



UNIVERSITY OF

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**EU-Algerian Interaction in the Context of the Barcelona Process:  
Interests, Processes and the Limits of Convergence**

Thesis submitted in accordance with  
the requirements of the University of Liverpool  
for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy by

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## **Abstract**

This study analyses EU-Algerian relations in the context of the Barcelona Process, also known as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). It seeks to unveil the interests of both parties upon their engagement in this venture in 1995, to dissect the ideational and strategic origins of their negotiating priorities, and to trace the ways in which these preferences have evolved/changed in the period 1995-2005. By focusing on the EMP, this research aims to assess the impact of the dynamics of both strategic and normative/ideational nature, inherent in this process, on the evolution of the preferences of Algeria and the EU. In other words, by considering the EMP both a setting and a process, this study seeks to highlight the influence of EMP interaction on a set of relevant policy priorities in the EU and in Algeria. Ultimately, the aim is to establish whether convergence of priorities, if it has occurred at all between the EU and Algeria in the framework of the Barcelona Process, was the product of their interaction within this process or the result of changes relating to their respective polities or to the international system more broadly.

To achieve this, a synthetic theoretical framework is employed, consisting of rationalist and constructivist conceptions of international behaviour as encompassed by international regime theory. To reinforce this largely macro, systemic approach, the analytical tools of Foreign Policy Analysis relating to the domestic sources of foreign policy behaviour are employed as well.

The results show that the EMP had little impact on the uncovered instances of interest convergence between the EU and Algeria in the chosen policy areas. It played only an indirect role in convergence of priorities in the area of political and security cooperation and had no effect on the dyad's preferences in terms of economic reform and energy cooperation. Approximation of interests in these instances was largely found to be directly correlated to changes in the respective polities of the EU and Algeria as well as in the international system. In conclusion, the results point to the shortcomings of the EMP as a framework for EU-Algerian relations and provide insights into how this relationship could be optimised in the future.

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## List of acronyms and abbreviations

AA	Association Agreement
AIS	Armée Islamique du Salut
ALN	Armée de Libération Nationale
ANP	Armée Nationale Populaire
AP	Action Plan
APN	Assemblée Populaire Nationale
APS	Algérie Presse Service
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSBM	Confidence and Security Building Measures
CSCM	Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean
DRS	Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité
EC	European Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EIDHR	European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
EMEP	Euro-Mediterranean Energy Partnership
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EP	European Parliament
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EuroMeSCo	Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission
FFS	Front des Forces Socialistes
FIS	Front Islamique du Salut
FLN	Front de Libération Nationale
FTA	Free Trade Area
GIA	Groupe(s) Islamique(s) Armé(s)
GMP	Global Mediterranean Policy
GSPC	Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat
HAMAS	Movement for an Islamic Society (Harakat al-Mujtama' al-Islami)
HCE	Haut Comité d'État
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MEDA	Mesures d'Ajustements/d'Accompagnement
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MEPP	Middle East Peace Process
MPC	Mediterranean Partner Country
MSP	Mouvement pour une Société de Paix
OAU	Organisation of Africa Unity
PBM	Partnership Building Measures
PRA	Parti du Renouveau Algérien
PT	Parti des Travailleurs
RCD	Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie
RMP	Redirected Mediterranean Policy
RND	Rassemblement National Démocratique
SEP	Strategic Energy Partnership

SMC  
SONATRACH

Southern Mediterranean Country  
Société Nationale pour la Recherche, la Production, le  
Transport, la Transformation et la Commercialisation des  
Hydrocarbures  
Union du Maghreb Arabe

UMA



## Introduction – Questions and setting

Since its inception in 1995, the Barcelona Process, also known as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), has been the subject of a considerable amount of scholarly scrutiny. Studies have in their majority concentrated on the attributes of the EMP as a vehicle of the European Union's (EU) policy towards the Mediterranean region,<sup>1</sup> but notably fewer research endeavours have taken bilateral relations in the form EU-Mediterranean partner country (MPC),<sup>2</sup> in the context of the EMP, as their foci.

The introduction of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003, however, led to increasing interest in key EU-MPC bilateral relations in the context of this more recent EU foreign policy framework, suggesting that the comparatively more multilateral character of the EMP had perhaps discouraged such research undertakings owing to the potential conceptual complexity that such studies would involve as well as to their practical (in policy terms) tangentiality. Be that as it may, it remains the case that if the enunciated differentiated and bilateral approach of the ENP is to effectively address the shortcomings of its predecessor in the EU's southern neighbourhood – as initially claimed by EU officialdom<sup>3</sup> - and academia is to heuristically vet this *nouvelle donne*, a useful starting point may be the consideration of key bilateral relations in the context of the Barcelona Process, especially in MPC cases of dialectically changing attitudes in relation to both policy frameworks.<sup>4</sup> Whilst addressing the connection between the prospects of the ENP and the results of the EMP is not the immediate objective of this research, its aim, nonetheless, is to contribute to filling the above notable gap

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<sup>1</sup> The use in this study of the expression 'Mediterranean region', 'Mediterranean area' or simply 'the Mediterranean', in the context of European foreign policy is confined to the latter's conception of the region. In the context of the EMP, the designation refers to Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta, pre-2004, to the same group minus the latter two thereafter, and plus Mauritania and Albania since 2007. In the context of previous Community policies towards the "region", such as the GMP and RMP (as will be seen below), the expression included Greece until its accession in 1981 and Spain and Portugal until the Iberian enlargement in 1986. This study does not engage critically with the notion of 'Mediterranean region'; for studies that do, see: M. Pace (2003) *Rethinking the Mediterranean: Reality and Representation in the Creation of a 'Region'*, PhD thesis, Portsmouth University; R. A. Del Sarto (2003) *Contested State Identities as Domestic Constraints to Regional Security: The Case of the Euro-Mediterranean Region*. PhD thesis, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

<sup>2</sup> Throughout this research, the acronym MPC will be used interchangeably with SMC (southern Mediterranean country).

<sup>3</sup> See: Commission of the European Communities (2003). *Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*, Brussels, COM (2003) 204.

<sup>4</sup> This is all the more relevant given the latest 'upgrade' brought to the EMP in the form of the Union for the Mediterranean. This policy development is still in its embryonic form at the time of writing and will not be engaged with in this study.

in the existing body of literature on Euro-Mediterranean relations - at least as far EU-Algerian relations are concerned.

Algeria's overt enthusiasm for the EMP has given way to a singularly critical posture in relation to the ENP. In fact, even prior to 1995, EC/EU-Algerian relations had characteristically been marked by fluctuating tendencies (as shown below). Yet, even in relative terms, research on EU-Algerian relations in their broad definition has remained sporadic.<sup>5</sup> However, Algeria has invariably been, and will remain, central to the outcome of any European policy initiative in the southern Mediterranean. Quite apart from the region-building aspirations of these policies, Algeria's contemporary history, its geographical location, its political, economic and geostrategic attributes as well as its national ambitions make it a pivotal state in the Mediterranean (Chapter two elaborates on Algeria's *sui generis* nature as a Mediterranean actor).<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, the recent resurgence of policy challenges in the region, such as "jihadist" terrorism, energy security, illegal migration and, concomitantly, the nexus democratisation-political Islamism-stability have reinforced Algeria's geo-strategic position vis-à-vis Europe. As such, its EU/EMP policy needs to be properly examined so that its origins, evolution and adaptation to interaction with the EU are better understood. After all, the EMP, as a policy enterprise, aimed at inaugurating a new era in North-South relations in the Mediterranean, predicated on the precepts of partnership and interdependence to break away from a not-so-distant epoch of *rattachement* and dependence. What better than EU-Algerian relations as a gauge of this spirit just as in a recent past Euro-Algerian relations embodied a mentality which defined the Mediterranean as a mere *frontière départementale*?<sup>7</sup>

This study focuses on EU-Algerian relations in the context of the EMP. It seeks to unveil the interests of both parties upon their engagement in this venture in 1995, to dissect the ideational and strategic origins of their negotiating priorities,<sup>8</sup> and to trace the way(s) in which

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<sup>5</sup> The reasons for this trend may be twofold: a/ the difficulty to conceptualise Algerian politics given their complex, idiosyncratic, opaque and un-institutionalised undercurrents, as asserted by William Quandt (1969: 266, as quoted in Roberts, 2003: 165) 'ideology as an explanation of Algerian political behaviour is simply not convincing to most observers', and dissected by Hugh Roberts (2002a); b/ lack of access to information and various domestic policy actors. See appendix 1 for corroborating quantitative findings.

<sup>6</sup> For a definition of the notion of 'pivotal state', see: Y. H. Zoubir (2004a) 'The Dialectics of Algeria's Foreign Relations, 1992 to the Present', in: A. Aghrout et al. (Eds.) *Algeria in Transition: Reforms and Development Prospects* (London: RoutledgeCurzon).

<sup>7</sup> The French establishment at the time of its colonial rule perceived the Mediterranean as running through France (Algeria being considered an overseas French department) just like the *Seine* River runs through Paris.

<sup>8</sup> Interests, preferences and priorities are terms used interchangeably in this study.

these preferences have evolved/changed in the period 1995-2005.<sup>9</sup> By focusing on the EMP, this research aims to assess the impact of the dynamics of both strategic and normative/ideational nature, inherent in this process, on the formation and evolution of the preferences of Algeria and the EU. In other words, by considering the EMP as both a setting and a process – an object of strategic and normative policy considerations and a causally consequential construct – this study seeks to highlight the influence of EMP interaction on a set of relevant policy priorities of both the EU and Algeria. Ultimately, the aim is to establish whether convergence of priorities, if at all, between the EU and Algeria in the framework of the Barcelona Process was the product of their interaction within this process, or the result of changes relative to their respective polities or to the international system at large.

The methodological section in the following chapter deals with the implications of these research aims, such as measuring interest convergence and tracing the origins of preferences.

Some of the most important issues that I have had to grapple with from the outset, with regards to the scope of this research, relate to a) the (belated) entry into force of the EU-Algeria Association Agreement (AA) and b) the inclusion (or not) of the ENP as a layer of analysis in this study.

Firstly, the fact that the AA entered into force on 1 September 2005, in other words on the edge of the timeframe of this study, begged the question as to whether or not the ensuing analysis was poised as a result to omit an important mechanism of interaction between the EU and Algeria in the context of the EMP. Indeed, the AA, as a mutually-agreed and negotiated treaty, which embodies the stakeholders' roadmap to achieving their priorities and objectives in the defined areas of political, economic and socio-cultural cooperation, is the main bilateral implementation mechanism of the objectives of the Barcelona Process. Its entry into force implies not only the enactment of its provisions, but also the organisation of annual Association Council meetings between the "associates" in order to review the state of progress of the work of the technical sub-committees put in place to oversee the implementation of AA provisions in a number of policy sub-areas. However, as such, the AA

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<sup>9</sup> This research will be limited to this timeframe; 1995 marking the launch of the Barcelona Process and 2005 being a threshold in the EMP's timeline, given that its tenth anniversary summit was meant as a reinvigoration exercise through the attempted bringing together for the first time of Euro-Mediterranean heads of state of government, whose absence in the end was what provided a reality check for stakeholders and spurred serious rethinking of the EU's Mediterranean policy.

reflects the preferences of the associates as already defined, adapted, influenced and transformed by the preceding negotiation process. Its entry into force does not, at least in the short term, have a meaningful impact on the preferences of its signatories. Besides, what this research is interested in is the effect of the EMP as a constructed regime on the interests of Algeria and the EU, and the impact of its strategic and ideational dynamics on those preferences. The negotiation process of the AA, as an important component of these dynamics, is at the heart of the analytical remit of this study; the AA as an “end product” in itself less so. In fact, to examine the impact of the EMP on the priorities of the EU and Algeria, the period under study will be divided where relevant into “before” and “after” the *signing* of the AA to see whether its adoption had an impact on the mechanisms through which the EMP affected their interests.

Secondly, given that the ENP was introduced a mere one year after the signing of the EU-Algeria AA and two years before its actual operationalisation, the question of whether – and concomitantly how and to what extent – the ENP would be included as a layer of analysis in this study had to be dealt with. The ENP’s *finalité* was said to be to provide a ‘desperately needed new dynamic in Euro-Mediterranean relations’ (Johansson-Nogués, 2004: 243) by supplementing the EMP rather than supplanting it. In substance, however, the themes promoted by the ENP are not much different from those of the existing main policy framework in the southern Mediterranean, the EMP, (Holden, 2005: 462), but, methodologically, it clearly marks a rupture with the Barcelona philosophy.<sup>10</sup> As such, I have decided not to engage in an analysis of the impact of the ENP on EU-Algerian relations in terms of policy issues. Added to the absence of an Action Plan, which Algeria has refused to even contemplate as will be shown in chapter three, this substantive thematic continuity makes it more valuable for this study to rather concentrate on the conjunctural context of the introduction of the ENP by way of assessing the changing preferences of the EU and Algeria and the external dynamics affecting their evolution.

The section below, parallel to revisiting the contours of the EU policy frameworks preceding the EMP, will sketch out the main tendencies of the relationship between the European Community and Algeria in the context of the former’s Mediterranean policies since 1957. It

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<sup>10</sup> For more details on the difference between ENP and EMP, see Del Sarto, R & Schumacher, T. (2005) ‘From EMP to ENP: What’s at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean’, *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10 (1), pp. 17-38.

will therewith highlight the intricacies of this relationship, which have often stemmed from the *sui generis* nature of the Algerian polity, with the aim of demonstrating that EC/EU-Algerian relations have never achieved a meaningful level of optimality.<sup>11</sup> This will also provide a useful background to EU-Algerian relations prior to their engagement in the EMP, helping identify the origins of some of their respective preferences at the time of the launch of the Barcelona Process.

## **I. Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and EC/EU-Algerian relations**

Patterns of cooperation in the Mediterranean Basin, prior to the introduction of the Barcelona Process, had been overshadowed by European integration, but had nevertheless begun to see an increase in the number of initiatives particularly after the end of the Cold War. The most notable of these are the '5+5' French initiative, the Mediterranean Forum initiated by Egypt, the Maltese proposal to create a Council of the Mediterranean, and the Spanish-Italian proposal<sup>12</sup> to launch a Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) modelled on the CSCE.<sup>13</sup> The degrees of success of these projects varied, with some safely taking off such as the Mediterranean Forum and then getting lost under the radar, others going as far as reaching a cruising phase such as the 5+5 whilst the rest crashed at launch as with the CSCM and the Council of the Mediterranean. The reasons behind these varying degrees of success are numerous; some lay with the respective attributes of individual initiatives, while others derive from the incommensurability of the sub-regional nature of some of these ventures with the more regional or global reach of the challenges they were designed to address.

The EMP germinated in a vacuum left by the overwhelming failure of these past attempts at structuring Mediterranean cooperation through (sub-)regional fora and institutional arrangements. If anything though, these efforts had demonstrated the existence of a shared political will, chiefly amongst governments of Mediterranean countries, for a new cooperative

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<sup>11</sup> Measured against their declared political, economic and socio-cultural objectives.

<sup>12</sup> Spain is the original instigator of the initiative (Gillespie, 2000: 171), but in an attempt to counter the French 5+5 initiative, it joined forces with Italy (Gillespie, 2002a: 3).

<sup>13</sup> For a detailed account of these initiatives, see S.C. Calleya (2004) 'The Euro-Med Partnership and Sub Regionalism: A Case of Region Building?', *University of California Institute of European Studies*, paper No. 040424, available at: <http://repositories.cdlib.org/ies/040424>.

institutional architecture.<sup>14</sup> A combination of optimism and conjunctural positiveness in relation to the Middle East conflict and a perception, European mostly, of the growing regionalisation of the challenges facing the Mediterranean culminated in the recognition of the potential benefits of cooperative and collective action in managing a ‘common’ Mediterranean destiny.

In this vein, the framework document of the Barcelona Declaration was drafted,<sup>15</sup> laying out the EMP’s aims and objectives and the main themes of cooperation between the EU’s (then) fifteen Member States and the (then) twelve southern Mediterranean countries. These elements were encapsulated by the three-basket structure of the Declaration, covering political and security issues, economic and financial cooperation and socio-cultural affairs.

Under the first chapter, the signatories pledged to work towards ‘establishing a common area of peace and stability’ and to uphold the principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms, self-determination and territorial integrity. The stakeholders, to this end, agreed to promote confidence-building and security measures, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to cooperate in the fight against terrorism and organised crime. Furthermore, the economic and financial partnership, considered to be the engine of the EMP, committed the partners to ‘building a zone of shared prosperity’ by establishing a free trade area by the year 2010. This was to be achieved through the negotiation of bilateral association agreements between individual MPCs and the EU, which stipulate the gradual liberalisation of the former’s economies accompanied by the harmonisation of their legislation and decision-making procedures, the eventual cost of which would be cushioned by European technical and financial assistance in the form of *mesures d’ajustements/d’accompagnement*, more commonly known under the acronym MEDA. Last but not least is the incorporation of a socio-cultural dimension in the EMP which was a novelty relative to the previous EC Mediterranean policies. This third basket of the Barcelona Process contains a pledge to enhance cultural understanding and promote intercultural dialogue between peoples of the Mediterranean. It was to be carried out through, *inter alia*, integrating civil society into the Euro-Med process and promoting exchange between the various components of societies north and south of the Mediterranean.

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<sup>14</sup> For an account on the ‘regional institutional architecture in the Mediterranean’, see: Z. Šabič and A. Bojinović (2007) ‘Mapping a Regional Institutional Architecture: the Case of the Mediterranean’, *Mediterranean Politics*, 12 (3), pp. 317-337.

<sup>15</sup> The full text of the Declaration can be found at: [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/euromed/bd.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/bd.htm).

Although it incarnates a regional effort to address “common challenges”, it is safe to assert that the EMP remains a largely European conception.<sup>16</sup> It is the culmination of more than thirty years of European “trial and error” policies, during which Algeria’s relations with the Community have historically been distinct relative to the rest of the countries of the Central Maghreb in particular (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia).

During part of the period immediately following the 1957 Treaty of Rome, during which the EEC proposed (what became) a ‘patchwork’ of agreements to formalise its trade relations with its Mediterranean neighbours (Gomez, 2003: 30), Algeria was still a French colony. As such it qualified for a regime of intra-Community treatment under the provisions of article 227 of the 1957 Treaty, which, by and large, granted Member State-level benefits to Algerian goods.<sup>17</sup> At the same time, other southern Mediterranean countries (SMCs) were in a position to have their trade relations with the EEC governed by articles 238 or 111 and 113 which are the legal structures within the Treaty of Rome providing for association agreements and limited commercial agreements, respectively (Pierros et al., 1999: 50).

After its independence in 1962, and despite the concomitant need to reconsider the legal status of its arrangement with the EEC, Algeria chose to maintain the existing configuration of its trade relationship. However, as the 1960s progressed, emerging dynamics within the EEC and Algeria rendered the status quo untenable. Internal Community divergences, fuelled by France, over the financing of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and mounting pressure from the agricultural lobby in Italy coincided with the 1965 coup d’état in Algeria to culminate in the termination of its trade status with the EEC. Subsequent attempts to negotiate a new agreement were soon to be undermined by Algeria’s persistent emphasis on more generous agricultural provisions, free movement of people and the improvement of the social conditions of its migrant workers in the Community, mainly in France. Furthermore, Algeria’s foreign policy stances at the time, perceived as radical, earned it criticism from most member states especially after its decision to suspend diplomatic relations with West Germany following the latter’s support for Israel in the 1967 six-day war (Aghrout, 2000: 51). Eventually, it was only in the context of the more “global” approach to the Mediterranean

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<sup>16</sup> For more details, see: F. Bicchi (2004) ‘The European Origins of Euro-Mediterranean Practices’, *University of California Institute of European Studies*, paper No. 040612, available at: <http://repositories.cdlib.org/ies/040612>.

<sup>17</sup> For more details, see: Aghrout, A. (2000) *From Preferential Status to Partnership: The Euro-Maghreb Relationship*. (Aldershot: Ashgate).

countries, which the EEC decided to formulate in the early 1970s, that negotiations for an EEC-Algeria cooperation agreement found firm ground. Indeed, the 1972 Global Mediterranean Policy's (GMP) inclusion of provisions on technology transfer, technical cooperation, labour, environmental and financial cooperation helped narrow the differences between the two parties, leading to the conclusion of an agreement in 1976. However, between Algeria's prevailing socialist economic orientation, its foreign policy priorities (Third Worldism, non-alignment and pan-Arabism) and domestic political dynamics (sudden death of President Houari Boumédiène in 1978 and the ensuing power struggle) little scope was realistically left for the GMP to optimise EC-Algerian relations – not to mention the Policy's inherent shortcomings.

The GMP, by the end of the 1980s, was largely deemed to have failed to fulfil its ambitions. Having suffered a number of blows, from oil crises and recessions to southern enlargements of the European Community, the GMP was finally reassessed by the EC in 1989, with a view to readjusting the design of its approach to address the deteriorating socio-economic conditions across the southern Mediterranean rim and, crucially, in response to the imperatives of the end of the Cold War. The result was a Redirected Mediterranean Policy (RMP)<sup>18</sup> whose principal objective, as influenced by a southern inclination within the European Commission, was to ensure a balancing act within the EC's external policy agenda between the Mediterranean dimension on the one hand and preoccupation with rapid developments in the East on the other.

In this context, the EC, under the policy entrepreneurship of Spain in particular and in close cooperation with the Commission in the first instance and France subsequently,<sup>19</sup> floated the idea of a partnership with the Maghreb countries within their newly-established *Union du Maghreb Arabe* (UMA).<sup>20</sup> The ambition behind this initiative was echoed in a communication from the Commission to the Council in the spring of 1992, acknowledging that: 'The record of almost twenty-five years of cooperation between the Maghreb and the Community is disappointing when compared with the hopes cherished by the two sides' (European Commission, 1992: 14). However, the contradictions of the proposal relating to the outright

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<sup>18</sup> Several labels have been used to designate the same policy, all starting with the prefix "re": redirected, renewed, revamped, revised, renovated, refurbished (Pierros et al., 1999: 165 fn. 3). 'Redirected' appears more appropriate as it captures the vocation of this policy as stated above.

<sup>19</sup> For more details, see F. Bicchi, (2003) *European Foreign Policy Making Towards the Mediterranean Non Member Countries*, PhD Thesis, European University Institute.

<sup>20</sup> Arab Maghreb Union (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia), established in 1989.



exclusion of Libya, in line with the Lockerbie-related international sanctions, and the overlap between Mauritania's status under the Lomé Convention and the eventual partnership, prompted a number of questions from the outset (Marks, 1996: 20). Moreover, as the idea was being distilled in the western Mediterranean, it came under fierce criticism from the (Middle) easterners, led by Egypt which called for a more global approach to the Mediterranean (Pierros, 1999: 136; Gomez, 2003: 55). As the prospect of peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians improved following the Oslo Accords of 1993, it was finally decided to capitalise on the ensuing optimism and abandon the idea of a Euro-Maghreb Partnership in favour of a more comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which would embrace both east and west Mediterranean countries, in addition to Cyprus and Malta. The shift of geographical scope was also essential for bringing the northern member states on board (Barbé, 1996).

During this period of renewed European interest in the southern Mediterranean, the political, economic and social situation in Algeria epitomised the challenges that the southern Mediterranean countries faced and demonstrated their potential impact on Euro-Mediterranean relations. Having introduced hasty reforms in 1989, with the apparent hope of addressing profound social discontent, the country headed down a path of unprecedented political chaos (see chapter two). Whilst the neighbouring countries were actively trying to draw political and economic dividends from the European policy initiatives, it soon became clear that Algeria by contrast was unable to do more than just renew the protocols of its financial and technical cooperation with the EC. It was not until the Barcelona conference of 1995 that the country's approach towards the EU became a little more purposive.

As mentioned above, the Barcelona Process came to redress the institutional deficit in Euro-Mediterranean relations which a number of initiatives had, since the end of the Cold War, vainly attempted to address. Capitalising on the perceived positiveness of the prevailing conjuncture and drawing on lessons learnt from three decades of experience in dealing with Mediterranean non-member countries, the EMP was presented by the EU as a comprehensive policy formula to face the "Mediterranean challenge".<sup>21</sup> In the South, on the other hand, the Partnership was viewed as a sign that the EU was not devoted to eastern Europe at the expense of its southern Mediterranean neighbours and that it was intent on balancing its

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<sup>21</sup> For details, see S. Stavridis & J. Hutchence (2000) 'Mediterranean Challenges to the EU's Foreign Policy', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 5 (1), pp. 35-62.

interests in the region against those of the United States, resented by many (certainly not all) Arab Mediterranean countries particularly after the first Gulf War.

Despite its manifest enthusiasm for the initiative in the run up to the Barcelona conference of 27-28 November 1995, it took nearly ten years before Algeria saw its Association Agreement with the EU become finalised and operational. It is effectively the last “normal” SMC, apart from Lebanon,<sup>22</sup> to have its relations with the EU contractualised by a Euro-Med AA.<sup>23</sup> The same observation applies to the state of the ENP’s Action Plans (AP) in the Mediterranean: Algeria, perhaps for completely opposite reasons, remains the only Mediterranean neighbour with a formal contractual relationship with the EU to have in fact refused to opt for an AP.<sup>24</sup>

Characteristically, therefore, Algeria has invariably found it difficult to dovetail with the moulds of the EC/EU’s Mediterranean policies, sometimes deliberately but often by default. The absence of explicit policy initiatives towards the EC/EU on its part meant that European initiatives were to constitute the only venues where EC/EU-Algerian relations could be formalised and optimised. However, as mentioned above, these European frameworks have by and large failed to do so. The EMP is no exception. But why is this the case? What were Algeria’s priorities upon its engagement in this venture in 1995? How different were they from those of the EU and (some of) its member states? Where were the ideational roots of their preferences? And, after ten years of interaction, what impact, if at all, did the EMP have on the preferences of both “partners”? Did it lead to more convergence of their interests, or was it more the result of factors external to this interaction? If it did, was it more as a result of its strategic dynamics or normative processes?

These are the *questions* driving this *research*. Accordingly, this study is primarily problem-driven as opposed to method- or theory-driven, making the added value of its contribution

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<sup>22</sup> The operationalisation of Lebanon’s AA, signed on 17/06/02, was seriously hampered by the country’s political turmoil from 2005. It had nevertheless an Interim Agreement for trade provisions in force from 2003.

<sup>23</sup> Libya and Syria do not yet have a ‘Euro-Med’ contractual relationship with the EU. Whilst the ratification of the already-negotiated Syria AA has been suspended sine die by the Council of the EU, it is not clear whether the recent resolution of the nurses’ crisis and the EU overtures towards Syria under the French presidency of the Council (June-December 2008) will lead to a formalisation of EU-Libyan relations through an AA.

<sup>24</sup> Egypt was the last SMC to adopt an Action Plan in March 2007, despite initial scepticism. For a detailed ENP state of play of all neighbouring countries, see: M. Emerson, et al. (2007) *The ENP Two Years On: Time Indeed for an ‘ENP plus’*. CEPS Policy Brief No. 126, Brussels.

chiefly empirical and policy-oriented.<sup>25</sup> However, using the right theoretical tools to capture both the normative and utilitarian dynamics as well as the various sources of policy in the actors in question is essential. The following chapter will outline the theoretical framework adopted in this study and its methodological implications, but, before that, three further clarifications are in order.

In terms of the priorities of the EU and Algeria in the context of the EMP, I will focus on the primary policy areas from each chapter of the Partnership. As far as the first basket is concerned, political reform (democratisation) and security cooperation have been the main areas of focus. From the economic and financial partnership, trade liberalisation and energy cooperation have been chosen, while migration issues represent the main hone-in area in the context of the third basket.<sup>26</sup>

With regard to the sources of data feeding this research, three streams have been relied upon. Original sources include interviews with government officials and civil society representatives (academics, journalists, business entrepreneurs), as well as official documents (speeches, declarations, memoranda, meeting summaries, internal circulars, etc.). Secondary sources, on the other hand, have also been used, such as academic publications, newspaper and web material.

As far as the hypotheses steering this research are concerned, they are evidently directly related to the theoretical assumptions underlying this study and are therefore more clearly articulated in the following chapter. But at this stage, suffice to enumerate the following: a/ the origins of the interests of the EU and Algeria are both ideational and strategic; b/ the nature of the interaction between the two within the Barcelona Process defines the extent of interest convergences in the dyad's relationship – if at all; c/ given the overwhelmingly utilitarian nature of the engagements of both sides in the EMP enterprise, this Process is expected to have little impact on the interests of the EU and Algeria.

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<sup>25</sup> Though its results may well serve as evidence for scholars engaged in the theoretical debates in which this study's framework is situated.

<sup>26</sup> Although the focus on specific policy issues may eclipse overarching EU-Algerian differences over how Euro-Mediterranean relations should be structured and institutionalised, their prominence in bilateral interaction is what informed my choice in this study. As subjects of intense negotiations, these areas will illuminate best processes of convergence/divergence which in turn can give an indication on broader differences over cooperation policy.

## II. Thesis outline

The following chapter, as indicated above, will develop the theoretical framework adopted in this study. It will situate the theoretical choices made against the background of broader International Relations theories and debates and will justify the chosen synthetic approach on an analytic basis. A literature review section is not included as such in this theoretical chapter, or even the introduction, but, effectively, a review of the literature has been undertaken and is spread over these two introductory parts of the thesis. This chosen configuration is mainly due to the nature of the theoretical framework used in this study, which needed to be elaborated separately from the introduction.

Given the density of the relationship under study and the often cross-policy implications of developments pertaining to EU-Algerian relations, **chapter two** will revisit the most important developments perceived to have considerably shaped the ideational and strategic predispositions of the EU and Algeria, upon their engagement in the EMP in 1995, in relation to the policy areas under study here. To this end, it will look back at the post-1986 catalysts of the EU's early 1990s Mediterranean policy, focusing on the systematic and institutional integration of democracy promotion in the Community's external relations. It will also highlight the events that exacerbated the EU's Mediterranean security concerns often leading to the prioritisation of security cooperation with the MPCs at the expense of pursuing political reform for instance. Moving on to Algeria and after reiterating the latter's *sui generis* nature as a Mediterranean actor especially vis-à-vis the EU, this chapter will then dissect the symbolism of the developments that followed the events of 5 October 1988 in order to show their impact on the individuality of Algeria and, in turn, on the nature of its engagement in the EMP (priorities, ideational predispositions, etc.). Because of the complexity of such events, the section devoted to Algeria will, in some places, necessarily go into more chronicling details than in the case of the EU. Lastly, in carrying out these tasks, this chapter will make continuous reference, where relevant, to the international events giving the more localised developments varying meanings and levels of significance.

Chapters three, four and five will tackle the questions related to the interests of the EU and Algeria in the chosen policy areas of the Barcelona Process. As such, **chapter three** will dissect the interests of the EU and Algeria within the political and security dimension of the Barcelona Process. It will identify what the preferences of both actors were, in terms of

political reform and security cooperation, at the launch of the EMP in 1995, and trace their evolution throughout the first decade of the Partnership. In doing so, it will provide an analysis of the ideational and strategic origins of these interests and highlight, where relevant, the impact that interaction within this framework had on the evolution of the dyad's interests. The analysis will proceed following a temporal sequence, divided into two periods: *before* the signing of the Association Agreement (1995-2001) and *after* its adoption (2002-2005). Reflecting two different types of interaction (one contractualised through an AA and the other not), this periodisation shall help discern the impact of the adoption of the AA on the evolution of the priorities of the EU and Algeria

**Chapter four** will examine the priorities of the EU and Algeria in the framework of the economic and financial partnership of the EMP, focusing on issues of free trade and energy cooperation in view of their prominent impact on AA negotiations and beyond. It will argue that, for much of the negotiation process, “specificity” was regularly invoked by both parties to justify policy rigidity and/or demand exceptional concessions from the other party. This specificity waiver was very much defined by the nature of economic relations between the EU and Algeria, and was – up to a point – a more recurrent discursive feature in the case of the latter. The chapter will also show that interest convergence in the areas in question was more the product of change in political preferences than economic structures, in reverse of the EU's initially foreseen causal order. The temporal sub-layer of analysis will be less important in this chapter than the previous one, because of less clear-cut periodic developments in the relevant issue areas throughout the timeframe of this study.

**Chapter five** will deal with the interests of the EU and Algeria in relation to the third basket of the EMP, honing in on the particular issue of migration. It will argue that the question of migration in the recent Euro-Algerian context bears a national emotional symbolism in Algeria mainly as a result of the country's traumatic experience in the 1990s. Algeria's stubborn insistence on “the free movement of people” in its AA negotiations with the EU, in as far as it was indirectly aimed at France's migration policy towards Algerians, is testimony to this tendency. As such, contrary to the policy areas examined in the previous two chapters, it will be argued that little EU-Algeria interest convergence on the issue of migration was achieved during the timeframe of this study (1995-2005). The **conclusion** will summarise the main findings of the study, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses in relation to the initial conceptual design.



## **Chapter one – EU-Algerian relations in the context of the Barcelona Process: In search of a theoretical framework of analysis**

This chapter aims to outline the theoretical framework adopted in this study. It will start by critically surveying what traditional International Relations (IR) theories have to say about the phenomenon of cooperation, and about the EMP as an instance of cooperation. It will make a case for using international regime theory and for conceptualising the EMP as a regime based on the ontological and epistemological virtues of this theory. These, it will be argued, accommodate a synthesis between rationalist and constructivist approaches which is very useful for the purpose of this research. After describing the model used in this context, I will then make a case for the complementation of this approach by a more micro-level analysis of foreign policy behaviour based on the work of Christopher Hill on Foreign Policy Analysis. The last section of this chapter will deal with the methodological implications of my theoretical choices.

### **I. Theorising cooperation: Traditional IR approaches**

The second half of the twentieth century witnessed a resurgence of regional dynamism in international relations. Increasing interdependence, coupled with the end of the Cold War and the absence of overarching polarities encouraged countries to engage in regional constellations based on cooperative frameworks whose scopes extended beyond the traditional common historical, cultural and linguistic denominators to include broader economic, geopolitical and security concerns.

As a result, the phenomenon of cooperation between states – or groups of states – has captured the imagination of IR scholars for much of the discipline's history.<sup>27</sup> Much like war and peace, questions regarding the conditions under which cooperation occurs and the reasons underlying states' cooperative policy choices dominated the early part of this debate. Subsequently, scholarly attention turned to international organisations, institutions and regimes as policy tools devised by state actors in the aim of fostering and maintaining cooperation.

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<sup>27</sup> International Relations as a discipline is assumed to have been formally established as such at the end of the Great War in 1919 (Burchill and Linklater, 2005: 6).

Whether of rationalist or constructivist provenance, IR theories have devoted considerable effort to understanding and explaining these phenomena. What follows is a critical account of what traditional theories have to say about cooperation in general and the EMP, as an instance of cooperation, in particular.

### *1. Realism and neo-realism*

Post-war realists, such as George Kennan, Walter Lippmann, Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr, emphasise the constraints imposed on politics by human nature, characterised by selfishness and egoism, and the absence of an international governing authority (anarchy), which require ‘the primacy in all political life of power and security’ (Donnelly, 2005: 30). The paucity at the international level of adequate institutions and procedures for resolving conflicts comparable to those in most domestic political systems makes the concept of power of central importance to realists. States – the key actors in the international system – act, therefore, in pure pursuit of their ‘interests defined as power’ (Morgenthau, 1985: 5). The use of this analogy in describing the nature of the international system, however, is marked by a lack of consensus as to a definition of power as well as how to measure it (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990: 84). Furthermore, for many realists, anarchy and the distribution of capabilities define the international system at any given time.

In answering the recurrent question of what keeps states from continually attacking one another, realists assume that the latter find it expedient to band together and pool their capabilities, in an attempt to *balance* the *power* equilibrium, whenever one state, or group of states, appears to be gathering a disproportionate amount of power, thus threatening to dominate the world or even a portion of it (Viotti and Kauppi, 1993: 50). Thus, classical realists account for cooperation between states by advancing a balance of power argument, further claiming that a state would cooperate with another state (or groups of states) solely in pursuit of its material interests.

Following growing dissatisfaction with its explanatory potential and its gradual demise post-1960s, the classical variant of realism saw the emergence of a more ‘structural’ strand largely



under the influence of Kenneth Waltz' *Theory of International Politics* (1979).<sup>28</sup> Structural realism<sup>29</sup> attempts to 'abstract from every attribute of states except their capabilities' (Waltz, 1979: 99) to shed light upon the impact of anarchy and the distribution of capabilities (independent variables) on states (Donnelly, 2005: 35). In the words of Waltz, 'international structure emerges from the interaction of states and then constrains them from taking certain actions while propelling them towards others' (Waltz, 1991: 29). On cooperation, Waltz distinguishes between two situations: hierarchy and anarchy. In hierarchic political orders, he asserts, actors have the tendency to 'jump on the bandwagon' of a leading candidate or a recent victor, because their security would not be jeopardised by losing (ibid.: 126). When anarchy prevails, on the other hand, bandwagoning would strengthen someone who would at a later stage make a volte-face. In this case, balancing is optimal in attempting to reduce that risk by opposing the stronger party. So, for structural realists, anarchy and egoism hinder cooperation (Donnelly, 2005: 37).

On the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, realist accounts reflect a widely-shared cynical perception of the initiative. Indeed, within this framework, the Barcelona Process is seen as part of an EU strategy to expand its political influence in the region to meet three balance-of-power goals: a) countering the United States in the region, especially in the Middle East; b) controlling the region through the creation of asymmetrical dependency relationships;<sup>30</sup> and c) containing political Islam (Crawford, 2004: 12). This argument is echoed by the view held by Fulvio Attinà (2003) that the Euro-Mediterranean 'design' is based on a dual logic: an economic and a political one. He argues that 'the former originates from the state of the world economy after the change of capitalism in the 1970s, and the latter originates from the state of international (in)security in the Mediterranean and the Middle East in the 1990s' (Attinà, 2003: 4). Moreover, viewed through the lens of structural realism, the end of the Cold War as an altered systemic condition is pointed to as a precursor of the developments surrounding the birth of the EMP. The withering of bipolarity and the emergence of the EU as a more cohesive entity in the early 1990s are said to have rendered the Mediterranean an area of increasing importance to the Community's foreign policy and thus the need for a more effective policy framework.

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<sup>28</sup> An insight into the main features of this foundational text was provided in K.N. Waltz, (1975) 'Theory of International Relations', in: F.I. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby (Eds.) *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 8, (Reading MA: Addison-Wesley).

<sup>29</sup> A term used interchangeably in the literature with neo-realism. 'Structural' as a result of its ontological assumptions. In other words, derived from its emphasis on structural attributes to account for state behaviour.

<sup>30</sup> To control large-scale migration flows, competing agricultural products, and to secure energy supplies.

However, realism stands accused of being unable to account for fundamental change in international relations, such as the end of the Cold War.<sup>31</sup> It is a theory tuned to explaining constancy (Donnelly, 2005: 48). Realists self-consciously choose to omit historical and cultural diversity of actors and interactions in international relations and rather emphasise repeated occurrences of certain patterns across time. Moreover, classical and structural realists alike have consistently denigrated the role of norms and institutions as independent variables in their theoretical models. They are at best described as intervening variables that can only be expected to have independent effects in minor issue-areas far removed from the struggle for power. As such, they only offer narrow and parsimonious explanations of phenomena, omitting an important element defining systems; that is, patterns of interactions between units in any given system.

## ***2. Liberal internationalism***

Liberals view “perpetual peace” as the normal state of affairs in the international system. Instead of anarchy and war, nature dictates harmony and cooperation and, as such, war can be removed from human experience. To this end, liberals prescribe democracy and free trade as the ‘twin medicines’ of the ‘disease’ of war (Burchill, 2005: 59). For liberals such as Schumpeter, Doyle, Cobden, Kant and Rousseau, democratic processes and institutions would undermine the absolute power of the ruling classes and thereby counter their inclination to violence. The establishment of republican forms of government, in which rulers were accountable and individual rights respected, are seen as conducive to peaceful international relations.

Additionally, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century liberals such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill praised the incompatibility of the spirits of war and commerce. Free trade is perceived by liberals as a more peaceful means of achieving national wealth than trade war, by expanding the range of contacts and levels of understanding between peoples of the world who would otherwise hold distorted perceptions of the “other”.

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<sup>31</sup> For an interesting study of the failure of neo-realism to explain European integrations, see: S. Collard-Wexler (2006) ‘Integration Under Anarchy: Neorealism and the European Union’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 12 (3), pp. 397-432.

Respect for human rights is another ideal advocated by liberal internationalists, maintaining that the legitimacy of domestic political orders is conditional upon the state's respect for the human rights of its subjects (Burchill, 2005: 66). The latter idea has been rejected by proponents of the Marxist and realist traditions, who respectively point to the failure of such a 'principle' to address the class-based nature of exploitation contained within the capitalist relations of production and the 'conditions of profound insecurity for states [which] do not permit ethical and humane considerations to override their primary national considerations' (Burchill, 2005: 68).

On cooperation, liberals, such as Mitrany, argue that the phenomenon would occur initially 'in technical areas where it was mutually convenient', but, once lucrative, it would subsequently 'spill over' into other functional areas deemed by states as potentially of mutual advantage (Mitrany 1948, as quoted in Burchill, 2005: 64). The experience of the EC/EU is commonly cited as an example of this functional logic.

Proponents of the liberal view reject, though not *en bloc*, the proposition which attributes to the Barcelona Process the goal of establishing hegemony in the Mediterranean Basin. They claim that its objective is rather a zone of *prosperity, stability, and peace* as the Barcelona Declaration would have it (Attinà, 2003: 8). In this vein, the EMP is seen as

...primarily a gap-reducing process in the following meaning of the term: the structural gap between the partners (that is the numerous differences existing between them) does not matter per se. What matters is the distance of each partner and the two groups of partners from the standards and values, included in the Barcelona Declaration, with regard to respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms, diversity and pluralism in society, settlement of disputes by peaceful means, the market economy, promotion of private sector, dialogue and respect between cultures and religions (ibid.).

It has also been suggested that the EMP shares comparable conceptual links with the "Washington Consensus", in that close ideological and theoretical perspectives underlie both. Indeed, Diana Hunt (1999) and George Joffé (1999) are among those who perceive common elements between the Washington Consensus and the Partnership, which include the emphasis on trade liberalisation and policy designs inspired by principles of the market economy.

However, closer scrutiny of the policy reforms prescribed under the EMP would reveal that it is not entirely consistent with the principles underlying the Washington Consensus, and in turn, with (neo-)liberalism (Phillipart, 2003b: 209-211). This pertains to at least two inconsistencies, namely the EU agricultural policy and the trade-diversion effect of the free trade area (FTA). Indeed, the non-reciprocity of agricultural liberalisation as provided for in the economic and financial basket of the Barcelona Declaration feeds into the rhetoric of some,<sup>32</sup> who argue that free trade is often used as an ideological weapon by the powerful to regulate the economic development of subordinate societies. In other words, in failing to liberalise its agricultural sector, under the protection of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the EU's support of the sanctity of market principles is rarely matched by its own economic behaviour. FTAs, through their own endemic dynamics, create a diverging effect on the trade trends of SMCs which may end up being locked into a uniform import/export pattern (Hoekman, 1999). Furthermore, the liberal perspective fails to provide a solid account of the reasons behind the acceptance by the SMCs of the EMP, beyond the financial aspect of the Partnership. It appears, moreover, that liberals underestimate the significance of cultural divergences as obstacles to the success of the European initiative (Attinà, 2003: 15) and fail to come up with realistic alternative proposals.

### *3. Neo-Marxism*

Neo-Marxist approaches,<sup>33</sup> such as Wallerstein's (1979) world-systems theory and Emmanuel's (1972) theory of unequal exchange, differ from the classical Marxist theories in that the former challenge the latter's view that capitalism brings industrial development to the whole world, although they argued that development was possible in some 'semi-peripheral' societies (Linklater, 2005: 123). Effectively, the neo-Marxist paradigm is the product of an attempt to develop and adapt traditional Marxist theory to the analysis of underdeveloped economies, or, in neo-Marxist terms, to the study of the economic and political relations between the 'centre' and the 'periphery' of the world economy and the impact of these on the periphery (Hunt, 1989: 162). Viewed through a neo-Marxist lens, these relations are characterised by unequal exchange and the subordination of the periphery and the semi-periphery to the interests of the core industrialised nations.

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<sup>32</sup> Mainly from the neo-Marxist stream of thought, discussed below.

<sup>33</sup> These are assumed to encompass Frank's Dependency theory, Wallerstein's world-systems theory and Emmanuel's theory of unequal exchange, common to whom is the challenge of classical Marxists.

Neo-Marxists such as Galtung (1971) argue that, in order to preserve its privileged position and exploitation of the periphery, the industrialised core resorts to the division of the latter into distinct arrangements through international cooperation and regionalism. To them, cooperation and regionalism are intended to result in the perpetuation of the structure of the world economy characterised by a developed core and an underdeveloped periphery.

As regards the southern Mediterranean, it is well established that it is highly economically dependent on the EU, both in terms of trade and, to a lesser extent and to varying degrees, financial assistance. Indeed, in light of the significant proportion of transactions with the EU in the SMCs total trade, there is no doubt that the latter is the motor of economic growth for the whole region. Thus, in terms of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, the case of the EMP, which involves on the one hand a highly developed and integrated European economy and, on the other, underdeveloped scattered SMC economies, has been perceived as an instance that could be examined through the dependency theory lens.

Ahmed Aghrout is one such analyst who argues that the case of the Barcelona Process<sup>34</sup> fits the dependency model whereby the relationship 'assumes, among other things, domination and exploitation of the peripheral economy [in this case the Maghreb] via capital investment from the centre [in this case the EU]; penetration of the dependent country by multinational corporations from the centre...' (Aghrout, 2000: 14).<sup>35</sup> Thus, according to this perspective, the EU would have devised the EMP initiative in the aim of preserving its dominant position in the Mediterranean region and maintaining access to the SMCs' relatively low-cost resources which would help ensure a certain degree of competitiveness for its economy.

Neo-Marxist theories have notoriously been subject to fierce criticism in many respects. Besides underplaying the autonomy of developing countries in making their own decisions and having a share of their predicament, in their commitment to change rather than analysis, the *dependentistas* stand accused of behaving like politicians rather than social scientists. Furthermore, Aghrout, in his critical analysis, refers to the fact that a number of neo-Marxist theories (mainly dependency theorists) were more suited to the experience of the Latin American economies and that, given the heterogeneity of developing economies, do not

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<sup>34</sup> His study focuses on Euro-Maghreb relations in particular.

<sup>35</sup> In turn, this reasoning could apply to a dyadic relationship within this broader framework, such as EU-Algerian relations.

necessarily provide the most adequate frameworks for generalisations. He argues that, by way of illustration, ‘with varying degrees, the economic development of the Maghreb countries has not been primarily dependent upon foreign investment’ (Aghrout, 2000: 15). This, argues Aghrout, undermines the dependency claim that the centre controls the peripheral economies primarily via capital investment. He is joined in this vein by Marjorie Lister, who refers to the phenomenal growth since the 1970s of the “East Asian Tigers”<sup>36</sup> in dismissing the neo-Marxist proposition that developing countries could not prosper in the world capitalist system (Lister, 1997: 76)

#### ***4. Neo-liberal institutionalism***

The core assumption of this paradigm straddles the lines of neo-realist and neo-liberal thinking, suggesting that the key actors in international relations (states) are not always oblivious to the repercussions that their actions might have on the wealth and power of other states. Conversely, it does not claim that states’ manoeuvring space is always restrained by international institutions. Neo-liberal institutionalists, such as Robert Keohane,<sup>37</sup> argue however that states’ actions are dependent to a considerable extent on existing institutional arrangements, which impact on: a) ‘the flow of information and opportunities to negotiate; b) the ability of governments to monitor others’ compliance and to implement their own commitments – hence their ability to make credible commitments in the first place; and c) prevailing expectations about the solidity of international agreements’ (Keohane, 1989: 2). Thus, according to Keohane, ‘states are at the centre of [our] interpretation of world politics, as they are for realists; but formal and informal rules play a much larger role in the neo-liberal than in the realist account’ (ibid.: 2).

In his seminal work on neo-liberal institutionalism *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory*, Keohane (1989: 3) defines institutions as ‘persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.’ Furthermore, Keohane makes the relevance of his theory to an international system conditional on the existence of interests and potential gains between actors from their cooperation. For he argues that, ‘in the absence of mutual interests, the neo-

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<sup>36</sup> To which can be added the newly-emerging developing countries of India, China, Brazil, and South Africa.

<sup>37</sup> Widely associated with this school of thought.

liberal perspective on international cooperation would be as irrelevant as a neo-classical theory of international trade in a world without potential gains from trade (ibid.: 2).

This neo-liberal institutionalist reasoning is reflected in Keohane's work elsewhere on cooperation. Indeed, while distinguishing between cooperation and harmony, Keohane confirms that cooperation takes place once the actions and behaviour of given actors after a process of 'policy coordination' are 'brought into conformity' in such a way as to facilitate the attainment of other actors' goals and objectives (Keohane, 1984: 51). For Keohane, cooperation should be perceived as a reaction to actual or potential situations of conflicting interests, in the absence of which there would not be a need to cooperate in the first place (ibid.: 54). In a world of uncertainty and interdependence,<sup>38</sup> cooperation allows states to fulfil their interests and procure public goods for the *regime* in place. Anarchy is mitigated by regime and institutional cooperation which brings higher levels of regularity and predictability to international relations. Regimes constrain state behaviour by formalising expectations of each party to an agreement where there is a shared interest.

However, by employing rational choice and game theory to conceptualise state behaviour, liberal institutionalists fail to question the origins of states' interests and instead consider them as "given" and exogenous to social (international) interactions. By accepting actors as rational utility-maximisers, liberal institutionalists (and rational choice approaches in general) fail to take into consideration the role of ideas and knowledge in the very conception of those interests. They do, however, seek to identify and understand patterns of cooperation rather than consider the latter a set of discrete and isolated acts. As such, they seek to interpret cooperation 'within the context of related actions and prevailing expectations and shared beliefs' before claiming to properly grasp its meaning (Keohane, 1989: 56).

The EMP, according to rational institutionalists, is the product of the strategic preferences of EU member states and the utility calculi of their southern Mediterranean partners. While defined outside this Euro-Mediterranean "site" of interaction, the preferences of the "partners" in the Barcelona venture may converge on certain policy areas such as in the security sector. Whatever their interests however, the central attraction of the EMP for the Euro-Mediterranean countries lies in its information-cost-reducing characteristic, which,

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<sup>38</sup> A concept largely associated with Keohane and Nye (1977, 2001), introduced in *Power and Interdependence*.

when weighed against the costs of engagement constraints, still adds value to and satisfies the interests of the parties concerned. It is nonetheless the failure of the liberal institutionalist approach to explain the origins of and variations in the interests of states and the impact of norms and institutions on them which is considered its main point of weakness. Constructivists are the main source of this criticism.

### 5. *Constructivism*

One of the fundamental differences between constructivism and the rationalist approaches outlined above is that the former is not, in and of itself, a theory of international politics (Adler, 1997: 323; Ruggie, 1998a: 34; Wendt, 1999: 7). It draws its philosophical and intellectual inspiration from the works of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber (Ruggie, 1998b). Its proponents hold 'the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world' (Adler, 1997: 322). As such, the ontological assumptions of constructivism emphasise the importance of inter-subjective knowledge and meanings for understanding policy choices and outcomes. In problematising the identities and interests of international actors, constructivists purport to show that these are socially constructed and that, as a result, the normative and ideational dynamics of interaction ought to be properly accounted for in order to understand states' outlooks and behaviour. In short, identities are considered as relational constructs defined by structures of collective meanings (Wendt, 1992: 397; Weldes, 1996).

Epistemologically, constructivists stress the structural characteristics of ideas, the constitutive role of norms and the importance of epistemic communities in their efforts to understand international relations dynamics (Haas, 1992b).<sup>39</sup> Their critics reject the value of their accounts on grounds that they are based on *post hoc* observation of values and ideology (Keohane, 1988: 392), and for failing to come up with distinctive testable hypotheses and objective methods to test hypotheses, which is largely blamed on constructivism's over-emphasis of meta-theory and ontology at the expense of theory proper (Checkel and Moravcsik, 2001; Guzzini, 2000).

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<sup>39</sup> These characteristics will be elaborated below.



Applying a constructivist approach to defining the Barcelona Process, Adler and Crawford see the EMP as an attempt at ‘inventing a region...and regional identity’ on the basis of ‘civic beliefs’ (2004: 23). In other words, through the construction of the a sense of “we-ness”, which includes defining common challenges, Mediterranean actors – led by the EU – have succeeded in framing their regional cooperation around ‘pluralistic [security] community processes, institutions and practices’. These, it is argued, embody normative not material power and security community-making not balance of power (ibid.). While this approach may succeed in capturing the EU’s tendency to justify its region-building efforts in the Mediterranean by referring to its own experience and projecting its inner “self” (Bicchi, 2006), it certainly falls short of accounting for the strategic calculations of (some) southern Mediterranean partners who may not share the EU’s security concerns, but do “talk the talk” in pursuit of their own interests. Even the EU’s behaviour in the region has shown that, in instances where its norms and values intersect with its hard security concerns, it shows little hesitation in prioritising the latter (Youngs, 2004a).

## **6. *International regime theory***

Starting out as an attempt to occupy the middle ground between studies that focus on international structure on the one hand and formal organisations on the other, analysis of international regimes has since the mid-1970s become a major research programme in International Relations.<sup>40</sup> Questions regarding the origins of instances of rule-based cooperation in the international system, their effects on the behaviour of state and non-state actors as well as the factors determining their success and stability continue to attract scholarly attention from within different approaches in the discipline.<sup>41</sup>

This rapid development exposed the concept of international regimes to a volley of criticisms aimed primarily at its perceived “imprecision” and misleading conceptual characteristics (Strange, 1983; Junne, 1992). These reactions prompted proponents of the study of regimes to work on a more consensual formulation of the definition of the concept.<sup>42</sup> Their efforts culminated in the convening in 1982 of an international conference on the subject, resulting

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<sup>40</sup> The concept was first introduced by J.G. Ruggie (1975) ‘International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends’, *International Organization*, 29 (3), pp. 557-583.

<sup>41</sup> For a comprehensive survey of the international regimes literature, see: Levy, M.A. et al. (1995) ‘The Study of International Regimes’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 1 (3), pp. 267-330.

<sup>42</sup> Intermediary definitional propositions ranged from equating regimes with patterned behaviour (Puchala and Hopkins, 1983) to assimilating them to multilateral agreements (Young, 1982).

in, *inter alia*, a 'consensus definition' of international regimes (Hasenclever et al., 1997: 8). This work was later compiled into Stephen Krasner's book (1983: 1), where regimes are defined as

implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in any given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.

Norms serve to guide the behaviour of specific regime members in such a way as to produce collective outcomes that are in harmony with the goals and shared convictions specified in the regime principles. Such norms are justified on the basis of values extending beyond self-interest. If applied to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, this definition highlights the existence of a number of these regime components. Indeed, norms, including the obligation - albeit moral - of partners to refrain from engaging in non-democratic and aggressive behaviour and to guarantee and respect essential rights and freedoms of citizens are clearly discernible.

A number of more specific rules translate regime norms into concrete prescriptions and proscriptions. Some can be altered more easily than principles and norms since there may be more than just one set of rules than can attain a given set of purposes. Rules pertaining to the EMP, as stated in the Barcelona Declaration, include the respect for diversity and pluralism, ensuring the independence of the judiciary and legislative branches of power and the adoption of 'suitable measures as regards rules of origin, certification, protection of intellectual and industrial property rights and competition'.

Finally, decision-making procedures provide ways of implementing regime principles and altering its rules. These refer, in the instance of the Barcelona Process, to exchange of information through regular sectoral (sub-)ministerial meetings and conferences as well as the bilateral association council meetings that take place annually between the EU and individual SMCs. It is important to note here, as confirmed by Keohane (1984: 59), that 'principles, norms, rules and procedures all contain injunctions about behaviour...They imply obligations,

even though these obligations are not enforceable through hierarchical legal systems. Some injunctions are far-reaching and extremely important, they may change only rarely. Others are merely technical and can be altered without great political or economic impact'. This affects the nature of regimes, making some more complex than others.

Governments create regimes to deal with issues that they perceive as being interlinked to such an extent that they ought to be dealt with jointly. Issue-areas are defined by Keohane (1984: 61) as 'sets of issues that are in fact dealt with in common negotiations and by the same, or closely coordinated, bureaucracies, as opposed to issues that are dealt with separately and in uncoordinated fashion'.

As "consensual" as it may be, this definition of international regimes has not been critique-free. It has been labelled as 'only a list of elements that are hard to differentiate conceptually and that often overlap in real-world situations' (Young, 1986: 106). Consequently, some analysts have sought to replace this description with a more simplistic formulation which would be less prone to diverging interpretations. Robert Keohane (1989: 4) proposed that the concept of regimes be defined as 'institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, pertaining to particular sets of issues in international relations.' The added value of this alternative 'lean' formulation is said to be relieving scholars from the burden of justifying their decision to define as a given injunction a norm rather than a rule, by loading the single concept of rules with enough meaning to replace the original elements of principles, norms, rules and procedures (Hasenclever et al., 1997: 12).

### *6.1. Variants of regime theory*

The concept of international regimes was born out of the need to understand international cooperation, viewed as coordinated reciprocal adjustments of states' (actors) policies yielding benefits to participants. Systematically organised cooperation is a common feature of international politics, yet most of it seems to be organised horizontally rather than vertically in that rule enforcement is seldom hierarchical but relies on the practice of reciprocity. Regimes are multilayered systems of rules in which agreements are nested and understanding the dynamics and effects of these systems is central to understanding the conditions underlying the occurrence of international cooperation.

Over time, a number of approaches purporting to conceptualise regime formation and consequences have been put forward. According to their underlying assumptions and explanatory variables, these interpretative stances have been labelled as power-based, interest-based and knowledge-based 'schools of thought' (Hasenclever et al., 1997: 1).<sup>43</sup> Elsewhere, a more epistemologically based classification of these approaches has been used, proposing four categories of regime analysis: structural, game-theoretic, functional and cognitivist theories (Haggard and Simmons, 1987: 499). The issue with the second of these categorisations is that, in emphasising the epistemological stances taken by the various proponents of these approaches to account for regime dynamics, it ended up producing a misleading typology. Indeed, upon examination of Keohane's work (1984) on international regimes for instance, one clearly comes to the conclusion that he relies on elements of structural, game-theoretic and functional approaches, which makes his analysis, according to the epistemological typology, structural, game-theoretic and functional at once. It appears, therefore, far more appropriate to label Keohane's approach interest-based, reflecting its emphasis on the interplay between regimes and interests, and distinguishing it from other approaches which focus on the distribution of power in the international system (power-based) or the role of ideas and knowledge (knowledge-based) in the formation of international regimes.

There exist fundamental differences between these approaches, or more precisely between power- and interest-based perspectives, on the one hand, and knowledge-based variants, on the other. The former, in their assumptions that states act rationally in international relations in order to maximise the fulfilment of their interests and that these are exogenous to states' identities and interactions, are ontologically rationalist. Knowledge-based approaches, by contrast, emphasise the role of ideational dynamics, communication and identities both in the formation of interests and in the processes through which they are satisfied. As such, they are more constructivist, or 'reflective',<sup>44</sup> in their ontological stance. This rift between these variants of regime theory affects notably the degree of 'institutionalism' that they espouse.<sup>45</sup>

Power-based theories of regimes, which contend that states are interested not only in absolute gains, but care equally for how well their competitors do (relative gains), do not grant a large

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<sup>43</sup> These are also referred to, respectively, as realist, neo-liberal and cognitivist theories of regimes (Hasenclever et al., 1997).

<sup>44</sup> A label articulated by Keohane (1988) to refer to the cognitivist/constructivist paradigm.

<sup>45</sup> Institutionalism refers to the view that international institutions matter (Hasenclever et al., 1997: 2).

degree of significance to international institutions. While this realist contribution to the theory of regimes can by no means be reduced to restatements of orthodox realist interpretations of world politics as a state of war, which in essence deny international institutions any significant role, it takes international cooperation and regimes seriously both in the security realm and beyond, considering them as significant phenomena to be accounted for. In emphasising relative power capabilities as a central explanatory variable, realist contributions stress the effect of the distributional aspects of cooperation and regimes on states. As such, rule-based cooperation for power-based theorists is more difficult to establish than interest-based theories (or neo-liberals) would suggest. When it happens, however, it is said to be the product of the shifts in the distribution of power resources or of the result of unforeseen distributional consequences of regimes (Hasenclever et al., 1997: 84). Robert Gilpin, Stephen Krasner and Joseph Grieco are associated with this approach.<sup>46</sup>

The interest-based school of thought, under the influence of Robert Keohane,<sup>47</sup> has come to represent the mainstream approach to analysing international regimes to the extent that the other two approaches regularly refer to its premises in order to clearly individuate theirs. Neo-liberals propose to analyse regimes as strictly interest-based phenomena, emphasising their role in helping states realise common interests. States are depicted as rational egoists, concerned only with their gains and losses. Moreover, interest-based theorists readily acknowledge the effects of power differentials on international cooperation, but maintain that constellations of interests – which are not amenable to configurations of power – and prevailing expectations should be given at least equal consideration.

The work of neo-liberals, like Keohane, draws substantially on economic (functional) theories of institutions, focusing on information and transaction costs to account for regime formation and maintenance.<sup>48</sup> Game-theoretic models, such as the Prisoners' Dilemma used by Keohane and Axelrod (1984), are used because in their view they capture the essence of a wide range of situations in international relations and characterise the constellations of interests underlying regime formation and regime type (Hasenclever et al., 1997: 30).

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<sup>46</sup> For more details, see R. Gilpin (1981) *War and Change in World Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); S.D. Krasner (1985) *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism*, (Berkeley: University of California Press); J. Grieco (1990) *Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America and Non-tariff Barriers to Trade*, (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press).

<sup>47</sup> Particularly in *After Hegemony* (1984)

<sup>48</sup> To the extent that some authors have suggested labelling them 'econoliberals' (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998: 890).

Accordingly, states create regimes to assist them coordinate their behaviour in such a way as to attain Pareto-optimal outcomes,<sup>49</sup> and once “up and running”, regimes are maintained by their membership even when they no longer serve the purposes for which they were initially set up. Regimes, for reasons of costliness, tend to be maintained or transformed by their members rather than just abandoned.

One point of convergence between neo-liberal and realist approaches to regimes lies in their respective models which treat actors’ preferences (interests) and identities as exogenously given, rather than treated as dependent variables.<sup>50</sup> The causal relationship, for rationalists, between preferences and interactions is one way in that the former helps explain the latter but not vice versa. This assumption, along with others, has been criticised by proponents of cognitivist or knowledge-based approaches.

Knowledge-based approaches to international regimes display a dissatisfaction with the model of the ‘*homo aeconomicus*’, underlying rationalist theorising, and favour the ‘*homo sapiens*’ alternative by stressing the importance of knowledge in accounting for international behaviour (ibid.:136). Cognitivists argue that, by dismissing the processes that shape states’ identities as well as their foreign policy preferences and priorities, rationalists *ipso facto* overlook a significant source of variation in international behaviour. They, thus, focus on the origins of interests as perceived by states and, in this vein, grant causal and normative ideas a central role in their analyses.

However, the extent of the criticism levelled at the rationalist approaches from within the cognitivist camp is not the same across the board. Whereas some perceive the problem with rationalism as one of essential incompleteness, others suggest a more fundamental shift towards an analytical mode informed by sociological perspectives. Hasenclever et al. refer to the former as ‘weak cognitivists’ and the latter ‘strong cognitivists’ (ibid.: 5). For the sake of clarity and coherence, however, in this study I prefer to differentiate between these two branches as, respectively, “thin” cognitivists and “thick” cognitivists. This distinction should avoid confusion between the quality of the arguments that both sides present, by referring to

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<sup>49</sup> Whereby everyone is better off than what they were prior to cooperation. In other words, to avoid suboptimal results.

<sup>50</sup> For a comparison between the two approaches, see: M.W. Zacher and B.A. Sutton (1996) ‘Mutual Interests, Normative continuities, and Regime Theory: Cooperation in International Transportation and Communications Industries’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 2 (1), pp. 5-46.

the distance of each group from the rationalist camp and it also corresponds to an appellation used elsewhere to distinguish between two categories of the wider constructivist label (Reus-Smit, 2005: 203).<sup>51</sup> In essence, thin cognitivists see their scholarly contribution as complementary to mainstream rationalist accounts of regimes by supplying a theory of interest change. The thick cognitivists' contribution, on the other hand, runs deeper by proposing an alternative research programme which considers knowledge and ideas as operating at a more fundamental level than that of a mere intervening variable. The characteristic assumptions of both variations of the knowledge-based approach to regimes are engaged with in more detail below, as are the reasons for adopting the thin version in this research.

## **II. The EMP as a regime: Definitions and approach**

The historical importance of the Mediterranean for the Europeans was revived by the new dynamism of the 1980s and 1990s, stemming from the Community's southern enlargements followed by the end of the Cold War lethargy, as well as the emergence of more consolidated constitutional policy-making structures in the EU. Building on the legacies of past EC Mediterranean policies, the Euro-Med Partnership was presented as a novel policy framework to match this increasing prominence of the southern rim. The EMP has subsequently 'led to a process whose analysis encompasses different theoretical possibilities' (Edwards and Philippart, 1997: 18).

Borrowing the concept of international regimes, some authors have advanced the argument that the EMP can be conceptualised in regime terms. Xenakis and Chrysochoou (2001a; 2001b; 2003; 2004; Xenakis 2000) are the main proponents of this line of argument, contending that the EMP is a regional, multidimensional regime *in statu nascendi*. In their definitional approach, they employ Keohane's "lean" definition of regimes, arguing that, in the case of the EMP, it is helpful 'since norms are not explicit... and no substantive level of institutional autonomy characterises the operation of its mechanisms' (ibid., 2004: 282).

However, its practical convenience notwithstanding, the reason given here by Xenakis and Chrysochoou for their choice of Keohane's definition of regimes appears to be contradictory

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<sup>51</sup> Constructivism and cognitivism are all terms used interchangeably in this study to refer to the wider constructivist 'family' of approaches.

with the very nature of the EMP and with their argument. Although the authors are quite right in pointing to the fact that the level of institutional autonomy of the structures of the Partnership remains weak, they choose a definition which depicts regimes as institutions. How can the EMP be defined as an institution if it is, in their own words, granted only the status of a 'nascent regime'? It is, furthermore, not clear where the authors stand as far as the difference between regimes and institutions is concerned, for they do not delineate the boundaries between the two.<sup>52</sup>

The two authors are right, however, in arguing that the EMP – and regimes in general – is not an epiphenomenon or an end in itself, but a process that 'impacts on policy outcomes and related behaviour, thus transcending structural orientations that conceptualise a world of rational self-seeking actors' (Xenakis and Chrysochoou, 2004: 283). By conceptualising regimes as independent variables, their approach helps one assess their constraining and constitutive impact on actors' preferences and behaviour.

Other authors like Solingen and Ozyurt (2004) have applied different variants of the institutionalist paradigm, namely rational, constructivist and historical, to the EMP in an attempt to conceptualise what they term the 'triple logic of the Barcelona Process' (ibid.: 3). This approach bears resemblance to the international regime theory where an analogy can be drawn with its power-, interest- and knowledge- (or cognitivist) based variants.

Because it allows a middle ground approach between international structure and formal organisations, on the one hand, and between rationalist and constructivist ontologies on the other, I take sides, in this study, with international regime theory in conceptualising the EMP and examining its causal effect on the preferences of the EU and Algeria in the chosen policy areas. More specifically, by choosing to conjoin elements of the rationalist and cognitivist strands of regime theory (as will be shown below), I will be able to identify the ideational origins of the interests of both the EU and Algeria, upon their engagement in the EMP in 1995, and to trace the evolution of their priorities between then and 2005. This eclectic approach will also provide me with the analytical tools necessary to capture both the

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<sup>52</sup> The view I take here as regards the difference between the two concepts is that regimes facilitate the institutionalisation of portions of international life by regularising expectations, but that some international institutions such as the balance of power are not bound to explicit rules. Institutions exist where there is a conjunction of convergent expectations and patterns of behaviour or practice.



normative and instrumentalist dynamics of the EMP and to identify the ways (mechanisms) and the extent to which it influenced the (evolution of) interests of this dyad.

Unlike Xenakis and Chrysochoou, however, I employ the conventional definition of regimes under the assumption that they are deliberate constructions that influence the behaviour of states through their formal and informal principles and norms, as well as specific rules, procedures and programmes (Levy et al., 1995).

The Barcelona Process incarnates an attempt on the part of the EU, and the southern partner countries, to operationalise and regularise cooperation between them in commonly-identified areas of shared interest, aspirations and Mediterranean vision. By laying out goals and convictions in the declared principles of the Barcelona document, defining the norms and rules that would guide their behaviour and agreeing on a *modus operandi* of the decision-making process, the partner countries laid the groundwork for the establishment of an international (regional) regime in the Mediterranean. Indeed, the explicit goals of the EMP as embedded in the Barcelona Declaration aim at the creation of a (Euro-Mediterranean) area of shared peace and prosperity and the promotion of intercultural dialogue between the peoples of this region. For this purpose, the normative content of the Declaration refers to the promotion of democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and individual freedoms, the pursuit and encouragement of free market practices and reforms and empowerment of civil society.

In pursuit of its global and comprehensive approach, the Process provides a set of mechanisms aimed at operationalising its collective choices. These are information exchange and dialogue structures such as the Euro-Med Committee, regular ministerial and sub-ministerial meetings and conferences, Association Council meetings, civil society networks and cultural (academic, artistic, educational) exchange programmes. Implementation is central to the viability of regime creation and the EMP's record in this regard has shown mixed results. The heterogeneous nature of its membership, however, coupled with the *sui generis* path it has pursued, mined by conjunctural obstacles, meant that the EMP has not been able to reach a fully-fledged regime status, as shown by the failed attempt to adopt a common Charter for Peace and Stability in 2000 (as will be discussed in chapter 3). Genetically though, it is encoded with the features of a regime which, in ripe circumstances, can develop into a regime proper.

One of the novelties of the Barcelona Process lies in the inclusion of the socio-cultural basket (of issues) on its agenda compensating thereby for the lacunae of previous EC policies towards the region. This highlights the diffusion effect upon which the EMP is based, linking the political and security issues to the economic sphere and attaching the whole to “soft” issues (see following chapters). As such, the Partnership can be said to be a multi-dimensional regime.

The following sections will deal with the caveats and methodological implications of my theoretical choice.

### *1. Beyond the rationalist-constructivist fault line: A synthetic approach*

Debates over the causal effects of norms and ideations (knowledge, beliefs, values and strategic concepts), as opposed or relative to the role of means-end calculations, have traditionally been a source of polarisation in the study of international politics. But renewed post-Cold War interest in these theoretical conceptions seems to have culminated in the recognition of the need for a combination of normativity and rationality to explain the most politically salient processes that at least empirical research aims to elucidate (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Keohane, 1988; Katzenstein et al., 1998; Klotz, 1995a; Checkel, 1997).

The rationalist meta-theoretical tenet portrays states as self-interested, goal-seeking actors assumed to be endowed with the rational capacity, time and emotional detachment necessary to choose the most beneficial course of action regardless of the complexity of the choice(s) they face (Ward, 2002: 68). The “most beneficial course of action”, refers in this context to the maximisation of individual utility (preference).<sup>53</sup> As such, foreign policies and patterns of cooperation are accounted for in terms of the rational weighing of costs and benefits by states. Rationalists assume that actors’ preferences are not amenable to change over time and across actors. Their source of variation in this regard lies in the systemic attributes of the environment in which the individual and collective behaviour takes place.

On international regimes, rationalist theorising starts out with two premises. First, it is assumed that, had it not been for the beneficial value of reciprocal agreements, there would be no need for international regimes which, for rationalists, facilitate the attainment of such

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<sup>53</sup> Utility functions in rationalist thinking refer not only to wealth but include such values as status and power.

agreements. Secondly, it is argued that, if cooperation were costless to achieve – in other words if agreements did not involve concessions and compromises – there would be no need for regimes to facilitate cooperation. Thus, for rationalists, it is both the value of agreements and the difficulty in reaching them that account for the relevance of regimes in international relations (Keohane, 1984). So, regimes are seen as facilitators of cooperation as they reduce uncertainty through their cost-reducing, information-providing virtues.

Following on from these assumptions, rationalist models predict that international regimes are likely to emerge in issue-areas where there exists a dense network of shared interests amongst the potential regime members. It is the ratio of anticipated benefits from cooperation to its transaction costs that ultimately determines the prospects of establishing a regime in a particular issue-area(s). Once in place, regimes are believed to have a reputational effect on their members, making it costly for the latter to envisage defecting except if the benefits of doing so exceed those of keeping good reputation by compliance (ibid., 1988).

Rationalist approaches to the study of international regimes, and of international relations in general, have come under close scrutiny on the part of strong cognitivists who, in their critiques, have questioned the former's ontological and epistemological assumptions.<sup>54</sup> Ontologically, rationalists have been criticised for their view of norms and rules as problem-solving devices designed by rational, utility-maximising, pre-existing states. This view, argue proponents of the cognitivist approach, omits the role of normative structures and social institutions – defined as 'conditions of the possibility' – in shaping the behaviour of states, or any social behaviour for that matter (Hasenclever et al., 1997: 158). They point to the international normative structures of sovereignty and international law as illustrations of 'constitutive institutions', which make meaningful international interaction possible (Wendt, 1991: 390). Some rationalists have come to accept this tenet of cognitivism concerning the dependence of states themselves as actors on established normative frameworks. However, they maintain that, once socialised, states will engage in rational behaviour when it comes to collective action problems, so long as the fundamental international normative structures remain unchanged (Hasenclever et al., 1997: 161).

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<sup>54</sup> For a discussion of the ontological and epistemological 'anomalies' of rationalist regime theory, see: F.V. Kratochwil and J.G. Ruggie (1986) 'International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State', *International Organization*, 40 (4), pp. 753-776.

Epistemologically, cognitivists have targeted the positivist model of explanation adopted by rationalist students of international regimes, which likens norms and rules to external causes of international conduct and involves a clear separation of subject and object. On the former, they argue that in lieu of conceptualising regimes as mere incentive-manipulators, prescribing or proscribing certain actions in given circumstances (as do rationalists), they should be seen as embodying shared knowledge which also constitutes behaviour. In other words, regimes have both a 'regulative' and 'constitutive' dimension (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986: 764). They are like rules of a given game (of chess or football for instance) whereby they do not cause particular moves but provide actors with the necessary knowledge to act meaningfully. Advocates of cognitivism argue that positivist accounts of rule-governed behaviour are highly misleading by reducing regimes to technical ordering devices, and need therefore to be opened to more interpretive strains to be able to move beyond cause-effect relationships and capture the role of the dynamics of common understandings in the emergence of international cooperation (ibid.: 766).

Commonly, writers from the cognitivist approach emphasise that rationalist theories of regimes lack an 'endogenous dynamic' as a result of their assumption of fixed preferences, which precludes capturing major changes in human institutions. As such, they are seen as only providing a one-dimensional explanation of a multidimensional reality by obscuring the source(s) of state policy preferences (Keohane, 1988: 390-391). Reactions from the rationalist camp to such accusations tend to acknowledge that their analyses do indeed omit an important explanatory factor, but maintain that it is very much their parsimonious character that makes their programme a solid one. For them, limiting the number of variables that a theory considers strengthens its content, predictability and explanatory capacity. They dismiss any account based on 'post hoc observations of values and ideology' (ibid.: 392).

Authors of cognitivist persuasion, on the other hand, emphasise the dependency of state identities on broader normative structures and of interests on identities. They thus perceive any attempt at making sense of regimes that is abstracted from the normative and ideational structures, within which these regimes are embedded, as essentially misleading. Thick cognitivists argue that better insights of the phenomenon of regimes can be gained from focusing on the legitimacy of normative injunctions, the importance of inter-subjectively shared meanings and the role of communication in their formation, the process of identity formation in international politics and the conservative power of historical structures

(Hasenclever et al., 1997: 157). Some within this camp argue that the existence of states in a rule-governed international society fundamentally affects cooperative ventures between them. They believe that the 'power of legitimacy' of the norms and rules underlying a given regime in relation to the broader normative structures of international society determines the nature and robustness of these regimes.

Others, concentrating on the role of inter-subjectively shared meanings in cooperation between states, highlight communicative dynamics through the 'power of arguments' in rule-interpretation and rule-application (Risse, 2000; Müller, 2004). They refer to practical discourses between states as a method of maintaining convergent expectations by (re)establishing common consensuses on norms and rules. Another group of cognitivists focus on the 'power of identity', derived from the socialisation of states in the international system of norms and rules, on the understanding and perception of a state's role and interests in the international society.

Thick cognitivists have attracted criticism for their emphasis on the impact of international institutions on state behaviour and policy. In fact, they are criticised for drawing parallels between domestic and international society, for the level of institutionalisation in the latter is way below what they hold. Where norms and rules do exist in international relations, they remain vague enough, providing sufficient leeway for state actors to make arbitrary interpretation of them, to varying degrees evidently based on their interests and the distribution of capabilities. Moreover, thick cognitivist approaches fail to predict at what point consensual values and knowledge will produce knowledge. The generation of new knowledge, just as easily, might make cooperation less easy to attain by exposing new incentives to defect.

Where does this debate leave my theoretical approach to EU-Algerian relations in the context of the EMP? To the extent that the view I hold is that both the EU and Algeria are sophisticated rational actors making detailed means-end calculations to maximise their utilities,<sup>55</sup> but that the utilities they want to maximise sometimes involve reconfiguring the other player's preferences, identities and normative commitments, I perceive the EMP to be a 'strategic social construction' (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 888). Besides, the normative

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<sup>55</sup> Of course, taking into account the EU's multi-layered decision-making processes and divergent member states' interests, especially in relation to Algerian in the 1990s. This aspect is discussed in more detail below.

role of the EU, as the main norm entrepreneur within the EMP, has been seriously scrutinised and said to be at best secondary to its strategic interests (Youngs, 2004a; Hyde-Price, 2006; Haddadi, 2004).

What is more, relying solely on ideational and normative variables would assume the existence of shared norms and values between the EU and Algeria. Whilst there may indeed be a set of common *explicit* principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures agreed upon and encapsulated by the Barcelona Declaration, there exist *implicit* norms and principles which cannot be overlooked or assumed to be *common*. Over the years, the Partnership has proved to represent an aggregate of (separate) interests rather than a shared Euro-Mediterranean interest per se (Xenakis & Chrysochoou 2001a; 2001b; 2003; 2004). Therefore, where there may be limitations in using a rationalist theory of regimes, laying primarily in its omission of the origins of interests and states identities and preferences, a more cognitivist approach can be relied upon and its variables used to identify the origins of preferences of the EU and Algeria. When identities and ideational and normative structures are more or less stable, a more rationalist approach to regimes would help capture the dynamics inherent in them by emphasising their functional role.

Despite the fact that cognitivist and rationalist approaches are at the antipodes of each other's ontological and epistemological assumptions, writers of both persuasions have called for a synthesis of both approaches to help us understand both practices and specific institutions and the relationship between them. Indeed, productive engagement is possible between the two approaches – engagement based on a scholarly division of labour addressing subsequent links in one causal chain. We have seen that cognitivists emphasise how norms shape the identities and interests of actors and that rationalists, treating interests as unexplained givens, stress how actors go about pursuing their interests strategically. The first group focuses on interest-formation, the second on interest-satisfaction. Seeking to build bridges instead of fences between the two approaches, some cognitivists see in this difference a possible division of labour, with cognitivists doing the work of explaining how actors gain their preferences and rationalists exploring how they realise those preferences (Klotz, 1995a; 1995b). Cognitivism is thus not a rival theoretical perspective to rationalism, but rather a complementary one. The result, argues Audie Klotz, 'is a reformulated, complementary research agenda that illuminates the independent role of norms in determining actors' identities and interests. Combined with theories of institutions and interest-based behaviour, this approach offers us a

conceptually consistent and more complete understanding of international relations' (1995a: 20).


By their own admission, rationalist analysts recognise that their assumption of rationality, like that of egoism, 'is a theoretically useful simplification of reality rather than a true reflection of it' (Keohane, 1984: 5). Between international structures and human decisions lies interpretation; prior to choosing a particular course of action in international cooperation, circumstances are assessed and interests identified (Haas, 1992a: 2). Interpretation, in turn, is dependent on the body of knowledge available to actors, which shapes their perceptions of reality and informs decision-makers about causal linkages. As a result, thin cognitivists ascribe greater importance to actors' interests and preferences than their rationalist counterparts, who consider them as given. The origins of these interests and preferences are treated analytically as contingent upon actors' understanding of the natural and social world. However, thin cognitivists see their research agenda as a remedy for the conceptual shortcomings of rationalism, in that they believe that ideas as well as interests have causal weights in explanations of human actions. In terms of international regimes, the thin cognitivist study attempts to fill a gap in interest-based theorising by forming a theory of interest change. Its analysis settles for the conceptualisation of states as utility-maximisers, but maintains that interests (utility) depend on knowledge and ideas and that these are independent of material structures and thus considered autonomous explanatory variables. It also stresses the importance of inter-subjectively shared meaning for the identification of specific issue-areas (problems) and how to deal with them (norms, rules, etc). Without consensus, convergent expectations would not happen (Hasenclever et al., 1997: 141).

## ***2. Ideas as variables and socialisation mechanisms: Operationalising the synthesis***


How does a middle ground approach, sitting between the rationalist and cognitivist variants of regime theory, help me attain the analytic goals of this research, namely to identify the ideational origins of the interests of the EU and Algeria upon their engagement in the EMP and to trace the mechanisms through which the latter impacted upon the evolution of the dyad's priorities? This section will outline the model I use to situate ideas and interests as subsequent links in a causal chain and to define the socialisation processes I seek to unveil.

Hasenclever et al. (2000) have proposed a model of rationalist-cognitivist synthesis according to the logic illustrated in the figure below:

**(a) Cognitive variables causally preceding rationalist ones**



**(b) Cognitive variables causally succeeding rationalist ones**



Source: Hasenclever et al. (2000)

**Figure 1:** *Causality between interests and ideas in the model adopted*

They argue that the division of labour between the rationalist and thin cognitivist variants of international regime can take the form of a causal chain in which the latter variables are either ‘prior or posterior to the rationalist ones’ (Hasenclever et al., 2000: 26). As such, actors’ behavioural alternatives and preferences are problematised and the ideational features of strategic situations unveiled. Goldstein and Keohane (1993), in an earlier study and in a similar vein, developed a model conceptualising just what is meant by ideas and their ‘causal pathways’, which I will rely upon. They distinguish between three different types of ideas. At a fundamental level, they talk about ‘world views’ defined as ideas that ‘define the universe of possibilities of action’ (ibid.: 8). They can emanate from religious or scientific doctrines. Their second category refers to ‘principled beliefs’ which they define as ‘normative ideas that specify criteria for distinguishing right from wrong and just from unjust’ (ibid.: 9). They translate fundamental doctrines into prescription for human action. Lastly, Goldstein and Keohane label beliefs about cause-effect relationships ‘causal beliefs’ (ibid.: 10). Causal beliefs guide actors on the relationship between policies and outcomes (goals).



In terms of 'causal pathways', they make three propositions. Firstly, when making decisions about policies to achieve their goals, actors do not have sufficient information about the implications of their choices. In such situations, actors choose the course of action which best fits their normative and analytical understandings for it is the expected effects of these actions that explain them. These expectations depend on causal and principled beliefs; the former influencing the choice of means to achieve given ends and the latter defined by principled beliefs. In this pathway, beliefs play the role of 'road maps' (ibid.: 13). This causality can explain how different choices can be taken under otherwise similar material conditions by referring to differences in the belief systems of actors.

Secondly, when attempting to obtain optimal outcomes through cooperation, actors may face more than just one optimal choice. In the absence of objective criteria to choose the best course of action, actors settle for solutions based on shared cultural, normative or causal beliefs. Here, ideas are said to serve as 'focal points' which help define acceptable solutions to collective action problems (ibid.: 17-18). The third and last causal pathway refers to the 'institutionalisation of ideas'. Once ideas become encased in practices, they become influential on the formulation of policy (ibid.: 21). Ideas may become institutionalised as a result of their 'power' or because they reflect the interest of the most powerful. In the latter case, even if these interests wither away, the effect of those ideas remain.

Elsewhere, the third pathway in which ideas affect policy has been criticised for containing an unresolved dilemma (Yee, 1996: 89). The formulation positing that ideas once institutionalised influence policy does not shed light on the causal connection between ideas and policy. The implied linkage here between ideas and policy is mediated by institutions, yet institutions are the product of ideas as well as other factors. In other words, there is more to institutions than just ideas and to attribute the causal linkage between ideas and policy to institutions can be misleading. Furthermore, once ideas become institutions (or strongly institutionalised) it is more accurate to speak of institutions affecting policies than ideas being encased in institutions.

A synthetic approach has also many merits for the second analytical objective of my research, relating to the assessment of the impact of the EMP on the priorities of both the EU and Algeria. Ultimately, I aim to ascertain whether dyadic interest convergence is due to interaction within the EMP, to polity changes in either actor, or to external impetus from in

the international system. The impact of regimes is often defined as a socialising one, whereby ‘actors acquire different identities, leading to new interests through regular and sustained interactions’ (Bearce and Bondanella, 2007: 706). Yet, between ‘the logic of consequentiality’ and ‘the logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 1989),<sup>56</sup> the level of socialisation and the type of mechanism at play vary. Checkel (2001; 2005a) identifies three types of mechanisms along the axis rationalism-constructivism: strategic calculations, role playing and normative suasion.

Strategic calculation occurs when agents, viewed as instrumentally rational, carefully calculate and seek to maximise their interests by adapting their behaviour to the norms and rules favoured by the norm entrepreneur, taking into account rewards and incentives be they material (financial assistance) or social (shaming, status) (Checkel, 2005a: 808-809).<sup>57</sup>

Signalling the start of a shift from a logic of consequentiality towards a logic of appropriateness, role playing occurs when actors adopt certain roles because they are appropriate to the particular setting in place. A change in an actor’s behaviour does not necessarily imply a change of interest, but rather that the former is a function of the latter (ibid.: 810).

Finally, the last socialisation mechanism takes place in settings where argumentation and persuasion replace rational calculation, leading to agents’ active and intentional internalising of new understanding of appropriateness. Here, the switch from a logic of consequentiality to one of appropriateness is complete (ibid.: 812).<sup>58</sup>

Although regime theory has many virtues for problem-driven, as opposed to method-driven, research because it allows students of international relations to combine varying ontological and epistemological elements, it does have a serious shortcoming to which I now turn.

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<sup>56</sup> The former is the realm of rationalist approaches, defining interaction and cooperative behaviour in terms of utility-maximising and the latter more constructivist, positing that actors try to “do the right thing” rather than maximising their given preferences.

<sup>57</sup> For more on strategic calculation, see: F. Schimmelfennig (2005) ‘Strategic Calculation and International Socialisation: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe’, *International Organization*, 59 (4), pp. 827-860.

<sup>58</sup> For more details on the concept of argumentation, see: T. Risse (2000) “‘Let’s Argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics”, *International Organization*, 54 (1), pp. 1-39.

### III. Systemic vs. sub-systemic analysis: The case for factoring in 'Domestic Sources' of FP

Assessments of the merits and shortcomings of theories of international regimes often converge in one complaint: not enough attention, neglect and omission of domestic politics (Haggard and Simmons, 1987: 513; Keohane, 1988: 392; Zürn, 1995: 282; Risse-Kappen, 1999: 187; Legro, 1997: 35). For proponents of regime theory, regardless of their provenance, international cooperation is not the result of individual action but rather that of the interplay of at least two actors. As such, the use of systemic analyses to explain interactive outcomes appears to be appropriate for them. Besides, they hold that systemic approaches account for the behaviour of states on the basis of the attributes of the system as a whole (be they material or ideational) and it is in the parsimonious nature of such theories, as opposed to emphases of unit-level and idiosyncratic factors, that their added value lies. Analysing state behaviour starting amidst a plethora of seemingly relevant facts leads observers to overlook the (international) context of action rooted in the enduring features of world politics.

Christopher Hill (1996: 6) terms this approach, which attempts to 'explain major developments [in world politics] through structures which are observed at the international level, subsuming individual states and what goes on inside their borders', *international structuralism*. He argues that a sound account of foreign policy must not disregard *das primat der innenpolitik*, and offers five fundamental objections to the 'cavalier' systemic approaches.

First, he argues that divergent national interests, which often undermine international cooperation, stem from the strongly asserted sense of collective identity and community rife within a nation-state which in turn derives from the way generations of people within these nation-states interpret their 'position, legacy and capability' (ibid.: 7).

Second, Hill targets the very reason given by proponents of systemic theorising for the strength of their approach and that is their endemic oversimplification and assertion. He argues that such a procedure is not always fruitful (ibid.: 8). The third objection put forward by Hill relates to the fact that, apart from the elements differentiating between the positions of various states in the international system such as power and wealth, structuralists fail to address the many more dimensions on which states vary and which help construct solid explanations of how the world works. These factors relate to the internal characteristics of states such as their constitutions, their values, their openness to cooperation, etc. (ibid.: 9).

Fourthly, Hill refers to historical facts such as the delaying of decolonisation in Africa by Portugal and the continuous rejection of UN membership and EEA agreements by the Swiss as illustrations of instances where states exert what he calls 'existential capacity' to resist the apparently systemic or structural pressures (ibid.: 10). He argues that distinctive responses to outside stimuli escape systemic theorising and can only be captured by considering domestic impulses.

The last point made by Hill in countering structuralist approaches relates to their rationalist factions, dominating international theorising, whereby he argues that, in aiming at producing complementary explanations to those deriving from external sources, a good deal of writing on domestic sources has taken on the rationalist route. This, according to Hill, is an 'impoverished view of politics... [analysis of foreign policy] can be about particular classes subordinating both foreign policy and the democratic process to...competing visions or sets of beliefs about politics' (ibid.: 11).

Systemic analyses provide useful tools for observers to understand how the constraints under which governments act in international relations affect their behaviour, but fall short of producing determinate predictions about states' intentions. This is particularly true insofar as variations in states' behaviour stems from variations in their internal dynamics. This characteristic weakness on the part of systemic approaches translates into an underdeveloped, and understated at best, conception of the foreign policy processes within states and the role of domestic factors in those processes. All in all, a focus on systemic imperatives alone leads to a simplified view of policy processes.

The thin cognitivist approach adopted in this study, which investigates the origins of interests by emphasising the role of ideas and beliefs in FP and in instances of international cooperation in particular and which does not challenge the perception of states as utility-maximisers, does not – insofar as its analysis revolves around systemic imperatives (ideas and interests) – escape the criticism directed at such (systemic) approaches. This is all the more valid since the attempt in this study is to understand the relationship between the EU and Algeria in a very specific context, that of the Barcelona Process. The interaction being examined here is between two actors whose domestic foreign policy-making apparatuses are important to the extent that attempting to conceptualise their foreign policy stances based

solely on outside systemic analysis is doomed to fall short of optimality. In fact, as Hill argues (1993: 307), ‘the experience of European foreign policy over the last twenty years or so has been so unique that the search for one theory to explain its evolution is doomed to fail’. Scholars of the European Union face considerable ontological and epistemological challenges related to their subject area. Consensus remains to be reached on what it is that they are studying, let alone how to go about studying it (White, 2001: 204).

For those endeavouring to theorise EU foreign policy, such difficulties are aggravated by the multi-level, multi-institutional characteristics of the EU’s foreign policy-making system, by the obfuscating and ambiguous terminology in which the EU FP is frequently couched and by the *sui generis* nature of the Union itself (Hill, 1998: 43). European foreign policy is a system of external relations, a collective enterprise through which national actors conduct partly common and partly separate international actions. To explore the nature and limits of that system and the inertial forces which inhibit changes and direction requires not only examination of the system itself but more importantly of the nation-state upon which it rests and the domestic contexts within which they make foreign policy. Therefore, ‘any explanation...of the CFSP, which does not include the national dimension, is fundamentally flawed’ (Hill, 1996: 11).

Additionally, in the words of Christopher Hill, ‘foreign policy can never be abstracted from the domestic context out of which it springs’ (2003: 37). This is particularly relevant for the case of Algeria, especially as far as its policy towards the EU and its member states is concerned. It is no secret that the way in which that country perceives its position in the world had been to a considerable extent shaped by its colonial experience. The impact of the colonial era of Algeria on its FP has been diffused mainly through the domestic political constellations to which it gave way post-1962. The ruling elite in Algeria, up to the present time, has drawn its political legitimacy from its role in the war of independence. Combined with limited participation of the wider actors in society in the political output of their country has meant that foreign policy-making in particular has been the exclusive domain of the “revolutionary” elite, incarnated effectively by a strong military.

In addition to this feature lie the internal dynamics of the political economy of the country. The essentially pivotal role of the hydrocarbon sector in the Algerian economy and the entrenched interests of key political figures in the remaining few sectors cannot be overlooked

when analysing the foreign political economy of the country, closely linked with the broader FP sphere. Adding to this is the recent turbulent period traversed by the country during the 1990s and that has to a considerable extent re-shaped the country's perception of itself and, accordingly, of its role in world politics and foreign policy.

So, there exist a number of domestic factors in the case of Algeria which are essential for any attempt to understand its FP stances. This necessity matches the need to devise a similar domestically-focused approach to arrive at a more effective conceptualising of EU FP, and imposes the need for a more sub-systemic approach emphasising the domestic sources of FP and thereby complementing the macro-level approach of international regime theory.

This said, when considering the role of domestic factors in the formulation of foreign policy, one can easily get trapped in the complex web of elements constituting 'domestic sources'. In other words, a domestic sources approach to FP can be easily undermined by the effect of idiosyncrasies, the very weakness pointed at by advocates of more systemic approaches. To circumvent this potential shortcoming, the approach adopted in this research is based on Christopher Hill's model, which considers foreign policy to be the product of what he calls 'a two-way flow between internal and external dynamics' (2003: 21). This approach highlights the role of domestic factors in foreign policy-making by positioning these factors midway between affecting policy outcomes and being conversely affected by foreign policy (inside-out and outside-in).<sup>59</sup> On the one end, it deals with the relationship between the domestic and the foreign by making reference to the impact of domestic events, constitutional structures and types of regimes. On the other hand, it moves in a normative direction, considering how meaningful foreign policy is to modern societies and how far can they participate in its formulation (ibid.: 219).

To begin with, Hill sheds lights on the umbrella term 'sources' by deconstructing its components. It is a term which refers to actual sources of FP, constraints to FP and actors in FP (ibid.: 220). Sources can range from actual institutions within states to ideas and values, initiatives and upheavals. Moreover, constraints can vary from lobby groups to material and financial constraints. Lastly, "actors" is a much larger designation that can include

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<sup>59</sup> This approach bears resemblance to Robert Putnam's concept of 'two-level game', except that the latter is more rationalistic in its assumptions and approach and is concerned primarily with the role of the policy-maker in this two-level game. For more details, see: D.R. Putnam (1988) 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level games', *International Organization*, 42 (3), pp. 427-460.

individuals, the four Ps (parliaments, public opinion, pressure groups and the press), ethnic minorities and other migrant groups and transnational groups such as al-Qaeda (ibid.: 220-224). The use of the term 'sources' instead of "constraints" or "limits" is justified by its suggestion of a more proactive input into foreign policy.

On the 'inside-out' role of domestic sources, Hill suggests three broad paths of influence: complications from domestic events, constitutional structures, class and development (ibid.: 224-240). On the first path, Hill evokes the effect of resources, political culture and domestic change as interconnection points. Resources involve questions of public expenditure decisions, as well as long-term allocation of funds. Controversy more often than not surrounds the commitment of resources for instruments of foreign policy as opposed to 'domestic consumption' as well as the choice of particular instruments and recipients of those resources. This is characteristically rife in well-established democracies where public expenditure is subject to transparent processes and public scrutiny. In the case of the EU, for instance, this is relevant insofar as its allocation of resources to the eastern neighbours during the 1990s, triggered concerns in the South particularly amongst Mediterranean member states whose interests in the southern Mediterranean supersede those of their northern counterparts. It therefore highlights a much deeper dynamic in European foreign policy-making involving varying interests of northern and southern members and their impact on policy outcome towards SMCs.

Domestic political culture is another variable in the 'domestic events' path (ibid.: 227). In every polity there exists a domestic culture, embedded in social attitudes and political institutions, which influences foreign policy and is in turn the product of past 'traumas' in the political life of a country. This is particularly relevant in the case of Algeria as far as its colonial experience is concerned. This episode in Algerian history has considerably shaped the socio-political culture of the country. It has certainly had an impact on the very identity of the country and inevitably affected and still affects its foreign policy. This is true for European countries too, not least France, whose political system has been affected by the Algerian experience as well as its foreign policy towards the former colony to this very day. One can also include the political traumas inflicted by terrorist activities on Europe in particular and their impact on the EU's policy towards Algeria.

A further connection between internal events and foreign policy, referred to by Hill (ibid.: 228-9), concerns domestic upheavals, civil wars and near-revolutionary situations. The occurrence of such changing events can, depending on their severity, lead to shake ups in foreign policies to extents matching the gravity of the respective situation. These changes can vary from mere revisions of particular policies to the engineering of more assertive and expansionist policies, passing by the redirection of foreign policy in search of international support. Again, this applies to the Algerian case, whose experience in the “black decade” of the 1990s has had an impact on its foreign policy both during and after that period.

The second path of influence relates to the constitutional structures and the broader nature of the regimes in particular polities. Different constitutional structures (be they federal, presidential, parliamentary, multi-party coalitions, single party rule, etc.) affect foreign policy outcomes in different manners depending on the (constitutional) provisions which attribute varying degrees of freedom of action to various FP actors.

The EU constitutional structure, based on numerous treaties, is a case in point. It is certainly unique not least in the way decisions regarding its external environment are made. Its multi-level decision-making process in the external relations sphere has an effect on its policy outcomes insofar as key areas of that sphere may have been considered the *domaine réservé* of key member states, as is the case with France and Algeria. This means that any analysis of EU policy towards Algeria has to take into account the specific stances and roles of particular member states. The constitutional structures argument also applies to the national polities of member states of the Union. The fact that France’s constitution, for instance, gives considerable freedom to the presidency in the foreign policy-making sphere means that the country’s policies towards countries like Algeria are deeply affected by the convictions of key figures within that institution such as the president and his advisors. Moreover, the impact of different regimes on foreign policy outcomes is a more obvious one. Policy processes in democratic regimes are different from those in non-democratic and military regimes. The two differ in sources, constraints and actors. The powerful role of the military institution in Algeria cannot be overlooked in analysing the country’s FP.

On the third path connecting the domestic to the foreign, Hill proposes class and the socio-economic context within a given polity as intervening variables (ibid.: 240). Foreign policy can be handled exclusively by a ruling elite at the levels of formulation and implementation,



as is the case in the EU and Algeria. Furthermore, development, argues Hill (*ibid.*: 244), defined as both the level of development and the type of the socio-economic system, intersects with foreign policy. In the case of the former, the less developed a country the less proactive its foreign policy is likely to be. This is due primarily to the lack of resources necessary for devising and maintaining an assertive FP and the “short-sighted” nature of the objectives of the country such as securing financial assistance and countering foreign interference. This was probably the case in Algeria in the course of the 1990s, when the country was in dire financial and economic straits and was keen on putting off any interference in its troubled domestic affairs at the time.

As far as the type of socio-economic system is concerned, it seems clear that a liberal/capitalist economy yields a different type of foreign policy than a socialist/communist regime. The former would seek foreign markets and investments, for instance, whereas the latter would be primarily concerned with countering the expansionist and imperialist tendencies of its liberal counterpart. The shift towards more liberal socio-economic policies in Algeria and its consolidation at the turn of the century, with the coming to power of Bouteflika, has undoubtedly had an impact on the domestic environment of foreign policy-making.

On the ‘outside-in’ relationship between foreign policy and the domestic sphere, Christopher Hill argues that, over the years, there has been growing international awareness, among populaces, of the interconnectedness between what goes on inside and outside their national boundaries. This has been on the increase since the events of September 11, 2001 and is common to societies which are relatively well off and are not preoccupied with other domestic issues (*ibid.*: 250). Coupled with the democratic character of these societies, this situation has meant that foreign policy is now more than ever affected by the constituencies lying behind it. Decisions made by democratically-elected decision-makers, therefore, are connected to key institutions representing society at large namely, political representation, public opinion, interest groups and the media (*ibid.*: 251). These can play the role of sources, constraints, or even actors in foreign policy.

The case of EU policy-making towards Algeria is no exception, as the EU’s democratic practices allow these societal institutions to have an input in this process. This was particularly visible during the 1990s, when European bodies of civil society were highly

critical of the EU's response to the crisis in Algeria and thus put pressure on its policy-makers to act.<sup>60</sup> Whereas particularly true in democratic polities, this domestic societal effect has also meant that other (less democratic) states can now embark on "public diplomacy" campaigns aimed at their counterparts' constituencies. This can be more effective when the active state has a substantial Diaspora in the receiving one. The case of Algeria and France is a good illustration of this tendency and needs to be taken into consideration when analysing Algerian policies and discourses towards France.

#### **IV. Methodology**

Undoubtedly, the intricacy and eclecticism of the devised theoretical framework is commensurate with the complexity of the subject under study. The EU and Algeria are two complex actors engaged, through the framework of the Barcelona Process, in a multidimensional relationship. To study their policy preferences and priorities in this context, a synthesis of rationalist and constructivist, systemic and sub-systemic approaches is the most optimal approach. The remaining research task at this stage is to operationalise this framework through coherent strategy and methods.

The starting point of the EU-Algeria relationship in the context of the EMP was marked by a divergence of dyadic priorities as regards certain political/security, economic and social policies, as illustrated by the subsequent thorny negotiations of the Association Agreement, which was to codify this relationship. To understand the nature of the evolution of the interests of both actors in the context of the EMP, it is necessary to come to terms with the origins of that divergence in terms of ideations. In other words, what were the world views, principled and causal beliefs and their consequential pathways which led to this initial state of play?

To establish the priorities of the EU and Algeria and their ideational origins, I set out to study the discourses of both actors at the time. Starting out from the view that the ideational capacities or mechanisms that enable ideas and beliefs to affect policies can be illuminated if networks of ideas and systems of beliefs are viewed as languages or discourses (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2003), multiple interviews were conducted with policy and civil society actors that were involved in the policy-making process at the time. Policy documents and secondary data

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<sup>60</sup> Resulting in the sending of the (in)famous EU Troika to Algiers in 1998 (see chapter three).

were also used, as supplementary and verification sources, to tap into the thought processes of both actors. In order to check the correlation between these initial ideations and preferences, I consider alternative policy options available to both actors in 1995 and establish the pathways between ideas and interests.

Secondly, to trace the evolution of the priorities of the EU and Algeria is to assume that initial divergences gave way to an approximation of interests. Indeed, if the AA was eventually signed, ratified and its provisions implemented, then there must have been an underlying dyadic interest convergence. Only the extent to which this convergence is the result of interaction in the framework of the EMP is less certain. In order to establish this causality, I set out to trace the processes and mechanisms through which the EMP impacted upon the interests of both actors. This method not only allows the identification of the effect (or not) of the EMP, but where there is a clear causal link between the EMP and interest convergence, it also helps understanding whether the latter is the result of rationality or normativity. Before I turn to the method used to trace what I referred to above as the socialisation processes of the EMP – i.e. process tracing – I need to say a few words on measuring interest convergence in the context of the Barcelona Process.

To measure interest convergence between the EU and Algeria in the chosen policy areas of the EMP, I propose to divide the period under study into two separate time frames: the first between 1995 and the signing of the Association Agreement in 2001, and the second between 2001 and 2005. The purpose of this periodisation is to help ascertain further the impact of the EMP on the priorities of the EU and Algeria, with the signing of the AA serving as a threshold of interaction. Did the AA make any difference to the relationship in terms of approximation of priorities?

Another issue pertaining to the task of measuring convergence relates to normative suasion. This third socialisation mechanism needs to be nuanced. While it can be envisaged that interest convergence through this mechanism can happen in the case of Algeria – i.e. Algeria ending up internalising EMP norms following the logic of appropriateness – it is more difficult to imagine the EU – the EMP norm entrepreneur – redefining its norms as a result of “persuasive communication” emanating from Algeria. What the EU can do, however, as a result of this mechanism is adapt its strictures or its prioritisation of strategic and normative interests when the two intersect. In other words, instead of redefining its norms, which are

after all said to reflect its identity and are enshrined in what is essentially a treaty (i.e. the AA), the EU can change the application and the severity of its conditionality or pursue short-term strategic interest at the expense of normative goals. Adapting European norms would automatically amount to a convergence of priorities between Algeria and the EU; the opposite would mean the EU allowing its norms to be trumped by strategic interests.

### *Process tracing*

The process tracing procedure aims to explain ‘the decision process through which various initial conditions are translated into outcome’ (George and McKeown, 1985: 35). It is a method that seeks ‘to establish the ways in which the actor’s beliefs influenced his receptivity to and assessment of incoming information about the situation, his definition of the situation, his identification and evaluation of options, as well as, finally, his choice of a course of action’ (Yee, 1996: 77). Simply put, ‘process tracing is [a method] strong on questions of how and interactions’ (Checkel, 2005b: 6).

Besides its methodological attraction for scholars from both rationalist and constructivist theories owing to its compatibility with their epistemologies (ibid.), process tracing is a useful method for establishing causality through mechanism-based accounts. It involves extensive qualitative data.

For this study, I triangulated across three data streams: interviews, official documents and secondary sources. Interviews were conducted where possible with actors involved in the policy-making process at different stages during the period under study. The purpose of these interviews was to evaluate the evolution of the thought processes of policy-makers during this period. Where such interviewees were unavailable, documents were used as a surrogate source of this type of data. In any case, official documents (speeches, declarations, memoranda, meeting summaries, internal circulars, etc.) were used to check the validity of the data obtained in some instances through interviews and to check, in the case of Algeria, when norms were becoming internalised.

No less than forty interviews were conducted with European and Algerian officials, between February 2006 and May 2007, in addition to a few *ad hoc* conversations with key EU officials and Algerian diplomats in Brussels throughout 2008 and early 2009. Thirty five of these

interviews were formally transcribed, while the rest was not because they consisted of informal conversations. Half of the interviews (twenty one exactly) were conducted with European officials from various national and “supra-national” institutions, namely the French, Spanish and British missions in Brussels, the Council of the EU, the EC delegation in Algiers, the European Commission and Parliament. Given the multi-level decision-making process of the EU, the variety of these interviews allowed me to tap into the “minds” of different policy makers at these levels. Even within one institution, (eg. Commission and Parliament), officials from different units were interviewed to get a sense of the nuances in perspectives. In the European Parliament, officials interviewed were both MEPs and administrators.<sup>61</sup>

Interviews on the Algerian side were conducted with foreign ministry officials from the EU and Arab affairs Departments, diplomats and journalists in Brussels and London; journalists, academics, think-tank researchers, business actors and former military officials in Algeria. Three of the Algerian diplomats interviewed, twice each, have been involved in EU-Algerian relations from the start of the Barcelona Process. One of these officials was the head of the Algerian delegation that negotiated the Association Agreement. This makes the value of their interviews quite substantial relative to other less well-informed interviewees.

To maximise the amount of information “extracted” from the interviews and in view of the discomfort of most, especially EU, officials to speak openly about certain issues, all interviewees were offered the possibility to have their interviews “anonymised”, and all but one requested anonymity.

In terms of documents, in addition to the publically available texts on both sides, a few internal memos, non-papers and policy recommendations were given to me by officials from the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Embassy in Brussels. This type of documents reveals a great deal about the thoughts and ideas internal to both actors prior to their interaction. When compared with the contents of related public documents, valuable insight is gained into the strategies of both actors and their consistence with their beliefs and interests.

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<sup>61</sup> Despite the even distribution of interviews across EU and Algerian policy actors, and even the overall parity of the research material relied upon in this study, (some sections of ) some chapters will present more details on Algeria’s “side of the story” than the EU’s.

## **V. Conclusion**

This chapter has thus far outlined the theoretical approach adopted for researching EU-Algerian relations in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. It began by revisiting the central tenets of traditional IR theories and critically assessing their conceptions of the EMP. International regime theory was shown to be of particular value for this research owing to the opportunity it provides for combining rationalist and constructivist epistemologies to obtain a well-equipped framework for a problem-driven study. Following existing works, I have then argued that the Barcelona Process can be considered a regional, multidimensional regime, demonstrating that it bears the essential features of a regime according to the 'consensus definition' of the concept.

This then led me to address the fundamental ontological and epistemological argument surrounding the various variants of regime theory, which reflects a much broader debate in IR. This argument concerns the rift between rationalist and constructivist approaches and the possibility of building bridges over this divide. Approaches to regimes reflect this wider debate, in that some are purely rationalist such as the power- and interest-based approaches, whilst others are more constructivist such as the thick cognitivist approaches. The argument endorsed and formulated in this study is that it is possible to devise a scholarly division of labour between the two types of approaches.

This approach has been supported by some regime analysts such as Keohane and Goldstein. I choose to label this approach thin cognitivism. After highlighting the usefulness of this approach to my research, I then present a framework which operationalises this approach based on Keohane and Goldstein's model conceptualising the role of ideas in foreign policy and on Checkel's socialisation mechanisms typology. After that, I argue for the need to complement such a systemic approach with more sub-systemic analysis of the domestic sources of FP. Methodologically, I justify the use of process tracing as both a method suitable for answering the type of questions asked in this research and as one which can be used with such synthetic theoretical approaches.



## Chapter two – The run up to Barcelona: Revisiting watersheds in the evolutions of the EU and Algeria

The decade leading up to the proclamation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was particularly marked by important developments in the respective polities of the EU (then still the European Community) and Algeria, as well as in the international system, shaping both actors' worldviews and defining considerably the nature of their engagement in the Barcelona Process. Before delving into the analysis of the evolution of the priorities of the EU and Algeria in the Barcelona context, it is necessary to revisit the evolutions in question in order to ascertain their significance for the origins of the dyad's interests in 1995. Of course, it could be argued that events going back further than the decade preceding the launch of the EMP were also highly influential on processes of interest-formation in both the EU and Algeria, but the choice made here to limit the present exercise to the most recent events is informed by the widely-shared view that, at least in relation to the policy areas at the centre of the analytical focus of this study (democracy promotion and security cooperation, free trade and energy, migration), these events are most pertinent.

Starting out with the Iberian enlargement of 1986, with its implications particularly in terms of Spain's Mediterranean foreign policy protagonism (Gillespie, 1996; 1997b; 2000), developments on the European side led to the gradual formulation of a more ambitious Community-level Mediterranean policy, predicated on the promotion of (the perceived) interacting processes of economic and political liberalisation as well as socialisation and region-building. In Algeria, failed post-independence development and economic policies gave way to a more liberal approach aimed at a more effectual integration of the Algerian economy in the global market. Compounded by the 1986 slump in the price of oil, this policy failure precipitated the introduction of radical reforms to the Algerian polity through its liberalisation and the institutionalisation of political pluralism, only to result in more dramatic crises. Incarnating the normative and often strategic justification of these policy, political and polity changes, the end of the Cold War recalibrated the strategic significance of the Mediterranean in the calculi of regional and international actors. As a result, reinforced Euro-Mediterranean relations came as a natural evolution in the order of these "things", but were nonetheless considered to have different utilities depending on the impact of this *redistribution des cartes* in and on each actor.



This chapter aims to revisit the most important developments perceived to have considerably shaped the ideational and strategic predispositions of the EU and Algeria, upon their engagement in the EMP in 1995, in relation to the policy areas under study here. To this end, it will look back at the post-1986 catalysts of the EU's early 1990s Mediterranean policy, focusing on the systematic and institutional integration of democracy promotion in the Community's external relations. It will also highlight the events that exacerbated the EU's Mediterranean security concerns often leading to the prioritisation of security cooperation with the MPCs at the expense of pursuing political reform for instance. Moving on to Algeria and after reiterating the latter's *sui generis* nature as a Mediterranean actor especially vis-à-vis the EU, this chapter will dissect the symbolism of the developments that followed the events of 5 October 1988 in order to show their impact on the individuality of Algeria and, in turn, on the nature of its engagement in the EMP (priorities, ideational predispositions, etc.). Because of the complexity of such events, the section devoted to Algeria will, in some places, necessarily go into more chronicling details than in the case of the EU. Lastly, in carrying out these tasks, this chapter will make continuous reference, where relevant, to the international events giving the more localised developments varying meanings and levels of significance.

### **I. On the way to Barcelona I: The EU, democracy promotion and the quest for southern stability**

The second enlargement in the history of European integration, which saw the inclusion in the Community of Greece in 1981 in addition to Spain and Portugal in 1986, Europeanised to a certain extent the Mediterranean concerns of these new member states adding to the existing preoccupations of France and Italy with the region.<sup>62</sup> Accordingly, the traditional – albeit subordinate to the strategic imperatives of the Cold War – (southern) European anxieties over Mediterranean weakness and potential instability were exacerbated by the emerging political, socio-economic, cultural and security threat perceptions (Jünemann, 1998: 366; 2003a: 5). What's more, if the Cold War had led to a reductive assessment of Mediterranean security issues focusing on countering the threat of Soviet capitalisation on Mediterranean fault lines, the new international security configuration threw into sharp relief the limited, yet needed, meaningful involvement of the EU in the resolution of the region's predicaments.

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<sup>62</sup> For more details, see: S. Stavridis et al.(Eds.) *The Foreign Policies of the EU's Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990s* (London: Macmillan).

If the Gulf War of 1990-91 and its repercussions represented the first “southern” hard issue that Europe had to come to terms with in the post-Cold War era, other longer-term (perceived) challenges were becoming evidently more pressing (Marks, 1996: 11). Protracted conflicts and the proliferation of all types of armament, including nuclear and chemical programmes, were often of primary concern to southern European member states in particular, because of their immediate geographical exposure to these perceived threats.<sup>63</sup> In this context, Spain’s concerns over Algeria’s putative military nuclear ambitions<sup>64</sup> and Italy’s fears over Libya’s ballistic missile capability raised alarm bells in Europe and beyond. Although it was, and still is, widely agreed that the southern Mediterranean seldom presented Europe with a major military threat, as militarisation is intended mainly for south-south balance of power, it was more the looming threat of radical Islamist actors’ coming to power and the unpredictability of autocratic rulers’ impulsive goals that lent threatening potential to this military build-up (Dokos, 2000: 95; Vasconcelos, 2002: 6-8). Indeed, the exceptionalism shown by the majority of the North African and Middle Eastern regimes to the successive ‘waves’ of democratisation sweeping through emerging countries and the mounting challenge posed by political Islamists to the incumbent regimes in these countries, as witnessed in Algeria at the end of the 1980s, inspired and often reinforced these European perceptions. Against the background of the fast-spreading post East-West-confrontation alarmist prophecy of an impending ‘clash of civilisations’ stemming from Islam’s perceived inherent hostility to western values, devising a strategy of containment towards the Mediterranean was considered a policy priority (EuroMeSCo, 2005: 17).

Tensions in Euro-Mediterranean relations towards the end of the 1980s can be imputed only in part to hard security issues and the resurgence of political Islam. Most intricately, a number of socio-economic problems plaguing most southern Mediterranean countries constituted the underlying causes of the most acute of challenges to Europe (Larrabee et al., 1998: 4-10; Benyaklef, 1997; Romeo, 1998: 22). Failed economic policies, mono-export economies,

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<sup>63</sup> For more details on these issues, see: M.E.S., Selim (2000) ‘Towards a New WMD Agenda in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: An Arab Perspective’, *Mediterranean Politics*, 5(1), pp. 133-157; P. Boniface (2000) ‘Arms Control in the Mediterranean Area: A European Perspective’, *Mediterranean Politics*, 5(1), pp. 167-188; F. Cavatorta (2002) ‘The Failed Liberalisation of Algeria and the International Context: A Legacy of Stable Authoritarianism’ *Journal of North African Studies*, 7 (4), pp. 23-43.

<sup>64</sup> ‘The Algerian Nuclear Problem, 1991: Controversy over the Es Salam Nuclear Reactor’, *Electronic Briefing Book No. 228*, National Security Archive, George Washington University, 10 September 2007. Available at: <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb228/index.htm>

falling oil revenues and the collapse of the global commodity market led to worsening economic performances on the part of SMCs, resulting in spiralling debt burdens across the southern Mediterranean.<sup>65</sup> Paradoxically, southern economies' dependence on the export of raw material and natural resources, such as hydrocarbons, on which Europe is highly dependent, represented in such circumstances another source of concern for the EU (interruption of supplies due to social unrest, deteriorating infrastructure because of lack of investment, etc.) rather than constituting another factor of interdependence between the two shores of the Mediterranean. Besides inhibiting governments' ability to meet their growing populations' demands for welfare and employment, this situation did not help assuage grass-root discontent with the ruling elites causing their credibility to atrophy further. As a result, emigration to Europe became for the marginalised majority of increasingly disillusioned youth the only way to secure a more decent living. Against the widespread feeling of Europe's limited socio-economic capacity of absorption of these increasing flows of immigrants, these trends added to the EU's political and security anxieties vis-à-vis the southern Mediterranean.

Not only had the EU's Mediterranean enlargement translated into the Europeanisation of the new member states' intrinsic security concerns, some of which included territorial interests as in the case of Spain in North Africa, but it also meant that these new EU stakeholders would ensure that the Community's political attention is not entirely consumed by the rapid transformation taking place at the eastern frontier following the disintegration of the Soviet bloc. Astonished by the swift approval of a generous aid package to the newly-independent eastern European countries,<sup>66</sup> new Spanish commissioner for Mediterranean affairs, Abel Matutes, urged the Community to ensure an external relations balancing act with its eastern neighbours through a new approach to the Mediterranean (Pierros et al., 1999: 128). Beyond increased financial assistance, Matutes called in 1989, on behalf of the Commission, for a more comprehensive Mediterranean policy than hitherto pursued by the Community. Having found resonance with the Mediterranean intergovernmental trio that held the Council gavel in 1989 and 1990 (Spain, France and Italy), these efforts culminated in the formulation of a

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<sup>65</sup> In 1989, the total external debt of the Maghreb countries stood at ECU 41 billion, while that for the Mashreq states stood at ECU 53 billion – figures that represented significant proportion of gross national income (Gomez, 2003: 44).

<sup>66</sup> The programme became known by its French acronym PHARE (*Pologne, Hongrie, Assistance à la Restructuration économique*) having been initially destined to Poland and Hungary before being subsequently expanded to cover the rest of what have now become the EU's newest member states following the 2004 and 2007 enlargements.

number of Mediterranean initiatives that aimed to provide sub-regional and/or issue-specific substantive support to the newly approved Redirected Mediterranean Policy (RMP).<sup>67</sup> Be it the 1990 Spanish-Italian proposal for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), the French alternative “5+5” initiative, or ultimately Spain’s 1992 idea of a Euro-Maghreb Partnership, although they all failed to take off to any meaningful operational altitude, these renewed European efforts demonstrated the centrality of Mediterranean security in the post-Cold War EU policy-making calculi and the notable comprehensiveness of the new approach towards the achievement of stability in the region (Barbé, 1998: 120-121). The promulgation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995 consolidated this new European thinking, notwithstanding its heterogeneity, and firmly institutionalised Mediterranean member states’ concerns and preferences as regards achieving southern Mediterranean peace, prosperity and stability.<sup>68</sup>

### *The EU and democracy promotion*

The novelty provided by the systematisation of democracy promotion within the EMP is what loomed large on the evolution of EU-Algerian relations in the 1990s, relegating the more substantive economic and financial chapter to a secondary/intervening variable role. In the context of the Cold War, democratisation was for the European Community a domestic political priority concerned chiefly with the upholding of the democratic *acquis* within the Union’s territory and its diffusion to prospective Mediterranean members. As such, compared with the United States, where systemic structures of democracy assistance in the foreign policy-making sphere had been in existence for slightly longer, by the end of the 1980s the EU – as a unitary organisation – was still considered a neophyte at democracy promotion. Although the strategic constraints of the Cold War meant that western powers saw it as very much contrary to their interests to put at risk key alliances by making relations with other states conditional upon their democratic credentials, US foreign policy has invariably contained a powerful idealist element and promoting democracy abroad has been one of its goals, in one way or another, since the time of Woodrow Wilson. Democracy promotion was then reemphasised in the euphoria of the post-Cold War period under Bill Clinton. By

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<sup>67</sup> The new policy’s content was outlined in CEC (1990), *Redirecting the Community’s Mediterranean Policy: Proposals for the Period 1992-96*, SEC (90) 812 final, Brussels.

<sup>68</sup> For a detailed analysis of the nuanced agenda amongst the various EU ‘policy entrepreneurs’ as regards this new Mediterranean dynamism, see: F. Bicchi (2007) *European Foreign Policy Making toward the Mediterranean* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan).

contrast, for the EU, it was not until the changing patterns of global politics imposed on its leaders a reassessment of its role in the world that democracy promotion emerged as an imperative objective in the pursuit of its strategic interests. Formally, many analysts refer to the adoption of an EC Development Council resolution in November 1991 as a turning point for the EU's commitment for the promotion of democracy in third countries (Olsen, 1998: 344; Gillespie and Youngs, 2002: 5; Youngs 2001a: 2, 2001b: 355). This normative turn was then firmly institutionalised in mainstream foreign policy machinery through the Maastricht treaty and reaffirmed in subsequent treaties, before being endowed with a wide range of policy tools and operational instruments.

Underlying the EU's new democracy policy agenda was the realisation that, unlike the Cold War's strategic configuration, within the new security environment the promotion of democracy was likely to be the optimal guarantee of western interests. Informed by the influential reasoning of the 'democratic peace' theory, the prevailing wisdom in the EU was pervaded by the belief that, by virtue of democratic systems (accountability, transparency, rule of law, cooperation), spreading democracy would reduce the risk of confrontation and ratchet up the prospect of harmony in the international system. Similarly, better political governance was seen as conducive to more effective macro- and micro-economic policies aimed at generating more growth and prosperity. The latter were perceived to be favourable for the EU's business interests, as European commercial entities would be able to operate profitably, and for long-term bottom-up societal and elite transformations in the developing world spurred by the development of the private sector (Gillespie and Youngs, 2002: 9-10). Notwithstanding the limitations and contradictions of the 'democratic peace' reasoning, democracy promotion was credited with reconciling western normative aims with rational concerns.

Concomitantly, the EU's relations with third countries in the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) space, in Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America saw in the late 1980s and early 1990s the earnest introduction of the new democracy promotion agenda through the "contractualisation" of a political commitment to democratic norms and practices. However, parallel to this, such political normative provisions remained conspicuously less

institutionalised in the context of the EU's relations with the Mediterranean countries<sup>69</sup> even after their "renovation" in 1990 through the RMP. Instead, the aim of the EU's express calls for an enhanced political dialogue with the Mediterranean countries seemed limited to mitigating the hostile effect of the Gulf War towards the West in general and Europe in particular,<sup>70</sup> rather than encouraging political reform in these countries. However, the EU's propensity for political passivity towards the Mediterranean was challenged by the European Parliament's (EP) decision in 1992 to withhold its assent for the new fourth protocol aid allocation for Morocco and Syria on human rights grounds.<sup>71</sup> The EP's action generated a great deal of criticism for MEPs, including from European governments, not least for its perceived tangential impact on the more general democratic lacunae in the Mediterranean. It did nonetheless presage the coming of a new European approach to the Mediterranean (Marks 1996: 13).

The exceptionalism applied by the EU to the Mediterranean in the context of its democracy promotion agenda was informed by a set of considerations, said to be particularly germane to the region, militating against the prioritisation of structural political transformation over immediate material concerns. These, argues Youngs (2002), derived from the intertwined issues of migration, political Islam and geographical proximity. While political liberalisation was considered by European governments to be conducive in the long-term to less migratory pressure, the potential of such political change to engender short-term instability and/or benefit Islamists constituted a greater widespread concern amongst policy-makers. In this vein, unease about the prospect of "unwelcome" regime change and its potential impact on migrations flows across the Mediterranean was what prompted European states to significantly tighten their North African immigration controls from 1992 onwards following France's lead in response to the dramatic developments in Algeria. Furthermore, precipitate regime change carried the potential of undermining ongoing negotiations on security cooperation and arms' proliferation which had by then become one of the EU's resonant concerns, as mentioned above. Of more significant influence, however, was the fact that

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<sup>69</sup> In the context of the democratisation literature, the Mediterranean is considered an oblique reference to the Arab countries of the region excluding Israel and Turkey, both considered relatively advanced in "democratic" terms notwithstanding their serious shortcomings.

<sup>70</sup> Widespread protests took place across the Arab street, including in the relatively distant Maghreb countries where France's participation in the US-led coalition against Saddam Hussein was strongly condemned (Seddon, 1991). Western governments decided to reward Mubarak's Egypt for supporting them during the Gulf War by granting a threefold increase in aid and a \$20 billion debt write-off.

<sup>71</sup> The EP's concerns related to Moroccan policies in Western Sahara and Syrian practices towards political prisoners, particularly of Islamist inclination.

European hopes for Arab-Israeli reconciliation and the resolution of the region's longstanding conflict lied with many of the incumbent Arab regimes perceived to be more favourable to existing peace terms than most (Islamist) opposition movements in places like Egypt, Jordan and even Palestine. As a result, and contrary to its own "democratic peace" thinking, the EU preferred to await sustained progress in the elusive Middle East peace process rather than pursue a more active democracy promotion strategy in the Mediterranean (Youngs, 2002: 41-42).

Against this backdrop, the alignment of the Mediterranean policy as of 1995 with the rest of the EU's contractual relations with third countries, in terms of democracy promotion, can be seen as the product of the standardisation of policy imposed by European governments 1993 treaty commitments. The cautious evolution of the EU's policy can also be said to have been the progeny of intra-European *quid pro quo*, which saw the reluctant northern member states' acquiescence to more meaningful financial assistance for the region secure the consent of southern member states to the systematic inclusion of a commitment to democratic principles in EU-Mediterranean relations. Accordingly, the inauguration of the new pan-regional partnership in Barcelona in 1995, which formalised the democracy and human rights promotion agenda at the regional level, signalled a modest reversal of European strategy in the Mediterranean. Indeed, the articulation of this normative commitment in the political chapter of the Barcelona Declaration in vague declaratory terms and its dilution with the "counter-commitment" to non-intervention in the domestic political affairs of each partner was indicative of the EU's preference for incremental consensus-building with its Arab neighbours. The "nesting" of a normative discourse on political reform within a comprehensive range of institutionalised cooperation was seen as crucial for fostering socialisation around a shared commitment to democratic norms. The avowed logic of the Barcelona Process was that political liberalisation, economic reform and cultural understanding would constitute a perfect complementary combination that would ensure well-being, stability and Europe's own security. This was predicated on the judgment that, in the longer-term, political reform would facilitate both stability and moderation in the region, as well as guarantee the best prospects of generating the economic growth that would eventually alleviate migratory pressure.

The pre-eminence of security considerations in the thinking underpinning the EU's long-term partnership approach to political transformation in the Mediterranean indicated that the strong

economic liberalisation element, upon which the methodology of the EMP is predicated, had a more functional than immediately strategic commercial utility. Indeed, outside the energy sector and in spite of forthcoming privatisation processes in other sectors, North Africa offered relatively limited lucrative commercial opportunities compared with the more integrated advanced markets of Latin America and Asia. As such, European business input into the design of the EMP appeared to be limited to seeking the inclusion of more technical economic governance provisions, such as customs and public procurement procedures, dispute settlement mechanisms and fiscal transparency, than broad political reforms (Youngs, 2001a: 63).

Thus, in a region where political structures inherited for the most part from the colonial era had demonstrated formidable reticence in the face of (the need for) political reform, the EU's democracy promotion plan appeared informed by an expectation of spill-over from market-oriented economic reform to political liberalisation. Consequently, in view of the region's limited liberalisation experience, foisted upon it by way of austerity measures by the international financial institutions, it was hoped that the envisaged Euro-Med free trade area (FTA) would encourage more structured reforms, supported by a broad range of institutionalised cooperation and benefits, that would make the desired transition a less painful experience. Clientelistic structures of governances were expected to atrophy with time, leading to greater transparency. Moreover, the momentum amassed by the liberalisation process would, eventually, force elites to relinquish parcels of power over the economic sphere. Crucially for European policy-makers, an important conduit to political liberalisation through economic reform would be provided by foreign direct investment (FDI) (Joffé, 2000; 2005). It was expected that Mediterranean governments would seek to offset the domestic costs incurred by the FTA (lost fiscal income, production cutbacks, rising unemployment, etc.)<sup>72</sup> by providing incentives for FDI, which would translate in a genuine commitment to the adoption of market norms leading to more transparency and less *rentierist* proclivities (Youngs, 2002: 52).

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<sup>72</sup> For more details, see: A. Tovias (1997) 'The Economic Impact of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area on Mediterranean Non-Member Countries', *Mediterranean Politics*, 2(1), pp. 113-128; A. Tovias (2004) 'Economic Liberalism between Theory and Practice', *University of California Institute of European Studies*, Paper No. 040504, available at: <http://repositories.cdlib.org/ics/040504>; E. Kienle (1998) 'Destabilization through Partnership? Euro-Mediterranean Relations after the Barcelona Declaration', *Mediterranean Politics*, 3(2), pp. 1-20; D. Hunt (2002) 'Employment Implications of the Euro-Med Free Trade Agreements', *Journal of North African Studies*, 7 (1), pp. 71-98.



Notwithstanding the merits of the EU's agenda and the sanguine enthusiasm accompanying the introduction of the Euro-Med FTA, many observers cast doubt on the conceptual relevance of the EU's reasoning for the Mediterranean and most felt their scepticism vindicated by the practical deficiencies pertaining to the application of this "grand liberal plan". Overwhelmingly, concern over the impact of the likely costs of the FTA-required adjustment on perceptions of the EU in the Mediterranean countries prevailed. It was feared that the resentment that would result from further socio-economic difficulties would be cashed in upon by the elites to justify dilatory tactics. The selfish EU exclusion of concessions on agricultural and textile products from the prospective FTA was likely to further undermine its transformative potential in the Mediterranean, where agriculture alone employed almost half the workforce (Hunt, 1999: 28-34). What's more, the financial assistance offered by the EU under its MEDA (*mesures d'ajustement/d'accompagnement*) programme, designed to help Mediterranean partner countries mitigate the costs of their transition, was deemed paltry both in absolute and relative terms (Joffé, 1997: 23-26). It was, therefore, not surprising to realise that not only had the EMP's liberalisation process led in some instances to the short-term reinforcement of the nexus between the state and dominant private-sector firms, but it also became clear that harnessing economic liberalisation as a vector for political reform in the Mediterranean was going to be a tall order indeed.

## **II. On the way to Barcelona II: Algeria, "home-grown" liberalisation and the descent into violence**

The late 1980s and early 1990s were also marked by profound transformation in Algeria, paralleling developments in Europe in particular and in the international system more broadly. However, contrary to many other part of the (developing) world, the structural changes experienced by Algeria at this juncture had genealogically little to do with the demise of the Communist bloc and the incipient new world (dis)order. Its experience was part and parcel of the *sui generis* nature and construction process of the Algerian polity since the country's independence in 1962, which although not totally disconnected from the external environment were more reflective of internal dynamics. Commenting on this "uniqueness", North Africa specialist William Quandt summarised Algeria's post-independence tale in the following words:

In the Arab world, Algeria stands out for many things: it was colonised longer and more intensively than any other Arab country; it fought the bloodiest war for independence; it was the most austere socialist of the oil-producing countries in the 1970s; it took the most convincing steps toward democracy in the period 1989–91; and it endured one of the most bloody internal conflicts of any Arab country in the 1990s (As quoted in Bonner et al., 2004: 1).

Undoubtedly, Algeria's modern political history has been one of excesses. Its accession to independence was dramatically earned following a costly eight-year armed popular struggle which put an end to France's 132-year radical colonial rule (Horne, 1987). The sacrifices symbolised by Algeria's War of Independence became subsequently enshrined in the structures and ideologies of the newly-born Algerian state. Leadership, policy and vocation were state components that acquired as a result an inextricable association with the concept of revolution. From domestic to foreign policy, the choices of independent Algeria were in many ways incongruous within the Maghreb and beyond.<sup>73</sup>

As the progeny of the liberation movement, the modern Algerian state was structured around the main organisational pillars of that movement, namely the National Liberation Front (*Front de Libération nationale* – FLN) and its armed wing the National Liberation Army (*Armée de Libération nationale* – ALN).<sup>74</sup> The FLN became constitutionally the single party around which much of the country's civil and political societies were organised, controlling the administration and defining the new “Democratic and Popular Republic's” socio-political policies. These were avowedly predicated on a “specific” form of socialism, straddling precepts of the Latin American, Soviet, Chinese and Ba'athist variants, and strongly rooted in the Arabo-Islamic ideals (Cheriet, 1992: 10). This socialist developmental model pursued by successive governments, under the presidencies of both Ahmed Ben Bella (1962-1965) and Houari Boumédiène (1965-1978),<sup>75</sup> avowedly aimed at consolidating ‘the restoration of the sovereign, democratic, socialist Algerian state within the framework of Islamic principles’,<sup>76</sup> became the lynchpin of the implicit relational contract between the post-independence

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<sup>73</sup> On these themes, see: J.P. Entelis (1986), *Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalised*, (Boulder, CO: Westview).

<sup>74</sup> The ALN is now known as the National Popular Army (*Armée nationale populaire* - ANP) – the constitutional name of the Algerian army.

<sup>75</sup> Colonel Boumédiène, then minister of defence, deposed Ben Bella in a military coup on 19 June 1965. He subsequently suspended the 1963 Constitution, dissolved the National Assembly and FLN's political structures, and presided over a newly-installed “Council of the Revolution” composed mainly of military officials.

<sup>76</sup> Declaration of 1 November 1954 available at: <http://www.el-mouradia.dz/francais/symbole/textes/1nov54.htm>

Algerian elite and society by means of which the latter's political rights were subordinated to the stability and development of the new polity. The army, which by then had become the sole and incontestable power broker in the country as a result of its revolutionary credentials and the solidity of its rank, provided for the regime an oppressive security apparatus charged with the supervision of the implementation of that contract. However, so long as social equality and economic development helped maintain post-independence dignity and enthusiasm, eradicating the vestiges of colonialism was, by and large, more important for Algerians than political freedom (Ruedy, 2005: 195-230; Evans and Phillips, 2007: 67-101).

Imbued with the colonial scars of exploitation and injustice, collective Algerian memory imposed on post-independence foreign policy architects a decidedly radical Third Worldist inclination. Its objectives, as enunciated in the polity's founding ideological texts from the 1962 Tripoli Programme to the National Charter of 1976, were the struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism, and the establishment of a new international economic order (Mortimer, 1984: 2). Capitalising on the international legitimacy conferred upon them by the war of liberation and bolstered by the expertise they had gained in the course of the liberation struggle, Algerian leaders rose fast to influential ranks within North-South relations fora such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77. It was their conviction that genuine political and economic dependence could only be achieved by a developing country if it rid itself of subordination to developed powers which led them to reinvigorate Third World politics and seek a level playing field with former colonial powers. However, this failed to prevent Algeria from developing a quasi-dependent military and, to a certain extent, financial relationship with the Soviet Union, which became its principal arms supplier.

Accordingly, the expression of this anti-imperialism through practical support for independence and revolutionary movements in Latin America (Cuba), Africa (Angola, South Africa, Mozambique), Asia (North Korea) and the Middle East (Palestine), as well as through hard-line posturing in regional organisations such as the Arab League, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and O[A]PEC (Organisation of [Arab] Petroleum-Exporting Countries), brought Algeria's foreign policy stances to loggerheads with most western powers. France, and in turn the European Community, as well as the United States, were most exposed to the radicalism of Algeria's foreign policy in the two decades following its independence. This international agenda was considered the best way of achieving complete emancipation from the perverse hegemony of the "West" in the economic and cultural spheres. Hostile attitude

vis-à-vis the US for instance expressed itself in continuous opposition to American policies in support of Israel to the detriment of Palestinians and Arabs; in support of Fidel Castro's Cuba, and against Morocco for the self-determination of the Western Sahara people.

Acrimonious relations with France, for their part, were compounded by issues relating to the welfare of the large Algerian emigrant community in the Hexagon, trade in agricultural and wine produce and the 1970s nationalisation programme of Algeria, which saw the appropriation of the remainder of French naval and nuclear bases as well as its hydrocarbon interests in the country. Deteriorating relations with France had inevitably a spill-over effect on EC-Algerian relations as illustrated by the relatively tardy conclusion of a cooperation agreement between the two parties in 1976, long after neighbouring Morocco and Tunisia signed theirs in 1969 (Pierros et al., 1999).<sup>77</sup> However, notwithstanding these notable foreign policy divergences, economic relations between Algeria and the West, particularly France and the US, remained healthy. Large hydrocarbon exports were traded for French and US industrial expertise and capital, which were necessary for the realisation of Algeria's 1970s (over-)ambitious industrialisation programme. Indeed, Algeria is one of the four biggest gas producers in the world, enjoying unique export flexibility through both pipeline and LNG (liquefied natural gas) infrastructure, and an underexplored oil producer. As a result, while America became one of Algeria's major oil and gas customers, France (and the EC) was Algeria's main source of imports. Of crucial importance to these powers in their relations with Algeria was also its geo-strategic location as the largest Mediterranean country with borders reaching deep into the Sahel, which was considered pivotal for the stability of North Africa and the western Mediterranean, as it came to be seen in the 1990s.

### ***1. The turn of the 1980s: Democratic pioneering as Algerian exceptionalism***

The grace of Algeria's post-independence years ended with the sudden death of its second (and most respected) president, Houari Boumédiène, in December 1978, following a rare disease. The "socialist revolution" of the Boumédiène regime had been successful in giving substance to the idealistic promises of independence, though following an austere and authoritarian methodology. Economic development, social egalitarianism and international

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<sup>77</sup> For detailed analyses of the contractual relations of Morocco and Tunisia with the EU, see: J. Damis (1998) 'Morocco's 1995 Association Agreement with the European Union', *Journal of North African Studies*, 3 (4), pp. 91-112; B. Chourou (1998) 'The Free-Trade Agreement between Tunisia and the European Union', *Journal of North African Studies*, 3 (1), pp. 25-56.

standing were the main achievements of the Boumédiène years, albeit in many ways marked by profound imbalance and unsustainability. Economic growth was driven largely by the hydrocarbon sector, supporting a heavy capital-intensive (import-substituting) industrialisation that failed to stimulate processes of scale and generate employment opportunities; agrarian reform was far from ensuring agricultural self-sufficiency; and the strategic utility of the Third Worldist, socialist foreign policy choices waned with the looming fall of the Soviet Union. However, despite these shortcomings, Algerians' collective memory, as if having sensed the impending darker days, was unashamedly selective in its idealisation of the Boumédiène experience, for it was indeed with his successor that the fallout of these policy imperfections was going to manifest itself most dramatically.

Against this background, the leadership vacuum left by Boumédiène was going to be hard to fill. His successor, Colonel Chadli Bendjedid, was off to a difficult start having been picked out by his fellow army officers, as the most senior amongst them, against other more predisposed civilian contenders, such as foreign minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika and FLN coordinator Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui. As commander of a regional military department, Chadli was relatively unknown to most Algerians but his political preferences were soon to become more apparent despite the initial rhetoric of continuity pursued following the ratification of his nomination in February 1979.

Beginning with the appointment of his cabinet members, Chadli signalled by purging the majority of Boumédiène's closest allies his intention to slowly but surely "de-Boumédiénise" state institutions and practices. After sidelining key figures of the previous regime, including Bouteflika and Yahiaoui, Chadli named a more reform-minded government. The new team hinted at an apparent departure from previous socio-economic orientations by decreeing a five-year plan (1980-84) that promised a 'better life' for Algerians by notably shifting resources away from heavy industries and relaxing austerity strictures (Ruedy, 2005: 232). Considered against a whole set of other domestic measures promulgated by the Chadli regime, such as the release of former President Ben Bella from prison in 1980 and the abolition of exit-visa requirements to leave the country, these socio-economic adjustments were met with mounting grass-root cynicism fuelled by a feeling that their gist amounted to political manoeuvring aimed at compensating for Chadli's lack of credibility rather than genuinely reforming the polity. Internationally, the process of *recentrage* of foreign policy initiated by the Chadli regime in 1980-81, which began by the successful mediation between

Washington and Tehran for the release of American hostage diplomats and resulted in a notable improvement in Algeria's relations with the US,<sup>78</sup> was also seen as a Chadli strategy of canvassing foreign support to undermine his opponents from the Boumédiène nationalist, socialist old guard. The latter became a clearer trend as the 1980s progressed and the Chadli camp's grip on power became more consolidated. Indeed, boosted by his re-election for a second term by the FLN congress of December 1983 and by the approval two years later by the same FLN assembly of a second more liberal five-year plan, Chadli dropped all pretence at continuity and impartiality and became more strident in favour of reform and against the rigidity of the old guard. In similar vein, he adopted a more accommodationist attitude towards France and Morocco with whom the question of Western Sahara had been (and eventually remained) a contentious issue.<sup>79</sup>

Despite Chadli's measures, the economic situation grew from bad to worse. Reeling from the collapse of oil and gas prices in 1981 and again in 1986, the state of the Algerian economy made grim reading by 1987 under the spiralling effect of a growing import bill for food, capital and consumer goods and a concomitant foreign debt (servicing).<sup>80</sup> Compounded by a growing gangrene of corruption and nepotism, which pervaded the egregious management style of the Chadli regime, this quandary threw into sharper relief the ubiquitous opposition to Chadli on the one hand and deepening divisions between the different ideological factions unleashed by the disintegration of the Boumédiène regime on the other.

The splinter movements that developed between independence in 1962 and 1968 were formed by leading figures within the historic FLN who fell out with either Ben Bella or Boumédiène. For the most part, these movements did not contest the form of the regime so much as the legitimacy of the faction that held power. They represented the thwarted ambitions of losers in the power struggles inside the FLN – Hocine Aït Ahmed, Colonel Mohamed Chaabani,

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<sup>78</sup> As illustrated by the high-level visits that took place between Algiers and Washington in the first half of the 1980s: Vice-President George Bush visited Algiers in 1983 and Chadli made what was the first ever visit by an Algerian head of state to Washington in April 1985. Important economic and military deals were signed during these exchanges.

<sup>79</sup> Warmer relations with France were more the result of the coming to power of the Socialists led by François Mitterrand in 1981 and the apparent willingness of both Chadli and Mitterrand to break the ice that had hitherto paralysed Franco-Algerian relations.

<sup>80</sup> Foreign debt stood at over \$20 billion in 1986, consuming over 50% of hard currency earnings in servicing as oil prices fell to around \$10/barrel in the same year leading to 40% drop in revenues (Ruedy, 2005: 245-6).

Colonel Tahar Zbiri, Krim Belkacem<sup>81</sup> – rather than the interests of a substantial element of the society. Correspondingly, they were inclined to resort to military conspiracies of one kind or another as their preferred *modus operandi*. By contrast, the splinter movements that emerged after Boumédiène’s death represented the main ideological currents within Algerian society. By overtly abandoning Boumédiène’s ambitious social project and failing to replace it with an alternative capable of mobilising popular energies and enthusiasm, Chadli’s tentative liberalisation plan alienated important societal currents and instigated a centrifugal dynamic undercutting the extant centripetal force which allowed the FLN-state to channel the various ideological tendencies in the society. Since, for these tendencies, the lack of an avowable social project deprived the state of any rationale for its dictatorial and corrupt proclivities, they came increasingly to contest the state on ideological grounds. There accordingly developed a vigorous Islamist movement, but also a Berberist movement, a variety of socialist groupings, a fledging liberal-democratic/human rights movement, a feminist movement and so forth. For various reasons, none of these movements were capable of offering an alternative model of governance; only the Islamists seemed able to do so. Against this picture, it is safe to say that it was Chadli’s maladroit political strategising, which (mis)led him to believe that his political interests lay in manipulating the fault-lines of Algerian political society, playing off one movement against the other, that paved the way for the most severe political crisis of post-independence Algeria.

Violent expressions of disenchantment with the Chadli regime and “*le système*” associated with it appeared as early as 1980. Often manifesting themselves in angry protests animated by youth mobs, these movements of protest, which were to become the default mechanism of state-demos “dialogue” for the rest of the decade, were characterised by three underlying dynamics. Demographically, the phenomenon reflected the exponential growth of the Algerian population between independence and the mid-1980s. Encouraged by policy planners, Algeria had one of the highest birth rates in the world, leading its population to reach 23 million from an initial twelve, two-thirds of whom were under twenty-five (Evans and Phillips, 2007: 106). With high ambitions and no living memory of the colonial period, Algerian youth held different ideational references for their (country’s) future adding a vertical fracture along generational lines to emerging horizontal ideological divisions within the Algerian political landscape.

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<sup>81</sup> Aït Ahmed and Zbiri were forced into exile and were only allowed to return to the country by President Chadli. The other two figures were assassinated.

Secondly, dissatisfaction with the regime reflected the state's systematic failure to meet its socio-economic obligations of providing adequate living conditions and equal employment opportunities for the millions of youths entering the job market every year. This further magnified the systemic political alienation of the young generation and imbued most of its political activism with a profound socio-economic vocation. The third dynamic relates to Chadli's myopic political calculations vis-à-vis his opponents and his propensity to court cultural conservatives (*arabisants*) and Islamists as bulwarks against Berberists and leftists. Accordingly, many of the measures promulgated by Chadli, nearly invariably with a stroke of the pen – be it, to cite but a few, the Arabisation of the justice and administrative systems in 1979, the enactment in 1984 of *Shari'a* provisions as a Family Code governing, *inter alia*, matrimonial and patrimonial issues, the revision of the National Charter in 1986, or eventually the legalisation of Islamist parties in 1989 – aggravated more than eased an otherwise deteriorating situation in the country. As such, the events in the Kabyle region of 1980, which became known as the Berber Spring,<sup>82</sup> other manifestations of popular discontent in 1982, 1984, 1985 and 1986 throughout the major urban centres of the country, and, ultimately, the events of October 1988 all reflected the interplay between these dynamics.

At the end of summer 1988, the end of Chadli's second term loomed large over the Algerian political arena. Frustrated with the failure of their reform programme, Chadli and his team of liberal advisors blamed FLN apparatchiks accusing them at best of passive dilatory behaviour and at worst of deliberate sabotaging of the economic liberalisation process. Furthermore, Chadli himself faced growing opposition to his re-election on grounds of policy failure after almost ten years at the helm of the state. The ensuing political tension in the run up to the sixth FLN congress coincided with the *rentrée sociale* (end of summer break and resumption of school and work) and translated into numerous grass-root rumours about an impending general strike. Beginning with some industrial action limited to factories on the outskirts of Algiers, violent protests then erupted around some high schools of the capital on the night of 5 October. The following day, the movement spread like fire throughout the capital and in all major cities of the country and turned in the course of four days into a ransacking and vandalising rampage against all symbols of the FLN-state. As the protests grew stronger and more streamlined as a result of apparent galvanisation by some Islamist leaders, the

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<sup>82</sup> An evocation of the Prague Spring of 1968.



interventions of the security forces displayed more violence resulting in the death and injury of hundreds of young protestors.<sup>83</sup> On 10 October and following a meeting with the main leaders of the Islamist movement, President Chadli addressed the nation in a televised speech in which he laid out in elliptical terms his own grand democratic strategy to meet longstanding popular demands and expectations and thereby overcome the crisis that had engulfed the country. Focusing mainly on political plights, Chadli declared that

...it [was] time to introduce necessary reforms in the political field, and to revise some institutional structures and constitutional foundations in order to adapt them to the next stage...On this matter, a project is being prepared which will be subject to the decision of the People...We will eliminate the current monopoly of responsibility and will permit the official institutions of the State, the Parliament or others, to play their part in the control and monitoring of the State (as quoted in Volpi, 2003: 43).

By choosing to say little about socio-economic woes, Chadli implicitly acknowledged the non-economic genesis of the riots as indicated by the slogans used by the protesters (Roberts, 2002b: 9). His message was widely interpreted as referring to an upcoming liberalisation of the polity and, just as quickly as it erupted, the historic movement of protest which made the month of October of 1988 a “black” one in Algeria’s political history, subsided. What became even clearer as the content of Chadli’s political liberalisation programme was outlined is that the latter was not conceived overnight.<sup>84</sup> The Chadli camp had prepared itself for this moment, which, against all surface appearances to the contrary, appeared engineered to this end.

Following his re-election for a third term in December 1988, Chadli proposed a project for a new constitution that omitted all references to socialism, permitted the creation of ‘associations of a political character’, ended the FLN’s single-party status, and assigned the army to a strictly territorial defence role devoid of any right to interfere in political processes. The proliferation, within a short time of the adoption of the new constitution by referendum in February 1989, of a plethora of political parties, civil society organisations and newspapers,

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<sup>83</sup> Official figures put the number of deaths at 156, whereas independent estimates range between 250 and 500.

<sup>84</sup> Contrary to the declaration of Chadli’s prime minister at the time, Abdelhamid Brahimi, who claimed having no prior knowledge of the president’s plan (Volpi, 2003: 44). The dismissal of Brahimi shortly after the October events may be an indication as to why he may not have been kept in the loop by Chadli.

seemed to suggest that Algeria was indeed ‘on the verge of a democratic breakthrough’, becoming ‘the Arab world’s first democracy’ (Quandt, 2001: viii). But, as it became subsequently clear that the Chadli regime was deliberately encouraging the creation of political parties with quasi-irreconcilable conceptions of the state rather than canvassing alternative programmes for government, hopes for a vibrant Algerian democracy soon vanished (Roberts, 2003: 118). Faithful to its tradition, Algeria was to botch its “home-grown” experience and maintain its individuality as a polity of extremes.

## ***2. Into the abyss: Democratic opportunism and war as the continuation of politics***

‘The most dangerous moment for a bad government is usually when it begins to reform itself...only a great genius can save a ruler who tries to help his subjects after a long oppression.’

(Alexis de Tocqueville, 1998: 222)

Taken at face value, Chadli’s *démarche* was received favourably in Europe reflecting France’s voluble support for his regime’s overture. With the advent of liberalism in Central and Eastern Europe, Chadli’s team felt vindicated further in their approach. However, the legalisation of Islamist parties in explicit contradiction with the constitutional proviso that forbade the existence of religious and regionalist political formations raised eyebrows not only in Europe but also amongst Algeria’s immediate North African neighbours. Indeed, the FLN-controlled parliament decided in September 1989, under pressure from the Presidency, to legally recognise the existence of the Islamic Salvation Front (*Front islamique du Salut*, FIS), an Islamist party representing a coalition of Islamic organisations that had sprung to the fore on the back of the events of October 1988. The avowed rationale which the choice of Chadli’s reinforced team of “reformers”<sup>85</sup> obeyed was predicated on the assumption that, regardless of its virulent rhetoric, the FIS was to help them overcome the remaining stumbling blocks to their liberalisation programme while being contained by two of the *nouvelles donnes* that characterised the Algerian political scene: a) in a pluralistic arena, it would have to contend notably with two other less vigorously radical Islamist parties led by influential figures (HAMAS led by Mahfoud Nahnah and *al-Nahda* led by Abdallah Djaballah), a renovated FLN that could eventually team up with the secular FFS party (*Front des Forces socialistes* – Socialist Forces Front), and the diametrically opposed secular and Berberist RCD

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<sup>85</sup> Mouloud Hamrouche, hitherto an influential liberal (politically and economically) figure in Chadli’s cabinet, was nominated prime minister in September 1989.

party (*Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie* – Rally for Culture and Democracy),<sup>86</sup> b) the rapid modernisation of society that would result from the liberalisation of the economy, the flowing of free-market enterprise and the improved well-being of the electorate.<sup>87</sup>

However sanguine the proponents of this logic were, the reality was that, by the time the euphoria of multi-partism and democratisation settled and adaptation to the new configuration of the polity completed, the FIS had already largely consolidated its grass-root base positioning itself as the strongest political opposition force in the country. Its *montée en puissance* culminated in the victory it achieved in the country's first pluralistic local elections of June 1990, from which it emerged near-hegemonic in the control of local councils of the major urban centres of the country.<sup>88</sup> This emphatic performance emboldened FIS leaders Abassi Madani and Ali Benhadj, whose political discourse was now veering towards calling more vigorously for the establishment of an Islamic state in Algeria. Under the spur of the financial and electioneering dividends deriving from control of local councils, the continuing deterioration of the socio-economic situation and the public anger caused by the Gulf War,<sup>89</sup> the FIS seized the apparent bewilderment of the Chadli regime to wrest the organisation on its own terms of parliamentary elections by the end of 1991. By December of the same year, Chadli was severely weakened as he had to sacrifice Hamrouche, who failed in executing his plan of dissolving the FIS' radical doctrine in "modernist" progress, and the army was preparing to close in on Chadli's room for manoeuvre.

If anything, the results of the first round of the legislative election of 26 December 1991 confirmed that no political party in Algeria was able to confront, individually or jointly with other parties, the sweeping tide of the Islamists.<sup>90</sup> The FIS looked poised to win an

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<sup>86</sup> The FFS led by the historic figure of Hocine Aït Ahmed and the RCD by Saïd Sadi. The RCD was perceived as an almost-strictly Kabyle-based party whose legal recognition was also problematical from a constitutional point of view.

<sup>87</sup> For detailed analyses of the emergence of the FIS, see: M. Willis (1996) *The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History* (NY: NY University Press); ICG (2004) 'Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page', Middle East Report No. 29, Cairo/Brussels.

<sup>88</sup> The FIS polled 4.2 million votes (54 percent of the total and a little over a third of the electorate) and won control of 854 of the 1,581 local councils and 31 of the 48 *Wilaya* (regional) assemblies, with (near-)absolute control in Algiers, Oran, Constantine and Annaba. Only the Berber-dominated Kabyle region and the Saharan provinces escaped the FIS tide (Ruedy, 2005: 253).

<sup>89</sup> For a detailed analysis of the impact of the Gulf War in the Maghreb, see: Y.H. Zoubir (1993) 'Reactions in the Maghreb to the Gulf Crisis and War', *Arab Studies Quarterly*, January.

<sup>90</sup> For detailed analyses of political parties in Algeria, and the Maghreb at large, see: M.J. Willis (2002a) 'Political Parties in the Maghreb: The Illusion of Significance', *Journal of North African Studies*, 7 (2), pp. 1-22;

overwhelming majority of parliamentary seats and form its own government. The FLN, which had benefitted the least from the introduction of multiparty competition, scored a negligible result on the back of a prosaic election programme, whereas the other major contenders were too bogged down with competing for the votes of shared constituencies to represent any challenge whatever to the three-million-voters-strong FIS. Before (what it considered) the unpalatable idea of a FIS legislative victory was realised, the army intervened to interrupt and thereby annul the democratic process and force Chadli to step down from the presidency.

In doing so, on 11 January 1992, the army leadership had to rely not only on its forceful persuasive/dissuasive power but also on political and constitutional Machiavellianism in its attempt to both save face and circumvent further complications. As a result, Chadli's resignation letter announced the prior covert dissolution of parliament. In the face of the resulting dual vacuum of power, the existing constitution was *de facto* suspended as it did not provide for such a scenario. As such, neither the president of the National Assembly nor that of the Constitutional Council were entitled to the interim presidency. Thus, by way of filling this constitutional vacuum and formalising its effective control of the state, the army installed a five-men collective presidency known as the High Committee of State (*Haut Comité d'État* – HCE) tasked with running the country for the remainder of Chadli's term (until December 1993). To confer legitimacy upon this extra-constitutional structure, the army general staff then invited Mohamed Boudiaf, a leading figure of the liberation movement who had lived in exile since 1964, to preside over the Committee and effectively become Algeria's fourth president.<sup>91</sup> From then on, the enactment of the state of emergency and the banning of the FIS added to a chain of events that fuelled an Islamist insurgency pitting FIS militants against government security forces and resulting in the death of tens of thousands of Algerians over the course of a decade *horribilis*. As Algeria's democratic experience went into the abyss, armed conflict took over from electoral rivalry as a violent process of nation-state (de)construction.

With the exception of relations with Mitterrand's France, Chadli did not articulate a clearly discernible European policy, having by then began to lose most of the modicum of domestic

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M.J. Willis (2002b) 'Political Parties in the Maghrib: Ideology and Identification. A Suggested Typology', *Journal of North African Studies*, 7 (3), pp. 1-28

<sup>91</sup> The HCE consisted of Defence Minister General Khaled Nezzar, head of the organisation of War of Independence veterans Ali Kafi, Human Rights Minister Ali Haroun, Rector of the Paris mosque Tidjani Haddam and Boudiaf.

credibility he held as leader. Although Algeria maintained relatively strong commercial relations with countries like Spain, Italy and Germany, it was particularly France which had a *droit de regard* on Algeria's political developments, especially after 1988. Unsurprisingly, international responses to the unfolding Algerian crisis were in the first instance largely instinctive given that outside onlookers failed to foresee the forceful political intervention of the army (Zoubir, 1999: 18). If anything, this *effet de surprise* proved that although foreign powers like France were intimately supportive of Chadli's pluralistic overture, the events immediately following the first round of the 1991 legislative election were totally insulated from outside world interference. The introspective attitude shown in this regard by the architects of the interruption of the electoral process is testimony to their acting in pursuit of their own interests, which, as far as they were concerned, were inextricable from the survival of "Republican order". It also demonstrates their determination to define the crisis as a strictly internal affair, neutralising any prospective foreign meddling.

First to react were Algeria's North African neighbours. Leaders of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia expressed unequivocal support for the new regime in Algiers, urging the international community not to interfere. Apprehensive about the galvanising effect the coming to power of an Islamist regime in Algiers might have on their own Islamist opposition, Mubarak, Kaddafi and Ben Ali preferred to see familiar military rule in Algiers (Volpi, 2003: 57).<sup>92</sup> Morocco's King Hassan II was more ambiguous in his response, as he expressed less voluble support for the military regime in Algiers while regretting that not allowing Islamists to govern would not only prevent them from showing their impotence at high-level governance, but was also likely to radicalise them further. His oblique reference to the missed experimental opportunity with Islamists in Algeria was certainly informed by other strategic considerations pertaining to Morocco's relationship with Algeria. Being less exposed to radical Islamist opposition than other Maghrebi leaders, owing mainly to the status of "Amir El Mouminine" [Commander of the Faithful] conferred upon the Moroccan monarch by the constitution, Hassan II concerns were related to the uncertainty caused by Chadli's dismissal over the future of the issue of Western Sahara and Moroccan-Algerian relations at large, especially that a notable degree of rapprochement between the two leaders became palpable towards the end of the 1980.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> They are all of military background and had come to power, in the cases of Kaddafi and Ben Ali, through military coups.

<sup>93</sup> For more details on this period, see: Y.H. Zoubir (2000) 'Moroccan-Algerian Relations and their Impact on Maghrebi Integration', *Journal of North African Studies*, 5 (3), pp. 43-74.

Among western governments, bewilderment with the dramatic turn of events in Algiers translated into indecisiveness as to the appropriate course of action. In the US, initial 'concern' with the cancellation of the democratic process gave way to a carefully balanced "wait-and-see" attitude which did not exclude the eventuality of a FIS-led government and envisaged opening channels of dialogue with its moderate leaders (Zoubir, 1999: 18). In Europe, southern member states of the EU (Spain, France, Italy) felt most concerned about developments in Algeria because of the potential geopolitical (energy, security) and human (migration) implications of their geographical proximity to the Maghreb, in case Algeria was to become an Islamic republic with contagious effect for its neighbours. Accordingly, Spain and Italy offered prompt support for the regime in Algiers,<sup>94</sup> following France's lead. France, the EU's default Algeria policy shaper, had been behind Chadli's economic and political liberalisation plans from the outset (Bonora-Waisman, 2003: 17-35). As a relatively close relationship developed between Chadli and Mitterrand throughout the 1980s, the spoiling of this rapprochement by an uncompromising military was bound to score extremely low with Mitterrand. The French president was indeed openly critical of Chadli's deposition stopping short of pillorying the army's intervention by depicting it as 'an abnormal act at the very least' (ibid.: 46). Mitterrand maintained a relatively disapproving attitude towards the new military regime for the rest of his presidency, though less rigidly so towards the end of his term (May 1995), for he was probably never fond of the return of the FLN's old guard to power in Algeria. However, his successive Socialist (until April 1993) and cohabitation (April 1993-May 1995) governments articulated a much more nuanced policy towards the unfolding Algerian crisis. France's commercial interests in Algeria, the importance of the size of the Algerian community in France and stability of the wider Maghreb were all factors that imposed a rational approach on the part of the French establishment towards Algeria.

The essence of France's conception of the nature of the Algerian crisis was economic. The rise of the Islamist *intégristes* was seen as a fundamental manifestation of failed economic development and its remedy had to concomitantly be substantively economic (Howorth, 1996: 158). Accordingly, French policy during this period consisted for the most part of trying to keep the Algerian regime afloat by providing it with financial lifelines to help it both overcome its severe economic woes and fight the insurgency. In the same vein, instead of normative strictures, attached to the allocation of funds were demands for the acceptance of

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<sup>94</sup> The Spanish government offered a \$1 billion export credit to Algeria and Italy's state-owned utility company ENI signed an important gas deal with Algeria's Sonatrach (Volpi, 2003: 111).

an International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment programme, the implementation of a privatisation programme and the liberalisation of the hydrocarbon sector. As a result, beginning in 1992, Algeria benefitted from a \$1.5 billion refinancing deal with a group of private creditors led by the French state-owned bank *Crédit Lyonnais* (Volpi, 2003: 110). Following suit, the European Parliament (EP) sanctioned the adoption of Algeria's Fourth Financial Protocol within the very same vote that suspended those of Morocco and Syria on human rights grounds. A further ECU400 million balance-of-payment loan was granted to the Algerian government by the European Commission, stipulating that its second instalment (ECU150 million) would be disbursed subject to the Algerian authorities satisfactory implementation of certain market-oriented reform by notably accepting an IMF programme (Roberts, 2003: 322; Gomez, 2003: 154).

The economic determinism of France's strategy began to wane in 1994 when the Algerian government concluded a deal with the IMF and began consolidating its authority and being no longer under threat of being toppled by the Islamist insurgency. With the coming of Jacques Chirac to power in 1995 and the spilling over of the Algerian conflict on French soil in the summer/fall of the same year, France's attitude towards the Algerian crisis was more thoroughly reassessed. Support for the Algerian regime became more explicitly conditional upon political progress towards democratisation and more criticism was now being voiced on the lack thereof (see following chapter). To this end, France's policy became deliberately more Europeanised, "hiding" behind Communitarian discourse and policies for the achievement of its more engaged objectives. In this regard, the inauguration of the Barcelona Process in 1995 came as a timely development, especially as it was imbued with a strong normative dimension. It allowed the French government to diffuse the tensions besetting bilateral relations between France and Algeria, benefiting when needed from the "cover" of internal EU dynamics. As a result of this attitudinal shift in France, the EU assumed by default a more proactive policy towards Algeria as became evident from 1997 onwards (Youngs, 2002; Morisse-Schilbach, 1999).

At the same time, the priorities of the Algerian regime derived from its existential dilemma as it contrived to improve its nationalist credentials in order to justify and win support for its claim of "saving democracy". On the other hand, it was desperate to assuage the economic distress of important sections of the Algerian populations, which the regime needed to win back from the Islamist rebellion, without the prohibitive cost of agreeing to debt rescheduling

and IMF intervention since this meant surrendering Algeria's national sovereignty in the economic sphere and thus the regime's own nationalist legitimacy. On the first account, important efforts were made to turn the HCE into a façade of nationalism and national consensus, starting with the solicitation of Mohamed Boudiaf. After the latter's assassination a mere six months after his rapturous return to the country in January 1992, the same logic brought Ali Kafi and Belaïd Abdesselam to the helm of the state as, respectively, president of the HCE and prime minister/minister of economy. Kafi was secretary general of the war veterans' association and well known for his support for Arabisation, an important element of Islamists' appeal. Abdesselam had founded Sonatrach, Algeria's national oil and gas company, and as the architect of Algeria's industrialisation programme under Boumédiène he had a nationalist reputation that remained intact. To obviate recourse to the IMF and debt rescheduling, the strategy of these successive governments was predicated on the liberalisation of the hydrocarbon sector – the country's main source of income – with the aim of shoring up investment and redressing severe current account deficits especially after the fall of oil prices with the end of the Gulf War. Selective privatisation of state-owned industries was also envisaged, but lack of foreign investor interest for fear of instability undermined the government's policies. Vis-à-vis the EU, such priorities translated into relative political disinterest in European policy activism in the Mediterranean, such as the RMP, with the exception of the improved accompanying financial packages which were perceived as a valuable source of relief for the dire credit posture of the country. Even talks of the creation of a Euro-Maghreb partnership with Tunisia and Morocco did not spur active political interest on the part of Algerian decision-makers, who were still preoccupied by the incipient crisis and unaware of the impending diplomatic embargo to which they were going to be confined.<sup>95</sup>

Under mounting pressure from heavy external debt servicing payments, most of them related to short- and medium-term borrowing during the late 1980s and early 1990s, Algeria's "war economy" strategy began to limp and the re-profiling of the debt became inescapable. Moreover, the escalation of violence during the first half of 1993 and increasing targeting of European "expats" by armed Islamist groups were a prelude to a new phase in the Algerian conflict marked by a tense climate of fear. The ensuing pressure on the regime changed the

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<sup>95</sup> Interview, Algerian diplomat, Brussels, 12/03/07.



balance of power between army commanders, giving the faction more favourable towards an IMF deal the upper hand.

With the support of France, which had conditioned financial and technical assistance to debt rescheduling, the regime replaced Abdesselam with the more economically liberal R dha Malek whose new government promptly signalled its willingness to reschedule. By the time a (painful) deal with the IMF was reached in May 1994, the regime began devising a more robust counter-insurgency strategy and its survival seemed no longer threatened. Consequently, with the internationalisation of the conflict beginning with the targeting of Westerners in Algeria, managing ensuing external pressure became for the regime at least as, if not more, important as cultivating a nationalist image at home. This became clearer with the appointment of Defence Minister, General Liamine Zeroual, to the position of “Head of State” in January 1994, when the regime’s priority became the return to constitutional rule through the organisation of national elections and the initiation of a *national* political dialogue to that end – both increasingly reoccurring demands of the international community. Though, domestically, this turn of events (new head of state, more violence, new strategy) precipitated the polarisation between so-called “eradicators” and “conciliators” that had hitherto only mildly pervaded the Algerian power structure,<sup>96</sup> internationally it rendered the improvement of the country’s reputation and the breaking of the regime’s isolation matters of national mobilisation. In this context, the EU’s convening of the Barcelona conference in November 1995 to inaugurate the regional Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, presented Algerian policy-makers with a unique diplomatic opportunity to defend its policy choices through direct dialogue with European countries (without having to go through France) and seek support for its counter-insurgency strategy.

### III. Conclusion

The foregoing account has charted the developments that marked the evolutions of both the EU and Algeria in the decade leading up to the Barcelona conference of 1995 in an attempt to dissect the ideational and strategic predispositions of both actors upon the ratification of the Barcelona Declaration. The aim of this chapter is to lay the ground for the forthcoming analysis of the origins of the dyad’s priorities in 1995 and their subsequent evolution through

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<sup>96</sup> Eradicators advocated all-out war against the Islamist insurgency (*le tout-s curitaire*), whereas conciliators favoured the option of dialogue with moderates and even the rehabilitation of the FIS in some instances.

interaction in the context of the EMP. The exercise focuses on the political, economic and social developments considered pertinent to the policy areas under consideration in this study; i.e. democracy promotion and security cooperation, free trade and energy cooperation, migration.

Beginning with the EU, this chapter revisited the evolution of the formulation process of a more coherent Mediterranean policy against the background of the Community's 1980s southern enlargement and the realisation in the post-Cold War order of the pressing nature of challenges in the southern Mediterranean countries, such as political Islamism, economic underdevelopment and protracted authoritarianism. It also traced the evolution of European democracy promotion strategies and their particular deployment in the southern Mediterranean. In doing so, it identified a linkage, albeit somewhat loose, between the standardisation of democracy promotion in EU-Mediterranean relations and the development of an institutionalised, multi-vectored cooperation framework. In this context, the EU's functional logic towards the encouragement of long-term political transformation in the Mediterranean on the basis of economic liberalisation was questioned against its inherent contradictions and practical incoherence particularly in the case of the Mediterranean. What's more, the EU's propensity to prioritise security concerns over normative commitments in its relations with Mediterranean neighbours is most visible in its relations with Algeria, which, for the period under consideration, embodied the EU's major political (Islamism, military rule, terrorism), economic (bankruptcy, mono-export economy) and social (migration) concerns.

The evolution of the Algerian polity between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s was more dramatic and complicated and as such required a more elaborate account than the one devoted to the EU. This chapter argued that Algeria has invariably been different from its North African neighbours, both in absolute terms and in relation to the EU. It has retraced the polity's post-independence trajectories, showing how the events of 1988 were part and parcel of the country's *sui generis* evolution. The introduction of pluralism in the late 1980s stemmed from the idiosyncrasies of Algeria's power structures and was little influenced by external developments. However, the violence paradoxically engendered by this liberalisation process had international repercussions, notably on the EU. Not only did Algeria's conflict with Islamist extremism spill-over physically into Europe, but it had profound implications

for Euro-Algerian relations owing to the nature of the EU's reaction to the crisis and its impact on Algeria's policy choices (This is discussed in more depth in the following chapter).

The following chapter will delve into the political dimension of EU-Algerian relations in the context of the Barcelona Process, focusing on issues of democracy promotion and security cooperation. It will start by identifying the interests of both parties in relation to these policy areas in 1995 and analyse their evolution through to 2005. It will aim throughout to dissect the impact of interaction in the Barcelona context on the evolution of the dyad's priorities.

### **Chapter three – Political and security partnership: Bridging differences through extra-EMP processes**

Of all three “baskets” of the Barcelona Declaration, the chapter on political and security cooperation is arguably, by virtue of its loftier normative and strategic desiderata, the most challenging. It embodies the aspiration of achieving peace and stability in a region where both have been elusive for the most part of the post-Cold War years. Bolstered on the one hand by a sense of western moral prevalence in international relations and on the other by a window of optimism for the resolution of the Middle East conflict, European member states proffered in this chapter the construction of a cooperative and democratic Mediterranean region with the aim of pursuing their own interests (Hollis, 2000: 109). In effect, much of the substantive content of the other two *volets* of Barcelona (free trade area and cultural dialogue) was devised with an avowedly long-term functional purpose relative to the concept of peace and security of the first pillar (Kienle, 1998: 2-4). Overriding faith was placed in the potential of economic integration and increased human interaction to generate prosperity and ratchet up mutual understanding, result in political liberalisation and stem traditional security threats associated with the Mediterranean. As a result, for many, long-term success in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has become synonymous with the achievement of its political and security objectives (Schmid, 2002; Attinà, 2004: 14). Frustratingly, however, these have been relatively slow to materialise, for even if the architects of the Barcelona Process ensured by design that it is conceptually disconnected from the many inter-state conflicts besetting the Mediterranean region, endemic regional rivalries and animosities were soon to catch up with EMP and inhibit its operational advances (Schumacher, 2004a: 89).

Even if the political chapter was the most directly affected of EMP elements by the protraction of the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbours, it was still hoped that the symbiotic design of the Barcelona model would ensure slow but continuous progress in the first chapter, in parallel with the relative successes being realised in the other areas. In the context of EU-Algerian relations more specifically, the provisions of the political and security partnership were at a premium for both parties. Their priorities in this area were such that upholding the potential of the first pillar in advancing political and security cooperation became an objective in its own right given the modest progress in the economic and cultural spheres.

This chapter will dissect the interests of the EU and Algeria within the political and security dimension of the Barcelona Process. It will identify what the preferences of both actors were, in terms of political reform and security cooperation, at the launch of the EMP in 1995, and trace their evolution throughout the first decade of the Partnership. In doing so, it will provide an analysis of the ideational and strategic origins of these interests and highlight, where relevant, the impact that interaction within this framework had on the evolution of the dyad's interests. The analysis will proceed following a temporal sequence, divided into two periods: *before* the signing of the Association Agreement (1995-2001) and *after* its adoption (2002-2005). Reflecting two different types of interaction (one contractualised through an AA and the other not), this periodisation shall help discern the impact of the adoption of the AA on the evolution of the priorities of the EU and Algeria. Prior to this, the next section will outline the main characteristics of the political and security chapter with the aim of revisiting its main developments in the period under study.

### **I. Content of the political and security basket: Steady progress towards stagnation**

The formulation of the political and security component of the EMP owes much to a number of factors, notably Europe's experience with the CSCE/OSCE model,<sup>97</sup> the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty as regards the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for the EU, and the improved prospects of peace in the Middle East post-Oslo accords (Edis, 1998: 95). Despite the fact that the political and security partnership has been on the whole limited to soft issues, being in essence an exercise in European power projection aimed at dealing with security threats in terms that the EU itself can articulate (Joffé, 2001: 31), it was bound to touch some sensitive nerves because of the nature of regional wounds. Even if the terms it was couched in were rather vague, especially compared with the second basket, the mechanisms envisaged in the first chapter for the operationalisation of its objectives were to prove problematical in more ways than one.

The stated overall aim of the first pillar of the Barcelona Declaration is to 'establish an area of peace and stability' to be achieved through a range of commitments to the promotion, encouragement and upholding of a number of principles and objectives.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> Although the overall design of the EMP is more reflective of the EU experience than the OSCE model. For more details, see (Bicchi, 2004: 16-22; EuroMeSCo, 2005: 15).

<sup>98</sup> Barcelona Declaration, 28 November 1995: [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/euromed/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm).

- develop the rule of law, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, under the proviso of respect for national political, economic and social specificities;
- peaceful settlement of internal and external disputes;
- cooperate in preventing and combating terrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking;
- promote a regional security environment conducive to good neighbourly relations and cooperation;
- pursue a viable strategy for the eradication of weapons of mass destruction and discouraging recourse to conventional arms accumulation in the region;
- elaborate confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM) aimed at creating an area of stability, with a view to eventually establish a Euro-Mediterranean “pact” to that effect.

Following the Barcelona conference of 1995, however, the ambitious security agenda of the first basket was scaled down, initially as a result of the emerging process of priority approximation and consensus-building amongst partners, but subsequently in response to increasingly deteriorating Arab-Israeli relations and the concomitant need to mitigate the effect of resulting controversies. The question of terrorism, for instance, was at the core of a protracted ‘interpreting game’ between Israelis on the one hand and Syrian and Lebanese representatives on the other, which saw each side seeking to qualify references to terrorism in the Barcelona Declaration based on their respective priorities (Bicchi and Martin, 2006: 201). Cooperation in the fight against terrorism in the framework of the Barcelona Process became subsequently pervaded with scepticism on both sides of the Mediterranean, as was demonstrably the case with Algeria. Furthermore, the Action Plan approved at the first meeting of the partners in May 1996 listed six areas of dialogue (enumerated above), amongst which, preventive diplomacy, CSBM and partners’ participation in international human rights conventions were prioritised (Hollis, 2000: 111; Balfour, 2004: 13).

However, the proposed “Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability” was to be the backbone of the first chapter of the EMP as it was intended as an instrument of the implementation of the principles of the Barcelona Declaration where issues of peace and stability were concerned.<sup>99</sup> The proposal, though originally sponsored by France and Malta and conceived as a ‘Stability Pact’, was an attempted reproduction of the (Edouard) Balladur Plan for a “Pact on Stability in Europe”, and as such more a progeny of French diplomatic

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<sup>99</sup> Chairman’s formal conclusions, Third Euro-Med Conference of Foreign Ministers, Stuttgart, 15-16 April 1999: [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/euromed/conf/stutg\\_conc\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/conf/stutg_conc_en.pdf).

activism than anything else (Xenakis and Chrysochoou, 2001: 77; Adler and Crawford, 2004: 33; Attinà, 2004: 15). As soon as it was mooted, the idea of a pact was confronted by Arab political sensitivities relating to colonialism and Israeli enmity, raising southern suspicions over Europe's true intentions within the EMP: too much emphasis on security cooperation from the outset, at the expense of other aspects of cooperation, was seen as a blatant indication of the EU's overriding security concerns in its approach to the Mediterranean (Gomez, 2003: 79; Jünemann, 1998: 367). Consequently, "pact" gave way to "charter" but the road ahead remained rocky.

The enunciated conceptual separation of the remit of the Barcelona Process from the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) was put to the test almost as soon as the Barcelona conference was over. Starting with the deferral of the original idea of holding the follow up Euro-Med ministerial conference in Tunis, the exposure of the conduct of Barcelona business to the vicissitudes of the MEPP, following the coming to power of Israeli hardliner Benjamin Netanyahu in May 1996, was soon to have a visible effect on the actual substance of the EMP. Deteriorating Arab-Israeli relations mainly as a result of Netanyahu's policy of settlement expansion in East Jerusalem brought the question of conflict in the Middle East to the centre-stage of the EMP's second ministerial conference, which took place in Malta on 15-16 April 1997, and pushed the main agenda of the Partnership to the wayside (Peters, 2004: 20). Thereafter, not only was the MEPP *de facto* recognised as a security variable to contend with in and through the region's cooperation policy frameworks (EuroMeSCo, 2002a: 7), but political decisions on the Charter for Peace and Stability were put on the backburner pending more favourable 'political circumstances'.<sup>100</sup> Meanwhile, the only concrete measures that could be implemented in the framework of the first pillar concerned the establishment of a regional network of foreign policy institutes known as EuroMeSCo,<sup>101</sup> the holding in Malta of regular information and training seminars for junior diplomats from both shores of the Mediterranean, and a pilot project on cooperation among civil protection services in disaster relief (Commission of the European Communities, 2002: 14).

Taking account of the Malta setback and the many political difficulties that emerged subsequently as a result of worsening violence in the Middle East, the third ministerial

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<sup>100</sup> Conclusions, Second Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, Malta, 15-16 April 1997: [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/euromed/conf/malta\\_conc\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/conf/malta_conc_en.pdf).

<sup>101</sup> Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission, which built on its "Mediterranean" forerunner MeSCo (Heller, 2001: 76).

meeting of Stuttgart in 1999, which took place after the “rescue meeting” in Palermo, reiterated the importance still attached by the partners to the Charter project and adapted the language used to define its *finalité* to the prevailing circumstances. More specifically, it was recalled that ‘stability in the Mediterranean region requires a comprehensive and balanced approach in order to address common security concerns, strengthen cooperation and adopt measures conducive to stability’, and the Charter was felt to be optimal for the provision of ‘an enhanced political dialogue as well as the evolutionary and progressive development of *partnership-building measures*, good-neighbourly relations, regional cooperation and preventive diplomacy’ (Chairman’s conclusions, 1999: 2 – added emphasis). The apparent abandonment of the initial notion of confidence-building measures,<sup>102</sup> with its CSBM variant, in favour of the less contentious partnership-building measures (PBM) implied a readjustment of focus away from “hard” security considerations and more towards the tackling of the type of “soft” security issues pervading the Mediterranean (Aliboni, 2000: 7). The shift was also reflective of a learning process among EU partner states as regards the security perceptions of their southern (Arab) counterparts as well as differences in security cultures north and south of the Mediterranean, as crystallised by the negative reaction of Maghreb states to the creation of EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR by their south-western European partners (Attinà, 2004; Chourou, 2001: 63; Soltan, 2004).<sup>103</sup> For Arab Mediterranean states, reluctance to engage fully in the proposed European security frameworks, even under the banner of “peace and stability” within the EMP, stemmed from the fact that most of them were either unwilling to normalise relations, or were otherwise officially at war, with Israel without a comprehensive peace deal (Heller, 2001: 79; Peters, 2004: 23). If Europeans believed that the EMP was able to preclude future conflict without directly resolving existing ones, Arabs considered the latter to be a pre-condition of the former.

Despite the continuing deterioration of political conditions in the Middle East, the discursive shift introduced in the Stuttgart conference in relation to Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation as well as the adoption in the same meeting of “Guidelines for Elaborating a Euro-Mediterranean Charter”, for Senior Officials to use as a basis for drafting the text of the

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<sup>102</sup> For an overview of CBMs in the Mediterranean, see: C. Spencer (1997) ‘Building Confidence in the Mediterranean’, *Mediterranean Politics*, 2(2), pp. 23-48.

<sup>103</sup> EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR stand for “European Operational Rapid Force” and “European Maritime Force”. They were both set up in 1995 and are composed of forces from Spain, France, Italy and Portugal. Both were answerable to the Western European Union (WEU), and since the latter’s integration into the EU both have become part of the ESDP. They were both tasked with performing the “Petersburg Tasks” of humanitarian, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions. For more details, see: <http://www.eurofor.it>.



Charter, gave cause for optimism as to the emergent collaborative dynamic within (and the prospects of) the EMP's political dialogue (Balfour, 2004: 14). Furthermore, Commission documents reviewing and outlining plans for the 'reinvigoration' of the Barcelona Process echoed this attachment by encouraging the adoption of the Charter at the Marseille conference due to take place in November 2000 (Commission of the European Communities, 2000a; 2000b). However, as the year 2000 unfolded, the regional political context deteriorated further and final hopes for the revival of Israeli-Palestinian talks faded. The failure of outgoing US President Clinton's last attempt to clinch a peace deal between Israelis and Palestinians in the summer was swiftly followed by then Israel's defence minister Ariel Sharon's provocative visit to the *Haram al-Sharif*<sup>104</sup> in East Jerusalem, amounting to the final straw in what was already a highly explosive situation (Spencer, 2001a: 84-85). The violence unleashed through what became known as Palestinians' second "Intifada" (or uprising) bore a direct impact on the fourth Euro-Mediterranean conference of foreign ministers which took place in Marseille on 15-16 November, not least as a result of the boycott of the meeting by the Syrian and Lebanese delegations by way of protest at Israel's oppressive policies against Palestinians. In view of such acrimonious atmosphere, the only achievement of the Marseille conference was that it took place at all (Gillespie, 2002b: 106), and the French presidency decided to defer *sine die* the adoption of the Charter 'owing to the political context'.<sup>105</sup>

By the time of the Valencia gathering in April 2002, hopes for making any further progress on the Charter had almost vanished. The concluding remarks of the Spanish presidency made no reference to the Charter, while the adopted Action Plan confined to a single sentence future work on the document by 'confirming the mandate of the Senior Officials' towards the adoption of the Charter 'whenever the political situation allows' – without defining what the latter caveat consists of or how to go about achieving it.<sup>106</sup> In addition to the "contamination" of the Barcelona Process by the worsening conflict in the Middle East, the fallout from the events of 11 September 2001 in the United States (hereafter 9/11) exacerbated in many respects the existing political chasm between the partners on both shores of the Mediterranean (Jünemann, 2004). However, this did not seem to dissuade Spanish diplomats from seeking the introduction of novel elements to the Barcelona Process in the hope of stimulating a

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<sup>104</sup> Also known as the Temple Mount, home to Islam's third holiest site, al-Aqsa Mosque as well as the Dome of the Rock. Its Western Wall is the holiest site in Judaism.

<sup>105</sup> Presidency's formal conclusions, Fourth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, Marseille, 15-16 November 2000: [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/00006.en0.html](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/00006.en0.html).

<sup>106</sup> Valencia Action Plan, Fifth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, Valencia, 22-23 April 2002: <http://www.euromedbarcelona.org/NR/rdonlyres/DB32785E-6693-486F-A847-7861CF97AC04/542/PlandeValencia.pdf>.

reinvigoration dynamic. The most significant of the Action Plan's proposed measures concerned the creation of a dialogue on a) matters related to Europe's nascent Security and Defence Policy (ESDP); b) a 'Regional Co-operation Programme in the field of justice, in combating drugs, organised crime and terrorism as well as co-operation in the treatment of issues relating to the social integration of migrants, migration and movement of people' (JHA, see below); c) Dialogue between cultures and civilisations (Gillespie, 2002b; Balfour 2004: 14). The Valencia conference also attempted to address the admittedly lopsided nature of the EMP by institutionalising a sense of more meaningful "co-ownership" of the Process, notably by reviewing the structural modalities of the Euro-Med Committee and considering holding ministerial conferences alternately in northern and southern partner countries (Gillespie, 2002b: 113-114).

The attempted resuscitation of the EMP's security cooperation programme after the failure of the envisaged project of a Charter for Peace and Stability, through the initiation of a dialogue on defence matters, was another indication of the European origins of the policy dialectics of Euro-Mediterranean relations. The advocated (re)turn towards the prioritisation of "hard" security cooperation, though this time not totally at the expense of "soft(er)" security issues (as will be seen below), was directly informed by the EU's propensity for inward reflection in its search for policy responses to the emergence of external challenges (EuroMeSCo, 2004: 11-12; Jünemann, 2003a: 2).<sup>107</sup> Starting with the publication by the Council of the EU of the Common Strategy on the Mediterranean in June 2000<sup>108</sup> and culminating in the Valencia Action Plan, EU references to the need for deepening political dialogue to accommodate recent developments pertaining to the ESDP became more consolidated (European Council, 2000). Having initially introduced the ESDP in (reaction to) the galvanising context of the humanitarian crisis of the Balkans in the latter half of the 1990s, the EU's hopes for the development of a fully-fledged defence capability were subsequently bolstered by Franco-British convergence to this end after the St Malo summit in 1998 (Jünemann, 2003b: 38). In the aftermath of 9/11, ESDP gained more credence and its utility in the Euro-Mediterranean

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<sup>107</sup> An EU behavioural trait described by one Algerian diplomat as 'autistic' (Interview, Brussels, 31 Jan. 2007).

<sup>108</sup> "Common strategies" were developed as new EU foreign policy instruments by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 (entered into force in 1999) with the aim of consolidating Maastricht's CFSP provisions. The Common Mediterranean Strategy was adopted after the publication of those for Russia and Ukraine, ostensibly to take stock of the EMP's progress and to give it greater coherence, but visibly as a result of European internal foreign policy-making dynamics. For more on the Common Mediterranean Strategy, see: C. Spencer (2001b) 'The EU and Common Strategies: The Revealing Case of the Mediterranean', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 6 (1), pp. 31-51

context became more justified in the eyes of European policy-makers. However, before this new-found vector of Euro-Med security cooperation could yield any tangible results, the EU had to spend considerable resources to dissipate residual southern scepticism related to the EUROFOR/EUROMARFOR experience (EuroMeSCo, 2002b). Despite modest successes to this effect, as illustrated by the elaboration of a disaster management project and the participation of troops from SMCs (Morocco) in some ESDP missions (Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Althea”), the ESDP dialogue failed to become the default forum for security cooperation within the EMP for a number of reasons (Tanner, 2005; Balfour, 2004: 16). To cite (but not dwell on) the most important of these obstacles, one could easily point to the impact that the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 had on the security subjectivities of SMCs, reviving their existing sceptical reflexes vis-à-vis security cooperation with the West (and by extension the EU) even if in some instances this was more a reaction to Arab popular pressure than the product of elite convictions. The Iraq war had also crystallised the profound divergences dividing EU member states over issues of CFSP, hindering the development of ESDP into an effective policy framework (Schäfer and Ibrahim, 2005). In the end, the introduction of the European Neighbourhood Policy, with its avowed preference for bilateralism, confined security cooperation in the Mediterranean to sub-regional programmes at best, with the increasing terrorist threat consolidating its “justice and home affairs” (JHA) variant (Pace, 2007).

With Euro-Mediterranean efforts to construct collective security arrangements bogged down one way or another by a combination of structural and conjunctural deficits, and against a background of emerging new challenges in the form of diffuse terrorist threats and concomitant inter-cultural and inter-community tensions, the EU saw in its incipient JHA agenda an appropriate policy framework to endow the EMP with the necessary tools to address the region’s predicaments. Indeed, with European longstanding concerns over Mediterranean immigration issues peaking towards the end of the 1990s, warranting the consolidation of the Community’s migration policies, the Tampere meeting of the European Council in October 1999 spurred the development of a more effective JHA policy package (Monar, 2001). As a result, and contrary to the ESDP dialogue which received a relatively brief mention, the Common Mediterranean Strategy of 2000 contained a whole section on JHA advocating specific policy and cooperation initiatives and reflecting the growth of EU shared competences in the area which were inexistent at the time of the Barcelona conference. By the time of the Valencia ministerial conference, partner activities at the level of JHA

Senior Officials had intensified especially after the events of 9/11, leading to the endorsement by foreign ministers in 2002 of ‘a regional programme’ codifying cooperation on JHA matters (Bicchi, 2002: 8; Gillespie, 2003a: 28).

The chosen institutional venue for the deployment of this programmatic novelty was the third chapter of the Barcelona Declaration within which, it was contemplated, pertinent security issues would be addressed alongside a more meaningful cross-cultural dialogue. Third basket provisions had hitherto only been timidly pursued leaving enough uncharted territory for partners to capitalise on in the hope to regain some momentum with the Barcelona Process at a time when serious cracks were beginning to show on the first and second pillars (Gillespie, 2003a: 24). Reactions from MPCs to the “externalisation” of European JHA priorities through the EMP agenda seemed overall collaborative, although reservations about issues such as terrorism and the modalities of cooperation on migration were (expectedly) forthcoming (Wolff, 2006). Despite the fact that part of the rationale for the shift of agenda focus in Valencia more towards the social and cultural component of the EMP was informed by a willingness to circumvent over-politicised issues, the integration of controversial JHA matters such as migration and terrorism in the same chapter was likely to spoil the enthusiasm shown on both shores for an enhanced cultural dialogue.

However, by the time of the Barcelona summit of 2005, celebrating the tenth anniversary of the EMP, concrete cultural proposals such as the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean foundation had materialised through the launch in 2005 of the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures.<sup>109</sup> Similarly, cooperation on terrorism and other JHA matters became more firmly institutionalised through the inclusion of specific provisions in the so-called “new generation” association agreements, concluded belatedly with Algeria and Lebanon notably, the prioritisation of JHA programmes in the Commission’s Regional Strategy Paper 2002-2006,<sup>110</sup> and the introduction of a “twinning” programme (similar to the system in place for candidate countries) in areas of cooperation that

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<sup>109</sup> Named after the late Swedish Foreign Minister, Anna Lindh, who was behind her country’s voluntarism in the area of cultural dialogue within the Euro-Mediterranean context. The Foundation is based in Alexandria, with offices partly located in the Bibliotheca Alexandrina and partly in the premises of the Swedish Institute in Alexandria. It has been conceived as a ‘network of networks’ of civil society organisations from both shores in the aim of bridging cultural gaps between them. For more information: <http://www.euromedalex.org/Home/EN/Home.aspx>.

<sup>110</sup> The purpose of Regional Strategy Papers is to provide a strategic framework for programming the regional envelope of the European Community’s MEDA assistance programme. The 2002-2006 Paper is available here: [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/euromed/rsp/02\\_06\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/rsp/02_06_en.pdf).

require high levels of expertise such as border-management, judicial cooperation and crime prevention (EuroMeSCo, 2005: 68). Moreover, if anything, the outcome of the 2005 summit confirmed that JHA and terrorism had become priority issue areas on the agenda of the Barcelona Process, as illustrated by the adoption of a “Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct for Countering Terrorism” and a Five-Year Work Plan which seemed to reconfigure the Barcelona Declaration by setting “Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security” as a pillar of cooperation *à part entière*.<sup>111</sup> If the adoption of the Counter-terrorism code of conduct can be seen as the progeny of the British presidency under the stewardship of Tony Blair (June–December 2005), reflecting the UK’s international pro-activism in this area especially after the London terrorist attacks of 7 July 2005, the separation of other JHA issues from the third basket of the Barcelona Declaration is more an indication of the momentum gained by migration issues and cooperation in the Mediterranean.

The faltering fate of the EMP’s security component did not prevent the Mediterranean initiatives of other western (European) security organisations from knowing less troubled fortunes. As is well known, the end of the Cold War was not only behind the EU’s energised policy pro-activism in the Mediterranean, but it also led to the emergence of a number of geographically-broader and thematically-specific security cooperation frameworks. Be it the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO), the WEU or the OSCE, all came up with their often-overlapping versions of Mediterranean dialogue overtures, contributing to the emergence of a crowded regional policy architecture (Bin, 1997).<sup>112</sup> NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, by far the most substantive framework, has been the most productive practical initiative owing in part to the Alliance’s organisational stability and coherence but most importantly as a result of US involvement and strong bilateral emphasis. Southern Mediterranean countries have shown more active interest in NATO’s proposed security partnership despite the perceived bias in the US approach to the Middle East conflict, knowing they are likely to face less normative strictures and more practical added value than with former European colonial powers (Fenech, 1997).<sup>113</sup> This said, it is fair to recognise that the revival in 2002 of the western Mediterranean “5+5” dialogue has given rise to an efficient sub-regional forum where regular security exchanges between the five south-western European countries (Portugal, Spain, France, Malta

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<sup>111</sup> Five Year Work Programme: [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/euromed/summit1105/five\\_years\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/summit1105/five_years_en.pdf).

<sup>112</sup> NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue was launched in 1994 and encompasses seven Mediterranean countries (Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel and Jordan); the WEU’s Mediterranean Initiative was introduced in 1992 and included Cyprus and Malta; the OSCE’s dialogue initiative was launched in 1994.

<sup>113</sup> Interview, retired army officer, Algiers, 09/11/05.

and Italy) and their North African counterparts (Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya) take place, despite the sub-system's own endemic obstacles (Western Sahara, troubled bilateral North-South relations, Ceuta and Melilla, etc.).

### ***The political reform dimension: Between stagnation and subordination***

The nexus between internal political reform in MPCs and regional (in)stability was identified from the outset by the Barcelona Declaration as central to efforts of region-building within the EMP. The balanced overall pursuit of both goals was enshrined in the "Barcelona philosophy" as crucial not only to the success of the first chapter but to a satisfactory performance of the Partnership as a whole. However, while by the end of the first phase of the Barcelona Process (1995-2000) security cooperation had become a recurrent subject in Euro-Med interactions (not necessarily as a reflection of progress) democracy promotion seemed to have slipped into a more tenuous position despite being equally compromised by the EMP's contextual shortcomings and the EU's half-hearted elaboration of a pertinent policy roadmap (Youngs, 2005: 2). Arguably, and despite appearances to the contrary, the events of 9/11, marking the beginning of the second phase, reinforced this situation as the securitisation of political dialogue in the Mediterranean tipped the balance to the detriment of political liberalisation notwithstanding the increasingly widespread recognition of the link between terrorism and political repression (Gillespie, 2004: 12).

It is commonly held that the EU's focus on normative orientations in its foreign relations is an exercise in identity-projection and reproduction, transcending shrewd rationalist calculations (Gillespie and Youngs, 2003: 2-3). This would partly explain the fact that when political modernisation was being invoked by the EU as a motive for the launch of the EMP, debate on Arab reform was scarcely audible elsewhere, especially across the Atlantic. In reality however, far from being a unanimous deliberation, the inclusion of political reform in the Barcelona agenda was the product of undercurrent dynamics of very much rationalist, institutional decision-making processes involving compromises between Commission officials and southern member states on the one hand and the European Parliament and Nordic states on the other (Gillespie, 2004: 4).<sup>114</sup> Aware of these intra-European fault-lines, Arab SMCs adhered to the proposed venture expecting benefits to outweigh costs and

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<sup>114</sup> For more details on the EU North-South compromises in the Barcelona Process, see: R. Gillespie (1997a) 'Northern European Perceptions of the Barcelona Process', *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals*, 37.

knowing reasonably well that its democracy promotion pretensions could be eventually 'neutralised' (ibid.: 5).<sup>115</sup> In any case, the EU approach to political change in the Mediterranean adhered typically to a philosophy of gradualism and relied on notions of soft power, peer pressure, persuasion and cooperative partnership. Policies aimed directly at identifiable democratic progress have been weaker than those aimed more generally at facilitating the osmotic drift of societal and political values. The development of a wide range of social, cultural and economic cooperation has been deemed to provide for the self-enlightenment of Arab actors exposed to European norms (Youngs, 2004b: 8-14).

In practice, through both bottom-up (support of grass-root civil society organisations) and top-down (socialising or coercing government actors) strategies, the EU's efforts did not exert significant diplomatic pressure on southern Mediterranean governments for far-reaching democratic reform. Serious consideration was not given to invoking the democratic conditionality clause, included in all EMP association agreements. Nor were aid allocations oriented uniformly towards the more reformist Mediterranean states. Notable increases in MEDA aid were granted to states such as Egypt and Tunisia where democratic rights were increasingly restricted. New political dialogue initiated under the EMP did not focus on issues of internal political reforms in any specific or primary fashion; it was acknowledged that these discussions rather concentrated on challenges related to the Middle East Peace Process (Youngs, 2005: 2). In addition, no systematic dialogue on democracy with Islamist opposition forces was developed, and no common EU line emerged on whether this was desirable (Gillespie, 2004: 7).

In terms of funding priorities and levels of diplomatic attention, economic reform, mitigating drugs trafficking, environmental protection and population control all assumed higher priority than encouragement for political reform in the Arab partners of the EMP. The scale of human rights and democracy funding allocated to the Mediterranean was limited. The Commission's democracy and human rights budget line – initially MEDA Democracy, subsequently the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) – allocated €36 million to the Mediterranean partners in support of 171 projects up to the end of 2002. This represented significantly less funding than was provided for Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe

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<sup>115</sup> For comparisons of European and Arab perceptions of democracy in the context of the EMP, see: R. Gillespie and R. Youngs (2003) 'Democracy and the EMP: European and Arab Perspectives', EuroMeSCo Brief No. 6, IEEI, Lisbon; EuroMeSCo. (2004a) 'Common Languages on Democracy in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership', Working Group I, Second Year Report, IEEI, Lisbon.

and sub-Saharan Africa (Stetter, 2003: 157). Moreover, most of these “democracy” funds went in practice to relatively soft projects, supporting NGOs working on developmental or environmental issues and generic priorities such as cooperation with unions on labour rights, and women’s rights projects typically covering family status issues (Youngs, 2006: 4). Besides divisions among member states on modalities of democracy promotion such as conditionality, a more vigorous performance on the part of the EU was hampered by the availability of the “partnership” rhetoric card to SMCs allowing them to defuse any European attempt to apply pressure (Gillespie, 2004: 8).

For fear of regime destabilisation and the advent of hostile Islamist forces to power, or as a showcase illustration of sheer impotence, the effectiveness of EU democracy promotion efforts within the EMP showed serious limitations. The intensification of the terrorist threat and the sense of urgency of immediate security imperatives it instilled added a new layer of considerations whose implications are difficult to ignore. Indeed, several strands of policy, developed under the Barcelona Process since 9/11, have sat uneasily with, if not directly undercut, its political reform objectives (Joffé, 2008a).

Besides the setbacks imposed on the political reform agenda of the EMP by the trust deficit between Arab and European partners resulting primarily from the perceived injustices in the Middle East, the events triggered by the attacks of 9/11 and the Bush administration’s “global war on terror” have had further inhibiting consequences on democracy promotion efforts in the Mediterranean. Despite the apparent renewed focus on Middle East reform induced by post-9/11 transatlantic pertinent policy reassessments, the subsequent European mobilisation of the Barcelona Process reflected a far from critical review of the EU’s approach to Arab reform. Rhetorical commitments<sup>116</sup> to the need to imbue the EMP’s political reform policies with more effectual content are said to amount to nothing more than a response to the new US forceful activity in this area (Gillespie, 2004: 15; Youngs, 2005: 3). Still, there has not been the same discernible and qualitative rupture in EU discourse as in US strategic pronouncements.

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<sup>116</sup> See for instance: Commission of the European Communities (2003b). *Reinvigorating EU Actions on Human Rights and Democratisation with Mediterranean Partners*, Brussels, COM (2003) 294 final; European Council (2003) *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December.



Correspondingly, while member state governments were introducing new democracy promotion initiatives in the region, such as Germany's Task Force for Dialogue with the Islamic World, France's *zone de solidarité prioritaire*, the UK's Engaging with the Islamic World Group, and similar programmes across the foreign affairs apparatuses in Denmark, Holland and Sweden (Youngs, 2004b: 6), EU spending priorities told a different story. Indeed, the region's share of funds from the EIDHR has declined since 2001 (Youngs, 2005: 3). Furthermore, the EU has increasingly used its economic and political leverage to encourage Arab governments' cooperation on controlling illegal migration and sharing information on counter-terrorism, and less on encouraging democratic reform in those countries. EU spending priorities would seem to support this criticism. Some of the largest new aid projects have gone to projects to reduce migration pressures, with Morocco receiving a €40 million allocation for such a programme. A €250 million fund for cooperation on controlling migration was introduced by the EU in February 2004. A €2 million MEDA-funded project carried out by the European Police College and police forces from five member states commenced in March 2004 with the aim of enhancing cooperation with southern Mediterranean police forces on 'fighting terrorism' and 'human trafficking' (*Euromed Synopsis* 262, 4 March 2004). What's more, in December 2005 EU ministers agreed to devote €800 million to controlling illegal immigration from or via the southern Mediterranean after a series of deaths among African emigration candidates at the Ceuta and Melilla borders. In contrast, EU governments allocated a paltry €10 million in the same year to EIDHR democracy promotion projects in the region (Youngs, 2006: 2).

Similarly, a focus on counter-terrorist cooperation with Mediterranean regimes has been reflected in much of the most conspicuous new EMP activity since the attacks of 9/11. Since the end of 2001, the EU has insisted that anti-terrorism cooperation clauses be inserted in all new third country agreements, an obligation applied to Algeria in the concluding stages of its association agreement negotiations. After the May 2003 terrorist bombings in Casablanca, several European governments assisted Morocco's introduction of tough anti-terrorist provisions that had strongly negative human rights repercussions (Kausch, 2008). Counter-terrorist cooperation has been formally included as part of EMP ministerial meetings, with substantive discussions and experience-sharing underway by 2004. An initiative to intensify security cooperation with southern Mediterranean governments under the ESDP rubric was launched by the Spanish presidency in 2002. By the autumn of 2004 cooperation on ESDP was regularised somewhat, while the EU's new non-proliferation initiative incorporated a

regional disarmament and WMD control process to be applied in the Mediterranean (EuroMeSCo, 2004b: 10). As a result, EU reengagement with Syria and Libya focused in the first instance on issues of WMD proliferation than domestic political reform (Youngs, 2005:8).

Despite the securitisation of political cooperation with SMCs, the introduction of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003 – in anticipation of the EU’s biggest enlargement to date – brought fresh hopes for the revival of the EMP’s ambitions for political change. Purporting to foster ‘a ring of friends’ on the EU’s post-2004 enlargement periphery (Commission of the European Communities, 2003a; 2004), the ENP was said to build on the EMP *acquis* in the Mediterranean and free up the possibilities of cooperation on specific economic and political reforms by differentiating between Mediterranean states. This differentiated bilateral approach offered, through the medium of Action Plans, southern partners (as well as new eastern neighbours of the EU) the prospect of deeper involvement in a wide range of EU policies amounting to ‘everything but the institutions’.<sup>117</sup> Besides the conceptual and operational novelty introduced by the ENP, observers were enthusiastic about the potential impact that the shifting of the EU’s centre of gravity more to the East could have on diluting the ‘conservative instincts of the front-line southern member states’ when it comes to political reform in the Mediterranean (Gillespie, 2004: 15).

For all its promises, the biggest problem with the EU approach is that the incentives offered under the ENP are too stingy to alter the calculations of local regimes. Despite the new “Governance Facility”,<sup>118</sup> overall levels of aid to the southern Mediterranean remain low compared, for example, with sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, most northern EU member states want to see aid resources diverted away from middle income SMCs towards the least developed countries in Africa (neglecting the fact that pockets of deep poverty exist within Arab states). On the other hand, the ENP cannot offer Arab states the two things they want most: full access to the single market and free movement of workers. Although the November

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<sup>117</sup> For more details, see: M. Emerson (2004) ‘European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy or Placebo?’, CEPS Working Document No. 215, CEPS, Brussels; N. Tocci (2005) ‘Does the ENP Respond to the EU’s Post-Enlargement Challenges?’, *The International Spectator*, XL (1), pp. 21-32; J. Kelley (2006) ‘New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European Neighbourhood Policy’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 44 (1), pp. 29-55.

<sup>118</sup> A new tool introduced by the European Commission in 2006 to encourage political reform in ENP countries, Commission of the European Communities (2006a). Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels, COM (2006), 726 final.

2005 Barcelona summit committed the EU to further liberalise its agricultural and textile markets, this was hedged with numerous 'exceptions' to market opening, notwithstanding a few bilateral agreements as in the case of Morocco. On migration, there is even less scope: most member states are in favour of tightening up rather than liberalising their immigration regimes. As a result, the logic of 'everything bar the institutions' is bereft precisely of what was arguably the most potent leverage over democratic reform in southern and eastern Europe, namely the prospect of governments gaining voting rights and thus formal influence over EU policies as a *quid pro quo* for political liberalisation (Tocci, 2005: 30).

Even more damaging to the ENP than all these policy shortcomings has been Europe's response to the Hamas victory in the Palestinian elections of January 2006. The EU's attempt to persuade Hamas to renounce violence and recognise Israel's right to exist may have been justified, but the perception in the Middle East is that the EU has been as guilty as the US in calling for democracy, but then refusing to recognise one of the region's first democratically elected governments because the result was not to its liking. Far from rewarding democracy, the EU moved quickly to suspend aid programmes, without waiting to see if such support and engagement could influence the behaviour of the new Hamas government. The EU even contradicted its own policy of pressing for a more parliamentary style of government in the Palestinian territories by switching its support to President Abbas, to circumvent the Hamas-led legislature. None of this is to suggest that Hamas represents model liberal values, but the EU's behaviour tends to undermine its credibility in the region.

Adding to this, the merging of both MEDA and EIDHR funds into a single ENP financial instrument (ENPI), which requires the assent of SMC governments for the disbursement of packages, threatens to leave strategy towards the region without a pool of resources ring-fenced specifically for democracy assistance (Youngs, 2005: 6). In short, the EMP and, even more so, the Neighbourhood Policy have been good at setting the general parameters for political reform; they have so far been poor at engaging to prompt and provide incentives for changes on more detailed issues impacting in significant ways on the political life of southern Mediterranean states. Yet, the mere resilience of the EMP in the face of the numerous obstacles it has had to face over the years is seen by the EU as evidence of a cooperation momentum within the Process likely to lead to a 'de-politicisation of political dialogue in the Mediterranean (Gillespie, 2004: 20).

## II. The priorities of the EU and Algeria in the framework of the first pillar

The EU's post-Cold War incipient concerns with democracy promotion and security challenges in North Africa were to play out in the quandary posed by the political crisis that erupted in Algeria in 1992. The delicate balance between immediate rational (security) imperatives and lasting political reforms, upon which the long-term success of the EU's new political engagement in the Mediterranean was predicated, was put to the test in the most dramatic of Algeria's post-independence political experiments. The unsatisfactory outcome of the democratisation process initiated in this pivotal country with considerable hydrocarbon reserves was arguably one of the most potent near-abroad challenges for the EU's nascent common foreign policy apparatus.<sup>119</sup> If, on the one hand, the advent to power in Algiers – even through the ballot – of an Islamist regime with a professed anti-western-democratic outlook was deemed an unwelcome prospect, on the other hand, the systematic integration of democracy promotion in the European body politic rendered the countenance of secular “lesser-evil” democratisation outcomes less comfortable.

As a result, the revocation of the electoral process by Algerian military commanders in January 1992, under the pretence of safeguarding democracy, brought before the EU an unprecedented political dilemma: to condemn the cancellation of a democratic election whose outcome would have brought to power an Islamist regime with an ambiguous commitment to democracy (Heristchi, 2004), or to subordinate democracy promotion to the imperative of (unguaranteed) stability even if that meant dealing with an instinctively oppressive military regime. The initial round of Algeria's first pluralist legislative election took place on 26 December 1991, after being deferred for six months following the ‘quasi-insurrection’ orchestrated by FIS leaders in the streets of the capital in opposition to a new unfair electoral law designed by the Hamrouche government, in the hope of shoring up the FLN at the expense of the Islamists (Zoubir, 1995: 126). Neither the vigorous crackdown on FIS militants at the hands of the security forces following the declaration of a state of siege on 5 June, nor the imprisonment of its influential leaders Abassi Madani and Ali Benhadj and the ensuing internal struggle between radical and moderate forces within the Islamist movement over its future courses of action, prevented the inevitable victory of the FIS in the first round.

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<sup>119</sup> The fallout from the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1992 was the other major challenge. ‘A pivotal state is so important regionally that its collapse would spell trans-boundary mayhem...A pivotal state's steady economic progress and stability...would bolster its region's economic vitality and political soundness’ (Zoubir, 1999: 15).

Ironically, even with one million fewer votes than in the local elections of the previous year, representing less than 25 percent of registered voters,<sup>120</sup> the FIS was poised to claim a comfortable majority of parliamentary seats after the second round and circumvent the formation of a coalition government hoped for by President Chadli Bendjedid (Pierre and Quandt, 1996: 8; Volpi, 2003: 51; Bouandel, 2003: 11). Indeed, the last of Chadli's maladroit calculations in his misadventure with Algeria's Islamists led him to envisage negotiating a power-sharing deal with the FIS' moderate faction headed by the party's interim leader Abdelkader Hachani, involving *inter alia* the sidelining of radical elements within both the army and the FIS (Willis, 1996: 238-239). However, for military commanders, this was the last straw that warranted intervention to put an end to the president's tenure and void the electoral process (Zoubir, 1995: 129).<sup>121</sup> Their doing so on 11 January 1992 marked the onset of a new political era in Algeria, characterised by a systematic deconstruction of the nascent democratic institutional framework in juxtaposition with the total militarisation of policy processes and institutions, and by the institutionalisation of violence as a form of political expression at the levels of state and society (Martinez, 2004; Kouaouci, 2004; Joffé, 2002). Thousands of FIS party militants were incarcerated by the regime in ad hoc prison camps in the Sahara desert, a state of emergency was enacted in February, and the party of the FIS was outlawed the following month. Simultaneously, calls for "*jihad*" and rumours about the formation of an Islamist *maquis* [guerrilla] proliferated throughout the major cities of Algeria, causing widespread distress across "the silent majority" of the population.

In terms of foreign policy, these domestic developments led to greater isolation of Algerian decision-makers. This was due to their express concerns to thwart foreign interference by any means, especially following allegations that countries like Sudan, Iran and Saudi Arabia had been supporting FIS leaders in the pursuit of their own revolution in Algeria. This served as an excuse to prevent western governments from meddling in the incipient crisis – a strategy informed by the desire of army commanders to insulate their military coup from foreign criticism.

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<sup>120</sup> The FIS polled 3.26 million votes, only 24.59 percent of the electorate. On a low turnout this amounted to 47.27 percent of the total vote and enabled the FIS to win 188 seats outright and its candidates to gain the lead in 143 of the 198 undecided seats. Hocine Aït Ahmed's FFS won 25 seats, mainly in Kabylia, the FLN a mere sixteen nationwide and Independents three. These results pointed to the FIS ultimately gaining around 75 percent of the seats in the new Assembly (Zoubir, 1995: 128).

<sup>121</sup> According to Isabelle Werenfels, some thirty army officers were involved in making this decision, of whom three objected to the halting of the election process (2007: 182, fn. 60).

The reactions of western governments to the democratic interregnum and the ensuing drama in Algeria are instructive in many respects as regards their attitudes towards the *problématique* of democracy—Islamism—strategic interests. To begin with, if a limited number of seasoned Algeria observers (official and independent) had foreseen the eventuality of a political quagmire as a result of the liberalisation process, many in Europe and the United States were surprised, if not bewildered, by the dramatic turn of events in January 1992.

In the US, initial apparent confusion gave way to a determined expression of impartiality vis-à-vis the main protagonists of the erupting Algerian conflict, refraining from condemning either side's choices whilst urging respect of normative commitments. Subsequently, however, a number of considerations, informed principally by the nature of US-Algerian relations which had hitherto lacked significant ideological and material ties and by the spectre of the Iran experience, led US officials to adopt a largely accommodationist attitude towards the FIS, in the hope at best of encouraging a compromise between the regime and non-violent Islamists and at worst of precluding another hostile Islamist regime should the FIS succeed in coming to power in Algiers. With the withering of the latter prospect, however, the Clinton administration's attitude shifted towards offering conditional support to President Zeroual's government by notably fostering economic and political reforms (Zoubir, 1999; Pinto, 1998; Zoubir and Bouandel, 1998a; Spencer, 1996). This US behaviour reinforced Algeria's scepticism of the role of outside actors in the crisis and was to serve as an excuse to dismiss upcoming peace efforts such as the Rome Platform.

On the other hand, European pronouncements on the internal politics of Algeria have invariably been a source of difficulty, particularly for French governments. As a result of the history of Franco-Algerian relations, not only were the French assumed by their European partners to be the 'only outsiders to understand what goes on in Algeria and why', but France's interests in its former colony were often deferred to as denominators of a "common" Algeria policy (Spencer, 1998a: 174-5). Consequently, in the aftermath of the interruption of the electoral process in Algeria and during much of the ensuing crisis, France took the lead in the formulation of the EU's Algeria policy. Accordingly, its lack of cohesion notwithstanding, the European response to the unfolding Algeria crisis – insofar as it intermittently amounted to a collective policy – consisted largely of ensuring the survival of the Algerian regime against an increasingly virulent Islamist insurgency, which itself helped influence EU deliberations. Far from seeking to address the rights and wrongs of the military intervention,

the modalities of such EU policy were rooted in economic determinism which imputed the origins of Islamism to failed developmental economic policy. Between financial assistance and IMF negotiations, France's unwavering support for the Algerian regime as a lesser-evil, guarantor of French interests in Algeria and beyond pervaded the EU's logic (Jünemann, 2000: 112). It was not until the collapse of the regime was deemed no longer a possibility, after 1995,<sup>122</sup> that a modest degree of discernible rhetorical political conditionality integrated the EU's approach towards the Algerian crisis. This, however, provided the Algerian regime with a card to play against Brussels – the French card – whenever relations with the EU warranted such strategising. Furthermore, with the subsequent gradual retreat of France from the forefront of EU's Algeria policy, the nuances pervading pertinent European thinking became more visible, as evidently exposed in 1997-98.

All in all, on the eve of the Barcelona conference of 1995, there seemed to be a convergence of priorities between the EU and Algeria as far as the promotion of democracy was concerned. Survival of the Algerian state in its existing configuration, with all the privileges and interests that this preserved for local and European actors, was the overriding objective of decision-makers on both shores of the Mediterranean. So long as the FIS, though dismembered, continued to be perceived as a threat to national and regional orders, shoring up military authority and inhibiting the party-political scene in Algeria were considered legitimate means to that end. However, the short-sightedness of this strategy was not only to prove costly in the short-term but, most importantly, it laid an infertile ground for longer-term democracy cooperation between the EU and Algeria.

### *1. Before the signing of the AA, 1995-2001*

Against the background of growing uncertainty, the assassination of President Mohamed Boudiaf in June 1992 threw into disarray the urban mass audience, captivated by the FIS between 1989 and 1991, into which the first HCE president had managed to make successful

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<sup>122</sup> 1995 saw a relative subsiding of violence especially in major urban areas. Additionally, the IMF and debt-rescheduling agreements provided reasonable breathing space for the regime allowing the acquisition of vital counter-insurgency military equipment. Finally, the successful holding of the presidential election was not only a positive step towards the return to constitutional rule, but it was also an illustration of mass opposition to the violence and of the failure of the Islamists to win over the support of the population. What's more, a sense of victory had predominated since 1995 amongst army leaders, as illustrated by the interview with "General X" in the magazine *Politique internationale*: 'In military terms, we broke their back (*Groupe islamique armé*, GIA) towards the end of 1994. The worst period was spring 1994, when the GIA and to a lesser extent the AIS (*Armée islamique du Salut*) took the initiative in several areas by attacking economic and military targets...But since 1995 the wind has changed direction once and for all', *Politique internationale*, No. 79, Paris, 1998.

inroads since his return to Algeria. What's more, the contemptuously brutal circumstances of his death, imputed by public opinion to one or another faction of the regime, deprived the military-backed authorities of both historic and patriotic credentials, and the prospect of future democratic legitimacy. The elimination of the only political figure in Algeria capable of rallying genuine popular support led not only to the further de-legitimisation of the state but also encouraged the growth of the Islamist insurgency.

Consequently, the immediate primary concern for the HCE regime was to patch up a reasonable measure of legitimacy to preclude further disillusioned FIS and non-FIS constituents from joining and/or providing support for the rebellion. Accordingly, most political decisions taken by the regime in the course of the year following the death of Boudiaf served no other purpose but to give a semblance of continuity with his nationalistic enterprise, which implied a return to the radical foreign policy discourse of the 1970s.<sup>123</sup> But the failure of this strategy, in the face of the increasing intensity of the violence and mounting foreign criticism following the internationalisation (increasing outside interest) of the conflict, saw the regime broach the issue of dialogue with opposition parties in response also to the looming expiry of the HCE's (failed) mandate at the end of 1993. Unable to reinstate constitutional rule, members of the collegial Presidency had to figure out a new formula for the continuation of the "transition", but one that took account of their lack of legitimacy on the one hand and accommodated their determination to stay in power on the other. Thus, the purpose of the proposed dialogue initiated at the end of 1993 with national political actors was to secure a transfer of legitimacy for the extended transitional rule through both domestic and international endorsements (Roberts, 2003: 168; Bonora-Waisman, 2003: 68).

Despite protracted efforts, the National Dialogue Commission, charged by the army with overseeing the dialogue process, failed to achieve consensus amongst the major political parties of the FLN and the FFS on the post-HCE formula.<sup>124</sup> Disagreements between political leaders and army commanders on the rehabilitation of the FIS and its inclusion in the attempted reconciliation overture translated into a boycott by most political parties of the National Dialogue Conference, scheduled for the end of January 1994 to sanction the

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<sup>123</sup> Most notably the appointments of the nationalists Ali Kafi as the new head of the HCE and Belaïd Abdesselam as prime and economy minister.

<sup>124</sup> The plan consisted of restoring "a state Presidency", a government and a National Transition Council as a surrogate for the Consultative National Council set under Boudiaf in replacement of the dissolved National Assembly (Bonora-Waisman, 2003: 68).



modalities of the transition period (Bonora-Waisman, 2003: 68). In view of the resulting resounding debacle, and the reported refusal of Abdelaziz Bouteflika to be nominated interim president,<sup>125</sup> there was nothing for it but for the army to unceremoniously appoint Defence Minister, Liamine Zeroual, as “head of the state” on 30 January 1994 (Ruedy, 2005: 263). In the meantime, a return to a more conciliatory foreign policy tone towards the “West” was favoured by the new leaders of the HCE, with a view to obtaining a financial lifeline from the country’s creditors.

Out of conviction, but also as a means of shoring up his legitimacy and authority, Zeroual favoured from the outset an approach of dialogue, and one which was predicated on inclusiveness. This policy preference differentiated his outlook from that of his more hard-line, eradicator regime peers.<sup>126</sup> His reputation as an honourable military man, not involved in army business between 1989 and 1993, predisposed his conciliatory approach to Algeria’s political predicament to find positive resonance with large sections of society, with major political parties and even with Islamist leaders (Roberts, 2003: 157). However, it was within the regime itself that the numerous overtures initiated accordingly by Zeroual in 1994 ran into fierce opposition. Between direct talks with Abassi Madani and Ali Benhadj, and the release from prison of a number of influential members of the FIS, Zeroual’s efforts ran into the ground in the autumn having found no army support, political and otherwise (Bonora-Waisman, 2003: 72-75). Rather than give up, however, Zeroual managed to subsequently wrestle concessions from the army *état-major* to agree to holding an early presidential election in 1995 which he hoped would help him formalise the popular support he had enjoyed and convert it into political capital for a more autonomous pursuance of his policies, including with the Algeria’s main European interlocutor, France, which had failed to show unambiguous support for Zeroual.<sup>127</sup>

Why Zeroual was half-heartedly allowed by regime hardliners to engage in dialogue with the Islamists in 1994 is not clear. However, what became apparent in retrospect is that discussions were permitted so long as they revolved around peripheral issues and did not tackle substantive matters. This may have been part of a strategy conceived by army commanders to

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<sup>125</sup> Bouteflika is said to have refused to serve under army control, a condition which army commanders found unacceptable.

<sup>126</sup> For more details on the eradicator and conciliator tendencies within the Algeria’s body politic, see: Y.H. Zoubir (1998) ‘The Algerian Political Crisis: Origins and Prospects for the Future of Democracy’, *Journal of North African Studies*, 3 (1), pp. 74-100; (Roberts, 2003: 151-159).

<sup>127</sup> His appointment as a head of state in 1994 was for a three-year “transition period”.

buy time from an increasingly sceptical international community while negotiating an IMF deal, or a way of discrediting the conciliatory faction of the FIS by blaming the failure of an otherwise doomed dialogue on Islamist intransigence. Whatever it was, sensing a lack of genuine commitment to dialogue by the regime, Algeria's main political parties ("the Fronts") decided to convene a distinct dialogue process under the auspices of the Catholic Sant'Egidio community in Rome. Following a first round of talks at the end of November 1994, a joint document titled 'Platform for a Political and Peaceful Solution to Algeria's Crisis', setting out a roadmap for a return to the electoral process and the renunciation of terrorist violence, was adopted in January 1995.<sup>128</sup> Except for the eradicationist parties of the RCD and *Ettahaddi* ["Defiance"], in addition to the hesitant HAMAS (Movement for an Islamic Society) and PRA (*Parti du Renouveau algérien*), all parties of substance including the FIS adhered to this 'National Contract', which was deemed largely constructive by the international community.<sup>129</sup> Despite being deliberately couched in unprovocative terms and distanced from the traditionally vilifying blame-game of the crisis, the Rome Platform was swiftly dismissed by the Algerian government on grounds of foreign sponsorship and interference. Accepting the foreign-facilitated proposal would have been suicidal from an Algerian foreign-policy point of view, some believed.<sup>130</sup>

Against a background of flaring violence, seriously threatening foreign especially French interests in Algeria – as demonstrated by the hijacking at Algiers airport of an Air France aircraft on 24 December 1994 – and its subsequent spill over to France's major cities, the decision of the Algerian regime to reject outright a valuable opportunity to put an end to the crisis precipitated its international isolation. By this time, the discourse of European governments seemed increasingly focused on encouraging dialogue with the FIS as the only means to a lasting political solution to the conflict. This development reflected, more or less, France's incipient discursive shift towards the Algerian crisis, expressed most volubly by foreign minister Alain Juppé (Morisse-Schilbach, 1999: 82; Holm, 1998: 107). However, while France's attitudinal shift was the product of a combination of electoral considerations, more consolidated EU Mediterranean policy activism, and increasing international pressure for more pertinent action in Algeria, the apparent adjustment in the EU's position was a

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<sup>128</sup> The text of the document can be found in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, March 1995, p. 7. An English version was also published in *Mideast Mirror*, 16 January 1995, and is available in (Pierre and Quandt, 1996).

<sup>129</sup> The FIS was represented by its two most senior officials not imprisoned by the regime, Rabah Kébir and Anwar Haddam, based respectively in Germany and the US.

<sup>130</sup> For an instructive account on the Rome initiative and the reaction of Algiers, see (Roberts, 2003: 171-177).

confirmation that its Algeria policy was still little more than just the sum of French predilections. Indeed, the French presidency of the EU in the first half of 1995 represented a timely opportunity for the French government to use the European platform in order to placate public opinion, satisfy its European and US partners, and start bullying the Algerian regime. The latter, aware of the rising French tide, became desperate for broader international support, particularly from the EU. After the closure in the summer 1994 of the European Commission's office in Algiers and its earlier rejection of the Algerian government's request to broach exploratory negotiations for a new contractual agreement under the Euro-Maghreb Partnership (Morisse-Schilbach, 1999: 84-87), the Algerian regime hoped for a more tangible political engagement on the part of the EU as opposed to its hitherto (French-imposed) innocuous financial support.<sup>131</sup>

### *1.1. 1995-1997:<sup>132</sup> 'Learning to know each other'<sup>133</sup>*

The nearest France's apparent change of policy came to materialise in the opening months of 1995 was when its outgoing ailing President, François Mitterrand, suggested in February that the EU could convene an international conference by way of follow up to the Sant'Egidio initiative (Youngs, 2001: 96; Bonora-Waisman, 2003: 105; Morisse-Schilbach, 1999: 86). Besides provoking an unsurprisingly vitriolic Algerian rebuff, Mitterrand's proposal was reduced to an unpalatable idea by the contradictory statements of influential members of his right-wing cabinet, illustrating the political rift that had pervaded the French establishment in relation to "*la question algérienne*" as a result of both cohabitation (1993-1995) as well as endemic intra-party and partisan divergences.<sup>134</sup> It was not until the election of Jacques Chirac to the Elysée Palace in May 1995 that France's policy shift became more tangible, reflecting the resulting streamlining of governmental deliberations. Indeed, a number of developments in the course of the remainder of 1995 presaged that, under President Chirac, France's attitude was set to become more critical towards the Algerian regime – though at times no less obliquely than previously – encouraging and relying more regularly (or rather when convenient) on improved EU engagement.

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<sup>131</sup> Interview, Algerian diplomat, Brussels, 31 January 2007.

<sup>132</sup> The periodisation that follows is based on political and security developments pertaining to Algeria, the EU and the international system.

<sup>133</sup> The phrase was used by an Algerian journalist specialising in EU-Algerian relations to describe the process of early interaction within the EMP (Interview, APS correspondent, Brussels, 14/03/07).

<sup>134</sup> The discursive contradictions between the presidency and the prime minister's office, on the one hand, and between the foreign (Alain Juppé) and interior (Charles Pasqua) ministers, on the other, epitomise these chasms. For a detailed account on domestic French politics and the Algerian crisis, see (Bonora-Waisman, 2003).

Beginning with the adoption of supposedly “technical” measures by way of response to the Air France incident – measures knowingly charged with significant emotive symbolism<sup>135</sup> – the new Chirac government sought to mark its departure from the existing Algeria policy in three main ways. Discursively, the first perceptible change came in the form of more voluble support for a conciliatory approach to the crisis, with now Prime Minister Juppé advocating dialogue as a means to a durable political solution to the Algerian conflict (Bonora-Waisman, 2003: 129). However, if conceived initially as a deliberate tactical manoeuvre to show putative impartiality, the ambiguity of this discourse in relation to the inclusion of the FIS in the advocated dialogue became subsequently a corollary of the French government’s policy response to the terrorist attacks in Paris which were attributed to Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group (*Groupe Islamique armé*, GIA). Indeed, in the aftermath of Paris’ exposure to Islamist terrorism in the summer and autumn 1995, French government and media reactions were instinctively directed inwards, questioning and indirectly blaming the Muslim/Maghreb immigrant community of the *banlieues* for its failure to integrate into the mainstream secularist Republican model (Morisse-Schilbach, 1999: 94). As a result, the French authorities adopted drastic security measures in major cities, arresting thousands of suspected Islamists and searching hundreds of thousands of immigrants in the streets (Howorth, 1996: 165; Abi-Mershed, 1999: 13-15). France’s Algeria policy was conducted as much by the interior as the foreign and defence ministries, attracting fierce criticism by European-based FIS spokesmen (Spencer, 1996: 134). Despite the size of the Muslim community and the French establishment’s oft-celebrated traditional closeness to the Arab world, France has characteristically been (at least until 9/11) one of the western countries where political Islam is misunderstood, demonised and feared (Provost, 1996: 114-119). Besides regularly putting France at loggerheads with the policies of neighbouring Germany, the UK and Italy towards Algerian Islamists, this attitude precluded the development of any meaningful multilateral cooperation with the Algerian regime as regards the fight against terrorism.<sup>136</sup> Arguably, it

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<sup>135</sup> Soon after his election, President Chirac decided to suspend the entirety of Air France’s activities in Algeria. His injunction had broad consequences as a number of European airlines, such as Lufthansa, British Airways and Iberia, decided to follow Air France’s lead. On top of that, he ordered the transfer of Air Algérie operations in Paris from Orly airport to a specially-dedicated high-security area of Roissy-CDG airport where the airline’s passengers would be subject to drastic check-in and police procedures. In response, the Algerian government decided to suspend all Air Algérie flights to Paris.

<sup>136</sup> Not only did France pillory its European and US partners for harbouring extremist individuals and, in some instances, terrorist cells, but it also often showed reluctance to share valuable intelligence with EU member states in support of its criticism. This was particularly the case when Charles Pasqua was interior minister 1993-1995 (Interview, Secretariat of the European Council, Brussels, 28/02/07).

also gave the Algerian regime additional migration leverage with the EU, which meant that France's stringent visa policy towards Algeria was regularly invoked by its diplomats as a reason for delaying AA negotiations when convenient (see chapter five).

The second discursive shift introduced by Chirac related to the conditioning of financial assistance to the democratisation of the Algerian regime. Having thus far insisted on acceptance of an IMF structural adjustment programme as a pre-requisite for the granting of French and EU aid, France was now openly declaring its preparedness to pillory the Algerian regime on political grounds. Announced by Jacques Chirac, such policy suggested that France was not so much concerned with supporting Zeroual's efforts to return to democratic legitimacy as it was interested in pursuing its own agenda (Bonora-Waisman, 2003: 134). French aid, he said, was to be 'commensurate with the pace of democratisation of the Algerian regime which needs to take into account the demands of the French government or face appropriate action' (Morisse-Schilbach, 1999: 96; Bonora-Waisman, 2003: 134).

Intervening in a context where there was already talk of reducing the level of French aid to Algeria from FF6 billion (\$1 billion) while tripling that destined to Morocco, this change of attitude reinforced a feeling of isolation within the Algerian regime. At a time when Chirac chose Morocco as his first non-European destination as president to renew his country's attachment to strong relations with the kingdom – a year after its diplomatic spat with Algeria which led to the closure of the land border between the two neighbours and a mere few days after the July metro attacks in Paris – President Zeroual saw his request to meet with his French counterpart, on the fringes of the UN's fiftieth anniversary New York event, become the source of unprecedented controversy (Morisse-Schilbach, 1999: 95-96). The proposed meeting was meant to be an opportunity to discuss the many important issues of the day for both France and Algeria, but as a result of a disagreement over whether or not it should be covered by the media against the backdrop of Algeria's presidential election campaign, it ended up adding more fuel to the Franco-Algerian fire when Zeroual decided to cancel the show in the face of Chirac's perceived arrogance. Thus, the third tangible change in French policy towards Algeria consisted of applying more diplomatic pressure on the Algerian

regime, by notably attempting to ostracise it at the regional level including in relation to issues of relevance to Algeria's role in the region, such as terrorism.<sup>137</sup>

Although Chirac's objection to media coverage of his planned meeting with (candidate) Zeroual was avowedly driven by eagerness to show impartiality towards the forthcoming Algerian presidential election, in the end it produced the adverse effect. By capitalising on the fact that the Algerian head of state had refused to accept Chirac's conditions and thereby cancelled the meeting, Zeroual's supporters sought to reaffirm the general's credentials of patriotism and integrity reviving ever so slightly Algerians' shattered pride as well as hope in their leadership which, since the killing of Mohamed Boudiaf and the signing of the IMF agreement, had vanished (Djebbar, 1996). This turn of events played evidently to the advantage of Zeroual, whose project of a presidential election had been relentlessly undermined by his detractors in the eradicator camp and sceptically questioned by most observers after the failure of his dialogue overtures. Despite the election's boycott by the main "Fronts", the coming to power in France of a vocal non-eradicator government in relation to the Algerian crisis left little choice for Algeria's army hardliners but to stand behind Liamine Zeroual's political plan. Held on 16 November 1995, a mere ten days before the Barcelona conference,<sup>138</sup> Algeria's first pluralist presidential election was considered, despite its many irregularities, a success by most accounts. Zeroual's victory, against the "moderate" Islamist Mahfoud Nahnah (HAMAS) and the secularist Saïd Sadi (RCD), with a proportion of 61 percent of the votes was deemed modest and credible, and the significantly high turnout of 75.69 percent a sign of popular defiance against the threats issued by Islamist insurgents against potential voters (Roberts, 2003: 319; Zoubir, 1998: 92).<sup>139</sup>

Contrary to Jacques Chirac's maiden Maghreb tour, which he also used to outline the fledgling Euro-Mediterranean Partnership initiative to his Moroccan and Tunisian counterparts by way of maintaining French influence in the region in the face of mounting Spanish pro-activism, it seemed inconceivable that a similar ostracising attitude could be displayed by France or even

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<sup>137</sup> In Morocco, President Chirac vowed to be the kingdom's spokesman within the EU and to stand besides the Moroccan people in their fight against extremism. In September 1995, shortly following the second terrorist attack in Paris, he visited Tunisia and expressed to President Ben Ali his intention to ratchet up cooperation with Tunisia particularly in the struggle against terrorism (Howorth, 1996: 164-168).

<sup>138</sup> By pure coincidence from an Algerian point of view; the election schedule was the product of internal political and practical considerations only (Interview, Algerian diplomat, Brussels 12/03/07).

<sup>139</sup> For a detailed account of the 1995 presidential election, see: M.S. Tahî (1996) 'Algeria's Presidential Election: The Rejection of Compromise', *Journal of North African Studies*, 1 (3), pp. 279-305.

the EU when it came to inviting Algeria to the inaugural conference of the Barcelona Process on 27-28 November 1995.<sup>140</sup> Algeria was no Libya, and although in the Euro-Med context diplomatic language referred to North Africa or the Mediterranean, in reality it may well have been the Algerian crisis that had been foremost in the minds of the European politicians involved (Pierre and Quandt, 1996: 39). But the 1995 presidential election was in many ways a game-changer as it deprived onlookers of the opportunity to criticise Zeroual on his democratic credentials and that includes France. Inevitably, this revived – though moderately – the Algerian regime’s foreign policy confidence.

For all its deliberate low-profile positions vis-à-vis the Algerian crisis – even when voluntarily commenting on the ground-breaking presidential election of 1995 – the EU was indeed relieved that the prospect of collapse of the Algeria state was no longer realistic and that a meaningful dialogue of sorts could be broached with the more legitimate president. But coming as it did in the form of an emphatically conditional and democratic discourse, even after Chirac’s elliptical acknowledgement of his Algerian counterpart’s legitimacy (Bonora-Waisman, 2003: 136), the EU’s new voluntary political engagement with Algeria fell short of the regime’s hopes.<sup>141</sup>

By merely ‘taking note’ of the results of the presidential election in Algeria and calling for it to be swiftly followed by legislative elections, not only did the French and EU reactions to the resumption of the democratic process in Algeria mirror each other, but they seemed to have deliberately sought to keep the conciliatory faction within the Algerian power structure *en mauvaise posture*, indirectly undermining its position, by at least failing to acknowledge significance of the election for the very democratic progress called for by the EU (Roberts, 2003: 320; Morisse-Schilbach, 1999: 97).

Feeling increasingly isolated as a result, the Algerian regime saw in the incipient Euro-Mediterranean Partnership a diplomatic “life buoy”, which it had to embrace and use as a springboard for its counter-terrorism survivalist agenda. Indeed, beyond legitimacy, the aim of the regime was to canvass for its fight against terrorism in a regional multilateral arena (Marks, 1996: 15), focusing on the European “partners” it had hitherto failed to convince to

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<sup>140</sup> Interview, Commission official, Brussels, 5/03/07.

<sup>141</sup> As illustrated by Algiers’ tepid reaction to the decision of the EU Council meeting of 17 December 1995 not to isolate Algeria by mandating the Commission to open prospective AA negotiations with the Algerian authorities (Interview, Algeria chief AA negotiator, Brussels, 31/01/07).

support its struggle against Islamist extremism.<sup>142</sup> Algiers had always blamed the authorities in countries like Germany, Belgium, the UK, Italy and Sweden of providing shelter for Algerian Islamist activists considered terrorists in their country – a reproach reiterated rather sardonically ten years later in a foreign ministry memo addressed by Algeria to the tenth anniversary summit of the Barcelona Process.<sup>143</sup> Beyond the security implications of such European attitude, of more concern to the regime in Algiers was its contribution to the strengthening of the ‘moral embargo’ being gradually foisted upon Algeria (Martinez, 2003). What’s more, the EMP represented a medium for Algeria to obviate the hegemony of France on its relationship with the EU by establishing more far-reaching links with other member states (Youngs, 2001: 104). Essentially, the Barcelona Process was considered a rare “strategic anchoring”<sup>144</sup> opportunity for Algeria at a time when “strategic rents”<sup>145</sup> were damagingly elusive (see below for more details).

Correspondingly, in the run up to the Barcelona conference, Algeria sought to revamp its traditional diplomatic pro-activism on the Arab scene by advocating a collective policy in favour of the inclusion of Libya in the new regional venture (Gomez, 2003: 75). Having at least relatively succeeded in closing Arab ranks on this issue, Algeria was bitterly disappointed by the ‘sabotaging’ attitude of countries like Syria when it came to the question of terrorism, which topped Algeria’s priority list. As mentioned above, as a result of Syrian and Israeli arguments over the definition of terrorism, reference to cooperation on the matter in the Barcelona Declaration achieved little beyond platitudinous diplomatic routine. While Syria’s concerns were legitimately justified by its state of war with neighbouring Israel (and vice versa), Algeria still hoped that its more pressing domestic predicament and interests would be taken into account by fellow Arab states and accommodated into their approach to the EMP.<sup>146</sup> That was not the case, as the determined positions of Syria and Lebanon precluded any Arab unity on this question. Far from capitulating, however, Algeria continued to lobby for the prescription of meaningful counter-terrorism cooperation in the Euro-

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<sup>142</sup> Interviews with Algerian diplomats, London and Brussels, 20/12/06 and 31/01/07.

<sup>143</sup> ‘Aide-mémoire de l’Algérie sur le bilan des dix années de partenariat euro-méditerranéen’, Algiers, 28/11/05.

<sup>144</sup> Interview, Algerian foreign ministry official, Algiers, 26/02/06.

<sup>145</sup> For more on the concept of “strategic rents”, see: C.M. Henry (2008) ‘Reverberations in the Central Maghreb of the “Global War on Terror”’, in: Y.H. Zoubir and H. Amirah-Fernández (Eds.) *North Africa: Politics, Region, and the Limits of Transformation* (Abingdon, Routledge).

<sup>146</sup> Interviews with Algerian diplomats, Brussels, February-March 2007.



Mediterranean framework, by notably providing enthusiastic support for the idea of a Charter for Peace and Security.<sup>147</sup>

At the European level, the Barcelona Process represented for France a suitable regional cooperation venue where political dialogue with Algeria could be rationalised. Indeed, for the first time since the eruption of the Algerian crisis in 1992, France signalled its readiness to cede a greater role for the EU in the macro-political management of relations with Algeria while concomitantly adopting a lower-profile approach to the question.<sup>148</sup> On a rare visit to Algeria in 1996, French Foreign Minister, Hervé de Charette, declared that dialogue between France and Algeria could be reinforced within broader frameworks than just bilateral relations, such as the Barcelona Process (Morisse-Schilbach, 1999: 102). Besides reducing exposure, through visible and direct involvement in the Algerian imbroglio, to the vilifying attacks of Islamist groups, the hope of the French government was to succeed in defusing the endemic tensions besetting Franco-Algerian relations by relying more systematically on multilateral mechanisms in dealing with pertinent and traditionally complex issues (Daguzan, 2002: 143). France's policy reassessment was also informed by the evolving communitarian approach towards CFSP whose greater effectiveness was seen as depending on member states' willingness to compromise on their traditional external *chasses gardées*. For France in particular, an instinctively fierce protector of its foreign policy spheres of influence, this necessary change of approach was spurred by the US' increasingly prominent role in North Africa deriving partly from its implicit exasperation with EU foreign policy inaction (Youngs, 2001: 104).<sup>149</sup>

In this vein, in the wake of the formal reopening of the electoral process in Algeria the EU displayed a more confident discourse which effectively replaced the noticeably fading French pronouncements. This was soon to break away from CFSP's hitherto meagre record of declarations on Algeria, which did not exceed three out of a total of more than three hundred between 1993 and 1997 (ibid.: 98). This was most pertinently the case with the constitutional referendum of November 1996 as well as the legislative and municipal elections of 1997.

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<sup>147</sup> Interview, Algerian diplomat, Brussels, October 2008.

<sup>148</sup> Interview, French diplomat, Brussels, 21 February 2007.

<sup>149</sup> France's dominant presence in the economic, especially hydrocarbon, sector in Algeria was being increasingly challenged by Anglo-Saxon companies, a trend actively encouraged by the Algerian regime in response to France's highly selective immigration and investment policies (Interview, retired army officer, Algiers, 09/02/06).

Shortly after his election to the presidency, Zeroual announced his intention to introduce a number of significant changes to the pluralist constitution of 1989, with a view to rectifying the most important of its inherent contradictions and lacunae.<sup>150</sup> Despite widespread opposition to the proposed amendments in Algeria – although most of the expressed disappointments related to one or another indentitarian aspect of the Algerian party-political scene rather than the fundamental spirit of the text – these were adopted by referendum on 28 November.<sup>151</sup> The gist of these changes concerned the consolidation of presidential prerogatives to the detriment of the legislature, and the banning of party-political exploitation of the components of national identity, namely Islam, *Arabité* and *Berberité*. Even with opposition claims of systematic repression and fraud by the authorities during the vote, France reserved a studied silence to the event, while the EU welcomed the development, urging the Algerian authorities to pursue their course towards a gradual return to constitutional legitimacy (Morisse-Schilbach, 1999: 104; Youngs, 2001: 97).

Similarly, when legislative and local elections were held in the summer and autumn 1997 the EU was quick to express its satisfaction with the Algerian regime's anxious efforts to put up a semblance of political normality against a background of intensifying violence (Roberts, 2003: 332). France, for its part, refrained from sending in observers as part of an invited UN observer mission to the Algerian election, while a number of other member states decided to participate albeit with modest contingents. Needless to say that, not only did France do nothing in the context of these elections, it said subsequently nothing too (Morisse-Schilbach, 1999: 105-106).

The primary objective of the 1997 elections for the Algerian regime was to complete the post-1992 institutionalisation process, while ensuring a return to the *status quo ante* 1989 but with a pluralist façade. Having effectively reduced Parliament to a token institution, by introducing in the 1996 constitutional change an upper chamber (Council of the Nation) which through its one third of appointed members ("presidential tier") can *de jure* prevent any bill from becoming law,<sup>152</sup> the primary aim of the regime was now turned towards controlling the

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<sup>150</sup> These related primarily to defining the nature of the Algerian political system (presidential, parliamentary, French-like cohabitation, etc.), and the role of indentitarian symbols in political debates.

<sup>151</sup> For a detailed analysis of the content of the amendments and their significance, see: H. Roberts (1997) 'Algeria: A Controversial Constitution', *Mediterranean Politics*, 2 (1), pp. 188-192.

<sup>152</sup> At least three-quarters of upper chamber votes are needed for any bill emanating from the legislative lower chamber to be adopted. Thus, by appointing one third of senators, the president has a *de facto* constitutional veto-power over Parliament.

pluralist trimmings. Thus, besides “re-domesticating” the FLN by forcing out the Sant’Egidio enthusiasts, and creating a new state party (*Rassemblement national démocratique*, RND) to preclude the monopoly of the FLN, all that was required for a successful instauration (from the point of view of the regime) of a pluralist democracy was the overwhelming rigging of the vote to ensure the “right” outcome. The engineered result was a new Popular National Assembly (*Assemblée populaire nationale*, APN) in which ten parties were represented, including two Islamist parties,<sup>153</sup> largely dominated by the neophyte RND party.<sup>154</sup> In obeying a logic other than that of democratic elections, Algeria’s 1997 electoral efforts achieved little more than just reinstating representative civilian institutions and as such deserved no endorsement as democratic electoral proceedings.<sup>155</sup>

However, far from reflecting an informed understanding of the opaque undercurrents of the Algerian political system, or translating into concrete action, the EU’s new-found rhetorical engagement in the Algerian conflict remained cautious at best. Sporadic attempts by a few MEPs, such as Daniel Cohn-Bendit of the Greens’ Group,<sup>156</sup> to propose resolutions critical of the Algerian elections were rejected by the EP and member states alike. Apart from the announcement of the impending opening of negotiations for the conclusion of an association agreement, made during a visit by Commissioner Manuel Marín to Algiers in December 1996, no meaningful political engagement was shown by the EU. As if to offset this positive step, however, Marín refused to meet with members of the opposition and representatives of human rights organisations such as Amnesty International both prior and during his visit to Algeria (Youngs, 2001: 98-99).

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<sup>153</sup> MSP (Movement for a Society of Peace, formerly HAMAS) and the MN (Movement of *Ennahda* [Renaissance]). For detailed analyses of the MSP’s and MN’s participation in the political process, see: N. Hamladji (2002) ‘Co-optation, Repression and Authoritarian Regime’s Survival: The Case of the Islamist MSP-Hamas in Algeria’, Working Paper SPS No. 2002/7, European University Institute, Florence, available at: <http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/bitstream/1814/327/1/sps20027.pdf>; M. Willis (1998) ‘Algeria’s Other Islamists: Abdallah Djaballah and the Ennahda Movement’, *Journal of North African Studies*, 3 (3), pp. 46-70.

<sup>154</sup> The RND was created in February, less than 4 months prior to the 5 June parliamentary election, which to most people constituted irrefutable evidence that rigging on a massive scale took place in the 1997 elections.

<sup>155</sup> For detailed analyses of the results and significance of the 1997 elections, see: M.S. Tahi (1997) ‘Algeria’s Legislative and Local Elections: Democracy Denied’, *Mediterranean Politics*, 2 (3), pp. 123-133; (Roberts, 2003: 191-199).

<sup>156</sup> The “Greens” have invariably been the most vocal critiques of Algeria’s human rights record within the EP (Interview, advisor on human rights, EP Greens Group, Brussels, 28/03/07).

Opened in March 1997,<sup>157</sup> EU-Algerian negotiations were anyway suspended a few months later in view of the apparently numerous divergences between both parties' positions in relation to second and third chapter provisions pertaining to economic liberalisation and migration – divergences originating in Algeria's so-called "specificity".<sup>158</sup> Apart from JHA cooperation under the banner of counter-terrorism, which was prioritised by Algeria but not the EU, political issues of reform and democratisation came nowhere near constituting an obstacle to these negotiations.<sup>159</sup> Quite the contrary, in the face of recrudescing violence in the summer and autumn of 1997, which saw the killing of hundreds of innocent civilians in nightly village massacres, the Algerian authorities decided in September to suspend negotiations until the domestic situation allowed better 'political visibility'.<sup>160</sup> It was not until images of the atrocities in the villages of Raïs, Beni Messous and Bentalha galvanised international public opinion that the EU decided to reconsider its Algeria policy even if for a conjunctural purpose and in response to set of specific circumstances.

### *1.2. 1997-1999: Forced initiation of dialogue*

The massacres perpetrated in the most obscure of conditions in the second half of 1997 and the turn of 1998 marked a turning point in the Algerian crisis and its internationalisation. The slaughtering of thousands of civilians in a series of overnight attacks on villages located for the most part in the Mitidja plain south of Algiers, cast, at best, serious doubts on the ability of the Algerian government to protect its citizens and, at worst, provoked concerns that these killings were implicitly allowed to happen by the security services as part of their perceived opaque and perverse counter-insurgency strategy. Either way, in the face of the resilient authoritarianism of the Algerian regime and its unwillingness to genuinely (re)integrate opposition forces in the constitutional process, European governments found it more difficult to justify their active disengagement from the crisis. Their unease was compounded by the emergence of regular journalistic accounts and defector testimonies offering a detailed documentation of the atrocities.<sup>161</sup> Relayed by reports from international human rights and

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<sup>157</sup> Later than most SMCs, owing to political violence in Algeria (Interview, Commission official, Brussels, 23/02/07).

<sup>158</sup> The facets of this specificity are threefold: political (terrorism), economic (over-dependence on hydrocarbon) and social (important emigrant community in Europe).

<sup>159</sup> Interview, Algerian foreign ministry official, Algiers, 14/05/07.

<sup>160</sup> Interview, Algeria's chief AA negotiator, Brussels, 31/01/07.

<sup>161</sup> Mohamed Larbi Zitout, an Algerian diplomat, and "Captain Haroun", an officer of the secret service (*Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité*, DRS), who fled their posts and sought refuge in London, provided first-hand accounts alleging the direct involvement of the security services in the massacres. They were

media organisations,<sup>162</sup> these allegations could not go unnoticed among European publics who began demanding more meaningful action from their governments.

In the absence of French hegemony on the EU's Algeria policy, a retreat reinforced by the election of the Socialist Lionel Jospin as prime minister in June 1997 and his government's eagerness to avoid the spilling over of violence to French territory, countries like Germany and to a lesser extent the UK stepped forward to formulate a common European response to the escalation of violence in Algeria. Coming after the pronouncements of the Pope, the UN Secretary General and High Commissioner for Human Rights, Kofi Annan and Mary Robinson respectively, in favour of a more determined engagement by the international community to put an end to the Algerian conflict, pressure for European action was driven by German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel (Spencer, 1998b; Pinto, 1998: 72).<sup>163</sup> He urged his newly-elected British counterpart, Robin Cook, to put his Labour government's enunciated "ethical foreign policy" to good use in Algeria by organising an effective European response.<sup>164</sup> Less than wholeheartedly,<sup>165</sup> the British government agreed to take action by announcing the dispatching of an EU "Troika" (UK, Luxembourg, Austria), at the junior ministerial level, with the aim of convincing the Algerian government to allow UN Special Rapporteurs to investigate the human rights situation in the country (Gomez, 2003: 159).

However, in the face of an undeterred Algerian interlocutor, fiercely averse to any intrusive foreign *démarche*, the EU leaned back on the Barcelona Process and compromised by offering to broach a gradual political dialogue, focused instead on political reform and the fight against terrorism (Morisse-Schilbach, 1999: 118-119; Gomez, 2003: 159). In this vein, when the visit of the Troika took place on 19 January 1998, the delegation was able to meet with regime and opposition members but could not visit massacre sites and saw its offer for

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among the first in a series of defections which caused considerable damage to the reputation of the Algerian army and embarrassment for the Algerian government.

<sup>162</sup> See for example: Amnesty International (1997) 'Algeria: Civilian Population Caught in a Spiral of Violence', MDE 28/023/1997, 18 November, available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic.4565c2252.459e0cb12.3a66a99b4.0.html>.

<sup>163</sup> Kinkel's pro-activism seemed, to all intents and purposes, to have been prompted by domestic political electioneering rather than genuine German state interest in Algerian politics. His replacement by Joschka Fischer of the SPD later in 1998 led to the subsiding of German pressure (Youngs, 2001: 105).

<sup>164</sup> The UK took over the rotating presidency of the European Council in January 1998.

<sup>165</sup> The British government was rather reluctant to engage in the Algerian quandary for two main reasons. First, Britain had traditionally very few affinities with Algeria and did not have an informed understanding of that country. Secondly, energy cooperation between the two countries had intensified in the previous years, as companies like BP invested heavily in Algeria (\$3.5 billion in 1995). The government was under pressure from the House of Commons to take action on Algeria, on the basis of the testimonies it had heard from dissident former Algerian officials (Interview, British diplomat, Brussels, 06/03/07).

humanitarian aid flatly rejected. To save face, the delegation announced the forthcoming reopening of the Commission's office in Algiers and invited Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf for a visit to Brussels in the context of the incipient EU-Algerian political dialogue.

In a similar vein, the European Parliament decided, at the initiative of the French Chairman of the Human Rights Sub-Committee André Soulier, to set up an ad hoc delegation of MEPs with the aim of visiting Algeria and establishing dialogue with the Algerian Parliament. Taking place a few days after the Troika's visit, the parliamentary delegation of nine MEPs met with representatives of all political parties of the 1997 legislature, as well as with members of civil society (human rights organisations, women's movements, associations of families of victims of terrorism and newspaper publishers).<sup>166</sup> As such, the terms of reference of the EP delegation's mission appeared much less constraining than those of the Troika, with the exception of a shared ban on any meeting with FIS representatives. Despite its broader dialogue with Algerian political actors, many western sceptics questioned the added value of the EP mission relative to that of the Troika. Indeed, the declarations of delegation chairman André Soulier, during and after the visit, gave the impression that, rather than enlightening the European Parliament and public opinion about the reality of the Algerian situation, his initiative aimed at 'lobbying' for the Algerian authorities and 'tranquillising' European concerns (Roberts, 2003: 335).<sup>167</sup> Between publicly tearing up a letter addressed to the delegation by the FIS leadership,<sup>168</sup> reprimanding the delegation's Rapporteur Cohn-Bendit after his issuing a declaration criticising the Algerian government,<sup>169</sup> praising the existence of a democratic spirit within the Algerian polity despite the crisis,<sup>170</sup> and calling for the EU to support democracy in Algeria through dialogue and to stop questioning the role of the army in the massacres,<sup>171</sup> Soulier seemed to have gone out of his way to stick to the terms of reference (to say the least!).

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<sup>166</sup> European Parliament (1998a) 'Algeria: Wind of Change', *News Report*, Brussels, 11 February, available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/press/sdp/newsrp/en/1998/n980211.htm#1>.

<sup>167</sup> Soulier's attitude earned him the accusation of having behaved as 'a good old friend of the FLN', in reference to his links as a lawyer with FLN leaders back in the 1950s-60s. For more details, see: L. Aggoun and J.-B. Rivoire (2004) *FrançAlgérie. Crimes et Mensonges d'États: Histoire Secrète de la Guerre d'Indépendance à la Troisième Guerre d'Algérie* (Paris: La Découverte), pp. 546-547.

<sup>168</sup> European Parliament, Op. Cit.

<sup>169</sup> European Parliament (1998b) 'Algeria: Statement by André Soulier', *News Report*, Brussels, 10 February, available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/press/sdp/newsrp/en/1998/n980210.htm#1>.

<sup>170</sup> European Parliament (1998c) 'Algerian Parliament a Reality', *News Report*, Brussels, 12 February, available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/press/sdp/newsrp/en/1998/n980212.htm#1>.

<sup>171</sup> European Parliament (1998d) 'Algeria: Dialogue with Algerian Parliament must be pursued', *News Report*, Brussels, 18 February, available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/press/sdp/newsrp/en/1998/n980218.htm#1>.

Clearly, these successive EU initiatives did little to exert explicit pressure on the Algerian regime regarding human rights issues, and uncover the paradoxes of violence in Algeria. If anything, they showed that, even without France at the forefront of the Algeria policy, the EU was unable, in the absence of effective leverage and understanding of the opaque system in Algiers,<sup>172</sup> to press hard for Algeria to show more transparency in its counter-insurgency campaign. Even at its weakest, the Algerian regime was still able to aggressively placate European criticism of its policies, often playing the propensity of certain member states to provide protection for extremists against the audacity of others to ask too many questions.

However, the EU's efforts were not all that fruitless. A dialogue of sorts was indeed broached with the Algerian government as inter-parliamentary and intergovernmental interaction became more regular in subsequent months, paving the way for a better understanding and improved EU-Algerian relations (Morisse-Schilbach, 1999: 120).<sup>173</sup> Furthermore, the reopening of the Commission's delegation offices in Algiers, in the wake of the initialling of the MEDA Framework Convention in May 1998, facilitated the disbursement of relatively targeted MEDA funds for socio-economic programmes as well as the implementation of more specialised MEDA Democracy projects. In the case of Algeria, these aimed at supporting the private press and providing human rights training for the police force, in addition to specific categories of youths and women (Roberts, 2003: 336; Youngs, 2001: 107).<sup>174</sup>

From an official Algerian perspective, the interest of the international community in the conduct of the country's domestic business generated unprecedented anxiety despite what was said about the limited nature of its immediate overt impact. In particular, the political role of the army had come under exceptional external scrutiny, which led military commanders to review their strategy with the aim of reducing their public exposure.<sup>175</sup> A commonly-shared view within the army high command was that military successes on the ground were being overshadowed by continuing violence on the one hand and the tarnished legitimacy of the

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<sup>172</sup> Interview, French MEP, EPP-ED Group, Brussels, 02/05/07.

<sup>173</sup> Jacques Poos, Luxembourg's foreign minister and a hitherto harsh critique of the Algerian regime's policies, declared in 1998 that the EU had changed its vision of Algeria as a result of its better understanding of the reality in that country owing to more direct contact. For more details, see: B. Loos (2000) 'L'Europe et l'Algérie', *Algeria-Watch*, available at: <http://www.algeria-watch.org/farticle/tribune/loos3.htm>.

<sup>174</sup> For more details on these programmes, see: Commission of the European Communities (1999a) *The Annual Report of the MEDA Programme, 1998*, Brussels, COM (1999) 291 final; Commission of the European Communities (1999b) *Evaluation of the MEDA Democracy Programme, 1996-1998*, Brussels.

<sup>175</sup> Interview, Algerian journalist, Algiers, 23/02/06.

post-1997 pseudo-civilian façade of the polity on the other.<sup>176</sup> Indeed, the truce announced by the AIS in September 1997, after arduous negotiations with the DRS, went almost unnoticed abroad as it was immediately followed by a wave of massacres (ICG, 2001a). Furthermore, disagreement at the helm of the state over the modalities of political dialogue with the Islamists meant that, ironically, the AIS ceasefire exacerbated existing tensions between Zeroual and top army commanders, led by the Chief of General Staff Mohamed Lamari, causing further factional rifts. The tit-for-tat outcome of these developments consisted of further attempts to put pressure on army commanders over their alleged wrongdoings before they could formalise their deal with the insurgency and retreat from the frontline of politics.

Accordingly, the Presidency staged in April 1998 a media campaign which revealed impending government inquiries into extra-judicial killings allegedly committed by military-backed self-defence groups (Zoubir and Bouandel, 1998b: 13). A month later, Foreign Minister Attaf announced, in a *volte face*, his government's decision to invite the UN to designate a "panel of eminent persons" to undertake a thorough fact-finding mission into the violence of recent years in Algeria (Spencer, 1998b: 128). However, Zeroual's decision – with the support of his security advisor General Mohamed Betchine – to attempt to take total control of the RND, as a reliable party relay, prompted the unleash of an army-instigated virulent press offensive which vilified his closest aides and ended with the President's resignation (Roberts, 2007: 10).

An early presidential election scheduled for February 1999, subsequently postponed until April, brought in the most dramatic of circumstances Abdelaziz Bouteflika to the Presidency, presaging a turning point in the Algerian crisis. Elected by default after the last-minute withdrawal of the other six candidates in protest at the military establishment's partiality towards the "president-designate", Bouteflika promised to bring peace to Algeria and received prompt support from the FIS and AIS leaderships (Bouandel, 2001). A consensus had emerged among army commanders that Bouteflika was the right "civilian" candidate – having been foreign minister during Algeria's international "golden era" (1960-70s) – to carry forward their envisaged measured retreat from the forefront of the political scene, after the

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<sup>176</sup> Interview, Algerian policy analyst, *Institut national des Etudes stratégiques globales* (INESG), Algiers, 22/02/06.



legalisation of the military victory over the Islamist insurgency.<sup>177</sup> Thus, during his campaign, Bouteflika announced that he would propose a Law on Civil Concord which would be nothing more than a ‘political expression’ of the AIS agreements (ICG, 2001a: 4). He also promised to restore Algeria’s international image and hinted that there would be significantly less army interference in the political scene under his watch and that he would not accept to rule as a “three-quarter president”. While he clearly possessed the necessary skills to fulfil the former promise, having been a talented foreign minister under Houari Boumédiène, he needed more than just political tact to deliver on the second. He was off to a decent start, nonetheless, as he received support from European leaders, including Jacques Chirac who was keen on seeing the back of Zeroual, and was to enjoy the virtues of an indispensable political quality – luck. The impact of his coming to power on EU-Algerian relations was almost instantaneous.

### *1.3. 1999-2001: The Bouteflika effect*

Algeria’s hope to see its diplomatic isolation alleviated by the dynamics of the Barcelona Process had by 1999 proven over-optimistic. Overdue EU political engagement eventually only brought unwarranted attention to the complexities of the Algerian polity by yet again singling out a given party to the conflict for its alleged (ir)responsibility. Compounded by the relentless opacity of the regime, Algeria’s tarnished reputation verged on pariah status in 1997-98. As such, even its desire to canvass for its counter-terrorism struggle within the Euro-Mediterranean context was met with implicit apathy in most European capitals where either Algerian Islamist fugitives found open refuge, or tangible security cooperation was being deliberately withheld (or both). As a result, irregular interaction with the EU in the framework of AA negotiations was bogged down with these and other divergences, precluding the emergence of a meaningful dialogue. For its part, the EU’s aim of laying through the EMP the foundations for dialogue and modest cooperation on incremental reforms, which can help defuse some of the grievances behind the violence in Algeria, was disempowered by the convolution of the conflict on the one hand and its reluctance in practice to engage more systematically in the quandary on the other. When a tentative dialogue was finally carved out with the Algerian government in 1998, it was more in reaction to the outcry of horrified European public opinion over the village massacres than as a result of careful policy assessment. Meanwhile, Algeria’s engagement in the multilateral mechanisms and institutions

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<sup>177</sup> Unease among some army commanders about the nomination of Bouteflika, owing to their experience with him in 1994, made the consensus difficult to reach initially. Subsequently, they closed ranks behind his candidacy as he was deemed ‘the least worst of the candidates’ (Nezzar, 2003: 69).

of the EMP remained steadfast. It continued to actively participate in ministerial and Senior Official meetings, be it to denounce Israeli aggression against Palestinians or in support of efforts to adopt a Charter for Peace and Stability.<sup>178</sup>

Despite his spoilt election, the coming of Abdelaziz Bouteflika to power had an invigorating effect on EU-Algerian relations. His pre-election discourse of peace, reconciliation, reform and openness provided fresh hopes for European governments and institutions about the prospect of positive change in Algeria<sup>179</sup> – notwithstanding the more pessimistic reactions of the traditionally-sceptical EU quarters. These were quick to point out the apparent forestalled progress of Bouteflika in consolidating civilian power over military interference, as illustrated by the nine-month delay in the formation of a “consensus” government, and in improving civil and political rights following the continuation of the ban on the FIS and emergency-law provisions.<sup>180</sup> However, his liberal economic outlook<sup>181</sup> and the support his peace programme elicited initially from FIS leaders Abassi Madani and Rabah Kébir<sup>182</sup> presaged more streamlined relations with the EU. Indeed, the voluntary elaboration of economic liberalisation policies as part of a governmental programme, for the first time since the 1980s, was likely to bring the priorities of the EU and Algeria, in this area, a step closer together, obviating a structural obstacle to the conclusion of an AA.<sup>183</sup> Additionally, Bouteflika demonstrated a slightly more relaxed attitude towards low-level EU engagement in the promotion of judicial reforms and human rights following his decision to invite Amnesty International and other human rights groups to look into previous massacres (Youngs, 2001: 110).<sup>184</sup> Subsequently, as it became evident that key aspects of presidential plans for peace and consolidation of civilian rule were running into deep-rooted resistance within certain army quarters and their clientelist civil and political networks (Mortimer, 2006: 162), EU

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<sup>178</sup> Algerian diplomats put forward textual proposals to this effect during the conceptual/drafting phase of the Charter (Interview, Algeria chief AA negotiator, Brussels, 12/03/07).

<sup>179</sup> Interview, Commission official, Brussels, 3/05/07.

<sup>180</sup> For an assessment of Bouteflika’s first term in office, see: R. Mortimer (2004) ‘Bouteflika and the Challenge of Political Stability’, in: A. Aghrout et al. (Eds.) *Algeria in Transition: Reforms and Development Prospects* (London: RoutledgeCurzon).

<sup>181</sup> For more details, see: A. Aghrout (2008) ‘Policy Reforms in Algeria: Genuine Change or Adjustments?’, in: Y.H. Zoubir and H. Amirah-Fernández (Eds.).

<sup>182</sup> For more details, see (ICG, 2001a).

<sup>183</sup> Interview, Secretariat of the European Council, Brussels, 27/03/07.

<sup>184</sup> For a detailed analysis of this policy choice, see: R. Schwarz (2002) ‘Human Rights Discourse and Practice as Crisis Management: Insights from the Algerian Case’, *Journal of North African Studies*, 7 (2), pp. 57-85.

member states felt reinforced in their view that European policy should be firmly oriented towards supporting Bouteflika.<sup>185</sup>

The programmatic focus on far-reaching liberal economic policy was for Bouteflika as much about the need for national material progress as it was about sending a strong political message of change to western governments. This was part of his first-term strategy of projecting a new face of the country abroad using an aggressive foreign policy campaign that would in turn strengthen his domestic power base. Knowing too well the constraints imposed upon him by the conjunctural as well as structural domestic configurations of power, Bouteflika had to rely on his vocation and the area of policy for which he had most room of manoeuvre, in the hope of making successful inroads into other more challenging issue areas. Accordingly, he embarked on an ambitious ‘diplomatic offensive’ as early as July 1999, which led him over the course of his first year to no fewer than thirty countries in Africa, Europe, America, Asia and the Arab world (Mortimer, 2004: 185).<sup>186</sup> In this context, Algeria showed more readiness to re-engage in negotiations with the EU with a view to adopting a Euro-Med Association Agreement (*La Tribune*, 16 May 2005).<sup>187</sup> Thus, when talks resumed in April 2000 it was clear from both sides’ attitudes that this was more about Politics than anything else.<sup>188</sup> Algeria wanted to demonstrate that it had turned the dark page of the 1990s and was ready for a “strategic political anchoring” with the EU; the latter obliged as it was under pressure to finally “do something useful” in its relationship with Algeria, and to ensure the participation of a key SMC in its ongoing region-building efforts.<sup>189</sup>

Despite its notable successes on the international scene, Bouteflika’s presidency was, within its first eighteen months, finding it increasingly difficult to assuage growing popular dissatisfaction. With the return of relative stability, socio-economic preoccupations became once again the focus of public and political opposition criticism. Rising unemployment as a result of the privatisation process of state-sector enterprises, stretched social services under the pressure of rural exodus, and crumbling purchasing power owing to a weakened currency were but a few of the most acute sources of discontent demanding swift government action. However, no sooner was Bouteflika able to turn his attention to domestic policy once a

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<sup>185</sup> Interview, Commission diplomat, Algiers, 15/05/07.

<sup>186</sup> For a detailed overview of Bouteflika diplomatic campaign, see: Y.H. Zoubir (2004b) ‘The Resurgence of Algeria’s Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century’, *Journal of North African Studies*, 9 (2), pp. 169-183.

<sup>187</sup> Interviews, Algeria chief AA negotiator/Commission official, Brussels, 31/01/07 and 03/05/07.

<sup>188</sup> Interviews, Commission officials, Brussels, 23/02/07 and 03/05/07.

<sup>189</sup> Interview, Algeria foreign ministry official, Algiers, 26/02/06.

government was in place than a resurgence of violence at the start of 2000 exacerbated popular scepticism and undermined the legitimacy of his policies (ICG, 2000). Moreover, growing signs of tension with the army high command and the eruption of the Kabyle crisis of spring 2001 led many observers to rather hastily write off Bouteflika's ability to distinguish his fate at the helm of the Algerian state from that of his predecessors (Mortimer, 2004: 184).<sup>190</sup>

Against this backdrop, the resumption of EU-Algeria AA negotiations met with unprecedented European criticism targeting Algeria's human rights record and the contribution of Bouteflika's Law on Civil Concord to the perpetuation of practices of impunity within Algerian state-society relations (Bouandel, 2002a). Sweden broke EU tradition vis-à-vis Algeria in this respect by expressly using its presidency of the Council in the first half of 2001 to pillory the state's human rights practices (*Le Matin*, 2 April 2001). The European Parliament added its voice by calling on the Algerian government 'to cooperate with the UN' in order to elucidate the cases of "the disappeared", whose number was estimated at more than 6,000 (*Le Jeune Indépendant*, 20 January 2001).<sup>191</sup> This polemical activism on the part of EU actors followed a grass-root civil mobilisation of sorts consisting of a number of petitions issued by Algerian and European intellectuals and organisations (*Le Monde*, 22 May 2001). These, in turn, seemed galvanised by the publication of two testimonies on Algeria's "dirty war", implicating state security services in the massacres of the 1990s.<sup>192</sup>

However, far from disrupting the negotiation process, these developments seemed to have reinforced governmental willingness within both the EU and Algeria to press ahead with the talks. The only remaining impediment to the conclusion of the Agreement appeared to have been the thorny issues of counter-terrorism cooperation and the movement of people.<sup>193</sup> Euro-Algerian *quid pro quo* saw Algeria's insistence on the need for lifting the protection provided

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<sup>190</sup> For a detailed analysis of the Kabyle crisis of 2001, see: ICG. (2003) 'Unrest and Impasse in Kabylia'. Middle East/North Africa report No. 15, Cairo/Brussels.

<sup>191</sup> For more details on the issue of the "disappeared", see: R. Tlemçani (2008) 'Algerian Under Bouteflika: Civil Strife and National Reconciliation', Carnegie paper No. 7, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, pp. 7-8.

<sup>192</sup> Nesroulah Yous, a civilian, recounts a harrowing eyewitness experience of the massacre of Bentalha in 1997 in: *Qui a tué à Bentalha? Algérie: Chronique d'un Massacre annoncé* (Paris: La Découverte); Habib Souaïdia, an officer in the special forces of the Algerian army, describes several alleged instances of army wrongdoings in: *La Sale Guerre: Le Témoignage d'un Ancien Officier des Forces spéciales de l'Armée algérienne, 1992-2000* (Paris: La Découverte).

<sup>193</sup> Interview, Algeria chief AA negotiator, Brussels, 31/01/07.

for wanted Islamists in certain European capitals and for easing of the visa regime imposed on Algerian citizens be counter-conditioned to judicial reform and the inclusion of a readmission clause in the AA (*El Watan*, 25 October 2001). At this point, it was only through the impulse of another extra-EMP development that the positions of both parties were brought close enough to allow the conclusion of negotiations and the adoption of the AA to happen.

## **2. After the signing of the AA, 2001-2005**

By summer 2001, Bouteflika was coming under intense domestic and foreign criticism for his handling of Algeria's most pressing issues. Continuing violence, albeit at lower intensity than previously, proved that civil peace remained elusive despite the neutralisation of thousands of armed AIS and GIA *maquisards* [insurgents] after the promulgation of the Law on Civil Concord. The persistence of the Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat (*Groupe salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat*, GSPC), a splinter of the GIA,<sup>194</sup> in its rejection of presidential amnesty and in carrying out military attacks against government forces, constituted a serious stumbling block to the restoration of comprehensive peace. The further withdrawal by Islamist leaders of their qualified support for Bouteflika peace's initiative on grounds that, contrary to initial promises, it proved little more than a "police measure" which ignored the political roots of the crisis (ICG, 2000: 7; 2001a: 9), delivered a severe blow to the momentum that Bouteflika had amassed in his early months in office.

The eruption of the crisis in Kabylia in April 2001, which manifested itself in weeks of sustained and particularly violent unrest throughout the region, was another destabilising factor for Bouteflika. The lethal shooting by the gendarmerie of a number of youths in the region with no apparent justification, along with the portraying of the ensuing crisis in ethnically Manichean terms by western media, politicised further what was essentially an issue symptomatic of a broader national malaise (Willis, 2008: 232; ICG, 2003). This meant that international human rights organisations swiftly seized the matter as another instance of the Algerian regime's contempt for human rights. Western governments followed suit, and the crisis became – for a moment – a focal point for international criticism of the Algerian regime's democratic shortcomings. Accordingly, reference was made to 'regular discrimination and daily harassment of the Berberophone minority...whose cultural and

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<sup>194</sup> The GSPC was set up in September 1998 by the GIA commander of the Boumerdès region, Hassan Hattab, who rejected dialogue with the government.

identity rights are not guaranteed' when the Kabyle situation was deplored in the European Commission's Algeria Strategy Paper 2002-2006.<sup>195</sup> Similarly, when visiting Washington in July 2001 for the first time as Algerian president, Bouteflika saw the Bush administration reiterate its call for the respect of human rights and civil liberties, with oblique reference to the events in Kabylia. Adding to the Americans' explicit disappointment at Algeria's timid economic reforms, the implicit Kabyle criticism flattened Bouteflika's expectations in relation to this visit during which he failed to obtain substantial cooperative commitments from the US (Zoubir, 2002: 74-75).

Following the dramatic events of 9/11 in Washington and New York, however, the perceived international strategic value of Algeria radically changed as the world's superpower woke up to international terrorism and was to reshuffle its and the international community's normative and strategic priorities accordingly. In the wake of such tectonic developments, Algeria was swift to seize its payback chance by offering wholehearted sympathy and unequivocal support for the United States (*Algérie Presse Service*, 6 November 2001). Returning to Washington on 5 November for a more assertive visit to the White House, President Bouteflika reassured his American counterpart of Algeria's steadfast commitment to the fight against transnational terrorism and its qualified readiness to cooperate with America's policy response (Zoubir, 2006: 4). Subsequently, security cooperation between the two countries improved markedly, with intelligence sharing, military training and technical assistance constituting the main facets of this new-found affinity (Zoubir, 2002; 2004b; 2008; Hemmer, 2007; Henry 2008).

The sense of vindication of the Algerian regime following 9/11 was expressed most sardonically to European governments, including through the handing over to the US authorities of a list of hundreds of suspected Algerian militants on the loose in a number of European capitals. Preceding the terrorist attacks of Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005, the EU's response to 9/11 was swift and multidimensional (Galli, 2008). Starting with the adoption of an ever-expanding list of terrorist groups and individuals, which under pressure from the US ended up including some EU-based Algerian individuals,<sup>196</sup> the EU's new counter-terrorism discourse culminated in the recognition of the existence of dormant

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<sup>195</sup> 'Algérie: Document de Stratégie 2002-2006 & Programme indicatif national 2002-2004'. Brussels, available at: [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/algeria/csp/02\\_06\\_fr.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/algeria/csp/02_06_fr.pdf).

<sup>196</sup> Interview, Algerian diplomats, Brussels, February-March 2007.

logistical bases in the UK, Spain, Belgium, Italy and Germany (European Council 2003: 3).<sup>197</sup> Subsequent EU attempts at the externalisation of the post-9/11 counter-terrorism strategy to the Mediterranean near-abroad, through the firm institutionalisation of the JHA agenda within the EMP, brought European states closer to their southern Mediterranean partners in this policy area, though inevitably at the expense of their more normative enunciated objectives (Wolff, 2006: 5; Bicchi and Martin, 2006: 201). As far as Algeria was concerned, this change of policy brought the EU knocking at an open door following what some have described as a process of ‘externalisation-in-reverse’, whereby Europe internalised a policy approach already well articulated in Algeria (Joffé, 2008a: 158).

### *2.1. 2001-2004: Payback vindication*

The policy fallout of 9/11 within the EU led to the approximation of its security priorities with Algeria’s longer-standing preferences, which had hitherto by default impeded the advancement of negotiations on the political aspects of the AA.<sup>198</sup> Algeria’s insistence on the inclusion of counter-terrorism provisions in the AA were no longer falling on deaf ears as its European interlocutors appeared less sceptical of its political intentions in this area.<sup>199</sup> If the attacks in France in 1995 and 1996 were rather complacently imputed to the isolated peculiarities of Franco-Algerian relations, the drama of 9/11 unveiled the true nature of international terrorism – that it is just that, international – forcing European governments to review their policies towards the phenomenon. Algerian officials are adamant: had it not been for 9/11, the EU and Algeria’s counter-terrorism policies would have remained almost diametrically opposed and the AA could have never been delayed further.<sup>200</sup> While Algeria’s *sui generis* experience with Islamist terrorism in the 1990s had certainly contributed to this deadlock,<sup>201</sup> the impact of the EU’s lack of adequate institutional capability and political will in dealing with the issue cannot be overstated.

Thus, the only remaining issue of contention besetting EU-Algeria AA negotiations was that of “the movement of people” – with democratic considerations invoked in a strictly

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<sup>197</sup> For a detailed analysis of the EU post-9/11 counter-terrorism discourse, see: R. Jackson (2007) ‘An Analysis of EU Counterterrorism Discourse Post-September 11’, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 20 (2), pp. 233-247.

<sup>198</sup> Interviews, numerous Algerian diplomats and foreign ministry officials, Brussels and Algiers, 2006/7.

<sup>199</sup> Interview, Secretariat of the European Council, Brussels, 28/02/07.

<sup>200</sup> Interview, Algeria chief AA negotiator, Brussels, 31/01/07.

<sup>201</sup> Interview, Commission diplomat, Algiers, 15/05/07.

preambular context.<sup>202</sup> For this reason, Bouteflika decided to travel in person to Brussels at the beginning of October to strike the iron while it was still hot and give a final political impetus to the negotiations (*Le Quotidien d'Oran*, 10 October, 2001). After meeting Commission President Romano Prodi, both leaders made an unprecedented firm commitment to the conclusion of negotiations within two months. The announcement of a specific timeframe forced both parties to come to terms with their differences and adopt a less politicised, functional approach to cooperation (*Le Quotidien d'Oran*, 9 December 2001). Consequently, negotiations were concluded on 5 December and the AA was initialled on 19 December.<sup>203</sup> As a distinct feature of the Agreement, the inclusion of an entire section ('Title VIII') on 'Cooperation in the Field of Justice and Home Affairs', more than just constituting a novelty in EU-Mediterranean relations in the framework of the EMP, reflected the specificity of the Algerian case in particular as even Lebanon's AA, which was concluded around the same time, did not include JHA provisions except for illegal migration (European Council, 2002: 71). By contrast, a whole Article (90) on the 'fight against terrorism' was included in the EU-Algeria document, committing both parties to 'preventing acts of terrorism...through the exchange of information on terrorist groups and their support networks in accordance with international and national law...and by pooling experience of means and practices including in the technical and training fields' (ibid.: 78). Reflecting clearly Algeria's longstanding concerns with regard to the activities of terrorist groups and individuals on European soil, the document confirms that a 'reverse externalisation' did indeed take place between the EU and Algeria after 9/11 when, in relation to readmission agreements, it states that

Desirous of facilitating the movement and residence of their nationals whose status is regular, the Parties agree to negotiate, at the request of either Party, the conclusion of agreements on combating illegal immigration and on readmission. If either Party considers it necessary, such agreements shall cover the readmission of nationals of other countries arriving in their territory *direct* from the territory of the other (ibid.: 73 – added emphasis).

Notice the double dilution of the EU's readmission priority by the above provision's underlying caveats: the discretion of the other party, and the arrival of illegal immigrants

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<sup>202</sup> Interview, Algeria chief AA negotiator, Brussels, 31/01/07.

<sup>203</sup> Bouteflika made another trip to Brussels, even though it was not he who initialled the document. This was testimony to the political importance of the AA for Algeria and, most of all, its association with Bouteflika's policy of *ouverture*.



*directly* from, in this case, Algerian territory. Besides excluding the systematic insertion of a readmission agreement in any bilateral immigration talks, the AA ensures that, even in the event of the conclusion of such an agreement, it would eventually fail to transfer any meaningful burden to Algeria as very few illegal emigrants (including Algerians) leave directly from Algerian territory to southern European shores. And even if that was the case, it is usually almost impossible to ascertain the place of departure of illegal immigration candidates.

Thus, Algerian negotiators were satisfied with the results of their protracted AA talks with the EU.<sup>204</sup> They had obtained important concessions on the political and politicised issues of priority to them, notably terrorism and migration. By and large, the EU also welcomed the conclusion of an AA with Algeria, considering it to be the only way through which the prospect of gaining purchase on Algeria's predicaments could be realistically ratcheted up.<sup>205</sup> France, Spain and Italy were particularly optimistic about the commercial dividends of the AA,<sup>206</sup> while in the less gullible northern member states there was concern about the eschewal of normative objectives in favour of the more strategic and commercial benefits of the AA. Their doubts were reinforced by Algeria's relentless aversion to outside interest in its human rights practices. Indeed, barely one month after the initialling of the AA, its propensity to "reject foreign interference" was yet again on display when a visit of a European Commission delegation, aimed at assessing the impact of its EIDHR projects in coordination with Algerian civil society stakeholders, was postponed *sine die* because of deliberately undelivered visas (*Algeria-Watch*, 30 January 2002).

Shortly thereafter, the signing of the AA – scheduled to take place by the end of the Spanish presidency of the EU in June 2002 – prompted a flurry of international appeals by human rights activists, led by Amnesty International, urging the EU to fully implement Article 2 of the Agreement and press the Algerian government to improve its human rights record. Denouncing for the most part Algeria's handling of the "disappeared" issue, the continuation of the state of emergency despite the improved security situation, and the abuses witnessed during the Kabyle riots,<sup>207</sup> the bulk of this advocacy activism was focused on lobbying MEPs

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<sup>204</sup> Interview, Algeria chief AA negotiator, Brussels, 12/03/07.

<sup>205</sup> Interview, Commission official, Brussels, 21/03/07.

<sup>206</sup> Interview, Spanish diplomat, Brussels, 16/03/07.

<sup>207</sup> See for instance, Amnesty International (2002a) 'Algérie, quand les Gestes symboliques ne sont pas suffisants : Les Droits humains et l'Accord entre l'Union européenne et l'Algérie', MDE 28/007/02, April,

who were preparing to vote on the EU-Algeria AA in the fall. These efforts were in the end not unsuccessful as the European Parliament reacted by adopting in October a ‘resolution on the conclusion of an AA with Algeria’ (European Parliament, 2002), echoing the concerns and criticisms of Algerian and international activists regarding Algeria’s political reform lacunae, albeit in a much milder form than initially envisaged owing to a series of amendments introduced by MEPs from the European People’s Party (EPP).<sup>208</sup> This, however, did not prevent MEPs from giving their assent to the adoption of the AA in the same vote, long after its ceremonious signing on 22 April on the sidelines of the fifth Euro-Med ministerial conference in Valencia.<sup>209</sup>

In a letter addressed on the occasion to José María Aznar, Spanish Prime Minister and President of the European Council, President Bouteflika of Algeria outlined his perception of the added value of the AA for his country.<sup>210</sup> The main part of the document emphasises the expected economic dividends of association with the EU, particularly in terms of modernisation and diversification of the Algerian economy, the *mise à niveau* of small and medium-sized enterprises, and the transfer of knowledge to the private sector in terms of information technology and managerial skills. Most interestingly, the president expresses hope that, through the AA, the EU would be able to support the minority of reformers in Algeria and help them overcome deep-entrenched conservative resistance in all sectors of society for the advent of a market economy and democracy. In this context, he refers most explicitly to the role that the EU could play in ‘reinforcing civil society’ for the spreading of those values. Traditional issues of priority to Algeria in its relationship with the EU, such as terrorism and migration, are only relatively briefly mentioned in the closing part of the letter.

It is intriguing to note that Bouteflika chose not to dwell on the usual “political anchoring” aspect that had invariably characterised Algeria’s discourse on the AA. Was it a case of a

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available at: <http://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/asset/MDE28/007/2002/fr/dom-MDE280072002fr.pdf>; Amnesty International (2002b) ‘Algeria: 10 Years of State of Emergency, 10 Years of Grave Human Rights Abuses’, MDE 28/003/2002, News Service No. 24, 08 February, available at: <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE28/003/2002/en/8e9078c9-faff-11dd-9fca-0d1f97c98a21/mde280032002en.pdf>.

<sup>208</sup> Interview, advisor, EPP secretariat, European Parliament, Brussels, 05/03/07.

<sup>209</sup> Interview, advisor, cabinet of the EP president, Brussels, 02/05/07.

<sup>210</sup> I was given a copy of the letter by Algeria’s chief AA negotiator (*Lettre du Président de la République au Président du Conseil espagnol, Président en exercice de l’UE, M. J. María Aznar, 22/04/02*). It is important to note that, under Aznar’s right-wing government, Hispano-Algerian relations witnessed a notable improvement as symbolised by the signing of a Friendship Treaty in October 2002. This rapprochement coincided with a period of tension in Spanish-Moroccan relations (Gillespie, 2006a). The signing of the AA under the Spanish presidency of the EU was considered important symbolically by both the Spanish and Algerian governments.

sense of total vindication and political rehabilitation of the regime after 9/11? Or was it more a sign of a gradual learning process whereby Algerian policy-makers realised that the AA's added value would be more optimal in the area of economic reform than international political posturing?

The key to deciphering this apparent discursive shift lies in the following two developments. First, Bouteflika's emphatic liberal economic policy choices were somewhat contradictorily undermined by his government's rejection of the EU's offer of an interim agreement for the implementation of the AA's second volet provisions, pending the completion of its ratification process by both parties. This was a practice used in the cases of Egypt and Lebanon for instance, but the Algerian government deemed the idea 'inappropriate', invoking the imperative of submitting the AA to democratic scrutiny (Algerian ministry of foreign affairs – MFA, 2004a). However, if far-reaching economic reforms were genuinely high on the Algerian government's agenda, it would seem a little odd to reject a 'selective' – albeit useful – application of the AA on equally selective democratic grounds. Notwithstanding Bouteflika's avowedly liberal economic outlook, taking the content of his letter at face value would be to ignore the domestic context of the implementation of his reform agenda, which presaged a protracted process at the very least (see chapter five for more details).

The second, more telling analytical clue relates to the exceptionally explicit reference in Bouteflika's message to the "conservative forces" within Algerian society and their preclusion of reformist programmes. In doing so, Bouteflika placed himself expressly as a bulwark against prominent regime opponents of reform, and sought the support of European governments for the daunting task of trying to curb their influence. Against a background of increasing factional infighting within the regime, especially following the Kabyle crisis, Bouteflika was unequivocally hinting at his struggle against a stronghold of army *état-major* commanders who had by then shown their determination to prevent him from running for a second term (Szmolka, 2004: 49).<sup>211</sup> Disagreements with certain superior military officers related not only to the policy of reconciliation with Islamist militants, but also to the question of economic liberalisation, which ran counter to the commercial interests of many army-related networks of state officials and economic operators. In this context, Bouteflika may also have intended, on the other hand, to reassure European partners of his commitment to a

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<sup>211</sup> This was confirmed 8 years later in the context of the 2009 presidential race (*Le Quotidien d'Oran*, 28/3/09).

liberal agenda in anticipation of the simmering “Khalifa affair”,<sup>212</sup> which was essentially the product of factional struggle at the helm of the state (Hadjadj, 2007). Having secured the support of Jacques Chirac, which was vital for the dismantling of the Khalifa “empire”, Bouteflika hoped to rally other influential European leaders behind his covert plans.<sup>213</sup> Spain and Italy were important in this regard given their strong economic and commercial ties with Algeria. Thus, far from constituting a discursive shift, Bouteflika’s message was quintessentially political and only paid lip service to the EU’s economic interests for a shrewd utilitarian purpose.

The message seemed to have got through, certainly with the help of the many bilateral diplomatic charm offensives which Bouteflika launched in Europe and beyond. Besides Jacques Chirac’s France, with which relations had by 2003 improved to the extent that both leaders began talking about concluding a friendship treaty (Tuquoi, 2007), Bouteflika succeeded in carving out strong links with European leaders such as Germany’s Gerhard Schröder, Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi and Spain’s José María Aznar. Subsequently, European policy became clearly oriented towards supporting Bouteflika’s interdependent domestic policies of political reconciliation, economic modernisation and civilianisation of political institutions.<sup>214</sup> In security terms, the priority of EU governments was to share counter-terrorism intelligence with their Algerian counterparts, seeking to obtain the lists of amnestied terrorists in return for stricter control of exiled Algerian activists.<sup>215</sup> In the absence of governmental interest, civil society furore over human rights abuses in Algeria gradually subsided, especially after the return of a modicum of normality in Kabylia in response to government concessions to the region’s representatives, including the official constitutionalisation of *Tamazight* as a “national language”.

An analysis of Algerian foreign ministry documents (public and unpublished) reveals that, following the signing of the AA, Algeria’s discourse within the EMP’s multilateral fora became particularly focused on the reinvigoration of the Barcelona Process and the resolution of the Middle East conflict with specific reference to the 2002 Arab (League) “peace

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<sup>212</sup> Abdelmoumene Khalifa is a young Algerian entrepreneur who rose rapidly to the forefront of the country’s political and economic scenes after starting in 1998 – from scratch – a vast business empire that covered aviation, banking and pharmaceuticals. The Khalifa Group then collapsed in 2003, faster than it emerged.

<sup>213</sup> Interview, Algerian academic, Algiers, 16/10/06.

<sup>214</sup> Interview, French and Spanish diplomats, Brussels, 21/02/07 and 16/03/07.

<sup>215</sup> Interview, Algerian foreign ministry official, Algiers, 17/10/06.

proposal”.<sup>216</sup> While this nuanced shift reflects to a degree the prevailing mood vis-à-vis the modest results of the Barcelona Process and the vicissitudes of the second Intifada, it was also a clear indication of Algeria’s post-AA “sit back” attitude once the EU’s became *demandeuse* in the very issue areas of importance to Algeria.<sup>217</sup> The combination of growing foreign policy confidence, in a context of booming oil prices and a fully-fledged “global war on terror”, and an increasingly palpable power struggle between Bouteflika and the army high command, meant that the normative discourse that the EU had cultivated in relation to Algeria since 1997/98 became visibly retracted.<sup>218</sup> As a result, democracy-related events such as the 2002 legislative election were only informally commented by European policy-makers, regardless of political significance and fundamental irregularities (ICG, 2002; Bouandel, 2002b; Aghrout, 2004). Correspondingly, with the approaching presidential election of 2004 rising tension at the helm of the Algerian state diverted government resources inward and translated into less enthusiasm for the AA.<sup>219</sup> Concomitantly, the ratification process of the Agreement was put on the backburner, leaving the fate of EU-Algerian relations at the mercy of extra-EMP processes.

## 2.2. 2004-2005: Strategic learning

The protraction of the AA’s ratification process was on the part of the EU<sup>220</sup> largely due to the 2004 enlargement “success story” which led to the accession of ten new member states to the Community (*El Watan*, 16 may 2004), most of which were former Soviet republics whose democratic transformation had been at the top of the EU’s agenda since the fall of the Berlin Wall. In anticipation of the policy reconfigurations about to be imposed by this “big-bang” expansion, the European Commission formulated its new ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood Policy’ (Meyer-Resende, 2004). Drawing methodologically from *la méthode élargissement*, the avowed objective behind the ENP was to help the EU create an “ring of friends” in its immediate vicinity by ‘expanding the zone of prosperity, stability and security beyond [its]

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<sup>216</sup> Amongst the texts in question: Algerian MFA (2004b) Sommet euro-méditerranéen à la Haye, Algiers, 30 November; ‘Pour une vision commune de progrès et de solidarité dans le cadre du Partenariat euro-méditerranéen’, unpublished non-paper prepared for the meeting of the 2003 Mediterranean Forum; ‘Non-paper sur la relance du Processus de Barcelone présenté par l’Algérie’, unpublished non-paper prepared for the 2004 meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of the “5+5” group.

<sup>217</sup> Interview, Algerian diplomat, Brussels, 23/03/07.

<sup>218</sup> EU officials argue that the EU chose not to appear to be meddling with internal Algerian political developments, such as through issuing qualifying statements, for fear of destabilising the fragile balance of power between the country’s institutions and the relative peace that has prevailed since 1999 (interview, Commission diplomat, Algiers, 15/05/07).

<sup>219</sup> Interview, Algerian journalist, Algiers, 16/10/06.

<sup>220</sup> Only seven member states had ratified the document in two years (*Le Jeune Indépendant*, 28 April 2004).

borders' (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006: 139). Far from inspiring consensus around it, however, the ENP spurred vivid debates amongst policy-makers and analysts both within the EU and outside.

Far from being designed with the explicit intention of addressing the socio-economic woes of the southern periphery, the ENP was more a progeny of the EU's shifting internal dynamics (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005: 19). Once extended to include EMP countries with the exception of Turkey, the ENP seemed indeed suited to 'offer the key to a desperately needed new dynamic in Euro-Mediterranean relations' (Johansson-Nogués, 2004: 243). However, some aspects pertaining to this new framework's principles and mechanisms mark a clear rupture with certain dimensions of the "Barcelona philosophy" (Crawford, 2005).

First of all, the ENP's largely bilateral and differentiated approach to relations with near-abroad countries was a move away from the overall regional-partnership focus of the Barcelona Process. In a region like the Mediterranean where conflicts are an endemic feature of the political landscape, tailored bilateral relations may indeed be the best way to circumvent regional constraints and satisfy the preferences of some SMCs like Israel and Morocco. But conversely, moving away from multilateralism and region-building may not be optimal for conflict resolution but rather detrimental, as may be the case in the dispute over Western Sahara.

Secondly, rewarding the "reformers" and leaving aside the "laggards", according to the ENP's principle of positive conditionality, implies again an attitudinal shift on the part of the EU vis-à-vis its practices within the EMP. Whilst this method makes the EU and some of its partner countries more proactive in promoting reforms and achieving them, it has the potential of alienating the "non-reformers" and pushing them towards seeking like-minded alliances to maximise their leverage with the EU. The instance of the Russian-Algerian rapprochement may be interpreted along this line (Darbouche, 2007). Far from creating an arc of friends, this approach may lead to rivalling *arcs* of friends.

Meanwhile, in Algeria, the race to the presidential election of April 2004 was gathering steam. A rift in the alliance between President Bouteflika and his prime minister from 2000, Ali Benflis, began to appear amid the Khalifa affair imbroglio. More specifically, Benflis' rising influence, as secretary general, within the party of the FLN raised many eyebrows in

the Bouteflika camp, especially when in March 2003 he declared that his party aspired to be independent of regime influence (Holm, 2005: 118). Interpreted by Bouteflika as a move by his political rivals intended to deprive him of FLN support in the forthcoming presidential election – support he had been canvassing since 1999 – the statement led to the dismissal of Benflis from his prime ministerial position. Subsequently, an unprecedented *bras de fer* openly broke out between Bouteflika and a faction of the regime led by General Mohamed Lamari, Ali Benflis and many influential figures of the FLN (Bouandel, 2004: 1527-1533). The incumbent president had the support of a splinter group of FLN “*redresseurs*” [re-adjusters] led by Abdelaziz Belkhadem, the RND, and intelligence chiefs.<sup>221</sup> The resulting election campaign was the most animated and unpredictable in the history of Algeria’s presidential contests. Winning seemed genuinely up for grabs, and up until the eve of the announcement of the results domestic and outside onlookers believed that the race would not only go to a second round, but that it could indeed go either way. In the end, the triumph of Bouteflika in the first round was a turning point in Algerian politics. His success in completing his first term, let alone getting re-elected for a second – the first president since Chadli to do so – was crucial for the consolidation of civilian rule within the executive branch of power at the expense of the military (Roberts, 2007: 14).

This *nouvelle donne* cleared the way for the incumbent president to purge the army of a radically politicised tendency which considered its role in the fight against radical Islamists inextricable from meddling with the political institutions of the state.<sup>222</sup> From 2005 onwards, Bouteflika gained the upper hand over military commanders, with the exception perhaps of the head of the intelligence services. The president’s manoeuvres, however, could not have succeeded without the implicit consent of the intelligence chiefs, whose influence on all sectors of Algeria’s political and civil societies has reached considerable proportions in the last twenty years mainly as a result of the fight against radical Islamist militancy.<sup>223</sup> The achievements of Bouteflika’s enterprise are not without significance for the process of reform of the Algerian polity. The civilianisation and rationalisation of executive power is a precursor of reduced factionalism which in turn is a fundamental precondition for any meaningful institutionalisation of politics in Algeria to take place. However, for these transformations to lay the foundations for the advent of democracy and the rule of law, they

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<sup>221</sup> Numerous informal conversations with Algerian journalists in Algiers and Brussels over the fieldwork period.

<sup>222</sup> This tendency was incarnated by Generals Mohamed Lamari, Larbi Belkheir and Fodhil Cherif. All three figures were pushed out of power between summer 2004 and 2005.

<sup>223</sup> Interview, Algerian journalist, Brussels, 22/02/07.

needed to be accompanied by specific downstream measures on which Bouteflika's record has been most disappointing.

Indeed, part of Bouteflika's strategy for the consolidation of presidential authority at the expense of the army high command consisted of undermining opposition political parties, concomitantly disempowering parliamentary scrutiny, and neutralising the most outspoken media critiques by way of intimidation. The typical involvement of these political and civil society actors as appendages in the factionalist struggles of the regime justified in his eyes the adoption of an authoritarian outlook towards these elements if his political projects were to bear fruit. If cautiously carried out before 2004, this strategy became ostentatiously emboldened thereafter. However, the unexpected faltering of Bouteflika's political momentum at the end of 2005, owing to ill health, brought back his detractors to the forefront of the Algerian political scene. Coinciding with a recrudescence of terror attacks in 2006, as a prelude to a much larger campaign following the GSPC's conversion in early 2007 into an al-Qaeda franchise in the Maghreb, Bouteflika's physical frailty became a springboard for criticism of his peace plans especially following the reported involvement of amnestied Islamist militants in the new wave of attacks. The thrust of these critiques turned subsequently to the enunciated presidential plan for constitutional revision to allow the incumbent to run for another term.

In this context, the introduction of the ENP provoked no official reaction from Algeria. Policy-makers were certainly aware of the EU's new proposed framework, but felt that, in many ways, it did not warrant a public *prise de position*. For besides domestic political uncertainty, the Algerian government felt remotely concerned, if at all, by the new policy given the new, not-yet-ratified "association" status of the country with the EU on the one hand and the Eurocentric nature of the ENP on the other.<sup>224</sup> Commission officials, for their part, admit that there was a 'marketing flaw' in the launching phase of the ENP, as they realised that an additional effort could have been made to show a minimum of regard to SMCs traditionally averse to "imposed" European policies, such as Egypt and Algeria, by at least showing interest in their views on the content of the ENP beforehand.<sup>225</sup> This being said, regardless of initial reactions and strategies, the fact remains that Algeria was in no position to

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<sup>224</sup> Interview, Algerian diplomat, Brussels, 31/01/07.

<sup>225</sup> Interview, Commission official, Brussels, 03/05/07.



consider practically adhering to the ENP so long as the AA awaited ratification and implementation.

In fact, the only Algerian reaction to the potential ramifications of the EU's 2004 enlargement on EU-Algerian relations was limited to primarily journalistic queries on whether the ten new member states would also have to ratify the AA, causing further delays to an already protracted process (*El Moudjahid*, 10 July 2004). These questions prompted the representative of the European Commission in Algiers, Lucio Guerrato, to clarify the likely impact of enlargement on communitarian constitutional processes, arguing that new member state legislatures would not need to ratify the EU-Algeria AA as it would be considered part of the *acquis*, and to reiterate the EU's attachment to its partnership with Algeria (*El Watan*, 16 May 2004).

It was not until the dust of the presidential election had settled that the Algerian Council of Ministers approved the AA, referring it subsequently to Parliament for ratification. In the last 2004 cabinet meeting in December, the ratification of the AA was flagged up as a government priority for the following year. Chairing the meeting, President Bouteflika called on all national stakeholders to ensure the successful implementation of the Agreement, emphasising the need for economic operators in particular to seize the opportunities it offers to improve the competitiveness of their enterprises in the face of European businesses (*Le Quotidien d'Oran*, 2 January 2005). By portraying association with the EU as an important threshold for the necessary integration of the Algerian economy into the global economy, Bouteflika was anticipating the opposition that the next phases of the adoption of the AA were going to face from political and economic actors.

In the absence hitherto of a meaningful debate on the added value of the AA for Algeria, the parliamentary ratification process provided an opportunity for opposition parties notably to voice their views on the government's choice in this regard. The Trotskyist Workers' Party (*Parti des Travailleurs*, PT), led by the charismatic Louisa Hanoune, expressed instinctively the most critical view of the AA pointing to the potential impact of its liberalisation agenda on the state's fiscal revenues and the country's unemployment rate (*Le Quotidien d'Oran*, 27

April 2005).<sup>226</sup> Other opposition parties, such as the FFS and the RCD, criticised the AA on the basis of its limited democratic added value, arguing that, in the expected absence of a rigorous application of the Agreement's political stipulations, the gains of the wider Algerian population would remain meaningless (*El Watan*, 16 March 2005). Unsurprisingly, however, the AA was eventually endorsed by all political formations within parliament, with the exception of PT MPs who voted against it (*El Watan*, 15 March 2005). Even the Islamist opposition party *El Islah* [Reform], led by Abdallah Djaballah, voted in favour of the adoption of the AA, reinforcing the overwhelming favourable majority of the Tripartite Presidential Alliance representing the government (FLN, RND, MSP).

It must be said that, after a decision was made to finalise the process of adopting an AA, the Algerian government spared no effort in attempting to convince domestic sceptics of the merits of such undertaking by highlighting the association status' virtues and giving reassurances as to its economic impact. Such efforts did not go unnoticed in the EU; so much so that the Commission's ambassador in Algiers felt the need to praise the government's 'admirable' commitment to defending the dossier in the face of home critics (*Le Quotidien d'Oran*, 16 March 2005). However, the government's PR campaign seemed to have failed to assuage the concerns of some Algerian entrepreneurs who, on the eve of the entry into force of the AA,<sup>227</sup> warned of an impending "tsunami of European goods" about to wipe out the country's fragile infant industries (*El Khabar*, 31 August 2005). Curiously, the most emphatic business fears emanated from sugar producers, such as the state-owned *Enasucré*, who dreaded the impact that the possibility of other operators to import tax-free, on a first-come-first-served basis, up to 150,000 tons of sugar, as provided for by the agreement, would have on their market share (*Le Jeune Indépendant*, *Le Quotidien d'Oran*, 29 August 2005). Ironically, even Algeria's most successful and avowedly liberal entrepreneur, Issad Rabrad,<sup>228</sup> joined the outcry by calling on the government to suspend this provision and allow local producers enough time to prepare themselves (*La Tribune*, 15 September 2005). In the end, the short-lived character of most of these protests was either an indication of their being

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<sup>226</sup> Louisa Hanoune went as far as qualifying the adoption of the AA as unconstitutional, by reference to Article 121 of the Algerian Constitution which prohibits the presentation of 'draft bills likely to cause a reduction in public resources or lead to an increase in public spending' under the proviso that such texts provide, at the same time, for an increase in state revenues by other means.

<sup>227</sup> After the ratification of the AA by both chambers of the Algerian Parliament at the end of March, a six-month time lag before its entry into force (on 1 September) was agreed with the EU, pending *inter alia* the ratification of the document by the Dutch Parliament and its enactment by the President of Algeria (*L'Expression*, 26 April 2005).

<sup>228</sup> CEO of the Cevital Group, a multi-billion dollar company specialising in food processing and light industry.

exaggerated because of a general lack of information (*El Watan*, 31 August 2005) – a hypothesis refuted by the government<sup>229</sup> – or a sign that the deep-vested commercial interests of some powerful “monopoly-holders” were being threatened. Whatever it was, the government went ahead with the AA implementation schedule, starting on 1 September, for the purpose of which an important institutional coordination mechanism was put in place.

However, Algeria’s commitment to an earnest implementation of the AA contrasted sharply with its attitude towards the ENP. As the European Commission came calling during the final phase of the AA’s ratification process, with the aim of gauging the perception in Algiers vis-à-vis the ENP, Algerian decision-makers broke the silence they had hitherto observed with regard to this new European policy framework. Leonello Gabrici, Head of the Maghreb Unit in the EC’s external relations department, was the first EU official to get a direct sense of the prevailing scepticism in Algiers vis-à-vis the ENP when conducting a scouting trip in preparation for a visit of ENP Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner to the country (*Le Quotidien d’Oran*, 17 February 2005). Moreover, shortly before the Commissioner’s visit in June – the first visit by an EU Commissioner since 1996 (Benattallah, 2006: 25) – the head of the European affairs department in the Algerian MFA, Mohamed Hannache, stated in unequivocal terms and in the presence of Commission diplomats that ‘the ENP does not constitute a priority for Algeria’ (*Le Quotidien d’Oran*, 04 May 2005). Finally, when visiting Algeria, Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner received from her Algerian counterpart formal confirmation of his country’s self-exclusion from the ENP (Algerian MFA, 2005c).

Although the Commission’s press release ahead of the visit stated that Ferrero-Waldner would seek to ‘discuss the re-launch of political dialogue [with Algeria] ... and the potential of the European Neighbourhood Policy’ (Commission of the European Communities, 2005a), no official mention was made of the ENP in the actual course of that visit. Instead, following her meetings with the Algerian president and foreign minister, the Commissioner described the real objective of her trip as consisting of reiterating the ‘EU’s willingness to support Algeria’s economic and social reforms, and to cooperate with Algeria in the fight against terrorism, especially that the AA has now been ratified’ (*El Moudjahid*, 27 June 2005). In fact, what the

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<sup>229</sup> Algerian foreign ministry officials argue that they worked with their colleagues from the ministries of commerce and industry to inform as best as possible Algerian entrepreneurs, notably by organising a series of seminars with representatives of numerous industry confederations.

EU delegation did not expect<sup>230</sup> was to receive from the Algeria government an ‘Action Plan’, or a ‘Road Map’, outlining rather assertively their national political, economic and social priorities within the AA and drawing on the government’s programme, ENP Action Plans of other SMCs and “additional elements”.<sup>231</sup> Additionally, Algeria demanded the formal opening of negotiations on a visa agreement; the encouragement of more meaningful European investment by the Commission; proposed the conclusion of an agreement on scientific research and inter-university exchanges; and proposed that the EU support Algeria’s education and vocational training sector reform (Algerian MFA, 2005d).

Algeria’s rejection of the ENP<sup>232</sup> seemed to have been initially taken lightly by Commission officials who continued to insist on the conclusion of at least a Country Report for Algeria, upon which an Action Plan would eventually be based.<sup>233</sup> It was not until the Algerian government reiterated its dismissal of the ENP in a foreign ministry memo (2005a) that the EU switched to a more realistic “taking note” position.<sup>234</sup> Advocated by officials within DG Relex, who are (now) well-familiar with the dynamics of Algeria’s decision-making processes, this realism reflects a notable degree of learning on the part of EU officials. By their own admission, these have learnt to respect Algeria’s decisions knowing that ‘when Algerian decision-makers say “yes”, it means “yes”, and when they say “no”, it is a definite “no”’.<sup>235</sup> They have also realised, in light of the 1990s experience, that the EU has insufficient leverage with Algeria, even when the latter is at its most vulnerable, to attempt to influence its policies. Thus, working with and around the country’s preferences does now appear to be the only way for the EU to gradually gain purchase on issues of more normative importance.<sup>236</sup> This became all the more pertinent in the face of Algeria’s growing foreign policy assertiveness resulting from consolidated domestic stability, especially following the promulgation in 2005 of the National Peace and Reconciliation policy,<sup>237</sup> and increased international courtship for energy and counter-terrorism expertise (Sancha, 2005).

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<sup>230</sup> Interview, senior official, Cabinet of Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, Brussels, 16/03/07.

<sup>231</sup> ‘Plan d’action de la mise en œuvre de l’accord d’association’.

<sup>232</sup> For a detailed analysis of Algeria’s ENP policy, see: H. Darbouche (2008) ‘Decoding Algeria’s ENP Policy: Differentiation by other Means?’, *Mediterranean Politics*, 13 (3), pp. 371-389.

<sup>233</sup> Interview, senior Commission official, ENP Directorate, Brussels, 15/03/07.

<sup>234</sup> Interview, Commission official, Brussels, 03/05/07.

<sup>235</sup> Interview, Commission official, Brussels, 03/05/07.

<sup>236</sup> Interview, Commission official, Brussels, 21/03/07.

<sup>237</sup> For a detailed analysis, see: G. Joffé (2008b) ‘National Reconciliation and General Amnesty in Algeria’, *Mediterranean Politics*, 13 (2), pp. 213-228.

Despite this relational strength (Lesser, 2001), Algeria's behaviour with the EU also showed signs of learning. Indeed, the proposed Action Plan for the implementation of the AA includes a whole chapter on 'democracy and the rule of law', in which the Algerian government outlines its priorities for the consolidation of state institutions responsible for the upholding of both normative objectives, such the parliament, public administration and the judiciary (Algerian MFA, 2005b: 2-3). However, given Bouteflika's meagre record in reforming these institutions, there is little chance for such enunciated objectives to translate into genuine government policy. They are only there to placate the EU and ensure that the proposed document, by paying a modicum of lip service for the EU's discourse, is accepted as a basis for interaction. Subsequently, Algeria remained expressly attached to – albeit increasingly critical of – the EMP (Algerian MFA, 2005a; 2005e; 2005f), and, in the wake of the EU's exposure to Russia's energy *Realpolitik*, saw the main priorities of its relationship with the EU be limited to the conclusion of a 'strategic energy partnership', to negotiating a new visa agreement, and for the EU to support its WTO bid.<sup>238</sup>

### III. Conclusion

After ten years of interaction in the context of the Barcelona Process, there is little evidence to suggest that a genuine rapprochement of political and security interests took place between the EU and Algeria as a *direct* result of EMP processes. Of course, this is not to suggest that there was no convergence of priorities whatever between the two parties on issues of relevance to the EMP. As this chapter has shown, given the fundamental differences that had pervaded EU-Algerian relations as far as the question of terrorism was concerned for instance, there needed to be some degree of convergence of preferences for the AA to be adopted. What is evident, however, is that interaction within the EMP had largely little to do with surpassing the major stumbling blocks to these interest approximations and the latter were more the result of strategic socialisation processes than a logic of appropriateness. Strategic calculation was prevalent on both sides and the dynamic underlying the AA negotiation process was less about normative suasion than utility maximisation. Domestic imperatives were largely predominant in the making of foreign-policy decisions on both sides, with EU member states playing a lead-role and Algeria's internal conflict bolstering military commanders as the locus of power in the country.

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<sup>238</sup> Interview, Commission official, Brussels, 03/05/07.

For long after 1995, one of the fundamental differences between the AA negotiation priorities of the EU and Algeria related to the question of terrorism. Beleaguered by an internal struggle for survival against a violent Islamist insurgency, the Algerian regime made of the issue of “terrorism” its diplomatic *cheval de bataille*, both in the hope of obtaining international support and to justify its often controversial policy responses. In the EU, and in many ways as a result of the very nature of the Algerian crisis, overall sympathy for this Algerian cause was at best timid. Thus, Algeria’s insistence on providing for the fight against terrorism in the AA was met consistently with EU scepticism. Until, that is, the events of 9/11 changed the EU’s perception of the Islamist terrorist threat. Indeed, subsequent European policy reassessment led to the realisation that much can be achieved in countering what has been described as the world’s new twenty-first-century threat by engaging with an experienced partner, especially given its important links with Europe including in the form of a strong migrant community. Algeria was prompt to seize this opportunity by *playing the role* of vindicated victim whose once-ignored plight was now a source of unprecedented relational strength vis-à-vis the EU.

9/11 intervened after a short period of relative convergence between the European and Algerian interests, particularly in the area of political and economic reforms. Starting in 1999, shortly after the coming of Abdelaziz Bouteflika to power, this notable improvement was a corollary of the change of policy orientation introduced by the new Algerian president. Stemming largely from Bouteflika’s avowed liberal convictions, but also as the product of a national decision-making consensus on the most optimal way to overcome a severe conjunctural crisis, this policy shift had almost little to do with EMP interaction. Indeed, following the broaching of a political dialogue with the EU towards the end of 1997, Algeria’s military decision-makers learnt that their European interlocutors were particularly uncomfortable with the overt militarisation of the regime, which was not going down well with European civil society and public opinion in a context of dramatic violence in Algeria. Undoubtedly, their subsequent *strategic calculi* led to their re-proposing to Bouteflika – the liberal “dandy diplomat” of Algeria’s heyday – to become president of the Republic despite widespread reticence amongst many army commanders. Thus, EMP interaction allowed Algerian decision-makers to broaden their grasp of European subjectivities vis-à-vis Algeria, which had usually been confined to the French establishment, leading to a semblance of interest approximation through a strategic socialisation mechanism.

It was not until the entry into force of the AA in 2005 that a relatively genuine convergence of political priorities between the EU and Algeria became clearly discernible. In fact, having realised the benefits of streamlined relations, both parties learnt to strategically obviate traditional obstacles to cooperation. As such, the EU has scaled down its normative strictures in relation to Algeria – knowing that it has limited leverage to translate those strictures in meaningful change – and has chosen to capitalise on areas of mutual interest such as counter-terrorism. Similarly, Algerian policy-makers have shown unprecedented readiness to officially pay lip service to the EU's rhetorical normative priorities, clearing the way for more meaningful cooperation. Thus, interaction within the AA has allowed both the EU and Algeria more insight into their reciprocal subjectivities, leading to a utilitarian approximation of interests through selective obviation of differences.

## Chapter four – Free trade and energy cooperation: The politics of “specificity” in an interdependent relationship

The economic and financial partnership of the Barcelona Process is indisputably the linchpin of the EMP design. It was not only, at least at the start of the Process, the most elaborate component in terms of proposed content and timeframe, but it subsequently proved to be a venue for relatively substantial interaction between the partners, especially in the context of AA negotiations, and as an overwhelming consumer of MEDA funds (Bicchi, 2002; Brach, 2007: 556). Besides purporting to conceptually reflect the prevailing development-economics wisdom of the “Washington Consensus” (Schumacher, 2004b: 1; Hunt, 1999),<sup>239</sup> the prospective Euro-Mediterranean free trade area (FTA) is most pertinently a product of the EU’s instinctive *modus operandi* in the context of region-building efforts such as the EMP. The centrality of trade liberalisation and economic cooperation to the EU’s EMP project is nothing but a calculated reproduction of its distinct post-war integration experience (Marks, 1996: 4; Joffé, 2005: 36), building on and consolidating an existing network of variable preferential trade and cooperation agreements with southern Mediterranean countries.

Within the specific context of the EMP, the pre-eminence of the free-trade component could not be justified by overall EU commercial interests alone given the hitherto relatively limited significance of the Mediterranean market for Europe,<sup>240</sup> representing at the time eleven percent of exports and eight percent of imports (Kienle, 1998: 2). As such, the EU’s emphasis on economic reform in its incrementalist approach to wider SMC predicaments was dictated by high hope for and expectation of a spill-over from market reforms to political liberalisation and containment of migratory pressure. Such correlational reasoning was predicated on both modernisation theoretical assumptions, positing a positive chronological sequence between a given threshold of economic development and political reform (Cavatorta, 2009: 10-13),<sup>241</sup> and the belief that the pursuit of free trade and structural reform within the institutionalised partnership of the EMP would facilitate both a more far-reaching process of economic liberalisation and a more controlled process of change through regular interaction than those

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<sup>239</sup> Notwithstanding some fundamental shortcomings in this respect, on which see: Philippart (2003b).

<sup>240</sup> If one excludes the importance of energy exchanges, which are in any case not incorporated in the envisaged FTA as will be shown in this chapter.

<sup>241</sup> For a critical analysis of the relevance of these assumptions in the context of the EMP, see: E. Kienle (2005) ‘Political Reform through Economic Reform? The Southern Mediterranean States Ten Years after Barcelona’, in: H. Amirah-Fernández & R. Youngs (Eds.) *The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Assessing the First Decade* (Madrid: FRIDE/RIEcano).



driven by other actors and methodologies (Youngs, 2002: 52). Thus, anchoring regional integration, economic development and political change to a free-trade construct orbiting the highly-integrated European market was the *finalité* assigned by the Barcelona architects to the second basket (Tovias and Ugur, 2004: 403).

However, the prospect of a free trade area was met with a modified rapture across the region. Within the EU, divisions (referred to in chapter two) between northern and southern member states concerned mainly the binary prioritisation of “trade and aid”, driven by the centrifugal forces of the broader external relations balancing act between eastern European and southern Mediterranean challenges. Amongst the Mediterranean partner countries,<sup>242</sup> doubts over the workability of the Euro-Med formula were widespread – with the exception perhaps of Tunisia which showed confidence that it would benefit from the investment and other opportunities offered by the FTA – but overall assessments of the partnership dividends encouraged favourable deliberations in the end. Accordingly, countries like Morocco and Jordan saw eventual advantages as relating to opportunities of increased EU financial resources, whereas for Algeria and Egypt the stakes were more political and security-related (Marks, 1996: 14). Algeria’s attitude, in particular, towards the second basket was further conditioned by its economic structures and the nature of its trade relations with the EU, characterised by the predominance of hydrocarbons and an interdependent exchange of natural resources in a form of fossil fuels on the one hand and capital-intensive and agri-food consumer products on the other.

This chapter will examine the priorities of the EU and Algeria in the framework of the economic and financial partnership of the EMP, focusing on issues of free trade and energy cooperation in view of their prominent impact on AA negotiations and beyond. I will argue that, for much of the negotiation process, “specificity” was regularly invoked by both parties to justify policy rigidity and/or demand exceptional concessions from the other party. This specificity waiver was very much defined by the nature of economic relations between the EU

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<sup>242</sup> In the context of the Euro-Med FTA, SMCs refers most generally to the eight Arab partner countries, excluding Turkey, Malta and Cyprus because of their pre-accession status (and member states status for the latter two since 2004), and Israel because of its special trade and MEDA provisions in view of its level of economic development. For more details, see: A. Tovias and J. Bacaria (1999) ‘Free Trade and the Mediterranean’, *Mediterranean Politics*, 4 (2), pp. 3-22; A. Tovias (2004) ‘Economic Liberalism between Theory and Practice’, *University of California Institute of European Studies*, Paper No. 040504, available at: <http://repositories.cdlib.org/ies/040504>.

and Algeria, and was – up to a point – a more recurrent discursive feature in the case of the latter. The chapter will also show that interest convergence in the areas in question was more the product of change in political preferences than economic structures, in reverse of the EU's initially foreseen causal order. Unlike in chapter three, the next section will only briefly outline the relatively unchanged content of the second EMP pillar (hence a shorter chapter four), providing instead a critique of its shortcomings from the point of view of Algeria. It will then describe the structural features of the Algerian economy as these are crucial for dissecting the tenets of its economic policy proper (if any). The temporal sub-layer of analysis will be less important in this chapter than the previous one, because of less clear-cut periodic developments in the relevant issue areas throughout the timeframe of this study.

### **I. Content of the economic and financial basket: Asymmetries, 'high hopes and low motives'**

The European Union had long sought to influence economic development in the Mediterranean by encouraging export-led growth through a series of bilateral cooperation agreements that date back to the 1960s and 1970s. However, the prevailing antithetical import-substituting policy orientation in the majority of SMCs meant that the free access to the European market granted to their manufactured products by this unilateral free-trade regime had by the mid-1980s all but visibly failed to translate into meaningful economic dynamism. In view of the conspicuous economic failure of this socialist doctrine – against the background of impressive export-driven development in East Asia notably, the fledging institutionalisation of a global trade regime under the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the proliferation of regional FTAs – the EU's revised Mediterranean approach in the early 1990s advocated more reciprocal free trade as a catalyst for material progress and far-reaching regional cooperation (Rhein, 1999).

Correspondingly, the envisaged construction of 'an area of shared prosperity' through the EMP was predicated on the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean FTA by the year 2010. The implementation of this mid-term objective through a series of association agreements between individual SMCs and the EU was to provide gradual free access to SMC markets for European industrial goods while notoriously offering little improvement to existing terms of trade for southern Mediterranean economies. More specifically, the quasi-exclusion by the EU of agricultural products from these limited free-trade agreements did not only contradict the

spirit of WTO rules (Licari, 1998: 7), but it also denied SMCs the possibility to capitalise on their comparative advantage in this sector and optimise the benefits of their participation in the proposed FTA (Zaim, 1999: 46-48).<sup>243</sup> Indeed, the EU's proposed family of AAs were limited by lack of coverage: agriculture and services were effectively excluded; limited by lack of depth as substantial (and probably increasing) technical barriers to trade remain due to differences in regulatory requirements; limited by rules as restrictive rules of origin and lack of cumulation constrain the degree of effective market access (Brenton and Manchin, 2003: 1).

Besides attempting to justify such selectivity on grounds of "specificity" of the agricultural sector in the EU's intergovernmental geo-economic equilibrium and by playing on the juridical ambiguity of the incipient WTO regime in this regard (Martín, 2004: 444-445; García-Alvarez-Coque, 2002: 410), the EU devised a new financial regulation framework with the aim of mitigating the impending costs of the underlying structural asymmetries of the AAs in addition to incentivising transformation in SMCs. The new financial facility, known as MEDA (*Mesures d'Ajustement*), was endowed with more important volumes of money than previous financial protocols,<sup>244</sup> and was avowedly more political in the sense that it was designed to support but also, through conditionality and targeted projects, catalyse the prescribed reform process (Holden, 2005: 463). The bulk of MEDA funds were destined to country-specific structural adjustment programmes, while the rest aimed at sponsoring region-wide projects (See appendix 3 for a schematic illustration of the structure of the EMP's second basket).

Despite its *prima facie* significance, the MEDA transition wherewithal was deemed little more than paltry by SMCs in view of the expected socio-economic costs of FTAs. Tunisia, for instance, considered the most economically advanced of Arab SMCs, estimated the cost of transition over the first four to five years after the entry into force of the AA at \$2.2 billion (Marks, 1999: 55). Notwithstanding the differentiated methodology of "first-come, first-

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<sup>243</sup> For a comparative analysis between of the Euro-Med FTA and other EU-led FTAs, see: P. Gándara and M. Büge (2006) 'The European Union's Trade Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean: Coherence or Chaos?', Go-EuroMed Working Paper No. 0601, Berlin, available at: [http://www.go-euromed.org/documents/working\\_paper/Go-EuroMed\\_WP\\_0601\\_Germany\\_on\\_Trade.pdf](http://www.go-euromed.org/documents/working_paper/Go-EuroMed_WP_0601_Germany_on_Trade.pdf).

<sup>244</sup> €3,435 million were earmarked for MEDA I (1995-1999) and MEDA II (2000-2006) consisted of €5,350 million. Loans and other financing provided by the European Investment Bank (EIB) were added to the MEDA instrument, more than doubling the sums in both periods (source: [http://www.dellbn.ec.europa.eu/en/eu\\_and\\_med/meda.htm](http://www.dellbn.ec.europa.eu/en/eu_and_med/meda.htm)).

served” used by the Commission in the allocation of MEDA funds, even reforming frontrunners amongst SMCs complained that EU assistance was, as far as they were concerned, nowhere near the convergence funding provided for southern and eastern European accession candidates, which faced almost similar liberalisation strictures from Brussels (Minasi, 1998). These SMC protests were echoed by positions within the Commission and among southern member states, which favoured, rather egoistically in the case of the latter, “more aid than trade” but failed to secure substantial increases of contributions from their less-cash-strapped northern counterparts, such as Germany.

The socio-economic costs of what has been described as an effectively unilateral liberalisation of trade in the Mediterranean through the EMP have often been quantified in macro- and micro-economic terms. The impact of the dismantling of custom duties on state fiscal revenues and public sector budgets was identified as the immediate cost of the FTA with varying degrees of severity in SMCs, ranging from around thirty to ten percent of fiscal income depending on the level of tariff protection and the share of EU trade in a given country’s economic balance sheets (Tovias, 1997: 115-117; Schumacher, 2004b: 11-12; Hoekman, 1999: 90). Other macro-economic prognoses warned of trade distortions as ineluctable corollaries of asymmetrical and partial trade liberalisation, implying trade creation, diversion and deflection (Tovias, 1997: 119-121). At the micro-economic level, cost-benefit assessments identified employment (conditions), income, prices of consumer goods, the informal economy and social expenditure as the areas where the social repercussions of the FTA would be most acute (Martín, 2004; Hunt, 2002; Zaafrane and Mahjoub, 2000: 17-23).

For many critics of the EMP, the costs of the prospective Euro-Mediterranean FTA were to be compounded by the numerous imperfections of the enterprise, on top of the agricultural and MEDA shortcomings referred to above. The main lacunae can be summarised as follows:<sup>245</sup>

- *Transition period.* The envisaged twelve-year timeframe for completion of the trade liberalisation process by Euro-Mediterranean partners, after the entry into force of association agreements, was deemed relatively problematic in light of the breadth of reform requirements on the part of SMC, on the one hand, and the time lags allowed in

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<sup>245</sup> For more detailed analyses of these drawbacks, see: Licari (1998: 13-17), Tovias (1997: 121-124) and Schumacher (2004b: 14-16).

similar circumstances in the cases of Greece (22 years), Turkey (32 years) and Cyprus (30 years), on the other. However, exponents of more stringent deadlines argued that SMCs needed to be “shaken up” in order for meaningful reforms to be undertaken without further ado.<sup>246</sup>

- *Rules of origin and horizontal integration.*<sup>247</sup> With the exception of Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria,<sup>248</sup> Euro-Med association agreements have so far only allowed for bilateral cumulation of rules of origin as opposed to diagonal and even full cumulation (Brenton and Manchin, 2003: 14). Given the positive correlation between cumulation policies and regional trade dynamics (Schumacher, 2004b: 14-16; Tovias, 1997: 122-124), the EU’s stubborn rigidity on this issue has achieved nothing but impeding the enunciated objective of encouraging intra-SMC trade and economic integration, which constitutes an integral part of the broader regional FTA project (Escribano and Jordán, 1999). The resulting pattern of bilateral FTAs concluded hitherto between the EU and SMCs has concomitantly been described as a “hub-and-spoke” model. The EU, as a consolidated and regularly enlarging market, sits opposite a disintegrated grouping of less-developed states with which it has concluded a series of FTAs allowing free access for its manufactured products to their markets and, as such, inhibiting further their ability to attract FDI. Evidently, these polities’ seemingly relentless impotence in carving out more meaningful regional cooperation between them deserves a large part of the blame. Whether in the sub-regional contexts of the Maghreb or the Arab League’s Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) – with the exception perhaps of the nascent Agadir Agreement process – little progress has been achieved in forging stronger trade links between SMCs, owing for the most part to political blockages.<sup>249</sup>

From an Algerian standpoint, issues of foreign-debt management and transfer of technology through FDI were of primary importance. Although the Barcelona Declaration

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<sup>246</sup> Interview, Commission official, Brussels, 21/03/07.

<sup>247</sup> Rules of origin define the conditions that a product must satisfy to be deemed as originating in the country from which preferential access is being sought. The main justification for rules of origin is to prevent trade deflection, whereby products from non-participating countries destined for say the EU market are redirected through free trade partners of the EU to avoid the payment of customs duties.

<sup>248</sup> As a result of the existing sub-regional free-trade agreements between these countries in the framework of the Arab Maghreb Union, the EU agreed to include cumulation rules in their AAs (Boudhraf, 1999: 122).

<sup>249</sup> For a detailed analysis of these frameworks, with particular emphasis on the Maghreb, see: G.C. Hufbauer and C. Brunel (2008) *Maghreb Regional and Global Integration: A Dream to Be Fulfilled* (Washington DC: Peterson Institute).

'acknowledge[d] the difficulties that the question of debt can create for the economic development of the countries of the Mediterranean region', and pledged that partners would 'continue dialogue in order to achieve progress in the *competent fora*', the issue of SMCs' debt burden has never been included in the agenda of the economic and financial partnership of the EMP beyond receiving brief mention on two occasions, in similar language as above, when Euro-Med foreign ministers met in Palermo in 1998 and in Marseille the following year.<sup>250</sup> Algeria's traumatic experience with foreign debt from 1985 onwards, which saw the country sink in up to \$33.7 billion of debt in 1996 and devote over 80 percent of its foreign currency income to debt servicing (Aïssaoui, 2001: 234),<sup>251</sup> predisposed foreign policy-makers to consecrate the issue in their interactions with European creditors. Accordingly, the EU's deliberate omission of foreign debt in the Euro-Mediterranean context has been a target of regular criticism on the part of Algeria (Licari, 1998: 11-12), even if with relative moderation given its traditional prioritisation of more political matters within the EMP.<sup>252</sup> As recently as 2005, even after having reduced external-debt levels to exceptionally manageable proportions with the help of booming hydrocarbon revenues (*Le Quotidien d'Oran*, 14 May 2006), Algeria reiterated the principled importance it attaches to the issue, which still plagues a number of other SMCs (Algerian MFA, 2005a).

Similarly, the Barcelona Declaration and subsequent Euro-Med policy statements have conveyed little European interest in the active promotion of foreign direct investment in SMCs (Martín, 2000: 5). Instead, it was expected that FDI flows would be commensurate with the liberalisation of trade in SMCs, stipulated by the EMP, and with the improvement in regulatory apparatuses, notwithstanding the perverse effect of the hub-and-spoke dynamics pervading the network of AAs linking them to the EU. Rhetorically, Algeria has invariably insisted on FDI as a leading vector of economic growth in emerging markets, and has constantly criticised the EU for not doing enough to encourage European operators to invest in Algeria. Of course, the question of what is Algeria conversely doing, in terms of reforms and improving FDI determinants, is seldom openly addressed in such policy statements. But, the EU's lack of voluntary engagement in this issue, such as by establishing a Euro-

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<sup>250</sup> Concluding statement by Robin Cook, UK presidency, Euro-Med *ad hoc* ministerial meeting, Palermo, 3-4 June 1998: [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/euromed/conf/palermo\\_conc\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/conf/palermo_conc_en.pdf); Presidency's formal conclusions, Fourth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, Marseille, 15-16 November 2000: [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/cr/00006.en0.html](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/cr/00006.en0.html).

<sup>251</sup> The trauma culminated in the signing of a debt-rescheduling deal with the IMF in 1994. Algeria reimbursed the near-totality of its debt to Paris and London Clubs creditors in 2006.

<sup>252</sup> Interview, Algerian foreign ministry official, Algiers, 17/10/06.

Mediterranean investment bank, is often a source of blame on the part of Algeria (Algerian MFA, 2005a: 3).

*Euro-Mediterranean energy cooperation: The EMP's added value*

Energy (oil and gas) is perhaps the only area where interdependence in Euro-Mediterranean relations is characterised by net complementarity. European consumers rely considerably on external sources for their energy supplies, whose security is considered of strategic importance as a raw material for industrial activity and for the “European way of life” more broadly. Southern Mediterranean producers, on the other hand, are heavily reliant on hydrocarbon export revenues, most of which are obtained from sales on the European market, to meet their developmental ambitions. Moreover, Mediterranean energy exports to the EU have grown steadily over the years, accounting on average for a third of European imports with varying geographically-defined dependencies.<sup>253</sup> More specifically, Euro-Mediterranean energy interdependence is most important in natural gas, owing to the abundance of underexplored gas reserves in SMCs (Algeria, Libya, and Egypt) and the growing share of this relatively clean and efficient fuel in the European energy mix (Mañé-Estrada, 2006).<sup>254</sup>

If Euro-Mediterranean countries were in the past unable to harness energy as a factor of enhanced regional cooperation, it was certainly as a result of the nature of the industry (intrinsic suspicion after the “oil shock” of the 1970s, powerful national and international oil companies, strategic significance) and the incomplete consolidation of European common market integration. However, processes of rapid economic globalisation have brought the interests of energy consumers and producers closer, demanding greater cooperation between them (Mañé-Estrada, 2008). Furthermore, as the European Community became increasingly integrated, both politically and economically, including in the energy sector, the need for more domestic and external policy coordination and solidarity became more pressing for EU policy-planners as of the early 1990s (Commission of the European Communities, 1995b; 1995c). In view of its recognised growing dependence on external energy sources, the EU has sought to broach closer cooperation frameworks with major suppliers such as Russia and countries in the Middle East and North Africa (Gándara, 2007: 7).

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<sup>253</sup> For a detailed analysis of energy interdependence in the Mediterranean, see: H.G. Brauch (1996) ‘Energy Interdependence in the Western Mediterranean’, *Mediterranean Politics*, 1 (3), pp. 295-319.

<sup>254</sup> This was recognised as such by the EU as early as 1995, see: Commission of the European Communities (1995a). European Community Gas Supply and Prospects, Brussels, COM (95) 478 final.

Accordingly, the Barcelona Declaration recognised the ‘pivotal role of energy in the economic partnership’ and outlined, though parsimoniously, areas of potential cooperation in this context, most notable of which was the European Energy Charter Treaty. Following up in the same vein, the Commission put forward an ‘Action Programme’ proposing the establishment of a regional forum with a view to providing a structured framework for more regular interaction between Euro-Mediterranean energy policy-makers (Commission of the European Communities, 1996: 7). As a result, the idea of a Euro-Mediterranean energy partnership (EMEP), structured around a ministerial conference and a senior officials’ forum, emerged during the first meeting of Euro-Med energy ministers in Trieste in June 1996. Furthermore, the first working meeting of the forum (EMEF) took place in Brussels in May 1997. The first medium-term action plan of the EMEF, adopted in 1998, identified as its priorities for the period 1998-2002: a) Security of supply; b) competitiveness of the energy industry; and c) the protection of the environment. In terms of longer-term objectives, the EMEF’s Granada meeting in 2000 identified the following:

- reform of the legislative and regulatory framework for the energy sector of the Mediterranean partners;
- restructuring of the energy industry of the Mediterranean partners;
- convergence of the energy policies of the European Union and the Mediterranean partners;
- integration of the Mediterranean energy markets;
- development of interconnections, in particular South-South when appropriate; and
- promotion of renewable energy sources in the framework of sustainable development.

Following a timid start, the objectives of the Euro-Med energy partnership were reviewed by energy ministers during their third gathering in Athens in 2003. The conference set out a second action plan for the period 2003-2006, focusing more practically on the implementation of infrastructural projects of mutual interest around the Mediterranean basin and providing logistical support for the operations of the Forum.<sup>255</sup> More recently, Euro-Med energy ministers reiterated the importance of the EMEP for the optimisation of energy relations in the region, and endorsed a new action plan for the period 2008-2013, shifting priorities to the

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<sup>255</sup> For more details on development of the EMEF and its mechanisms, see: EUROMED Report, No. 58, 23 May 2003. Available at: [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/euromed/publication/euromed\\_report58\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/publication/euromed_report58_en.pdf)



harmonisation of energy policies and regulatory frameworks as well as promoting sustainable energy strategies and investment.<sup>256</sup>

Despite a hitherto weak institutional structure<sup>257</sup> and irregular activity over a decade, the EMEP has the potential to become a regional strategic energy partnership *par excellence*. It envisages a regional approach to energy security predicated on reciprocity and mutual interests (Sid Ahmed, 1999: 119). Given the nature of global and Mediterranean energy challenges, such an ambitious approach seems to provide an adequate framework to address the Mediterranean dimension of the EU's energy challenge (Belkin, 2008). Algeria perceives the EMEP as a mechanism capable of addressing the issues pertaining to its energy relationship with Europe such as the destination clause, the commercialisation of gas in the European market, funding for the establishment of a common Maghreb electricity market, and so forth.<sup>258</sup> But it remains well aware of the EU's relative supranational impotence in this area, its nascent policy activism notwithstanding,<sup>259</sup> and of the unrelenting interests of national energy champions and their influence on member state governments as demonstrated by the latter's predilection for bilateral energy dealings (Burke, Echagüe and Youngs, 2008: 11).

## II. Structural determinants of the dialectics of Algeria's political economy

The 1980s were synonymous for all central Maghrebi countries (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) with dire economic crises, owing largely to a shared failure of egregious governmental economic policies. Different sets of domestic political and economic circumstances meant not only that the initiation of necessary reform programmes by these countries took place at various stages,<sup>260</sup> but, crucially, that the outcomes of these adjustment processes were divergent. Whereas in the cases of Morocco and Tunisia structural reforms generated stronger and more diversified economic growth, less vulnerable to the vagaries of

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<sup>256</sup> For more details, see: European Council (2007) Ministerial Declaration on the Euro-Mediterranean Energy Partnership, 16709/07, Limassol, 17 December.

<sup>257</sup> This may change in the near future as a result of the establishment of a technical secretariat to provide logistical support for the EMEP, known as the Rome Euro-Mediterranean Energy Platform: <http://www.remep.org>.

<sup>258</sup> For more details, see: Speech of the Algerian minister of energy and mines, Chakib Khelil, to the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial conference on Energy held in Rome on 1-2 December 2003. Available at: [http://www.mem-algeria.org/actu/ministre/allocutions/euro-med-rome\\_cn.htm](http://www.mem-algeria.org/actu/ministre/allocutions/euro-med-rome_cn.htm).

<sup>259</sup> For more details, see: A. Piebalgs (2007) 'Future of Euro-Mediterranean Energy Relations', Speech at the OME General Assembly Meeting, Brussels, 10 December.

<sup>260</sup> Morocco started its economic reform programme in 1983, Tunisia in 1986, and Algeria in 1988/9.

external shocks,<sup>261</sup> and maintained if not strengthened political stability, in Algeria they were a prelude to a decade of unmitigated economic decline, political violence and international isolation (Dillman, 1998: 1).<sup>262</sup> Even the relatively tardy intervention of international financial institutions in 1994 failed to redress the fundamental deficiencies of the Algerian economy and to redefine the terms of its interaction with the world economy (Akacem, 2004).

Algeria's pattern of economic behaviour has since independence been largely determined by a combination of interlinked structural imperatives that set it apart from neighbouring countries in terms of economic policy orientation. Violence is a common explanatory variable among studies of Algeria's political economy (Joffé, 2002; Martín, 2003; ICG, 2001b), even though its correlation with economic failure is of a more symptomatic than causal nature. Rather, underpinning the distorted mechanisms behind the violent manifestations of resource distribution in Algeria is the capture of state administrative and economic institutions by fragmented, competing elites.<sup>263</sup> The construction of the post-independence Algerian state on the organisational pillars of the war of independence (FLN, ALN) translated not only into the hegemony of the single party on political and civil activities, but also, as a result of the "specific socialism" developmental doctrine under which the public sector was submitted to tight central administrative control, into the embedding of elite interests in public economic policy (Joffé, 2002: 31-32; Roberts, 1982: 40-44). As development was (and still is) driven by rent from the only value-creating sector, hydrocarbons, and power struggles between various poles overseeing vast clientelist networks became increasingly expressed in economic terms, this rentierist propensity became reinforced (Entelis, 1999).

With the disruption by conspicuous economic failure and concomitant political dissent (Islamism and Berberism) in the 1980s of the politico-economic equilibria, which had hitherto ensured the sound resource-distributive functioning of the state, the fallout from the elite structural constraint became more tangible. Indeed, as economic policy reform became an inevitability in the 1980s (as described above), consensus amongst the various strands of the

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<sup>261</sup> For a comparative analysis of structural reform outcomes in North Africa, see: K. Pfeifer (1999) 'The Parameters of Economic Reform in North Africa', *Review of African Political Economy*, 26 (82), pp. 441-454.

<sup>262</sup> For a comparative analysis of the relationship between economic liberalisation and political change in North Africa, see: B. Dillman (2002) 'International Markets and Partial Economic Reforms in North Africa: What Impact on Democratization?', in: R. Gillespie and R. Youngs (Eds.) *The European Union and Democracy Promotion: The Case of North Africa* (London: Frank Cass).

<sup>263</sup> Lahouari Addi uses a different metaphorical terminology to describe state capture: 'privatisation of the state and nationalisation of commercial activity' (2006: 207).

Algerian elite as to the best way forward proved increasingly difficult to achieve. Despite the willingness of a governing group of reformers, led by Mouloud Hamrouche, to broach meaningful liberal change, resistance from within the FLN, the army high command and various *organisations de masses* (labour unions, war veterans associations, etc.) prevented the emergence of a political coalition in favour of market-oriented reforms (Dillman, 1998: 5). Unlike in Morocco and Tunisia, where the political regimes of Hassan II and new-elected Ben Ali were more consolidated and committed to liberalisation, the reforming capability of Chadli's weakened presidency was circumscribed by regime factionalism. As the conflagration that followed the interruption of the democratic interlude in 1992 led to the suspension of state institutions and the militarisation of decision-making processes, meaningful economic reforms were subordinated to regime survival, owing to the increasing bi-polarisation of elite divisions. Epitomising the impact of elite divergences on economic policy in this context are both the quandary leading up both to the IMF deal and the prescript of privatisation of state-owned industries (Werenfels, 2002).<sup>264</sup> Vested interests within many elite circles, bureaucracies, state companies, labour unions and private sector actors put up stiff resistance to the rhetorically envisaged privatisation panacea – a process that reflects the nexus between economic change and private exploitation and which has been seen as a mechanism for reducing state control and encouraging private and foreign investment.

The overwhelming weight of hydrocarbons in Algeria's political-economic equation is the upstream side to the above process. The symbiotic relationship between steady oil and gas revenue and regime continuity demonstrated most dramatically its centrality to the country's stability in the 1980s and 1990s (Henry, 2004). Making up 97 percent of export revenue, 60 percent of state income, and over a third of GDP (Abderrezak, 2001: 11-12), the sector is simply *une donne existentielle* [existential factor] for the Algerian state. However, beyond the strategic importance of hydrocarbons, it is the economic culture cultivated around them that amounts to a structural determinant of economic policy. "Dutch disease", over-reliance on exports for basic commodities, debt-prone trade dynamics, and shadow economy are but the most ostensible of characteristics in such situations (Joffé, 2002: 41-43). In effect, this makes decisions about economic reform policy including trade liberalisation, currency exchange, investment code, and fiscal and public spending policy dependent on the vicissitudes of

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<sup>264</sup> For an overview of Algeria's privatisation process since the mid-1980s, see: A. Aghrout, M. Bouhezza and K. Sadaoui (2004) 'Restructuring and Privatization in Algeria', in: A. Aghrout et al. (Eds.) *Algeria in Transition: Reforms and Development Prospects* (London: RoutledgeCurzon).

international oil markets. Algeria's economic crisis has, in short, become integral to its political predicament, which can now only be resolved if purely political measures are accompanied by appropriate economic change. Indeed, the two aspects of the Algerian crisis are in a symbiotic relationship with each other, and neither can now be solved alone. In the words of Bradford Dillman (2000: 136):

The history of the 1970-1998 period [in Algeria] is one of incredible lost opportunities. Algeria has condemned itself to repeat and compound the same tragic economic mistakes it has made in the 1970s and 1980s. A large public sector suffering massive losses and a subsidized private sector with little regard for productivity, marginal gains, or other necessities of development linger as its destiny, though now accompanied by bloodshed and the shredding of the social fabric. Without inclusive democracy, it is hard to imagine how synergistic relations among state, business and society will ever be rebuilt.

### **III. The priorities of the EU and Algeria in the framework of the second pillar**

Algeria's express interest in engaging in AA negotiations shortly following the Barcelona conference of 1995 puzzled many observers, stakeholders and onlookers alike, inside and outside the country. Indeed, from a strictly economic viewpoint, the Agreement's added value appeared much less evident than for other SMCs or in other policy sectors (Martín, 2003: 54). For a mono-export economy like Algeria's, based overwhelmingly and stubbornly on hydrocarbons – a sector not covered by the prospective Euro-Mediterranean FTA – adopting an AA with the EU was tantamount to a unilateral liberalisation of trade. In the words of the President of the National Confederation of Algerian Entrepreneurs, Naït Abdelaziz, 'Algerian companies ha[d] nothing to export to the European market, except hydrocarbons' (*Le Maghreb*, 25 April 2007).

Yet, besides the geopolitical imperatives of the moment, Algeria needed the financial and technical support, concomitant of EU association, to withstand the dreaded impact of stringent IMF conditionality inherent in the 1994 debt-rescheduling deal (restricted public spending and subsidies, tighter monetary policy and national currency devaluation, price and exchange rate

liberalisation, and privatisation of public enterprises).<sup>265</sup> As such, the EU's ancillary assistance with structural reform, through its expertise, more global approach to economic transition, and additional funding was perhaps considered by Algerian decision-makers the most realistic economic dividend of the AA in the very short-term.<sup>266</sup> From a longer-term perspective, signing up for a FTA with the EU was seen as a means of securing, in addition to official development aid (ODA), increased private foreign capital investment both as direct investment (FDI) and, as the Algerian state begins to divest itself of economic assets and service responsibilities (privatisation), in the form of portfolio equity investment (Aghrout, 2005: 9).<sup>267</sup>

However, it is no secret that Algerian decision-makers only turned to IMF assistance as a measure of last resort. Having come to the unpalatable conclusion that the very political autonomy and legitimacy they had hitherto tried to preserve, by obdurately refusing outside aid, could no longer be pursued without an overhaul of existing structural economic policies, they bowed to the inevitable (IMF deal). Accordingly, the 1994 structural adjustment programme was considered a "necessary evil", whose reform prescriptions were to be only selectively implemented, in such a way that the brunt of the resulting hardship is borne by the population and does not undermine elite vested interests (Joffé, 2002: 34).<sup>268</sup> This basically meant that an intense process of macro-economic reform, on the one hand, and piecemeal privatisation, on the other, were undertaken between 1995 and 1998. As a result, the Ouyahia government managed to control the macro-economy, reduce the budget deficit, stabilise foreign exchange reserves, reduce inflation, and lower the debt service ratio. Nevertheless, this led to a widespread pauperisation of society, as the middle class had largely collapsed, unemployment rocketed on the back of an estimated 180,000 redundancies (Testas, 2004: 24), and household budgets became overwhelmed by basic commodity expenditure (Dillman, 1998: 11). What's more, this calculated execution of the reform process left uncompleted some of the most important aspects of the necessary institutional economic reconstruction,

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<sup>265</sup> Interview, Algerian diplomat, London, 20/12/05.

<sup>266</sup> Interview, Commission official, Brussels, 21/03/07.

<sup>267</sup> Of course, increased FDI was a widely shared desideratum amongst SMCs and a loudly professed promise of the EMP by the EU, but private investors did not flock into the southern Mediterranean partners as expected. MENA countries continued to be perceived as the least attractive of FDI destinations among emerging markets, owing largely to a number of shared generic deficiencies pertaining mainly to the political and legal environments in SMCs, as well as to business cultures, in some instances (Joffé, 2000; 2005: 40).

<sup>268</sup> For a detailed analysis of the impact of IMF structural reforms on the sector of education alone, see: A. Benziane (2004) 'Economic Reforms in Algeria and their Impact on Higher Education and Student Benefits', *Journal of North African Studies*, 9 (2), pp. 102-114.

especially as regards the banking sector, the fiscal regime and public sector *mise à niveau* more broadly (Bustos, 2003: 17).

The macro-economic *redressement* realised between 1995 and 1997 benefitted also from a rise in oil prices on the international markets, as well as improved hydrocarbon returns for the Algerian government as a result of increased production (Aïssaoui, 2001: 100). Besides encouraging a selective implementation of the provisions of the IMF stand-by agreement, recovered energy rents dwarfed the potential ancillary benefits of EU association in the eyes of Algerian decision-makers.<sup>269</sup> Additional adjustment financial assistance was no longer vital – some of which was anyway made available by the EU without AA pre-requisites – and regime survival was not in question any longer. Thus, not only did the prospect of added outside oversight on economic policy/practice become even more undesirable, but the Algerian regime – keen on shoring up and indeed consolidating its domestic credibility after the election of Liamine Zeroual – was also in a less tenuous position and able to avoid further delegitimising and unpopular (economic) decisions.

By contrast, the Algerian regime still needed international political support for its controversial domestic struggle against the Islamist insurgency, especially from the European Union whose Algeria policy had hitherto been heavily, and rather perversely, influenced by France (as seen in the previous chapter). However, as the EU began as of late 1995 to develop a more autonomous position vis-à-vis the Algerian crisis, reflective of a bit more than the lowest common denominator of member state interests, the Algerian regime sought to influence this nascent process while still malleable. In this context, engaging in direct AA talks with the European Commission was considered ideal for such a political purpose.<sup>270</sup> But of course, AA negotiations come as a package and not *à la carte*, and the EU would certainly insist by default on including trade liberalisation in the interaction even though it was under no illusion that Algeria would rather not ‘talk free trade in any meaningful way’.<sup>271</sup> Besides standardisation of external relations in terms of both policy and practice (negotiations), the more downstream motive behind the EU’s insistence on trade liberalisation and economic

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<sup>269</sup> Interview, Algerian business consultant, Algiers, 17/10/06.

<sup>270</sup> Interview, Algerian EMP Senior Official, Brussels, 04/02/08.

<sup>271</sup> Interview, Commission official, Brussels, 5/03/07.

reform in its early AA interaction with Algeria is the instinctive belief that this would address in a sustainable way some of the grievances behind the violence in Algeria.<sup>272</sup>

Against this background, when it became clearer for Algerian decision-makers in 1997 that their AA *démarche* was likely to yield little or no political results in terms of counter-terrorism support from the EU, the trade liberalisation aspect of negotiations was made a scapegoat for the *sine die* suspension of talks.<sup>273</sup> Invoking, on the one hand, the need to take into account the “specificity” of the Algerian economy and, in turn, its trade relations with the EU and, on the other, the lack of visibility over the national “economic dashboard” due to the security and political imbroglio, Algerian decision-makers walked out of AA talks blaming EU policy rigidity.<sup>274</sup> Besides, privately, Algerian negotiators felt that bowing to the IMF deal was partly the result of European, especially French, pressure which manifested itself most conspicuously through the conditionality attached by the Commission to the ECU400 million balance-of-payment loan granted to Algeria in 1991. As such, they believed that it was payback time, having signed the IMF deal in 1994, and were determined not to return home empty-handed should they accept the EU’s AA strictures this time round.<sup>275</sup> However, having failed to obtain tangibly meaningful support for their counter-insurgency efforts after the first few rounds of AA talks, Algerian negotiators remained resolutely attached to the “specificity” argument.

The exclusion of agriculture and fisheries from the prospective FTA, itself justified by the sensitivity of these sectors within (some member states of) the EU, was on occasions used by Algerian foreign ministry officials as justification for their lack of enthusiasm for the second basket of the EMP, notwithstanding the quasi-irrelevance of these sectors in the Algerian economy.<sup>276</sup> The situation of the EU-Algeria AA remained unchanged until 2000. In the meantime, the IMF structural adjustment deal expired and was not renewed despite deteriorating economic indicators in Algeria after the fall in oil prices between 1997 and 1999. It was not until the coming of Bouteflika to power in 1999 that a tangible change of policy took place in Algeria.

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<sup>272</sup> Interview, Commission official, Brussels, 5/03/07.

<sup>273</sup> Interview, administrator, EuroMed Directorate, EP secretariat, Brussels, 19/03/07.

<sup>274</sup> Interview, Algerian chief AA negotiator, Brussels, 31/01/07.

<sup>275</sup> Interview, Algerian EMP Senior Official, Brussels, 12/03/07.

<sup>276</sup> See for instance Algerian MFA (2005a). Numerous interviewed Algerian officials mentioned this EMP shortcoming, even if to highlight EU inconsistency.

**Table 1: EU-Algeria trade statistics, 1995-2005**

Value (Mio ECU/Euro)

Year	TOTAL	Food, beverages and tobacco	Crude materials	Energy	Chemicals	Machinery and transport equipment	Other manufactured products	Breakdown by product as % of total					
	SITC 0-9	SITC 0+1	SITC 2+4	SITC 3	SITC 5	SITC 7	SITC 6+8	0+1	2+4	3	5	7	6+8
<b>EU Exports</b>													
1995	4 727	844	204	60	682	1,035	280	17.9	4.3	1.0	14.4	40.9	20.7
2000	6 211	1,150	151	79	855	2,753	1 124	18.5	2.9	1.3	13.8	44.3	18.1
2001	7 718	1,249	214	56	1,003	3,626	1,492	16.2	2.8	0.7	13.0	47.0	19.3
2002	8 271	1,134	290	75	1,096	3,997	1,606	13.7	3.5	0.9	13.2	48.3	19.4
2003	7 960	956	246	105	1,121	3,927	1,553	12.0	3.1	1.3	14.1	49.3	19.5
2004	9 451	1,110	260	122	1,296	4,858	1,706	11.7	2.8	1.3	13.7	51.7	18.0
2005	10 414	1,165	233	171	1,333	5,595	1 802	11.2	2.2	1.6	12.8	53.7	17.3
<b>EU Imports</b>													
1995	4 944	26	39	4 534	69	67	76	0.5	0.8	93.5	1.4	2.0	1.6
2000	16 620	29	45	12 143	161	55	92	0.2	0.3	73.1	1.0	0.5	0.6
2001	16 170	26	54	11 216	164	442	53	0.2	0.3	66.4	1.0	2.7	0.5
2002	14 378	32	53	10 713	140	253	112	0.2	0.4	74.5	1.0	1.6	0.5
2003	14 594	40	66	10 621	183	312	113	0.3	0.5	72.5	1.3	2.1	0.5
2004	15 252	41	58	11 161	175	350	59	0.3	0.6	73.3	1.1	2.3	0.6
2005	20 762	50	50	15 317	191	377	71	0.2	0.4	73.5	0.9	1.8	0.3

Source: Commission of the European Communities (2006b)

### 1. The Bouteflika effect II

1999 marked what economists would describe as an ‘inflection point’ in Algeria’s economic policy (Martín, 2003: 39). If, hitherto, a semblance of economic liberalism had to invariably be wrested from successive Algerian governments by international financial institutions, Bouteflika seemed to have set Algeria on a path of voluntary liberalism when he acceded to power that year. Favouring liberalism was for Bouteflika perhaps less about personal economic outlook than about attempting to make difficult inroads into and achieving autonomous political power inside an opaque and factionalised system he had been on the fringes of for two decades (Joffé, 2002: 47).<sup>277</sup> It also related to building alliances with external actors for that purpose, which required sending the right signals of change.<sup>278</sup> Liberalising foreign trade and attracting FDI were the main external facets of Bouteflika’s programme of economic reform.

<sup>277</sup> The reversals of liberal legislation he enacted by fiat in August 2006 with respect to the hydrocarbon law and in July 2008 regarding the investment code seem to confirm this characteristic.

<sup>278</sup> Interview, Algerian business consultant, Algiers, 15/05/07.



In the context of EU-Algerian relations, this new policy orientation translated into renewed interest in the conclusion of an association agreement, *especially* given that this implied signing up for a FTA. Doing so was for Bouteflika synonymous with ‘anchoring’ his enunciated reform programme to the EU *acquis*, as embodied by the EMP (Aghrout, 2005: 9), by way of locking in his policy engagements and signalling to ‘investors that the government is unlikely to reverse its liberalisation policies in the future’ (Tovias and Ugur, 2004: 396). To further enhance the credibility of his reform agenda, the new president went as far as promising Algeria’s accession to the WTO by 2003-4 (*Le Soir d’Algérie*, 30 July 2003). While this target was certainly over-ambitious, given the inherently protracted nature of WTO accession processes, the objective of concluding AA negotiations proved less difficult to achieve. Accordingly, talks with the EU resumed less than a year after the coming of Bouteflika to power, and were concluded on the sixteenth round since the start of the process in 1997 (*Le Quotidien d’Oran*, 25 October 2001).

Palpable change characterised the approach of Algerian negotiators to the post-2000 AA talks. Their efforts were concentrated on the issue of counter-terrorism cooperation and, to a lesser extent, on human mobility, as free trade concerns on grounds of “specificity” had all but vanished.<sup>279</sup> Indeed, as, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, EU-Algeria AA negotiations overcame their thorniest issue on day one, Algerian decision-makers turned emphatically to JHA provisions as their next priority area, hoping to capitalise on the reshuffled EU priorities to obtain as many concessions in this policy area as possible. Why not try to wrest additional free-trade waivers from EU partners if that was indeed one of the genuine concerns of Algerian decision-makers? Or indeed consult widely enough with national economic operators – at least those with exporting capacity – to forge as solid a consensus as possible and not leave them with a feeling of betrayal after the conclusion of the AA (*Liberté*, 30 August 2005, 26 June 2006; *Le Quotidien d’Oran*, 28 January 2006, 14 June 2006)? Instead, as shown in the previous chapter, Algerian negotiators emerged triumphant from the AA negotiations, showcasing the individuality of the EU-Algeria document on the basis of its containing a whole chapter on JHA.

The EU did not seem entirely surprised by the notable shift of emphasis on the part of Algerian negotiators when AA talks resumed in 2000, given the fact that the president’s

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<sup>279</sup> Interview. Algerian chief AA negotiator. 31/01/07.

“signals” outside the immediate EU-Algeria sphere were numerous, important and reassuring.<sup>280</sup> These included a) the enactment of a new private investment code that would scrap the extant distinction between foreign and Algerian investors; b) the liberalisation of upstream and midstream activities of the hydrocarbon sector through a new Hydrocarbon Law ending Sonatrach’s monopoly; and c) accelerating and enlarging the privatisation process by earmarking 1,200 state-owned enterprises for sale (Joffé, 2002: 47). Western governments and organisations were, however, impressed with Algeria’s swift economic recovery since 1999. By 2002, the value of Algeria’s exports doubled, helping the central bank accumulate in excess of \$20 billion in foreign currency reserves, compared with just over \$4 billion in 1999. Concomitantly, foreign debt was reduced by a third from the level of 1996 to reach \$22 billion in 2002 (Martín, 2003: 42).

However, this rosy macro-economic picture, painted on the back of rising international oil prices, hid a persistently grim socio-economic situation overall. The majority of the population was still struggling to make ends meet, living in fairly difficult social conditions.<sup>281</sup> Furthermore, despite some improvement, FDI inflows remained inferior to the levels necessary to result in meaningful economic change, especially given that most of the new non-hydrocarbon investments were limited to sectors like telecommunications which tend not to be labour-intensive. Most importantly, Algeria still attracted less FDI than neighbouring Morocco and Tunisia, which ranked amongst the most attractive FDI destinations in the region (Escribano and Lorca, 2008: 147). In short, if macro-economic rectitude had become a cover for economic failure it is mainly due to Bouteflika’s limited institutional reforms, which left unabated parasitic practices of corruption, inefficiencies, rent-seeking and patronage – a situation reflected partly by the country’s rate of allocation and absorption of MEDA funds.

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
<sup>280</sup> Interview, secretariat of the European Council, 27/03/07.

<sup>281</sup> For detailed analyses, see: Joffé (2002) and Martín (2003).

**Table 2: MEDA commitments data (in million euros)**

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Total MEDA I	Total MEDA II
Morocco	30	0	236	219	176	141	120	122	143	152	660	677
Algeria	0	0	41	95	29	30	60	50	42	51	165	233
Tunisia	20	120	138	19	132	76	90	92	49	22	428	328
Egypt	0	75	203	397	11	13	0	78	104	159	685	354
Jordan	7	100	10	8	129	15	20	92	43	35	254	205
Lebanon	0	10	86	0	86	0	0	12	44	18	182	74
Syria	0	13	42	0	46	38	8	36	1	53	101	136
WBG	3	20	41	5	42	97	0	100	81	73	111	350
<b>Total bilateral</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>337</b>	<b>797</b>	<b>743</b>	<b>650</b>	<b>409</b>	<b>298</b>	<b>582</b>	<b>505</b>	<b>562</b>	<b>2.587</b>	<b>2.356</b>
Regional	113	33	114	66	145	160	305	29	110	135	471	740
<b>Total</b>	<b>173</b>	<b>369</b>	<b>912</b>	<b>809</b>	<b>802</b>	<b>569</b>	<b>603</b>	<b>611</b>	<b>608</b>	<b>697</b>	<b>3.057</b>	<b>3.096</b>

Source: Commission of the European Communities (2005b)



Source: Commission of the European Communities (2005b)

**Figure 2: Algeria MEDA disbursement**

## *2. Energy interests: The irrelevance of EMP interaction*

Algeria has invariably portrayed itself as a reliable source of energy for Europe, and has increasingly been recognised as such by the EU in recent years (Piebalgs, 2006; Commission of the European Communities, 2000c; 2006c; 2007). Its geographical proximity to the energy-hungry European market and the abundance of its hydrocarbon, especially gas, reserves have naturally predisposed its energy exports to be overwhelmingly oriented towards the EU.<sup>282</sup> Furthermore, the innate importance of energy export income for state revenues has meant that Algerian decision-makers have as much interest in ensuring a continuous flow of pipeline fuels as consumers on the receiving end. As a result, even at the height of the 1990s full-blown conflagration, Algerian oil and gas exports flowed uninterruptedly.

With the coming of Bouteflika to power and the designation of reform-minded Chakib Khelil as energy minister, Algeria announced in 2000 an ambitious plan for the optimisation of its energy potential with a view to maximising revenue and re-launching the economy after a decade of lethargy (Aïssaoui, 2001: 29). This envisaged the liberalisation of the hydrocarbon sector by introducing new legislation to redefine Sonatrach's relationship with the state and limit its role to a purely commercial function (ibid.: 30). Many observers assimilated this bold proposal with the new administration's broader liberal outlook, but in contrast with the rest of the incipient reform programme (EU, WTO), the announced new energy policy was met with widespread sullen suspicion. The main bone of contention amongst many of the country's politicians, sector cadres and union activists was the impact that the new legislation would have on Sonatrach, a company which is not only by far the largest business entity in the country (employing 120,000), but also a source of great national pride. Underlying concerns about the de-nationalisation of the hydrocarbon sector and the privatisation of Sonatrach led to an unprecedented national mobilisation against the proposed reform, resulting in the shelving of the draft proposal in view of the looming 2004 presidential election (*Gas Matters*, January 2003).

Even though the draft law was eventually dusted off following the landslide re-election of Bouteflika for a second term and adopted as law by the APN in April 2005, only to be annulled by presidential decree a year later (*Gas Matters*, September 2006), what this episode

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<sup>282</sup> For a detailed analysis of the development of Algerian gas exports to Europe, see: M. Hayes (2004) 'Algerian Gas to Europe: The Trans-Med Pipeline and Early Spanish Gas Import Projects', Working Paper No. 27, James Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Houston.

shows from the point of view of EU-Algerian energy interests is how the EU has invariably been preoccupied with its own priorities alone.

Parallel to legislative reform and central to the ambition of overall sectoral optimisation was an announced expansion of oil and gas production. Oil production was to be increased from its 1999-level of 1 million barrels per day to 1.4mbpd by 2005. Most importantly from an EU perspective is the planned increase in gas exports from their existing levels of 65 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year to 85 bcm by 2010 and 100 bcm on the 2015 horizon (Faïd, 2007: 57). Concomitantly, new transport infrastructure consisting of liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals and new submarine gas connections to Europe were also announced (*Gas Matters*, February 2001).<sup>283</sup> If anything, these commitments on the part of Algeria carried strong signals not only about the government's willingness to liberalise the hydrocarbon sector, but also that Europe would benefit the most from the envisaged infrastructural developments.<sup>284</sup>

Yet, while the Bouteflika government was struggling with the ratification process of the draft new hydrocarbon law, little support for its efforts was shown by the European Commission contrary to the attitude it had shown towards similar situations in countries like Norway and the UK for instance (*Gas Matters*, September 2006). Instead, the Commission paid more attention to relatively tangential developments such the second meeting of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) – a loose structure launched in 2001 and grouping the world's major gas exporters – which took place in February 2002 in Algiers, expressing concerns that gas producers might form an OPEC-like cartel leading to price collusions to the detriment of consumers.<sup>285</sup> Moreover, in its ongoing efforts to consolidate the EU's gas market, the Commission insisted that suppliers drop “destination clauses”<sup>286</sup> from long-term gas contracts tying them to European buyers. Having reached a deal on this issue with the Russian gas giant Gazprom relatively easily in 2003, the European Commission turned to its second biggest gas supplier, Sonatrach, hoping for the similar outcome. However, Algerian energy negotiators

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<sup>283</sup> Such as Medgaz, linking Algeria directly to Spain, and Galsi which goes directly to Italy via Sardinia. For a detailed analysis, see: Clingendale (2008) ‘The Gas Supply Outlook for Europe: The Roles of Pipeline Gas and LNG’, The Hague.

<sup>284</sup> Interview, senior Sonatrach official, Rome, 4/07/08.

<sup>285</sup> Interview, senior Sonatrach official, Rome, 4/07/08.

<sup>286</sup> Destination clauses, or territorial restrictions, are a standard feature of traditional long-term supply contracts for both pipeline gas and LNG. They seek to restrict the ability of the buyer to on-sell gas to a third party outside its territory at a higher price.

proposed considering “profit-sharing” mechanisms as a surrogate of destination clauses<sup>287</sup> – something which the EU found equally problematical until 2007 when a deal was reached on these very terms.<sup>288</sup>

In contrast, European energy companies and national governments showed more interest in the developments that have marked the Algerian gas scene since 2000, partly as a result of their more direct stakes in them than is the case for the European Commission, and partly because EU-Algerian energy relations are a predominantly bilateral affair.<sup>289</sup> This has been reflected in the Commission’s impotence in “unbundling” the monopolies that large European energy champions maintain on the production and distribution of gas and electricity in their national markets. The limited role of the Commission has also played out most embarrassingly when it failed to over-rule the decision of the Spanish energy authorities to thwart Sonatrach’s plans to competitively sell its gas directly to Spanish end users.<sup>290</sup> Only the recurrent winter gas crises since 2006, featuring Russia’s Gazprom and a number of the former Soviet satellite republics – now decidedly turned to the West – seem to have galvanised the EU, leading to its courting of suppliers like Algeria and proposing bilateral “strategic energy partnerships” based *inter alia* on liberal precepts (Piebalgs, 2007). Only, now, it may be too late given the shifting interests of producers like Algeria, not to mention the protectionist turn of many decision-makers, including Bouteflika, in recent years.

#### IV. Conclusion

It was very much their belief that the trade liberalisation provisions of the association agreement could eventually be neutralised, either through the ratification process or one of the many loopholes in the GATT regulation regarding FTAs, or eventually mitigated against the twelve-year transition period, that led Algerian decision-makers to engage in AA negotiations in 1997 against all economic odds. To them, of course, international political support for their counter-insurgency quandary was top of the EMP agenda, as they were only prepared to take a gamble on the free-trade side of the deal if their political priorities were satisfactorily

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<sup>287</sup> Interview, senior Sonatrach official, Rome, 4/07/08. Profit-sharing mechanisms oblige the buyer/importer to share a certain part of the profit with the supplier if the gas is sold onto a third buyer for a higher price or for a purpose other than the one stipulated by the contract.

<sup>288</sup> See: ‘Commission and Algeria reach agreement on territorial restrictions and alternative clauses in gas supply contracts’, Press Release No. IP/07/1074, Brussels, 11 July 2007.

<sup>289</sup> Interview, senior Sonatrach official, Rome, 4/07/08.

<sup>290</sup> Interview, senior Sonatrach official, Rome, 4/07/08.

addressed. Against such a background, arguments of “specificity” proved most useful in view of the EU’s reliance on a similar logic when justifying the exclusion of trade in agriculture, which is where most SMCs’ economic competitive advantage lies.

Algeria’s disinterest in free trade in the 1990s was far from being merely the product of a rational cost-benefit assessment, for anchoring economic reforms to the EU could indeed have helped with the process of structural adjustment initiated under IMF supervision. Moreover, when a decision was made in 2000 to resume AA negotiations, most structural economic conditions were unchanged compared to 1997. What had changed was political leadership. As such, the dynamics of these negotiation decisions demonstrated clearly how elite commercial interests in Algeria, which were embedded in the status quo, were a determinant factor in Algeria’s economic policy decisions at least during the 1990s. Having successfully dragged Algeria into an IMF deal in 1994, the EU for its part seemed little concerned about the country’s decision to suspend negotiations in 1997 and its stubborn aversion to far-reaching economic reform.

When considered against the advances of economic and institutional changes since the signing of the AA in 2002 (or lack thereof), these findings confirm the limited impact of EMP interaction on the preferences of Algeria as regards free trade. Reforms remained stalled and, in some instances, advances were indeed reversed, to the extent that the inflow of FDI and even MEDA funds failed to show any improvement. Meanwhile, the EU’s priorities seemed to have shifted to the securitisation of Mediterranean relations, including cultural dialogue and migration issues. With the increase in oil prices as of 2003, its economic interests with energy producers like Algeria seemed limited to the hydrocarbon sector. However, its incipient supranational competence in this area, through a consolidated internal gas and electricity market, has meant that its efforts to carve out meaningful partnerships with southern suppliers have not produced the desired results. More could have been achieved if such efforts were concentrated on the embryonic and rather neglected Euro-Mediterranean Energy Partnership, which even to southern producers seemed to have added value. But as such, the EMP was bereft of its potentially most useful policy structure of energy dialogue in the Mediterranean, and was as a result equally innocuous with regard to approximating EU-Algerian energy interests.

Theoretically, the above suggests, again, the predominance of strategic calculi on the part of both the EU and Algeria in the framework of the trade and energy policy areas. Priority shifts in both actors were more the result of mostly political factors external to EMP interaction, which, by and large, proved to have had no impact on interest approximation in these areas. The dialectics of Algeria's attitude towards trade liberalisation in its relationship with the EU were mostly found to have been the product of domestic political changes in Algeria than vice versa. Not only does this challenge the basic presumptions of international regime theory, but it defies the EU's own functionalist logic when it comes to promoting political reform in its southern neighbourhood.



## **Chapter five – ‘Bringing the peoples closer’: Human mobility issues between third-pillar rhetoric and longstanding grievances**

Between the political challenges of the first basket, on the one hand, and the centrality of the economic pillar to the entire EMP project, on the other, the social, cultural and human provisions of the third basket fell behind in the agenda of the Barcelona Process from the outset. Despite being originally considered one of the most innovative aspects of the EU's new approach to Mediterranean relations (Pace and Schumacher, 2004: 122), the intercultural dimension of the EMP suffered a number of setbacks deriving most ironically from the EU's lack of practical experience with cultural cooperation in the Mediterranean and its initial top-down take to region-building in this context (Gillespie, 2003a: 21; Jünemann, 2002). However, by the turn of the century, frustration at the protraction of regional efforts in pursuit of relatively pressing EMP political and economic goals led to increasing calls for the ‘reinvigoration’ of the Barcelona Process. Coinciding with the consolidation of institutional JHA competence within the EU, following the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, this collective sense of urgency spurred consensus amongst European policy-makers to invest balance in the Barcelona Process by imbuing its long-neglected third basket with more substantive content. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, this change of attitude met with sympathy outside the EU, though shared MPC scepticism in relation to a number of JHA issues still imposed compromise (Spencer, 2001a).

Migration has always been a constant feature of Euro-Mediterranean exchanges and has in more recent years acquired an increasingly defining role in inter-state relations in the region. Although this was acknowledged as such in the Barcelona Declaration, which purported to foster human exchanges as a factor of ‘bringing the peoples closer’, issues relating to illegal immigration – dealt with in the third basket – continued to beset relations between northern and southern Mediterranean countries. Diminishing societal tolerance of migrants in northern EU member states due to their increased ‘visibility’ (Bicchi, 2002: 5), and lack of adequate institutional preparedness in their southern counterparts to deal with the immigration implications of their new EU-membership status (Baldwin-Edwards, 2007: 115; Triandafyllidou, 2007), resulted in a change of perception amongst European policy actors in the late 1980s and early 1990s: from a largely socio-economic issue immigration became a security problem (Huysmans, 1995).

As one of the SMCs with the highest number of emigrants in Europe,<sup>291</sup> Algeria has traditionally shown strong political interest in migratory issues in the context of its relationship with the EU. However, this has not always translated into a synchronised set of negotiating priorities between both sides, as demonstrated by the persistent emergence of migration as an issue of contention in EU-Algerian interactions since the early 1970s (Pierros et al., 1999: 107). This chapter deals with the interests of the EU and Algeria in relation to the third basket of the EMP, honing in on the particular issue of migration. It will argue that the question of migration in the recent Euro-Algerian context bears a national emotional symbolism in Algeria mainly as a result of the country's traumatic experience in the 1990s. Algeria's stubborn insistence on "the free movement of people" in its AA negotiations with the EU, in as far as it was indirectly aimed at France's migration policy towards Algerians, is testimony to this tendency. As such, contrary to the policy areas examined in the previous two chapters, it will be argued that little EU-Algeria interest convergence on the issue of migration was achieved during the timeframe of this study (1995-2005). The size of this chapter, considerably shorter than previous chapters, is commensurate with the nature of the issue in hand in the context of EU-Algerian relations and the amount of primary data available to me at the end of this research exercise.

### **I. Content of the cultural, social and human affairs basket: Between neglect and mutational reinvigoration**

'Developing human resources, promoting understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies' are the broad aims which the third basket of the EMP set out to achieve, in recognition of the importance of human capital, people-to-people exchanges and intercultural understanding for the peace and stability desiderata of the Barcelona Process.<sup>292</sup> Despite having delineated, for that purpose, specifically-targeted areas of action, such as media, youth, social development, health and migration, the intercultural dimension was largely deemed to have displayed a disappointing record by the time of the 2000 evaluation mid-point (Pace, 2005). While this verdict was by no means limited to the third basket, its modest achievements – if any – would have clearly suffered from a relative perceptible lack

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<sup>291</sup> Migrants from Turkey, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia represent 95 percent of total SMC migrant community in the EU (Aubarell and Aragall, 2005: 5).

<sup>292</sup> For a conceptual analysis of the logic of dialogue underlying the EMP, see: M. Pace (2004) 'The Role of "Political Dialogue": A Dialogic Understanding of European-Mediterranean Relations', paper presented at the ECPR Standing Group on the European Union, Second Pan-European Conference on EU Politics on *Implications of a Wider Europe: Politics, Institutions and Diversity*, Bologna, June.

of visibility, which was in turn reflective of the disproportionate overall distribution of partner-government interests/efforts across the three pillars of the EMP. Within the EU, this was for instance pertinently the case with the UK government, which did not attach much importance to the third *volet* as (at least) it did not want to see cultural initiatives be used as palliatives for lack of generosity on agricultural access in which it saw more value (Youngs, 1999: 13). By contrast, however, Sweden was one of the very few EU countries to have pursued third-basket cultural objective wholeheartedly and from the outset (Schumacher, 2001).

In effect, overall neglect of the cultural basket in the early years of the EMP was due to the EU's emphatic pursuance of a security charter within the first basket and the completion of an optimal number of bilateral AA negotiations with SMCs. While responding to contextual imperatives in the region, this prioritisation within the EMP agenda was also the product of the EU's inside-out approach towards Mediterranean stability. It took some time for EU Mediterranean policy-makers to learn that what had worked in the experience of European construction may not necessarily yield the expected results if applied by systemic extrapolation elsewhere, especially in the case of the Mediterranean. However, European attitude towards the third basket began to change towards the end of the 1990s in response to developments both within the EU and in its relations with the Mediterranean countries.

Immigration had been on top of the EU agenda since the early 1990s and continued to gather prominence along other "soft" security concerns as the decade progressed. Accordingly, the EU's competences in the JHA sphere were widened after the Tampere Council meeting of October 1999 (Gillespie, 2003a: 22). In view of the inherent importance of migration issues in Euro-Mediterranean relations, the EU's evolving policy agenda in this area was swiftly extended to the EMP, starting with the Common Mediterranean Strategy, adopted by the European Council in June 2000, which came to redress the Barcelona Declaration's deficit in this regard (European Council, 2000). Indeed, the new document devoted an entire section to the JHA theme and, as it avowedly purported to reinvigorate the Barcelona Process, its commitments found reflection in the Commission's renewed concomitant efforts and went on to become one of the main domains of EMP activity (Bicchi, 2002: 8).

Despite the thematic overlap between the EU's "new" security agenda and the existing provisions of the first basket, 'European policy practitioners came to see the third basket as a

context within which to broach [emerging] security issues' (Gillespie, 2003a: 24). This institutional shift of emphasis was clearly motivated by shared eagerness to capitalise on the uncharted setting of the third pillar, obviating the "contamination" of the political and security basket by the deteriorating Middle East conflict, to not only re-launch security cooperation with MPCs but also to inject new momentum into the faltering Partnership. In the wake of the 9/11 events, the incipient Euro-Mediterranean JHA agenda was perceived as an appropriate framework to respond to what the EU eventually began to consider as an existential threat, and the focus on terrorism became considerably sharpened subsequently (ibid.: 27).

However, anxious efforts were simultaneously made to mitigate the heavy-handed response of the Bush administration towards international terrorism and avoid the stigmatisation of Muslims worldwide and within the EU more specifically. Indeed, there was a renewed sense of urgency amongst European policy-makers to address the protracted Middle East conflict seen as the source of much of the alienation and reactionary radicalisation in the Arab world. Thus, preventing Huntingtonian scenarios of impending 'civilisational clashes' from gaining further currency in the aftermath of 9/11 was expressly identified by Euro-Med foreign ministers as part of their priorities within and for the upgraded third basket.<sup>293</sup> 'In practice this meant that existing JHA themes would be imported from the EU and placed alongside the idea of a cultural dialogue, where the immediate priorities were programmes relating to youth, education and the media' (ibid.: 28).

This renewed strategic commitment crystallised in the Valencia conference of April 2002 in the form of a 'regional cooperation programme in the field of justice, in combating drugs, organised crime and terrorism as well as cooperation in the treatment of issues relating to the social integration of migrants, migration and movements of persons'.<sup>294</sup> In terms of intercultural dialogue, the most encouraging innovation of the Valencia conference was undoubtedly the decision to establish a Euro-Mediterranean Foundation as the 'flagship initiative' of Euro-Mediterranean dialogue between cultures. While placing JHA issues alongside ambitious goals of intercultural dialogue in the third basket increased the risk of contagion from the increasing securitisation of migration and of the 'politisation' of dialogue

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<sup>293</sup> See: Presidency conclusions. Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Brussels, 5-6 November 2001. available at: [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/13582.en1-communic%C3%A9.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/13582.en1-communic%C3%A9.pdf).

<sup>294</sup> See: Valencia Action Plan. Fifth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, Valencia, 22-23 April 2002: <http://www.euromedbarcelona.org/NR:rdonlyres/DB32785E-6693-486F-A847-7861CF97AC04/542/PlandeValencia.pdf>.

(Malmvig, 2005), Euro-Med partners eventually managed to see the process of setting up the new institution through, after two years of *quid pro quo* over its mandate and functioning modalities (Gillespie, 2003b).

From the outset, what became known as the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures has been criticised for being explicitly defined by Euro-Med foreign ministers as ‘an intergovernmental instrument’ in their mid-term conference in Crete in 2003.<sup>295</sup> Indeed, one of the issues that the prospective Foundation was always likely to face related to the role that partner governments would play in the running of the cultural enterprise, in view of the EMP’s elitist propensities so far (ibid.). In the face of different conceptions amongst partners, including within the EU, of the role of civil society and, indeed, of what constitutes civil society (Jünemann, 2002: 89-93), the idea that the Foundation would enjoy meaningful autonomous decision-making capacity seemed to have been *de facto* ruled out. By opting for a ‘federal model’, whereby the Foundation would effectively amount to a “network of national networks” – knowing that “national networks” would in a number of MPCs be systematically placed under rigorous central-government control – Euro-Med officials decided determinedly to err on the side of caution (Gillespie, 2002b: 234).

The cause of such policy conservatism seems to lay in the shared distrust amongst autocratic MPCs of opposition actors using the Foundation as an uncensored political platform to forge cross-border democratic alliances – a concern often disguised within contra-Islamist alarmist prophecies, which has traditionally found myopic sympathy in southern member states. This tribulation is reflective of the broader *problématique* of Islam in Euro-Mediterranean relations, which, for some, underlies through its terroristic and migratory manifestations the rationale of the Barcelona Process (Silvestri, 2005: 389). Indeed, only relatively recently has the EU begun to develop adequate policy tools to deal with its perceived Islamist challenge, both externally and, increasingly since the Madrid attacks in 2004 and London bombings in 2005, internally (Monar, 1998). However, it is often its failures to strike a consistent policy chord in its dealings with such issues and to effectively differentiate between various Islamist strands that have consistently undermined its otherwise well-founded “dialogic” efforts (Pace, 2005).

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<sup>295</sup> See: Presidency conclusions, Mid-Term Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Crete, 26-27 May 2003, available at: [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/75950.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/75950.pdf).

Following the Valencia conference, the promotion of intercultural dialogue through the Anna Lindh Foundation became a recurrent theme in the EU's relevant policy pronouncements. This was notably the case in the 2004 report on the 'EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and Middle East' (European Council, 2004). By linking Arab MPCs and non-Mediterranean Arab countries, this policy document implicitly recognises the pan-regional nature of the issues facing the EU in what is more commonly referred to as the Middle East and North Africa, and sets out a broader vision accordingly drawing a clear parallel with existing US initiatives. With the advent of the more differentiating Neighbourhood Policy furthermore, intercultural dialogue became more clearly spelt out in terms of 'people-to-people' initiatives – clearly a result of the mere fact that the ENP was originally destined for the eastern neighbourhood of the EU with which issues of mobility cause less anxiety than with the South – and more explicitly delineated benchmarks. Lastly, the Barcelona conference of 2005 placed similar emphasis on the subject,<sup>296</sup> but separated issues of 'migration, social integration, justice and security' from the intercultural dimension by placing them in what has effectively become the fourth basket of the EMP (Aubarell et al., 2009: 9). Whether doing so reflects a strategic shift in the EU's approach to third-basket issues since 2002 by seeking to preclude the otherwise-inevitable spill-over from JHA to dialogue is unclear, but it seems less equivocal that such a move is a clear manifestation of the unrelenting significance of migration issues in the EU's Mediterranean agenda (Gillespie, 2006b).

### *Migration in Euro-Mediterranean relations: The EMP's hidden motive?*

Migration within the Mediterranean basin is a long-established phenomenon with deep historical and socio-political implications. Previously, there was a clear symbiotic relationship between immigration/emigration movements and both economic and demographic trends within the region's host and sending countries. This was most aptly demonstrated by the dialectics of Euro-Mediterranean migration movements in the 1960s and 1970s. In a period of economic growth in the North and demographic boom in the South, (labour) migration from the latter to the former followed a similar upward trend (Baldwin-Edwards, 2005: 4-11). Conversely, as European economies began to shrink in the early 1970s, as a result of the Arab oil crisis, more restrictive immigration measures were introduced by European governments,

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<sup>296</sup> In the meantime, the area of JHA was rebranded Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, in accordance with the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty.

leading to a reduction of regular inflows of migrants from SMCs which, at the time, had no clearly-articulated emigration policies (Khader, 2005: 84; Baldwin-Edwards, 2006).

More recently however, the continuing significance of migration in the Mediterranean began manifesting itself increasingly in security terms, which have become particularly engrained in the EU's relevant discourse (Collyer, 2006). Though implicit associations between migration and security are not a recent development, it is only with the end of the Cold War that the security discourse has come to be associated with migrants themselves as opposed to militaristic, state threats. While a number of economic and other objectivist explanatory categories have been put forward concerning the "securitisation" of immigration (Weiner, 1993), the coincidence of the beginning of this process with "end-of-history" prophecies and a sense of western moral prevalence in the international system, leaves little doubt as to the rather normative identitarian origins of such change of attitude (Collyer, 2006: 259). In the specific context of the EU, this has been intrinsic to its post-Cold War intense integration efforts, which have been explicitly linked to a sense of "we-ness" and the need to protect the values underpinning this incipient sense of collective political identity. Of course, perceptions of instability in the near-abroad have also often reinforced an inherent feeling of exposure of internal stability to external threats, as has been relentlessly demonstrated by European reactions to various terrorist attacks. Since 9/11, these have been more explicitly associated with migration and border-control failures, as was demonstrably the case during the British government's presidency of the EU in the second half of 2005,<sup>297</sup> which together with Spain emphatically pursued more far-reaching migration cooperation with Mediterranean partner countries.

The Barcelona Declaration in and of itself did not devote much attention to issues of migration, compared with other issue areas. This was certainly the corollary of the general parsimony that characterised the content of the third basket, but, still, between the pronounced legal and illegal migratory provisions, the latter got the lion's share. It is fair to say that any meaningful legal or political engagement on issues of migration was at that point understandably tied to the EU's fledging institutional competences in the area, but European governments could have made more efforts in taking into consideration the importance for example of migrant remittances for southern Mediterranean economies – exceeding in many

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<sup>297</sup> A presidency marked by the 7/7 London bombings, which, as it turned out, were the work of British(-born) citizens.

instances inflows of ODA and FDI – by linking them somehow to second-basket economic and financial projects (Gallina, 2006; Testas, 2001).<sup>298</sup> By contrast, association agreements have offered a much more comprehensive and differentiated coverage of migration issues, reflecting their varying degrees of relevance in EU-MPC bilateral relations (Magliveras, 2004: 464). Thus, the AAs of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Turkey – accounting between them for forty percent of third-country migrants in the EU (De Arse and Mahia, 2008: 32) – contain important provisions concerning the conditions of workers from protection against discrimination to social security, but those of the rest of the MPCs are much less elaborate on these issues.<sup>299</sup>

In the new millennium, these agreements became increasingly perceived as instruments for combating illegal migration. Indeed, the EU's Seville Council meeting of 2002 called upon the "externalisation" of immigration control by the introduction of mandatory of "readmission" clauses in community agreements with third-country (Aubarell et al., 2009: 10). The 2004 Hague Programme confirmed the EU's move towards a burden-sharing approach with neighbouring countries in the management of the migration challenge (Doukouré and Oger, 2007). Typically, externalisation, which in the EU's lexicon is referred to as "external dimension", involves a) increased emphasis on external borders and on the fight against illegal immigration, such as border control measures, the construction of fences, patrols (Lutterbeck, 2006); b) proposals for the processing of asylum claims outside European territory, for instance through regional protection and transit processing centres; and rather accessorially c) action targeting "root causes" and attempts to link migration and development (Balzacq, 2008).

Against a background formed by changing patterns of migration governance in the Maghreb (Collyer, 2008: 160), the EU migration policy agenda has met with mixed reactions from the countries concerned. By and large, Maghrebi countries (Morocco, Tunisia and lately Libya) have, after a few sticks and many carrots, shown readiness to accommodate the EU's demands as far as externalisation of migration governance is concerned. With the exception of readmission agreements, which are proving to be a thorny issue across the board, these countries have been cooperative on other fronts, such as the installation of asylum processing

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<sup>298</sup> For a detailed study of workers' remittances in the Mediterranean, see: EIB (2006). 'FEMIP Study on Improving the Efficiency of Workers' Remittances in Mediterranean Countries', Final Report No. FTF/REG/01/2005, Rotterdam.

<sup>299</sup> For more details on the provisions on migration of various Euro-Med documents since 1995, see appendix 4.



centres and increased border policing. Morocco in particular, in view of its geographical location, has been the focus of the EU's efforts in the Maghreb, and not without success as Moroccan authorities have been rather keen on portraying themselves as frontrunners in the fight against illegal migration which they have had to increasingly confront in recent years. Algeria, by contrast, has proven itself to be an awkward player with the EU on this front, for apart from signing a few bilateral readmission agreements (with Spain, Germany, Switzerland, France and Italy) it has actively been opposed to the European approach to migration issues in the region.

## **II. The priorities of the EU and Algeria in the framework of the third pillar**

As with other former European colonies, historical patterns of Algerian emigration were largely defined by cross-national linguistic, cultural, and even political affinities. As such, the history of migration in Euro-Algerian relations was until recently limited to the history of Algerian emigration to France, which, prior to 1962, had been primarily circular (Collyer, 2003: 3). Effectively, until 1968 Algerians were allowed free circulation between their country and France, and the primary motives of their early emigration movements related to the war of independence (*Harkis* fleeing FLN reprisals)<sup>300</sup> and the growing demand for low-skilled workers in the 1960s' booming French economy (ibid.). In those early days, Algeria's post-independence socialist regime depicted North-South migration movements as being part of the post-colonial domination continuum (Labdelaoui, 2008a: 2), but in the hope of addressing the paralysing human-capital deficit plaguing the emerging nation-state, decision-makers engaged in temporary-work-placement agreements with France providing a framework for the management of Algerian migratory flows. However, as the already-precarious living conditions of migrant workers began to deteriorate further in the early 1970s and a shift in the attitude of the French authorities towards Maghrebi immigrants in general became palpable, the Boumédiène government at the time decided to unilaterally – and rather exceptionally by regional standards – halt its migration cooperation with France (Collyer, 2008: 159).

The political fallout of this bilateral disagreement extended rapidly to Algeria's relations with the European Community, as EC-Algerian negotiations on a cooperation agreement were held

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<sup>300</sup> *Harkis* are Algerians who opposed the indigenous independence movement and either actively sided with the French army or simply did not join the FLN-controlled resistance.

up in the early part of the 1970s by Algeria's persistent demands for, on top of other things, the inclusion of provisions pertaining to the "social and living conditions of migrant workers" in Community member states (Darbouche, 2008: 373). Despite being aware of the Community's impotence in this policy area, Algerian decision-makers' insistence on this issue was aimed at influencing France's pertinent behaviour through the EC rather than bilaterally.<sup>301</sup> Why Algeria avoided any forceful confrontation with French policy-makers on this issue is not clear,<sup>302</sup> but in the absence of a subsequent reformulation of emigration policy, migration became a recurrent issue of contention in EC/EU-Algerian interactions.

The Franco-Algerian situation remained unchanged in subsequent years, even as the profile of Algerian emigrants evolved from largely low-skilled to more qualified labour (Collyer, 2004a: 18). Indeed, the 1980s saw the Algerian population experience exponential growth, but one that was not accompanied by necessary and meaningful economic and political progress. Correspondingly, signs of political opposition to the regime became more visible especially within the hitherto contained Islamist and Berberist movements, as demonstrated by their escalating skirmishes with the central government as of the early 1980s. Increasingly disillusioned post-independence-generation youths coming out of the Algerian education system found no solutions to their ambitions except outside the country, and France was their destination of choice. By 1990, approximately one million Algerians lived in France, representing 97 percent of all Algerian emigrants (Collyer, 2006: 262). In Europe on the other hand, the EC had completed its Mediterranean enlargement process with the Iberian emigration countries becoming fully-integrated in the common market by 1986. Vertically, European integration was reinforced by the signing of the Schengen Agreement in 1985, providing for the removal of systematic border controls between participating countries. As one of the original signatories of this treaty,<sup>303</sup> France moved swiftly towards a more restrictive immigration regime starting with imposing short-term visa requirements on Algerian nationals in 1986 (De Wenden, 2000).

More recently, Algerian emigration patterns shifted in a number of significant ways owing to changing "push factors" pertaining most conspicuously to the political conflagration of the 1990s, which deeply scarred the country. Whereas earlier migration waves were formed by


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<sup>301</sup> Interview, Algerian academic, Algiers, 16/10/06.

<sup>302</sup> "Pride complex" vis-à-vis France, negotiation tactic of aiming higher than prepared to settle for, etc., are possible explanatory factors.

<sup>303</sup> In addition to the Benelux states and the Federal Republic of Germany.

job-seekers and family reunions, new emigrants were, typically, highly-qualified professionals with well-established livelihoods in Algeria (journalists, artists, writers, academics, politicians, state officials, etc.), motivated instead by political frustration in relation to the main protagonists of the conflict (army and Islamists). Accordingly, asylum became the main motive of Algerian emigrants in the 1990s and their destinations varied as a result (Collyer, 2003: 4-6). Within the EU, Germany and the UK became favoured destinations with asylum seekers, especially amongst FIS politicians who lacked trust in the French security establishment which they accused of connivance with Algerian military commanders in the execution of the 1992 *coup d'état* (Collyer, 2003).<sup>304</sup>



Source: Collyer (2003)

**Figure 3:** Algerian asylum requests in the top five EU destinations, 1994-2001

In view of the multitude of its deep-rooted links and interests in the country, France was going to inevitably be drawn in the fledging Algerian conflict. What was less certain to many observers, however, was the direction of its reaction, though one apparent clue lied in the significant Algerian immigrant population in France which exceeded one million. For the first time in the history of Franco-Algerian relations, migration was poised to become an issue of both national and mutual security concerns in both countries. However, this was not to be

<sup>304</sup> For a detailed analysis of the dynamics of asylum-seeking of Algerians in the UK, see: M. Collyer (2004b) 'Navigation Guide to Refugee Populations in the UK: Algerians', The Information Centre about Asylum and Refugees in the UK, available at: <http://www.icar.org.uk/1135/algerians-in-the-uk/profile-of-the-algerian-population-in-uk.html>.

explicitly the case until the advent of a cohabitation right-wing government in Paris in March 1993, under the leadership of Edouard Balladur, Alain Juppé, François Léotard and Charles Pasqua, respectively prime, foreign, defence and interior ministers. It was the latter who took charge of France's security policy towards the Algerian crisis, having been interior minister previously (1986-1988) and said to be one of the Algerian security establishment's favourite French Gaullist interlocutors (Roberts, 2003: 175). Following the onset of terrorist attacks on French nationals in Algeria in summer 1993, the immediate target of the new French government was a series of known Islamist individuals and networks in France. These were the most visible of actors, such as the *Fraternité algérienne en France*, a FIS-linked organisation, and were often reproached for their political support of violence (Collyer, 2006: 262). Pasqua's repressive measures of 1993 and 1994 targeted all visible forms of Algerian political Islam in France, in an attempt to reduce the possibility of the Algerian conflict spilling over into France. Despite the limited effect of these policies given the unrelenting escalation of violence in Algeria and the increased frequency of attacks targeted at French interests in Algeria (Embassy attacks, airline hijack, etc.), Algerian decision-makers greeted these measures with satisfaction not least because of Pasqua's constant pillorying of the contrasting policy postures of other EU member states.

Less comforting from the Algerian point of view, however, was the other side of Pasqua's Janus-faced strategy. Dramatic visa restrictions for Algerian nationals were being slowly implemented from the late 1980s, culminating in the transfer in 1994 of visa-processing centres from local consulates to a specialised interior-ministry agency in Nantes, and leading to the plummeting of the number of visas granted to Algerians from over 500,000 in 1988 to an estimated 40,000 in 1995 (Collyer, 2003: 6). These disadvantageous measures were then formalised through a new agreement that was foisted on the Algerian regime in 1994, which was left with little choice but to capitulate in return for support for IMF negotiations and counter-insurgency.<sup>305</sup> Combined with a series of ancillary measures concerning Algerian airline airport procedures and intensified stigmatisation of Algerian immigrants in France, particularly through indiscriminate police stop-and-search practices, France's draconian immigration policies added to Algerians' feeling of international isolation during the crisis, especially given that its Algeria decisions were often replicated in other EU member states. As such, from that point onwards Algeria's migration battle with the EU was yet again a battle against France's visa regime.

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<sup>305</sup> Interview, Algerian diplomat, London, 20/12/05.

### *The primacy of bilateralism: Migration as rhetoric in EU-Algeria EMP interaction*

Algeria's migration policy has experienced limited substantive change since the abandonment of the organised-labour-flows cooperation frameworks in 1973. However, at that point there seemed to be a discursive shift in the context of this policy area reflecting the willingness of Algerian decision-makers to decouple the international politics of migration from historical subjectivities. Accordingly, migration has become systematically referred to in the Algerian policy lexicon as *la circulation des personnes* ["circulation/movement of people"] or *échanges humains* ["human exchanges"]. This seemed to be a conscious attempt on the part of Algerian policy-makers to (re)frame the foreign-policy dimension of migration within an internationalist doctrine, stressing its being part of uncontrollable globalised movements, which, amongst other things, contribute to fostering intercultural dialogues and shared prosperity (Labdelaoui, 2005: 2). By de-emotionalising and de-personalising migration issues in this way, Algerians sought – in view of the persistent structural predominance of emigration to France – to both deprive France of a negotiating lever and, in turn, streamline bilateral relations.<sup>306</sup>

In relation to emigrants, this rhetorical reformulation of interests came to reflect somewhat the changing patterns of their characteristics since the 1970s. Accordingly, Algerian emigrants became portrayed as an extension of the national community, and referred to as *la communauté algérienne établie à l'étranger* [Algerian community based abroad]. This discursive construction meant that state agents perceived this artificial entity as an object of policy needing attention and protection, in return for political mobilisation through elections and for economic participation through transfer of knowledge and remittances (ibid.: 4). Contrary to the de-linking efforts mentioned above, such rhetoric suggested there to be a degree of intimacy between the Algerian state and emigrants, whereas in reality, for over thirty years, this relationship has proven to be all but harmonious.<sup>307</sup>

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<sup>306</sup> Interview, Algerian academic, Algiers, 16/10/06.

<sup>307</sup> Algerian emigrants have always reproached successive governments, apart from their conspicuous overall failures, for the high prices of national airline tickets; for inefficient consular services; for inadequate money transfer and exchange facilities; and, until recently, for imposing national service exemption documents on male citizens as a quasi-exit visa requirement.

In terms of immigration, Algeria had for many years no discernible policy framework in place. Until recently, sub-Saharan immigrants constituted the most important inflow of foreign nationals as their interactions with Algerian Touaregs have been part of millennia-long traditions (Mebroukine, 2009: 5). So long as the mostly-commercial activities of these temporary immigrants represented no perceptible threat for the Algerian state,<sup>308</sup> successive governments seemed content with existing provisions especially given that other categories of economic immigrants were limited to so-called “expats”, whose situation was regulated by the investment agreements signed with their respective companies, generally in the hydrocarbon industry. However, as suspect movements began to appear in the mid-1990s along traditional flows on the southern borders and as it became increasingly apparent that these involved illicit activities including arm trafficking with direct implications for the ongoing Islamist insurgency, the attitude of the Algerian authorities changed.<sup>309</sup> As the above trends accelerated in the 2000s, concomitant with the rapid economic growth and the changing nature of terrorism in Algeria,<sup>310</sup> a more clearly articulated immigration discourse was formulated by Algerian policy actors (Labdelaoui, 2008a).

Algeria’s incipient interest in these immigration developments seemed to have brought its migration policy priorities closer to those of the EU. More specifically, the intrinsic security implications of recent immigration movements in Algeria have meant that devising a security-oriented policy response became inevitable for Algerian decision-makers. Indeed, a wide array of preventive and combative measures have been introduced since 2000, including the enactment of a restrictive legal framework that criminalises illegal immigration acts, the installation of “reception centres” for illegal immigrants, and the reinforcement of border-surveillance by improving police capabilities and erecting a multi-billion dollar electronic border-control system (Labdelaoui, 2008: 7-10; Mebroukine, 2009: 3-5). Moreover, in view of the fact that the majority of illegal immigrants who enter Algeria do so by way of transit, the need for greater cooperation between the EU and Algeria in this area has become harder to

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<sup>308</sup> Immigrants from sub-Saharan countries (Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Chad, etc.) were estimated at 20,000 in 2005. For a detailed analysis of regular and irregular sub-Sahara immigration in Algeria, see: N.-E. Hammouda (2008) ‘La Migration irrégulière vers et à travers l’Algérie’, CARIM-AS 2008/75, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole.

<sup>309</sup> For a detailed analysis of border management in Algeria, see: H. Labdelaoui (2008b) ‘La Gestion des Frontières en Algérie’, CARIM-AS 2008/02, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole.

<sup>310</sup> Algeria’s economy boomed on the back of high energy prices between 2003 and 2004. Most terrorist groups of the 1990s were dismantled, with the exception of the GSPC (see chapter 3) which turned into al-Qaeda’s Maghreb franchise in 2006/6. Between 2000 and 2007, a reported 65,000 illegal immigrants were arrested by the police (Mebroukine, 2009: 1).

ignore. And indeed, this has become a recurrent theme in Algeria's relevant discourse, including at the highest level (Algerian MFA, 2004b; 2005g; Algerian MFA, 2006a; 2006b; 2006c; *Liberté*, 10/07/2006; *ANSA*, 14/11/2007).

However, parallel to this apparent *prise de conscience*, Algeria continued to insist on the inadequacy of a security response to African immigration to Europe as proposed by the EU.<sup>311</sup> Its arguments related to the fact that African migration flows to Europe represent a fraction of those from South American, East European and intra-African movements (Mebroukine, 2009: 8). Instead, Algerian officials have advocated a "global approach" to migration issues, taking into consideration the development needs of countries of origin and the transnational reach of associated trafficking networks. Yet, Algeria has so far failed to flesh out a practical and workable roadmap for its global approach and has limited its contribution to existing regional efforts in this direction to issuing unconstructive criticisms or actively impeding initiatives such as through boycott.<sup>312</sup> As far as SMC immigration is concerned, Algeria has remained resolutely opposed to the EU's burden-sharing efforts, refusing to act as a "buffer zone" for Europe.<sup>313</sup> It has also regularly criticised EU funds earmarked for migration-related projects as paltry, even when Algeria's foreign currency reserves have in recent exceeded those of most, if not all, EU member states.

The EU has found it difficult to handle Algeria's position(s) on migration issues, again for lack of leverage. If publicly and in regional fora, Algeria's migration discourse has purported to speak for countries in the region and indeed claimed to defend shared interests, in bilateral interactions with the EU the preoccupations it expressed in this regard were predominantly "Algerian".<sup>314</sup> They related primarily to the Schengen visa restrictions applied to Algerian applicants and deemed largely disadvantageous in comparison with neighbouring countries.<sup>315</sup> In view of the genesis of such stringent requirements, Algerian negotiators were consistently unequivocal: they wanted France to reverse visa strictures and to call upon its fellow member states to follow suit.<sup>316</sup> Besides the emotional symbolism that this issue embodied up to the point when the tables turned, the motive of Algeria's behaviour seemed to have been nothing more than putting pressure on a *demandeuse* EU by way of both raising the stakes in its AA

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<sup>311</sup> Interview, Algerian foreign ministry official, 15/05/07.

<sup>312</sup> Interview, administrator, EuroMed Directorate, EP secretariat, Brussels, 23/03/07.

<sup>313</sup> Interview, Algerian diplomat, Brussels, 12/3/07.

<sup>314</sup> Interview, Commission official, Brussels, 5/03/07.

<sup>315</sup> Interview, Algeria chief AA negotiator, Brussels, 31/01/07.

<sup>316</sup> Interview, Algeria chief AA negotiator, Brussels, 31/01/07.

negotiations, in the hope of obtaining counter-terrorism support, and signalling to France that there was a new way to Paris for Algerian decision-makers – that is through Brussels. In the meantime, EU-Algerian priorities with regard to migration issues seem to have benefitted the least from this negotiation game, and remain today as divergent in reality as they were in 1995.

### **III. Conclusion**

EU-Algerian EMP cooperation in the area of migration has been as bumpy as the evolution of the Partnership's third basket. In spite of all the rhetoric on both sides in favour of the intercultural content of the Barcelona Process, little in the way of rapprochement of interests was provided by either side to result in meaningfully 'bringing the people together'. In fact, EMP interaction between the EU and Algeria in this context, far from leading to a convergence of interests, has most probably resulted in at least the reinforcement of pre-interaction divergence. Algerian decision-makers calculated negotiating priorities within the EMP accounted largely for this state of affairs. Their emotional attachment to migration issues, inherited from Algeria's *sui generis* relationship with France, particularly in this area, and from the trauma of the 1990s, precluded any socialisation dynamics from taking root in the interaction, not even those of strategic nature. As such, migration represents an interesting policy area from the perspective of the theoretical framework of this study. Algerian negotiators viewed migration issues as means of pressure on the EU whenever invoking European visa restrictions proved handy. Algeria's interests in this area with the EU as predominantly bilateral and, in this sense, capitalising on EU interaction to put pressure on specific member states proved equally useful on more than one occasion. Strategic calculation pertaining to migration issues was only indirectly linked to migration as a policy area insofar as the latter was invariably utilised by Algeria as a means to getting somewhere else.

Algerian policy-makers' awareness of the significant influence of member states on the community's migration policies, notwithstanding its reinforced competence in this area, was key to their attitude. Not even the increasing severity of illegal immigration in Algeria helped sway their determination to pursue hidden motives. As such, their rhetoric in this context was largely multilateral, but their interests were quintessentially bilateral. On the other hand, the EU's lack of leverage on Algeria, especially when it comes to issues of migration, contributed



to this outcome. All that was left for the EU was to pursue other issue areas in which it could more easily make inroads.

In relation to other aspects of the intercultural basket, Algeria had much less trouble. The establishment of the Anna Lindh Foundation was perceived as a welcome development, although like other SMCs, Algeria encouraged a more federal configuration of the intercultural foundation. Its experience with radical Islamist actors was still fresh in the memories of decision-makers and, accordingly, made its case more compelling than others. The only disappointment from an Algerian point of view would have been the choice of Egypt (yet again) as a host country for the organisation's offices, although this was more reflective of the longstanding rivalry between the two countries on the Arab scene than a rationally-calculated reaction.

## Conclusions

This research has set out to examine the dynamics of the interaction between the EU and Algeria within the framework of the Barcelona Process. It has aimed to do so with a view to analysing the interests of both the EU and Algeria in this context, by way of identifying their ideational and strategic origins as well as the impact of the EMP on the evolution of the dyad's priorities. As such, the underlying goal of this study is threefold: a) to trace the evolution, over a period of ten years (1995-2005), of the preferences of the EU and Algeria in the context of the EMP; b) to ascertain whether there was any convergence of interests between the two parties in this context; and c) to establish whether the EMP as process had anything to do with eventual instances of interest convergence and, if so, through what mechanisms.

To do so, I have employed a synthetic theoretical framework consisting of rationalist and constructivist conceptions of international behaviour encompassed by international regime theory. To reinforce this largely macro, systemic approach, I have also relied on the analytical tools of Foreign Policy Analysis relating to the domestic sources of foreign policy behaviour as provided for by the work of Christopher Hill. The corollary of the above research choices in methodological terms has inevitably pointed towards the use of process tracing, which, as a research method, demands a considerable amount of data and in multiple streams. The operationalisation of this rather eclectic theoretical design consisted of a) honing in on specific policy areas from across the pillar structure of the EMP (political reform and security cooperation, trade liberalisation and energy cooperation and migration); b) introducing, where relevant, a temporal layer of analysis to differentiate between pre- and post-AA interaction; and c) triangulating between three data streams (interviews, official documents and secondary sources).

Firstly, with respect to the set of policy areas relating to the political and security chapter of the EMP, this study has found little evidence to suggest a direct impact of the process of interaction on the evolution of EU-Algerian interests in this area. The EU and Algeria started off in 1995 from quite diverging positions, though immediate calculations, pertaining to Algeria's growing diplomatic isolation at the time and France's changing approach to the Algerian conflict, meant that both sides had strong interests in the incipient regime. Most

notably, differences over political reform and counter-terrorism beset much of the dyad's interaction until the turn of the century. A breakthrough in AA negotiations was only possible as a result of polity changes in Algeria and developments in the international system, namely the advent of Bouteflika to power in 1999 and the 9/11 attacks. The signing of the AA did not seem to introduce any meaningful change to existing EU-Algerian dynamics, as demonstrated by Algeria's subsequent rejection of the ENP. In fact, if anything, the post-AA period saw the EU's interest in Algeria's democratic deficit wane, but that has been shown to have been mainly related to the post-9/11 change of mood in western countries and the positive inroads made by Bouteflika into the consolidation of civilian rule in Algeria.

However, this research has found that, indirectly, the EMP did play a role in approximating the interests of the EU and Algeria in relation to political and security issues. Indeed, the intensification of political dialogue between the two at the start of 1998, which was justified by European actors as being part of EMP interaction, led Algerian military commanders to realise that increasing European political interest in their handling of the intensifying violence was not only a response to public outrage in Europe but also, and most importantly, an expression of waning patience towards the overt militarisation of the regime. This, in turn, spurred a change of strategy on the part of army commanders with the aim of placating European anxieties and reducing exposure, and was an oblique prelude to the coming of Bouteflika to power and the corresponding attitudinal shift towards relations with the EU and the signing of the AA in particular. It has also been shown that, after the signing of the AA, Algerian EU decision-makers learnt to strategically pay lip service for the EU's normative political concerns, rather than cultivate a hostile discourse, knowing that the EU lacks any meaningful leverage to pursue those concerns in practice.

Furthermore, in terms of role playing, Algeria showed little hesitation in playing the role of a vindicated victim after the events of 9/11. This has indeed brought its longer-standing interests in the fight against terrorism closer to the EU's incipient strategy in this area. Based on Checkel's typology of socialisation mechanisms, this convergence of priorities is indeed a sign of an emerging shift from the 'logic of consequentiality' to the 'logic of appropriateness', but, again, in the specific context of EU-Algerian relations not as a direct result of EMP interaction but of change in the international system. The shift in question, however, took place in the EU, not in Algeria, which suggests a "reverse socialisation" process in this

instance – a case of a promoter of socialisation adapting its behaviour to changing subjective understandings – though in response to strategic rather normative suasion.

Against a background of changing international strategic priorities, the EU has also shown signs of learning from its interaction with Algeria, by beginning to strategically obviate issues of contention between the two in the hope of gaining incremental purchase on more normative issues. This has been pertinently the case in the post-AA period and, more specifically, in the wake of the introduction of the ENP. EU policy actors have learnt to work around their Algerian counterparts' preferences, knowing that these are more subject to Algerian domestic politics than EU influence.

Strategic calculation on the part of both the EU and Algeria in relation to EMP first-basket policy areas seemed to presage more optimised relations as a result of the dyad's subsequent express pursuance of mutual interests. Indeed, a glance at the evolution of EU-Algerian relations outside the timeframe of this study (after 2005) reveals that both partners have moved in this direction. The first Association Council meeting in May 2006 defined a roadmap for EU-Algerian cooperation within the framework of the EMP. The new agenda identified as priority areas a) enhancing energy cooperation through a proposed "strategic energy partnership" (SEP); b) supporting Algeria's economic reform programme and specifically its WTO accession process; and c) concluding an agreement on migration issues in the form of a "mobility partnership".<sup>317</sup>

These reshuffled priorities are also a clear indication of Algeria's more assertive foreign policy behaviour in the post-9/11 period, especially in relation to the EU. The view in Algiers was that much needed to be done in foreign relations to compensate for Algeria's lost decade of the 1990s. In this vein, it was indeed at Algeria's behest, in the wake of the first Russia-Ukraine "gas crisis" of January 2006, that an energy partnership was envisaged. Hoping to capitalise on the EU's sense of vulnerability vis-à-vis overdependence on Russian gas supplies, Algerian decision-makers offered to negotiate a SEP in return for the EU's political support at the WTO and the facilitation of visa procedures for Algerian nationals. Seeing

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<sup>317</sup> Insight obtained from numerous discussions with EU and Algerian policy-makers in Brussels in 2008/9. A Commission official in charge of the Algeria dossier confirmed as late as February 2009 that these priorities were still valid.

added value in all of these areas, the EU was prompt to respond favourably to these Algerian proposals, but progress in their implementation has been rather slow.

Secondly, in the areas of free trade and energy cooperation, this study has shown that not only did EMP interaction have no impact on the convergence of interests that was seen in the early 2000s, but that its significant potential to forge a meaningful energy rapprochement – bilaterally as well as at the regional level – failed to be explored. Algeria is known for having an economic policy, which, excluding its energy variant, has been less rational than reflective of elite vested commercial interests in the distribution of rent. Therefore, any decision on its part to sign up for a FTA with the EU would be subjected to the main determinants of its political economy. This has been proven to have indeed been the case within the EMP, as Algeria's decision to place less emphasis on its "specificity" and engage in AA negotiations was clearly the result of political change incarnated by Bouteflika than the outcome of an economic cost-benefit calculation. Moreover, the primacy of member states interests in their respective energy relations with Algeria trumped the EU's nascent willingness to reinforce its energy cooperation with the country, and was therefore unable to capitalise on the existing structures of the Euro-Mediterranean Energy Partnership for that purpose. However, when it finally acquired sufficient decisional competence in this area, the balance of power between energy producers and consumers had tilted towards the latter and the terms of dialogue were no longer within the EU's reach. The signing of the AA had little influence on this state of play, as Algeria's economic policy continued to obey the regime's political imperatives and the regional energy partnership remained nothing more than a set of intermittent action plan objectives.

Thirdly, a similar ineffectual role was played by the Barcelona Process in the area of migration policy. Algeria's longstanding grievances against France's approach to Algerian immigration have had a large impact on its attitude to cooperation with the EU in this area. This was particularly the case from the 1990s onwards, when France's stringent visa procedures were replicated by all Schengen member states, leading to a feeling of accentuated isolation amongst Algerians. As a result, Algeria's response to what is perceived as mere European rhetoric on migration policy was largely uncooperative. The main motive behind its attitude was to change France's visa policy and the EU's calls for the signing of a readmission agreement fell, as a result, on deaf ears. Again, only a more assertive foreign policy posture seemed to have got Algeria to where it wanted on migration issues, for if one looks outside

the timeframe of this research it appears that France did eventually ease its visa regime in 2006 leading to a friendlier Schengen-visa procedure more generally. This change came about following Algeria's proposal of a SEP to the EU in the first half of 2006, not the signing of the AA or its entry into force.

The insignificant impact of the EMP on the preferences of the EU and Algeria in the above policy areas signifies a lack of optimality in its template design for their relationship. If EU-Algerian relations have seldom been optimised by the EU's proposed regional cooperation frameworks, it is because these have by and large been unadapted to the specifics of this relationship. In the absence of meaningful policy pro-activism on the part of Algeria for much of the relationship's history, the EU found it convenient to either delegate the task of devising a strategic policy towards Algeria to better-informed member states or use its ready-made regional policy templates as venues for cooperation with Algeria. Nonetheless, there have been two periods in the history of EU-Algeria relations when the latter felt sufficiently confident to express its dissatisfaction with the EU's proposed frameworks: in the 1970s and 2000s.

In the early 1970s, Algerian foreign policy had reached an apex of influence and confidence, unprecedented since the country's independence. The prominent role of its still-legitimate leaders in the Non-Allied Movement was the best testimony to the country's diplomatic aura. Besides a booming hydrocarbon economy, this international confidence was what allowed Algeria to reject the EC's proposed cooperation agreements at that time. With the fading of this assertiveness at the end of the 1970s, however, Algeria plunged into a period of policy passivity especially with the EU. It was only in recent years that it recovered a renewed sense of confidence in foreign policy, again helped by a charismatic leader, high energy prices and the *nouvelle donne* of international terrorism. This new buoyancy found reflection in Algeria's relations with the EU on two occasions between 2003 and 2008: first, when the ENP was introduced Algeria's reaction was flat, outright rejection, and second, when the Union for the Mediterranean project was proposed in 2008 – initially by French President Nicolas Sarkozy then by the EU – it was greeted by a noticeably lukewarm reception in Algiers.<sup>318</sup>

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<sup>318</sup> For detailed analyses, see: R. Gillespie (2008) 'A "Union for the Mediterranean"...or for the EU?', *Mediterranean Politics*, 13 (2), pp. 277-286; M. Emerson (2008) 'Making Sense of Sarkozy's Union for the Mediterranean'. CEPS Policy Brief No. 155, Brussels.

This study has shown that, unless the EU is prepared to accommodate Algeria's individual policy priorities, which cannot be dealt with within generic cooperation frameworks, it is unlikely to make meaningful inroads in the pursuit of its long-term strategic interests in the country especially given that its leaders do not foresee a perspective of deeper relations with Brussels. Besides, without it showing readiness to do so, Algerian decision-makers will continue investing greater efforts in pursuit of strategic bilateral relations with individual member states, which would not necessarily be of broader benefit for the whole Union, rather than trying to turn existing unworkable EU frameworks into strategic venues of cooperation. The energy sector captures most pertinently this necessity. Energy is undoubtedly where EU-Algerian short- and medium-term interests lie – and indeed long-term interests if one factors in the potential of renewable energy – and it is most conspicuously an area of policy that cannot be optimised by existing frameworks as much as more specialised settings. Additionally, the scope for enhanced bilateral energy relations between Algeria and specific (southern) member states is significant, and that would not be necessarily satisfactory for the EU's collective energy interests. The same applies for other areas of priority to both countries, such as economic reform and investment, as well as combating illegal cross-border activities, be they migratory or terroristic. As much as this is particularly true for the Algerian case, it has implications for the EU's interactions with its neighbourhood more broadly. The use of "sticks and carrots" by the EU does not always work in its neighbour socialising efforts, and in cases where the sticks are not big enough to deter neighbours and/or the carrots are unattractive, officials in Brussels would need to show more flexibility to better satisfy their interests. Taking into account the neighbours' own strategic and even normative preoccupations is the only way that can allow the EU to optimise its relations with countries like Russia, Turkey and Algeria.

Algerian EU decision-makers are well aware of this state of affairs and are beginning to act upon it. In a last conversation with Algeria's chief AA negotiator in Brussels in March 2009, where I attempted to get a sense of the diplomat's take on the question of interest convergence – something I had refrained from doing during two previous encounters – I was told exactly that. His verdict is that there is more significant scope for meaningful convergence of interests within Algeria's bilateral relations with member states than within relations with the Union as an entity. This is a fact that reflects the nature of EU-Algerian relations: very few links between the Algerian economy and the common market as such; inexistent economic

dependence in Algeria on European tourism for instance; no migration agreements, etc. By contrast, there is strong interdependence in the energy sector, complementarity in security cooperation, and mutual interests in issues like illegal migration. Politically, I was told, Algeria's had never sought convergence with the EU; just with its member states. In view of this situation, Algeria's proposal for a SEP in return for WTO support and a "mobility partnership" was a carefully calculated move on the part of policy makers. In many ways, Algeria sees itself, in terms of model of optimal cooperation with the EU, as the Russia of the southern Mediterranean. Its self-perception is one of a (sub-)regional power with an interdependent relationship with the EU. This often translates into an attitude of rejection towards the EU's democracy promotion policies. Besides the power status, Algeria's recent experience with political pluralism is seen as a valuable "indigenous" basis for future and more meaningful reform – a bit like Russia's "sovereign democracy" (Darbouche, 2008). The potential of energy as a vector of domestic development and strategic foreign relations is another source of policy towards the EU, especially since the latter's growing dependence on outside supplies of primary fuels such as natural gas. Energy is for Algeria what normative power is for the EU – a source of leverage in foreign policy – with the only difference being that norms do not buy the EU any influence with Algerian policy-makers.

This reality poses a challenge to the EU's normative pretensions. Neighbours such as Russia and Algeria have recently emerged from their own periods of isolation and have sought to reassert themselves on the international stage. Their foreign policy resurgence is inherently strategic in nature and will not be thwarted by norms. The EU can either ensure that such renewed strategising is harmoniously integrated in its own strategic agenda or it will lead to more confrontation and less optimisation. Finding the right balance between normative posturing and strategic behaviour is key to the outcome of such interactions. This study has confirmed that the EU's avowedly normative frameworks such as the EMP and the ENP would have to be endowed with variable geometrical qualities to take into account cases that fail to fit the moulds that they offer, such as EU-Algerian relations.

On the weaker side, the findings of this research in relation to the 'causal pathways' of ideational intervention vis-à-vis interests have been rather limited. The model of Goldstein and Keohane, which was outlined in the theoretical chapter, has had limited use in this study because of the complexity of the relationship in hand, the number of ideational and strategic sources of interests being probed, and the number of policy areas under study. The model may



be of higher value for more parsimonious studies that seek to focus on one actor only and in a given context. Furthermore, I have found it more rewarding to the overall goal of this research to focus more on dissecting the mechanisms and dynamics of socialisation than sorting out the causal pathways of ideational causation.

Equally partial has been the analysis of the impact of the signing of the AA on specific aspects of interest convergence, such as norm internalisation for instance. This study did not seek to probe the impact of specific regulatory harmonisations, which *de facto* entail a degree of norm internalisation such as in the economic partnership, on the broader interests of Algeria in the relevant policy areas. The aim was indeed to examine the more macro-level interests, focusing on policy orientation and discursive intentionality. Moreover, the resources available to me in this research have simply not allowed the accommodation of such specific analysis. However, I believe this is an area where future research could be valuable. By studying the impact of micro-norm internalisation on macro-policy change, useful light could be shed on the type of norms that successfully influence policy in Algeria in particular and in MPCs more broadly. Such studies could focus on either the typology of norms promoted by the EU or indeed the mechanisms in partner countries which make it possible for these norms to be “irresistible”. In this respect, a comparative dimension juxtaposing different MPC experiences could help yield more compelling results that would provide useful guidance for the EU as to which norms to promote first, how and when.

For now, I believe that this study has provided sufficient insight into the dynamics of EU-Algerian relations in the context of the Barcelona Process to inform better policy initiatives in the future. Indeed, what is needed to optimise EU-Algerian relations is more thinking outside the box by both parties. The EU, more specifically, needs to show less autistic propensities in its relations with third countries, and make more efforts to take into account their individual priorities. Recent policy announcements and actions have presaged a possible shift of EU policy in this direction. These include the conclusions of the General Affairs Council meeting of 8-9 December 2008 and Morocco’s “advanced status” agreement, which was signed in October of the same year. If EU-Algerian relations are to go down the route of differentiated treatment, then a logical start would be an energy partnership to reflect the primacy of the dyad’s interests in this area of policy. From then on, the rest should follow.

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
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
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**Appendix 1:** *EU-Algerian relations as a subject of study in the relevant literature compared to other MPCs.*

The chart below represents the findings of a content analysis exercise that examined the contents (1996-2005) of three chosen prominent English-language academic journals specialising in the subject of Euro-Mediterranean relations and the international relations of the Mediterranean (Mediterranean Politics, The Journal of North African Studies and Mediterranean Quarterly). The purpose of the exercise is to a/ survey the amount of published research on EU-Algerian relations and b/ to compare it with research on the EU’s relations with other MPCs (Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey and Libya). The results revealed that, of the three journals, *Mediterranean Politics* appears to contain more works related to this theme in relations to the other two journals. *Mediterranean Quarterly* is at the other extreme of the spectrum with no published works at all devoted to EU-Algeria. Overall, aside from Libya - that has had very little interaction with the EU – EU-Algerian relations as a subject of study seems to attract very little scholarly attention especially relative to other MPCs with contractual relations with the EU. Even if an argument can be made for the specificity of EU-Turkish relations given Turkey’s European perspective, there remain the figures for “EU-Morocco” and “EU-Tunisia” which in both instances score more than “EU-Algeria”.




## Appendix 2: The three organisational dimensions of the EMP



Source: Adapted from Philippart (2003a)



**Appendix 3:** *Structure of the economic and financial basket*



Source: Brach (2007)

**Appendix 4: Migration in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership**

Document	References to migration	Actions to be taken	Expected impact
<b>Barcelona Declaration</b>			
<b>Declaration</b>	<p>Acknowledge the importance migration plays in the relationships</p> <p>Guarantee the protection of all the rights recognised under existing legislation of migrants legally resident in the territories of the signatories</p>	<p>Strengthen the cooperation to reduce migratory pressures for example through vocational training programmes and programmes of assistance of job creation</p>	
<b>Work Programme</b>	<p>Establish closer cooperation in the field of illegal immigration</p> <p>Encourages meetings in order to make proposals concerning migration flows and pressures</p>	<p>Adopting relevant provisions and measures, by means of bilateral agreements or arrangements, in order to readmit their nationals who are in an illegal situation.</p> <p>Meetings taking into account acquired experience, particularly as regards improving the living conditions of migrants legally established in the EU. Periodical meetings of officials to discuss practical measures which can be taken to improve cooperation among police, judicial, customs, administrative and other authorities in order to combat illegal immigration. The meetings have to take into account the need for a differentiated approach considering the diversity of the situation in each country.</p>	
<b>Association agreements</b>			
Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia	<p>Article 71</p>	<p>To reduce migratory pressure by means of improving living conditions, creating new job opportunities and developing trainings in those areas from which immigrants come</p> <p>Resettling those, who have been repatriated on account of their illegal status</p> <p>Improving social protection system and enhancing the</p>	<p>Keeping the MPC nationals in their home countries by offering them what they expect to find in the host countries of the Community, namely a better standard of living and an improved employment</p>

		health cover system	environment
Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon		<p>Social dialogue shall focus on problems related to migrant communities' living and working conditions (the movement of workers, illegal migration, repatriation of illegal immigrants)</p> <p>Priority areas: reduction of migratory pressure, promotion of the role of women and improvement of the social security and health care systems</p>	<p>Developing more appealing work environment in the MPC and thus reducing migratory pressures.</p>
Israel	Restrictive social dialogue; no migration		
Palestinian Authority	None		
<b>Presidency conclusions of ministerial meetings</b>			
<b>Malta 1997</b>	<p>The signatories underline their common wish to intensify the dialogue and cooperation on the Euro-Mediterranean level on migration issues and human exchanges and in the field of illegal immigration</p>		
<b>Stuttgart 1999</b>	<p>It was noted that activities in the third chapter of the Barcelona Process mainly cover good governance and human rights, education, youth, health, women's participation, migration and human exchanges, culture, dialogue between cultures and civilisations, dialogue between civil societies, fighting international crime, particularly drugs and terrorism, and the fight against racism and xenophobia. Ministers referred to the results of the Valencia conference and urged that the various activities in this chapter be further concentrated on priority areas, notably through the updated Regional Indicative Programme. Ministers welcomed the meeting on migration and human exchanges held in The Hague on 1-2 March 1999 which provided an opportunity for a frank discussion on this important and delicate issue.</p>	<p>Work should be pursued, which could lead to the holding of a high-level meeting.</p>	

**Marseille 2000**

The ministers reaffirmed the necessity, even if the Charter is not adopted, to reinforce the political dialogue. The Senior Officials were given the mandate to do this, especially in the fields of terrorism, migration and human exchanges. There should be no more taboo topics whereas a topic is of common interest.

The importance of the human dimension in the partnership was stressed. They expressed their interest to deepen the dialogue in this area, giving emphasis to a global and balanced approach, and supporting the co-development policies and the integration of migrants from third countries, residing legally in the territories of the member states.

**Brussels 2001**

Migration was here presented as a part of the political partnership and not as a part of the third basket. The Ministers expressed their satisfaction with the holding, on 22 October, of a further meeting of Senior Officials on migration and human exchanges preceded by two meetings of experts on 13 June. They instructed the Senior Officials to continue and deepen the dialogue on this sensitive topic which should, moreover, also form an integral part of a regional programme in the third chapter to be agreed by the 27 partners. The Ministers took note of a Presidency report on the progress of discussions by the Euro-Mediterranean Committee on migration, judicial co-operation and the fight against organised crime and terrorism. They stressed the importance of launching a regional programme on common problems, the resolution of which is so important in developing the fundamental values on which the Partnership is based. They considered that these discussions were encouraging since they enabled some progress to be made.

The Ministers requested the Euro-Mediterranean Committee to already reach agreement in a spirit of

	<p>Partnership and within a global approach on a framework document, if possible for the Barcelona V meeting. The Ministers stressed the input of civil society into all aspects of the Partnership. In particular, they noted the conclusions of the Civil Forum that took place on 19 and 20 October in Brussels where three topics were discussed: peace and conflict prevention, migration and movement of people and cultural exchanges. The Ministers urged the protagonists in civil society to organise themselves to respond better to the terms of reference of the regional programmes.</p>		
<p><b>Valencia 2002</b></p> <p><b>Conclusions</b></p> <p><b>Valencia Action Plan</b></p>	<p>Welcomed the idea for a Ministerial Conference on Migration and Social integration of emigrants to be held in the second half of 2003, which should include aspects such as: co-operation with the countries of origin, social integration of its migrant workers and management of migratory flows.</p> <p>The Conference reiterated the importance of the third Chapter of the Declaration of Barcelona and mandated the Euromed Committee to study ways and means to develop further its contents.</p> <p>The Conference endorsed the Framework Document (see below) and asked the Commission to implement it with partners, notably through a regional cooperation programme including concrete measures on the above mentioned issues in a balanced, reciprocal and coordinated manner. The Conference: Welcomed the idea for a Ministerial Conference on Migration and Social integration of emigrants to be held in the second half of 2003, which should include aspects such as: co-operation with the countries of origin, social integration of its migrant workers and management of migratory flows.</p>	<p>Organisation of a Ministerial Conference on Migration and Social integration</p> <p>Commission should implement the framework document with the partners through a regional cooperation programme.</p>	

<p>Regional Cooperation Programme in the field of justice, in combating drugs, organised crime and terrorism as well as cooperation in the treatment of issues relating to the social integration of migrants, migration and movement of people – Framework Document 2002</p>	<p>The social integration of migrants, migration and movements of people are of vital importance to the Partnership. A large proportion of migrants legally resident in the European Union are from the Mediterranean Partner countries. The harmonious development of the Partnership will be facilitated by measures aimed at promoting their social integration by combating racism and xenophobia.</p> <p>Furthermore, the promotion of partnerships between countries of origin and host countries in order to make the most of migrants' contribution to the regional or local development of their countries of origin will stimulate trade and investment in the Mediterranean Partner countries. The geographical proximity and the gap in prosperity between the European Union and its Partners have led to illegal migration flows and trafficking in human beings, with very adverse consequences in social and human terms.</p> <p>Furthermore, the implementation of procedures governing the issue of visas to nationals of the Mediterranean- strengthen solidarity and exchanges of information between countries of origin, transit and destination Partners has often been placed on the agenda for our Euro-Mediterranean meetings.</p>	<p>- Reinforcing measures for social inclusion and family reunion</p> <p>- strengthen human rights and step up the fight against racism and xenophobia</p> <p>- promotion of partnerships between countries of origin and host countries in order to make the most of migrants' contribution to the regional or local development of their country of origin.</p> <p>- promote and improve exchanges of information and statistics on migration flows</p> <p>- investigate the possibilities of simplifying and accelerating visa-issue procedures in general</p> <p>- Promote assistance, cooperation and training relating to increasing the capacities of institutions in the processing of asylum applications and in refugee protection.</p>	
<p><b>Naples 2003</b></p>	<p>The Ministers expressed strong support for all present and future initiatives aiming at integration at a sub-regional level such as the AMU or Agadir, on issues such as trade, infrastructure networks, and migration policies. They supported the implementation of policies of sub-regional integration in both the Western and Eastern Mediterranean, beginning with the three central Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia). The latter could constitute a "pilot experiment" in that respect aimed at being extended, to other partner countries.</p>	<p>Partners should agree upon readmission agreements including illegal migration. Conducting a study on the relationship between illegal and legal immigration.</p>	

The Ministers took note of the progress made in the implementation of the regional programme covering the justice, police and migration sectors which for the first time in the framework of the partnership allowed experts and practitioners from the Euro-Mediterranean countries to work together in judicial co-operation, in the fight against terrorism, drugs and organised crime and in a joint approach to migration. The Ministers gave full support for this first experience of concrete teamwork, on training of judges, training of police forces and the development of a common tool of observation and analysis of the migratory flows in the Mediterranean and look forward to the further development of this co-operation. Migration and movement of people.

The Ministers reaffirmed the importance of migration and express the view that, if carefully managed, migration can be a positive factor for the socio-economic growth of the whole region. They ensured that the dialogue and co-operation on migration which has started with some Mediterranean Partners is extended to all and covers the root causes of migration, the possibilities to promote legal migration and to combat illegal migration through readmission agreements covering illegal immigration, to be agreed upon with Partners most directly involved. In this respect, they confirmed the need to adopt a global approach balancing security concerns and the management of migratory flows, on the one hand, with the facilitation of legal movement of persons and social integration of migrants, on the other. The Ministers also took note of the Commission's intention to initiate a study into the relationship between legal and illegal migration.

<p><b>Luxembourg 2005</b></p>	<p>Migration and social integration of migrants is a central issue of the Euromed Partnership. Partners should agree on a strategic approach that aims to optimise the benefits of migration for all partners. Such an approach would include intensified cooperation aimed at encouraging cooperation programmes with countries of origin of potential migrants. Ministers examined the possibility to hold specific Ministerial meetings prepared in advance by relevant Senior Officials meetings. Association Agreements and Neighbourhood Action Plans will help in promoting joint management of the movement of people as well as the integration of migrants.</p> <p>Efforts need to continue to foster integration within the host country, including through intensifying the fight against discrimination and social exclusion. The new ENPI can be used to promote a comprehensive approach including cross-border cooperation among the partners and between them and the countries of origin. All aspects should be taken into account, including the fight against racism and xenophobia as well as a study of the labour markets in the EU and in partner countries. Ministers agreed that a regional strategy against racism, xenophobia and intolerance should be designed in the framework of the partnership instruments, including the Anna Lindh Foundation.</p>	<p>Designing a regional strategy against racism, xenophobia and intolerance.</p>	<p>Justice, Security, Migration and Social Integration has its own chapter outside the three baskets</p>
<p><b>Tampere 2006</b></p>	<p>Ministers underline the need to strengthen the management of migratory flows in a comprehensive and balanced manner beneficial to the peoples in the whole Mediterranean region while respecting migrants' rights, and to intensify co-operation on all aspects of migration between all parties concerned, including the fight against trafficking in human beings, and negotiations of different kinds of readmission agreements. In a spirit of partnership and on the basis of the Barcelona 5-year Work Programme the Ministers stress the need to increase cooperation in the fields of legal migration, migration and development, and illegal migration.</p>	<p>Working towards the objectives of the 5-year work programme</p>	



	<p>The Ministers take note of the work of the FRONTEX agency. Ministers welcome Euromed Partners' contribution to the preparatory work of the Euromed Ministerial meeting on migration due to take place in 2007 in coordination with the Commission, aiming at agreeing on a series of further measures to promote co-operation on all issues pertinent to migration. In this context, an overview of existing bilateral and Community funded projects in the areas of migration and development, legal and illegal migration have been compiled on the basis of information provided by all Partners.</p> <p>Ministers also take note of the contributions from other international initiatives such as the EU-Africa Ministerial meeting on Migration and Development held in Tripoli on 22-23 November, as well as the Rabat Euro-African Ministerial meeting on migration. Expressing their renewed commitment to implement the 5-year work programme adopted by the Heads of State and Government in November 2005, Ministers commit to work towards the objectives contained in these Ministerial conclusions.</p>		
<b>Other important documents</b>			
<p><b>Common Strategy of the European Council of 19 June 2000 on the Mediterranean region</b></p>	<p>Building on the acquis of the Barcelona Process and further to the conclusions of the European Council in Tampere, the EU will: develop effective cooperation mechanisms to fight against illegal immigration networks, including trafficking in human beings, inter alia, through the establishment of readmission arrangements relating to own and third country nationals as well as persons without nationality — work with Mediterranean partners to address the question of migration, taking into full consideration the economic, social and cultural realities faced by partner countries. Such an approach would require combating poverty.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Developing effective cooperation mechanisms to fight against illegal immigration networks</li> <li>- establishment of readmission arrangements</li> <li>- exchange information and statistics on migration flows</li> </ul>	

<p><b>Final Report on an EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, 2004</b></p>	<p>improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts, consolidating democratic states and ensuring respect for human rights, exchange information and statistics with the Mediterranean partners on migration flows.</p> <p>The EU aims to promote a comprehensive approach towards migration and the social integration of legally residing migrants and extend to all partners the dialogue and co-operation on migration which has already started with some Mediterranean partners.</p>	<p>Continue to provide technical assistance and cooperation for improved joint management of migration flows, including border control, and institutional capacity building; Seek the conclusion of readmission agreements with our partners; Strengthen the safeguards with respect to international obligations to provide protection for refugees alongside fair treatment of third country nationals who reside legally in the EU.</p>	
<p><b>Five Year Work Programme to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Process, 2005</b></p>	<p>Acknowledging that Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security are issues of common interest in the Partnership, and should be addressed through a comprehensive and integrated approach, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership will enhance co-operation in these fields to:</p> <p>(a) Promote legal migration opportunities, work towards the facilitation of the legal movement of individuals, recognising that these constitute an opportunity for economic growth and a mean of improving links between countries, fair treatment and integration policies for legal migrants, and facilitate the flow of remittance transfers and address 'brain drain';</p> <p>(b) Reduce significantly the level of illegal migration, trafficking in human beings and loss of life through hazardous sea and border crossings;</p> <p>(c) Continue to pursue the modernisation and efficiency of the administration of justice and facilitate access to justice by citizens.</p> <p>(d) Reinforce judicial co-operation, including on cross border issues;</p> <p>(e) Facilitate solutions to problems arising from</p>	<p>With a view to contributing to the above objectives Euro-Mediterranean partners will:</p> <p>(a) Hold a Ministerial meeting to discuss all issues pertinent to migration. And hold an expert senior officials meeting to prepare the Ministerial and discuss other issues of relevance;</p> <p>(b) Develop mechanisms for practical co-operation and sharing experience on managing migration flows humanely, deepen dialogue with countries of origin and transit and explore options for providing assistance for countries of origin and transit;</p> <p>c) Promote schemes for safer, easier, less expensive channels for the efficient transfer of migrants' remittances, encourage active contacts with expatriate communities to maintain their participation in the development process in their country of origin;</p> <p>(d) Develop ways to assist capacity building for those national institutions in partner countries dealing with expatriates;</p> <p>(e) Promote legal migration opportunities and integration of migrants;</p> <p>(f) Enhance cooperation to fight illegal migration. This</p>	

	<p>mixed marriage disputes and child custody cases and encourage cooperation in accordance with the principle of the UN Convention of 1989 on the Rights of the Child and national legislation.</p> <p>(f) Promote the ratification and further implementation of the relevant UN conventions on combating organised crime and drugs, and improve co-operation by law enforcement agencies.</p>	<p>cooperation should involve all aspects of illegal migration, such as the negotiation of different kinds of readmission agreements, the fight against human trafficking and related networks as well as other forms of illegal migration, and capacity building in border management and migration;</p> <p>(g) The Euromed Partners welcome the convening of a Euro-African Conference on Migration;</p> <p>(h) Develop contacts, training and technical assistance for judicial and legal professionals, building on the Euromed Justice Programme, the ENP Action Plans and other agreed multilateral and bilateral instruments, with the participation of the concerned Mediterranean partners in the design and implementation process;</p> <p>(i) Develop contacts, training and technical assistance for police and law enforcement officers, building on ENP Action Plans, other agreed instruments and the Euromed Police Programme, encouraging networks in the Euromed region and drawing on the expertise of Europol with the participation of the concerned Mediterranean partners in the design and implementation process.</p>	
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Source: Saarinen (2008)