A Catachresis of Creativity?

Liverpool '08, culture-led regeneration, and the creative industries.

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Abstract

This thesis scrutinises an orthodoxy which, after crystallising in the late 1990s, continues to exert influence upon an increasing number of national governments. This is that the 'creative industries' are to be encouraged as they are at the vanguard of a new economic order, and more particularly that, due to their inherent creativity, these industries are intimately linked with processes of entrepreneurship, and with projects of 'culture-led regeneration'. This latter concept, whereby 'culture' is seen as having a vital part to play in reviving the fortunes of cities facing socioeconomic difficulties, has become prominent over a similar time frame. It is argued that these linkages, which lie at the basis of much cultural policy discourse and intervention, rest on unstable foundations, often due to an ambivalent deployment of the terminology of 'creativity' and 'culture'. The core of the thesis is an analysis of one specific example of political intervention in the cultural realm: the 2008 European Capital of Culture programme in Liverpool, England. The thesis argues that relevant local and national policy discourse posits a relationship between this programme and increased activity and business formation within the creative industries which is highly problematic. This argument is based on analysis of relevant policy documents, and also on data derived from a series of interviews with entrepreneurs working in the city of Liverpool within the creative industries. More broadly, it is argued that the narrative of economic growth connected to the creative industries is based upon a duplicitous deployment of available statistics, and that the potential for the successful operation of such industries within a city such as Liverpool is in any case limited by a number of entrenched structural factors. These, however, continue to be skirted by a wider political narrative of success regarding the European Capital of Culture intervention which in a short space of time has become similarly entrenched and persistent. What this prevailing narrative obscures, and what this thesis therefore seeks to reveal, is the fragility of the concept that there is such an entity as 'the creative industries' at all; that, such as it does exist, the arguments for its support are largely based on an ideological, and not, as is claimed, an 'evidential' basis; that its role in culture *or* regeneration, not to mention the supposed conjunction of the two, in the local context is negligible; and that this state of affairs may necessarily be so due to the prevailing configuration of economy, state, and culture.

Contents

Acronyms used in the thesis:

ABI	Annual Business Inquiry
ACME	Arts Culture and Media Enterprises
BERR	(Department for) Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform
CBI	Confederation of British Industry
DCMS	Department for Culture Media and Sport
DIUS	Department for Innovation Universities and Skills
ECoC	European Capital of Culture
ERSA	European Regional Science Association
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GLC	Greater London Council
GVA	Gross Value Added
IDBR	Inter-Departmental Business Register
LCS	Liverpool Cultural Strategy
LFS	Labour Force Survey
LSP	Local Strategic Partnership
NESTA	National Endowment for Science Technology and the Arts
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SIC	Standard Industrial Classification
SOC	Standard Occupational Classification
UK	United Kingdom
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
VAT	Value Added Tax

Acknowledgements

Chapter One – Introduction

This thesis examines certain aspects of engagement in the field of culture by government bodies. In particular, it seeks to examine the relationship between cultural policy and creative industries that is articulated over a range of these bodies. As such, its approach is initially informed by what Gray (2010: 222) identifies as "the political science approach" to cultural policy. This approach consists of analysis of the texts generated, the concepts deployed, and the interventions made when governments allocate resources within the cultural realm, enabling an appreciation of the manner in which such policy construes a certain version of events. In order to understand why this construal takes certain forms and not others, it is important that this approach is deepened with an investigation into the concepts and assumptions which can serve to support this position, and which strengthen the articulation and justification of cultural policy. It is also considered important to seek out knowledge regarding how such policy is experienced by relevant actors, and how it is experienced and understood by those it influences, or purports to influence. In this manner, the thesis examines certain aspects of cultural policy with reference to a specific place at a specific time – the UK at the opening of the 21st century – but argues that this particular case is predominantly of interest not due to its specific characteristics, but rather due to its typification of a broader policy discourse, entailing ramifications beyond its geographical and temporal boundaries.

Justifying cultural policy and its resultant interventions in the cultural field is an area which remains problematic for government (O'Brien 2010a), and over the course of some two centuries, the rationales for political intervention in the cultural realm in the UK have assumed a wide range of forms (Minihan 1977: x). Looking specifically at the recent past, it is possible to identify how in the last 30 years the allocation of resources to cultural programmes and institutions has increasingly been justified in terms of the potential *economic* benefits which may result from this allocation (O'Connor 2005: 47). Whilst the arts and culture may often be assumed to operate on a different logic to the profit-seeking motives of a capitalist economic structure, it is argued by some that taking a position such as this disregards the fact that "art and culture are real social and economic mechanisms" which "are responsible for thousands of jobs, billions of dollars in revenue" (Currid 2007: ix). This potential for economic benefit to arise from the cultural realm has been identified within policy circles internationally, and this is aligned to the notion that the support of culture can provide the foundations to promote a transformation in the economic order, and the emergence of a new, creative, economy. Throsby, for example, suggests that in an increasingly globalised economy, creativity is seen as being integral to "competitive advantage" and that "at the heart of the creative economy are the cultural or creative industries" (2008a: 147).

Within the UK, this specific terminology of 'creative industries', and the case that government must intervene to ensure their development, first emerged during the New Labour administration of the

1990s (DCMS 1998), and continues to be made in a variety of quarters up to the present day (e.g. CBI 2010). This case is made not only because these industries are seen as providing a means to justify government spending in the realm of culture – something akin to a return on investment – nor because such industries are considered to have the potential to generate "billions of dollars", as noted above. The operations of the creative industries are also seen to align with a prevailing neo-liberal consensus regarding the value of private enterprise and entrepreneurship; it is argued that that creative industries have especially dynamic and entrepreneurial characteristics (Richards 2007, Van Heur 2010a), and these characteristics are especially useful in achieving the competitive advantage identified by Throsby.

Competitive advantage can also be gained due to the capacity for innovation within these creative practices, which is seen as central to economic growth: Lazzeretti argues that we can consider culture as a source of innovation in this way (2007: 190), and it is due to this innovative and entrepreneurial capacity which they embody that the creative industries are seen as central to the emergent creative economy. This new economic order is treated as a historic inevitability in many quarters, and so a further justification for policies seeking to bolster the creative industries may be provided by a sense that their future importance is all but assured. Indeed, on reviewing the situation at an international scale, Van Heur finds that "all policy documents on the creative industries" are structured on "the assumption that creativity *will become* increasingly important" in this emergent new economy (2010a: 129, original emphasis). Similarly, Florida, whose work relating to this field has influenced administrations in a number of countries, asserts that "the creative economy is reshaping nearly every aspect of economic development as we know it" (2005: 49), and so those who do not engage with this development risk being left behind. This teleological narrative whereby creativity *will* play a central role in the 21st century persists throughout policy and academic discourse (e.g. Landry and Bianchini 1995: 3, Hartley 2005: 1). Not only will creative industries form the basis of this new economic order, but their entrepreneurial, creative character may also show us how other industries will eventually come to operate within this new order (Leadbeater and Oakley 1999: 13).

Given that the importance of the creative industries thus comes to be seen as something of a truism, government at a variety of levels is engaged in the task of ensuring that the value of these creative industries is captured, and that the creative environments deemed necessary for their manifestation are promoted (Jayne 2005). This thesis examines some of the ways in which this is done, and the ideas which serve to justify such actions. Hagoort *et al.*, for example, note the importance of concepts such as Landry's 'creative city' which, they argue, is where Florida's 'creative class' live, to cities seeking to maintain or enhance their economic standing:

Landry has labelled the creative city, thereby cementing a belief in the exclusive nature of the city as the most important protagonist for the creative industry [...] only those cities which offer a haven to [...] the 'creative classes' can count on increased economic prosperity. (2007: 11)

Based on ideas such as these, it is considered appropriate for governments to allocate resources to interventions aimed at the promotion and development of areas which have suitable conditions in which "creativity can flourish" (Landry 2001: 2), in order to reap the benefits associated with the entrepreneurial, creative people who engage in this creative activity. Cultural policy is seen as having a particular creative role to play here. Supporting cultural activity such as a "vibrant artistic community", for example, will by such a model enable local administrations "to attract and stimulate those who create in business" (Florida 2004: 55). This thesis will examine how the nature of this overlap is articulated, and how it is constructed as a desirable outcome for policy intervention.

This thesis seeks to consider these ideas in ways that have previously been not been attempted, and provide alternative perspectives to those considered thus far. The way in which cultural policy interacts with creative industries, and the role for entrepreneurs within these industries, can all too easily be asserted on the basis of the ideas set out above, rather than examined and analysed. This thesis will therefore consider how ideas such as these become manifest by examining a specific example of a cultural programme largely organised and funded by government bodies[1], and which can therefore be considered a tangible manifestation of cultural policy as outlined above. The example which the thesis focuses on is Liverpool's tenure as European Capital of Culture (ECoC) in 2008. The ECoC programme was instigated by the European Union to celebrate the cultural richness and diversity of European countries (European Commission 2010a) and involves a revolving annual programme of city nomination, the host city organising a programme of cultural events throughout their allocated year. Despite strong claims being made both before (e.g. Liverpool Culture Company 2002) and after (e.g. European Commission 2010b) Liverpool's ECoC year regarding the linkage between the ECoC programme and creative industries growth, there is a real lack of research examining the nature of this relationship. An investigation into this issue is therefore both pertinent and timely. Based on the positions briefly set out above, the key questions which this thesis seeks to consider in order to successfully address this gap are therefore:

- Why have the 'creative industries' come to be considered as important within cultural policy, and in what form?

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1. The Liverpool ECoC considered in the thesis received 58% of its funding from Liverpool City Council, and a further 22% from other public sector bodies. This is comparable to other ECoC cities (Impacts 08 2010: 51).

- What is the nature of the relationship between these industries and publically-funded cultural programmes? Specifically,
    - How is this relationship articulated within policy documents, and by those working to implement these policies?
    - How is the issue of the meanings of terminology in this area negotiated? Whilst 'culture' and 'creativity' may be understood to refer to the same object, they also have the potential to refer to very different objects.
- How do entrepreneurs working within the creative industries experience the effects of cultural policy?

This thesis therefore seeks to reveal how this relationship is articulated, how it is experienced, and why it is seen as valuable. On this latter point, what is clear is that the aim for programmes such as the ECoC is often a broader process of 'regeneration', mending some of the economic and social problems of the host location, and this specifically 'culture-led regeneration' (DCMS 2004a, Evans and Shaw 2004) is seen as having the potential to revive the fortunes of cities not least via the increased prevalence of the 'creative industries' considered thus far. Bailey, for example, argues that up to half of all new business start-ups are in the creative sector and that "this high proportion has in turn been attributed to the impact of 'culture-led regeneration'" (2006: 2), whilst programmes such as the ECoC are often linked specifically to such economic regeneration (Evans 2004: 72). By analysing the particular relationship between a cultural programme such as the ECoC and the practices of those who have formed businesses in the creative industries, this thesis seeks to provide a more grounded understanding of these phenomena.

1.1 The structure of the thesis

Despite the apparent clarity offered by a narrative whereby creative cultural programmes can promote creative entrepreneurs to establish creative businesses, this thesis contends that a narrative such as this obscures what creative industries are, what their value is, and how those within such industries approach their work. Schlesinger argues that "creative industries discourse [...] has acquired the look of an increasingly closed ideological system" (2009: 11), and similarly Bell and Jayne outline how plans to regenerate cities via creative practice are extremely widespread and seldom critiqued or questioned (2010: 210). This thesis therefore seeks to admit perspectives and positions which do not fit this dominant narrative of neat and clear creative success. It should be noted that, in the interests of both coherence and brevity, the thesis broadly seeks to tackle the narrative regarding the regenerative power of creative industries, and the overlap between these industries and cultural policy interventions, on its own terms; that is, to examine whether this narrative of a relationship between

culture-led regeneration and successful creative industries is leveraged in the case of the Liverpool ECoC, and if so, whether this narrative has an internal logic and consistency. Clearly, it might well be asked why specifically *cultural* initiatives have come to be used as a political tool to such a great degree over the particular period of time under consideration, or whether the cultural position of the creative industries is one which is adequately understood, or whether the promotion of entrepreneurship in any case is an appropriate tool for those seeking to 'regenerate' a city. These questions, and many others, are pertinent and valid. This thesis, however, does not seek to lay new foundations for the debate of these topics, but merely to examine the extant foundations in a more comprehensive manner, not least because these foundations continue to be built upon up to the present day. By examining where weaknesses may lie in these foundations, however, this thesis can help to prepare the ground for their potential reconfiguration. The argument of the thesis will be presented according to the following structure.

Chapter Two sets out the terms upon which the subsequent analysis will take place. This chapter starts by noting that, despite the increased focus upon the issue of creative industries in many fields, the referent of this term is not necessarily clear. In order to suitably analyse the relationship between a cultural programme and a set of 'creative industries', however, it is necessary to know what these industries are, and how they have come to be grouped together. Chapter Two presents this grouping in the context of a historical development of relevant terminology. The course of this development, therefore, is traced in order to gain a rounded understanding of the factors under consideration. Adorno's work (1991) on the "culture industry", which largely refers to commodities emerging from the novel 20th century usage of technology enabling mass reproduction of audio-visual phenomena, is briefly examined, as this lays the foundations for later work by writers such as Miège (1989) who refer to "the cultural industries", in the plural. This later work discusses a broadly similar set of commodities, but does not conceive of them as part of an inescapable structure of stupefaction, but rather as a set of relationships potentially less problematic yet more complex than the "culture industry" concept allows for. Chapter Two argues that this distinction is deepened further with the later emergence of the terminology of the 'creative industries', and that this new terminology raises potential difficulties for the proposed relationship between these industries and the type of cultural programme under consideration in the thesis.

Having moved towards a clearer understanding of one main object of this research, Chapter Two goes on to consider another of the key concepts aligned to the narrative of success in creative industries: entrepreneurship. The majority of policies relating to creative industries posit a central role for entrepreneurs (Van Heur 2010a: 135), yet this is another concept whose referent is not necessarily clear. The meaning of, and role for, entrepreneurship is therefore examined in order to establish a coherent

understanding to underpin primary research relating to entrepreneurship in the creative industries in the local context.

Chapter Two concludes by outlining some of the key concepts involved in the dominant discourse regarding the creative industries in greater detail. These are: i) that we are currently in the age of an emergent 'new economy', fundamentally different from previous economic orders, and that, relatedly, there has been a 'cultural turn' in analysis within which some argue that there has been a collapse of boundaries between the cultural and the economic (Ray and Sayer 1999) rendering the cultural of prime importance for economic success; ii) that these ideas form part of the basis for a policy approach seeking 'culture-led regeneration', whereby culture can be used to drive primarily economic transformation within a given location, and; iii) that at the root of much of the policy discourse related to such cultural interventions are concepts relating to 'creativity', such as the 'creative city' (Landry 2000) and 'creative class' (Florida 2004) theses, whereby a good cultural environment attracts successful entrepreneurial people, and this in turn can be associated with creative and entrepreneurial processes of governance. These concepts are outlined in Chapter Two in order that their usage in relation to the particular case at hand may be considered in later chapters.

Having established an understanding of relevant concepts, Chapter Three outlines the need to interrogate the research questions set out above from a number of methodological standpoints. Namely, from an engagement with the statistical data that has been gathered regarding the nature of the creative industries, from an analysis of dominant discourses regarding creativity, and also from a consideration of data gathered via interviews with policymakers and practitioners. Considering these varying approaches in unison enables a more nuanced understanding of these issues than has previously been achieved, and this chapter describes the justification for these approaches. It is argued that to achieve a holistic understanding of the issues under consideration, it is important to examine not only the nature of the political narrative around creative industries, and the evidence and concepts that this is based upon, but also the experience of those whom this narrative is notionally about, i.e. those who have actually carried out some process of entrepreneurship within the creative industries. This chapter also details the argument for Liverpool's ECoC year constituting a suitable case for the study of the topics at hand. Having established the research methodology seen as most appropriate to study this site, the ensuing chapters are based upon analysis of the data gathered via this approach.

Chapter Four begins the presentation of findings with a macro-level consideration of the economic importance of creative industries. There would be no particular interest in a programme such as the ECoC having an effect on the creative industries or otherwise, unless they were considered to have a particular value, and so this chapter focuses on the emergence of a dominant narrative at a national level within the UK regarding the creative industries' outperformance of other industrial sectors, both

in terms of economic output and employment levels, and considers the wider influence this dominant narrative has. It is the position of this thesis that statistics on these topics are central to, and should therefore be the initial object of, any consideration of the subject of creative industries, as they are vital to the importance associated with the creative industries in many quarters. Chapter Four also argues that it is the gathering of these statistics which, at least in part, serves to form the object of the 'creative industries' under consideration.

As these figures are considered so important, Chapter Four discusses in detail how the relevant evidence is collated, and posits that, rather than supporting a teleological argument regarding how the creative industries *will* be at the basis of a 'new economy', a decade's worth of data seems to show how the only significant evidence of economic growth has been within industries which have very little to do with the areas which cultural policy generally deals with; a rift seldom acknowledged within a discourse which presents the creative industries and, indeed, creativity itself as a unified entity. This raises difficulties for the proposed inter-relationship of cultural policy and creative industries under consideration, and in turn for the appropriateness of cultural policy as a tool to generate the economic benefits associated with these industries. Evidence that there has been significant growth in other sectors which do not fit the 'new economy' discourse is also briefly considered.

Having examined, and problematized, the statistical evidence base, Chapter Five considers the discourse of a strong connection between 'culture' and creative industries growth, particularly within documents relating to the Liverpool ECoC, but also in relation to national policy discourse in the UK. It is argued that in these there is evidence of catachresis – that is to say the misapplication of language – when it comes to the notion of 'creativity'. As referred to above, because they are particularly 'creative', an intervention based largely in the arts is positioned in such documents as acting as a catalyst for growth within the range of creative industries, as these too demonstrate 'creativity'. Business formation is similarly 'creative'. It is argued that this position evokes Florida's influential 'creative class' thesis (2004) which links multiple disparate elements by denoting them all as creative and, crucially, argues that these disparate manifestations of creativity are fundamentally unified and linked. Direct evocations of Florida's work will be considered, both in relation to national cultural policy, and also locally in the case of the 'Liverpool Cultural Strategy' produced during 2008. Chapter Five also discusses how the ECoC is leveraged in attempts to position Liverpool as a 'creative city' in policy documents, evoking Landry's thesis (2000). Once again, the language of creativity is here applied to multiple and disparate objects as though they were unified and common. This chapter argues that it is this assumed commonality which is a key factor enabling the links between cultural policy and creative industries development under consideration to be drawn in the case of the ECoC and similar programmes, but that this commonality is contentious. The chapter concludes with a

consideration of where the value expected to emerge from creative entrepreneurship fits into the ECoC process.

In light of this unified conception of creativity, Chapter Six focuses in the first instance on policy at a local and national level which is related specifically to developing the creative industries. This chapter shows how a directly analogous process occurs within such creative industries policy, with linkages once again posited between all forms of 'creativity', the basis of which is difficult to ascertain. Firstly, the role for 'Merseyside ACME' – the agency responsible for developing creative industries locally – within the ECoC process is examined, and this is contextualised by a consideration of the national UK government position on the creative industries as presented in the 'Creative Britain' report (DCMS *et al.* 2008). Chapter Six shows how the discourse by which arts-centred cultural activity is placed at the centre of the economic growth considered in earlier chapters is perpetuated. As in Chapter Five, Chapter Six argues that a unified notion of creativity is in place, and that once again policy discourse is characterised by catachresis. Chapter Six continues by assessing the 'creativity' of the factors at play, suggesting that the current state of affairs, both in local and national policy, may be but the latest manifestation of an entrenched tendency. Rather than engaging with a cultural world transformed by the creative industries whose power they seek to leverage, it is posited that policy discourse often seems content merely to propose an assumed commonality between all types of 'creativity'. Despite the caution urged by the analysis of the preceding chapters, however, Chapter Six concludes by showing how this assumed commonality of all things 'creative' lies at the base of a sustained political narrative which proposed that Liverpool's ECoC has successfully demonstrated the influence which cultural policy can exert upon creative industries, and is a model for other cities to follow in this regard.

Whilst the previous chapters consider the issues at hand mainly from a discursive, theoretical perspective, Chapter Seven interrogates these same issues from an alternative perspective by focussing on data gathered from a series of interviews conducted with entrepreneurs within the creative industries working in Liverpool. This data comes from unstructured interviews, and so avoids the imposition of any relational framework, instead seeking to examine the important factors relating to the development of practice as narrated by practitioners themselves. This data is shown in many cases to be in contrast to the dominant political discourse revealed by the analysis in the previous chapters, and suggests the need to reconsider the focus placed upon entrepreneurship within the creative industries, based upon the experiences of those who actually occupy this valued role. The data also reveals a clear split regarding practitioners' self-conception as 'creative' between expressive arts-based practitioners and others, and demonstrates the important role played by higher education for the majority of practitioners in terms of the location and nature of their business practices. Interesting questions are also raised regarding the nature of place and the role of the public sector, and so a more

nuanced understanding of the potential for influence that programmes such as the ECoC, and cultural policy more broadly, have for practice in the creative industries is established. Whilst such findings counter a simplistic understanding whereby creative cultural programmes will encourage creative businesses, by elucidating factors which may be of greater import to those working in the creative sector, they may help provide the basis for policy which has a clearer understanding of factors influencing creative practice.

The discussion of data in Chapter Seven thus serves to question the extent to which the operation of creative industries and an agenda of 'regeneration' on multiple fronts are linked, and also examines the relationship between those working within the creative industries and those tasked with implementing the policy interventions discussed previously. This chapter shows how despite the continued narrative of success and inter-relationship between policy and creative industries discussed in Chapter Six, across the range of creative industries there is very little evidence of any tangible effects having emerged from the ECoC process over a five-year period of increasing intervention in Liverpool[2]. Whilst the ECoC was broadly looked on positively by those interviewed, the perceived lack of overlap between creative industry business practices and the ECoC programme did in some cases seem to exist as part of a broader suspicion or antipathy towards the goals or working methods of public sector agencies more generally, and this is explored. What seems clear, however, is that the assumed overlap between activity in a programme such as the ECoC and creative industry practice will not occur without clear, deliberate intervention, and that this intervention did not occur in the Liverpool case.

By way of conclusion, Chapter Eight reflects upon the ambition of the thesis to scrutinise the interaction between cultural policy and cultural policy from a combination of perspectives, in hitherto unattempted ways. This final chapter also aims to position the research findings within a broader context, aiming to elucidate some of the avenues further research in this area might take in order to understand the factors at play more completely. These are based on the issues arising from interview data considered in Chapter Seven and include the nature of entrepreneurship within creative industries, their particular geography and the problems inherent in linking the development of a creative sector to agendas of social inclusion and social justice.

The thesis thus aims to show that the overlap articulated within cultural policy between its interventions and the operations and development of new creative businesses can be understood within the context of a broader turn towards a focus upon articulating the specifically economic

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2. Liverpool won the nomination for the ECoC title in 2003, and the 'Liverpool Culture Company', the organising body for the Liverpool ECoC, organised a series of themed years of activity from 2003-2008, culminating in the main programme of 2008.

benefits that such policies may have. The evidence for these benefits, however, arises from a particular and partial use of the concept of 'creativity' which is shown throughout the thesis to be especially problematic. Without this particular use, however, a discourse of economic benefit is difficult to sustain. Similarly, it is also difficult to maintain that a cultural programme such as the ECoC may assist in leveraging this economic benefit without this particular reading of creativity. By examining the context in which this policy discourse perpetuates, the thesis seeks to deepen understanding of how such a position is maintained, and also to provide a corrective to this position by considering how tangible manifestations of this policy are experienced as being of minimal importance by the creative entrepreneurs they are purported to influence; a group who, it is shown, may experience 'creativity' in very different terms. By considering the nuanced position articulated by this group, the thesis thus aims to provide a more grounded understanding of the relationship between creativity, value, cultural policy and place.

Chapter Two – The Terms of Engagement

Depending on the body of work one examines, one could be forgiven for thinking that the role of the creative industries is one which is now well understood and requires little critical engagement. It is asserted in some quarters, for example, that, "the importance of a thriving creative sector to the economy of cities is well recognised," and that "culturally creative workers are central to promoting creativity in cities and growing the creative industries sector" (Loughborough University 2009). Similarly, arguments can be made that there is "wide recognition" that "cultural facilities and activities have a catalytic economic role in the urban economy" (Cooke 2008: 26), and even that such creative activities have become "the cornerstone of contemporary society" (Granger and Hamilton 2010: 2). Looking towards the political arena, the 2009 'Year of Creativity and Innovation' saw the European Commission launch a 'Creativity Forum' to "prove that creativity [...] can be of key importance for a successful turn in economic development" (EU 2009). In concert with an increased coalescence around this position whereby creative industries are considered central to boosting economic growth, there has been a proliferation of case studies aimed at better understanding the operation of various discrete parts of the creative sector (e.g. Bilton on advertising (2009), De Propris and Wei on jewellery (2007), Hesmondhalgh and Baker on television (2008), Ó Cinnéide and Henry on performing arts (2007), Van Heur on electronic music (2010a)), and these studies can to some degree be situated within this wider frame, often treating one subsector of the creative industries as a synecdoche for the whole.

The entrenchment of this position whereby the value of the creative industries and their links to cultural activities are 'known', particularly within the UK, can in no small part be attributed to work carried out by DCMS during the tenure of the New Labour administration (1997-2010), which worked to co-ordinate the construction of an 'evidence base' for the economic primacy of the creative industries sector (DCMS 1998, 2004b, 2007, DCMS *et al.* 2008). Taylor (2006: 8) points out that the findings from this evidence-collation project are presented as unambiguous, and that the message of high employment and economic growth attributable to creative industries has resulted in the adoption of policies which aim to stimulate creative sector growth within all regions of the UK. Promotion of creative industries therefore forms a key part of regional economic development policy across the nation, although it must be acknowledged that the level of commitment to such policy, and its appropriateness, varies throughout the country (Jayne 2005: 543). Whilst arguments have recently emerged that such concepts have moved on sufficiently that we can claim to have reached a point in analytical time "after the creative industries" (Banks and O'Connor 2009), the ongoing influence of the creative industries model and attendant evidence produced by the DCMS is undeniable. Not only does this influence remain current and continuous (Chapain and Lee 2009), but the New Labour focus on creative industries has proved influential internationally (Schlesinger 2009: 12). This thesis, though, in concert with the more slender body of critical work carried out regarding the creative industries

concept (e.g. Garnham 2005a, Oakley 2009a), argues that if the first question research into this area seeks to answer is 'How can policy best support these industries?' then it implicitly accepts (or, worse, ignores) a raft of assumptions; these include, for example, the idea that this promotion by policy is actually possible, that the operation of these industries is palpably beneficial, and indeed that these industries constitute a discernible and discrete mode of activity in the first place. In order to better understand the relationship between cultural policy and creative industries, this thesis seeks to unpack and interrogate these often taken for granted assumptions.

To carry out an investigation focussed upon the creative industries, however, it is necessary to know *what* the object of research actually is, social scientific enquiry all too often being hampered by vague or unclear definitions (Berg 2007: 21). This chapter therefore seeks to outline the development of the terminology of the creative industries so that we may better understand the object under consideration, and similarly to outline the key concepts associated with the prevailing narrative around creativity, culture and regeneration sketched in the preceding chapter. One of the key knowledge gaps that this thesis seeks to implicitly reveal is the failure of much previous research to clearly delineate the terms upon which this research aims to engage; what are the 'creative industries'? What constitutes 'entrepreneurship'? How do these concepts fit in with the idea of 'culture-led regeneration'? And what are the broader structures within which this research becomes pertinent and relevant? If these questions are not answered, an examination of the way in which these concepts play themselves out in the context of the 2008 ECoC in Liverpool risks a lack of focus.

It is thus essential to begin by establishing a more concrete understanding of these terms. Issues around definition in these areas are highly contested, and determinant boundaries are subject to constant slippage and realignment. As an object cannot reasonably be researched without defining what that object actually *is*, however, this chapter examines the relevant extant literature and, in so doing, delineates the foundations upon which the following chapters and the associated data-gathering and analysis builds. It thus seeks to tie down certain concepts which, as will be considered later, are otherwise in danger of breaking loose from their definitional moorings and becoming free-floating signifiers, conceptual chameleons which can be applied to almost any object indiscriminately, and therefore also misapplied all too easily.

2.1 The creative industries

To adequately understand the relationship between cultural policy and creative industries, it is first necessary to understand what these creative industries actually are. As noted, despite a clear definition being produced and reproduced at a national government level by the DCMS of the discrete subsectors

of the economy which make up the creative industries macro-category (e.g. DCMS 1998, 2004b, see below), issues of definition and boundary surrounding the creative industries remain highly problematic and contested (e.g. Throsby 2008b, Banks and O'Connor 2009). To simply take the definition provided at this national policy level as read would thus risk ignoring the ideological and historic character of this macro-category. Central to the enquiry of this research is the appropriate use of terminology around 'creative industries', and this terminology can only be adequately understood in the context of a historic process of development. To achieve a coherent and stable understanding of the appropriateness of the current usage of the term 'creative industries', therefore, and how it has come to be deployed within cultural policy, it is necessary to understand the bases upon which it is deployed, and the common criteria upon which membership is granted. To this end, it is instructive to trace a brief history of the development of terminology regarding the interaction between economic processes, culture and creativity. Understanding this process of development, or perhaps, rather, of mutation, is vital to appreciating the ideological position which the creative industries now occupy, and thus to understanding what place they may be understood to occupy within political processes attempting to bring about 'culture-led regeneration'. To begin with, it is possible to identify the origin for the current terminology, but not its current usage, form or meaning, in the work of the Frankfurt School, and more precisely of Theodor Adorno, in the middle of the 20th century.

2.1.1 The 'culture industry'

Whilst it is important to be wary of what Williams refers to as "technological determinism" (1974: 133), that is to say the idea that we can explain the nature of, for example, the cultural position of the popular music industry solely in terms of the emergence of technology enabling the reproduction of sound, it should be noted that the context for discussion of the increasingly industrial character of relations within the cultural domain, and the further iterative encroachment of market principles into this domain, is the emergence of new technologies enabling the reproduction and dissemination of audio-visual cultural products, broadly synchronous with the span of the 20th century (Hughes 1990: 13). This unprecedented development is one which raises a wide range of cultural and economic questions, which are far from achieving resolution. It should be noted, however, that for a significant stretch of human history there has been a strong relationship between the cultural field and the commodity form, and the history of artistic endeavour is not one which can accurately or adequately be understood as occurring in a realm entirely separate from prevailing economic structures until the arrival of the twentieth century's reproductive technology. The interaction between these two forces has an extremely long history: Bruegel's *The Painter and The Connoisseur*, for example, commented on the relationship between art and commerce some 450 years ago, the role of the economic power of the Florentine Medici to the development of artistic achievement yet prior to this is well-known, and Hyde

argues that the role of the market within cultural practice has been a subject of debate at least since the time of ancient Greece (2006: 160). We can also recognise something of the current situation in Tönnies' seminal 19th century writing on *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*: "the city is [...] the centre of science and culture, which always go hand in hand with commerce and industry. *Here the arts must make a living,* they are exploited in a capitalistic way" (1957: 228, emphasis added).

The historical fact of relationships mediated by markets, therefore, is acknowledged by all writers on the subject of the nexus between culture and 'industry'. The development of the language of the 'creative industries' (and so the development of the understanding of what this term refers to), though, can be understood in terms of a changing attitude to, or an attempted repositioning of, this culture/industry dialectic, which begins with total opposition in the discourse of the 'culture industry', and evolves towards the currently entrenched position which attempts some form of synthesis. This latter position is useful in making the case for political intervention in the cultural realm at both a national and local level, particularly in terms of 'regeneration' (see below). The current grouping terminology of the 'creative industries', and the reasoning behind the membership of the majority of its constituent subsectors, however, has clear origins in the earlier work of Adorno (1991) (London Development Agency 2008: 12), which considers the character of the commodities produced by these novel processes of technological reproduction.

Adorno and Horkheimer's writing in the 'Dialectic of Enlightenment' on what they term the 'culture industry' therefore provides the initial basis for this discussion. As is implied by its singular title, this is understood to be something of a monolithic structure which produces films, magazines, music, radio broadcasts; that is to say arts/entertainment commodities. In this work, a strong value judgement on such commodities is explicitly stated. For the authors, the work which is produced by such an industrial process is knowingly "rubbish" (1979: 121) and this modern method of production affects the cultural commodities produced thus: "what is new is not that it is a commodity, but that today it deliberately admits it is one" (1979: 157). The mass produced cultural commodity celebrates its position in the market. Adorno clarifies this in later writing on the culture industry which argues that previously cultural artefacts "sought after profit only indirectly, over and above their autonomous essence. New on the part of the culture industry is the direct and undisguised primacy of a precisely and thoroughly calculated efficacy in its most typical products" (1991: 99).

The accrual of profit, therefore, is the *sine qua non* of the products of the new culture industry. Profit is no longer a by-product of the main activity of cultural and artistic achievement or refinement; culture is to be understood here *only* in terms of the profit motive, operating just as any other business, and this new relationship is in no small part brought about by the technological developments discussed above. Prior to the 20th century, it was simply not technically possible to reproduce audio-visual

material in a way that would facilitate such 'industrialisation', and so it is this particular set of circumstances that leads to the growth of the culture industry. Once this industrialisation occurs, the cultural object becomes a product, and nothing more than a product. Crucially for Adorno and Horkheimer, all the products of such an industrial process are therefore, in essence, the same; they observe that "the technology of the culture industry is no more than the achievement of standardization and mass production" (1979: 122).

Clearly this is a damning assessment of the nature of mass cultural engagement. Yet at the beginning of the 21st century, the players which make up Adorno's 'culture industry' and the commodities they produce are as popular and economically successful as they have ever been, or rather more so, permeating society in an ever-expanding interconnected web, in ways which would have been almost unimaginable when Adorno was writing. Whilst there is no doubt that this new mass production and reproduction of cultural goods opens up for the very first time in human history (the development of moveable type and the printing press aside) the *possibility* of standardisation within the cultural realm, it must be considered whether the analysis offered here truly provides a nuanced picture of the realities experienced when these commodities are encountered or produced. At the very least, it is clear that a political discourse which emphasises the beneficial value of 'creative industries' is operating on a different ideological basis to that presented by Adorno, although it is also clear that similar objects and processes are under consideration. We must therefore examine the ways in which the terms of this debate evolve.

2.1.2 The 'cultural industries'

The analysis above by which cultural commodities become no different from any other product jockeying for position in the marketplace seems not to allow any space for the possibility that not all cultural production in the modern age has succumbed entirely to the primacy of the profit motive. In his seminal analysis of the practice and meaning of 'culture', Williams (1981) considers the continued existence of a more diverse range of activities than could be understood through the lens of a single-minded culture industry enacting its will upon an oppressed populace. On the problem of distinguishing between "objects of utility" and "objects of art" in the context of bringing such objects to the market, he notes that "it would not be true – it would in fact be seriously reductive – to say that the general market order has transformed all cultural production into a market-commodity type" (1981: 50). Williams identifies, as does Adorno, that the 'commodification' of culture has existed throughout history to some extent, but does not acknowledge that all such production is now in thrall to mass-production and devoid of artistic or cultural worth. He does, however, seem to point to a similar dichotomy in this realm as Adorno; that on the one hand there is work produced for cultural, artistic

reasons, and on the other there is work produced for the market, for economic reasons, and whilst the former is still possible, these two forms are still basically in opposition.

Attempts are made to develop this understanding and shift the terms of discourse around the interaction between industry and culture in the final third of the twentieth century. By this new approach, the position of the cultural commodity can be seen as being less problematic, yet more complicated than that conceived of within the idea of the 'culture industry': more complicated in that cultural commodities operate in ways other commodities do not, but less problematic in that the evidence for all cultural production becoming in effect a monolithic machine for propaganda and stupefaction is not nearly as strong as Adorno implies. This dual transition marks the start of a process of reassessment of the economic role of cultural activity and eventually results in the emergence of wider discourse in which this cultural activity is also conceived of as being 'creative' in a number of forms, a project considered further below. In terms of a move away from the 'culture industry', however, Garnham makes it clear that the cultural commodity need not necessarily support the dominant ideology (1990: 34), and Garnham's contemporary, Miège, is perhaps the most important figure when it comes to problematizing the views of Adorno. He clarifies his position thus:

> Reference to the 'cultural industry' – in the singular – misleads one into thinking that we are faced with an unified field, where the various elements function within a single process [...] The same model is said to be at work quickly levelling out the different modes of creativity and imposing common standards. There is no need to take the analysis very far to discover that this postulate is false. (1989: 10)

Miège argues for an understanding which takes into account the complex, *non-standardised*, nature of the production of cultural commodities and artefacts, and as such seeks to shift analysis towards 'the cultural industries' – plural. Whilst we are still dealing with a grouping unified by the industrial production of cultural products, this output is no longer seen as being characterised by such an overarching unity.

Miège also adopts a new position on the continued existence of non-mass produced cultural commodities as noted by Williams above, arguing that, "the fact that numerous small production units still exist alongside monopolistic forms is not due to souvenirs of the past [...] small businesses are better equipped to respond to changes in social demand and to renew creativity" (1989: 44). We thus see the development of a more complex understanding of the meeting point between business and culture, and the association of a particularly innovative, and small-scale, form of creativity with the work of the cultural industries. Scott (2007: 321) argues that there is no reason to assume that a process

of commodification *necessarily* leads to reduced aesthetic or artistic value as Adorno would have it, and the complex reality of the relationships involved in the cultural market is neatly defined by Garnham:

> The cultural market [...] can not be read either as a destruction of high culture by vulgar commercialism or as a suppression of authentic working-class culture, but should be read as a complex hegemonic dialectic of liberation and control. (1990: 164)

By attempting to understand the cultural sector in a more nuanced way, and by focussing on the centrality of the cultural industries to the London economy, Garnham was influential in policy development work situated at the Greater London Council (GLC) at this time, which played a large role in shifting the terms of policy debate regarding culture away from the previously dominant approach in which cultural industries are "the 'other' against which cultural policy react[s]" (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt 2005: 3), attempting rather to integrate them *within* this policy. Direct applications of the cultural policy approach of the GLC cannot be studied in practice due to its disbanding in the mid-1980s, but the influence of the policy approaches explored at this time continues, even as the terms of the analysis of the interplay between culture and economy change once more in the shift towards the usage of the term 'creative industries' which is the main consideration for this thesis.

2.1.3 The 'creative industries'

The emergence of this new terminology of 'creative industries' in the late 1990s involves the constitution of such industries as a vital part of the modern economy, with much discussion having a teleological bent, as noted in Chapter One. Government ministers argue for instance, that the creative industries are, "where the wealth and the jobs of the future are going to be generated from" (Smith 1998: 31). Evans traces this teleology back into studies of cultural industries over the preceding twenty years (2001: 139), and statements such as Smith's perpetuate throughout the first decade of the 21st century (Hartley 2005, Henry 2007, Van Heur 2010a), and form the implicit basis for much current research into creativity (e.g. Creative Campus 2010). Being preponderantly associated with the discourse of government policy and advocacy, the 'creative industries' are most often discussed in terms of their positive attributes and potential, and such an approach clearly moves away from the ideological position regarding the role of the 'culture industry' as conceived by Adorno. The shift towards a language of 'creativity', though, also means that this grouping encompasses a broader range of activity than either the culture industry or cultural industries concepts discussed thus far allow for.

The emergence of the new terminology of 'creativity' is seen by Pratt (2005) as being in some ways a distancing technique on the part of the incumbent New Labour administration not wishing to be linked with the earlier work of the GLC discussed above. Garnham (2005a), however, sees this as a more deliberately obfuscatory tactic, enabling a broad tent to be drawn over a wide variety of activities, obscuring the content within. This broadening range presents some conceptual difficulties which this thesis will explore. Throsby, for example, argues that this terminology of creativity may be implicitly problematic given that it "may be imposed by a particular policy-making agenda rather than evolving from definitional first principles" (2008b: 217). Whilst, then, there is an established and developing literature regarding the teaching, understanding and development of creativity, in its broadest sense, broadly concurrent with the period of policymaking under consideration (Hyde 2006, Pope 2005, Robinson 2001), it is clear that what policy regarding the creative industries is concerned with is not so much the development of creativity itself, however that may be conceived, but rather how to develop a particular type of economic activity which can be so labelled, due to its exceptional economic growth. Whilst the shift from 'culture industry' to 'cultural industries' represents a changed approach to understanding a broadly *similar* set of activities, then, the 'creative industries' bring in a whole extra set of activities for consideration, the commonality of which is questionable. The issue of what is included in this definition, and why, is highly important to this thesis, and this issue will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four within analysis of the gathering and deployment of statistical evidence relating to the creative industries. For the purposes of relevant extant policy interventions (e.g. Merseyside ACME 2008, NESTA 2009a), however, the 'creative industries' as conceived of at a central government level still consist of the thirteen subsectors outlined when this specific terminology emerged (DCMS 1998). These are: "Advertising, Architecture, Art and Antiques Markets, Computer and Video Games, Crafts, Design, Designer Fashion, Film and Video, Music, Performing Arts, Publishing, Software, Television and Radio" (DCMS 2010). As the justification for political support of the creative industries rests upon data and discourse relating to *these particular* industries, it is these which are examined within this thesis. It will be argued in Chapter Four that, in attempting to outline an appropriate definition for this term, it is mistaken to treat the 'creative industries' as a coherent object about which we can theorise and postulate, but are merely currently unable to precisely define. Cunningham, for instance, argues that the boundaries of this term are vague only because the concept is engaged in a creative process of finding its appropriate object in a "productive ferment" (2009: 376). Rather, this thesis seeks to show this term to be one whose object is constantly slipping due to inherent, and insoluble, tensions in the nature of the grouping outlined above.

The ensuing chapters of analysis will demonstrate how the task of drawing a boundary around this particular object is especially difficult due to the amorphous potential for the notion of 'creativity'. We must also bear in mind Pratt and Jeffcut's point that "labels such as creative industries, cultural industries, creative economy [...] have all been used. Whilst academic cases can be made for a

differentiation between them, the overwhelming policy discourse is one in which they are used interchangeably" (2009: 5). The ramifications of this state of affairs when it comes to cultural policy is thus a key concern for the ensuing analysis. Is it clear what policy is trying to achieve? Or are multiple different terms being used as though they represented the same object? If this differing terminology is used as though homologous within policy, then there is a very strong possibility that the goals of such policy will remain indistinct, and so the achievement of these goals is brought into question. Looking at the particular case of the Liverpool ECoC enables these questions to be answered not only on a theoretical level, but also with reference to empirical data.

2.2 Entrepreneurship

In Chapter One it was noted that the creativity associated with the creative industries is often also linked to the creativity associated with processes of entrepreneurship. Policy related to the creative industries often focuses on the importance of creativity at an individual level – they "have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent" (DCMS 2001: 5), for example – and policy characterises such creative individuals central to the creative industries being essentially entrepreneurial (Bell and Jayne 2010). By instigating processes of entrepreneurship, which are associated with innovation, employment growth and increased economic output, such industries are seen as being especially valuable. As this thesis seeks to examine the specific place of this creative individual working in the creative industries, within the wider context of cultural policy, then, just as the section above examined the terminology around 'creative industries', so is it necessary to examine the use of terminology regarding 'the entrepreneur'. It may be expected that the task of drawing a conceptual boundary around the object of the entrepreneur may be more straightforward than for the creative industries yet, just as theory and policy on the creative industries has to contend with the dubious stability of its referent, so is it the case with the notion of entrepreneurship.

Despite having a largely accepted, unproblematic everyday meaning along the lines of 'one who undertakes the creation and operation of a new business venture', closely associated with the originating French verb *entreprendre*, within the wider literature on the subject, entrepreneurship emerges as a highly contested and disputed concept, both in the very object it refers to and in the ways in which this object can best be understood. Although this lack of clarity is acknowledged (e.g. Carson *et al.* 2008: 14, Chell *et al.* 1991: 1, Lambing and Kuehl 2007: 16, Ogbor 2000: 614), resolution of this situation is seldom attempted, leading to a potentially tautologous situation whereby entrepreneurship can signify whatever the researcher chooses, and can be located wherever it is sought out. A lack of clear definition most often results in the functional enactment of a 'common sense' definition whose meaning can fluctuate, but which more often than not maps to self-employment (e.g. Blanchflower and

Oswald 1998). In light of this potential incoherence, then, it is important to establish what the entrepreneur *might* be in order once again to reach a stable position upon which to base further study. Herbert and Link's oft-quoted taxonomy of theories surrounding entrepreneurship sets out the majority of possibilities and is thus worth considering. By this study, the entrepreneur is variously seen as being:

- The person who assumes the risk associated with uncertainty
- The person who supplies financial capital
- An innovator
- A decision-maker
- An industrial leader
- A manager or superintendent
- An organiser and coordinator of economic resources
- The owner of an enterprise
- An employer of factors of production
- A contractor
- An arbitrageur
- An allocator of resources among alternative uses

(cited in Chell *et al.* 1991: 26)

From this list, one can observe that whilst the more common understandings of what the entrepreneur is or does are covered ("the owner of an enterprise", "an organiser and coordinator of economic resources"), so are meanings which are much more specific ("an arbitrageur") or general to the point of locating huge swathes of activity under the heading of 'entrepreneurship' ("a decision-maker"), making it difficult to separate out just what it is that is being considered when the label 'entrepreneur' is employed. Indeed, Steyaert and Katz perversely describe entrepreneurship as "a type of action that can occur nearly anywhere, at nearly anytime by nearly anyone" (2004: 190), leading us close to the potential situation outlined above where we are in danger of finding entrepreneurship anywhere we look for it (du Gay 2004).

2.2.1 Entrepreneurship and the creative industries

The discussion above raises the issue of how best to research the entrepreneur within the context of the creative industries. Many argue for the importance of entrepreneurship within the creative industries: as noted above, Van Heur argues that one of the overarching themes of policy regarding creative

industries is the importance of the role performed by entrepreneurs (2010a: 135), and Potts and Cunningham state that entrepreneurship is the dominant mode of growth within creative industries due to the prevalence of smaller firms (2008: 245). This entrepreneurship is seen by some to be linked to a more general notion of creativity:

> Given the fact that creative people are more inclined to independence in general and to economic independence in particular it seems to be plausible that they have a higher propensity to start a company than non creatives. [...] Talented people are more creative than the rest of the population, they are more entrepreneurial. (Acs *et al.* 2008: 5)

There is thus a natural fit between the creation *of* a new business and creativity *within* that business. It is therefore in the interests of policy to engender a climate which will be suitable for such creative people. The basic argument from a policy perspective is that the creative industries are a high growth sector, able to tap into international markets, and so promoting new business ventures in this creative sector can help to increase employment levels and economic output. This process can also assist in the regeneration of cities by enhancing "the quality of all our lives" (DCMS *et al.* 2008: 1) and furthering "social cohesion" (Leadbeater and Oakley 1999: 17). In terms of delineating the meaning of 'entrepreneurship' at hand, though, there is clearly a special value placed on the creation of a new business venture and this can therefore be understood as the key act of creative entrepreneurship. Policies which in some way encourage this act can thus be seen as aiming to promote a burgeoning creative economy. Such policy links to wider neo-liberal discourse around the value of 'enterprise' in and of itself, and a stress on the individual's responsibility for his own economic conditions (e.g. Morris 1991). This focus on the particularly valuable role of the entrepreneur can also be placed within the context of the emergent 'new economy' discourse, discussed further in the following section. Jessop (2002), for example, traces the development of the economy over the latter half of the twentieth century from a Fordist model within what he terms a "Keynesian Welfare Nation State" which experiences crises in the 1970s and 1980s, leading to the emergence of a new model, the "Schumpeterian Competition State". This change entails a move from centralised, standardised production and state operation towards the promotion of entrepreneurship, inter-regional competition and a shift towards the exaltation of flexibility and free enterprise over and above a discourse more focussed on central planning. The creative industries are positioned as being a perfect fit for this new order, and thus being the source of the "jobs of the future" as held by Smith above. This thesis, therefore, seeks to examine whether the creative industries do indeed constitute a good fit for the role that has been set out for them, and to examine the role played by those who can be considered entrepreneurs within the creative industries.

It must be noted, however, that in terms of definition of who these entrepreneurs are, one issue which is raised by the relevant literature (and which will be considered further in Chapter Seven) is, to use the terminology of Herbert and Link's taxonomy above, whether the "person who assumes the risk associated with uncertainty", the "manager", the "co-ordinator of economic resources", or the "allocator of resources among alternative uses" should or should not be considered as occupying the valued role of 'entrepreneur'. Whilst these functions map closely to what is generally meant by the term, there is a strong tradition (Chell *et al.* 1991: 5) which identifies the need to differentiate between an *owner-manager* identity and an *entrepreneurial* one: from such a position, whilst the owner-manager may have taken the step of starting a business in the past, assuming the financial risk for the business venture and so on, unless they continue to seek new opportunity, new markets and enact 'new combinations' (see below), they do not fulfil the role of 'innovator'. As such, their business operates only within the ordinary cycle of business operations to further their personal goals and secure their own income, not to generate wider growth and profit, and therefore merely occupies the territory of 'lifestyle business' and cannot be associated with the business and employment growth associated with the 'true' entrepreneur.

It is clear that much of the dominant discourse around the dynamism of creative industries is linked to this dynamism associated with entrepreneurship and in this it echoes the work of Schumpeter, who is widely considered to be the most important and influential (Ogbor 2000: 615, Swedberg 2000: 11) theorist of entrepreneurship. For Schumpeter, the economy is driven forward by the act of entrepreneurship which consists of enacting "new combinations" of the means of production (1934: 68), and the application of such innovations renders existing products and markets obsolete via a process of "creative destruction" (Scott 2006). As noted above, it is only when this innovation is enacted specifically that entrepreneurship really takes place: outside of this, the business owner or risk taker is simply operating a business under normal circumstances and fulfils no entrepreneurial function. As Schumpeter states, "if we choose to call the manager or owner of a business "entrepreneur", then he would be an *entrepreneur faisant ni bénéfice ni perte*, without special function and without income of a special kind" (1934: 45). A key consideration for this study, therefore, is to what degree and in what way such an entrepreneurial process is, or can be, enacted within the operations of the creative industries, whether it can appropriately be applied to all sub-sectors, or whether an alternative model of understanding is required for the processes involved within these industries. For some (e.g. NESTA 2009b, Bakhshi *et al.* 2009), cultural and/or creative work is by its very nature innovative and thus presents ideal Schumpeterian opportunities for economic development. By occupying such innately innovative territory, enterprises in the creative industries are seen to be less prone to behave like start-up businesses in less innovative areas, wherein entrepreneurial activity risks being limited to the initial activity involved in the creation of the new business. After this, only the 'owner-manager' role continues to be enacted, limiting future business

growth. In the interests of defining an object for research, however, it is those who have at least initially performed this business-forming act of entrepreneurship who constitute the object for study, the continuation of this entrepreneurial role being open to question. Primary research will thus have as one of its concerns an examination of the extent to which entrepreneurship in the Schumpeterian sense continues to be enacted from this basis, or is of any moment either to those within these industries, or to those seeking to promote such activity within a wider context of regeneration. These issues are discussed in detail in Chapter Seven.

2.3 Culture, creativity and regeneration

The context for the study of the objects of 'the creative industries' and 'the entrepreneur' considered thus far is their place within a programme seeking to 'regenerate' a city. Despite the establishment of a strong narrative on the value of both the creative industries and culture-led regeneration for broader cultural and economic life, and despite a policy discourse which, as later chapters demonstrate, often explicitly aligns the two, there is little research examining how a programme such as the Liverpool ECoC may interact with creative industries in the local environment. In examining this case, this thesis works towards filling this gap. The consideration of these two themes in concert is particularly appropriate as the claims regarding the creative industries noted briefly above – that they can provide the basis for future successful economic growth, and that they have the potential to drive local economic regeneration whilst simultaneously contributing to more instrumental, social outcomes, thus providing a form of holistic 'regeneration' – occur at the confluence of a number of dominant conceptual streams, and the discourse around the possibility for 'regeneration' linked to culture arguably occurs at this *same* confluence. By considering these overlaps, we may more fully understand the relationships posited between creativity, culture and regeneration. The overlapping concepts utilised in framing these relationships which form the foundations for the analysis in the remainder of the thesis are, therefore, delineated in the remainder of this chapter.

As Garnham (2005a: 20) notes, the creative industries rhetoric can be seen to overlap conceptually (or to deliberately attempt an alliance) with prevailing discourse around an emergent 'new' economy, variously conceived of in the latter half of the twentieth century as the "knowledge economy", the "information society", the "network society", the "weightless economy", and so forth (Bell 1979, Steinfeld and Salvaggio 1989, Quah 1999, Castells 2000, Graham 2002 etc.). The promotion of the creative industries also dovetails with the idea of a 'culture-led' regeneration of cities which entails the emergence or attraction of a 'creative class' for increased prosperity. These are often linked with the idea of a 'creative city', and linked to a more generalised, beneficial notion of 'creativity' (Chapain and Lee 2009). Support on the basis of these ideas can be situated within the frame of a 'cultural turn'

within the social sciences, and can also easily align with a wider dominant neo-liberal agenda. The remainder of this chapter considers these themes more fully.

2.3.1 A 'new' economy

A narrative surrounding the creative industries whereby they form the vanguard of a transformational economic order was noted in Chapter One. In light of this, it is appropriate to discuss the concept of a 'new economy' in relation to the special role the creative industries are seen to have, and why their promotion is so valued by policymakers. Hartley argues this concept is central to the primacy given to the creative industries: "why did policy-makers and educational institutions turn their attention to the creative industries, rather than to some other service sector? The answer to this was in the logic of the **new economy**" (2005: 19, original emphasis).

Although initially having a much broader scope, and a rather different focus, discussion of the 'new economy' has in some quarters come to be explicitly aligned with the constituent parts of the creative industries, or as having 'culture' at its heart. It is thus of particular relevance to cultural policy or programmes such as the ECoC. The notion of the emergence of a fundamentally new phase of capitalism became a focus for analysis to an ever greater degree during the final quarter of the twentieth century. Bell's conception of the "post-industrial society" is perhaps the strongest totem in this movement and is succinctly described thus: "the post-industrial society is an information society, as industrial society is a goods-producing society" (1974: 467). Relatedly, Driver points out regarding the specific topic, place and time period at hand that,

> New economic times for New Labour are [...] post-industrial in character. Labour
> modernizers have made great play of the importance of information and communication
> technologies and the cultural industries to advanced market economies. (1999: 249)

The prior primacy of the physical world is replaced by the non-physical in this new paradigm, and so knowledge and information, embodied in 'human capital', constitute the key to economic growth. To some degree, there is no doubt that the operations of the economy did indeed undergo significant changes as the twentieth century drew to a close. Part of the rationale for support of the creative industries is that they are seen as tangentially related to the potential for 'culture-led regeneration', discussed further below, in areas which have suffered economic decline, and it is clear that this decline, and the subsequent requirement for regeneration, has largely occurred due to a real employment slump in these areas, typically in manufacturing and traditional industry. By filling the void left by the 'old' economy, these 'new' industries are seen to be of particular use in regenerating such areas. These

industries are also seen as being more flexible and less bound to geography or infrastructure, and thus as having a greater potential to provide regeneration on a flexible basis. Also, to link to the discussion in the section above, Henwood (2005) argues that the broader 'new economy' idea is strongly conceptually linked to processes of entrepreneurship, in much the same way as the constituent creative industries are.

As well as the tangible decline of 'old' industries, there have been other clear changes which support the idea of a transformational economic order. One of the most striking developments in human affairs evident in the final years of the 20th century was the incumbent ubiquity of information and communication technologies and their rapid technological development, which has brought about a situation where continuous global communication and exchange of information is now an everyday reality. The creative industries are particularly bound up in these transformations. In terms of the products of at least some subsectors of the creative industries (such as publishing), for some this technological development was conceived of as having the potential to bring about a world in which every discrete piece of 'information' imaginable could enter the market, be priced accordingly, and form the basis of a new economic order – a 'knowledge economy' (Graham 2002). As Doctorow (2008) notes, however, this particular manifestation of the knowledge economy "has completely failed to materialise". One of the reasons for this, as far as certain creative industries are concerned, is a result of the dual nature of this technological revolution – just as it becomes easier to transmit information, so it becomes easier to copy and store this information, and indeed to make *perfect* facsimiles of it (the music and film industries are notably deeply engaged with this issue.) Technological development can therefore operate as something of a double-edged sword for the creative industries. More importantly, though, developments around information and communication technologies come to be seen as constituent parts of the creative industries in and of themselves.

The issue of the constituent role of these more technological and software-based industries within the creative industries grouping will be considered in detail in Chapter Four, but here it should be noted that some see the 'newness' of this new economy as being *specifically* cultural and symbolic in nature. Lash and Urry, for example, support the notion that the economic importance of physical outputs and physical capital is declining, but add to this the idea that the creative industries are the ideal exemplars of this emergent new economy, whose characteristics they outline thus:

> What is increasingly produced are not material objects, but *signs*. These signs are of two types. Either they have a primarily cognitive content and are post-industrial or informational goods. Or they have primarily an aesthetic content and are what can be termed postmodern goods. (1994: 4)

The DCMS-defined creative industries sector as outlined above straddles this post-industrial/ postmodern boundary, and includes producers of both types of signs, both types of goods. This straddling of boundaries is perhaps one result of the mutability of the 'new economy' concept. Hutton, for example, argues that "the dot.com crash of 2000 burst the New Economy bubble (although the euphoria has seemingly been transferred to the 'creative economy')" (2009: 139). As a result of this mutability, the "economic imaginary" (Jessop 2004) of the new economy persists, and is closely aligned to the 'creative industries' sector as denoted by the DCMS, which is seen as containing the industries at the vanguard of Lash and Urry's 'postmodern' economy (or, similarly, a 'post-Fordist' economy). This development is seen as being reflective of broader changes in the culture at large: the creative industries are a model for how the wider economy is either *already* operating, or *will* come to operate. From such a position these industries "can no longer be seen as secondary to the 'real' economy where durable, 'useful' goods are manufactured" (Hesmondhalgh 2007: 1). By such an analysis, therefore, any process of attempted 'regeneration', particularly attempted economic regeneration, would be well advised to strongly consider the role of the cultural and the creative; as the economic order either has changed or is changing radically, and as the creative industries are central to this process, it would seem prudent to do everything possible to support their development. The nature of the deployment of such an idea in the context of the ECoC and wider cultural policy is therefore considered further in later chapters, as is the evidence for the existence of this newly distinct postmodern economic order, and for the role of the creative industries within it.

2.3.1.1 The 'Cultural Turn'

Just as this thesis seeks to scrutinise the prevailing discourse regarding the potential for a culturally-inflected transformed economic order, and approach its claims with caution, so it also aims to be cautious regarding the propensity to view *any* activity which can be defined as 'cultural' as typifying this newly transformed state of affairs. This propensity is one off-shoot of the so-called 'cultural turn' in analysis which posits 'culture', in the broadest sense, as being an increasingly important factor, not least in the operation of the economy. This increased *emphasis* on the cultural, however, should not necessarily be interpreted as the increased *importance* of the cultural, and particularly not the cultural as pertaining to the arts. Methodologically useful as it may be, for instance, the rational, acultural, ahistorical calculating agent of economic analysis is clearly a figure who has no analogue in reality, and in human affairs economic practices can never be wholly separated out from cultural ones (e.g. Firey 1945), although there may be continuing disagreement as to the nature and direction of the relationship that exists between the two. Whilst traditionally approached as different domains, however, the late 20th century saw culture and economics being increasingly understood as co-dependent, with some going so far as to propose a "collapse of the boundaries between economy and culture" (Ray and Sayer

1999), and this movement occurred as part of a general trend towards studying the importance of cultural matters for economic activity. Due to the changing character of certain sectors, shifting from the primacy of physical capital to human capital, as discussed above, the culture of work and workers themselves was seen as having ever more importance, therefore requiring ever more analysis. To some degree, this is appropriate. To the extent that it is more reliant on human capital in order to succeed, work must therefore increase its dominion over not simply the bodies, but also the hearts and minds of workers, and the more 'cultural' the work, the more human capital is relied upon. The capacities required for economic success may therefore no longer be so reliant on physical capabilities so much as mental ones (Tudor Hart 2008: 3). It is when this cultural turn becomes solely focussed on the 'culture' of specifically arts or entertainment-related work, such as that which constitutes the bulk of the activity that fall under the 'creative industries' heading, however, that its insights begin to seem especially tendentious, and where we encounter a clear example of the concept of catachresis central to this thesis which is defined by the OED as "improper use of words; application of a term to a thing which it does not properly denote".

As Miller makes clear, in a shifting of focus specifically on to the creative industries to chime with the prevailing ideas of a 'new' economy, "the implication was no longer that these had been neglected; rather it was that they were now *the heart and core* of the modern economy" (2002: 172, emphasis added). Miller also makes a concise assessment of the appropriateness of this method of understanding the links between the economic and the cultural: "this version of the cultural turn I would strongly oppose. It seems to me to be a sleight of hand through which a shift in academic emphasis is presupposed to reflect a shift in the world that these academics are describing" (2002: 172). Similarly, Slater notes that:

> Contemporary analyses of globalization, the information society and 'new economies' suffer on the whole from the same problem: an analytic discovery, through which one could overcome the inadequacies of previous economic thought, is instead treated as the empirical discovery of a new economy which transcends all economic thought. (2002: 75)

By this version of the cultural turn, academia does not discover, it *creates*. Thrift notes that "the cultural turn in the social sciences and humanities now has a direct line into, and indeed *is a part of*, the cultural turn in capitalism" (1999: 157, emphasis added). By placing a focus on an object to examine its relative importance, there is a risk of misinterpreting our own spotlight as an indicator of that very importance. The analysis of this thesis therefore seeks to be wary of positions which may only constitute the cultural as important in order to benefit from this constitution. Thrift, for example, argues the case that, in a manifestation of this circular logic, the greatest beneficiaries of the escalated attention paid to the cultural aspects of business operations are often the management consultants promoting the need to

pay attention to the cultural aspects of business (1999: 157). The supposed 'need' to focus on the culture of business operations thus becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy; having decided that a change has occurred, resources are leveraged into the examination of that change, and those who seek often find only that which they set out to discover. As noted above, this thesis seeks to avoid such a dilemma with regard to the subjects under consideration by taking as its starting position the issue of *whether* cultural policy as manifested in programmes such as the Liverpool ECoC is related to the operation of creative industries, rather than *how* this relationship best operates.

To take such a cautious stance is not to say that a broader cultural shift has not occurred, however. It could be argued, though, that what has occurred is a shift towards the general acceptance of the importance of culture, rather than a shift in the reality of that importance; an interpretation of developments *as* new, rather than an actual newness. As considered in the first half of this chapter, for example, a historical analysis shows that the operation of market or commodity relations in the cultural realm began long before the 20th century, and from one perspective the encroachment of capitalist relations further and further into this realm can be understood as simply the normal operations of a capitalist system. As Harvey argues, it is "precisely because capitalism is expansionary and imperialistic [that] cultural life in more and more areas gets brought within the grasp of the cash nexus and the logic of capital circulation" (1990: 344). Indeed, it would be of great interest if the technological developments in the reproduction and dissemination of cultural content had somehow managed to *escape* the expansionist tendencies of capitalism. Similarly, Coyle places 'culture', in its wider 'general way of life' sense, as indeed being at the heart of economic growth in the West, but broadly from the 19th century onwards (2007: 19) – again, not a recent development or one which would require a novel analytical turn or warrant research into a supposedly 'new' arena.

The evidence for, and indeed the very notion of, creative industries at the heart of a 'new' economic order is therefore potentially a problematic one, and so especially in the context of discussions of 'creativity', this thesis seeks to treat any policy narrative based on such ideas with caution. In any case, it must be noted that to limit the focus of policy seeking to leverage any new economic state of affairs to industries producing cultural products is, for some, to fundamentally misunderstand the shifts which *can* be said to have occurred within the capitalist system:

> It is simply misleading to equate the symbolic with the cultural [...] and then proceed to speak about a range of sectors – from the fine arts and the music industries and broadcasting – as if they exercised a monopoly over the creative deployment and extension of symbolic forms [...] There is a symbolic form to the kinds of economic knowledge to be found in the finance and information-based services such as banking, insurance, accountancy and law as much as there is in those industries which wear 'culture' on their sector label. (Allen 2002: 39)

From such a reading, due to a simple linguistic similarity, an important concept is in danger of being fundamentally misapplied, resulting in an unnecessarily limited understanding of the social realm. Whilst it is wise to heed this warning and to bear in mind that 'culture' is not a simple concept to deal with, even if we accept that the creative industries may not in fact show us the future model for *all* other industries, and that claims made for their impact, or the novelty of their role, may have been rather overstated, there is no denying that certain changes in the operation of the economy *have* occurred, and that new technological forms *are* in place. The way cultural policy interacts with these changes is therefore worthy of scrutiny. The extent to which these can or cannot be placed at the centre of a new form of economic operation, though, is an issue to be borne in mind in the ensuing analysis, in contrast to a trend of assuming these issues have already been resolved. Similarly, despite having become a dominant policy paradigm over the course of the last two decades, this thesis starts from a position which considers it inappropriate to approach the role of culture in city regeneration as one which can be taken as read.

2.3.2 Culture-led regeneration

Perhaps the most important aspect of an increased attention upon cultural matters for the purposes of this study is this gradual emergence of a model whereby processes and interventions specifically related to culture are seen as integral to the economic and, relatedly, the social wellbeing of cities. The clearest articulation of the essence of this model is in the work of Evans and Shaw (2004) who identify three models of city regeneration with a role for culture: "culture-led regeneration", whereby cultural policy serves as the "catalyst and engine" for wider regeneration processes in the city; "cultural regeneration" which sees a cultural programme deeply embedded and integrated into wider social and economic strategies; and "culture and regeneration" where more direct regeneration initiatives such as property development also have an adjunct of cultural activity, but one which is not interwoven in any fundamental way. As will be made clear via the analysis in Chapter Five, in the discourse surrounding Liverpool's ECoC, the process is clearly assumed to be one of culture-led regeneration, and one which builds directly on the influential "Glasgow Model" (Tucker 2008) of attempting to use this particular cultural initiative to transform a city's fortunes.

Whilst the European City/Capital of Culture[3] award is presented as serving to celebrate the quality, and diversity, of cultural achievements across the continent of Europe, it is clear from a cursory look at those cities which have held the title that a key change occurs with Glasgow's designation in 1990. Whilst the 1980s see cities which already have international profiles and, amongst other strengths,

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3. The 'City of Culture' award was renamed 'Capital of Culture' in 1999.

strong cultural-tourist economies such as Athens, Amsterdam and Paris holding the title, the 1990s sees less high-profile cities such as Glasgow, Antwerp and Thessaloniki designated ECoC, and this divergent trend continues into the 2000s with sites as diverse as Graz, Patras and Sibiu holding the title. The prevailing set of justifications for awarding the title have thus clearly been moved to a different location in the years since the designation of Athens as the first ECoC. In part, this shift in emphasis can be attributed to Glasgow's use of the title in an attempt not simply to lay out its cultural stall, but to use the year in an attempt to transform the cities fortunes more broadly; to enact this "culture-led regeneration" (García 2004a: 319). Since 1990, host cities have been much more likely to articulate the value of the ECoC in explicitly economic terms, highlighting the role the award can play in processes of urban development and in achieving city regeneration goals (McGuigan 2005, Palmer-Rae 2004: 47). Evaluations of subsequent ECoC's refer to the success of Glasgow's approach (Deffner and Labrianidis 2005, Richards and Wilson 2004), and the notion of the "Glasgow model" is one which still has resonance for urban policymakers (García 2004a, 2005). By such a model, whereby the cultural and the economic are intimately intertwined, it is not unreasonable for policies to articulate an important place for the creative industries – where, after all, would we be more likely to find culture transforming the economy? – but, as noted above, the nature of the relationship between such an intervention as the ECoC and these industries has seldom been investigated, and this therefore provides the rationale for the investigation of this thesis.

The origin of this culture-focussed approach to regeneration can in no small part be located in a shift in the 1980s, in concert with the prevailing political climate, towards an emphasis on the articulation of 'value for money' in relation to culture, and the funding of arts organisations increasingly becoming justified in economic terms, within the context of a trend towards the encroachment of what Keat refers to as "market or quasi-market principles" more broadly across the public sector (2000: 1). Part of this process involves the articulation of an overlap between the allocation of government resources to cultural programmes and the operation of the creative industries which are seen as having the potential to neutralise the historical opposition between the arts and the economy, the arts being perceived by some as a 'drain' on the public purse. This re-articulation aims to prove the economic case for culture, and justify support for culture on the terms of this newly dominant ideology. As Selwood notes, though,

> On the basis of their respective turnovers […] the subsidised cultural sector and the creative industries seem worlds apart. Spokespeople are, however, prone to blur the distinctions between the one and the other, not least in the context of advocacy. Indeed, there is potential mileage to be gained in highlighting the relationship between the two sectors. (2001: xlvi)

There is every danger, therefore, that the relationship between cultural policy and creative industries may be deliberately misconstrued in order to fit with prevailing ideology around the economic value of culture and creativity. The analysis of this thesis must therefore be sensitive to this possibility. Feist, for instance, notes that Myerscough's seminal text on the economic importance of the arts (1988), which forms the background to the shift in approach marked by the "Glasgow model", and which was used to justify continued 'investment' in artistic practice, could attribute most of its vaunted economic returns to "high-earning commercial cultural industries; the 'arts', as more reasonably defined, and the subsidised sector in particular, accounted for perhaps just one tenth of [the] total" (2001: 200). The economic benefits attributable to the arts and culture are thus far from straightforward.

Whilst the cultural realm now finds its operations and 'outputs' increasingly couched in economic, functionalist reasoning, and becoming loosely understood in terms of the operation of a successful industry, and whilst this success is the major source for expected emergent 'regeneration', cultural policy does not, however, articulate its regenerative potential solely on these terms. The non-economic 'outputs' of cultural activity must also be taken into account when questions of value and regeneration are considered. This is not to say that aesthetic considerations necessarily come into play in culture-led regeneration strategies, however, but rather the ways in which culture can promote well-being and community (however such highly contested terms are defined) and combat social exclusion in addition to any economic returns are also considered to be of key importance (Hesmondhalgh, 2007: 141). It should perhaps be noted, though, that implicit in much neo-liberal discourse is the underlying assumption that social and economic problems can, in the final analysis, map onto one another (DCMS 2004a), and ultimately it is economic value which is most prized (Jayne 2005: 539). The specific goals which national and local policies hope to achieve in this area are discussed further in later chapters, but it is clear that cultural activities are uniquely positioned in the political arena in being considered to have the capacity to contribute to city regeneration on such a broad, multivalent basis. Whilst this model is still generally accepted from its 1990s roots, it should be noted that cultural expenditure aimed at regeneration and justified on the basis of its relationship to creative industries seldom occurs directly within the purview of the creative industries, for example, on training schemes or apprenticeships (Symon and Williams 2001: 56). As will be argued throughout this thesis, though, all things cultural and creative are often expected to coalesce due to their presumed commonality, intervention in one 'creative' area serving to influence all others. It will be argued that Liverpool's ECoC, and its stated goals, can be firmly set in this tradition, but that such an approach is inherently problematic.

2.3.3 Creative classes and cities

The mechanisms by which the goals of culture-led regeneration may be achieved can also be aligned to two concepts which will be considered in greater detail in Chapter Five, Florida's theory of the 'creative class' (2004, 2005), and Landry's ideas regarding the 'creative city' (2000). Briefly put, Florida's creative class thesis has been influential internationally in city regeneration contexts (Potts and Cunningham 2008) as it provides a clear mechanism by which culture-based programmes can serve the economic, social and cultural goals of regeneration policies. An appropriate cultural infrastructure will serve to develop or attract the emergent 'creative class' who are central to the success of cities. To this end, Florida makes the following claim:

> All members of the Creative Class [...] share a common creative ethos that values creativity, individuality, difference and merit. For the members of the Creative Class, every aspect and *every manifestation of creativity* – technological, cultural and economic – *is interlinked and inseparable*. (2004: 8, emphasis added)

The members of the creative class exercise creativity within their work, and are presented as having a broadly unified set of tastes and practices outside of this work, as a result of their creativity. If the city landscape can provide appropriate cultural and 'creative' attractions, therefore, people who are 'creative' and thus embody the innovatory and entrepreneurial capacity discussed above necessary for economic development, particularly within the creative industries at the forefront of the emergent new economy, will be attracted or retained, and the benefits associated with their presence can be reaped. As Florida succinctly puts it, "supporting lifestyle and cultural institutions like a cutting-edge music scene or vibrant artistic community [...] helps to attract and stimulate those who create in business and technology" (2004: 55). In this way the creative class can be seen as being broadly similar in character to Gans' conception of the "cosmopolite" (1968), professionals with few ties, free to seek out areas in which they can live and experience the cultural facilities available in the city.

The affinity between such ideas and the culture-led regeneration ethos is clear, and this theory dovetails neatly with the primacy placed on entrepreneurial activity discussed above. Florida states that those within the creative class thrive on their individualistic creative expression and so, "acknowledge that there is no corporation or other large institution that will take care of us – that we are truly on our own" (2004: 115); a particularly harsh but nevertheless clear evocation of prevailing neo-liberal ideology. This thesis seeks to resist work which seeks to examine the whereabouts and size of the creative class (e.g. Clifton 2008) which thus implicitly accepts that there is a creative class which *can* be the object of analysis, but rather contribute to a rival body of work (e.g. Peck 2005, McGuigan 2009) which questions the creative class thesis, especially the notion that it has anything to do with any

robust sense of 'creativity'. This thesis will thus argue that cultural policies which utilise this concept are prone to incoherence, and that this will affect their resultant outcomes.

Similarly influential in the broader debates around cultural policy is Landry's theory of the 'creative city' whereby the future success of the city depends on the quality of 'creative' solutions to urban problems. This requires breaking out of established forms of governance and traditional approaches (2006: 2). This theory is explicitly drawn upon in policy planning around the deployment of strategies based on interventions around culture and creativity (e.g. Gibson and Klocker 2005, Lee 2007). We can identify this focus on creativity at the level of a city administration as being part of the emergence of a new form of governance as discussed by Griffiths:

> Entrepreneurialism, the mode of urban governance which has emerged from the crisis of managerialism, is predicated on a competitive quest for new sources of economic development, in response to a collapsing manufacturing base and a growing internationalisation of investment flows. (1998: 42)

In such a climate of creative entrepreneurialism, once again, a key consideration for this thesis is to what end the label of 'creativity' is applied, what the discourse of 'creativity' in such a context is (and is not) actually referring to, and the dangers of this becoming a catch-all term for anything related to culture on the one hand, or to innovation (or, worse, novelty) on the other. In this thickening semantic fog, any 'creative' intervention, such as creative industries development programmes, or the staging of the ECoC, may be assumed to automatically bring about all the benefits related to these diverse areas; any overlap, though, risks being more assumed than manifest.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to lay out the foundations for the ensuing analysis, and to highlight the potentially problematic nature of the terminology involved which could be otherwise presumed to be benign. It has shown how the creative industries concept fits in with a broader political climate in which policy surrounding culture is increasingly justified in terms of its potential economic benefits. It has also, however, shown that in moving beyond a group of specifically 'cultural' industries, the coherence of the creative industries concept is one which must be questioned by any investigation into this topic rather than merely accepted. It has also discussed how these creative industries are often positioned as being particularly entrepreneurial, and thus particularly valuable, but how the notion of the value emerging from those who create new businesses is one which must be opened up to scrutiny. In examining the nature of the relationship between cultural policy and creative industries, then, the

particular role of those who have started businesses within these creative industries is one which the thesis seeks to question. Finally, the ways in which this entrepreneurship may be linked to the concept of a 'new' economy, wherein the creative and cultural are of utmost importance, and wherein cities seeking economic success must aim to promote these new industries was considered, and the role for programmes aimed at culture-led regeneration such as the ECoC and the place of the 'creative class' in such transformations was raised. The way in which these arguments align with policy discourse around culture and the creative industries will be subject to scrutiny within the later chapters of the thesis.

On the terms set out above, this thesis therefore seeks to contribute an understanding of what the relationships between large-scale cultural programmes and creative industries seem to consist of, this relationship having seldom been examined by previous research. To do this, the particular experiences within the city of Liverpool in 2008 will be considered in light of the broader structures which shape this area of policy intervention as delineated in this chapter. Importantly, these will be considered across the range of creative industries as defined by relevant policies. This will elucidate the manner in which these industries have been grouped together by policymakers as part of a broader discursive structure regarding the role of creativity, and will consider the appropriateness of this construction in light of the narratives of practice given by those who find themselves occupying the role of entrepreneur within the creative industries so valued in such a discourse. As a means of achieving this understanding, the methodological foundations of the ensuing research, and the details of how this research was carried out, is the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter Three – Site and Method

In order that any understanding of the issues raised thus far may reach beyond the purely theoretical, it is necessary to relate the research for this thesis to a specific case, albeit one with the potential to provide insights reaching beyond the specificity of its circumstances and location. To this end, the hosting of the 2008 European Capital of Culture in Liverpool is seen as presenting an ideal site in which to base primary research. This chapter will briefly explain how this particular choice of Liverpool in 2008 was arrived at, outline what this research consisted of, and present the broader methodological approach underpinning the thesis. It is posited that in examining the relationship of the creative industries to a process of culture-led regeneration, an appropriate methodology must incorporate a variety of approaches in order to move beyond a limited or limiting conception of the relevant factors at work. This chapter describes the form of this variety, and also explains the specific knowledge which each of these varying approaches can provide, which, when considered in concert, may provide an appropriately holistic understanding of the issues at hand.

Briefly put, Chapters Four to Seven, which form the main body of this thesis, outline the data emerging from three key lines of enquiry: i) an examination of the statistical 'evidence base' pertaining to the creative industries, its historical antecedents, its justifications, and its current employment; ii) a study of how the idealised aims of cultural and creative industries policy are articulated in both the national and the local context, and the underpinnings of this position, and; iii) research into what may be termed the biographical narratives of the 'creative entrepreneur' (including a discussion of the appropriate usage of such a label) in order to examine the extent of the affinity that policy discourse does (or does not) have with such narratives.

Researching from these multiple standpoints enables the relationship between programmes such as the ECoC, the creative industries, and the surrounding policy environment to be understood with a higher degree of clarity than has previously been the case, and also avoids the potential difficulty raised in Chapter Two of imputing relationships where none may exist; that is, by taking as its starting consideration the question of *whether* there is a significant relationship between the creative industries in the local context and this programme of culture-led regeneration, rather than the question of *the nature* of this relationship, this work avoids making the assumption that this relationship is already known to exist, as can often be the case in much current discussion of these issues (e.g. UNCTAD 2009, ERSA 2010).

3.1 Research location

In order to form a full and specific understanding of the way the issues and concepts discussed in Chapter Two manifest themselves within a programme aimed at achieving 'culture-led regeneration', a particular case study is required. Why, then, should Liverpool's tenure as ECoC in 2008 be considered so appropriate for the purpose of this study? For starters, Liverpool certainly constitutes a city that can present a strong case for the need for some form of 'regeneration' – according to national statistics, its historic population decline has continued unabated for the last 25 years[4], the only UK 'core city'[5] for which this is the case. Similarly, data relating to the local population's skills levels reflect Liverpool's position as the area consistently ranked highest for 'multiple deprivation' out of the 354 districts in England[6], with the proportion of residents with the highest level (NVQ4+) of educational achievement being consistently lower than the national or comparable 'core cities' average level for the last decade[7].

It should also perhaps be noted that the ECoC bidding process was overseen by the department at Liverpool City Council directly responsible for 'regeneration' and the award was positioned as being vital to the process of reversing Liverpool's historically ailing fortunes, as per the "Glasgow Model" discussed in Chapter Two (Liverpool Culture Company 2003a: 3). Also, just as the potential regenerative power for cultural programmes has been noted within national government, with culture for example, being at the "heart of regeneration" (DCMS 2004a), so in Liverpool's current 'cultural strategy' do we find an analogous position in statements regarding the role of culture in the city's future success such as: "our prospects as a city will rely upon creative responses to present and future challenges and our cultural assets and values must play a central role" (Liverpool First 2008: 4). Similarly, the justifications made by local government regarding the staging of the ECoC in 2008 are an exemplary case of the arguments leveraged to support the idea of culture-led regeneration. The five long term goals the ECoC is expected to achieve within the city, as stated in Liverpool's ECoC bidding document are:

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4. ONS Mid-Year Population Estimates (2010) show a consistent decline from a population level of over 500,000 in 1983 to under 440,000 in 2008.

5. "The Core Cities Group is a network of England's major regional cities: Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham and Sheffield" (Core Cities 2010).

6. Source: Indices of Deprivation (http://www.imd.communities.gov.uk/).

7. The proportion of Liverpool residents with the highest level of qualifications is consistently 5-10% lower than the 'core cities' or national average over the period 1999-2009. Source: Annual Population Survey (2010).

- Contributing to the economic, social and physical regeneration of Liverpool.

- Increasing access to education and learning which develops creativity and skills relevant to the knowledge economy and cultural businesses.

- Sustaining a strong infrastructure of cultural organisations, activities, facilities and services.

- Creating an attractive environment for cultural businesses and creative people.

- Contributing to a vibrant city centre and revitalised neighbourhoods across the city.

(Liverpool City Council 2003)

From this, it is clear to see that the ECoC was positioned at the level of local government as being able to contribute strongly to a virtuous, regenerative triad of social, economic and cultural redevelopment within the city, with a particular emphasis on business operations, exemplifying the notion of 'culture-led regeneration'. A 2003 report commissioned by Liverpool City Council to support the ECoC bid notes that the role the award could play for increased city "competitiveness" (ERM Economics 2003: 4), and Jones and Wilks-Heeg argue that a central reason for Liverpool being awarded the role of UK host city was that it was "widely considered the candidate city most likely to replicate the 'Glasgow effect' of using the ECoC award as a central plank of a wider project of urban renaissance" (2004: 342). They also argue that as a result of strategies such as these, cultural policy can be seen to have emerged from the periphery to occupy a *central* role within an 'entrepreneurial' mode of governance at the local level.

As well as being positioned as having the potential to replicate this "Glasgow Model" by assisting in city regeneration, the Liverpool ECoC is also of particular interest as, post-2008, Liverpool has itself became an embodiment of such a 'model', with the UK government instigating a national 'City of Culture' prize, bidders justifying their involvement by referring to the 'success' of Liverpool's tenure as ECoC (e.g. Hull City Council 2010). Outlining the reasons for the establishment of this prize, Lady Hodge MP reminds us that the Liverpool ECoC has demonstrated that, "culture changes people's lives, and has the power to transform cities and economies" (DCMS 2009). Not only does the Liverpool case exemplify pre-existing positions regarding the interaction between cultural programmes, creative industries and the wider regeneration agenda, therefore, but it also seems to have acted to help solidify these positions and continue the supporting discourse. By scrutinising the aims and proposals used to justify the Liverpool case, therefore, we can clarify the broader project of culture-led regeneration itself, and the role of the creative industries within such programmes, beyond the mere specifics of the 2008 year.

The case of Liverpool is also of particular interest in relation to the other key object of analysis for this thesis, namely the creative industries agenda. The city is notable for its early adoption of this now

prevalent agenda. Due to Merseyside's designation as an 'Objective One'[8] region in the early 90s, one of five key "drivers" identified to transform the region was to develop the "culture, media and leisure industries" (Couch 2003: 177). To this end, European funding resulted in the establishment of 'Merseyside ACME', an organisation which continues to exist in the post-Objective One period (and which is now part of the 'economic development company' for Liverpool, 'Liverpool Vision') with the stated aim of "developing creative industries" in the sub-region (Merseyside ACME 2005). What is of interest to the analysis of this thesis, and what is considered further in later chapters, is that this creative industries development body was also involved in constructing Liverpool's winning bid for the 2008 ECoC and so, long before the ECoC year itself, and before such questions were being raised to any great degree within policy or academic discourse, Liverpool already occupied a position wherein two of the key considerations for this thesis were overlapping in some form: explicit policy-driven attempts to promote creative businesses, and an aim to stage the ECoC in order to leverage attendant processes of 'regeneration'. The Liverpool case is therefore particularly interesting now that these ideas seem to have gained such traction over a much wider area.

Due to its strong desire to create a 'legacy' from the operations of 2008, Liverpool also enables this study to examine the position of an intervention such as ECoC over a reasonably broad timeframe. Looking prior to year itself, the 2008 programme represents the culmination of a series of five themed event years staged by the Liverpool Culture Company, and so the influence this 'run-up' period may or may not have had upon creative entrepreneurs within the city can be examined – do they, for example, narrate a process of identifying potential business opportunities which the forthcoming 2008 programme may bring as having led them to organise their enterprise in a particular manner at a particular time? By using the ECoC as a topic of enquiry when interviewing creative entrepreneurs, a current and highly visible, high-profile example of attempted culture-led regeneration is raised, enabling research to elucidate issues which may in other circumstances remain obscured. Carrying out this research whilst the ECoC is still fresh in the minds of those upon whom it purports to exert an influence assists in filling the gap in research concerning how workers in creative industries regard such an event. The thesis also examines policy positions regarding the continuation of the influence of the 2008 programme and the way its legacy may be appropriately secured, again reaching beyond the particulars of the 2008 year itself. In particular, the focus on the case of Liverpool in 2008 entails analysis of the narration of the goals the year was seen as being able to achieve, including plans by the aforementioned Merseyside ACME body to create a 'quarter' for creative entrepreneurship during the period of study; a quarter whose development at the time of writing (mid-2010) remains uncertain.

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8. The European Union's 'Objective One' funds are allocated to areas where GDP is below 75% of the EU average with the aim of supporting economic development. The subregion of Merseyside received such funding between 1994 and 2000, and again between 2000 and 2006.

Also, by studying these issues at this particular geographical level, a useful insight can be gained into the appropriateness of the national policy 'vision' within the UK, articulated in the recent 'Creative Britain' report of "a Britain in ten years' time where the local economies in our biggest *cities* are driven by creativity" (DCMS *et al.* 2008: 6, emphasis added). As one of the UK 'core cities', Liverpool would doubtless be included within such a vision, and so an examination into how this city in particular fits into a 'Creative Britain' again has ramifications beyond the merely local. Rather than being a study merely of the 2008 ECoC itself, therefore, what this thesis seeks to reveal is how the staging of the ECoC in Liverpool in 2008 is but one manifestation of a broader programme of political interventions utilising culture, and to use this particular case to engage with the nature of this broader programme.

3.2 Research questions

C. Wright Mills instructively noted that, "no social study that does not come back to the problems of biography, of history and of their intersections within a society has completed its intellectual journey" (1959: 6) and, to adapt the aims of Mills slightly, it could be argued that studies of the creative industries over the last decade, varied and numerous as they have been, can often be seen as lacking due to the paucity of their consideration of such "intersections" as they relate to this topic. As noted in Chapter Two, an examination of the operations of a business within a single subsector of the creative industries, such as Fashion or Art, often constitutes the whole object of research in this area, and these single analyses are presented as offering a useful insight into the way the macro 'creative industries' sector operates as a whole. Studies such as these, though, can all too easily gloss over the issue of what constitutes the wider sector, which should be understood not as a naturally occurring category, but rather as a site of construction and contention. That said, research which focuses *solely* on how and why the creative industries have become so highly regarded in policy circles can easily ignore the personal experiences of those working within such industries, acting merely to perpetuate already dominant discourses. Keeping such a theoretical distance from personal narratives in this manner risks ignoring those who should be at the very centre of such research. Policy which purports to act on behalf of a group but pays scant attention to the views or behaviour of that group clearly operates from, at best, a dubious logical position.

In highlighting the importance of the individual actor in this way, it is also important to bear in mind that 'policy' cannot itself solely be read off from policy documents; whilst these documents are clearly of vital importance in elucidating the bases from which policies are being constructed, and will form a central plank of the ensuing analysis of this thesis, these policies also filter down to the personal level when it comes to their implementation, and so it is also considered important to engage with those involved in this process who work for public sector bodies. This research, therefore, seeks to link

ideology and practitioner in a manner which has not previously been attempted, and to carry this task out within the context of Liverpool as a city which clearly continues to align itself with an agenda of culture-led regeneration (O'Brien and Miles 2010). As noted, this is an agenda with which the creative industries are explicitly, intrinsically and inextricably linked, yet their position within such an agenda is seldom questioned. The key questions which this research seeks to consider, therefore, are those delineated in Chapter One:

- Why have the 'creative industries' come to be considered as important within cultural policy, and in what form?
- What is the nature of the relationship between these industries and publically-funded cultural programmes? Specifically,
    - How is this relationship articulated within policy documents, and by those working to implement these policies?
    - How is the issue of the meanings of terminology in this area negotiated? Whilst 'culture' and 'creativity' may be understood to refer to the same object, they also have the potential to refer to very different objects.
- How do entrepreneurs working within the creative industries experience the effects of cultural policy?

By attempting to link the answers to these questions together, and in order to consider their implications *across* the range of creative industry subsectors, this research thus aims to provide a more rounded understanding of the nature of the interactions between these areas than has previously been achieved. These questions must be tackled in different ways, however, and therefore the remainder of this chapter discusses how they are best approached.

3.2.1 Statistical data and the 'evidence base' regarding creative industries

In attempting to answer the first question set out above, that is how the creative industries have come to be such a major focus for cultural policy, the first issue which will be examined, in Chapter Four, is the statistical evidence base presented by the UK national government, and taken up in many quarters, regarding the creative industries. It will be argued that this evidence base either explicitly or implicitly constitutes the justification for a great deal of current and historical study into the subject of the creative industries, and is the main prop supporting policy interest and intervention in this area. This topic is therefore of great importance and must be considered in some detail.

Assessing the relative importance of the creative industries within the UK has been the subject of a great deal of research and debate over the first decade of the 21st century and, although the project of evidence-gathering has begun to subside somewhat, the assumption of the creative industries' importance based on this project largely continues to the present day. Chapter Four traces the development of this evidence-gathering project by examining the ways in which data are gathered and the positions these data are used to support in some detail. At a national government level, for example, the far-reaching 'Creative Britain: New Talents for the New Economy' report produced across three government departments by DCMS, DIUS and BERR states as its main goal the positioning of Britain as the "world's creative hub" and, as noted above, the achievement of this goal is constructed around a "vision [...] of a Britain in ten years' time where the local economies in our biggest cities are driven by creativity" (2008: 6). Such a presentation of creativity as being at the forefront of economic development builds upon a long line of influential work aimed at achieving a greater understanding of the creative sector and to advocate on its behalf; 'Creative Britain' builds upon the Work Foundation's 'Staying Ahead' report (2007) which outlines the general importance of the sector, and this report in itself builds on earlier DCMS initiatives to construct an 'Evidence Toolkit' (initiatives which in their turn circuitously resulted in the 'Creative Economy Programme', a comprehensive series of 'evidence' documents published in the latter half of 2007). As well as these in-depth reports, the DCMS also continues to regularly publish its 'Creative Industries Economic Estimates' (DCMS 2010); statistical bulletins detailing the wealth and employment generated nationally by the activities of the creative industries. This range of documents will be considered in Chapter Four to establish the ways in which they serve to constitute the object of the creative industries, and a particular understanding of this object. As noted in Chapter Two, it is this national picture that provides the impetus for the adoption of the creative industries agenda at a number of levels within the UK. These data are to some extent the root from which this wider adoption grows, and so it necessary to go back to this source to understand this proliferation. Also, whilst data-gathering projects are often carried out to present locally-specific data (Impacts 08 2009), when the case for the ultimate importance of the creative industries is made, it is often these persistent headline figures regarding national growth which are utilised, be it in local or national contexts (BurnsCollett 2007). It is thus considered important to examine the discourse of national economic growth in some detail.

As well as looking in depth at the background to this evidence gathering process in order that it may be better understood, the actual data given in the most recent reporting of this evidence from the 2010 edition of the DCMS 'Economic Estimates' is also examined in Chapter Four. Claims made as to the relative economic importance of the creative industries are analysed to examine whether these stand when the data they are based upon are subject to scrutiny. Broadly speaking, the majority of relevant policy documents created within the UK since the end of the 20th century repeat one of a number of striking claims about the fast growth and major economic potential of the creative industries; generally

the figures coalesce around this sector constituting 7% of the whole UK economy, comprising around 2 million employees and being responsible for a changeable, but consistently above-average, level of economic growth (Work Foundation 2007, DCMS *et al.* 2008), and these claims are quite persistent. A decade separates these two statements, for instance:

> [Referring to the results of the 'Creative Industries Task Force':] These industries are growing at almost twice the rate of the economy as a whole. (Leadbeater and Oakley 1999: 11)

> Recent figures suggest that UK creative industries employment grew by an average of 2% per annum between 1997 and 2006 (twice the rate of growth of 'non-creative' employment). (Hesmondhalgh and Banks 2009: 415)

Both at the outset of the creative industries discussion in the late 1990s, and at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, we can thus see the same claims being levelled for the relative importance of the creative industries to the national economy, and these are claims which are not solely limited to the UK case. Foord notes in a review of international approaches that in strategies beyond the UK how broadly similar narratives are presented: "creative industries were presented as important both in absolute terms and as a rising proportion of national and regional economies" (2008: 92). This economic transformation is usually established by quoting figures which emerge from the evidence-gathering processes discussed above regarding the economic performance of the creative industries, and so this process must be properly understood.

Whilst Foord provides some discussion of the appropriateness of presenting the position of the creative industries as increasingly important in such a manner, this thesis argues that many studies are content, if they engage with this economic justification at all, simply to reproduce the claims of governmental evidence bases but not to engage in an interrogation of their basis. An asserted economic outperformance then forms the foundation of whatever intervention relating to 'creativity' is subsequently made, regardless of the appropriateness of this. The thesis seeks to rectify this approach. Without interrogating the nature of data, we cannot be certain of the solidity of the foundations which are being built upon. Headlines from governmental policy documents can be simply re-stated uncritically (e.g. Henry 2007: 1), and any ensuing discussion predicated on assumptions of these claims being broadly representative of reality. The main focus of Hesmondhalgh and Banks' (2009) article quoted above, for instance, is the *nature* of work in the creative industries, and the failure of policy to take account of the myriad problems the day-to-day realities of such labour can pose in such seemingly positive headline figures. In some sense, though, noting the growth in creative work and then going on to interrogate the value of this work in some senses lets these headline figures themselves 'off the hook'. We must, however, consider the position explained succinctly by Throsby that "much of the

speculation about the economic effects of the cultural industries on the economy, whether at the national, regional or local level, remains a matter of theoretical assertion rather than empirically established fact" (2008b: 229).

By examining the statistical basis for some of these assertions, we may therefore be able to better understand the economic position of the creative industries, and related policies. In doing so, the issue of why such a powerful and united discourse seems to have emerged around the creative industries in the presence of such assertions becomes a central consideration. It is instructive on this issue to consider the point raised by Hesmondhalgh that "for journalists and academics, sensational reports of a transformed future draw attention from readers, editors and funding bodies [...] For politicians and policymakers, predicting and supporting transformation can appear progressive" (2007: 240). It is the position of this thesis, however, that the academic should not primarily set out to proselytise for a glorious new dawn, but rather attempt to methodically scrutinise and understand the nature of unfolding events as accurately as possible. To this end, data pertaining to industries other than the creative industries will also be analysed in Chapter Four to see if there is evidence of a "transformed future" beyond the boundaries of the creativity agenda.

By examining where statistics regarding creative industries come from, how they are developed, and what they show, therefore, a better understanding of their position can be attained. If the evidence suggests that this group of industries is unified around a robust conception of their practices as 'creative' ones, and that as such these industries are outperforming the rest of the economy, and are also in some form part of a 'new' and emergent economic order as is argued, then, at least from some perspectives, under the remit of the state as currently constituted it would be incumbent upon government to understand the new processes which are involved in such industries, and also to put strategies in place to ensure their support and development. If the evidence suggests something different, however, then a different response may be necessary. In any case, this state of affairs must be established and not merely asserted, and so a rigorous analysis of the nature of the statistical evidence base enables this topic to be properly understood.

3.2.2 The discourse of culture and creativity

The issue alluded to in the previous chapters, that each of the objects of study for this research has potentially ill-defined boundaries, will be placed under further scrutiny within Chapters Five and Six. It will be argued here that the application of the language of 'culture' and 'creativity' endemically leads to catachresis. That is to say that, when culture and creativity come to the policy table (or the academic table, for that matter), the fact that these terms have many potential referents leads to them being used

to signify multiple, and potentially opposing objects, *at the same time*, which presents clear difficulties in a process of, for instance, executing a successful cultural policy, or constructing a coherent cultural strategy. This is akin to the idea of 'ambivalence' discussed by Fairclough regarding a process of discourse analysis, which is used "where a word may be taken to have a combination of two or more senses, in contrast with 'ambiguity' where a word may be taken to have one sense *or* another" (1995: 113).

In order to highlight such ambivalence we must therefore consider what can reasonably be termed the 'discourse' around cultural policy and the creative industries, examining how their assumed inter-relationship is established and sustained. In order to do this, what must be sought is what Foucault terms the "historical *a priori*" which "defines the conditions in which [one] can sustain a discourse about things that is recognised to be true" (1970: 158). These conditions shape understanding (Foucault 1970: 297) and have important implications for the usage of terminology. Just as 'creativity' as a concept is utilised for a variety of ends (cf. the 'creative class' and the 'creative city' discussed earlier), and the idea of the 'entrepreneur' is one which is potentially amorphous, similarly, the term 'creative industries' which forms the key consideration for this study is one whose referent and whose unifying locus is not always apparent. Industrial groupings are most commonly made by the *output* of their operations and not via their *input* which makes drawing any helpful boundaries for intervention extremely problematic, yet this term continues to be used in practice as though it were a largely benign one. It is the position of this thesis that the dominant discourse regarding creativity, however, serves to obscure issues such as these, rather than elucidating them.

3.2.2.1 Locating Discourse

Despite numerous attempts to delineate the boundaries of the sector dating back at least fifteen years (Evans 2001: 274), the debate over who are the most appropriate members of the creative industries grouping is one which seems to be perpetually current. This thesis strongly argues that it should not logically be possible to argue for the importance, economic or otherwise, of a certain group of industries or type of activity without being able to identify what that group of industries or type of activity actually is. That discourse around the creative industries can, and does, continue with such force despite the fact that this delineation still lacks rigour suggests that there are other, stronger forces at play in the rise to primacy of the perceived benefits of creativity and culture than the mere analysis of available evidence and an appropriate political response to this. It is therefore argued that a broader self-perpetuating discourse exists, and that it is this which should be a key consideration in the understanding of the rise of this phenomenon. Academic enquiry, however, can often be in danger of forming *a part* of this discourse, rather than illuminating its existence. Evidence for the operation of

such a discourse linking various manifestations of a notional 'creativity' is therefore sought at a number of levels. As the brief discussion in Chapter One clarified, there exists a fairly clear narrative regarding the particular values which can be associated with certain forms of cultural and creative practice. Policy documents relevant to the Liverpool ECoC, and the wider climate in which its staging occurred, were therefore sought out in order to examine the ways in which this narrative may be reflected and built upon within these documents. Documents were gathered in the first instance by web and archive searches for literature produced by relevant governmental bodies outside of the local context, and this process was then augmented by direct negotiation with local bodies to obtain a more comprehensive range of documents relating to the particular case under consideration.

At the European level, documents relating to analysing and articulating the position and role of the creative industries were identified, as well as documents relating to the presentation and assessment of the ECoC programme, in order to provide a broader context to national and local policy in this area. Subsequently, documents were then gathered reflecting national policy in this area, specifically relating to New Labour's creative industries policy, both from central government departments such as DCMS, and also from non-departmental public bodies such as NESTA. These consist of annual reports, strategy documents, internal presentations, discussions of evidence and so forth. Over the time period of study, it was also possible to source some of the reactions expressed at this central government level to the events of the Liverpool ECoC via ministerial speeches and articles, and to locate these within the context of wider policy discourse. In order to situate the particular case at hand within the national and international policy climate, documents were also sourced at the local level. These were mostly publically available documents such as the annual reports of the Liverpool Culture Company, or those produced for a public audience by Liverpool City Council, but also include some internal documents sourced via direct negotiation with these local bodies and other relevant organisations such as Merseyside ACME and Liverpool First focussed upon the processes around bidding for the ECoC and planning for creative industries within the city. Finally, in order to consider not only the history but also the possible continuation of prevailing themes which have influenced processes around the Liverpool ECoC, bidding and presentation documents were sourced regarding the future UK City of Culture Competition, whose instigation is in no small part framed around the success of the Liverpool ECoC. In each of these areas, the texts analysed are considered to be "typical" ones (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 23), and so suitable for the analysis of this research. Details of the documents analysed are given in Appendix A-1.

Ironically enough, given the discussion above, it should be noted that the term 'discourse' *itself* is yet another whose boundaries shift and warp depending on the user; Mills notes that, unhelpfully, "even within a particular discipline, there is a great deal of fluidity in the range of reference of the term" (1997: 3) and, similarly, Wodak notes the confusion this term can cause (2008: 1). The way this term is

deployed in this thesis must be therefore be established. The meaning most useful in the context at hand is the sense used by critical discourse analysis, particularly the form in which Fairclough refers to the notion of discourse when discussing a phenomenon related to the one under consideration here: the "enterprise discourse" which permeated government policy during the 1980s. Fairclough notes of this discourse that it "cannot be located in any text. The focus needs to be rather on processes across time and social space of text production, and the wider strategies that text production enters into" (1995: 127). In this sense, it is not that discourse will simply be 'read off' from particular texts in the ensuing analysis, but rather that this analysis will attempt to understand the prevailing assumptions and circumstances which result in these texts being produced in the particular forms they take, as this is what can best elucidate understanding of the discourse in operation. What discourse analysis will not consist of in this case, therefore, is the fine-grained analysis of the particular documents referenced above, filtering out their properties via the occurrence or conjunction of particular words and phrases or particular linguistic features (Fairclough 2003). That is not to say that certain, specific terms will not be examined, however, or that these texts will not be subject to close analysis. Rather, the range of documents considered, as set out above, are examined via a process of thematic textual analysis in order to ascertain how they present and construe the relationships and objects under consideration, i.e. the nature and place of the creative industries, their role, and their interaction with cultural programmes and activity. The representations of these activities are then organised according to their thematic content. This thematic organisation does not encompass the entirety of each text, but rather the content of these texts as it pertains to the specific research questions laid out above. As Fairclough notes, "in any analysis, we choose to ask certain questions about social events and texts, and not other possible questions" (2003: 14), and so analysis here focuses in particular on the evidence for dominant themes which can be seen to resonate throughout the body of policy documents, regardless of their geography or target audience. These "patterns and commonalities" (Wodak 2008: 6) imply the existence of a wider schema serving to shape these documents in particular forms, and so enable ensuing analysis to attempt to draw out these structuring devices, and consider the "wider strategies that text production enters into" which Fairclough refers to.

To this end the manner in which the nature of creativity, inasmuch as it pertains to the creative industries, is articulated will be examined, as will the justifications given regarding the support of these industries in order to draw out and better understand the relationships which are either explicit or implicitly assumed within these documents, and therefore also to understand the practices and interventions which are considered most appropriate and worth of political support. In this, the coding of documents will to a large extent be shaped by identifying the differing types of assumptions framed by Fairclough (2003) in his discussion of discourse analysis. Most important in this case are the identification of Propositional Assumptions, "assumptions about what is or can be or will be the case", and Value Assumptions, "assumptions about what is good or desirable" (Fairclough 2003: 55).

Amongst the range of possible meanings which can be associated with the terms culture and creativity under consideration, it is inevitable that certain meanings will be deployed at the expense of others. In what manner are the nature of creativity, culture, and associated business activities thus presented? Is there commonality in this presentation? If, as Schlesinger (2007: 377) argues, creativity has become a "hegemonic term" within policy, it is important to identify the particular manner in which this term is understood, deployed and operationalized. Once the manner in which these terms are used has been identified, the internal logic of the claims made to support these particular organising thematic schema can be subject to scrutiny, and attempts can be made to understand why the objects under consideration are presented in particular forms rather than possible alternatives. By considering this data in concert with that emerging from the other methodological approaches, we may therefore reach a clearer understanding of the extent to which discourse around creative industries falls into the pattern identified by Fairclough as being characteristic of much policy discourse of "representing desires as facts, representing the imaginaries of interested policies as the way the world actually is" (2003: 204) or, as is the nature of much discourse, of making "dominant ideologies appear as 'neutral'" (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 8)

3.2.2.2 Discursive structure

An important theoretical reference point for such an analysis, as noted above, is the work of Foucault. Although referring to discourse at a broader cultural level, Foucault notes that, "all manifest discourse is secretly based on an 'already-said'" (1989: 27). This discourse-focussed part of the study therefore seeks to elucidate the links between the theories and concepts set out in Chapter Two which constitute, as it were, what has been "already-said" to enable the extant policy position relating to the creative industries to have been constructed with its current goals, in its current form. Similar to the primacy placed above on the process of locating the "strategies that text production enters into", Mills notes that Foucault "is interested less in the actual utterances/texts that are produced than in the rules and structures which produce particular utterances and texts" (1997: 6), and it is these pre-existing frames behind the positioning of culture and creative industries within policy and programmes such as the ECoC that the thesis hopes to reveal. It will be argued that the concepts already considered in Chapter Two such as the 'creative city' or the 'creative class' and the history surrounding the development of the term 'creative industries' form the hidden skeleton which serves to shape policy discourse and interventions in their current form. The explicit or implicit evocation of these concepts, and their interconnection and utilisation, is therefore traced within current policy documents and initiatives. Analysis thus seeks to situate the discourse surrounding the relationship between cultural policy and creative industries within a broader 'discursive structure' which can explain its deployment. On this concept of the discursive structure, Mills notes that,

A discursive structure can be detected because of the systematicity of the ideas, opinions, concepts, ways of thinking and behaving which are formed within a particular context, and because of the effects of those ways of thinking and behaving. (1997: 15)

In Chapters Five and Six, UK local and national policy documents such as those mentioned above are therefore analysed for evidence of this 'systematicity'. This analysis will also appropriately build on Foucault's contention that analysis should "no longer [treat] discourses as groups of signs [...] but as practices that *systematically form the objects of which they speak*" (1989: 54, emphasis added).

On this issue of how objects are formed, it is important to note how intimately interwoven are the issues of *what* the object under consideration is, that is to say how the creative industries are discursively constituted, and *how* evidence can be gathered upon this object regarding collation of evidence and statistics as discussed in the section above. Indeed, in its work examining the differing international approaches and nomenclature of this subject, the OECD notes that, "the DCMS has undertaken the work of collating and publishing statistics on *what they refer to* as the creative industries. Inclusion in this grouping was *partially dependant on the availability of data* from Annual Business Inquiries" (2007: 41, emphasis added). The issue of data-gathering considered above is thus inextricably linked to the wider issues of 'discourse' under consideration, and so these two aspects of the research can be considered in many ways to be two sides of the same coin, and intimately related rather than two completely separate approaches to be integrated post-hoc.

3.2.3 Policy and practitioner experience

Once the thesis has considered questions of why the creative industries have historically come to be considered of such importance, and how they have come to be conceived of in a particular form, it becomes possible to compare and contrast this discursive construction with the accounts of those whose work actually relates to these industries on a day-to-day basis. The accounts of those who work implementing policy will be interwoven into the chapters relating to analysis of policy discourse, and then subsequently, in Chapter Seven, the focus will be placed upon practitioners within the creative industries, considering the accounts individuals within this group give of their own experiences, independent of the organising schema of this discourse.

At the level of policy, interventions to support the creative industries are based almost exclusively on macro-level statistical or ideological justifications. The figure of the creative entrepreneur as an *individual* (albeit one within a broader social structure) is largely absent, and a sense of their particular motivations, and the background and the nature of their work remains elusive in these justifications

(Ross 2008). The analysis within Chapter Seven seeks to fill this void by tracing the relevant factors for this study emerging from what can be considered the 'biography' of a number of practitioners within the creative industries, thus aiming to come closer to a completion of the intellectual journey described by C. Wright Mills above, by considering the social intersection of the personal and the historical, the combination of which can render the processes under scrutiny more fully intelligible (Chamberlayne *et al.* 2000). The narratives regarding creative practice which emerge from this process can be analysed to ascertain how closely they mirror policy discourse, and also studied for evidence of common structural influences acting within, or upon, the grouping of creative practitioners; a commonality which is rarely sought in empirical work. Grant and Perren warn that much research into entrepreneurial activity, "can perhaps be seen as adopting the pragmatism of the archetypal politician's or intermediary's agenda and accepting the received wisdom of enterprise discourse that pervades society [...] the researcher is caged within artificial boundaries that have been set by others" (2002: 202). By integrating a practitioner-based approach, this trap of replicating 'top-down' categories for understanding the processes at work within the creative industries, which may not take the experience of the workers under consideration into account, should therefore be avoided. The problem of starting research from potentially erroneous assumptions can thus be minimised. The history and relevance of this 'biographical' approach is considered below.

3.2.3.1 The biography of creative practice

The classic text of biographical research is most often considered to be Thomas and Znaniecki's 'The Polish Peasant in Europe and America' (1927), which contains a detailed account running to hundreds of pages of all aspects of the life of a single Polish immigrant. This biographical record involves the utilisation of a number of what have come to be referred to as 'life documents' (or 'human documents'), including letters, official records, and other evidence pertaining to the life of the individual, in combination with the life-story as narrated by the subject, to form a complete picture of their lived experience. The collation of such a detailed picture of an individual within a certain social location serves to elucidate wider social structures and emerging social positions in ways which would not be possible without engaging at this level of the personal biography. Emphasis is placed on the "continual interaction of individual consciousness and objective social reality" (Kohli 1981: 63). Whilst a focus *solely* on the biographical could not teach us anything outside of a single individual's experience, any research where this level of experience is entirely absent can be seen as similarly lacking in scope. That said, the scope of this study is such that it is simply not possible to gather *complete* personal life stories or life histories from a large enough number of individuals to represent a group such as the 'creative industries' and adequately analyse them. Nor, however, is this the aim of the research. Rather, the approach taken here is based on Plummer's position which extols the value of,

"first order accounts which attempt to enter the subjective world of informants, taking them seriously on their own terms and thereby providing first hand, intimately involved accounts of life, the prime example [being] the life story" (2001: 18).

This study seeks not to understand the *entirety* of the life of the creative entrepreneur, but rather to focus on the particular issues which are considered to be important for their current employment. This takes into account questions such as what their motivation is for being involved in such work, what the precursors are to this work, and the processes by which they have achieved the competency to carry out such work, as well as more specific questions related to the situation of this study: how and why they have come to be located in Liverpool, whether the wider cultural policy and programme of the city has affected their work, how they see their position within the city, their views on the subject of 'entrepreneurship', and so forth. This is therefore an approach which primarily utilises, to use Plummer's terminology, the "short life story" approach.

The short life story can be seen as an example of the "topical life document", which "does not aim to grasp the fullness of a person's life, but confronts a particular issue" (Plummer 2001: 26). This focussed "story" can then be analysed to bring out the salient themes, and over a wide range of interviews these themes can be compared and contrasted as appropriate. The decision to collect *short* life stories rather than complete ones is also largely a question of breadth over depth, and for the purposes of this particular segment of the research, breadth is the more informative and relevant dimension, it being a dimension which it is all too easy for studies of the creative industries to neglect. The commonality (or otherwise) of the stories that emerge and the way 'creativity' is conceived of by the practitioners themselves over a *wide range* of industry subsectors is thus of key concern, and provides an opportunity to better understand how the perceived unity of the creative industries at a policy level manifests itself 'on the ground'. As Bertaux and Bertaux-Wiame found in their study of artisan bakers, "subsequent life stories again and again revealed to the same working-life structure, which soon appeared characteristic not of the men, but of the relations of production within the framework of which they had to work" (1981: 176). This study similarly aims to examine whether common themes emerge from the narrative accounts gathered which may clarify the precursors of creative practice. Following the example of Bertaux and Bertaux-Wiame, a "focus upon what they [have] *done* in life (practices) rather than what they thought about it" when engaging with practitioners is considered to be important (1981: 181) to avoid the focus solely on psychological factors which is often taken when studying concepts such as the 'entrepreneur' (Down and Revely 2004).

This biographical approach opens up the potential for new perspectives to be admitted to the analysis of creative industries and cultural policy, and raises the possibility of entirely new topics for analysis emerging. As Apitzch finds in a study of migrant self-employment, the biography can often be

positioned in contrast to commonly held assumptions regarding the groups of which the individual is a member: "remarkably clear biographical types could be found, which stood, in fact, in stark contradiction to currently widely accepted assumptions on migrant self-employment" (2004: 45). Similarly, Thompson notes that,

> The life history approach appears to offer information which is from its very nature coherent, rooted in real social experience; and is therefore capable of generating wholly fresh sociological insights as opposed to the self-reflecting answers of pre-determined questions. (1981: 289)

By tracing the creative biography, therefore, we raise the possibility of appropriately gathering knowledge about the creative entrepreneur *independently* from the categories which the creative industries discourse is made up of, and thus avoiding traps which this discourse may have set for us. Also, whilst seeking out a narrative/biographical account within social research risks reducing the complexity of lived experience into a coherent series of key events that shape the lifecourse as though it were a logical 'career', what is under scrutiny in this thesis is precisely the narrative of such key events in the context of an *actual* career and so, if anything, this 'failing' may in fact constitute a benefit within the context of this element of research.

3.2.3.2 The interviews conducted

Despite its potentially 'top-down' impositional framework, the initial basis of the interviews carried out with entrepreneurs is the very DCMS typology of the creative industries as presented in Chapter Two. This, though, was in order that the unifying character of this grouping, or otherwise, could itself be interrogated, and interrogated from a practical as well as a theoretical position. In order to achieve this, 27 interviews were carried out with entrepreneurs over the range of DCMS categories. As the table below demonstrates, no opportunity emerged to speak with entrepreneurs in the subsectors of TV or Designer Fashion, but these are likely to be poorly represented in the local environment in any case[9]. The range of other areas has been covered as shown in the following table:

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9. Recent IDBR data suggest the number of enterprises in Liverpool working in the area 'Radio and Television Activities', for example, can be measured in single figures.

DCMS Area	Number of interviewees
1. Advertising	3
2. Architecture	3
3. Art/Antiques	4
4. Craft	2
5. Design	2
6. Designer Fashion	N/A
7. Film/Video/Photography	5
8/12. Software/Computer Games	2
9/10. Music/Performing Arts	4
11. Publishing	2
13. TV/ Radio	N/A

As a pertinent factor to ensuing analysis is the subsector to which each interviewee belongs, they will be referred to by using the subsector labels from the table above and an identifying number, such as 'Architecture (1)' or 'Music/Performing Arts (3)'. This enables key information regarding the responding individuals to be borne in mind, and to identify specific individuals within each subsector whilst maintaining their anonymity and avoiding the potential confusion arising from the use of over two dozen pseudonyms.

Interviews were carried out as they provide an especially effective means to understand phenomena from the point of view of participants, and to grasp their perception and understanding of events (Berg 2007: 97). As it is practitioners' own understanding of the nature and development of their creative careers which is the key concern for this strand of the research, the interview was thus selected as being the most appropriate method. These practitioner interviews were unstructured, noting Bernard's characterisation of such interviews, that they are based on a clear interviewing plan, but also characterized by exercising a minimum level of control over the responses of the interviewee (1994: 209). Enabling interviewees to discuss the important events of their creative careers on their own terms, as they themselves define them, and avoiding the limiting imposition of a rigid structure on to these accounts is of paramount importance (Yow 1994: 34, Elliott 2005: 4). Seeking information in this way helps to redress some of the imbalance of power inherent to the research process (Elliott 2005: 17) and, perhaps more importantly, seeking out narratives constructed on the participants' own terms also enables the possibility of discovering knowledge not conceived of in current dominant discourse (Yow 1994). To the greatest extent possible, then, the interviewees themselves were encouraged to direct the course of these interviews (Bertaux 1981: 39, Bernard 1994: 212).

It should also be noted that it is not necessarily the objective truth of these accounts that is under consideration, but rather the nature of the accounts themselves. As Bevir and Rhodes note, "because people act on beliefs and preferences, it is possible to explain their actions by referring to the relevant beliefs and preferences" (2003: 19). Even if the creative entrepreneurs' understanding of, say, the nature of the processes involved in the hosting of the ECoC in Liverpool do not reflect the *actual* operation of such a process, they nevertheless elucidate the beliefs that form the basis of their wider actions. The goal of this part of the research process is therefore to discover what Kohli refers to as the "subjective truth" (1981: 70). As well as seeking out this "subjective truth" of the factors considered to be important to the entrepreneur's creative career, their position regarding the particular importance of the ECoC itself was also sought out in cases where it did not present itself naturally during the interview, in order to ascertain whether there is a 'match' between the policy discourse regarding the place for creative industries within a process of culture-led regeneration, and the experience of practitioners within the areas which this discourse pertains to. Interview data relating to this topic is discussed in Chapter Seven.

As well as interviewing creative practitioners, in order to inform understanding of relevant policy and how the discursive structures identified in this area resonate with relevant actors and influence the execution of these policies, a further a set of qualitative data gathering was also carried out consisting of interviews with key figures responsible for putting cultural policy into practice at the regional and local level, on a similar basis to the interviews discussed above, although these were semi-structured, based on the themes emerging from policy analysis. Due to the smaller sample size, these interviewees are referred to by pseudonym for the purposes of maintaining anonymity. Alison, Ben and Chris are key figures related to cultural policy, the ECoC and the creative industries and are responsible for historical and ongoing cultural strategy within Liverpool City Council; Deborah, Evan and Francis are key figures within support agencies relevant to development of the creative industries sector in Liverpool. These interviews similarly enable a 'bottom-up' perspective on the activity which occurs to 'promote' the cultural and creative sector to be drawn out, and extracts from these interviews are considered below in the light of analysis of relevant policy documents to provide a more nuanced understanding. Also, in a similar fashion to the interviews discussed above, this process enables the "subjective truth" of those intervening on behalf of the creative sector to be drawn out.

Whilst negotiating access was a key hurdle to overcome in terms of both studying those responsible for cultural policy interventions and gathering the biographical narratives of the creative entrepreneurs, this was due to the researcher being in a position of a relative lack of 'power', which results in the ethical considerations in this research being minimal. All respondents take on the role of expert informants and, as the interviews carried out were in most cases unstructured, and in all cases sought out this 'expert' information from the point of view of the expert themselves, as noted above, the

power differential in the research environment is shifted as much as possible away from the researcher. Explicit consent was sought for the digital recording of interview material, and explicit consent was also sought for the usage of any material which risks identifying any participants directly. This risk is only raised in any case in relation to the policy practitioner-focussed interviews, as these respondents will occupy a potentially identifiable role which it may be necessary to discuss to give suitable context to their responses.

In the case of the creative entrepreneur, all data is anonymized (responses are at their most specific identified only by industrial subsector) and so the possibility of any one individual being identified from the material presented in the thesis is reduced to the greatest extent possible. Once transcribed thematically and anonymously, all digital audio files were erased, and all transcriptions kept for the collation of this thesis were situated in a secure location and electronically protected. This transcription process was the starting point of analysis, following Plummer's model of research consisting of transcription followed by coding and analysis (2001: 150). Merrill and West note that "coding involves identifying concepts and themes as you read the interviews" (2009: 132), and the close attention paid to the content of interviews through the transcription process served to reveal unifying concepts, themes and patterns in the data (Bernard 1994: 360). Whilst based on patterns and commonalities in a similar manner to the process of thematic document analysis set out above, then, the aim of this stage of analysis was to treat data in as unimpositional a manner as possible, considering not how this data necessarily related to the research questions at hand, but rather identifying what the most common themes and tropes emerging from the multiple narrations of creative practice were. Having established the salient themes emerging from the data by such a coding process, patterns were sought within and between the different types of practitioners, enabling broad similarities but also differences between groups to be identifies, and these are used to provide the structure for the analysis of this data presented in Chapter Seven.

Finally, it should be noted that in terms of the selection of creative entrepreneurs represented in the table above, the sample is considered to be a purposive one (Yow 1994: 47). That is, the sample as set out in the table above is not seeking to be representative of the make-up of the creative industries as they operate within the local area, but rather to cover the range of subsectors of the creative industries so that analysis could be carried out regarding the relative operations and motivations of the practitioners within each. Similarly, in terms of both the creative entrepreneurs and the figures from various public sector bodies interviewed, the sample is also an "appropriate population" (Berg 2007: 40), covering the range of practitioners most useful to the research aims, rather than merely those most easily available. Entrepreneurs were sourced in a variety of ways: two of the entrepreneurs interviewed were prior acquaintances known to have established a business in an appropriate area, however the majority of interviewees (n=20) were contacted directly via e-mail or telephone as a results

of web searches and documents gathered relating to businesses operating in the areas delineated above, with no previous knowledge of the researchers. Data was sourced from the IDBR (see Chapter Four) indicating that a clear majority of creative industries in the city were located within the Super Output Areas in the regions surrounding the city centre, and this knowledge was used to narrow down the search for appropriate businesses. In each case, information provided either directly within business literature or sourced via wider web searches was used to clarify if the individual responsible for establishing the business maintained a role within its operation. Where this was the case, this individual was contacted directly and an interview requested. Contact was made in this manner with 23 individuals, three of whom did not respond. Further to this, three further interviewees were recommended during the course of these interviews and subsequently contacted, and a final two interviewees were contacted via attendance at local conferences aimed at developing the skills of creative businesses in the city. The interview process was drawn to a close once a sufficient cross-section of interviews across the range of creative industries had been carried out.

3.3 Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the approach to research that the remainder of the thesis is based upon. It has shown why the case of the Liverpool ECoC is seen as particularly useful in providing a case study in which to examine the topics outlined in Chapter Two, and discussed the methodological approach taken in order to best understand these topics. The findings emerging from the approach outlined are presented in the ensuing chapters. Firstly, the macro-level statistics regarding the creative industries will be interrogated to ascertain whether they do indeed represent a solid base upon which to build an extended discourse around value and regeneration, and of a fruitful relationship between creative industries and cultural policy. This will involve analysis of the methods by which these statistics are collated, and an analysis of the statistical findings themselves. Politically, such findings are part of the increased focus on making the 'value' case for culture as discussed in Chapter Two, and also occur in the wider context of the increased emphasis upon "evidence based policy" under the New Labour administration (Sanderson 2002). The role for this 'evidence' in forming policy is thus of particular interest in the era under consideration.

This analysis will then be contextualised by an examination of the concepts which serve to structure policy discourse and interventions related to the creative industries and culture. These discursive props will be examined for internal consistency and rigour to see once again if they can support the claims which are based upon them, with particular attention to the case of the Liverpool ECoC. Nuance to the 'official' position as presented in policy documents will be provided by data from interviews with those working to implement policy in this area. This official position regarding the creative

industries and cultural policy will then be considered in the light of the personal narratives of those who have taken up the role of entrepreneur within the creative industries as outlined in Chapter Two. This will raise the potential for new insights and greater understanding to emerge on the topics at hand.

By considering the material emerging from policy-focussed interviews in concert with detailed narratives from creative practitioners, a consideration of relevant policy documents, and the 'evidence base' pertaining to such policy, a rounded picture of the issues pertaining to 'culture-led regeneration' can be achieved, and this can serve to elucidate the discursive structure which shapes policy positions into particular forms. How this structure does, or does not, reflect the experiences of the entrepreneurs who are often construed as playing a vital role in these regeneration processes can therefore be considered. In order to examine the foundations upon which this structure is built, then, the next chapter begins with a thorough examination of the evidence base collected in the UK around the economic position of the creative industries.

Chapter Four – Creative Evidence:

The Economic Performance of the Creative Industries

It has been noted how claims made as to the economic importance of the creative industries are central to the wider discourse on their potential role in regeneration, and to justifications for policy interventions on their behalf. The first paragraph of the Executive Summary which opens the cross-departmental 'Creative Britain' report referred to in previous chapters, for example, reads thus:

> Britain is a creative country and our creative industries are increasingly vital to the UK. Two million people are employed in creative jobs and the sector contributes £60 billion a year – 7.3 per cent – to the British economy. Over the past decade, the creative sector has grown at twice the rate of the economy as a whole and is well placed for continued growth as demand for creative content – particularly in English – grows. (DCMS *et al.* 2008: 6)

Similarly, in March 2010, a consortium of 17 major UK cultural organisations released the 'Cultural Capital' report, subtitled 'Investing in Culture will build Britain's Social and Economic Recovery'. This re-states figures such as those above with the following justification, emphasising the teleological understanding of the economic role of 'creativity' discussed earlier:

> Creativity is the key to economic recovery. Public investment in the arts and heritage helps to generate the cultural capital that feeds the creative industries [...] the creative and cultural industries have grown faster than the rest of the economy, and account for 6.2% of Gross Value Added. (Arts Council England *et al.* 2010: 7)

These economic claims constitute a key part of the discursive structure around the value of creativity that forms national government policy, and informs local interventions around culture-led regeneration such as the ECoC in Liverpool. Later chapters will discuss how the regenerative potential associated with the ECoC is seen as being partly dependent on its ability to increase the size of the creative industries sector locally. Statistics such as those quoted above regarding the contribution of the creative industries to the wider economy enable such an increase to be presented as a desirable outcome, and are seen by many to amply demonstrate the success achieved by the creative industries. Here we can clearly see strong propositional assumptions being made regarding how the economy is structured, and the role for the creative industries within this structure, and these are aligned with strong value assumptions regarding the best way to maintain this role. These statistics are referenced in numerous academic and political quarters, by arts advocacy bodies, and in the general media (e.g. CBI 2010, Fleming 2007: 108, Hall 2010, Hartley 2005: 2, Henry 2007: 1, Hesmondhalgh and Banks 2009:

415, Leadbeater and Oakley 1999: 11, NESTA 2009c, Oakley 2009b: 7, Potts and Cunningham 2008: 240, Rae 2007: 55, Support The Arts 2010, Taylor 2007). Whilst a minority of these sources (e.g. Oakley 2009b) point out the problematic nature of such statistics, the majority quote the available figures as clear evidence of how integral these industries are to the burgeoning new economy, and how vital they are to economic success in any given location. Foord (2008: 92) presents evidence that this state of affairs is characteristic not only of the UK case, but is the predominant way in which creative industries are presented internationally. Such statistics thus represent one of the key 'knowledges' contained in broader discourse on the creative industries (Jäger and Maier 2009: 34), and by their repetition constitute a key aspect of this discourse.

This chapter therefore seeks to understand how such strong and unequivocal statements as those in the extracts above come to be made, and will examine in detail how the figures quoted within such statements are arrived at. It will consider how in gathering these statistics, questions of *what* it is that should be measured must be wrestled with, together with questions of *how* this measurement can be achieved. Once the nature of data-gathering has been considered, the chapter moves on to consider the ends to which data are put, and therefore whether it is appropriate to link cultural programmes such as the ECoC with an increase in the level of activity within these apparently successful industries. Questions are also raised around the notion of "individual creativity" being conceived of as central to the success of these industries (DCMS *et al.* 2008: 13).

In particular, the role of *software* as a constituent part of the creative industries macro-category as defined by policy will be addressed. It will be argued that Hesmondhalgh has good reason to argue that this subcategory "was included in order to bolster figures and provide a more powerful alliance around the 'creative industries' banner" (2007: 179) but that this statement can be taken even further, and that it is the case that software is the single most important constituent of these figures. This chapter will argue that the *only* way this "powerful alliance" can be made around the creative industries, at least economically speaking, given the currently available data, is to attach the cultural sector to the feracious IT sector and behave as though these two halves lock together to form a single entity called 'creativity'. It will be shown, however, that as software is also the one constituent of the 'creative industries' for which the strongest case can be made that there is *no* culturally expressive content to speak of, this raises very serious questions around policy attempts to leverage the power of 'creativity' and to align this to specifically *cultural* pursuits, particularly with a view to encouraging a process of culture-led regeneration. The chapter will end by considering whether conceiving the creative industries as having a central role within a 'new economy' is a reasonable position to take from the available evidence. This chapter thus raises serious questions regarding the potential inter-relationship between cultural programmes such as the ECoC and the economic benefits which may be derived from the creative industries, which will be considered further in the following chapters.

4.1 Gathering an evidence base

The importance given to the gathering and dissemination of statistics relating to the creative industries which emerged out of the DCMS over the course of the New Labour administration can be seen as symptomatic of a move towards a more general turn towards 'evidence based policymaking'. Oakley (2008: 19) identifies this practice as achieving "a high-water mark of commitment" within central government during the mid-2000s, adding that from the very outset of their appearance on the stage of central government any discussions around creative industries are "always accompanied by a stress on evidence" (2008: 21). Indeed, the turn towards a more economic-focussed perspective regarding the role of arts and culture, and the attempt to deproblematize the relationship between culture and the economy as discussed in Chapter Two, necessarily entails the collection of quantitative data so that the case for culture can in some sense be objectively 'proved'. Garnham points out that this data gathering, "takes place within a context where the search for 'value for money' governs government expenditure and [...] within a broader context of policy thinking that has shifted focus from 'the arts' to 'the creative industries'" (2001: 445).

The first question that should be asked when attempting to understand where the statistics of wealth and growth referred to above emerge from, then, is what is it that is being measured? And, relatedly, how has this measurement been carried out? Whilst a broad outline of the emergence of the terminology of the creative industries has been traced, it is necessary at this point to engage with the debates around the most appropriate object for this terminology, which are still current. As will be seen later in this chapter, the definitional drift which occurs as a result of a change of focus from 'cultural' to 'creative' industries is an important factor when it comes to drawing a logical boundary around this sector, and in understanding the role of the industries contained therein both economically and socially. Whilst the uni-directional process traced in Chapter Two of the development of creative industries terminology is an accurate one, it is not the case that this single path has led to a single destination; although the DCMS definition of the sector has gained primacy, this is by no means the only logical end point to historic debates on this subject, nor indeed the only definition currently available for what does or should constitute the 'creative industries'. There remain a number of conflicting approaches regarding what groups should be included under this new heading, the extent to which the industries contained under this heading overlap with the cultural sector within a country or region, and the methodologies which can be used in either of these areas to achieve an accurate level of measurement once a definition is finally reached. This has important ramifications for a consideration of the relationship between cultural policy and the creative industries. The following discussion from the DCMS, for example, on how the measurement of the creative sector should be approached, serves to provide a sense of the historical and ongoing nature of these debates, their

geographical scope, and also provides a sense of the difficulty in achieving any form of consensus on this issue:

> In Europe there have been long running discussions on the constitution of the cultural sector and data collection [...] A Leadership Group (LEG) reported on the possibility of harmonisation of cultural statistics in 1999, and a Working Party on Cultural Statistics continues to explore the issues. The LEG group [...] acknowledged the problem that definition is in part a matter of policy, and departed significantly from UNESCO's FCS [Framework for Culture Statistics] in terms of 'breadth', by establishing more limited parameters for the cultural sector. So, Sport, Environment, Advertising, Fashion, Languages and Games were excluded. (2004b: 8)

Such definitions are therefore inevitably and inherently political ones, as, it can be argued, is the entire endeavour of 'evidence-based policy' (Oakley 2008). It is not the aim of this thesis, however, to resolve all of these issues, or to propose a 'correct' definition of the creative sector. Rather the aim is to understand the basis on which UK policy has come to be constituted in its current form, and therefore understand the substance of the claims made regarding the special value of the creative industries, as these claims form a significant part of the territory which this thesis explores. This chapter also aims to show how issues of definition and measurement are inextricably bound together when considering the creative industries as a discrete sector and how this definition, being an inevitably political one, is therefore also inevitably one which is imposed from above, raising questions about its relevance to those it seeks to unite.

4.1.1 What should be measured?

As has been noted, the most comprehensive and high-profile manifestation of the concept of the creative industries as central to future prosperity at a national policy level is the cross-departmental endeavour 'Creative Britain: New Talents for the New Economy' (DCMS *et al*. 2008), a "strategy document for the creative economy" which sets out a list of "commitments" for creativity inspired by the Work Foundation report, 'Staying Ahead: The Economic Performance of the UK's Creative Industries' (2007). These documents are both a part of the DCMS 'Creative Economy Programme' which has also published a series of 'evidence' documents about the make-up of the creative sector. Yet, as noted above, a definition of what does, or should, make up this particular sector has historically been far from clear – Evans notes calls for a more rigorous definition of the creative industries dating back to the very emergence of the concept (2001: 274) – and debates persist on this issue (Garnham 2005a, Hesmondhalgh 2007). In order to gather evidence, though, boundaries for definition must be

(and indeed, have been) demarcated. To understand how the prevailing and influential definition of creative industries utilised by the DCMS in the UK has been arrived at, particularly with regard to what extent a group of 'creative' industries differs from the pre-existing group of merely 'cultural' ones, and to understand the appropriateness of this definition, it is instructive to consider how attempts to demarcate the boundaries of the sector have played out over the course of a decade of discussion of the creative industries idea. This reveals issues regarding the potential appropriateness of conceiving of a potential relationship between a programme like the ECoC and creative industries development.

4.1.1.1 The interplay of 'culture' and 'creativity'

It was noted in Chapter Two how the 'creative industries' can be seen to emerge from a prior conception of the 'cultural industries' which had reproducible commodities with artistic content at their heart, commodities such as art prints, novels, magazines, vinyl records, and videocassettes and, despite adopting a notably different take on their social position, these are broadly the same objects under consideration by the earlier discourse of the 'culture industry'. It was, however, also noted that "the overwhelming policy discourse is one in which [these different terms] are used interchangeably" (Pratt and Jeffcut 2009: 5). In the face of such interchangeable usage, it is important to consider to what extent a discourse of 'creativity' differs from one of 'culture', and how much this difference matters. The industries which find themselves grouped under any of these headings are most often based upon the development of the ability to record and fix audio-visual material, and by the rapid refinement and geographical spread of this process and the attendant related processes of innovation. Such a monumental achievement has many ramifications, and the consumption of new technologies in this area has been even more rapid than in others (Miller 2007: 227); one only has to conceive of the fact, for example, that the compact disc did not exist 30 years ago, that the DVD has only a 20 year history, and that internet connections enabling high-speed, high-quality distribution of media have only become popularly available during the last decade to understand the tremendous, and global, potential of at least certain strands of the creative industries.

It is important, however, to bear in mind that currently employed definitions of the creative industries extend *beyond* such explicitly cultural elements. Radio, cinema, publishing, music, television and the like all operate within a similar realm which can be comfortably headed 'cultural' according to one definition of this term (basically a synonym for 'artistic', with a certain bias towards popular entertainment and media), and those working within such industries would doubtless recognise the cultural content of their work in this arts-related sense of the word: we can appreciate that the term 'culture' has a multiplicity of meanings without being confused as to which one applies here. Yet

despite emphasising *culture* in its re-naming of the former Department of National Heritage in 1997, and from the context clearly using the term in this very same manner (mapping closely to the sixth definition of 'culture' in the Oxford English Dictionary, which references "the arts and other manifestations of human intellectual achievement regarded collectively"), it must be questioned as to why New Labour's DCMS shifts to the more nebulous 'creativity' when grouping together the industries under consideration here. What prompts this re-designation?

It is clear that the term 'creative' *can* explicitly refer to a very similar territory to that occupied by the above definition of culture: definition 1b of 'creative' in the OED refers to a meaning of "inventive", "*spec. of literature and art*, thus also of a writer or artist" (emphasis added). What can be stated with a fair degree of certainty is that this re-designation did not occur as a result of a demand from those working in the arts sector, or designer fashion, say, to be recognised as more 'creative' and less 'cultural'. Garnham (2005a) argues that this re-naming is a tactic which enables a broad tent to be drawn over a variety of activities, obscuring the content within. Such a move enables the term 'creative' to act as though it were a synonym for cultural as in the artistic/entertainment sense set out above, but simultaneously allows the definition of creativity to broaden out in ways the term 'cultural' could not reasonably do. Within the UK, the heading of 'creative industries' encompasses *all* the constituent parts of the *cultural* industries, but makes certain additions, thus aligning these additional industries with the overarching cultural aura, and implying some commonality either in practice or in outcome. When Adorno and Horkheimer (1979) propose the pernicious influence of the products of the 'culture industry', or when Miège (1989) discusses the problems of predicting the patterns of consumption for goods which have low reproduction costs such as those produced by the 'cultural industries', they would not have seen it as appropriate to include a field such as architecture in their analysis; yet architecture, as of the mid-1990s, is designated as belonging to the same creative sector of the economy as the publishing of magazines. A key aspect of the debate around what appropriately constitutes the 'creative industries', therefore, concerns how these should be defined in relation to the 'cultural sector'. The prevalent questions which seem to have emerged in a policy and evidence-gathering context are: to what extent can we (or should we) separate 'creativity' from 'culture' and, if the two do indeed overlap, in what areas do they do so? Similarly, from the perspective of this research, this raises the question of, if these areas are distinct, who defines the terminology used to bring about this distinction, and is this relevant to those who it actually refers to?

Given that, as per the definitions outlined above, the two terms are potentially identical, discussing the difference between such apparently close concepts as 'creativity' and 'culture' might seem on the face of it to be tantamount to arguing about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. Yet if these differences translate into significantly different definitions for the purposes of the data-gathering project under consideration whereby 'cultural' practice, however defined, is seen to have a stagnant

rate of employment growth whereas 'creative' practice, however alternatively defined, is considered to be the fastest growing sector in the national economy, then these seemingly trivial differences will result in significant, practical policy implications and an appropriately different leveraging of resources. Indeed, despite the apparent difficulty of alighting on a sturdy definition in this particular realm, numerous attempts have certainly been made to delineate the difference between 'culture' and 'creativity'. A recent study for the European Commission, for example, identifies these two areas thus:

> The "cultural sector":
> - Non-industrial sectors producing non-reproducible goods and services aimed at being "consumed" on the spot (a concert, an art fair, an exhibition). These are the arts field (visual arts including paintings, sculpture, craft, photography; the arts and antique markets; performing arts including opera, orchestra, theatre, dance, circus; and heritage including museums, heritage sites, archaeological sites, libraries and archives).
> - Industrial sectors producing cultural products aimed at mass reproduction, mass-dissemination and exports (for example, a book, a film, a sound recording). These are "cultural industries" including film and video, video-games, broadcasting, music, book and press publishing.
>
> The "creative sector":
> - In the "creative sector", culture becomes a "creative" input in the production of non-cultural goods. It includes activities such as design (fashion design, interior design, and product design), architecture, and advertising. Creativity is understood in the study as the use of cultural resources as an intermediate consumption in the production process of non-cultural sectors, and thereby as a source of innovation.
>
> (KEA European Affairs 2006: 2)

More recently, KEA have also been responsible for authoring a paper for the European Commission considering "The Impact of Culture on Creativity" wherein we discover that,

> Culture-based creativity helps to promote well-being, to create lifestyle, to enrich the act of consumption, to stimulate confidence in communities and social cohesion [...] It contributes to product innovation, to branding, to the management of human resources and to communication. (2009: 6)

Clearly this chimes strongly with the ideas discussed in Chapter Two regarding the potential for a process of 'culture-led regeneration' with creativity providing benefits to a location beyond the purely

economic (although more worryingly, it also seems to present the idea of culture as a balm for all social ills; it might well be asked from such a list what it is that 'culture-based creativity' can *not* do), and statements such as the above are woven throughout the discourse of cultural and creative industries policy, as will be shown in Chapters Five and Six wherein it will be argued that these represent another example of the catachresis discussed previously. For now, however, it is sufficient to note that if we can understand an idea such as 'culture-based creativity', then this implicitly entails culture and creativity being somehow separate, and the definitions employed being distinct. Based on the 2006 KEA report, the Work Foundation in the UK posit the influential 'concentric circles' model shown in Figure 1 below to aid understanding of the cultural/creative sector's place in the wider economy, and the place of the 'creative' as opposed to the 'cultural' industries:

**Figure 1: The Work Foundation's concentric circles model of the creative economy**
Source: Work Foundation 2007

The centre of this diagram includes "traditional art forms" and "core creative" activity such as "the writing of computer software, the establishment of a 2.0 website or the evolution of a new character in a video game" (2007: 104). The next circle out, the 'cultural industries', are concerned with "the

commercialisation of pure expressive value" (2007: 104), such as the music or film industries, and one step out again from this we find 'creative industries', described as "analytically first cousins to the cultural industries; distinct while belonging to the same family of activity" (2007: 105), where this same "expressive value" which is utilised in the cultural industries is "*essential*" (2007: 105, emphasis added). Expressive activity of some form therefore permeates the sector and is its principal characteristic by such a model. Such expressive *creative* (but non-cultural) industries include the architecture and fashion industries. So, by this model, advertising is 'creative', whereas music is 'cultural'; design work is 'creative', and a computer game is 'cultural'.

Such demarcations demonstrate the difficulties encountered when trying to separate these areas of activity in any simple or, perhaps, useful way when it comes to the task of collating statistics. Just as it has been noted that such terminology tends to get used interchangeably within policy, Griffiths notes that study of cultural forms generally is extremely susceptible to a form of definitional drift, and that "the notion of the arts has been displaced by the broader and more amorphous idea of the cultural sector; the cultural sector has in turn become the cultural industries; and the cultural industries have turned into the creative industries" (2006: 416). By this formulation, either we are merely talking about the same object using different terms or, more problematically, we are constructing *different* objects and referring to them *as though* they were the same; a misapplication of language, or catachresis. Conceptual vagueness in definition can thus be obscured by the use of a consistent referent. From any of the ever-increasing number of 'mappings' of this creative sector, however, a consistent and enduring focus, at least in the UK, on what we can reasonably define as 'cultural' activities is clear. The centrality of "expressive value" and culture, in the arts-focussed sense referred to above, to the notion of the creative industries must always be borne in mind when considering the particular idea of 'creativity' which is associated with this concept. Even if it were ideologically or methodologically useful to draw a line between tasks which are either 'creative' on the one hand or 'cultural' on the other, whenever this is attempted it is found to be a virtual impossibility. Indeed, despite attempting to draw such lines, the Work Foundation report describes the two areas as "highly porous" with increasing "collaboration" and "interdependencies" (2007: 106). In any case, by this model the creative industries wholly subsume the cultural industries, so these are bound to constitute a highly significant proportion of the whole sector and, in the case of current usages, the *most* significant proportion; as Throsby succinctly notes of the UK case, "virtually *all* of the 13 industries included in the DCMS classification could be seen as 'cultural'" (2008a: 220, emphasis added). From this position, it would not seem unreasonable to expect a programme focussed on cultural activity such as the ECoC to influence creative industries in some way.

4.1.1.2 Drawing sector boundaries

To put the issue of the most appropriate terminology to label this group of industries temporarily to one side, the broader issue of *which* industries should appropriately be considered within this macro-sector containing the cultural and/or creative when it comes to the task of drawing boundaries around this sector, and gathering relevant data, is itself not necessarily easy to resolve, as noted above. The OECD, for example, conducted a workshop on "The International Measurement of Culture" in December 2006, incorporating a survey on the terms used in defining the 'cultural sector' internationally which found massive variation between countries (OECD 2007: 48). The DCMS similarly note this divergence at an international level and argue that "clearly, the precise set of domains that are identified collectively as the cultural sector is contingent, dependent upon particular geographical and historical circumstances" (DCMS 2004b: 9). Following this train of thought of what should and should not be included in measurement inevitably leads to a discussion of the eternal question of what culture *is*, and this can potentially lead to the definitionally unhelpful position demonstrated in the title of Mato's recent article, "All Industries Are Cultural" (2009). Hesmondhalgh and Baker pithily note of positions such as this, "in a trivial sense, this is true, but it gets us nowhere" (2008: 101). Of course, in human society objects and processes become associated with meaning, and this meaning can be significant in the operation of a number of industries. This does not mean, however, that it aids understanding to consider all industries 'cultural industries', just as, in turn, it does not necessarily follow that these are all 'creative industries' or, as Banks and O'Connor formulate the question, "if everything can be creative – a management model, a kidney dialysis machine, package holidays – then wherein lies the specific value of the cultural/creative industries?" (2009: 367).

It is clear that the sixth definition of 'culture' given in the OED discussed above, basically referring to the arts, is not the same as the seventh which refers to "the distinctive ideas, customs, social behaviour, products, or way of life of a particular society, people, or period", despite a single word being used to refer to both ideas. Words can have numerous meanings without confusion necessarily arising as to which meaning is being employed at any one time. Nowhere in the literature on cultural industries, for example, is it suggested that the cultivation of land (the first definition of the term 'culture' in the OED) might be included under such a heading, and sensibly so. It must also be noted that certain types of 'creative' activity do not find themselves included in definitions of the creative sector. Galloway and Dunlop, for example, note how the individual creativity involved in process such as developing scientific innovations are not typically included in definitions of the 'creative' sector (2007: 28). This is clearly due to the lack of a focus upon expressive, artistic cultural content, postulated as "essential" to the sector in documents such as the Work Foundation report referenced above, within such broader industries.

When considering how the creative/cultural sector has come to be concretely defined within the UK, it has been noted how influential the work of the DCMS has been, both in developing an 'evidence toolkit' in this area, and in achieving some resolution of these issues. This work also continues to provide the basis for concrete interventions regarding the creative industries, and to exert its influence internationally (Flew and Cunningham 2010: 114). The definition of the creative industries which emerges from the DCMS, and the wider climate of definitional work in play concurrently, must therefore be examined in detail, to see whether the idea of the creative industries which emerges is one which is logically defensible, reflecting the overarching unifier of artistic, expressive practice which has been considered up to now, or whether there are any difficulties regarding this unity of practice.

The positioning of the creative industries as being of key economic importance occurs concurrently with the emergence of the DCMS in 1997, and in 1998 the department created the Creative Industries Mapping Document, the first real attempt to establish the spectrum of activity associated with the creative industries (White 2009: 338). As such work had an affinity with the climate first discussed in Chapter Two of increasingly justifying arts subsidy in terms of its economic impact, and also in the reframing of the relationship between culture and the economy, the 'creative industries' proved to be a popular concept at many levels, and a great deal of work was carried out to clarify the insights within the mapping document and apply these within the regions of the UK (Rae 2007: 108). To give some brief examples of how such work developed over the course of a decade, and to outline how definitions remain contested, it is instructive to consider some of the different approaches taken to delineate this sector. Pratt (1997), at the outset of the discourse around creative industries, argued for the importance of considering the 'Creative Industries Production System' (CIPS) which takes into account all 'dimensions' of the creative industries, that is to say the breadth of creative outputs, and the depth of inputs required for these. DCMS documents (2004b: 11) note that this model is used in 'several' regional creative industries strategies and plans. In their work centred on South East England, for example, DPA (2002) suggest that the focus should be on 'The CCI sector' – explicitly made up of 'creative' *and* 'cultural' industries seen as including,

> Advertising: Architecture: Archives: The Arts and Antiques Market: Countryside Recreation: Crafts: Design: Designer Fashion: Digital Media: Film and Video: Historic Sites, Buildings and Houses: Interactive Leisure Software: Libraries, Information and Knowledge Management: Museums: Music: Performing arts: Publishing: Software and Computer Services: Sports: Tourism: Television and Radio. (DPA 2002: 9)

This list demonstrates certain categories which are not included in the DCMS mapping, and these could be considered the more 'cultural' aspects of the 'CCI sector', such as heritage, libraries and tourism. DPA explain the difference between the DCMS list and this one in terms of the "two

dimensions" of the "cultural industries" – breadth and depth, defining a number of problems regarding emergent central government definitions thus:

> Outwith the DCMS definition are Sport, Tourism, Libraries, Information and Knowledge
> Management, Archives and Galleries [...] Definitions in this area are dominated by public
> policy-making concerns, and the traditional bureaucratic boundaries of responsibility. New
> concerns with regulation, changing technologies and social practices are likely to continue to
> make conventional boundaries and definitions inadequate. (2002: 8)

Following this delineation, we can see how one of the implicit logics of the eventually prevailing DCMS grouping is that the constituent parts of the creative industries should be fundamentally *commercial* operations, with economic success as their defining attribute (Jayne 2005). It would, after all, be bizarre to find a statement such as the one quoted at the outset of this chapter about a sector which is outstripping the wider economy in terms of its relative growth rate and generated wealth and find that this encompassed the operation of institutions often run on a not-for-profit basis such as libraries and archives, despite the undoubtedly 'cultural' nature of these institutions.

There is, however, a similar bias towards the 'cultural' in international definitions such as the UNESCO (2006) formulation of the creative realm, which categorises the different dimensions of the sector thus:

	SICs nuanced by occupation and product classifications			
	Arts Visual, fine, performing arts	**Heritage** Natural Cultural Tangible and Intangible	**Audio-visual** Film, video, new media	**Books & Press**
Production & Consumption	' Employment ' Value ' Performances	' Employment ' Value	' Employment ' Value ' No of titles	' Employment ' Value ' No of titles
Education	' Enrolment ' Performances in/by schools	' Enrolment ' Attendance (visitors, locals)	' ICTs in education	' School textbooks
Traditional knowledge	' Craft artisans ' Story tellers ' Festivals ($, attendance)	' Intangible heritage (no of themes) ' Biodiversity	' Traditional knowledge on the Internet ' Audio-visual documentation	' Languages in print
Archiving & preserving	' Document centres	' Conservation (jobs, $)	' Film archives (volumes)	' Libraries (volumes, transactions)

Figure 2: UNESCO's model of the creative economy

Source: UNESCO 2006

On the topic of gathering data regarding this creative economy, UNESCO belatedly released a new Framework for Cultural Statistics in 2009, which has a dubiously broad definition of what should be included in such a framework: "the UNESCO Framework for Cultural Statistics defines culture

through the identification and measurement of the behaviours and practices resulting from the beliefs and values of a society or a social group" (2009: 9). Statistics relating to 'practices resulting from beliefs' would surely be very broad indeed, but the Framework comments on the culture/creativity wrangling at hand thus:

> Many countries have used the term 'creative' to describe these industries, but many industries within a creative 'sector' may not be creative. The definition and measurement of creativity is in itself subject to much debate. Creative industries usually cover a broader scope than traditional artistic domains with the inclusion, for example, of all ICT industries or research and development. The framework addresses this issue by allowing the inclusion of some specific creative industries (design and advertising) as a separate domain. (2009: 19)

Clearly, this is quite a different position from the concentric circles model above whereby cultural activity is central to creative industries. By such a conception as the UNESCO model, an appropriate visualisation of this activity would more likely take the form of a partially overlapping Venn diagram, with some creative industries having nothing whatsoever to do with culture. It will be argued below that this is, in fact, the more reasonable position to take but that such a position is not reflective of the influential creative industries model as originated the UK, nor of a discourse which posits a relationship between cultural policy and these creative industries. Indeed, the UNESCO position would pose problems in justifying the special place given to the creative industries as per the UK model. The basis for the ever-pervasive figures regarding sector value and growth quoted at the outset of this chapter, however, is this UK model based on the work of the DCMS. The particular industries these figures are based upon must therefore be considered.

4.1.1.3 The 'DCMS 13'

The 'Creative Economy Programme' referred to above was established by the DCMS to offer "coherent analysis of the UK's creative industries, their significance in the global economy and the opportunities and challenges they face" (Howells *et al.* 2007). This programme has produced a number of evidence documents, exploring issues such as the size and scope of the creative sector, spillover effects, and the role of multinational companies, building upon extant DCMS work which has its origins in the 'Creative Industries Mapping Document' of 1998. Whilst the discussions regarding appropriate definition such as those considered above have had some influence, the creative industries as identified by DCMS almost immediately coalesced around certain key industrial groups, and remain in this fixed position to the present day. It is these specific groups that form the foundations for the statistics at the basis of the claims made at the outset of this chapter, and whose commonality is considered further

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below. As noted above, the Work Foundation explain the criteria for the inclusion of any given industry thus,

> What is distinct about the creative industries is that their revenues are largely generated by commercialising 'expressive value' and that necessarily a greater part of their commercial turnover is attributable even more so than other parts of the knowledge economy to acts of genuine 'creative origination'. (2007: 96)

What 'creative' means in this sense is a partial mystery (especially 'genuine' creativity), but elsewhere the DCMS state the case more explicitly in that the key characteristic of the creative industries is that they "generate intellectual property with a potential for wealth and job creation" (2004b: 20), and from these two positions we could reasonably assume that it is intellectual property emerging from expressive value that separates the creative industries from others. It is also clear that the role for a form of entrepreneurship as outlined in Chapter Two is particularly important for these creative industries, as they fundamentally rest on creativity at the individual level (DCMS 2001, DCMS *et al.* 2008). Figure 3 below indicates the 13 sectors which constitute the DCMS creative industries on this basis, together with the SIC codes[10] which are used as a basis for data gathering. As some SICs contain activity deemed to be outside of the creative industries, only a proportion of the total activity within these codes is included in the estimates, and this is denoted in the final column.

It is clear from the figure below how the notion expressed by Throsby of "virtually all" of these activities being 'cultural' comes about; publishing of books, reproducing sound recordings and so forth have the same clear unifying locus as the 'cultural industries' discussed previously: reproducible, arts-related commodities. Yet the creative industries concept as delineated here also clearly goes beyond such a locus, taking software consultancy, for example, into its remit. Some of these groups are expressly noted as being difficult to measure; the thirteen identified groups are combined into eleven separate areas as "due to the structure of the official classifications used, it is necessary to combine 'Interactive Leisure Software' with 'Software and Computer Services' and 'Music' with 'Performing Arts'" (DCMS 2010: 1), and it is particularly difficult to gather statistics upon groups 4 and 5 in Figure 3. Before considering the appropriateness of the activities included in this grouping, therefore, it is also necessary to consider the intimately related issue of how data is actually gathered.

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10. The Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code is used to provide data on all sectors of industry within the UK. The codes provide an increasing level of specificity from 2 to 5 digit level, and map to the European NACE (Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté Européenne) system to the 4 digit level.

Mapping Document Chapter	Sector	Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)		Proportion of code taken
		Code	Description	
1	Advertising	74.40	Advertising	
2	Architecture	74.20	Architecture and engineering activities and related technical consultancy (‡)	✓ (25%)
3	Art & Antiques	52.48	Other retail sale in specialised stores (‡)	✓ (5%)
		52.50	Retail sale of second-hand goods in stores	✓ (5%)
4	Crafts	Majority of businesses too small to be picked up in business surveys		
5	Design	No codes match this sector		
6	Designer Fashion	9 Codes	Clothing Manufacture (†)	✓ (0.5%)
		74.87	Other business activities not elsewhere classified	✓ (2.5%)
7	Video, Film & Photography	22.32	Reproduction of video recording	✓ (25%)
		74.81	Photographic activities	✓ (25%)
		92.11	Motion picture and video production	
		92.12	Motion picture and video distribution	
		92.13	Motion picture projection	
9 & 10	Music and the Visual & Performing Arts	22.14	Publishing of sound recordings	
		22.31	Reproduction of sound recording	✓ (25%)
		92.31	Artistic and literary creation and interpretation	
		92.32	Operation of arts facilities	
		92.34	Other entertainment activities not elsewhere classified	✓ (50%)
		92.72	Other recreational activities not elsewhere classified	✓ (25%)
11	Publishing	22.11	Publishing of books	
		22.12	Publishing of newspapers	
		22.13	Publishing of journals and periodicals	
		22.15	Other publishing	✓ (50%)
		92.40	News agency activities	
8 & 12	Software, Computer Games & Electronic Publishing	22.33	Reproduction of computer media	✓ (25%)
		72.21	Publishing of software	
		72.22	Other software consultancy and supply	
13	Radio & TV	92.20	Radio and television activities	

Figure 3: The DCMS 13

Source: DCMS (2010)

4.1.2 Measuring the creative industries

The use of SIC codes as outlined in the table above to measure, for example, levels of employment within the creative industries is discussed further below, but it is important to note how interwoven are the issues of *what* is measured and the *availability* of data. As noted in Chapter Two, inclusion in the

creative industries grouping as shown in Figure 3 is indeed "partially dependant" on the availability of relevant data (OECD 2007: 41); a 'perfect' definition is irrelevant, after all, if there are no tools with which to measure its constituents. In terms of ascertaining the role of creative industries, though, what is implicit in this wrangling over definitional inclusion and the role of measurement is the increasing primacy within cultural policy given to the successful operation of markets, and the promotion of economic growth. Cultural policy articulates an alignment with vibrant and world-class *industries* in this arena, and there are relatively simple tools available which may allow us to understand whether an industry is successful or not, as compared to any attempts to capture the broader 'value' of culture (e.g. ESRC 2009) which is an inherently problematic, and ultimately political, process. For businesses, one can measure the profit being made, or the number of people employed, or the proliferation of operations as long as a delineating boundary has been drawn. Clearly, such measurements will only serve to measure 'success' from a particular perspective, but a broadly-accepted one nevertheless. The boundary-drawing exercises referred to above largely exist for the purpose of gathering these specifically economically-focused statistics. What will be argued below, however, is that the issue of *how* to adequately define the creative industries obscures a much more important issue: when the creative industries are bound upon any logical or sensible basis, then the claims that are made for their economic success do not stand up on the basis of the currently available data. Unless their boundary is stretched to include activities which can be deemed 'creative', regardless of whether they have the cultural, expressive content which, as established, is vital to any reasonable unification of creative industries, then all claims for the economic primacy of these industries are in danger of dissolving. This is not to say, however, that this thesis considers such industries to be unimportant; they are vital to modern society. It merely seeks to illuminate the fact that they may not necessarily represent an appropriate foundation upon which to base activity seeking to achieve 'regeneration' in some form, and it is the appropriateness of this relationship between creative industries and such projects of regeneration that will be examined further in the ensuing chapters.

4.1.2.1 Gathering statistics

Having arrived at a definition of what constitutes the creative industries with the 'DCMS 13' (to leave aside the issue of the appropriateness of this definition temporarily), we must also briefly consider the sources for the available statistics surrounding the creative industries and their economic performance. To begin with, we should bear in mind the stark warning from KEA European Affairs:

> Statistical tools do not enable the cultural & creative sector to be captured properly. At European and national level, statistical categorisations are often too broad. Data are rarely comparable. A considerable amount of cultural activity takes place in establishments whose

primary classification is non cultural and therefore not recorded within existing classifications. Self-employed cannot be identified. (2006: 4)

Were the issues around definition set out above resolved, therefore, the task of *how* to gather data relating to this sector would still remain. Once again, the OECD workshop on the international measurement of culture helps to set out some of the key points here, identifying how cultural activity may be located in businesses which are not themselves 'cultural', and which therefore may be missed out in simple statistical measures of the number of specifically creative industries (2007: 18). A business may have, for instance, a design department or a library but if its main designation under statistical classification is in a radically different area this creative or cultural activity may be 'invisible'. This approach of measuring 'creative' employment both within and without the 'creative industries' is the basis of the 'creative trident' approach developed by Higgs *et al.* (2008) in an attempt to move "beyond the creative industries" to a broader understanding of creativity. Current statistics collated by DCMS do attempt to capture 'creative employment' outside the creative industries themselves, but it is the core industries that form the heart of data-gathering, and it is arguable that this is appropriate to some degree. For the most part, policy discourse around the creative sector is still to some degree attached to the idea of a discrete, separate creative sector that is outperforming other discrete industrial sectors, rather than to the notion which is preferred by some of an amorphous, generalised notion of creativity gradually permeating throughout the economy, and so it is appropriate to focus our attention to data gathered relating to the relative economic position of these specific industries, rather than to seek out 'creativity' in every quarter and try to measure its influence. Also, even if the more broad approach to creativity were our major concern, measurement on such a holistic basis is only partially feasible due to problems with data sources and methodologies, particularly within the UK. Higgs *et al.* characterise the UK as having "significant limitations" (2008: 7) when it comes to gathering data to appropriately measure the creative sector, but it must also be noted that improvements have been made, and continue to be made, in attempts to gather evidence on the nature of this sector. How, then, is such data gathered?

4.1.2.2 The data: SIC Codes, SOC codes, the ABI and the LFS

As can be seen from the table of the 'DCMS 13' in Figure 3, measurement of the number of businesses within different creative industry subsectors is largely achieved via data based on a set of SIC codes, yet there are certain areas where no code is available to represent a given subsector, and many areas where the SIC code available is too broad to map directly to the relevant area. This problem arises due to SIC codes being essentially outdated, a problem exacerbated by the creative sector being especially changeable and volatile (DCMS 2007: 2). There has been a slight improvement with the newly

designated SIC2007 which was the result of a series of consultations started in 2002, carried out in concert with a major revision of the EU's industrial classification system (ONS 2009: 2), and data resulting from this reclassification first became available during 2009. Clearly, though, with any re-assessment taking the best part of a decade, there is currently little scope for such codes to be changed in a timely fashion to reflect broad changes in the economy. The OECD gives some idea of the scale of this problem regarding the appropriateness of available codes, noting that "a European Commission Leadership Group, working on a somewhat restricted definition of culture, listed 57 industry classes it considered to be culture related. Of this list, only *five* were considered to be *entirely* cultural" (2007: 64, emphasis added).

Indeed, the international OECD survey of those responsible for statistical information around the cultural sector found that "responses tend to confirm that countries find existing classifications not fit for purpose when applied to the culture sector" and that "the culture sector is not well reflected in most existing general purpose classification standards" (2006: 2), adding that,

> All of these classifications underwent a significant revision process during the late 1980s and early 1990s. It was hoped at the time that the revisions would lead to a greater concordance among the various standards; in the areas relevant to culture, the success of this process was particularly limited. (2007: 11)

In effect, this means that, even though the SIC codes are perhaps one of the most useful tools to build statistical information in this area, even one of the most recent and influential reports to assess the state of the Creative Industries in the UK, the Work Foundation's 'Staying Ahead' report, admits of the figures it bases its arguments on that,

> The standard industrial classifications for official statistics do not accurately reflect the structure of the creative industries and as such it is difficult to capture the full extent of activity. Due to these constraints the figures should be considered as *best estimates* rather than *definitive valuations*. (2007: 194, emphasis added)

As the headline figures quoted at the outset of this chapter make clear, however, these caveats can easily get lost when it comes to making the case for the success of the creative industries. This is perhaps unsurprising given that policy documents in this area follow a well-established pattern of presenting these headline figures of exceptional success in the opening pages of their executive summaries, and caveats such as those above in the closing pages of their appendices.

Although the gathering of appropriate data to attain an accurate sense of the relative makeup of the sector thus has many attendant difficulties, it should be noted that even where creative industries do not have their own discrete SIC code, they do at least have some place to sit, and we can therefore place some measure of confidence in this estimated data. Whilst it was accurately noted above that certain activities cannot be easily captured, such as smaller businesses involving self-employment, data sources rely on VAT and PAYE records; currently (as of mid-2010), VAT registration is compulsory for any business with an annual *turnover* in excess of £68,000 (and voluntary for those with a lower turnover), and PAYE registration is dependent on many factors, including a business having at least one employee earning in excess of £97 per week. Whilst very small businesses and self-employment will not be captured by such records, it is likely that in consideration of overall economic output we can be confident that a large segment of the economic operations of the creative industries will be captured in such data, although it must be borne in mind that there is a,

> Lack of data on self-employment and Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) – the ABI does not include data on self-employment (an important category in many parts of the Cultural Sector), and only uses a limited sampling of SMEs. Given that there is a well-documented preponderance of SMEs in the Cultural Sector – compared with the economy as a whole – the accuracy of the survey data is compromised. (DCMS 2004b: 6, emphasis added)

The main sources of information recommended by the DCMS Evidence Toolkit are the Annual Business Inquiry and the Labour Force Survey. The ABI gives nationwide data down to 4-digit SIC code level and this data comes from a sampling of the IDBR, a list maintained by the Office of National Statistics of UK businesses, covering all parts of the economy. The ONS states that "the coverage on the IDBR, which is one of its main strengths, represent[s] nearly 99 per cent of UK economic activity" (2010). It not only covers VAT registered businesses and businesses with employees registered for PAYE as noted above, but also includes data from surveys sent to over a quarter of a million businesses. Data on employment types outside of employment within specific industries is also available via the use of Standard Occupational Codes (SOC) gathered from the Labour Force Survey. As it is not based on companies, the LFS can capture less conventional employment patterns, as well as self-employment and smaller enterprises, although again there are reservations about the ability of such data to cover the entirety of creative work (DCMS 2004b: 34). There is, however, reason to have at least some measure of confidence that statistics regarding the creative industries do have some use and can provide a reasonably informed view, especially of their position in the economy, despite their clear limitations.

4.1.3 Creative Industries Economic Estimates

Utilising these sources, the most comprehensive and current collection of data on the state of the creative industries arising from the definitions considered above are the DCMS 'Creative Industries Economic Estimates' (CIEE) – an annual publication arising out of the Creative Economy Programme, updating the historical data on the economic position of the creative industries, and most recently updated at the start of 2010. This update is the source of the data considered below. Whereas at the start of the New Labour project in 1998, a statement claiming that creative industries "are where the wealth and the jobs of the future are going to be generated from" (Smith 1998: 31) could only be taken on faith, a decade on it is possible to look back over the evidence in hand to ascertain as to whether this was an appropriate stance, whether the narrative of a new economic order can be seen to have any basis in the available evidence, and also whether the persistence of such a discourse as presented in Chapter One relates to the evidence which has been gathered.

First, then, let us consider the oft-cited headline figures for employment and economic growth, and the outperformance of the creative industries. Using data from the 2010 CIEE, Figure 4 shows the performance of the creative industries relative to the UK as a whole.

Figure 4: Creative industries vs. total UK GVA[11] growth (proportion of 1997 levels)

Source: DCMS CIEE (2010)

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11. Gross Value Added: "GVA measures the contribution to the economy of each individual producer, industry or sector in the United Kingdom" (ONS 2009).

Here it is clear to see that the creative industries have consistently outperformed the overall UK economy, and whilst at 2007 the total UK GVA figure was just over 60% higher than its 1997 level, the creative industries GVA had more than doubled during this period, with broadly consistent growth and with the creative industries representing around 5% of total UK GVA; slightly lower than, but broadly in line with, the figures quoted at the outset of this chapter. Figure 5 considers the issue of employment growth over the same period.

Figure 5: Creative industries vs. total GB employment growth (proportion of 1997 levels)
Source: DCMS CIEE (2010)

Again, the outperformance of the creative industries is clear to see, the solid line above representing a move from employing 1.5 million people to almost 2 million, representing around 7% of total employment, again broadly in line with the figures quoted earlier. Despite the fact that the data sources and methodologies in use are far from perfect, they do present us with a broadly accurate picture of the state of the economy. It may reasonably be asked whether we can therefore be confident that these headline figures establish that the creative industries have in fact turned out to be the high-growth, new economic force to be reckoned with in the post-industrial marketplace, and thus whether cities seeking some form of regeneration would be wise to attempt to promote their growth. To answer this question, the issues of definition and measurement considered thus far in the chapter must be brought to bear. Knowing how this data is gathered, and what data has been sought, do the solid lines above representing 'creative industries' really tell us what they seem to, and support the prevailing cultural policy discourse?

4.1.4 The software[12] elephant

The consideration of this data takes us back to an issue first raised in Chapter Two, and noted above. Whilst the cultural content of the majority of software production is debatable, it can reasonably understood as an act of 'creation', but only as can many activities well outside the remit of the creative industries. If 'creative' is to be considered here in the sense of definition 1a from the OED, "pertaining to creation; originative", then the creative industries would swallow up huge swathes of the economy. What has been demonstrated as being key to the notion of 'creative industries' terminology up to now, however, is the notion of cultural, artistic commodities and the utilisation of expressive, meaningful content to create intellectual property, activity closer to OED definition 1b of the term creative: "Spec. of literature and art, thus also of a writer or artist: inventive". As this definition is being made by the government department responsible for culture and media, this is perhaps not surprising. A shift to terminology of 'creativity' away from 'culture', however, has given policymakers the ability to classify a less obvious industry, namely that of software, as being a member of the overall macro category. Hesmondhalgh's analysis of the appropriateness of the inclusion of 'software' is stark:

> Developing [...] software is a very different activity from the artistic-expressive (or journalistic-informational) pursuits evoked by the term 'creative industries'. It is this artistic-expressive element – the aura of the 'artist' – that is in large part the source of the sexiness of the concept for politicians and other policymakers. (2007: 179)

The most significant activity which falls under this new banner of creative industries, however, is this very category of 'software'. In the sense set out above, the expressive *cultural* content of the majority of software production is low. The programming of a computerised database system, for example, can reasonably be understood as an act of *creation*, of course, but not in any sense relating to literature or the arts. So, why the inclusion of software and not any other groups that involve more broadly 'creative' activity? Garnham argues that 'creative' as used in this context is,

> A shorthand reference to the information society [...] an attempt by the cultural sector and the cultural policy community to share in its relations with the government, and in policy presentation in the media, the unquestioned prestige that now attaches to the information society and to any policy that supposedly favours its development. (2005a: 20)

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12. In the ensuing discussion, 'software' is used as shorthand for the DCMS data category '8/12': "Software, Computer Games & Electronic Publishing". The reasons why 'software' is considered to be a broadly accurate and appropriate label for this grouping are discussed in the text.

This shorthand enables policy to attach itself to the "sexiness" of culture and a supposedly new economic order, and also to utilise the statistics relating to software development to make the economic case for the primacy of this new industrial grouping. Yet such a shorthand also involves crossing a definitional rubicon and undermining the unifying logic of the concept of the creative industries. This dubious inclusion of software is of such vital importance as it heavily affects, indeed dominates, the 'evidence base' which is presented as proof of the potential for the creative industries sector as a whole (Ross 2007: 20), and by which the creative industries come to be seen as particularly valuable. Software thus becomes something of an 'elephant in the room' when it comes to the value associated with the creative industries – domineering to a great degree yet strangely unacknowledged. Whilst figure 4 above showed the relative performance of the creative industries in terms of GVA, figure 6 below shows the proportion of creative industries GVA attributable to software:

Figure 6: Proportion of creative industries GVA attributable to DCMS group '8/12'
Source: DCMS CIEE (2010)

Not only is this category dominant, but it represents an increasingly dominant proportion of total creative industries GVA. As it is with GVA so it is, to a lesser extent, with levels of employment, as Figure 7 shows. This inclusion of software may have a sense of legitimacy were the creative industries concept found to have some parallels in the organisation or practices of the businesses grouped, yet there seems to be little evidence for this. Hartley notes that the creative industries are, "so varied in scale, organization and sector of economic activity that they are barely recognizable as a coherent object of analysis" (2005: 23).

Figure 7: Proportion of creative industries employment attributable to DCMS group '8/12'

Source: DCMS CIEE (2010)

Following the shift in terminology to creativity, the constituent parts of this newly imagined sector can no longer be wholly unified by their common 'cultural' content, but nor can they be united under any sense of 'creativity', (other than the expressive, arts-focused meaning outlined above which does not apply to software), which is not so nebulous as to become meaningless. This apparent lack of a coherent object for study, however, is implied by some to be a problem of using outdated, 'traditional' approaches to understanding industry and the economy. Hartley (2005) argues that those working within the creative industries do not form any alliances within their sector, or form any kind of identity related to their inclusion in this grouping. Remarkably, though, this is not seen as problematic, but rather simply as a sign that this *new* sector must be approached in a *new* way. If these industries are not found to have any commonality in their practices this is because they are being looked for in the wrong way; an *old* way, which does not take account of their newness. Such an argument is logically untenable, and brings to mind nothing so much as the newness of the proverbial Emperor's clothes.

Whilst the development and encroachment of information technology and software into ever more areas of human existence has indeed been transformational within living memory, there is no reason to align this development particularly to a group of industries based on artistic, cultural expression, nor for statistics to be based upon a position whereby *all* activity relating to software is considered to be expressively creative. As can be seen from the DCMS table in Figure 3, and from the discussion above, certain SIC codes are seen as only partially representative of the creative industries, and therefore scaling factors are applied to these codes when relevant data is collected so as to more accurately represent the creative sector. For the 'Software, Computer Games and Electronic Publishing' sector, however, SIC codes representing large swathes of employment and GVA are taken at 100%, and are therefore seen as being totally representative of the creative industries. The constituent parts of DCMS

group 8/12 are given by three separate SIC codes. Their constituent parts and the proportion taken for data gathering are given below:

22.33 Reproduction of computer media (25%)

This class includes: reproduction from master copies of software and data on discs and tapes

72.21 Publishing of software (100%)

This class includes: development, production, supply and documentation of ready-made (non-customised) software

72.22 Other software consultancy and supply (100%)

This class includes:

- analysis, design and programming of systems ready to use:
- analysis of the user's needs and problems, consultancy on the best solution
- development, production, supply and documentation of made-to-order software based on orders from specific users
- writing of programs following directives of the user
- web page design

(HMSO 2002)

Data relating to these codes for 2008 presented in Figure 8 shows that the vast majority of employment is provided by industries within the final code of 72.22:

Figure 8: Relative 2008 employment : SIC codes relating to software

Source: ABI

Although the 2003 SIC codes do not enable computer games to be separated out, we can see that the 'electronic publishing' component of DCMS category 8/12 'Software, Computer Games and Electronic Publishing' is a negligible proportion of this grouping, and thus it is not unreasonable to refer to this group as 'software' as has been done throughout this chapter. Also, data for the new 2007 SIC codes discussed above which map to these codes, does allow us to refine this picture somewhat, as Figure 9 shows.

Figure 9: Relative 2008 employment : SIC07 codes mapping to SIC03 codes for software
Source: ABI

The picture is very similar: 18.20 represents 'reproduction of recorded media', part of which is computer media which, again, is negligible; 58.21 is a new code for 'publishing of computer games' both online and offline, which is barely visible in the figure above; 58.29 represents 'other software publishing' i.e. *not* computer games, which forms a similar slice to 72.21 in Figure 8 above; and 72.22 now maps to three separate codes:

> **62.01 : 'Computer programming activities'**
> This class includes:
> Analysis, design and programming of systems ready to use:
> - development, production, supply and documentation of made-to-order software based on orders from specific users
> - writing of programs following directives of the user
> - web page design
> Designing of structure and content of database

62.02: 'Information technology consultancy activities'

This class includes:

Analysis, design and programming of systems ready to use:

- analysis of the user's needs and problems, consultancy on the best solution

62.09 'Other information technology and computer service activities' including software installation services.

(ONS 2009)

The majority of these activities have very little to do with the expressive value or cultural forms discussed in the section of this chapter involving the appropriate definition of the sector. Let us consider, then, the quotation from Hesmondhalgh noted at the outset of this chapter in which he states that the software subcategory "was included in order to bolster figures and provide a more powerful alliance around the 'creative industries' banner" (2007: 179). White (2009: 339) reflects that there is "probably an element of truth" in this assertion, noting the dominance of software within DCMS data. The figures above, however, show much more than a 'bolstering' of the figures, and certainly more than an 'element' of truth in Hesmondhalgh's assertion. What, then, happens to the headline figures presented in figures 4 and 5 if this category of software is removed?

If software is separated out from the overall CIEE figures a very different picture of the remaining creative industries sectors emerges in terms of GVA:

Figure 10: Software vs. the other creative industries - GVA

Source: ABI/ONS

The same pattern also emerges in terms of employment:

Figure 11: Software vs. the other creative industries - Employment

Source: ABI/ONS

As presumably needs little explanation from the above figures, when data on software is removed from the overall creative industries picture, the other industries, and that is to say the predominantly culture-based industries, can make no significant claims to economic outperformance, and have generally been performing no better or worse than the economy as a whole. This would be no shameful position for these industries to find themselves in, were it not for their assumed position at the vanguard of a new high-growth economic order or their alignment with economic regeneration.

4.2 Creativity at the heart of a new economy?

From the analysis above, it is only reasonable to agree with Garnham that whatever levels of growth there have been within the wider economy as a result of any form of emergent 'new' economy "stem *not* from what we normally think of as media and culture [...] but from business information services" (2005a: 22, emphasis added). It therefore seems especially prudent to bear in mind Foord's warning of the tendency in cultural policy of "to unthinkingly associate cultural and creative enterprises with a generic new knowledge economy" (2008: 91). The *overall* pattern which these statistics present regarding the growth and size of the creative industries (i.e. those of figures 4 and 5 above) is often presented without disclaimer, however, or with any caveats brushed aside, and so the reification of the notion of a high-growth 'creative economy' especially related to cultural activity continues; an object called 'the creative industries' is discussed as a clearly bound entity that behaves in a specific way, and once the idea of this being a high-growth sector occurs, it spreads, meme-like, throughout discourse.

Consider once again, for instance, the position of Arts Council England together with a myriad of other cultural organisations as given in 2010, quoted at the start of this chapter, which leverages the GVA growth of the creative industries to argue for support of funding of the arts and heritage, positing an intimate relationship between the two. Whilst it is true the only logical factor grouping the majority of creative industries is their cultural content, the economically significant statistics quoted are not reflective of such a grouping. Facetious though the question may sound, leveraging in the economic performance of the 'creative industries' to argue for the support of arts-related public bodies can only lead us to ask whether government funding of the arts will plausibly result in high rates of employment in software consultancy. The following chapters will show, however, that in the discourse around the creative industries and cultural policy, and the role programmes such as the ECoC can play in promoting creative industries activity, arguments akin to this are made.

Often, however, analysis such as that presented in this chapter is considered to be almost irrelevant. Whether the creative industries actually are one of the fastest growing industry sectors or should be considered central to economic growth seems to be of little interest, they simply *are* 'important' - the discourse gains its own momentum and analysis follows in its wake. Henry, for example, concludes that "the economic value of the creative industries cannot be ignored" (2007: 199), a conclusion which is based on the citation of a number of national statistics on the value of the creative industries as collated in the 'Staying Ahead' report. As noted above, though, it is certain at least in the UK case that these statistics must be considered problematic at best. From the Creative Economy Programme instigated by the DCMS (2007) certain trends become clear: in terms of total business turnover, the biggest part of the 'success' of the creative industries can be attributed to i) an extremely small number of businesses (0.1% of businesses accounting for 50% of turnover in the sector), ii) to multinational businesses (representing 1% of businesses but almost 30% of turnover), and iii) to businesses involved in software (around 40% of total sector turnover). Whilst policy rhetoric around creative industries continues to talk-up its enviable growth rate and economic contribution, it is noticeably coy about attributing the major part of this success to multinationals and the provision of business information systems, instead placing its focus on instances of individual arts-based creativity. What will be considered further in Chapter Six, then, is how (for example) the trans-national success of Siemens eventually translates into the provision of a number of apprenticeships at publicly-funded art galleries in Liverpool, and a focus on the creative power of individuals (DCMS *et al.* 2008: 8).

Even if the creative industries *are* experiencing growth, their centrality to a new economic order (providing we treat this concept in itself as unproblematic) and their enviable growth rate are both questionable, at least in terms of their 'creativity'. It could reasonably be assumed that if this sector really were at the vanguard of a new economic order as was claimed at the start of the New Labour administration then there would be some notable employment growth over a period of ten years but,

software aside, this seems not to be the case. Consider, however, some of the sectors of the economy where available evidence suggests employment *has* shifted, compared to the shaded sectors containing the creative industries shown in Figure 12:

	1998	2008	Change
221 : Publishing	0.7%	0.6%	-0.1%
223 : Reproduction of recorded media	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
722 : Software consultancy and supply	1.1%	1.6%	0.5%
742 : Architectural and engineering activities and related technical consultancy	1.4%	1.7%	0.2%
744 : Advertising	0.4%	0.3%	-0.1%
748 : Miscellaneous business activities not elsewhere classified	1.6%	2.1%	0.4%
921 : Motion picture and video activities	0.2%	0.2%	0.0%
922 : Radio and television activities	0.3%	0.3%	0.0%
923 : Other entertainment activities	0.4%	0.4%	0.0%
924 : News agency activities	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%
927 : Other recreational activities	0.5%	0.6%	0.1%
553 : Restaurants	2.3%	2.8%	0.5%
741 : Legal, accounting, book-keeping and auditing activities; tax consultancy; market research and public opinion polling; business and management consultancy; holdings	3.2%	4.3%	1.1%
745 : Labour recruitment and provision of personnel	3.0%	3.6%	0.6%
801 : Primary education	3.4%	4.6%	1.2%
851 : Human health activities	7.9%	8.6%	0.7%
853 : Social work activities	4.4%	5.1%	0.7%

Figure 12: Proportion of total employment attributable to different industrial groups 98-08

Source: ABI

In the shaded creative industries grouping at the top of Figure 12, we can see how there is a general pattern of no remarkable change, other than in the software consultancy grouping. For comparison, some of the most changeable sectors are given below this. Service-based industries such as restaurants and recruitment see impressive growth over this period, but there is little sign of a domineering policy discourse to suggest *these* industries are at the forefront of a changed economic order or should be at the forefront of city-regeneration agendas. As Garnham notes,

> The growth in demand for cognitive skills [...] has been outstripped by that of the demand for interpersonal skills [...] Such jobs have been central to our economies and societies for a long

time. Their growth is better captured by the classical analysis of the growth of a service economy [...] than by the newly minted 'information society'. (2000: 149)

If any lack of growth in the creative industries *is* acknowledged, it is in the context of the creative industries being somehow 'naturally' a high-growth sector, and so if they are not outperforming the rest of the economy, this is because some intervention to restore them to their 'natural' place is required; a corrective to 'market failure' (Creigh-Tyte and Stiven 2001: 173, NESTA 2007). The idea that the creative industries may have already found their 'natural' place in a market which is functioning correctly is seldom considered. In any case, it seems that political projects attempting to draw upon the success of the creative industries which intervene only in the cultural realm may find this success difficult to capture.

4.3 Conclusion

This chapter has shown how accounts of the creative industries as a particular source of value, as raised in previous chapters, are based in no small part on the deployment of statistics gathered as part of political projects to construct an 'evidence base' regarding these industries. It has shown how the question of what particular industries should be considered to be relevant to this project is one which is not easily answered, but that in any consideration of creative industries and creative economies there is always a clear focus upon expressive activity related to culture or creativity in the especially artistic senses of these terms. Whilst there are problems associated with gathering data relating to the creative industries as they come to be defined at a central government level, this chapter has shown how there is reason to have a degree of confidence that the available statistics are representative of the economic position of the creative industries to some extent. When this official 'evidence' is scrutinised, however, the case for a new era of capitalism with particularly cultural creative activity at its core seems to have been overstated, although due to the way this evidence is presented, this fact is easily glossed over.

The non-exceptional performance of the majority of the creative industries, however, raises real questions for their potential role as economic regenerators, and for the concept of an emergent new economy more broadly. As Henwood has it, "the alleged economic importance of the entertainment industries is a staple of both left and right discourse, with extravagant claims made about their rank in production and trade, but it's just not true" (2005: 28). By Henwood's analysis, the concept of the 'new economy' associated with such industries does not represent a truly different era of capitalist operations, but rather only the latest stage in the process of 'creative destruction' which Schumpeter identifies as the means by which capitalism, via innovation and constant churn, continues to survive (1934). Harvey summarises the nature of economic change in the recent past thus:

There has been a sea-change in cultural as well as in political-economic practices since around 1972 [...] But these changes, when set against the basic rules of capitalistic accumulation, appear more as shifts in surface appearance rather than as signs of the emergence of some entirely new postcapitalist or even postindustrial society. (1990: vii)

The emergence of new technologies and practices may have changed the shape of the playing field, but they have not changed the nature of the game. Whatever level of importance is placed upon these changes, however, it seems that we would be mistaken to identify them solely with an understanding of 'creativity' in the cultural sense which is the essential unifying characteristic of the majority of industries under consideration. Again, it is hard not to concur with Garnham that "the shift to creative industries has been [an] attempt to capture the current prestige [...] of innovation, and the very general concept of "creativity" that accompanies it, for a sector and a group of workers to whom it does not really apply" (2005a: 22).

This misapplication has occurred partly due to the difficulties of data collection, but mainly due to an indistinct application of the concept of 'creativity' in grouping industries together. To return to the idea of the 'cultural turn' discussed in Chapter Two, it seems as though the notion of a specifically culture-based group of industries being at central to the modern economy (Miller 2002: 172) is hard to square with the evidence discussed above, but this position is masked by the use of the obfuscatory language of 'creativity'. This imprecise language of creativity is employed without rigour, thus hiding conceptual, and practical, difference, a position made all the more problematic in that the story presented around creativity becomes such an attractive one via this obfuscation. Schlesinger, for example, notes the work of Elliott and Atkinson, who argue that Britain "is being deluded by 'top-notch exponents' of 'bullshit' about the significance of the creative industries. The size of the 'knowledge economy' has been inflated and hyped" (2007: 387).

From the picture presented in this chapter, therefore, we must be extremely cautious about policies which purports to bring about regeneration via the operation of creative industries which intervene solely in terms of culture and the arts; whilst there is a massive overlap between the two in terms of the activities they encompass, as revealed above there is also a crucial disjuncture to contend with. Despite this disjuncture, though, a clear relationship between cultural policy and creative industries success is often articulated. The ways in which this message is perpetuated will be considered in the next chapters, and Chapter Five will examine policy documentation relating to Liverpool's ECoC, and consider how this relates to a broader policy discourse. It will be argued that just as the definitional wrangling outlined above has not resulted in an application of a notion of creativity that is rigorous and coherent when it comes to the gathering of statistics, so the idea of creativity as utilised in policy can be prone to a similar obfuscatory incoherence.

Chapter Five – Culture-led Regeneration and Creativity

The preceding chapter established that a discourse of economic outperformance relating to the creative industries can be leveraged by the architects of cultural policy and by cultural organisations seeking to justify their operations and interventions. There is, however, a serious conceptual rift which this attempted alignment glosses over. In light of this, the current chapter seeks to return to the concept of catachresis which has been raised previously by considering the role set out for the creative industries within cultural policy documents, and the concepts which are leveraged to keep the creative industries aligned with the operations of this policy when they might otherwise be seen to diverge.

Particular attention is paid in this chapter to the case of Liverpool regarding the development of the city's policies surrounding the bidding for, staging of, and subsequent development from, the ECoC. It will be argued that what Van Heur terms "a blanket approach to creativity" (2010a: 13) which obscures the differences between creative industries subsectors, aligning this entire grouping with the cultural and artistic, can be seen to permeate the documents pertaining to the ECoC published by the Liverpool Culture Company (the body responsible for bidding for and subsequently staging Liverpool's ECoC), and within strategic documents published by Liverpool City Council and Liverpool First[13]. It will be argued that the positioning of culture and the creative industries within these documents in this manner is not merely a result of the difficulties regarding appropriate definition discussed in the previous chapter, but reflective of a broader discourse regarding the nature of creativity. This discursive structure forms the skeleton which serves to shape these documents, and forms the basis for positions taken regarding the appropriate role for culture in the context of 'regeneration'. This chapter therefore frames the Liverpool ECoC as but one tangible manifestation of a wider discursive project.

In particular, as noted previously, this chapter will concentrate on how the concepts and themes raised in Chapter Two, such as the 'creative class', the 'new economy' and an emphasis on the importance of entrepreneurship, exist as the "historical a priori" (Foucault 1970: 158) which shape policy as it relates to culture and to the creative industries, and serve as the "already said" (Foucault 1989: 27) which form discourse in this area, be it explicitly or implicitly. As well as identifying these recursive themes within policy discourse, this chapter seeks to critique their appropriateness, asking whether the "strategies that text production enters into" (Fairclough 1995: 127) in this case are ones which are reasonable or appropriate. It will be argued that, just as the usage of statistical evidence to bolster the case for supporting the creative industries has been found to be questionable on a number of bases, so it is that when the concepts which shape policy discourse are placed under a reasonable level of scrutiny they

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can be found to be fundamentally misapplied; or at least applied within a discursive frame that makes certain problematic assumptions regarding the nature of culture and creativity. This chapter makes the case that, just as the nature of economic and employment growth related to the creative industries is obscured by the usage of statistics to advocate for activity which these statistics do not represent, so when it comes to cultural policy is the relationship with creative industries an obscured and indistinct one; the creative industries seeming somehow to exist simultaneously at the heart of political arguments and yet also almost at the furthest orbit of the interventions of cultural policy. It will thus be posited that programmes such as the ECoC will have a limited impact upon creative industries unless the basis upon which they operationalize their understanding of 'creativity' is altered.

In examining the role of creativity, this chapter also examines the role given to the entrepreneur in policy, particularly with regard to the creative industries, and questions the manner in which this entrepreneurship is expected to be influenced by, and contribute to, the goals of regeneration. Material from the interviews carried out with those responsible for implementing policy is utilised below to provide some further context to the discussion of relevant policy documents, and also to provide a more complete understanding of the operations of policy in this area. As discussed previously, in order to maintain anonymity the interviewees involved in policymaking are referred to by pseudonym: in this chapter comments are quoted from Alison, Ben and Chris who are key figures related to cultural policy, the ECoC and the creative industries from within Liverpool City Council.

5.1 Cultural policy, the ECoC, and the creative industries

Looking at the history of cultural policy, Hesmondhalgh and Pratt note that

> If the rise of the cultural industries, and the responses of intellectuals to their expansion, helped to shape cultural policy, it did so as a ghostly absent presence. The cultural industries were the "other" against which cultural policy reacted, in the shape of arts subsidies, but also in the formation of public service broadcasting in some countries. (2005: 3)

Yet as part of the establishment of the DCMS at the start of the New Labour administration, four key aims are set out, one of which is "fostering the creative industries" (DCMS 1999: 8). At least on paper, therefore, this "ghostly absent presence" has been brought in from the cold and made flesh, and particularly made flesh in the form of the 'creative' rather than the 'cultural' industries partly via the process of definitional development outlined in Chapter Two. Indeed, Selwood describes this association with the creative industries as the new department's "most striking feature" (2009: 222). The relative appropriateness of a grouping so named, and containing the constituent subsectors shown

in Figure 3, being treated as an object which can be aligned with specifically *cultural* policy has been shown in Chapter Four to be problematic. It will be argued in this chapter that, due to this partially inappropriate marriage, the creative industries move from being a ghostly absence in policy to something of an indistinct blur; a now-you-see-them, now-you-don't presence within a cultural policy environment unable to resist the attraction of an association with a sector that is framed as outperforming the rest of the economy in an environment where economic justifications for policy intervention have gained primacy (Garnham 2001, McGuigan 2004). Simultaneously, however, the difficulty is raised of articulating how the relationship between the programmes instigated by cultural policy and this economic success operates, risking the emergence of a situation akin to that raised in the previous chapter where the usage of a common language of 'creativity' serves to obscure more than it reveals.

The position the creative industries are seen as occupying for cultural policy, and for programmes such as the ECoC, is thus the key consideration for this chapter. It will be shown how, whilst references may be made to beneficial outcomes for creative businesses or entrepreneurs in policy discourse, these factors seldom seem to find their way to the heart of cultural policy interventions despite the fact that, as McGuigan argues, nowadays "cultural practices are deemed worthy of public support because they are of *economic* value" (2004: 1, original emphasis). Rather, this discourse of economic value positions the over-achieving creative industries as an apparently natural outcome of all cultural policy intervention, via relationships which are always in some way unclear, or merely assumed. Cultural policy thus continues in many ways to operate on its traditional lines of intervention, attempting to promote artistic endeavour of the highest quality, and also attempting to promote wider engagement with the arts; the operation of the creative industries is aligned with this process largely by the blur of association between 'culture' and 'creativity', and the potential (but not obligatory) overlap between the meaning of these words noted previously. What helps to entrench this position is a situation whereby a system of regional competition leads to attempts to secure economic advantage particularly at the geographical level of the *city*, leading to the adoption of influential 'creative city' and 'creative class' agendas by a multiplicity of local administrations seeking competitive advantage. These concepts, especially Florida's 'creative class' thesis, show further evidence of the catachresis of 'creativity' and therefore any cultural policy based on these ideas may build on unstable foundations. The potential for provincial UK cities to piggyback on the success of the creative industries more broadly is also deeply questionable. The consideration of the case of the ECoC in Liverpool in 2008 provides an ideal opportunity to consider all of these issues.

5.1.1 Why become the ECoC?

It is clear that the process of 'culture-led regeneration' discussed in Chapter Two is the Liverpool Culture Company's desired outcome for staging the ECoC in Liverpool. One of a number of key documents produced by the Culture Company around the bidding process for the ECoC states that, "with its potential to drive both tourism and inward investment, as well as contribute to the enormous challenges of regenerating communities, culture is the chosen key tool in dealing with facing and embracing change" (2003a: 3). What, then, is the particular role that the ECoC is seen as being able to play in serving these ends? In his analysis across the range of documents produced by the differing cities which bid to secure the UK nomination for the 2008 ECoC title, Griffiths notes that,

> Perhaps the most notable feature of the bids [...] is the emphasis they all place on the relationship between culture and social cohesion. Each of them draws attention to the economic benefits that culture can bring to a city. Significantly, it is the economic importance of the cultural and creative industries that is played up, rather than that of tourism and visitors. (2006: 427)

This is not particular to the UK case; in a wide-ranging review of the history of the broader ECoC programme, Palmer-Rae find at the European level that "an expansion of creative industries" (2004: 103) is an oft-stated economic goal for ECoC cities. Whilst this focus on the creative industries may be true for the majority of bids, it would be overstating the case somewhat to say that Liverpool's bid has the creative industries at its very core, nor is the Liverpool bid reticent about the tourism benefits it expects should it be awarded the ECoC title (e.g. Liverpool Culture Company 2002: 601, 606). The narration of 'success' by the Culture Company after the ECoC year was completed was similarly content to highlight the related tourism increases of 2008 (e.g. Liverpool Culture Company 2009: 4, 18). Nevertheless, Liverpool's bidding document articulates that the award will, for example, make the city a "key destination" for "cultural, creative and tourism businesses" (Liverpool Culture Company 2002: 1004), that it will create "an attractive environment for cultural businesses and creative people" (2002: 301), and that it aims to engender "new products, innovations and businesses" (2002: 302) via a broader climate of creativity that will emerge from the practices around staging the year, which will result in "a sustainable culture of innovation, excellence and achievement in arts, sports, tourism and creative industries" (Liverpool Culture Company 2002: 303). In concert with its wider effects, the ECoC is posited as having a special creative impact upon creative industries, and in positioning the city positively in terms of 'creativity'. In the Culture Company's business plan there is discussion of the development of "Liverpool's position as a premier European destination for culture, tourism and investment with an emphasis on creativity as a key driver for the future" (2003b: 11). Here we can once

more identify the linkage of strong propositional assumptions regarding what is, or can be, the case with implicit value assumptions regarding the desirability of this current or future state of affairs.

Creativity is discussed throughout all related literature as a natural bedfellow of the cultural programme of the ECoC, and the tourism agenda is never seen as superseding a creative industries one; rather culture, tourism and creativity are positioned as all forming the interlocking parts of a larger whole in relation to the assumed benefits of the ECoC award. A key claim made of the potential for Liverpool's ECoC prior to 2008, for example, is a continued reference both at local and national level to the expected emergence of "14,000 jobs" in the city's "culture sector" (e.g. Liverpool Culture Company 2003c: 7, 2005: 35, DCMS 2004a: 13), this sector being defined as comprising "tourism, sports, heritage *and the creative industries*" (Liverpool Culture Company 2005a: 35, emphasis added). Indeed, Jones and Wilks-Heeg argue that "the rationale for Liverpool's bid is best captured" in the production of this narrative of an increase in employment in "the cultural and creative industries" (2004: 350). It is thus clear that, in concert with the trend Palmer-Rae (2004) find in other ECoC cities, Liverpool's ECoC is not simply aimed towards celebrating the cultural achievements of the city but also specifically at economic growth, especially within the grouping of 'creative industries'. It should perhaps be noted that in focussing on the more instrumental outcomes expected of the ECoC, rather than the particulars of the programme itself, this thesis can in some way be seen to echo the concerns of the cultural policy climate within Liverpool itself. O'Brien (2010b) explains in great detail how the process around bidding for the ECoC within the city did not emerge from a longstanding interest in cultural policy within local government, nor from an especially strong engagement with the local arts sector, but can perhaps be best understood in terms of the local administration within Liverpool embracing a dominant political position regarding the uses of cultural festivals. O'Brien positions Liverpool as using such interventions in a more instrumental fashion than can be seen to be the case in other, similar cities. O'Brien and Miles apportion this to the "ad hoc and reactive nature of political culture in Liverpool [...] based on the assumption that [cultural] policy is easily transferable from place to place" (2010: 11).

5.1.2 The Liverpool ECoC approach to culture

Given the discussion of Chapter Four, it is clear that a programme focussed upon cultural activity such as the ECoC may potentially only intervene in areas which are not directly related to the economic outperformance and exceptional employment growth associated with the creative industries idea as a whole. On the other hand, it has been noted in Chapter Three how the city of Liverpool has a longer history than most of being involved in the development of creative industries, and how the body responsible for this development locally, 'Merseyside ACME', was involved with drawing up the

ECoC bid. Does Liverpool's approach to operating the ECoC, then, give good reason to expect "new businesses" or thousands of new jobs within the creative industries to emerge from its programme? What is clear is that the main focus for the Liverpool bid, and for the programme of the eventual year itself, is overwhelmingly the funded arts infrastructure of the city, with the city's sporting strengths present as something of a cultural (in the broader sense) adjunct; the programme for the year is framed as having its basis in the "strengths of the current Liverpool cultural infrastructure which in terms of music, sports and the visual arts is, we believe, matchless" (Liverpool Culture Company 2002: 305). The list of organisations involved is very heavily weighted towards arts venues (Liverpool Culture Company 2002: 404-410), with a lesser number of sporting and educational organisations listed.

Regardless of broad-church statements such as those given at the opening of the Liverpool bid to the effect that this event is positioned as a "celebration of culture in all its aspects – not just of 'the arts'" (2002: 101), much as was found when querying what could be the most useful unifying characteristic when it comes to the grouping of the creative industries discussed in Chapter Four, it is clear that there *is*, in fact, a primacy on the arts and artistic expression in the ECoC programme, and particularly on the traditionally funded organisations which are usually the objects of cultural policy, rather than a broader category of creative industries. Of course, this is in no way inappropriate for a cultural festival. It must be noted, however, that this cultural activity is narrated as entailing an eventual rise in employment and an increase in the productive capacities of the city of Liverpool, both in directly cultural industries and in the wider creative sector. Whilst the power of artistic endeavour to draw in tourists is reasonably clear, the power of such endeavour to bolster local industrial capacity is perhaps less clear, and therefore the reasons such claims are made need to be investigated.

What should be noted at this stage, though, is the sense that the Liverpool ECoC is in any way focussed on creative or cultural production within the city is questionable. Rather, the notion of culture as discussed in ECoC-related literature is most often something external which the citizens of Liverpool can experience and incorporate into their lives; it is not necessarily something which comes from the population, but rather comes *to* them. A large part of the ECoC bidding process is, therefore, essentially a push towards the traditional 'engagement' strand of cultural policy. The appropriateness of this will be discussed further in Chapter Six. Even in a report around the 'Creative Communities' programme based on increasing *active* participation amongst "ordinary people" (Liverpool City Council 2005: 32), the language used shows this consumption-led approach. The programme can be considered successful: "by virtue of increased 'cultural consumption' by larger and more broad ranging local audience" (Liverpool City Council 2005: v).

This is not to say, however, that the people of the city are seen wholly as occupying the role of passive spectators to a year-long show put on by arts institutions consisting of celebrations of work from

outside the city, nor that there is no place whatsoever for production within the ECoC. Although

Chapter Four has severely questioned the economic role which we can expect the more cultural

subsectors of the creative industries to play, the operation of arts facilities, for example, is one activity

included in this overall 'creative industries' designation, and so this direct artistic activity is likely

related to some attendant benefits for the creative industries sector as a whole. Also, Liverpool's ECoC

bid states that "we will not be repeating the experience of Glasgow and elsewhere of buying in the

huge preponderance of 'cultural product' from beyond the city" (Liverpool Culture Company 2002:

305), but rather that the aim is to "show off" "indigenous capacity", and enable it to do more, partly by

making increased funding levels available. There is, therefore, a sense in which at least some of the

creative industries subsectors are assumed to have direct involvement in the operations of the ECoC,

essentially as clients of the Liverpool Culture Company, providing the arts for the populace, and for

spectators from beyond the city boundaries. This may be a fairly narrow way of utilising "creativity as

a key driver for the future", but it is at least a step in this direction, and the development of the ECoC

programme from 2003-2008 certainly involved much direct employment of certain creative

practitioners within the city. The centrality of local arts-related industries to the ECoC programme

may, however, be more questionable. Consider this response from interviewee Alison regarding the

2008 programme and local creative practitioners:

> There was criticism of, from some of the creative industries, of why should we have
> the big spider from Artichoke[14]? 'We could have done that ourselves.' That isn't what
> we were trying to do, we were trying to place ourselves on an international stage.
> And therefore we need international influence to get into Japan, America,
> Scandinavia, in terms of 'look at this, Liverpool can deliver'.

It seems here that the aim of 'showing off' "indigenous capacity" within the creative sector stated in

bidding documents ends up competing with a goal of showing off the capacity of the local city council

to carry out complex procurement procedures and bring internationally renowned work to the city.

Whilst inspiring confidence in the ability of the local administration to 'deliver' is clearly useful to the

ongoing success of a city, it is not necessarily useful to the creative industries locally which were

previously positioned as being particular beneficiaries of the ECoC programme. Regardless of who is

responsible for the work on show (although this will clearly have ramifications for the operation of at

least some local creative industries), the model presented by the ECoC is often more one of *delivery*

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14. 'La Princesse', commissioned by the London-based Artichoke Trust, and designed and built in France by 'La
Machine', cost the Liverpool Culture Company £1.5 million (BBC 2008a). The work involved a giant mechanical
spider which appeared at various points throughout Liverpool City Centre in September 2008; a 'highlight' of the
ECoC programme. The enormous puppets created by 'La Machine' have been commissioned internationally by a
variety of cities seeking the spectacular.

than of facilitation. The ECoC is broadly constituted as a salve to be applied to a troubled populace from without, and the interventions made as part of the ECoC programme are not ones which will *directly* result in making Liverpool a centre for creative activity *per se*; rather culture can be 'applied' to the city and its population, and the associated benefits will then gradually ripple out from this central intervention. As this model seems to present a rather oblique relationship between this intervention and its purported benefits, the logic behind such a relationship must be examined.

5.1.3 How the ECoC will benefit the locality

Although the main focus of Liverpool's ECoC bid is clearly on what some would see as a fairly traditional view of cultural activity, based heavily around the maintained arts sector, it is clear that there is also a place for the broader category of creative industries within the bid but, as noted, the relationship between these two elements is oblique. Two of the five long-term aims for the ECoC as quoted within Chapter Three, though, relate specifically to the creative industries. These are, firstly, "increasing access to education and learning which develops creativity and skills relevant to the knowledge economy and cultural businesses", clearly linking the ECoC intervention to the 'new economy' concept, and "creating an attractive environment for cultural businesses and creative people" (Liverpool Culture Company 2002: 301), which fits with the idea considered previously of entrepreneurship and business creation being linked to more cultural creativity. In both of these aims, there is a clear affinity with the logic of the 'creative class' thesis of Richard Florida first discussed in Chapter Two whereby those who are most likely to create new businesses, and have the levels of skill and resources to do so, are drawn to areas with a strong cultural infrastructure. This concept presents one pathway by which the ECoC could clearly be seen to have a positive influence upon the level of creative industry activity within the city.

Not only is there a good degree of conceptual overlap, however, but the creative class thesis is *explicitly* referenced by national policy documents relating to the role of culture-led regeneration around the time of Liverpool's nomination as the ECoC, and these documents echo the sentiments used in justification of the Liverpool bid. The highly influential DCMS document 'Culture At The Heart of Regeneration', in making the case for the role of culture in the regeneration of cities, argues that "cultural regeneration can bring economic benefits by providing employment and generating revenue. It also attracts people and businesses" (2004a: 5), and also makes reference to,

> Strong international advocacy of the importance of culture and creativity to economic and
> social growth. For example, Richard Florida in his acclaimed book, The Rise of the Creative

Class, argues that cities will only thrive if they are able to attract the new breed of creative, skilled people who want to live in places with high quality cultural facilities. (2004a: 8)

Indeed, Oakley notes that Florida's theories are now accepted, and accepted uncritically, by policymakers in many areas within the UK (2004: 70), and Foord points out that Florida has "had a major impact on creative enterprise policy" (2008: 97). One of the key props of the discursive structure on the value of culture-led regeneration is that cultural activity will act as a magnet for people who will proceed to set up skilled, creative businesses; the creative entrepreneurs who this research seeks to engage with, and who are discussed at length in Chapter Seven. Liverpool's tenure as ECoC, for example, is framed as being able to facilitate regeneration in the city by "exploiting its creativity and developing its talent for innovation" (Liverpool Culture Company 2002: 1101), thereby positioning the city as a key destination for creative businesses (Liverpool Culture Company 2002: 1004). Culture is presented by policy as being able to attract the creative class by making a city into "a more desirable place to live and work, and, subsequently, for businesses to invest" (DCMS 2004a: 37). Clearly, cultural interventions and business activity are assumed here to be intimately linked. The problem with this concept, however, is that it involves a usage of the term 'creative' which is just as problematic as that considered in Chapter Four's discussion of defining boundaries in order to gather statistical evidence, and once again the appropriateness of its alignment to cultural interventions is dubious. The characterisation of Florida's thesis by the DCMS as "a convincing argument" (2004a: 40) is thus extremely questionable, as are the nature of the outcomes which may emerge from policies influenced by this thesis. The nature of Florida's argument must therefore be examined.

5.1.3.1 The creative class thesis

As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, whilst the *actual* usage of the term is perhaps endemically prone to movement and slippage, there is clearly a sense in which the term 'creative' as used in the 'creative industries' most appropriately refers to expressive, arts-related activity, as this is the mode of activity which serves to unite the majority of the industries which end up coming under such a designation however it is utilised. What 'creative' means when it comes to the 'creative class', however, is more difficult to ascertain, and as such, we should be extremely cautious about the appropriateness of a policy discourse which seeks to align the process of culture-led regeneration to such a notion of creativity. Whilst strident and convincing critiques of the work of Florida have been made, most notably by Peck (2005), and most recently by McGuigan (2009), the continuing influence of this work requires us to consider the means by which this influence is sustained. Here it will be argued that within the work of Florida, and therefore within the policy discourse which references his ideas, there is a deliberate obfuscation whereby the 'creative class' are spoken of *as though* they represented

such expressive, artistic practitioners, and that this purposive lack of clarity affects the way in which this thesis becomes adopted at a policy level. Essentially, there seems to be little tangible reason why particularly cultural interventions such as the ECoC should be associated with the arrival of a successful 'creative class' or why this creative class should be associated with the operation of creative industries, yet these elements seem to be consistently aligned as though indivisible. In examining the nature of the relationship between creative industries and programmes such as the ECoC, it is thus important to examine how this alignment continues. It will be argued that even though the main arguments of the creative class thesis attempt to link all of these elements together into a cohesive, related whole, a close reading reveals little basis upon which to found such a linkage, and so it can be argued that this alignment represents another example of the catachresis of 'creativity'. Such catachresis amplifies the power and reach of discourse, serving to, as Jäger and Maier have it, "bridge contradictions and increase plausibility" (2009: 48).

As membership of the creative class is allocated by Florida on the basis of occupation and economic status, it may be assumed that the creative class would be made up primarily of those working in occupations within the creative industries. Indeed, from the markers Florida uses to evoke the milieu of the creative class, one would assume that a similar area of arts-related production, and engagement with a culturally expressive form of activity, is what is under discussion. Florida alludes to "the Left Bank in Paris or New York's Greenwich Village" (2004: 15) as suitable environments for the members of the creative class, and argues that this class must be supported due to the benefits to society engendered by typical creative class members such as "Steve Jobs, Jimi Hendrix, Gertrude Stein, Paul Allen, Billie Holiday or Andy Warhol" (2004: xiv). This amalgamation of an artistically cultural setting, with some ICT development activity at its margins, seems to map almost exactly to the eventual manifestation of the 'creative industries' considered in Chapter Four, and to share in what Hesmondhalgh refers to as the "sexiness" of the notion of artistic creativity (2007: 179); the type of creativity leveraged most strongly by cultural policy, and that at the heart of the ECoC programme. Indeed, Potts and Cunningham indicate that Florida's creative class theory represents a broader-than-usual mapping of the creative industries, but a mapping of these industries nevertheless (2008: 243). The creativity which Florida is discussing, however, has a fundamentally different object than that used in any conception of the creative industries considered thus far, as it based on the "the idea that *every human being is creative*" which Florida characterises as the "single most important" element of his thesis (2005: 3, original emphasis).

As a result of this conviction, Florida believes it is vital for economic and social well-being to enable every human being to use this innate creativity and so to become a member of the emergent, and successful, creative class. Whilst the growth of the creative class would therefore be of clear interest to those seeking 'regeneration', it may be thought that any policy which sought to engender the

promotion of creativity on such a broad basis would necessarily be different in character to one specifically geared towards the promotion or attraction of the creative industries, or of arts organisations, unless all the divergent possible meanings of the term 'creativity' were considered to be in some sense related due to their co-labelling. It is clear, for example, that the creativity of the 'creative class' category is predicated not so much on a discrete set of industries as much as a mode of behaviour, and a mode of behaviour that reaches much farther than would a specifically artistic or expressive interpretation of 'creativity'. Again, the issue of drawing boundaries for the purpose of gathering statistical evidence becomes relevant here. That creativity within the concept of the creative class goes far beyond the broadly culture-based definition which is mostly alluded to when it is discussed can be seen in the fact that the 'outer layer' of the creative class – the "creative professionals" – as defined by Florida for the purposes of gathering data comprises "management occupations, business and financial operations occupations, legal occupations, healthcare practitioners and technical occupations, [and] high-end sales and management" (2004: 328). This definition clearly extends far beyond the limits of the creative industries, and it is difficult to grasp the extent to which the term "creative professionals" enables us to understand this grouping of occupations further than the simpler term 'professionals' would; as McGuigan puts it, "the Creative Class, then, is largely what would otherwise be called routinely 'the professional-managerial class'" (2009: 293).

Even within the more focussed 'inner layer' of the creative class – the so-called "Super-Creative Core" – there is the inclusion of those working in "computer and mathematical occupations" and "education, training and library occupations". Much as was found in the in-depth examination of statistics relating to the creative industries' economic performance, this, clearly, is explicitly *not* a definition of creativity centred solely on artistic or expressive values, and we may therefore be inclined to scepticism regarding policy interventions which express the perceived outcomes of culturally 'creative' activity in terms of the attraction of a 'creative class' on these terms. Florida suggests, after all, that the main element of creativity within the creative class is that members are financially compensated for occupations which require them to "think on their own" (2004: 69). The meaning of 'creative' here is clearly close to the sense of definition 1a from the OED mentioned previously, "pertaining to creation; originative", rather than any meaning relating to the arts or culture. From a Floridian perspective, though, the creativity of the creative class, the creativity involved in processes of entrepreneurship, and the creativity of a programme such as the ECoC are, in fact, all intimately associated with each other, and therefore it is not unreasonable to expect all these factors to be inter-related, and we would be justified in articulating a relationship between creative industries and a programme such as the ECoC in the way the Liverpool Culture Company does as considered above.

5.1.4 The unity of creativity

Such a unified conception of creativity has important ramifications for a policy discourse that sees cultural interventions as the driver for increased levels of 'creative businesses', and that sees culture as providing primarily economic regenerative benefits. Liverpool City Council's 'Capital of Culture Economic Impacts Study' into the benefits the ECoC is expected to bring states, for example, that the award "re-affirms that Liverpool is a City that places culture, the creative industries and tourism at the heart of its regeneration project" (Liverpool Culture Company 2003c: 7). Just as the diverse and contentious membership of the 'creative industries' grouping is concealed within such statements as these, so by the approach of Florida are all members of the creative class aligned with an artistic, cultural approach to creativity, despite in the most part being made up of those working within explicitly non-cultural occupations. The notion of the 'creative class', however, *subsumes* the cultural definition of creativity within a much broader idea akin to 'independent thinking'; as Pratt notes, "the creative class debate is not about the cultural industries or cultural production" (2008: 111). Yet the notion of creativity is discussed in Florida's work as though the *major* object under discussion was this specifically cultural activity, and so wherever this work is influential, this sleight-of-hand may give rise to a potentially misdirected set of policies.

The basic problem in sustaining the belief set out above regarding the regenerative potential of the ECoC and similar interventions, in that 'applying' culture to the city will result in a 'rippling out' of influence from an artistic centre, and so providing greater resources to artistic institutions, for example, will increase the level of activity within creative industries, or that these will be at the "heart of regeneration", is that, at its core, the creative class thesis which influences such positions requires one to believe in a group unity whereby financiers and musicians, for example, have vital unifying characteristics. Florida argues that all forms of activity which can be labelled 'creative', be they artistic, technological or economic "share a common thought process, they reinforce each other through cross-fertilization and mutual stimulation" (2004: 33). We are, however, given no evidence by Florida upon which to base this belief. More importantly, once conceived of as a homogeneous group, the creative class is imagined as having a certain set of cultural (in every sense of the word) predilections, the support of which has certain ramifications. So, despite apparently encompassing a third of the total population and making up the "new mainstream", Florida makes the claim first considered in Chapter Two that,

> All members of the Creative Class [...] share a common creative ethos that values creativity, individuality, difference and merit. For the members of the Creative Class, every aspect and *every manifestation of creativity* – technological, cultural and economic – *is interlinked and inseparable*. (2004: 8, emphasis added)

The members of the creative class therefore not only approach their work in a similar, 'creative', way, but also *every other* aspect of their life outside of their occupational role, and operate according to a unified set of tastes and practices. From a cursory knowledge of their biographies, this would be an unsustainable position solely for the six high-profile supposed members of the creative class singled out by Florida above, not to mention the millions which apparently constitute its full membership, yet Florida contends that a group of this size has, for example, as one of their unified characteristics "the desire to be "always on", and make life a broad-ranging quest for experience" (2004: 195). The basis for these claims is never made clear. Such claims of an "interlinked and inseparable" creativity, however, seem to provide the only route by which an intervention such as Liverpool's ECoC, focussed on the provision of a programme of arts activity, will serve to "generate new products, innovations and creative businesses" (Liverpool Culture Company 2002: 303), as is claimed. What *is* clear is that Florida sees 'creativity' as such an indivisible, unified entity. Whilst the importance of attracting outsiders to one's locale for economic prosperity has been the most influential impact of his writings, this concept of unification is arguably just as important; the process of linguistic association by which any policy around culture and the arts can radiate outwards to success in a multitude of 'creative' fields is one which persists throughout the first decade of the 21st century, and is present not only in Liverpool's ECoC bid towards the start of the decade but also in the emergent 'Cultural Strategy' created during 2008 as part of the continued push towards achieving culture-led regeneration.

5.1.4.1 Liverpool's Cultural Strategy

Just, then, as the role of a version of the creative class thesis seems implicit in Liverpool's justification for staging the ECoC, for example in references to the interest that "the city's private sector, its entrepreneurs and its creative industrialists" have in "[continued] investment in the cultural assets and life of Liverpool" (Liverpool Culture Company 2003d: 102), so too in the 'Liverpool Cultural Strategy' (LCS) (Liverpool First 2008) devised during 2008 to ensure the ECoC continued to provide an ongoing 'legacy' is there a yet more explicit invocation of these concepts. Again, there is a focus on 'culture' with an expected effect upon 'creativity', and thus an assumed overlap, or even equivalence, between these two ideas. Much as with the earlier bid for the ECoC, the arts infrastructure of Liverpool is concentrated upon in the LCS, and some dozen pages are given up to listing Liverpool's 'cultural assets and achievements', which are indeed impressive, especially when considered in the light of Liverpool's relative deprivation (see Chapter Three). The argument presented regarding these cultural assets being vital to the city's future prosperity fits directly into a Floridian conception of where value resides. The strategy, for example, contains statements to the effect that "our cultural assets and values must play a central role" for "our prospects as a city" (Liverpool First 2008: 4). Florida's conception of the arts as being but one manifestation of a broader unified creativity is useful here. If we believe that

all forms of creativity are interconnected, then so long as one is employed in a creative, i.e. professional, capacity, one will also seek an environment where there are creative, i.e. cultural, assets such as those which Liverpool can offer.

What makes any argument such as this problematic is the compelling evidence that, despite their over-representation in terms of cultural engagement, there are significant numbers of such professionals who have very little interest in such cultural matters (Wing Chan and Goldthorpe 2007, Bennett *et al.* 2009). The more questionable issue in terms of policy which aims to bring about 'regeneration', however, is that if "every manifestation of creativity" is indeed "interlinked and inseparable" as claimed by Florida, then *any* intervention which can be glossed with the sheen of being 'cultural' or 'creative' can be justified as representing part of a wider regenerative whole which will eventually result in the emergence or arrival of a group of workers and activities which will bring about economic prosperity. There is, however, no reasonable logical pathway for this particular train of thought; the efficacy of such an approach is therefore debatable, and the inter-relationship between cultural policy, creative industries and processes of entrepreneurship under scrutiny becomes further prone to question. As Böhm and Land neatly state regarding UK policy more broadly, "the assumption seems to be that 'creativity' is a transferable skill, and that developing the population's artistic creativity will deliver creativity and innovation in other sectors" (2009: 80). An assumption such as this seems to be the only explanation for a situation such as that delineated in the LCS whereby, for example, Liverpool's "creativity" results in "competitive advantage" through the "research and innovation of our universities", and this strength can be developed by "leadership [...] and vision from the city council *and the cultural sector*" (Liverpool First 2008: 13, emphasis added).

This sense of a unified form of creativity tracing a single orbit around the nucleus of the arts is not the only way in which the LCS builds upon the work of Florida. There are clear links in statements which assert "the links between the city's *creative core* and economic growth" (Liverpool First 2008: 17, emphasis added). From the context, though, it seems that the 'creative core' as discussed within the LCS is assumed to consist mainly of employees of the creative industries, rather than a wider group akin to those within Florida's 'super-creative core', again showing how susceptible the language of creativity is to the production of perennially unstable referents. Similarly, there is a clear evocation of the logic of Florida's thesis in the assertion that, "the range and diversiy [sic] of Liverpool's cultural offer [...] enhances quality of life, provides a powerful magnet to attract skilled, entrepreneurial people and drives a visitor economy which makes an increasing contribution to the local economy" (Liverpool First 2008: 7).

Yet whilst for Florida cultural creativity is but one branch of an overarching multipartite creativity, the implication of the logic in the LCS is that cultural creativity is at the *centre* of all these other forms of

creativity. Whilst a general climate of creativity could theoretically be engendered by support of the arts infrastructure within the city if one is supportive of the idea that all creativity is interconnected, and therefore that by supporting the arts infrastructure "creative responses" will manifest themselves in a whole variety of areas such as "health, community safety, economic growth, intercultural awareness, climate change" and so on (Liverpool First 2008: 14), it is this idea of all types of creativity being somehow connected that is perhaps the weakest part of Florida's thesis. Apart from multiple assertions that this is the case, the only real evidence given to support this idea is that members of a similar income bracket have similar predilections when it comes to leisure pursuits. To posit that the connection between all types of creativity can result in a situation where supporting the arts will help to tackle, for example, issues around social inclusion is therefore an imaginative leap with no reasonable foundation, especially given the clear role which culture can play in maintaining social divisions (Bourdieu 1986), and arguably a corruption of Florida's already precarious initial position, albeit one which is politically expedient. This can therefore be seen as another manifestation of the catachresis of creativity, whereby the language around creativity is used to align many novel elements with discussions previously set aside only for artistic matters. This alignment is apparently achieved by little more than the potential definitional overlap of the terms involved, and serves to gloss over the differences between these broader forms of creativity and an especially arts-focussed one.

5.1.5 The creative city

As well as the 'creativity' of the creative class thesis, there is a similar affinity between developments in Liverpool around the implementation of the ECoC and the creativity involved in the 'creative city' thesis associated with Landry. This thesis, much like the backdrop to the creative industries agenda, is based on a notion of fundamental transformation or implicit newness to the status of cities today, and the necessity for their responses to their conditions to be similarly new. The Liverpool Culture Company, for example, claim that as a city Liverpool is,

> Moving completely away from old-style city governance to a new model where creativity is at the core of innovative regeneration [...] Ours is a creative city agenda; a liberating agenda which empowers its citizens and stakeholders and helps unleash their creative potential. Planning and delivering the Capital of Culture programme is itself a challenge to creativity. (2005a: 6)

The ECoC and the "creative potential" of citizens are thus seen as playing important parts within a 'creative city', references to which abound in the documentation produced by the Liverpool Culture Company (e.g. 2002: 104, 2003b: 3, 2003c: 3, 2003d: 102). Much like the discussion above of how

'culture' is described as something that can be applied to the city from without rather than being an inherent capacity, however, so the same seems to be true of the use of 'creativity' in this case:

> There is also a need to use creativity to tackle and address issues such as social exclusion, the reconfiguration of neighbourhoods, environment, heritage and health. (Liverpool Culture Company 2005a: 21)

From the Culture Company's point of view, using 'creativity' for these ends is a reasonable response; after all, "creative activity is proven to build self-esteem" (2005b: 27), and therefore adding some creativity to the lives of the local population should prove beneficial all round, and also help the city itself to be creative more broadly, resulting in this "innovative regeneration". Again, this focus on the importance of the 'creative city' idea in Liverpool can be seen as a reflection of national cultural policy. Throsby notes how "the DCMS approach to the creative industries in the UK [...] has found application in identifying those cultural sectors that can contribute to the development of 'creative cities'" (2008b: 227).

Despite the removal of a conceptual boundary between all differing forms of creativity in Florida's work resulting in the emergence of a more unified, yet curiously loose, conception of 'creativity', it is clear in this work that there is still a premium value placed upon specifically artistic creativity; both in terms of its potential for entertainment, and in the attractive aura it elicits for members of the creative class (and for its theorists), even if this form of creativity does not necessarily have a noticeable presence in their work itself. In Landry's work on 'the creative city' which is being drawn upon here, however, the definition of 'creativity' opens out to become much more broad, and the concept moves expressly further from alignment to a specifically cultural usage, and thus yet further from being a plausible outcome of cultural policy interventions.

Notably, there is confusion regarding the nature of the relationships at play both within the work of Landry as well as within its subsequent adoption by the discourse of policy. Landry's theories are explicitly drawn upon in policy planning around the deployment of strategies *specifically* based around culture and related creativity such as the Liverpool ECoC (Gibson and Klocker 2005, Lee 2007). If the goals of Landry's 'creative city' are predicated on a *non*-cultural rendering of creativity, though, then these goals are unlikely to be achieved if interventions are made solely on a reading of 'creativity' which overlaps with the arts and culture. Landry himself is initially clear about this, stating that "many cities now use the brand 'creative city', usually when referring to their arts strategy. The creative city is not an arts strategy; instead it seeks to embed a culture of creativity everywhere in the city" (Landry 2003: 17). From such a reading, a programme like the ECoC which seeks to instigate a city-wide agenda

of creative success solely from a cultural, artistic programme risks limited success. What, then, should cities do to be appropriately creative?

In his earliest work defining 'the creative city', Landry takes what we have seen to be a somewhat common line regarding the future of the global economy, making statements such as: "the industries of the 21st century will depend increasingly on the generation of knowledge through creativity" (Landry and Bianchini 1995: 4). From one perspective, this seems like a pleonastic assertion – how could knowledge be 'generated' without also being 'created'? – and so, again, it is important to ascertain to what ends the specific terminology of 'creativity' is being deployed in this case. Initially, it seems that Landry is explicitly *not* proposing that the industries of the 21st century will be based on a specifically cultural form of creativity – neither the arts (see above) nor the 'creative industries', therefore, should be understood to play a central role in the creative city (Landry 2000: 52). In this context, creativity achieves its broadest definition, and is akin to a general sense of openness to new ideas, diversity, change, and suchlike. The creative city solves old problems in *new* ways, because of the creativity of its "urban professionals". This requires breaking out of established forms of governance and traditional approaches, and does not necessarily set out any particular role for the arts or culture.

Landry invites us to ponder, for example, "How often do strategic urban plans start with the words 'beauty', 'love', 'happiness', or 'excitement'..." (2006: 2), and argues for the boundless power of creativity, making statements to the effect that "every city could be a world centre for something if it [were] persistent and tried hard enough" (2000: 8). In terms of understanding the overlap between cultural policy and regeneration around questions of creativity, however, this position presents certain dilemmas. In terms of governance, to plan to support a specific range of industries in order to draw upon their economic potential is one practical approach (although the issue of the unifying logic of the 'creative industries' grouping raises questions even here). To support such industries or to engender a climate of broader 'tolerance' in the hope of attracting a certain type of individual, for example, is likely a more difficult aim, but one that could reasonably be attempted. To attempt to plan for *creativity itself*, however, is almost an oxymoron – to predict unpredictability, to systematise the mercurial. By this reading, not only is the language of the 'creative city' misapplied in the Liverpool case, with its focus solely on the arts, but it is questionable whether it can *ever* become applicable. What is much more problematic, and perhaps also more emblematic of the concepts under consideration, is that, having established that the creativity of the creative city is not directly related to artistic activity, Landry states in later work that,

> Turning imagination into reality or something tangible is a creative act, so the arts, more than most activities, are concerned with creativity, invention and innovation. Reinventing a city or

nursing it through transition is a creative act, so an engagement with or through the arts helps. (2006: 250)

For this author, this position evokes nothing so much as the logic of Woody Allen's famed syllogism, "All men are mortal. Socrates was mortal. Therefore, all men are Socrates". The presence of such dubious logic persists throughout Landry's development of the idea of the 'creative city'; in order to demonstrate the potential of 'creative' approaches to solving urban problems, Landry's work becomes a barrage of case studies, and yet by his own reasoning, there is explicitly little to be learned from these examples: "cities focused mainly on best practices are followers not leaders and do not take the required risks to move themselves forward" (Landry 2006: 1). The only lesson we can learn from a city which has achieved success by a 'creative' solution to a problem seems simply: *be creative*. How this can be achieved is not made explicit, and in all likelihood cannot be made explicit, especially in the context of public policy.

What seems more likely to happen in the realm of policy is that traditional interventions, such as competing to win an established title such as the ECoC, or activity based on traditional cultural policy justifications around the value of engagement with arts and so on are made, but these actions are glossed with the language of creativity, and aligned to any prevailing agendas such as the 'creative industries' which can bolster their case, regardless of the appropriateness of these linkages. This paradoxical apparent *lack* of creativity in 'creative' interventions is discussed further in Chapter Six. This state of affairs, though, is perhaps endemic. As Landry states, "incorporating creativity into city management is problematic as cities are run by public officials who are accountable to electorates" (2000: 45). To achieve a healthy, creative city, the proscription can only be given in vague terms: "the creativity needed has different qualities [than that involved in creative/media industries]. Good ideas are interwoven with courage, the skill of mediation, negotiation, dialogue, and even love" (2006: 93). Interweaving courage with love is clearly not a strategy that can easily be implemented by policy, nor is it likely to be a useful course of action for the "public officials who are accountable to electorates". In terms of what *does* get taken up in light of the discussion above, it is instructive to consider the interpretation of Peck:

> Investments in the 'soft infrastructure' of the arts and culture are easy to make, and need not be especially costly, so the creativity script easily translates into certain forms of municipal action. Whether or not this will stimulate creative economic growth, however, is quite another matter. (2005: 749)

There seems, therefore, to be a fundamental tension between the aims articulated by cultural policy and the interventions made to reach these aims, such as the ECoC.

5.2 The place of entrepreneurship

Interrogating the issue of how creativity may be expected to bring about "creative economic growth", as Peck has it, leads us back to a consideration of the issue of entrepreneurship relating to the creative industries, this being one of the key factors associated with such growth. It has already been noted how the language of "new businesses" and the effects on "entrepreneurial people" is utilised in relation to the assumed outcomes of culture-led regeneration in the case of the ECoC in Liverpool, and this reflects a national policy discourse which also places a primacy on the value of entrepreneurship specifically within the creative industries and also more generally (e.g. DTI 1998). Again in this area, however, we can identify the existence of assumptions regarding a natural overlap or coalescence between the operation of cultural policy and activity related to new business formation, rather than anything approaching a more tangible, discernible relationship.

As a part of its fourth key aim of "fostering the creative industries" as noted at the start of this chapter, an early DCMS annual report outlines an aim of establishing NESTA, the 'National Endowment for Science Technology and the Arts' (1999: 12), and a recent NESTA study regarding research into the issue of entrepreneurship within the creative industries reports that "the UK has no problem starting creative businesses, but it struggles to grow them. Many lack the necessary skills and commercial awareness for sustained growth, and the ability to respond to increasing foreign competition" (2007: 1). The study also identifies that, particularly as a result of the oversupply of graduates in creative disciplines, the entrepreneurial function is not fulfilled in the creative industries in terms of identifying and responding to economic opportunity by the enactment of new combinations of the means of production, but rather that much entrepreneurial activity is undertaken as merely "a means to an end – that of facilitating ongoing opportunities for creative practice" (2007: 4). Whilst, then, there is a dominant value assumption with respect to the desirability of entrepreneurship, here we find a potential disjuncture regarding what this entrepreneurship may achieve. A misdirected focus on the part of some practitioners is presented as being to blame for a recent dip in the share of total GVA attributable to creative industries, and the conclusion drawn is that there is therefore a need for "entrepreneurship education" to cement practice within the creative industries as the entrepreneurial activity that it should rightfully be, in order that the creative industries can maintain their position as a naturally high-growth sector. The discourse of the creative industries as the "fastest growing sector in the UK" accounting for "8% of GVA" (as dissected in the preceding chapter) is also attributed to entrepreneurial processes in a DCMS document produced considering a similar need for 'Developing Entrepreneurship for the Creative Industries' (2006). This raises the same paradox as those documents discussed above, however, when considering the issue of the creative industries in relation to the goals of 'regeneration'.

Firstly, as noted in Chapter Four, the creative industries are discussed here as though they could be approached by any political intervention as though they were a unified entity. If the high growth rate of the 'creative industries' can be leveraged by developing entrepreneurship within *any* of the constituent industries, we have seen how intervention is particularly prone to occur in one of the arts-focussed domains which constitute the majority of the 'creative industries' grouping. These, however, seem on the available evidence to be unrepresentative of the high growth associated with the sector, and thus the promotion of entrepreneurship in these areas may not result in economic benefits, or any wider 'regeneration'. Secondly, in terms of how the ECoC may promote entrepreneurship, from a political perspective the ECoC is seen as affecting activity related to creative industries within the city more by promoting a creative image of the city, which may then filter down into creative practice, rather than by any direct intervention in the realm of business. Relationships of influence thus remain indistinct. As interviewee Ben from Liverpool City Council states of the ECoC,

> I think you would hope there's some sort of intangible effect in terms of putting across an image of the city as a creative place, and you can't measure how that has an impact on creative industries in the city.

A creative image will enshroud the city, catalysing innovative practice, in a holistic, yet unmeasurable fashion. Similarly, reflecting on the year, interviewee Chris states:

> The creative industries either went along with it, or didn't go along with it. I think the majority did. The vocal few didn't, and think 'well, it made no difference to us, I'm not getting any more business, I'm not acting any more, I'm not performing any more, and therefore what difference did it make to me?' but actually the bigger picture is it wasn't about the individuals, the bigger picture was about perception, confidence, regeneration.

The ECoC is thus seen to aid regeneration by attracting entrepreneurial, creative people and bolstering the confidence and creativity of those already present. By a formulation such as Chris's, impact at the level of the individual creative business is not a particular goal of the ECoC in its eventual manifestation. Indeed, the primacy of the effect on city *image* that the ECoC can provide was referenced within all policymaker interviews carried out, as well as forming a key plank of the articulation of the final success of the ECoC (Liverpool Culture Company 2009), and also in the final assessment of the research programme into the impacts the ECoC programme has had on the city (Impacts 08 2010). This seems to build on the 'Glasgow Model' of repositioning the impressions of those living outside the city via the ECoC programme. Landry, for example, refers to a 'virtuous cycle' of marketing associated with Glasgow (2000: 154).

A link between the ECoC programme and creative industries development, or any economic regeneration more broadly speaking is, however, questionable in the Glasgow case. For instance, in the direct aftermath of 1990, Glasgow had still to contend with major problems of deprivation, and in terms of the local economy *vis-à-vis* creative industries, Booth and Boyle conclude that,

> There is little evidence to support the argument that Year of Culture 1990 made a clear contribution to local economic development. There was extensive rhetorical reference to the economic and social benefits of developing cultural industries [...] but there were few tangible policies and fewer projects that linked job creation or training to the very successful program of events. (1993: 45)

Similarly, in a later analysis in 2007, Miller argues that there was no sustained growth resulting from the 1990 programme in Glasgow (2007: 45); García finds that entrepreneurs in the creative sector in Glasgow "doubt that the ECOC has been a catalyst for the city's cultural industries and do not feel that the event has had a direct impact on their work" (2004a: 859). Whilst there may indeed have been changes in the external image of both ECoC cities, expecting transformation in terms of image and confidence and other intangibles to result in the associated benefits of new businesses and economic regeneration seems to be yet another aspect of the questionable assumed interrelationship between all aspects of culture and creativity discussed thus far. Indeed, on examining the relationship between the ECoC programme and purported economic regeneration more broadly, Palmer-Rae find that "very few cities" engage on this topic "in any meaningful way", and that "economic objectives were stated in reports and in interviews, but there appeared to be much rhetoric but few independent analyses of actions and outcomes" (2004: 103)

Whilst NESTA identifies the need to promote "entrepreneurship education" to ensure a thriving creative sector, the ECoC process is narrated as being able to bring about such a thriving sector without such tangible interventions, purely by the aura of creativity it provides; the importance for those involved with staging the ECoC is primarily in providing a *sense* of creativity pertaining to the city over and above promoting the operations of any actual creative industries in the local context. This is yet another manifestation of the process of catachresis discussed thus far; multiple objects are labelled as 'creative' and intervention in one is therefore assumed to provide results in some, or all, others. That activity which results in a more positive aura around the city of Liverpool will serve to promote creative entrepreneurship locally is questionable. Similarly, whilst a discourse which links cultural activity to an increased sense of well-being and ambition, and also a sense of innovation and creativity, therefore resulting in growth within the creative sector is a pleasingly neat formulation, if policy truly seeks to promote entrepreneurship, rather than intervening in the cultural realm, it may perhaps be more important to take into account not the common 'creativity' of such processes, but rather evidence

which shows the greater importance of, for example, prior income levels (Li 2002), prior relevant experience (Rae and Carswell 2001) and pre-existing wealth (Blaug 2000) in the execution of processes of entrepreneurship. Also, Blanchflower and Oswald note that "individuals' psychology [...] does not seem to play a large role" in the process of entrepreneurship (1998: 29). The role for cultural policy in such matters, therefore, seems particularly limited, especially if its narratives seek to occlude the "social processes and influences" which affect processes of entrepreneurship (Goss 2005: 207), by merely understanding all such processes as 'creative' ones.

5.2.1 Policy and the entrepreneur

Even if policy in this case did seek to intervene directly, rather than tangentially, to promote entrepreneurship, the degree to which new business formation within certain creative industries can comfortably sit within this broad structure linking creativity, culture, and innovative economic growth is, as found by the research of NESTA, open to question. Johnson and Reed argue that the main reason for governmental intervention to promote entrepreneurship is, "to negate the effects of *constraints* on entrepreneurship that mean there are too few entrepreneurs in the economy, with economic growth suffering as a result" (2008: 4, original emphasis). Whilst this takes as read the idea that entrepreneurship is a source of wider value, which some (e.g. Spicer and Jones 2005) would dispute, the key issue raised by the findings of the NESTA report noted above is not necessarily whether there is a deficit in the level of entrepreneurship, at least as enacted in the creation of a new business, but rather whether those who create business within the particularly cultural, expressive subsectors which make up the majority of the creative industries grouping cannot be relied upon to provide economic growth, as they place a greater weight on the *non-pecuniary* rewards of such undertakings which are, by the nature of the sector, potentially greater than in other areas of the economy. In a situation where there is "an oversupply of labour to the creative industries with much of it working for free or on subsistence wages" (Hesmondhalgh and Banks 2009: 420), it is arguable whether the promotion of new creative businesses would bring about regeneration, even if the ECoC were able to influence this process, as its supporting literature posits.

Perren and Jennings argue that policy discourse can only present entrepreneurship in a particularly skewed manner, and cannot conceive of a position whereby entrepreneurs or owner-managers may *not* want their businesses to grow to the point where they have impact at the national, or international, level (2005: 177). This discourse also posits a situation whereby entrepreneurs are dependent on policy interventions creating an appropriate climate for them to flourish:

The explicit assumption is one of causality – it is government action that gives rise to conditions in which business activity can flourish [...] In order to be successful, which by implication is defined by the government, but not necessarily the entrepreneur or small business owner-manager, as making an identifiable contribution to national economic prosperity, small businesses and entrepreneurs must be helped by government. (Perren and Jennings 2005: 179)

Similarly, within the world of cultural policy, we see how it is policy intervention which can bring about the appropriate creative milieu to enable successful economic regeneration, and that without this intervention the trailblazers of the new economy, or the creative class, may not be adequately housed and the success of the creative industries will falter. This tension is best traced by Van Heur:

There is a constant tension in the policy literature here, since it emphasizes that individualistic creative entrepreneurs with innovative ideas abound, while simultaneously arguing that this is not good enough and that state intervention in order to intensify entrepreneurial activities is of absolute necessity. (2010a: 131)

Whilst it is possible to identify some figures within government who diverge from this point of view – in a recent House of Lords debate, for example, Lord Howard of Rising expressed the view that government policy was contributing to the decline of the creative industries as "the terrifying deluge of ill thought-out legislation and regulation is the exact opposite of the freedom from interference that makes the creative mind tick" (HL Deb, 6 June 2007, c1121) – it seems that such views are rare. The point of view expressed by Lord Howard, for example, constituted a lone voice amongst the sixteen Lords participating in this particular debate. The remainder of participants concentrated on a celebration of the UK's creativity, the majority referencing once more the statistics of high growth relating to the creative industries referred to in Chapter Four, and praising political interventions which were seen as being vital to ensuring the continuation of this growth. Thoughts such as Lord Howard's, however, do raise the pertinent question of what policy intervention can achieve with reference to creativity, and also to entrepreneurship. The question must be raised of whether 'entrepreneurship', in the more tightly defined sense of 'focussed on innovation and opportunities for business growth', is something that *can* realistically be encouraged by policy, particularly policy related to culture and cultural regeneration. Baumol argues that the level of propensity for entrepreneurial activity within a given population is fairly constant, and that policy should therefore not seek to *induce* entrepreneurship – "if that is the task assigned to policymakers, they are destitute" (1990: 894) – but rather to divert these existing proclivities to produce the maximum benefit for society as a whole. Despite the tendency in policy to view entrepreneurship as an unconditional good (as is also often the case with 'creativity'), and synonymous with employment and business growth, Baumol

also makes the important point that "the entrepreneur may [...] lead a parasitical existence that is actually damaging to the economy" (1990: 894). Where the creative entrepreneur fits on this continuum and what ramifications this has for a process seeking to achieve 'regeneration', is thus worthy of consideration.

Policy such as that which has resulted in the Liverpool ECoC, which aligns the creation of a cultural environment to the attraction of people with desirable personal qualities, however, implicitly accepts the large body of literature on the concept of entrepreneurship which understands such activity in terms of personal traits and predilections. Lambing and Kuehl (2007), for example, suggest that the entrepreneur has, amongst other qualities, "passion, tenacity, confidence, self-motivation, tolerance of ambiguity, a need for achievement" and, predictably, they are also "creative". Florida would no doubt recognise such a character as an exemplary member of the creative class (2004: 76), and this discourse links neatly to the narration of success around the ECoC which can be identified not in an increase in any tangible markers *per se*, but more by an increase in "confidence", "ambition", and "aspiration" (Liverpool Culture Company 2009: 3, Impacts 08 2010: 55). It is important to note here that identification of these qualities is almost wholly susceptible to the Forer effect (1949)[15], and that, even if it were possible to identify the key traits of entrepreneurs in more accurate categories such as "passion", "need for achievement" or, indeed, "creativity", as Chell *et al.* have it, "the ability to attribute causality to these factors is seriously in doubt" (1991: 36, see also Nijkamp 2003: 399). We must therefore be wary of a process which attempts to link cultural traits, such as a predilection for attending the theatre, with the expected emergence of new business ventures, unless we accept the unified version of creativity posited by Florida, as discussed above, which there is much reason to treat with caution.

5.3 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the means by which a programme such as the ECoC may be understood as having an effect on the level of creative industries within a city. It has been shown how documents pertaining to the Liverpool ECoC clearly articulate a privileged role for the creative industries when discussing the expected outcomes of the programme. It has also been shown how the ECoC programme, in line with local and national policy, has clear affinities with the 'creative class' thesis of Florida. Documents pertaining to the Liverpool ECoC also reference the notion of the 'creative city' in terms of how this programme will achieve its goals. This chapter has shown how, whilst the

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15. Forer argues that "for the purpose of characterizing a particular individual, stipulation of those traits which he demonstrates is a meaningless procedure" (1949: 118).

interventions made as a result of the ECoC are primarily related to the arts sector of the city, a unified conception of creativity results in a situation where such interventions are expected to have ramifications on creativity elsewhere, including in processes of entrepreneurship in creative industries. It is argued that such positions misapply the language of creativity and expect a relationship between all the factors under consideration to emerge despite there being no evidential basis for such an expectation, but also that it is in part this very misapplication which enables contradictions within wider discourse to be obscured, and for a stable position to be maintained in the face of the difficulties traced in this chapter. This stable position presents a role for the entrepreneur within the creative industries which they may not be able, or inclined, to occupy, leaving the goals of policy potentially unfulfilled. As such, the proposed relationships between cultural policy, creative industries, entrepreneurship and regeneration become prone to question.

Having discussed in this chapter how policy focussed on cultural intervention articulates a relationship with creative industries, the next chapter will examine policy which is particularly focussed upon the creative industries to see if a similar relationship emerges, or whether such a policy uses the concept of creativity in a more concrete way. It will also question the extent to which policy which seeks to engage with the creative industries can be considered to be the 'creative' force it is often presented as, in the ground-breaking 'creative city' sense of the term, and consider how such policy deals with the cultural transformations that can be attributed to at least some of the creative industries under consideration.

Chapter Six – Creative Industries and Policy Creativity

The preceding chapter highlighted how a unified conception of what constitutes 'creativity' can be seen to link in with justifications made regarding the beneficial effects of an intervention such as the ECoC, and the ways in which such interventions are understood to have a regenerative potential. This chapter will examine whether policy documents relating specifically to the creative industries – of which there are few (Banks and O'Connor 2009: 366) – are also characterised by such a unity, and continue to associate the success of the creative industries with specifically cultural activity. Once more, the particular case of the Liverpool ECoC will be considered in the context of national policy discourse, and again it will be seen how the successful development of creative industries is indeed linked to such specifically artistic interventions. In light of the theme of the differing meanings of 'creativity' under discussion, the issue of the extent to which this policy environment can be considered a 'creative' one first touched upon in Chapter Five will be developed. It will be argued that there is reason to believe that the policy positions examined thus far can be considered as quite entrenched ones, and this raises the possibility that current policy potentially fails to engage with the cultural transformations which at least some subsectors of the creative industries have been responsible for, particularly when it comes to the issue of cultural engagement. Despite the difficulties raised in this and the previous chapters, however, this chapter will conclude by examining how a continuing discourse of a successful relationship between the ECoC and creative industries development has emerged which seems likely to continue untrammelled for some time. Quotes from interviewees included in the discussion below are identified by pseudonym as outlined previously; in this chapter respondents from Chapter Five are joined by Deborah, Evan and Francis who are key figures within creative industry support agencies relevant to businesses in Liverpool.

6.1 Liverpool and Merseyside ACME

From the discussion in the previous chapter, it would not be unreasonable to approach the relationship posited between the Liverpool ECoC programme and creative industries development with scepticism, and particularly to question whether the new creative businesses which are expected to emerge via the attraction of 'creative people' to the staging of the ECoC *will* actually emerge. There is, however, some cause for reserving such a judgement given the involvement of Merseyside ACME with the Liverpool ECoC bidding process. As noted earlier, Merseyside ACME is a body whose explicit goal is "developing creative industries" (Merseyside ACME 2005) in the local area, and who have been operating since the 1990s. Not only is the work of ACME referenced within the ECoC bid, ACME are partly responsible for the form of that bid and, as will be discussed further below, their operations leading up to and during 2008 were positioned as having the potential to secure a 'legacy' for the ECoC

year. As was noted in Chapter Three, Merseyside ACME was established as a result of European Objective One funding to develop culture-related industries in the sub-region and its later literature follows the shifting trend towards utilising the language of the *creative* industries. Whilst this broader category has been seen to include, and base its discourse of economic success upon, software industries, ACME's operations do not necessarily extend to supporting the entire breadth of creative industries to this extent, which may be as a result of the terms of their original remit: Objective One funding identified five key 'drivers' for economic development, one of which was developing "cultural, media and leisure industries", a *separate* driver to the development of "knowledge-based industries" (Couch 2003: 177). Chapter Four discussed how there is a potentially inappropriate overlap of these two areas under the 'creative industries' label, and it would be accurate to say that ACME's main focus is skewed towards what interviewee Chris within the local city council refers to as the 'traditional' creative industries:

> Now, what do I mean by traditional creative industries? Visual arts is a traditional
> creative industry. People who run theatres, and put on shows are involved in the
> creative industries. But not necessarily in the digital end of the creative industries [...]
> I attended the National Creative Industries 09 conference this week in London and
> they spent almost all of the two days talking about digital.

Nevertheless, their support does extend to some of what Chris would refer to as 'digital' industries, such as web design, and recent material articulates the role of ACME as "ensuring that the *creative industries* sector remains at the forefront of the region's strategy for economic growth and regeneration" (Merseyside ACME 2005: 1, emphasis added), implying the broad 'creative industries' sector, and its associated relationship with economic growth, is their key priority. Whether this sector actually *is* at the forefront of regeneration strategies, or indeed of economic growth has been considered in the previous two chapters, but what is clear is that as such a body is seen as having a role within the ECoC process, and the concomitant process of 'culture-led regeneration', then it would not be unreasonable to expect the creative industries to have a clear position within this process. Whilst there is a clear rhetorical place for the creative industries, though, this does not necessarily eventually manifest itself in any clear programme or intervention based on creative practice. As in Chapter Five, it will be argued here that this absence of any concrete intervention regarding the creative industries occurs due to the blurring of the distinctions between different forms of 'creativity' which serves to present them as a unified whole.

Much as with the consideration of Florida's conception of creativity, then, a notion of an inter-related and unified manifestation of creativity can also be seen to lie at the heart of policies which relate directly to the creative industries, reflecting an assumption of a dual regenerative benefit, in both the

economic and the social arena. As Leadbeater and Oakley outline in their discussion of the role of independent creative entrepreneurs:

> Culture is not just a source of jobs and income but also a sense of confidence and belonging. Cities that have invested successfully in cultural renewal do so to generate not just economic growth but also a renewed sense of civic pride and purpose. (1999: 16)

This theme of the dual benefit of cultural intervention will be returned to later in this chapter. For now, the manifestation of this duality in the particular case of Merseyside ACME will be examined. Initially, a considerable part of ACME's operations lay in providing financial resources for start-up companies within the creative sector, thereby accepting both the logic of entrepreneurship as beneficial practice, and the logics of the arguments around support for this 'creative' sector itself. What is perhaps peculiar in the case of the operations of ACME, but also emblematic of the argument at hand, is that a body working to support the creative industries sector is also intimately involved in the support of community arts projects and initiatives such as the 'Creative Communities' programme for Liverpool's ECoC programme referenced in Chapter Five. It is this community arts activity which is largely responsible for ACME's place within the narrative constructed around the benefits of the ECoC, rather than business development, but the catachresis of 'creativity' allows the promotion of new business ventures to be posited as a potential outcome of the ECoC process due to ACME's involvement. These two processes are aligned in the ECoC bid document which states that as a key organisation involved in delivering the year's programme, there is an important place for:

> Merseyside ACME whose purpose is to support the successful development of creative businesses on Merseyside, and the regeneration of local neighbourhoods through arts-based activities. (Liverpool Culture Company 2002: 403)

The bid document also notes that "ACME has directly funded over 120 arts projects, planned and managed by 517 local people, involving 9,389 participants and welcoming 23,000 adults and children as audience members" (2002: 402). It should be noted that ACME is not, however, an organisation with, for example, an arts team, a strategic team, and a business support team. It is an organisation that historically has had consistently fewer than five employees, yet as part of the ECoC process is charged with "implementation of a 5 year plan" for the creative sector, "spearhead[ing] strategic investment and growth", and developing "international markets" for the creative industries (Liverpool Culture Company 2003d: 45), as well as being responsible locally for the level of 'arts-based' activity referenced above. The idea that these activities would naturally sit together within one organisation and influence one another is both the result of the discourse of a unified, overlapping nature of a holistic form of creativity raised in Chapter Five, and of a tendency, both in all policy documents relating to the ECoC

and in cultural policy more generally, towards faith in the power of this creativity to do good, and to promote 'social cohesion' (Griffiths 2006). It is the position of this thesis that these notions form the basis of a fundamental tension as to the role of the creative industries for cultural policy. Upon such a basis, cultural policy continues its usual job of promoting 'engagement' with culture and/or creative practice, and this is expected to eventually translate into the existence of successful creative industries via a gradual rippling out of influence, much as discussed earlier with consideration to the notion of the 'creative class'.

In an interview carried out in 2008, the director of Merseyside ACME stated clearly regarding this community-based work:

> Basically we saw it as part of a continuum. There's the community *there* and there's the industry up *here*, and there's got to be a link, and trying to just stimulate interest down at a community level in creativity and creative industries.

ECoC bidding documents also note that ACME's "support for local creative businesses" is "balanced" by work which demonstrates "the power and effectiveness of creativity within community based regeneration activity" (2003d: 45). Again here there is the notion of a single object – 'creativity' – which is able to operate in multiple, divergent ways. Creativity is at the heart of business development and also at the heart of regenerating inner city areas and their 'communities', yet these two activities clearly involve separate referents for creativity. An architect may be involved in the 'creation' of a new housing development, a graphic designer may be expressively and visually 'creative' to fulfil the needs of their client to appeal to a particular demographic, and the local 'Arts In Regeneration' programme, for example, may provide, "the *creative* skills programme in communications, drama, writing, visual arts and creative technology [which has] built confidence and self-esteem in its 800 participants" (Liverpool Culture Company 2002: 503, emphasis added). The 'creativity' involved in the occupations noted above, however, does not necessarily relate to, the 'creativity' of what is tantamount to palliative relief for the socially deprived. By a common use of language, however, the two are consistently aligned, both conceptually and operationally. A situation therefore arises wherein, as the director of ACME makes clear above, the link between community arts and creative industries becomes an almost common-sense assumption, even though it would be difficult to locate evidence for such a link.

6.1.1 A creative industries legacy for Liverpool after 2008

Another attempt to link ACME's operations to the ECoC occurs around plans to create a 'creative industries quarter' in the city during 2008[16]. Plans for such a quarter have been on the drawing board for a number of years, and the plans focused on 2008 represented the second attempt to create a creative industries quarter in the city, the area demarcated for the first attempt having largely remained a site of dereliction within the city centre (Parkinson and Bianchini 1993: 171). A document produced early on in 2008 related to these plans suggests a 'launch' of the area be carried out towards the end of the ECoC year thus:

> Launch event to coincide with close of City of Culture:
> Message = Creative Quarter is a legacy of the Cultural and Creative recognition of Liverpool.
> (Merseyside ACME *et al*. 2008: 43)

Similarly, earlier consultancy documents suggest that the area could be used during the 2008 "celebrations" themselves (BurnsCollett 2007: 6), that the ECoC year will result in "increased opportunities" in the sector in this area (2007: 18) and that "the delivery of a sustainable creative quarter can demonstrate the legacy of Capital of Culture 2008" (2007: 28). Clearly, the ECoC and the creative industries are once more presented here as being intimately related. The key justification for the development of such a quarter given in these documents relate to the potential such an area would have for economic regeneration, leveraging the headline statistics around economic and employment growth related to the creative industries discussed in Chapter Four. Just as this chapter demonstrated a very problematic relationship between these statistics and the operations of cultural organisations, however, so it is hoped that Chapter Five has demonstrated some of the difficulties presented in assuming that such a clear relationship exists between the staging of a cultural festival and an increased level of business formation within the creative industries, regardless of any discursive alignment of the two.

It will be argued in the next chapter that research conducted with those who have actually undertaken a process of business formation and who carry out work within the creative industries suggests that engagement with policy interventions made by organisations such as ACME is limited. Also, the idea that routes into the creative industries can be widened by engaging in community arts, or by planning

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16. For the sake of clarity, this is in addition to the 'cultural quarter', located in an area housing some of the city's galleries and museums, and the 'creative quarter' based around an area of city centre warehouse redevelopment (Gilmore 2004: 109).

specific locations for creative activities, is one which, at best, has little supporting evidence. Given the scope of the difficulties that would have to be overcome to engender a fully thriving creative industries sector within a city such as Liverpool, however, it would be wrong to assign blame to an organisation such as ACME or a programme such as the ECoC. DCMS research indicates that 40% of those working within the creative industries have degree-level qualification, compared with 25% in the economy as a whole (2007). This rate in Liverpool, however, is lower still at only 20%, and the proportion of Liverpool's population with no qualifications whatsoever is almost double the national average[17]. Whilst the community arts projects which are supported by ACME may indeed prove beneficial to those involved in a number of ways, they are clearly unlikely to increase the level of degree-level qualification which seems vital to a successful creative sector, and it is similarly unreasonable to expect the ECoC to have any effect in this area. Furthermore, such local scale intervention can do little to affect other macro-level factors such as the dominance of London in all creative industries in the UK[18]. The potential for a "sustainable creative industries quarter" to emerge *anywhere* within the UK will be severely affected by this dominance of London. To have such an internationally influential cultural centre within a relatively small nation is rare, and is clearly the result of a complex variety of historical factors, but London's ability to build upon its pre-existing strengths, perpetuate them and exert a pull on those who wish to succeed in the creative industries serves to severely skew employment patterns in this area, and it is unlikely that a year-long intervention such as the ECoC will do much to change this pattern in the short or long term.

Such broader issues regarding the nature of the operation of the creative industries will be returned to in more detail in the concluding remarks of Chapter Eight. For now, it is sufficient to note that is extremely questionable as to whether any area within the UK can compete with London's dominance in this arena, either nationally or internationally. It is equally questionable, if not more so, as to whether there is the potential to forge such a strong sector in a city with such relatively low levels of educational attainment, regardless of the commitment displayed to this development. The demographic climate of Liverpool is clearly part of a wider set of circumstances which have resulted in Liverpool requiring action aimed at bringing about regeneration of some sort, but the particular alignment of the creative industries to an agenda of regeneration in circumstances such as these is deeply problematic. In such circumstances, the issue of an organisation such as Merseyside ACME promoting creative industries via a continuum of activity including the generation of "interest" at a community level is not necessarily an appropriate one, and seems to be part of the process of individualisation regarding factors involved in 'social inclusion' identified by Levitas:

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17. Source: Annual Population Survey (2009).

18. Whilst 17% of total employment in the UK is based in London, data derived from the DCMS SIC codes in Chapter Four show 36% of all employment based in the capital. (Source: ONS/Nomis 2010).

There has been a slippage towards [...] treating cultural capital as something that intrinsically resides in individuals rather than in groups, and can be acquired by them through participation in or consumption of the cultural and heritage industries. (2004: 53)

To conceive of the sector in this way negates any social factors at play in the operation of the creative industrial field. As is the case with the notion of entrepreneurship more broadly, without relevant skills and resources, personal qualities alone are unlikely to be sufficient for success. Similarly, generating *interest* in creative activity will not necessarily translate into productive practice within the creative industries without such wider resources, and so any legacy for the creative industries emerging from the ECoC will be inevitably stunted if no steps are taken to address this.

As well as these macro-level structural factors affecting development of the creative industries locally, agencies such as ACME are doubtless curtailed by funding regimes and agendas in their turn. Consider this point of view from interviewee Deborah related to the issue of education touched on above:

> ...But, if you look deep into that stuff, there's all sorts of stuff around social inclusion stuff, but actually the two things don't marry up. In the creative industries – in a meeting I was in with [X] last week, talking about training and stuff and I was saying – [X] from the council was talking about getting money from the LSC[19], and I told them, they tend to fund NVQ[20]1 and 2, and the sector wants degree, and... there's a mismatch, because the sector does want highly skilled and, normally, highly educated people.

An organisation seeking to provide training pertinent to the operation of the creative industries may therefore find itself curtailed in engaging in the most appropriate activities due to the operation of other agendas that are outside its control. Similarly, the activity at the community arts end of the creativity agenda focussed on by Merseyside ACME is likely an outcrop of the availability of funding for such activity; such an agency can provide no support of any kind without resources. The notion of community activity 'balancing' the business and sector support aspect of ACME's remit, however, is fundamentally problematic, but does serve to once more reveal an inherent tension within the relationship between creative industries and cultural policy. Despite hopes that the ECoC programme in Liverpool will result in "new products, innovations and businesses" (Liverpool Culture Company 2002: 302), the actual interventions made by the Culture Company are all directly related to the arts,

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19. The Learning and Skills Council.

20. National Vocational Qualification. NVQ1 is equivalent to lower-level secondary school achievement, NVQ2 to higher-level secondary school achievement. NVQ4+ would represent degree-level qualification.

and there is no direct programme to support creative industries within the city or to explicitly promote their involvement within the ECoC *beyond* arts organisations. There is merely an assumed coalescence.

More worryingly, however, to provide a local context to the national statistics considered previously, there also seems to be little evidence for any growth within the creative industries sector in the city of Liverpool at least over the entire course of ACME's lifespan as an organisation explicitly concerned with promoting this sector. Analysis carried out by the Impacts 08 research programme into the effects of the ECoC, for example, shows relative levels of creative industries employment as fairly static within Liverpool and other 'core cities' (2010: 37), seeming to contradict the view of interviewee Evan:

> Anyone who reads the current, policy, you know, looks at what's happening in the economy internationally, anyone with any sense is saying creative industries is the driver. And, you know, but the reality is Liverpool's future is going to be based around tourism, heritage and – which are low value jobs – and creative industries, which tend to be high value jobs. So, I know which one I'd be focussing on.

Clearly the teleological narrative regarding the role of the creative industries discussed in earlier chapters has had an influence on this position. What could perhaps be better said here, however, is that anyone who has been exposed to the discourse of a 'new economy' and the primacy of creativity and culture within that economy (and the confusion between the two) would be inclined to *believe* that creative industries are "the driver". Even without considering the appropriateness of attempting to leverage national or international economic growth trends in provincial cities in the North of England, the 'evidence' to support this discourse of growth has been shown in Chapter Four to be deeply problematic in any case. Again, evidence of a lack of growth locally is presumably considered irrelevant to such a position whereby "anyone with any sense" sees creative industries as the appropriate economic driver locally. Like a cargo cult, as long as the conditions for 'creativity' are provided, then *eventually* success will arrive (Peck 2005: 762), and the ECoC is seen as one of the ways in which such an environment can be provided. Even if there is no real sign of success so far, it *will* come, and so a discourse of the assumed nature of the creative industries, and their assumed role in a 'new economy' is reproduced and aligned to the operation of a programme of culture-led regeneration.

6.2 'Creative Britain'

It seems, then, that focussing on an organisation whose remit is notionally the consideration of creative industries *as* industries, and their development, leads us to a similar site of overlap and catachresis as does the consideration of cultural policy which purports to have a relationship with such industries. This state of affairs is not limited to the local environment, however. At a national level, the unstable

associations considered previously regarding the perpetuation of a general unified conception of creativity can similarly be seen within policy documents pertaining specifically to the operation of the creative industries, and apparently drawn up on the basis of encouraging their growth.

As noted previously, the Creative Economy Programme of the DCMS has arguably done the most in recent years to bring arguments relating to the beneficial role of the creative industries to bear. The notion of engagement with the arts being at the root of economic, and tangentially, social regeneration which helps to form the ECoC bid is reflected in this national policy discourse relating specifically to the creative industries. Whilst we have seen previously that an array of cultural organisations may attempt to associate themselves with the creative industries despite the questionable nature of this association, however, the 'Creative Britain' report has the successful operation and development of the creative industries as its *sole* area of focus. Despite being almost entirely focussed on business and the operation of the economy, though, this report *also* positions engagement with the arts as being the root cause of Britain's creative industries constituting such a significant proportion of national GVA even though, as has been demonstrated in Chapter Four, the available evidence clearly suggests that this is largely attributable to software consultancy. After references to "national prosperity" and the "jobs of the future", reflecting the teleological narrative around the new economy outlined in Chapter One – Hesmondhalgh and Banks argue that Creative Britain "is ultimately a product of 'information society' and 'knowledge economy' thinking" (2009: 425) – the report echoes Florida's arguments by arguing that "every young person has creative talents" and talks of the need for "more opportunities to experience arts and culture" to make the most of this creative talent in order to form the next generation of creative industries (DCMS *et al*. 2008: 4).

This focus on "individual talent" once again obscures important structural elements in the operation of creative industries, and the logic behind the concept of promoting further "opportunities to experience" and engage with culture in promoting the development of these industries is considered further below. By once again aligning the use of the term 'creativity' specifically to the arts and culture, though, it is clear that in this report the idea of 'creativity' is not being used in the sense of being 'broadly originative'. This would be a difficult enough position to sustain in itself when discussing the abilities of "every young person". Rather, the report seems to indicate that every young person has specifically *artistic* talent. This is an untenable position. The logic of the 'Creative Britain' report seems to support the idea set out within the consideration of the operation of Merseyside ACME above of a continuum between generating individual 'interest' in the arts and the furthering of entrepreneurial operations within the creative industries, exposure to art serving within 'Creative Britain' to open young people up to "the possibility of a future career in the creative industries" (DCMS *et al*. 2008: 7). Without wishing to labour the point, in terms of achieving "national prosperity" via the creative industries, there could clearly be only an extremely oblique link between childhood trips to an art

gallery and a career designing IT systems and yet such exposure, as supplied by events such as the ECoC (Liverpool Culture Company 2002: 301) is positioned as providing the means by which the economic success of the creative industries, which is largely based on such IT work, is maintained and perpetuated. Heterogeneity is obscured and the difference in technical capabilities required for different aspects of 'creative' work left to one side. As O'Connor notes of the government approach to mapping the creative industries,

> The DCMS definition simply did not describe the complex structure of the creative industries nor the employment and remuneration arrangements of the majority of those within it. The definition thus encouraged a deeper delusion, that policies to support and encourage such creative entrepreneurialism would suffice as an industrial strategy. (2007: 44)

The relationships involved in achieving economic success in the creative industries are more complex than is allowed for here.

6.2.1 'Creative Britain' and employment

The city of Liverpool also has a specific and direct link to the aims of Creative Britain, as one third of the organisations across the country named in the document as providing "creative apprenticeships" are within the city (DCMS et al. 2008: 8). The organisations housing these apprenticeships are all, however, from the traditional arts institutions which form the centre of the 2008 ECoC bid as discussed previously. There are, for example, no film companies, no software companies, no design studios, no architects, no advertising agencies. Again, therefore, the arts are presented within policy discourse as being synecdochical for the creative industries, and by a process of catachresis, one is treated as though it were a vital influence upon the other; yet again all diverging forms of 'creativity' are treated as branches from a common root. This apprenticeships scheme is framed as "a major signal of the Government's intent by supporting creative industries to expand significantly apprenticeships to 5,000 a year by 2013 right across the country" (DCMS et al. 2008: 6). Whilst the drive to diversify the creative industries workforce is admirable, with operations in the bulk of creative industries concentrated so heavily in particular demographic groups and locations, as noted above (and discussed further in Chapter Eight), the question remains as to what apprenticeships "across the country" can actually achieve to this end. More importantly, the annual figure for apprenticeships represents less than 1% of the national creative industries workforce and is particularly skewed to certain cultural subsectors. Perhaps more worryingly at a policy level are the views of those working to support the creative industries such as interviewee Francis, who seems to consider the whole agenda to support a greater

number of creative businesses via entrepreneurship, and the push for higher employment, as misguided:

> So, Creative Britain is a really good example, I mean…I've read it. It has little relevance to me. It's very much based around spatial, cultural…it's a load of crap. Bluntly, it's a load of crap.

Particularly regarding the issue of apprenticeships locally, consider this exchange:

> Francis: …5,000 it was actually, 5,000. Now these are people that the industry hasn't said it wants.
>
> - So, how did that come about?
>
> Francis: Well, exactly. I have to say [the] apprenticeships have been incredibly successful, and we just, the first intake have just finished and 64% got jobs [and] actually if you want to change the fabric of society, fantastic, 'cause actually it's working, because these kids would never have got a job in media in a million years on their own. Never. Ever, ever, ever. They're all working-class kids, no way, no chance, some of them couldn't spell – the things that – and they'd have never got degrees, so there's just no way – but actually they're really going to be successful. So, if you want to change the fabric of society, fantastic. However, if you want to create an *industry* – well…it's not very cost-effective.

Thus the tension between social and economic aims which much of the discourse of cultural policy aims to ameliorate is revealed as a persistent one. Just as is the case with interventions specific to the ECoC, an effective *industrial* policy may not necessarily serve as the most effective *social* policy, yet cultural policy attempts to present these aims as intertwined. If the aims of social justice were parallel to the aims of business, however, then capitalism would arguably present us with a utopian social order. To persist with a discourse that positions creativity as able to serve both these masters simultaneously is therefore of limited practical use, and policy which presents this as the case is either disingenuous, obfuscatory, or at the very least rather optimistic. Francis also puts the political aim of the promotion of greater numbers of enterprises and a push to increasing relative levels of employment within the creative industries in stark relief:

> Creative industries are not huge job creators. They're big *wealth* creators. You'll have ten people earning 50 grand, rather than 100 people earning 18. So you've really got to focus that in. You don't need lots of people, really, comparatively.

There are thus two key problems with the discourse of engagement with the arts, be it within Liverpool's ECoC or any other national (or international) programme, acting in some way as the basis of a successful creative industries sector:

i) The conception of the creative industries included in such a definition is almost always a partial one, and potentially so partial that it *precludes* the economic success broadly associated with the sector, and ii) There is little evidence that employment levels in this partial conception of the creative industries *are* growing, a fact that those tasked with supporting the sector apparently acknowledge as endemic of the sector. To promote the partial, cultural segment of the creative industries, therefore, is to risk promoting oversupply and raising hopes for fulfilling employment which can never be satisfied (Hesmondhalgh 2007: 205).

At the national level, a presumed unity of creativity and a misapplication of terminology once again seem to be leveraged to try and alleviate this second condition; 'Creative Britain' refers, for instance, to skills gaps within the "software computer games and new media industries" in such subjects as maths and engineering, but goes on to suggest that the chance to work in the exciting cultural world of the creative industries may generate "incentive [...] to study subjects perhaps considered dry and difficult" (2008: 21). Once again this seems either to be broadly disingenuous or at best idealistic, and also seems to contradict the previous justification engaged in within the very same document to the effect that pathways into the creative industries can be best opened up by specifically engaging with the creative arts.

6.3 Is policy on creativity *un*creative?

One way to understand this lack of fit between policy discourse and its purported aims around promotion of creative industries is to propose the continuation of a historical, pre-creative industries cultural policy tradition into a world which has been culturally transformed, and transformed by many of these very industries. As with the idea of the 'new economy' discussed previously, however, simply by using the language of 'creativity' all the processes discussed throughout the thesis thus far are in danger of drifting into a position whereby anything which can be so labelled automatically becomes cutting-edge and fundamentally different to what has gone before. As Gibson and Klocker note, "creativity remains interesting to academics and policy-makers precisely because it implies a departure from norms, being genuinely (even radically) new – an antidote to discipline and restriction" (2005: 100). When this creativity is sought out in cultural programmes such as the ECoC, however, we find the paradox of what is essentially uncreative 'creativity'; of established techniques leveraged *as though* new and creative, and thus assumed to bring about the new state of affairs they are part and parcel of.

Liverpool has, after all, instigated a programme of culture-led regeneration many years after the 'Glasgow model' of utilising the ECoC award to affect processes of regeneration had gained traction, yet an assumption persists that engaging with creativity in any sense automatically involves new, ground-breaking approaches.

When discussing his creative city theory, for instance, Landry makes the case for the necessity of intervening on such a 'creative' basis as, "the idea that the future will resemble the past is long gone" (2000: 50). Even if one is in agreement with this claim, in the case of the Liverpool ECoC of 2008 it seems that this particular version of the future bears many similarities to the past. The history of the discourse around creativity thus presents a central paradox in leveraging the supposed power of 'creativity' in regeneration initiatives; if Landry's idea of creativity (i.e. originality and innovation) being vital to urban development is considered, then the tactic of promoting culture and creative industries can be seen as being potentially antithetical to such an aim. Indeed, as has been noted previously, the 'creative industries' at a broader discursive level seem to be merely the latest object leveraged in an attempt to fit the long-extant 'new economy' concept or 'imaginary' (Jessop 2004). Chapter Two described how such thinking has been prevalent for at least 40 years and, as outlined in Chapter Four, the creative industries-focussed variant has had a decade to prove its case, yet the evidence which has emerged over the course of this period of data-gathering does not convincingly establish the relationships purported to exist in this area. In any case, the articulated benefits associated with culture and creativity as discussed above, that is to say the dual and linked benefits of economic and social improvement, have a lengthy policy history, and echoes of the current policy discourse may be found as far back as the emergence of substantial cultural policy in the UK in the mid-19th century.

To begin with a slightly shorter frame of reference regarding the benefits expected to emerge from the ECoC and instigate a process of regeneration, Gray presents such programmes as ideological projects with no substantive evidence base, dating back to the 1970s:

> Governments have increasingly emphasized the role of cultural and artistic resources as
> contributors towards subjects as diverse as the encouragement of economic growth (dating
> back in Britain, for example, to the later-1970s), reduction of public debt, urban regeneration,
> the remedying of social exclusion, and the creation of social benefits from personal
> development to community empowerment – regardless of the evidential basis for these. (2007:
> 206)

If such programmes have been persistently instigated regardless of evidence for a period of 30 years, it would be prudent to consider the possibility that the ECoC programme may be the result not of a considered reflection on the best method of rectifying the social and economic problems facing

Liverpool in the early 21st century, but rather as part of an ongoing ideological tide wherein justifications for intervention are actually immune to evidence, and are simply further manifestations of ideas which are historically 'known' and acted upon, regardless of their rectitude. One of the pathways by which creative industries are linked to social goals in programmes such as the ECoC is outlined by Stevenson thus:

> The logic of cultural planning is as follows: social inclusion is achieved through economic development which is achieved by fostering the creative industries (which in practice largely refer to "the arts", but discursively embraces the popular and multicultural) in a way that "includes" the marginal and rejuvenates degenerative urban spaces. (2004: 127)

As noted above, this link between the fostering of creative industries and the attempted 'inclusion' of marginalised social groups via artistic activity is even brought together in the very same small-scale agency in the Liverpool case.

This goal of 'social inclusion' is clearly prevalent in national policy discourse, and throughout a variety of cultural practice; Levitas notes that "the rhetoric of inclusion can be found in DCMS publications and elsewhere across the culture industry" (2004: 52) and the idea that engagement with culture improves the social position of those who engage is still central to policy discourse, and has long been held; Carey (2005: 97) and Minihan (1977: 52) are amongst many who outline the 19th century belief in the improving power of art. Their work helps inform the analysis at hand, however, by, in the former case, outlining the difficulty in collating any factual evidence to sustain such a view, and in the latter case providing a compelling account of the gradual evolution (and more often stagnation) of cultural policy discourse in the UK. Minihan, for example, notes an almost century-long stability from the beginnings of what could be considered the first real cultural policy in the UK, noting that in the 1920s "the advocates of public funding for cultural facilities voiced opinions essentially similar to those put forward in the 1830s and 1840s" (1977: 179). Whilst there is an increasing alignment to creative industries in modern policy discourse, and discussion of economic arguments, in the case of the ECoC it can be noted that some of the arguments, such as that referenced in Chapter Five regarding the value of increased "cultural consumption" by "ordinary people", are essentially 19th century ones on the beneficial nature of exposure to culture, now couched in the 21st century language of 'social inclusion' and more troublingly attached to 21st century cultural forms. Whilst the argument that cultural policy can have a socially regenerating effect persists, however, as McGuigan notes, "how it is supposed to do that is left somewhat unclear" (2004: 101).

We have seen above how the purported links between cultural policy and development of the creative industries are questionable on a number of fronts. By reviewing relevant literature, Carey elucidates how similarly questionable is the case for culture as *social* regenerator:

> Summarizing the results of over a hundred years of experimental psychology in their book *Psychology of the Arts*, Hans and Shulamith Kreitler conclude that there is no reason to expect that works of art will produce behavioural changes in their recipients. (2005: 101)

Even if engagement with cultural forms cannot make one into a better person, however, we have seen that the general trend associated with cultural policy in the late-20th century is its increasing association with rising levels of wealth and business activity. Just as the link between social progress and engagement with culture has a long, if unsubstantiated, policy history, however, so it is with this assumed link between culture and industrial development. Minihan identifies the purchase of the Parthenon/Elgin marbles as the first major intervention of government into cultural matters in Britain, and discusses the following justification made in parliament at this 'year zero' of cultural policy:

> The most cogent speaker in favour of purchase was J.W. Croker, who introduced practical considerations when he claimed that possession of the marbles would even prove to 'the advantage of our manufacturers, the excellence of which depended on the progress of the arts in the country.' 'It was money spent,' he said: 'for the use of the people, for the encouragement of arts, the increase of manufactures, the prosperity of trades, and the encouragement of industry; not merely to please the eye of the man of taste, but to create, to stimulate, to guide the exertions of the artist, the mechanic, and even the labourer.' (1977: 17)

Positing such a link between the availability of culture and the arts and "the prosperity of trades" or the "increase of industry" seems to be a very closely related cousin of the position of 21st century cultural policy as discussed in these last two chapters. Whereas in the 19th century, culture was seen as potentially having a much broader impact, in the 21st century the main industrial focus for cultural policy is on those industries that are more directly 'creative' themselves although, as has been clearly established, this definition is not without problem in itself. Some argue that this excessive focus on creative industries has led to a cultural policy excessively focussed on the economic, to the absence of cultural concerns:

> Labour modernizers' penchant for design, information technologies and the cultural industries – 'cool Britannia' – hardly amounts to a cultural turn by Labour's leaders [...] it is their perceived contribution to economic growth and to British exports which lie at the root of Labour's love of culture. (Driver and Martell 1999: 253)

Similarly, O'Connor argues that by excessively focussing on creative industries genuine cultural policy concerns have vanished (2009: 394). Yet even at its inception in Britain, cultural policy seems to have had at least an adjunct of economic goals, even if any evidence for such a link was never raised. Minihan also points out how the select committee on purchasing the marbles noted how Fine Arts were "connected with the advancement of every thing valuable in science, literature, and philosophy" and to "the reputation, character, and dignity of every Government" (1977: 14). It is not unreasonable to see this position as an earlier articulation of the idea of an "interlinked and inseparable" form of creativity most latterly articulated within Florida's creative class thesis, whereby creativity in one area is intimately linked with creativity in all others.

Despite the language used, from this perspective, current cultural policy does not necessarily break significantly with the past, nor is it a part of a brave new 'creative' world. Assumptions regarding what is desirable, and the usage of terminology in this area, thus seem to have a much longer history than is allowed for in the current climate which seeks to highlight this 'creative', innovative, nature of recent interventions. The tension over what cultural policy is to achieve seems rather to be endemic to cultural policy itself, and just as from one perspective the 'new economy' is merely the natural continuation of the regular operations of the economy (Harvey 1990), so the questionable links made regarding the ECoC in Liverpool in respect of 'creativity' are merely the latest manifestation of the normal course of cultural policy. Using 'culture' to tackle social exclusion, to promote engagement, to aid community cohesion, and so forth is therefore not a 'creative' solution in the 'creative city', or even the 'creative class' sense of the word. Yet whereas some years ago, for example, it was posited by Montgomery that "the days of funding endless self-serving 'community arts action' groups, of seeing art as a proxy for social work, should soon be over" (2005: 342), in Liverpool, not only are these days not over, but via the misapplication of the language of 'creativity', in documents such as the Liverpool Cultural Strategy, they are presented as an innovative way to move forward. The decades-old idea of cultural regeneration is presented as a novel strategy, despite its extremely broad adoption, in part due to the linguistic turns that enable the conflation of culture with 'creativity' and therefore innovation. What, ironically, is much more problematic when the case of the creative industries comes to play a part in this discourse is that they *can* be seen to have brought about a fundamentally altered cultural landscape, and this raises important questions regarding the role of cultural policy which, at the level of the ECoC at least, seem not to be addressed.

6.3.1 Cultural policy and cultural change

It has been noted that one of the ways in which the ECoC is seen as being able to affect the level of work being carried out in the creative sector is via promoting engagement and participation with its

cultural programme, and in Chapter Five it was noted how the ECoC can be seen in political terms as an entity which does not necessarily consist of work arising from the city of Liverpool, but as something that can be applied to the city from without, which may then serve to catalyse indigenous creative work due to the multipartite but ultimately uniform nature of 'creativity'. This model of applying an intervention to a place and promoting engagement has been prevalent over the course of cultural policy development. Minihan quotes Keynes on the role of the Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts, the wartime precursor to the Arts Council, as being "to carry music, drama and pictures to places which otherwise would be cut off from all contact with the masterpieces of happier times" (1977: 217), and notes how discussion at this time focussed on the need to inculcate a notion of shared values and experience, similar to the repeated references to the values of 'community' in documents pertaining to the ECoC. As discussion of the development of the terminology of 'creative industries' in Chapter Two revealed, however, what characterises the cultural world these creative industries have brought about is immediate and mass dissemination of cultural and symbolic artefacts. A programme such as the Liverpool ECoC, therefore, which posits as one of its goals raising "awareness" of "cultural opportunities" (Liverpool Culture Company 2002: 305), reflecting a national policy position regarding the value of increased exposure to cultural forms, raises a central tension between the methods of cultural policy and the cultural world of the creative industries which this policy purports to be interested in. As Garnham notes, the current policy environment which, as outlined above, focuses on social and economic 'inclusion', and sees these as intimately interlinked, in the case of cultural activity presents "access as a central problem and policy aim while at the same time wishing to justify support for commercial cultural activities on the grounds that they are so successful and dynamic economically and thus presumably do not suffer from an access problem" (2001: 450).

Put another way, why would creative industries require policy support if they had achieved the success which this policy drive is based upon? Despite being broadly made up of cultural activities, the creative industries do not represent a simple fit for the world of cultural policy, but rather heighten the tension of what such policies are and are for. What persists is the problem of a transformation of cultural engagement which such policy does not, and perhaps cannot, engage with. Once again, Garnham sums the situation up neatly: "many, if not all, of those who are now deemed to be socially excluded, are existing and enthusiastic customers of the creative industries. For some analysts the creative industries are part of the problem and not its solution" (2001: 457). A policy discourse in which culture is a uniform good, and all aspects of culture are uniformly linked, however, cannot deal with this level of nuance.

If 'creativity' in all its forms *was* actually promoted by engagement with culture, as is the position taken within the policy documents discussed above, it would have to be acknowledged that in many ways those who are the object of such policy interventions live in an environment potentially saturated

with cultural and symbolic forms. Whilst the overall artistic content of television, for example, is debatable, it is clearly driven by engagement with images, drama, music, and other cultural forms. Based on research from the 1980s, Mulgan and Warpole suggest that the average British adult watches over 30 hours of television week (1986: 35), and 25 years after this assessment, despite the increase in other forms of media competing for attention, studies suggest this figure has not diminished whatsoever (Independent 2010). Castells notes that "in urban societies media consumption is the second largest category of activity after work, and certainly the predominant activity at home" (2000: 302), and in the UK engagement with culture in the forms presented by a significant number of the creative industries seems especially prominent:

> In the UK, the average household spending on recreation and culture as a percentage of the gross domestic product is 7.9%, making it higher than anywhere else in the world. Britons buy music and visit cinemas more often than they visit museums. (Parker *et al.* 2006: 4)

Engagement with culture in this way spreads increasingly fast, and seems to need little political encouragement – Minihan traces the number of radio licences in the UK growing from 600,000 in 1923 to 5 million in less than a decade, and as noted previously, on a broader scale Miller notes the rapid growth of internet access over a similar period (2007: 227). This has the potential to completely alter the cultural landscape, and therefore must change the course of any discourse which purports to be rooted in engagement with culture. As Carey notes of the processes of development first raised in Chapter Two, "the 20th century technological revolution" provided the masses "day and night – on screens, through headphones, through amplifiers – with art on a scale and of a kind undreamed of by the official art-world" (2005: 28). Even in the mid-19th century, Minihan (1977: 79) notes how the mass availability of affordable engravings leads to a much wider engagement with the arts than was achieved by cultural policy of the time. What, then, of a programme such as the ECoC whose regenerative power is based at least in part on increased 'engagement'? If engagement with culture encourages the proliferation of the creative industries, then clearly the creative industries themselves have little difficulty in forging such engagement.

This proliferation of opportunities for engagement with culture provided by creative industries undermines not only the economic but also the social aspect of the dual benefit associated with cultural policies referred to above. As Wing Chan and Goldthorpe explain:

> It appears unhelpful to discuss limited cultural consumption simply in terms of 'social exclusion'. If a low level of cultural consumption is in fact to be regarded as a problem for public policy [...] it cannot be seen as one that is restricted to the most disadvantaged groups

in society. Rather, it must be recognized as a fairly common feature of the lifestyles of those who are clearly in the social mainstream. (2007: 5)

The latest figures from the DCMS 'Taking Part' survey, for example, indicate that the most popular form of artistic participation ('crafts') is engaged in by 17% of the population, and that the most popular form of arts attendance ('live music') is engaged in by 34% of the population. It is therefore not unreasonable to assume a significant number of people with little or no interest in the arts or culture. Given the high percentage of its membership responsible for building software, it would not even be unreasonable to assume a significant proportion of the constituency of the creative industries having little interest in such matters. The strong propositional assumptions within discourse regarding overlaps between a cultural programme and creative industries development, therefore, should likely be treated with caution. In any case, it is clear that the relationship between cultural policy and creative industries is an inherently tense one.

Simply put, the ground upon which certain creative industries have achieved cultural dominance are grounds upon which a programme such as the ECoC cannot compete. The one unique quality which the ECoC can provide is its location; these are specific events occurring in a specific physical space which can only be experienced within that particular location. In the cultural world brought about by the creative industries, however, this may represent a barrier as much as an incentive. As Mulgan and Warpole argue,

> The privatisation of pleasure – driven by basic economics – has become a fundamental issue, whilst traditions of civic, municipal, and public cultures are being swept away. [...] When television is available at around 2p an hour, why bother with the expense and trouble of travelling to the city centre? (1986: 107)

Hesmondhalgh argues that the success of creative industries technologies "has drawn on the individualisation of social life" (2007: 100), and Mommaas agrees that changes in communicative and physical mobility increasingly allows "people to develop their own taste independent of an established national élite. Besides, there is an expanding media-cum-leisure industry catering for a larger diversity of tastes" (2004: 527). These drastic shifts in cultural engagement seem to have bypassed a cultural policy that articulates its goals in terms of increased cultural engagement, with this engagement serving in part to create an appropriate milieu for creative industries and wider regeneration. Yet those responsible for making the case for the ECoC see the creative industries as being naturally related to such an intervention, despite a variety of differences in methods and modes of operation. Garnham provides this important insight for the case at hand:

The cultural industries *are* mass media whose whole raison d'être is to exploit economies of scale and scope and efficient systems of distribution in order to deliver a cheap product or service to large numbers of consumers. One may not like mass media, but one should not pretend that one can have a large number of competing mini-media, at least at current levels of GDP. (2005b: 483, original emphasis)

6.3.2 Creating the success of the ECoC

Despite the myriad difficulties set out above, however, regarding the relationship between creative industries, the ECoC and cultural policy more broadly, the narration of Liverpool's ECoC success at a government level after 2008 sees this discourse of creativity continue as strong as ever. As noted in Chapter One, Liverpool's tenure as ECoC is positioned as proving the case that "culture changes people's lives, and has the power to transform cities and economies" (DCMS 2009), and in 2009 the then Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, Andy Burnham, held that Liverpool's tenure as ECoC had shown how "culture and creativity are part of the answer to tough economic times", how "creative skills will be more important – not less – in the economy of the future" and also how we must consider "the links between a vibrant cultural base, culture and creativity in schools and the digital economy" (Burnham 2009). This is not merely the position of a New Labour administration, concerned with augmenting the case of its continuing Creative Economy Programme, however. After a change in national government in mid-2010, current UK Prime Minister David Cameron held firm with the view set out in Chapter Five that the ECoC provided interlinked benefits for tourism and creative industries:

> Look at how Liverpool benefited from being the European Cultural Capital in 2008. Jobs in the city's hotels and bars rose by over a quarter, jobs in the creative industries increased by half and one million hotel beds were sold in the city. (Cameron 2010)

This claimed rise of 50% in employment in creative industries in the city is extremely unlikely to be accurate. Although the problems in collating evidence have been well covered, by no model do they show such growth, nor as has been discussed is there any logical pathway by which the ECoC could have instigated such growth. What has also been shown, however, is the persistence of a discourse linking cultural policy and economic success which seems remarkably resilient, and which also seems to be maintaining its resilience. Based on findings such as *"some* creative industries enterprises reported a growth in their client base which they viewed [sic] *partly* attributable to the Liverpool ECoC" (Impacts 08 2009: 3, emphasis added), a report by the Impacts 08 research programme into the effects of the ECoC, which also presents the lack of any relative increase in creative industries employment over the course of a decade discussed above, was interpreted by ex-culture minister Lady

Hodge thus: "that makes me hugely optimistic about what UK City of Culture can do for strengthening the profile of cities and encouraging the creative sector" (Hodge 2010).

Statements from central government such as those above clearly align with the problematic discourse of an economy entirely transformed as discussed in Chapter One, and with one which sees creativity as part of a fundamental newness working throughout the entirety of society. In discussing the legacy of the ECoC, Burnham (2009) provides a clear echo of the language of Landry quoted at the outset of this chapter: "the world in January 2009 is a fundamentally different place to what it was in January 2008". Once again it is argued that there are tangible links between the ECoC intervention, the cultural infrastructure of the city, 'creativity' in schools and elsewhere, and the wider economy which, as the discussion above has demonstrated is, at best, a matter of faith. This association continues not just at a national, but at an international level:

> Cultural and creative industries also contribute to the competitiveness and social cohesion of
> our cities and regions. European Capitals of Culture such as Lille, Liverpool and others show
> that investing in this sector creates jobs. (European Commission 2010b)

The same story of cultural regeneration resulting in successful creative industries, and the relatively successful performance of these industries, persists. As noted, in an attempt to spread the power of such supposed linkages at a national level, the UK has now set up a national 'City of Culture' competition to "unlock the cultural and creative power in the whole of the UK" as, in an echo of Florida, "all British cities are full of talent" (Burnham 2009). Here there is a clear continuation of the discourse above of the wide potential to tap 'creativity', and as a result of this competition if nothing else, the creativity agenda will presumably be perpetuated as a whole for some years to come.

In the process around the bidding for UK City of Culture 2013, the local administration of a city such as Norwich, based on the model of success established by Liverpool, put forth the argument that the award will "provide a model for the future for medium sized UK cities who want to drive social and economic change through culture and creativity", and would serve to "make Norwich a national leader in the UK Knowledge Economy and make us a recognised national and international centre of excellence in the Creative Industries" (Norwich UK City of Culture 2010). Eventual award winner Derry/Londonderry in its bid discusses the familiar notion of "culture at the heart of regeneration", the necessity of "making culture accessible" to its population and the "opportunities for our creative industries" (Derry ~ Londonderry City of Culture 2013 2010) which the reward would result in, in a smooth continuation of the dominant discourse. The problems with such arguments as these in the case of Liverpool have been discussed in detail above, and these apply even more so in the case of a yet smaller, yet more provincial city such as Derry. Looking into the future, then, cultural policy in this

area seems likely to persist upon the belief that culture and creativity, however defined, are natural bedfellows, and the one will always follow from the other. This may in part be due to the persistence of certain influences around these concepts: under the headline "The Government's New Guru", a recent Economist article (2010) identifies how Richard Florida and his theories on creativity are proving influential upon the latest UK government, for instance. The continuation of this dominant position, though, does nothing to reduce the clear heterogeneity both within the creative industries and between them and the operations of cultural policy, even when such policies claims to be directly concerned with these industries.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has further problematized the presumed relationship between creative industries and cultural policy examined in the previous chapter, but has also noted how political discourse concerning this relationship, with particular regard to the Liverpool ECoC, persists with a narrative of success, regardless of these problems. This chapter has further developed critique on the basis of the catachresis of 'creativity', showing how community arts development and cultural engagement more broadly are posited as being integral to the development of creative industries. It was suggested that rather than necessarily being a new development, however, that this tension regarding the relationship between policy interventions and the development of related industries may be endemic to the cultural policy sector. What is more problematic in the current era, however, is that certain creative industries have transformed cultural engagement, and so to argue that cultural policy can benefit creative industry development by promoting such engagement serves not only to raise the problematic question of the nature of this relationship, but also to question whether cultural programmes such as the ECoC are the most reasonable way to proceed in the 21st century. As was found in Chapter Five, here again it seems that a nebulous notion of how cultural activity will gradually influence success in the creative industries (the economic value of which is in doubt in the first place) is in play. As this lacks logical rigour, however, the extent to which such goals will be attained is deeply questionable.

So far, the discussion of this thesis has predominantly focused on conceptual and theoretical issues raised by a consideration of academic analysis and policy documents. As was outlined in Chapter Three, though, it is seen as extremely important to also consider the experience of those actually working within the creative industries. Perhaps this purely discursive, theoretical analysis of the relationships involved in this area misses some important factors which are only visible 'on the ground', and perhaps when questioned those who have carried out processes of entrepreneurship in the creative industries do articulate a clear role for the ECoC, or for the ideas and concepts considered thus far, providing a contrast to the preceding analysis. The next chapter will therefore consider the

narration of occupational development by those who have set up businesses across the creative industries, and will thus examine the important factors which emerge within a wider discussion of their conception of their own practice. It will be seen that these accounts also present a number of difficulties for the ideal notion of the creative industries that permeates policies such as those discussed thus far, but it will be argued that they also raise new possibilities for a transformed understanding of the role and development of such industries.

Chapter Seven – Accounts of the 'Creative Entrepreneur'

Having considered the discourse which seems to operate within relevant policy documents regarding the relationship between cultural policy and the creative industries, and having also considered the way in which processes of entrepreneurship are particularly linked to the notion of 'creative' activity, especially within creative industries, this chapter focuses on the responses given in interviews carried out with those responsible for starting their own businesses within these industries in the city of Liverpool, as delineated in Chapter Three. As analysis thus far has largely considered the nature of policy discourse, it is important to also consider the experiences of those working within the creative industries, as their accounts may provide insight into the relationships under consideration which more desk-based analysis cannot provide. This chapter will show how the factors emerging as important for those interviewed raise new topics for consideration, and thus raise the prospect for a more fine-grained understanding, less prone to the catachresis of creativity discussed so far.

These accounts were gathered via unstructured interviews, in which respondents were encouraged to narrate their own experiences of establishing businesses and working within the creative industries and the processes which had influenced their actions. The data arising from these interviews was then analysed and coded around the emergent salient themes. This chapter aims to consider these themes in light of the issues which have come under consideration in the previous chapters, contrasting this 'bottom-up' perspective with the 'top-down' constructs of policy discourse. The main topics which have been extracted from discussion of the 'biographies' of those interviewed, whose practice seems so valued by cultural policy, are i) their conception, or otherwise, of their practice as a 'creative' one, and more broadly the appropriateness of the nomenclature of 'creative industries', ii) the factors around choosing Liverpool as the particular location for their business, iii) their notion of 'entrepreneurship' in relation to their own practice, and in relation to questions of value, and iv) how the specific initiative of the ECoC, and public sector initiatives more broadly, affect or overlap with their practice.

As noted, in order to maintain the anonymity of respondents, they will be referred to for the most part by reference to the DCMS category of the creative industries they work within, such as 'advertising' or 'publishing', and also by an identifying number to indicate which particular respondent is under consideration, in the form 'Craft (1)', 'Film/Video/Photography (4)' and so forth. The majority of the material quoted below, and presented in appendices, comes from transcripts of audio recordings of interview sessions; a small minority of the material comes from notes taken within or immediately after the interview had occurred where recording was not possible, or not acceptable to the interviewee.

7.1 The unity of creativity?

In previous chapters, the issue of the commonality of the practices carried out by those working within the 'creative industries' grouping has been severely questioned. Whereas Hartley argues that "we *must* describe them [the creative industries] holistically" (2005: 32, emphasis added), and that those within the creative industries have simply yet to fully understand their commonality, Taylor notes the persistence of this non-adoption of group identity (2006: 15), and argues that it may only be practitioners within the arts who see the existence of such an overlap:

> It should be regarded as significant that the arts lobby mostly uses the creative industry tag. Very few other sector bodies, representing other components of what are taken to be the creative industries, use the tag in their sector's promotion work. (2006: 12)

Firstly, then, it is germane to consider the issue of whether those interviewed chose to express a sense that their own practice is one that is 'creative' in a sense that may unify the seemingly disparate areas under consideration, or whether as Taylor suggests, the notion of any overlap between the differing subsectors of the creative industries only has currency from the perspective of arts practitioners. Whilst from the previous discussion we may expect no mention of the idea of 'creative industries' to occur during the interview process, a number of respondents did in fact utilise the terminology of 'creative industries' in their accounts. A sense of ownership of the term itself, or of what it represented, however, was far less forthcoming, and in the majority of cases the terminology of the 'creative industries' did not naturally arise. What does seem to emerge from the interview data is a precarious conception around the unity of creative practice which in some way mirrors that found within policy, and the point of view offered by Taylor above; those within the more arts-related or culturally expressive subsectors of the creative industries grouping seem more inclined to conceive of an overlap between their practice and the other subsectors within the creative industries, whilst the reverse is not true, as is discussed below. In both of these cases, however, due to these positions being grounded in actual practice, the discourse of practitioners is much less prone to catachresis of 'creativity' to which policy seems particularly susceptible.

7.1.1 Are they 'creative industries'?

Firstly, let us consider usage of the term 'creative industries' itself. There seems to be evidence that, in the minority of cases where this term was brought up independently, it is one which has been imposed from without, and which practitioners do not consider representative of their practice. Consider this interviewee, for example:

Craft (2): I'd never call *myself* a 'creative industry', but in the Bluecoat[21] we're in a "creative industry unit". Which means that we're on a lease, and not a license Or is it the other way round? Different from the retail units. But that's the only thing that affects us.

Similarly, this exchange occurred with an interviewee working in advertising, in a discussion of the early development of their career:

Advertising (1): ...and then I got a job in a small consultancy based in 'Digital Inc.' – ICDC[22] had an incubator for start-up creative industries.

- Is 'Creative Industries' a label you would apply to yourself?

Advertising (1): No, definitely not.

In further discussion, the reason for this was made clear. The area of advertising in which they operated was not seen by this interviewee as representing a truly *creative* practice:

Advertising (1): We work with a lot of creatives, loads of different people *[reference made to specific visual arts, music, craft and design practitioners].* and they *are* what I would call creative industries because they're making things, or they're performing. We're kind of writing press releases and sending them to press, and maybe setting up a photocall, or maybe doing the odd bit of design here and there, but nothing that would really warrant a position within the 'creative'... *[trails off]*

As within the 'ideal' policy conception, therefore, there is a sense for this practitioner of the most appropriate place to apply the 'creative' label as being expressive, arts-based practice. Whereas Chapter Five described how policy discourse conceives of this artistic creativity as being a core activity which ripples out to influence other 'creative' areas, however, a response such as that above questions the viability of such a process. A very similar exchange also occurred with an interviewee from within the 'Art/Antiques' sector most closely related to such 'core' creative activity regarding the start of their career:

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21. A local arts centre, re-opened during 2008 with space for retail, creative industry and artist studios
22. The 'International Centre for Digital Content', a School within the Media, Arts & Social Science Faculty of Liverpool John Moores University.

Art/Antiques (1): I just wanted to know who could help me. Creative Bias[23] had some grants available, it was literally for businesses who had started in the last six months in the creative industries to help them grow.

- Is that the label that you would apply to yourself?

Art/Antiques (1): No, no, it's a term created entirely by government. I'd never use it. And I don't see the unity, not in any way. I think there's at least three distinct groups who have *very* little to do with each other. On a practical or theoretical basis. The idea of 'creativity' isn't all that helpful. It's not some kind of general skill, and it's a very artificial definition [...] Artists I would say are a proper definition of someone working in the *creative* industries, because they are creating, objects, artworks. To then put a graphic designer or someone working in video production in the same category as the artist is just... maybe we pretend not to see the difference.

The issues considered in the previous chapters of the thesis, of who and what is most appropriately deemed 'creative', and the relations between these areas, thus seem to be very keenly felt by a number of those designated by policy as belonging within the 'creative industries' category, and the various definitional problems identified previously seem to remain just as problematic at this practical level as they do at the conceptual level. On this topic, there are perhaps two key issues to consider which emerged from interview data, reflected in the quotations above, and reflective of the discussions related to policy thus far: i) whether there is an overlap in the *nature* of the industries grouped under this heading, and ii) whether there is any similarity in the *paths taken* by those interviewed towards working within these industries.

7.1.1.1 The non-creative creatives

From the analysis of the interview data gathered, there seems to be a definite split in self-conception amongst entrepreneurs operating within the area designated by policy as the creative sector: as noted above, those who occupy the most expressive, most clearly arts-based (and therefore, by one definition, most appropriately 'creative') roles, such as those in art, music and film often *do* discuss an overlap between their practice and other areas. Those in less clearly expressive roles however, do not articulate such an overlap, and also may not necessarily see their roles as 'creative' ones in any substantial way. This is clear from the response of the interviewee working in advertising considered above who considers it much more appropriate for visual artists and musicians to be seen as 'creative industries', and who adds:

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23. A local creative industries development initiative.

> **Advertising (1):** When people come and see us, they do refer to us as
> fucking...creative, frigging creative geniuses, which is nice. but... *[trails off]*

Similarly, we can consider the role given to 'creativity' by another interviewee from advertising, which is expressed with great clarity:

> **Advertising (2):** Everyone loves creativity, they love seeing things that speak to
> them, and that's what they buy into, but it's underpinned by big, fuck-off[24], solid
> boundaries. Creativity doesn't underpin our business at all.

Very similar points of view to this were also expressed by those interviewees working in the realm of architecture in relation to their own practice. Consider, for example, this response:

> **Architecture (1):** I think from your perspective you need to understand that what I do
> is, in one sense, not creative. The creativity that can be imbued in architecture is
> extremely hard-won, and practice, you know, is opposed to theory. That's the
> definition of it. [...]
> [*A named office*] practise architecture exclusively as a business, there's no art in
> what they do whatsoever. They understand the funding matrices that developers
> use, they understand – there's [*building in Liverpool*]: very high profile, they knew
> how to get the public sector funding to get it done, it had huge press, a very well-
> organised machine. Now there is a *form* of 'creativity' in that process, but there is no
> pretence to *art*.

It is clear from this final sentence that a unified conception of 'creativity' whereby any form of creative activity is related to any other is not held by this respondent, and that these forms can, in fact, be clearly distinguished. Whilst it has been shown how the discourse of policy attempts to draw a clear connecting line between artistic creativity and other forms in terms of justifying interventions such as the ECoC, the extent to which activity in a field such as architecture is likely to be influenced, even in a tangential or eventual way, by political interventions to increase the level of arts engagement by children as discussed in Chapter Six, for example, is questionable. The topic of the appropriate role for cultural policy that emerges from interview data is considered in more detail below. Another architect expressed their view of the situation thus:

> **Architecture (2):** Well, architecture is not art-based, really, it's problem solving, it's
> academic. There's very few people practising architecture as what I would think of as
> creative, as a creative art. I think a lot of it is business.

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24. 'Fuck-off' is being used colloquially here as an adjective in order to emphasise size.

Whilst policy can establish a discourse of practices such as advertising and architecture as 'creative', those who actually practise such occupations offer very clear expressions of the appropriateness of such a label to their working practice. There is no sense that this is work which at its core involves an expression of the self (Sennett 2006: 104), or more generally artistic qualities (e.g. Ross 2003: 112), or that such factors influence this work to any great degree, as is often implied to be the case. This may be due to the situation being that implied by Hartley, that the creative industries have merely not noticed their inherent commonality (2005: 26), but it is perhaps more likely that there are simply fundamental differences in the nature of these industries. We may, for instance, in light of the comments made above consider Evans' comments regarding architecture, which he characterises as, "quite distinct from painting and writing, not simply because it requires the addition of some extra ingredient such as utility or function, but because it encompasses everyday reality" (Evans 1997: 89). The nature of the work involved precludes the construction of a simplistic commonality. Similarly, the social position and practices involved in advertising seem to be well understood by the practitioners quoted above as not being fundamentally 'creative' in this expressive way, but again as encompassing important factors of utility. The conflation of these disparate activities by policy can be seen from this perspective as simply being one which fails, methodologically and intellectually, to take the diverse nature of the activities involved fully into account, merely assuming a commonality from without, and then proceeding as though this commonality has some fundamental substance upon which we can treat the 'creative industries' as a coherent object for analysis. If the 'creative industries' are not a coherent object of analysis, however, then nor are they a coherent object for policy intervention, and any discussion of the economic (or any other) performance of this imagined single 'sector' relates to an object which will remain permanently intangible.

To continue on this theme, considering the discussion in previous chapters of the inappropriateness of the definition of software within the 'creative industries' grouping, the analysis of interview data also proffered an extremely useful point of view from one interviewee who now works within the 'Art/Antiques' subsector of the creative industries, but previously had a career within the 'Software/Computer Games' subsector. This interviewee narrated the difference between their prior and current practice thus:

> **Art/Antiques (2):** Well, there's a difference between following a process and the act of creating art even though they both involve 'creation'. The actual creation of software I used to do, I wouldn't call it creative. It is coding, it's well structured, there are formal processes you have to follow, testing and so on. Once a service is agreed, software development follows a more rigorous course. Based on risk, you want things to work every time. If you want to express yourself, that's not for you.

This practitioner thus robustly reinforces the conceptual analysis carried out previously, and this quote strongly echoes the viewpoint put forward by Lash and Urry, albeit in more academic language, who argue that, "whereas the software sector entails abstract, codified knowledge, what the culture sector entails among its artists who are so important in creating the value-added is not cognitive knowledge but a hermeneutic sensibility" (1994: 123).

Even in the area of web design, which makes up a small minority of the economically successful 'software' category used in policy to promote the value of the whole creative sector, there emerges the sense that expressive, cultural values (or this 'hermeneutic sensibility') are not a central, core element of practice. The following interviewee expressed this view when prompted to consider their cultural role:

> **Software/Computer Games (2):** I could do a website for an artist – I have done – but I don't think the website itself is art. Don't get me wrong, they're very nice, but I'm responding to a client at the end of the day.

The issue of what 'creativity' actually refers to, which seems to cause so much potential confusion from the analysis of the three preceding chapters, therefore, seems to be one which is reasonably easily dealt with by those who choose to set up businesses within the 'creative industries': having to actually practise such activities on day-to-day basis, there is a clear sense of what the terms of engagement do and do not refer to, what their work is, and what it is not; indeed, what the nature of the creativity involved, such as it is, relates to, and what it does not. As an interviewee working in the realm of design offers:

> **Design (1):** Everyone is creative unless you're being told what to do. It just seems to be a question of semantics. It's how you define creativity. You know, if someone doesn't know how to get a piano out of a door: 'be creative'. But that's not the same as someone painting a picture.

The issue of an "interlinked and inseparable" form of creativity at the heart of the creative class thesis which seems to be so influential upon policy discourse, as considered in the previous chapters, does not seem to be on the agenda for these practitioners; or rather it seems to be easily dismissed as an irrelevance. As noted, however, there does on the face of it seem initially to be some assumed unity of creative practice narrated by those within the more cultural/expressive creative industry subsectors.

7.1.1.2 The creative creatives

In discussion of a variety of creative practices, such as computer gaming, mobile technology, and digital media, for example, an interviewee from the subsector of music stated the following:

> **Music/Performing Arts (2):** I think they are all overlapping. They don't overlap in a natural form, but one of the things I have an absolute understanding of from my business, and it hasn't realised itself yet, but people who have got periscopes up and have got vision, is that sooner or later they are going to be co-dependent on each other. And you see that through the innovation of technology. [...] Anyone who's got creativity will come to a funnel on a central processing unit.

This interviewee was certain that the subsector of music could proliferate throughout the majority of other areas which constitute 'the creative industries'. This position did, however, come with some clarification:

> **Music/Performing Arts (2):** Creativity is the natural talent, innovation is the platform or the model that facilitates it. That's how I see it. That's not to say *musicians* should be innovative, that's just a handling of the language.

Again, therefore, even where some linkages between differing industrial subsectors are seen, practitioners are not prone to the overlap and blurring of boundaries that policy and academic discourse can be prone to. The need for discrete *facilitation* between cultural forms and other 'creative' practices, rather than the assumed 'rippling out' process discussed previously, is identified as a necessary step, and the creativity involved is not assumed to be all of a piece. Where an overlap between differing 'creative' areas is noted by practitioners, as in the case above, it is not necessarily in terms of a unity of *practice*, more a set of opportunities for interaction between different arenas which do not themselves have a fundamental commonality. In a discussion of the other areas being researched which emerged towards the end of discussions with another practitioner working in the field of music, for instance, there came the following point of view:

> **Music/Performing Arts (1):** I would interact with all of those [areas], every single one of them. Say, for example, [*an event the interviewee was involved in*] involved architecture, loads of those areas need music, you need to get your music published...

Utilising the products of other sectors within one's own professional practice or collaborating with other practitioners may indeed occur, but this does not necessitate being put into the same industrial grouping as them. The visual artist may inspire the designer whose product is sold by the advertiser,

but as we have seen above, the advertiser may not necessarily consider themselves to be 'creative', nor is there necessarily any imagined or actual overlap between the practices of these different workers, linked though they may be in some fashion. Similarly, the interviewee quoted above no doubt 'interacts' with many other areas professionally, such as transportation or insurance, but there must be some more concrete commonality to enable the drawing of a logical boundary, and for policy to intervene in a way appropriate to this bounded area. Whilst the following respondent from the world of film is undoubtedly correct in making reference to overlaps in areas such as:

> **Film/Video/Photography (1):** ...musicians exploring ways of creating music through programming. I use programming to do video work where I'm building things for theatre and I'm trying to get ways for people to interact with it and there's levels of programming to do with that. I think all these areas do overlap, you can't put one umbrella over all of them, but you can't box them off from each other, and the digital is a big part of that.

It does not follow that *all* digital operations should be assumed to align with artistic expression under the banner of creative industries, as seems to be the case with the boundaries drawn by policy discussed in Chapter Four. Just as there are more opportunities for the use of software and computer technology in the expressive arts, so do all manner of everyday experiences involve such considerations; we are more likely to find computers present in household appliances, just as we are more likely to use software to an ever greater degree within our daily communication. To acknowledge the increased involvement of ICTs in creative practice and to exclusively align them with that practice alone is to disregard the increased involvement of ICTs in a multitude of other areas.

7.1.2 A common creative background?

Despite having focussed so far on the seeming conceptual split within the interview data relating to creativity, however, it should be noted that those who did not frame themselves or their business practices as especially 'creative', or as having anything in common with the other constitutive parts of the creative sector, did mostly relate an initial professional desire to be involved in activities related to what may broadly be termed 'culture' in the artistic sense in the process of charting their professional biography, or discuss their background as involving the study of art-related subjects. This does lend some weight to the arguments of policy documents discussed in Chapter Six, whereby encouraging educational achievement in the arts may lead to a flourishing creative sector. The table in Appendix A-2 shows the split between those who currently see themselves as involved in expressive/cultural practice, regardless of their use of the 'creative industries' banner (or their conception of a wider notion

of 'creativity' beyond their specific practice), those who have some background in such practice, and those who do not fit into either of these categories.

Unsurprisingly, given the field of investigation, a majority of those interviewed do consider their work to be cultural or expressive in some way, and a reasonable number have a background in such expressive or cultural activity, whereas only a minority do not. It does pose a major difficulty for group commonality, however, if even *some* proposed group members do not offer any sense of cultural or expressive motivation in their work and significantly, given the preceding arguments, it is this third grouping of those who do not articulate any cultural component within their work which includes those interviewed within the subsector of 'software'. Of those who have a prior history of such creative practice or study, comments were made such as these:

> **Architecture (2):** I was going to do fine art [at degree level], I'd taken a lot of time to sort out a portfolio, post-A-level. I don't know why I decided that, because I didn't really want to do fine art.

> **Art/Antiques (1):** I finished my degree, loved my degree, always wanted to be involved in art, wanted to be an artist, realised that wasn't going to happen. [...] I was quite confused by the whole thing. I love it, but I don't love it enough. There are people here who are obsessed and really talented.

> **Film/Video/Photography (3):** I didn't even realise I was going to be in a band before I was in a band, it was straight from school, and then when I got tired of that, I then jumped into doing instrumental work, when that got a bit intense I had enough money to open my own studio, so redefined myself as a recording engineer, eventually too many heavy metal bands, so redefined myself, got a band going again, signed to CBS, and then went back into the movie industry, and then producing.

Whilst many of those interviewed, then, had an initial desire to work in some sense around 'the arts' and have achieved this, others have found this desire checked, channelled into other areas, or simply cut off. For example, these two practitioners, like the architect quoted above, had a background directly related to Fine Art, but now found themselves working in other fields:

> **Craft (1):** I discovered towards the end of my degree [in Fine Art] that I wasn't a fine artist. [...] I set out to be a painter, and someone had to tap me on the shoulder and say 'you've been painting that for six months, you're not even enjoying it.' It was a difficult time.

> **Music/Performing Arts (3):** I suppose I very much liked the idea of being an artist, but I was hampered by... well, an overwhelming lack of any real talent didn't help.

Whilst this may be seen to some degree as reinforcing the view that engagement with arts education has resulted in new businesses within the creative industries, it would arguably be premature to see this as evidence of the 'rippling out' into eventual creative industries practice from a central stimulation of practice within the arts as described in policy discourse. That a pattern of this initial longing for, or engagement with, an expressive artistic education which gradually mutates into practice of a different kind is confined merely to those who end up working within the creative industries is unlikely: in 2008 alone, almost 8,000 degree applications were received in Creative Arts and Design subjects in the city of Liverpool, of which fewer than 15% were accepted[25], and these statistics are of a similar magnitude to the respective figures from recent years[26]. Clearly, there are many individuals with this initial desire to study in creative, artistic areas, yet few of these are likely to end up working in the creative industries locally; recent research by the Impacts 08 research programme suggests, that the entire creative industries sector in Liverpool is made up of around 4,500 people (2009: 31). It is therefore rather more likely that a personal biography of an initial desire to study or practise art which has gradually changed or been abandoned for practice of another form is one which permeates many other sectors outside of those within the 'creative industries'. It is also the case that such study is not a universally common precursor within the creative industries. Clearly, though, a research project of this size can only provide so much insight, and clarification of this issue would require further study. What *is* clear from the research at hand, however, is that this issue of higher educational study and its relation to subsequent practice emerged as a very important issue within the biographical narratives of the overwhelming majority of those interviewed, regardless of their stance on the subject of 'creativity', particularly as it relates to the location of their practice.

7.2 Location

Despite differences in stance upon many issues, a key unifying theme which emerged out of the majority of biographical narratives related by entrepreneurs in relation to the development of their current form of working was the issue of how and why those interviewed had set up businesses in the particular location of Liverpool. On this there is a clear division to be identified initially between two groups: those businesses which have been set up by those who grew up in the city, and those established by individuals who have come to the city from elsewhere. The breakdown of the entire group is shown in Appendix A-3, where it can be seen that a large proportion of those currently practising within Liverpool originally hail from the city. Regardless of their origin, though, and

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25. Source: UCAS 2008.

26. 2008: 7898 applications, 1164 acceptances; 2007: 8950 applications, 1213 acceptances; 2006: 7397 applications, 1111 acceptances; 2005: 7534 applications, 1071 acceptances.

echoing the statistics discussed in Chapter Six regarding the high incidence of graduates within the creative industries, it is clear that the universities within the city play a very important role, both in attracting and also in retaining those who have subsequently formed new enterprises within the creative industries. Indeed, the findings of this stage of research strongly echo those found by Banks studying a similar topic in the nearby city of Manchester: "many entrepreneurs were born in Manchester or hailed from nearby towns and cities, while others had attended college/university in the city and decided to 'stay on'" (2006: 464). This pattern of origination or attraction via university study accounts for the location of the vast majority of those interviewed in this study. Of those who are originally from the city, some have come into the creative industries from a non-educational route, but there were many statements made which identified the role of the local universities in retaining practitioners within the city. It is within the cohort from outside the city that the importance of the universities as a force of attraction becomes most clear, however, and perhaps explains the high incidence of entrepreneurs originally from outside the city within the sample interviewed. Often the decision to attend university locally does not seem to have been made as a result of any great insight or research, nor with any long-term view to entrepreneurial opportunities within the city, nor in some cases with any real sense of the city whatsoever, but once the degree process has been completed, the city often manages to retain those it has captured. The full range of relevant responses is given in Appendix A-4, but a selection is noted below:

Architecture (3): I came here to study, basically. It was purely the school.

Art/Antiques (1): I wanted to study [*subject*] [...] I wanted to go to a city, and I wanted to – I visited the three or four places that did it, and I liked Liverpool.

Design (2): I just wanted to get away from [*home town*], really. Liverpool seemed as good a place to study as any. And I'm just here now, really.

Film/Video/Photography (1): It's more fortuitous, accidental. A lot of people who graduate in Liverpool...I was here to study and there was no big reason to move away.

Within these quotations, and the wider selection in Appendix A-4, it would not be over-reaching to argue that the nature and quality of school and education is at least as important as the quality of place as an attractive force, not that the latter is unimportant, however, nor that the two are necessarily unrelated. Rather than being attracted by a vibrant, 'creative' milieu, however, from the positions outlined above it seems, at least in initially attracting those who go on to establish businesses in creative industries, that bolstering and diversifying the range of higher education opportunities is just as valuable a route to take, should this be an aim which policy seeks to fulfil. In any case, there was little sense that it is specifically Liverpool's *cultural* infrastructure which has attracted those from

outside who have eventually fulfilled some form of entrepreneurial function within the creative industries, despite this being strongly linked to a successful creative industries sector in policy discourse.

On the issue of decision-making regarding location, and Liverpool's relative attractive force, it is perhaps instructive to consider the research into the 'knowledge economy' businesses of Liverpool Science Park which found that: "LSP is of interest only to companies who either are already in the Liverpool City Region or who have a pre-existing link with the City" (Tasker 2008: 7). Similarly, from the interviewee responses above, it seems within the creative 'sector', such as it is, that there is little sense that Liverpool has specifically attracted entrepreneurs within the creative industries who see business opportunities ripe for exploitation here. Rather, it has managed to *retain* those who have arrived to study, often with no strong compulsion to choose Liverpool as a city in which they see future business potential, and also it has retained some of those who have always been present. A more concrete understanding of the reasons Liverpool seems to operate in this way, and whether this is also the case for the entrepreneurial cohort in other cities, would require further research beyond the boundaries of this study, although the findings of Banks referred to above do point to some evidence in this direction, and it should be noted more generally that "the empirical evidence suggests that entrepreneurs do indeed have a distinct propensity to establish firms in regions where they already live" (Scott 2006: 7).

7.2.1 Does this practice benefit the locality?

Whilst entrepreneurs may be prone to establish businesses in the locations they already find themselves in for a number of reasons, what is perhaps more troubling for policymakers seeking to engender a climate conducive to the development of creative enterprises in the hopes that a 'creative city' will emerge, resulting in either social or economic regeneration (or both), is the issue raised by a minority of interviewees, particularly in the subsector of music or with a background in this subsector, of the extent to which creative practice centred on Liverpool is actually of benefit to the city. In terms of the operations of the popular music industry, with which Liverpool has a notably strong symbolic relationship, consider this response:

> **Music/Performing Arts (4):** My take on it, and it's by no means a universal take, and I do think things are changing, but I think there's something about the emotional and psychological makeup of the artistic community here that is all about creation, and finds the nuts and bolts side boring. [...] I think we all found the company side of the record company too boring for words, the thing of being the person that deals with the invoices, and people, and as soon as an offer came in from a record

company, [*a major record label*] set up the licence and repertoire division, and they signed up 40% of the independent record market, and that took the business side away, which meant we could concentrate on recording – but not generally in Liverpool. So, did that benefit Liverpool? Maybe not.

Also in the world of music, consider this response which, whilst fully supporting the image of Liverpool as a dynamic cultural city of the kind that policy seeks to promote in narrating the background to particular business choices:

Music/Performing Arts (2): I wasn't an academic, I wasn't going to be a lawyer or a doctor, I saw Berlin in Liverpool. And thought 'this place is amazing, it's got a soul, it breathes, it's got character, it's a well.'

went on to conclude the discussion of these issues with the following caveat:

Music/Performing Arts (2): Our offices are in [*another city*], as it happens. My business premises is in [*another city*] but I managed to understand that I can keep a profile through my personal brand name.

In these cases, the issue of how the local operation of creative industries is actually of benefit to a locality in terms of 'regeneration' potentially becomes quite nebulous, particularly if, as has been noted, the primary aim of an intervention such as the ECoC is an increase in the level of arts-based cultural activity and an improvement of the image of the city. Particularly with regard to economic regeneration, we may consider Henwood's take on the division of income within the creative industries: "the illusion-spinners are not the prime reward-getters – senior managers and stockholders are" (2005: 165). This raises certain difficulties for a policy environment which places such value on creativity at the individual level and posits individual entrepreneurship as a particularly valuable activity. In any case, whilst such interventions as the ECoC may indeed result in an improved cultural aura around a place, and directly employ some in a creatively expressive capacity, there is no guarantee that the exploitation of this aura will benefit those who actually reside in the city which generates it. In the quotations above, it is clear that for some, Liverpool's image becomes a resource that can be used for the purposes of creative businesses, with related profits leaving the city, or that the less expressive, and often more lucrative, activities involved with creative business can be placed in the hands of those operating elsewhere, to the relief of those uninterested in these more business-focussed matters. Whilst there are indeed successful businesses trading on the city's cultural capital in some form, the relationship between this success and the wider success of the city itself, or any associated regeneration, is less clear.

7.2.1.1 The problem with image

Another factor which emerged from interview data is the question of where this tradable cultural capital comes from. As the public sector bodies of Liverpool seek to characterise the city as "daring, unpredictable [...] creative and edgy" (Liverpool First 2008: 3, 44), it must be asked in what sites such daring edginess can reside. For such an image to resonate it must surely be reflective of some kind of reality. Kohler and Löwis (2008), for example, suggest that abandoned sites and derelict spaces are vital to any creative activity. Relatedly, one interviewee noted,

> **Architecture (1):** I did come to the Biennial in 1999, and that was exceptional I've got photographs of Henry Street with bins on fire, dereliction, squalor, then you're into a show, and I thought "this is – something's happening here". I accept that's not the image Messrs. Bradley[27] and his chums want the world to see. But a little bit later I was in New York, and you're in Queens and everything's a mess and ...you know?

A similar point was made by another interviewee:

> **Film/Video/Photography (4):** What makes places popular have got something to do with the underbelly. So, Amsterdam - prostitution, San Francisco - Alcatraz, no one predicted that. That sort of regeneration, there's a lot of these places based on these kind of things. But once they realise they've got something, they put up a load of tat

Whether or not there is a direct benefit to those in a given area from the operation of creative businesses, it is clear that the issue of the cultural resources of place does not entail simple relationships, or a virtuous circle whereby everything may continuously improve for all parties, but rather a complex, dynamic set of circumstances.

It is perhaps instructive on this point to briefly consider the ECoC programme directly, and its attempts to leverage the cultural cachet of one of Liverpool's most famous offspring, former Beatle Ringo Starr. Invited to participate in the opening ceremony of the ECoC to ensure international media coverage of the event, and taking the opportunity to promote his latest single penned about the city, 'Liverpool 8', taken from his recent album, also entitled 'Liverpool 8' (the recording of songs about his birthplace is a perennial feature of Starr's recorded output), Starr provoked local controversy[28] due to

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27. A reference to Warren Bradley, Leader of Liverpool City Council at the time of this interview
28. Including, notably, the decapitation of a topiary effigy of Starr recently unveiled at a local railway station (BBC 2008b).

this exchange which occurred as part of a television interview during this same promotional run, days after the ECoC opening ceremony:

> Starr: I was at Liverpool for the weekend for the City of Culture. Great.
>
> - And that's an exciting thing to be happening for Liverpool, I would have thought?
>
> Starr: Well I think any city would, you know, be an exciting event. As it was for Liverpool.
>
> - Do you, what do you miss about Liverpool when you're not there?
>
> Starr: (laughs)
>
> - I didn't know that would get a laugh! Obviously this is going to be a great answer! Are there any things you miss about being in Liverpool anymore?
>
> Starr: Uhhh...no! (audience laughter). No, I love Liverpool, I was a child, I grew up in Liverpool, family members in Liverpool, but...you know! (laughs, further audience laughter)

Whilst it is not unsurprising that a man who can be considered to have contributed to a process of global cultural influence does not feel the need to revisit the derelict urban fabric of his childhood[29], what is also true is that to some degree it is this very derelict urban fabric that is being traded as a symbolic commodity in his recorded, creative output. Similarly, from the interview extracts with those working in music quoted above, one trades on the image of Liverpool, but the profits derived from this are made by a multinational record label, and the other has a 'profile' based on the cultural cachet associated with the city, but a business registered elsewhere. If the reality of at least certain aspects of the urban fabric of the city of Liverpool is one of "dereliction", as also noted in responses above, then this can only ever be at odds with policy approaches to creativity which seek 'regeneration', even though some research suggests this dereliction may be informing, and in some respects central to, the very creative practice which emerges within the city. As Lovink and Rossiter note of the general move towards creativity within policy:

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29. At the time of writing, the streets containing Starr's birthplace are earmarked for demolition by Liverpool City Council.

> Yes, 'we need to be more creative'. But this agenda is way too convenient. It takes comfort
> precisely in its refusal to admit disruptive agencies that intervene or straight out ignore
> bureaucratic directives. (2007: 11)

The possibility that creativity may, at least in some areas, rest on the uncomfortable, the neglected, the squalid, or indeed, the ungovernable, is clearly not one that can easily be admitted into government policy, a tension which may render the creativity agenda permanently problematic.

The use of Liverpool as a cultural resource which does not necessarily feed back into the local economy is not a newly arising issue, however, but is noted by local council policy documents as far back as 1987 when the issue of linking cultural policy to economic regeneration was first discussed by Liverpool City Council (Parkinson and Bianchini 1993: 162). Of the local popular music group Frankie Goes To Hollywood, for example, a group arguably more popular in the UK at their peak than even The Beatles[30] (and who for the purposes of this aspect of discussion notably recorded an album entitled 'Liverpool'), an early "Arts and Cultural Industries Strategy" for the city notes that, "...for example, none of the £250m earnings from Frankie Goes To Hollywood's first album benefited the local music industry in Liverpool" (Liverpool City Council 1987: 7). There is scant evidence, however, that in the intervening twenty years this situation has successfully been tackled in any way, or that current cultural policy seeks to intervene with regards to establishing a more complete value chain to extract economic value from the creative activity it purports to promote. Policy intervenes on the justification of boosting the cultural aura around a particular geographic location, and this is expected in and of itself to create a number of positive externalities, yet there is little indication given of how these may come about.

Given the roots of the discussion above, whether this state of affairs is endemic only to the music industry is an issue which requires further investigation; there is, for example, seemingly a converse, yet related, situation in the computer games sector whereby location in Liverpool is of no particular moment to the content of work created in the city, but wherein enterprises are similarly likely to be subsidiaries of the multinational corporations which dominate the creative industries (see Chapter Eight). We can consider, for example, the case of Bizarre Creations, a locally-based developer most famed for games set in outer space, whose main cultural reference points are the international history of computer gaming rather than anything particular to the local environment, who are owned by an American publisher in itself majority owned by a French conglomerate. Similarly, Sony Computer Entertainment operates out of Liverpool, and is most strongly associated with the 'Wipeout' series of

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30. Frankie Goes To Hollywood's 'Relax' ranks 6th in the chart of best-selling singles in the UK; The Beatles' 'She Loves You' ranks 7th. Source: everyhit.com.

racing games set in a fantasy future world, whose cultural reference points are similarly international. What such operations offer to a city in terms of regeneration is debatable, but the influence which a specifically place-centric programme of cultural events will have on such industries is likely negligible. What does emerge out of the interviews conducted in a more general sense, though, is the related issue of the dominance of other geographical areas within the creative industries, and of the role of London in particular. For the purposes of this research, it is informative to note that this central dominance is often narrated as something which interviewees have little desire to participate in, and a factor which can be successfully avoided by working in a peripheral city such as Liverpool.

7.2.2 Avoidance of the centre

London's dominance of the creative industries has been noted briefly in Chapter Six, and will be returned to in Chapter Eight. To inform the discussion at hand here, it is useful to note a recent London Development Agency report which states that, "when its surrounding regions are included London can be seen to provide nearly 60% of UK creative employment" (2008: 30). As this report also notes, however, "a critical mass effects [sic] matters: in such cities [as London] one may find an audience for almost anything". As Scott relatedly finds,

> Participation in cultural-economic activities is based upon dense networks of producers combined with a dependence on complex local labour markets [...] these geographic underpinnings are decisive for understanding processes of creativity and innovation in the cultural economy. (1999: 807)

In terms of successful business operation in the bulk of the creative industries, therefore, density matters, audience matters, and so size matters. What is possible in world cities such as London, with a population of 7 million, or Berlin, with a population of 3 million, or New York with a population of 19 million, is unlikely to be feasible in a city such as Liverpool with a declining population of just over 400,000, or in the majority of other UK cities hoping to leverage in the power of culture to improve their economic circumstances. As will be discussed in the concluding remarks of Chapter Eight, this is particularly problematic given the 'winner-takes-all' characteristic of some creative businesses. In terms of the capacity of the local environment, consider this opinion given in one interview regarding one of the most successful cultural outcomes of the ECoC year:

If you look in Liverpool, there is hardly any film industry. I mean you've got Sol at Hurricane, and he made Of Time and the City[31], and you'd think after you make that you'd be laughing, but you're just back to square one. The film industry here you're not even as good as your last film. It counts for nothing.

Also, the size of a city will partially determine the wealth available to those involved in creative practices to make such activity viable commercially, a structural problem not easily dealt with, and one which is of concern to interviewees such as these:

Architecture (1): Obviously, though, what's missing in Liverpool is money. Or the money is all in the wrong place [...] A lot of the private wealth in this city is not in the hands of people who are ideal patrons for the arts. In any sense. Really. Which is difficult.

Art/Antiques (1): The people that want to buy art don't tend to live in the city, they tend to live outside.

Art/Antiques (3): [One way to] tap straight into networks for sales is because either the owner or the sales director or somebody within it is connected to a lot of very wealthy people who've got money to spend. I don't come from that kind of background.

What drives the location of some entrepreneurs within the local context, however, seems to be at least in part the opportunity to specifically *avoid* such a competitively dense and active centre as London. A full list of responses to this end is given in Appendix A-5; indicative examples are given below:

Art/Antiques (1): Everyone kept saying 'go to London' and I said 'there's no point me going to London because there's another 40 thousand people already there'

Film/Video/Photography (2): I think, 'would it be easier in London? Would it be harder?' And it would probably be harder to make a name for yourself, there would probably be more work, but it would probably be more competitive [   ] you'd meet less people, so getting a name for the work you do would be harder

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31. Produced with the assistance of the Liverpool Culture Company, directed by celebrated auteur Terence Davies, 'Of Time and the City' is a cinematic meditation on the city of Liverpool which has received international acclaim (e.g. New York Times 2009).

Liverpool's attraction for many, therefore, lies in some sense in this very lack of a competitive, thriving industrial environment. On this point, interviewees working within architecture particularly noted the limits a city such as Liverpool can offer:

> **Architecture (1):** If you're going to move in architecture, you tend to go to the centre, the greatest concentration of architects in this country is in London. It sustains a culture, there is a scene, which there can't be here. There simply aren't enough people. There aren't enough people in the profession.

> **Architecture (3):** The reasons I'm here aren't professional. Purely professionally, I'd find somewhere better than Liverpool quite easily.

Clearly for some, though, this lack of other established industry is also considered something of an opportunity:

> **Art/Antiques (3):** Financially, the market hasn't developed yet [in Liverpool]. So, there's lots of culturally interesting people, but so far there isn't a proven market. Whereas in London, there's a proven market. [...] I believe keeping artists in the region is important for a healthy arts economy across the UK. That not everyone wants to go and live and work in London. But they need the same ambition, and have that ambition supported outside London.

It is also clear from many responses, however, that some are attracted by the potential of being in a position where they do not have to compete so vigorously for work, where there is not liable to be a large cohort of other people with the same skills present jostling for position and business, and where the market does not involve potentially coercive competition to such a great degree (Keat 2000: 45). This is certainly reasonable enough from an individual perspective, although how this can translate into the successful operation of creative industries in the city, or whether it will contribute to achieving goals related to 'culture-led regeneration', is clearly another matter. On this same theme, one interviewee reflected on the comfort afforded by such a lack of competition, but also the difficulty for practitioners within Liverpool to break free of the confines of the city:

> **Film/Video/Photography (1):** I think because it's so small, it's easy to find other people to do projects [...] I liked it because it doesn't feel competitive here. Maybe it's insular, someone said it feels a bit like 'The Truman Show'[32]. [...] It's got everything in a small space but it's very inward-looking. Which is great for incubating projects, and incubating your own practice, because it's very supportive, you end up

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32. A 1998 feature film featuring a protagonist constantly under surveillance.

> helping a lot of people out with their projects, people support you in yours but it's
> hard to think 'how do I take it outside of Liverpool?'

This value placed on the ability to pursue projects, rather than in necessarily being able to find any wider markets to exploit them in, leads us back to a consideration of the issue of entrepreneurship and the values sought in the operation of such businesses.

7.3 Entrepreneurship

What is clear from the vast majority of interviews carried out is that entrepreneurship within the creative industries is often a matter of expediency rather than of the identification of opportunity for wealth generation or any similar economic motive. Presumably if the people identified above were acting from an entirely rational, economic perspective then an acknowledgement of the parochial position of Liverpool would result in a realisation of the potential for maximisation of profits elsewhere, and a related business movement. As Ghoshal explains, however,

> Mainstream economics has, in the main, always worked on the assumption of Homo
> Economicus--a model of people as rational self-interest maximizers. [...] Common sense has,
> of course, always recognized that human behavior can be influenced by other motives.
> Increasingly, empirical evidence provides overwhelming support to what common sense
> suggests. (2005: 82)

As was noted in Chapter Five, from a policy perspective, a lack of concern for business growth and pecuniary rewards on the part of a majority working within the creative industries is constructed as a 'failure' of business operation which needs to be rectified via, for example, better education on methods to increase the size and turnover of creative businesses. This lack of concern for growth is also a 'failure' from the position of those who value entrepreneurship for its ability to contribute to the economy. Whether this is considered a failure for those who have actually established businesses within the creative sector, especially within the more culturally expressive areas of the creative industries, though, is quite another matter. Much research attests to the fact that most creative workers make little money (Hesmondhalgh 2007: 73, Selwood 2001), often due to a greater emphasis being placed on the value of self-realisation through creative work (Hesmondhalgh 2007: 199), and more generally on value being sought through the practice of work rather than its eventual financial rewards via what Caves refers to as the 'art for art's sake' principle. This "calls for proceeding with creative effort even at adverse personal economic cost, and hence implies that the creative artist might wish to carry on even when an ideally efficient governance system instructs her to halt the project" (2000: 137).

As Hyde explains, "fidelity to one's gifts often draws energy away from the activities by which men become rich" (2006: 282). The question is thus raised as to whether this precludes such workers from truly being considered 'entrepreneurial' outside the initial act of business start-up. Even a fairly proselytising document regarding the potential for entrepreneurship within the creative industries, 'The Independents' from think-tank Demos, finds that most of those interviewed were earning far less than the average wage level, and were not averse to this situation (Leadbeater and Oakley 1999: 23). Such a lack of focus on monetary rewards certainly seems to apply in the case of many of those interviewed, and also seems to split along the creative/non-creative lines considered previously. Consider, for example, the contrast of these two responses both from within the field of music, the first working in a more expressive/creative capacity:

> **Music/Performing Arts (1):** I could definitely make more money doing something else, but then I wouldn't be happy! It's one of those things, it's self-fulfilling. It is selfish to some degree, a lot of people I might – are to some degree very selfish, a lot of the best artists are self-absorbed [...] if a company offered me a lot of money and they were really hard to work with and gave me no creative freedom, or you can go with someone and you've got freedom to... you'll go for less money.

And the second working in a less expressive capacity:

> **Music/Performing Arts (2):** The music industry is a business. A hard-nosed, economically driven business. It's not about character, it's not about music, it's not about emotion and sympathy to arts, it's a fucking business, you know what I mean? And if you can not survive in that business, then you're out.

Clichéd though it may seem, this dichotomy between the expressive, more artistic practitioner, relatively unconcerned with money or business growth, placing creative value above economic value, and the more business-minded, less expressive practitioner with the opposite perspective does seem to be a pattern which emerges clearly from interview data. A range of responses across a number of sectors highlighted the importance of personal fulfilment over and above the seeking out of business opportunities to exploit, and these are detailed in Appendix A-6. These come from those who can be seen to have more expressive aims for their practice, who can often be said to operating their enterprises not in response to any external opportunities for profit, but rather in response to an internal, personal desire to carry out a certain form of practice. The most direct exemplar of these is the following response:

> **Film/Video/Photography (3):** As long as we know we're not going to starve, ok, then it's about doing the best job you can. Rather than making the money.

Here, then, there is a clear sense that practice is in and of itself fulfilling, and that economic success is not the overriding concern, once basic needs have been met. The issue of the 'problem' of the UK not growing its creative businesses therefore becomes to a large extent a matter of perspective and of a differing system of values. As Keat argues regarding such communities of practice as are involved in at least some creative industries,

> [Markets] fail to meet the appropriate criteria for judging the 'quality' or 'value' of what is provided [...] the value or quality of what is 'produced' by these cultural activities cannot properly be assessed by reference to their satisfaction of consumer preferences. (2000: 21)

Nor is the concept of utilising non-pecuniary modes of value specific to cultural or creative industries: "there is plenty of evidence that income acquisition is not the only significant motive of those working in market enterprises" (Keat 2000: 119).

In Chapter Two the way in which the creative industries discourse has evolved from the writings of Adorno on the 'culture industry' wherein the profit motive had total primacy was outlined, and whereas for some this primacy remains – Cooke and Lazzeretti, for example, state that "all [creative industries] make money, some criminally large amounts" and are often characterised by "entrepreneurship bordering on racketeering" (2008: 2) – it seems that within the creative industries at least as they operate in this local setting, there is a much less stark state of affairs in evidence. Clearly, this lack of interest in financial goals is a difficult position to square with a discourse around a dynamic, outperforming high-growth sector at the vanguard of a new economic order, and one which will contribute to economic regeneration within deprived areas. Statements such as those set out above and in Appendix A-6 regarding other measures of value, however, were entirely absent from the narratives of those in the *less* expressive parts of Music and Arts businesses, nor were they made by those interviewed in Advertising or Software. One interviewee working in Advertising had an interesting perspective on this matter, and one seemingly at odds with many of these other points of view regarding value:

> **Advertising (2):** I think the whole idea of art, or creativity, is to sell products in one way or another. In my opinion. [...] Maybe it's something to do with the money you draw from it. Maybe to be a member of the creative community, you're not meant to draw that much money, whereas if you are a firm like us, we do all right, we don't take home thousands and thousands, but we get by.

This demonstrates a central tension in attempts to inculcate a sense of creativity in order to reap the associated economic benefits. When an initiative such as the ECoC is made primarily in the areas most related to the expressive or cultural subsectors of the creative industries, it is questionable as to

whether any expected resultant economic growth, often posited as the source of wider regeneration, will manifest itself. Even if a broader climate of creativity, in a wider sense than that used within the strictures of the definition of 'creative industries' were to emerge, this would not be guaranteed to align with the beneficial outcomes assumed to flow from the forms of creativity framed by policy. By assuming varying forms of creativity to be all of a piece, the prevailing agenda around the creative industries may ironically result in the incubation of conditions inimical to its own success. However, as creativity is seen at a number of levels as a benign benefit to be promoted, as a "value in itself" (Schlesinger 2009: 13), then what is perhaps most important in findings such as these is the potentially contradictory nature of such creativity, which may not be so easily tethered to the frames constructed to harness its apparent benefits.

7.3.1 Growth beyond the entrepreneur

Similarly, in the narration of their experiences of entrepreneurship and creative labour, there is clearly a tension in terms of an idealised formulation of the constant expansion and growth of new enterprises. Lambing and Kuehl argue that for the 'classic' entrepreneur, "the skills the entrepreneur needs will change as the business grows. He or she should no longer be involved in daily tasks but instead should concentrate on management and motivation" (2007: 121). For those unconcerned with pecuniary reward, however, this may not be an attractive prospect. In their study of entrepreneurship within the creative industries, Leadbeater and Oakley suggest 80% have "no ambitions for growth" (1999: 29) and that "many want their businesses to stay small" (1999: 11), and in a study of creative industries beyond the urban environment, Bell and Jayne also find that over 80% of practitioners do not seek to expand their business in terms of the number of employees it has (2010: 212). Similarly, the research for this thesis found views such as this:

> **Film/Video/Photography (1):** To a degree, I would say I have trouble letting go, I would feel like if there's something I want to make, only I could make it.

This dichotomy between creative value and the potential for growth was perhaps put most clearly within the following response:

> **Film/Video/Photography (3):** ... it had started to move in that direction of all the bids to pay the wages, then you're discussing things like pensions, and after that you're thinking 'what was I doing this for?' And I think that second thing applies to most organisations, and cultural organisations, whether you're talking about the music industry, whatever professional background, what you find after a while is you spend so much time facilitating the organisation itself that you wonder 'what did we set out to do here?' and that I think is the big problem.

Similarly, one interviewee noted the importance of scale when it comes to the arts:

> **Art/Antiques (3):** My job is not to try and run a giant institution, it's to try and have a personal relationship with people, who then might go and influence others through having a really in-depth conversation, you know what I mean?

Even in a less 'core' or expressive cultural activity such as architecture, the issue of scale is still seen as pertinent in an analogous manner:

> **Architecture (2):** As soon as you start an office, it's a machine that needs to be drawing, the people who work there need to be doing things every day [ ] In terms of an office that employs, you need to set out the stall, and say what you are, and have a brand, because if you don't, you end up being basically a call centre that produces drawings. And something that could be fulfilling gets reduced to just pushing out material.

> **Architecture (3):** Growing too big is very common. You need to learn to manage. The trick to that is employ someone who is very good at that. It's actually more difficult in a small office, as you think 'can I reasonably afford to take someone on who has that role?' They are essential.

Those interviewees in Advertising and Software who expressed a view on this subject, however, seemed to be extremely pleased to be taking on further staff, expanding to new premises and so forth. As with the issue of wealth creation, this issue of scale in relation to value is clearly one that is pertinent to many parts of the creative industries, and for any activity where maximisation of profit is not the only, or even the main, source of value extracted from practice. At the time the bulk of these interviews were carried out, for instance, the highly influential British design studio The Designers Republic ceased trading after 23 years, with founder Ian Anderson stating:

> I've never liked that agency model – it's not where creativity lies. DR accidentally ended up there in order to service bigger clients. I'm not being ungrateful to the people who ran the business side at DR – it wasn't their fault. I'm glad we did it – it took getting there to make me realise that it wasn't where I wanted to be. (Creative Review 2009)

Whilst the narration of policy around culture and the creative industries seems to imply we can have our creative cake and our economic ha'penny, as it were, and that economic benefits will naturally spiral out from cultural practice, when it comes to the imperatives of business and creativity, it seems these tensions cannot be removed so easily. In certain creative industries it is perhaps the case that the third of Schumpeter's entrepreneurial drives of "creating" may overwhelm the first two of "founding a

private kingdom" or "the will to conquer" (1934: 93), with concomitant ramifications for business growth. Certain practices may be limited to a certain size to provide the value desired by their instigators. A policy discourse which focuses on the value in increased GVA and employment rates growing at rates in excess of any other industrial sector, though, will find itself at odds with practitioners such as those quoted above. At this stage, then, it is important to consider how the specific interventions made as a result of this discourse, as discussed in the previous chapter, are experienced by those interviewed; whilst the mechanisms by which the ECoC would bring about higher levels of "creativity" and "cultural businesses", and so too bring about "economic regeneration", have been shown to be somewhat unclear, it is important to consider how those already operating within these areas experience such an intervention, and if in fact there is a more clear and tangible relationship than may seem to be the case purely at the level of policy discourse.

7.4 The European Capital of Culture

Regardless of the fact that the majority of interviews were carried out in close proximity to the end of Liverpool's ECoC year, and that some had established their business during the run-up period to 2008, very few of those interviewed mentioned the ECoC independently in narration of their creative practice, either historically or currently. Appendix A-7 shows a wide range of responses on this subject, and the majority of these come in response to prompts given during interviews after the subject had failed to manifest itself in the absence of such prompting. The only exception to this seems to come from those involved in operating businesses who were direct clients of the Liverpool Culture Company, and who therefore had recent experience of working on projects specifically as part of the ECoC programme within the purview of their business operations. A sense that the ECoC had influenced business practice, cultural practice or the general operation of creative industries in Liverpool was largely absent. Given its profile within the city, this suggests that the difficulties identified in the previous chapters – i.e. those of any intervention in a 'creative' or cultural capacity being expected to influence any other activity which could be so labelled, no matter how closely or distantly related to the original intervention – are ones which remain as problematic in practice as in discourse. This is not to say that the ECoC was broadly seen as useless or harmful, however. Once prompted, the general timbre of comments was that the ECoC was 'fine', that it had caused 'no harm'; a general 'why not?' approach:

> **Advertising (1)**: Yeah, it was fine. I mean, we didn't get any work off it.

> **Architecture (3)**: I mean, it didn't affect my practice, obviously. [...] But it was...you know, fine. Why not?

This was linked to a sense that the ECoC had been beneficial in promoting a good image of the city more broadly, or of resolving poor impressions of the city. This was of no particular import to the practice of these industries, however, but was rather seen as a city-wide phenomenon. Also, for some respondents the ECoC may not have been viewed as being particularly interesting from a cultural point of view:

> **Craft (1)**: That had no effect on my life. I mean, I knew it was happening [ ] I think it ruined the Biennial[33]. It became really sterile. Though, I don't know if Capital of Culture is to blame for that.

> **Music/Performing Arts (3)**: I mean, let's be honest, there was a few good things but...you know, not a lot. Not a lot. I suppose if it helps people to realise that Liverpool isn't as totally...fucked as it used to be then that can't hurt, but culturally? (incredulously) Superlambananas[34]? You know what I mean?

This sense that there had been no special impact or interaction with creative industries in the city is backed up by the findings from a survey of creative industries conducted by the 'Impacts 08' research programme into the effects of the ECoC. This found that the main impact (or expected impact) on business that respondents believed would result from 2008 was a general "improved external image of Liverpool" (2009: 66, 69), with the overwhelming majority of respondents agreeing that the way the ECoC may have affected their business was by "generating a higher profile for Liverpool" (2009: 70). These findings are notably different to an earlier survey carried out as part of the same piece of research *before* the ECoC where an expectation for "more commercial/business opportunities" was the dominant theme in responses regarding where the ECoC would have impact (2009: 58, 61). This may relate to the discussion in policy documents around the ECoC at the bidding stage noted in Chapter Five to the effect that: "we will not be repeating the experience of Glasgow and elsewhere of buying in the huge preponderance of 'cultural product' from beyond the city" (Liverpool Culture Company 2002: 305). As was also noted in the previous chapter, though, there has been dispute as to whether the programme of the ECoC appropriately drew on local creative expertise. This same Impacts 08 references more qualitative work with creative industries, concluding that, "across all consultations there were respondents who had a sense of not being directly involved [...] there was a great sense of a

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33. The Liverpool Biennial is a contemporary arts festival, established in 1998. The programme for the festival was expanded as part of the ECoC programme.

34. A reference to a popular event during 2008: over 100 miniature replicas of Taro Chiezo's 'Superlambanana' sculpture, resident in the city since 1998, were produced and spread throughout the city on the now ubiquitous 'CowParade' model.

lack of involvement and engagement with ECoC 2008" (2009: 40). This disputation also arose from some interviewees:

> **Music/Performing Arts (1)**: There was so much going on, and because they'd made the big spider[35], and *[an event this interviewee was involved in]* was the weekend before, everything was put into [the spider]. They didn't care about anything else. And that wasn't even involving Liverpool, do you know what I mean? Ok, it was brilliant, but it was such a waste of money. To spend millions of pounds of that...

> **Publishing (1)**: I can only look at it as a huge missed opportunity, because having dabbled in creative arts since I left school, you can't help thinking what you would have done yourself if you'd been more involved. What would have been good additions. And my simplistic view of it, when you travel abroad, to Naples or New York or wherever, places that are generally agreed to be great cities, they do what they do locally, there's not masses of culture parachuted in and grafted on to the city.

The ECoC in Liverpool, then, was considered by some to be unsupportive of the local creative sector, and across the board the expectation of an increase in business opportunities before the year clearly dissipated post-2008 into a sense that the year would be broadly beneficial on a city-wide level rather than having a particular effect upon creative industries. The Impacts 08 study, for example refers to "a general sense of disappointment that there had not been any specific ECoC initiatives whereby procurement from local creative businesses was encouraged, or any explicit policy to encourage local procurement" (2009: 44). As noted above, however, there were some interviewees who felt more directly positive about the ECoC. At the root of this difference seems to be the slightly more general issue of the relationship between the business practices of those interviewed and their interaction with, and opinion of, the public sector more broadly.

7.4.1 Interaction with the public sector

Many of those interviewed had had prior dealings with the various organisations and bodies which exist to facilitate cultural practice and/or the development of the creative industries, the Liverpool Culture Company and Merseyside ACME included. From the accounts given, however, there seems once more to be a notable split between those operating in what could be considered the more expressive/cultural aspects of the creative industries and those at the other end of this spectrum, as considered above. As cultural policy, despite a discourse of influence over, and relationship to, the

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35. See Footnote 14.

creative industries, still seems to intervene largely in this expressive 'centre', this is perhaps not surprising. What is problematic, though, for the prospect of any such interventions to influence a notionally wider creative sector, is that whilst some of the more arts-focused practitioners express an affinity with the stated social goals of cultural policy and can thus work sympathetically within such structures, some of the less directly expressive practitioners often express positions which are extremely antagonistic and suspicious towards such facilitating bodies, and this antagonism can spread towards any involvement with the public sector more widely, the ECoC included.

There were a minority of interviewees whose employment had led them to work directly with the Liverpool Culture Company in delivering part of the programme for the ECoC, broadly in what can be termed the 'community arts' area; as noted in previous chapters the engagement of the 'community' is seen as key to a number of the beneficial processes the ECoC is assumed to bring about, not least in the development of the creative sector. Having this direct experience of essentially being clients of the ECoC process, the narration of practice of these interviewees differs from the majority view of ambivalence on the ECoC quoted above, as the ECoC process directly employs them to execute their expertise and continue to operate their businesses. This may result from a more natural affinity between such practitioners' work and the goals of cultural policy; clearly, to draw on the funding available as a result of the ECoC, clients must in some way narrate a process which chimes with the aims of this policy. Consider, for example, this narration of the role of the 'community' by an interviewee who expressed a more positive view of the ECoC than the majority quoted above:

> **Film/Video/Photography (1):** I was working on one of the Four Corners projects[36] and they were based outside of the city centre, so I was in South Liverpool developing a theatre show for the communities, working with them, and that was a really good example of a project which was not just token community engagement, the community was, that was part of the whole process, they basically helped host and devise this theatre show that we put on, and kind of linked a few communities together through their stories.

Few other interviewees narrated the nature of their business practice in such a manner; social goals were seldom articulated. At least in terms of the creative industries, the ECoC can perhaps most effectively be seen as representing a client with an aim, which may employ those who can further its aims, rather than as being representative of any wider opportunity for developing a range of creative practice within the locality. Also directly employed by the ECoC was this interviewee:

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36. "Four Corners is a city-wide creative neighbourhood regeneration programme working with residents, cultural organisations and Liverpool City Council" (www.lga.gov.uk/lga/core/page.do?pageId=2414200).

> **Music/Performing Arts (4)**: I got to dress up for the opening event, which was nice, and there were a few other bits that came down from the Culture Company, so yep, it keeps you busy, you know?

Again, there is a dichotomy between the ECoC being perceived as directly beneficial by those it directly employs (Impacts 08 2009: 42), and as a broad but non-specific force for good by those it does not, with little middle ground in between these two positions. None of those interviewed suggested, for example, that the ECoC may have been involved in the encouragement of a broader milieu of creative practice, or the promotion of specifically creative activity in the city.

7.4.1.1 Difficulties with the public sector

Even those directly funded as a result of the ECoC process, however, were liable to express frustration with the bodies tasked with running this process. Consider again the views of this interviewee from the Music/Performing Arts subsector:

> **Music/Performing Arts (1)**: It was so hard to get the Capital of Culture to do anything about marketing. You would think with them commissioning it that they would want to support it, and I had such a battle with the marketing people, because they never even put it in the listings, they wouldn't do anything. [...] It was really, really hard.

This interviewee also narrated a lack of interest or resources for developing practice established during the ECoC after 2008:

> **Music/Performing Arts (1)**: I thought 'what was the point in doing all that for Liverpool when there's nothing available to help you carry on?' So why should I? If they're not willing to support local artists...

This frustration with the operations of the Liverpool Culture Company is perhaps endemic of a problem larger than the specific intervention of the ECoC itself, in that there seems from many interviewee responses to be a real antipathy between the goals and aims of the public sector and those working within private enterprises, even amongst those whose main clients or funders may very well be public sector bodies. Consider this account of working with organisations such as the Liverpool Culture Company:

> **Advertising (1)**: When you work with people who are doling out opportunities, or policing opportunities – public sector – they are just fucking mad. They're on a

different planet in terms of how they work. You can be asked to put in a tender and have two weeks to do it, and it'll be 50 fucking thousand words long. but it ll take them six months to get back to you! And then they'll decide they set the wrong tender. A lot of it's frustrating, I don't think the system's set up to encourage... enterprise. The problem they have is when they come up with an idea and think 'ok, well we need to collaborate between...' – a big push at the moment is collaborative working with the third sector, social enterprises, charities and the like, and the private sector. And that's always been a big part of the work we do because we've identified those opportunities, and always done work with social enterprises. web-work, design-work, a whole host of things. But the public sector just don't know how to do it. They don't know how to manage or...just get those things going. It's incredibly, incredibly difficult to work with them, to work with public sector.

Opinions occupying a similar area to this straddled many different areas of practice; relevant interview extracts on this point are outlined in Appendix A-8, but many entrepreneurs outlined a viewpoint from which they were 'not interested' in, or had tired of working with any public sector organisations. This related to a sense that the goals of the relevant agencies and funding bodies, and those in business may be in a number of senses opposed, in ways related to the sense of non-pecuniary value articulated above. Consider the perspective of this interviewee:

> **Film/Video/Photography (4)**: So if you take an organisation like, say, Northwest Vision, you go and meet them and one of the things that strikes you straight away is that no one ever talks to you about film. No one ever says 'Did you see that? It was great.' So, in that sort of arena, it's very different, it's a meal ticket, it's a job, it's money, it's a pension. And so at that level what you tend to find is anyone with any experience of dealing with them, you find nothing but frustration. [...] You get in this state where you're dealing with layers and layers of organisations who, if anything, claim to be cultural, and creative, but are the very opposite. The very meaning of creativity is it's spontaneous. [...] So when you're looking at which part to target the money at, whilst your back's turned, you know, something else is happening. Once you try to arrange from the top, you're on a hiding to nothing, it's too complicated

Unlike the sense of working, at least partly, in co-operation with the Liverpool Culture Company and related organisations which came from more directly expressive practitioners, here there seems to be more of an 'us-and-them' relationship of two cultures, between creative businesses and those organisations established to support their development. Given the discussion in previous chapters, it is unsurprising that the question of dealing with bodies relating to cultural policy, having not naturally emerged during the course of discussion when raised as a topic, did not even factor for one interviewee working in the 'software' subsector:

Software/Computer Games (1): Cultural policy. So…what is that?

- [explanation]

Software/Computer Games (1): No, I wouldn't have a clue about that.

What is perhaps more surprising is the antipathy felt by some interviewees at *any* involvement in cultural activity by policymakers:

> **Film/Video/Photography (4)**: Take the example of the Beatles [...] These developments pass all of the establishment by, and by that I mean the political establishment, so they knocked down the Cavern, and not just that, but when people said 'why not put up a statue?' councillors said 'we don't want a statue to long-haired drug-addicts'. Now, obviously, things have changed now, politicians wouldn't be as stupid to say that, but most of them don't know what the hell's going on in any case. [...] Really, the establishment cannot get a handle on these things. They say we recognise we've got an information, knowledge society, culture is important economically, so now we need to position ourselves. So we don't know what to do, so they reach for the accepted things.

Whether true or not, there is at least a sense amongst some practitioners interviewed that the following view has some validity:

> **Publishing (1)**: What makes most cultural things great is they're not planned, and they come from the underground.

Clearly from such a viewpoint, any planned intervention such as the ECoC can never be 'great', and can only create its own discrete form of cultural practice, outside of this 'underground'. Whilst such practice may have noble aims, like furthering community engagement or social inclusion, amongst some interviewees there was suspicion expressed about such aims relating to the promotion of creative practice. We can contrast the view given by the practitioner employed by the ECoC quoted earlier regarding the value of working with 'communities' on cultural projects, to these responses from practitioners working directly within the arts:

> **Art/Antiques (3)**: I've just got fed up of that whole...I do believe in art for art's sake, and I do believe that artists have a value in society. And I don't – I can be a politician and I can hold my own at those meetings and give them, tick their boxes, but that's not interesting to me, actually. And I think there's an awful lot of outreach and education programmes that sound great and you can spin 'til you're blue in the face, but actually the quality of the work that's being produced? It falls between so many camps that it ends up not being interesting to anybody, you know.

Art/Antiques (4): Various funding bodies, have this idea that if you just try and communicate what you're doing to everybody. and everybody has a right to access the arts, which they do of course, but something gets lots in trying to communicate to everybody. Any business would find out who their key customers are And that s one thing that culture suffers from in the city, there's a demand to try and reach a 16 year old living in Kirkdale and an OAP[37]...or, you know...actually. it's bonkers

This sense of a clear split between the world occupied by cultural policy and that occupied by private practice was articulated most aggressively by this respondent:

Music/Performing Arts (2): I work in an entrepreneurial cut-throat business. I don't work in a quango-y, council world, so whilst I like to go and visit that on a Sunday afternoon with my family, my main business is, I could be in Detroit making fucking cars, you know what I mean?

This respondent similarly expressed a suspicion about the aims of local government when it comes to creative practice:

Music/Performing Arts (2): If the city council came up with some you know 'New World Centre!' and 'we've got local builders to build this newbuild with breezeblocks and wood and it looks fantastic, we've done it in a boundary 2 area where there's regeneration needed, it's in Anfield'. No one wants to fucking work in Anfield! That's the mentality of the city council. They're building a community centre And that serves its purpose, of course, genius, kids need community centres

There are, therefore, clearly multiple tensions in the relationship between cultural policy and the creative entrepreneur, however conceived, which raise important questions for the discourse of inter relationship considered in previous chapters.

It should be noted, however, that in narration of the development of their entrepreneurial practice a number of those interviewed did posit a key role for bodies outside the private sector, and their potential to assist such entrepreneurial practice, but these were not necessarily directly related to specifically creative practice:

Art/Antiques (3): It doesn't have to be creative support for creative people. it's just practical stuff, if you've got pots of money to help certain business, then it might be useful to segment it, but we don't need a different type of pot A scheme I found really useful was called the New Entrepreneur Scholarship – they've just closed it

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37. Old Age Pensioner.

down! It was run by the Chamber of Commerce and JMU[38]. And it was a three or four month programme where you did a day a week and it was literally 'how-to-start-a-business' and it was fantastic.

Design (1): Liverpool University ran a free course called Connect for people who were on the dole but had an art qualification. Which is half of Liverpool. So I was in the first intake of that and it was brilliant.

Film/Video/Photography (1): I thought what has benefited me the most, and I thought a bit of business support to start with to be legitimate, I got on the NES course at the Chamber of Commerce, so that was a very traditional business set-up programme. Accounts and tax and marketing and all that stuff. And they gave you a grant so that helped.

Music/Performing Arts (2): When I first started it was the trade union centre, the Flying Picket, had a place for the city council to run courses. Basically, if you were on the dole and you said you were a musician, fine, ok, we can put you on a course. That should be provided, it should be done.

Much like in the motivating factor in their arrival in Liverpool, then, once again here we can see the importance placed by some entrepreneurs on a form of educational development. More direct interventions aimed at the establishment of 'creative' spaces, such as the 'creative industries quarter', discussed in the previous chapter as a potential 'legacy' for the ECoC, were viewed with suspicion by interviewees who discussed this topic (these comments are outlined in Appendix A-9).

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter has considered the salient themes which emerged from interviews with those who have established businesses in Liverpool within the creative industries, together with their views on the ECoC programme in light of the discussion of policy of the previous chapters. It has shown how the problematization of the prevailing assumptions present within policy discourse regarding the relationship between the regenerative policy goals of a programme such as the ECoC and the operation of creative industries within these preceding chapters is yet furthered by an examination of interview data, but these data also raise the prospect of understanding the issues at hand from novel, empirically-grounded, perspectives.

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38. Liverpool John Moores University, formerly Liverpool Polytechnic.

The issue of a unified form of creativity considered previously has been shown to have little relevance for many of the practitioners interviewed, who conceive of their practice as not necessarily creative, nor as necessarily overlapping with other parts of the creative or cultural sector; although the more artistic the practice, the less this seems likely to be the case. What interviews raise as a much more important factor in the nature of the creative industries locally is the role of higher educational establishments which have served either to attract or retain those who have later established businesses within the city. The value associated with these businesses was questioned, however, in discussion of what drives these entrepreneurs, who can not necessarily be relied upon to provide the benefits of increased employment rates and economic output associated with entrepreneurship, due to the non-pecuniary benefits they often focus upon in their practice. It was also shown how many entrepreneurs have established businesses in the local environment specifically to avoid centres of such economic growth and competition.

Having problematized the role of the 'creative entrepreneur' more broadly, the chapter also considered the potential for a disjuncture to exist between the creative aura around a place and the sites where value is derived from that aura. Most tellingly for the relationships under consideration in this thesis, it showed how the ECoC programme seemed to be of no particular moment to those interviewed, other than the entrepreneurs it had directly employed. The assumption that this creative intervention would gradually ripple out and influence the creative industries particularly seems to have little supporting evidence. The possibility that this may be due to a more general antipathy between creative practitioners and public sector organisations which seemed to emerge from the interview data was also raised.

There thus seems to be evidence that the goals of the ECoC, and cultural policy more broadly, as they relate to the creative industries may in many ways be in fundamental tension with the operation of these industries themselves, at least on this scale. Despite constructing a narrative of a strong effect upon creative business within the city, evidence suggests those working within creative industries have not experienced such an effect. More broadly, discourses of entrepreneurship, and indeed 'creativity', associated with the creative industries do not seem to be reflected within the practice of those working in these areas. By way of conclusion, the next chapter reflects on the research underpinning this thesis, and considers how the factors emerging from the interview data presented in this chapter may provide the basis for future research in this area.

Chapter Eight – Conclusion

This thesis has set out to analyse the nature of the relationship between cultural policy and creative industries by considering the discourse of policy and the experiences of the entrepreneurs valued by this policy. In so doing it has examined how a particular political intervention in the cultural realm – the ECoC in Liverpool in 2008 – was presented as having the potential to influence the development of creative industries. Liverpool's ECoC programme is one of a number of interventions which articulate goals regarding an increase in the size of the creative sector, or in the number of creative jobs (Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2008: 98), and it has been shown how in many ways it can also be seen as emblematic of broader national and international policy trends regarding the nature of culture and creativity. By examining how the value which creative industries are given in policy is established via an analysis of the relevant statistical evidence base, how a discourse of inter-related creativity around cultural policy is perpetuated, and how this discourse can be seen in many ways to be in opposition to the experience of those working within the creative industries, the thesis has aimed to fill a gap in existing research regarding this relationship between policy and creative industries, and to reveal this relationship as an inherently problematic one.

It has been shown that, whilst culturally expressive activity is the only reasonable unifier for grouping creative industries with cultural policy, an examination of the extant statistical evidence base shows how the persistent claims regarding the economically important role of the creative industries are based mostly upon work within the software industry, which is not characterised by such culturally expressive activity. Therefore, the only way such activities *can* be linked is via positions based upon the assumption of an inherent commonality to all manifestations of 'creativity', whereby creating new software, creating a new business or creating in the artistic sense are all branches from the same tree, as is argued, for example, by Florida (2004, 2005), whose work becomes a clear reference point for such policies. The argument of this thesis, however, is that this position involves a misapplication of language when it comes to 'creativity': the catachresis noted in the thesis title. This allows any cultural intervention to be presented as 'creative' even when it involves what may be fairly standard procedures, and allows linkages to be drawn between unrelated objects. This misapplication is enabled via the application of common terminology to disparate objects, and the analysis of the thesis therefore highlights the necessity of treating any application of the terminology of creativity with caution, lest by using such language we contribute to this process, or allow it to pass by unnoticed as can often be seen to occur. That said, data emerging from practitioner interviews, has shown how these questionable linkages regarding creativity are seldom present in narratives given from this alternative perspective informed by practice. When creativity in some form has to be applied in practice, such difficulties do not loom so large. Problems still remain, however, due to the lack of fit in at least some areas between the discourse of economically valuable creative activity, and the reality of this creative practice. As

shown in Chapter Two, faith in an emergent 'new economy' requires the operation of a stable 'economic imaginary' (Jessop 2004), and arguably the catachresis of creativity serves to assist in this stabilisation process. As 'creativity' provides a potential centre to unite divergent meanings and applications it is, at least from one perspective, almost immaterial that this term can be seen to be misapplied. In providing discursive stability, it serves its purpose. What is clear, however, is that due to the inherent difficulties associated with this term is that it is unlikely to constitute a centre which can hold indefinitely. That said, it seems far from reaching a crisis point at present and, indeed, seems to be strengthening and broadening out to include in its remit, for example, discussion on the economic value of wider processes of innovation which, via similar processes to those traced in this thesis, are once more presented as especially related to cultural activity (Banks and O'Connor 2009, Pratt and Jeffcut 2009.)

The methodological approach as outlined in Chapter Three has thus served to provide a useful set of perspectives regarding the relationships under consideration, and it is hoped that the presentation of data from a variety of sources in the preceding chapters has served to provide relevant and novel insights. A clear systematicity of ideas (Mills 1997: 15) has been shown with relation to the concept of 'creativity', and considering this systematicity in light of the data gathered from statistical evidence and the practitioner interviews conducted has revealed how the relationship between cultural policy and creative industries is in many regards more assumed than manifest. That said, having deliberately approached the issues from the perspective of policy, this research has in some senses had its insights curtailed by policy's impositional framework. To examine how the object of 'creative industries' as defined by policy operates, for example, is to some extent to accept the terms of that policy. Not to do this, however, would have ultimately entailed carrying out a different piece of research with different aims to the one at hand, and so this limitation has been to some degree unavoidable.

What is potentially more troubling for this research is a consideration of the extent to which it can influence dominant policy discourse. Whilst recent academic analysis has shown a turn towards a problematization of the categories and operationalization of polices around creative industries (Banks and O'Connor 2009, Schlesinger 2009), the general discussion within the thesis, but in particular in Chapter Six regarding the establishment of Liverpool's ECoC as a model of 'success', has shown how the narration of an inter-relationship between creative industries (or 'creativity' more generally) and cultural policy seems extremely impervious to contradiction. Just as earlier chapters discussed how at the outset of creative industries discourse, their centrality to future economic success was presented as a known fact regardless of the nature of the evidence base for such a claim, so it seems that the Liverpool ECoC is now 'known' to have influenced creative industries locally, again regardless of the nature of the evidence for this influence, or, indeed, evidence that such an influence would be beneficial in any case. The legend, so to speak, has become fact. To return to a consideration of the

language of 'creativity', perhaps in this instance it would be most appropriate to consider that meaning which maps most closely to usage 1.e given in the OED, where it is applied to "strategies which are imaginative or ingenious, esp. in a misleading fashion."

By utilising the dominant discourse of the importance of creative industries and their relation to creative, cultural climates, the Liverpool ECoC is able partially justify its programme in a manner convincing to a range of stakeholders, despite there being little tangible engagement with, or experience of influence by, those creative entrepreneurs so valued in this discourse. What is particularly problematic is the fact that not only is this dominant narrative used to support the instigation of the ECoC programme in the early part of the decade, but this programme is then used as a prop to support the continuation of this narrative at the close of the decade. Whilst this research has attempted to provide new insights which are likely to be of interest to an academic audience considering the role of culture and creativity, then, from the evidence considered in the thesis it seems unlikely that policymakers will value the problematizing of a story of 'success' as presented in this thesis, nor the general antipathy towards the public sector narrated by some practitioners as noted in Chapter Seven. Certainly, from the narrative of 'success' around the influence Liverpool's ECoC has had upon creative industries locally, it seems that the 'rose-tinted' perspective which has characterised much creative industries discourse historically (Jayne 2004) is set to continue. Discourse in this case seems to be impervious to contradictory evidence, and results in the leveraging of ever more resources to consolidate its chimerical position and attempts to construct reality in its own image. That said, the empirical data from practitioners discussed in Chapter Seven provides many interesting avenues on which to base potential future research which may act as an alternative to this standpoint. In concluding, therefore, this chapter will consider some of the key findings of the research, posit potential explanations for these findings, and present areas where further enquiry may be warranted in order to better understand the issues at hand. In so doing, this discussion builds specifically upon the themes raised in analysis of practitioners' narratives discussed in the previous chapter regarding the role of entrepreneurship, the importance of location, and the place of policy, as it is the data arising out of these interviews which provides the best basis for a potentially transformed understanding of the issues at hand.

8.1 Entrepreneurship and the creative industries

Early discussion within this thesis showed how entrepreneurship and the creative industries are seen by many to be natural bedfellows, and how entrepreneurship can be understood to assist in providing the economic value associated with the creative industries. What ensuing analysis has revealed, however, is that, despite the consideration in Chapter Two of how the 'creative industries' concept can

be considered as an attempt to square the tensions between the cultural and economic, many of the contradictions in this area prove extremely persistent (Banks and O'Connor 2009: 366) Many of the 'entrepreneurs' within creative industries interviewed focus strongly on the non pecuniary benefits they associate with their work, and thus from at least one perspective should not be considered 'true' entrepreneurs, as they cannot be relied upon to continually seek opportunities for growth. Clearly, the potential for this state of affairs to arise is much higher for industries based on something as potentially intrinsically valuable as artistic expression. This presents clear problems within a policy environment which values the economic growth associated with the creative industries so highly, especially when, as considered in detail in Chapter Four, such economic growth can only be reasonably associated with a very specific and non-representative subsector of the creative industries. It must be concluded, therefore, that the issue of the role of entrepreneurship within creative industries is much more problematic than is often implied.

Whilst we may not share the conclusions of Adorno and Horkheimer (1979) regarding the nature of cultural commodities, and whilst Miège (1989) is correct to point out the role of smaller businesses in destabilising the discourse of a dominant, monolithic 'culture industry', it is nevertheless true that the majority of the *economic* potential for creative activity still comes from its industrial, reproducible character and this is, increasingly, a global industrial character. In moving away from a discourse of the 'culture industry', the terminology of 'creative industries' may cause us to lose sight of the fact that an increasing concentration of market share is in the hands of fewer and fewer companies within some creative industries (Christopherson 2008: 76, Hesmondhalgh 2007: 170). If cultural policy is primarily seeking to leverage the economic potential of cultural forms, a focus on innovative new businesses may be misdirected.

As we have seen, though, a discourse based on a particular understanding of 'creativity' causes policy to place a special focus on the level of individual talent and the entrepreneur (Bilton 2009: 36), even though the value of the role of the 'creative entrepreneur' is thus deeply questionable. Indeed, Miller argues that entrepreneurs and smaller businesses do not generate the economic benefits associated with the creative industries (2009: 95). It is the position of this thesis, therefore, that Foord and Ginsburg are correct to argue that political optimism regarding the value of creative entrepreneurship needs to be reconsidered (2004: 287), and that a discourse of creativity and flexibility, wherein increased choice and access, facilitated by the spread of communication technologies, such as that posited by Anderson (2007) in his "long tail" thesis, may result in an increased potential for the success of diverse producers, including creative ones, is obscuring the fact that such diversity is not at the root of the economic value being generated in most creative industries, and there is in fact an increasing concentration occurring when it comes to economic output. Indeed, after positing the "long tail"

concept, Anderson later concludes that "revenues are disproportionately in the head" (2008), and this seems particularly to be the case when it comes to culture-related businesses (Economist 2009).

Broader understanding than is possible within the scope of this thesis could therefore be gained by future researching aiming to understand the position of larger creative industries, beyond the level of the individual entrepreneur, and how these interact with a wider political environment. The volatility of demand in certain creative industries, for example, favours business structures which can cope with huge uncertainty and a high failure rate and clearly, the structure best able to cope with this state of affairs is unlikely to be the small business or the lone entrepreneur. Research suggests an enormous failure rate in some creative industries (Caves 2000: 61, Goldman 1996: xi, Kotaku 2008, Mulgan and Warpole, 1986: 117) due to the uncertain character of products, or what Caves, after Goldman, refers to as the 'nobody knows' principle, leading to a position of 'winner-takes-all' success (2000: 364) which gives great returns to the 'winner', but keeps the majority locked out. Whilst in such circumstances, it is perhaps only rational to find the situation noted in Chapter Seven of entrepreneurs focused on the non-pecuniary rewards arising from their work, further research into different organisations' perspectives on issues of wealth, size and growth within the creative industries could enable a greater understanding of the forces at work in this area.

As noted, in seeking to elucidate the relationship between policy and creative industries, this thesis has also focussed mostly on trying to understand how this relationship could be seen to operate particularly from the perspective of policymakers, rather than simply investigating the nature of the creative industries themselves. Whilst this relationship has been shown to be problematic in any case, if a clear link had been found, there would still be clear issues for analysis to contend with in terms of a socially or economically regenerative agenda (or a position which fuses the two), as the prevalence of difficult working conditions within the creative industries presents a real problem for the creativity agenda at hand. There is a great deal of research suggesting that such work is very often characterised by low pay and low security (Belfiore 2002: 95, Evans 2001: 157, Leadbeater and Oakley 1999: 15), long hours (Gill and Pratt 2007: 17), and a need to take on multiple jobs (Feist 2001: 195), and so more often than not offers a poor quality of life (Hesmondhalgh 2007: 205, Hesmondhalgh and Banks 2009: 420), which can often be understood as a process of 'self-exploitation' (McRobbie 2002: 101). This kind of instability and uncertainty is a particularly pointed version of that associated with the processes of entrepreneurship which are promoted more broadly (Sennett 1998: 31, 80). The appropriateness of political intervention in such an area is thus questionable, especially when related entrepreneurship is expected to "deliver results" (Perren and Jennings 2005: 177) for the local economy and conform to the wider model of entrepreneurship as valuable to wider society (Foord and Ginsburg 2004: 301).

The role for the entrepreneur for 'regeneration' is thus deeply questionable, yet as has been shown, this fact is notably skirted by a discourse which sees creativity as a particularly malleable area of intervention that can be leveraged in any location. The research findings presented here suggest, however, that there is more research to be done regarding the complex role of place for creative industries and cultural policy.

8.2 Geography and the creative industries

Related to the points raised in the section above, analysis of the discourse around the ECoC, and the UKCoC award, shows that there is continued assertion of a position that the replication of success and economic growth can occur in almost any location. The 'new' economy is seen as being a potential, flexible fit for any city; generating a creative environment can serve to attract those who will create new businesses, and generating cultural interest and engagement can develop the same capacities in the local population. Whilst the logic of such a policy has been questioned, what is yet more problematic for notions of 'regeneration' are the findings that certain interviewees are actively seeking to avoid centres of concentrated success by their location in a provincial city. In addition to clear identification of the dominance of London, and the prevalence of a pattern of industrial concentration into a few key centres globally early on in research (Pratt 1997), Oakley identifies this problem clearly with policy regarding creative industries, noting the difficulties of the prevalent notion "that these are sectors that can be replicated and developed pretty much anywhere, without regard for the specifics of place" (2004: 72). Montgomery puts this even more directly, arguing that "not all cities can be centres of creative industries production beyond meeting the demands of very localized markets. Birmingham cannot compete with London" (2005: 341). Future comparative research between different business types in different locations could therefore serve to elucidate the factors necessary for the regenerative goals of cultural policy to be achieved, and also demonstrate whether the close linkage of cultural programmes and business development found in the Liverpool case is strongly made in other locations, or specific to the make-up of an organisation such as Merseyside ACME.

8.2.1 Compulsory competition?

From the analysis first considered in Chapter Two, however, this thesis would consider Montgomery's position above that "not all cities can" compete to be accurate, yet it also must conclude that cities are in a sense compelled to compete, and this may be one factor explaining the continued presentation of inter-relationship which occurs around factors relating to culture and creativity. Chapter Two discussed the move towards a political-economic order characterised as the 'Schumpeterian

Competition State' (Jessop 2002), and in this state competition *between* areas has become the dominant state of affairs. Harrison (2006, 2007, 2008) traces the rise of the region and 'city-region' as the dominant spatial unit for intervention under New Labour, raising the perhaps counter-intuitive spectre of "centrally orchestrated regionalism" (2007: 32), and the emerging belief that it is these regions which are the motors of global economic growth. As each region must prove itself to be a dynamic centre of economic growth, so each seeks to develop the creative industries which are assumed to be at the core of this growth. If there is a new economic order emerging, and regional competition is central to economic development, each city *has* to compete, and present itself as a driver of the new creative economic order, even when the evidence for the reality of this state of affairs is, as has been shown in the Liverpool case, somewhat underwhelming.

As noted previously, in the context of the UK, London dominates: whilst 17% of total employment in the UK is based in London[39], data derived from the DCMS SIC codes in Chapter Four show that if we focus solely on creative industries this proportion is doubled, with 36% of all employment based in the capital. If software is removed from these figures, to focus mainly on the more cultural industries, this trend simply extends with over 50% of employment in the capital. Whilst a document like the Liverpool Cultural Strategy makes suggestion to the effect that an event like the ECoC in the city will provide a "spring-board" to "make the city's creative strengths more widely known in the region, the nation and the world, [...] more effective in contributing to the economy, and [will] support the development of the cultural sector and creative industries" (Liverpool First 2008: 13), it seems likely that London's domination (Evans 2001: 158) will continue, and the situation alluded to in discussion of the case of music within Chapter Seven, whereby the industrial capacity to take economic advantage of the cultural talent of Liverpool will primarily be located in the capital (Bianchini 1993: 4), will also continue.

The research of this thesis could perhaps be best augmented, therefore, having problematized the dominant discourse regarding the inter-relationship of cultural policy and creative industries, by further examination of the means by which this discourse is perpetuated, and perhaps therefore also by a more detailed examination of its historical precursors than could be traced within the brief consideration presented in Chapter Six. Van Heur, for example, argues that policy which holds that creative industries can be developed in any location comes from a prevailing practice of 'fast policy'. Via this process,

> Policy makers and consultants with short attention spans and a need for rapid results
> increasingly rely on 'off-the-shelf program techniques' from other cities while ignoring the

39. Source: ONS/Nomis 2010.

complex realities on the ground and offering no sustainable techniques to connect global visions with local practices. (Van Heur 2010b: 190)

This chimes strongly with the findings of this thesis, and it must therefore be concluded here that the proposed goals of cultural policy interventions would therefore be better placed if they attempt to actively engage with these complex realities. Yet, looking at recent activity in this arena, Stevenson *et al.* (2010: 168) note that regional and local authorities responsible for cultural policy have an extremely limited number of locations as common reference points, usually large West European capital cities with well developed tourist economies. The exceptional is hence taken as the typical and the importance of embedded value chains and wider contexts are ignored within a policy environment whereby any set of circumstances is assumed to be transferrable to any location. As Scott advises, however,

Any region that seeks to initiate a process of local economic development within its borders needs to pay very close attention indeed to the task of identifying feasible production niches, i.e. forms of economic activity that have not yet been irreversibly dominated by more highly developed regions [...] it is in general not advisable to attempt to become a Silicon Valley when Silicon Valley already exists elsewhere. (2000: 27)

One could argue, though, in the context of the creative industries in a country the size of the UK that is problematic for Liverpool, or any other location, to attempt to develop a sustainable creative industries sector when London already exists, and has the advantage associated with being the first mover in these fields (Hannigan 2003: 354, Schumpeter 1989: 258, Scott 2000: 22). An intervention which seeks to promote indigenous creative capacity can only represent a first step towards any 'regeneration' and, as noted in Chapter Seven, without any means to capture this capacity, its value will travel to places where it can be captured (Scott 2000: 3, 13), often in dense spatial agglomerations (Leunig and Swaffield 2007: 6), and by the increasingly concentrated global practitioners discussed above.

8.2.2 Clustering of industry

It should perhaps also be noted that, due to the lack of any developments in the time period during which this thesis was written, no significant opportunity emerged to study the attempts to establish a 'creative industries quarter' to reap such agglomeration benefits in the Liverpool case, discussed in Chapter Six. As these plans reflect broader national trends, further study could be usefully carried out in this area (although the very fact that this 'legacy' area is yet to substantially emerge almost two years after the end of the ECoC year is certainly interesting in and of itself). Leunig and Swaffield, for

example, identify 56 attempted 'quarters' related to culture-led regeneration within the UK (2007: 32) and such attempts to 'cluster' creativity are influential not only nationally (O'Connor 2005: 48), but replicated internationally often "with little confirmatory evidence" (Foord 2008: 99). Whilst Scott argues that such quarters or clusters are often a pre-condition of successful creative industries (2000: ix), when such clusters *do* result in thriving creative industries, there is research to suggest that this largely occurs in the absence of any policy intervention (Foord 2008: 100, Mommaas 2004: 521), and that policy approaches to clustering in this area are often poorly conceived and implemented (Jayne 2005: 554). By examining how such plans play themselves out in the Liverpool case, further detail may be added to the picture presented in this thesis.

Rather than developing capacity at the local level, for example, Frith argues in the case of music that it is relationship with global businesses of the type discussed in the sections above that is required (Frith *et al.* 2009: 85), and similarly Leadbeater and Oakley point out, that access to appropriate markets is dependent on London-based large-scale international distributors (1999: 36). What would also be interesting to consider in light of the 'creative industries quarter' of Liverpool is evidence that policy attempts to group *all* creative industries in one location and expect agglomeration benefits risks being less effective than one which focuses on specific sectors and specific activities (Vorley *et al.* 2008: 103). In the current context, it would also be pertinent to consider evidence that, just as certain creative industries do disproportionately well during periods of growth, the same is true in periods of recession; that is to say that they disproportionately shrink in relation to other economic sectors (Freeman 2007), and this particularly seems to be the case for advertising, the largest sector of the creative industries outside of software (TSB 2009). Again, however, tackling this issue would require research with a considerably different scope to that undertaken here.

8.3 The limits of influence

Despite attempting to engage with a broader canvas of 'creativity', then, it must be acknowledged that the main finding of this research is that, due to a number of factors, the role for cultural policy and culture-led regeneration is much more problematic than is generally acknowledged when it comes to the particular 'creativity' at hand in processes of entrepreneurship in creative industries. Existing research over a variety of areas can be seen to support the findings presented above. Johnson and Reed (2008: 26) cite data to suggest that, considered more generally, policies to induce entrepreneurship have "at best, no effect" on employment levels and, more specifically, McDonald *et al.* find that interventions such as those discussed above to create 'clusters' of successful businesses largely occur via a process of self-selection by firms, and detect little evidence of strong positive relationships between the interventions of government policies and such activity (2006: 535). Evans identifies that it

is the specific character of "these so-called creative industries" which means they are not "likely to be responsive to a generalised economic and interventionist approach by government, let alone 'planners'" (2001: 153). The data regarding practitioners presented in Chapter Seven would seem to extend these findings to a consideration of a large-scale intervention such as the ECoC.

Whilst interventions such as the ECoC do indeed help to increase the level of cultural activity in a city, which may in turn create a broader sense of a 'creative' environment, the attractive power of such a city image is debatable. In an examination of the tenets of the 'creative class' thesis, Houston *et al.* conclude that "people still follow jobs rather than the other way round as Florida suggests" (2008: 135). Without intervening more directly in terms of employment, such a programme is likely to be of limited success as it cannot link up with the ever more concentrated activity of extracting value from creative practice discussed above. As Pratt summarises, "being creative in a vacuum is not productive. An idea is nothing without production, and goods need distribution and consumption [...] Ideas have no value until they are applied and operationalized" (2008: 113). Establishing a 'creative' environment via a programme of cultural activities certainly has its benefits, but this environment will remain to some extent isolated and unable to draw on the positive, regenerative aspects generally associated with creativity without these broader links. Unless policy attempts to tackles this situation more directly, the findings of this thesis will remain pertinent. Reimer *et al.* discuss these "much lauded linkages between creativity and place", and conclude from discussions with those involved in the business of design, that, "when interrogated at greater length it was harder to extract concrete manifestations of these sentiments. Far more apparent were economic factors that embed the leading agencies in the capital, namely and most importantly, access to clients and a ready supply of talented individuals" (2008: 167).

Just as discussion in Chapter Seven offered little evidence that it was the general sense of Liverpool as a 'creative place' which attracted or served to retain entrepreneurs within the city, so it is here that more everyday concerns of staff and market are the key factors serving to retain businesses in the capital. Just as there is a 'ready supply' of talent heading to the capital, as has historically always been the case (Hughes 1990: 24), so the research of this thesis has shown that there is also talent which, for whatever reason, wishes to avoid the capital. In cultural policy discourse, however, it seems to be the case that those specifically avoiding the capital are also seen as being able to replicate its success in a different location. Oakley argues, however, that, "we need to develop a more nuanced place-based strategy for creative industry developments that reflects these differences [in place]" (2004: 73).

The problem a city such as Liverpool faces in developing a strategy which more accurately reflects the particularities of its location is that, just as the dominance of London in factors relating to the creative industries seems to be persistent, so it seems that the relative deprivation of Liverpool is similarly persistent. In 1993 in an assessment of the cultural position of the city, Bianchini discusses how the

"local market for cultural activities" (p.5) is hampered by the low educational profile of the population. Scott (2000: 184) similarly argues that this is a vital factor for creative production. The persistence of Liverpool's underperformance in terms of educational qualification well into the 21st century, however, is clear from discussion in Chapter Three. Bianchini also notes the link between levels of income and the health of the cultural market, a factor also noted by some of the entrepreneurs quoted in Chapter Seven. On this note, despite the investment of nigh on a billion pounds in the city and its surrounds as a result of EU Objective One funding (Liverpool Daily Post 2009), as discussed in Chapter Three, the economic profile of the population of Liverpool has changed little; the relative level of disposable income of the city's population is actually lower in 2008 than it was in the mid-1990s when Objective One status was first established[40]. This reflects a broader pattern whereby "the prospects for those living in areas that have received significant levels of assistance from urban policy programmes have not been transformed in the past decade" (Leunig and Swaffield 2007: 44).

Of course, the 'problem' of a limited cultural market within the city is only a problem should indigenous production and consumption be the focus of cultural policy. It has been noted at various points in the thesis how 'creative' cultural programmes are often linked with tourism, and thus the status of the indigenous population might not be so important for success. Yet if such goals are the key aims of such strategies, there are similar problems to contend with as those noted above:

> The success of strategies that use cultural policy to boost retailing and consumer services industries, expand tourism and attract external investment increasingly depend on factors over which cities have very limited control, ranging from airfare prices to changes in the level of the residents' and visitors' disposable incomes [...] the employment generated by the 'customer effect' of cultural policies – which is particularly strong in sectors such as retailing and hotel and catering – is frequently low-paid, part-time, and characterised by deskilling and poor levels of job satisfaction, legal rights and working conditions. (Bianchini 1993: 203)

To compound this, Frith *et al.* argue that cultural policies seeking to make areas attractive to investment from outside can actually serve to undermine indigenous creative capacity (2009: 83), and García similarly argues that "satisfying tourism interests may be in direct contradiction to the traditions of the place and may affect its natural environment" (2004b: 116). The increase in visitor levels which is presented as one way in which the ECoC is presented as having 'succeeded' (Liverpool Culture Company 2009), may thus prove no less problematic to the creative industries although, again, this constitutes a separate research topic to the one considered here.

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40. Source: ONS 2010. Relative to a UK baseline of 100, Gross Disposable Household Income in Liverpool stood at 83.6 in 1995, and at 81.5 in 2008.

8.4 The creative industries and regeneration

What is perhaps the most difficult tension to resolve on the topic of the creative industries, and which could form a key aspect of future research beyond the scope of this thesis, is how a set of activities which is seen as being at the centre of a nexus which can bring about both economic and social regeneration is so intimately related with inequality, seemingly subverting the entire 'regeneration' agenda. Oakley points out that "terms like social inclusion, neighbourhood renewal and widening participation are peppered throughout any policy documents relating to the creative industries" yet, "on the face of it, these look like sectors that have a lot to contribute to social polarization" (2004: 72). This facet of creative practice is acknowledged by influential writers such as Florida yet, whereas the more attractive aspects of his thesis are taken up (regardless of the problems with this thesis as outlined previously), such problematic elements are conveniently left to one side during this process. Whilst Florida's ideas on the role of a 'creative core', for example, is explicitly referenced in the LCS, his discussion of the role of 'community' within the context of the creative class is not acknowledged. There would be no place in the community-centred language of the LCS for a notion such as this, for example:

> The kinds of communities that we desire and that generate economic prosperity are very different from those of the past [...] Traditional notions of what it means to be a close, cohesive community and society tend to inhibit economic growth and innovation. Where strong ties among people were once important, weak ties are now more effective. (Florida 2004: 269)

Florida makes it quite explicit that "the more creative a region is, the more income inequality you will find there" (2004: 354), a finding echoed by others (Caves 2000: 182, Ross 2007: 28), and also asserts that social capital and community cohesion are unhelpful for processes of entrepreneurship (Florida 2004: 272), in line with other research which finds a greater sense of community in areas of greater poverty (Turok 2004: 22). Whereas Florida expounds how the creative class are repelled by tightly-knit communities, the Liverpool Cultural Strategy and the ECoC align 'creativity' with cultural initiatives explicitly justified in terms of their very value for 'community cohesion' and the like. Due to the lack of rigour in the terminology utilised, therefore, there is the potential for such strategies to be based on notions which are fundamentally antithetical to their own success, in addition to the myriad other issues regarding definition considered thus far. Until the discourse of creativity can be focussed to a point where it is clear which of its aims are mutually exclusive, or even what its aims actually *are*, there is, ironically, as discussed in Chapter Six, the risk of policy stagnating around the same cluster of interventions, resulting in policy lacking in the very 'creativity' it purports to promote.

What is more problematic for a discourse around the benefits of promoting creative activity is the evidence of demographic homogeneity within creative industries workers (Parker *et al.* 2006: 3, Van Heur 2010a: 142), largely resulting from the prevalence of informal, personal networks which it is difficult for policy to influence (Christopherson 2008: 89). In concert with the discussion of the nature of some creative work above, then, there is the distinct possibility that some creative industries present stubborn difficulties for any policy intervention. As celebrated designer Karl Lagerfeld characterises his industry of fashion:

> It's like cinema. Lots of boys and girls want to do it, but very few make it. [...] To do this job you must be able to accept injustice – the same goes for fashion. There are other careers. You can work for Social Security, get promoted and work behind a counter. It's a safe bet. If you want social justice, be a civil servant. Fashion is ephemeral, dangerous and unfair. (Jezebel 2007)

There does indeed seem to be evidence that on multiple fronts for a number of reasons, creative work is 'unfair'. Whether, then, it is appropriate for local authorities to even seek to promote it is an open question.

What this thesis has shown, however, is that a programme such as the ECoC, valuable though it may be for increasing the profile of a city, is liable to have little impact specifically on creative industries, unless one conceives of all matters 'creative' as being intimately linked, and by indiscriminately applying the same label to all such activity, seeks to align intervention in one area with results in another. By revealing the instabilities in the purported relationship between a programme such as the ECoC and creative industries, it is hoped that this thesis has demonstrated how this linkage of all things 'creative' is logically untenable. It does, however, seem to be remarkably persistent. From this, we can perhaps conclude that it is simply the desire to be associated with the attractive aura of all things 'creative' and the sense of inevitability aligned to the 'new economy' which enables this problematic situation to persist. As Derrida advises, "as always, coherence in contradiction expresses the force of a desire" (1978: 352). It is this coherence in contradiction that characterizes the 'catachresis' which has been a theme of this thesis, and until such desires abate, it seems likely that this contradiction and such catachresis will remain.

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A-2 Culturally expressive practice of interviewees

	Expressive / cultural practice currently	Prior cultural practice / study	No expressive / cultural activity
Advertising (1)		Study of literature	
Advertising (2)		Film background	
Advertising (3)			✔
Architecture (1)		Study of art	
Architecture (2)		Study of art	
Architecture (3)			✔
Art/Antiques (1)		Study of art	
Art/Antiques (2)	✔		
Art/Antiques (3)	✔		
Art/Antiques (4)	✔		
Craft (1)	✔		
Craft (2)	✔		
Design (1)	✔		
Design (2)	✔		
Film/Video/Photography (1)	✔		
Film/Video/Photography (2)	✔		
Film/Video/Photography (3)		Music background	
Film/Video/Photography (4)	✔		
Film/Video/Photography (5)	✔		
Software/Computer Games (1)			✔
Software/Computer Games (2)			✔
Music/Performing Arts (1)	✔		
Music/Performing Arts (2)			✔
Music/Performing Arts (3)	✔		
Music/Performing Arts (4)	✔		
Publishing (1)		Music background	
Publishing (2)			✔

A-3 Geographical origin of interviewees

	Raised in Liverpool	Raised Elsewhere
Advertising (1)	✔	
Advertising (2)	✔	
Advertising (3)	✔	
Architecture (1)		✔
Architecture (2)	✔	
Architecture (3)		✔
Art/Antiques (1)		✔
Art/Antiques (2)		✔
Art/Antiques (3)		✔
Art/Antiques (4)		✔
Craft (1)		✔
Craft (2)		✔
Design (1)	✔	
Design (2)		✔
Film/Video/Photography (1)		✔
Film/Video/Photography (2)		✔
Film/Video/Photography (3)	✔	
Film/Video/Photography (4)		✔
Film/Video/Photography (5)	✔	
Software/Computer Games (1)		✔
Software/Computer Games (2)		✔
Music/Performing Arts (1)		✔
Music/Performing Arts (2)	✔	
Music/Performing Arts (3)	✔	
Music/Performing Arts (4)		✔
Publishing (1)	✔	
Publishing (2)	✔	

A-4 The role of university as magnet in a number of cases

A] Those already within the city:

> **Advertising (1):** I studied here, my degree, and then following, my masters at JMU[41].

> **Advertising (3):** I hung around after school, went to John Moores because they offered me a place, and I just...stayed hanging around I suppose. You get to know people, you know, and it sort of builds and builds.

> **Architecture (2):** I wandered round Liverpool University on a sunny day and ended up doing architecture, really.

> **Design (1):** I went to John Moores because I was in Liverpool and I needed a degree. I wasn't expecting to like it.

> **Film/Video/Photography (5):** I actually went away to go to uni, to Manchester. You just need to get away from your parents before you go weird. I came back because I know the place. I'll probably come back and forth, you know?

> **Music/Performing Arts (3):** Yeah, I probably should have gone somewhere else, but I went to uni round here. The thing is I'm pretty lazy, so I could just hang around here and do what I wanted to do so, you know, why not, you know? I already know the bus routes and all that.

B] Those from outside the city:

> **Architecture (1):** I applied to Liverpool and Glasgow and Edinburgh. I applied to Liverpool because it was a good school. In the country, there are about 30, 35 courses, I think, but Liverpool is pretty high up, outside London. I had passed through Liverpool, but I had no sense of it as a place.[...] I'm not sure how else you would get here. You could qualify elsewhere but I think it's unlikely you'd pitch up here.

> **Architecture (3):** I came here to study, basically. It was purely the school.

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41. See Footnote 38.

Art/Antiques (1): I wanted to study [*subject*] [...] I wanted to go to a city, and I wanted to - I visited the 3 or 4 places that did it, and I liked Liverpool.

Art/Antiques (4): I arrived here straight out of school, I came to John Moores, and just from there, in getting to know people on the course and that kind of thing, I started putting things together, and one thing turned into another and it really just snowballed from there.

Craft (1): - Is Liverpool a place you had been to much before you came here to study?

- No, there's nothing really to come here for, you'd go to Manchester. But my granddad was from here, so we'd come to meet them every now and then. [...] I didn't really want to go to university but my tutor at college [...] he said I should apply. I really don't know why I applied to John Moores.

Design (2): I just wanted to get away from [*home town*], really. Liverpool seemed as good a place to study as any. And I'm just here now, really.

Film/Video/Photography (1): It's more fortuitous, accidental. A lot of people who graduate in Liverpool... I was here to study and there was no big reason to move away.

Software/Computer Games (1): I came to Liverpool, went to Liverpool Polytechnic, now John Moores University, I studied computing and business, [...] I stayed in Liverpool, joined the Merseyside Innovation Centre which is now the Science Park [and] over the years I actually created my own consultancy business involved in advising businesses in new technologies.

Music/Performing Arts (1): I came to study music at LIPA. I did auditions for a lot of places and I didn't like them. I came to LIPA because you didn't have to necessarily do one instrument.

A-5 Attitude to place, and the role of London

Architecture (1): Heaven knows why I should buck the trend on this, but why should you have to go to London to practice? There's a lot of laziness, though. You can get away with a lot of shit up here. By and large your client is lower down the educational chain, even though they may be as wealthy as they are in the south, but the perception here is that you can get away with murder.

Architecture (2): In London where you have a lot of architects, there is a sort of competition, there is the next big idea, the next image, you're in magazines or you're competing to get into magazines to get a job. Up here, architects aren't bothered about national press, really. I think you've got people who decide to live here, and then the thing is whether that affects how you feel in terms of aspiration, and whether they're lower, or whether just by virtue of being in London you have more opportunity. [...] Even in London, a lot of shite gets built. But in Liverpool, you do tend to see a lot more of the shite. Maybe the good work hasn't been built yet, but there is such a lot of shite around.

Art/Antiques (1): Everyone kept saying 'go to London' and I said 'there's no point me going to London because there's another forty thousand people already there.'

Art/Antiques (3): Financially, the market hasn't developed yet [in Liverpool]. So, there's lots of culturally interesting people, but so far there isn't a proven market. Whereas in London, there's a proven market. [...] I believe keeping artists in the region is important for a healthy arts economy across the UK. That not everyone wants to go and live and work in London. But they need the same ambition, and have that ambition supported outside London.

Design (2): I like the pace of it, really, I can do my own thing, and there's just less pressure like there would be somewhere like London, you know, everyone coming and going and this and that and...I'm not interested in having a heart attack at 30, so I'd rather be somewhere where I can do what I want.

Film/Video/Photography (2): I think, 'would it be easier in London? Would it be harder?' And it would probably be harder to make a name for yourself, there would probably be more work, but it would probably be more competitive [...] you'd meet less people, so getting a name for the work you do would be harder.

Music/Performing Arts (1): It is hard, though. I'm quite lucky because there isn't another one of me, if I was in a different city, or if I was in London, there'd probably be 30 or 40, so I'm quite lucky because I've found a little place that I can be, but yeah, I wouldn't like to be in a place... *[trails off]*

Music/Performing Arts (4): [Liverpool]'s not that big a city, and you kind of know who's good, who you can work with, who's reliable, and I give people work, they've offered me work, so it works that way, you don't have to be too competitive.

A-6 Where value arises from work

Architecture (1): Successful practice [...] may not have anything to do with the idea of a successful *business*. I'm more interested in the translation of ideas. [...] I don't want to *lose* money. But I don't think that is enough to drive one as a human being. Unless one is particularly vacuous. [...] You tend to find that those who *are* successful financially have devoted their lives to being successful through business, and the problem with that is that one neglects any artistic sensibility whatsoever.

Art/Antiques (3): I don't work with artists who are just commercially viable. I work with artists who I think have a contribution to helping us think differently about the world that we live in. Which, commercially, is...mental.

Art/Antiques (4): You don't do this for money, really. It's always been the credit crunch for me! Welcome to my world, everyone!

Craft (1): I've never had a career idea. The future is still unclear. I never know where I want to end up, I don't know if this is the final thing or what I should be doing forever. [...] In a way, it is self-indulgent.

Design (1): I worry that I'm not pragmatic enough to realise what a stupid decision it was. I just think things will turn up. The main reason is that, yes, 'I Am Creative', and when you're creative, then you have an itch to do something, and you have ideas that you want to do and if you're in a job where you're being told what to do then you have to find time to do your own stuff and start to resent doing other things, but you can't turn it off; you can't decide 'I won't have any more ideas this week'.

Film/Video/Photography (1): I graduated four years ago and didn't want to find a proper job [...] didn't want to work full time for anyone, in the sense of I didn't want to have a boss, and I still had lots of creative projects I wanted to work on.

Film/Video/Photography (3): As long as we know we're not going to starve, ok, then it's about doing the best job you can. Rather than making the money.

Publishing (1): There's not a financial imperative. I'm sure there's a lot of people who start up their enterprises to make money, and first and foremost to make money, but that's really a happy, kind of, after effect, it's not the reason to do it. I'm not a budding Richard Branson. It's more of a burning need.

A-7 Views on the ECoC

Advertising (1): Yeah, it was fine. I mean, we didn't get any work off it.

Architecture (1): 2008 really comes very close to the end of that wave of building activity, really, it was a bit late. You've got to understand the period of time it takes to procure a building.

Architecture (3): I mean, it didn't affect my practice, obviously. [...] But it was... you know, fine. Why not?

Art/Antiques (1): Q: Did the Capital of Culture affect...

-No. The way I looked at it was it didn't do any harm. Because it got people thinking about arty stuff. But from my point of view it didn't help at all.

Art/Antiques (2): It's like the Olympics, it's great that the UK's got the Olympics, but it's not going to affect me.

Art/Antiques (3): I used the momentum to get things going, I decided to go with it, because of the general interest in culture. Whether or not it was useful for *me*? Not really.

Craft (1): That had no effect on my life. I mean, I knew it was happening. [...] I think it ruined the Biennial. It became really sterile. Though, I don't know if Capital of Culture is to blame for that.

Design (1): It didn't make any big difference, things happen anyway.

Design (2): That kind of thing just doesn't interest me. Whatsoever.

Film/Video/Photography (1): There were some parts where they dropped the ball or got decisions wrong, but other parts they got really right. It was influential, I liked the spider, it engaged a lot of people, and last year a lot of independent artists who were doing stuff anyway stepped up to the mark a bit, there was a lot going on that wasn't funded. Hopefully that momentum will carry on.

Film/Video/Photography (2): I don't think it did too badly, and I think there was some amazing stuff that came out of it. Things irritated, like they had the Open Culture channel... I think there was a lack of vision with that... also just technically, they bought Sky TV channel 167 for a year, I mean, who watched that? What a waste of money, why not just develop... There was no consistency in the programme, they would just get random things people had made, and then it just stopped.

Complete waste of money. I did some filming work, and all that equipment is now just sat in a cupboard somewhere. That's the legacy!

Film/Video/Photography (3): The lambananas[42] seemed very popular. They paid a lot of money, because they weren't comfortable in making their own decisions, they got a lot of people in, but when their ideas came through they didn't like them so they were back to square one quite late. And that was scary in terms of what it was.

Film/Video/Photography (4): You get the same thing with Capital of Culture, you end up dealing with people on occasion who have no understanding at all. They might be handing out money, but they have no understanding of the process of making a film, they actually have very little enthusiasm for film.

Music/Performing Arts (1): There was so much going on, and because they'd made the big spider, and *[an event this interviewee was involved in]* was the weekend before, everything was put into [the spider]. They didn't care about anything else. And that wasn't even involving Liverpool, do you know what I mean? Ok, it was brilliant, but it was such a waste of money. To spend millions of pounds of that...

Music/Performing Arts (2): I think it ticked all boxes, it delivered, it gathered its momentum in the last couple of months. They started the campaign too early, so it had its peak of excitement and then deflated, then they tried to keep things bobbing along. In essence, it did the job. Could it have been better? No doubt about it. It could have well been better.

Music/Performing Arts (3): I mean, let's be honest, there was a few good things but...you know, not a lot. Not a lot. I suppose if it helps people to realise that Liverpool isn't as totally...fucked as it used to be then that can't hurt, but culturally? (incredulously) Superlambananas? You know what I mean?

Music/Performing Arts (4): I got to dress up for the opening event, which was nice, and there were a few other bits that came down from the Culture Company, so yep, it keeps you busy, you know?

Publishing (1): I can only look at it as a huge missed opportunity, because having dabbled in creative arts since I left school, you can't help thinking what you would have done yourself if you'd been more involved. What would have been good additions. And my simplistic view of it, when you travel abroad, to Naples or New York or wherever, places that are generally agreed to be great cities, they do what they do locally, there's not masses of culture parachuted in and grafted on to the city.

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42. See Footnote 34.

A-8 Difficulties working with public sector organisations

Advertising (1): When you work with people who are doling out opportunities, or policing opportunities – public sector – they are just fucking mad. They're on a different planet in terms of how they work. [See Chapter Seven for extended extract]

Art/Antiques (3): For me personally I'm not particularly interested in networking with the politicians and strategic bods anymore. It's not helpful to me, they don't understand what I'm doing.

Art/Antiques (4): Various funding bodies, have this idea that if you just try and communicate what you're doing to everybody, and everybody has a right to access the arts, which they do of course, but something gets lots in trying to communicate to everybody. Any business would find out who their key customers are. And that's one thing that culture suffers from in the city, there's a demand to try and reach a 16 year old living in Kirkdale and an OAP...or, you know...actually, it's bonkers.

Film/Video/Photography (3): You don't expect these people to be visionaries, technical visionaries...well, it would be great if they were. But it is frustrating, in the past some didn't even know what DVD was, it had been a format for four years, and you get stunned at that level sometimes, you get a question and think 'I don't know where that's coming from...oh my god. [...] They always go top-heavy, they get their own infrastructure and it eats up such a huge portion of the funds, that it's under pressure, so it squeezes a bit, and then it doesn't work, so it's a tough one.

Film/Video/Photography (4): I would not go back now to a funding agency. I would just go and raise money from people [i.e. private individuals]. I spent so much time dealing with them I thought 'never again'. [...] I had the same experience with Capital of Culture, they approached me and asked me to make a film, and the experience we had with them was that 9 months after producing the film we were still waiting for money, and you just think 'no'.

Music/Performing Arts (2): [The public sector] doesn't attract the right people and therefore they stay in this kind of fucking...it's fourth division stuff and that's where the funding is. Not in the premiership. [...] City council platforms are never sympathetic to hard-nosed creativity. I don't think the mentality and the remit and the accountability, if you like, lends itself to the flair, and requirements of musicians and what they need. However, however, however – it should have a place for them to develop.

Music/Performing Arts (3): I don't know if you've ever dealt with the [local city] council, but you soon realise you're not dealing with people who... I mean, they could be... well, let's say it wasn't helpful for the way I work.

Publishing (1): I think there's a fundamental problem with agencies across the board in that I think by definition they don't get paid enough to get the very top level of professional or moderator or mentor, if you like, to actually do the task they're supposed to do. So, again being crude about it, they're handed a pot of money to invest in the creative industries and it's their job to try and cherry pick the ideas and individuals and teams they think are most likely to deliver results, so that becomes a *very subjective thing, you're* talking about hunches, about taking a punt.

A-9 Opinions given regarding the proposed 'creative industries quarter'

Advertising (1): In terms of location, you've got Novas down there, you've got a lot of the biennial stuff going on down there, it works as a location on loads of different levels. But also as maybe somewhere to get murdered.

Art/Antiques (3) : I think those kind of things [such as a 'creative quarter'] tend to happen naturally, and when they're enforced they tend to shift identity, so the Manchester Northern Quarter is a good example, where that actually started out with the visual arts, and when there was a deliberate plan to turn it into the Northern Quarter, it's moved more into bars and music and people can't afford to open up in quite the same way.

Film/Video/Photography (4): The council [...] think we have to clean it up, knock it down, make it modern, make it new. They don't understand.

Music/Performing Arts (1): Down there it's still very daytime. At night, you would never go down there.

Music/Performing Arts (3): I think now they want everyone to go down towards [*the Baltic Triangle area*] and go and be some kind of groovy community of artists, like it's, you know, the 60s and it'll turn into New York. And it's like three garages and... [*trails off*]

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