



***Crowd Psychology and the Policing of Football Crowds in
England and Wales.***

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James Hoggett: Crowd psychology and the policing of football crowds in England and Wales.

Abstract

This thesis has two primary objectives. The first is to explore the dynamics of any relationship that may exist between the psychological theories of the crowd that the police may hold and the public order practices they use to police football crowds in England and Wales. To address this objective the first three empirical chapters consist of an analysis of a questionnaire survey distributed to public order officers in England and Wales which addresses these issues, an exploration of public order police training to examine the impact that crowd theory may have in public order policing in terms of any theory/practice relationship and finally an examination of the dynamics of any theory/practice relationship within the operational context of the policing of a football match. The second objective is to assess developments made between the South Wales police, Cardiff City Football Club and Cardiff City supporters to combat issues of football disorder and explore the extent to which the Elaborated Social Identity Model (Reicher, 1996) can be used to explain how this approach may impact upon conflict reduction within this domain.

Methodologically, this thesis adopts a pragmatic approach and uses primarily mixed method designs including questionnaires, ethnographic observations and semi structured and ad hoc interviews. This thesis identifies that the police in England and Wales hold a perception of football crowds that has much in common with classical psychological theories of the crowd (Le Bon and Allport) and that they also support the use of undifferentiated force against football crowds to prevent disorder occurring. Moreover, this thesis suggests that these classical psychological theories are institutionalised within public order training in England and Wales and serve both as a rationale and justification for the development of policing practice based primarily on force. Furthermore, this thesis suggests that because of this, in practice tactics which utilise force are explicitly built upon as good practice for the future. Finally, this thesis also identifies that the alternative approach developed at Cardiff City has been successful in terms of conflict and policing cost reduction.

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"I'm a white male, age 18 to 49.

Everyone listens to me, no matter how dumb my suggestions are!"

(Homer J Simpson)

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Introduction

This thesis examines the policing of football crowds in England and Wales. It was funded by an ESRC 1+3 case studentship in collaboration with the UK football policing unit (UKFPU). The research grew out of the success that the Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) has had in informing police practice particularly as this relates to the policing of international football tournaments (EURO 2004) and as such had a clear set of objectives. Primarily these objectives were to explore how the ESIM may be used to inform the policing of football in England and Wales. While extensive research has been conducted from an ESIM perspective at a variety of crowd events including international football tournaments, little currently exists specifically exploring the dynamics of domestic football crowds and football crowd policing.

The current thesis therefore covers a broad range of literature in chapters one to four. Chapter one explores public order policing, chapter two examines crowd psychology, chapter three looks at crowd psychology as it relates to football matches with an international dimension and chapter four examines crowd psychology and theories of football violence as they relate to football in England and Wales. The thesis also uses a number of different methods which will be addressed in each of the empirical chapters. Primarily the thesis adopts a pragmatic approach to the subject matter and utilizes mixed method designs, which include survey questionnaires, ethnographic observations and semi structured interviews. From this review a number of research questions were developed which form the basis of the empirical research chapter's of the thesis.

The empirical focus of the thesis is on the possible relationship between crowd psychology and public order policing at football and in particular how police perceptions of football crowds may manifest themselves practically in terms of the specific use of strategies and tactics to police them. Previous social psychological research suggests that where the police hold a theoretical perception of the crowd in line with the 'classic' crowd psychology of Gustavé Le Bon this can lead to police

practices that inadvertently escalate public disorder (Stott & Reicher, 1998a). In contrast, more recent social psychology research using the Elaborated Social Identity model has developed principles for operational good practice (Reicher et al, 2004; 2007) that have successfully been implemented in the context of policing an international football tournament creating a model of conflict reduction (Stott et al. 2007; 2008). This research on police perspectives and public order tactics also reflects debates within the policing literature which suggests that a primary factor governing the police's choice of public order tactics is police knowledge (Della Porta & Reiter, 1998).

Despite the existing research on the relationships between police theoretical perceptions of crowds and their practices toward them, the topic remains both under researched and limited by reliance on post hoc data (e.g. Drury, Stott & Farsides, 2003). Moreover, neither the research on police perspectives or models of conflict reduction has been specifically applied to the context of policing football within England and Wales. Therefore the dynamics of any theory/practice relationship or models of conflict reduction in the context of domestic football remains relatively unexplained.

This thesis will seek to address the limitations identified in the literature in a number of ways. Chapter five of the thesis examines police perceptions of football crowd psychology and the public order policing methods used to police football. Chapter six explores the potential impact that police perspectives of crowd psychology may have on public order policing methods in terms of what relationship, if any, crowd theory has with the tactics and strategies developed to police football crowds. It does so by critically reviewing the public order training that officers receive in order to be able to police football crowds in England and Wales. In turn, chapter seven examines the operational dynamics of any theory/practice relationship in the context of an actual policing operation of a high risk football crowd event. Finally, chapter eight explores the alternative approach developed at Cardiff City for the effective management of public order at football in England and Wales. The chapter seeks to illustrate how the ESIM can be used to both inform such models and explain any success in terms of

the psychological impacts it has on Cardiff supporters. Finally chapter nine provides a conclusion to both the individual empirical chapters and the thesis as whole.

Throughout the thesis the term police perception will be used to denote two key ideas. The first is the way in which theories of the crowd may influence the way the police may perceive, understand or define a crowd in terms of specific attributions or characteristics, for example, as a mob or a threat to public order. The second is the way in which the police may perceive, understand or define the strategies and tactics they use to police a crowd in relation to these theories. Throughout the thesis the terms police perception, police understanding and police category definition will be used in a largely interchangeable way to describe these ideas and relationships. The thesis will now turn to the first literature review chapter which begins by exploring literature on the public order policing of crowds.

Chapter One: A review of Public order policing literature

1.1 Public Order Policing

Reicher et al (2007) identify that public order policing traditionally refers specifically to the policing of crowd events, even though it may be argued that most if not all policing is in some way related to the maintenance of public order. In short this highlights a core issue of this thesis. The term public order policing is used in association with crowds precisely because crowds are associated with public disorder. This raises obvious implications for the ways in which crowds are policed.

1.1.1 Approaches to public order policing

Within public order policing literature the implication that crowds are associated with public disorder has led researchers to study the different ways in which police forces around the world attempt to deal with crowd policing. This research (e.g. della Porta and Reiter, 1998; McPhail et al, 1998; Waddington, 2007) has identified two primary approaches to public order policing that have developed in Western democracies, usually contrasted as 'escalated force' and 'negotiated management'.

1.1.2 Escalated Force versus Negotiated Management

McPhail et al. (1998) compared and contrasted the two approaches in relation to protest policing in the United States and highlighted five main differences between the two approaches. Firstly, the escalated force model ignores First Amendment rights¹ while the negotiated management model respects these rights. Secondly, there is low tolerance for community disruption within the escalated force model and little willingness to tolerate changes to the status quo, while in contrast the negotiated management model has high tolerance for community disruption and change. Thirdly, under the escalated force model the only contact between police and demonstrators is undercover police infiltration, while under the negotiated

¹ The first amendment to the United States Constitution is part of the Bill of Rights that expressly prohibits congress from making laws which among other things infringe the freedom of speech or limit the right to peaceable assembly.

management model communication and contact is frank and open and involves discussions of respective responsibilities, practices and goals. Fourthly, the escalated force model is based on mass arrests of any individuals who violate persons or properties or who engage in non-violent civil disobedience, while within the negotiated management model the police make great efforts to avoid making arrests. Finally, within the escalated force model the use of force is a key first response, while under the negotiated management model such force is avoided except where necessary to overcome resistance to arrest or prevent serious harm or death.

Research on the policing of labour disputes, political protests, environmental movements and sporting events among others, has suggested that there has been substantial historical changes in policing practices and policies in North America and Europe since the Second World War (McCarthy and McPhail, 1998; McPhail, Schweingruber and McCarthy, 1998; Hall and De Lint, 2003). Much of this literature points to movement from reactive policing grounded in the threat and use of force to a more preventative consent based approach which relies initially on communication, and negotiation before the use of force.

Despite this apparent shift, reports of the increased use of force and confrontation by the police have continued in some countries such as Britain. While police actions in a number of recent anti globalisation protests in Canada, the USA and Europe have also demonstrated the readiness of the police to use substantial force in certain public order situations. This research (e.g. Sheptycki, 2005; De Lint, 2005) suggests that approaches to public order policing can vary from country to country, force to force and even event to event. However, despite such variability there is a general consensus in the literature that the policing of public order events in Western Europe and Northern America is increasingly moving in the direction of accommodation rather than that of overt force and that this is a positive move (della Porta and Reiter, 1998; Waddington and King, 2005). This apparent change raises important questions about how and why such variability still exists.

1.1.3 Variability in public order policing

Recent research has suggested that changes in public order policing approaches has been due to growing police recognition that police actions can negatively impact on crowd behaviour (King and Waddington, 2004). This has created a situation whereby it is possible to identify *"what may loosely be described as an apparent increase in police sensitivity concerning the possible impact of their actions"* (King and Brearley, 1996, p.102).

In contrast however, Schweingruber (2000) suggests that while public order policing may appear to have moved towards a more 'negotiated management' rather than 'escalated force' approach this may have more to do with practical, political and legislative constraints rather than a shift in police sensitivities about the impact of their actions on crowd behaviour. What such research suggests is that while the police may initially adopt a more negotiated management approach to crowd policing this may be due to external constraints rather than a reflexive self awareness of the potential impact that police actions may have on the crowd. Hall and De Lint (2003) suggest that variation in the implantation of policing approaches is caused by a duality; *"As the police understand most situations, the best way to maintain order is to limit the show and use of force, while relying on negotiation and persuasion to resolve conflicts. At the same time in contexts where the police perceive a clear threat to public order, in particular when unions or more typically other radical groups refuse to play by the rules of the game, police thinking shifts markedly to the view that extraordinary force is necessary and justified both to prevent and control public disorder"* (Hall and De Lint, 2003, p.219).

What this literature suggests then is that rather than think in terms of either escalated force or negotiated management, as has traditionally been the case within public order literature, it may be more constructive to think in terms of the relationship between the two and the circumstances in which they may be used to police crowd events.

1.1.4 A combined approach?

Innes (2005) argues that over the past three decades the reform of policing in the UK has tended to oscillate between positions emphasising coercive hard policing functions and alternative conceptions that focus upon the conduct of soft policing, where the emphasis is upon a more persuasive mode of social control. Innes concludes that future policing styles need to be able to respond to the diverse demands of the public and that this will require a combination of hard and soft policing or escalated force and negotiated management. The importance of such diversity of approach has become even more evident with the recognition of the diversity of those being policed. As Button et al. (2002) note *"Policing organisations face dealing with diverse groups of individuals together, who separately would generally solicit different policing responses, posing planning and pragmatic dilemmas for the policing organisations"* (p.27).

Further, P.A.J Waddington's research on the policing of demonstrations, protests, and other major events has emphasised that they are seldom policed solely on the basis of stringent pre-planning or rigid adherence to a single set of tactical and strategic options. Public order operational deployment usually involves a variety of contingency plans that consider different geographical spaces, categorisation of those present and other temporal and dynamic developments (P.A.J. Waddington, 1998). Moreover, as David Waddington (2007) notes *"a variety of authors have emphasised that the police commitment to negotiated management, far from being monolithic and unchanging, will vary in relation to different situations and the actors involved in them"* (p.16).

1.1.5 An ideal model for public order protest policing?

Taking this issue of variability further, De Lint (2005) developed what he suggests to be a model of best practice for public order policing in relation to protests in Canada. De Lint's research suggests that the overall objective of public order policing in Canada is to recognise politics, facilitate communications and defuse violence. De Lint suggests that the police attempt to do this through the use of *"dimensions of*

intensity, visibility, immediacy and spatiality to facilitate the staging of grievances while managing the dynamics of expression" (De Lint, 2005, p.179). De Lint also gives attention to some of the means through which such objectives may be delivered by the police. These means include training and learning, organisational and cultural change, better decision making and coordination and greater recognition and understanding of the role of different responsibilities and accountabilities.

De Lint (2005) argues that models of public order policing can be plotted in correspondence to three intersecting lines of order production, 'the politics of law, the politics of consent and the politics of enforcement'. From analysis De Lint argues that five 'ideal' public order-policing models are created according to where these lines intersect. De Lint calls these five types 'Service policing', 'Control policing', 'Hybrid policing', 'Disordered policing' and 'Crisis policing'. It is the third 'hybrid model' that has been the focus of De Lint's research, and which also usefully ties together Innes' (2005) suggestion of the need to incorporate negotiated management and escalated force approaches together within public order policing rather than stand them in opposition to each other.

According to De Lint 'hybrid policing' is an utilisation of dual control strategies. De Lint suggests that the hybrid policing model "*readies hard countering behind the absorptive layer of accommodation (the Iron fist in velvet glove)*" (2005, p.183). In other words it is a model of public order policing that utilises both negotiated management and escalated force. De Lint suggests that a hybrid model of protest policing best manages intergroup relations as it is able to balance the competing influences of law, public consent and police enforcement and therefore is the most beneficial for reducing crowd disorder. The research covered suggests that use of different approaches to police crowds depends on who is being policed and the threat that they are believed to pose to public order. As yet, however, the literature has failed to adequately address how and why such influences may underpin the police's choice to adopt a particular approach to public order policing in the first place.

1.2 Police knowledge

Della Porta (1995, 1998) and her colleagues (della Porta and Fillieulle, 2004; della Porta and Reiter, 1998) argue that developments in approaches to public order policing are associated with two different processes. The first of these is specific lessons learned during the course of an individual's police career and the second is 'police knowledge' or "*the police's perception of their role and of the external reality*" (della Porta and Reiter, 1998, p.22). Della Porta et al. (1998) suggest that police knowledge plays a vitally important role in underpinning police work with a common philosophy of approach. Della Porta and Reiter (1998) suggest that police knowledge incorporates a number of interlinked variables which affect the choice of approach to public order policing. These variables include the dominant legal framework, political determinants and accountability concerns, the prevailing police culture and the categorisation of events and participants. These variables will be addressed in turn.

1.2.1 The influence of the dominant legal framework

Della Porta and Reiter (1998) highlight the relevance of the legal framework in which control strategies are implemented for explanations about the adoption of particular approaches to public order policing. Bjork (2005) explored this relationship further. He examined public order policing at two major protests surrounding European Union summits in Sweden and Denmark and found that the legal framework within which each force had to operate significantly effected the way they were able to police the protests. Bjork found that the "*hyper-complexity of the legal framework in Sweden seems to have played as important, but unintended, role in the violent handling of the serious riots in Gothenburg, and that the legal powers in Denmark, in contrast, seems to have contributed to the less aggressive handling of the protest events during the European Union summit in Copenhagen*" (2005, p.305).

P.A.J Waddington (1994a, b; 1998) has also explored issues around the impact of the legal framework on public order policing. For example, he suggests that while the law is conceived by legislators as a means of resolving problems its enforcement can

actually create greater problems for the police (Waddington, 1994a). Waddington argues that the pursuit of policing goals occurs within a social, structural and cultural context which enables certain courses of action and precludes others. As Bjork (2005) discovered where legislation is too overarching, rigidly adhered to or unable to respond or adapt to the differing circumstances to which it is to be implemented, then it may cause rather than solve problems.

1.2.2 Political determinants and accountability

Peter Waddington (1994a) makes the point that, despite the fact that the Public Order Act (1986) greatly expanded the police powers to ban marches and impose conditions on marches and assemblies, constabularies throughout the UK have seldom resorted to this legislation. Waddington (1994a) attributes this widespread reluctance to the determination of senior officers to avoid encountering two highly undesirable forms of trouble. 'On the job' trouble refers to such potential problems as injury, violence and damage to property all of which may arise as a consequence of doing police work. 'In the job' trouble alludes to the possible criticism (flak or fallout) consequent on controversial police action. This may take the form of internal criticism by superior officers or external criticism (e.g. from the media, courts, politicians or a public enquiry). Generally speaking, confrontation is viewed as a recipe for trouble, an arrest for a minor offence could spark off a riot in which damage and injury result in an inquiry that threatens careers, hence, confrontation is avoided.

In order to achieve their goals of maintaining public safety and law and order, officers are therefore faced with the challenge of applying laws and maintaining an appropriate balance between coercion and accommodation. Waddington (1994a) suggests that too much in either direction would be the recipe for either or both on the job and in the job trouble. Waddington suggests that what is required is a balancing of these different pressures whereby discretion, accommodation and coercion are brought together in a process of incorporation. *"From this perspective, incorporation involves not simply accommodation and consensus, but the balancing of various types of trouble. Police seek accommodation so as to achieve their aims of*

avoiding confrontation by 'winning over' the organisers and marginalising what they regard as the troublemakers. On the other hand, they are prepared to use coercion where they deem it necessary" (P.A.J. Waddington, 1994a, p.382). What Waddington highlights is that if the crowd becomes disorderly, the police want sufficient insurance to deal with it adequately, but seek to avoid allegations of provocation. The crowd must be seen to relinquish public sympathy by their actions before the police can afford to take forceful action (PAJ Waddington 1994a).

Such determinants link in with research on police accountability and public order policing conducted by Cronin and Reicher (2006) in which they identify how concern about both internal (audiences within the police service) and external (audiences outside the police service) accountability affects and frames officers decision making processes during public order operations. Cronin and Reicher's analysis of a public order command training programme explored how the command decisions of senior officers were affected by their concerns about the accountability of their decisions and that these concerns pressured them to act in different and sometimes contradictory ways.

For example, officers were aware that external accountability pressures such as being blamed for being too permissive and allowing disruption to occur or being blamed for being too repressive and hence responsible for the escalation of disorder affected what they could do and when. Similarly these pressures also had to be counterbalanced against internal accountability concerns in the form of either internal enquiries, concern about reputation amongst their peers, and the views and cooperation of junior officers. Similarly to P.A.J. Waddington (1994a), Cronin and Reicher (2006) found that it is the balancing of these accountability concerns that is a central feature of senior commanders' decision making during public order operations. They also found that this balance changes over time throughout the different phases of an event and that this change in balance effects policing decisions. More specifically they found that *"as violence escalated, officers portrayed internal audiences as dropping any ambiguity about intervention and external*

audiences as dropping support for non-intervention” (Cronin and Reicher, 2006, p.190).

P.A.J Waddington (1993a) also looks at another important determinant of public order policing approach, which is linked to the idea of ‘trouble’, that of political influence. Waddington highlights that there may be circumstances where implicit or explicit political pressure acts on the police to create the situation whereby they are forced to resort to firm and confrontational measures, regardless of their implications for either form of trouble. Waddington refers to this as a situation in which the police feel under a professional obligation to ‘die in a ditch’. At the implicit level, Waddington provides examples of such circumstances such as the visit of foreign monarchs or dignitaries or the symbolic significance attached to particular locations or occasions such as government buildings or royal ceremonies. At the more explicit level Waddington notes how powerful forces behind the police can affect their use of public order strategy and tactics. He notes that *“Government, state institutions, powerful economic and social institutions, all have a vested interest in digging proverbial ditches in which they would have the police die. The order that the police are duty bound to uphold inevitably favours those powerful interests and so the room to manoeuvre is limited”* (P.A.J. Waddington, 2003, p.415).

The analysis of these political and accountability dynamics also share much in common with the work of Jefferson and Grimshaw (1984) who examine the different influences which shape public order strategy. As noted in Waddington (2007) *“they suggest that chief police officers formulate policies with regard to the views of three significant audiences: Legal audiences (the courts, police authorities and the Home Secretary); Democratic audiences (politicians and the community at large); and occupational audiences (their immediate colleagues of all ranks and the wider police community)”* (p.18).

1.2.3 Public order police culture

The cultural predispositions of the police have often been explained in terms of what Holdaway (1983, p.2) describes as a 'cop canteen culture'. Such a police occupational subculture it is argued is based on machismo and an action orientated pragmatic approach to getting the job done, which simultaneously negatively stereotypes dissenting groups. This subculture provides a guide to the day to day work of police officers and the associated strategies and tactics best suited for achieving it.

Reiner (1985) suggests that although there may be common tendencies generated by the basic features of police work in any contemporary industrial society, their cultural expression can differ. In this way then Reiner argues that police culture is neither monolithic nor invariant, but responsive to social structure. Reiner suggests that the basic determinant of a police culture is the role that the police in question are assigned to. In the case of public order policing then the role is primarily to maintain order and therefore police powers will be directed at those believed to be a threat to this order.

Della Porta and Reiter (1998) note that within public order police occupational culture there is an in built tendency for machismo and suspicion of crowds which may generate a predisposition to repressive behaviour. They suggest that this culture is functional for public order police work in that it encourages the formulation of stereotypes of crowd members and crowd events likely to be troublesome or pose a threat to social order. This then raises questions about what the potential implications of this culture may be in terms of how crowds will be perceived and policed.

1.2.4 The Categorisation of events and participants.

It appears that a crucial determinant of how crowds are policed is the extent to which those being policed are, or are perceived to be, a threat to public order (P.A.J. Waddington, 2003; D. Waddington, 2007) For example, as noted in D. Waddington (2007), Noakes et al. (2005) found that "*police perceptions of demonstrators will be all the more favourable where the latter are older in years, middle class and*

subscribe to political positions that are not diffuse and abstract in nature” (p.17). Further Noakes et al. (2005) go on to relate categorisation of crowd members with style of policing, noting that the negotiated management style of public order policing is more likely to be adopted in situations in which those being policed are perceived to share an established relationship based on familiar rules of engagement.

Similarly, Earl and Soule (2006) found that the categorisation of event by the police in terms of how threatening it was perceived to be was a key factor in explaining police presence and police action at social movement protest events in New York State. Further, a study by Fillieule and Jobard (1998) examined the policing of demonstrations by the French police and found that one of the key interacting factors that predicted the way any individual demonstration would be policed was the police perception of the nature of the demonstration and its organisers. This involved both an assessment of the tactics they might use and the legitimacy of their goals in the minds of the police.

The importance of police categorisation of event and demonstrator for subsequent police strategy and tactics was further recognised in a study by Schweingruber (2000). Schweingruber suggests that prior police knowledge about demonstrators defines for the police the reality of the situation that they expect to face when policing crowds and therefore leads to the police enacting and following particular strategies. In other words, the strategies the police adopt toward demonstrators depend not primarily upon their objective actions or attributes during an event but on socially constructed preconceived images of demonstrators and predictions about their behaviour. This is an important point that shall be explored in detail throughout the remainder of this thesis.

1.3 The paramilitary policing debate.

The development of different approaches to public order policing and the impact of police knowledge have been tied into a specific debate within the public order literature about the style of policing best suited to implementing affective public order policing and why this may be the case.

The so called 'paramilitary policing' debate is divided between those academics who either believe that a negotiated management approach to public order policing can best be achieved through the adoption of a more militaristic public order policing style and those who believe that such paramilitary styles lend themselves to a escalated force rather than negotiated management approach and should be avoided because they have an inherent capacity to exacerbate violence. This debate can be most clearly evidenced in the work of P.A.J. Waddington (1987, 1991, 1993a,b, 1994,a,b) who advocates the paramilitary approach and its positive qualities, such as enhanced control over police and crowd events and Tony Jefferson (1987, 1990) who is critical of the transfer of military discipline and command structures to civil policing.

Waddington maintains that the tradition of non-paramilitary styles of policing involves the risk of disorganised forays by individual officers acting on their own accord or discretion. The result being that such actions fail to discriminate between the innocent and guilty, thus serving to undermine police authority and provoke violent crowd reactions. Alternatively, Waddington (1994b) suggests that through planning and careful management of protest using intelligence and well trained effectively led paramilitary units, it is possible to avoid provoking violent crowd reactions. For Waddington, *"instead of leaving individual officers to take uncoordinated action at their own discretion, a paramilitary approach deploys squads of officers under the direction and control of their own superiors"* (P.A.J. Waddington, 1993b, p.353). This emphasis on clear lines of command and effective co-ordination is regarded by Waddington as the key to eradicating inherent tendencies for officers to lose it in the heat of battle. In this way supporters of paramilitary policing suggest that it may assist in preventing negative police crowd

interactions and therefore avoid situations in which police actions may cause problems by exacerbating the crowd.

However, for those opposed to paramilitary policing styles, such as Jefferson (1987, 1990) paramilitary policing does precisely the opposite, it necessitates the use of force to police crowds because it creates *“an occupational culture which requires that the most aggressive and bull headed individuals be supported in the field and defended in the aftermath, and an ideology of the demonstrator as violent sub-human undeserving of either respect or sympathy”* (Jefferson, 1987: p.52). Jefferson is therefore highly critical of military discipline and command structures in civil policing. Jefferson argues that such a policing style undermines the true strength of the police, which is their flexibility in the face of civilian populations, their discretion and their individuality. From this perspective then far from paramilitary policing being the surest way to ensure the safety of the public, police discipline, and the legitimacy of the police, it is castigated for being highly repressive and provocative and directly related to the possible heightening of the potential for conflict. In this sense then, Jefferson hints at the potentially self fulfilling role inappropriate paramilitary style police interventions can have in the development or escalation of crowd disorder.

Despite the apparent differences between those for and against paramilitary policing, both sides recognise the potentially negative impact that police public order methods may have on crowd behaviour. In doing so, public order literature illustrates that police crowd interactions are a key variable for understanding how crowd disorder may be created, escalated or diffused (King and Waddington, 2004, 2005; Waddington and King, 2005).

1.3.1 The interactional level of public order policing

In recognition of the potential relationship between police crowd interactions and public order outcomes, public order literature has begun to identify the importance of issues such as the perceived legitimacy and fairness of police actions by the crowd

in the prevention of public disorder. For example, della Porta and Reiter (1998) identify that the micro interactional level of policing is a vitally important variable influencing crowd behaviour at public order events. They highlight how attention should be given to the nature and context of the interaction between the police and those they are policing. Della Porta and Reiter (1998) suggest that conflict escalation during crowd events is often due to indiscriminate or heavy handed police dispersal tactics and subsequent crowd reactions to this. Marx (1970) also illustrates that interaction is a particularly important variable determining public order outcomes because particular forms of police behaviour may have the unintended effect of contributing to disorder, rather than preventing or attempting to prevent it. Marx (1970) suggests that both the use of too much or too little force can be counterproductive in different circumstances.

Waddington and King (2005) also note how public order policing has had to develop a reflexive self awareness about the potentially inflammatory role police conduct at the interactional level can play. This perspective is neatly summarised by King and Waddington (2004) who note *“that public order policing is not simply reactive. Rather it entails a dynamic interaction between the police and protestors which can pre-empt and de-escalate potential disorder or lead to a mutual spiral of conflict”* (p.119).

1.3.2 A public order model of crowd dynamics?

The most complete attempt within public order literature to address the issues raised so far has been made by the authors of the Flashpoints model of crowd dynamics and public order policing. Initially developed by Waddington and his colleagues (Waddington, 1992; Waddington, Jones and Critcher, 1989) and more recently refined in collaboration with David King (King and Waddington, 2004; 2005; Waddington and King, 2005). The model developed through analysis of a number of public order events during the late 1980's and 1990's. The Flash Points model is concerned with explaining the circumstances in which disorder is likely to break out or alternatively fail to ignite during crowd events.

To do so the model seeks to locate incidents of crowd disorder within a wider contextual framework rather than simply pointing to the immediate event itself. The model embraces six interdependent levels of analysis which Waddington (2007) suggests should be thought of as a series of widening concentric circles. The different levels are; Structural, Political/ideological, cultural, contextual, situational and interactional, running from aspects of face to face interaction at the micro core, through a series of more macro contextual levels.

Through the application of the model to public order policing events, the authors suggest that of particular importance to successful public order outcomes are the perceived fairness and legitimacy of the specific tactics and strategies used by the police. King and Waddington (2004; 2005) suggest that tactics which are too provocative and forceful and which do not attempt to understand or incorporate the aims of those being policed are likely to cause an adverse reaction from crowds. Waddington and King (2005) therefore suggest that the development of crowd theories, which place greater significance on the various contexts and dynamics of disorder, on the social identities, definitions and objectives valued by participants, and on the potentially self fulfilling and inflammatory role police conduct can play before and during civil disturbance, have meant that police public order policy has become commensurably more sensitive to wider social issues.

1.3.3 Criticisms of the Flashpoint model

However, the model has received a number of criticisms from a variety of authors. For example, P.A.J Waddington criticised the notion of a flashpoint claiming that it was "*neither analytically useful nor empirically testable*" (1994b, p.159). He argued that evidence could always be found to support the different levels but that this would reveal little of the dynamic processes that occur within them and throughout the event itself. As Waddington and King (2005) themselves note of Flashpoints "*our model may well be less overtly pre-occupied with such variables as identity and history*" (p.498). PAJ Waddington also questions the utility of the notion of a

flashpoint as he argues that there is often a discernible time lag in a riot between what may be viewed as a precipitating incident and the onset of widespread disorder.

Furthermore, while this model has been usefully applied to a variety of public order situations, it has not so far been applied to the policing of football crowds in England and Wales. Therefore its explanatory capability with regards to football disorder remains unclear. In fact a common problem with most of the public order literature is that it is concerned primarily with protest policing. Little research has explicitly been developed in relation to the policing of football crowds, therefore the relevance of this work to the current thesis remains questionable. One of the few studies of public order policing which does explore the policing of football is that of Adang and Cuvelier (2001) and this research will therefore be examined now.

1.4 The European football championships 2000.

During the European football championship in Belgium and the Netherlands in 2000 a systematic study of crowd behaviour was conducted by Adang and Cuvelier (2001). Post tournament analysis illustrated that the two hosting countries, Belgium and the Netherlands had adopted different approaches to policing the tournament. Adang and Cuvelier's (2001) study therefore provided the perfect opportunity for research to begin to explore the impact that differing styles of policing can have on levels of disorder at a major international football tournament. In Belgium, analysis revealed that the style of policing adopted used large numbers of paramilitary police officers and more readily used force as the first response to crowd control. In contrast, the style adopted in the Netherlands involved lower numbers of police officers and those on duty were deployed in pairs primarily in normal police uniform and more readily used interaction as the first response to crowd control. Furthermore, Adang & Cuvelier (2001) demonstrated that the two different policing approaches, which they termed high profile and low profile respectively, had quantifiably different impacts on levels of hostility and conflict.

The study found that in high risk situations despite the high profile Belgium approach using nearly three times as many officers on the street and twice as many riot police it had no greater impact on the amount of disorder observed. Conversely, the study also identified that in low risk situations where the high profile approach was adopted the highest levels of disorder were recorded. In other words, the study highlighted that high profile policing in low risk situations was actually causing disorder. Subsequently, Adang and Cuvelier (2001) were able to demonstrate that the low profile policing approach utilised in the Netherlands was associated with lower levels of disorder in the context of international football tournaments than the Belgium high profile approach. The findings from this research have subsequently been used to address issues of good practice for the policing of international football tournaments. From this research, Adang (2001), in association with the Dutch police, developed a theory and strategy, which was termed the 'friendly and firm' approach to public order policing at football matches. This theory stresses the benefits of adopting a communicative approach whereby officers engage in positive interaction with supporters as a first response to crowd control. The Euro 2000 study has therefore been extremely useful for demonstrating that different styles of public order policing can directly influence different public order outcomes in relation to football crowds.

1.5 Summary

In summary the work within public order literature has usefully been able to illustrate the different approaches and styles of public order policing as well as the development of different strategies and tactics. The current review of public order literature has so far identified two contrasting approaches within public order policing, 'escalated force' and negotiated management. More recently literature has illustrated that it may be more helpful to think of the two models inclusively, the issue being when, why and how force is used rather than simply whether it is used.

The literature has also usefully highlighted many of the factors which impact upon a police force's choice of public order policing method so that a comprehensive picture of the current state of public order policing in Western democracies has been

created. In particular, police knowledge has been identified as a key factor which can influence police choice of approach to public order policing as well as police perceptions of crowds and crowd behaviour.

Furthermore, the literature has also clearly identified that police actions can and do affect crowd behaviour and therefore public order outcomes. For example, the paramilitary policing debate has shown that using force inappropriately can cause violent reactions from the crowd and that perception of police legitimacy and fairness within police crowd interactions may play an important role in crowd behaviour.

However, despite this, two important problems remain with regard to this literature and the present thesis. The first is a specific challenge for this thesis in that little of this public order literature has been developed in relation to the policing of football matches. This is all the more surprising when it is considered that on average the police in the U.K. spend approximately thirty million pounds annually policing football and that incidents of 'disorder' still occur at around fifteen percent of football matches within England and Wales resulting in approximately three thousand arrests per annum (NCIS, 2005). Moreover, the Greater Manchester police, one of England's largest police forces, estimate that around three quarters of its entire public order policing budget is spent on policing football. If measured in these terms then the management of football crowds is by far the largest and financially relevant public order issue confronting the police within the U.K. There is a real need therefore to address the issue of public order policing at football matches within England and Wales.

The second problem is more general and important, in that while recognition has been given within public order literature to the importance of psychological theories of the crowd and the social psychological processes which may mediate crowd police relationships and underpin perceptions of legitimacy, the literature has failed to fully explain such dynamics. In other words, public order literature is unable to provide an

analysis of the underlying processes that may mediate crowd police relations and public order outcomes.

While the research has identified that the perceived legitimacy of police tactics can play a role in crowd disorder and that police knowledge may underpin the police's choice of tactics it is unable to explain why tactics may be perceived as legitimate in the first place nor the part that police understanding of crowd psychology may play in underpinning police knowledge and the categorisation of crowds and crowd members. Schweingruber (2001) suggests that this may be because public order literature has generally failed to engage with the social psychological research on crowd dynamics. He notes that *"although a number of scholars (e.g. della Porta, 1998; Waddington, 1994) have addressed the role of police knowledge in protest policing, none have described in detail how ideas constructed by social scientists have shaped police knowledge and impacted upon protest policing policies"* (p.372).

1.6 Conclusion

Waddington (2007) suggests that King and Brearley (1996) *"speak for the overwhelming academic consensus by insisting that, in order to maintain credibility, public order theory must recognise the underlying rationality of the majority of crowd members. Further the dynamic potential of crowds must be acknowledged and the possible impact of police and other action on this dynamic process appreciated in order to arrive at a workable solution to the problem of controlling public disorder"* (p.6). However in making this assertion it is questionable whether public order literature has been able to offer this kind of analysis.

What is evident from this review of public order policing is that as well as not being football specific it lacks any general analysis of the underlying psychological processes that may mediate the outcome of the different policing approaches, styles, strategies and tactics previously discussed. There appears to be an overwhelming consensus within the literature that the occurrence or prevention of public disorder are ultimately dependent on the perceived legitimacy of a particular

police operation and the specific tactics used to achieve the police's strategic objectives (Jefferson, 1990; P.A.J. Waddington, 1999). However, despite this recognition attention has focused neither on exploring how ideas constructed by social scientists may have impacted upon or shaped police knowledge nor on the way in which subsequent police perceptions of crowds affect their choice of public order policing method. Finally, public order literature has been unable to explain how police action may or may not come to be perceived as legitimate or why it is that police action may have positive or negative affects on crowd behaviour. In order to address such issues there is a real and pressing need to look at crowd psychology literature.

Chapter Two: The psychology of crowd dynamics

2.1 The historical context of crowd psychology

The origins of the association between crowds and disorder identified in the previous chapter can perhaps be found within the tradition of crowd psychology that emerged in 19th century France. This period was marked by the mass transition from hierarchically ordered village life to new urban life in large cities. Due to this upheaval one of the greatest fears of the ruling classes' during this period was if and how people would continue to respect the existing social order during such change (Reicher, 2004a). This fear of the threat to the established social order that was posed by mass urbanisation found its ultimate manifestation in the crowd and as such it was crowds that put issues of social control at the top of the political agenda. In accordance with the times early crowd psychology was therefore quick to both highlight and demonise this threat (e.g. Taine, 1878). It is important to note therefore from the outset that the historical context which marks the birth of crowd psychology was intractably linked with concerns over social control. It therefore highlights the beginning of a key relationship that will be examined throughout this thesis that between psychological theories of the crowd and the practices of social control used to police them. However, before the origins of this theory/practice relationship are explored this chapter will firstly examine whether such fear of crowds was justified by exploring in more detail social historical accounts of crowd events during this period.

2.1.1 The crowd in history

While the ruling elite of the 19th century were fearful of the crowd and contemporary scholars quick to argue for its irrationality and destructiveness (e.g. Taine, 1878) this is in stark contrast to more recent evidence provided by social historians of crowd behaviour during this period. While these social historians do not seek to deny the existence of brutality and destructiveness within crowds their work illustrates that theories that assume crowds are inherently mindless are of limited use in approaching such phenomena. For example George Rude (1959, 1964, 1970) examined in detail the pattern of disturbances and the behaviour of crowds in 19th Century France and Britain. Rude highlighted the normative and rational nature of

such behaviour and how it was important to understand the role that wider socio-historical contexts played in shaping this behaviour. By doing so Rude's work dispels many of the ideas prevalent in the crowd psychology of the time that crowds were irrational mobs.

However, at the same time Rude has identified the prevalence of 'irrational mob' models of the crowd within social historical accounts. More specifically, Rude illustrates how historians, sociologists and psychologists have aided this process *"by resorting to a convenient and ready to hand vocabulary which, though hallowed by time, is none the less misleading and inadequate and that Taine's 'mob' should be seen as a term of convenience, or as a frank symbol of prejudice, rather than as a verifiable historical phenomena"* (Rude, 1959, p.239)

Other social historians have also revealed similar patterns of crowd behaviour during other historical periods of civil unrest. For example Tilly, Tilly and Tilly (1975) explored collective action and mass violence in France, Germany and Italy from 1830-1930'. They argued that crowd violence is not deviant or irrational but rather shaped by the means through which ordinary peoples ability to act together on their grievances and aspirations has been affected by urbanization, industrialisation or the social historical context. Other historians such as Thompson (1971) and Reddy (1977) have also discerned similar patterns in crowd behaviour in a variety of different settings and historical periods.

Reddy (1977) in particular, in his exploration of demonstrations in the French town of Rouen during 1752-1871, illustrated the normative nature of crowd events and highlighted the need to understand both the context in which these demonstrations took place and the identities of those that took part in them. As Reddy notes *"what must be characterised is the community base that made coherent action possible, a sense of membership that stands in a prior relationship to the motives of particular individuals. That the incidents under consideration had a coherent form, however diverse the actions or foci may have been is a conclusion that the evidence forces upon the historian"* (Reddy, 1977, p.82). The central point to take from this social

historical research is that it is vital to recognise the role that other agencies outside of the crowd, such as the police, the army, the state and its institutions played in shaping crowd behaviour and crowd disorder. Social historical accounts demonstrate that crowd conflict developed from interaction particularly with the state and that it was normatively structured. This is a far cry however from the position taken by the dominant psychological theories of crowd behaviour at the time.

2.2 Classical crowd psychology: Gustave Le Bon

During the 19th century one theory in particular stood out and continues to have a far reaching influence. There can be little contention that Gustave Le Bon's seminal work 'The Crowd' (1895, translated 1947), has had a lasting impact on how crowds and their psychology are understood. This work also forms what is often referred to as a 'classic model' of crowd psychology (Stott and Reicher, 1998a). One of the reasons that Le Bon's theory has perhaps been so influential is because it not only accounted for the potential threat that the crowd posed through mass action but it also accounted for the potential promise such power held if it could be harnessed. Le Bon's work was developed as a political project through which he attempted to establish crowd psychology as a mechanism for social control. In fact Le Bon frequently "*urged establishment figures at the time to employ his principles so that they could use and manipulate the crowd's power for rather than against the state*" (Reicher, 2004a, p.236). What this illustrates is that crowd theory has been influencing and informing police practice since the 19th century.

Le Bon's theory was centred on two main premises. Firstly, that the anonymity of the crowd led to a loss of individual identity and hence the normal standards and values governing individual action. Secondly, that because of their numbers, crowd members develop the feeling of having invincible power. The core concept of Le Bon's theory is 'submergence' which he uses to describe the transition from individual psychology to crowd psychology. Due to the loss of individuality, once in a crowd people become open to suggestion to passing ideas or more particularly emotions that sweep through the crowd through a process of contagion. Such emotions derive primarily from what Le Bon termed the 'racial unconscious', an

atavistic substrate which underpins our conscious personality and is only revealed in crowds as this personality is swept away. Le Bon terms this racial unconscious the 'group mind' something which he describes as irrational and primitive in nature and above and beyond individual cognition. Furthermore, while Le Bon suggested that the group mind is primitive he also believed it to be empowering, giving rise to a sense of invincibility among crowd members. For Le Bon, the power and primitiveness of this racial unconscious or group mind is then in turn revealed in the character of the crowd, hence the perceived destructive and barbaric power of crowd behaviour and its potential threat to social order.

Le Bon's work marked the popularisation of the crowd psychology tradition and it was and remains enormously influential. Despite its influence the work has also received a great deal of criticism. Reicher (2004a) argues that these criticisms can be directed at three different levels, the descriptive, the theoretical and the ideological. At the descriptive level Le Bon's work suffers initially from the fact that it was developed without any formal experience or observation of the subject matter to which it was applied, it was therefore a theory without referent and as such was thoroughly decontextualised. This decontextualisation in turn led to problems of generalisation, reification and pathologisation.

This decontextualisation at the descriptive level is subsequently mirrored at the theoretical level in a decontextualised theory of the human self based on the use of an individualistic meta-theory (Reicher and Stott, 2007). Le Bon's theory suggests that individual identity is the basis for rationally controlled behaviour and that while it may be affected by social factors it is not in any way constituted by them. Therefore, if an individual were to lose their individual identity, as hypothesised by Le Bon when people enter into a crowd, then their behaviour would become irrational and uncontrolled. As such Le Bon denies that crowd behaviour can be socially structured in any way and therefore by obscuring the social bases of crowd behaviour Le Bon renders crowd actions as both meaningless and mindless.

Finally, at the ideological level, Le Bon's concern with social control meant that his theory served several purposes. Firstly, Le Bon's work was unable to grasp the legitimacy of the grievances that often motivate crowds. It thereby denies the crowd its capacity to act intelligently and ethically and denies the crowd any '*raison d'être*'. Secondly, since Le Bon views crowds as inherently irrational and barbaric then responsibility for the initiation or escalation of disorder by agencies of the state is denied. This becomes particularly clear from examination of what was omitted from Le Bon's theory. Whilst his theory was concerned with struggle between different social forces or groups, in his account only one of those forces, the crowd, appears. Le Bon pays no attention to the role and actions that other groups such as the army or police play, nor to the wider social context or the institutions towards which crowd action may have been directed and which social historical research identified as of great importance.

Implicit within the theory then is the view of the need to repress crowds. The theory proposes the need for the forceful and indiscriminate control of all crowds and crowd members, as if it is they alone that are responsible for disorder and therefore it is their behaviour alone that needs to be controlled. While Le Bon's work has been criticised a key argument of this thesis is that its legacy is still felt today both within policing and academia as well as wider society and that this has had a great impact both on how the police understand crowds and as well as how they police them.

2.2.1 Classical crowd psychology: Floyd Allport

A major challenge to Le Bon's work was made by Floyd Allport. Allport's (1924) starting point for a theory of crowd behaviour was an attempt to dismiss Le Bon's 'group mind' as a convenient fiction for summarising the actions of individuals. Allport's approach was based a combination of instinct and learning theory. Allport considered any reference to a group mind that was separate from an individuals psyche as a meaningless abstraction. Instead, Allport argued that crowd action is only explicable in terms of the individual traits and attributions of participants. For

Allport, all individuals behave on the basis of enduring response tendencies which derive from their conditioning histories.

Allport's central argument was that of course people may behave differently in groups, just as they behave differently in other situations. However, people learn to respond appropriately (and therefore differently) to different situation specific stimuli and groups of people (or crowds) are simply another type of stimulus situation. Social interaction is therefore perceived to be just a matter of conditioned response sequences in which one person's response functions as another person's stimulus, which in turn elicits another response and so forth. In other words, for Allport crowd behaviour is nothing more than an aggregate of individual responses. For Allport, crowd members who take part in violent action would be expected to already have violent or anti social tendencies and violent crowds can therefore be explained in terms of the violent individuals who make up its composition.

However, Allport does suggest that crowds have a particular type of effect on learnt response tendencies. Allport argues that being part of a crowd, helps to generate a spiralling atmosphere of emotionality and the larger the number of people present the greater this mutual-excitation becomes until eventually the collective boils over leading to mutual over-stimulation and the breakdown of learned response tendencies. At this point people are left with nothing but their underlying biological instinctual apparatus which Allport suggests is based on the struggle for survival. In other words, Allport suggests that being part of a crowd eventually results in a suppression of individuality and the subsequent loss of the ability to restrain urges of anti social behaviour.

So despite its attempt to break with the group mind tradition, Allport's work actually shares a number of similarities with Le Bon. The core conceptual premise which underlies both theories is that the standards which control our behaviour are associated with individual identity. Both authors argue that in crowds people lose their unique and idiosyncratic identities and behave in terms of a primitive animalistic substrate, the only difference being that Allport's substrate is more

biological and Le Bon's more metaphysical (Reicher, 2004a). The main difference between the two theories is summed up by Reicher et al. (2007) who note that "*if the classic view, in popular parlance, might be called the mad mob approach, then Allport's view is the hooligan approach*" (p.409). Crowd violence is perceived to be the result of people with violent learnt response tendencies being attracted to certain crowds in the first place where their primitive biological instincts are released during participation.

Therefore, for all Le Bon and Allport's arguments about the explanation of crowd behaviour, they both agree on the primitive pathological nature of that behaviour and by so doing both theories rupture the links between society and identity and between identity and action. Both theories seek to position their explanatory focus within the crowd itself at the expense of wider social, historical and contextual issues. Because both theorists argue for the destructive nature of the crowd their ideas have also both been used to underpin understanding of the threat to the social order that crowds pose, whether through allusion to mad mobs, or the delinquent nature of the individuals attracted to disorderly crowds in the first place. In so doing, both theories have intrinsically been linked to ideas about social control and the need to police crowds.

2.3 Modern crowd psychology: Deindividuation theory

Both Le Bon and Allport's theories were referent free and therefore lacked empirical data against which their ideas could be tested or verified. In contrast, social historical accounts have provided evidence which suggests that such decontextualised theories are inaccurate. Yet despite this, they still engender a lot of support. This is partly due the appearance of subsequent experimental data linked to the work of deindividuation theorists, who provided some of the evidence that the original crowd theories lacked. Deindividuation theorists adopted a new and far more scientific and experimental approach to investigating what happens to individuals in group settings.

The first study in this tradition, by Festinger, Pepitone and Newcomb (1952) proposed what was termed the deindividuation effect. In the context of a controlled experimental study it was found that when male subjects were made to feel anonymous in a group they were more likely to express hostility towards their parents. These results were explained as being due to the fact that *“under conditions where the member is not individuated in the group, there is likely to occur for the member a reduction of inner restraints against doing various things”* (Reicher et al., 1995, p.164). The key assumption was that people obtain some form of release when they are in a group which allows them to behave in abnormal ways. More specifically, freedom from restraint was brought about by deindividuation. Therefore, deindividuation was proposed as the process through which it would be possible to understand the behaviour of crowds.

For Festinger et al (1952), deindividuation is a central component of group behaviour and as with the theories that went before (e.g. Le Bon and Allport) a person's individual identity was perceived as the sole basis for self control. Thus once restraints are removed from the individual, impulsive behaviour is released. Festinger et al (1952) argued that deindividuation occurred when an individual became 'submerged' within a group. However while the experimental manipulations designed to develop and test the theory may have been new, the underpinning idea and rationale behind the theory of deindividuation was not. It was developed explicitly from the Le Bonian concept of submergence (Reicher, 1984b).

What is important to note then is that deindividuated behaviour is understood to be the result of a break down in an individual's normal cognitive functioning, a process that is brought about or exacerbated particularly in crowds. It is in the crowd that the individual is most likely to become deindividuated and therefore within the crowd that people are most likely to become irrational and their behaviour become anti-social. The theory therefore repeats the 'classical' idea that crowds are a meaningless atavistic intrusion. Despite this, Deindividuation research has proved very influential and subsequently led to a number of studies which sought to explain how anonymity, particularly within the crowd, enhanced anti social behaviour.

The most comprehensive attempt to theorise the relationship between deindividuation and anti-normative behaviour was made by Zimbardo (1969). Zimbardo developed a model which proposed that a series of antecedent variables led to a state of deindividuation. These variables included anonymity, novel or unstructured situations, the taking of consciousness altering substances such as alcohol or drugs, sensory overload, and arousal. Zimbardo suggested that deindividuation is a process whereby an individual's normal cognitive functions which usually inhibit anti-social behaviour are unable to operate properly. The result is that emotional, impulsive, irrational and regressive behaviour becomes typical for that person. Deindividuation is therefore characterised by lack of self observation and self evaluation, resulting in a lowered concern for social evaluation and a weakening of restraints based on shame, fear, commitment and guilt. In turn this weakening of self controls lead to a lowered threshold for exhibiting otherwise inhibited behaviours. In other words, what Zimbardo (1969) was explicitly interested in was the process whereby decreases in self observation and concern for social evaluation led towards anti social behaviour and therefore the potential anti-normative nature of deindividuated behaviour and by inference crowd behaviour. Subsequently, deindividuation theory has been revised and reformulated by both Diener (1979, 1980) and Prentice-Dunn and Rogers (1982, 1989). These reformulations will not be addressed here but comprehensive critical reviews are available elsewhere (e.g. see Reicher, 1984b; Reicher et al., 1995; Postmes and Spears, 1998).

2.3.1 Criticisms of Deindividuation Theory.

It appears obvious even from this brief review that despite the methodological developments which the deindividuation tradition introduced it faithfully reproduced Le Bonian and Allportian ideas of a single, socially decontextualised identity which provides the basis for rational action and self control. As such, crowds are believed to be an arena in which individuals lose their identity either through the emergence of a metaphysical or biological substrate or a process of deindividuation.

Crowds therefore lead to situations in which individuals lose their ability for rational and controlled behaviour and therefore the behaviour of individuals in crowds, and by proxy the behaviour of the crowd as a whole, will be uninhibited and characterised by uncontrolled antisocial behaviour. In other words, despite its methodological development, Deindividuation theory offered little conceptual advances. Reicher (2004a) takes the criticism of deindividuation further and argues that *“deindividuation theory discards the strengths and retains the weaknesses of Le Bon’s argument. By ignoring the issue of power, deindividuation models also ignore the potential of crowds and their transformatory possibilities. By retaining an individualistic notion of identity and of its loss in the crowd, deindividuation theory perpetuates the notion of collective action as generically incoherent and socially meaningless”* (p.238). There have been a number of other attempts in modern crowd theory to explain crowd behaviour in individualistic terms. Perhaps the most notable of these are ‘frustration aggression’ theory and ‘game’ theory.

2.3.2 Modern Crowd theory: Frustration/Aggression theory and Game theory

The frustration/aggression model was developed and applied to crowds by Dollard et al. (1939). The theory was a mixture of Allport’s individualistic theory which suggests that all human behaviour is a function of drives, cues, learnt responses and rewards and Freudian hypotheses which link frustration to aggression. The theory suggests that while frustration may arise in everyday life it is also difficult to release the resultant aggression against the frustrating agent in these circumstances. This is because in ordinary everyday situations the individual has learned the appropriate way to respond to frustration within the confines of the law and what is socially acceptable behaviour. However the theory contends that the individual’s feelings of aggression do not dissipate but become displaced onto other objects. Dollard et al (1939) suggest that the anonymity offered by the crowd contributes towards an individual’s willingness to join in crowd behaviour because it reduces the individual’s sense of responsibility for subsequent actions. The crowd is therefore believed to be an arena which can facilitate the cathartic release of aggression and through a

subsequent process of crowd intensification can lead to greater intensity of aggression and aggressive behaviour.

Like the frustration aggression model, Olson's (1965) game theory is very much in the individualistic tradition. The theory suggests that all behaviour including crowd behaviour is premised on individual rationality whereby we make choices for action based on the ability of that choice to maximise our individual benefits over potential costs. For Olsen, the effect of the crowd is that it offers the opportunity for individuals to pursue benefits or valued ends which ordinarily may not be available or accessible due to fear of sanction or punishment by other individuals, groups or organisations. In this sense crowd behaviour while appearing organised and coherent is in fact a collective of individuals seeking to maximise the potential benefits available to them.

These theories can be seen as a development of previous research by suggesting that being in a crowd does not lead to a loss of individual identity and therefore that anti-social or disorderly crowd behaviour is not irrational. However, both theories can be subjected to similar criticism. Neither theory provides any analysis of crowd or group norms, instead acknowledging only behaviour at the individual level and therefore associating crowd behaviour only with processes internal to the crowd. Both theories therefore deny the role that social factors, through the actions of groups or institutions outside of the crowd, can have on crowd behaviour. They therefore reduce what are complex social events to merely an aggregate of individual responses and reactions. The theories therefore provide no theoretical basis from which to uncover the social meanings or social forms and determinants of aggression or disorder. In this sense then they are inconsistent with both the public order and social historical literature previously addressed.

2.4 Sociological and Social Psychological perspectives of crowd dynamics

Sociological approaches to crowd behaviour stand as an important development to crowd theory, particularly with regard to their acknowledgement of the importance

of the wider social context, social interaction, and group norms. The current brief review will split this broad area of research into three sections. The first part will trace the development, influence and impact of what has been termed 'Mob sociology' (Schweingruber, 2000) the second will do the same with Smelser's (1962) structural functionalist theory of collective behaviour and the third likewise with 'emergent norm theory' (Turner and Killian, 1987). Each of these theories is examined here because of the influential impact they have had on subsequent theory, practice or both.

2.4.1 Mob Sociology

Schweingruber (2000) conducted a study of various U.S. police documents that discuss the policing of crowds, demonstrations and riots and traces the origins of the prevalence of what he terms 'Mob sociology' (see Mombousse, 1967) in the United States back to the work of Blumer (1939). Schweingruber suggests that the key tenet of mob sociology is to explain how a law abiding crowd becomes a law breaking mob. Schweingruber argues that Mob sociology contends that crowds are leaderless and unorganised and characterised by an awareness and respect for law and order which originates from its members ingrained knowledge and respect for it. In contrast mobs are organised and have high levels of leadership in which everyone shares a common motive for action and in which respect for law and order is replaced by emotion and irrationality. Mob sociology supposes that crowds begin to become mobs as the result of some climatic event and the resultant spiral of stimulation this causes means that individuals become absorbed into the mob and are controlled by a form of crowd mind.

In this sense then, mob sociology while derived from the work of theorists such as Blumer (1939) ignores one of its central points, namely that crowds occur within a larger social context. Instead mob sociology concentrates more on the negative transformatory power of crowds whereby individuals are transformed in crowd situations, lose their identity and become irrational. In this sense therefore mob sociology has much in common with the crowd psychology of Le Bon.

Schweingruber suggests that mob sociology is important because it became diffused throughout U.S. policing literature in the late 1960's and early 1970's and was used to both design and justify specific demonstration management practices. Schweingruber (2000) argues that there is an affinity between mob sociology and the 'escalated force' model of protest policing in the US. Since the 1970's however in response to the civil rights and anti war movements in the U.S a more negotiated management model of public order policing has developed. However, Schweingruber suggests that this development has had more to do with a campaign carried out by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to expand the recognised rights of demonstrators through the First Amendment and public forum law in the federal courts than to a specific shift in the underlying theory of crowds contained in American police literature. Schweingruber therefore contends that mob sociology has had long lasting and wide ranging consequences for public order policing in America. The work of Schweingruber (2000) therefore illustrates a potential relationship between crowd theory and police practice which is a central theme of this thesis.

2.4.2 Smelser's theory of collective behaviour

Neil Smelser's (1962) theory of collective behaviour was strongly influenced by structural functionalist explanations which see society as basically well integrated and self regulating. Smelser's theory was an attempt to highlight the significance of the context of crowd violence, as well as the triggering or precipitating incident or event responsible for sparking it off (Waddington 2007).

Smelser argued that the development of a riot could be explained through six largely predictable and interlinked phases. These basic determinants of disorder can be defined as follows. Firstly, the immediate features of the situation that either facilitate or constrain disorder, this phase is termed structural conduciveness. Secondly, the model suggests that where feelings of frustration exist that arises from the perception that the group's rights have been ignored then this can lead to

disorder, this is termed 'Structural strain'. Thirdly the model suggests the central importance of the development of a generalised hostile belief against the object of the crowd's frustration through which both blame is appointed and retaliatory action agreed upon. Fourthly, the model identifies what it terms precipitating factors. These are any incidents which may serve to support or heighten the generalised hostile belief. The fifth stage involves the mobilisation of participants for action which occurs through processes of communication and leadership which advocate disorder. Finally, the last phase in explaining the outbreak or containment of a riot is the intervention of the state. The model suggests that this is best achieved through decisive but fair intervention which should be aimed at severing links between crowd leaders and their followers. Like Mob Sociology in America, Smelser's theory has been shown to have a strong influence on public order policing strategies in the UK (Waddington and King, 2005).

However, while Smelser's theory usefully illustrates the contextual nature of crowd disorder, in keeping with its structural functionalist tradition, public disorder is characterised as an illegitimate though highly patterned activity engaged in by deviant groups. Furthermore while it identifies the importance of police action in maintaining social control it doesn't take into account the immediate impact that the state may have played in the context of the crowd event or crowd violence. Instead the theory focuses simply on the need for uncompromising interventions to prevent disorder from occurring or escalating without a reflexive awareness of what the impact of this may be. Importantly then, as with the other models of crowd psychology addressed so far, the model ignores the role and impact of other agencies on crowd behaviour. It therefore fails to address the relevance of social interactions for crowd behaviour.

2.4.3 Emergent Norm Theory

The first attempt to address the issue of interaction within a theory of crowd behaviour was made by Turner and Killian (1972). Their Emergent Norm Theory showed a greater sensitivity to the part played by social interaction and coordination

in crowd activity and therefore shares common ground with some of the social historical research which was touched upon at the beginning of this chapter. Emergent Norm Theory was an attempt to combine symbolic interactionism (the creation of meaning within social interactions) with psychological research on the formation of group norms in situations of uncertainty (e.g. Asch, 1952; Sherif, 1936). The theory seeks to demonstrate that far from being pathological and irrational crowd action is both rational and guided by norms. However, the theory suggests that these crowd norms, far from being traditional and established may actually transcend existing institutional patterns and develop during crowd events themselves. As the name of the theory suggests the key to understanding collective behaviour is to explain the processes involved in this norm formation.

Turner and Killian, explain the process of norm formation in crowds in terms of a perception of unanimity (Asch 1952) whereby emergent norms are validated to the extent that they are believed to represent the views of the group rather than any particular individual. The specific process through which such norms become established involves interaction and discussion between people within the crowd during a preliminary (or milling) phase of crowd formation. Turner and Killian (1987) suggest that crowds are composed of a variety of different people, some of whom willingly and actively express their opinions and share their views of the situation facing the crowd while others are less inclined to do so, and in this way certain people gain prominence. Turner and Killian call these individuals 'keynoters' and the more other people in the crowd favour the position taken by these keynoters by suppressing their own uncertainty about the situation the more widely these other positions are excluded. Through this process Keynoters resolve crowd ambivalence and are able to propose definite norms and actions with such authority that an illusion of unanimity is created, which grows and grows until eventually becoming a self fulfilling prophecy.

Emergent Norm Theory makes an important first step in developing a theory of crowd behaviour which can account for the social and interactional influences which impact on crowd dynamics. However, while in these respects the theory marks an

important development in contrast to the more traditional theories, it can be criticised for failing to fully break from them in a number of key ways. Firstly, in concentrating on the uncertainty often present in crowd situations and therefore the need to develop new behavioural (emergent) norms the theory shows a lack of sensitivity to the prior knowledge of particular crowds. By focusing on the micro interactional level and ignoring the macro level the theory fails to recognise the relationship between crowd member's identity and the wider aspects of social reality in which the crowd is situated.

This shortcoming highlights two further important limitations to the theory. Firstly, the deliberative processes involved in keynoting means that the theory has difficulty in explaining how crowds can change rapidly without noticeable milling periods and yet still remain united in their common goals or norms. The process of norm creation suggested by the theory is labour intensive and not dynamic enough to account for rapid change or reflect how broad cultural understandings can affect crowd behaviour and norms. The second major theoretical problem is that the theory is unable to explain why some suggestions from some keynoters prevail over others without reducing this to the individual participant's predispositions. In this sense emergent norm theory can be seen as simply an elitist form of the individualistic tradition (Reicher, 2004a).

2.5 Summary

Crowd psychology has a long history which from its inception has been linked to issues of social control. Crowd behaviour has traditionally been reduced to individual pathology, by theories which have explored crowd action at an intra-individual level. Crowds are an arena in which crowd psychology suggests individuals may lose their identity and thus become mindless and unpredictable or where the anonymity offered allows the individual to behave in ways that would ordinarily draw sanction. In this way crowd behaviour has been perceived as irrational, anti-social and inherently violent and destructive.

In short, in the course of the history of crowd psychology the crowd has been demonised, reified, pathologised and generalised. What such work highlights is that by insisting on the universal character of crowds and their inherent conflictual nature these theories have taken a whole series of diverse phenomena and grouped them simply together as a kind of reified psychological mechanism. As Reicher (2004b) notes, by doing so *“what we lose in the process is any ability to explain when groups enter into conflict, what conditions lead to such conflict, who they target in their actions, and the precise forms taken by their action”* (p.924). Social historical research covered at the beginning of the chapter demonstrates that this reification is a dangerous simplification which ignores how crowds exist and function within wider socio-historical contexts. While sociological theories have attempted to identify the importance of the wider social context and Emergent Norm Theory began to extend the analysis of the underlying processes that may shape and influence crowd behaviour from an intra- to inter-individual level a common criticism still remains. That is that *“the subject remains isolated from societal definition and hence the relations of determination between larger scale social factors and the actions which take place within and between groups remain opaque”* (Reicher, 2004a, p.243).

2.6 Conclusion

The chapter has illustrated how psychological theories of the crowd have a long history of association with crowd control and have influenced the policing of crowds. In doing so both crowd theory and crowd policing have focused almost exclusively on the crowd itself to explain crowd behaviour. What both the social historical and public order literature have been able to demonstrate is that crowd events are as much about what the state and its institutions such as the police are doing as it is about what the crowd is doing. In this chapter theories of crowd psychology have been explored in an attempt to address how and why this may be the case. However the crowd psychology examined so far has been unable to do this. Crowd psychology therefore needs to be expanded so that crowd behaviour and disorder come to be explained and understood as intergroup phenomena. What is needed is a theory that recognises the importance of the social historical context in which crowds occur,

the importance of the identities of those who take part in crowd events as well as those who police them, and finally the importance of the nature of the intergroup relations that exist and develop between these different groups during crowd events. If this occurs, it may become possible to explain and account for the dynamic nature of crowd behaviour. The Elaborated Social Identity Model of crowd behaviour is a theory that attempts to do just this and it will therefore be addressed in the next chapter.

Chapter Three: The Elaborated Social Identity Model of crowd behaviour

3.1 The problem of crowds for psychology

The previous chapter identified how crowds have posed a distinctive problem to psychology of explaining how shared standards might emerge in particular contexts. Crowd events are usually novel or ambiguous situations in which everyday routines and norms may not readily apply. Furthermore, crowd events are often largely unstructured lacking formal hierarchies or agreed channels for formal discussion. How then can crowd behaviour be rational, patterned and spontaneous?

3.1.1 The Social Identity Model (SIM)

The SIM (Reicher, 1982, 1984, 1987) proposed that collective behaviour during a crowd event is made possible through the shared salience among crowd participants of a common and socially determined identity and that both the form and content of this identity is context dependent (Reicher, 1982, 1984, 1987). In contrast to 'classical' perspectives on crowd psychology that suggest people lose identity and hence lose control in collective settings, the SIM contends that what actually occurs is a process whereby people shift identity and hence shift behavioural control from that of a individual to a social basis. What they will then do depends upon the beliefs, norms and values associated with the particular social identity which is salient. As Reicher (1996a) explains *"people do not lose their identity in the crowd but rather shift from acting in terms of personal identity to acting in terms of the relevant social identity. Correspondingly, people do not lose control over their behaviour in the crowd, but rather control shifts to those values and understandings by which this identity is defined"* (p.328). In other words, the shift from individual to group or crowd behaviour involves a shift from personal to social identity and the emergence of cultural and social standards as the basis for behavioural control.

Developed from Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1978; 1982) and Self Categorisation Theory (Turner, 1982; Turner et.al. 1987), the SIM demonstrated how collective

action in a crowd is made possible when people adopt a common self categorisation and social identity. Through processes of induction and deduction people are able to discern the norms governing identity in specific situations. Through common identification with other crowd members, people can then act collectively in terms of the 'prototypical' (stereotypical dimensions defining the ingroup category) behaviour and norms pertaining to that identity. The SIM proposes that crowd or collective action will be limited to those who identify with the social category and to behaviours that are ideologically consistent with that category. In other words, the SIM describes how, upon defining oneself in terms of a social category a common identification is formed with others who also define themselves in terms of this social category. Situation specific norms are created and adhered to by all those who identify with this category which makes spontaneous collective action in terms of these identity norms possible.

3.1.2 A Social Identity critique of Deindividuation Theory

Reicher (1984b) used the SIM to criticise the dominant crowd theory of the time, deindividuation theory. Reicher identified and explained how deindividuation theory was unable to account for central problems within its own data. The main thrust of the criticism was that rather than deindividuation leading to anti social behaviour the data actually suggested that deindividuating circumstances can lead to lowered aggressiveness and even increased affection amongst those supposedly deindividuated. Further meta-analyses of the data were conducted in subsequent studies (Reicher et al. 1995; Postmes & Spears, 1998) which found that the problems with deindividuation theory were actually magnified when it was applied to crowds and crowd behaviour. As Reicher et. al. (1995) note, *"If the complexities of deindividuation manipulations remain to be fully unravelled, we have, nevertheless, some indications of which conditions maximise the salience and the expression of social identity: immersion in a group, lack of personalising cues, identifiability to ingroup, lack of identifiability to outgroup. In other words, precisely those conditions that result from being part of a large crowd."* (p.192). Therefore, crowds, the phenomena that deindividuation theorists would argue should have the greatest

deindividuating impact and therefore lead to the greatest loss of identity and hence rationality, in fact appear to have entirely the opposite impact on peoples' psychology. While deindividuation theory struggled to explain such phenomena the social identity model was readily able to explain these dynamics and apply them to crowd behaviour.

3.1.3 The St. Pauls Riot

Reicher's (1984a) study of the St. Pauls riot was a powerful example of social identity processes in action. The St. Pauls Riot on the 2nd April 1980 was one of the first major inner city race riots of the 1980's and arose from a police raid on a café in the St. Pauls area of Bristol. The raid resulted in a crowd of people attacking the police and a subsequent escalation of violence which resulted in the police being forced out of the St. Pauls area. Reicher (1984a) was able to build an empirical account of the riot that identified that collective action during the event by the crowd was not random but had a normative pattern and was meaningful to participants in terms of their collective identity.

Furthermore, Reicher (1984a, 1987) identified that there was clear limits to collective action and demonstrated that participants explicitly referred to themselves in relation to a St. Pauls identity and described their relationships to others in terms of this categorisation. Thus, for example, they made distinctions according to whether people were fellow St. Pauls' inhabitants, whether they were outsiders or whether they were members of categories seen as specifically antagonistic to the St. Pauls identity. Moreover, Reicher also illustrated how this identity prescribed the limits to action. Only people or targets that were perceived as antagonistic to the St. Pauls identity were attacked while others that were not were left alone.

In other words hostility was differentiated and could only be understood by reference to the crowd's social identity. The norms of this common St Paul's identity specified what counted as acceptable conduct and therefore what behaviours

became collectively sanctioned and what did not. The study was a vitally important development in crowd psychology as it began to illustrate that collective action was determined by the nature and salience of shared social identity and that this social identity was in turn dependent upon both a distal and proximal context.

3.1.4 Problems with the SIM

However, while developing understanding of crowd behaviour, the SIM still left a number of questions unanswered. The emphasis on social identity as determined by the broad macro context led to the potential for a rather one-dimensional reading of the nature of crowd conflict. Conflict could simply be read off from the St. Pauls' social identity as if it was inherently violent. Yet this left unexplained how identities could and did change over time during the crowd event. Further, by examining the nature of crowd behaviour without examining in detail how conflict actually emerged from wider intergroup relations with the police, and without including the perspective of the police as a possible contributing factor, the question of how an otherwise peaceful crowd might become conflictual was left unaddressed. In other words, the SIM was unable to explain how social identity and thus behaviour can change during the course of an event and also how context can both shape social categories but also be shaped by them.

3.2 *The Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM)*

These problems led to the development of the Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) of crowd behaviour which focused on the emergence and development of crowd conflict through intergroup interaction (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher 1996 b, c; Reicher 2004a; Stott & Reicher, 1998a). Reicher (2004a) notes that *"If identity is about the organisation of action, then one might expect that out-group resistance to ingroup actions will frame the effectiveness of different identity constructions. Indeed, one can go further and argue that, in the case of crowd events, the out-group does not just provide resistance to action, but provides the very grounds on which it occurs"* (p.250). Rather than context being perceived as something external, the

ESIM was developed to explain how context and social identity have an interactive relationship, particularly in the case of crowd events.

3.2.1 The battle of Westminster Bridge

The Elaborated Social Identity Model developed from extensive field based research with a variety of different types of crowd event. Reicher (1996c) first developed an ESIM analysis in a study of events of the 24th November 1988 at which the National Union of Students organised a demonstration to protest against plans to replace student grants with student loans. A designated route for the protest march had been agreed in advance between the organisers and the police. However during the march a section broke off from the route and moved towards Westminster Bridge in an attempt to reach the Houses of Parliament. Subsequently the police blocked protestors from crossing the bridge and crowd conflict began to develop. Reicher (1996c) used the ESIM to explain not only how crowd conflict between demonstrators and the police developed at Westminster Bridge but also how it escalated over time during the course of the event as a result of identity change.

The study suggested that the conflict at Westminster Bridge arose from alternative perceptions about democratic rights held by the protestors and the police. Reicher (1996c) demonstrates that the protestors believed that it was their legitimate right to cross Westminster Bridge and lobby parliament; therefore in preventing them from doing so the perception was held that the police were acting illegitimately. In contrast, the analysis also identified that the police believed that the students had no right to break from the agreed route of the march or to lobby parliament while it was in session and therefore their attempts to do so were illegitimate.

The study usefully illustrates that far from conflict developing from the irrational, random and anti normative behaviour of those in the crowd it arose out of a context in which the two major groups in the event, the demonstrators and the police held irreconcilable perceptions about each others' proper social behaviour. The analysis demonstrates that this clash occurred to the extent that it violated each group's

expectations of the others' social identity. Collective crowd conflict developed in a situation in which police action had become perceived as illegitimate and action against the police had come to be perceived as legitimate

Furthermore, Reicher (1996c) also explored the importance of intergroup dynamics subsequent to the initiation of conflict to explain how they produced conditions under which conflictual practices became generalised. As such the study is able to show how conflict was then able to develop and spread during the course of the event. Reicher (1996c) suggested that the common experience of protestors was the denial of their perceived rights and the indiscriminate nature of police tactics. In so far as common fate is a precursor of group formation, in being brought together as a common category and presupposing the support of others sharing this category membership, crowd members gained both the power and confidence to confront the police. The analysis therefore suggested that the spread of conflict coincided with changes in the self categorisation of crowd members which in turn explains how protestors became both willing and able to enter into conflict with the police. In this sense the study illustrated that far from crowd behaviour being divorced from society, as supposed by classical crowd theory, it is in fact both determined by, and a determinant of, wider societal contexts.

3.2.2 The Poll Tax riot

A further example of how analysis of intergroup processes can be used to help to explain the development of collective crowd conflict is provided by Stott and Drury (2000). The study addressed issues of identity and behavioural change during the course of a crowd event and the potential impact this change can have. Their study of the 'anti-poll tax' demonstration in central London on the 31 of March 1990, examined how a sit down protest combined with some minor confrontation outside Downing Street involving only a small number of demonstrators led very rapidly to forceful police intervention against large sections of the demonstration. The evidence suggests that the police decision to use force in this indiscriminate way was primarily driven by perceptions of the crowd as illegitimate and a threat to public

order. In contrast however, analysis demonstrated that the people in the crowd could see no threat to public order, just legitimate civil disobedience against what was seen as an unjust system of taxation. Consequently large numbers of demonstrators came to perceive the forceful behaviour of the police as an attack on their democratic rights. In technical terms people in the crowd began to collectively perceive the behaviour of the police as illegitimate.

Given the relatively indiscriminate use of force by the police a psychological unity emerged that also left people in the crowd feeling powerful enough to strike back at the police. This change in the crowd's psychology also increased the ability of those small numbers originally attempting to engage in conflict to influence and find support among ordinary demonstrators. Therefore, the perception of illegitimate policing combined with perceived empowerment within the crowd was the psychological basis from which many who had previously rejected violence began to become violent and through which an increase in collective disorder occurred (Stott & Drury, 2000). Of course, such emergent hostility confirmed initial police views that this was becoming a disorderly crowd so there was an increase in the scale and intensity of forceful intervention used by the police. This process of cyclical interaction then intensified until it culminated in one of the largest riots ever witnessed in central London.

3.2.3 Summary

What this research suggests is that widespread disorder can and does emerge during crowd events not because crowds are inherently dangerous but as an unintended consequence of the indiscriminate use of force by the police (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1996c; Stott & Reicher, 1998a). In this sense then ESIM literature begins to answer the questions raised by public order literature about how and why the perceived legitimacy and fairness of police tactics by the crowd are important in subsequent disorder. It also builds upon the public order literature which addressed the potential impact that police stereotypes or categorisations of crowds and crowd members can have on subsequent police deployments. The ESIM literature identified

that by influencing the choice of public order policing tactics used to police crowds police categorisation can impact on subsequent police/crowd interactions and crowd behaviour. More specifically, ESIM research began to illustrate that the police may hold an outdated understanding of crowds and crowd behaviour that is more in line with the classical models addressed in chapter two. It also suggests that this may have implications for the perceived legitimacy of police tactics and for police/crowd relationships and crowd conflict.

3.3 The police perspective

What the ESIM research covered so far has illustrated and which is fundamental to both understanding crowd behaviour and managing it, is that in large crowd events, the most prominent out-group are often the police. Given their position of legal authority and power, they are also the group best positioned to enforce their understanding on the crowd of how such events should proceed. Any adequate explanation of crowd behaviour and crowd conflict must therefore include understandings of the behaviour and actions of the police, as well as the crowd (Drury et al., 2003). Central to this has been a recognition that since crowd psychology has, and still is, inextricably linked to issues of social control it is vitally important to examine the relationship between police perspectives on crowd psychology and their perspective on appropriate methods to police crowds. More specifically ESIM research has sought to investigate how the police perspective on crowds may effect what they do in practice and therefore their intergroup relationships with crowds.

Stott and Reicher (1998b) recognised that in order to fully explain the intergroup dynamics of disorder there is a need to focus on exploring the understandings and actions of the police as well as the crowd. Stott and Reicher (1998b) sought to gain evidence that the police treat crowds indiscriminately and to highlight why this was the case. To do so they conducted interviews with police officers and explored issues surrounding the role and impact of police perspectives on crowd events. Their analysis demonstrated that the police in the study held the perception that crowds

were composed of a heterogeneity of people. However, their analysis also highlighted that officers understood crowd conflict as a result of anti social minorities seeking to exploit the gullibility of ordinary people in the crowd. Stott and Reicher argue that within public order policing Le Bonian and Allportian theories are combined, creating what they call an 'agitator' model of crowd disorder, in which violent minorities exploit gullible majorities to create crowd disorder. Consequently, they suggest that the police perceive all crowds as potentially dangerous and, in situations of actual conflict, perceive all crowd members as equally dangerous.

Moreover, Stott and Reicher (1998b) found that traditional police tactics for dealing with crowd disorder were such that it made it very difficult for officers to be able to distinguish between different groups within the crowd and therefore to differentiate interventions according to whether participants were engaging in disorder or not. In this way the analysis highlighted how a convergence of ideological and practical factors leads the police to use force against the crowd as a whole when disorder occurs. Stott and Reicher (1998b) also suggested that given the police's simplistic reduction of crowd conflict to basic crowd pathology it was not surprising that the role the police play in such events was largely ignored by the police themselves. In short, the study demonstrates that if the police understand crowds as potentially dangerous and irrational then they are likely to treat them as such which may in turn set in motion a self fulfilling escalatory cycle of disorder.

Another piece of ESIM research on the potential impact that police perspectives may play on crowd dynamics examined the impact of police expectations on the control of English soccer fans abroad. Stott (2003) in a questionnaire study on the Belgium Gendarmerie at Euro 2000, examined the nature of police stereotypes and expectations, and how such understandings potentially play a role in shaping the intergroup dynamics through which large scale disorder at football matches can occur. Stott (2003) found the Gendarmerie perceived English fans in terms of the social category 'hooligans'. The fans' behaviour when viewed from this perspective seemed to exemplify this categorisation, providing the Gendarmerie with further evidence of English football hooliganism. Because of these expectations English fans

were perceived as a uniform threat to public order and the Gendarmerie adopted tactics consistent with this understanding based on coercive force and its indiscriminate use. Stott's (2003) study therefore reinforced the idea that there may be a relationship between the perspectives held by the police and their actual practice during crowd events.

Thirdly, Drury, Stott and Farsides (2003) in a questionnaire based study, examined police perceptions of crowds, appropriate public order policing methods, and attributions of responsibility for crowd conflict. Their results indicate the police see the general composition of crowds in terms of a simple dichotomy of a peaceful (yet gullible) majority, and a violent, powerful minority who assert influence over the majority, leading them towards disorder. Officers therefore see disorder as a consequence of processes internal to the crowd. Given this understanding, Drury et al. (2003) also found that police officers support tactics of quick intervention and strict control. In other words the study illustrated that the 'classical' theoretical understanding of crowds held by the police appeared to lead to an understanding of the need to use force as a primary means to control crowds.

Finally, a recently published piece of research by Prati and Pietrantonio (2009) developed the analysis of Drury et al (2003) by using the same questionnaire in a study of the perceptions of Italian police officers. Their results were similar to that of Drury et al (2003) and provided cross cultural validation of the link between officer's theoretical model of the crowd and their adherence to the indiscriminate use of force to police crowds. Prati and Pietrantonio (2009) also suggest that exposure to crowd conflict strengthens officers adherence to classical understandings of the crowd and the need to use force to police crowds.

3.4 Conclusion

Drury and Reicher (2000) suggest that *"Social identity be regarded as a model of one's position in a set of social relations along with the actions that are possible and proper (legitimate) given such a position. Social identity is therefore understood as*

... tied to action in the world. It is therefore amenable to change as actions and the social relations that frame them also change" (p.581). Using such a model of social identity and by invoking the intergroup character of crowd events it becomes possible to examine how one group of people may act on the basis of one set of understandings but the same acts may be interpreted in very different ways by another. Moreover, where the first group has the power to enact its interpretations over and against the second group (as is the case with the police) then this may place the second group in an unanticipated position. This then creates a new context within which the second group has to redefine what is proper and possible. Thus the dynamics of power and legitimacy are crucial in understanding crowd conflict and what is important to recognise is that in a differentiated social world, intentions are not always realised and acts often have unintended consequences. This process is particularly evident in crowd events where there are often multiple in and out-groups, this can explain how crowd behaviour can change dynamically throughout a crowd event. In this way crowds therefore offer a particularly fertile arena in which to study such processes.

ESIM research has identified how an asymmetry of perspectives between those in the crowd and those in the police about the legitimacy of the other's conduct and action may create the conditions for the development or escalation of collective crowd conflict. The research has also identified that a major factor contributing to this asymmetry is that the police hold a view of crowd dynamics that has strong resonance with classical theories of the crowd, such as Le Bon (1895), Martin (1920) and Allport (1924). Accordingly, the police perspective on crowds is based on an ideology that de-contextualises the crowd, and explains incidents of disorder solely in terms of processes internal to the crowd itself. In this sense the police perspective appears to provide a rationale and justification for police choice of indiscriminate and forceful tactics to control crowds. This in turn shapes the context for subsequent police/crowd interactions and may start a negative self fulfilling cycle in which each group believes the behaviour of the other is illegitimate and therefore strengthens their sense of legitimacy in opposing it.

However, two problems remain with the ESIM literature covered so far. Firstly the data collected on police perceptions of crowds has been largely post hoc or not event specific, so as yet little evidence exists about how these processes work in practice during actual crowd events. Secondly, the ESIM research on intergroup dynamics and crowd conflict examined so far have not been specifically related to the context of policing football crowds. Therefore for the purposes of this thesis there is a need to explore these processes within the context of policing football crowds. This will be the aim of the next chapter.

Chapter Four: Contextualising Crowd Theory: The ESIM and Football Crowds

4.1 Theories of football disorder

Traditionally research that has sought to explain crowd conflict at football matches has done so in terms of football hooliganism. In contrast, the ESIM provides an alternative to this reductionist perspective (Adang & Stott, 2004; Stott & Reicher, 1998a; Stott, Hutchinson & Drury 2001; Stott & Pearson, 2007; Stott, Adang, Livingstone & Schreiber, 2007; 2009; Stott & Adang, 2009). This chapter will briefly examine some of the theories of football violence and their implications before moving onto explore the issue from the alternative perspective of the ESIM.

4.1.1 The hooligan models

Football 'hooliganism' is a well known and often used term to describe disorder at football matches and those involved in it. However as a descriptive and explanatory term it is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, there is no real consensual agreement about what the term actually means, what behaviour it is used to describe and who it should be applied to. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the use of the term has a number of explanatory consequences. Using the word 'hooligans' or hooliganism may simply paper over what people actually do in any given situation. By ignoring the specifics of action the term therefore reduces human action to uniformity and renders such action refractory to explanation (Reicher, 2004b).

Despite these problems, within the context of football crowd research the term has been and still is generally applied to describe anyone involved in disorder at football games, organised or otherwise. The central focus of this literature has been to examine and explain the behaviour of these 'hooligans' and thus explain football crowd conflict. Traditionally this research has been sociological in nature and examined the wider macro social processes that underpin such behaviour. This work has been covered and summarised comprehensively elsewhere (e.g. Frosdick and

Marsh, 2005; Stott and Pearson, 2007) so the following will only very briefly consider four of the central theories, their usefulness in explaining football disorder and some of the problems associated with them.

4.1.2 Football Aggro

One of the first analyses of football hooliganism was provided by Marsh et al (1978), who argued that football disorder should be conceptualised as 'Aggro', a code of conduct based on traditional values of masculinity, courage, and fair play. For Marsh et al. (1978) humans have an inherent tendency toward aggression and hooliganism is simply a process of ritualising this tendency away from actual violence to a form of more staged or managed behaviour and football provides the arena that facilitates this. What is important to note about the work of Marsh et al. is that central to their analysis is the view of disorder as meaningful (rational) and based upon set of 'rules' which govern codes of conduct between hooligan groups. In this sense it was a move away from Le Bonian notions of the irrationality of such crowd behaviour.

4.1.3 Working class aggressive masculinity

The second major development and perhaps most influential account of hooligan behaviour was provided by Dunning, Murphy and Williams (1988) and Murphy, Dunning and Williams (1990). They developed a class based structural configuration account of hooliganism which located the phenomenon within particular forms of working class aggressive masculinity. As Murphy et al. (1990) noted "*one can see, in Britain at any rate, perhaps especially in England, football hooliganism is related in a complex way to the class structure. At its roots, if we are right, football hooliganism is a long established subculture of aggressive masculinity that is predominantly but by no means solely working class*" (p.64). The work of Dunning et al (1988) and Murphy et al (1990) suggests that football provides an arena in which working class individuals can still engage in aggressive acts of masculinity which are denied them in other contexts.

4.1.4 Armstrong's Blades

Armstrong (1998) developed a more sub-cultural interpretation of football hooliganism through a detailed ethnographic study of Sheffield United supporters (the Blades) in the 1980's and 1990's. Armstrong illustrated how the Blades identity and its associated sense of community created a sense of power which allowed members to engage in certain behaviours that individually would be censored or prevented. In this way Armstrong (1998) suggested that rather than 'hooligan' behaviour simply being the result of aggressive masculinity it is actually underpinned by ongoing processes of identity, legitimacy, power and interaction. Far from being irrational, mindless or inherently destructive then, football hooligan behaviour was seen as creative, rational, meaningful for those involved and inherently social.

4.1.5 Criticisms and implications of hooligan models

These hooligan approaches have been extremely influential in academic, public and policing circles. However, more recently they have been criticised for reducing crowd disorder simply to the outcome of the presence of hooligans. While ESIM research does not seek to deny the role that hooligan groups can and do play in football violence it maintains that large scale collective conflict cannot be explained by simply reducing the scope of analysis to focus only on hooligan identity and behaviour. The ESIM contends that doing so is problematic as it limits both the explanatory scope of theories of crowd violence as well as responses to dealing with it. In this sense then the dominance of 'hooligan models' has both theoretical and practical implications.

Stott and Pearson (2007) clarify these practical problems. They note how *"by ignoring the role of the authorities in the creation of conflict, they have also contributed to a powerful ideological position which paints whole crowds of English fans, and the individuals that comprise them, as the source of the problem. By ignoring the potential situational causes, the theories carried with them a sense in which hooliganism was an enduring social problem. Since aggressive masculinity was assumed to be the cause, and was itself an outcome of class or human nature, there*

was little that could be done to prevent riots other than controlling the movement of hooligans and their access to the game" (p.53).

4.1.6 King's practical theory of football violence

Anthony King (1995) attempted to develop a more detailed and interactive analysis of football violence by applying Waddington's Flashpoints model to an incident of football violence at a game between Galatasaray and Manchester United in Istanbul. King was interested in highlighting the complexity of the social processes which led to violence between the two groups of football fans including the historical and cultural background to the violence. King suggests that it is important to take into account the historical factors which facilitated the development of a certain style of masculine football fandom from the 1960's. King's analysis concentrates on the cultural and ideological constitution of male football fans through reference to the transformed social conditions of the late 1950's and the emergence of a newly affluent working class. King suggests that nationalism and a national consciousness came to define for many what it meant to be a football supporter abroad.

King suggests that in particular the form of nationalism that formed the basis of Manchester United fans cultural and ideological constitution was based on traditional working class conceptions of masculinity which in turn created a sense of community. Furthermore, it was only through (violent) support for Manchester United that supporters were able to prove themselves through instantiating this masculinity. As King (1995) notes *"Football fans invent a national community for themselves which becomes real for them through practice"* (p.643). King suggests that this nationalist consciousness played a role in the incident in Istanbul. King also suggests that the Turkish media and their representation of English fans as hooligans played an important role fuelling anti western feeling among Turkish fans and therefore in creating the wider socio-historical background which facilitated the violence.

Despite this historical background to the event King suggests that disorder only occurred through the 'actualisation' of this historical background which occurred at a bar where United fans gathered to drink and sing. As King explains *"through singing, the fans had brought the imagined national community of United to life and this birth brought with it the possibility of violence because they had created something that was both noticeable to others and had to be defended from assault by the United fans if they were to retain their pride"* (p.646). Subsequently large numbers of Turkish supporters gathered outside of the bar which in turn created a reaction from those United fans inside it and some supporters became involved in a fight. King suggests that it was at this point that the interactional level in his theory of violence was reached. In this way King suggests how the actualisation level eventually facilitates movement to the interactional level.

King's theory marks a dramatic change in theories of football violence. King recognises that it is *"not enough for sociological accounts to analyse only structural or objective factors in explaining social interaction. Social interaction is not the inevitable outcome of prescribed rules but rather social practice actualises certain social understandings strategically with an outcome that is in no way inevitable. Crucially, it is only through strategic practice that the cultural resources, which inform practice, are reproduced"* (p.649). In this sense then King's theory addressed issues of both proximal and distal context as well as intergroup interaction in the development of crowd conflict.

4.1.7 Criticisms of King

However, the model fell short of being able to offer a complete account of football crowd conflict. At its centre lies a paradox. It suggests that violence is not an inevitable outcome of the composition of a crowd or the proximal and distal context which surrounds them rather it is the interaction between these factors that actualises violence. However, King then states that historical background has a degree of determination over the actualisation and interactional levels since it limits the possible practices in which fans can engage. Since King suggests that male

football fans all share a nationalistic masculine identity it follows that by actualising this identity football fans create a social context in which violence at the interactional level is the most likely outcome. The theory thereby fails to acknowledge or account for the possibility of identity change during the course of an event.

ESIM research has revealed that context and identity have a much more interactive relationship. Furthermore while a nationalistic masculine identity may well be prominent among some in a football crowd it is by no means the only identity present. The theory therefore fails to address how those who do not share this masculine identity do or do not become involved in violence or do or do not become empowered to prevent such violence. The theory also ignores the impact of police action or inaction during intergroup interactions. The only attention paid to the police by King concerned how the arrest of Manchester United fans after the event were used by the Turkish state and media for propaganda purposes to denounce the behaviour of United supporters. King's theory therefore shares many of the criticisms levelled at Waddington's flashpoints model in focusing too heavily on the macro contextual level of analysis at the expense of fully exploring the micro interactional level. What is needed is a theory of football crowd conflict that can account for all of these dynamics and which can explain both the form and content of crowd behaviour, as well as how and why conflict may or may not develop.

4.2 The ESIM and the World Cup Finals, Italy 1990.

The first ESIM study to challenge the notion that football crowd violence can be explained simply by the presence of 'hooligans' was by Stott and Reicher (1998a). Their work examined football related disorder at the World Cup in Italy 1990. Stott and Reicher (1998a) illustrated how in order to explain the onset and pattern of conflict involving England fans at the tournament it was important to understand the socio-historical and intergroup dimensions of that conflict. Stott and Reicher (1998a) demonstrated how collective conflict at the tournament was a consequence of the developing interactions between England supporters and the Italian Carabinieri rather

than simply due to hooligan predispositions among England supporters. Thus, they argue it is necessary to reconceptualise the problem of so called football hooliganism in terms of the social psychology of crowd dynamics, where both prior dispositions and inter-group interactions are used by researchers to articulate explanations about the generalisation and escalation of crowd conflict.

Stott and Reicher (1998a) suggested that during the tournament at the game between England and the Netherlands collective conflict developed and escalated through a number of interlinked factors. Firstly, the Italian Carabinieri treated all England fans as if they were potentially dangerous and all forms of collective 'self assertion' by England fans (such as singing, drinking, boisterousness) as a manifestation of this potential. Secondly, England supporters perceived that because of this treatment their legitimate rights were being denied and that the Carabinieri's denial of these rights was illegitimate. Thirdly, an asymmetry of perspective therefore began to develop between the Italian police and England fans in general. In this circumstance resistance to police action and even attacks against them became construed in terms of self defence rather than aggression, and those engaging in such action became prototypical given this redefined sense of England fan identity.

Therefore, in the context of these intergroup relations, those amongst the England fan group who may have actively been seeking conflict were empowered by the support of others who originally eschewed violence. In this sense the intergroup dynamics created by indiscriminate and forceful police intervention aimed at preventing hooligan behaviour may have actually had the opposite effect and made those minorities seeking confrontation more influential. Stott and Reicher conclude by noting the dangers that a one sided focus on the risk posed by hooligans can have for practitioners, to the extent that they fail to address their own actions and therefore create a self fulfilling prophecy. They suggest that *"In the end, the irony is that a fear of hooligans may produce the very conditions where they gain influence over those who hitherto eschewed them"* (p.374). This has implications not only for

the policing of football matches with an international dimension but also for the policing of football in England and Wales and therefore for the current thesis

4.2.1 Collective disorder at the World Cup, France 1998.

The intergroup nature of collective football violence at international tournaments was further addressed by Stott, Hutchinson and Drury (2001). In a study of the World Cup finals in France at 1998 they provided further evidence that intergroup relationships between the police and football supporters can affect levels of collective disorder. The study examined the behaviour of both English and Scottish supporters in France and sought to account for both the occurrence and non occurrence of collective disorder involving these supporters. The study demonstrated how an ongoing historical process of inter- and intra-group interaction functioned to generate and then change the nature of supporters' collective identities and that this process was directly responsible for both the scale and intensity of the violence involving English supporters' and the non violence of Scottish supporters'. In other words, the study demonstrated how the intergroup context for each groups was functioning to shape the normative dimensions of the social category driving collective action.

The study suggests that the context experienced by England supporters was one of hostile outgroup action by local French youths and lack of protection or intervention from the French police. Moreover, where England fans reacted against local youths they were then subjected to forceful and undifferentiated action from the police. The study suggests that through subsequent discussion amongst England fans following such experience a shared understanding of outgroup illegitimacy developed. In this context action against such out groups came to be understood as both necessary for self defence and legitimate, even among those supporters who previously deemed such behaviour as unacceptable. Moreover, in this new context minorities among the England supporters whose actions had previously been perceived inappropriate came to be influential and empowered and their actions prototypical.

In contrast to the English context however the Scottish intergroup context allowed carnivalesque norms to develop among Scottish supporters and be self policed. Stott et. al. (2001) suggest that this occurred because of the different socio-historical context which existed between local youths, the French authorities and Scottish supporters as compared to English supporters. In the Scottish context Scotland fans were not targeted by local youths and the French police had no prior history of antagonistic relations with Scotland supporters. They therefore perceived Scottish behaviour as boisterous but non-confrontational. This therefore enabled an intergroup context to develop during the tournament in which Scottish supporters were allowed to act out 'identity consonant' behaviour and thus in turn saw their intergroup relationships with the police and locals in terms of legitimacy. They therefore sought to maintain these relationships by actively self policing these carnivalesque prototypical norms and actively differentiating themselves from those perceived to be hooligans and in particular England fans.

A key contention of the study was that in these ongoing socio-historical contexts, hooliganism was emerging as prototypical for the social category of England fan and 'hooligans' thus felt empowered to live out, and attempt to recreate, their confrontational understanding of intergroup relations. In contrast the study also illustrates that where there was no historical outgroup hostility (as in the Scottish context) towards in group members (Scottish fans) then Scottish fans defined themselves through an explicit contrast with the hooligan supporters of rival teams, even though at a domestic level Scottish football suffers from similar levels of football related disorder to England. Within the international context however, Scottish fans actively sought to maintain their carnivalesque reputation through self policing those that transgressed this non hooligan identity as this allowed them to continue to engage in identity consonant behaviour.

Stott et. al. (2001) note *"the role that social relations can have in creating the conditions through which hooligan forms of normative action are realised. These social relations have a historical dimension that we suggest is functioning to*

maintain and reinforce an antagonistic form of identity, such that aggression toward others defines for many what it means to be an England fan. Hooligan norms among English fans are therefore facilitated from one context into another. The expression of these norms will confirm among out-groups a stereotype of English fans as dangerous, therefore reinforcing and maintaining hostile outgroup relations towards the category in general" (p.379). By examining the occurrence and non occurrence of collective violence involving English and Scottish supporters at the same tournament the study was able to address issues of variation in behaviour in terms of intergroup relations and their underlying social historical context. The study therefore begins to illustrate the potentially negative long term implications that policing can have on the behaviour of football supporters and their social identities.

4.2.2 Summary

ESIM research has suggested that a focus on 'hooligans' and the undifferentiated use of force by the police as the primary means to control crowds can be problematic. In line with public order literature, ESIM crowd research has also identified that the perceived legitimacy and fairness of police strategy and tactics can significantly impact on crowd behaviour and levels of collective disorder at football. It has also been able to illustrate how and why this is the case. In doing so ESIM research has also begun to identify how principles derived from crowd psychology can be usefully integrated into police crowd management strategies to better manage crowd perceptions.

4.3 *The ESIM and public order policing strategy and tactics*

Research by Reicher et al. (2004) established two general implications that ESIM research can have for crowd policing. Reicher et al. note that *"rather than thinking primarily about the best form of police action to control the crowd, it is important also to concentrate on how to act in order to get the crowd to control itself. Second, the best way of achieving this is to place a major emphasis on how to be supportive towards crowd members pursuing legal goals and activities, even under conditions where one is aware of the presence of groups with illegal goals and activities and*

even at points where these groups start to act in illegal or violent ways” (p.569). To support these implications Reicher et al (2004; 2007) developed four more specific principles for crowd policing termed education, facilitation, communication and differentiation.

4.3.1 Education

Reicher et al. (2004; 2007) illustrate how traditionally the emphasis within public order policing on intelligence and information gathering has primarily been concerned with identifying and gathering information on the presence of individuals with a known or suspected history of violence. This work has been very effective in enabling the police to target such individuals and take action against them. Specifically in relation to football this has resulted in a legislative framework aimed at punishing such minorities and has taken the form of football banning orders. However, while such legislation has undoubtedly had a positive impact it has also been criticised (Stott and Pearson, 2006; 2007), as taken in isolation it ignores the wider social situational and historical context in which crowd disorder occurs. It is therefore in danger of simply feeding into the classical theoretical idea that crowd conflict is entirely due to the dispositions of crowd members. Reicher et al (2004; 2007) suggest that equal importance should be placed on gathering information on the perspectives, behaviours, norms and experiences of the other people being policed. In other words, that it is of great practical importance to educate oneself about the social identities of the different groups in the crowd. By gathering this information tactics and strategies can be developed that are tailored to particular groups so that interventions are not seen as illegitimate. As Reicher et al. (2004) conclude, *“We suggest that the same effort that is put into identifying violent individuals should be put into obtaining an understanding of group identity. Equally, similar priority should be put on both factors in intelligence briefings”* (p.565).

4.3.2 Facilitation

The second principle identified by Reicher et al (2004; 2007) follows directly on from the recognition of the need to identify and understand the different social identities

of those in the crowd in order to tailor interventions. That is, that the primary focus of police strategies should be how best to facilitate the lawful intentions of those in the crowd. The overall aim of this principle of facilitation should be to create the situation whereby crowd members do not react to police presence as something which impedes them but instead perceive it as something that helps them. The idea underpinning this principle of facilitation is to prevent an asymmetry in perceptions of legitimacy arising between the crowd and the police and therefore avoiding the development of large scale conflict. However, this facilitation process may well be difficult to achieve especially in circumstances where as well as those with lawful aims there are also groups with unlawful aims present who's behaviour needs to be prevented rather than facilitated. As Reicher et al (2004) note *"It is at the point where violence is beginning to break out and where the temptation to clamp down is at its strongest that facilitation becomes most important. It is at this point that a clear indication that the police are supporting collective aims (and that violence endangers them) can make the difference between escalation and de-escalation."* (p.565).

4.3.3 Communication

This then takes us directly to the third crowd management principle suggested by Reicher et al. (2004; 2007), that of communication with crowd members. The main point to take from this is that actions taken by the police in the interests of the crowd will be ineffective or even counterproductive unless they are perceived as such by participants themselves. Reicher et al (2004; 2007) suggest that the only way that this can be achieved is through a comprehensive communication strategy that runs through all phases and all aspects of a crowd event. Communication is important because uncertainty always provides the opportunity for those drawing on historical distrust of the police to gain influence. This raises important practical questions about what is communicated and how. Reicher et al (2004) argue, that the police should tell crowd members how policing and police actions are designed to facilitate them and also how the behaviour of others may be impeding them from achieving this because of their illegal activities. The how question is two fold, firstly

consideration should be given to utilising crowd members or organisers themselves to communicate with the rest of the crowd. Listening to guidance from other crowd members who are perceived as one of them may be more influential than the same guidance given by the police would be. Utilising delegates or representatives from the crowd to communicate with the crowd should be given consideration throughout any operation rather than merely once disorder is beginning to occur. The second part of the how question is linked more to the use of technologies such as loud speaker systems to make better and clearer communication with the crowd possible.

4.3.4 Differentiation

The fourth and final principle is differentiation and Reicher et al (2007) argue that it should underpin all the others. In other words, in every aspect of public order policing it is vital to maintain a differentiated approach to the crowd and the people within it. Therefore a central component to any crowd policing strategy should be to be aware of the different identities, behaviours and reactions of the crowd and not to treat all crowd members the same. While this may at first appear obvious, as research on police perspectives have demonstrated this situation may be more complicated. As Reicher et al. (2004) note *"there is a widespread acceptance of classic views of agitation and contagion and hence the belief that once violence starts everyone is dangerous. As we have repeatedly stressed, it is precisely at this point that differentiation is most important. It is precisely when some crowd members start to become hostile that it becomes important to treat the generality of crowd members in a friendly way. It is precisely in order to stop the violence of the few that one must be permissive towards the many"* (p.566). These principles for crowd management raise important questions about how tactically such strategic intentions can be implemented. Work by Stott and Adang (2003; 2009) began to address these questions.

4.3.5 Understanding and managing risk at football with international dimensions

Developing the work conducted by Adang and Cuvelier (2001) at Euro 2000 which identified a relationship between perceived levels of risk to public order, style of public order policing and levels of disorder, Stott and Adang (2003; 2009) explored the viability of coercive and consensual styles of public order policing for managing and reducing football crowd violence. The research used data gathered from 35 football matches in 11 European nations involving English and one Scottish team in UEFA Champions league and UEFA Cup matches.

The study highlighted the limited way in which risk to public order is currently conceptualised and defined by the police. They suggest that traditionally risk has been understood by the police in terms of specific characteristics of a group or person. For example, the police traditionally define groups of football supporters in terms of the prior history of involvement in disorder of that group. Stott and Adang suggest that although helpful in planning stages of police operations such static and historical categorisation can lead to errors in the risk classification of football matches and the negative stereotyping of supporters of certain teams.

Secondly, in terms of risk being attributed to the characteristics of specific persons, within the policing of football individuals have traditionally been classified in terms of an A, B or C categorisation. With A representing low risk, B representing some risk and C representing high risk. Again, while such risk classification is useful for planning police operations and gathering information on the potential composition of the crowd to be policed, it is inherently static. It does not take account of the actual behaviour these individuals engage in during the event itself or how a person's identity and behaviour may change during the course of an event due to intergroup interaction. Furthermore these classifications are often applied differently by different forces and therefore raise questions about the police's ability to deploy accurately in response to these classifications. These two traditional measures (the group and the individual) of risk to public order are therefore very limited.

Stott and Adang (2003; 2009) suggest that risk to public order needs to be understood as dynamic, as something that ebbs and flows along a continuum from low risk to high risk during the course of an event rather than as something that is static and predefined. Stott and Adang sought to examine what factors govern shifts towards or away from risk during policing operations and how such factors could be managed so that risk is kept to a minimum. Their research suggested that movement along this continuum is primarily governed by inter group interaction. In light of this finding Stott and Adang (2003; 2009) argue that three other additional factors should be included to form the basis of police risk assessments. These factors are firstly, defining and understanding the culture and identity of those being policed, secondly, the balance or perceived appropriateness of police deployments, and thirdly international police cooperation.

Using ESIM principles Stott and Adang (2009) proposed a model of good practice for policing football matches with an international dimension. In terms of defining the culture and identity of those to be policed, Stott and Adang suggest that operational resources should be applied prior to the event to achieve this, in much the same way as suggested in the principle of Education discussed previously. Secondly in terms of achieving a balance between police deployment and fan perceptions of legitimacy in both low and increasing risk situations, Stott and Adang suggest that it is vital to maintain a balance between perceived levels of risk and the nature of police deployment. Stott and Adang suggest that if this balance is achieved it will have positive psychological and behavioural consequences. For example at a psychological level where police deployment is understood as appropriate subsequent police crowd relations are likely to be perceived as legitimate. In turn at the behavioural level there will be emergent self policing. However, if such balance is not achieved then it can equally have negative psychological and behavioural consequences. Police crowd relations may be seen as illegitimate and subsequently there may be increased support for those engaging in anti social behaviour.

Stott and Adang (2009) argue that achieving this balance involves, in the first instance, information gathering, monitoring of the crowd and low impact police

visibility. They suggest that this is best achieved through the initial deployment of officers in pairs or small groups in standard uniform engaging in positive interpersonal interaction with fans communicating both behavioural limits as well as how the police are attempting to facilitate supporter's aims. In situations in which risk increases an escalation in operational deployment should occur characterised by increased officer visibility and the firm communication of tolerance limits. The source of the increased risk should be further validated if possible by using officers from the visiting police force who should also be involved in subsequent communication with the source of the risk.

If such communication is ignored and risk continues to escalate then further deployment will be necessary. This phase should be characterised by targeted intervention and the removal of those posing the risk. This intervention must be intelligence led and differentiated so that only those specifically posing risk to disorder are dealt with in this way. Having made this intervention and removed the risk then there should be a clear policy of police de-escalation. If however risk remains and increases then the police have a variety of further options based on force available to them such as dogs, horses or batons.

4.3.6 Summary

These principles for successful crowd management are not meant as one size fits all recipes for public order policing, in fact Reicher et al (2007) stress how specific deployments must always be tailored to the given event. What these principles provide therefore is simply a means of asking questions from which these specifics can be developed. In summary, ESIM research (Reicher et al 2004; 2007; Stott & Reicher 1998a; Stott et al. 2001) has shown that the key to understanding the success of (the components of) a crowd management approach lies in its engagement with the dynamics of power and legitimacy. The role of inter-group context is crucial in understanding the process by which ordinary or genuine supporters will or will not become involved in collective conflict. For example, Inter-

group relations and interactions that are perceived as legitimate have been shown to be associated with the maintenance of non violent norms (Stott et al, 2001).

Drury and Reicher (2000) neatly summarise all that has been addressed and suggest; *“it is not the mere presence of the police that leads to change [in fan identity], nor are the effects of their presence merely to be understood at the cognitive level. Any changes are dependent upon the ways in which the police act towards crowd members. In short, the extreme position can only become influential to the extent that the police act towards the majority so as to create a new context and new social relations within which extreme actions become both legitimate and possible”* (p.598). These important developments in crowd theory and crowd management principles have begun to be recognised at a police policy level both within Europe and England and Wales.

4.4 The ESIM and Police Policy.

Within Europe the Police Cooperation Working Party of the Council of the European Union developed its recommendations² for policing football matches with an international dimension in line with the ESIM model of good practice (Stott & Adang, 2003). Furthermore the ESIM has also had a policy impact within England and Wales. For example, as a reflection of the important developments in theory and evidence, updates were made to the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Manual of Guidance for Keeping the Peace (2003). This manual sets the national guidelines for the policing of public order in England and Wales. Reflecting these developments the manual notes the importance of intergroup interaction by stating that *“policing crowds is a dynamic and interactive process”* and that *“a trigger incident may be a result of actions by crowd participants, by the police, or as a result of altered perceptions arising from the interactions between them”*.

Moreover, the manual rejects ‘classic’ theory by recognising the meaningful nature of crowd action and asserting that *“members of a crowd do not necessarily get*

² Measures to Prevent and Control Violence and Disturbances in Connection with Football Matches with an International Dimension (2006) referred to more commonly as the EU Handbook

carried away by 'crowd hysteria'" (all p. 27). The relevant section of the ACPO manual concludes by recommending four principles for successful crowd management closely reflecting those set out by Reicher et al (2004; p.28).

However, while the ESIM research covered so far has usefully highlighted strategic principles on which to develop a tactical model of good practice for policing crowds and in particular football crowds the research has yet to assess the implementation of these principles. Stott and Adang (2009) suggest that *"Public order policing has to be underpinned by a philosophy or theory of crowd control that in turn translates itself into specific forms of operational structure and tactical deployment"* (p.6). The 2004 European Football championships in Portugal offered the ESIM the opportunity to do this.

4.5 Euro 2004 and the application of the ESIM.

The best example of ESIM crowd management principles operating in practice can be found at the 2004 European Football Championships in Portugal (Euro2004). For the championship ESIM principles and the tactical model developed by Stott and Adang (2003a; 2003b) were used to inform the security policy for the tournament of one of Portugal's two main police forces, the Polícia de Segurança Pública (PSP, who have jurisdiction for all Portugal's main cities and were therefore responsible for all match venues involving the England team). In line with Adang and Stott (2004) the strategic policing approach developed was graded, dynamic, information-led and non-confrontational. If problems did emerge, the policy was to first identify and validate the risk before specifically targeting those responsible through the information-led use of force. Furthermore, where such intervention was necessary policy dictated that all those not involved should continue to be facilitated and supported in carrying out legitimate behaviours. When the risk had been dealt with there was subsequently to be a clear policy of de-escalation.

As well as helping to develop the PSP's security policy for the tournament (Adang and Stott, 2004; Stott and Adang, 2003b), Stott and Adang were also involved in a

large scale study of the impact of the PSP policy on fan behaviour, particularly that of England fans, during the tournament. The research (Stott et al, 2007; Stott et al, 2008) highlighted that during the tournament there were no major incidents of disorder involving England fans in PSP controlled areas. In contrast, the research also illustrated that the Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR, the second of Portugal's police forces) which has jurisdiction over all Portugal's rural areas and small towns and who's security policy was not informed by the ESIM experienced two major riots involving England fans in Albufeira. Stott, et al. (2007, and 2008) explored these findings in detail and demonstrated how the contexts created by different forms of policing helped to bring to the fore different understandings of what constituted proper and possible behaviour among England fans and underpinned shifts toward or away from collective conflict

Stott et al. (2007; 2008) suggest that because of the intergroup context created by the PSP's policing policy, a change occurred in England fans identity which resulted in the absence of conflict in match cities and a cultural shift toward peaceful intergroup relations. Stott et al. (2007) suggest that *"the broad differences in collective behaviour between match cities and Albufeira was associated with the respective dominance, or availability, of different forms of England fan identity, the form and content of which consisted in large part of different understandings of the category's intergroup relations with the police. The relative dominance, in manifest terms at least, of each version of identity content was therefore also associated with observed differences in public order policing tactics"* (p.92).

The differences in policing style between the PSP and GNR were summarised by Stott et al. (2007) in terms of 'low' and 'high' profile policing. The low profile approach adopted in PSP areas was characterised by graded tactical deployment in the form Adang and Cuvelier (2001) identified as being successful in Holland during Euro 2000. Stott et al.'s (2007; 2008) analysis suggests that the low profile policing approach adopted in PSP controlled areas was effective because it helped to maintain and possibly even created perceptions of legitimacy in the relationship between fans and the police, and this in turn helped to undermine the potential of

England fans for violence by promoting self-policing and non violent behavioural norms.

In contrast, the high profile approach adopted by the GNR was based more on the reactive and indiscriminate use of force. Stott et al (2007; 2008) suggest that in Albufeira this approach created perceptions of illegitimacy in police/fan relationships and the subsequent empowerment of the minority within the England fan group who were seeking confrontation rather than those seeking to avoid it. Stott et al. (2007) summarise the implications of these different styles of policing and how they may effect England fan identity and behaviour in the following way; *“while the overwhelming and indiscriminate use of force may quell disorder in the short term, it may also create forms of social identity that entrenches hooligans within the social category enabling them to sustain and justify their attempts to recreate conflict in future social contexts. However, low profile policing may create social relations that make antagonistic identity content less sustainable which in turn serves to marginalise and disempower hooligans over the longer term”* (p.93).

The impact of these differences can perhaps be identified most strikingly from work by Stott et al. (2008) which demonstrated that during Euro 2004 in PSP areas there was evidence of a developing association between ingroup identification among England fans and perceived similarity with the police. As Stott et al. (2008) note *“prior to the tournament, ingroup identification among England fans was negatively associated with similarity to the police in match cities. In other words, strong identification as an England fan implied dissimilarity to police prior to the tournament. After the tournament, however, ingroup identification among England fans was positively associated with similarity to the police in match cities. This suggests that the meaning of being an England fan, in terms of their relationship with the police at least, underwent a significant change during the tournament”* (p.41)

This research illustrates that a policing approach based upon ESIM principles can be effective in managing intergroup dynamics and that such an approach can impact

upon identity and behavioural change. Furthermore, it also highlights that the approach can affect intergroup relationships in terms of positive social identification between groups who had previously been perceived in opposition. This process in turn may have real long term implications for public order policing. As Stott et al. (2008) note *"the importance of identification between crowd participants and the police may be that it functions as the psychological tool through which public order can be successfully maintained"* (p.134).

What the Euro 2004 research has highlighted is both the short and long term impacts that different policing approaches can have on crowd behaviour. Furthermore, it also illustrates how the ESIM can have a productive relationship with police practice. In terms of the actual results and potential benefits for long term cost and conflict reduction the PSP approach proved extremely successful (Home Office, 2005). Such outcomes can most evidently be seen not only by the arrest figures for the tournament (which comparative to previous tournaments were very low) but also from subsequent analysis of the more psychological outcomes the model is believed to had had on those groups involved (Stott et al., 2007; 2008).

4.6 ESIM research in the context of policing football in England and Wales

In recognition of the impact of this work in European policing contexts, the UK Home Office began to fund research to look at good practice in relation to the policing of football in England and Wales. As part of this research a study of the policing of football games in England and Wales was conducted by Stott, Livingstone and Hoggett (2008). The study focused on the potential impact that the policing of football matches has on crowd dynamics and disorder and critically examined some of the more specific tactics used to police football crowds in England and Wales. Specifically the study illustrated the importance of police operational structure and the need for tactical autonomy for commanders in the front line. The study also stressed that there was a requirement to make sure that the relevant competencies for these front line commanders were developed. Moreover the study also critically reviewed police containment tactics and suggested that their inappropriate use may

create the dynamics for disorder or at least develop or escalate these dynamics. The issue of graded tactical deployment and the importance of non confrontational tactical options were also addressed as were the role of football intelligence officers and the possibility of developing their community liaison role. Finally, issues of multi-agency co-operation and infrastructural responsibilities were also examined.

Stott et al. (2008) concluded the study by noting that *"while there is no universal panacea that can act as a national model within England and Wales, there are clearly underlying principles that can be of use for those developing and implementing strategic and tactical models at a local level"* (p.23). These principles it is suggested are exactly those that were identified by Reicher et al. (2004; 2007) and Stott and Adang (2003; 2009) and which were so successfully implemented at Euro 2004 in Portugal. However, the applicability of such a model to the context of policing football in England and Wales has yet to be assessed and research is required to address this issue.

4.7 Conclusion

The previous literature review chapters have been used to illustrate that there is a long and clear history of association between crowd psychology, social control and policing that has clear implications for the development of future theory and practice. It has identified the problems and limitations in previous psychological and sociological explanations for crowd violence and football violence in particular. The review has established that the ESIM provides the most definitive theoretical explanation and practical guidance. Theoretically, the ESIM highlights the role that identity, socio-historical context, police perspectives and intergroup interaction play in structuring crowd norms and behaviours. Practically, the ESIM suggestion that there is a convergence of ideology and practice in the field of public order policing means that both police perceptions and tactics must be reflexively and critically examined so that their possible contribution to the initiation and/or escalation of conflict can be assessed and subsequently minimised.

However, specific limitations remain. Firstly with regards to ESIM research on the role of police perspectives, as identified previously, the research has been largely post hoc or context free and nothing specifically exists in relation to police perceptions and football crowds. Secondly, despite the ESIM research which explores football crowd dynamics, the models of good practice for crowd policing and the application of such models to policing international football tournaments, there is little in the way of research which addresses these issues in relation to the policing of football crowds in England and Wales. It is with these issues in mind that this thesis seeks to address a number of important research questions.

4.7.1 Aims of the thesis

The primary aim of this thesis is to conduct a comprehensive examination of the relationship between crowd theory and police practice in the context of policing football in England and Wales. More specifically, the thesis seeks to examine how crowd psychology may influence police perceptions which in turn may determine the police's use of tactics based on the undifferentiated use of force to police crowds. In order to both assess the practical applicability of the ESIM in this context and also to some extent the ESIM itself a number of empirical studies of football policing in England and Wales are required.

Firstly, while previous ESIM research has suggested that police perspectives are underpinned by a Le Bonian theory of crowd behaviour, there is as yet no empirical confirmation that this is specifically the case in relation to police perspectives regarding football crowds in England and Wales. Confirmation of the existence of such a police perspective and its relationship with police strategy and tactics is therefore required. *The first empirical chapter will address this issue by establishing whether police officers in England and Wales hold a Classical theoretical perspective of football crowd behaviour and what relationship this may have with the strategies and tactics they believe are best suited to policing football crowd given this perspective.*

Secondly, if such perceptions exist then there is a need to identify and understand how they may become part of police 'knowledge' (della Porta et al, 1998) and what relationship, if any, they may have to the strategies and tactics that the police develop in order to police football crowds. To do this the second empirical chapter will examine the training that police officers receive in order to be able to police football crowds. *In order to try and address these issues the second empirical chapter examines police public order training, specifically as it relates to the policing of football crowds, the explicit and implicit use of crowd theory within this training and how this knowledge may relate to officers decision making with regards to choice of public order strategy and tactics.*

Thirdly, if a 'classical' perspective is held by officers in England and Wales in relation to football crowds and is incorporated in public order training then important questions are raised about what role if any this perspective plays in subsequent police actions during actual football policing operations. The third empirical chapter will therefore seek to explore the role that police perspectives have in terms of strategic and tactical approaches to policing football in England and Wales during an actual policing operation. *In other words, the study seeks to examine whether police classical theoretical perspectives of the crowd are being implemented in practice in the operational theatre and what the implications of this are for the future of policing football crowds.*

Finally, previous ESIM research has identified principles for operational good practice and also validated their use in practice in the context of an international football tournament. However, within the context of policing football in England and Wales no similar models have yet been identified or evaluated. The final empirical chapter therefore marks a slight change in emphasis and the beginning of an investigation into alternative models of football policing and how such approaches may be understood through reference to alternative crowd theories such as the ESIM. *The final empirical chapter will therefore explore the extent to which the absence of disorder among football supporters in domestic football can be understood theoretically in terms of the effective management of crowd dynamics and the extent*

to which the dynamics proposed by the ESIM are capable of building a theoretical analysis of conflict reduction over extended periods of time in way that highlights the relevance of social psychology as a basis for the development of policy and practice.

The thesis will now turn to the first empirical chapter noted above and explore officers' perspectives of football crowd behaviour and the strategies and tactics they suggest are best suited to policing football crowds given this perspective.

Chapter Five: Exploring police perspectives of football crowd dynamics in England and Wales

5.1 Introduction

Previous research both within the public order and psychological literature covered by this thesis has illustrated the importance that police perceptions of crowds may play in subsequent police/crowd interactions and therefore in the potential development or avoidance of large scale conflict. Della Porta and Reiter (1998) for example, identified the role that 'police knowledge' plays in framing officers' choice of public order strategy and tactics. Within the ESIM literature, research (e.g. Stott & Reicher, 1998b; Drury et al, 2003; Prati & Pietrantonio, 2009) has been more explicit in suggesting that the police hold Le Bonian views of crowds which may lead officers to use indiscriminate force against crowds. This in turn may be responsible for creating an asymmetry in perceptions of legitimacy between the police and the crowd about the other's behaviour and consequently set in motion an escalating spiral of conflict leading to rioting.

Research by Stott and Reicher (1998b) has also suggested that differences in rank among police officers might affect perceptions of, or reactions to, crowd events and crowd members. They suggest that officers of different rank stand and act in different locations in relation to crowds and that lower ranking officers are typically much nearer to the crowd than more senior colleagues. Drury et al (2003) also explored the role that rank may play and found that junior officers more significantly endorsed Le Bonian views compared to their senior colleagues. Thus, this research suggests that the extent to which representations held among police officers may actually translate into a self fulfilling prophecy are mediated by rank. Building upon rank as a possible mediating factor which may impact on the theory/practice relationship, research by Prati and Pietrantonio (2009) suggested that experience of policing crowds may also mediate this relationship. They found that greater experience of and exposure to policing crowd events reinforced or strengthened officers' agreement with classical crowd theory and coercive policing methods. Thus

the extent to which representations held among police officers may actually translate into a self fulfilling prophecy may also be mediated by exposure to crowds.

5.1.1 Aims

Previous ESIM research (e.g. Stott & Reicher, 1998b; Drury et al, 2003) has suggested that the police understand that crowds comprise a variety of people, but that this composition is defined primarily in terms of a dichotomy of an influential violent minority and a peaceful yet irrational majority. As the literature review chapters illustrated, one of the central features of classic models of crowd psychology is their passive interpretation of how social influence operates within crowds. Stott and Reicher (1998b) suggested that police officers hold a common view of social influence whereby they perceive that everyone within a crowd is subject to the influence of a powerful minority of agitators. Given this, Stott and Reicher (1998b) and Drury et al. (2003) suggest that police officers will endorse the view that all football crowds are potentially violent and dangerous. Further, given the logic that defining a crowd as such denies causal responsibility to outside agencies, they suggest that the police lack awareness that the strategies and tactics they use to control crowds may actually contribute towards the initiation or escalation of any violence and therefore endorse the use of force to control crowds. The aim of this chapter will therefore be to explore in more detail the nature of any theory/practice relationship.

To do this the chapter will firstly seek to explore whether a Le Bonian understanding of crowd behaviour is held by police officers in relation to football crowds in England and Wales. Secondly, if Le Bonian category definitions of football crowds are held by officers, the chapter will explore what relationship, if any, such definitions have with public order policing tactics, specifically those that rely primarily on the use of indiscriminate force to police football crowds. Thirdly, the chapter will also examine the impact that rank may have on police perceptions of football crowds. Finally, the chapter will also examine the impact that exposure to crowds may have by comparing the perceptions of officers that have operational experience with those that only have public order police training experience.

5.2 Method

This chapter seeks to explore whether the police in England and Wales hold a particular understanding of football crowds and police tactics, therefore in order to obtain data with sufficient breadth of coverage a questionnaire survey was used to gather data on police perceptions. The questionnaire survey enabled comparable data to be gathered from officers across England and Wales which could then be statistically analysed to explore officers agreement/disagreement with specific themes related to football crowds and police tactics. The questionnaire used in the current chapter was taken from the research conducted by Drury, Stott and Farsides (2003) in their study of the role of police perceptions and practices in the development of public disorder, which in turn was based around themes identified by Stott and Reicher (1998a).

The questionnaire was chosen as it had previously been successfully used in the study by Drury et al (2003), it therefore allowed for better comparison with this previous research. However, since the present study was solely interested in police perceptions of football crowds and the strategies and tactics used to police football crowds, the questionnaire was adapted so that rather than including questions on demonstrating and ceremonial crowds (as per Drury et al, 2003) only the questions measuring perceptions of and reactions to football crowds were included.

Questionnaires were distributed personally to all officers in two different contexts. Questionnaires were either given to officers after they had completed a public order training course (as in chapter 6) or during an operational pre brief for a football operation (as in chapter 7). Officers were informed about the purpose of the research prior to the distribution of the questionnaires and informed that they were free to withdraw at anytime. In the case of distributing the questionnaire at the end of different public order training courses, all officers undergoing the training on every course attended completed the questionnaire and returned it before they left (a total of 65). In the case of distributing the questionnaire to officers at the operational pre brief officers were asked to return the completed questionnaire by

the day of the operation itself (a two week period). In this instance a total of 39 out of 60 questionnaires were completed and returned to me.

The current chapter therefore explores the responses of 104 public order police officers from forces across England and Wales to questions about their perceptions of football crowd composition, the threat football crowds pose to public order, attributions of responsibility for football crowd conflict and appropriate public order policing methods to police football crowds. The demographic make up of the respondents was as follows; Time served in the police force ranged from 4 to 29 years. Of the sample 39% (n=41) were constables, 16% (n=17) were sergeants, 19% (n=20) were Inspectors, 15% (n=15) were Chief Inspectors and 11% (n=11) were Superintendents. Furthermore, as noted previously, 62.5% (n=65) of the officers had just completed public order training courses while 37.5% (n=39) were already operationally active. The questionnaire explored police perceptions in terms of the following themes:

(1) Football crowd composition: This was measured by the following questionnaire statements;

- "People of all sorts can be found among football crowds"
- "The majority of people in football crowds have peaceful aims"
- "A significant minority of people in many football crowds have violent aims"

(2) The homogenous threat of football crowds: This was measured by the following questionnaire statements;

- "Professional agitators are skilled at inciting violent behaviour among previously peaceful members of football crowds"
- "Under some circumstances, even the most respectable and ordinary people can become irrational and violent when caught up in the middle of a football crowd"
- "Once violence starts in a football crowd, otherwise law-abiding people get affected by the general behaviour and drawn in"

- “All football crowds are potentially violent and dangerous”

(3) Attributions for crowd violence: This was measured by the following questionnaire statements;

- “The nature of football crowds is such that one usually need look no further than the crowd itself to explain violence when it erupts”
- “When violence occurs involving football crowds, the police are rarely responsible for either the initiation or any escalation of such violence”
- “Once dispersal orders have been given by the police most genuinely peaceful supporters will have retreated to a place of safety. Most people remaining want conflict with the police”
- “The motivation for people in football crowds to cause trouble is for fun and excitement”.
- “The police are often responsible for the eruption of violence because of their inflexible and indiscriminate response to violence by small numbers of crowd members”

Finally (4) Coercive policing methods: This was measured by the following questionnaire statements;

- “Football crowds must be strictly controlled to prevent widespread violence erupting”
- “If even a few members of a football crowd become violent it is important for the police to intervene quickly and in force as this is the best way to ensure that violence does not escalate”

For all these statements, participants responded on a 6 point likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Finally a measure of the officers' rank was also obtained.

5.2.1 Analytic strategy

The analysis is divided into six parts. Firstly it will examine police officer's endorsement of each of the individual questionnaire statements using a one sample T-test measuring the significance of the distance of the mean from the scale midpoint 3.5. Secondly, the analysis will conflate these individual questionnaire items into their respective thematic categories (crowd composition, homogenous threat of crowds, attributions for crowd conflict and coercive policing methods) and again examine officer endorsement of these categories using a one sample T-test measuring the significance of the distance of the mean from the scale midpoint 3.5. Thirdly the analysis will use regression equations to explore possible relationships between these different thematic constructs. Fourthly, multiple regression will then be used to examine any potential underlying structure to these relationships. Fifthly, the impact of officer rank on endorsement of questionnaire items will be examined using independent samples T-test measuring the significance of the difference between ranks in terms of the distance of their response from the mid point 3.5. Finally, any significant differences in response between those officers who only have training experience of public order policing compared to those who have actual operational experience as well as training will similarly be examined using an independent samples T-test. Again the significance of the difference between these officers' responses in terms of their distance from the mid point 3.5 will be measured.

5.3 Results

5.3.1 Endorsement of accounts of football crowds

The individual questionnaire statements within each of the four themes identified (football crowd composition, the homogenous threat of crowds, attributions for crowd conflict and the importance of coercive policing methods) will be analysed separately to illustrate the extent to which officer's endorsed these ideas.

5.3.2 Football crowd composition.

Officers agreed with the statement "*People of all sorts can be found among football crowds*" ($M = 5.15, \pm 1.15, t(104) = 14.70, p < .001, d = 1.44$), the distance of the mean from the midpoint suggests that officers believe that football crowds have a heterogeneous composition. However, despite this, officers also agreed that "*the majority of people in football crowds have peaceful aims*" ($M = 5.27, \pm 0.80, t(104) = 22.46, p < .001, d = 2.20$), while "*a significant minority of people in many football crowds have violent aims*" ($M = 4.63, \pm 1.51, t(104) = 7.64, p < .001, d = 0.74$). The distance of the means from the midpoint for both items was significant.

5.3.3 Homogenous threat of crowds.

If officers believe that violent minorities can influence peaceful majorities within football crowds as Le Bonian and Allportian theory would suggest then it would be expected that officers would perceive that everyone in the crowd may pose a threat to public order. In the present study officers agreed that "*professional agitators are skilled at inciting violent behaviour amongst previously peaceful members of a football crowd*" ($M = 4.11, \pm 1.33, t(104) = 4.68, p < .001, d = 0.45$). Further, officers tended to agree that "*under some circumstances even the most respectable and ordinary people can become irrational and violent when caught up in the middle of a football crowd*" ($M = 4.43, \pm 1.29, t(104) = 7.32, p < .001, d = 0.72$). They also agreed that "*once violence starts in a football crowd, otherwise law-abiding decent people get affected by the general behaviour and get drawn in*" ($M = 3.95, \pm 1.19, t(104) = 3.86, p < .001, d = 0.37$). The distance of the mean from the midpoint for all of these questionnaire items was significant. The mean of the final questionnaire statement in the homogenous threat of crowds theme "*all football crowds are potentially violent and dangerous*" ($M = 3.62, \pm 1.62, t(104) = .78, p > .435, d = 0.07$) was not significantly different from the midpoint. However, while officers did not clearly endorse this statement neither did they reject it.

5.3.4 Attributions for crowd conflict.

If public disorder is perceived to be a function of mechanisms internal to the crowd then logic suggests that police practices themselves should not be viewed as responsible for such disorder. In line with this idea officers tended to disagree with the statement that *"the police are often responsible for the eruption of violence because of their inflexible and indiscriminate response to violence by small numbers of crowd members"* ($M = 2.30, \pm 1.29, t(104) = -9.40, p > .001, d = 0.92$) and this disagreement was significantly below the midpoint. Moreover, officer's also agreed that *"the motivation for people in a football crowd to cause trouble is for fun and excitement"* ($M = 5.01, \pm 1.09, t(104) = 14.12, p < .001, d = 1.38$), that *"when violence occurs involving football crowds the police are rarely responsible for either the initiation or escalation of such violence"* ($M = 4.00, \pm 1.40, t(104) = 3.64, p > .001, d = 0.35$) and that *"once dispersal orders have been given by the police most genuinely peaceful supporters will have retreated to a place of safety. Most people remaining want conflict with the police"* ($M = 4.11, \pm 1.47, t(104) = 4.26, p > .001, d = 0.41$). The means for all these statements were significantly above the midpoint. For the last questionnaire statement within the homogenous threat of crowds theme *"the nature of football crowds is such that one usually need look no further than the crowd itself to explain crowd violence when it erupts"* ($M = 3.58, \pm 1.51, t(104) = .58, p < .561, d = 0.41$) endorsement was not significantly above the scale midpoint, however neither was it significantly below it.

5.3.5 Importance of coercive policing methods.

To the extent that the sample endorsed statements that there is a violent minority within many football crowds, who can influence the majority and therefore that football crowds as a whole pose a threat to public order and that the police are rarely responsible for any disorder, it may be expected that officers would also support the use of coercive policing strategies and tactics that treat the crowd as a whole. In support of this officers tended to agree with both the statements *"football crowds must be strictly controlled to prevent widespread violence erupting"* ($M = 4.14, \pm 1.49, t(104) = 4.38, p > .001, d = 0.42$) and *"if even a few members of a*

football crowd become violent it is important to for the police to intervene quickly and in force as this is the best way to ensure that violence does not escalate” (M = 4.31, ± 1.44, t(104) = 5.74, p > .001, d = 0.56).

5.3.6 Relations between attitudes.

In light of these results the current study will examine whether these different questionnaire statements inter-relate and form part of the constellation of attitudes that previous research (Stott and Reicher, 1998b; Drury et al, 2003) suggest serve to justify particular forms of policing methods. In order to examine the relationships between these attitudes it is first necessary to conflate the different questionnaire statements into single thematic measures of crowd composition, the homogenous threat of crowds, attributions for crowd disorder and coercive policing methods. Tables 1-4 illustrate the combined frequencies of all of the questionnaire statements within the specific thematic category.

Table 1; football crowd composition combined frequencies

		Football crowd composition			
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	disagree	1	1.0	1.0	1.0
	2.6666666666666665	1	1.0	1.0	1.9
	3.3333333333333335	3	2.9	2.9	4.8
	3.6666666666666665	4	3.8	3.8	8.7
	slightly agree	5	4.8	4.8	13.5
	4.333333333333333	7	6.7	6.7	20.2
	4.666666666666667	15	14.4	14.4	34.6
	agree	16	15.4	15.4	50.0
	5.333333333333333	22	21.2	21.2	71.2
	5.666666666666667	15	14.4	14.4	85.6
	strongly agree	15	14.4	14.4	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Table 1 illustrates the combined frequencies for officers agreement with the idea that a variety of different people can be found within football crowds but that this composition can be defined by a simple dichotomy of peaceful majority and violent minority. To test officers agreement with this idea, the crowd composition category will again be measured by a one sample T-test looking at the significance of difference from the midpoint 3.5 ($M=5.01, \pm .78, t(104)= 19.69, p > .001, d= 1.93$). The significance of the mean from the midpoint suggests that officers do agree with this understanding.

Table 2; Homogenous threat combined frequencies

		Homogenous threat			
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1.5	1	1.0	1.0	1.0
	1.75	2	1.9	1.9	2.9
	2	1	1.0	1.0	3.8
	2.25	2	1.9	1.9	5.8
	2.5	4	3.8	3.8	9.6
	2.75	1	1.0	1.0	10.6
	3	4	3.8	3.8	14.4
	3.25	5	4.8	4.8	19.2
	3.5	5	4.8	4.8	24.0
	3.75	13	12.5	12.5	36.5
	4	16	15.4	15.4	51.9
	4.25	14	13.5	13.5	65.4
	4.5	12	11.5	11.5	76.9
	4.75	9	8.7	8.7	85.6
	5	5	4.8	4.8	90.4
	5.25	5	4.8	4.8	95.2
	5.5	2	1.9	1.9	97.1
	6	3	2.9	2.9	100.0
Total		104	100.0	100.0	

Table two illustrates the combined frequencies for officers agreement with the ideas that professional agitators are skilled at inciting violent behaviour among previously peaceful members of football crowds, that under some circumstances, even the most respectable and ordinary people can become irrational and violent when caught up in the middle of a football crowd, that once violence starts in a football crowd, otherwise law-abiding people get affected by the general behaviour and drawn in and that all football crowds are potentially violent and dangerous. Overall agreement with the idea that football crowds pose a homogenous threat to order can again be measured by a one sample T-test looking at the significance of difference from the midpoint 3.5 ($M=4.03, \pm .90, t(104)= 5.99, p > .001, d= 0.58$). Again results illustrate that officer agreement with the idea of the homogenous threat of football crowds was significantly above the midpoint.

Table three represents the combined frequencies for officer's agreement with all the statements for attributions for crowd conflict. To create this table the scores for the questionnaire item *'the police are often responsible for the eruption of violence because of their inflexible and indiscriminate response to violence by small numbers of crowd members'* were reversed so that they were compatible with the scores from the other questionnaire statements in this category. Officers agreement with the attributions for crowd conflict category can again be measured by a one sample T-test looking at the significance of the mean from the midpoint 3.5 ($M= 4.28, \pm .89, t(104)=8.91, p > .001, d=0.87$). Again results suggest that overall officer's agreed that crowd disorder was attributable to the crowd itself rather than due to interaction with the police.

Table 3; Attributions combined frequencies

Attributions for crowd conflict					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	2.4	1	1.0	1.0	1.0
	2.6	1	1.0	1.0	1.9
	2.8	4	3.8	3.8	5.8
	3	5	4.8	4.8	10.6
	3.2	6	5.8	5.8	16.3
	3.4	9	8.7	8.7	25.0
	3.6	5	4.8	4.8	29.8
	3.8	7	6.7	6.7	36.5
	4	9	8.7	8.7	45.2
	4.2	6	5.8	5.8	51.0
	4.4	6	5.8	5.8	56.7
	4.6	6	5.8	5.8	62.5
	4.8	4	3.8	3.8	66.3
	5	9	8.7	8.7	75.0
	5.2	12	11.5	11.5	86.5
	5.4	7	6.7	6.7	93.3
	5.6	4	3.8	3.8	97.1
	5.8	1	1.0	1.0	98.1
	6	2	1.9	1.9	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

Finally, table 4 represents the combined frequencies for officer's agreement with the two statements for the need for coercive policing methods to police football crowds. Agreement with the need for coercive policing methods can again be measured by a one sample T-test looking at the significance of the mean from the midpoint 3.5 ($M=4.23, \pm 1.27, t(104)=5.87, p > .001, d=0.57$). This suggests that overall officer's agreed that the successful policing of football crowds require the use of coercive policing methods.

Table 4; Coercive methods combined frequencies

The need for coercive policing methods

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	2	1.9	1.9	1.9
	1.5	3	2.9	2.9	4.8
	2	3	2.9	2.9	7.7
	2.5	5	4.8	4.8	12.5
	3	8	7.7	7.7	20.2
	3.5	14	13.5	13.5	33.7
	4	16	15.4	15.4	49.0
	4.5	14	13.5	13.5	62.5
	5	14	13.5	13.5	76.0
	5.5	10	9.6	9.6	85.6
	6	15	14.4	14.4	100.0
	Total	104	100.0	100.0	

5.3.7 Regression equations.

Now that single measures of crowd composition, the homogenous threat of crowds, attributions for crowd conflict and the need for coercive policing methods are available a series of regression equations will be conducted to explore any possible underlying relationship between the questionnaire themes. To do this these variables were firstly put in a correlation matrix (table 5) to illustrate what correlations existed between the four questionnaire themes.

Table 5; Correlation matrix

		Correlations			
		Football crowd composition	homogthreat	crowdviolence	coercive
Football crowd composition	Pearson Correlation	1.000	.226*	.320**	.065
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.021	.001	.511
	N	104.000	104	104	104
homogthreat	Pearson Correlation	.226*	1.000	.318**	.279**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.021		.001	.004
	N	104	104.000	104	104
Attributions for crowdviolence	Pearson Correlation	.320**	.318**	1.000	.497**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.001		.000
	N	104	104	104.000	104
coercive	Pearson Correlation	.065	.279**	.497**	1.000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.511	.004	.000	
	N	104	104	104	104.000

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The table reveals that officers understanding of crowd composition correlates with their perceptions of the homogenous threat of crowds and attributions for crowd disorder. However it also reveals that officers' understanding of crowd composition is not correlated with officers understanding of the need to use coercive policing methods. Therefore while police officers' understanding of crowd composition does appear to have some relationship with both homogenous threat and attributions for crowd disorder it does not appear to do so with police understanding of suitable tactics. Interestingly though both homogenous threat and attributions for disorder are significantly correlated with coercive policing methods. Based on the correlation matrix therefore, the possible inter-relationship between these ideas previously suggested need revision before being tested by regression.

The revised hypothesis that will be tested by regression equations is that firstly, because police officers perceive football crowds as composed of a peaceful yet

gullible majority and a violent and manipulative minority, officers will categorise football crowds as posing a homogenous threat and attribute disorder to football crowds themselves. Secondly, because police officers understand that football crowds pose a homogenous threat to public order and that this threat comes from internal dynamics within the football crowd then the police need to control football crowds by using coercive policing methods.

To test this model a number of regression equations will be needed. First, regression will be used to examine whether police officer's understanding of crowd composition predicts their understanding of the homogenous threat of crowds and secondly to examine whether it also predicts attributions for crowd disorder. Thirdly, regression will also be used to examine both whether police officers understanding of the homogenous threat that football crowds pose and officers attribution of crowd disorder to the crowd itself predict their understanding of the need to use coercive policing methods.

Using the category 'crowd composition' as the independent variable, regression demonstrated that the model was found to be a significant predictor of agreement with the 'homogenous threat of crowds' category ($f(1,102) = 5.47, p < .021$), with the regression coefficient 'crowd composition' being ($B = .25, t = 2.33, P < .021$). Moreover, the model was also found to be a significant predictor of agreement with 'attributions for crowd conflict' ($f(1,102) = 11.66, P < .001$), with the regression coefficient crowd composition being ($B = .36, t = 3.41, p < .001$).

Secondly using the category 'the homogenous threat of crowds' as the IV, regression found that the model was a significant predictor of agreement with the coercive policing methods category ($f(1,102) = 8.63, p < .004$), with the regression coefficient, being ($B = .39, t = 2.94, p < .004$). Finally using the category 'attributions for crowd conflict' as the IV, regression demonstrated that the model was found to be a significant predictor of agreement with the coercive policing methods category ($f(1,102) = 33.38, p < .001$). With the regression coefficient being ($B = .70, t = 5.578, p < .001$).

The results of the regression equations suggest that where officers understand crowd composition as a dichotomy of peaceful majority and violent minority then this predicts their perceptions about the homogenous threat that football crowds pose and the understanding that disorder is attributable to processes internal to the football crowd itself. Furthermore, regression also revealed that where officers hold perceptions about the homogenous threat of crowds and attribute crowd disorder to the crowd themselves then this predicts officers perceptions of the need to use force to police football crowds.

5.3.8 Multiple regressions

This chapter set out to explore if any, ideological structure underpins police officers understanding of the need use coercive policing methods to control football crowds. Whilst analysis revealed that crowd composition is not a useful predictor of coercive policing methods it did identify that both homogenous threat and attributions for crowd disorder (both of which regression revealed were predicted by crowd composition) are. Since both perceptions of homogenous threat and attributions for disorder predict coercive policing methods a multiple regression equation (table six) is needed to explore the relationship between these variables.

Table 6; Multiple regression model

ANOVA^b

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	43.637	2	21.818	18.015	.000 ^a
	Residual	122.325	101	1.211		
	Total	165.962	103			

a. Predictors: (Constant), crowd violence, homog threat

b. Dependent Variable: coercive

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.712	.628		1.135	.259
	Homogenous threat	.189	.127	.135	1.497	.138
	Attributions for crowd violence	.643	.128	.454	5.034	.000

a. Dependent Variable: coercive policing methods

Table six identifies that 'attributions for crowd violence' makes the greatest contribution towards officers understanding of the need to use coercive policing methods. Therefore the analysis suggests the potential structure underpinning the relationship between crowd theory and public order practice may be as follows. Firstly, it is police officers understanding that disorder at football is attributable to processes internal to the crowd itself rather than due to any police action that is the strongest predictor of police endorsement of the use of coercive policing methods to control football crowds. Secondly, that police understanding of attributions for crowd disorder is itself predicted by their perception that football crowds are composed of a peaceful majority and a violent minority.

5.3.9 Differences within the sample: Rank.

In the current study the sample was divided between police constables (n=41) and higher ranks combined (n=46)³. Table seven illustrates the significance of any difference between the two rank categories in terms of the distance of the mean response for questionnaire items from the midpoint 3.5.

Table 7; Pc versus management

Questionnaire statement	Police constable (n=41)		Management rank (n=46)		T	P
	Mean	Std. Dev	Mean	Std. Dev		
A significant minority of people in many football crowds have violent aims.	5.29	.78	4.00	1.77	4.47	.001
Under some circumstances even the most respectable and ordinary people can become irrational and violent when caught up in the middle of a football crowd.	4.78	1.12	4.19	1.34	2.18	.032
The motivation for people in a football crowd to cause trouble is for fun and excitement.	5.43	.77	4.67	.96	4.04	.001
The nature of football crowds is such that one usually need look no further than the crowd itself to explain crowd violence when it erupts.	4.41	1.32	2.78	1.33	5.72	.001
When violence occurs involving football crowds the police are rarely responsible for either the initiation or escalation of such violence.	4.73	1.16	3.41	1.30	4.94	.001
Once dispersal orders have been given by the police most genuinely peaceful supporters will have retreated to a place of safety. Most people remaining want conflict with the police.	4.90	1.04	3.54	1.45	4.94	.001
Football crowds must be strictly controlled to prevent widespread violence erupting.	4.51	1.39	3.63	1.49	2.84	.006
If even a few members of a football crowd become violent it is important for the police to intervene quickly and with force as this is the best way to ensure that violence does not escalate.	4.85	1.17	3.84	1.41	3.58	.001

Table seven illustrates that police constables level of agreement with all the questionnaire statements were significantly higher than those officers of

³ Ideally one would want to compare samples of officers from all ranks. However, in the current study the distribution of ranks was such that this would have been impossible. Instead then the current analysis examines the relationship between officers likely to be at the frontline in public disorder (police constables) and the major questionnaire variables, as compared to those of higher ranks (in the current study, Inspector, Chief Inspector, and Superintendent). In the present study Sergeants were omitted from the comparison as while they may have greater involvement in frontline public order policing, they are also a management class. It is for this reason that Sergeants have been omitted from analysis.

management rank. The table also illustrates that whilst both police constables and management rank officers agreement with the first three questionnaire statements in the table are all above the midpoint 3.5, for the remaining five questionnaire statements the Mean responses of the management rank are very close to the midpoint (above and below). This suggests that it is police constables who more clearly and significantly agree with statements that are in line with 'Le Bonian' or 'Agitator' theory.

5.3.10 Differences within the sample: Training versus experience

In the current study the sample was divided between those who had just completed a public order training course in order that they could police crowds (n=65) and those who were already operationally active in policing football crowds (n=39). Table eight illustrates the significance of any difference between the two rank categories in terms of the distance of the mean response for questionnaire items from the midpoint 3.5.

Table 8; Training versus operational experience

Questionnaire statement	Officers who have just completed a public order training course (n=65)		Officers who are operationally active (n=39)		T	P
	Mean	Std. Dev	Mean	Std. Dev		
A significant minority of people in many football crowds have violent aims.	4.41	1.64	5.00	1.19	2.09	.04
Under some circumstances even the most respectable and ordinary people can become irrational and violent when caught up in the middle of a football crowd.	4.18	1.40	4.84	.98	2.81	.006
The motivation for people in a football crowd to cause trouble is for fun and excitement.	4.73	1.10	5.48	.91	3.55	.001
The nature of football crowds is such that one usually need look no further than the crowd itself to explain crowd violence when it erupts.	3.10	1.42	4.38	1.31	4.55	.001
When violence occurs involving football crowds the police are rarely responsible for either the initiation or escalation of such violence.	3.66	1.37	4.56	1.27	3.33	.001
Once dispersal orders have been given by the police most genuinely peaceful supporters will have retreated to a place of safety. Most people remaining want conflict with the police.	3.64	1.45	4.89	1.14	4.87	.001

Table eight illustrates that officers who are operationally active in the policing of football significantly endorse more questionnaire statements in comparison to those officers who have completed public order training but are not yet operationally active. The table also highlights that while agreement with the first three statements in the table are all above the midpoint for both groups, for the last three statements agreement from officers who only have public order training experience appear much closer to the midpoint than those who have both training and operational experience. This suggests that officer's perceptions of football crowds and policing tactics become more Le Bonian in nature when they have both training and operational experience to inform their perceptions.

5.4 Discussion

The study addressed the role that police perceptions of football crowd's play in their choice of strategy and tactic to police them. Taken as a whole, the results of this study largely support the analysis of Stott and Reicher (1998b) and Drury et. al, (2003) that officers hold a Le Bonian view of crowds and that this view underpins their strategic and tactical understanding of the need to use of force to police crowds. For example, the officers in this study agreed that all sorts of people can be found in a football crowd, yet at the same time the composition was simplified down into a basic dichotomy of a violent minority who are capable of exerting influence over others and thereby drawing them into disorderly behaviour and a majority of law-abiding people, who when in crowd situations are unable to resist this influence. In turn, officers agreed that crowd disorder is the result of processes internal to the crowd and that police actions are not responsible for either the initiation or escalation of any crowd disorder. Finally, officers also agreed that there is a need for police action based on strict control and quick forceful intervention to police football crowds.

In terms of the structure of the analysis the results of the individual questionnaire statements will be discussed first. The analysis illustrated that of the fourteen questionnaire statements examined only two of the t-test results were not significantly differentiated from the midpoint of the questionnaire scale in the way

that may have been expected given the result of previous research on police perceptions (Drury et al., 2003). It is therefore necessary to look again at these measures. The variable, *"all football crowds are potentially violent and dangerous"* (M=3.63, SD=1.62, $t = .784$, $p > .435$), from the theme the homogenous threat of crowds, did not receive significant endorsement although likewise because the result was so close to the midpoint neither did officers disagree with the statement. Furthermore, the variable *"the nature of football crowds is such that one usually needs look no further than the crowd itself to explain crowd violence when it erupts"* (M=3.58, SD=1.51, $t = .584$, $p > .561$) also did not receive significant endorsement, but again the proximity of the mean to the midpoint also illustrates that the variable was not disagreed with. The question can therefore firstly be asked, what in the current study is different to that of Drury et.al (2003) which may explain such differences? The most obvious answer is that the current analysis focuses solely on football crowds where as Drury et.al's (2003) study also examined demonstrating crowds and ceremonial crowds, therefore adding measures from these variables may have slightly altered the scalability of the variables and/or their individual results. However, because the current study is specifically interested in the policing of football crowds, the results from the questionnaire statements may provide a more accurate representation of officers understanding of football crowds than was otherwise achieved by Drury et al (2003).

Secondly, there may be specific issues with the way officer's interpreted these two questions or with the analysis itself (such as the significance of the midpoint which will be addressed later). This may be likely because as Drury et al. (2003) note, *"it is difficult to reconcile how officers can view the majority as potentially irrational and easily influenced by professional agitators [who] are skilled at inciting violent behaviour but not as prone to engage in disorder"* (p.1493). In relation to the results from the other statements examined they all support the contention that the police hold a Le Bonian perception of football crowds and that they view tactics based on forceful control as most suited to policing football crowds.

The second part of the analysis attempted to explore the possible relationship between these perceptions of football crowds and the tactics used to police them by conducting more advanced statistical analysis. Regression equations were therefore conducted to examine whether, as previously suggested (Stott and Reicher, 1998b; Drury et al., 2003) the police believe that the majority of people within crowds are subject to the influence of a violent minority, therefore all crowds are potentially violent and dangerous, causal responsibility for disorder is attributed solely to the crowd itself and that the police therefore endorse the use of force to control crowds.

In support of this hypothesis regression analysis revealed that where officers agreed that football crowds were composed of a peaceful majority and a violent minority it predicted perceptions about the homogenous threat that football crowds pose and that disorder could be attributed to football crowds themselves rather than due to any police actions. However, regression also illustrated that police officers perceptions of crowd composition did not predict officers understanding of the need to use coercive policing methods. Furthermore, regression analysis also suggested that endorsement of the homogenous threat of football crowds and attributing disorder to the crowd itself were strong predictors of officers agreement with the need to use coercive policing methods. Finally, multiple regression illustrated that it was police officers attribution of disorder to the crowd itself rather than any actions they might take that was the strongest predictor of their subsequent use of force to police football crowds.

In light of these results, the relationship between theory and practice suggested previously (Stott & Reicher, 1998b; Drury et al, 2003) needs slight revision. The regression equations revealed that the relationship between theory (police knowledge) and practice was more subtly nuanced. The regressions suggest that a more cyclical relationship between theory and practice may more accurately reflect how police perspectives inform coercive policing methods. The new model can be described as follows. Firstly, police officer understanding of the dichotomous composition of football crowds informs their understanding both of the homogenous

threat that football crowds can pose to public order and that disorder is attributable solely to the actions of the crowd. Secondly, whilst both officers understanding of homogenous threat and attributions for disorder inform their perceptions about the need to use coercive policing methods to control football crowds, it is the attribution of disorder to the crowd itself that is the strongest predictor for the subsequent use of force to police football crowds. Finally, this attribution for disorder cannot be understood without acknowledgement of police officers understanding of crowd composition.

This model is only a slight change to that previously suggests and further supports claims made by Stott and Reicher (1998b) that the classic psychological theories of Le Bon and Allport have been incorporated into police knowledge and have created what have been termed the 'agitator' model of crowd disorder. The model proposes that within crowds the bad (violent minority) can lead the mad (ordinary majority), into creating disorder. Hence, perceptions of crowd composition is a strong predictor of police attributions for crowd disorder which is in turn the strongest predictor of the police decision to use coercive force to police crowds. Perceptions about the homogenous threat of crowds appear to be implicit within this model but do not appear explicitly to be necessary within this theory practice relationship. This then has a number of implications. Firstly, in terms of football intelligence and planning, the analysis suggests that the categorisation of risk based on the perceived attributes of individuals or groups may lead to police deployments that lack balance (Stott and Adang, 2003a; 2009). Secondly, that it is important to make officers aware of the impact that police action (or inaction) can have on the development, escalation or de-escalation of crowd conflict.

The study also found that a marked difference exists between the ranks in terms of the extent of endorsement of a number of questionnaire statements. It was found that police constables were more likely to support classical Le Bonian ideas that link crowd composition, homogenous threat, attributions for crowd disorder and the need for coercive policing methods together. In other words, analysis supports the work of Drury et al (2003) who suggest that the extent to which representations held

among police officers may actually translate into a self fulfilling prophecy are mediated by rank. For example, as identified by Drury et.al (2003) police constables are 'closer to the ground' in the policing of football crowds and are therefore more likely to perceive the threat posed by these crowds directly than officers of higher rank. It is police constables therefore who are most likely to be in direct contact with football crowds and also police constables who appear most likely to use force to control these crowds because of the perceptions they hold. This then has obvious implications for both public order training and practice which the subsequent chapters will attempt to address.

Finally, analysis also revealed that that a marked difference exists between officers who have both operational experience and have completed public order training courses compared to those who have only completed public order training courses in terms of the extent of endorsement of a number of questionnaire statements. Those with both operational and training experience more strongly agreed with Le Bonian ideas about crowd composition, the homogenous threat of crowds, attributions for crowd conflict as well as the need for quick forceful intervention. These results support the work of Prati and Pietrantonio (2009) who found that the greater the officers' experience of, and exposure to, crowds and crowd conflict the greater their endorsement of Le Bonian views of crowds and coercive policing methods. This raises interesting questions about the role that training plays in developing such understanding and also about the dynamics of any theory/practice relationship in the operational theatre. Again both these issues will be addressed in subsequent chapters.

5.5 Limitations

However, while the analysis in current chapter has largely supported the findings of previous research (e.g Stott and Reicher, 1998b, Drury et al, 2003) and added subtly to the analysis caution is needed in interpreting the questionnaire data. Such caution is required particularly when making inferences from the data which explores the significance of differences from the scale midpoint on single items.

While differences from the scale midpoint are interesting, on their own they may reveal little about the underlying perceptions that officers hold or the relationships between them. That is they fail to explore what is behind this difference from the midpoint. Did officers simply use the midpoint as a reference for answering all the questionnaire statements and therefore it reflects nothing more than the middle point on the questionnaire scale rather than as something qualitative with specific reasoning and meaning behind it. Therefore while such findings in the current chapter are interesting and useful for illustrating potential police perceptions they require fleshing out so that a more comprehensive understanding of their importance and meaning can be obtained. This then is a challenge for the subsequent chapters in the thesis.

5.6 Conclusion

The current chapter has demonstrated that police perceptions of football crowds have much in common with classical (Le Bonian, Allportian) models of crowd behaviour. Moreover it has also demonstrated that these perceptions have a relationship with the strategies and tactics that the police suggest are best suited to policing football crowds. That is, that police perceptions of football crowds are contributing to the use of police practices that are likely to be indiscriminate, and are therefore of the type that both public order and ESIM literature have identified as playing a potentially self fulfilling role in the development and escalation of crowd conflict. As identified in the literature review chapters, such 'classical' theoretical views of crowd behaviour are not in line with modern scientific theory or police policy nor are the strategies and tactics endorsed in line with the principles of crowd management and models of good practice that exist (e.g. ACPO manual of guidance for keeping the peace, 2003; Reicher et al., 2004;2007; Stott & Adang, 2009). The study has therefore identified the potential negative implications that the 'Agitator' model of football crowds may have for future police crowd relationships and also for the development of strategies for the long term reduction of crowd conflict and policing costs at football.

The next chapter will seek to explore issues raised here by examining how such perceptions may become part of police understanding of football crowds. It will do so by looking at the public order training that officers receive, and how this may play a role in both what they do and how they perceive both the crowd and their actions. Such training offers a unique arena in which to examine the theory practice relationship and its implications because it helps highlight how theory can influence police decision making which in turn affects practice. It is therefore to an analysis of police public order training in England and Wales that the thesis now turns.

Chapter Six: Crowd psychology, public order police training & the policing of football crowds.

6.1 Introduction

The literature review chapters identified how 'classic' psychological theories of the crowd may still be relevant today precisely because they underpin the psychology of those who are charged with controlling crowds and therefore affect what they do in practice. Research by della Porta and Reiter's (1998) has illustrated how such perceptions may become incorporated into 'police knowledge' and be subsequently used to determine the choice or style of policing that is adopted to police crowds. As demonstrated in the last chapter, public order police officers in the U.K. still appear to hold classical theoretical models of the crowd and also appear to favour specific policing tactics which utilise undifferentiated force against football crowds. It therefore raises important questions about how and why such understandings of crowd behaviour exist within public order policing and what potential implications they have for operational practice.

Stott, Livingstone & Hoggett (2008) argued successful football policing operations depend upon the extent to which police commanders are adequately trained to understand and deal effectively with the dynamics of crowds. While much recent research suggests that classic models of the crowd have now been largely superseded in the literature by theories that accept the rational and normative nature of crowd action (e.g. McClelland, 1989; McPhail, 1991), work by Cerrah, (1998) has illustrated that police public order training in England and Wales still utilises a Le Bonian (Le Bon, 1895) model of the crowd in its teachings. Indeed the most recent public order training release from the National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA⁴, June 2008) 'Learning Descriptor Specialist Uniform Support' includes uncritical reference to Le Bon's theory of the crowd and therefore suggests that classic theory is still prominent within this field. How much the existence of these perceptions and their incorporation within police knowledge may be the result of police public order training in England and Wales particularly as it relates to the

⁴ a British Non-Departmental Public Body established to support police by providing expertise in a variety of different areas including public order

policing of football therefore needs to be explored, so that the potential impact of promulgating such knowledge and skills into the operational theatre can be assessed.

Furthermore, the need to explore public order training is all the more pressing as there is, as yet, little research which examines it and that which does exist focuses almost exclusively upon the command decisions of senior officers and their concerns about the accountability of their decisions (Cronin & Reicher, 2006; PAJ Waddington, 1993a, 1994a). This paucity in the literature coincides both with U.K. Home Office recognition of a need for enhanced training at all levels of the Police Service (Home Office, 2001) and a recent international agreement to establish a pan European training course for police commanders who take responsibility for the policing of football matches in their host nation⁵. However, currently there is insufficient data available in the literature to understand what police training will need to deliver in order to promote an adequate understanding of crowd dynamics and their relationship to public order policing.

6.1.1 Aims

The current study therefore begins to re-dress these limitations by examining the nature of public order police training within England and Wales. More specifically, the current study focuses upon a series of training sessions involving hypothetical exercises of football crowd policing operations. Using these 'real time' events the study will a) examine in situ what form of crowd theory is being applied within football related public order training b) explore what relationship, if any, this has to officers' understanding of football crowd dynamics and psychology c) analyse the understanding of strategies and tactics that may flow from such models of the crowd and d) explore the implications of this police training as it relates to the effective policing of football crowds.

⁵ Agreement was reached to fund such training at a 'High Level Conference Towards and EU Strategy Against Violence in Sport' collaboratively organised by the European Commission, the Portuguese Presidency of the Council, the European Parliament and UEFA. Brussels, 28th-29th November, 2007.

6.2 Method: Rationale

A mixed method design (see Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Brannen, 2005) was chosen because working with the police in an operational context requires the adoption of a pragmatic approach (Dewey, 1920; 1948) in which the specific question or topic of research takes primacy over the choice of methods rather than vice versa. In relation to the current study, the research required the collection of different types of data so that an analysis of officers understanding about crowds and police tactics could be made prior to, during and after the policing operation. As Brannen (2005) suggests, mixed method designs should be used when the researcher is seeking specific outcomes, primarily those of corroboration, where the same results are derived from both qualitative and quantitative methods and elaboration, where the qualitative data analysis exemplifies how the quantitative findings apply in particular cases. In this case whether the use of crowd theory within public order training may interact with student's strategic and tactical decision making during hypothetical policing operations and influence their views of football crowds upon completion of the training course.

6.2.1 Method; Background

There is currently no training within England and Wales specifically oriented to the policing of public order at football matches. Instead, training for policing football is provided within a framework of courses which deal with the policing of public order more generally. These public order training courses provide officers with the knowledge and skills currently required to police public order across the forty three separate police forces in the England and Wales. These courses span all police ranks from command to constable and also include non rank specific specialised roles such as public order tactical advisors⁶.

All courses follow a curriculum created by the National Policing Improvement Agency. Course materials are then provided by the NPIA to regionally accredited

⁶ Officers whose role is to provide a police commander with strategic and tactical advice both before and during public order operations.

police trainers who in turn deliver these courses making sure that they conform to this national curriculum. Given this national framework, by attending a sample of courses from different regional centres data could be collected that could confidently be described as representative of public order training courses nationally.

The research therefore initially involved attempts to gain access to different public order training courses across the country. This access to the regional centres was established through contacting the ACPO portfolio holder for policing football⁷ who facilitated attendance at different centres through his policing contacts. Access was also obtained from existing contacts from previous employment as a Football Liaison Officer (FLO) for the Avon and Somerset Constabulary and finally through contact networks established while attending the courses.

Seven courses were attended in total and these were as follows. 1) Two Initial Public Order Commander (IPOC) courses. The IPOC course is a one week course for forward Commanders (known as Bronze⁸ commanders within the UK public order policing model). 2) One Major Sporting Events (MSE) course; a three day course for police commanders who will be responsible for policing inside sports stadiums for all major sporting events. 3) One, Tactical Advisors course. This is a week long course for all officers seeking to become public order Tactical Advisors in England and Wales. 4) Finally, three public order Common Minimum Standard (CMS) courses. These are public order training courses that all police officers must complete in order to be able to police public order events (such as football) or provide mutual aid to other police forces as part of a nationally standardised Police Support Unit (PSU⁹). The

⁷ ACPO elects individual representatives to take responsibility for policy within specific areas. These individuals are referred to as Portfolio holders. At the time of the study the football portfolio holder was ACC Steven Thomas, then of Greater Manchester Police.

⁸ During a public order policing operation Bronze commanders are charged with taking the primary responsibility in implementing appropriate tactical responses within their geographical or functional area of responsibility

⁹ PSU's are essentially a paramilitary style police unit generally composed of eighteen Police Constables, three Sergeants and an Inspector. They are trained to a National Minimum Standard specifically to deal with incidents of public disorder and to allow for Mutual Aid across different police forces.

courses chosen were those that covered the full spectrum of public order training offered nationally at the time of research and the officers sampled were all those students and instructors who were taking part in the training programmes attended.

6.2.2 Qualitative data collection and analysis

The courses took two forms; firstly the IPOC, MSE and TAC Ad courses were classroom based. These courses were attended on average by between five and ten police students. Students started the courses by discussing and familiarising themselves with the background material provided by the NPIA, after which knowledge tests were conducted by the trainers. The students then had to complete a number of 'table top exercises' which were based on hypothetical policing operations for various different types of public order situation. Each exercise could last up to a day. Students would be allocated to various roles (i.e. Senior Commander, Tactical Advisor, etc) and would begin by developing strategy and tactics for each operation based on the information received from the trainers. Different scenarios would then be 'fed into' the event by the trainers during the exercise via 'paper feed' or radio (e.g. a group of hooligans had just arrived at the main railway station). Students then had to deal with the developing scenario using their strategic and tactical plan. Finally at the end of each exercise and the course as a whole debriefs were held where students and trainers drew conclusions.

In contrast, the CMS courses had no classroom based component as they took place in outdoor centres or public order training 'villages'. They generally involved a larger number of students, up to 21. Here the students had to take part in physical activities such as a test for physical fitness, working together as a PSU, baton charging, shield formations, working under fire from petrol bombs and 'bricks'. Here students were evaluated on their speed, efficiency and competency in performing the tactics but were not asked about rationales for using such tactics.

In relation to the classroom based training course access was obtained to all course materials from the course trainers, prior to or during the respective training courses.

Each training course was then attended and observations made on what was taught and how. This involved making detailed field notes throughout about course content and delivery. Furthermore, during each observation and with the consent of participants, the comments of instructors and general discussions between the students during each course were recorded on a digital recorder or by written field notes. All of the discussions and table top exercises that were recorded were transcribed at the earliest opportunity. In relation to the CMS courses, observations of the training courses were conducted and the officers conversations both during exercises and in breaks in between were recorded as written field notes. In all, observations cumulatively totalled 25 days during which time approximately 50 hours of discussion were digitally recorded and fifteen A4 pages of field notes made.

During the research there were a number of ethical issues that also needed to be addressed. It was important that all officers were aware of my research at the training courses. It was also important that officers were allowed to choose whether or not to be part of the research observations. In an attempt to ease any concerns that officers may have had about being part of the observations, they were all assured anonymity and informed that they could ask any questions or raise any concerns they may have at any point during the course. Finally it was important that everyone was comfortable with my presence and that it was not distracting from the important training that they were receiving. Only once all of this had been communicated and agreed upon by everyone was the research carried out.

The analysis began by transcribing all recordings from the courses and combining them with the field notes so that a comprehensive data corpus was created. All material that explicitly related to policing football crowds was then identified. This involved removing a large amount of data from the data corpus. For each of the classroom based training courses there was usually a day given to hypothetical exercises based on policing football, separate days were also generally given to exercises based on policing demonstration and environmental crowds respectively. A further day was generally given on each course to covering legislation and reviewing public order tactics. For observational data of the CMS courses all training was based

on developing officer's competencies in using tactics based on force. Only data directly relating to policing football or to specific tactics and strategies are included in the final analysis.

The remaining material was then re-read and the data analysed using a constructionist revision of grounded theory (Pidgeon, 1996; Glaser & Strauss, 1967).. The data analysis was approached in much the same way as it would have been using grounded theory; however a specific hypothesis based on ESIM was used to filter the data and provide a rationale for selecting specific instances of data. That hypothesis was that there is a relationship between officer's understandings of crowd behaviour and the strategies and tactics they support or use to police crowds. The data was therefore examined with this in mind and any data that specifically addressed this issue, whether it confirmed or disconfirmed this hypothesis was selected. In this sense this revision of grounded theory is similar to a combination of thematic analysis (Kellehear, 1993) and grounded theory. The data was analysed in this way as the method offered the best opportunity to develop a meaningful analysis out of the massive amount of data collected and involved a lengthy process of data coding and analysis, which was conducted in several steps.

The first step involved organising the data into two broad categories, which were simply called 'references to crowd theory' and 'references to strategy and tactics'. The data placed under the heading 'references to crowd theory' contained all references, from both course material and from students and instructors on the courses, which having been read was believed to refer to crowd theory. Likewise, the data initially placed under the heading 'references to strategy and tactics' contained all the references made either within course material or by students and instructors, that was believed to refer to specific tactics and strategies for policing football crowds.

These data sets, together with the rationale for their inclusion under the specific category heading, were then presented to my supervisor. After the presentation the data was discussed between us. At this point it was agreed that a number of

subheadings were needed to better organise the data. My supervisor asked that all the data be re-read and a number of subheadings developed into which the data could be placed.

After further reading of the data corpus a number of subcategories were then developed into which data extracts were again placed. Firstly, data previously categorised under the heading references to crowd theory were subsequently divided into two subheadings. The first 'explicit references to crowd theory in training', was used to refer to any data that specifically mentioned a crowd theorist or model of crowd behaviour, while the second 'implicit references to crowd theory in training' was used to categorise any material in which football crowds were discussed in terms that had strong similarity to established models of crowd behaviour but in which a specific crowd theorist or model was not mentioned.

Secondly, data previously categorised under the heading references to strategy and tactics were divided under a number of new subheadings. The first of these, 'the relationship between theory and practice', was used to group all instances in which people on the courses discussed the policing of crowds in terms of a causal relationship between how football crowds behave and the strategy and tactics needed to police this behaviour. The second of these, 'a focus on football hooligans' was used to group all instances where football hooligans were discussed. The heading was chosen as concern with football hooligans could be seen to reflect similar concerns within the 'agitator model'. The third subheading used was 'the use of force', and the fourth 'indiscriminate intervention'. Both of these headings were used to include any instances where police strategy or tactics were discussed on the courses in terms of coercive policing methods but differed in terms of whether these methods were targeted or undifferentiated. The fifth heading developed was 'alternative policing tactics'. This heading was used to include all instances where tactics and strategies other than those primarily relying upon force were discussed. The final subheading used was 'accountability concerns'. This heading was used to include any instances where the students or instructors discussed other issues that may affect their choice of strategy and tactics.

This new data corpus was then again presented to my supervisor. The subheadings were agreed and the data then critically analysed so that only data where there was agreement between the two of us was included within the category. All data on which agreement couldn't be met was dis-guarded from use in the final analysis. Finally, these subheadings form the structure of the subsequent analysis section and the data included selected for its representativeness in terms of indicating the wider body of data within the thematic category. Table nine illustrates all the instances of data under each of these headings after agreement with my supervisor, the courses the data was taken from and from which the examples provided in the subsequent analysis were taken.

Table 9; Training course and type of data gathered

	Major sporting events	IPOC course A (GMP)	IPOC course B (Torquay)	Tac Ad	CMS L2 course A (GMP)	CMS L2 course B (A&S)	CMS L2 Course C Glouc	Total
Explicit theory			1					1
Implicit theory	3	4	2	6				15
Relationship between theory and practice	2	3	3	3				11
Focus on football hooligans	3	4	2	1				10
The use of force	1	5	4	5	CMS courses all about force			15
Indiscriminate intervention	1	2	4	1				8
Alternative tactics	1	1	0	4				6
Accountability concerns	2	5	5	3				15

6.2.3 Quantitative data collection and analysis

The survey questionnaire adapted from the study by Drury et al., (2003) and used in the previous chapter was distributed to officers after each training course had been completed. A total of 65 questionnaires were distributed and returned

(encompassing all the students on the course I attended). For the purposes of this study, measures were taken of police perspectives on: crowd composition; the effects of crowds on participants (homogenising); explanations of or attributions for crowd violence; and tactical response to crowd violence. For all of these themes students were given a series of statements to which they responded on a 6 point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (Strongly agree).

Rather than being overly concerned with the structure of these attitudes, as in the previous chapter, the study in line with Stott (2003) reports on the significance levels of the difference of the means from the midpoint (3.5) for each questionnaire measure using a one sample T-Test. The rationale for the questionnaire was to test the representativeness and reliability of the qualitative analysis developed. Therefore the issues raised in the previous chapter about reporting the significance of difference from a midpoint are not applicable as the qualitative data provides a detailed explanation that was missing in the previous chapter

6.3 Analysis

6.3.1 Explicit references to crowd theory in training.

The first issue arising from the analysis was the almost total absence of any explicit reference to crowd theory in any aspect of any of the courses. In fact the only such reference was contained within a chapter entitled 'Crowd Psychology' within the National Centre for Policing Excellence (NCPE)¹⁰ (IPOC) Distance Learning Handbook. The opening to the chapter states;

"Although many psychologists have written numerous theories concerning disruptive crowd behaviour, this information sheet is an attempt to provide some useful background information and some ideas that are pertinent to operational considerations. Everett D Martin; a crowd psychologist of the 1920's wrote in his book 'behaviour of crowds':- 'A crowd is a device for indulging ourselves

¹⁰ Now part of the NPIA

in a kind of temporary insanity by all going crazy together'. All psychologists seem to agree, that membership of a crowd results in a lessening of an individuals ability to think rationally, whilst at the same time his/her more primitive impulses are elicited in a harmonious fashion with the emerging impulses of all other crowd members. The result being the establishment of a collective mind"
(NCPE Handbook, p.24)

The extract is interesting in three respects. First is its clear and unequivocal reference to the theoretical idea that crowds are an arena in which ordinary people lose their individual rationality such that their behaviour is governed by emotional impulses. Second is its assertion that such a theoretical position is undisputed within the scientific literature. Third, its affirmation that such a theoretical model has direct relevance to police operational practice.

6.3.2 Implicit references to crowd theory in training

While there was little other explicit reference to crowd theory made within any of the observations made or course materials obtained, the idea of the inherent irrationality of the crowd was also invariantly reflected in discussions between trainers and students. For example, in the following extract taken from a debate between a training Inspector and his students the Inspector asserts (through implicit and inaccurate reference to Solomon Asch's¹¹ famous conformity paradigm) that crowds invariantly lead to a loss of individuality and rationality, which in turn leaves them open to casual social influence.

"Remember that once a crowd assembles they lose their individuality. How many times have you heard a person at a football match say I don't know what came over me. Apparently seventy five percent of the population can be influenced by the

¹¹ Asch, S. E. (1951). Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgment. In H. Guetzkow (ed.) *Groups, leadership and men*. Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Press.

behaviour of others and can be made to conform" (IPOC Course A, Trainer N)"

Students themselves then recapitulated this theoretical model of the crowd in their own discussions, even when trainers were not directly present. What was evident is that implicit within such discussion was the idea of the crowd's irrationality. As such, it was universally and explicitly accepted that 'hooligans' (i.e. violent individuals or groups) could always become the primary factor governing the behaviour of the crowd as a whole. For example, during one exercise a student acting as a commander for the hypothetical policing operation specifically briefed the other students about the impact such minorities can have;

"If protagonists or ringleaders immerse themselves into the middle of a crowd, they can be the sort of brain or engine of that crowd driving them on."(MSE Course A, Student C)

Furthermore, where hooligans were understood to be present it was also the case that the crowd as a whole was described as a threat to public order and that there was therefore a requirement to police all fans that were present. Thus discussions of crowd dynamics sat neatly alongside judgements concerning how to react to large crowds containing suspected 'hooligans'.

"Well we worked on the basis that within that group of three hundred [ordinary fans] you probably had your hardcore nominal's¹² and crowd dynamics say that the behaviour of these nominal's can affect the behaviour of the others there" (MSE Course A, Student D)

¹² 'Nominals' is a term used by the police to refer to anyone fitting the profile of 'hooligans'

6.3.3 The relationship between theory and practice

As the above extract implies the important feature of conversation about crowd dynamics is that they invariably served as a rationale and justification for students' proposed strategy and tactics. In particular there was a focus on arresting and containing hooligans as the primary preventative measure. For example, in discussion during another table top exercise a student, also acting as the senior commander, defined his views to his subordinates on the strategic focus of their hypothetical football policing operation.

"The arrest policy for today is to identify ringleaders and protagonists at an early stage and arrest them. This will then impact on crowd dynamics and assist in early resolution and affects the ability of the groups to organise disorder". (IPOC course A, Student G).

In other words officers' theory of crowd dynamics led directly to a strategic focus on arresting 'ringleaders' because students understood that this removes the overall threat to public order posed by the crowd.

6.3.4 A focus on 'Hooligans'

This of course raised important questions for the students about how this targeting of hooligans could best be achieved. When discussing solutions students emphasised the importance of police spotters¹³ to identify hooligans and feed this 'intelligence' into their operation.

"You have intelligence about the types of clothing and uniform that the people we are interested in are going to be wearing so the spotters are automatically going to be looking for those persons" (TAC AD Course A, Student T).

¹³ police officers whose role is to be able to identify known trouble makers.

6.3.5 The use of force

Having dealt with the identification of hooligans discussion turned toward how these individuals and groups could be contained, disrupted or otherwise removed from the crowd. A student tactical advisor discussed with the commander how they could use spotters to coordinate PSUs, allowing them to separate hooligans from the crowd at the end of their hypothetical football match.

“Outside we have a PSU and a spotter and they are going to pull out the risk element as they see them coming out and coral them with the PSU” (TAC AD Course A, Student R)

6.3.6 Indiscriminate intervention

Despite this focus, during all exercises students acknowledged and accepted that for various reasons it is actually often not possible to even identify let alone separate ‘hooligans’ from crowds. Moreover, in such circumstances it was described as perfectly appropriate to take action against the whole crowd. During one of the table top exercises students were discussing the fact that a large crowd of away fans had arrived simultaneously at the railway station. Noting the perceived impossibility of isolating any hooligans they chose instead to forcibly corral the entire contingent of fans and remove them from the area.

“If we don’t know who the goodies or baddies are we will have to clear them all” (IPOC course B, Student F)

Another tactical response in such circumstances included highly visible displays by the police of their capability to use force, described as a means of deterring any hooligans thought to be present in the crowd;

“If they don’t have a lot of police officers there they will think well what’s going on, and they will go and play. Whereas if we show

them that we are there we can take control of them" (MSE A, Student C)

Thus far from isolating those suspected of holding violent intent the police instead choose tactics that actually involved the relatively undifferentiated use of force. Thus, despite an initial focus upon targeting hooligans, the less discriminating use of force was central to the tactical plans that students developed. At the same time there was very little discussion about the potentially negative impact that this undifferentiated use of force may have upon crowd dynamics. This ultimately culminated in the tactical position whereby the use of force would be the defining and central characteristic of tactical plans related to policing football crowds. Indeed, as one instructor asserted, should that not be the case then students could legitimately begin to question the credibility and competence of their Senior Command.

"Arrest, containment and dispersal are the three key tactical considerations and if you don't see that bleeding through Silver's¹⁴ tactical plan as it drips down to Bronze level then you should be asking questions because if you haven't got elements of the aforementioned then it could be that the plan isn't quite up to it".
(IPOCA, Instructor B)

6.3.7 Alternative tactics

While attention was ubiquitously paid to the use and display of force, there was at the same time a relative absence of discussion about alternative approaches. Where such discussion did occur these alternatives were treated with some scepticism. For example, in discussion about a recent operation to deal with a crowd of Millwall fans

¹⁴ The role of the Silver commander is to develop and co-ordinate the tactical plan It is usually Silver who is expected to be the Senior Operational Commander on the day of an event, brief the Senior command team and take an overview of the implementation of and changes to the tactical plan throughout the operation.

a trainer and student debated the efficacy of an approach which focused upon facilitating the crowd.

Student A: "We had Millwall last year and obviously Millwall come with a reputation but we decided that perhaps if we treat them normally then they might respond to that. And they thought it was great, even the Millwall thugs thought how good it was that the police were looking after us and dealing with us as human beings rather than being rounded up with batons like they get everywhere else and it worked for us it worked very well".

Trainer B: "Sometimes these novel approaches work very well. But what was your contingency if they had turned nasty"?

Student A: "Batons [laughter] well we always have that to fall back on to don't we!"(MSE course, Student A, Instructor B)

6.3.8 Accountability

The above extract also demonstrates how discussions about tactics were not just framed in terms of a shared theory of the crowd. The analysis also identified the importance of concerns about contingencies and accountability in decision making. At times students expressed concerns that being unable or unwilling to exercise the use of force would leave them professionally vulnerable. For example, during the planning phase of one table top exercise a group of commanders sought to justify their request to senior colleagues to utilise large numbers of officers where the intelligence suggested that they may not be needed.

"We thought lets be realistic, we looked at the intelligence and really it shows that realistically the risk groups from both teams actually get on quite well and the chances are that we are totally over reacting and that actually we could have a police free game, but we just don't know and nobody is going to be brave enough to

make that decision so lets be really firm about it and do it properly"

(MSE course, student E).

6.3.9 Quantitative analysis

The qualitative analysis identified a basic pattern in the data whereby public order training emphasised a 'classic' theory of the crowd. At the same time instructors and students discussions reflected an understanding of the crowd as irrational and therefore easily influenced by hooligans. This in turn was associated with a strategic emphasis on the removal, containment or disruption of hooligans through the use of force lest their ability to 'hijack' the crowd became manifest. When it was not possible to achieve this, then a strategic and tactical shift toward the use of force against crowds as a whole was evident.

The pattern of responses by students to questionnaire items is representative of this analysis. For example, students agreed that *"the majority of people in football crowds have peaceful intentions"*, $M = 5.385, \pm .722, t(65) = 21.028, p < .001, d = 2.60$, but that *"even the most respectable and ordinary people can become irrational and violent when in a football crowd"* $M = 4.185, \pm 1.401, t(65) = 3.967, p < .001, d = 0.48$. They agreed that *"football crowds always contain a significant minority of people with violent aims"*, $M = 4.415, \pm 1.647, t(65) = 4.479, p < .001, d = 0.55$, who are *"skilled at inciting crowd violence"*, $M = 4.123, \pm 1.352, t(65) = 3.715, p < .001, d = 0.46$, *"for fun and excitement"*, $M = 4.738, \pm 1.107, t(65) = 9.013, p < .001, d = 1.11$. Students agreed that *"once violence occurs in a football crowd otherwise law-abiding decent people get affected by crowd dynamics such that they are drawn into the emerging disorder"*, $M = 3.861, \pm 1.285, t(65) = 2.268, p < .027, d = .28$.

Students also agreed that *"all football crowds must be strictly controlled in order to prevent widespread disorder"*, $M = 3.969, \pm 1.550, t(65) = 2.439, p < .017, d = 0.30$. Moreover, they agreed that *"if even a few members of a football crowd become violent it is important for the police to intervene against the crowd quickly and with force to ensure the violence does not escalate"*, $M = 4.107, \pm 1.469, t(65) = 3.334, p <$

.001, $d = 0.41$. Finally, students disagreed with the statement that *“the police are often responsible for the eruption of violence because of their inflexible and indiscriminate response to violence by small numbers of crowd members”*, $M = 2.492$, ± 1.336 , $t(65) = 6.081$, $p < .001$, $d = -0.75$.

6.4 Discussion

This chapter had four central objectives. The first was to examine what understanding of crowd theory is being applied within public order police training in England and Wales. The second was to explore the potential impact such theory has upon police students' understanding of the crowd. The third was to analyse the strategy and tactics that flow from this model of crowd dynamics. Finally, the fourth was to explore the implications of this analysis for theory and practice.

Turning to the first objective it is evident that there is a relative absence of explicit theory in public order police training in England and Wales. In all of the written police training materials collected there was only one explicit reference to a theory of the crowd. In line with classic theory this single reference points unequivocally to the idea that in the crowd individuals will collectively undergo a loss of rationality and be subject to contagion and impulsivity. This theoretical position is given added weight and credibility through the inaccurate assertion that this theoretical model of crowd dynamics and psychology is undisputed within the scientific literature.

In terms of the second objective the analysis illustrates how this theoretical model then coincides with similar descriptions of the crowd by trainers and students. In particular, students and trainers asserted that the football crowd was an arena within which ordinary fans could lose rational control of their behaviour. Moreover, that football crowds invariably attract violent minorities that are capable of hijacking the crowd directing it toward violence. In other words, as identified in the previous chapter it appears that the very presence of those defined as hooligans leads officers to perceive the potential threat to public order posed by the crowd as a whole and attribute disorder to processes internal to the crowd.

In relation to the third objective, this understanding corresponds with specific strategic and tactical orientations. Strategically the orientation was toward the use of force at two levels. Initially the focus was on identifying and removing hooligans from the crowd. However, it was acknowledged that identifying and isolating these minorities was at the very least problematic. In such situations the strategic orientation would shift to using force against the crowd as a whole. Tactically, this was achieved by corralling and containing crowds of fans arriving in particular locations or through obvious and indiscriminate displays of police capability to use force. Where strategic and tactical alternatives were discussed these were either dismissed or their success viewed as contingent on the use of force.

In relation to the fourth objective the analysis identified a number of potential implications for both theory and practice. In relation to theory, in line with Stott and Reicher (1998b) Drury et al., (2003) and the previous chapter, the study suggests that the police in England and Wales hold a classical or 'agitator' model of crowd dynamics. The chapter also demonstrated that such theoretical understanding may lead to an increased likelihood that during emergent disorder police will use force in an undifferentiated manner and thus could inadvertently initiate the dynamics of widespread disorder as a kind of self-fulfilling prophesy.

The current study is also able to move beyond these previous studies in a number of ways. First, data has previously been gathered post hoc. In this sense previous studies were always open to the criticism that the data reflected post hoc rationalisation where officers were seeking rhetorically to deflect blame and create justifications (Wetherell & Potter, 1989). In this study it has been possible to examine police articulations of crowd theory in training situations and during hypothetical scenarios. This provided a unique opportunity to examine how police theoretical modelling of crowds related to their real time decision making about how to deal with them.

The previous chapter suggested that the agitator model leads the police to view the crowd as heterogeneous in composition but also as homogeneously dangerous and that this theoretical position then combines with police perceptions about attributions for crowd disorder to increase the likelihood that the police may treat football crowds uniformly in situations where disorder is expected (also see Stott & Reicher, 1998 a & b). The current study supports and develops this work. It highlights how the entire focus of police training is on the control and disruption of suspected ringleaders. The analysis suggests that this is not simply because they are perceived as an inherent threat to public order, in and of themselves, but also because of their perceived ability to influence the irrational crowd. However, this study also suggests that this places the police in a problematic position, as for various reasons, it is often difficult to identify and isolate hooligans (Stott et al., 2008). In this situation then the police tend to fall back upon the threat of or use of force against the crowd as a whole. This study suggests that they do so because the agitator model quite reasonably leads them to assert that the very presence of the minority renders the crowd dangerous and in need of strict control. Such a view of the crowd also leads to a relative lack of reflexivity about the potentially negative impact that such indiscriminate tactics can and do have upon ordinary fans or crowd dynamics (e.g. Stott et al, 2001; Stott and Pearson, 2007).

In relation to implications for practice, the study suggests is that while there is little explicit reference to crowd theory, implicitly the 'classic' model of crowds permeates almost every aspect of public order training throughout England and Wales. Moreover, the course material provided by the NPIA rather than developing a critical assessment of classic theory reinforces the model by presenting it as unproblematic fact. It is no surprise then that those police officers who deliver the training courses therefore consistently assert the model and students consensually articulate an understanding of their role and the effectiveness of their tactics in its terms. At no point was the factual accuracy of this theoretical model discussed or challenged. In effect the 'classic' model of crowds appears institutionalised within public order police training within England and Wales forming a philosophy on which to base operational practice. The research therefore suggests that through such training

classic crowd psychology is becoming imbedded within Police knowledge and that this may be leading towards the development of 'escalated force' rather than 'negotiated management' approaches to public order policing (della Porta and Reiter, 1998; Waddington, 2007).

This research also supports contentions that policing tactics are not merely a matter of police understanding of the crowd. Cronin & Reicher (2006) and P.A.J. Waddington (1993a, 1994a) have argued that both the setting of strategy, the use of tactics and decision making during public order policing operations are affected by the expectations and demands of those who scrutinise them. In other words, accountability to both internal and external audiences introduces a dynamic to policing operations that must be understood and prepared for. The current study also suggests that this is an important issue, yet it demonstrates that training does little if anything to formally address this issue.

6.5 Limitations

The current analysis is based upon a data set gained from observations conducted at a relatively small number of police public order training events. Moreover, two courses do currently exist that are not included within the observations, the Advanced Public Order Commanders Course (APOC) and the Football Intelligence Officers Course (FIO). However, both of these are recently new developments and were either unavailable or simply not being run during the five month period within which the observations took place. None the less the courses that were observed cover the majority of the public order training courses currently available to police officers in England and Wales and it is therefore unlikely that the two courses absent from the study would dramatically alter the themes identified in the analysis.

There is also the possibility that courses may be delivered differently or the content altered slightly in different regional training centres. However, all the courses are nationally accredited and designed to support the development of national minimum standards and mutual aid whereby officers from different police forces are

trained to a common national standard so they can work together during public order operations. As such there is a need for consistency in both content and delivery. Indeed the courses delivered by the regional training centres have to be broadly representative of the NPIA curriculum. It is therefore unlikely that there will be large scale variations in the content and delivery of these courses in other regional centres and it is therefore likely that the sample will be representative of public order training nationally.

Another potential criticism is the data draws from discussions of largely hypothetical scenarios and as such does not reflect what actually goes on in the operational context. However, the scenarios used during training were actually quite realistic since they were often based on actual events. Exercises were also conducted in real time and under stressful conditions. Indeed, these scenarios and exercises form the basis of training precisely because they are understood to be a close approximation of 'real life'. None the less such criticism is well founded and it remains to be demonstrated how police understandings relate in real time to actual policing operations.

6.6 Conclusion

The NCPE booklet distributed to IPOC students quotes from Martin (1923). In his book, Martin (1923) acknowledges that Le Bon provided a basis for the development of this theory (Reicher et al, 2007). This stands in stark and obvious contrast to the ACPO Manual of Guidance for Keeping the Peace (2003) which makes explicit reference to the fact that people in crowds do not necessarily get carried away by "crowd hysteria" (p.27). The Manual also asserts that policing of crowds is a dynamic and interactive process and that therefore conflict can emerge not just from crowd participants but also from the dynamics of interaction between the crowd and the police. It is evident from this research that significant work is required in order to integrate ACPO policy more formally and explicitly into the NIPA curriculum.

In line with ESIM principles for crowd management (Reicher et al, 2004; 2007), the ACPO Manual recommends four key crowd management principles. It states that these principles should be considered during the planning, briefing and deployment stages of any policing operation involving the management of crowds. For example, ACPO guidelines state that 'intelligence' gathering should be used to assist understanding of different group's intentions and cultures (p.28). The rationale for this is that understanding the cultures and intentions of those who make up a crowd is vitally important so that perceptions of the legitimacy of police action among them can be established and maintained. However, the current analysis suggests that in training for football emphasis is exclusively upon intelligence as the location and identification of suspected hooligans. The identity and cultural perspectives of ordinary fans is largely ignored. These ACPO guidelines further suggest that officers' should not view everybody in the crowd as the same, particularly when disorder begins to occur. However, the analysis suggests that when police suspect that hooligans are present and they cannot separate them from others in the crowd then they do precisely the opposite and shift strategically and tactically to the indiscriminate use of force against the crowd as a whole.

While the ACPO guidance recognises that such indiscriminate tactics may sometimes be unavoidable it recognises the need to communicate with the crowd in order to ensure the maintenance of perceived legitimacy. Yet while the Manual stipulates the importance of communication as a principle of crowd management this is something that seems largely ignored in training. Finally, the ACPO manual identifies facilitation as a key principle, highlighting the importance of allowing crowds to pursue lawful aims whilst at the same time dealing with groups acting unlawfully. Yet this analysis suggests that in training the focus is exclusively upon the forceful control and disruption of groups suspected of intending to act unlawfully while little time is spent discussing means through which the legitimate behaviour of all fans can be facilitated or undermined by police action. Furthermore, where these issues were discussed they were described as novel and as such dismissed.

Because the relationship between police perceptions of crowd psychology and public order tactics have not yet been examined in the operational context this thesis cannot as yet state confidently that the suggested relationships between classic theory, practice and outcomes exist operationally. The next chapter will therefore seek to address this by examining these dynamics in practice. By doing so it may become possible to address the issue of whether the classical theoretical model implicit and explicit within public order training and apparently held by public order trained police officers affects operational practice. In other words, it remains to be seen whether simply understanding crowds in terms of the 'agitator model' is enough to set in motion a whole ideological cycle which may ultimately lead towards the indiscriminate use of force against the whole crowd in practice.

Chapter Seven: The role of crowd theory in determining the use of force in public order policing at football

7.1 Introduction

Both of the previous two chapters in this thesis suggest that there is a relationship between police officers' theoretical understanding of football crowds and their strategic and tactical orientation. As a consequence, it has been argued that where the police perceive that a 'violent minority' is present in a football crowd then they attribute the potential for disorder to processes internal to the crowd and may therefore chose to implement police tactics that rely upon undifferentiated or 'escalated force'. According to ESIM research (Stott & Reicher, 1998a;b) this escalated force may in turn create perceptions of police illegitimacy in the crowd which may increase the likelihood of collective disorder. However, despite evidence of this relationship between police theory and practice, in the absence of data gathered contemporaneously there is currently no systematic analysis of how police theoretical understandings of crowds interact with operational demands as they play themselves out within the complex dynamics of an actual crowd event.

7.1.1 Aims

The current chapter will therefore explore the relationships between police theoretical understanding of football crowds and the use of public order strategy and tactics in practice. It will do so by examining operational police officers' perceptions of crowd theory, the strategy and tactics used to police an actual football crowd event and the subsequent understanding of this event expressed by the officers involved.

7.2 Method: Background

The event chosen for this analysis was a Football League fixture between two Championship clubs from the South of England that took place on Saturday 16th December 2006. A crowd of approximately twenty thousand fans were expected to

attend. Police intelligence suggested that this number would include approximately one thousand away fans, the vast majority of who were expected to pose little threat to public order. However, police intelligence also indicated that a minority of fans from both the host and visiting clubs were intent on engaging in disorder. Furthermore, the previous fixture between the two sides had resulted in major incidents of public disorder both in and outside the stadium. Reflecting this, the event was therefore classified by the host police force as category C or 'high risk'. The fixture therefore provided a large scale public order policing operation and crowd event within a force area that offered me full access to the policing operation.

7.2.1 Method: Rationale

In order to address the research questions it was necessary to establish that specific theoretical understandings of crowds were in place among officers due to be involved in the policing of the event. It was then necessary to gather data on police strategy and tactics during the event. Finally, it was necessary to systematically explore officers' own interpretations of these events. As in the previous chapter, the current study therefore employed a mixed methods design (see Waszak and Sines, 2003 for an overview of mixed methods in psychology).

7.2.2 Method: Data collection

Firstly sixty survey questionnaires (used in the previous chapters), were distributed to officers following a pre-match briefing two weeks prior to the game. The questionnaire was given to every officer who attended this briefing and therefore covered a range of different police ranks and operational roles. These included PSU officers, mounted officers, dog handlers, the command team and the football intelligence team. Again, as in the previous chapter, measures were taken of police theoretical understanding of crowds in terms of crowd composition, the psychological effects of crowds upon participants and causes of, and police tactical responses to, crowd violence. Participants responded to all items by demonstrating levels of agreement to questionnaire statements on a 6 point scale ranging from one (strongly disagree) to six (Strongly agree). A total of thirty nine officers involved in

policing the event returned completed questionnaires before or on the day of the match itself.

Prior to, during and after the event a programme of semi-structured ethnographic participant observation was conducted (Drury & Stott, 2001). This ethnographic framework not only allowed data to be collected during the operation itself but also enabled planning meetings to be attended as well as pre and post match briefings. Prior to the match operation this ethnographic methodology involved attending briefing and planning meetings and recording what was discussed and agreed (as well as distributing questionnaires). Through these observations it became apparent that the primary focus of the police during the match day operation would be on the away fans. As such, prior to the event, it was possible to arrange with the police commander to shadow the 'Bronze or forward' commander throughout the event, whose responsibility was to police the away supporters arriving into the city by train. Shadowing the bronze commander allowed observations to be made on the main body of the policing operation and where the most direct police fan interaction were planned to take place.

On the day of the operation the police commander for the operation formally introduced me at the main briefing and to those who were not already aware (from the pre brief) the object of my research was outlined. During the event observations focused on police tactics and actions (what they did and how), fan behaviour (what they did and how), any interactions between the police and supporters (communication, physical and verbal) and finally any incidents of disorder (including anti social behaviour and violence). Throughout the event interviews were also opportunistically conducted with various police officers who were involved in policing the away supporters. This meant access was available to three PSU's (66 officers) and the bronze commander and his tactical advisor. These interviews primarily focused on what the officer's were doing in situ and why.

Two weeks after the operation a post match police debrief was held by the police 'silver' commander. Notes were again made at this debrief and a week after a

written de-brief of the match day operation from five senior officers involved in the event was sent to me. With the consent and help of the command team a series of semi-structured interviews with a sample of police officers of various ranks was also arranged. The officers sampled were those who had been in key operational roles during the match day policing operation and who had also completed the questionnaire. Twelve officers were interviewed in total all of whom gave their consent prior to the interviews.

The interviews were semi-structured and focused on two main areas. The first was an exploration of the officer's ideas about the themes raised by the questionnaire. These questions asked the officers to describe their understanding of crowd composition and crowd dynamics, attributions for crowd disorder and police tactical responses to crowd disorder. The second area covered by the interviews related to the actual operation itself and the questions were based on the observations made on the police strategy and tactics and any notable events that occurred during the operation. Officers were allowed to answer the questions in any way they wanted and take as much or as little time as they needed. Observations and interviews were recorded on an audio recorder or by written field notes either contemporaneously or as soon as was practical after the event and were later transcribed.

Throughout the research there were a number of ethical considerations that had to be addressed. Gaining access to a policing operation of this scale involves establishing a level of trust between the police and researcher. Access to sensitive and detailed information about police procedure, intelligence and practice were all made available. A guarantee of anonymity to both officers and any specific information provided was established before the research was conducted. Before access to the field was granted specific rules and procedures for conduct were established to both minimise any disruption the research may have caused to the operation and also to minimise risk to my safety and the officers involved.

7.2.3 Analytical strategy

The analysis is broken into two sections. The first combines the questionnaire data and part of the post operation interview data in which officer's were specifically asked to explain their understanding of the different themes covered in the questionnaire. In terms of analysing the interview data, similarly to the previous chapter (Pidgeon, 1996; Glaser & Strauss, 1967) an initial process of coding the data under the four specific thematic categories from the questionnaire (crowd composition, crowd dynamics and behaviour, attributions for football disorder and police strategy and tactics for policing football) was conducted and then presented to my supervisor. This data was then critically discussed between the two of us and only data that was agreed as representing these headings was kept and from which the examples in the analysis are taken. However since each of the twelve officers were asked for their opinions on each of these themes coding was more straightforward than in the previous chapter. For the questionnaire data, in line with Stott (2003) and the previous chapters, the significance levels of the difference of the means from the midpoint (3.5) is reported using a one sample T-Test.

The second part of the analysis covers the observations of the operation itself and combines them with data from both the opportunistic interview data gathered on the day of the operation and the post match interview data where officers discussed the operation. Complete and chronological field notes were initially presented to my supervisor. The field notes were discussed between the two of us and a number of analytically relevant incidents were identified within the overall event (e.g. the corralling and escorting of away fans). Only those incidents which received agreement about their relevance and significance from both of us are included in the analysis section. The interview data was then organised into a series of themes relating to officers understanding of police tactics used during the event, exploring in particular officers' descriptions of the key incidents identified from the observation. Again this was achieved through a process of coding and critical revision between my PhD supervisor and me. All extracts from the data were selected for inclusion based on their representativeness in terms of the wider thematic category. The suffix indicates the precise origin of the extract.

7.3 Analysis

7.3.1 Police understanding of football crowds

Officers tended to agree that *'all sorts of people can be found in a football crowd'* ($M = 5.13, \pm 1.321, t(38) = 7.695, p < .001, d = 1.23$) and that *'most people in football crowds have peaceful intentions'* ($M = 5.08, \pm .900, t(38) = 10.944, p > .001, d = 1.75$). As an officer noted about nature of football crowds;

"It's a family affair, people of all sorts and of all ages." (Sgt2, post match interview).

However, officers also tended to agree that *'football crowds contain a minority of people who have violent or disorderly intentions'* ($M = 5.00, \pm 1.192, t(38) = 7.858, p > .001, d = 1.26$), who are particularly *'skilled at inciting crowd violence'* ($M = 4.10, \pm 1.334, t(38) = 2.882, p > .008, d = 0.45$). As an officer noted

"Some of the hooligan risk group, if you like, will try and generate some feelings of aggression or violence, and then not necessarily take the front place in that violence when it starts" (PC 9, post match interview).

In line with such ideas officers also tended to agree that *'even the most respectable and ordinary people can become irrational and violent when caught up in the middle of a football crowd'* ($M = 4.85, \pm .988, t(38) = 8.511, p > .001, d = 1.36$). As an officer noted;

"99% of people there are there to watch the football and don't really cause us any cause for concern other than the fact that they may get caught up in that violence that that 1% try and engage in." (PC 6, post match interview)

Importantly, therefore officers also tended to agree that *'once violence starts in a football crowd people get affected by the behaviour of others and are drawn into*

disorder' (M = 4.10, ± 1.021, t(38)= 3.687, p > .001, d = 0.59). Thus, while some officers described the majority as ordinary law abiding people they also portrayed crowds as posing a uniform problem for the police precisely because a minority can exploit this irrationality to influence the crowd as a whole toward disorder.

"I think there is a very low percentage of people who are risk¹⁵, and a large percentage of people that will follow disorder or become unhelpful should there be disorder, sheep or people that follow on...they just get carried along with the event as it happens. But you have a very small number that are particularly capable at ring-leading."(BC1, post match interview)

Given this view, officers tended to agree that *'the nature of football crowds is such that one usually needs look no further than the crowd itself to explain violence when it erupts'* (M = 4.38, ± 1.310, t(38) = 4.217, p >.001, d = 0.68). The data also suggests that officers lacked reflexivity about the potential for police use of force to play a role in the production or escalation of disorder in that they tended to agree that *'the police are rarely responsible for either the initiation or any escalation of violence at football'* (M = 4.56, ± 1.273, t(38) = 5.220, p > .001, d = 0.84). As another officer stated;

"If you give them an inch they will take a mile. There is really no other way of dealing with them." (BC3, post match interview)

Moreover, officers also agreed that *'football crowds must be strictly controlled in order to prevent widespread disorder'* (M = 4.44, ± 1.373, t(38) = 4.258, p > .001, d = 0.68). They also tended to endorse the view that *'it is important to intervene quickly and with force if anyone becomes violent within the crowd so this violence doesn't escalate'* (M = 4.67, ± 1.364, t(38) = 5.343, p > .001, d = 0.86). This suggests that

¹⁵ 'Risk' is a term police officers in the U.K. use to describe individuals and groups who are thought to be posing a threat to public order.

police understand the management of the crowd in terms of their ability to control its behaviour. Moreover, that when a violent minority is present within a crowd the use of force is an effective means to achieve this behavioural control. Certainly police described the need for control as a central feature of their attempts to prevent disorder.

"The policing of football is easy if you take control early on. The difficult days are the ones where you haven't got that control."

(SGT1, post match interview)

7.3.2 The event

The analysis turns now to explore the possible implications such understanding may have had for police strategy and tactics during the actual event. Field notes from the pre match briefing indicated that a central feature of the police tactical plan for the event was to corral all the travelling away fans when they arrived in the city, place them in a public house and then escort them to and from the stadium. Consequently, through negotiation with a local landlord the police had arranged for a local pub to house the away supporters due to arrive by train at the city's mainline station. Field notes record that it was the police intention to deploy to the station, contain the entire contingent of away fans within a box escort¹⁶ and take them to the designated public house which was approximately ten minutes walk from the station. From there they would later be escorted to the stadium. It was the police intention to clear any groups of home supporters judged to be posing a risk to public order from the pre-planned escort route and thus prevent any major outbreak of disorder.

¹⁶ A box escort is a method used to corral large numbers of people in a contained manner. In effect officers surround the group and enclose them in the middle.

The post match written debrief identified that host force policy dictates that for all fixtures designated 'high risk' all PSU¹⁷ officers have to deploy in full NATO¹⁸ (riot) uniform from the beginning of the operation. Force policy was applied for this event. Following their match day briefing three PSUs deployed to the train station and field notes record that by 11:30 a.m. approximately four hundred away fans had arrived at the station. The visiting forces football intelligence officer (FIO)¹⁹ was, as is normal practice, present at the station and identified to the bronze commander that a minority of these supporters were the expected 'risk fans'. The PSU officers blocked off all exits from the station except the one through which all away supporters then exited. The supporters then had to pass through a police filter cordon²⁰ directly into a box escort, which was to take them to the nearby public house. Field notes recorded that during this process the Bronze Commander announced to the fans that they would be escorted to the public house, where they would be able to drink and eat, and that they would then be escorted to the stadium on foot at a designated time. It was clear that throughout this process the away fans had little choice but to comply with police instruction.

Observations recorded that during the police escort officers kept the visors on their riot helmets up and engaged in high levels of friendly interpersonal interaction with the away supporters. In post event interviews when officers were talking about their dress code on the day they described how they were aware of the possible negative impact deployment in NATO uniform could have. However, their accounts also describe how this concern was overwritten by the fact that the uniform offered officers greater protection from injury, a central issue for them given concerns over

¹⁷ A PSU is the acronym for police support group, which is a public order trained police unit consisting of three police serials (One Sergeant and six Pc's per serial) and one Inspector in charge of all three serials.

¹⁸ NATO is the name given to police riot uniforms. These include protective clothing and helmets. In the current study officers did not carry shields with them.

¹⁹ A football intelligence office, is a officer who works specifically with a football club to identify and deal with risk supporters and also build relations between legitimate supporters the club and the police.

²⁰ A police filter cordon is made up of officers standing in lines with gaps between them for people to pass through. A section 60a of the 1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act had been granted by the court and signed by the police commander. This was randomly enforced by collecting the personal details from a sample of the supporters at the station as they passed through the filter cordon.

the high risk nature of the fixture. They also emphasised that the wearing of NATO uniform allowed them to demonstrate police capability to use force if they were required to do so. Such 'displays of strength' to the crowd of away supporters were described as a tactic for dissuading the fans from causing trouble.

"Well maybe a negative point could be that whether we are sort of showing that [by wearing NATO uniform] we mean business and it might bring them to our level sort of thing. But turn that right around and we see it more as a positive. We can show that we do mean business, so I don't think there are a lot of negatives at all".

(SGT1, post event interview)

The away supporters reached the public house without incident. Post match the rationale for using this tactic of mass containment was described in terms of its ability to deliver control to the police in the face of the perceived dangers posed by the crowd.

"A reason for using this tactic is that, invariably the safest way for us to manage a group of supporters, of which we knew a proportion of them would be risk supporters, is to gain control as soon as the arrive in the city".(SC1, post match interview)

At the designated time the decision was taken to remove the fans from the public house and escort them to the stadium. Subsequently, notes record that the Bronze Commander entered the pub and instructed the fans that they were required to finish their drinks within a few minutes and exit the pub into a box escort. It took approximately fifteen minutes for the fans to comply. On leaving the pub all the away fans were forced to enter the escort. Immediately outside of the escort there were now also police horses and police dogs. Roads ahead of the escort were closed by the police to prevent road vehicle traffic, and the escort began to move off in the direction of the stadium. Observational notes made at the time record that the crowd within the escort began to chant and sing football songs and a few bottles

were thrown into empty spaces to the sides of the escort but that despite these provocations the rest of the crowd remained calm.

As the public house was some considerable distance from the stadium and fans had been drinking field notes recorded that a few fans requested that they should be allowed an opportunity to go to the toilet. The notes also record that there was some indication that if fans were not allowed to do this that they may become disorderly. After some time the escort was stopped by the Bronze Commander and fans were allowed to urinate onto wasteland alongside the road. According to field notes this happened on three occasions during the forty five minute period it took to reach the stadium. During a post match interview the Bronze Commander discussed how on each occasion he was aware that urinating in this way was technically against the law. However, his rationale for stopping to allow the fans to do this was based on the ability this action would give him to maintain physical control over the crowd.

"I think they were going to do it anyway. Okay, so they were probably breaching some city law about pissing in the street, but on balance they were going to stop anyway, so you maintain some sort of control by facilitating those toilet stops." (BC2, post match interview)

As the escort approached the stadium, field notes identify that the Bronze commander responsible for clearing the escort route reported that large numbers of home 'risk' fans were gathering in a park alongside the route of the escort. As it approached the park, large numbers of these fans charged violently towards the escort. Post match interviews clarified that the Bronze commander responsible for clearing the route requested additional resources that were initially not available as all other public order resources were being used to escort the away fans. Eventually, the Silver Commander reallocated a PSU and horses from the escort and notes record that the home fans were dispersed as a result of a series of baton charges which lasted for approximately five minutes. Throughout this incident the away fans

remained compliant to police instruction to stay within the box escort. Following the dispersal the escort proceeded to the stadium and all the away fans entered just before the match kicked off.

The home team won the match one nil and notes record that the crowd of approximately four hundred and fifty away fans were held back inside the stadium for fifteen minutes so that the area around the stadium could be cleared of home supporters. All the away fans were then contained within another box escort as they exited the stadium. Those who had not travelled by train were then allowed to leave. As the escort moved away from the stadium and for approximately twenty minutes along the escort route, field notes indicate that groups of home supporters attempted to attack the crowd within the escort. PSUs ahead of the escort repeatedly baton charged these groups which prevented them reaching the escort. During these confrontations there was no concerted effort made by any away fans to break free or otherwise confront the home supporters and they remained compliant to police instruction. Approximately fifty minutes after leaving the stadium the escort reached the train station. A scheduled train had been delayed at the station by the British Transport Police to await the away fans arrival at the station. The away fans boarded the train with no further confrontations between supporters or police.

Despite the substantial disorder involving home fans in a post match interview one of the commanding officers described the operation as successful. This success was described in terms of the lack of intention among away supporters to create or otherwise involve themselves in the disorder. His comments also indicate that the police were aware of their tactical inability to contain away fans should they have sought collectively to engage in the disorder.

“That day in particular I have to say that they [away fans] were not that intent on having a fight. Because if they had have been they could have broken free and could have joined in”. (SC, post match interview)

Moreover, some officers expressed concerns about the fact that the lack of opportunity to use force against away fans because they were orderly throughout may actually have negative consequence for future operations. As one officer noted:

“The only thing that nags me at the end of these sorts of operation is that have we just delayed it again until next season? When the fixtures come out next year and we see [away club] coming up on a Saturday, have we just delayed having to do it all again next year? Because we have not made so much of a statement this time, that they [away supporters] look at it and think we are not going to go there because. Or is it going to self-perpetuate itself every year regardless of what happens, if we are playing [away team] that we are always going to have to have this type of policing response”.
(FIO, post match interview)

7.4 Discussion

This study set out to examine the potential relationship between police theoretical understanding of crowd dynamics and their strategic and tactical responses during a high risk crowd event. This was done by gathering data in three ways. First, data was gathered on police understanding of crowd dynamics. Second, direct observations of the policing of the high risk crowd event were made. Third, contemporaneous and post hoc interviews were conducted to explore officers understanding of the event and the tactics that were used. The data demonstrates that prior to the event those policing it did perceive crowd dynamics in terms of a peaceful majority and violent minority. The majorities' malleability then meant that if a minority were present, the crowd as a whole was likely to be seen as uniformly dangerous. Furthermore, the data also suggested that the police lacked reflexivity about the potentially negative impact that the use of force can have upon crowd dynamics. Finally, officers understood that controlling crowds was centrally important and that the use of force was a means through which they could achieve this.

The questionnaire analysis and interview data therefore provides support for the argument that the police involved in this event held what can be described as a 'classic' psychological perspective of crowd behaviour (Stott & Reicher, 1998b; Drury et al., 2003). This perspective was in turn associated with an understanding of the appropriateness of tactics which would control crowds through the use or threat of force. The primary strategic and tactical approach to the management of the perceived threat to disorder was subsequently the forceful mass containment of the entire contingent of away fans. This study therefore provides further confirmation of the relationship identified in the previous two chapters, creating a strong body of evidence that there is an association between police understanding of crowd dynamics and police public order strategy and tactics. In particular, where the police hold the perception that there is a violent minority within the crowd they subsequently view the whole crowd as potentially dangerous, attribute disorder to this danger and therefore rely upon tactics which are relatively indiscriminate towards crowds as a whole.

However, it was evident that this mass containment was not just a matter of the theoretical perspective. The paramilitary NATO uniform was worn simply as a matter of force policy and would therefore always be worn for all high risk events. The resources used to police the public order aspects of this event were also all in PSU formation and were therefore specifically trained in the use of force as a means of crowd containment and dispersal. Given these institutional constraints toward paramilitary formation and the priority given to the use of arrest containment and dispersal identified in public order training, it is not surprising that police tactics utilised containment and dispersal as their primary tactical options. Throughout the policing operation these PSUs were concentrated on the containment of away fans. However, the tactic of mass containment then presented an opportunity for home fans to initiate disorder, partly because all police resources were being used to corral the away fans and partly because the away fans had gathered in one location as a result of police tactics (Stott, Livingstone & Hoggett, 2008). Since the police did not have the legal rights or resources to operate a mass containment tactic on all home fans, they therefore had little choice but to corral the away fans and disperse the

home fans if and when they initiated disorder. In line with Della Porta & Reiter's (1998) ideas about the multifaceted nature of 'police knowledge' the analysis also supports the idea that there appear to be a set of practical constraints such as the legal context and policing culture also determine the policing style that is adopted.

The data also demonstrates that throughout this event officers engaged in positive interpersonal interaction and communication with away supporters. Moreover, by ensuring that they could attend the football match unmolested, drink safely in a public house and engage in toilet breaks on their way to the stadium, it is evident that facilitation was therefore also an integral aspect of the tactical approach. As such there were aspects of the policing operation that were consistent with a 'negotiated management' style. In this respect it is relevant that throughout the event away fans did not engage in disorder and complied with police instruction. It is possible that these aspects of 'negotiated management' helped to create a sense of intergroup legitimacy between the away supporters and the police and therefore undermined the potential for violent norms to emerge (Stott & Pearson, 2007).

However, it is also relevant that the data from post match interviews suggest that the police were unaware of the potentially positive role that their facilitation tactics may have had upon crowd dynamics during the event. For example, the analysis suggested that the operation was seen as successful because the away supporters (the focus of the operation) were not disorderly. However it also identified that the police believed that this was not due to the explicit police tactics used which they acknowledged may have been ineffectual (as they did not actually get to use force against the away supporters as they did when dispersing the home supporters) but simple because the away fans were not up for it on that particular day. The police tactics not based on force (communication, interpersonal interaction and facilitation) were not even considered as making a positive contribution towards the fans conduct. Therefore in planning for the operation next year the ability to use more or greater force was seen as the best option rather than addressing the issue of why the away fans did not engage in disorder this time and how other tactics may have played a part in this.

7.5 Limitations

The study has a number of limitations. The first and most obvious limitation is that the study focuses on football crowds at just one event. There are specific and unique features of football crowds such as two opposing sets of fans with their own prior histories, the effects of which must be considered. Secondly, the political sensitivities to policing football are far less than those which may surround political demonstrations. Thirdly, levels of alcohol consumption can differ markedly along with the aims and intentions of participants. Therefore it can only be speculated how these relationships work in other types of crowds and future research should also seek to examine these relationships within a wider array of crowd events. Finally, the most obvious limitation is that the current study does not contain data gathered from participants during the crowd event. Consequently, it is difficult to determine the role and impact of police tactics on supporters' perceptions of legitimacy and behaviour. Such data would certainly have allowed for a more conclusive interpretation of the event and its outcomes. Certainly future research should seek to gather such data.

7.6 Conclusion

Nonetheless, the current analysis advances the literature in a number of respects. It supports the contention that there is a relationship between police officers' theoretical understanding of crowd dynamics and the tactics they use to police such events. In this respect, the study shows where police held a 'classical' theoretical perspective so too the *modus operandi* was mass containment and dispersal through the threat and use of force. But the data also suggests that the relationship between police theoretical understandings and their tactics is perhaps more complicated than has been suggested previously (Stott & Reicher, 1998a, Drury et al, 2003; Prati & Pietrantoni, 2009).

What this study demonstrated is the way in which while officers may have held a 'classical' view of crowds, its relationship to practice proved problematic. While tactics based on force were utilised, during the event officers also adopted tactics

more in line with a negotiated management approach. Officers used facilitation, negotiation and communication and yet demonstrated no apparent awareness of these as formal tactics or of the positive impact they may have been having upon crowd dynamics. In other words their behaviour embodied a tacit understanding of the crowd as a reasoned and norm governed social grouping. However, this tacit understanding coexisted alongside the explicit classical theoretical perspective articulated by officers. It therefore remained un-reflexive and failed to provide an articulated basis for developing such novel, effective, efficient and less confrontational approaches to policing, capable of reducing conflict within football over the longer term.

Such an analysis also sits neatly alongside some of the public order literature which identified that in practice the police may utilise what De Lint (2005) termed a hybrid policing model, which can be thought of as an 'iron fist in a velvet glove'. More importantly, in line with Schweingruber (2000), since Le Bonian understandings of football crowds appeared to be in place this hybrid model appears to have developed more because of practical and legislative constraints (as noted in the previous paragraph), rather than due to any underlying shift in police sensitivities about the impact of their actions on crowd behaviour. Finally this also links in with the two processes which della Porta and Reiter (1998) identified influence police public order strategy and tactics. They are individual specific lessons learned and police knowledge. What the current study suggests is that officers are utilising individual experience about what works and in doing so recognising the limitations that escalated force may have in some circumstances and therefore the need for the utilisation of negotiated management. However, it also suggests that because police knowledge is explicitly dominated by a Le Bonian model of crowd behaviour these lessons learned are remaining individual while the use of tactics based primarily on force are explicitly being built upon and shared. In this sense then police knowledge is reinforced and escalated force supported whilst individual experience and negotiated management is undermined.

The study suggests that the police may therefore do more in practice than they say they do, however because such understanding remains tacit it is not explicitly built upon. In other words, the study suggests the fact that the police are only able to articulate a 'classical' theoretical view of crowds is unfortunate because it may be a barrier to a fuller recognition and implementation of a 'negotiated management' approach to public order policing.

Chapter Eight: An alternative model for the effective management of public order at football in England & Wales?

8.1 Introduction

The empirical chapters in this thesis have so far explored the potentially counter productive relationship that may exist between classical crowd theory and public order practice. Questions about what, if any, alternative policing approaches exist within the context of policing football in England and Wales and what relationship, if any, such alternatives may have with crowd theory have yet to be addressed. The evidence available from Euro 2004 (Stott, Adang, Schrieber and Livingstone, 2007; 2008) and covered in the literature review chapters builds a convincing empirical case that managing collective disorder among football fans is not simply about the control of hooligans but also about the effective management of crowd dynamics and psychology (Stott & Pearson, 2006;). In particular, it demonstrates that it is useful to adopt approaches to policing which encourage members of the crowd to perceive their intergroup relationships with the police as legitimate. Where this is achieved a situation may emerge in which those seeking disorder are marginalised, important moments of self policing increase and there are overall reductions in collective disorder.

However to date, evidence to support these ideas has only been collected at one international event (Euro2004) during a limited time frame. There is at present little in the way of analysis of the applicability of such a model to the extensive and sometimes major incidents of football crowd violence that occur within the U.K. The existing literature therefore does not include a detailed exploration of strategies of long term conflict reduction, particularly as this relates to domestic football in England and Wales. Moreover, the small amount of research that does exist on the policing of domestic football in England and Wales draws exclusively upon observations of police practice and crowd behaviour and does not touch directly upon the underlying social psychological processes mediating these observed relationships (Stott, Livingstone & Hoggett, 2008).

However, during the course of this domestic research on football, a series of ethnographic observations were conducted with the South Wales Police and Cardiff City Football Club. These observations identified how the approach to tackling football related disorder developing at Cardiff had many similarities with the ESIM informed policing model of the PSP at Euro 2004. As such, Cardiff City provided the opportunity to address the applicability of an alternative policing approach to football within the domestic policing context. Before such an analysis is conducted however it is important to understand the wider socio-historical background that provides the contextual backdrop for the developments at Cardiff City.

8.1.1 Background

Domestically there is a history of 'violent' fan groups associated with most major football clubs in England and Wales. Perhaps one of the most notorious of these is the fans of Cardiff City Football Club (CCFC). Their reputation for collective violence has developed on the back of a whole series of major incidents of serious 'disorder' across many years (Davies, 2009). Throughout the 1980's and 90's 'hooliganism' at football became highly publicised and within this framework CCFC's 'Soul Crew', the name adopted by CCFCs hooligan following, were considered one of the main protagonists. The notoriety of the Soul Crew and the problems they posed led Eddie Curtis, the then head of the England Football Police Delegation to state during an interview on television that *"since Euro 2000 some of the worst hooligan activities on mainland Britain and the largest number of hooligans that can be turned out are by Cardiff City"* (BBC, 2002).

In 2000 CCFC was bought by Sam Hammam who installed himself as the Club's Chairman. One of his top priorities was to transform the club's infamous hooligan notoriety. However, soon after his takeover there were two serious and high profile incidents of 'rioting' at CCFCs stadium, Ninian Park, surrounding matches involving Bristol City F.C. on Saturday 29th December, 2000 and Leeds United F.C. on Sunday 6th January, 2001. On both occasions there was large scale collective conflict that predominantly consisted of confrontations between Cardiff fans and the South Wales Police (SWP) rather than between opposing sets of supporters.

These incidents proved to be a catalyst for the South Wales Police, CCFC, Cardiff fans and the Local Authority to begin to develop initiatives in an attempt to address what they saw as the underlying causes of the collective disorder. Through a series of changes that flowed from this initiative there is evidence of a steep decline in the levels of public disorder at Ninian Park. This decline is reflected in the number of Cardiff fans arrested and the number of resources used to police matches at Ninian Park between 2002 and 2006. For example, in the season 2002/03 there were 194 Cardiff fans arrested (both home and away) but by the 2004/05 season this figure had declined to 90. The SWP recorded 14 'significant incidents' involving CCFC fans during the seasons 2002/03. During the season 2003/04 this had declined to a total of 9, only two of which were at Ninian Park. By 2004/05 this had reduced to no incidents at Ninian Park and 5 incidents away, but according to the SWP only three of these involved major disorder. In terms of policing Ninian Park the season 2001/02 required the use of approximately 1716 police officers, whereas by 2005/06 this had declined to approximately 946. However, while this initial downturn in levels of disorder spread across several consecutive seasons, most recently there has been a subsequent escalation in disorder. For example, statistics from the 05/06 season too the 07/08 season show an escalation in arrests from 55 to 90

Since the implementation of the Football (Disorder) Act 2000 a large number of Cardiff fans who had been convicted of football related offences were subjected to Football Banning Orders. According to Home Office figures by 2002 CCFC had the highest number of arrests and football banning orders associated to it than to any other club in England and Wales. Yet despite the removal of CCFCs main hooligan contingent incidents of collective disorder involving Cardiff fans continued to occur. However, these incidents occurred predominantly at matches away from Ninian Park under the jurisdiction of other police forces. Moreover, there was considerable variability in levels of disorder involving Cardiff supporters within other force areas and even within the same force area. For example, in 2003 there was major disorder involving Cardiff fans following their visit to Huddersfield F.C. However, in contrast to the rioting at Huddersfield the corresponding fixture at Bradford City F.C. the

following season, also under the jurisdiction of West Yorkshire Police, passed off without major incident.

8.1.2 Aims

An analysis of the situation at CCFC therefore provides a fertile opportunity to examine the extent to which the ESIM is capable of explaining both conflict reduction over extended periods among crowds attending domestic football fixtures in England and Wales and its subsequent increase. Moreover, the fact that major riots continued to occur sporadically at fixtures in other force areas during this time period provides an opportunity to explore the potential impact of variability in the relationships between social psychological processes among Cardiff fans, the policing approach adopted and the extent which these processes may have influenced either the absence or presence of disorder.

This chapter seeks to extend the literature in two distinct ways. The first is to explore the extent to which the absence of disorder among football fans in domestic football can be understood theoretically in terms of the effective management of crowd dynamics and psychology. The second is to explore the extent to which the dynamics proposed by ESIM are then capable of building a theoretical analysis of conflict reduction over extended periods of time in ways that highlight the relevance of social psychology as the theoretical basis for policy development in this domain. It is to exploring how the ESIM can explain the changes made in South Wales in terms of their impact on Cardiff supporter's collective psychology and their overall outcome in terms of cost and conflict reduction that will be explored in detail for the remainder of this chapter.

8.2 Method

The central method adopted for this programme of research was participant observation with the same fan group across multiple events. This approach has the advantage of allowing for comparisons across different contexts. Since it was the intention of this research to examine the potential role played by social psychological processes and intergroup dynamics, it was also therefore necessary to gain access to and gather data from all of the key interacting groups. This involved

developing and maintaining contacts with officers in the South Wales Police, the Cardiff City FC safety and security team and Cardiff city supports (particularly the Valley RAMs). Therefore initial concentration was given to establishing meaningful access to and becoming embedded within the context. Any variability in psychology and behaviour could then be explored and evidence gathered on the factors influencing fan psychology and behaviour.

8.2.1 Data gathering

Following sponsorship from ACPO after Euro 2004 Dr. Clifford Stott was able to develop access to the West Yorkshire Police for the fixture between Leeds United F.C. and Cardiff F.C. on 15th January, 2005. At that fixture contact was made with the football intelligence team from South Wales Police, CCFC's Safety and Security team and key representatives from CCFCs fan base. Subsequently, a programme of semi-structured observations began with CCFC made by Dr. Stott and myself which took in the following 21 fixtures.

In the season 04/05 Dr Stott made observations at the following fixtures: Sheffield United (A), Saturday 5th March; Plymouth (A), Saturday 2nd April; Stoke City (A), Tuesday 5th April. During the season 05/06 Dr Stott and myself conducted observations at the following matches: Stoke City (A), Tuesday 27th September; Sheffield United (A), Saturday 29th October; Sheffield Wednesday (A) Wednesday 9th November; Leeds United (A) Saturday 10th December; Arsenal (A) (FA cup), Saturday 7th January; Sheffield Wednesday (H) Saturday March 4th; Wolverhampton Wanderers (A, observations made solely by me) Saturday 11th March; Coventry City (A) Sunday 13th April. In the season 06/07 Dr Stott and I made observations at the following games: Leeds United (A) Saturday 19th August; Birmingham City (H) Saturday 26th August; Sheffield Wednesday (A) Saturday November 25th; Stoke City (A) Tuesday November 28th; Tottenham Hotspur (H) Sunday 7th January; Wolverhampton Wanderers (A) Saturday 20th January; QPR (A) Saturday 21st April. Finally in the season 07/08 Dr Stott and I conducted observations at the following fixtures: Liverpool (A) (Carling Cup), Tuesday October 31st; Stoke City (A) Saturday

February 2nd; Wolverhampton Wanderers (H) (FA Cup) Saturday 16th February; Barnsley, FA Cup Semi Final at Wembley, Sunday 6th April.

The fixtures were chosen either because access was available to the host police force or invitations were forthcoming from CCFC or CCFC fan groups. Where access to the host police force was available observations took the form of shadowing Police Commanders at various levels (usually Bronze Command). It was generally possible to attend briefings, view police strategic and tactical documentation and take an overview of the police operation throughout. Where access to the host force was not sought or available, access to matches was provided by CCFC. These observations took the form of participating in the event either among Cardiff City fans or shadowing the CCFC safety and security team. Observations recorded the approximate chronology of events and the observers' qualitative impressions of fan behaviour, fan group interactions, police deployment (numbers, uniform, behaviour, etc), fan and police interactions and any other aspects of the situation judged at the time by the observers to be theoretically relevant. These data were recorded directly onto audio recorders and later transcribed. Where observations were made by both Dr Stott and myself, field notes were written up independently and then compared and triangulated so that a comprehensive and accurate narrative of events was created. Photographs and video were also used to record events when this was possible. Table ten illustrates the events attended, the nature of initial police deployments at these events, and any conflict between fans or between fans and the police.

Table 10 event, police deployment, and conflict.

Event	Nature of initial police deployment			Conflict between opposing fans			Conflict between Cardiff fans & police			Conflict between other fans & police		
	Normal	Hybrid	Nato	None	Minor	Major	None	Minor	Major	None	Minor	Major
2004/2005												
Sheffield United (a)			X	X					X	X		
Plymouth Argyle (a)			X	X				X		X		
Stoke City (a)			X		X			X		X		
2005/2006												
Stoke City (a)		X		X				X		X		
Sheffield United (a)		X			X		X			X		
Sheffield Wednesday (a)		X		X				X			X	
Leeds United (a)		X		X			X					X
Arsenal (a)		X		X				X		X		
Sheffield Wednesday (h)		X		X			X			X		
Wolverhampton Wanderers (a)			X		X				X	X		
Coventry City (a)		X		X			X			X		
2006/2007												
Leeds United (a)		X		X			X				X	
Birmingham City (h)		X		X				X		X		
Sheffield Wednesday (a)		X		X			X			X		
Stoke City (a)		X		X			X				X	
Tottenham Hotspur (h)			X		X			X			X	
Wolverhampton Wanderers (a)		X		X			X			X		
Queens Park Rangers (a)			X		X			X		X		
2007/2008												
Liverpool (a)		X		X			X			X		
Stoke City (a)	X			X			X			X		
Wolverhampton Wanderers (h)		X		X			X			X		
Barnsley (a)		X		X			X			X		

8.2.2 Other data

For some fixtures pre-event planning meetings were attended, and pre and post event interviews conducted. Throughout each fixture semi structured interviews with various parties were conducted by both Dr Stott and me (e.g. police at all levels, club officials, fans, etc). On these occasions fan interviews were driven by specific theoretical concerns as they were relevant to the, often rapidly developing, surrounding events. The verbal content of these interactions was recorded as written field notes or onto audio recorders and transcribed as soon as was practical. All key actors were fully aware of the research and provided informed consent prior to their first interview.

Throughout the period between January 2005 and April 2008 regular communication with the South Wales Police, CCFC Operational Command team, CCFC Safety and Security Team and SWP Football Intelligence Officers was maintained primarily by Dr Stott. These communications generally focused upon the strategic and tactical approaches to the management of Cardiff fans, their relationships to other police forces, the nature of the threat to public order posed by Cardiff fans groups and details regarding the levels of resources, arrests and Football Banning Orders. The SWP also provided access for both Dr Stott and me to key policy documents. Additionally throughout this period a series of meetings, interviews and other communications took place with key representatives from the Cardiff fan base. In general terms these were focused upon fans' intentions, their experiences of policing, relationships with other fan groups, views upon violence and those involved in it and relationships to other agencies such as CCFC and SWP. Data was either recorded directly or as audio or written field notes.

Finally, during this period both Dr Stott and myself were introduced to a member of the Rams (Jason Whatley) who was conducting an independent piece of research examining Cardiff supporters identity and attitudes during this period of transition and development for Cardiff City FC. Jason was interested in the research we were conducting and agreed to allow me access to the interview data that he had collected. Jason provided me with the transcripts from 16 interviews conducted with

a range of Cardiff city supporters. The interviews were semi structured, with the main topics of discussion being their experiences of violence at football, their experiences of policing at football and identity issues as Cardiff City supporters.

8.2.3 Analytical strategy.

The analysis involved a number of different stages. Initially, as noted observational data and ad hoc interview data was written up into a comprehensive historical narrative. To do this Dr Stott provided me with all of his observational field notes and interview data which was then triangulated (Denzin, 1978) with my own field notes before being presented back to Dr Stott. Once agreed upon the observational data was then used to inform analysis of both Dr Stott's and Jason's interview data. As in the previous chapters this interview data was thematically organised using a constructionist revision of grounded theory (Pidgeon, 1996; Glaser & Strauss, 1967) in order to explore how the events observed corresponded with descriptions of fans' identity and relationship to others during this period. The analysis of fans phenomenology was then cross referenced with police interview data and statistics to explore how the historical events along with the social and psychological processes evident among fans corresponded to police understandings, strategy and tactics.

Finally, all of this data was again triangulated and presented to my PhD supervisor so that a consensual account of the theoretically relevant historical events could be agreed upon. Unless otherwise stated, the account of events presented here is based upon either a) direct evidence from official statistic, direct observation, video or photographic evidence b) agreement between two or more independent sources of data (e.g. correspondence between independent interview data or between interviews and observations). Where sources diverge or only one provides data a specific reference to that source is given prior to a description of the event. The extracts from the qualitative data presented were selected for their representativeness in terms of exemplifying the wider body of data within the

relevant thematic category. The suffix indicates the precise origin of the extract and who the data was collected by (CS, JW and JH).

8.3 Analysis

8.3.1 The Valley RAMs.

Being the largest and most successful club in Wales CCFC has traditionally drawn a large contingent of fans from the three major South Wales Valleys just north of the city. During the season 2000/01 different groups of CCFC fans from these valleys had begun to organise a travel club for away fixtures under the banner of the Valley RAMs (i.e. the Valleys of the Rhondda, Aberdare and Merthyr - RAMs). Over the next year the RAMs rapidly expanded developing their own website along with a strong sense of collective identity. A central feature of this identity was a desire to legitimately utilise football as a place for drunken boisterous behaviour but which was explicitly differentiated from hooliganism.

“People like to drink or have a bag of chips, bet on the horses, have a sing-song, find a pub, go to the game, sing their head off, make a fool of themselves, let their hair down, and come home. It doesn’t mean that they’re hooligans that they want to fight.”(VR, 2, JW)

Whilst not actively seeking violence the RAMs described themselves in terms of a strong sense of solidarity and a requirement to defend one another if confronted. Thus, some RAMs would describe how they would actively participate in disorder if they understood that they were being provoked by other groups.

“On normal procedures, you come out [the stadium] and mill around the buses, because there is a threat, not just from away fans mind, but from the police. You wouldn’t get on the bus and leave your mate outside if the police were heavy handed and

pushing because you would be seen as a coward, you would stay there with you mate 'cos there's a threat". (VR, 4, CS)

It was because of this tendency to become involved in disorder that the RAMs were classified as risk supporters by the police. The South Wales Police (SWP) acknowledged this issue, describing how the size and hence fighting power of Cardiff's active 'hooligans', the 'Soul Crew', was mediated primarily by their ability to influence the spontaneous involvement of large contingents of the RAMs.

"For me the Soul Crew were nothing without the Valleys behind them because the Valley Boys, they are big hard boys and they have got the numbers. The Soul Crew would say 'oh we have got to fight them, there is fifty of us, come on lads' and then they would have two thousand of the Valley boys charging behind them and it looks impressive" (SWP FIO, SI, CS)

8.3.2 The crisis of confidence, dialogue and change.

Following the major 'riots' of 2000/01, the SWP began an analysis of the causes of disorder among the Cardiff fan base. In particular documentation obtained from the SWP identified that an emphasis was placed upon the disorder emerging from an array of different inter-related factors rather than in terms of simply the convergence of hooligans. Central to their analysis was an understanding of the limitations of their approach to public order policing. As a senior Commander at Ninian Park during this period commented:

"You had very little steward intervention outside the ground, the car park outside was full of weapons. I mean it was gravelled, it was full of stones. We were getting very little movement from the local authority into tarmac that. Our camera provision outside of the ground wasn't fantastic and our tannoy system wasn't as affective as it should have been. So

we end up with a situation at the end of the games where we were actually doing running lines of police for two hours before we contained the situation. Where you probably had 300 maybe more... home supporters in running lines with the police. What we were doing was a real failure in policing. We were ending up batoning and people were going away with trophies which would be an injury from confrontation with the police and no retrospective arrest"(ACC, CS).

In response to this recognition, the SWP then took an active role in establishing a meeting between the various relevant agencies including themselves, CCFC, the local authority and importantly key representatives from the Cardiff fan base. This involved increasing the levels of dialogue with official and unofficial fan organisations in order to increase mutual understanding of the problems faced both by fans and by the club (SWP documentation). As a direct outcome of this initiative, CCFC initiated a ticketing and safety policy in the season 2000/01. Additionally, with respect to away fixtures, the stadium manager and club safety officer would seek to attend a meeting with the host club and police force in order to exchange information, develop cooperation and discuss and agree strategies and tactics. CCFC also began providing stewards for all its competitive away fixtures.

Under the terms of the initiative CCFC & SWP also signed two formal cooperation agreements (which were made available to me for the current research). One included a provision for the exchange of confidential information. This then allowed both the club and SWP to identify and intervene against suspected or convicted 'hooligans' and, if necessary, to instigate a policy of short to long term stadium bans for those involved in or convicted of football related offences. The other was a charter agreement with Cardiff County Council relating to the eradication of anti-social behaviour more generally across the South Wales region. CCFC also introduced a club photo-ID card based membership scheme and made it a condition that tickets for away fixtures would only be offered to those holding these cards.

Alongside the photo-ID membership and ticketing scheme CCFC developed a travel arrangement policy such that match tickets would only be issued for high risk away fixtures alongside an official travel ticket. This policy of combined ticketing and travel would also be used where possible for fan groups travelling to Ninian Park for fixtures designated high risk.

“For these games the Club will arrange transport either directly with the coach companies or through official supporters Clubs formed at the Club. The Club also co-ordinates the travel arrangements with South Wales Police and the local Police for the game so that rendezvous points, arrival times etc are organized and known to all involved.” (CCFC policy document).

Alongside these policy changes there were infrastructure developments to the area immediately outside the stadium. Notes made by Dr Stott recorded that additional CCTV cameras were installed along with improved lighting, the car park was tarmaced by the Local Authority and a large area of it opposite the away turnstiles was fenced off to accommodate the easier segregation of away fans arriving by coach. Changes were also made to the security response immediately outside Ninian Park with CCFC stewards taking an active responsibility for managing fans in this area. As one police commander commented, this enabled the stewards to provide a less confrontational means of managing the crowd.

“What changed dramatically after that and it was incremental was steward intervention rather than police outside the ground. The stewards would intervene and ask people to move back, so there was a much lower level of confrontation, it wasn’t the police in riot gear it was stewards saying come on this is for the club etc” (SWP, Supt, 1, CS).

Correspondingly, alongside their drive to secure Football Banning Orders for those convicted of football related offences the police also developed their tactical

approach; characterised by communication and positive interpersonal interaction with fans. As a CCFC official pointed out:

“There was no contact, no dialogue, there was nothing. Then they [the police] stopped that. They started talking to fans and they would interact with the fans, go to the fans meetings, the fans then thought ‘we know why they are here now they are not here to beat us up, there not here to bludgeon us, there here for a reason’, and the fans reacted accordingly” (AK, 1, CS).

8.3.3 Increasing intergroup legitimacy and psychological change

During interviews with between Dr. Stott and members of the valley RAMs it was described how prior to the new regime their relationship with the club was perceived as antagonistic and as such that it was perfectly acceptable to engage in aggressive acts without fear of censure from other supporters.

“It was a case of in the past, fuck the club .You know what have they done for us or whatever. We were seen as the enemy here, let’s do what we want. If you want to snap something on the way out, you’d snap something, no one [other fans] would say anything”. (VR GD, CS)

Subsequent to the changes to policy, infrastructure and policing some within the Valley RAMs began to describe their impact in terms of an emerging sense of legitimacy in their intergroup relationships with both Club and police. Rather than enforcing the traditional approach of confronting the fans some described how the new Chairman, Sam Hammam, had actively sought inclusion and involvement even from those seen by the club as hooligans.

“Sam knew the best way to fight hooligans was to get them to accept that they have got to be part of it, you know that’s what

he done. You know this is Sam's business and they were wrecking the club. Now if he had come in here with a big stick, which hadn't worked at all [in the past], they would have just of seen him as the enemy" (VR CK, CS).

Some RAMs also explained that following the new approach a sense of common ownership and identification with the club emerged.

VR: 'Well we are all in it together, we know we can help the club and it's our club now and we feel it's our club" (Interviews, VR, CS)

Others also referred to a developing relationship of mutual respect with the SWP defined in terms of a sense of fairness under the law.

"There are bridges built with the police in Cardiff, definitely, and we've got respect. We know a lot of good, some good police in Cardiff who have got respect for the boys. They are fair they won't let you break the law or whatever, but they'll treat you fair" (BJ, JW)

Consequently, those who were seeking to create disorder were described as marginalised from the wider contingent of risk fans and less able to influence the large numbers they needed to create widespread disorder.

"We have between us all at the club managed to isolate and almost totally break up the so called "organised hooligan element" that had been so prevalent at Cardiff. We have achieved this by attracting huge numbers of fans, happy enough to travel on organised coaches and willingly compliant" (VR GD, JH)

Some RAMs organisers were explicit about the processes involved in undermining the potential for widespread disorder by reducing the influence of, and therefore disempowering, the hooligan element.

"We still got some [fans] who don't want to improve, but they have been isolated because the majority of the bad guys you know as a percentage, take one hundred of the bad guys, you've got five raving right wing lunatics, five up the other end who don't want nothing, and a massive amount in the middle who get caught up in things. Well those five out of the hundred, the nutters who want to fight all the time and don't care what they do to the club, will try and kick things off and arrange things when they know they've got 95 behind them, now those 95 will say fuck off". (GD, CS)

This new approach was also related to an improvement in the quantity and quality of the intelligence that SWP were able to gather from fans about their movement and intentions. As one of Cardiff's most notorious 'hooligans' noted, even fans defined by the police as posing high risk would wilfully communicate such information to the SWP.

"They [SWP] ring me ask me where we are, I don't lie, I don't tell them no lies you know what I mean, and I class them as decent people, and I class South Wales Police right, not in every walk of life like, but as regards of football they are the model every other police force should look at" (KT, JW)

This improved intelligence then allowed the SWP Command team to generate more confidence in the assessments of the risks posed by specific fixtures. This in turn generated a level of trust in the intelligence that would allow the Police to respond in a more proportionate and differentiated fashion to any emerging problems. As a SWP commander noted when explaining the approach;

“One of the most critical things for me is trusting your intelligence. If [FIO] comes to me and says ‘there’s no problem with this, we need a Sergeant and twelve’ [PC’s], then that’s what we will police it with and if he says ‘we need five PSU’s’, that’s what we will police it with. Its trusting that intelligence and I think we’ve got it right time after time” (CI, CS).

The success of this approach is reflected in the comments of a senior officer of the SWP.

“This time four years ago, we’d have been policing this game with what, 6-8 PSU’s and here we are doing it with three tomorrow. It’s a win win, the club are saving money because they are not paying for the same number of officers at games and we’re saving, with the overall wider community of South Wales also benefiting as there’s less officers being subtracted from their communities to police the football. What I can’t understand is why my colleagues around the country are perhaps not taking the same view” (CS, CS).

8.3.4 Developing the model under the jurisdiction of other police forces.

According to the SWP the main organised ‘hooligan’ group among Cardiff fans was by 2005 in complete disarray. None the less the development of the RAMs invariably meant that large numbers of fans classified by police as posing a risk to public order (Category B supporters) would travel together to away fixtures by coach. For example, an Inspector in the South Yorkshire Police described the situation that the presence of the RAMs posed from a host police force perspective.

“In the Cardiff City fan base [there are] a large number of Category A and B fans, who can be difficult to police and also on

occasions involve themselves in disorder. This group traditionally, although not exclusively, has been embedded in the Valley RAMs Supporters Club which generally travel by coach from the ex-mining communities in South Wales" (SYP 1, CS).

However, the SWP were explicit about the level of risk such fans posed being largely governed by the way they were handled by the host forces.

"Should spontaneous disorder break out then Cardiff supporters carry with them a huge threat with plenty of willing participants. This for me is the nub with Cardiff fans at present. Manage them well and the opportunity for disorder is taken away" (SWP, FIO RW, CS)

8.3.5 Continuing disorder away from home

Despite the changes made at Cardiff, incidents of conflict involving Cardiff City supporters continued to occur at some games. One example can be found from the game between Wolverhampton Wanderers and Cardiff City on Saturday 11th March 2005. During the fixture between the two clubs the previous season there had been large scale disorder between Wolverhampton Wanderers supporters, Cardiff City fans and the West Midlands police. Based on this historical information the game had been categorised and resourced as high risk. Furthermore, because of this recent history, there was a general feeling of antagonism toward the West Midlands constabulary from Cardiff supporters about how they were policed, the context of which is summed up by one of Cardiff's risk supporters.

"When you go away to different parts of the country, the Midlands, places like that, they just treat you like cattle they don't treat you like human beings. And that's not just the lad's,

that's families with kids and everything. We are all classed as scum if you like and they just treat everybody like shit' (Big J, JW).

Prior to the fixture field notes record that the South Wales police and Cardiff City FC safety team identified that there had been little contact made by the West Midlands police with regards to planning the operation. As such doubts were raised by the SWP to me about how facilitatory the West Midlands police were going to be to Cardiff supporters.

On the day of the match, field notes record that the event was relatively incident free until half time. According to field notes at this point a group of younger Cardiff supporters became involved in an altercation with the bar staff at the ground, who were refusing to sell them alcohol as per club policy and were putting the shutters down at the bar. At this point the staff in the bar radioed for assistance and uniformed officers and club stewards moved into the area. Observations note the officers were able to calm the situation relatively quickly and other people in the crowd around the incident did not attempt to join in. As the incident was being resolved a large group of riot police moved into the concourse and pushed indiscriminately into the Cardiff fans gathered there (including me). This sparked an immediate reaction from the people there, who began to push back. Conflict between Cardiff supporters and the police and escalated. This conflict continued for about 15 minutes until relative order was established by the police.

After the game finished Cardiff fans were held back inside the ground for 15 minutes. A West Midlands officer informed me that this was so that the Wolverhampton supporters could disperse. Field notes identify that all officers were by this point dressed in full riot gear and formed cordons outside the ground around the Cardiff end. Speaking with a West Midlands officer field notes record that the post match plan was to effectively contain all Cardiff supporters as they left the ground and then march them on mass up the hill next to the stadium to their coaches. However, as the Cardiff fans reached the top of the hill notes indicate tha

they were prevented from continuing to the coaches by officers in riot gear, then as the street behind them filled with more supporters officers moved in behind them sealing the supporters in the street. As this occurred tensions between the supporters and the police began to emerge. Officers at the back of the cordon then began trying to get people to move up the street. Initially this was done by shouting instructions to the crowd; however the police at the bottom of the road then began to attempt to move the crowd more forcefully. This force was met with hostility from those in the crowd who began to push back against the police. Conflict quickly developed and escalated between Cardiff supporters and the police and large scale conflict occurred.

Field notes indicate that this continued for around 20 minutes until the supporters finally reached the coaches. Cardiff stewards then attempted to get people onto the coaches. Once everyone was on board the coaches they were escorted by large numbers of police riot fans away from the area. Following a post match investigation by CCFC, the South Wales Police and Cardiff fan groups it was felt that a contributing factor to the incident was the indiscriminate forceful policing everybody experienced including the RAMs. As a South Wales officer noted in discussion with me;

“At Wolves the majority of what happened there was your Valley Rams, they saw a threat [the West Midlands police] coming up the hill charging towards them and they will not run, they stand to a man and they took on that confrontation” (FIO, JH).

This example raises two important questions for the policing of Cardiff supporters. Firstly, what are the features of policing approaches during these increased or high risk Cardiff away fixtures at which significant incidents of disorder do not occur? Secondly, how do these policing approaches interact with the group level social psychological dynamics of the RAMs?

8.3.6 Education and Communication.

Observational records from the twenty one fixtures attended identified that a common feature of policing operations associated with an absence of collective disorder was communication and dialogue between the host Police force, SWP, CCFC and the RAMs. For example, following the major disorder involving Cardiff fans following their visit to Huddersfield F.C. in 2003 Cardiff fans were due to return to West Yorkshire for the fixture against Bradford F.C. According to field notes made by CS the West Yorkshire Police held the view that the scale and intensity of the previous incident of disorder was in part an outcome of aggressive police tactics. As a consequence some months prior to the fixture the match Commander took part in a meeting with representatives from the SWP, CCFC and the RAMs. At that meeting a consensual understanding of the legitimate intentions of the RAMs was developed and the strategic focus of the West Yorkshire police was able to orient toward facilitating such behaviour. The RAMs representative's description of the meeting conveys the subsequent sense of intergroup legitimacy that emerged.

"It was the best meeting I ever had in any of the negotiations. Instead of saying what we could do for him, the first thing he said was 'what can we do for you', which was great and we sat down and discussed [things] like that and it was so successful"
(VR, CS)

In contrast to the rioting at Huddersfield observations recorded that the fixture at Bradford passed off without incident. However, it was evident that such pre event planning and dialogue was further enhanced when there was ongoing communication between all groups throughout the events themselves. For example, in 2004 there was major disorder involving Cardiff fans prior to an away fixture against Sheffield United F.C. Commanders from the South Yorkshire Police (SYP) subsequently acknowledged that this incident was partly an outcome of their attempts to forcefully contain the RAMs on their busses prior to the fixture. As a consequence, prior to the fixture at Sheffield United in 2005 there was a pre-event

planning meeting involving SYP, CCFC and SWP. Following the meeting the SYP appointed

“A dedicated information officer whose specific role was to create lines of information into the travelling fans. PC [W] will make several pre-match calls [with] the aim of identifying a member of each travel coach as a contact... and early contact will be made with that individual... Contact will then be made by PC [W] to all known contacts as coaches are travelling, passing key messages such as non-tolerance of drunkenness as well as providing information central to the enjoyment of the occasion by fans.” (SYP, fixture policy document)

Combined field notes (CS&JH) record that on the day of this fixture eighteen RAMs coaches were expected to arrive at a specified time at a rendezvous point on junction 33 of the M1. SWP Police intelligence indicated that at least two of these coaches were transporting high risk fans. When some of the RAMs coaches did not arrive as expected observations record that the Bronze Commander in charge of the RV point began to suspect that fans on these coaches were deliberately seeking to evade detection in order to initiate disorder elsewhere. Consequently, the Commander began to organise the deployment of PSUs to react more forcefully to the RAMs as a whole. However, due to the existing channels of communication between fans, club and police it was possible to contact the missing RAMs coaches and determine that their delay was actually due to heavy traffic on the route to the RV. This information was communicated to the Bronze Commander, which then prevented any unnecessary loss of trust and escalation in police response. Once again, in contrast to the previous event, field notes record that this fixture passed off without major incident.

8.3.7 Facilitation and the adjustment of tolerance limits

Thus, an apparent central feature of the absence of disorder in force areas hosting CCFC was a police strategic focus on facilitation. In general terms observational data identified that this reflected itself in the host police developing a tactical approach that was capable of facilitating the more legitimate aspects of the RAMs identity (i.e. drinking, eating and getting to and from the match unmolested). Such arrangements were useful for the host force because their tactics would have previously been to utilise force (or the threat of force) to gather the Cardiff fans together in a single location (Observational data, e.g. Sheffield United away 2004). By focusing upon facilitation the host force effectively created the impetus for the RAMs to gather together of their own accord without the requirement for the police to utilise force. As a SWP officer notes;

"Basically they are all from the same sort of area and the culture is they like a drink. Now we have found it successful when we go away, that if we can find them a public house or a club or somewhere like that, that'll house them and we can get them there, and then the police keep away opposing hooligan groups then this severely affects their behaviour. We have found this to work to our favour and we have been able to assist in the planning of operations while we have been away".

(FIO, CS)

Field notes record that for some successful fixtures this form of containment was facilitated by CCFC only distributing tickets on the day of the fixture at a rendezvous point some distance away from the stadium, usually a motorway service station (e.g. Leeds United away 2006). This then ensured that all Cardiff fans would have to arrive at the RV point during a specified time period and travel only on coaches accredited by CCFC. They would then be met by PSUs from the host police force and escorted either to the stadium or more usually to public houses where, in both cases they would normally be allowed access to alcohol.

As well as access to alcohol once Cardiff fans reached the host area, the supporters also enjoyed drinking on the coaches to and from the game. This therefore meant that the RAMs were invariably contravening the Sports Events (control of Alcohol) Act 1985 and the Football (Disorder) Act 2000 which prohibit the consumption of alcohol on organised transport on the way to or after a designated football match. It was this access to alcohol both on the coaches and once at the host area that was critical to ensuring that risk fans would travel with the RAMs rather than independently by car or train, where they would be free to drink unhindered. Indeed, RAM organisers described how many fans were only willing to travel on RAMs coaches on the explicit understanding that the police would not prevent anyone from drinking alcohol.

"If I say to them no you can't have a drink on the bus they will do their own thing. If I say 'look boys this is a dry trip' they won't come [with us], because [drinking] it's such a big part of it." (VR CK, JW)

Thus, when the RAMs organisers were aware that they would be denied access to alcohol they would either stop at a public house before the RV or carry alcohol on their busses. Recognising this problem CCFC and SWP would take a flexible approach and operate a 'drink not drunk' policy.

"It's about an accepted tolerance level for their drink. We [the Police] know that they are going to drink. So are you going to be tolerant and say yes you can drink or do you say no you are not going to have a drink? [If you say no] perhaps they won't turn up, perhaps they will go into the city centre to meet up with somebody. Perhaps they will exchange blows". (FIO, JH)

The SWP would then actively seek similar agreements from the host police forces. Some host forces (for example, South Yorkshire Police, West Yorkshire Police) would adjust their tolerance limits, because they recognised the benefits for managing

public order that flowed from allowing the RAMs access to alcohol. As a consequence the RAMs organisers would then be able to ensure that the majority of Cardiff fans would travel together on organised coaches and wilfully communicate their movements and intentions, compliantly gathering in a single agreed location prior to the match.

Given such facilitation the RAMs would actively demonstrate that they were not seeking to flaunt their open contravention of the Act by ensuring that prior to their arrival in the host force area all alcohol would be stored out of sight in the luggage compartments underneath the coaches. Our field notes record that on occasion police even boarded RAMs busses explicitly to enforce this aspect of the Act but deliberately did not search the luggage compartments even though they knew that alcohol was stored inside. In other words, the RAMs organisers understood that they had an implicit agreement with the host force that alcohol consumption would be allowed and this was the 'carrot' they used to gain the compliance of the vast bulk of the RAMs, and particularly those who would be otherwise posing high levels of risk to public order. As a member of the RAMs identified in discussion with Dr. Stott;

"We had an agreement, we said look you find us pubs and we'll all stick together, and put us in the pubs before the game. [But] sometimes they can't do that, so what they [the RAMs] would often do is stop on the way to have a drink. We'd also have some cans on the bus, underneath the bus so that on the way home instead of these buses stopping in towns and villages where we would drink, [after] a mile or two we'd pull over, put the drinks on top and the boys could have a drink on the way home. What harm is that? That worked great". (Interviews, G, CS)

8.3.8 Legitimacy, self-policing and compliance

Such tactics appear to have been effective because they reinforced a sense of police legitimacy among the Cardiff fans which corresponded with important acts of self-policing. For example, during the events surrounding CCFCs away fixture against Bradford City F.C. in 2004 (observations by CS recorded that) the RAMs were housed in a public house prior to the match. After drinking for some time Cardiff fans boarded their coaches to attend the fixture. As they did so the landlord communicated to the police that a karaoke machine had been stolen. Immediately, this information was communicated to RAMs organisers and a short time later the undamaged karaoke machine was returned, the transgressing fan was severely rebuked by his fellow RAMs, who in turn provided an apology and £40.00 in cash to the landlord by way of compensation.

This 'self-poling' culture was evident even in circumstances of extreme provocation from other fan groups. For example, CCFC played against Leeds United at Elland Road on Saturday, 15th January, 2005. Following the success at Bradford observations by CS & JH noted that the West Yorkshire Police once again adopted the 'facilitation and dialogue approach' to the RAMs. This involved meeting the RAMs at their rendezvous point at a nearby motorway service station but deliberately not searching the luggage spaces underneath before escorting them into the stadium²¹. Following the match the police requested that the Cardiff fans remained in the stadium. Field notes identify however, that approximately three hundred Leeds United fans sought to break through a police cordon in order to initiate fighting with the Cardiff fans. The West Yorkshire Police took approximately forty five minutes to disperse the Leeds fans with baton and horse charges. Throughout this period all Cardiff fans complied with police instruction. Contemporaneous interview data with RAMs organisers recorded in field notes indicates that Cardiff fans deliberately did not seek to break out from the stadium to become involved in the disorder that they knew to be going on outside.

²¹ Indeed, following the match as a reward for the Cardiff fans good behaviour the West Yorkshire Police allowed a mini-bus to distribute cases of beer to the coaches as they were about to depart.

8.3.9 Differentiation and the marginalisation of 'hooligans'

Such self-policing was also associated with a physical marginalisation of those who were seeking to create disorder and as such if and when disorder occurred it remained relatively small scale and those involved more easily apprehended by the police. For example, prior to another away fixture against Sheffield United, this time in 2005, field notes record that the South Yorkshire Police decided to build upon the success of the previous season. Consequently, the SYP allocated to Cardiff fans prior to the match the entire town centre of Rotherham, a small town adjacent to Sheffield. As a consequence the RAMs gathered in the town centre and drank in three or four of the pubs without incident. Field notes record that throughout this period PSU officers from the SYP patrolled the city centre in pairs and engaged in high levels of positive interpersonal interaction with Cardiff fans. Subsequently, the Cardiff fans compliantly boarded their busses and were escorted to Bramall Lane approximately forty five minutes before the match kicked off. The buses transporting the Cardiff supporters were grouped outside the stadium and surrounded by a 'loose' cordon of police in hybrid uniform (i.e. the RAMs were free to move through the cordon should they wish to). The officers in the cordon were not aggressive but interacted with fans encouraging them into the stadium where the RAMs already knew that beer would be on sale inside. As this was occurring, a group of approximately five RAMs approached a motor cycle officer in the cordon and jokingly asked if they could sit on his bike. To their surprise the officer actually agreed and allowed one of them to do so, even offering to take a photo. Immediately following this interaction, field notes recorded that one of the group turned to other Cardiff fans in the immediate vicinity and commented loudly:

"There all right this lot, the old bill I mean, you can get on alright with them coz there willing to have a joke" (Field notes, JH)

Subsequently, observations recorded that the vast majority of the RAMs entered the stadium. However, a small group of approximately 12 RAMs surreptitiously moved through the loose police cordon and walked briskly away from the stadium. They

were not followed by other RAMs or police. A short time afterwards the SYP became aware that a small incident of disorder involving Cardiff fans had occurred in a nearby public house. Because of their relative isolation, the group of Cardiff fans were then easily identified and detained by the police as they tried to make their way back to the stadium.

8.3.10 Long term transformation of antagonistic social relations?

Furthermore, where such approaches were adopted they were associated with changes in how Cardiff fans described their relationship with that force. For example, in interviews with JW, where Cardiff supports discussed their experiences with host forces in terms of the early and relatively indiscriminate use of force they would describe their relationship with police as illegitimate and accuse these forces of actively provoking disorder.

"I think we get treated like shit [when the RAMs travel] away. You know we got every single restriction against us when we arrive at away teams. When we arrive at their towns and their grounds we are met by police in riot gear. They are all like Robocop, very physical towards us, and basically looking for us to cause trouble. [But] they kind of provoke us, so yeah away [policing is] definitely much worse" (NBY, interviews, JW)

However, in contrast where the Cardiff approach was adopted it had the potential to transform how RAMs would describe that very same Force. As one RAMs member notes:

"South Yorkshire [sic] was bad at one time. You know the trouble we have had up in Sheffield and what have you, over the years. But they have come around now. Sheffield United are being overly nice, they are giving us pubs for the boys to have a drink in. They are learning" (BS interviews, JW)

8.3.11 Balance and proportionality

However, an important point to note about the Cardiff approach is that it does not exclude the use of force entirely. As a South Wales Police Commander pointed out:

"It's not a weak system of policing though. I mean we don't take a back step. If you see when there is disorder we are firm and very affective. It's not a case of 'oh we are with our pals' because it's like I mentioned before, 99% of people want to come to watch the football, the 1% that don't will incur the wrath of the club and us."(ACC, CS)

Rather it is an approach that requires the information led use of force at appropriate junctures. This was recognised by the RAMs themselves some of whom described how forms of policing they saw as legitimate were not those that did not use forceful tactics but those that balanced facilitation against the differentiated and proportionate use of force.

CS: *"Would you say that it is fair to characterise that in terms of, you know, stop policing you [the RAMs] on the basis of your reputation"?*

VR1: *"Yes. See they won't out aggressive us or intimidate us. You can't intimidate us. That will just get the response of 'well come on'".*

CS: *"So aggression doesn't wash with you guys"?*

VR1: *"No. It just makes us more aggressive. Look if a copper came in here and was being friendly and one of our boys spoke to him badly our boys would sort him out. 'What the fuck are you saying that for? He's alright you treat him properly'. But the copper who comes in and says 'get out of there' he'd have fifty people on him".*

CS: *"So if they treat you with respect you treat them with respect, is that it"?*

VR1: *"In most cases, but it can go wrong cant it. You know you can't say that that is the perfect plan. Some scum bags need to be treated badly. But when and where do you draw the line. I have thought sometimes, when they have been treating us too nicely, thinking fucking hell they had better keep this in check before they get too powerful. It's a balance you know."*(VR1, CS).

Consequently, where host forces adopted such approaches there was a sharp reduction in the amount of resources that the force required to police Cardiff fans from year to year. For example, at Stoke City F.C. there were major disturbances involving Cardiff fans surrounding their home fixture in the season 2000/01. For this fixture, Staffordshire police records indicate they were required to use twenty seven PSUs, an approximate six hundred and seventy five police officers. For following fixtures, the Staffordshire Police accommodated the facilitation and communication approach. Correspondingly, they avoided any further incidents with Cardiff fans and by 2005 had reduced their commitment for this fixture to two PSUs or approximately fifty police officers (Staffordshire police records).

8.3.12 The demise of the RAMs

Despite the evident success that the model developed at Cardiff had in terms of reducing the levels of disorder associated with fans of CCFC it faced many pressures both internally and externally. Ad Hoc interviews with Cardiff supporters from a number of observations recorded how some RAMs described how many of the risk fans were becoming disaffected because they were bored by the lack of violence. Similarly, others described how since becoming less of a threat to host forces they were more likely to be arrested for more minor transgressions of the law that previously had been ignored. However, the main pressure centred on the issue of the consumption of alcohol. By 2006 the South Wales Police acknowledged that they

had come under pressure from other forces to address the heavy drinking culture of the RAMs. This culminated in a growing sense of resentment among the RAMs that they were now being unfairly and unjustly targeted for successfully complying with the drive toward the reduction of disorder. As one of the RAMs organisers notes

"What's happened now is we've helped with the methods that we've put on ourselves and the methods we travel under, we stick together, they find us pubs whatever and it worked for a while. But then they moved the goalposts and all of a sudden now they are saying 'right, they no longer fight they're not so much of a threat, they all stick together let's stop them drinking now, let's get them twelve o'clock in the ground and stop them drinking' and it, it moved the goalposts" (G, interviews, JH)

These pressures coincided with RAMs organisers expressing concerns about their difficulties to continue to encourage fans onto their busses. Shortly afterwards the formal organisation of the RAMs collapsed. As one RAM organiser noted

"I have walked away from it because at the end of the day I feel like we are stitching everybody up" (VR GD, JH).

This period also occurred at a time when Sam Hamman sold the club in order that CCFC could fund a new stadium development. Subsequently, there has been a return to the mass unorganised and uncoordinated travel to away fixtures that characterised CCFC supporters before the development of the RAMs and a belief among some of the RAMs organisers that the problems associated with the past may also return.

"What people are going to do is travel independently and the risk of disorder is going to be huge again. Then perhaps they will appreciate what they had" (VR GD, JH).

8.4 Discussion

The study had two main aims. The first was to explore the extent to which the absence of disorder among football fans in domestic football can be understood theoretically in terms of the effective management of crowd dynamics. In addressing this first aim, the analysis suggests that following the disorder in 2000 and 2001 the South Wales Police and CCFC rejected an approach which focused attention solely on the behaviour of Cardiff City fans as a means of tackling disorder. Instead, their response was linked to the understanding that crowd disorder and specifically the incidents of 2000/2001 was the result of intergroup conflict which was linked to wider issues of anti-social behaviour, policing responses, infrastructure and club policy. The response that emerged encouraged multi agency contribution which included CCFC fans and was aimed at developing the intergroup relationships which surrounded the club and through which subsequent interactions could be better managed. Specifically, the analysis has illustrated how, as a consequence of this initial dialogue, a number of developments were made by the club, the supporters and the South Wales police in an attempt to more effectively manage crowd dynamics at Cardiff.

Analysis illustrated that many of the developments made at Cardiff have much in common with Reicher et al.'s (2004; 2007) principles for crowd management, primarily those of education, facilitation, communication and differentiation. The approach at Cardiff also shared some of the good practices identified by Stott et al. (2008) in their review of domestic football, such as the use of non-confrontational tactical options, multi agency responsibility, and developing the community policing aspect of the football intelligence teams.

Analysis suggests that these developments may have had a subsequent impact on crowd dynamics. For example, the analysis demonstrates how the changes made by the SWP and CCFC were associated with theoretically relevant psychological changes among the RAMs, which in turn had practical benefits for the police. First, there was an emergent perception among the RAMs of the legitimacy of their intergroup relationships with both Club and police which led to improved relationships between

all parties. This, in turn appeared to create a sense of trust between the different groups in maintaining these relationships and a perception of common ownership and identification with the club

Moreover, this perception of legitimate intergroup relations appeared to be underpinned by a shift in the content of Cardiff fan identity towards non violence and an apparent self policing among Cardiff fans of actions that would be seen as 'hooliganism' by the authorities. Moreover, in this context those who were seeking to create disorder were subsequently isolated from the wider contingent of fans and therefore less able to influence the large numbers they needed to create widespread disorder. Thirdly, the increased intergroup legitimacy appears to have had practical benefits, whereby even fans previously categorised as risk actively began communicating their behaviour and intentions with the SWP.

The analysis has also identified a number of practical implications that appear to flow from this. Firstly, the changes made at Cardiff appear to have resulted in a reduction in the levels of conflict experienced (as demonstrated by arrest figures). This has had a secondary implication, in that a reduction in levels of disorder have also been associated with a reduction in the levels of police resources required to police games at Cardiff City and therefore thirdly, impacted on the overall policing costs at Cardiff in the long term.

In contrast, while the analysis has provided evidence of the decrease of both conflict and policing costs at Cardiff City, there were, none the less, significant incidents of disorder that continued to occur when CCFC fans travelled to other force areas, for example Wolverhampton. Analysis suggests that within other police force's jurisdiction the approach developed at Cardiff wasn't always integrated within the host force's operation. Where such facilitation was not forthcoming continued incidents of disorder sometimes occurred. Moreover, analysis suggests that these incidents cannot simply be attributed to a violent predisposition among the Cardiff fans themselves (as football banning orders had removed most of the 'hooligans'). In other words the analysis suggests that it is difficult to reconcile such disorder simply

to the presence and behaviour of Cardiff fans at these events. Rather the argument is made that such disorderly outcomes were the result of perceptions of illegitimacy surrounding interactions between Cardiff fans and other groups, perceptions primarily held by the hosting police force. The study therefore suggests that both the absence and occurrence of disorder among football fans in domestic football can be understood theoretically in terms of the effective management of crowd dynamics.

In addressing the second aim of this chapter, the extent to which the ESIM is capable of building a theoretical analysis of conflict reduction over extended periods in ways that highlight the relevance of social psychology as a basis for policy and practice, the analysis provides support for previous ESIM accounts of large scale football related disorder. For example, the analysis has highlighted the intergroup nature of this disorder, the role that powerful outgroup's such as the police can play in the establishment of perceptions of legitimacy and the positive transformational impact that such intergroup legitimacy can have on social identity and subsequent intergroup relations and interactions.

In doing so the study supports Stott et al.'s (2007;2008) contention that social identity and intergroup processes underpin variability in behaviour among the same social category, which in the case of Cardiff fans can lead them towards or away from disorder. What the current analysis has been able to illustrate is that this variability is linked to the accessibility of different forms of Cardiff fan identity, the content of which was mediated by intergroup dynamics which in turn were primarily driven by the nature of public order police deployment.

From an ESIM perspective the approach developed at Cardiff is effective fundamentally because it seeks to police disorder by managing inter-group interactions rather than focusing solely on the crowd themselves as the problem. Research (E.g. Stott et al, 2001; 2007; 2008) suggests that in this context, risk to public order can be managed in ways that generate (or at least maintain) shared perceptions amongst crowd participants of the legitimacy of their intergroup relations with the police. The current study supports this idea. Moreover, as Stott et

al. (2008) identified at EURO 2004 this process forms part of a wider shift in intergroup identification, whereby the experience of legitimate policing changes the association between ingroup identification and perceived similarity, or identification with the police which further assists in minimising the risk of disorder. Again the current study supports this idea. For example, the contention can be made that the subjectively legitimate relations created by the policing model at Cardiff were associated with a developing perception among Cardiff fans of perceived similarity or identification with the police (Stott et al., 2008). The analysis suggests that the approach adopted by the SWP helped to develop relationships between supporters and the police, even to the extent that known risk supporters explicitly stated that they had a positive relationship with them and would actively keep them informed of their movements (see page 169).

In contrast, evidence such as the incident at Wolverhampton, suggests that where police forces continued to try and control the movements, behaviour and consumption of alcohol of Cardiff fans through indiscriminately forceful tactical implementations, perceptions of subjective illegitimacy may be created between the police and Cardiff supporters. Such relationships in turn have been demonstrated to result in large scale incidents of spontaneous disorder. Analysis also suggests that this has negative long term implications for future events at which the host force police Cardiff fans.

Again this analysis supports the ESIM by identifying that where the approach adopted at Cardiff was not incorporated into other force's policing operations and instead Cardiff fans were policed on the basis of their historical reputation in a largely undifferentiated and forceful way, then this intergroup context had a different impact. Perceptions of illegitimacy developed and those challenging this illegitimacy through acts of anti social behaviour came to be empowered through support from the wider fan group. Again the study therefore provides support for previous ESIM research, such as that conducted at EURO 2004 which examined the negative impact that the forceful policing methods used by the GNR had on English fans in comparison with that used by the PSP (Stott et al., 2007; 2008). Like this

research the analysis suggest that the broad differences in the behaviour of Cardiff fans observed at different matches was associated with the respective dominance of different forms of Cardiff fan identity, the content and salience of which depended largely on the different understandings of the Cardiff supporters' intergroup relations with the police.

Finally, the analysis highlighted how a variety of contravening pressures eventually resulted in the RAM's disbanding. This coincided with an emerging perception among Cardiff fans that because of this, there was a real possibility of a return to the large scale sporadic disorder that Cardiff were historically associated with. This view is reinforced by police statistics which illustrate that since the RAM's collapse in 2006 there has been a subsequent increase in the numbers of Cardiff fans arrested for disorder at football.

8.4.1 Limitations

The chapter has a number of limitations. The most obvious of which is that the study has no quantifiable data on fan's perceptions of legitimacy in different policing contexts, nor on the perceptions of the police that may have governed choice of police deployment. Therefore caution is required when suggesting the precise mechanics of the psychological processes underlying differences in outcomes. Certainly distribution of a questionnaire of the kind used in the first three chapters to fans and the police after every game attended would have been constructive; however, logistically it would have been impossible to do. Therefore the phenomenological analysis developed allowed focus to be given to the wider contexts in which the psychological processes identified were embedded.

A second criticism is that not all of the data was collected first hand specifically to form part of the current chapter. Data was also obtained from two other researchers who have conducted research with Cardiff City football club. Therefore it is possible that the data provided by them may have been selective or have had a slant put on it reflecting the researchers' own research interests, ideas and perspectives.

Nevertheless, where possible all data has been triangulated and cross referenced so that no one single data source has been overly relied upon and the data used supported by a variety of sources. Furthermore, references to where this data came from and who it was collected by have been clearly identified in the analysis.

8.5 Conclusion

It can be argued that the approach to policing developed in South Wales is effective at reducing crowd conflict because it *“manages crowd events in such a manner that avoids the forms of intergroup interaction, collective psychology and intra-group relations that the literature on crowd psychology proposes are necessary for widespread conflict to occur”* (Stott et al, 2008,p.134). The intergroup context created by the developments at Cardiff meant that a collective sense of responsibility emerged between Cardiff City supporters, the club and the police to address issues of disorder. This intergroup context in turn allowed for the facilitation of Cardiff City supporters’ legitimate aims and intentions which created perceptions of legitimacy between the parties involved. Cardiff fans in turn felt empowered to maintain these positive intergroup relationships as evidenced by incidents of self policing and therefore those seeking to break these relations through antisocial behaviour became marginalised both physically and psychologically from the wider fan group.

The Cardiff City study has attempted to identify how police practice can affect identity content and behavioural change within the same social category over a number of different events and over an extended period of time. The obvious similarities between the Cardiff model and the PSP model at Euro 2004 have been suggested in the analysis and discussion. The study contends that the psychological changes among Cardiff fans which occurred as a result of the intergroup context created by police action are also similar to those which occurred with England fans at Euro 2004.

The current study has also been able to extend the available literature in a key way. Because the study was able to follow the same fan group across a number of different contexts over a longer period of time analysis has been able to show that identity changes brought about by the perceived (Il)legitimate intergroup context created by policing can have enduring impacts upon subsequent events (Drury & Reicher, 2005). What Cardiff City demonstrates therefore is that the ESIM can provide a relevant basis from which to explain both the absence and occurrence of disorder involving the same fan group at domestic football games over an extended period and develop effective practice and policy within this domain. While ESIM research rightly recognises that one size doesn't fit all (Reicher et al 2004; 2007), the Cardiff example does provide evidence that police tactics can be developed to more effectively manage crowd dynamics so that disorder can be minimised and real long term cost and conflict reduction can be achieved. The analysis has illustrated that not only can the ESIM accurately explain these crowd dynamics, but also by doing so, that theory and police practice can be productive partners in the context of policing football in England and Wales. The study has therefore contributed to the existing body of research that examines the relationship between police strategy and tactics, fan psychology and levels of disorder in the context of football but developed its scope of applicability to that of policing matches within England and Wales and addressing the issue of long term conflict and policing cost reduction.

Chapter Nine: Conclusions

9.1 Exploring police perspectives of football crowd dynamics in England & Wales

Chapter five explored police perceptions of football crowds and the policing tactics best suited to police them. The chapter suggests that the police perception of football crowds combines the classical psychological models of Le bon and Allport to create an 'agitator' model in which the majority of crowd participants are seen as irrational and incapable of resisting the influence of deviant minorities who seek to exploit them to create disorder. The analysis suggests that this may lead the police to attribute disorder to processes internal to the crowd and subsequently endorse tactics which treat the crowd in a largely undifferentiated and forceful way in an attempt to prevent crowd disorder.

The ESIM research surveyed in the literature review chapters identified the importance of intergroup interaction in the development of crowd conflict and how police category definitions can affect the dynamics of these intergroup relationships. Chapter five has helped to further illustrate how police perceptions can feed into their intergroup relations with the crowd and the implications this may have for both the behaviour of the police and crowd. For example, Stott and Reicher (1998a) and Drury et al (2003) suggest that historically certain institutions (e.g. the police) have been able to promote particular representations of social groups that, in turn, have had consequences for attributions of blame and legal sanction. Therefore in contexts such as football crowds where officers hold a view of crowd dynamics that has much in common with classical models and can act upon this then analysis suggests that this may create an asymmetry of perspectives between the police and the crowd which may result in a self fulfilling prophecy.

Chapter five suggests that it is the police's attribution of disorder to processes internal to the crowd that has greatest impact upon their endorsement of coercive policing methods which in turn may be the catalyst for such self fulfilling outcomes. The analysis allows the contention to be made that where football supporters, whether domestic or national, are perceived by the police to have a historical

reputation for violence they may subsequently be policed more strictly and forcibly than those that do not have disorder historically attributed to them. Furthermore as noted by Stott et al., (2001) such a historical dimension to police/fan relations may in turn function to maintain and reinforce antagonistic forms of fan identity, whereby disorderly or violent behaviour becomes an integral part of what it means to be a supporter of that team.

What chapter five suggests is that it is dangerous for police strategies and tactics to be based on the perceived attributes of particular football crowds at the expense of recognising the reflexive relationship that exists between police tactics and crowd disorder. However despite suggesting the possible existence of a systematic relationship between crowd theory and police practice, the chapter was unable either to illustrate how or why the police may hold such understanding or explore the dynamics of this relationship in practice. To investigate these issues in greater depth chapter six explored this theory/practice relationship within the context of public order police training in England and Wales.

9.2 Crowd psychology, public order police training and the policing of football crowds
This chapter explored the potential crowd theory - police practice relationship within public order policing by examining the public order training that officers received in order to police football crowds and the role that crowd theory plays within this training. This study provides further support for the contention that there is a systematic relationship between classical theoretical models of the crowd and subsequent indiscriminate and forceful police responses to them.

The study demonstrated that there is, certainly within England and Wales, a lack of focus upon ESIM crowd theory within public order training. The national training framework within England and Wales therefore does not reflect any significant development in scientific thinking about crowd dynamics since the early part of the twentieth century (Martin, 1924). But it is also evident that there is a lack of

emphasis given to theory and empirical research in general within public order training.

For example, as the literature review chapters illustrated, there is now an extensive scientific literature on the effective management and policing of public order. In particular this literature contains an empirically led debate that compares and contrasts the efficacy of 'escalated force' versus 'negotiated management' (e.g. D. Waddington, 2007), two approaches which rely differentially upon the use of force. It seems somewhat ironic that given the centrality of the use of force in public order training, the existence of this debate and its related evidence was never even referred to during any of the observations undertaken in the course of this doctoral research. In this sense the study supports White's (2006) claims that police training is "*proceeding down an intellectual cul-de-sac*" (p.389).

The research also suggests that the current status of public order training in England and Wales does not entirely reflect the policy set out in the ACPO Manual of Guidance or that in the EU Handbook. In particular the updates made to public order policy and crowd psychology are not being supported or incorporated into training with regard to strategy and tactics. It can be argued this is important because training is the primary means through which these developments in policy can and will cascade down into practice.

The study suggests that because classic theory may be institutionalised within public order policing as a form of operational philosophy in order to develop public order police training any change must be seen as more than just a matter of policy but of root and branch reform in public order policing. The study contends that integral to such reform is a view of police practice, research, policy and training as equal partners. Indeed, it is the view of this thesis that this type of partnership is vital if society is to properly address the long term reduction of football related 'public disorder' and the massive and ongoing costs of policing football across the European Union. Chapter seven attempted to further contextualise these issues by examining

in practice the relationship between police perceptions of crowds and the strategy and tactics they actually use to police them.

9.3 The role of crowd theory in determining the use of force in public order policing at football

Chapter seven explored the relationship between the police's theoretical understanding of crowd psychology and the strategy and tactics used in practice by the police during a football crowd event. As with the previous chapter it was found that the police in this study also appeared to hold a view of crowds that had much in common with 'classical' crowd theory and endorsed policing methods based on the use or threat of force to control crowds. This view was reflected in the policing strategy adopted for the crowd event and the tactics used. Post event, during reflection on the operation, officers discussed their tactics primarily in terms of the ability this gave them to control the crowd of away supporters.

In line with arguments made in chapter five, the study suggests that perceptions about the away fans' prior history and reputation may have informed the police's belief that previous incidents of disorder involving this fan group were solely attributable to the supporters who comprised this group and therefore that unless all away fans were strictly controlled throughout the event disorder would likely occur. As chapter six suggested, this occurred despite the recognition that only a minority of away fans would be 'risk' supporters. Little attention was given to the potentially negative impact that these tactics could have had upon crowd dynamics during the operation.

While chapters five to seven explored the relationship between classical crowd theory and police practice they also identified a range of other factors that influence what the police do in practice, such as accountability concerns, legislation and police force policies. While identifying that police knowledge (particularly of crowd theory) does play a role in police practice the thesis identified that this relationship is more complex and subtly nuanced than previously suggested. For example, police interviews identified that in practice the police do a lot more than they say they do.

Therefore, the theory/practice relationship may be more complex than previously suggested. For example, during the event, officers used a number of non confrontational tactics such as facilitation, positive interpersonal interaction and communication. However, none of these tactics were part of the pre match strategy and post match while the use of tactics based on force, such as containment, were discussed as being necessary for future policing operations involving the two clubs, no mention was made about building in the less confrontational tactical options also used on the day. This appears largely because the officers in the study understood football crowds and crowd control in terms of Le Bonian theory, therefore the extent to which they used non confrontational tactics remained unacknowledged and the impact that these tactics may have had on away supporters remained tacit.

The study therefore provides more detailed evidence of the role that classic crowd psychology has in influencing crowd policing practices. The analysis suggests that classic theory is an important mediating variable both in determining the use of policing approaches based on the threat or use of force and undermining moves toward a more 'negotiated management' approach. In suggesting such a theory/practice relationship chapters five to seven also allow the contention to be made that developing police understanding of crowd dynamics may allow the police to begin to do what they say in practice and explicitly develop and build upon police practice which may otherwise remain tacit within individual officers understanding.,

9.4 Alternative models for the effective management of public order at football in England and Wales

Chapter eight moved away from examining relationships between classic crowd theory and police practice and attempted to explore an alternative model for policing football which was neither primarily based on the use of force nor explainable in terms of classical models of crowd psychology. The multi-agency approach developed in South Wales is a model that developed relatively independently as a result of active recognition that the responsibilities for the problems at Cardiff City were not simply attributable to the supporters themselves. Because of this there was a real impetus from all parties involved to address and

change the situation that had led to the disorder of 2000/2001. Cardiff City therefore provides evidence that alternative models of police practice can exist in England and Wales and that they can develop in spite of the apparent institutionalisation of classic crowd theory within public order policing. Furthermore, the approach developed at Cardiff was subsequently evaluated using an Elaborated Social Identity perspective which empirically illustrated why the approach has been effective and by doing so provided further support for the ESIM.

In effect what the model at Cardiff City illustrates is how police practice can be developed to manage a crowd's perception of the police's legitimacy. It can be argued that this has assisted in the development of a self policing culture, even among high risk supporters. In such circumstances those that have continued to try and seek disorder have become both physically and psychologically marginalised by the majority of supporters and therefore disempowered. The positive relationships created with both club and police led to lower levels of conflict at matches and therefore a reduction in the requirement for police resources and associated policing costs. In other words the model at Cardiff City highlights the potential long term cost and conflict reduction benefits that the adoption of this type of approach may have.

However, the chapter also identified that a great deal of variability in Cardiff fan behaviour still occurred when they travelled to away fixtures. The analysis suggested that a key determinant of such variability was the intergroup relations created by different police deployments in different force areas. Where the model developed at Cardiff was facilitated by the host force then large scale disorder appeared to be avoided. However, where the host force did not incorporate the Cardiff model and instead policed the Cardiff supporters in a relatively forceful and undifferentiated way then incidents of large scale disorder sometimes still occurred.

In line with Stott et al (2008) the study suggests that this pattern occurs because policing based on a high profile paramilitary style may inadvertently generate the dynamics of illegitimacy and empowerment through which large scale disorder can and does emerge. This is because such approaches may be perceived as illegitimate

by the supporters (the example provided on page 181 of a Cardiff fan expressing his hostility towards a “Robocop” style of policing highlights the issue well) and therefore can put in motion the development of conflict due to an asymmetry in the perspectives held by those involved in the event (e.g. Drury and Reicher, 2000). As noted by Stott et al. (2008) *“While high profile paramilitary policing may well be effective at gaining short term control of a physical location, such a heavy hand could actually function to generate and maintain a negative relationship over the long term between the police and specific communities”* (p.137). Again the antagonistic relations that Cardiff fans perceived existed between themselves and the West Midlands Police at Wolverhampton (page 171) illustrated this.

Finally, the analysis has also illustrated that not only can the ESIM more accurately explain such crowd dynamics than classical models can, but by doing so it demonstrates that the ESIM and police practice can be productive partners in the context of policing football in England and Wales. It can be argued therefore that in the future the theory/practice relationship has the potential to be as equally productive as it has perhaps been potentially counterproductive in the past (e.g. Stott and Reicher, 1998b). In so doing, the thesis contributes to a body of evidence that examines the policy and theory implications of ESIM and highlights the mutually constructive relationship that can be created between social psychological theory and the effective management of public order.

9.5 Reflections, limitations and future research

From the very beginning of this thesis one of the main challenges has been to develop research within the confines of a strict set of parameters. These parameters were to develop work that was related to the policing of football matches within England and Wales that had both a practical value for the police themselves as well as a theoretical value for the research community, particularly to the ESIM of crowd behaviour. This posed a number of difficulties.

Firstly, working with the police is very challenging. To gain access it requires the researcher to be opportunistic and flexible and to be able to articulate ideas to the police so that they can appreciate what you are doing and why. Working within the policing environment it is important to understand the dynamics and relationships that exist so that you can recognise and exploit any further opportunities and networks of access that may become available.

Secondly, to be able to conduct research in this environment required the development of new research styles involving mixed method designs (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2009) and a pragmatic approach (Morgan, 2007). This raised issues for planning and analysis, for example how the different methods and data sets could be combined to create coherent and meaningful results that were of an academically acceptable standard while also being easily understood by the police.

As well as a number of specific limitations which have been addressed in each chapter as they relate to that particular study, there are also a number of limitations that apply to the thesis as a whole. One of the general limitations that can be applied to the thesis is that it has only covered the theories of psychology and public order policing perceived as most relevant to the subject area. This means that a great deal of the historical and theoretical background to the theories covered have been left relatively unexplored or unexplained. For example, social identity theory and self categorisation theory have had an enormous impact on social psychology and the ESIM in particular. Some of the key psychological processes which underpin group formation such as social influence, categorisation processes and identity change to name but a few, were first identified and illustrated within the social identity tradition but these have not been central to my research. While a more thorough theoretical grounding would undoubtedly give a greater scope to the thesis, by doing so it may have taken away from the central focus of it, the policing of football.

A second limitation that is applicable to chapters five, six and seven of the thesis refers to the questionnaire used. For example, as explained on page 89, the

questionnaire was adapted from the study by Drury et al. (2003). Although the original questionnaire did have questions specifically related to the policing of football it wasn't designed specifically to address only police perceptions on football crowds. Since the original questionnaire was also interested in demonstrating and ceremonial crowds it therefore used less football specific terms and language to describe crowds and police tactics. Therefore, a reformulation of these questions in terms of the specific language, tactics and culture that underpins the policing of football as a unique area of policing may have helped officers understand the questions and resulted in data that reflected what officers said and did more accurately. However, the possible limitations of the questionnaire only became apparent once it had already been used in the study of police perceptions in practice (chapter seven), therefore the decision was made not to make any changes to it. To have done so would have meant that it would not have been possible to combine the questionnaire results of the public order training study (chapter six) with that of the police perceptions in practice study (chapter seven) to create an overview of the theory/practice relationships that was the basis of quantitative analysis study (chapter five).

A final limitation of the thesis is that whilst it has explored police perceptions, the structure that underpins them and their relevance to practice it has relied heavily on the assumption that what officers articulate and say they also actually do. Chapter seven illustrated that this may not necessarily be the case and officers may do more than they say. It therefore raises interesting and important questions about the data and future research.

This then leads to potential areas of future research. For example, in identifying that a multiplicity of inter related factors may affect the police's adoption of specific tactics and strategies to police football crowds the study has illustrated the need to examine in more detail some of the factors that may also impact upon what the police both say and do. In particular work on police culture or specifically public order police culture may prove illuminating. Research on police culture suggests a gap between what the police say in private (canteen culture) and what they do in

practice (Chan 1996). Research also suggests that it is the circumstances in which the officers find themselves that dictates behaviour not the attitudes and beliefs that they bring with them (Waddington 1999). Research also suggests that police culture is dependent on what and who officers generally police (Reiner 1998).

However, I believe that this work could encourage a rather one dimensional reading of police culture and from an ESIM perspective I think that context and culture may be better conceptualised as having an interactive relationship with each other. For example as Jefferson (1990) suggests, paramilitary units have an aggressive macho culture. They also operate in a context predominately underpinned by the use of force. In this sense their culture and the context in which they operate may be mutually reinforcing.

Moreover, Waddington (1999) suggests that police culture provides a rhetoric that gives meaning to experience and sustains occupational self esteem. The police, he suggests, work hard at affirming what their experience denies. In other words, the police glorify action and excitement in talk because for most officers everyday work is mundane and not exciting. However such an interpretation may not be so readily applicable to public order policing. For example, Waddington himself suggests that we need to look at the circumstances in which the police act rather than simply reading off what they do from what they say. So if we take the policing of a crowd as the circumstance in which public order officers act and also link it to what they say, then the public order policing of crowds may be one of the few arenas in which the police are able to put macho talk into practice. This perhaps illustrates a real gap in the literature on the impact of PSU culture on police theoretical understanding and public order strategy and tactics as public order policing is one of the few areas in which officers can not only talk about force but also use it.

Furthermore, Prati and Pietrantonio's (2009) recent examination of police perspectives and public order practice suggests that exposure to crowd conflict results in greater adherence to classical views of the crowd and therefore to stricter control measures to police crowds. It may equally be the case however that it is

exposure to public order police culture that increases adherence to classical views of the crowd. It becomes even more interesting to explore this possible relationship given that chapter seven also identified that exposure to operational practice while strengthening officer's Le Bonian understanding of crowds also appears to develop a tacit understanding among officers that other less confrontational tactics are needed. Investigating a theory/culture/practice relationship may therefore prove illuminating.

Another area that future research could expand upon is police training. For example, the relationship between theory and practice has been examined here only in the context of the U.K. public order training. I suggest that it none the less has relevance to police training in other nation states as well as for understanding police responses to crowds more generally and the work of Prati and Pietrantonio (2009) supports this. However, it remains to be shown the extent to which classical theory still forms the bedrock of police understanding internationally and as such there is a pressing need for further cross national research to examine police training and practice.

9.6 General conclusions

The thesis has advanced social scientific knowledge of the role that crowd psychology can have on public order police practice. The thesis has demonstrated that Le Bonian and Allportian theories of the crowd are embedded within public order police training and practice. Furthermore, it supports the work of Stott and Reicher (1998b) who suggest that the police combine such classic theories of the crowd into an 'agitator' model in which the 'bad' are able to lead the 'mad'. The thesis suggests a systematic relationship underpinning police perceptions of football crowd behaviour whereby police understanding of crowd composition impacts upon their understanding of attributions for crowd disorder which may subsequently form a rationale and justification for the police to use force against the whole crowd.

The thesis has also identified that the relationship between police understanding of crowd psychology and public order policing is more complex than identified by

previous research. It has demonstrated how it not only prevents officers from recognising the impact that the use of undifferentiated force can play in escalating crowd disorder but also from recognising the potentially positive impact that other actions such as facilitation or communication can have. Such good practice only appears to be recognised at a tacit level, it is therefore not being explicitly built upon. In contrast the need to use force to police crowds is widely articulated, identified as good practice and built upon nationally. The thesis therefore suggests that classic theory may be an important mediating variable in undermining a move toward 'negotiated management'.

Despite the thesis' overwhelming focus on the role that crowd psychology has had in developing public order policing methods which have real implications for collective disorder, it is important to recognise that it does not suggest taking a position of psychological determinism. The thesis has acknowledged in both the literature review and empirical chapters that institutional factors and operational demands also play a critically important role. However, this thesis suggests that it may be the case that so entrenched are classical theoretical ideas that they have become institutionalised, at least with respect to the policing of public order at football. Furthermore, given that these same officers police other crowd events, it may be reasonable to assume that 'escalated force' may actually be the default position for public order policing more generally within England and Wales. Consequently, there is a pressing need to update police education concerning crowd dynamics if public order policing is to fully embrace a 'negotiated management' approach.

The central message to take from this thesis is that the absence of modern crowd theory in the public order policing of football crowds seems somewhat problematic given the history of disorder associated with football and previous research which suggests the importance of police competencies in the effective management of football crowd dynamics (Stott et al, 2008). There can be little if any dispute that policing football is inherently difficult, often quite stressful and occurs in a highly challenging environment within which officers must make effective decisions. Indeed, ineffective decision making can be catastrophic (e.g. Taylor, 1981). The

central finding of this research is that the nature of such decision making is at the very least influenced by officers' knowledge of crowd dynamics. It is the contention of this thesis that the public order policing of football in England and Wales (and indeed internationally) must be updated to include the latest scientific knowledge so that officers can make these highly demanding decisions in the most informed way possible. Indeed, the evidence suggests very strongly that where such knowledge is made available there can be significant reductions on the overall levels of football related disorder (Stott et al, 2007; 2008; Stott & Pearson, 2007).

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Appendix

The Nature of Crowds - A Questionnaire

This research is seeking to examine and measure police officers' views of crowds and crowd behaviour. It will form part of a wider national ACPO sponsored study of crowd behaviour. In the questionnaire below you will be asked about three sorts of crowds: crowds of football supporters (referred to as *football crowds*), crowds at political demonstrations (referred to as *demonstrating crowds*), and crowds of observers at ceremonial (e.g., royal) occasions (referred to as *ceremonial crowds*). Answers can range from strongly disagree to strongly agree. There are 6 boxes corresponding to this, please put an X in the box which most strongly reflects your view. Please answer each and every question as honestly as possible. You will not be asked for any information which would enable you to be identified and - in any case - all answers will be confidential, known only to the researcher. Thank you for taking the time to assist in this study.

Crowd Composition

- a. People of all sorts can be found among *football* crowds.

Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree
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- b. The majority of people in *football* crowds have peaceful aims.

Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree
------------------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	---------------------------

- c. A significant minority of people in many *football* crowds have violent aims.

Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree
------------------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	---------------------------

The Effects of Crowds

- a. Under some circumstances, even the most respectable and ordinary people can become irrational and violent when caught up in the middle of a *football* crowd.

Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree
------------------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	---------------------------

- b. Professional agitators are skilled at inciting violent behaviour among previously peaceful members of *football* crowds.

Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree
------------------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	---------------------------

- c. All *football* crowds are potentially violent and dangerous.

Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree
-------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	----------------

- d. Once violence starts in a *football* crowd, otherwise law-abiding decent people get affected by the general behaviour and get drawn in.

Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree
-------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	----------------

- e. The motivation for people in a football crowd to cause trouble is political.

Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree
-------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	----------------

- f. The motivation for people in a football crowd to cause trouble is for fun and excitement.

Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree
-------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	----------------

Entering Crowds

- a. When going into situations involving *football* crowds, the thought of possible extreme and violent behaviour by the crowd makes me worry about my safety.

Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree
-------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	----------------

Attributions/Explaining Crowd Violence

- a. The nature of *football* crowds is such that one usually needs look no further than the crowd itself to explain violence when it erupts.

Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree
-------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	----------------

- b. When violence occurs involving *football* crowds, the police are rarely responsible for either the initiation or any escalation of such violence.

Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree
-------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	----------------

- c. The police are often responsible for the eruption of wide-scale violence among crowds, because of their inflexible, heavy-handed, and indiscriminate response to violence by small numbers of crowd members.

Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree
-------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	----------------

- d. By the time the police take any serious action against violent members of a *football* crowd, most genuinely peaceful crowd members will have retreated to a place of safety once dispersal orders have been communicated to the crowd. Most people remaining *want* conflict with the police.

Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree
-------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	----------------

Tactics for Dealing with Crowd Violence

e. *Football* crowds must be strictly controlled in order to prevent widespread violence erupting.

Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree
-------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	----------------

f. If even a few members of a *football* crowd become violent, it is important for the police to intervene quickly and in force. This is the best way of ensuring that violence does not escalate, whilst protecting the safety of the intervening police personnel.

Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree
-------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	----------------

g. When trouble does escalate in any crowd, the situation is such that it is not possible for the police to differentiate between crowd members, even if they wanted to, i.e., because of poor visibility when in riot gear.

Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree
-------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	----------------

d. When trouble does escalate in any crowd, the situation is such that it is not possible for the police to differentiate between crowd members, even if they wanted to, i.e., because of the difficulty of identifying individual crowd members.

Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree
-------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	----------------

e. When trouble does escalate in any crowd, the situation is such that it is not possible for the police to differentiate between crowd members, even if they wanted to, i.e., because of the need to get past 'innocent' crowd members to get to 'guilty' ones.

Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree
-------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	----------------

f. When trouble does escalate in any crowd, the situation is such that it is not possible for the police to differentiate between crowd members, even if they wanted to, i.e., because of the need for the police to remain in groups for the sake of safety.

Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree
-------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	----------------

Policing Crowd Situations

a. Junior officers are sometimes resentful of their senior officers' reluctance to deal firmly with *football* crowds.

Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree
-------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	----------------

b. The police behave 'as one' more than is usual when confronting a violent or potentially violent crowd.

Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree
------------------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	---------------------------

Experience

The following questions are included only to examine patterns of views. Information obtained from answers to these questions will rarely be enough to identify individual respondents to this questionnaire - and in any case will never be used for that purpose.

a. Time in police service (in total) _____

b. Present rank _____

c. Is there anything else you would like to add about crowds, the people in them and the actions they take, why violence erupts within some crowds, or indeed anything else? If so, please write your comments (as clearly as possible) in the space below/overleaf.

Thank you for your time and trouble in answering all the questions with complete honesty.