

**TITLE: ILLUMINATING EXTERNAL INSTITUTIONAL BYSTANDER COMPLICITY IN GENOCIDE:
CASE STUDY RWANDA**

THESIS SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
LIVERPOOL FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY BY HAZEL MARGARET CAMERON.

DECEMBER 2009

VOLUME II

**CHAPTER SIX: FRANCE'S POLITICAL AND MILITARY RELATIONSHIP
WITH RWANDA: EXTERNAL INSTITUTIONAL BYSTANDER COMPLICITY IN
GENOCIDE?**

"The more one looks, the more one finds examples in the recent history of genocide of minority groups whose fate hinges on their historic connection with Western, usually former imperial powers" (Levene, 2005a: 201)

Despite the wealth of historical evidence of Western state complicity in genocide in periods of European colonialism and war as previously noted (see chapter 3), there have been only limited scholarly efforts to conceptualise complicity in such atrocities. One must therefore argue that open discussions of Western institutional complicity, facilitating a genuine and reflective debate, are imperative. This chapter explores ongoing debates in relation to French complicity in the Rwandan genocide.

In order to move these debates forward this chapter affords an analysis of primary data from the author's own fieldwork in Rwanda and secondary data drawn from various sources (as previously highlighted in chapter 2), thereby furnishing the reader with a detailed study of France's political and military relationship to Rwanda, with a particular focus on the period from 1990 to the genocide of 1994. The actions of the French military UN sanctioned Operation Turquoise are analysed by utilising a case study of the genocidal killings that took place in Bisesero, a mountainous area of Kibuye Prefecture in south-western Rwanda, and one of the few locations where the Tutsi inhabitants vigorously resisted the genocide. This chapter challenges the idea that French motives during the genocide were humanitarian, and argues that in June 1994 the French deliberately and effectively used a 'humanitarian intervention' as a cloak for the defence of narrow state interests by creating a protective corridor to facilitate the safe passage of fleeing génocidaires of the interim "Hutu Power" government later characterised by the ICTR as controlling the genocide. The French intervention also facilitated the defeat of resistance in Bisesero, crushing the few remaining survivors on the mountainsides. Interviews with survivors of Bisesero, former Hutu

militiamen and former Rwandan soldiers, reveal how French soldiers continued to train, arm and provide indoctrination of hate ideologies to the militia throughout the genocide, and in some instances actively participated in the killing of Tutsis. The detailed analysis of such case material clearly evidences instances of French state criminality whose actions as an institutional bystander to genocide can be proven to have assisted, aided or abetted the perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda in numerous ways. Said analysis also verifies the necessity of understanding events in Rwanda in terms of colonialism as previously determined in chapter 3 herein.

French African Policy Post-Independence

Among the former colonial powers that once ruled Africa, France is the only country to have continued, post-independence, to station its own troops in Africa - constituting what has been described as a 'permanent intervention' (Luckham , 1982 cited in McNulty, 2000: 108). Thus, France is the only ex-colonial power which retains defence treaties, military agreements and complex systems of military cooperation with a large number of African states, namely twenty-three out of Africa's fifty-three states (ibid: 108). Historically, France has also generated strong relationships with francophone African countries which were not colonies of France prior to independence as was the case with Rwanda, a relationship nurtured by the French from the beginning of the presidency of Major General Juvenal Habyarimana in 1973 as detailed in chapter 3 herein.

A controversial aspect of French African politics has always been its frequent military intervention on the African continent since decolonisation. The intricacies of Franco-African accords and agreements, and such political and economic involvement on the continent, 'has enabled the French army to intervene at least thirty times in Africa since 1963' (Martin, 1995: 13). According to Martin (1985, 1995), the traditional Franco-African post-independence relationship, the so called *coopérations*, were however much less cooperative than the name suggested. In fact, the cooperation agreements put in place after decolonisation were, in Martin's words, 'mere adjustments to previous agreements that in no way affected her [France's] hegemony' (1985: 192). Martin also notes that 'a number of *coup d'états* have occurred in various Francophone countries precisely when French economic, political and strategic interests were being directly or indirectly threatened' (1985: 194). Indeed, Giscard d'Estaing, French President (1974-1981) revealed in the French newspaper *Le Monde* that

'[w]e have intervened in Africa whenever an unacceptable situation had to be remedied' (1981). One might therefore suggest that such agreements reek of neo-colonial control of Francophone Africa.⁵⁵ The projection of French culture and values overseas has always been an integral part of French foreign policy and as such French politicians historically have felt obligated to protect France's global status in equal proportion to the requirement of African elites for French patronage (Krosiak, 2007:61). In addition, France has been somewhat dependent on Africa as a source of strategic raw materials⁵⁶ (Martin, 1985: 197), as a market for its manufactured goods and as an outlet for capital investment (Martin, 1995: 9).

The Cold War era in Africa

The Cold War (1947-1989) transposed the newly independent countries of the African continent into 'proxy battlefields between the United States and the former Soviet Union', the two unparalleled superpowers of the post World War II era (Schraeder, 2000: 395). During the Cold War era, American and French policies toward Francophone Africa were motivated by differing elements; namely, ideology for the United States, and culture and economics for France, which were complementary. As such, US-French relations at this time tended to be 'balanced, cooperative and predictable' (Schraeder, 2000: 398).

France and the United States have a long history of rivalry in the Congo-Zaire. However according to the memoirs of Jacques Foccart⁵⁷ (1995, 1997), it was the United States' successful efforts in 1965 to place in power in the Congo the pro-American Mobutu Sese Seko that facilitated penetration of 'Anglo-Saxon influence' into the largest country of francophone Africa and therefore constituted a clear victory for the United States at the expense of French interests. French fears of losing influence in the region to the Anglo-Saxons were fuelled by an identity crisis in French foreign policy after the Cold War, increased tensions between France and America in other geopolitical areas, a perceived threat to French exclusivity in Francophone Africa, the memory of the Fashoda incident, changes in

55 See Dumoulin, A., (1997), *La France Militaire et l'Afrique. Coopération et Interventions: Un État de Lieux*, Brussels, Editions Complexe for a detailed discussion of French Military interventions and cooperation agreements in Africa.

56 Strategic raw materials are minerals that are vital to the functioning of high-technology industries. French dependency in 1985 was as follows: 100 percent for cobalt, 87-100 percent for uranium, 83 percent for phosphates, 68 percent for bauxite, 35 percent for manganese, and 32 percent for copper

57 Jacques Foccart (1913-1997) spent much of his political career as chief adviser for African policy. He was considered the instigator behind various coups d'état in Africa during the 1960s.

US foreign policy, and resistance among bureaucrats in the state apparatus to a fundamental change in French policy. Huliaras argues that “The ‘anglosaxon conspiracy’ theory was to a large extent a French misperception. But, from another point of view, French foreign policy in the Great Lakes crisis clearly reflected a very real fear that the United States would supplant French influence in the biggest francophone country in Africa.” (297: 2003). This was undoubtedly the most noteworthy case of French-American tensions during the Cold War era.

Rwanda in the Cold War era

External actors have been of central importance to Rwandan society throughout the twentieth century, shaping its economy, its social relations and its political power structure. As previously highlighted in chapter 3, the development of Hutu Power in 1959, and independence in Rwanda in 1960, resulted in the Tutsi population existing under constant discrimination and threats of violence, with tens of thousands fleeing into exile in neighbouring countries including Uganda. Of significance to the current chapter is the formation of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Uganda, and the resulting civil war between the RPF and the Rwandan army (FAR) detailed in chapter 4 herein.

As such any account of post-independence Rwanda must allude to the Rwandan government of Juvenal Habyarimana’s closest military and political ally, namely the French government of right-wing president, Giscard d’Estaing, succeeded in 1981 by the socialist president, François Mitterrand.

In 1975 a Franco-Rwandan military cooperation and training agreement was signed in Paris under the authority of d’Estaing (Prunier, 1995: 89n) with some suggesting that such a special relationship was being nurtured by France in francophone Africa to counter the perceived rise of Anglo-American influence on the continent in the shadow of decolonisation (Krosiak, 2007: 56). The agreement stated that ‘[t]he government of the French Republic places at the disposal of the government of the Rwandese republic the French military personnel whose services are required for the organisation and instruction of the Rwandese national police’ (McNulty, 2000: 109). ‘[D]espite an OAU⁵⁸ resolution as early as 1978

58 The African Union (AU) is the successor organisation to the international organization of the former Organization of African Unity (OAU). The AU was established in 2002 by the nations of the former OAU but has greater powers to promote African economic, social, and political integration, and a stronger commitment to democratic principles. All 53 nations of Africa are members.

condemning the existence of foreign military bases on the [African] continent' (McNulty, 2000: 108), the French military persisted, maintaining 400 *coopérants* forces in Rwanda throughout the 1980s. Such external influence made Rwanda one of the most controlled states in the world among non-communist countries (Human Rights Watch, 1999).

Mitterrand and 'the hissing snake in the garden of Eden'

"Mitterrand's policy in Africa was consistent with his Machiavellian outlook on politics and his cynical regard for life in general" (Wallis, 2006: 20)

The 1980's presidential campaign of President Mitterrand promoted a 'new way' in France's view of the world and an ethical foreign policy that would 'sever the link between aid given and favours expected' (Wallis, 2006: 19). Mitterrand 'pledged to defend the rights of the oppressed people everywhere, champion a fairer system of international development and work for world disarmament' (Cole, 1997: 140). He portrayed himself as an ardent supporter of reducing France's sale of armaments, stating that France should instead aim to export goods which would not further destabilise the developing world with the threat of civil or international war in the way that armaments do. Such a promotion was problematic, however, given that on his inauguration in 1981, France was the leading arms exporter per capita in the world (see McCarthy, 1987, for a detailed overview of the French left's accession to power). Mitterrand's policy of supporting the 'poor and oppressed' was short-lived with arms sales flourishing; 'political and military assistance to dictators with appalling human rights records continued apace' (Wallis, 2006: 20). The French government of François Mitterrand continued to propagate a close military relationship with the Rwandan dictatorship of President Habyarimana (Des Forges, 1999).

Prunier has argued that 'France [sees] itself as a large hen followed by a docile brood of little black chicks' (1995: 103). He adds that France uses Africa 'as a money-laundering machine' with overpriced government contracts being handed to those friends in favour. 'French political parties are partly financed through such operations, political friends are 'rewarded' and loyal Africans get their share' (ibid). One may argue that there were other motives for such indirect and subtle forms of domination by military means in the case of Rwanda.

The French have historically displayed substantial trepidation of Anglophone encroachment, nurtured by centuries of Anglo-French rivalry and a belief that the 'Anglo-Saxons'⁵⁹ were attempting to diminish the position of the French on the African continent (Meredith, 2005: 493). Such concerns were amplified notably by the humiliating incident at Fashoda in 1898⁶⁰ since when 'the French had been watchful in guarding against Anglophone intrusion in what they considered to be their own backyard — le pré carré' (Prunier, 1995:99). Contemporary French Anglophobia is however motivated not so much by a threat from the United Kingdom as it is by the previously noted unpalatable extension of American influence on the African continent (Bayart, 1995: 49), with some describing 'a highly public duel between Paris and Washington in francophone Africa' (Smith, 1994: 355-67). The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 signalled the end of the Cold War and the replacement of hitherto fairly complementary US and French foreign policies with a new competitive international environment in which American and French policies were clearly both being driven by economic self-interest (Schraeder, 2000: 401). Indeed 1992 witnessed a myriad of American public speeches denoting a considerable deviation from its Cold War tendency to defer to European economic interests in their former colonies in favour of a more belligerent US approach in the promotion of US trade and investment in Africa (Schraeder, 2000: 402).

It appears that it was such disquietude that in fact motivated much of French policy towards Rwanda. In supporting the regime of Habyarimana, the French had the opportunity not just to upstage Belgium, Rwanda's former colonial master, but also to crush the rising forces of 'the hissing snake in the Garden of Eden', (Prunier, 1995: 104) namely the Anglophone Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) which is discussed in some detail in the following chapter.

The little chicks call on the large hen - Operation Noroît

The RPF invasion of Rwanda on 1 October 1990 as detailed in chapter 4, was somewhat unanticipated by Habyarimana who was attending an event in New York in the company of his archenemy, President Museveni of Uganda. A few days later, Habyarimana directed a plea for urgent French military assistance to President Mitterrand, exaggerating his alarm and

59 Any English speaker

60 Fashoda was the location of the climax to a series of territorial disputes between Britain and France. The 'Fashoda Syndrome' is the assertion of French influence in areas which may become susceptible to British influence.

trepidation of 'an Anglophone Tutsi plot to carve out a large new central African kingdom' (Wallis, 2006: 25). This resulted in the immediate launch of French Operation *Noroît* in Rwanda and dramatic increases in French military numbers in the country (ibid). From the outset of the RPF incursion in 1990, the French government were resolute in their portrayal of the RPF as synonymous with the Ugandan army of Museveni, whom they accused of arming and training the guerrilla force. The French abhorred Museveni who was the personification of an Anglo-Saxon, being a fellow Anglophone with strong allegiance to the United Kingdom and viewed as a threat to Francophone Africa (Prunier, 1997: 104). The Tutsi refugees who made up the RPF were identified by the French as Ugandan Anglophones and described in exceedingly inflammatory and derogatory terminology as '*Khmer Noir*' (Black Khmers) in reference to the genocide and killing fields of Cambodia (Wallis, 2006: 26). In a BBC Panorama broadcast (1995), French politicians and military commanders dismissed the RPF as a group of 'terrorists and killers'.

The October 1990 RPF invasion from Uganda radically altered the nature and extent of the military relationship between France and Rwanda. Mitterrand's decision to launch Operation *Noroît* was officially for the protection of French expatriates in Rwanda in the event of continuing unrest (Prunier, 1995 ed:100) although from the beginning of the outbreak of civil war in 1990, the French authorities were fully aware of the risk of ethnic war and genocide in the country (Kroslak, 2007: 74-75). According to a Rwandan journalist, 'Kigali airport was allegedly used as a hub for French arms dealers who were secretly supplying Iran'. The resolve of the French to see the disintegration of the Anglophone threat of the RPF to francophone Rwanda was such that they financed and shipped significant volumes of 'lethal equipment' to the FAR (Prunier, 1997:148). Of note is that, in October 1990, Rwanda made clandestine communications with Egypt to negotiate an arms deal, liaising directly with Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then a foreign office official in Cairo but who was later installed as UN secretary-general, and fulfilled this role throughout the entire period of the Rwandan genocide of 1994. The governments of Rwanda and Egypt concluded their negotiations in late October and took receipt of almost \$6 million of weapons, inclusive of mortars and ammunition (Wallis, 2006: 31) with a French government controlled bank acting as insurer for the funds deposited (Wallis, 2006: 32).

By launching Operation *Noroît*, France was empowered to organise and train members of the Rwandan Army (FAR) and the specially recruited Presidential Guard. The ostensible purpose of *Noroît* was to protect Europeans, but a clandestine element within it, called *Panda*, provided the direct support to the Rwandan army. Additionally there is corroborated evidence that the French military of Operation *Noroît* were also responsible for actively training thousands of the Hutu militiamen of the *Interahamwe* and the smaller *Impuzamugambi* who later would become the main perpetrators of the crime of genocide (TESTIMONY SM/1/2/12; TESTIMONY SM/3/2/12). The former Chief Prosecutor General in Rwanda, Jean De Dieu Mucyo stated in an interview that the French supplied FAR with Panhard armoured cars, heavy artillery and some Gazelle helicopters (interview, 2005). A former soldier of FAR states that 'in 1990 the French came with the guns and taught us how to use them. The French soldiers went into battle with us, fighting the RPF, but it was only the French that fired the heavy guns' (TESTIMONY SM/1/1/11). Such military intervention by the specialist military forces of Operation *Noroît/Panda* who arrived in October 1990 was in fact a breach of the Franco-Rwanda agreement of 1975 which clearly specified that the French military were only legally permitted to organise and instruct the Rwandese national police (McNulty, 2000:109). In order to put the French on a legal footing with the Rwandans and to enable them to continue future assistance against their perceived 'Anglo-Saxon' threat from the north, the 1975 Franco-Rwandan agreement was amended on 26 August 1992 to include entitlement of the Rwandese Armed Forces (FAR) to French assistance (McNulty, 2000: 110). This amendment legally permitted the French to continue with their military training of the FAR whilst providing a veil for the clandestine and not-so-legal schooling of the Hutu militiamen who subsequently progressed to being the main groups responsible for large scale massacres in 1994 (Prunier, 1995: 165).

There is additional evidence that, despite pronouncements that *Noroît* would not interfere in internal affairs, the French influence on Rwandan national defence was not restricted to the physical coaching in target practice with firearms, the art of strangulation, and the construction of clubs from wood. Testimonies have indicated that the potential *génocidaires* were also provided with ideological indoctrination by the French. One witness, a former Rwandan soldier, stated '[t]he French soldiers would teach us that the Tutsi were our enemies and that we should kill them at any opportunity. The French taught us that if we allowed the Tutsi to return, they would take over our country. They would cause us to perish'

(TESTIMONY SM/3/1/11). Another former Rwandan soldier testified that the French told them 'your enemy is the Tutsi. As long as they are alive, the Hutu will never be comfortable. Figure out a way of killing them and finishing them' (TESTIMONY SM/2/1/11). Witnesses and photographic evidence substantiate that French soldiers directly assisted Rwandan army units in civilian areas. A Human Rights Watch investigation in 1992/1993 'observed French soldiers manning checkpoints...They were armed with 5.56mm FAMAS automatic rifles, as well as Wasp 58 assault rocket launchers and other infantry support weapons. Like Rwandan army troops, French troops demanded identification from passing civilians' (1994: 23).

The invasion of the RPF in 1990 was quickly repulsed by the Rwanda army with the assistance of the French military intervention codenamed Operation *Noroît*; however the French military remained overt in its presence in Rwanda. After their initial attack of October 1990 was repulsed, the RPF retreated into a series of guerrilla incursions into Rwanda which were met with rapid retaliatory action by the Rwandan army ably assisted by the French. Habyarimana's regime staged indiscriminate attacks on civilians and issued press releases identifying RPF infiltrators as being responsible for the violence which provided him with credible grounds for arresting Tutsi civilians on suspicion of supporting the RPF. 'The detainees would be held without charge, thousands of them for months, in deplorable conditions. Many were tortured and dozens died' (Des Forges, 1999).

By the summer of 1992, hard diplomatic negotiations were underway to establish a ceasefire in the ongoing civil war, with a new RPF strike anticipated at any moment. International pressure mounted on Habyarimana to share power. Sanctions were applied or threatened by the international community, including French officials who warned the Rwandan president that they would soon withdraw their Troops. Habyarimana knew that without the presence of this force he would face imminent defeat at the hands of the RPF (Kuperman, 2004:75). As such, Habyarimana relented to international pressure and reluctantly signed the first Arusha protocol, a stepping stone of the peace process discussed in detail in chapter 4. In an effort to move the peace negotiations forward, a US deputy assistant secretary arranged for the RPF and Rwandan government to hold talks in Harare in July 1992. Paris was incensed by such a US intervention which was perceived as 'the USA trying to hijack France's attempts to bring order to its own *pré carré* (backyard). Nothing was more guaranteed to produce a swift reaction in Paris than the thought that the Americans may be about to tread on their own neo-colonial toes' (Wallis, 2006: 43).

In April 1993, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, warned of acts of genocide in Rwanda against the Tutsi minority, echoing the conclusions of an international fact-finding mission composed of non-governmental organisations that had visited the country some weeks earlier (Schabas, 2000: x). The French government were kept abreast of the hate propaganda broadcast over the airwaves and printed in newspapers as well as the ongoing massacres and the 'dangerous activities' of those who became some of the perpetrators of genocide (Krosiak, 2007: 86). Martres confirms that genocide was foreseeable from October 1993 (Assemblée Nationale, 1998: 281) yet the French administration continues to deny predictability of the forthcoming genocide.

As a result of renewed fighting, a United Nations reconnaissance mission visited Rwanda in August 1993 and on the basis of the mission's findings, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was established in October 1993, commanded by Lt General Dallaire. This is outlined in detail in chapter 4 herein. The French military did not disguise their dislike of UNAMIR, which they perceived as 'impinging' on its territory (Wallis, 2006: 69). However, such disdain was not one-sided and indeed one less-than-enthusiastic UN official told the BBC that UNAMIR was just 'taking in France's dirty linen' (BBC Panorama, 1995). The French operation codenamed *Noroît* officially left Rwanda in December 1993, but witnesses have testified that elements of the French military attachment of *Noroît* remained in Rwanda covertly and continued military training up to and throughout the period of the genocide the following year (TESTIMONY SM/4/1/11). Saint-Exupéry (1998b) discovered that two French officers who remained in Kigali tapped the Kigali telephone network, including all the embassies' connections.

"It is in hard times that you know your real friends"

For the two years prior to the genocide, Rwanda was sub-Saharan Africa's third-largest importer of weapons, which is quite a feat for one of the smallest countries in Africa. McNulty indicates that '[t]he headwaters of the flow of weapons to conflict in the African Great Lakes are to be found in those Western countries with the world's largest arms industries, notably the US, France, UK and Belgium' (2000: 108). As previously mentioned, although not the sole supplier, it was the French who delivered military supplies and secure

telecommunications equipment to the extremist regime in Rwanda which played an integral role in the unfolding tragedy in 1994 (Des Forges, 1999: 814). When the intensive massacres of Tutsi and Hutu moderates commenced on the night of 6 April 1994, traditional weapons and farming implements, including machetes, knives and hoes were the main tools of the militia. Evidence suggests however that the Rwandan army and Presidential Guard often turned automatic rifles and grenades on survivors seeking refuge in churches, stadiums, or school buildings (Austin, 1999: 34) and as such firearms can clearly be viewed as a crucial factor of the Rwandan genocide.

On the day following the death of President Habyarimana, genocide commenced as detailed in chapter 4 herein. Very soon, six French nationals resident within Rwanda had lost their lives; that led to action by the French government, in coordination with other countries of the West, to conduct an evacuation in Rwanda of all its European citizens (Wallis, 2006: 82). The operation was codenamed Amaryllis and was engaged in Rwanda from the 8-14 April 1994. Notably, the first family removed from Rwanda by the French was the widow of Habyarimana⁶¹ and thirty members of her family who are suspected of being responsible for some of the excesses of violence perpetrated by the GOR during the preceding civil war. Tutsi members of staff at the French embassy were left in Rwanda by the French to be killed by the Hutu génocidaires⁶² (Prunier, 1995: 234-236). Those entering the French embassy after the evacuation of its staff found 'two rooms filled with destroyed evidence of the French role in the Habyarimana regime' (Wallis, 2006: 94). One United Nations official testifies that, on 9 April 1994 a French military plane which was part of Operation Amaryllis landed at Kigali airport with a full load of military arms which was unloaded to members of FAR before the French soldiers reverted to their role of assisting with the evacuation of Europeans from Rwanda (BBC Panorama, 1995)⁶³. The UNAMIR commander notified a Security

61 The current Rwandan government have made repeated requests to France for the arrest and extradition of Agathe Habyarimana on charges of genocide. This has been refused to date, but because of such allegations, France has declined to issue Agathe Habyarimana refugee status see <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6251425.stm>

62 A French term which can be loosely translated as 'killer of people'. The term was coined in the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 to describe those who were either actively involved in the preparation and planning of genocide or the hard core Hutu element directly responsible for the killings.

63 The Belgian Col. Luc Marchal who was second in command of UNAMIR told the BBC, and later confirmed to Le Monde (23 August 1995), that one of the French planes supposedly participating in the evacuation operation arrived at 0345 hours on 9 April with several boxes

Council adviser of his revulsion at the conduct of the French members of Amaryllis whom he accused of stealing his UN vehicles from the airport and opening fire on several occasions from these vehicles (Callamard, 1999: 289). The French commander of Operation Amaryllis has retorted that whilst in possession of said UN vehicles, they had masked the UNAMIR markings by means of French flags (Wallis, 2006: 88).

Deliveries of arms from France continued throughout the genocide (Peterson, 2001:282). One former member of the Interahamwe has testified that as a French shipment of arms was being unloaded from a French military plane at Goma airport, the French were assuring them ‘...you cannot be defeated because we support you. Once we unloaded the planes we were issued with the weapons and boarded onto buses at Goma to be taken to Kigali or some other place’ (TESTIMONY SM/4/1/11). On 17 May 1994, a United Nations Arms embargo mandated a halt to all arms shipments to Rwanda (S/RES/918)⁶⁴; however, as late as 18 July 1994, arms originating from France were delivered to the genocidal Hutu regime in exile in Zaire under the guise of Operation Turquoise (Saint-Exupéry, 1998a). McNulty (2000) argues that the sheer scale of French arms sales to Rwanda in the period immediately preceding the genocide and during the genocide played a conclusive role in sustaining and escalating the violence⁶⁵. The French consul in Goma said these were legitimate shipments that had been ordered and paid for long before the genocide occurred (Peterson, 2001: 282).

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the French held an important position in the decision-making processes of the Council. Interviews with several former ambassadors to the United Nations clearly evidenced that the French representatives of the United Nations Security Council chose not to share the substantial information and intelligence at their disposal, gathered during their three year engagement in Rwanda (INTERVIEW EL/08; INTERVIEW EL/12: INTERVIEW EL/14). There is no doubt that both the non-permanent and some of the permanent members of the UN Security Council were kept deliberately

of ammunition. The boxes, about 5 tons, were unloaded and transported by FAR vehicles to the Kanombe camp near Kigali airport, where the Rwandese Presidential Guard was quartered. The French government denied this, saying that the planes carried only French military personnel and material for the evacuation.

64 S/RES/918 can be read in full at <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/218/36/PDF/N9421836.pdf?OpenElement>

65see also Human Rights Watch Arms Project, 1994 for full details of the role of the French government in arming the perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda

uninformed – not least by the then UN Secretary-General, francophone Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who had facilitated the arms deal between Egypt and Rwanda some four years previously (see Willum, 1999).

The French Resolution – Operation Turquoise

By the end of May 1994 the RPF had advanced and secured the airport of Kigali; by controlling most of eastern Rwanda, the RPF had effectively put a halt to the genocide of Tutsi in this area. Human rights organisations and even the French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé were describing the events in Rwanda as ‘genocide’ (Bryer, 1994; Wallis, 2006: 205), although Juppé went on to blame both sides for the slaughter. Mitterrand also intimated concerns of a double-genocide taking place in Rwanda (Wallis, 2006: 187). By mid-June 1994 there were few Tutsis left to rescue in Rwanda as the relentless massacre of Tutsi had all but succeeded in exterminating its targets, with the exception of a few scattered pockets of survivors principally in the Bisesero region of Rwanda (African Rights, 1998). It was, however, becoming self-evident that the RPF were close to toppling the Hutu regime.

It was in full knowledge of these conditions that the French government on 20 June 1994 put forward a draft resolution to the United Nations Security Council for a self-funded ‘humanitarian intervention’ in Rwanda codenamed Operation Turquoise. Resolution 929 was authorised by the U.N. Security Council on June 22 1994 (S/RES/929)⁶⁶, providing the intervention with an aura of authenticity. Operation Turquoise was granted a chapter VII mandate and described by the UN Security Council as ‘a temporary multinational force’ to establish secure humanitarian areas by ‘all necessary means including the use of force’; the duration of deployment was limited to two months. As previously noted in chapter 4, repeated requests throughout the previous two-month period by the UNAMIR Force Commander Dallaire to have his Chapter VI Security Council mandate amended to a Chapter VII operation permitting use of force were continually rejected by the United Nations. Dallaire strenuously opposed the United Nations authorisation of a second UN mandated mission into the same country but to no avail. ‘I was concerned about there being two missions in one country with conflicting mandates but ultimately I knew the French were using a humanitarian cloak to intervene in the country’ (interview, 2005). The United Nations

⁶⁶ S/RES/929 can be accessed in full at <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/260/27/PDF/N9426027.pdf?OpenElement>

authorisation of Resolution 929 raised much domestic cynicism with French newspapers printing scathing allegations of its government's blatant complicity in the preparation and implementation of the genocide in Rwanda (Nundy, 1994).

In an interview, one former British Ambassador to Rwanda stated that '[t]he real blinder the French played was to get Security Council agreement to this [resolution 929]' (INTERVIEW EL/22). Interviews with three former Ambassadors to the United Nations Security Council illuminated the distinct apathy within the United Nations Security Council to Resolution 929, with five abstentions out of a total of fifteen council members. It appears that few on the Security Council believed that France was motivated by strictly humanitarian concerns (INTERVIEW EL/08; INTERVIEW EL/12; INTERVIEW EL/14). The interviewees have indicated that the general opinion was that it was virtually unimaginable that France had had 'a crisis of conscience' and much more believable that it was about to use the cover of the United Nation's seal of approval to protect French interests in Rwanda and save Hutu génocidaires from retribution (INTERVIEW EL/04). One Ambassador to the United Nations Security Council during the genocide stated 'I believed there were other reasons [for the intervention]. Any humanitarian consequences of the deployment were purely a by-product' (ibid). Operation Turquoise was supported by a few hundred troops from Senegal and Chad and about forty from the Congo and Niger; however, it is the opinion of the UNAMIR Force Commander that 'this was solely to give it an aura of multilateralism, but it was far from this' (INTERVIEW EL/22). Prunier argues that what finally pushed President Mitterrand to take action in Rwanda was President Nelson Mandela's declaration of his intention to respond to the Great Lakes crisis when addressing the Tunis meeting of the OAU on 13 June 1994, a statement viewed by the French president as 'another member of the Anglo-Saxon world who was openly saying that he was about to intervene in French speaking Rwanda' (Prunier, 1995: 281).

The very day after the French Resolution was passed, the French military arrived in Rwanda heavily armed with marine mortars, light and heavy helicopters, fighter-bombers, ground attack planes, reconnaissance planes and more than one hundred armoured vehicles. However, the Force Commander of UNAMIR, Dallaire, noted that there were very few trucks; moreover, those trucks present had no lift capabilities such as would be required for a humanitarian intervention. It was his opinion that this was primarily a military intervention despite the stipulation by the Security Council that the intervention was for humanitarian

purposes (Interview, 2005). It was also noted by Dallaire and members of FAR that many of the French soldiers and commanders of Operation Turquoise had previously been garrisoned in Rwanda with Operation Noroît (ibid). A subsequent French Parliamentary Commission report on Rwanda conceded that the use of such troops 'without doubt created a source of ambiguity and encouraged mistrust and scepticism' (1998).

A government official in Rwanda, who was in Kigali during 1994, stated in interview that the Interahamwe militia responsible for the majority of the atrocities 'gave the French a very warm welcome. There was much shouting and dancing in the street and French tricolours being waved around and the flags were hung even on the Rwandan Army military vehicles. The killers were shouting "Vive La France"⁶⁷' (Interview Mucyo, 2005). Despite entering the country with a UN mandate the French troops did not wear the blue berets of the UN. Instead the French government insisted that they wear the green and red berets of the French elite paratroopers and marines – not troops one would normally encounter in a 'humanitarian' role (Wallis, 2006: 129).

Operation Turquoise as facilitator of a continuing genocide

The French troops of Operation Turquoise failed to prevent the Rwandan police, army or Interahamwe militia continuing their slaughter of the remaining Tutsi and indeed evidence indicates that the arrival of the French buoyed the spirits of the near defeated génocidaires who felt protected by the arrival of their long term ally and thereby empowered to complete their task of exterminating the few remaining Tutsi (INTERVIEW EL/02; INTERVIEW EL/10). It has been argued that the arrival of the French military in June 1994 actually allowed the massacre of the Tutsi of Rwanda to continue for an extra month (Gourevitch, 1998: 161). Witnesses have testified that French soldiers of Operation Turquoise actively killed Tutsis trapped at the roadblocks of the Interahamwe militia (TESTIMONY SM/5/2/12; TESTIMONY SM/4/1/11). One witness states 'yes the French did genocide and they helped people who did genocide...During the genocide they would help the Interahamwe with the roadblocks and check the identity cards to try and catch Tutsi civilians' (Interview with Mucyo, 2005). An ex-FAR testified 'I did not see French soldiers shooting openly but when they captured Tutsi at road blocks they would put them into their trucks and drive them to the

67 'Vive La France' can be translated 'Hurrah for the French'

barracks...the people caught on the roadblock were never seen again' (TESTIMONY SM/1/1/11). According to another witness who joined the Interahamwe before the start of the genocide, Tutsi prisoners arrested by the French at roadblocks in April 1994 were killed and loaded into trucks by the Interahamwe and the bodies dumped in Lake Vert. He has stated that six French soldiers provided an escort to the trucks carrying the corpses of the Tutsi detainees (TESTIMONY SM/1/2/12).

Testimonies have also been proffered of other forms of punishment distributed by the French of Operation Turquoise against persons suspected of being RPF. Witnesses including an ex-Far and another a former Mayor in Karama Commune, testified that they 'saw the French arresting people during the genocide. They tied them up and then beat them badly. They then took them by helicopter to Nyungwe forest and pushed them out of the choppers from the air' (TESTIMONY SM/5/2/12, TESTIMONY SM/1/3/13). One victim of such treatment who had survived being tortured by the French and thrown from one of their helicopters has visible scarring to his body allegedly from said treatment (TESTIMONY SM/4/2/12).

By early July, Rwandan Hutus were fleeing in their thousands across borders into refugee camps within Tanzania and Zaire and, some days later, the Hutu Power interim government of Rwanda fled into the Safe Zone Humanitaire (SZH) of Operation Turquoise (Gourevitch, 1998: 161) where looting was freely taking place under the gaze of the French. Some former Rwandan soldiers have testified that French soldiers were actively stealing cars which were resold in Zaire (TESTIMONY SM/4/4/14). France had promised the international community that it would arrest the architects of the genocide who had by now fled into the SZH; however, 'striving ...to keep open the possibility of future power-sharing negotiations, the French actually facilitated the safe passage to Zaire of the Hutu government, the army, and the militias', (Kuperman, 2001: 50). This included Colonel Théoneste Bagosora (Off. 2000: 81; Pfaff, 1998), who has since been convicted of crimes of genocide at the International Criminal Tribunal Rwanda (ICTR Press Release, 2008). One British eyewitness stated that 'French soldiers who arrived in Butare on July 1...evacuated Colonel Bagosora, flying him out on July 2' (Kiley, cited in Human Rights Watch, 1999).

BISESERO: A 'THORN IN THE SIDE OF THE GÉNOCIDAIRES'

An area of undulating, rolling hills known as Bisesero lies in south-western Rwanda, in the prefecture of Kibuye. Bisesero is 28km from the small town of Kibuye but the narrow,

winding mountainous roads which have to be negotiated to reach the hills of Bisesero from Kibuye take an hour and a half to traverse. The hills are separated by deep valleys and in the higher elevations, there are steep forested hillsides dotted with caves. Elevations range from 1400 to 2400 metres and Bisesero hill is at roughly 2000 metres. The genocidal massacres of 1994 began at a slightly slower pace in Kibuye prefecture because of its high concentration of Tutsi. When the killings started in early April of 1994, thousands of Tutsi from the surrounding communes fled to the Bisesero Region, where they staged a steadfast resistance against their Hutu attackers. The historical reputation of the residents of Bisesero region as a warrior people attracted other Tutsi to the region because they erroneously thought they would find safety there (African Rights, 1998: 5). The Hutu militia established a base at Gishyita, which was a twenty minute drive from the Bisesero Mountains, giving them easy access to their prey (TESTIMONY SM/3/5/15).

Translated eyewitness accounts of the Tutsi people of Bisesero clearly show that they were poorly armed; 'at the start of the killings we only had a few machetes and clubs but we didn't think it would last long. We also had stones to throw that the women had collected. The women were really truly brave, but the killers were armed with guns and grenades' (interview Bisesero, HMC/B4/2005). The Hutu militia would attack during the day and then withdraw in the late afternoon, only to resume the attacks the following day. According to eyewitness reports, the resistance fighters of Bisesero would lie in the ground waiting until the Hutu were close before rising to face their attackers in hand-to-hand combat. But they were no match for the well-armed and well-fed Hutu militia (interview Bisesero, HMC/B8/2005). Such was the continuing resistance in Bisesero that eventually the local militia called for reinforcements from the presidential guard, the army, and the police to help in suppressing the remaining resisting Tutsi (African Rights, 1995). In the words of one survivor, they had become 'a thorn in the side of the génocidaires' (interview Bisesero, HMC/B4/2005). The result of this call to arms was described by one defendant at the International Crimes Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) who stated that '[a]fter a period of relative calm, on 13 May 1994 thousands of Tutsi (estimated by one witness to number between 15000 and 40000)⁶⁸ who had sought refuge were subjected to a major attack and massacred. Another witness estimated that only 10000 of the 40 – 50000 refugees survived the attack. Other accounts claimed 'there were from

⁶⁸ It is extremely difficult to get reliable estimates of numbers. This can be attributed to the conditions which the witnesses were facing. The disparity of witness estimates is evident in this transcript.

5000 – 15000, predominantly Hutu attackers, armed with rifles, grenades, and traditional weapons’ (ICTR Case No ICTR-96-13)⁶⁹.

According to interviews with survivors, by late June 1994 there were, of the peak number of 65,000 people resisting in Bisesero, only about 2000 survivors. Witnesses describe these emaciated survivors as suffering from untreated wounds and hiding in caves or within the densely wooded forests (Interview Bisesero, HMC/B10/2005). The resisters of Bisesero learned from one of their few working radios that French soldiers had arrived in Kibuye Prefecture with a UN mandate to stop the genocide. They thought their prayers had been answered (Interviews Bisesero, June 2005).

Operation Turquoise reaches Bisesero

On the arrival of Operation Turquoise in Kibuye Prefecture, the French established roadblocks and a military post at Gishyita, a place used by thousands of the Interahamwe militia as a meeting place for their daily assaults against the Tutsis in hiding in the Bisesero mountains. Former members of the Interahamwe have stated that these French roadblocks were manned by both French soldiers and Interahamwe (TESTIMONY SM/4/3/13; TESTIMONY SM/7/4/14) and it was a common occurrence for civilians to be killed at the roadblocks, including women and children, in the presence of the French (TESTIMONY SM/4/4/14). Another former Interahamwe has evidenced how French soldiers spectated as the local Hutu militia leaders briefed the Interahamwe before organising their day’s transportation into the ‘killing fields’ of the Bisesero mountains (TESTIMONY SM/3/5/15). Other ex-FAR and Interahamwe witnesses at the Mucyo Commission have stated that they were handed guns and grenades by the French soldiers (TESTIMONY SM/1/1/11) and they would thereafter move up the mountains on foot whilst others were transported in buses, trucks or French jeeps (TESTIMONY SM/1/2/12). Once the génocidaires had left the base at Gishyita, testimonies of former Hutu militia have revealed that the French used military telescopes to monitor the militia ‘working’ on the hillsides (TESTIMONY SM/5/5/15). One former member of the Interahamwe noted that when the Hutu militia returned to Gishyita each evening from the mountains, those in command would meet with the French soldiers at

⁶⁹ Transcripts of all ICTR hearings can be accessed at www.ictr.org

the military centre to inform them of the events of the day in Bisesero (TESTIMONY SM/1/2/12).

On the 26 June, several British journalists who had arrived in Kibuye became aware of the plight of the surviving resisters of Bisesero. One of these journalists informed the French soldiers at Gishyita that they were aware of the continuing slaughters at Bisesero (Human Rights Watch, 1999) and his intention to forward an article to his editor that evening on the continuing massacres in the region (Kiley, 1994). On the 27 June, a former Interahamwe and self-confessed killer states that he was approached by French soldiers in Gishyita. 'They bought me a Primus [beer] and asked me to take them to Bisesero' (TESTIMONY SM/3/5/15). The French were escorted mid afternoon onto Bisesero hill by Interahamwe who travelled in a separate vehicle from the thirty or so French soldiers. Some of the Interahamwe were wearing the uniform of the Red Cross. One survivor of Bisesero stated:

"They had three cars, two of them [armoured personnel carriers] of French soldiers and the third car with the militia [Interahamwe] but it stopped a short distance away. We said 'lets go there' when the cars had separated and stopped. 'If they kill us they kill us'. Not long before they came, the Interahamwe had killed some of our people and they [the bodies] were near me. Three were dead but two were still hot. We went and picked them and took them to the French cars. One had been shot and two dead by machetes. I talked to the French soldiers through the open window of the car and asked what help they could be to us. They stayed in their cars. They said they needed to know how many of us were here and said to bring everyone down out of the forests and onto the road" (Interview Bisesero, June 2005 HMC/B3/2005).

A witness who survived the massacres at Bisesero indicated that, because the survivors were desperate, they were prepared to take a risk despite noting that the French had arrived accompanied by the Interahamwe militia, some of whom they recognised as killers involved in numerous massacres at Bisesero (interview Bisesero, June 2005 ref HMC/B1/2005). They also believed they would be safe from the militia as there were French helicopters circling above. One of the survivors who testified at the Mucyo Commission stated that by using loudspeakers to hail people, 'the French were instrumental in talking the people out of their places of hiding' (TESTIMONY SM/3/5/15). One of the survivors of genocide continued:

“The French waited till we had done what they had asked and we were all out of hiding and gathered together on the road. They had started to look anxious. They just said we can’t help you just now. They said they didn’t have lorries and would have to leave but promised they would come back soon. The French soldiers took the guns we had taken from the killers. We had eighteen guns but it did not matter because we had no ammunition and did not know how to work them. They must have thought we would be able to shoot our killers.” (Interview Bisesero, HMC/B3/2005).

A former Interahamwe who arrived at Bisesero with the French convoy stated that ‘one militia near where I was standing with the French had just killed a Tutsi and was standing beside the body’ (TESTIMONY SM/3/5/15) whilst a child of fourteen years who was a victim of the attacks at Bisesero described how ‘[w]e were attacked and chased by militiamen. French soldiers watched what happened from their vehicles without doing anything’ (Gisanura cited in Sage, 2005). It was the feeling of some of the survivors of Bisesero that when the convoy of French troops arrived in the area, they were quite disinterested; however, having viewed the recently-slaughtered bodies of Tutsi, one witness believed that some of the soldiers realised that it was the Hutu that were the perpetrators of genocide as opposed to being the victims as they had been led to believe (Interview Bisesero, HMC/B1/2005). On his return to Kibuye one of the Interahamwe militia, a former teacher who had escorted the French onto the Bisesero Mountains informed his militia leaders of the numbers and location of the remaining surviving Tutsi on the hillsides, and plans were made to destroy the last of the resisters of the region. This witness has testified that ‘the French had no plans to save any of these Tutsi, our aims were the same – to kill the Tutsi. The French supported the mission of the Hutu’ (TESTIMONY SM/3/5/15). Numerous witnesses including former Interahamwe, ex-FAR and Tutsi survivors have provided testimonies of how surviving Tutsis faced some of the worst genocidal attacks only hours after the arrival of the French at Bisesero (Mupenzi, 2006).

The French officer Diego who was in charge of the convoy which discovered the survivors of Bisesero was sickened by the duplicity of his military superiors and the reality that the true victims of genocide in the Bisesero Mountains were the Tutsi. On his return to base on the 27 June he filed a report on his findings at Bisesero and consulted his superiors within Operation Turquoise. He fully expected to be returning to Bisesero at first light to evacuate those who were clearly in mortal danger; however, he was prevented from taking such action by the

direct orders of his superior officers who were unperturbed at his concerns over the imminent danger to the hundreds of Tutsi they had seen on the hills (Saint-Exupéry, 2004:87). Diego made numerous phone calls to Paris and was frustrated by the resistance of higher military and government officials, 'who, despite Turquoise's alleged humanitarian mandate, seemed inclined to resist intervention' (Wallis, 2006: 152). The French officer took the decision to disobey the orders of his commanders and in the company of the French journalist Patrick de Saint-Exupéry, started off in convoy with his troops to return to Bisesero in an effort to evacuate the remaining survivors. His efforts were, however, thwarted by the arrival of the head of the special elite forces attached to Operation Turquoise, himself a veteran of Operation Noroît, who landed his helicopter on the road in front of the convoy preventing passage (Saint-Exupéry, 2004:83-84). It was two days later on 30 June that Diego, accompanied by the same journalist and his troops, once again disobeyed direct orders and returned to Bisesero where they found over one thousand people massacred since their first visit to the area some three days previously. Under pressure because of the presence of the media, their superior officers at base camp relented and steps were taken to rescue the desperate survivors who were barely alive (Saint-Exupéry, 2004: 89). The witnesses to the actions of the French military at Bisesero, whether Interahamwe, ex-FAR or Tutsi survivors, all stated that were it not for the negligent conduct of the French subsequent to their arrival in the area on 27 June, many more of the people of Bisesero would have survived the genocide (Mupenzi, 2006).

The actual number of Tutsi killed in the Bisesero Region between April 9 and June 30 is uncertain. African Rights (1998) estimate that some 50,000 people were killed at Bisesero, though some witnesses report as many as 75,000 killed (interview Bisesero, June 2005). The responsibility of French members of Operation Turquoise at Bisesero is undoubtedly an extreme example but nonetheless indicative of the approach of a section of the upper echelons in the French government. Having detailed the negative aspects of Turquoise, one must not ignore the very real humanitarian achievements of the operation. Several studies have estimated the number of Rwandans saved by the French. Prunier has estimated that between 13,000 and 14,000 people were saved during the mission of operation Turquoise (1997: 297), while Adelman and Suhrke have been more generous in their margins of between 10,000 and 15,000 (joint evaluation, 1996: 54-5). Des Forges has also acknowledged that the French did save people in Rwanda (1999: 586, 590) putting the number at 17,000,

albeit highlighting that this was undertaken with a force of the best-equipped elite paratroopers. To highlight such a discrepancy, Des Forges notes that 'UNAMIR, with its barely 500 men, poorly armed and equipped, protected at one time nearly twice that number (1999: 689).

Operation Turquoise provides much relevance for criticism. The stated humanitarian aims and objectives of the mission were barely fulfilled. Such was the need to remain credible in the eyes of France's African allies, many of whom were longstanding dictators and tyrants, that much of the actions of Turquoise were in reality directed towards the prevention of an RPF victory. A confidential newsletter, reputed to be from French government circles, showed the cynical disregard with which some, at least, of the French military and political establishment viewed the ongoing genocide. Entitled 'considerable political and geostrategic interests are hidden behind the Rwandese heap of corpses', it argues that the francophone country held a key to the region and could not be 'lost' to Anglophone influences. The newsletter ended as follows:

"the region cannot be left in the hand of an English-speaking strongman completely aligned to American views and interests. That is why, since 1990, France has supported the late President Juvénal Habyarimana in order to fight the RPF. It did not work out so now the only choice left to us is to put back in the saddle the Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko, the one man capable of standing up to Museveni" (Prunier, 1997: 278-9).

Post-genocide relations in Rwanda

The military victory of the RPF with the fall of Kigali on 4 July 1994 was viewed by France as the first time a francophone country had fallen not only to a rebel force but one with Anglo-Saxon influence. Some in French administration even perceived Rwanda as the beginning of a series of regional 'dominoes' that may eventually lead to Anglo-Saxon domination of portions of the Great Lakes region of central Africa which would prove detrimental to France and la francophonie (Glaser and Smith, 1994: 182-185). On 6 July Turquoise accepted that 'Kagame had won the war...An uneasy peace came into effect between the two sides, with the RPF tolerating the SHZ (safe humanitarian zone), while the French in turn restrained the more belligerent members of their staff who wanted a crack at Kagame's men' (Wallis, 2006: 160). France's actions after the genocide mirrored the acerbity

they felt in the midst of an RPF defeat of the French supported Hutu regime in Rwanda. Wallis states that 'French representatives stormed out of conferences when the president of the new regime in Kigali stood up [and] denied aid to Rwanda, block[ing] EU help to the country' (2006: 212).

Prunier overheard a senior French military officer proclaim 'the worst is yet to come. Those bastards will go all the way to Kinshasha now. And how in God's name am I going to explain to our friends [francophone heads of state] that we have let down one of our own' (1997: 337n). Of some consolation to the French government was its erroneous assumption that the RPF would be short term rulers of Rwanda. 'By helping their former allies escape, France was intent on preserving the means of bringing pressure to bear on the RPF' (Kroslak, 2007: 241). The subsequent war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) illuminates the devastating consequences of such French policy (see Prunier, 2009).

In many respects, Laurent Kabila's rise to power, after the ousting of the French backed President Mobutu in the DRC in 1997, marked out a further victory for the Anglo-Saxons at the expense of French interests. 'The international aspect of this supposed internal war in the Congo may be contextualised as part of the struggle between Washington and Paris for spheres of influence (and, particularly, markets) on the continent' (Taylor, 2003: 49). This has raised French fears that the Congo 'might serve as a potential springboard for the further spread of Anglo-Saxon influence throughout francophone Africa' (Schraeder, 2000: 413).

Mitterrand – 'Our responsibility is none'

Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the French government still insist that it bears no responsibility for the genocide in Rwanda. In an interview published in *Le Figaro*, François Mitterrand stated in September 1994 'Our responsibility is none'.

A French Parliamentary Commission on Rwanda was created in 1998 to investigate French policy regarding Rwanda. This was instigated as a result of pressure from civil society, non-government organisations and reporters, most notably the French journalist Patrick de Saint-Exupéry who raised serious questions about the depth and extent of French support for the Habyarimana dictatorship and genocidal regime in Rwanda from 1990 until the end of the genocide in 1994. In the final report published on December 15, 1998, France skilfully exonerated itself from any responsibility in the Rwandan genocide stressing that 'in no way

was it involved.' The report concluded that the French Parliamentary Committee do not support the 'unacceptable accusation' that France was complicit in the genocide⁷⁰.

Though French troops compiled their own lists of people accused of taking part in the killing, they were never given to the UN or the ICTR. Internal reports from the French military indicate that French soldiers believe they were tricked by their superiors, having been led to believe that it was the Hutus of Rwanda who were the victims of genocide. Indeed many French soldiers complained to journalists on location at Kibuye during Operation Turquoise that they had been 'duped' by their own government (McGreal, 2007). One French Sergeant watched over a group of machete-scarred, emaciated Tutsi survivors and told a journalist in early July 1994, 'we have been deceived...this is not what we were led to believe. We were told that Tutsis were killing Hutus. We thought the Hutus were the good guys and the victims' (Gourevitch, 1998: 160). The identity of the true victims of genocide was successfully distorted with one report even suggesting that the Tutsi were 'committing collective suicide' (Hintjens, 1999: 274). Such distortion of the truth by the French commanders and Hutu officials ensured that the French soldiers stood by as the governor of Kibuye led militia attacks into the hills of Bisesero to exterminate the small pocket of remaining Tutsi survivors (McGreal, 2007). Such deceit by their government resulted in much bitterness in the French army when it became clear that it was the Tutsi who were the true victims of genocide. One internal army document speaks of 'soldiers who cracked, not because of the corpses and violence and hunting down victims...but because of a sense of guilt' (Saint-Exupéry, cited in Pfaff: 1998). One French commander reported being 'misinformed about what was happening in front of his eyes and later humiliated at what he had been drawn into by the politicians in Paris' whilst other commanders who were veterans of Operation Noroit, maintained throughout the duration of Operation Turquoise that 'the Rwandan government and its army were legal organisations' (McGreal, 2007).

In February 2005, six individuals filed a lawsuit in France claiming that French soldiers were guilty of 'complicity in genocide' while deployed to Rwanda during the 1994 genocide despite the 1998 parliamentary panel absolving the military of responsibility in the genocide. In December 2005, the Paris army tribunal, the only French court with jurisdiction to try

70 Full report available online at <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dossiers/rwanda/rapport.asp>

French troops for crimes committed abroad, opened an investigation into accusations of two of the plaintiffs (Sage, 2005). At the time of writing, this investigation is still ongoing.

For the past twelve years, the Rwandan government has made repeated accusations against France in relation to the genocide. In April 2005, Article 2 of the Organic Law of Rwanda (2004) established a 'Commission of Enquiry to Establish the Role of France in the Genocide of 1994' referred to generally as the Mucyo Commission, being headed by the former Chief Prosecutor General and Minister of Justice, Jean De Dieu Mucyo. The Mucyo Commission is a domestic tribunal, made up of a seven-member panel of historians, legal experts and a senior military officer of the former Rwandan army. The Mucyo Commission gathered evidence at hearings throughout a seven day period in October 2006 and a further seven day period in December 2006, the aim being to make formal recommendations to the government of Rwanda on whether or not to take legal action against France for genocide-related damages at the International Court of Justice⁷¹. The three-volume 337 page report was released on 5 August 2008. The 'Mucyo Commission report' names former French President Francois Mitterand, his son Jean Christophe Mitterand and several members of his cabinet as well as senior military officials among those who should be held responsible for the slaughter of over a million people in 1994.

In addition, the report identifies 20 French military and 13 political figures who, the Rwandans argue, have a solid criminal case to answer. Despite the fact that France considers itself the birthplace of human rights, Paris has refused to permit its soldiers to testify before any court with regards to the genocide in Rwanda (Petersen, 2001: 287).

As previously detailed, France has levelled allegations of human rights abuses and massacres, including responsibility for the assassination of President Habyarimana in 1994, against the RPF and most notably Paul Kagame, the current leader of Rwanda (chapter 4 herein) and

⁷¹In November 2006 there was a bitter diplomatic fall-out between Kigali and Paris after the French judge Jean-Louis Bruguiere called for Rwandan President Paul Kagame to be brought in front of an international criminal tribunal in relation to the death of former Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana in 1994. It is commonly accepted that such an allegation, being raised as the Mucyo Commission entered phase II of screening testimonies, is an international smoke-screen to try and vindicate the French role in the Genocide (Buckingham, 2006). It is acknowledged that, given the current political climate in Rwanda, testimonies at the Mucyo Commission are liable to be emotional and potentially influenced by the strong anti-French mood in the country. None the less, the other sources utilised here, including fieldwork research, provide ample supporting evidence for the conclusions reached by this thesis.

suffice to say that French Judge Jean-Louis Bruguiere is seeking to bring Kagame and eight other high ranking Rwandan officials before a UN tribunal, issuing arrest warrants in November 2006 to facilitate such a prosecution (Africa Research Bulletin, 2006).

French policy in Africa post-genocide

Despite formidable human rights abuses by its 'client' African governments, France has continued to support dictators and regimes whose abusive and murderous policies towards their own people have been well evidenced. The longevity and dynamism of such policies are disturbing, surviving the Presidencies of de Gaulle, Pompidou, Giscard d'Estaing and Mitterrand , and enduring changing times, values and world politics. The term François-Xavier Verschave utilised to highlight the connection between France and its 'client' African states – *la Françafrique* – is not without cynicism, with 'fric' being French slang for money. Speaking in 1996, a diplomat in the Ivory Coast summed up the equation, 'you could talk about the French presence [in Africa] for hours and hours but it comes down to two things – prestige and business' (French, 1996).

CONCLUSION

The main Rapporteur of the French Assembly report stated, in respect of the Rwandan genocide, that 'France is neither responsible or guilty' (OAU report, 2000: para 12.7). This statement does however contradict the majority of the findings of the French Assembly. As the OAU report indicates '[t]he [French Assembly] report's evidence and the report's findings seemed unrelated' (OAU report, 2000: para 12.8). In addition, significant aspects of French involvement were omitted from the enquiry, including an indicative picture of French military assistance to Rwanda throughout the 1990s until the end of the genocide in 1994. Despite the French government's refusal to acknowledge its responsibility in the atrocities of Rwanda, this chapter has evidenced that there is an abundance of evidence to hold the French government collectively accountable for its failure to act to prevent or stop the Rwandan genocide.

Genocide does not occur without ideological preparation and practical, logistical and strategic preparation. From 1990 onwards France performed an integral role in the architecture of the Rwandan genocide. France colluded and conspired with the genocidal Hutu regime and did supply arms and military equipment, military training and the alleged dissemination of

racialised ideologies to the Rwandan Army (FAR) and Hutu militia organisations. Once the genocide in Rwanda commenced in April 1994, France knowingly persisted in its collusive, participatory role by continuing to deliver arms and military training to the génocidaires throughout the period of Operation Turquoise in breach of a UN arms embargo. One Prosecutor of the ICTY has clearly indicated that any assistance in genocide constitutes sufficient participation to meet the terms of complicity as defined by the Genocide Convention (see chapter 5 herein) and as such it is arguable that the knowing participatory role by the French throughout the period of the Rwandan genocide can be construed as complicity in genocide.

The motives for the proposal of a humanitarian intervention in Rwanda by the French government are highly questionable and again are suggestive of complicity in the ongoing genocide. The policy of a French intervention in Rwanda was only adopted once it became apparent to them that France's chosen allies, namely the Hutu regime, were on the point of being ousted by the Anglophone rebel army of the RPF, perceived by the French as an 'Anglo Saxon' enemy as previously noted. A victory by the RPF was unpalatable to the French after its historical deep commitment to the Hutu regime. France was so fervid in its desire to block the RPF from halting the genocide and taking power in Rwanda that it pursued its role by deliberately and effectively forming a 'humanitarian intervention' as a cloak for the defence of their narrow state interests. The French intervention in Rwanda allowed the French to rearm the génocidaires who were buoyed and encouraged by their arrival; but the intervention also created a protective corridor to facilitate the safe passage of members of the interim government responsible for orchestrating the genocide, and fleeing génocidaires, protecting them from retribution and punishment. The French intervention also facilitated the defeat of resistance in Bisesero, crushing the few remaining survivors on the mountainsides. Despite having knowledge of the daily suffering of the Tutsi people on the hills of Bisesero, the French soldiers arrived there accompanied by militia and unequipped to rescue the desperate survivors. These soldiers then left the area knowing that the wounded and starving Tutsi were in mortal danger and having learned that the Tutsi were in fact the true victims of genocide and not the perpetrators as they had been led to believe by their commanders, indicative of deviant actions by some of the leaders of the French military in Rwanda.

The analytical discussion in this chapter of France's political and military relationship with Rwanda from 1990 and throughout the period of the genocide of 1994 has observed the emergence of external bystander institutional complicity in genocide illuminating with special clarity that the French government overtly violated international law for political and economic advantage in central Africa. The conduct of the French military in Bisesero is clearly definable as complicity and clearly indicates that power interests rather than humanitarian concern guided the French humanitarian intervention in Rwanda for which there is a potential for prosecution in terms of the concept of state crime.

In an effort to further develop our exploration of complicity by external institutional bystanders to genocide, the following chapter will analyse the role of the United Kingdom in Rwanda through documentary evidence and interviews in our ongoing study to move the boundaries of 'the genocide template' (Lemarchand, 2006: 9).

CHAPTER SEVEN: THE ROLE OF THE UK IN RWANDA

'As for governments, realpolitik still rules when human rights comes up against superpowers interests' (authors own emphasis , Robertson, 2002: 533)

The previous chapter provided a detailed analytical discussion of the French government's political and military relationship with Rwanda throughout the Presidency of Juvenal Habyarimana with a particular focus on the period from 1990 and throughout the crime of genocide in 1994. The chapter assisted in developing the concept of bystander institutional complicity in genocide and state crime by exposing the knowing participatory role constitutive of complicity in genocide by the French government. The aim of this current chapter is to further illuminate the implications of external institutional complicity in genocide for political gain by undertaking a detailed analysis of the role of the United Kingdom in the genocide in Rwanda.

As such this chapter will explore British foreign policy in some detail with regards to its colonies in Africa, which will necessarily include the 'special relationship' between the United Kingdom and the United States in both the Cold War and post Cold War eras. British interests in central Africa including Rwanda and Uganda are discussed and thereafter this thesis examines British foreign policy in Rwanda during the period of the genocide. To provide the reader with clarity, the relevant data collated is described in terms of knowledge, options and explanations. Knowledge refers to what early warning the British government were in possession of and assesses the depth and quality of such warnings. Options refer to the political and legal courses of action which could be drawn upon by the British government and, lastly, explanations simply refer to the reasoning provided by the elite for their actual responses to the genocide.

This chapter concludes by discussing the extent to which colonialism and indeed neocolonialism have impacted on the decision-making processes of the British government as well as putting forward some suggestions to enhance our understanding of their rationale and explanations. Such a detailed analysis permits conclusions to be made as to whether the role of the United Kingdom is constitutive of complicity in genocide and, allow further development of the concept of bystander institutional complicity in genocide and of the utility of the concept of state crime.

Unnatural boundaries

'African conflicts have resulted from the way the boundaries were drawn by the colonial powers' (INTERVIEW EL/18).

It was under the influence of Lord Rosebery as Foreign Secretary that Uganda was finally made a protectorate in 1894. This decision was taken partly because he believed that colonies were valuable for their own sake, but it was also because Uganda had acquired strategic importance. It was Cecil Rhodes' advance into the 'Rhodesias' in 1889 which provoked such a settlement. In addition to Uganda, Kenya, and Nyasaland were also 'brought into British control' (Pugh, 1999 :130).

Prior to British rule, southern Uganda was the locale of a number of African kingdoms including the Buganda, the most powerful of which lost out under the British policy of divide and rule, often referred to 'Buganda sub-imperialism'. British economic, educational and social policies also contributed to divisionism in Uganda. Further divisive policies were introduced by the British colonists who formed a privileged class of Asian immigrants who acted as 'middlemen between Europeans and Africans' (Mutibwa, 1992: 2-3,7).

British determination in establishing its influence 'from the Cape to Cairo' brought the country into repeated conflict with the French Empire. The closest the two came to war was in 1898 over Fashoda which was discussed in the previous chapter, but the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 saw their imperial discord in Africa laid to rest, as the two joined forces against a threatening German Empire – a chain of events which culminated in the first World War.

In the aftermath of the First World War, Germany was forced to forfeit its empire in Africa and British colonial rule in central Africa was extended to most of the north and east of Uganda as well as to Kigezi, originally part of Rwanda as discussed in chapter three herein. This British partition resulted in bringing together, within one country, peoples of differing levels of social development and lacking in close historical contacts, whilst splitting nationalities and tribes into, or among, several countries. This process undoubtedly sowed the seeds of discord detrimental to the establishment of peaceful and harmonious relationships between different peoples of Uganda and pre-colonisation Rwanda (Mutibwa, 1992: 2). Such partition has also resulted in a minority population of Eastern DRC, commonly referred to as

Congolese Kinyarwanda speakers, who are describable as 'a national group from a nation state extending into the territory of a neighbouring multiethnic state' or, in other words, people of Rwanda becoming people of the Congo as a result of shifting borders (Prunier, 2009: 333).

British Foreign Policy post World War II

It is apparent that one of the main aims of post-WWII British foreign policy has been to maintain as far as possible Britain's power status initially as a 'great power' and latterly as an eminent global power, albeit second in rank, that should not descend into a singularly European one. Referring to their power status, Sir Roger Makins, the British Ambassador to the US, noted in 1954 that 'we take this for granted...[it is] a principle so much at one with our outlook and character that it determines the way we act without emerging itself into clear consciousness' (Makins, cited in Verrier, 1983: 85). Labour government leaders continually sought to preserve Britain's 'Great Power' status and initially explored the possibility of becoming a 'Third Force' between the US and USSR. This was to involve an alliance of the European colonial powers together with their colonies (Kistatsky, 2005:96). Foreign secretary Ernest Bevin noted in a memorandum dated 4 January 1948, titled *The First Aim of Foreign Policy* - 'it should be possible to develop our own power and influence to equal that of the United States of America and the USSR. We have the material resources in the Colonial Empire, if we develop them...[this policy] will show clearly that we are not subservient to the United States or to the Soviet Union' (cited in Gorst and Johnman, 1997 :23).

An additional aim of post World War II British foreign policy was to guarantee that, wherever possible, the international system is organised in such a way as to benefit British and Western commercial interests whereby the world's economically most important states and regions remain under effective Western control (see Woodhouse, 1962, for full overview of British foreign policy since the second World War). Post WWII era historians have noted a renewed European interest in Africa and indeed a memorandum dated 19 December 1947 records Field Marshall Montgomery outlining 'the immense possibilities that exist in British Africa for development' and 'the use to which such development could be put to enable Great Britain to maintain her standard of living, and to survive'. 'These lands contain everything we need', he noted, such as minerals, raw materials, labour and food; but he was concerned with the 'lack of a grand design', stating that 'there must be a grand design for African

development as a whole'. Montgomery argues that Britain needed to develop the continent since the African 'is a complete savage and is quite incapable of developing the country himself' (cited in Hyam, 1992: 498). As a result, Britain's post-war Labour government escalated the exploitation of Britain's colonies in order to help a British economy devastated by war. This policy was both supported and encouraged by the United States (Duignan and Gann, 1975 :680) corroborated by a British foreign office document dated 1950 that highlights:

'the United States realises the importance to her own economy, in peace and war, of many British colonial resources and the possibilities of their further development...the United States agrees with the basic aims of British colonial policy ... The United Kingdom and the United States are basically agreed on long-term objectives on Africa' (Curtis, 1998: 71).

Historical literature clearly indicates that such mineral wealth as found in Central and Southern Africa have notoriously given rise to conflict over the political control of strategic resources resulting in gross violations of human rights. One interviewee with a wealth of experience of diplomatic service in East and Central Africa stated that

'The Congo in all its history is a story of conflict over resources and control in its early post independence years by international businesses with diplomatic interests and, more recently, the Ugandan incursions into Eastern Congo, ...were perhaps not prompted by but they certainly were extended and protracted and embittered by greed really to get hold of those resources' (INTERVIEW EL/02).

Although governments now promote that Africa's major importance to the West in the post-war period was due to its strategic relevance in the Cold War, 'in reality Africa's major importance, like most of the rest of the Third World, is primarily economic, serving as a source of raw materials'(Curtis, 1998: 98).

Neo-colonialism in Africa

In later years, the British Empire initiated decolonisation in Africa and the colonial empire was granted independence (discussed in chapter 4). Uganda gained independence from

Britain in 1962, and since then has experienced considerable political turmoil including periods of civil war (Mutibwa, 1992: 2).

As pertinent today as it was historically, independence was generally replaced by neocolonialism, a term coined in the early 1960s by Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's first postcolonial president, to describe the economic and political dominance of weaker nations by more powerful ones. Both nations remain independent, but the policies of the weaker nation mirror the concerns of the more powerful, backed by political and financial, rather than military, pressure. Nkrumah stated '[n]eo-colonialism is...the worst form of imperialism. For those who practise it (sic), it means power without responsibility, and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress' (Nkrumah, 1965).

In the mid 1960s, Milton Obote, Uganda's first post-independence leader, threatened huge British financial, industrial and agricultural interests within the country as a result of a nationalisation drive in which the state had taken sixty percent interest in all foreign and Ugandan-Asian-owned businesses. Uganda, the country once dubbed the Pearl in Africa by Winston Churchill due to its abundance of raw materials, was the base for eighty British companies and as such the prospect of nationalisation was not acceptable to London (Hutton and Bloch, 1980). So began the search for a possible successor to Obote. 'The tale of how the Western powers took measures to reverse the decline of their fortunes in Africa during the 1960s is complex in detail but simple in principle'. Suffice to say that Obote accepted aid from the Israeli government unaware that it was being used as a proxy by America, a close ally of his British opponent, and that it had been cultivating Idi Amin as his successor for some time through their military presence in a manner consistent with their role as American proxies. Bolstered by the Israeli assistance and the greater power of the Ugandan tank corps, Amin was able to overwhelm the majority of the armed forces loyal to Obote on 24 and 25 January 1971. Hutton and Bloch (1980) have evidenced how the British government was instrumental in establishing in power this brutal dictator of extraordinary cruelty. The British-supported coup in Uganda, engineered by British and American interests, is a useful example of British foreign policy towards a former colonial country when the weaker nation fails to treat the concerns of the more powerful nation as its priority.

'NATURAL ALLIES'

The announcement of a special relationship

Relations between the United States and Britain date back some four centuries (Montgomery, 2007). However it was only in Winston Churchill's famous 'Iron Curtain Speech' of 5 March 1946, at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, that he formalised this 'special relationship' as a result of the 'iron curtain [that] has descended across the Continent'. The following is an extract from this speech:

'Neither the sure prevention of war, nor the continuous rise of world organisation will be gained without what I have called the fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples. This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States. This is no time for generalities, and I will venture to be precise. Fraternal association requires not only the growing friendship and mutual understanding between our two vast but kindred systems of society, but the continuance of the intimate relationship between our military advisers, leading to common study of potential dangers, the similarity of weapons and manuals of instructions, and to the interchange of officers and cadets at technical colleges. It should carry with it the continuance of the present facilities for mutual security by the joint use of all Naval and Air Force bases in the possession of either country all over the world. This would perhaps double the mobility of the American Navy and Air Force. It would greatly expand that of the British Empire Forces and it might well lead, if and as the world calms down, to important financial savings. Already we use together a large number of islands; more may well be entrusted to our joint care in the near future.' (Langworth, 2008: 119)

So in the shadow of the Second World War, as the West embarked on a Cold War with Soviet Russia, Britain opted for a special relationship with the United States that endures to this day⁷².

The perceived benefits to Britain in such a 'special relationship', evident in Churchill's speech, were mutually symbiotic, as portrayed in a US State Department memo of policy towards Britain in 1948 which outlined the common values of these 'natural allies'. It stated that 'British friendship and cooperation is not only desirable in the United Nations and in dealing with the Soviets; it is necessary for American defense (sic). The United Kingdom, the Dominions, Colonies and Dependencies, form a world-wide network of strategically located territories of great military value, which have served as defensive outposts and as bridgeheads for operations' (Baylis, 1997: 49). US planners also appreciated the significance of 'strategic materials for which British colonies and dependencies constitute important sources of supply' (Curtis, 1998: 73).

The 1960s continued to witness the United Kingdom providing strong support for US foreign policy. An internal US memo described how

'[t]he firmest public support from any government on our policy in Vietnam has come from the British. This, despite the fact that Vietnam is a difficult issue for any British Government, and especially a labor Government'
(Dumbrell, 2001: 156).

Certainly, decolonisation witnessed British global power being steadily replaced by the United States. Britain was, however, content to take up a position as 'junior partner in an orbit of power predominantly under the American aegis' (Balfour, 1945, cited in Nafeez Mosaddeq, 2003: 6). It is clear why Britain has long been understood by US leaders as 'a fortified outpost of the Anglo-Saxon race' (Adams, cited in Hartley, 1994:9).

The Cold War ended in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The US Ambassador to Britain, Raymond Seitz, noted that 'a critical component in the long, successful saga of the Cold War was the relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States' and that 'while our focus was in Europe, we both also realised this was a global business'. Seitz noted

⁷² The US and Britain had formed various alliances throughout the early twentieth century. Owing to the United States not having declared war on the Ottoman Empire, it entered WWI as an 'associated power' of Britain as opposed to an ally. The US, USSR and Britain were also allies known as 'the big three' during WWII.

that Britain was the United States' closest ally, and the relationship 'would remain undisturbed regardless of which political party came to power in London or Washington'. A key aspect 'is the degree to which our two nations find their respective international interests to be parallel' and the vigour of the relationship 'depends on the perception of strategic coincidence'. Seitz concluded by noting that 'our priorities will not match with quite the same frequency as they once did' but that 'there is so much content and body in this relationship that will carry through the passing of an old era' (Seitz, 1993: 85-87).

The special relationship after the fall of the Iron Curtain

There are two contemporary views on the alleged 'special relationship' between the United Kingdom and the United States in the post Cold War era. The first is that it no longer exists, with Dumbrell arguing that 'the writing for the special relationship was on the Wall as it fell' (2001: 220). The second and more dominant view is that the special relationship continues. McCausland and Stuart argue that '[t]he US-UK partnership flourished during World War II, deepened during the long twilight struggle with the Soviet Union, and has prospered further since the end of the Cold War. It is likely to survive any new challenges that may loom on the horizon' (v: 2006).

It may be suggested that the most significant aspect of the special relationship between these 'natural allies', and indeed the foremost indicator of the continuing existence of such a relationship, is mutual support for aggression. Indeed, despite the policy differences between the US and Britain, on the one hand, and the primary attention accorded by British planners to Europe on the other, the fact remains that Britain still plays a critical role in support of US foreign policy and world order, often independently from its role in the EU.

British interest in Rwanda

What was British foreign policy towards Rwanda in the period before and during the genocide of 1994 and what gave rise to such decision-making? Was such foreign policy compatible to the British government's legal obligations in terms of the Genocide Convention and International Law in general? In an effort to obtain a better understanding of these areas of government processes, it is necessary (as noted at the beginning of this chapter) to provide a timeline indicating knowledge available to the British government both before and during

the genocide; options that were available to the elite members of the British government; and explanations provided by same for the decisions reached.

The data for the timeline is collated from relevant and reliable information and intelligence from both official and unofficial sources which was available to the British government from 1990 - 1994; official communications and directions between the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, British embassies of Kinshasa, Kampala and Dar Es Salaam, and Government ministers in Cabinet; the content of interviews undertaken with elite informants as previously described in chapter 2 herein.

A detailed analysis of the elite interviews undertaken for this thesis and the documentary evidence gathered indicates that the British government were in possession of detailed, reliable and relevant intelligence, both before and during the Rwandan genocide, which would have allowed them a clear perspective on the situation in the country. The available information will be discussed hereafter but it is important to highlight that a vast amount of documentary evidence of significance to this thesis remain classified by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office despite repeated requests by the author for its release in terms of the Freedom of information Act (see chapter 2).

KNOWLEDGE

Prior to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the United Kingdom did not have an embassy in either Rwanda or Burundi, although documentation released by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office does evidence the presence of a British Honorary Consul in Rwanda throughout the early 1990s. The lack of diplomatic capacity in Rwanda is reflected in that Britain had no direct political or financial interests in the country prior to the genocide. However, the same could not be said of two countries sharing borders with Rwanda, namely Uganda and the then Zaire which, unlike Rwanda, were rich in raw materials and had governments sympathetic to foreign investment. Britain has historically nurtured a strong relationship with President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda since his rise to power in 1986 and maintains substantial business interests in the country.

The following narrative timeline documents not only the nature and extent of the warnings available to the British government, but also the quality of the intelligence and information available both before and during the genocide. On taking up his position as British High

Commissioner of Uganda in 1993, Edward Clay assumed roving responsibility as non-resident ambassador to Rwanda and Burundi. Prior to this time, Rwanda and Burundi had been covered by the British government in a variety of 'ad hoc' ways. Historically the two countries had been divided between the British Embassies of Kinshasa and Dar Es Salam and thereafter both countries were administered from Kinshasa. No satisfactory explanation has been available for such a decision.

Prior to his departure, the High Commissioner to be was given instructions in respect of Rwanda by the FCO which were recalled by Clay as:

'We (the British government) know almost nothing about them (Rwandans) and care less but you can go there to cover it and we want you to cover it because the main angle for us is the role of the Ugandans as the home of the Rwandans in exile, their supposed or alleged role in supporting the RPF and more distantly the repercussions that this little situation in central Africa and their relationship with the French... Just remember that our relations with Paris will always matter more than our relations with Uganda, so that was the message that I was given (Interview, London, 2006).

At the British High Commission in Kampala, the responsibility of maintaining a dialogue with the RPF was that of the deputy High Commissioner. A rapport had been developed since the RPF invasion of Rwanda from its base in Uganda in 1990 and according to the High Commissioner 'we were quite close to them...they had an excellent and very strong intelligence machine inside Rwanda. They were warning of impending tragedy. They were warning us of catastrophe' (Interview, 2006)

Chapter 4 of this thesis has already detailed the invasion of Rwanda from southern Uganda by the RPF on 1 October 1990. The following day, the British embassy in Kampala reported a 'Ugandan military incursion into Rwanda...a force of some several hundred men in Ugandan army uniforms with armoured cars'. The FCO was further advised that 'the force consists of exiled Tutsis from Rwanda' and that 'the Ugandan government condemned the incursion' (FCO/HMC/17 – 1 October 1990). Throughout October 1990 daily reports were forwarded from the British Embassies in Kampala and Kinshasa to London giving detailed updates about the incursion of which 'the Ugandan government has made strenuous attempts

to distance itself from'. These reports also included what steps the Ugandan government were taking to end the attack (FCO/HMC/16 - 4 October 1990). Further telexes made the FCO aware of mounting suspicions both in Rwanda and Uganda that there has been 'connivance at senior levels in the preparations for the incursion into Rwanda by ...the Rwandan Patriotic Front' and 'I understand the Rwandese government is alleging that men and supplies are still crossing the Ugandan border to reinforce RPF and that this demonstrates Ugandan collusion'. Of significance from this declassified confidential document (FCO/HMC/16 - 4 October 1990) is that it indicates that some embassies in Kigali 'have agreed to recommend to capitals that there should be a community demarche in Kampala quote seeking to bring the Ugandans to their senses unquote'. The identification of the informant and embassies involved in the proposed community demarche has been deleted from the released documentation. The text continues with the opinion of the British High Commissioner being that 'such a demarche would be both premature and counter-productive. It would achieve nothing and could only damage our interests here' (FCO/HMC/15 - 8 October 1990).

By the 12 October 1990 telexes forwarded to London provide substantial detail of a meeting held in Rwanda for the resident ambassadors in Kigali with the Rwandan foreign minister 'at which he claimed that the GOU (government of Uganda) was now actively colluding with the rebels (RPF). A meeting held the previous day between a group of individuals whose details remain classified, reached the 'broad consensus that...Museveni himself [was] taken by surprise by the incursion into Rwanda although many individuals in senior positions must have had an inkling of what was afoot...there was anecdotal evidence to indicate that individuals in [government of Uganda] senior positions...were conniving in attempts to help the rebel cause with supplies' (FCO/HMC/07 - 12 October 1990).

On the 1 November 1990 a British diplomat in Uganda held a 'further meeting' with a classified source who had 'met quote senior rebel leaders unquote on 31 October for 3 hours'. During this dialogue with the rebel leaders, the classified source negotiated to allow Mobutu to be permitted to act as mediator which was accepted. This source was able to update the author of this telex for London on the current state of the rebel RPF (FCO/HMC/12 - 1 November 1990).

The following two months witnessed periods of intense fighting followed by extended periods of calm. However, on 23 January, the British embassy in Kinshasa reports to the FCO

London that 'RPF forces captured the town of Ruhengeri (Rwanda) following a dawn attack. The capabilities of the RPF were also noted herein stating 'the RPF have shown that they have access to the resources necessary to hit the GOR [government of Rwanda] in important areas. RPF claims to be able to take Kigali pretty much at will can by no means be discounted' (FCO/HMC/06 – 23 January 1991). The following day a telex containing similar intelligence was forwarded from Kampala to London. A member of FCO staff has thereafter handwritten thereon 'this confirms a report from Tony Wood in Kigali which I received yesterday' (FCO/HMC/11 – 24 January 1991) confirming that there were multiple sources of similar information which would permit some degree of triangulation.

As previously discussed in chapter 4 of this thesis, peace negotiations at Arusha commenced in an effort to bring the civil war in Rwanda to an end. These intense meetings were held monthly with the full minutes of these often lengthy meetings being forwarded to the FCO, London by an unidentified source (FCO/HMC/14 – 10/12 July 1992). In addition, the British Embassy in Dar Es Salaam forwarded a summary for the attention of London, Paris, Brussels, Kampala, Kinshasa and Washington. A handwritten note by a staff member on telex dated 13 July 1992, summarising the peace talks in Arusha held over the previous three day period states 'this is a welcome development and a positive move towards a full ceasefire, if they can make it hold' (FCO/HMC/20). Once again Dar es Salaam embassy reported to London on the next round of talks which opened on 11 August 1992 (FCO/HMC/21 – 14 August 1992) and also to notify the FCO office of the signing of the 'protocol agreement on the principles of government' (FCO/HMC/22 – 19 August 1992). The talks continued between the government of Rwanda and the RPF in Arusha on a regular basis with summaries continuing to be forwarded to London throughout the remainder of 1992 and throughout the first few months of 1993 (FCO/HMC/25 – docs 14 October 1992 – 8 March 1993). Some of these telexes from the embassy in Dar Es Salam reporting on the Arusha Peace Process are labelled as 'routine' (FCO/HMC/23 – 21 September 1992) whilst others are labelled 'priority' (FCO/HMC/24 – 13 October 1990) or 'immediate' (FCO/HMC/26 – 8 March 1993).

Warnings of impending tragedy

'NGOs are more reliable because nobody is trying to lobby them or trying to bring them into the process but they witness because they're

going round helping in various parts of the country, they actually witness it first hand what is happening' (INTERVIEW EL/16)

It was in January 1993 that Oxfam became 'increasingly fearful of where developments in Rwanda may be heading, and raised its concerns with officials in the British Foreign Office and with the Secretary of State of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Douglas Hurd' (Press Release, 22 January 1993). Just a few weeks later Edward Clay took up his position as British High Commissioner of Uganda, thereby assuming roving responsibility for Rwanda, for which he was given instructions by the FCO prior to his departure as noted above.

Throughout the first three months of 1993, another British diplomat indicated that 'we were warned, from people who were themselves rather vague about the detail, that some catastrophe was ... this was warnings from the RPF who of course had an excellent and very strong intelligence machine inside Rwanda. They were warning of impending tragedy. They were warning us of catastrophe but there was to a degree a sense of crying wolf because they were always over writing what was happening' (INTERVIEW EL/02).

As a result of similar warnings of 'impending tragedy' being received by the embassies of other members of the United Nations Security Council, March 1993 saw the matter of a potential catastrophe unfolding in Rwanda being raised as a topic of discussion. It was the French ambassador to the Security Council who first suggested the creation of a UN peacekeeping mission for Rwanda (EL03); this, however, received a cool reception. Some two months later in May 1993, the Secretary-General, in a report to the Security Council, recommended the creation of a UN observer mission for the Rwanda-Uganda border. As a result, on 22 June 1993, the Security Council adopted resolution 846 creating the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) which was deployed on the Ugandan side of the border between Uganda and Rwanda. Its mandate was to monitor that border 'to verify that no military assistance reaches Rwanda, focus being put primarily in this regard on transit or transport, by roads or tracks which could accommodate vehicles, of lethal weapons and ammunition across the border, as well as any other material which could be of military use' (S/RES/846).

Peace talks continue

In the meantime, peace talks were continuing in Tanzania and on 4 August 1993, 'the long-negotiated peace accord between the government of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front was finally signed, amid much rejoicing and considerable relief' (FCO/HMC/27 – 5 August 1993). Shortly thereafter Lt. General Dallaire arrived in Kigali with a mission to evaluate the possible role of UN international peacekeepers in the country and in September 1993, the Secretary-General to the UN recommended to the Security Council that a peacekeeping force be provided for Rwanda without delay. This resulted in the United Nations Security Council passing resolution 872 on 5 October 1993, establishing the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), commanded by General Dallaire (S/RES/872). One British government cabinet member recalls being in discussion with the then Foreign Secretary, Lord Hurd and 'getting very cross because we couldn't do more in the UN (United Nations Security Council). This was in the October/November 93 and it was partly because it was a tiny country, very few people had experience of it. Edward Clay was saying how worried he was, Dallaire found a back route to me and you know the people who were on the ground were very frightened too' (INTERVIEW EL/04).

By December 1993, tensions were apparent in Rwanda partly as a result of hate radio airing increasingly virulent propaganda against the Tutsi of Rwanda. It became apparent to some members of the British government and the United Nations that the Arusha Peace Accords 'are not going to work' (INTERVIEW EL/02; INTERVIEW EL/04; INTERVIEW EL/10) with one cabinet member describing them as 'window dressing. That's not what [was] happening on the ground' (INTERVIEW EL/04). Within the first few weeks of the New Year, the French Ambassador in Kampala was 'sounding some really deathly warnings... It was he who spoke first of the use of the term cockroach on Radio Mille Les Collines'⁷³. This information was made available by the British Embassy in Kampala to the FCO London although it was highlighted that the French Ambassador to Uganda:

'was issuing these warnings from the point of view of attacking the role of the RPF – they were bringing about a situation in which there was such tension that might lead to the contemplation of terrible things; and

⁷³ The term cockroach is an offensive name given to the RPF by the Hutu Power of Rwanda. It is utilised as a form of dehumanisation and neutralisation.

secondly, the President of Uganda's governments interference by supporting the RPF and alleging that they were actually, you know, fuelling them and supplying them and all that; and thirdly, attacking us because they saw that the Ugandan government was a cat's paw of the British government' (INTERVIEW EL/02).

The UNAMIR Force Commander Dallaire stated when interviewed that throughout the first three months of 1994, he visited the various foreign embassies in Kigali, Rwanda and warned them of an impending atrocity liable to result in many deaths. Inexplicably, when Edward Clay visited Rwanda in the last week of February 1994, to present his credentials to President Habyarimana as the non-resident British Ambassador, he visited each of the city's embassies in turn but according to a staff member of the FCO in London, 'none of his diplomatic colleagues told him anything' (INTERVIEW EL/06) and as such he was not advised of Dallaire's alleged warnings to them. Dallaire did meet Edward Clay personally during his visit this same week in February, but did not inform Ambassador Clay of his concerns of impending atrocity that he claimed to have shared with those countries representatives with permanent embassies in Rwanda. That no intelligence was shared with Ambassador Clay has been confirmed in interviews with both Dallaire and Clay. A member of staff from the FCO during this period of time states 'I don't know why they [Dallaire and foreign embassies in Kigali] didn't talk to him, either they didn't believe it or they had vested interests'. However, during a speech some years after the genocide, one British MP stated that during February and March 1994, 'General Dallaire, as commander of UNAMIR, found his warnings of impending calamity discounted and disregarded by his superiors in the governments – including that...of the United Kingdom – to which they were reported' (Extract of speech by Peter Hain, MP, 22 January, 2001⁷⁴). When interviewed in London in 2005, Dallaire was adamant that his situation reports (sitreps) were being forwarded to United Kingdom intelligence.

Whilst in Kigali in February 1994, Edward Clay was informed that the British Honorary Consul Tony Wood had fled to London in fear of his life. This detail was forwarded in a telex to London (FCO/HMC/28).

⁷⁴ <http://www.aegitrust.com/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=19&Itemid=44>

In interviewing former permanent and non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, it was established that several such persons had met with Claude Dusaidi, the RPF representative at the UN, in the corridors of the New York building in the weeks prior to the genocide. In a press release at a later time Dusaidi alleged that during these few week of February and March 1994, he gave 'detailed information ... about militia training, arms dumps, political murders, hate propaganda, and death lists, all of it provided to ... British diplomats' and other members of the United Nations Security Council (Press Release by RPF 30 April 1994). None of the interviewees can confirm or deny this claim (INTERVIEW EL/08; INTERVIEW EL/12; INTERVIEW EL/14).

Throughout February and March 1994, London received several telexes from its embassies in Africa advising the FCO that the Peace Progress had encountered various obstacles, not least the stalling of President Habyarimana in fulfilling the requirements of the Arusha Accords agreed the previous year (FCO/HMC/28; FCO/HMC/29).

It was thus that late on the evening of 6 April 1994, London was made aware of the death of two Presidents in a plane crash by telex from Washington (chapter 4 details the full circumstances of the crash and its aftermath). Washington also forwarded this intelligence to the British embassies of Kampala, Dar Es Salam, Kinshasa, Addis Ababa, Actor and the United Kingdom Mission in New York. The report concludes 'it was anyone's guess who was responsible for shooting down the plane' (FCO/HMC/30).

On the following day, the President of the United Nations Security Council, Colin Keating, issued a written statement indicating 'there has been considerable loss of lives, including the deaths of Government leaders, [and] many civilian and at least ten Belgian peacekeepers as well as the reported kidnapping of others'. This written statement was agreed by all members of the Security Council . On this same date, namely 7 April 1994, the British High Commissioner in Kampala, Edward Clay, sent a telex to FCO London indicating 'we have spoken to our Honorary Consul' suggesting that Tony Wood had returned to the country sometime since Clay's visit to Rwanda in February. The telex states that the Honorary Consul and another informant by the name of Kanyarushoke 'both speak of there having been some prolonged periods of shooting. But Kanyarushoke believes this was the Presidential Guards reacting hysterically and firing wildly in the air, rather than to kill'. Clay concludes by

commenting with regards to the political power vacuum in Kigali created by the assassination, that 'Rwanda is in a very dangerous condition' (FCO/HMC/18).

Clay thereafter enters into a detailed description of the way forward for Rwanda now that 'The Presidency' is vacant. In telex forwarded to FCO, London he states:

'it is even more urgent to move towards the swearing in of transitional assembly and government. Acceptance by all parties of an interim president should be a precursor of that. The Arusha provisions – which cannot yet be implemented, of course – provide for the speaker of the National Assembly to take over the Presidency on an interim basis in the event of the incapacity of the President... The former constitution also provides for the speaker of the National Assembly to become interim President for three months. There is such a speaker in being. He is Doctor Sindikubwabo, who was engaged in politics from soon after independence until 1973, but then dropped out until his come-back in 1989...He has no real power base and is a rather unsubstantial figure. But those characteristics might turn out to make him attractive as a stop-gap President. ...Please instruct me if you wish me to talk to Museveni again about exerting his influence on the RPF. We shall need to be careful to avoid exaggerating Museveni's influence over them' (FCO/HMC/18 – 7 April 1994).

The FCO in London responded to the foregoing within four hours of receipt stating 'agree you should speak to Museveni...You could point out that the RPF have an important opportunity to participate in power-sharing if they play their cards carefully and constructively. We agree that it should be possible to get these points across without suggesting that we hold Uganda in any way responsible for the RPF or events in Kigali'. The FCO in London continue 'Given the uncertainty surrounding the crash, we are for the moment avoiding attributing responsibility to any group' (FCO/HMC/31 – 7 April 1994).

When interviewed, one senior British government minister stated that 'the 7th of April 94, in a way, was not a shock at all' (INTERVIEW EL/20). Indeed the death of Habyarimana was perceived by the UK government as something of a positive development in terms of Rwandan politics (DOC FCO/HMC/04 - 9 April 1994).

On the 12 April 1994, the Presidency of the European Union issued a statement which was forwarded by the FCO in London to their embassy in Kampala the following day. The Secretariat stated that 'the European Union...wants an international commission of inquiry to investigate fully the causes of the destruction of the Presidential aircraft' (FCO/HMC/32 – 13 April 1994). On this same day the British High Commissioner in Kampala invited the RPF vice-president to 'join all EU Heads of Mission 'at our regular meeting today'. In his reporting from Kampala back to London the following day, the Commissioner described the RPF's reaction to 'the atrocities initiated by the Presidential Guard on the morning after the *accident* to Habyarimana's aircraft and their attack on the RPF in Kigali'. The telex detailed that the RPF vice-president 'believed the regime (government of Rwanda) had a long-laid contingency plan to kill the opposition if really forced into a corner, but they had not expected the degree of brutality employed'. The RPF representative was also questioned at this meeting on his thoughts regarding the possibility of withdrawing UNAMIR from Rwanda. He responded

'UNAMIR should remain at least until the RPF and the remnants of the government side had seen what help UNAMIR could give them in the new situation. It would not however be necessary to enhance UNAMIR's capacity to intervene: the RPF could take care of the current disorder and should be left to do so'.

This telex concludes with the British diplomat commenting

'the RPF is acquiring the demeanour of a government in waiting, being pushed by events to assume responsibilities beyond its expectations. Museveni would not fault this approach. Their claim that only they are in a position to stop the massacres is plausible. The most dangerous moment for the RPF will indeed arise if the Rwandan population set about each other, perhaps provoked by the army and/or fear of the RPF as a Tutsi force, posing a security problem beyond their power to solve. The RPF seem to see some value in UNAMIR, at least for the time being. It would be premature to change the force's character or mandate until the RPF have attained their military objectives and we can see more clearly what the UN can do to assist in normalising the conditions of life, bringing relief and perhaps

facilitating contacts between the RPF and the other parties' (FCO/HMC/33-13 April 1994)

On 14 April 1994 Oxfam launched an appeal for 'Victims of Rwanda Emergency' in which it is stated 'the level of violence has shocked everyone' (PR/HMC/01). This was followed on 19 April with a further Oxfam press release announcing the arrival in Burundi of two Oxfam Emergency Department members who will assess the conditions on the Rwanda – Burundi border. Oxfam highlight that 'fighting and killing continues inside Rwanda' and 'Oxfam is extremely concerned about the safety of its 18 local staff in Rwanda, and about the safety of civilians there generally (PR/HMC/02). On 19 April Kenneth Roth, Director of Human Rights Watch wrote to the President of the Security Council pointing out that the ongoing atrocities in Rwanda constituted the crime of genocide and urged the five permanent members to fulfil their duty under the Genocide Convention to stop the killings and punish the perpetrators (Robertson, 2002:77).

UN Security Council adjust UNAMIR's mandate

It was in this climate that the UN Secretary-General issued 'Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda' dated 20 April 1994 which stated

'The members of the Security Council are fully aware of the critical situation in Rwanda... The violence appears to have both political and ethnic dimensions. No reliable estimate of deaths has so far been available, but they could possibly number tens of thousands... In this situation, it became impossible for UNAMIR to continue the tasks emanating from its mandate... Both sides have adopted rigid positions, with RPF presenting preconditions that RGF rejects... I regretfully have concluded that there is no prospect of a cease-fire being agreed upon in the coming days'.

The following options were thereafter presented by the UN Secretary-General to the United Nations Security Council members to permit them to reach a decision on 'whether, and if so, how, the United Nations will maintain its efforts to help a people who have fallen into

calamitous circumstances'. The Secretary-General offered three alternatives for the consideration of the Security Council. Firstly:

'The first alternative is predicated on the conclusion...that there is no realistic prospect of the two opposing forces agreeing on an effective cease-fire in the immediate future. Without a cease-fire, combat between them will continue and so will the lawlessness and the massacres of civilians. This situation could only be changed by the immediate and massive reinforcement of UNAMIR and a change in its mandate so that it would be equipped and authorised to coerce the opposing forces into a cease-fire, and to attempt to restore law and order and put an end to the killings. This also would make possible the provision and distribution of humanitarian assistance by humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organisations not only in the capital, but in other parts of the country where the population has been displaced or subjected to deprivation as a result of the violence. Further, the restoration of stability in Rwanda would assist in preventing the repercussions of the violence from spreading to neighbouring countries and leading to regional instability. This scenario would require several thousand additional troops and UNAMIR may have to be given enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations...I should report that the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations called on me on 19 April with a plea to reinforce UNAMIR to enable it to end the chaos in his country'

The Secretary-General thereafter continued with his second alternative to the United Nations Security Council that suggested:

'...a small group headed by the Force Commander, with necessary staff, would remain in Kigali to act as intermediary between the two parties in an attempt to bring them to an agreement on a cease-fire, this effort being maintained for a period of up to two weeks or longer, should the Council so prefer. Additional tasks would include assistance in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible in this situation. UNAMIR has received assurances from both sides that they will cooperate

in such operations, though there can be no certainty that this will be done. The team would require the support of an infantry company to provide security, as well as a number of military observers to monitor the situation, apart from civilian staff, the total being estimated at about 270. The remainder of UNAMIR personnel would be withdrawn, but UNAMIR, as a mission, would continue to exist.'

The Secretary-General in his report thereafter outlined the third alternative, namely the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR from Rwanda, which he made clear he did 'not favour'.

'However, in view of the extreme nature and dimensions of the violence and mass killings over the last two weeks, there is little ground for hope that effective commitments could be obtained [that both sides would take measures to ensure the safety of civilians in the areas under their respective control] and it must be kept in mind that the consequences of complete withdrawal, in terms of human lives lost, could be very severe indeed. There could also be similar repercussions in neighbouring countries where citizens of the ethnic groups found in Rwanda reside.'

In response to this communication, the UN Security Council recalled its resolution 909 of 5th April 1994 which extended the mandate of UNAMIR until 29 July 1994 with a six-week review provision . They also stated that they were '... appalled at the ensuing large-scale violence in Rwanda, which has resulted in the death of thousands of innocent civilians, including women and children'. They advised that owing to their 'deep concern for the safety and security of UNAMIR' they had reached an agreement to adjust the UNAMIR mandate to the following in keeping with the second alternative suggested by the Secretary General in his letter of 20 April 1994:

'a) To act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a cease-fire; b) To assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible; and (c) To monitor and report on developments in Rwanda, including the safety and security of the civilians who sought refuge with UNAMIR, and authorises a force level as

set out in paragraphs 15 to 18 of the Secretary-General's report of 20 April 1994 for that purpose.'

Resolution 912 was agreed on 21 April 1994 and, consequently, the number of UNAMIR troops was reduced from 2700 to 270.

In the meantime, meetings between the RPF and the President of Uganda were continuing in an effort to allegedly put pressure on the RPF to agree to a cease-fire. A further meeting had been arranged between the Secretary General of the RPF, Rudasingwa, President Museveni, and the Rwandan and US ambassadors to Uganda. A telex from Edward Clay to FCO London states that 'Museveni readily agreed to invite me to join the group, and we also agreed it might be prudent to invite the French ambassador' (FCO/HMC/34 – 20 April 1994). The result of this meeting was a draft initiative for a cease-fire proposed by Museveni with the approval of the British High Commissioner, Edward Clay, albeit not all his suggestions were accepted. This information was relayed by telex to London and to the United Kingdom Mission in New York. Both parties, namely the RPF and Government of Rwanda representative, 'were tasked to put the proposal to their respective authorities and to report back with their reactions to President Museveni on Saturday morning' (23/04/94). Edward Clay was invited by Museveni to attend this meeting also (FCO/HMC/09 – 21 April 1994). A further telex to London reports that 'He [Museveni] told Rudasingwa [RPF General Secretary] the prospects of getting a decent settlement in Rwanda were better from the RPF's point of view than they had ever been. The RPF should not risk their advantage by flouting world opinion'. This document continued 'we should keep alongside Museveni and encourage him to remain engaged with RPF' (FCO/HMC/03 – 20 April 1994).

Later the same day a communication forwarded from Kampala to London confirmed the text of the final draft of the proposal for Museveni to put to the RPF and the Rwandan government. In this communication, Edward Clay notes that the RPF representative had proven quite difficult whilst the government of Rwanda had been accepting of the proposals. The text written by Clay states 'I reminded the meeting that Rudasingwa's (RPF representative) attempts to introduce discussion of quote legitimacy unquote and to qualify the word quote violence unquote would be seen by world opinion as distractions from the overwhelming need to stop the killings' (FCO/HMC/35 – 21 April 1994). It was in this same date that the United Nations Security Council agreed on resolution 912, namely the

withdrawal of the bulk of UNAMIR peacekeepers from Rwanda, authorising only 270 to remain from the initial 2500 (S/RES/1994).

Over the next few days, several press releases indicated the extent of the atrocity and ongoing massacres in Rwanda. On 21 April, an ICRC press release indicated that 'the fighting that has raged in central Rwanda since early April has now spread to the entire country... Tens maybe hundreds of thousands killed: the exact number of victims of the massacres that have swept Rwanda over the last two weeks will never be known ... The human tragedy in Rwanda is on a scale that the International Red Cross has rarely witnessed' (PR/HMC/04). The following day, Oxfam issued a statement condemning the United Nations Security Council decision to drastically reduce UNAMIR numbers in the country. Some two weeks after the start of the violence, Oxfam estimated in their press release that that over 100,000 people had been killed (PR/HMC/05 – 22 April 1994).

Amnesty International released a press statement saying that 'government and security force officials are ordering the killing in Rwanda and the international community should act to stop them' (PR/HMC/6 - 26 April 1994).

Two days later the ICRC called on all governments concerned, including all members of the Security Council, to take all possible measures to end the massacres (PR/HMC/7 - 28 April 1994), whilst Oxfam issued a press release stating that 'Oxfam fear genocide is happening in Rwanda' based on the content of the phone communications from staff in Burundi's border with Rwanda (PR/HMC/8 – 28 April 1994). These press releases proved somewhat inflammatory and, on the 29 April 1994, a long Security Council debate took place to discuss the use of the word genocide in an outgoing United Nations Security Council Presidential Statement. The United Kingdom and the United States resisted the use of the word (INTERVIEW EL/12). The Council did, however, acknowledge that 'massacres and wanton killings...in a systematic manner' were occurring (ibid). The ICRC issued the most strongly worded statement in its history demanding that the Security Council take action (PR/HMC/4-29 April 1994) and also wrote to the Foreign Office of the UK to draw its attention to the tragic situation in Rwanda, stating that '... [this] is an initiative addressed simultaneously to several Governments in a position to influence the course of events in Rwanda , urging them to act without delay to bring an end to the massacres' (PR/HMC/4-29 April 1994).

In a letter also dated the 29 April 1994 the UN Secretary-General informed the Security Council 'that the Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda has reported a further deterioration of the situation in Kigali and other parts of Rwanda...UNAMIR reports strong evidence of preparations for further massacres of civilians in the city and there are several large concentrations of civilians who fear for their lives but enjoy little effective protection'. As such the Secretary-General questioned the revised mandate agreed in resolution 912 on 21 April 1994 drastically reducing the number of troops stationed in Rwanda with UNAMIR. The Secretary-General wrote:

'...it has become clear that that mandate does not give UNAMIR the power to take effective action to halt the continuing massacres...according to some estimates, as many as 200,000 people may have died during the last three weeks. This humanitarian catastrophe is rightly a matter of growing anguish in Africa and the rest of the world and demands urgent action by the international community...The events of the last few days have confirmed however that UNAMIR's revised mandate is not one which enables it to bring massacres under control...It has become clear that the horrors ... can be ended only if law and order is restored, a task which is far beyond UNAMIR's present capacity. In these circumstances I urge the Security Council to re-examine the decisions which it took in resolution 912 and to consider again what action, including forceful action, it could take, or could authorise Member States to take, in order to restore law and order and end the massacres. In making this recommendation, I am of course aware that such action would require a commitment of human and material resources on a scale, which Member States have so far proved reluctant to contemplate. But I am convinced that the scale of human suffering in Rwanda and its implications for the stability of neighbouring countries leaves the Security Council with no alternative but to examine this possibility' (S/518/1994).

In Uganda, ceasefire discussions continued with President Museveni mediating between the RPF and Rwanda government representatives. The British Embassy continued to be deeply involved in the ailing cease-fire negotiations. One telex from Kampala, forwarded to FCO London and the United Kingdom Mission in New York, states 'a visiting Belgian diplomat has meanwhile reported that three quarters of Kigali now appears to be under the control of the RPF...UNAMIR's strength has now been reduced to 430' (FCO/HMC/19 – 26 April 1994).

Museveni had been a central mediating figure throughout the fragile process of negotiating a cease-fire; however, President Mobutu of Zaire had made various offers of assistance which had been rejected. A report from Kampala to London on 29 April 1994 states that 'regional initiatives (peace) are currently in disarray. Mobutu is running his own show as quote facilitator unquote, but it is essentially a spoiling game: he has so far given the RGF an alibi for failing to turn up at Arusha and the RPF for failing to negotiate at Arusha. Mobutu is perceived...as having the capacity to do harm but little to do good'. Clay also details in this communication 'Museveni's fury at being accused of in effect masterminding the RPF's operations' (FCO/HMC/18 – 29 April 1994).

The following day, at the 3371st meeting of the Security Council, held on 30 April 1994, the outgoing President of the United Nations Security Council stated on behalf of the Council, and as agreed by the Council, that it 'is appalled at continuing reports of the slaughter of innocent civilians in Kigali and other parts of Rwanda, and reported preparations for further massacres. It endorses the concern expressed by the Central Organ for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) that the massacres and wanton killings have continued unabated in a systematic manner in Rwanda.' The statement does quote directly one sentence from the Genocide Convention, but does not mention the word genocide .

On the 3 May 1994, David Bryer, the Director of Oxfam, personally presented a letter to Prime Minister John Major at Downing Street, requesting intervention in Rwanda, informing him that there is 'genocide on an horrific scale with a level of killing the world has not seen since Cambodia in the 1970s...For the most part, the death squads are armed with clubs and machetes, not guns, so I believe that even a relatively small UN force could offer protection to civilians seeking refuge in safe areas... This week, I was sent the enclosed fax from people

hiding in the Hotel des Mille Collines in Kigali. The Hotel contains 500 people and is being protected by just 6 soldiers' (Copy of letter in possession of author). Amnesty International had also issued press releases indicating their overwhelming concern at the ongoing massacres in Rwanda. On 4th May. Documentation indicates that the British ambassador to the United Nations Security Council, Hannay, had been asked in a letter from Amnesty International to respond on behalf of the United Kingdom to their press release. Documentation reveals that Hannay forwarded a telex to London seeking instructions from the British Foreign Secretary, Hurd, but as is the case with much of the released FCO documentation, the responses to information and requests by the government remain classified (FCO/HMC/10 – 4 May 1994).

On 17 May 1994, resolution 918 was approved by the UN Security Council, authorising the expansion of UNAMIR force level up to 5,500 troops, and permitting them to contribute to security and protection. It should, however, be noted that although the resolution authorised increasing force levels, it did not actually authorise deployment of 5,500 troops. In the text of resolution 918, the Security Council intimate the following:

'...urgent need for coordinated action to alleviate suffering of the Rwanda people and help restore peace in Rwanda, and in this connection welcoming cooperation between the United Nations and the OAU as well as with countries of the region...[The Security Council] invites Member States to respond promptly to the Secretary-General's request for the resources required, including logistical support capability for rapid deployment of the UNAMIR expanded force level and its support in the field' (S/Res/918 - 17 May 1994).

The emphasis on 'welcoming' was in the original text, a text whose compilation was dominated by the US and the UK ambassadors to the Security Council. Although Resolution 918 authorises the expansion it permits only a phased implementation, phase I being permitted at this time and implementation of further phases being dependent on satisfactory

update reports. The text of the document clearly 'invites Member States to respond promptly to the Secretary-General's request for the resources required, including logistical support capability for rapid deployment of the UNAMIR expanded force level and its support in the field'. It is apparent that the invitation is directed to all members and not certain factions of the United Nations.

On this same date, Oxfam issued a press release intimating their concern that the United Nations Security Council resolution 918 stipulates no deadline for the arrival of troops in Rwanda (PR/HMC/06 – 17 May 1994). On the 23 May 1994, Oxfam issued an international press release announcing that they have sent a letter to President Clinton of the United States asking him 'not to delay urgent action to save lives in Rwanda' and describing themselves as 'exasperated' (PR/HMC/07 – 23 May 1994).

At a Press Conference in New York, 25 May 1994, the Secretary General intimated that over 200,000 people had been killed and expressed his frustration with the international community's refusal to act quickly, in particular by sending troops (SG/SM/5292).

A further press release was issued by Oxfam on 26 May 1994 in which it 'condemns months of inactivity by Governments as genocide rages in Rwanda'. So far, three African Governments, Ghana, Senegal and Ethiopia, had made firm commitments to supply 2,200 troops to the UN force in Rwanda, but no government seemed willing to provide the planes to immediately get them there or the equipment they might need. One Oxfam spokesperson stated in the press release that 'it is bad enough that hardly any governments have offered troops. It is even worse that no one seems willing to pay for those troops that have been offered...we are entitled to ask what has been done by governments in the past month, and especially in the last fortnight since Resolution 918 of the UN Security Council authorised 5,500 extra troops' (PR/HMC/08).

The Secretary-General declared on 31 May that what had occurred in Rwanda constituted genocide (report of the UN Secretary-General, 31 May 1994, S/1994/640). However, phase 1 of resolution 918 had still not been implemented and no troops had arrived in Rwanda. The Secretary-General advised all Member States that the government of Ghana were prepared to dispatch the required troops immediately, but pointed out that this deployment would be pointless without proper equipment, particularly armoured personnel carriers. He thereafter requested that the Security Council consider initiating phase II of Resolution 918 in close synchronisation with phase I because of its projected long delay in deploying troop and equipment.

During an interview with a senior member of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London, it became evident that throughout May 1994, almost all the information and intelligence, in relation to the atrocities in Rwanda, received at their office, was from Washington. Such an admission is of significance in relation to the 'special relationship' alluded to earlier in this chapter. This office forwarded it to the United Kingdom Mission in New York and from there to London and the FCO forwarded all such intelligence to their Embassy in Kampala. Unfortunately, the FCO have taken the decision not to declassify this intelligence; this undoubtedly leaves substantial gaps in our understanding of the content and relevancy of the intelligence that the British government would have been in possession of throughout May 1994.

It was on 17 June that France announced its plan to the United Nations Security Council to deploy a mission to Rwanda as an interim peacekeeping force, hoping that its proposed resolution would receive United Nations Security Council agreement. Two days later on 19 June 1994, the Secretary-General issued a letter once again to the President of the United Nations Security Council articulating his growing frustration that phases I and II of resolution 918 had still to be implemented. He stated:

'the Secretariat has still not been able to secure offers for medical and other support units. In the absence of firm commitments for military logistical units, it will be necessary to seek a civilian contractor on an emergency

basis...until the necessary logistic support from Governments can be secured...It should be noted that none of those Governments possessing the capacity to provide fully trained and equipped military units have offered so far to do so for the implementation of the Security Council's resolutions to deal with the situation in Rwanda.' (S/728/1994)

It was in this climate of inactivity by international nations that a report was released on 28 June 1994 by the Special Rapporteur who was appointed some four weeks previously to report on the human rights situation in Rwanda. His detailed assessment confirmed that genocide and other human rights violations had occurred in the country and that by the time of the release of his report, the genocide had claimed most of its victims (E/CN.4/1995/7).

OPTIONS AND RESPONSES

October 1990

Despite every conceivable effort it has not been possible to have the FCO responses to correspondence released. This makes it difficult to ascertain fully what British policy was in the period from 1990 until the start of the genocide and hence the requirement for this study to undertake elite interviews.

When the RPF mounted their offensive into Rwanda from south Uganda on 1 October 1990, the ensuing developments were reported fastidiously to the FCO in London. Being a close ally of President Museveni of Uganda, it would have been vital that the British government were kept abreast of any tensions as a result of the mounting suspicions in Rwanda and Uganda that there had been 'connivance at senior levels [by the Ugandan government and military]in the preparations for the incursion into Rwanda by ...the Rwandan Patriotic Front'. Of note is that the British government were requested to participate in 'a community demarche in Kampala' as those requesting thought it essential to 'bring the Ugandans to their

senses'. As noted above, the British High Commissioner recommended to the FCO that such a demarche 'would be both premature and counter-productive...and could only damage our interests here' (FCO/HMC/15). One can only but assume that the FCO followed the counsel of their ambassador in Uganda as the United Kingdom did not participate in a demarche in Uganda during this period of time. Due to censoring of documentation it has not been possible to authenticate the reason for the requested demarche although it has been reliably suggested that it was in protestation at the Ugandan government's ongoing support of the rebel RPF and its violence in Rwanda.

The previous section highlighted that the United Kingdom was very involved in intelligence gathering meetings (FCO/HMC/12) that enabled them to be fully cognisant of the capabilities and intentions of the RPF; they further knew that the 'RPF claims to be able to take Kigali pretty much as will' (FCO/HMC/06). What is lacking in any of the communication as such to the FCO is a request for direction. At no time is there any indication that guidance is requested on how the United Kingdom may put their contacts with the RPF to best use. Conspicuous by its absence is any intelligence of the actions of the Government of Rwanda during this period.

UN Resolutions

On 5 April 1994, the United Nations Security Council agreed resolution 909 (1994) which extended the mandate of UNAMIR until 29 July 1994 with a six-week review provision on the understanding that progress be made in establishing the transitional institutions provided for under the Arusha Peace Agreement between the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic front.

On the day following the death of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, the British ambassador to the UN, Hannay, agreed to the issuance of Presidential Statement (S/PRST/16) in response to the assassination which reaffirmed the United Nations Security Council's commitment to the Arusha Peace Agreement and urged all parties to implement it fully.

Whether his agreement was ministerial or official⁷⁵ is unclear, however. This same date, namely 7 April, saw the High Commissioner to Uganda providing various options to the FCO for what he perceived as being the political direction that Rwanda must now face (FCO/HMC/18).

The FCO in London responded to the foregoing within four hours of receipt, and as such less than 24 hours after the death of President Habyarimana, stating 'agree you should speak to Museveni... You could point out that the RPF have an important opportunity to participate in power-sharing if they play their cards carefully and constructively. We agree that it should be possible to get these points across without suggesting that we hold Uganda in any way responsible for the RPF or events in Kigali'. The FCO in London continue 'Given the uncertainty surrounding the crash, we are for the moment avoiding attributing responsibility to any group' (FCO/HMC/31 – 7 April 1994).

On the 12 April 1994, Grocott, MP, asked Hurd, the Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to respond to his question:

'Is it not tragically true and salutary to point out, even at this stage, that the suffering in Bosnia over the past few days bears no comparison to the suffering in Rwanda ... Therefore, what reassurance can the Foreign Secretary give the House and the country that the international community's consideration of those matters bears some relation at least in time, energy and money spent, to the suffering in the countries concerned' (Grocott, Hansard, 12 April 1994).

In response, Hurd stated that '... The civil war in Bosnia and the suffering in the former Yugoslavia are in our continent. They are quite close to us. It is right that we should be devoting such effort to them' (Hurd, Hansard, 12 April 1994).

UN Security Council adjust UNAMIR mandate Resolution 912 21 April 1994

⁷⁵ This was official language used by elite informants of the British government to describe whether a decision was made by the individual or at cabinet level.

Nigeria presented a draft resolution on behalf of the Non-Aligned Caucus, the group of non-aligned UN member states. The resolution advocated the strengthening of UNAMIR, but it was never tabled in the Security Council because the US, with power of veto, strongly opposed this option.

The letter of the Secretary-General to the United Nations Security Council of 20 April 1994 (S/1994/470) was outlined in some detail in the previous section. It advised the Security Council of three options available to it in view of the deteriorating state of Rwanda, namely to strengthen UNAMIR, to reduce its strength, or to withdraw from Rwanda completely. It has to be said that the Council was concerned with the question of how UNAMIR could assist in obtaining a cease-fire, but rarely touched upon the fate of the Rwandans or how UNAMIR could respond to the crimes against humanity being perpetrated, except for those small 'humanitarian pockets' that were under its control and where Tutsi civilians had sought refuge (Des Forges, 1999: 625-628).

The Secretary-General's preference was for the first option of strengthening UNAMIR, this preference being expressed orally to the Security Council by the Secretary-General's Political Adviser Chinmaya Gharekhan (Independent Report, 1999: 16). Eventually it was the British UN Ambassador, Hannay, who came up with four possible options to deal with the situation in Rwanda. The first solution he proposed was to increase the number of peacekeepers and to strengthen the mandate of UNAMIR to include peace enforcement; however, Hannay advised the Council that this option would potentially lead to a debacle akin to that in Somalia around six months previously. His second suggested option was to provide UNAMIR with a mandate permitting it to stay on without any change to its composition and mandate, but Hannay questioned whether there was any value or purpose in retaining UNAMIR, arguing that UNAMIR with this mandate would have no capability to save civilians. Hannay's two remaining options were that UNAMIR could be pulled out completely, or it could retain a skeletal force in Rwanda. Hannay had very much taken the lead on this situation within the Security Council and indeed it was he who dictated that taking all into account, the latter would be the best alternative. The US agreed wholeheartedly with the British stance.

The majority of the permanent members of the Council with power of veto, namely the US, the UK and Russia, preferred the partial withdrawal of UNAMIR; Nigeria and the majority of

the non-permanent members in the Council preferred the option of bolstering both the numbers of peacekeepers in Rwanda and the mandate provided to UNAMIR.

Discussions which led to resolution 912 were heated within the Council-

'this was the point when the Americans [US delegation to UNSC] received these completely barmy instructions which was that the whole force [UNAMIR] had to be pulled out... When Madeleine [Albright] told me that, she said to me 'Look I have got these instructions' and I said 'Madeleine you can't do it you know, you just can't do it. There is a force there the Ghanaians, there is a General [Dallaire] who is prepared to stay we must stabilise the situation at the very least, but if we withdraw when we know that terrible things are happening well...' and she [Albright] got her instructions changed. All that has been documented a good deal as you know but the brunt of the blame has been given to the Americans, rather unfairly in my view. And the outcome of that was the infamous resolution [912] which everyone always describes as the Security Council's withdrawal of UNAMIR. The Security Council didn't withdraw UNAMIR, UNAMIR collapsed. The Security Council passed a resolution basically saying the force that is in Kigali is to stay there but it was a tiny force of course, 500 or something, mainly Ghanaians with some Tunisians and some others... All it was was a stabilisation measure; it was not an instruction to withdraw. The SC never decided to withdraw; the two battalions withdrew themselves as they had the right to do. Troop contributors always have that right. The SC merely decided that UNAMIR would stay but that it would basically stay in that run down condition until we could get more people. So that is very often misrepresented.' (INTERVIEW EL/08)

And so it was that on 21 April 1994 the Council agreed Resolution 912, which reduced UNAMIR to 270 troops (Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the UN..... Carlsson report, 1999: 20-22). It must be acknowledged that the final decision taken by the Council was predicated on the civil war between the RGF (Rwandan Government Forces)

and RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front), not on the systematic genocide of Tutsi civilians by the interim government of Hutu extremists.

The G-word

For the first four weeks of genocide, the Council did not discuss the genocide at all, although there was strong evidence indicating a systematic campaign of extermination. Nevertheless, the Ambassador of New Zealand, Colin Keating, who was holding the presidency of the Council for April, believed that uttering the word 'genocide' in relation to the Rwandan conflict would force the Council to act (INTERVIEW EL/12). Had the crisis been termed 'genocide,' then all the members of the Council would have been legally and morally bound to act under the terms of the Genocide Convention. Keating saw this as his last opening to alter the course of the Council's discussions, as New Zealand's presidency would end on April 30, 1994. On April 29, Keating tabled a draft Presidential Statement in the Security Council, which referred to the Rwandan conflict as genocide. It was supported by four of the other non-permanent members, namely, New Zealand, the Czech Republic, Argentina and Spain (INTERVIEW EL/14). Keating's proposal, however, was vehemently opposed by the US, the UK, and China (INTERVIEW EL/12; INTERVIEW EL/12). Hannay's objections were eventually accepted within the United Nations Security Council, albeit reluctantly by many of the member states, and they finally adopted a declaration early on April 30 that used the legal terminology of the UNCG but still rejected the use of the term 'genocide' itself.

A Presidential Statement requires the consensus of all members of the Council and as such Keating's proposal was dismissed. Instead, the drafting meetings of the Council came up with a Presidential Statement condemning

'all these breaches of international humanitarian law in Rwanda, particularly those perpetrated against the civilian population, and recalls that persons who instigate or participate in such acts are individually responsible. In this context, the Security Council recalls that the killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group in whole or in part constitutes a crime punishable under international law.'

(30 April 1994)

Although it does quote directly one sentence from the Genocide Convention, it does not mention the word 'genocide.' The Presidential Statement was the last remaining opportunity for the non-permanent members to make a difference in Rwanda; it was agreed upon only after Keating had issued his threat to the permanent members to table it as a resolution in an open meeting of the Council. (INTERVIEW EL/12)

As noted in the previous section, throughout the following two week period, the Secretary-General of the UN continued to urge the Council to adjust the mandate of UNAMIR thereby bolstering the number of troops in Rwanda. Included in his most recent written request to the Security Council dated 29 April 1994 was:

'I urge the Security Council to re-examine the decisions which it took in resolution 912 and to consider again what action, including forceful action, it could take, or could authorise Member States to take, in order to restore law and order and end the massacres. In making this recommendation, I am of course aware that such action would require a commitment of human and material resources on a scale, which Member States have so far proved reluctant to contemplate' (S/518/1994).

Some ten days thereafter, one member of the British Parliament asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in the House of Commons 'what recent requests the Secretary-General of the United Nations has made to the Security Council members about upgrading the UN involvement in Rwanda and what was his response' (Worthington, Hansard, 9 May 1994). The Under Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs responded 'the UN Secretary-General has made no requests to the Security Council about upgrading United Nations involvement in Rwanda' (Lennox-Boyd, Hansard, 9 May 1994).

In addition to continued requests from the UN Secretary-General, there was increased pressure from NGO's and other organisations providing mounting evidence of an ongoing genocide. As a result the Security Council met on 16 May 1994 to discuss the situation. The British ambassador to the United Nations Security Council once again proved himself to be obstructive during this meeting as the question of increasing the strength of UNAMIR was

proposed (INTERVIEW EL/14). Hannay argued that to reinforce the peacekeepers in Rwanda, and provide a stronger mandate affording security and protection the people of Rwanda, would court disaster. Hannay once again warned the Security Council to consider the tragedy in Somalia (ibid). Despite Hannay's objections, Resolution 918 was approved by the UN Security Council the following day . This resolution 'authorised a force level as set out in paragraphs 15 to 18 of the Secretary-General's report of 20 April 1994 for that purpose'; the Council had adjusted the mandate to the first alternative put forward by the Secretary-general in his report of 20 April 1994 authorising a UNAMIR II operation of 5,500 troops. Hannay had made clear to the Security Council that 'future action in Rwanda must be taken primarily through the efforts of African countries...that in his opinion had a key role to play' (Melvern, 2000: 192). Clearly such an increase in strength required the offer of troops from UN member states and indeed there were sufficient offers from African countries, such as Ghana, Ethiopia, Malawi, Senegal, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Zambia, but they required material equipment, armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and airlifting. Such material prerequisites were supposed to be contributed by Western states, which, however, proved reluctant to offer anything.

On the 23 May 1994, some two weeks after the adoption of Resolution 918 inviting 'Member States to respond promptly to the Secretary-General's request for the resources required, including logistical support capability for rapid deployment of the UNAMIR expanded force level and its support in the field' the Shadow Secretary of Defence issued a press release and wrote a letter directly to the Secretary of State for Defence Malcolm Rifkind querying the lack of British Government involvement in Rwanda. In reply, Malcolm Rifkind wrote:

'I believe that the international community should react positively and quickly to help bring about a solution to the problem...the UK has not been asked to provide any personnel for the operation. However, there is no support for any operation to enforce a peace in Rwanda. The UK has taken an active role in Security Council consultations on the expansion of the UN force to protect the supply of humanitarian relief to those most in need' (23 May 1994).

By the 31 May 1994, some two weeks after the authorisation of Phase 1 of Resolution 918 strengthening UNAMIR to 800 troops, no troops had arrived in Rwanda. The Government of Ghana were prepared to dispatch the required troops immediately; however, there was still no offer of essential equipment, and most especially armoured personnel carriers, from any of the Member States of the West, and without which 'the troops would be unprotected, immobile and ineffective'. The Secretary-General, in his report to the Security Council, stated that

'it is unacceptable that, almost two months since this violence exploded, killings still continue...The delay in reaction by the international community to the genocide in Rwanda has demonstrated graphically its extreme inadequacy to respond urgently with prompt and decisive action to humanitarian crises entwined with armed conflict'

As a result of the lack of provision of such equipment, the Secretary General reported that it was estimated that Phase 1 'would not be operational for another four to six weeks depending on how soon the resources required are made available by Member States and delivered on the ground' (S/1994/640).

Three weeks passed; the secretariat was still unable to secure offers for medical and other support units, and advised the Security Council in a letter of 19 June 1994 that

'in the absence of firm commitments for military logistical units, it will be necessary to seek a civilian contractor on an emergency basis...until the necessary logistic support from Governments can be secured...It should be noted that none of those Governments possessing the capacity to provide fully trained and equipped military units have offered so far to do so for the implementation of the Security Council's resolutions to deal with the situation in Rwanda...In the light of the above, it is evident that, with the failure of Member States to promptly provide the resources necessary for the implementation of its expanded mandate, UNAMIR may not be in a position for about three months to fully undertake the tasks entrusted to it by those resolutions. Meanwhile the situation in Rwanda has continued to

deteriorate and the killing of innocent civilians has not stopped'
(S/1994/728).

According to document S/1994/565 from the UN Secretary-General, the Ghanaian battalion should have been sent to Kigali in seven days following the resolution of May 17, equipped with armoured patrol cars (APCs), a prerequisite for UNAMIR II protection and safety. The US had made a tentative offer at inflated costs, to lease fifty APC's to the UN; however, the Pentagon exacerbated the process of dispatching them. After several practical difficulties had been resolved, such as the US insistence in repainting the APC's, the US finally transported the vehicles to Entebbe, Uganda, on 30 June 1994 by which time the genocide was virtually over (Adelman and Suhrke, 1996: 53).

When questioned in the House of Commons, at Prime Minister's Question Time on 7 July 1994, about the lack of British military support towards the strengthening of UNAMIR II, the British Prime Minister, John Major, explained '[I]t is simply not practicable for it [the United Nations Security Council] to become the policeman of every part of the world' (Hansard, 7 July 1994). One week later, however, the under Secretary for State from the FCO, Lennox-Boyd, advised Parliament that 'we are fully joining in international efforts to bring a halt to the bloodshed...we have offered 50 trucks to the United Nations Aid Mission in Rwanda, UNAMIR' (Lennox-Boyd, Hansard, 13 July 1994) – much to the hilarity of the Conservative Members on one occasion (Hansard, 13 July 1994).

On being questioned further in Parliament by Worthington about 'the wholly inadequate offer of supplementary logistical support', Lennox-Boyd responded 'I can only reiterate that the provision of British equipment is the result of what has been requested of us by the United Nations...the troops sought by the Secretary-General are coming from a number of African countries, which I think is right... it is not lack of support from the British Government that is constraining activities in that area [formation of UNAMIR II]' (Hansard, 13 July 1994).

In addition to the unnamed Conservative MP's, The Force Commander of UNAMIR was derisive of the British contribution stating

'The British offered fifty Bedford trucks ... for a sizeable amount [of monies] to be paid [to the British Government] upfront. The Bedford is an

early Cold War-era truck, which in 1994 was fit only to be a museum relic ...The British later quietly withdrew their request for payment and provided some of the vehicles, which broke down one at a time until there were none left' (Dallaire, 2004:376).

As a result of the lack of response in providing for the formation of UNAMIR II, its launch was delayed until the genocide was virtually over.

The Secretary of Defence, Malcolm Rifkind was asked in Parliament, 'what requests he has received to provide troops for peacekeeping purposes in Rwanda' (Luff, Hansard, 19 July 1994). He responded, '[w]e have received no requests to provide troops for the United Nations operation in Rwanda...' (Rifkind, Hansard, 19 July 1994). Questioning in parliament continued when Rifkind was asked to 'assure the House that any requests for specialist military assistance that may be forthcoming will be looked on as sympathetically as possible' (Luff, Hansard, 19 July 1994). Despite Rifkind's implicit intention not to support any operation to enforce peace in Rwanda, his public representation in parliament was '[Y]es, naturally we would do so because we understand the scale of the human tragedy that is unfolding in Rwanda' (Rifkind, Hansard, 19 July 1994). Rifkind continued 'I am sure the United Kingdom can hold its head high for the contribution that it is making in helping to minimise the dreadful suffering in Rwanda' (Rifkind, Hansard, 19 July 1994).

A year after the atrocities in Rwanda, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London sent a letter to an international inquiry saying that it still did not accept the term genocide. It said that it saw a discussion about whether the massacres constituted genocide as 'sterile' (Curtis, 2003: 360).

EXPLANATIONS

The earlier section titled *Knowledge* has provided a detailed insight into not only the nature and extent of the warnings available to the British government, but also the source, and as such the quality, of the intelligence and information available to them, both before and during the genocide. The earlier section titled *Options and Responses* thereafter provided an insight into the responses of the UK government when faced with the options available to them. It clearly evidenced a positive decision not to fulfil their obligations in terms of the Genocide

Convention, the requirements of which were discussed in chapter 5 of this thesis. What we now need to explore are the possible reasons why the UK government responded in such a manner and opted for the responses previously outlined with a view to determining whether the UK was in any way complicit by omission in the genocide of 1994. During the elite interviews undertaken for the purposes of this thesis, some of the interviewees put forward various explanations for the responses which will be discussed below.

Warnings

As noted earlier in this chapter, the UK had no economic interests in Rwanda prior to the genocide; however, there was political interest in the civil war of 1990 onwards as a result of the close relationship that the British government had nurtured with Rwanda's close neighbour, Uganda. This was due in no small part to the economic interests that the British government held in Uganda. British interest in the turbulence of Rwanda was also due to one of the combatants of the civil war, namely the RPF, having originated from Uganda amid allegations of support from the Ugandan President Museveni which he strenuously denied at this time. It should be noted however that during the '15th Liberation Anniversary' on 4 July 2009, Museveni delivered a speech explaining his substantial role and that of the Ugandan National Resistance Army (NRA) in the liberation of Rwanda in 1994 stating 'he created the situation where by RPA was never defeated' (BBC Monitoring Africa, July 25, 2009).

This chapter has revealed the 'close' relationship that had developed throughout the early 1990s between the RPF and the British High Commission in Kampala, a relationship which produced 'excellent and very strong intelligence' which was, as a matter of course, relayed to London. What is still not apparent is to what degree this relationship was mutually beneficial. As previously outlined in this chapter, throughout the 1990s, both before and after the arrival of Edward Clay as High Commissioner in Kampala, the RPF were warning the British diplomats there of 'impending tragedy...catastrophe' – all detail that was communicated to London. What is of note, however, is that the RPF were perceived as being rather skilled in the art of manipulation and their warnings were perceived by the High Commission in Uganda as exaggeration and 'a sense of crying wolf'. According to one British official from the office in Kampala, it was just not possible to make any 'real assessment' of the information being passed from the RPF. Their warnings could not be triangulated, albeit the intelligence forwarded from this group of rebels was without fail forwarded to London. One

diplomat explained that 'failing to recognise the validity of those warnings was at least a failure of information and of understanding and analysis' (Interview EL/02). British cabinet members stated 'we knew very little about it. It wasn't a country which we had ever been closely involved and so there really was no knowledge' (INTERVIEW EL/18), and 'there was neither great knowledge nor great pressure' (INTERVIEW EL/30).

The general consensus of the elite interviewees who were members of the British government during the period immediately preceding and during the genocide in Rwanda, is that they themselves were largely uninformed, lacking in any semblance of reliable or relevant information about events in Rwanda (INTERVIEW EL/08; INTERVIEW EL/16; INTERVIEW EL/18; INTERVIEW EL/24).

Explaining responses

The positive decision not to act when faced with substantial reliable information of the outbreak of uncontrolled violence and genocide in Rwanda has been explained and excused in varying manners. Within five days of the death of Rwanda's President, the Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office explained in Parliament that it was 'proximity' which dictated that the British government were correct to expend energy and resources in responding to the civil war in Bosnia whilst not responding in any manner to Rwanda's ongoing plight. He advised that 'the former Yugoslavia are in our continent. They are quite close to us. It is right we should be devoting such effort to them' (Hurd, Hansard, 12 April 1994). During interviews it was found that several cabinet members agreed that a lack of response for Rwanda was justifiable. 'Douglas was simply being starkly honest about our incapacity to act on too wide a front. We had to judge where we could be most efficient' (INTERVIEW EL/24); whilst another agreed that inaction was justifiable in Rwanda since it was 'on a different continent' (INTERVIEW EL/16). One senior British Government Minister explained:

'The three-sided civil war in former Yugoslavia was a different case [to Rwanda]. We were aware of the dangers of the civil war as well as the inhumanities being perpetrated on the borders of the European Union. The judgement we made was that, in these circumstances, we could make a difference' (INTERVIEW EL/24).

Another cabinet Minister indicated: 'I was struggling with the Bosnia problem which raised many of the same issues [as Rwanda] but was very much on our own doorstep' (INTERVIEW EL/18).

Such opinions were not however, shared, across government. One member of the FCO in London described Hurd's comments as 'appalling' and continued 'it's a pretty strange statement to have made because Britain is one of the three permanent members of the Security Council so we do have an obligation to police the world so to speak and be informed about it. So, that is a pretty uninformed statement, let's put it that way.....it implies that Africa doesn't matter' (INTERVIEW EL/06). Another member of cabinet also disagreed with such a governmental position. This interviewee stated:

'my disagreement was why are we prepared to do so much in one area [Bosnia] and not in another [Rwanda]. And it is proximity, yes, you're right. You know, small country, middle of a great big Continent, it's not terribly friendly, don't have the resources, have to make hard decisions so, in a sense, ethics almost didn't come into it...At a[cabinet] meeting I told them they [the Rwandans] are mad with killing fever and you have to intervene. You cannot stop this unless you physically intervene and I can remember being challenged about putting British soldiers to their death in a foreign land. I had a battle royal. It all came down to resources and British interest and demands on British troops. It's all the same story' (INTERVIEW EL/20).

When questioned on proximity-dependent policies, one British ambassador to the UK Mission in New York stated 'It's difficult to do this in a public domain because it sounds so terrible..... Double standards exist but that doesn't mean to say you don't help where you can' (INTERVIEW EL/08).

A decision to downsize UNAMIR: Resolution 912 - 21 April 1994

As described in some detail in the section *options and responses*, the British Ambassador to the United Nations, Hannay, played a significant role within the United Nations Security Council in deciding the fate of UNAMIR when its mandate was reviewed on 21 April 1994, and ultimately in the decision reached to drastically reduce the strength of UNAMIR in

Rwanda. In putting forward his various options to the Council, Hannay explained that it was inadvisable to strengthen the mandate to include peace enforcement in case it resulted in a repetition of the debacle in Somalia some six months previously. This explanation for non-intervention is referred to as the 'Mogadishu Factor'. Hannay also argued against leaving the UNAMIR mandate unchanged since it was incapable of saving lives. This left the two remaining options of either removing UNAMIR completely or retaining UNAMIR in Rwanda as a small skeletal force. The UK voted to downsize UNAMIR to a skeletal force of 270 personnel and not to provide them with a mandate permitting peace enforcement.

One UN employee indicated, however, that during the discussion on the future of UNAMIR on 21 April 1994, the Council formed 'two camps', namely those favouring intervention, led by Nigeria, New Zealand and the Czech Republic; and those insisting on a complete withdrawal, led by the United States and the United Kingdom (INTERVIEW EL/12). When asked about the assertion that the UK had advocated a complete withdrawal of UNAMIR from Rwanda, one British ambassador explained:

'That's a lie! That is a simple lie. We did not favour withdrawal. And as I mentioned, I was the one that probably got Madeleine to change her instructions round. They (the US) only very briefly favoured withdrawal but they did make a lot of policy mistakes the Americans. First of all they sent her instructions saying they favoured withdrawal. That lasted 24 hours and then she turned the instructions around and they [US representatives] then voted for the maintenance of UNAMIR. Then when the discussions were going on about what should be done they had this completely barmy idea that any new force should operate from outside Rwanda and should not go into Rwanda and should merely concentrate in ensuring that the refugee camps and so on were safe. Well that was totally barmy considering that people were being murdered by the thousands inside Rwanda and you couldn't establish a ring of ringside seats around Rwanda to watch this happening and so that one was gradually worn down and then they basically came on board UNAMIR II. But that is incorrect, that description about the two camps' (Interview EL/08).

A non-permanent ambassador to the United Nations Security Council was interviewed and asked about the assertions of there being two camps within the Council. He responded:

'I would say that [this] is actually a snapshot of a particular day or couple of days and if you looked at it across weeks or months there is kind of a – and here I am talking about it from my perception of the British position – it wasn't a straight line, it sort of oscillated and it partly oscillated in response to changing situations and levels of information... I think though that it is fair to say that the British position did sort of evolve... to being a more neutral position as the time went on' (INTERVIEW EL/12).

Discussion within the House of Commons clearly highlights that the British ambassador's role within the United Nations Security Council was in keeping with British policy and his stance would have been in accordance with the will of the cabinet and Foreign Secretary. Indeed, when asked in Parliament to explain British government approval of the reduction in strength of UNAMIR, and if there is 'one level of compassion for our European friends in Bosnia and another for Black Africans' (Hansard, 25 April 1994). Hurd, British Foreign Secretary replied:

'I am not sure how ... maintaining a United Nations force on the original scale will help assuage those horrors. Have not they read the report by the Secretary-General on which the Security Council acted? The Security Council concluded, on the advice of the Secretary-General, that it was no longer possible for the United Nations force to carry out its mandate in the form expected...there is no magic in keeping troops there if there is nothing useful that they can do...The effort must be to bring an end to the fighting. That cannot be achieved, as has been proved, by the United Nations force on the ground' (Hansard, 25 April 1994).

However, in contradiction is the interview in 2006 of a British Ambassador to the UK Mission in New York UN Security who stated:

'I think you know that if we had had any idea of what was happening [in Rwanda] we ought to have produced some troops to strengthen UNAMIR. I mean it couldn't be said that we didn't have them; of course we had some

troops even although we were heavily engaged in Bosnia. We should all have done so, the Americans should have done, we should have done, and other Europeans should have done and so on...we should have backed intervention. I mean if we believe now in the 'Responsibility to Protect', well you can't read that back to then but in retrospect of course, there was a responsibility by the international community to protect the Tutsis because they were not being protected by their own government' (INTERVIEW EL/32).

As noted in section *options and responses*, for several weeks after the agreement of Resolution 912 and indeed until the revision of its mandate on 17 May 1994, there was continuing pressure on the members of the United Nations Security Council to initiate an intervention in Rwanda. Senior members of the 1994 British government continue, however, to explain their lack of intervention in terms of there being 'no instinct or impulse at the time...to intervene in any forceful way'. Additional reasoning for the policy of non-intervention in Rwanda was given that the UK government is 'instinctively very cautious; reluctant to believe that putting in white European troops from former colonial powers into a war situation in an African country is likely to be helpful' (INTERVIEW EL/18).

G-word explanations

As previously noted, it was Hannay, the senior British delegate to the UN Security Council, and his US counterpart that strenuously objected to the use of the word 'genocide' to describe the ongoing atrocity in Rwanda whilst in attendance at an informal meeting of the Council on 29 April 1994 to discuss the potential of setting up a war crimes tribunal. Interviews have confirmed that Hannay's position regarding his objection to classify events in Rwanda as genocide was the 'official line from the United Kingdom rather than ministerial position' (INTERVIEW EL/18). One British journalist has recorded that Hannay stated 'the Council would become a *laughing stock*' if they adopted the term genocide within the Security Council (Melvern, 2000: 180), a quote which has been repeated in numerous publications over the past decade. However, what is apparent from reviewing the full context surrounding the comment made, and from undertaking detailed interviews, is that reference to a 'laughing

stock', is in respect of the United Nations Security Council's discussion on setting up a war crimes tribunal. The correct context of the comment was 'if all we can do is after five weeks or whatever it is, say we are going to set up a tribunal to try everyone after us – they'll just laugh at us – that's what that was about' (Interview EL/08).

However, this does not depart from the reality that much of the meeting of 29 April 1994 was a discussion regarding:

'the Council's recognition and use of the word 'genocide' and there was a lot of what might be called theoretical opposition to that based on reluctance to categorise in a legal sense what was' (INTERVIEW EL/12).

Interviews with members of the FCO, London and members of the British Cabinet of 1994 have revealed that:

'It was Douglas Hurd who said 'We are not to call this genocide'. The reason is because that then brings up obligations under, you know, the Genocide Convention. Again, his mind was really somewhere else, but he would not allow it, and the American...Madeleine Albright, she was totally against calling it genocide. I think we were very much following the American lead on this and, again, it was the New York discussions that kind of dominated the thinking here. I don't think the people at the desk level or even up to the head of department would have necessarily advised on such a floppy policy but it was definitely coming from the top, from Douglas Hurd' (INTERVIEW EL/06).

A Cabinet Member recalls during a Cabinet meeting in July 1994 that Foreign Secretary Hurd 'thump[ed] the table once and said *We will not call this genocide*'. The hesitancy of the UK in recognising what was now being defined as genocide was:

'[b]ecause the lawyers claimed that in international law, that as soon as you use the word genocide then you are bound to take certain actions and they [the UK] didn't have the resource to take those action... that is

basically the reason, because of the international law and the obligations and such like so it wasn't the fact that they just didn't think that it was genocide' (INTERVIEW EL/20).

Another Foreign Office Diplomat who was something of an expert on African issues and particularly those relating to Rwanda indicated during interview that 'we [the FCO] kept referring the issue [use of the word genocide to describe events in Rwanda] to some committee of experts until they decided what actually happened and dictated we weren't going to use this word [genocide]. It was Douglas Hurd who was responsible for this, by the way – it's not people at the bottom, it definitely came from the top' (INTERVIEW EL/06).

General political will

'If there is a *general* political will by the international community, almost *any* dispute can be stopped...however as a former colonial power Britain has generally been reluctant to intervene unilaterally' (INTERVIEW EL/24).

This was the comment of a senior member of the UK government of 1994 when discussing intervention in Rwanda. Indeed several independent reports and individual actors have stated that the genocide could have been prevented or stopped had the international community possessed sufficient collective will. One British Cabinet Member has asserted, however, that in the case of Rwanda the lack of intervention from the international community had nothing to do with lack of political will, but was merely because the facts had not been established. The interviewee continued:

'there are always two sides to the argument...I don't think the problem was simply lack of political will... I'm not trying to say that there was criticism not to be made of the international community. I think the international community didn't find out, it didn't make enough effort to find out what was going on and perhaps didn't want to. Not because it was afraid of what it might discover but simply because it was preoccupied elsewhere' (INTERVIEW EL/16).

The interview continued:

'[L]ike everybody else, we saw the press reports and we were aware of the fact that there was clearly loss of life taking place. I don't think any of us were aware of the.... I have to choose my words carefully, I don't think..... any of us would have been absolutely certain as to the scale of what was happening...I don't think I appreciated or accepted that that meant there was a sustained and deliberate desire to massacre every possible person they could find in that.... it sounds so terrible, sounds so awful, you tend to assume it can't be quite that bad and the information coming out of Rwanda was mixed, I mean it was all anecdotal because of the very nature of what was happening there. The contacts were limited so you had journalists, some of whom were getting very graphic reports, of a very dramatic event, so I think I would sum that up by saying we knew there were horrible things happening. I think that it would be correct to say that we didn't appreciate the full scale until later of what was happening and the sheer intensity of it' (INTERVIEW EL/16).

When questioned on the political will of the UK government towards the ongoing atrocity in Rwanda, one other senior member of Cabinet stated 'it's a combination of legal obligations, national interests, humanitarian considerations, public pressure, practicality and you've got to work out a combination of these...it was not a general lack of will' (INTERVIEW EL/30).

As a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council, the British government evidently failed to acknowledge urgent requests from the Secretariat for the provision of troops and /or logistical support to permit the speedy formation of UNAMIR II as previously detailed herein. Indeed the UK was specifically asked to provide immediate logistical support for the proffered Ghanaian troops to allow them to be deployed soonest and in any case within seven days of 17 May 1994.

It has been argued, however, that the logistics forwarded by the UK were 'very valuable once it was provided' (INTERVIEW EL/08). A Cabinet Member indicated that

'the UK contribution to the international response was proportionate and was reasonable. Whether the international response itself was

adequate is a different matter, and I go back to the point that, I'm repeating myself, that clearly I think the mistake that was made by the international community, including the United Kingdom, was not to find out early enough the scale of what was happening in order to judge whether some much more substantial response was needed.'

(INTERVIEW EL/16).

It has been further suggested that explaining the British government's response to the knowledge and options available has to be viewed in the knowledge that British policy in relation to Rwanda was being made in response to guidelines and intelligence coming from New York, circumstances described by one FCO diplomat as 'interesting because that's a very unusual situation. But it was so' (INTERVIEW EL/06).

In his published memoirs, Hurd has stated in reference to the tragedy in Rwanda 'We acted throughout in good conscience, though that in itself is not itself a justification for particular decisions. We made mistakes.' (Hurd, 2004: 493).

CONCLUSION

This chapter has endeavoured to establish British foreign policy towards Rwanda in the period before and during the genocide of 1994 in addition to establishing the factors giving rise to such decision-making. It must be acknowledged that it has not always been possible to validate and/or triangulate all the documentation which was collated for this thesis, but due to the nature of the enquiry, all relevant data gathered has been included herein and will be given the weighting deserved in summing up this chapter.

Significant to the question under enquiry is the revelation that British Foreign Policy in the period preceding the genocide and the actual atrocity appears to have been influenced by US intelligence and its policy towards Rwanda, an important aspect which will be discussed in greater depth in the following concluding chapter.

In relation to the scope of reliable and relevant information and intelligence available to the UK government, this thesis has evidenced that the government were in receipt of ample detail to have permitted a clear insight into the deteriorating conditions in Rwanda. Reliable and relevant intelligence was being forwarded to the UK from Washington, though due to the ongoing censorship of much of the documentation it is not possible at this time to ascertain

the exact content of same. It must be acknowledged, however, in fairness to all delegations to the United Nations Security Council, that this thesis does not dispute the assertions of the President of the Security Council in April 1994 that they 'were given very little detail and indeed the situation was much more dangerous than was ever presented to the Council' (Interview EL/12).

Despite statements by Members of the British government of being 'uninformed, unsighted, lacking in any semblance of reliable or relevant information about events in Rwanda' it is clear that there was a wealth of available information. Throughout the fifteen years since the genocide in Rwanda, the British government has repeatedly excused its decisions and actions in respect of Rwanda by claiming to have had no prior interest in the country and no access to intelligence or information. Predicating their inaction on this basis is clearly inaccurate as this thesis has evidenced that their diplomatic relationships with Uganda and France necessitated that they keep abreast of events in Central Africa. An intelligence network had been developed and sustained throughout the 1990s and the period of the genocide with the RPF apparently being provided with the opportunity of voicing their opinion on UNAMIR's mandate prior to United Nations Security Council discussions.

It is evident that official governmental instructions were being forwarded to Kampala and the UK Mission in New York; however, again due to the ongoing censorship of documentation, it has not as yet been possible to establish the detail of all UK policy making communications.

In summing up, omission is only criminalised when there is a legal requirement imposing a clear obligation to act – as is found in Article I of the Genocide Convention, which imposes an unconditional positive obligation on contracting parties to prevent genocide. It is apparent that the British government did have knowledge and took a positive decision not to act to prevent genocide in Rwanda and as such omitted to fulfil its obligations in terms of the Genocide Convention and International Law. The evidence presented here builds a case to show that the positive steps undertaken by the UK government in negating their legal responsibilities can be summarised as follows:

- Arguing that Rwanda was on a different continent, which negated the very real and documented dangers as a result of the ongoing civil war and the inhumanities being perpetrated against civilians.

- Presenting to Parliament that UNAMIR could not stop any killing despite evidence to the contrary, thereby depriving the peace-keeping force of a strengthened mandate.
- Invoking Somalia and the 'Mogadishu factor' within the Council when arguing for a reduction of strength in UNAMIR's revised mandate and thereby presenting the reduction as a rational decision.
- Predicating decision-making on Rwanda's civil war when there was clearly a parallel genocide occurring.
- Refusing, despite evidence to the contrary, to invoke the term genocide in United Nations Security Council communications on the advice of UK government legal experts who concluded that such an admission would incur legal obligations in terms of the Genocide Convention.
- Misrepresenting in Parliament the request made of the UK to provide troops and logistical support for the formation of UNAMIR II.
- Failing to dispatch with due haste the APC's desperately required to enable the launch of UNAMIR II and put a stop to genocide. The genocide was all but over before the APC's arrived in Rwanda.

By exploring this theme, it has become evident that the objective of British foreign policy during the period concerned was not in keeping with those expected of a signatory to the UN Charter and the United Nations Convention on Genocide, and it must be suggested that such decision-making was for the advancement of the interrelated goals of maintaining power status and ensuring economic interests in key areas. Such an objective is clearly incompatible with the British government's legal obligations in terms of the Genocide Convention and International Law in general, and infers a degree of complicity in genocide by omission. The question as to why the UK government made a positive decision not to act will, however, be further hypothesised in the following concluding chapter.

This case-study has further illuminated the implications of external institutional complicity in genocide for political ends and has as such provided a clear indication of the direction in which criminology needs to take so as to move boundaries of 'the genocide template' (Lemarchand, 2006: 9). Whereas the previous chapter detailing a case-study of France concluded that the knowing participatory role by the French was suggestive of complicity in genocide by assisting the perpetrators of the crime, this thesis concludes that the UK

government are responsible for complicity in genocide through crimes of omission, an act which amounts to a violation of international law.

CHAPTER EIGHT: A CONCLUSION

'Great power and great crimes are inseparable. It is only those with great political or economic power who can, with the stroke of a pen, an utterance of an order, or even a knowing nod of the head, send thousands to their death or consign millions to lives of unrelenting want and misery. When economic and political powers pursue common interests, the potential for harm is magnified further' Michalowski and Kramer (2006: 1).

This is a thesis about great crime, namely the mass criminal atrocity of genocide. It is also a thesis about great power, namely the external institutional bystanders who are complicit in the great crime of genocide in violation of international criminal laws. They are indeed inseparable. This thesis has provided a detailed insight into the intricacies of external institutional bystanders complicity in genocide for political and economic advantage and the conclusions have, as per the aim of the study, expanded the boundaries of 'the genocide template' identifying crimes that were facilitated by the French state's overt and active intervention in genocide, and the British state's less overt and more passive role in genocide.

Reiterating the aim

The aim of this thesis was:

- to explore the impact of colonialism on genocidal conflict with the objective of concluding whether the genocide of Rwanda in 1994 requires to be understood in terms of the country's colonial history.
- to gain a greater insight into the crime of genocide by illuminating the responses, actions, and ultimately the role of some of the powerful government actors from those nations external to the country of genocide to establish to what extent one may regard external states as being complicit in the genocide of Rwanda.

This doctoral thesis explored the complex historical interrelations between colonialism and genocide illuminating important dimensions in the specific relationship of colonialism and genocide in Rwanda. The thesis also included a socio-legal approach in the analysis of the

available international criminal law pertinent to genocide, addressing unavoidable socio-legal questions the context of genocide and the influence of powerful institutions.

Although historians, political scientists and international jurists have contributed greatly to understandings of international crime, this thesis argues that criminology has an important contribution to make also. The thesis approached its criminological study of international law by utilising the concept of state crime to understand and respond to institutional bystander crimes of complicity in genocide in terms of international criminal law.

The politics of international law

In keeping with the scholarship of Bolewski, this research evidences that politics and law are not separate domains of international relations, but rather, they co-exist in a state of interdisciplinary cross-fertilization' (2007: 131). This is however contradictory to the scholarship of Morgenthau (1985: 13) who maintains that politics are autonomous to the law.

The approach undertaken for this thesis has illuminated the complexities of how modern politics has conditioned the institution of international law. It further evidences that international politics and law is a relationship of fascinating complexity and intrigue, a relationship that has evolved and finds expression in such diverse areas as complicity in genocide as captured in our analysis in chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis. Just as colonialism has a relationship to genocide, so do the powerful political institutions and with reference to the writing of Whyte (2009: 214), this relationship cannot be 'understood as a one-off incident in which the criminal 'event' is contained within a relatively narrow time frame'. The empirical research undertaken for this thesis has clearly established that the crimes of external institutional bystander complicity in genocide have a history. There is a history to the role taken by the French and the British in response to events in Rwanda and their violation of state responsibilities that are established in international law clearly identifiable as part of an ongoing process of neo-colonial victimization in central Africa that encompasses a sequence of events stretching over many years. Traditionally, criminology has been unhelpful in understanding crime as an ongoing process (Whyte, 2007: 454) with power relationships between victims and offenders and the normalisation of being a repeat victim being misinterpreted by conventional criminologist (Walklate, 2003: 127-9). This thesis concludes that relationships between international politics and violations of international law can only be understood as part of an ongoing longitudinal process of unequal power relations. .

This thesis approached the concept of power in international politics from the perspective that powerful manipulation is not readily visible and having stripped away layers of complexity, revealed how power operates in a multi-dimensional sense, influenced by the underlying precepts of economic and political advantage rather than human rights norms. That political decision-making, both before and during the genocide in Rwanda, was unhindered by legal obligations and reasoning, highlights the irrelevancy of international criminal law in politics and its weakness of ability to prevent or resolve the incidence of genocide in Rwanda.

This thesis permits one to conclude that international criminal law is therefore epiphenomenal in that it manifests itself as all powerful but the reality is that, when confronted with the actions of determined states, international criminal law is weak and ineffectual. This is in keeping with Bowring's characterization of 'the degradation of international law' in the era since the US led military attack on Libya (2005/2009: 245-9). Zolo (2006) however, argues that such discriminatory and discretionary adherence to international law is evident throughout history (cited in Whyte, 2009: 216) which posits international law as an instrument of the military and political dominant, with 'consideration of the winners' crimes...systematically excluded (Toscano, 2008, cited in Whyte, 2009: 216), bearing echoes of allegations of 'victor's justice' at the Nuremberg trials post World War II.

Having clarified herein that law is fundamentally political, with powerful institutions possessing the ability to influence and even create the law, it is evident that such legislation will not be upheld when it conflicts with the perceived political interests of the dominant states. International law is thus not enforceable independently of the will of powerful states, and one cannot regard it, in any compelling sense, as binding. As such, this thesis has highlighted a profound scepticism about law providing a viable path to international order. The ability of the British and French governments to make political decisions in response to events in Rwanda for political and economic advantage was facilitated by their ability to break the law with impunity, a finding that Whyte argues 'is often treated as peripheral in criminology and socio-legal studies: that power is derived from the ability of the powerful to break the law' (2009: 218).

Motivations and Opportunities

That international politics is a strategic game has evidenced itself in this thesis in the roles played by both the government of France and the United Kingdom in seeking to maximise

their respective political and economic interests' out-with the existing international criminal constraints during the genocide in Rwanda. From the literature reviews and data analysis undertaken herein, it is evident that one has to understand these former colonial countries in Africa as being in constant pursuit of power. A balance of power is a necessary condition for international law, but this is not feasible when one explores the conduct of the UK and France before and during the genocide in Rwanda.

Historical and contemporary Anglo-Saxon rivalry is rooted in not only economic and geopolitical disputes over Africa, but also in mutual paranoia and deep ideological and cultural divisions as was alluded to in some detail in chapters 4, 6 and 7 herein. Also noted is that some commentators firmly believe that the role of France and Britain in Rwanda in the period of the civil war from 1990 and throughout the genocide was an undeclared war between France and America, with Britain's foreign policy being driven by Washington.

It has become received wisdom in criminology that all crimes require motivation and opportunity, an approach to crime that originated in the work of Cohen and Felson (1979), hence the understanding of any crime calls for the exploration of both. Having analysed the data gathered for this thesis as discussed in chapters 6 and 7 herein, it became clear that the motivation driving both the French and the British governments was reverberations of postcolonial global economics as well as historical political and ideological factors reminiscent from periods of colonization (as set out in chapter 3). Such factors laid the foundations for the latter motivational factors leading to the crime of complicity in genocide.

Because of Rwanda's instability post-independence, opportunities manifested themselves for powerful governments of the West to gain political control in the Great Lakes region of Africa thereby providing an opportunity to manipulate the economic markets of Central Africa⁷⁶. Markets for misappropriated goods are a powerful international opportunity, and it was undoubtedly such an incentive that was instrumental in the resulting atrocities of Rwanda's genocide and more particularly those seen in the DRC in the post-genocide period (Mullins and Rothe, 2008)

⁷⁶ The corporations who are willing to buy stolen minerals and other commodities from war zones such as the DRC motivate governments to take such actions. Mineral wealth could not however drive civil conflict if there were no buyers for them.

As this thesis has demonstrated in chapters 6 and 7 herein, the relationship between the UK, France and their respective economies has very obviously shaped patterns of criminal behaviour, both before and during the genocide, in Rwanda. Indeed, this same relationship has continued to shape relationships and patterns of criminal behaviour between the states of Rwanda, a predatory state, and the UK, a capitalist state, post-genocide, resulting in continued criminogenic behaviour in the Great Lakes Region of Africa at the time of writing this thesis.

COMPLICITY IN LAW

This thesis revealed in Chapter 5 that complicity in genocide is equitable to responsibility for genocide. Complicity is described in international law as assistance in the form of aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring or otherwise participating in criminal offences. Complicity in international law is therefore described as facilitating genocide by acts of commission rather than omission.

Having explored the body of literature of the 'bystander' in chapter 5 of this thesis, the thesis demonstrated a clear need for the development of an enhanced academic understanding of the bystander in terms of violations of international criminal law to include the powerful attributes of the external institutional bystander whose geographical proximity to the location of the event is inconsequential in terms of culpability. To recap, the prerequisites for the external institutional bystander of this thesis are that the groups share the characteristics of a government, state, corporation, institution, international organization etc. They must possess power, authority, legitimacy and control to be part of a decision-making process. The groups should have the legitimacy to lead and be in a position to influence a majority of the international community. Not all bystanders are equal and any useful definition, in respect of complicity in international crimes, must acknowledge that some bystanders carry a greater responsibility than others do.

Chapter 5 highlighted the legal standing in relation to external institutional complicity in genocide and other violations of international criminal law, and as such has provided the reader with a lens for understanding the scope of liability of states and other institutional bystanders as responsible actors. Institutional bystanders to genocide are in sum liable to charges of complicity in genocide should:

- 1) they fail to undertake their positive obligations; such as the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III where a cleared missed moment of opportunity to act has been identified and where reliable intelligence clearly warned of imminent and serious humanitarian risks. This necessarily requires determination of the consequences for the perpetrators of genocide resulting from non-compliance of institutional bystanders with such treaty obligations.
- 2) their actions be shown to have assisted, aided or abetted the perpetrators of genocide in some form. Article III makes punishable four forms of participation in the crime (conspiracy, direct and public incitement, attempt and complicity). This necessarily requires determination of the consequences for the perpetrators of genocide resulting from the complicity of institutional bystanders. It must be proven that the institutional bystander had knowledge of the genocidal intent of the principal perpetrators albeit they did not necessarily share that intent. An example are the actions of the commercial suppliers of poisonous gas who knew of the intent of the purchasers to use the gas for the purpose of destroying a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, even if the suppliers themselves did not share that intent.

This thesis concludes that these are the two key points of law relating to 'bystander' complicity (as opposed to direct involvement) in genocide that are of significance to this thesis. By developing an external bystander's criminality in international law, our capacity in understanding the role of the United Kingdom and France in the Rwandan genocide has been expanded to capture the nature of complicity of institutional bystanders to genocide.

Such legislated violations of international criminal law by states do not however capture the equally important ongoing relationship between powerful political institutions and international law. Such relationships are relatively if not completely hidden and encompass a series of deliberate acts in the furtherance of the political interests of dominant states over an extended period of time. Such deviant conduct cannot be conceptualised under existing notions of state crime in international law and this research serves to illuminate the inadequacies and limitations of states crime in existent international law. The analysis of data in chapters 6 and 7 of this case-study has unveiled elements of the ongoing power relationships and lack of adherence to international law by the British and French.

COMPLICITY AS AN ONGOING PROCESS

This thesis has identified that at the core of the British government of 1994 until present day, are a number of powerful individuals capable of, and actually engaging in, crime against the citizens of the Great lakes Region of Africa, as part of government policy with the motive of maintaining power and advantage in politics and economics in this arena. In this thesis of institutional external bystander complicity in genocide, we can see a very direct relationship between political economy and the motivation of the perpetrators. In both analytical studies of the UK and France, it is clear these state agencies and the corporations supplying military hardware, stood to gain financially from collusion in such criminal enterprises. This thesis has clearly highlighted the need to understand the role of external institutional bystanders to genocide in the context of the wider international economy.

Whilst undertaking the empirical research of this thesis, the specific relationship between colonisation and genocide manifested itself and its significance to this thesis was determined. In summarising the discussion of chapter 3 herein, the Belgian colonisers of Rwanda took a complex pre-colonial political system of Tutsi hegemony and racialised it. They then used this racial distinction to exacerbate existing inequalities and racialised them also. What had been oppressive conditions in pre-colonial Rwanda became more cohesive because of colonisation. Colonial rule thus exacerbated the ethnic/class distinctions between the two broadly evolving groups and it was this 'Hamitic myth' that would become central to the Hutu extremists' efforts to mobilize ordinary citizens to commit the mass murder of the Tutsi 'invaders' that became known as the Rwandan genocide of 1994. One can conclude that the criminogenic activities of France and the UK before and during the genocide in Rwanda (as concluded in chapters 6 and 7 herein) are a legacy of former colonial pursuits and neo-colonialism. From the era of independence, Rwanda had acquired its military structure from its French supporters and this was maintained throughout the Cold War era and until the genocide of 1994. That the decline of the cold war left Britain and the US free to pursue neo-colonial policies in central Africa in areas of geostrategic significance and economic potential has been discussed in some detail throughout this thesis.

One must acknowledge that although every African territory has experienced colonialism and postcolonial reorganization, not all degenerated into single party states supported by the West and vicious civil wars, as was the case in Rwanda.

French complicity in genocide

Despite the French government's repeated refusal to acknowledge its responsibility in the atrocities of Rwanda's genocide of 1994, chapter 6 presented evidence to hold the French government collectively accountable for its failure to act to prevent or stop genocide. Genocide does not occur without ideological preparation and practical, logistical and strategic preparation and from 1990 onwards France performed an integral role in the architecture of the Rwandan genocide. France colluded and conspired with the genocidal Hutu regime and did supply arms and military equipment, military training and the alleged dissemination of racialised ideologies to the Rwandan Army (FAR) and Hutu militia organisations. The motives for the proposal of a humanitarian intervention in Rwanda by the French government are highly questionable and again are suggestive of complicity in the ongoing genocide. This research clearly indicates that power interests rather than humanitarian concern guided the French humanitarian intervention in Rwanda. The analytical discussion of France's political and military relationship with Rwanda from 1990 and throughout the period of the genocide, illuminates with special clarity the implications of external institutional bystander complicity in genocide as defined in chapter 5 herein, for political and economic advantage.

That a prolonged civil war of four years culminating in genocide ensued, is due primarily to the fact that both agitators, namely the RPF and FAR received substantial Western assistance. But whereas the French role of complicity in Rwanda's genocide was overt and direct, the British supporting role towards the RPF in Uganda was considerably less visible with support being mediated through Uganda's Presidency and military.

UK complicity in genocide

In relation to the scope of reliable and relevant information and intelligence available to the British government both before and during the genocide, this thesis has evidenced that the government were in receipt of ample detail to have permitted a clear insight into the deteriorating conditions in Rwanda. Despite statements by Members of the British government of being 'uninformed, unsighted, and lacking in any semblance of reliable or relevant information about events in Rwanda', it is clear that there was a wealth of available information. Throughout the fifteen years since the genocide in Rwanda, the British government has repeatedly excused its decisions and actions in respect of Rwanda by

claiming to have had no prior interest in the country and no access to intelligence or information. This research permits one to conclude that predicating their inaction on this basis is clearly inaccurate; this thesis has evidenced that their diplomatic relationships with Uganda and France necessitated that they keep abreast of events in Central Africa.

The British government, prior to the RPF incursion into Rwanda of 1990, provided military training to the rebel force from its British army base in Uganda. During this same period, the United States military transported the RPF leadership to the US for advanced military training. Many African analysts believe that the order for the October 1990 RPF invasion of Rwanda could not have been given without the knowledge, approval, and active assistance of the Pentagon's CIA and Britain's MI-6, both agencies being heavily engaged in Uganda as previously noted in chapter's 4 and 7. Written submissions to the International Criminal tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) as was discussed in chapter 4 herein corroborates these assertions. In contrast to France's overt role in their support of FAR, it is only through the detailed research and analysis of this thesis that it is now apparent that Kagame, who led the incursion of the RPF into Rwanda, was supported militarily and ideologically throughout this period, by both Britain and the US. Such a revelation is of great importance to this thesis since there is universal agreement that it was the 1990 invasion by the Tutsi guerrilla army of the RPF that ultimately determined the fate of millions of innocent people in Central Africa throughout the 1990s and into the twenty-first century.

Documentation evidences that by 17 May 1994, the United Kingdom and the US had knowledge that the RPF were responsible for mass killings and gross violations of human rights in Rwanda yet the British government continued to support them in their efforts throughout the entire genocide and until the time of writing this thesis. This has led to suggestions that the UK and US waged the military offensive in Rwanda through its proxy, the RPF for the purposes of capitulating the regime of President Habyarimana to western diktat and in preparation for the installation of an RPF-dominated government in Rwanda sympathetic to United Kingdom/US policies in Central Africa.

It is apparent that the British government did have knowledge and took a positive decision not to act to prevent genocide in Rwanda and as such omitted to fulfil its obligations in terms of the Genocide Convention and International Law. By exploring this theme, it has become evident that the objective of British foreign policy during the period concerned was not in

keeping with those expected of a signatory to the UN Charter and the United Nations Convention on Genocide, and it must be suggested that such decision-making was for the advancement of the interrelated goals of maintaining power status and ensuring economic interests in key areas. Such an objective is clearly incompatible with the British government's legal obligations in terms of the Genocide Convention and International Law in general, and infers a substantial degree of complicity in genocide by omission. Omission is criminalised when there is a legal requirement imposing a clear obligation to act – as is found in Article I of the Genocide Convention, which imposes an unconditional positive obligation on contracting parties to prevent genocide. These findings were useful in furthering development of the concept of external institutional bystander complicity in genocide.

Much of what has previously been identified in the literature as state crime are overt acts, such as overt military action. This thesis has however identified a form of state criminality that is hidden, involving crimes of omission. Chapter 1 herein discussed the ongoing debates surrounding the utility of definitions of state crime. Schwendinger and Schwendinger argued for a definition that includes those practices that, although they fall short of being officially declared illegal, are perceived by the majority of the population as illegal or socially harmful. In fact what this thesis evidenced are acts of state crime for which legislation is inappropriate owing to the weakness of that legislation rather than the lack of recognition within legislation of the act as illegal.

Just as the British government knowingly supported the Ugandan regime of Idi Amin for economical and political reasons (chapter 3 herein), so is the case with the current regime of President Kagame of Rwanda who has shown himself to be receptive to British coercion. The current economy of Rwanda rests not only on international economic aid but also on the plundering of the natural resources of the DRC, such as its diamonds, minerals as well as permitting the trafficking through Rwanda of Angola's conflict diamonds on their way to Antwerp and beyond (discussed in chapter 4 herein).

Although becoming global in appearance, the innermost machinations of the ongoing crisis in the DRC can be interpreted as the last link in a chain of events that were triggered by the RPF invasion of Rwanda in 1990 and the subsequent civil war that lasted nearly four years and ended up precipitating the genocide of the internal Tutsi. The hidden policies of the British government supported these historical events. France was the first external power involved in

Rwanda, acting in the same way as it had in other francophone parts of Africa since decolonization of the 1960s but found itself in the midst of hundreds of thousands of corpses in 1994. As previously noted, France was somewhat albeit not entirely overt in its activities in Rwanda.

A number of African countries, led by Rwanda, invaded Zaire in September 1996, overlooked by the British and French (chapter 5 herein). This is the first known instance of postcolonial imperial conquest in Africa by an African country albeit with the tacit support of the United Kingdom. Looting and gross violence arson, rape torture involving trafficking and economic predation have been the norm of this conflict all of which have been supervised and approved of by the state of Rwanda. The Congolese conflict has caused the death of nearly four million human beings partly because soldiers killed them and partly because their living conditions exacerbated by war, caused their death. Rwanda has this year launched its third military foray into the DRC. There are broad economic and political motives behind these incursions that have to do with Rwanda's regional ambitions.

The first two Rwandan invasions of 1996 and 1998 were devastating for the Congolese but hugely beneficial for Rwanda who became involved in the lucrative mineral trade out of Eastern Congo and this thesis concludes that their 2009 military operation aims to solidify their economic stake in the region. The United Kingdom was a covert external institutional bystander to genocide in Rwanda in 1994. They have maintained a cooperative relationship with the Rwandan government since the end of the genocide and their subsequent rise to power within the country. There is a wealth of relevant and reliable information documenting the perpetration of atrocities in the DRC by the army of the Rwandan government yet the British government, Rwanda's largest donor country, continues to provide unconditional economic aid, military and diplomatic support to Rwanda. One must suggest their continuing role is that of an external institutional bystander who is complicit in further violations of international criminal law in the knowledge that they may do so with impunity.

Britain continues to invest heavily in the DRC, having supported the overthrow of President Mobutu, the assassination of Kabila senior and his replacement with Joseph Kabila. By providing covert security, defence and strategic support to Rwanda, the United Kingdom has gained commercially through Anglo-American subsidiary Anglo Gold Ashanti's mining of gold in South Kivu amongst many other British corporations who have invested in Congo's

global mining industry. This research has highlighted that in the current climate in Central Africa it is unproblematic for Western governments, with their own private geostrategic and monetary agendas, to inflame rather than solve the difficulties of states they earmark for political or military 'solutions'. By supporting the build up of a Ugandan and Rwandan forces throughout the post-genocide era, and by directly intervening in the Congolese civil war, the United Kingdom and the United States bear direct criminal responsibility as external institutional bystanders for the ethnic massacres committed in the Eastern Congo that includes several hundred thousand people who died in refugee camps in violation of international criminal law.

The analysis of data in chapters 6 and 7 of this case-study has unveiled elements of the ongoing power relationships by the British and French in addition to their breach of international law and impunity to prosecution for same. Complicity in international law perceives genocide as a crime specific to a particular time, date and locus, however this is not the finding of this thesis which instead evidences external institutional bystander complicity in genocide to be a meaningful part of an ongoing process and one that has a major impact on the course of the genocide. As such the behaviours detailed in chapters 6 and 7 cannot be conceptualised under existing notions of state crime and this research serves to illuminate the inadequacies and limitations of a concept of state crime in international law as it currently stands.

OUTCOME OF STUDY

The study set out to explore the role of the British government in genocide and complicity, and concluded that their role requires to be understood in the context of both colonialism, and political and economic advantage as part of an ongoing process of victimization, thereby broadening academic understanding of complicity which was unanticipated. The empirical work demonstrated that the socio-political colonial aspects of the Rwandan genocide were unavoidable and this thesis necessarily went beyond the aims initially targeted. Such a socio-political colonial aspect in the international community's response to the genocide is also of significance to the contemporary crisis in the Great Lakes Region of Africa.

A significant outcome for this thesis is the conclusion that the overt and covert actions of the external institutional bystanders to genocide are disassociated from human rights norms. Instead these actions are directly attributable to the political and economic interests of the

external institutional bystanders to genocide. It was such political and economic interests which instigated the foreign policies of the United Kingdom and France during the genocide and led to longstanding relationships between the RPF and FAR respectively.

The conduct of the French military in Bisesero is clearly definable as complicity, and there is a potential for prosecution as discussed in chapter 6 herein. The French role as an external institutional bystander to genocide in Rwanda was direct involvement and collusion with the genocidal Hutu regime, actions that were relatively overt. The British as an external institutional bystander to genocide in Rwanda shaped conditions in the country every bit as much as the French albeit their actions were much more hidden from scrutiny. The actions of the United Kingdom were a positive act, namely a failure to act towards the victims in Rwanda despite having the power to prevent, stop or mitigate the crime. Such crimes of omission are indeed even further removed from the conventional definitions of state crime and international law as alluded to in the introductory chapter to this thesis, than the complicit crimes of commission of the French in Rwanda.

At no point during this research did any of the actors intimate that their respective government's reluctance to intervene was for fear of infringing the doctrine of national sovereignty despite its pervasiveness in discussions of intervention.

REFLECTIONS

Having discussed the weaknesses and inadequacies of international law and its asymmetrical and retributive form of justice that systematically excludes the dominant state, it is necessary to articulate whether the complicity of external institutional bystanders in respect of genocide may be overcome. Specific types of complicit criminal conduct and the root causes of the conduct that require to be addressed have been unveiled herein. Such institutional behaviours are generally concealed from public scrutiny so as to prevent governmental instability and downfall and maintain public opinion. Both the British and French government concealed their deviant and criminogenic behaviours as part of an ongoing process of power relations and international politics in central Africa. The actions of these powerful institutions were however in contrast to each other and reminiscent of their respective country's demands for ethical foreign policies and historical attitudes towards human rights, reinforcing once again the necessity of viewing such crimes as ongoing processes as opposed to specific events.

In comparison to the more overt deviance of the French government in Rwanda, were the covert, secretive activities and criminal complicity of the British government during a period of time spanning several years. One may speculate that such intentional concealment is suggestive of an even greater degree of criminality than that of the French, and is certainly a disregard for any ethical dimension of the foreign policy of a modern civilised government. The British government have long portrayed themselves as being rigorous in adhering to ethical principles, and indeed one former Secretary of State of John Major's Conservative government stated when interviewed: '[w]e took great exception when Robin Cook became Foreign Secretary and said that he was going to launch an ethical foreign policy for two reasons. First of all it implied there had been no ethical dimension before which was absurd, but secondly it implied that somehow ethics by themselves could determine foreign policy to the exclusion of other considerations. That just seems to me barking, it is just not deliverable' (INTERVIEW EL/16).

By way of explaining such contrasting behaviour, one can only speculate that since the British government portrays British foreign policy as being underpinned by ethics, it is bound by necessity to undertake activities with clear non-ethical dimensions covertly. Braithwaite (1999) has argued that shaming is the key to controlling all types of crime. Exposure of such unethical decision making policies within the bastion of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London would certainly be acutely embarrassing to the government actors concerned in criminal complicity in the violations of international law and may be worthy of consideration as an appropriate method of confronting state crime. Such a suggestion is purely speculative and detailed research is required to build on previous studies of controlling state crime in order to establish the viability of shaming and to assess other appropriate methods of controlling such covert complicity in genocide.

In contrast to the covert conduct of the British government are the more overt actions of the French government detailed in chapter 6 of this thesis. What is of interest to this thesis is why France was prepared to engage in complicity in genocide in a somewhat less secretive manner than the UK. France considers itself to be the birthplace of human rights, a tradition that can be dated back to the eighteenth century. Indeed France was one of the first nations to draft a declaration proclaiming human rights in 1789. France's relationship with the government of Rwanda, which was initiated in 1975 with the signing of the Franco-Rwandan agreement (detailed in chapter 6 herein), has always been cloaked in the aspirations of human rights

whilst concealing its real objectives of political and economic advantage in central Africa. Explanations of French military assistance to Rwanda at the behest of President Habyarimana to expulse the invading RPF of 1990, was couched in human rights rhetoric, as were all subsequent overt and covert French military acts until the end of the genocide in July 1994. It was such misrepresentation of protecting the citizens of Rwanda against the invading rebel army of Southern Uganda that empowered France to negate the criminality of their actions in violation of international law. Said criminogenic behaviour could feasibly be tackled by prosecution, thereby enforcing the international laws and conventions on genocide. It is in fact imperative that the French government be held accountable by their informed constituencies for their complicit role in the genocide in Rwanda if future replications are to be deterred.

The international community's indifference to Rwanda brought tremendous embarrassment to the United Nations Security Council and the UN itself. In response to this failure the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan urged the UN General Assembly in 1999 to consider adopting a doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Canada sponsored an international commission which after worldwide consultations proposed a 'responsibility to protect' (R2P) doctrine, in which state failure in their obligations to protect their citizens means that the international community inherits that responsibility suggesting a growing sense of mutual obligations. R2P was adopted in 2005 and has given an instrument to human rights groups, activists and the domestic public in general, to indirectly pressure their state officials to act appropriately, and be willing to be held electorally accountable if they do not. It is encouraging that efforts are ongoing in the international arena to combat behaviour by powerful institutions that may include external institutional bystander complicity in genocide.

Another influential actor on state criminogenic organizations are large corporations who may also be usefully defined as external institutional bystanders. The ongoing crisis in the DRC which has seen the deaths of over four million people and untold crimes against humanity, is a direct consequence of the political instability in the Great Lakes region of Africa as a result of the genocide in Rwanda and the refugee crisis that ensued. As the discussion in chapter 4 herein of the DRC illustrates, there are a plethora of international corporate actors willing to facilitate economic gain from violence and genocide. Corporations and states have created a liaison because they often pursue the same objectives and often engage in unethical and illegal actions to achieve mutual goals. To establish a greater insight into the political economy of institutional external bystander complicity in violations of international law it

would be useful to expand this thesis to include such corporations with a view to exploring their role and actions in such criminogenic activities.

Further research is also required in relation to African external institutional bystanders to the Rwandan genocide. Much criticism has been levelled at Western nations as a result of their inaction and response to the genocide, however, to date, no studies have been undertaken to establish the responses and role of powerful African governments both before and during the genocide of 1994 to establish if they too can be deemed as having been complicit, and if so, what was their motivation. . The Organisation for African Unity (OAU – now referred to as the African Union, AU) consists of 52 African Heads of State. In 1998 the OAU established a Commission to investigate the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the surrounding events in the Great Lakes Region. The OAU and several African states namely Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Burundi, played a central role in the Arusha peace negotiations as discussed in chapter 4 herein. The Commission was highly critical of the actions of the body. They perceived the OAU to have been an active and vocal key actor during events in Rwanda, but throughout the period of April – July 1994, like the UN, it failed to define events in Rwanda genocide. Neither did it call on the international community to treat the crisis accordingly. To date there has been no criminological analysis of such a response.

It is only once criminologists and international jurists can begin to piece together all elements of the tragedy and instability in the Great Lakes Region throughout the past two decades that we will have a more realistic understanding of how international law might intervene to prevent a genocide like that which occurred in Rwanda, from recurring in the future. This thesis is but one small step towards a momentous objective in international law.

APPENDIX A: INTERVIEWING KEY POLITICAL INFORMANTS

SEVENTEEN SENIOR UK AND UN POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES WHO WERE IN KEY OFFICES AT THE TIME OF THE GENOCIDE WERE CONTACTED BY LETTER TO REQUEST AN INTERVIEW. THIS RESULTED IN 16 INTERVIEWS BEING UNDERTAKEN – 15 OF WHICH WERE FACE-TO-FACE AND ONE OF WHICH WAS BY MEANS OF WRITTEN CORRESPONDENCE. WITHOUT EXCEPTION, THE RESPONDENTS MADE THEMSELVES AVAILABLE TO FOLLOW UP INTERVIEWS IF REQUIRED. FOLLOW UP INTERVIEWS WERE NOT FOUND TO BE NECESSARY FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS THESIS.

CODE	DATE OF INTERVIEW	LOCUS OF INTERVIEW	DURATION	POSITION
EL/02	29.03.06	LONDON	2HRS 20 MINUTES	Former British diplomat at the most senior level
EL/04	17.05.06	LONDON	1HR 5MINS	Former British Secretary of State
EL/06	16.05.06	LONDON	45 MINS	Retired senior civil servant within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
EL/08	28.03.06	LONDON	62 MINS	Former British diplomat at the most senior level
EL/10	29.08.05	LONDON	1HR 10MINS	Former Senior military personnel attached to the United Nations New York
EL/12	20.02.06	NEW YORK	1HR 15MINS	Former Representative of a non-permanent member state of the UNSC (1994)
EL/14	11.04.06	LONDON	30MINS	Former Representative of a non-permanent member state of the UNSC (1994)
EL/16	26.04.06	LONDON	55MINS	Former British Secretary of State
EL/18	29.03.06	LONDON	48MINS	Former British Secretary of State
EL/20	17.05.06	LONDON	1HR 5MINS	Former British Secretary of State
EL/22	25.01.06	LONDON	29MINS	Former British Secretary of State
EL/24	31.07.07	WRITTEN CORRESPONDENCE	N/A	Former member of the British government at the most senior level
EL/28	16.05.06	LONDON	45MINS	Former British civil servant stationed in Kampala Embassy, Uganda
EL/30	27.03.06	LONDON	35MINS	Former British Secretary of State
EL/32	11.04.06	STRATHCLYDE, SCOTLAND	52MINS	Former British civil servant stationed in UK Mission, New York

APPENDIX B

DETAILS OF THE 'POWERFUL' SUBJECTS ACCESSED AND INTERVIEWED IN RWANDA, SOME OF WHOM ARE REFERENCED BY NAME IN THE TEXT OF THE THESIS

NAME	DATE OF MEETING & PLACE	BRIEF OUTLINE OF SUBJECT
General Paul Rwarakabije	05.12.05, RDRC Office, Kigali	<p>Rwarakabije is a former member and overall commander of the 20,000 strong rebel movement, the Forces Démocratique pour la Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR – a recognized terrorist movement). The FDLR was based in eastern Congo following the flight of Hutu extremists to eastern Congo after their involvement in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The FDLR rebel group is comprised of key members of the 1994 genocide, plus Hutu members of the former Rwandan army, as well as a mix of displaced Rwandan Hutus. On 16 November 2003 the top Rwandan Hutu rebel commander, Major General Rwarakabije based in the Democratic Republic of Congo formally surrendered to the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan government. He and several of his officers flew into the Rwandan capital, Kigali, to be greeted by top Rwandan officials eager to display a political victory over the Hutu-rebel movement. The sudden surrender of the top officials followed direct discussions between the Rwandan government and the rebel group. Mr. Rwarakabije himself does not have an official record of being involved in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, having merely led attacks against northern Rwanda between 1997 and 2000.</p> <p>DURATION: 52 mins</p>
Aloisee Inyumba	05.12.05, Government Office, Kigali	<p>Was the Finance Commissioner for the RPF during the 'liberation war' of 1990 – 1995. During that time she frequently travelled to the UK and the US to raise and collect funds for the RPF. At time of meeting, Inyumba is a high-profile member of Kagame's Rwandese Patriotic Front, which rose to power following the genocide. She initially served as Minister of Gender in 1994 then as Minister of Social Affairs before being appointed executive secretary of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission in Rwanda. She is now</p>

		<p>governor of Kigali-Ngali Province in Rwanda</p> <p>DURATION 15mins</p>
Tito Rutaremara	05.12.05, Office of President	<p>Rutaremara was Chairman and Chief Coordinator of the Rwanda Patriotic Force from 1990 until end of December 1993. It was he who signed the Arusha Peace Accords on behalf of the RPF as he was their main JPMC (Joint Political-Military Commission) negotiator. President Habyarimana signed at this time on behalf of the Rwandan government. On the 29th December 1993 he was placed in command of the lead parliamentary group to lead the way forward to sharing government in Rwanda. He left Kigali during the genocide to continue negotiations for peace.</p> <p>DURATION: 1hr 10mins</p>
Faustin Musare	02.12.05, Office of President	<p>Senior official of the RPF before and throughout period of genocide. Currently Director General of Governance and Civil Society Unit, and personal assistant to President Kagame.</p> <p>DURATION 15 mins</p>
Tom Ndahiro	02.12.05, Office of Human Rights, Kigali	<p>Currently Rwanda's Human Rights Commissioner. Was a foot soldier in the North of Rwanda with the RPF during the genocide. Was not involved in diplomacy at that time.</p> <p>DURATION: 35 mins</p>
Agnes Ntamabyariro	30.11.05, '1930' Prison, Kigali	<p>Agnes Ntamabyariro bn 01.07.57 @ Kibuye was at time of interview in prison awaiting trial on charges of being a genocide perpetrator having been allegedly</p>

		<p>responsible for the organisation and implementation of genocide.</p> <p>She was raised in the Kibuye Province, a catholic, and was educated at primary school in Rwanda. At 14 years of age, she left Rwanda for Zaire (DRC where she had two years secondary education before leaving for Belgium where she obtained a further 3 or 4 years secondary education. She thereafter spent a few months in London before returning to the Congo and finally returning to Rwanda in 1973.</p> <p>On her return to Rwanda, Ntamabyariro attended Butare University where she studies law and became a qualified lawyer. She became a High Court Judge for the next ten years in Butare Province before being given the position of Vice-President of the Rwandan High Court</p> <p>In 1992 she was given the position of Minister of Commerce and Industry with the Government of Rwanda and in July 1993 was moved to being the Minister of Justice in Rwanda, the position she held when the genocide commenced.</p> <p>Several of the interim government of Rwanda, including Ntamabyariro, left Kigali on the 12th April 1994 and made their way to Gitarama where they sent up a temporary headquarters. In July 1994 she fled Rwanda; she was arrested on the 27 May 1997 where she was in exile with her family. Her husband and family remain in Zambia to this day.</p> <p>DURATION: 1hr 24mins</p>
Jean de Dieu Mucyo	29.11.05, Parque General, Kigali	At time of meeting Mucyo was Chief Prosecutor General for the Supreme Court, Kigali, and one of the few francophone/non-RPF to grace a senior position

		<p>within the country. He is a survivor of the genocide who witnessed the arrival of Operation Turquoise in the country</p> <p>DURATION: 30mins</p>
Joseph Mutaboba	<p>Several meetings during both fieldtrips. Informal meetings included attending dinner at home with his family. Gatekeeper</p>	<p>During genocide, Mutaboba was a lecturer at a British university but was recalled to Rwanda by the RPF after the genocide. He then took up the position as Rwandan Ambassador to the United Nations. At the time of our meetings, and currently, Mutaboba is Rwanda's permanent secretary in the Ministry of the Interior (Internal Security) and a regular spokesperson to the media denying Rwanda's military role in the DRC. These accusations have since been admitted to by the government of Rwanda.</p>

APPENDIX C

INTERVIEWS UNDERTAKEN AT BISESERO, KIBUYE PROVINCE RWANDA

THE FOLLOWING TABLE PROVIDES A DESCRIPTION OF FIVE INHABITANTS OF THE BISESERO AREA REFERRED TO IN THE TEXT OF THE THESIS WHO WERE INTERVIEWED IN AN UNSTRUCTURED, CONVERSATIONAL STYLE METHOD ON 26 JUNE 2005. EACH INTERVIEW LASTED BETWEEN 30 MINUTES AND ONE HOUR APPROXIMATELY.

REFERENCE	DESCRIPTION OF SUBJECT
HMC/B1/2005	MALE SURVIVOR/RESISTER OF GENOCIDE, BISESERO 1994
HMC/B3/2005	MALE SURVIVOR/RESISTER OF GENOCIDE, BISESERO 1994
HMC/B4/2005	MALE SURVIVOR/RESISTER OF GENOCIDE, BISESERO 1994
HMC/B8/2005	MALE SURVIVOR/RESISTER OF GENOCIDE, BISESERO 1994
HMC/B10/2005	MALE SURVIVOR/RESISTER OF GENOCIDE, BISESERO 1994

APPENDIX D

INTERVIEWS WITH VICTIMS/SURVIVORS OF GENOCIDE

During the first fieldtrip to Rwanda twenty interviews were carried out with survivors of varying backgrounds and categories. All those interviewed were selected randomly on their willingness to discuss an event that remains extremely traumatic to each individual with the interviews being unstructured and conversational in style. It is acknowledged that due to the context of the research phenomenon under study and the continuing deep-seated emotions, the information gathered in the field in Rwanda has been treated critically and reflexively as to its accuracy and reliability. The following interviews are referenced in the text of thesis.

DATE	REFERENCE CODE	DESCRIPTION OF SUBJECT
11/06/05	R/02/2005	FEMALE SURVIVOR, GITARAMA
13/06/05	R/03/2005	FEMALE SURVIVOR, KIGALI
19/06/05	R/06/2005	FEMALE SURVIVOR, KIBUNGO

APPENDIX E

TESTIMONIES OBTAINED AT MUCYO COMMISSION, KIGALI, RWANDA, DECEMBER 2006

In April 2005, Article 2 of the Organic Law of Rwanda (2004) established a 'Commission of Enquiry to Establish the Role of France in the Genocide of 1994' referred to generally as the 'Mucyo Commission', being headed by the former Chief Prosecutor General and Minister of Justice, Jean De Dieu Mucyo. The Mucyo Commission is a domestic tribunal, made up of a seven-member panel of historians, legal experts and a senior military officer of the former Rwandan army. The Mucyo Commission gathered evidence at hearings throughout a seven day period in October 2006 and a further seven day period in December 2006. I was aware that testimonies in relation to the French Operation Turquoise in the region of Bisesero, Kibuye Province, Rwanda were to be heard during the December hearing however due to the cost implications it was not feasible for me to attend personally. As such, I requested and obtained permission from Jean De Dieu Mucyo for me to be represented at the hearing. As such, Shami Mugisha attended the hearing from 11 December 2006 – 15 December 2006 (both dates inclusive) on my behalf, taking copious notes of each days testimonies. Each evening after the days evidence had been heard, I would contact my representative by telephone in Kigali, Rwanda and there would follow a one hour conversation during which he would reiterate the days evidence which I would note. The testimonies used are noted in the text of the thesis. The three-volume 500 page report of the findings of the 'Commission of Enquiry to Establish the Role of France in the Genocide of 1994', including verbatim testimonies, was submitted to the Government of Rwanda on 15 November 2007 and released to the public on 5 August 2008. This allowed the information provided by my representative to be verified as accurate. It is currently only available in French language.

The following are the details of those testimonies referenced in the text of the thesis.

DATE OF TESTIMONY	REFERENCE	SUBJECTS STATUS DURING GENOCIDE 1994
11/12/06	SM/1/1/11	MEMBER OF RWANDAN ARMY
11/12/06	SM/2/1/11	MEMBER OF RWANDAN ARMY
11/12/06	SM/3/1/11	MEMBER OF RWANDAN ARMY
11/12/06	SM/4/1/11	MEMBER OF RWANDAN ARMY
12/12/06	SM/1/2/12	INTERAHAMWE MILITIA
12/12/06	SM/3/2/12	INTERAHAMWE MILITIA
12/12/06	SM/4/2/12	TUTSI ARRESTEE

12/12/06	SM/5/2/12	MEMBER OF RWANDAN ARMY
13/12/06	SM/1/3/13	MEMBER OF RWANDAN ARMY
13/12/06	SM/4/3/13	INTERAHAMWE MILITIA
14/12/06	SM/4/4/14	INTERAHAMWE MILITIA
14/12/06	SM/7/4/14	INTERAHAMWE MILITIA
15/12/06	SM/3/5/15	INTERAHAMWE MILITIA
15/12/06	SM/5/5/15	INTERAHAMWE MILITIA

APPENDIX F

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION RELEASES

THE FOLLOWING TABLE DETAILS THE SOURCE AND RECIPIENT OF TELEX COMMUNICATIONS OBTAINED VIA SIX SEPARATE FOI REQUESTS TO THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, LONDON BETWEEN MARCH 2006 AND NOVEMBER 2007. EACH REQUEST FOR RELEASE OF CORRESPONDENCE WAS AMENDED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN RESPONSE TO FEEDBACK FROM THE FCO PRIOR TO THEIR RELEASE OF ANY DOCUMENTATION. THE DOCUMENTS THAT WERE USED IN THE THESIS AND REFERRED TO IN THE TEXT FROM SAID RELEASED DOCUMENTS ARE SET OUT IN THE TABLE BELOW.

REFERENCE	DOCUMENT TYPE	FROM	TO	DATE
FCO/HMC/17	TELEX	UK EMBASSY KAMPALA	FCO LONDON	1/10/90
FCO/HMC/16	TELEX	UK EMBASSY KAMPALA	FCO LONDON	4/10/90
FCO/HMC/15	TELEX	UK EMBASSY KAMPALA	FCO LONDON	8/10/90
FCO/HMC/07	TELEX	UK EMBASSY KAMPALA	FCO LONDON	12/10/90
FCO/HMC/12	TELEX	UK EMBASSY KAMPALA	FCO LONDON	1/11/90
FCO/HMC/06	TELEX	UK EMBASSY KINSHASA	FCO LONDON	23/1/91
FCO/HMC/11	TELEX	UK EMBASSY KAMPALA	FCO LONDON	24/1/91
FCO/HMC/14	TELEX	UNKNOWN SOURCE	FCO LONDON	10/7/92 - 12/7/92
FCO/HMC/20	TELEX	UK EMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM	LONDON, PARIS, BRUSSELS, KAMPALA, KINSHASA, WASHINGTON	13/7/92
FCO/HMC/21	TELEX	UK EMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM	FCO LONDON	11/8/92

FCO/HMC/22	TELEX	UK EMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM	FCO LONDON	19/8/92
FCO/HMC/25	TELEX	UK EMBASSY KAMPALA	FCO LONDON	14/10/92 – 8/3/93
FCO/HMC/23	TELEX	UK EMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM	FCO LONDON	21/9/92
FCO/HMC/24	TELEX	UK EMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM	FCO LONDON	13/10/90
FCO/HMC/26	TELEX	UK EMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM	FCO LONDON	8/3/93
FCO/HMC/27	TELEX	UK EMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM	FCO LONDON	5/8/93
FCO/HMC/28	TELEX	UK EMBASSY KAMPALA	FCO LONDON	20/2/94
FCO/HMC/29	TELEX	UK EMBASSY KAMPALA	FCO LONDON	MARCH 94
FCO/HMC/30	TELEX	WASHINGTON, U.S.	LONDON, KAMPALA, DA ES SALAAM, KINSHASA, ADDIS ABABA, UKMIS NEW YORK	6/4/94
FCO/HMC/18	TELEX	UK EMBASSY KAMPALA	FCO LONDON	7/4/94
FCO/HMC/31	TELEX	FCO LONDON	UK EMBASSY KAMPALA	7/4/94
FCO/HMC/04	TELEX	UK EMBASSY KAMPALA	FCO LONDON	9/4/94
FCO/HMC/32	TELEX	FCO LONDON	UK EMBASSY KAMPALA	13/4/94
FCO/HMC/33	TELEX	UK EMBASSY KAMPALA	FCO LONDON	13/4/94
FCO/HMC/34	TELEX	UK EMBASSY KAMPALA	FCO LONDON	20/4/94
FCO/HMC/09	TELEX	UK EMBASSY	FCO LONDON, UKMIS NEW YORK	

		KAMPALA		21/4/94
FCO/HMC/03	TELEX	UK EMBASSY KAMPALA	FCO LONDON	20/4/94
FCO/HMC/35	TELEX	UK EMBASSY KAMPALA	FCO LONDON	21/4/94
FCO/HMC/19	TELEX	UK EMBASSY KAMPALA	FCO LONDON, UKMIS NEW YORK	26/4/94

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