A Study of the Representation of 'Muslim' and 'Asian' Identities in the British National Press

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Abstract

It has long been argued that Islam has been covered in the 'western' media in oppositional terms – with events such as 9/11 playing a pivotal role in this. In the British context, a form of stereotyping also exists which ensures that people of South Asian ethnicities (specifically Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Indian ethnicities) are also included in this process. Misunderstanding between different ethnic 'groups' of citizens in the UK is an important issue, and in 2001 led to violence in a number of towns and cities. This thesis provides an original contribution to knowledge through a mixed-methods analysis of three case-studies based on UK national press content, and considers the way in which the 'groups' identified above are covered. The three cases – The *Satanic Verses* incident (1989), Bradford Riots (2001), and Gillian Gibbons incident (2007) – are chosen because their varying characteristics enable some telling comparisons of similarity and difference. The study finds a dearth of 'ordinary' voices from within the groups noted above in British press coverage, with a heavy reliance on the voices of religious and community 'leaders' instead. This was true in cases where minority voices tended to be dissenting (1989, 2001), as well as where they were more supportive of the status quo (2007). While events such as 9/11 and 7/7 undoubtedly had an effect on coverage of British Muslims and people of South Asian ethnicities – meaning that already negative coverage was exaggerated – this study concludes that this effect may not have been as great as previously thought outside of the specific context of terrorism. This is evidenced by coverage sampled concerning the 2007 Gibbons incident.

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Introduction

This thesis investigates British national press coverage involving the representation of 'Muslim' and 'Asian' identities in Britain – using three primary case studies ranging from 1989-2007. It aims to study the way in which these different identities have been represented by the British press though this time period. This is an intriguing topic for research, in that it involves two separate types of 'difference' – both 'racial/ethnic' difference and religious difference – a topic which is discussed further below.

Whilst there is a valid argument that perceived differences in what we call 'race' are just that – perceptions imagined into being as part of the human quest for identity – for the purposes of this study, this is largely ignored, given that (as is shown throughout this work), the press often tend to identify people through such categorisations. Religious difference is a categorisation which is *not* imagined however – representing a conscious decision by a person to subscribe to (or in the case of someone born into a religion, remain subscribed to) the philosophies and beliefs of a certain religion. But in contemporary society – especially in what has become known as the 'west' – these two categorisations are often intertwined, leading to generalisations being made between religious and racial categories. Poynting and Mason (2007) for instance, describe the way in which (in the UK context) 'most Muslims, and the most recognizable Muslims, are of South Asian ancestry' (2007: 63) and identify how this has led to a degree of conflation being present between these two 'identifiers', and hence the combination of the two to form an 'other' group. This process is not one based solely in demographics and geography however, but history as well, and Said (1978) describes the way in which the historical attitudes and imaginings of the 'west' (which he terms 'the Occident') where the 'east' (termed 'the Orient') is concerned, combine to form an image of a 'symmetrical' and yet 'diametrically inferior' people and culture (1978: 72). In the contemporary British media, it is arguable that this process has conspired to create an 'other group' – a grouping of people who whilst undeniably British, are viewed as separate to the 'mainstream'. In other words, there is a type of 'them and us' scenario in operation.

Other events in more recent history have also had an undeniable effect on the way in which the Muslim/'South Asian' 'other' is portrayed in the media. The most striking of these were the so-called '9/11' attacks of 2001. Here, the world was shown the mass murder of civilians, carried out ostensibly in the name of 'religion' – specifically the religion of Islam. The reaction to the attacks by America was swift – the George W. Bush administration stating that it had declared 'War on

Terrorism' – beginning military operations in Afghanistan that very year and later in Iraq in 2003. Although Said (1997) stated long before 9/11 that 'Muslims and Arabs are essentially covered, discussed and apprehended either as oil suppliers or as potential terrorists' (1997: 28), the effect which 9/11 has had on images of Muslims in the media since then should not be underestimated. Poynting and Mason (2007) acknowledge this, and argue that although it had been underway since the *Satanic Verses* incident of 1989 (and possibly even as far back as the Iranian Revolution in 1979), there was a shift in the representation of the 'Asian "Other"' from description in racial or ethnic terms to one of religious terms – 'Muslim' (2007: 81). This suggests that the 9/11 attacks may have broadened the gamut of the Muslim stereotype – as well as increasing its use/importance. In the British context, a second set of 'Islamic terror' attacks which were to occur on July 7th, 2005 (the so-called '7/7' attacks) are also likely to have played a role in these representations – given that they took place on British soil and were carried out by British citizens. Featherstone, Holohan and Poole (2010) support this analysis, describing a number of changes in British press content observed in the wake of 7/7 – which is something discussed further in the conclusion to this thesis.

Stereotypes and the study of stereotypes are important for a number of reasons. Firstly, a stereotype, when it manifests itself in the form of the 'othering' described above can only help to further create and perpetuate the feelings of difference of which it is a part. Secondly, when a racial stereotype becomes widely-held, it becomes a constituent part of what Hall (1990) terms 'inferential racism' – a form of racism which relies on a set of 'unquestioned assumptions' in order to operate (1990: 13). Hall argues that this then allows 'racist statements to be formulated without ever bringing into awareness the racist predicates on which the statements are grounded' (ibid). Hall even goes as far as to suggest that many people who 'formulate the world' in inferentially racist terms do not even know that they are doing so (ibid). A later discussion by Hall (1990) regarding racism in the media illustrates how this might operate in practice – suggesting that it is not generally the individuals involved in the production of media content who are actively racist, but rather the structure and the practices of the media which cause it to produce racist content (1990: 20).

Stereotypes and assumptions of difference do of course have repercussions outside of the theoretical. In the summer of 2001, divisions in communities in northern England were made violently apparent, when a number of instances of civil disobedience occurred across a broad area of the country. These disturbances were to become known as the 'race riots' of 2001. Violence of this type was certainly nothing new in Britain – many instances of civil disobedience motivated by racial divisions and racism having occurred prior to 2001 – but the disturbances in 2001 were different to

events such as the widespread riots which had occurred in 1981 and 1985 in areas including Brixton (London) and Toxteth/L8 (Liverpool), in that they did not generally take place in Britain's largest cities[1]. Instead, it was large towns and smaller cities such as Bradford, Burnley and Oldham that were gripped by violence in 2001. The exception to this was activity which occurred in Leeds, which is one of the country's larger cities – although differences in the causal factors of this set of disturbances have meant that they have been left out of the majority of academic analyses of the wider 2001 violence – see for instance Kundnani, 2001; Amin, 2003. Disturbances had been experienced in Bradford before – in the Manningham area in 1995 – which were similar to those in 2001 in that they involved mainly people of South Asian ethnicity clashing with the police, but these earlier instances of violence were not nearly as widespread, or as widely reported as those which occurred in 2001. The violence in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford in 2001 has largely been blamed on tensions which developed between Balkanised 'white' and 'South Asian' communities(Kundnani, 2001; Amin, 2003; Kalra and Rhodes, 2009) – although in each instance far-right wing groups such as the NF and BNP also had a role to play in 'sparking' the incident. Although a number of official reports investigated the violence in an attempt to identify its causes and, as will be shown in later chapters, the disturbances themselves had little to do with religion, Phillips (2006) states that in the broader sense the blame for the social polarisation which existed in many of Britain's northern towns and cities 'fell squarely on the shoulders of the British Muslim population' (2006: 28).

Later in this study, a content analysis is presented of British national press coverage of one particular set of these 'race riots' – Bradford, West Yorkshire (Chapter Six) – which took place after similar disturbances, first in Oldham, Greater Manchester and then in Burnley, Lancashire. One of the aims of the analysis carried out here is to identify instances of the coverage of the dissenting voices of British people of a South Asian ethnic and/or Muslim religious identity, and the violence in Bradford in 2001 represents a prominent example of this type of dissent coming largely from the city's residents of South Asian ethnicities. This suggests that dissenting voices would have been likely to have been covered in the press – given that they represented an important part of the story. This study is not merely about the disturbances in Bradford however – nor is it merely about ethnic or racial 'difference'. In order to analyse the dissenting voices of British Muslims 'heard' in the press, a further two case studies are included here, which were carried out in a similar style to the one above. Rather than simply identifying cases similar to the Bradford disturbances, where civil disobedience by a 'minority' group directly led to a story being created, here it made sense to consider events where the 'minority' was less active in creating the story itself. A number of

[1] The disturbances in 1981 and 1985 have also variously been referred to as 'race riots'. These instances of violence are discussed in relation to their larger historical context in Chapter Two.

academics have noted the importance of the *Satanic Verses* incident in 1989 in changing and further distorting perceptions of British Muslims (e.g. – Modood, 1990; Alexander, 2000; Poynting and Mason, 2007), and it is here that the original research presented in this thesis begins. The nature of the *Satanic Verses* incident as a complex event motivated by individuals outside of Britain as much as it was by Rushdie's novel itself[2] is suitably different from the Bradford disturbances described above that it allows for a greater spectrum of dissonant voices to be observed. It is not so different that no comparisons can be drawn between it and the events of 2001 described above however – with Bradford playing an important role in the story due to the infamous book-burnings which were carried out there by Muslims. The temporal location of both these events is crucial however, in that they occurred *before* the 9/11 attacks, which as previously described were of great importance in conceptions of Muslims and people of South Asian ethnicity in Britain. To this end, a third case study is included in this thesis, which concentrates on the Gillian Gibbons incident of 2007. Gillian Gibbons was a British schoolteacher who had been working at a school in Sudan, North Africa, when she was accused of blasphemy for allowing her class to name a teddy bear 'Muhammad' (BBC, 2007a). Rather than simply considering an event involved with terrorism here in the post-9/11 context (7/7 would have been perhaps the obvious example coming from a British perspective), the Gibbons incident was selected because of how, in many ways, it mirrored the events of the *Satanic Verses* incident in 1989. Both cases involved a British national being accused of blasphemy by a foreign power – and in both cases there was a risk of physical harm coming to that person. Both cases were also covered widely by the media – allowing in-depth sampling to be conducted, and a reasonable sample size to be achieved. This in turn allowed the mixed-methods approach used in these case studies to be carried out – a larger sample size meaning that quantitative statements made about the data are more meaningful. Finally, both of these cases represent examples where Muslim voices – from both within and outside Britain have protested against something deemed to be offensive to Islam.

The first chapter of this thesis is concerned with placing the British stereotyping of Muslims and people of South Asian ethnicities in its historical context – and whilst it is by no means an exhaustive account, it contains many examples thought to be salient to the study conducted here. Chapter Two performs a similar function to the previous chapter, in that it is partly a history, but this time is concerned with the history of racially motivated civil disobedience in Britain. Also included here is a substantial discussion of civil disobedience, and how it has been related to race in theory and

[2] Modood (1990) argues that although Rushdie blamed the *'mullahs'* for 'whipping up' Muslims in order to fulfil their own political motives, 'the truth is that all the religious zealots had to do was simply quote from *SV* [*The Satanic Verses*] for anger, shame and hurt to be felt (1990: 154).

practice. Chapter Three takes a closer look at some of the more problematic terms encountered in this thesis, and puts the stereotyping of 'other' groups into a theoretical context. Following these three background chapters, Chapter Four presents a discussion of the particularities of the methodology employed here – as well as introducing the research question itself. This chapter outlines a strategy for answering the question which is utilised throughout the following four chapters. Chapters Five, Six and Seven present analysis of the individual case-studies carried out – The *Satanic Verses* incident (1989), Bradford Riots (2001), and Gillian Gibbons incident (2007) – and these are discussed separately in each individual chapter. Chapter Eight continues the analysis carried out in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, in a *comparative* sense – in order to identity any trends in the data. This discussion is then synthesised to form a final argument and conclusion, and this conclusion is put into the context of wider academic research in the area.

Chapter One

Historical Issues Concerning the Stereotyping of British Muslims and people of South Asian Ethnicity

Introduction

In order to provide a basis for understanding the way in which Muslims and South Asians have been covered by the British media, it is important first to look at the issue in its historical context. This is underlined by theses such as those of Edward Said (1978), and later Paul Gilroy (2004), which demonstrate the profound way in which modern Britain has been affected by issues such as the rise and decline of its Empire. The following chapter draws attention to this historical context, by plotting a timeline which begins in the Eighth Century, when the Muslim Caliphs first began the colonisation of Southern Europe, right up until the present day.

To call the issues detailed in this chapter 'Muslim issues', or 'Islamic issues' would be wrong. Piscatori describes how events such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the *Satanic Verses* incident may have been seen as 'Islamic issues' in world politics, because of the way they touch on core Muslim values, or the way in which the majority of Muslim states have politically claimed them as their own. He also warns against such a conceptualisation – highlighting the differences which exist amongst Muslims in the understanding of such issues (1990: 781-782). Piscatori goes on to compare depictions of the *Satanic Verses* incident as an 'Islamic issue' to describing democracy as a wholly western phenomenon (1990: 785). For Piscatori, to describe something as an 'Islamic issue' can only promote the notion that Muslims represent a single homogeneous group, with one single worldview[3]. Many of the issues in this chapter concern not merely Muslims, but people of South Asian ethnicity as well. These issues are covered here because of possible misconceptions about the South Asian ethnic grouping in Britain, which form a theme throughout this study. A central part of the thesis presented in the later chapters of this work deals with the conflation of terms such as 'Muslim' and 'Asian' in the press, and as such, it was important that the historical analysis presented here be informed by salient issues which affect both 'groups'. The issues in this chapter should not, therefore, be thought of merely as 'Islamic issues'. They are issues which may have affected Muslims and South Asians (either in Britain specifically, or anywhere else in the world) in some way. They are

[3] Such a conceptualisation is described in a report by the Greater London Authority (2007: 105), and discussed in further detail in Chapter Three of this thesis.

not, however, issues which affected *only* Muslims, or with which *only* Muslims have been, or are concerned. Although the issues considered in this chapter may have affected the way in which Muslims are 'seen', or stereotyped by non-Muslims, and the (largely non-Muslim) media, this does not make them 'Muslim issues'.

To put together a complete and unabridged history of issues of this type would be an almost impossible task, and is not something which could easily be placed within the confines of what is a relatively short section of this thesis. Therefore this chapter sets out to provide a concise rather than exhaustive history of events salient to the stereotyping of British Muslims and British people of South Asian ethnicity. The chapter begins with an overview of historic events, and discusses the significance of certain possible 'turning-points' in the coverage of Muslims and Islam in Britain, as well as changes made to the legal immigration framework over the years. By centering its analysis around these salient events, this chapter is able to provide a depiction of the historical problems which exist in the stereotyping of British Muslims and South Asians in a condensed format. Following this, the chapter closes with an analysis of data concerning the South Asian ethnic demographic in Britain.

Pre-World War II Immigration and Issues

Britain has been home to a significant Muslim population for at least the last 300 years (Runnymede Trust, 1997: 13), although it should be noted that Islam is by no means a new arrival in Europe[4]. The first major Muslim group to settle in Britain are said to have been the 'Lascars' – seamen working for the East India Company, whose numbers are estimated to have grown to around 3000 by 1842. With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, sea travel from Western Europe to the Near East and South Asia became much faster, and many more Lascars began to settle in Britain (ibid). The majority of these sailors came from Yemen[5], and settled mainly around seaports such as South Shields, Liverpool, Cardiff (Peach, 2005: 18-19; Halliday, 2006: 29), Manchester, and the East End of London (Ansari, 2004: 25). Many Indian sailors employed by the East India Company also began to settle in Britain (Visram, 1986: 9). Visram mentions that the first reported Christian baptism of an Indian in Britain was in 1616 (although the man concerned had been brought to Britain two years previously). The youth was Christened as Peter, and was intended to study in Britain, before returning to India to

[4] Until at least the 1100s, much of Southern Europe was dominated by the Islamic world, being in practice colonised (Miles, 1989: 13). This began in the eighth and ninth centuries, when Spain, Sicily, and portions of France were conquered by the Islamic world (Said, 1978: 59).
[5] Ansari also identifies the Aden hinterland, British Somaliland and Malaya as British Muslim immigrant places of origin at this time (2004: 25).

act as a Christian missionary (2002: 1). British families returning from India would often bring with them Indian nannies or ladies' maids known as 'Ayahs', as well as general servants. Whilst not 'indentured' as such, these servants were generally employed on a low wage basis as cheap labour. When African slavery was legally abolished in 1833, many other Indians *were* recruited as indentured labourers, to work all over the British Empire. Visram argues that this was merely slavery in a new guise (Visram, 1986: 9).

Ansari mentions that in early twentieth century Britain, Muslims were often 'not seen primarily in terms of their religious identity. Their ethnicity or colour was crucial in defining how they were seen and the treatment they received' (2004: 92). This treatment was not always favourable, with discrimination in the job market and in housing representing a major problem for Muslims at the time (ibid). Relationships between 'Muslim' men and 'white' women were also discouraged (2004: 92-93).

After the end of World War One in 1919, Ansari describes how British society seemed particularly sensitive to the issue of who was and who was not an 'alien' – in other words 'who had the right to be in Britain and who ought to be compelled to leave (Ansari, 2004: 96). This sentiment is believed to have caused a series of riots, which took place mainly in Liverpool, South Shields and South Wales. People of ethnic minorities in these areas found themselves targeted by white protestors, due largely to the rising unemployment for which they were blamed (although this tended to have little factual foundation) (2004: 96-97). These disturbances are covered in some detail in Chapter Two, which provides a history of civil disobedience in Britain through the ages.

Post-World War II Immigration

The next large-scale immigration of Muslims to Britain came in the period following World War Two (a war which was fought not only by Britain, but also its colonies (Visram, 2002: 341)), with many people from Pakistan, Bangladesh and India brought in to aid with the post-war labour shortage (Peach, 2005: 19; Holohan, 2006: 14). Ansari (2004) identifies South Asia, parts of the Middle East, Africa and Cyprus as the main points of origin of immigrants to Britain between 1945 and the mid-1970s (2004: 145). Ansari states that post-war immigration patterns can be divided under two broad headings – roughly *before* and *after* the oil-crisis of 1973-4. Before the early 1970s, 'the economic strategy of capital investment and expansion of production of Britain called for a large number of migrant workers from 'less-developed' countries, many of them Muslim' (2004: 145). The recession

which ensued after the oil-crisis of 1973/4 resulted in high unemployment, particularly in the industries where the majority of immigrant workers were employed. This cut the demand for immigrant labour, meaning that 'any organised form of recruitment of migrant workers, particularly from the New Commonwealth, ceased' (2004: 145-146).

The Commonwealth Immigrants Act (1962)

Until the Commonwealth Immigrants Act (1962) was passed, citizens of the Commonwealth 'had free entry into Britain' (Hayter, 2003: 7). By the 1960s however, the British economy had begun to slow down after the boom of the post-war period and the economy no longer required large numbers of immigrants to fill labour shortages (Mynott, 2002: 18-19). A more cynical point of view[6] is provided by Workers Against Racism, who argue that at this time, immigrants went from being 'a necessary evil', to 'no longer even necessary' (1985: 37), suggesting that before the 1960s the British government had grudgingly accepted immigration only as a necessary reality.

The Commonwealth Immigrants Act effectively limited immigration to Britain from the Commonwealth, being described as follows:

> To make temporary provision for controlling the immigration into the United Kingdom of Commonwealth citizens; to authorise the deportation from the United Kingdom of certain Commonwealth citizens convicted of offences and recommended by the court for deportation; to amend the qualifications required of Commonwealth citizens applying for citizenship under the British Nationality Act, 1948 ; to make corresponding provisions in respect of British protected persons and citizens of the Republic of Ireland; and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid
> (Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1962: 2).

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[6] Although Mynott does concede that in the post-war boom period:

> Those European countries with colonies and ex-colonies (principally France, Britain and Holland), looked to them as a source of labour – albeit only after it became apparent that the displaced and the refugees of Europe were not going to be sufficient (2002: 18).

This suggests that perhaps immigrant workers from outside of Europe represented something of a 'last-resort' solution for France, Britain and Holland.

The Act required anyone from the Commonwealth and colonies seeking to settle in the UK after July 1st 1962 to have been issued with a 'job voucher' in one of three categories. Immigrants could either:

- Have a job to come to.
- Possess special skills which were in short supply, or:
- Be part of a large undifferentiated group whose numbers would be set according to the labour needs of the United Kingdom economy (Spencer, 1997: 129).

Ansari (2004) describes how the number of immigrants from Pakistan and Cyprus rose sharply in 1961 following the announcement of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act (2004: 158). These attempts to 'beat the ban' may have meant that the effect of the new legislation was in fact the opposite of that intended by the then Conservative government:

> By removing the right to come and go freely, the 1962 Act transformed what had in the past been temporary movements from the New Commonwealth into the permanent settlement of migrants and their families, and in the process did away with the relatively flexible reserve of labour hitherto available (Ansari, 2004: 158).

It has been suggested that the Act 'activated latent fears about the threat posed by immigration and encouraged committed racists to take things even further' (Workers Against Racism, 1985: 37). Certainly by underlining a perceived 'problem' with immigration, the British government would have drawn it to the forefront of the public's mind, possibly strengthening existing xenophobic/racist beliefs. Spencer identifies the most important facet of the Act as being the way in which it drew a distinction between the rights of the holder of a British passport, and the holder of a passport issued by another Commonwealth government. It was the first time that this had ever occurred in British law (1997: 134). This may have contributed to a conception of 'otherness' where immigrants to Britain from the Commonwealth were concerned.

The Commonwealth Immigrants Act (1968)

In 1968, another 'Commonwealth Immigrants Act' was officially introduced, which stated that its role was to:

> Amend sections 1 and 2 of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962, and Schedule I to that Act, and to make further provision as to Commonwealth citizens landing in the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man; and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid (Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1968: 2).

Hansen (1999) states that:

> The passage of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill, 1968, was among the most divisive and controversial decisions taken by any British government. For some, the act was the most shameful piece of legislation ever enacted by parliament, the ultimate appeasement of racist hysteria (Hansen, 1999: 810).

Hansen's reason for making such a statement concerns primarily the plight of the 'Asian' community in Kenya, who were being forced out of the economy[7] by the Kenyan government's 'Africanization policy' (Hansen, 1999: 809-810). Until 1968, the security of the Kenyan Asians had been assured by their possession of British passports. After the passing of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act in 1968, this security was revoked, when the British government announced that it would no longer recognize those passports. Whole airliners full of refugees were turned away from Britain, leaving them effectively stateless (ibid). Cohen (2001) concurs with Hansen's analysis above, describing the Act as having 'excluded and betrayed thousands of East African Asians who had been given the option of retaining United Kingdom citizenship on the independence of Kenya and Uganda' (Cohen, 2001: 33). It is doubtful that these problems with the Act represented a mere oversight on the government's behalf. In 1968, Hepple stated that:

> As is well known, the purpose of this new restriction [the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1968] is to slow down the entry into the U.K. of East African Asians who, through choice or inadvertence, did not acquire citizenship of the countries in which they reside within the

[7] I.e. were not being allowed to work.

> required period after independence and who hold U.K. citizenship and U.K. passports (Hepple, 1968: 424).

A solution to these problems did not arrive quickly – Hansen also notes that in 1999 (31 years later), some refugees were still waiting to enter the UK (Hansen, 1999: 810).

The 'Rivers of Blood' Speech (1968)

On April 20th, 1968, Enoch Powell MP made a speech at the Midland Hotel, Birmingham, which was to become infamously known as the 'Rivers of Blood' speech[8] (Heffer, 1998: 449). Powell was probably aware before making the speech of its potential impact, remarking that 'I'm going to make a speech at the weekend and it's going to "fizz" like a rocket; but whereas all rockets fall to earth, this one is going to stay up' (ibid). The speech was fervently anti-immigration, stating for instance that:

> We [Britain] must be mad, literally mad, as a nation to be permitting the annual inflow of some 50,000 dependants, who are for the most part the material of the future growth of the immigrant descended population (Heffer, 1998: 451).

In another line, Powell gave a description of his vision of a future Britain – that 'in this country in 15 or 20 years time the black man will have the whip hand over the white man' (ibid). Copsey (2004) describes how during the 1970s, 'Powellism' began to open up 'legitimate space' for the extreme-right party the National Front (although he states that this was largely recouped by the Conservatives when Margaret Thatcher 'made a bid for the racist constituency' in the late 1970s) (Copsey, 2004: 117). This underlines the importance of this particular speech in a history such as this – it is one which played an important role in the history of the far-right in Britain.

[8] This is due to a line in the speech where Powell quotes Virgil – 'as I look ahead, I am filled with much foreboding. Like the Roman, I seem to see "the River Tiber foaming with much blood"' (Shepard, 1996: 325).

The Immigration Act (1971)

The Immigration Act (1971), which became law in 1973 (Spencer, 1997: 143) was officially passed in order to:

> Amend and replace the present immigration laws, to make certain related changes in the citizenship law and enable help to be given to those wishing to return abroad, and for purposes connected therewith (Immigration Act, 1971: 3).

Böhning (1974) describes the Act as having 'put a final stop to the immigration of non-professional workers from the New Commonwealth' (1974: 160). Indeed, in Böhning's estimation, the intention of the Act 'was not so much to regulate immigration as to keep further Coloured [sic] British citizens out' (ibid). Poynting and Mason (2007) concur with this analysis, stating that the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act and the 1971 Immigration Act 'effectively racialized the basis of the immigration system' (2007: 65). They go on to state that 'the intention [of the Acts] was quite clearly to enable the exlusion of targeted applicants of non-white [sic] 'races'' (ibid). The three acts described here had obvious significance for South Asians seeking to enter Britain as citizens, as well as South Asians who were already Commonwealth citizens (as well as other ethnic groups). This significance was not necessarily limited to people who were not resident in the UK at the time, however. As described above, Workers Against Racism (1985) suggest that the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act may have encouraged white racists to victimise people of different ethnic backgrounds – an analysis which could presumably also apply to either of the subsequent Acts introduced in the same vein.

The Iranian Revolution (1979)

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 transformed Iran from a monarchy, under the rule of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, to a theocratic Islamic Republic, lead initially by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, until his death in 1989. Boroumand and Boroumand (2002) mark the 1979 revolution, and the subsequent seizure of the US Embassy in Iran later that year, as the moment that 'Islamist terror first burst onto the world scene' (2002: 6). Poynting and Mason (2007) state that the Iranian Revolution may have been important in the representation of the 'Asian 'other'' in the British media – in that it arguably marked a turning point where this 'group' went from being represented as 'Asian' or 'Pakistani' to 'Muslim' (2007: 81). Abbas (2001) also identifies the revolution as an

important event, in that it may have precipitated the first use of the term 'fundamentalism' in connection to Islam in the British press (2001: 250). Abbas states that it was the *Observer* newspaper which first used this term in this way, in 1981 – to describe 'the dangerous fundamentalism revived by the ayatollahs and their admirers' (*The Observer*, 1981, cited in Abbas, 2001: 250).

The media's reaction to the revolution may have been compounded by an event which was to become known as the Iranian Hostage Crisis. In November 1979, the American President Jimmy Carter invited the ex-Shah to New York to receive medical treatment. The deposed Shah, however, was by this point wanted in Iran, awaiting trial for crimes he allegedly committed whilst still in power. A group of around 500 students began a demonstration outside the US embassy in Tehran, with demands that the US extradite Reza back to Iran for trial. When an extradition was not forthcoming, the students stormed the embassy compound, taking around 67 American hostages. Although 15 hostages were released fairly quickly, 52 remained in captivity for well over a year (444 days) (Saunders, 1985; Farber, 2005). Said (1997) notes that since the seizure of the American embassy in 1979, Iran has been 'demonized' by the American media – and continues to arouse 'seething passions' in many Americans (1997: 81).

Asari[9] (1989) suggested that the British media treat Iranians as if they are radically different from Britons, and as if they are governed by different values. This, Asari says, means that:

> Iran as "the nation of fundamentalist Muslims" is judged by a different set of standards from other nations. Poles and Chileans, who are taken to belong to Western civilisation, automatically qualify for a democratic polity, whereas Iranians belong to an Islamic world which by definition lives and should live by a different set of rules (Asari, 1989: 10).

Whilst in one sense, Iranians *are* governed by a different set of values to Britons (because the two countries have separate governments and legal systems), the extent to which this is consensual or democratic cannot be readily determined. To assume therefore that the entire nation was *personally* governed by such values would be wrong, although if Asari is correct, this is the way in which the case is presented by the British media.

[9] Farzaneh Asari is the pen-name of an exiled Iranian writer (Asari, 1989: 9).

The Rushdie Incident (1989)

Anglo-Indian writer Salman Rushdie's fourth novel *The Satanic Verses* was published in 1988, but in 1989 the world's attention was drawn to it by Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini – who ordered a *fatwa* (religious decree) calling for Rushdie's death. The reason given for this was that Rushdie had blasphemed against Islam, and against its Holiest Prophet – Mohammed. This resulted in demonstrations and book-burnings being carried out, and attacks on people involved in the book's publication (BBC, 2009a). Demonstrations against the book are reported to have been largely limited to the UK (Modood, 1990). Modood's explanation for this has little to do with Khomeini's *fatwa*. He indicates that it was largely due to the fact that the British Muslim population is made up largely of Barelvi Sunni Muslims. Modood describes Barelvis as a sect known for its intense devotion to the Prophet Mohammed that 'goes well beyond what some would regard as orthodox and has been called "the mythification of Muhammed"' (Modood, 1990: 150). Also, as Ayatollah Khomeini was a Shia rather than Sunni Muslim preacher, Modood argues that his *fatwa* would have had little, if any impact on the majority of British Muslims (Modood, 1990: 149).

Although Modood points out that in his opinion, Muslims of the Barelvi sect may have been especially offended by depiction of the Prophet Mohammed contained in *The Satanic Verses*, although he also describes how:

> Virtually every practicing Muslim was offended by passages from the book and shocked that it was written by a Muslim of whom till then the Asian community were proud. Rushdie has argued that the *mullahs* whipped up the ordinary Muslims for their own political motives. The truth is that all the religious zealots had to do was simply quote from *SV* [*Satanic Verses*] for anger, shame and hurt to be felt (Modood, 1990: 154).

Whilst Piscatori (1990) allows that Barelvi Muslims are often more politically inclined than their 'primary competitors' in Britain, the Deobandis (whom, he states have a tendency to be somewhat apolitical) (1990: 786), his explanation for the fervour of the British Muslim response to *The Satanic Verses* lies elsewhere. He explains the way in which a political and religious rivalry exists, or existed between Shia ruled Iran and the Sunni Saudi Arabian Royal Family. As Saudi Arabia contains the Muslim Holy cities of Mecca and Medina, it holds a special role within Islam, making the Royal Family custodians of Islam's two Holiest sites. When *The Satanic Verses* was published, Saudi Arabia replied with a 'mild reaction', whilst Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini pronounced a *fatwa* demanding the death of

Salman Rushdie. Piscatori suggests that Saudi Arabia received criticism for its refusal to endorse the *fatwa* from rival Iran, which saw itself as the world's only true Islamic state. This rivalry, Piscatori says, may have spilled over into the British Muslim population, who then tended to take on the view of the side which most matched their own.

The *Satanic Verses* incident may have been important in stereotypes not only of British Muslims, but also of British people of South Asian ethnicities. Alexander (2000) notes that during the *Satanic Verses* furore – when book burnings took place in the Yorkshire city of Bradford, the city's South Asian community were portrayed as 'reactionary and anachronistic' (Alexander, 2000: 10) - possibly indicating that a conflation had taken place between British 'Muslims' and 'South Asians'. The *Satanic Verses* incident is an event which is central to this thesis – press coverage of it being analysed in some detail in Chapter Five, and central to this analysis is the concept of conflation of British 'Muslims' and 'South Asians'. A further account of the *Satanic Verses* incident is also present in Chapter Five.

The End of the Cold War (1990)

Whilst the Cold War had little to do with Islam itself, its end in 1990 can be seen as important in the wider context of the coverage/stereotyping of Islam/Muslims. The Cold War was a war of ideals – and can be essentialised in terms of Capitalism versus Communism. Interesting parallels can be drawn between the Cold War and the (currently ongoing) War on Terror – in that both involve defined ideologies, and in both, military operations were carried out by multiple groups, in diverse locations around the globe. These similarities are underlined by Clarke (2004), who states that:

> Cold War America saw all foreign policy issues through the prism of the conflict between the two superpowers [America and the USSR], much as we now see the world through the war on terrorism. The Cold War had parallels with the War on Terror. Both conflicts raged globally, with regional wars, secret sleeper cells, and competing ideologies. The two struggles also threatened the horrific destruction of our cities by weapons of mass destruction (although in the Cold War we knew the enemy actually had thousands of nuclear weapons). Our opponents in both vowed to seek the imposition of their form of government and way of life on all nations (Clarke, 2004: 37).

Herman and Chomsky (1988) also discuss the Cold War as part of their 'Propaganda Model' of the mass media – where information is required to pass through five 'filters' before it can become 'news' (1988: 1-35). The fifth of these 'filters' was entitled 'anticommunism as a control mechanism'[10] (1988: 29-31). This is further explainedby the following paragraph:

> Issues tend to be framed in terms of a dichotomized world of Communist and anti-Communist powers, with gains and losses allocated to contesting sides, and rooting for "our side" considered an entirely legitimate news practice (Herman and Chomsky, 1988: 30-31).

It is the 'dichotomised world' described above which is of real interest in the context of this chapter. Whilst Communism did not disappear with the end of the Cold War (North Korea being a prime example of this), the threat (whether real or perceived) it posed against the 'west' was greatly diminished. This 'threatening' role was arguably filled by 'Islamic terrorist' groups (specifically al Qaeda), although this may not have become truly apparent until the events of September 11th, 2001 (9/11). Other attacks did take place on American assets in the period between the end of the Cold War and 9/11 however – such as the al Qaeda attacks on the American embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya on August 7th, 1998. These were not small scale attacks – in Tanzania, 11 died as a result of the bombing of the embassy (Dagne, 2002: 62), and in Kenya over 200 were killed, and around 5000 people wounded. 12 American citizens were amongst the dead (Clarke, 2004: 181). Al Qaeda also plotted choreographed attacks which were set to take place on the eve of the millennium – including bombings at Los Angeles International Airport and the Amman Radisson hotel in Jordan, the shooting of Christian tourists at Mount Nebo, Jordan, and an attack on the US Navy Destroyer *USS The Sullivans*, which had been moored in Aden Harbour, Yemen (Clarke, 2004: 213). With the exception of the attack on *USS The Sullivans* all of these attacks were foiled before they could take place – although this attack was also destined to fail[11] (ibid). These attacks did not have the same impact as the 9/11 attacks in 2001 (described further below) however, which precipitated the War on Terror. This is underlined by Miller (2006), who states that:

> Since 11 September 2001 both the US and UK governments have comprehensively overhauled their internal and external propaganda apparatus. These have been globally coordinated as never before to justify the 'War on Terror' including the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq and the assault on civil liberties at home (Miller, 2006: 45).

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[10] It should be noted that Herman and Chomsky were writing *during* the Cold War.

[11] It did, however bear a striking resemblance to a later (October 12th, 2000) al Qaeda attack on another American ship, the *USS Cole* – which killed 17 US sailors (CNN, 2003).

Many parallels can be drawn between the Cold War and the War on Terror, and it is likely that perceptions of Communism as the universal 'enemy' of the 'west' have much in common with the portrayal and stereotyping of 'Islamic' terrorists. Whilst this is not something directly investigated by this thesis, it is important to note as part of the broader historical context – given that many scholars identify 'terrorist' as being a stereotype often applied to Muslims in the 'western' media – e.g. (Said, 1997; Sardar, 2002; Allen, 2005) – a stereotype which in Britain is often thought to affect Muslims of a South Asian ethnicity in particular (Allen, 2005: 50).

The British 'Race Riots' (2001)

As mentioned in the Introduction, during the summer of 2001, a number of disturbances occurred across many of Britain's northern towns and cities – including Bradford, Burnley and Oldham. These instances were on a relatively large scale (in Bradford for instance, 326 police officers were injured and around 400 arrests made) (Hussain and Bagguley, 2005: 408), and were often termed 'race riots' by the media due in a large part to the complex situations which are thought to have precipitated them. These potential causes are discussed in Chapter Two, where a timeline of British civil disobedience is presented. The disturbances in Bradford in particular are a key interest of this study, and an analysis of press content from the time of their occurrence, along with a discussion of their potential causes is presented in Chapter Six. Although (as is explained in more detail in Chapters Two and Six) debate exists surrounding the exact causes of the disturbances which took place, they all shared one common feature – that the disturbances all involved large numbers of people of South Asian ethnicities.

The September 11th Attacks on America (9/11) (2001)

On September 11th 2001, America was struck by the most destructive terrorist attacks it had ever witnessed on its home soil – attacks which left nearly 3,000 people dead across three states (BBC, 2011a). The attacks set in motion the George W. Bush administration's 'War on Terror', and made Osama bin Laden into what *Time* magazine referred to as 'the most wanted man in the world' (Beyer, 2001: 7). Although little needs to be said here about the specifics of the attacks themselves, such is the degree of infamy they gained, a point of interest regarding the attack on the World Trade Centre in particular is that this was not the first time it had been targeted by 'Islamic' terrorists. In 1993, a car bomb attack had left six dead, but the structure of the towers intact (FBI, 2008). Whilst

in many ways the 1993 bombing was eclipsed by the 2001 attacks, it still represents an important chapter in the history of 'Islamic' terrorism in the west.

Almost the whole of the 2001 attack was caught on camera and broadcast over live television (Karim, 2002: 101). Karim identifies the explosion of the space shuttle *Challenger* in 1986, the on-camera shooting of supposed presidential assassin Lee Harvey Oswald in 1963, and the broadcast of the explosion of the German airship *Hindenburg* over radio in 1937, as perhaps the only live broadcasts in history which are comparable to that of 9/11 (ibid). The completely unexpected action taken on 9/11, says Karim, 'shook journalists' and viewers' cognitive foundations of reality' (ibid). Kellner (2003) outlines the way in which terror groups have long used media spectacle as a device to 'promote their causes, attack their adversaries, and gain worldwide publicity and attention' (2003: 1), describing an increasing trend in attacks taking this form since the 1970s – some even spawning Hollywood dramatisations (2003: 1-2). The choreographed events of September 11th 2001 represented an exemplar of this technique, quickly gaining the Hollywood-esque label of '9/11' and catapulting al Qaeda to worldwide infamy. This is underlined by Friedman (2004), who states that:

> Osama bin Laden wanted to coax just the right response out of the United States by creating a situation in which the United States could not ignore him. His goal was to cross a threshold that Americans would deem intolerable (something bin Laden had failed to do with his previous attacks on the U.S. embassies in Africa or the USS *Cole* in Yemen), causing a massive attack to be launched on the Islamic world that used the most advanced and sophisticated methods available (2004: 93).

If indeed this *was* the goal of the September 11th attacks, then it would be easy to argue for their 'success', given that they directly precipitated the 'War on Terror', which led to the invasions of both Iraq and Afghanistan – strikes aimed at al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan coming just seventeen days after 9/11 (Hewitt, 2008: 31). If Bin Laden had been 'ignored' before 9/11, this was certainly not the case afterwards.

It has been speculated, e.g. – Sheridan (2006), that following 9/11, instances of 'Islamophobia'[12] and discrimination against Muslims increased. In America, Kaplan (2006) identifies an increase not only in discrimination, but also in so-called 'hate crimes'[13] perpetrated against Muslims. Law (2010) also

[12] 'Islamophobia' is a term explored in some detail in Chapter Two.
[13] In a footnote, Kaplan states that hate crimes need not be violent, including such things as verbal racial slurs and also vandalism (2006: 2, 25).

mentions an 'increase in hostility' against Muslims and other groups following the attacks (2010: 148). Discrimination against Muslims in general is nothing new - Sheridan for instance, also mentions that pre-9/11, Muslims were the most likely faith group to state that religious discrimination had worsened since 1996 (2006: 318). Poynting and Mason (2007) present an account of anti-Muslim sentiment in Britain and Australia from 1989 to 2001, concluding that:

> The much-clichéd "Day that Changed the World" in September 2001 did not actually see the world reinvented anew. We have demonstrated that the upsurge of anti-Arab racism and Islamophobia in the UK and Australia after 11 September 2001 arose, as did similar episodes during the 1991 Gulf War, from the exacerbation of existing tendencies, which have been manifest in everyday racism, both before 1991 and in the intervening period (Poynting and Mason, 2007: 81).

Poynting and Mason go on to claim that following the events of 9/11, the representation of the 'Asian Other' in the British media may have undergone a transformation from 'Asian' or 'Pakistani' to 'Muslim' (2007: 81). This is a factor which may make 9/11 an especially important historical 'turning-point' as far as Islamophobia in Britain is concerned. Poynting and Mason go on to argue, however, that this 'transformation' is likely to have been underway from as far back as the time of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, or the *Satanic Verses* incident in 1989 (ibid).

The July 7th Attacks on London (7/7), the July 21st London Bomb Plot and the Shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes (2005)

On the 7th July 2005, London suffered a series of coordinated terrorist attacks to its transport network. Given the date (07/07/2005), the attacks quickly gained the name '7/7'. Four suicide bomb attacks targeting the London public transport system killed a total of 56 people (52 civilians and 4 bombers), and injured over 770 (BBC, 2009b). The news that the bombers had been not only resident in Britain, but also themselves British citizens was given extensive coverage by the media, e.g. BBC (2005); Mail Online (2005). The media also described the 'ordinary' lives the bombers appeared to have lead before carrying out the attacks, e.g. Mail Online (2006), although a point made by Jordan and Boix (2004) indicates that this is nothing unusual – that in the case of al Qaeda, operatives tend to 'blend in with the rest of the Muslim community' (2004: 3). Jordan and Boix also state that al Qaeda members will often drink alcohol openly and not wear the beard common amongst many 'observant Muslims' (ibid).

As the attacks took place entirely on British soil, it is interesting that the media would react in this way. By placing emphasis on the fact that the bombers *were* in fact British, as if it were a they were be more likely to have been from outside the country, the reaction may imply that the media (or indeed the general public, for whom they supposedly speak) believed the bombers to be of foreign origin. One reason for this could be that the 'Western' world was still reeling from the events of the September 11th attacks on America less than four years previously – attacks perpetrated in large by non-American citizens, and supposedly masterminded from thousands of miles away by Osama bin Laden. The very thought of a terrorist attack on British soil could conceivably lead a nation in such a mindset to almost automatically deduce that foreign (quite possibly 'Muslim') attackers were to blame. This effect may have been compounded when CCTV footage of the bombers' journey to their targets was aired. A common theme throughout the second chapter of this thesis is the way in which people of South Asian ethnicity have in recent times tended to become broadly labelled as a single group (often in a rather confused manner). The fact that the bombers' appearance suggested that they may have been of South Asian origin might have caused people in turn to assume that they were Muslim. In a different context there is precedent for this type of conflation – Sardar (2002) describing how the first victims of 'revenge attacks' following 9/11 were Sikh – suggesting that the reason for this was the fact that Sikhs tend to be of a South Asian appearance, and were therefore assumed in this case to be Muslim (2002: 51).

Although 7/7 was not a 'media spectacle' in the same cinematic way as 9/11, it was still mediatised in some interesting ways. Images of the aftermath of the attacks won both first and third place at the Citizen Journalism awards (BBC, 2006a), a competition which was new in 2006, and one which owes much to the rise of the now ubiquitous camera phone. This may have meant that effects similar to those identified by Karim (2002) regarding reactions to the mediatisation of 9/11 discussed previously could conceivably also apply to 7/7. Indeed, Carey (2002) describes the important role which citizen journalism also played in coverage immediately after 9/11.

On the July 21st 2005, just two weeks after the tragedy of 7/7, another bomb plot targetted Central London. Just as with 7/7, the targets were three tube-trains and a bus, and just as with 7/7, the attack has been linked with 'Islamic' terrorism. Unlike 7/7, however, all four of the bombs failed to detonate (BBC, 2007b). Unsurprisingly, the two attacks (7/7 and the July 21st Plot) caused a state of heightened security in London and other major British cities. This nervousness may have contributed to the police-shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes on July 22nd. De Menezes was a

Brazilian national who was travelling to work as an electrician, when he was shot seven times in the head by armed officers of the Metropolitan Police, who wrongly suspected him of being a suicide bomber (Hewitt, 2008: 51). Scotland Yard eventually stated that de Menezes was 'completely unconnected to the bomb attacks' (BBC, 2005b). The wrongful killing further opened the debate surrounding the possibly over-zealous police targeting of 'suspects' as part of a nationwide anti-terror campaign.

The Jyllands-Posten Cartoons Controversy (2005)

The *Jyllands-Posten* cartoon controversy involved 12 cartoons, some depicting the Prophet Mohammed (an act in itself unacceptable to many Muslims), in an offensive manner. One of the most infamous of these cartoons depicted Mohammed wearing a turban/bomb on his head, which for many Muslims, effectively linked the most Holy Prophet in Islam with terrorism (Modood, 2006b). The cartoons caused outrage amongst many Muslims around the world, culminating in riots in some countries (Asser, 2006), and along with the Gillian Gibbons incident in 2007 (discussed below), re-sparked the debate begun by Salman Rushdie's novel *The Satanic Verses* in 1989 over freedom of speech concerning religion. A conclusive solution to a debate such as this is difficult to draw, with valid arguments being made on both sides. Modood (2006b) suggests that perhaps a degree of self-censorship would be the answer, although this assumes that the person performing this act would have to have a full understanding of the issues they are concerned with – as may not always be the case.

The controversy over the publication of the cartoons gained a good deal of media attention, which tended convey shock at the angry reactions provoked. One article concerning the cartoons, for instance was titled 'All this over a cartoon' (Baig, 2006). This article then went on to state that 'a simple set of cartoons has inflamed millions of Muslims across the world' (ibid). This general tone of disbelief at the perceived overreaction of many Muslims to what tended to be seen by the British press as a harmless piece of satire, may have created further negativity in the portrayal of Muslims, whether offended by the cartoons or not.

The Gillian Gibbons Incident (2007)

As mentioned previously, in November 2007, a British schoolteacher, Gillian Gibbons was arrested in Sudan for the crime of blasphemy. Gibbons had allowed her class to choose a name for a teddy bear, and saw nothing wrong when the class selected the name 'Muhammad' (BBC, 2007a). Whilst the Gibbons incident was resolved within a matter of days, in the context of the timeline of salient events presented here it is important – especially given that it came so soon after the 2005 *Jyllands-Posten* incident described above. It is likely that the combination of these two events opened up a debate on blasphemy in a contemporary society, although as both incidents involved the religion of Islam, it is likely that this debate was coloured by many of the processes described so far in this thesis. As mentioned in the Introduction, the Gibbons incident is also important in the context of this thesis – being the third case study included as part of the primary research presented here. A more thorough account of the events involved in the Gibbons incident is therefore given in Chapter Eight.

Britain's Muslim Population

A discussion of the issues affecting stereotypes of British Muslims is of little use unless it defines the scale of the problem of stereotyping – i.e. how many people are actually likely to be affected. Although British Muslims as a 'group' represent a minority, the exact size of that minority determines not only how large a 'voice' the group has on a national scale, but also how likely a non-Muslim might be to come into regular contact with members of the Muslim minority group. Contact is important as far as stereotypes are concerned for obvious reasons. Unless a stereotype is 100% correct, 100% of the time (which is by definition impossible), it is likely that many individuals being stereotyped will display characteristics which are incongruous with this. This may lead to a person outside of the stereotyped group, on encountering a stereotyped person, rejecting the stereotype as false – which may not have happened had the contact not taken place.

As a question concerning religion was not introduced into the UK census until 2001 (Peach, 2005: 18), it is necessary to utilise back-projection in order to estimate figures before this date. According to the 2001 census, 1.6 million Muslims resided in Britain that year (Peach, 2005: 18; Modood, 2006a: 37). The following table was achieved by 'applying the 2001 percentages of the different ethnic groups [statistically associated with Muslims] to the estimated ethnic composition of the population in the census years 1951 to 1991' (Peach, 2005: 23). Although the three South Asian

ethnic groups[14] used are not the *only* ones associated with the Muslim population in Britain, they are by far the three most prominent (2005: 23) and, as such, this should not have an overwhelmingly derogatory effect on the results presented below.

Table 1.1 Estimates of Total Numbers of Muslims in the UK (South Asian and Total) 1951-1991

	1951	1961	1971	1981	1991	Actual 2001
Estimated Number of Muslims in the UK of South Asian Ethnicity	16,000	42,000	190,000	450,000	750,000	1,168,000
Total Estimated Number of Muslims in the UK	21,000	55,000	251,000	593,000	990,000	1,591,000

Data taken from Table 2.5 (Peach, 2005: 24).

By placing these statistics into a simple line graph, and adding a third line showing the difference between them, it is plain to see that they suggest that a growing number of Muslims in the UK are not of South Asian ethnicity:

Figure 1.1 Table 1.1 in Graphic Format Showing Difference



The graph indicates a growing future level of ethnic diversity amongst the British Muslim population. Peach also points out that in the 2001 census, Britain's Muslim population was the youngest (in that

[14] The three ethnicities identified by Peach here are 'Indian', 'Pakistani' and 'Bangladeshi' (Peach, 2005: 24).

it had the largest proportion of 0-15 year olds) of any religious 'group' in England and Wales (Scotland and Northern Ireland's data was held separately), and as such, strong future population growth is expected (Peach, 2005: 23,25). This indicates that overall levels of ethnic diversity amongst British Muslims are likely to increase in the future.

The number of Muslims from different ethnic backgrounds in Britain is an important statistic for a number of reasons. Firstly, research (e.g. Peach, 2005; Greater London Authority, 2007) has suggested that Muslims in Britain may be covered by the media, and are perhaps sometimes thought of as if they represent a single, homogeneous group[15]. With an increase in the number of Muslims from a diverse array of ethnic and racial backgrounds, it is conceivable that stereotypes of homogeneity may begin to lessen in the minds of non-Muslims. Second, an increase in the population of any minority is likely to mean an increase in the amount of culture produced by that minority. If, for instance, there were only a handful of families of South Asian ethnicity living in Britain, it would be highly unlikely that British-produced services targeted at people of South Asian ethnicity, (such as the BBC Asian Network) would be available. By producing and promoting their own individual cultures in this way, ethnic minority groups may find that proper social recognition and acceptance become increasingly forthcoming as illusions of homogeneity amongst the 'mainstream' begin to evaporate.

Conclusion

The issues outlined in this chapter are not thought to stand alone as definitive turning points in the coverage of Muslims and people of South Asian ethnicity in the British media. They do however form a complex pattern which suggests a more general negativity in this area, which cannot be ignored. Said (1997) emphasizes the way that much of what non-Muslim Europeans and Americans 'know' about Islam is delivered to them by the media, and that repetition of a certain point (whether right or wrong), about an unfamiliar subject can have drastic effects. If, for instance:

> The Iranian crisis is regularly rendered by television pictures of chanting "Islamic" mobs accompanied by commentary about "anti-Americanism", [then] the distance, unfamiliarity, and threatening quality of the spectacle limit "Islam" to those characteristics (Said, 1997: 48).

[15] This is a concept covered in more detail in Chapter Three.

Said was writing before 9/11 – an event which many (e.g. Poole, 2006; Featherstone *et.*al, 2010) consider to have triggered a shift in the reporting of Muslims by the western media. What Said's account shows is that although 9/11 almost certainly did have the type of large-scale effect on the coverage of Islam and Muslims described by academic commentators such as Poole (2006), it is far from the only issue which has affected this coverage during the course of modern history. At least as far back as the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the western media has to some extent covered the world's Muslim people as if it represents some kind of threat (Poynting and Mason, 2007: 69). Events since that time, such as the *Satanic Verses* incident in 1989, the 1998 al Qaeda attacks on American embassies in North Africa, as well as 9/11, and 7/7, can be seen to have formed a chain of consequences, with the media often singling 'Islam' and Muslims out as a global 'problem'. The mechanics of this portrayal are considered in Chapter Three, and it is hoped that by identifying possible factors affecting its existence, this stereotype's operation can be better understood.

Chapter Two

Race as a Catalyst for Civil Disobedience in Modern British Society: A Short History

'A riot is at bottom the language of the unheard' – Martin Luther King Jr.[16]

Introduction

At its heart, this chapter is all about voice. The concept of voice can be applied to any grouping of humans – be it a grouping of a single individual or many. The grouping might be *de jure* – one which is enshrined in law, such as a racial or religious grouping[17], or *de facto*- where no legal grouping is recognised, but a grouping does nonetheless exist– most subcultures would fit this definition for instance.

The notion of voice tends to be centred around groups of many, simply because even with the advent of the internet, and the resultant rise of communication methods such as worldwide discussion forums and blogging, it is difficult to make one individual voice 'heard' above all the rest. For this reason, the individual might decide to join efforts with a group, in order to get their point across. As the quotation at the head of this chapter puts so aptly, riots often tend to occur when the voice of a group goes unheard for too long – which may also be true of other forms of civil disobedience.

This thesis intends to consider the voice of a specific 'group' in the UK – that of British Muslims. Because of the issues raised in the previous chapter regarding conflation of the descriptors/groupings 'British Muslim' and 'British South Asian' by many sections of the public and press, it is important that the case studies used in this piece of work represent events which vocalised voices from both 'groups', or important areas of coverage might be missed. The relationship between the groupings 'British Muslim' and 'British South Asian' is a complex one, and in order to properly consider it, data must be gathered which is likely to represent both.

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[16] Oxford University Press (1979: 296).

[17] It has been suggested that if less attention were paid to racial groupings, then the problem of racism would disappear – that racism is an inevitable product of the concept of race (Gilroy 1987; 2004; Law 2002). Whilst in an ideal world this might be the case, for the purpose of this thesis, it is necessary to acknowledge the differences and groupings humankind has applied to itself.

Whilst dissenting British Muslim voices have certainly not been hard to find in recent years, dissenting voices linked with a distinctly British South Asian identity are much rarer. One quite recent, well-known, and extensively reported instance where dissenting British South Asian voices were 'heard' however, were the so-called 'race riots' of 2001 which occurred across Northern England. As the primary research section of this thesis takes the events which occurred at this time in the city of Bradford as a case study, this chapter lays the ground for a thorough analysis by examining racially charged civil disobedience that occurred in the past, as well as the media (specifically the press) reaction to it.

Although dissenting British Muslim voices are relatively easy to find in the press – militant Islamic fundamentalism having attracted the British media's attention many times, there is a possibility that events such as 9/11 (2001) and 7/7 (2005) have modified this situation. The post-9/11 rise in America of the number of 'hate-crimes' committed against Muslims and Sikhs, as well as people of South Asian and Arab heritage, and other communities 'perceived to be Middle Eastern' identified by the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC, 2003: 47) for instance, might have created a reluctance amongst Muslims with dissenting opinions to articulate them in the public realm – because of fear of reprisal by other members of the public. Whilst it would be foolish to assume that British crime would follow the same pattern, equally there is no reason to automatically assume that it did not[18].

Because 9/11 was a major event, and received an unprecedented amount of media coverage[19], it makes a tempting choice for the researcher. The problem with this is that 9/11 (and to a lesser extent 7/7) has already received an equally unprecedented amount of academic attention – making it a less attractive subject for original study. The wider 'fallout' from 9/11 is perhaps a more interesting subject in many ways, and can be studied alongside events not directly related to 9/11 – by means of selecting two or more events for study, one from each side of 9/11.

[18] There is a view that with regards to 'social ills' such as crime, the high cultural status of the United States actually causes it to impose certain aspects of its own problems on to other countries such as Britain (Hall *et al.*, 1978: 26).

[19] Much has been written about the 'cinematic' nature of 9/11 – that in many ways the images broadcast around the world shortly after its occurrence resemble a Hollywood disaster movie – e.g. (Smith, 2005). It is likely that those involved knew this whilst planning the attacks, and used the device intentionally to create maximum terror. This is also likely to have added to the (already very high) level of media coverage received by the events that day.

This study therefore includes a further two case studies, which concentrate on Muslim voice in the press – one from twelve years before 9/11 (the Rushdie incident of 1989), and one from six years afterwards (the Gillian Gibbons arrest of 2007). Because these two events share many similarities, it will be possible to look for differences in the way that Muslim voice was articulated in the press. This was the main reason that this particular pairing was chosen – although the two events were separated by a period of around eighteen years, many interesting parallels can be drawn between them. Both cases involve a supposed instance of blasphemy against the religion of Islam[20] by a Briton, and in both cases the physical well-being of the person concerned was threatened by an 'Islamic' foreign government[21].

Also worthy of note is that neither of the two samples which look for Muslim voices directly involve 'terrorist' organisations such as al Qaeda – which since 9/11 has become a byword in the media for the threat posed to many countries by 'Islamic' extremists. Whilst the threats to Salman Rushdie's life could be labelled as an example of 'state-sponsored' terrorism – in that they were initiated by a ruling elite figure within Iran (the late Ayatollah Khomeini), this is still a far cry from the type of underground organisation usually held up as representing 'Islamic' terror by the British press. As this study intends to look for British Muslim voices of dissent in the press, this is important. There is less likely to be a knee-jerk negative reaction to an event that does not involve connections to a specifically proscribed network of international terrorists than there is one which involves a recognised nation-state – no matter how frayed British relations with that state might be. There is also the fact that both these events deal with blasphemy – a subject that any member of a religion is likely to have an opinion on. Both these factors add up to suggest that reporting on these two particular stories is more likely to contain the voices of British Muslims commenting on the event than stories which involve 'Islamic' terrorism.

As well as considering the voices being 'heard' (or perhaps not being heard) in the press, it is important to think about the overall context within which they are consumed by the reader. This chapter therefore examines the pros and cons of moral panic theory as a research tool, and discusses whether it might be of use in studying the extent to which coverage of 'Islamic' terrorism has affected press coverage of British Muslims in general.

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[20] Rushdie having written the novel *The Satanic Verses* (which contains a character purported to be an allegory of the Prophet Mohammed), and Gibbons having named a class teddy bear Mohammed in the Sudanese school she was a teacher in.

[21] Iran 'sentenced' Rushdie to death for his novel, offering a bounty to any Muslim who assassinated him, and in Sudan, Gibbons ran the risk of being sentenced to up to forty lashes after being charged with blasphemy by the courts.

One contextual issue specific[22] to media coverage of terrorism[23] and civil disobedience in the British Isles involves politically based events in Northern Ireland. In order to understand something about the way that these issues are covered by media on the British mainland, it is important that coverage of 'the troubles' and the issues surrounding them is first considered – to examine what specific effects this may have had on British media coverage of terrorism and civil disobedience. Many towns and cities in mainland Britain had experienced the effects of terrorism first hand through the actions of of Irish nationalists long before the advent of the 'war on terror'[24], and this history is likely to have affected the way in which terrorism is seen and imagined by the British public. Following this reasoning, a section of this chapter considers the role played by Northern Ireland and issues involving Northern Ireland in contemporary British reporting of terrorism and civil disobedience.

Finally, this chapter provides a brief history of civil disobedience of a particular type – that which can be said in some way to be racially or religiously motivated. Although the focus here is on events which occurred in the UK, salient events from outside this context are also included in order to provide some background where it is needed.

Civil Disobedience

Throughout the history of society, there have occurred instances of civil disobedience. Although the motivations and and manifestations of these occurrences vary widely, their shared defining feature is an attempt to defy the will of the local form of civil authority in some way.

Quill surmises that 'the meaning of civil disobedience today is unclear, much as the meaning of politics, perhaps even democracy itself is unclear' (2009: 5). Quill goes on to mention that in the face of an obvious injustice such as racial segregation, civil disobedience will often (with hindsight) be applauded, but that in many other cases the situation is not so clear-cut. Quill cites examples which may cause confusion include the breaking of domestic law in order to protest against human

[22] Although issues involving Northern Ireland are also covered by the media in places other than the British Isles, it is unlikely that this coverage is of the same depth or breadth, or that it has the same effect on the receiver as coverage in mainland Britain or the Republic of Ireland. This is down to geographical proximity, as well as the involvement of countries in the issues surrounding Northern Ireland.
[23] Although the events studied in this thesis do not directly involve anything which would fall under the traditional definition of terrorism, in the broader context of media coverage of Muslims and British South Asians, terrorism has become an important factor to consider – due to stereotyping – e.g. (Said, 1997).
[24] The IRA and associated groups ran a campaign of attacks including attacks on mainland Britain for many years – with many occurring during the 1990s.

rights abuses in a foreign country, and attempts to cut a country's carbon emissions through acts of civil disobedience. In many cases, it seems that civil disobedience comes about to give a voice to a group or issue which did not have one before – or had a voice which was largely ignored by wider society.

Probably the most extreme examples of civil disobedience are those which culminate in a violent revolution, or the deposition of the local civil government. The exact mechanics of how such situations arise are unclear, and are deeply rooted in group-dynamics, and the extent to which civilians see themselves as enfranchised members of a society – although certain factors related to these events do appear to be recurrent throughout history. The purpose of this chapter is not to discuss the mechanics of revolution, however, so a full analysis of these issues is not presented here.

At the opposite end of the scale, Quill also mentions recent phenomena such as 'flashmobs' and the Critical Mass movement[25]. Whilst these occurrences rarely result in violence, and are often ostensibly intended to be taken in a light-hearted manner, they can serve a similar purpose to more violent forms of civil disobedience – in that they can disrupt the normal operation of society in a localised area, and/or give voice to an issue. A major difference between these more passive methods of civil disobedience and the others mentioned previously might be the way in which they are organised. Although new media such as social networking, email and mobile telecommunications are not technically a necessity for these types of events to take place, it was almost certainly these new methods of communication which gave birth to them. This is in obvious contrast to the more 'traditional' modes of mass civil disobedience, such as riots, which existed long before the advent of such technologies, but often find use for them in the modern context – as shown by Mackenzie (2011), who considers the extent to which technology can be 'blamed' for the London Riots of 2011.

One theorist who advocated (at least in most instances) and practiced a non-violent form of civil disobedience was Henry David Thoreau. In his essay *Civil Disobedience* (1849), Thoreau writes of the injustices carried out by the American government of the time[26], and advises the conscientious reader to refuse to pay their taxes as a form of protest. Thoreau himself spent time imprisoned for this reason, and inspired such later thinkers as Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. If

[25] A movement which organises events known as Critical Mass Bike Rides, where participating cyclists travel to a pre-determined location *en masse*, thereby disrupting normal traffic-flow.
[26] Notably the practice of slavery, as well as the war with Mexico.

nothing else, this goes to show that non-violent methods of civil disobedience were in existence and being advocated long before the advent of modern telecommunications.

Race, Rioting and 'Race Rioting'

Another commonly reported form of civil disobedience is the so-called 'race riot' – which is certainly not a concept unfamiliar to the UK public. Use of the term 'race riot' is avoided here however, as it is often unhelpful – although a riot may be motivated by factors connected to race, the term 'race riot' is often used imprecisely. This is because if taken literally, the term 'race riot' implies a pitched battle between people of one or more different races or ethnicities – fighting from within their 'own' 'groups' exclusively, but this situation occurs only very rarely in reality. As Waller argues with regard to the rioting which took place in Toxteth/the L8 area, Liverpool in July 1981, 'the rioting was not a race riot, in that the struggle was not white against black or vice versa; but there was a strong racial component to it' (Waller cited in Frost and Phillips, (eds) 2011: 67).

This is not to say that throughout modern history there has been a lack of riots motivated by some form of (often extremely legitimate) racial grievance – because as the historical portion of this chapter points out, the reality is quite the opposite. What it does mean, however, is that the term 'race riot' is often misleading in the extreme, and its widespread use might only further the cycle of racism often seen as endemic in contemporary 'western' society. Later in this chapter, the press's practice of 'connecting' riots is examined – as is the way in which this might amplify existing tensions which could lead to a riot. The term 'race riot' is often used as a 'catch-all' term by the press to link riots in this way, which makes it interesting in this context.

The Vilification of Cultures

As will be seen from the historical portion of this chapter, much of the media (especially the press) have a propensity to simplify their reporting of civil disobedience in such a way that one certain 'causal factor' can be blamed for any instance where violence has occurred. This may make sense for the press, because of the desire of the majority of readers to consume material which agrees with their own particular world view. Deep analysis of the situation would therefore not only be superfluous to demand, but also possibly detrimental to the enjoyment of the reader.

This might explain the way in which certain forms of culture specifically are often held up by commentators as something which only serve to encourage violence – especially with regard to riots. Probably the most recent instance of this in the British context came during the riots of 2011. Although there was very little evidence of any racial motivation for the riots which spread to include many of the major English cities, the right-wing media seemed to devote a great deal of resources to blaming 'black' culture (specifically the musical genre/subculture of Gangsta Rap) for the riots. This vilification is examined below, and is interesting in this context because of the way in which it can inform the researcher of the ways in which other racially 'associated' cultures might become vilified by the media. This may be beneficial when considering whether Muslims have been vilified by the media – another subject which is discussed in this section.

Sewell (2011)[27] states with regard to the culture surrounding Gangsta Rap that:

> It is a milieu that glories in loose women and fast cars, in macho dominance and easy wealth. Concepts of restraint, hard work and personal responsibility are absent. Respect is something to be demanded rather than earned.
> So much of the music and the video output is close to pornographic, with women degradingly treated as little more than sex objects. In this world, the highest ideal to which a man can aspire is to be a philandering, gun-wielding gang leader (2011).

Much of Gangsta Rap is indeed difficult to defend. Although the genre is not without its moments of genuine artistry, Sewell's overall analysis of it here is reasonably accurate – a sizable proportion of it does seem to serve consumerism above all else, treat women as sex-objects and lack any real sense of social responsibility. This does not, however justify the other points made by Sewell.

The real problem with Sewell's argument – as well as the Starkey argument which he cites[28] is that Gangsta Rap is *not* specifically the domain of black cultural influence. Although Gangsta Rap has its roots in Hip-Hop, and largely black (as well as deprived) neighbourhoods in cities such as New York and Los Angeles, it is not the case that it can be described as a solely 'Black' phenomenon – or that it can be said to make up Black culture in its entirety.

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[27] Sewell's article attempts to dissect the rationale behind the UK riots of 2011.

[28] Although Sewell acknowledges that people of many different ethnicities took part in the 2011 rioting, he also appears to agree largely with the analysis of David Starkey, who infamously stated on an episode of *Newsnight* (BBC) that 'A substantial section of the chavs have become black. The whites have become black.' (cited in Sewell, 2011).

Sewell's reader is not encouraged to wonder at what point 'White and Asian youths' stop *emulating* 'gangsta' culture, and instead start *living* it for themselves – the problem is presented simply as one of Black culture spreading and corrupting youngsters of other ethnicities. The argument also seems to overlook the fact that consumerism and sexism were both widespread long before the advent of Gangsta Rap! Perhaps the greatest crime of Gangsta Rap is the way in which it has created[29] and perpetuated such negative stereotypes of young Black Males in the 'West', causing them to be repeated endlessly in all forms of media.

As explained above, and in the historical case studies explored later in this chapter, instances of civil disobedience tend to be complicated, with no one definite causal factor. The demonization of a certain form of culture or subculture such as Gangsta Rap in order to 'explain' any such outbreak of civil disobedience is therefore folly. As this thesis intends to explore issues surrounding the coverage of British Muslims (and as explained previously, by extension British South Asians), it is important to consider how this framework might fit into the case studies examined in later chapters – as well as other similar events which might be useful in further study. At least since 9/11, the Muslim religion has become an example of a distinct form of culture (which in the British case has acquired a skin-colour identifying component among much of the white majority) which might be 'blamed' by the media for unusual events in this way.

This is not to suggest that there is a direct relationship between the demonization of Gangsta Rap during the UK riots mentioned above and any possible vilification of Muslims by the UK press – even in the case of an outwardly similar event such as the Bradford Riots of 2001. The two forms of culture are completely different – one being an ancient and widely practiced world religion, and the other a modern, aggressive form of music/musical culture. What is similar however, at least in the British context, is that they are both forms of culture which tend to be associated with certain racial 'groups', and that they often acquire negative connotations in certain types of press reporting.

In the case of an event such as the 2001 Bradford Riots, it will be possible to examine whether this undue vilification was present in the press with regard to Islam. As the riots were in no way connected to the religion of Islam – other than that a proportion of the rioters were statistically likely to be Muslim (being mainly British South Asian and from Bradford), references to religion must be viewed with a degree of suspicion by the researcher in this context. What makes Bradford even more interesting when looking for this type of vilification is that the 2001 riots occurred just two

[29] Although negative stereotypes of young black males were also extant long before the advent of Gangsta Rap, the specific 'gangsta' stereotype arrived at much the same time.

months before 9/11 – meaning that connections can be drawn without having to consider whether or not they represent merely the effects of 9/11 on press reporting.

The vilification of cultural groups is likely to represent a vicious cycle. Because a group is viewed with suspicion by the media, its 'voice' will be pushed further out of the mainstream, and into the peripheral, alternative forms of media. This is in turn, likely to create further resentment of mainstream culture within the group, which may lead to further dissent/disobedience. Because the Bradford Riots of 2001 occurred before 9/11 (and the ensuing media coverage widely regarded as having raised the level at which Muslims are vilified by the western press), they can be said to have occurred at the end of a specific era – within which, whilst Muslims were not always covered fairly (e.g. Said, 1997), there did not exist the level of demonization which began in the wake of 9/11.

Another interesting thing about the Bradford riots is that they represent one of the first major examples of contemporary civil disobedience by British South Asians. This factor may be of interest when considering the vilification of South Asian/Islamic culture alongside another body of theory which is examined in the next section – that of the moral panic. Because moral panic theory takes account of the *proportionality* of a media response to a 'threat', the fact that what occurred in Bradford in July 2001 may have represented something 'new' may be of some importance. British South Asians being involved *en masse* in violent civil disobedience is not necessarily any more a cause for concern than any other 'group' being involved in such an act – or indeed any collection of people who cannot be brought together under a single 'group heading' (if such a thing is possible in today's society). Because it represented an unusual image however – something that the press and its readers were not used to seeing, it is likely that such an event would receive an increased level of media coverage compared to a riot involving a 'group' generally considered to be more volatile (and therefore more likely to be involved in such an act) – perhaps certain groups of football 'fans' or high category prisoners for instance. This effect would have been compounded by the fact that British South Asians are a relatively visible minority group – skin colour playing a major role here.

Moral Panic

If civil disobedience is considered to be an outlet for the voice of oppressed groups, then in many ways, the mass media can be considered to be the gatekeepers who either support or undermine that voice. By supporting or denying the claims made by the disobedient group(s), the media can

presumably[30] affect the way in which other members of the public come to see the people involved in the act of civil disobedience. This may have the potential to either shorten or further the cycle of injustice the group perceives to work against themselves. This could happen in a number of ways, but once popular opinion rests in support or sympathy for a group, it is likely that its fortunes will change for the better. For this reason, the way media inform uninvolved citizens of instances of civil disobedience is important. One area of theory which considers this is moral panic theory – which is discussed in this context below.

Here, it is most useful to consider those citizens whose only real source of information on the act(s) of civil disobedience concerned was the media. People with first-hand information, or people who encounter people who personally experienced what happened are likely to have been affected in a different way – although they may still contribute to the creation of a moral panic (often using the media as a vehicle). Cohen (2002) suggests that the media may fulfil up to three roles in 'moral panic dramas':

> (i) *Setting the agenda* – selecting those deviant or socially problematic events deemed as newsworthy, then using finer filters to select which of these events are candidates for moral panic; (ii) *Transmitting the images* – transmitting the claims of claims-makers, by sharpening up or dumbing down the rhetoric of moral panics; or (iii) *Breaking the silence, making the claim*. More frequently now than three decades ago, the media are in the claims-making business themselves. Media exposures – whether *The Guardian's* tale of government sleaze or *The Sun's* headline 'Would You like a Paedophile as Your Neighbour?' – aim for the same moral denouement: 'We Name the Guilty men.' (2002: xxviii-xxix).

Waddington (1986) points out that one of – if not *the* hallmark feature(s) of a moral panic is concerned with proportionality. This is to say that a moral panic is defined by an *overblown* reaction to a threat (or perceived threat). If the reaction to a threat is in fact proportional, then this reaction cannot be said to represent a moral panic. The problem for the researcher – at least according to Waddington, is that of establishing first the scale of the problem, and second, the scale of the media reaction to it. Only then can a researcher begin to consider whether or not a reaction was proportionate. Whilst the scale of a media reaction is fairly simple (if time consuming) to quantify – through the use of quantitative research methods, the scale of the threat may be much more difficult to determine. Waddington argues that moral panic studies have 'tended' to concentrate

[30] Media effects theory is a large and inconclusive area, but for the purposes of this discussion it is assumed that media content has at least *some* effect on the receiver.

mostly on the scale of the reaction, and do not generally pay as much attention to the scale of the threat.

Goode and Ben Yehuda (1994) counter Waddinton's argument by stating that whilst *some* threats are almost certainly difficult or impossible to quantify (examples stated include 'future oriented' threats such as global warming or nuclear war), many others are in fact readily calculable. This argument is supported by 'four indicators of disproportionality' which are said to be reliable enough to mitigate Waddington's argument by checking the reliability of available statistics. These are; examples of exaggerated figures; examples of fabricated figures; 'other harmful conditions' and 'changes over time' (Goode and Ben Yehuda, 1994: 44-45).

The first two indicators – exaggerated or fabricated figures essentially involve nothing more than the researcher checking up on the sources used by the media. Instances are cited where both of these criteria are almost certainly fulfilled by at least some media content. 'Other harmful conditions' refers to other closely related threats which receive a disproportionate amount of media attention when compared – the example being deaths resulting from the use of legalised drugs such as nicotine compared to those from use of illegal drugs. Because deaths resulting from illegal drugs receive a proportionately higher level of media coverage than those from legal drugs, the reaction can be said to be disproportionate – the danger of death from illegal drugs is to some extent exaggerated by the media. The fourth indicator – 'changes over time' involves more attention being paid to a specific condition at one point in time than another (where the condition has not changed in terms of seriousness). Again the example given here involves illegal drugs – a rise in the number of Americans saying that drug abuse was the nation's number one problem from the mid 1980s to 1989 is cited.

One study which Waddington notes as exemplary in terms of looking at both threat *and* reaction is *Policing the Crisis* (1978) by Hall *et al.* Here, the authors examine the rise of 'mugging' in the UK – as well as the British media's reaction to it. From the outset however, it is clear that the authors did not regard mugging as anything new at the time in which they were writing. Mugging, they point out is really no different to any other form of 'street crime' which has been present in British cities from the very beginning. They also note that the increased levels of media interest in street crime of the 1970s were nothing new – referencing the outbreaks of 'garrotting' covered by the press in cities such as Manchester and London in the late 19th century. Instead, they argue, the media had 'imported' a *label* from America (that of the 'mugger') – a label with little difference to the archaic

term 'footpad', but one which came with its own connotations, often specific to the American context:

> Labels are important, especially when applied to dramatic public events. They not only place and identify those events; they assign events to a context. Thereafter the use of the label is likely to mobilise *this whole referential context*, with all its associated meanings and connotations. It is this wider, more connotative usage which was 'borrowed' when the British press picked up the term [mugging] and began to apply it to the British setting (1978: 19).

The actual connotations of the term 'mugging' or 'mugger' are also examined:

> It had become a central *symbol* for the many tensions and problems besetting American social and political life in general. 'Mugging' achieved this status because of its ability to *connote* a whole complex of social themes in which the 'crisis of American society' was reflected. These themes included: the involvement of blacks and drug addicts in crime; the expansion of the black ghettoes, coupled with the growth of black social and political militancy; the threatened crisis and collapse of the cities; the crime panic and the appeal to 'law and order'; the sharpening political tensions and protest movements of the 1960s leading into and out from the Nixon – Agnew mobilisation of 'the silent majority' and their presidential victory in 1968 (1978: 19-20).

Clearly, the connotations most important in the British context would involve the way in which black people – specifically young black males are constructed as 'muggers'. The 'crisis' of mugging in the UK in the 1970s was therefore according to Hall *et al.* a situation where black people were demonised[31]. Because reporting by the media appeared to blow this 'crisis' out of all proportion – that is to say that it was disproportionate, the 'crisis' of mugging in the 1970s can also be described as a moral panic according to Hall *et al.*

Whilst (as above) Waddington (1986) mentions *Policing the Crisis* as representing a rare example of a 'moral panic' study where the author(s) consider both 'sides' – threat and reaction, it is worth noting that he also has a major criticism of the work. Waddington points to the way in which Hall *et al.* look exclusively at rates of increase in crime when establishing their thesis that street crime had not

[31] The term 'demonised' is especially apt here, as Hall *et al.* examine the construction of the 'black mugger' in light of Stanley Cohen's work on 'folk devils' (Cohen, 2002).

increased during the time period studied (1986: 248). Instead, Waddington argues, research should have included reference to other measures of change – such as the 'amount of deterioration' in the crime situation (as a smaller rate of increase in something is still, nonetheless an increase in absolute terms). Whilst the purpose of this section has not been to analyse the worth of Hall *et al.*'s work, this does go to show how difficult it can be to assess the scale of a 'threat' – if not the existence of a threat in the first place.

The applications of moral panic theory are by no means limited to mugging, and academics have examined moral panic in relation to subjects as disparate as the disorder caused by mods and rockers in the 1960s (Cohen, 2002), paedophilia (Critcher, 2002), and Satanism (Jenkins and Maler-Katkin, 1992). One subject which has come to the forefront of the media's attention in recent years, and (as explained previously) is of contextual interest given the aims of this study, is 'Islamic' terrorism – and moral panic theory could conceivably be applied here. As this could conceivably be quite useful in this context, a brief description of 'Islamic' terror in relation to moral panic theory is now presented.

Because of the problems with moral panic theory presented by Waddington (1986), and described above, there are problems with application of the concept to a problem such as 'Islamic' terrorism. Whilst the theory that if the media overreact to a threat, then the ensuing overblown coverage represents a moral panic is sound, fundamental problems exist when this is put into practice. 'Islamic' terrorism is for means of its own survival, a secretive affair – and it is likely that even the most accurate estimates of the risk it poses to a particular country are flawed[32]. To further compound this problem for the researcher, statistics released by government agencies may contain deliberate inaccuracies which are the product of political reasoning. As for the most part modern terrorism is of a cellular nature, it is actually likely that few terrorists themselves have any idea as to the absolute scale of their organisation(s). This means that the scale of the threat posed by 'Islamic' terrorism cannot be quantified by any normal means, and that there is no way of knowing in absolute terms whether or not any media reaction to it is in fact an over-reaction.

'Successful' terrorist attacks can however be quantified with a depressingly high level of accuracy. Pape (2005) lists what he describes as probably 'the most comprehensive and reliable study of suicide terrorist attacks that is now available' (2005: 4). Pape's work also illustrates a *growing* threat

[32] Whilst security services expend large amounts of resources studying this threat, the fact that 'Islamic' terrorism sometimes 'breaks through the net' and succeeds in its aims proves that they still know less than they would like.

from suicide terrorism on a worldwide scale. But the worldwide scale of Pape's work involves many different countries – some of which, for a variety of reasons are unfortunate enough to face many more suicide terrorist attacks than a country such as the UK. In the UK's case then, this lack of statistics again makes the threat impossible to quantify – as isolated instances such as 7/7 cannot by definition fit into any accurate rates of increase or decrease.

Whilst moral panic theory is an interesting platform for debate, and in all fairness is probably more useful than the epistemological problems outlined above might suggest, it is not a concept which will be used in this study. *Policing the Crisis* may still be of specific use in the context of this study, for the way in which it examines the link made by the media between acts of criminality and skin colour in the British context. Whilst this thesis is concerned with media coverage of different 'groups', and different types of crime, the insights made by Hall *et al.* are still valuable in this context.

The Case of Northern Ireland

As this study is concerned primarily with the British context, it is important in this chapter to consider the region of Britain which has generated by far the largest amount of civil disobedience and terrorism over the last century. This region is the disputed territory of Northern Ireland – which whilst its issues are far too complex to begin to examine in a mere subsection of a chapter[33], has been of clear importance in the evolution of the modern British public understanding of civil disobedience.

Civil disobedience in Northern Ireland is indeed a complex issue. At what point acts of civil disobedience end and acts of terrorism begin is often a blurry boundary, and as stated, not one which will be debated here. What can be said with confidence however, is that there have been numerous occurrences of civil disobedience in Northern Ireland – many of which have been reported on by the media in mainland Britain, and which tend to be separated from other domestic news under the particular heading of 'events which occurred in Northern Ireland'.

As Northern Ireland is separated from mainland Britain by the Irish Sea, it is already demarcated from the mainland countries of England, Scotland and Wales in one important way. But another way

[33] Many nationalists for instance would not regard nationalist civil disobedience as such and might suggest that acts of 'terrorism' were in fact acts of 'war', due to the fact that they do not recognise British civil authority in Northern Ireland.

in which this happens is the way in which it is constructed in the mainland media[34] - being as it is a country which has borne witness to an ongoing conflict stretching back many hundreds of years. Because of this conflict – which has often been referred to both colloquially and formally as 'the troubles', methods of law enforcement employed in Northern Ireland are often visibly different from those in common use on the British mainland[35]. These differences – such as the regular use of heavily armoured Land Rover vehicles by the police, as well as the intervention of the British Armed Forces under Operation Banner (1969-2007) are likely to have added to the media's construction of Northern Ireland as a place inherently different in some way to the comparatively peaceful countries of England, Scotland or Wales.

This 'difference' may have been underlined by the many attacks carried out on the British mainland by Irish nationalists (such as the Provisional IRA) over the years. Here, the everyday life of mainland towns and cities was disrupted (a situation which peaked during the 1990s), costing the lives of many people, and injuring hundreds more. In its essence, terrorism relies on the fear of an unexpected, and often unprovoked attack, and it is likely that this eventually breeds a certain level of resilience amongst people in areas afflicted by it. Segell (2006) for instance gives a degree of credit to the IRA attacks on London of 1969-2001[36] for the speedy return to normality of the London public transport system following the 7/7 bombings in 2005. This 'Blitz spirit' is perhaps ironic in the face of the media hysteria which often surrounds terrorism and acts of terrorism, but nonetheless is likely to contribute in some way to the overall context within which terrorism is imagined and understood in Britain.

Looking once again at the relationship between the understanding of British civil disobedience and Northern Ireland, it is interesting to note that the 1981 Scarman report stated with respect to the Brixton Disorders that year that 'the petrol bomb was now used for the first time on the streets of Britain (the idea, no doubt, copied from the disturbances in Northern Ireland[37])' (Scarman, 1981: 1). Allusions to the more robust style of policing used in Northern Ireland are also common in reporting

[34] 'Mainland media' in this context refers to any media based in mainland Britain, and aimed primarily at the people of mainland Britain.

[35] At one point, before it was disbanded in 2001, the Royal Ulster Constabulary was considered to be the most dangerous police force in the world to be employed by, due to numerous kidnappings and assassinations of officers (Ryder, 1989: 2).

[36] Segell also mentions the importance of attacks by the Nazi German Luftwaffe during the Blitz of 1940 and 1941, as well as Nazi German V1 and V2 missile attacks in 1944.

[37] It is possible that this statement is incorrect. Pilkington (1988) mentions the use of petrol bombs during the Notting Hill riots of 1958 for instance (1988: 120; 122).

of mainland disorder – Northern Irish[38] tactics are generally held up as a counterpoint to the softer style common on mainland Britain[39]. This illustrates how far beyond the mainland British experience of civil disobedience Northern Ireland has gone, providing some context as to the great influence events in Northern Ireland may have had upon the mainland public's understanding of it. Although none of the events of the 'troubles' are discussed in the following historical section, because of the profound influence they are likely to have had on the British public's understanding of civil disobedience and other violent events, it is important that they are not forgotten in this context.

British Race-Related Civil Disobedience – A Timeline

Theoretical discussions of context are useful to the researcher, but it is important that they are combined with an understanding of the way in which events have actually unfolded in practice. Accordingly, the following section of the chapter is concerned with the provision of a timeline of significant civil disobedience events which occurred within Britain, as well as events which took place in other countries, but which are still thought to be salient in this context. This is not intended to be an exhaustive piece on the history of civil disobedience in Britain, but instead to furnish the reader with a working understanding of the historical background which underlies such events in the British context.

As stated previously, a key concept here is the notion of 'voice' - and the way in which it may have changed throughout the years. As should be clear to anyone studying this subject, the UK is no stranger to civil disobedience – and often when this has occurred in the past, there have been racial overtones. There have been times when this may have precipitated change for the better – the unrest of the 1980s for instance almost certainly raised at least some mainstream awareness of the racist policies adopted by sections of the British police. But this was not without a cost – the many deaths, injuries, incarcerations, loss of business and public spending which almost inevitably result from such chaotic events. Racism was still present in the British police after the 1980s (and to some

[38] Such discussions are also likely to include mention of mainland European police tactics, which whilst perhaps not on the same level of intensity as those of the Northern Irish police, are generally considered to be more robust than traditional mainland British methods.

[39] Reiner disputes the factuality of this somewhat, arguing that the 'benign image of the British bobby' is in fact a myth – although 'the apparent militarization of the policing of public disorder and scandals about abuse of powers have begun to challenge it' (1998: 40). Whilst Reiner was writing in 1998, there is good reason to believe that the image of the British Police may have worsened in subsequent years – events such as the publication of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry in 1999, and the death of newspaper seller Ian Tomlinson at the hands of the Metropolitan Police in 2009 showing the force in an especially unpleasant light.

extent almost certainly still is to this day), as the inquiry into the death of Stephen Lawrence identified. The fact that very similar riots occurred in 1985 – just four years after the riots of 1981, also indicates that the first 'round' of rioting was perhaps not enough to 'wake up' the public to the abuse of police powers said to be rampant in some inner-city areas around that time.

This timeline begins with the 'Arab Riots' of 1919 and 1930 – described by the BBC (2004) as 'Britain's first 'race riots''. Whilst it may be possible to go back much further than this to look at a 'complete' history of racially motivated riots and civil disobedience in Britain[40], it is likely that these particular riots have stuck in the nation's cultural memory as a distinct set of events because of their inclusion of British people of 'visible' minority ethnicities. This timeline is a 'working history' – in that its interest is mainly in events which are likely remembered or known of by a good proportion of the British population – who are then likely to include the events in their own understanding of the world around them. For this reason, 1919[41] was deemed a good place to start in investigating this particular facet of history.

The 'Arab Riots' in South Shields and Elsewhere (1919 and 1930)

Lawless (1994) describes the often neglected fact that in the early 1900s, many thousands of Arab seamen[42] settled in British ports such as South Shields, Cardiff and Liverpool (1994: 35). Lawless states that although, together with Somali seafarers these sailors represent the first significant Muslim communities to settle in Britain, they have (or at least had) been largely ignored by academic research, which tended to focus on the later and more numerous Muslim arrivals from South Asia (ibid).

Many Arab sailors who had settled in the port town of South Shields in Tyneside, north east England were involved in disturbances in 1919 and 1930. As the occurrences in South Shields are probably the best known of the 'Arab riots' which occurred, it is these which are concentrated on here. Similar occurrences are reported to have occurred in other ports – including Liverpool (in 1919) (Byrne, 1977: 276) and Cardiff (in 1930) (Lawless, 1994: 39).

[40] Although it is dependent on the definition of 'race' or 'ethnicity' being used, it seems highly unlikely that these riots were in fact the very first time that people of different ethnic backgrounds had clashed in a riot on British soil.
[41] 1919 also came one year after the armistice of World War One (November 11th, 1918) – an event which almost certainly caused humanity to enter a new 'era'.
[42] Lawless notes that most of the sailors were originally from Yemen. Although Lawless uses the term 'Arab' to describe the settled sailors, the term 'British Arab' seems more suited to 2011. A similar problem is present with the term 'seaman' or 'seamen' – the term 'sailor' or 'seafarer' is more inclusive here.

In February 1919, the disturbances in South Shields involved violent clashes between British Arab and white sailors, largely motivated by competition for jobs. Racial tension in the area had reportedly been simmering ever since the end of the First World War. Dr Abdul Majid (an Indian barrister) visited Tyneside in March of that year, where he watched the trial of twelve British Arab sailors who had been charged with rioting. Dr Majid (who is believed to have been very much an 'establishment figure' is reported to have emphasised during discussions with the Mayor of South Shields and other local government officials that 'The Arabs did not want to take jobs away from British seamen, but asked for fair compensation as British subjects. After all, they were British subjects on British soil'. (1994: 36). Dr Majid's intervention here is interesting, as it represents an establishment figure 'standing up' for an unheard minority – in this case the British Arab sailors in question. Not only were the sailors of an ethnic minority at a time when this was much less common in Britain, but also likely to be mainly working class (seaman/sailor implies a person of low rank) – another 'group' within society renowned for obtaining poor treatment from the establishment.

Unfortunately, the intervention of Dr Majid was not enough to prevent another riot along similar lines – this time in August 1930. In July 1930, the National Union of Seamen (NUS) and ship owners had announced that they planned to introduce a new rota system in order to register British Arab sailors at the ports of Cardiff, South Shields and Hull – ostensibly to eliminate bribery by boarding house masters from the process of engagement of ship's crew. British Arab sailors working at these ports would need to re-register, and would be selected for employment under a rotation system. The Seamen's Minority Movement opposed these plans, and argued that they represented a new form of control over the employment of British Arabs. In South Shields, the Seamen's Minority Movement claimed that they represented *all* the British Arabs in that town when they denounced the new system. This was not in fact the case (1994: 38-39).

On August 2nd 1930, the Seamen's Minority Movement picketed the NUS and Board of Trade offices in South Shields. This came to a violent conclusion and resulted in around twenty British Arabs, and 'several' leaders of the Seamen's Minority Movement being arrested and charged with rioting and incitement to riot (1994: 39).

As so often seems to happen following a riotous situation with which people of ethnic minorities are involved, this event was labelled as a 'race riot' (which, as stated previously is often a misused and

misleading term). Byrne (1977) argues that in this particular case, the term was indeed widely misused[43] – and cites the *Daily Worker*, which reportedly stated at the time that: 'press efforts to treat the fight as a "racial riot", are an outstanding distortion of the facts designed to conceal a desperate effort to break the strike[44]' (1977: 272).

Although the *Daily Worker* may have had political and ideological motive to claim that the reporting of a 'race riot' was in fact a smear campaign against striking workers, there exists evidence which makes a compelling case for this view. Byrne, for instance, mentions a meeting held by the Seamen's Minority Movement at the Mill Dam, South Shields on July 24th, 1930, where it was stated that 1,100 'white seamen', and 900 'Arabs and Somalis' were supporting a boycott of the PC5 form (1977: 271). The PC5 was a form which a sailor had to obtain from the NUS, indicating that their membership fees were paid in full, before they could ship out to sea. This indicates that the anger directed at the NUS that summer in South Shields was in no way limited to people of one particular ethnicity.

Secondly, Byrne describes a baton-charge on the August 2nd picket line by police, after the picket had moved itself forward in an attempt to prevent 'scabs[45]' from reaching the NUS office. Here the police supposedly 'seemed to single out the Arabs for attack', and 'only Arabs were arrested at the quay... the white men from the committee of action were arrested at their homes that night' (1977: 272). This seems to suggest that the violence was not caused directly by the protesters, but by the police – who attacked the picket line. Lawless describes the August 2nd crowd as 'mainly Arab' (Lawless, 1994: 39) – although the term 'mainly' still reinforces the idea that the crowd was of mixed ethnicity.

In any case, there are enough hints here to suggest that the 1930 riot in South Shields was probably not anything close to a 'race riot'. Although an event had occurred there just 11 years previously in 1919 which *could* be described as something approximating a 'race riot' (in that reports seem to indicate that people of two distinct ethnicities were battling one another), the events of 1930 do not seem to have been the same. Whilst with the benefit of hindsight it is obvious that two similar events separated by a period of 11 years are likely also to have major differences, it is important to

[43] Byrne states that 'almost all press coverage portrayed the episode as a race riot' (1994: 272).
[44] Byrne does however describe the South Shields Riots of 1919 mentioned previously as a 'race riot' (1977: 263).
[45] It is important to note that Byrne's use of the derogatory term 'scab' for a worker crossing a picket line may be an indication of a particular (left-wing) political viewpoint. Also, BBC (2004) notes that there are conflicting reports about what exactly triggered the violence.

remember that in 1930 the events of 1919 would still have been fairly 'fresh in the mind' for most people who could recall them. This may have skewed their thinking so that they *expected* a 'race riot' to break out in 1930 when they heard of the protest. This illustrates the importance of history in helping to shape the future – and is one reason that this historical timeline will be so useful in the study of more recent events.

In this particular instance, the 'voice' of the rioters was unable to accelerate the change sought by them. Lawless describes how by the end of September 1930, resistance to the new rota system had collapsed in both South Shields and Cardiff, and by the year's end, most British Arabs who were eligible to sign up for it had done so (1994: 40). As will be seen from the remaining portion of this chapter, it is by no means an isolated situation in this sense, with seemingly impotent riots (in terms of long-term effect) occurring relatively often. There have, however also been occasions when real progress has been catalysed by this type of violence – examples of which are also detailed here.

The Battle of Cable Street (1936)

The Battle of Cable Street took place on the 4th October 1936 in the East End of London, and was a clash between anti-fascist demonstrators and Oswald Mosley's British Union of Fascists (BUF), who were being overseen by the Metropolitan Police. The clash grew out of a planned march by the BUF (hence the initial presence of the police), but soon grew violent, when civilians began to force the police escort back using barricades and weapons. The event is sometimes viewed as being the day the working class banded together, irrespective of race or religion, to bar fascism's progress through the East End of London at all costs (Renton, 2000).

Copsey (2000) notes that although Cable Street is often viewed as being the climax of an uninterrupted sequence of conflicts between fascists and anti-fascists, this was simply not the case. According to Copsey, the events of 1936 came in the wake of a decline in anti-fascist activity which had taken place in 1935 (2000: 42). Thurlow (2000) notes that although the 4th October 1936 is often remembered as the day that the labour movement, Jewish working classes and local inhabitants 'decisively checked' the incursions of the BUF into the East End of London, this was also actually not the case – as many areas of East London were still witness to BUF activity long after this date (2000: 74).

These possible distortions in the common memory of the events of Cable Street are important because as Kushner (2000) points out, some believe that the day was of such significance that it represents one of the greatest events in the history of the East End of London – perhaps even twentieth century Britain (2000: 110) (this is the reason for its inclusion as the first item in this short history of British civil disobedience). Linehan (2000) goes even further than the two accounts mentioned above, suggesting that in the longer term, Cable Street may in fact have been a constructive event for the BUF – noting that the organisation's membership figures swelled shortly afterwards, but also pointing out that this was largely due to propaganda from the far-right, which showed the anti-fascists in an extremely negative light for their part in the day's events. This coverage is interesting, as on the surface it may share some characteristics with popular coverage of more recent acts of civil disobedience in Britain.

Although as Linehan points out, 'the Cable Street crowd has rightly been conceptualised as an instrument of nobility and virtue by many' (2000: 29), the BUF characterised it as something altogether different – as a sinister force, bent on overthrowing the British government and monarchy. The rhetoric of the Spanish Civil War was also invoked in an attempt to woo the significant Irish-Catholic population of the East End to the BUF cause – anti-Franco forces in Spain having attacked Catholic churches and members of the clergy (Linehan, 2000: 28). The BUF even attempted to criticise opposition to its march on moral grounds[46] – Linehan reports of the way in which anti-fascist demonstrators were described by right-wing sources as 'barbaric' and of having regressed into 'an animal past' (2000, 26).

Although it was by no means the first instance of racially awakened civil disobedience in Britain, Cable Street almost certainly represents a milestone in the way it is likely to be conceptualised in the contemporary British public conscience. It is almost as clear-cut an example of civil disobedience as a force for good as is possible, given its existence so close to World War Two, and the revelation of the full horror of European fascism. It is also an event which is well remembered – marches honouring its anniversary being held in the East End to the present day – e.g. (BBC, 2007c).

[46] It should be noted that in the Britain of 1936, the title 'fascist' had less sinister connotations to those it evokes today.

The Notting Hill and Nottingham 'Race Riots' (1958)

In August 1958, a complicated series of events took place in Notting Hill (West London), and Nottingham. As these events were complex, with violent episodes occurring in more than one location at once, they are examined in some detail here. A number of mechanisms are identified which may also be of use in looking at other instances of civil disobedience.

The 'race riots' of 1958 began on a Saturday night – August 23rd, 1958 in Nottingham (Crane, 1958: 669; Pilkington, 1988: 106). A conversation between a Jamaican man and a white woman in the Chase Tavern pub (reportedly one of the only pubs in the area of St Ann's where 'West Indians' could drink) so irritated a nearby white man that he shouted 'lay off that woman' (Pilkington, 1988: 106). This led to a brawl, which in turn led to violence on a larger scale outside the pub. Racist slogans were shouted by many white people, who set upon outnumbered groups of black people (ibid). Before long, the situation had degenerated into 'a major race riot' (Pilkington, 1988: 107), which left eight people hospitalised (ibid).

Pilkington reports that on the very same Saturday night (August 23rd), a group of nine white youths crammed themselves into a car, and set out on a 'pleasure tour' of west London, which ended up with three black men hospitalised, and the arrest of all nine youths (and their subsequent imprisonment for four years) (1988: 109). The teenagers had driven around the areas of Shepherds Bush and Notting Hill that night attacking lone black men (never groups) (ibid).

These two apparently coincidental events in cities separated by a distance of over one-hundred miles were linked together by the media (something which is not a rare occurrence, as this chapter will show). This process was assisted by two Nottingham MPs, who that week 'publically called for an end to the uncontrolled entry of black people into Britain' (Pilkington, 1988: 110). On Tuesday 26th August, James Harrison MP (Labour, Nottingham North) made comments suggesting that the 'open door' policy of Britain was impractical in the face of competition for housing and jobs (ibid). J.K. Cordeaux MP (Conservative, Nottingham Central) appeared on the BBC's *Tonight* programme, echoing the views of Harrison. He had travelled to London 'with the express purpose of informing Cabinet Ministers that he had been convinced by the race riots [sic] that black immigration should be curtailed' (ibid). Whilst ordinarily these types of comments might have been largely ineffectual, in the wake of that weekend's instances of disorder, they only added to an already tense atmosphere around the country.

It was almost predictable then, when on the following weekend racially-charged violence once again broke out in the cities of Nottingham and London. This time the first incident occurred in London (on Friday 29th August) – when Majbritt Morrison (a white woman) was having an argument with her husband Raymond Morrison (who was black), outside Latimer Road tube station in Notting Dale. This argument led to the intervention of passers-by (who were white) on behalf of Mrs Morrison. When Mrs Morrison tried to protect her husband from the men who had intervened, the level of violence began to increase. This was amplified further by the arrival of a group of Mr Morrison's friends (who were black), who also became involved in the fight. Whilst this incident was eventually resolved without serious injuries, it turned out to be just the beginning of that weekend's violence (Pilkington, 1988: 113).

On Saturday 30th August, word of the previous night's incident had spread, and pubs were packed full of people – many of whom were reportedly 'bristling' with anti-black sentiment (ibid). As the pubs closed at the end of the night, many drinkers were stood around in crowds, when Majbritt Morrison was spotted in the street. Racist abuse was directed at Mrs Morrison, who was also hit with a number of milk bottles. When she arrived home, she found the police waiting for her – who instructed her to go inside. She repeatedly refused, and was arrested for obstructing the police – being held until 5am (ibid).

When Mrs Morrison had been taken away, the gathered crowd went on a rampage, smashing windows in a number of nearby streets. As the crowd neared a party being held by a number of black people, the police arrived – averting a 'potentially disastrous confrontation' (Pilkington, 1988: 114). The police, however, decided to escort the black party-goers out of Notting Dale, rather than attempt to confront the rioters. Whilst this almost certainly mitigated the possibility of further violence, Pilkington mentions the way that these tactics seemed to confirm the belief of the rioters that 'through violence they could drive black people out of Notting Dale (ibid).

Nottingham also experienced unrest on Saturday 30th August – although in contrast to London, the police were already on high alert looking for any troublemakers. Although crowds of white people gathered in Nottingham that night, most black residents stayed indoors, and out of trouble. The only real incident of the night reportedly involved a car containing three black people who unwisely drove through the area. The crowd pounced on the car, attempting to overturn it – and the occupants narrowly escaped thanks to the efforts of the police. Following this incident, the crowd

(which reportedly numbered over 4,000 people) turned on itself, with fighting breaking out between groups of white men. In the end, twenty four people were arrested by police that night (Pilkington, 1988: 112).

On Sunday 31st August, violence occurred yet again in London, as a group of around 400 white teenagers – many of whom were armed, gathered outside Latimer Road tube station and were seen shouting racist comments. Eventually a group of black people were attacked by the youths, which resulted in a number of serious injuries. It appears that most black people in the area stayed indoors that night, and the white teenagers are reported to have turned instead on the police, who were largely unprepared for such an incident[47]. A number of police officers were injured in sporadic instances of violence, which ran up until around midnight (Pilkington, 1988: 114-115).

On Monday 1st September, Notting Hill was struck by what Pilkington described in 1988 as 'some of the worst rioting that Britain [had] seen this century' (1988: 115). Black people tended to stay indoors as much as possible at this point due to the threat of violence after the events of the past three days, but shops still opened and the buses still ran. When, in the late afternoon, the streets began to fill once again with gangs, the local MP for Labour, George Rogers began travelling the area appealing for calm (ibid). Pilkington reports that by Monday, the character of the riots had changed. News of what was happening had spread – both by word of mouth and through the media, and many people from outside Notting Hill had been drawn there, seeking trouble (1988: 119).

Many instances of violence occurred on Monday 1st September. Although many black people stayed inside, away from trouble, others were not so lucky. For some, even staying indoors was to prove to be no protection against the rioters – such as the people inside 'The Blue Parrot' – a 'West Indian café', which Pilkington reports to have been wrecked by a group of around 800 white people. It reportedly took over thirty police officers to end this situation (1988: 119).

Perhaps inevitably, given that the police seemed either unable or unwilling to stem the violence in West London, on Monday night, many black civilians in the area decided that they themselves would tackle it. Around three-hundred black people crammed themselves into two houses above another 'West Indian café', arming themselves with petrol bombs and blades, and lay ready to spring an ambush on any aggressors (1988: 121). It was not too long before a crowd of white people gathered

[47] On the Sunday night, there were only ten constables on patrol in Notting Dale (Pilkington, 1988: 114).

outside the café shouting racist slogans. When the crowd began shouting that the café should be burnt down, the people inside struck – throwing petrol bombs from the third floor windows. The majority of the crowd fled extremely quickly when challenged in this way, and news quickly spread. Many black residents now began fighting back against the white rioters, and in much the same way as white people from outside Notting Hill had come there to riot, black outsiders now did the same. Monday night was also the point that the police finally sent reinforcements into Notting Hill (1988: 122-123).

Violence continued until Tuesday 2nd September – when police finally gained the upper hand over the rioters. Although reinforcements were of obvious help here, the fact that black people had fought back against their aggressors was almost certainly of great importance. Tuesday was a reasonably uneventful night, and by Wednesday 3rd September, the violence had ceased entirely (1988: 123).

The events of 1958 represent some of the worst rioting ever to have occurred on the British mainland. Because there were instances (on the Monday night, in London), where groups of white rioters were directly in opposition with groups of black rioters, there are also events within the narrative as a whole, which can perhaps accurately be described as 'race riots'. The term 'race riot' is still perhaps a little too misleading to be useful, however. This is underlined by a statement from Baumann (1999), who describes Notting Hill as 'the scene of the first "race riot" (1999: 69). This chapter has already examined events in South Shields in 1919, which almost certainly fall under the same definition of 'race riot' as events in Notting Hill might – meaning that Baumann's statement is wrong. This might suggest that although Baumann was aware of the earlier events in South Shields, he did not believe them to fall under the same definition – which underlines the fact that the term 'race riot' is simply too open to interpretation to be of any real use in describing a situation. It is, perhaps, better to treat individual situations as individual situations – which also would avoid the problem described earlier, of conflating un-related events to form something altogether much bigger[48]. Attempting to link riots by using 'catch all' terms such as 'race riot' is unhelpful in that the practice often ignores the specific reason(s) behind a riot. There is also a danger inherent in the label, in that the words 'race' and 'riot' may become associated – implying that where people of different races mix together, riots generally follow, and when they do occur, the cause is 'race' rather than anything else.

[48] Although this chapter uses groupings to describe multiple riots, this is due to this being the way that they are recognised by society. A truly impartial historical study would probably separate the groups of riots into their individual components.

It is possible that if the first round of events in Nottingham and London in 1958 had not been 'combined' by the media to form something which they were not, that the later (in many ways more serious) events might never have occurred. Crane's 1958 analysis of the British racial zeitgeist at the time of the riots suggests that there was no 'fundamental or large-scale objection' to black people in Britain, but does suggest three reasons why the riots might have occurred (1958: 669). Pressure on housing is the first of the factors suggested by Crane. He suggests that the recent influx of black people[49] in the (dilapidated) areas affected had caused great irritation amongst residents due to overcrowding. Next is a classic right-wing argument against immigration – that of pressure in the jobs market. Crane argues that certainly in Nottingham, there was no sign of black people displacing white people in their jobs – he also argues that the rule of 'last in, first out' in British industry makes this highly unlikely in the first place (ibid). Thirdly, Crane mentions racial prejudice arising from the association of black males with white females. Whilst Crane suggests that this is the 'least' of the three possible causal factors here (ibid), it almost certainly had some bearing on events in London during the second weekend of rioting. The incidents involving Majbritt Morrison and her husband Raymond reportedly involved racist insults such as 'nigger lover' being flung (Pilkington, 1988: 113) – which is suggestive of anger at the couple's relationship. These three factors, combined with the popularity of the 'Teddy Boy' subculture[50] among teenagers of the time are blamed by Crane for creating an atmosphere within which such riots could, and did, blossom.

Watts Riots (1965)

The Watts Riots began on the 11th of August 1965, when black motorist Marquette Frye was pulled over by the California Highway Patrol for suspected drink-driving. Frye's 'somewhat boisterous, though humorous and co-operative' behaviour soon attracted a crowd. Frye later became belligerent, and his mother and brother arrived. All three family members were arrested, but the incident had already sparked what was to become known as the Watts Riots (Sears, 2000: 81-82). Unrest continued for six days, leaving 34 people dead, almost 4000 arrests, and over 1000 people injured (Sears, 2000: 82). During this time, vehicles were damaged, white motorists assaulted, and a police command post was threatened (Fogelson, 1967: 337).

[49] Crane mentions that *any* large influx of people of this type would have caused the same resentment – it had nothing to do with the fact that the newcomers were black, this being coincidental (1958: 669). Because black people represent a 'visible' minority, however, this is likely to have made them easy targets.
[50] Crane writes that these young 'hooligans' were the cause of much violence in the streets at the time, and that they appeared to begin to target black people simply because they could 'get away' with it rather than any deeper resentment being at work (1958: 670).

Whilst the Watts Riots were by no means the only 'racially motivated' riots to occur in America in the 1960s (amongst others, the Detroit Riots of 1967 are an important example), the similarities which can be drawn between Watts and the later LA Riots (1992) (Chang, 1994[51]), make them an interesting case study to include in this brief history. Parallels can also be drawn between the riots of Los Angeles, and riots which have occurred in the UK – such as the racial segregation believed to have played a part in causing the majority of the English riots of 2001 .

Opinions as to what caused the Watts Riots – as with many instances of civil unrest, are varied. Whilst some saw the unrest as a representing a breakdown in society, and a descent into criminality, others saw it as an uprising - the consequence of justifiable anger against a system which the (mainly black) residents of Watts felt had disenfranchised them. Reitman and Landsberg (2005) include interviews with many people who were present in Watts at the time – ranging from participants in the unrest to members of the security services who attempted to end it, and this only underlines the division of opinion which surrounds the events of 1965.

Whilst, with the benefit of hindsight it may be tempting to dismiss any arguments that the Watts Riots were not motivated by political (and racial) reasons – coming as they did during an important period for the Civil Rights Movement in America, it is also important not to be blinkered by romantic notions of political empowerment and revolution. What occurred in Watts involved many people, and as can be seen throughout history, groups of people may have many and varied motivations for acting as they do. Certainly, Lee W. Minikus – the Highway Patrol Officer who arrested Frye and his family sees no reason why his actions in particular that day should have sparked such a situation – stating with regard to the arrest that:

> It was his mother who actually caused the problem. She got upset with the son because he was drunk. He blew up. And then we had to take him into custody. After we handcuffed him, his mom jumped on my back, and his brother was hitting me. Of course they were all arrested (cited in Reitman and Landsberg, 2005: 1).

Although Minikus would have obvious motive to claim this, Tommy Jaquette, a South-Central Los Angeles resident who claims to have participated in what he refers to as the Watts 'revolt' again does not suggest that any undue brutality was inflicted upon Frye or his family members. What is

[51] Chang also notes differences between the riots – such as the fact that whilst Watts was primarily an African American revolt, the later LA Riots were much more multiethnic (Chang, 1994: 105).

suggested however, is that the gathered crowd refused to disperse, which led to the violence in the days following (Reitman and Landsberg, 2005: 2).

Whilst the unrest in Watts seems likely to have been motivated largely by racial and political factors, from the eyewitness accounts above it would seem that the arrest of Marquette Frye was a catalyst, rather than the cause of the violence. This is in contrast to the Los Angeles Riots (1992), which were began almost immediately after the LAPD officers filmed beating Rodney King were acquitted.

This difference is important, because if there is seen to be a genuine reason for an instance of public outrage, the media and members of the public not involved in acts of civil disobedience are more likely to empathise with the participants. Despite this, Sears suggests that many members of the public did sympathise with people involved in the disorder, because of their perceived cause (2000: 83).

In terms of causes, it seems likely that the Watts riots were triggered by a 'spark' event, rather than the arrest of Marquette Frye being of any special importance to the rioters. Although many blamed a conspiracy of gang members for the riots, the 1968 Kerner Commission Report did not find any evidence to substantiate this claim (Chang, 1994: 104-105). Horne mentions the 'black scare' of the time – where ruling elites 'sought to blame the Nation of Islam – and not police brutality, unemployment, racism, etc. – for the uprising' (Horne, 1992: 67). This could be one factor indicating why gang conspiracy may have been blamed for the riots. Whereas many white officials blamed 'outside agitators' for the riots, leaders in the black community were more likely to see Watts as a 'racial protest' (Sears, 2000: 82). As the Kerner Commission Report[52] (1968) stated:

> The nation is rapidly moving towards two increasingly separate Americas. Within two decades, this division could be so deep that it would be almost impossible to unite: a white society principally located in suburbs, in smaller central cities, and in the peripheral part of large central cities, and a Negro society largely concentrated within large central cities. (Cited in Sears, 2000: 81).

The fact is clear that America was, and is a country divided on racial lines. The discrimination endured by many racial and ethnic minority groups within such a society will almost always lead to a resentment and anger which waits to 'boil over' – there can be no slow release of this pressure, as

[52] The Kerner Commission Report was set up after 'race riots' in 1967 rather than in direct response to Watts (1965), although Watts was also taken into account.

the group has no 'voice' within 'mainstream' (i.e. – white) society. At that point, all it takes is a 'trigger event' to spark an incident of violent disorder such as the Watts Riots of 1965. This is an issue which is perhaps applicable to some of the riots which occurred in Britain in 2001 (including Bradford), and is explored later in this chapter.

Widespread Rioting in Britain (1981)

The first riots of 1981[53] began in London, on March the 2nd, when a demonstration by a group called the New Cross Massacre Action Committee was held[54]. As it reached Fleet Street, the demonstration turned violent, resulting in 23 arrests, and 17 police officers were injured (Benyon, 1984a: 3).

The weekend of the 10th-12th of April saw more violence on the streets of London, this time in Brixton, and led to an inquiry being conducted by Lord Scarman (ibid). By July, rioting had spread to other major cities – including Birmingham, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Nottingham and Sheffield (Hall, 1999: 189). Whilst it is not suggested that all occurrences of violence shared a common trigger, the underlying context which led to their outbreak is largely unvaried.

Whilst the riots of 1981 are often referred to retrospectively as 'race riots', closer to the time this was not generally the case. Benyon states that:

> Only Enoch Powell and certain newspaper journalists seemed prepared to argue that racial tension played a major part in the other disturbances. Most opinion leaders stressed that Brixton, Toxteth and Moss Side were not race riots but confrontations between young people – black *and* white – and the police (1984a: 6).

This correlates with Waller's account (Waller cited in Frost and Phillips, (eds) 2011: 67), mentioned in the previous section of this chapter, that the Toxteth Riots of 1981 were not 'race riots', because they were not a struggle of black against white or vice versa. Waller does mention the strong racial component involved in the Toxteth Riots, however.

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[53] Hall notes that similar riots had also occurred in the St Pauls area of Bristol in April 1980 (1999: 189).
[54] The demonstration was to protest against the alleged failure of the police to properly investigate a fatal fire which had occurred in Deptford in January of that year. The fire claimed the lives of thirteen young black people, and was regarded as arson by many locals (Benyon, 1984a: 3).

More recently, it is the so-called 'Sus laws' and in the case of Brixton, 'Operation Swamp 81'[55] which are most often blamed as providing the 'fuel' for the riots of 1981 – although the 'spark' in each case is generally acknowledged to have been different. This can be witnessed in contemporary reporting across the whole spectrum of the British press – e.g. Quinton (2010), which is an article from the left-leaning *Guardian*, or Slack (2010) taken conversely from the right-leaning *Daily Mail*.

The 'Sus laws' were actually part of an archaic piece of legislation – The Vagrancy Act of 1824, which had been designed to control unlicensed peddlers, prostitutes and beggars, by allowing for their imprisonment for up to one month. 'Rogues' and 'vagabonds' could be imprisoned for up to three months under the act. Section four of the act allowed police to arrest anyone suspected of having the intent to commit a crime – and it was this section which became known as 'sus', as the police began to use it widely in the 1970s (Terrill, 1989: 437-438).

These powers are generally viewed as having been widely abused – very often in a discriminatory manner against black youths. Benet Hytner QC, who was appointed by Greater Manchester County Council to conduct a report on Moss Side following the 1981 riots had the following to say on the matter:

> We were satisfied that for some time prior to the summer of 1981 a number of officers misused their powers to stop and search subjects.... [sic] We were satisfied that on many occasions, particularly but not only in Moss Side, black youngsters have been racially abused (cited in Nally, 1984: 60).

The Scarman Report on the Brixton riots seemed to echo this view, stating that:

> Such plausibility as this attack has achieved is due, sadly, to the ill-considered, immature and racially prejudiced actions of some officers in their dealings on the streets with young black people... I have no doubt that some of the allegations of harassment made against individual police officers in the course of the Inquiry are true. While I am in no position to make findings on individual allegations, the weight of criticism and complaint against the

[55] 'Operation Swamp 81' was a plainclothes police operation based in the borough of Lambeth (of which Brixton is a part). By the Metropolitan Police's own account, the operation resulted in 'a significant number of black youths being stopped and searched' (Metropolitan Police Service, 2011). The Metropolitan Police also state that the operation 'intensified the resentment of a group who already frequently protested against and obstructed police actions on the street (ibid).

police is so considerable that it alone must give grave cause for concern (Scarman, 1981: 64-65).

What these accounts signify is that although the riots of 1981 were not 'race riots' – in that they did not involve people of different races rioting against each other, they most certainly did share an important racial dimension. Along with the outwardly similar events which were to occur in 1985 (detailed below), the riots of 1981 are generally remembered as being some of the most destructive to have occurred on mainland Britain in recent memory.

Riots on the Streets of Britain Once More (1985)

In 1985[56], Britain again bore witness to acts of serious civil disobedience on the streets of Birmingham and London. In this instance however, the riots had tragic consequences – in Handsworth, Birmingham, shopkeepers Kassamali and Amirali Moledina were burned to death inside their Post Office (Cowan, 2011), in Brixton, London, a photographer died when a brick hit his head (Hawkes, 2004), and on the Broadwater Farm Council Estate in Tottenham, North London, police officer Keith Blakelock was stabbed to death. The Broadwater Farm riot was itself rooted in tragedy – the disorder ostensibly stemming from the death of resident Cynthia Jarrett, who collapsed whilst the police were searching her home (Davis, 1989). The rioting of 1985 originated in Handsworth, spreading first to Brixton, and then to Toxteth, Peckham, and Tottenham (Hall, 1999: 190). As with the previous disorder of 1981, riots tended to be catalysed by 'spark' events, but were almost certainly 'fuelled' by a widespread (and not necessarily unjustified) resentment of the police and sense of alienation within the affected neighbourhoods. A breakdown of the major 'spark' events is presented below:

Rioting in Handsworth began on September 9th 1985, after the owner of an illegally parked car with no tax disc displayed attempted to resist arrest by fleeing into a nearby cafe. When backup officers arrived to arrest the owner, they began to be pelted with missiles by bystanders, and the volatile situation began to develop from there (Cowan, 2011).

On the 28th September 1985, police officers raided the home of Cherry Groce in Brixton. As the officers were looking to arrest Mrs Groce's son Michael in connection with an armed robbery, they

[56] It is interesting to note that Benyon (1984b) mentions a number of reports indicating that further rioting, on a smaller scale occurred in some areas in 1982 and 1983. The reason for the dearth of reporting on this is purportedly that the attention of the media was focussed on the Falklands War (Benyon, 1984b: 241).

had suspected that he would be armed. Although Michael was not at home, one of the officers – Douglas Lovelock discharged a weapon, wounding Cherry Groce, who was subsequently paralysed from the waist down and spent the next two years in hospital (Hawkes, 2004).

Less information is available concerning the rioting in Toxteth, Liverpool in 1985 mentioned by Hall (1999). On October 1st 1985, the BBC reported that violence in Liverpool had followed a protest at the Magistrate's Court over the charging of four black defendants in connection with a stabbing investigation (BBC, 1985). The violence led to the destruction of 'at least five' vehicles, as well as missiles being thrown at Hope Street Police Station (ibid).

Events on the Broadwater Farm Estate in Tottenham bore frightening similarity to those in Brixton the previous month. On the 5th October 1985, Metropolitan Police officers were once again raiding the home of a black woman – Cynthia Jarrett from Tottenham, when she reportedly collapsed, and subsequently died. Police had been searching for stolen goods following the arrest of Mrs Jarrett's son Floyd (who was subsequently acquitted) (Hall, 1999: 190; Stoddard, 2011). Again, as with the events of 1981, rioting was preceded by a period of heightened police activity – this time involving a series of raids aimed at uncovering drug dealers and offensive weapons (Hall, 1999: 190).

From the events of 1981 and 1985, it is possible to see a clear pattern emerging. Initially, a 'voiceless' group (in this case this group mainly included, but was not limited to young black inner city males) is given unfair treatment by an institution (in this case the police). As tension builds between the two groups, so does the risk of a volatile confrontation – which can then be sparked by almost any instance of public interaction – in this case, the events in Handsworth. Because of the reach of modern media, disenfranchised 'voiceless' groups in other areas get to see what is happening when events reach a head, and realise that the issues affecting them are receiving (or are likely to receive in the near future) public attention. This provides increased volatility in what may be geographically distant areas, causing the chain-reaction effect often displayed in these situations – e.g. the UK riots of 1981, 1985 or more recently 2011[57].

'Solutions' to these problems often focus on controlling volatile groups (or perhaps more accurately, groups whose volatility has been ensured) within society, or on trying to ensure that institutions such as the police do not discriminate e.g. on racial grounds (perhaps a futile task in a society where racism is widespread). A more effective solution in the longer-term would be to ensure that 'voices'

[57] The series of riots which occurred in 2001 might also be considered here – however, as is outlined later in this chapter, direct provocation from far-right groups was also to blame for sparking many of these situations.

from across the whole cross-section of society were being heard – perhaps nullifying the need for violence in order to get a message across.

It is interesting to note that the official report which investigated events in Tottenham in 1985 (the Gifford Report/Broadwater Farm Inquiry) is at odds with the above explanation. The report states:

> Nor do we accept the explanation put forward by many newspapers, that the estate was seething with tensions which would have sparked a riot in any event, and that it only needed a "trigger" to set it off. On that view, the death of Mrs Jarrett is seen as the "trigger", but any other event might equally have served. Such an analysis seriously underestimates the magnitude of that tragedy (Broadwater Farm Inquiry, 1986: 191).

So instead of viewing the Broadwater Farm riots as an inevitable occurrence, the inquiry blames the death of Cynthia Jarrett as representing an abnormally emotive event, which caused the disturbances. Whilst the report does mention the similarities between the death of Mrs Jarrett and that of Cherry Groce the previous month, as well as the pre-existing poor relationship between members of the police and people on the estate, its view seems to be that the Broadwater Farm riot would not have occurred had not a very specific event (the death of Cynthia Jarrett) also taken place.

Dewsbury (Yorkshire) (1989)

On June 24th 1989, a riot occurred in the town of Dewsbury, West Yorkshire. As this riot was of a relatively small scale – lasting only one day and involving somewhere between 59 and 79 arrests[58] (Roy, 1989; Wainwright, 1989), it received limited attention both from the media, and subsequent academic research. It is an event of some importance in the context of this study however, for reasons of both *where* and *why* it occurred.

Dewsbury is located in West Yorkshire, roughly 11 miles South East of Bradford – the city which is one of the main focal points of this study. Whilst this of itself is not especially interesting, when the reasons behind the Dewsbury riot are considered, it becomes an event of clear importance in this context. Violence occurred in Dewsbury on the same day that two rival protest rallies were being held in the town centre. One involved the Kirklees Black Workers' Group (KBWG), who were holding

[58] Reports of the number of arrests made differ from newspaper to newspaper.

an anti-racism rally (around 250 attendees), and the other, the far-right British National Party (BNP) (around 150 attendees) (Wainwright, 1989). The Bradford Riots of 2001 were also sparked on the day that a demonstration by a far right group was planned (this time the National Front) – although this event was later banned by police. Whilst trouble between the two opposing rallies in Dewsbury was reportedly avoided, a number of British South Asian youths 'went on the rampage', badly damaging a pub, and causing an estimated 18 other incidents of damage – mostly to cars (Wainwright, 1989).

It is likely that this violence was in some way sparked by the appearance of the BNP in Dewsbury. Roy (1989) reports that a group of around 300 'Asians' had spent the afternoon chanting anti-racist slogans, and that violence broke out when the police moved in to disperse them. As with the Bradford riots of 2001, the police came under attack at this point, and again as with Bradford, there appears to have been no large-scale direct confrontation between the rioters and the far right group involved.

Another interesting fact in the context of this study is that both the articles mentioned above (Roy, 1989 and Wainwright, 1989) make some mention of disorder which had occurred one week prior to this (June 18th, 1989) in Bradford. This disorder was connected to a protest against Salman Rushdie's novel *The Satanic Verses* – press coverage of the publication of which is also examined by this thesis. Whilst the press' making this connection was perhaps inevitable, given the close proximity of Dewsbury and Bradford, as well as both riots involving the 'same' minority ethnic group, it does show how unrelated incidents might be connected by the press, and then associated in the mind of the reader.

The Los Angeles Riots (1992)

On April 29th, 1992, widespread rioting was once again to hit the US city of Los Angeles. The chain of events contributing directly to the riots began on March 3rd, 1991, when black motorist Rodney King was stopped by the LAPD, and beaten by a number of officers. A now infamous amateur video captured much of the beating, and created widespread anger against the LAPD when it was broadcast. Although the video appeared to show a helpless man being brutally beaten by the

police[59], and was presented as evidence during the trial of the accused officers, all four were found 'not guilty' by the jury (Lacayo and Donnelly, 1992).

Although the prosecution might have assumed that they had a very good case against the officers involved – given the video evidence, a number of factors stacked up against them, and resulted in the officers being acquitted. These factors have received a great deal of attention both in the media and in academia, and there are a number which stand out as especially important. Firstly, the trial was moved from Los Angeles to Simi Valley (an overwhelmingly white community) because of the amount of publicity it had received (Lacayo and Donnelly, 1992). Whilst, in an ideal world, relocation would not pose a problem for a trial – because jurors would be 100% unbiased in terms of skin colour, it is generally held that in the trial of the four officers accused of beating Rodney King, this was not the case. Lacayo and Donnelly (1992) argue that Simi Valley, where the population was just 2% black was always likely to produce a jury sympathetic towards white police officers – given its large population of police officers and fire fighters. Vogelman (1992) describes what he bluntly refers to as the 'Big Black Man Syndrome', and the way in which it might operate in the courtroom. In Vogelman's opinion, this phenomenon was very much present during the 'Rodney King Trial'[60] – with King being portrayed as the 'prototypical "Big Black Man"', being 'larger than life' and possessing 'superhuman strength' (1992: 574). This was, in Vogelman's opinion, how the defence managed to paint King as a 'threat' when the case reached court.

Stereotypes such as the above linked in with the case presented by the defence – that in fact Rodney King was the only 'threat' visible in the video footage, and that he was in some way endangering the police officers who were present. One juror supposedly stated that she had believed Rodney King to be in 'total control' of the situation (Butler, 1993: 15). Although this argument may seem counter-intuitive to anyone who has viewed the Rodney King 'arrest' footage, it is important to remember that the video cannot tell the whole of the story – it does not show the viewer what happened before the camera was turned on, and it does not contain any relevant sound.

Regardless of what caused the 'not guilty' verdict to be delivered inside the courtroom, following its announcement at 3:00pm on April 29th, 1992, violence almost immediately erupted across a wide area of Los Angeles (Bergesen and Herman, 1998: 39). Johnson *et al.* note that in terms of loss of life

[59] The video showed officers clubbing and kicking Rodney King 56 times in just 81 seconds (Lacayo and Donnelly, 1992).

[60] Johnson *et al.* note when mentioning 'the defence attorney's ability to put King, instead of the four white police officers, on trial' (1992: 358) that the consistent characterisation of the trial by the media as 'The Rodney King Trial' made the outcome of the trial almost predictable.

and injuries, as well as property damage and loss, the 'Los Angeles Rebellion' of 1992 was the worst such event in the then recent history of the United States (including the Watts Riots of 1965) (1992: 357). They also note that unlike the Watts Riots, what occurred in Los Angeles in 1992 was a multiethnic riot – citing arrest data statistics from the *Los Angeles Times*, which shows that during the period affected by the riots, there were large numbers of people arrested from multiple ethnic groups[61] (1992: 357-358).

Given that the outbreak of the riots occurred so soon after the announcement of the jury's verdict, it seems almost certain that it at the very least represented the trigger event for the violence. As has already been discussed in this chapter however, understanding the trigger for an outbreak of violent civil disobedience such as the Los Angeles Riots is not the same as understanding the context within which it occurred. Johnson *et al.* state that they prefer the term 'rebellion' to describe what occurred in 1992, and that they also believe it (at least with the benefit of hindsight) to have been a predictable event (1992: 358). This, they state, is because they view the 'rebellion' not as a reaction to a *single* act of police brutality (that experienced by Rodney King), but rather one against a far more general abuse of power by the police and criminal justice system – which had built up a large element of frustration and alienation amongst the residents of South Central Los Angeles (ibid).

Also to blame were the large disparities between rich and poor in Los Angeles. Dreier (2003) describes how, following the Watts Riots, the city's 'liberal forces' were energised to find an alternative to Mayor Sam Yorty – who had done little to respond to the grievances which had led to the riots. This replacement came in the shape of Tom Bradley – who was elected mayor in 1973 and was to go on to serve for twenty years. Whilst Dreier describes Bradley as having done much good for poverty and race relations in Los Angeles, the passage of Proposition 13[62] in 1978, and the election of Ronald Reagan as president in 1980[63] made it difficult for this situation to continue (2003: 39-40).

The election of Bradley could be viewed as progressive change resulting from the articulation of a voice through the Watts Riots – he did much to try and diversify the police department; increased

[61] Bergesen and Herman dispute the accuracy of such statistics, arguing that not only were many arrests during this period actually for curfew violations, but also that because it has been suggested that the police were using the civil unrest to round up and deport people they believed to be undocumented immigrants (they cite the American Civil Liberties Union, 1992: 1), Latinos may be unfairly over-represented here (1998: 42).

[62] Proposition 13 was an amendment to the Constitution of California which limited the amount of tax which could be levied against a property – limiting the ability of cities to raise funds.

[63] Reagan reduced the federal funds available for urban social programs, which made things difficult for Bradley and Los Angeles (Dreier, 2003: 40).

municipal hiring of African American and Hispanic citizens, and helped minority entrepreneurs gain access to contracts put out by the city (2003: 40). It is clear, however, that enough was not done to cure the problems suffered by Los Angeles – regardless of whether the city's mayor wanted to improve the situation. Whilst there are many reasons that this might be the case (which will not be discussed here), it does show that even an event such as the Watts Riots, which shocked the nation and precipitated a series of large riots in other cities across the country could not help America as a whole to see the problems which needed to be solved in some of its poorest communities. Because of this it was perhaps simply a matter of time before something similar was to occur again. Along with the English riots of 1981 and 1985[64], this almost certainly shows that riots are not so reliable a vehicle for the voice of an oppressed group that they in any way guarantee that it will be effectively 'heard'. Clearly, this requires something more than just 'shouting louder'.

The Manningham (Bradford) Riots (1995)

For a number of nights in June 1995, riots occurred in the Yorkshire city of Bradford, causing an estimated £500,000 of damage (Laudon, 1995). Although these events have not received a great deal of academic attention since they occurred, they are important in the context of this study because of the close relation they bear to the Bradford Riots of 2001 – both in terms of geography (both events were centred around the Manningham area of the city) as well as their motivational factors. Although they have almost certainly been overshadowed by the more widely reported and discussed riots of 2001, the events of June 1995 are examined here, which provides a better context for the study of the 2001 disturbances presented later in this thesis.

News reports of exactly when the riots of 1995 began are incongruent. This is likely to be connected to a phenomena encountered when studying events which occur in Britain's smaller cities (especially those in the largely ignored north) – that the national press may not tend to have resident journalists stationed within them. This means that national newspapers may have to rush to get journalists to the scene of the event if they wish to report first hand on it – but this can only happen after the initial occurrence. National newspaper reports (especially early ones) of events which

[64] As has already been established, the 1985 riots involved much the same motivational factors as 1981 – implying that little had changed in the years between them.

occurred in smaller northern cities such as Bradford often appear to be based on secondary information[65] – which suggests that this situation is the case.

Despite this apparent problem, from reading the newspaper reports of the time, a general picture of what occurred can be built up. Alibhai-Brown (1995) reported in *The Independent* on Monday 12th June, 1995 that 'pitched battles between police and Asian youths - some only 12 years old - have erupted in Bradford over the past two days'. Whilst this implies that the riots began on Saturday 10th of June, Wilkinson (1995a) reported in *The Times* that they began on Friday the 9th. As well as the problems encountered by national newspapers in this type of situation described above, this disparity is likely to have a lot to do with the chaotic nature of rioting. After all, even if a national press reporter had been stationed in Bradford at the time, not being omnipotent they may not have known exactly when the riots began themselves. In any event, it is at least clear that riots occurred in Bradford that weekend, which were triggered at *some* point, by *some* thing.

The trigger event is generally regarded to have been a dispute between the police and local South Asian youths, over a game of football which was being played in the street (Alexander, 2000: 10; Loudon, 1995; Wilkinson, 1995a). Whilst this dispute played out, it was said that the police officers involved had mistreated two South Asian women who were present, which led to the violence (Alexander, 2000: 10). Wilkinson (1995b) reports a similar story, with the exception of the incident involving the women – here only one woman is mentioned, although this time she is said to have been carrying a baby.

Alexander also highlights the way in which the events of June 1995 were held to signal a much wider crisis within the South Asian and Muslim community in Bradford. She describes how, 6 years previously during the *Satanic Verses* furore, Bradford's South Asian and Muslim communities had been portrayed as 'reactionary and anachronistic', but in 1995 they were being portrayed as if they were 'in the throes of cultural and social breakdown' (2000: 10). Indeed, it is important to remember that 1995 was not the first time that dissenting voices had come from minority communities in Bradford. As well as the book-burnings and protests which occurred at the time of the Rushdie incident, Vallely (1995) cites the sacking of white Bradford head teacher Ray Honeyford

[65] The most reliable indicator of this is the publication of the same quotations/interviews and data by multiple newspapers. In cases such as this it would seem highly unlikely that any active journalism had been carried out.

in 1983[66], and 'unpatriotic' protests during the Gulf War in 1991 as other instances where dissenting voices were heard from Bradford's South Asian and Muslim communities.

The cause(s) of the riots in Manningham in 1995 are likely to be more complex than the 'trigger' event might at first suggest – a feature shared with many other riots. Whilst the 'heavy-handed' attitude of the police when working within the South Asian community did receive criticism (Wilkinson, 1995b) – a situation which arguably reversed itself in the six years leading up to the Bradford riots of 2001, other issues are also mentioned which may have 'fuelled' the riots. The largest of these appears to be a 'turf war' being fought in Manningham between British South Asian 'vigilantes' or 'clean-up gangs' and those involved in the vice trade of the local red light district, which was/is centred around Lumb Lane – e.g. McElvoy (1995); Mellor (1995). Mellor[67] (1995) mentions that many people were quick to link the riots with the ITV television series *Band of Gold* (1995) – arguing that it brought more people involved in prostitution to the area, and further inflamed the local vigilantes. Mellor rejects this hypothesis, stating that poverty is more to blame for prostitution than television drama, and supports the idea that there were multiple causes for the riots. This does not escape the fact however, that multiple sources mention the tensions which had been simmering in the Lumb Lane area previous to the riots. It is difficult to see how such an atmosphere, which had reportedly already involved acts of physical violence (McElvoy, 1995) might not have contributed to the riots of 1995.

Although the purpose of this section is not to carry out a full analysis of press content pertaining to the Manningham Riots of 1995, it is interesting to note that along with the article written by Mellor (1995) mentioned above, there was at least one other article printed shortly after the riots which was written by a well-known person connected in some negative way to Bradford. The article in question was written by Ray Honeyford (1995) – the sacked head Bradford teacher mentioned previously, and was printed in *The Times* – a newspaper with a reputation perhaps as good as most others. Honeyford goes in to some detail about what he terms the 'Muslim riot', and again the subject of prostitution is brought up as a causal factor. What is perhaps most interesting about the article is the fact that *The Times* felt the need to print it. In printing an article by Honeyford, *The Times* must have known that it was printing controversial views about Bradford, and associating events in 1995 with those of 1984 – 11 years earlier. The debate surrounding the Honeyford

[66] Ray Honeyford (who was the head teacher of a predominantly Muslim school) was sacked in 1984 after making comments which were critical of multi-cultural education, as well as Pakistani people. Vallely (1995) cites this as an example of the 'cohesion and power of this [sic] community when provoked'.
[67] It should be noted that the writer of the article was in fact Kay Mellor, the creator of *Band of Gold* – a series about prostitution in Bradford.

incident was resurrected yet again by the newspapers in 2001 following the later riots in Bradford – which is something examined further by the associated chapter of this thesis.

Although they did not excite as much media interest as the later riots of 2001, the Bradford Riots of 1995 are important in the sense that they represent some of, if not the first acts of civil disobedience to have been committed by British South Asians as a 'group'. They also bear similarity to the 2001 riots in the fact that they had little (if anything) to do with religion, which is a factor often brought up by the media when British South Asians are discussed as a 'group'. The 1995 riots are not directly studied in this thesis, because they received comparatively little media attention (which is what this study is interested in), but they must not be forgotten for the way they may have helped to paint Bradford as a 'radical' city – one where a riot or protest might always be just around the corner. Because Bradford (as well as many other similar places) generally finds little coverage in the national news, it tends to be overtly negative events which are reported on – such as the Honeyford and Rushdie incidents, or either set of riots. This is likely to skew the imagination of the population towards viewing the city in a negative light, and the Honeyford (1995) article described above is a good example of one way this situation is perpetuated – by the creation of tenuous links between largely unrelated negative incidents.

'Race Riots' Across Northern England (2001)

Over the summer of 2001, a number of towns and cities across the north of England were struck by riots – which are often referred to as the '2001 Race Riots'. These riots are described by Kundnani as 'the worst riots in Britain since the Handsworth, Brixton and Tottenham uprisings of 1985' (2001: 105). The affected areas included Oldham, Leeds (Harehills)[68], Burnley and Bradford – the occurrences in Bradford (press coverage of which is examined directly later in this thesis) being of primary interest here. The rioting which occurred in Leeds stands out as different, in that its primary cause does not appear to have involved far-right groups such as the BNP or National Front. Here, an arrest over a suspicious vehicle tax disc led to allegations of police brutality, leading in a somewhat familiar pattern to widespread rioting (BBC, 2003).

Because the riots shared similarities in terms of *when* they occurred, as well as *where* they occurred, they tended to be grouped together by the media when reported – a phenomenon which has been observed a number of times already in this chapter. As has already been stated, this often serves to

[68] Kundnani (2001) does not mention Leeds in the context above. This is probably due to issues with the causal factors behind the riots in Leeds, which are described shortly.

exacerbate tensions in areas where they were already running high. Whether or not this process caused a particular riot is generally impossible to prove, but it is hard to imagine a situation where it might not have some effect. This is something which Bujra and Pearce (2011) point out with respect to the rioting in Bradford in 2001, which occurred *after* the other riots that summer:

> The significance of Burnley and Oldham to the riot in Bradford was indirect, based on the fears engendered amongst Bradford Asians about possible Far Right incursions in their city... the riots in Bradford were by no means a repeat performance of these earlier disturbances, though there were some parallels (2011: 14).

Bujra and Pearce also mention an article printed in the *Observer* prior to the Bradford riots of 2001, which reflected on whether Bradford would be the next town/city to erupt into violence (2011: 15). This represents one of the more direct ways that the media might have some influence over future events where instances such as this one are concerned – by suggesting that Bradford might 'erupt', the *Observer* may have made this outcome more likely. Fear of far-right groups such as the BNP or National Front is also important in the context of Bradford, because of the particularities of what occurred there in 2001. Whilst a National Front march/demonstration had indeed been planned for the day on which the riots began, it was reported that around twenty or less supporters actually showed up, but did not march (Vasagar and Dodd, 2001; Wright, 2001). Ordinarily it might be imagined that such an event would draw little attention from anyone not directly involved in it, or in demonstrating against it – however in Bradford, a violent and destructive riot occurred on the very same day. This might suggest that earlier occurrences in Oldham and Burnley had inflamed tension and anxiety to the point where it eventually 'boiled over' into a riot. Although this is not examined in detail here, it is interesting to note in the context of the rest of the chapter, as it may represent another instance of the media's linking together and framing of events actuating further events in the real-world.

With this being the case, events in Oldham and Burnley are examined in some detail here in order to provide a context for the case-study of the Bradford Riots which is presented later in this thesis. Whilst the Leeds Riots are interesting in that they occurred around the same time (summer, 2001) and in a similar place (northern England), in this context, they are less useful, and are not examined in detail here. This is not to say that the occurrence of another (largely unrelated) riot in the summer of 2001 might not have affected later events, but rather that any effect it may have had

would probably have had more to do with the way it was covered by the media than the actual event itself.

It is almost impossible to consider the riots which occurred in Oldham and Burnley in 2001, without first looking at the specific contexts within which they occurred. Kalra and Rhodes (2009) write of the 'racialised symbolic landscape' in both towns, which can be traced back to the collapse of the local textile industry and housing markets (2009: 48). Here, particular areas of each town came to be seen as ethnically homogenous – being either 'white' or 'Asian' (2009: 47). This led to resentment between the two local 'groups' – with the examples cited by Kalra and Rhodes involving the construction of new facilities in areas perceived locally to be 'Asian'. Some members of the local white community perceived this as 'positive discrimination' on the part of the local authorities, which led to feelings of 'abandonment' (ibid). Amin (2003) also notes the high levels of unemployment experienced since the decline of the British manufacturing industry by (but by no means limited to) the old mill towns of Lancashire and Yorkshire, such as Oldham, Burnley and Bradford (2003: 461). It seems likely that this would have only served to amplify any jealously felt between racialised neighbourhoods, as resources would be scarce. Indeed, Amin writes that 'competition for scarce local opportunities fuelled resentment, especially as stories grew of whites getting better jobs and better housing estates and of Asians [sic] receiving preferential welfare support' (ibid).

Whilst this type of segregation/balkanisation is certainly not a unique occurrence, activity by far-right groups did much to antagonise the existing situation – particularly in Oldham. Whilst the Oldham Riots of 2001 were directly sparked by a BNP/NF march on May 26th, there had actually been two previous demonstrations involving the far-right there that year (Kalra and Rhodes, 2009: 48). Kalra and Rhodes also mention an incident involving around 450 visiting Stoke City[69] football hooligans, following a match with Oldham Athletic. Here, Stoke 'supporters' are reported to have marched through the Glodwick area of the town, in an attempt to provoke the local 'Asian' community (ibid).

This type of provocation was to come soon after what Kundnani (2001) describes as the coming of age of a new generation of young British South Asians, who had been born and had grown up in Britain, but who were unwilling to accept 'the second-class status foisted on their elders' (2001: 108). Kundnani suggests that this 'new generation' would not hesitate to meet violence with

[69] Kalra and Rhodes also note that the fans being mostly from Stoke-on-Trent is of particular interest here – the city having registered 'significant levels' of BNP support in recent years (2009: 48).

violence – leading to a growing number of confrontations between groups of whites and British South Asians (ibid). Rising levels of this type of violence would almost certainly have contributed to the ability of the far-right to gain a foothold in the area – by adding a degree of fear to the jealously already present in sections of the local white community. It would also have contributed to the 'powder-keg' atmosphere, which was eventually to explode in the form of the 2001 riots.

Illustrative of this is the case of Walter Chamberlain – a 76-year-old white D-Day veteran, who was seriously beaten by a group of British South Asian youths in Oldham. Orr (2001) describes how the BNP 'seized upon the unwilling Mr Chamberlain as its poster boy' as part of its campaign to 'foment unrest in the area'. Storrar (2001) states that it was this attack which 'prompted NF thugs to swarm into the town'.

The far-right protest (and anti-fascist counter-protest) that day were not the spark which 'ignited' the Oldham riots however. That credit is reputed to have gone to an altercation between two 15-year-old boys (one white, one British South Asian) outside a chip shop in the Glodwick district of the town (Jenkins, 2001; Orr, 2001). Following this fight, the mother of the white youth supposedly appeared, and made a call on her mobile phone – appealing to someone for 'help'. Minutes later, two taxis containing a number of white males arrived (ibid). These men are said to have then gone on a 'rampage' in the area – targeting shops and houses owned by British South Asians (Jenkins, 2001). Following this, police arrived and arrested five white males. According to community leaders however, some British South Asians were also 'rounded up', which provoked 'retaliation' from members of the local British South Asian community (ibid).

The rioting in Oldham lasted for two days, and over the course of that weekend police made 21 arrests (Narain, 2001). Interestingly, youths were reported by police to have travelled up to 40 miles to take part in the disturbances – a number of arrestees were British South Asian youths from West Yorkshire (ibid). This does not take into account the 'right-wing extremists' who were also believed to be partly from outside of the Oldham area (Stokes, 2001a), although later reports do point to arrests made of people from as far afield as Birmingham and Essex (Herbert, 2001a).

One month later, 'outsiders' were once again reported by some to have caused riots – this time in the Lancashire town of Burnley (Reade, 2001)[70]. Harris (2001a) reports that a two seemingly coincidental violent incidents took place early on Saturday 23rd June, 2001. Firstly a dispute

[70] Harris (2001a) reports that Police Chief Superintendent John Knowles admitted 'marked similarities' with the occurrences in Oldham, but also stated that there was 'no evidence' of outside orchestration.

between a British South Asian family and a number of white party goers over loud music being played at around 5.00am led to 'racist and threatening' abuse being shouted at the family. This was followed by the arrival of a van believed to be linked to the BNP. Shortly after this occurred, a nearby British South Asian taxi driver's vehicle was pelted with stones, and he was assaulted by a group of white men with what is believed to have been a hammer when he got out of his taxi to 'remonstrate'. Anger is reported to have spread throughout the town's British South Asian community when it was claimed that it took police 30 minutes to arrive to a 999 call which was made (ibid). Elsewhere in the town, in a nightclub, a dispute over a British South Asian man's gambling debt resulted in a fight where a white male was hospitalised after being stabbed in the neck. This reportedly prompted a gang of white youths to take to the streets, chanting racist slogans, and throwing stones at local businesses (ibid).

Following the assault of the taxi driver, it is reported that 'gangs of Asian youths' threw stones at police (Cole, 2001). 'Minor altercations' were also reported between 'white and Asian youths' (ibid).

On Sunday 24th June 2001, Burnley suffered a second consecutive night of rioting. 'Rival groups of white and Asian youths' are reported to have clashed and set fire to numerous businesses in 'tit-for-tat' attacks that night, with cars being overturned, a second taxi driver attacked, and a Mosque 'marched on' by a group of white males shouting racist abuse amongst other incidents(Cole and Peachey, 2001).

Despite the large number of overtly racially motivated incidents reported, the deputy mayor of Burnley, Rafique Malik reportedly stated that 'there is no history of major racial tension here' (ibid). This statement seems anomalous, given the arguments outlined previously, which paint Burnley as a racially segregated town – at least in the imagination of its citizens if not in reality. Malik's statement perhaps indicates surprise that problems similar to the deep-rooted social-ills reportedly present in other places (particularly Oldham) could be present in his own town. Later Malik is quoted as stating that 'it would be a shame for Burnley to be tagged as another Oldham because it is not' (ibid).

After Oldham and Burnley (as well as Leeds), came the rioting in Bradford – a full account of which is not present in this chapter (it is discussed at some length in its own chapter). The issues raised here with regard to the other riots of 2001 pose some interesting questions about how the rioting in Bradford was covered by the press. By July (when the rioting in Bradford occurred), the press would

have had a good deal of time to mull over the question of *why* such events were occurring, and it will be interesting to see to what extent local voices are heard through its reporting of the event. Kundnani (2001) describes the violence in the three areas as 'the violence of communities fragmented by colour lines, class lines and police lines... the violence of hopelessness... the violence of the violated (2001: 105), and it is important to look to what extent this came across through the reporting of the time. Whilst with hindsight it is easy to look back and consider exactly what was occurring in 2001, at the time it would not only have been much more difficult to do this, but also possibly less tempting for a press journalist to do so. The knee-jerk reaction in such cases tends to be one which lays the blame firmly with the rioters themselves, rather than considering any possible deeper problem. It is only with time that the balanced truth tends to be heard about a riot through the press. Where violent incidents are concerned, it can take time to see that the perpetrators may have been victims themselves – not of violence, but of a society which rejected both them and their voice.

The Birmingham 'Race Riots' (2005)

The riots which occurred in the Lozells area of Birmingham in October 2005 are interesting for a number of reasons. The first of these is that although the disturbances were deemed to be 'race riots' by more than one national newspaper (e.g. Reilly, 2005; Wilkes, 2005), they did not fit what often seems to be considered as the 'standard model' of a 'race riot' – that is, people of a country's ethnic *majority* rioting against people of one or more of the country's ethnic *minorities* (or *vice versa*). The events which occurred in Birmingham involved mainly people from the black and British South Asian communities of Birmingham – and although they were almost certainly racially motivated – with the riot's 'sides' being defined seemingly by the ethnicity of the participants, the 2005 riots represent a side to British racism not often reported on by the mainstream media[71]. In this alone, it represents a particularly interesting case.

Also interesting is the way in which alternative forms of media may have had a hand in bringing the tension which caused the riots to a head. Gereluk and Race (2007) describe how a local pirate radio station 'exacerbated' the situation which developed in Lozells (described below), and increased racial tensions in the area which were 'already fragile and precarious between the two minority groups' (2007: 114).

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[71] That is racism between people from two or more ethnic *minority* 'groups', which does not on the whole involve people from the ethnic *majority*.

The tensions believed to have caused the Birmingham riots of 2005 are linked to an allegation of rape made by a black teenage girl against a group of South Asian men/boys (Poynting, 2006: 87; Gereluk and Race, 2007: 114). Investigations by police into this incident, found a complete lack of evidence, and could not find the supposed victim[72] (Poynting, 2006: 87). This is the allegation which was detailed by the pirate radio station described above, and is believed to have been the largest 'cause' of the riots.

Despite this apparent lack of evidence, the *Daily Mirror* reported the *alleged* rape as if it was proven to have taken place – 'fighting between West Indians and Asians was sparked by the brutal rape of a teenage Jamaican girl' (Reilly, 2005). The article in question was published on October 23rd, 2005 – the day after the riots began (October 22nd, 2005), so it cannot be said to have *caused* the riots. Rioting did continue on Sunday the 23rd however, so it might be assumed that this example of sloppy journalism helped to prolong the violence by mis-informing the public. Had the writer mentioned an '*alleged* rape', or a rape 'to which no evidence has yet been found', this effect could easily have been mitigated. This underlines the importance of language in effective journalism – with the smallest changes in lexis or sentence structure sometimes playing an important role when a writer's purpose is to inform the public of current events. The instance in the *Daily Mirror* may or may not be isolated, but as a full analysis of press content was not carried out for this incident, this cannot be verified either way here.

Contradictory reports exist as to how exactly the rioting in Lozells began (King, 2009: 96), but violence seemed to follow a rally and public meeting on October 22nd, 2005 which had both been arranged with the approval of the local police (King, 2009: 95-96). Violence on the whole is reported to have continued until October 23rd (Friday), although King mentions incidents occurring as late as the Sunday (October 25th) (King, 2009: 96). Weapons used are believed to have included petrol bombs, firearms and machetes (ibid) – which suggests the involvement of organised criminal elements in the rioting (see below). British South Asian-owned shops and the local South Asian Resource centre were attacked, with the shops being looted, and four black youths were attacked by South Asian youths – one of whom (Isiah Young-Sam) died from stab wounds he received (ibid; Allyne, 2005; Wilkes and Finney, 2005). Although much of the violence perpetrated during this period is reported to have been gang related, the fatal attack on Isiah Young-Sam is believed to have been a 'random' attack on an innocent man unconnected with the riots (Allyne, 2005).

[72] This should not of course be taken as undisputable evidence that the rape did not take place – victims of rape are often reluctant to come forward to police. There were also claims reported that the girl did not wish to come forward because she was an illegal immigrant (King, 2009: 95; Wilkes, 2005).

Besides the (alleged) allegation of rape which kick-started the Lozells Riots, there are inevitably a number of deeper factors at play which allowed the area to explode into violence as it did. Here, King paints a familiarly bleak picture – mentioning extremely high levels of unemployment, high levels of criminal gang activity, and a strong degree of disenfranchisement (both political and economic) within the Lozells area (2009: 97-100). Vulliamy (2005, cited in King, 2009: 99) mentions tension between the black and British South Asian communities in Lozells (which had been extant long before 2005), which centred around the perceived level of business-ownership by British South Asian residents compared to black residents. Whilst British South Asian residents are reported to have been relatively successful in business in the area, black businesses did not seem to thrive in the same way – which bred resentment between the 'two' communities.

Whilst criminal gangs were almost certainly a factor which raised the level of violence during the Lozells Riots – something demonstrated by the use of illegal firearms during the disturbances, it is important that this is also considered in the wider context. Gang crime tends to be associated with areas such as Lozells, which are economically and socially disadvantaged – and the high level of gang activity in the Lozells area had reportedly reached the point in 2005 where crime and drugs were seen as a normal way to live by many youngsters (Black Radley Report, 2007: 15, cited in King, 2009: 100). With street gangs often divided along ethnic lines[73], their high level of activity in Lozells may also have contributed to the existing inter-ethnic tensions themselves. It cannot be said, however that gang violence is likely to have been the *only* cause of this tension. Clearly the area had/has complex problems, but the trouble with this is that the media (specifically the press) tend to oversimplify this type of situation. This type of oversimplification is a factor which will be considered in the later sections of this thesis, when press coverage of the 2001 Bradford Riots is analysed.

[73] King cites information taken from an interview with the West Midlands Police, which suggests that gangs in the area were indeed divided in this way – between black and South Asian ethnicities (2009: 100).

Chapter Three

Contemporary British Stereotypes of Muslim and South Asian Culture, and the Problems of Defining 'Racial' Terms

Introduction

When concerned with questions of ethnicity, race, and racism, it is important that there is clarity about the frame of reference within which the argument falls. Scholars have spoken in the past of the way in which 'Western' discourse may have created a divide between the 'West' and the 'East'; or the 'Occident' and the 'Orient' (Said: 1978). This is said to have caused 'Western' people to view 'Eastern' people[74] in a certain way. What is seen, according to some, is an 'otherness' which would not exist, had 'Occidental' discourse not created it (ibid). The process was/is almost certainly not a positive one:

> At the outset one can say that so far as the West was concerned during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, an assumption had been made that the Orient and everything in it was, if not patently inferior to, then in need of corrective study by the West. (Said, 1978: 40-41).

Similarly, Jackson (2005) cites Llorente (2002) in suggesting that the devaluation of certain *terms* may be a natural feature of all language[75] (Jackson, 2005: 21). This, Jackson argues, is due to the binary structure of language, where 'almost every noun, adjective and verb has its direct opposite' (ibid). Examples given in this context include good/evil, native/foreigner and west/east (ibid). Bringing this into context, Jackson mentions that:

> When politicians and newspapers describe the September 11, 2001 attacks as an 'assault on civilisation', the reader knows that (bad) barbarians are somehow involved. A similar process occurs when words like 'evil', 'freedom', 'hate', 'Western' and 'justice' are utilized (ibid).

[74] In this case, predominantly people from Arab and South Asian countries, rather than those from Eastern Asia.
[75] From the way which Jackson links language with discourse, it can be assumed that this would be a feature shared by them both.

Jackson's analysis here seems concurrent with Said's, in that it suggests that Western discourse may be generally negative about what Said terms the 'Orient'.

Assumptions of inferiority such as those believed to operate in the 'West' where the 'East' is concerned would have an obvious propensity for hampering the lives of those whom the assumption is made (as outlined by Gilroy below). These assumptions may not be limited merely to citizens of 'Eastern' countries – conceivably also encompassing immigrants to 'Western' countries, as well as their descendents.

Gilroy suggests the extreme consequences which such perceptions of difference may conceivably lead to[76]:

> The calculus that assigns differential value to lives lost according to their locations and supposed racial origins or considers that some abject human bodies are more easily and appropriately humiliated, imprisoned, shackled, starved, and destroyed than others (2004: 11).

In the context of black Americans at the turn of the century, Johnson (1912) wrote that the stereotype of a 'happy-go-lucky, laughing, shuffling, banjo-picking being' meant that 'his efforts to elevate himself socially are looked upon as a sort of absurd caricature of "white civilization"' (Johnson, 1912: 79). The 'Sambo' stereotype Johnson describes here is probably very different to the stereotypes of difference identified by Said in the context of people of 'Eastern' origin. Its importance here lies in the way in which (according to Johnson) the stereotype was able to limit the achievements of black people in America, and even when achievements *were* made, to dismiss them as mere homage to those of white people. Clearly, perceptions of difference such as these are not benign and cosmopolitan, aiming to acknowledge and embrace cultural 'otherness' thereby forming greater understanding and 'cosmopolitan identity' (Beck, 2006), but dangerous and racist, instead limiting the understanding of the 'other' group to an apparent imitation of 'white civilisation' and helping to ensure that social inequalities are perpetuated. This also reflects the 'western' way of thinking described by Said and Gilroy, where 'other' groups are seen as inherently inferior, less intelligent, or less able to succeed when compared to white groups.

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[76] This analysis may not be limited merely to racial or ethnic groups – conceivably any group perceived as 'inferior' in this way may experience the same problems.

In the UK, Ipsos MORI polls show 'race relations' to be continually thought of as one of the most 'important' issues (at times, *the* most important issue) facing Britain today (Ipsos MORI, 2008). If theories such as the ones described above are believed to be true, then this may represent a paradox. On the other hand, it may indicate that the public realizes the problems inherent in the stereotyping of 'other' groups and wishes for better relations, whilst not knowing exactly how to go about it. In the context of the British media, Law (2002) suggests that since the 1980s there has been a significant change in the coverage of 'race issues', but conceptualizes this as a '*great anti-racist show*' – which may also be seen as 'an outward, empty attempt of mere display masking continuing normative and progressive whiteness in news organizations' (2002: 76). Law also relates this process to a continuing failure by the British media to provide appropriate services for 'black and minority ethnic communities and consumers' (ibid). This also relates to a point made by Hall (1990), who posits that if the media do indeed function in a systematically racist manner, this is not the fault of the *individuals* working within an organization, but rather the organization itself – the structure and set of practices which define how this takes place through complex and often contradictory social relations (1990: 20).

Gilroy (2004) mentions that notions of cultural inferiority and unimportance, as well as those of the dichotomy between 'Christendom' [in Said's words, 'the Occident'] and the 'Orient' have perhaps been re-awoken since the 9/11 attacks on the United States, and the subsequent 'war on terror' undertaken by the Bush administration (Gilroy, 2004: 11, 21). Although, such a shift in opinion after 9/11 does not seem unlikely, Said (1997) suggests that such concepts may have been 're-awoken' at a much earlier date (possibly during the 1973/4 OPEC oil crisis). In order for this to have taken place, however, such assumptions (if indeed they exist) would have had to have lain dormant for a period of time. The reason for such a reversal would be unclear, making the theory difficult to envisage – if 9/11 is taken as the 'turning point', one explanation may lie in the Cold War, and the increased sense of struggle between 'good and evil' between the 'West' and the USSR after the advent of the Reagan-era in 1980. After the period of détente beginning in the 1960s, where the US had begun to trade and build relations with the USSR, Reagan began to portray the USSR as 'an expansionary menace with whom compromise was almost morally indefensible' (Cox, 1985: 487). This may have had a little to do with the Iranian revolution as well as other world issues the US found embarrassing:

> After America's humiliating defeats in Vietnam and Iran, and the Angolan, Mozambiquan and Ethiopian 'revolutions', it seemed as if nothing could prevent further Soviet advances in the eighties (Cox, 1985: 493).

This move back towards the portrayal of the USSR as the 'evil empire', after a period of (chilly) relations, may have meant that there was little room for the demonization of Islam (although events such as the Iranian Hostage Crisis of 1979-81 ensured that the foundations for such a demonization would arguably be laid at this time). After the end of the Cold War in 1990, the 'evil empire' had disappeared. Numerous 'Islamic' terror attacks during the 1990s (detailed in Chapter One), leading up to the events of 9/11 meant that 'terrorism'[77] was to become the new enemy of America/the West.

As this thesis is concerned with the representation of British Muslims by the media, it is primarily British stereotypes of Muslims which will be explored by this chapter. As Muslims in Britain are of mainly 'non-white' origin (Peach, 2005) and the predominant ethnic 'group' in Britain is 'white', this can at times stray from being a solely religious or cultural issue, and becomes a racial one. For this reason, the chapter begins by examining terms such as 'race' and 'ethnicity'[78], before moving on to discuss what is meant by terms such as 'Islam' or 'Muslim', and closes by reviewing possible stereotypes of British Muslims and related ethnic groups, as well as discussing possible reasons behind racism itself.

The Problems of Definition

'Race', 'Ethnicity' and 'Racism'

'Race' and 'Ethnicity'

To think of 'race' as a term with a hard and fast definition is problematic. Even the dictionary describes how 'the term is often used imprecisely', and that 'even among anthropologists there is no generally accepted classification or terminology' (Hawkins and Allen, 1991: 1188). It has also been questioned whether race stands for:

[77] More cynically, 'Islam'.
[78] For as stated below, terms such as these do not benefit from hard and fast definitions.

> Skin colour, or geographical place of birth, or nationality, or culture, or something else – some essential psychic or moral quality that can be differentiated (Jakubowicz et al. 1994: 28).

This demonstrates the extent of uncertainty with which the term can be used, and clearly represents an issue at the heart of any debate concerning race.

Jakubowicz et al. (1994) describe the way that in their view, the terms 'race' and 'ethnicity' are often used interchangeably in common parlance, and it is true that in many applications (such as medical studies), this is the case. Rivara (2001) describes some of the problems inherent in this:

> "Ethnicity" is used synonymously for "race" in many studies. It is equally ambiguous. For some, it is based on use of a shared language such as Spanish. For others, it refers to continent or country of origin of our ancestors, such as Europe, Africa, or Italy. While some believe that it represents shared sociocultural beliefs, the diversity within such ethnic labels is again enormous (Rivara, 2001: 119).

This problem is demonstrated in a study of US cancer statistics by 'race and ethnicity'. A chart showing cancer incidence rates by race, ethnicity and sex contains a combined 'race or ethnicity' axis, which includes such headings as 'African American', 'Alaska Native', 'White' and 'Hispanic' (Parker et al, 1998: 34). The heading 'Hispanic', however, is qualified by a footnote which reads: 'Persons of Hispanic origin may be of any race' (ibid). The purpose of the 'Hispanic' category is therefore unclear in this study, although it does underline some of the problems faced when dealing with terms such as 'ethnicity' and 'race' – in that a clear definition cannot be reached. Ideally, a scientific study would be more concerned with scientific 'objectivity' than with racial semantics.

This issue is also relevant when the way in which it may relate to interpretations of religious groups such as Muslims is considered. The term 'Muslim' is a broad heading for followers of the religion of Islam, and as such, covers people of almost every colour, and corner of the globe. If Muslims suffer from perceptions of homogeneity, how can this be, when the 'group' is so diverse, and may be described in common parlance by different terms?

In a study some years ago into aspects of identity in a multi-ethnic society, Hutnik (1985) found that there appeared to be an anomaly where the personal identity of British South Asian people was

concerned. Whereas British African Caribbean people were found to assert their colour as a very important factor in their personal identity, for South Asian people, this was much less so. Statistically, 'English' – i.e. (in this context) white people, were just under half as likely to mention colour as African Caribbean people, and around twice as likely as South Asian people (Hutnik, 1985: 307).

The major identifier found to operate amongst the South Asian group was one of religion (62% were reported to have asserted their religion in some way), followed relatively closely by nationality. For whites, no variable particularly stood out, although dimensions of nationality and religion seemed equally important at 38% (ibid).

These issues are important in this context, mostly because of the way they suggest that for South Asian people, colour is extremely unimportant as far as their identity is concerned. This is certainly less so than for African Caribbean people, and to a lesser extent, white people. It cannot be overlooked, therefore that an element of confusion may operate, if for the majority group (white), colour is much more important than for those of South Asian backgrounds. Whilst white people in Britain (a mainly Christian demographic) are less likely to make a distinction of religion (and with the recent decline in Church attendances, this may now be even less so), British South Asian people (the majority of whom are Muslim (Peach, 2005)), are far more likely to do so. The results seem to suggest that a white person is more likely to 'see' a South Asian person, where a South Asian person might 'see' a Muslim, Sikh, or Hindu, etc.

'Racism'

'Racism' is defined by Jakubowicz et al. as prejudice caused by:

> The set of values and behaviours associated with groups of people in conflict over physical appearances, genealogy, or cultural differences. It contains an intellectual/ideological framework of explanation, a negative orientation towards 'the other', and a commitment to a set of actions that put these values into practice (Jakubowicz et al, 1994: 27).

In some ways, 'ra*cism*' is easier to define than 'race' or 'ethnicity'. The latter two terms can in many cases be quite subjective – the issue of whether or not people of Arab or Hispanic descent classify themselves as 'white', for instance can vary with the individual concerned. 'Racism' is comparatively

straightforward in its basic sense – being conflict for no other reason than perceived differences in 'race' or 'ethnicity'. The inclusion of 'cultural racism' as described in this chapter complicates this definition a little, although at its base level, 'racism' remains unchanged. Racism's primary purpose could never be anything as 'logical' as personal economic or political gain, due to the fact that it (racism) merely reflects a hatred or fear of a certain type of difference in the racist. In this way, it may be considered an illogical reaction to an illogical fear or hatred (that of perceived differences in other members of one's own species).

Anthias's definition of 'racism' is slightly looser than that of Jakubowicz et al, but comes to a similar conclusion:

> Racisms come in different guises. All are, however, underpinned by a notion of a natural relation between an essence attributed to a human population, whether biological or cultural, and social outcomes that do, will or should flow from this (1995: 288).

Anthias then goes on to propose that racism would be better defined as 'a discourse and a practice whereby ethnic groups are inferiorised' (ibid: 294). It seems then that 'Rac*ism*' embodies the act of discriminating against another person, either purely or partly because of their 'race' or 'ethnicity', with the subjective component of racial or ethnic difference being attached by the rac*ist* rather than the victim.

The Oxford English Dictionary describes the term 'ethnic' as (amongst other meanings):

> (Of a social group) having a common national or cultural tradition... denoting origin by birth or decent rather than nationally (*ethnic Turks*)... relating to race or culture (*ethnic group; ethnic origins*) (Hawkins and Allen, 1991: 481).

In turn, 'ethnic minority' is defined as 'a (usu. identifiable) group differentiated from the main population of a community by racial origin or cultural background' (ibid). Anthias points out the number of definitions which have been applied to 'ethnicity' over time, and describes it as a 'problematic notion' (1992: 11). Whilst religious or linguistic communities are often found to be ingredients in 'ethnic' groups, Anthias also points out that they are not coterminous with them. Clearly, there is a strong case for the Muslim religion, with its strong emphasis on the language of Arabic and multitude of 'races' who can be found practicing it, to be called an 'ethnic group'.

Hall (1992) identifies a process where:

> In recent years, biological notions of races as a distinct species (notions which underpinned extreme forms of nationalist ideology and discourse in earlier periods: Victorian eugenics, European race theories, fascism) have been replaced by *cultural* definitions of race, which allow race to play a significant role in discourses about the nation and national identity (Hall, 1992: 298).

In other words, there may be a trend towards discrimination on cultural grounds, rather than merely biological ones – i.e. phenotype. Although Hall states that biological racism has been *replaced* by cultural racism, it is unlikely that he means the end of biological racism entirely (as it is almost certainly still with us).

Much cultural racism perceived to be targeted at Muslim people still relies on phenotype as an indicator, in order to target its victims – as although not all British Muslim people are South Asian, this group is sometimes seen stereotypically as being a homogeneous Muslim group[79], meaning that it receives a disproportionate amount of cultural racism. Phillips (2006) for instance, suggests that: 'young British Muslim men are frequently depicted as the new `folk devil', a position which has strong parallels with African-Caribbean youth in the 1980s' (Phillips, 2006: 26). This unenviable position is one in which young British Muslim/South Asian males may find themselves the object of fear or blame for a wide variety of things, although the most notable of these tend to be concerned with acts of terrorism. Although it is unlikely that young males are the only members of such groups faced with such prejudice, it tends to be they for whom the brunt of the problem is known.

'Islam' and 'Muslims'

Whilst the words 'Islam' and 'Muslim' are common parlance for most English speaking people, their usage is often based on a rather loose understanding of the cultures encompassed and represented by them. Obviously if someone defines themselves as a Muslim, then it can be safely assumed that they *are* indeed, at least by their own reckoning, a Muslim. Whether they will follow the same

[79] Puar (1996) for instance, describes the way in which 'perceptions of "brownness" imbue South Asian communities with a false homogeneity', and that this perception of a homogeneous brownness 'leads to a "colour equals culture" equation that denies specificity' (Puar, 1996: 128). This may often lead South Asian communities to be seen as purely Muslim communities, especially by white people.

version of Islam as another Muslim living in the next house, or someone thousands of miles away in another country however, is a different matter.

Islam, as with many other religions, is of worldwide prevalence. That is to say that there is no one area or country of the world where a believer is required to reside in order to worship. Scholars such as Peach (below) have pointed out the fact that certain parts of the world may have gained prevalence in the mind of the non-Muslim public, when concerned with Islam. This may be especially true in countries such as Britain, where a majority of Muslims are of South Asian origin, and also generally, where much world media news concerning Islam also concerns the Middle East. As mentioned previously, Britain is home to a large amount of Muslims – 1.6 million in the 2001 census (Peach, 2005: 18, Modood, 2006a: 37), the greatest number in any EU country excluding France and Germany (Modood, 2006a: 37). So whilst the Middle East is certainly of a primary importance to Muslims, due to its including the holy cities of Makkah and Madinah, it cannot be said that it is the only global region which is important when thinking about Islam. With reference to the large proportion of British Muslims who in the 2001 census identified themselves as South Asian origin, Peach points out that:

> Although South Asian groups represent Islam in Britain, there is a danger in essentialising Islam and arguing that South Asian characteristics are fully representative of Islam itself. Pakistanis and Bangladeshis may be almost entirely Muslim, but Islam is pan-ethnic and there are Muslims in Britain of Arab, Albanian, Bosnian, Iranian, Nigerian, Somali, Turkish and many other groups of origin whose characteristics and socio-economic profiles are very different from those of the South Asian groups. There are huge differences between Sunni Barelwi Pakistanis and East African Ismailis. What is true of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations as a whole is not necessarily true of individuals drawn from those populations (Peach, 2005: 25).

Whilst Islam clearly cannot be defined by any one race, ethnicity or global location, in countries such as Britain, there is a danger of the religion being essentialised into just that.

Another problematic assumption, which it has been suggested is affected by many so-called 'Westerners' (a term which is itself difficult to define), is that Islam in general represents a single, organised monolith, perhaps with a hierarchal structure similar to that of the Catholic Church (Said, 1997: 40-41). Islam however encompasses numerous different sects, each with their own

interpretations of the Holy Texts, and is not 'led' by any one living figure in the way that Catholicism is, meaning that on close inspection, the assumption of an over-arching Islamic 'world authority' cannot be found to be true. Said, in fact, later asks:

> How can one talk about Islam today and never once mention the conflict raging between partisans of *ijtihad* – individual interpretation – and partisans of *taqlid* – reliance on the interpretation of authorities – as modes of Koranic interpretation? (1997: 93-94).

In fact, even when concerned with a nation-by-nation basis, the idea of a homogenous, monolithic Islam has been found to be defective. Halliday for instance remarked that:

> I have often heard interviewers asking Muslim representatives about the 'Islamic' view on this or that, assuming, which is quite false, that there is one, single, reading of the issue in question – the status of women, the environment, globalisation or whatever. As an observer of politics, sociology *and money*, I would have to say that there is no such thing as a single 'Muslim' community in the UK, anymore than there is a single 'Jewish' or 'Christian' one [original emphasis] (2006: 31).

Halliday goes on to mention that a person's original country of origin (or also one must assume, their ancestral country of origin), has little bearing on particular religious figures whose views are important to them (ibid). Some people *will* undoubtedly align themselves with a particular figure in this way (Husain for instance mentioned that his parents, who are Muslims of Indian and Bangladeshi ethnicity (2007: 2), committed themselves to a *pir* (spiritual master) from their country of origin (2007: 9)). There is, however certainly no reason to believe that *every* follower of Islam (or of most other religions) would do this.

This thesis is concerned with the representation of British Muslims in the media – which will be shown in this chapter to be a major source of information on ethnic minorities for the non-minority public. The media, however, are not always positive about such subjects – a recent report into media coverage of Muslims for instance, found that one key theme in the dominant narrative was that there was in fact a lack of Muslim leadership, with:

> Religious leaders such as imams, and secular leaders such as office-holders in Muslim organisations, are out of touch with the people they claim to guide and represent, particularly young people (Greater London Authority, 2007: 103).

Although from one perspective, this seems to negate the claim that Islam is reported and perceived as being centrally led, it is important to remember two things: Firstly, that most people receiving the messages put out by the media are *not* experts on Islam, and as such do not have any real idea as to the actual organisational structure of the religion. Secondly, that the concept of a centrally-led Islam is unlikely to be stated explicitly, due to it being factually untrue. This means that the receiver of the message is left to work out for themselves exactly *who* the centralised leadership might be – which would not necessarily be limited to religious, and organisational leaders.

Said (1997) suggests that in the past, Muslims have been covered by the media 'either as oil-suppliers or potential terrorists' (Said, 1997: 28)[80]. Whilst these two descriptors can certainly be applied to a minority of Muslims (and for that matter, non-Muslims), the majority are involved in neither activity. To suggest in an almost subliminal manner that *all* Muslims are like this, however, could strengthen a sense of central leadership – as if it is believed by the reader, the question of *how* all those people came to hold the same views, would remain.

It is also possible that the ideals of certain 'Islamist' groups – of creating a global *Caliphate*[81], and also the generally accepted concept of *Ummah* (the global community of Muslims) (Modood, 2006a: 46), may have played a role in creating perceptions of Islam as a singularity with a homogenous worldview. Modood has compared the Muslim solidarity expressed through *Ummah* with regard to 'military disasters and humanitarian horrors' such as Palestine, Bosnia, Kashmir and Afghanistan, to the US black power movement (ibid). Events such as the bombing of Afghanistan and invasion of Iraq were condemned by the majority of Muslims [as well as many non-Muslims], although most were also against acts of terror perpetrated by Muslims (Modood, 2006a: 47). With a tiny minority of Western Muslims going to fight a *jihad* against Western forces – which, it might be assumed, may have been partly due to their believing in the concept of *Ummah*, the non-radical, so-called 'moderate' Muslim became more of a myth in the mind of the non-Muslim public. Whilst *Ummah*

[80] Here Said is concerned with both Muslims *and* Arabs, rather than one of the two groups individually. Also, *Covering Islam* was originally published including this citation in 1981 – the reference refers to an amended 1997 edition.

[81] *Caliphate* refers to an Islamic Nation ruled under Sharia law. Abbas provides a brief description of the term from a historical perspective, noting that following the death of the Prophet Mohammed in 632, the *Caliphs* (a *Caliphate* is led by a *Caliph*) spread Islam across the globe. By 661, half of the known world was under Islamic rule (2005: 5). According to Miles, this situation lasted in Southern Europe until at least the 1100s (1989: 13).

itself is far from a radical or destructive concept (if anything, it is nothing more than an expression of a Muslim person's love for their fellow Muslims around the world), as with many things, when viewed from a radical perspective, it has the potential to become a destructive force. It may also create the illusion of a centrally-led Islam to the uninformed, possibly helping to strengthen existing perceptions of 'otherness' and fear.

Themes identified as part of a dominant narrative concerning Muslims in the British media in a recent study would certainly appear concurrent with a negative view of *Ummah*. One, for instance was said to be that all Muslims residing in Europe have 'mixed loyalties', and 'owe their principal loyalty to the worldwide Ummah[82], not to the country where they live' (Greater London Authority, 2007: 103). The report then went on to state that in this way, European Muslims were largely covered as 'an enemy within' (ibid). Saeed (2007), suggests that another way British Muslim people are viewed by the media is as 'aliens within', mainly by way of exaggerations of perceived differences in culture. Putting the two coverage types together would create an 'enemy alien' – something almost reminiscent of classic films such as *Invasion of the Body Snatchers* (1956), a film often thought of as allegoric of the Cold War. The similarities between Cold War fear of the USSR, and 'War on Terror' - era fear of Muslims/Islam is something touched upon by Rohrer (2008), and articulated almost entirely through references to popular culture[83].

The concept of the 'enemy within' could be largely due to the way in which the media operate, and the fact that a story such as British Muslim insurgents found in Iraq is more likely to constitute an interesting story for the reader than one concerning a British Muslim who is simply against the Iraq war, but who also condemns acts of terrorism such as 9/11. A report commissioned in 2000 to investigate the realities of Britain as 'multi-ethnic' for instance, found that:

> Any reference to Muslims [in the media] is likely to switch on the notion, implanted by numerous other stories, that most Muslims are terrorists and/or 'fundamentalists' in their interpretation and practice of their faith. (Runnymede Trust, 2002: 169).

[82] *Ummah* represents Muslims worldwide, as a 'family'. There is no central leadership.
[83] Popular culture by its very nature can of course be a reasonably accurate indicator of the attitudes of the general public at that time.

An earlier report on anti-Islamic sentiment, or 'Islamophobia', published before 9/11 found that:

> Sweeping generalisations are then made about all Muslims, in ways which would not happen in the case of, for example, all Roman Catholics, or all Germans, or all Londoners (Runnymede Trust, 1997: 5).

The report went on to state that:

> Any episode in which an individual Muslim is judged to have behaved badly is used as an illustrative example to condemn all Muslims without exception (ibid).

Finally, 'ceaseless representations of Islam in the media strictly within the context of terrorism' are identified by Morlino, undermining 'even the efforts of those who work specifically against it' (2004: 99).

It is highly likely then, that the public's view (if that is what it is) of Muslims as a single group, with decisions made in some mythical central location, is a negative feature of our society. It undoubtedly weakens the position of Muslims as citizens to be indiscriminately associated with terrorism and religious extremism in this way.

British law does not treat Muslims in the same manner as the media (that is, as a homogenous group, or a 'nation'). Modood describes the way in which the law operates in relation to discrimination against Muslims:

> Until December 2003, it was lawful to discriminate against Muslims as Muslims because the courts did not accept that Muslims are an ethnic group (though oddly, Jews and Sikhs are recognized as ethnic groups within the meaning of the law); on that date an offence of religious discrimination was created but confined to employment, Before the advent of the offence of religious discrimination, the exclusive focus on race and ethnicity, and the exclusion of Muslims but not Jews and Sikhs, increasingly came to be a source of resentment among Muslims. Muslims did, however enjoy some limited indirect legal protection *qua* members of ethnic groups such as Pakistanis, Arabs and so on. (2006a: 38).

Contemporary British Stereotypes of Muslims and British South Asians

The underlying myth of Muslim culture's inferiority when compared to 'occidental culture' as Said calls it, is likely to represent as much of a problem now as it did at his time of writing. He himself described in a 1997 edition of *Covering Islam*, that he felt the way in which the media 'delivered Islam' had 'become a good deal worse' in the sixteen years since the book had first been published (1997: xlviii). If coverage became 'worse' from 1981 to 1997 (a period including such events as the *Satanic Verses* incident, and the first Gulf War), then from 1997 to 2008, it is likely to have changed even further, due to the influence of numerous high profile and often tragic events[84], such as the 1998 al Qaeda bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon, and the bombings of the London Underground in 2005.

Since such tragedies occurred, Islam has become a more widely discussed topic in Britain. This was probably something inevitable given the high-profile 'Islamic' nature of the self-confessed perpetrators. Discussion in the media however has not been limited to 'Islamic' terrorism – recent topics have included debates in 2006 over the right of Muslim women to veil their face in public, sparked by comments made by the (then) leader of the House of Commons Jack Straw MP (BBC, 2006b), and in 2005 over the ethics of allowing faith-based schooling[85] (BBC, 2005c).

According to the 2001 census, only half (50.1%) of South Asian/Asian British people living in England and Wales described themselves as 'Muslim'. The next two most prominent religious groups in this demographic were Hindus (23.5%), and Sikhs (13.9%). If the 'South Asian/Asian British' categorization is split into individual countries of 'origin', then the statistics become further informed. Whilst 92% of British Pakistanis, and 92.5% of British Bangladeshis described themselves to be Muslim, only 12.7% of British Indians did so (45% were Hindu, and 29.1%, Sikh). (Peach, 2005: 22). Pakistanis and Bangladeshis then, are clearly more likely to be Muslim than Indians – something which is likely to be a hangover from the British partitioning of India on religious lines (which created the Dominion of Pakistan) in 1947 (Krishan, 1983).

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[84] As described in some detail in Chapter One of this thesis.

[85] Whilst faith schools in Britain represent multiple religions (with the majority being Christian), the discussion in 2005 was mainly over the rights of Muslims to utilise the system. A 2004 report by a committee of MPs for instance, said to have been 'prompted by race riots in the north of England in 2001' [see Chapter One of this thesis] (BBC, 2005a) found that 'giving parents more choice about their children's school had led to the development of racially segregated schools in some cities' (ibid).

The mixing of these three categorizations under the heading of 'South Asian' (or colloquially in British parlance, simply 'Asian'), has different effects in different situations. In the statistics described by Peach, for instance, the groups were likely to have been amalgamated in order to allow for statistical simplicity. In everyday usage however, the term 'Asian' when used in this way, can become an inadvertent form of colour racism. It is as if the individual's personal heritage simply does not matter, and that they can be described merely as their appearance suggests. Whilst appearance/skin colour is a simple way to classify people (due to its visibility), it may not be the best way.

In a similar vein, Modood describes the dichotomous issue of whether South Asians (including those born and raised in Britain) think of themselves as 'black'. According to the results of a survey published by Modood and others in 1997, only around one in five South Asians ever[86] think of themselves in this way (1997: 295) (although Modood has also outlined the difficulties in approaching such an issue) (2001, 68-69).

The term 'Asian' when used in this sense is quite closely related to the racial slur 'Paki', as the two terms can be used almost interchangeably to describe a person of South Asian origin. Whilst 'Asian' is not directly offensive in the way the terms 'nigger' or 'Sambo' would be to a black person[87], to call someone with no Pakistani heritage a 'Paki' may be. 'Paki' however has acquired offensiveness, even when used to describe someone of Pakistani origin. Familiar terms such as 'Brit' (British) or 'Scot' (Scottish), do not have the same connotations, and there is little indication as to exactly why this may be. One possible explanation is that through its usage to describe *anyone* of South Asian (or sometimes even Arab or North African) descent, it has acquired racist connotations. The use of 'Asian' in a similar way (as a blanket term) has not acquired the same connotations, due to the fact that it is not generally used incorrectly in the way 'Paki' is. Although British North Africans and Arabs are fewer in number than South Asians, the fact that they tend to share a very similar phenotype means that often the term 'Asian' *is* used incorrectly in this way however. It is also important to note in this respect that whilst 'British Asians' are often perceived as 'British Muslims', many in fact are not, and suffer from misrepresentation in this way.

[86] The actual question was 'do you ever think of yourself as being black?' (Modood et al. (1997: 295).
[87] Etymologically, the term 'nigger' is derived from 'negro', which is in turn derived from 'denigrate', meaning to turn something black, defame or belittle it (Ayto, 1990: 164, 364). 'Sambo' is likely to be derived from *The Story of Little Black Sambo* (1899) (Bannerman: 1957), an illustrated children's book which quite literally (through its illustrations) paints a stereotypical and offensive picture of black people.

Another possible explanation for the racism inherent in terms such as 'Paki' is that they are used by racists to underline perceived differences in their chosen victim – to somehow make them appear 'less-British'. As one 16 year old respondent to a survey investigating the cultural identities of young British South Asian Muslim women puts it:

> People don't see you as British, they identify you as Asian, they just go by the colour, they don't know anything about you. They go "She's just a Paki." You know, like that, full stop (Dwyer, 2000).

In the case of this particular respondent, who identified herself as a 'British Asian' (ibid), this view clashed with her own. To demean[88] someone's heritage in this way, as if they can never become 'British' because of the origin(s) of their ancestors, is likely to be offensive and is certainly racist.

This situation raises an interesting question – would the same apply for another 'victim' with the same heritage and ethnic makeup as the respondent above, but who described themselves simply as 'Asian' rather than a 'British Asian'? To use the term 'Paki' to describe the person, even if they were of Pakistani origin *would* still be racist, simply because of the connotations the word itself has acquired. The term 'Asian', however, has no such connotations, meaning that it would probably not be considered offensive (assuming that the view of the person in question[89] was known prior to using the term).

The term 'Asian' is generally used in a descriptive context – to outline someone's race (or the race they are perceived to be), whereas the term 'Paki' is generally used in an offensive (racist) context, to insult or mock someone's race/culture. Rattansi (2005) describes the term as 'an abusive form of "Pakistani", beloved of British racists who include people of any shade of brown in the insult' (Rattansi, 2005: 69). Rattansi goes on to argue that a new form of racism has taken shape in the UK, directed at Muslims both in Britain, and around the world. This racism:

> Allows the formation of a malleable discourse to include terrorism, patriarchy, rural pre-modernity and other elements, depending on the context and strategic need. Especially, it allows British Muslims and sometimes British Asians and occasionally all brown Britishers to

[88] As shown by the work of Said (1978), the 'eastern' world is often thought of in the 'west' as inferior, meaning that to take away someone's 'Britishness', leaving them purely as an 'Asian' would probably demean their heritage in the eyes of a racist.
[89] i.e. - That they felt they were an 'Asian' rather than a 'British Asian'.

> be positioned as "the enemy within." The participation of British Muslims in the mass demonstrations against the war in Iraq has provided further resources for the representation of Muslims as potential and actual fifth columnists (ibid).

Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) concur with this statement to an extent, describing how in their opinion, 'the racist stereotype of the 'Paki' has become the racist stereotype of the 'Muslim fundamentalist' (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992: 55). This may indeed be the case, as it appears that at times all 'brown' British people are being tarred with the title 'Muslim fundamentalist', although the term 'Paki' has been around colloquially for so long, that it may take time to fade away (if it ever will). A certain irony exists in the fact that the leadership of Pakistan has pledged its support for the 'War on Terror', and remains a key ally of the 'West' in this respect (Kundnani, 2007b).

A report recently commissioned by the Lord Mayor of London suggested that five of the most powerful underlying conceptions of Muslims in the print media today are that:

- All Muslims are much the same.
- All Muslims are essentially different from all non-Muslims.
- Muslims are morally and culturally inferior to non-Muslims.
- Muslims are a threat to non-Muslims
- There is no possibility of Muslims and non-Muslims living and working co-operatively together, either in the world at large or within individual European societies.

(Greater London Authority, 2007: 105).

Similar conceptions have been described by the *Guardian* newspaper's former Middle East Editor Brian Whitaker, who stated that:

> There are at least four very persistent stereotypes that crop up time and again in different articles [in the British press]. These tell us that Muslims are:
>
> a) Intolerant;
>
> b) Misogynistic;
>
> c) Violent or cruel;
>
> d) Strange or different.
>
> (Whitaker, 2002).

Whilst the Greater London Authority report also notes that such notions are rarely stated explicitly, the example below should make clear where the notion of a very real culture of anti-Muslim prejudice in the press has come from. The example moves away from the concepts of racism outlined previously, and towards a more specialised mode which many have termed 'Islamophobia'. Whilst the article in question is concerned with Sudanese Muslims rather than British Muslims, the conception noted above that 'all Muslims are much the same', would presumably mean that this difference would mean little to the 'Islamophobic' reader.

One recent example of Islamaphobia in the media, comes from a recent front page of the *Daily Express* newspaper. It surrounded the case of Gillian Gibbons; a British teacher who had been working in the largely Islamic country of Sudan, and had been charged with 'insulting religion, inciting hatred and showing contempt for religious beliefs' (BBC, 2007d). The reason for this was that she allowed the children of her class to name a teddy bear Muhammad – which is also the name of the most important Prophet in Islam.

The page juxtaposes two articles. The first describes the way that 'up to 10,000 Muslims' called for Mrs Gibbons to be executed by firing squad, and contains the bold headline 'KILL HER'. The sub-heading read: 'Mob bays for blood of British teacher' (Broster and Flanagan, 2007: 1). The second, smaller article proclaims that '77% say NO to more migrants', and describes how: 'more than three-quarters of the public called for the numbers flooding into the UK to be slashed' (Whitehead, 2007: 1). Whilst both of these articles may indeed have had a factual basis, the way in which they have been placed next to one another gives off some highly negative connotations. The first and larger of the two articles describes how many Sudanese Muslims had called for the execution of Mrs Gibbons, due to what they perceived as a sleight made by her against Islam. The reader is further informed graphically by a photograph of a protestor brandishing a large sword, with banners being waved in the background, and the smiling face of Gillian Gibbons inset in its top right-hand side. Whilst the front-page portion (the article was continued within the newspaper) of the Whitehead article is much smaller, most of its negativity is encompassed by the bold statistics in its title.

The first thing the reader may infer from the two articles is that many Muslims display barbaric tendencies, especially where so-called 'westerners' are concerned (implied by the use of language in the first article). The second is that the majority of the British public is concerned with the number of immigrants making their home in Britain – with 77% of the population reportedly 'saying no' to more migrants (title of the second article).

The term 'migrant' in this sense is literally defined as someone who 'migrates' – more specifically someone who moves 'from one place of abode to another, esp. In a different country' (Hawkins and Allen, 1991: 915). This means that it could be used to describe people religious or otherwise, of any skin-colour or culture, moving to Britain from any other country on Earth. As has already been shown by the quotation from the Greater London Authority (2007) report, perceptions of Muslims as all 'much the same' and as 'different' from non-Muslims are popular in the contemporary British print media. Therefore, the juxtaposition of a story concerning Sudanese Muslims (the Gillian Gibbons story) with a story concerning immigration to Britain may imply a link between Muslim extremism and immigration. Studied in this context, the front page seems to carry heavily Islamophobic connotations. All five of the underlying conceptions established by the Greater London Authority report (above) are represented in some way. The page represents Islamophobia not in the sense that it makes a direct attack upon the religion of Islam, but in that it attacks Sudanese Muslims as well as British ethnic minorities in general, and points ridicule at the Sudanese Muslims concerned for their becoming offended by the actions of Mrs Gibbons.

Whilst media effects theory still struggles to fully explain the complex relationship between the output of media producers and the actions of media receivers, there is good reason to believe that negative reporting about particular groups in society (such as Muslim people) can be important. Hartmann and Husband (1974) conducted a study of the role of the media in terms of attitude formation in its recipients. They found that in areas of Britain with little or no ethnic minority population, the majority of information concerning people of ethnic minorities 'known' by white people came from the media in some way. This would mean that members of the white voting population who did not come into regular contact with people from ethnic minorities, would derive much of their information about people from ethnic minorities from the media. As a large proportion of Britain's ethnic minority population reside in inner-city areas (Peach, 1996), it can be assumed that it is mainly the non-urban white population which is spoken of here. Cottle (1993) suggests that preconceived ideas, beliefs and values can even influence what is seen visually – 'believing is seeing' (Cottle, 1993: 187). This could mean that white people informed about ethnic minorities only by the media could then visit an area populated by a large number of ethnic minorities, and to a certain extent, 'see' whatever it was that the media had told them about ethnic minorities. As Mark Twain put it, 'you cannot depend on your eyes when your imagination is out of focus' (Twain, 1889) (meaning much the same thing). Cottle's research also suggested that the largest topic of news coverage concerned with the inner city was 'crime', at 31.9%, followed by

'race' and 'policing', at 14% and 13.2% respectively (Cottle, 1993: 128). Two of these topics are concerned with criminality in some way, and the other with difference – perhaps again indicating that an 'enemy alien' stereotype may lurk beneath the surface of media coverage of certain ethnic minorities.

White Minorities and the Concept of Parochialism

The debate over ethnicity and race raises the issue of white minorities – 'minority' groups within mainstream culture, with little or no visible means by which to differentiate themselves from the 'majority'. The issue is important here not least since many (179,000) Muslims living in Britain today classed themselves as 'white' on the 2001 census (Peach, 2005: 20). Whilst around one-third of these (63,412) were defined as 'white British', the other two-thirds (115,997) were defined as 'other white', with the remaining 1,547 being 'white Irish' Muslims. Peach includes Turkish, Bosnian, Kosovan, Albanian, North African and Middle Eastern ethnicities in the composition of the broad 'other white' group (ibid).

Perhaps due to the relatively small numbers encompassed by 'invisible' minority groups such as 'white Muslim', a certain amount of misunderstanding seems to be generated by the topic. Anthias's work concerning British-Greek-Cypriots shows that an individual can look visually similar to others of the majority population[90], and may for the purposes of official documentation be classified in a similar manner – e.g. 'other white', whilst still retaining a great deal of their native or traditional culture (1992: 112-125). For this reason, it would be wrong to suggest that 'other white' minorities in Britain reside outside the sphere of influence of ethnic or racist discrimination by racists, xenophobes and bigots within the white majority (although, as discussed previously, 'visible' minorities tend to suffer worst even from 'cultural racism').

Saeed (2007) writes that 'recent media debate about Eastern European migrants to the UK seems to suggest that certain white communities are problematised by the media' (2007: 445). Whilst Saeed refers to Eastern European immigrants, who represent proportionally less Muslim people than many other white groups, this type of problematisation goes to show that it is not only Muslim white ethnic groups which receive discrimination. An article from the the *Sun* newspaper for instance, entitled 'A Million Migrants in Two Years' displays a cartoon of the globe, with the north and south poles labelled, as well as a depiction of the UK, labelled 'all the other Poles' (Sun, 2006). This article

[90] i.e. – Display a very similar phenotype.

is quite clearly intended to raise fears of a Polish 'swamping' of Britain (many Poles immigrated to Britain following Poland's entry into the EU in 2004). This 'satire'[91] seems remarkably reminiscent of a similar cartoon from the *Mirror* newspaper described by Hartmann and Husband (1974). This time concerning illegal immigrants[92], the cartoon:

> 'Showed two lovers on a beach, one of whom was saying 'I thought you said this was a quiet beach' while the beach was being overrun by illegal immigrants in turbans, including a man riding on an elephant, a snake-charmer complete with snake, and a man carrying a bed of nails (Hartmann and Husband, 1974: 31).

In the opinion of Hartmann and Husband, this type of image (especially when concerned with actual events), 'can only perpetuate an outlook which is antithetical to good race relations and likely to influence perceptions of current events' (ibid).

In the case of Britain, there seems to be an association drawn almost subconsciously between Islam, and non-white ethnicity; most notably South Asian ethnicities. Whilst as previously mentioned, recent demographics have indicated that 68% of Britain's Muslim population are of South Asian ethnicity (Peach, 2005: 20), clearly this also indicates that 32% are not. Peach mentions the 'danger' of essentialising Islam to the point where it denotes nothing but South Asian culture (Peach, 2005: 25). If this were to take place, almost a third of British Muslims would be under represented in popular conceptions of Islam.

Gilroy (2004) writes that 'neither race nor racism are the exclusive historical property of the minorities who are their primary victims' (Gilroy, 2004: 16). He points out that 'racism' can and does occur in all 'directions'; i.e. it concerns ethnic *majorities* as well as *minorities*. It seems doubtful then that racism is formed purely for the control and coercion of minority groups. Perhaps more likely is that at its basic level, 'racism' can often represent nothing more than a 'knee-jerk' response to a fear of some perceived difference. What this difference is, and how deep the fear goes, is a different question entirely. Gilroy has mentioned for instance the 'aspiration that skin colour will one day be no more significant than eye pigment' (Gilroy, 1987: 226).

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[91] Although it may have been intended as satire, many would see it differently.

[92] The stereotype indicates that these illegal immigrants originated from somewhere in the Indian subcontinent.

Gilroy has stated that he believes 'race' to be the 'complex, unstable product' of rac*ism* (2004: 16), indicating that the 'knee-jerk' hypothesis above may conflict with his own. His is a humanitarian view where every type of person, of every group commonly thought of as a *race* in fact represents one single *human race*, which has mistakenly defined certain sections of itself in different ways, some positive, and some negative.

Workers Against Racism, describe the concept of parochialism – which in its essence describes the 'knee-jerk' fear of difference touched upon above:

> Parochialism is the typical fragmented response of isolated communities to outsiders. It is characterised by its restricted focus and rarely goes beyond the confines of a particular area. Because it is based on parochialism, prejudice is arbitrary and indiscriminate. Prejudices have no wider or longer term significance. To a Catholic peasant in a Lancashire village, a Protestant farmer from another region, a group of travelling tailors from Bradford, an African slave or a French visitor are all potentially equal objects of suspicion. His suspicions are most likely to be directed against the peasants in the next village who are attempting to gain more grazing rights from the lord's land at 'his expense' (1985: 11).

A similar concept was described by Said, with regard to what he perceived to be the 'imagined geography' of the 'Orient':

> A group of people living on a few acres of land will set up boundaries between their land and its immediate surroundings and the territory beyond, which they call "the land of the barbarians". In other words, this universal practice of designating in one's mind a familiar space which is "ours" and an unfamiliar space beyond "ours" which is "theirs" is a way of making geographical distinctions that *can be* entirely arbitrary... The geographic boundaries accompany the social, ethnic, and cultural ones in expected ways (1978: 54).

To some extent, this hypothesis may be disproved by race-riots such as those experienced in Oldham, Greater Manchester in 2001, due to the close proximity within which the perpetrators on both sides resided (although it has been postulated that the riots were engineered by far-right groups such as the BNP). Working with this logic, it is easy to come to the conclusion either that the riots should not have happened, as the two groups would have seen each other as one single group, or that the concept of 'parochialism' is flawed in some fundamental way. With this said, it is also

possible to argue that the riots may have been caused not by any real distance (in the geographical sense) between the homes of the two groups, but by an 'imagined' distance, which takes into account differences in culture, and the possibility that the two groups may have interacted very little.

Certainly, British Pakistani communities (which according to statistics from the 2001 census represent 67.8% of all Muslims resident in the United Kingdom (Peach, 2005: 21)) have a tendency to form tight-knit communities outside of non-Muslim areas. This is illustrated by institutions of kinship networks such as *Biraderi* (derived from *Biradar*, or 'brother' (Anwar, 1985: 62)), popular in Pakistan, and 'carried over' into Britain by immigrants. Essentially a *Biraderi* comprises a mutually beneficial network of kin[93], which is especially useful for immigrants arriving in an unfamiliar country and culture; 'kinship networks assist with the settlement, the achievement of status and occupational advance of member families and individual members' (Anwar, 1985: 66). A study carried out by Anwar suggested that out of 103 British Pakistani people interviewed, 81 had a preference to live in a mainly Pakistani area, and it was suggested that this was often due to a desire to live near to close friends and family (1985: 70). Whilst people of most ethnicities can demonstrate a preference for living close to friends and family, for the purposes of a *Biraderi*, the contact of members on an almost day-to-day basis is important, making close proximity a necessity rather than something which is merely preferable. *Biraderi* therefore, may represent much of the reason for the grouping-together of British Pakistanis, and it has been suggested (Peach, 2006b) that it may therefore contribute to ethnic segregation. Such tight-knit communities may also be intimidating for 'outsiders' with little or no idea of what is meant by a kinship network, and may contribute to the sense of 'otherness' believed to operate for many white people where South Asian communities are concerned in Britain.

It seems probable then, that parochialism relies not only on physical distance to create perceptions of difference and the racist product which this can entail – it can also use an *imagined* distance. In the case of the Oldham 'race riots', this 'imagined distance' may have been created by a perceived cultural void, as well as the fact that the people on the two different 'sides' were of different phenotypes. In this way, although the two 'groups' inhabited much the same living space[94], they may have interacted little and perceived the 'other' group as extremely different to their 'own'.

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[93] It is noted that 'kin' in this sense is used quite broadly, and can include close friends, as well as extended family (Anwar, 1985: 62-63; Shaw, 2002: 7).

[94] In the 2001 census, Oldham ranked 62nd out of 376 local authorities where residential overcrowding was concerned (Oldham Council, 2003: 7).

Although at first this may seem to clash with Gilroy's humanitarian view, on closer inspection it may not. Gilroy's thesis is partially dependent upon notions of 'race' having been created in the first place not by natural differences, but by 'racism' itself. It is assumed that this takes place when racism exaggerates differences[95] between different 'groups', which may then activate an instinct[96] such as 'parochialism' (or in plain language, a fear of difference). It is also possible to see this from the opposite direction, however. Bowles and Gintis (2004) suggest that rather than a fear of difference, it may simply be a desire to deal with people who are 'like' oneself which may create 'parochialism' – 'individuals implement their desires to associate with others like themselves by engaging in what we term parochial practices[97]' (Bowles and Gintis, 2004: 5).

This chapter has served a number of purposes. The first of these has been to explore some of the stereotypes and presuppositions currently believed to operate in Britain around Muslim and South Asian communities. Another has been to discuss definitions of terms such as 'race' and 'ethnicity', as well as possible reasons behind racism itself. These discussions will be primarily important in Chapter Four, where methods for the analysis of media content will be discussed and devised. Without a clear understanding of what is meant by terms important in the comprehension of such media content, objectivity could not be approached by this research. In this context, the historical issues explored in Chapter One will also be important, and will help to ensure that the research findings are as objective as possible.

[95] Generally in phenotype, but as stated earlier, in recent times there appears to have been a trend away from this, and towards a more 'cultural' form of racism.
[96] If indeed it is instinctive.
[97] Although they note that parochialism may also exclude those with 'objectionable' traits (Bowles and Gintis, 2004: 6).

Chapter Four

Research Methods and Methodology

Research Question

How does the British national press report ethnic and religious difference? A study of the representation of 'Muslim' and 'Asian' identities in Britiain.

Introduction

In order to answer the research question above, the sections below draw on material discussed in the earlier chapters of this thesis to develop a set of indicators/objectives related to the British press's representation of British Muslims and people of South Asian ethnicities. Although these objectives come under four distinct headings – 'conflation', 'voice', 'othering' and 'change over time', they are often linked, and share complex relationships which are explained below. This chapter is intended as a bridge between the first (literature review) half and the second (analysis of primary data) half of the thesis. The second half of the chapter covers the particular methodology which was chosen in order to answer the research question, and discusses its pros and cons.

Conflation

As previous chapters have shown, stereotypes of Muslims are widespread in Britain, and can be a destructive force as far as multicultural society is concerned. These stereotypes often involve a degree of conflation – in amalgamating individuals into 'groups', and then these groups into yet larger ones. One objective of this thesis concerns this conflation. It seeks to determine the level to which the conflation of British Muslim culture and British South Asian culture is visible in the British national press. Although there are instances where the two cultures come together (the majority of British Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are also Muslim for instance) to normalise this particular representation is also to normalise a certain view of society – a view where people are evaluated not by their own individual character traits but by their more visible attributes (ethnicity, religion, sex, dress, etc). This view is compatible with a multi-ethnic/multi-religious society only where those ethnicities and religions are separate – leading to a fractured society which risks resentment and antagonism forming between these imagined 'groups'. Resentment is likely to form in any situation

where these distinct groups have appeared, because of the widespread and natural human fear of the unknown or 'different'. This has been seen to occur numerous times throughout human history – with the particular groupings dependent upon the society, technology and zeitgeist of the time – often with tragic consequences. Jealously is also bred between groups, as in such a society fortunes are inevitably different for some groups than others. Within countries (which themselves are perhaps the ultimate forms of imagined groups currently in existence), it tends to be the case that one group in particular will achieve domination – either through force, economically, culturally, or by a combination any of these means. This means that other groups which society defines within itself are likely to become repressed – leading to further resentment of a different kind.

When the growth of this resentment reaches a certain stage, it is likely to have violent consequences. In many cases this will take the form of a riot – perhaps a 'race riot' – as seen in Chapter Two. As the quotation from Martin Luther King Jr. at the head of Chapter Two points out, riots have much to do with the voice of an oppressed group within society finding a platform through which it can be heard by society at large. Any of the riots described in Chapter Two could fit this description – although in each case the precise event which 'triggered' the violence is different. But whilst they represent the largest medium through which this is likely to occur, riots are unlikely to represent the only channel through which the voices of repressed groups might be heard. 'Pressure' is also likely to be released more gradually over time, through channels such as the mass media, alternative media, and the arts.

Voice

The above analysis can be applied to the 'groups' mentioned at the beginning of this chapter – British Muslims and British South Asians, which to some extent are likely to represent repressed groups within British society (in that neither represents the dominant group in Britain). Another objective of this thesis relates directly to the 'release' of the voice of these 'groups' through the media – specifically the national press. Generally, the voices of individual people are incompatible with stereotypes – in that individuals tend to have individual opinions rather than simply stating whatever might stereotypically be expected of them. Therefore, the way in which British Muslim and British South Asian voices are 'heard' in the press is of great importance in this context. If opinions and voices generally tend to come from a limited set of 'spokespeople' for 'groups', then this might feed in to stereotypes, where that 'group' is seen as a monolith. But when people from

the 'group' are covered as individuals, stereotypes will begin to unravel – as a wealth of different opinions will be heard and assimilated by the reader.

This is the rationale behind the three case studies selected for use in this thesis. The *Satanic Verses* incident of 1989 and the Gillian Gibbons incident of 2007 share a number of similarities in that they both concern alleged blasphemy against the religion of Islam – and subsequent threats to the life of a British citizen from a foreign nation (Iran in Rushdie's case, and Sudan in Gibbons'). These two cases provide a good platform from which to examine how British Muslims have been covered by the press when incidents occur which are connected to the interpretation of Islam. Because of the importance of 9/11 in the coverage of Islam, the fact that these events are from either side of September 2001 will also enable comparative analysis to be carried out to identify any effect which that event might have had.

The third case examined by the study is that of the Bradford 'Race' Riots of 2001. This particular event is interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, it represents an event which was connected specifically to the British South Asian 'group' without involving any real religious factors (which is somewhat of a rarity in the British news). Secondly, it occurred in Bradford – a city which has a demographically large number of Muslims, and which also featured in coverage of the *Satanic Verses* incident in 1989 when demonstrations were carried out against the book. This makes it an excellent case study not only to examine the way in which British South Asian voice is handled by the British press, but also to consider the extent to which a British South Asian identity might be conflated with a British Muslim identity. This is important, because if British Muslims are being stereotyped as British South Asians by the press, then it follows that the reverse might also be true. Thirdly, the Bradford riots are important in historical terms, in that they represent a contemporary event which occurred just months *before* 9/11. Again this is interesting from the perspective of a comparative analysis – as data can be compared to that drawn from the 1989 sample, to analyse change over time, and to that drawn from 2007 to analyse the effect of the 'paradigm-shift' events of September 2001 on coverage of British Muslims (although, as explained below, this is not a primary objective of the thesis, which is interested in the indirect effects which acts of terrorism such as 9/11 may have had on the broader coverage of Muslims, rather than searching directly for their effects).

'Othering'

As well as the 'macro level' issues of the conflation of different 'groupings', and the coverage of these 'groups' as monoliths, there are likely to be other stereotypes at work in the press's coverage of British Muslims. One of these is likely to be the process of 'othering' described by (Said, 1978). This process fits in with those described above because it requires that 'groups' of people are 'created' in some way (in this case by the press). But the mechanism of 'othering' goes one step further – creating not only imagined groups of people who are said to be 'all the same', but also creating the idea that these groups are also inherently different in some way to the 'majority' group. This concept always comes from the perspective of the majority group – which is one reason that the national press is a useful medium to study in this regard. Whilst local newspapers or forms of alternative media are generally small operations which are consequently 'close' to their audience, the national press are much larger – covering a much wider audience – both in terms of size and often geographical spread. This means that the national press are unable to 'fine-tune' their coverage to suit their audience in the same way that the smaller local or alternative forms of media can, and are likely to amalgamate coverage to suit the 'masses'. As a consequence of this, national press coverage is more likely to come from a 'majority group' perspective.

Said (1978) concentrates on 'othering' in geographical terms – specifically the way in which the countries, culture and people of the 'Orient' have historically been imagined and portrayed in the countries of the 'Occident'. Whilst this might be of significance in the context of this thesis – South Asia and Islam both being important parts of the historically imagined 'Orient', Said also makes provision for this process to occur on a smaller/more general scale:

> A group of people living on a few acres of land will set up boundaries between their land and its immediate surroundings and the territory beyond, which they call "the land of the barbarians." In other words, this universal practice of designating in one's mind a familiar space which is "ours" and an unfamiliar space beyond "ours" which is "theirs" is a way of making geographical distinctions that *can be* entirely arbitrary (1978: 54).

Whilst the above quotation might be of direct relevance to the work of Kalra and Rhodes (2009) which describes the 'racialised symbolic landscape' present in northern British towns such as Oldham and Burnley (discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis), it is unlikely that 'othering' is a

process which occurs solely between geographically distinct peoples[98]. In this way, even 'groups' which live geographically *amongst* the 'majority group' might be 'othered', through certain processes which might be assisted or amplified by the media. These processes are likely to include a focus on differences between the 'other group' and the 'mainstream group' rather than similarities, a denial of 'voice' (allowing the 'other group' to speak for 'itself'), and a focus on the 'mysteriousness' or 'irrationality' of the 'other group' – which is related to the focus on 'its' differences. These processes are also likely to be of direct relevance to coverage of British Muslims and British South Asians in the British national press.

Change Over Time

All of the above features represent stereotypes, or defining features of stereotypes, but they do little to explain the *significance* of this type of trope. One way that this can be achieved is to compare the prominence of stereotypes over time – an analysis which the multiple case studies analysed in this thesis will allow. As stated previously, these three samples were selected not merely for their individual importance, or relation to the research question/other samples, but also for their location within the narrative of recent history. Whilst ideally to answer a question such as the one considered here, more than three samples would be used, this would also be expensive both in terms of time and resources – and as such was not suitable for such a study. This meant that the study had to make the best use of the minimum number of case studies. As the minimum number of nodal points required to identify a trend is three, it was logical that three case studies were selected. Probably the most important event in recent history as far as the media coverage of Muslims is concerned were the September 11th attacks of 2001 (9/11). Although the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks were not British, because of the processes described above of amalgamating and 'othering' Muslims by the media, it is likely that in many ways, 9/11 had as much of an effect on the coverage of British Muslims as it did on any other geographically defined 'group' within Islam. In the British context, a second event is also likely to have played a major role in shaping this coverage – this being the attacks which took place on July 7th, 2005 (7/7) in London, which did involve British citizens as perpetrators. Whilst 9/11 and 7/7 were therefore important events in the coverage of British Muslims, this study does not attempt to determine the significance of this effect – which is something which numerous academic studies have already examined. Instead, this study investigates the prominence of *stereotypes* of British Muslims – and does so through the study of press content over time. It is therefore important that the effects of 9/11 and 7/7 can be tracked

[98] Whilst 'between' might imply that 'othering' is a two-way process, Said is careful to point out that this does not have to be the case – the 'other' is not required to accept the distinction (1978: 54).

within the research, which the study allows for by sampling events from both before and after the period September 2001- July 2005.

Methodology

Why the National Press?

The national press is a useful medium to analyse for a number of reasons. The first of these is the nature of the press when compared to other media. Unlike television news, the British press is (currently) largely unregulated – meaning that there are likely to be a greater range of dissenting views presented within its sphere. This diversity is attractive for a research project such as this one, because it means that a wider range of results can be found. Results found in this way can also hint at underlying cultural factors, because certain newspapers are statistically bought more often by certain groups within society. This means that journalists generally 'know' their audience, as people tend to buy a newspaper which represents values they personally agree with.

Past content from the national press is also much easier to find than for a medium such as television. Although many press archives are text-only services (meaning that the graphology of articles cannot be studied), services such as *Lexis Library* do allow the user to quickly and easily search for articles containing certain search terms/strings. This enables a much wider scope of research to be conducted than if television content (archives of which are limited) was being studied. Although in an ideal world time and resources for research would be limitless – meaning that this would not be a consideration – realistically this means that study of newspaper content can be very beneficial in terms of the depth and breadth of a piece of research.

Sampling

Because three particular samples were chosen for this study, it could be argued that only samples which would agree with the primary thesis primary thesis presented here were selected – so called 'cherry picking'. There are problems with this argument however, in that in order to gather empirical evidence, the study had to sample *something*. Whilst this could have taken the form of a continuous sample – of *all* press coverage containing a certain term from 1989-2007, for instance, this would have been even larger than the (already considerably sized) sample used here. As online databases of newspaper content are incomplete before around the year 2000, this would have

entailed an unfeasible cost both in terms of resources and cost[99]. Another problem with a continuous sample would be the fact that it would not lend itself to mixed-methods analysis in the same way as the more focussed case studies presented in this thesis, because the articles sampled would not share a common theme. This would make it much harder to compare individual articles on a qualitative basis unless some form of sub-sampling was conducted. These sub-samples would have to be selected in some way, meaning that the same arguments regarding 'cherry-picking' could be used.

Because a continuous sample would be unable to focus on a particular event, it might also be difficult to produce data with which to effectively answer the research question. Whilst 'Muslim' is likely to be a term which appears in the press often, because Muslims and Islam have represented key interests for the media in recent years, news stories which directly refer to British South Asian people are likely to be more difficult to find. Whilst a focussed sample such as the case study presented in this thesis concerning the Bradford 'Race' Riots of 2001 makes it possible to find articles referencing British South Asians, this would be a far more difficult task with a continuous sample. This problem is compounded by the number of different ways in which a journalist might refer to a British South Asian person/people – 'British South Asian', 'South Asian', 'Asian', 'British Pakistani', 'Pakistani', 'British Bangladeshi', 'Bangladeshi', 'British Indian', and 'Indian' representing just some of the possibilities here. There would also be the problem of *implicit* references, which might prove almost impossible to find (and would likely prove a problem in sampling for articles referencing Muslims as well).

Because multiple samples are used here, ranging over a broad time period, and with reasonably different focuses, the likelihood of problems arising from sample selection is also diminished. Whilst it is a simple task to select one example which might fit with a certain theory, it is more difficult to pick a number of examples – especially if they are quite different. Because a synthesis is to be drawn from the three case studies presented here, any problems inherent in their selection should be mitigated. The mixed-methods style used to analyse the material presented here also contains inherent repeatability, in that it uses quantitative analysis to inform a further qualitative analysis. The quantitative nature of the first half of this methodology should allow future research to analyse further samples in the same way – which should yield the same conclusions. Although a degree of subjectivity is unavoidable in qualitative analysis (and therefore the second half of the

[99] See below in 'Data Sources' for a full explanation of why this would be the case.

methodology), the focussed nature of the analysis carried out here means that this effect is minimalised.

The Samples

As mentioned above, this study takes a total of three case studies for analysis – ranging from 1989-2007. The samples taken for each case study are of equal length – 7 days. This particular length was selected because it is the shortest length guaranteed to include a Sunday – and therefore the Sunday newspapers. This study is not specifically interested in the Sunday newspapers – however, it is interested in the 'British national press' as a whole – and it is therefore logical that the Sunday newspapers are included in its sample. It was also felt to be important that every day of the week was included in order to eliminate any bias which might be inherent in sampling only from a certain part of the week. Whilst the likelihood of this affecting a sample is small, it can be completely eliminated by sampling one whole week, and so it was logical to do this. Whilst this phenomenon could also be said to occur at different times of year, this could not be mitigated without using a much larger sample size – whilst coverage of events in most cases lasts only for a limited time. The sampling dates for each case study are as follows:

The *Satanic Verses* Incident: 15.02.1989 – 21.02.1989

The Bradford 'Race' Riots: 08.07.2001 – 14.07.2001

The Gillian Gibbons Incident: 28.11.2007 – 04.12.2007

As two of the topics had a definite 'beginning', the day following this was chosen as the start of the sample. For the *Satanic Verses* incident, this was the day following the announcement of a *fatwa* ordering Salman Rushdie's death by Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini (the *fatwa* was announced on 14.02.1989). In the case of the Bradford 'Race' Riots, the date chosen was the day following the first major instances of violence to occur in Bradford (which occurred on 07.07.2001). The Gillian Gibbons incident was slightly more complex in that it involved first the *arrest* of Gibbons, and later her actually being *charged* with an offence. In this case, it made sense to compare the story with that of Salman Rushdie in 1989 (which shares many similarities). In the case of the Rushdie sample, the sample began when a *definite* threat had been made against Rushdie (Khomeini's *fatwa*) – and as such, the sample for the Gillian Gibbons incident begins on the date on which she was actually

charged with committing an offence (28.11.2007) as opposed to merely being arrested on suspicion of committing an offence (25.11.2007). In this case, the day *of* the incident rather than the day *following* it was selected for sample. The rationale behind this is that because the Gillian Gibbons story had already 'broken' with her arrest, news reporters were likely to be on the scene in Sudan, ready to instantly report any developments in the case. It was therefore much less likely that it would take a day for the news to 'filter through' to the press, because the press was already aware of the story.

Data Sources

Obtaining data for the samples from 2001 (the Bradford 'Race' Riots) and 2007 (the Gillian Gibbons incident) was simple – as the *Lexis Library* online database contains (with the exception of the *Financial Times*) data from all the British national newspapers for these years. *Lexis Library's* resources for 1989 are incomplete however – with only *The Times, The Sunday Times, The Independent*, and *The Guardian* being available online for that year. Another online database (*UK Press Online*) contains data for the *Daily Express* and *Daily Mirror* from 1989 – but a number of newspapers were not found on any online databases. The solution to this was to sample the missing newspapers directly from microfilm records stored at the British Library's Colindale archive in North London. Whilst this was a costly and laborious process, it allowed the completion of the 1989 sample[100].

Sampling directly from microfilm created a new set of problems, however – as the data it produced was not digital. A similar problem was encountered with data drawn from the *UK Press Online* database, which provides visual, rather than text-based data. To allow for digital analysis of the material to be undertaken, it must first be converted into a form which can be 'read' by a computer. As commonly available optical character recognition (OCR) software was found to be ineffective for this purpose, this meant that each article had to be typed by hand into the computer. As the corpus to be typed totalled 52,570 words, this was a labour-intensive process, but one which ensured that the accuracy of the data for analysis could be trusted.

[100] With the exception of the *Financial Times*, which as stated is not available through any online database. As the *Financial Times* is a specialist newspaper, rather than one which is commonly read throughout the population, it was decided that it would be left out of the samples. Although it is available through *Lexis Library*, the *Morning Star* was also omitted from the samples for this reason.

In some cases, microfilm records can also be almost totally illegible due to bad practice on behalf of the creator of the microfilm (as was the case with a number of articles from *The People* newspaper stored at Colindale, where microfilms lacked proper focus, or had not been framed properly). In most cases, the microfilms used for research at Colindale are the 'best' or only copy available in the archive – meaning that any missing data is lost.

More limited problems were also encountered with electronic samples. In the case of articles drawn from the *Lexis Library* service, full authorship and page location details were not always available. Whilst this means that references to articles are not always complete, they always at least point to the right issue of a newspaper for an article to be found. A number of spelling mistakes were also found within the articles sampled from *Lexis* Library. Whilst this may seem unimportant, because of the type of quantitative analysis carried out in the later chapters of this thesis, it could possibly lead to a skewed sample. The spelling mistakes were not a common occurrence however, and may even represent typographic errors in the original newspaper content. This is especially true of the *Satanic Verses* sample, because spell-checking capabilities were limited in 1989. The database *UK Press Online* gave a similar digitisation problem to the manual sample drawn from the British Library, in that the service delivers articles as PDF files, rather than as plain-text (as is the case with *Lexis Library*). To circumvent this problem, the limited number of articles drawn from *UK Press Online* were digitised manually in the same way as those sampled from microfilm.

Sampling Schema

Electronic databases such as *Lexis Library* and *UK Press Online* allow for sampling using a search term or search string – making this a quick and easy process to follow. For each electronic sample, multiple search terms were used – avoiding problems associated with sampling for a single search term – which can skew a sample because of patterns in the usage of that one term. Where applicable, the databases were instructed to search for instances of a search term 'anywhere' within an article (as opposed to just in the headline or body text). Search terms for each case study were as follows:

The *Satanic Verses* Incident (1989): 'Blasphemy', 'Rushdie' and 'Prejudice'

The Bradford 'Race' Riots (2001): 'Bradford', 'Muslim' and 'Prejudice'

The Gillian Gibbons Incident (2007): 'Blasphemy', 'Gibbons' and 'Prejudice'

In the case of the *Satanic Verses* incident, the search terms 'blasphemy' and 'Rushdie' were intended simply to yield the maximum number of articles related to the story. The third search term 'prejudice' was a common search term for all three samples, intended to draw out articles which were less related to the main story (whilst still being relevant to it), and which discussed issues of racial or religious prejudice. Because after they were sampled, the articles were manually divided by way of relevance, the sampling of irrelevant articles did not pose a problem, and did not pose a danger of skewing the sample – because they were manually removed. Similarities in content between the Gillian Gibbons incident and the *Satanic Verses* incident meant that it was logical for the Gibbons sample scheme to mirror that of the *Satanic Verses* sample – with Rushdie's name being replaced by Gibbons'. The sample for the Bradford Riots was more complicated, in that this story was very different to either of the other two – being a story related neither to religion or a specific individual. The search term 'Bradford' was again intended to draw out the vast majority of articles relating to the riots – but probably the most interesting search term here is the term 'Muslim'. As stated, the Bradford Riots were in no way related to religion – so the selection of this search term could be said to presuppose that newspapers were linking them in some way to Muslims. But equally, an article which references the term 'Muslim' could be arguing that the riots were nothing to do with Muslims. The search term 'Muslim' was intended to look for subtle references to religion in coverage of an event which seemed to have only coincidental links to it.

In the case of sampling conducted manually at the British Library archive, it was not possible to simply carry out a keyword search of articles. In this case, the solution was to read every newspaper from cover to cover – noting pages which contained *any* reference to the *Satanic Verses* incident. Pages were then optically copied onto paper, and digitised as described previously. Whilst this represents a different sampling schema to that used for the electronic samples, it was the only realistic way to acquire data for certain newspapers. Although far from an ideal situation, the likelihood of this introducing any recognisable degree of skew to the data also seems remote.

Working With the Data

Once all data was sampled and digitised, it was imported into a database created using the software package *NVivo 8*. *NVivo* is a powerful piece of software which is designed to aid in large qualitative research projects such as this one. Here, only *NVivo*'s more basic functions were used, as its role in the project was to function as an easily manageable database rather than a tool for heavy analysis. By using *NVivo* in this way, it was possible to tag each article with metadata describing such attributes as its newspaper, publication date, relevance to the sample, etc. *NVivo* was used to produce many of the charts relating to sampling which appear in the individual analysis chapters of this thesis.

A second software package, *Wordsmith 5* was used to create statistics for most of the textual analysis presented in the later chapters of this thesis. *Wordsmith* is a set of tools which is designed for use in corpus linguistics research – meaning that it was of great use here. All of the word frequency data and collocation analyses presented in the later chapters of this thesis were generated by *Wordsmith*. In some cases, the analysis carried out using *Wordsmith* was used to create a sub-sample from within which qualitative analysis could be carried out. This process represents a method by which quantitative and qualitative analysis can be linked in a repeatable and rational manner. One example of this process is located in Chapter Five, relating to the *Satanic Verses* incident sample. Here, a collocation analysis was produced using *Wordsmith* for the search string "Muslim*/Moslem*[101]". This produced not only a list of words which tended to appear within a certain number of places of the terms described by the search string, but also a breakdown of *clusters* of words which tended to appear in connection to them. From this, it arose that 'Muslims in Britain' and 'Moslems in Britain' were two of the most common clusters of words relating to the search term. When the alternate spellings were combined, there were 24 instances of this cluster/phrase, each located within a separate article in the *Satanic Verses* incident corpus. The particular paragraphs within which these instances occurred were isolated and included in the chapter's appendix. From this basis, a qualitative analysis of the articles was carried out – which considered not only the specific use of the phrase 'Muslims/Moslems in Britain', but also how this might relate to the article a more general manner, and how the article itself represented British Muslims.

[101] Meaning 'Muslim' plus wildcard at end, OR 'Moslem' plus wildcard at end.

By using the mixed-methods approach described above, this study aims to sidestep many of the potential shortcomings inherent in quantitative and qualitative research methods when used in isolation. Whilst quantitative methods are the only realistic way that a large sample such as the one used here can be analysed, they often tend to miss the more subtle attributes of a text. Qualitative methods are useful in looking for these attributes, but generally need to concentrate on too small a sample to make any broad claims, in order to be effective. Hence by combining the two disciplines, a larger overall sample size can be used, whilst subtleties of the text can still be analysed. Because this study draws samples from three different events/time periods, mixed-methods also provide benefits in terms of comparative analysis. Here the whole context of exactly what (if anything) has changed over time and in relation to different stories can be examined – from article length, to the collocation of certain terms, to the more subtle aspects of the journalism. Once again, this broad analysis would be impossible using a single method.

Chapter Five

Analysis of British National Press Coverage of the *Satanic Verses*/Rushdie Incident 15.02.1989 – 21.02.1989

Introduction

This chapter presents analysis of press coverage of the *Satanic Verses* incident of 1989 – the methodology for which is described briefly in the previous chapter. The *Satanic Verses* incident connects with the two further case studies used in this thesis (the Bradford Riots of 2001, and the Gillian Gibbons incident of 2007) in a number of ways, which are detailed below. For a quantitative description of the data sampled for use in this chapter, please see the Appendix to Chapter Five.

Salman Rushdie published his fourth novel *The Satanic Verses* in 1988. It was not until February 14th, 1989 that the Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini issued a *fatwa* (religious decree) ordering Rushdie's death. The reason given for this death threat was that Rushdie had blasphemed against Islam, due to the acts carried out by a number of characters in his novel – in particular the character 'Mahound', who is generally understood to be an allegory of the Prophet Mohammed (Brians, 2004).

Khomeini's *fatwa* caused demonstrations to occur in many parts of the world, including Bradford, UK, meaning that there is an overlap between this case study and the second sample used in this thesis (the Bradford 'Race' Riots of 2001) – this being one reason why the *Satanic Verses* incident was considered a good case study to be sampled in this thesis. To some extent, this overlap will allow the study to consider press coverage of the dissenting voices of Muslims and British South Asians[102] in 1989 and 2001from within Bradford. This will be interesting in light of the claim made by Kundnani (2001) mentioned in Chapter Two of this thesis that: 'By the 1990s, a new generation of young Asians, born and bred in Britain, was coming of age in the northern towns, unwilling to accept the second-class status foisted on their elders' (2001: 108). Although the dates of the samples are not perfectly aligned with this line of analysis (neither being in the 1990s), they are not far from

[102] Although as stated previously it is dangerous to conflate these two groupings, demographics suggest that if a person is British South Asian, then it is statistically most likely that they will also be Muslim (Peach, 2005: 22). This is true even more so in Bradford, where the largest ethnic minority group are of Pakistani heritage (Owen, 2003: 40)(and therefore statistically more likely to be Muslim than many other British South Asian groups (Peach, 2005: 22).

being – one being from 8 months before the 1990s began, and the other roughly a year and a half after they ended.

Alexander (2000) describes the *Satanic Verses* 'furore' (as well as other events such as the Gulf War) as representing a turning point in perceptions of 'previously undistinguished Asian communities' (2000: 6). Alexander later writes that 'the term 'Asian' in relation to negative images and stereotypes has become synonymous with Muslim communities', and that this draws on notions of an emergent 'Pakistani and Bangladeshi underclass' (2000: 6-7). Also mentioned here is that:

> 'The Asian community' have moved from a concern with a uniformly victim status to that of perpetrator – a reinvention of passive recipient to active combatant which has simultaneously, and significantly, transformed the gendered markers of imagined Asian identities. (Alexander, 2000: 7).

Although he identifies no particular event as a 'turning point', this transition from a stereotypical image of 'Asian passivity' to an image which relies on a 'militant aggressive identity' is also noted by Saeed (2007: 452). It is interesting to note that although Alexander acknowledges the link between stereotypes of British South Asian groups and British Muslims, she was writing in 2000 – one year before 9/11, and the resultant negativity which surrounded British Muslim communities. It is possible that since Alexander's time of writing, this event may have compounded and magnified the effect she describes – which is a concept investigated further in this thesis – as outlined in Chapter Four (Methodology).

There is a more general degree of overlap between this case study and the third one examined in this thesis – the Gillian Gibbons incident of 2007. Here it is the very reason for the furore itself which is interesting – blasphemy being the culprit in both cases. Whilst there were also many differences between the two cases, the general sequence of events was very similar. What sets the Gillian Gibbons case apart from the other two case studies is that it came after 9/11 (2001) – an event which changed the world dramatically; as well as 7/7 (2005) which may have had a similar effect on a smaller scale in the British context. As in each instance sampled, coverage of British Muslim and British South Asian communities and culture is of primary interest, the study will analyse this, in order to test the claims made above. Although only three very specific events are sampled here, evidence for changes in the media's imagining of British Muslim and British South Asian communities would be most interesting, given the surrounding context.

Quantitative Corpus Analysis

As described in Chapter Four (Methodology), this study utilises a mixed-methods approach to research. Here, quantitative methods have been used to examine the large amount of data produced by sampling, in order to assist the more qualitative analysis also presented in the chapter. In order to carry out this quantitative analysis, a number of different corpora were first produced from the body of data as a whole. As the purpose of this quantitative analysis is to draw inferences from the type of language used with regard to certain subjects, only articles coded as 'very relevant' were introduced to the corpora. This avoided the problem of skewing the content of the corpora away from the subject being studied (the Rushdie incident), which would have resulted in erroneous data being studied. As an example of this problem, the introduction of a number of 'slightly relevant' articles might be considered. Here, each article makes a passing reference to the Rushdie incident, but has a main subject which is not relevant to it – for the purposes of this example, this subject is assumed to be sport (as was sometimes the case). If the articles are an average of 800 words in length, but are only concerned with the Rushdie incident for an average of 100 words, then an average of 700 words per article is concerned with sport. This would mean that the lexis being analysed in the corpus would be to some extent biased towards the very specific one used for sport – thereby skewing the results. By only including 'very relevant' articles however, this problem is sidestepped.

Letters which had been written to the newspaper represented somewhat of a dilemma when producing the corpora, as there were good cases for both their inclusion and exclusion. Whilst they have (presumably) not been directly produced by staff working for the newspaper, letters to the editor are still highly likely to have passed through a gate-keeping and editing process (carried out by newspaper staff) before going to print. Of the many letters a newspaper is likely to receive, only a select few are chosen to go to print – and newspapers usually reserve the right to make changes to those letters that they do print. For this reason, letters *were* felt to be suitable for inclusion in the corpora. Whilst they do not represent directly produced newspaper output, they are still a component part of the newspaper's content as a whole, and can therefore be assumed to have a similar role in producing an effect on the reader as any other piece of text would. As the purpose of this study is not to consider the effects of different types of newspaper content on the consumer, this is considered no further here.

Headlines and captions to photographs (where available[103]) were included in the corpora along with the body text of the article. The rationale for this was simple – the aim of this quantitative analysis was to draw out inferences from the text as a whole. Therefore it is logical that any ancillary text should be included in the analysis of the text[104].

Four types of corpora were produced for this case study, resulting in a total of 78 separate corpora. When added together, these produced one single corpus of 123,199 words. This corpus contained 252 articles, which averaged 489 words in length. The average length was slightly higher for articles from Sunday newspapers (585 words) than those from weekday newspapers (476 words). The four corpus types were:

Per Newspaper, Per Day (e.g. *Daily Mail*, 15.02.1989) (61 Corpora[105])
All Newspapers, Per Day (e.g. All Newspapers, 15.02.1989) (7 Corpora)
Per Newspaper, All Days (e.g. *Daily Mail*, 15.02.1989-21.02.1989) (9 Corpora[106])
All Newspapers, All Days (All Newspapers, 15.02.1989-21.02.1989) (1 Corpus)

Full statistics for these corpora are available in the Appendix to Chapter Five – Tables A5.1 – A5.10. The weekday newspaper with the largest collection of corpora sampled in terms of word count was the *Independent* (Table A5.7) with a total of 25,633 words sampled. The smallest belonged to the *Daily Mirror*, (Table A5.3) with 3,225 words sampled.

In terms of article length, the newspaper with the longest average article length was the Sunday newspaper *The Observer*, (Table A5.10) with an average of 919 words. Of the weekday papers, this title goes to *The Guardian*, (Table A5.6) with an average of 683 words. The newspaper with the shortest average articles was the *Daily Star*, where articles were on average 238 words long (Table A5.4).

These statistics are relatively unsurprising, given the types of newspapers they come from. *The Observer* is likely to have long articles, being a Broadsheet Sunday newspaper – as is *The Guardian*,

[103] As mentioned in Chapter Four, electronic databases do not always store this data.
[104] The exceptions to this rule were by lines, and text directing the reader to another page of the newspaper. These were not included, as it was felt that they would add nothing of interest to a corpus which was to be studied quantitatively.
[105] This would have produced 62 corpora, but for the fact that no articles were sampled for the *Daily Express* on February 2nd, 1989.
[106] These corpora did not need to be produced for the Sunday newspapers, as the sample for these only covered one day. Therefore this was already covered by the corpora produced 'per newspaper, per day'.

which is also a broadsheet. The *Daily Star*, being a Redtop Tabloid is likely to have shorter, less in-depth articles. These tendencies are displayed again in terms of absolute word count, with the *Independent* and *Daily Mirror* being a Broadsheet and a Redtop Tabloid respectively.

Although few surprises can be had from looking at the corpora produced here in a basic numerical manner, one feature which stands out are the large overall sizes of the corpora produced by the *Guardian* (Table A5.6), the *Independent* (Table A5.7), and *The Times* (Table A5.9). These three newspapers produced much larger corpora – in terms of both word count, and number of articles sampled, than any of the other newspapers sampled. Although these newspapers were also three of four which were sampled electronically from the Lexis Library database, this is probably not the cause of this phenomenon. Whilst the manual samples carried out at the British Library Newspaper Archive may by their nature have been subject to human error, this is not the case for the two newspapers which were sampled electronically from the UK Press Online database (the *Daily Mirror* (Table A5.3) and the *Daily Express* (Table A5.1)) – where no such phenomenon was observed. The numbers for these two newspapers seem to correlate well with those of the manually sampled newspapers. This is also the case for the fourth newspaper sampled from the Lexis Library database – *The Sunday Times* (Table A5.10).

With the statistics for the *Guardian*, *Independent* and *Times* therefore based on what seem to be reliable samples, it seems likely that the larger corpora produced by these newspapers were caused by some other factor. Here, the subject matter at hand might be considered. The Rushdie incident represented a disagreement between two reasonably well-known figures – one the head of a religious sect, and the other a popular author. The *Guardian* and *Independent* have a well-established reputation as being centre-left, liberal Broadsheet newspapers – meaning that this story, which concerned the topics of culture, religion, literature and freedom of speech would be particularly likely to appeal to their readership[107] – perhaps justifying their production of a large amount of copy. The large amount of coverage generated by *The Times* may be more difficult to rationalise. Although *The Times* is not generally considered to be a particularly right-wing newspaper, it is almost certainly aligned politically to the right of newspapers such as the *Guardian* or *Independent* – and as such, is assumed to have a different type of readership. To some extent this may be reflected in the amount of coverage it produced, however. Although this was high

[107] Because of their political stances, these newspapers have large followings in the academic, student and educational communities – all of whom are likely to be interested in such topics. Although it could be argued that this represents the stereotyping of people by their occupation (and it does), newspapers have to be aware of the interests of their reader in order to survive, and as such, this still seems like a possible explanation.

compared to other newspapers sampled, it was still lower than that of the *Guardian* or *Independent*. The level of coverage of the *Satanic Verses* incident seems to fall the further right one looks across the broadsheet spectrum – the largely conservative *Daily Telegraph* [Table A5.5] being an example of this.

Tabloid newspapers were always likely to devote less coverage to a story such as the Rushdie incident than broadsheets. Whilst Rushdie and Khomeini represent celebrities (and therefore a tabloid interest) in the sense that they are nowadays reasonably well-known public figures, they are likely to have been much less so before the advent of the Rushdie incident. They also do not represent *popular* celebrities of the type generally given preferential coverage by the tabloid newspapers. The level of coverage that the story did receive in the tabloids could perhaps be explained by a sense of 'national outrage' and an outpouring of 'patriotism' at the threatening actions of a foreign country[108] towards a British individual – especially in the case of tabloids which are towards the right of the political spectrum such as the *Daily Mail* (Table A5.2) and *The Sun* (Table A5.8).

The average article length decreases the further one goes from the 'serious' broadsheet papers, through the 'middle market' newspapers, and towards the red top tabloids. The weekday newspapers were separated as follows in order to demonstrate this:

[108] Although Khomeini was not the elected leader of Iran, as its religious figurehead he still wielded considerable political power and influence.

Weekday Broadsheets (139 Articles Total)

The Times

The Guardian

The Independent

Daily Telegraph

Weekday Middle Market Tabloids (43 Articles Total)

Daily Express

Daily Mail

Weekday Red Top Tabloids (41 Articles Total)

Daily Mirror

Daily Star

The Sun

Broadsheet newspapers had relevant articles which averaged 564 words, middle market articles averaged 389 words, and the relevant articles in red top tabloid newspapers averaged 272 words. This is unsurprising, given the nature of the different types of newspaper described above. Broadsheets tend to give a deeper level of analysis than either of the other two newspaper types – followed by the middle market newspapers and then the red tops. This generally requires more words (article length) to be devoted to a subject. Although this may seem an obvious feature to highlight, it could prove important when considering the type of language used by different newspapers, and so was deemed worthy of inclusion here.

Following the basic introductory analysis described above, the corpora were subjected to a deeper analysis, using the software package *Wordsmith Tools 5.0*. As described in full detail in Chapter Four, this software is designed to allow the researcher to (relatively) quickly and easily identify any linguistic trends which might be in operation within a corpus, by using techniques such as frequency and collocation analysis. Methods of analysis which would take a great deal of time if carried out manually are opened up to the researcher by this software.

Analysis of Main Corpus

When faced with a large collection of corpora to analyse, it is most logical to begin with one single corpus, produced from the collated material. Inferences can then be drawn from this analysis which can subsequently be investigated further through analysis of the smaller corpora. Therefore in this case, analysis begins with the collated corpus – 'all newspapers, all days'.

To this end, the first method of serious textual analysis used here involved producing a word list for the main corpus using *Wordsmith Tools*. As *Wordsmith Tools* produced a comprehensive frequency analysis for this document – down to logging words which were observed only once, it is little more feasible for inclusion here than the document itself. The data can be described much more easily, however.

Wordsmith reports that in the 123,199 word corpus, there are a total of 10,048 unique words used. This includes common words such as 'the' (the most common word in the corpus, with 8,289 instances of use), as well as variations on the same word, such as plurals and alternate spellings. Although it was not possible to include the word frequency list in its entirety here – the table data being 10,048 rows long, the 100 most popular terms are included as an appendix – Table A5.11. A similar problem is encountered when attempting to display such a large amount of data as a traditional graph or chart. Although the trend will be easily visible, it is largely useless to the reader, because it is impossible to display an accurate legend in print. A statistic which can be easily visualised however, is the usage of a certain word throughout the sample – either over time (per day) or by newspaper. To avoid producing impractical amounts of data, this technique is limited here to a collection words thought to be useful to the analysis, and as such is included throughout the chapter.

Whilst at first it might seem most logical to amalgamate similar groups of words, in many cases doing this would destroy useful data. A good example of this is the term 'Muslim' and its associated variations such as 'Muslims'; 'Moslem' and 'Moslems'. Joining these four terms together to produce one statistic might lose some of the subtlety which is required here – each term having slightly different connotations. The term 'Muslim' (279 instances) is perhaps the least interesting of the four terms in this context, as it is the singular, as well as the most common/preferred spelling of the term to describe someone who follows the religion of Islam. What might be more interesting is the term 'Muslims' (289 instances). Because this plural term is used (slightly) more often than the singular

term, it could be inferred that on the whole, newspapers were talking about Muslims as a group *more* (or at least *as much*) as they were talking about Muslims as singular individuals. This pattern is repeated when looking at the alternate spelling 'Moslem' (168 instances) and its plural 'Moslems' (208 instances). Whilst this example involves some obvious oversimplifications[109], it still serves to prove a point – that the distinctions between very similar terms can be useful in a statistical analysis such as this.

Also interesting is the distinction between the two alternate spellings of 'Muslim' mentioned above. 'Moslem' is a somewhat dated spelling, which is generally best avoided so as not to cause offence to any Arabic speakers[110]. It will be interesting to map not only the usage of this spelling through time across the three case studies presented here (one would assume its usage to have dropped over time), but also which individual newspapers tended to use the alternate spelling. In the case of any newspapers which use it almost exclusively, this is likely to represent an editorial decision. Why the alternate spelling was chosen for use is interesting in itself – journalists and editors generally being professional/trained writers. Although the reason for the term's offensive misinterpretations may not have been as widely known in 1989 as they have become[111], there still must have been some reason that it was selected for use over the more common spelling of 'Muslim'.

A commonly used word which might be of some interest is the term 'Mr' (786 instances). Here it is important to note that in the *Satanic Verses* incident there were two main individual protagonists – Salman Rushdie (the British author of the novel) and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (the Iranian Ayatollah who initiated the *fatwa* ordering Rushdie's assassination). Analysing the corpus reveals that whilst Salman Rushdie was often described as 'Mr Rushdie', Khomeini was never referred to in this manner. Khomeini was always referred to as 'Ayatollah Khomeini' – rather than 'Mr Khomeini'. To describe Rushdie as 'Mr Rushdie' whilst describing Khomeini as 'Ayatollah Khomeini', whilst factually correct, might also serve to underline differences between the two protagonists, and in some ways might also 'mark' Rushdie as 'ours' – a British person being threatened by an outside force. It could be argued that this almost represents an abstract form of binary opposition – in the way that it might create an 'us and them' scenario, where 'Mr Rushdie' is part of 'us' – the known and understood, and 'Ayatollah Khomeini' represents 'them' – the mysterious and unknown 'other'.

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[109] The singular term 'Muslim' can for instance be used to describe Muslims as a group/monolith – for example, 'the Muslim view', or 'the Muslim world'.

[110] Baker notes that this can occur due to the mispronunciation 'mawzlem', which is associated with the spelling 'Moslem', and sounds similar to the Arabic word for an oppressor (2010: 324).

[111] It is equally plausible that the alternate spelling has fallen out of popular favour due to underuse – i.e. the spelling has simply 'died out'.

The analysis above of course ignores the possibility that the term 'Ayatollah' was in fact being used as Khomeini's title ('Ayatollah' being in fact a religious title) – in a similar way to a term such as 'Doctor' or 'Professor', and its use therefore was actually an example of newspapers giving respect to Khomeini as an important Shia Muslim scholar. This type of respect might be considered unusual in many newspapers however – specifically the red top tabloids. These newspapers are renowned for their personal tone, and often their lack of respect for public figures. Later analysis in this chapter shows that Khomeini was sometimes referred to in the red top tabloids as the 'Mad Mullah', which is representative of this type of reporting. In this type of newspaper, not referring to someone by their proper title is of little consequence – so the fact that there is not a single instance of the phrase 'Mr Khomeini' in the entire corpus seems counterintuitive. This 'othering' of Khomeini is, on the surface, possibly of little relevance to British Muslims – the majority of whom (as explained further in the following section) are of the Sunni sect, rather than the Shia sect of which Khomeini is a leader. This is something explained by Modood (1990), who states that:

> The vast majority of Muslims, including those in Britain, are Sunnis who, incidentally, owe no allegiance whatsoever to Shiite Ayatollahs, and who, unlike the Shia, take all passages in the Quran literally rather than metaphorically (Modood, 1990: 149).

Whilst there would certainly have been nothing preventing a Muslim of the Sunni sect from paying attention to the views of Khomeini, it seems unlikely given this context. Modood goes on to state that mere quotes from *The Satanic Verses* would be enough for 'shame and hurt' to be felt amongst 'ordinary Muslims' – and again plays down the effect that Khomeini had on creating anger felt against the novel (1990: 154). But the section below shows that the difference in sects between the majority of British Muslims and Khomeini was only rarely alluded to in reporting – meaning that any 'othering' of Khomeini as a 'Muslim leader' would be likely to have reflected on British Muslims in general by association with him in the press.

Reporting on Different Sects of Islam

Especially in light of the analysis above, one important distinction that newspapers may have made in the context of the Rushdie incident involves two different sects of Islam – Sunni Islam and Shia Islam. Of these two sects, Sunni Islam is the most widespread, accounting for around 85-93.5% of the world's Muslim population (Bennett, 2011: 130). This is also the case within Britain, where Sunni

Mosques represent around 87% of all Mosques (Peach, 2005: 28). It is not the case in Iran, however, where Shia Muslims represent the religious majority (around 89% of Iranian Muslims belong to the Shia sect) (Bennett, 2011: 131). The Iranian Ayatollahs (such as Ayatollah Khomeini) are of the Shia sect, from which the Sunni sect differ on many issues, including 'questions of succession, law and authority, interpretation of the Qur'an, marriage, inheritance, and jurisprudence in general ' (Elgamri, 2010: 103). By drawing attention to this fact during the *Satanic Verses* incident, a newspaper would have rationalised the debate surrounding the seriousness of the assassination order – by pointing out that only a minority of the world's Muslims would be likely to recognise a decree which came from Ayatollah Khomeini. This is an issue also explored by Elgamri (2010) when analysing broadsheet newspaper coverage of the Rushdie incident. Although Elgamri's work considers many of the same questions which are explored in this chapter, differences in methodology[112] and sampling[113] between the two pieces mean that they are each useful in their own right. It will be interesting, however, to compare the results of the two studies, given the differences in methodology.

In English, 'Shia' is a reasonably difficult term to work with. As with many words 'borrowed' from other languages, it has a number of alternate spellings – as observed previously with the term 'Muslim'. And as with the term 'Muslim', none of the spellings can be said to be 'correct'[114]. By interrogating the word list produced by *Wordsmith Tools* in alphabetical order, all alternate spellings of a word in use within the list can be found. In this case, three were identified – 'Shia' (23 instances), 'Shiite' (0 instances[115]) and 'Shi'ite' (2 instances). Factoring in the plurals of each word, more instances were found – 'Shias' (9 instances), 'Shiites' (1 instance) and 'Shi'ites' (0 instances). One reference was also found to 'Shiism'. References to the more widespread Sunni sect might also be considered here – and although no alternate spellings were found for this term, there were 14 instances of the word 'Sunni', 8 of the plural 'Sunnis', and 1 of 'Sunnism'. Firstly, the eight terms observed above were split into their respective religious sects – Sunni and Shia, and then mapped across the week sampled for all the newspapers sampled combined – as shown in Figure 5.1 below:

[112] Elgamri utilises only qualitative analysis – limiting the number of articles which can be analysed.
[113] Elgamri's work considers only *The Guardian*, *The Independent*, and *The Times* newspapers (Elgamri, 2010: 102).
[114] Although the spellings 'Shiite' or 'Shi'ite' might be avoided due to possible negative connotations in English.
[115] See statistics for plurals.

Figure 5.1 Usage Data for the Words 'Shia', 'Shias', 'Shiites', 'Shi'ite', and 'Shiism' (Shia Terms), and 'Sunni', 'Sunnis', and 'Sunnism' (Sunni Terms) (All Newspapers, 15.02.1989-21.02.1989)



	15.02.1989 (Wednesday)	16.02.1989 (Thursday)	17.02.1989 (Friday)	18.02.1989 (Saturday)	19.02.1989 (Sunday)	20.02.1989 (Monday)	21.02.1989 (Tuesday)
Shia Terms	12	7	1	3	7	2	4
Sunni Terms	3	5	1	2	5	3	4

Although at first this graph seems to show spikes on certain days, it is important to remember that it does not take into account the fact that multiple instances of a term may have appeared within one single article – skewing the results produced. It does show that in absolute terms, more references were made to Shia Islam than Sunni Islam. The graph is more interesting when it is viewed with the data split into the individual newspapers which make it up rather than across the date range – as presented below in Tables 5.1 and 5.2.

Table 5.1 Usage Data for the Words 'Shia', 'Shias', 'Shiites', 'Shi'ite', and 'Shiism' (Shia Terms), and 'Sunni', 'Sunnis', and 'Sunnism' (Sunni Terms) by Newspaper (Weekday Newspapers)

	Shia Terms	Sunni Terms	TOTAL
Daily Express	2	2	**4**
Daily Mail	0	2	**2**
Daily Mirror	0	0	**0**
Daily Star	0	0	**0**
Daily Telegraph	1	1	**2**
The Guardian	5	4	**9**
The Independent	17	7	**24**
The Sun	0	0	**0**
The Times	4	2	**6**
TOTAL	**29**	**18**	**47**

Table 5.2 Usage Data for the Words 'Shia', 'Shias', 'Shiites', 'Shi'ite', and 'Shiism' (Shia Terms), and 'Sunni', 'Sunnis', and 'Sunnism' (Sunni Terms) by Newspaper (Sunday Newspapers)

	Shia Terms	Sunni Terms	TOTAL
News of the World	0	0	**0**
The Mail on Sunday	0	0	**0**
The Observer	7	3	**10**
The People	0	0	**0**
The Sunday Express	0	0	**0**
The Sunday Mirror	0	0	**0**
The Sunday Telegraph	0	2	**2**
The Sunday Times	0	0	**0**
TOTAL	**7**	**5**	**12**

When the data is presented in this form, it is possible to see a clear division between certain newspapers. In the case of the weekday newspapers (Table 5.1), *The Independent* clearly had the most instances of use of these terms – followed by *The Guardian*. *The Times* was not far behind *The Guardian*, and the *Daily Express*, *Daily Mail* and *Daily Telegraph* also had instances of use. When the data from the Sunday newspapers is interrogated, it can be seen that only *The Observer*[116], and *The Sunday Telegraph* used the terms. It is interesting to note that no instances of use whatsoever were logged by any of the red top tabloids. This perhaps correlates with the observations made previously on the length of the corpora (the red tops having the smallest word counts), as it could

[116] It should be noted that although *The Observer* is now part of the same company as *The Guardian*, this was not the case in 1989 – *The Guardian* did not purchase *The Observer* until 1993 (Guardian, 2012).

suggest that a lesser degree of analysis was being carried out by the red tops (the distinction between Sunni and Shia Islam being of some importance in the context of the Rushdie incident).

In order to make the data in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 truly useful however, it should also take account of the frequency of use of these terms within each newspaper's corpus. Table 5.3 therefore includes figures which show the frequency of each type of term for each newspaper[117].

Table 5.3 Frequency Data for Sunni and Shia Terms by Newspaper (Sorted by Frequency, High to Low)

	Corpus Length	Shia Terms	Sunni Terms	Total Terms	Frequency (Corpus Length Divided by Total Terms)
The Observer	4594	7	3	10	459.4
The Independent	25633	17	7	24	1068.0
Daily Express	6940	2	2	4	1735.0
The Sunday Telegraph	4901	0	2	2	2450.5
The Guardian	23909	5	4	9	2656.6
The Times	19419	4	2	6	3236.5
Daily Telegraph	9408	1	1	2	4704.0
Daily Mail	9790	0	2	2	4895.0

In Table 5.3, the smaller a newspaper's frequency figure is, the more frequently the two sets of terms were being used within its corpus. Because this figure takes account of the overall length of the corpus, it is now fair to include the Sunday newspapers with the weekday ones – as has been done here. Newspapers have been sorted in descending order of the frequency observed – *The Observer* having the highest frequency, and the *Daily Mail* the lowest. The three weekday and six Sunday newspapers (see tables 5.1 and 5.2) where no instances of use for any of the terms were logged are not included in Table 5.3.

Whilst *The Independent* corpus had the most instances of Shia and Sunni terms, when one takes into account the size of the actual corpora, it becomes clear that *The Observer* used the terms with the greatest frequency. It should be taken into account that the sample size here was not particularly large (being just one day for *The Observer*, and six days for *The Independent*), but this statistic is still interesting. Whilst it might appear strange that certain newspapers used Sunni terms but no Shia terms in their corpus (of which all articles were of relevance to the Rushdie incident), this might be

[117] This was calculated by dividing each newspaper's corpus length (number of words) by the total number of times the terms (both Sunni terms and Shia terms) appeared within that corpus.

explained quite easily. A writer for instance could easily make the distinction between Shia and Sunni Islam whilst mentioning only one of the sects – e.g. 'the Ayatollah Khomeini has little influence over the majority of British Muslims, who unlike him are mainly of the Sunni sect'.

Perhaps more interesting than the data presented in Table 5.3, is the lack of mention of either Sunni or Shia Islam from the red top tabloids presented in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, and mentioned above. In the context of the Rushdie incident, this seems unusual even for newspapers such as the red tops, which are renowned for their low-levels of analysis. What seems to be suggested by this, is that there were newspapers in the sample which made no distinction between Sunni and Shia Islam. Although inferences can be made from this about the coverage of British Islam (as well as Islam in general) by these newspapers, it is important that conclusions are not drawn from this limited data. These newspapers may have made no mention of British Muslims during the course of the sample, for instance – meaning that they had little reason to mention a distinction between Sunni and Shia Islam. Indeed, it seems that the distinction between coverage of the Rushdie incident as a foreign affairs story, and coverage of the Rushdie incident from a more British perspective, may be important in the context of this research. The demonstrations which took place in Bradford, Yorkshire against *The Satanic Verses* are of particular interest here because of the focus of the research, and the later sample involving the Bradford Riots of 2001. Whilst many of these demonstrations had taken place before the announcement of the *fatwa* by Ayatollah Khomeini – and therefore cannot be considered to be part of that foreign affairs story, as the sample from which this research is derived is taken from *after* the announcement of the *fatwa*, the way in which they are reported is still of interest.

Reporting on Bradford, Yorkshire and the Bradford Book-Burnings

Simply from interrogating the word frequency table produced by *Wordsmith Tools* for the corpus of relevant articles in its entirety, it is easy to see that Bradford was mentioned numerous times. The term 'Bradford' is used 161 times in the corpus, and related terms such as 'Bradfordian' (2 instances), 'Bradfordians' (1 instance) and 'Bradford's' (5 instances) are also present – adding up to a total of 169 references to Bradford. Although the word 'Bradford' does not necessarily relate to the city of Bradford, Yorkshire – there being a number of other places with the same or similar names throughout the world, as well as institutions such as the (then) Bradford and Bingley bank, it seems likely that in this sample of relevant articles, most instances of the term 'Bradford' do refer to Bradford, Yorkshire. In order to prove this, as well as identify the way that Bradford was mentioned

in the newspapers sampled, the section of *Wordsmith Tools* called *Concord* was used to analyse the term 'Bradford', and to produce a concordance[118] for it. *Concord* was instructed to produce a concordance for the search term 'Bradford*'[119] for the total sampled corpus (all newspapers, all days).

When a concordance is created using *Concord*, a number of useful tables are produced – including the concordance itself (a collection of 'snapshots' of all the instances where the search term occurred within the corpus), a collocation analysis of the search term (a list of the words which were commonly found near to the search term), and a list of 'clusters' (collections of words which were commonly found near to the search term as well as each other). *Concord* can also highlight patterns which occur throughout a corpus near to the search term.

The three most common collocates of 'Bradford*' across the whole sample for a five word range (within five words on either side of the search term) are fairly uninteresting – these being 'the' (118 instances), 'of' (91 instances) and 'in' (76 instances). The fourth collocate however, may be interesting – this being 'Mosques' (36 instances). Because there were 169 references to 'Bradford*' in the sampled corpus (as shown above), this means that the term 'Mosques' occurred within five words of 'Bradford*' 21.3% of the time. Interestingly, the singular term 'Mosque' does *not* appear in the list of collocates for 'Bradford*' – although the reason for this will become apparent.

The term 'Muslim' was also a collocate of 'Bradford*' within the five word range – occurring 11 times. This does not take into account the alternative spellings encountered previously, however. When the terms 'Muslims' (10 instances) 'Moslem' (7 instances) and 'Moslems' (11 instances), are included along with 'Muslim', a total of 39 instances of collocation are observed for 'Bradford*' – more than that for the term 'Mosques'. This means that the combined permutations of the word 'Muslim' were in fact more common collocates of 'Bradford*' than 'Mosque'. This means that the fourth ('Muslim', 'Muslims', 'Moslem' and 'Moslems') and fifth ('Mosques') collocates of 'Bradford*' both refer to Islam in some way.

When *Concord* is used to identify common clusters of words around the term 'Bradford*', the possible reason for the absence of the singular term 'Mosque' becomes apparent. The most popular

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[118] *Concord* is able to produce a list of all the instances of a term in a corpus – or a collocation between separate terms – known as a concordance. This also is linked back to the original source text – in this case allowing for the whole article to be easily viewed in each case.

[119] An asterisk indicates a 'wildcard' – in this case at the end of the search term. Terms related to 'Bradford' such as 'Bradfordian' were therefore included in the concordance.

cluster observed here was 'Council of Mosques', which occurred 25 times within the corpus. By checking the concordance itself, the probable reason for this becomes apparent. Many instances where this cluster occurred refer to a particular story – involving an individual called Sayed Abdul Quddus. Quddus was not only reported to be a vocal supporter of Khomeini's death threat against Rushdie, but also the Joint Secretary of Bradford's influential Council of Mosques (Davenport, 1989; The Sun, 1989). This story led to Quddus becoming a central figure in much of the media's coverage of the Rushdie incident – and probably explains why the singular term 'Mosque' was not a collocate of 'Bradford*' – although the plural 'Mosques' was used as part of 'Bradford Council of Mosques', no references were made to individual Mosques. The story also explains the fifth most common collocate of 'Bradford*', which was 'council' – with 34 total instances recorded.

Two other particularly interesting collocates of 'Bradford*' identified by *Concord* are 'book' (with 13 instances), and 'burning' (with 8 instances). Because of the specific nature of the *Satanic Verses* incident, it is likely that the term 'book' would be used with some regularity[120], but the term becomes interesting when combined with 'burning' in the context of the search term 'Bradford*', because copies of *The Satanic Verses* were publicly burned in Bradford in 1989.

The word frequency table produced for the corpus shows that the term 'burning' was used a total of 37 times – which means that there were 29 instances of its use which did not collocate with 'Bradford*'. This does not mean that 29 instances of the term did not refer to the particular book-burning in Bradford, however – the city may have already been cited earlier in the article for instance. In order to further examine the term 'burning', a concordance was produced for this particular word[121].

Unsurprisingly, this shows the term 'book' to be a collocate of 'burning' within the corpus – 24 instances of this were identified, and 'the book burning' was flagged as a pattern by *Concord*, with 8 instances. Few other collocates of 'burning' were of interest in this context – being mostly common words such as 'the' 'of' and 'in'. One term which may be of interest however, was the term 'public' (which had 9 instances of collocation). By examining the concordance produced, the context within which the term 'public' accompanied the term 'burning' can be examined. The concordance included such instances as 'Long before the **public burning** of the book in Bradford in January, there

[120] The term 'book' was used 587 times throughout the corpus. This was more common than the term 'novel', which was used just 169 times

[121] Although other similar words were identified in the corpus by the word frequency table – including 'burned' and 'burnings', none of these were identified as collocates of 'Bradford*', which is the focus in this instance.

had been protest marches and demonstrations' (Mills, 1989) [emphasis added in bold]; 'We may even need to defend their right to give it a **public burning**, and to lobby for it not to be read' (Young, 1989) [emphasis added in bold]; and 'Mr Quddus, the joint secretary with the influential Bradford Council of Mosques, who took part in the **public burning** of the book, said he was sticking to his earlier comments that Mr Rushdie 'deserves hanging" (Morris, Mills and Hughes, 1989)[emphasis added in bold]. Whilst each of these extracts is interesting in its own right outside of this context, they also show the way in which the term 'public' was being used here. Rather than the 'public' burning the book, all 9 instances of the term 'public' as a collocate of 'burning' describe a 'public' burning – a burning which has taken place *in* public, rather than being carried out *by the* public. Whilst none of the variants of the term 'Muslim' appear as a collocate of 'burning', browsing the concordance reveals that the descriptor 'Muslim' *was* being used to describe *who* had carried out the burning – e.g.:

> The religious edict or fatwa issued by the Ayatollah Khomeini calling for the murder of Salman Rushdie and all involved in the publication of his supposedly blasphemous novel Satanic Verses should be a source of the most acute embarrassment to the **Muslims** in Bradford who took part in the ceremonial **burning** of the book and those politicians who have subsequently encouraged demands for the suppression of the work (Independent, 1989) [emphasis added in bold].

> Mr Sher Azam, president of the Council [the Bradford Council of Mosques], which organized the public **burning** of a copy of the book, said: 'From our point of view he has not said anything different from what he said earlier on. He said that the Council had itself rejected Mr Rushdie's statement as an insult to all **Muslims** rather than an apology before Ayatollah Khomeini's comments had been reported (Morgan and Davenport, 1989) [emphasis added in bold].

In the second extract, the involvement of Muslims in the burning of the book is implied rather than stated, although the term 'public' is once again used to describe the book burning itself. The repeated use of the term 'public' in the way described above is interesting because it seems almost superfluous. In 1989, technology was limited in comparison with the present day, which meant that events occurring in the private sphere were more private (one could not simply upload a video of a private event to a website such as *Youtube* in order to make it 'public' for instance). It is likely then that the book-burnings would have had to have been held in public to some degree for the media to have found out about and subsequently report the event. What the term 'public' *might* imply when

used in this way, is that it is unusual for British Muslims to hold 'public' events – perhaps conjuring up images of a secretive and unknown group which is set apart from the general public.

Reporting on British Muslims

The above section explores the way in which one particular group of British Muslims were covered by the press during the Rushdie incident – a handful of individuals in Bradford who were involved in book-burnings. But this study is also interested in more generalised press coverage of British Muslims within this context. Given the relationship/conflation which has been identified earlier in this thesis between the press's coverage of British Muslims, and their coverage of British South Asians, it will also be interesting to see if this occurred during the period sampled for this chapter.

Again, a good starting point for an investigation such as this is the word frequency table. Below, the frequencies of a number of words are listed for the corpus as a whole. The terms in the table were selected because in some way they refer either to a religion, country, culture, or geographic/cultural population. Most of the specific terms chosen here are of obvious relevance to the question at hand – being related to South Asia, for instance. Some terms which have been examined previously (such as 'Muslim') are also included again here for easy reference:

Table 5.4 Usage Data for Selected Terms for Whole Corpus (Sorted by Alphabetical Order)

Word	Number of Instances
Asia	4
Asian	5
Asians	5
Bangladesh	12
Bangladeshi	6
Bangladeshis	4
Britain	367
British	408
Briton	6
Britons	5
Christian	50
Christianity	29
Christians	36
India	59
Indian	51
Indians	1
Iran	405
Iranian	363
Iranians	36
Islam	296
Moslem	168
Moslems	208
Muslim	279
Muslims	289
Pakistan	78
Pakistani	9
Pakistanis	5
People	217
Person	18
Persons	1
Population	8

Although some reasonably interesting data exists in the table above – such as the fact that there are generally more instances of terms describing countries (such as 'India') than there are the people or culture/contents of that country (e.g. Indian or Indians), its usefulness is limited without some level of collocation analysis having been carried out. This is addressed below.

A problem exists when looking for instances where British Muslims or British South Asians are mentioned by an article using collocation analysis. Collocation analysis is simply not sensitive

enough or intelligent enough a method to identify all such instances – and the data which *is* produced is easy to confuse, when looking for instances as specific as this. This problem will become apparent when the data below is considered. Here then, qualitative methods will also be employed, in an attempt to draw out the more subtle nuances from the data which tend to be missed by more insensitive quantitative methods.

The first stage in analysing this data was to produce a collocation analysis for the search string "Muslim*/Moslem*"[122] using the 'all newspapers/all days' corpus. As there were a total of 944 instances of all the permutations of the term 'Muslim' within this corpus, *Concord* had a large amount of data to construct this analysis with. Although the collocation analysis itself is not particularly interesting in this case, because it dealt with a total of four terms ('Muslim', 'Muslims', 'Moslem' and 'Moslems') – meaning that many collocates are duplicated, some interesting data can still be drawn from it. Said (1997: 28) states that Muslims tend (or tended) to be covered either as 'oil suppliers' or as 'potential terrorists'. In the Rushdie story, there is very little connection to the oil industry, but there is what might nowadays be called a 'terrorist threat' – the threat of the assassination of a British citizen on British soil. It is interesting to note therefore, that the term 'terrorist' does not appear as a collocate of the search string "Muslim*/Moslem*". This is also true for terms connected to 'terrorist' – such as 'terrorists' or 'terrorism'. Other terms which are commonly lexically associated with 'Islamic' terrorists were also searched for – including 'fundamentalist' (0 instances of collocation), 'fundamentalists' (5 instances of collocation) and 'fundamentalism' (0 instances of collocation), 'fanatic' (0 instances), 'fanatics' (5 instances), 'fanatical' (0 instances) and 'fanaticism' (0 instances). Positive (or 'neutral') terms such as 'community' (29 instances of collocation) and 'leaders' (27 instances of collocation) were words more commonly seen close to the search terms within this corpus. It will be interesting to investigate whether this collocation changes over time in the next two chapters.

Possibly even more interesting in this instance, are the 'clusters' of words highlighted by *Concord*, which commonly occur near the search terms within the corpus. Many of these clusters are unsurprising – given that they occur within the text of an infamous statement made by the Ayatollah Khomeini on February 19th, 1989 which declared that it was 'incumbent upon every Muslim' to ensure that Rushdie was 'sent to hell' (Daily Star, 1989; Doran, 1989a; Joseph and Plummer, 1989; Parry and Palmer, 1989). Although the text of this statement varied slightly between newspapers (possibly due to it being a translation into English), it received widespread coverage – which is likely

[122] Meaning 'Muslim' plus wildcard at end, OR 'Moslem' plus wildcard at end.

to have affected the collocation results in this case. Hence, phrases such as 'it is incumbent' (8 instances) and 'execute them wherever' (5 instances) (also part of Khomeini's statement) were identified by *Concord* as common word clusters.

Many clusters not connected to Khomeini's statement were also identified however. These included 'Muslims in Britain' (15 instances), which was the second most common cluster identified after 'the Satanic Verses' (19 instances), 'the Muslim community' (14 instances), and 'leaders in Britain' (11 instances). Some of these clusters were also duplicated for other search terms – e.g. 'the Moslem community' (9 instances) and 'Moslems in Britain' (9 instances).

Below, every instance of the most popular of these clusters – 'Muslims in Britain', as well as the alternate spelling 'Moslems in Britain' are analysed qualitatively in their surrounding context. This style of guided qualitative analysis represents one way that electronic quantitative data can be useful outside of a purely statistical analysis. Taking the corpus as a whole, each instance of a cluster was identified, and then sampled from the surrounding context. In this case, the whole surrounding paragraph was sampled for inclusion as an appendix – please see Extracts A5.1-A5.24. Clearly the sample used here is coloured by the fact that 'Muslims/Moslems in Britain' was its search term – and these extracts cannot be claimed to be representative of the entire output of a newspaper. But what is illustrated here is the way that such content *is* included in that total output. Whilst it is impossible to analyse every word of the large sample used in this case study in the qualitative detail presented here, the fact very that such output exists in a published newspaper suggests that it is also likely to have occurred before and since then.

In order to give a basis for the qualitative analysis of this data, the newspapers included in both samples were totalled (please see Tables 5.5 and 5.6). In these two cases, each separate instance also represents a separate article – neither phrase was observed occurring more than once in a single article.

Table 5.5 Newspapers Using the Phrase 'Muslims in Britain'

Newspaper	Number of Instances
The Independent	6
The Guardian	5
The Times	2
The People	2
TOTAL	**15**

Table 5.6 Newspapers Using the Phrase 'Moslems in Britain'

Newspaper	Number of Instances
The Daily Telegraph	3
The Daily Mirror	2
The Daily Star	1
The Daily Mail	1
The Daily Express	1
The Sun	1
TOTAL	**9**

From this analysis, it can be seen that the phrase 'Moslems in Britain' appeared to be favoured by tabloid and middle-market newspapers (with the broadsheet *Daily Telegraph* being the exception). Conversely, the phrase 'Muslims in Britain' was favoured by broadsheet newspapers (with the exception of the Sunday red-top tabloid *The People*).

The phrase 'Muslims in Britain' (in either of the two forms sampled here) would almost certainly refer to Muslims who are British. Although it could refer to foreign Muslims visiting Britain, this seems unlikely – as it would be more accurate simply to state this. This means that it is a useful term to examine when considering the core research questions of this thesis – namely, the extent to which newspapers conflate 'British Muslims' with 'British South Asians', as well as the ways in which voices dissenting from the mainstream *status quo* which originate from within these two 'groups' are dealt with by the press. It should also be noted that the phrase 'Muslims/Moslems in Britain' may have connotations beyond its overt meaning. By describing someone or something (in this case the religious grouping 'Muslims') as being 'in' something (in this case 'Britain'), the phrase might suggest that the natural place for the article being described is not the one which is being pointed out – otherwise there would be little point in describing it this way. So the phrase 'Muslims/Moslems in Britain' might suggest that Muslims are in fact 'outsiders' in Britain – a 'group'

who really belong somewhere else. This effect could also be amplified by the use of other words – such as 'the', to create the phrase 'the Muslims in Britain' – e.g. Extract A5.9. This can be interpreted as an instance of the type of 'inferential racism' described by Hall (1990), given that it relates Muslims to a certain geographical location (which might be assumed to be the 'Orient' as described by Said (1978)) as an unquestioned assumption. Therefore, as Hall describes it, racist statements can be 'formulated without ever bringing into awareness the racist predicates on which [they] the statements are grounded (1990: 13).

The opposite of the phrase 'Muslims in Britain' would be the phrase 'Muslims outside Britain', and it is interesting to note that based on his own analysis of some of the same content studied here, Elgamri (2010) identified that representations of British Muslims suggested that:

> Their stances over religious-related issues, such as the Rushdie affair, were dictated by Muslims outside Britain since blaspheming Rushdie, and the call to kill him, came originally from a foreign Muslim spiritual leader – Khomeini (Elgamri, 2010: 109).

When taken in this context, the phrase 'Muslims in Britain' acquires extra connotations – of an oppositional force within Britain – a force which is commanded from afar by leaders such as the Ayatollah Khomeini. It is also important to note, however that the use of this phrase could also be as innocent as it first sounds. There are Muslims in Britain, but there are many more Muslims *outside* of Britain, and the opposite reading of the opinions stated above is that 'Muslims in Britain' is merely a descriptive phrase.

In practice, many instances of the phrase were actually quite positive about 'Muslims in Britain', when taken in context. This is exemplified by Extract A5.16, which mentions the difference between Sunni and Shia Islam – as well as the fact that whilst most British Muslims are Sunni, the Ayatollah Khomeini was Shia. As the data above has already shown, this was a relatively rare occurrence within the sample, but almost certainly a positive distinction for a newspaper to make. It is certainly a distinction which would do much to dispel the notion mentioned above, that British Muslims were in some way being 'controlled' by the Ayatollah Khomeini.

Another seemingly positive use of the phrase was Extract A5.1:

> 1 THERE are 1.7 million Muslims in Britain, but only a few are fanatics ready to die at the Ayatollah's command (Cliff, 1989).

Here, the author underlines the fact that although there are many 'Muslims in Britain', only a 'few' are 'fanatics' who would follow the Ayatollah Khomeini's orders. To examine only the paragraph within which the sampled phrase appeared would in this case be misleading, however – something which is alluded to by the title of the article (which was printed in *The People*) – '20 Ways to Spot a Mad Mullah' (Cliff, 1989). Exactly what a 'Mad Mullah' is, is not detailed by the article[123], although it contains a twenty point list of features said to be typical of such a person. As one such signifying feature is simply defined as 'MUSLIMS [sic] must pray and wash five times daily', the article essentially dismisses all practicing Muslims as 'Mad Mullahs' (ibid)[124]. Point 14 on the list – 'ISLAM means submission to God. The Koran is based on the teachings of the illiterate Prophet Mohammed 1,400 years ago' (ibid) appears to be nothing more than a statement intended to cause offence to Muslim readers. Especially considering that the Rushdie incident itself surrounded blasphemy against the Prophet Mohammed (the Holiest Prophet in Islam), to unnecessarily refer to the Prophet as 'illiterate' in this way seems to indicate a malicious intent on the part of the author.

Confusingly, the author also includes the following statistics in the list of 'ways to spot a Mad Mullah': 'ISLAM [sic] is the fastest-growing faith in Western Europe. In Britain there are now more practicing Muslims than Roman Catholics' and 'A NEW mosque [sic] opens in Britain every two weeks' (ibid). In this context, this appears to be nothing more than a negative statement about the growth of Islam in Britain. The seemingly positive text quoted in Extract A5.1 then acts as a 'disclaimer' for its author – as on one hand the article treats all Muslims as a single monolithic entity, whilst on the other, it suggests that not all Muslims are 'fanatics'. This is reinforced by the fact that Extract A5.1 was included in the list as the very first point. This article is interesting as it suggests that its author holds anti-Islamic opinions, whilst also wishing to give the reader an impression of tolerance. What really sets the article apart however, is the simplistic and superficial way in which its author sets out to achieve this.

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[123] In this case it seems likely that it would be assumed to be a derogatory term for anyone choosing to follow the teachings of Ayatollah Khomeini.

[124] Praying (including washing one's self) five times daily is one of the five pillars of Islam – a basic requirement of the religion.

A second article from *The People* is identified by Extract A5.3:

> Most said Muslims in Britain ready to carry out the Iranian leader's orders to assassinate the author should be kicked out (Nelson, 1989).

This article mentions public support for the deportation of Muslims supporting the Ayatollah Khomeini's *fatwa*, – and it is the voice of the public which is 'heard' throughout the article – it being essentially a collection of 'vox-pop' quotes (all of which are critical either of the Ayatollah Khomeini; anyone supporting the *fatwa*; or of the British government for not imposing harsher sanctions against Iran) (Nelson, 1989). A total of four vox-pop quotes are used, as well as the paraphrasing of a statement made by the Iranian Writers Association (in exile). It is interesting that there appears to have been no input from British Muslims in the article. As the article concerns itself with British Muslims (or at least 'Muslims in Britain'), it might be assumed that one or more British Muslims would have been invited to give their opinion for the article. Certainly, none of the quotations included in the article are said to have come from a British Muslim. This represents a willingness on the part of *The People* to circulate negative statements about a 'group' of people (British Muslims), whilst allowing the members of the 'group' no opportunity to defend themselves within the article.

Extract A5.18 comes from the *Daily Telegraph*, and is not particularly negative. Although the article states that the British government should 'remind' British 'Moslems' of the illegality of the incitement to murder, it is not reasonable to presume that the author truly believes that anyone has forgotten this fact. Instead, the term 'remind' serves as a softer and less patronising synonym of the word 'tell'. The rest of the article may be of some interest here however. The article itself surrounds the reward offered by Iran to anyone prepared to kill Salman Rushdie – this was reported to be three million US Dollars for an Iranian assassin, or one million for any non-Iranian (Reynolds, 1989: 4). At numerous points throughout the article, the term 'Moslems' is used to describe a seemingly monolithic group – a particularly good example of this being the following sentence: 'In a move to defuse the row over what Moslems see as "blasphemy" in The Satanic Verses, Viking-Penguin in London issued a statement regretting the distress the book had caused Moslems' (ibid). The first instance of the term 'Moslems' in this sentence is the more problematic, in that it seems to imply that *all* 'Moslems' regarded *The Satanic Verses* as blasphemous – which seems unlikely. This is because of the way the word 'Moslems' is used in conjunction with the word 'see'. Had the author written 'what **some** Moslems see as "blasphemy"', or 'what **many** Moslems see as "blasphemy"',

this would be a much less problematic statement – because it does not amalgamate all the world's Muslims into one single entity.

The article also implies that *all* 'Moslems' might be a threat to Salman Rushdie – albeit in an indirect manner. An example of this is the following paragraph: 'The French publishers, Presses de la Cite, said that they had abandoned plans to bring out The Satanic Verses. France has three million Moslems' (ibid). Here, no attempt is made to explain why the number of 'Moslems' in France is relevant to *Presses de la Cite*'s decision – nor is any further comment made on the matter. One implication might be that because France has a relatively large number of 'Moslems' living within it, the publisher may have cancelled plans to release *The Satanic Verses* there due to a possible threat. The statement essentially normalises the idea that Muslims are problematic, by allowing the reader to *assume* their own opinion from the two facts given – firstly that a French publisher had cancelled plans to bring out *The Satanic Verses* in France, and secondly that there were three million Muslims in France at the time.

What the examples from *The People* and the *Daily Telegraph* above might signify, is a difference in anti-Islamic, or 'Islamophobic' rhetoric in broadsheet and tabloid newspapers. Where the articles drawn from *The People* are almost *open* in their distrust and fear of Islam, the article from the *Daily Telegraph* employed a much more subtle manner – almost *suggesting* to the reader that Muslims are all alike, and always problematic. In order to investigate whether these two newspapers were unique in dealing with issues connected to Islam in this way, or whether this is reflective of a more widespread trend, more extracts from other newspapers need to be considered here.

Again utilising the extracts drawn from around the common phrase 'Muslims/Moslems in Britain', the reporting of further tabloid newspapers is first examined here – beginning with Extract A5.17, which was drawn from the red-top *Daily Star*. Extract A5.17 does not overtly treat British Muslims as a monolith – the quote itself, 'FANATICAL [sic] Moslems in Britain last night hailed the Ayatollah Khomeini's sentence of death passed on a London-based author '(Daily Star Foreign Desk, 1989) makes it clear that only 'fanatical' Muslims were supporting the death threat – rather than Muslims as a whole[125]. Again there is a problem with the phrase 'Moslems in Britain', however. Rather than simply referring to 'British Moslems', the choice of the phrase 'Moslems in Britain' reminds the reader that 'Moslems' are also located elsewhere – perhaps also implying that British 'Moslems' are outsiders – foreigners, who even when born in Britain, never really belong there. Beyond the

[125] Although 'fanatic' is generally a problematic term regardless of the context within which it is used.

sampled paragraph, the article contains other features of interest here. The phrase 'Mad Mullah' is used – although unlike in the article analysed earlier from *The People* (Cliff, 1989), this refers solely to the Ayatollah Khomeini (Daily Star Foreign Desk, 1989). Here it is the 'manic followers' of the 'Mad Mullah' living in Britain who are said to pose a threat to Rushdie (ibid).

The article also contains quotes from Sayed Abdul Quddus (mentioned previously in this chapter), who is reported to have stated that Rushdie 'deserves hanging', and that 'if I saw Rushdie walking down the street I would do my best to carry out the sentence' (ibid). Whilst these quotations represent a British Muslim being given a chance to speak – unlike in the second article from *The People* discussed previously (Nelson, 1989), they are problematic in the fact that there is no balance present. No other quotations said to be from British Muslims are present in the article – failing to remind the reader that not all British Muslims supported the 'death sentence' prescribed by Khomeini as Quddus did. When discussing coverage of Quddus in the British broadsheet newspapers, Elgamri (2010) notes that:

> Since Quddus was represented as a leading British Muslim figure, readers would take his statements and comments to represent the British Muslim community, and probably Muslims at large, especially since similar anti-Rushdie comments and protests had already been reported from other Muslim countries (2010: 110).

Although Elgamri's analysis is based solely on the coverage of three British broadsheet newspapers, the pattern he identifies of Quddus being reported as a 'leading' British Muslim figure is repeated once again here. In this particular case, this is unambiguous, with Quddus being described in the *Daily Star* as 'leading British Muslim Sayed Abdul Kudus' [sic] (Daily Star Foreign Desk, 1989). Whether or not Quddus could be described as a 'leading' British Muslim rests largely on whether or not one considers the Bradford Council of Mosques to be a group of particular influence in British Muslim society. If the group *is* thought to be influential in this way, then it follows that its members could be described as 'leading British Muslims'. If it is not, then this description would be superfluous and misleading. To describe a member of a group as broad as 'British Muslims' as 'leading' might still be problematic however, in that it implies a certain degree of consensus within the group – as well as implying that it has a 'leader'. This means that the description of Quddus as 'leading' is still problematic.

Finally, the article describes publicised police efforts to ensure the safety of Rushdie, and mentions that Scotland Yard 'are to step up surveillance on Moslem groups in London and elsewhere in the country' (ibid). What this statement implies is that Scotland Yard was interested in placing not just extremist Muslim groups under surveillance, but in *all* Muslim groups – once again implying that *all* Muslims pose some kind of threat. Whilst this may have been true of Scotland Yard (earlier chapters of this thesis having established that the Metropolitan Police of 1989 was, on the whole, far from unprejudiced), it seems unlikely that such details would have been publicised. What is more likely is that Scotland Yard announced increased surveillance of *extremist* Muslim groups, and the *Daily Star* failed to report the term 'extremist'.

What the article described above shows, is that negative reporting on Muslims in the red-top tabloids was by no means limited to the obvious style embodied by the articles analysed from *The People* earlier. Daily Star Foreign Desk (1989) displays an altogether more subtle form of negativity – albeit with the same end result. Muslims worldwide are described as if they represent one single monolith, which invariably poses a threat whenever it comes into contact with 'western' society. The more subtle style of reporting used by the *Daily Star* here might be of especial influence on a reader when combined with the blunter style which tends to be more typical of a red-top tabloid. This would be due to the fact that blunt red-top reporting tends to be so very unsubtle that it might be obvious to even the most naïve reader. When combined with a more subtle style, blunt reporting might act as a distracting factor on the reader, who would then draw a greater effect from the less obviously tainted subtle reporting contained in other articles within the newspaper.

In light of the analysis carried out on broadsheet and tabloid newspapers above, it is interesting to examine an article from one of the 'middle-market' newspapers. These newspapers are sometimes regarded as tabloids – and often use similar devices, but also tend to give a slightly deeper analysis on a subject. Extract A5.23 was sampled from the headline of a *Daily Mail* front page article – 'Rushdie Gets Armed Guard: Now Moslems in Britain Back Khomeini's Call for Death Sentence on Author of 'Satanic' Novel' (Doran, 1989b: 1). It is interesting to examine the *Daily Mail*'s reporting here, to see if it fits into the patterns identified above.

Extract A5.23 was sampled from a section of headline, which occurred above of, but was probably intended to be read after the main (larger) headline 'Rushdie Gets Armed Guard' (Doran, 1989b: 1). Again, this could be regarded as a negative use of the phrase 'Moslems in Britain' – implying a foreign group within Britain – and also directly stating that this group (or sections of it) support

Khomeini's 'death sentence' on Rushdie. Again, Quddus is described as a 'leading' British Muslim – in this case a 'British Moslem leader' (ibid) – which has the same problems as the instance described above. But a direct quote from the Quddus demonstrates a problem faced by journalists in covering this story. Quddus is quoted as saying that 'there are any number of our people who would willingly carry out what to us would not be a crime but a justified act' (ibid). Here it is Quddus himself who implicitly amalgamates British Muslims, by using the terms 'our' and 'us'. Although the quote is likely to have been taken from a longer speech – and therefore selected by the journalist, Quddus's grouping of British Muslims into a single monolith cannot be avoided without some degree of paraphrasing – for example, "Sayed Abdul Quddus said yesterday that there were any number of Muslims who would willingly carry out what many see to be not a crime, but a justified act".

The above of course accepts the view that Quddus was a central figure in the story whose views required publication. This links with the idea of Quddus as a 'leading British Muslim' (and all its associated problems) described above, as his role on the Bradford Council of Mosques was likely to be the reason that his views were given greater credence than any other British Muslim.

Later in the article, Muslims are once again represented as a monolithic group – this time by the writer himself. The sentence: 'The book [*The Satanic* Verses] is considered by Moslems to be blasphemous to Mohammed, the prophet [sic] of Islam' (Doran, 1989b: 1) implies quite directly that *all* Muslims considered the book to be blasphemous. As this article was published on February 15th, 1989 – only one day after the Ayatollah Khomeini's *fatwa*, and *The Satanic Verses* becoming a major media story, it seems unlikely that all of the world's Muslims would even have *heard* of the book – let alone have decided whether or not it constituted blasphemy according to their chosen religious interpretations. Once again, the sentence could easily have been altered to read 'some Moslems', or 'Moslems who we have spoken to' (if this was the case) – both of which would have been more accurate statements, which would not have misled the reader in the same way.

A later sentence refers to 'moderate Moslems' – 'While moderate Moslems called for calm, Tory MP Terry Dicks urged Home Secretary Douglas Hurd to order the immediate deportation of Mr Quddas, who burned a copy of Satanic Verses in Bradford last month' (ibid). This might seem at odds with the sentence analysed previously – which amalgamates all Muslims together as being one in opinion. Here the reader is informed that some Muslims are 'moderate' in their views – appealing for calm (although implicit in this statement is the idea that these 'moderates' were still offended). Whilst this view allows for Muslims not always being of the same opinion, it still lists people under set

categories – implying that a Muslim can either be 'moderate' or 'conservative' – but probably nothing else.

There is also a second problem with the sentence above – which concerns the deportation of Sayed Abdul Quddus. The problem here is that at no point in the sentence – or the rest of the article, is Quddus's nationality or birthplace mentioned. As there are inherent problems with deporting a citizen of a country who never *entered* that country, but, rather was born there – namely that there would be nowhere to deport them *to*, this represents more sloppy journalism. The reader is left to assume that because Quddus has a 'foreign sounding' name[126], and is also a Muslim who is a member of the Bradford Council of Mosques, that he must have originated somewhere else – in other words, he is an outsider in Britain. Whether or not Quddus was actually born in a foreign country is irrelevant to this, because by omitting the facts on this, the writer is implying that he *was*. This type of 'normalisation', is likely to help breed the idea that every Muslim or person with a 'foreign sounding' name in Britain was actually born in another country – and hence do not truly 'belong' in Britain.

Conclusions for Chapter Five

Although the main conclusions for the thesis will be drawn in Chapter Eight, which looks at all three case-studies in tandem, it is also useful to look at the type of statements which can be made solely from the data analysed here in Chapter Five. This discussion will be split into three main components, as outlined in Chapter Four (Methodology) – these being 'conflation', 'voice' and 'othering'.

Conflation

The sample analysed for the *Satanic Verses* incident showed little evidence of newspapers having conflated British Muslims with British South Asians. Although examples of the coverage of British Muslims were relatively common in the sample, Table 5.4 shows that few specific references are likely to have been made to British South Asians –whether directly or indirectly, simply because few terms used to describe British South Asian people appear within the corpus. Indirect statements likely to represent conflation of British Muslims with British South Asians, whilst much harder to sample for, were evidenced in some of the material reviewed in this chapter however – as Nelson

[126] 'Foreign sounding' in that it is not a name traditionally associated with the dominant white culture of the UK.

(1989) shows. Nelson's article includes vox-pops drawn from a poll carried out with members of the public, stating of them that: 'Most said Muslims in Britain ready to carry out the Iranian leader's orders to assassinate the author should be kicked out' (1989). This statement clearly conflates 'Muslims in Britain' with a group which British society can 'kick out'. The implication here is that a British Muslim also represents an immigrant to the country – and hence someone who can be deported – rather than someone who was born in Britain and who would have nowhere to be deported *to*. As no further statement is made in this regard, the reader is left to decide for themselves exactly why a British Muslim could be 'kicked out' of the country, although the implications described above might lead them to believe that all British Muslims are outsiders.

The problems outlined towards the end of the section 'Reporting on British Muslims', in Doran (1989b) are also relevant to this argument, in that a similar mechanic is present. Here, however, it is one specific person (Quddus) who is implicitly described as an outsider by the statement regarding his deportation. Although the statement itself comes from a political elite (Terry Dicks MP), the article makes no mention of Quddus's nationality, or where he might be deported *to* – confusing the situation for no apparent reason. So whilst the statement itself may be factual, the reader is left only with the knowledge that a 'Moslem leader' from Bradford might be deported. Because Quddus is described as a 'Moslem leader' this statement might implicitly make all British Muslims 'outsiders' by association with him – as with the mechanism described by Elgamri (2010) mentioned previously.

The statistics for the terms 'Sunni' and 'Shia' (as well as related terms), suggest that these two sects of Islam often seemed to be covered as if they represented a single monolith. The overall usage of terms describing different sects of Islam was low throughout the corpus – suggesting that their differences were discussed only rarely. The apparent lack of distinction made between these two sects by the press in this case effectively amounts to a conflation – whether through a lack of understanding, or a deliberate attempt to make the story appear more significant than it was, by making it appear as though Khomeini had more followers than he is likely to have had in actuality. Unfortunately, given the samples used in this study, it will be impossible to investigate if this conflation was still present in later years, because the distinction between Sunni and Shia Islam is of no particular relevance to any of the other stories sampled in this thesis. This type of conflation would represent an interesting avenue for further study however – especially since the advent of 'western' military involvement in Iraq, and the subsequent mediatisation of sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia groups there. This situation is likely to have raised awareness of the different sects of Islam in the UK, and may have affected coverage of such groups.

Voice

The coverage of voice within the analysis presented here is mixed, and difficult to draw any broad conclusions from – given that the qualitative analysis which could identify such coverage was by necessity, limited. A number of interesting observations can still be made on this subject however.

Exactly what would represent a 'dissenting' voice during the Rushdie incident is not difficult to determine in the British context. Given that the killing of any person is forbidden by British law under any circumstances outside of a situation which involves warfare or law enforcement, the British government could by no means have supported Khomeini's *fatwa* against Rushdie. This is underlined by the fact that Rushdie was provided with an armed guard by the British police service (Doran, 1989b). Slaughter (1993) goes as far as stating that 'in Iran, England and elsewhere, most Muslims rejected it [Khomeini's *fatwa*] as an example of Shiite or Iranian fanaticism (1993: 154). In this sense, Slaughter argues, the bounty placed on Rushdie's head was a 'terrorist act' and thus not an issue of free speech (ibid). Logically, this means that any voice speaking out in support of Khomeini's *fatwa* would have represented a 'dissenting' one in the British context. Voices speaking out against Rushdie or *The Satanic Verses*, but not supporting the 'death sentence' represent something of a grey area in this context – given that there is little argument about the fact that Rushdie's novel was indeed offensive to Islam/Muslims. This is something underlined by Modood (1990), who states that:

> The anger against *SV* [*The Satanic Verses*] had nothing to do with fundamentalism – or indeed Khomeini. Virtually every practicing Muslim was offended by passages from the book and shocked that it was written by a Muslim of whom till then the Asian community were proud. Rushdie has argued that the *mullahs* whipped up the ordinary muslims for their own political motives. The truth is that all the religious zealots had to do was simply quote from *SV* for anger, shame and hurt to be felt (Modood, 1990: 154).

Although the book would almost certainly have been offensive to any practicing Muslim who read it, Slaughter mentions a legal case which was initiated by a group of 'Muslim leaders'. Although the case sought prosecution of Rushdie for blasphemy (which was a crime under British law), a high court ruling stated that the law protected only blasphemy against the Church of England (Slaughter, 1993: 158). This meant that the British establishment indirectly *supported* Rushdie's book – which

whilst almost certainly offensive to certain groups of people, did not represent a criminal act. In this sense, a voice speaking out *against* Rushdie's book – and therefore his freedom of speech, would have represented a dissenting one.

The article by Nelson (1989) described above is of further interest in this regard. As mentioned, Nelson's article is implicitly negative about British Muslims from the outset – effectively conflating a British Muslim identity with a foreign identity. The article also contains a series of vox-pops, however – short quotations from members of the public about what they thought about the *Satanic Verses* incident. Of the four vox-pops included in the article, three deal with the story in terms of 'foreign affairs' – concentrating on Iran and the Ayatollah Khomeini. The remaining quote concerns British Muslims, stating that 'Muslims must abide by British law – not the insane rantings of a nutcase thousands of miles away' (Nelson, 1989). This quote is interesting in that it states that 'Muslims' rather than 'British Muslims' or 'Muslims in Britain' must abide by British law. Read literally, this implies that the person quoted here believes that all of the world's Muslims should respect British law. Although the article comments on British Muslims, and contains voices drawn from the British public, it is interesting to note that none of these are mentioned to be British Muslim voices. Direct mention is made to one British Muslim in particular in a section of the article entitled 'Mullah Mania' (Nelson, 1989). This short section states that 'A BRICK [sic] was thrown through the window of Muslim leader Rana Tufail's home in Stoke-on-Trent after he led protests against Salman Rushdie (ibid). This statement is similar to the description of Quddus in Doran (1989b), in that it describes Tufail simply as a 'Muslim leader', and mentions where he lives, but gives the reader no further information. All the reader is told is that Tufail 'led protests against Salman Rushdie' (ibid). Whether these protests were peaceful or agreed with the Ayatollah Khomeini's *fatwa* is not mentioned – although the reaction to it *is* – the vandalism of Tufail's home. Although the article gives the public a voice in the national press, this voice is entirely one-sided. British Muslims are denied a voice in the article, because whilst they are discussed, they are not given any opportunity to reply. This would seem counterintuitive to any attempt to form an objective article – as only one side of the story is given. At no point does the article mention that not all British Muslims were protesting against Rushdie, and it does not include any voices of British Muslims who *were* protesting. The article essentially gives the impression that all British Muslims were protesting, and that everyone else in Britain was against this – which had already spilled over into at least one act of violence with the vandalism of Tufail's home.

There were examples of British Muslims being given a voice in certain articles, but these voices often seemed only to reinforce notions of a monolithic group, which was united in its condemnation of Salman Rushdie and his novel. This is exemplified by coverage of Sayed Abdul Quddus (which has been mentioned a number of times in this chapter). Quddus was often described as a 'Muslim leader', and was extremely outspoken in his views, calling not only for Rushdie's assassination by British Muslims, but also stating that he would carry this out himself if he was given the chance (Daily Star Foreign Desk, 1989). The reporting of Quddus's views was generally problematic however – with a number of factors contributing to this. Generally speaking, as has been outlined in this chapter, Quddus was described as a 'Muslim leader' or 'leading Muslim'. This was also something noted by Elgamri (2010) in his analysis of a similar sample (2010: 110). This portrayal of Quddus is likely to have led readers to believe that to some extent, a majority of (if not all) British Muslims agreed with his views on the Rushdie incident (which is also something noted by Elgamri (2010:110)). Quddus's coverage as a 'Muslim leader' would not be so problematic if his opinion was offset by other views contrary to his own personal analysis, but when this is the case, competing views tend to come either from the journalist themselves or from other non-Muslim sources. The analysis carried out here did not identify a single instance of Quddus's view being contrasted with a different view from another British Muslim. This portrayal of Quddus's views as representative of the views of all British Muslims was compounded further by the way in which Quddus himself articulated his opinions – as well as the particular quotations from him which were selected to go to press. This is exemplified by the quotation from Quddus mentioned earlier, which states that 'There are any number of our people who would willingly carry out what to us would not be a crime but a justified act' (Doran, 1989b). The use of the terms 'our' and 'us' here implies that Muslims (or perhaps more specifically, British Muslims) are a monolithic group who share one single opinion – in this case that the execution of Salman Rushdie for blasphemy would be justified. Quddus's use of the phrase 'our people' might invoke images of a businesslike organisation – 'our people' being a phrase commonly used in a business setting to describe one's employees or colleagues. Although Quddus is a British Muslim who has a right to his own opinion, the way in which he is implicitly represented here as a spokesperson for British Muslims in their entirety is problematic. Pragmatically, it may have been difficult for a journalist to find British Muslims who were willing to speak out against the death threats because anyone doing so would be likely to feel intimidated. There are many other ways in which the article could have made it clear that Quddus's views did not represent the views of British Muslims in their entirety however, which it does not.

The examples above are not representative of the entire sample. What they do show however, are instances where the press either prevented British Muslim voices from being heard, or portrayed those voices as a single, negative voice. The absence of positive Muslim voices suggested here is of great interest to this study. It seems that when Muslims are allowed to 'speak' in the press, it tends to be that what is said is something negative. These negatives would not necessarily be to the detriment of *everyone*, but they are negative to Britain's 'majority group' – either directly or ideologically. In this way, Muslims are represented as an 'other' through the portrayal of their views and the controlled release of voice – they are represented as a self-serving, different, and monolithic group.

Othering

The process above is not the only way in which Muslims were 'othered' by the press in the sample analysed. These processes ranged from the debatable and extremely subtle – such as the use of different titles to describe characters in the story such as Rushdie and Khomeini, to the more overt – such as the assumption that British Muslims are also at some level, foreign to Britain (as described previously in the section 'conflation'). Other instances were also noted – such as the use of the term 'public' when describing the book-burnings which took place in Bradford as part of the *Satanic Verses* incident. What all of these processes have in common is that they create the image of British Muslims as a separate 'other' group within Britain. This process of 'othering' works in tandem with the other two processes described above – be it through a mechanistic link as with British Muslims who are treated as if foreign to their own country, or through an ideological link – such as the issues connected to voice described in the previous section. It should also be noted that not all of the processes are concerned specifically with *British* Muslims – this underlines the coverage of Muslims *worldwide* as a single monolith – which further enables the othering process. Whether this overall process is something which is mirrored or linked to a similar process where British South Asians are concerned remains to be seen – and is something which is considered in later chapters – but this seems likely given the demographic link between a British Muslim and British South Asian identity, and the process of covering British Muslims as 'foreign' outlined here.

Chapter Six

Analysis of British National Press Coverage of the Bradford 'Race' Riots

07.07.2001 – 14.07.2001

Introduction

This chapter presents analysis of press coverage of the so-called Bradford Race Riots of 2001. Although this is the second case study included in this thesis, no comparative analysis is carried out here. This chapter details analysis of the Bradford Riots only – all comparative analysis with other case studies is detailed in Chapter Eight. For a quantitative description of the data sampled for use in this chapter, please see the Appendix to Chapter Six.

The riots which took place in Bradford, Yorkshire in 2001 are not examined in any detail in Chapter Two of this thesis – although factors involved in setting the scene for them (such as the 1995 Manningham Riots, and the riots which had occurred previously in 2001 in other towns such as Burnley and Oldham) are. For this reason, an overview of the events involved in the 2001 Bradford Riots is included here in order to put the analysis which follows it into context.

As with many riots, there are a number of root-causes which have been suggested for the Bradford Riots of 2001. The Bradford Riots were especially chaotic however, in that no one 'spark event' seems to have triggered the initial outbreak of the violence which took place – which is unusual even when compared to the majority of the serious riots described in Chapter Two of this thesis. Like Oldham, Burnley, and many other formerly industrial towns and cities in northern England, Bradford is an area which has suffered from economic deprivation, as well as a lack of integration/a process of balkanisation between the various ethnic communities who live there (Kundnani 2001: 106-107). Kundnani describes how many of northern England's Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities were in fact amongst the most impoverished 1 per cent of all people in Britain (2001: 106). These factors are all likely to have added to the tension which led to riots occurring in 2001, which Kundnani describes as 'the violence of communities fragmented by colour lines, class lines and police lines... the violence of hopelessness... the violence of the violated' (2001: 105). The Ouseley Report, which happened to be being carried out at around the time of the Bradford Riots expressed similar concerns:

> The key concern in the District is that relationships between different cultural communities should be improving, but instead they are deteriorating. There are signs that communities are fragmenting along racial, cultural and faith lines (Ouseley, 2001: 6).

A similar situation is described by Hemmerman *et.al* (2007) in the nearby city of Leeds, where the 'drivers of racist hostility' were found to include 'white resentment of black and minority ethnic families' ability to access social housing, jealousy of lifestyle and possessions, and perceptions of unfair preferential treatment' (2007: 76). Kundnani's analysis (above), suggests that here groups of society's 'have-nots' have become balkanised along racial lines – breeding not only resentment between groups, but also suspicion of the motives and methods of others. This was also a theme in a recent Channel Four documentary – *Make Bradford British* (2012), where residents of Bradford often expressed surprise when they learned first-hand about similarities between the cultures of people from other ethnic groups within their home city, and their own culture. Although the examples above involve only cities located in West Yorkshire, this phenomenon is by no means thought to be limited to this particular geographical area – Amin (2003) and Kalra and Rhodes (2009) both describe a similar situation as having developed in the towns of Burnley and Oldham – located in Lancashire and Greater Manchester respectively. In the case of Oldham, an official report conducted following the Oldham Riots found that:

> One consequence of separate development has been the growth of myths... e.g. that all the Council's money is used to help the Asians, or that the police deliberately fomented the riots' (Oldham Independent Review, 2001: 9).

Whilst all of these locations are in the north of England, it is likely that social deprivation since the end of the Industrial Revolution era has played a role here – explaining why fewer examples of this type of resentment appear to occur in the more affluent south. Phillips (2006) points out that the blame for the social polarisation which led to such resentment fell 'squarely on the shoulders of the British Muslim population' (2006: 28), and mentions that reports following the northern disturbances of 2001:

> Generally held minority ethnic communities accountable for enduring inner-city 'problems', whereas the cultural exclusivity of the white population and the role of white households and institutions in avoiding, abandoning and underinvesting in these areas were rendered largely invisible (Phillips, 2006: 29).

Phillips' analysis of the discussion which was precipitated by the riots in Bradford (and elsewhere) in the summer of 2001 is therefore one which suggests that minority communities – in this case South Asians – were essentially blamed for the situation as a whole. Although Phillips acknowledges that problems of segregation were raised in by this discussion, these problems are seen to have been caused by ethnic minority communities – rather than the community as a whole. In another northern city – Preston – where in 2008 around 50% of all children living in the city were found by a report to be living in families suffering from 'financial deprivation', councillor for the St George's ward (one of the worst affected wards in the city) Taalib Shamsuddin stated that in his opinion large ethnic minority populations were a factor in this because 'there is poor planning when it comes to delivering services to ethnic minorities' (*Lancashire Evening Post*, 2008). Whilst this statement does not expressly blame ethnic minority communities for the deprivation of entire areas experienced in Preston, it identifies that a problem exists in regards to the provision of services for them. Bagguley and Hussain's (2003) analysis of the 'raft' of official reports which appeared following the 2001 riots, states that they 'promulgated an ideology of 'community cohesion' organised around crude functionalist ideas of social integration where we should all come to share a common social identity' (2003: 14). This again suggests that ethnic minority communities (at least at that time) are/were in some way different from other communities, and realistically may need to be provided for in a different way. It is interesting that all of the above accounts concentrate on ethnicity as the 'dividing factor' in the northern towns and cities affected. This fits with Rex's (2005) analysis of the situation that:

> The discussion following the Northern riots made little mention of Islam as an exacerbating factor. Nor did the young white rioters often mention Islam as the basis of their hostility. They simply saw Asians as taking resources away from themselves and leaving them to live in poverty (2005: 237-238).

As this chapter will demonstrate however, this was not always the case in press reporting of the riots – with rioters often described as 'Muslim', and it is argued here that this implicit linking of a South Asian ethnicity to a Muslim religious identity fulfils a number of roles in the representation of an imagined 'other' group in British society.

Newspaper reports on the Bradford Riots did not always agree on the facts of the situation – possibly due to the chaotic nature of the events which unfolded. Although a rally by the far-right

group the National Front (NF) had been planned for July 7th, 2001, this was banned by police before it took place – with only a handful of NF supporters reported to have been sighted by police on the day – who were turned away from the city as they disembarked a train (Mail on Sunday, 2001). There were however early clashes reported between groups of 'white' and 'Asian' people – including the stabbing of two men (Herbert, 2001b; Mail on Sunday, 2001; Mowling, 2001). This is generally blamed on an Anti-Nazi League rally which turned violent when crowds either 'discovered' (BBC, 2008) or heard 'the rumour' (Herbert, 2001b) that a number of white racists had gathered at a nearby pub. Reports of this initial clash are fragmented, with some describing a direct confrontation where white racists shouted abuse at nearby Asians, and others describing a process where rumours of a racist gathering were distributed throughout the crowd, leading to a massed assault on its supposed location. This might be explained by the fact that the Anti-Nazi League demonstration had drawn a large crowd – and the perspective of someone involved in the situation might depend on their geographical location within it. The Anti-Nazi League rally was reported to have consisted largely of 'Asian' people (Moss, 2001) – which might explain how this clash implied a racial dichotomy.

Following a series of relatively small skirmishes reported to have taken place between Asians and whites, a much larger crowd of Asians is reported to have embarked on a rampage in the city centre – which was then forced back into the (largely Asian) Manningham district (Ward, 2001). The crowd did not disperse when faced with police in riot gear – instead tension grew – and over the course of the night, 80 police officers were reported to have been injured (Moss, 2001), with reports of bricks, bottles and fireworks being thrown at police (Herbert, 2001b; Moss, 2001). Shops and pubs were vandalised and set alight, and cars were also torched (Ward, 2001). The disturbances in Bradford were protracted events, causing an estimated seven million pounds worth of damage, injuring over 300 police officers, and resulting in 200 jail sentences (BBC, 2007e).

Quantitative Corpus Analysis

As with the *Satanic Verses* incident sample, the first step in analysing the data for the Bradford Riots was to carry out a quantitative analysis of the corpus using *Wordsmith* (as described in Chapter Four). In order to do this, a number of corpora were again produced from 'very relevant' sampled articles – for each newspaper each day sampled; for the combined newspapers on each day sampled; for each newspaper for every day sampled, and finally one master corpus containing data from every newspaper on every day sampled. Whilst, as previously mentioned, the Bradford Riots

sampling produced 439 articles (of all relevancies)as opposed to just 288 articles for the *Satanic Verses* incident sample. Despite this, the master corpus for the Bradford Riots sample was in fact considerably shorter than that of the *Satanic Verses* incident sample – at 72,290 words as opposed to 123,199 words. Whilst the master corpus for the *Satanic Verses* incident sample contained 252 very relevant articles, the master corpus for the Bradford Riots sample was drawn from just 156. The average article length for the Bradford Riots sample was therefore 463 words. Detailed data concerning the word length of individual corpora can be found in the Appendix to Chapter Six – Tables A6.1-A6.10.

Even in the early stages of quantitative analysis, some interesting data was produced by the Bradford Riots sample. Tables A6.1-A6.10 show that although on average the longest articles were published in Sunday newspapers – specifically *The Sunday Telegraph* and *The Sunday Times* at an average of 863 and 824, these may be anomalous in that each of these papers published only one article on the day sampled – producing an average of one. The next highest average article length came from the *Daily Mail* at 734 words – which is a more reliable average drawn from a total of 11 articles. This is interesting, because the *Daily Mail* is a mid-market/tabloid newspaper, yet on this subject its average article was longer than any of the broadsheet newspapers in the sample (with the exceptions of *The Sunday Telegraph* and *The Sunday Times*, as stated). Normally a broadsheet newspaper would be expected to produce a larger average figure. One influential factor in this anomaly could be the publication of reader's letters to the editor, which were individually logged as separate articles in the sample. Although as mentioned in Chapter Five, these letters are included in the sample for good reason, they are by their nature considerably shorter than standard articles (as well as often printed in batches/separate articles), which may have skewed the average word length towards a shorter value for any newspaper which printed a series of them. In this case therefore, the average word length of published articles does not represent a reliable indicator of the depth of coverage provided by a specific newspaper. Data drawn from the Sunday newspapers might be especially anomalous in that it was drawn from the first day following the riots. This would mean that not only was the story extremely current news, but also that comparatively little would have been known about the events – with journalists having had limited time to research the day's occurrences.

Despite the above problems with the usability of data on average article length, averages were produced for weekday broadsheet, middle market and tabloid newspapers in the same manner as was carried out for the *Satanic Verses* incident sample. The newspapers were again separated as follows:

Weekday Broadsheets (72 Articles Total)

The Times

The Guardian

The Independent

Daily Telegraph

Weekday Middle Market Tabloids (34 Articles Total)

Daily Express

Daily Mail

Weekday Red Top Tabloids (31 Articles Total)

Daily Mirror

Daily Star

The Sun

Although the distinction is not large, the average article lengths for the three different types of newspapers listed above are in the order which would normally be expected. Broadsheet articles were longest, at an average of 510 words; followed by middle market articles at an average of 487 words; and finally red top articles at an average of 337 words. The distinction identified here is much less apparent than that of the *Satanic Verses* incident sample, which may be a fact of some interest. It might be that as a 'home affairs' story (as opposed to the 'world news' story of the *Satanic Verses* incident), the Bradford Riots were of more interest to the middle market and red top tabloid newspapers – red top tabloids especially often eschewing coverage of world affairs in favour of more domestic issues.

Analysis of Main Corpus

As with Chapter Five, following the basic preliminary analysis of corpus size presented above, the next stage was to begin analysis of the master corpus, which contains data for every newspaper sampled, for every day of the sample. This allows an overall picture to be formed of the 'shape' of the data, before more focussed methods of quantitative analysis, and finally an extremely focussed qualitative analysis are carried out.

Wordsmith reports that in the 72,290 word corpus, a total of 6,933 unique words are used. Again, this figure includes commonly used words, as well as alternate spellings and other variations of words. As with Chapter Five, the top 100 words from the Bradford Riots corpus have been included in the Appendix to Chapter Six – table A6.11. Some potentially interesting observations can be made from the top 100 word list – although due to the list's amalgamated nature, their scope for use may be limited. One such observation is the usage of the terms 'Asian' and 'white', which are often used as ethnic descriptors, compared to the term 'riot' itself. 'Asian' appeared as the 24th most used term on the list with 369 instances of use; 'white' was 42nd most common with 245 instances; and 'riot' was the 60th most used, with 154 instances. This is interesting, because it might suggest that newspapers gave more attention to the people (particularly 'groups' of people) involved in the riots, than to the riots themselves. The observation is reinforced when variants of the terms are introduced – as the tables below display. There is an apparent tendency towards words which relate to ethnicity in the sample when compared to words which relate to riots:

Table 6.1 Frequencies of Selected Terms Relating to Ethnicity for All Newspapers 07.07.2001-14.07.2001

Word Rank	Word	Number of Instances
24	ASIAN	369
58	ASIANS	158
208	PAKISTANI	46
614	PAKISTANIS	16
730	BANGLADESHI	13
1006	BANGLADESHIS	9
371	INDIAN	26
3249	INDIANS	2
42	WHITE	245
192	WHITES	50

Table 6.2 Frequency of the Term 'riot' and Selected Related Terms for All Newspapers 07.07.2001-14.07.2001

Word Rank	Word	Number of Instances
60	RIOT	154
51	RIOTS	186
3054	DISTURBANCE	2
262	DISTURBANCES	37
41	VIOLENCE	245
1014	CLASH	9
437	CLASHES	22
1112	CLASHED	8

Another interesting factor here is that the term 'police' was more common than any of the terms above – it was the 13th most frequent term, with 581 instances of use. Again, there are a number of factors which may contribute to this phenomenon – not least the fact that the word 'police' can be used as either a singular or plural if combined with other terms – e.g. 'police officer' or 'police force'. The police also represent an easily defined group for a newspaper reporting retrospectively, as the majority of UK police officers are set apart by their uniform – unlike other groups such as ethnic 'groups', where a distinction can be difficult to make based solely on appearance.

Another group reportedly connected to the rioting was the NF (although as described previously, there is debate over the accuracy of this). The table below lists the frequency of many words which might be used by newspapers to describe NF members and associated groups such as the British National Party (BNP):

Table 6.3 Frequencies of Selected Terms Relating to the National Front Group for All Newspapers 07.07.2001-14.07.2001

Word Rank	Word	Number of Instances
204	NF	47
68	NATIONAL	139
83	FRONT	114
N/A	NATIONALIST	0
189	NAZI	51
2518	NAZIS	3
1286	FASCIST	7
542	FASCISTS	18
177	RACIST	54
1067	RACISTS	9
435	BNP	22

As the actual presence of the NF in Bradford during the riots is debatable, it is difficult to determine the salience of the data in Table 6.3 without further analysis. It is almost certain that the NF played *some* role in provoking the later violence however – the initial disturbances reportedly stemming from a rally which was being held *against* the planned NF march. The extent to which the 'white' people reported to have shouted racist slogans in the street might have been NF sympathisers would be almost impossible to determine. It is clear however that some mention was made to the NF and other far-right organisations within the corpus.

Coverage of Islam Throughout the Corpus

As mentioned previously, there was no evidence that religion played a role in motivating the Bradford Riots of 2001. Many of the people who took part in the rioting were of South Asian ethnicity, and as explained in Chapter Four, one of the factors to be identified by this thesis is whether the press has a tendency to conflate the identity of South Asian ethnic groups in Britain with a 'Muslim' identity, and *vice versa*. Although the two identities are demographically linked (Peach, 2005: 25), there is no reason to presume that simply because someone ethnically identifies themselves as 'South Asian' that they are also a Muslim (or again *vice versa*). Despite this, the term 'Muslim' appears in the word list for the master corpus of articles relevant to the Bradford Riots – it was the 211th most popular term, being used a total of 45 times. Below, Table 6.4 details the frequencies of other terms related to the term 'Muslim', as well as the term 'Mosque', which was included to identify whether any incident situated geographically close to a Mosque might have been the cause of the term 'Muslim' appearing within the corpus:

Table 6.4 Frequency of the Term 'Muslim' and Selected Related Terms for All Newspapers 07.07.2001-14.07.2001

Word Rank	Word	Number of Instances
211	MUSLIM	45
468	MUSLIMS	21
814	MOSLEM	12
2508	MOSLEMS	3
3281	ISLAM	2
1657	ISLAMIC	5
1685	MOSQUE	5

The inclusion of the above terms in the corpus almost certainly represents an interesting phenomenon in the context of this thesis. Although these terms were relatively insignificant in the word list when compared to terms descriptive of ethnicity, the terms 'Muslim' and 'Muslims' are unusual enough in this context that their inclusion so frequently in the corpus is of great interest to this thesis. This is something which will be analysed more closely using collocation analysis later in the chapter.

Because book burnings were carried out in Bradford during the *Satanic Verses* incident, it is possible that the references to Muslims noted above could conceivably have been caused by newspapers linking the Bradford Riots to the Rushdie incident in some way. However, as Table 6.5 shows, references to the *Satanic Verses* incident seem to be uncommon in the Bradford Riots corpus – especially when compared to terms such as 'Muslim', meaning that this is unlikely to have been the case.

Table 6.5 Frequency of the Term 'Rushdie' and Selected Related Terms for All Newspapers 07.07.2001-14.07.2001

Word Rank	Word	Number of Instances
1733	RUSHDIE	5
2624	SALMAN	3
3598	SATANIC	2
3762	VERSES	2
4004	AUTHOR	1

Table A6.12 details particular newspapers which printed terms included in Table 6.4 (which have been amalgamated under the heading 'Muslim terms'. In order to conserve space, Table A6.12 was included as an appendix. As can be seen from Table A6.12, only the corpora for certain newspapers contained terms including or relating to the term 'Muslim'. These newspapers were:

The Daily Express
The Daily Mail
The Daily Telegraph
The Guardian
The Independent
The Times

The distinction between newspapers which did use these particular terms during the sample is interesting, because the above newspapers represent the entirety of the broadsheet and middle-market newspapers in the sample. No Sunday newspapers or red-top tabloid newspapers were observed to have used any of the terms in Table 6.4 in the course of their sampled reporting. Although some newspapers used the selected terms more than others in absolute terms, the measure of frequency introduced in Table A6.12 also takes account of corpus size. Statistically, one of the terms was used for every 777.3 other words in the master corpus. It is also interesting to note that only the 'middle market' newspapers *The Daily Express* and *The Daily Mail* used the spelling 'Moslem/Moslems' (although *The Daily Express* did also use the spelling 'Muslim').

The clear-cut distinction between the 'types' of newspapers which used the terms in Table A6.12 might suggest more than simply that they were favoured by some newspapers more than others. This is because the Sunday newspapers were sampled from only one day – the first day in the sample. If a piece of news related to the riots and involving a Muslim or Muslims came to light later in the week, then there would have been no chance for the Sunday newspapers to have reported on it within this sample. In the case of the red-top tabloids, the superficial reporting style suggested by the small size of these newspaper's sampled corpora implies that little analysis of the riots was carried out. In the case of a story where the 'Muslim terms' would be likely to appear, this may have prevented it from appearing in the red-top tabloids.

In order to examine the context within which the terms in Table A6.12 were used, a collocation analysis was carried out using the master corpus (all newspapers on all days). The collocation analysis was produced for all the terms except 'Mosque' (which had only been introduced as a form

of 'control' term). The search string used was therefore "Muslim/Muslims/Moslem/Moslems/Islam/Islamic". With relatively little data (a total of 88 instances of terms, once 'Mosque' is disregarded), the collocated terms found were limited in number, but some interesting findings were produced regardless of this. Table 6.6 includes collocated terms of the search string terms, but disregards common terms which were returned such as 'and', 'of' and 'the'.

Table 6.6 'Uncommon' Terms Collocated With Muslim/Muslims/Moslem/Moslems/Islam/Islamic Terms for All Newspapers 07.07.2001-14.07.2001

Term	Search Term Collocated With	Instances of Collocation
COMMUNITIES	MUSLIM	10
COMMUNITIES	MOSLEM	5
NOT	MUSLIM	10
ALL	MUSLIM	6
WHITE	MUSLIM	6
BY	MUSLIM	6
YOUNG	MUSLIMS	6
YOUNG	MUSLIM	5

Some of the terms in Table 6.6 are self-explanatory. References to 'Muslim communities' are a common occurrence in newspaper reporting when British Muslims are mentioned. It is interesting however, that here it is the plural 'communities', rather than the singular 'community' which is regularly collocated with the search terms. This implies that newspapers which did mention Muslims in terms of community, did so whilst acknowledging that there are *multiple* communities within Britain associated with Muslims – rather than one single monolithic community. The term 'Young' is also reasonably self explanatory. The more detailed collocation data produced by *Wordsmith*, but not included in Table 6.6 shows that in all but two instances of collocation, the term 'young' occurred one place to the left of either 'Muslims' or 'Muslim' – clearly describing 'young Muslims' in either case. This is interesting because it was reported that the majority of people partaking in the Bradford Riots were 'youths' e.g. – BBC (2001a). This might mean that 'young Muslims' were being discussed with reference to having taken part in the riots, which is interesting, given that as previously described, there appears to have been no direct religious motivation for their occurrence.

The terms 'not' and 'all' are slightly more difficult to explain as collocate terms. Although these terms might appear self-explanatory – perhaps stating that the people involved in the riots were 'not

Muslim', or were 'all Muslim', the more detailed collocation data reveals that they were only used in the L1[127] position twice each. A similar problem is encountered with the collocate term 'by' – which might imply that newspapers were suggesting the riots had been caused 'by Muslims'. 'By' does not appear in the L1 position at all within the sample however, lowering the likelihood that this was the case. Given that the term 'young' seemed to form a repeated pattern when collocated with the terms included in the search string described above, it was selected for further investigation. Extracts A6.1-A6.12 in the Appendix to Chapter Six detail every instance of collocation between the term 'young' and a term included in the search string used above – with factors thought to be salient in this context now analysed.

Of the twelve extracts returned by this collocation, three relate to remarks made by the Labour MP Ann Cryer, who made comments concerning immigration into Britain which were aimed largely at Muslims coming into the country. Cryer did not seem to make any explicit mention of the riots in Bradford, but there is reason to believe that she intended her comments to provide comment on their possible cause (certainly this seems to be the way in which the comments were received by the press). At the time, she was the MP for Keighley (a town around ten miles away from Bradford), and her statement not only focussed on Muslims and people of South Asian ethnicity, but also came just days after the riots. Cryer's comments reportedly included the statement that cross-continental arranged marriages amongst Britain's Muslims were 'importing poverty' (Hurst, 2001a) and she called for curbs on allowing Asian immigrants into the country if they could not speak English (Dodd, 2001a). Given the way in which this chapter demonstrates the widespread linking of certain South Asian ethnicities with a Muslim identity by the media during the Bradford Riots, Cryer's comments would seem to refer to events in Bradford quite specifically (if indirectly). Cryer's is not the only voice from the political elite which is 'heard' through these extracts – one (Extract A6.7) coming from an article written by the then Home Secretary David Blunkett, and another (Extract A6.10) containing from the paraphrasing of David Blunkett. Extract A6.7 is of some interest in this context – coming as it does from a member of the political elite (David Blunkett), as well as making a now familiar opposition between 'white' and 'Muslim'. This same extract was also sampled as part of a different collocation analysis where the focus was placed on the term 'white' however – and as such is analysed in more detail later in this chapter (although the extract was included a second time in the Appendix to Chapter Six (as Extract A6.13) for clarity). Another extract (Extract A6.9) describes how 'Muslim leaders' had jointly condemned the violence in Bradford as 'un-Islamic' (Ward and Wainwright, 2001) – which is yet another example of the quoting of 'leaders' to represent Britain's

[127] One space to the left of the search term – L2 would be two spaces to the left, and R3 three spaces to the right for example.

Muslims, rather than ordinary people. In this case this is especially interesting, given the indirect links between Islam and the 2001 Bradford Riots, but it should be noted that this trend was continued throughout the three case studies presented in this thesis. Further analysis of this phenomenon is presented in Chapter Eight, when the three case studies are compared side by side.

Three of the twelve extracts (Extracts A6.2, A6.3 and A6.4) come from a single article printed in *The Independent* (Alibhai-Brown, 2001). This article is interesting for a number of reasons – not least that although it seems to take a pragmatic approach to events in Bradford, it still continues to refer to participants of the riots as 'Muslim'. Another seldom-used term is also used to describe rioters in terms of ethnicity here however – 'brown'. This term is used twice to describe people in Bradford – once alongside the term 'white' – 'I am referring to both internal and external chaos, and the ways in which both affect the brown and white inhabitants who are too readily aroused' (Alibhai-Brown, 2001). The second time the term is used in this way, it is to describe the burning of the *Satanic Verses* by Bradford Muslims in 1988, which is linked to the 2001 riots by Alibhai-Brown by means of a historical analysis of the city – 'for the metropolitan elite, excitable brown chaps who had read the Koran but not Proust were of no consequence' (ibid). Use of the term 'brown' to describe people of South Asian ethnicity is by no means common, and this was certainly the case in the sample for the Bradford Riots – the term 'brown' appearing just 5 times throughout the master corpus (two instances of which are described above). It appears as though Alibhai-Brown's use of the term may reflect an idiosyncrasy on the part of the writer, and although the term is uncommon, it would certainly seem to be no more offensive than terms such as 'white' or 'black' are as approximations of a person's skin colour. In fact, the term 'brown' may be quite useful in this instance, as it describes the ethnicity of some of the participants of the riots without using the somewhat unwieldy term 'South Asian', the 'catch-all' term 'Asian', or the wrongly used (in this context) religious term 'Muslim'.

Use of the term 'Muslim' in another extract – Extract A6.5, is again problematic. Here, the article (this time from *The Guardian*) paraphrases a quote from Allan Brack, the director of Bradford Festival, – an event which was cancelled in 2001 over fears of clashes caused by tension from the planned NF rally in the city (Wainwright, 2001). The statement attributed to Brack in Extract A6.5 is that:

> Increasing self-segregation in Bradford schools had created a "self-imposed ghettoisation" which was stopping young Muslims from being assimilated in the traditional way of immigrants (Wainwright, 2001).

Whilst there is no way of knowing whether these were Brack's exact words – given that only part of the quotation is direct, the above extract represents a highly problematic statement – at least in the isolated context presented above – because it seems to imply that all Bradford's Muslims are immigrants to Britain. The article as a whole, does not problematise this statement in any way – with no further mention being made of immigration or immigrants. The terms 'Asian' and 'Muslim' continued to be used interchangeably for the duration of the article however – as demonstrated by the two further extracts below (emphasis added in bold):

> Arrests climbed to more than 40 as detectives followed up hours of video film showing rioters - mostly young **Asians** making little or no attempt to disguise themselves - torching cars and hurling missiles at riot police (ibid)

> Anger in the city was focusing on allegedly out-of-control youths in the **Muslim** community, which has seen tributes to the Hamas Islamic militant movement sprayed on Bradford shops, and on overwhelmingly **white** estates, where teenage gangs have stoned buses, forcing services to be withdrawn (ibid).

In the second extract above, 'Muslim' is also used in opposition to the term 'white' – again suggesting that not only are Muslims always separated from the majority British white society by ethnicity – but that for a white person also to be a Muslim is almost unthinkable. The second extract shown above was immediately followed by a quotation (this time a direct quote) from local restaurateur Jehangir Durrani, who stated that police should crack down hard on those involved 'whether they're white or Asian' (ibid). Here this statement again uses the ethnic descriptors 'white' and 'Asian', but coming as it does straight after a sentence where the term 'white' was used in opposition to the term 'Muslim', it further strengthens the association between 'Asians' and 'Muslims'. In the overall context of the article – including the unproblematised statement by Brack described above, the article makes a number of implicit claims, none of which can be substantiated (or are in fact, true). These claims are that:

- 'Muslims' and' 'Asians' are in fact different ways of naming the same group (at least in the case of Bradford), and can be used interchangeably.
- Muslims (and therefore by extension, Asians) are (or at least tend to be) immigrants to Britain.
- The Muslim/Asian 'group' exists as a completely separate entity to the white community.

If the statements above are problematised, each one can be said to hold a grain of truth – if not in the case of the whole of Britain, then at least in the case of Bradford. Muslims in Bradford do *tend* to be of Pakistani or Bangladeshi ethnicity, but this is not *always* the case. There *are* Muslims and South Asians who are immigrants to Britain, but there are also many who are not. Finally, whilst Bradford exists in a state where communities are often divided on ethnic or religious lines, there are almost certainly examples where this is not the case – and to suggest that this is the way things are or have to be by normalising the situation is to accept than nothing about it can or should be changed.

Extract A6.11 is of some interest here, although it should be noted that it was taken from a letter to the editor of *The Independent* newspaper, rather than an article written by *The Independent* itself (Rahman, 2001). The letter was written by Miran Rahman, a resident of St Peter Port, Guernsey, in response to another letter printed by *The Independent* two days earlier, from Sir David Hargreaves (Hargreaves, 2001). Rahman (2001) mentions a stereotype which he claims was in operation in Britain at the time, where young Muslims are portrayed as 'surly, violent and criminally inclined, as opposed to their articulate and urbane Hindu counterparts' (Rahman, 2001). This is interesting, because it not only makes a distinction between British Muslims and another religious group commonly associated with a South Asian ethnic identity (Peach, 2005: 22) – Hindus, but also because it seems at odds with a statement made in Extract A6.3 by Alibhai-Brown, that:

> Most Asian men, even young hot-head Muslims, do not act this destructively even if they are victims of deprivation, racism and neo-Nazism. If anything Asian men have found it difficult to gain respect in this society because they are seen as weaklings' (Alibhai-Brown, 2001).

These two statements are contradictory, because where Rahman seems to suggest that young British Muslims are stereotyped as aggressive and violent, Alibhai-Brown amalgamates male 'Asians' including 'hot-head Muslims' under one heading, and notes that they are often seen as 'weaklings'.

The contradiction in these two stereotypes is at odds with the assertion made by Alexander (2000), that:

> Representations of 'the Asian community' have moved from a concern with a uniformly victim status to that of perpetrator – a reinvention of passive recipient to active combatant (Alexander, 2000: 7).

Whilst Alexander's view is compatible with that of Rahman above, clearly in July 2001, some debate still existed over the stereotypical 'status' (i.e. 'victim' or 'perpetrator' of people of Asian ethnicity in British society). All of the above statements were also made *before* the watershed moment of 9/11 – meaning that this situation is likely to have become further complicated, as perceptions of Muslims as a 'group' (which as mentioned, are quite possibly intertwined with perceptions of South Asians) were further distorted[128]. Outside of the debate regarding stereotypes, these contradictory statements underline problems which exist in identifying a person or a group merely as 'Asian' or 'South Asian'. Whilst identifying an individual simply by a grouping such as ethnicity, religion or class is problematic enough, these problems are amplified further when a broad ethnic grouping such as 'Asian' is applied. Whilst in popular British usage the term 'Asian' generally refers solely to people of South Asian ethnicity – rather than East Asian (as in common American usage), or any of the multitude of other ethnic identities represented across the continent of Asia, this is still far too broad a category to be of any meaningful use in attempts to essentialise a particular culture (which, as stated is already a fruitless task).

Moving on, the collocated term 'white' identified in Table 6.6 may also be of considerable interest given the research interests of this thesis – as it implies that another ethnic dimension might have been introduced to discussion of a religious 'category'. Again, the term 'white' does not appear in the L1 position when collocated with the term 'Muslim' at all – meaning that it is probably not used as simplistically as to describe a 'white Muslim'. Collocated instances of 'white' appear on both sides of the term 'Muslim' – with four occurring on the left side, and two on the right. These instances are included in the Appendix to Chapter 6 – Extracts A6.13-A6.18. A seventh extract is also included – which illustrates the pitfalls of working with data that has been previously digitised by an outside source such as *Lexis Library*. Extract A6.19 is a collocation between 'white' and 'Muslims' which was also highlighted in the concordance produced by *Wordsmith* (although not listed as a collocation,

[128] Poynting and Mason (2006) for instance state that since 9/11, ethnic minorities associated with Islam have experienced 'increased negative attention from the police and security forces in countries allied with the United States' – citing the UK as one prominent example of this (2006: 365).

because it only appears once within the master corpus). When Extract A6.19 is read in conjunction with the other extracts for 'white' and 'Muslim', it is clear that 'Muslims' is in fact a typographic error on behalf of either the original author or *Lexis Library*. This is obvious because Extract A6.19 is in fact a direct quote from the Ouseley Report (as are many of the other extracts produced by this particular collocation). Fortuitously, *Wordsmith* was still able to recognise this collocation, because 'Muslims' was also included in the search string.

When the instances of collocation for 'Muslim' and 'white' are analysed in detail, a slightly different picture of the two term's concurrent usage in the press begins to emerge. Of the seven extracts, five are direct quotes from the Ouseley Report (three of which also appear within the same article) (Extracts A6.15-A6.17), one comes from an article written by the (then) Home Secretary David Blunkett (Extract A6.13), and just one is from an article written by an actual regular newspaper journalist – Peter Simple[129] (Extract A6.14). This means that of the instances of collocation identified for 'white' and 'Muslim', six out of seven originated in, or came directly from elite political discourse – with just the one remaining instance having been produced by the press itself. Whilst the fact that these particular quotes were selected for publication from the 47 page Ouseley Report (Ouseley, 2001) is interesting, this thesis is concerned with press content rather than elite discourse. What these findings suggest however, is that a distinction between 'white' and 'Muslim' people was commonly made by elites at the highest levels of political power in the United Kingdom in 2001. Whilst this produces a rather negative image of the British political establishment, it is important to remember that the Ouseley Report was not concerned directly with the Bradford Riots of 2001. In fact, the report had been written before they occurred (BBC, 2001b) – and was therefore concerned with the 'root issues' of the extant problems in Bradford (which had already been highlighted by the Manningham Riots of 1995). The fact that it was published just days after the 2001 riots took place appears to have been completely coincidental (BBC, 2001b). As Herman Ouseley was the Chairperson of the Commission for Racial Equality (and therefore able to speak with some authority in the area), it also follows that the extract from the article written by David Blunkett (Extract A6.13) may simply paraphrase what was written in the Ouseley Report.

The isolated instance of collocation written by a professional journalist (Extract A6.14) is interesting in the context of this thesis (although it is impossible to make any kind of generalised statement from a sample of just one article). Although 'Peter Simple' was renowned as a journalist for his 'infamous war on reality' (The Telegraph, 2005), and often wrote of imaginary characters as a form

[129] 'Peter Simple' was actually the pseudonym of the late journalist Michael Wharton (The Telegraph, 2005).

of satire, the article which Extract A6.14 is taken from does not exhibit these features – rather it is a reasonably factual piece (Simple, 2001). Simple makes a binary opposition between 'Muslim Pakistani' and 'white English' people, and relates this directly to the Bradford Riots, stating that the riots represented 'genuine, unmistakable hatred' (ibid). Whilst Simple may also have been attempting to paraphrase the Ouseley Report with this statement, his use of the term 'English' implies that this is not the case. To describe 'white' rioters as 'English' whilst placing this depiction in direct opposition to 'Muslim Pakistani' rioters implies that Simple did not consider 'Muslim Pakistanis' to be English. Here, if the sentence is read literally, Simple is correct – Muslim Pakistanis are not, by definition, English – rather they are Pakistani. As there are no reports of any Pakistani citizens having taken part in the Bradford Riots, however, it seems more likely that Simple refers to the British Pakistani people of Bradford involved in the riots – who were indeed, by definition, English. Simple's statement is also problematic in that it amalgamates all people of Pakistani ethnicity as being Muslim – which is incorrect. Although Peach (2005) mentions that 'Pakistanis and Bangladeshis [in Britain] are almost entirely Muslim' (2005: 25), this does not mean that every single British Pakistani should be automatically assumed to be Muslim – or even religious at all. In fact, data presented by Peach reveals that of Britain's 714,826 citizens of Pakistani ethnicity, and 280,830 of Bangladeshi ethnicity, 657,316 and 259,833 identified themselves as 'Muslim' in the 2001 Census (Peach, 2005: 21). This means that 57,510 Britons of Pakistani ethnicity and 20,997 of Bangladeshi ethnicity – a total of 78,507 people would have been misrepresented in 2001 (according to official statistics) by a statement that 'all British Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are Muslim'. Although this is a small number when compared to the total population of the country, it represents around 7.9% of the people of Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnicity in the UK. Whilst for the most part then, it is true to state that a British person of Pakistani or Bangladeshi ethnicity is *likely* to describe themselves as 'Muslim', this is by no means a universal truth, and to suggest it is, is to misrepresent a large number of people. This section has identified that conflation between 'Asians' and 'Muslims' was commonplace in the press during the period sampled for the Bradford Riots study. The next section focuses more specifically on coverage of ethnicity in an attempt to further inform the analysis above.

Coverage of Ethnicity Throughout the Corpus

'Asians'

Although the above section has said a little about the way in which issues of race and ethnicity were covered by the press at the time of the Bradford Riots, here the analysis moves on to consider this in more detail. As race and ethnicity have been purported to have been motivational factors for this particular set of riots, their coverage here is of special interest. The frequency of many terms used to describe different ethnic groups has already been covered in this chapter, by Table 6.1, and it is here that this deeper analysis begins. The most commonly used terms to describe ethnicity in Table 6.1 are derivatives of either 'white' or 'Asian', but another set of terms of possible interest (especially in the light of the quote from Simple (2001) in Extract A6.14, and discussed above), relate specifically to 'Pakistani' people. Although the UN recognises 'Southern Asia' as consisting of 9 separate countries (United Nations Statistics Division, 2011), statistically it is Pakistan, Bangladesh and India which are most commonly associated with South Asian ethnic identities in Britain (Peach, 2005: 21). In the case of Bradford, a South Asian ethnic identity is also statistically likely to mean a Pakistani ethnic identity (Office for National Statistics, 2009) – a case not uncommon in the northern English post-industrial landscape. In fact, Bradford's strong association with a Pakistani ethnicity has earned the city the nickname 'Bradistan' in some quarters (Shackle, 2010). But as can be seen from the quote from Simple (2001), these statistics sometimes lead people to assume that *all* British South Asian people are of Pakistani heritage – either not knowing or not caring of the rich diversity which is to be found within the culture of the South Asian subcontinent, and misrepresenting a great number of people. This lack of distinction is also visible in racial slurs such as 'Paki' – a term which appears 14 times within the master corpus (3 instances of 'Paki' and 11 instances of 'Pakis') – and is often used by racists to denigrate anyone who appears to belong to a South Asian ethnic group. Cole (1998) goes even further when describing the slur 'Paki', stating that it is 'relatively unrelated to Pakistan' (1998: 40), and has in fact become:

> A generic term for anyone who is perceived to be from a specific alien stock (biological racism) and/or is believed to engage in certain alien cultural practices, based, for example, around religion, dress or food (cultural racism) (Cole, 1998: 40).

This is also noted by Copsey (2010) with regards to 'football casual' (hooligan) culture:

> Many casuals still harbour racist attitudes towards Asians who are often, regardless of where they are from, be it India, Sri Lanka or Bangladesh, all lumped together as 'Pakis'. (Copsey, 2010: 11).

It should be pointed out that the term 'Paki' appears within the corpus only to describe either the actions of certain people in Bradford at the time of the riots, or racism more generally – it is not suggested here that a mainstream British newspaper would use such a term in its everyday reporting[130].

The importance of the 'Pakistani' (more specifically 'British Pakistani') identity in relation to newspaper coverage of British South Asians in Bradford at the time of the riots is illustrated by the frequency of terms used in Table 6.1. 'Pakistani' and its plural 'Pakistanis' are used a total of 62 times in the master corpus, whilst 'Indian' (and plural) is used only 28 times, and 'Bangladeshi' (and plural) is used just 22 times. This suggests that of the three South Asian 'national' identities most commonly associated with British South Asians, the 'Pakistani' identity stood out in the coverage as the most commonly reported. This is perhaps logical, given Bradford's ethnic makeup – where the majority of people of South Asian ethnicity living in Bradford are of Pakistani heritage. Because of the importance of ethnicity – particularly a Pakistani ethnicity to the coverage, a collocation analysis for the search term 'Pakistani*' was produced using *Wordsmith*.

Perhaps because of the relatively small amount of data contained in the sample for the software to analyse (62 instances), the collocation analysis for 'Pakistani*' produced largely inconclusive results. Collocate terms were limited to common terms such as 'the' and 'of', with the exception of two cases – 'Bangladeshi', which was collocated with 'Pakistani' 8 times, and 'youths', which was collocated with 'Pakistani' 5 times. Every instance where 'Bangladeshi' was collocated with 'Pakistani' involved either the phrase 'Pakistani and Bangladeshi' (5 instances) or the reverse – 'Bangladeshi and Pakistani' (3 instances). 'Pakistani and Bangladeshi' was in fact the only commonly used 'cluster' of words identified by *Wordsmith* – underlining the phrase's importance within this aspect of the sample. This perhaps says more about the coverage of British Bangladeshis in the sample than it does of British Pakistanis – illustrating how British people of Bangladeshi ethnicity

[130] In order to substantiate this, a concordance was produced which listed every use of the term 'Paki' or 'Pakis' within the corpus. In every case the term in question was used either as part of a quotation – e.g. "they shouted 'Pakis' at us", or in order to *describe* a racist attitude towards British South Asian people.

might tend to be amalgamated with 'Pakistani' groups. To further demonstrate this, a collocation analysis was also produced for the search term 'Bangladeshi*'. The only 'uncommon' collocate term that this analysis returned was the term 'Pakistani' (which, as with the analysis for 'Pakistani*', was collocated 8 times). Because there were only 22 instances of the search term 'Bangladeshi*' (i.e. 'Bangladeshi' or 'Bangladeshis') within the master corpus, this means that around 36% of the time either term appeared within the sample, 'Pakistani' was collocated with it. What this suggests is that when British Bangladeshis were covered by the press, there also tended to be reference to British Pakistanis. Again, because of the small/limited sample used in the analysis presented here, broad conclusions cannot be drawn from it, but this is an interesting finding nonetheless – and suggests the amalgamation of the two 'groups' by the press. A collocation analysis for the search term 'Indian*' returned neither 'Pakistani' or 'Bangladeshi' as common collocates – suggesting that when British people of Indian ethnicity were covered outside of the 'catch-all' term 'Asian', they were covered separately to the two other ethnic groups identified here.

The other term identified as a collocate of 'Pakistani*' – 'youths' is interesting in that all 5 instances of collocation included 'youths' in the R1 position – forming the phrase 'Pakistani youths'. As previously mentioned, the bulk of the rioting in Bradford is reported to have involved youths (BBC 2001a), suggesting that this phrase may have appeared in the context of describing the rioters themselves. Here again, there is possibly a degree of amalgamation – as although the *majority* of people of South Asian ethnicity living in Bradford are of Pakistani heritage, this is by no means the case in every instance. In order to further investigate this, all 5 instances of the phrase 'Pakistani youths' in the master corpus are included as appendices – Extract A6.20-Extract A6.24. It is interesting to note that these extracts were drawn from just two sources – with four coming from a single article, and the fifth from a letter to the editor. This analysis also mirrors that carried out previously in this chapter for the terms 'young' and 'Muslim'.

The article containing four instances of the phrase 'Pakistani youths' details comments made by Hashmukh Shah, who was spokesperson for the World Council of Hindus and who was reported to have lived in Bradford for 33 years (Roy, 2001). Despite this, it is interesting to note that Shah is also described as an 'Indian businessman' in the article. Shah's comments pin the blame for the Bradford Riots firmly on the city's British Pakistani communities – specifically British Pakistanis who are also Muslim. One quote in particular – that Bradford's Mosques are/were 'less religious centres, more like training grounds for the Taliban' (Roy, 2001) is not only derogatory towards Bradford's practicing Muslim citizens, but also interesting in that it represents a link being drawn between the Afghan

Taliban group, and British Muslims. Whilst in more recent years, links have been made between the two groups in the media due to stories concerning British Muslims travelling to Afghanistan to assist the Taliban in operations against outside security forces stationed there as part of the 'War on Terror' (e.g. Kirkup, 2012), Shah's comments were made in July 2001 – two months before 9/11 and the beginning of the 'War on Terror'. This would appear to support Said's (1997) assertion that Muslims are covered by the media as 'potential terrorists' (1997: 28) – a statement which was made long before the advent of the 'War on Terror'. As with the majority of distinctions between 'white' and 'Muslim' people made in the press and described in the previous section, it is interesting to note that Extracts A6.20-A6.24 are all drawn from sources outside of the media, which have been given 'voice' through the article itself.

Whilst the quotes from Shah outlined in Roy (2001) are disparaging about British Pakistanis who live in Bradford, the other article (actually a letter) which used the phrase 'Pakistani youths' represents perhaps the opposite opinion (Rashid, 2001). The letter was written by Amar Rashid from Bradford, who describes the riots as having 'emancipated' him from the 'coolie class' 'suffered by by the first and second generation of Pakistani Asians living in Bradford' (Rashid, 2001). Rashid seems ambivalent about the violence which took place – stating that although he 'should' feel ashamed about it, he does not[131]. The Bradford Pakistani community described by Rashid is one forced into a certain area of the city – the 'coolie area' (presumably this includes Manningham, given that Rashid states that the riots took place in this same area), and one which suffers 'constant' racial abuse from 'white people' 'whom, when they are sober, do not consider themselves racists' (Rashid, 2001). Whilst this description of 'white people' certainly represents a racial stereotype (that British 'white people' have a tendency to drink too much and become racist/abusive), it might also symbolize the experiences of someone who has often suffered racial abuse in a society where such a thing is not only illegal, but also widely considered to be wrong. This racism might not always be as direct as a slur or attack, but often takes the form of an existing 'status-quo' – where British South Asians (specifically in this case British Pakistanis) are amalgamated together in the 'mainstream' as something other than 'normal'. This is the 'coolie class' described by Rashid – a 'class' which is widely tolerated, but generally disapproved of, and seldom allowed a say in 'mainstream' affairs. Rashid's account represents the Bradford Riots as an expression of the frustrations of this 'class', which were caused by ethnic Pakistani youths demanding the right of full participation in British society. Interestingly, Rashid's analysis of the Bradford Riots of 2001 shares similarities with that of

[131] Rashid goes as far as to say that his own brother-in-law was a police officer who had been injured during the riots.

Abbas (2001) where the Bradford book burnings of 1989 (during the *Satanic Verses* incident) are concerned. Abbas states that:

> The image of the Bradford book-burnings was circulated at the expense of the plight of British South Asian Muslims suffering from the blaspheming of their religion as well as denial of their right to free speech and freedom of expression. Invariably, these groups used the Rushdie book to vent their suffering of being alienated and marginalised in society through years of racist hostility and structural subordination (2001: 252).

Whilst Shah (cited in Roy, 2001) and Rashid (2001) both have very clear (if contradictory) opinions on exactly what caused the Bradford Riots, it is important to note that they themselves both reside in Bradford, and as such are likely to have their own biases and prejudices on the subject. Whilst they may have been privy to information not available to an outside newspaper journalist, the contradictory nature of their accounts suggests that at least one might be flawed. The fact that this line of analysis – as with the previous analysis for the terms 'Muslim' and 'white' – has returned articles containing reference to outside sources is interesting, and suggests that certain topics (in this case, issues involving race or ethnicity) might be breached mostly by proxy in the press. Even in these small samples, this has occurred multiple times, and in a number of different ways – by selecting quotes from elite discourse; by interviewing a 'community leader' who holds outspoken views; or by printing a letter to the editor (which would almost certainly have been selected for publication from a large influx of such material). Whilst Shah (cited in Roy, 2001) might be described as a member of an elite – speaking as he did for a religious organisation, no such claim is made of Rashid (2001) – meaning that his account represents the voice of an 'ordinary' Bradfordian of Pakistani ethnicity. Amongst the texts sampled for qualitative analysis, this was something of a rarity.

It is interesting to note that whilst Extracts A6.20-A6.23 and A6.24 represent voices from within Bradford – specifically from within its South Asian communities, both of them could still be said to reinforce stereotypes about those communities. The quotations from Shah in Roy (2001) (Extracts A6.20-A6.23) – and indeed the whole of the article they are drawn from, do this in a very direct manner – Shah effectively blaming the riots on Pakistani (and by his own extension), Muslim culture. Interestingly, Shah also links this argument back to the *Satanic Verses* incident of 1989 (Extract A6.22), stating that it politicised Pakistani youths in the area. Shah illustrates this by describing how these same Pakistani youths had forced local prostitutes out of the area following this process of

politicisation (Roy, 2001). This seems coherent with the analysis of Alexander (2000) mentioned previously. As also mentioned previously, Shah might invoke the stereotype of the 'Islamic' terrorist – by comparing Bradford's Mosques to 'training grounds for the Taliban'. It is important to remember in this context however, that Shah's comments were made prior to 9/11 and the declaration of the 'War on Terror' (as well as subsequent British military activity in Afghanistan). In this context, the Taliban might not have been regarded as a terrorist group in the same way – because they were not regarded to pose a direct threat to British citizens, and as such might not have been considered direct 'enemies' of Britain.

Extract A6.24, which was drawn from Rashid (2001), works in a slightly different way. Here the author portrays Pakistanis in Bradford as oppressed, rather than oppressors – frequently using the terms 'coolie' and 'coolie class' (Rashid, 2001). In doing this however, the author is also inadvertently reinforcing stereotypes about British South Asians – such as all British South Asians living in a particular area – in this case the 'coolie area' (ibid). The author also describes a situation where British Pakistanis are 'mild-mannered people making few or no demands and grateful for being in Britain' (Rashid, 2001) – and mentions the Chawala character from the BBC sit-com *It Ain't Half Hot Mum* (1974-1981) as a prime example of this – being in the author's opinion 'there to serve the white man and grateful for the protection he provides' (ibid). This passive stereotype is clearly incompatible with occurrences such as the Bradford Riots or the *Satanic Verses* book burnings of 1989, and Rashid describes it (or more specifically the 'coolie class') as 'dead' following the former event (ibid). Whilst this may or may not be the case, the fact that a member of the Bradford South Asian community (the author) himself talks about that community as if it is a monolith – without discussing the fact that this itself is a stereotype can only serve to reinforce that stereotype. Hartmann and Husband (1974) showed that in areas of Britain with little or no ethnic minority population, the majority of information concerning people of ethnic minorities 'known' by white people came from the media. In this particular case, because the author is describing their 'own' community, this effect might even be amplified. Whilst this may be the case, Rashid's letter still represents a rare positive view with respect to the rioters in Bradford – Phillips noting that the grievances which led to the violence were generally given very little 'voice' (2006: 28). It is also interesting that the arguments from Shah and Rashid described above, to an extent mirror the differences between the arguments of Alibhai-Brown (2001) and Rahman (2001) described previously. This would appear to show that Alexander's (2000) argument that stereotypes of British South Asians had changed by 2000 (her time of writing) from 'victim' to 'perpetrator' might have been premature. Although a stereotype of British South Asians (particularly people of Pakistani

ethnicity, and often, by connection, a Muslim religious identity) as 'perpetrators' did exist in 2001, this stereotype did not stand alone, and a parallel stereotype of 'South Asian victims' was still extant. This would indicate that any change towards a less 'passive' stereotype – i.e. that of a 'perpetrator' was a much slower process than Alexander might seem to suggest.

'Whites'

Although this thesis is primarily interested in coverage of British South Asians and British Muslims, in this particular case it might also be logical to look at coverage of white people – the other 'group' involved in the Bradford Riots (or at least certain stages of the Bradford Riots). As Table 6.1 shows, the terms 'white' and 'whites' are used repeatedly throughout the master corpus – 245 and 50 instances being observed respectively. A collocation analysis for the search term 'white/whites[132]' shows that the terms 'white' and 'Asian' were commonly found close together (within 5 words of each other) within the corpus – 54 instances of this being returned. 'Asians' was also returned as a collocated term of 'white', with 13 instances. When the second term 'whites' is taken into account, these figures rise further – with 22 instances of the collocation 'whites' and 'Asians' being returned, and 5 instances of the collocation 'whites' and 'Asian'. A distribution graph for these collocations – Figure 6.1, shows a tendency for 'Asian' terms to appear in the R2 space when used in conjunction with 'white' terms – two spaces to the right of the word sampled. This suggests that the terms may have been being used in opposition – e.g. 'white and Asian'. A breakdown of the information contained in Figure 6.1 can be found in Table A6.13.

[132] This search string was preferable to 'white*', which produced a number of erroneous results.

Figure 6.1 Total Instances of Collocation for 'White'/'Whites' and 'Asian'/'Asians' by Collocate Term's Location in Relation to the Term Sampled, for All Newspapers: 08.07.2001-14.07.2001



	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
TOTAL INSTANCES	2	12	9	13	1	2	30	12	11	2

Whilst it seems a minor point, it is also interesting to note that Figure 6.1 shows that terms describing 'Asians' tend to appear two spaces to the right of terms describing 'whites' (position R2) over 50% more than they appear two spaces to the left (position L2). If the word separating the two terms in each case is assumed to be 'and', this means that the phrase 'white(s) and Asian(s)' occurred noticeably more often than 'Asian(s) and white(s)'[133]. As there is no particular reason to put either word before the other, this is interesting – given that putting one term first could be argued to assign more importance to it. Although *one* of the two terms *has* to be used before the other if this form of expression is to be used, in an unbiased situation it might be expected that a 50/50 distribution would be produced by the above sample. One explanation for this anomaly might be the number of syllables in the two terms. Taking the singular expressions as an example, 'white' has one syllable, whilst 'Asians' has two. This is similar to the common written salutation 'Dear **Sir** or **Madam**' – where 'Sir' contains one syllable and 'Madam' two. By convention in this situation, 'Sir' tends to appear first (although there is no official rule for this). Whilst it could equally be argued that this is due to the historical dominance of males in society, one explanation for this convention is

[133] This is supported in most cases by the commonly encountered word clusters returned by the collocation analysis – 'whites and Asians' (12 instances); 'white and Asian' (11 instances); 'Asian and white' (7 instances). There were also 5 instances of 'white or Asian' returned.

that placing the monosyllabic word first and the disyllabic word second simply makes the phrase easier to pronounce in the English language. For this reason, it is not suggested here that this anomaly is due to any particular 'white perspective' on the part of newspaper journalists – although the statistic is still intriguing. Coverage of white people throughout the corpus is considered further in a broader context in the next section.

Coverage of the Riots Themselves

The binary opposition made between 'Asians' and 'whites' described above is interesting in the context of this thesis – as is the fact that what occurred in Bradford was often described as a 'race riot'[134]. Although, as stated in the introduction to this chapter, the initial violence allegedly began when racial abuse aimed at Asians was shouted by whites who were leaving a pub – culminating in instances of physical hostility and the stabbing of two men, this does not account for the majority of the violence which took place. Rather, the majority of the first night's violence involved mostly 'Asians' and the police – which is a multi-ethnic organisation. Investigating the distribution of oppositions between 'Asian' and 'white' terms throughout the week proves inconclusive as a line of analysis – as Figure 6.2 (below) shows. Here, instances of collocation between 'white'/'whites' and 'Asian'/'Asians' in either position L2 or R2 were mapped against the day of the week on which they occurred in order to give a basic timescale for the use of the binary oppositions described previously.

[134] The phrase 'race riot' appears 28 times in the master corpus.

Figure 6.2 Collocation of 'white'/'whites' and 'Asian'/'Asians' in Position L2 or R2, by Date for All Newspapers: 08.07.2001-14.07.2001



	08.07.2001	09.07.2001	10.07.2001	11.07.2001	12.07.2001	13.07.2001	14.07.2001
TOTAL INSTANCES	11	9	7	12	0	4	0

Although Figure 6.2 suggests a slight downwards trend in the use of oppositions such as 'white and Asian' or 'Asians and whites' (with the exception of July 11th 2001), the sample is too small for this to provide any conclusive evidence that this was the case – seven days is simply not a long enough timescale. This 'trend' also disappears if the number of relevant newspaper articles sampled for a particular day is taken into account. This is shown by Figure 6.3 (below), which plots the same figures shown in Figure 6.2, but this time divided by the total number of articles in that particular day's corpus.

Figure 6.3 Collocation Frequency of 'white'/'whites' and 'Asian'/'Asians' in position L2 or R2, by Date for All Newspapers: 08.07.2001-14.07.2001[135]



	08.07.2001	09.07.2001	10.07.2001	11.07.2001	12.07.2001	13.07.2001	14.07.2001
FREQUENCY	0.5789	0.2308	0.3333	0.3333	0	0.1176	0

Although Figure 6.3 suggests that the distribution of these oppositions within the sample was chaotic for the most part, it is clear that they were made much more frequently on the day following the first instances of violence (July 8th, 2001). Despite this, Figure 6.2 shows that in absolute terms, distinctions of this type were regularly made on other days in the sample. Therefore it is unlikely that all of these direct distinctions between 'white' and 'Asian' refer to the initial clashes which took place on July 7th 2001 between largely white and Asian groups of people in Bradford.

As mentioned previously in this chapter, one factor given for the start of the riots in Bradford was the presence of the NF in the city. Whilst this actual presence is debatable, it seems likely that the NF played at least *some* part in causing the riots – whether due to aggression caused amongst a group of people who came together to rally *against* the NF; whether NF members/sympathisers caused trouble on the day which led to violence, or a combination of the two factors. The NF represents an interesting group in British society, in that (along with most other far-right groups) they are treated as pariahs by the majority of the population. For this reason it might be expected that a collocation analysis produced for terms related to the NF would show an extremely negative

[135] Frequency was calculated as X/Y and plotted to four decimal figures, where X = the number of collocations given in Figure 6.2 and Y = the number of articles in that day's corpus as in Figure 6.2 (very relevant articles only).

lexis to have been used when describing them. This is not the case, however. A collocation analysis was produced for the search string "national front/NF" – which sampled all instances of either the phrase 'National Front' or its acronym 'NF'. This showed 'National Front' to have been used 103 times in the master corpus, and 'NF' 47 times. Very few overtly negative collocated terms were returned by the sample however – perhaps the only exceptions being 'against' (collocated 9 times with 'National Front'), 'protest' (collocated 8 times with 'National Front'), 'banned' (collocated 6 times with 'National Front' and 5 with 'NF'). Another possibly negative term in the context of the NF might be 'march' (due to possible associations with militaristic fascism), which was collocated 16 times with 'National Front' and 7 times with 'NF'. Whilst negative, none of these terms are insistently so in the same way as 'Nazi', 'fascist' or 'racist' might be. Although Table 6.3 shows that there were 51 instances of the term 'Nazi' throughout the corpus, further collocation sampling for this particular term shows that on 47 of these instances it was directly preceded by the term 'anti' and followed by the term 'league' – clearly referencing the Anti-Nazi League rather than the NF. A collocation analysis was also carried out for the term 'racist' which shows that the term was used 54 times throughout the master corpus. Although there are 9 instances of 'anti' being collocated with 'racist' in the L1 position – again clearly describing anti-racist groups, there are also 5 instances of 'thugs' collocated with it, which is a much more negative term than any of the others described above. All instances of 'thugs' were collocated with 'racist' in the R1 position – i.e. 'racist thugs'.

Although this study is interested in coverage involving British Muslims and South Asian groups, the brief collocation analysis for the NF carried out above is interesting here. This is because it shows that even for a group which is generally disdained by the British public, the lexis returned by a collocation analysis is not usually so extreme as to be instantly recognisable as negative. One reason for this could involve the different terms sampled above. It seems that when a newspaper described the NF in its 'proper terms' i.e. 'National Front' or 'NF', it was unlikely to make a value judgement on the group. But when a newspaper described the NF or its supporters indirectly – perhaps referring simply to 'racists', value judgement statements *were* made – such as 'racist thugs'. What this might suggest is that newspapers have multiple ways to refer to a group which is disliked – either by the reporters themselves, or presumed to be disliked by the newspaper's readers. Whilst British Muslims and South Asians are probably not disliked to the extent which the NF is in Britain, Muslims in general do represent a 'group' which historically has received negative coverage in the media (e.g. Said, 1997). People of South Asian ethnic groups may have experienced this by association through conflation with British Muslims – which is something investigated by this thesis. What this could suggest is that sampling directly for terms related to a group which might be receiving negative

treatment will not produce negative results – and that a much broader sample base must be used to illustrate this. The problem with this is that a broader sample base would necessarily introduce further elements of subjectivity to the sample, because it would not be studying a term directly related to the subject in the way that 'NF' or 'Muslim' is.

Conclusions for Chapter Six

Given the data which has been discussed above, a number of conclusions can be made from Chapter Six – before a comparative analysis between the three case studies presented here is carried out in Chapter Eight. As with Chapter Five, this discussion is split into the three sections identified during the discussion of the research question in Chapter Four – 'Conflation', 'Voice' and 'Othering'.

Conflation

One thing which should be very clear from the coverage analysed in this chapter, is that in reporting the Bradford Riots, British newspapers had a definite tendency to conflate a South Asian ethnic identity with a Muslim religious identity. Although statistics show that in Bradford if someone is of a particular South Asian ethnicity, then this is likely to be a Pakistani ethnicity (Office for National Statistics, 2009), and that if someone is of Pakistani ethnicity that they are overwhelmingly likely to identify themselves with the Muslim religion (Peach, 2005: 22), the conflation of Bradford's 'Asians'/'Pakistanis' with 'Muslims' identified here is problematic. Amalgamating a number of individuals into a single group is problematic even if those individuals do share a common set of observable characteristics – because individuals, by definition, tend to hold differing opinions no matter how they are linked to other individuals, and any 'observable characteristics' may well be subjective. In this vein, Gilroy (1993) points out that even 'races' themselves are not 'simple expressions of either biological or cultural sameness' – they are in fact 'imagined' – being 'socially and politically constructed' (1993: 20). Here, however, the problem is worsened by the fact that some of the individuals being amalgamated into the Asian/Pakistani/Muslim 'group' do not even belong there according to the generally accepted 'definition' of that group. Whether these are people of a South Asian ethnicity who are not Muslim or people who are Muslim but not of a South Asian ethnicity does not matter – the fact is that the press's conflation and amalgamation of terms leads to their misrepresentation.

Evidence of this conflation is to an extent visible from the very fact that terms such as 'Muslim' appeared within the master corpus sampled for this case study – all the constituent articles of which were 'very relevant' to the Bradford Riots. This is because the Bradford Riots did not directly involve 'Muslims' – there being no particular religious motivation for their occurrence. An official report (the Ouseley Report) being conducted into segregation in Bradford *did* form a tenuous link between Bradford's Muslims and the riots however – given that Muslims were identified as a group affected by the segregation investigated by the report – and that the term 'Muslim' was used in opposition to the term 'white' as if it defines an ethnic/racial group – e.g:

> Fear of confronting all white and/or all Muslim schools about their contribution, or rather lack of contribution, to social and racial integration (Ouseley, 2001: 1).

By a quirk of fate, this report, which was unrelated to the disturbances in Bradford except by circumstance, appeared shortly after they occurred. This is likely to have meant that Muslims as a group were linked to the riots (however tenuously), because of the perceived causal relationship between segregation and their occurrence already described. Previous disturbances in Oldham and Burnley involving similar postulated causal factors had also already occurred – meaning that occurrences in Bradford were always likely to be viewed in the same context – a context where (as Phillips (2006) describes), 'the blame for social polarisation and community tensions fell squarely on the shoulders of the British Muslim population' (2006: 28). This process was evidenced through the press's use of terms such as 'Muslim' within the corpus – which often represented nothing more than direct quotes from the Ouseley Report – e.g. Extract A6.18, which cited the same quotation from the report as is given above (Dodd, 2001b). Later uses of the term 'Muslim' in the Ouseley Report do make clear that not all people of South Asian ethnicity in Bradford are Muslim – e.g:

> Islamaphobia is regarded as prevalent in schools and the community and affects how the Asian community is regarded and treated, especially Muslims (Ouseley, 2001: 10).

These instances are deeper in the report however – whereas the quotation from page one is in the 'Overview' section of the report – which is more likely to be read by a busy journalist. Even if a journalist did read the report in its entirety, the fact that an official government report had made such a distinction between 'white' and 'Muslim' is likely to have meant that journalists felt able to use this opposition.

Citations from the Ouseley Report such as Extract A6.18 represented the bulk of newspaper content sampled when a collocation analysis for 'white' and 'Muslim' was carried out, but a collocation analysis for 'young' and 'Muslim' carried out earlier in the chapter showed different results. Here a number of largely editorial articles used the term 'Muslim(s)' (specifically 'young Muslim(s)') to describe people involved in the riots (Extracts A6.1-A6.12) – underlining the scale of the problem of conflation in the sampled reporting. Although it might be logical at this point to map instances of the use of the term 'Muslim' throughout the corpus on a by-day basis, to analyse the extent to which the Ouseley Report might have affected coverage in the way described above, this is not without problems – because the report was leaked before it was officially published (Baird and Cooke, 2001; Jenkins, 2001). This means that any attempt to identify the 'cut-off' point for the report's influence on the press would be futile. Figure 6.4 below demonstrates that *no* instances of terms commonly used to describe Muslims in the corpus were observed on the first day of the sample (July 8th), but that this figure steadily rose until July 12th, when it briefly disappeared, before rising again on July 13th. Important to note in this context is that (as shown by Figure 6.2 previously), only two 'very relevant' articles were sampled for the date July 12th – probably explaining the absence of any references to Muslims observed here.

Figure 6.4 Combined Use of the Terms 'Muslim', 'Muslims', 'Moslem', and 'Moslems' in Master Corpus (By Day)



	08.07.2001	09.07.2001	10.07.2001	11.07.2001	12.07.2001	13.07.2001	14.07.2001
TOTAL	0	12	15	19	0	26	9

As the Ouseley Report was not officially published until July 12th, 2001 (Guardian, 2001), the claims which can be made of Figure 6.4 are limited – although the day following the report's publication there is a clear spike. Given that many instances where newspapers identified rioters as 'Muslim' did not cite the Ouseley Report, it seems unlikely that it was responsible for every instance where this occurred. This type of misrepresentation matters, because it allows a stereotype to be imagined – in this case the assumption that everyone who is or appears to be of South Asian ethnicity is a Muslim. This is similar to the situation Hall describes when writing of 'inferential' (as opposed to 'overt') racism:

> By *inferential* racism I mean those apparently naturalised representations of events and situations relating to race, whether 'factual' or 'fictional', which have racist premisses [sic] and propositions inscribed in them as a set of *unquestioned assumptions*. These enable racist statements to be formulated without ever bringing into awareness the racist predicates on which the statements are grounded (Hall, 1990: 13).

Although assumptions of a particular religious inclination for a particular ethnicity (or more correctly in this case *group* of ethnicities) are in no way overtly negative, a further assumption follows this one. This is the assumption described elsewhere in this thesis that all Muslims are the same – a monolithic and dangerous group – which *does* represent a negative stereotype. This assumption is considered further below – when processes of 'othering' identified in this chapter are discussed.

Voice

A number of different voices were 'heard' throughout the coverage explored in this chapter. Whilst the strongest/'loudest' voice in the press is always likely to be that of the press itself, the voices of other individuals and groups are often heard – through such mediums as vox-pops and letters to the editor, or even whole articles written by 'outside' individuals/groups. One of the strongest voices heard outside of the press's own in the material sampled for this chapter was that of the Ouseley Report. Whilst this report was (as above) only connected to the Bradford Riots by circumstance, the press was always likely to utilise it in attempts to 'explain' the riots – given that it was carried out by a prestigious institution and released almost concurrently with the advent of the violence in Bradford. Whilst the results of the report were certainly of interest given these factors, it still does not diminish the fact that very few voices from within Bradford were noted in the sampling conducted here. Although this study makes no pretentions of being an exhaustive account of exactly which voices were covered in any of the given samples, the relative lack of local voices identified here is interesting. Firstly, no interviews with rioters whatsoever were identified by this study. Whilst the possible reasons for this are many – the safety of any reporters involved, along with the secrecy of the identity of any rioters being two of the most obvious – this type of interview is not unheard of. Shortly after widespread rioting took place in London in 2011 for instance, the BBC anonymously interviewed two girls reported to have been involved in looting (BBC, 2011b). But interviews with uninvolved members of the Bradford population are also largely conspicuous in their absence from sampled coverage. One example of this which was observed – Roy (2001) is an article based around comments made by Hashmukh Shah – a Hindu 'leader' from Bradford. This is made obvious from the headline of the article, which reads 'Muslim Parents and Mosques are to Blame, Says Hindu Leader' (Roy, 2001). Shah is described as the spokesperson for the World Council of Hindus, and a number of references are made to this role – in the 564 word article (including headline), three direct references are made to Shah's 'leadership' in some way. In this way, Shah is represented as a community *leader* rather than a 'normal' member of the community – arguably a member of an 'elite'. The article also makes frequent references to the Muslim 'leadership' in

Bradford – further denying 'normal' voices. Shah largely takes the view described previously that the riots in Bradford were the fault of the Pakistani community – although a Pakistani ethnic identity is conflated here with a Muslim religious identity, e.g. Extract A6.20 which reads:

> Hashmukh Shah, an Indian businessman who has lived in Bradford for 33 years and is the spokesman for the World Council of Hindus, pinned the blame for the unruly behaviour of **Pakistani** youths partly on the **mosques** (Roy, 2001, emphasis added in bold).

Shah also reportedly made a distinction between different South Asian ethnic groups based on religious lines, e.g:

> Comparing the behaviour of **Hindu Indian** children with their **Muslim Pakistani** counterparts, Mr Shah said: "they talk of economic deprivation, complain of the police and discrimination, but these are excuses (Roy, 2001, emphasis added in bold).

One other local voice is heard (briefly) at the end of the article – Mohammed Ajeeb, who is also described as a 'former Lord Mayor' and a 'community elder' (Roy, 2001). Ajeeb is described only in establishment and political terms – as a 'Labour supporter' who was awarded an OBE (ibid). The only contribution by Ajeeb is a short quotation stating that 'it will take us 10 years to put right what's happened' (ibid). The inclusion of this short segment may be an example of a reporter 'paying lip service' to the concept of local voices in the press – as although it represents another voice within the article, it informs the reader of little they would not be likely to know already, and is actually nigh on pointless.

Exactly what would constitute a 'dissenting' voice in this situation is difficult to determine – given that there were so many conflicting views of what may have caused the riots in Bradford. It is useful in this context to consider the 'official line' given by sources within the government, as well as sources closely associated with the government (such as the Ouseley Report), to determine what a dissenting view would entail. In an article printed in *The Guardian*, the then Home Secretary David Blunkett was careful not to blame any particular 'group' – describing 'thuggery and disorder' caused 'by fascists or anyone else' (Blunkett, 2001). Later in this article Blunkett went on to mention alienation felt 'by many Muslim and white young men' (ibid) – again avoiding 'pinning the blame' on any particular group. The Ouseley Report (Ouseley, 2001) – which whilst unrelated to the riots (as previously explained) may have been a source of information on the 'root' causes of the riots for

those in the press and government again avoided singling out any one particular group as being to 'blame' for the segregation which was to be found in Bradford. Whilst it described Inner City Bradford as 'Muslim dominant', and the way in which the rest of the district did not see itself as being part of the 'Bradford identity' (Ouseley, 2001: 10), later the report mentions 'Islamaphobia' [sic], and 'resentment towards the Asian community by sections of the white community' (ibid). In this way, the report seems to strive for balance, rather than blaming one particular group. Comments made by Shah however distinctly blame one particular group within Bradford – 'Muslim Pakistanis' as Shah himself puts it (Roy, 2001). This means that in one way Shah's views could be seen as 'dissenting' – in that they do not follow the 'official' government line. In another way however, the articulation of Shah's voice in *The Daily Telegraph* could be an attempt to imply a view which the journalist/newspaper would not be comfortable stating directly themselves – blaming Pakistanis/Muslims by proxy (through Shah). Shah would have reason to be biased against anyone he perceived to have been involved in the riots, given that the article itself describes that his pharmacy had been set alight during the riots – causing damage of around half a million pounds (Roy, 2001).

Another instance of a 'local voice' observed in this data sampled in this chapter came from a letter written by Bradford resident Amar Rashid printed in *The Independent* (Rashid, 2001). As discussed previously, Rashid's letter represents the articulation of a voice representing a 'soft' stereotype of British Pakistanis – exemplified by Rashid's descriptions of a 'coolie-class', which is 'there to serve the white man and grateful for the protection he provides' (Rashid, 2001). Here it is the 'white' establishment which is implicitly blamed for the rioting in Bradford. Bradford Council is directly blamed for the situation which led to the riots in one paragraph which states 'Bradford Council has done its bit to keep the status quo. The education policy effectively prevents a child from the "coolie class" attending a school outside the area' (ibid). Whether or not Rashid's letter represents a 'dissenting voice' is again difficult to determine. Rashid's voice is the closest to an 'ordinary' local voice observed in this chapter – given that neither he nor *The Independent* makes any claim as to his role in society. Rashid's claim that people of Pakistani ethnicity in Bradford are part of a 'coolie-class' is extreme, and at least on the surface, does not stray far from the views of racial inequality expressed in the Ouseley Report. Where the Ouseley Report appears to strive for balance however, Rashid makes no such attempt. The Ouseley report also describes a situation of '*Islamaphobia*' to operate in Bradford – a term which implies *fear* of Muslims (Abbas, 2001: 249) (who are effectively conflated with British Pakistanis as a 'group'). This does not fit with the 'coolie-class' described by Rashid – a subservient group of people, rather than a group which is 'feared' in any way (until the

Bradford riots at least). In this sense, Rashid's letter *does* represent a dissenting opinion – given that it demonstrably does not match the 'official' view of segregation in Bradford.

Othering

The Balkanised neighbourhoods of Bradford and other northern English towns and cities described in the introduction to this chapter perhaps represent an extreme example of the situation described by Said (1978) and discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis. This situation is one where geographical distinctions are set up between 'our' space and 'their' space – 'they' being the group which is 'othered' – specifically in this context Said refers to 'their' space as 'the land of the barbarians' (Said, 1978: 54). Said goes on to state that:

> It is enough for "us" to set up these boundaries in our own minds; "they" become "they" accordingly, and both their territory and their mentality are designated as different from "ours" (Said, 1978: 54).

Whilst this might well be the case in some situations, coverage of Bradford's population was observed in this chapter to involve cases of 'othering' not linked to the mere creation of the 'us' identity – the 'us' identity being the imagined 'white mainstream' of society. This again brings to mind the 'inferential racism' described by Hall (1990) (above), which relies on unquestioned assumptions in order to enable racist statements to be formulated without making obvious the racist predicates which they are grounded in (1990: 13). Hence statements such as this one from Brack (quoted in *The Guardian* and described previously) can be made:

> Increasing self-segregation in Bradford schools had created a "self-imposed ghettoisation" which was stopping young Muslims from being assimilated in the traditional way of immigrants (Wainwright, 2001).

This statement seems to suggest that all of Bradford's Muslims are in some way 'immigrants' to the country – an 'other' group which somehow does not 'fit in'. Whilst this seems to rely largely on the conflation described previously for part of its argument – by making 'Muslim' a term which denotes not only a religion, but also an ethnicity, it then follows that people of South Asian ethnicity in Britain could be assumed to be immigrants. Further assumptions/stereotypes are then made/invoked when Brack mentions the way in which these 'immigrants'/'outsiders'/'others' do not

assimilate into British society in the 'traditional way'. This fits with the analysis of Phillips (2006) described previously, that blame for the social polarisation in places such as Bradford tended to fall 'squarely on the shoulders of the British Muslim population' (Phillips, 2006: 28). Also interesting in this regard is the more general analysis of van Dijk with regard to British newspaper coverage of the 1985 disorders in Birmingham and London. Van Dijk states that 'at the highest level, the distinction between US and THEM [sic] is that of "belonging" or not, exemplified in the often expressed criterion of "integration" or "adaptation" (van Dijk, 1989: 244)[136]. This suggests that some of the assumptions made as part of the South Asian ethnic stereotype described above have existed in Britain for many years, and have not always been limited to people of South Asian ethnicity.

Instances of three of the indicators described in Chapter Four are identified here – the fourth being 'change over time', which is not analysed until Chapter Eight. This takes the form of a comparative analysis between the data presented here, and in the other two case studies (Chapters Five and Seven).

[136] Van Dijk describes 'us' as 'British, whites, ordinary people, etc', and 'them' as 'aliens, criminals, blacks, etc' (van Dijk, 1989: 242).

Chapter Seven

Analysis of British National Press Coverage of the Gillian Gibbons Incident

28.11.2007 – 04.12.2007

Introduction

This chapter presents analysis of press coverage of the Gillian Gibbons incident of 2007 (which is referred to hereafter as the 'Gibbons incident'). As stated in previous chapters, although the Gibbons incident connects with the other samples contained in this thesis in a number of ways, a full comparative analysis of the case studies is not discussed until Chapter Eight. For a quantitative description of the data sampled for use in this chapter, please see the Appendix to Chapter Seven.

The Gibbons incident began on November 25th, 2007, when the English primary school teacher Gillian Gibbons was arrested in Sudan for allegedly insulting the Prophet Mohammed (BBC, 2007f). Gibbons, who was teaching in Sudan, had allowed her students to vote on a name for a class teddy-bear in the September of that year. Of the 23 students, 20 voted for the name 'Mohammed' – and so the name was selected for the bear (BBC, 2007f). Whilst the name was not physically marked anywhere on the bear itself, Sudanese police saw the situation as an attempt to make an image of the Prophet Mohammed – and therefore an insult to the religion of Islam, which forbids such practices (ibid). Gibbons was therefore arrested under article 125 of the Sudanese criminal law – which covers insults against faith and religion (ibid). At this point, Gibbons' potential punishment was unclear – as she had not been charged – although newspapers reported that she might face up to ten years in prison for the crime of sedition (Daily Mail, 2007), or up to forty lashes and six months in prison if she was charged with the crime of insulting Islam (ibid). Although the British government became involved in attempts to have Gibbons freed, on November 28th she was charged with a criminal offence – the precise wording of which varies between different sources. Some sources state that Gibbons was charged with the crime of 'insulting religion and inciting hatred' (BBC, 2007f; Rajan, 2007), where others gave the charge various names including 'insulting Islam' (Flanagan, 2007) and 'insulting Islam and inciting hatred' (Beeston and Crilly, 2007). This suggests that there may have been a degree of confusion over exactly what occurred in the courtroom in Sudan. November 28th, 2007 is also the point at which the sample for this case study begins – as described in Chapter Four.

On November 29th, Gibbons was found guilty as charged – although she was not given the maximum sentence for the crime. Gibbons was eventually sentenced to 15 days in prison and deportation (BBC, 2007f). This sentence was greeted by 'angry' protests in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum on November 30th – where protestors demanded that Gibbons be given a harsher punishment (ibid). Following this, Gibbons was moved to a secret location to protect her safety (Observer, 2007). On December 1st, two British peers – Baroness Warsi and Lord Ahmed (who are also Muslim) travelled to Sudan, reportedly to press the Sudanese government into pardoning Gibbons (BBC, 2007f). On December 3rd, Gibbons received a pardon from Sudan's president al-Bashir and was released from prison (BBC, 2007f). This was also greeted by demonstration in Khartoum – where a group of around 30-40 people protested Gibbons' release outside the British embassy.

There are a number of reasons why the Gibbons incident is of interest to this study. The first – as previously mentioned is that many parallels can be drawn between the Gibbons case and that of Salman Rushdie in 1989 – coverage of which was analysed in Chapter Five of this thesis. Whilst there are also many differences between the two cases which prevent generalisations from being made between the two, the similarities are enough that a degree of comparative analysis can be carried out. Secondly, the Gibbons incident took place a considerable amount of time after the Rushdie incident of 1989. Whilst again too many factors are at play for any definite statements on causality to be made, any changes in the type of coverage given to Muslims as compared to the Rushdie incident would be interesting, given that the intervening period contained events such as 9/11 (as well as the beginning of the 'War on Terror') in 2001 and 7/7 in 2005. Whilst no hypothesis is made here as to what any such changes might be, an analysis is presented in Chapter Eight.

The Gibbons incident did not directly involve 'ordinary' British Muslims – meaning that its inclusion as a case study here might appear counterintuitive. Analysis carried out in Chapter Five – as well as other work such as that of Said (1997), Poole (2002) and the Greater London Authority (2007) however, indicates that Muslims worldwide are often covered as if they represent a single monolithic group – of which British Muslims are an important – and for other British people, visible, component. Even coverage of the protests carried out by Sudanese Muslims as part of the Gibbons incident might therefore be interesting to this study. British Muslim voices which also came from the political elite were present in the Gibbons incident in the form of the two British peers who travelled to Sudan reportedly in order to negotiate Gibbons' release (BBC, 2007f). This particular type of voice was not observed in newspaper coverage during the *Satanic Verses* incident sample – with the reason for this probably being that such elite political British Muslim voices simply did not

exist in 1989[137]. Coverage of these British Muslim voices from within the political elite may be an interesting avenue for investigation, given the sometimes problematic statements from voices within the political elite identified in coverage of the *Satanic Verses* incident and Bradford Riots. Also, given the importance of 'Muslim leaders' in coverage of British Muslims as described in Chapter Five, this could make coverage of Baroness Warsi and Lord Ahmed during the Gibbons incident still more interesting in the context of this thesis. Although political rank generally does not imply leadership of a religious group, there is a possibility that Ahmed and Warsi may have been covered as 'leaders' of British Muslims in the sense that they represent influential individuals who are also part of the British Muslim 'group'. Because Ahmed and Warsi's purpose in Sudan was to assist Gibbons (rather than argue that Gibbons *should* be punished for blasphemy), coverage of their trip is likely to represent positive coverage of British Muslims (albeit from the political elite) in a case of blasphemy against Islam.

British Muslim voices were also 'heard' through the medium of protest during the Gibbons incident – although unlike during the *Satanic Verses* incident, these protests were positive – rallying *against* the treatment given to Gibbons. Analysis of press coverage of these positive protests forms an important part of this chapter, as it represents an instance where overtly positive images of British Muslims may have been shown by the press – something not observed by this thesis thus far.

Quantitative Corpus Analysis

As with the other two samples in the study, the first step in analysing the newspaper data collected for the Gibbons incident was to carry out a phase of basic quantitative analysis, in order to give a sense of the 'shape' of the sample. In order to do this, the same methodology as for the other case-studies was followed – a number of corpora were produced, for individual newspapers and dates, and then combined into larger corpora – finishing with the 'master' corpus, which contained all the 'very relevant' data sampled for the Gibbons incident. All corpora were produced using only 'very relevant' data, to avoid skewing the quantitative data produced by *Wordsmith* – as described in Chapter Five.

The master corpus for the Gibbons incident totalled 76,096 words in length. This is slightly longer than the master corpus for the Bradford Riots (72,290 words), and considerably shorter than the master corpus for the *Satanic Verses* incident (123,199 words). Detailed information for the sub-

[137] Mohammed Sarwar became Britain's first Muslim MP in 1997 (Daily Mail, 1997), and it was Lord Ahmed himself who became Britain's first Muslim life peer in 1998 (BBC, 2009c).

corpora produced for individual newspapers is available in the Appendix to Chapter Seven – Tables A7.1-A7.10.

An interesting trend becomes apparent when the data in tables A7.1-A7.10 is reviewed. Unlike the other case studies in this thesis, the largest weekday corpora were not produced by broadsheet newspapers. Here it is the *Daily Mail* (Table A7.2) which produced the largest corpus (in terms of word count) – at 11,502 words. This trend is mirrored by the other 'mid-market' newspaper in the sample – the *Daily Express* (Table A7.1), and a red-top tabloid (*The Sun*) (Table A7.8), which produced corpora of 8,710 and 9,139 words respectively. These three corpora were larger than those sampled for any of the four weekday broadsheet newspapers in the sample – the *Daily Telegraph* (6,803 words/Table A7.5); *The Guardian* (6,717 words/Table A7.6); *The Independent* (5,613 words/Table A7.7); and *The Times* (7,960 words/Table A7.9). When the average length of a newspaper's sampled article is considered this trend is not quite as apparent – the broadsheet *The Independent* had the largest average at 561.3 words, but the *Daily Mail* still comes a close second in this regard – with an average of 547.7 words. This might suggest that the Gibbons incident was covered in more depth by the mid-market newspapers in the sample than it was the broadsheets. This was not the case for the *Satanic Verses* incident sample – and although the two cases are not directly comparable, is still interesting, given the number of similarities between the two events.

Creating a wordlist for the Gibbons incident master corpus using *Wordsmith* reveals that there are 6,356 unique words used within it (including common words such as 'the'). As with other chapters, the 100 most common terms in the master corpus are listed in the Appendix to Chapter Seven – in Table A7.11. The Gibbons incident arguably involved more terms directly related to the narrative at hand than either of the previous case-studies. Not only did the incident centre around a single individual (Gillian Gibbons), but this individual had also been incarcerated in a specific place (Khartoum, Sudan), for committing a specific 'crime'[138] (blasphemy/naming a teddy bear 'Mohammed'). This meant that there were a large number of terms which would almost certainly appear near the top of the wordlist. In this sense, the wordlist for the Gibbons incident is a little more difficult to work with than the ones in previous case studies, but useful information can still be drawn from it.

Anecdotal evidence obtained from browsing the articles which make up the master corpus suggests that in many tabloid and mid-market newspapers, Gibbons was not always referred to by her full or

[138] A crime at least as far as Sudanese law was concerned at the time.

actual name. This suggests that newspaper articles may have had a tendency to refer to Gibbons by a more 'familiar' name (e.g. 'Gill' or 'the teddy bear miss'). This is certainly the case in *The Sun*'s (2007a) article '*Muslims Back Gill*', and Parker's (2007a) article '*'Teddy' Miss is Caged*' – both of which were sampled from *The Sun* newspaper. Because of the large amount of tabloid and mid-market content sampled for the Gibbons incident, this more familiar style of naming might feature heavily throughout the corpus. If this is the case, then it may well be important – suggesting as it does content which was overwhelmingly positive and empathetic towards Gibbons. Merely from analysing the wordlist, it is possible to see that the term 'Gill' appeared 16 times throughout the master corpus, and 'miss' 24 times.

Because the story directly involved Muslims (the Muslims in Sudan who protested during the Gibbons incident), it is difficult to infer anything about any potential coverage of British Muslims simply from the wordlist – because the number of times the term 'Muslim' (or any related term) was used implies very little. Interestingly, the alternate spelling of 'Muslim' – 'Moslem' (as well as the alternate plural 'Moslems') is completely absent from the Gibbons incident corpus. This seems to confirm the observations made by Baker (2010) that this spelling ceased to be used by the *Daily Express* and *Daily Mail* around July 2002 and July 2003 respectively (2010: 324). The explanation for this phenomenon is that on July 16th, 2002, the Muslim Council of Britain's Media Committee wrote to the editors of both of the above newspapers, requesting that they standardise their spellings of common Arabic words in order to avoid causing offence to British Muslims[139] (ibid). Table 7.1 below, shows the number of instances of terms connected to Islam which occurred in the Gibbons incident master corpus – including multiple spellings of the name 'Mohammed'. Not all instances of the name 'Mohammed' and its alternate spellings are likely to refer to either the Prophet Mohammed, or the teddy bear named by Gibbons – Mohammed being an extremely popular name.

[139] As noted in Chapter Five, the reason for this is that 'Moslem' can be mispronounced as 'mawzlem', which sounds similar to the Arabic word for an 'oppressor' (Baker, 2010: 324).

Table 7.1 Frequencies of Selected Terms Relating to Islam for All Newspapers 28.11.2007-04.12.2007

Word Rank	Word	Number of Instances
45	MUSLIM	294
69	MUSLIMS	155
N/A	MOSLEM	0
N/A	MOSLEMS	0
55	ISLAM	193
92	ISLAMIC	124
50	MOHAMMED	226
871	MOHAMMAD	11
222	MOHAMED	48
N/A	MOHAMAD	0
1892	MUHAMMED	4
172	MUHAMMAD	62
N/A	MUHAMED	0
N/A	MUHAMAD	0
N/A	MUHAMMET	0
250	SHARIA	43
5791	SHARIAH	1

Table 7.1 shows that although the spelling of the word 'Muslim' had been standardised by British national newspapers in 2007, the spelling of the name 'Mohammed' had not. The explanation for this is likely to be simple – that newspapers were referring to living people named 'Mohammed', and were simply transliterating their names in the same manner as they themselves did. As little useful information can be gleaned from Table 7.1 alone, a collocation analysis is carried out later in the chapter, which aims to analyse the type of coverage given to British Muslims in particular. British Muslims were thought to have appeared in the corpus in some capacity, given that two British Muslim peers travelled to Sudan in an attempt to negotiate Gibbons' release, as well as the protests already mentioned.

Muslims worldwide are often covered in a reductive manner as if they represent a single monolithic group by the media[140] (e.g. Said, 1997; Poole, 2002; Greater London Authority, 2007), Poole (2006) also noting that (in quantitative terms) 'there seems to be a clear correlation between the reporting of world events involving Muslims and British Muslim communities' (2006: 91). This means that coverage of Sudanese Muslims during the Gibbons incident may also be of some interest to this

[140] This conception of Islam as a monolithic institution is by no means thought to be limited to the media. In fact, in defining 'Islamophobia', The Runnymede Trust (1997) points out that Islam is often seen as 'monolithic and static', leading to 'sweeping generalisations' being made about all Muslims 'in ways which would not happen in the case of, for example, all Roman Catholics, or all Germans, or all Londoners' (1997: 5).

study. The study will analyse not only the type of coverage given to Sudanese Muslims, but also the degree to which Sudanese Muslims were 'singled out' by the press. Because of the sympathetic coverage it seems probable that Gibbons received (suggested by the familiar terms of address such as 'Gill' identified above), it is likely that coverage of those in Sudan who imprisoned her or supported her imprisonment would have been negative. It also seems likely that Sudanese Muslims may have been covered as a separate 'entity' to British Muslims in the case of the Gibbons incident because of the contrast between the views of the Sudanese Muslim protestors calling for a harsher punishment for Gibbons, and the British Muslim peers who were working towards her release. It seems unlikely that the two British peers involved would not have been reported to be Muslim by the press – given the relevance which this might have had to Gibbons' case – meaning that any contrast made between British and Sudanese Muslims would have been obvious to the reader. It will be interesting to see if this translates into more varied coverage of Muslims during the Gibbons incident sample – especially if the views of 'ordinary' British Muslims were also covered by the press. Table 7.2 below shows the frequency of terms which might be related to coverage of the Muslim demonstrators in Sudan within the master corpus.

Table 7.2 Frequencies of Selected Terms Relating to Coverage of Sudanese Muslim Demonstrators for All Newspapers 28.11.2007-04.12.2007

Word Rank	Word	Number of Instances
854	DEMONSTRATION	11
479	DEMONSTRATIONS	21
4197	DEMONSTRATOR	1
517	DEMONSTRATORS	19
1806	EXTREMIST	4
330	EXTREMISTS	31
2191	FANATIC	3
352	FANATICS	29
1824	FUNDAMENTALIST	4
1825	FUNDAMENTALISTS	4
293	MOB	35
870	MOBS	11
280	PROTEST	37
965	PROTESTED	10
N/A	PROTESTOR	0
2362	PROTESTORS	3
674	RIOT	15
N/A	RIOTER	0
3242	RIOTERS	2
5663	RIOTS	1
27	SUDANESE	366

Table 7.2 suggests that the demonstrations in Sudan are likely to have been covered reasonably frequently within the master corpus. These demonstrations are analysed further below, with the aid of a collocation analysis.

Coverage of Muslims Within the Corpus

Although this study is primarily concerned with the representation of British Muslims in the press, previous case studies, as well as the academic works mentioned above have shown that the coverage of Muslims worldwide can also be important in this context. The collocation analysis carried out here aims to analyse coverage of Sudanese Muslims who demonstrated for a harsher punishment to be given to Gibbons after she was sentenced for blasphemy. Table 7.2 shows that a number of terms which may have related to the demonstrators are present in the master corpus – but it does not show a definite relationship between these terms and that context, nor does it show whether other terms were also used to describe the demonstrators. Because of this, a more sophisticated sampling method was needed in order for an effective collocation analysis to be

carried out. For this reason, a collocation analysis was carried out for the search string 'Sudanese Muslim*/Muslim* in Sudan/Muslim* in Khartoum', in order to determine the how the terms in Table 7.2 might be related to Sudanese Muslims.

Although the search string described above is reasonably broad, when applied to the master corpus, it returned only 9 instances in its concordance. Of these 9 instances, all but one were of the phrase 'Muslims in Sudan' – and all of the 8 instances of this phrase, were included in quotations from outside parties. 6 of these referenced a statement made by Abdul-Jalil Nazeer al-Karouri – a cleric at Khartoum's Martyr's Mosque, which included the sentence 'Imprisoning this lady does not satisfy the thirst of Muslims in Sudan. But we welcome imprisonment and expulsion' (Broster and Flanagan, 2007; Mulchrone, 2007a). The remaining two referenced a statement made by Sheikh Mohammad Abdel Karim, of Sudan's Council of Islamic Scholars, which included the sentence 'Retracting this light sentence would wound the sensibilities of Muslims in Sudan' (Broster, 2007; Mulchrone, 2007b). An interesting phenomenon illustrated by the references above is that the two articles which quoted Karim appear to have been written by the same reporters involved in writing two of the articles which quoted al-Karouri two days earlier (Broster for *The Daily Express*, and Mulchrone for *The Daily Mirror*). As these two negative statements do not appear to have garnered widespread coverage in the press (demonstrated by the sampling described here), it is interesting that these two particular journalists included them in their content. A number of possible explanations for this exist – including the sharing of sources by the journalists themselves, or by their colleagues. It might also suggest that certain writers/newspapers were more likely to give coverage to sources which gave a negative opinion on the Gibbons incident. The other phrase, which was sampled just once in the concordance for this search string was 'Sudanese Muslim' – and simply referenced the fact that Unity High School (the school where Gibbons worked) was popular with Sudanese Muslim families (Milmo and Penketh, 2007).

As the search string above was unsuccessful in sampling coverage relating to the demonstrations against Gibbons' 'light' sentence, a second approach was tested. As can be seen from Table A7.11, the list of the 100 most popular terms in the master corpus for the Gibbons incident does not include any terms which overtly relate to a demonstration or riot – suggesting that they were reasonably rare within the corpus. This is supported by the information in Table 7.2. In order to better determine which terms were commonly used to describe the demonstrators, a corpus was produced which disregarded data drawn from November 28th and November 29th 2007 – the demonstrations having begun on November 30th, after Gibbons' sentence was passed on the 29th

(BBC, 2007f). This new corpus contained only data from *after* Gibbons' sentence was handed out – and therefore from the period within which the demonstrations were actually occurring. This should have made it easier to identify terms which were used to describe the demonstrators themselves within the corpus as a whole. When a word list was produced for this corpus however, the same problem was encountered as with the main corpus – there were no terms which related overtly to a demonstration or riot in the 100 most popular places in the word list. Although the corpus used to produce it was shorter by two days, this word list still contained 5,469 terms.

In this sense, it is almost impossible to produce a full list of the words used to describe the protesters in Sudan. What the word list from the more specific corpus above suggests however, is that no term used to describe the protesters was so popular as to appear in the 100 most used words (although equally, coverage of the protests could also have been rare). This meant that a collocation analysis carried out for the terms in Table 7.2 was unlikely to miss an extremely popular term – and whilst this was still not a perfect solution (because other terms may also have existed), it seemed to represent the only reasonable way to sample coverage of the protests. The terms included in Table 7.2 were therefore used to form a search string for a collocation analysis. The actual string used was:

demonstrat*/extremist*/fanatic*/fundamentalist*/mob*/protest*/riot*

The only term from Table 7.2 which was not included in the sample was the term 'Sudanese'. The inclusion of this term would have been likely to skew the sub-sample because of the wide range of contexts within which it could have been (and presumably was) used – and so it was removed from the sample. The search string was applied to the modified corpus described above – which covers November 30th,2007 – December 4th, 2007.

Browsing the concordance produced by *Wordsmith* for the collocation analysis described above reveals that terms such as 'protestors' were not only used to describe the Sudanese Muslims who protested *for* Gibbons' sentence, but also to describe people in Britain who protested *against* the punishment. This is emphasised by word clusters identified using *Wordsmith* – many of which refer to the 'Sudanese embassy' (which was the location where protests against Gibbons' sentence took place in London). Conversely, many of the other clusters identified by *Wordsmith* involve the 'British embassy' – which was where many of the protests in Khartoum were centred.

Because the search string used for the collocation analysis was so broad, the useful data which can be drawn from it is limited. Whilst this might seem counterintuitive, having a large number of terms in a sample tends to produce large amounts of 'noise' – or data which is not of any interest to the analysis being carried out. In this case, two collocates were identified which might be of interest to the analysis. Relationships were identified between the sampled term 'mob' and the term 'baying' (5 instances of collocation) – as well as between the sample term 'protests' and the term 'hardline' (3 instances of collocation). Whilst the only sampled term where instances of collocation were identified with the term 'baying' was 'mob'[141], the term 'hardline' was also observed within 5 words of other terms in the sample – notably 'mobs' (1 instance) and 'protestors' (1 instance). Whilst 'mobs' implies that a value judgement has been taken on the legitimacy of the protests which took place, 'protests' is a more balanced term. As the term 'hardline' was used with both of these terms, these instances were sampled for further qualitative analysis. The extracts including these instances of collocation are included in the Appendix to Chapter Seven – Extracts A7.1-A7.5.

In the master corpus as a whole, 'hardline' was a reasonably common term – it ranked as the 375th most popular word with 27 instances in the master word list. Its use in relationship to the protestors in Sudan was thought to be especially interesting, given the fact that it also appeared in other contexts within the corpus. In every instance described by Extracts A7.1-A7.5., 'hardline' appears as an adjective modifying another term – although this is not always the term sampled for. All instances of the term 'hardline' in the sample directly relate to Muslims in Sudan. These instances are:

'hardline protests' (Extract A7.1)
'hardine Islamic leaders' (Extract A7.2)
'hardline Mosques' (Extract A7.3)
'hardline sermons'(Extract A7.4)
'hardline Islamic mobs' (Extract A7.5)

This shows 'hardline' to be a term which was used to describe a number of things connected to Islam in some way – from religious leadership ('Islamic leaders'; 'Mosques' and 'sermons') to the protests themselves ('protests' and 'Islamic mobs'). The term 'hardline' is also interesting because of its implications/connotations. Although the term 'hardline' itself does not appear in the dictionary, the

[141] One instance of collocation was identified between 'baying' and 'protestors', but in this case 'baying' was being used as a modifying adjective with the term 'mob' (in the L1 position), and 'protestors' also appeared within 5 words – causing two instances of collocation to be identified in the same sentence.

phrases 'hard line' and 'hard-liners' do – describing 'unyielding adherence to a firm policy' and 'a person who adheres rigidly to a policy' respectively (Pearsall and Trumble (eds), 2002: 641). As in this case 'hardline' would simply appear to be a misspelling of 'hard line', in literal terms the Sudanese Muslims described by Extracts A7.1-A7.5 are simply being described as firm adherents to a policy (which in this case would be Sudanese law). Not only is this usage technically correct, but it also implies a plurality amongst the Muslims of Sudan – because the term 'hard' not only has a direct opposite ('soft'), but presumably a multitude of levels of 'hardness' in-between. These particular people, the reader is effectively being reminded, are not representative of every Muslim in Sudan. This is stated directly in Extract A7.3, which contains paraphrased comments and a quotation from Khalid al-Mubarak – the spokesperson for the Sudanese embassy in London. Al-Mubarak reportedly blamed death threats made against Gibbons on 'hardline Mosques' and said that 'protests were not representative of society in Khartoum' (Rice and Heavens, 2007).

Collocation analyses carried out for 'hardline' and 'hard line' using the master corpus show that this type of usage was common throughout the reporting sampled. This showed that there were 27 instances of 'hardline' in the corpus (as mentioned previously), as well as 5 instances of 'hard-line'. Browsing the concordances produced for these 32 instances, reveals that all refer to either the protestors in Sudan, religious leadership in Sudan, or the Sudanese government itself. The term 'Islamic' was a common collocate term of 'hardline' (with 6 instances of collocation), and there were also three instances of collocation between 'hardline' and 'Islamist'. Use of the term 'hardline' to describe Muslims in Sudan is interesting, because it appears to differ from the type of treatment given to Muslims during the Rushdie incident. Where, during the Rushdie incident, many examples were found of Muslims being covered as a largely monolithic 'group' – even when national boundaries were taken into account, this suggests that during the Gibbons incident, reporting of Muslims as a composite group was more widespread. This is something which is discussed further as part of the comparative analysis presented in Chapter Eight.

The plurality involved in coverage of Sudanese Muslims suggested by the analysis above is interesting, but its features mean that it says little about coverage of British Muslims – the primary interest of this study. To this end, a collocation analysis was carried out on the master corpus for the search term 'Muslim*'[142]. This showed that the term 'British' was one of the terms most commonly collocated with the term 'Muslim' (55 instances). In fact, the only terms which were collocated more frequently with 'Muslim' within the master corpus were common terms – 'and', 'to', 'a', 'of'

[142] It was unnecessary to include the alternate spelling 'Moslem' in the search, given that it did not appear in the master word list.

and 'the'. Of the 55 instances where 'British' was collocated with 'Muslim', 48 occurred in the L1 position – forming the phrase 'British Muslim'. 'British' was also a common collocate of the plural 'Muslims' – with 29 instances of this being recognised by the software. Of these 29, 27 occurred in the L1 position, forming the phrase 'British Muslims'. To determine how often these phrases referred to the British Muslim peers who travelled to Sudan during the time of the sample, separate collocation analyses were produced for 'British Muslim' and 'British Muslims'. 'Peers' was a common collocate of 'British Muslim' – occurring within five words of this phrase 21 times. Of these 21 instances, all occurred in the R1 position – forming the phrase 'British Muslim peers'. This leaves only 6 instances of the phrase 'British Muslim' which were not immediately followed by the term 'peers'. The case of the plural phrase 'British Muslims' is more complicated. As the phrase cannot simply be followed by 'peers' to refer to the British Muslim peers, the ways in which it might relate to them are more complex. As 'British Muslims' only occurred 27 times within the corpus, the concordance for the phrase was analysed manually (qualitatively) to determine how often the context in which the phrase was used referred to the peers. It was found that of the 27 instances of 'British Muslims' in the master corpus, only 3 referred directly to the British peers. The further 24 instances all involved 'ordinary' British Muslims. Interestingly, evidence was also found of quotations from the peers themselves, speaking about other British Muslims. In the above analysis, these instances were logged as *not* concerned with the peers themselves – as it was they who were being quoted speaking about a different subject. As this study is concerned with the representation of British Muslims, all 24 instances of the phrase 'British Muslims' where the context refers to 'ordinary' British Muslims are included as extracts in the Appendix to Chapter Seven (Extracts A7.6-A7.29), and salient articles are analysed below.

From browsing Extracts A7.6-A7.29, it is clear that the majority of instances where 'ordinary' British Muslims were directly mentioned in the corpus were positive. British Muslims are variously described as 'horrified' (Extract A7.6; Extract A7.17); disgusted (Extract A7.10) and 'embarrassed' (Extract A7.26) at the treatment received by Gibbons, and mention was made of the protests which British Muslims took part in against this treatment (Extract A7.13; Extract A7.14). British Muslims were also said to have 'condemned' Gibbons' treatment (Extract A7.10; Extract A7.15; Extract A7.25). The exception to this positivity was Extract A7.16, which stated that 'only a handful of British Muslims yesterday joined a rally to back the teacher jailed in Sudan for naming a teddy bear Mohammed' (Latchem and Carlin, 2007). The article which Extract A7.16 was drawn from emphasised this negative sentiment – the headline itself being 'Bear Minimum; Exclusive Just 14 UK Muslims Go to Sudan Protest Gillian Tells World' (ibid), and it later states that 'It was in stark

contrast to the thousands who marched in Khartoum 24 hours earlier demanding the death penalty for Gillian' (ibid). A reason for the low turnout at the British protest is eventually given – that the 300,000+ invitations had only been sent out by email at 3pm the previous day (meaning that a large turnout was never likely), but this only appears after the statements above have been made. The strong reason given for the low turnout seems at odds with the title of the piece, which makes no mention of this, and implies that the majority of 'UK Muslims' either supported or were indifferent to Gibbons' treatment in Sudan. This is reinforced by the parallels drawn with the protest which took place in Sudan against the 'lenience' of Gibbons' sentence, and seems in this context to cover the world's Muslims as a single monolith – because whilst protests by Muslims in Britain *against* Gibbons' treatment got only a low turnout, Muslims in Sudan protesting for a *heavier* punishment created a protest of thousands. The reader is perhaps left wondering why protests similar to the ones in Sudan – calling for a harsher punishment for Gibbons – did not occur in the UK. This negative coverage of the British protest contrasts with more positive coverage which can be found elsewhere. Extract A7.13 for example simply describes how 'a small group of British Muslims' protested over Gibbons'' treatment (Chamberlain *et.al*, 2007) – and the article itself makes no other mention of the protest. Extract A7.14 is more positive still – describing how 'a group of British Muslims, including Tooting MP Sadiq Khan' demonstrated outside the Sudanese embassy in London (Evans-Pritchard, 2007). Here the size of the demonstration is not mentioned, but the fact that a figure from the political elite (Khan) was in attendance *is*. Khan is also a Muslim (Khan, 2010). Whilst all three of these extracts were published on the same day (December 2nd, 2007), they were printed in three separate newspapers – Extract A7.16 in *The People*, Extract A7.13 in *The Sunday Telegraph*, and Extract A7.14 in the *Mail on Sunday*. It is possibly interesting that the negative statement (Extract A7.16) comes from a red top tabloid (*The People*), whilst the two positive/neutral statements come from mid-market (Extract A7.14/the *Mail on Sunday*) and broadsheet (Extract A7.13/*The Sunday Telegraph*) newspapers.

Latchem and Carlin's (2007) article is written in such a way that the protest in London is deemed to be 'not good enough'. The headline itself – 'Bear Minimum' (Latchem and Carlin, 2007) (whilst a pun) implies that British Muslims could and should have done more to protest against Gibbons' treatment. No mention is made of any form of protest being made by non-Muslim Britons however – making it appear as though the burden of protest rested solely with British Muslims. Again, this is a subtle way in which the article covers Muslims worldwide as if they represent a single monolith – because demonstrations were made *against* Gibbons by Muslims in Sudan, Latchem and Carlin write as if British Muslims (who presumably had nothing to do with the demonstrations in Khartoum)

should not only demonstrate against this, but also apologise for it[143]. It also seems that Latchem and Carlin expected that a great number of (if not all) British Muslims should have protested against events in Sudan – although again, no mention is made of the lack of non-Muslim Britons protesting on the streets during the Gibbons incident. This difference is interesting, because it seems to imply that British Muslims on the whole do not possess the same features as many non-Muslim Britons which might prevent or hinder them from attending such a protest – for instance – political apathy, work commitments, or social lives. It is almost expected that British Muslims as a group should have immediately rallied on hearing the news of Gillian Gibbons' arrest. This type of coverage of British Muslims as an extremely politically engaged group not only sets it aside as an 'other' group – in that it is fundamentally different to the 'normal' group – but also implies a degree of fear – in that the difference from the 'normal' group is that the 'other' group possesses the ability to rise *en masse* almost at will. In light of events such as 7/7 (2005), where a group of British Muslims were found to be behind a terrorist attack on London, the concept of British Muslims as a potentially powerful and politically active group is one which might be unwelcome in a society where minority groups are routinely covered by the media as homogenous and monolithic. Another factor from the past decade which should be considered within a conception of British Muslims as unusually politically active are the demonstrations held against the invasion of Iraq in 2003 – one of which (held on February 15th, 2003) was Britain's largest ever recorded demonstration, with an estimated 750,000-2,000,000 participants (Robinson *et.al.,* 2010: 150). The Muslim Association of Britain was among the groups which organised this event (ibid), and Pickerill (2008) describes the way in which many Muslims have been 'galvanized' by recent anti-war events – making Muslims a visible presence at anti-war demonstrations, as well as the wider protest movement in Britain (2008: 4). More generally, Law (2010) describes the way in which the rise of British Muslim political power has affected the *status quo* of the British political establishment:

> The rise of Muslim political agency and its challenge to British multiculturalism has been accompanied by adaptation of Muslim demands to the national context and the construction of legal and institutional compromises in the governance and management of the British state. (2010: 94).

One of the 'closed views' of Islam identified by the Runnymede Trust (1997) is that Islam is seen as an enemy not as a partner (1997: 7) – and although this description concentrates on the view that

[143] This is perhaps especially interesting in light of Sardar's (2002) analysis that in the US, Muslims are generally identified either as 'terrorists' who have 'declared war on the west' or as 'apologists' who claim to be liberal, and defend Islam as a peaceful religion (2002: 51).

Islam is 'violent and aggressive' and 'firmly committed to barbaric terrorism', it shares a core similarity to the one implied in the article by Latchem and Carlin (2007) above. This is that Muslims represent a homogeneously hostile group – the hostility in this case being a political hostility instead of a violent one, but a hostility nonetheless.

In terms of the 'voice' provided for British Muslims by Extracts A7.6-A7.30, mixed results were observed. Only rarely were 'ordinary' British Muslims allowed to state their opinion in these extracts, and even then these instances were limited – for example Extract A7.7, which states 'British Muslims staged a peaceful protest outside the Sudanese embassy in London yesterday. They held teddy bears and carried placards saying "Not in our name" (Taher and Crilly, 2007)[144]. Here, the voices of British Muslims are conveyed through the written messages carried to a protest, but no interviews with protesters are reported – an oddity, given that the protest was reportedly prearranged and involved a Member of Parliament (Latchem and Carlin, 2007). This should have given a national newspaper based in London ample time to dispatch a reporter to the scene in order to conduct interviews, had it desired to. Voices from the wider British Muslim community are heard in the rest of the article – with quotations from Baroness Warsi, Muhammad Abdul Bari (Secretary-General of the Muslim Council of Britain), and Khurshid Ahmed (Chairperson of the British Muslim Forum) (Taher and Crilly, 2007). Whilst Warsi played a central role in the Gibbons incident – having travelled to Sudan herself in order to negotiate Gibbons' release, Bari and Ahmed did not. These two quotations are introduced in the article by the statement – 'Britain's most influential Muslim organisations have united in condemning the punishment meted out to Gibbons' (Taher and Crilly, 2007). Given this statement, it is fair to say that Bari and Ahmed are represented as British Muslim 'leaders' – a problematic title which was discussed in Chapter Five of this thesis with respect to Sayed Abdul Quddus. That once again a newspaper has relied on prominent members of British Muslim organisations to give statements on an issue related to Islam is interesting – especially as in this particular case the newspaper appeared to have a good chance to interview politically active British Muslims who were not members of any 'leadership', which it did not take. This reluctance to interview 'ordinary' (i.e. not 'leaders') members of society who are also British Muslim means that the article conveys only the views of more prominent British Muslims, which does little to break down any stereotypes of homogeneity which might have been engendered in the past, in the way that a broader range of voices might.

[144] 'Not in our name' was also a slogan commonly used during demonstrations against the 2003 invasion of Iraq mentioned above – e.g. Peek, (2003); Thorpe and Helmore, (2003).

Extract A7.22 speaks directly to the lack of British Muslim voices being heard surrounding the Gibbons incident:

> No, the voices we need to hear now belong to Britain's vast, sensible Muslim majority. If British Muslims speak up decisively and loudly against this lunacy, then they can achieve two good things at once. Their arguments will be heard with respect in Khartoum, since they cannot be said to be founded on any kind of cultural imperialism, or to be actuated by Islamophobia (Johnson, 2007).

Generally the article which this extract was taken from (Johnson, 2007) is quite positive about British Muslims – and was printed on November 29th, 2007 – before the protests described above had taken place. This is despite the fact that the author appears to follow the same analysis as the article above from Latchem and Carlin (2007) – that the burden of protest over the Gibbons incident rested with British Muslims rather than anyone else – something exemplified by the headline 'British Muslims Should Protest About This Teddy Bear Lunacy' (Johnson, 2007). The author does give a reason for this however – which is included in Extract A7.22 – this being that the arguments of British Muslims in this context 'cannot be said to be founded on any kind of cultural imperialism', or 'be actuated by Islamophobia' (Johnson, 2007). The second part of this statement (regarding Islamophobia) is correct – because someone cannot logically be said to hold a phobia/fear of their own stated beliefs[145]. The first part of the statement however, is more problematic. Johnson offers no explanation as to *why* British Muslims cannot be accused of 'cultural imperialism', which is somewhat of an enigma – because British Muslims are exactly that – British. By this statement, Johnson implies that an inherent difference exists in the culture of British Muslims when compared with other Britons (who presumably according to Johnson need not/should not/cannot protest over this issue). Whilst there do exist inherent differences in the culture of British Muslims and non-Muslim Britons (as are likely to be found within any defined cultural or religious group), Johnson's comment seems to imply that British Muslims are somehow less 'British' – less a part of the culture of the nation in which they live. It might even imply that British Muslims hold loyalty to their religion closer than they do loyalty to their country. This would be especially interesting, given that Peach (2005) suggests that where Britain's Muslim Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are concerned, housing segregation rates appear to suggest that ethnicity is a stronger bond than religion amongst these two groups (2005: 28). Whilst Johnson's article appears for the most part to be well-meaning towards British Muslims (at least on the surface), this comment suggests an ingrained belief in an

[145] Whilst by definition the term 'phobia' implies an *irrational* fear, it is not generally used in its completely literal sense when describing 'Islamophobia'.

'other' group in Britain. Whilst Johnson does not explicitly state any racial argument here, it might also follow that he believes that this 'otherness' stems from British Muslims being 'outsiders' – i.e. because the majority of British Muslims come from ethnic minority groups, they are somehow less 'British' than people of the ethnic majority in Britain. This again seems rather like the 'inferential racism' described by Hall (1990), and mentioned in the conclusion to Chapter Six of this thesis – because Johnson makes the *assumption* that British Muslims have more in common culturally with Sudanese Muslims than they do with other non-Muslim people in Britain. Also interesting is the fact that Johnson is himself an elite voice – at the time of his writing above, he was MP for Henley, Oxfordshire.

During the course of the article described above, Johnson also makes mention of Britain's 'vast, sensible Muslim majority' (Johnson, 2007), to some extent aggregating British Muslim opinion – which is a trend continued throughout other extracts – and perhaps again invoking the terrorist/apologist duality described by Sardar (2002). Extract A7.26 for instance mentions that 'a vast majority of British Muslims are so embarrassed by this' [the protests in Sudan] (Wall, 2007). The author of Extract A7.17 states that 'I don't doubt most British Muslims will be horrified by the situation in which Mrs Gibbons finds herself. The majority do not back Sharia law and are just as committed to living lives of peace as the rest of us' (Clark, 2007), and Extract A7.29 asserts that 'of course, most British Muslims are peaceful' (Phillips, 2007). Whilst the quotation from Wall (2007) actually comes from Inayat Bunglawala (a member of the Muslim Council of Britain), and might therefore be treated with a degree of credence – given that one of the aims stated by the Muslim Council of Britain is to promote consensus and unity on Muslim affairs in the UK (MCB, 2012), the other writers mentioned above appear to have no basis on which to speak on behalf of 'the vast majority' of British Muslims. Whilst all of the above statements are positive about the opinions of British Muslims, the fact remains that they are amalgamations – with no evidence of accuracy given. Again this is a situation where a journalist might be expected to provide anecdotal evidence from British Muslims themselves that this is in fact the case, but where this occurs, it is once more limited to the 'elite' British Muslim voices described previously. Whilst journalistic practice and deadlines may contribute to this situation – by ensuring that journalists are likely to use the same sources repeatedly simply because it is easier and less time-consuming, the dearth of 'ordinary' British Muslim voices sampled here is surprising. Although he refers specifically to ethnic minorities (rather than religious minorities (although as mentioned various times throughout this thesis, the two are often linked by the press), van Dijk (1993) points out that when minorities are quoted at all, more often than not their opinions are 'balanced' by those of white (i.e. 'mainstream') speakers (1993:

254). A particular statistic quoted by van Dijk is that 'in only 3.8% of British news reports on ethnic affairs, are minorities allowed to speak on their own' (ibid). Findings described by Richardson (2006) regarding the British broadsheet press are also interesting in this context. Richardson states that:

> Muslim sources are overwhelmingly only included and only quoted in reporting contexts critical of their actions and critical of their religion. When Muslim activities are not criticised – or when reported activities are not labelled as *Muslim* actions – Muslim sources are, almost without exception, absent from journalistic texts (Richardson, 2006: 115).

This is interesting – given the nature of the Gibbons incident (much criticism was directed at Muslims in Sudan). This underlines the fact that although there was a relative lack of coverage of Muslim voices (certainly 'ordinary' Muslim voices) in British newspapers during the Gibbons incident, this coverage would still be likely to represent a 'spike' in coverage of Muslim voices if press content was reviewed over a period longer than the seven days investigated in this thesis.

Much of the coverage described in this chapter (including that above), seems to suggest that when British Muslims were covered by the press, unqualified opinions often spoke for 'the vast majority' of British Muslims. Whilst there was a good deal of coverage sampled which included the voices of British Muslim 'leaders', these were often 'heard' alongside non-Muslim voices. Whilst this situation differs from the 'normal' situation described by Richardson above, this type of inclusion of Muslim voices largely still involves a process of differentiation. British Muslims are differentiated because of the constant referrals to Muslim 'leaders' rather than 'ordinary' members of the community – and on top of this, Muslim opinions are contrasted/'backed-up' with 'mainstream' non-Muslim opinion. In this way, British Muslims are seen as Muslims first, and people second – another way in which the 'group' is imagined and 'othered'.

In light of the relative lack of comment from 'ordinary' British Muslims described above, it is interesting that Extract A7.10 states:

> I am encouraged so many British Muslims have expressed their disgust over Gillian's treatment and condemned the Sudanese government. That is a step in the right direction. This gives them a chance to stand up and be counted. To draw a line and to say enough is enough (Kelly, 2007).

The article Extract A7.10 was sampled from contains no other mention of British Muslims 'expressing their disgust' – or any other feeling – and it was printed on the day of the protest in London (rather than the day following it). There was a possibility that it alluded to another article published in that edition of the newspaper (which was *The Sun*), however. A total of 8 articles were sampled from *The Sun* from the date this article was published (December 1st, 2007) – which were qualitatively (manually) checked for references to British Muslims. Other than the reference in Extract A7.10 described above, only two of the other articles sampled that day for *The Sun* make mention of British Muslims in this context – these were Parker and Whitaker (2007) and Ali (2007)(which also produced Extract A7.6). Parker and Whitaker describe the Muslim Council of Britain as having branded the sentence 'an obscene over-reaction' (Parker and Whitaker, 2007), and quote the group's spokesperson Inayat Bunglawala as stating that 'people should remember that this is all over a teddy bear' (ibid). Ali (2007) is itself largely written by a British Muslim – Mohammed Akbar Ali, who is described in the headline simply as a 'Muslim leader in Liverpool' (Ali, 2007) and in the introductory section of the article (for which no author is given) as 'the leader of the Muslim community in Liverpool' (ibid). It should be noted that although Liverpool is not one of the areas of Britain associated with a particularly large Muslim population (in relative terms) (Peach, 2005: 28), it is misleading that its Muslim citizens should be represented as a single community who share a single leader. Whilst Ali might indeed represent some, or even the majority of Muslims in Liverpool, it is unlikely that he is able to act as a spokesperson for *every* Muslim in the area. Ali goes into some detail about why in his view Gibbons' sentence was 'unjust' and how the case had 'crossed the border of religion and got into the realm of politics' (Ali, 2007), but with the exception of the introduction (almost certainly written by a journalist working for *The Sun*), his is the only voice 'heard' in the article – there is no mention of the British Muslims that Ali is said to 'lead'. Given that of the 8 articles sampled from *The Sun* that day, only two others contain statements from British Muslims 'expressing their disgust' (both of whom are also to some extent 'leaders' of British Muslims), the statement made by Kelly (2007) in Extract A7.10 above seems odd. In order to further investigate this, the 6 articles sampled from *The Sun* for the previous day (November 30th, 2007) were checked for the same type of references. Here two articles draw attention to British Muslims who disagreed with Gibbons' sentence – one of these containing a reference to a British Muslim who is not described as a 'leader'. Firstly Parker (2007b) quotes another Muslim 'leader' in Bari (as with Taher and Crilly (2007) previously) – a reference which is placed above another separate quotation from Rowan Williams (the Archbishop of Canterbury). This opposition (quoted below) is interesting in itself:

> Muhammed Abdul Bari, Secretary-General, of the Muslim Council of Britain, said: "This is a disgraceful decision and defies common sense."
>
> The Archbishop of Canterbury, the Most Rev Rowan Williams, said: "I can't see any justification for this. It is an absurdly disproportionate response to what is at worst a cultural faux pas" (Parker, 2007b).

Parker (2007b) contains other direct quotes, but none from religious leaders – besides the two above, quotes are included from the (then) Foreign Secretary David Miliband, Gillian Gibbons herself, and her son John. The two quotes from Bari and Williams were arranged exactly as above – Bari first, with Williams below. No explanation is given as to why a Christian Church of England opinion is included with the article here – although Williams echoes the view expressed by Bari[146]. Again, although van Dijk (1993) describes the phenomenon in ethnic, rather than religious terms, the quotation above seems to share similarities to the process noted by him – that minority views in the press are 'nearly always' balanced by those of white speakers (1993: 254). Whilst this is a particularly stark example of this effect – given that the quotations are included sequentially, there is no reason to believe that the same process does not exist with subtler methods in other press coverage.

The other article of relevance included in *The Sun* on November 30th 2007 – *The Sun* (2007b) differs from others described here, in that it is a collection of letters written by 'ordinary' people regarding the Gibbons story – entitled 'Muslims Fear a Bear Backlash' (The Sun, 2007b). Of the authors of these letters, only one describes themselves as Muslim – Khalid Anis from Bowdon, Cheshire. Although the original layout of the article is not available from the *Lexis Library* database, Anis' letter appears at the top of the plaintext sampled for the study, and is listed as being the '£50 letter' (The Sun, 2007b) – meaning that there is no reason to assume that it was not given this prominent place in the layout of the page. Nine other letters from readers are present in the article. Anis' letter was as follows:

[146] Williams had previously been involved in debates surrounding Islam in the UK, including the wearing of veils by some Muslim women (BBC, 2006c), giving a possible pretext for his statement, but this is not mentioned in the article (Parker, 2007b). The article in question was published *before* Williams made controversial comments on Sharia Law in the UK – which took place in February 2008 (Siddiqui, 2008: 261).

> I DON'T [sic] know any Muslims who are insulted by this teddy bear.
>
> I am a Muslim and I'm far more concerned about the safe return of Gillian Gibbons.
>
> Please don't taint Britain's Muslim community with an action that has no basis in Islam. Sudan wants to give us a bloody nose by playing a political game. All I and thousands of my fellow Brits want is Gillian back home please (The Sun, 2007b).

The fact that Anis was publically awarded a £50 prize for his letter is interesting – as his is the only one which supports British Muslims by pointing out that the actions of Muslims in Sudan have very little to do with the actions of Muslims in Britain. Of the nine other letters printed in this article, five make directly negative generalised statements about either Muslims, 'Muslim leaders' or Islam in general. None make a distinction between the Muslims in Sudan who arrested Gibbons and any other Muslims. The statements made included references to Gibbons' 'Islamic persecutors', Islam as a 'bigoted, female-hating religion', and statements such as 'It is barbaric. How can Muslim leaders ever expect us to understand their religion when they dish out such violent punishments?' (The Sun, 2007b). This final statement is especially interesting, because it includes the binary opposition 'us' and 'them' (actually 'they'). Not only does it generalise 'Muslim leaders', but it also describes Islam as a religion which 'we' (presumably non-Muslim readers of *The Sun*) do not understand – and possibly never will. This is remarkably similar to a much earlier (1998) instance identified by Allan (1999) – again in *The Sun*, of an 'us' and 'they' scenario – this time regarding British Muslims. Here Muslims in Leicester were reported to have complained to the police about a display of ceramic pigs in the window of a local home – prompting an editorial piece by *The Sun* about the 'pig squad', which stated that:

> *The unbending attitude of militant Muslims who think they have a right to to* [sic] *impose their culture in a Christian country is frightening.* There has to be give and take if we are all to get on together. But it seems **WE** give and **THEY** take (*The Sun*, 1998, cited in Allan, 1999: 161; original emphasis).

For Allan, *The Sun*'s editorial position (the 'we') finds its 'racialized definition' in opposition to a 'they' which is positioned 'outside' of the imagined community of *The Sun*'s readers (Allan, 1999: 161). When read in conjunction to the instance identified by Allan (which was published in the same newspaper almost a decade earlier), the 'us' and 'they' statement described above (The Sun, 2007b) becomes even more interesting – because it shows the way in which British Muslims might be linked

with Muslims worldwide through a very simple, but often repeated form of 'othering'. Whilst 'we' are perfectly rational, peaceful people, 'they' are an irrational force, which will stop at nothing to impose its own will worldwide.

Another statement in the 2007 article identified here is interesting, because it was essentially made twice across two different letters. These two letters were as follows:

> WE [sic] are told Islam is a peaceful religion which does not condone violence of any sort - yet there are far too many cases like this one which totally contradict those claims.
>
> DAVID JEFFS [sic]
>
> Rochdale, Lancs
>
> MUSLIMS [sic] like to tell us they are tolerant and peaceful but once again their actions contradict their teachings.
>
> BILL KENNEDY [sic]
>
> Telford, Shrops (The Sun, 2007b).

In both of these statements, Muslims are once again generalised – though this time as both violent and as hypocritical about this violence (claiming to be peaceful). What these statements demonstrate is an inability or unwillingness of the writer's to distinguish one Muslim from another – i.e. because the writer sees Muslims as a single monolith, they cannot distinguish between peaceful Muslims, and other Muslims who are violent and intolerant. Although this study makes no claims about the effect on the reader the type of coverage it has identified might have, given the widespread coverage of Islam as a monolithic religion identified in the case studies presented here, it seems unlikely that this has not at least perpetuated this type of attitude – if not represented a direct cause. It is interesting to note that each of these statements again describes an 'us' and 'them' scenario – directly in the letter from Kennedy, and indirectly (through use of the term 'we') in the case of the Jeffs letter.

The only other letter in the article which was vaguely positive about Muslims stated: 'IT'S [sic] disgusting that an experienced British teacher decides to help a Third World country only to become a victim of their mad mullahs. Is Allah not a figure of love?' (The Sun, 2007b). Whilst this

statement uses the phrase 'mad mullah' (use of which as a derogatory nickname for Ayatollah Khomeini by red-top tabloids during the *Satanic Verses* incident was observed in Chapter Five), the use of this phrase is limited to the Muslims who actually decided to incarcerate Gibbons – 'a victim of their mad mullahs' (ibid). This is juxtaposed with a statement describing Allah as a figure of love – presumably indicating that many Muslims are also loving, peaceful people. This letter could not be described as overtly positive however, and had a position roughly half-way down the article in the plaintext available from *Lexis Library*. Whilst position matters little in terms of the overall content of the article, it may have had various psychological effects on the reader.

Given that newspaper staff are likely to have selected these final published letters from a large number of letters which were not published, the juxtaposition of Anis' positive letter with so many other negative letters is interesting – especially given the £50 prize awarded to Anis previously mentioned. As it seems unlikely that Anis was the only *Sun* reader who wrote to the newspaper with a positive statement about British Muslims, it is odd that his letter should be awarded a prize and given a prominent position within the article, yet juxtaposed with so many conflicting opinions. Whilst *The Sun* might be seen to support Anis' opinion through the prominence assigned to it, it also effectively undermines it by making it appear as though it is an unusual opinion to hold. Although negative opinions on the page are not perhaps given the same status or prominence as the sole overtly positive view, negative themes are repeated throughout the article, and presented as if they are the views of the majority of British people (or at least British *Sun* readers). This might lead the reader to believe that *The Sun* could not award a prize to a negative letter – causing them to question why this might be the case. There is certainly precedent for this type of insincere/hypocritical reporting on race in Britain – Law (2002) for instance describes the way in which empty displays of anti-racism in the British media (which he dubs the *'great anti-racist show'*) often appear as if they might be played out in front of a 'backcloth' of institutional racism (2002: 76). Whilst in this case, *The Sun* is referring to a religious, rather than a racial group, the way in which British Muslims are often covered as an ethnically defined monolith (as previously described) means that aspects of racism are likely be carried over into coverage of religion. On the other hand, the coverage described above could just as easily represent a case where *The Sun* has striven for balance in its content – by offering different types of prominence to different types of opinions. Whilst it is impossible to know exactly *why The Sun* chose to print the letters it did in the particular way it did, it is nonetheless an article which is interesting not just because of the apparent anomalies contained within it, but also because of the opinions expressed in many of the letters included within it.

Kelly's (2007) previously described statement regarding British Muslims 'expressing their disgust' is somewhat more enigmatic, following the analysis of articles sampled from *The Sun* conducted above. Kelly (2007) describes herself as 'encouraged' that 'so many' British Muslims expressed their disgust over the treatment received by Gibbons – yet very little evidence that this was the case was sampled from the newspaper Kelly was writing in. There were a handful of examples of British Muslim 'leaders' expressing their disgust, this is true, and the letter from Anis described above represents a single 'non-elite' British Muslim voice being heard above the clamour in *The Sun*, but Kelly's use of the phrase 'so many' British Muslims would seem to imply that a great deal of British Muslims had expressed their disgust. Because no source for this statement is referenced by Kelly, it is impossible to know whether she was privy to some information not mentioned in her statement, or whether she was exaggerating/fabricating the voice of British Muslims in this instance. This represents another anomaly within the data, although it does represent another example of the denial of British Muslim voice – being spoken for here by proxy, through Kelly herself.

Conclusions for Chapter Seven

Conflation/Coverage of British South Asians Within the Corpus

This chapter has shown that coverage of Muslims by the British press during the Gillian Gibbons incident was mixed. Whilst some articles made a clear distinction between the particular group of Muslims in Sudan responsible for Gibbons' arrest/protesting for a harsher punishment for Gibbons, and other Muslims worldwide, other articles tended towards coverage of the world's Muslims as a single homogenous monolith. Another 'group' of interest to this study – British South Asians were absent from coverage of the Gibbons incident – as shown by Table 7.3 (below).

Table 7.3 Frequencies of Selected Terms Relating to Coverage of British South Asians for All Newspapers 28.11.2007-04.12.2007

Word Rank	Word	Number of Instances
N/A	ASIA	0
N/A	ASIAN	0
N/A	ASIANS	0
1906	PAKISTAN	4
5330	PAKISTANI	1
N/A	PAKISTANIS	0
2569	BANGLADESH	2
N/A	BANGLADESHI	0
N/A	BANGLADESHIS	0
2925	INDIA	2
4846	INDIAN	1
N/A	INDIANS	0

Although Table 7.3 includes many terms related to the description of a South Asian ethnicity, none were present in large numbers in the Gibbons incident sample. In one sense, this is not surprising – as the Gibbons incident had nothing to do with a South Asian ethnicity. In another sense however, it is surprising that nothing relating to a South Asian ethnicity was observed in the qualitative analysis carried out in this chapter – given the strong relationship between a South Asian ethnicity and a Muslim religious identity often implied by press coverage analysed in Chapter Six of this thesis. When British Muslims were covered in the press content sampled in this chapter, this was seldom done in terms of ethnicity. This is something that the coverage sampled for the Gibbons incident had in common with that sampled for the *Satanic Verses* incident and covered in Chapter Five – where again, no real conflation between a Muslim and South Asian identity was observed. Whilst this phenomenon is examined in more detail in the next chapter, it is important to note that although no evidence of conflation working in the 'religion > ethnicity' direction was found by this sample (or the *Satanic Verses* incident sample), this does not mean that it does not exist outside of these particular situations. This is something accentuated by the similarities which can be drawn between the *Satanic Verses* incident and the Gibbons incident themselves – neither of which involved British Muslims as primary actors (although British Muslims were involved in more minor roles). A sample aimed particularly at investigating this type of conflation in particular might be better served by an event which involved British Muslims as primary actors – although such events do not generally make common news stories.

Voice

In the course of this chapter, there have been a number of examples of voices originating from British Muslims – as well as a number of examples of the denial of that voice. Generally speaking, this sampling produced similar findings to the previous two case studies carried out in this thesis – in that when British Muslim voices were heard, there was an overwhelming tendency for that voice to come from a British Muslim 'leader' in some form. The extent to which these 'leaders' really have the ability to speak for Britain's Muslim population is not of any real consequence in this discussion – as firstly it is unlikely that they possess the ability to speak for *every* British Muslim, and secondly, this was only ever *implied* through newspaper coverage – rather than expressly stated. Whether this apparent tendency towards the quotation/interviewing of 'leaders' comes from the malignant desire of a newspaper editor to make British Muslims appear as a monolithic group, or simply from lazy journalism is also of little consequence here – although it seems more likely that the latter is in fact the case. As Hall (1990) puts it (again in the context of race/ethnicity rather than religion):

> If the media function in a systematically racist manner, it is not because they are run and organised exclusively by active racists; this is a category mistake. This would be equivalent to saying that you could change the character of the capitalist state by replacing its personnel. Whereas the media, like the state, have a *structure*, a set of *practices* which are *not* reducible to the individuals who staff them (1990: 20).

Following Hall's analysis here, it would seem most likely that British Muslim 'leaders' tend to be approached for comment/quoted on issues simply because it represents a standard practice as far as newspaper journalists are concerned. As mentioned in the previous section, instances were also observed where British Muslim voice was 'balanced' by more 'mainstream' voices – in much the same way that van Dijk (1993) describes. Whilst the observations of both Hall (1990) and van Dijk (1993) described here relate specifically to ethnicity/race rather than religion, it is important to note in this context that a link between a South Asian ethnicity and a Muslim religious identity *had* previously been implicit in newspaper coverage – as this was identified in Chapter Six, which took a sample from 2001. This is something which is discussed further in the next chapter. Although it is dangerous to assume that patterns of news coverage relating to ethnicity/race can simply be 'mapped' onto similar patterns of news coverage for religion, the link described above means that in the context of such a relationship, any difference may be irrelevant – given that the

two identifiers of ethnicity and religion might be combined together by the media to form one imagined whole.

It is interesting to consider the British Muslim voices sampled for the Gibbons incident in terms of 'dissent'. Once again, the most logical way to do this is first to determine what the 'official line' on the incident was – as any 'dissenting' voice would logically have to deviate from this message in some way. As stated previously, a number of voices originating in the political 'elite' were identified in the analysis of the coverage sampled for the Gibbons incident. These included the voices of the two British Muslim peers (Warsi and Ahmed) who visited Sudan in order to negotiate Gibbons' release. Firstly, it is important to note that the very pretext for Warsi and Ahmed's travelling to Sudan gives a major clue as to the official opinion. What it implies is that although Sudan was considered safe enough for senior British political figures to travel there without a full military escort, the British political elite did *not* agree with Gibbons' sentence – and did not expect the Sudanese authorities to come to the desired conclusion (the release of Gibbons) without some form of persuasion/coercion. Whilst some sensitivity towards the religion of Islam was shown (in that Warsi and Ahmed are both Muslim), the decision to arrest Gibbons in this instance was clearly regarded as 'wrong'. Whether this judgement came from the government or from Warsi and Ahmed themselves is disputed – Phillips (2007) describing the Foreign Office as 'spineless' in this instance, and stating that Ahmed and Warsi's efforts to have Gibbons freed were 'ostensibly freelance' (Phillips, 2007). Phillips also quotes both Warsi and Ahmed on different subjects *not* directly related to the Gibbons incident however, noting:

> Yet even the peers who have lobbied for her release have been equivocal in the past in the defence of freedom. Thus Lord Ahmed denounced the knighthood for Sir Salman Rushdie, which he likened to honouring those who masterminded the 9/11 attacks.
>
> And Lady Warsi has said that it was 'a very dangerous step' to expect British Muslims to weed out the extremism in their midst (Phillips, 2007 – partly included in Extract A7.28).

Here the voices of Warsi and Ahmed are undermined by Phillips, who later states that 'such ambivalence is most disturbing' (ibid). Implicit in this statement is that Ahmed and Warsi are hypocrites – something identified as a possible stereotype of Muslims when letters to the editor printed in *The Sun* (2007b) were discussed. This is an issue considered further in the next section of the conclusion to Chapter Seven – 'Othering'. The fact that Warsi and Ahmed appeared to be

strong voices *against* Gibbons' treatment however, means that the British 'elite consensus' (if such a thing can be said to exist) was one of protest against the Sudanese government.

The familiarity of terms sometimes used to describe Gibbons, such as 'Gill' or 'the teddy bear miss' – e.g. *The Sun*(2007a); Parker (2007a) give clues as to the view of the British press on the matter of the Gibbons incident. These friendly modes of address are commonly used by tabloids and mid-market newspapers in order to show empathy or solidarity with a person – and certainly no examples were observed in this chapter of the British press actively calling for Gibbons' punishment. This means that the press can almost certainly be considered to have been a force campaigning for Gibbons' release.

Therefore in order for a voice to be considered truly dissenting from the 'mainstream' view presented by voices within the British political elite and press, it would have to be one which *did not* support Gibbons – possibly even a voice which actively supported the treatment of Gibbons imposed by the Sudanese government. Whilst such voices were by no means common in the material discussed during the course of this chapter, they did exist. The most overt example of this comes from what was (on the surface), a generally positive article – Johnson (2007). In Extract A7.21, Johnson writes:

> If you want grounds for despair, read the entries on the BBC website, in which some British Muslims say that she should be punished; or read the entries from people in Sudan saying that the children should be punished (Johnson, 2007).

As stated previously, Johnson's article came before the protest by British Muslims in London against Gibbons' treatment was made – and in it Johnson calls for 'Britain's vast, sensible Muslim majority' to protest against her imprisonment (Johnson, 2007). Clearly, the messages posted on the BBC's website would represent dissenting voices in this case – although no further evidence of their existence (such as a citation or URL) is provided by Johnson. Furthermore, Johnson fails to mention the problem that participants in discussions on internet fora (presumably including the BBC's comments section) are largely anonymous to their peers – giving rise to phenomena such as 'trolling' – which is defined by Rowland (2005) as:

> A purely mischief-making activity in which the "troll" posing as a genuine participant in a discussion, initiates an antagonistic environment for their amusement by asking apparently innocuous questions or making apparently innocent comments (Rowland, 2005: 521).

Therefore although Johnson asserts that comments were made online by 'British Muslims', he appears to have no way of knowing that this was indeed the case. On top of this, no explanation is given for Johnson's repetition of the messages reportedly posted by British Muslims on the website – and their inclusion in a sentence alongside messages posted reported to have been posted by 'people in Sudan' further complicates the situation. Nonetheless, these messages do represent dissenting voices in this case – although they are 'heard' only by proxy – through Johnson himself. One other case was identified which might stand out as a dissenting voice – in the previously described article by Latchem and Carlin (2007). Here, it is not the voice which is articulated so much as the way it is portrayed which makes it appear as if it is dissenting from the commonly held view that Gibbons was morally innocent. Latchem and Carlin describe the protest held by British Muslims (including MP Sadiq Khan) on December 1st, 2012 outside the Sudanese embassy in London as a 'damp squib' (Latchem and Carlin, 2007). In the opening lines of the article (including the headline), negative references are made to the protest a total of five times – these are listed below:

> BEAR MINIMUM; EXCLUSIVE JUST14 UK MUSLIMS GO TO SUDAN PROTEST... [sic] [headline].
>
> London mini-protest pales beside Sudan demo against Gillian...
>
> ONLY a handful of British Muslims yesterday joined a rally to back the teacher jailed in Sudan for naming a teddy bear Mohammed...
>
> Just 14 people turned up at Sudan's London embassy following a nationwide call to back Gillian Gibbons...
>
> It was in stark contrast to the thousands who marched in Khartoum 24 hours earlier demanding the death penalty for Gillian. But despite yesterday's damp squib, hopes are rising Gillian, 54, could be freed tomorrow (Latchem and Carlin, 2007).

Also interesting is the fact that two of these negative statements compare the protest in London *for* Gibbons to the protest in Khartoum *against* her – making it appear 'logical' that a contrast is drawn here. As previously mentioned, this serves to make Muslims worldwide appear as if they are a monolithic entity. This possibly again invokes the previously described stereotype of Muslim hypocrisy – i.e. although a few British Muslims protested against Gibbons' treatment, this is not the belief of the majority of the world's Muslims, who wished her to be punished. Also implicit in this it that Muslims want 'us' to believe that 'they' are peaceful people – hence the half-hearted protest in London. Clearly this stereotype of hypocrisy also relies on one of homogeneity – as it takes all of the world's Muslims to be the 'same' – rather than free-thinking individuals. This is something which is discussed further in the next section – on othering. As the article by Latchem and Carlin is described in some detail previously in this chapter, there is no need to repeat this here. In terms of voice however, Latchem and Carlin took what was a positive voice – the protest against Gibbons' treatment in London, and made it appear as though it was a negative voice – by taking a certain viewpoint on the issue. As mentioned previously, if the protest in London is framed in different terms (as it was in the other articles which were observed to mention it, such as Taher and Crilly (2007) and Chamberlain *et.al* (2007)), it becomes instead a positive event – showing that some British Muslims cared enough about events in Sudan that they were prepared to protest about them in the street – even at the short notice mentioned by Latchem and Carlin (2007).

The most overtly dissenting voices observed in the Gibbons incident corpus came from outside of Britain – being the voices of the protesters in Sudan calling for a harsher punishment for Gibbons. Although this study is interested primarily in the coverage of British Muslims, the coverage identified where the world's Muslims are treated as if they represent a single monolith – both above and elsewhere, indicates that even coverage of Muslims in geographically distant locations such as Sudan may be relevant in this context. It is therefore interesting that observed coverage of protestors in Sudan seems to follow a familiar trend – one where voices are only 'heard' by proxy, rather than in any direct manner. This is perhaps understandable, given that reports exist stating that during the protests:

> Western journalists and observers were told to leave after demonstrators headed towards them, moving their hands across their throats in a gesture of execution (Williams and Gysin, 2007a).

Whilst this provides a plausible reason why protestors had not been interviewed at the scene of the demonstration, it does not explain why no quotations had been obtained prior to this occurrence, or at a different time/location altogether. Voices are variously 'heard' in Williams and Gysin's article through quotations taken from banners which were being held during the demonstration that reportedly stated 'punishment, punishment, punishment' (ibid) as well as chants which were heard such as 'kill her, kill her by firing squad' and 'no tolerance – execution' (ibid). This distant style of coverage is certainly nothing new where coverage of protests and demonstrations is concerned. McLeod and Detenber (1999) for instance, note that protesting groups which are viewed as radical in their beliefs and strategies tend to be 'marginalized' in news coverage (1999: 6). As the views of protesters in Sudan would almost certainly have been viewed as 'radical' by most people in Britain – given the extent to which they contradicted the 'mainstream' view that Gibbons was morally innocent, McLeod and Detenber's work suggests that it is no surprise they were marginalized through a denial of individual voice. In allowing individual protesters to speak for themselves, the press may also have humanised them – by breaking up any images of homogeneity, and showing them to be individuals. What this does not explain is the widespread coverage described previously of the protest in London, which appeared to be covered in a similar manner – with very few direct quotations from protesters. This might be explained by two factors – firstly the small size of the protest may have meant that journalists were less inclined to give it any great depth of coverage[147], and secondly, because the protests followed the existing British *status quo*, they may have come as no great surprise to many spectators – and journalists may have seen little point in quoting an opinion which matched that of the majority of their readers. But this is at odds with conventional opinion, which suggests that newspaper readers tend to select their paper of choice precisely *because* they agree with the opinion it tends to take – hence, newspaper journalists tend to write for a certain 'target audience' – as described by Allan (1999: 109). The fact that the voices of British Muslim protesters in London were not reported more widely on a direct level therefore represents something of an enigma – given that the motivations for their demonstration appeared to agree with conventional British opinion at the time.

Instances were also identified in this chapter where newspaper journalists apparently spoke 'on behalf' of British Muslims as a group – such as Kelly (2007), who's statement 'I am encouraged so many British Muslims have expressed their disgust over Gillian's treatment and condemned the

[147] Although this may well have been the case, it is important to note that articles covering this particular protest did not tend to describe its actual size. Latchem and Carlin (2007) represented an exception to this.

Sudanese government' (Kelly, 2007) was investigated previously. As very few instances of British Muslim voice were articulated in *The Sun* (the newspaper which Kelly (2007) was published in) the day of or the day prior to Kelly's statement, this represents another somewhat enigmatic piece of coverage. There is a possibility that Kelly was referring to a source outside of *The Sun* – perhaps reported in another newspaper (although the relative dearth of British Muslim voices seemed to be present in every newspaper sampled here), or in television news – which was not sampled at all by this study. This seems unlikely however – given that Kelly does not mention any particular source for the articulation of this 'disgust'. Another possibility is that Kelly was implying that the few 'disgusted' British Muslim voices which were 'heard' in *The Sun* represented a *relatively* large number – perhaps implying that Kelly was surprised at this reaction. One further explanation might be that Kelly genuinely thought that the few British Muslim 'leaders' quoted in newspapers could represent the entirety of Britain's Muslim population. Whilst any of these explanations could plausibly be the case, in the context observed in this chapter, Kelly's statement almost appears as though she is speaking (or attempting to speak) for the majority of British Muslims herself.

Othering

A number of instances/themes were identified in this chapter which relate to the conception of British Muslims as an 'other' group. There is also evidence that this conception may have changed its appearance over time – something which is discussed in the next chapter with reference to the other case-studies presented in this thesis. As observed in previous chapters, this process of othering is often related to the two processes discussed above – conflation and the articulation of voice in the press. One area in which this became apparent in this chapter was in the generalisations which were made about Muslims and which were observed in a number of different articles. In this case, the most prominent generalisation made about Muslims was that Muslims tend to be 'hypocritical'. Here, Muslims are stereotyped as a group which wishes to be considered as peaceful/spiritual, but in reality is aggressive and dangerous. This stereotype was identified in two separate reader's letters to the editor (those of Jeffs and Kennedy) which were printed in *The Sun* (2007b) and discussed in the main body of this chapter – as well as being present by implication in the article by Latchem and Carlin (2007), which is discussed in this context in the above section on 'voice'. In the particular context of the Gibbons incident, this stereotype was revealing – as it tended to manifest itself in discussions where British Muslims

were amalgamated with other Muslims worldwide (in this case, the Muslims in Sudan who were calling for a harsher punishment for Gibbons). It seems that the 'hypocritical' stereotype might stem from an inability/unwillingness on the part of the person doing the stereotyping to realise that Muslims are as much individuals as any other human 'group' which can be defined. Thus, when some Muslims (or at least, people *calling* themselves Muslims) use their faith in an aggressive manner to attack other 'groups', the person imagining the stereotype cannot see the difference between these Muslims and other Muslims – who are indeed peaceful. So when a peaceful Muslim attempts to apologise for/demonstrate against the aggressive actions of others who practice their religion, the 'stereotyper' does not see the difference – it is as if the person doing the attacking is also attempting to apologise for it – often as the attack (in this case the treatment of Gibbons) is still ongoing. This is made further problematic by an environment which seems to *expect* peaceful Muslims to apologise for/argue against the actions of aggressive Muslims – as shown particularly well by the article from Johnson (2007) discussed previously. Here Johnson (an 'elite' voice) states (in the headline) that 'British Muslims should protest about this teddy bear lunacy' (Johnson, 2007). As discussed previously, this statement is followed by a discussion of *why* it is British Muslims in particular who should protest, rather than any other grouping of British people/British people in general. In order to discuss this in further detail here, it makes sense to include a more substantial citation of Johnson's argument:

> The jailing of Gillian Gibbons is helping to confirm people's worst prejudices about Islam. It may be that the judge will simply spring her today, in which case all will be well. But if he doesn't, and if this business drags on, then there is one group that must speak up.
>
> There's no point in the British government raging from afar, or rattling an empty scabbard. There's no point in us jumping up and down on the sidelines, and shaking our fists at Khartoum. Any such posturing would only help, of course, to deepen the intransigence of the Sudanese.
>
> No, the voices we need to hear now belong to Britain's vast, sensible Muslim majority. If British Muslims speak up decisively and loudly against this lunacy, then they can achieve two good things at once. Their arguments will be heard with respect in Khartoum, since they cannot be said to be founded on any kind of cultural imperialism, or to be actuated by Islamophobia.

More importantly, a strong protest by British Muslims against the imprisonment of Gillian Gibbons would help to contradict the growing ranks of pessimists and neo-cons - the people who say that the real problem is Islam, the religion itself. There is a body of commentators who say that we are deceiving ourselves about the scale of the problem. Islamism, they claim, is not the fault of a few extremists. These people claim that difficulties we are experiencing are intrinsic to the religion itself - because it is in essence a religion of war, unreformable, medieval. I think they are completely wrong, and they can be proved wrong (Johnson, 2007).

Problems with the third paragraph of the quotation above (regarding cultural imperialism and Islamophobia) have already been discussed in this chapter, and there is no need to do this a second time here. But there are other points made by Johnson above which are also interesting in this context – not least that the Gibbons case was 'helping to confirm people's worst prejudices about Islam' (ibid) – a statement which is further unpacked in the fourth paragraph, when Johnson mentions the 'growing ranks of pessimists and neo-cons' who 'say that the real problem is Islam, the religion itself' (ibid). Whilst Johnson discusses this matter in a way which does not invoke the stereotype of hypocrisy described above – he does for instance mention the view held by some that the religion of Islam (i.e. Muslims in general) represents a problem – he frames his argument in a way which suggests that British Muslims should protest against (rather than distance themselves from) events in Sudan. To imply that British Muslims above other groups should 'protest' against the Sudanese government also implies that British Muslims would have a higher chance of success in this regard – perhaps because they belong to the same 'monolith'. If Johnson had instead stated that British Muslims should distance themselves from events in Sudan – proclaiming them to be wrong, whilst protesting *alongside* other Britons, the article would be much less problematic, but as it is, it seems to imply that a deep connection exists between Muslims in Britain and Muslims in Sudan. Whilst people of the same religion often share a bond which goes beyond other boundaries[148], this does not mean that a demonstration by British Muslims would necessarily have been taken any more seriously by authorities in Sudan than a demonstration by anyone else in Britain.

The portrayal of Muslims worldwide as a single monolith seems at odd with some particular lexical trends which were identified during the course of this chapter – notably the use of the term 'hardline' to describe various entities and occurrences associated with Islam which occurred

[148] In Islam, this is often referred to as *Ummah* (Modood, 2006a: 46).

in Sudan. A number of instances where the term 'hardline' was used to describe protests in Sudan are described by Extracts A7.1-A7.5. The term 'hardline' (as previously mentioned) clearly implies that an opposite state exists – because of the opposition which can be made between 'hard' and 'soft'. If Muslims in Sudan were described as 'hardline', then it follows that other Muslims not described in this way were not 'hardline' – otherwise the description itself would be pointless. The use of this term represents an example where Muslims worldwide were *not* covered as a single monolith. This does not diminish the findings described above however – not least because the two views were being implied by different journalists. Secondly, the article by Johnson (2007) described above proves that a writer can directly state that a worldwide homogeneity amongst Muslims does not exist and yet still implicitly support this view in another way. This contradictory state of affairs is something which is discussed further in the next chapter, where the stereotype of Muslims worldwide as 'hypocritical' is examined in a comparative sense.

Chapter Eight

A Comparative Analysis of the *Satanic Verses*, Bradford Riots and Gillian Gibbons Case Studies

Introduction

The three previous chapters have each concentrated on an isolated case study – which were separated from each other not only by a period of many years in some cases, but also by important differences in the event which was being sampled for. Chapter Eight aims to weave these three separate threads together, forming a conclusion with respect to the objectives previously set out for the study in Chapter Four. As with the individual case studies themselves, the most logical way to begin this chapter is by considering the macro-level quantitative data produced for each chapter. In doing this, it is possible to see (as Table 8.1 below shows) that the corpus used in analysis of the *Satanic Verses* incident described in Chapter Five was by far the longest in the study as a whole – totalling 123,199 words, as compared to 72,290 words for the Bradford Riots sample (Chapter Six), and 76,096 words for the Gibbons incident sample (Chapter Seven). Whilst this might seem interesting given the closely-matched corpora produced for Chapters Six and Seven, it could just as easily represent nothing more than a statistical anomaly. In order to better determine whether this statistic is of interest, the corpus produced for each chapter is split down further – into a broadsheet, mid-market and tabloid corpus – and the results compared below in Table 8.1. Please see Chapter Four for a breakdown of the specific newspapers included under the headings 'broadsheet', 'mid-market' and 'tabloid'. A breakdown of the data included in Table 8.1 for individual newspapers can be found in the Appendices to Chapters Five, Six and Seven.

Table 8.1 Quantitative Comparison of Corpora for Chapters Five, Six and Seven

	Satanic Verses 1989 (C5)	Bradford Riots 2001 (C6)	Gillian Gibbons 2007 (C7)
Broadsheet Corpus (No of Words)	78369	36693	27093
Daily Average Length (6 Days)	13061.5	6115.5	4515.5
Number of Articles in Corpus	139	72	62
Article Average Length	563.8	509.6	437.0
Mid-Market Corpus (No of Words)	16730	16565	20212
Daily Average Length (6 Days)	2788.3	2760.8	3368.7
Number of Articles in Corpus	43	34	44
Article Average Length	389.1	487.2	459.4
Red-Top Corpus (No of Words)	11140	10458	17749
Daily Average Length (6 Days)	1856.7	1743.0	2958.2
Number of Articles in Corpus	41	31	62
Article Average Length	271.7	337.4	286.3
Sunday Corpus (No of Words)	16960	8574	11042
Number of Articles in Corpus	29	19	24
Article Average Length	584.8	451.3	460.1
Total Corpus Length (No of Words)	**123199**	**72290**	**76096**
Daily Average Length (7 Days)	17599.9	10327.1	10870.9
Total Number of Articles in Corpus	252	156	192
Average Article Length	488.9	463.4	396.3

Please note: Sunday newspapers were not included in the statistics for the 'broadsheet', 'mid-market' or 'red-top' corpora in Table 8.1.

Certain caveats apply to the data included in Table 8.1. Although the majority of these were discussed at some length in Chapter Four, they are reiterated here for clarity. The first of these is that the data sampled for this study is claimed only to be *representative* of a newspaper's coverage during the sample period. There may well exist items which were published by newspapers, but not identified by the sample schema used here. Secondly, a different (manual) sampling schema was used by necessity for some of the data sampled for Chapter Five/ the *Satanic Verses* incident. Although this is the case, it is unlikely that the manual sampling conducted at the Colindale newspaper archive would have affected the statistics shown in Table 8.1 too greatly. This is because the likelihood of a newspaper writing an article relevant to the *Satanic Verses* incident without including a term such as 'Rushdie' is low – meaning that the majority of manually sampled articles would still have been sampled, had a semi-automated system (such as *Lexis Library*) been available to assist in their sampling. Thirdly, because these samples are only to be considered representative (see point one), they may not be directly comparable against each other. This is not thought to present an insurmountable problem however, since (as with point two), it seems unlikely that newspapers would write articles relevant to the subject being sampled, without including the

primary search term in the text in each case. Whilst this is certainly not impossible, it does mean that the margin for error is reasonably low. Also important to consider is a point made about letters to the editor in Chapter Six – that letters are often printed as separate articles by newspapers – and because they tend to be quite short, this practice could skew the average article length for a newspaper downwards compared to a newspaper which does not do this. This is an issue, but given the ratio of reader's letters compared to articles in the average British newspaper, as well as the claims made by this study, is not significant.

Even with these caveats in mind, the data included in Table 8.1 are still interesting here. Quantitatively speaking, the data for the Sunday newspapers are perhaps the least useful – given that each 7-day sample contained only one Sunday edition – which means that the data could easily be skewed one way or another. When the data are broken down as in Table 8.1 however, it is clear that (as one might expect), the Sunday newspapers *tended* to have a longer average article length than any other type of newspaper (this was true in each case study except the Bradford Riots sample[149]). In all but the Gibbons incident sample, the average article lengths for the other types of newspaper also displayed results similar to what might be expected – broadsheet articles tended to be longest – followed by mid-market and then red-top articles. This was not the case for the Gibbons incident sample, however, where the average mid-market article was slightly longer than the average broadsheet article. As previously mentioned in Chapter Five, broadsheet newspapers showed a strong interest in the *Satanic Verses* incident – producing 173 sampled articles in total – compared to 73 for the Bradford Riots sample, and just 62 for the Gibbons incident sample. In fact, at 78,369 words, the broadsheet corpus for the *Satanic Verses* incident sample was longer than the *master* corpus for either of the other two case studies – accounting for much of the difference in length produced in the master corpora. The keen interest shown by broadsheet newspapers in the case of the *Satanic Verses* sample is interesting – especially considering the similarities the story shared with that of the Gillian Gibbons incident previously mentioned in Chapter Four. The fact that the broadsheets showed an interest in the earlier story but not the latter is intriguing, not least because Gibbons was located in a foreign country at the time and being threatened with physical punishment, whereas Rushdie was in Britain and under police protection for much of the story. To an extent this might be explained by Rushdie's celebrity status as a published author, given that his previous novel, *Midnight's Children* (1981) had already won the Booker Prize in 1981 (The Man Booker Prizes, 2008). Whilst celebrity stories are more commonly associated with mid-market and

[149] This might be accounted for by the fact that the Sunday in the Bradford Riots sample was only one day after the event itself occurred – meaning that London-based newspapers did not have the time or information available to prepare the type of lengthy editorial articles common in Sunday newspapers.

red-top newspapers than they are broadsheets, this can be explained by the fact that Rushdie was not a celebrity in the 'popular' sense, rather a celebrity in the world of culture, which is generally something unlikely to be of interest to a tabloid newspaper or its readers[150]. This is also reflected by an increase in the size of mid-market and red-top corpora for the Gibbons incident sample, when compared to the Rushdie sample – where the broadsheet corpus is smaller. This is likely to be indicative of the fact that Gibbons represented a 'normal' person rather than a figure of 'highbrow' culture such as Rushdie. The mid-market and red-top newspapers could therefore run the Gibbons story as a human-interest story – exemplified by the use of familiar descriptors such as 'Gill', 'Gillian' and 'the teddy bear Miss' observed in mid-market and tabloid coverage in Chapter Seven. A collocation analysis carried out for the search-term 'Salman' on the *Satanic Verses* incident master corpus reveals that of 346 instances of this term, 'Rushdie' was collocated a total of 314 times (300 times in the R1 position[151]). The same analysis carried out for the word 'Gillian' using the Gibbons incident master corpus shows that the term 'Gillian' was used a total of 455 times, but that the term 'Gibbons' was only collocated with it 230 times in total, and just 224 times in the R1 position. These statistics confirm that Gibbons was referred to significantly more often simply as 'Gillian' than Rushdie was as 'Salman' – suggesting a much more 'familiar' or empathetic tone in reporting concerning Gibbons. In fact, instances of the term 'Gillian' which were not immediately followed by 'Gibbons' occurred 231 times, as opposed to just 224 instances of 'Gillian Gibbons'.

Conflation

Whilst inferences can be drawn from the quantitative data above, it is best if this is done in conjunction with a comparative qualitative analysis of the data – allowing the two methods of analysis to further inform each other. Perhaps the most striking difference between the coverage of the three events analysed by the case-studies here involved the conflation of 'Asians' and 'Muslims'. Whilst little evidence was found to support the thesis that British Muslims were stereotyped as being of a South Asian ethnicity (during either the *Satanic Verses* incident or the Gibbons incident), coverage which conflated British South Asians with Muslims was commonplace during reports of the Bradford Riots. This was clearly observed in Chapter Six – when sampling showed that terms associated with descriptions of Muslims (such as 'Muslim' and 'Moslem') had a common presence in the sampled corpus (please see Table 6.4 for statistics pertaining to this). This stereotyping/conflation might not be without reason – given that statistics show that the majority of

[150] Although mid-market newspapers do show an occasional interest in culture of this type, the above would almost certainly be the case for a red-top newspaper.
[151] One space to the right of the sampled term – i.e. 'Salman Rushdie'.

British South Asians in Bradford are of Pakistani heritage (Office for National Statistics, 2009) – an ethnicity which is in Britain overwhelmingly associated with a Muslim identity (Peach, 2005: 22). But this ignores the assessment described in Chapter Six that the riots in Bradford and elsewhere appeared to be more about race or ethnicity than they were about religion. Whilst religion almost certainly played a part in the root cause of the segregation in Bradford believed to have created the 'powder keg' which was sparked when the riots began – something underlined by the Ouseley Report (Ouseley, 2001) –, the riots themselves were almost certainly sparked by the presence/threatened presence of members of the NF/NF sympathisers. This is strongly suggested by the fact that the riots began on the very same date for which an (eventually banned) NF march through the city had been planned (Vasagar and Dodd, 2001; Wright, 2001). This appears to have been much more than mere coincidence – as noted in Chapters Two and Six. Although more recently, groups have appeared which, whilst largely aligned with the views of racist organisations such as the NF/BNP, concentrate their efforts on attacking Islam (the English Defence League (EDL) is the best known example), these groups were not reported to have been present in Bradford in 2001[152]. References to the religion of rioters were therefore irrelevant, because religion is not believed to have played a part in directly causing the riots – whereas race/ethnicity is. These representations in terms of religion are interesting in light of Poynting and Mason's (2007) analysis that:

> After 11 September 2001, the representation of the Asian 'Other' in the UK increasingly undergoes a transformation from Asian or 'Pakistani' to Muslim, but this was already under way since the Rushdie affair in 1989, and arguably since the Iranian Revolution in 1979 (Poynting and Mason, 2007: 81).

Because the riots in Bradford occurred *before* September 11th, 2001, the irrelevant representation of people involved in terms of religion shows that the process described above was indeed underway prior to those important events as the above quote suggests. Poynting and Mason's analysis also shows the issue of conflation in a wider context, and suggests that this phenomenon is not specific to coverage of the riots in Bradford in 2001.

There are a number of other problems with the conflation of a British South Asian and a Muslim identity, given that it misrepresents British South Asians who belong to a different religious group, or

[152] Copsey (2010) reports that the EDL was not actually formed until June 27th, 2009 (2010: 8). He also notes that whilst the EDL shares many links with far-right groups, it tends to focus primarily on discrimination based on religion (2010: 12).

who are atheist, agnostic, or undecided. Given the problems which have been described with the coverage of Islam as a single entity both in this study and elsewhere – (e.g. Said 1997; Poole, 2002; Greater London Authority, 2007), essentialising British South Asians as being members of only certain religious groupings is also problematic as it helps to 'create' the concept of a 'typical Asian', who can then be essentialised/stereotyped. This fits with Fowler's (1991) analysis that a stereotype represents 'a socially-constructed mental pigeon-hole into which events and individuals can be sorted, thereby making such events and individuals comprehensible' (1991: 17) – i.e. the 'empty vessel' of the stereotype of a 'typical Asian' can contain all manner of things once it 'exists'. Whilst stereotyping people of South Asian ethnicity as being Muslim is a stereotype involving religion, it serves to make the mental image (empty vessel) of a 'typical Asian' stronger, so that it can more easily be invoked. If a 'typical Asian' can be thought to exhibit a certain tendency – i.e. being Muslim, then it follows that other tendencies can also be assigned to this imagined stereotypical person/group of people. Again, this is similar to the 'inferential racism' described by Hall (1990), where 'apparently naturalised representations of events and situations relating to race' are set up as 'unquestioned assumptions' (Hall, 1990: 13). The 'unquestioned assumption' in this case would be that any British person who appears to be of a South Asian ethnicity must automatically be a Muslim.

As mentioned previously, no real evidence was found of the opposite of the above situation occurring in the press – i.e. an imagined 'typical Muslim' stereotyped as being South Asian. This does not prove that this inverse version of the stereotype does not exist, however. Sardar (2002) notes that the label of 'Asians' is 'used to identify most Muslims living in the UK' (2002: 52) – a situation which he describes as 'ridiculous', not only given that Islam 'seeks global, Universalist notions of identity', but also because 'Asia is not a race or identity, it's a continent' (ibid). Sardar goes on to mention that even people who live in Asia do not tend to refer to themselves as 'Asian' (ibid) – underlining the many problems which exist in any attempts to amalgamate a diverse group of people under a single group 'heading'. Similarly Allen (2005) states that 'when one speaks of 'racism' towards 'Asians' in Britain, the descriptor 'Asian' is clearly inappropriate' (Allen, 2005: 49). A study described by Law (2002) found that irrelevant negative references to race and ethnicity were often present in British media content, which often implicitly links race with violence and crime (Law, 2002: 75), and whilst this does not involve a specifically religious aspect, it does show that 'race' is often brought up needlessly as an identifying feature in certain situations. Because Muslims

are not necessarily a *visible* minority[153], any racial stereotyping of this type would also be likely to create a visibility where one may not have previously existed.

There also exists the possibility that stereotyping of British Muslims as being South Asian in ethnicity does occur in the British press, but that none of the samples in this study were correctly tuned to observe this. Given that the Bradford Riots sample was tuned towards British South Asians as a defining group, and there exist many similarities between the *Satanic Verses* and Gibbons incident samples (two events which whilst related to Islam in general, did not *directly* involve British Muslims), this is certainly a possibility. The fact also remains that although it is the inverse situation, many instances of the stereotyping of British South Asians as Muslim *were* identified by the Bradford Riots sample (as described previously). Without straying too far into the realm of media-effects theory, it is possible that this could work 'both ways' – as by associating a certain ethnic group with a certain religion, someone might very well go through the same process in reverse, when considering first the religious group. The stereotyping described above might be important for a number of reasons. As well as the more obvious issues of misrepresentation described above, a report by the Greater London Authority (2007) notes that when faced with a surprise (the examples used in this case were the 9/11 attacks) the human mind's first priority is to:

> Place it [the surprise] within a narrative or larger spectrum, so that it is connected to more familiar experiences and begins to make sense, and so that any further such events can be better anticipated, and actions to deal with them are maximally effective (Greater London Authority, 2007: 97).

In the specific case of the 9/11 attacks, Law (2010) describes the way in which in America 'Islamic communities and other vulnerable groups have become targets of increased hostility' since September 2001 (Law, 2010: 148). Law goes on to mention that this hostility was not always limited to Muslims themselves, with 'those who "look" of Muslim or Arab descent' also becoming targets for aggression (ibid). Sardar (2002) makes a similar argument (again regarding the American context), stating that:

> The post Nine Eleven USA recognises only two kinds of Muslims: the terrorist (who has declared war on the West) and the apologetic (who claims to be liberal and defends Islam as a peaceful religion). Unfortunately, the distinction between the two is not really clear. To

[153] Although many Muslims are 'visible' – due mainly to particularities of dress, others are not.

begin with they both tend to look very similar: Arab or South Asian appearance, the moustache and de règle beard, the beatific smile and the odd turban makes them almost indistinguishable (Sardar, 2002: 51).

Sardar goes on to state that 'this must explain why the first victims of revenge attacks in New York immediately after 11 September were Sikhs' (ibid). Poynting and Mason (2006) mention a similar process in the British and Australian contexts with regard this time to law enforcement officials, stating that:

> Since 11 September 2001, ethnic minorities associated with Islam have experienced increased negative attention from the police and security forces in countries allied with the United States. In the United Kingdom and Australia this has been particularly so (Poynting and Mason, 2006: 365).

What the examples above illustrate is a tendency for a 'Muslim' identity (the identity which was claimed by the 9/11 attackers) to be conflated with other identities, be they other religious identities such as the Sikh victims of 'revenge attacks' mentioned by Sardar or ethnic identities such as those described by Poynting and Mason. In the British context, as already mentioned, the most likely ethnic identity to be associated with a Muslim identity would be a South Asian identity[154]. Further illustration of this trend in light of the July 7th 2005 (7/7) bombings in London is provided by Frost (2008), who notes that racially aggravated 'hate crime' increased by 29 per cent in the period between November 2004 and November 2005. Although Frost notes that the total number of religiously aggravated offences in the same period dropped to 34 from 49 the previous year, in 23 of these cases the 'actual or perceived' religion of the victim was Muslim (2008: 567). This indicates that 7/7 may have had a similarly catalytic effect to 9/11 on levels of 'hate crime' (given the increase in racially aggravated offences described above), and that crimes targeting Muslims as a particular group in the UK were relatively commonplace in 2005.

Poynting and Mason describe a 'shift' as having taken place over the 'decade or so' before 9/11 – which went from the identification of 'a mainly "Pakistani" or "Asian" identification, to identification in terms of religion: from "Asian Other" to "Muslim Other."' (2006: 366). This is somewhat the reverse of the situation described by Alexander (2000) (again in the British context) prior to 9/11. Alexander states that:

[154] Given the ethnic demographics of Muslims in the UK already described at various points throughout this thesis.

> The term 'Asian' in relation to negative images and stereotypes has become synonymous with Muslim communities, again drawing on the notion of an emergent Pakistani and Bangladeshi underclass. (Alexander, 2000: 6-7).

What this might suggest is that prior to 9/11, the direction of conflation between the 'Muslim' and 'Asian' groupings tended to be that the descriptor 'Asian' was being applied to 'Muslims'. But following 9/11, the direction may have changed so that now the emphasis was placed on religion – i.e. the descriptor 'Muslim' was being applied to 'Asians'. This would be logical, given that the 9/11 attackers claimed a 'Muslim' identity, and that since the attacks and the subsequent War on Terror, a great deal of emphasis in discussion has been placed on Islam as a religion – as discussed in Chapter One. Whilst Muslims have been stereotyped as 'terrorists' since long before 9/11 – see, for example, – Said (1997: 28), this stereotype has also flourished since the attacks. Another interesting event in the British context are the 7/7 attacks – given that these attacks took place on British soil, and were carried out by British citizens – again claiming a 'Muslim' identity. Although the Gibbons incident sample described in Chapter Seven did not find evidence to suggest that this was the case, the possibility remains (as described above) that this represented a particular problem with that event as a sample – rather than suggesting that such conflation does not take place.

Data presented by Peach (2005) and discussed in Chapter Six regarding data obtained by the 2001 UK Census underlined the extent of the problems of misrepresentation inherent in stereotyping people of South Asian ethnicity as Muslim. Here it was noted that in 2001, 78,507 Britons of Pakistani or Bangladeshi ethnicity did not state their religion as 'Muslim' on the Census form – around 7.9% of the total 995,656 people who stated their ethnicity to be 'Pakistani' or 'Bangladeshi' (Peach, 2005: 21). This statistic does not include other ethnic groups which might be included under the 'catch-all' heading of 'South Asian'. Peach's statistics indicate for instance, that of Britain's 1,036,807 citizens of Indian ethnicity, just 131,463 stated their religion as 'Muslim' in 2001 – in fact, 45% of British Indians (around 466,563 people) stated their religion to be 'Hindu' (Peach, 2005: 22). Clearly then, suggestions/stereotypes that British South Asians – or even specifically British Pakistanis and Bangladeshis as a group are almost wholly Muslim, are unhelpful, and misrepresent, what is in absolute terms, a great number of people. If, as is suggested above, this process also implicitly works in reverse – stereotyping British Muslims as 'South Asian' – it would be similarly problematic, as only 67.8% of people who stated their religion as 'Muslim' on the 2001 UK Census also stated their ethnicity as either Indian, Pakistani or Bangladeshi (Peach, 2005: 21) – meaning that

around one-third of Britain's Muslims did not belong to one of the three 'main' South Asian ethnic groupings in Britain.

Voice

In terms of the voices 'heard' in the material sampled, a number of patterns were observed across the three separate case studies – although there were also a number of points where the observed samples differed from each other. The most notable of the patterns identified was the widespread reliance on British Muslim 'leaders' when comment from within the British Muslim community was included. This was not always the case, but the vast majority of British Muslim voices 'heard' in the three samples tended to be 'leaders' of some description – whether on a worldwide, national or local scale[155]. Examples of this include the quotation of Sayed Abdul Quddus (the Secretary of the Bradford Council of Mosques) in Chapter Five stating that he would kill Salman Rushdie himself if the opportunity arose (e.g. Davenport, 1989; *The Sun*, 1989), the quotation of various Muslim religious leaders from Bradford who commented on the riots which occurred there in Chapter Six (e.g. Ward and Wainwright, 2001) – as well as British Muslim leaders who condemned actions of the Sudanese government during the Gibbons incident (e.g. Ali, 2007; Wall, 2007). Interestingly, the voices of 'leaders' from other religious groups were also observed in all three of the samples – the then Archbishop of Canterbury Robert Runcie in Chapter Five (e.g. Nettleton, 1989; Plummer, 1989[156]) as well as the later Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams (Parker, 2007b) in Chapter Seven, and the spokesperson for the World Council of Hindus, Hashmukh Shah in Chapter Six (Roy, 2001). Whilst the inclusion of comment from religious leaders might seem logical in Chapters Five and Seven – given that they dealt with the *Satanic Verses* and Gibbons incidents – both of which involved alleged blasphemy against a religion, the inclusion of religious voices in Chapter Six is, as mentioned previously, interesting given that the event it sampled did not directly involve religion. The problem of the inclusion of 'Muslim' as an irrelevant descriptor during coverage of the Bradford Riots was dealt with previously in Chapter Six – as well as above, in the section of this chapter concerned with conflation. But the inclusion of the voice of a Hindu 'leader' is interesting. Roy's (2007) article was printed in the *Daily Telegraph*, and is based largely around the opinions of Shah – as suggested by the headline 'Muslim parents and Mosques are to blame, says Hindu leader' (Roy, 2007). Shah has very few positive statements to make about Bradford's Muslim population (and as mentioned in Chapter Six, may be somewhat biased – given that his business was badly damaged during the riots,

[155] It is important to note that use of the term 'leader' here is not indicative of an opinion that any 'leader' could truly represent the voice of every Muslim/British Muslim – or any other large 'group'.
[156] These instances are included in the Appendix to Chapter Five – as Extracts A5.13 and A5.21 respectively.

for which he blames local Muslims), but the article does draw attention to one interesting fact. Shah indirectly describes himself as Indian in the course of the article:

> "When Indians came to Britain, they suffered from the same conditions. They had a level playing field.
>
> "Because of our hard work, perseverance and keeping our youth under control, Indian children are leading in the field of education today (Shah, quoted in Roy, 2001).

Because Shah is described variously as a Hindu 'leader', someone of Indian ethnicity, and someone who lives in Bradford, the article is indirectly drawing attention to the fact that not all people of South Asian ethnicity who live in Bradford are Muslim – a point which, as previously discussed, was not overwhelmingly evidenced in the articles sampled. Despite this, the article still makes sweeping generalisations *within* ethnic groupings constituent of the 'South Asian' grouping – as is shown by the following extract:

> Comparing the behaviour of Hindu Indian children with their Muslim Pakistani counterparts, Mr Shah said: "They talk of economic deprivation, complain of the police and discrimination, but these are excuses (Roy, 2001).

Here Bradford's residents of South Asian ethnicity are described in a bilateral manner – Bradford South Asians are either 'Hindu Indian' or 'Muslim Pakistani' – nothing else, and nothing in-between. It is also worth noting that in the previous quotation, Shah refers to people of South Asian ethnicity living in Bradford in terms of immigration – 'when Indians came to Britain...' (ibid). In this way, Shah frames *himself* as an 'outsider' to 'mainstream' society, by mentioning his own ethnic group as a 'group' which *arrived* in Britain at some point – rather than merely a grouping of British people based on ethnicity. Shah's comments are especially interesting in light of the points made by Hall (1990) and Law (2002) regarding anti-racism in the media (which are discussed further in the section of this chapter on 'othering'). Both of these arguments describe the media as an institution which on the surface projects an 'anti-racist' agenda, but deeper down may harbour a great deal of institutionalised racist sentiment. Read in this context, Shah's comments might have been included in the article described above as a method by which Muslims/people of Pakistani ethnicity could be openly criticised *without* drawing accusations of racism – given that Shah himself is of a South Asian ethnicity. This draws attention to the way in which the press (and indeed the media in general) act

as gatekeepers for voices – deciding whose is heard and whose is not, and also signals the way in which racism might be perceived as a solely 'white' phenomenon – i.e. because Shah is of Indian ethnicity, his sweeping generalisations about people of Pakistani ethnicity can be excused/ignored.

Roy's article also continues to use problematic methods of phrasing after he has finished quoting Shah. It mentions that:

> Bradford is fortunate to have Pakistani leaders such as Mohammed Riaz, who has been the unsuccessful Tory parliamentary candidate in Bradford in 1997 and 2001, and Mohammed Ajeeb, a former Lord Mayor.
>
> They are both brave enough to put the blame in varying degrees on Pakistani youths for the riots in Manningham (Roy, 2001).

Although (as mentioned in Chapter Six), Ajeeb is allowed a single line here, stating that 'It will take us 10 years to put right what's happened' (ibid), this could hardly be called an illuminating articulation of voice – rather it merely restates the level of damage done to the city (presumably both physically and culturally) by the riots. Also interesting is the fact that Bradford is deemed 'fortunate' to have Pakistani 'leaders', and that these leaders are 'brave' enough to blame 'Pakistani youths' for the riots (ibid). This implies that *only* people of Pakistani ethnicity can effectively 'lead' other people of Pakistani ethnicity – and that even these leaders need to be 'brave' in order to stand up against the Pakistani community – perhaps in order to show it for what it 'really' is with regard to the riots. In this way, Pakistani 'leaders' are seen as an intermediary between 'civilised' 'mainstream' society, and the violent Pakistani 'other' group. This is something discussed further in the next section of this chapter – on 'othering'.

Another interesting point which can be made here is that it is 'Pakistani *youths*' who are blamed for the Riots in Bradford – a trend which was common throughout coverage in the sample. In light of an argument made by Kundnani (2001), this is even more so. Kundnani argues that a 'new generation of young Asians' was 'coming of age in the northern towns', who were 'unwilling to accept the second-class status foisted on their elders' (2001: 108). Alexander (2000) also focuses specifically on 'Asian *youths*' (specifically males) as a group which is seen as threatening and violent in Britain – underlining the fact that changes in the perceptions/stereotypes of people of South Asian ethnicity might be related to the supposedly burgeoning unwillingness to accept discrimination described by

Kundnani above. This is discussed further later in this section. Van Dijk's (1989) observations on coverage of the 1985 riots in Birmingham and London are interesting in this context. Here van Dijk identified that a division was being made by certain sections of the British press (namely *The Sun*) between 'West-Indians' and 'Asians'. Where 'Asians' were stereotyped as 'meek and well-adapted (run corner shops, and fit into the framework of the Thatcherist ideology of popular capitalism)', 'West Indians' were seen as more 'rebellious' (van Dijk, 1989: 254). Clearly, by 2001, in the context of the Bradford Riots, this stereotype had changed to include 'Asians' under the heading of the 'rebellious other'. This evolution of the 'Asian' stereotype is also an issue discussed in more detail in the section of this chapter concerned with 'othering'.

As mentioned above, in Chapters Five and Seven (the *Satanic Verses* and Gibbons Cases), instances were observed where the voice of Anglican bishops (specifically in both cases the archbishop of Canterbury) were 'heard'. As also noted above, there is logic implicit in this, in that both cases involved alleged blasphemy – although not against the Christian religion. As a senior member of the Anglican Church, the archbishop of Canterbury can be assumed to be knowledgeable where the subject of blasphemy is concerned – although not in a specifically Islamic context. To further investigate this, a word frequency analysis was carried out for the term 'bishop' and 'archbishop' which indicates how often the voices of senior Christian clergy were 'heard' in each corpus. This is detailed in Table 8.2 below. This analysis also included the corpus for the Bradford Riots.

Table 8.2 Frequencies of Selected Terms Relating to Bishops for Different Master Corpora

Word	*Satanic Verses* (C5)	Bradford Riots (C6)	Gillian Gibbons (C7)
BISHOP	21	7	5
BISHOP'S	1	0	0
ARCHBISHOP	12	1	7
ARCHBISHOPS	1	0	0
ARCHBISHOP'S	2	0	0

The data contained in Table 8.2 indicates that comment from – or coverage pertaining to Anglican bishops was not totally uncommon – although it was far from widespread. The terms were most commonly observed in the *Satanic Verses* incident corpus – although the larger size of that corpus (see Table 8.1) may account for this. Table 8.2 also shows that (although it was not observed in the qualitative analysis carried out previously), mention of bishops was included in the corpus sampled for the Bradford Riots coverage. Given that the event investigated in each chapter involved Islam in some way – either directly in the case of the Rushdie and Gibbons incidents, or through implication

by the press and others in the case of the Bradford Riots, the fact that there was reference to senior figures in the *Anglican* Church is interesting. Because no instances of the mention of bishops were observed in the qualitative analysis conducted in Chapter Six, a concordance was produced for the 8 instances of this identified in Table 8.2, and reviewed. This concordance showed that every instance of the word 'bishop' in the Bradford Riots corpus referred to the bishop of Bradford – who was then David Smith. The single instance identified of the term 'archbishop' refers to the 'archbishop of Bradford' (also said to be David Smith) (Harris, 2001b). This appears to be an error on the writer's part, as no such position exists within the Church of England (Bradford Diocese, n.d.) – and as such, can be assumed to again refer to the *bishop* of Bradford. Every instance where Smith is mentioned in the Bradford Riots corpus refers to comments he made about the riots themselves – including 'I am very distressed - people are angry and feelings are running very high' (Smith, quoted in Kelly, 2001) and:

> This will not help the Asian community. The BNP and the National Front must have been sitting at home with a glass of beer, saying 'look at that, they're doing our job for us' (Smith, quoted in Cooke, 2001).

Another quote which is especially interesting in this context comes from Herbert (2001b), who paraphrases Smith:

> Notably, it has been left to the white, Anglican Bishop of Bradford, the Rt Rev David Smith, to voice the perceived Asian grievances most forcibly. There was a feeling that police had over-zealously removed Asians from the city and not responded strongly enough to white racist taunts, he said (Herbert, 2001b).

Herbert's statement above implies that 'Asians' in Bradford were not voicing 'their grievances' following the riots 'leaving' this task to Smith – although no reason why this might be the case is given. Herbert does however quote two local residents one of whom (Ansari) implies that he is Muslim, and another (who is stated to be 'white') whose voice is endorsed by stating that his wife is 'Sri Lankan' – an ethnicity which is recognised as belonging to the 'South Asian' grouping (United Nations Statistics Division, 2011):

> The relative racial harmony of the area was written into the battlelines: at least three white, bandana-wearing faces were to be seen among the Asians on White Abbey; a group of concerned, middle-aged Asians stood in defence before the premises of Richard Walker, one of Oak Lane's few white businessmen, as the fires threatened to burn there on Saturday.
>
> "There's no racial tension in this area," said Mr Walker, whose wife is Sri Lankan, yesterday. Oak Lane resident Ayub Ansari said: "The majority of English are very tolerant. This is not (about being) Muslim. We tried to stop the youth but they are wild." (Herbert, 2001b).

Both of these quotations are interesting in that they deny that racial tensions existed in Bradford at the time of the riots. This is perhaps what Smith refers to when he mentions that it 'has been left to' the bishop of Bradford to 'voice the perceived Asian grievances most forcibly' (ibid) – given that neither of the views presented above reflect the widely held analysis of the riots in Bradford presented in Chapter Six. This view is that the 'root cause' of the riots was a process of Balkanisation which had taken place in the city's neighbourhoods on ethnic lines, leading to resentment between different ethnic groups e.g. (Kundnani, 2001; Ouseley, 2001). Whilst neither the view of Walker or Ansari can be said to be 'wrong' – because they reflect the views and experiences of them as local residents, they certainly do not represent the views of many other commentators – which as well as the academic voices mentioned above, include other local residents such as Rashid (2001). It should also be noted that Ansari's use of the term 'English' is interesting in this context, as it could be taken to imply the very division which he is denying exists[157]. In this sense, these views can be said to represent dissenting voices – because although (as described in Chapter Six) 'official' voices such as the Ouseley Report avoided placing the blame for the riots on any one particular 'group' in Bradford, they did acknowledge that a problem existed regarding racial segregation in the city (Ouseley, 2001: 10). The claim that it was 'left' to the bishop of Bradford to voice the grievances of 'Asians' following the riots (Herbert, 2001b) remains perplexing, despite the voices noted above which seem to deny that any such grievance exists. Voices such as Rashid (2001), whose diatribe against the treatment of 'Pakistanis' in Bradford as a 'coolie class' was also printed in *The Independent* reflect that this was not the case – and although Rashid's letter was printed two days following Herbert's article, Herbert's statement is still enigmatic, given that British South Asian voices as vocal as Rashid's were clearly in existence in Bradford.

[157] Ansari is said to be a 'resident' of Oak Lane (Bradford) and is therefore likely to be an English national himself.

Also interesting is the fact that Ansari places the blame for the riots on Muslim 'youths' – echoing the arguments made previously about this. This is interesting, given that he is a resident of the very area where the riots took place, and he himself implies that he is a Muslim. Ansari's voice then represents another case of youths of a Muslim religious or South Asian ethnic identity being seen as the culprits for the violence – but this time coming from a member of the Bradford Muslim community. The way in which this focus on 'youths' might fit into other changes in the stereotyping of British Muslims and people of South Asian ethnicity over time is interesting, given the comments made by Kundnani described previously about a 'new generation' who were not willing to accept the 'second-class status foisted on their elders' (Kundnani, 2001: 108), and again this is something which is revisited in the section of this chapter concerned with 'othering'.

Browsing the concordances produced for the terms 'bishop' and 'archbishop' for the other two case studies – the *Satanic Verses* and Gibbons incidents reveal some other points of interest. In the *Satanic Verses* incident corpus, the term 'bishop' is once again commonly used to denote the bishop of Bradford – which in 1989 was Robert Williamson. Of the 22 instances of the terms 'bishop' and 'bishop's in this particular corpus (as shown in Table 8.2), 15 relate to Williamson. Analysis of these instances reveals that the bishop of Bradford was once again being quoted by the press commenting on issues local to Bradford – as illustrated by the following extract from *The Guardian*:

> Bradford's Muslims, Britain's largest Muslim community, have been urged by their Council for Mosques to keep within British law. The council has urged the Bishop of Bradford, the Rt Rev Robert Williamson, to ask the Government and the book's publishers to stop publication immediately.
>
> On Sunday, the bishop urged Bradford Muslims not to close the door too quickly on a solution to the controversy and called for calm.
>
> After meeting yesterday, the council issued a statement, which said: 'While we welcome the plea for calm from the Bishop of Bradford, we feel he has a moral obligation to use his influence to ask the Government and the publisher to show the same gesture of goodwill as they have shown towards Mr Rushdie and to ensure circulation is ceased forthwith.' (Pallister, Morris and Dunn, 1989).

Another extract which illustrates this comes from the *Daily Telegraph*:

> A statement issued by religious leaders after yesterday's meeting was a clear attempt to defuse a potentially volatile situation in Bradford, where Moslems are incensed at what they see as intolerable insults and blasphemies in Mr Rushdie's novel.
>
> The Rt Rev Robert Williamson, the Anglican Bishop of Bradford, has become so concerned at the mood of anger among Moslems that he is convening a summit of leaders from all religious groups.
>
> The Bradford Council of Mosques was responsible for organising the first public burning of Mr Rushdie's book at a protest in the city attended by 2,000 people in January. (Wright and O'Brien, 1989).

Whilst these two articles were not the only examples of coverage of Williamson's opinion (and cannot be said to be *representative* of the entirety this coverage), they are of interest in this discussion for a number of reasons. Pallister, Morris and Dunn (1989) contains direct and indirect quotations from a number of different sources – and the article itself is constructed around these quotations. The 798 word article (headline included) includes direct quotations from a total of 6 separate sources – which are listed below:

- Zaki Badawi (Chairperson of the Imams and Muslims Council)
- A statement signed by Mohammed Al-Khateeb, Akbar Ali, and Miftah Osi-Efa (a Merseyside Imam, a trustee of the Merseyside community and the vice-president of the 'Merseyside Muslim Community' respectively)
- Mohammed Qadri (President of the Merseyside Muslim Society)
- A statement from the Bradford Council for Mosques
- Liaqat Hussain (General Secretary of the Bradford Council for Mosques)
- A threatening note which was found next to a typewriter 'daubed with paint' after a break-in at the headquarters of the Bradford Council for Mosques (Pallister, Morris and Dunn, 1989).

Although many of these sources are connected to each other in some way, this article still defied trends identified in every case study presented in this thesis in the sheer *amount* of direct quotes it contained from British Muslims. Whilst all of the above quotations attributed to British Muslims

come from British Muslims who are to some extent denoted to be 'leaders'/members of an elite, this is still interesting in the context of voice. The article is also interesting because of the quote it contains from the Bradford Council for Mosques which asked the bishop of Bradford to 'use his influence' to ask the British government and the publisher of *The Satanic Verses* to ensure that the book's circulation was ended. Given that the 'official line' throughout the Rushdie incident was supportive of Rushdie and *The Satanic Verses* (as described in Chapter Five), the request made by the Bradford Council of Mosques to the bishop of Bradford would represent a voice which was dissenting from this *status quo*.

The second article quoted above – Wright and O'Brien (1989) is again interesting. Here the bishop of Bradford is an active voice – calling a summit of religious leaders (presumably including Muslim leaders) to discuss 'the mood of anger among Moslems [sic]' (Wright and O'Brien, 1989). In the article itself, this extract was followed by a direct quotation from the Bradford Council of Mosques, which reportedly stated that 'The Council of Mosques does not support violence and does not incite Moslems to break the law of the country in which they live' (ibid). This is followed by another statement from the Council of Mosques which underlines the fact that it does not 'take any directive from any institution or government abroad, and the article goes on to mention 'the struggle between radical and moderate elements in Teheran' – underlining the fact that Muslims represent a group composed of many different elements and individuals. Despite this, the opposition of the statement regarding the 'potentially volatile situation in Bradford' and the bishop's efforts to diffuse it with a statement from the Bradford Council of Mosques denouncing violence over the *Satanic Verses* incident is interesting – as it makes the Council of Mosques appear hypocritical, given that it is represented as an organisation involved in Muslim 'leadership'. This is especially so, given that the following paragraph was included in the introduction to the article, which describes the Council of Mosques' General Secretary:

> Their two-hour discussion was attended by the council's joint secretary, Mr Sayed Abdul Quddus, who has been reported as saying he agreed with Khomeini's death sentence on Mr Rushdie. Police are seeking advice from the Crown Prosecution Service on his comments. (Wright and O'Brien, 1989).

This is interesting, given that 'hypocrisy' was identified as a stereotype of Muslims in Chapter Seven – having been identified in two separate letters to the editor included in *The Sun* (2007b):

> WE [sic] are told Islam is a peaceful religion which does not condone violence of any sort - yet there are far too many cases like this one which totally contradict those claims.
>
> MUSLIMS [sic] like to tell us they are tolerant and peaceful but once again their actions contradict their teachings. (*The Sun*, 2007b).

Given that the data-sets included in the *Satanic Verses* and Gibbons incident samples were originally produced 18 years apart from each other, this shows that stereotypical coverage of Muslims retained similarities over this period – this stereotype being that Muslims say one thing and yet do another – and that whilst 'they' often project an image of peacefulness, this is really just a thin veneer masking 'their' true warlike nature. This was also a feature of 'Islamophobia' identified by the Runnymede Trust (1997) – their report on the subject stating that Muslims are often seen as 'manipulative not as sincere', and that they 'use their religion for strategic, political and military advantage rather than as a way of life shaped by a comprehensive legal tradition' (Runnymede Trust, 1997: 8). This is implicit in the coverage given to the Bradford Council of Mosques in Wright and O'Brien's (1989) piece, and directly stated in the two reader's letters from *The Sun* (2007b) above. In the section on 'othering' below, it is argued that British Muslims and people of South Asian ethnicity are often amalgamated/conflated by the press as if they represent a singular 'other group'. In this context, it is interesting to note that the voices given access by the press in order to speak for this 'other group' are almost exclusively described in religious, rather than ethnic terms – i.e. these voices tend to be described as 'Muslim' rather than 'Asian/South Asian/Pakistani/etc' – and if ethnicity *is* mentioned, it tends to be only as a secondary defining factor. This is even the case when religion is largely irrelevant to the topic being covered – as with the Gibbons incident, where the same pattern was observed. It is also the case that these voices tend to be 'elite' in the sense that they are almost always described as Muslim leaders. Whilst there are exceptions to this rule – the article by Roy (2001) which describes Pakistani 'leaders' in Bradford, and contains quotations from Shah, who is represented as a Hindu 'leader' – these appear to be rare occurrences, rather than representing any particular trend. This is shown by the fact that in Chapter Six – where as explained previously, ethnicity was a defining part of the story – Roy's article was the only instance of this plurality in 'leadership' being covered. This focus on Muslim 'leaders' is a feature of coverage of this stereotypical 'other group' which appears to have remained largely static over time – as is described further in the concluding section of this chapter. This static nature is especially interesting, not only

given the period of time covered by the three case studies presented here – which is over 18 years, and includes events thought to be especially salient to coverage of this particular 'other group' such as 9/11 and 7/7 (something which is discussed further later in this chapter) – but also given the other changes which appear to have taken place in the coverage of this 'group' – such as the growing focus on *youths* which is also discussed later.

Given the statement made by van Dijk (1993) and mentioned previously in Chapter Seven that 'minority' voices tend to be 'balanced' by those of mainstream 'white' voices in the media (1993: 254), an interesting avenue for further investigation in this area would be to perform a quantitative analysis focussed on this. Such a piece would be able to confirm or deny the suggestions made by this study that when Muslim voices are quoted in the British national press, they tend to be accompanied by 'mainstream' (i.e. non-Muslim) voices. Also interesting would be figures relating to elite/non-elite Muslim sources used by the press – given that this study strongly suggests a bias towards the quotation of Muslim 'leaders' when compared to 'ordinary' (i.e. non-'elite') Muslims (although this would necessarily introduce an element of subjectivity as to precisely what constitutes an 'elite' source).

Othering

So far, this study has identified a number of trends surrounding the coverage of British Muslims and British South Asians. In this section, these trends will be discussed alongside existing literature in the area in order to form a picture of the way in which British Muslims and British South Asians are 'othered' by the press.

Points have been made already in this chapter concerning the process of conflation which often takes place when a newspaper covers events that can be linked to a Muslim religious or South Asian ethnic identity. Whilst (as previously discussed), this process may have changed over time – from one where an 'Asian' ethnic identity tends to be conflated with/placed onto people of a 'Muslim' religious identity to one where a 'Muslim' identity tends to be conflated with an 'Asian' ethnic identity, these two processes are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Although Poynting and Mason, (2006; 2007) suggest that following the 9/11 attacks in 2001 there was a shift from the representation of the 'Asian other' in ethnic terms to its representation in religious terms – i.e. that the 'other' group is defined as 'Muslim', this type of conflation was also observed *prior* to 9/11 in Chapter Six of this study (the Bradford Riots sample which was taken from July, 2001). 'Muslim' was

found to be a common descriptor in this chapter – and whilst not as common as ethnic terms such as 'Asian' or 'Pakistani', this is interesting because its very presence in the sample was inappropriate. Given that Poynting and Mason suggest that this conflation does indeed take place in both 'directions', it is fair to conclude that an 'other' group is imagined in the British press – which consists of both people of a Muslim religious identity *and* people of a South Asian ethnic identity. It is likely that this imagined 'other' group is amorphous in many ways – having different characteristics assigned to it in different situations – which might go some way towards explaining the conflicting opinions over exactly what characteristics are displayed by it expressed by commentators such as Alibhai-Brown (2001) and Rahman (2001) and observed in Chapter Six. Here, Alibhai-Brown argued that:

> Most Asian men, even young hot-head Muslims, do not act this destructively even if they are victims of deprivation, racism and neo-Nazism. If anything Asian men have found it difficult to gain respect in this society because they are seen as weaklings' (Alibhai-Brown, 2001).

This is much the opposite argument to that of Rahman, who stated that young Muslims are generally portrayed as 'surly, violent and criminally inclined, as opposed to their articulate and urbane Hindu counterparts' (Rahman, 2001). Whilst Rahman's view of young Muslims (Rahman also specifically mentions people of a Pakistani ethnicity) echoes that of Alexander (2000) (who also focuses on young male 'Asians'), that representations of 'the Asian community' have moved from 'victim' to 'perpetrator' (2000: 7), Alibhai-Brown's does not – which is something especially interesting, given that Alibhai-Brown describes herself as a Muslim with 'part-Pakistani' heritage (Alibhai-Brown, 2011). Alibhai-Brown's (2001) view of 'Asians' as 'weaklings' is echoed to an extent by Rashid (2001) – who is of Pakistani ethnicity and lives in Bradford. Rashid describes the subservient 'coolie-class' which he claims British Pakistanis and Muslims in Bradford belonged to as 'dead' following the riots – 'Pakistani youths' having 'shaken off their shackles' and begun to demand the right to participate fully in society' (Rashid, 2001). What these conflicting views illustrate is that even amongst Muslims, people of South Asian ethnicity, people from Bradford and academic researchers in the area, there is no consensus as to what the stereotype of the 'Asian/Muslim other' 'looks like'. Given that this stereotype is the central interest of this thesis, this is an interesting observation, and one which is discussed further shortly.

One constant which was observed in all three case studies presented here, was a reliance on 'elite' sources to convey the views of this 'other' group. These tended to take the form of the many

Muslim 'leaders' who were quoted in order to support the stories sampled in each case study. Whilst this might be viewed as a 'good thing' – given that although these 'leaders' cannot truly claim to represent every Muslim in a given area, their voices do represent instances where the (often dissenting) voices of this 'other' group are 'heard' in the press, Hall (1990) suggests that this process might actually work in reverse. Because the 'other' group are not dealt with as 'normal' individuals (being almost constantly spoken for by their 'leadership') – as would be the case with anyone not a member of that group, this draws attention to the fact that a *difference* is being implied. Hall writes of British situation comedies such as *On The Buses* (1969-1973), *Love Thy Neighbour* (1972-1976), and *It Ain't Half Hot, Mum* (1974-1981), stating that:

> These are defended on good 'anti-racist' grounds: the appearance of blacks, alongside whites, in situation comedies, it is argued, will help to naturalise and normalise their presence in British society. And no doubt, in some examples, it does function in this way. But, if you examine these fun occasions more closely, you will often find, as we did in our two programmes, that the comedies do not simply include blacks: they are *about race*. That is, the same old categories of racially-defined characteristics and qualities, and the same relations of superior and inferior, provide the pivots on which the jokes actually turn, the tension-points which move and motivate the situations in situation comedies (Hall, 1990: 17).

This is something also alluded to by Law (2002), who states that:

> This *'great anti-racist show'* may also be seen as an outward, empty attempt of mere display masking continuing normative and progressive whiteness in news organisations, racial and ethnic inequalities of power and employment and a collective failure to provide appropriate quality news services for black and minority ethnic communities and consumers (Law, 2002: 76, original emphasis).

Law goes on to mention the way in which the 'great anti-racist show' might well be 'played against a backcloth of institutional racism' (ibid). Hall blames the *institution* of the media itself – rather than any specific actors for this state of affairs – as previously discussed in Chapter Seven. For Hall it is the very *structure* of the media, and the practices inherent in this structure, which cause it to function in an inferentially racist manner (Hall, 1990: 20).

Whilst Hall and Law both write in terms of race and racism here, this does not mean that these theories cannot be applied to the coverage of British Muslims. As already stated in this section, British Muslims are often conflated with British South Asians to form a single imaginary 'other group'. In this study, the defining characteristics of this 'group' have been seen to vary – something which was especially apparent when comparing the *Satanic Verses* and Gillian Gibbons incident samples. Whilst the *Satanic Verses* incident sample found that the 'other group' was covered as if it represented a single monolithic entity, in the sample concerned with the Gillian Gibbons incident, coverage of this 'group' was seen to be more composite in nature – something exemplified by the widespread use of the term 'hardline'. In the next section, conclusions are drawn as to why coverage of the Rushdie and Gibbons incidents might have differed in this way – as well as how this fits in with the other features of the imagined 'other' group described here.

Conclusions – How Has the Stereotype of the 'Muslim/South Asian Other' Changed Over Time?

So far in this chapter, a number of points have been made regarding the way in which the 'other' group described in the previous section has been covered in the press. This section will define the boundaries of this stereotype, how it operates in different situations, and how this fits with existing theory in the area.

Firstly, confusion exists in a number of areas where this stereotype is represented. This is shown by the victim/aggressor status variously assigned to the 'other' group and described in the section above. These explicit statements represent a plurality in press coverage, but here it is argued that this plurality still falls under the same 'other' group heading – the 'other' group exists as 'victim' and 'aggressor' at the same time. Given the increase in crime and attention from law enforcement services directed at Muslims and people *perceived* to be Muslim following the 9/11 attacks described earlier in this chapter (Sardar, 2002; Peek, 2003; Poynting and Mason, 2006; Law, 2010), it seems strange that this 'group' would be generalised as 'aggressive' rather than as 'victimised'[158]. What this underlines is an inability on the part of the person imagining the 'other group' to differentiate between one 'member' and the next. In other words, because a specific set of people claiming a 'Muslim' identity, who had a certain ethnic appearance were involved in the 9/11 attacks, the characteristic of 'aggressor' can be applied to everyone in the 'group'. Because at times this does not fit a specific situation – such as perhaps a hate-crime attack – the 'group' can also be represented as 'victims', which leads to confusion. Similarly, at some points in the study the 'blame'

for aggression was shifted in coverage towards the younger end of the 'other' group – as was observed during coverage of the Bradford Riots. This does little to change the stereotype in the larger sense however.

This is also related to perceptions of the 'group' as a monolith. As stated previously, in some of the cases analysed here, the 'other group' was covered as if it represented a single solid entity – the *Satanic Verses* incident and Bradford Riots being cases in point. But during the Gibbons incident, coverage was seen to change to include a more pluralistic model of the 'other' group – something underlined by the differences in the use of the term 'hardline' between this sample and the one for the *Satanic Verses* incident described above. This is confusing, given that the *Satanic Verses* and Gibbons incidents shared a number of key characteristics which have already been discussed in Chapter Four. But one major difference which these two events had was the number of dissenting British Muslim voices[159] which were 'heard' during the coverage. During the *Satanic Verses* incident, dissenting British Muslim voices were heavily covered – with Sayed Abdul Quddus's personal view that Rushdie should be killed gaining widespread access to newspapers (e.g. – Davenport, 1989; The Sun, 1989). During the Gibbons incident however, dissenting Muslim voices were much less heavily covered – with very few instances observed. Johnson (2007) did briefly mention dissenting British Muslim voices, and the article written by Latchem and Carlin (2007) displayed British Muslim voices which were supportive of Gibbons in a negative light (both articles are described in Chapter Seven). But these articles were in the minority of those observed when compared to articles which discussed the same instances of voice as the one written about by Latchem and Carlin – the protest carried out against Gibbons' treatment by British Muslims in London – in a positive light. Coverage of the Bradford Riots was similar to that of the *Satanic Verses* incident, in that 'other group' voices[160] tended to be heard less in favour of 'mainstream' elite voices – many of which blamed 'Muslims' for the riots[161]. Instances of 'other group' voices blaming Muslims were also heard however – such as Shah, who as a Hindu 'leader' blamed Muslims without leaving the 'other group' (Roy, 2001) and Rashid (2001), who as a person of a Pakistani ethnicity living in Bradford does not so much 'blame' Muslims as state that Muslims represent a downtrodden group, who were always liable to rise up against their treatment by the 'mainstream'. Coming as it does from within the 'other group' itself however, Rashid's voice may have been labelled as 'self-serving', even though it corresponds with

[159] Although this section still refers to the amalgamated 'other' group here, 'Muslim' voices are relevant because of the nature of the events (blasphemy).
[160] Here 'other group' is more relevant, because indicators of both ethnicity and religion were in common usage in coverage.
[161] This is supported by the analysis of Phillips (2006) who states that the blame for the social polarisation in places such as Bradford tended to fall 'squarely on the shoulders of the British Muslim population' (Phillips, 2006: 28).

much of the academic analysis which has taken place since the riots (e.g. – Kundnani, 2001; Phillips, 2006).

A previously described tendency relating to coverage of the 'other group's' voice is the almost constant referral to 'leaders' of some type. As stated, these 'leaders' tended to be defined religiously rather than in terms of ethnicity, and although any form of 'leader' cannot be said to truly represent one hundred per cent of the people they 'lead', this was rarely problematised in coverage. Whilst in one sense this type of opinion sourcing might simply fit in with the established practices of journalists – being easily carried out, and requiring little in the way of analysis (because it can be said to be 'representative') – in another, it fits well with the type of 'othering' described here, in that it allows for a monolithic 'group opinion' to be easily 'created'. Hence when Quddus's voice was allowed access to newspaper articles during the *Satanic Verses* incident, it was represented in such a way (as a Muslim 'leader') that it spoke for the *entire* 'other' group. This was compounded by a lack of 'normal' Muslim voices in coverage of the incident, and also by a tendency towards coverage of 'mainstream' sources – as illustrated by Table 8.2 which indicates that a considerable amount of coverage of the views of Anglican bishops/archbishops took place at the time of the Rushdie incident[162]. Again, this is illustrated by the work of van Dijk (1993) who states that (ethnic) minorities are only rarely allowed to speak 'on their own' in the British media (1993: 254). This was a tendency which was observed in all three samples – with little variation.

In many ways, the study carried out here suggests (at least when viewed superficially), that coverage of British Muslims might have *improved* in the period between July 2001 and November 2007. As has been mentioned already in this chapter, signs that the 'monolithic' image often assigned to Islam was becoming weaker/breaking up – such as the press's increased use of the term 'hardline' (a term which suggests that variance exists in Muslim opinion), and clear distinctions made between British and Sudanese Muslims – might suggest that coverage of Islam was becoming more positive. This type of coverage stands in stark contrast to observations made in 1997 by the Runnymede Trust that:

[162] Although as noted previously, the large size of the Rushdie corpus could potentially have made this effect appear more prominent than it really is.

> Any episode in which an individual Muslim is judged to have behaved badly is used as an illustrative example to condemn all Muslims without exception (Runnymede Trust, 1997: 5).

Coverage of this kind also represents a shift from an earlier type of reporting found by this study – particularly that displayed in coverage of the 1989 *Satanic Verses* incident – where British Muslims were often reported as part of a monolithic whole – in that case, an entity spearheaded by Iran's Shia Ayatollah Khomeini (despite the majority of British Muslims being of the Sunni sect). This is especially interesting, given the many similarities that can be drawn between the *Satanic Verses* and Gibbons incidents, which have been discussed a number of times already in this thesis.

Given that the intervening period between July 2001 and November 2007 included events such as 9/11 and 7/7, the apparent improvement in coverage observed here might seem counterintuitive. As mentioned, rising levels of hate-crime perpetrated against Muslims, or people perceived to be Muslim, indicate that many people might not differentiate between the self-professed 'Muslims' who committed these terrorist acts of murder and anyone else who appears to be Muslim. It also indicates a rising hostility to Muslims in general. But academic studies carried out since 9/11 have not always found that this is the case in the media. Nacos and Torres-Reyna (2003) for instance describe a number of improvements in US media output following 9/11 – including 'a more comprehensive, inclusive, and less stereotypical news presentation' of Muslim and Arab-Americans (2003: 151), as well as increasing use of Muslim and Arab Americans as sources for news (ibid). A study by Featherstone, Holohan and Poole (2010), discussed further below, describes how perceptions of Muslims as a monolith in the UK press might have broken up somewhat since 7/7 (although this may not be as positive a process as it would at first appear). A report commissioned by the Lord Mayor of London released in 2007, however, largely echoed the findings of the Runnymede Trust (1997) described above – that one of the most powerful conceptions of Muslims in the print media (even in 2007) was that 'all Muslims are much the same' (Greater London Authority, 2007: 105). In addition to this, it must not be forgotten that since long before the advent of 9/11, academics have been reporting a shift in the stereotyping of people of a South Asian ethnicity or Muslim religion from being racially defined, to becoming religiously defined. Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) for instance claim that 'the racist stereotype of the 'Paki' has become the racist stereotype of the 'Muslim fundamentalist' (1992: 55). This trend is also reported in the years following 9/11 – Poynting and Mason (2007) stating that the representation of the 'Asian other' in the British media may have undergone a transformation from 'Asian' or 'Pakistani' to 'Muslim' (2007: 81). Certainly, this thesis found that in reporting the Bradford riots of July 2001, many

newspapers introduced a religious descriptor (Muslim) to a story which involved racial, rather than religious tensions.

A solution to the conundrum of why the Gibbons incident appears to have been reported in a generally positive manner (at least where British Muslims are concerned) may lie in the specifics of the event itself. This is implied by the findings of Featherstone, Holohan and Poole (2010). Featherstone *et.al* suggest that following 7/7 (and to some extent, 9/11), reporting of British Muslims in the British media underwent a 'huge shift', and began to locate British Muslims within the conceptualisation of the 'Islamic terrorist' – something which was not the case prior to these events (2010: 176). The Gibbons incident, however, did not involve a terrorist act – rather an act committed by a state itself (Sudan). Whilst this is similar in many respects to the *Satanic Verses* incident, what set the 1989 event apart in this regard was the incitement by Ayatollah Khomeini for people from both inside and outside of Iran to commit what *could* be construed as a terrorist act (the assassination of Salman Rushdie). Therefore, as well as similarities, important differences also exist between the Gibbons incident and the earlier *Satanic Verses* incident.

Featherstone *et.al* also describe a 'new terrorism' which emerged in the wake of 9/11 – but contextualise this as part of the wider changes which have occurred in world politics and economics since the 1970s. Here it is suggested that events such as the massacre of members of the Israeli Olympic team in Munich, Germany in 1972 by the Palestinian 'Black September' terrorist organisation (whilst certainly shocking), did not encroach into the everyday lives of Europeans in the same way that events such as 9/11 did. The reason postulated for this is that globalization had not yet begun to 'make the world smaller':

> It is our contention that the reason the events of Entebbe and Munich did not strike fear into the hearts of the general populace was because processes of globalization were not yet in full swing (Featherstone *et.al*, 2010: 170).

Featherstone *et.al* go on to describe how the neo-liberal political ideologies adopted by the US and UK since that time may have, in some way, made it easy for 'Islamic' terrorism to emerge as a major issue in the western world:

> In this regard we want to suggest that the specific problem of contemporary (Islamicized) global terror emerged in response to the generalized anxieties produced by neo-liberalism

> and the consequent spread of the precariousness of everyday life through the capitalist economies (2010: 172).

In simple terms, terrorism, by definition, requires people to fear it in order for it to be effective (that is, to have its demands heard). Because people living in western capitalist countries tend to experience a heightened level of anxiety in their everyday lives – presumably given the extra demands put upon them by employer and/or state – they are predisposed to be fearful (however irrationally) of something like 'Islamic' terrorism:

> Given that many people already feel embattled by the insecure nature of everyday life, it is easy for them take [sic] the next step and translate those feelings of anxiety into fears about the heinous schemes of particular enemies and reluctantly accept new legislation which will reduce the liberty of every citizen (2010: 173).

This 'new terrorism', so feared in capitalist western nations since 9/11, was compounded in the British context by the events of 7/7. Whilst 9/11 had been perpetrated mainly by citizens of Saudi-Arabia – rather than American nationals, 7/7 was carried out by an entirely British team of suicide bombers. This (as stated previously) meant that the British press had to change its conception of the 'Islamic terrorist' in order to include British Muslims – something which had not been the case beforehand. This is something put into context by Moore, Mason and Lewis (2008), who mention that 36% of all news stories in the British press which involve Muslims also involve terrorism (2008: 3). Given that the Gibbons incident did not involve terrorism, it represented an instance where Muslims (as well as particularly British Muslims) appeared in a major news story, whilst *not* having to appear under the umbrella of 'terrorism'.

Whilst the above is true, reporting of the Gibbons incident analysed in Chapter Seven of this thesis still displays a number of features thought by Featherstone *et.al* to be characteristic of the reporting of Muslims/British Muslims in the post-7/7 climate. Featherstone *et.al* describe the problem faced by the British press, who struggle to reconcile the need to 'represent Britain as a unified multicultural imagined community' with "othering' the bombers as Islamic radicals who were nonetheless normal British citizens (2010: 179). To this end, the press have found it more necessary to 'mark out the 'good' and 'bad' Muslims' and to 'use alternative strategies for 'othering'' (2010: 176). This duality is visible in the coverage sampled from the time of the Gibbons incident analysed in this thesis. When viewed in this way, it is possible to see that whilst coverage did not amalgamate

all Muslims into one single 'whole', Muslims were still 'othered' – by means of a distinction being made between 'good' or 'bad' Muslims – but never anything in between. Hence, 'hardline' Muslims exist in Sudan (bad), whilst more 'moderate' Muslims exist in Britain (good). This is especially interesting given observations made by Featherstone *et.al* where British 'Islamic terrorists' such as those involved in 7/7 are concerned. In cases such as these, the person concerned is almost always reported by the press as a 'previously ordinary, often non-practising, individual, who has lost direction and been misguided by 'radical ideology'' (2010: 176). This radical ideology is almost invariably reported to have originated outside of the UK – amongst foreign Muslim clerics or imams – the 'Mad Mullahs' (2010: 176-180). So, whilst the Gibbons incident did not involve any 'terrorist' actors – or fit into any conventional idea of 'terrorism', it was still reported within the same context as that described by Featherstone *et.al*. This context is one where a duality exists within the world's Muslims – who are either 'good' or 'bad'. In the case of British Muslims, it is a naïve and easily corrupted group which is reported on – whilst outside of Britain there exists a dangerous, radical element, which seeks to turn Britain's own citizens against it as terrorists. This supposed duality, and danger of corruption can be witnessed in articles such as that of Johnson (2007) which called for 'Britain's vast, sensible Muslim majority' to 'speak up decisively and loudly' against Gibbons' arrest, but which also described messages reportedly posted by British Muslims on the BBC's online discussion forum[163] calling for her to be punished, as well as mentioning messages written by Sudanese Muslims, calling for the punishment of her class.

Disagreement exists in academic theory where the coverage of Muslims is concerned – the Greater London Authority for instance reported in 2007 that one of the dominant conceptualisations of Muslims in the press is that 'all Muslims are much the same' (2007: 105), whilst theorists such as Sardar (2002) as well as Featherstone *et.al* (2010) describe the *duality* in the coverage of Muslims which is discussed above. This study has suggested that since 9/11 and 7/7, Muslims are indeed reported in a dual manner by the British press – with 'good Muslims' and 'bad Muslims' being created and reported, but rarely (if ever) Muslims who are simply 'ordinary' people. The data analysed here also suggests that this form of 'othering' might spill over from stereotypes which are merely defined by religion, to also include racially defined groups – particularly in the case of British South Asians. Whilst this theory is supported by the views of theorists such as Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) as well as Poynting and Mason (2007) who describe the way in which the 'Asian other' in the British media has become the 'Muslim other' (Poynting and Mason, 2007: 81), this study is not properly placed to make definitive statements regarding this question. Whilst the Bradford Riots

[163] Problems with which were discussed in Chapter Seven.

case study presented in Chapter Six did show evidence of this type of conflation, this was not the case for the *Satanic Verses* or Gibbons incident samples – where no conclusive evidence of this was found. So whilst the data presented here shows that conflation between 'British South Asian' and 'British Muslim' groups certainly occurred in the British press in the run up to 9/11, it cannot speak for the period following this. This is a question which could be investigated by further studies in this area, and although major news events involving people particularly defined as British South Asian tend to be somewhat uncommon in the British press, it is likely that such an event will appear in the news at some point in the future.

Appendix to Chapter Five

Coverage Sampled for Chapter Five

As detailed in Chapter Four (Methodology), newspaper coverage of the *Satanic Verses* incident was drawn from three different sources. Here, the coverage has been collated, and then analysed, to give the reader a sense of the 'shape' of the sample before any detailed analysis is carried out. Please note that further data is present in the Appendix to Chapter Five. References to this data can be identified by an 'A' prefix to the name of the visualisation – e.g. 'Table A5.1' as opposed to 'Table 5.1'.

One minor deviation here from the other samples in the study involves the Sunday edition of the *Independent* newspaper – the *Independent on Sunday*. As this was not launched until January 28th, 1990 (Independent, 1990), it was not possible to include it in the *Satanic Verses* incident sample. It is, however present in later samples.

As mentioned, due to the age of the *Satanic Verses* sample, electronic copies of articles were not always available. This meant that a total of three sources were used – two being electronic (the databases Lexis Library and UK Press Online), as well as manual sampling which was carried out at the British Library's Colindale Newspaper Archive in North West London. Below is a list of the individual newspapers which were sampled from each particular source:

Lexis Library (Electronic)

The Times

The Guardian

The Independent

The Sunday Times

UK Press Online (Electronic)

Daily Mirror

Daily Express

British Library (Manual)

Daily Mail

Daily Star

Daily Telegraph

The Sun

The Mail on Sunday

News of the World

The Observer

The Sunday Express

The Sunday Mirror

The Sunday Telegraph

The People

As previously mentioned, it should also be noted that particularities of the sampling method were, by necessity, different for the different types of source. Although a key word search was used with the electronic sources, this was not possible for newspapers sampled manually. In the case of these manually sampled newspapers, the entire text was read, and any relevant articles copied and digitised. In practice, this meant that the electronic samples would return a mixture of relevant and irrelevant articles, whilst the manual sample returned only those deemed relevant by the researcher. Below are graphs showing both the *total* number of articles sampled for each day (both relevant and irrelevant) combined from all three methods (Figure A5.1), as well as one which separates the articles in terms of relevance for the two electronic methods (Figure A5.2). Three levels of relevance were noted – 'very relevant', 'slightly relevant' and 'not relevant'. 'Slightly relevant' was defined as an article where the main subject does not concern the one being sampled,

although it is mentioned in passing. A good example of this would be the type of article which gives a rundown of the week's events – where whilst the event being sampled may be mentioned, this only takes place alongside the discussion of other events.

Figure A5.1 Total Number of Articles Sampled For Each Day (All Three Methods and Relevancies)



	15.02.1989 (Wednesday)	16.02.1989 (Thursday)	17.02.1989 (Friday)	18.02.1989 (Saturday)	19.02.1989 (Sunday)	20.02.1989 (Monday)	21.02.1989 (Tuesday)
Total	36	57	36	48	31	38	45

Figure A5.1 also shows that a grand total of 291 articles were sampled for the *Satanic Verses* incident sample. This takes into account articles sampled using all three methods.

Figure A5.2 Number of Articles Sampled by Relevance (Electronic Methods Only)



	15.02.1989 (Wednesday)	16.02.1989 (Thursday)	17.02.1989 (Friday)	18.02.1989 (Saturday)	19.02.1989 (Sunday)	20.02.1989 (Monday)	21.02.1989 (Tuesday)
Not Relevant	2	6	1	6	0	2	0
Slightly Relevant	1	1	3	8	2	2	5
Very Relevant	22	36	24	22	2	24	25

As can be seen from Figure A5.2, the keyword search was reasonably successful in returning relevant articles for study. Three keywords were used for this search – 'blasphemy', 'prejudice' and 'Rushdie'. Whilst the keyword 'Rushdie' was always likely to return a high number of articles relevant to the study – Rushdie being a reasonably uncommon surname in the UK[164], the keywords 'blasphemy' and 'prejudice' were included in an attempt to sample some less relevant articles. Whilst this may appear counterintuitive, it was envisaged that articles of *slight* relevance might actually transpire to be quite interesting within the overall context of the sample. As the articles were to be sorted in terms of relevance, there was deemed to be no downside in using this method when sampling. In any event, it is likely to have given the samples a greater breadth – although the numbers of articles sampled using these 'secondary' search terms was not particularly great (something illustrated by Figure A5.3 below).

[164] The online UK surname geographical mapping tool at http://gbnames.publicprofiler.org/Surnames.aspx [Accessed December 27th, 2011] was unable to produce distribution results for 'Rushdie', explaining that this was because less than 100 instances of that surname were logged in the UK in the 1998 Electoral Register.

Figure A5.3 Number of 'Very Relevant' Articles by Keyword Search Term (Electronic Methods)



	15.02.1989 (Wednesday)	16.02.1989 (Thursday)	17.02.1989 (Friday)	18.02.1989 (Saturday)	19.02.1989 (Sunday)	20.02.1989 (Monday)	21.02.1989 (Tuesday)
"Rushdie"	13	28	15	20	2	19	16
"Blasphemy"	5	2	8	1	0	3	9
"Prejudice"	4	6	1	1	0	2	0

Tables

Table A5.1 Corpus Data for the *Daily Express*

	Size of Corpus (Word Count)	Number of Articles	Daily Average Article Length
15.02.1989	984	2	492
16.02.1989	2117	6	353
17.02.1989	1599	4	400
18.02.1989	512	2	256
20.02.1989	1728	8	216
21.02.1989	0	0	0
TOTAL	**6940**	**22**	
AVERAGE	***1156.7***	***3.7***	
AVERAGE ARTICLE LENGTH	**315.5**		

Table A5.2 Corpus Data for the *Daily Mail*

	Size of Corpus (Word Count)	Number of Articles	Daily Average Article Length
15.02.1989	837	2	419
16.02.1989	2842	4	711
17.02.1989	1340	3	447
18.02.1989	859	3	286
20.02.1989	1605	4	401
21.02.1989	2307	5	461
TOTAL	9790	21	
AVERAGE	*1631.7*	*3.5*	
AVERAGE ARTICLE LENGTH	466.2		

Table A5.3 Corpus Data for the *Daily Mirror*

	Size of Corpus (Word Count)	Number of Articles	Daily Average Article Length
15.02.1989	274	1	274
16.02.1989	1129	2	565
17.02.1989	713	2	357
18.02.1989	189	2	95
20.02.1989	560	2	280
21.02.1989	360	1	360
TOTAL	3225	10	
AVERAGE	*537.5*	*1.7*	
AVERAGE ARTICLE LENGTH	322.5		

Table A5.4 Corpus Data for the *Daily Star*

	Size of Corpus (Word Count)	Number of Articles	Daily Average Article Length
15.02.1989	793	4	198
16.02.1989	497	2	249
17.02.1989	338	1	338
18.02.1989	340	2	170
20.02.1989	284	2	142
21.02.1989	1076	3	359
TOTAL	3328	14	
AVERAGE	*554.7*	*2.3*	
AVERAGE ARTICLE LENGTH	237.7		

Table A5.5 Corpus Data for the *Daily Telegraph*

	Size of Corpus (Word Count)	Number of Articles	Daily Average Article Length
15.02.1989	1958	3	653
16.02.1989	2678	5	536
17.02.1989	1934	3	645
18.02.1989	737	2	369
20.02.1989	624	2	312
21.02.1989	1477	3	492
TOTAL	9408	18	
AVERAGE	*1568.0*	*3.0*	
AVERAGE ARTICLE LENGTH	522.7		

Table A5.6 Corpus Data for *The Guardian*

	Size of Corpus (Word Count)	Number of Articles	Daily Average Article Length
15.02.1989	5421	8	678
16.02.1989	3836	8	480
17.02.1989	6005	7	858
18.02.1989	1812	2	906
20.02.1989	2458	3	819
21.02.1989	4377	7	625
TOTAL	23909	35	
AVERAGE	*3984.8*	*5.8*	
AVERAGE ARTICLE LENGTH	683.1		

Table A5.7 Corpus Data for *The Independent*

	Size of Corpus (Word Count)	Number of Articles	Daily Average Article Length
15.02.1989	1913	3	638
16.02.1989	6570	14	469
17.02.1989	2277	5	455
18.02.1989	8035	12	670
20.02.1989	2298	7	328
21.02.1989	4540	14	324
TOTAL	25633	55	
AVERAGE	*4272.2*	*9.2*	
AVERAGE ARTICLE LENGTH	466.1		

Table A5.8 Corpus Data for *The Sun*

	Size of Corpus (Word Count)	Number of Articles	Daily Average Article Length
15.02.1989	438	2	219
16.02.1989	968	3	323
17.02.1989	953	3	318
18.02.1989	1202	5	240
20.02.1989	144	2	72
21.02.1989	882	2	441
TOTAL	4587	17	
AVERAGE	*764.5*	*2.8*	
AVERAGE ARTICLE LENGTH	269.8		

Table A5.9 Corpus Data for *The Times*

	Size of Corpus (Word Count)	Number of Articles	Daily Average Article Length
15.02.1989	6472	8	809
16.02.1989	3305	6	551
17.02.1989	3637	6	606
18.02.1989	1913	4	478
20.02.1989	2483	4	621
21.02.1989	1609	3	536
TOTAL	19419	31	
AVERAGE	*3236.5*	*5.2*	
AVERAGE ARTICLE LENGTH	626.4		

Table A5.10 Corpus Data for All Sunday Newspapers (19.02.1989)

	Length of Corpus	Number of Articles	Average Article Length
News of the World	652	3	217
The Mail on Sunday	478	1	478
The Observer	4594	5	919
The People	1771	6	295
The Sunday Express	1514	3	505
The Sunday Mirror	1382	3	461
The Sunday Telegraph	4901	6	817
The Sunday Times	1668	2	834

Table A5.11 Word Frequency Table for All Newspapers 15.02.1989-21.02.1989 (Top 100)

Word Rank	Word	Number of Instances
1	THE	8289
2	OF	4010
3	TO	3720
4	IN	2690
5	AND	2648
6	A	2627
7	IS	1583
8	THAT	1571
9	IT	1171
10	FOR	1142
11	RUSHDIE	1098
12	HE	1055
13	WAS	960
14	BE	949
15	ON	846
16	AS	838
17	HIS	832
18	#	829
19	BY	800
20	MR	786
21	NOT	762
22	HAS	707
23	WITH	687
24	SAID	678
25	HAVE	655
26	BUT	627
27	S	601
28	BOOK	587
29	THIS	562
30	ARE	535
31	AN	518
32	THEY	516
33	FROM	497
34	I	495
35	WHO	482
36	AYATOLLAH	465
37	WOULD	455
38	WHICH	452
39	AT	438
40	THEIR	420
41	BRITISH	408
42	IRAN	405
43	WE	400

44	HAD	376
45	BEEN	375
46	BRITAIN	367
47	IRANIAN	363
48	WILL	361
49	KHOMEINI	359
50	ALL	356
51	DEATH	354
52	AGAINST	343
53	SALMAN	340
54	IF	337
55	OR	336
56	SATANIC	336
57	VERSES	336
58	NO	330
59	SHOULD	329
60	WERE	314
61	THERE	303
62	ONE	300
63	ISLAM	296
64	MUSLIMS	289
65	ITS	285
66	MUSLIM	279
67	ISLAMIC	269
68	ABOUT	259
69	LAST	258
70	WHAT	254
71	OUT	248
72	HIM	245
73	TEHRAN	244
74	FOREIGN	241
75	YESTERDAY	228
76	MORE	222
77	PEOPLE	217
78	AUTHOR	213
79	WORLD	212
80	ANY	211
81	CAN	210
82	MOSLEMS	208
83	SO	201
84	THAN	200
85	DO	194
86	AFTER	191
87	WHEN	187
88	ONLY	186
89	OVER	186

90	GOVERNMENT	183
91	STATEMENT	181
92	OTHER	180
93	THREAT	177
94	LONDON	171
95	OUR	171
96	NOVEL	169
97	MOSLEM	168
98	UP	168
99	RELIGIOUS	166
100	EVEN	164

Extracts

Please note: All of the extracts below have search terms/collocated terms highlighted in bold.

Extract A5.1

1 THERE are 1.7 million **Muslims in Britain**, but only a few are fanatics ready to die at the Ayatollah's command (Cliff, 1989).

Extract A5.2

There were singns [sic] of deepening unease in Iran and the wider Arab world, as well as among **Muslims in Britain**, about how far the situation had gone (Ezard, 1989).

Extract A5.3

Most said **Muslims in Britain** ready to carry out the Iranian leader's orders to assassinate the author should be kicked out (Nelson, 1989).

Extract A5.4

The strong homosexual element in My Beautiful Laundrette, about the Pakistani community in London, led to demonstrations when the film was shown in New York and execration by **Muslims in Britain** (Mills, Lister and Morris, 1989a)

Extract A5.5

Mr Rushdie, his literary agent and his publishers, Viking and Penguin, are in serious danger. They are now, to thousands of Shia fanatics, mahdur ad-damm: warriors against God whose unclean blood is to be shed as a religious duty. There is also reason to believe that their lives are at risk as a result of a request to the Imam for judgement by **Muslims in Britain** (The Times, 1989).

Extract A5.6

'I am not sure if the Ayatollah was calling on ordinary **Muslims in Britain** to take the law into their own hands and execute Rushdie and this is why I have some reservations about his declaration. His comments were a natural reaction and we hope they will put pressure on the publisher to withdraw the book. We hope and pray that they will not lead to any violence.' (Beeston *et.al,* 1989).

Extract A5.7

I gain the impression that few of the protesting **Muslims in Britain** know directly what they are protesting against. Their Imams have told them that Mr Rushdie has published a blasphemous book and must be punished. They respond with sheeplike docility and wolflike aggression. They forget what the Nazis did to books - or perhaps they do not: after all, some of their co-religionists approved of the Holocaust - and they shame a free country by denying free expression through the vindictive agency of bonfires (Burgess, 1989).

Extract A5.8

Although there would have been no official notice to **Muslims in Britain** about the instructions, the community would have been aware of them (Mills, 1989).

Extract A5.9

6. The present controversy could lead to enmity against the **Muslims in Britain**. That would be tragic. It could, on the other hand, provide an opportunity for Christians to consider how seriously they believe what they profess (Newbigin, 1989).

Extract A5.10

The passage features in a list of references to the book which has been circulated among **Muslims in Britain**. Other items include the general presentation of the Prophet Mohammed, assumed to be Mahound, a reference to the companions of the Prophet as 'scum' and 'bums', and doubts about the authenticity of the divine revelation to the Prophet (Mills, Lister and Morris, 1989b).

Extract A5.11

Two particular histories have formed a particular form of Islam in Saudi Arabia, and another, extremley [sic] right wing, sectarian, and marginal Islam in Pakistan. The two have fused ideologically and entwined organisationally to attempt the imposition of a uniformity on the multifarious mass of **Muslims in Britain**. Presided over by a number of Muslim organisations, the goodwill of ordinary pious Muslims throughout the country has been appropriated and injected with the twin analgesics of uniformity and a sense of transcendental narcissism. The distinction between piety and segregationism disappears, as does that between imagination and reality. The instrument is demonology. Salman Rushdie thus becomes the exorcist's instrument for exhibiting magical efficacy, as Moses did with the miracle of his stave and Abraham with Nimrod (Azmeh, 1989).

Extract A5.12

There are about 1.5 million **Muslims in Britain**, most of them products of the wave of immigration which the post-war labour shortage drew from Pakistan and India (Cook, 1989).

Extract A5.13

Earlier, Mr Winnick praised as 'excellent' the Archbishop of Canterbury's condemnation of the death sentence and his message to **Muslims in Britain** to keep their anger about The Satanic Verses 'within the bounds of the law.' (Nettleton, 1989).

Extract A5.14

But this rhetoric was derided by some **Muslims in britain** [sic] with experience of Shi'ite militancy. 'It is sheer froth, with no practicality,' one Arab diplomat said (Ezard and Pick, 1989).

Extract A5.15

Muslims in Britain have yet to learn what tolerance is, and how it is implied in compassion and mercy, and so commanded by God. They have yet to learn what criticism is, and that it must be met with words, not knives (Ward, 1989).

Extract A5.16

Khomeini leads the Shi'ite sect. This has few followers here. Most **Moslems in Britain** – and throughout the world – are Sunnis (Moore, 1989).

Extract A5.17

FANATICAL **Moslems in Britain** last night hailed the Ayatollah Khomeini's sentence of death passed on a London-based author (Daily Star Foreign Desk, 1989).

Extract A5.18

"It is an intolerable and barbaric state of affairs," he said. The Government should confront Iran over the affair, and remind **Moslems in Britain** that incitement to murder was against the law (Reynolds, 1989: 7).

Extract A5.19

To try to calm mounting tension among **Moslems in Britain**, Rushdie's publishers Penguin Viking issued an apology (Davies, 1989a: 2).

Extract A5.20

IRAN'S envoy in London yesterday urged **Moslems in Britain** to execute Satanic Verses author Salman Rushdie (Smith and Gilbride, 1989: 1).

Extract A5.21

THE Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Robert Runcie, yesterday expressed sympathy with Moslem anger over Mr Salman Rushdie's novel, The Satanic Verses, but condemned Ayatollah Khomeini's call to murder the author and appealed to **Moslems in Britain** to stay inside the law (Plummer, 1989).

Extract A5.22

An emergency meeting of executive members of the city's Council of Mosques said **Moslems in Britain** should obey the law and ignore the directives of foreign governments (Wright and O'Brien, 1989).

Extract A5.23

Now **Moslems in Britain** back Khomeini's call for death sentence on author of 'Satanic' novel (Doran, 1989b: 1)

Extract A5.24

Moslems in Britain have burned copies of the book, which features a prophet they claim is meant to be Mohammed (Davies, 1989b)

Appendix to Chapter Six

Coverage Sampled for Chapter Six

As noted previously in Chapter Four, the press coverage for the Bradford Riots was drawn exclusively from the *Lexis Library* online database – meaning that it was sampled already in its digital form. As with the previous chapter, the first section of analysis in this chapter is intended to give the reader a sense of the 'shape' of the sampled coverage of the Bradford Riots – before moving on to a deeper analysis of the coverage itself. Again, many series of tables and charts are included in the appendix (Appendix to Chapter Six) – which can again be identified by the inclusion of an 'A' prefix in their title – e.g. 'Figure A6.1' as opposed to 'Figure 6.1'.

In the same manner as Chapter Five, once sampled, articles for the Bradford Riots were read and given a 'relevance rating' of either 'Very Relevant', 'Slightly Relevant', or 'Not Relevant'. The same definitions of 'relevance' were also used here (see the section 'The Coverage' in Chapter Five for further details). Below, Figure A6.1 shows the number of articles which were sampled on each day of the Bradford Riots sample, for all three search terms:

Figure A6.1 Total Number of Articles Sampled For Each Day for All Three Search Terms



FigureA6.1 shows that a grand total of 442 articles were sampled for the Bradford Riots sample[165], but does not show any clear trend towards a greater or lesser volume of news being published at any point during the week sampled. Below, Figure A6.2 introduces the measure of relevance:

[165] Although this is far greater than the figure for the *Satanic Verses* incident sample presented in Chapter Five (288 articles), the reason for this is likely to be that the manual sampling carried out for much of the *Satanic Verses* incident sample produced only relevant articles (and therefore less data overall).

FigureA 6.2 Number of Articles Sampled by Relevance for All Three Search Terms



	08.07.2001 (Sunday)	09.07.2001 (Monday)	10.07.2001 (Tuesday)	11.07.2001 (Wednesday)	12.07.2001 (Thursday)	13.07.2001 (Friday)	14.07.2001 (Saturday)
Not Relevant	42	22	23	38	41	33	53
Slightly Relevant	0	4	3	5	4	4	14
Very Relevant	19	39	21	36	2	34	5

Figure A6.2 shows that a large proportion of the data sampled for the Bradford Riots sample was irrelevant to the topic being studied, and that only a minority of sampled articles were deemed to be 'slightly relevant'. It is interesting to note that the ratio of Very Relevant : Not Relevant articles is much greater on some days than others. One explanation for this involves one particular search term used to sample the data – the term 'Bradford'. Whilst the term 'Bradford' relates directly to the city of Bradford, it also has other uses – including the sports teams contained within Bradford, such as Bradford Bulls RLC (a rugby club) and Bradford City AFC (a football club), as well as a bank – Bradford and Bingley PLC. This means that the search term 'Bradford' was likely to produce a sample containing a large amount of data not relevant to the Bradford Riots on days when news surrounding one of the sports clubs (e.g. the results of a match) or the bank (e.g. financial data) was published. There is a large dip in the relevancy of sampled articles on Thursday July 12th, 2001, followed by an increase on Friday July 13th, 2001, which appears anomalous. Although the day's sample contains a number of non-relevant articles relating to sport, there would be no reason to expect this to lower the figure for relevant articles. One explanation might be that the low relevancy figures for the Thursday and Saturday actually represent a downwards trend, as the riots had become 'old news', and that the larger figure of the Friday actually represents the anomaly here. It should also be noted that the number of 'slightly relevant' articles sampled rose dramatically on the Saturday. This might represent a shift in the reporting of the Bradford Riots – from a 'current' story, which is reported on directly, to an 'old' story, which is commented on only in relation to other

stories. A shift such as this might suggest that newspaper reporters were no longer trying to 'understand' the riots, but by the Saturday felt that they understood them well enough to aid their understanding of other stories. Figure A6.3 below shows the amount of data sampled (all relevancies) for each search term:

Figure A6.3 Number of Articles Sampled by Search Term



	08.07.2001 (Sunday)	09.07.2001 (Monday)	10.07.2001 (Tuesday)	11.07.2001 (Wednesday)	12.07.2001 (Thursday)	13.07.2001 (Friday)	14.07.2001 (Saturday)
"Bradford	42	49	33	64	29	43	45
"Muslim"	8	10	6	7	8	15	18
"Prejudice"	11	6	8	8	10	13	9

Figure A6.3 shows that as with the *Satanic Verses* incident sample, the primary search term for the Bradford Riots sample ('Bradford') was much more successful in finding articles than either of the secondary search terms. This was to be expected, given the nature of the search terms and the event being sampled. As with the *Satanic Verses* Sample this cannot skew the sample data, because only sampled articles actually relevant to the Bradford Riots were used by the study. As with the *Satanic Verses* incident sample, the secondary search terms ('Muslim' and 'prejudice') were largely unsuccessful in sampling relevant articles – the search term 'Muslim' returned only 1 'very relevant' article, compared to 71 'not relevant' articles, and the search term 'prejudice' returned 1 'very relevant' article, three 'slightly relevant' articles and 61 'not relevant' articles.

Tables

Table A6.1 Corpus Data for the *Daily Express*

	Size of Corpus (Word Count)	Number of Articles	Average Article Length
09.07.2001	3122	6	520
10.07.2001	670	2	335
11.07.2001	2404	7	343
12.07.2001	219	1	219
13.07.2001	1812	6	302
14.07.2001	261	1	261
TOTAL	**8488**	**23**	
AVERAGE	***1414.7***	***3.8***	
AVERAGE ARTICLE LENGTH	**369.0**		

Table A6.2 Corpus Data for the *Daily Mail*

	Size of Corpus (Word Count)	Number of Articles	Average Article Length
09.07.2001	1783	3	594
10.07.2001	1299	2	650
11.07.2001	418	1	418
12.07.2001	0	0	0
13.07.2001	2303	4	576
14.07.2001	2274	1	2274
TOTAL	**8077**	**11**	
AVERAGE	***1346.2***	***1.8***	
AVERAGE ARTICLE LENGTH	**734.3**		

Table A6.3 Corpus Data for the *Daily Mirror*

	Size of Corpus (Word Count)	Number of Articles	Average Article Length
09.07.2001	2368	4	592
10.07.2001	806	2	403
11.07.2001	331	1	331
12.07.2001	0	0	0
13.07.2001	1115	5	223
14.07.2001	0	0	0
TOTAL	**4620**	**12**	
AVERAGE	***770.0***	***2.0***	
AVERAGE ARTICLE LENGTH	**385.0**		

Table A6.4 Corpus Data for the *Daily Star*

	Size of Corpus (Word Count)	Number of Articles	Average Article Length
09.07.2001	558	3	186
10.07.2001	221	1	221
11.07.2001	345	3	115
12.07.2001	0	0	0
13.07.2001	344	2	172
14.07.2001	0	0	0
TOTAL	**1468**	**9**	
AVERAGE	***244.7***	***1.5***	
AVERAGE ARTICLE LENGTH	**163.1**		

Table A6.5 Corpus Data for the *Daily Telegraph*

	Size of Corpus (Word Count)	Number of Articles	Average Article Length
09.07.2001	3760	6	627
10.07.2001	2499	3	833
11.07.2001	1750	7	250
12.07.2001	0	0	0
13.07.2001	1512	4	378
14.07.2001	390	1	390
TOTAL	**9911**	**21**	
AVERAGE	***1651.8***	***3.5***	
AVERAGE ARTICLE LENGTH	**472.0**		

Table A6.6 Corpus Data for *The Guardian*

	Size of Corpus (Word Count)	Number of Articles	Average Article Length
09.07.2001	2257	3	752
10.07.2001	2443	4	611
11.07.2001	1794	5	359
12.07.2001	0	0	0
13.07.2001	3734	5	747
14.07.2001	401	1	401
TOTAL	**10629**	**18**	
AVERAGE	***1771.5***	***3.0***	
AVERAGE ARTICLE LENGTH	**590.5**		

Table A6.7 Corpus Data for *The Independent*

	Size of Corpus (Word Count)	Number of Articles	Average Article Length
09.07.2001	3243	5	649
10.07.2001	1983	3	661
11.07.2001	1320	4	330
12.07.2001	252	1	252
13.07.2001	1013	5	203
14.07.2001	0	0	0
TOTAL	**7811**	**18**	
AVERAGE	***1301.8***	***3.0***	
AVERAGE ARTICLE LENGTH	**433.9**		

Table A6.8 Corpus Data for *The Sun*

	Size of Corpus (Word Count)	Number of Articles	Average Article Length
09.07.2001	1136	3	379
10.07.2001	136	1	136
11.07.2001	2831	4	708
12.07.2001	0	0	0
13.07.2001	267	2	134
14.07.2001	0	0	0
TOTAL	**4370**	**10**	
AVERAGE	***728.3***	***1.7***	
AVERAGE ARTICLE LENGTH	**437.0**		

Table A6.9 Corpus Data for *The Times*

	Size of Corpus (Word Count)	Number of Articles	Average Article Length
09.07.2001	3667	6	611
10.07.2001	962	3	321
11.07.2001	2045	4	511
12.07.2001	0	0	0
13.07.2001	288	1	288
14.07.2001	1380	1	1380
TOTAL	**8342**	**15**	
AVERAGE	***1390.3***	***2.5***	
AVERAGE ARTICLE LENGTH	**556.1**		

Table A6.10 Corpus Data for All Sunday Newspapers (08.07.2001)

	Length of Corpus	Number of Articles	Average Article Length
News of the World	471	2	236
The Independent on Sunday	986	2	493
The Mail on Sunday	407	1	407
The Observer	1280	2	640
The People	1657	4	414
The Sunday Express	770	3	257
The Sunday Mirror	1316	3	439
The Sunday Telegraph	863	1	863
The Sunday Times	824	1	824

Table A6.11 Word Frequency Table for All Newspapers 07.07.2001-14.07.2001 (Top 100)[166]

Word Rank	Word	Number of Instances
1	THE	4263
2	OF	2189
3	AND	2097
4	TO	1857
5	A	1596
6	IN	1557
7	#	807
8	WAS	668
9	THAT	648
10	IS	618
11	FOR	609
12	BRADFORD	585
13	POLICE	581
14	WERE	581
15	ON	562
16	IT	518
17	AS	501
18	THEY	483
19	SAID	462
20	BY	461
21	ARE	449
22	WITH	447
23	BUT	384
24	ASIAN	369
25	HAVE	367
26	FROM	363
27	PEOPLE	362

[166] Please note that the '#' symbol denotes a numerical entry.

28	AT	344
29	BE	341
30	HE	321
31	NOT	321
32	THEIR	317
33	I	308
34	WE	285
35	THERE	284
36	THIS	275
37	HAD	274
38	CITY	267
39	WHO	258
40	ALL	246
41	VIOLENCE	245
42	WHITE	245
43	AN	226
44	HAS	221
45	BEEN	218
46	ONE	218
47	COMMUNITY	208
48	YOUTHS	198
49	WHICH	196
50	UP	192
51	RIOTS	186
52	MORE	173
53	OUT	172
54	HIS	165
55	RACIAL	163
56	WHEN	162
57	INTO	160
58	ASIANS	158
59	OR	157
60	RIOT	154
61	THEM	153
62	WILL	152
63	AFTER	151
64	WOULD	149
65	RACE	144
66	NO	143
67	OFFICERS	143
68	NATIONAL	139
69	ABOUT	138
70	WHAT	138
71	REPORT	137
72	MR	134
73	COMMUNITIES	131

74	YOUNG	131
75	SHE	128
76	TWO	127
77	MANNINGHAM	122
78	THAN	122
79	NIGHT	121
80	JUST	120
81	LAST	118
82	LOCAL	116
83	FRONT	114
84	OTHER	113
85	HOME	112
86	SOME	112
87	ALSO	108
88	YESTERDAY	108
89	WHERE	106
90	BLUNKETT	104
91	RIOTERS	104
92	STREETS	98
93	THESE	96
94	IF	94
95	RIGHT	94
96	RIOTING	94
97	CARS	93
98	SO	93
99	YEARS	92
100	BEING	91

Table A6.12 Frequency of 'Muslim terms' within different newspapers 07.07.2001-14.07.2001

Newspaper	Corpus Length	"Muslim"	"Muslims"	"Moslem"	"Moslems"	"Islam"	"Islamic"	"Mosque"	Total Terms	Frequency[167]
News of the World	471	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**0**	
The Daily Express	8488	4	0	10	1	0	0	1	**16**	**530.5**
The Daily Mail	8077	0	0	2	2	0	0	2	**6**	**1346.2**
The Daily Mirror	4620	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**0**	
The Daily Star	1468	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**0**	
The Daily Telegraph	9911	11	3	0	0	2	1	0	**17**	**583.0**
The Guardian	10629	17	2	0	0	0	3	0	**22**	**483.1**
The Independent	7811	11	11	0	0	0	1	2	**25**	**312.4**
The Independent on Sunday	986	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**0**	
The Mail on Sunday	407	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**0**	
The Observer	1280	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**0**	
The People	1657	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**0**	
The Sun	4370	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**0**	
The Sunday Express	770	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**0**	
The Sunday Mirror	1316	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**0**	
The Sunday Telegraph	863	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**0**	
The Sunday Times	824	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	**0**	
The Times	8342	2	5	0	0	0	0	0	**7**	**1191.7**
TOTAL	**72290**	**45**	**21**	**12**	**3**	**2**	**5**	**5**	**93**	***777.3***

[167] Frequency was calculated as 'Corpus Length' divided by 'Total Terms'.

Table A6.13 Detailed Collocation Information for 'White'/'Whites' and 'Asian'/'Asians' by Collocate Term's Location in Relation to the Term Sampled, for All Newspapers: 08.07.2001-14.07.2001

TERMS	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
WHITE/ASIAN	0	7	3	8	1	1	17	8	8	1
WHITE/ASIANS	2	4	1	1	0	1	0	2	2	0
WHITES/ASIAN	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0
WHITES/ASIANS	0	0	5	3	0	0	12	1	0	1
TOTAL INSTANCES	**2**	**12**	**9**	**13**	**1**	**2**	**30**	**12**	**11**	**2**

Extracts

Please note: All of the extracts below have search terms/collocated terms highlighted in bold.

Extract A6.1

She said that Asian parents should think "a little more about arranging a marriage with a **young Muslim** person of UK origin" (Bunting, 2001).

Extract A6.2

Hundreds of **young Muslim** men, maddened (sometimes said as though this was the only reason) by the growing presence of the National Front and British National Party, took to the streets and were met by white racist thugs looking for a bloody good fight. In the end, the mobs turned against the police. The usual slogans and explanations - deprivation, racism, Islamaphobia [sic], the far right - are already in circulation. Repair kits - regeneration, training, additional resources, possibly a report by a major commission - will follow soon. Water canons [sic] are threatened by tough man David Blunkett - but hush now, tread a little gently before rushing on (Alibhai-Brown, 2001).

Extract A6.3

Things are more complicated than we think and the lives of British Muslims are not represented by these noisy, obstreperous men who would never be allowed near any daughter of mine. Most Asian men, even **young** hot-head **Muslims,** do not act this destructively even if they are victims of deprivation, racism and neo-Nazism. If anything Asian men have found it difficult to gain respect in this society because they are seen as weaklings (Alibhai-Brown, 2001).

Extract A6.4

Many of the **young Muslim** men do not know who they are. Abused as "Pakis" all their lives, their parents and others have driven them to embrace a Pakistani identity that is a negation of their Britishness. Many in the older generation tell me that the youngsters are "too British, too much full of rights ... Bloody fools ... In Pakistan the police would kill them on sight" (Alibhai-Brown, 2001).

Extract A6.5

Resentment continued at the cancellation of Bradford Festival's planned finale on Saturday, after police warned that tensions over the possible NF rally meant that revellers' safety could not be guaranteed. The festival director, Allan Brack, said increasing self-segregation in Bradford schools had created a "self-imposed ghettoisation" which was stopping **young Muslims** from being assimilated in the traditional way of immigrants (Wainwright, 2001).

Extract A6.6

The true causes are several. An immediate one was the appearance in the city of the BNP and National Front, producing fear that provoked a reaction of violence. **Young Muslims** are now aware of Islam's greater assertiveness abroad, but the Bradford rioters were also flexing their muscles as young people, getting a buzz from violence. There was copy-cat behaviour, too, following the other northern riots (Darbyshire, 2001).

Extract A6.7

But to avoid further mindless destruction, we also now need to separate out intelligently the issues of how to deal with violent disorder from very real issues such as the alienation felt by many **Muslim** and white **young** men in places like Bradford. And that is exactly what I now intend to do. David Blunkett MP Home secretary (Blunkett, 2001).

Extract A6.8

"I'm looking to get the support from the Asian community, more specifically from Asian parents, to consider when arranging the marriage of their child, thinking a little more about arranging a marriage with a **young Muslim** of UK origin (Stokes, 2001b).

Extract A6.9

Muslim leaders jointly condemned the violence yesterday as "un-**Islamic**" and called on **young** people in Bradford to show control (Ward and Wainwright, 2001).

Extract A6.10

David Blunkett, the Home Secretary, told the Commons that wanton destruction and violence would not be tolerated whatever the debate about alienation or disaffection among **young Muslims** involved in the disorder (Hurst, 2001b).

Extract A6.11

Men such as Winston Churchill enthusiastically sponsored the notion that India was a land of incessantly warring tribes, with the "wily" and "effete" Hindu Brahmins struggling for supremacy against the supposedly less sophisticated but more warrior-like Sikhs and Muslims. This ridiculous "martial race" theory did much to poison relations between communities and in Britain today it is still present (albeit in a modified form), with **young Muslims** being stereotyped as surly, violent and criminally inclined, as opposed to their more articulate and urbane Hindu counterparts. Hardly an approach likely to win over disenchanted young British-Pakistanis (Rahman, 2001).

Extract A6.12

Her remarks, intended to address causes of alienation among young Asians, provoked condemnation from religious leaders and politicians of the Muslim community in West Yorkshire. Mrs Cryer, a campaigner against arranged marriages, said she wanted to provoke debate about disaffection and under-achievement among **young Muslims** and Bangladeshis but not Hindus or Sikhs (Hurst, 2001a).

Extract A6.13

But to avoid further mindless destruction, we also now need to separate out intelligently the issues of how to deal with violent disorder from very real issues such as the alienation felt by many **Muslim** and **white** young men in places like Bradford. And that is exactly what I now intend to do. David Blunkett MP Home secretary (Blunkett, 2001).

Extract A6.14

Our politicians, public men and pontificators of all kinds are incessantly talking about "racism". But when they are confronted with genuine, unmistakable racial hatred, as with the **Muslim** Pakistani and **white** English rioters in Bradford, they change their tune. "Thuggery a law and order issue," says Tony Blair. "Less to do with race, far more with anger and alienation," says a Guardian leader. Such is the tone of Left-liberal thinking (Simple, 2001).

Extract A6.15

The report by Sir Herman Ouseley - now Lord Ouseley, as he took his seat in the Lord's yesterday - says people are also afraid of questioning the fact that schools are increasingly all-**white** or all-**Muslim** (Baird and Cooke, 2001).

Extract A6.16

As the city's **white** and **Muslim** communities become increasingly segregated, living in separate areas and attending different schools, their fear of crime - and of each other - is growing (Baird and Cooke, 2001).

Extract A6.17

It adds: "There is fear of confronting mono-cultural all **white** and/or all **Muslim** schools about their contribution, or rather lack of contribution, to social and racial integration and about the education they are offering their pupils in failing to prepare them for a knowledge-based multicultural world" (Baird and Cooke, 2001).

Extract A6.18

The report said there is "fear of confronting the gangs culture, the illegal drugs trade and the growing racial intolerance, harassment and abuse that exists". The report continues that there is "fear of confronting all-**white** and/or **Muslim** schools about their contribution, or rather lack of contribution, to social and racial integration". There is also fear of challenging wrongdoing "because of be ing labelled 'racist'." The report relays views from Brafordians on their area in one disturbing section. One perception the inquiry found was of "white flight and middle-class people (moving) out of the city, leaving behind an underclass of relatively poor white people and visible ethnic minority communities". This white flight is also being joined by Sikhs and Hindus (Dodd, 2001b).

Extract A6.19

"There is a fear of confronting all-**white** and all-**Muslims** schools about their contribution, or rather the lack of contribution, to social and racial integration and segregation in schools ... one sign that the communities are fragmenting along racial, cultural and faith lines," the report states (Herbert, 2001c).

Extract A6.20

Hashmukh Shah, an Indian businessman who has lived in Bradford for 33 years and is the spokesman for the World Council of Hindus, pinned the blame for the unruly behaviour of **Pakistani youths** partly on the mosques (Roy, 2001).

Extract A6.21

"The responsibility for taking control of **Pakistani youths** lies with their parents and community leaders" (Roy, 2001).

Extract A6.22

Politicised by the Rushdie affair, in the 1990s **Pakistani youths** forced white prostitutes out of Lumb Lane which runs down to the main Muslim settlement in Manningham, scene of the weekend's riots. The prostitutes' argument - "we were here first" - left Pakistani vigilantes singularly unimpressed (Roy, 2001).

Extract A6.23

They are both brave enough to put the blame in varying degrees on **Pakistani youths** for the riots in Manningham (Roy, 2001).

Extract A6.24

After Saturday the "coolie class" is dead.The **Pakistani youths** have shaken off their shackles and are demanding the right to fully participate in society - the right to a good education, the right to work and most importantly the right to live and move were they want freely without fear of oppression. The disturbances, whilst regrettable, have produced an opportunity for true integration of all communities in Bradford to be considered by all parties on an equal basis (Rashid, 2001).

Appendix to Chapter Seven

Coverage Sampled for Chapter Seven

In the same manner as for the two previous chapters, a quantitative description of the data sampled for the Gibbons incident is now detailed in order to give a sense of the 'shape' and size of the sample. This is then followed by a quantitative analysis of the actual data contained within the sample, which informs a more focussed qualitative analysis. It should be noted that the Gibbons incident data includes an extra Sunday newspaper not found in either of the previous samples. This newspaper is the *Daily Star Sunday* , which did not launch until September 15th, 2002 (Sunday Express, 2002).

As with the data sampled for the Bradford Riots case study, all data for the Gibbons incident was sampled digitally from the *Lexis Library* online database of newspaper content. In line with previous chapters, references to tables and extracts to be found in the Appendix to Chapter Seven are prefixed with an 'A' – e.g. 'Table A7.1' as opposed to 'Table 7.1'. In the same manner as with the case studies described in other chapters, all articles sampled for the Gibbons incident were read and given a 'relevance rating' of either 'Very Relevant', 'Slightly Relevant', or 'Not Relevant'. The same definitions of 'relevance' were also used here (see the section 'The Coverage' in Chapter Five for further details). Below, Figure A7.1 shows the number of articles which were sampled on each day of the Gibbons incident sample, for all three search terms:

Figure A7.1 Total Number of Articles Sampled For Each Day for All Three Search Terms



	28.11.2007 (Wednesday)	29.11.2007 (Thursday)	30.11.2007 (Friday)	01.12.2007 (Saturday)	02.12.2007 (Sunday)	03.12.2007 (Monday)	04.12.2007 (Tuesday)
Total	33	28	47	52	54	33	54

Figure A7.1 shows that a total of 301 articles were sampled for the Gibbons incident. This is slightly more/almost equal to the 288 articles sampled for the *Satanic Verses* incident, but still much less than the number sampled for the Bradford Riots (442). Figure A7.1 shows an apparent increase in the number of articles sampled on Friday November 30th, 2007 – which followed the day Gibbons was found guilty by the Sudanese court. Whilst Figure A7.1 includes articles which were not relevant to the study in its figures, this may be of interest. Figure A7.2 below introduces a measure of relevance to the data found in Figure A7.1.

Figure A7.2 Number of Articles Sampled by Relevance for All Three Search Terms



	28.11.2007 (Wednesday)	29.11.2007 (Thursday)	30.11.2007 (Friday)	01.12.2007 (Saturday)	02.12.2007 (Sunday)	03.12.2007 (Monday)	04.12.2007 (Tuesday)
Not Relevant	9	6	6	16	20	6	7
Slightly Relevant	4	0	6	4	10	3	12
Very Relevant	20	22	35	32	24	24	35

FigureA7.2 shows that the observations made of Figure A7.1 above still stand when a measure of relevance is introduced. There was a rise in the number of 'very' and 'slightly' relevant articles sampled on November 30th, 2007 – which is also apparent when only 'very relevant' articles are considered. The number of relevant articles sampled then appears to follow a downward trend, before rising once more on December 4th, 2007. This was the day following Gibbons' release after she received a pardon from the Sudanese president. It is interesting to note the difference between Figure A7.2 and its counterpart in Chapter Six – Figure A6.2. Whilst Figure A7.2 shows that compared to 'very relevant' articles, relatively few 'not relevant' articles were sampled for the Gibbons incident, FigureA6.2 shows that this was not the case for the Bradford Riots sample. Figure A6.2 shows that on the majority of days for the Bradford Riots sample, more 'not relevant' articles were sampled than 'very relevant' articles. Figure A7.3 below shows the amount of data sampled (of all relevancies) for each individual search term used.

Figure A7.3 Number of Articles Sampled by Search Term



	28.11.2007 (Wednesday)	29.11.2007 (Thursday)	30.11.2007 (Friday)	01.12.2007 (Saturday)	02.12.2007 (Sunday)	03.12.2007 (Monday)	04.12.2007 (Tuesday)
"Gibbons"	27	23	40	41	39	28	44
"Blasphemy"	0	0	1	1	0	1	5
"Prejudice"	6	5	6	10	15	4	5

Figure A7.3 above shows that as with the other samples taken in this study, one particular search term was dominant in the number of articles returned. In this case this was the search term 'Gibbons', which was the first of the terms to be sampled. Although 'blasphemy' was also a term likely to be central to the coverage of the Gibbons incident, Figure A7.3 suggests that when it was used, it was generally used in the same article as the term 'Gibbons'. The search term 'blasphemy' still turned up three articles which were relevant to the sample but which did not use the term 'Gibbons', however – e.g. Snow (2007). Whilst in this case it appears that the use of the term 'blasphemy' in relevant articles without the term 'Gibbons' was rare, Snow (2007) is an example of an article which would have been missed, had multiple search terms not been used. The number of such articles could conceivably have been much greater. This might also suggest that Gillian Gibbons was 'characterised' by the press – with her name being used in the majority of articles – rather than simply being referred to as 'the teddy bear teacher' or 'the teacher arrested in Sudan'. This may be an interesting factor when further analysis of the coverage is carried out later in this chapter, as prior to her arrest Gillian Gibbons was completely unknown to the national media – unlike someone such as Salman Rushdie, who was already a published author before the Rushdie incident began.

Tables

Table A7.1 Corpus Data for the *Daily Express*

	Size of Corpus (Word Count)	Number of Articles	Average Article Length
28.11.2007	1433	3	478
29.11.2007	822	3	274
30.11.2007	1110	3	370
01.12.2007	2654	7	379
03.12.2007	664	3	221
04.12.2007	2027	4	507
TOTAL	8710	23	
AVERAGE	*1451.7*	*3.8*	
AVERAGE ARTICLE LENGTH	378.7		

Table A7.2 Corpus Data for the *Daily Mail*

	Size of Corpus (Word Count)	Number of Articles	Average Article Length
28.11.2007	1477	3	492
29.11.2007	2097	2	1049
30.11.2007	2740	6	457
01.12.2007	1313	2	657
03.12.2007	2300	5	460
04.12.2007	1575	3	525
TOTAL	11502	21	
AVERAGE	*1917.0*	*3.5*	
AVERAGE ARTICLE LENGTH	547.7		

Table A7.3 Corpus Data for the *Daily Mirror*

	Size of Corpus (Word Count)	Number of Articles	Average Article Length
28.11.2007	958	3	319
29.11.2007	878	6	146
30.11.2007	1017	3	339
01.12.2007	977	2	489
03.12.2007	361	2	181
04.12.2007	1186	6	198
TOTAL	5377	22	
AVERAGE	*896.2*	*3.7*	
AVERAGE ARTICLE LENGTH	244.4		

Table A7.4 Corpus Data for the *Daily Star*

	Size of Corpus (Word Count)	Number of Articles	Average Article Length
28.11.2007	345	1	345
29.11.2007	406	1	406
30.11.2007	417	1	417
01.12.2007	1041	3	347
03.12.2007	416	1	416
04.12.2007	608	2	304
TOTAL	3233	9	
AVERAGE	*538.8*	*1.5*	
AVERAGE ARTICLE LENGTH	359.2		

Table A7.5 Corpus Data for the *Daily Telegraph*

	Size of Corpus (Word Count)	Number of Articles	Average Article Length
28.11.2007	1455	2	728
29.11.2007	1517	2	759
30.11.2007	1028	4	257
01.12.2007	1086	4	272
03.12.2007	708	4	177
04.12.2007	1009	3	336
TOTAL	6803	19	
AVERAGE	*1133.8*	*3.2*	
AVERAGE ARTICLE LENGTH	358.1		

Table A7.6 Corpus Data for *The Guardian*

	Size of Corpus (Word Count)	Number of Articles	Average Article Length
28.11.2007	1081	2	541
29.11.2007	1043	3	348
30.11.2007	866	1	866
01.12.2007	1195	3	398
03.12.2007	873	3	291
04.12.2007	1659	6	277
TOTAL	6717	18	
AVERAGE	*1119.5*	*3.0*	
AVERAGE ARTICLE LENGTH	373.2		

Table A7.7 Corpus Data for *The Independent*

	Size of Corpus (Word Count)	Number of Articles	Average Article Length
28.11.2007	1165	2	583
29.11.2007	618	1	618
30.11.2007	1937	3	646
01.12.2007	731	1	731
03.12.2007	596	1	596
04.12.2007	566	2	283
TOTAL	5613	10	
AVERAGE	*935.5*	*1.7*	
AVERAGE ARTICLE LENGTH	561.3		

Table A7.8 Corpus Data for *The Sun*

	Size of Corpus (Word Count)	Number of Articles	Average Article Length
28.11.2007	723	3	241
29.11.2007	505	2	253
30.11.2007	2107	8	263
01.12.2007	2979	8	372
03.12.2007	578	3	193
04.12.2007	2247	7	321
TOTAL	9139	31	
AVERAGE	*1523.2*	*5.2*	
AVERAGE ARTICLE LENGTH	294.8		

Table A7.9 Corpus Data for *The Times*

	Size of Corpus (Word Count)	Number of Articles	Average Article Length
28.11.2007	344	1	344
29.11.2007	1289	2	645
30.11.2007	3118	6	520
01.12.2007	845	2	423
03.12.2007	1224	2	612
04.12.2007	1140	2	570
TOTAL	7960	15	
AVERAGE	*1326.7*	*2.5*	
AVERAGE ARTICLE LENGTH	530.7		

Table A7.10 Corpus Data for all Sunday Newspapers (02.12.2007)

	Length of Corpus	Number of Articles	Average Article Length
Star Sunday	610	2	305
News of the World	1390	3	463
The Independent on Sunday	1248	2	624
The Mail on Sunday	739	2	370
The Observer	1112	3	371
The People	1482	3	494
The Sunday Express	801	2	401
The Sunday Mirror	820	2	410
The Sunday Telegraph	1988	3	663
The Sunday Times	852	2	426

Table A7.11 Word Frequency Table for All Newspapers 28.11.2007-04.12.2007 (Top 100)[168]

Word Rank	Word	Number of Instances
1	THE	4043
2	TO	2420
3	A	2010
4	OF	1926
5	IN	1661
6	AND	1616
7	HER	934
8	IS	846
9	WAS	833
10	FOR	802
11	THAT	763
12	SHE	742
13	#	711
14	GIBBONS	698
15	SAID	604
16	BE	586
17	IT	518
18	ON	465
19	I	457
20	GILLIAN	445
21	BY	444
22	HAVE	443
23	WITH	440
24	AS	435
25	SUDAN	395
26	BUT	393

[168] Please note that the '#' symbol denotes a numerical entry.

27	SUDANESE	366
28	THIS	365
29	BEEN	363
30	TEACHER	362
31	TEDDY	361
32	HAS	355
33	AT	351
34	HAD	344
35	BRITISH	336
36	NOT	336
37	BEAR	327
38	ARE	322
39	AFTER	317
40	HE	315
41	THEY	312
42	FROM	307
43	WE	306
44	WHO	298
45	MUSLIM	294
46	AN	293
47	KHARTOUM	249
48	MRS	242
49	WOULD	231
50	MOHAMMED	226
51	NAME	220
52	THEIR	214
53	WILL	207
54	WERE	202
55	ISLAM	193
56	UP	190
57	IF	189
58	SCHOOL	186
59	MS	185
60	THERE	177
61	LAST	175
62	COULD	171
63	GOVERNMENT	171
64	ONE	171
65	OUR	168
66	YESTERDAY	168
67	BEING	163
68	BRITAIN	158
69	MUSLIMS	155
70	FOREIGN	153
71	OR	152
72	SENTENCE	152

73	PEOPLE	151
74	TWO	150
75	VERY	150
76	HIS	149
77	NO	149
78	DAYS	146
79	YEAR	145
80	OUT	144
81	ABOUT	142
82	SHOULD	140
83	ALL	137
84	PROPHET	135
85	JAIL	133
86	OVER	133
87	WHAT	133
88	NIGHT	132
89	WHICH	130
90	SO	129
91	CASE	125
92	ISLAMIC	124
93	RELEASE	124
94	MORE	123
95	AL	122
96	PRISON	119
97	CLASS	118
98	PRESIDENT	118
99	AGAINST	115
100	MY	114

Extracts

Please note: All of the extracts below have search terms/collocated terms highlighted in bold.

Extract A7.1

15 DAYS IN HELL;

(1) Teddy bear teacher escapes the lash but faces two weeks in Sudanese jail (2) An insult to justice (3) Teddy bear teacher stunned by guilty verdict as fears grow of **hardline protests** after prayers An insult to justice Teddy bear teacher stunned by guilty verdict as fears grow of hardline protests after prayers (Williams and Gysin, 2007b).

Extract A7.2

The verdict came at the end of a day of drama and farce in Khartoum that saw British diplomats initially prevented from entering the court. Defence lawyers said they would appeal. But with the Sudan authorities planning a major security operation today amid expected **protests** by **hardline** Islamic leaders urging tougher sentencing, there were fears the tactic could backfire. British officials said they would be pressing for a reduction in sentence, and the five days Mrs Gibbons has already spent in custody might count against the 15 to be served (Williams and Gysin, 2007b).

Extract A7.3

Khalid al-Mubarak, spokesman for the Sudanese embassy in London, blamed the death threats on "hotheads" from **hardline** mosques, and said the **protests** were not representative of society in Khartoum. "After prayer, people in particular mosques, not the mainstream, were the ones shouting slogans to this effect," he said (Rice and Heavens, 2007).

Extract A7.4

Protesters, who had heard **hardline** sermons at Friday prayers, waved banners proclaiming 'Punishment, punishment, punishment', and 'They grossly over-reacted' chanted: 'Shame, shame on the UK' and 'No tolerance - execution.' Others yelled: 'No one lives who insults the prophet.' Hundreds of police looked on but did nothing to disrupt the protest, a clear indication, observers said, that it had been condoned by the fundamentalist government (Williams and Gysin, 2007a).

Extract A7.5

Divorcee Mrs Gibbons, 54, has no idea that **hardline** Islamic **mobs** armed with swords, clubs and axes have taken to the streets of Khartoum howling for her to be executed for insulting their religion after she allowed her class to call a teddy bear Mohammed (Paul, 2007).

Extract A7.6

THE conviction of teacher Gillian Gibbons for allowing her pupils in Sudan to name a teddy Mohammed has horrified **British Muslims** (Ali, 2007).

Extract A7.7

British Muslims staged a peaceful protest outside the Sudanese embassy in London yesterday. They held teddy bears and carried placards saying "Not in our name" (Taher and Crilly, 2007).

Extract A7.8

While her imprisonment has caused outrage in the UK - and among **British Muslims** in particular, who feel that Islam's image has been tarnished - Gibbons and her family have been at pains not to criticise the Khartoum government, for fear of further inflaming tensions (Rice, 2007).

Extract A7.9

BRITISH [sic] **Muslims** yesterday slammed the Sudanese government's treatment of teacher Gillian Gibbons (Sun, 2007a).

Extract A7.10

I am encouraged so many **British Muslims** have expressed their disgust over Gillian's treatment and condemned the Sudanese government. That is a step in the right direction. This gives them a chance to stand up and be counted. To draw a line and to say enough is enough (Kelly, 2007).

Extract A7.11

Brushing aside complaints by **British Muslims** that Sudan's reaction to the affair was "abominable" and "gravely disproportionate", hardliners stirred up protests like the one that took place on Friday. After this Ms Gibbons was moved from a women's prison to a location where Mr Jazouli said she was well-guarded and kept separate from other prisoners (Independent on Sunday, 2007)

Extract A7.12

They, and Dr Bari, must also strongly condemn the ruling against the teenage Saudi girl who was raped multiple times only to be sentenced to 200 lashes for the "crime" of being in a car with a man who wasn't her husband. International pressure to clear the 19-year-old is increasing: **British Muslims** need to add their voices to the clamour (Khan, J, 2007).

Extract A7.13

The Sudanese government now plans to run workshops for overseas teachers to explain how to avoid offending the Muslim faith. A small group of **British Muslims** yesterday protested outside the Sudanese embassy in London over the treatment of Mrs Gibbons, repeatedly chanting, "Let her go!" (Chamberlain *et.al*, 2007).

Extract A7.14

John Gibbons said he had no plans to visit his mother in Khartoum. 'I am not going because we hope the situation will be resolved sooner than later.' In a dramatic phone call on Friday night Mr Gibbons spoke to his mother for the first time since her arrest. The call to his home came from Khartoum.

He said: 'I have no idea where she is and she didn't tell me. I said to her, "Hello mum. We miss you and love you." I was tearful but she sounded strong and seemed to be bearing up under her ordeal. The call lasted only a few minutes. I was enormously relieved just to hear her voice and know that she seems to be well.' In a further sign of the growing furore over the case, a group of **British Muslims**, including Tooting MP Sadiq Khan, demonstrated outside the Sudanese embassy in London, chanting: 'Let her go, let her go.' Baroness Warsi said Mrs Gibbons had been in 'good spirits' during the meeting. 'I asked her how she was feeling and if she was eating well. She was in good humour, she was telling jokes.' Mrs Gibbons, who moved to Sudan in August, could have received up to 40 lashes, six months in prison and a fine if she had been convicted on a more serious charge of inciting religious hatred (Evans-Pritchard, 2007).

Previous paragraph included for context.

Extract A7.15

28 November: Gibbons is charged with insulting religion and inciting hatred. **British Muslims** condemn the decision (Observer, 2007).

Extract A7.16

ONLY [sic] a handful of **British Muslims** yesterday joined a rally to back the teacher jailed in Sudan for naming a teddy bear Mohammed (Latchem and Carlin, 2007).

Extract A7.17

IDON'T [sic] doubt most **British Muslims** will be horrified by the situation in which Mrs Gibbons finds herself. The majority do not back Sharia law and are just as committed to living lives of peace as the rest of us (Clark, 2007).

Extract A7.18

This is the moment for the Council of **British Muslims**, the unelected body (of men) who claim to speak for Muslims in this country, to step up and condemn in the strongest possible terms what is going on in Sudan - and indeed in Saudi Arabia, where a young women faces being publicly lashed 200 times for the 'crime' of being raped (Khan, S, 2007).

Extract A7.19

British Muslims branded the sentence as a "farce and manifestly unjust". The White House said the trial was "outrageous". Gillian's son John, 25, said he was hoping to visit his mother in jail (Daily Mirror, 2007a).

Extract A7.20

British Muslims should protest about this teddy bear lunacy (Johnson, 2007).
(Headline)

Extract A7.21

If you want grounds for despair, read the entries on the BBC website, in which some **British Muslims** say that she should be punished; or read the entries from people in Sudan saying that the children should be punished (Johnson, 2007).

Extract A7.22

No, the voices we need to hear now belong to Britain's vast, sensible Muslim majority. If **British Muslims** speak up decisively and loudly against this lunacy, then they can achieve two good things at once. Their arguments will be heard with respect in Khartoum, since they cannot be said to be founded on any kind of cultural imperialism, or to be actuated by Islamophobia (Johnson, 2007).

Extract A7.23

More importantly, a strong protest by **British Muslims** against the imprisonment of Gillian Gibbons would help to contradict the growing ranks of pessimists and neo-cons - the people who say that the real problem is Islam, the religion itself. There is a body of commentators who say that we are deceiving ourselves about the scale of the problem. Islamism, they claim, is not the fault of a few extremists. These people claim that difficulties we are experiencing are intrinsic to the religion itself - because it is in essence a religion of war, unreformable, medieval. I think they are completely wrong, and they can be proved wrong (Johnson, 2007).

Extract A7.24

Lord Ahmed and Baroness Warsi deserve praise for securing a Presidential pardon - showing **British Muslims** were as outraged at her mistreatment as anyone else (Daily Mirror, 2007b).

Extract A7.25

BRITISH Muslims have condemned the extremists who are calling for Gillian Gibbons's death (Wall, 2007).

Extract A7.26

"A vast majority of **British Muslims** are so embarrassed by this (Wall, 2007).

Extract A7.27

This puts all of us at risk, including the many **British Muslims** who abhor extremism and want to live in freedom (Phillips, 2007).

Extract A7.28

And Lady Warsi has said that it was 'a very dangerous step' to expect **British Muslims** to weed out the extremism in their midst (Phillips, 2007).

Extract A7.29

Our political and security establishment won't even use the term 'Islamic terrorism', denying that this violence is rooted in religion.

Of course, most **British Muslims** rooted in religion.

Of course, most **British Muslims** are peaceful. But as an increasing number of reformist Muslims are now openly saying, to deny the religious roots of this terrorism and extremism is absurd and knocks the ground from under their own feet (Phillips, 2007).

Please note: Although Extract A7.29 contains two instances of the phrase 'British Muslims', it was included here as a single extract. This is because of the close proximity within which the two instances occurred. The first instance appears to be a sub-heading within the article itself – explaining the odd syntax used here.

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