arena in which they seek to explore and explain. Retrospective facilitation may arise making it more likely that researchers perceive particular relationships which they have come into contact with in past data gathering bouts. The risks of retrospective error cannot be eliminated. However measures such as documenting conversations, field notes and dictation can help to facilitate accurate recall of what the significant issues were. Additionally, consensus amongst researchers is an important tool in the management of retrospective error.

The data collection is ongoing with stages of analysis. Initially, research interests are broad, and the task is to absorb all information possible in the data gathering opportunities which could be relevant to the over-arching topic. Field notes become memos about "*analysis, thoughts, interpretations, questions, and decision about further data collection*" (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 110). Each individual data set is organised and coded through thematic analysis. The emergent categories, or themes, are identified and this guides the subsequent data collection. The key aspect of CGTM is in the comparison of the first data set with the second. Then comparison of these data sets with the third, and so on. Through the process of thematic analysis core categories emerge.

Thematic analysis can be used as a standalone method, or as it is in the current context as an analytical tool in the larger framework of the methodology. Thematic analysis is beneficial, particularly here, as it is independent of theory and epistemological standpoint (i.e., irrespective of epistemological or constructionist approach). Thematic analysis is also particularly useful in the current context as it permits comparison across a range of data, and methods. The method is therefore

flexible and can be utilised in order to examine a broad array of subjects. However, a theme to which will be continually returned is that the flexibility of methods does not imply that there are no principles which govern the approach of researcher conduct in the use of the method. For a full discussion of thematic analysis as a method see Braun & Clarke (2006).


Core categories are identified generally by the frequency of which the variables crop up, and are interlinked with other frequently occurring categories, or issues. This repeated engagement provides CGTM a rigour which lacks in other forms of qualitative analysis (e.g., discursive analysis or mere thematic analysis). This is a continuing search for evidence which facilitates theory development by exposing exceptions in the core categories. Meaning the final shape of the theory is likely to provide a good fit to the phenomena. Ultimately, the theory grounded in the data which has been gathered in over a course of time and involving different participants emerges from the categories and sub-categories in relation to the research interests. This generates concepts to explain peoples' actions regardless of time and place.

Engaging in this process, asking questions and making comparisons, informs analysis in light of emerging evidence, ultimately guiding the analysis, to facilitate the theorising processes and inform the direction of further data collection. Thus, the phases of a CGMT are; (1) data gathering; (2) organisation of the data; (3) thematic analysis; (4) reading/writing; and, (5) theorising (see Figure 3.1). The research is cyclic, and is repeatedly engaged until the data gathering process is complete; meaning that that significant categories identified by the process have become saturated. A saturated research category implies data gathering no longer contributes to what the data already informs you about the research issue.

There are multiple variations of grounded theory approach (e.g., Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Glaser, 1992; Charmaz, 2006). Grounded theory can be perceived as method which entirely separates theory and the data (e.g., Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Another approach is to introduce a literature review (beginning with areas which are related to the area but not to directly what you are writing on), during the data gathering process.

Figure 3.1: This figure illustrates the repeated, cyclic research processes which are involved in the development of a CGTM analysis

Constructed Grounded Theory Method



This emergent literature review allows the theory to emerge from the data. Or, CGTM approach permits basic background knowledge of the subject area to be brought with the researcher to the data (e.g., Charmaz, 2006), which enhances the sensitivity during the gathering process. However, all agree that a full literature review performed prior to data gathering may expose the research to criticism of bias and a shutting down openness to themes which emerge from the data.

In keeping with the CGTM (Charamz, 2006) a limited albeit existent understanding of the background theory has been brought to the data collection from early stages. Given that the basic underpinning principles of the background literature is that police tactics can create disorder, research sought to understand how this could be the case. However, after repeatedly engaging in the data it became clear that the relationship between police tactics and crowd disorder was not straightforward indicated by the notable absence of disorder. The research then sought to understand from a police perspective the benefits and rationale behind the tactics which they were employing to successfully manage order at international football events. Specifically, ultimately what became the research focus became the benefits and limitations of employing high and low profile measures to manage crowds of international football fans.

The literature review has been an ongoing aspect of the data analysis which is used in order to make sense of the findings. The literature review has been conducted in line with the recommendations of Glaser (1998), which suggest reading around the specific field, before turning in the last instance to the particular field sought to build upon. In doing so, the current research addressed a wide array of literatures, including; policing public order, social protest and demonstrations, football control, hooligan theories, military command and control, critical incidents management, private security and policing, traditional decision making and judgement, natural decision making, social cognition, stereotyping, heuristics, and crowd psychology; before reviewing the literature on inter-group psychology and social identity. This permitted a *“creative inter-play among the processes of data collection, literature review, and researcher introspection”* (Patton, 1990, p. 163).

CGTM is all about discovering social processes through data derived from participants' actions and understanding toward a particular phenomenon. Grounded theory can serve to uncover the abstract processes and broad conceptual themes that influence and reflect police reality when encountering foreign nationals in the context of international football events. Given that research in context of international football has taken the perspective of the crowd, a grounded theory approach was considered to be the best method to allow contribution to the current research by building on what exists, while still being entirely responsive to the research situation as it was in reality.

Various designs have been employed in order to construct the CGTM approach. Given the complexity of the research environment and the multiplicity of different audiences involved an ethnographic design (which permits various approaches to data gathering), is; 1) most suited to addressing the objectives of the current project; and, 2) facilitates triangulation of the research findings.

3.1.3 Ethnographic research design

Ethnographic design is characteristically flexible and highly opportunistic (Green, 1993), allowing for a wide variety of different data sources. Ethnography is the comparative and descriptive analysis of the everyday and of what is often taken for granted. Ethnographic questions generally concern the link between behaviour and, or, how processes develop over time. The data base for ethnographies is usually an extensive description of the details of the social life of the participant population.

In qualitative research approaches, such as ethnography validity is considered whether the research examines that which it was intended to, and the integrity of the results (Winter, 2000). Validity is generally determined by asking a series of questions, and looking for support for ones answers by examining others findings. From a quantitative perspective the reliability is the extent to which the findings can be replicated in future examinations, and thus generalised inductively. The question of reliability and generalisability does not concern qualitative researchers' instead the precision and the integrity of their findings more significant. The idea of discovering knowledge through measures of reliability and validity is replaced by the idea of

trustworthiness (Mishler, 2000), which is “*defensible*” (Johnson 1997, p. 282). For a full review of the distinctions see Golafshani (2003).

Ethnographic research design was considered best suited to conducting a CGTM in the field of policing international football. Ethnography has a high degree of external validity because participants are generally unaware data gathering has taken place, reducing the likelihood they are reactive to data gathering (e.g., demand characteristics). However, control over extraneous variables is difficult, if not impossible in the context of policing crowds. Ethnography typically employs different methods consisting of structured or unstructured observations, and the recording and coding of behaviours. In addition, structured and unstructured interviews and informal conversations are also core methods of ethnographic research. An ethnographic approach to data also permits the integration of qualitative and quantitative measures, which can help provide meaning to theory, to a greater degree than can either method alone. The general approaches to data gathering which have been employed at one or more points during the three phases of the research project will now be broadly overviewed; before turning to a more specific description of how they are employed throughout the three phases of the current work.

3.1.4 Participatory research

The aim of participant observation is to gain a close and intimate familiarity with a given group of individuals. The observer is non-intrusive and seeks not to affect the on-going behaviours sought to be examined, sometimes blending into the environment and becoming ‘invisible’ e.g., in a crowd situation. In other situations, the opposite strategy is used, where the researcher becomes a full participant in the contextual situation and blends into the environment through becoming a ‘part of the group’, as for example in the focus group discussions. The current research employed both forms of participatory design, in different situations using different approaches.

3.1.5 Descriptive research

Descriptive research seeks to depict that which exists within a participant group social reality. Descriptive studies do not strive to measure the effect of a variable; only to describe the phenomena, event or inter-action. Description can be used to refer to behaviours, thoughts and observations of the participants Interviews are particularly useful descriptive tool for getting the story behind a participant's experiences. *'It is a process of finding out what others feel and think about their worlds'* (Rubin & Rubin, 1995, p. 145). Interviews, observations and archival research tools have all been employed to differing degrees and at different points during the current three phase research project to construct a descriptive account of the phenomena being addressed.

Interview studies relating to understanding crowd psychology (Reicher, 1996a), and police psychology (Stott & Reicher, 1998), have argued for interviewing respondents in groups. The rationale behind this is that the social relations in the interview context are similar to the social relations which are experienced in crowd events. People will often admit to things in a group when they are aware that others are admitting them too, thus, the ability to identify with the group can possibly lead people to reveal more than they would on their own (Goldie & Pritchard, 1981). This study sought to adopt this approach where possible, however logistically this was not always feasible. In one city three officers were interviewed simultaneously, but the remaining nine interviews were conducted singularly. The discussion with three people lasted one hour and fifteen minutes. The average individual interview time was 45mins.

Interviews were conducted to gain in-depth information around particular topics to further investigate participants' responses (McNamara, 1999). Namely, to further investigate participants' understandings of foreign nations and police strategies and tactics. Interview technique was suited as the enquiry sought to; (1) expand the understanding of particular social concepts; (2) generate deeper insight into the police perspective; (3) explore how representative the initial findings were; and, (4) understand changes in social identity over time.

After gaining the interviewee's permission a tape recorder was used to avoid the loss of important details. An exact record of the conversation has enabled a useful working of notes and an electronic record has allowed a focus on recording the finer details while interviewing. Recording interviews can have a self-censoring effect on the interviewee, and can influence the degree retort or disclosure in their responses. The ultimate format was explained, to better understand the way in which international football fans are policed when at major tournaments and to preserve experiences as a tool for research. Terms of confidentiality were also stressed, and officers assured data would remain anonymous.

Observation techniques have been used in two different ways in the current project. First, unstructured observation has been employed to examine the management and interaction between the different audiences in real time during international football events. This has yielded vast amounts of qualitative descriptive data about what is actually going on during such events. Second, structured observation techniques have been employed during the Euro 2008 tournament. This has yielded quantitative descriptive data regarding the deployment, strategies and interactions between police and fans on the ground during the tournament (see 3.3.4 Conducting structured observations).

Archive research can be used for investigating large scale and widely occurring phenomena. The researcher assembles details gathered by others, often for reasons unconnected to the focus of the research known as a secondary source method. The secondary approach is not reactive, but can be unreliable because the researcher has no control over the primary data sources or reporting of them. With the use of secondary sources it is important to recognise the absence of awareness of the justifications for the original data collection; the subjectivity of the interpretation of the writer/reporter of the primary data (Robson, 2002). The use of secondary methods may be inappropriate and fail to reflect an unbiased perspective. This need not be so pending on the source of the information, but are important considerations in the use of such methods. The advantages are that the time, effort and the cost of secondary source methods are generally lesser than gathering primary sources (Fielding & Fielding, 2000).

The uses of secondary source use in the current context is largely used as a triangulation method (e.g., police documents or media reports), or (as in Chapter 7), as a means of defining the social, political and media context of the situation in which the police are performing their public order duties. Secondary sources are particularly useful in the current context where the scope of the research is international and thus developments and preparations in different European cities are of interest. Secondary source research methods can yield a higher level of data collection than primary methods, particularly when the research participants are speaking different languages.

3.1.6 Triangulation

One of the most significant differences in the deviation from traditional empiricism is the loss of rigorous control over the way the data is gathered, measured and interpreted. As a result the risk of various forms of bias or error is arguably increased. This potential can be reduced through the process of multiple source triangulation, gathered using different methods (Denzin, 1989). “...*Triangulation strengthens a study by combining methods. This can mean using several kinds of methods or data, including using both quantitative and qualitative approaches*” (Patton, 2001, p. 247).

Triangulation is a step taken by qualitative researchers to improve validity by managing the potential for bias. Triangulation may include multiple methods of data collection and data analysis in order to research a consensus on the perspective or point sought to be made. This does not suggest a fixed triangulation method for all research. The methods chosen in triangulation to test the validity and reliability of a study depend on the criterion of the research. Triangulation typically involves several investigators or peer researchers’ interpretation of the data at different time or location. Consensus is considered in the current research through agreement between different parties (e.g., between crowd members, between the police or the press); or, between statements of these parties in conjunction with field notes, photographs, videos and audio recordings. This is an approach which has been employed in previous studies of inter-group interaction (c.f., Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2000; Stott & Drury, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998; Stott et al., 2007).

Ultimately, the benefits of triangulation include “*increasing confidence in the research data, creating innovative ways of understanding a phenomenon, revealing unique findings, challenging or integrating theories and providing a clearer understanding of the problem*” (Thurmond, 2001, p. 254). By employing qualitative and quantitative methods as tools for triangulation this can be argued to overcome the ideological constraints associated with each method as it stands alone. Using different methods for triangulation provides the ability to check the reliability of different sources of data, and importantly, understand the differences between different sources.

Gulon, Deihl and McDonald (2002) outline five types of triangulation; (1) Data triangulation, which involves using different sources of information in order to increase the validity of a study, (2) Investigator triangulation, involves using several different investigators in the data gathering and analysis processes, (3) Theory triangulation, involves the use of multiple perspectives to interpret a single set of data, (4) Methodological triangulation, involves using a multiple qualitative and/or quantitative methods to study the issue, and, (5) Environmental triangulation involves the use of different locations, settings and other variable factors in order to control for environmental factors which may influence any one data set. The current research employs all five of these triangulation techniques at different points within the data gathering and analysis process.

Given that this research has been conducted in various different contexts, and countries, it has been necessary to rely on primary and secondary source information is a valuable tool for triangulating data accounts. Police, crowd, and other audience and media accounts are cross-referenced by occurrence, or understanding, to provide a rich and detailed account of an event or relationship. This is then cross referenced with field notes, colleagues and expert police observers’ observations and perceptions, serving as a method of balancing the account and piecing together an ‘objective’, as is possible, account of what is actually happening.

3.1.7 General materials

Materials necessary to collect data were largely technological, and will be addressed here. The specific materials (e.g., interview schedules) varied, and will be explored in subsequent discussions of the three phases of this research. Those utilised will be addressed in data collection discussion.

A dictaphone was a central tool, which was carried at all times. It was used to record every aspect of data collection from interviews and observations, to presentations and focus groups. The dictaphone facilitated structured data gathering and also functioned as a verbal diary, for recording interesting events, thoughts, information and sounds. In addition, a camera was also carried at all times, facilitating pictures and videos to be taken during participant observation. However, as with all methods there are advantages and disadvantages of the employment of camera use as tool. The obvious caution is to the privacy and human rights of those being documented. Taking pictures of particular participants without consent (e.g., children) is not ethically or legally acceptable. However, generally camera use and video recording is acceptable in public areas. The second caution of camera use, particularly in naturalistic settings such as the current work is the potential for its use to interfere with that which is being observed. Where visual data have been used in such a way to triangulate, or illustrate issues in the current project (e.g., Chapter 8), the identity of those in the picture have been obscured to preserve principles of anonymity.

The dictaphone and the camera allow a story about variability to be told because: (1) the dictaphone has the facility to capture a conversation both in time and over time; and, (2) they both allow a repeated visiting of different moments of the conversation, or event to check for consistency. It is the evidence for lack of consistency that is the platform for the study of variability. Variability in turn allows stories to be told about the event in context. Without this technology examining relationships would have been much more difficult, and less valid.

A laptop computer was another vital tool. The laptop was not carried during the participant observations, only when specifically needed. Given the amount of

travel required for the research it was a sound basis from which to keep all necessary information e.g., documents, schedules, review reports, interview schedules. Sound bites and camera images were uploaded at the end of each working day to the laptop, ensuring they were backed up and preventing the loss of data. The laptop was a key tool for note taking during the focus groups discussions. Finally, the laptop facilitated a written diary, which during phase three was kept on a daily basis using the MicrosoftOne note program.

3.1.8 Research ethics

The current research was deemed by the Institute at the time of inception not to require ethics approval which has been subsequently ratified by a University committee. While ethics approval was not deemed necessary at the time of inception, this did not excuse the research from being conducted with ethical consideration.

The term 'ethics' usually refers to the moral principles, guiding conduct, which are held by a group or even a profession (though there is no logical reason why individuals should not have their own ethical code)" (Wellington, 2000, p. 54) All researchers, regardless of the research design and orientation are responsible for ensuring methods of data collection are ethically appropriate. Broadly, the key principles of research ethics for any study involving humans are: (1) informed consent; (2) right to withdraw; (3) sensitivity; (4) representation; (5) confidentiality; (6) anonymity; and, (7) protection and support. The general emphasis here is that a researcher has a responsibility, and duty of care to uphold to the participants, irrespective of that which is being examined.

Humphreys (1970) argued that research is unethical if: (1) the researcher misrepresents their identity to gain information, (2) the researcher breaks confidence, meaning that the researcher deliberately misrepresents the character of the research or (3) the research has negative consequences for those being studied. Confidentiality and prevention of harm is enforced here, the participants' identity is not revealed in any manner, whilst researchers know who has provided data, they should not make this known to others. Also, discussions considered to be private, such that they were

talked about in a situation which was not considered to be 'data gathering time' (i.e., over dinner/lunch, or drinks at the end of a working day), have not been included. The research is ethically sensitive to the need for anonymity of reporting. Data is reported anonymously in relation to the respondents, to ensure that no officer can be held to account for their perspectives. The names and locations of who said what within the framework of this research is confidential, the only descriptive information provided is a general location of geographically where the data has been gathered at different phases of the research. The use of direct quotes has been presented without a city location.

Regarding field research one of the major concerns is deception. Deception is considered necessary in some forms of research, but is highly controversial in social sciences. This research sought to prevent deception of research objectives in various ways regarding the information provided to the participants involved. Within the current project, prior to collection of any data, all participants were given the following information: (1) who the researcher was; (2) what the research was about; (3) what the objectives of talking with them were; and, (4) what would be done with the information. After this information had been delivered participants were asked if they were happy to participate; and if so, permission to audio record their participation was requested. Their verbal consent to involvement, and consent to being recorded was the most practical way to gain informed consent in a dynamic and opportunistic field environment.

However, it is impossible to inform participants of the exact nature and be comely transparent in the field for a number of reasons. "*...in practice it is often impossible for researchers to inform subjects [about] everything*" (Cohen, Lawrence & Morrison, 2000, p. 51). Various constraints such as time and opportunism act to limit the nature of the information which can be provided in particular situations. Not overlooking the obvious fact of the matter is the nature of the research itself is such that the findings and reported have been a developing and emerging analysis. "*I have never known an interviewer to be completely honest with his respondents ... Neither does any researcher ever have adequate insight for a perfect representation of his identity; it is always a matter of greater or lesser misrepresentation... The researcher*

must also keep in mind that no method can ever be completely safe for himself or his respondents ... The ethics of social science are situation ethics" (Humphreys, 1970, p. 170).

Depending on the methods, written informed consent may not always be necessary or appropriate in social research. This was considered to be the case here. The strength of qualitative research methods often lies in the informality of the communication, as well as the iterative nature of the research process. Written consent was not practical with regards to: (1) police participants; or, (2) crowd participants, in the current research given the dynamic environment in which the data will be gathered. The protection of participants through their informed consent process favoured a verbal interaction between researcher and participant.

Informed consent implies people agree to take part in research on the basis of knowledge of what it is about, and their trust of the researcher. This governs the information about the project being verbally relayed and requesting permission of the participant to; (1) take part; and, (2) be recorded using a dictaphone. The practice of informed consent is principally against; infringement of privacy, and deception. An important consideration of informed consent when working with a sensitive subject population such as the police is that you simply cannot gain access to their perspectives without them implicitly complying too share details with you. They simply will not discuss matters with researchers unless they are perceived to be established as trustable; generally this is a characteristic of who or what organisation they are working with. As Dean (1954, p. 233), states, *"A person becomes accepted as a participant observer more because of the kind of person he turns out to be in the eyes of the field contacts than because of what the research represents to them. Field contacts want to be reassured that the research worker is a 'good guy' and can be trusted not 'to do them dirt'"*

During data gathering within the framework of PREP the host police forces and review team were made aware of the researchers' dual position as: (1) research assistant to the PREP; and, (2) PhD student at the University of Liverpool. This was ensured prior to the reviews, and emphasised on the first day of the peer reviews. The

peer review team policy was an informal process of public introductions between researchers and participating police commanders on first meetings, during which each member on the group spoke briefly about themselves. This ensured the objectives of data gathering for the current project were clearly understood by the reviewers and host police forces, and their consent obtained.

Regarding the observational ethics, according to the British Psychological Society (1993), guidelines on ethical conduct regarding observational research are; *“9.1. Studies based upon observation must respect the privacy and psychological well being of the individuals studied. Unless those observed give their consent to being observed, observational research is only acceptable in situations where those observed would expect to be observed by strangers.”* In the context of an international football event or tournament both the police and foreign national crowd members would expect to be observed by strangers.

3.1.9 Timeline of data collection

Using various specific qualitative and quantitative methods of collection of data to gain as much information as possible about the issue of policing foreign nationals has been considered the best means by which to approach data gathering. This observational research technique involves studying particular populations or social groups over a given duration of time. Although the sample groups may change over the course of the period, the research interests remain the same between the populations.

The benefit is that it allows examination of changes over time, which is particularly useful for the current project as it permits the issue of identity and social change to be adequately addressed. However, studies such as this require enormous amounts of time and are often quite expensive. This is especially true of the current study as a result of the international focus. Because of this, these studies often have a small group of participants within each data set, which makes it difficult to generalise the results to a larger population e.g., policing public order outside the remit of international football.

The research conducted for the present study has been broken down into three data collection phases. Phase one of the data gathering took place between October 2006 and July 2007. Phase two took place between July 2007 and February 2008. The data gathering in phase one and two has been facilitated by the participation in a large scale international project, namely the Peer Review Evaluation Project (PREP).

Data gathering in phase three was conducted during the Euro 2008 tournament. Data gathering took place between 6th and the 22nd of June. The data gathering in phase three has been facilitated by the participation in a large scale international project. The specific procedures and methods varied between the three phases, although the platform projects used to gain access were interlinked between the three phases. First, the platform projects utilised to access data will be described, followed by a detailed outline of the actual data gathered in each phase of the collection. For a summary account of the total data gathering efforts during this study see Appendix I.

3.2 The Peer Review Evaluation Projects

The data gathered in research phase one and two has been facilitated by involvement in the novel initiative of the EU Council international PREP. The reviews bring experienced police commanders from several different countries to a host country at the invite of a host police force. The aim is to evaluate the operation and provide feedback to the host by means of an evaluation report.

A team of expert police reviewers was composed of twenty-one members from the following thirteen countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The pool was composed by requesting the willingness of one senior police officer from all EU countries to participate. The criteria for involvement has been that the senior officers could speak English and were operationally active. The following countries indicated they were unable or uninterested in nominating an officer: Greece and Latvia. The expert review team observe a host public order operation of management of an international football event in real time.

3.2.1 The objectives of a peer review evaluation

PREP is essentially an utilisation focused evaluation (UFE; Paton, 1997). A UFE is based on the intended use, by the intended users. It is based on the principle that an evaluation should be judged by its utility and actual use, and the design of the evaluation should be developed with the host user in mind. This is similar to pragmatism (see Alison & Crego, 2008), and the notion of action research (Lewin, 1946). The underpinning principle of the approaches is the preservation of knowledge and projection of experience into future practice.

The first phase of the peer review was to identify the utility of the report and determine points of interest to the host police force. Research was then conducted with police and authorities for the purpose of examining the aspects requested by hosts. In addition, the evaluation was guided by principles from the EU handbook for the management of football events at which one team is an EU member (Council of the European Union, 2006). The handbook consists of the following sections: (1) exchange of police information (before, during, after); (2) preparations; (3) co-operation between police forces; (4) co-operation between police forces and stewards and employment of stewards; (5) strategic and tactical performance for public order management; and, (6) dynamic risk assessment.

The method of the peer review evaluation is driven by the principle that it is not only in situations which go wrong that valuable lessons can be learnt. Peer reviews are an evaluation in the absence of accountability, which aims to construct a safe learning and sharing environment. In this framework the focus is not only incidents, if any develop, but on the professional handling of the event as a whole. Amongst other benefits, the visiting police reviewers also gain knowledge by observing the way which other police forces manage international football events and foreign nationals.

The evaluation report was written for the purpose of identification principles of good practice and areas for attention (see Appendix A). Following dissemination of the report, it becomes the property of the host police force. To share the experiences and facilitate learning more broadly the evaluation reports have been published anonymously to facilitate learning (Adang & Brown, 2008).

3.2.2 Conducting a peer review evaluation

The methodology of the peer reviews in phases one and two were the same. The peer review took place over three sequential days in which four senior police reviewers, one researcher and one research assistant worked together. The role of the researchers in the team was to: (1) facilitate the review; (2) instruct on data gathering techniques; and, (3) to facilitate focus group discussion, from which the evaluation review report was constructed. During the course of the peer reviews in non-English speaking countries the review team members were provided with translators by the host police force. Generally, three translators accompanied the three research groups on their activities over the three days.

Day one of the review consisted of introductions between review team members and command team (of the host police forces), and the development of an action plan between the peer review team to conduct the investigation. The action plan designated roles and responsibilities of data gathering between the team members, and developed an interview schedule for each to ensure all key interviews were conducted. The review teams also familiarised themselves with the host city e.g., hot spots were the foreign nationals would gather, route to the stadium, transport links.

Day two was the day which the police operation and football match took place. Generally, the team divided into three pairs and would split off in different directions to conduct interviews in the morning with key police commanders and multi-agencies. Police briefings were often held prior to the operation beginning, in which case the peer review members attended. Later on during day two, the objective turned to conducting participant observations and informal interviews on the street

with police and crowd members attending the football event. Movement between key locations e.g., the city and stadium areas was typically by foot or public transport. Day two came to an end at approximately midnight, or later pending the developments related to football match and foreign nationals. The actual football match was not of interest, and served as time to take a break before observations continued after the match.

Day three was spent in a focus group discussion between the senior commander review team members which was facilitated by researchers. Commencing early morning and continuing until members had to depart for flights home, typically late afternoon. During this time practitioners describe their discuss experiences generally, and in relation to the specific event in question. Review members were also offered the opportunity to ask questions and clarify strategic and tactical decisions with members of the host command team. The discussion was audio recorded, and later transcribed and this served as the basis for the composition of the evaluation report.

3.2.3 The role of current author in the peer review projects

The role of the current author in the review team was threefold; (1) a research assistant to the review teams; (2) to produce the evaluation reports which were disseminated to the host police forces; and, (3) to gather data for the current research project. The position within the peer review facilitated access to a variety of data sources for the current research, and importantly over came the issue of access to police perspectives in the context of policing international football. The peer reviews facilitated access to a variety data sources, and participants: (1) structured and unstructured interviews; (2) participant observation; and, (3) focus groups.

All data collection and participant observations of the current author were made in the accompaniment of the peer review research co-ordinator (an experienced academic and public order expert). This was a strategic decision, which served as a means of inter-rater reliability for the data gathered and reported in the current study.

3.2.4 Advantages of gathering data within the peer review projects

Researching police perspectives of foreign nationals from this position afforded the rare opportunity to glean police perspectives prior to, during and after the operation. It also facilitated access to an array of different police perspectives from hosts and visiting commanders. The peer review team were granted full and open access to all aspects of an operational event, including official documentation, pre event briefings and interviews' with police and co-operating agencies. Typically, the context of public order policing is not conducive to the interviewing of members during the process. However, the framework of the peer review presented a unique opportunity to overcome this limitation in a way which was supported by the host forces. Frontline officers on the ground were encouraged to co-operate with peer review team members on the ground.

A difficulty in any inter-group crowd field based research is to anticipate what was going to happen, where and how to cover a broad geographic area to ensure observations account for interesting developments. By using the peer reviews as a platform for data gathering the method largely overcame this limitation. Essentially, each peer review had two researchers and four police commanders conducting ethnographic research, in different places and times and providing feedback on: (1) what they have observed, and heard; (2) what they considered to be significant; and, (3) their understanding of significant aspects of the policing and the management of foreign nationals.

Another advantage of gathering data within the peer review framework was that the host command team fed real time information and intelligence during the operation to the review teams. Police intelligence provided a vantage point from which the review teams were 'tipped off' of to behavioural developments and incidents. This afforded the researchers to be in the right place, at the right time to observe collective processes, and instances which were perceived to be risky, as they unfolded between police and crowd members.

PREP took place in a safe environment for the hosts and police reviewers'. There was a sense of trust and confidence between and with the expert reviewers. Thus, information sharing and discussions amongst the host police forces and the peer reviewers became increasingly open and comfortable as PREP continued. The host police and the reviewers shared their experiences, both formally and informally, which provided a great vantage point from which to understand their perspective, role, and perspectives of foreign national groups.

3.2.5 Limitations of gathering data within the peer review projects

The peer review framework did generate several limitations which should be acknowledged. First, the data sets for each host city are not systematically identical. There are slight variations within each data set as a result of different police preparations and approaches to managing the event i.e., the nature and access to data sources are not exactly the same. The data gathering was facilitated within a pre-defined setting in which there were fixed objectives and ultimately access to various parts of the police operation was dependant on the level of co-operation of the host police force. Despite this, the method of the peer review and questions asked between the events were similar.

Secondly, ideally, after research questions are identified the primary objective in gathering the data would be the ability to control the environment in which it is collected. This is not the reality of data gathering within the peer reviews. To a degree research was confined by the peer review objectives and was opportunistic in nature. In situations which the evaluation points corresponded with the research interests more data was gained from that data set, than from peer review in which the focus did not interact directly with researchers objectives.

Additionally, factors such as language barriers played a role in the context of international data gathering. Often a translator was present to assist with this issue but it should be acknowledged the original detail and exact wording can become lost in translation. Despite these opportunistic limitations, the PREP provided an empirically

valuable opportunity to gather data on policing in a naturalistic context and to develop research.

3.3 CEPOL research project

Data collection in phase three of the current research project has been facilitated as a member of a part of a wider CEPOL research project. Data collection by the CEPOL research team was conducted between the 6th and the 18th of June 2008. The educational course involved sixteen participants consisting of researchers and practitioners. The sixteen participants gathered structured observation samples regarding police deployment and interaction with the crowd during the first two weeks of the tournament, involving ten matches (see Table 3.1). The host cities in Austria were Klagenfurt, Innsbruck, Salzburg and Vienna. The host cities in Switzerland were Geneva, Basel, Berne and Zurich. The current research has been granted exclusive rights to the analysis and publication of the structured observation data gathered by the CEPOL research group at Euro 2008.

3.3.1 Procedure of the CEPOL research project

During the tournament the CEPOL observers were divided into four teams of four individuals, two in Austria and two in Switzerland. Teams and cities in which data gathering took place were allocated in advance of the tournament, generally based on the distance between the cities, to best minimise travelling distances for the four teams. In Switzerland, one team gathered structured observation data in Berne and Geneva; and the second in Basel and Zurich. In Austria, one team gathered structured observations in Vienna and Salzburg; and the second in Klagenfurt and Innsbruck (see Figure 3.2).

Typically, groups worked on a three day framework of data gathering for each single match day. The first day was spent becoming accustomed to the city and the hot-spots where fans would gather. In the evening informal observations were conducted in the cities official private viewing areas (PVA), as a warm-up for the official gathering the following day.


Table 3.1: Matches at which structured observation data was gathered in Austria and Switzerland at the Euro 2008 tournament

Date	Location	Country	Game	Classification
08/06/2008	Klagenfurt	Austria	Germany Vs. Poland	Risk
11/06/2008	Basel	Switzerland	Switzerland Vs. Turkey	Risk
11/06/2008	Geneva	Switzerland	CZE* Vs. Portugal	Non-risk
12/06/2008	Klagenfurt	Austria	Croatia Vs. Germany	Risk
12/06/2008	Vienna	Austria	Austria Vs. Poland	Risk
13/06/2008	Berne	Switzerland	Netherlands Vs. France	Non-risk
13/06/2008	Zurich	Switzerland	Italy Vs. Romania	Non-risk
14/06/2008	Salzburg	Austria	Sweden Vs Spain	Non-risk
14/06/2008	Innsbruck	Austria	Greece Vs. Russia	Non-risk
16/06/2008	Vienna	Austria	Austria Vs Germany	Risk

* CZE = Czech Republic

Figure 3.2: A map which shows the location of the host cities in Austria and Switzerland during the European Championship tournament 2008

Map of the host cities at the Euro 2008 tournament



The second day was match day in the host city where the structured observation data was being gathered. On the third day the group of four discussed the police management to compose a standardised CEPOL briefing report, which was completed on each match day, with observers documenting field notes and records of structured observations into computerised format. The day would also include travelling to the next host city.

Similar practical observation training activities have been conducted at previous major international football tournaments, namely Euro 2000 and Euro 2004. Structured observation data gathered at Euro 2008 permits a comparative analysis between the findings of Euro 2000 and Euro 2004.

3.3.2 Conducting structured observations

To conduct observations the teams of four were divided into pairs. Each team comprised of a researcher and an experienced practitioner to minimise the potential effects of observer bias. The method of conducting structured observations on match day was similar for all teams in both countries. Observations typically started at approximately 1200hrs until approximately midnight. Pending the actual situational developments on match days, observation times did last longer. Sample gathering took place in areas in which fans were likely to gather e.g. prominent landmarks, central public squares, in and around official viewing areas and in and around stadium areas. Each observer in the pair adopted a different geographical location from which to gather samples, in close proximity to the other. One hour of samples were gathered from each geographical position, to record the average police deployment and interaction in that area during that time. After one hour the observer would move onto another area from which to gather samples, or remain in the same place for another hour.

The structured observations were conducted every 15 minutes, collecting four per hour from a particular location. This method of observational sampling is a form of scan observation, which has been deemed 'point' (Dunbar, 1976), or 'on the dot'

sampling (Slater, 1978). Observers chose a specific space to gather samples, by using landscape markers to outline the exact geographical location. Every 15 minutes observers took a ‘picture’ mentally of the situation within their area and detailed the activity within the predefined location through a standardised observation checklist (see Appendix D for sample check sheet). The checklist in total consisted of 23 related categories including the total number of fans, total number of police, nature of police uniform, deployment and tactical options, and the nature and quantity of the interactions between fans and police.

3.3.3 Current author activities and data collection

Other methods have been used to gather data to provide rich understanding of the social context for the purposes of the current research. Between June 6th and 16th the current author gathered data surrounding four matches in Austria at Klagenfurt, Vienna (on two occasions) and, Salzburg (see Table 3.2). Structured observation data has been gathered, and the CEPOL research group was also used as a platform to conduct ethnographic and participation data collection for the current studies. During the pre-match day and match day observations of police and fan interaction, police tactics and risk management focused on the purposes of the current project (see Appendix E for data set of ethnographic data).

Table 3.2: *Matches at which the current author has conducted structured observation and ethnographic research during the Euro 2008 tournament*

Date	Location	Game	Classification
08/06/2008	Klagenfurt	Germany : Poland	Risk
12/06/2008	Vienna	Austria : Poland	Risk
14/06/2008	Salzburg	Greece : Russia	Non-risk
16/06/2008	Vienna	Austria : Germany	Risk

The decision of the current research to gather data at this stage in Austria was based on methodological reasons. The current research sought to examine the police management of high risk social groups. Of the 16 social groups of foreign nationals in

attendance at Euro 2008, three were categorised as high risk: (1) Croatia; (2) Germany; and, (3) Poland. Austria drew the three national teams to play the qualifying stages of the tournament in Klagenfurt and Vienna. Salzburg was considered to pose low risk and as such provided an opportunity to experience police management in the perception of low risk as opposed to high.

The relationship between the three projects used to access the data for the current work should now be clear; and description will now shift to outlining the specific data sets which have emerged during the three phases of the work.

3.4 Phase one data collection

Data collection for phase one took place between October 2006 and July 2007. The data sets were gathered pre, during and post four public order police operations, in different European countries (see Appendix B for data sets gathered in phase one). During the operation the police were managing foreign nationals in the context of an international football event. The countries from which data was gathered were geographically located in the North (Denmark), South (Spain), East (Romania) and West of Europe (Holland). Sampling strategy was open and opportunistic, which is a particularly useful tool in the early exploratory phases of research projects, and was considered best suited for introductory investigation.

3.4.1 Observations

In phase one observations were conducted on the interactions between police and crowds before, during, after the football events, which totalled to 44 hours of field research. Additionally, 7 police and security briefings averaging 45mins were attended in which the researcher was an observer. The use of participant observation in the current study infers two different forms of observation: (1) within the police organisation; and, (2) in relation to the inter-group interaction between police and the crowd during the football event. Field notes were documented as audio recordings, where safe and possible to do so. This includes observations, informal conversations, unstructured and semi-structured interviews with police and crowd members, songs

and chants, as well as descriptions of specific events, places and people. Photographs of significant aspects of the operation were also taken.

3.4.2 Interviews

In phase one the interviews were conducted with 46 police staff at the four events. Of those interviewed 16 of the officers had the role of an expert reviewer for the peer review evaluations. Out of the peer review frame work the reviewer's full time role were as strategic command officers (Gold and Slivers). The review team was composed of officers from ten countries in the EU: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Interviews were also conducted with 25 strategic command officers of the host police forces. Their role was to conduct public order management of the international football event in real time. In addition 5 operational staff and 5 non-police private security staff were interviewed. The role of the private security staff was ensuring public safety and order within the stadium grounds. Crowd members at the events have also been interviewed, 17 fans from five countries: Denmark, England, Netherlands, Spain and Turkey. Finally, 3 sports journalists were interviewed at one event.

Interviews with the command and assisting agencies personnel were conducted before, during and after the event. The interviews were structured in such a way to gain the relevant information for the peer review evaluations. The interviews with command staff were generally informal, and with no time limitations. Thus, the researcher was in a position to investigate further on particular issues and ask unstructured questions. On the day of the football match on the scene interviews were conducted through opportunistic methods to gather police and fan perspectives of the event. The interviews with crowd members were semi-structured by the interests of understanding in-group social identity, perception of the social context and the inter-group relations with out-groups.

In phase one, the interviews were conducted in two ways; (1) aimed at investigating the EU peer review evaluation points; and, (2) semi-structured by the

broad and inter-group considerations of risk perception and management in the context of international football events. This was the investigative research title which the current project has received funding for, and was thought to be suitably extensive to ensure the data spoke for itself.

3.4.3 Focus groups

In phase one, the focus groups were mediated by the co-ordinator of the peer review evaluations. In total 14 hours of focus groups (110 A4 pages of transcriptions), were gathered in phase one. The focus groups were conducted in such a way that allowed the expert reviewers to discuss what they felt to be significant. A consensual agreement between the reviewers of what was significant, and why, serves as a means of validating the reliability of the analysis and findings. The agreement between the commanders is a strong form of inter-rater reliability for the account of the event, this reduces the likelihood of experimenter bias in the interpretation of the findings.

An advantage of using focus groups is that it generates vast amounts of data and perspectives on issues of discussion. Focus groups have the advantage of yielding high volumes of data, in less time than it would take to conduct interviews individually with each member of the review team. Focus groups elicit information in a way that allows researchers to find out why an issue is salient and what is salient about it from different perspectives, and understand how these perspectives interact. People will often admit to things in a group when they are aware that others are admitting them too. The ability to identify with the group can lead people to reveal more than they would on their own. This is particularly useful if discussing issues of high sensitivity.

3.5 Phase two data collection

In phase two, data collection took place between July 2007 and February 2008 by participation in the peer review evaluation projects. The sample was gathered from five public order events, in different countries pre, during and post policing of

international football events. The police operations were prior to hosting the Euro 2008 tournament. One city in Austria (Vienna), and four host cities Switzerland (Geneva, Zurich, Basel and Berne), have been host to a peer review evaluation (see Appendix C for data sets gathered in phase two).

The difference between PREP in phase one and those conducted in phase two were that the latter were used as a tool for the evaluation of police practice in preparation for the Euro 2008 tournament. This provided a unique opportunity to explore pre-tournament police preparations and psychology in relation to the major international tournament. Broadly, the PREP objectives were to address the implementation of the bi-national 3D police risk management strategy for the tournament.

The 3D strategy is based on an increase through three stages in correspondence to actual risk posed by a given situation; tactical deployment, uniform and equipment should reflect this risk 'reality' by increasing and de-creasing accordingly. First, 'Dialogue', represents an initial low profile police presence and uniform, with tactical instruction to talk with the fans. Second, 'De-escalation', corresponds to an increasing level of risk on the ground. This stage is characterised by diffusion of the situation. Interpretation of the way this should tactically be achieved, by increasing or decreasing the level of police deployment profile and tactics, was at the discretion of the host force. Third, 'Durchgreifen' (firm and resolved action) is characterised by the use of force to manage the source of risk. The 3D explicitly lacks the tactical specificity of a 'de-grading' stage, characterised by the return of police deployment to 'Dialogue' stage; this is a recommendation of the EU International Handbook. The '3D' strategy encourages a dialogue based public order profile and graded tactical deployment targeted towards the source of risk, if any develops.

Five of the eight host police forces have made requests for a peer review evaluation in preparation for hosting Euro 2008. Through the platform of the peer review evaluation feedback provided to the four host police forces in Switzerland relating to the practical interpretation and implementation of the 3D approximately one year before the tournament took place. At a senior level this led to collaborations

between the four host police forces in Switzerland to systemise the implementation of the strategy.

3.5.1 Observations

In phase two, observations were conducted on the interactions between police and crowds before, during, after the football events, which totalled 62 hours of participant observation. Additionally, 7 police and security briefings (averaging 45mins) were attended in which the researcher was an observer. In the same fashion as during the phase one all field notes were documented as audio recordings.

3.5.2 Interviews

In phase two, interviews were conducted with 68 police staff. Of those interviewed 20 of the officers interviewed had the role of being the expert reviewers for the peer review evaluations. Out of the peer review framework the reviewer's full time role were as strategic command officers (Gold and Silver). The review team was composed of officers from thirteen countries in the EU: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Interviews were also conducted with 30 strategic command officers of the host police forces. Their role was to conduct public order management of the international football event in real time. In addition 18 operational staff and 5 non-police private security staff were interviewed. A total of 26 crowd members at the events were interviewed from eight countries: Austria, Denmark, England, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and Turkey.

3.5.3 Focus groups

In total 14 hours of focus groups were conducted in phase two. The focus groups were mediated by the co-ordinator of the peer review evaluations and by the first author twice. The significant difference between the focus groups in phase one and two is that the latter broadly discussed aspects of the host police operation which the expert reviewers felt required consideration in preparation for hosting Euro 2008.

The 3D strategy and implementation was widely discussed in the five focus group discussions.

3.6 Phase three data collection

Data gathering during the Euro 2008 tournament took place in two distinctive sections. First, using qualitative and quantitative methods data was gathered on: (1) police strategy and tactics and behaviour; (2) fan perspectives and behaviour; (3) police-fan interactions; and, (3) levels of conflict. England did not qualify for Euro 2008. Second, towards the end of the tournament interviews have been conducted with high ranking officers who have been involved in the management of the tournament.

3.6.1 Participant observation

While conducting structured observations, participant observation research was conducted for the purposes of the current project. Over 70 hours was spent observing interactions between police and crowds. The primary data source is field notes which were documented as audio recordings. This includes verbal notes, observations, informal conversations, unstructured and semi-structured interviews with police and crowd members, songs and chants, as well as descriptions of specific events, places and people. Pictures and video footage were also collected. Approximately 15 hours of dictation recording was gathered, which was later transcribed (72 A4 pages).

3.6.2 Field interviews

Although interviews were ethnographic and opportunistic, a semi structured interview schedule of key questions to ask frontline officers was constructed (see Appendix F). Interviews with police were semi-structured with a focus on understanding the graded tactical model of policing and developing risk. A semi structured schedule was also constructed for questioning foreign nationals (see Appendix G). The interviews with foreign nationals were aimed at understanding in-

group social identity, relations with out-groups and perception of the social context. Semi structured interviews have the advantage of creating a structure to the format of questions, but facilitate flexibility to discuss the aspects perceived to be most important be the interviewees'. Police, foreign nationals and other perspectives were gathered through opportunistic on the scene interviews. When not possible to interview officers at the scene of incidents, attempts were made afterwards.

In total 93 people were interviewed in this part of data gathering. This included; 36 police staff at an operational level; German, Austrian, Greek and Polish. The officers interviewed were performing the role of public order management at Euro 2008. In Klagenfurt there was a political requirement for officers not to engage in unstructured interview with the researchers. However, some officers were happy to give brief informal interviews. The politicians reversed their decision after hosting the two matches considered to pose the highest threat of disorder during the tournament.

50 foreign nationals in attendance at the Euro 2008 tournament in Klagenfurt, Vienna and Salzburg were interviewed. The nationals identified themselves as; Austrian, English, German, Greek, Italian, Polish, Russian, and Scottish. Small groups would allow one person to translate for them, if there were language barriers. 7 security staff were interviewed. The role of these staff was to maintain public order in the PVAs. Additionally, and not included in the above formal interview count local people, bar owners, hotel workers and staff from the national fan zones were interviewed.

3.6.3 Semi-structured interviews with police commanders

Interviews were conducted in Austria between 8th and the 18th June 2008 in Austria, with officers in Klagenfurt and Vienna. Interviews were also conducted in Switzerland between 18th and 22nd June 2008 with police officers in Zurich and Geneva. In total 12 commanders who played a key role in policing the host cities at Euro 2008 were interviewed. Informed by the initial coding analysis of phase two, a semi-structured interview schedule was prepared prior to the tournament (see Appendix H). Interviews were conducted the participants were strategic and

operational commanders (Gold, Silver or Bronze). The role of the officers has been the equivalent of 5 Gold commanders, 4 Silver and 3 Bronze commanders. Nine commanding staffs were interviewed in Switzerland, the other three in Austria.

Despite the interviews being arranged and planned in advance the sample of participants were chosen by their availability on the day of interviewing. Of the interviewees, four have been interviewed in the phase one, the others had not. The interviews were held in the host police forces station, with the exception of one, which was conducted in a police containment vehicle. The length of the interviews was largely determined by the amount of time the officers had available, given the tournament was still ongoing at the point which the interviews took place. After the interviews had been conducted informal observations were undertaken in the PVA and city centre of the host city, accompanied by one of the commanding officers.

The interviews were not systematic, but ethnographic in the sense they aimed to cover particular questions, but allowed the respondent the opportunity to discuss what they felt to be significant. Questions were not asked in any particular order although the discussion was guided by the interviewer in order to ensure all the predetermined questions were addressed. During the course of the interviews attention was paid to reasons for specific decisions and what strategies were employed to achieve favourable outcomes, and in what conditions. To minimise observer bias, during data collection time was allowed for extended answers. Extended pauses were not interrupted and tangential issues were not discouraged as they generally tied back in relevance to later topics of specific interest. It allowed sufficient flexibility to detect possible embedded institutional perspectives from the responses.

3.6.4 Archival and media research

Archival research has been conducted prior to, during and after the tournament. This consisted of media coverage of English, Austrian and German sources prior and after to the tournament, approximately 150 articles, totalling 235 A4 pages. Of this, approximately 60 articles, totalling 102 A4 pages have been gathered by CEPOL members instructed to collect media reports pre-tournament in their home

country, which were distributed to the current author. Video footage from during the tournament was also observed from: YouTube, Oe24 and Wein Orf. Articles posted on the official Euro website and police sites were gathered including; press releases, 3D factsheet, National Sicherheitskonzept and UEFA 2008 Fan guide. Official Austrian BM.I situation reports were also obtained.

3.7 Data treatment and analysis

3.7.1 Phases' one and two

Data organisation is an important aspect of developing grounded theory. Immediately, following the evaluations all dictations and audio recordings (e.g., interviews, briefings, audio field-notes and focus group discussions), gathered over the course of the three days were transcribed. The transcriptions were word by word verbatim. The audio recordings were transcribed manually for the reason that familiarity with the data and depth of immersion achieved by the line by line transcription is an important early aspect of the CGTM analytical procedure. Transcribed sound bites were dated, timed, and the continuous line number option on Microsoft Word was used for ease of referencing of extracts in the main body of data. The data was then organised into interviews, observations and focus group data.

The treatment of the data following collection was the same for each of the nine data sets in phase one and two. Immediately following collection the data has been treated as described above, and analysed prior to taking part in the next data gathering bout. Thus, the data treatment and analysis of each data set informed researcher understanding of the issues, and refined the research questions for the subsequent data gathering opportunity.

Data analysis was conducted in line with CGTM. The first stage of the analysis is open coding. This is the process of identifying and coding all aspects of the data into emerging categories through thematic analysis. Thematic analysis (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) is a rarely acknowledged, foundational qualitative method for the analysis of identifying, analysing and reporting themes or patterns within a set of data.

It has been traditionally acknowledged as a process 'within' major analytic frameworks e.g., grounded theory, rather than an approach in its own right. However, recently the method has been considered an analytical strategy in its own right (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis is not typically used to generate theories usually it is employed to explain a concept or situation. Thematic analysis is particularly useful to explore themes across perspectives. Creating codes is a procedure that breaks down the often large body of data into manageable groupings and identifies or names those captions. For example, the researcher may code a written transcript of an interview, by putting all the text which refers to particular situations, or understandings under one heading, and coding it e.g., 'use of force', 'risk', or 'stereotype'. The initial codes are flexible and the data drives the findings by revealing to the researcher what is significant about a body of data. To code the data the text has been opened in a Microsoft Word program and the insert comment option has been used through the entire body of data to note coding next to text.

The second stage of coding analysis, involves axial coding. This refines and develops categorisation by conceptually ordering the data into the categories according to their properties and dimensions using the description to explain these categories. Different unpinning arenas of understanding were identified in each theme, and sub themes developed from this identification. In particular, looking for areas in which there was consensus concerning the similarities and differences in understanding crowds at international football events and the way in which this understanding the perpetrations and the duration of the tournament developed. The analysis paid particular attention particular discourses exposed by rhetoric, which may suggest particular organisation views, or identities, were underlying police perspectives of risk management. This stage identifies core categories in the body of data, and identifies sub-categories within this. An important aspect of this coding stage is note taking while examining the codes and trying to relate them to one another.

Finally, selective coding was conducted after open and axial coding on all nine data sets. Selective coding is the identification of over-arching categories from the whole body of data, and the relationship to one another. This section was not

conducted using a computer. The key concepts and sub-categories which have arisen from the bulk of the data were each written on individual A3 pieces of paper and laid flat on the ground next to one another. A process of moving them, further note taking on how they fit together, and integration of categories into more significant categories has been engaged. The process was timely, and involved the reconstruction of several sets of A3 papers. Seeing the concepts in two dimensional form aided identification of how they linked together, advanced the structure of the arguments surrounding them. How to present the data findings and arguments and in what order in the form of empirical chapters, was constructed by this final stage.

3.7.2 Phase three

(1) Structured observation data

The day after the data was gathered each of the 16 individuals produced an excel file recording the structured observations in computer format. Following completion of the course, all files were compiled into a central excel file. Analysis of structured observation data was conducted using SPSS. The data was then split according to city and country. The data was then analysed using non-parametric methods (See Chapter 7). The analytical strategy was three fold, first was to examine the general patterns of police deployment at the Euro 2008 tournament. Second, was to examine the relationship between police perception of high risk and the relationship this has to tactical and strategic deployment. Third, was to examine the inter-group relationship between police deployment and the nature of interaction with foreign nationals. By addressing these three issues analysis of this section of data sought to test hypothesis put forward by the crowd psychology literature for understanding football disorder.

(2) Ethnographic data

After the Euro 2008 tournament all dictations and audio recordings e.g., interviews, briefings, audio field-notes, were transcribed. Again, the transcriptions were word by word verbatim. Transcribed sound bites were dated, timed, and continuous line number option on Microsoft Word was used for ease of referencing of

extracts in the main body of data. Following this, using the diary which had been kept during Euro 2008 a detailed account of research observations over each data gathering day was constructed.

The interview material was also transcribed prior to analysis. The transcripts were analysed and material were organised into broad themes of interest. The analysis sought to address a commanders' perspective of successes and practical problems faced during the tournament in relation to: the management of foreign nationals, intra-group considerations and logistical issues, the valence of changes over the course of the tournament, and the perceived benefits. The aim was importantly to grasp an awareness of how the way by which, if any, social relations and perspectives of tactics and strategies had changed over the course of the preparation and tournament, and if so, to address how and what affected the changes.

The analytical strategy for all the data collected in phase three was to integrate the structured quantitative data and the qualitative ethnographic accounts to develop a concise understanding of police deployment patterns at Euro 2008, and expose the variables which explain why the policing took place the way it did. Put other way, it is to present a study what happened (see Chapter 7), and why (Chapter 8).

CHAPTER 4:

**ORGANISATIONAL SOCIAL IDENTITY AND GROUP DYNAMICS
IN POLICING PUBLIC ORDER**

4.1 Introduction

The current research distinguishes itself from the current literature application of the social identity meta-theory to policing, which is dominated by the ESIM of crowd disorder. The ESIM is an extension of the social identity meta-theory, although its exclusive focus on dynamics of disorder limits the extent to which it can be used more broadly to understand social groups and their relations to others in an occupational capacity. In a sense inquiry takes a step back from the ESIM, returning to earlier established principles of social met-theory (SIT and SCT framework), as a broad and flexible model for understanding the social group of the 'police'.

Rather than focusing on the crowd identity as the significant audience this research examines the police identity. This is a natural progression, as areas become increasingly specialised, it is necessary to begin examining the particular natures of the social identities and organisational structure of social groups which perform foundational roles in society. Clinical psychology, forensic psychology, critical incident management are amongst the growing number of disciplines which conduct a large part of their research based on case study and participant understanding. By the examination of particular characteristics experts in these fields apply principles, or rules of thumb, refined over many years. This research leads the way for a broader application of the social meta-theory to understand the psychological dynamics which govern the various levels of abstraction in social reality for public order public order officers in their occupational capacity.

As with the disciplines mentioned above underpinning this work is the principle of applied psychology. Applied psychology can be placed anywhere on a framework from studying the broad application of theory, to the immediate solution of practical problems, where the importance of everyday experience is that which is the focus of study, allowing the reality of the participants to tell a story about who they are and how they define themselves. Applied investigators are by definition concerned with issues arising in a particular setting of everyday life.

4.1.1 Social identity in an organisational context

Social identity has had a major impact on the way by which social psychologists think about, and conduct research on the issues of group processes and inter-group relations. However, researchers investigating social identity have largely focused on inter-group phenomena in the context of large scale social categories (e.g., race, gender, and crowds). As a result, the social identity tradition has paid less attention to smaller groups and intra-group phenomena. This tendency has acted to direct social identity research away from the study of organisations and organisational identity (van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2001); as well as opportunities for integration with other literatures, such as team cognition and performance. The background literature on the inter-group relations between police and crowd members leads naturally to the examination of the police as an organisational social group, which is subject to both intra-group and inter-group dynamics.

Group dynamics cannot be understood in the absence of the categorisation and identity processes of group members (Hogg & Terry, 2001). Organisationally, officers share social identity which gives meaning to action and goal direction. Roles (specific place or function within the system), norms (attitudes, behavioural associations of role) and values (higher order principles which governs the group as a whole), provide the framework for co-ordinated action (Katz & Kahn, 1966). By categorising oneself as a group member a subsequent accentuation of the perception of the self as a prototypical member leads to conformity with the group norms and values. Organizational identity serves as a cognitive frame for understanding reality, as shared assumptions about the world provide a discourse about their social reality.

Waddington (1999) argues occupational cultures are typically consistent throughout police organisations world-wide, despite differences in national cultures. Identity creates an occupational culture specific to the group in question (Bate, 1984). Manning (1995) defines occupational culture as *“accepted practices, rules and principles of conduct that are situationally applied, and generalise rationales and beliefs”* (p. 472). Thus, it can be put forward that while there may be multiple identities within the police organization, the processes which underpin the identities

and generate the organisational culture are generic, and consistent throughout police forces in Europe, and across the world.

Organisational identity emphasises a social identity whereby organisational group members' categorise themselves, as well as others on the basis of their intra-group and inter-group perspectives on their role differences. Social identification is an immensely important theoretical model for understanding organisational behaviour (Albert, Ashford & Dutton, 2000). *"What is surprising is that there has actually been very little engagement between social identity researchers who study organisational contexts and organisational scientists who employ social identity concepts"* (van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2001, p. 186).

4.1.2 Social identity and team dynamics

A second arena the social identity tradition has yet to integrate on perspectives of shared interest is that of the team performance and cognition literature; which is founded on utilising intra and inter-group dynamics within team contexts to understand and promote organisational effectiveness. In a team, collective aims interact with the personal self, and the two cannot be separated. In a public order role officers work as part of a team, psychologically and practically in a unique formation. Operationally, team members jointly work toward a collective outcome, and individual actions often cannot be distinguished from other team members. This requires people to work collaboratively and in a co-ordinated way as a group. In this case, group performance in public order policing is affected not only by the individuals' capabilities and efforts, but also by the nature of the relationships among the group members and by group processes between teams.

Team processes relates to what actually happens within an organisational team. Interactions between team members and inter-group team members external to the team are strongly predictive of both team performance and member satisfaction (Guzzo & Dickson, 1996). One of the variables which are most traditionally studied in this remit is that of 'cohesion'. The power of a cohesive team is that it is likely to increase the salience of norms and adherence to them (Barker, 1993). Related to the

concept of cohesiveness, is the concept of trust (Kramer, 1999). Research indicates that the likelihood of productive team processes is enhanced by higher levels of interpersonal trust amongst team members (Dirks, 1999). Decision making processes in teams have been extensively studied in critical incident contexts (Guzzo & Salas, 1995). In addition, another set of process variables which have been found to considerably influence team performance are related to the motivational processes in teams, for example, collective efficacy beliefs and shared mental models.

Dynamic environments (such as that of public order policing) require high interdependence among team members, the development of shared models and the use of this shared knowledge to guide behaviour (Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001). The team cognition literature suggests a organisational team's performance can be influenced by different variables, including team cohesiveness, group efficacy, training and leadership competency, all of which deserve consideration within the public order team. Existing work on public order policing does not reflect the social meaning of team work in this context, nor the way it may interact identity, strategy or tactics. This research will provide an early investigative exploration of how these dynamics may be considered in this context.

4.1.3 Objectives

The current objectives are to broadly address the organisational identity and group structure in a public order context of policing international football, and the inter-relatedness to intra-group team processes in this context. Understanding police psychology during a public order policing has been argued to be of central importance in the development of the inter-group theory in a public order context (Reicher, 1996; Stott & Reicher, 1998; Drury et al., 2001). From an organisational perspective how officers identify with their role, and how this relates to the way they work with one another to achieve organisational goals provides the basis for understanding how they work with others (i.e., out-groups such as foreign nationals). Specifically, the research interests that shape the analytical focus are twofold: (1) to explore the organisational identification processes and structure of groups in a public order context; and, (2) to

understand how the identities are related to the intra-group dynamics and performance perspectives of the officers.

4.2 Method and analytical strategy

The process of identifying robust organisational identity processes and shared understandings, which are irrespective of the location or time, has developed from a constructed grounded theory analysis. Data collection and analysis phases have been discussed in full in the general methods section. The study uses a multi-method approach embedded in the ethnographic, observation and interview data gathered in the three phases. The analysis of the data gathered through the various methods has conceptually made a contribution to the analysis presented by way of verification and triangulation. For example, organisational identification can be found in organisational artefacts, like documents, mission statements, briefings, as well as in conversations. Basically in any kind of communication in which the narrative are stories, conversations and points of attention about organisation and officers' identification accumulate to provide an overall picture. However, for the purposes of limited space and the coherency of argument the analytical emphasis of the data presented here is largely on interview data gathered longitudinally over the data collection phases. This approach serves to focus an enormous corpus of data which is expressed by officers as important aspects of their identity. Thus, self reported expressions of how officers understand their role and intra-group relations with others in the context of public order are presented.

Given the interest was to explore identity processes from the perspective of officers, and the relationship this has to their perspective of intra-group dynamics for public order teams, the research specifically sought not to impose *a priori* categorisation or hypotheses on the data. Instead the empirical objective has been to gather a body of evidence which represents public order police as an organisation from which to construct an analysis. As standard, where possible and appropriate three questions were posed to officers during interviews; (1) what is your role here? (2) what are your expectations? and (3) how do you feel about your task? Respondents' answers to these questions were particularly useful relating to the

current analysis and also facilitated discussion around the central issues from the officers' perspective. Also, as the data gathering continued and the grounded theory developed the research had the opportunity to begin asking more directive questions, in order to develop the understandings in relation to particular issues.

Self reported expressions of how officers understand their role and intra-group relations with others in the context of public order policing are presented. By continued exposure to differing organisational police groups and repeated data gathering, particular variables which officers repeatedly discussed have grown out of the nine data gathering opportunities. The data analysis presented as core thematic categories which have developed from the analysis of information provided by interviewees. The findings have proven to be robust findings across the participant populations; with the themes emerging across data sets. The analysis was not measured, but in line with a CGTM. For full details of the analytical strategy see the General methods section. The themes identified have been done so through a rigorous engagement with the constructed grounded method, over the course of the nine police operations at which data have been considered for this analysis. Different methods and participants have been used to triangulate the themes across sample populations.

The constructive discussion seeks to emphasise the relationship between the categories, and where suitable, verbatim quotations from the raw data are presented to illustrate discursive issues. Where this is the case, the officers role is identified, alphabetised city and line number within the raw data set. As the result of restricted space in what is already an extensive book of findings it would be impossible to document every piece of evidence which has contributed towards the emergence of the theme as distinct variable which falls. Thus, in line with similar publications on police psychology in crowd management (Cronin & Reicher, 2006; Stott & Reicher 1998a), the quotations included are selective. They are included on the basis that they best exemplify the dynamics which attention is sought to be drawn to. This is not to argue that these dynamics exist in all public order policing contexts, but only in this early investigative review to illustrate the processes variables which have emerged from the data sets which informed by the literature are important considerations for organisational function and team processes.

4.2.1 Sample characteristics

The data was gathered pertaining to organisational social identity during twelve distinct data gathering periods, in six different countries, between the dates of September 2005 and July 2008. The following countries: Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain and Switzerland were the source of the perspectives presented. In situations where officers were not English speaking a translator was present to interpret the interview. In total, 158 officers were interviewed formally or informally. The officers who were interviewed formally were command level officers with whom a time and place within the framework of the PREP has been arranged to conduct an interview. This took place within the police station and in the company of another researcher who was the co-ordinator of the PREPs.

Interviews conducted informally were typically with frontline staff and were during the operational time public order policing on the ground. These interviews were opportunistic and dependant on approaching officers on the ground during times which there was little happening e.g., in places where there were limited/no fans, immediately before kick off after the fans had entered the stadium or during the match. Within this number, 77 officers were in command positions (i.e., Gold, Silver or Bronze), and the remaining 81 officers were frontline staff. This research characterises frontline officers as those who are tasked with the duty of police on the front line *per say*. Officers in this position are on the ground taking instructions through the chain of command from a Bronze commander. The rationale behind this was that the officers were those who have the most direct contact with the crowds. The majority of the sample was male, with the exception of 5 female frontline officers. All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed.

In line with the GSB command and control structure the demographics which were considered important were the occupational role, and not the rank of the officers interviewed. In the GSB model the experience and occupational role of the officer is considered to supersede the rank and line organisation. The age of the interviewees has not been considered relevant, but the level of experience in public order and policing (international) football events has been considered important. Interviews

were typically conducted with commanders prior to operational policing of the international football event. Interviews with frontline officers were typically conducted following briefings prior to their deployment for operation or on the ground during their operational engagement during a football event. To avoid interference with the task of public order policing approaching officers on the ground took place during times in which there were few/no fans around.

Interviewing officers in an operational context was a strategic decision and served to ensure the collective identity was salient. The officers were dressed in police uniform, they were sited on police facilities or acting on the basis of their professional position, which previous social identity investigations have demonstrated to be powerful antecedents of social identity salience (Cronin & Reicher, 2006; Reicher & Levine 1994; Turner et al., 1987). The strategy was effective as officers and commanders alike largely identified themselves in collective (i.e. 'we'), rather than personal (i.e. 'I'), terms. The data analysis also indicates that they perceived and evaluated others on the basis of their social identity. Given that identity is context dependant, and the issue sought to be address was that of organisational identity the salience of the individual's identity as part of the collective group of police was important to ensure that responses where representative of the group and the perceived collective relations with others.

4.3 Analysis

The analysis is presented into two core sections (subsection where appropriate), within which the findings relating to the perspectives of officers interviewed will be presented. First, the key findings as they relate to identification (roles, norms, values and goals), of public order officers generally will be discussed. The findings illustrate two distinct intra-groups operating within the inter-group of public order police (specialist and non-specialist). The analysis goes on in the second section to provide variables of team processes (e.g., group performance, shared mental models, training and collective-efficacy), within the intra-group sub-groups of specialist and non-specialist which may vary.

4.3.1 Subgroup Identification

The first thing to note from the analysis is that the respondents differentiate themselves within the overall role of public order management into subgroups within the broader framework of the organisational identification. The significant distinction is between the specialists who perform the role on a full time basis (i.e., riot control officers or special force officers) who are specialists in crowd control and, the non-specialist, who perform the role of public order management in addition to their full time function within the organisation more broadly (i.e., criminal investigations, traffic police). Reviewing Commander; *“There is a difference between the units who are working on this [public order] in a full time manner and those who are just doing it for the day”* City D, 208-210.

4.3.2 Roles

Observations reveal that both subgroups are present as standard in the public order management of foreign nationals. Often, the non-specialist officers have the same PPE as the specialist officers. It is often difficult to differentiate between the two subgroups on the ground, as their role within the public order operation is visually similar. The role of the specialist officers is in theory deployment in situations which the non-specialist officers are losing control of the situation. A major conceptual difference between the two subgroups is that specialist officers identify with the role of public order in any context as something normal, Riot control (Specialist) *“It’s normal, we are used to this”* City G, 881-882.

While the non-specialist officers drew attention to the fact they do not identify with the role of public order as normal. Frontline officer (non-specialist); *“Normally on the street you are two people, maybe three and you can influence what the other people do. You talk to someone and the other one stands around and watches, they provide for your safety. Public order is different, if there are 100 people in a line and you have to walk, you hear no command because it is so loud it is different. You always have to look what to others do ... This [public order role] is the most different*

to normal work. To talk with the people to do our work is as usual, as every day, but we are not so many people normally, this is the most different." City K, 260-273.

The quotation above captures several theoretically important points. The first is the emphasis on the level of abnormality in relation to standard practice. The majority subgroup of non-specialists revealed perceptions of the role as an inconvenience, it is additional shifts for them, something they have to do but would prefer not to. The second is the identification of the role as posing a higher level of risk to officer safety than routine policing. There are environmental differences in the interplay between how the (non-specialist) subgroups perceive their surroundings in the context of policing international football. The third, which is an issue which shall be emphasised in the discussion of training, is that this non-specialist officer begins to allude to the environmental stressors experienced in the public order role.

4.3.3 Prototypicality and reliability

From the perspective of the non-specialist officers they perceive their group as less prototypical of the category, in comparison with the specialist officers. The prototypical public order officer is considered to be the specially trained officers, the non-specialists feel that they embody the 'typicality' in this occupational role in this context; Frontline officer, (non-specialist) [how do you feel in your role?] *"It depends on the body left and right of you. Because in our company there are people who have trained with the Special Forces [public order specialists] for years, and they have come back to the normal police station and these are the people you want to work with. So it depends on the bodies left and right of you."* City K, 389-401. It is also clear from this comment that the composition of a public order operational group has an impact on the officers' identification with the team, and their perspectives of competency in the role.

4.3.4 Norms and values

Interestingly, while there are distinct subgroups there is also a strong sense of super-ordinate organisational identity, whereby officers clearly articulate their unity

through shared norms, values and goals. The norms, values and goals were found to be relatively consistent to organisational identities across organisations in Europe. While the two groups are clearly consensual on fundamental aspects of the public order role, the two groups are fragmented by different occupational perspectives on other key variables.

Normative social behaviour in public order has been emphasised by the non-specialist and specialist as; (1) to stay together and act as one homogenous group and (2) to demonstrate the capacity for strength. The goal of unity as an occupational necessity in the public order formation; in basic training they are told they should never lose one another, and as a result they function such that they act as one homogenous group. This has been emphasised by frontline officers (non-specialist), *"We feel secure when we have a good team, and when there are enough people" [what makes a good team?] "...we have the same concept, everybody knows their job, and they know we have to stick together"* City F, 1006-1112. Group cohesion is also a central aspect of tactical decision making; Bronze commander, [what is important when making decisions?] *"That everyone in the group is secure, that actions don't go outside the group and that they stick together. That's the most important things for decision making"* City F, 1079-1080.

4.3.4.1 Scepticism

Officers are normatively sceptical about the future and those being policed. For instance, the large majority of officers (specialist and non-specialist) asked for their predictions for the development of the operation, responded with uncertainty. This has been the case in all operations, whether they perceive the event to pose a high or low level of risk. There is a strong identification with the fact that officers can never predict what is going to happen next. Police officers often perceive worst case scenarios; Silver commander, *"The police officer thinks in worst case scenarios. For every doctor the person who comes to see them is ill, whether they are healthy or not. And for every policeman most people are criminals, whether they are or not"* City O, 584-588.

4.3.4.2 Unity

Normative social attitudes in the context of policing public order are characterised by support and safety for themselves and their colleagues. As described by this non-specialist frontline officer; *“We work normally, we take care of each other and there are no problems”* City D, 172-172. Also, there is a widespread belief that when situations develop if officers are in large numbers then they will be safe and can deal with any situation. One non-specialist frontline officer stated that *“We have a lot of police; we are wearing protection, so it doesn’t matter how it goes”* City D 1060-1061. As a result, they feel safer when in large numbers which implies it doesn’t matter what situation develops.

In relation to the quantity of officers deployed non-specialist officers are likely to emphasise that there are not enough officers generally to police a situation. The perception of a need for large numbers has been a particularly robust finding among the non-specialist officers in relation to both high and low risk football events. Frontline officer (non-specialist); *“Many officers make us feel safe, of course, but in reality there are not as many as we would want to have”* City G, 1038-1039. This occupational attitude toward the policing of foreign nationals is a significant one with regards to the way it can be theorised to interact with crowd psychology. In line with ESIM large numbers of officers, acting collectively as a group increased the likelihood that officers will be categorised as one, and seen collectively as one of ‘them’ rather than as individuals. This begins to construct the ‘us Vs them’ boundaries.

4.3.4.3 Safety and support in numbers

While specialist officers share the socially normative perspective of safety in numbers, they are more likely to emphasise the particular contexts in which there is a need for large numbers of officers; Special Forces commander ; *“I think when you are out-numbered in a large way this make you feel unsafe. Especially out-numbered in a situation when people are being aggressive and trying to attack you. This is a really bad situation ... This brings very much stress, even if you are very well trained like us*

the higher the stress is going the higher the fear is going. The possibility to use force, even excessive force, it is there because you start to fear for your safety, even your life. Like anyone, you would do anything to get out of this situation” City G, 515-524.

The quotation above illustrates another point, that whether or not the officers are in positions of perceived danger or actual danger, even those who are well trained specialists are liable to experience high levels of stress and fear in public disorder situations. Generally, it is important to draw attention to the significance of the collective in the role of public order, the collective identity and norms are intrinsically linked to the safety and security an officer feels in their role. Officers are human, and as a psychological group they react to a threatening situations as any other group would; they unite and support one another, which then guides socially normative behaviours.

4.3.4.4 Demonstration of force and equipment

The capacity to demonstrate force has been considered a significant aspect of identity, and a tactical decision which is considered to prevent the potential for disorder. Intrinsically linked to this, what becomes clear in addressing identification in public order officers is the significant role PPE and uniform play in relation to their perceived identity. The role of PPE had various functions from officer’s perceptions;

First, as a deterrent for potential disorder; Bronze commander *“If they see that we have a strong police force then they [fans] leave it” [how do they show they are strong?] “They just stand there. That is enough... with the riot uniform they look quite impressive. I think when we are strong enough then nothing much will happen” City F, 252-259.*

Second, as a symbol of status and power, which differentiates the officer from crowd members: Special Forces commander *“If you don’t have your uniform your authority is lost in the situation, you don’t have your legal and state power, if you want. You are just a human-being, being confronted by a person who tries to hurt you” City G, 233-244.* Without their uniform and PPE, they might as well be another

member of the crowd; left to protect themselves with their bare hands. PPE and uniform not only define them, but interacts with their self esteem and collective-efficacy.

Third, it is socially normative to have PPE and without it they feel unprepared; Gold commander *"I know in minimum protection they will be more at ease"* City E, 591-595. It is in situations without PPE they are not actualising their identity, or norms and values, they are most likely to experience stress. PPE also fulfils the function of uncertainty reduction, which renders the group more salient, and competent in relation to others. Aggregate members' appraisals of their group's capabilities as a whole are based on their operative capabilities, PPE, the ability to mobilise large numbers of officers, provide a show of force, and demonstrations of their power. Without PPE, they lose part of their identity; as it is a central aspect of their identity in this role.

4.3.4.5 Prevention of disorder

A robust finding in relation to higher order principles governing police officers' understandings of their objectives are the value of preventing disorder. This is a robust finding which was emphasised by most of those interviewed. Frequently, officers reported a value of reassurance to the public, and the belief that their presence was positive for the local people; particular in situations which the host city has seen instances of large disorder in the past. A surprising finding is that the value of protecting the public was far less cited, being mentioned by only three frontline officers. While they are occupationally defined by the prevention of disorder, it is equally important to emphasise that across Europe, the actual use of force was robustly emphasised as a last resort. Frontline officer, (non-specialist) *"To go in, and use force when things escalate, then it can go bad, for us and for them. This is the last resort."* City K, 229-230.

To summarise, an organisational distinction has been drawn between specialist and non-specialist public order officers. There is continuity between the norms, values and goals of the subgroups, which are primarily to; (1) support and protect one

another (characteristically this is achieved through homogeneity), and (2) prevent public disorder. PPE is central to the social identification of both subgroups, and considered vital in achieving the strategic goals of the group.

Unsurprisingly, the subgroups which have been found to exist within the super-ordinate social group of the police have between them developed complex intra-group differences in team process variables. Collectively, the super-ordinate identity is defined by the shared mental models with regard to norms, values and goals. However, between the subgroups there is disparity between the mental models and police knowledge that guides behaviour in a public order context.

4.3.5 Task and equipment experience

There are notable intra-group differences between the specialists and non-specialists within the remit of police knowledge at the level of task and equipment. Both of which have implications for perceptions and affective responses in a given situation. One obvious level of distinction is the frequency of each of the subgroups have taken part in public order events generally, and policing foreign nationals more specifically.

Riot control officer, (specialist); *"Experience is a problem at the beginning. The longer you do the job then the more positive experiences you have. You see that you have normal people who don't want to have trouble with us."* City L, 46-48. This quotation illustrates several conceptual differences between specialist and non-specialist officers. First, task experience impacts on the perception of those being policed and the expectation of their behaviour. Second, is that contact and exposure to the situation equips the specialist officers with the ability to formulate an experientially-based perspective of the crowd members, and importantly the experience to differentiate between crowd members who can pose a risk to officer safety and those who do not. The normative expectation of specialist and non-specialist officers in a public order context varies.

The necessity for large numbers of officers generally has been characterised above as a perspective which many of the non-specialist of officers held. In contrast to this, specialist officers show a level of tactical depth and a response to the actual risk posed by a crowd at a particular point in time and sensitivity to the developing dynamics in a public order context. Riot control officer (specialist) *"I think you need experience to know that it is not always necessary to show force"* City L, 351-354.

Other ways by which police knowledge differed between the subgroups, include the information they draw on to make sense of situations. Non-specialist officers were far more likely to anchor their understanding on exceptional events or instances. Additionally, they were more likely to draw on alternative experiences in public order more generally e.g., demonstrations and riots more broadly, and use this to make sense of the context of policing football events. For example, one non-specialist commented, *"We had really big riot here, the protesters were tearing up the place. It will be the same when the football fans come"* City O, 705-706. Conversely, specialist officers were more likely to draw on experiential accounts, specific to the foreign national fan groups, based on primary knowledge or that of their colleagues.

4.3.6 Training

Training has been widely discussed at all levels over the course of the data gathering. Training constructs normative shared understandings of context, PPE and situation and is a central source of police knowledge. In the current discussion, the considerations of relevancy are training as preparation for a major tournament and on the efficacy beliefs of the two subgroups. There is a major contrast between the training levels with regards to frequency, duration and intensity, and this has a massive impact on the perceived capability of the officers' appraisal for their training related ability.

The non-specialist officers cognitively compared the preparatory experiences to that of the specialist, with the impression that they are ill prepared. Frontline officer, (non-specialist): *"The training was just basic training yes? With the body protection, with the canine, with the Special Forces. The Special Forces have been*

training since January, and we were just one and half days, two days. [So you think you should have had longer?] “Yes.” City K, 312-318.

Team training level and how they had been preparing for the event had a direct relationship with the perception the non-specialist officers had of their team’s competency and perceived ability level. In smaller groups individuals can influence the way that others behave, but in larger groups an officer has no control over the way another is acting, officers feel they are not prepared well enough to deal with this aspect either. Frontline officer, (non-specialist) [how do you feel about the training?] *“Training is a bit difficult in a way. In a normal way you are two people on the street ... in a big formation you cannot influence what others does. This is the difficulty because many people maybe make many mistakes. There is always one. The training was good but it was, personally I think it was not enough ...”* City K, 260-269.

This perspective has also been shared with the specialist officers; Riot control officer, (specialist) *“If you are with officers who are not really well trained you don’t really feel safe. You think; if I get into trouble they won’t back me up, they won’t support me really because they fear to help me. This is not the case within my unit”* City G, 808-810. Specialist officers have a completely different perspective on their capability as a collective unit; Commander the city force riot control, (specialist) *“If a fire starts we are there and we extinguish it. Our training allows us to do anything”* City G, 766-767.

4.3.7 Social experience and group cohesion

A major conceptual difference between the two subgroups is that specialist officers are working together all the time as a group, while non-specialist officers work in a different group with each operation, it is not fixed. Thus, their shared mental models about team interaction and group cohesion are notably different.

Non-specialists officer’s work in a variable group environment; Front line [do you work with the same people all the time?] *“No. Every time it is a different team, it’s not fixed”* City F, 995. As the relationships are less known, the group formations

are random, they may be working with international mutual aid officers they have never met; and this can impact the way officers feel and perceive the situation. They question the competency of the officers around them, and question their confidence in whether they will provide protection. A quotation presented early illustrates a non-specialist officer who gauges the competency of their group from the presence of specialist officers. This has a significant impact on the level of cohesion they have with the group.

Identification with team members provides an opportunity to inquire and learn about each other's skills and abilities, develop trust in one another in relation to team performance and the interaction between the team members. Consequently, the group dynamics of specialist officers is not characterised by the relational uncertainties of the non-specialist. They rely on each other for their own safety, working with their specialist partners they develop a relationship and provide safety for one another. Special Forces commander (specialist); *"My unit is working together the whole day together so they know they can rely on one another. They speak about the deployments they have afterwards sitting with a beer and say 'oh, thank you for pulling me up'. They started together and we are spending more time with our colleagues in deployment than we are at home."* City G, 544-547.

4.4 Discussion

The analysis reveals police organisation and intra-group dynamics to be far more complex than originally expected. The data analysis is concerned with identifying the existence of particular perceptions and examining the extent to which they help us to understand psychological and social dynamics in the policing of foreign nationals. The objective is to represent the key considerations of the grounded theory analysis; rather than a view point of singular individuals or one subgroup. The perspectives included represent findings from across participant populations over nine international football policing events. It is worth emphasising the construction of the account represents research and a practitioners' perspective of the events, the latter were independently reviewing police operations at which data has been gathered.

The task inter-relatedness on the organisational goal gives rise to a unity, given that all officers conceptually perform the same task. The defining characteristics, norms and values of the organisational identity can be summarised as, scepticism and uncertainty, solidarity and homogeneity of action, and strength in numbers. PPE and uniform are perceived to be an important aspect of identity. The finding that organisational identity has been defined by identification with scepticism is a robust finding in police science (Reiner, 1992; Stolnick, 1994; Waddington, 2009a). There was little support found for the suggestion of control as a norm (Stott & Reicher, 1998), but rather findings were more consistent with the fear of losing control (Waddington, 1994). The prevention of disorder is emphasised as the most important organisational goal. The *potential* for the use of force has been emphasised, however the *actual* use of force is considered highly negative. Disorder is considered threatening to both officer and crowd safety, and a situation to be avoided. Nevertheless, officers are not so optimistic as to think that all encounters can be managed peaceably and the use of force is recognised as a necessary, and important, last resort to maintain control if necessary to reduce the fear of escalation and to retain authority.

According to SCT, policing based on the norms and values identified may translate into a tactical approach which characteristically has the potential to create 'us' vs. 'them' social boundaries between the police and crowd members. It is important to consider the way by which organisational norms can interact with dynamics of crowd psychology. One interpretation of the organisational identity could be as a key variable in constructing asymmetrical perspectives between the crowd and police. The focus on the potential for disorder and the perception of the need for PPE combined with the normatively sceptical attitudes is theoretically concerning from a crowd psychology perspective. According to crowd theory, these are prime factors which can lead to wide scale disorder, based on the argument that an emphasis on risk has the potential to act as a self-fulfilling prophecy. However, the data which the ESIM is based relies on post hoc analysis of disorderly situations. By examining the nine operational events from which this account has been constructed prospective research has not found the officer understandings and normative behaviours to be associated with instances of disorder.

An equally valid interpretation, from the perspective of the in-group, is that the norms and values are highly important to the functioning of the group. Theoretically, there is a similarity between the police organisational norms and values, and the dynamics of crowd psychology as outlined by ESIM. The two groups in the inter-group context are responding to their collective perceptions of threat in very systematic and similar ways. Just as the crowd homogenise and increase their in-group identification and protect one another, so do the police.

The ESIM analysis, maintains that behaviours that are socially normative to crowd members' social identity (regardless of the valence of the behaviour as perceived by others) will justify their continuation and acceptance by out-group members (i.e., by the police) as long as the actions are not illegal. Applying this argument to the crowd perception of police psychology, if police normative behaviours are perceived negatively by the crowd then it could be argued to be a result of the crowd perception, rather than the actions of police. By applying the arguments surrounding the collective norms and actions of the crowd to that of the collective norms and actions of police, one is forced to accept that given the actions of the police are not illegal.

Two fundamentally different identifications with the role and perspectives of the social reality of public order policing have been identified. The finding of subgroup differentiations organisationally is a novel finding in relation to the existing literature on police and crowd psychology. The teams working on the ground, to achieve the collective norms and values, were a mix of non specialist and specialist officers. Currently, the significant organisational distinction in a public order context is between command and frontline level. The analysis supports the argument that just as it is empirically incorrect to perceive the crowd as a homogenous unit this is also true of the officers tasked with policing them on the frontline. This distinction illuminated that different types of officers will differentially impact on the working groups cohesion and performance. The social identity patterns identified indicate the need for reconceptualising the in-group identification at ground level and a reflection of these understandings in practice. *"Harmonious relations between subgroups ... are often best achieved by simultaneous recognition of subgroup and organisational*

identity” (Hogg & Terry, p.132). Through identifying the distinctions between groups, it provides the ability to begin addressing the differences and to identify strategies to minimise the negative implications of such.

SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) assumes that as a consequence of the motivation to maintain a positive collective self esteem, people aspire to belong to groups that compare favourably to other groups. This suggests that people should generally be motivated to belong to groups that have a higher relative comparative value on some evaluative and relevant dimensions. The value of a social identity may be undermined when a high performing (high status) group is combined with a low performing (low status group). As it is rare for departments or organisations in mergers and co-operative functions between the distinctive fractions to be of exactly the same status (see Terry, 2003) it is reasonable to assume that there will be some form of threat in an organisational merger that may lead to resistance to the changes. If group boundaries are perceived to be impermeable between the high and low status groups, for example the non-specialists are distinctively aware that they are not specialists, as a result of the salience of their relatively perceived inferior status low status groups may feel particularly threatened and demonstrate high levels of inter-group bias on status irrelevant dimensions. High status group members may experience less threat but because of the unstable nature of the group dynamics they may seek to maintain their distinctiveness by showing in-group bias on status relevant dimensions. Bias can be a coping mechanism in the sense it is one way that groups can reduce their perceptions of threat, it can also be a way of resisting integration between fractions of an organisation.

The distinct subgroup identities not only shape how the groups define themselves, and their teammates, but the inter-group dynamics between the two on a multitude of variables. Essentially the differences are the result of police knowledge. Police knowledge is ‘the police perception of external reality which shapes concrete policing on the ground’ (Della Porta & Reiter, 1998). At its most basic, this is the link between experience and practice in policing. The differences identified between the groups are at an intra-group level, including collective-efficacy, cohesiveness, and

confidence and trust. This is largely the result of their history and training experiences. These issues will be addressed in turn.

It has been suggested by many that besides the technical competencies required to accomplish a task, members of a team also need to possess inter-personal competencies in order to successfully interact with each other during task resolution (Stevens & Campion, 1994; McGrath, 1984). Mischel and Northcraft (1997) suggest that when individual team members assess the collective-efficacy of the group that they belong to, they not only take into account the technical expertise of their teammates but also their capacity to work together efficiently. Thus, members of a team hold two distinctive types of collective-efficacy beliefs, some that are related to task performance (based on the technical competencies they possess) and some that are related to inter-personal processes (based on their inter-personal competencies). Consistency between these factors determines in theory whether the teams becomes one integrated unit, or simply remain an aggregation of individuals, or separate teams, linked together. Evidence presented here suggests differences between the non-specialist and the specialist on these two variables.

The cognitive nature of the differences observed leads to the conclusion that the subgroups have differing perspectives of collective-efficacy. Collective-efficacy is an emergent group level property that reflects the way team members perceive their team reality or 'what we think of us' (Mischel & Northcraft, 1997) which influences team performance (Bandura, 1997; Bar-Tal, 1989). As Bandura (1997) observes, "*A capability is only as good as its execution. The self-assurance with which people approach and manage difficult tasks determines whether they make good or poor use of their capabilities. Insidious self-doubts can easily overrule the best of skills*" (p. 35). The evidence suggests that how one performs is inextricably tied to how confident one feels about the task at hand. The team performance literature equally emphasises the important interaction between collective-efficacy and team performance, particularly in dynamic environments.

One's expectations of self-efficacy are the product of a complex process of self-persuasion that relies on the cognitive processing of diverse sources of efficacy

information (Bandura, 1995). These sources include performance accomplishments, vicarious experiences, verbal persuasion and physiological states. The most influential sources of efficacy are performance accomplishments that evolve from mastery experiences (i.e., actual experiences of successfully completing that task) (see Moritz, Feltz, Mack, & Fahrbach, 2000). Self-efficacy is a very specific notion that depends on the exact constraints of the task to be completed and one's perceptions of their ability to complete such a task.

According to the SIT a low level of self esteem which may be related to a lack of perceived ability or confidence motivates discrimination. In accordance with the SIT in theory officers who do not feel confident in their roles as a result of perceived lack of training or education are may be likely to discriminate, rely on negative stereotypes and perceive the need to use force, although further research would be need to establish this link. Tajfel and Turner (1979) specified a number of strategies available (depending on the nature and subjective judgments of the relevant intergroup context) to people with less-than-satisfactory social identities, ranging from individual behaviours such as dissociating oneself from or leaving the group, to collective strategies such as evaluating the in-group in relatively positive terms on status-irrelevant dimensions or competing directly with a higher-status out-group.

Confidence in task performance is intimately linked to group cohesion, competency and trust. The three are empirically interlinked, although theoretically separate issues. Specialist officers reported high levels of in-group identification, with the role and with one another. The data analysis suggests a high level of peer solidarity, and a strong sense of group cohesion. They also reported that while working with less experienced non-specialist officers that they felt had lower levels of competency and trustworthiness (in that they would support them) interacted with their sense of safety. Conversely, the majority of the officers who perform the role of policing foreign nationals in the context of international football are not specialists, and strongly differentiate the task to that of their normal job. They report a higher sense of danger and injury, and a lack of knowledge of one another's competencies.

Trust is assumed to be determined by various attributes, such as competency and expertise. There are two aspects to collective competency, knowing what your team is capable of and knowing the limits of those capabilities. Competence-based trust describes a relationship in which groups believe that another person is knowledgeable about a given subject area. The process of identity construction and maintenance occurs as a result of particular social conditions, common experiences, shared norms, and shared mental models of the inter-group relations in a public order context. The subgroups have shared mental models regarding task knowledge as a result of a shared common fate determined by group membership; the mixed groups do not have shared mental models of team knowledge. Currently, in the literature the discussion of competency and trust dynamics is largely limited to a framework of the leader-follower relationship. The analysis presented indicates the significance of these variables between teams on the ground. These dynamics of confidence and competency function at both an intra- and inter-group level. The data analysis places a novel framework to the understanding of the police solidarity phenomenon, and the prerequisites and antecedents of such.

These findings are important because shared mental models enhance team effectiveness (Lim & Klein, 2006; Rentsch & Klimoski, 2001). The group differences in team shared mental models have been related to the perception of environmental stressors and perspectives of the need to use force. A central finding was that those officers who identified most strongly with peers, also tended to report lower levels for the perception the need to show of force and use force. This is consistent with the buffering model (Cohen & Wills, 1985), which stresses that the process of social support protects people from the potentially adverse effects of perceived stressful events. The analysis begins to highlight the ways social support may impact on the coping strategies for stressors and crowd management.

The analysis begins to highlight limitations with the nature of public order training in Europe from the police perspective. Training and education should be modified to reflect the occupational needs of the non-specialist officers. This research suggests there are two central practical considerations to be made; (1) addressing variability in perception of team performance variables and (2) addressing the

occupational norm of perceived danger. By achieving the former, one may see modifications to the latter and in the perceived need for the use of force and PPE. Practically, these can both be addressed by modifications to the training received by the non-specialist officers.

Training gives the team members an opportunity to inquire and learn about each other's skills and abilities (Kozlowski et al., 1996). Training should be modified in order to facilitate a shared understanding of competencies. Non-specialist officers should train with, or be trained by, specialist officers on a more frequent basis. Additionally, the composition of public order teams should be considered. Training with fixed groups presents an opportunity for group cohesion and confidence. Non-specialist officers must be provided with practical opportunities to develop public order experience. If necessary, practical training could involve travelling to different cities, at which public order events frequently take place. This, in theory should act as exposure training and build a level of stress inoculation in a public order environment. Consensus among the team members about their team's collective-efficacy should increase over time as they gain experience in performing together, indicating convergence of perceptions about the team and its environment (Kozlowski et al., 1996).

More broadly, the subgroup psychology has implications for international co-operation, at the level of working group's integration and relations between police co-operation. The EU guidelines encourage co-operation and working together, as it is not uncommon for international bi-national hosts to manage major events. This research suggests that the occupational implications of group and force collaboration should be made from a group and inter-group perspective.

Related to theory and practice more generally, the analysis raises implications for the unquestioned acceptance of officers to police crowds of foreign nationals in low profile uniform to appease the crowd, which has come to dominate the theoretical landscape. The study begins to address the psychological considerations from a police perspective. The current evidence-based advice is that deploying officers in standard uniform without PPE is the best strategy for reducing public disorder. On the basis of

the evidence presented, this option would not be likely to increase pro-social interaction between police and crowd members. If anything, the current data would indicate that doing so would make this outcome less likely. The data highlight the potential for increased stress and fear by deploying officers into a public order context under-equipped and/or ill-prepared (from their perspective). The crowd psychology literature puts forward the argument that even in environments perceived to be high risk officers should strive to police in a low profile manor, until actual risk (e.g., people are kicking off), develops. This is likely to create a conflict of interest between what is best from the perspective of managing the crowd psychology, and what is best from the perspective of managing the police psychology. In so much that, if officers are equipped in low profile PPE they will be less likely to intervene and interact with the crowd during these critical situations. However, if officers are equipped in high profile PPE crowd members are more likely to perceive the context as illegitimate.

This evidence-based account suggests that the debate around policing strategies should attend to whether it is practical and in accordance with human rights legislation to expect officers to enter uncertain environments without PPE. While crowd psychologists strongly maintain this to be the best strategy from the crowd perspective, from a police perspective this is not the case. Future research should be focused on how the police perception of the danger of crowds can be balanced with the duty of care to protect the officer and their sense of safety. This is an issue which has been wholly overlooked by the existing literature. Research should seek to address the generalisability of the findings presented here.

In relation to originality and values, generally there is a trend for retrospective investigations of inter-group theory in public order in relation to specific events. Importantly, the police contribution to these dynamics has received limited attention and is typically gained from understandings of conflict or instances of mass disorder. The emphasis here is to explore the reality of public order policing, specifically of those on the frontline and to highlight what is actually going on in relation to those performing the public order role and the identity process and intra-group dynamics which relate to this. Additionally, the focus has been largely on understanding the

frontline dynamic rather than command, as they are the ones likely to face the threat head on and be physically injured.

Perspectives on group effectiveness and performance are largely based on empirical studies that exclude the external environment in which groups function, therefore the scope of these theories is constrained. Similar research has pointed to the need for more attention to work groups in natural contexts, with greater emphasis on both how these groups interact with their external environment and how this interaction process relates to effectiveness (Ancona, 1987; Argote & McGrath, 1993).

A benefit of the research method was the cross disciplinary approach which sought to integrate two distinct disciplines within social psychology, that of organisational research and social identity. Haslam (2001) argues strongly for a group based approach to understanding organisations because of the psychological attachment employees can have with their organisation, and work place. A key consideration of police culture which has come forth from sociological studies of the police in Scotland during the policing of football events is that the police do not operate as one homogeneous unit, or 'team' in Erving Goffman's (1959) terms, but as several smaller teams working largely independently of each other (O'Neil, 2004). van Knippenberg & Hogg (2001, p. 187), stress *"... it is essential for social psychologists and organisational scientists to create shared forums for the exchange of ideas and the presentation of discussion of their research to a greater extent than the case is now. This will not only be a benefit of the applied and theoretical value of these research projects, but may also integrate social psychological and organisational psychological perspectives on issues of shared interest such as identification, commitment, leadership and group performance"*.

This study broadens and deepens our appreciation of the importance of applying organisational understandings to the output of policing on the ground. However it would be a fallacy to claim that it is not without weakness. These data do not claim that all officers, in all countries, perceive their organisation sub-grouped as discussed, nor that all subgroups perceive competency differences between them. What it does do is demonstrate that dynamics exist within the sample population

examined over the nine different operations, in six different countries, and an approach for understanding probable reasoning patterns in the organisational social reality of public order policing. It is widely recognised the most efficient way to examine a group is to adopt a position of participant observation. However, even from this position organisational identity cannot be perceived to its full extent from outside the organization.

The self descriptions and motives in this work have taken for granted the assumption of a shared social identification as police officers, with strategic intentions that are linked to the associated collective identity. In line with the argument put forward by Cronin & Reicher (2006), on the grounds that despite tensions within a collective organisation between officers, they remain encompassed within a collective 'we' and for that reason there is justification for considering the distinction within the broader identification of the whole, as public order police officers. While observing in the field how people discuss and respond to events it can also not be assumed that the officers who made a contribution to the construction of this analysis clearly articulated everything they were thinking, or intended for the distinctions they have made to draw the lines which they have. However, this is the risk taken by conducting an ethnographic study of police perspectives.

As emphasised in the general methods section these data were not systematically gathered. This means that no definitive claims can be made about the relationships and processes to which attention have been drawn nor does the analysis demonstrate conclusive causal relationships between the identification differences, or inter- and intra-group tensions. The research does however draw attention to the critical role that work groups play in organizations and the demand for more attention to be directed toward researching organisational social identity and group performance effectiveness.

With regards to specific hypothesis which can be advanced on the basis of this work, it can be posited; (1) officer's levels of experience and training will be put forward as explanations related to the perception of threat and the methods of policing employed to manage the crowd; and, (2) a lack of experience and training will be used

as justification for the implementation of high profile means of managing the crowd. The hypothesis will be examined in chapter nine, which presents a case study analysis of the policing at Euro 2008.

There are several specific ways to develop this research in terms of further understanding the dynamics highlighted. Firstly to understand the police role in public order should be conducted in such a way that recognise the differences in training and group processes. Secondly, there should be further research focus into the ways which officers deal with the disparity between the inter- and intra-group perceptions of efficacy and how this translates into their policing style. Finally, there needs to be a broader and more systematic approach to understanding the consequences of the differences in identification. This research demonstrates that the police may be less cohesive than past literature has theorised, at theoretical level there are distinct organisational identities within the public order formations and emphasis should be placed on understanding these differences.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has taken a broad and exploratory approach to establishing what it means to be a public order officer from the perspective of the participants who perform the role. This has been achieved by employing principles of social identity and inter-group relations to make sense of organisational and occupational functions of policing public order in the context of international football. It certainly seems that as a tool for understanding organisation identities and team processes in a public order context the social identity is a useful heuristic tool to being navigating the complex social reality of within the occupational life of public order officers. This practical and applied exploration of social and occupational considerations will be employed in subsequent chapters to make inferences regarding how the recommendations put forward for the governance of public order management by crowd psychology theorists may interact with practice from the police perspective.

Moving forward, Chapter 5 will continue to use a social identity based model to outline four different categories of threat senior commanders perceive in light of the norms, goals and values of public order police identity.

CHAPTER 5:

**POLICE THREAT PERCEPTION AND THE RELATIONSHIP TO
PATTERNS OF DEPLOYMENT**

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter began by exploring the occupational and organisational identity of public order officers on the basis of their own self definitions. A foundational principle of the SIT is that humans strive to positively differentiate our identity (the individual and collective), on the basis of variables which we perceive to be central to whom we are. In situations which we perceive a threat to our identity we will take measures perceived to be appropriate to manage the threat (balanced against the value of the characteristic that is threatened), in order to avoid cognitive dissonance and to preserve the perceived value of our identity. It seems that the next step forward in this exploratory investigation of public order identity is; 1) to investigate the various categories of threat which police perceive to their organisational identity when preparing to host international football events; and, 2) to consider the way these perceptions of threat interaction with strategic and tactical decision making regarding measures to manage this threat.

A theoretical model which specifically relates to risk perception and management of disorder in the context of policing international football has been put forward by Stott & Adang (2008). The Understanding and Managing risk model (see Chapter two), is essentially a body of recommendations based on concepts of dynamic risk assessment and graded tactical deployment. The model seeks to outline characteristics of police behaviour and action and how this can interact with crowd dynamics which are argued to be correlated with high or low levels of disorder. The non-empirical model is based on the ESIM model of crowd disorder, and as a result is relatively limited in its conceptual focus on the threat of crowd disorder. The model does not consider the pre-event nature of threats which are perceived to be posed to organisational identity of public order officers, by the officers themselves.

More broadly, in the context of policing order in a demonstration environment, research has addressed the issue of how senior police officers risk perception interacts with decision making by Cronin & Reicher (2006 & 2009). They report on the basis of data gathered during the real time management of an event that increasing risk causes officers' to feel they must increasingly rely on high profile

measures of management. Importantly, in the research context which they reported on there is an imminent risk of serious disorder. This research seeks to consider the threats posed to the public order identity perceived in advance of hosting an international football event, rather than during the management of such.

Police attempts to manage order by increasing their strategic and tactical capabilities have been hypothesised by crowd psychologists as likely to increase the threat of disorder. However, it is highly unlikely the senior officers who are making the decisions to do so are seeking an increased threat situation (which they then have to manage). It becomes of importance then to begin to understand why particular forms of police perceptions and actions are seen to be risk taking in relation to managing order by some audiences, and not by others. Possibly even more significantly is that research begins to contextualise the array of audiences within the context of police foreign nationals; and the position of police threat perception and decision making within the broader framework of the organisational constraints and multi-agency inter-group relations considerations.

The reflections on the issue of threat put forward by crowd psychologists paint a picture of threat to police officers as that of disorder posed by the foreign national groups. Given the reality of managing a media focused, multi-agency management, international event it is unlikely this is the only threat senior officers perceive to their organisations as they prepare to host. There may well be any number of social, political, learnt behaviour, local or media founded explanation for why police forces perceive and respond to threats the way they do. The police psychology of threat perception is an area which has received relatively little attention, which such research may better understand the threat associated with managing a large scale events (a useful tool for practical learning), and to better understand why police act the way they do in public order management situations.

Concerns related to threat perception, police deployment and subsequent conflict levels in the context of policing major international football tournaments have been raised by quantitative observation study conducted at Euro 2000 (Adang & Cuvelier, 2001). Furthermore, the relationship of police stereotypes and cognitive bias

to police tactical management of national identities has been raised as an issue for investigation (Stott, 2003). In order to begin to appreciate the rationale underpinning police deployment strategies it is necessary to understand how commanders perceive the threat associated with the policing of foreign nationals generally, and more specifically the threat associated to national identities. The literature highlights limitations in police dynamic risk assessment, leading to deployment strategies which can be unbalanced to the actual risk on the ground (Adang & Cuvelier, 2001; Stott & Adang, 2003). Thus, there is a consensus on the benefit of examining the nature of commanding officers' perception of threat and its relationship to strategic and tactical decision making.

5.1.1 Defining threat to public order identity

Currently in the crowd psychology and public order literature there has been no attempt to define threat to public order officers. This research turns to the established ITT to provide an empirical framework from which to define and understand threat to identity from the perspective of the participants. Social psychological threat perception relates to situations in which people perceive a threat (e.g., physical, emotion, power and status), to their well being or social identity. The perception of threat has real consequences for the way people process and react to situations. From an Inter-group Threat Theory (ITT; Stephan & Stephan, 2000), perspective an inter-group threat is perceived when members of one group perceive that another group is in a position to cause them harm. In the current context this social definition of threat is particularly useful as a tool for defining the construct and provides continuity to the investigation police identity objectives.

The ITT informed definition of threat places the emphasis on the perception that an out-group is in a position to cause the in-group harm. In most occupational contexts in developed countries workers undertake their role assuming that their organisation have taken the necessary measures to increase the likelihood of them finishing their days work uninjured or threatened. This is a particularly prevalent consideration in the context of public order, which again has largely escaped consideration as a result of the focus on injury to crowd members in the inter-group

context. Frontline officers must face the potential for injury or worse, and leaders have a responsibility to provide the motivation, skills and tools for their employees to perform safely. It is important to consider how occupational safety is conceptualised. By definition, this study will begin to explore the perceptions and measures taken by senior commanders to increase the occupational safety to their workforce. Importantly, the research will begin to explore the way by which the recommendations of the crowd psychologists may interact with occupational threat to increase the likelihood of injury.

According to the ITT, the perception of threat is likely to have negative implications for inter-group relations. Applied to the current context, this may have a vast range of implications; however the current interest is in examining the relationship between threat perception and police deployment strategy. Building on the crowd psychology literature, police deployment can be understood to negatively interact with inter-group relations when there is an asymmetry between the police deployment and threat posed by the fans, leading to over/underestimation of risk. Explaining the relationship between threat perceptions and underpinning deployment are of great value in developing the current research area. Conflict responses both relate to cognitions and emotions, which collectively act to inform understandings threat. Acknowledging that out-group threat can lead to non-hostile behavioural responses (e.g., negotiation, communication and compromise), cognitive and affective responses to the out-group may still be negative (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Thus, inter-group threat perception is centrally important to understanding situations in which conflict is likely to develop.

ITT proposes that the four threats each contribute to negative out-group attitudes (i.e., realistic, symbolic, anxiety and attitudes towards out-groups). This proposition has received support in various inter-group contexts with predicting attitudes; (1) toward racial out-groups in both White and Black samples (Stephan & Renfro, 2002), (2) gender attitudes (Stephan & Stephan, 2000) and, (3) attitudes towards immigrants (Stephan, Ybarra & Morrison, 2009). In summary, the model provides a useful categorical framework from which to assess inter-group threat perception, and predict inter-group bias. The ITT has been limited in application to

small scale collective groups; however, the theoretical conceptualisation of the nature of perceived threats is useful in the current large scale collective inter-group context.

To investigate police perceptions of threat the current analysis conducted three phases of data collection, in a naturalistic environment, at nine different international football events. Prior to the hosting of an international football match data were gathered from senior police commanders regarding their perceptions' of identity related threat for the impending event. During the event management in real time, data were then gathered relating to the police deployment strategies and tactics to managing the threats. After the event senior commanders focus group discussions were conducted to investigate their perception of the balance between pre-event threat perception and during-event management of threat.

5.1.2 Objectives

In this study, the interactive effects of social identity and perceived threat will focus on two central issues: (1) the particular aspects of social identification that moderate responses to threat from a command perspective prior to the hosting of a football event; and, (2) the general picture of police deployment strategy in real time in relation to perceived threat.

5.2 Method and analytical strategy

Threat perspectives are understood here as a function of verbal expression through interview and deployment behaviour. The study uses a multi-method approach to illustrate key issues in the threat perception and risk management which have been derived from the commanders hosting international event and reviewers who have assessed the operations in real time. Analytically, two distinct issues will be discussed; (1) first, threat appraisals by commanders, and (2) second general deployment patterns over the nine operations where the data has been gathered.

The first aspect of the analysis identifying psychological processes in threat perception and assessment has developed from a grounded theory analysis. The

identification of threat has been constructed largely on the basis of information gathered through interviews with key members of strategic command teams prior to the policing of international football events. Police briefings (command and frontline) have also served to be very useful sources of data to understand threat perception. Each international football event can be defined as having a unique identity and a finite life, and is thus distinguishable from the policing of other international football events. However, it is highly likely that patterns of common characteristics in the threat experience of commanders policing foreign nationals will be observed.

The examples provided avoid details of the specific operation, information on location, and officers to preserve anonymity. The analysis does provide direct quotes from extracts, interviews, and/or the peer reviews to emphasise key points. However, to effectively present the findings from an extensive body of data the extracts are highly selective. The data are presented in such a way to exemplify the key theoretical issues derived from each policing operation. In line with grounded theory, the ITT did not inform the analysis and identification of police perceptions of threat. The theory was employed subsequent to the analysis to provide a framework to present the findings of the research. One change to the original framework was to substitute 'negative attitudes' for 'attitudes towards foreign nationals' as this more accurately reflects the data gathered.

The analysis explored the nature of threats, by drawing on experiences from real time policing. The work sought to understand the way police understand groups of foreign nationals and the categorisations of particular national groups, by examining the way the police officers talk about the groups. The nature, content and valence of stereotypes are useful tools from which to build pictures of who is considered to pose threat and those who are not. By doing so, what is sought to be achieved is not an understanding of what it means to be a member of a particular national social group, but rather to understand the consequences which this has for the policing of particular national groups. Importantly, the data gathered at five of the nine operations was in relation to preparing for the impending Euro 2008 tournament.

The second aspect of the analysis is a behavioural aspect, which intends to build on the first analysis by exploring the nature of patterns of police deployment observed in relation to the police operations at which psychological data has been gathered. This aspect of the analysis is based on two approaches; (1) the observation of police deployment in real time; and (2) focus group discussion between senior commanders reviewing the police operation in real time. The analysis has been based on the consensual agreement between visiting commanders who have been reviewing the operations and providing feedback to the hosts. The issue of dynamic risk assessment has been a key analytical issue for visitors to feedback on as well as a key issue for discussion on focus groups between the visiting commanders. The behavioural analysis provides a general picture of police deployment in relation to threats at nine European police operations during which foreign nationals have been policed.

The data has been gathered across phase one and two of the peer review evaluation projects; which consists of data gathering at nine public order operations. The data come from senior police commanders who are facing the imminent task of performing the leadership role in the policing of an international football event. The data also come from senior commanders who were present to evaluate the police strategy and tactics at the event (within the framework of the PREPs, see Chapter 3), although their contribution is limited to the focus group discussion element of the analysis. While the data gathered on senior commanders provides the focus of the analysis it is important to recognise that data gathering has been in no way limited to the commanders. Before and during the event briefings and command meetings, participant observation during the events, interviews have been conducted with a broad range of audiences who play a key role in the inter-group context of policing foreign nationals (e.g., multi-agency staff, local people, crowd members and frontline officers).

The analysis developed as one individual strand of research which grew from the broader CGTM (See Chapter 3); for which the broad investigative objectives of the project were to examine the police perspective of threat at international football events. As a result, during each policing operation the issue of risk and threat

perception was routinely discussed. Following the completion of the PREPs research was left with masses of information relating to police perception of threat across the nine events. Given the limited exploration in the literature on the subject of police threat perception, the current researcher perceived the opportunity to develop this body of work by writing a chapter on police threat perception. This was to be achieved by documenting the threats to public order identities, and examining how the threats impact on the strategic and tactical decisions.

The analytic strategy was first to group the pre-event police threat perceptions across the nine operations using thematic analysis. The ITT was found to provide a useful theoretical framework which explained the nature of the threat perception of police commanders. Ultimately, using the ITT permitted learning experiences across the nine different public order events to collectively develop four key themes related to senior police commander threat perceptions; (1) realistic threat, (2) symbolic threat, (3) precaution and, (4) nature of national categorisation. Following this the data gathered during the event was analysed from trends across the operations relating to their threat information handling and distribution and the actual occurrence of threats during the event. By doing so the research provides a broad account of what the senior commanders expected to happen, and what actually happened. Finally, the focus group discussions of senior commanders are included to provide a peer reviewed impression of the threat perception and management at the event.

5.2.1 Sample characteristics

Data has been gathered on threat and risk assessment prior to, during, and after nine distinct police operations at international football events, from Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain, and Switzerland between September 2005 and December 2007. The data gathered in Austria and Switzerland were gathered during police preparations for the Euro 2008 tournament. An ethnographic method provided a rich body of data including interviews, documents, briefings, participant observation and focus groups.

Given that threat assessment and risk management are largely functions which guide the decision making processes of strategic and tactical command staff the analysis here was limited to include the perspectives of only this participant group. In total, 65 commanding officers have contributed to this study. Of this, 29 were commanders who had performed the role of strategic or tactical command during the nine operations. Within this number, 17 have been commanders preparing for key strategic and tactical positions at the Euro 2008. The remaining 36 were senior commanders reviewing the host operation.

5.3 Analysis

Through the course of the nine operations commanders have identified a multiplicity of threats, for clarity they have been divided into a psychological index of perceived threats and sources of danger (i.e., realistic, symbolic, precaution and the nature foreign national categorisation), in other words what and who do commanders find threatening. The behavioural analysis will present the consensus of reviewing commanders in relation to the general nature of deployment at the nine operations.

5.3.1 Realistic threat posed by international football events

Realistic threats were discussed within all nine operations by commanders. Threat assessment is largely the product of three considerations; (1) the inter-group relations between the opposing support groups of the football event taking place; (2) the significance of the match in terms of qualification; and (3) the number of people who will be in attendance (at the match and generally in the city). These considerations are embedded in operational practice throughout Europe and are taken to indicate the threat level related to the event. The threat assessment is not limited to visiting supporters and has been expressed more broadly throughout the operations. There is the potential for extraneous factors to impact on the police deployment irrespective of the threat posed by visitors.

Silver commander *“On the football side there is little risk, it’s just a friendly game, there is no importance talking about the sport. However, politically there is always some risk when this team is involved”* City H, 333-336.

Threat perception is socially and politically embedded in the contextual situation in relation to the hosts and the visitors. In cities which hosted simultaneous events at the same time as the football event (e.g., religious gatherings, protests or Christmas tree light switch on), these factors were perceived to be threats and increase the risk of disorder. Additionally, during several of the operations commanders identified the potential threat of local people using the football event as a platform to address broader societal, religious or political grievances. The issue of social and political uncertainty is not restricted to the visiting fans and commanders are acutely aware of the potential for disputes among local supporters to precipitate in-fighting, rather than with outsiders, Commander of the Special Forces *“I’m not so worried about the [home fans] making trouble [with visiting fans], the threat is that they [home fans] start something political just amongst themselves”* City C, 920-924.

5.3.1.1 Physical threat

The most obvious realistic threat is physical, in relation to injury or safety to subordinates on the job. However, the threat perception in relation to this potential is not entirely limited to interest in officers physical wellbeing, the threat of injury has economic and political implications which commanders would also seek to avoid.

Gold commander *“If I have one police officer hurt, he doesn’t work for one week or one month. I have 800 officers in my force, last year 81 police officers were injured and this is only the cases where they were injured by aggression in the street on the job, I don’t count the guys who broke their leg or something. With this amount, I can’t and I don’t have the right to take any risks for them [in relation to uniform and PPE].”* City E, 624-629.

The quotation illustrates that the injury rate within this particular force, approximately 10% was as a result of aggression while on duty. Commanders have a

duty of care towards their officers, and tend to use the threat of injury as a rationale to deploy officers in PPE and lean towards high profile deployment. Significantly, the widely discussed nature of threat comes from the perspective of ineffective police management by various internal and external audiences and the various implications this may have on the police force.

5.3.1.2 Public confidence

The first of which, relates to the local community where events takes place. Commanders are acutely aware of the potential for international football events to impact on the wider communities and there is pressure to be seen to be acting by these fractions. International football events and tournaments can create major disruption to the local community by way of traffic, transport, noise, and disorder. Officers largely integrate the locals into their operational plan and make strategic decisions based on minimising inconvenience to them. Commanders are also acutely aware of the need to maintain public confidence in relation to risk management with the locals, particularly in situations which there has been large scale disorder in the past. Following instances of widely publicised disorder and/or apparent failure by authorities to control it this can result in a loss of public confidence.

Gold commander *“The demonstration came here and caused big confusion for the locals, protestors were breaking into shops for three days and it was a big trauma for the population, they do not accept it. Now they have an impression that fans are coming to destroy the city, we must show that we can manage this risk.”* City E, 107-111. Commanders are aware that the public lose confidence when they see community values and norms lowering in police, that is, they perceive that the police are not doing the best that they can to protect them. The perception of social and moral order drives public confidence in the police and when they start to lose this, they may lose public support. This understanding is reflected in strategic objectives and a number of the operations have been oriented by the aim to demonstrate to the local community that there is no risk to them. Police presence and the ability to use force and take control of the situation are considered key methods by which this can be achieved. Concerns to minimise the community disruption generally imply

increased control of the crowd. City riot police commander *“Things have happened in the past, and the general public are happy to see the police when fans show up. They want us there.”* City F, 407-409.

5.3.1.3 Competing demands of inter-group audiences

Commanders are intensely aware of the need to accommodate different audiences and be seen to be managing the situation effectively. Gold Commander *“You must think about the impact of your approach. You think about the politicians, the press, the population which it will impact on, because a lot of people will become stressed if the situation is not handled efficiently”* City, 317-321. The police deployment strategy is not the only significant aspect in the management of crowd psychology; it is equally as important relation to the management of other significant audiences too. Police strategy and tactics can have different effects on different audiences, and this can create a tension between best management of the community and that of the crowd. When it comes to prioritising, commanders are far more likely to perceive the benefit in managing local perspectives of threat and prevent undermining the relationship with them.

5.3.2 Symbolic threat posed by international football events

Symbolic threat can be understood as dangerous to the in-group police organisation in terms of threat to identity values and norms, reputation, and maintenance of professional standards. Symbolic threat is equally as important to commanders’ decision making as realistic threat. These factors are mediated by the outcome of disorder or more precisely the uncertainty relating to the outcome of disorder. The police value system is highly oriented by the maintenance and prevention of disorder.

5.3.2.1 Symbolic threat and accountability

As the following quotation below illustrates, symbolic threat is more readily perceived when these values and professional credibility have been, or are, under

question. Gold commander *"We cannot have another situation, another escalation, another riot. We cannot have that, especially not in the field of football because next year is 2008. Because the incident in October has already raised questions over whether we can handle public order situations. If something happens now, again there will be a big discussion over whether we can handle this. We will give them the message that we can't handle this."* City F, 403-408. The challenge is not in the violence which can originate from the crowd per se, but alternatively in the unpredictability of the outcome of such events and the impact as social identity threat. The threat of damage to reputation draws questions about a police force's ability to cope.

5.3.2.2 Symbolic threat of high status groups

There is a sense that foreign nationals may not come with the intention of causing disorder, however, symbolically, visiting fans in high status positions attract attention from lower status home fan groups; who seek to challenge the existing social relations between themselves and the opposing fan group and change the status quo, to establish who is toughest. Thus, those foreign nationals perceived to be high status groups are symbolically threatening even in the absence of intent to cause disorder by the fact opposing fan groups will try to challenge them. Therefore it is not merely about the out-group themselves but the interaction others will seek to have with them. As a consequence there is consensus that visiting fans are treated homogeneously and differently to home fans on the grounds of symbolic threat to order.

Reviewing commander *"One of the key issues to me, I have seen many times with European football is that the way fans and the home fans are treated completely differently. You can go to the stadium and every away fan is strip searched, and the home fans are allowed to bring flares in. It's like giving them a lighter"* City B, 312-315. As result of this dynamic, particular strategies and tactics for the management of the high status visitors at international football events are perceived to be logistically the most effective mean to protect against disorder. However, this approach has the effect of perceiving the visiting party as homogenous and, more importantly, as treating them homogeneously. In addition, the actual intentions of the visiting fans are

irrelevant, as ultimately the threat lies in those who seek to challenge them. Finally, the facilitation of the lawful intentions of the high status groups becomes less important than controlling the access that other groups have to them, encouraging methods of segregation and control of the movement of the high status group. While from a police perspective their actions are not purposefully aimed at discriminating against the crowd and can even be argued to protect and help the crowd, these actions are likely to be perceived by the crowd as hostile acts.

5.3.2.3 Strategic control of the minority

One reviewing commander commented, *“There is always a tendency to focus on the visitors. Always, if you have 500 visiting and you keep them quiet then you have no problems. We put them in a place that will suit them, we don’t give them drink, we contain them and use enough police to control them. Focus on the visitors and you don’t have a problem”* City C, 145-148. As the quotation illustrates this strategic approach is widespread in Europe and is likely to maintain perceptions of high status groups as dangerous. Which suggests the means of dealing with the visiting crowds will fail to resolve conflict and, conversely, make it more likely that the visitors will engage in disorder given the opportunity. However, officers will typically fail to see the negative impact this can have on relations with the visiting crowds and the broader impact that this can have on maintaining defensive and unproductive relations with particular high status groups. Characteristically commanders do not believe that this strategy increases the likelihood of disorder, the causal attribution of the threat source is external with little consideration for the interaction this tactic can have for the inter-group dynamics.

This dynamic is one which from a police perspective differentiates an event, from a tournament. During a tournament, it is not possible to control the behaviours of the visiting supporters, as it is likely there can be any number of out-groups. Thus, there is a higher level of uncertainty and less control over the situation from a command perspective. There is evidence to suggest that this results in symbolic threat being posed by all. As reported by this Silver commander *“It was a big problem between the six commanders here that we thought we had an enemy on the street, we*

thought the fans who would come would be violent, and not normal.” City K, 584-588.

5.3.3 Precaution in the context of international football events

Accountability concerns are a major factor which relates to commanders feeling individually threatened by inter-group interactions. They are afraid of negative consequences to themselves which may be the outcome of interaction with out-groups. There is a sense, that policing international football is a no-win situation. The best case a commander can ask for is that the event passes with no incident and thus no repercussions for them. Commanders make decisions related to deployment with consideration for their accountability concerns. Subjective interpretation and feelings are intrinsic to threat assessment and reasoning patterns in relation to threat perception are based on emotions and not statistics. This is largely a result of commanders coping in an environment where the only time people notice their actions is when things go wrong. There is an absence of identification of opportunities rather than threats.

5.3.3.1 Preparing for the worst

One Reviewing Commander commented, *“Think about Hillsborough for example, if something goes wrong who is going to be in the dock later to justify that? Based on these lessons learnt there are clear protocols of command and a clear understanding of risk”* City C, 726-727. This officer went on to say, *“On match day, if I am there, I am very much thinking right, ok these officers are mine and I am accountable for everything they do”* City C741-742.

The concern of being liable for the outcome of the operation and the potential of external inquiry define the way commanders see their role and the threats posed by policing football events. Hillsborough was important in reconceptualising issues of disorder at football events. The commander quoted above was using this as an example to illustrate the personal accountability which commanders face in the event of major disorder to which the authorities are arguably responsible. Commanders are

acutely aware their necks are on the line if the worst happens and it is likely that either externally and/or internally they will be called on to explain why they made the decisions they did. As the quotation below clearly demonstrates the perception of threat is not only informed by the desire to protect the reputation of the organisation broadly, but significantly informed by a desire to protect their career and reputation.

Reviewing commander *"We have a Gold Silver Bronze structure, I am a Silver, Silver does everything, takes every precaution ... it's strategic backup so if things go really wrong it's not you that goes under the meat cleaver"* City B, 127-130.

This suggests that commander's precautionary actions through strategy and tactics are employed not through a perception of need for them but through a need to protect themselves, and their reputation. In a high stakes situation it is a normal expectation that the strategy will have to provide the resources for the worst case scenario otherwise the lack of preparedness becomes an issue of dereliction of duty. Understanding is characterised by uncertainty, leading to a generalised anxiety towards policing foreign nationals as a situation or activity that could cause harm. The constant threat of attack makes the perception of public order dangerous and there is always the possibility that something bad will happen which will have personal implications. Gold Commander *"I can only guess what will happen. We just have to wait and see what happens ... Sometimes big problems, other times only minor problems. But very rarely no problems at all. We will see what the day gives us"* City D, 768-774.

5.3.4 Categorisations of foreign nationals

Theoretically a significant issue is the extent to which the police perception of national identity governs police tactics and strategies. Officers can have negative attitudes towards groups and national identities which can have negative consequences for the way by which they are policed.

There is a sense that some national groups pride themselves on their party atmosphere and contribution to the positive festivities, whilst other groups are heavily engaged with the importance of the football, both of which have implications on the threat they pose and their style of interaction with other national groups. *“The Swedish, the Greeks and the Russians, they are more party fans. They just want to make a big party. The football is beautiful but not as important as it is to the Germans, the Polish and the Croatians, this is the main difference. They want their team to win, and that makes the opposition the enemy. That is difficult to handle”* City I, 364-368.

5.3.4.1 Homogeneity of categorisation

As a product of threat perception, attitudes towards groups of foreign nationals can be considered in very simple terms, the valence of stereotypes in relation to particular national groups can be positive, such that the whole group are understood to pose little threat, or negative, which reflects a high level of threat perception. Categorisations are without exception discussed in terms which applies the threat perception to the group homogeneously. There is vast amount of evidence to suggest that police tactics and approaches are directly informed by national identities, for example one Reviewing commander stated *“If it was the Dutch fans coming, you would treat them very differently to the English.”* City C, 318-320.

There is a general understanding that the threat posed homogeneously by national groups is typically not towards the police, but towards other fans and as a result of; (1) the seriousness by which they take football event and, (2) the level of alcohol consumption typical of the national groups. One Silver Commander stated that *“The characteristics of eastern type teams are alcohol consumption combined with violence”* City B, 634-635. Interestingly, alcohol was not considered to be a problem with all national groups, but in relation to a select few who have been identified as posing the highest levels of threat.

5.4.3.2 *Categorisation and historical continuity*

Some groups are perceived to pose a larger threat than others as a product of the way they have behaved in the past. There is continuity between the perceived threat and the level of disorder the social group has been associated with in the past. Even stating this, the threat is not considered to be dormant within the national groups, and widespread amongst all. The threat posed by teams is a result of the inter-group relations this group has with other teams. The level of disorder which can be related to national groups historically is a critically important, as this cannot be discounted by the police in the planning of a police operation.

The national groups who are considered to pose the highest level of threat when abroad are England, Germany, Poland (and Eastern European teams in general). These nationals have been flagged up time and time again for the threat they pose to the maintenance of order, and particularly in relation to Euro 2008, for example a Gold commander stated [which fan groups would you prefer not to play here?] *“England, Poland and Germany. There are also big questions which countries from Eastern Europe”* City H, 139-142. To a lesser extent Turkish fans are also considered threatening, one Gold commander stated that *“The Turkish fans take the game very seriously. They don’t behave aggressively with the police, but towards the supporters of the opposition team”* City A, 23-24. The rhetoric used to describe these groups is generally diplomatic, based on the notion of emotionality, volatility and the accountability pressure they create.

5.4.3.3 *Reinforcing the status quo*

When these nations play there is an unquestioning reliance on the status quo enforcement in relation to the management practices. The higher threat the national supporters pose the more likely it is that the officers will respond strongly to the perceived threat, as they have the resources to do so, One Commander stated that *“The risk assessment is high risk never the less, because there are some nations which if these nations come for a football event there might be a problematic development”* City G, 406-407. Attribution of threat to national identities can be a

generalised as a negative attitude towards the fan groups and as justification for high profile deployment.

5.3.5 Behavioural accounts in relation to threat management

Through participant observation of police activity prior to and during the operational policing of nine events, consistent issues in relation to threat perception and management of foreign nationals have been identified. These are related to the assessment of vulnerability to threat and the relationship between information and intelligence, and police management of foreign nationals in relation to graded tactical deployment and dynamic risk assessment. Commanders acknowledge a broad array of realistic and symbolic threats which may impact on the operation at hand. A significantly understated issue relates to the likelihood of the threats becoming reality, or put another way assessing the vulnerability to threat and determining how likely it is that the identified threats will develop. This manifests itself in various ways in the operational policing of the events.

It is a commonly known fact that any threat or risk assessment is as good as the information it is based on. In the briefings prior to the operations there was a distinct absence of information as it related to factors of the social identity of the visiting nationals (e.g., their values, aims and goals). Rather, the emphasis is by and large placed on intelligence, focused on gaining information about individuals with a history of disorder and what they may plan to do if they are in attendance. It is of equal importance to understand intelligence as it relates to the intentions of the majority. The fundamental difficulty is determining the rate of occurrence as statistical information is not available on past events.

Information led operations are standard operating procedure, key to operations, strategic objective throughout Europe. Often in command briefings the intelligence sections of the operation reveal there is no intelligence. Rather than this being taken as information which pertains to the lack of indication for disorder it is frequently taken to indicate the opposite, and increases the sense of uncertainty about the operation. In an uncertain situation you would need to prepare for worst case

scenario. Thus, intelligence of having no intelligence was not considered strategic information, but rather an absence of information.

The communication of threat information relays this sense of uncertainty to the frontline officers. An important consideration drawn from the police briefings is that commanders use information strategies which portray the social reality in such a way to heighten and attenuate the awareness of the frontline officers. The commander's subjective interpretation of threat is passed down to the officers on the frontline. Commanders relay the threat information to the frontline officers in such a way that suggests there is more threat in the situation than there is evidence to suggest. For example, in one particular command briefing on the morning of the event the intelligence section of the operation reported clearly that there was no intelligence. Thus, there was no intelligence relating to intent of the fans, indicating disorder, or method of travelling to the stadium. In the afternoon in the frontline officers briefing the commander did not convey this message to the officers, instead a picture of uncertainty and unknowing was constructed in relation to several aspects of the fans intentions.

5.3.6 Pre-event command predictions

Despite the uncertain conditions of the decision making, commanders attempt to predict the key threat variables, and the possible impacts (threat assessment). This serves to construct a perception of risk (high or low), in a particular situation, on which deployment decisions (e.g., uniform, numbers and formation) are based. Of the nine operations observed the risk classification has been one low risk and eight high risk classifications, irrespective of the fact that there was no intelligence available at any of the nine operations. Significantly, the outcome of the nine events was largely peaceful, at two of the events there were small scale altercations, as the result of the home fans actions. The outcome of actual risk development during the operations observed has not lined up with the perceptions expressed prior to the event.

5.3.7 Focus group consensus

Focus group discussions surrounding the operational deployment across the nine operations were in agreement that the police deployment strategies were not proportional to the risk level on the ground at eight of the nine operations. This consensus amongst practitioners illustrates the existence and the extent of the issues of deployment in relation to dynamic risk assessment in reality. This finding relates to the generalised perception of risk to the overall deployment strategy and demonstrates a discrepancy between the commanders' perception of threat and tactical deployment in relation to threat.

An additional consideration of the focus groups, which is theoretically linked to dynamic risk assessment, is in relation to graded tactical deployment at the nine events. Prior to the events, commanders explicitly expressed intentions to deliver a low profile police tactical deployment strategy at seven of the nine operations. This was the operational intention of the five commanders who were preparing for Euro 2008. The reviewing commanders consensually agreed that the host police forces' operational objectives were not objectively fulfilled. The key issue is that the officers were deployed in high profile deployment and in groups. A key observation is that the treatment of the visiting foreign nationals was consistently different to the home fans and the proportion of officers positioned at the visiting fans entrances is characteristically much higher than at the home sections.

5.3.8 Foreign national's intentions

While it is important to recognise that the nine events passed by and largely without major incident, it is important to acknowledge that at all nine of the events there were differences between the threat perceived and the intentions of crowd members during the event. Over the nine events, the fans intentions where expressed to be, for the most, part peaceful. Even during the event at which disorder did develop there was found to be a distinction between the majority of those who sought to enjoy the football, and the small amount in all national groups who (defined by their fellow nationals), were likely to enter into confrontation with the opposition fans.

Interestingly, some fans maintained there was no threat, others expressed the desire to enter into conflict and a third group insisted that you can never be sure what will happen at these events. A final consideration from the fans perception is that visiting fans were more likely to comment on the policing, and perceive the policing to be negative.

5.4 Discussion

This study examined commanding officers' threat perception and the general patterns of deployment in response to the threat perception, finding that the events observed all passed without significant incidents. By studying command psychology (when policing foreign nationals) it can be seen that there are a broad array of threats and consequences which inform the decisions made in relation to deployment. The perception of threat creates accountability pressure to act in line with the high profile approach with the intention of minimising the potential for disorder. Threat perceptions have been argued here to be not merely limited to the potential consequences to the commander, and the police organisation but have implications more generally in which multiple stakeholders should be accounted for. The various demands on the commander to minimise the potential for disorder create considerable dilemmas in the analysis and evaluation of the actual threat posed on the ground in order to develop a proportionate strategy.

Taken together this psychological and behavioural analysis examines the variables which underpin commanders' threat perception in the policing of foreign nationals; and, identifies mechanisms of social threat which interacts with strategic and tactical practices in the management of them. There are several findings which are to be discussed as significant. The first of which is that the generalised threat perception is embedded in the operational practice of policing foreign nationals which can be related to patterns of high profile deployment. The second issue is that the perception of threat posed to order by foreign nationals is not the only threat which commanders must contend with in the context of policing international football. And finally, threat perception can be understood as an organisational function of the accountability concerns of the commanders.

Risk is a perception of potential problems and the implications of those problems if the risks were to become reality. As the literature relies significantly on understanding police management of public order events almost exclusively through hindsight investigation there is a lack of appreciation for the extent of the risk which officers must consider in the evaluation of perceived threat which could interact with operations. Only in fully understanding the extent to which a multiplicity of factors can interact with the policing of football events can it be maintained that the commanders understanding of risk is anything but static, but characteristically dynamic and responsive to an array of risks.

The first thing to emphasise is that commanders' threat perception will depend on the precise situation, taking into account a number of variables (e.g., history, experience, social and political context). However, the current analysis broadens the understanding of this phenomenon by providing a broad index of potential threat perceptions and the influence this has on strategy, which defines the tactical deployments during actual operations. The depth of the analysis and validity of the ways by which threat perception can translate into practical police tactics and perception of risk is enriched hugely by the consensual agreement of reviewing commanding officers. There is consensus that there is disparity between the perception of threat, and the actual management of it.

On the one hand, threat perception can be seen as an advantage, in the context of ambiguous and dynamic natural decision making environments (e.g., policing, emergency wards, and battlefields), a wealth of literature suggests we are not reason-based thinkers who only use the facts to figure out what is threatening and how much of a threat is presented (Klein, 1993; Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood & Zsombok, 1993; Endsley & Garland, 1995). According to Natural Decision Making models, situations are assessed against existing knowledge and a decision is made on the basis of this (Klein, 1993) in the face of time constraints. The rational choice model of in relation to tactical decision making is not representative of how police commanders making key decisions in the policing of international football events.

Threat perception is as much a subjective affective response as it is a cognitive analysis. The perception of threat when none exists can be perceived to be a general bias towards the avoidance of error (which can be costly to in-group values or lead to harm, or damage to reputation). This is certainly what the evidence presented here suggests. In accordance with the ITT police officers, both command and frontline (see chapter five), are predisposed to perceiving threat from the out-group. On the other hand, such threat perceptions have real impact for the way officers respond to the situation, and from a crowd management perspective this could raise issues in relation to expectancy and practical management; particularly in relation to those crowds perceived to be the most threatening.

Research suggests commanders' perception of threat is mediated by accountability factors in the use of the high profile deployment. This research suggests the best way to understand the discrepancy between the reviewers' perception of the risk and the police deployment is to look at the motivations of the commanders. Inter-group threat assessment is not a calculation, experience and affective based judgement call, based on the available information embedded in the desire to avoid negative repercussions for the individual making the decisions, and the social group. High status groups such as police commanders are likely to respond forcefully towards the perception of threat because they have the resources available and the desire to be seen to be taking control of the situation. Evidence supports the contention that one reason why commanding officers tend to construct assessments of risk which is not objective (in accordance with the opinion of expert reviewers who were also practicing commanders) in relation to the most likely outcome has to do with sustaining the approval of those around, or subordinate to them. Commanders seek to protect their reputation and to protect the police as an organisation in terms of reputation and the maintenance of professional standards. These motives can lead to the broad precautionary measures taken in the actual deployment.

Taken as a whole, the results support and develop findings which relate to the influence of accountability demands on strategic and tactical decision making at a command level. The finding that accountability interacts with threat perception prior to deployment, in advance of a public order operation, to shape strategic decision

making is a relatively novel finding. However it is consistent with other studies involving commander's tactical decision making during the operational policing of public order contexts. For example Cronin & Reicher (2006) found that balancing the pressure to act from various audiences in order to avoid accountability pressure alters the tactical course of public order policing. Waddington (1994b) identified that commanders are highly concerned with similar concerns deemed 'in' and 'on' the job trouble. Accountability concerns of 'in' and 'on' the job trouble creates a reluctance to deploy officers in standard uniform profile because of the repercussions this may have (Waddington, 1994b; Cronin & Reicher, 2006). Commanders are in an environment of media, political, public and peer scrutiny, often driven by the search for accountability. This research contributes to this, by illustrating commanders in advance of public order operations feel they should rely on high profile deployment in part as a result of internal and external accountability concerns.

Instances of external pressure, for example from the public, on the police to act forcefully can be very problematic. When the solution is increased use of force, an escalation can occur instead of de-escalation. There are many examples of failures when the police have acted in this manner (Waddington, 1994; Bessel & Emsley, 2000). External pressure can also affect the police force's way of adhering to the principles of human rights of those being policed (Waddington, 1991; 1994a; Della Porta, 1995; Waddington & Chritcher, 2000). Thus, while it is true that serious disorder carries the threat of personal and collective repercussions, and the loss of public confidence; accountability pressure caused by internal and external audiences which can also act to have negative implications for the management of public order events.

There is evidence that visiting foreign nationals frequently find themselves the target of police action and on the receiving end of tactics which are not readily applied to the home fans. Treating the visiting fans as one unit, irrespective of their national identity, and enforcing segregation and control of behaviours can be dangerous and counterproductive. It is of great importance to differentiate between a physical mass of people and a psychological crowd. By treating a crowd which is comprised of various psychological groups as one, the police actively enforce a

common fate amongst the visiting fans. According to the SIT a common fate is a key determinant of a unified and collective group membership. It increases the level of identification with the surrounding group/crowd members and increases the likelihood of a shared and common identity. When this psychological unity is imposed crowd members feel the fate of the group that is important, there is a sense of 'we' rather than 'I'. Caution should be taken to avoid inter-group dynamics such as this, as avoiding the 'us' Vs 'them' divide is a useful psychological tool in managing inter-group relations (Reicher, 1987).

Commanders are open about their strategic intentions of controlling visitor movements and utilising the high profile strategy in relation to high risk groups. The implications of this for the groups identified as threatening is that they are repeatedly perceived and treated as a threat, importantly, including situations where they are not objectively posing risk. The commanders' intentions may be to avoid instances of disorder, however there is evidence available to suggest that strategies of control and restriction of movement have precisely the opposite effect. A number of studies, identify that by clamping down on a crowd as a unified whole, rather than facilitating legitimate intentions and targeting illegitimate intentions, has the effect of creating conditions rife for conflict (Drury & Reicher, 1999; 2000; Drury et al., 2003; Reicher, 1996; Stott, 2003; Stott & Reicher, 1998; Stott & Drury, 1999; 2000). While the dominant literature should be acknowledged it is also necessary to emphasise this study stands in contrast to this research as there has been a distinct lack of disorder evident in the public order operations at which these tactics have been utilised.

Crowd psychology tends to maintain there is a 'classical' understanding at play in the policing of crowds and this body of work can be seen as evidence for this contention in relation to particular crowds of foreign nationals. Commanders acknowledge the way perceptions of police management can undermine relationships between the police and the public, but seem to deny the same consideration to crowds of nationals. There is a widespread failure to recognise that within these bodies of visiting foreign nationals, just as with the locals, the group seek to have their democratic rights upheld by the police and watch the sports event in safety.

Considerable evidence has mounted during the course of the data gathering and analysis to suggest that negative inter-group attitudes towards particular national groups are held in the context of international football, and these bias methods of management in relation to those groups. It is too simplistic an argument to posit that police view all national out-groups similarly however there does appear to be a dichotomy between 'good' national groups and 'bad' national groups. 'Bad' national groups are virtually symbolic of threat. The mere announcement of their presence leads to enhanced security and actions to control their behaviours, even those considered to be typical of football fans (e.g., drinking, going shopping, and visiting local landmarks). Across Europe these groups are typically considered to be England, Poland, Germany, and to a lesser extent Turkish and Eastern European nationals.

Reicher and Hopkins (2001) staunchly challenge these assumptions, arguing on the basis of a social identity informed argument that characteristics and stereotypes based on national identity are invariably incorrect. This research specifically avoided details of the nature of stereotypes held of particular groups instead favouring a focus in the analysis of how national identification informs us about the way police perceive foreign nationals, and importantly how this interacts with the way they are treated. The reason for this avoidance is that the data have not been gathered in a controlled environment, as such that the nature of the discussion did not cover all stereotypes of all European national teams, rather just those perceived to be high risk. Additionally, the most significant aspect of stereotyping at a national level in the current consideration is how this acts to shape the expectations of disorder and policing strategies employed towards the groups (rather than the nature of the stereotype per se). As has already been discussed, caution should be taken with employing measures which impose a common category of threat on any crowd or group, to avoid a homogenous unity between fractions of the crowd.

The literature has pointed to a cycle of distrust between national groups and the police as a result of these psychological dynamics (Reicher et al., 2000; Schrieber & Adang, in press). The history of treatment and the collective trans-active memories of these groups are likely to fuel not only a system where the police do not trust the foreign nationals, but where the nationals do not trust the police generally as an out-

group. The long-term implications of this, is that unless there are systematic changes to the way the composition and threat is perceived within these groups the cycle will continue.

An approach which dwells on characteristics of national groups may divert focus away from the situation and its importance. This is characteristic of the Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE; Ross, 1977), by which explanations for behaviours are embedded in individual characteristics at the expense of depreciating the situational dynamics. Negative stereotyping might worsen the prospects for an orderly manifestation. Particularly in ambiguous situations officers are more likely to perceive information and behaviour which align with them, through the process of searching for confirmatory evidence (i.e. confirmation bias). The notion that one group is less dangerous than another is a dangerous concept, for various different reasons. There has been found to be a typical strategic and tactical orientation to focus on the control of visiting fans, and high risk fans in particular.

This study broadens and deepens an appreciation for the perception of threat in the context of international football. Although the focus here was on the broad understandings of individual officers across different times and places, one must remember that the officers are acting in a collective capacity. They are not expressing personal views they are revealing a common pattern in the reality of commanding public order events. It is clear that policing international football events are not only about the fans, there are many dynamics which the commanders must balance and cope with in order to effectively manage such an event.

5.5 Conclusion

The orientation of the current Chapter was to broadly examine police perceptions of risk at foreign national football events. The findings of this analysis have grown from stringent and systematic coding of the nine police operations analysed. The centrality of threat and accountability in providing understanding to the motive for police deployment relates to the emergence of such properties from the analysis itself. This research is not without limitations, it cannot make definitive

claims about the impact of any given threats in particular, nor is there ability to demonstrate a causal relationship between threat perception and police deployment decisions.

Practically, there are implications for both foreign nationals and police in particular. In order for organisations to work effectively, it is not sufficient to have policy and procedures but also to hold commanders personally accountable for their actions, and this is no less true of the police as an organisation. This creates a considerable tension between the recommendations of the crowd psychology literature and natural inclination of the commanders in charge of these events which instinctively guides them to protect the personal and professional values of the organisation by making sure that there is no opportunity for foreign nationals to cause disorder. At a practical level, operational considerations should be made by commanders as to how and what information they manage and communicate to frontline officers. Threats are not an objective feature of an individual or group it is a perception and judgment about the nature of that individual or group.

On the basis of these findings one can hypothesise there will be particular patterns in the way which social identity-related processes interact with police perception and the actualisation of high and low profile strategies and tactics on the ground. In the literature factors such as a classical understanding of crowd behaviour (Stott & Drury, 1999; 2000), training (Stott et al., 2008) and stereotypes (Stott, 2002) have been linked to a high profile tactical deployment. In addition, perceived (social) identity threat and accountability are factors of high profile deployment. Identifying the existence of negative attitudes towards particular groups is the first step towards addressing them.

The research conducted in Chapter 4 and 5 has began to highlight how the existing political and academic recommendations of crowd management can interact with an organisational public order police identity at different levels of abstraction. Moving forward to Chapter 6, the focus now shifts to directly examining the police interpretation, and implementation, of a low profile public order police model of management based on crowd psychology principles.

CHAPTER 6:
GRADED TACTICAL MODEL OF DEPLOYMENT: THEORY AND
PRACTICE

6.1 Introduction

Theoretical understandings of crowd psychology have informed a model of graded tactical deployment which has been put forward by academics (see Stott & Adang, 2003a & 2003b; Stott et al., 2008; 2007) and supported by policy (see Council of the European Union 2005a & 2005b), as the most efficient way police management may minimise crowd disorder in the context of international football. The behavioural principles underlying the model are based on a low profile approach, integration to the crowd, positive interaction and based on early intervention in response to developing disorder; either by low profile officers those on the scene or by reserves who would be drafted in wearing PPE. The interactive and graded model of deployment manages crowd dynamics (i.e., by facilitating legitimate intentions such that non-confrontational crowd norms are established) and encourages the crowd to internally manage itself (i.e., self policing and the marginalisation of disorderly elements), rather than reliance on police action and use of force for control. The empirical evidence to support the graded tactical model and its relationship to crowd psychology is limited and reliant on data gathered during the Euro 2004 tournament, surrounding the English national fan group (Stott et al., 2008; 2007). The English fans were the only group of nationals who were involved in instances of disorder at this tournament.

Essentially, a graded tactical model describes increasing police deployment style from low to high profile in correspondence with actual developments. In the first instance, strategy and tactics are low profile in tactical orientation i.e., standard uniform, communication based tactics, and aimed at differentiating between legitimate and illegitimate intentions and behaviours of crowd members. If necessary, and in response to developing instances in real time, tactical deployment can be increased to reflect escalating threat levels but should still be oriented by principles of communication and differentiation. In the event increasing disorder dynamics cannot be controlled through low profile means alone the model recommends intervention through the use of high profile tactics and equipment. Importantly, this should be followed by a de-escalation of tactics to reflect the threat level as it reduces.

It should be acknowledged that the practices described may not be at odds with policing principles in public order management in Europe. In recent times public order generally, and particularly over the past ten years has reportedly been underpinned by a movement towards a dialogue based, community oriented model of low profile management (Della Porta & Reiter, 1998). The graded tactical model of deployment is a relatively new development in the management of foreign nationals at international football events. The so called 'friendly but firm' graded model was developed by the Dutch Police Academy for the policing of the Euro 2000 tournament (Adang & Cuvelier, 2000). Systematic analysis of crowd behaviour during Euro 2000 demonstrated the impact that different police strategies can have on the level of hostility and conflict during international football events. Where a high profile police strategy which maintained distance and avoided formal interaction was used it was associated with a higher level of disorder than situations where the police employed a low profile deployment, and behaviourally interacted with the crowd.

Following this a similar model was implemented by one of the two host police forces tasked with the management of foreign nationals at Euro 2004 (see Stott & Adang, 2003a; 2003b). In cities which policed in line with principles derived from empirical research (i.e. facilitating legitimate majority, expression of tolerance limits, low profile deployment, proactive approach, graded and targeted tactics) there were lower levels of disorder than in those cities relying on a high profile approach (i.e. high uniform police approach, high profile deployment strategy and reactive high profile tactics). These conclusions were derived without systematic comparison and integration of the police perspective to the approach. In both cases, practitioners have worked in collaboration with theorists in order to implement the model.

Despite the model being integrated in EU policy guidelines for the effective management of foreign nationals at international football events, and strategically orienting police deployment at major tournaments for the past ten years, there has been very little systematic research conducted on the translation of the graded model into practice, nor the perceived benefits or limitations of this model from a police perspective. What limited empirical research has been conducted on the police perspectives and implementation of community oriented models has been done so in

the context of policing demonstrations in Sweden. Following the extensive rioting surrounding the EU summit in Gothenburg (2001) there was a review of police strategy and tactics from which recommendations were made to implement a community oriented graded tactical model of management. Parallels can be drawn with the recent recommendations of the HMIC and IPCC following the G20 rioting in London. Researchers in Sweden have reported that the shift towards dialogue-oriented policing in public order contexts has been met with initial reluctance by commanders and frontline officers (Knuttsen, 2009; Wahlström, 2007)

“Understanding the police perspective is essential if we want to see not only the formulation but also the delivery of successful policing strategies” (Reicher et al., 2004, p. 571). By understanding the cost/benefit decisions concerning the implementation and use of high and low profile methods, and the ease with which the task of public order management can be conducted based on graded tactical model deployment is of central importance to understanding the most effective means of policing international football. Given that there is a risk the responsiveness could be reduced by the police being under equipped or ill prepared it is necessary to address the graded tactical deployment in practice rather than theory, and from the perspective of those who perform the task of public order management.

6.1.1 The 3D at Euro 2008

Euro 2008 adopted a specific security approach named the 3D. The 3D is a graded tactical model of deployment based on recommendations of crowd psychology management and as such the preparatory phases provides the ability to address the implementation and perspectives of the modern graded tactical model of deployment. According to Swiss police and the BM.I of Austria, the 3D graded tactical deployment model is a three phase step of actions with corresponding uniforms for each stage, taken by the police to manage the developing dynamics of public order management. Stage one is ‘Dialogue’ with a corresponding standard uniform, with very basic PPE (i.e., a baton worn on the belt) and an emphasis on talking with the crowd members. Stage two is ‘De-escalation’ requiring an increased protective uniform worn by the officers involved and an emphasis on minimising developing

disorder. Stage three is 'Duchgreifen' (translated as determination or drastic-action) which requires full riot control and use of force for dispersing the crowd, and reinstating order. Involvement with the police preparations for Euro 2008 has placed researchers in a unique opportunity to explore the police psychology at command and frontline level relating to a graded tactical model of deployment in advance of the tournament.

6.1.2 Objectives

The aims are to: (1) present a behavioural analysis of the way the graded tactical model has been delivered on the ground in real time by host forces in the preparatory phases for Euro 2008 and, (2) explore the understandings of the graded tactical deployment model from the perspective of those who are tasked with implementing it, for example its utility in a public order context and cost/benefit considerations of its implementation. A general objective has been to examine the contrasts and consistencies in understanding and attitudes towards the graded tactical model at different organisational levels within the police forces.

6.2 Method and analytical strategy

Police forces at the bi-nationally hosted Euro 2008 tournament sought to implement a graded tactical model of deployment. At least one year prior to the event taking place five of the host police forces invited senior commander reviewers from around Europe to observe their actualisation of the graded tactical model and provide feedback. The review provided researchers an opportunity to access two forms of data; (1) from the host police force in their understandings and actualisation of the model and, (2) the consensual perspectives of the reviewing commanders. During the review various methods have been used to gather data, including participant observation, interviews and focus groups. The basic interview schedule of questions which were posed to frontline officers regarding the nature of their understanding of the graded tactical model of deployment (see Appendix F). The schedule consists of open ended questions, allowing flexibility and experience based opportunism to guide the interviews.

There are two main approaches which inform the analytical strategy. The first is to present a behavioural analysis which points to the way the graded tactical model of deployment was implemented on the ground during real time operations prior to the tournament. This aspect of the analysis is based on two approaches; (1) the observation of police deployment in real time, and (2) focus group discussion between senior commanders reviewing the police operation in real time. The account provided here is the consensual agreement between senior commander reviewers who have assessed the operation in real time in order to provide feedback information on the delivery of the 3D at an operational level to the host police force. It is important to note that all five host police forces received evaluated feedback similar to the behavioural analysis presented here.

The second analytical focus is the presentation of findings derived from interview data gathered from commanders and frontline officers. The interviews were conducted opportunistically, but focused on developing an understanding of police psychology as it relates to the graded tactical model. Given the interest was to explore the understanding of a graded tactical model from the perspective of officers, the research specifically sought not to impose *a priori* categories or hypotheses on the data. Instead the empirical objective has been to gather data which represents the police perspective from which to construct an analysis based on the robustness of the issues being reported or discussed. As standard, where possible and appropriate three questions were posed to officers during interviews; (1) How do you understand the 3D? (2) What do you think of the 3D? and (3) Can you provide an example of when you have seen dialogue / de-escalation / *duchgreifen* being effective?

All interview data was first transcribed. A grounded theory analysis has been conducted over the course of the peer review evaluations, where respondents' comments were content analysed, a number of themes relevant to the current discussion emerged. The aim was to interview police officers that occupied different positions in the hierarchical structure, to understand the graded tactical deployment from different levels within the police organisation.

6.2.1 Sample characteristics

In total five reviews were conducted of real time police operations in five of the eight host police forces between August 2007 and January 2008. Of the five host operations, four were in Switzerland and one was in Austria. To construct the behaviour analysis approximately 50 hours of participant observation of the police management of football crowds in real time was conducted. During the participant observation of the five operations, 26 fans in attendance at the football events were interviewed in order to gauge their attitudes towards the policing in general, and their understandings of the inter-group relations at the events. The review teams have also been present for ten operational briefings in total; five of which were command and five of which were frontline.

The feedback on the graded tactical model has been based on the consensual agreement of four reviewing commanding officers during each review which formed an evaluative feedback to the hosts; in total 20 commanders have participated in reviewing host operations in preparation for Euro 2008.

In total, 48 officers have been interviewed. The interviews were both formal and informal interviews conducted with 17 operational commanders who performed the role of strategic command during the five operations being evaluated. At a operational frontline level 31 officers have made a contribution to the understandings of the current analysis. The majority of participating officers have been male ($n = 46$), and the minority female ($n = 2$). The reviewers were active police commanders, who came from the following European countries; Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.

Interviews with frontline officers have typically been gathered following briefings prior to their deployment for operation; or on the ground during their operational deployment at the football event. Interviewing officers in an operational context was a strategic decision and was intended to ensure that the collective identity was salient. The officers were dressed in police uniform, they were sited on police facilities or acting on the basis of their professional position, which in line with

previous social identity investigations are all powerful antecedents of social identity salience (Cronin & Reicher, 2006; Reicher & Levine 1994, Turner et al., 1987). The strategy can be considered effective as officers and commanders alike largely identified themselves in collective ('we') terms, rather than personal ('I').

6.3 Analysis

The first section of the analysis provides a general picture of what happened operationally during the five operations in relation to the delivery of the graded tactical model. The analysis draws on the consistencies between the reviewers' evaluative perspective of five host operations in relation to the delivery of the graded tactical model of deployment. The analysis then provides a detailed account of the policing at one event to paint a picture of the policing strategy and tactics. The second section presents an explanation for why the model has been delivered in such a way, constructed from the analysis of police understandings in relation to it.

6.3.1 Reviewing commanders' perspectives on the delivery of graded tactical model

The consensual feedback to the five host police forces on the basis of the expert reviewers' perception has been consistent across all five operational events. The feedback was that objectively the theoretical model has not been delivered in practice on the ground. The vision of the 3D was not what was observed in practice at the event. In their evaluation reviewing commanders pointed to consistent variables to which they felt led to the police practice deviating from the theoretical plan across the five operations.

6.3.1.1 Briefings

In the command briefings and operational briefing of the frontline officers, both of which had taken place prior to the policing of the football event in all five host cities, the reviewers recognised a consistent lack of emphasis or reinforcing of the strategic expectations on the officers to act in line with the graded tactical deployment

model or to actively interact with crowd members. During only one operational briefing did the Gold commander state that the operation would utilise a graded tactical model of deployment. At another command briefing it was made clear the start point of the strategic approach of policing for the football event was to begin only at 2D. Thus, the operational intentions were to begin from the position of de-escalation, skipping the dialogue phase.

6.3.1.2 Deployment and uniform profile

The feedback given to all five hosts was that the deployment of officers and PPE issued were not in line with a graded tactical deployment. Dynamic risk assessment in relation to the uniform and PPE were consistently reviewed as not being balanced or proportional to the actual threat posed on the ground from their perspective. Frontline officers frequently, although not always, deployed in a high profile uniform and this step was not perceived to be phased in response to developments but a strategic decision. In the instances where police were seen to be wearing a low profile uniform, standard uniform reviewers recognised that officers on the ground lacked proactive management and active engagement with the fans. In relation to tactics there were no observations of the officers actively contacting fans or approaching them across the five operations.

6.3.1.3 Interaction

In correspondence with the deployment observations, the reviewers also agreed that the PPE was a point for concern in the delivery of the graded tactical deployment model. The tactics used were based, in all five operations on high profile means. In all instances high profile deployment provided the major part of the police profile. With regards to equipment, over the course of the five events the review team witnessed baton rounds being fired in the air as a warning, the deployment of water cannons, dog handlers and street clearing vehicles. The officers were not observed to engage in proactive dialogue with the fans, which suggested that the operation was not in line with the graded tactical model of response to developing risks. The reviewers have consistently flagged up the issue that there has been a lack of

interaction between police and crowd members and an absence of proactive contact. The review team consistently reported that there was a lack of interaction, positive or negative between police and crowd members. In all five cities, officers were observed by the review team to keep their distance from fans, even in the low level of perceived risk, and remained in large groups wearing PPE.

6.3.1.4 Communication

What was an apparent observation during all five operations was the lack of communicative technology being utilised. In terms of communication during the operational policing of events, this can be achieved in two ways; (1) direct dialogue between police and foreign nationals and (2) a range of visual and sound technologies; e.g., LED screens, messages on trucks moving through key areas and mobile loudspeakers. However, tactics based on communication principles have been virtually nonexistent. At one event the police used a mega-hailer to communicate, but this was largely the extent of the communication technology.

6.3.1.5 Multi-agency co-operation

Finally, in all five host cities the review team drew attention to the need for multi-agency co-operation between the stadium staff and the police in the delivery of a graded tactical deployment. The police are responsible for the management of order outside the stadium and inside the stadium security staffs are in the first instance responsible. The remit of the police deployment only extends to inside the stadium if events develop such that the security staffs are not able to manage the developments. The reviewers argued that in actualising the graded tactical deployment model concept must be consistent both outside and inside the stadium. At the events there was little contrast between high profile police deployment and the way the private security were dressed and equipped. Private security had PPE such as batons, stab proof vests, and riot helmets. The reviewers perceived this to inhibit the low profile intentions of the police and recommended that in order to achieve a graded tactical deployment stewards and security must embrace the concept and work towards similar policies as the police. The police and club must communicate with one another

and come to an agreement on how best to manage the concept both inside and outside the stadium.

6.3.2 Behavioural account and inter-group perspectives at one event

6.3.2.1 Arrival to the stadium

The first contact the visiting fans had with police representatives when they arrived at the stadium en masse via a train were lines of high profile intervention officers. The officers were stationary and positioned in lines with approximately five meters between each other in high profile PPE uniform, with riot shields and equipped with baton round launchers (they were not wearing helmets). The position of the officers on either side of the street acted to guide the fans directly from the train station to the visiting entrance of the stadium. At the entrance doors to the visiting section of the stadium eight fully kitted riot officers (wearing helmets) were positioned, also equipped with two baton round launchers.

Fans that were spoken too outside the stadium, and on their entrance to the stadium acknowledged the police presence was large, and expressed varied perspectives on the deployment strategy and tactics. For example, one fan commented that the police had a difficult job and that they do it well. *“At every point there are police”* [Do you think many police works well to manage fans?] *“It’s difficult to say, when things happen what can they do? ... I think it’s very difficult for the police. I think they do a good job, a very good job actually”*. (969-974, City II).

Most of those spoken to expressed a general attitude of ambivalence towards the policing, so long as it did not interfere with them watching the match. [What do you think of the policing?] *“If the police stay in the background then there is no problem... if they let us do our thing, then we let them do their thing”* (831-832, City H).

Although some fans who expressed initial ambivalence did go on to comment that the high profile tactics can have a negative impact on the atmosphere, by making

it feel tense and uncomfortable, but acknowledging this they also emphasised they would rather have too many police than no police (see below).

[How do you feel about the way the police are dealing with things?] *“The police, yes they just make their job”* (689) ... *“When there is too much police they make the atmosphere a little bit more aggressive. There are a lot of people who when they see this many police they become aggressive. But when there is no police it would not be good”* [So you think the police can have an influence on the atmosphere?] *“Yes. When they are all the way with the guns and dogs it makes us a little nervous I think”* (706-710, City H)

6.3.2.2 After the match, leaving the stadium

The match ended as a draw, 1 – 1 was the score. After the match, again there was a large police operation to keep the fans segregated. Directly on exit of the stadium the visiting fans were met by a line of 34 intervention officers who wore riot protection helmets, shields and several had rubber bullet guns. There were three officers handling police dogs. Street clearing vehicles were used for segregation purposes to cut off a main road immediately next to the stadium. Red and white police tape which was erected as a cordon in front of the vehicles to guide fans back to the train station. Fans waited at the cordon, and eventually began to tear down. There were minor verbal confrontations between the visiting fans directed towards the police. Waiting fans revealed due to the police cordon they were restricted from getting to their vehicles to go home. Small missiles were also thrown in the direction of the police. Throughout the duration of the exit officers used a mega hailer to repeatedly convey the message “Stay back”. There was reliance on full riot control uniform, equipped with batons, rubber bullet guns, dog handlers and large street clearing vehicles. No disorder developed or was reported by police or reviewers at this event.

6.3.3 Host commanders' understandings of the graded tactical model

6.3.3.1 Contrast to normal approach

The first thing to note is that the graded tactical model was perceived by the host commanders across the five operations as conceptually rather different to the ideology which is engrained into organisational approach to public order policing. The commander acknowledges the 3D is a *“dogmatic approach this is the problem. It is there in gold letters.”* (300, City E) The commander distinguishes between telling the officers, which is one aspect, and training them to actually do it which is another entirely. In sum, *“it is a strategic idea but it is to see how it goes”* (442, City E). As this quote illustrates, commanders expressed uncertainty over how well the changes had been accepted in the minds of the frontline officers, or if in fact they had been accepted to any degree at all.

6.3.3.2 Variation in interpretation

There were variations between the ways commanders within the same operation perceived the value and underpinning principles of the 3D, for example a Silver commander stated *“According to the 3D strategy we don't use lots of force for a little problem, it has to be balanced. First we operate with uniformed police, we have forces in riot gear in reserve who will come if needed”* (508, City F). In this there is recognition of the need to balance the tactics to the actual threat. However, the gold commander at the same event perceived the value of the graded tactical model to be more of a behavioural instruction to be friendly, emphasising the importance of active communication, *“We want the uniformed units go out, talk to the people and de-escalate, have an active friendly dialogue with them”* (pg. 30, 1325, city F). The contrast between the Silver and Gold interpretation of the 3D can be deduced down to their operational tasks within public order. While Silver emphasises what could be considered a tactical interpretation of the graded tactical deployment model, Gold seems to emphasis a more strategic interpretation.

6.3.3.3 Reliance on traditional methods

Ultimately, normalised management of public order is embedded in intervention and tactics which rely on high profile measures, this point has been emphasised by commanders across the two countries, for example; *“Normally horses we haven’t. In normal crowd control we have water cannons and we use tear gas, we can use rubber gummy [bullets] but not very often.”* (296-298, City E). Characteristically, in the culture of public order policing there is an absence of the recognition of non-confrontational tactical options as tools which can aid the management of public order. This could be a result of several variables primarily it is likely to be because these are not management tactics which are emphasised in training. As a result officers feel if a situation to developing the most effective way to manage it is to extinguish it with force. This deals with the problem, and minimises the risk of officer injury by entering a confrontational environment to discuss matters; given the circumstances officers perceive it unlikely that dialogue will be high on the agenda for crowd members within an increasing risk situation.

This is the way public order policing has traditionally been taught and what is normalised, as a result the graded tactical deployment model makes officers uncomfortable. *“For the officers I think the most important problem is that they have fear to go into a crowd of people. Normally with the riot tools we keep our distance, and now we ask them to go between the people, into the crowd and speak with them. It is difficult, they need experience to know that this can work.”* (26-29, City 1). There is a significant risk posed by isolation in a hostile crowd, particularly in the absence of PPE, by being outnumbered and out powered potentially anything could happen to an officer at the hands of the crowd. Additionally, in order to rely on the public order tactics which they are trained in i.e., baton rounds, water cannons and dispersals, distance from the crowd is needed to actualise these measures, they cannot be used from close range.

The commanders are aware of this limitation and the disparity between this and the way an officer would normally patrol. Commanders are also acutely aware that officers behave differently in a public order context to that which they do day to

day, and the task of communication is no longer a central aspect of their identity. One Commander stated that *“the fundamental problem in police culture is that when you are in normal day to day routine policing the officer is someone who will talk with you, naturally a community police officer. Where you put them in a mission of crowd control or so, there is no more time for discussion or talking. This, from my point of view is wrong.”* (232-237, City E).

6.3.3.4 Increase risk to officer safety

Commanders perceived the deployment of police officers in low profile approach to be strategic risk taking. Across the events there were various reasons put forward for why they felt this to be the case, largely the reason underpinning this was that the perceived risk created both internal and external accountability pressure for the commander. Internally, the first thing to note is that while some commanders within units felt the low profile approach to be appropriate others did not, leading to tension between the command team. The majority of the frontline officers were unhappy with the decision to put them into a potentially dangerous environment in a standard uniform. Commanders reported that they could and would not take risks that may result in officer injuries. Commanders spoke of the tension which this created not only between the command team, but between command and frontline officers.

6.3.3.5 Role ambiguity

The commanders spoke of the difficulties the strategy creates in relation to officers understanding what actions they are permitted to take in increasing danger. The management of disorder is a delicate procedure and at times there is a demand for the use of force in order to minimise escalating dynamics. Knowing when to intervene is not an exact science and commanders reported concerns that they felt the strategy may lead frontline officers to believe that in situations where increased use of force was necessary to prevent disorder, officers may not feel that they should be taking these steps, or be reluctant to do so. There is no clear way to distinguish whether dialogue is the most effective option in an escalating situation, or whether you are in a

de-escalation phase or in a more dangerous position. One commander described the change between the stages in the model to be 'merely thin red lines'.

6.3.3.6 Ergonomic response limitations

An additional concern at a strategic level with the deployment of officers in low profile standard uniform and then increasing the deployment in relation to risks is resource related. Commanders reported two primary concerns in relation to resources. The first was that they did not have enough officers to make a deployment in standard uniform, and have another set of officers on standby to intervene if high profile deployment was necessary. The manpower and the monetary implications of this have been raised. Secondly, the commanders expressed concerns over the time it would take to respond to incidents of developing disorder. If, as the graded tactical deployments recommends officers are provided standard uniform and equipped with a firearm (as is standard PPE across Europe, although not in the United Kingdom) this may mean they are more likely to have to rely on an extreme measure to protect themselves until back-up from fully kitted high profile officers arrives on the scene.

6.3.4 Frontline officers' understandings of the graded tactical model

6.3.4.1 Normal police work

Across country boundaries, responses of frontline officers suggested there were consistent perceptions held in relation to the graded tactical model. The first, most notable and robust, understanding was that the majority of the frontline officers interviewed held an understanding of the graded tactical model as 'normal police work'. Even those officers who reported not fully understanding the principles underlying the 3D approach, or those not aware of the strategy, held the perspective that dialogue is a normal function of police work. This understanding has been consistent irrespective of the way the strategy was interpreted by officers. They believed that it was not at odds with their normalised procedures, emphasising there is little contrast between what the model outlines and what is expected of them normally. The widespread finding that officers understood the strategy as normal

police work is interesting, as it is in contrast to what was observed through participation at the events, and that which was reported by the commanders;

“I think the model is good. It is normal police work. The first rule is dialogue and when that doesn’t work you need to take the next step. Its everyday police work” (140-143, City F).

“This is nothing new in my opinion, this 3D concept, although we didn’t have this name for it before. It is the normal way to talk with people, be present, and use force at the very end if necessary” (689-629, City G).

6.3.3.2 Simplification of the model; 2D

Analytically, what was also a consistent feature of frontline police understanding of the graded tactical model, as the two quotations above illustrate, is a general pattern of simplification of the three stage graded deployment into a two step approach in relation disorder. First you talk, and then you intervene. By examining this detail of ‘normal police work’ further it becomes clear that the graded tactical deployment model is not considered normal but attempts to diffuse conflict by first response of dialogue and communication is a police norm. *“Every policeman has to talk. The best weapon of a police man is his voice, and this is everywhere”* (211-215, City I).

This two stage understanding of the model has particular implications for the perception that officers had of dialogue as a tactical tool in crowd management. The benefits of communication have been understood as a reactive tactic, as opposed to a proactive and preventative approach to managing potential disorder. This can be interpreted as evidence that prior to any further action being taken, the expression of tolerance limits are a key and normative behaviour in public order management. They also understood their role to be reactive to incidents if they arose, emphasising an early intervention. One officer explicitly stated that communication changes the dynamics between police and fans, allowing the fans to identify not to the uniform worn but to the person. However, the officers were effectively waiting for the

situation to develop into an incident and only then seen their role to enter into dialogue with the fans. What is not perceived to be standard practice is the active process of seeking out crowd members to talk to. This can be illustrated by an interview with one officers response to the question, [Are you instructed to talk to the fans all of the time or only when there is an incident?] *“For questions and if there is an incident, otherwise we don’t have to talk to them”* (1835-1836, City F).

6.3.3.3 Conceptual clarity

What is clear from the outset is that there has been a lack of conceptual clarity over the three stage model at the frontline level. This finding was widespread and indicates a lack of strategic and tactical depth in understanding of the stages and the corresponding relationship this may have to the development of disorder dynamics by the frontline officers who were expected to deliver it. But what is also evidently clear is that they don’t find the underpinning philosophy at odds with standard practice. So much so, that several frontline officers expressed the view that the model was patronising, and nonsense, as this is exactly how they do their work. The pursuit of regulatory steps had created an environment whereby the strategy was being seen by some as something that did not require legislation. It was self evident and obvious that one would attempt to engage in discussion before taking action. For this reason some officers expressed the view that the graded tactical deployment model to be more of a public relations strategy than a police model of public order management.

6.3.3.4 Dialogue as a reactive response

Dialogue in the frontline is clearly and broadly understood as a reactive response to emerging disorder, to the frontline officer it means a verbal message that the police are ready to take action if you don’t calm down. Officers clearly emphasised that dialogue was their first response to developing disorder and it was considered a positive and good way to manage fans. However they also expressed reservations that it could be effective in the management of foreign nationals. The frontline officers were sceptical of the extent that dialogue was useful in calming situations, *“We have to wait and see how far we get with this philosophy. The basic*

idea is quite good. It sounds so simple but theory and practice are two different things” (1019-1028, City G).

6.3.3.5 Dialogue as conditional

Even the most optimistic of officers raised questions in relation to dialogue as a tactic in the management of disorder and expressed the view that it is limited and entirely dependent on those who are being spoken to. One officer stated that *“first you have the dialogue this is very important as you can most the problems solve”* [how often does it work?] *“Fifty fifty I think, I depends on who you are talking to”* (1671-1674, City F). Importantly, as this quotation succinctly captures a key characteristic that underpins their perception of whether dialogue will work with fans; it is highly dependent on the situation and the group of foreign nationals who are being policed. Dialogue is an interaction between different people if the other party don't want to enter into discussion then the tactic will be ineffective.

What has also become clear, is that while officers supported the strategy of talking as the first step in resolving emerging disorder in crowd contexts they were also quick to emphasise the long list of conditions and contexts under which this strategy is not believed to possible and/or effective. Thus, the model could work in situations where dialogue and de-escalation is applicable, but at the same time it was felt that there were few situations in which dialogue was appropriate with fans.

A key finding in relation to dialogue is that it has been considered counter to the use of force. When the officers feel they are losing control of a situation they feel that they cannot have contact, at this point they felt that the only option available after conflict has developed is to increase the numbers of riot police. *“If you have riots or excess behaviour you simply cannot enter into dialogue, or wait for a de-escalation, if they [fans] don't want to talk then this is pointless”* (1025-1028, City G).

6.3.3.6 Alcohol

Alcohol consumption is also related to issues in resolving conflict with dialogue, but it is important to emphasise that officers perceive alcohol to only be a problem with particular national groups, not a widespread issue which can be attributed to all national groups. *“Dialogue does work between the police and the fans, but if they are drunk you never know. It always depends on the level of alcohol in their blood, it’s fruitless to talk with a drunk”* (826-828, City G).

6.3.3.7 Language barriers

Practical considerations such as language barriers were also cited as an issue that prevents officers engaging in dialogue with some foreign nationals. Additional considerations are the social identity of the national group, their relationship with the fans of the opposition, and how seriously they take the game, all of which have been highlighted as aspects which contribute to whether or not dialogue is an effective tactic for de-escalating the situation. Effectiveness is perceived to be largely dependent based on those who are being policed. For example, one officer commented, *“With party fans if you smile at them they will smile back, but when you have fanatical fans they are angry. And if someone is angry, it is difficult to talk with them, if they are angry they don’t smile back at you”* (418-420, city I). Thus, the nature of the national group themselves is an important factor in whether not particular strategies are effective from a police perspective.

It is clear that officers found dialogue however conditional, to be standard practice, what they did not consider to be normative was the proactive instructions which underpin the dialogue step of the graded tactical deployment. This aspect, along with the low profile uniform and behavioural instructions to go into the crowd, were the parts of the model which officers did not perceive to have any value strategically or tactically. This was evident in the absence of willingness to engage in inter-group interaction.

6.3.3.8 Traditional measures deter disorder

Normative tactics in public order characterise physical distance and avoidance of the crowd. They are trained to keep their distance in order to protect themselves and their colleagues. Show of force is considered a positive strategy, as the minority are not going to try anything because they know they will lose. They don't recognise the value in proactive engagement and low profile uniform because they see their way as being the most effective in achieving the strategic goal of the prevention of disorder. *"A massive police presence does deter problem fans from becoming unruly, and starting a fight. That system works. We are satisfied that our idea of visible police presence works well"* (988-980, City G).

High profile policing is perceived on the ground as a good thing, visible presence acts as a deterrent for trouble makers and reassures the public. The frontline officers felt that their response to developing disorder will be more efficient and resourceful when officers are equipped from the beginning. Officers perceive danger associated with the low profile uniform and tactical equipment in a public order context, for example high visibility vests make them feel like an easy target for missiles and/or attack and they also prevent quick and unrestricted access to their personal protection weapons and other use of force options.

Tactically, the reduced distance between the police and the crowd means reduced the number of viable options. Physical distance means less danger, the further away officers are from the crowd the less risk there is of being stabbed or being hit with missiles. Further, contrary to what the literature currently suggests, officers are acutely aware that their actions and tactics can negatively interact with the dynamics. Police officers feel that distance is a good strategy *"The point is we want to stay in the background, we are not breathing down the neck of the fans, and we don't want to provoke them"* (874-876, City G). Officers feel not only for their safety (their training dictates that distance is a benefit), but also in relation to the management of the crowd psychology itself. By staying in the background they understand that their presence is less likely to aggravate the potentially disorderly elements of the crowd.

6.4 Discussion

It is important to understand the strategic and tactical recommendations which come forth from the crowd psychology literature from the perspective of those who are tasked with the implementation of such management strategies. The analysis begins to illustrate what makes low profile policing a risk from a police perspective, and starts to address the psychological processes that underpin strategic and tactical decision making at command and frontline level. The academic literature and policy in the management of international football events points to the potential benefits in relation to crowd management of a graded tactical model of deployment premised on a low profile deployment. However, what the current research demonstrates is that there is a disparity between practicality and ideology.

Centrally, this work presents several key findings, the first is that there are considerable limitations to the extent that the low profile graded strategic and tactical deployment model is/can be translated into operational practice. The second is that irrespective of the high profile uniforms and tactical equipment (e.g., baton round launchers and the visible deployment of water cannons) utilised for crowd management in the current study there has been no disorder or instances of conflict at these events. This research is not limited to the understandings of police but has incorporated data gained from the participants in the crowd at an event being policed with high profile tactics. Consequently, we are able to determine the role and impact of police tactics on supporters' perceptions of legitimacy and behaviour. Their perspective of the police and their tactics was not one of illegitimacy or contempt for the police management, but of support in their difficult role, in the recognition that high profile deployment may create tension within limited fractions of the crowd. This raises questions surrounding the relationship between police strategy and tactics and the level of surrounding disorder. This provides further conclusive evidence in addition to the lack of overall disorder at these events that one must look further than the police tactics to explain instances of disorder.

Contributing to discussion more generally, in the literature there is debate about how to best manage the dynamics of the crowd tactically. Waddington (1987;

1991; 1993; 1994a) has consistently argued that it is best achieved through high profile measures and deployment. Jefferson (1990) has argued the contrary, to the effect that a high profile tactical deployment inherently has the tendency to exacerbate tensions and cause disorder through 'a massive and highly oppressive police presence' (Jefferson 1990, p. 85). The crowd psychology literature has advanced a model of best practice policing based largely in consensus with Jefferson's perspective. The current findings present clear evidence that policing crowds with high profile measures does not lead to disorder. Thus, it highlights the methodological limitations of focusing on issues of conflict generally in crowd situations, and in the specific instance of policing football fans.

The analysis also emphasises that policing a crowd is an inter-group interaction, in line with the social identity models of crowd disorder. The effect that police tactics have on the management of a crowd is as likely to depend on those being policed as it is the tactics used to manage them. While in some situations police tactics may well contribute to the levels of disorder observed, those same tactics may also resolve issues of disorder. There are specific and unique features of football crowds such as two opposing sets of fans with their own prior histories which must be taken into account. Thus, there is a risk of committing the fundamental attribution error in attributing the blame solely on the police, an approach which does nothing to help identify the variables which make conflict situations more or less likely.

Additionally, crowd psychology literature advances the argument that there is a relationship between a police 'classic' psychological perspective of crowd behaviour (Stott & Reicher 1998a; Drury et al., 2003) and their strategic and tactical orientation. Classical psychology is essentially the perspective of the crowd as irrational and inherently dangerous. However, the evidence to support this claim is limited and based on data gathered using *post hoc* interviews and questionnaires with officers, furthermore officers have not been directly involved in policing of the specific instances of disorder which the interview investigations have explored (e.g. Stott and Reicher 1998a; Drury et al., 2003). Thus, the relationships between 'classical' theory and practice are very difficult to sustain empirically. This research has found very limited support for the supposition that police perceive the crowds as

irrational. What has been uncovered over the course of the analysis is a perception of danger in the policing of crowds. It seems a self evident point but crowds can, and have repeatedly proved to be dangerous areas, full of uncertainty and occupational hazard. For example, in June 1998, after a FIFA World Cup match in France between Germany and Yugoslavia a French policeman was beaten so badly by German fans that he was left permanently brain damaged. Thus, surely a perception of danger and a level of fear is a healthy cognitive and affective response in an environment which has the potential to be dangerous.

What can clearly be delineated from the data presented is that graded tactical deployment is logistically and practically considered difficult to implement. A consistent observation from the feedback of expert reviewers to the host police force was that the graded tactical deployment is not something which is easily implemented. Generally speaking, commanders understand the graded tactical deployment model to involve making changes to core values and norms. These findings are consensual with those of other researchers in Sweden who have observed that the implementation of dialogue-oriented policing in public order contexts has been met with initial reluctance (Knuttsen, 2009; Wahlström, 2008). De Lint (2005) also acknowledged a contrast between the value a new public order strategy may have for practitioners and the ease with which it can be delivered in practice on the ground. The current study demonstrates by exploring the underlying psychology behind why the reluctance to employ the measures exists at different levels within the police force.

The findings explore attitudes towards risk associated with low profile police approaches and the factors which contribute to the weighting of the risk assessments at a command and frontline level. Together, these two factors determine the level of comfort with which police officers take risks and the degree of competence in making risky decisions as they relate to real time policing and balance to the actual threat in particular situations. Understanding how and why these cost/benefit decisions are made is central to understanding the implementation of such novel public order strategies. With any risk analysis the potential limitations are weighted against the potential gains. One key aspect that is clear from the analysis is that the strategic and tactical level appraisal of the opportunities and benefits offered by the graded tactical

model and of dialogue as a means for managing crowd dynamics have been readily recognised by commanders and frontline officers. However, the police officers who contributed to this study did not have the perception that these low profile tactics and equipment are effective in all situations, the problem is that there are practical and ideological issues with its implementation.

The analysis points to the fact that police officers in the study, and members of the crowd in attendance at the football events, perceived a benefit from a high profile approach. The police officers interviewed believed high profile equipment can have a positive and comforting effect on the majority of those in attendance at the sporting event and the local population. What is largely absent from the literature, with the exception of Waddington's arguments (1993) which especially centre on the benefit offered in relation to command and control in the use of high profile formations, is the consideration that high profile tactics and equipment can have this positive effect (as the officers in the current study perceived). Resulting from the focus on instances of disorder the positive effects of a high profile strategy as an effective management of crowd and public perception is totally overlooked.

There is a significant contrast between protecting the local community, police officers and those in attendance and creating a negative atmosphere. It seems to be that the current literature is explicitly focused on the latter. The variation is not in the way officers are dressed or equipped, it is in the way they behave. The issue of contention should not be about what they are wearing (i.e., high profile or low profile uniform) is balanced to the risk at that moment in time, or whether they have the capability to use force, the real source of the problem surrounds police behaviour while they are in either high or low profile uniform. It's all about behavioural profile and body language, if police are acting aggressively in high or low profile uniform it will increase the tension; if police cars are driving by with blue lights and sirens this too will escalate the crowd perception of threat and cause the police deployment to be perceived as tense.

A consistent issue which was identified across the reviewer's evaluation, the participant observation and the interviews with command and frontline officers was

the difficulty surrounding dialogue as a tactical tool, and communication strategies more generally. There is a distinct lack of active engagement with the fans, when officers are not interacting but standing in large groups, with significant distance between themselves and the crowd this can begin to construct the 'us' vs. 'them' dynamics. This may be contributing to why fans who do identify with the police acknowledge that their tactics can be tense. The more fans come to see the police as 'them' rather than part of 'us' the more likely it will become that the actions of the police are perceived negatively. There is a widespread lack of willingness to engage in dialogue with the crowd members in the absence of increased risk, which essentially can be understood as missed opportunities to get the majority of the crowd members 'on-side' with the police.

It is clear from a police perspective that dialogue is a first step to the management of public order, but the effectiveness of it is also considered to be highly contingent on the specific situation at hand. There is agreement within the dominant models of public disorder upon the importance of situational factors and the potential role these factors may play in conflict (Waddington, et al., 1989; King & Waddington, 2005). Tactically, there is a general lack of consideration of non-confrontational tactical options as tools. Typically, when asked about normalised approaches to public order management commanders were quick to emphasise the equipment, uniform, arrests, baton rounds, dog handlers and water cannons. Officers perceive their primary role and objective as preventing disorder, and these tools are considered the most effective means by which to achieve this. In the events which have been observed the distinct lack of disorder provides evidence suggest that this may be the case.

The observational data presented also draws attention to the importance of multi-agency co-operation in the delivery of a low profile approach to public order policing. The low profile effect cannot be delivered by the police alone. It is equally dependant on private agencies and audiences who are responsible for the management of foreign nationals in areas such as the stadium. It is not reasonable to expect police officers to be under equipped outside the stadium where private agencies are fully equipped inside. Additionally, the way private security employees interact with the foreign nationals during the match may have an impact on the way foreign nationals

behave after the event, outside the stadium, which is then the police responsibility to manage. Considerations should be made to consult with and agree a uniform policy with non-police agencies in planning the operation phases of international football events, and tournaments, to standardise the risk management and deployment strategies between agencies. Regular meetings between multiple agencies could be considered best practice management to establish risks, to both order and safety, and ensure standardised measures for dealing with them.

The practical issue of police policy implementation is broad ranging, and equally as important in a domestic context as it is internationally. This research illuminates factors which could be considered to improve the effectiveness of public order strategies ideologically, in practice this can be of benefit to any police force within the UK which hosts football events. The significant recommendation of the HMIC (HMIC, 2009) report on the police tactics at G20 was revision of strategic and tactical approach to policing public order, including training, operational structure and cultural understanding of crowd behaviour. Addressing the issues faced in implementing a low profile approach in a football context may equip decision making and strategic revision of tactics in the UK. However, the research equally serves to additionally advocate the justifications for why police forces rely on high profile measures in the first place, and address the unquestioned nature surrounding the low profile graded tactical models.

A limitation of this research is that the body of research is restricted by the fact it can only pertain to the understandings which officers held in Austria and Switzerland. It cannot be assumed to represent a general understanding of graded tactical models, for example the perspective the Polish and Ukrainian police may have if the model is sought to be implemented there in preparation for Euro 2012. A benefit of the analysis is the multiplicity of research methods used to construct this investigation provides an analytical strength which is absent from the existing literature by providing an interactive perspective of the dynamics, and an overall picture of the policing at one event in particular. Additionally, the analysis is not limited to one event, but integrates expert perspectives of senior commanders who consensually agree a graded tactical model was not actualised in practice at five

separate events, and at none of which was there any disturbances or disorder. Frequently in the investigation of crowd and police psychology, investigators rely on a single method approach; this analysis integrates observations, interview and consensual agreement between experts on the operational delivery of the graded tactical model.

6.5 Conclusion

To conclude, there have been found to be considerable limitations to the extent that the low profile graded strategic and tactical deployment model is effective in practice, however, there has been a marked lack of disorder at the high risk events observed and analysed. Theoretically, this raises questions surrounding the relationship between police strategy and tactics and the level of surrounding disorder. Practically, it recommended the implications of a graded tactical model of deployment be understood more thoroughly, and in more detail by those expected to deliver the model. The unquestioned acceptance and enforcement of the model may have dangerous and complicated implications for officers tasked with maintaining order on the frontline. The issue is really about how to get officers to approach the crowd and interact with them, to not be scared of them. Although, training and education should seek to emphasis to officers to the benefits of active and participatory contact and communication with crowd members as there is an absence knowledge surrounding how inter-action may encourage the crowd dynamics so that crowd members are 'on the police side'.

CHAPTER 7:

**POLICE DEPLOYMENT PATTERNS AND THE RELATIONSHIP TO
INTER-GROUP RELATIONS AT EURO 2008 AND EURO 2004**

7.1 Introduction

The previous Chapter 6 moved the focus of investigating identity related variables from the context of policing international football events generally, to that of the psychology involved in hosting a major international football tournament (see Chapter 2 for the definitional distinction), namely the Euro 2008 championship football tournament. This was achieved by the investigation to the police perspectives of, and the practical implementation of, the 3D graded tactical deployment model during the preparatory phases for the tournament. The objectives for the remainder of this thesis continue the focus on the policing of a major international tournament by examination of the real time policing on the ground at the Euro 2008.

The current and subsequent Chapter (8) stand alone as separate analysis, employing different research methods, but are however intimately interlinked. Both seek to test specific hypotheses which have been put forward by crowd psychologists about the interaction between particular forms of policing and the theorised outcomes; in terms of inter-group interaction between police/crowd and crowd/crowd at the Euro 2008 tournament. Here, quantitative methods are employed to analyse structured observation samples gathered in the eight host cities of the tournament on match days at Euro 2008. In the following Chapter, more traditional qualitative ethnographic methods are employed to investigate the police/crowd interaction. A qualitative case study analysis compliments the current quantitative analysis by providing a richly detailed account of policing at the high risk event on the ground; detail which cannot be offered by a quantitative analysis. Together these two chapters offer to the literature a methodologically broad ranging (qualitative and quantitative), analysis of policing risk dynamics at in real time during the Euro 2008 tournament.

7.1.1 The amalgamation of methods

Qualitative studies can provide evidence to support or refute hypothesis, but the approach lacks the statistical strength of a quantitative analysis. Likewise, while a quantitative analysis has a stronger analytical power it lacks the ability to provide any insight to why the statistics hold the answers which they do. Thus, while the current

quantitative analysis of police behaviour and interaction cannot address the psychological processes underlying the behavioural patterns, this can and will be addressed in the following Chapter. In short, to overcome the limitations of each research approach both will be employed to explain broad patterns of the police deployment and the relationship to positive and negative inter-group interactions in Austria and Switzerland at Euro 2008.

The study of inter-group interaction at public order events generally favours ethnographic methods, such as participant observation and interviews with crowd members. Typically, there is a focus on the phenomenological experience of those who are/where in attendance at the event, which facilitates qualitative data gathering, but not quantitative. The existing phenomenological literature has produced a body of work that is largely based on qualitative data, from the perspective of the crowd, which makes particular predictions about the way that police strategy and tactics interacts with; (1) the threat classification of the group of foreign nationals; and, (2) the inter-group relations between the police and crowd. Namely, that high risk foreign national's are policed on the basis of stereotypes (Stott, 2003), and treated qualitatively different to those considered to be pose low risk to public order (Stott & Reicher, 1998). It also puts forward a particular hypothesis about the inter-group effects of such policing. Namely, that a low profile approach to policing foreign nationals is related to increased levels of positive interaction between the police and crowd. While phenomenological data provides a rich contextual detail to a participants identity and relationship to action, it lacks the ability to draw statistically provide evidence of relationships and to test specific hypotheses.

The use of structured data overcomes this issue by providing a more general interpretation of the actual happenings and patterns surrounding the police deployment patterns, rather than an exclusive focus in the phenomenology. It also provides a means by which police strategies, tactics, and outcomes, in relation to the inter-group interaction can be comparatively analysed. Structured observations are non experimental, and thus cannot provide causal explanations. However, structured observations can facilitate the investigation of predictions put forward by the existing literature about the relationships among variables. It has the advantage of providing

data gathered in real time, natural settings which allow a broad understanding regarding patterns of how the police have acted. This can be measurably related to the positive and negative patterns of interaction between police and crowd, and between groups of foreign nationals.

7.1.2 Structured methods at previous tournaments

The methods used in order to gather the structured observation data at Euro 2000, 2004 and 2008 are systematically identical. The researchers responsible for the development of the method have conducted data gathering longitudinally at the three tournaments. The same research group have organised the data gathering at all three tournaments, a number of the observers have participated in data gathering at several of the tournaments and where necessary they have trained new observers to the observational techniques. The observational data across all three tournaments has been gathered in relation to the exact same observational check sheet. This facilitates the comparative discussion across the three tournaments. However, the reporting of data from past tournaments has been limited, and only facilitates discussion of published data relating to Euro 2004.

Euro 2000 tournament was the first international tournament at which the method of structured observational data collection was utilised. The results of this investigation indicated a relationship between situations in which disorder developed and the police deployment strategy (Adang & Cuvelier, 2000). Specifically, high profile policing was related to situations in which higher levels of disorder were reported in the policing of high risk fans compared with the use of low profile policing to manage groups considered to pose the same high level of risk. While interesting, the results are narrow in scope and the write up of the findings does not provide support for the statistical significance of the differences; only bar charts which indicate the relationship exists. Additionally, this pattern could be related to the national groups involved in the instances of disorder, and their relationship and history in relation to policing. The groups considered to pose high risk and the scale and frequency of the instances of disorder are not reported.

Structured observation data was then gathered at the Euro 2004 tournament. While limited aspects of the data gathered at this tournament analysis have been presented in two separate publications (Stott, et al., 2003; Schreiber & Adang, 2010), a general picture of the findings in relation to the hypothesis advanced by the crowd psychology literature has not been provided.

Euro 2004 was hailed as an overwhelming success by politicians in Britain (Home office, 2005), and academics (Stott et al., 2008; Stott et al., 2007; Stott & Pearson, 2007), in relation to the low level of arrests at the tournament. However, the success of the tournament is attributed to very different factors by each party. Politicians advocate the perspective that the success can be put down to the introduction of measures to prevent English foreign nationals who have been known to become involved in disorder at international events travelling to Euro 2004. Conversely, academics maintain that the success rests with the police tactics in managing foreign nationals. At the tournament the English nationals were the only foreign nationals to be involved in large scale disorder. It seems to be in apparent contradiction that the academics claim that low profile policing in Portugal increased the positive inter-group dynamics and reconceptualised the high risk foreign nationals (English) identification with the police, as the English fans were the only national group to engage in conflict with the police. The question then follows, on what grounds the Euro 2004 was a success? And furthermore, how did the police profile and management style at Euro 2004 compare to that at other international tournaments?

At Euro 2000 and Euro 2004 English fans were involved in public disorder. Furthermore, the academic research on the policing of foreign nationals to date has been based exclusively on the policing of English nationals. The Euro 2008 tournament provided a good opportunity to examine the policing of foreign nationals in the absence of the English because the national team did not qualify to play at the event.

At Euro 2000 (Adang & Cuvelier, 2000) and Euro 2004 (c.f., Stott et al., 2007), there was an explicitly formulated police approach based on principles of low

profile, friendly but firm and festive management. The variation between host cities' strategies and the police understanding of a low profile strategy and relationship to tactics has not received systematic examination. Euro 2008, like tournaments prior to it, adopted a specific security approach and as such the preparatory phases afforded the ability to address the implementation of low profile strategies for public order policing. The 3D (which has been extensively discussed in Chapter 6), is based on the recommendations related to crowd psychology. In practice, these principles have been seen to reduce conflict levels and encourage positive relations and self policing intra-group dynamics amongst the crowd (Stott et al., 2007). The underpinning principle of the model is that foreign nationals should be policed on the basis of their behaviour on the day and not on the basis of behaviours in the past. In theory, given that the 3D model is delivered in practice, there should be no measurable difference between the policing at a high risk event compared with events considered to be low risk if the low profile strategy is implemented.

7.1.3 Objectives

There are several objectives of the analysis, which broadly seeks to examine patterns of operational police deployment in Austria and Switzerland during Euro 2008. Specifically, the research seeks to address whether there was; (1) an effect of the risk classification (high/low) on the police deployment; and (2) the relationship risk classification has with the level of positive and negative inter-group relations between police and foreign nationals.

In addressing these two issues, the findings will facilitate the testing of two hypotheses which are put forward by the crowd psychology literature. Namely, (1) that fans of national groups considered to be high risk are policed differently to those who are not considered to pose high risk, and (2) policing approach to high risk fans creates the social conditions where negative inter-group interaction is increased between the national fan groups, and between the national fan groups and the police.

Finally, by drawing on the limited structured observation data which is available from at Euro 2004 (Stott et al., 2007), the current study provides a comparative view of the patterns of police deployment at the two tournaments.

7.2 Method

Structured observation is used to identify and record the frequency of people's actions. The procedural method begins with identifying a set of instructions for the observer to follow on precisely when and what to observe, and how the data was to be recorded. In the current instance standard collection sheets were used to record, and mark the type of behaviour being observed (see Appendix D for sample check sheet used). Broadly, the check sheet has been developed to examine; (1) police strategy, tactics and behaviour, (2) fan perspectives and behaviour, (3) police-fan interactions and, (4) levels of conflict. For a full outline of the detailed procedure see the general methods section. For a detailed account of the procedure related to gathering the samples on the ground see Chapter 3 (3.4.3 Conducting structured observations).

Observations are structured when an observation list is used with a fixed number of points to notice, and when this list is applied in a pre-determined number of situations, or with a pre-determined number of people. By providing specific definitions of the different elements of policing and interactions, the researchers defined the variables under investigation in a more precise way than is possible in the qualitative analysis of inter-group interaction at international football events. In a highly structured observation, the codes for that which are being measured are defined in a precise way. This allows the researchers conducting the structured observations to be clear about exactly what they are looking for when documenting each sample (i.e., what types of behaviours or events are regarded as evidence within each code), and consistent between the samples they gather. A positive aspect of structured data collection is that the parameters of what you are seeking to examine and measure are very clearly defined, compared with that of unstructured observation whereby the events and developments in real time may determine the focus of data collection.

An important characteristic of gathering samples in relation to observations is that they are considered to be representative. They should reflect the actions being performed by the police, the identifiable fans, and other people in the area at the time of sampling. For this reason observers were instructed to gather data in the main areas where the fans were gathered, rather than in places which were not characteristic of the majority. Thus, geographical areas which were considered optimal for data gathering were town squares, PVAs and central gathering areas.

As a result of the increasing popularity of PVAs a methodological difference between the data samples gathered at Euro 2004 and those gathered Euro 2008 is that the latter contained relatively more samples which were gathered in fenced off public viewing areas than at previous tournaments. In the PVAs it is not uncommon to have private security policing the area, in addition too/or, in place of the police depending on the specific context and host city.

For clarity of interpretation, standard uniform officers can be characterised descriptively as day to day uniform. As it was during the height of summer, this was often visibly represented by officers wearing short sleeved shirts and light weight trousers. Half riot uniform can be understood as officers wearing protective equipment including; body armour, flame retardant jacket and trousers, either without a helmet, or with a helmet attached to their waist. Full riot uniform can be characterised as attired similarly to half riot, including the officer wearing the riot helmet. Standard uniform can be considered to be consistent with a low profile strategic approach, while full and half riot uniform is considered more in line with a high profile strategy.

The aim of structured observation sampling is to be as objective as possible to avoid any contamination of the results by impacting on the behaviour being observed. Prior to the event all observers took part in a practical structured observation training course to increase inter-observer reliability. Observers travelled to the Netherlands where they took part in an observation training course. In addition to the training course, the officers who were on the ground collecting the data samples were familiar with the method; some having taken part in structured data gathering at previous

tournaments, and all were involved in a research course where they have been extensively briefed on the method. In addition, those taking part were operational police officers, who regularly took part in the policing of public order events, or researchers who have a specific interest in public order management.

The research strategy for gathering the structured samples was overt, meaning that the observers made no effort to conceal their activity. If crowd members or police officers approached the researcher and asked what they were doing the details of the investigation were openly explained. As the behaviours were not private, and the actions of those documented were in the public domain where they could be expected to be observed, the research strategy was ethically conducted in line with the British Psychological Society guidelines for participant observation in crowd contexts.

A consideration which inevitably must be factored into the police style is that the main groups of foreign nationals identified by commanders prior to the tournament as the highest risk groups (Germany and Poland) have all been drawn to play in Austria, and against one another in Klagenfurt. In Switzerland only one group identified as being highest risk was drawn (Turkey). The risk categories attributed to the groups of foreign nationals were predetermined prior to the tournament by police and securities responsible for the hosting of the tournament.

7.3 Analytical approach

The Euro 2008 tournament took place between June 7th and June 24th 2008. In total 31 games were played in eight host cities across, four in Austria and four in Switzerland. Structured observation data was gathered in all eight host cities. At Euro 2008 data was gathered at 10 host matches, 6 in Austria and 4 in Switzerland. The sample was representative in respect of risk, 5 of which were high risk and 5 of which were low risk matches at the tournament. Data gathering was limited to samples gathered on match days at the events in the host city.

A total of 755 samples were gathered, (Austria, n = 448; Switzerland, n = 307). Of these, ten of the samples had missing values within the data set (all in

Austria). These have been excluded from the analysis. The samples which were analysed are subdivided into five events considered to be high risk, at which 355 samples have been gathered (Austria, $n = 267$; Switzerland, $n = 88$), and five events which were considered to be of low risk at which 390 samples have been gathered (Austria, $n = 171$; Switzerland, $n = 219$). At Euro 2004 a total of 1896 observational samples were taken. These are subdivided into seven increased risk matches (899 samples) and seven normal risk matches (997 samples). For full details of the observers and procedural strategy at Euro 2004 see Stott and colleagues (2007).

The day after the data was gathered each of the 16 individuals produced a excel file recording the structured observations which were later combined to make a single data set. The analysis of the structured observation data was conducted using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Distribution was examined using Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the results were highly significant ($p < .001$), which indicate the data was non-parametric data. Descriptive statistics i.e., distributions and means of police deployment in the matches considered to pose high risk and those considered to pose low risk, the data was then split according to country, and city. Due the extreme skew in the distribution of the data it could not be successfully transformed to fit parametric assumptions, therefore the data was analysed using non-parametric statistics (i.e., Mann Whitney, Kruskal-Wallis and Chi-squared).

Descriptive statistics are given as median and inter-quartile ranges. Data relating to the interaction between the police/crowd and fan group one/fan group two is recorded in the data spread sheet as present or not present. Thus, the way the data has been recorded and captures facilitates only the percentages in which the behaviour was present to be reported here.

The analytical strategy was first, to examine general patterns of police deployment in Austria and Switzerland at Euro 2008. Second, was to examine the relationship between the risk groups and the relationship to police deployment. Third, was to examine the inter-group relationship between police deployment and the nature of interaction with foreign nationals.

7.4 Analysis

7.4.1 General patterns of police deployment at Euro 2008 and 2004

The data from the structured observations indicate that police were not present in all the samples taken. There was a visible police presence in 52% of samples taken at the tournament. Breaking down the patterns by country reveals the general police deployment pattern in Austria to be different to that of Switzerland. The data from the structured observations indicate that there was a visible police presence in 60% of samples taken in Austria. In Switzerland, the structured observation results indicate that there was a visible police presence in 44% of samples taken in Switzerland. At Euro 2004 in 80% of the samples police officers were present. The average ratio of officers per 100 fans at Euro 2004 was 4, at both high and low risk matches.

Table 7.1 shows the patterns of deployment in relation to the form of which policing was visibly present in the samples taken in Austria and Switzerland at Euro 2008, and at Euro 2004 when broken down into standard uniform, half riot uniform, full riot uniform and police vehicles (which include cars, PSU vans and containment arrest vehicles).

Table: 7.1: *General picture of police deployment at Euro 2008 and Euro 2004 in percentages of samples in which police were recorded as present*

	Euro 2008 (Austria)	Euro 2008 (Switzerland)	Euro 2004* (Portugal)
Standard uniform	28%	34%	80%
<i>Median</i>	3	7	<i>n/a</i> ¹
<i>Inter-quartile range</i>	4	6	<i>n/a</i>
Half riot uniform	39%	12%	31%
<i>Median</i>	8	10	<i>n/a</i>

¹ *n/a*; this information is not presented in the publication.

<i>Inter-quartile range</i>	13	14	<i>n/a</i>
Full riot uniform	4%	4%	>1%
<i>Median</i>	100	40	<i>n/a</i>
<i>Inter-quartile range</i>	132	95	<i>n/a</i>
Riot police vehicles	13%	7%	>1%
<i>Median</i>	2	1	<i>n/a</i>
<i>Inter-quartile range</i>	4	1	<i>n/a</i>
Foreign police	27%	22%	<i>n/a</i>
<i>Median</i>	8	6	<i>n/a</i>
<i>Inter-quartile range</i>	16	5	<i>n/a</i>

**Euro 2004 data based on the analysis of Schreiber & Adang (2010)*

7.4.2 General patterns of police deployment in relation to risk and non-risk matches

The proportion of police officers present was on average 2 officers per 100 fans in relation to low risk matches and 5 officers per 100 fans around increased risk matches. In order to examine the difference between the way each country responded to risk categorisation, further analysis examined police deployment patterns in relation to high and low risk categorisations separately in Austria and in Switzerland.

In Austria, if police were present, the proportion was on average <1 officers per 100 fans in relation to low risk matches and 5 officers per 100 fans at high risk matches. In Switzerland, if police were present, the proportion was on average 3 officers per 100 fans in relation to low risk matches and 3 officers per 100 fans around high risk matches (see Figure 7.1). The average ratio of officers per 100 fans at Euro 2004 was 4, at both high and low risk matches. Figure 7.2 shows the deployment of foreign police officers recorded at high and low risk events in Austria and Switzerland.

Figure 7.1: Average ratio of police per 100 fans at risk and non-risk games, at Euro 2008 in Austria and Switzerland




Table 7.2 shows the patterns of deployment in relation to the form of which policing was visibly present in the samples taken in Austria and Switzerland at Euro 2008, and at Euro 2004 when broken down into standard uniform, half riot uniform, full riot uniform, police vehicles (which include cars, PSU vans and containment arrest vehicles), and foreign police presence; further split by deployment at risk and non-risk events.

Table 7.2: Police deployment at Euro 2008 and Euro 2004 as it relates to risk in percentages of samples in which police were recorded as present


	Euro 2008 (Austria)		Euro 2008 (Switzerland)		Euro 2004* (Portugal)	
	risk	non-risk	risk	non-risk	Risk	non-risk
Standard uniform	31%	24%	35%	33%	77%	81%
<i>Median</i>	4	2	6	8	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>
<i>Inter-quartile range</i>	8	1	6	8		
half riot uniform	52%	19%	7%	14%	34%	28%
<i>Median</i>	7	9	3.5	10	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>
<i>Inter-quartile range</i>	7	16	4	12	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>

Full riot uniform	4%	0%	3%	4%	0	0%
<i>Median</i>	100	0	40	5	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>
<i>Inter-quartile range</i>	132	0	0 ⁺	95	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>
Riot police vehicle	18%	6%	6%	7%	15%	16%
<i>Median</i>	2	1	2	1	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>
<i>Inter-quartile range</i>	4	4	1	1	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>
Foreign police					<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>
<i>Median</i>	13	4	7	6	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>
<i>Inter-quartile range</i>	16	3	4	16	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>

**Euro 2004 based on the analysis of Schreiber & Adang (2010)*

⁺Inter-quartile range cannot be computed due to the low frequency of full riot samples which record a presence

Figure 7.2: Ratio of foreign police presence per 100 fans at risk and non-risk games, at Euro 2008 in Austria and Switzerland



Mann Whitney analysis tests on the police deployment in Austria in relation to risk classification indicates a highly significant interaction between the overall police deployment and risk categorisation ($U = -7.865$, $n = 439$, $p < .001$). Specifically, there was found to be significant effect of risk categorisation on half riot deployment ($U = -7.874$, $n = 438$, $p < .001$), and full riot deployment ($U = -1.975$, $n = 438$, $p < .048$). In

relation to standard uniform the results were non-significant, but there is a trend towards a higher number at high risk events ($U = -1.788$, $n = 438$, $p < .074$).

Planned comparisons using Mann Whitney analysis on the police deployment in Switzerland in relation to risk classification indicates no significant interaction between overall police deployment and the risk categorisation ($U = -.753$, $n = 307$, $p > .05$). Specifically, there was found to be no significant interaction between the risk categorisation and: standard uniform ($U = -1.02$, $n = 307$, $p > .05$), half riot uniform ($U = -1.61$, $n = 307$, $p > .05$), or full riot uniform ($U = 1.091$, $n = 307$, $p > .05$). There was found to be a significant relationship between the foreign police deployment and the risk categorisation, at a high risk event there was more visible foreign police presence compared to low risk events ($U = -3.36$, $n = 307$, $p < .001$).

7.4.3 Interaction between police and fans

In Austria positive interaction between police and fans was recorded in 20% percent of the samples. In Switzerland positive interaction between police and fan was recorded in 28% percent of the total samples. Table 7.3 shows the recorded patterns of positive and interactions between fans and police at Euro 2008 and Euro 2004 in percentiles which the interactions were present.

Table 7.3: *Interaction between police and fans at Euro 2008 and Euro 2004 of samples in which police were recorded as present*

	Euro 2008 (Austria)	Euro 2008 (Switzerland)	Euro 2004* (Portugal)
Positive police – fan interaction	20%	28%	9%
Negative police fan interaction	4%	2%	<1%

**Euro 2004 data taken from Schreiber & Adang (2010)*

Levels of negative interaction were higher at Euro 2008 of samples compared to Euro 2004 however it would be misleading to understand this to mean that at the Euro 2004 tournament had no negative incidents; English fans clashed with riot police officers in two of the host cities, during times were no researchers gathering data and thus the records of negative interaction are not represented in the structured data.

7.3.4 Interaction between fan groups

Positive interaction between fan groups has been recorded in 41% percent of the total samples in Austria, and 48% percent of the total samples in Switzerland. Not related to risk categorisation negative interaction between fan groups has been recorded in 5% percent of the total samples in Austria, and 5% percent of the total samples in Switzerland. Table 7.4 shows the recorded patterns of positive and interactions between fans groups at Euro 2008 and Euro 2004 in percentiles which the interactions were present.

Table 7.4: *Interactions between fan groups at Euro 2008 and Euro 2004 in percentage of samples in which police were recorded as present*

	Euro 2008 (Austria)	Euro 2008 (Switzerland)	Euro 2004* (Portugal)
Positive interaction between fan groups	41%	48%	14%
Negative interaction between fan groups	5%	5%	<1%

**Euro 2004 data taken from Schreiber & Adang (2010)*

Chi squared analysis was conducted to examine any differences between the risk categorisation and inter-group interaction patterns between Austria and Switzerland. In Austria, there was found to be a no relationship between risk categorisation and the recorded instances of; positive interaction (between fan group one and fan group two); positive interaction between police and fans; instances of

negative interaction between fans; instances of negative interaction between police and fans at high or low risk events, in Austria; incidents; or, police intervention.

In Switzerland, there was found to be no relationship between risk categorisation and the recorded instances of; positive interaction (between fan group one and fan group two;; positive interaction between police and fans; negative interaction between police and fans at high or low risk events; incidents; or, police intervention. However, there was found to be a significant relationship in relation to the recorded instances of negative interaction between police and fans irrespective of risk ($\chi^2 = 4.693$, $df = 1$, $p = .040$).

7.4.5 Policing within Austrian host cities

On the basis of these findings analysis turned to address the specific differences between the deployment patterns within each Austrian city in relationship to risk. If police were present, the proportion was at low risk matches on average <1 in Innsbruck, and 1 in Salzburg officers per 100 fans, and at increased risk matches 3 officers per 100 fans in Vienna, and 10 in Klagenfurt. Table 7.5 shows the median distribution of police in risk and non risk host cities in Austria.

Table 7.5: Median distribution of police in Austrian cities that were hosts to risk and non risk events, in the samples which police were recorded as present

Risk	City	N	Median	Inter-quartile range
Low	Innsbruck	74	10	8
Low	Salzburg	97	14	3
High	Klagenfurt	96	17	16
High	Vienna	171	14	7

Table 7.6 shows the patterns of deployment in relation to the form of policing was visibly present in the samples taken in Austrian host cities when broken down into standard uniform, half riot uniform, full riot uniform and police vehicles (which include cars, PSU vans and containment arrest vehicles) and foreign police presence.

Table: 7.6: *General picture of police deployment within the Austrian host cities, in percentages of samples in which police were recorded as present*

	Innsbruck (low risk)	Salzburg (low risk)	Klagenfurt (high risk)	Vienna (high risk)
Standard uniform	17%	29%	16%	40%
<i>Median</i>	3	2	10	3
<i>Inter-quartile range</i>	6	0	14	4
Half riot uniform	31%	9%	74%	40%
<i>Median</i>	10	6	15	4
<i>Inter-quartile range</i>	10	3	16	4
Full riot uniform	5%	>0%	6%	3%
<i>Median</i>	5	0	18	100
<i>Inter-quartile range</i>	2	0	18	132
Riot police vehicles	13%	>0%	34%	9%
<i>Median</i>	1	0	2	3.5
<i>Inter-quartile range</i>	4	0	2	5
Foreign police	28%	10%	77%	8%
<i>Median</i>	5	3	15.5	2
<i>Inter-quartile range</i>	5	2	13	1

Kruskal-Wallis was conducted on police deployment in the different cities in Austria and revealed statistically significant differences in the total number of police $\chi^2 (3, N = 439) = 86.80, p < .001$, normal police $\chi^2 (3, N = 439) = 29.20, p < .001$, half riot police $\chi^2 (3, N = 439) = 112.98, p < .001$, and police vehicles $\chi^2 (3, N = 439) =$

49.87, $p = .001$. There was not found to be a significant effect of city on full riot police $\chi^2 (3, N = 439) = 6.94, p > .05$.

Planned comparisons were conducted using Mann-Whitney tests on differences between individual cities. Comparisons are only conducted upon those DV's which the Kruskal-Wallis test found to be significantly affected by city. Due to the large number of comparisons a partial correction was conducted on the p values (Sankoh et al., 1997) therefore p values $< .01$ are considered significant. A full Bonferroni correction is not conducted as DVs as the omnibus tests revealed significant differences.

Planned comparisons using Mann-Whitney analysis was conducted among the four Austrian host cities in relation to police deployment. There was found to be a significant difference between Klagenfurt and Innsbruck on the following variables: total number of police ($U = -6.59, n = 170, p < .001$), half riot ($U = -6.42, n = 171, p < .001$), and riot vehicles ($U = -8.78, n = 170, p < .001$). There was no significant difference found between the policing in Klagenfurt and Innsbruck on the normal uniform variable ($U = -.208, n = 171, p > .5$).

There was found to be a significant difference between Klagenfurt and Vienna on the following variables: total number of police ($U = -5.49, n = 268, p < .001$), normal uniform ($U = -4.15, n = 268, p < .001$), half riot ($U = -7.57, n = 268, p < .001$), and riot vehicles ($U = -4.36, n = 268, p < .001$).

There was found to be a significant difference between Klagenfurt and Salzburg on the following variables: total number of police ($U = -7.91, n = 194, p < .001$), normal uniform ($U = -2.46, n = 194, p < .001$), half riot ($U = -9.13, n = 194, p < .001$), and riot vehicles ($U = -5.92, n = 194, p < .001$).

There was found to be a significant difference between Innsbruck and Vienna on two variables: total number of police ($U = -3.71, n = 245, p < .001$) and normal uniform ($U = -4.07, n = 245, p < .001$). There was no significant difference found

between the policing in Innsbruck and Vienna on the following variables: half riot ($U = -1.29$, $n = 245$, $p > .05$) and riot vehicles ($U = -.698$, $n = 245$, $p > .05$).

There was found to be a significant difference between Innsbruck and Salzburg on the following variables: half riot ($U = -3.19$, $n = 171$, $p < .001$) and riot vehicles ($U = -.259$, $n = 171$, $p < .001$). There was no significant difference found between the policing in Innsbruck and Salzburg on the following variables: total number of police ($U = -.468$, $n = 171$, $p > .05$), normal police uniform ($U = -1.63$, $n = 171$, $p > .05$).

There was found to be a significant difference between Vienna and Salzburg on the following variables: total number of police ($U = -5.09$, $n = 268$, $p < .000$), normal uniform ($U = -2.15$, $n = 268$, $p < .001$), half riot ($U = -4.92$, $n = 268$, $p < .05$), and riot vehicles ($U = -3.10$, $n = 268$, $p < .001$).

7.4.6 Interaction between fans groups in host cities in Austria

Positive interaction between fan groups in Austrian cities has been recorded in 46% percent of the total samples in Innsbruck, 28% percent of the total samples in Salzburg, 44% percent of the total samples in Vienna, 30% percent of the total samples in Klagenfurt. Negative interaction between fan groups in Austrian cities has been recorded in 7% percent of the total samples in Innsbruck, <0% percent of the total samples in Salzburg, 7% percent of the total samples in Vienna, 4% percent of the total samples in Klagenfurt.

7.4.7 Interaction between the police and fans in host cities in Austria

Positive interaction between police and fans has been recorded in 12% percent of the total samples in Innsbruck, 20% percent of the total samples in Salzburg, 25% percent of the total samples in Vienna, 20% percent of the total samples in Klagenfurt. Negative interaction between police and fans has been recorded in 6% percent of the total samples in Innsbruck, <0% percent of the total samples in Salzburg, 5% percent of the total samples in Vienna, 4% percent of the total samples in Klagenfurt.

7.4.8 Arrest statistics

The Swiss police made 550 arrests and detentions during the tournament. The Swiss authorities said the arrests represented one detention for every 4,200 visitors; compared to one in 2,330 in Germany at the WC06, or the total number of 53 arrests in Portugal during the Euro 2004². The Austrian authorities announced on the 27th June 470 arrests were made, while an estimated 1.7 million fans travelled to Austria to watch the 12 group stage matches hosted by the country³. 174 of these arrests were made in Klagenfurt on the second day of the tournament, this equates to 37% of the total arrests. The number of arrests made in Austria on the first night of the tournament was almost 3 times the amount of arrests that were made through the duration of the entire Euro 2004 tournament.

7.5 Discussion

To reiterate, the objectives of the current study were to investigate the operational police deployment in Austria and Switzerland during Euro 2008. Specifically, the research sought to address whether there was; (1) an effect of the risk classification (high/low) on the police deployment; and (2) the relationship risk classification has with the level of positive and negative inter-group relations between police and foreign nationals.

7.5.1 The effect of risk classification on policing

The research addressed to the effect of risk classification on the police deployment profiles in the two host countries. The results indicate that there was a significant difference between the police tactical deployment between Austria and Switzerland. The presence of police profile represented by the data at high and low risk matches demonstrates a significant difference between the two countries in the way by which the police behaviourally responded to the classification of a high/low

² <http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKL2682087420080626> *Swiss organisers hail peaceful tournament.*

³ *Ibid.*

risk event (see Figure 7.1). Austria showed main effects of total police, foreign, riot and half riot in correspondence to a high risk categorisation. In Switzerland only a main effect of the foreign police deployment at high risk events was found.

This suggests that deployment in Switzerland was quantitatively equal at high risk and low risk events, and thus there was no effect of the risk categorisation on police deployment. However, the results support the contention that in Austria the risk categorisation acted to mediate the police deployment tactics and strategy in the management of the event. In Austria the recordings of half riot uniform were seven times more than that in Switzerland at an event considered of the same level of risk. A distinction in Austria was made between high and low risk games, indicated by the significantly higher number of visible officers, half riot uniforms and riot control vehicles. It was recorded there were five times as many police per 100 fans at a high risk match in Austria than at a low risk match.

One finding which was not as expected was that in both countries, in light of the fact that Austria hosted the three fan groups considered to pose highest risk of the tournament, the likelihood of seeing officers in full riot PPE was the same in Switzerland as it was in Austria. Additionally, in Switzerland, it has been found that there was more deployment of riot police at low risk events, than at high risk. This difference was not in the expected direction. Generally speaking these differences are fractional, and in both countries the mean number of officers wearing full riot PPE uniform was <1%. This indicates that the need for a police presence in high profile police uniform including the need to wear protective helmets was very low in both countries. Given that police commanders were unlikely to take risks with the safety of their officers this can be taken to indicate that the overall level of expected conflict and negative inter-group behaviours has also been assessed to be low.

Thus, in relation to the question of whether there was an effect of the risk classification on police deployment at the Euro 2008 tournament the evidence presented here supports that there was a quantitative difference; but that this effect was limited to the policing in only one of the two host countries. Given this dynamic, the analysis then sought to investigate whether both the cities in Austria which were

host to as high risk events (Klagenfurt and Vienna), showed a significant effect of increased police profile or whether the bi-national difference was driven by one city more so than the other. Further analysis also sought to address the extent to which the policing in the cities which hosted high risk compared to low risk matches (Innsbruck and Salzburg), differed.

As can be seen by the analysis presented, the policing in Klagenfurt significantly differed in the sense it was more high profile in compared with Vienna, Innsbruck and Salzburg. The results indicate that part of the bi-national effect of risk classification is driven by the deployment approach in Klagenfurt at which there was statistically more half riot uniform deployment officers and police vehicles. Vienna opted for a more low profile approach, compared with Klagenfurt, relying on significantly more standard uniform officers and less half riot, full riot and police vehicles.

The difference in policing could be put down the geographical size of the host cities being that Klagenfurt is only a fraction of the geographic size and population of that in Vienna; therefore one could theorise that Klagenfurt is likely to capture more instances of police deployment/action than Vienna, but this is not likely to be the case. The reason is that the structured observation samples have been systematically gathered in areas where the foreign nationals gathered, and thus are not representative of the general size of the city or population. In comparison with the cities that were host to foreign nationals considered to pose a lower risk to public order (Innsbruck and Salzburg) the police presence in Klagenfurt is significantly higher, whereas there is less difference recorded between the deployments in the hosts to low risk events (which are geographically similar to Klagenfurt), compared to Vienna.

The results interestingly find that the significance of risk classification was not limited to the effect of the significantly different policing in the high risk classification, but the result also indicate an effect of the low risk classification in Innsbruck; in which the policing significantly differed from the counterpart low risk host city of Salzburg. For an city hosting low risk classified match Salzburg relied high visibility of half riot and police vehicles, strategically this is most like the

approach taken in Klagenfurt, rather than Salzburg. Salzburg employed a strategy most comparable to the approach witnessed during the Euro 2004 tournament, relying on a high visibility of normal uniform officers and no recordings of full riot uniform or vehicles.

7.5.2 The effect of policing on the inter-group dynamics at Euro 2008

The first thing to note is that as a result of the way by which the data was gathered in relation to inter-group dynamics between the police and fan groups statistical analysis could be conducted. Instead, what could be provided is a pattern of the presence or absence of behaviours (as perceived by the data gather), to be positive or negative in valence.

The data indicate that overall instances of positive interaction between the police and fans were marginally higher in Switzerland, than that recorded in Austria. Additionally, there were more instances of positive interaction between the two fan groups in Switzerland, than that recorded in Austria. Additionally, negative interaction between the police and fans were twice as likely to be witnessed in Austria, compared to Switzerland. Given that Austria was host to the three foreign nationals groups considered the highest risk in Europe, this is a rather unsurprising finding. Further, while the data can show the existence of this dynamic an issue which cannot be addressed in the current study is whether the negative interaction between the police and the fans in Austria is as a result of the fans behaviour, or that of the police. Taken at a bi-national level then, this evidence does appear to suggest that a low profile policing approach does in fact facilitate positive inter-group interaction, while a high profile policing increases negative inter-group interaction.

However, examining policing and inter-action in Austria raises questions about the relationship between high profile deployment and its theorised relationship to negative inter-action. While recognising that Klagenfurt had the highest number and profile of police on the streets during the Euro 2008 tournament the findings also report the higher level of positive inter-group than Salzburg; and a lower recording of negative fan interaction than Vienna. This is a particularly prominent finding as it is

clear from the data that Vienna deployed significantly more standard uniform officers than Klagenfurt (which opted for a reliance on half riot PPE), yet the positive interaction in Vienna was markedly lower than that which was reported in Klagenfurt. Indeed, Salzburg was found to have the lowest profile police approach between the Austrian cities; despite this, the positive interaction reported between fans was the lowest of all four cities. Innsbruck, despite the profile being most comparable to Klagenfurt witnessed the highest level of positive interaction in Austria.

An important finding in relation to inter-group dynamics which is maintained in both the host countries at the tournament (and an important consideration in light of the crowd psychology literatures supposition that police action is typically responsible for disorder at international football events), is that foreign nationals were more likely to engage in negative interaction with other foreign national groups, than they are to engage in negative interaction with the police. They are more likely to want to fight with one another, than they are to see the police tactics as a threat and target them. Additionally, in relation to the levels of negative interaction, the reports of such were very low in relation to the number of fans in attendance at the tournament.

These results indicate that police strategies and particularly half and full riot PPE do not precipitate violence, nor are they related to lower levels of positive or negative interaction between the police and fans as is currently hypothesised by crowd psychology theorists (Stott et al., 2004; 2007). The perspective put forward in the literature regarding the impact of police tactics and strategy is not consistent with the structured observation data presented here. The literature argues that risk fans are treated differently to those considered to be non-risk, while there is some support for this in relation to the policing in Klagenfurt, across the tournament it seems this was not the case.

7.5.3 Considering the hypotheses of the crowd psychology literature

An additional aim of the current analysis was to discuss the results as they relate to the hypothesis put forward in the literature by the ESIM related to the relationship between the police deployment and inter-group interaction. The first of

which is that fans of national groups considered to be high risk are policed differently to those who are not considered to pose high risk. The findings of this analysis do provide support for this contention on the basis of the data gathered in Austria, but not on the basis of that gathered in Switzerland. One explanation which could be offered to explain the contrast is that in situations where the football teams of two national fan groups both considered to pose high risk are playing one another (as was the case in Klagenfurt and Vienna), the policing varies to events considered to pose high risk but only involve one national fan team who are perceived to pose a high level of risk (as was the case in Switzerland).

And the second hypothesis is that policing approach to high risk fans creates the social conditions where negative inter-group interaction is increased between the national fan groups, and between the national fan groups and the police. Again, there was found to be mixed support for this hypothesis. Taken at a bi-national level the findings support the ascertain that low profile policing does in fact facilitate positive inter-group interaction, as well as providing evidence to suggest that high profile policing increases negative inter-group interaction. However, the inter-group dynamics recorded in Austria provides much evidence to contradict to this assertion. Thus, police approaches have not been found to relate to differences in inter-group relations between foreign nationals and the police in the way which the literature hypothesises. It can be concluded from the current results that the relationship between police strategies and the level of positive and negative interaction between the police and crowd is certainly not a straight forward one; as the crowd psychology literature suggests.

7.5.4 Comparing Euro 2004 and Euro 2008

Considering the data of Stott and colleagues (2004, 2007) it can be seen that Euro 2004 opted for a far more high visibility of low profile police deployment than Euro 2008. At Euro 2004 in 80% of the samples police officers were present. The average ratio of officers per 100 fans at Euro 2004 was 4, at both high and low risk matches. The deployment of half riot police was more than in Switzerland, but not as much as in Austria. However, as we have established without the policing in

Klagenfurt, half riot poling at Euro 2004 would also have been higher than that at Euro 2008.

The policing at Euro 2004 amounted to significantly less positive interaction between; (1) police and foreign nationals and, (2) between foreign national groups than at the Euro 2008 tournament. Even in Austria (with Klagenfurt included) the level of positive interaction was more than double that recorded at Euro 2004. Thus, in relation to the success of the police strategy at Euro 2004 compared with that of Euro 2008 in terms of the positivity of interaction between the police and foreign nationals this body of data suggests that Euro 2008 managed the inter-group relations more effectively than the policing at Euro 2004. One obvious factor which may point to the differences between positive and negative interaction between the two tournaments is the absence of the English nationals at the latter.

The major difference between the Euro 2004 and Euro 2008 in terms of strategy for managing the foreign nationals is that efforts were been made to control the number of English foreign nationals who had a previous identification with disorder at international tournaments. The extremity of the measures taken to control the presence of the English fans at Euro 2004 was not paralleled by the efforts to control the number of German, Polish or Turkish fans who travelled to Euro 2008. An additional consideration is that at the Euro 2004 tournament, despite the low levels of arrests and the avoidance of any preventative arrests there was large scale disorder. The same cannot be said for Euro 2008. This could be taken as support that the measures taken during Euro 2008 were more effective in managing the overall strategic objective of a public order operation; which is the avoidance of public disorder.

In Portugal at Euro 2004, the only instances of mass disorder involved the English fans. Indeed, at Euro 2000, co-hosted by Belgium and the Netherlands, there were also a series of major incidents of disorder during which 965 England fans were arrested. At the 2006 World Cup Finals in Germany, there were again a series of incidents of crowd disorder and 828 England fans were arrested or detained (for a detailed overview of these events see Stott & Pearson, 2007). Even at Euro 96 there

were a series of incidents of football related disorder involving English fans, both within and outside the country. This has repeatedly been put down to the police tactics that were used in the management of the English fans, but the ultimate fact of the matter is that other national groups were managed using the same tactics and disorder did not develop involving these national groups.

In relation to 'success' of the police strategy and tactics at the Euro 2004 compared with Euro 2008 in relation to managing disorder, there were less arrests at the former. There must be caution in the interpretation of arrest figures along with other official and unofficial indicators, such as reports of assaults, damage to property, and media reports. Thus, the question then moves to address whether the lower level of arrests at Euro 2004 could be related to the disorder in that the police forces in Portugal were reluctant to make preventative arrests. A second, key issue related to differences in arrests at the two tournaments is whether the decision to prevent English nationals known to engage with disorder travelling to the tournament had an impact on the ultimate levels of arrests.

The low arrest statistics could be the result of banning order legislation, in England and Wales, in which the British government prevented those fans who previously had been involved in conflict from leaving the home country during the tournament (Home Office, 2005). In other words, according to the Home Office report (2005) positive outcomes were achieved through controlling the movement across national borders of those individuals and groups who were seen by the authorities as likely to initiate disorder. The same measure was not taken in relation to the German or Polish fans at Euro 2008, which could begin to offer one potential explanation for the increase in arrest statistics.

7.5.5 Additional considerations of the analysis

Another interesting finding across the tournament is the level of foreign police deployment at matches considered to pose risk. This can be interpreted as an increased reliance on international co-operation in order to manage high risk nationals, which is in line with recommendations at a political level. The results found

that in Austria were least likely to see foreign police co-operation in Vienna, and were most likely to experience police presence in Klagenfurt. While the remit of this data set cannot explain why this is the case, one explanation for the high police presence in Klagenfurt will be explored in the subsequent qualitative investigation of the policing in the city.

The crowd psychology literature emphasises the importance not only of communication, but who it is communicated by, and the means by which this is achieved. According to the SIT the source of communication messages are often best received by groups when the source is considered to be someone they socially identify with. 'Who' should be 'one of us', in other words, in the context of public order someone which the crowd can relate to and preferably in their own language, and foreign national police officers from their home country and wearing the uniform they would at home has been argued to be an effective strategy according to academics Reicher et al., 2004; 2007) and international policy of the EU handbook. Research at past tournaments has reported there have been issues related to the willingness of the host countries of fans considered to be high risk in facilitating co-operation (Adang & Cuvelier, 2000), the finding of increase police co-operation can therefore be taken as a positive indication of the increasing levels of support being offered across Europe to facilitate safety, order and enjoyment at football events.

The levels of positive interaction during the Euro 2008 tournament are almost surprising given the perspectives of the police officers prior to the tournament. However, it does go to provide further evidence to support the claim that officers enter into dialogue in order to actively and positively interact with foreign nationals where they felt safe and appropriate to do so. What this also indicates is that positive interaction between the police dressed in half and full riot protection must have been readily taking place throughout the tournament, raising further questions about the necessary need to deploy officers in low profile uniform and increase the risk posed to them.

7.5.6 Limitations of structured observation data

The structured observation data is subject to particular limitations. For example there is always an issue with observer bias; in as much that inter-observer reliability cannot be guaranteed. Measures to address this were put in place; teams were composed of at least one member with practical experience. Prior to the event all observers took part in a practical structured observation training course to increase inter observer reliability. Moreover, observers typically had experience gathering structured data at previous European championships.

The method is time consuming, taking place over hours and sometimes in hot or wet weather. Researching in these difficult conditions means that it cannot be assumed there were no repeat performance effects. Rating checks would be a good way to improve the inter-observer reliability. This would involve spot checks where two researchers make a judgement about what is observed, and check to ensure that they are both reporting relatively consistent measurements. Although this would considerably complicate, and add cost and man power, to what is essentially a straight forward methodology to conduct.

Additionally, the method itself is by definition about gathering snap-shots of particular interventions, interactions and events at a particular time and place; then using this data to present a picture of the data set which can be considered to represent the 'average' behaviours and interactions. However, as a research strategy it cannot be avoided that significant instances and inter-actions may well be taking place which are not in the remit of the sample. Given this, one cannot rule out the fact that events which could change the picture of the general may have been omitted as a result of being in the wrong place at the time of data gathering.

Acknowledging the limitations, it also facilitates particular advantages for crowd research, by providing a statistical basis from which to discuss relationships and allows correlation relationships to be more readily drawn surrounding the nature of policing and the ultimate outcome of the events while retaining the external validity of the research findings. The advantages of structured observation are that the

data are quantitative and relatively easy to collect. Observation of behaviour exactly as it occurs in the real world, and structured observation categorises this behaviour in such a way that is comparative. Quantitative information is primarily used to measure the extent to which particular behaviours occur, or when statistical inference is preferred in order to add an objective measure of the factors being investigated.

7.6 Conclusion

To conclude, these results indicate that police strategies and particularly half and full riot PPE do not precipitate violence, nor are they related to lower levels of positive or negative interaction between the police and fans as is currently hypothesised by crowd psychology theorists (Stott et al., 2004; 2007). The perspective put forward in the literature regarding the impact of police tactics and strategy is not consistent with the structured observation data presented here. The literature argues that risk fans are treated differently to those considered to be non-risk, while there is some support for this in relation to the policing in Klagenfurt, across the tournament it seems this was not the case. The nature of this analysis cannot reveal the detail underpinning the differences, or the psychology which provides a rationale for their existence. Research will not turn to addressing this methodological limitation in Chapter 8, by providing a qualitative case study analysis rich in contextual detail of the police strategy and tactics and relationship to inter-group relations at the Germany Vs. Poland match hosted by the city Klagenfurt, in Austria at Euro 2008.

CHAPTER 8:

A STUDY OF THE INTER-GROUP RELATIONS AT EURO 2008:
GERMANY VS. POLAND

8.1 Introduction

The structured data presented in the previous chapter demonstrates that there was a significant difference between the police strategy and tactical deployment in the management of foreign nationals in Klagenfurt, compared to the other host cities in Austria. Quantitative analysis can only present a picture of what happened generally, and lacks the ability to provide a rationale for the underlying psychology between police and crowd members, the outcome or phenomenological experience of what it was actually like to be in Klagenfurt. The current analysis seeks to do the latter, by drawing on data collected during the high risk event in Klagenfurt. The aim is to understand the factors which may have contributed to the police deployment profile at the Germany Vs Poland match, which took place on the 8th of June 2008.

The current Chapter relates to the thesis more generally by providing a case study of a real life policing of which draws together various analytical points which have been emphasised throughout the thesis. By providing a case example of how identity related considerations, group processes factors within the police and inter-group dynamics interact with the policing employed to manage a high risk event in the context of international football. The point which is being sought to be made here by providing a concrete example is that there are a multiplicity of factors and audiences, over and above those actually being policed, which the interact with the police strategy and tactics.

Additionally, this case study stands out in the ethnographic accounts which are currently offered by the literature in the sense that it provides an example of a high risk event which *did not* result in disorder. The police achieved the ultimate objective of the role which is to maintain public order. It provides a useful indicator of the variables and circumstances under which instances may become dangerous, with an increased likelihood of disorder, which was averted by police management. Situations such as that documented in this Chapter occur with a broader frequency than actual incidents. Waiting for an instance of large scale disorder to occur is likely to provide little useful information which can be used in future interventions to successfully manage the environment. Instead, by capturing 'near miss' learning points,

researchers and practitioners may become better equipped to identify the relevant variables and predict incidents, resulting in the development of interventions which are likely to enhance safety for those in attendance, and performing an occupational role at international football events.

8.1.1 Socio-cognitive and behavioural case study

This paper reports on an ethnographic study of the socio-cognitive and behavioural variables policing during the first match perceived to be of high risk during the Euro 2008 tournament. The police strategy and tactics on the ground, and the interaction with foreign nationals was observed in Klagenfurt over a three day period. Observations were made of a police intervention during which 140 German nationals were preventatively arrested. Interviews were conducted when possible with police on the ground, although a political decision was made at a high level instructing police officers not to co-operate with researchers, so this limited the level of access which was achieved in relation to the police perspective on the ground. However, contacts which developed during the PREP were utilised to gain access to a high level strategic police commander in the morning of the match day. Interviews were conducted over the three days with foreign nationals from an array of European countries, although the focus has been on gaining a perspective of the German and Polish fans.

The analysis is broad ranging, and considers a plethora of factors which are likely to have made a contribution to the professional handing of the event strategically and tactically. The analysis indicates negative and pessimistic pre-tournament media coverage, in the host country and Poland, which research suggests was related to the police and crowd perspectives of threat, in such way that had symbolic and realistic consequences for the way the fans were policed. The analysis also highlights the importance of geographical, infra-structural, local and political perspectives on the management of high risk international football events.

In relation to the policing, the analysis indicates a highly visible presence of German *Bereitschaftspolizei*, specialist officers in riot control. Interviews with

Austrian and German officers, and fans, suggest the German support was heavily relied on because they had a level of experience managing international football events, which the Austrian police did not. The Austrian police were highly concerned and had an expectation of disorder. This was in contrast to the optimistic perspective held of the German police who were interviewed. Despite the high profile police deployment strategy, tactics and the use of full PPE, the interactions between police and fans on the ground were positive, as indicated by interviews and the observation data presented. The event passed largely without incidents, with the exception of the mass preventative arrest. After the match, at the end of the evening, there was a party atmosphere where all nationalities celebrated together on the main streets of Klagenfurt, in the absence of disorder. The theoretical significance of these findings is discussed in relation to the existing crowd psychology literature and with consideration for the best way to minimise widespread disorder at high risk events.

The strength of this analysis lies in the multiple methods used to consolidate the argument. Multiple forms of triangulation have been employed in an attempt to provide an objective account of what actually happened at the event, and to reflect the inter-group relations as best as possible. It is the first account in the crowd and public order literature to attribute consideration for the perspectives of frontline police, commanders and crowd members integrated with structured observation data, archival research and participant observation as a crowd member. In other words, the aim is to provide an integrated study of the two sides of the inter-group dynamic as this data relates to the same crowd events. It is the most comprehensive account of policing and the relationship with foreign nationals in terms of accounting for the multiple audiences at play which has been offered to the literature. This is to satisfy the methodological objectives of triangulation, and to provide the most objective and accurately presented account possible; given the potential for subjective interpretation due to the nature of the research.

8.1.2 Objectives

To reiterate, the concerns shaping this enquiry are to present a case study 'what happened and why' account of the policing of high risk nationals in Klagenfurt

by examining police understandings and explore operational police practice in an international context, also accounting for the impact police strategy and tactics had on the crowd dynamics and levels of disorder.

8.2 Method and analytical strategy

The data gathering at Klagenfurt took place within a wider CEPOL research group framework (see Chapter 3). An ethnographic methodology was used for data gathering which is characteristically flexible and suited to the highly opportunistic nature of field research (Green, 1993), making available a wide variety of different data sources. The policing and interaction with fans by the police was observed in Klagenfurt over a three day period; prior to the match, match day and the day following. Over this period approximately 36 hours were spent conducting observations and interviews.

Using qualitative and quantitative methods data was gathered on; (1) police strategy, tactics and behaviour, (2) fan perspectives and behaviour, (3) police-fan interactions and (4) levels of conflict. In total 96 structured observation samples were gathered in Klagenfurt by two researchers, including the current author. The two researchers travelled ahead of the organised research group to conduct observations at the high risk event. Participant observations were conducted simultaneously. The observational account presented was conducted by the current author who witnessed everything which is reported, completed using real time interviews, follow up interviews, and reports from archival sources.

Police and foreign national perspectives were gathered by the first author through opportunistic on the scene interviews. The interviews with the foreign nationals were semi-structured by understanding of in-group social identity, relations with out-groups and perception of the social context. Prior to the tournament a semi-structured interview schedule was completed (see appendix G). In Klagenfurt 12 German national supporters and 8 Polish national supporters were interviewed during the match day. In addition, 5 German national fans and 3 Polish national fans were interviewed post hoc in Vienna during observations for a subsequent match

specifically about their impressions and experiences in Klagenfurt. In total, 17 (n=17) German nationals and 12 (n= 12) Polish nationals were also interviewed in order to construct the foreign national phenomenology accounts. Interviews with fans were opportunistic, and lasted between 15 minutes to one hour.

Interviews with police were semi-structured with a focus on their understanding of the graded tactical model of policing and of developing situations of risk see appendix F). When it was not possible to interview officers at the scene, attempts were made to gather data from the police perspective afterwards. During the course of the day interviews were conducted with 1 Austrian senior commander, who was responsible for the implementation of the 3D policy throughout the Austrian forces for Euro 2008. In addition, 8 frontline officers (all German riot control) have been interviewed. In total, 9 (n= 9) police officers were interviewed in Klagenfurt. Interview ranged in length, and lasted between 15 minutes and one 1 hour in duration.

Interviews, observations and notes on informal conversations have all been documented as audio recordings, where safe to do so. In such situations where it was unwise to overtly record, verbal notes were recorded immediately after the event took place. This method has the advantage that other researchers can go back over the notes in order to verify that the interpretation of accounts is accurate. They also serve to verify the observations that the original researcher made. Archival research was conducted prior to, during and after the tournament. This serves to contextualise the events and add further detail to the analysis.

Research strategy was to provide an exploratory case study of social context, police tactics and inter-group relations. A case study account is an “empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2009, p. 13). Or put another way, a ‘what happened and why’ account. Given the subject is inter-group interactions and there is no ability to control or manipulate behaviour in this unpredictable and potentially dangerous context, this was considered the most suiting strategy. From the combination of data sources police understandings and the relationship to strategy and tactics were explored. Emergent theoretical themes were

identified through the data gathering process and initial analysis. The theoretically relevant issues are explored by providing observational accounts.

The first stage of the analytical processes in the organisation of data was the process of transcription of the interview material for analysis. The transcripts were analysed and material were organised into broad themes of interest. Different underpinning arenas of understanding were identified in each theme, and sub themes developed from this identification. The study was interested in exploring the frequency of particular issues and understandings held by officers, through discussion with them. The analysis sought to explore agreement and disagreement of main themes although, detecting patterns of rhetoric among participants was also considered important.

The analysis first presents a consensual account of context, events and incidents in Klagenfurt. 'Consensus' is derived from a triangulated account of events (Denzin, 1989) based on structured observation data, field notes (observations and interviews), photos, video footage, media reports and police press release. Structured data is then provided to create a general pattern of the policing style in Klagenfurt and the inter-group relations recorded at the event. A case study constructed on the basis of participant observation is then created which investigates the developments observed and the atmosphere on the day, in relation to the policing and inter-group relations. In the case study a detailed account of the mass arrest is included.

Finally, a thematic analysis was conducted on police and fan perceptions of social reality and inter-group relations and presented to consolidate the observation data. Given the methodological approach is informed by the ESIM, which is underpinned by the principle crowd behaviour is shaped by inter-group contexts, specific attention is drawn the way in which the context shapes policing, which in turn constructs dynamics at the event. To illustrate the tactical approach attention is drawn to single incidents, presenting an analysis of situations in which conflict did, or did not materialise.

8.3 Analysis

8.3.1 Contextualising the Germany vs. Poland game

The match took place on the second day of the Euro 2008 tournament, and was the first match considered to pose increased level of risk to order and took place on the 8th June 2008. Klagenfurt is the capital city of the Southern Carinthian Province; where the local population is 90,600¹ making it the smallest host city of the Euro 2008 tournament. The infrastructure of the small city centre is dense, and the streets are narrow (see Figure 8.1). All road traffic was blocked from entering the city centre, meaning the only vehicles to be seen in the small city were the police. The 10th Octoberstrasse (see point A) and Karfrietstrasse (see point B), were the two main streets where bars line either side, and tables and benches were set up to facilitate the visiting fans, located immediately on the entrances to the local shops and restaurants. Three Public Viewing Areas (PVAs) offered the opportunity to watch the match on the giant screens. One was located in the very heart of the city, the NeucPlatz PVA (see Figure 8.1). Another, the MessePlatz was located on the outskirts of the city and the third was outside of the city at Lake Woerthersee. In the city, the AlterPlatz (see Figure 8.1) also had bars, benches and large viewing screen, in addition to the local bars which faced onto the AlterPlatz. The stadium was custom built for the tournament, with a capacity of 32,000 and is located two miles from the city centre. The local people had named the stadium the 'UFO'².

Politically the Governor, the late Jorg Haider, served as leader of the far-right Freedom Party of Austria and Alliance for the Future of Austria, and had been publically accused of being xenophobic and anti-Semitic³. Prior to the tournament the town councillor publically recommended the local women to leave their houses as rarely as possible, and only with pepper spray in their handbag, and cab drivers only to work with a weapon in the car⁴. Local newspapers reported, 'At the WC 2006 in Germany 4000 Mrs. von Hooligans were raped'⁵. A photomontage was published by the Polish tabloid newspaper Super Express on the 5th of June showing the severed heads of German national team players Loew and Ballack with the quotation 'Leo daj

nam ich gtowy!' *Leo bring us their heads!*'. Leo is the Polish national team manager. This is claimed to have exacerbated fears of fan violence in Klagenfurt⁶. Albert Slamanig, security chief of the Carinthia said that the Polish press coverage ahead of the game was *"disgusting and everything but helpful for us."*⁷ The city was reported as a 'ghost town' as a consequence of a fear campaign, released by politicians and spread by the media⁸. On the first night of the tournament Haider distributed five-euro-coupons and appealed for locals not to miss this *"event of the century"*⁹.

The perspective of high risk is equally reflected in the official B.M.I situation report prior to match day, which documents that there were more and more indications that there would be football related security troubles in Klagenfurt¹⁰. The report also detailed that there was no specific information relating to Polish risk fans, but estimates 200-250 German risk fans would be in attendance. The Regional Police Command of Carinthia made requests to the B.M.I for extra support the day before the game, the appeal was not granted on the grounds that there was no new intelligence to justify the measure¹¹.

The media and police report that 25,000 German nationals and 20,000 Polish nationals descended upon Klagenfurt for the match which took place on a Sunday. Reports estimate as many as 80,000 people which included security, police, party goers and Austrian people travelled to the city for the match¹². More than 2,300 police were drafted in along with 2,000 private security agents. This included 70 German hooligan spotters, 400 German officers¹² and 25 Polish officers¹³. Police were patrolling the streets and set up road blocks in the days leading up to the match¹⁴. Strategically, there was a 'No tolerance against the well known'¹⁵. Another source reported the slogan of the officials was "If you don't want trouble, you don't cause trouble"¹⁶. The main tactical approach was focused on the fans who were identified as being involved in disorder at past tournaments, which relied heavily on co-operation with German and Polish spotters¹⁷.

On the evening before the match the Interior Ministry situation report revealed in total 17 arrests were made (14 German, 2 Austrian and 1 Czech)¹⁸, on the 10th of Oktoberstrasse. The Polizeichef Wolfgang Rauchegger reports that known prominent

Figure 8.1 Schematic map of the events and geography in Klagenfurt

high risk fans were arrested¹⁹, although the B.M.I documents did not report this²⁰. On the day of the match 157 people were arrested.

Of the 157 detained, 144 were German, 10 Polish, 2 Austrian and 1 Slovenian²¹. A mass arrest was responsible for 140 of those detained, this was a preventative measure and involved German nationals. The media reported the group were accused of attacks on police officers, breach of the peace and anti-Semitic chanting, such as 'Alle Polen müssen einen gelben Stern tragen' *"All Polish must wear a yellow star"*^{22 23 24 25} and 'Sieg Heil'^{26 27}. Reports also document the arrestees could be heard chanting 'Deutsche Fussballfans sind keine Verbrecher' *"The German fans are not criminals"*²⁸. A police press release stated these fans had been watched over time and the arrests were necessary to prevent the fans carrying out further offenses²⁹. Media reported there were 140 known high risk fans among the group³⁰, although other sources reveal only four of those arrested had records for violence^{31 32}. Of the 157 arrested all but 2 were released without charge^{33 34}. Over the course of the match day 2 police officers were injured one as a result of a traffic incident and the other from a missile which was thrown by fans³⁵.

8.3.2 Structured observation data

In Klagenfurt on match day of the Germany Vs. Poland game police were not present in all the samples taken, but were recorded in 87%. The general picture of the police presence in Klagenfurt at the Germany Vs. Poland game was: 31% of samples officers wore standard uniform, 63% half-riot presence, 15% full riot and 71% foreign police (Non-Austrian). Riot vehicles were recorded in 15% of the samples at the Germany Vs Poland match.

In Klagenfurt at the Germany Vs. Poland match, positive interaction between police and fan was recorded in 17% percent of the total samples, and negative interaction in 10% of samples. Positive interaction between the German and Polish fans has been recorded in 32% of samples, and negative interaction in 10% of the samples. Incidents were recorded in 5% of samples.

8.3.3 Participant observations

From around mid-day large numbers of fans began to gather on the streets in Klagenfurt. Observationally, there were more identifiable German fans than Polish. The Germans and Polish fans were mixed on the street, drinking in custom built bars which lined the streets. Observations reveal interactions between the fan groups were for the most part positive, and the atmosphere was mainly friendly and relaxed. Fans were seen up and down 10th Octoberstrasse drinking, talking and taking pictures with one another (see Figure 8.2). In NeuePlatz PVA Germans and Polish fans played friendly games of table football together. While there were isolated incidents of disorder recorded on occasion throughout the day, this was the majority of inter-group contact was positive, in particular after the match, which was notably different to the supposed chaos that had been predicted by media and politicians prior to the event.

Figure 8.2: German and Polish fans enjoy the positive atmosphere together



The German police were on the streets in far larger numbers than the Austrian. In the morning and early part of the afternoon Bereitschaftspolizei wearing PPE, although generally with a beret and without a helmet, were stationed in groups of between six and ten across the city centre positioned approximately every 50 metres along main streets and thoroughfares. German police vans were highly visible in

locations throughout the town centre often with groups of Bereitschaftspolizei standing around them or seated inside. Despite the high profile nature of the police profile interactions with German and Polish fans were seen to be positive.

Figure 8.3: German fans positively interacting with German riot control specialists



The officers in high profile PPE appeared to be an attractive and welcome spectacle. Observations were conducted for approximately 3 hours in the same location (point A Figure 8.1), between 1300hrs and 1600hrs and during this time the group of approximately ten officers being observed received much attention from fans. They were repeatedly approached by German fans (see Figure 8.3); and less so but still notably by Polish fans (see Figure 8.4). The female riot specialist officers in particular received a lot of positive attention (see Figures 8.3 & 8.5). During the encounters they were asked to pose for pictures, and take pictures of fans, which they appeared happy to do. They gave directions and engaged in general chat with fans throughout the day. Typically, German fans approached the officers but observations of Polish fans doing so were also made (see Figure 8.4).

During the three hours in the one specific location, one isolated incident to which the police profile changed from that reported above. The incident involved a Polish fan punching a German fan in the face, causing the latter to have a bleeding nose.

Figure 8.4: Polish fans positively interacting with German riot control specialists



Figure 8.5: Riot control specialist taking a picture on behalf of a fan



There was a notable and swift response from the officers being observed, in which their behaviour and body language changed entirely (see Figure 8.6). After the

fan was removed, they deescalated and returned to the more relaxed behavioural profile.

Figure 8.6: Riot control specialists' behavioural profile in response to an isolated incident



At approximately 1730hrs, 50 identifiable German and 50 Polish nationals were drinking beers and watching the match between Austria and Croatia on the viewing screens in the Alterplatz. The situation was quiet and there was no segregation, both groups sat together at tables focused towards the ongoing match. At this time a large group of about 50 people who were not wearing football colours entered the Alterplatz en mass from the east side, walked through the centre and gathered around the fountain on the west side of the Square. They were immediately followed by approximately 30 Bereitschaftspolizei who divided into three groups of 10 and stood passively watching the fans from the North, West and East of the Square around fountain area. Over the course of the next hour more German fans began to gather with the group at the fountain. They did not behave similarly to the others watching the football, they had little interest in the game, making no effort to watch but instead standing and talking amongst themselves. The atmosphere was notably heavy, and tense; not like that witnessed earlier in the day. Generally, those fans that were wearing coloured football strips left the square, leaving mainly the large German

group. A representative from the German fan supporters' club representative who was there confirmed that amongst the group were German and that known trouble makers where amongst the group.

By 1830hrs the group numbered around 150 and continued drinking and talking among themselves but not watching the football screens. On occasion they chanted pro-German songs, and 'Deutschland! Deutschland!' The German police remained stationary and other nationals and locals who came to the Alterplatz joined them around the edge of the square rather than entering directly onto it (see Figure 8.7). So at this point many people including the police were watching the group from the perimeter of the square.

Figure 8.7: Specialist riot control and fans (left) watch the group of German nationals (right) from the perimeter of the Alterplatz



At around 1845hrs a transvestite identified as a local, entered the Alterplatz via Herrengasstrasse (Point D on Figure 8.1), and sat on the small wall of the fountain. Approximately ten people from this crowd began to approach the transvestite, verbally chanting, pointing, and on occasion throwing cups beer and coins at her. The transvestite approached one of these men standing in front of him

and appeared to ask why he was throwing things. The group then formed a horseshoe shape around the transvestite, continuing to on occasion throw beer and chanting (see figure 8.8). After a few moments the transvestite exited the square. Throughout this episode the Bereitschaftspolizei were in close proximity and had full sight of the interactions but there was no dialogue, interaction or attempt to prevent the behaviour. During this interaction the number of Bereitschaftspolizei deployed into the Alterplatz increased.

Figure 8.8: German nationals and group together shouting, and on occasion throwing missiles at local



At about 1900hrs the crowd stationed by the fountain moved in two waves to the north, down Herrengasstrasse. The first wave of fans entering Herrengasstrasse was closely followed by approximately 30 Bereitschaftspolizei from the Alterplatz. The second wave of fans followed them and where also followed by a second group of thirty Bereitschaftspolizei. After just a few minutes the first and second units of Bereitschaftspolizei formed cordons blocking the Herrengasstrasse (see Figure 8.9).

Figure 8.9: Specialist riot control officers' cordon off Herrengasstrasse



At around 1910hrs the Bereitschaftspolizei in the cordons put on their helmets and some could be seen removing fans from either bars or side streets and escorted them north toward Ursulinengasse Strasse. At around 1930hrs the cordons were lifted. Our observations record that groups of Austrian riot police were deployed into and blocking the narrow side streets leading off the main thoroughfare. At the end of the Herrengasstrasse units of Bereitschaftspolizei and Bavarian Special Forces had detained approximately 140 people (see Figure 8.10). It was then announced over loud hailers that these fans were to be arrested. Some fans in the group began to shout ‘football fans are not criminals’ and were subsequently arrested and removed.

The match between Germany and Poland kicked off at 2045hrs. The PVA (Point E Figure 8.1) had been closed several hours prior to this, as it was full to capacity. On the 10th Oktoberstasse there where a high volume of Beritschaftspolizei observing the German and Polish fans as they watched the match on the viewing televisions. There were no incidents observed during the match. The match ended at 2230hrs, the score was Germany 2 – Poland 0. Fans began to pour out from the PVA exit, onto 10th Oktoberstasse, there were approximately 40 fully kitted specialist riot control, wearing helmets and face protection, positioned in a line down the west side

of the street. They remained this way for approximately 45 minutes until the fans from the area had dispersed.

Figure 8.10: Specialist riot control, contain and mass arrest 140 German nationals



The highest concentration of people that remained on 10th Oktoberstrasse were fans of various nationalities, although predominantly Croatian, German and Polish, they danced to music from the bars and continued to drink beers until the early hours of the morning (see Figure 8.11). During this later stage of the evening there were no German officers patrolling and for the first time in the day observations were made of Austrian police. The atmosphere was a celebratory one, and officers could be seen recording images of the positive interactions between the fans.

Figure 8.11: Party atmosphere on the 10th Oktoberstrasse after the match



8.3.4 Interview data regarding the inter-group relations

8.3.4.1 German fan perspective of context, identity and police

Overwhelmingly German fans reported a positive social context were they felt welcome, and all of those interviewed defined their identity as non-violent and party seeking. The majority of Germans also defined the relations with Polish fans positively, although simultaneously expressed concerns that some Polish fans were intimidating, although most sought to stress they felt this was just a minority of the group. Several Germans suggested the intentions of the Polish were defined by a desire win the match, rather than have fun. Several also mentioned the role of the Polish media in constructing negative tensions between the groups.

German Fan: "We have met a few [Polish] who were very aggressive from their character and voice. And we went our way; we left them and went around because we do not want trouble. We are friendly and the main reason for us is having fun and have a big football party ... I think they do want to have fun, but the important thing for them is to win ... We have this in Germany, the same fans, for the most part the fans I have met here have been angry, perhaps I have met the wrong fans." (26-35)

All the German fans interviewed recognised the majority of police were from Germany. All fans reported positive social relations with all police, and felt they positivity contributed to their celebrations. Fans defined themselves as similar to the police, and socially identified with the officers, as a source of support if they found themselves in difficulty. [How do you feel having the German police here?] German fan: *"It's great. If we are in trouble we can talk to guys, when you don't know where to go they are your friends. But if they were not Germans we would look for other police friends. The Austrian guys are also very cool." (76-79)*

One fan mentioned that they had come into contact with an Austrian officer, who had emphasised that they felt they did not have the experience to manage an

event like this without the aid of experienced support. German fan: *"We met one Austrian police officer and we were German and he was very communicative. He also told us that Austrians don't have experiences with such events, so he told us also that he was very happy that he could collect this knowledge."* (1325-1328)

Several fans mentioned that a problem with the German police was that they had no local knowledge of directions or places, and were unable to facilitate them with directions. The majority of Germans reported the massive police presence made them feel safe, recognising the police were there to protect them. Generally, the perspective was held that the high level of policing was necessary and professional. German Fan: *"They were like ice hockey players during the match, in the public viewing zone. With helmets on, masks on and teeth protectors and it's not really friendly, but they were very professional. They went in, done what they had to and then got out again."* (1367 – 1369)

8.3.4.2 Polish fan perspective of context, identity and police

The overwhelming majority of Polish fans also defined themselves as positive, non-confrontational and emphasising they were 'good' supporters. Many Polish fans when discussing their identity, made the distinction between the majority and minority, and sought to stress only a small amount of Polish fans will seek trouble. Polish Fan: *"I would say at the most 400-500 hundred will come for trouble and the other 30,000 will come for the fun."* (404)

However, several of the Polish fans interviewed did express a negative attitude, not towards the German fans per se, but towards superordinate German identity and its historical connotations. As this extract from a conversation with a group of 6 Polish fans indicates, with regards to their identity and social relations the football match is an arena in which historically embedded grievances can be addressed:

[How do you get along with German fans?] *"We don't like Germany."* (All agree)

[Why?] Polish fan: *“because of the history.”* [Do you think that is important at football, the history?] *“Yes. I think 90% of people in Poland would like to win against German because of the history, because of the Second World War, because of Auschwitz and now it is the European Union but we still want to win against Germany. Polish supporters said if our team win one match, only one and it is Germany then we can go home and it will be ok. Not only me, all Polish people.”* [And you all feel the same way?] All: *“Yes.”* (1157 – 1170)

Several fans and a representative from the Polish Fanzone argued the fans of the national team are different to the fans at a domestic level, with different social backgrounds and intentions in attending events. One fan went further and discussed the economic differences between Eastern and Western Europe, stating the fans who can afford to travel with the national team treat the experience as a holiday. Polish fans also recognised the role of the media in constructing tensions stating they felt the locals seen them as a threat. Polish fan: *“What I do know is the local Austrian people are very scared, they have closed some shops and it sounds unbelievable but they have closed some hotels. They don’t want to earn money because they are scared that something might happen. What I know from one polish woman that lives here is that there are rumours that the polish men are raping women”* (458-461)

Polish fans generally did not identify the patrolling police as German officers rather than Austrian; others commented it was the same social context as WC06. Generally, the Polish fans recognised the police are a normative and accepted part of football but found the police presence overwhelming and unnecessary, and acknowledged the difficulties related to policing such an event. Polish fan: *“Everywhere you look there are policemen. There is too much, it is extreme.”* [Would you rather there were less?] *“No, it’s a normal thing. If there are a million people and 5 are looking mean, we need policing but if these people are not in the area then you don’t need the policing. But it is very difficult for the police to know where is the people are or are not”* (614-619)

Interestingly, all Polish nationals who were interviewed were consensual in discussing the police management in Poland compared with the approach in Austria.

They were all in agreement that police are much tougher and harder in Poland than in Austria. This point is illustrated from the following extract involving two Polish fans:

[Is the policing the same in Poland?] Polish fan 1: *“No, no it’s tough. It’s very different to here. When you get on a bus or a train or whatever, there is a welcome ceremony; a very warm welcome with all the batons and stuff, oh it’s rubbish.”*

Polish fan 2 *“I think they need to learn how to interact with people because now it is really hard. They tease supporters and shout at them”*

Polish fan 1: *“They are there next to the stands and shout “what the fuck are you looking at”, things like that, yeah it’s really rough.”* (365-372)

8.3.4.3 Police perspective of the context and foreign nationals

An interview with a senior police commander on the morning of the match day emphasised factors which underpinned the Austrian police perspective of the event. Officers at command and frontline level were reported to be inexperienced, stressed and under pressure, they could not afford to make any mistakes or take chances. Low profile strategies were not seen as an appropriate option and reliance on high profile tactics to demonstrate their capability was the favoured option.

Austrian Senior commander: *“Do you see another police here in the town? Traffic police or riot police. I think the problem is that we have nothing in the middle. We have riot or traffic, they are friendly and they make their job, but they are riot police. And the other problem is the chiefs are very afraid that they cannot handle the situation. For this little town it is the first time they have such an event, and they have young chiefs, not in age but from their function and work experience. They don’t want to make a mistake, if they make a mistake everybody will say that they are not able and everybody knows this. So they are very stressed, and they believe in the riot police. And we have the German police, and there are more German police is more than the Austrian police”* (491-497).

The commander also recognised the role of the media, and impressions from previous tournaments in constructing tension and fear; [Who are they worried that will say that they can’t handle the situation?] Austrian Senior commander: *“I think it*

which is then used to make inferences about police psychology and action in that context. By distancing the research from such approaches it is hoped that the research in this area will seek to provide an approach which is integrative of relevant positions such that a full and rich understanding of what is actually going on from the various perspectives can be achieved.

The existing research on the specific relationships between police theoretical knowledge of crowds and management practice is limited by its reliance on post hoc data. This paper addresses this limitation by examining the role of police theoretical view of crowd psychology and their operational practice during a in relation to crowds high risk football event. The case study analysis indicates the social, political and logistical background of the host city played an important part in constructing the inter-group context for the police and fans. The analysis points to various theoretical considerations which can interact with the inter-group dynamics of the police and crowd psychology in situations of risk.

8.4.1 Key role of police knowledge in Klagenfurt

There was a disparity between the way the German police and the Austrian police defined the crowd in to relation the way they defined themselves and surrounding social relations. An array of different sources, including the perspectives of the Austrian officers involved in policing events attribute this perception of fear and the high expectation of disorder down to the lack of experience in managing crowd events. This evidence suggests that a significant aspect of police knowledge, over and above the basic training which non-specialist officers receive, is actual hands on the job experience. Where officers do not have firsthand experience managing football events they turn to other channels of information to order to construct their perspectives. This finding further consolidates the interview data findings presented in Chapters 1 and 2.

8.4.2 Relationship between policing and conflict in Klagenfurt

This analysis also does not support the convictions of previous writers who maintain that high profile police tactics and measures lead to increased levels of disorder and negative interaction. The interaction reported was for the most part positive, and people enjoyed the attraction function that the riot police performed. An argument advanced by Stott et al., (2007; 2008) is that low profile policing leads to a perceived identification and similarity with the officers policing, which is not achieved when police forces are deployed in riot uniform and utilise high profile tactics. The evidence presented here suggests that regardless of whether the police officers are deployed in high or low profile deployment formation, given that they are behaving in a professional and targeted way there will be positive identification with the officers. Although the deployment was high profile the behaviour of the officers was not intimidating or confrontational, and even the mass arrest lacked hostility. It could be that the German fans identified with the German police, as they categorised themselves in the same group as the Germans given their national identity was salient.

Many of the Polish fans interviewed over the course of Euro 2008 reported negative perspectives of the police tactics and their management styles in Poland. This brings into a play a very interesting dynamic that has not been considered in the literature; that is the perspectives of those being policed in the context of international football event is largely informed by the expectations and knowledge of police style and approach in their national country. Those interviewed in this study put the potential for conflict down to the transitive and historical memory between the two groups rather than the police tactics in managing the fans. To consider these aspects as insignificant, and favour an explanation based on the police alone is simply incorrect and dismissive of the significance of social and national identities and their role in shaping social context and relations.

The psychological literature currently surrounds the social category of the English fans. The absence of English fans at the tournament also allows investigation of risk as it relates to social categories separate of this fan contingency. The German fans have been perceived similarly to the English fans by the Belgian Gendarmerie at

Euro 2000 (Stott, (2003). The perceived mean threat posed by English fans was close to the mean threat posed by German fans; the German fans were understood to be equally as dangerous, aggressive and likely to be involved in disorder as the English fans (Stott, (2003). In the build up to the WC06 hosted by Germany, Polish fans came under significant scrutiny “*seemingly substituting the English for their reputation*” (Schreiber & Adang, 2010, p. 2).

8.4.3 Media role in shaping the inter-group context

The case study of the inter-group context in Klagenfurt illustrates the key role media sources can play in shaping the inter-group dynamics, and the way in which they can act to influence police expectations, perception of risk and tactical decision making. This served to create in and on the job trouble for the host police force. Accountability pressure in previous studies has been found to influence police management of demonstrations (Reicher & Cronin, 2006), towards decisions which support high profile tactics and increased the perspective of the need for high profile police management.

This paper suggests that exposure to the dominant media representations are national identity dependant and when identified in the literature can have important implications for identity processes of; (1) the police, (2) the foreign nationals, and (3) the perception of social relations between the two. Police and crowds occupy a central position in the media surrounding tournaments. There is a negative hypervisability of football fans across the media, which acts to encourage a negative social representation. In understanding why the policing developed as it did in Klagenfurt one thing becomes immediately apparent, that is the negative and pessimistic pre-tournament media converge. The media displays football disorder disproportionately, whilst neglecting minor crimes. The profile of football offenders in the media are also distorted, causing misunderstanding of criminal offending. The media is a mode of influence which shapes how people understand the inter-group dynamics at international football events. The data presented suggest that police perceptions of the risk at high risk football events can be shaped by mass media coverage. Individuals pick up from media and interpersonal communications circulating images of the fan

groups at the event. This is particularly interesting in relation to theory surrounding football ‘hooliganism’ which is considered by some researchers as largely a mass media construction (Crabbe, 2003; Poulton, 2005; Stott & Pearson, 2007).

Unfortunately, despite an abundance of literature which points to the media role in constructing the social representations of football fans an empirically based archival and media account of how this may be so is scant. The large majority employ non-systematic, single method and anecdotal evidence to argue for a relationship between the media construction of social reality and the actual social context, and inter-group relations. The transition from media representation to dominant social representation has been highlighted here, in addition to the implications this has for the police managing the event, and in the construction of the out-group national social groups. Little work has been done into how representations, imagery and symbols circulate in international football, transmitted and transformed by multiple actors with a wide array of effects. Perhaps future work could account for the transmission mechanisms through which representations, beliefs and attitudes about particular social groups are propagated in the context of a major international football event.

8.4.4 Preventative arrests

The issue of preventative arrests has been met with criticism by academics, claiming that it infringes on the human rights of those being arrested (see Stott & Pearson, 2006; 2007). The analysis presents data which stands in contrast to that presented currently in the literature, where the emphasis is on the negative implications for human rights of crowd members in the use of containment tactics. Officers must act under rules obliging signatory member states to safeguard the right to life and liberty according to the Human Rights Acts. Fans are not preventatively arrested without good, legally sanctioned grounds to do so. Quite the opposite of the ‘classic’ theoretical view of the crowd, which has been argued to underpin the decision to employ high profile tactics such as containment and dispersal this research demonstrates that there has been significant justifiable grounds to take action against the group of German nationals in Klagenfurt.

Whether the mass arrest was right and justified, or wrong and unjustified decision is as much a philosophical and political question as it is practical and psychological. The one thing which can be understood with certainty there, were the particular understandings of the crowd and their intentions in place prior to this action being taken. They were identified as being fans who had previously been involved in disorder, they were disrupting the peace, behaving confrontationally, and acting en masse. They were not behaving in the same jovial and celebratory manner that the others were, and had a negative impact on the atmosphere. The other fans around them moved away to the perimeter of the square, became quite and watched on as the mass group interrogated and threw things at the local transvestite. The Austrian police authorities took the decision to arrest them, and following this decision only a handful of arrests were made at the event and no major disorder. Whether or not disorder would have arisen in the absence of the decision to make the mass arrest can only be speculated. What we do know is that following this decision there was a notable absence of disorder.

8.5 Conclusion

This study begins to suggest that the problem of football related tensions cannot be addressed by relying on one side of the inter-group environment; it is important to recognise the broader picture and account for a multiplicity of variables which may, or may not, contribute to the outcome of disorder at international football events. Many of the variables this case study points to as important aspects in the understanding of inter-group relations (e.g., media, local population, to the role of learned behaviour and experience), have been factors which have been considered by police officers involved in the earlier stages of this research as key considerations for public order policing. This chapter acts as a means of consolidating the broad and variable considerations which have been put forward from the analysis of police perspectives of risk and threat earlier chapters using the research method of a case study to do so.

In the literature there is an overwhelming emphasis on the role the police can have in constructing a self fulfilling prophesy, by their expectation of disorder which

in turn results in the crowd being treated as such, which causes them to behave as such. The analysis provides evidence that the police constructed self fulfilling prophecy hypothesis can be correct. A key issue which should be emphasised is making the distinction between whether the officers treat high risk groups in such a way that causes disorder; or, as is supported by the case study here, that fractions of the high risk groups behave in a threatening manner to which the police respond. The self fulfilling prophecy works both ways.

To conclude this Chapter, what happened? In relation to public disorder the answer is very little. Why? The evidence certainly suggests high profile police strategy and tactics played a key role in the prevention of disorder. This chapter, in a similar vein to those which precede it, provides thought provoking alternative perspectives to the main stream consensus' which is presented in the dominant crowd psychology literature. To conclude this body of work, Chapter 9 will now consider the general discussion surrounding the data presented, implications of such at the broader level of existing literature, and avenues for the development in relation to method, theory, practice and policy.

CHAPTER 9:
GENERAL DISCUSSION

9.1 Introduction

The management of international football events impacts on a variety of stakeholders, and the best way to manage the safety and security of those in attendance is a fundamental issue which must be addressed by theory, policy and practice. The current research has adopted a multi-disciplinary approach to understanding police perceptions of foreign nationals in the context of international football. The current body of international research has been developed through collaborations and professional relations with different organisations and police forces throughout Europe.

The ESIM maintains that police strategy and tactics that are perceived to be illegitimate by crowd members increase the likelihood of disorder, and in the context of policing foreign nationals this theory is advanced as an explanation for instances of disorder. Post hoc ESIM analysis explains the dynamics of conflict during protests and demonstrations (Reicher, 1996b; Drury & Reicher, 1999; 2000), and international football events (Stott & Reicher, 1998b; Stott et al., 2007). The findings presented here are grounded in prospective analysis and the relationship to subsequent public order outcomes emphasises the key issue that keeping order and managing disorder are two entirely separate theoretical issues. The over emphasis of the model in determining the inter-group relationship between the in-group i.e., the crowd, and an out-group e.g., the police, do not bode well with the context of international football events; where there can be various significant inter-group relations, such as the opposition fans and the population, to be considered in addition to the police/crowd relationship.

In examining the ESIM in practise, an aspect of the evidence which must be considered is the conflict levels surrounding international football events at which high profile police tactics and strategies are employed. If the police tactics, particularly those presented by the literature as being high profile, were the key variable in explaining crowd disorder at international football events instances of disorder would have been observed, but this has not been the case. As the theory only works in a minority of cases then it is insufficient in heuristic power to explain

disorder in the context of policing international football events. In line with the principle of *lex parimoniae* (the law of parsimony), it is logical to advance the hypothesis that in order to explain instances of football disorder there are more factors than the police tactics to consider, which necessitates a more thorough explanation.

9.2 Reintroducing the police perspective

The psychological sense of identity (i.e., who we are compared to them), and the implications of identification are hugely important social tools through which we navigate the social world. Research findings suggest that by drawing on the theoretical frameworks of SIT and SCT this can advance understandings of police perceptions and practices in the context of policing foreign nationals. By integrating a multiplicity of distinct domains within psychology it begins to address the police perspective in relation to foreign nationals, also the theoretical considerations which developed from an emersion into this context and data gathered from within it. The intention being to reach an understanding of the real time issues of working in a public order formation. Theoretically, the research sought to consider the way identity processes feed into police strategy and tactics to establish a more general understanding of the organisational roles, goals and values.

In essence, the research tackled the issue of ‘who we (public order officers) are’, and touched on the issue of how this may interact with crowd psychology. At a broader level, the work provides evidence of just how important it is to consider the multiple identities at work in the context of policing, and the complex way in which they may impact on those being policed. The study provides a systematic review of public order organisational identity which provides a rationale for an organisational distinction between subgroups of specialists and non-specialists in a public order context.

A key factor that impacts on the way police approach foreign nationals, and deserves practical and theoretical consideration are their collective efficacy perspectives in public order formations. At its most basic, the findings suggest that this is the link between experience and practice in a public order context policing

which is considered the result of police knowledge. Police knowledge is "*the police perception of external reality which shapes concrete policing on the ground*" (Della Porta & Reiter, 1998, p. 2). Practical experience determines the way by which police officers in this study understand threat and danger in a public order context, and was demonstrated to impact on shared mental models of collective efficacy. For many years, the theoretical literature on shared mental models has maintained that teams hold multiple mental models (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993; Wilson & Rutherford, 1989). For instance, Klimoski and Mohammed (1994) stated that "*there can be multiple mental models co-existing among team members at a given point in time*" (p. 432). This has been found to be the case in public order formations, where the significant variable is the practical experience in managing public order.

In a protest context the theory has been advanced that police understand the protesters and their intentions in accordance with those who are participating, and constructed through experience with, or intelligence of them (Della Porta & Reiter, 1998; King, 2004). Experience with the protesters can be direct or indirect via police communications with other forces. Absence of a record, or presence of an unfavourable record serves to reinforce a perception of the need for more forceful crowd management tactics. The findings presented here support these suppositions in the context of policing foreign nationals. This research suggests; (1) officers' levels of experience and training will be put forward as explanations related to the perception of threat and the methods of policing employed to manage that risk and the crowd, and, (2) a lack of experience and training will be used as justification for the implementation of high profile means of managing threat and the crowd.

Based on the knowledge-based research of those doing the job, they feel basic training does not equipped them well for the management of a large scale public order operation such as that of hosting an international football tournament. It makes suggestions for improving police training and education based on knowledge from those doing the job so that theory can be translated into operational practice. One possible means of managing this perception is to have expert public order officers who have been involved previously in the policing of international football events at seminar/training events in advance of hosting the tournament. This would give the

officers an opportunity to gauge what the experience is really like, and receive the information from someone whom they are likely to relate to as 'one of us', who has gone through the experience. In training and education, both academics and officers have much to learn from one another by an increased reliance on information exchange. It is a reciprocal relationship, in which the goals should be oriented by two key principles; 1) the development of methods to promote order in crowd situations; and, 2) to maximise the safety to officers and others within the inter-group network of variable audiences. Presentations and other forms of interactive media's should be continued, reliance on the method could be a valuable tool in developing a practice based research focus. The source of the information is an important consideration, in line with the hypothesis of the SIT officers are more likely to accept this information if it is delivered by someone who they perceive to be one of them. Rather than a researcher, who may deliver the same messages but are likely to be considered less similar, as this could compromise the degree to which the message is accepted.

The ESIM is based on the perception of police illegitimacy from the perspective of the crowd. The focus on the potential for disorder, the perception of the need for PPE, and the potential to use force combined with the normatively sceptical attitudes is theoretically concerning from a crowd psychology perspective. According to crowd theory, these are prime factors which can lead police tactics and strategy to interact with dynamics in a way that makes wide scale disorder more or less likely. However, these variables are recorded as key aspects of public order organisational social identity and have not been related to instances of disorder in the current body of work. An equally valid interpretation, from the perspective of the in-group, is that the norms and values are highly important to the functioning of the group. At a frontline level the research suggests aspects of police psychology which have been handled critically by the crowd psychology literature and implicated in increasing the threat of disorder at public order events, e.g., solidarity and homogeneity of action, which are valuable to the police perspective on the frontline.

There is evidence to suggest, particularly frontline officers, tend to think of rioting as irrational behaviour (Stott & Reicher, 1998). This understanding has been advanced in the literature as a model of Classic crowd psychology. However, a key

distinction to make is that while evidence may suggest some frontline officers understand crowd *disorder* as irrational there is no evidence to suggest that they find crowd *behaviour* in the absence of disorder as irrational. This is an important point which has not been emphasised in the literature. The empirical evidence for the Classic model of psychology, and the way by which it may drive police strategy and tactics in the absence of disorder is not strong. While the findings do present evidence to suggest that police view crowds with trepidation and as dangerous (Cronin & Reicher, 2006) there is very little evidence to suggest that in the context of policing international football events police view crowds as irrational. What the police involved in this study associate with higher levels of risk are the social history, the identities and inter-relationships between groups of foreign nationals and the history they have with others.

9.2.1 Threat and risk perception

The ITT provides a model from which to understand the nature of threat perception in the context of policing international football fans. The current work presents evidence that commanders objectively recognise a disparity between operational threat perception and the actual threat posed in real time. Threat perception works in complex ways to exacerbate the likelihood that commanders will make decisions which favour high profile deployment. What was seen in Chapter 5 is that even in the absence of threat materialising, officers at command and frontline levels have a preference towards PPE. In their perspective, serves to protect the reputation of individual commanders', the frontline officers physically, and the police as an organisation more broadly from negative repercussions.

Officers do perceive the policing of public order as a dangerous working environment. As has been demonstrated here, there are realistic, symbolic, anxiety and stereotypes at work. The ITT model equally helps to understand that while threat perception can have negative implications, it also need not. There may be a value in perceiving threat when none exist, according to the theory that in-group members may have a general bias towards the avoidance of error which may lead to harm. Thus, we may be predisposed to perceive threat from out-groups (Stephan, Ybarra & Morrison,

in press). While the risk of these threats materialising may be low, the implications of what could happen if they do are substantial not only for the police but for local communities. The *ability* to use force is perceived as a central aspect of public order identity, the *actual* use of force however is considered negative, sought to be avoided and heavily emphasised as a last resort for regaining authority and control over the situation.

Decision making associated with taking risks in a gain/loss context reveals that typically participants took risks involving gain more in situations where they perceived had more to lose by not taking the decision; compared with situations in which they may gain more than lose. We are not astute risk takers, psychologists have provided ample evidence across a multiplicity of situations and contexts to establish this. The key issue is that by applying a traditional model of understanding to the police decision making it is clear to see that in the public order context police understanding overwhelming seems to be underpinned by an understanding that taking risks (such as having officers in standard uniform, relying on integration tactics within the crowd), they have more to lose than to gain.

9.3 High profile policing

There was found to be considerable reliance on PPE and high profile tactics throughout Europe in the management of foreign nationals. Correspondingly, there were limitations to the extent, and ease with which the low profile graded strategic and tactical deployment model was implemented in practice. However, there was a marked lack disorder surrounding the events observed and analysed. Theoretically, this raises questions surrounding the nature of the relationship between high profile police strategy, tactics and disorder. The findings support the contention that the interaction between the police tactics and the relationship to crowd disorder is more complex than is currently presented in the literature. The results find little support for the contention that the deployment and use of high profile measures of policing has the 'inherent capacity to exacerbate disorder' (Jefferson, 1990), particularly in situations of a low level of risk (Adang & Cuvelier, 2001; Stott et al., 2007).

Waddington (1987; 1991; 1993; 1994) has consistently argued effective public order management is best achieved through high profile measures and deployment. Jefferson (1990) has argued the contrary, to the effect that a high profile tactical deployment has the inherent capacity to exacerbate tensions and cause disorder through 'a massive and highly oppressive police presence' (Jefferson 1990, p. 85). The majority consensus on high profile tactics emphasise the potentially counterproductive impact of high profile policing and the relative efficiency of the low profile approach (see Waddington, 2005). The crowd psychology literature has advanced a model of best practice policing based largely in consensus with the majority perspective, albeit emphasising the issue of perceived proportionality of tactics by the crowd being policed. However, the crowd psychology literature is just that; the crowds' perspective. The distinction between the two 'sides' of the arguments can largely be put down to the extent to which they integrate a police perspective into their understandings. While Waddington has based his research on work with the police, Jefferson and the crowd psychologists largely have not.

The findings also raise theoretical points for consideration over the concept of perceived proportionality, which is advanced by the ESIM as the key mediator in the development of disorder and is a complex issue. The way one stakeholder may understand proportionality in police response may not be what the crowd, or more accurately factions of the crowd perceive to be proportionate. Host police forces and expert reviewers had differences of opinion regarding the proportionality during the same event; the deployment may be seen differently by the varying national groups at international football events, where one perceives proportionality, another may see non-proportionality. There is some evidence within this body of data to suggest that the perception of proportionality, and legitimacy, from a crowd perspective is influenced by their expectations of 'normal' policing on the basis of public order tactics which are normalised in their home countries. Proportionality is a subjective construct, dependant on the goals, norms and values of those making the judgement.

What largely was not studied, as a result of the focus on disorder, was the extent to which the use of high profile PPE and tactics can be a positive management approach in relation to disorder; and the mediating effects of a high profile account in

relation to the public and police. This research begins to suggest that there are benefits to high profile police tactics and equipment and that it is effective in managing the risk of disorder.

The consequence of the decisions to employ high profile PPE and tactical measures was effective according to the data collected for the current project. Strategic decisions are all about deciding what the ultimate goals are and how to achieve these goals. If the goal is to avoid disorder the strategic and tactical approach to do this should be determined by whether or not the means provide the ends effectively, and are justifiable within the law. Data gathered in this body of work suggests the overall priority, and organisational goal throughout forces in Europe is the prevention of disorder. The decision to use high profile measures have not exacerbated the potential for disorder, but have managed the pre-event perception of threat and prevented instances of disorder from developing.

High profile police tactics can be positive and contribute to the social context or negative and create tensions; this mainly comes down to the behavioural profile of the officers, and the level of communication they had with fans. Specialist officers in full PPE were seen to attract attention, fans wanted their pictures taken with the officers and this built positive relations between them. Horses were also seen to attract positive attention, children like to touch them and have their picture taken, creating a particular non hostile atmosphere. On the other hand, dog handlers were unapproachable, the dogs are often loud and aggressive, creating a completely different social context and thus, delivering a different social message. While officers carry batons as PPE in all contexts of policing public order during the course of the research they have only been observed to be drawn once. This body of evidence begins to suggest that high profile PPE and tactics can provide positive psychological outcomes for the officers policing, and the broader populous of those being policed; given that the officers facilitate this.

The crowd literature has been critical of preventative arrests, arguing that it is a violation of human rights (Stott & Pearson, 2006; 2007; Pearson, 2006). The key to resolving whether this is the case or not resides in the determination of at what point it

is appropriate and necessary, for the safety and security of the broader population, to intervene on a potentially dangerous situation. Critically, a public order offence is not limited to the actual act of disorder or the damage to property, but the threat of such. Officers are sanctioned by law to take action against the threat of disorder given that risk is sufficient to justify measures being taken. By referring to the legal definition of a public disorder offence it is difficult to sustain the argument that a preventative arrest is an infringement of human rights. This research presents an instance of mass arrest in which the behaviours of those arrested were acting en masse in an anti-social and anti-normative manner in relation to the broader crowd. They were arrested and subsequently no disorder developed thus arguably helping to achieve the objective of maintaining order and justified legally.

This is not to say that public order policing should be oriented away from friendly, community based dialogue policing. Or importantly, that this style is at odds with the way policing is taking place currently in the EU on the basis of the samples examined by this research. What is also clear from this work is that this style of policing can be achieved by officers protected in full uniform, having received the appropriate training, experience and education. It is not about whether or not they implement these tactics, but rather about the way they behave when they are using them. It is the behavioural profile that is important. The key issue is not about whether or not police rely on PPE and high profile equipment, it is about the way officers behave when they are using them.

The notion that crowd psychology can, or should, be managed by low profile policing is ideological in theory and practice. By exploring police behaviour in delivering, and perspectives of a graded tactical model of deployment, it becomes clear that the unquestioned acceptance and enforcement of the model may have dangerous and legal implications for officers tasked with maintain order on the frontline.

9.3.1 Implications from a frontline perspective

Risk in public order context cannot be eradicated. The best that can be done is managing the potential for such (Reicher et al., 2004). The police role in managing high risk situations is to identify threats in order to prepare for the worst possible outcome. Police authorities must make a decision whether to act, or not to act; or equally, whether to deploy in low profile, standard uniform or high profile PPE. In understanding the cost/benefit analysis of the police in relation to low and high profile measures, it becomes clear that the weight of the potential benefits is outweighed by the risks associated with standard uniform deployment.

It has been argued (Stott et al., 2004; 2007; Reicher et al., 2004; 2007) that police deployment which is not considered by the crowd to be balanced to the risk can be dangerous and counterproductive. This thesis advances the understanding that allowing ill-equipped or underprepared police to deal with instances of disorder, if or when it may arise, is equally as dangerous and counterproductive to the strategic goal of managing order. The emphasise on low profile management can result in officers becoming concerned with establishing whether or not they can or cannot act; resulting in no action being taken at all and risk dynamics increasing. Disorder can develop very quickly, not only does this impact on frontline officer safety and organisational reputation, if not adequately dressed and equipped, it also means there is a time delay in responding to developments while officers deploy who are adequately equipped to deal with disorder. This also entails resource implications and costs. While disorder is rare it presents a very real threat.

Ultimately, any study of inter-group processes seeks to address the dynamics of conflict and co-operation within the particular subject area, or inter-group context, by drawing on established theories of inter-group relations. The issue is how to get officers to approach the crowd and interact with them, and to not be reluctant on the basis of perceived threat. In strategically achieving contact between police and crowds in public order contexts the findings suggest that this will not be achieved by removing important aspects of police identity and protection, as this from their perspective places them in harm's way. Training and education should seek to

emphasis to officers the benefits of active and participatory contact and communication with crowd members. There is an absence in tactical depth surrounding how talking may encourage the crowd dynamics such that members are 'on the police side'.

The study begins to address the psychological considerations from a police perspective. The current evidence-based advice is that deploying officers in standard uniform without PPE is the best strategy for reducing public disorder. On the basis of the evidence presented, this option would not be likely to increase pro-social interaction between police and crowd members. If anything, the current data would indicate that doing so would make this outcome less likely. The data highlights the potential for increased stress and fear by deploying officers into a public order context under-equipped and/or ill-prepared, from their perspective. This creates a conflict of interest between what is best from the perspective of the crowd and what is best from the perspective of the police.

Protecting the public is the job of the police, and they expect to be fully equipped to fulfil this requirement. PPE and the ability to use high profile tactics are considered by officers to be central and important components of their police identity in the context of public order. They feel without them they become just another person in a potentially disorderly crowd. As this is the case, questions should be raised over whether it is in line with human rights recommendations and safety regulations in the workplace to make recommendations that officers are deployed in low profile standard uniform into conditions which have the potential to become disorderly.

9.3.2 Implications from an inter-group relations perspective

The first thing to note is that the inter-group relations in the context of policing international football events are certainly not limited to the in-group (a group of fans) and the out-group (the police), which is the emphasis of the dominant crowd literature (Stott & Reicher, 1998a; Stott et al., 2007; Stott et al., 2008). There are a number of audiences such as the local population, the media and private security which are all

pertinent variables in understanding inter-group relations in the policing of foreign nationals.

A key theoretical issue which arises from the work here is that from an inter-group perspective not all fans perceive high profile tactics as illegitimate. This arises even in situations where experienced practitioners deem the police profile to be disproportionate to the actual risk posed at the time. The football fans who were interviewed during this project expressed an array of perspectives towards high profile police measures. Some felt ambivalent towards the police tactics, understanding that police profile is a normalised aspect of football events. A number of fans expressed support and empathy for the police at international events, recognising that the job of differentiating between troublesome factions of the crowd is a difficult one. Others have expressed support for high profile measures as it makes them feel safe and secure, so long as it does not interfere with their attendance and watching the game. As well as holding relatively positive perspectives of the police at the events the perspective that the police tactics can create tension was held simultaneously by some. Even fans who are members of groups considered to pose risk, German and Polish, are not critical of police high profile deployment, but instead welcome their presence, they do however, accept that it can create tensions with some factions of the crowd.

Even if for the moment it is accepted that low profile policing does manage crowd intentions to engage in disorder, this is only one audience of an array of variables that the police must contend with. While it may manage the crowd psychology, it certainly will not manage all the expectations and dynamics that the police must manage in the context of such an event, to both external and internal audiences. As Cronin and Reicher (2006; 2009) recognise, police commanders in practise navigate their way through public order events by balancing off the cost/benefits of particular actions against the competing demands of each audience with a stake in the event. It is not possible to keep all audiences happy, and the police must make priorities as to what they consider the most important objectives. The police are employed to protect the community and property in the jurisdiction where they have power. They are not empowered or permitted to take risks of a safety and

order nature for the officers within their force or the local people for the benefit of building relations with foreign national groups.

Perhaps, to explain disorder surrounding high risk national groups largely as the product of police tactics commits a fundamental attribution error. That is, ascribing an explanation to the out-group at the expense of ignoring the broader social context. While on occasion there may be a relationship between the police tactics and increased level of disorder this is certainly not what is pointed to by this research. Attributing blame to either the police tactics or one of the football national groups in attendance at an event is not sufficient to explain disorder. The outcome of disorder is not the product of one side or the other but based on the situational, contextual and ideological variables involved in the particular interactions, placed within a broader political and social context. A central consideration for the ESIM research in the context of international football is that the relationship between opposing fan groups was over looked in the literature at the expense of the focus on policing.

9.3.3 Implications for understanding football related threat perception and disorder

This research has observed the policing of national groups considered to pose the highest level of risk in Europe i.e., England, Germany, Poland and Turkey. Stott and Reicher (1998) make the argument that crowd violence cannot be explained purely in terms of the crowd itself, in other words the existence of determined and premeditated individuals who plan and initiate conflict is not a good enough explain as *"it is difficult to differentiate between events and explain why violence occurs in some cases and not in others"* (1998, p. 357). This argument exactly can be applied to the explanation of police methods as the key variable underpinning instances of disorder; it works both ways and there is ample evidence presented here to suggest that high profile methods do not lead to disorder.

The other side of this argument is that there are many instances in which high profile PPE, and tactical tools are used in the management of international football fans and equally in these conditions there is no disorder. Thus, the argument that when disorder does arise it results largely from the police tactical management, is too

simplistic, too ideological. In accordance with this rationale the ESIM in itself as an empirical tool for the reduction of disorder does nothing to help identify the variables which make disorder more or less likely.

There are higher order principles at work, over and above the nature of the police on the ground at the time, the behaviour of the actual fan groups attending the event at the time. An absence of acknowledging this basic social identity related factor is what can be seen from the crowd psychology literature. Turner (1987, p. 4) argues, "*If we reject the concept of the group mind and seek individual psychological explanations of group behaviour, do we not inevitably deny the very properties (higher order, emergent) of social behaviour that gave rise to that concept, and reduce the group in kind to the level of the part . . . ?*". What the ESIM does is use an inter-group relations behavioural theory, but fails to account for the higher order psychological principles which govern the interactions.

What may be a more useful tool is to look towards the SIT and the SCT, more generally, for explanations of contexts in which high risk groups are more likely to experience tensions with other nationals. Identity is neither fixed nor singular but shifts in response to changes in social context and relations. Applied to groups of foreign nationals in the context of international football this advances the theory that relation's surrounding a social group's change depending on the situation or opposition that they are facing. It is a more likely explanation that when football disorder does take place it is in a context where one team is playing against another with whom they have historical identity related tensions. Alternatively an opposition group that seeks to establish a higher status in the realm of football related disorder by challenging a group who are perceived to be a high status group.

In understanding the threat posed by foreign nationals at international football events, recommendations in theory and practice include understanding the social identity of the national groups being policed (Reicher et al., 2004; 2007; EU handbook, 2009). If, for example, the national group identity has been branded as disorderly and with the potential to provoke other groups by their mere presence; the police would be at error for not acknowledging this information and acting

appropriately. Additionally, if there are deeply embedded historical tensions between national groups this would provide further justification for the deployment of high profile measures and PPE. Disorder is a very rare occurrence indeed, conflict has been observed empirically to be very infrequent, through the course of this research. The issue of inter-group conflict and resolution in behavioural sciences is too complex for adequate representation by a single dimension or a single explanation for disorder. In the public order and psychological literature it is suggested risk perception of whom, or what is to be policed, can act as a self fulfilling prophecy (Waddington, Critchler & Jones, 1989; Della Porta & Reiter, 1998; Stott & Adang, 2003a; 2003b; Stott, 2003; King & Waddington, 2005).

The media has, for some time, been implicated in the construction and amplification of football related disorder at international football events (Crabbe, 2003; Weed, 2001; Dunning, 2002). This relationship between the media escalation of disorder expectation and policing is not limited to the context of football. Similar dynamics have been theorised to exist more broadly in relation to policing public protest context, for example analysis of the G8 in 2005 (Rosie & Gorringer, 2009a), and the G20 Summit protests in 2009 (Rosie & Gorringer, 2009b; Greer & McLaughlin, 2010), provide evidence for the role of media in constructing the social context. Thus, expectations of violence may be popularised by the media, which has then been theorised to play a role in police management of international football events. This research provides tentative support for argument that the media can interact with both police and crowd perceptions, in their understandings of threat and expectations of disorder at international football events.

What is central to the dynamics of international football is that foreign national groups are considered high risk, and engage in disorder, because of their social identities, what they perceive to be acceptable behaviour, which others may not, and the historically embedded inter-relations with other national groups. A dynamic which is not readily considered is that some will engage in disorder because they want to. By overlooking these critical variables in the international context the ESIM may well be misread as a model excusing behaviours of particular social groups who do engage readily in disorder.

9.3.4 Assessment of the risk posed by high profile policing

Gulliantuni (1994) reviewed academic writing on football violence and the corresponding actions of the government. The current research should be considered the production of a comprehensive review of graded tactical deployment based on the knowledge of those who perform the task of public order policing. The purpose is to draw on what is promising about the strategies and tactics adopted and therefore intended to inform the wider debate on policing public order. The actual incidence rate of disorder is extremely low, it is such a rare occurrence that it is suggested on the basis of this research that factors other than police tactics underpin the outcome of a disorderly event. In theory the principles of dynamic risk assessment and graded tactical deployment in the context of international football has its limitations; and, empirically the observed evidence is limited to a handful of studies (Stott & Reicher, 1998; Stott et al., 2007). Recommendations which may put police officers at risk should be thoroughly examined by every means available.

The context of international football events informs understandings of public order policing, crowd psychology, and subsequently political policy. The psychological theories of policing public order are embedded in crowd psychology models e.g. ESIM (Reicher, 1996a, 1996b; Stott & Reicher, 1998a; Drury & Reicher, 2000; Stott & Drury, 2000). Fundamentally, crowd psychology is about the crowd. It cannot account for the practicalities of being responsible for managing the groups, nor can it account for the complex inter-group relations beyond that of the police and the crowd. It is important to make the distinction between crowd psychology and the benefit which public order tactics provide to other invested audiences within the inter-group context. While the hazards of wearing full PPE and employing high profile tactics in relation to crowd psychology should be acknowledged so should the benefits of the methods in relation to the police psychology. This research reports that high profile measures were employed successfully and achieved the strategic objective of maintaining order.

Stott et al., (2007) discuss in detail the practical and reciprocal relationships which they believe should be built between policy and practice on the basis of crowd psychology research. Tentatively, this work suggests further systematic research is conducted on the subject body of those expected to deliver the model in practice; and with consideration for the multiplicity of inter-group relations that function in this arena. This research begins to provide an account of high profile policing which stands in stark contrast to the majority perspective that is embedded in research of disorderly events; and to suggest that high profile measures and tactics can be effective and beneficial in managing police and other audiences in this context. Until further research has been conducted to examine the generalisability of these findings it would be unwise, in light of these considerations, to recommend further policies based on the understandings crowd psychology models which act to govern the behaviours/tactics of the police. Quite simply, the recommendations based on crowd psychology, which are politically supported in Europe, have real implications for police officers who are doing the job, which until now have not been subject to investigation.

9.3.5 Scientific goals vs. political goals

Psychology is essentially a behaviour science with the capability, and the responsibility, to address important social issues which are largely behavioural. As a profession that conducts research on psychological and social phenomena, psychologists often feel obligated to speak out on behalf of or against certain social policies as a profession, and as individuals. Psychology may not be able to reveal or dictate the 'right' social policy, but it can help to educate the public and decision makers about the consequences of various social policies and social phenomena, thus informing the democratic process through which social policy decisions are made (Kendler, 2002). However, an important distinction should be made between the issues which psychological research can reasonably address using empirical data, and the issues about which psychologists take a personal stand.

9.4 General limitations

9.4.1 Research strategy and method

Arguably, the central limitations of the current research are the lack of control over the data gathering environment and the overwhelming volume of raw data gathered during the research project. While this has facilitated the development of theory and knowledge in a practical sense, at times managing the on-going analysis and commitment to the projects from which the data has been gathered has been demanding and exhausting. Also, at times the volume of data has, during the analytic process, been confusing such that at the beginning absolutely everything seems pertinent to the research questions. However, with time, and with application, these limitations have become advantages in the long term.

An overwhelming amount of social psychological knowledge is based on the statistical analysis of quantitative data (Hogg & Vaughn, 2002). To do this, data is obtained and translated or coded into quantities (numbers), and then compared by various formalised statistical means. Statistical significance is translated into frequency of expected prevalence rate and interpreted through the likelihood of occurrence. As the majority of the data was gathered opportunistically rather than systematically, it is not suited to quantitative analysis. The current analysis recognizes this limitation. It is therefore concerned only with identifying the existence of particular perceptions and examining the extent to which they help to explain underlying psychological and social process.

Additionally, and related to the previous issues, because of the nature of the predominantly qualitative data, it would not be proper, nor viable, to make claims about the generality or extent of consensus of particular perspectives presented in this thesis. Perspectives have been included in the current study as a result of the representative of the majority of those observed or interviewed, and on the basis of consensus among expert reviewers. This by no means assures the perspectives that were reported are shared by all officers who policed Euro 2008, or that alternative reviewers' and researchers' may have come to the same conclusions. The accounts cited in the analysis merely serve to demonstrate the existence of particular perceptions.

9.4.2 The paradox of understanding

Psychologists role is to observe and report, and in order to do this a researcher must understand their meaning of the world, and come to appreciate why the subjects of their study act in the way which they do. With this comes several risks, first of which is that of 'going native'. This can be considered an over identification with the subjects such that the objective researching becomes submerged into the background. Any researcher in a field environment must work hard to ensure an analytic distance from the participants, however challenging this maybe. Subjective thoughts and feelings are regarded as bias in the sciences is an important aspect to be controlled for while conducting social research.

Another criticism which can be levelled at this research is that it may be impossible for a researcher, who is not a member of the group being studied to ever completely and entirely understand the group. Arguably, all that a research can grasp is a partial understanding of a phenomenon at best. Capturing meaning through language and symbols, and the essence of one's identity can be so taken for granted by the in-group members that in study these participants fail to articulate what it is that they are actually trying to convey.

2.4.3 Ethical limitations

Within this body of work there are critical ethical limitations which should be acknowledged. First, there has been no written consent gathered from the participants. In the case of the police participants it can be argued that there was implied consent, given that the officers were free to make the decision of whether to talk with the researchers or not. In the case of the crowd participants' verbal consent has been attained. This has implications for other ethical considerations. For example by the nature of the data gathering platform, and the opportunistic data gathering methods, it is not possible to gain enough information about each and every participant to facilitate the option of withdrawing from the study. Additionally, there is no opportunity to debrief the participant about exactly how and for what purpose the data they have provided will be used. Acknowledging these limitations it must be

emphasised that measures have been taken to minimise the repercussions of such. For example, great care has been taken to protect anonymity and accountability of participants throughout.

9.4.4 Practical limitations

There are many demands on the researcher within the specific platforms which have been utilised in gain access to data in the current context. Participation in the data gathering process in an uncontrolled environment add to this, taking up valuable time and adding to one's responsibilities as a researcher. An additional consideration here is that data gathering in a situation which presents a risk to order by definition present a risk to researcher safety.

Data gathering in an international setting presents a set of unique complications, notwithstanding the language limitations there may also be implications for the way by which a researcher is conceptualised by the multiple groups of participants. One maybe seen as an insider or outsider, both or neither. This is an unavoidable dilemma of interviewing in a cross-cultural setting, which may have implications for the data which one is capable of gaining. For example, if one is seen to be working 'with' the police crowd members can be reluctant to engage with the data gathering process. Likewise, if the police perceive the researchers objectives to be non-beneficial to them, they can enforce restrictions on the information which is permitted to be shared with them (as evidenced Chapter 8).

9.5 Future research; opportunities for development

9.5.1 Theory development

Given that this research supports the argument that the ESIM is not sufficient to explain all instances of disorder there are two potential routes for theory development in this area. First, there may be a benefit to revisiting to the 1980s Flashpoints model of disorder (Waddington, Jones & Critchler 1987; 1989), which was discussed in Chapter 1. While not an empirical model, more of a sociological

account, the model does outline six social/environmental variables which should be considered to contribute to instances of disorder. There must, and should be room for the integration the experiences of multiple audiences and variables into a social theory of disorder and the use of the flashpoint model (which emphasises the inter-group nature of any disorder account), may present an opportunity to this. In light of this research it may be a very useful tool for understanding the different social-psychological factors which make disorder more or less likely in particular situations ad hoc.

The second, consideration at a broader level for explaining instances of football disorder is that there could be a value in integrating the social identity and convergence theories. Convergence theories have been largely abandoned since the development of the social identity theories; however the two are not incompatible. It may be useful to consider the two theories as explaining different forms of football related disorder. However, at this point these suppositions are nothing more than that. Given that this body of work was broad and exploratory, further and more specific empirical investigation into these two possibilities would be necessary to establish the validity of such.

What can be advanced from the findings of this work is that future research may benefit from an understanding of public order management which is embedded in an organisational social identity perspective orientation, in addition to that of a crowd psychology perspective. Categorisation and interpretation of the social environment is determined by subjectively determined features, which are shaped by prior expectations, goals and theories, many of which derive from group membership (Oakes et al., 1994; Oakes & Turner, 1990). Although multiple factors influence how people work, social identity theories portend to be a unifying concept of organisational behaviour because what and how people think as members of social groups influences subsequent behaviour and attitudes in social systems. The social identities in organisations serve as important drivers of performance. How people think as members of groups affect the outcomes of learning interventions. Therefore, social identity is a key input to, or driver of, learning and performance in organisations. There is value in understanding the police contribution to inter-group

dynamics from the perspective of the in-group, rather than the out-group and the way by which group norms and values interact with the practicalities of policing.

There has been work done on methods of reducing intergroup anxiety (Islam & Hewstone, 1993) and negative stereotypes (Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005), that has found inter-group contact may decrease both anxiety and stereotype usage. Since inter-group threat appears to be an important influence on inter-group bias, in the context of policing foreign nationals, it should be considered when attempting to reduce inter-group tension in the context of policing foreign nationals.

The broad exploratory investigation presented here is suited to the development of statistical enquiry into the relationships that have now been qualitatively identified. This could be achieved by developing measures to assess the support structure between organisational groups (i.e., the existence of particular relationships), and the function (i.e., the extent to which relationships provide particular resources). For example, the differences in collective-efficacy could be measured using a questionnaire, such as modifying the collective-efficacy in sports questionnaire (see, Sullivan, Short, & Feltz, 2001). Further research should address the extent to which the two groups perceive the crowd as an occupational hazard and the degree to which they succumb to stressors. The response to environmental stressors between the groups could be examined by bio-psych investigations through access to public order training.

9.5.2 Method and approach development

It is widely recognised police reform of public order strategy and tactics often follow instances of widely publicised disorder, perceived failure by authorities and loss of public confidence (Adang & Brown, 2008). This can be evidenced in the wealth of political enquiries that follow public disorder (e.g. Kerner Commission, 1969; Scarman, 1981; Taylor, 1990; HMIC, 2008). Police learn from the analysis of their mistakes when events do not go as planned (Della Porta & Reiter, 1998). The methodology of the Peer review evaluation is driven by the pragmatic principle that it is not only in situations that go wrong where valuable lessons can be learned (Adang,

1992). Learning from success is a current movement and has been acknowledged as a methodological tool in critical incidents research (Alison & Crego, 2008).

Future research should seek to develop theory regarding social psychology in crowds and in relation to police tactics in instances not defined by disorder. Police research has always involved comparative case analysis but is now learning to build a register and story account of 'near miss' events (Alison & Crego, 2008). This can be achieved by collecting experiences and accounts, in a natural or simulated, operational context and writing about the context and reasons for the decisions made. It avoids any element of blame and focuses instead upon preserving experiences as outcomes for future resources. Social psychology has much to learn from experiences in the absence of conflict and this has been demonstrated by the current body of work. It is not necessary to focus on the minority of cases where disorder or worse has developed before these learning experiences can be instigated for the future management of public events.

The PREP method provides a unique and unprecedented naturalistic research opportunity to achieve this. The analysis of an event and the underpinning psychology in the absence of disorder is a valuable learning, and equally valuable, empirical tool into the effective management of risk elements. Particularly as the Peer reviews generate the opportunity to gather data before, during and after the event in question and is not limited ad hoc inquisition. The PREP design allows for psychological inquiry to be driven by the real issues and build upon theoretical literature to frame and understand these issues. By examining the reality and the context of policing, also near miss and past failings to recommend systems and practices that over time should become standards for the industry. The naturalistic model detracts from a narrow and exclusive focus on the police actions and behaviour which appears to dominate both in the literature and media focus on such events. This is achieved by looking at the police actions, their tactics and strategy on the ground as one part of a complex social and cognitive landscape of the operational objectives, which characteristically determine the policing of fans at international football events.

A more general comment in terms of method approach in the context of understanding inter-group conflict generally and specifically in the policing of public

order should seek to marginalise the perspective that a research bias in participant observation strategy is necessary in the subject area (Drury & Stott, 2001). Admittedly, studying complex social interactions cannot avoid the implications of subjectivity; researchers should be managed in such a way to best avoid bias in the research. Bias in research sampling suggests that there may be an emphasis on selecting data to fit the model which is sought to be advanced. This should not be considered the basis of any empirical study let alone in qualitative data collection. While subjectivity is an important aspect of the qualitative analysis, by using ethnographic and flexible research methods researchers should not lose sight of the basic principle, for conducting empirical research, is premised on seeking to disprove existing theory in order to advance scientific understandings.

9.5.3 Practical development

Future research should be focused on how the police perception of the danger of crowds can be balanced with the duty of care to protect the officer and their sense of safety. Equally, research should seek to understand how to manage the perspective of danger the police see in crowds, through training and education which according to the officers involved in the current study felt was subject to particular limitations. Police training for public order was reported to be; (1) not enough training to work in public order formation, (2) focused on high profile tactical means e.g., baton charge, water cannons and, (3) no training of low profile tactical options.

Psychology and physiology in critical incident management tools could provide a huge opportunity to investigate the officer psychology in public order management. Training schools dealing with practical and simulated training, for the army, police, and other emergency services take place on a routine basis. By gaining access to, and working in co-operation with police public order training events this may provide a rich ground from which to examine theories embedded in a qualitative method. This could be achieved by the investigating the corresponding physiological responses and the potential cognitive limitations in attention, memory and social interpretation of the situation in the management of public order training events. There is much potential to drive theoretical knowledge in the arena of public order by

drawing on the methods and knowledge embedded in critical incident management research (e.g., Alison & Crego, 2008)

9.6 Conclusion

The research has questioned the role of crowd psychology models as a basis for recommendations in the context of policing public order. An over emphasis on the police role in instances of public disorder has been identified. This has led to an oversight of other highly significant inter-group relations which are implicated in the complex dynamics of international football events. In explaining international football disorder consideration should be placed on the inter-group relations between high risk national groups and the way they interact with opposing fan groups; in terms of social identity, history and inter-group relations with other national groups.

The research finds evidence that policing crowds with high profile PPE and tactical measures does not inevitably lead to disorder and, that these can act to have a positive impact on order management. The work presented the case that, given the objective of public order policing is the maintenance of order; high profile means have been broadly implemented to effectively achieve this goal. The analysis raises issues surrounding the currently unquestioned acceptance of crowd psychology recommendations into the working practices and policies surrounding the policing of international football fans. By taking a broader perspective on the issue of public order management at international football events, it becomes clear efforts should be made to understand police strategy and tactics in the absence of disorder as it may be unwise to advance practical recommendations which rely on data gathered in the novel and rare instance of such disorder.

GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS

3D: The 3D is three strategic and/or tactical steps which correspond tactically to the increasing level of risk in the situation. The 3D is the risk management strategy implemented by AUT and SUI for the policing of crowds at Euro 2008. The strategy is based on an increase through three stages in correspondence to actual risk posed by a given situation; tactical deployment, uniform and equipment should reflect this risk 'reality' by increasing and de-creasing accordingly. The first, 'Dialogue', represents an initial low profile police presence and uniform, with tactical instruction to talk with the fans. Second, 'De-escalation', corresponds to an increasing level of risk on the ground. This stage is characterised by diffusion of the situation. Third, 'Firm and resolved action (Durchgreifen)' is characterised by the use of force to manage the source of risk; critically the force must be targeted.

AUT: The acronym for the country of Austria, which was one of the two host countries of the Euro 2008 tournament.

BCS: The abbreviation for the Boy Camp Studies. The BCS are a set of three experimental studies, including the Robbers Cave (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961), they were designed to investigate the relationship between inter-group competition and inter-group conflict.

BM. I: The acronym for the Bundesministerium für Inneres, in English this is the Austrian Ministry of the Interior.

CEPOL: The acronym for the Collège Européen de Police, in English this is the European Police College.

CRS: The acronym for Compagnies Republicanines de Securite (the), which is the civil riot control force in France.

ENT: The acronym for the Emergent Norm Theory, formulated by Turner and Killian (1957). The theory provides an explanation for the origins and development of normatively structured behaviour in crowd contexts.

UEFA: The acronym used for the Union of European Football Association (Union des Associations Européennes de Football) is the administrative and controlling body for European association football and futsal. It is almost always referred to by its acronym UEFA. UEFA is the biggest of six continental confederations of FIFA.

ESIM: The acronym for the Elaborated Social Identity Model of crowd behaviour. A model of crowd dynamics which outlines the psychological components necessary for the origins and development of conflict in a crowd context (c.f.).

EU: The acronym for the European Union is an economic and political union of 27 member states which are located primarily in Europe.

EU handbook: A term used to describe the European Union Council (2006) "*Handbook with recommendations for international police co-operation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member state is involved*", Official Journal of the European Council, (322/01). The handbook contains recommendations for the operational, strategic and tactical management of football fans in the context of international football.

Euro 2000: The acronym for the UEFA European championship football tournament 2000, which was bi-nationally hosted by sixteen cities in Belgium and the Netherlands between 10th June and 2nd of July 2000.

Euro 2004: The acronym for the UEFA European championship football tournament 2004, which was hosted by ten cities in Portugal between 12th June and 4th July 2004.

Euro 2008: The acronym for the UEFA European championship football tournament 2008, which was bi-nationally hosted by eight cities in Austria and Switzerland between 7th June and 29th June 2008.

FIFA: The acronym used for the Fédération Internationale de Football Association. It is almost always referred to by its acronym FIFA. FIFA is responsible for the organisation and governance of football's major international tournaments, most notably the FIFA World Cup, which has been held since 1930.

Gendarmerie (the): The Gendarmerie is considered quintessentially representative of a paramilitary police force. The Gendarmerie is the name of the police Authorities in Belgium, France and Romania.

G8 Riots: The G8 is an unofficially annual forum for the leaders of Canada, the European Commission, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. The G8 summits during the twenty-first century have been associated with protests and demonstrations; and the two- or three-day event, the issues and the venue are focal points for activist pressure. The most notable G8 related riots are: Genoa, Seattle, Toronto, London and Quebec.

HMIC: The acronym for Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, which has the statutory responsibility for the inspection of police forces in Britain.

IPCC: The acronym used for the Independent Police Complaints Commission, which is an organisation that has overall responsibility for the system for complaints against the police in Britain.

ITT: The abbreviation for the Inter-group Threat Theory, which was formulated by Stephan and Stephan (2000), it draws on the meta-theory of the SIT to explain the psychological variables which underlay the experience of identity threat and the possible reactions of individuals, or groups to a perceived threat to their identity through coping strategies.

NCIS: The acronym from the Criminal National Intelligence Service, which is a governmental subsection service in the UK set up in 1992 to centralise the gathering and distribution of intelligence on serious and organised criminal matters.

Poll Tax riots: A term used to describe riots, in British cities during protests against the Community Charge (commonly known as the poll tax). The largest riot was in central London on Saturday March 31st 1990. This riot is sometimes called the Battle of Trafalgar, because much of the rioting took place in Trafalgar Square.

PPE: The acronym for personal protective equipment, which is the specialised clothing or equipment worn by employees for protection against health and safety hazards. In the current work this can be considered the riot control uniform, bullet-proof vests and visor helmet. Batons are a tactical equipment aspect of PPE.

PREP: The abbreviation for the Peer Review Evaluation Project, funded by the Council of the European Union. The peer reviews bring together experienced and active senior commander from across Europe to a host public order event in the context of international football in order to produce an evaluative report for the host police force. For more details on the method of the PREPs see chapter 3, alternatively reference Adang & Brown (2008).

PSP: The acronym for the Policia de Seguranca Publica one of the two police forces responsible for the management of football fans at Euro 2004. The PSP employed a model of crowd management based on principles of good practice policing derived from empirical crowd psychology.

Public Order Act 1986: The full title of which is An Act to abolish the common law offences of riot, rout, unlawful assembly and affray and certain statutory offences relating to public order; to create new offences relating to public order. The act is an act of the parliament in the United Kingdom which provides the legal and statutory definitions of public order offences.

PVA: The acronym for the Private Viewing Areas which is an area organised for collective public viewing of sports and other events, which is not in the first instance under the jurisdiction of the police, but is the responsibility of private security.

SCT: The abbreviation for the Self Categorisation Theory, which was formulated by Turner (1982) and advanced by Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, Wetherell (1987). The theory uses the concept of

social identity to provide a more general theory of inter-group relations which addressed inter-group and intra-group (i.e., the dynamics internal to a given in-group), processes. A distinction is made between the different levels of identity; (1) sub-ordinate or personal identity (i.e., who I am vs. you); (2) intermediate or social identity (i.e., who 'we' are vs. 'them'); and, (3) super-ordinate identity (i.e., who we all are, at a human level).

SDT: The acronym for the Social Dominance Theory, which was formulated by Sidanius and Pratto (1999), is designed to explain the origin and consequence of social hierarchies; i.e., the existence of subordinate and dominant groups in societal inter-group relations (for a review see Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006).

SIM: The abbreviation for the Social Identity Model, which is an extension of the SIT and the SCT and was formulated by Reicher (1982; 1984; 1987), by observation and interviews during the naturally occurring crowd behaviour of the inner city riots in St Paul, Bristol. The aim was to explain the defining features of rioting behaviour.

SIT: The abbreviation for the Social Identity Theory, which was formulated by Tajfel and Turner (1979). The SIT has been developed to account for the motivational aspect of in-group bias and posits the hypothesis that that the self can be defined in two sub-systems, (1) the personal, (idiosyncratic); and, (2) the social (collective).

SJT: The abbreviation used for the System Justification Theory, formulated by Jost and colleagues (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Burgess, 2000) posits that people need and want to see prevailing social systems as fair and just. System justification theory seeks to understand how and why people provide cognitive and ideological support for the status quo and what the social and psychological consequences of supporting the status quo are, especially for members of disadvantaged groups.

Spotters: A term used to describe intelligence gatherers in the context of policing football events.

SUI: The acronym used for the country of Switzerland (one of the two hosts of Euro 2008).

SPSS: A social sciences statistical computer programme.

TDM: The abbreviation for Traditional Decision Making theories (e.g., Savage, 1954; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; 1979; 1992). TDMs were influenced by decision making choices in economics, particularly preferences in gambling strategies and relies on the assumptions of optimisation (i.e., the options chosen make the system as effective and functional as possible), and rational choice. These theories largely (although not entirely) stand in contrast to more recent Natural Decision Making models.

TFM: The abbreviation for The Flashpoint Model of public disorder, which was formulated by Waddington, Jones and Critchler (1987; 1989). TFM theorises six possible variables that may contribute to a riot; (1) structural (i.e., the organisational aspects); (2) political-ideological (i.e., the extent to which the out-group are regarded as legitimate); (3), cultural (i.e., the cultural background and beliefs held by the police and crowd); (4) contextual (i.e., the broader social context which the behaviours take place); (5) situational (i.e., the particular details of the specific incident); and, (6) interactional (i.e., the particular details of the relations between operational officers and crowd members).

UFE: The abbreviation used to describe an Utilisation Focused Evaluation (Patton, 1997). The focus of the UFE is on the intended use by the intended users. It begins with the premise that evaluations should be judged by their utility and actual use, therefore evaluators should facilitate the evaluation process and design any evaluation with this as paramount as will affect the use of it.

WC06: The acronym for the FIFA World Cup 2006, which was hosted by twelve cities in Germany between 9th June and 9th July 2006.

WC10: The acronym for the FIFA World Cup 2010, which was hosted by ten cities in South Africa between 11th June and 11th July 2010.

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CHAPTER 8 SECONDARY SOURCE REFERENCES

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³ [http://www.economist.com/obituary/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12415006&fsrc=rss&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+economist%2Ffull+print+edition+\(The+Economist%3A+Full+print+edition\)](http://www.economist.com/obituary/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12415006&fsrc=rss&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+economist%2Ffull+print+edition+(The+Economist%3A+Full+print+edition)) *Jorg Haider, an Austrian populist, died 11th October aged 58*.

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- ²⁵ http://www.focus.de/sport/fussball/em2008/klagenfurt-polizei-nimmt-140-deutsche-in-der-innenstadt-fest_aid_307503.html *Polizei nimmt 140 Deutsche in der Innenstadt fest.*
- ²⁶ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7444420.stm> *Euro 2008 clashes spark arrests.*
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- ²⁸ http://diepresse.com/home/sport/fussball/euro2008/gruppeb/389373/index.do?direct=389378&vl_ba cklink=/home/index.do&selChannel *157 Festnahmen: Deutsche Hooligans in Klagenfurt.*
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- ³⁰ http://www.focus.de/sport/fussball/em2008/klagenfurt-polizei-nimmt-140-deutsche-in-der-innenstadt-fest_aid_307503.html *Polizei nimmt 140 Deutsche in der Innenstadt fest.*
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- ³² http://www.welt.de/welt_print/article2085129/Unruhen_im_Keim_erstickt.html *Klagenfurt fessnahme Unruhen im Keim erstickt.*
- ³³ <http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/international/Klagenfurt-39skirmishes-and-fist-fights39-result.4167470.jp> *Klagenfurt 'skirmishes and fist-fights' result in 157 arrests.*
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APPENDICES

Appendix A

Good practices and points of attention identified by the Peer Review Evaluation Project. Over the course of the EU peer review evaluation reviews the senior police commanders composed a comprehensive account of what they considered to be good practices and points of attention (Adang & Brown (2008).

Good practices

Presented here are the collective good police practices that have been identified by police reviewers in the evaluation in nine real time police operations, of different EU countries.

- Effective management of media for benefit of police and local community
- Co-operation with agencies external to the police
- Balance between police profile and actual situational risk
- Tactical deployment in line with a friendly and firm, community oriented policing approach (particularly in a situations of increased risk)
- Good utilization of spotters and information
- International co-operation
- Careful preparation and planning of the operation
- Good use of information
- Dynamic risk assessment
- Good co-operation between police and football associations, and club representatives
- A well trained, integrated stewarding system
- A co-operative National Football Information Point (NFIP)
- Bullet proof or protective vests worn underneath rather than above clothing (functioning to create the impression of a low profile police uniform, while ensuring protection for the officer)
- Officers role in the operation determined by their experiences and not their rank
- GPS system to monitor the movements of all units in the operation

With regard to police co-operation:

- A liaison officer working with visiting forces.
- Provisions for visiting police co-operation (e.g., mobile phone, liaison officer, translator).

With regard to fans:

- Positive facilitation of fans.
- Innovative ways to communicate with fans.
- Communicating key information via websites before arrival in a foreign city.

- Language courses for officers in order to break down language barriers.

With regard to officers:

- Briefings with visual aids.
- Half time briefings and debriefings.
- Formulation of a clear behavioural profile and clear communication to officers of this.

With regard to tactics:

- Rapid intervention and degrading when necessary.
- Use of the planning officer as a quality assurance officer.
- Use of tactical advisors.
- Explicit use of police officers who have experience for specific functions or at fixed posts.

With regard to preparing for an international football event:

- Make a clear differentiation between different types of risks, and particularly between spontaneous and planned disorder.
- Awareness of contingency scenarios (e.g., for evacuation, bomb threat, flares and pitch invasion).
- Dedicated, full time training for intelligence officers.
- Clear identification of hot spots based on previous experiences and flexible deployment at the identified hot spots.
- Police involvement in preventive activities.
- Specific attention to crowd and officer safety.

In preparation for Euro 2008 the 3D risk management strategy was identified as good practice as a policy based on graded tactical deployment model of public order. However, the host police forces implementation of the concept prior to the tournament, during the evaluations, was identified as a point of attention.

Points of attention

During the evaluations the senior police commander review teams also noted what they considered to be points of attention. Presented here are the collective points of attention relating to police practices that have been identified by police reviewers in the evaluation in nine real time police operations, in different EU countries:

The most common points of attention were as follows.

- Lack of dynamic risk assessment
- Tactical performance not fitted to situation
- Failure for officers to implement strategy

- Non-compliance with EU handbook, especially information exchange section;
- Language barriers
- Lack of interaction with fans
- Co-operation between police and non-police multi-agency partners

Other points of attention include:

- Command position fulfilling exhaustive list of responsibilities.
- The balance between police officer uniform and behaviour on the one hand and actual risk on the other (increased level uniform observed to have difficulty implementing and carrying out the 'dialogue').
- Operations utilised with high profile presence and uniform not in line with the pre-event objectives.
- Lack of command level emphasis to the officers for the behavioural expectation of officers.
- Lack of involvement and partnership with other police forces (e.g., transport police).
- Lack of consideration for the integration of support forces officers.
- Officers lack of proactive contact with spectators (officers can fail to see their role as that of contacting and interacting with fans).
- Police and club relationship; lack of protocol or accountability for the actions of the club private security: substandard body searches performed by club staff.
- Risk assessments in relation to (lack of) intelligence.
- Tactical responses which are disproportionate to risk.
- Visiting contingency of officers not being used to the maximum benefit of the operation;
- Lack of command and control in ambiguous situations;
- The use of spotters: some forces choose to deploy spotters in uniform, other use plainclothes spotters;
- The task of spotters: some forces choose to deploy spotters who actively interact with fans, whereas other forces do not want / expect their spotters to interact directly / openly with fans.
- The use of stewards from away teams: on some occasions stewards accompanied away fans during transport. Sometimes they assisted home stewards at the entrance to the stadium or in the stands.
- The division of tasks between police and stewards: there were clear differences between forces regarding what police and steward responsibilities;
- Segregation of fans; inside stadiums, there is segregation of home and away fans. Outside the stadium (either in the direct vicinity of the stadium or in the city centre) some forces choose to keep home and away fans separate, others deliberately choose to mix them.
- The use of intelligence: some forces adopt a consistent intelligence-led approach, for other forces the relation between intelligence and decision-making is less clear.

- The treatment of fans: in some forces a consistent friendly and firm approach is adopted, in other forces treatment of fans is less consistent, with mixed messages being communicated to fans.

Appendix B

Full account of the data sets gathered in phase one

City A; 30th October – 2nd Nov 2006

- 6 Command staff interviewed
- 7 Operational staff interviewed
- 16 Fans interviewed (9 home, 7 away)
- Presentation given by police commander; ‘policing philosophy’
- Commanders briefing & frontline briefing
- Operational order
- Peer review agenda
- General information police document ‘Policing in the Netherlands’
- Observations (approx 12 hours)
- Field notes written up (e.g. briefings, presentation, orders) 16 pages, 665 lines
- Transcribed dictation (e.g. interviews, observations) 18 pages, 872 lines
- Focus group (4 hours; 24 pages, 847lines)
- Peer review evaluation report (15 pages)
- Total people contacted for the review: 60 people

City B: 20th Nov – 23rd Nov 2006

- 7 Command staff interview
- 4 Operational staff interviewed
- 1 Private security command staff interviewed
- 2 Private security steward staff interviewed
- 3 Journalists interviewed
- CD Rom depicting responsibilities and functions of police force
- Police intelligence order
- Police information document ‘Police and fans together against hooliganism in football project’
- Champions league match press kit
- UEFA security briefing & commander ‘briefing’
- Observations (approx 10 hours)
- Transcribed dictation (e.g. interviews, observations) 28 pages, 1270 lines

- Focus group (2 hours; 17 pages, 591 lines)
- Peer review report (15 pages)
- Total people contacted for the review: 25

City C: 23rd – 25th March 2007

- 7 Command staff interviewed
- 2 Operational staff interviewed
- 2 Security steward staff interviewed
- UEFA security briefing
- Operational order Orden De Servicio Num. 587/07
- Police information documents
- Information from the Football Association website
- Observations (approx 12 hours)
- Transcribed dictation (e.g. interviews, observations) 26 pages, 1169 lines
- Focus group (4 hours; 14 pages, 883 lines)
- Peer review report (16 pages)
- Total people contacted for the review: 35

City D: 1st Dec – 3rd of Dec 2007

- 8 Command staff interview
- 5 Operational staff interview
- 1 Private security command staff interviewed
- 1 Fan (home)
- Police Presentation on match
- Intelligence documents
- Briefing documents
- General info document
- Pre-match briefing for commanders
- Observations (10 hours)
- Transcribed dictation (e.g. interviews, observations) 34 pages, 1177 lines
- Focus group (4 hours)
- Peer review report (19 pages)
- Total people contacted for the review: 35

Appendix C

Full account of the data sets in phase two

City E: 21st -23rd August 2007

- 6 Command staff
- 3 Operational staff
- Operational order
- Police intelligence document
- Information sheet used by officers on the ground: for Q & A
- Intelligence for fans
- 'Useful information from the police' document
- Observations (12 hours)
- Transcribed dictation (e.g. interviews, observations) 21 pages, 934 lines
- Focus group (4 hours)
- Peer review report (16 pages)
- Total people contacted for the review: 25

City F: 11th – 13th November 2007

- 10 Command staff interviewed
- 5 Operational staff interviewed
- 1 Private security command staff interviewed
- 6 Fans interviewed (away)
- Operational order
- Secherheitskonzept (security order)
- Commanders briefing and operational briefing
- Information from Football Association
- Power point presentation relating to Euro 2008 (progress and preparation)
- Power point presentation relating current event
- Observations (12 hours)
- Transcribed dictation (e.g. interviews, observations) 29 pages, 1308 lines
- Focus group (4 hours; 25 pages)
- Peer review report (18 pages)
- Total people contacted for the review: 40

City G: 15th – 17th November 2007

- 7 Command staff interviewed
- 8 Operational staff interviewed

- 1 Private security steward staff interviewed
- 13 Fans interviewed (11 away, 2 home)
- Briefing for international cooperation
- Intelligence document
- Maps and hotspots
- Organisational plan
- Vehicle operational order
- Einsatzbefehl
- Behrorduhgaufragt
- High profile police operational order
- Spotters briefing and Vienna riot control unit briefing
- Observations (10 hours)
- Transcribed dictation (e.g. interviews, observations) 36 pages, 1698 lines
- Focus group (4 hours; 30 pages)
- Peer review report (21 pages)
- Total people contacted for the review: 65

City H; 16th – 18th October 2007

- 7 Command staff interviewed
- 12 Operational staff interviewed
- 1 Private security command staff interviewed
- 1 Private security steward staff interviewed
- 7 Fans interviewed (5 away, 2 home)
- Euro 2008 fire brigade order
- Euro 2008 planning order
- Presentation 'Was erwartet uns an der Euro 2008?' Schierhiets Konferenz (security conference)
- Vertraulich – Operational order
- Police information
- Internet information on host city
- Operational briefing and half time briefing,
- Observations (10 hours)
- Transcribed dictation (e.g. interviews, observations) 49 pages, 2198 lines
- Focus group (3 hours; 30 pages)
- Peer review report (19 pages)
- Total people contacted for the review: 41

City I: 8th Dec – 10th Dec 2007

- 7 Command staff interviewed
- 3 Operational staff interviewed
- Operational order
- Commanders briefing and operational riot unit briefing
- Preparation for Euro 2008 folder
- Observations (8 hours)
- Transcribed dictation (e.g. interviews, observations) 11 pages, 536 lines
- Focus group (3 hours)
- Peer review report (23 pages)
- Total people contacted for the review: 22

Appendix D Sample check sheet for conducting structured observations

1	Sample Number					
2	Location (Text)					
3	Enclosed/ secured area (yes=1/ no=0)					
4	Time (hh:mm)					
5	Total number of fans (without police)					
6	Fans team 1					
7	Fans team 2					
8	Other fans					
9	Stewards/ other security					
10	Unknown civilians /others					
11	Total number of police officers (visible; not in vehicles)					
12	Foreign police					
13	Normal uniform					
14	Half riot					
15	Full riot (baton, helmet worn)					
16	Police vehicles					
17	Riot vehicles					
18	Water cannon					
19	Mounted police					
20	Dog handlers					

21	Positive interaction fans 1 – fans 2 (yes=1/ no=0)					
22	Positive interaction fans – police (yes=1/ no=0)					
23	Positive interaction fans – stewards (yes=1/ no=0)					
24	Negative interaction fans 1 – fans 2 (yes=1/ no=0)					
25	Negative interaction fans – police (yes=1/ no=0)					
26	Negative interaction fans – stewards (yes=1/ no=0)					

Incidents and interventions WITHIN last 15 min

27	Incident (none=0, small=1, medium=2, big=3)					
28	Police intervention (none=0, stopping=1, arrest=2, dispersion=3)					
29	Police use of force (yes=1/ no=0)					

- Please insert only numbers. Don't use symbols such as „?” or „100-150”

Appendix E

Full account of data set gathered in phase three

Klagenfurt 6th - 9th June 2008 (Germany Vs Poland)

- 1 Command staff interviewed
- 8 Operational staff interviewed
- 1 Private security steward staff interviewed
- 3 Securities (including supervisor) declined to talk with us
- 20 Foreign nationals (German and Polish) interviewed
- Observations: 30 hours
- Transcriptions: 32 pages, 1568 lines

Vienna 10th - 11th June 2008 (Austria Vs Poland)

- 1 Command staff interviewed
- 12 Operational staff interviewed
- 1 Private security steward staff interviewed
- 15 Foreign nationals (Polish, German, Austrian) interviewed
- CEPOL team de-briefing evaluation report
- Observations: 15 hours
- Transcriptions: 15 pages, 755 lines

Salzburg 11th - 12th June 2008 (Greece Vs Russia)

- 1 command staff interviewed

- 14 operational staff interviewed
- 2 private security steward staff interviewed
- CEPOL team de-briefing evaluation report
- Observations: 10 hours
- Transcriptions: 10 pages, 496 lines

Vienna 14th - 16th June 2008 (German Vs Austria)

- 1 Command staff interviewed
- 15 Foreign nationals (German, Austrian and Polish) interviewed
- CEPOL team de-briefing evaluation report
- Observations: 15 hours
- Transcriptions: 5 pages, 217 lines

Appendix F

Semi-structured ethnographic interview schedule for frontline officers

- Why did you do that? (opportunistic in relation to actions)
- What effect do you think that has? (opportunistic in relation to actions)
- What do you think of the fans here?
- How do you understand the 3D strategy? / What does the strategy mean to you?
- What does dialogue mean? Give an example of when you have seen it work
- What does de-escalation mean? Give an example of when you have seen it work
- How do you understand the third D? Give an example of when you have seen this work

Appendix G

Semi-structured interview schedule for foreign nationals

- Why do you think that happened? (opportunistic in relation to actions)
- How does that make you feel? (opportunistic in relation to actions)
- Have you heard of the 3D Euro 2008 policy?
- What do you think of the policing here?
- Have you travelled anywhere else? What do you think of police there?

Appendix H

Semi-structured interview schedule for police commanders

- How do you understand the 3D strategy? / What does the strategy mean to you?
 - To what degree is it a media and public management strategy

- To what degree is it an intervention strategy in response to disorder
- To what extent is it a friendly but firm philosophy of policing
- In what way does it manage the crowd? What did you think of the fans here?

- Was the 3D strategy well received?
 - Acceptance of the 3D policy at different levels of command
 - Understanding the 3D policy at different levels
 - Any issues in the implementation of the strategy for commanders or junior officers

- What is significant about each of the three Ds?
 - What does dialogue mean? Give an example of when you have seen it work
 - How do you find D1? Are there issues with enacting this D?
 - What does de-escalation mean? Give an example of when you have seen it work
 - How do you find D2? Are there issues with enacting this D?
 - What does the third D mean? Give an example of when you have seen this work
 - How do you find D3? Are there issues with enacting this D?

- What do you expect of police actions they relate to specific Ds?
 - Are officers are equipped and trained to deal with one stage, or all stages
 - Should deployment always start with 1D? Or can deployment start a 2/3D?
 - How do you know when to move to the next D?

- Do you pressure from within the police force? If so, what are they?
 - Pressure from external agencies outside the police force? If so what are they?
 - How does this make you feel?

- Has the strategy changed policing since its introduction? Long / short term
 - Training / preparation; what training have you had for the 3D?
 - Were to officers prepared well for 3D?
 - Were officers' confident about their ability to enact the 3D?

- What are the outcomes of the 3D?
 - What is effective about the 3D strategy?
 - Do you think the 3D was successful?
 - Do you think it could be improved in anyway?

Appendix I

Summary account of data gathered during the current study

The culmination of the multi-method research effort can be summarised as:

- Interview and observation dictation transcriptions total 377 A4 pages
- Participant observations of the police management of foreign nationals total 176hrs
- Nine focus groups were conducted: with the total duration of 28hrs, dictation transcriptions total 195 A4 pages
- 15 operational briefings were attended, including; police staff briefings and debriefings, UEFA security briefings and private security staff briefings (averaging 45 minutes)
- Research activities have produced nine peer review evaluation reports: 162 A4 pages;
- 745 structured observation samples have been gathered on; (1) police strategy and tactics and behaviour; (2) fan perspectives and behaviour; (3) police-fan interactions; and, (3) levels of conflict
- Archival research has been conducted from media sources and video footage in Austria, England, Germany, Poland and Switzerland. Approximately 150 articles have been gathered, totalling 235 A4 pages
- Official police documentation has been gathered throughout the project, including: operational orders, intelligence documents and information documents. Articles on police, official Euro 2008, and Football Association websites have been gathered. Additionally, official police reports were obtained through the Austrian and Swiss Interior Ministry after Euro 2008