

**AN EXPLORATION OF MORAL JUDGEMENT WITH
SOCIAL IDENTITY IN A DEVELOPING WORLD
ETHNO-SOCIAL CONFLICT CASE STUDY**

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by

Sanjee Perera

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ABSTRACT

In a global society of fragmentary conflicts, which relentlessly spills over and aggravates global political stability and creates mass fear and oppression, socio-morality is necessary for social order and cohesion as a policing mechanism for altruism and basic pro-social behaviours. The social identity approach suggests a positive value distinctiveness within in-groups which is usually juxtaposed with a negative attribution with out-groups. Further more social categorisation claims that shared identity undermines individual accountability, and displays a singular predilection towards aggression. Meanwhile the pervasive nature of kinship ideology and perceived threat in ethno-centric conflict, suggests societies in conflict would produce truncated morality. Furthermore empirical evidence according to the truncation hypothesis claims that moral development is truncated in societies of conflict. Therefore this investigation (N= 1065) proposed three exploratory questions that explored the relationship between ethno-social identification and attachment in Sri Lanka, a society engaged in armed ethnic conflict. Firstly, the nature of social identification and group attachment was explored using Social identity paradigm's 'Measure of Social Identity' (Brown et.al 1996). Secondly, the nature of the Kohlbergian moral judgement competence (cognitive indicators with C-index, stage preference with MSP) was explored using the Moral Judgement Test (Lind 2000). And finally, the demographic conditions and characteristics that significantly affect moral judgement in this context.

The findings suggest that Conflict Level ($R=0.16$), Gender ($R= 0.63$) and Age ($R= -0.12$), are the most significant contributors ($R = 0.1$, $p < 0.05$) in a predictive model in accounting for variance in strength of social identity

and group attachment (MSI). MSI decreased with age and women scored significantly higher in than men.

Furthermore, in the cognitive investigation of moral judgement competence, MSI, Age, Gender and Conflict Level together accounted for 0.3% of the variation in the C-Index. As group attachment and identity strength increased the capacity to consistently apply moral principles to ones judgement (C-index) decreased with MSI emerging as the only significant predictor ($R = -0.07$, $p < 0.05$). In the affective investigation of moral judgement competence, Gender accounted for 0.4% of the variation in Moral Stage Preference and was positively related to Gender with a coefficient of 0.07 indicating higher scores for women. While no significant differences were found in the multiple analysis of variance for moral judgement competence (C-index & MSP), the analysis of variance scrutinising MSI reported significant interactions between Gender ($F(1, 712) = 4.06$, $p < 0.05$) and Religion ($F(3, 712) = 7.51$, $p < 0.01$) were significant, while the other main effects of Age ($F(1, 712) = 1.38$, $p = 0.24$), Ethnicity ($F(3, 712) = 1.23$, $p = 0.30$) and Language ($F(2, 712) = 1.22$, $p = 0.30$) were not significant. Conflict Level as a main effect was found to be approaching significance ($F(1, 712) = 3.75$, $p = 0.053$). This exploratory investigation provides an initial understanding of the nature of ethnocentric identification and group attachment and its relationship to moral judgment.

CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	II
CONTENTS	III
LIST OF FIGURES	VIII
FOREWORD	IX
CHAPTER 1.....	1
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SINGHALESE AND TAMIL ETHNO-SOCIAL IDENTITIES AND THEIR POST COLONIAL CONFLICT INFLUENCES.....	1
<i>Conflicted identity narratives and proto-historical influences in juxtaposed identities.....</i>	7
<i>Contemporary grievances and issues that affect the identity stratification and legitimacy</i>	21
CHAPTER 2.....	41
MORAL DEVELOPMENT & DISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORKS.....	41
<i>Emmanuel Kant's Moral Philosophy as a Precursor</i>	45
<i>Piaget' Theory of Cognitive Development and its Moral Precursors</i>	48
<i>Lawrence Kohlberg's Moral Stage Theory</i>	53
<i>Gender Biases within the Kohlbergian Model.</i>	60
<i>Moral Universalism and Cross Cultural Compatibility within the Kohlbergian Model.</i>	64
<i>Jurgen Habermas's Moral Consciousness and Revisions of the Kohlbergian Model</i>	71
<i>Georg Lind's 'Dual Aspect Model' and its Revisions of Moral Judgement Measurements.....</i>	75
<i>Contemporary Conceptions of Moral Development in relation to Empirical Research</i>	87
CHAPTER 3.....	103
AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL IDENTITY, ETHNIC IDENTITY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN POST-COLONIAL CONFLICT	103
<i>Introduction to the Social Identity Approach: Social Identity Theory & Social Categorisation Theory.....</i>	106

<i>Introduction to the Ethno-centric identities and collectivist societies</i>	120
<i>National identity within post- colonial conflict paradigms</i>	130
<i>Rupert Brown's Model of Ethno-centric Identity and Attachment in Social Conflict.</i>	143
CHAPTER 4	148
RATIONALE	148
RESEARCH QUESTION ONE	148
RESEARCH QUESTION TWO	152
RESEARCH QUESTION THREE	162
<i>Procedural Reflections in Statistical operationalization</i>	163
CHAPTER 5	165
RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS	165
<i>Pragmatic and Paradigm considerations in instrument selections for the measurement of social identity and moral development.</i>	165
<i>Considerations in selecting a Moral Measure</i>	171
<i>Kohlberg's Moral Judgement Interview</i>	172
<i>Defining Issues Tests (DIT; Rest, Cooper, Coder, Masanz & Anderson, 1974)</i>	174
<i>The Moral Judgement Test (Lind)</i>	177
<i>Considerations in selecting a Social Identity Measure</i>	183
<i>The Multi-group Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM) Phinney (1992).</i>	185
<i>Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade & Williams (1986) ten item measure;</i>	193
<i>Background and development of the Brown et. al, ten item measure</i>	195
CHAPTER 6	202
<i>Formative pilot studies that shaped the research imperative</i>	202
<i>Pilot study</i>	202
<i>Translation Rationale</i>	222
<i>Considerations Given to Translation Theory</i>	226
<i>Translation Limitations & Considerations</i>	227
<i>Translation Procedures</i>	229
<i>Lind Validation Criterion</i>	231
CHAPTER 7	235
METHODOLOGY	235

<i>The Rationale, Design, Hypotheses, Materials & Research Measures, Sample, Procedure and Ethics</i>	235
<i>Summary Rationale</i>	235
<i>DESIGN</i>	235
<i>RESEARCH QUESTIONS</i>	237
<i>MATERIALS & RESEARCH MEASURES</i>	238
<i>PARTICIPANT SAMPLE</i>	239
<i>Developmental Reflection of Sampling Methodology</i>	239
<i>Sampling Methodology</i>	241
<i>PROCEDURE</i>	244
<i>ETHICS</i>	246
<i>CONTRIBUTING FACTORS</i>	248
<i>VARIABLE 1: Gender</i>	249
<i>VARIABLE 2: Age</i>	251
<i>VARIABLE 3: Religious Belief</i>	253
<i>VARIABLE 4: Ethnicity</i>	256
<i>VARIABLE 5: Language of participation</i>	258
<i>VARIABLE 6: Conflict Level Classifications</i>	259
<i>Summary Sources of information for classification</i>	260
<i>Classification Procedure and other Resources</i>	260
CHAPTER 8	265
RESULTS	265
<i>An Exploration of Moral Development and its contributory factors on Societies of Conflict in the Developing World</i>	266
<i>Summary procedure of results</i>	267
<i>Analysis for Research Question 1;</i>	267
<i>Analysis for Research Question 2;</i>	267
<i>Analysis for Research Question 3;</i>	267
<i>Descriptive illustration;</i>	268
SUMMARY DESCRIPTIVES OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES	273
DESCRIPTIVES OF SOCIAL IDENTITY (MSI)	275
DESCRIPTIVES LINE GRAPHS SCORE DISTRIBUTION IN MSI, MSP & C-INDEX BY CONFLICT AND AGE	278
<i>Parametric assumptions for inferential analysis : Normal Distribution, Homogeneity of Variance, Homoscedascity & Linearity and sample size</i>	282
<i>Scatter plots between MSI and C-Index, MSP & MSI</i>	286
RESEARCH QUESTION 1:	290
RESEARCH QUESTION 2a:	292

<i>RESEARCH QUESTION 2b:</i>	293
<i>RESEARCH QUESTION 3</i>	294
<i>3a; Multivariate Analysis of Variance on Moral Development (MSP & C-index) of socio demographic categorical variables.</i>	294
<i>3b; Univariate Analysis of Variance on Social Identity (MSI) of socio demographic categorical variables.</i>	297
CHAPTER 9	301
CONCLUSIONS & DISCUSSION	301
SUMMARY RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS	301
DISCUSSION	305
BIBLIOGRAPHY	336
APPENDICES	388
1 - ADDITIONAL MAPS, FIGURES & ILLUSTRATIONS.....	389
<i>1a – Language families & dialects of Indo-Aryan and Dravidian proto-history</i>	389
<i>1b – Geopolitical spread of subsamples</i>	390
<i>1c – University population spread by place of birth</i>	391
<i>1d – University population spread by place of birth</i>	392
<i>1e – Population density of Sri Lanka by census data</i>	393
<i>1f – Defence ministry warzone classification territories</i>	394
<i>1g – Defence ministry’s official statistics Internally Displaced People</i>	395
<i>1h – Defence ministry’s official statistics on military expenditure.</i> ..	396
<i>1i – Socio-economic indicators by luxury facilities (phone usage)</i> .	397
<i>1j – Socio-economic indicators by luxury facilities (internet usage)</i>	398
<i>1k – Conflict & poverty levels in Sri Lanka</i>	399
<i>1l – Human poverty in Sri Lanka</i>	400
<i>1m – District map of Sri Lanka</i>	401
6.1 – CONTEXTUAL SETTINGS OF CULTURE & LANGUAGE	402
<i>Linguistic Lineage, Context and Characteristics of Sinhala</i>	402
<i>Linguistic Lineage and Characteristics of Tamil</i>	404
6.2 – SUMMARY REFLECTIONS ON TRANSLATION VALIDATION	409
7.1 - SOCIO-ECONOMIC LEVEL CLASSIFICATIONS DESCRIPTORS	412
8.1 – FURTHER RESULTS	452

LIST OF TABLES

<i>Number</i>	<i>Page</i>
Table 1: 4 separate measurement points of stage	182
Table 2: School Samples according to gender distribution	250
Table 3: School Samples according to Age distribution	252
Table 4: School Samples according to Religious Belief	254
Table 5: School Samples according to Ethno-social group	257
Table 6- Descriptions of dependant variables.....	273
Table 7 -Moral stage preference of sample.....	273
Table 8 - C-index transformed	274
Table 9 - Population MSI means by Religion	275
Table 10 - Population MSI means by Ethno Social Group	276
Table 11 - Population MSI means by Conflict Level.....	276
Table 12 - Population MSI means by Age.....	277
Table 13 - Population MSI means by Gender	277
Table 14 - Population MSI means by Language	277
Table 15 - Test of Homogeneity of Variances for MSI	285
Table 16 - Test of Homogeneity of Variances for C-Index	285
Table 17 - Test of Homogeneity of Variances for MSP.....	285

LIST OF FIGURES

<i>Number</i>	<i>Page</i>
Figure 1: School Samples according to Gender distribution.....	251
Figure 2: School Samples according to Age distribution.....	253
Figure 3: School Samples according to Religious distribution	255
Figure 4: School Samples according to Religious distribution & gender.....	255
Figure 5: School Samples according to Ethnic distributions by gender	258
Figure 6 - Research Instrument Summary	265
Figure 7 - Cohens C-Index count	274
Figure 8 - Moral Stage Preference count	274
Figure 9- C-Index mean plotted against Conflict Level	278
Figure 10 - MSI mean plotted against Conflict Level	279
Figure 11 - MSP mean plotted against Conflict Level	279
Figure 12 - MSP means plotted against Age	280
Figure 13 - MSI means plotted against Age	280
Figure 14 - C-Index means plotted against Age	281
Figure 15 - Histogram illustrating the distribution of the MSI Scores	283
Figure 16 - Histogram illustrating the distribution of the C-Index Scores	283
Figure 17 - Histogram illustrating the distribution of Moral Stage preferences.....	284
Figure 18 - Scatter plot based on the means between MSI and Moral Stage Preference	286
Figure 19 - Scatter plot based on the means between MSI and C-Index	286
Figure 20 - Scatter plot based on the sums between MSI and C-Index	287
Figure 21 - Scatter plot based on the sums between MSI and Moral Stage Preference	287
Figure 22 - Measure P-plot illustrating the Standardised Residual of the Multiple Regression	288
Figure 23 - Confidence Intervals for MSI scores by Religion of participant	298
Figure 24 - Mean MSI scores by Ethno Social Group	298

FOREWORD

Conflict, whether creative or destructive has been a vital formative part of human evolution. As we dodder beyond the rubble of the 20th century, beyond the scars and disfigurements of the two world wars, we convince ourselves that we have become a more 'life respecting' species. Having grown up in Sri Lanka where a bitter war festers with atrocities committed in the name of ethnocentric ideals, I find this species maturation difficult to believe. Furthermore, this identity crisis that is described as one of the most dramatic failures of modern post-colonial nation building (Rajasingham-Senanayake, 1999), which has led to a bitter ethno-centred conflict has spiralled out of control to an irrevocable and irredeemable violation of humanity in this island state. Having witnessed the worst of the Tamil pogroms and the inevitable retribution that came in the form of bombs, in the busiest civilian locations in my impressionable adolescent years, and, having grown up in the midst of identity discourse that was used to legitimise and validate the human right to share landscape, I was particularly confounded by the pervasive nature of kinship ideology.

The differentiation of Sinhala and Tamil was not an exogenous criterion in phenotype as believed within these identity groups (e.g. in comparison to South African Apartheid) and yet the psycho-social constructs enhanced by language and religious differences had created irrevocable gulfs

between these identities and made social mobility between groups impossible. The idea that this level of violence could be explained by an identity crisis was inconceivable. However, this identity based group conflict has provoked my desire to understand its structure and drive for more than a decade of my academic study.

My undergraduate sociology dissertation was focussed on a socio-economic analysis of this conflict. While this led me to conclude that socio-economic unrest and relative deprivation had much to do with sustaining the conflict and explained Sri Lanka's parallel Marxist revolution between the state and the Sinhalese youth, this did not prove to be as pervasive or longitudinal, even if as violent in its short life span. The Marxist/Socialist concerns or the polar differences between resource differences were not resolved, nor were they correlated with ethno-social groups. And yet, the socialist unrest ceased its violent outbursts and spluttered into occasional non violent demonstrations. However, the ethno-centred conflict that could not be fully explained by relative deprivation persisted, and decade by decade fell further into bitter distrust and resentment spreading from an extremist hierarchy into civilian society.

My psychology under graduate dissertation on the other hand, focussed on moral development on ethnocentric societies of Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka, inspired by the truncation hypothesis of the Northern Irish school of

thought (e.g. Breslin, 1982; Fields, 1973; 1974; 1976; Fraser, 1974; Ferguson & Cairns, 1996; Kahn, 1982). This study was designed to measure moral truncation that juxtaposed eastern and western models of conflict with identity primed measurements. While this study found no moral truncation, it found a moral augmentation which didn't really fit in with the research fabric. Therefore these findings were discarded, attributed to sampling (N=196) flaws and possible spurious relationships with unidentified lurking variables.

However the identity polarisation and prioritisation of ethno centred identity in societies of conflict suggested there were correlations between two very separate national samples (Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka) both in quantitative measures of identity, as well as qualitative expressions of identification. These shared commonalities in expression extended to the conflict measure in this pilot study. This led me to believe that identity structures particularly when kinship ideology is assumed creating ethno-identities had an affect on people's reasoning capacities. In exploring the particularly bitter the nature of ethno-conflict, it seemed self evident that this psycho-social ideology was far more potent than other causes of conflict. Religious conflict was perhaps one of the few conflict models that were comparable. However, faith systems and religiosity allowed for a certain amount of social mobility between groups. It was only when

faith conflicts were grounded in ethno-social constructs that it became irrevocably exclusive.

Despite the recent drop in conflict/casualty statistics there are 82 recorded conflicts with 35 of them registering more than a 1000 deaths a year (Uppsala 2004;, Wallensteen & Sollenburg, 1995). Much of this violence has emerged from ethnic conflict. Furthermore many of these ethnic conflicts have been post-colonial tangles of different groups of peoples fighting for political self determination, grappling territorial and state dominion in their attempt to find self expression and identity. This group identity or the more romanticised 'sense of belonging' has been a vital part of human culture from the primitive homo-sapient, and plays a vital role in individual identity and security (Grosby 1994, Mc Kay 1982). However, for most ethnic peoples living in the situations of violent ethnic conflict, it is a precarious and vulnerable 'belonging'.

Ethnic conflict nevertheless is not a modern phenomenon as recorded history witness. It is not particularly the increased frequency of ethnic conflict which has raised international concern. Two or three decades ago, ethnic conflict was primarily internal and contained.; an inconvenience to national governments certainly, but not a serious threat to world order. What has modernised is the methods and context it is waged in. Ethnic conflict has suddenly become an international concern because it has

demonstrated the ability to disturb world peace and exacerbate into international catastrophes in an era of nuclear weapons.

Most of these volatile conflicts scattered around the world are rooted within ethno-social identity and its complex machinery (Duffy –Toft 2003; Fox 2002; Kalyvas 2006; Read & Miller 1998; Overwalle, & Van Rooy 1998) and are passionate, irrational and dynamic drives of violence. Research into group logistics suggest that in-group reasoning produces negative behaviour towards the out-group, and truncates inter-group altruism & pro-social behaviour (eg. Atkinson et al., 1993; Berry, 1984; Berry et.al. 1977; Cross, 1991; Helms, 1990; Hinkle & Brown 1990; Lambent et. al. 1986; Messick & Mackie 1989; Phinney, 1993; Phinney & Chavira, 1992; Tajfel & Turner, 1986;). Social reasoning and group behaviour research, suggest that diffusion of responsibility and abstract motivation is a strong drive towards uncharacteristic aggression (eg. Keyes 1981; Levinson, 1950; Masson & Verkyuton, 1993; Stavenhagen 1990; Thompson, 1989; Yee & Brown., 1992). This advocates the need for a clearer understanding of the structures and drives of Social Identity and its influence on moral reasoning and moral behaviour.

Unfortunately research also suggests that because of extreme conditions, societies of conflict create truncated socio-morality among other developmental and psychopathological impairments (eg. Allodi, 1980;

Cairns 1983; Cohn et al., 1980; Dawes & Tredoux, 1989; Ferguson & Cairns, 1996; Fields, 1973, 1976; Fraser 1974; Garbarino, et al. 1992; Greer 1980; Miligram & Miligram, 1976; Punamaki and Suleiman, 1990; Straker, 1987; Straker et al. 1996; 1976; Terr 1990; Turner, Turner & Reed, 1980). However, some studies contradict this (eg. Breslin's 1982; Cairns and Conlon 1985; Lorenc and Branthwaite 1986; Westman & Lewandowski, 1991).

Therefore this cross cultural research proposes to explore moral development in relation to ethnic identities in societies of conflict. Tajfel's social identity theory maintains that "Individuals need to maintain and enhance the positively valued distinctiveness of their in-groups compared to out-groups, to achieve a positive social identity" (Tajfel 1972b, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1979, 1986; Turner, 1975). Turner's self categorisation theory (Turner, 1982, 1984, 1985; Turner et al., 1987 as cited in Turner, 1988. pp. x -xi) maintains that shared social identity depersonalises individual self perception and action. As Turner clarifies, "The fundamental hypothesis shared by both these theories is that individuals define themselves in terms of their social group memberships and that group-defined self-perception produces psychologically distinctive effects in social behaviour". (Turner, 1988. pp. x-xi).

Meanwhile, within Kohlberg's progressive stage theory of moral development, the second level characterises acceptance of conventional morality and respect for social justice, and law and order, and conformity to social expectations, and the more advanced third level of post conventional, principled morality requires acknowledgement of 'individual's natural and inalienable rights' and a sense of 'public good'. But more critically it requires an individual to act out of universal principles based upon the worth and equality of all human beings, and a "consideration of interests of all individuals in every situation". (Kohlberg et. al. 1979). This model leaves little room for negative stereotyping and group bias, and requires empathy and altruism.

If ethnic conflicts heighten individuals' ethnic identity as assumed by Tajfel's research, and consequently create in-group out-group prejudice, perhaps even leading to expressions of aggression through violence in societies of conflict, this implies that the group identity itself would have a disruptive influence on moral development. Moreover studies conducted on moral development in societies of conflict have failed to arrive at a unified conclusion (Cairns 1983; Ferguson & Cairns, 1996; Fields, 1973,1976; Greer 1980; Reed 1980; Turner, Turner & etc.) This study envisaged to explore the impact ethnic identity has on moral development in societies of conflict.

This implication of a moral truncation clearly has an indirect impact on the conflict itself. If an ethnic identity in societies of conflict heightens into out-group bias that has an impact on social behaviour, this suggests a vicious circle of prejudice and moral truncation, disrupting empathetic interpersonal communication in creatively reaching a positive win/win solution to social tangles that feed the violence. This study hoped to uncover psychological insights into intra-group interaction providing a better understanding into the political chemistry of the ongoing peace processes currently taking place in the case study sample (Sri Lanka) as well as general insights into obstacles in the way of peace in other such ethnic conflicts.

This 'developing world conflict society' case study attempted to understand the relationship between social identity and moral development as it operates within such a context. This experimental sample (N=1065), matched as closely as possible to national statistics, attempts to recreate a structural model of Sri Lanka's bipolar identities and its tensions. This study attempted to discover the nature of ethno-social identities in such societies of conflict in socioeconomic extremities of the developing world, to assess the nature of its moral atmosphere and the capacity of its moral judgement among its young adults. It also aspired to gain a clearer understanding of the impact of various factors and conditions (such as age, gender or socio economy, religion etc.) that impact both self perception of

identity and moral judgement in severe conflict, and to explore the complex interrelationships within this enigmatic phenomenon.

The results confirmed that the exploratory inclinations were accurate and established that at least in this context social identity has an affect on moral development both in its cognitive indicators and moral stage preferences. However, none of the other explored factors such as age, gender, religion, socio-economy, conflict level and language of participation had an affect on moral judgement, precluding the possibility that these could confound or collude the results. Furthermore, the predictive model also indicated that socio-economy, age, gender and religion, all contributed differentiations in identity attachment, especially when paired. Furthermore, conflict level and socio-economy were significant contributory factors to identity intensity.

While this study is an exploratory study with no convergent designs within comparative operationalization, which limits its interpretive value, it is a first step towards weaving a research literature fabric that can then be then stretched across disciplines from sociology to political science. While there is a lack of quantitative designs that these findings can be compared to in context specific conclusions, these results fit with allied disciplines in conceptualisations of aggression and identity as well as the framework of moral identity theories developed within the antecedent research domains.

Furthermore, there is a large body of theoretical and qualitative literature written on ethnic conflict and its impacts. The phenomenological narrations particularly in political science literature that consistently theorise that strong identity attachment and moral capacities are negatively related. These findings are possibly one small step that can determine the accuracy of their claims.

Chapter 1

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SINGHALESE AND TAMIL ETHNO-SOCIAL IDENTITIES AND THEIR POST COLONIAL CONFLICT INFLUENCES

The 'ethnic conflict' in Sri-Lanka is perhaps one of the most bewildering conflicts of our time. Historically and anthropologically there seems to be a proto Aryan-Dravidian 'conflict' that has re-emerged in almost all of the South-Asian post-colonial states in the form of 'racial' or 'ethnic' struggle (Frawley, 2005). But the said Aryan-Dravidian 'racial' identities submerged in the ancient mists of the pre-Christian eras (500 BC), have only been kept alive in 'popular history, culture and mythology' (Frawley, 2005). Despite this, in Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, Bangladesh, Kashmir and Indonesia there is 'racial conflict', or ethnic tension based on these 'racial' identities. Militant groups engaged in 'liberation struggles' throughout the continent have succeeded in sustaining militant confrontation over long periods of time, and have successfully supplemented the financial and cultural capital required to sustain such a struggle (Thomas, 1994).

To an extent this financial and cultural capital has been achieved in these struggles by winning, to some degree, international sympathy and overt or

covert assistance by extensive and cogent media propagandas. But the human voluntary¹ resources utilised for this sustained conflict suggests that the balance of social equilibrium is not quite perfect in these locations.

Meanwhile, in the post colonial nation building age, the configuration of modern national identities has been typically achieved by selective forgetting of culturally mixed and hybrid pasts; by constructing authentic, 'pure', and stable contemporary 'ethnic' histories; and finally by projecting back into proto history race-based academically legitimised identity categories and classifications that are essentially modern socio-political formations (Rajasingham-Senanayake, 2002).

It would be simplistic to suggest reductive generalisations or draw unified conclusions about all third-world 'ethnic' conflicts. Each has its own unique structure and drive, but disturbingly most have some elements like oppressive economic drives and post colonial reorganisation that give them disquieting similarity (Thomas, 1994). Most of these conflicts are characterised by a militant group maintaining representation of the ethnic minority that is oppressed, discriminated and afflicted by the 'chauvinistic'² majority and a state apparatus that is representative of this 'chauvinistic' majority. It is further featured by a militant struggle for

¹ *The extent to which the paramilitary recruitment is truly 'voluntary' is challenged by some organisations (e.g. UNICEF, 2006)*

political self-determination and an aspiration for a separate state for liberation from this oppressive domination. Another common feature is that these states struggle to maintain its internal and external legitimacy, equilibrium and national cohesion as well as a representative 'democratic state apparatus'. Furthermore while some of these states admit to an 'ethnic' problem others perceive it merely as a terrorist problem (Ahmed, 1998; Thomas, 1994).

In Sri-Lanka, the harsh reality is that there is a self-consuming conflict expressed in a most virulent, destructive & potent form. The conflict is responsible for the massacre of thousands, both civilian and military (be they army personnel or 'terrorist' soldiers), along with the destruction of social structures which depletes the country's resources and truncates the country's political and economic development.

Primarily the bare facts present us with a dilemma. There is undeniably a conflict; but what exact form this conflict takes and what forces drive this conflict, are unclear and is submerged in innumerable debates. Meanwhile there exists a myriad of complex identity tensions (e.g. Between the Sri Lankan Moors and Indian Tamils in the North East, between up country and low country Singhalese Buddhists, between Indian and Sri Lankan Tamils) and judicial and legislative conflicts within the infant state.

¹ As described by Arendt (1945) to mean exaggerated, bellicose patriotism and a blind belief in national

Furthermore alongside the LTTE/Government of Sri Lanka armed conflict, there existed another armed conflict between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Sinhalese Marxist youth uprising. Therefore for the sake of coherency, the argument needs to define what the 'conflict'³ referred to is, and further define the problem that is being analysed. So primarily it is necessary to highlight that it is specifically the militant struggle (between the Sri-Lankan Government and the militant LTTE, its legitimisation, justifications, politics and impetus) that is being referred to here. However, this armed conflict is not under scrutiny or evaluation here. The focus of this thesis is the identity conflict and the behaviour of the social groups in their interactions with each other as a just moral society. Furthermore, it is important to note that the political and phenomenal aspects of the conflict which are entangled with the moral judgments, behaviours and atmosphere of the collectives are necessarily a part of the impinging identity conflict that is being scrutinised by this thesis. Therefore, the phenomenological aspects of the Sri Lankan conflict need to be addressed in concise form only where relevant to the identity conflict.

In narrating the 'story' of the Sri Lankan conflict, a diverse array of disciplines and perspectives organize the conflict in several different ways.

superiority and glory

³ *The term 'conflict' has dichotomous meanings, sociologically as well as polemologically either in its destructive physicalistic definition or in terms of its ideological interpretation. The argument has attempted to specify which definition is being used at different points.*

Generally the markers used are the levels of violence, the territoriality, locations of the violence, the main actors, the voices and stories in the conflict discourse and the differing attempts at resolution. (Rajagopalan, 2006). This discourse has drawn on these various narrations and markers in identifying the influences on identity stratification according to the Social Identity School, and therefore bears the varying emphasis according to the relevant markers of the original source. In considering the violent armed conflict of contemporary history alongside the limited perspectives of the academic debate on public community opinions, this discourse has also taken into consideration ethno-conflict forums and their summaries. These websites were used as markers to inform the discourse on recurring themes and grievances. (e.g- Eelatthamilzhan, 2005; EelamWeb, 2004).

Furthermore, in considering grievance discourse, this thesis has focussed on the issues that are particularly relevant and important to the minority Tamil identity as opposed the grievances of the majority Sinhalese identity or as expressed by the state. These minority grievances have then been explored along with the Sinhalese response to the grievance. This focus has been afforded to the minority grievances to better frame the conflict in its struggle for identity stratification, and to understand the impetus of an identity seeking separatism, as opposed to listing a narrative of grievances between the two identities. Furthermore, this discourse has focused on the grievances and the identity conflict before and during the

commencement of armed conflict, rather than the innumerable grievances that exploded into the conflict narrative in the aftermath of a full scale war.

Conflicted identity narratives and proto-historical influences in juxtaposed identities.

The intractability and complexity of the Sri Lankan conflict has led political scientists to consider it one of the most dramatic failures of modern post-colonial nation building (Rajasingham-Senanayake, 1999). The bestial metaphors of the war which juxtapose the lion versus tiger are particularly illustrative of the ferocity of the conflict (Naik, 2006) and the nature of the identity juxtaposition. To understand the complexities of the Sri Lankan conflict it is necessary to understand the nature of the self perception of the ethno-social identities as well as the contentions of origin and identity as posited by the two conflicting perspectives. To explore the underpinnings of these identities, firstly one must establish the ascendant factors of the identity in their supra-national diasporas' history and 'proto-identity' factors that formed the foundation of the juxtaposed identities.

The self perceptions of the Tamil and Sinhalese 'proto-identities' are traced back to, and beyond, the Aryan invasions of the indigenous aboriginal tribes of Sri-Lanka (Deraniyagala, 1988; Rajasingham-Senanayake, 1999). The Tamil separatist perspective conceives their proto-ancestors to be Dravidian, as do both Sri-Lankan Tamils and Indian Tamils, along with a host of other Dravidian sub-national groups in south

Asia (Krishnamoorthi, 2003). It is this supra-national projection and proto-civilisation claims that merge two historically and politically separate groups of peoples into one political collective seeking 'self determination'. The anthropological claims (Starostin, 2002) that have been adopted into the core of the separatist ideology, classify the Tamil speaking peoples, the Dravidian anthropological and linguistic groups (Caldwell, 1856), to a single 'Proto-Elamo-Dravidian' (PED) family (McAlpin, 1974; McAlpin, 1975). This ideology at some unidentifiable point has transmuted itself into the group-identity conception and has been expressed within the core of the separatist claim for a nation state of their own; a 'Tamil Eelam'. These conceptions juxtapose the Dravidian peoples against Indo-Aryans peoples, in various contexts including military history, cultural development, linguistic and anthropological claims among others (e.g. Asko, 1999; Mallory, 1989; McAlpin, 1974; McAlpin 1975).

Meanwhile the Sinhalese peoples consider the anthropological origin of the 'Arya- Sinhala' identity a part of the Indo-Aryan heritage, differentiating themselves from North Indian Indo-Aryan groups by combining this heritage with the native Australoid⁴ aboriginal element (Pichumani, Subramanian, & Deraniyagala, 2004). Be it in mythology,

⁴ Anthropological studies classify the descendants of the Iron age/Bronze age inhabitants of Sri Lanka to be 'Australoid' by genetic and linguistic classification, who are still found in isolated tribes isolated from the Indo-Aryan/Dravidian mainstream. (e.g. Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi & Piazza, 1994; Huxley, 1870).

recorded⁵ proto-history or cultural narratives, both of these anthropological groups have a proto-history of grievances with the Dravidian groups further exacerbating the identity juxtaposition (e.g. Deraniyagala, 1992, 2001; Madduma-Bandara, 2002; Mark, 1998).

This proto history has been adopted into contemporary culture and reified in its mascots, totems, symbols and other cultural discourse. For example mythology traces Singhalese origins to Prince Vijaya who in turn is believed to have had a leonine ancestor. The etymology of the word 'Sinhala' comes from the word lion⁶ and the 'Singhalese peoples' are called 'People of the Lion' or the 'Lion Race'. The Sri Lankan national flag bears a sword-bearing lion, which is a replica of the one used by the pre-colonial Kandyan kingdom. When Tamil nationalism reached military conflict magnitude it chose an appropriate counter symbol, the tiger. This was founded in the supranational Dravidian history in the militaristically significant Tamil dynasty of the Indian 'Chola peoples'. In contemporary military practice, the Sri Lankan army has regiments called 'Sinha', or lion, and its opponent, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), popularly known as the Tamil Tigers, have leopards, panthers and cheetahs in their ranks (Jeyraj, 1999).

⁵ *The form of the records includes both epics and paintings.*

⁶ *Translated 'Singha' or 'Singhaya'*

In considering contemporary identity discourse and self perceptions of the two in-groups, and counter perceptions of the out-groups in understanding identity salience within the cultural fabric, it is worth considering the sources of information and their legitimacy. For example proto-history as taught by the state national history curricula (as mythological 'pre-history') as early as in primary education, when the very first concepts of 'race' and ethnicity are formed, is pivotal. This proto-history is traditionally traced back to the arrival of 'Prince Vijaya and his men' about 2500 BC, from Northern-India. The 'Mahavamsa'⁷ chronicled in the 6th century A.D. records the Aryan Prince Vijaya arrived on the same day the Buddha attained enlightenment⁸. According to tradition he married 'Quveni' a local aboriginal princess from the indigenous tribes, who is proverbially known as a Fay-princess or witch⁹, and bore two children. Tradition relates how the 'Veddhas'¹⁰, aboriginal gypsies today trace their ancestry back to these indigenous tribes. Prince Vijaya was later remarried to an Aryan princess who arrived from North-India (Bullis & Mahanama, 1999; Paranawitharana, 1967; Wijesekera, 1984).

⁷ The 'Maha-vamsa' (the great-tradition) is an ancient historical chronicle that a major part of Sri-Lankan ancient history is derived from.

⁸ Significant to a majority Buddhist in-group, as auspicious momentum and perhaps in a salvationist reinterpretation of claiming origins through a group of Royal criminals, outlawed and transported to a penal colony.

⁹ Though the direct translation of 'Yakkinni' would transliterate as either witch or she-demon, However the semantic connotations are quite different. The 'Yakshas' were an indigenous tribe, though Quveni is said to have para-human powers.

¹⁰ Veddhas are an aboriginal forest dwelling (nomadic) people that consider themselves an indigenous Sinhalese travelling peoples. (James 1978) Their part in Singhalese ancestry is significant so as to reify a differentiation from the Inddo-Aryan's within the Indian subcontinent.

The 'Sri-Lankan peoples' according to state engineered hegemony (both Sinhalese and Tamil) trace their origin to these waves of colonisation, which absorbed the indigenous tribes. Psycho-socially, the consciousness or notion of one-nation possibly springs on this chosen historical point considered to be the beginning of Sri-Lankan History. This is un-problematised history as it is taught at the early stages of developmental identity-consciousness in state-education¹¹ in text-books written by the Ministry of Education, this is the norm and accepted tradition that the state media supplements and builds upon (Bullis & Mahanama, 1999; Paranawitharana, 1967; Wijesekera, 1984).

The national identity crisis begins at this point because at a certain level of national and ethno-national consciousness, the majority consciousness of the Sinhalese peoples, trace their origin back to 'Prince Vijaya and Queen Quveni, pre-dating the origins of Sri-Lankan Tamil-identity traced back to the Chola¹² occupation and settlements. Consequently this proto-history posits the Sri Lankan-Tamil identity to the Chola occupations &

¹¹ *Private Schools (independant anglicised Church Missionary schools of colonial origin) still use national curriculum and syllabi, while international schools use national curriculum till SAT's O' Levels (London) and A' Levels (London) where American and British History is given priority depending on the international exam the student is submitted to.*

¹² *A powerful 'Dravidian' (Tamil) empire that emerged in South India, resulting in Indian invasions and occupation of Northern parts of Sri-Lanka (between 993-1070 BC) and various other parts of Asia.*

settlements from 993-1070 BC and the residue from subsequent waves of invasions and raids by Southern and East-Indians of the North of the island (Bullis & Mahanama, 1999; Paranawitharana, 1967; Wijesekera, 1984).

The group stratification according to this discourse is subtle, creating a primary status and a secondary status according to identity origin. This very subtle implication that the 'Singhalese peoples' established their presence in the island first has been heatedly contested (e.g. Manogaran, 2000; Manogaran & Pfaffenberger, 1994; Sivarajah, 1996). This has also led to several different means of challenging this stratification from origin discourse (of Lankan identity), proto origin discourse (of proto Dravidian identity) to other cultural, military and moral superiority discourse. (eg. Jeyaraja-Tambiah, 1996; Jayratnam-Wilson 2004; Jeyaratnam-Wilson, 1988; Manogaran, 2000; Manogaran & Pfaffenberger, 1994; Sabaratnam, 2001)

However, as seen in most territorial nationalism and ethno-social group conflicts, this conception of which group has a prior claim on a geopolitical landscape, is of primary importance in legitimacy discourse both within and between groups (e.g. Curtis, 1986; Duignan & Gann 1981; Jaffrelot, 1996; Jones, 1994; Rydgren, 2004). This slight on the point of origin problematises the in-group's (whether Sinhala or Tamil) claims to geo-

political heritage. Therefore this gives rise to heated discourse on this point of origin that attempts to justify and legitimise the judicial and political citizenship rights which the conflicts is really about (Noel, 1968). For example, the separatist claim and the allied militant Tamil groups found and centre the conflict discourse on the identity origin and supersedence. This discourse usually traces the roots of Tamil-identity beyond the Sri Lankan-Tamil identity, to the supra-national Tamil identity and Dravidian proto- history as the LTTE home -page demonstrates;

'The Tamils are an ancient people, the lingua-franco of the Tamils, is one of the oldest living languages of the world. The Tamil classical literature, popularly called Sangam-literature (1st-4th century AD) is a collection of poems of lasting quality and artistic merit they reflect faithfully the high level of civilisation and literary attainment of the ancient Tamils.' (EelamWeb, 2004).

The pages further posits a Dravidian-Tamil presence in Sri Lanka prior to the arrival of Vijaya (5000 BC) to the Indian epic-poem of Ramayana, interpreting the mythical war between good and evil¹³ in Hindu mythology of Rama (conceived as an incarnation of the Hindu-god Vishnu) and Ravana (conceived to be the demon-god of Lanka) as evidence. Given the predominantly Hindu religious beliefs of the Tamil in-group this creates subtle moral dimensions to the 'Sinhala-Tamil conflict'. Some bio-anthropological perspectives go even further to problematise the Indo-

Aryan ancestry of the Sinhalese ethno identity (e.g. Kirk, 2005). Some political historians from the separatist perspectives even suggest that a large number of the Sinhalese peoples are Dravidian Tamil's who transferred their allegiance between groups in the early colonial¹⁴ eras (e.g. Velupillai, 1981).

Meanwhile, the Sinhala in-group seem to accept the aforementioned projections of the ethno-social origins by the State-apparatus and its hegemonic culture, and are largely oblivious to these counter-identity narratives. However, in parallel, and as a response to the Tamil fundamentalism of the LTTE, Sinhalese fundamentalist parties such as Sihala Urumaya¹⁵ dispute these claims (De Silva, 2005; Mathews, 1996; Ranwella, 2006) and dismiss these counter narratives as LTTE propaganda. This perspective further claims that the state is over concerned by the Tamil minority and neglects and marginalises the majority Sinhalese' concerns to entertain western interference and NGO aid. The core contention revolves around the state apparatus's positive discrimination towards the Tamil minority (De Silva, 2005; Maddumabandara, 2005; Ranwella, 2006) To further exacerbate Tamil claims to the island, some political historians also posit that historical evidence points out that until the 9th century, with possibly the exception

¹³ *The epic of Ramayana is chronicled as the war between the gods and the demons, the good or the divinity represented by the Aryans and the demonical or the Evil by the Dravidian.*

¹⁴ *E.g. Dutch, Portuguese*

of the megalithic remains at Pomparippu and Katiraveli, there is no definite evidence of Dravidian settlement in the island (De Silva, 2000; Karthigesu, 1965). They also claim that “no significant definite archaeological evidence has yet come to light regarding any Tamil settlement in the Batticalo district in the Eastern Province, which is now a predominantly Tamil area or other parts of Southern-Ceylon until the 13th century which from which point there is some archaeological epigraphic evidence to suggest Dravidian settlement.” (Karthigesu, 1965, p.233).

The other historical, instrumentalist concept that is heatedly contested¹⁶ between the extreme wings of the ethno conflict in the separatist dispute, is the existence of a separate unified historical Tamil kingdom before colonisation by the British. Again differing parties use differing sources as evidence to challenge or establish this assumption and its strength. The LTTE claim that “Ceylon had been ruled by both Tamil and Sinhalese Kings, the Tamil Kingdom comprising of the north and eastern parts and the Sinhalese kingdom(s) the Southern and western parts of Ceylon.” (EelamWeb, 2004) This contention goes on to claim that except for brief periods when the whole of Ceylon came under a single ruler, there existed two or more kingdoms and that the Tamil Kingdom was always one of

¹⁵ Translates as *Sinhalese Heritage* - to directly contrast the Tamil counter concept.

¹⁶ Perhaps heatedly disputed is too 'involved' a word for the lack of discussion on this ideological plane of the conflict discourse between the state and the militant group. This discourse is purely concerned with the current conflict situation. When there is any discourse at all, LTTE ideology and justification rhetoric is directed at the international audience while the state is dismissive of such 'propaganda'.

them. While the state apparatus ignores this discourse at best, extreme Sinhala chauvinism maintain these claims to be ‘fabricated history’ (De Silva¹⁷, 2005; Maddumabandara, 2005; Ranwella, 2006). However, moderate political and historical analysts challenge both extremes asserting that “A Tamil Kingdom did exist from the 13th century to the early part of the 17th century, but except during the brief heyday of its power it seldom controlled anything more than the Jaffna peninsula” (De Silva, 2000). The Sinhalese conflict perspective in most part avoids identity genesis and anthropological discourse, and instead engages in contemporary grievances (e.g. Gunewardena, 1995; Maddumabandara, 2005).

The Tamil self perception much like the Sinhala self perception is fragmented at best and erased by successive colonial cultural eradication. While there exists some 169 Tamil political groups representing Tamil interests, the LTTE discourse is pivotal given its detailed identity concept and consequent conceptions of intent. The LTTE is the most aggressively militant among the various political groups that posit Tamil representation, and the only one actively in a full scale ‘state of war’ against the nation state. Their claim to a Tamil homeland popularly conceptualised as a ‘Tamil Eelam’ is based on two separate arguments. The first argument posits a separate Tamil kingdom that the British corrupted into one state in

¹⁷ It is important to differentiate Dr. Nalin De Silva who is from the extreme Sinhala perspective, from the historian and political analyst, Dr. K.M De Silva who is from a moderate perspective, who are both referenced in this statement from counter perspectives.

their colonial reign. This was inferred by references from British politicians from the period (e.g. Sir Hugh Cleghorn in 1799 who refers to two distinct ethnic groups in the country). The second argument posits racist treatment on the part of the majority Singhalese peoples and the Sri Lankan state, which they perceive to be majority biased. This will be further explored below.

Partly the ethno-national identity crisis of the Sri-Lankan Tamil identity is aggravated by the fact that there is a supra-national Tamil identity that stretches across most Asian nation states historically. In the twentieth century this has expanded across the world to large immigrant colonies in America, Canada, Britain, Australia, Africa, the Scandinavian states and other European states. So the nation based Tamil identity whether as Sri-Lankan Tamil, Indian Tamil, Indonesian Tamil, Singaporean Tamil, Malaysian Tamil is enveloped by the supra-national diaspora 'racial' identity (Sivasankari, 2007). This is further strengthened by organised identity cohesion by groups such as the 'International Federation of Tamil Peoples'. The Tamil language is claimed to be one of the five oldest living languages of the modern world and the Dravidian racial and culturally identity, anthropologically & historically is perhaps stronger and more permeative than most national identities can ever hope to be (Zvelebil, 1992). To further complicate to the already aggravated identity crisis, the largest Tamil populace in the world is contained in the neighbouring

Southern-Indian state of Tamil-Nadu, which is not only politically powerful and influential but has played a large and significant part both in overt and covert politics in the Sri Lankan conflict (Ganguli, 1998).

On the other hand the Sinhala identity is more nationally contained. Culturally the Arya-Sinhala identity does not have the same links with supra-national Aryan¹⁸, or rather Indo-Aryan identity that the Tamil identity has with supra-national Dravidian identity. The Aryan-based identities of North India or other nation-states are seen as alien and separate. The Sinhala identity is culturally prioritised with the Buddhist identity (Deegalle, 1997). Though the Sinhalese peoples adhere to several different religions, (e.g. Roman Catholics, Anglicans, Methodists, Baptists) a large proportion of the majority of Sinhalese are of Buddhist faith (Fernando & Kearney, 1979) and see themselves as the guardians of Buddhism (Deegalle, 1997). Perhaps this emphasis alongside the state protection of Buddhism¹⁹ is the basis of the accusations of Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism by the militant groups (e.g. Thiruchandran, 2003). This Buddhist identity, which differentiates them from the neighbouring south Asian identities, is further prioritised and individuated on the grounds that Sri-Lanka is the only nation-state in the world to have the

¹⁸ *European Aryan identity is not even vaguely synonymous with this anthropological identity in the Sinhalese identity consciousness.*

¹⁹ *In the same way the British state is considered the protector of the Anglican faith.*

largest (78%) proportionate Buddhist majority (Fernando & Kearney, 1979; Deegalle, 1997).

Though Buddhism originated in Northern India, its most important relics, its higher echelon of clergy, the original form of its doctrine and its august seats are contained within Sri-Lanka. It is in effect the Vatican, Mecca, and Jerusalem of Buddhism, and Buddhists of other nations pay homage to the religious and historical sites. The Sinhalese, though conscious of the majority status within the nation-state, are also equally conscious of being a minority Supra-nationally (Deegalle, 1997). This minority consciousness and the perceived threatened culture by Tamil separatism, as well as the over whelming Dravidian supra-national political presence, and trends of Westernisation through globalisation, brings about the Sinhalese identity-crisis (Kemper, 1991).

The three waves of colonisation by the Portuguese, Dutch and then British (and the impact of these influential cultures) greatly challenged the Sri-Lankan ethno-national identities. However to a great extent, they also influenced and developed the ethno-national identities in its assimilative challenges. Certain elements within the ethno-national identity that marked them apart and bound the ethno-national populace, were emphasised and prioritised, while other characteristics were adopted or adapted according to the necessities of survival (Kemper, 1991). Some of

the characteristics that are clear features of this are the religious and cultural adaptations where a part of both ethno-national groups adapted to the Portuguese culture and religion. This was especially prevalent in the colonial strong-hold cities such as Galle, Negombo, Colombo, Mortuwa, Mt.Lavinia where regional cultures are still quite akin to their colonial assimilators (Jayasuriya, 2000). At the base of the psycho-social conflict is this identity crisis that needs to be resolved by overt or covert means. This identity crisis, though creating a psycho-social conflict situation does not necessarily coerce violence.

Contemporary grievances and issues that affect the identity stratification and legitimacy

To understand more relevant contemporary political developments that had an impact on the Tamil and Sinhalese identities and the allied group conflict, the political phenomenon immediately before and after the independence from colonial rule is important. The Tamil conflict perspective identifies the primary grievances at the community as the responsibility of the British colonial administration in the process of decolonisation. Firstly that the colonial administration who secured Indian Tamil labour in the face of local revolt against the empire, did not consider the welfare of this group in the process of decolonisation (Civattampi, 1995; Hoole, 1994;1995; Suryanarayan, 2001). Furthermore, that the power balance they had maintained during colonial rule, and the original power structure that existed, before colonisation was arbitrarily abandoned to establish a unitary government (e.g. Eelatthamilzhan, 2002; Manogaran, 1987). The decolonisation process acceded the formation of a democratic state as opposed to an entirely federal administration. Given the numerical minority, a democracy deprived the Tamil minority any real power compared to a federal administration that would have afforded the numerical minority a less disadvantageous position. (Rajasingham-Senanayake, 1999; Sathananthan, 1998). In terms of its affects on identity stratification and intra-group salience this also relegated the Tamil in-group status to that of a minority group alongside a number of other minorities.

The LTTE in its public web page attributes this power imbalance and the consequent majority chauvinism to be the cause for the separatist claim. The LTTE home page claims that the British were careful 'not to disturb the existing power balance between the different racial groups'. They further posit that this original 50/50 representation "in the Legislative Council membership was based on communal representation and this was the agreed proportion between the Sinhalese and the Tamils" (EelamWeb, 2004). The change in this representation (1924-1931) to a two-to-one ratio in favour of the Sinhalese majority they contest is in "violation of the Devonshire formula, (which states) that no single community should be in a position to out vote all the others combined" (EelamWeb, 2004).

Ironically the Sinhalese conflict perspective, also attribute blame for this particular geopolitical re-organisation to colonial rule (e.g. Bandarage, 1983). Furthermore, Madumabandara (1999) identifies three significant events that exacerbated this fragile power balance and induced conflicting goals to unitary nation building. The first was in 1931 (pre-independence); when the Jaffna Youth Congress, calling for self-rule for the Tamils, boycotted the state-council elections. The second was in 1938, when Ponnambalam called for a 50-50 balanced representations between the majority and the minority. This led to Ponnambalam's formation of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress and S.W.R.D Bandaranaike's conception of the

Sinhala Mahasabha²⁰, both drawn on communal lines in 1944. Madumabandara maintains that one of the reasons for “these unrealistic expectations of power by minorities was the perverse manner in which the (Devonshire) formula in which the British organised the power sharing in the half century immediately prior to independence” (1999 p.148). In many of the colonial constitutions of Ceylon, each racial group, regardless of the composition of the population, was given an equal representation at the council level; this power structure was then immediately abandoned in decolonisation to be replaced by democratic procedures which favour numerical representation. Some writers such as, Dixit (1998), argue that the British policy of ‘divide et impera’ engineered conflict in most subject colonies, resulting in the plethora of post-colonial conflicts (De Silva, 1998; Dixit, 1998; Trautman, 1997; Wilson, 2000).

Dixit (1998) argues that this power structure was developed through British instrumentalism. He contends the British also played on the apprehensions of the Tamil Minority and used them as an instrument in their colonial regime. Another contributory factor to the reciprocal British-Tamil relationship was the British familiarity with the Tamil-speaking peoples because of long standing connections of the Empire with the Coromandal coast of India. Maddumabandara identifies this as the beginning of contemporary group antagonism.

²⁰ *Local councils*

“The result was that Tamils became disproportionately influential in the management of Sri-Lankan political and economic affairs right till the time of the country’s independence despite their being a minority. Tamils also became economically dominant because of their association with colonial rulers and their comparatively aggressive entrepreneurship. So the historical, ethnic and religious antagonism was compounded by the Sinhalese feeling of being discriminated against and unfairly treated by the British with the support of the Tamils.” (Maddumabandara, 2003, p21)

The extreme Sinhala right even goes as far as to identify the Tamil administrative valence used by the British colony as a continuing oppressor struggling to keep hold of abusive and unequal power (De Silva, 2005).

This manipulated socio-economic juxtaposition was further exacerbated by the erroneous twinning of philology and ethnology²¹ and a colonial reinterpretation of Indus civilisation and the purported superiority of the Aryan (Indo-European) over the linguistic communities (Trautman, 1997). Rajasingham-Senannayeka (2002) argues that this configured artificially-antagonistic ethno-social identities, that were hitherto not necessarily mutually exclusive, came about by this British reorganisation of ethno-social identity stratification.

²¹ i.e. the equation of language with ethnicity/race

This fragile sense of distrust that existed under colonial rule was at a significant cross road in the wake of decolonisation and the formation of the infant state at the beginning of a journey of nation building. According to the Tamil perspective, this was the beginning of a series of grievances that was committed by the newly formed state disenfranchising the Tamil community who were already insecure about their standing in wake of the decolonisation (Eelathamilzhan, 2002; Sathananthan, 1998; Suryanarayan, 2001). These grievances can be identified as the pivotal cause of the estrangement between the Tamil in-group and the state as well as the animosity between the groups.

In 1948 D. S. Sennanayaike²² leading the UNP became Sri-Lanka's first executive Prime minister of the newly formed nation state. The 95 member parliament in which there were only 19 Tamil MPs decided to enact the 'Ceylon Citizens Act', which was specifically intended to limit the open influx of South-Indian labour to the country. The Bill stipulated that anyone wishing to obtain citizenship had to prove that their grand father was born in Ceylon i.e. that they were at least third generation immigrants. This was prompted by the Kandyan working classes who had been deprived of their lands by British colonial confiscation and faced the threat of losing even their meagre opportunities of employment to emigrant labour. Unfortunately this resulted in around one million immigrant

²² *Don Stephen Senanayake (14 October 1947 - 22 March 1952)*

Indian-Tamils which included the colonial plantation workers being classified as temporary residents under this Act, as did around 500,000 Moors, 45,000 Burghers²³ and 7000 Britons. The British, Burghers and Moors left the island gradually and some of the Indian-Tamils were repatriated to South-India (Shastri, 1999; Vittachi, 1999). This was a severe blow to the Tamil consciousness who had started to merge the resident Sri Lankan Tamil group with the Indian Tamil immigrant group, into a collective 'Tamil identity'. Dixit, posits that this legislation of repatriation 'heightened the Tamils sense of deprivation' (1987, p.11).

The Singhalese perspective justify this legislation by maintaining that this decision was made jointly by Sri Lankan Tamil and Singhalese MP's of the Sennanayake cabinet, as the Indian-Tamils in question were of clear Indian origin and citizenship (mostly born in India or of some first and second generation). They claim that the original intention was for them to return to their native homeland at some point (Maddumabandara, 1999). This perspective further disputes this grievance, contending that plantation-workers of the island form a clear sub-ethnic group and that their roots do not go back further than 1823. They also contend they are a separate geographical entity in the highland plantations where they live and work. (eg. Maddumabandara, 2003; Samaranayake, 2007). Maddumabandara also argues that this sub-ethnic group of Indian-Tamils who live under the

²³ *Burghers: of Dutch, Portuguese, or British mixed descent.*

poverty line for the most part, “have none of the elitist convictions of the Northern-Tamils of Sri Lankan origin. The latter group trained in exclusive anglicised private schools, and are clearly demarcated, distinct and divergent group from the Indian-Tamil plantation worker population” (p.24). He further argues that “not even by a fantastic stretch of the imagination, can a political or historical analyst claim that the plantation workers of the central province ever had an aspiration to secede or to support an ethnic secession in another part of the country” (Maddumabandara, 2003, p25).

Maddumabandara further challenges Dixit’s former claim of Indian Tamil deprivation, contending that in 1948 the Indian-Tamil plantation workers considered themselves Indian-citizens and that plantation-workers²⁴ felt a pride in being Indian-Tamils. He also posits they were until recently categorised as such, until the “opportunistic separatist political leaders not the people concerned, accused the government of discrimination based on this distinction” (1999, p25). Maddumabandara (1995) further claims that this is a clear “opportunistic move driven by power-manipulation of national politics by one sub ethnic-group to the ends of another sub ethnic-group” (1999, p.138). In essence this is the crux of dispute from the majority Singhalese identity perspective.

²⁴ *Plantation workers were almost exclusively Indian-Tamils.*

The second grievance that appears within the Tamil perspective is the newly formed state is the disastrous ‘Sinhala-Only Act²⁵’ under the SWRD Bandaranaike²⁶ government. Supporters of the Act saw it as an attempt by the nation state that had just gained independence to distance themselves from their colonial masters, while its opponents viewed it as an attempt by the linguistic majority to oppress and assert dominance over minority communities.

The Tamil perspective felt particularly betrayed, as the Sinhalese majority voted Bandaranaike back into power on his promise to make Sinhalese, the official state language and Buddhism the official state religion. This was met with a strong opposition from the Tamil communities compelling Bandaranaike to enter into what was to be the ‘Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact’ on wide ranging issues on language and regional councils. Unfortunately this was later abrogated at the behest of the powerful Buddhist lobby with the demise of Bandaranaike himself. This created a deep sense of betrayal among the Tamil people, and further exacerbated their sense of insecure belonging to the nation state (eg. Eelathamilzhan, 2005; Manogaran, 1987; Sathananthan, 1998; Suryanarayan, 2001). The concept of ‘Tamil Eelam’ first came in to

²⁵ *This language law attempted to reverse the use of the English language by replacing it with the Sinhala Language in civil-service.*

²⁶ *Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike (Sri Lankan politicians are curiously referred to by their full initials as opposed to their Christian names).*

political currency in 1959, in the aftermath of the ‘Sinhala-Only Act’ (Stokke, 1998; Zissis 2006). Perhaps this attempt for engineered national identity in the attempt to reform the widely Anglicised culture was one of the gravest political blunders of the political-conflict’s history and the genesis of the conflict.

Curiously there appears to be no justification of this from the moderate Sinhalese communities who dismiss the extreme Sinhalese wings legitimisations of a majority language. At best the act is interpreted as having intended to prevent discrimination against the non-English speaking masses within the state apparatus (e.g. in Education and Civil service) and deprive the English speaking Ox-Bridge educated elitists of the special privileges they enjoyed by the socialist/communist government of the time (De Silva, 1997; Maddumabanda, 2003; Samaranayeka, 2007). Both communities however acknowledge the gravity of the repercussions of this piece of legislation.

Unfortunately this political move occurred at the beginning of post-colonial nation building. This bewildering post-colonial cultural bereavement was a time where ethnic-identity and national-identity as concepts and ideologies were being defined. In the midst of repatriation of the ‘Indian-Tamils’²⁷, it was a time of insecurity and vulnerability for both

²⁷ Specifically the immigrant working populace brought in by the British Government to work in the Plantations

'ethnic' groups in terms of identity development. Though to some, the difference between Indian-Tamil and Sri Lankan-Tamil seem quite obvious, the newly formed state had not foreseen such identity-crises or insecurities in the minority communities; meanwhile the Sinhalese identity was struggling to emerge out of the colonial cocoon of subject-citizenship identity and reassert its ethnic-identity. The Act symbolizes the post independent nation's attempts to assert its Sri Lanka's identity as a nation state, but for Tamil communities, it also became a symbol of minority oppression and a justification for them to demand an separate nation state, which resulted in decades of civil war (Stokke, 1998; Zissis 2006).

Another grievance that emerges in Tamil perspective conflict discourse is the 1965 abrogation of the 'Dudley-Chelvanayagam Pact'. The 'Dudley Sennanayake²⁸ government', attempted to salvage the previously abandoned "Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact" in introducing elements of federal devolution to resolve power sharing issues. This envisaged devolving power to Tamil regions through 'District Councils' in place of 'Regional Councils'. (Oberst, 1988; Wilson, 2000) The Tamil perspective felt particularly harassed by the 'Sinhala Buddhist' opposition to legislation that would allow some legislative power back into Tamil communities. The Tamil perspective identifies this Buddhist opposition particularly from the influential clergy, as a consistent characteristic of

²⁸ Son of D.S. Sennanayake.

Singhalese Chauvinism (e.g. Chandrasekharan, 2000). Jeyaraj claims that "In effect, Sinhala Buddhist Hegemonism has vetoed the legitimate rights of the Tamil people" (2000, p.8). These events marked the beginning of Tamil separatist resentment of Buddhist clergy involvement in politics.

The further grievance of the Tamil perspective is attributed to the 'Sirimavo Bandaranaike²⁹ Government' in the 1970s whose socialist government is accused of engineering repressive legislative policies on Tamil interests which induced the beginnings of violent protests and conflict. Among these offending policies is the quota system assigned in university entrance, which marginalized Tamil students due to numerical deficiencies and favoured the Sinhala majority (Eelathamilzhan, 2005; Manogaran, 1987; Sathananthan,1998; Suryanarayan, 2001). This induced the Tamil young adults aspiring university entrance to stage mass protests that sometimes led to violence. These acts of civil disobedience were handled with short sighted heavy handedness, when it should have been handled with sensitivity and in consideration of rising ethno-social tensions. These violations were instead used as examples and the offenders imprisoned. (Eelathamilzhan, 2005; Manogaran, 1987). The Tamil perspective also identifies her introduction of the republican constitution devoid of all minority rights guaranteed under the previous constitution an exacerbation of grievances to an already oppressed

²⁹ *Wife of SWRD Bandaranaike formed Leftist coalition government*

community (e.g. Eelathamilzhan, 2005; Manogaran, 1987; Sathanathan, 1998; Suryanarayan, 2001).).

During this government two major Tamil parties united to form the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) that started campaigning for a separate state of 'Tamil Eelam' in the north and eastern parts of the country, within a federal government, that would grant the Tamils greater autonomy. However, enactment of the sixth amendment of the Sri Lankan Constitution in August 1983 classified all separatist movements as unconstitutional, effectively rendering the TULF purpose immobile (Hennayake, 1989). Beyond the TULF, however, factions advocating more radical and militant courses of action soon transpired, and the ethnic divisions deteriorated into a violent ethno-social conflict (Oberst, 1988).

The further grievance of the Tamil perspective is attributed to the J.R Jayawardene³⁰ government, under who's administration the hitherto community tensions and occasional separatist violence developed into a full scale armed conflict. This period is perhaps the darkest and most brutal for the Tamil community and the core of the separatist movement's justifications. J.R Jayawardene was engaged with responding to the establishment of a coherent and organised separatist movement and the beginnings of armed conflict with the LTTE rebellion. Eelathamilzhan,

³⁰ *Junius Richard Jayawardene*

(2005) claims that “when the Tamil representatives to parliament returning with a massive mandate from the Tamil people, for a separate Tamil state, there emerged one of the most Sinhala supremacist leaders” (p.46). J.R. Jayawardenes ‘Executive Presidential’ system of governance enabling himself continued power and adoption of a second ‘Republican Constitution’ was also severely criticised by the Tamil perspective as it blocked the development of legislative separatism as well as otherpower sharing mandates (Eelathamilzhan, 2005; Manogaran, 1987; Sathananthan,1998; Suryanarayan, 2001).

This period was also particularly known for its vicious anti-Tamil pogroms, which has been established in the conflict history as ‘Black July’. Black July is generally identified as the genesis of full-scale state of war between Tamil militants and the government of Sri Lanka. It is estimated that between 400-to possibly 3000³¹ Tamil civilians were killed or are recorded missing, tens of thousands of houses were destroyed. This led to a surge of Sri Lankan Tamils to emigrate, seeking asylum in the West, no longer able to feel secure in the country (Jeyaratnam, 1989; Rajasingham-Senanayake, 2001; Roberts, 1989; Stanley, 1984). These riots perpetrated by mostly Singhalese civilians, occurred following a lethal ambush of a

³¹ The Government of Sri Lanka confines the upper limit of this projection to a 1000, based on the Truth & Reconciliation Commission that was appointed to investigate and seek justice for the victims of Black July (Bandaranaike-Kumaratunga 2004)

military convoy by the LTTE which killed 13 Sri Lanka Army soldiers outside the town of Jaffna. The government of Sri Lanka attempting to avoid a public backlash that could inflame prevalent ethnic tensions, endeavoured to conceal the event, and secretly buried the soldiers at the Colombo cemetery without the procedural military honours or returning the bodies back to the bereaved families. This pivotal miscalculation on the government's part induced and inflamed a Sinhalese mob at the cemetery to assaulting Tamil civilians, while looting and burning properties in retribution. This incident spiralled out of control, induced by wild rumours, and joined and exacerbated by a criminal element that took advantage of the situation resulting in a most brutal attack on a community that was in no way prepared for it (Jeyaratnam, 1989; Manogaran, 1997; Manogaran, 2000; Piyadasa, 1986; Rajan, Somasundaram, Daya, Sritharan, Thiranagama & Hoole, 1992; Rajasingham-Senanayake, 2001; Sivarajah, 1996; Stanley, 1984).

The Sinhalese perspective as well as the state almost unanimously, acknowledges the responsibility of the state and Sinhalese civilians in this mass atrocity. The catalogue of incompetencies and bad judgements calls during this time has been analysed and reanalysed by an entire discipline of journalism dedicated to the issue (Kumaranatunga, 2004; Maddumabandara, 2002). President Kumaratunga³² acknowledges this

³² President Chandrika Bandaranaike-Kumaratunga

atrocities as an episode of deep shame in the nation's history. She further posits there comes a time when as a nation one must "look the truth in the face and make a national apology, first to all the victims of that day in Black July and then beyond them to the entire Nation". (Kumaranatunga, 2004)

Conversely the extreme wing of the Sinhalese perspective emphasises the number of Sinhalese families who were also killed or injured when they risked their lives to defend their Tamil colleagues and friends. They also consider the state attempts at reparation and contrition to be politically motivated and blown out of proportion in playing up to an international community (De Silva, 1997; De Silva, 2005; Ranwella, 2006; Roberts, 1989).

The Jayawardene government is also condemned by the Tamil Perspective for its proposals of 'District Development Councils' in 1984, reassigning devolution outcomes to a second chamber with members appointed solely by the president. Furthermore this government is condemned for rejecting the 1985 Thimpu proposals on self-determination for Tamils. Another significant grievance is the 'Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord' in 1987, which enabled the Indian Peace-Keeping force to take control of the North East. This particular move had further consequences on the identity stratification

as a third debatably neutral group that was salient to the Tamil Identity was brought into the negotiation process.

India had, initially (under Indira Gandhi and later under Rajiv Gandhi), provided support to the separatist interests from the beginning of the movement. This included providing sanctuary to the separatists, as well as support for the training camps for Tamil guerrillas in Tamil Nadu of which the LTTE emerged as the strongest force (Mansingh, 1984). Following the Black July riots Indian communiqués attempted to make it clear to the Sri Lankan President, Jayewardene, that armed intervention in support of the Tamil movement was an option India would consider if diplomatic solutions between the state and the LTTE should fail. President Jayewardene responded to this by inviting the assistance of armed intervention (Hagerty 1991).

Under the terms of this agreement the state contracted to a devolution of power to the provinces, as well as a withdrawal of troops from the north supervised by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF); concurrently the Tamil rebels were expected to disarm (Hennayake, 1989; Marasinghe, 1995; Rajasingham, 2002). However, as a consequence of not including the LTTE in the dialogue that led to this agreement, this resulted in a hesitant cooperation between the LTTE and the IPKF and a reluctant disarmament on the part of the LTTE initially. This ineffective process

led to active confrontations between the LTTE and the IPKF. Eventually the LTTE declared their intent to continue the armed struggle for an independent Tamil Eelam and refused to disarm and the IPKF found itself engaged in a violent policing of the process. Finally, India withdrew the last of its forces from Sri Lanka in 1990, and fighting between the LTTE and the government of Sri Lanka resumed (Hennayake, 1989; Marasinghe, 1995; Rajasingham 2002). In terms of identity consciousness this third party intervention due to out-group invitation and the estrangement of a previous ally to an adversary, all has significant influences on the relationship between the Sinhalese and Tamil identities.

This era changed forever what began as community tensions and a conceptual identity conflict, to a very real and brutal 'civil war' that added a horrifying dimension to the identity conflict and in-group consciousness narrative. From this point onwards the grievances of the Tamil peoples and those of the Sinhalese peoples³³ mostly revolve around grievances that are related to horrific events involving bloodshed, carnage and violations of human rights mostly between the LTTE and Nation state's troops. These are too innumerable to record within the limitations of this chapter. It is worth noting however that the successive governments of Premadasa³⁴, Kumaranatunge and Wickremesingha³⁵ are all condemned by

³³ Not identified or discussed here.

³⁴ Ranasinghe Premadasa (President 1989-1993)

³⁵ Ranil Wickremesinghe (Prime mjinister 1993 - 1994)

the Tamil perspective for continuing betrayals and the failure to resolve Tamil issues.

Among these grievances the Premadasa government's early indications that they were willing to engage in a serious dialogue with the Tamil Liberation Movement and then its failure to satisfy the intention is noted in a number of public discourse forums of the Tamil community (e.g. Eelam Nation). The Premadasa government is also condemned for the systematic alleviation of the state war apparatus and "the most gruesome acts that reflected 'organised state terrorism' on the Tamil people" (Eelathamilzhan, 2005). Further grievances that are identified with this regime are 'the Kannapuram massacre of July 1993' and the massacre of more than 1500 Tamil civilians by aerial bombing up until 1994 (Eelathamilzhan, 2005).

The grievance discourse from the Tamil perspective also condemns the Kumaratunge government for postulating a 'War for Peace' agenda which never delivered. Eelathamilzhan (2005) summarises this Tamil community public discourse on the failure of the post 80's administrations and allege, "What started as a profound and promised period of reconciliation and peace with the Tamil people through dialogue with their Liberation movement, by a determined and calculated deceptive government agenda, was to end as a period of subtle, prolonged and

debilitating campaign of economic, medical and humanitarian embargoes imposed upon the Tamil civilian population”. This discourse also allege that the military agenda had overwhelmed every aspect of society and scrutinised every element of civilian life, giving rise to civilian arrests, detentions, disappearances, the appearance of mass graves and the systematic abuse of human rights of the Tamil people. (Jeyaratnam, 1989; Manogaran 1997; Manogaran, 2000; Rajasingham-Senanayake, 2001; Sivarajah, 1996)

The Sinhalese grievance discourse runs along similar lines with accusations of mass massacres, ethnic cleansings, and a series of civilian targeted bombs that has created a sense of bitter animosity towards the LTTE. (De Silva, 1997; Maddumabandara 2003; Rajasingham-Senanayake, 1999; Samaranayake, 2007). This is not necessarily always transferred to the Tamil out-group; but if and when Tamil out-groups profess their support to separatism or the LTTE, this transference occurs.

Meanwhile the Sinhala politicians and the state apparatus, struggling to hide incompetency in political management, were not blind to the potential and opportunity of the facade of an ethnic conflict. It did not take the elite of ‘ethnic’ groups from both sides of the divide long to see the immense fortuity and profit in the ‘war-industry’ (Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2005; Palmer, 2005). It does not take long for imagined conflict to become real

in the heat of random violent incidents which instigated the beginnings of continuous organised violence. In the North-east, young Tamil youth from economically oppressed conditions were indoctrinated with ethno-centric arguments to their plight by charismatic political leaders, and pressurised to join the militant group for freedom of self determination where they would rule their own. In some cases children abducted and coerced to join the ranks of increasing numbers of child soldiers (Palmer 2005; UNICEF 2006;). Meanwhile, young Sri-Lankan Sinhalese youth are similarly drafted into the army from similar conditions where state propaganda attributed the continuing terrorist problem to economic detriment and mass poverty (Palmer, 2005).

The elites of civil society of both groups inaugurated the prevalent culture of elitist-opportunism. International aid poured in to the hands of the control apparatus on both sides of the barricade, and the permanent 'emergency measures'³⁶ created a social atmosphere where civil-justice is distorted to serve the ends of those in power (Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2005; Palmer, 2005). The economic deprivation, social polarisation, and social frustration that grew out of this volatile condition were conveniently directed to potent psycho-social ideologies such as nationalism and ethno-centrism.

³⁶ *This abused constitutional measure distorts and overrides general constitutional civil-justice, accommodating press censorship seizure of public property such as aircraft's, naval vessels. This also accommodates the banning of any political activity that the state perceives as encouraging terrorism.*

Chapter 2

MORAL DEVELOPMENT & DISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORKS

This chapter endeavours to map the background to the contentions and controversies in moral measurement and the rationale behind the revisions and amendments in the designated research instrument (Georg Lind's Moral Judgement Test - MJT). This chapter also explores the epistemological developments and criticisms of the traditional view of moral development and the various paradigm shifts that has been appropriated into the designated instrument to make it compatible with the context and character of the research purpose.

To earnestly consider the psycho-social framework of moral development and its psychometric measurements, it is necessary to understand the conceptual precursors of the moral domain. The foundation of these concepts, found in classical European moral discourse, have left a lasting effect on the models within the moral sphere. Whether morality is essentially an intrinsic natural developmental process or an extrinsic artificial normative policing structure, whether it is a rational process or an emotive process, and most importantly the elements that augment and

truncate its development have to be considered as it relates to the models of Kant, Habermas, Piaget, Kohlberg & Lind.

Psychology has handled the loose conception of morality, virtue and ethics, and its allied judgments, behaviours and actions from a number of different approaches with no real unification in macro-structure. Much of psychoanalysis considered it to be a by-product of the defensive functions of the self-serving ego and its conflict of guilt (e.g. Freud, 1947; Hogan, Johnson, & Emler 1978), while Jungian self disclosure theorists redeem it from this cynicism by considering it a veridical expression of human motivation (e.g. Jouard, 1971; Kegan, 1982) in parallel with a rare school of personality theory (Fingarette, 1969; Wollheim, 1984). Personality theorists explicate it with concepts of altruism, honesty, and extraversion within personality trait models (e.g. Allport, 1937; Berkowitz & Lutterman, 1968; Burton, 1963; Cattell, 1950; Eysenck, 1970).

Socio-biologists and evolutionary theorists (e.g. Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Campbell, 1975; Hamilton, 1972; Maynard Smith, 1982, 1974; Trivers, 1971; Wislon, 1975; Wright, 1994) consider these behaviours to be survivalist capacity of species endurance. Meanwhile social psychologists (e.g. Aronfeld, 1968; Batson, 2003; Bandura, 1969, 1977; Darley and Batson, 1973; Lesko, 1991; Mischel, 1968; Milgram, 1963; Skinner, 1953; Snyder et al., 1993, 1995, 1998, 1999), despite their widely

varied explanations for this phenomenon, consider the behaviours to be socially conditioned or learnt, excited purely by arbitrary external contingencies and contexts.

While it is impossible to entirely isolate the cognitive school from fragmentary influences of these various models, it is also difficult to bring the fundamental assumptions of the cognitive concept of moral development (despite its affective valence) to congruently concur with the conceptual underpinnings and operational assumptions of these (social, personality trait, socio-biological and psychoanalytical) models. So in attempting to explore two fundamentally different concepts (social identity & moral development) that this thesis believes are operationally related, despite being derived from two conflicting schools of thought, theoretical contradictions need be addressed. Therefore, it is necessary to explore the fundamental assumptions behind the cognitive moral developmental model and the implications of the operational semantics of its measurement, to fully consider its relationship to a social-psychological concept.

Contemporary moral theorists who attempted to chart the moral domain and the transferability of concepts between abstract meta-ethics of the classical age and the instrumentalist specifications of modern empirical moral research of the last century, have established that this is not inappropriate despite a few mixed model dilemmas and a few ambiguous

abstract concepts that are open to varied interpretations. Their conclusion is that the interdisciplinary influence on moral psychology has left it all the more potent and enriched (e.g. Blasi, 1990; Boyd, 1990; Dobert, 1990; Wren, 1990).

It is however necessary to assess the conceptualisation of the moral sphere in brief summary at least according to Kant, Piaget, Habermas and Kohlberg, given the underpinning of the moral domain in this investigation and their formative impact on Georg Lind's model. Therefore, this outline is less concerned with giving a balanced narrative of these paradigms, and instead has focused on pertinent aspects of these paradigms, in terms of its applications and ambivalence as relevant to the research instrument used by this research and its research agenda.

Emmanuel Kant's Moral Philosophy as a Precursor

Kant's classical concepts of ethics have had tremendous impact moral ethics in a number of disciplines including psychology. This has been particularly pervasive in Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg and Jürgen Habermas and consequently on Georg Lind's Dual Aspect theory. Therefore it is necessary to briefly highlight some of the major features of Kantian ethics. The precise nature configurations and the underpinnings of these features will be discussed when scrutinising the specific features concerned in the relevant models, as well as in the macro-concept evaluation. Like Rousseau, Kant considers liberty to be the lynchpin of moral justice and to be characterised by reason. Kant circumvents contemporary dilemmas between the right and the good by positing that only intention defines the virtue of an action. He asserts, "The good will is not good because of what it affects or accomplishes or because of its adequacy to achieve some proposed end; it is only good because of its 'willing'³⁷" (1785, p.452). This implies that nature and the physical world are governed by laws, which only a rational being can understand or operate within and has the capacity to conceive. He asserts "this capacity is 'will'; since reason is required for the derivation of actions from laws; will is nothing else than practical reason" (1785, p.460). The essence of

³⁷ i.e. motivation

this claim adopted by Habermas, Piaget, Kohlberg and Blasi has an enormous repercussion in the paradigm of moral motivation, moral action and moral judgement which requires the nature of moral identity and personal responsibility to define the direction of moral behaviour as will, shall be later discussed when considering the macro-fabric of the moral sphere.

Kant further refines and stratifies Rousseau's concept of 'general will' to form the heart of his contention of the 'categorical imperative' which he contrasts against a 'hypothetical imperative'. This dualism, which accounts for the instructive 'ought' in moral theory and pragmatic drive of moral action, is again revisionist of preceding binary models (Kant, 1785). However, the significance of his alternative lies in his position of perspective. He redeems the concept of conflicting imperatives by the autonomy of free will which he characterises in agreement to Rousseau. He posits that the moral will and its autonomy and freedom are the same in essence (1785). This autonomy and freedom, he contends, are independent of the causality and predetermination that govern our perception. He claims that our phenomenal perception of an integrated causal system is a pragmatic function of our sensory perception. He further contends that this noumenal review of life liberates us from the causal limitations of moral autonomy. This, he asserts finally reduces "the definite concept of morality to the idea of freedom" (p.449) while conceding to its limitations

within self concept. This paradigm leads to and supports the universal principal of 'right' where Kant (1785) concludes "Any action is right, if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with universal law" (p.495). This justice based ethic, influenced by a host of classical and modern philosophers from Aristotle, Plato, Socrates, Spinoza, Hobbes, Locke, Descartes, Rousseau, Hume, to Dewey, has characterised the central quality of universal morality as conceived the Western Anglophone world.

These essentially priori strains of knowledge were adopted into the empirical epistemology of psychology by 'psychologists' such as Piaget and Kohlberg and even Habermas. While some would argue that the introduction of priori knowledge into empirical sciences has resulted in the contradictions and ambiguities that plague moral discourse, others contend that it has enriched not only psychology but the social sciences in general (e.g. Blasi, 1990; Boyd, 1990; Dobert, 1990; Haste 2010; Wren, 1990). Nevertheless these contentions and ambiguities are examined in detail later in this chapter.

Piaget' Theory of Cognitive Development and its Moral Precursors

Piaget's overarching influence on the Kohlbergian Paradigm of moral development makes it necessary to consider his understanding of morality along with other aspects of his developmental approach that impinge on the operational concepts of this study. It is necessary to recognise Piaget's interdisciplinary orientations and influences in considering his model. Elkind observes his philosophical as opposed to psychological, orientations and argues, "it would be hard to overemphasise the importance of regarding Piaget as a genetic epistemologist rather than a psychologist" (Elkind in Piaget, 1969; p. ix). Ferguson (1996) among others (e.g. Wells, 2006) proposes that Piaget combined the philosophy of Kant, the sociology of Durkheim and the psychology of Bovet, in his concept of morality. Nevertheless contemporary psychology has adopted his work into the core of the discipline and operationalized many measures of cognition based on his conceptual grasps, suggesting that his intra-disciplinary orientations and influences do not necessarily impede their transferability within psychological understandings. Whether this combination creates operational implications in combining his model (or models developed based on him) with social psychological models is under researched.

Piaget, like Kant, saw the construct of the individual human mind as the source of our perception and rationality. However, unlike Kant, he sought a biological explanation in a universal tendency of each organism toward self-regulation or equilibration as it perpetually encounters and adapts to its environment. He sought to explain how human beings acquired a system of rules in his 'genetic epistemology'; in particular, logical formalisations applied to equilibrated thought structures and in certain cases to transformations from one level to another in the development of thought. Rejecting innatist views, including Kant's 'a priori' categories, he argued that human beings are not born with categories or structures of thought but instead construct them through the process of assimilation and accommodation (Hyde, 1970; Piaget 1998; Russell, 1994).

Piaget (1932) explored the 'moral realities' of a child by attempting to understand how a sample (n=2159) of children conceived and played a game of marbles. He proposed that the concept of moral development is engendered in "how an individual acquires a system of rules" (p.11). He proposed that in the consciousness of rules, children were first oblivious to their existence, and later considered them "sacred and immutable". This he suggested finally developed into a more mature understanding that rules were "a product of mutual consent" (p.45-62). Piaget (1932) also recognised a four stage continuum in the practice of rules. He suggested that the child exhibited spontaneous and ritualised basic motor functions

which he termed 'simple individual regularity', which then developed into egocentric imitation, which led to cooperation and finally a codification of the rules. He further explored the comparison between the actual practice of the rules and the consciousness of those rules to conceive his 'ideal-typology'.

Based on Bovet's (1912) concept of moral obligation which he suggested was generated by fear and affection, Piaget proposed a model of 'unilateral' respect which he suggested was characterised by a heteronomy that declines, at least partially, to make way for autonomy characteristic of mutual respect (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969). They further claimed that, "Heteronomy is expressed by a number of affective reactions and by certain remarkable structures peculiar to moral judgment before the age of 7 or 8" (p.124). In congruence with Lewin (1903) he notes that at least initially the physical presence of the authoritative source is more potent and affects this process. At this point, the Piagetian model is in congruence with the reinforcement models of the day. He then proposes that systematic assimilation leads first to establish this stage, and as the child's coherence of realities develops and leads to ambivalence of the rules provided by the authority figure, to supersede the stage. This usurping of the heteronomous dependencies and the uprising of ambivalence, Piaget attributes to an affect ridden process; "The elements that make up respect become disassociated and the disassociation leads to a

mixture of affection and hostility, sympathy and aggression, jealousy etc” (p.125). This affect-ridden structure and the parallel cognitive affective invariant sequence is one of the crucial precursors to the Lind model.

Meanwhile Piaget’s (1969) nuanced definition of moral realism creates ambiguous grounds in moral motivation. Piaget claims, “From the stand point of moral judgement, heteronomy leads to a systematic structure that is pre-operatory both with reference to the relational cognitive mechanisms and to the processes of socialisation” (1969, p.125). He further qualifies this with the claim that “this structure is moral realism, according to which obligations and values are determined by the law or the order itself, independent of intentions and relationships” (p.125). This claim, that moral judgement is dependent thus on moral realism, and that it is independent of intentions and relationships, has mixed repercussions on the current thesis if the research instrument bears parallel assertions. This is particularly significant as social identity perspectives claim that deontological/moral motivations and actions are dependent on in-group, out-group relationships. Meanwhile this model doesn’t negate the impact of the affect laden moral motivation and the process of socialisation within and between psycho-social collectives on moral realism nor qualify whether this is restricted to a particular part of lifespan (i.e. childhood).

Hyde (1970) evaluates Piaget's methodology along with his theory construction and compares the Piagetian model to four contemporary psychological approaches to child development (Behaviourism, Gestaltism, Geneticism, and Psychoanalysis) and infers that despite significant contradictions in fundamental assumptions (also shared between other models) that Piaget's conceptions are not as unfamiliar to the fabric of psychology as some critiques (e.g. Hazlitt, 1930; Isaacs, 1930) would contest. He further compares Piaget's findings in relation to other studies of concept formation, perception, language, conceptual thought and personality and similarly finds both congruence and contradiction. Therefore, it is plausible to conclude that an endeavour to compare a cognitive developmental concept to a social psychological one is not wholly unreasonable as long as the attempt is sensitive to any possible contradictions within operationalized concepts and their underpinning precursors.

Lawrence Kohlberg's Moral Stage Theory

Kohlberg (1958) further developed Piaget's developmental paradigm in his doctoral thesis, and proposed a revision of this stage theory by restructuring the phenomenon into a six stage model. Influenced by Kant, Habermas & Dewey he expanded this paradigm within a framework of moral philosophy to conceive developmental cognition in a series of 20 year longitudinal studies. His paradigm proposed six qualitatively different stages that posited an invariant stage sequence albeit varied developmental rates. True to his Piagetian foundation, he also assumed the parallel development of cognition and affect (Kohlberg, 1969).

The first, pre-conventional level is characterised by heteronomous morality in stage one and by naïve instrumental hedonism in stage two. This level is generally seen to be characteristic of children under nine, some adolescents and many criminal offenders (Ferguson, 1996; Schillinger, 2006). Parallel to Piaget's first stage of moral thought, he proposed that individuals assume that powerful authority figures hand down a fixed set of rules which he or she must unquestioningly obey. Individuals who show characteristics of stage one generally explain 'moral action' in terms of consequence. In stage two, within Piagetian understandings of affect driven ambivalence usurping this sacred obedience to authority, Kohlberg

conceives reciprocity based moral cognition (even though both Piaget & Kohlberg didn't consider an action moral until an individual achieved concepts of contract in true allegiance to Rousseau and Kant). Despite the attainment of mutual contractual reciprocity, individuals at this level are still at a pre-conventional level because they are still reasoning at an isolated individual level rather than within a concept of a mutually dependant collective. Not having achieved an understanding of a social structure of dependency and consequence, they conceive individuals bartering favours rather than understanding the dependencies of a value based society (Kohlberg, 1976, 1987).

The conventional level is characterised by mutual interpersonal reciprocity at stage three, and authority and social order maintenance in stage four. This is generally found to be characteristic of a majority of adolescents in society. Stage three is an additional nuance that Kohlberg supplemented in expanding Piaget's paradigm, as a qualitatively different stage that individuals progressed through before they attained a relativistic outlook. This stage is still characteristic of some of the trends referred to in a heteronomous stage despite subtle advances (Kohlberg, 1976, 1987).

Finally, the controversial post conventional level is characterised by social contract legalistic orientation and a universal ethical principal orientation. The highest stage of principled morality is conceived to be attained after

the age of 20 and only reached by a minority of adults (Kohlberg, 1976, 1987). Stages five and six as will be considered in full later, have been problematised by empirical evidence. These contradictions have been examined in full within Habermas' revisions as well as further macro-evaluations of the moral sphere within this chapter.

Kohlberg (1979) posits that this six stage paradigm fulfils the four criteria defined by Piaget. Firstly, that each stage is distinctive and qualitatively different in structure (in modes of thinking) and that they are functionally unified throughout the developmental process within that stage. Secondly, that these structures create a progressive invariant sequence moderated only in developmental rate by cultural and educational factors. Thirdly, that each of these sequential modes creates a structured whole where task responses are not cued. It instead represents a pattern of thought-organisation, which in turn implies that various aspects of the stage structure should symptomise a complete cluster of responses in development. Finally, that the stages illustrate hierarchical integration, forming an order of increasingly differentiated and yet integrated structures fulfilling a common function, where higher stages displace or integrate lower stages (Holm & Jonas, 2004).

The Kohlbergian paradigm should be understood within life span development given its integral operation within developmental progression

of other cognitive faculties in parallel to Reid, Kant & Dewey. To further establish moral cognition in parallel to other cognitive faculties, Kohlberg (1976) describes how moral developmental progress is in congruence (if not in symmetry) with other faculties such as intelligence as proposed by Piaget (Schillinger, 2006). He further posits that while intelligence is a necessary condition for advanced moral development (i.e. beyond pre-conventional/conventional) it is not a sufficient condition. Given the advanced logical thought processes required (Kohlberg, 1976) for conventional and post conventional stages, to achieve these stages one must have achieved concrete-operation and formal operational stages. This assumption seems to imply that moral motivation declares logical reason a necessity in coherence with early classical thinkers (e.g. Kant) problematizing affect driven motivations. This makes the cognitive factor imperative to stage development.

Kohlberg (1989) further establishes this necessary cognitive motivation of moral judgement and action. In parity with Kohlberg, Reimer (1989) disputes the claim that moral behaviour can be incorporated through social learning, that such indoctrination was not durable as many social psychological studies prove (Brown & Herrnstein, 1975; Hartshorne & May 1928, 1930). He claims that altruistic or honest behaviour is not a consistent trait or characteristic, but instead varies according to context and stimulant (p.17). Schillinger (2006) posits that this difference between the

stages of moral development is due to the qualitative changes in the thought processes when reasoning in a moral context. These stages were conceived as stages of social justice and social perspective taking. Conversely, the Kohlbergian moral stages are based on structural maturational characteristics, as well as indicating individual developmental processes through assimilation and accommodation with environmental contingencies. Each stage essentially depends on the previous stage and prepares for the subsequent stage. Schilinger further posits that while this allows for individual differences, they develop within structural parameters that are independent from cultural factors.

While the proposal for these ‘universal structural dimensions’ are based on Piagetian criteria, Kohlberg (1969) claims that they supplant them, and further posits that moral development occurs beyond the ages of Piagetian proposal. Therefore, as Schillinger claims “one had to assume that Piaget’s phases of heteronomy and autonomy would be equivalent to his stages 1 & 2” (2006, p.21); this would mean Stages three to six would then go beyond the Piagetian scale. Nevertheless it is necessary to understand Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s semantics of heteronomy (Type A) and autonomy (Type B) in conceiving the full meanings and implications of these claims.

Reimer (1989) disambiguates the concept of autonomy as used by the Kohlbergian paradigm, by referring to its etymological implications of

self-governance. He contends that Kant took autonomy to mean “that persons are the subjects or the constructors of the moral law” and Kant contrasted this with heteronomy or being governed by an external will or object (p.27). Reimer and Feinberg (1973) both further contend that autonomy can be better understood in contrast to anomie, ‘or being virtually out of control’ (Reimer, 1989, p.27). This suggests autonomy implies self control according to self chosen principles.

Characterising his philosophical preoccupations, Kohlberg’s focus is with the structure of Moral behaviour and the characteristics of these components rather than the traditional psychological focus of behavioural content (Lind, 1985). Habermas and Kohlberg eliminated these aspects of behavioural content on the misapprehension that these were deontological examinations of justice models that were not universally applicable. Dobert (1990) argued that this elimination usurped the theory of necessary psycho-social elements. It then subsumed decisions of moral dilemmas under the concept of content, which created incongruence in a deceptive relativism and an unjustified universalism (p.71). Therefore, the functional differences between formal and normative contents of these qualitatively differentiated stages meant that the definition of the moral quality of a judgement was isolated from a value judgement (Dobert, 1990).

Nevertheless, the Kohlbergian model was encapsulated in his 'Moral Judgment Interview (MJJ)' which embodied an intimate dialogue between theory formation and empirical research and then further finely tuned in the later revised 'Issue Scoring' version (Lind, Hartmann & Wakenhutt 1985). The 'Interview Method' required the participants to answer a number of questions and account for their own words in their responses. For example 'Did person X act in the right way? Why did you think so? Then these responses are scored according to scoring manual that has codified criteria and exemplars (Colby et al, 1983; Kohlberg, 1958; 1984). The original MJJ and others that have been modelled on the response scoring aspect of the MJJ (e.g. Gibbs, Basinger, & Fuller's, 1992, Socio-moral Reflection Measure SRM & Socio-moral Reflection Measure Short form SRM-SF) differ from the empirical questionnaire type measures because they are production tasks unlike the recognition tasks required in rubric competence tests such as the MJT (Georg Lind's Moral Judgement Test).

Even so, the MJJ and the theoretical foundations of the Kohlbergian Moral Judgement Scale and its central tenets of moral universalism, structural formalism (i.e. that content is independent of structure), and cognitive developmentalism was the foundation for a multitude of moral measurements in the western world including the MJT (Moral Judgement Test – Lind 2000) DIT AND DIT-2 (Defining Issues test by Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, and Thoma, 1999), SRM & SRM-SF (Socio-moral Reflection

Measure SRM & Socio-moral Reflection Measure Short form SRM-SF by Gibbs, Basinger, & Fuller, 1992) and a number of others which will be critically evaluated later.

Gender Biases within the Kohlbergian Model.

Gilligan (1977, 1982, 1986b, 1987; Gilligan & Attanucci 1988; Gilligan, Brown & Rogers, 1990; Gilligan, Lyons & Hamner, 1990; Gilligan, Ward & Taylor, 1988), proposed that there was a gender difference in basic life orientation and therefore in conceptions of self and morality. Gilligan & Attanucci (1994) posits that the gender differences in the stage scores achieved by Kohlbergian participants has been interpreted inaccurately because moral orientation has been equated with moral stage. She suggests that in real life scenarios men and women both consider dilemmas from a care perspective as well as a justice perspective. But that in expressing these concerns they tend to over represent one approach and under represent the other. However, she suggests that there is a gender differential in this representation with men focusing on the justice perspective and women the care perspective. She establishes this view by presenting evidence for two separate orientations between genders. She suggests that the flaw in the Kohlbergian model is that it assumes that there is a single moral perspective which is oriented according to justice.

She suggests that the intrinsic difference between the orientations is based on the way moral problems are conceived and reflects on different dimensions of human relationships that give rise to moral concern (Gilligan & Attannucci 1994). She suggests this justice orientation “draws attention to problems of inequality and oppression and holds up an ideal of reciprocal rights and equal respect for individuals” (p. 225). In contrast she characterises the care orientation as a perspective that draws attention to problems of detachment or abandonment, and holds up an ideal of attention and response to need. Gilligan, (1989) further suggests that the influence of context on use of orientations is an important factor that the Kohlbergian/ neo Kohlbergian paradigms have underestimated and challenges the assumptions that the established approach to problem solving in moral dilemma is the only valid approach.

However, these claims have been undermined by empirical research that has revealed that men and women do not differ in stages of moral reasoning (e.g. Pratt, Diessner, Hunsberger, Pancer, & Savoy, 1991; Walker, De-Vries, & Trevethan, 1987; Wark & Krebs, 1996), in type of moral orientation (e.g. Jaffee & Hyde, 2000), or in the method of norm application³⁸ (Dobert & Nunner-Winkler, 1986).

³⁸ Ridity versus flexibility

Despite this deflation of the gender orientation hypothesis in moral reasoning, moral behavioural research provides a myriad of empirical studies that suggest behavioural differences between the sexes. For example, Barriga, Morrison, Liao, and Gibbs (2001) found significantly higher values on the moral self-relevance test in women. Tangney and Dearing (2002) found that in response to moral transgressions, women experience more shame and guilt than men. Similarly, Arnold (1993) reports that female adolescents prioritise moral values than their male peers.

Conversely, Oliner and Oliner (1988) found no gender differences among rescuers or among participants in the control groups on scales measuring social responsibility, social commitment, and community helping. Colaizzi, Williams, & Kayson (1984) similarly found no significant difference in gender in altruistic actions. Similarly, Geras (1995), maintains that gender was not a good predictor of rescuing behaviour in his literature review of rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe. These conflicting and varied empirical reports examining a wide spectrum of moral self concept, intent and behavioural research suggests the underlying behavioural ecology is complex.

Based on some of these markers Nunner-Winkler, Meyer-Nikele, & Wohlrab, (2007) followed up on the motivational overtones in Gilligan's

claims and investigate stereotypes and role expectation in moral behaviour. They scrutinised Gilligan & Wiggins, (1987) claim that women were more compassionate and responsive to the plight of 'those in need', while men were more impartial and detached by focusing on gender identity and culturally shared stereotypes. They found a moderately significant relationship between high gender identification and low moral motivation in boys, but not in girls. They propose that gender differences in moral motivation result from an interaction between individually differing degrees of gender identification and content of culturally shared gender stereotypes (Nunner-Winkler, Meyer-Nikele, & Wohlrab, 2007). These findings seem to fall in line with research in moral identity, moral emotion and moral motivation (e.g. Blasi, 1983, 1984, 1995; Colby & Damon, 1992; Hardy & Carlo, 2005; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004a; Moshman, 2005). While these studies further necessitate a better understanding of social identity and community attachment (as opposed to moral identity and moral self concept) and moral reasoning, they establish that the Kohlbergian paradigm is far from irrelevant or simply gender biased. Nevertheless, Gilligan's initial criticisms opened the door for a richer understanding of cultural and contextual influences on moral identity.

Moral Universalism and Cross Cultural Compatibility within the Kohlbergian Model.

While this chapter will further scrutinise the contradictions and controversies from within the meta-theory on artificial relativism and unjustified universalism, before that, it is necessary to briefly consider the cross cultural applicability of the model and non western and non Anglophone concepts of moral development. This is particularly significant as the culture-individual relationship is increasingly conceived as dialectical and dialogical, creating an epistemological shift in assumptions (Haste, 2010a). When Kohlberg's theory was formulated Skinner and Bandura and a culture of social learning theory, was at centre stage in American Psychology (Kagan, 2006). The epistemological discourse of the time did not consider culture to be as significant a factor in individual development and it was at best considered an independent factor that 'conditioned' the passive individual. While, Kohlberg rejected learning theory (e.g. Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972) he dismissed 'culture' as being primarily concerned with conformity. Cross cultural extensions of his research on moral reasoning remained mostly within a Kantian perspective (Haste & Abrahams, 2008). Therefore, if the Kohlbergian model's 'Western', 'Anglophone' orientations were incompatible with non western societies as some critics claim (e.g. Cole, 1996; Shwedder, Mahapatra & Miller, 1987) and biased towards liberal, middle-class,

western Anglophone, cultural ideologies (Edwards, 1986; Simpson, 1974; Snarey, 1995; Sullivan, 1977; Vine, 1983) operationalization of cross cultural field tests would need to take these weaknesses into consideration in identifying a measure.

In conceiving a moral universalism within a formalistic developmental structure one assumes that the ethical code not only encapsulates obvious moral truisms, but has characterised the complexities in all its cultural shades and nuances into a coding manual. This is particularly important in judgment production tests which are matched up to a predetermined tabulation of maxims. However, one could also argue that culture is not fixed or static; such complexities, characteristics and orientations are not in exhaustive. In the case of unscorable cross cultural data such as the Shweder et. al, 1987 instance, Haste (2010) suggests that “even though the measure is ostensibly of cognitive complexity, which should work across cultures, the nature of the complexity of the Indian ethic precluded it being matched to an ethic of justice” (p.3). Such instances of unscorable data are increasingly leading some Kohlbergian moral discourse to consider other systems or clusters of ethics in an attempt to expand the epistemologies’ ‘moral imagination’ (Johnson, 1993).

Haste (2010) contends that ethical discourse in different cultures are not just value systems but are based on cultural assumptions held in that

society about relationships of interdependence, and relationships with a form of divinity that underpin the codes that sustain the moral order.

Haste notes that another important epistemological development in moral universalism is the “very important recognition that any culture might have more than one, parallel, moral discourse” (2010, p.4). In parallel to Kohlberg’s justice oriented ethical code that has been centralised in cognitive developmental moral discourse, such cultures might also emphasise filial piety, or honour. For example, Shweder and colleagues (1997) identify three different clusters of ethics; Autonomy, Divinity & Community in their study of South Indian moral discourse. Significantly all three ethical strands co existed in all participant responses (Shweder et al. 1997).

Kohlbergian moral discourse has always been suspicious of moral relativism but has cautiously attempted to avoid what Johnson calls ‘moral law folk theory’. Therefore in measuring moral judgement it becomes necessary to consider the culture of the target research populace at hand, and consider the clusters of ethics that are prioritised in that society. Unfortunately there are no pre-existing Kohlbergian moral discourse studies that have evaluated parallel ethical narratives to the justice ethic in Sri Lanka, nor are there culture specific moral measures. While it is safe to assume that that Sri Lankan society bears some similarities to the South Indian culture and prioritise ethical clusters like filial piety and honour, it is

also safe to assume that a society that has experienced centuries of colonial oppression and decades of civil conflict will prioritise a justice ethic. Furthermore as the research purpose of this study is essentially tied up in justice ethics, civil liberty and conflict, an instrument that prioritises a justice ethic would not be wholly inappropriate.

Another concern beyond the general cultural compatibility with parallel moral ethics of other societies revolves around the disputes referring to collectivist/individualistic orientation in stage six. The cause for the concern and controversy of the universal relevance of stage six perhaps lies in the attempt to sequester and reintroduce content as noted by Dobert (1990). This incongruence in artificial relativism has created much discourse (Winkler 1990; Puka 1990; Locke 1980; Dobert 1990; Habermas, 1990; Gunzberger, 1987) but no realistic alternative proposed by the Kohlberg school. However the Lind model has adopted Habermas's alternative approach in an attempt to resolving this to some extent in his dual aspect model.

Unfortunately, there is no coherent alternative within the Kohlbergian school, to a universally acceptable consensus to appease these elements of artificial relativism and unjustified universalism. The relationship between moral nihilism, behaviourism (gender bi-polarism and relativism from psycho-social schools, e.g. Skinner), sociology (e.g. Weber), cognitive

developmentalism in moral relativistic positions (e.g. Gilligan) and the contrasting universalistic positions of Kant's imperatives are all fraught with contradictions (Winkler, 1990). Kohlberg's multidimensional problem solving (i.e. development of understanding and cognition through perspective taking) and Habermas' pragmatic consequentialism are also vulnerable to these criticisms.

Kohlberg et al. (1990) allows for these criticisms and attempts to articulate a psychological basis for stage six by distancing it from stage five suggesting it is not meant to be equidistant. Puka (1990) claims that in the Kohlbergian sequence, stage six alone fails to integrate the moralities of individual respect and group concern with each other, suggesting that they do not fit within the stage sequence. He posits that stage six "is not simply the stage after stage five" (p.183) and that the psychological descriptors of stage six are extravagant in its "maximally³⁹ integrated, and differentiated, reversible and equilibrated" attempt to encompass cosmological dilemmas (p.185). He also argues that the philosophical approach 'to the role of stage six is even more grandiose' (p.184). He infers that stage six's preference of universal principals over the pragmatic and over situational/contextual habit, or particular intuitions, corrupts it from universal applicability. The stage six priority of the Kantian respect for persons equal regard for individual autonomy over pragmatic utilitarian

³⁹ His italics

concerns for group welfare excludes the moral world view of collectivist societies where individual priority is counter ethical as discussed earlier. Puka (1990) posits that the inner core and fundamental foundation of this is a whole stage lower and less cognitively mature than egalitarian justice. Given the collectivist world views and characteristics of the case study sample, this raises concerns for this research endeavour and requires a research measure of the Kohlbergian paradigm that has resolved these issues satisfactorily.

Lind (1995) suggests this issue can be resolved by refining moral judgment to the original Kohlbergian (1964) conceptualisation of moral judgement as a competence⁴⁰. He claims that the two key advantages in defining it so is that firstly it measures the individual on his or her own moral standards, rather than imposing externalist moral standards true to a specific culture and context. This approach (to test design) circumvents the much critiqued (e.g. Pittel & Mendelsohn, 1966) externalist methods of moral measurement that brings into question of cultural compatibility and moral universability. Lind (1995) claims that any measurement instrument based on this definition takes on the particular moral standards of the culture in question into account by virtue of the test's design.

⁴⁰ Moral judgment competence is defined by Kohlberg (1964) as 'the capacity to make decisions and judgments which are moral (i.e., based on internal principles) and to act in accordance with such judgments' (p. 425)

The flaw in the Kohlbergian paradigm and measures such as Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview (Colby et al., 1987) and others that imitate its structural design, is that the subject has to prefer stage five and six moral values in his or her reasoning for getting a high score on Kohlberg's developmental scale. Moral measures designed according to this definition and design perspective, such as Lind's Moral Judgement Test, registers consistency circumvents universal validity of the stage ordering because scoring is neutral regarding any particular preferential stage hierarchy (Lind, 1978; 1993; Lind & Wakenhut, 1985). Instead the subject has "to demonstrate through his or her competence to apply his or her moral principles, consistently"⁴¹ (Lind 1995 p.16) which produces a cognitive competence of consistence referred to as a C-index alongside the moral stage preference. Lind claims that this design solution where a subject's personal opinion is overlooked, as is stage preference, instead for the degree to which a person bases their judgement on moral considerations⁴² is an ideal remedy to the content based problems of artificial relativism and unjustified universalism.

⁴¹ i.e. an internalised personal, established, value system.

⁴²i.e. Rather than on the consideration whether a given argument agrees or disagrees with her or his own opinion.

Jurgen Habermas's Moral Consciousness and Revisions of the Kohlbergian Model

Habermas adapts much of his concepts in human knowledge and ethics from Piaget and Kohlberg. From Kohlberg, Habermas takes the stages of ethical development; like the Kohlbergian model he claims discourse ethics are deontological, cognitivist, formalist and universalist. For Habermas, constructivist learning affirms firstly that knowledge is a product of the learning process, secondly that learning is based on problem-solving that involves an active role played by the learner; and thirdly that the learning process is guided by those directly involved in it.

In his approach to moral theory Habermas is closest to Kantian understandings of moral development. Like Kant he identifies types of pragmatic reasoning and types of 'ought' proper to what is practically expedient, ethically prudent and morally right. Habermas's aim is "to reconstruct the moral point of view as the perspective, from which competing normative claims can be fairly and impartially adjudicated" (McCarthy, 1995, p. viii). This form of reconstruction, according to Habermas' approach, is universal in import. Habermas considers this to be an attribute of reasoned argument among those subject to the norm in question, as opposed to a Kantian categorical imperative. This posits that for a norm to be valid its consequences must be universally acceptable to

all in a practical discourse. This shifts the frame of reference from Kant's individual reflective moral consciousness to a community of moral subjects in dialogue creating a discursive refined system (McCarthy, 1995 p. viii).

Habermas (1985) claims that the dispute around the Kohlbergian model is based on four problems. The first, he attributes to the difficulties in establishing experimental evidence that verifies the sixth moral stage. This he claims casts some uncertainty on "whether we can speak of 'natural' stages at the level of post conventional morality" (p.3). The second issue he identifies as the discovery that regression occurs in post-adolescent life which casts doubt upon the "normative point of reference of moral development" (p.3). Habermas queries whether "the ability to act and judge in morally mature ways" could be "adequately conceptualised in cognitivistic and formalistic theories" (p.3). Thirdly he claims that accommodating relativists and value sceptics as a group in Kohlberg's stage model is problematic. Finally, he examines the possibility of merging the Kohlbergian structural theory with psychodynamic aspects of judging.

Habermas (1992) further posits that Kohlberg "saddles socio-moral perspectives with the job of grounding a logic of development". He criticises Kohlberg's attempt to enable his social perspectives to express capacities for social cognition, suggesting that it is more appropriate to separate the two dimensions. He distinguishes the perspective structures as

separate to the justice concepts derived from the socio-cognitive inventory. He accuses Kohlberg of attempting to include in the these normative aspects covertly positing that this is unnecessary “because a moral dimension is intrinsic to the basic concepts of a social world and norm governed interaction” (Habermas, 1992, p.131)

Habermas (1985) also suggest that the methodologies employed by the Kohlbergian School to measure moral development were short sighted (e.g. SISM; Standard Issue Scoring Manual, Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). He proposes that theories underpinned by Piagetian tradition are better measured by response coding that is informed by hermeneutic interpretation. While acknowledging the operational complexities of this alternative, he claims that the current method of operationalization brings to issue stage five along with stage six. He posits that surrendering the capacity to differentiate the stages at the post-conventional level, undermines the coherence of the stage structure. This further casts doubt on whether principled moral judgements represent a ‘natural’ stage in the same sense as judgements classified as pre-conventional and conventional (Habermas, 1985).

Habermas (1985) proposes an alternative from the perspective of discourse ethics. He suggests a different interpretation to stages five and six, by identifying the orientation to general principles to the orientation from the

orientation to procedures allowing for the justification of principles. He claims that at stage five principles are viewed as absolute and beyond the need for justification. Conversely at stage six, they are viewed as more flexible, and more relative to explicit procedures of justification. Habermas posits that differentiating stages of reflection is intimately tied into the larger macro-structure of a specific normative theory which is better distinguished by a preference for a particular justification. He claims that this enables us to distinguish whether a subject is not just relying “on the self evident nature of universal principles, but on the legitimating power of justificational procedures” which is better equipped to rule out sceptical objections and judge consistently (Habermas, 1985, p.4).

Georg Lind's 'Dual Aspect Model' and its Revisions of Moral Judgement Measurements.

Lind (1978, 1999, 1995, 2000; Lind & Wakenhut, 1985) develops his 'Dual Aspect Model' based on Kohlberg's stage model salvaging the functional influential factors of Kant and Piaget as a design solution to the above discussed flaws in the Kohlbergian flaws. It's central tenet is that moral judgement is necessarily a cognitive and affective duality in keeping with Piaget. Therefore the most unique characteristic of the 'Dual Aspect Model' and the feature that distinguishes it from the traditional Kohlbergian school is the simultaneous assessment of two aspects of moral judgement behaviour; the Piagetian cognitive and affective elements in moral judgement within the Kohlbergian understanding of moral development.

The primary principals of the dual aspect theory of moral behaviour and development, as posited by Piaget, Kohlberg and Lind, are its formalist, sequential, cognitive, dual structure (Lind, 2000a). To grasp the projected models of measurement advocated by the 'Dual Aspect Model' one has to grasp Lind & Wakenhut's (1985) critiques and revisions of the existing research indices based on the Kohlbergian School. The strategies advocated by the Tests for Moral Judgement (TMJ) design solutions,

creates the foundation for the Dual Aspect Model's Moral Judgment Test (MJT).

However, the success of this model in resolving the disputes that surround its theoretical implications is its adoption of Habermas' revisions of the Kohlbergian flaws. Kohlberg (1985) describes the reason for the Dual Aspect Model /MJT's construction as an attempt to, "systematically differentiate and integrate the assessment of the cognitive structure or stage of moral judgement and its content, that is, the attitudinal, affective or normative content of moral judgement" (Kohlberg, 1985 xv Düsseldorf Lecture). He concedes that this new measure and its research demography is different to the child psychology oriented North American school he pioneered, focussing on a more mature sample population and different socio-political dimensions and employs an entirely different methodology in this endeavour.

The operational definitions of the research literature on moral judgement are juxtaposed by two rival schools of definition; the 'rule conformity' definition (e.g. Hartshorne and May, 1929) and the 'good intention' definition (e.g. Rest, 1979; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999). Lind (1980, 2006) follows the third alternative school of definition that conceives it to be instead a 'competence' in keeping with the original Kohlbergian claims (1958; 1964; 1984). The 'Dual Aspect Theory' defines

moral behaviour as consisting of two inseparable but distinguishable aspects. The first is an individual's preference or "affection for moral ideals and principals" and the second is their "ability to reason and act according to these ideals and principals" (Lind, 2006, p.7)

Lind & Wakenhut (1985) indicate that "cognitive developmental theory does not always permit a conclusive decision in favour of one specific operational form in moral judgement research" (p.79). They contend that in justifying the development of a specific instrument, further specifications must be formulated based on the relevant scientific issue at stake. Therefore they claim that the very process of constructing measures for psychological research further develops and clarifies the concept at hand (Loevinger, 1957). They also claim that there are some psychological postulates that are inherent in cognitive developmental theory which also call for alternatives in psychometric measurement (Lind & Wakenhut, 1985). They further contend that this alternative attempts to follow Kohlberg in his endeavour to measure concrete moral judgement behaviour. They differentiate this alternative from the kind of questionnaires that measure moral attitudes that report on how they 'usually' behave or how they would possibly behave, which they feel merely report a hypothetical moral disposition. They claim it also avoids the confounding variables that affect introspective, self reporting questionnaires that are convoluted with the subjects state of being when

responding (e.g. Eckensberger and Reinshagen, 1980; Lemper, 1982) This alternative is instead a psychometric test they define as an ‘experimental questionnaire’ (Lind, 1982b) which concentrates on concrete moral judgement behaviour by measuring its patterns. This analysis of patterns reveals the manifestations of an individual’s attitudes and cognition which form the dual aspects of moral behaviour (Kohlberg, 1979; Lind, 1985b).

This model identifies the fault of the ‘questionnaire-type measures’ that attempt to approximate Kohlberg’s interview method but ignores the central aspects of Kohlberg’s cognitive developmental theory. It further posits that the underlying assumptions of the cognitive developmental theory contradict the ‘anthropological requirements’ that form the basis of classical tests and questionnaires. The contradiction lies in the assumption that these classical tests make in attempting to separate characteristics of personality, like substances into separate components. Conversely the cognitive aspects of the moral judgment competence are “aspects of the same mental ‘substance’, and thus must be dealt with together” (Lind, 1985b, p173). Lind further contends that the fault lies with our attempt to separate them into different realms and reify them (Haste, 2002). Another critique of the prevalent methods that attempt to approximate Kohlberg’s interview method proposed by this model is their failure to recognise that both the production and recognition of moral arguments are an important

expression of moral judgement, which complement rather than substitute each other (Lind & Wakenhut, 1985).

The other aspect that Lind & Wakenhut (1985) highlight in the model and its underlying implication for psychometric measurement, is the further sophisticated 'structural approach'. They posit that the assignment of a response to a stage according to a coding manual "presupposes a classical theory of psycho-metrics in which each individual response is taken to as a sign of a probable underlying state" (Lind & Wakenhut, 1985, p.81). This model also attempts to revise the flaws in the Kohlbergian interview method, such as differential motivation in judgment behaviour (where the capacity to exhibit the highest stage is not available which results in underestimating the stages in moral judgement competence) and the failure to record intensity and consistency of responses which is only inferred from the number of times it is recorded in the interview (Lind & Wakenhut, 1985).

Meanwhile the 'Moral Judgement Interview' and its replications fall short of the positive dividends that the classical questionnaire could provide, that the 'Dual Aspect'/TMJ revisions in measurement suggest could be adapted to its advantage. Firstly its economical access allows such measures to be used extensively with hypotheses which require large numbers. Secondly, their more obvious transparency promotes an easy access to critically

evaluate its theoretical content validity along with efforts to analyse moral judgement behaviour and its determinants differentially. Thirdly this model advocates an adoption of such a pre-structured measure on the grounds that the differentiating the intensity preference for a particular moral orientation can be directly obtained by appropriate response scales (Lind & Wakenhut, 1985, p82).

However, Kohlberg recommends the clinical interview format rather than closed questions to make it difficult for an individual to achieve a higher score by guesswork. The attitude questionnaire typology is vulnerable to such quasi-augmentations that allow participants to 'fake' their competence scores upwards. To be a reliable competence this possibility must be clearly disabled (Emler, Renwick & Malone, 1983; Haste, 2002; Lind, 2002).

This model identifies four challenges that the design and construction of moral judgment measures present and posit the following directions. Firstly it claims that the endeavour is to create an experimental design that is attempting to measure an individual's ability "to bring to bear in concrete acts of judgement, moral attitudes which compete with other orientations that can guide action, and to do so in an integrated and differentiated manner cannot be measured by individual items, taken singly or in summation" (Lind & Wakenhut, 1985, p. 82). Lind criticises

atomisation of Kohlberg's MJI among other Kohlbergian measures that accedes single responses as evidence of an underpinning disposition, and in doing so losing the structural relational properties of the underlying phenomenon (Haste, 2002, p.210). Instead he advocates a structural method that exhibits a systematic relationship between a pattern of questions and a pattern of answers. This, Lind claims facilitates the hermeneutic aim to allow for testing competitive hypothesis about an individual's motive in judgement behaviour (Lind, 1982b; 1984b). These elements (responses to items) and their relationships (factorial design) are devised to reveal the hypothesised disposition of an individual. (Lind & Wakenhut, 1985)

The second challenge that test designs have to overcome is the participants' predispositions to simple acquiesce, whether it is due to perceived locus of authority or other personality related variables as well as participants' predisposition to conformity of opinion. This model advocates that moral motives are differentiated from acquiesce by examining the participants' evaluations of qualitatively different arguments by measuring a stage factor (Haste, 2002). In order to differentiate a participants' moral concern from a desire to support intuitive opinion the model advocates arguments based on both sides of reason (i.e. orthogonal pro and con factors). This is in keeping with Kohlberg's interview

techniques which test a “person’s firmness of structure” (Eckensberger, et. al, 1980; Kohlberg, 1958).

The third dispositional factor that needs to be considered is the participants’ differential attention to the particular moral principle presented within the dilemma. To cope with the situational differentiation and hierarchical integration of moral judgment in the total personality system, this model takes the dilemma scenario into account as an experimental factor creating a dilemma factor within the measurement (Lind & Wakenhut, 1985, p. 88).

Based on these criticisms Lind (1980, 1985a, 1985b, 1995, 2000a, 2000b, 2006) posits a revision of the understanding of moral judgement in its operationalized definitions and consequently the requirements in creating an appropriate measurement. The dual aspect theory incorporates many of the Piagetian and Kohlbergian claims of moral development. However, it makes some crucial modifications and clarifications influenced by Habermas’ revisions.

The first of these postulates is the inseparability of the cognitive and affective aspects of moral judgement. To reiterate, Piagetian theory claims that “affective and cognitive mechanisms are inseparable, although distinct; the former depends on energy, and the latter depends on structure”

(1976, p.71). Kohlberg as established previously follows a similar scheme in his paradigm of moral development. Lind posits he further develops this, and evaluates its implications in the measurement and stimulation of moral-cognitive development (Lind 1985a, 1985b, 1995, 2000a, 2000b). Lind (2000a) translates Piagetian assumptions of cognitive-affective parallelism, to a correlation of a participant's moral attitude and their moral judgement. Moreover the second postulate, further influenced by Piagetian duality establishes a 'parallelism' factor which requires these two separate but inseparable aspects to register a significant correlation (Haste, 2002; Lind, 1985a; 2002; 2006; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969).

The third postulate is the Kohlbergian requirement of the participants' internal moral principles to emerge as opposed to conforming to externalist expectations (i.e. the test constructors; Kohlberg 1964; Pitell & Mendellsohn 1966). While most investigations attempt to redress this operationalisation a functional measure needs to ensure this within the construction of measurement itself in ensuring construct validity, as seen in the Lind measure.

The fourth postulate is the necessity of a moral task characteristic in measuring moral judgement and the fifth is the equivalence of pro and con arguments within this moral task. Lind (2006) claims that to measure moral judgement competence, the instrument must contain a moral task as

advocated by Kohlberg (1984) and influenced by Habermas (1990). Habermas contends that the ability to engage in moral discourse with one's opponents, exhibits one's capacity to apply moral principles, not only theoretically but also in emotionally charged situations (Haste, 2002). Kohlberg used dilemmas and counter arguments in his clinical interviews for the assessment of independent judgements and the validation of developmental levels (Kohlberg, 1958). This task enables participants to deliberate on moral dilemmas and to rate arguments both for and against their own stance, in order to facilitate the interpretive analysis and clarify the subjects real understanding (Kohlberg 1958; Lind 1978; 1985a; Lind & Wakenhut, 1985a; Piaget, 1966).

The sixth postulate is the so called 'non-fakeability' element of the model. This vulnerability as discussed previously brings into issue the validity of developmental assessments produced by measures that have not disabled this capacity in its design. For example Emler Renwick & Malone (1983), Markoulis (1989) and others demonstrated in their experiments that the P-score (the main index used with the DIT) can be faked upward when the subjects are properly instructed (Lind, 1996). However, when this attempt was replicated using the MJT subjects failed to manipulate their score beyond their optimal stage (Haste, 2002).

The seventh postulate is the sensitivity to change. Lind (2006) contends that while competence measurement should disable upward manipulation of scores devoid of the relevant stage competence, “it should be sensitive to real changes over the wide range of the scale” (p.15). The Kohlbergian School had impeded such erosion because the data called into question the construct validity of the measure (Kohlberg, 1984). Lind drops this measurement bias to allow regression.

The eighth postulate in keeping with Kohlbergian ideology is the ‘quasi-simplex⁴³ structure’ which requires that, when “the test dilemmas demand principled moral judgement, acceptability ratings of each stage should support the notion of an ordered sequence” (Lind, 2006, p.16). This means the correlations among the stage ratings should form a quasi-simplex structure (Kohlberg, 1958; Lind 2000a; Lind, 2006).

The quintessence of the Lind model posits that affect and cognition are analytically clearly distinct but ontologically inseparable aspects of moral judgement behaviour. Consequently, that moral development behaviour should be seen as a ‘two-sided process of change in affects and in the structure of judgments in a more formal sense than Kohlberg has suggested. Finally, that the assumption of ‘structural wholeness’ should be

⁴³ The simplex method (in the statistical algorithm) is an iterative procedure, solving a system of linear equations in each of its steps, and stopping when either the optimum is reached, or the solution proves infeasible.

regarded not as an empirical hypothesis but as a methodological criterion that serves to measure the cognitive aspects of moral development (Lind, Hartmann & Wakenhut, 1985).

Contemporary Conceptions of Moral Development in relation to Empirical Research.

To fully understand the positive and negative influences on current moral paradigms and contentions, it is necessary to explore some macro theorists and other analysts who attempt to survey and appraise the definitions and assumptions of the Moral sphere and its various models. This review based on the macro evaluations of Gilligan, Tugendhat, Blasi, Wren, Dobert and Haste among others who attempt to illustrate the complexities behind understanding the moral concept in its relations to other psycho-social configurations in an interdisciplinary fabric of knowledge, and establishes the sensitivities, strengths and weaknesses in what seems necessarily to be an interdisciplinary concept. This appraisal seeks to identify possible erroneous assumptions that could confound the attempt to explore the relationship between a purely psycho-social concept (social identity) and an interdisciplinary concept (moral development). This would avoid mixed disciplinary assumptions in establishing the relationship between social identity and moral development in embedding it within the macro theories of conflict and socio-economy.

Tugendhat suggests the primary objective of philosophical research to be “clarification of concepts and meanings” (1999, p.3). While modern philosophers seem to agree that the primary objective of philosophy is to

create 'concepts for living' rather than to establish an ultimate truth (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994), classical philosophers seemed to be attempting to be more concerned with discovering the semantics of life and its social ecologies (Rawls, 1955). Contemporary philosophy has altered its course and objectives somewhat, and despite its idiosyncratic worldviews that may be too disparate to compare, it is arguably cumulatively progressive (Carey, 2007). However many social sciences, when faced with infant project concepts that have a parallel sibling concept matured within other disciplines, frequently attempt to adopt, investigate and establish these semantics based on other disciplines (e.g. philosophy). However, the contradiction created in this practice is the possibility of a conflicting purpose and drive that is inferred within the original concept. Moral concepts are prone to this particular tendency, as many academics recognise, with mixed results.

Blasi (1999) contends that the impact of European philosophy on psychological frameworks of moral theory and its empirical research, to be positive and necessary (p.40). However, he identifies three elements that the process of assimilation of philosophical precursors may create ambivalence in, which are particularly pertinent to understanding the contentions within the moral framework. His first critique is its attempt to narrow the domain of morality. Blasi (1999) acknowledges the necessity of excluding some unarticulated, implicit and even explicit elements of

moral phenomenon in the process of unifying and differentiating theory, into macro structure. He contends that the elements that are excluded from definitions to fit clinical empirical goals, depriving the definition of its full meaning. He particularly criticises the lack of uniformity in these exclusions, arguing “one must acknowledge that we have been less than explicit in determining which actions should be considered morally relevant” (p.40-49). The second concern Blasi (1999) raises is the inappropriate use of philosophical considerations in psychological arguments. He argues, that despite some positive dividends the tendency to create mixed arguments where “philosophical considerations are not just used to simply generate hypothesis, but become part of the empirical argument” create straw man fallacies (p.50). Blasi further contends that a “psychological controversy based on philosophical considerations does not contribute to either philosophical or psychological understandings” (p.52).

Thirdly, Blasi challenges the reduction of the subjective perspective. This ‘assumption of phenomenalism’ (Kohlberg, Lewin & Hower, 1983) which Blasi acknowledges to be liberating “is at times compromised, even within cognitive developmental research and theory” (1999, p.57). He cites examples from Turiel (1983), Nucci (1981), Smetana (1981), where the participants’ perspectives were overlooked in favour of intrinsic properties and actions of the moral conduct in defining morality. Blasi (1999) further argues that such inconsistent dilution of phenomenological assumption in

the interpretive reconstruction of participants' systems of moral ideas may compromise the position it is placed in a stage hierarchy (p.58). While this interpretive reconstruction is clinically saturated in a few psychometric measures such as Lind's Moral Judgement Test (MJT; 2001, where he has considered much of these challenges in his test construction), the essence of this subjective distortion remains. In response to a dilemma a participant may (much like Blasi's interview subject) appropriate or reflect what he perceives to be the desired interpretation of moral principles that the participant follows (p.58).

These challenges are further problematised in a society such as Sri Lanka, where the epistemology of moral concerns and development of moral contentions are little understood. The collective reasoning as opposed to the more Greco-Roman/Western and individualistic priorities also pose issues. While Lind's (2001) MJT cannot be faked upwards, it is possible moral truncation may be the result of such second guessing of the agenda of the investigation source or even conspiracy theory of the investigation purpose. While the methodology section will clarify the extreme care taken to avoid such compromise of methodological procedures and retaining parity of standards within samples, it is necessary to consider the theoretical implications nevertheless.

The difficulty lies at the heart of the cognitive competence we are attempting to measure. Usually cognitive developmental psychology deals with limited or rather less subtle faculties such as language, logico-mathematical reasoning and perception. Blasi argues, that this evaluative stance is an intrinsic component characteristic of the discipline and its attempt to “determine the possibly universal end state of a specific competence and to order the various forms that this competence takes on the basis of chronological sequence and logical hierarchy” (Blasi, 1999; p.59) .

Therefore, there is a necessity to clarify the basic nature of the characteristics and disparities between the psychological and philosophical domain in systematic logical coherence. This by inference qualifies challenges that refer to mixed discipline collusions has been advocated by many macro-theorists (e.g. Blasi, 1999). As Blasi (1999) has coherently established above, in attempting to measure moral development the investigator undertakes to establish finite characteristics (albeit it’s developmental progression) of an enigmatic macro-concept. While some psycho-social elements of this macro-concept are within cognitive measurement and its impacts within certain contexts impressionable and measurable, this investigation aims to be cautious of projecting simplistic unified relationships.

Having reviewed some of the interdisciplinary complications in assimilating philosophical concepts into psychological theory and the contentions of phenomenological assumptions of meta-theories, it is worth focussing on specific concepts that impact our research indices.

Among the concepts that are crucial to moral development for the purpose of our investigation, is the workings of moral motivation and directive, which this investigation believes to be mutually reciprocal with social identity. The assumption behind the moral motivation of an ethno-social collective depends much on what we conceive to be the moral intentions, fuel, drive and structural functions to be and the nature of moral directives that the moral motivations submit to. Tugendhat (1990) attempts to clarify the semantics behind moral motivation and moral directives based on the classical semantic of 'ought' or 'must'. He develops Mackie's (1977) concerns of the source and consequence of the classical 'ought' in terms of actor/agent and impact, in pragmatic/epistemic contexts within a more overarching model. Tugendhat (1990) establishes three strains of this moral directive; 'rational rules', 'rules that define practice', and 'social rules'. While acknowledging overlaps and limitations that are not exhaustive, it is worth noting that each moral directive would correspond slightly differently in view of a moral atmosphere generated by an ethno-social identity within a conflict framework.

The first, 'rational rule', Tugendhat suggests is a value statement in an expression of advice, that has a deliberative outcome on the agent at the receiving end (1990). This he compares to the Kantian concept of the 'hypothetical imperative' (p.4). The assumptions/expectations of this initial exploration of the moral atmosphere of ethno-social groups in conflict environments are that rational moral directives of this type would be an established moral valence that guides moral action. The second strain, 'rules that define practice', is less significant within the assumptions of moral directives of this thesis. However, it is not completely outside the moral experience of the Sri Lankan experimental sample. For example, male Tamils carrying a parcel in high risk areas are checked at most security checkpoints; even though it is neither a requirement nor classified as 'good' or 'rational'. Instead, it is a self imposed maxim on the part of the security personnel in high risk areas. The third, even more significant strain to the experimental conflict sample is the normative 'social rule' (Tugendhat, 1990, p.6). This is particularly complex and potent in societies of conflict where the legitimacy of judicial rules or indeed the legitimacy of the state is challenged; therefore normative expectations of moral atmospheres within communities are more secure and compelling.

Tugendhat (1984) further implies that the moral motivation to follow these moral directives lies in a self concept that is reciprocally determined by a community and nourished by moral esteem. The legitimacy and relevance

of a particular set of moral directives and the reciprocal justification of these rules lie in who individuals conceive themselves to be (p.154). He further reiterates that “It is because you are essentially a so-and-so, and to be a so-and-so is essentially connected with a scale of better-and-worse relative to these rules” (1990, p.10).

When the self-concept is inclusive of a universal collective and prioritises the wellbeing of this universal collective, the moral directive does not contradict advanced moral characteristics. However, as established earlier, when ethno-social identities determine self concept and moral atmosphere in societies of extreme (life threatening) conditions, these directives can be contradictory.

Tugendhat (1990) refines this earlier model by scrutinising the structures of moral esteem by the characteristics and sanctions of ‘moral praise’ and ‘moral blame’ and its developmental sequence in the process of socialisation. He claims Rawls’ explication of moral motivation (1971, 1980) lacks a full treatment of the ‘ought’ despite its parallels with Tugendhat’s conception. He further claims that Piaget’s (1932) concept of ‘moral respect’, in his contrast between ‘unilateral respect’ and ‘mutual respect’, was fundamental to the 2 stages of moral consciousness (1990, p.13). He also highlights the concept of ‘self-esteem’ and its corresponding ‘self-contempt’ and its inter-subjective relevance (p.13).

Therefore, this investigation has attempted to locate a social identity measure that is particularly in keeping with these macro-structures, even if they are not fully developed within the social identity perspective. The Brown (1995) measure examines this introverted self-concept based identity that includes this emotive and self-evaluative valence, to fully understand the congruence of these particular concepts (as explored by Tugendhat) in submitting to a moral atmosphere, created by the relevant identity.

Wren (1990) attempts to delineate the philosophical tensions between 'Internalist' and 'Externalist' conceptions of moral motivation which problematise the linguistic, epistemological, and logical conceptions of the value 'good' and its moral boundaries. In doing so, he ascertains how moral motivation is built into the concept of moral cognition. Wren (1990) defines 'Internalist' views to be that "in the domain of practical and, a fortiori, moral thinking, justifying reasons are also exciting reasons or are at least to be counted among the latter's rational grounds" (p.18). Externalists he defines in contrast, "are those views in which justifying reasons are not presupposed by them" (p.18).

Wren (1990) contends that the corresponding literature allies both normative propositions and motivational statements of the 'Internalists' to hold that moral judgements are intrinsically motivating and can justify this

by either a 'causal' or 'expressive' validation. Wren further contends that the causal form can be attributed to Kant and cognitive developmental psychologists who he claims "have more or less explicitly ascribed causal efficacy to the intellectual component of moral development" (p.21). The expressive form, he attributes to philosophers such as Hume. He also contends that the tensions between these two are reflected in the opposition between rationalist and empiricist philosophies, as well as deontological (duty oriented) and aretaic (virtue oriented) ethics. The consequence of this delineation is the nature of motivation in ethno-social groups, which many social psychologists and motivation theorists consider to be deontological.

The causal form of internalism, Wren attributes to some of Piaget's (1932) concepts (among other cognitivists), particularly in reference to his 'ideological feelings' which Wren classifies as a subjective (experiential) cognitive state from which the sense of obligation is derived. Wren (1990) contends that moral cognition is "a more or less adequate adaptive organisation of one's experience" in synonymy to Piaget's concept of equilibrium (p.28). To achieve a 'maximally adequate moral judgement', Wren (1990) contends we replace inferior judgments and corresponding hypothetical behaviours that embody inferior judgments which directs motivation according to the new cognitive construct of the superior

judgement. This is parallel with what Dewey refers to as the continuous process of valuing conduct (1902).

Other Piagetian concepts Wren (1990) attributes to expressive internalism, “on the basis of his distinction between verbalised and concrete judgements - a distinction that reflects the pragmatic underpinnings of his epistemology” (p.24). Wren also suggests that psychoanalytical theorists such as Freud, some personality theorists (e.g. Allport, 1937; Burton, 1963; Cattell 1950; Eynseck, 1970) and socio-biological schools of thought have invested in expressive internalism in their perspectives. Some of these are aligned with the concept of, and structural manifest of, social identity theory. This is particularly evident in the conceptual underpinning of social identity, as measured by Brown (1995).

Given the subtle assumptions this research study makes of ‘moral ideology’ when influenced by social identity, it is necessary to establish whether this ‘moral ideology’ refers to the above mentioned cognitive construct engineered by the process of experiential balance of assimilation and accommodation, or whether it refers to a more expressive form. It is plausible to hypothesise that in high-conflict regions moral motivation refers to a causal internalist form where day to day survival assimilates and accommodates any hypothetical conceptual beliefs and ideologies. It is also plausible to consider that in low-conflict regions, participants are more

likely to hold more externalist constructs of moral motivation as their value judgements are likely to be less tested when compared to their high-conflict neighbours who live in more severe conditions. Within this understanding Wren's (1990, p.24) chicken and egg conundrum of which precedes which is nullified, as it assumes they are mutually deterministic based on context (in this case of high and low conflict).

Externalism, Wren attributes to the social psychological perspective which he maintains fails to acknowledge or establish an essential link between motivation and moral beliefs (1982). Wren also argues that social learning theorists' (e.g. Aronfreed, 1968; Bandura, 1977; Mischel, 1968) commitment to the reinforcement paradigm and its consequential hegemony of extrinsic motivation of all human action, considers moral action to be a response to random stimulus. He further identifies the flaw in this externalist view as a mixed model fallacy as warned against by Blasi (1990) in transposing a meta-ethical concept into a psychological/social scientific one. He claims that "By divorcing moral motivation from moral meanings, social psychology transforms externalism from a meta-ethical perspective into a scientific one that, from the moral point of view, is rather ominous to say the least" (Wren, 1990, p.27).

Despite some personality psychology alignments to social identity theory, the lynchpin of the concept lies fairly stoutly in social psychology. The

isolation of moral action from moral motivation that is a necessary inference of the social identity model problematises any endeavour to explicate a relationship between the two concepts. These underpinning inferences have been considered in deciding on the Brown measure (1995) which was the most congruent social identity measure for cognitive purposes, given its affective/emotive component as well as its deliberative/cognitive component.

It is also necessary to determine whether moral ideology as referred to within a model of social identity in a psycho-social sense, is experiential at all or whether it can be attributed to social learning and overtly instructive sources (e.g. news media, national curriculum of history, social studies or literature). Depending on the cognitive/social content of the process of identity development (be it exclusive or inclusive) and the process of identity stimulant socialisation (as considered above by Tugendhat, 1990), it is necessary to explore the characteristics and structures of moral motivation within this framework.

Another important consideration that has to be examined within the research assumptions is the gap between moral judgement and moral action which has been examined by a number of macro-theorists. For example, Walker (2004) reiterates Blasi's concerns in the gap between moral judgement and moral action within his research in moral identity and

personality and calls for a focus on moral character and moral personality. Walker argues that Blasi (1980) theorised that moral cognition alone cannot explain the variability in moral action, which calls for a more comprehensive framework. While these concepts of judgement-action relationship were empirically established by Arnold (1989) and Buchanan (1992) to some extent, Walker emphasises the lack of focus and priority within the research field.

Blasi's (1983, 1984, 1993, 1995) 'Self-model' points to three components of moral functioning; the characteristics of the moral self, the nature of moral responsibility, and the functions of self consistence (integrity).

Walker posits that the first of these concepts, 'the moral self', which focuses on the values within ones moral identity, explores a continuum where it is deeply relevant to some individuals day to day reality, and less pertinent to others' daily self concept as evident in his findings (Walker, Pitts ,Hennig & Matsuba, 1995). He posits that morality has different degrees of centrality in peoples' awareness which is in parallel to contemporary findings (Colby & Damon, 1992; Hart & Fegley, 1995).

The second of these concepts, 'Moral responsibility', or as Haste proposed moral engagement (1990), bridges the gap between the realisation of a moral course of action and its undertaking. This sense of personal

responsibility, Walker (2004) argues, implicates self in action by reflecting a personal consciousness of moral worth which connects Moral judgement and Moral action. Kohlberg and Deisner (1991) posited that this sense of personal responsibility was conceived in moral attachment and was relational, affective and deontological, which Walker conceives to implicate affective processes in the origins of the experience of personal responsibility.

Integrity, or as Blasi (1980) conceived it 'self consistency', the third component of this model, Walker (2004) posits is a fundamental drive for moral action that desires consistency between moral judgement and the individual's commitment to it by moral action. Walker further submits that while there are fragmentary social psychological/behaviourist concepts of the processes referring to this drive, cognitive developmental focus is distracted from this central function. Walker further advocates a focus on moral character and moral personality, as do others (e.g. Campbell & Christopher, 1996; Punzo, 1996; Walker & Hennig, 1997). Bergman (2004) shares this concern and charges the Piagetian/Kohlbergian preoccupation with moral cognition overlooking the centrality of moral motivation. Like Walker he posits that Blasi provided the crucial elements to a critical synthesis that responds to this oversight.

These contradictions and considerations within the moral construct require instruments and paradigms that are based on this theoretical construct to configure methods of moral measurement with precision. Given this theoretical quagmire it would be easy for research measurements to compromise its construct validity. When an instrument is considered for a research imperative within assumptions of a specific model of research assumptions, the instrument has to be scrutinised to ensure it grasps the theoretical subtleties of that which it purports to measure. Therefore the methodological considerations in instrument selection and the identification of specific paradigm considerations have to be examined alongside the pragmatic considerations of the context requirements.

Chapter 3

AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL IDENTITY, ETHNIC IDENTITY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN POST-COLONIAL CONFLICT

The term 'identity' was coined by Erikson (1959) as a change of focus to Freud's psychoanalytical theory by giving primary consideration to the implications of the ego rather than the id beyond Freud's concept of ego. This expanded it to 'ego identity' which he defined as 'the awareness of the fact there is a self-sameness and continuity to the ego's synthesizing methods which are effective in safeguarding the sameness and continuity of one's meaning for others' (p.23). Erikson's concept of ego identity linked the psycho-biological drives of an individual's inner nature with those influences on self originating from society and culture (Leets, Giles & Clement et. al, 1996). This psychodynamic approach given its roots in Freud's biological emphasis, adds some coherence to the attempt to justify ethnic identity as social identity.

In Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, Flament, Billig & Bundy, 1971), the psychological reality which stems from a social reality, challenges Erikson's attempt at a psychosocial synthesis based on the biological forces of the Freudian id (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Tajfel & Turners'

Social Identity perspective in both the original 'Inter-group Theory' and the later 'Self Categorisation Theory', with basic elements stressing self categorisation and self definition in terms of group membership and group defined self perception all culminate in a subjective social reality (SCT;Turner 1982, 1984,1985; Turner et. al. 1987; SIT Tajfel, Tajfel, 1972b, 1981, Tajfel & Turner 1979, 1986; Turner 1975).

Sheriff (1966) observed discriminatory behaviour as soon as groups became aware of each others' existence, before they were exposed to competitive conditions. Ferguson & Kelley (1964) observed overvaluation of group products in non-competitive situations. Billig & Tajfel (1973) observed similar in-group favouritism, as did Allen & Wilde (1975), while positive interpersonal attitudes did not seem to be necessary for group formation (Burnstein & Mcrae, 1962; Feshbach & Singer, 1957; Kalin & Marlowe, 1968; Myers, 1962; Rabie & Huygen, 1974).

Turner (1984) notes that though there is less consensus about the criteria which embodies the basic psychological process in group formation and essential constituents in group belongingness, there is wide consensus that interdependent social relationships are the foremost component (e.g. Cartwright & Zander 1968, Lott & Lott 1965, Shaw 1976; Sheriff, 1967) implying shared identity and social structure are assumed to develop almost inevitably over time from mutual interpersonal interdependence

(p.519). The critique in applying this to ethnic identity however would be that this could be applied primarily, if not solely to small face-to-face groups whose numbers can interact on a face-to-face basis as Turner accedes (p.524). Therefore, though we could safely assume that while some logistical machinations of social identity bias as presented by Tajfel and Turner (1979) are relevant to Ethnic conflict, there is still a lot of unaccounted variables in ethnic bias.

Nevertheless a majority of the applicable understandings and conflict, discrimination and related negative behaviours are also stratified within the 'Social Identity Approach'. Consequently, so are the more robust and field applicable measures of social identity. Therefore, as this developmental exploration is attempting to understand the relationship between moral judgement and social identity in reference to ethnicity, it necessitates a more in-depth examination of the social identity, ethnic identity and national identity as understood within the social identity approach. However, this examination is less concerned with presenting a balanced narrative of these paradigms, and instead has attempted to examine the facets that affect the definition and operationalization of the research instrument.

Introduction to the Social Identity Approach: Social Identity Theory & Social Categorisation Theory

In the 21st Century where ethno-social group relations are an imperative part of world peace and survival, it is necessary for group reasoning to engender pro-universal reasoning. In Kohlberg's progressive stage theory of moral-development, the 2nd level characteristics include acceptance of conventional morality, respect for social justice, law and order and conforming to social expectations. The more advanced third level of post conventional, principled morality requires acknowledgement of 'individual's natural and inalienable rights' and a sense of 'public good, but more critically it requires an individual to act out of universal principles based upon the worth and equality of all human beings' and a "consideration of interests of all individuals in every situation" (Kohlberg et. al. 1979).

Essentially this leaves little room for negative stereotyping and group-bias, and requires empathy and altruism in individual and group relationships and behaviour. If one assumes ethnic-conflicts heighten individuals' ethnic-identity based on Tajfel's (1981) research, and therefore create in-group out-group prejudice perhaps even leading to expression of aggression through violence in societies of conflict, this

implies that the group-identity itself would have an obstructive influence on socio-moral development and exacerbate grounds for group conflict.

To clarify the parameters of social identity theory and its many possible shades of meaning, one has to understand the purpose and the research ecology that the minimal paradigm study was conducted in. The research question is one pertinent to all ethno-social conflict; why group members malign other groups, and what makes them believe that their group is better than others. To examine this Tajfel and colleagues conducted a series of studies which sought to identify the minimal conditions that creates group discrimination by members in favour of their own groups against the out-group (Tajfel, Flament, Billig & Bundy, 1971).

The first step was to create a group differential study that was stripped down of the factors that were hitherto considered to play a determinative role in group prejudice; factors such as a history of conflict, grievance, personal animosity with out-group members, interdependence and reciprocity with in-group members. The design was to then introduce information into the situation to discern the point where discrimination would appear. This first study based on preference for the abstract painters Klee and Kandinsky, indicated that even under these most minimal conditions, participants deviated from a strategy of fairness and chose to

discriminate in favour of those participants identified as within their in-group. (Tajfel 1978a).

To further investigate the conditions that breed this discrimination, a second study was devised in which the participants were afforded further decision making strategies allowing the participants to choose a pair of rewards from a number of alternatives that were not afforded in the first. These strategy matrices were (a) fairness; (b) maximum joint profit (giving the greatest total reward to the 2 recipients); (c) maximum in-group profit (giving the greatest total reward to the in-group member); and (d) maximum difference in favour of an in-group member (strategy that led the in-group member to 'defeat' the out-group member by the largest margin) (Tajfel, 1978c p.78). This second experiment again indicated that participants departed from a strategy of fairness to one of in-group favouritism. Tajfel et al., (1971) claim that "their actions are unambiguously directed at favouring the members of their in-group against the members of their out-group. This happens despite the fact that an alternative strategy-acting in terms of the greatest common good- is clearly open to them at a relatively small cost" (p. 172).

Tajfel (1978b) and Turner (1975) later clarified that the imperative conclusion of the minimal group studies was that the mere act of categorising themselves as part of an in-group was sufficient to lead them

to display in-group favouritism. These findings challenged established understandings of group conflict (eg. Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer & Sears, 1939; Sherif, 1966) that determined the causal paradigms for conflict in terms of goal oriented objectives and deep seated motives. Tajfel's (1981) Social Identity theory and Turner's Social Categorisation theory (Turner, 1982, 1984, 1985; Turner et al., 1987), both stress group action and group perception & behaviour, interpret conflict as necessarily identity related. However, this does not qualify as both a necessary and sufficient condition for conflict and violence.

Tajfel's Social Identity theory further maintains that 'individuals need to maintain and enhance the positively valued distinctiveness of their in-groups compared to out-groups, to achieve a positive social-identity' (Tajfel 1972b, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1979, 1986; Turner, 1975, as cited in Turner, 1988. pp. x -xi). Tajfel claims that when the participants of the minimal groups study categorised themselves as members of a group this gave their behaviour a distinctive purpose and meaning.

"This meaning was found by them in the adoption of a strategy for action based on establishment, through action, of distinctiveness between their own 'group' and the other, between the two social categories in a truly minimal 'social system'. Distinction from the 'other category provided... an identity for their own group, and thus some kind of meaning to an otherwise empty situation. (Tajfel 1972, pp. 39-40)

He defined this social identity as the individual's knowledge that he/she belongs to certain groups which attach some "emotional and value significance" to the individual by being a part of the membership (Tajfel 1972 p.31). Haslam (2001) clarifies this as a part of a person's 'who they are' associated with internalised group membership. Haslam (2001) further differentiates this from the notion of personal identity which refers to self knowledge that derives from the individuals unique attributes such as physical appearance, intellectual qualities etc. (p. 31)

Meanwhile, Turner's Self Categorisation Theory (Turner, 1982, 1984, 1985; Turner et al., 1987 as cited in Turner, 1988. pp. x -xi) maintains that shared social-identity depersonalises individual self-perception and action'. In an attempt to further develop a clearer understanding of the features of Tajfel's (1978a) inter-group - inter-personal continuum Turner and colleagues hypothesised (Turner 1982; Brown & Turner 1981) that an individual's self concept itself could be defined along a continuum varying from definitions of selfhood in terms of personal identity to in terms of social identity. Furthermore, Turner (1982) contended that the self-concept is the cognitive mechanism that underpins this behavioural continuum proposing that the switching-on of social identity activated inter-group behaviour; 'social identity is the cognitive mechanism that makes group behaviour possible. Turner referred to this switching on or activation of social identity as depersonalisation (p.21). Deschamps & Devos (1998)

accounts for this process of depersonalisation as the outcome of intensification of group alliance within the bi-polar continuum. As the salience of belonging to a group intensifies, one moves from the interpersonal pole to the inter-group pole. They maintain that consequently, these elements depersonalise the self according to stereotypes determining the group (p.7). Turner further expanding on Tajfel's (1978a) claim that in the context of inter-group behaviour, members were prone to perceive out groups as homogenous, hypothesised that, they would be similarly prone to perceiving homogeneity among in-group members (Turner, 1987, p.50).

As Turner emphasises that "the fundamental hypothesis shared by both these theories (SIT & SCT) is that individuals define themselves in terms of their social group-memberships, and that group-defined self-perception produces psychologically distinctive effects in social behaviour" (Turner, 1988. pp. x-xi). This implies that social identity, particularly in the form of the more potent ethno-social identity could create negative group-bias that could truncate advanced pro-universal reasoning and group behaviour that is divorced from personal accountability.

While some definitions of in-groups extend this paradigm to the populist zero-sum approach particularly in political science, this extension cannot be assumed without undermining the empirical validity of the paradigm.

For example, Stavenhagen (1990) extends out-group discrimination to hostility and rejection. (p.9). The social identity approach itself is commonly misinterpreted in a number of ways; particularly it is often taken as suggesting that group members have either an automatic or a personal drive to display prejudice (Haslam 2001, p.32; Turner & Reynolds 2001, p.67; Turner & Oaks, 1997; Brubaker and Cooper, 2000; Turner, Hogg, Oakes Reicher & Whetherall, 1987). Haslam (2001) further suggests that this tendency to display in-group favouritism has been misconstrued as either a universal cognitive bias or an individual difference. Haslam clarifies that “in contrast to both interpretations the theory suggests that in-group favouritism is not an automatic or a person specific response, but a reaction to a particular social psychological circumstance” (p.32). Furthermore, the minimal group paradigm when applied to ethnic-conflict settings (e.g. Stavenhegan, 1990) as suggested above, is even more severely reduced a mob mentality caricature and misconstrued to assume that in-group identification precedes and is a causal factor in out-group hostility and inter-group conflict. Therefore the assumptions and non assumptions and SIT and SCT needs to be considered and clarified before applying the dual paradigm as a contributory factor to conflict, or even the failure to resolve conflict.

These misconceptions are entrenched in the temporal and cultural fabric of its research precedents and contemporaries. Social psychology’s interest in in-group bias and social identity and social categorisation arose in the

context of intergroup relations (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Brewer and Brown, 1998). This has led to a coupling of in-group bias and out-group prejudice based on the assumption that the more we understand why individuals become attached to their groups, the more we will know about why they come to dislike or derogate groups. Brewer (2001) further maintains that “the formation of in-groups and in-group identification arises independently of attitudes towards out-groups” (p.16). She challenges the assumption that attachment to in-groups is the primary process. Brewer faults this on Social Psychology’s foundational assumptions in Sumner’s (1906) theory of ethnocentrism which assumed a negative zero sum approach (pp. 12-13).

The ‘minimal group paradigm’ (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament, 1971) challenged the assumption that differential treatment between in-groups and out-groups is derived necessarily from cooperative interdependence within groups and competitive relationships with the out-group. In the minimal group experiment the mere categorisation into different social groups without any confounding factors of interdependence or competition has given sufficient rise to in-group bias and out-group discrimination (Tajfel et. al, 1971, Turner, 1978, Brewer, 1979, Diehl 1990). Field studies (Hinkle & Brown, 1990, Brewer & Campbell, 1976, Messick & Mackie, 1989) exploring out group discrimination and in-group bias have also failed to substantiate a direct causality in consensus. (Brewer, 2001 p.19)

Therefore early studies of ethno-centrism which provided a zero-sum approach, where positive in-group attitudes were related to negative out-group attitudes (e.g. Levinson, 1950; Masson & Verkyuton, 1993; Yee & Brown., 1992) have been contradicted and various alternatives provided.

One social-psychological alternative suggests that the existence of in-group bias does not necessarily mean that there is a negative relationship between these attitudes and, by implication, assumes no relationship (Messick & Mackie, 1989; Hinkle & Brown, 1990). A second alternative suggest that in-group and out-group attitudes are positively related, and is supported by developmental and multi-culturalist approaches. The developmental view (Cross, 1991; Helms, 1990; Phinney 1989, 1993) holds that a more secure ethnic or racial identity is associated with empathetic acceptance of other groups. Meanwhile the multi-culturalist approach (Berry, 1984) and research based on this hypothesis (Berry, 1984; Berry et.al. 1977; Lambent et. al. 1986) also indicate that individuals with a positive and secure sense of their culture will have positive attitudes towards other groups.

The third alternative proposed by Brewer (2001) is perhaps is the most coherent and relevant to the current context. Brewer reinvents the four facets of Sumner's (1906) ethnocentric paradigm with some adjustments. Sumner's theory of ethno-centrism had proposed the following four elements in social organisation. The first was that, human societies were

necessarily organised into in-groups and out-groups (Social Categorisation Principal). The second that individual's value their in-groups positively and maintain positive cooperative relationships within the group (the in-group positivity principal). The third that in-group positivity is enhanced by social comparison with out-groups, in which in-group traits and results are considered more superior to those of the out group (the inter-group comparison principal). And the fourth that relationships between in-groups and out groups are characterized by conflict, antagonism and mutual contempt (out-group hostility principal). Sumner posited these four elements as a unified behavioural tenet between groups.

Brewer (2001) resubmits these four elements as four distinguishable entities empirically and conceptually which "represent a systematic progression along a continuum of possible relationships, between in-group formation and inter-group behaviour, in which each element in the progression provides a necessary but not sufficient condition for the subsequent elements" (p.19). Both Brewer (1906) and Sumner (2001) postulates that the first two stage elements are probably universal characteristics of all human groups though a number of conditional and contextual factors that influence this first phenomenon to progress into the second phenomenon has been offered by various authors including Tajfel and Turner (1979). However, Brewer (2001) proposes that the third and

forth elements necessarily require external conditions that are not inherent to the processes of group formation.

To understand this model in context of prevalent literature it is necessary to understand the relationship between these four factors. A wide array of explanations contradicting and complimenting the relationship between this first factor (group attachment) and the second factor (group positivism) (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and the bipolar continuum (Tajfel, 1978a) has emerged in an attempt to clarify the phenomenon (eg. Schiffman & Wickland 1992, Branscombe, Scmitt & Harvey 1999, Messick & Mackie 1989; Hinkle & Brown 1990, Terry and Callan 1998; Reynolds, Turner & Haslam 2000, Mummendy & Schriebner, 1983, 1984).

Tajfel and Turner (1979) hypothesises three factors which influence the optimal conditions which initiate individual's progress from this first stage of forming an attachment to a group, to the second stage of valuing in-group's positively and out group's negatively. The first was the extent that individuals' identified with a group and internalised that group identity and membership as a part of their self concept. The second was the extent to which the current cultural/socio-political context provided grounds between groups. Thirdly they hypothesised that the extent of the perceived relevance of the comparative out-group which would also be shaped by the relative and absolute status of the in-group. However they also allowed

that if the out-group's relative superiority is not contested or the task is irrelevant to the group the individual may display positive out-group discrimination (p.41). Field research evidence for these conditional stages and patterns that lead an individual from just belonging to a group to valuing groups positively or negatively has further stratified the dimensions of these paradigm conditions (Terry & Callan 1998; Reynolds, Turner & Haslam, 2000; Mummendy & Schriebner, 1983, 1984).

One of the explanations that have been offered to account for in-group positivity is enhanced self-esteem (Turner, 1975; Tajfel, 1978). However, group outcomes and statuses are not always aggrandising, and realistic group attachment requires one to embrace group successes, as well as failures and atrocities (Turner, Hogg, Turner & Smith, 1984; Brewer & Webber, 1994; Crocker & Major, 1989; Hirt, Zillmann, Erickson & Kennedy, 1992). Some studies have even posited that the relationship between group positivism and individual self esteem is converse, with the individual conferring alleviated esteem to the group by alliance (Greenwald & Banjali, 1985) Therefore Tajfel & Turners enhanced self esteem explanation has been contested and converse alternatives proposed.

One that is particularly relevant in its incorporation to moral reasoning is Hertel and Kerr's (2001) proposition. They contend a normative drive to explain in-group positivism, claiming that individuals show loyalty and

positive bias only because it is driven by social norms. They further maintain that the alleviated sense of self esteem group members experience may be the consequence of fulfilling socio-moral standards that are expected by society (Hertel & Kerr, 2001; p.308).

Other notable alternatives also contribute to our understanding of ethno-social conflict and cognitive processes. Messick & Macki (1989) suggest that the relationship between out-group discrimination and self esteem is a motivator for individual's positive group valuing. Crocker & Luhtanen (1990) claim that the variable which links inter-group discrimination is collective and not personal self esteem. Hinkle, Brown & Ely's (1992) literature review further suggests that participants, who share collectivist values, were more likely to display a correlation between group identification and in-group positive. Meanwhile Brewer (1991) proposed the 'Optimal Distinctiveness Model' which contends that individual's desire for acceptance and inclusion and their need for differentiation drive group membership to desire differentiation. Brewer (1999) further contends, that in order to achieve and maintain an optimum level of inclusiveness, members may change the meanings and values of their groups in line with social context, suggesting identities need to be understood in terms of the structures and context of the social ecology.

Brewer (2001, p.23) further suggests that that the extension of positive attitudes and cooperation orientation is limited to the in-group and that the attitude towards those from the out group is at best characterised by indifference. Research also suggests compared to those individuals from a members own group, out-groupers are less likely to be helped in ambiguous circumstances (Frey & Gaertner, 1986; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977; Gaertner, Dovidio & Johnson, 1982) more likely to be construed as provoking conflict and hostility (Baron 1979, Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1981), less likely to be given the benefit of doubt in the attribution of negative behaviours (Weber 1994) and less likely to be seen as deserving state welfare benefit (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995).

These findings predict a rather damning affect on the moral development in those individual's attached to a group. These findings further suggests that these individual's capacity for universal empathy and the code of behaviour driven by the "universal principles based upon the worth and equality of all human beings" (Kohlberg, 1979) would be severely impeded even in the absence of existing conflict.

Introduction to the Ethno-centric identities and collectivist societies

Ethnicity is perhaps one of the concepts coined by psychology to be most misunderstood and misused by lay perception. Even within the discipline there is little coherency to its static elements. Nevertheless it is considered to be one of the most potent concepts of our time and the explicit cause of conflict and violence around the planet. To fully understand if this claim is true it is necessary to understand the effects of this concept and its relationship to prejudice, and how it drives aggression and violence. To achieve this it is first necessary to briefly understand the intrinsic qualities of ethnicity, and its salience to social identity, as well as the different understandings of its nature in comparison to the social identity approach.

The Psychodynamic approach and the Social Identity approach are traditionalist in the acknowledgement that ethnicity is a 'persistent sharing of some kind of essential character with others' (Erikson, 1959, p.109). Symbolic Interactionism, a culmination of Mead, combined with Bloomer's pragmatism and Darwin's behaviourism, emphasises the sociological agency interpreted by dramaturgical means (Cardwell, 1971; Charon, 1989; Blumer, 1969; Goffman, 1959; Mead, 1934). Meanwhile Social Constructionism claims that identity is a subjective historical construction (Gergen, 1985; Gergen & Davis, 1985), and Communication

Theory interprets ethnic identity as inherently a communicative process to be understood in the context of as a transaction (Hecht, 1993; Hecht, Collier & Ribeau, 1993). Therefore all three differ from Erikson's traditionalist approach in the assertion that identity is negotiated or constructed through interaction and cannot be examined out of context or outside relationships.

The Primordialist perspective (Eller & Coughlan 1993) views ethnicity as an innate or instinctive predisposition (Shils, 1957) composed of ties that lie at the core of a person and result in a naturally biologically-based identity, rather than an identity rooted in personal affection, obligation and common interest (DeVos 1975; Geertz 1963; Greely, 1974; Isaacs, 1964, 1975). Nash (1989), posits primordial ties are infused in the individual at the earliest ages of socialisation, and form the "social expression of the psychological basis of identity, self hood, and others who are like the self, and yet others who are different from the self" (p.4). As Stavenhagen (1990) clarifies 'the in-group feeling that characterises every human group, the hostility felt for all 'others', the rejection of 'them' by 'us' (p.9). Leets, Giles & Clement. (1996) conceives this link between ethnicity and kinship as permanent, as a consequence of the basic primordial need of human nature for group affiliation that is best satisfied by the maintenance of an ethnic identity (Keyes, 1981; Thompson, 1989).

In contrast 'Instrumentalists' such as Barth (1969) and Weber (1968) claim ethnicity is defined by social, not genetic forces defining ethnic groups as 'those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in common descent' (Weber, 1968. p.389). Cohen (1969) & Depres (1967) supporting this interpretation of a subjective perception, propounds ethnicity as an instrumental manipulation of culture in service of collective political and economical interests. Yelvinton (1991) argues that ethnicity serves people with common interests coalescing in to groups in pursuit of those interests especially in times of socio-economic change, classifying ethnicity as one of the most effective unifying principles in advancing individual interest (Leets et. al 1999). Despite the prevalent mass of literature attempting to define ethnicity and group formation and conflict, there is still little coherence as to how ethnic identity leads to group formation and how social prejudice and conflict may arise from this process.

As this thesis attempts to explore ethnic identity in terms of social identity and group attachment, and measure its affects within Tajfelian paradigms it is necessary to develop this exploration within those intentions. Therefore it is necessary to first evaluate the paradigms of the social identity approach and then apply the understandings of ethnic identity and national identity within the parameters of the research context.

Much of the existing body of literature on the social identity theory and social categorisation theory is based on research conducted in individualistic western world samples. The subtle paradigm shifts that exist when applied to a collectivist society is less popularised. Paez, Martinez-Taboada, Arrospe, Insua & Ayestaran (1998) contend that the dominance of social identity and its integration within personal identity is mediated by the historical context and intrinsic political and cultural values. They claim that the aspects of social identity theory that is vulnerable to contradictory empirical evidence is only applicable within individualistic societies. They further contend that the criticisms alleged by Turner, Hogg, Oakes Reicher & Whetherall (1987) for example are not applicable in collectivist societies. Their studies demonstrate that the SIT paradigm is far more manifestly applicable in collectivist societies. In their review of Social Identity in the context of collectivist societies (1998), they provide evidence which establish the augmented affects of social identity in collectivist and socio-centric cultures in comparison to individualistic and ego centric ones (e.g. Quevedo, 1972; Morales & Paez, 1996; Morales, Lopez & Vega, 1992; Triadis, 1992, 1994; Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai & Luca, 1988).

Furthermore, research on ethno-centric group identities and conflict contexts inevitably add dimensions that are altogether more damning to intra-group relationships. Barth (1981) claims that the difference of

nominal membership in a group and virtual membership which is shaped by experience where one internalises meanings which transforms all that an individual is. This distinction illustrates the difference between the randomised minimal group paradigm style abstract group membership which is devoid of all meaning and experience compared to cultural identities which append centuries of deeply entrenched meanings, norms and values on the individual's group attachment. Korostelina (2007) contends that norms are a necessary part of identity if they provide differential characteristics to the group and are shared by its membership. She claims that "Shared values increase the salience of social identity and define group boundaries" (p.74).

Korostelina (2007) further posits that the meaning of ethno-social identity develops on the periphery of between groups and constitutes, within both the content of the group membership and the specific features relationships with out-groups. She proposes eight components to a multi-modal meaning to social Identity within an ethno-conflict context. The first is in-group traditions and culture; this reveals the features of the in-group relationships between members. The second is in-group language; this component establishes the importance of linguistic influences on cognitive constructs of world view, and concerns native and other shared languages within the in-group. The third pertains to the characteristics of in-group members, which includes prototypes as well as stereotypes, valued

individual features. The fourth component is based on in-group history, which includes chosen traumas, and glory, historical events, narratives of group genesis, fairy tales, legends and epics about heroes that belong to the in-group and are essentially a part of in-group history apparatus. The fifth component is in-group ideology, reflecting goals, aspirations and aims of group. The sixth is the relationship to the out-group; this features the connectivity to the out-group, the history of the relationship between them and the benefits, gains, losses, insults, victories scored against the out-group the record of discriminations and the difference in status and power. The seven is reverberated identity; this element refers to the in-group identity that is a product of out-group comparison; 'who we are' in terms of 'who we are not'. Finally the eighth component is out group image which reflects stereotypes, attitudes towards out-groups and the perceived culture and history of out groups (p.75)

The multimodal paradigm explains the underlying reasons for behaviours individuals from ethnic-groups' exhibit in attempting to engage in conflict situations and discourse, and group behaviours within this context. The paradigm can also be extended to explain the 're-identification process'; the post-colonial nation building attempts to engage as will be discussed further in this chapter. Korostelina (2007) further suggests that conflict and violence between groups can overwhelm multiple identities which individuals are allied to with multi-modal 'meanings', to a single identity

with prevailing threat narratives which becomes the dominant identity. She further argues that this dominant identity overwhelms individual identity and replaces the perceptions and behaviours that are group related. This dominant identity she argues forces people to adopt a dichotomous perception of scenarios with a positive 'we' and a negative 'they' (p.76). This paradigm is supported by field evidence that illustrate how changes in the meaning of social identity can lead to changes into attitudes towards policies (e.g. Tan, 2006 on East Timor and Indonesia & Buadeng 2007 on Karen people in Burma). Research on the determinants of conflict and tolerant behaviour further illustrates the capacity of identity meanings and its components to shape social identities and their incumbent groups (e.g. Deux, 1996; Huddy, 2001; Gurin, Hurtado & Peng, 1994; Simon & Hamilton, 1994; Breakwell 2004; Sellers et al., 1998)

Part of the problem that low status groups have to deal with in societies of ethnic conflict is the daily existence within a stigmatised group, or a minority in-group that cannot achieve optimal situations (e.g. political power, educational prospects, employment prospects) and feel trapped in the identity structure. Unlike in identity groups that are ascribed by meritocratic structures or voluntary conscription, ethno-centric identities are ascribed by quasi-biological and kinship networks. This further paralyses individuals' sense of empowerment, their sense of just world belief and concepts of universal equality and worth of all human beings.

This makes ethnic identity an inescapable factor that influences individual's quality of life by simply belonging to a powerless, devalued or stigmatised group. However, members of such groups are not passive recipients of social identity threats that elicit negative and stress responses, but actively seek to manage and cope with social identity threat (Branscombe & Ellemers, 1998; Crocker Major & Steele 1998; Crocker & Major, 1989; Ellemers, 1993; Levin & Van-Laar, 2006, Miller & Major, 2000; Swim & Stangor, 1998).

While social identity theory posits three strategies to resolve this dilemma, namely individual mobility, social change and social creativity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), ethnic conflict makes these strategies more than difficult to implement. The first strategy is the most commonly desired alternative; individual social mobility by leaving behind the conflict context (Jackson, Sullivan, Harnish & Hodge, 1996; Ellemers, 2001a; Wright & Taylor, 1998). However, when this is not possible where group identity is based on traits like ethnicity or gender usually and most obviously strategy is to seek distance by seeking asylum in a different nation state. Social change and social creativity on the other hand are usually the more accessible alternatives. Many ethno-social groups therefore extend the ethno-national structures they belong to by either joining a supra-national identity (Jackson et al., 1996; Sinnott, 2006; Moreno, 2002; Carey 2002), or in the case of majority minority contexts by merging with other minority groups

to overcome the numerical conditions that create the oppressive conditions. Nevertheless both these alternatives usually require the group to engage in the current status quo before the change can be legitimised, and is intrinsically a part of the ongoing conflict structure and process. (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Wright et al., 1990).

In a conflict situation, the ongoing discourse between groups whether in attempts to resolve conflict or to make allegations, or air grievances has a further determinative influence on the group identity and their attempts at social change. The multi-modal components of ethnic identity which ascribe 'meaning' (Korostelina, 2007) to identities and shape their evolution can create an ongoing dilemma producing perpetual conflict-seeking, aggressive individuals in societies of conflict who are on a quest for change and positivist differentiation. In establishing features of differentiation, both communication and inter-group relationship over time becomes significant. Larkey & Hecht (1995) maintain that the role ethno-social identity plays in inter-ethnic communications affect the communiqué itself. They suggest that identities are enacted in conversations and these enactments influence relationship outcomes by (a) actual communicative mismatches (dialects, patterns, etc.) or (b) underlying conflicts of values, and interest generating such mismatches. The ethno-social identity in question is differentiated from competing 'others' in its endeavour to establish linguistic demarcations (Banks, 1987; Hecht, Ribeau & Alberts,

1989; Glies & Coupland 1991; Giles, Bouris, & Taylor, 1977; Kochman, 1981; Stanback & Pearce, 1981) and through differentiation of normative values and structures (Collier, 1988; Collier, Hecht & Ribeau, 1986; Jarmon, 1980; Coupland, Coupland, Giles & Henwood, 1988; Giles & Johnson, 1986).

Jarmon (1980) posits two competing explanations for ethno-social conflict which dominate existing literature; 'Cognitive Incongruity' or the result of different ways of thinking based on ethno-social normative structures and socio-cultural patterns, and 'Awareness of Vested Interest' where competition for resources determines the interactions and the relationship between the two groups. This does not however, imply that these conflict settings are necessarily of volatile or destructive form. Jesse & Williams (2001) propose that the underlying factors leading to breach of cohabitation and amity, are threat perception, ethnic security dilemmas, and lack of trust between ethno-social in-groups.

All these factors and conditions seem to condemn existing conflict to battle on in perpetuity undermining individual identity features that redeem the negative behavioural facts of group identity unless other facets of human development emerge to resolve this socio-evolutionary incarceration. To further understand individual behaviour in the context of ethnic conflict's that have been problematized by post colonial identity

complexes, these potent ethno-centric identities and their multimodal structures and drives need to be understood in the volatile contexts of post-colonial nationalism

National identity within post- colonial conflict paradigms

Post colonial re-drafting of historical geopolitics has challenged not only the physical realities of nation states but has distorted and altered the concept of nationhood and consequently left a myriad of post colonial conflicts (engineered or otherwise) and an equal number of peoples seeking political self determination causing much of the violence and suffering the last century has seen. In the 21st century, as the planet contracts from a global village into an uncomfortable constricted block of council flats, intra-state conflicts fought on ones doorstep become an increasingly dangerous and disturbing form of oppression, constantly threatening to exacerbate into international conflict. This presents a challenging but necessary endeavour to redraft nationhood and ethnicity based on the milieu of this century's political realities.

Billig (1996) suggests nationhood and national identity groups 'involves an imagining of the community as possessing a unique spatial-temporal identity and claiming entitlement to its own political independence' (p.186)

Influenced by Anderson's study (1983), he points out the uniqueness of a group membership that is shared with imagined others and attached to a political geography. Though the attachment to a political geography has diminished in the last century (Csepele & Simon 2004, Moltchanova 2007), the essence of Billig's claim remains. Breuilly argues that 'Nationalism' should be understood as "a form of politics that arises in close association with the development of the modern-state" (1993 p. 12). Breuilly defines the term 'Nationalism' as a term used to refer to political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such action with 'nationalist argument'. He identifies three basic assertions that the political doctrine of a nationalist argument is built upon. Firstly that there exists a 'nation' with an explicit and peculiar character; Secondly that the interests, and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values. And finally that the nation must be as independent as possible, usually requiring at least the attainment of political sovereignty. (Breuilly, 1993, p.33) Johnston, Knight & Koffman argue that "territory can be used ideologically to promote certain interests which require social control by associating them with a place within which that control is exercised (and recognised under the doctrine of sovereignty) thereby legitimising the control by obscuring its real nature" (Johnston, Knight & Koffman, 1988, p.5) Rather than power emerging solely from social organisation, which can change, power is identified with place, which appears less fickle and abstract, and thus becomes institutionalised more easily. As a political

ideology 'nationalism' must be understood as making claims about politics and how states should be organised and justifying cultural value judgements in this organisation. This political doctrine or ideology of nationalism is linked with general patriotic and nationalist notions of political support for 'nation-states' recognising 'nation' as the unit for government and political organisation, hence the characteristic principle of nationalism is 'national self-determination'. (Axford et. al., 1997)

At an ideological level most post colonial ethnic-conflicts occur when 'national identity' and 'national self-determination' do not relate to all members of the nation-state, or rather when all members of the nation-state does not feel, that they can relate to the national-identity or that the consensus of national self-determination has left a part of its citizenry out of the equation. When attempts are made to create an engineered national-identity and nationalism based on elements of recovered pre-colonial national identities in cases such as Sri-Lanka, where part of the current citizenry and its culture was to a certain extent considered hostile⁴⁴, foreign and adversarial at early stages of ancient history, conflict is inevitable.

Smith defines a nation as a "named human population sharing historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy, and common legal rights and duties for all members"

(1991, p.40) However some of these other characteristics of a nation are more accurately classified as a characteristic of a nation-state. Furthermore, the terms 'ethnicity' and 'ethnic group' derived from the Greek word *ethnos*, is unnervingly interchangeable with the concept of 'nation'. Therefore more than one ethnic identity group in a nation state is likely to create innumerable complexities. Meanwhile the state has been defined as "a system of relationships which defines the territory and membership of a community, regulates its internal affairs, conducts relations with other states and provides it with identity and cohesion" (Jordan, 1985, p.1). Social cohesion especially in newly independent nation-states has proved to be tottering houses of cards, as post-colonial conflicts scattered around the world have demonstrated. With no recent political history to provide political stability or confidence, the citizenry reaches back to the pre-colonial eras for the nets of national identity and nationalism, which is essential for political cohesion in the modern nation-state, to justify the political unit and hold it together. Unfortunately for most postcolonial nation-states, colonial rulers have re-organised the ethnic population and its demographics to such an extent, that any attempt to revive pre-colonial nationalism or national identity create abysmal disparities with the current social ecology (e.g. Herbst 2000; Kanyinga, 2003; Silverstein, 2002).

⁴¹ The *Soli*; or Chola, were the Indian raiders that were a constant threat to the Sinhalese Kingdoms in pre-

Historically, 'national identity' & 'ethno-social identity' were almost synonymous. The first is conceptualised as a peoples who share a common language, history, tradition, religion, way of life, destiny, set of memories and aspirations (Kelman, 1997) and sometimes a common political/state apparatus or geographical demarcation. The second while including all of the above also qualifies itself far more powerfully with a common, imagined kinship, imagined normative cultures, and (in the case of modern history) recent ethnic memories. These socio-biological/evolutionary motivations that imply kinship and blood ties provide fertile ground for a stronger social identity to take root than that offered by a national identity. National and ethno-social identities much like other social identities are collectively constructed and goal motivated; furthermore, definitions and conceptualisations of national identity "are bound up with attempts to mobilise 'the people' for or against particular political projects" (Hopkins & Reicher, 1996, p.76).

Race, ethnicity and ethnic identity, powerful concepts in current conflict are even more complex a sociological dilemma. As Nash acknowledges that race, ethnicity, ethnic-identity and ethnic-group are some of the most complicated, volatile, and emotionally charged words and concepts in the lexicon of social science, that most discourses take for granted to have a clear and solid meaning and referent, and to be the sort of self evident

social reality that needs no other explication (Nash, 1989, p.1). As an academic concept, 'race' has given way to the more sociologically coherent concept of ethnicity, as the connotations of race seem to imply direct descent of an ancient anthropologically confined group of peoples. The homogeneity and character distinctness and other Darwinian implications that the word connotes is limitative in the modern world (or the ancient world). Ethnicity as a concept though equally limited is slightly more flexible a concept as it connotes elements beyond biology such as political, psychological and sociological organisation (Glazer & Moynihan, 1975, Barth 1969, Thompson, 1989). Especially in ethnopolitised societies like Sri-Lanka it is easy for people to perceive 'racial' or ethnic identities⁴⁵ as stereotypical solid indisputable concepts. Academically, ethnicity has proven to be a concept which cannot be defined with much precision and those who have achieved the task have not been able to achieve consensus; what some scholars consider examples of ethnicity others consider to be cases of other variables such as religious-sectarianism, class conflict 'and even sheer opportunism' (Ross, 1979 p.3). Yet social-policies, state-regulations, and welfare-provision, and more importantly conflict management strategy are made on this seemingly self evident, pragmatic social reality.

⁴⁵ Unfortunately the discourse in Sri-Lanka still utilises the term race as opposed to ethnicity and racial distinctiveness and homogeneity is an accepted indisputable social reality.

Twenty million people have died in ethnic conflict since the Second World War, of which a majority were ethnic conflicts and a large number of them post-colonial conflicts (Uppsala 2006). The elevation of ethnic-conflict from a local to a regional and sometimes international conflict, arises from the social demography of ethnicity (Darby, 1999). His argument based on Ted Gurr's international study of minorities at risk which found that, "of the 179 minorities identified in the survey, more than two thirds (122) have ethnic-kindred in adjacent countries" (p.6), contends that because most ethnic-minorities are not confined within a single nation-state, there exists many contradictions between the claims of particular ethnic groups and recognised states. (Darby, 1999, p.6). Perhaps the ideological conflict between national identity in a nation-state, and ethnic identities in view of its demographic distribution of ethnic minorities and majorities in this constitutionally contained entity, is the core of the problem.

In the case where such ethno-social identities have over a period of time gone unchallenged and untested, where the overlapping national identity had included the given ethno-social identity in its essential characteristics, they have settled down to a compromise. This compromise has in many countries been held together by legislative processes where sub-nations within nation states are acknowledged without undermining the

sovereignty of the nation state and allied national identity (eg. Kanyinga, 2003; Silverstein, 2002).

For example this is particularly evident in unitary states such as the United Kingdom. Despite its Anglo-centric London based political governance, the small compromises it has made in extending the national identity to be somewhat inclusive and political governance to be somewhat devolved has perhaps made it possible for a unitary state to function with moderate success. Even Northern Ireland has entered into this compromise since the Good Friday agreement. The legislative powers of the 1998 Northern Ireland, 1998 Scotland act in addition to the more recent Government of Wales Act in 2006, which further enables these very separate nations to come together in a functional Unitarian state. The token regional demarcations and the pragmatic but limited legal compromises seem to hold the key to this success.

However, when external forces such as invasion and colonisation have interrupted such relaxation and when the common language, culture, religion, traditions and historical memories are over written by an alien ecology, the reinvention of itself after the period of intervention becomes just that; a recreation that is fragmented and feeble and, in that insecurity, volatile (eg. Herbst 2000; Kanyinga, 2003; Silverstein, 2002). As the backbone of such inherited identities are essentially unchallenged serial

ancestral accedence, these re-invented identities can only subsist by politically emotive expression and a tendency to establish their characteristics by what they are not. As outlined above in explicating ethno-social identity according to Korostelina's (2007) multimodal paradigm, this identity reformation attempts to recreate the meanings of identity that the multimodal paradigm posits. This generally means establishing the salvaged fragmentary characteristics, diagonally counter to one or a number of other competing identities. For example, the Indo Aryan Singhalese communities in Sri Lanka characterise their identity by what they are not; 'not Dravidian Tamil', 'lighter skinned not darker skinned like the Tamil/ Dravidian counterparts', 'not Hindu and not of south Indian descent like the Tamil Dravidian communities'.

A further example of this is particularly evident in federally governed countries such as India which is still identified as a nation state, despite its multinational, multi ethnic conglomerate. India too has a predominantly Aryan- Dravidian Schism that has a North /South geo-political divide. The 28 states and 7 union territories of India encompass 1,652 'mother tongues' and 322 recognised ethnic groups with resilient identities that have been absorbed into the fabric of national identity in the nation building process since India's independence (Dutt, 1998, p411). India's bicameral parliament, operating under a Westminster-style parliamentary system is governed by a quasi-federal state system with weaker states and a New-

Delhi centred stronger locus of control (Dutt 1998, 421). Of the many post colonial geopolitical re-drafting, India's seemed the most problematic. The aforementioned developmental breach in identity cohesion by colonial rule and the prevalence deep seated fragmented identities applies even more severely to India. Nevertheless, Kashmir schism aside, the transfer of loyalties from regional, sub national and ethnic groups/communities to the nation, seems a successful compromise held together by the Indian Union legislative and the Indian constitution.

Despite the legislative feats accomplished by the exhaustive Indian constitution in holding 28 nation states and 7 union territories that brings together 322 ethnic groups, it is the deconstruction of the colonial Raj and the nation building process that brings about the aforementioned compromise of unitary nation state. Annamalai (2005) contends that the process of decolonisation must run parallel to the process of nation building on post colonial nation states, from reforming colonial education policy, to problematizing the colonial construction of knowledge. Part of problem of counter framed ethnic identities and cultural ecologies that are positioned conversely in post colonial nation states, is that it is still using cultural constructions devised by their colonial masters. Said (1978) contends that these frameworks of culture were knowledge bases "constructed by Europeans of the Orient from their perspective and for their purpose". Chatterjee (1996) further contends that new knowledge

was constructed about the colonies' history, mythology, religions, society and culture which were surveyed and categorised to make sense of the colonised new country. Native concepts and perceptions of its culture, history and self replaced by a more reductionist caricature that was more functionally appropriate instruments for the empire. Despite this, India seems to have resuscitated or reinvented a coherent national identity that draws most of its states together without yielding to civil war or separatism in every state apart from that of Jammu and Kashmir.

Donald Horowitz (1985) in his seminal work on ethnic conflict in the developing world describes the framework in which ethnic conflict occurs as a phenomenon that developed out of the state system that first grew out of European feudalism. He claims that control of the state, control of a state, and exemption from control by others, are among the main goals of ethnic conflict. He interprets the reasoning behind these attempts to control as an effort to ensure that their needs are met usually to the detriment of the opposing group/s, meaning the conflict over the state is generally perceived as zero sum conflict (1985, p.5).

In severely divided societies ethno-social conflict becomes the focus of all social issues be it educational controversies, development plans, business & trade union policy, tax policy etc. Horowitz claims that especially in a

ranked⁴⁶ system legitimacy of the state and historical grievances become key issues (1985, p.8). The result generally becomes a conflict of the existence of the state itself or the legitimacy of state-power and control over minority issues, as seen in most post-colonial conflicts. As demonstrated in the Sri-Lankan situation this concept of legitimacy applies not only to the minority subordinate group but also to the ethnic majority, as migration and incomplete conquests give rise to different kinds of lingering historical grievances. An indigenous group that was colonised and forced to abide entry of ethnic strangers for colonial economic purposes may later regard their presence as illegitimate *ab-innatio*. The initial waves of repatriation of Indian Tamil plantation workers immediately after independence, while 1st and 2nd generation Indian Tamils remained in Sri Lanka is a prime example. Horowitz avers that when ethnic violence occurs, 'un-ranked groups usually aim not at a social transformation, but at something approaching sovereign autonomy, the exclusion of parallel ethnic-groups from a share of power, and often reversion (by expulsion or extermination) to an idealised, ethnically homogenous status quo ante'. (Horowitz, 1985, p.30)

While some nation states have had relative success in resolving these dilemma's (e.g. Unitary states of India, and the United Kingdom), there seems to be no obvious solution. Some, like Habermas (2001) have argued

⁴⁶ Ranked System; Horowitz distinguishes conflict riven societies in to two categories ranked systems and un-

that the legitimacy of modern states must be based on a notion of political rights of autonomous individual subjects and avoid concepts of ethno-social identity. According to this view, the state should not acknowledge ethnic, national or racial identity but rather instead enforce political and legal equality of all individuals. However, purging a nation state and its citizens of long held cultural identity concepts is not simple, if not impossible. Others, like Taylor (eg.1985, 1989) and Kymlicka (eg. 2006, 2007) posit that the notion of the autonomous individual is itself a cultural construct. This school of thought advocate that the states must recognize ethnic identity and develop processes through which the particular needs of ethnic groups can be accommodated within the boundaries of the nation-state. This school of thought also introduces considerations in engineered inclusive identities in nation building projects.

Overall these considerations of identity suggests that an individual's competences, self esteem, attitudes, life contentment and the entire phenomenological realities of their day to day life is directly influenced by ethno-social, cultural, religious and national identities conflicts. Where cognitive psychology proposes educational and psychosocial environments that nurture augmented moral development, social identity perspectives propose societies that optimise collective and individual wellbeing that underpin these nurturing positivist conditions.

ranked systems. 'Ranked systems are societies which one ethnic group is in complete domination of another.'

Rupert Brown's Model of Ethno-centric Identity and Attachment in Social Conflict.

As this study utilises Rupert Brown's Social Identity measure to gauge assess group attachment as well as positive and negative feelings towards the ethno communities in this study, it seemed pertinent to briefly review Brown's understanding of Social Identity and ethno-social conflict. It also seems pertinent to explore why particularly ethno-national group attachment is significant to social and moral attitudes in a conflict context.

Brown (2000) contends that the advantage of utilising social identity based explanations in conflict that it takes into account in-group bias even in the absence of objective instrumental causes which is a complementary alternative to that offered by Realistic Group Conflict Theory (RCT) (Sherif, 1966). However, Brown contends that social identity processes may interact with, as well as supplement the instrumental motivations postulated by RCT. For example Struch and Schwartz (1989) found that perceived conflict (between religious groups in Israel) was related to out-group aggression (as predicted by RCT) and that this relationship was stronger for those who identified strongly with their in-group. Another example is Brown (2006) contends, Brown, Maras, Masser, Vivian and Hewstone's (2006) study where they observed a similar effect with real

(rather than perceived) conflict English passengers on a cross-channel ferry who had been prevented from travelling by the actions of an out-group (a blockade by French fishermen) had less favourable attitudes towards French people as a whole than those whose travel plans had not been thwarted. Brown (2006) claims that this effect was stronger for those who identified strongly with their nationality, and that national identification by itself was the most consistent predictor of xenophobic attitudes. Brown claims that this relationship between strong national or ethno-national identities is further evidenced in other studies of inter-ethnic or inter-nation attitude studies (Brown, Vivian & Hewtone, 1999; Gonzalez & Brown, 1999; Pettigrew, 1997) which makes it a strong predictor of intergroup attitudes in social conflict.

Brown (2000b) also contends that relative deprivation, which is a significant facet of inter group relationships and a substantial contributor to ethnic conflict and ethnic grievances (Gurr, 1970, Olson, Herman & Zanna, 1986; Runciman, 1966 Walker & Smith 2001), is also strongly predicted by strength of group identification and attachment. Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT) contends that the driving force behind feelings of discontent and subsequent collective action is a perception of inequality between what one's group currently experiences (in comparison to out-group) and what it is entitled to expect. Relative deprivation theory is a common explanation for ethnic conflict particularly in the Sri Lankan context (Gurr, 1970;

Horowitz, 1985; Smith, 2004). Brown (2000b) contends that both historical and contemporary sources of such inequality in comparison to other ethno-social groups, and the resultant collective action are influenced by in-group out-group identification (Tyler & Smith, 1998) and that strength of group identification is a better predictor of such collective action than the level of perceived deprivation.

For example, in experimental studies collective deprivation was more acutely registered when group identity was made more salient than personal identity (e.g. Kawakami & Dion 1994; Smith, Spears & Hamstra, 1999; Smith, Spears and Oyen 1993). When this is replicated in field studies (in this case in abortion activism and participation in the women's movement) intergroup attitudes and activist participation were better predicted by relative deprivation for those identifying strongly with the groups concerned (Hinkle, Fox-Cardamone, Haseleu, Brown & Irwin, 1996; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996).

Furthermore, Brown (2000b) contends that feelings of deprivation can also directly affect strength of group identification. For example, Gurin and Townsend (1986) found that discontent among women in gender inequality and motivation to engage in political action for legislative change was consistently predicted by an escalation of gender identification. Similarly, Abrams (1990) in a longitudinal study Scottish adolescents found that the

strength of national identity predicted perceived deprivation. Tropp and Wright (1999) similarly found a strong correlation between group identification and perceived deprivation among ethnic minorities in the US. Brown (2000b) contends that most of these studies presume that strength of group identification or attachment was an antecedent or moderator, while the most proximal determinant of collective action to be perceived relative deprivation. However other investigations have found that group identification itself is a primary predictor of propensity to participate in 'liberation' activism or social movements for change, independent of deprivation. (e. g. Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Simon, Loewy, Sturmer, Weber, Freytag, Habig & Kampmeier, 1998; Tougas and Villieux, 1988)

Brown's (e. g. 2000a; 2000b; Brown, & Capozza, 2006; Gonzalez & Brown, 2003; Mummendey, Klink, & Brown, 2001; Pehrson, Vignoles, & Brown, 2009; Zagefka, & Brown, 2005) research emphasises the relationship that group identification and strength of attachment has with a number of pertinent moral behaviours (particularly in an ethnic conflict context) such as acknowledgement of in-group atrocities, inter-group communication, altruism, forgiveness, prejudice, stereotypes, exclusion, perceived deprivation, negative attitudes, and other intergroup behaviours that particularly significant in conflict contexts. Therefore, a measure of social identity that predominantly concentrates on identity strength and

group attachment seems the most relevant in the context of moral judgment and ethno-social conflict.

Chapter 4

RATIONALE

This investigation proposes to explore the nature of moral development in relation to ethno-social group attachment and identification in the context of ethno-social conflict. Three theoretical research questions were formulated at this exploratory phase. The structure of these were based on the literature review and the nature of epistemological developments in view of the absence of a comparable research cluster that has directly investigated this specific research question in a comparable field context.

RESEARCH QUESTION ONE

As ethno-social identification and group attachment (operationalized as the Measure of Social Identity), was one of the central variables in the exploration of proposed above, the first research question was designed to scrutinise the nature of ethno-social identification and group attachment (MSI) itself and explore the demographic variables and extraneous conditions that contributed to the nature of this identification and attachment.

To briefly recapitulate the theoretical development of the social identity paradigm in its bearings on this thesis; the minimal experimental design and its allied school of empirical research suggests that ethno-social identification and group attachment would truncate the predilection towards advanced moral reasoning, judgment and behaviour. As discussed in chapter three, the social identity approach suggests a positive value distinctiveness within in-groups which is usually juxtaposed with a negative attribution with out-groups (Tajfel 1972b, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986; Turner, 1975). Further more social categorisation claims that shared identity undermines individual accountability (Turner, 1982, 1984, 1985; Turner et al., 1987), and displays a singular predilection towards aggression (eg. Levinson, 1950; Masson & Verkyuton, 1993; Yee & Brown., 1992 Stavenhagen 1990, Keyes 1981; Thompson, 1989). Furthermore since Sumners' (1906) founding paradigms, ethno-centred identity is necessarily juxtaposed as exclusive and conflicting with out-group in mainstream research (e.g. Allport, 1958, Sherif & Sherif, 1953). As discussed in chapters one and three, when post colonial identity conflicts and infant nation building processes complicate matters this adversity is further aggravated. Furthermore recent empirical evidence has emerged in field research to substantiate this zero sum approach in ethnocentrism. An example a recent Swiss study illustrated this in an investigation on the influence of pro- versus anti-discrimination in-group norms on Swiss nationals' attitudes towards foreigners. The results

revealed a significant interaction between national identification and perceived material in-group threat. High identifiers who registered strong ethno-group⁴⁷ identification showed a more negative discriminatory and prejudiced attitude towards foreigners than low identifiers, when perceived threat was high. Additional results revealed that high identifiers actually disagreed with the anti-discrimination norm when perceived threat was high, because were more attached to the in-group (Falomir-Pichastor, Gabarrot, & Mugny, 2008).

Therefore, the first investigation was designed to explore the nature of ethno-social identification and group attachment; in the field context of perceived and real threat (i.e. a code red armed conflict that experiences more than 50,000 casualties per annum field target).

Research Question 1; *What is the makeup and nature of social identity strength and group attachment, in societies of conflict? Which traits and characteristics (demographic/cultural) contribute to the intensity of this measure, and to what extent?*

Three demographic variables were identified, Age, Gender and Conflict Level as predictors of group attachment and social identification (MSI) in a regression analysis. Conflict level was identified as a predictor/

⁴⁷ In this case Swiss nationalism.

independent variable to further evaluate whether the degree of perceived threat and the level of phenomenological aspects of conflict in this armed conflict field target made a significant impact on ethno-group identification. Research on the relationship between age and ethno-social identification have been mixed (e.g. Brand, Ruiz, & Padilla, 1974; Broman, Neighbors, & Jackson, 1988; Nesdale, Durkin, Maass, & Griffiths, 2005). Therefore, Age was identified as an independent variable to further explore its developmental consequences in its contribution to ethno social identification. Gender was identified partly because of the proclivity in empirical research to explore gender differences in all socio-cognitive phenomenon, but also because gender differentials have been a controversial debate in the moral domain.

Multiple regression was identified as the appropriate mode of analysis as it allows a more sophisticated exploration of the inter relationships among a cluster of variables and the target dependant variable. This was ideal for the real life field research context that lacked the controls and minimalism of the laboratory based experiments. While an analysis of variance examined the demographic group differences, later in this investigation, research question one specifically ascertained the predictive contributions of Age, Gender, and Conflict level towards the multi-variate model of ethno-social group identification and attachment operationalized in Rupert Brown's Measure of Social Identity (MSI).

RESEARCH QUESTION TWO

Having explored the contributors to ethno-social group identification and attachment (MSI) this investigation proposed examining the contributors to Moral judgement competence, therefore the second research question was designed to scrutinise the nature of Moral judgement competence in the geo political field context of an acute ethno centric armed conflict.

To recapitulate the summary theoretical considerations of Moral judgement competence in the context of ethnic conflict one has to briefly consider the 'truncation hypothesis'. The Kohlbergian stage theory of moral development, particularly in its conventional and post conventional stages require advanced justice perspectives and an acknowledgement of value and equality of all human beings, and a consideration of interests of all individuals in every situation (Kohlberg et. al. (1979). These realisations of equality, legitimacy and universality of all human beings precludes negative stereotyping, and group bias and requires individual's to have developed a capacity for empathy and altruism.

If ethnic conflict heighten allied ethno centred identities as the research fabric assumes, and consequently create group prejudice, leading to expressions of aggression, this implies that moral behaviour, moral reason,

and moral judgement is incapacitated to some level by this heightened identity. The populist truncation hypothesis maintains that a number of psychological capacities are truncated by the phenomenological experiences in extreme conflict conditions (eg. Fields, 1973, 1976, Fraser 1974; Cairns 1983, Ferguson & Cairns, 1996, Allodi, 1980; Cohn et al., 1980; Dawes & Tredoux, 1989; Miligram & Miligram, 1976; Punamaki and Suleiman, 1990; Straker et al. 1996; 1976, Greer 1980; Turner, Turner & Reed 1980; etc. Terr 1990; Straker, 1987, Garbarino, et al. 1992). However, studies conducted on moral development in societies of conflict have failed to arrive at a unified conclusion (e.g. Fields, 1973,1976, Greer 1980; Turner, Turner & Reed 1980; Cairns 1983, Ferguson & Cairns, 1996).

This implication of a moral truncation clearly has an indirect impact on the conflict itself. If an ethnic identity in societies of conflict heightens into out-group bias that has an impact on social behaviour, this suggests a vicious circle of prejudice and moral truncation, disrupting empathetic interpersonal communication in creatively reaching a positive win/win solution to social tangles that feed the violence. This study hopes to uncover psychological insights into intra-group interaction providing a better understanding into the political chemistry of the ongoing peace processes currently taking place in the case study sample (Sri Lanka) as well as general insights into obstacles in the way of peace in other such

ethnic conflicts. This 'developing world conflict society' case study attempts to understand the relationship between social identity and moral development as it operates within such a context. This experimental sample (N=1065), matched as closely as possible to national statistics, attempts to recreate a structural model of Sri Lanka's bipolar identities and its tensions. This study, further attempts to discover the nature of ethno-social identities in such societies of conflict in the socioeconomic extremities of the developing world, to assess the nature of its moral atmosphere and the capacity of its moral judgement among its young adults. It also aspires to gain a clearer understanding of the impact of various factors and conditions (such as age, gender or socio economy, religion etc.) that impact both self perception of identity and moral judgement in high conflict, and to explore the complex interrelationships within this enigmatic phenomenon.

The design markers for operationalization, was informed by the literature review based on the limited moral development research in conflict zones. Research on moral development both in its cognitive and social aspects has increased since Kohlberg's pioneering work (Kohlberg, 1958; 1976) in this contentious field. Similarly, its relationship with various allied phenomenon such as political opinion, political identity, primary/secondary & Higher education, chronological maturation, altruism, introversion and extroversion, personality, intelligence, emotional intelligence, gender,

citizenry & civic education, civic engagement, religious belief, religiosity, spirituality, professional identities and a multitude of other concepts has been measured. However, ethno-social identity has been regrettably disregarded. This is a costly oversight in view of the aforementioned consequences of ethno-social conflict. Despite the various difficulties in assuming that the semantics and contentions of the Kohlbergian cognitive developmental model can be congruently corresponded with those of the social psychological model of social identity, this endeavour attempts to conceive the impact of social identity on moral judgement in societies of conflict.

While there are few context specific comparatives in the moral domain, the design of this study was informed and shaped by a small cluster of studies carried out in conflict zones. The first of these was the pioneering study by Fields (1973, 1976) which claimed evidence of moral truncation in high conflict areas in Northern Ireland. Similarly, these truncation fears were echoed by other authorities such as Fraser (1974) who suggested that Northern Irish children could become delinquents and develop in to amoral adults. Fields' (1974) study which was carried out among children from Belfast and Dublin compared to the American sample tested by Tapp and Kohlberg in 1971, which suggested a developmental delay in reaching moral maturity has however been criticised for its weak evidence based on a non-random sample which cannot be legitimately compared for statistical

significance with the larger randomly selected American sample (Ferguson & Cairns, 1996). Westman & Lewandowski's study (1991) attempting to determine the relationship between empathy, egocentrism, moral development, and psychological development and attitudes towards violence and conflict, suggested that those who have experienced violence and conflict would reject violence as the answer to conflict, while those who have had no experience of the situation would accept or tolerate such use of violence. Participants who exhibited a higher level of development according to Erickson's psychological development were less inclined to favour war (the use of violence) as a strategy, and were more likely to believe in rule through law and order.

Breslin's (1982) study examining the relationship between tolerance and moral development among 17 year olds from the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland hypothesised that adolescents from the North would score significantly lower due to the conflict. She also hypothesised that adolescents from areas of extreme violence would score lower than those from non-violent area. However, she found that Catholic adolescents on both regions scored significantly higher than their Protestant counterparts and those adolescents from areas of high violence also scored at a higher level than the individuals from areas of low violence. Breslin's findings are criticised as of a limited value because her 'Measure of Moral Maturity' hadn't been utilised to study moral development before and

because 28% of the sample rated 'principled' is notably higher than the average 13% achieved by Kohlberg sample. This suggests that Moral maturity among Irish 17 year olds is more developed than that of American adults (Ferguson & Cairns, 1996).

Cairns and Conlon (1985) examining Moral reasoning among 15 year old school girls in West Belfast & Dublin found no significant differences between Belfast & Dublin samples. This suggests that there was no significant effect on moral growth of this sample of students, though the study did report moral truncation compared to their American peers suggesting this truncation might be unrelated to the conflict situation. These conclusions are similar to the results found by Kahn (1982), who measured moral development in the Republic of Ireland using the 'Defining Issues Test' (DIT), which also revealed a lower score than their American peers. The Cairns and Conlon sample (1985) is criticised however on account for its small, non-random, all female, single sex school educated, catholic, highly urban sample for not being representative of either Northern Ireland or the Republic of Ireland. The SROM (Socio-moral Reflective Objective Measure; Gibbs, Arnold, Morgan, Schwartz, Gavaghan & Tappan, 1984) measurement they used is also criticised as it had never been established in a North American context and never been tested on a British or Irish context.

Lorenc and Branthwaite (1986) investigated the concern that the amoral violent environment in Northern Ireland would lead children to generalise their support for violence towards the security forces and to all figures in authority. They suggested that this amoral and violent environment would problematise the respect children had for teachers and figures of authority. However they found that children in the area studied (Londonderry) were growing up with a secure sense of right and wrong which had not been affected by the violent environment. This supported both Breslin's (1982) and Cairns & Conlon's (1985) conclusion that the early research pointing towards moral development had not been affected by violence (Ferguson & Cairns, 1996). Ferguson & Cairns (1996) studying the moral development of Northern Irish children and adolescents in both areas, by recording high political violence and low political violence, recorded a moral truncation in the areas where a high level of political violence is prevalent. This contradicted the Lorenc and Branthwaite (1986) study and also undermined Breslin's (1982) and Cairns & Conlon's (1985) conclusions to some measure. The results for the Ferguson & Cairns (1996) study were recorded as the "prevailing moral atmosphere in Ulster and the spatial nature of the results" (p35) Ferguson's (1998) cross national study on adolescents from Northern Ireland, Scotland and the Republic of Ireland however found that Northern Irish Adolescents were not developmentally delayed.

These results further highlight the lack of consensus among research on moral development suggesting that the variables are highly complex and area sensitive. Furthermore the research focus on children, seem to have diverted from any research on young adults who perhaps should provide a more explicit understanding of the impacts of moral development in societies in conflict. The other factor, as pointed out earlier, is the under-researched nature of moral development in societies of conflict and the non existence of such studies in the developing countries festered with either ethnic conflicts or post colonial border violence. This also emphasises the salience of the current study and the precarious nature of any preconceptions or assumptions made as there is no comparable previous research to go by.

These findings suggested that moral truncation cannot be assumed within the design due to contradictory evidence and has to be measured. As much of the of the contradictory studies were conducted differentiated by investigations that were operationalized by instruments that either factored cognitive aspects of moral development and those that didn't, it seemed crucial to preclude this inevitably and use a measure that acknowledged and operationalized both aspects of the phenomenon. Furthermore, the focus on children and the age that moral stages are achieved by them seemed less consequential to a conflict fabric where the front line action age of military personnel, paramilitary groups, liberation/freedom fighters

and human rights activists were spear headed by teenagers and young adults. Therefore the moral capacities and moral action of the youth culture was operationalized between 17 to 25 (Enlistment age for the Sri Lankan military is 18, and para-military ages usually range from about 15 to 25 precluding child sources according to UNESCO sources).

Another design marker was the Cairns and Conlon (1985) findings of no effect and the consequent criticism of homogenous sampling in urbanisation, majority/legitimised group (Catholic) and differentiations in conflict level. This suggested that the sampling needed to include both if not all ethno-social groups in a conflict landscape, as the dynamic interactions of ethnocentric conflict does not exist in isolation within the context. These findings also suggested that samples needed to capture a varied sample of urbanisation, conflict level, and socio-economy. To exclude Gilganesque gender truncations, a representative sample of gender groups were also included. Religious identity (as self reported by participant- as opposed to religiosity) was added to sampling factors to given its correlation with ethno-identity.

Therefore, the second investigation was designed to explore the nature of moral judgement competence; in the geo-political context of armed ethno-conflict.

Research Question 2; *What demographic conditions, characteristics and traits contributes to advanced (or truncated) moral judgement and to what extent do these demographic conditions, characteristics and traits account for moral judgement and development?*

This question was further split into a two part analysis in the statistical operationalization, so that the dual concept in moral judgement competence when operationalized using the moral judgement test (MJT) could be separately assessed. The cognitive element which gauges the consistent application of a particular moral principal (MJT's C-index) and the affective element which gauges the traditional stage preference mode (MJT's Moral Stage Preference) were both independently submitted as dependant variables in two separate multiple regression analysis.

In keeping with the previous statistical operationalization, the same demographic variables were identified, Age, Gender and Conflict Level, as predictors of moral judgement competence (MJT; C-index & MSP) with the additional variable of MSI (ethno-social identification and group attachment) as predictors in the regression analysis. The rationale for these predictive variables are the same as above. Conflict level was identified as a predictor/ independent variable to further evaluate whether the degree of perceived threat and the level of phenomenological aspects of conflict in this armed conflict field target made a significant impact on

moral judgement competence. Furthermore the developmental nature of the Piagetian- Kohlbergian paradigm and its sensitivity to level and quality of education made Age a necessary demographic variable. Similarly Gender was identified as a significant marker, not just because it is a commonly used operational marker in socio-cognitive research (due to innate socio-cognitive differences between the genders), but also because gender has been a contentious issue within the moral paradigm as discussed in chapter three in reference to Carol Gilligan's critiques of the model. Multiple regression was identified as the appropriate mode of analysis as discussed above for the same reasons

RESEARCH QUESTION THREE

While research question one and two examined, the dichotomous and ordinal variables as predictors, there were a number of nominal demographic variables that were not submitted to the regression analysis for self evident reasons. These demographic variables which were categorical elements of social organisation (such as Religion, Ethnicity, and Language medium) were scrutinised to explore whether these extraneous and innate group characteristics registered differences in social identification and attachment (MSI) and moral judgement competence (MJT- C-index & MSP). Gender, Age and Conflict level were also submitted to this analysis so as to procure a holistic understanding of the

differences in moral judgement competence between significant⁴⁸ organisational facets of this society.

Research Question 3; *What are the differences between demographic groups (Gender, Age, Religion, Ethnicity, Language medium, and Conflict level) in their moral judgement (C-index & MSP) and in their strength of social identity or group attachment.*

This analysis was also split into two parts. A six way multiple analysis of variance with two dependant variables (MJT- C-index & MSP) was used when investigating moral judgement competence. Then a six way analysis of variance with one dependant variable was used when investigating ethno-social identification and attachment (MSI).

Procedural Reflections in Statistical operationalization

While these sample qualities as design markers were suggested by the above reported research fabric, the sample sizes had to be determined within statistical parameters. If a multiple regression design was going to be utilised, the sub sample sizes had to allow more than 40 participants per subsample. This expanded the size of the group significantly. Furthermore, sociological frameworks of ethnic conflict, conflict literature

⁴⁸ In the non statistical sense of the word.

and political theory that engaged in paradigms such as game theory/evolutionary, state building /conflict management theories all seem to advocate a holistic approach and frame the nation states as demographic whole (e.g. Ross, 2004; Williams 1994; Angstrom, 2000; Gresham, 2004; Caselli, 2006; Cunningham, 1998; James & Goet, 2001; Irobi 2005; Wimmer, 2002). Therefore it seemed necessary encapsulate the nature of the conflict demography as a whole with representative quantities of the sample location. This led to the research procedures to follow national statistics and education ministry statistics as well as population density data to attempt to match these criteria in an ideographic sample caption.

This holistic approach in group volume was also determined by the theoretical underpinnings of Lorde's (1998) methodological findings which addressed the dangers of not acknowledging the unique interrelationships between age, gender, ethnicity, and social and environmental conditions (i.e. socio-economy, urbanisation etc.). Therefore, the importance of taking into consideration that such socio-demographic variables are viewed dynamically, rather than statically, in order to reduce the likelihood of oversimplification and overgeneralization of their meanings and applications (Constantine, 2001; Fandetti & Goldmeier, 1988; Hermans, 2001) were built into the results and discussion section.

Chapter 5

RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS

Pragmatic and Paradigm considerations in instrument selections for the measurement of social identity and moral development.

The intent of this research endeavour was to understand the nature of moral development and the moral atmosphere of a society in conflict in reference to what appears to be identity related dysfunctional group interaction, prejudice and discrimination. This creates a requirement to find two complementary research measures that measure these two diverse phenomena. In the quest for measuring both these psychological expressions in an experimental sample that had singular traits in comparison to the prevalent predominantly western empirical research fabric, sample specific and paradigm specific attributes had to be considered in selecting the corresponding instruments.

The first of these attributes was cultural fairness. Cultural fairness is a critical issue in psychological research, from logico-mathematical research (e.g. Rogoff & Chavajay, 1995; Triandis, 1996) to research on moral development, (e.g. Eckensberger, 1991; Snarey, 1995; Gielen & Markoulis, 1993). As Lind (1995) establishes, moral psychological

research, cultural fairness is not simply an influential factor, but a core-issue. Lind further contends that moral values alongside other values define the core meanings of culture. So it is necessary to consider whether moral research, alongside other sub disciplines of psychology complies to the standards of fairness in measuring competences traits and qualities of our subjects (Gielen, 1984; Simpson, 1974; Sullivan, 1977; Vine, 1984). Similarly social identity research posits that identity development formation of attachments and identity composition is culturally differentiated (Collins & Harvey, 2001). Therefore when cultural fairness is not considered within the research instrument, the findings are likely to be invalidated (Berry, 1969; Ember & Levinson, 1997; Ember & Ember, 2001).

The second consideration was demographic characteristics of the sample and the need to identify an instrument that wouldn't complicate or confound sensitivities of qualities⁴⁹ within the participant domain such as age, gender politics, socio-economic, experience of armed conflict, ethno-social, religious and cultural sensitivities. Methodological experts in Cross cultural data strongly advise against selecting measures that have been picked by synchronic and diachronic comparatives in both primary and secondary research examples (Ember & Ember, 2001). Therefore a

⁴⁹ *While a number of quantitative and qualitative methods were trialled with a diaspora sub sample group at Liverpool Hope, and various attempts at translation were trialled and abandoned due to culturally challenging semantics.*

number of moral measures used in conflict were not considered eligible simply because they had been used in other western conflict samples (e.g. DIT; SRM-SF, SROM, MJI). Similarly, a number of social identity and ethno-social identity measures were not considered appropriate because they were constructed to be more congruent with a specific demographic and specific research purpose that didn't match the exact research purpose of this investigation (e.g. The Multi-group Ethnic Identity Measure; MEIM, Internal- External Ethnic Identity Measure, Ethnocultural Identity Behavioural Index ; EIBI). Ember & Ember (2001) further recommend that the measure should reflect the purpose of the study with explicit precision taking into consideration both the cultural context sample sensitivities. Therefore an instrument that was culturally diplomatic, that did not offend the sensitivities of the threatened social norms was particularly sought. This was particularly an issue because much of the research was carried out with the cooperation of the ministry of education (and in the case of the excluded data the ministry of defence) as the state is at best, suspicious and defensive of western world research. An instrument that was appropriate and appealing to the young adult sample (17-26) was also a key priority as there were methodological complications with the original pilot study, where the SRM-SF was rejected by this age group a substantial number of participants for various reasons⁵⁰.

⁵⁰ *Some participants considered it a 'junior school task', as the measure is oriented towards a younger age group.*

The third consideration was to identify an instrument appropriate for the ambitions of sample size to ensure the replication of pertinent demographic factors such as age, gender, ethnicity, religious faith, socio economy etc. and yet not compromise the basic volume of sub-sample groups in every possible cross analysis. Given the importance of keeping the subsample sizes within the means of statistical analysis so as not to sacrifice the capacity or sensitivity to sub factors (e.g. high conflict region x Sri Lankan Tamil x high Social ID score on Moral development) that determine statistical differentials (Desu, & Raghavarao, 1990; Lenth, 2001) a comparatively large sample was necessary. Therefore, an instrument that was appropriate for large samples and manageable with challenging conditions in a diverse range of field contexts that could replace the laborious process of the moral interviews without compromising the qualitative objective and the 'elements of a cognitive task was sought. This advocated a preference for simple task based or questionnaire type measures rather than interview based clinical measures.

The fourth consideration was transferability of concepts in translation, across culture and language to be able to test a wider range of participants rather than a limited English speaking sample. This was particularly important as language and elements of westernisation was considered as possible confounding variables. Methodological experts in paradigm transference in translation particularly warn against the possibility of

paradigm shifts that can distort and confound the initial research intention. (e.g. Brislin, 1970; 1973; 1986; Rubin, Palmgreen, & Sypher, 2004; Beaton, Bombardier, Guillemin, & Ferraz, 2000). As there were no ready translated measures available, it was necessary to find two measures that would prove simple yet robust without losing qualitative and paradigm integrity. Ideally a measure that had been translated to other languages beyond European and Latin based languages and proved its robustness was sought.

The fifth consideration was the danger of using laboratory developed paradigms and their allied measures on a real world ecology that is complicated by socio-economic diversity, conflict intensity diversity and other components of cultural multiplicity. This is particularly germane to the Social Identity Measure as the Moral domain is based mostly on field research. Hyman's (2002) posits that in directly transferring concepts based on the laboratory based minimal groups design aligned measures to complex real world political fields can cause dilemmas. He outlines significant issues of external validity and cross-disciplinary translation which need to be moderated within a research design. Therefore a measure that was ideally developed from field research was sought.

Beyond these pragmatic considerations, the paradigm sophistication underlying the relevant measure was also considered. For example in the

moral domain, this investigation was particularly concerned in measuring the Piagetian cognitive and affective faculties of moral development specifically in terms of the consistency of judgement without incurring a paradigm shift into the opinion domain. The objective was to avoid compartmentalised pro-social reasoning where there was a difference between pro-social motivation for the in-group, as opposed to the out-group, or in situations of perceived threat or discrimination (as not a part of a particular collective or in-group). As discussed in chapter two, compartmentalised pro-social behaviour is moderated by concepts of group belonging, legitimacy, just world expectations and perceived threat. Therefore it was important to identify a measure that could perceive both structural advancement in the relevant formal aspects of the judgement as well as the content in the preferred normative qualities. It was also necessary to identify a research instrument that measured cognitive consistency or Moral integrity as Blasi conceptualised it (i.e. demonstrating integrity in moral judgement despite the opinion domain or dilemma context).

Furthermore, given the quandaries within stage six and post-conventional exclusivism to western world ideals of individualistic liberty, it was important to seek out a measure that had moderated these complications somewhat in a culturally transferable communiqué without diverting too much from the Kohlbergian intent. An instrument that provides

universally conceivable moral dilemmas, sensitive to cultural differences and the subtle nuances between individualistic and collectivist cultures that had been translated into many languages and used in comparable cross cultural research was prioritised.

Considerations in selecting a Moral Measure

Selecting a research measure to assess moral judgement within the sample was considerably more complex than in the selection of a Social Identity Measure, given the subtle incongruence's between the models in the moral domain. Therefore while a number of measures were considered the final determinative factors was the theoretical underpinning of the Dual Aspect model. This was particularly a difficult decision as much of the moral research in conflict contexts had utilised the SRM-SF, DIT, MJI or SROM (as evidenced in the chapter 2). However, the incomparably extensive cross cultural research using the MJT reconciled this concern. Among these were Moral Judgement Interview (MJI; Colby et al., 1987), Socio-moral Reflection Measure (SRM; Gibbs, Widaman & Colby, 1982), and the later revised and shortened (SRM-SF; Gibbs et al., 1992), Defining Issues Test (DIT; Rest, Cooper, Coder, Masanz & Anderson, 1974), Socio-moral Reflection Objective Measure (SROM; Gibbs et al., 1984), the Padua Moral Judgment Scale (PMJS; Comunian, 2002) alongside Lind's MJT. Miller (1987) appraised several the neo-Kohlbergian instruments

among these and concluded that the main alternatives to the Moral Judgement Interview (MJI) were the DIT, the SRM/ SRM-SF and the MJT. This investigation was swayed by similar preferences. These measures were carefully weigh up in congruence with the desired paradigm, context and sample considerations and rejected for varying reasons.

Kohlberg's Moral Judgement Interview

Kohlberg's MJI was rejected on number of issues including the challenges of such a laborious process within such a large sample size. While the qualitative robustness, detail and insight of such a process was valued, the demands and priorities of sample size and the central objectives of the study outweighed the qualitative appeal in this introductory study. The methodological implication of translating interview scripts from two local languages was also was also beyond the scope of pragmatic possibility. The need for various revisions in various aspects of the Kohlbergian model as discussed previously was also a decisive factor. This led to exploring neo-Kohlbergian options that encapsulated Kohlbergian intentions in a reductive form.

Sociomoral Reflection Measure (SRM; Gibbs, Widaman & Colby, 1982), and the (SRM-SF; Gibbs et al., 1992).

Among some of the other seriously considered measures and models were the SRM and SRM-SF which was satisfied the quest for a pencil and paper task that was based on the Kohlbergian tasks. The SRM uses Kohlbergian dilemmas while the SRM-SF asks questions such as "In general, how important is it for people to tell the truth?". Participants are required to accompany their responses with reasoning which is attributed to a particular Kohlbergian stage by the investigator. The scoring system is based on the four-stage neo-Kohlbergian model (Gibbs et al., 1992) and both measures exhibit good reliability and validity (Gibbs & Widaman, 1982; Gibbs et al., 1982, 1992). One critique of this model is that the scoring process requires a subjective evaluation of participant reasoning and results in a hard stage classification. Gibbs et al., (1982, 1992) recommend scorer practice according to a manual and a test-retest correlation to secure consistency when scored by more than one scorer in an investigation. However, the SRM and SRM-SF avoid revising the significant weaknesses in Kohlbergian model, particularly the structural issues in the post conventional stages. Despite this, the conformity to the classical model and the qualitative richness of the process persuaded the genesis of this investigation to utilise the SRM-SF in a pilot study (n=196). However this measure was rejected due to a number of factors including

complications that arose from sample age, and sensitivities within the specific politicised culture.

Defining Issues Tests (DIT; Rest, Cooper, Coder, Masanz & Anderson, 1974)

Both the MJT and DIT overcome these issues by being recognition tasks and have a number of similarities that recommend these measures above the other options available. In both participants are presented with Kohlbergian dilemmas and, for each dilemma, given 12 possible reasoned outcomes. Whilst the configurations of these items differ slightly, the real dividing issue is how the determinative paradigm that underpins calculations of the score. The DIT examines stage-preference by how often the reasoning of different stages is preferred. The most important score calculated is the P score, which measures preference for post-conventional items based on James Rest's (1973, 1999) four component model. In contrast the MJT examines stage consistency, by scrutinising how consistently respondents reasoning are in line with a specific stage indicated by argument preference. The central score of interest is the C score, which is obtained by using an Analysis of Variance that is formulated within the algorithm that accounts for a number of factors such as dilemma, task, etc. Lind (1995) posits that the C score measures moral cognition, compared to stage preference scores which only measure moral affect (Lind,1995). This facet in Lind's MJT is one of the pivotal claims that differentiate the MJT from other moral reasoning instruments. Rest,

Thoma and Edwards (1997) examined this issue by constructing a C score from the DIT. They posit that the P score produced greater construct validity as a developmental measure of moral reasoning. However, this yet to be evidenced by an independent source (Marx, 2006).

Nevertheless, the DIT recommended itself for this research imperative on a number of compatible and appropriate features. The multiple facets that encompassed moral judgement, moral motivation, moral sensitivity, and moral character seemed to fit the contentions in the research fabric of social identity theory and its adjunct pro-social behavioural research. The complexities of compartmentalised pro-social behaviours would have been better scrutinised in terms of group affects with such model that could encompass and differentiate between such pertinent nuances. Its psychological lynch pin also was less likely to contradict the contentions of the Tajfel and Turner model and redeems the aforementioned structure-content issues. Rest's (1999) hierarchical preference of moral stages and the DIT's focus on moral judgement was valued in this quest for research a measure. The more psychologically in-tuned reformulation of the post-conventional stage with its sensitivity to aspects such as the reciprocal relationship between culture and cognitive development was also a desired feature. In the consideration between MJT & the DIT, the Rest differentiation between the participants capacity to comprehend the highest stage without necessarily reflecting the participants actual stage was also

seriously considered as a challenge to the MJT's robustness. However, Lind's defence of this, and the appeal of moral attitudes according to Lind's definition was more congruent with the research requirements. Lind's model also encompassed some of the original appeal of the Rest version, which supported the choice of the latter.

Among the concern's that arose in using the DIT, was its sensitivity to political orientation. This weakness which had already existed in the Kohlbergian MJI (e.g., Alker & Poppen, 1973; Fishkin, Keniston & MacKinnon, 1973; Fontana & Noel, 1973; Sullivan & Quarter, 1972) had re-emerged in the DIT's as evidenced by a number of studies that found correlations between the P score and various measures indicating political orientation (Getz, 1985; Narvaez, Getz, Thoma & Rest, 1999; Gold, Christie & Friedman, 1976; Emler, Renwick & Malone, 1983; Barnett et al., 1995; Thoma, 1993). Another issue that had to be considered was the so called 'faking paradigm' (Marx 2002). While Marx (2002) posits that it is possible to fake the DIT downwards, but not upwards establishing its validity, Emler et al.'s (1983) evidence contradicts this.

The Moral Judgement Test (Lind)

Georg Lind's (1985) attempt to revise and clarify the theoretical quagmire of the Kohlbergian model founded the basis of the dual aspect theory. While many revisions and re-interpretations of the Kohlbergian paradigm have been offered by a number of authors including Kohlberg and his colleagues (Kohlberg, Levine & Hower 1984; Weinreich 1975; Kohlberg & Candee 1984; Rest 1973, 1999; Puka 1990, Reimer, et. al. 1979, Nucci & Pascarella, 1987; Lind 1985, Dobert 1990 etc.) as discussed previously some of which has resulted in measures such as the DIT, SRM, SRM-SF, MJS, MSI, PMJS, etc. However, none were as appropriate in model or measure to this research endeavour. Scillinger (2006) posits that Lind's model differs from the neo-Kohlbergian schools that attempt to either deny the affective cognitive dimensions can be separately distinguished or attempt to supplant it with more ontologically separate components or factors. Lind (2000) contends that they are inseparable and critical aspects of the same behaviour and any measure attempting to gauge this must approach it with this consideration. If the instrument limited itself to merely measuring attitudes the significance of the study would be limited to already well researched phenomenon. This instrument approaches moral judgment competence as a behavioural experiment (Lumsden, 1976). Therefore it is sensitive to aspects such as education induced change or possible social reflexivity brought about by conflicting norms

and even identity politics. It is this particular consideration that made it appropriate for this study, as the intent was to explore whether the strength of or attachment to social identities influenced moral development. Attributes such as its universal appeal and established success in translations across a large sample of countries and languages, and the clearly established guidelines in translation validation further recommended itself to this investigation.

Lind claims that the MJT aims to assess participants' moral judgement based on the Kohlbergian definition of Moral Judgement Competence, (i.e. the capacity to make decisions and judgements which are moral and to act in accordance to such judgements'). However, he posits that this measure unlike other measures of moral development which rely on opinion agreement or the opinion domain, is a behavioural test 'of a subject's ability to judge controversial arguments in a discussion about a moral problem on the basis of moral principles and orientations.' (Lind 2000a, p1.). He further maintains that the test is based on Kohlbergian stage theory, and according to the Kohlbergian paradigms of the cognitive affective dualism within moral development, tasks and judgement.

Based on modern cognitive-structural approaches to behavioural measurement, (Anderson, 1991; Broughton, 1978; Brunswick, 1955; Burisch, 1984; Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Kohlberg 1984; Lind, 1995;

Loevinger, 1957; Lourenco & Machado, 1996; Michel & Shoda, 1995; Pittel & Mendohlson, 1966; Travers, 1951 cited in Lind 200a) the MJT succeeds in engineering a test that seeks to discover the underlying orientations and precedents and infer their stage structure from the responses to the stimuli questions, without ambiguity. In concurrence with Kohlberg's original intention, the infra-structure of the dilemmas is built within the concept of the stages in the initial act of observation, test construction and scoring. (Kohlberg 1994, Lind 2000a). Therefore the MJT is designed to be a multivariate N= 1 experiment⁵¹, ensuring all relevant tasks are present in the test, and that they are uncorrelated and palpably separate and observable. The rationale behind this Lind (1989) posits is to ensure that the structural and individual differences are taken into consideration and to ensure the measurement is of "psychological properties (such as moral judgement competence), on the assessment of an individual pattern of behaviour, rather than a behavioural pattern of a sample of persons" (1989, p.2) to avoid an ecological fallacy⁵². Furthermore, it is ideographic⁵³ in its nature, and takes into account that the moral preferences in its overall pattern is only an indication of the moral stage that the participant is currently oriented into, rather than assuming a

⁵¹ i.e. It was not designed for individual diagnostics or for selection, as it only produces robust results if you use it with several respondents (Haste 2002)

⁵² i.e. we would falsely hypothesise that the structure of the behavioural data in a sample of individuals is identical with that of each individual (Lind, 1989)

⁵³ Because the function of this of this experiment is not to test the effects of some treatment but to describe the nature of existing developmental and behavioural properties (Lind, 1995).

moral preference alone indicates moral stage as alternative instruments do. (Lind, 2000a, p.2).

The primary principal of the MJT, which is central to replicating this behavioural test (and therefore the validation of this translation), is the dual aspect theory of moral behaviour and development, as posited 'by Piaget, Kohlberg and Lind' (Lind 2000a) which was considered in full in chapter two. To reiterate, Piagetian theory claims that "affective and cognitive mechanisms are inseparable, although distinct; the former depends on energy, and the latter depends on structure" (1976, p.71). Kohlberg seems to follow a similar scheme in his paradigm of moral development, and Lind posits he further develops this, and evaluates its implications in the measurement and stimulation of moral-cognitive development (Lind 1985a, 1985b, 1995, 2000, 2000a). Lind (2000a) translates Piagetian assumptions of cognitive-affective parallelism, to a correlation of a participant's moral attitude and their moral judgement. Therefore in the attempt to create a Sinhala & Tamil replica of the cognitive task, the translation validation results need to yield a high positive correlation between the MSP & C- Index and stages 5 & 6, a moderate correlation with stages 3 & 4, and a negative correlation with stages 1 & 2 maintaining its quasi simplex structure.

The test submits moral dilemmas in the form of narratives, and then presents the participants with 6 arguments and counter arguments per dilemma (6x2x2 in the standard version). The standard version submits two dilemmas with subtle differences containing the moral demand structures. Lind (2000a) posits that the 'Mercy Killing' (euthanasia) narrative adapted from Kohlberg's Moral Judgement Interview 'pulls' the highest level of moral reasoning on Kohlberg's sixth stage. The 'Workers' Dilemma', adapted from the novel 'Stellenweise Glatteise' by Max von der Grun is considered to 'pull' more to stage five. Each stage is embodied within 4 representative tasks (1 within a pro argument, 1 within a con argument present in both dilemmas) which are each rated on a likert scale span of 9 (-4 to +4). For an example, stage 1 is characterised in questions 1 and 12 in the 'Workers Dilemma', and 4 and 10 in the 'Doctors Dilemma' (please see table 1 below for all 6 stages and the corresponding moral task). The participants rating in each task submits a preference for a particular stage. The 24 preferences within the cumulative stage model illustrate an overall pattern which indicates the underlying moral orientation.

Table 1: 4 separate measurement points of stage

STAGE	Worker's Dilemma		Doctor's Dilemma	
	Pro	Con	Pro	Con
Stage 1	1	12	4	10
Stage 2	5	9	3	11
Stage 3	3	11	6	7
Stage 4	2	7	5	12
Stage 5	6	10	2	8
Stage 6	4	3	1	9

The dependant variable of this MANOVA styled algorithm is represented by the subjects judgement behaviour reflected in the -4 to +4 rating of the arguments provided. The moral factors determining the participants judgement behaviour is represented by the moral quality of the arguments as defined by Kohlberg's stages (Kohlberg, 1958; 1984). The opinion agreement or disagreement and the underlying task factor, is represented by the subjects rating of the pro and contra opinions of the protagonists decision. Lind posits that "the pro-arguments indicate which ideal level of moral discourse the subject prefers; the contra arguments indicate how much the subject lets this moral ideal determine his or her judgement of arguments in the presence of other powerful psychological forces" (Lind 1995, p.3).

While the sophistication of the measurement and its was impressive and the behavioural experiment format and its clarity of purpose, custom made

for this research imperative, the prospect of translating such a complex and sensitive instrument to two languages was daunting. The nature of the instrument also made traditional test-retest comparisons and internal consistency through reliability tests according to traditional psychometric tests inappropriate. This initially created a number of methodological concerns and procedural mishaps⁵⁴. However, Lind (2002) had created a comprehensive guide to translation validation and the prior translation processes to 32 countries had created precedent markers. Therefore the MJT was chosen despite the initial reservations about translatability. The MJT translations popular usage in a large volume of diverse research purposes in cross sectional, longitudinal, cross cultural and educational intervention projects involving more than 30,000 subjects of all ages, genders, social classes, educational backgrounds and cultures, further supported this choice.

Considerations in selecting a Social Identity Measure

Identifying an appropriate social identity measure was in some ways more difficult than identifying a moral judgment measure, as measurement models in ethno/social identity were less cohesive than in the moral

⁵⁴ Such as the year spent constructing and conducting field tests of a test-retest comparison between the Sinhala and Tamil versions and English versions in the hopes that high correlations would confirm the instruments consistency and reliability.

domain and a greater volume of measures and methodologies were utilised by social scientists for various purposes. This diverse ecology of methods and measures was filtered out by the specific purpose of this research imperative. Therefore the above mentioned general characteristics that applied to both instruments precluded a large proportion of measures that were designed to measure centrality and hierarchy of identity rather than the strength of attachment. Among the choices that were available, were measures of ethnicity as a concept or ethnic identity measures that were allied to a specific developmental paradigm of ethnicity, or a more general measure of group identity or social identity in keeping with the Tajfel and Turner paradigm.

Constant, Gataullina, and Zimmermann (2006a) differentiate ethnic identity from ethnicity which claim simply denotes where people come from, and it is an ascribed status. Ethnic identity, they claim is how individuals perceive themselves within a social ecology as they categorize and compare themselves to others of the same or a different ethnicity. They claim that ethnic identity is merely the self imposed or self chosen position that the individual posits themselves on, in salience to other groups, in the attempt to fit into a multicultural society. Zimmermann (2007) further posit that this may also encompass a network of strong beliefs, values, and what people hold dear of the preferred identity. He further contends that “Ethnic identity is then like a property that a person

can have for some time, can lose it and acquire a new one, or lose it and never take on or assume another one". (2007, p.22) Fearon and Laitin (2000) posit that ethnic identities are socially constructed, by individual actions or by supra-individual discourses of ethnicity. They further contend that ethnic identities take the form of oppositional identities, which imply a rejection of the dominant, typically 'white' behavioural norms (Austen- Smith & Fryer, 2005; Battu, Mwale & Zenou, 2007). This migrant based paradigm of ethnic identity is the basis for a large volume of research measures (e.g. Phinney's MEIM, 1992; Kwan & Sodowsky's IEEIM, 1997; Yamada & Yamada's EIBI, 1998). While this type of approach had some features that suited the majority minority construct of the Sri Lankan sample, the majority culture did not have the established dominance of hegemony assumed in this American sample based paradigm. Therefore, the underlying assumptions of this kind of paradigm had to be briefly considered.

The Multi-group Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM) Phinney (1992).

Among the measures considered for this research imperative was Phinney's (1992). The Multi-group Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM). This was particularly attractive as a measure given its cognitive affective parallelism due to the similar paradigm in Lind's MJT and because its

projected age range (adolescents and young adults). The measure claims to have a binary composition of an ethnic identity search (a developmental and cognitive component) and affirmation, belonging, and commitment (an affective component). This measure has been translated to Spanish and French, but at the time this study was designed there was no information on their reliability. Overall this measure seemed to be an ideal fit for the research design.

Phinney's (1990) paradigm posits that the process of identity development is similar to ego identity formation that takes place over time, as people explore and make decisions about the role of ethnicity in their lives. Phinney (1989) examined shared features in three separate models of this process (Cross, 1978; Kim, 1981; Atkinson et al., 1983; Arce, 1981) in Asian-American, African-American and Hispanic identities and proposed a three stage progression, from an unexamined ethnic identity through to a developmental period of exploration to an achieved or committed ethnic identity. Phinney (1989) proposes that early adolescents and occasionally adults who have not been exposed to ethnic identity issues are in the first stage, an unexamined ethnic identity. According to Cross (1978) and others (e.g., Atkinson et al., 1983; Kim, 1981), this first stage is characterized by a preference for the dominant culture in the case of minorities possibly influenced by authoritative personalities (e.g. parents). Phinney (1989) acknowledges that this not a necessary trait of this stage as

in some cases young people may just not be interested in this aspect of their identity. The second stage of this model proposes developmental trait characterised by exploration as a result of a significant experience that forces awareness of one's ethnicity ('encounter' according to Cross, 1978; or 'awakening' according to Kim, 1981) often involving an intense process of immersion in one's own culture. Phinney (1989) posits that this may also involve rejecting the values of the dominant culture. This stage model proposed that as a result of this process, people achieve internalisation of ethnic identity. Phinney (1989) further posits that this internalisation might require the person coming to terms with two fundamental problems for ethnic minorities: (a) that cultural differences between their own group and the dominant group and (b) the lower or disparaged status of their group in society (Phinney, Lochner, & Murphy, 1990).

This further scrutiny suggested that the underlying developmental model this measure was based upon did not seem appropriate for the sample at hand. While the developmental model offered an excellent insight into identity development particularly in minority identity development in societies such as America where the dominant identity (American Identity) was firmly established in comparison to the Sri Lankan identity and the majority Sinhalese identity which are both problematised and in some contexts transposed to a minority identity (e.g. in view of the supranational

Dravidian identities and the Asian subcontinent) it raised concerns whether the experimental design would be confounded by underlying assumptions⁵⁵.

Internal-External Ethnic Identity Measure (IEEIM) Kwan, K. L. K., & Sadowsky, G. R. (1997)

This measure developed using a sample of US Chinese immigrants and their experience of salience of ethnicity, fear of loss of face, and cultural stress, configured a paradigm of a factor-analytic structure of the Internal-External Ethnic Identity. Items in this measure reflect the common internal and external aspects of ethnic identity as conceptualized from the social psychological perspective, as well as the Asian values of family orientation and collectivism. The four factors, 'Ethnic Friendship and Affiliation', 'Ethno-Communal Expression', 'Ethnic Food Orientation', and 'Family-Collectivism' were identified. This measure has a record of high levels of internal consistency reliability and Q-sorts analysis indicated high inter-rater reliability, as calculated by the nonparametric phi coefficient (Kwan, 2000). While the collectivist identity considerations imbued in this measure was culturally appropriate, the American immigrant diaspora feature and its underlying assumptions made it inappropriate for this research purpose.

⁵⁵ This thesis is not concluding that it would, merely that it was risky to use such a measure in view of the

Ethnocultural Identity Behavioural Index (EIBI) Yamada, Marsella, & Yamada, (1998);

The Ethno-cultural Identity Behavioural Index (EIBI) is considered to be a sub-measurement of a larger effort to develop a multi-dimensional ethno-cultural identification scale for clinical and research use. This 19 item self-report behaviour index was developed based on a sample of 352 college students self-identifying with an Asian-American or Native-Hawaiian ethno-cultural group. This measure was interesting due to its correlations with ethnic pride and its considerations of Asian culture. The paradigm was designed and countered converse to a non-migrant group in establishing construct concurrent and convergent validity and yielded three factors that accounted for 60% of the total variance in its factor analysis. However, the paradigm assumptions of immigrant diasporas⁵⁶ made it inappropriate for this research purpose.

Given that many of these ethnic identity measures developed from American/Canadian sources for US/Canadian immigration/diaspora studies share underlying assumptions of immigrant diaspora status juxtaposed to a

paradigm differences and given the relative inexperience of the researcher.

⁵⁶ Participants who are self-categorised 'immigrants', converse to our sample who do not consider themselves to be immigrants, and vehemently oppose such categorisation.

strongly established hegemony it seemed prudent to adopt a measure that could be generalised to any group without underlying paradigm assumptions outside the SIT model. Therefore Social Identity measures that were closest to the intentions of ethnic identity measures, but were divorced from predetermined concepts of majority dominance and minority diaspora traits were explored.

Social identity is so complex as a construct that its measurement requires a dense cluster of indicators (Goyden, 2003). Therefore when identifying an appropriate measurement a key issue is whether to opt for a global measure of social identification which treats the concept as a unitary construct, or a measure that employs discrete subscales each measuring different sub-components of the construct (e.g. group pride). Haslam (2001) advocates the use of global measures when comparing across approaches as in this research imperative. He also advocates multi-component measures when attempting to explore 'fine grained' issues that focus in on specific social identity mechanisms. He also advocates multi-item measures when exploring a key dependant variable that is being compared across a range of contexts.

Comparable research in gender identity and student identity have been captured using semantic differential techniques (Reitzes & Burke 1980, Burke & Tully 1977) and similarly national identity has been measured

using multiple indicators (e.g. Haller 1996). Meanwhile, ethnic identity has been measured using mixed models varying from self cognitions and ethnically related behaviours (e.g. Driedger, 1975). A number of the simpler and reductive semantic differential measures when extended to a research purpose beyond its specific remit has to be twinned with another measure that supports the underlying paradigm of the research purpose (e.g. EIBI; Yamada, Marsella, & Yamada, 1998). However, to measure an entire set of identities using a full multiple indicator strategy presents an overwhelming response burden that is likely to disincline participants from cooperating.

Meanwhile some identity measures, attempting to examine the empirical structure of leading identities, are usually examined with single indicator question designs (e.g. 'Do you think of yourself as a Canadian first or a citizen of your province?' Blishen, 1978; McLean's, 1990). This type of 'zero-sum' approach (Laczko, 1995) designs preclude theoretical possibilities that maybe counterweights to identity politics (Goyden, 2003). The nested identity approach that contends several identities may co-exist without contradiction (e.g. Kalin & Berry, 1982; 1995) challenge this exclusive measurement. Even designs that implement rating rather than ranking identity centrality (e.g. Gurin, Miller & Gurin 1980; Kornberg & Stewart, 1983; Morse 1977) have been vulnerable to single item indicator problems. Meanwhile the 'matrix' or block format design (e.g. Dillman,

2000) where several rows of possible identities are meshed with columned rating scales of how closely the respondent identifies with each social group may not by itself be equipped to recognise the complexity of social identity.

Furthermore, when a cluster of identities are presented within the design, the cognitive demand on the subject is augmented (Krosnick, 1991) and the responses may exaggerate the congruence among identities (Andrews, 1984; Couper, Traugott & Lamias, 2001; Presser & Schuman, 1980). Randomisation of identity labels do not seem to be as affective in primacy effects (Deese and Kaufman, 1957; Luchins, Abraham, 1959) and scale wide effects persist when questionnaire fatigued subjects tick the first or last option (Hart, Rennison, & Gibson 2005), so as to move on to the next question (West, Finch & Curran, 1995). Another factor that needed to be considered was that Sri Lanka being a strongly ethno-centric state, much of the formalised questionnaires and applications from work to school requires tick in the box identity information (e.g. age, gender, 'race', region) which might prime a familiarity bias (Millsap & Everson, 1993). Goyden (2003) suggests that while carefully worded single item indicators can suffice in establishing a centrality hierarchy of social identities in a society, understanding the issues around the politics of identity require understanding its structure and correlated clusters in designating an appropriate measure.

Meanwhile, designs with more ambitious strategies based on cohesive models for structural examinations of identity (e.g. Frideres & Goldenberg, 1977; Noels & Clement, 1996) seem prefer semantic differential approaches. This approach is used predominantly with student/ young adult samples (Mackie, 1978) and seem ideally suited for them as the reigning social identity models (e.g. Tajfel, 1972; Turner, 1978) are design on experiments with student subjects. Therefore, a social identity measure that used a semantic differential model, developed based on a field sample rather than a laboratory minimal group that was in line with the Tajfel & Turner paradigm but appropriate for measuring ethno-social identity, was sought. This led this research imperative to the Brown et al's (1986) ten-item measure that complemented all of these research considerations and requirements.

Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade & Williams (1986) ten item measure;

As discussed in chapter two, the strength or degree of group identification and is the most durable and the most significant and relevant construct that social identity theory and its antecedent self categorisation theory has contributed in understanding a number of conflict related concepts like prejudice, perceived deprivation, altruism and forgiveness (Brown, 2010).

Therefore a measure that specifically focussed on strength of identification and attachment within a social identity theory paradigm was sought among the above mentioned instrument qualifications. The Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade & Williams (1986) ten item measure qualified this significant characteristic among the other relevant instrument qualifications that was required. While a number of measures as discussed above were considered most of these instruments did not focus on the degree of identity attachment, and was not structured within the Tajfelian social identity paradigm.

This measure also embodied the other desired attributes laid out and discussed in full at the beginning of this chapter, such as cultural fairness, cultural sensitivity, and field test appropriate. The concerns of identifying a simple translatable instrument that made operationalization simple in a quantitative study were ideally assuaged by this simple likert scale ten item measure. As this measure was developed for field testing as opposed to the lab appropriate instruments that mimic the minimal paradigm, it also resolved the epistemological concerns discussed above in reference to short falls of lab developed instruments when applied in field testing settings.

Background and development of the Brown et. al, ten item measure

The Brown et. al, ten item measure (also referred to as the ten item social identification measure) has been developed out of the qualitative insights gained from Brown and Williams (1984) interview study and loosely based Driedgers (1976) 'Ethnic Identity Scale' as an improved alternative. The Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade & Williams (1986) ten item measure does not have the complexities of development that was seen in the development of the Moral Judgement Test. It is a simple measure of strength of group attachment and identification using a likert scale measure agreement responses to statements about strength of group identification.

This instrument, particularly devised to measure the three core facets of awareness, evaluation and affect, (Hunter & Stringer, 1999) implicit in Tajfel's classic definition of social identity (Tajfel 1978, p.63) is articulated in ten first person perspective sentences. Five of these items affirm identity and five deny identity according to traditional sentence reversals. The measure has been repeatedly found to have psychometrically acceptable levels of reliability and validity (e.g. Brown, et al. 1986⁵⁷; Duckitt, 2005⁵⁸; Hunter & Stringer 1992⁵⁹; 1999⁶⁰;

⁵⁷ Cronbach alpha of 0.71

⁵⁸ Cronbach alphas in the four samples range from .72 to .88.

⁵⁹ Cronbach alpha of 0.72

⁶⁰ Cronbach alpha of 0.75

The antecedent and background of this scale is found in Brown and Williams (1984) interview study of group attachment. Brown and Williams (1984) contend that while a high volume of studies have replicated aspects of social identity, such as differential status relations on intergroup discriminations (e.g. Turner & Brown, 1978; Caddick 1981; Commins & Lockwood, 1979a; Bourhis & Hills, 1982; Brown & Rosss, 1982), effects of enhancing salience of particular intergroup comparisons (e.g. Turner, Brown & Tajfel, 1979; Shevington 1981) or the effects of varying the perceived characteristics of the out-group (e.g. Kalmuss, Gurin & Townsend, 1981; Brown, 1984) explanations of these consistently return to causality inferred by degree of attachment. He further contends that there has also been a considerable continuing interest in the parameters of in-group bias in the minimal or quasi-minimal context (e.g. Brown & Turner, 1979; Brown & Deschamps, 1980; 1981) and even the study of attributional processes in inter-group contexts (e.g. Hewstone, Jaspars & Lahlee, 1982). But despite the fact that all of these studies (and studies in this school of thought) have drawn upon social identification to account for observed patterns of intergroup discriminations, that there has been very little focus on the actual processes and paradigms of identification and intensity of group attachment.

The limited number of studies that examine group identification and its relationship to out-group discrimination or intergroup differentiation

(within the Tajfel & Turner paradigm) demonstrate mixed results (Brown, 1984). This scarcity of SIT paradigm based measures create a significant research gap in this epistemological domain. This research gap in the understanding of degree or strength of group identification or attachment is the rationale for the Brown & Williams (1984) interview based qualitative study, which is the precedent of the quantitative ten item measure (Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade & Williams, 1986) which also centres on the same research gap. In this qualitative study, they endeavoured to test the correlation between the degree and strength of identification with group differentiation. This field study led to a number of rich insights into aspects of group identification. The four part semi-structured interview focussed on the nature of the respondents' group identification' and produced the precursors to the Brown et al's (1986) construction of the 'ten item measure'.

This qualitative study (Brown & Williams, 1984) used a seven point self rating scale to measure 'how strongly they felt about their in-group'. The phenomenal quality of these group identifications were further measured by two open ended questions probing the important aspects of belonging to the group. However, Brown & Williams (1984) acknowledge that this is less than ideal, as a quantitative measure of identity strength or attachment and suggested a modified version of Driedgers (1976) 'Ethnic Identity Scale' as an improved alternative. The Brown et al (1986) construction of

the 'ten item measure' developed on the conclusions of the 1984 interview based study provided an ideal instrument for this research imperative because it took the characteristics of an ethno-social group into account give, these foundations while imbuing it with the social identity paradigms understanding of the relationship between the in-group and the individual. Therefore, it encompassed multiple components of identity (as Tajfel defines it) treating it as unitary construct within a reductive yet balanced representation (Haslam, 2001). It also measured the relevant subcomponents while being sensitive to possible cognitive /affective reactions to external constructs and stimulus (e.g. shame, pride).

Primarily, this instrument measures identity attachment and self perception of that attachment (e.g. 'I am a person who considers group X to be important', 'I am a person who identifies with group X', 'I am a person who feels strong ties with group X', 'I am a person who sees myself as belonging to group X') referred to as the awareness factor (Hunter & Stringer, 1999). These semantic differential stimuli obtain measurements of group priority, attachment and self perception of identity in keeping with Tajfels (1978, p.63) definition of social identity.

Secondarily this instrument attempts to measure emotive/affect laden (e.g. 'I am a person who is glad to belong to the group', 'I am a person who is annoyed to say I am a member of group X') and evaluative/ cognitive

judgements of the group, and feelings towards the group (e.g. 'I am a person who criticises group X', I am a person who tries to hide belonging to group X). Participants assess these ten statements and rate it on a Likert scale that allows each question to score between -2 to +2. Overall scores can therefore range from -20 to plus 20 (-2 to +2 x 10). Five of the ten items are positively stated, and five negatively stated for the purposes of reverse scoring to maintain consistency.

Duckitt (2005) contends that this scale also conforms to Phinney's (1990) four dimensional ethnic identification model. Phinney (1990) comprehensively reviewed studies of ethnic identification and concluded that there seemed to be distinct dimensions of ethnic identification: firstly ethnic self-labelling or self-categorization (the tajfellian 'awareness' factor), secondly attachment to the ethno-cultural group evaluation of the ethnic group (the affect and evaluation factors- positive or negative in-group attitudes). The fourth dimension which refers to involvement with the group and its cultural practices, ways and customs is not represented in this scale, perhaps because it is not tangibly evident in Tajfels definition and is rather a product of the first 2 factors. Nevertheless, Jackson and Smith's (1999) factor analysis of group identification found the Brown, Condor, Matthews, Wade, & Williams (1986) scale to be the strongest loading scale on their group identification or attachment factor.

Haslam (2001) identifies this measure as a global measure that takes a balanced unitary structural approach which makes it appropriate for an exploration of the interaction between the social identity model and the moral developmental model and sensitive to the mutual effects. The multi component facets make it ideally sensitised for the possible identity related positive and negative emotions and issues (e.g. shame, annoyance) and positive and negative behaviours (e.g. hide being a member of group, criticise group). Because this measure is a social identity measure, as opposed to an ethno-identity measure, there are no impinging assumptions on a predetermined paradigm and therefore fulfils the first consideration of cultural fairness. The simplicity and brevity of the instrument resolve any issues of respondent fatigue that its twin moral measure may have already over taxed and make it appropriate for a large sample and the varied context specificity of this demographic. The austerity and brevity also enhance ease of translation and conceptual transference. Haslam (2001) particularly recommends it for field research which further resolves Hyman's (2001) concerns. Therefore these considerations along with the conciseness of structure, presentation and mediation made the MSI the appropriate instrument for this investigation.

One of the limitations in using this scale is that other than a few general (and consistently repeated) review comments by a few reviewers (eg. Haslam, 2001; Hyman & Stringer, 1999) there is very little analysis and

assessment of the measure. While the unambiguous simplicity of purpose and expression and the transparent directness of structure make it an extremely attractive scale for operational ease, it deprives the commentator from complications of substance.

This does not mean that it is by any means obscure or unpopular, as it has been used by a number of studies investigating central issues within the social identity paradigm measuring a number a comparable behavioural facets (e.g. Duckitt, 2005; Erwin 2010; Hunter, Stringer, & Watson, 1992; Hyman & Stringer, 1992; 1999; Levine, Prosser, Evans & Reicher, 2005; Millar & Stringer, 2006; Tarrant, MacKenzie, Hewitt, 2006). Unfortunately none of these studies have gone to any length in evaluating the scale except the perfunctory comments of its Tajfelian social identity school factors. The only evaluative referent is the reoccurring consistently high Cronbach's alpha (referred to at the beginning of the subtopic). Unfortunately this simplicity of purpose and expression raises questions about the sophistication and sensitivity of this scale. This is especially pertinent to those investigations that is attempting to uncover causal and moderative relationships between social identity and other related concepts. However, for an exploratory study this lack of finer nuances and detail is not a particularly relevant concern, and the simplicity makes it an operationally advantageous trait.

Chapter 6

Formative pilot studies that shaped the research imperative

This chapter explores the pilot studies and other sub processes that refined the main research initiative and design. The preliminary explorations of the pilot study (Perera, 2000) is reported here in reference to its methodological learning curve, particular in reference to its design, sample, instruments and procedure and its determinative impact in designing the central investigation.

Pilot study

The initial pilot study that was conducted as a part of an under graduate dissertation project (Perera, 2000) was a minimalistic version of the current design. This pilot study inspired the central and subsidiary explorations of the central investigation. It further informed the subtle considerations of the research imperative and had a determinative influence on research instruments, sampling, design and theoretical underpinnings in paradigm

This study explored the influence of political disturbance and challenged group-identity on the socio-morality of young adults in societies

experiencing ethnic-conflict, by comparing the levels of socio-moral maturity & group-identity of young adults aged between 17 to 25 in societies experiencing political-violence (n=100) with young adults in societies experiencing comparative peace (n=65). The experimental groups were located in Northern Ireland and Sri-Lanka to provide an Eastern & Western Model of ethnic-conflict with two very different conflict structures and drives but universal similarities in group-identity, while the control groups were drawn from England, USA & Australia. The group-identity and conflict consciousness were measured by 10 reverse scored statements, while Socio-morality was measured using the 'Socio-moral Reflection Measure-Short Form' (SRM-SF; Gibbs, Basinger and Fuller, 1992). The experiment utilised a 2x2 (gender x area) unrelated design the results were analysed using an ANOVA test which divulged a significant difference between the SRM-SF scores in the experimental and control locations.($f= 6.204 (1,161)$, $p<0.01375$) Then the correlation between age and socio-moral development score, and 'identity-consciousness and conflict-awareness score' and the same, were measured using a Pearson's Product Moment Correlation Coefficient which divulged that there was a significant positive correlation between Identity-Consciousness and the SRM-SF Score ($r=0.368$) while the correlation between age and the SRM-SF Score was comparatively lower ($r=0.103$). This preliminary analysis indicated that the youth in conflict-driven countries have a more sensitive and sophisticated conflict and group-

identity awareness, which correlates with a more developed socio-moral consciousness.

One of the significant rationales behind the central explorations of this thesis is the contrary nature of these preliminary findings in comparison to the 'truncation hypothesis' popularised by mostly Northern Irish research who focussed on children and adolescents (e.g. Fields, 1973; 1974; 1976; Fraser, 1974; Ferguson & Cairns, 1996; Breslin, 1982; Kahn, 1982). While the pilot study itself had been inspired by a few scattered studies (e.g. Lorenc & Branthwaite, 1986; Cairns and Conlon, 1985; Ferguson, 1998) the differences between the age groups had made the comparisons inappropriate. But the theoretical underpinnings of these conclusions were still applicable. The claim behind the truncation hypothesis of social conflict is that sustained high levels of violence interferes the process of constructive decentration (Gibbs et al, 1992) fuelled through increasingly complex stimuli in the socio moral situation. This complex social-interaction is substantiated by "a shift from a generalised aggregate of the experiential community to an appreciation of the abstract concept of society" (Weinreich-Haste, 1986, p. 346). The truncation hypothesis suggests an adolescent resident in an area experiencing high levels of group conflict would find this process severely limited by the moral atmosphere of the community created by segregation, social cleavage,

avoidance strategies and negative out-group perceptions. (Ferguson & Cairns 1996; 20)

Furthermore, the qualitative insights that were contained within the data text⁶¹ suggested a deep inter-perspective understanding and concern in the conflict awareness responses. This provoked questions about the nature of the augmentative or truncative influences. The possibility that the vulnerability to these truncative / augmentative influences were based on extraneous factors that needed to be further examined presented itself. This provoked the research questions of the central exploration. Conversely, the possibility that the results were confounded by other factors such as flaws in sampling methodology, instrument or procedural flaws had to be considered. The flaws identified within this pilot study became significant markers which informed the research methodology of the central exploration.

One of the most significant learning curves of this pilot preliminary examination was its determinative influence on identifying a research instrument for the main study. The pilot study implemented a dual questionnaire ('Conflict & Identity Consciousness Measure; CICM) which

⁶¹ The text of the second part of the measure asked them to identify the conflicts they experience depending on the identities they considered important.

Sample response; *"I am Irish and therefore identify myself with the Irish political conflict, and therefore support Irish nationalism, however, individuals are contrary and I also actively pursue non allegiance in some contexts. I am agnostic; something I do not proclaim too loudly in a catholic school."* Please see appendix for sample questionnaire.

constructed a group-identity priority index and ethno-conflict awareness measure, intended to gauge group-identity consciousness and group-conflict consciousness. This binary measure alongside the socio-moral reflection measure intended to gauge Socio-moral development (SRM-SF; Gibbs, et. al. 1992) was mediated in English. One of the significant flaws of this pilot study was this alien medium in the case of the experimental sample drawn from Sri Lanka. This led to an arduous translation process which was a necessary measure to ensure the sample was not limited to English speaking private schools. Another flaw was the length of the research measure which consisted of the best part of 8 A4 sides (4 double sided pages) even when printed in a font size of 10 in Times New Roman script. This and the qualitative written form of the measure had a significant impact on the number of scorable responses in an opportunity sample. Therefore the central investigation set itself a research marker of more reductive format of a 2 paged limit on the combined research measure.

Part of the difficulties in this preliminary pilot exploration was identifying a research instrument that could quantify identity conflict in societies experiencing armed ethno-social conflict. It didn't seem possible to do this by using an existing established unitary research instrument. Therefore a self constructed binary measure was adopted. The group-identity measure which required the participant to complete ten sentences describing his/her

identity beginning 'I am...' in order of personal priority was preceded by a paragraph that primed a number of identities including ethno social identity to give all respondents a similar context. (Please see Appendix for a sample). Those responses which referred to ethno-social (e.g. Tamil, Dravidian, Irish Catholic, Sinhala Buddhist), national (e.g. America, Australian, Welsh) or ethno-political identity (e.g. IRA, LTTE, DUP) was given a reverse score according to its position in the ten point scale (e.g. if the respondent referred their ethno-social/ national /ethno-political identity in the second statement they were given a score of 8 points, if they referred to their ethno-social/ national /ethno-political identity in the seventh statement they were given a score of 3 points. Typically most respondents identified themselves according to kin ship, personal relationships (e.g. I am a sister, son), professional/ student status (e.g. Law student), and personality traits (e.g. I am an extrovert, I am confident, I am neurotic) or psychological states of being (e.g. 'I am contented', 'I am happy') outside the ethno-social labels. While some respondents filled these statements out with single word responses other respondents wrote up to 5 sentences to describe these identities. The study expected to find that most respondents from conflict samples would prioritise their ethno-social/ national /ethno-political identities over other facets of their identities prioritise their ethno-social identity in the first quarter (i.e. first three statements). Similarly the study expected to find that participants from the US, England and Australia would not prioritise their ethno-social/ national /ethno-political identities

(for the purpose of this study generally grouped under 'ethno social' identity). These expectations were met with significant ($p= 0.006$) ethno-social prioritisation in the experimental sample, where most respondents identified themselves by their ethnicity, religious affiliation, or nationality in the first quarter compared to the control sample. The control sample typically identified themselves according to kin ship, personal relationships, professional/ student status, and personality traits, or psychological states of being. However, there were a few outliers particularly within the English (e.g. from areas of ethno-social tension in Oldham) and US samples. This suggested a necessary precaution for sampling control groups that were opportunity or volunteer initiated.

The conflict-awareness measure followed from this identity expression and asked the participants to consider the "if and how these identities clash with other peoples identities and the values, goals and needs that are part of these identities" (Please see appendix for a copy of the instrument). The respondents were asked whether they felt that there was a conflict related to the identities (e.g. professional groups, gender groups), values and goals they identified with, in opposition to juxtaposed groups, and if so to describe how they felt about it. This was scored identically to the social identity section, and when and where respondents referred to conflict in the ethno-social/ national /ethno-political identity domain they were given a reverse score according to the statements position in the ten point scale.

Parallel to the social identity section, the study expected to find that most respondents from conflict samples would refer to identity conflicts arising from their ethno-social/ national /ethno-political identities over other facets of their identities prioritise their ethno-social identity in the first quarter. Similarly the study expected to find that participants from the control sample would not refer to ethno-social identity conflicts in the first quarter. The total of these two summed overall scores divulged the 'Conflict & Identity Consciousness' (CIC) score. This CIC measure was designed to divulge and prime the traits and reasoning that ensued from such identities in environments of severe conflict (Perera, 2000).

It is worth mentioning that both these measures were production measures, meaning the participants wrote down statements describing how they felt unlike a tick in the box rubric test. And therefore there was a qualitative facet to the data. However, it is the prioritisation (whether it was the 1st, 2nd or 3rd etc. statement from the top that referred to ethno-social identity and ethno social identity related conflict) which was then transformed these statements to a quantitative score. Further to the priority referent quantitative data this produced, the statements themselves gave the experimenter a certain degree of qualitative insights to the phenomenological qualities of the participants' identity and conflict experience. For example, a sample response read; "I am Irish and therefore identify myself with the Irish political conflict, and therefore

support Irish nationalism, because that's what my family feels. However, individuals are contrary and I also actively pursue non allegiance (in some contexts). I am agnostic; something I do not proclaim too loudly in a catholic school." Please see appendix for a sample questionnaire.

There were a number of other concerns in the self constructed CIC measure. Among these was the scrutiny for a possible 'Type 0/ III error' and the construct, convergent, discriminant and content validity of the instrument. These facets and their allied paradigms and issues had not been examined in depth and established in the pilot study. Given the limitations of a pilot study, or even the central investigation where the research imperative was not the focused on developing a fine tuning a measure of identity it seemed prudent to use an established measure. However, the qualitative insights to the data derived from the responses provoked further questions. Was it the strength of identity or intensity of identity attachment, or the positive regard towards the in-group that correlated with the moral augmentation, as opposed to priority over other identities? If this attachment or intensity of identification, or commitment to group was measured would the results be similar. Do secure mature identities and strong group affiliations that are self reflexive have an augmentative influence on moral development? Conversely, do insecure

challenged or transitional identities have a truncative relationship with moral development?

Meanwhile, another significant marker that informed the central exploration was considerations of selecting a moral development measure. The SRM-SF seemed an appropriate choice because it was the most pragmatic and economical instrument available at the time, which was essential given the large sample size. The simple statements also seemed appropriate to sub-samples who were responding to an instrument articulated in the Sri Lankan conflict samples second language. The other factor that influenced this decision was its comparative popularity in conflict contexts in the international research sphere (Basinger et al., 1991, Gibbs, et al. 1992; Gielan, et al., 1994, Ferguson, et al., 1994). It was reported to have appropriate levels of reliability (Gibbs, et al., 1992). The test-retest correlation for the entire sample is recorded as $r(234) = 0.88, p < 0.0001$. SRM-SF is also proved to be homogenous on the basis of the results of a Cronbach's alpha computation (0.92, $N = 374$), a split-half reliability computation, and an exploratory factor analysis. The measure is also recorded to achieve acceptable validity (concurrent, convergent, and discriminant) established by a highly significant correlation, $r(43) = 0.69, p < 0.0001$. The SRM-SF was scored according to the protocol laid out by (Gibbs, et al., 1992). These factors at the time were a persuasive determinant for using this instrument for this study (Perera, 2000).

However, the pilot study raised concerns in using the SRM-SF particularly for a Sri Lanka sample that had to be considered in designing the central exploration. The first consideration was the participant fatigue that the pilot opportunity sample complained of. More than 500 questionnaires were rejected due to partial completion or never returned by the opportunity sample, due to its sheer volume. Even undergraduates who were used to a barrage of research questionnaires that are thrust upon by social science research imperatives, seem to reject measures that require writing out responses. This suggested that the SRM-SF was not suited for an opportunity sample of this nature when twinned with another measure that required an equally intensive amount of respondent commitment. Methodological investigations on questionnaire type measures suggest that semantic differential structures are best suited for the young adult age group (e.g. Schurr & Henrikson, 1983). This also created a possibility that this unintentional filtering had created an extraneous trait among the respondents, and the scorable scripts merely represented those students who displayed traits of conscientiousness, diligence, compassion or helpfulness. These traits that could have secured participant cooperativeness could have also confounded the results and created a moral augmentation. However, ideally these variables should have affected both the experimental and control samples alike.

Another, consideration that this pilot study produced was a further examination of the operationalized concept of moral development by the SRM-SF. This is not a criticism of construct validity of the instrument, as this has been well established by the authors (Basinger et al., 1991, Gibbs, et al. 1992). Instead it was deepening realisation that the macro-concepts within the moral domain had subtle differences that created differences in operationalising macro-concepts. This led to a determinative consideration between the differences in the neo-Kohlbergian understandings of ‘Socio-moral Reflection’ in comparison to ‘Moral Judgement Competence’ which seemed more appropriate in a behavioural context when operationalized with identity.

Another learning curve marker of the pilot study was the participant sampling that could have affected the outcome. The participants of the pilot study were drawn from countries that fulfilled the ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ nation-state criterion as well as the ‘individualist’ ‘collectivist’⁶² criteria to attempt to rule out political ideology and social culture affecting the results as opposed to severe group-conflict and the destructive and violent environments such conflict engenders (Perera, 2000). The experimental samples (n=100) for this study were drawn from Sri-Lanka (n=50) & Northern Ireland (n=50) given the two locations satisfies the cultural requirement of an Eastern and a Western Model. The

ethnic-conflicts in Sri-Lanka and Northern Ireland had the similarities and diversities that complimented the design. The structures and the drives of the two conflicts had contrasting phenomenological qualities, while the in-group out-group logistics of conflict, and group-identities had similarities shared by post colonial conflict (Perera, 2000). The geographic areas chosen in drawing the sub samples were favoured to represent challenged identity (Belfast & Coleraine in NI, and Colombo & Kandy in SL). The Northern Irish participants were drawn from the East & the West of the river Bann resulting in a primarily rural and nationalist community ambience in the west, and urban Unionist community in the East. Similarly the Colombo sample came from Wellawatta⁶³, a concentrated urban Tamil community environment from the countries commercial Capital (Colombo) in Sri-Lanka, where the Sinhalese 82% majority are thinly spread. Meanwhile the Kandy sample is characterised by the Indian Tamil plantation workers (who's ethno social legitimacy in the country is problematised as discussed in the 1st chapter) alongside conservative Sinhala Buddhist populace (Perera, 2000).

The control samples were drawn from England (Liverpool & Manchester) Western Australia (from the centre and suburbs of Perth) and the US (Iowa, New York, Michigan & North Dakota) providing varying political

⁶² Australia was considered a mixed model of collectivist and individualist cultures as much of the populace are at least 1, or second generation Asian.

⁶³ Where the worst of the Tamil pogroms of 'Black July' were perpetrated.

environments at differing developmental stages of political, cultural and national identity. The assumptions of this control sample were that the respondents would not have experienced the phenomenological qualities of ethno-social conflict to a violent or survivalist extent. The gender distribution across the experimental sub samples (N=100, M= 55, F=45, Sri Lanka; N=50, M= 22, F=28; Northern Ireland N=50, M= 33, F=17) and control sub-samples (N=65, M= 32, F=33, England; N=15, M= 8, F=7; USA N=25, M= 16, F=9; Australia N=15, M= 8, F=7) were appropriately distributed. The age distribution was also equally distributed. The experimental samples also had an equal balance of both ethno-social groups, with a balanced representation of religious affiliation (Perera, 2000).

Another significant learning curve from the pilot study was the limitations of external validity when the sample is limited to a high conflict location sample or locations where identity is challenged or secure, based on demographic distributions of sample location. Therefore this factor could have influenced the location markers of the central exploration. Furthermore the conclusions of the pilot study acknowledged that the samples were drawn mostly from private schools which are based on a particular model of education (Perera, 2000). Therefore the moral augmentation could be accounted for by elitist well resourced prep schools that are based on western classical education. This led to the conclusion

that a large scale exploration needed to include diverse types of schools and varying underpinning models of education. While the initial intentions of the central study was to replicate this sample pilot sampling design its sub sample locations (e.g. Sri-Lanka, Northern Ireland x England, US, Australia) to ensure external validity in cross cultural contexts, these increasing demands of sub-variables revised this resolve. Therefore, the micro considerations and the allied explications in the research limitations of a PhD led to an exploratory study that focussed entirely on the eastern experimental model.

The sample age group chosen in the pilot study was young adults between 17 and 25 which was a design attribute the central exploration determined to be an ideal marker. Therefore this design marker was replicated in the central exploration design. This university/transition age group was originally selected for its developmental vigour of socio-moral reflection as well as increasing awareness of group identity and political sensitivity (Perera, 2000). This age is assumed to have a fully developed cognitive capacity while being in the age group that is generally classified to achieved Kohlberg's transitional stage from stages 3 and 4 (Colby & Kohlberg, 1983; Kohlberg, 1976), which makes this age group the ideal age to study moral development/ truncation. The absence of similar studies carried out on this age group at the time, as most studies on moral development had been carried out on adolescents, (Breslin, 1982; Cairns &

Conlon, 1985; Ferguson & Cairns, 1996; Ferguson, 1998; Kahn 1982, etc.) or children (Fields 1973, 1976; Frazer, 1974; Lorenc & Branthwaite, 1986, etc.) made this age group salient and relevant. Other exploratory questions provoked by these findings, such as whether there is an age differentiation point where truncative influences of conflict reverse into augmentative influences. Furthermore the developmental processes such as identity which is reported to have a vacillating or moratorium stages (Phinney, 1989) could have a spurious relationship with conflict and moral development.

Another design marker that was informed by the pilot study was the procedural methodology. The pilot studies' research procedure was operationalized by academic contacts located in the relevant regions or research conductors who visited the area at the time. Around 150 questionnaires were distributed by e-mail but only 22 were returned. Overall more than 600 questionnaires were sent to the different destinations via research contacts and around 190 were returned by the last scoring deadline, but disqualification of unscorable questionnaires reduced the number to 165. In Northern Ireland the Coleraine sample was carried out on an opportunity sample within the University of Coleraine. Participants were chosen according to ethnicity/ political affiliation, gender and age to achieve a balanced representation using stratified opportunity sampling. The Belfast sample was carried out on a similar stratified

opportunity sample of university age students attending diverse higher education institutions chosen according to the same denominators. The Sri-Lankan sample was similarly carried out on University age young adults in Colombo and on a sample of final year students in an International school in Kandy where 95% of the racial and religious distribution came from minority groups. The research conductors were fully briefed on how to carry out the investigations, especially on how to deal with relevant queries and concerns both before and after the experiment so as not to compromise the responses. The participants were initially briefed on the study by the research conductor according to a research brief and a further information sheet that was provided. The Questionnaire opened with the identity-measure and conflict-awareness measure so as to prime the participants before they completed the socio-moral score. Despite all these considerations given to the procedure, the standardisation is open to critique given the differences in academic experiences of the research conductors (e.g. The Sri Lankan sample was conducted by two senior academics within the discipline who were visiting the location for undergraduate recruitment, while the Colerain sample was conducted by a fellow post graduate student). This suggested that ideal standardisation, could only be achieved by replicating each treatment by the same research conductor.

While the methodology of the pilot study had a significant learning impact on the central explorations of this study, it is worth briefly exploring some of the more specific findings of the results in the statistical analysis. The results of the pilot studies' analysis of variance divulged a significant difference between the SRM-SF scores in the experimental and control locations ($f [1,161] = 6.204, p < 0.01375$) with a non significant difference between gender groups which was used as a comparative weighting factor ($F [1,161] = 1.14; p < 0.2863$). This is further illustrated in the descriptive statistics of SRM-SF means (e.g. Experimental group; Female= 353.40, Male=353.62 compared to Control group; Female= 343.79, Male=329.53. While the Kohlbergian School's approach to moral development has been critiqued as gender sensitive (Gilligan, 1977; Gilligan & Belenky, 1980; Gilligan & Murphy 1979; Gilligan 1982), the extreme reverse scores in the control sample did not seem to be in keeping with these considerations. However, statistical analysis suggested that these gender differences are not significant ($p= 0.29$) This was further tested by a post-hoc test which confirmed the results. Furthermore among the subsidiary explorations carried out by the pilot study, was the significant positive correlation between Identity-Consciousness (CIC score) and the moral development (SRM-SF Score: $r=0.368, n=165, p=0.02$), while the correlation between age and the SRMSF Score was comparatively lower ($r=0.103, n=165, p=0.03$).

The results of this pilot study supported the view that ethno-social conflict and phenomenological qualities of societies engaged in violent conflict did not necessarily truncate socio-moral reflection in young adults between 17 and 25. Given the lack of similar studies in the area the claim is made in a research vacuum, but these findings could be compared to research implications on studies conducted on children and adolescents. Studies conducted by Frazer (1974), Fields (1973), Ferguson & Cairns (1996) etc. which suggest moral truncation contradicted by studies such as Westman & Lewandowski (1991), Breslin (1998), Cairns & Conlon (1985), Kahn (1982) Lorenc & Branthwaite (1986) Ferguson (1998) etc. suggest that socio-moral development at the earlier stages of development are enigmatic and vacillating and perhaps regressive, depending on time, context and immediate political atmosphere. This contradictory research matter of course also suggests that the instruments and methodology used is too contrasting to expect the measurement of the same features problematizing the convergent validity across research designs. Nevertheless the difference of cohesive socio-moral stability, and interrelated elements such as self-concept, self-esteem, and group-identity in children, adolescents and youth/young adults have been established by studies such as Atkinson et al., (1993), Cross, (1991), Helms, (1990), Phinney, (1993), Phinney & Chavira, (1992).

However, it is this anomalous findings of moral augmentations that leads the central explorations of the doctoral study to further examine this phenomena in the experimental study with improved design and methodological practice.

Translation procedures for the Lind's Moral Judgement Test and the Brown's Social Identity Measure

Translation Rationale

As discussed above the pilot studies' (Perera, 2000) carried out in the experimental demography found the language that the measure was mediated in, to be a confounding variable that possibly skewed the results in favour of higher Moral Judgment scores due to socio-economic filtering through language competence. The opportunity samples obtained in this study (Perera, S. 2000a) was biased due to language competence among the socio-economic elite who were exposed to western world education and other elitist educational advantages. As the sample had a larger private school sample this further aggravated and emphasised this issue creating developmental scores that were not reflective of the countries moral atmosphere, but rather of the socio-economic elite who are disassociated from the conflict.

The advantage of being familiar with philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, Kant, Hobbes, Rousseau etc. due to private school curriculum which

includes 'Logic'⁶⁴, 'Greek & Roman civilisation'⁶⁵ and 'classical studies'⁶⁶ had to be considered in considering the skewed results of the pilot study. Particularly when contrasted to the underprivileged state school's adherence to national curriculum which are more likely to study collectivist 'Russian politics and philosophy and 'eastern philosophy' which lends itself less fluidly to moral language in an English medium further problematised the language of transmission. The more individualistic Greco-roman/European meta-ethics which form the basis of the Kohlbergian and Piagetian paradigm mediated its context, intent and dilemma more fluidly in English, to those who spoke it as a first language. Those who didn't seemed to have struggled to understand its semantics attempting to transpose it to the language of reason most familiar to them and in its process to a parallel system of moral norms within an eastern philosophical world view. Research suggests this process of transposed context, article, and intent are likely to create semantic distortions (e.g. Butler 2002; Howarth, 1998). This intimated the need for controlled semantics where a translation of the test was available to each participant in their first language, and an attempt was made to ensure a controlled semantic parity in relation to collectivist and individualist world views.

⁶⁴ GCE/ GCSE Logic curriculum includes western models of critical thinking pertaining to argument construction, detecting fallacies etc.

⁶⁵ Greek and Roman Studies: Includes Greco-roman history, literature and philosophy.

⁶⁶ Classical Studies: Includes European history literature and philosophy.

While some form of English was spoken by the majority of the experimental demography, the competence level was not appropriate for a research measurement of socio-moral or logico-mathematical reasoning. As the phenomenon that the research instruments were attempting to gauge was necessarily bound in comprehensive clarity and innate reasoning, it was necessary to mediate the research instrument through the native languages. Therefore a measure that was internationally recognised for fluidity in contextual conversion as well as robust structural integrity in translation had been identified in the moral domain. The MJT had been translated into 32 (Lind 2000 a) languages at the time, and used worldwide for a variety studies in diverse demographics (Lind, G. 2004). Therefore translation process has followed a dual course; that of the validation procedures set out by the author of the research measure as well as due process in Science & Social Science generic translations. The latter was particularly utilised due to the above mentioned semantics and their affiliated nuances and world views.

Meanwhile, the sensitivity of language in conveying identity (whether moral or ethno-social) and the deep seated identity consciousness within both Sinhalese and Tamil problematised this process. This was particularly relevant in terms of the nation state's attempt to reaffirm its cultural identities by anchoring conceptual buzzwords that are linked to an abstract cultural history that was open to interpretation. Therefore the need

to understand the history of semantic concepts and its allied terminology was crucial to avoid semantic ambiguity. The countries' nation building process as discussed in chapter one created further cultural sensitivities. The cultural hegemony's deontological paradigm was overtly juxtaposed with what is considered to be self interested western moral culture and individualism and fragmentation⁶⁷. This meant the translation of identity and moral meanings had to be conveyed in a more holistic encompassing tense. Particularly in the moral measure the rationale of consequence had to be examined to avoid confounding or corrupting the intent of the semantics within a dilemma that could alter the course of its virtue and therefore the consequent judgement. A multitude of such contradictory challenges created difficulties in the initial translation process which found semantic moderation without a structure created further semantic corruptions. Therefore the more systematic guidelines of translation theories in sciences and social sciences with its expertise in transposing pragmatics of intent and the functional organisation of context, and the parallel guidelines in humanities, which has more expertise in conceptual transposition, was sought.

⁶⁷ The western world view is considered fragmented in the eastern Buddhist concept of the universe where individuals have no separate soul, and are rather a collection of energies collated within this life cycle. No decision or judgment or even reflection is considered an isolated phenomenon, rather a accumulation of Karmic energy.

Considerations Given to Translation Theory

Among the competing approaches to translation theory, the discipline of sciences and social sciences compromise with that of humanities and linguistics, in acknowledging some practices in due process. Among such considerations in translation theory are those exploring grammatical analysis, referential and connotative meaning, and testing of translations posited by Nida (1945, 1964, 1976) and Nida and Taber (1974) and identifying possible confounding ambiguities. Meanwhile Werner and Campbell (1970) further address some of these tensions within translations particularly for social sciences research which Brislin (1970) examine and posit solutions to. Chapman & Carter (1979) further evaluate procedures used to verify and validate translations of research measures for cross cultural use. While some social science instrument translations ignore such due process, most creditable research instruments within sciences and social sciences take these theoretical foundations and pragmatic function into consideration in its process and methodology (Mc Dermott & Palchanes, 1994). This translation process took some of the above approaches and methods into consideration in its verification procedures, as will be seen in the procedure section.

Translation Limitations & Considerations

The need for comparable versions of cognitive assessment and research instruments that produce equivalent connotative meaning, for the use of culturally diverse ethnic groups whose primary language is not English, has frequently been a challenge to cross-cultural research even for individuals who are bilingual (Zauszniewski & Harman, 1996, Pearce, Hawkins, & Kearney et. al 2006 more). A frequent corruption of cross-cultural findings that form the research fabric is the erroneous assumption of the universality, of abstract, idealistic and even tangible concepts (Marin & Marin 1991). The cultural framework and values that research tools are developed in may differ from culture to culture, impeding or transforming semantics and functions that drive each individual measure. (Munet-Vilarno & Egan, 1990). Therefore, reliable and valid instruments must have congruence in underpinning theoretical concepts (Portor and Villaruel 1993), and a broader understanding of the conceptual lineage and its comparative function in the target language, population and culture must be examined.

Translation techniques and procedures can have a profound effect on the validity and reliability of an instrument as well as its transferable value, because the construct of an instrument changes when it is adapted and translated (Kearney et. al 2006, Fullerton, Wallace, & Concha-Garcia,

1993; Marin & Marin, 1991). The translation of instruments requires cautious and precise semantic transference mindful of cultural context and semantic ambiguity with clinical transparency of process in following generic or specific established procedures for instrument translation, to produce reliable and valid cognitive assessments and research tools. This study struggled with translating concepts such as 'Identity' which didn't seem to have a transferable popular usage outside an individualistic society. Linguistic identity crisis popularly, seen in nation states attempting to salvage national identities lost to colonisation, poses a bigger threat to translations for lay consumption. This is particularly seen when there is a diglossia of the language and the two forms do not match (Hudson, 1992). This was particularly difficult not just in transposing grammatical format but in semantics of super-formal noun, adjective adverb and verb forms. This translation endeavour added hitherto unforeseen dimension to the investigation. It is worth acknowledging that this unforeseen content expansion to the thesis required an understanding of extraneous disciplines such as socio-linguistic which was outside the author's knowledge domain. Translation also required specific competences in transferring different levels of meanings especially in syntax, semantics, and morphology. Translating from English to Sinhalese & Tamil posited complications that were more challenging than when translating between Romance languages (e.g. Spanish, French, Italian) and Germanic Languages (e.g. English, German). The translation

process for the Tamil version was particularly difficult as the Dravidian language family and its formative evolution was further removed from the Germanic versions. These Germanic linguistic expressions were particularly evidenced in the MJT given it was conceived in German, then translated to the English which was the medium the current translation process was working from. The Translation to Sinhalese version was marginally less complicated given some limited shared traits in morphology and semantics. Therefore the subtleties of knowledge transference between languages and cultures required an assessment of these contextual settings.

Translation Procedures

The first part of the procedure involved a sample of 8 non professional bilingual speakers translating it into 8 (4 Sinhala, 4 Tamil) separate rough drafts. The second part of the procedure was a back translation by a fresh sample (n=8, S=4, T=4) of non professional translators. These rough drafts were less than satisfactory when they were back translated by the back translator team. Further to this there were large gaps in some areas. This process was then further refined by a series of meetings with the translators who agreed on some basic semantic translations. For example, the word identity was extremely difficult to translate into a specific structural concept in the vernacular. In spoken Sinhalese, the ‘belonging morpheme’

which represented identity is 'kama'. For example some one's Sinhalese social identity is referred to as (in rough translation) 'Singhaleseness' (sinhalakama). The team struggled to conceptualise the word identity as a separate construct in vernacular usage when divorced by the accompanying identity feature. The tri-lingual speakers in the team also expressed concern that the two translations (Sinhalese and Tamil) were not precisely compatible.

This kind of continuing complication led the team to conclude that this translation needed input from a professional state translator. In the initial consultations the state translator who was trilingual reviewed the existing merged Sinhalese translation and suggested it was revised in formal diglossia as opposed to the vernacular form. He also suggested replacing the hitherto crude attempts at translating the word 'identity' with a formal proto-Sinhala concept of '*ananyathavaya*' which is an exact and precise translation of the concept. This led to a much cleaner cut Sinhalese version expressed in formal diglossia, while the Tamil version continued to experience difficulties. This resulted in a final version of the Tamil Translation being completed by the state translation department. The final translations have been refined into the published version by amalgamating three professional translations into one draft and then back translating into the original language. The translations were authorised as a true and

coherent translation by the state translators and by the then Vice Chancellor of the State University, as is the practice in this trilingual state.

Lind Validation Criterion

The Moral Judgment Test is submitted as a behavioural experiment as opposed to a traditional psychometric test due to its rationale and design (Lumsden, 1976). Therefore the response consistency and inconsistency are indicative of the subjects' moral-cognitive structure rather than properties of the instrument (Lind, 2000b). These considerations require the instrument to be translated not just in content, but retaining all its factorial attributes to retain its research validity. While the MJT has been translated to around 32 languages, each translation has been required to test its validation sample on a demarcated sample (within the test language group), with prerequisites such as age, education level, sample size, and standardised procedures. While standard Science & Social Science translation protocols are considered a given practice, replicating a behavioural task engineered to encapsulate the conceptual framework of a behavioural stage theory requires the re-establishment of the skeletal base of its assumptions. Therefore the 4 principals of Kohlbergian moral

judgment (as further developed by Lind) have to be clearly observable by the validation results.

The first validation factor that Lind (2000a) stipulates is evidence of the cognitive affective parallelism. He translates Piagetian assumptions of cognitive-affective parallelism, to a correlation of a participant's moral attitude and their moral judgement. Therefore in the attempt to create a Sinhala & Tamil replica of the cognitive task, the translation validation results need to yield a high positive correlation between the MSP & C-Index and stages 5 and 6, a moderate correlation with stages 3 and 4, and a negative correlation with stages 1 and 2. (Lind 2000a)

The second validation factor that Lind (2000a) stipulates is evidence of the Monotonous Preference Hierarchy. This criterion should illustrate the observable preference for the six Kohlbergian stages in cumulative order. While small inversions between stages adjacent stages (particularly 1 & 2, and 5 & 6) are deemed acceptable, the stage order should illustrate the theoretical predictions.

The third validation factor that Lind (2000a) stipulates is evidence of the Quasi-Simplex Structure. While the preference hierarchy reflects the developmental stage structure of moral development to further establish the stage order in cumulative development of the 6 stages, an inter-correlation

between neighbouring stages should be illustrated by the validation results. For example as Lind 2000a outlines, stages 5 & 6 should correlate higher than more distant stages such as 4 & 6, and as a result in illustration “the correlations should monotonously decrease from the diagonal to the left lower corner of the correlation matrix” (p.8). This is generally illustrated by a main component factor analysis with varimax rotation that ultimately produces two factors with the factor loadings of the preference scores for the 6 stages orderly located on the simplex curve between the 2 factors.

The forth validation factor that Lind (2000a) stipulates is evidence of the Correlation with Education. This criterion requires evidence of correlation between the level (and quality) of education and the C index. This is based on Piagetian & Kohlbergian assumptions (with many a classical precursor) that education stimulates moral development as opposed to being a simple product of brain maturation. While it is not a necessary requirement of the validation process, a low or negative correlation between the C- Index and Educational factors would suggest an abnormality of the sample, or of other confounding variables, which would cause the participant sample to be irregular and not representative of the standard demographic of the Language group.

Lind (2000a) presents these elements as the independent variables or factors in order to observe the operational orientations of the ‘individuals’ mind’ or rather, moral conscious, “but not to assess general effects of these factors” (p.3). The participants’ judgement behaviour embodies the dependant variable which allows the participant to rate the justification of the argument. Therefore the moral elements revealing the participants judgement behaviour is embodied within the moral quality of the arguments. (Lind, 2000a, p.3)

Because these analyses are made on the central study the results can be found in the main results chapter.

Chapter 7

METHODOLOGY

The Rationale, Design, Hypotheses, Materials & Research Measures, Sample, Procedure and Ethics

Summary Rationale

To recapitulate the objective of this thesis is to explore the impact of social identity on moral development in developing world societies of conflict. It also aspires to examine the impact of predicted factors that the research fabric considers significantly related to both social identity and moral development, and understand their collective relationship to this phenomenon. To be more specific, this study explores whether the strength of social identity has any bearing on moral development in a conflict setting. Social identity was defined and measured using Brown et al.'s (1986) 'Ten Item Measure of Social Identification' & moral development was identified and measured using George Lind's (2000) Moral Judgement Test.

DESIGN

This investigation adopted a four segment design in parallel to the four exploratory investigations. As discussed in chapter 6 a preliminary pilot

study had indicated that social identity and conflict may have augmentative influences on moral development. However, the findings of that study had also indicated that factors such as socio-economy and urbanisation or other unrecognised lurking variables could have had a spurious relationship with moral development inducing the moral augmentation. Therefore this design employed a linear regression model in its design, with social identity and the two factors of moral judgment (C-Index & moral stage preference) as the dependant variables manipulated according to the exploratory question in scrutiny. The independent variables accordingly were, conflict level, socio-economic level, age, gender, ethnicity, religion, language of participation as these were considered possible factors of prediction.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Research Question 1; What is the makeup and nature of social identity strength and group attachment in societies of conflict? Which traits and characteristics (demographic/cultural) contribute to the intensity of this measure, and to what extent?

To respond to this an exploration of the demographic (Age, Gender, Conflict level) contributors that account for the nature and variance of social identity (MSI) will be implemented.

Research Question 2; What demographic conditions, characteristics and traits contributes to moral development and judgement in both the capacity to consistently judge arguments according to their moral quality (rather than their opinion agreement or other factors) and in the developmental reasoning capacity to identify and prefer arguments based on Kohlberg's advanced moral stages in societies of conflict? To what extent do these demographic conditions, characteristics and traits account for moral judgement and development?

To respond to this an exploration of the demographic contributors (Age, Gender, Conflict Level) that account for the nature and variance of both C-index and Moral Stage Preference will be implemented.

Research Question 3; What are the differences between demographic groups (Gender, Age, Religion, Ethnicity, and Language medium, and Conflict level) in their moral judgement (C-index & MSP) and in their strength of social identity or group attachment in societies of conflict?

MATERIALS & RESEARCH MEASURES

This quantitative investigation was conducted in questionnaire form for pragmatic reasons as previously considered. This was the most competent and suitable method to collect large samples of quantitative data which was necessary to sustain the long term research agenda. As chapter five and six deals with the rationale, translation and considerations in identifying the research instrument it suffices to describe the physical quality of presentation of the investigative medium. The coupled questionnaire was bound with a cover page with basic demographic questions and a standardised brief. This pencil and paper measure was available in the language version of their choice, catering to the trilingual needs of the

national context. Please see appendices for a copy of all 3 versions of the research measures.

PARTICIPANT SAMPLE

Developmental Reflection of Sampling Methodology

The Participants of this analysis were drawn from Sri Lanka to fulfil the criteria of developing/ eastern nation state experiencing ethno-social conflict over half a century. The overall study was intended to be a comparison of 'developed/western' and 'developing/eastern' nation-states that were geometrically opposed. The original projections of an experimental sample of 3000 participants compared to a parallel control sample (England & Australia) developed along the lines of the original pilot study. In the course of the research process a number of small pilot⁶⁸ trial runs along with the preliminary undergraduate pilot study registered a significant need to conduct the research mediation in the participants 1st language, and the procedures and discourse of the translations added an unforeseen content expansion to the thesis. This resulted in a reassessment of the overall sample projections, and the data from the English (aprox. N=1300) sample and the smaller Northern Irish Samples (data collection in

this phase was never completed) is not included here as the Sri Lankan sample in itself registered an enormous amount of significant dynamics that bore further investigation.

The original sample size of the Sri Lankan sample was also more ambitious and a number of sub samples from the armed forces had to be abandoned due to ethical dilemmas⁶⁹. Given the nature of armed forces, the concept of voluntary participation was a null concept. In a number of cases the researcher felt that the participation was coerced and therefore the samples were abandoned. The only sample that was retained from the armed force sub sample was the 'Anonymous Air force Base' sample (N=28) where data collection was far more relaxed and a number of participants abstained without incurring the displeasure of the commanding officer and the general ambience felt far more autonomous. This sample was also collected outside military precincts which qualifies it to be outside the MOD's purview. While removing all military data had been considered including a small military sample seemed appropriate in attempting to create a population representation.

⁶⁸ These cannot really be justified as pilot studies that could be fully reported, merely trial and error processes where a number of Sri Lankan respondents who attempted to complete the central studies' dual measure and found that language competence interfered with completing the task.

⁶⁹ The data was collected through a cluster of military contacts who had limited authority. It was an procedural faux-pas on the part of the investigation to have not foreseen that military personnel competences cannot be measured without the explicit permission of the Ministry of Defence, and in some cases the National Security Council

The geographic areas chosen in conducting the investigation were favoured to represent national statistics of a number of germane variables (ethnicity, religion, education level, urbanisation, educational orientation, socio-economic orientation, high and low conflict etc.) The salience here is based on the rationale of focusing on young-adults who have lived in a conflict-ridden society all their lives providing a longitudinal overview of this generation.

Another pertinent consideration in exploring the dynamics within the sub samples that should be emphasised is the demographic variation within the university sample in contrast to the rather homogenous school samples. University participants included under graduates, post graduates, Buddhist monks, Roman Catholic nuns, radical political activists (which within the cultural context is far more potent than in comparative western semantics) students from diverse ethnic and religious and geographic (please see map 13.1 for geographic origin) origins living in the usual eclectic student campus contexts.

Sampling Methodology

The rationale behind the overall sample was to attempt to match the national characteristics of the nation state, keeping all sub samples to a

manageable minimum, yet with the flexibility of volume to allow parametric analysis within each variable /sub sample. Given the bulk of the 2 questionnaire volume, a necessarily larger sample (N= 3000) was projected so that the incomplete returns could be weeded out. As expected in opportunity sampling some participants completed only part of the research measure and approx. 400 questionnaires were deemed void.

The sub samples were engineered according to multiple sampling methods. First the experimental samples' provincial, urbanisation, and ethno-social majority demarcations were set according to national statistics. Then a further stratified projection of germane variables such as faith demographics, socio economy, regional populations (density), school type, conflict level etc. were drawn closely matched to the national demographics. Age was stratified with a large 18 year old population to provide flexibility to ensure the data could be further cross analysed with comparative moral development studies done by the Konstanz school. While there was an attempt to meet regional diversity representations, this was not quite rigorously adhered to, as it was not considered to be germane to moral growth as cultural stimuli had been already factored into the stratification.

Within this predetermined structural projection provincial and district selections were sampled using a randomised cyber procedure. Once these

district and town samples were assorted, within these demarcations regional opportunity procedures were allowed and preferences of township, school, student group class etc. were determined by opportunity sampling procedures according to access and time scale.

PROCEDURE

The participants were initially introduced by the class teacher/ lecturer/ sub commander, and in the case of Sinhalese or English speaking classes, and then retired to the back of the class or outside the class room to allow the researcher to brief the participants with minimum interference. In Tamil speaking communities a local translator (who in some cases was the class teacher or the principal) remained to translate the primary research brief and question and respond to the participants.

The participants were informed of the BPS research ethics of participant confidentiality, anonymity and privacy policy, and were further given a very brief explanation of the research rationale without compromising the research agenda. Participants were also allowed to comment on the clarity, procedure and research agenda in a feedback section. After the questionnaires were completed (which on average took about 15 to 20 minutes) the participants were debriefed where the research agenda was explained coherently, and data anonymity and ethical usage was again stressed.

Participants were then engaged in some light discussion in reflection of their understanding of the translation to confirm the reliability of the translations in regional and cultural contexts. The entire procedure took about 2 classroom periods (45 min x 2). In the scoring procedure translators were utilised in data input to translate the demographic section of the questionnaire. The scoring of the actual research did not need translation given the Likert scale/ semantic differential format.

ETHICS

The Data were collected on an anonymous basis and the anonymity/confidentiality was clarified to them in the primary briefing. The participants were also given the opportunity to opt out (to rule out non voluntary participation given the institutional class room settings). Given the number of school age students used in the study ethical implications and procedures was a constantly challenging factor. To briefly outline the necessary procedure for the 3 group types used in the investigation;

Schools: The Department of Education were approached first and they subsequently supplied a letter which was copied to all the local education authorities (or in some cases the 'town council' or 'village headman'), who in turn provided a letter to the school principals. Letters of permission from parents were not obtained as principals have the legal authority of *loco parentis* unless the parents formally oppose and opt out. In high conflict 'outstation'⁷⁰ areas a community leader or religious leader acted as the

Universities: The State-run University of Sri Lanka is a single institution governed by one governing body, with campuses all over the country. Permission was obtained from the governing body and departmental heads,

⁷⁰ Outstation: A colloquial term for regions that do not quite operate within state practices and procedures due to its rural isolation.

as well as courtesy requests from the lecturers in charge of the classrooms. In some case students were approached in the canteen (Peradeniya campus) as well as in common rooms, and residence halls.

Security Forces: A large number of these samples were discarded due to ethical concerns and other implications. Originally 3 samples were collected including police army and navy forces. However only one sample (n=28) was collected in a procedurally comparable manner and wasn't compromised by data collection within military precincts. This group was also the only group that (the researchers felt) experienced no pressure in responding to the investigation and were participating volitionally in parity to the school and university samples. This particular sample was a mine of ethical concerns as security forces operate on direct orders and like everything else act according to hierarchical commands. With the sample in question, however, there was more time to brief the participants in a more relaxed and informal setting, and create a sense of trust and anonymity of participation. The location of data collection also enabled the data sample to be outside the ministry of defence and 'national security council' restrictions on external endeavours of competence measurement.

An outline of the Demarcated Contributing Factors and their Demographic Characteristics

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Based on the body of research literature, factors that would affect social identity and moral development were considered as possible contributing factors to the phenomenon under scrutiny. Socio economy, conflict level, language of participation, gender, religion, ethnicity and age were the most prominent of these. While factors such as age, gender, ethnicity and religious belief were explicit factors, socio-economic classifications and conflict classifications were implicit and had to be measured from explicit information like city of residence/ location of school/ school type etc. and incorporated into secondary data sourced in national statistics & census data. The descriptors of the relevant levels for both socio-economy and conflict can be found within this exposition.

While every care was taken to achieve the closest possible representation within the stratified/ random mixed model to national demographics and the school census, where there is a disparity between these sources the data

registers small discrepancies in an attempt to moderate this. These have been appropriately signposted and justified below.

VARIABLE 1: Gender

Given Gilligan's concerns about the moral paradigm's gender bias, it was identified as a possible contributing factor to moral development, particularly to moral stage preference. The research literature of social identity also illustrates gender disparities in chapter three in identity expression. Therefore gender has been identified as a contributing factor within the research design.

The Gender distribution has been projected parallel to national statistics and ministry of education statistics (School Census 2001, 2002, 2003, & 2005; university census 2005, Ministry of Education. Please see Appendix 9.1) and is moderately over representative of female participants within Secondary and Higher Education to represent the national demographics. The gender differences in Moral Development has been taken into account and appropriately weighted in this projection.

The overall sample (n=1056) was comprised of 397 men and 668 women. This break down was a result of opportunity sampling, however these

percentages (37% men, 64% women) also closely imitate statistical percentages of the gender breakdown in secondary and higher education. The table below further breaks down this gender representation according to ethnic group.

Table 2: School Samples according to gender distribution

		Gender		Total
		F	M	
Ethno Social Group	BURGHER	6	2	8
	INDIAN TAMIL	30	21	51
	MUSLIM	17	19	36
	SINHALA	544	308	852
	SL TAMIL	71	47	118
	Total	668	397	1065

(for the purpose of statistical analysis the smaller ethnic minority groups (Muslim and Burgher) were amalgamated to create a other minority sub group variable.

The samples gender representation is further illustrated below according to school sample.




Figure 1: School Samples according to Gender distribution

VARIABLE 2: Age

The research literature corresponding to both moral development and social identity, has acknowledged age to be significant contributing factor to these phenomenon as discussed in chapters four and eight. Thus, age was identified as a significant contributing factor. Further to this the research fabric suggests that young adults within the age range of 17-25 are more politically sensitive and active. Therefore the age sample chosen for this study is young adults in the 17 to 25 age group. This university/transition age group should divulge the developmental vigour of socio-moral judgement as well as increasing awareness of group identity and political sensitivity. Further to this, young adults of this age are assumed to have a fully developed cognitive capacity while being in the

age group that is generally classified to be in Kohlberg's transitional stage from stage 3 to stage 4, which makes this age group the ideal age to study for moral development/ truncation. Given the 17-20 range is the age of initiation of political responsibility, and 20 – 25 yr group (especially in the university and security force environments- where the samples of this age group is exclusively from) is the age of political activism in Sri Lanka, this creates ideal experimental raw material.

The age distribution similarly has been projected in parallel to national statistics (School census 2001, 2002, 2003, & 2005; university census 2005, ministry of education) with the exception of the 18 year old sample which has been bloated to have a substantial sample size for cross validation studies with Linds' (2000a) cross cultural samples of a similar age. The analysis examined the results for an age effect (of the 18 sub sample) to abort the large sample creating confounding effects. The absence of similar studies carried out on this age group (17-25) fraught the procedure with methodological complications, as there is no basic framework assumptions work within.

Table 3: School Samples according to Age distribution

Education level	Age	N
Grade 11	17	124

Grade 12	18	460
Grade 13	19	128
University Sample Yr 1	20	38
University Sample Yr 2	21	70
University Sample Yr 3	22	93
University Sample Yr 4	23	63
University Sample Yr 5	24	49
University Sample Yr 6	25	40




Figure 2: School Samples according to Age distribution

VARIABLE 3: Religious Belief

The research fabric also identifies religious belief and religiosity to be a contributing factor to both social identity as well as moral development. Curiously none of the participants registered 'atheism' or 'none' as a belief preference, which is a characteristic of the strongly held faith identities of eastern samples. Religious distributions in parallel with the other samples have been projected in correspondence to national Statistics and Ministry of Education Statistics (National Census of Housing & Population 2001, School Census 2001, 2002, 2003, & 2005; University Census 2005, Ministry of Education.)

Table 4: School Samples according to Religious Belief

Religious Belief	N	Sample Percentage	National Percentage
Buddhist	794	74.6	76.7
Hindu	119	11.2	7.8
Christian (Anglican)	76	7.1	0.9
Roman Catholic	41	3.8	6.1
Islam	35	3.3	8.5




Figure 3: School Samples according to Religious distribution




Figure 4: School Samples according to Religious distribution & gender

VARIABLE 4: Ethnicity

Social identity research has identified ethnicity to be contributing factor to strength of Identity, particularly in contexts of majority and minority ethnic identities or threatened ethno-social in-groups. While the research fabric corresponding to moral development does not register such an effect, this thesis projects that by virtue of its impact on social identity there would be an indirect effect. The fore ethno-social affiliations have been identified as a contributing factor.

The ethno-social demographics distribution as above, have been projected in parallel to national Statistics (School Census 2001, 2002, 2003, & 2005; University census 2005, Ministry of Education. Please see Appendix 9.1). However, there are some small discrepancy such as the over representation of Sri Lankan Tamils and the under representation of the Sri Lankan Moor/Muslim community. The reason for the former is to make up for the Districts (such as some areas in Jaffna) that has not been accessible to the census. Meanwhile, the reason for the latter is the contrast in the under representation in the Muslim population in secondary education in the ministry of education secondary school statistics, suggesting a non engagement. This moderation is clearly illustrated in the table below.

Table 5: School Samples according to Ethno-social group

Ethnicity	N	Sample Percentage	National Percentage
Singhalese	852	80%	82.0%
Sri Lankan Tamil	118	11.1%	4.3 %
Indian Tamil	51	4.8%	5.1%
Sri Lankan Muslim (Moor)	36	3.4%	7.9%
Burgher 0	8	8%	0.2%

(for the purpose of statistical analysis the smaller ethnic minority groups (Muslim and Burgher) were amalgamated to create the sub group variable 'other minority'.

VARIABLE 6: Conflict Level Classification




Figure 5: School Samples according to Ethnic distributions by gender

VARIABLE 5: Language of participation

Based on the results of a pilot study (Perera, 2000a) this study was conducted in the trilingual options that are familiar to the experimental populace. Vygotskian considerations in relationship between language and thought, and the potency of ethno-social identity in relation to its mother tongue were also prominent factors in making this identification.

VARIABLE 6: Conflict Level Classifications

	Conflict Level 1; (Low- none)	Conflict Level 2; Moderate to low	Conflict Level 3 Moderate	Conflict Level 4; High to moderate	Conflict Level 5; High
Missing persons/IDP	None from region	None from region	None from region	Some from region	Very high from region
Land mine volume	None	None	None	Sporadic	Very high (classified internationally as a land mine intense region)
Bordering terrorist controlled area	No	Around 160 miles from conflict zone	Around 200 miles from conflict zone***	Under 100 miles of conflict zone	Classified as a conflict zone
Number of deaths	None reported*	None reported*	76**	Estimated deaths in armed forces between 500-1000 per year	No official records for LTTE, however they estimate over 2000
Geographic Regions (of sample)	Galle & Ruhuna Horetuduwa Moratuwa,	Matale,	Colombo & Jayewardenepura Kandy	Anuradhapura Pollonnaruwa	Trincomalee Sigiriya military sample
N	321	91	375	126	152

*No reported casualties in this zone due to armed conflict

**Due to terrorist bombings

*** While Colombo is not near a conflict zone, it is classified as moderate due to other factors (e.g. continuous terrorist bombs) that threaten the cultural and political capital.

Summary Sources of information for classification

1. Number of deaths (sourced from Ministry of women, Empowerment & Social welfare).
2. Whether it is bordering or within a 100 mile radius of a terrorist controlled area was measured using google earth.
3. Classification of land mine volumes Land mine reports (1999-2003)
4. No missing persons and IDPs (Internally displaced persons) were obtained from UNICEF/UNDP casualty statistics UNHCR⁷¹ Information on internal/regional displacement.

Classification Procedure and other Resources

While the conflict level differentiations seemed self evident to those within the country as were the factors used as descriptors, it was extremely challenging to find defence ministry statistics to support these descriptors. Therefore, this loose stratification has to remain a loose description based ordinal hierarchy, self evident to a socio-conflict geography, rather than an

⁷¹ UNHCR : UN High Commission for Refugees

equidistant parametric construct based on officially sourced casualty statistics. The time period referent for this classification was 1999- 2005.

While official sources refused to comment, anonymous military personnel were consulted to further refine some of the statistics. Therefore a number of indirect symptoms were used to evidence this classification. Information from the armed conflict database (re: troop numbers and weaponry) cross referenced with the Land mine reports (1999-2005) were utilised to draw some of the descriptors below. Other sources that were collaborated included UNICEF/UNDP casualty statistics UNHCR⁷² Information on internal/regional displacement.

Level 5 (High Conflict); In attempting to establish evidence to support the high conflict classification, state regional casualties claims (within the land mine reports 1999-2003) were further cross referenced with LTTE regional casualty claims (within the Land mine report 1999-2003), and the provinces demarcated as affected by mines or had been de-mined have been encompassed within the high conflict classification⁷³. These regions are particularly obvious as they naturally fall within Northern or North Eastern Provinces (Please see map in Appendix). While a few Central

⁷² UNHCR : UN High Commission for Refugees

⁷³ **Land mines:** The government has estimated that a million landmines were laid in Sri Lanka by both sides during the conflict (the LTTE has put the number at two million¹ and reported that more than 550 villages were affected, including 250 villages where de-mining had started and 307 that remained to be cleared. (Land mine Report 2000)

province border areas are within mining zones they are not within the catchment areas of the schools the samples within the central province are drawn from. Other projections from the 'ministry of nation building of Sri Lanka' which reviews and projects mining policy were also used to further ensure classifications below level 5 were not within land mine regions.

Level 4 (Moderate-High Conflict); Classification of level four was mostly based on regional displacement statistics provided by the UNHCR, and by virtue of the fact that most large refugee camps/units for the regionally displaced are located within these border villages in the Central province (which abuts the Northern and North-eastern conflict areas at least 2 of its borders (forming a v shaped curvilinear border- please see map in Appendix). The major hospitals and placement of defensive armed force units further corroborated this classification.

Level 3 (Moderate Conflict); Classification of level three was based on urban cities that experienced the conflict sporadically when the LTTE groups attacked the cultural and commercial capitals in targeting civilians to celebrate ethnic memories. (Please see Appendix 14.7.4 for bomb records). These bomb attacks have been based on Journalistic records (Lake House conflict data base 2005) and itemised in the appendices.

Level 2 (Moderate-Low Conflict); While classification of level two was based on minimal conflict references in journalistic records (Lake House conflict data base 2005).

Level 1 (Low Conflict); Level one was thus classified by virtue of no conflict records in journalistic records (Lake House conflict data base 2005).

Please note that as these variables were not essential to the central hypothesis and were incidental demographics, the scale was constructed based on rudimentary statistics that were at best fragmented (i.e. cannot be justified as equidistant only ordinal). However, this academic evidence based justification was carried out on founded on the common sense classification that the sub sample liaisons provided and further evidenced within available conflict symptom information. The following descriptors are based on sub sample liaison information to provide depth of understanding of each sub sample rather than evidence base of classification. Unfortunately these cannot be officially corroborated as the ministry of defence abstained from commentary.

A further 5 five indicators that were that were used to calculate the stratification of individual experiential quality was developed but have not

been used for this statistical analysis, and therefore can be found in the appendix (appendix 7.3)

Chapter 8

RESULTS

	Moral Judgement Test's C- index	Moral Judgement Test's MSP; Moral Stage Preference	MSI; Measure of Social Identity
Author	Lind, <i>et al.</i> (2000)	Lind, <i>et al.</i> (2000)	Brown, <i>et al.</i> (1986)
What it measures	The C-index measures a person's ability to <i>consistently</i> judge arguments according to their moral quality (rather than their opinion agreement or other factors).	The stage preference refers to Kohlberg's original scale model of six stages.	The strength or intensity of social identity and group attachment according to Tajfel's (1978) definition.
How it is calculated	This calculates consistent application of a particular moral principal. Please see appendix 8.1.1 for the algorithm applied	The number of times (mode) the participant rated the argument of a particular stage.	Likert scale semantic deferential preference that creates an ordinal scale.
Range of possible scores	The C index can range from 0 to 100. Low (0-9), Medium (10-29), High (30-49) Very high (above 50) (according to Cohen, 1988)	Stage 1; <i>obedience</i> Stage 2; <i>self-interest</i> Stage 3; <i>conformity</i> Stage 4; <i>law and order</i> Stage 5; <i>human rights</i> Stage 6; <i>universal human ethics</i>	The MSI can range from -20 to +20

Figure 6 - Research Instrument Summary

An Exploration of Moral Development and its contributory factors on Societies of Conflict in the Developing World

As indicated in chapter 1, 2 and 3, the research literature suggests that societies of ethno-social conflict are more likely to create Social in-groups and out-groups that are ethnocentric and exclusivist and challenge mutual empathy, altruism and cooperation and sometimes create negative out-group stereotypes & prejudice. As these conditions would invalidate the conditions required for advanced moral judgment, reasoning and development, this investigation attempts to uncover whether that strong attachment to a perceived ethno social community would correlate negatively with advanced moral development. Therefore this statistical investigation will explore the relationship between social identity, as measured by Brown, et al's. (1986) Measure of Social Identity (MSI), and moral judgement, as indicated by the Cognitive Index (C-index) and the Moral Stage Preference (MSP). Furthermore this investigation will explore the demographic variables that contribute to social identity.

Summary procedure of results

The narrative of the result chapter attempts to follow a logical step by step procedural investigation. Therefore results have been laid out in progressive phases in illustration of the three research questions;

Analysis for Research Question 1;

An exploration of the contributors to the nature of social identity (MSI).

Analysis for Research Question 2;

2a. An exploration of the contributors to the nature of consistent moral judgement (according to the C-index).

2.b An exploration of the contributors to the nature of moral stage preference (MSP).

Analysis for Research Question 3;

3a. An investigation of the effects of demographic characteristics' on moral development (MSP & C-index).

3a. An investigation of the effects of demographic characteristics' on social identity (MSP).

Descriptive illustration;

Firstly, descriptive explorations and explorations of parametric assumptions were carried out. Please note that much of the descriptive breakdown of the data, (particularly tabulated frequencies, means and standard deviations) has been contained to a brief illustration of the nature and shape of the data. It will also present illustrations to confirm that the assumptions of multiple regression, and factorial analysis of variance and multiple analysis of variance such as, normality, linearity and homoscedasticity are not violated. Please see Appendices for Further descriptive results.

Inferential analysis of research question 1; Research question one was first scrutinised by submitting the measure of social identity (dependant variable- MSI) to a simultaneous multiple regression to explore the predictive factors of the degree of group attachment (i.e. MSI). A simultaneous multiple regression was employed as there was no theoretical underpinning to suggest that any one of these independent variables contributed significantly to Social Identity than any other. The exploratory predictive factors submitted were, Gender, Age, and Conflict level.

Inferential Analysis of Research Question 2a; The 1st part of research question two was then scrutinised by submitting the C-index of moral judgement (dependant variable- C-index) to a stepwise multiple regression to explore the predictive factors of the moral judgment (C-index). A stepwise multiple regression was considered appropriate, as the literature body seemed to lead to the priori assumptions that moral judgement was related to social identity and other predictors in varying degrees which underpinned hierarchy of the identified contributory predictors. The exploratory predictive factors submitted were⁷⁴, MSI, Gender, Age, and Conflict level.

Inferential analysis of research question 2a; The 2nd part of research question two was then scrutinised by submitting Moral Stage Preference (dependant variable- MSP), to a stepwise multiple regression to explore the predictive factors of the Kohlbergian stage preference. Again a stepwise multiple regression was considered appropriate, as the literature body seemed to lead to the priori assumptions that moral judgement was related to social identity (MSI) and other predictors in varying degrees which underpinned the identified contributory predictors in this conceptual

⁷⁴ Moral Stage Preference was not submitted as an IV as MSP and C-index is a dual concept of moral judgement and therefore significantly correlated ($r=0.115$, $p= 0.001$) as is expected in affective cognitive parallelism.

duality. The exploratory predictive factors submitted were⁷⁵, Measure of Social Identity (MSI) Gender, Age, and Conflict level.

Inferential analysis of research question 3a; The 3rd phase of the investigation examined the differences between demographic groups (Gender, Age, Religion, Ethnicity, and Language medium, and Conflict level) in their moral development (C-index & MSP), This (dependant variable- C-index & MSP), was examined using a Multiple Analysis of Variance which scrutinised the association between the demographic variables. These exploratory independent factors submitted were⁷⁶, Gender, Age, Religion, Ethnicity, and medium of Participation (Language), and Conflict level.

Inferential analysis of research question 3b; The 3rd phase of the investigation further examined the differences between demographic groups (Gender, Age, Religion, Ethnicity, and Language medium, and Conflict level) in their social identity (MSI), This (dependant variable MSI), was examined using a Univariate factorial Analysis of Variance which scrutinised the association between the demographic variables.

⁷⁵ Again C- index was not submitted as an IV as MSP and C-index is a dual concept of moral judgement and therefore significantly correlated ($r=0.115$, $p= 0.001$) as is expected in affective cognitive parallelism.

These exploratory independent factors submitted were⁷⁷, Gender, Age, Religion, Ethnicity, and medium of Participation (Language), and Conflict level.

The Multiple Correlation Coefficients (R) the Coefficients of Determination (R²), the Effect sizes (F) the degrees of freedom (df) and the Significance (p) for all three research questions is reported below the descriptive statistics in paragraph format. The complete analysis information can be found in table format in the Appendices in table format. Further post-hoc tests and contrasts and other descriptive charts can also be found in the Appendices.

⁷⁶ Again C- index was not submitted as an IV as MSP and C-index is a dual concept of moral judgement and therefore significantly correlated ($r=0.115$, $p= 0.001$) as is expected in affective cognitive parallelism.

⁷⁷ Again C- index was not submitted as an IV as MSP and C-index is a dual concept of moral judgement and therefore significantly correlated ($r=0.115$, $p= 0.001$) as is expected in affective cognitive parallelism.

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

SUMMARY DESCRIPTIVES OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES

	C- INDEX	MSP	MSI
N	1065	1065	1065
Mean	21.4185	4.5540	9.21
Standard Deviation	12.94086	1.36040	4.436

Table 6- Descriptions of dependant variables

Table 6 shows basic means and standard deviations of the dependant variables.

		Frequency	Percent
Stage	1.00	37	3.5
Stage	2.00	68	6.4
Stage	3.00	101	9.5
Stage	4.00	247	23.2
Stage	5.00	286	26.9
Stage	6.00	326	30.6
Stage	Total	1065	100.0

Table 7 -Moral stage preference of sample

Table 7 displays the overall sample preferred stages 5 and 6, which is in keeping with the developmental span of the sample age group.

Moral development illustrations of the C-index and the MSP.




Figure 7 - Cohens C-Index count




Figure 8 - Moral Stage Preference count

The C-index has been transformed here to a developmental stage formation based on Cohen's, (1988) C-index stratification of the MJT (Low, 0-9, Medium, 10-29, High 30-49, Very high, 50-100). This can be seen below in table 8.

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Low	174	16.3
	Medium	581	54.6
	High	210	19.7
	Very High	34	3.2
	Total	999	93.8
Total		1065	100.0

Table 8 - C-index transformed

When this visual standardisation is implemented to compare the C-index, the MSP demonstrates the Kohlbergian cumulative preference in a normal population, with stage 5 and 6 being preferred most by a large percentage (57%) of the population. Conversely the C-index shows a normal distribution when transformed stratified segments with low, high and very high scores being achieved by less than 200 participants each, while middling scores are achieved by about 600 subjects.

DESCRIPTIVES OF SOCIAL IDENTITY (MSI)

Table 9 below shows the means and standard deviations of social identification and group attachment in the total population (N=1065), categorised by religion.

RELIGION	MEAN	STD. DEVIATION
Buddhist	9.19	4.362
Christian	8.76	4.779
Hindu	9.26	4.606
Muslim	11.11	4.013
Total	9.21	4.436

Table 9 - Population MSI means by Religion

Table 10 below shows the means and standard deviations of social identification and group attachment in the total population (N=1065), categorised by ethno social group.

ETHNO SOCIAL GROUP	MEAN	STD. DEVIATION
Sinhala	9.17	4.369
SL Tamil	8.62	4.994
IN Tamil	9.90	3.822
Other minorities	10.98	4.437
Total	9.21	4.436

Table 10 - Population MSI means by Ethno Social Group

Table 11 below shows the means and standard deviations of social identification and group attachment in the total population (N=1065), categorised by conflict level.

CONFLICT LEVEL	MEAN	STD. DEVIATION
Low / None Conflict	8.76	4.393
Moderate to Low Conflict	9.67	3.958
Moderate Conflict	10.54	5.202
Moderate to High Conflict	9.91	3.841
High Conflict	8.41	4.331
Total	9.31	4.459

Table 11 - Population MSI means by Conflict Level

Table 12 below shows the means and standard deviations of social identification and group attachment in the total population (N=1065), categorised by age.

AGE	MEAN	STD. DEVIATION
17	9.86	4.529
18	9.26	4.583
19	9.41	3.584
20	8.66	4.115
21	8.81	4.434
22	9.10	4.131
23	8.70	5.120
24	9.47	4.350

25	8.08	4.817
Total	9.21	4.436

Table 12 - Population MSI means by Age

Table 13 below shows the means and standard deviations of social identification and group attachment in the total population (N=1065), categorised by gender.

GENDER	MEAN	STD. DEVIATION
Male	8.86	4.501
Female	9.43	4.387
Total	9.21	4.436

Table 13 - Population MSI means by Gender

Table 14 below shows the means and standard deviations of social identification and group attachment in the total population (N=1065), categorised by language.

LANGUAGE	MEAN	STD. DEVIATION
English	10.11	5.500
Sinhala	9.08	4.219
Tamil	9.05	4.295
Total	9.21	4.436

Table 14 - Population MSI means by Language

**DESCRIPTIVES LINE GRAPHS SCORE DISTRIBUTION IN MSI,
MSP & C-INDEX BY CONFLICT AND AGE**

Figure 9 below shows the C-Index change when plotted against conflict level. This indicates that C-Index scores gradually fall as conflict level increases, with a large fall from None/Low Conflict to Low/Moderate Conflict zones.




Figure 9- C-Index mean plotted against Conflict Level

Figure 10 shows a peak in the MSI mean scores in the Moderate Conflict category with lower MSI scores nearer the extreme ends of the conflict scale.




Figure 10 - MSI mean plotted against Conflict Level

MSP mean scores were consistent across the conflict levels, as shown in Figure 11.




Figure 11 - MSP mean plotted against Conflict Level

Males' mean MSP scores dropped as they became older whereas females' scores increased as shown below in Figure 12.




Figure 12 - MSP means plotted against Age

Mean MSI scores showed a similar trend of females scoring higher overall, as male scores dropped in older participants.




Figure 13 - MSI means plotted against Age

Overall, male mean scores on the C Index fluctuated less than the female scores as the age of participants changed, but both had significant jumps under the age of 20 before female mean scores became more consistent after 20 (as seen in Figure 14).




Figure 14 - C-Index means plotted against Age

Parametric assumptions for inferential analysis : Normal Distribution, Homogeneity of Variance, Homoscedascity & Linearity and sample size

The overall sample (N=1056) is organised in sub sample groups of Gender, Age, Language of participation, Ethnicity, Religion and Conflict Level. There are some mutually exclusive groups (ex- no Tamil Buddhists or Singhalese Hindus etc). . All sub sample groups are larger than 40 (48 being the smallest available group).

To explore data distribution for the 3 central variables C-Index, Moral Stage Preference and Measure of Social Identity 3 histograms were generated. As seen below (Figure 1.1 & 1.2) the two central variables MSI & C-Index displayed normal distribution.




Figure 15 - Histogram illustrating the distribution of the MSI Scores




Figure 16 - Histogram illustrating the distribution of the C-Index Scores

The third Variable Moral Stage preference displayed cumulative distribution as expected in Stage preference behaviour.




Figure 17 - Histogram illustrating the distribution of Moral Stage preferences.

While other tests such as Q-Q plots and K-S tests were utilised to further explore normal distribution (but are excluded from the results section) the results of these were weighted with considerations of the sample volume. To further evaluate homogeneity of variance and the variables' suitability to be tested using parametric indices, the descriptive frequencies were explored which divulged a standard deviation of 1.36 and a variance of 1.85 for MSP as seen in the table above in the descriptive section. The Levene's test confirmed homogeneity of variance for all 3 variables as indicated below.

Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
.165	1	1063	.685

Table 15 - Test of Homogeneity of Variances for MSI

Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
.355	1	1063	.552

Table 16 - Test of Homogeneity of Variances for C-Index

Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
.009	1	1063	.926

Table 17 - Test of Homogeneity of Variances for MSP

Given the volume (n=1065) of the data it was difficult to illustrate linear distribution using a scatter plot generated by values, therefore these will be excluded from the results chapters. Two sets of scatter plots using means and sums were generated to explore homoscedasticity and linearity in the initial descriptive exploratory stage. As seen below (Figures 18 & 19) the scatter plots based on the means of the C-Index and Moral stage preference seemed to indicate a somewhat linear relationship and arguable homoscedasticity.

Scatter plots between MSI and C-Index, MSP & MSI.




Figure 18 - Scatter plot based on the means between MSI and Moral Stage Preference




Figure 19 - Scatter plot based on the means between MSI and C-Index

Despite the evidence of some reasonable doubt of linearity, the basic assumptions for a linear regression were met.




Figure 20 - Scatter plot based on the sums between MSI and C-Index




Figure 21 - Scatter plot based on the sums between MSI and Moral Stage Preference

The normal P-P plot below (Figure 22) further confirms the above contention that the mild tensions between homoscedasticity and

heteroscedasticity seen in the sample are not substantial enough to make a linear regression inappropriate.

Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual




Figure 22 - Measure P-plot illustrating the Standardised Residual of the Multiple Regression

INFERENCEAL ANALYSIS

RESEARCH QUESTION 1:

An exploration of the contributors to the nature of social identity and degree of group attachment (MSI) by submitting the measure of social identity (dependant variable- MSI) to a simultaneous multiple regression to explore the predictive factors (Gender, Age, and Conflict level) was implemented. Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure that no assumptions of the normality, linearity, multi collinearity and homoscedasticity were violated as evidenced and illustrated at the beginning of the chapter in the descriptive analysis.

The association between the MSI and predictors (Age, Gender and Conflict Level) is positive ($R = 0.1, p < 0.05$). Together Age, Gender and Conflict Level accounted for 0.7% of the variation in MSI (adjusted R^2). Gender and Conflict Level positivity related to MSI, while age related negatively. The regression coefficient for Age was -0.12, indicating as age increased the MSI score decreased. The Gender coefficient was 0.63, indicating a higher score for women. The Conflict Level coefficient was 0.16. Since the confidence limits for Gender and Conflict Level did not encompass a negative value, it can be concluded that the population regression

coefficients for both are positive (Gender – $t = 2.24$; $p = 0.03$ /Conflict Level – $t = 1.63$; $p = 0.1$), while the negative value for Age indicates that the population regression for Age is negative (Age – $t = -1.95$, $p = 0.05$). The standardised regression coefficients show that Gender and Age are significant predictors to MSI, while Conflict Level is not.

RESEARCH QUESTION 2a:

An exploration of the contributors to the nature of moral judgement (C-index) by submitting moral judgement (dependant variable- C-index) to a stepwise multiple regression to explore the predictive factors (MSI, Gender, Age, and Conflict level) of Moral Judgement was implemented. Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure that no assumptions of normality, linearity, multi collinearity and homoscedasticity were violated.

The association between the C-Index and predictors (MSI, Age, Gender and Conflict Level) is positive ($R = 0.07$). Together MSI, Age, Gender and Conflict Level accounted for 0.3% of the variation in the C-Index (adjusted R^2). MSI is negatively related to the C Index score with a coefficient of -0.07. The confidence limits for MSI were both negative (-0.37 to -0.02), so it can be concluded that the population regression coefficients is negative ($t = -2.34$; $p = 0.03$). Therefore the standardised regression coefficients show that social identity (MSI) is a significant predictor of moral judgement (C Index).

RESEARCH QUESTION 2b:

An exploration of the contributors to the nature of moral judgement (MSP) by submitting moral judgement (dependant variable- MSP) to a stepwise multiple regression to explore the predictive factors (MSI, Gender, Age, and Conflict level) of Moral Judgement was implemented. Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure that no assumptions of normality, linearity, multi collinearity and homoscedasticity were violated.

The association between the MSP and predictors (MSI, Age, Gender and Conflict Level) is positive (multiple R = 0.07). Gender accounted for 0.4% of the variation in MSP (adjusted R²). MSP is positively related to Gender with a coefficient of 0.07 indicating higher scores for women. The confidence limits for Gender were both positive (0.02 to 0.36), so it can be concluded that the population regression coefficients is positive ($t = 2.19$; $p = 0.03$). Therefore the standardised regression coefficients show that Gender is a significant predictor of Moral Stage Preference.

RESEARCH QUESTION 3

An investigation of demographic characteristics' on moral development (MSP & C-index) and social identity (MSP)

3a; Multivariate Analysis of Variance on Moral Development (MSP & C-index) of socio demographic categorical variables.

This analysis was carried out to evaluate whether socio demographic distribution of the data (and indirectly the opportunity sampling procedure) had an affect on moral judgement as measured by (MSP & C-index). This was analysed separately to social identity (MSI) based on the theoretical underpinning of moral universability (i.e. that cultural/ demographic factors are does not limit moral universability) and the priori assumption that social identity (MSI) should be influenced by socio demographic traits. This also resolved the pragmatic considerations of non dichotomous categorical variables that could not be submitted to a multiple regression.

Therefore an exploration of the contributors to the nature of moral judgement by submitting its measures (dependant variable- MSP & C-index) to a MANOVA to investigate whether socio demographic traits.

(Gender, Age, Religion, Ethnicity, and Medium of Participation/Language, and Conflict level) of Moral Judgement. Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure that no assumptions of normality, linearity, multi collinearity and homoscedasticity were violated

A one-way between-groups multivariate analysis of variance was performed to investigate the effects of identity demographics on moral development. Two dependent variables were used: C Index and MSP. The independent variables were Ethno Social Group, Gender, Religion and Language. Preliminary assumption testing was conducted to check for normality, linearity, univariate and multivariate outliers, homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices, and multicollinearity, with no serious violations noted.

There was a no significant difference between Ethno Social Groups on the combined dependent variables, $F(6, 2054) = 1.47, p = 0.19$; Wilks' Lambda = 0.99; partial eta squared < 0.01. When the results for the dependent variables were considered separately, no statistically significant differences were found using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of 0.002 (C Index: $F(3, 1065) = 1.59, p = 0.19$, partial eta squared = 0.005. MSP: $F(3, 1065) = 1.05$, partial eta squared = 0.37).

Furthermore there was a no significant difference between Gender on the combined dependent variables, $F(2, 1027) = 0.71$, $p = 0.49$: Wilks' Lambda = 0.99; partial eta squared < 0.01 . When the results for the dependent variables were considered separately, no statistically significant differences were found using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of 0.002 (C Index: $F(1, 1065) = 0.22$, $p = 0.64$, partial eta squared < 0.01 . MSP: $F(1, 1065) = 1.07$, partial eta squared < 0.01).

There was also a non significant difference between Religion on the combined dependent variables, $F(6, 2054) = 0.61$, $p = 0.72$: Wilks' Lambda = 0.99; partial eta squared < 0.01 . When the results for the dependent variables were considered separately, no statistically significant differences were found using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of 0.002 (C Index: $F(3, 1065) = 0.97$, $p = 0.41$, partial eta squared < 0.01 . MSP: $F(3, 1065) = 0.24$, partial eta squared < 0.01).

Furthermore there was a no significant difference between Language on the combined dependent variables, $F(4, 2054) = 0.61$, $p = 0.662$: Wilks' Lambda = 0.99; partial eta squared < 0.01 . When the results for the dependent variables were considered separately, no statistically significant differences were found using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of 0.002 (C Index: $F(2, 1065) = 0.97$, $p = 0.21$, partial eta squared < 0.01 . MSP: $F(2, 1065) = 0.94$, partial eta squared < 0.01).

3b; Univariate Analysis of Variance on Social Identity (MSI) of socio demographic categorical variables.

This Univariate analysis was carried out to evaluate whether socio demographic distribution of the data had an affect on Social Identity (MSI). This was analysed independently to explore the demographic variables (Gender, Age⁷⁸, Religion, Ethnicity, and Medium of Participation/Language, and Conflict level) that affected social identity (MSI) based on the priori assumption that social identity (MSI) should be influenced by socio demographic traits⁷⁹. This also resolved the pragmatic considerations of non dichotomous categorical variables that could not be submitted to a multiple regression. Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure that no assumptions of normality, linearity, multi collinearity and homoscedasticity were violated (which have been reported at the descriptive section of this chapter). However, the means and 95% confidence intervals for MSI in the Religion, Ethno-social group and Gender conditions are presented in Figures 23 & 24 below (Error bar charts of the remaining independent variables are not presented here due to their non significant impact on MSI).

⁷⁸ While Age and Conflict Level were analysed in the Regression to calculate its contribution to the Social Identity model (as this was possible as they were ordinal variables), they were reanalysed in this ANOVA as it seemed appropriate to include all demographic variables and the purpose of this analysis was to explore significant differences between groups.

⁷⁹ Despite the lack of theoretical underpinning for this.




Figure 23 - Confidence Intervals for MSI scores by Religion of participant




Figure 24 - Mean MSI scores by Ethno Social Group

This chart suggests that there are considerable differences in the measure of social identity between religions, as males score lower in all religions and overall. There is an overlap of scores suggesting that while the differences are significant, certain score-ranges are not mutually exclusive

to each religion or gender (with the exception of Buddhist males and Muslim females who had no overlap). These differences were further investigated, as described below.

The Measure of Social Identity (MSI) was analysed using a factorial analysis of variance with six between-participant factors of Religion, Gender, Ethnicity, Language, Conflict Level and Age. This analysis revealed that the main effects due to the Gender ($F(1, 712) = 4.06, p < 0.05$) and Religion ($F(3, 712) = 7.51, p < 0.01$) were significant, while the other main effects of Age ($F(1, 712) = 1.38, p = 0.24$), Ethnicity ($F(3, 712) = 1.23, p = 0.30$) and Language ($F(2, 712) = 1.22, p = 0.30$) were not significant. Conflict Level as a main effect was found to be approaching significance ($F(1, 712) = 3.75, p = 0.053$). Collectively, these demonstrate that males scored significantly lower than females in all religious groups as illustrated above in Figure 24. Similarly, it indicates that there was a significant difference between religious groups.

Interactions between Religion and Ethnicity ($F(2, 712) = 4.122, p = 0.02$, partial $\eta^2 = 0.11$), Religion and Language ($F(4, 712) = 5.59, p < 0.01$, partial $\eta^2 = 0.30$), and Religion and Gender ($F(3, 712) = 5.26, p < 0.01$, partial $\eta^2 = 0.22$), were found to be significant. These interactions create significant differentials, for example between Buddhist males and Muslim females who are mutually exclusive groups. The interaction between

Ethnicity and Gender ($F(3, 712) = 5.641, p < 0.01, \text{partial } \eta^2 = 0.02$) was also found to be significant. These collectively illustrate the gender differences between Ethno Social Groups. The propensity for the larger ethnic majority groups to score lower than smaller minority groups is evidenced above. This is particularly visible when considering the means of the Sinhala when compared to Other minority groups.

Similar to the gender differences in the religious groups, the gender differences in ethnicity also demonstrated the tendency for males to score lower than females. However, this is inverted in Sri Lankan Tamil females as seen above where the gender bias for females to score higher is reversed.

Furthermore, the interactions between Religion, Ethnicity and Language ($F(1, 712) = 3.96, p < 0.05, \text{partial } \eta^2 = 0.006$), Religion Language and Gender ($F(2, 712) = 6.87, p \leq 0.01, \text{partial } \eta^2 = 0.02$), Ethnicity, Language and Gender ($F(1, 712) = 7.38, p < 0.01, \text{partial } \eta^2 = 0.01$), and Religion, Ethnicity, Language and Gender ($F(1, 712) = 6.70, p = 0.01, \text{partial } \eta^2 = 0.009$) were also significant in keeping with the significant two-way interactions.

Chapter 9

CONCLUSIONS & DISCUSSION

SUMMARY RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS

Research Question 1; What is the makeup and nature of social identity strength and group attachment, in societies of conflict? Which traits and characteristics (demographic/cultural) contribute to the intensity of this measure, and to what extent?

Three demographic variables were identified, Age, Gender and Conflict Level as predictors of group attachment and social identification (MSI). The findings further suggest that Gender and Age are the most significant contributors in a predictive model in significantly accounting for variance in strength of social identity and group attachment. The regression model also registered a significant negative relationship between group attachment (MSI) and Age, suggesting that strength of group identification and attachment diminish. The results also suggested that women scored higher on strength of identification and group attachment with the largest differences between majority group men and minority group women.

While gender and age only account for very small variation of the model, these findings further frame the findings on moral judgement and are in keeping with comparable socio-cultural research.

Research Question 2; What demographic conditions, characteristics and traits contributes to moral judgement and to what extent do these demographic conditions, characteristics and traits account for moral judgement and development?

The central finding to this question is the very significant though modest negative relationship between social identification strength and group attachment and moral judgement (C-index). This suggests that as group attachment and identity strength increased the capacity to consistently apply moral principles to ones judgement decreased. However this does not seem to be reflected in moral stage preference as the negligible positive relationship between stage preference and identity score is not significant. Age, Gender and Conflict Level also accounted for a modest but significant amount of the variation in moral judgement (C-index). This gender bias was also reflected in the stage preference (MSP), with females scoring higher on the scale.

Research Question 3; What are the differences between demographic groups (Gender, Age, Religion, Ethnicity, and Language medium, and Conflict level) in their moral judgement (C-index & MSP) and in their strength of social identity or group attachment.

The MANOVA analysis which approached these questions differently, exploring the differences between groups rather than exploring the contribution to a variate model, found no effects in moral judgement (C-index and MSP) which confirm that cultural factors such as religion, ethnicity, language of participation or gender do not influence moral judgement. This also further placates epistemological concerns of bias in the cultural and gender domains. This seems to further imply that moral universability in gender and cultural domains can only be achieved when moral stage preference⁸⁰ is measured as a cognitive affective duality as Lind reinterprets Kohlbergian measurement, rather than adhering to the traditional affect driven model.

The analysis of measure of social identity (MSI), however, revealed a number of significant differences between groups in attachment. The

⁸⁰ The concept not the measurement variable.

results reported considerable significant differences between religious groups and gender groups, confirming the wide and mutually exclusive gap between majority faith males (Buddhist men) and minority faith females (Muslim women) were not a chance occurrence. This analysis also reported significant interactions (both 2-way and 3-way) between Religion, Ethnicity, Language, and Gender. Curiously while the regression model had previously identified age as contributing to the model of social identification (MSI) this analysis did not register any significant differences between age groups. This might be explained by the fact that age groups were gradually progressive (i.e., 17, 18, 19, 20 etc.) rather than polarised or equidistant differentiated (ex. 16 yr olds, 21 yr olds, 26 yr olds). Though Conflict Level also did not register significant group differences, the analysis suggested it was approaching significance⁸¹.

⁸¹ (p= 0.051).

DISCUSSION

The relationship between identity, culture and moral reasoning has been of contention for several decades; with various sub fields of the discipline approaching the quagmire of thesis's and hypothesises from diverse angles and from varying paradigms. (e.g. Blasi, 1983; 1984; 1995; Damon & Hart, 1992; Cheryan & Bodenhausen, 2000; Erikson, 1964; Forehand, Deshpande, & Reed, 2004; Hart, Atkins, & Ford, 1998; Haidt, 2001; Higgins, 2006; Lapsley & Lasky, 2001; Monroe, 2001; Shih, Pittinsky, & Ambady, 1999; Walker & Pitts, 1998). While the findings of these studies have been illuminating in understanding the importance of the multi-dimensions and focal points of identity in moral judgment and behaviour, they have emphasised the nature of 'moral identity' rather than ethnocentric group attachment and identification which is crucial in understanding ethnocentric conflict behaviours. While this focus on moral identity is crucial in the epistemological development of the moral domain, it does not explicate the specific concerns of extreme ethnocentric identities developed in ethnic conflict contexts.

However, a by-product of these increasingly sophisticated and reflexive epistemological developments is the shift in the moral domain to re-emphasise the hitherto neglected cognitive developmental characteristics of the original Piagetian-Kohlbergian definitions of moral judgement. Therefore moral judgment is no longer perceived as a Kantian justice ethic-centred, self-reported, attitude preference, but a cognitive competence measured much like other cognitive competences. This maturation in moral judgement epistemology has resulted in better flexibility in cross-cultural research when operationalising moral judgement in culturally sensitive semantic contexts. These developments in the moral domain, has not only made this particular investigation possible, but also profoundly relevant in understanding this particular relationship (ethno-centred group identification to moral development), in a context⁸² that this understanding could have significant⁸³ implications in further comprehending and managing ethno-centred community tensions.

The fundamental concern of this study was the relationship between ethno-social group identification and attachment on moral judgement both in its cognitive indicators and in its stage preference according to the Lind-Kohlberg paradigm. While the research literature on these separate sub-disciplines seemed to suggest that the obvious paradoxical assumptions of

⁸² Armed ethnic conflict.

⁸³ In the non-statistical meaning of the word.

the two paradigms (Social identity paradigm, Moral development paradigm) would inevitably create a negative relationship between these two phenomena, especially in an ethno-conflict context, it had not been hitherto established by a comparable research cluster. Therefore the exploratory conclusions of this study are made in somewhat of a research vacuum, provoking more questions than answers as with all exploratory pilot research. Therefore the primary conclusion of this study, that is significant to conflict literature, as well as moral developmental literature bodies, is the relationship between social identity and moral development. While Social identity emerged as a modest but significant predictor of moral judgements' cognitive indicators (MJT – C-index), Gender emerged as a modest yet significant predictor of Moral stage preference (MSP) in keeping with comparable research. Furthermore Age and Gender emerged as significant predictors of social identity (MSI) which is in keeping with comparative research findings. In addition, the investigation found no significant demographic or cultural influences between groups in either the cognitive or affective moral judgments competences, despite epistemological concerns of bias in gender and cultural orientation. However, ethno-social identity was significantly influenced by cultural variables Religion, Ethnicity, Language, and Gender.

These exploratory findings address some of the research gaps both in the moral domain and in furthering the understanding of group behaviour in conflict contexts, and provoke a number of pertinent research questions.

Ethno-social Group Identification and Attachment

Ethno-social identification and group attachment has been the missing component in moral judgment discourse of (moral) identity and judgement, therefore the preliminary research question considered the contributors to this dynamic concept, contextualised and framed within the severe conditions of ethno-conflict. The findings of this investigation (in reference to research question one), explicate the nature and influence of the demographic variables that contribute to group attachment, and identification. Three demographic variables, Age, Gender and Conflict level emerged as predictors of group attachment and strength of social identification. Together Age, Gender and Conflict Level accounted for 0.7% of the variation in MSI (adjusted R²). This is a very small but significant ($p=0.01$) contribution⁸⁴; nevertheless given the complexity of the phenomenon, particularly in a conflict context where ethno-social group identification is a dynamic concept which is influenced by

phenomenological experiences of political conflict, a considerable variance in a large sample would be explained by individual contextual differences. However it should be noted that the Levene statistic was not significant at ($p=0.685$) establishing clear homogeneity of variance.

The negative relationship between Age and group attachment and identification (MSI) suggest that strength of group identification and attachment diminish with age maturation and corresponds to operationally similar investigations on the phenomenon carried out on ethnic identity and self esteem. For example Rosenberg and Pearlin (1978) found that *Age* was a critical factor in teasing apart this relationship as cognitive maturation and confidence in self-concept increased with age maturation. Nwoke (2004; 2009) found that demands and pressures from external or internal environmental conditions, imposed upon teenagers⁸⁵, in their maturational progress, affect social adjustment processes in their struggle to identify with his/her ethnic group's way of life and cultural norms in balance with global norms. They found that this ethno- social adjustment process affected cognitive development in varying degrees, dependant on ethnic group, age and gender. Gender was the other significant predictor, which similarly corresponded to gender differential research in ethnic identification (e.g. Hartman & Cohen, 2008; Wilson, Marlino & Kickul,

⁸⁴ it is possible that the complexity of the analysis (i.e. the number of independent predictive variables) somewhat reduced statistical power though post hoc tests confirmed the effect size.

⁸⁵ Among Nigerian teenagers.

2004; Schonpflug, 2002). These findings suggested women scored higher on strength of identification and group attachment with the largest differences between majority group men and minority group women. The 3 way interactions further indicated that younger females had stronger identities than older subjects. This is in keeping with the research fabric, particularly in the context of immigration and diaspora studies (e.g. Zimmermann 2007; Constant, Gataullina, and Zimmermann, 2006b; Darity, Mason, and Stewart, 2006). Constant, et.al, (2006b) find that ethnic identity varies between genders which has a further has a significant impact on behaviour.

However, a significant clarification that needs to be addressed is that not all these⁸⁶ investigations defined or operationalized ethnic identity as ethno-social group identification and attachment. Ethno-social identity needs to be differentiated from the categorical semantic differentials (i.e. where ethnicity is a single preference category that is ticked in a questionnaire) and understood not as an entity but as a complex of processes and as historical constituted and temporally contextualised (Weinreich-Haste, 1988). Constantine (2002) contends that variables such as race, ethnicity, gender, age and social class are dynamic and context related. Therefore considering each of these variables in isolation fails to accurately reflect the complexities and life experiences of most people

⁸⁶ In reference to. Hartman & Cohen, 2008; Wilson, Marlino & Kickul, 2004; Schonpflug, 2002

(Constantine, 2001). Although contextualism is certainly not a new idea in developmental psychology; psychology as a discipline is too invested in the generalisations of trait dependant behavioural patterns (Higgins, 2006; Lamb 2006). Therefore, in this study, it is worth considering that while individual demographic variables were identified and statistically considered in their independent contributions, it is the model interactions that should be scrutinised in understanding the dynamics of group attachment. Furthermore these dynamics should also be further considered within a minority-majority framed ethno conflict condition. Nevertheless, these findings frame the findings on social identities' relationship with moral judgement and further explicate demographic influences and contributions to ethno-social group identification and attachment in their relationship to moral judgement.

Moral Stage Preference and Gender differences

Firstly, contrary to Gilliganesque expectations of gender bias against women in the Kohlbergian scale, females scored slightly higher on Moral Stage Preference (MSP) with only 24.9%⁸⁷ of the male participants preferring stage 6 compared to the 34% females. The regression model

confirmed this with gender contributing a significant ($p= 0.029$) 0.4% of the variation. While this is not a large contribution, the fact that MSP is sensitive to gender while the C-index is not, is illustrative of the relational difference between the cognitive developmental characteristics of the C-index and affect driven nature of the MSP. Given that the measurement of Moral Stage Preference (MSP) is still vulnerable to the original Kantian based justice ethic criticisms, unlike the C-index, if there was going to be a gender bias it should have been reversed according to the literature review.

While the gender differentials have been greatly researched (e.g. Gibbs, Arnold, & Burkhart, 1984; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Lyons, 1983; Pratt, Golding, Hunter, & Sampson, 1988; Rothbart, Hanley, & Albert, 1986) in the affective moral stage preference sphere since Gilligan's 1993 claims of gender bias, the findings as discussed in the literature review have been mixed. Some investigations found differences in the 'voice' or preferred manifestation of moral expressions providing relational alternatives to the Kantian justice ethic (e.g. Brabeck, 1983; Holstein 1976b; Krebs, Smith & Block, 1968; Hudgins & Prentice, 1973; Vermeulen, Denton, & Carpendale, 1994; Muuss, 1988; Vasudev, 1988). Gilligan (1981) argued that Kohlberg's representation of women as fixated at Stage 3, which characterise interpersonal morality, is flawed. Women's reasoning, according to Gilligan (1982), is contextual and relational, and Kohlberg

⁸⁷ Of the gender rather than the total given the gender imbalance in the sample (9.3% males and 21.3% females

has undervalued the equally valid Aristotelian moral concerns voiced by women (Vasudev, 1988). These differentials have mostly occurred in production tests (e.g. SRM, SRM-SF, MJI, SROM) rather than rubric recognition tests as discussed in the literature review. Meanwhile a large volume of empirical findings has reported no gender differences (e.g. Crown & Heatherington, 1989; Friedman, Robinson, & Friedman, 1987; Galotti, 1989; Pratt, Golding, Hunter, & Sampson, 1988; Walker, 1989) in the stage preference model led by findings such as Gibbs, Arnold & Burkhart (1984) and Silberman & Snarey (1993). Silberman & Snarey (1993) contend that these accusations have not considered the maturational issue that, during early adolescence, girls are generally about two years ahead of boys in cerebral cortical and social-cognitive functioning. Gibbs, Arnold & Burkhart (1984) further claim that “charges of a possible gender bias have been mitigated by the absence of sex differences in stage level in the preponderance of studies” (p. 1040). The gender controversy climaxed and waned at the turn of the century leaving more complex questions about gender differentials in the field (e.g. Philibert, 2002).

There have also been a few studies that have found an inverse gender relationship that corresponds to current findings. For example, White (1999) investigated the effect of gender upon moral development, among US coast guards, operationalized with Rest's Defining Issues Test (DIT).

The study found that coast guard women scored 4.5 points significantly higher than men scored on the DIT. Desplaces, Melchar, Beauvais, & Bosco, (2007) similarly found that women registered a somewhat⁸⁸ stronger preferences for principled moral reasoning than men when moral judgment score was operationalized using the C-index within academic institutions. Dawson (1992) found that in the context of corporate relationships with others, female business students registered higher moral standards. In view of such findings, one could conclude that while the inverse gender differential is certainly interesting, it is neither unique nor ground breaking.

Whichever direction the gender differential favours, one of the possible explanations offered for these inconsistencies come from the 'structural' approach offered by Betz, O'Connell, and Shepard (1989). They contend that differences between men and women, due to early socialization and other role requirements (e.g., wife, mother), will be overridden by the rewards and costs associated with occupational roles. Therefore the structural approach predicts that women will become more like men under similar occupational conditions. This could also suggest a pre-existent 'moral culture' that prevails in educational or corporate institutions rather than a gender orientation adaptation. This thesis contends that the

⁸⁸ Very small but significant correlations with age and gender not unlike our findings. with age ($r = .08$) and gender (0.01).

underlying explanation to gender differentials lie in such contextual differences, rather than an overall gender difference in cognition, or a specific gender bias in the instrument.

Shoda and Mischel (2000) have identified these as “behavioural signatures,” patterns of variability across situations that have their own consistency and can be explained as collective and contextual, individual differences. Their critique of the fundamental paradoxes in trait dependant generalisations in psychology, (for example personality psychology), suggests that while such theories claim that people act consistently across diverse situations, empirical research illustrate that the usual case is variability. This paradigm can be extended to a number of moral judgment competence related subsidiaries. Their proposal for the personality psychology context was a more sophisticated cognitive-affective pattern signature (CAPS) acknowledgement which is differently stimulated dependant on context. They argued such a pattern reflects an individual’s culture, subculture, and developmental history as well as genetic endowment and temperament. This view if extended to the quagmire of gender differential findings (but not limited to gender) on moral judgement competence in its diverse expressions, would better formulate the complex paradigm of moral development.

Moral Judgement Competence and Ethno-Social Identification

Having considered the predictors of social identification and attachment and the gender differences in the affect driven moral stage preference, this leaves us with the fundamental focus of this study, the relationship between moral judgement and social identification and group attachment (MSI). Given the Kohlbergian Moral Stage Preference (MSP) is an important facet of understanding this inseparable dual concept, investigations that utilise the Moral Judgement Test cannot ignore the stage preference findings in favour of the cognitive consistency element, though this is all too often the case. It is however the cognitive consistency of judgement application (C-index) that refines this to a competence and extracts it from the opinion domain as discussed in the literature reviews and resurrects it from the exclusivist flaws. Therefore the potential relationship between social identification and group attachment with this cognitive indicator is more pertinent. Nevertheless, by the same virtue, this has to be considered in correspondence with the findings in moral stage preference.

The moral stage preference (MSP) did not find a significant relationship with social identification and group attachment (MSI) unlike its cognitive counterpart. This lack of finding is in itself consequential, when compared

to the significant relationship between social identity and the cognitive indicators. The results indicated that while the association between C-index and all its predictors were positive ($R = 0.07$) accounting for 0.3% of the variation in the C Index, it was only social identification strength and group attachment (MSI) that emerged as a modest but significant predictor in the stepwise model which is in keeping with the priori assumptions. While the significant relationship accounts for a very small part of the variance, this can be explained by the complexity of this dynamic competence that is sensitive to other developmental criteria, such as educational level (e.g. Nucci, 2001, 2005; Nucci, & Turiel, 2009), societal complexity and urbanisation (e.g. Breslin 1982; Edwardes, 1975) conflict level (e.g. Ferguson & Cairns, 1986), authoritarianism (e.g. Keniston, 1969; Van Ijzendoorn, 1989; Wrightsman, 1977). Therefore the priori rationale could not expect a large variance contribution. Meanwhile, despite the cognitive affective parallel, the disparity in their relationship to a separate paradigm however, denotes a more complex phenomenon that empirical design in this exploratory study has attempted to gauge as unified entities for operational simplicity. Nevertheless, this relationship between cognitive indicators (MJT C-index) and ethno-social identification (MSI), fits in with the priori rationale.

These findings also correspond with limited operationally comparable findings of moral judgement, authoritarianism and ethnocentrism⁸⁹. Van Ijzendoorn, (1989) found that higher levels of moral judgment were related to a less authoritarian attitude, second, a less authoritarian attitude was related to a less ethnocentric attitude (contrary to Heaven et al.'s, 1985, findings) and that a less ethnocentric attitude relate to higher levels of moral judgment⁹⁰. While this studies' conceptualisation of 'ethnocentrism' was framed by measuring positive and negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities (validated by De Jong and Van der Toorn, 1984) rather than the strength of identification and group attachment, their regression coefficient (- .19) between moral judgment and ethnocentrism correspond to the current study in its modest contributions in accounting for model variance.

While there aren't many comparable studies that can be used to support these findings within the specific domain of social identity and moral judgement within an ethno-social context, a few related studies seem to indicate that these exploratory findings may be grasping at a more complex phenomenon. For example social psychological identity theorists, such as Reed (2007) examine how social identity, social influence, values, attitudes and judgments interact in shaping decisions and actions in consumer behaviour. He suggests that identity and self concept, values, and attitudes

⁸⁹ Attitude towards minority framed ethnocentrism in Holland which are admittedly sensitive to different conceptual structures. Nevertheless comparable to some extent.

⁹⁰ Measured using Socio-moral Reflection Objective Measure (SROM; Gibbs et al., 1984).

are an inextricable part of cognitive judgments in consumer behaviour. While this kind of study encompasses cognitive structures, the cognitive underpinnings are assumed by the behavioural aspects of choice, and therefore do not give us a more comprehensive understanding into the interaction between identity and cognitive developmental processes. Therefore, at best the implications of the interactions between the constructs of social identity and cognitive indicators can be conceptualised as relative. How or what causes this affect is little understood.

Meanwhile, there exist better developed models of the relationship between identity and judgement in allied sub-disciplines that can be compared to these findings. The most significant of these are the conceptual paradigm of moral identity which has some shared traits with collective identities (e.g. Lapsley & Lasky, 2001; Walker & Pitts, 1998). While this paradigm and its structural components in collective identities have not been fully explored, some initial reflections on similarities and comparatives may be noted. The emphasis of Moral identity seems to focus on self regulation, moral motivation and moral action (e.g. Blasi, 1984; Damon & Hart, 1992; Erikson, 1964; Hart, Atkins, & Ford, 1998). However, Aquino and Reed (2002) propose that, like other social identities, moral identity can be a basis for social identification that people use to construct their self-definitions. Furthermore they posit that like other identities, a person's moral identity may be associated with certain

beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours (e.g. Cheryan & Bodenhausen, 2000; Forehand, Deshpande, & Reed, in 2002; Shih, Pittinsky, & Ambady, 1999), particularly when that identity is highly self-important. They (Aquino and Reed, 2002) incorporate definitions of moral identity by grounding the construct in both self-concept and social identity theories (Tajfel, 1959; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner & Oakes, 1986) and establish a correlation between moral identity, moral cognition, and moral behaviour.

Higgins (2006) posits moral self-concept as a precursor of moral identity and its development. She posits that moral self-concepts emerge in young childhood and become self-conscious through middle childhood and into adolescence. She further suggests that in youth and young adulthood, moral self-concepts become more integrated, differentiated, and consolidated, and that a network of moral self-concepts may functionally guide decisions and behaviour, serving as reference points for the individual. This moral self-concept she refers to that is developed through the processes of socialisation seem to have much in common with the reflexive conceptualisations of the developmental model of ethno-social identity as posited by Phinney (1992; 1996). This could suggest that self-concept in a number of different facets (e.g. moral self-concept, ethno-social self-concept, gender self-concept, competence self-concept) are interactive pre-cursors to a complex selfhood in which moral identity,

gender identity, ethno-social identity are all a reflexive features in developmental continuum. However, it must be acknowledged that outside these arbitrary speculations, it is difficult to support these findings by context relevant comparative research.

Among the other considerations that are provoked by these findings is the relationship between ethno-centric culture and moral development. Narvaez, Getz, Rest, & Thoma, (1999) posit that while moral judgment cannot be reduced to cultural ideology (or vice versa), that when each construct is measured separately, then combined, the product is a powerful predictor of moral thinking. They differentiated religious ideology, political identity, and moral judgment and found a multiple correlation of 0.79 predicting 'moral thinking'. They posit that individual conceptual development in moral judgment and socialization into cultural ideology co-occurs, simultaneously and reciprocally, in parallel, as opposed to serial concepts. They further suggest that individual development in moral judgment provides the epistemological categories for cultural ideology, which in turn influences the course of moral judgment, to produce moral thinking.

Meanwhile, those who advocate developmental aspects of psychological pluralism in culturally differentiated contexts hold that a credible conceptualisation of a developmental pluralism requires an examination of

“ethnic and cultural sources of psychological diversity in emotional and somatic functioning, self organization, moral evaluation, social cognition, and human development” (Shweder & Sullivan, 1993, p. 497). This approach emphasizing the cultural patterns of social and moral development⁹¹, makes assumptions on a singular cultural ‘voice’⁹² based on unified in-group homogeneity in positing cultural differentiation. However, the participation in culture, the acceptance of cultural norms, the attachment to the collective identities and collective norms, along with the internalisations of these cultural identities play a significant role in considering cultural differences in moral development (Wainryb, 2005). Furthermore, these cultural assumptions may not be relevant to, or distort the ‘voice’ of those individuals who resist dislike, resent, oppose, resist, and wish to change some aspects of their culture. Therefore strength of attachment to a particular identity collective has to take into consideration and differentiate those members who opt out of these features as the Brown (1995) measure stratified.

Having made this distinction between those who internalise, identify and value a collective identity based priori of values, it is not significantly surprising that this study found that the intensity of social identity registered a model contribution in moral cognition. Moral cognitions

⁹¹ Please note that this approach is not specifically referring to the Kohlbergian stage model specifically but the general psycho-social conceptualisations of moral action in social psychology.

⁹² In a Gilliganesque reference.

negative relationship with identity attachment is in keeping with the presupposed assumptions of inclusive identity truncation. However, what the nature of this study fails to clarify at this point is whether this identity process has inclusive and exclusive parameters in keeping with social identity research(e.g. Arendt, 1960; Cross, 1991; Helms, 1990; Phinney 1989, 1993; Berry, 1984; Berry et.al. 1977; Lambent et. al. 1986) which further differentiate the relationship between social identity and moral development. This is a necessary clarification that further research endeavours could illuminate.

Meanwhile, sociological conceptualisations of this phenomenon (e.g. Carter 2006) is framed within Burke's (Burke, 1991; 2004; 2006; Burke, and Tully, 1977; Burke, & Harrod, 2005) 'Identity Control Theory' which examines the nature of peoples' identities and the relationship between their identities and their behaviour within the realm of their social structure. While this perspective overlaps with the moral identity perspective (Damon & Nisan, 2004), it has its own approach to the relationship between identity and moral constructs. Carter (2006) examined moral identity and normative behaviour across gender, race, and religion; found that moral identity is a general human process which does not vary significantly by gender, race, or religion which is in keeping with the current findings. They posit that this is predictive of normative behaviour and emotional reactions regardless of group affiliation. These

findings are also in keeping with the Narvaez, Getz, Rest, & Thoma, (1999) findings in social psychology. That moral judgment cannot be reduced to cultural ideology (or vice versa). However, this frame work also allows for the possibility that when each construct is measured separately, then combined, the product is a powerful predictor of moral thinking as suggested by Narvaez, Getz, Rest, & Thoma, (1999).

This suggests that it is not merely the group identity that affects moral development or moral judgment competence but the nature or intensity of that identification as found by the results of the research question. While this is a tenuous stretch in explaining a socio-cognitive phenomenon that is already straddled between two separate psychological approaches, intermittent evidence and explications in a few allied fields in social science is the best that the research paradigm has at this point.

Relational Difference in Cognitive and Affective Structures of Moral Judgement Competence

A noteworthy disparity, that needs to be independently considered further if not explained among the dynamics of the exploratory findings, is the relational difference between the cognitive indicators and the stage

preference indicators, despite the supposed correlational duality between the two parallel aspects of moral judgment. Given the exploratory nature of this study and the operational and evaluative proclivity of the empirical findings in moral judgement competence using the Moral Judgment Test (MJT) to consider only the C-index, this disparity cannot be explained via comparative research. It is possible that while these two capacities are very separate aspects of a unified underlying developmental phenomenon as Lind notes (Haste, 2002), that the singular natures of these two phenomena interact differently with social identity. To recapitulate Lind's metaphor of a red rubber ball (Haste, 2002) in his explications of Piagetian cognitive affective parallelism, one can claim that the shape of the red ball and the colour properties of the ball are necessarily inseparable. But while this unified phenomenon cannot be isolated as separate, and segregated psychometric phenomenon as the colour and the shape of the ball cannot be isolated, it is possible that the way the ball rolls on a flat surface is a distinctively different dynamic phenomenon. To attempt to assume that the colour should also engage in the same way as the shape of the ball does on a flat surface seems counter intuitive. Furthermore child psychological research suggests that Piagetian cognitive capacities interact with identity through the creation of a shared cognition, and is considered a precursor to, shared social identity (e.g., Swaab, Postmes, Spears, Van Beest, & Neijens, 2005). Furthermore, this perspective suggests that in some cases, this

process of convergence⁹³ of individual cognitions through communication is essentially a form of consensualization (Haslam, 1997) which is an essential part of identity formation (Postmes, Baray, Haslam, Morton & Swaab, 2005).

However, these conceptual stretches do not take into consideration the possible contradictions in this paradigm with Moral judgement competence and therefore is again a rather tenuous possibility that needs to be better understood in empirical evidence within a paradigm where all the relevant comparative facets are better established. Therefore, it is another facet in this exploratory study that bears further investigation.

Demographic Variables and Contextual Considerations in Moral Judgement

This study also examined socio demographic factors, of gender, age, language of participation, ethnicity, religion, and conflict level within this ethno-conflict field context and how they contribute to⁹⁴ and affect⁹⁵ Moral Judgement Competence. Research findings in the moral domain suggested

⁹³ However, the manipulation itself only created an awareness among group members of each other's cognitions. It did not in itself, it did not resolve any of the tensions or conflicts of interest. (Postmes, Baray, Haslam, Morton & Swaab, 2005)

⁹⁴ In the regression model.

⁹⁵ in the multiple analysis of variance.

that moral development is advanced or truncated by variables such as gender 'education level and quality', 'conflict level', 'urbanisation' and 'type of learning environment'. While group attachment (MSI) registered demographics contributions (Age, Gender and Conflict Level) and affects (between religious and gender groups), moral judgement (C-index & MSP) did not find any differences between demographics groups. Which confirm that cultural factors, such as religion, ethnicity, gender, and language of participation do not influence the phenomenon. These findings though not of central consequence, add its own small contribution to the mitigating revision of the gender/culture universability debate in both the paradigm and the instrument. The absence of differences in language groups in the overall multiple analysis of variance design is also heartening and confirms that the medium the instruments were conveyed in and therefore the translations did not create confounding variables.

Among these demographic variables however, the absence of age sensitivity is conversely noteworthy. Developmental empirical findings qualify the nature of moral judgement and development is sensitive to age by virtue of its indirect relationship with education level, if not quality. Lind (2000) however, stresses that this is not simply a case of biological or chronological development and brain maturation, but necessarily a cognitive advancement achieved by quality of education which affects moral judgement competence. Nevertheless the absence of this sensitivity

is noteworthy, if concerning in the results because the design and methodology presumed a correlation between age and educational level by virtue of school year categories. This lack of sensitivity to age (which assumed a subtle sequential progress in educational level e.g.- 17 yr olds will be in Yr 11 and 22 yr olds in 2nd year university) indicates the subtlety of differentiation in a fairly homogenous age group (i.e. 17-26), as the design was not devised to perceive developmental spans. Therefore, one can assume the distance between educational level and quality obscured the possibility of a significant differential. Despite the lack of inferential evidence, the descriptive results illustrated a steep regression from the ages of 17 to 20, which then resumed the upward augmentation in the university years of 20- 24⁹⁶. However this augmentation (as illustrated in figure 8.3.3333333333333333) is reverted back into regression in the 24-25 age group which is mostly constituted of final year University groups and perhaps a small sample of military personnel. The educational qualification of the air force sample was registered mostly at GCE O' levels therefore in this scenario the regression could be sensitivity to education quality. However this can only be speculated as the design is not devised for longitudinal inferential analysis.

⁹⁶ Sri Lankan, University entrance is recovering temporal delay that occurred during the Tamil pogroms of the 80s and the Marxist uprisings of the Sinhala Buddhists which caused Universities to shut for the period of 2 years. Therefore, final year A level examinations were delayed in the secondary development span creating a 4 year A level program. The system is catching up with itself by decreasing this period intermittently.

Another noteworthy demographic factor and phenomenological context that did not emerge as a significant regression model contribution or analysis of variance affect in the inferential analysis, was conflict level. Based on the afore mentioned truncation hypothesis (e.g. Breslin, 1982; Fields, 1973; 1974; 1976; Fraser, 1974; Ferguson & Cairns, 1996; Kahn, 1982), the priori rationale expected this variable to emerge as a contender. The descriptive analysis illustrated a subtle moral regression (in the cognitive index) according to conflict. While this was slightly inverted in the moderate to low conflict group (by 5%) and again in the high conflict group (again by 5%), the general trend indicated a conflict differential in cognitive indicators in both genders with the differential marking a steeper regression for men than women. It has to be noted that the two levels which the small inversions took place (moderate to low conflict and high conflict) were characterised by the large urban samples. While this regression was not evidenced significantly by inferential analysis, it is possible the two inversions colluded the clarity of the relationship caused by a spurious relationship with urbanisation. Therefore, it is worth noting a further replication or continuation of this exploration should identify urbanisation as a significant design marker. The Kohlbergian model's sensitivity to urbanisation is further evidenced in cross cultural research which suggests that larger cities create pluralist approaches to a multitude of dilemmas which enhances an individual's experience in moral problem

solving which has a developmental affect on moral judgement (Gibbs et. al., 2006; Breslin, 1982).

Another possible explanation lies in methodological and design flaws of the context. Despite the detailed in-depth secondary data that was assessed to develop the scale for a conflict intensity paradigm, the participants were allocated to a conflict level based on the geographic location of sampling (i.e. the location of their school or university). While this may have been appropriate for the secondary school participants (as they are likely to live in the city the school is located in), this may pose some complications for the university samples. As all university samples were located in moderate conflict or moderate to low conflict urban areas, those participants who are originally from high conflict areas (and are now temporarily resident in the university) may have been erroneously categorised. This could have been averted if the participant was categorised according to the data variable 'Place of birth', or 'place of residence'. This may be a possible explanation for the afore mentioned inversions and somewhat desensitised the clarity of Conflict Level as a variable.

Nevertheless this descriptive illustration of a moral regression seems to be in keeping with empirical evidence. While the previously discussed conflict hypothesis (e.g. Fields, 1973; 1974; 1976; Fraser, 1974; Ferguson & Cairns, 1996; Breslin, 1982; Kahn, 1982) will not be repeated here, it is

worth further examining some subtleties in ethical ideology. Ishida (2006) in his comparison of the DIT and the MJT find an interesting difference between a particular aspect of ethical ideology trait within the two measures. He finds that the traits of 'Situationist' 'Subjectivist' 'Exceptionist' ethical ideologies of the MJT and the DIT show a significant positive correlation ($r = 0.24$). The moderate, yet positive correlation is consistent with Lind (1995) and Rest et al. (1997) who report 0.20–0.53 correlations in various samples. However, the MJT C-score, is related negatively with ethical idealism ($r = -0.17, p < 0:05$) in the Ishida (2006) study. The correlation value is very similar to that of Ho et al. (1997), who report a -0.15 ($p < 0:05$) correlation between the DIT P-score and ethical idealism for the principled subsample. These findings suggest an interesting supposition. It is plausible to consider that the groups located in extreme conditions have developed an ethical ideology that is not a consistent competence in the way the C-Index measures, but rather an acquired external ideology, rather than an internalised competence in a Piagetian sense. This would explain while it is better illustrated within the stage preference but not the cognitive index.

This is further illustrated by the Ishida (2006) study, where the ideological specifics are further scrutinised in the DIT, and the MJT. While he found that the traits of 'Situationist' 'Subjectivist' 'Exceptionist' ethical ideologies of the MJT and the DIT show a significant positive correlation

($r = 0.24$) there was a distinct contrast in the 'absolutist' subjects, who are characterised by belief that desirable consequences will necessarily follow from appropriate actions and that ends do not justify means. Victimhood studies in ethics and justice politics claim that victims prioritise specifics in justice issues of moral violations (Zolkos, 2007). Therefore it is plausible to assume that those samples that experience extreme conditions and violations of justice and basic human right are likely prioritise micro-concepts of justice over macro-concepts. However such 'absolutist' traits score very low on the MJT C-index (12.81 mean score) compared to the DIT's P score (34.03 mean score) in Ishida's findings (2006, p. 71). However, it has to be noted that the mean score of high conflict sample ($N=247$) was not as low (20.6801 mean score) and the divide not as wide (lowest conflict group's mean score at (22.8834). This homogeneity within subsamples and minimal deviance perhaps explain the significant difference between groups, as well as the absence of effect in the overall model. Furthermore, ethical ideology traits of this sample, has not been measured by this or any other known study at this time. Therefore this kind of supposition of ideological traits within a subsample is suppositional at best.

Methodological Reflections and Limitations

Overall these findings are limited by the lack of convergent comparatives. The lack of design markers in the research fabric, and the various possible flaws in this study due to its context isolation and even possible flaws in the instrument transference have to be considered in understanding this study. Furthermore, the limited number of translated psychometric measures into Dravidian and Indo-aryan languages creates significant hurdles in semantic translation. When the measures are sophisticated behavioural measures that require subtle semiotic transference beyond the semantic transference, this process is further problematised. The content expansion of the translation procedures has to be acknowledged as a separate body of work that this exploration underestimated. Therefore, there is a need for a number of translations in both moral and identity domains, if the discipline is making universal generalisations. The danger that most cross cultural research is densely allied to mostly western samples problematises the pluralist assumptions of the discipline. While a few isolated measures such the MJT is making some progress in the semiotic transference, there is much work to be done in the area.

Overall this study's findings are made in somewhat of a research vacuum where there are no comparative statistical values in similar field research contexts to establish these findings in a pre-existing research fabric.

Furthermore these quantitative findings are not further enriched by qualitative insights that can better interpret the specific findings. Therefore a qualitative study of similar design would further support this study. Having said that, this study does seem to match the various preconceptions of ethno-social identity, moral behaviour, conflict and relative deprivation considerations in theoretical paradigms in a number of disciplines from moral psychology to political science. Therefore, it is clearly an area that is worth further investigation.

Moreover, a number of findings were supported by tenuous explanations in the absence of convergent comparatives in the research fabric. These areas are particularly emphasised as areas that need further investigation. This is especially so in the case of the disparities in the dual aspect (MJT'S C-index & MSP) relationship with social identification and attachment (MSI). The relationship with social identity at this point seem detrimental to moral development, but this study does not enhance the understandings of how or why beyond quantitative supposition. Therefore a number of these specific clarifications seem necessary to better understand this concept. This is particularly necessary the moral domain. For example the truncation hypothesis in homogenous neighbourhoods in comparison to multicultural urban neighbourhoods (e.g. Breslin 1982) should be replicated with identity measurement with a more sensitive identity measure that is based on a more sophisticated understanding of identity.

Furthermore, the aforementioned exclusive/inclusive identity structures, gender based and age influenced identities need to be understood with ethno-conflict based field research rather than diaspora study, as diaspora identities and minimal group identities have distinctive differences as posited by Hyman (2002). Furthermore, the identity influences of these traits should be scrutinised using an ethno-centric models in its affects in moral capacities. This is to name a few research gaps that characterise the area, where the possible salient designs are innumerable.