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Reforming Mexican public administration

Environmental and forestry policy networks in
the context of democratisation process

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requirements of the University of Liverpool for the
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by

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ABREVIATIONS

AEN	Alianza Ecologista Nacional/National Ecologist Alliance
AFP	Areas Forestales Permanentes/Permanent Forestry Areas
AMA	Acuerdo México-Alemania/Mexico-Germany Agreement
ANP	Areas Naturales Protegidas/Protected Natural Areas
CFE	Comisión Federal de Electricidad/Federal Commission Electricity
CIOAC	Central Independiente de Trabajadores Agrícolas y Campesinos/Independent Central of Agricultural Workers and Peasants
CAN	Comisión Nacional del Agua/National Water Commission
CNC	Confederación Nacional Campesina/National Peasant Confederation
CNOP	Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Populares/National Confederation of Popular Organisations
CNPA	Conferación Nacional Plan de Ayala/National Confederation Plan of Ayala
COA	Cédula Operacional Anual/ Annual Operational Permit
Conabio	Comisión Nacional para la Biósfera/National Commission for the Biosphere
CONADE	Comisión Nacional de Ecología/National Commission of Ecology
Conafor	Comisión Nacional Forestal/Forestry National Commission
CONANP	Comisión Nacional de Areas Naturales Protegidas/National Commission of Natural Protected Areas
Conasupo	Comisión Nacional de Subsistencias Populares/National Commission for the Economic Support of Poor Population.
Conapo	Comisión Nacional de Población/National Commission of Population
CRASX	Consejo Regional de Xpuhil/Xpuhil's Regional Council
CTM	confederación de Trabajadores de México/Mexico's Confederation of Workers
DDF	Dirección de Desarrollo Forestal/Directorate of Forestry Development
EIA	Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental/Environmental Impact Assessment

ENGOS	Organización Ambiental/Environmental Organisations	No Non	Gubernamental Governmental
FNF	Fondo Nacional Forestal/Forestry National Fund		
FONAFE	Fondo Nacional de Fomento al <i>Ejido</i> /National Fund of Encouragement for <i>Ejido</i>		
GATT	Acuerdo General de Tarifas y Aranceles/General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade		
GDP	Producto Interno Bruto/Gross Domestic Product		
GEMA	Grupo de Ecologistas del Mayab/ Group of the Mayab's Ecologists		
GNP	Producto Nacional Bruto/Gross National Product		
GTZ	Agencia Internacional/	Alemana German	para Desarrollo para International
INE	Instituto Nacional de Ecología/National Institute of Ecology		
INI	Instituto Nacional Indigenista/	Indigenous National Institute	
INEGI	Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática/National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Informatics		
ISI	Industrialización por	Sustitución de	Importaciones/Import-Substituting Industrialisation
LAU	Licencia Ambiental Unica/ Unified Environmental Licence		
LGEEPA	Ley General de Balance Ecológico y Protección Ambiental/General Law of Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection		
LGDS	Ley General de Desarrollo Sustentable/General Law of Sustainable Forestry Development		
LIGA	Liga de Comunidades Agrarias/League of Agrarian Communities		
NAFTA	Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte/North American Free Trade Agreement		
NGO	Organización No Gubernamental/Non-Governmental Organisation		
NOM	Normas Oficiales Mexicanas/Mexican Officials Norms		
ODA	Adminstración del Desarrollo de Ultramar/Overseas Development Administration		
OEPFZM	Organización de <i>Ejid</i> os Forestales de la Zona Maya/Organisation of Forestry <i>Ejido</i> Producers of the Maya Zone		
OET	Ordenación Ecológica del Territorio/Ecological Ordering of Territory		
PAN	Partido Acción Nacional/National Action Party		

PDR	Programas de Desarrollo Regional/Programmes of Regional Development
PFE	Plan Estatal Forestal/Forestry State Plan
PEMEX	Petróleos Mexicanos/Mexican Petroleum Company
PGE	Pacto de Grupos Ecologistas/Pact of Ecologist Groups
PIDER	Programa de Inversión para el Desarrollo Rural/Investment's Programme for Rural Development
PNA	Areas Naturales Protegidas/Protected Natural Areas
PND	National Development Plan
PNR	Partido Nacional Revolucionario/ National Revolutionary Party
PPF	Plan Piloto Forestal/Forestry Pilot Plan
PRD	Partido de la Revolución Democrática/Party of the Democratic Revolution
PRI	Partido Revolucionario Institucional/Institutional Revolutionary Party
PRM	Partido de la Revolución Mexicana/Party of the Mexican Revolution
Profepa	Procuraduría Federal de Protección al Ambiente/Federal Attorney's Agency for Environmental Protection
Progresa	Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación/Programme of Education, Health, and Food
Pronare	Programa Nacional de Reforestación/National Programme of Reforestation
Pronasol	Programa Nacional de Solidaridad/National Programme of Solidarity
PVEM	Partido Verde Ecologista de México/Mexico's Ecologist Green Party
SARH-SAGARPA	Secretaría de Agricultura/Ministry of Agriculture
Secofi	Secretaría de Comercio y Fomento Industrial/Ministry of Commerce and Industrial Encouragement
SECTUR	Secretaría de Turismo/Ministry of Tourism
SEDESOL	Secretaría de Desarrollo Social/Ministry of Social Development
SEDUE	Secretaría de Desarrollo Urbano y Ecología/Ministry of Urban Development and Ecology
SEMARNAP	Secretaría de Medio Ambiente, Recursos Naturales y Pesca/Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries
SEMARNAT	Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales/Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources
SENAFOR	Servicio Nacional Forestal/National Forestry Service

Sepesca	Secretaría de Pesca/Ministry of Fisheries
SMA	Sub-secretaría de Mejoramiento al Ambiente/Under-Secretariat of Improvement for the Environment
SPP	Secretaría de Programación y Presupuesto/Ministry of Planning and Budget
SPFEQR	Sociedad de Productores <i>Ejidales</i> Forestales de Quintana Roo/Society of Forestry <i>Ejido</i> Producers of Quintana Roo
SRA	Secretaría de Reforma Agraria/Ministry of Agrarian Reform
SSA	secretaría de Salud/Ministry of Health
SSF	Subsecretaría Forestal/Forestry Under secretariat
UCODEFO	Unidades de Conservación y Desarrollo/Conservation and Development Units
UEF	Unión de <i>Ejidos</i> Forestales de Campeche/Campeche's <i>Unión</i> of Forestry <i>Ejidos</i>
UEPCM	Unión de <i>Ejidos</i> del Pueblo Maya de Campeche/Mayan People <i>Ejidos'</i> <i>Unión</i> of Campeche
UNORCA	Unión Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas Regionales Autónomas/National Union of Autonomous Regional Peasant Organisations
US	Estados Unidos/United States

Abstract

Title: Reforming Mexican public administration. Environmental and forestry policy networks in the context of the democratisation process.
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This thesis centres upon two major issues, little studied in Mexican public administration literature: a) the institutionalisation process of environmental issues and b) the analysis of forestry policy-actors in institutional terms.

This thesis uses the institutional focus and policy networks as a theoretical framework, while examining policy actors, political factors that affect environmental and forestry policies, as well as the recent institutional changes in Mexico's environmental sector. The central hypothesis is that dual policy networks (agrarian and social policy networks), which cross Mexico's forestry policy, have been replaced by an unstable, and loose single policy network system (environmental policy network), led by a weak agency (Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries Secretariat, Semarnap [1994-200]-Semarnat [2000-onwards]).

There are three main findings of this thesis. The domestic policy actors, while building up a weak policy network, have influenced the poor results of forestry policy. While the government has failed to formulate long-term forestry policy, ENGOs have been deficient go-betweens, and peasants have remained passive actors, often controlled by old political interests, highly linked to the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), that has seriously affected the efficiency of policy-implementation.

The second finding is that Mexico's forestry policy has gained in precision, but not in political importance in the Mexican agenda. This is illustrated by the weak position of Semarnat within the Mexican government, in charged of ambitious goals without sufficient policy instruments and funds. Finally the analysis of the two case studies demonstrates that the composition of policy network and the efficiency of strategies have made the difference in relation to the initial policy outcomes in Southern Quintana Roo and Calakmul, as both policies were developed in similar conditions. They were undertaken in the same region, and influenced by analogous policy-actors, with a similar degree of participation, and similar goals. Solutions may require institutional coordination, decentralisation and institutional communication among policy-actors for more efficient forestry policy.

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*M. Saul Vargas Paredes
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Introduction

This thesis analyses forestry and environmental policies in Mexico, applying institutional focus and policy network as a theoretical framework, while examining policy actors, political factors that affect those policies, and recent institutional changes in Mexico's environmental sector. The central hypothesis is that the dual policy networks (agrarian and social policy networks), which cross Mexico's forestry policy, have been replaced by an unstable, and loose single policy network system (environmental policy network), led by a weak agency (Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries Secretariat, Semarnap [1994-200]-Semarnat [2000-onwards]).

While the government has failed to formulate long-term forestry policy, environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOS) have been deficient go-betweens, and peasants have remained passive actors, often controlled by old political interests, highly linked to the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), that has seriously affected the efficiency of policy-implementation. Analysis of two case studies of international relevance in Mexico illustrate this.

This thesis characterises Mexico as *a*) a developing non-agricultural country with conflictive and relevant agrarian policy network; *b*) a non-forestry nation (in economic terms) with high biodiversity (ranked

4th around the world) and high potential of forestry exploitation; and c) a country with a vast amount of protected areas threatened by high levels of population and poverty.

The main contribution of this work is that centres upon two major issues, little studied in Mexican public administration literature: *a)* the institutionalisation process of environmental issues and *b)* the analysis of forestry policy-actors in institutional terms. Also, this thesis considers that Mexico is experiencing formation of a weak policy-network on the forestry field, made up of peasants, ENGOs and government (in turn constituted by public agencies).

The Forestry Pilot Plan (PPF) and the reserve of Calakmul illustrate the analysis of Mexico's forestry policy, while help to prove that the composition (and presence) of policy network and efficiency of strategies (rather than social participation) were the key factors in the policy process (and indirectly, but importantly in policy outcomes).

Not only is the examination of those issues considered independently, but also their combination what represents the key original aspects of this thesis. In more detail, this thesis centres on the study of institutional policy actors that influence the forestry policy making, the structural problems that affect the emergent forestry policy network, and the organisational problems faced by Mexico's public administration to deal with the forestry problem. Although the

political factor is relevant, this thesis favours the examination of public administration rather than forest politics.

There are few works that examines the institutional process of environmental issues in Mexico. In fact, there are still few studies that analyses how the public sector has faced its own reorganisation in organisational terms. In this case, the creation of Semarnap modified not only several ministries, but also the view of the Mexican government of a particular policy. Likewise, forestry and environmental policies have been understudied in the Mexican public administration literature, in spite of multiple works on environmental issues (Mumme, et al 1988:1-20; Redclift, 1987; Quadri, 1990:4-58; Simonian, 1995; Umlas, 1996:243-52; 1998:161-90) forestry policy orientation (Merino, 1996:157-62; Halhead, 1984;) and forest politics (Silva, 1997:313-44; 1994:697-722; 1998:230-47; Parra, 2000).

Also, institutional analysis of forestry policy actors has not extensively been treated. In view of this, the thesis examines the Mexican public administration (in the context of Mexican politics) by presenting a practical current governmental problem, but that has been left in the bottom of the Mexican public agenda. Mexico's forestry policy is a serious problem in view of the constant and quick deforestation without apparent integral solutions.

My job in Semarnap gave me the opportunity to approach the serious problem of Mexico's forestry sector. Nonetheless, this issue is not considered in the central priorities of my country. In practice, this was the main motivation to write this thesis. Analysis of mid and long terms causes of deforestation, as well as the serious consequences to ignore this issue is one of the most important concerns of this work. Most importantly, this thesis attempts to propose some solutions.

In view of this, the thesis represents both an academic and practical study. While this work analyses the main problems of the environmental and forestry policies, proposes some alternatives that may be implemented by the government. Therefore, although this work is driven to specialists in Mexican politics, public administration and policy networks, it has a practical component as it proposes some specific solutions, useful for decision-makers.

The case study (the forestry policy) has a two-fold goal: *a)* to examine Mexican politics (especially the changes experienced by the Mexican public administration in the 1990s), and *b)* to offer some possible solutions to deal with the forestry issue. In this context, the thesis contributes to understand some of the current changes of Mexico's political system, by utilising the concept of policy network, which helps to understand the policy making in a changing scenario (from the traditional authoritarianism of the revolutionary regime to the current growing democracy). Thus, in spite of the central role of the

institutional presidency and the PRI, the thesis emphasises the interaction of institutional policy actors, both social and political ones.

On the other hand, this thesis also proposes some recommendations that imply governmental reforms, which can be useful for policy actors involved in the policy and for decision-makers. This thesis has been done also in hope that academic research can contribute to policy implementation. This is because the few studies on Mexico's forestry issues so far have underlined problem rather than realistic solutions.

Most importantly, because this thesis is centred on public policy and public administration issues, it wants to contribute to the diagnostic of the problem, and the possible solutions by presenting some alternatives. The forestry policy may be seriously taken into consideration in the Mexican public agenda if the policy actors focus on specific changes, such as: the improvement of the environmental sector (within the public sector), the organisational changes in agencies and social organisations (e.g. the *ejido*), and the implementation of new strategies, undertaken by policy actors, to strengthen the environmental policy network.

In this context, most of alternatives are of managerial nature, since this thesis does not considers that social participation be enough to improve the forestry policy, as broadly suggested by the most of works that analyse this policy (Carabias and Provencio, 1992: 7-12; Zabin,

1998: 401-25; Merino 1999: 1-2; Merino and Arias Toledo, 2002: 250-75). In this context, the thesis contributes to precise problems, while suggests the redesign of strategies of forestry policy actors. At this point, the thesis becomes interesting for policy makers and social actors involved in this policy.

Policy networks and structural problems

Most of policy-networks studies have been undertaken in developed countries (western and democratic countries) (e.g. Bressers, *et al*, 1994: 24-51; Coleman, 1999: 691-709; Daugbjerg, 1998: 75-89; and the classic works of Marsh and Rhodes, 1992), whereas few studies have been devoted to explain policy networks in developing and immature democratic countries because their politics are generally more unstructured. For example, in spite of some works that explored inter-organisational relations in Mexico by the late 1970s and early 1980s did not form a broad school of thought nor they did give public administration a key role (e.g. Bravo, 1979, 1982; Godau, 1982, 1984). In essence, those factors make up this original and pioneering thesis, contributing to Mexico's public administration literature.

In addition the Latin American context presents various challenges to the study of environmental issues with policy network concepts. Structural problems pervade political systems with some deficiencies not usually considered by theoretical frameworks. For example, in

Latin America some of the structural limitations that affect the functioning of policy-networks are: overwhelming executive dominance, (Carpizo, 1979:16-8), limited political pluralism (Linz, 1970), absence or weakness of democratic institutions (Remmer, 1989), deep rooted, corporatism (Malloy, 1977), pervasive clientelism (Rothstein, 1979), and high vulnerability in comparison with external agents (Hamilton, 1982:15-23).

Moreover, singular characteristics -influenced by structural problems— of political systems in developing countries contribute to the building of deep gaps between the formal and informal structure of decision-making. For example, in spite of federalist and pluralistic structure of decision-making in Mexico, the revolutionary regime set up a real structure of decision-making based on two main institutions, the executive power and the ruling party (PRI). These institutions that exercised extensive powers brought about the collapsed of the power of federal states, the other two state branches and largely dominated the political scenario without check and balances. This situation makes this case study interesting in terms of politics and public administration. On the other hand, the non-agricultural nature with high biodiversity makes Mexico an interesting case study in terms of forestry policy and policy-making.

The forestry issue

A current conceptual current problem is the dilemma between ethics and economics in Mexico's forestry policy. The core problem is not the multinational enterprises, but the poverty of people who live in forests. Therefore policy actors might concentrate on the strategies to create employment and income in the countryside (with conservation strategies), not on the dilemma of forestry plantations versus agro-forestry.

The central problem derives from the non-agricultural nature of Mexico, and the minor significance of forestry sector for the Mexican economy. While this situation pushes devastation of forest in order to encourage industry or tourism (e.g. the Mayan Riviera in Quintana Roo state), it does not provide an incentive for agricultural investment. Nonetheless, the ethical problem is that humanity would lose one of the most important world forestry reserves. Possibly, the vaccines against cancer and AIDS could be found in Brazil's and Mexico's forests.

Interestingly, the growing importance of forestry policy coincides with significant state reforms in Mexico. Successful recent reforms implemented over the last two decades ironically contributed to the collapse of one of the oldest political systems worldwide. The PRI's defeat in 2000 has symbolised the culmination of a long process of democratic transition in Mexico, since the current political regime is already considered to be part of 'electoral democracies'. In this

context, Mexico's countryside is still dominated by old patterns and is a long way off modernisation.

Basically, rural policy network that largely still influences forestry policy continues with clientelistic and corporatist practices because of 1) little relevance of rural sector for economy and Mexican politics, 2) the strong presence of authoritarian governance in the countryside, and 3) the lack of accountability of new institutions in charge of the countryside.

Finally, this thesis at the same time studies environmental and forest policies because forest policies have been recently launched as a single issue with an integral view (incorporating environmental concerns into policy-design), and there are not enough policy outcomes to be evaluated. In view of this, analysis of ENGOs and public agencies are centred on both environmental issues and forestry policy.

The Mexican context

Various aspects stress the importance of Mexico, both in its own right and in the Latin American context. It is the third largest country (the 13th around the world [Wikipedia, 2003:1]), the second most populated (97.7 million in 2000, while the rate of children per family was 2.4, [Conabio, 2002]), and most developed of the Latin American

countries (the 10th economy of the world [Wikipedia, 2003:1]), ranking as the world's fourth proven oil reserves.

In addition, while Mexico was the first Latin American country to experience a deep revolution during the twentieth century (1910), its economy, at present, is increasingly becoming integrated in the US economy (North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA), providing it with an ever increasing international role in Latin America (NAFTA, growing leadership in the region, multiple free trade agreements with the biggest economies around the world, and the main bridge between US and Latin America).

Mexico has experienced dramatic transformations during the second half of twentieth century. This situation shows mixed results. While the economy has registered important achievements (economic reforms, free trade agreements, growing exports), social (poverty, income distribution) and environmental indexes (deterioration of natural resources, pollution) are still serious challenges for Mexican authorities. Politics, in this context, offers a divided output. Though the political system is more democratic nowadays, various authoritarian patterns still remain (e.g. paternalism, corporatism, clientelism).

In the context of state reforms, in the 1990s forestry policy was redefined as a part of broader reforms –fundamentally agrarian and

environmental amendments— that *a*) affected the main policy actors of Mexico's forestry policy (peasants, government and ENGOs), and policy process (more social participation in policy amendments), *b*) reorganised Mexican public agencies, and *c*) resectorised forestry policy (redefining the forestry policy problem subsequently, not only as a agricultural issue, but also an environmental one).

In Mexico's forestry policy, the central problem has remarkable contradictions. On one hand, Mexico has forests with outstanding economic potential, but that present high rates of deforestation, trade deficit in this sector, and forestry is not a real economic option for their inhabitants (most of them are poor peasants with a low income). While initial central policy actors were only the state and peasants (until 1992), and then the ENGOs joined them, economic development policies and politics have influenced the current situation for Mexico's forestry policy.

Since Mexico did not have a deliberated forestry policy or an integral environmental policy until 1992, reforms over the last two decades have not largely considered the impact on forestry and environmental sectors. Conversely, because of the singular organisational structure of Mexican politics, the government (bureaucracy in particular) was able not only to control forestry policy until 1997 (keeping main policy actors under control), but also to change policy orientation, by

implementing contradictory reforms without significant political opposition.

The emergence of environment in Mexican politics was largely influenced by reforms of the 1990s. Not only was the growing interest of political parties and ENGOs on the issue, but also the building up of the environmental sector within Mexico's public administration in 1994. Until then, the environment had been regarded by the Mexican government as forming part of broader issues. Moreover, it was only considered in terms of the brown agenda (pollution), while the green agenda (natural resources deterioration) was practically ignored. As a consequence, the environment was spread over Mexico's public administration, as various agencies were in charge of this issue.

Evolution of Mexico's environmental institutions

The institutionalisation process of the environment in Mexico took place in 1994, when the environmental sector was created, placing the environmental issues under a single secretariat, and reallocating power within Mexico's public administration (e.g. Semarnap's creation affected the ministries of Agrarian Reform [SRA], Agriculture [SARH], and Social Development [Sedesol] in 1994).

This thesis focuses on peasants, ENGOs and state (public agencies) to analyse the forestry policy network. This is because congress and

timber interests have had a marginal role in the forestry policy network due to the strong presence of executive, and weak position of the forestry sector within Mexico's economy, respectively.

Unlike the two major policy networks of Mexican politics (Paz [1990:88-94] suggested two identifiable policy networks, one constituted by *técnicos* [economic policy network], and the other by politicians [political policy network]), in which there are strong linkages between their bureaucracies and policy actors, those of environmental policy network have low commitment among them in political terms, and little influence on major institutions of Mexico's political system.

This is explained partly by the existent distrust among forestry policy actors (and among environmental policy actors in general), and partly by the weak position of environmental agencies *vis á vis* other organisations of Mexico's public administration. While distrust and clientelistic relationship have permeated forestry policy, since most policy actors have been either highly controlled (peasants, farmers), or of little social representation (ENGOs), the formulation of Semarnap set out to deal with ambitious goals without having enough organisational, economic and political instruments and power.

Though the environmental sector modified some institutional linkages, distributional functions, and interest representation mechanisms, the

essential structure of Mexico's decision-making suffered little modification, since most agencies still dominate environmental interests. For example, though the agrarian sector was modified at the expense of a new environmental policy area, land distribution still remains a central issue for Mexico's politics, dominating most important decisions.

The same is true for social and agricultural policies. The reforms of 1990s implied significant transformations of the rural and social sectors. Initially, the government attempted to face social problems with an integrative view of health, anti-poverty, educational and environmental programmes as a big package. Nonetheless, environmental concerns stayed at the bottom of the public agenda.

Semarnap not only modified the existing institutional linkages and distributional features, but also had unexpected side effects, mirrored in intra-organisational problems. The fact that Semarnap integrated some areas from SARH, SRA and Sedesol implied a double challenge, since its inexpert personnel had to deal with a) various traditional bureaucracies without proper training, and b) diversity of policy goals since 'imported' agencies were in charge of different functions (e.g. environmental regulation, production, law application, social assistance). In practice, Semarnap became a new mixed secretariat, which joined political and economic policy network in its job.

The main advantage of policy network concepts is that they explain the decision-making process, taking into consideration that power is allocated between social and governmental actors. Basically, this thesis analyses the functioning of forestry policy considering not only governmental and social policy actors, but also inter and intra governmental relations, a largely understudied area of the Mexican public administration so far. In general, there are few studies of inter-governmental relations in Mexico because most of scholars have paid more attention to Mexican politics, as led by a centric state, which did not allow broad areas of negotiations.

Some considerations

This thesis used interviews, the Internet and newspapers to compensate for the insufficient information and literature. In doing so, fieldwork was undertaken in two periods (January-April 2002, and May 2003) applying open questions to eight public officials from Semarnat in Quintana Roo and Campeche states, as well as in the central offices in Mexico City. The same is true for eight leaders and members of ENGOs, and nine researchers from different institutions. In addition, press, reviews, journals, Semarnat's internal regulations, environmental laws, and books were reviewed during the same periods at the Universities of Yucatan, Campeche, Quintana Roo, Autonomous National University of Mexico (UNAM), El Colegio de Mexico, and the Iberoamerican University.

The interviews provided this thesis with primary information to identify main concerns for policy actors, as well as their strategies and goals. In general, it was evident that most policy actors have a partial view of the forestry problem since they have little knowledge about the issue (e.g. inexperienced bureaucracy, ENGOs' members with narrow view on Mexico's environmental problems, and little informed peasants to deal with forest issue in environmental terms).

Not surprisingly, some interviewed public officials avoided answering some questions about forestry policy problem by arguing that forestry policy could not be evaluated since it was still in progress, while others mentioned that they did not have enough information as they came from other sector of public administration (e.g. finances, agricultural, agrarian). On the other hand, most ENGOs while providing evidence of serious organisational problems, showed little information about broader problems that affect Mexico's forests. Finally, academics manifested their distrust with respect to deforestation statistics, since the current sources have serious differences.

Also, the interviews contributed to analyse old and new issues with innovating perspectives. For instance, the interviews emphasised three major issues: *i*) *ejido*'s (system of communal land) organisational problem rather than land tenure and socio-political issues, *ii*)

institutional process and structural reorganisation of public administration rather than ENGOs-government struggle in environmental policy; and *iii*) organisational problems of agencies rather than peasants-government conflicts in the forestry policy.

The main weakness of these interviews was the lack of systematisation as open questions were asked depending on each person's time. Thus, some interviews were broader than others. Basically, interviews applied to public officials (up and middle positions) were shorter than the academics and ENGOs' leaders because of time restrictions. At the same time, there were more interviews with public official and politicians than academics and ENGOs' leaders, since this thesis emphasises decision-making and organisational problems of Mexican environmental and forestry policies.

Structure of the thesis

This thesis is formed by six chapters. The first chapter provides a contextual framework of the formal and informal structures of Mexico's decision making, while offering a brief historical outlook of Mexico's forestry policy with referential aims. Since Mexico's forestry policy network is made up of three main policy actors, they are individually studied from the second to fourth chapter, while the fifth one analyses two case studies of international significance in

Southern Mexico with a dual goal: a) to analyse policy actors' behaviour during the policy implementation and b) to examine two similar policy-cases that initially had different policy outcomes.

The first chapter analyses the formal and informal institutions and rules of Mexico's political system. The chapter's main purpose is to analyse Mexican politics and its relationship with forestry policy. This is because recent reforms (1990s) not only impacted the authoritarian bases of Mexico's revolutionary institutions, but also the forestry policy process.

The second chapter designs an institutional model considering Mexico's structural problems to understand how policy network concepts can explain policy-making in a developing country such as Mexico, while analysing the rural and social policy networks to explain the role of peasants in the forestry policy network. This chapter focuses on the analysis of corporatism in Mexico's countryside and the institutional change of agrarian and agricultural agencies derived from the 1990s agrarian reform, known as the second agrarian reform.

The third chapter analyses Mexico's environmental politics and ENGOs' role in forest policy. While this chapter analyses former stages of Mexico's environmental policy (emphasising pollution), ENGOs are analysed with the aim of explaining their marginal role in Mexican politics so far, in spite of political vulnerability of Mexico's government

on this field. Mexico's structural problems are analysed in order to understand current problems of environmental policy.

The fourth chapter analyses public agencies' role in the forestry policy network and their structural deficiencies. In doing this, the thesis examines institutional evolution of environmental sector through an organisational analysis. The organisational analysis helps to understand limits (e.g. powerless of environmental agencies, administrative deficiencies, ill-equipped personnel) and capabilities (e.g. precision in policy analysis) of Mexico's environmental policy. This statement is supported by the examination of some environmental agencies (the National Institute of Ecology [INE], the Federal Attorney for Environmental Protection [Profepa], the National Forest commission [Conafor], and Environment and Natural Resources secretariat [Semarnat]).

The fifth chapter examines two Mexico's forest case studies of international relevance in Southern Mexico. The main goal is to analyse those policy cases in light of policy-network concepts, regarding policy actors' performance, while explaining that the initial different policy outcomes were produced by the presence/absence of policy networks rather than social participation, as most of institutional works analysing forestry policy suggest. The sixth chapter is devoted to conclusions.

Chapter 1

Mexico's political system: Institutions, rules, reforms, and impacts on natural resources deterioration

Introduction

Mexico's state reforms over the last two decades have impacted upon the Mexican political system. The transformation of the political regime derived from the elections in 2000 has been the most outstanding result. The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the institutional presidency were the most serious casualties of that political change, by giving up power in favour of other institutions and political groups. This chapter analyses Mexico's political system and its relationship with forestry policy.

This chapter's argument is that the transformation of Mexico's political system over the last two decades has affected not only public policies (including forestry policy), but also the regime itself. The main goal of this chapter is to provide a contextual framework of Mexican politics (the formal and real structure of decision making) and a brief historical outlook of forestry policy (describing policy problems) for future reference and comparison.

Since this chapter focuses on politics, it does not seek a deep analysis of economic development policies in spite of their relevant role in

defining current forestry problems. The influence of these policies on forestry will be examined in the fourth chapter. This chapter has five sections. The first focuses on the main political characteristics of the Mexican political system, stressing its main key political institutions and the rules and practices associated with them. The following section examines the political strategies employed to ensure control of the major social groups. The third section analyses the broad impacts of the reforms of the 1980s and the 1990s, including the deterioration of natural resources. The fourth section examines the main problems related to this deterioration, emphasising the most important characteristics of Mexico's current forestry problem. Conclusions take place in the last section.

Mexico's political system

July 2000 marked the end of one of the oldest authoritarian systems in the world. This event occurred when Mexicans voted to end the PRI's continuous rule of more than seven decades. Vicente Fox, the election winner and Mexico's current president, was the main symbol of various changes that had been taken place in Mexico since 1982: the transformation of Mexico's economy from statist to market principles; the collapse of the hegemonic party produced by splits in the elite, opposition victories, civil movements and guerrilla insurgencies; and demographic changes. These transformations are expected to change Mexican governance based on the presidency and PRI, which have been the core decision-making institutions, and the

major political instrument (liaison between presidency and society through corporative and clientelar relationships), respectively.

Mexico was characterised by a particular political system for most of the twentieth century (1917-2000). Its eclectic characteristics made it hard to classify applying widely used concepts in political science. For example, this political system had the face of a pluralist system without pluralism, and a federalist system without federalism. Also, there were often presidential elections *won* by the same ruling party. Political regime identified government as *revolutionary* but *growingly institutionalised*, while government was authoritarian, but not of classic bureaucratic authoritarian style. It was a political system in which presidents controlled the legislature and courts, and political representation took place through the Institutional Revolutionary Party's (PRI) corporations, not congress.

In addition, PRI and revolutionary governments were highly pragmatic, moving targets, shifting locations on the political scenario (from limited pluralist to authoritarian), altering policy outcomes (from progressive to conservative to centrist, then back), and adopting several political reforms. The more changes that took place in the political system, the more it seemed to stay the same. Mexico's political system seemed to experience an endless transition towards an unclear goal.

Historical context

The hybrid nature of Mexican polity, mixing democratic and authoritarian ingredients, provided the political regime with long-stability based on two main institutions –the institutional presidency and PRI—, and two major political strategies, corporatism and clientelism. While the former strategy largely contributed towards managing Mexican governance, the latter ensured political control through bureaucratic control over social groups.

Historical context helps to understand this complex political system. When the violent period of the Mexican revolution finished (1910-1917), the winning groups initiated competition for power without political rules. This situation showed the institutional weakness of the new regime. Although the constitution partly solved this problem, military and local leaders kept real power, making the political regime still unstable. To deal with this problem, President Calles (1924-1928) proposed, in his last state of the nation speech, to all revolutionary groups a path to institutionalise the allocation of power. Thus, the *Partido Nacional Revolucionario* (PNR) was born in 1929, made up of a coalition of regional, local and military leaders. This situation evidenced not only the low degree of institutionalisation of the revolutionary regime but also the institutional weakness of the presidency.

Calles' experience as a military leader, interior minister and then president of Mexico, largely contributed to the immediate success of the PNR. His knowledge of the key problem of that time –the constant menace of armed uprising— allowed him to get rid of enemies and build key political alliances nationwide. As a result, most of revolutionary organisations, both military and civilian, came together under the same political umbrella in 1929.

Although initially the PNR provided its heterogeneous organisations with autonomy, Calles' leadership gradually led him to centralise decision-making within the party by weakening the ability of local political actors to choose candidates. Calles' control over PNR allowed him to rule the government structure, including the presidency itself, from 'outside'. This period was called the '*maximato*' referring to Calles' strong leadership (the *Jefe Máximo*) over the institutions. That fact showed that power had been transferred from local organisations to the party of revolution, while the presidency remained weak.

In 1936, Calles was exiled by president Cárdenas (1934-1940). Instead of destroying PNR, Cárdenas intelligently took advantage of its increasing institutionalisation by appointing his private secretary as its leader. These fundamental decisions put the party's control in the hands of the presidency. At this point, the party not only began to have a symbiotic relationship with government, but also became an additional source of power. This new stage was marked by a)

integration of large social groups (organised within the party in four broad sectors: military, agrarian, labour, and 'popular' [mostly made up of federal bureaucrats]), b) renaming of the ruling party as the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM), and c) most importantly, the strengthening of the presidency at the expense of the ruling party.

Although Cárdenas was a military man, the first political casualty of the growing presidential power was paradoxically the army. While at the beginning the most important positions (governors and seats in congress) were for military officers, soon after both were notably reduced (See Camp, 1980). The culmination of these trends took place when Miguel Alemán -a civilian— in 1946 was nominated as presidential candidate of the PRM. This situation shows that civilian organisations had broadened its political importance within the party -and within the political regime in general—, pushing for substantial reorganisation. Major changes were the elimination of the military sector, and the adoption of the party's current name (PRI).

Institutions and rules

Nonetheless the importance of formal political institutions and written rules of Mexico's political system (based on the 1917 constitution and the wide national coalition formed in 1929, as regarded), unwritten rules and informal practices were crucial for most key political decisions. In this regard, PRI was the major tool that largely managed

the hybrid nature of this political system by being the main tie among their three levels or dimensions (a) legitimising ideology of the Mexican state, b) major organisational characteristics of Mexico's political system, and c) personalistic nature of polity (charismatic nature of governace). This fact contributed to the construction of a revolutionary regime that, unlike socialist countries, promoted executive power rather than empowering the ruling party itself.

While the first dimension of Mexico's political system had three components, such as a liberal democracy (with elections, individual rights, popular sovereignty, etc); an active and nationalist state; and the principle of no re-election, the second dimension included the centralisation of power around the institutional presidency; corporatist structuring of interest representation; and PRI's electoral dominance. Finally, the personalistic system permeated both inter-elite and elite-mass relations, where political groups and political career greatly depended on *camarillas* (network of political allegiances) based on personal links, friendship, and loyalties, as Camp (1975: 137-51; 1980; 1984; 1990: 85-107) and Smith (1979; 1986: 101-18) have broadly shown.

PRI's multiple functions (as a mass-organisation, corporatist organisation, electoral instrument, instrument of political control, co-option) connected those dimensions by legitimising the regime through elections, recruiting political personnel, and linking top

authorities with the population, while the Mexican style of governance encouraged active participation of democratic broad based organisations (i.e. PRI's corporations, PRI itself) to deal with political opponents, instead of public officials or government agents. As a result, the government ensured political support (through PRI), or at least political stagnation (through corporations) when it launched its policies.

The PRI and its corporations contributed to Mexico's political stability, mixing (formal) liberal democracy and revolutionary discourse during most of the twentieth century. This strategy helped the revolutionary regime to justify its authoritarianism (in practice), while carrying out elections (with capitalism) and supporting social goals using revolutionary discourse (with socialism). PRI was hardly challenged in electoral terms by other organisations or political groups. More importantly, this long-term stability was run through civil power (from 1946-onward) and without violence. The regime was referred to as the perfect dictatorship by Mario Vargas Llosa, referring to the eclectic characteristics in Mexico's political system (Carrreño, 1999: 1).

In this regard, Mexico's political system was defined as 'a hybrid of political liberalism and authoritarianism that gives it a special quality or flavour' (Camp, 1984: 9). This hybrid authoritarianism was more open than other vertical systems because much greater participation

was allowed in policy-making, and more importantly as its decision-makers changed frequently.

Furthermore the hierarchical order between executive power and the ruling party differentiated Mexico's political system from the socialist regimes. Unlike the socialist political systems (Eastern Europe, ex-USSR, Cuba, China), in which the dominant party (Communist party) represented the top of the political pyramid (the General Secretary being the main leader), in Mexico's revolutionary regime the top echelon of polity was institutional presidency. This situation let the political system be highly pragmatic. Since the president was the main political actor, PRI's leaders were susceptible to change depending on the president's interest, specific circumstances, or change of policy-orientation.

Mexico's presidency exercised extensive constitutional power (chief of army, chief of executive power) and meta-constitutional power (chief of PRI and Congress, key actor for Judicial power, and chief of governors in the federal system) (Carpizo, 1987). The two constitutional restrictions for Mexican presidents were a) the *sexenio* (six years term) and b) the principle of non re-election. This political array largely explains long-political stability without dictators, and also the long-democratic transition without clear targets (dictatorship was exercised by an institutional framework, not by a specific individual).

Institutional presidency

Sources of presidential power –based on the constitution of 1917— are: unified government, discipline within the PRI, and strong leadership of the PRI (Weldon, 1997: 225-58). *Presidencialismo* largely strengthened the asymmetric relationship between state and social groups, and between the PRI and other political organisations. This situation ensured that the most important decisions were of a top-down nature, and of low participation in policy formulation (although participation was broader than in other Latin American regimes), policy-implementation was over-politicised, and *camarillas* operated politically through bureaucracies (political personnel recruited by PRI).

Presidencialismo broke down the proper operation of the three-branch system. Meta-constitutional powers of institutional presidency have been so significant that the legislature and judiciary have had to accept presidential decisions. Before 1997, PRI's dominance in congress, federal states, and the most important municipalities was unquestionable. Since the PRI was controlled by the president, most deputies, governors and mayors were subordinated to the president's will. In addition, because judges of courts were appointed by congress, judicial power also was indirectly maintained subordinate to executive power.

Not surprisingly presidential transition became the most relevant event of the political calendar. In this context, two unwritten rules were developed. First, the political system provided the incumbent president with the right to appoint his successor (see Cosío Villegas, 1975b). This situation ensured presidential succession as the most significant expression of presidential power.

Secondly, between 1929 and 1994, all the presidents were ministers with their predecessor. (This rule worked so well that the only exception, Ortiz Rubio [1930-1932], was ambassador in Brazil at the time of his nomination). Those rules empowered the president to influence the political future of individual actors, becoming the core of political discipline, as 'a distinctive feature of the Mexican political class until recently' (Serrano, 1996:6). In addition, through PRI's corporations, the president ensured political support for his decisions (e.g. his successor's appointment), by exchanging distributive policies for electoral support and discipline (influencing the political careers of corporation leaders) managed by PRI.

Not surprisingly, although electoral processes existed, it was not significant for political representation and power allocation among political groups (parties, social organisations, interest groups). Because PRI won all the elections, political representation took place through its corporations (which struggled to nominate its leaders in PRI's lists) that included broad social sectors (workers, peasants,

groups of middle class, teachers, unionists, bureaucrats). In practice, however, political struggle took place *inside* PRI *previous* to election.

Because of electoral predictability, the political system developed a policy-cycle depending on *sexenio* (not on elections). Presidential power grew and diminished according to different events of the political calendar. According to Story (1985), the Mexican president used to have growing power during the first two years, while the new public personnel learned the *know how* of Mexican politics. During the third and fourth years, the president would reach the peak of his power, by filling the most important political positions in congress – during the intermediate election since deputies are elected every three years with the rule of no immediate re-election also applying— and most state governments with his allies and followers. Finally, during the last couple of years the president would prepare his presidential succession, since political struggle permeated the social scenario. As the incumbent president lost power, the PRI's candidate gained political influence.

The *Sexenio*, in addition, was a means of political mobility. Each administration implied a massive turnover of personnel within the government at the national and the state levels, also echoed at the municipal level every three years. For example, Hansen, (1970: 178) estimated that 'every six years changes in presidential administration witnesses a turnover of 18,000 elective offices and more than 25,000

appointive posts'. This scenario built up political stability at the expense of administrative efficiency, since bureaucracy had been over-politicised.

PRI

PRI was the central corporative agent of a complex and extensive structure based on three main sectors (workers, middle class, and rural organisations) embracing corporations with massive membership, Mexico's Confederation of Workers (CTM), Popular Organisations' National Confederation (CNOP), and the National Peasant Confederation (CNC). While the PRI became the main tie between the president and society through several corporations, its core roles were electoral legitimacy, control of mass organisations, and distributive populism.

PRI was born to legitimise the new political regime rather than to compete for power. PRI was the major symbol of institutionalised Mexican authoritarianism, providing the regime with political stability for a long time. Not surprisingly, most social science frameworks for analysing the relationship between the Mexican state and society in the 1960s and 1970s (when this regime reached the top of its power) were designed to explain stability rather than transition (e.g. Hamilton, 1982; Purcell and Purcell, 1977:191-226; Grindle, 1977;

Cosío Villegas, 1975a, b; Brandenburg, 1964; González Casanova, 1970).

While PRI managed corporations (and as a consequence political nominations, congress, courts, governors, mayors) PRI's organisations promoted government policies throughout society, apparently representing the interests of their members. This was possible thanks to a system of upward flowing loyalties, where co-option was the top strategy. This political machinery worked through the control exercised by the PRI (being actually led by the president) on governor candidate nominations, who in turn repeated the same organisation down the hierarchy of their respective states.

Thus, governors controlled local PRI, which in turn controlled local nominations over regional caciques,¹ and influenced the community positions like the *ejido* leader (the *ejido* is land granted to collectively organised communities, within which decision-making is organised collectively). Finally, distributive populism was reflected in political exchange between government and social groups. For example, in state-peasant relationships, the government provided land, seeds and subsidies, while peasants gave political support.

¹ This cacique is usually a political boss of the local elite (including the governor), representing local economic and political interests far from communities. Sometimes, his/her power derives from traditions and customs as well.

Corporatism and clientelism

Corporatism in Mexico, like elsewhere in Latin America –defined as ‘a formal relationship between selected groups or institutions and the government or state’ (Camp, 1984: 9)— is usually run by strong and relatively autonomous government agencies aiming to impose on society a system of representation of interests, practically eliminating the articulation of spontaneous interests, by setting a limited number of authoritatively recognised groups that interact with the government in a specific way (see Malloy, 1977: 12).

Unlike some developed countries (Germany, Italy and Japan) which displayed societal corporatism (state opening some areas to social groups’ interests), Latin American corporatism (strong presence of state, highly bureaucratised and expansive patterns of political authoritarianism, “statist” content of dominant ideology, and trends to institutionalise mechanisms of control of the popular sector), developed a statist version (civil organisations’ subordination to state interests) where state-centric scenarios of low competitive elections were the main device (*Peronismo* [Argentina] and *Cardenismo* [Mexico] are two classic examples of this political pattern during the twentieth century).

Clientelism, on the other hand, is profoundly rooted in national culture, generating a dependency relationship between authority and society. Scott (in Grindle [1977:37]) explains that:

This dependency relationship among individuals is basic to Mexican politics. It means that most Mexicans tend to be submissive to authority and so insecure personally that they seek a reciprocal submissive-dominant relationship with some other person. One consequence of this sense of dependency...is the patron-client relationship. Another consequence is that most Mexicans do not relate easily to abstract or impersonal organisations but only to the individual who leads the movement.

This relationship is based on resource scarcity, since in poor societies goods and services are perceived as available in limited quantity, generating the idea that if they were allocated in equal parts, they would become insufficient for every body. Thus, patronage linkage can be explained as a means to ensure a minimal amount of resource availability in adverse social scenarios (*Ibid*).

In Mexico's case, although corporatism was effectively consolidated by the industrialisation process during the mid-twentieth century, Mexico's formula of dominance mixed authoritarian control and conciliatory ideology, unlike other Latin American countries, where authoritarianism was accompanied by excluding ideology and policies.

While corporatism helped the political system to neutralise social demands, clientelism contributed largely to increased support to the

regime, avoiding systematic violence or repressive actions to rule the country. This is an essential element to understand Mexico's long-term stability with civilian governments, and permanent elections, unlike most Latin American countries, where militaries took power by eliminating the most basic democratic elements.

Also this political array explains why the Mexican system has been able to manage public policies, mainly those of a redistributive nature (i.e. agrarian reform, labour policy, subsidises, land distribution), with relatively low conflict. While in most countries of the region, these types of policies contributed to political conflict –and even social instability— in Mexico, the PRI and its corporations controlled social and political arenas through discretionary application of the law.

Key to this situation is the pattern of Mexico's policy making. Purcell and Purcell (1977:191-226) point out that Lowi's model has to be adapted to the Mexican political system to understand its policy making process. This is because the formal policy outcome varies widely from the expected or proposed outcome. While Lowi identified three patterns of policy making in the US, distributive, redistributive and regulatory, Purcell and Purcell suggest that the Mexican government applied a mix of those arenas to implement public policies, 1) regulatory distribution, 2) indirect, piecemeal regulation, and 3) regulatory redistribution.

Because of Mexican state control on policy arenas (based on discretionary use of law, strong state intervention in the economy, top-down decision-making, centralisation, corporatism and clientelism), public agencies were able to formulate (re) distributive policies, keeping control of policy-implementation by imposing many regulations and, as a consequence, space for negotiation.

At the end of the day, distributive or redistributive policies offered mild outcomes for losers and winners, permeated by regulatory measures. Ironically, regulatory policies tended to look like another set of distributive policies favouring symbolic and formalistic measures rather than serious sanctions and penalisations. The key point is that the Mexican state has used the law to negotiate with policy actors rather than to impose the laws themselves. The goal was to diminish the conflicts in distributive and re-distributive policies, and avoid serious confrontations with interest groups in the application of the law associated with regulatory policies.

Examples of this are abundant. Purcell and Purcell (1977:213-4) illustrate this with price control policies on primary goods. Since the government was the owner of various companies (it used to buy and sell food stocks), it controlled prices through its own pricing levels, instead of intervening in the regulatory arena in a direct way (i.e. announcing a particular price level). Thus, the government was able to

negotiate with entrepreneurs and the population (its clients) simultaneously.

Land distribution is another good example. Once the land was distributed, government kept control of land tenure. Because the *ejido* is communal land, land distribution did not include individual certificates or titles to land parcels. In addition, big owners were not greatly affected since most nationalised land was not the most productive, and furthermore the state often paid compensations for affected land. Although the government formulated deep redistributive policies, policy outcome was largely moderate. Neither the peasants were empowered, nor were big owners largely affected since they did not lose important lands. Alternatively, they were compensated.

While several of these eclectic characteristics have been changing lately due to the transition process and consolidation of an authentic democratic regime in Mexico (i.e. growing credibility of elections and a competitive system where the PRI is not largely predominant, decreasing power of president in favour of legislative and judicial powers, as well as of state governors, decreasing control of public opinion and mass media), the political system essentially still works in the same manner (e.g. corporatism and clientelism, no re-election principle, personalistic system albeit with less emphasis than during the revolutionary regime).

In this political system, satisfaction of particular or local needs was encouraged and permitted, but requirements for great changes in public policy or government priorities were regarded as illegitimate and menacing. Because of this, the state has generated an obsessive logic of management by control rather than through incentives. This has largely defined policy-orientation through bureaucracy and policy reforms.

Because of the emphasis on control, organisation (both public and private) in Mexico has been considered as a:

- a) space ruled by privileged groups;
- b) forum for power struggle;
- c) a system of interchange, where relationships are not only defined by objective goals, but also by informal aims;
- d) institution where authority is a privilege;
- e) space of either too authoritarian or too bargained decision-making;
- f) structure both unbending and sub-utilised; and
- g) institution of clientelist relationships.

In addition, because of the lack of counterbalances, bureaucracy has largely influenced policy reforms because as the Mexican president has gained more power since the 1940s, he became increasingly dependent on the bureaucratic apparatus. In addition, because of a permanent change of personnel, *camarillas* (mainly constituted by

*políticos*²) and bureaucracy (and growingly, what some termed the technocracy [*técnicos*]³) became the two major paths to power. Since Mexico's forestry management has been of a regulatory nature, bureaucracy became a key factor in defining policy problems and solutions (without other groups' and congress' interference).

Bureaucracy and forestry laws

Not surprisingly, bureaucracies of Agriculture (SARH) and Agrarian Reform secretariats (SRA) widely defined forestry policy strategy up to 1997, when the PRI lost control of congress. Since Mexican bureaucracy changed every six years, forestry policy was modified as a consequence. *Camarillas* and *técnicos*' interests and orientation largely influenced this policy, according to their political importance and eventual dominance. For example, most important forest policy reforms (of pro-market orientation) between 1992 and 1997 coincided with *técnicos* prevalence in Mexican public administration. This is because technocrats have dominated Mexican politics over the last two decades, favouring liberal economic policies (e.g. privatisation, pro-market, cuts in subsidies, managerialism).

² In general, *políticos*' career included any of the following: education at a public institution with specialisation in law, elective office, and long service to PRI.

³ Technocrats, on the other hand, have been educated growingly at private institutions, with advanced training at prestigious university foreign institutions in economics, administration, management, or engineering. Usually, they have not long experience in public office, are party members, but not activists, and incorporated into government service at high levels in the economic and technical bureaucrats (treasury, budget and planning, commerce, energy) (See Camp, 1987:97-118).

Together with the central bureaucracy, marginally local public administrations have also affected the forestry policy process. Since Mexico is a federal state with high biodiversity, state and local administrations have autonomy (usually quite restrictive) to implement forestry policies, while forestry has not had uniform importance nation-wide, since some states have a bigger extension of forest than others (e.g. Southern Mexico has vast extension of forestry, while the North is famous for its deserts).

The bureaucracies of SARH and SRA have largely influenced Mexico's forestry laws since 1926. They have used their wide discretionary power (since congress and courts have been subordinated to presidential power) to build a rural policy network deeply influenced by the state through control on subsidises and prices, project funding, and political intervention.

Proof of this is found in the formulation of contradictory laws since 1926 without significant political opposition. For example, while the 1926 forestry law emphasised the public character of Mexico's forests, the next bill (1940s) stressed the importance of big timber interests favouring in practice the privatisation of forests. While the former attempted to support peasants and the *ejido*, the latter favoured timber companies and business interests.

The 1926 forestry law required that forest areas should be exclusively exploited by *ejidos*. Nonetheless, due to the fact that land allocation was not accompanied by technical expertise, timber companies manufactured forestry production, keeping most of the earnings. In spite of multiple government failures (e.g. ill equipped bureaucracy to implement this ambitious policy in terms of the forestry planning and regulation), political opposition was absent. On the other hand, the 1940s law promoted bans on logging and industrialisation of the forestry sector (as part of the strategy known as the Import-Substituting Industrialisation model, or ISI), by giving concessions to big timber companies (through forest privatisation).

The 1986 law again supported the peasant sector, by rescinding concessions, and recognising the right of communities to form their own logging businesses. Finally, the 1992 forestry law (influenced by free market rules) modified the law's previous targets centred on communities. The new law promoted rural institutions compatible with the free market, opening the possibility of *ejido* privatisation. Obviously, those changes of policy orientation influenced Mexico's poor forestry policy outcomes, since successful forestry policies are usually of a long-term nature.

In all these changes of policy orientation, political opposition and social protest were quite low. Partly, because the forestry policy has not been so relevant for the Mexican government, and partly because

policy actors have traditionally been controlled by the government. Nonetheless, thanks to the growing role of congress and ENGOs in Mexican politics, the last two important forestry law amendments (1997 and 2003) have been carried out in more pluralistic scenarios. Undoubtedly, the 1980s and 1990s reforms largely affected the current forestry situation.

Impacts of Mexico's 1980s and 1990s reforms

Reforms initiated in 1982 implied a broader change of the Mexican state: from statism to managerialism. As will be examined in the third chapter, those reforms affected agrarian and agricultural policy networks, generating side effects on the forestry policy. While statism encouraged the economy to grow from the 1950s to the early 1970s on average by six and half percent per year, managerialism was the approach used to fix the mismanagement that exploded in 1982 (debt crisis, unavailable foreign credit, oil prices dropping, and deep economic contraction).

Economic stabilisation (constrained public spending, strict controls on exchange rates and inflation, and structural adjustment strategies [e.g. privatisation and liberalisation]) and the deepening of Mexico's commitment to free trade through NAFTA (breaking radically with past policies) represented one of the most outstanding reform accomplishments in the developing world.

Limited pluralism, centralised authority, and top-down decision making helped decision-makers (*técnicos*) to successfully implement their reforms. Ironically, these successful reforms made by the revolutionary regime came to end in 2000, when the right-wing National Action Party (PAN) won the presidential election. While those reforms emphasised economic competition and freedom, they broke down the old political pact between the government/PRI and social sectors of mutual protection, in which the former provided social protection in exchange of political support.

The government change in 2000 did not only imply simple renovation of politicians or parties, but also the transformation of formal and informal rules of regime. In fact, the Fox administration stopped the usual close relationship between government/ruling party, while identifying its government as part of a democratic regime rather than a revolutionary one. The exclusion of PRI as the main tie between state and society, increasing political pluralism (e.g. ENGOs, civil organisations without linkages with PRI), the growing importance of judiciary and legislature within polity, and credibility in elections are clear proof of this.

Public policies are being affected as well. Since the process of decision-making is less top-down because of growing participation of more political actors (e.g. social organisations, the congress, research

centres), policy definition process is more negotiated. For example, congress largely elaborated the last two forestry laws amendments, while encouraged intensive public discussion between involved groups (government agencies, peasants, timber interests, ENGOs, and forestry workers).

Policy-outcomes

Reforms modified the Mexican social scenario. Economic success was not sufficiently mirrored in social welfare, while PRI broke down the old political pact with social groups. In fact, social groups, which have traditionally supported the PRI, were the major casualties of reform. Basically, the social impact of reform centred on three aspects: a) falling living standards, b) slow employment growth, and c) growing income inequality.

Poor people and the working class paid the price for the reduction in public spending (which helped to reduce inflation). Subsidies and benefits cancellations were the main device of economic adjustments. In addition some market policies concentrated benefits in specific groups without producing anticipated positive externalities beyond them. For instance, in the early Salinas administration, trade increased non-oil exportation (especially manufactured goods), making exports rise 38 percent in the term 1989-1992. Nonetheless, by 1994 employment in the manufacturing sector had declined approximately

33 percent compared with levels in 1980 (See Pastor Jr. and Wise, 1998:41-81).

While inflation was successfully tackled (dropping from 98.9 to 7.1), slow employment growth was the main characteristic of that time. Since the late 1980s, the formal economy absorbed less than 30 percent of over one million of the economically active population annually, while the rest entered into the informal economy. On the other hand while the Mexican economy created 1.5 million new jobs between 1988 and 1993, it lost 500,000 in the corporate shake-up induced by Mexico's debt crisis (Cornelius, 1994:xi-xx). Finally, after 13 years of reforms, income inequality and regional disparities remain a serious economic matter. Poverty rates remain high with 23 percent of population living on less than two dollars a day in 1998 (OECD, 2002: ch.3). At this point, it was clear that Mexico's strong financial groups displaced popular sectors (workers, peasants, and middle class) as the key support of the regime.

On the political side, reform broke down any consensus inside the Mexican elite. The PRI's populist wing (left-wing) opted for party separation. This split *a*) remarkably influenced the most recent controversial election in history (1988), marked by suspicion of electoral fraud, *b*) and gave birth to the current left-of-centre Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). On the social side, reforms seriously damaged PRI's political alliances with workers (privatisation often

required massive layoffs and contract concessions to the bosses), peasants (land reform cut subsidies and stopped traditional land allocation), and middle class (public budget reduction affected traditional benefits on social security, public services, while economic adjustment increased taxes).

President Salinas faced this complex political scenario by launching a powerful social programme (National Programme of Solidarity, Pronasol) to compensate for the social costs of reforms (e.g. this programme directed billions of dollars toward grassroots antipoverty programmes in regions where PRI had obtained poor electoral results), while pro-business reforms were used to build new political alliances with the most diversified, concentrated and internationally competitive business sectors. At the end of the day, the Salinas administration rebuilt the PRI's social support, by weakening traditional corporatism (CTM, CNC, and CNOP), strengthening selectively new social organisations (e.g. grassroots and non-governmental organisations), and setting new strategic alliances with more competitive business sectors.

The 1994 peso crash collapsed the apparently stable political transition, in which the economy and political alliances were transformed without seriously threatening for the PRI. This economic crisis coincided with the presidential succession, conditioning the political future of the upcoming president. While Carlos Salinas

concentrated too much power in the presidency, president Zedillo (his successor) opted to govern by the rule of law (i.e. the constitution) rather than any unwritten rules, gave up the president's historic role as leader of PRI, promoted fairer electoral competition, encouraged independent courts and legislature, and most importantly, resigned the will to appoint his successor.

Natural resources deterioration

In this context, as part of the 1990s crucial policy changes in Mexico, a second agrarian reform was formulated in 1992 with the aim of encouraging rural investment. This was a new attempt to economically reactivate the countryside. Because of strong state intervention on the economy, development policies largely conditioned agricultural policies (and indirectly the forestry policy). Not surprisingly, the current situation in the forestry sector –defined in this thesis as a socio-environmental problem rather than an economic one— was largely conditioned by the economic strategies of the Mexican government.

Since the mid twentieth century, Mexico encouraged the industrialisation process at the expense of the primary sector. For example, agriculture represented just 9 percent of Mexico's gross domestic product (GDP) in 2002, industry 30 percent and services 61 percent (library.uu.nl). The Forestry sector in this context accounted

for just 1.2 percent of Mexico's GDP in the term 1994-1999 (Semarnat, 2002).

Nonetheless, until the 1960s Mexico was a rural nation. While in the 1950s nearly 60 percent of the population lived in the countryside, in the 1960s slightly more than 50 percent of people were urban. In the 1970s, Mexico was clearly urban since more than 60 percent of the population lived in cities. On the economic side, this change was reflected by the displacement of the primary sector as the main sector in Mexico's economy. While in the 1950s, the primary sector provided 60 percent of the employment, the 1970s only gave slightly more than 40 percent. Since then, the services sector began to increase becoming the most important of Mexico's economy (See Conabio, 2002: 1 and 3).

Mexico's revolutionary regime implemented one of the largest land distribution policies around the world. It transferred the majority of the forest land to peasants, an unusually great proportion compared with other countries world-wide. However, this social distribution was not accompanied by sufficient technical and economic resources to ensure long-term income and employment for rural workers, since the central problem in the Revolution's view was the landlessness.

As a result, Mexico's main problem is marked by the coexistence of rich biodiversity and the high economic potential of forests with poverty of peasants living in the forests, as well as high rates of

deforestation. This is reflected in the overlapping between poverty, indigenous communities, *ejido*, and high biodiversity areas: a) almost half of protected areas reserves are inhabited by poor indigenous people; b) there is significant migration of peasants into forest areas; as well as c) increasing rates of poverty; and d) the majority of forest municipalities are the poorest ones (INEGI, 1995; Conapo, 1990; Zendejas and Mummert, 1998:180-1; Molnar, *et al*, 2001:540).

Though Mexico is high in bio-diversity, its environmental deterioration is a serious problem. On one hand Mexico is one of the top countries in terms of biodiversity and endemism (species just found in Mexico) worldwide. Mexico is home to 10-12 percent of all known species (ranking first in reptiles [52 percent endemic], fifth in mammal [29 percent endemic], and fourth in amphibious [60 percent endemic], while the flora is estimated in 15,000 species with 35 endemic (Conabio, 1998:83).

On the other hand, the cost of environmental deterioration is approximately 63,000 million dollars, which represents 10 percent of Mexico's Gross National Product (GNP), according to the World Bank (González, 2002:1). More importantly, the relationship between the current rate of Mexico's environmental deterioration, economic growth and reduction of poverty are unsustainable.

While the rate of environmental deterioration is increasingly becoming a serious restriction for Mexico's external competition (and its consequent access to international markets), environmental deterioration is building up a vicious circle with poverty. In many rural areas, destruction of natural resources is apparently the only way to survive, since poor people are not able to access markets, public services, infrastructure, and facilities.

The forestry issue

The second agrarian reform produced deep political changes in the countryside. New social organisations arose challenging traditional leadership of the CNC (e.g. UNORCA and CIOAC), while management of natural resources emerged as a new issue associated with the land tenure system. This reform marked the end of land distribution, affecting the state-peasant relationship, and had side effects on the forestry policy.

Contrary to its importance for Mexican politics, forestry has crucial global and domestic roles. While temperate and tropical forests cover 33 percent of Mexico's land area (an area similar to that of Colombia or India), these forests provide key environmental services. Globally, they harbour important biodiversity and sequester carbon, which diminishes global warming. Nationally, forests stabilise hydrological

cycles, reduce erosion, slow the silting of reservoirs and waterways, and offer sites for recreation.

Because of distributive populism, policies of the revolutionary regime, such as the land tenure became a very complex arena. The *Ejido* was highly regulated by the state and made forestry policy highly dependent on agrarian politics. Because of this, agriculture and agrarian policy networks largely influenced forest policy. In fact, the most important reforms focused on production and land distribution rather than forestry issues, since the former were keys for political control.

Deforestation took place because the Mexican state did not pay proper attention to forestry policy. Some factors influencing deforestation were:

- a) The predefinition of land use as a condition to obtain a right of property,
- b) Forced induction of cattle, which influenced the clearing of vast amount of forests,
- c) Absence of small forestry property,
- d) Growing land exploitation through colonisation, agrarian enlargement, new land provisions, and new *ejidales* settlements of land of highly fragile ecosystems,
- e) Insecurity of land property (owners may loose their land when the state considers land as not being worked),

- f) Over-exploitation of land with short term goals derived from the agrarian regulation system (e.g. farmers burned their land in order to prove that they were working their land, destroying ecosystems as a consequence),
- g) Fragmentation of land parcels encouraged deforestation in vast areas (problem of land distribution),
- h) Historical absence of national land law with the aim of preserving natural resources (either regulatory or conservationist instrument).
- i) Powerlessness of society to participate in the protection of Mexico's ecological patrimony (citizens, foundations, civil organisations and enterprises were impeded from buying land with for the purpose of conservation),
- j) Prohibition over forestry enterprises to hold rustic property (they can only work on communal or *ejido* lands subject to temporary rent),
- k) Unclear property rights and disorder in land tenure,
- l) Dispersion of growing peasant settlements along critical areas (fragile zones within Protected Natural Areas, PNA),
- m) Encouragement of clearing colonisation programmes, and
- n) Over-exploitation encouraged by the National Fund of Encouragement for *Ejido* (FONAFE).

Characteristics of Mexico's forest scenario

Together with reforms, political discourse has largely influenced Mexican forestry politics. Two major political discourses lead world forestry debate (the managerial and the populist), which pervade Mexico's attempts to define its policy problem. Whereas the managerial focus points to slash and burn farmers and growing population as the major reasons for deforestation, the latter identifies small farmers as victims, rather than as active agents of deforestation, obliged by external circumstances to destroy forests. In other words, 'the populist discourse presents indigenous people as heroes, and timber companies and rancher as villains' (Adger, *et al.*, 2001:687).

These political discourses have presented anti-deforestation policy alternatives as mutually exclusive. While the managerial discourse regards deforestation as an economic problem and favours commercial plantations as a solution, the populist discourse considers deforestation as a socio-environmental problem, arguing for the strengthening of either state or communities (state intervention versus the institutional view).

Disregarding ideological perspectives, Mexico's forestry debate is centred on how to bring investment to forest areas while allowing for the fact that *ejidos* are not highly compatible with market rules. In fact, forest capitalisation has been a constant concern since the

nineteenth century. The second agrarian reform largely attempted to deal with this problem by emphasising the freedom of peasants to rent or sell their lands (these issues will be broadly examined in the third chapter).

In view of this, Mexico's forestry policy has serious challenges. The Mexican government has to launch a long-term forestry policy, dealing simultaneously with the needs of the forestry sector, coordination of public and private sectors, serious problems of poverty, and the traditions of local inhabitants. In addition, the forestry policy has to consider the particular characteristics of Mexico's land tenure system (communal land) and the complex decision-making process in the *ejido*.

This problem is more complex since Mexico is not an agricultural country, and as a consequence there are not many incentives for state and timber interests to invest in this sector. Unlike, for instance, other Latin American countries (e.g. Chile, Argentina or Brazil), Mexico has never developed a commercial timber industry nor pursued the possibility for timber plantations despite its rich potential of forest and non-timber products. Furthermore, US and Canada (Mexico's main trade partners) are the two biggest forestry producers in the world.

Basically, Mexico's forestry issue is a socio-environmental problem. This situation implies two main challenges: a) mechanisms to involve

communities in the forest problem, and *b*) absence of any strategy to implement organisational change in *ejidos*. The former presents four major challenges: *a*) ways in which to transform the forest into an economic option for local communities, *b*) how to ensure that the community will have real control over its forest (ensuring that other political or economic controls will not exercise their power on communities), *c*) how to influence communities to see the forest as a renewable resource (from a sustainable development perspective), and *d*) ways to establish efficient cooperation between communities and state without clientelistic and corporatist relationships. Together with those challenges, insufficient information and complex communitarian processes of decision making in *ejidos* increase forest policy problems.

The absence of any strategy to implement organisational change in *ejidos* derives from a lack of coordination among groups pushing for community participation in forestry decision-making. Various ENGOs and academics have been more concerned with democratic mechanisms rather than with the improvement of productivity in *ejidos*. For example, several ENGOs have centred their attention on stopping forest plantations regardless of their environmental impact, while confronting the state (arguing their commitment to the social organisation of peasants to spread democratic values), instead of propelling strategies to train peasants for organisational changes in *ejido* (e.g. emphasis on efficiency, productivity, management or environmental training).

Maybe part of the solution needed is a reallocation of tasks between policy actors. This is one of the most important points discussed in this thesis. Though the forestry policy deals with various dilemmas, perhaps the most important is to formulate a long-term policy, considering the two main policy options, which emphasise forest areas as a public or private good. Since Mexico is not an agricultural country, and its main partners are the biggest timber exporters worldwide, most public funds should be driven to forestry maintenance, while government promotes private investment on unproductive lands (deforested areas).

Local communities and poverty might be taken into account more seriously in the formulation of forestry policy. Finally, and as a part of this process, the government should consider a reorganisation of agricultural and agrarian policy networks, redefining development programmes and systems of incentive in favour of the sustainable use of forests, by using prices and subsidies (of water, energy and agriculture), which penalise excessive use of natural resources. Changes in Mexican politics should help this process.

Conclusions

The institutional presidency and PRI provided long-term stability in Mexico's political system, while corporatism and clientelism ensured

political control over social groups. Co-optation and distributive populism were the main devices. Nonetheless, the successful reforms of the 1980s and 1990s largely contributed to the collapse of this political system. As a consequence, not only public policies, but also the regime itself were deeply affected.

Vicente Fox's victory in the 2000 presidential elections was the culmination of Mexico's long political transition. The transformation of Mexico's political system has been mirrored in the real structure of decision-making both on horizontal (checks and balances among executive, congress and courts) and vertical (federal, state, and local) political planes. The institutional presidency and the PRI have been the largest casualties, since they have had to give up power to other institutions, agencies, and interest and political groups.

Paradoxically, successful reforms over the last two decades contributed to the collapse of Mexico's political system because it broke down the old political pact between the state and social groups (exchange of social benefits for electoral support). Basically, the modernisation of Mexico's economy was undertaken at the expense of the traditional alliances of the PRI (workers, peasants and middle class). These social groups paid the price for the economic reforms.

Because of a state-centric revolutionary regime with the institutional presidency on top, bureaucracy played an outstanding role in defining

the most important public policies. For example, the forestry laws from 1926 to 1992 were largely designed by bureaucracies without the participation of interest groups or the congress. This situation changed in 1997 when the PRI lost the majority in congress.

Together with increasing social participation (e.g. ENGOs, civil groups and international pressure), the growing role of congress modified the forestry policy formulation. Public debate and the participation of groups involved in policy-formulation were the novelty. The centre of political debate was transferred from the SRA and SARH bureaucracies to the federal congress.

The issue of natural resources deterioration was absent from the Mexican agenda until 1990s. The main causes of the second agrarian reform, pushing for reactivating the economy of the countryside, were not only the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, but also the demographic and economic transformation since the mid-twentieth century. Though the forestry sector was not considered among the initial goals of that reform, it influenced forestry policy, by affecting forestlands, land tenure, and the poor peasants living inside forests.

An analysis of the forestry sector was first considered in environmental terms and not only as an agrarian issue. Initial diagnosis showed serious contradictions. While Mexico ranks as one of the four most bio-diverse countries in the world, it is also one of the

most important countries reporting high rates of deforestation. This situation largely conditions Mexico's forestry issue.

Though Mexico has potential for forest exploitation, it has never developed the timber industry. In addition, since Mexico is not an agricultural country, and its neighbours rank as the two most important forestry exporters, Mexico's forestry policy should focus on conservation issues rather than on commercial plantations. To do this, public funds and international support should be driven to that goal. Poverty and the traditional inhabitants of forests should be considered in policy formulations, while policy networks (agrarian, agricultural and environmental) which cross the forestry sector should be redesigned to achieve more policy co-ordination.

Chapter 2

The value of policy networks: Mexico's rural and social policy networks

Introduction

The main focus of this chapter is the relevance of policy-networks in Mexico, whilst also analysing the rural and social policy networks which have greatly influenced forestry policy. Once having analysed, in the first chapter, the formal and informal institutions of Mexico's political system in order to understand the relationship between Mexican politics and forestry policy, this chapter is centred on the theoretical framework of the thesis as well as the main characteristics of the state-peasant relationship.

The central hypothesis is that while policy networks can explain policy making in Mexico, rural policy network still present poor policy-outcomes, as it is incapable to implement the formulated changes of the second agrarian reform. This policy network still continue practicing old political patterns, while natural resources management is subject to agrarian politics.

This chapter is divided into six sections. Firstly, it analyses concepts of institutionalisation and policy networks. Next, it presents the thesis' analytical framework, by presenting an institutional model to

analyse Mexico's forestry policy. The third section examines the rural and social policy networks, emphasising agencies and policy instruments to control peasants, one of the central policy actors of forestry policy. The fourth section analyses the second agrarian reform and its main impacts on forestry policy definition. The fifth section analyses policy outcomes of the second agrarian reform by examining the new rural institutions. The final section presents the conclusions.

Policy networks are increasingly used to explain relationships between governmental agencies and social groups. Not surprisingly, the incorporation of network concepts (e.g. inter-governmental, intra-governmental, intra-organisational, inter-organisational, policy-network, implementation-networks) into studies on organisations (Provan and Milward, 1995), politics (Rhodes, 1990), and policies (O'Toole, 1993) have gained importance, since the government is growingly perceived as a plural and fragmented institution with multiple interests.

On the other hand, rural policy network still largely influences the forestry policy process. Although Mexico's revolutionary regime implemented one of the largest land distribution policies around the world, transferring the majority of forest land to peasants (*ejido*), an uncommonly great percentage compared with other countries in the world, this social distribution was not accompanied by sufficient technical and economic resources to ensure long-term income and

employment for rural workers, since the central problem in the revolution's view was the landlessness.

The notion of state-peasant relationship is central to this chapter. In view of this, it is examined agrarian and social policy networks, which are formed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)-National Peasants Confederation (CNC), *ejido*-and ministries of Agriculture (SARH-SAGAR-SAGARPA) Agrarian Reform (SRA), and Social Development (Sedesol). Interestingly, because the forestry sector has been irrelevant in Mexico's economy, producers (timber interests in particular) are not analysed, while peasants have had both important political and symbolic roles in Mexico's revolutionary regime.

New institutionalism and policy networks

While new institutionalism challenges pluralistic/elite theories by claiming that institutions largely influence individual and collective decision-making, is an umbrella concept that embraces various models of institutionalisation.¹

In this regard, the common idea of models of institutionalisation is that political action is not erratic, but driven by rules, processes, values, routines, norms, procedures, and roles created within/by institutions. According to March and Olsen (1989:21), 'the

¹ Institutionalisation is understood, in general terms, as the process by which an organisation generates its rules and values.

institutionalisation of action through rules reduces...ambiguity and affects politics'. Those regulations and norms as a whole take their own life, being capable to impose on individuals and survive them (ideas coincident with Weber [1978: 941-1005] and the Allison's [1971] rational model).

Crucial to new institutionalism is the concept of policy network. Considered as a meso-level, the policy network is a concept of interest group intermediation that can be accommodated to different models of power allocation in liberal democracies' (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992:4; Jordan and Schubert, 1992; Van Warden, 1992). However, in developing countries, particularly in Latin America, the policy network concept has bigger challenges since systemic models of social interpretation, such as pluralism/elitism or Marxist have serious difficulties to interpret 'atypical' political systems or imperfect democracies, driving to native or local theoretical frameworks.

New institutionalism

While new institutionalism has stressed the interdependence between relatively independent social and political institutions rather than the predominance of polity on society (March and Olsen, 1984:738), encourages the deconstruction of complex institutions to understand the political process. This is relevant to this thesis, since its core

premise is that analysis of institutions and their relationship with social groups helps to understand the complexity of Mexican politics.

In general, evidence shows that neither the state nor its constituents are cohesive political institutions. Considering the Mexican case, there have been various examples that support this idea. For instance, Torres Hernández, while analysing the ministry of Planning and Budget (SPP), illustrates the severe compartmentalisation in the Mexican bureaucracy, its huge degree of department or agency autonomy, and weak spirit of inter-agency cooperation. That work shows that even in authoritarian regimes, bureaucracies have different interests and goals, and develop little bureaucratic cohesion besides the apparent uniformity of government for decision-making.

The multiple models of policy network coincide in seven basic assumptions: *a*) political institutions affect politics (they are not only mirrors of social forces); *b*) political and bureaucratic action is undertaken in an institutional context; *c*) organisations are the basic units into which private or public institutions can be broken down; *d*) there is not a significant separation between organisations and their personnel; *e*) organisations are social bodies, captives, and controllers of the environments in which they operate; *f*) organisations can be considered to be political actors themselves; *g*) and allocation of resources between organisations is a centre of power, while organisational performance can intensify that power.

Besides offering a solid theoretical view, the new institutionalism provides powerful analytical tools. In this regard, in the early 1980s Rhodes (1986: 98) undertook a theoretical description of the central-local relationships in Britain. This model, known as *power-dependence* theory, suggests 'that organisations depend on each other for resources and, therefore, enter exchange relationships' (Rhodes, 1997: 9). It is based on five assumptions: a) organisations are dependent on their counterparts for resources; b) they have to exchange resources to achieve their goals; c) though decision-making is limited by other organisations, the 'dominant coalition' keeps some discretion; d) this coalition uses strategies within known 'rules of the game' to manage the process of exchange; and e) the relative potential power of interacting organisations is a result of their resources, of the game's rules, and the process of resource exchange .

Implications of this model are that no organisations can undertake monopolistic power, and as a consequence none of them can ensure that its power will be imposed on the others; power is shared by *all* the existing organisations; and resource distribution is unequal, for there could not be two organisations or policy networks doing exactly the same.

Policy networks

Relevant to this model is the concept of policy network, which highlights two main ideas, the interaction of organisations and exchange of resources to achieve their goals. While elaborating a useful classification of policy networks by comparing two school of analysis (Anglo-Saxon versus the German School), Borzel (1998:254) offers a definition of policy network. She understand this concept as a:

...set of relatively stable relationships which are of non-hierarchical and interdependent nature linking a variety of actors, who share common interests with regard to a policy and who exchange resources to pursue these shared interests acknowledging that cooperation is the best way to achieve common goals.

In this context, the concept *policy community* is a variation of policy network characterised by more stable relationships, while *issue network* is the opposite since participants move in and out of network constantly. Since it is constituted by a large number of participants with quite variable degrees of mutual commitment or dependence on others in their environment, and it has atomistic structure (Rhodes, 1990:292-316). Also, linked to the theoretical framework of policy network is the concept of *resource*, which is defined as 'everything' that organisations can use in successfully accomplishing their objectives (e.g. constitutional-legal, financial, political and informational (Rhodes, 1986)).

Although the policy-network concept is a useful tool to analyse public policies, the lack of consensus around a single definition has produced many different interpretations of policy network. Such theoretical fragmentation has influenced the distinction of two schools of analysis. While the Anglo-Saxon focus (*typology of interest intermediation*) conceives policy network as a model of state/society relations in a given sector, German scholars (*a specific form governance*) mean this concept to be an alternative form of governance to hierarchy and the market (there is a poly-centred society, where resources are broadly allocated between public and private actors).

While the former has offered a greater criteria to classify policy networks, emphasising quantifiable and qualitative variables (e.g. Jordan and Shubert, 1992: 7-27; Van Warden, 1992: 29-52; Atkinson and Coleman, in Borzel, 1998: 253-73; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992: 181-205; Wilks and Wright, 1987), the later has been more ambitious in interpreting modern society, characterised in this view by high fragmentation of power.

The German school interprets policy network as an analytical concept stressing the structural relationships, interdependencies and dynamics between actors in politics and policy making, establishing implicitly that any policy can only be explained by concerted policies non-centrally towards common objectives (Borzel, 1998: 258-9).

Likewise, the German school supposes that modern societies are increasingly characterised by societal differentiation, sectorisation and policy growth, addressing high political complexity and putting governance under pressure (Jordan and Richardson, 1983).

At this point, this thesis considers policy-network as a model of a state-society relationship analysing Mexico's forestry sector. Policy network concepts help to analyse the reallocation of power experienced by public agencies and peasants. While the former impacted other existent policy-networks (and institutions of Mexico's public administration), the later were affected by the incorporation of other policy actors (e.g. ENGOS, and congress more recently). Also policy network concepts help to examine the informal mechanisms and resources to solve the conflict of collective interests without either bureaucratic or political hierarchy. For instance, this concept will be highly useful when analysing the two case studies of Campeche and Quintana Roo states.

The most powerful advantage of policy network is that, unlike other models, which share a state-centre conception of governance based on a single (national) authority of hierarchical coordination in policy-making, the policy-network concept is able to conceptualise the emergence of political structures which are characterised by 'governing without government' (Rhodes, 1997), that is policy network can analyse horizontal and vertical relationships, and most

importantly, dynamics set by the network and/or policy actors to make decisions.

The great potential of policy network should not hide its theoretical and methodological weaknesses. Policy network is questioned by its lack of explanatory potential and internal dynamic (Pemberton, 2000:771-92). This is reflected in a) the deficient mechanism to evaluate and quantify the resources that an organisation can use to achieve its goals (this is relevant as organisations usually utilise a broad range of those resources, some of them listed above); b) overestimation of network structure's role (networks have gained an image of resistance to change, reducing the idea of dynamism between policy-actors), c) tendency to combine theory and description (diminishing its potential for explanation and analysis), as well as its under-valuation of networks diversity (not all relationships form a network); d) and the agency's secondary role (an underestimation of institutions *vis à vis* network's structure).

Methodologically, policy network framework can reproduce the reductionism of other theories, by replacing individuals with institutions, and secondly, the role of group politics, structural context and social environment affecting institutional interaction can be shadowed by centring on organisations and their interrelations.

Additionally, policy network is short of legitimacy in the political system. Policy network in practice can exercise potential exclusion of some policy actors from the policy making since the network is not able to involve them because of its dynamic and logic; and it presents deficit democratic, as various important policy-makers are not elected by the people.

This is relevant for this thesis since forestry policy has a low profile in Mexican society, and policy-implementation is usually influenced by groups not accountable to the people (ENGOS, bureaucratic cluster around the most important centre of decision-making, and corporations) without the broad participation of elected bodies.

Considerations to apply policy-networks in Latin America

It is worthy to take into account Latin America's structural problems in order to apply policy networks as a tool to explain decision-making. In essence, there are at least three explanations of why 'imported' political models usually do not work properly in developing countries: a) usual social separation (even ethnic) between the rulers, dominated or ruled groups, and administrative bodies, which largely affect classic criterion of impersonal domination; b) the broad influence of informal relationship on formal structures of decision making; and c) existence of dysfunctional institutions, created for political conflict, instead of for cooperation.

In the case of Mexico, social separation is mirrored in corporatist and clientelistic relationships. The state-society relationship emphasises control and dependency rather than democracy and freedom (e.g. relationship among state and workers, peasants, middle class), which makes that authority exercises high discretionary will to apply law. Since Mexico's political system is highly personalistic, law application becomes a source of power subject to negotiation (during the revolutionary regime, for example, law was highly politicised, but politics was largely illegalised).

Not surprisingly, the application of law has usually depended on social pressure, local needs, and personal linkages between authority (especially bureaucracies) and social groups. Bureaucracy, in this context, became the outstanding institution that managed state-society relationship, by not only managing funds, but also by exercising political control (corporatism) and defining criteria to allocate subsidises to social groups (clientelism).

Second, usual close (informal) relationship between members of an organisation can surpass formal structure and legal processes, conditioning largely public agenda and goals to personal relationships and informal channels. For example, the priority of Mexico's environmental policy, like elsewhere in Latin America, largely relies on

the president's personal commitment or political strength of minister (degree of influence on president).

Finally, institutions in various developing countries, particularly in Latin America, are usually set up for conflict instead of for cooperation. Because of the general distrust between policy actors produced largely by authoritarianism, institutions have been set up to control each other, making every decision-making process more difficult. As a consequence, while institutions are more concerned with neutralising one another (making the political scenario highly conflictive), public opinion perceives this as political instability. Not surprisingly, in the mid term, various groups of population are willing to support caudillos, most of them military men with little commitment to democracy.

For instance, most of *coup d'état* of the 1970s were justified by the unstable social environment in which political forces were not able to reach agreements to rule those countries. More recently, the uprising of populist leaders in various Latin American countries (e.g. Chavez in Venezuela, Fujimori in Peru, Evo Morales in Bolivia) have gained social support thanks to the incapacity of traditional political class to reach agreements for implementing urgent reforms, while social instability rises along those countries.

The executive-congress relationship is a good illustration of the problem of institutions obsessively concerned with exercising control in Latin America's political systems. Often that relationship is conflictive because the former usually attempts to limit later's role, rather than try to help the president launch more efficient laws. In Mexico, in addition, since the next president usually comes from ministerial cabinet, political competence and conflict among ministries is the device inside government, impeding any possibility of cooperation.

Analytical framework for the thesis

Considering Latin America's structural problems, this thesis proposes an institutional model, facing three core issues of Mexico's public administration: a) patterns established by organisations (both public and private) in their relationship (*institutional linkage*); b) mechanisms set to allocate resources and functions between them (*distributional features*); and c) the impact that environmental non-bureaucratic factors have on the two previous issues (*contextual factors*).

The institutional linkages are explored while still considering the institutional presidency as the top echelon of Mexico's polity, but admitting its changing role in terms of political power. Key problems appear, nonetheless, when the basic hierarchical linkages between other public organisations and institutions are attempted to be

defined, since the legal framework and political actions are usually divorced (the impersonal relationship and non-written rules that affect formal structure of decision-making).

This is one of the most important problems in terms of distributional features, since most of works on public policy in Mexico so far have not considered the changing role of presidency, keeping static the presidential variable in Mexico's political system.

Another problem is related to changes experienced by institutions intervening in forestry policy lately, since various organisations have been created during 1990s (e.g. National Institute of Ecology [INE], Federal Attorney's for Environmental Protection [Profepa], National Forestry Commission [Conafor]), and others have been modified (Environmental and natural resources secretariat [Semarnap, 1994-2000, and then Semarnat 2000-onwards]), altering the dynamic of policy network, built by revolution's regime.

In order to examine *distributional functions*, dealing with the problem of the changing concentration of power in the institutional presidency at the same time, this thesis borrows Dunleavy's and Rhodes' concept of *core executive* to build a typology of a different degree of presidential power (Dunleavy and Rhodes, in Torres Espinosa, 1999:16-7), formulated as a continuum with two extremes (a strongly presidential power on one side, and a very weak president on the other).

Considering Dunleavy's and Rhodes' typology, it is possible to identify some intermediate points of the presidential power, formulated in four hypothetical pictures: a) *presidential government*, which is defined as an exercise of 'monocratic authority by the chief of executive'; b) *cabinet government*, which stresses the key role of cabinet and focuses on the decision-making process; c) *ministerial government*, that 'emphasises the strength of political and administrative departmentalism as a counterbalancing force on presidential authority and influence'; and d) *fragmented authoritarianism*, which underlines the roles of president, ministries and other political institutions, that run in different policy arenas.

The notion of the *core executive* is understood as the strategic and powerful source of policy definition and the central coordination of government policies, as well as the final arbiter within the executive of struggles between the multiple levels, factors and elements of the government (Dunleavy and Rhodes, in Torres Espinosa, 1999:16).

It is argued that Mexico's core executive use to include the presidency and two leading policy networks (the economic policy network and the political control policy network). The former is addressed to coordinate the agencies committed with the economic growth of Mexico, and the later is in charged of agencies involved in prevention and solution of political conflict. The relevant point here is that forestry policy has

been highly defined by the presidency, and it has strongly been influenced by those two major policy networks (both rural [politics] and social [economic] policy networks have importantly impacted forestry sector). This became more evident, when the forestry policy was shifted from the agricultural sector (integrated into economic policy network) to the environmental field (integrated into political policy network), and sectorised in both national security and economic ministerial cabinet.

To identify hierarchy, functions, and roles of specific organisations that lead and constitute the forestry policy network, the framework uses the concept of *cabinet*. In this vein, ministries are labelled as cabinet agencies, while other public agencies (e.g. decentralised agencies) as *non-cabinet agencies*. This label underlines the importance that direct contact with the president is a very worthy available resource, especially for the ministers. Though all the ministries have the same legal importance, practice does not back up this idea. For example, the Treasury and Interior secretariats have crucial political importance within the presidential cabinet, although this is not established in the law. Conflicts and struggles between them are useful to examine institutional linkages in terms of distributional features.

To examine the differences between cabinet agencies, this thesis utilises the notions of functional diffusion and functional

differentiation (Riggs, 1967). The former refers the presence of an agency in charged of many broad functions, while the later alludes to an agency performing a limited amount of specialised skills. This proposed taxonomy identifies three kinds of cabinet agencies: *Guidance ministries*, in charged of setting main criteria of policy goals or establishing rules that affect the performance of government as the whole; *specialised ministries*, those addressed to the implementation of specific policies or programmes; quasi *guidance ministries*, an intermediate category.

In respect of *contextual factors*, the thesis' structure differentiates between influences of general background and the process by which bureaucratic interest are represented (clientele relationship). The former involves both influences of unpredictable situations (e.g. changes in the wood prices, electoral results in forest regions, political disagreement between political parties), and structural environmental factors, while the later includes the structural nature of the national economic, political and social conditions, as well as the invariable international influences (especially the US influence, and particularly the North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA). The framework takes into account *clientelistic* relationships (LaPalombara, 1965:252) both as a bureaucratic resource, and an external influence, assuming at the same time that bureaucracy and societal interest groups can cooperate quite extensively (Peters, 1977:192).

What is important to examine here is the specific array, and the factors influencing those clientelistic relationships. Two dimensions of interaction are taken into account: the degree of power of interest groups to negotiate with or penetrate the bureaucratic apparatus, and the strength of bureaucratic resistance to those processes. Likewise, *bureaucratic constituencies* are identified as social groups or institutions (domestic or foreigner) with which agencies that have very narrow rewarding relationships.

Regarding the focus of the thesis, it is stressed that only the institutional linkages, the distributional links, and the contextual factors of a relevant connection with policy under analysis is extensively studied. Their selection depends basically on an extensive analysis of that policy together with the general knowledge of the existent environment. Description of those significant facts and events serve to build inferences and, in turn, to formulate a general explanation of the examined events.

Methodologically, this work acknowledges the disadvantages of utilising a single theoretical focus in studying complex political problems. By focusing on a single policy, various phenomena and processes have been underestimated, reducing the capacity for generalisation. This constraint is supposed to be compensated by analysing new data, with a relative new approach to some aspects of Mexican politics.

In addition, the analysis of issues not extensively mixed so far gives an additional worth to this thesis (forest politics, policy network, and institutional focus). The final consideration is that the use of an institutional view does not imply that individual or groups be little significant, but only pretends to stress that their activities, political actions, and conflicts take place not in an empty space, but in a specific organisational context.

Rural corporatism

The main pillar of corporatism in the countryside was the land allocation from post revolution to 1990s, since the Mexican countryside was the most effervescent political arena during the twentieth century (Carton, 1996: 9-67, 1995: 105-67; MacKinlay, 1996: 165-237; Otero, 2000; Gordillo and Mohar, 1995: 23-47). Evolution and conditions of Mexico's countryside conditioned the political role of rural and social policy networks. While the former grouped agrarian and agricultural policies, keeping peasants under political control, the later was driven to implement anti-poverty policies in order to avoid social mobilisation and rising of independent organisations.

In this context, *ejido* was funded with a two-fold aim: a mechanism to organise the rural production, as well as a peasant representative

institution. *Ejido* would work as institution for land distribution and representation of peasant interests before the state, diminishing the peasant political mobilisation, whereas encouraging agriculture production.

Ejido was simultaneously the lowest level of political structure in countryside, and central unit of political control. In practice, the political regime controlled rural politics through two main mechanisms, political (PRI-CNC-*Ejido*), and bureaucratic (public agencies, budget, governor, local leaders). On top of this complex organisation was the institutional presidency (operating with economic and political policy networks), and then there was a line up going down, made up of the PRI, CNC, local representations of CNC in federal states, *ejido*, and peasants (figure 1). Bureaucracies complemented rural policy network (e.g. SARH, SRA, Sedesol, ministry of Fisheries (Sepesca), governors and some local authorities), by offering services and subsidises.

The complex land tenure system was the essence of peasant-institutions relationship based on exchange of resources, where policy actors built a win-win relationship, consolidating policy network. As institutional presidency-PRI-CNC had efficiently worked since 1930s, CNC had unquestionable support from state, providing peasants with quick and friendly solutions to their problems (e.g. CNC was an efficient tie between authorities and peasants, as well as enthusiastic

supporter of land redistribution). In exchange, each peasant had to enrol in CNC's structure, becoming automatically PRI's member, and government's supporter.

To ensure peasants' long-term loyalty, the state only granted the right to farm the land –state kept the actual own on land— making the peasants dependent on political pressures and government decision-making managed by the strong, over-politicised and unaccountable bureaucracy (SRA-SARH) and social agencies (e.g. Sedesol from 1992). Indeed, peasants were dependent on CNC for access to wide field of resources, ranging from financial credit to seeds. Finally, peasants (landholders or *ejidatarios*) could neither rent nor sell their land. Thus, the state had direct control of people and natural resources (e.g. water, wildlife, fish, minerals, land, forest), while managed social stability in the Mexican countryside (the other two PRI's sectors operated in the same manner aiming similar goals with middle class and workers).

Rural policy network

The CNC extended rural policy network to go down through League of Agrarian Communities (LIGA, which was CNC's representation in each federal state), which in turn controlled local agrarian organisations, which also, controlled every single *ejido* (figure 2). In this point, the *ejido* became the cornerstone of political control by keeping specific

information on any *ejidatario*. In terms of decision-making, *ejido* (considered as a social and economic unit) is administrated by a General Assembly (which includes all the *ejidatarios*) as a top authority.

While major decisions must be made by majority vote of the Assembly, day-to-day activities of *ejido* are carried out by *Comisariat*, made up of three elected officials (with designated alternates) during three years terms –a president, treasurer, and secretary. This system, in practice, repeated the same logic of political regime, where administrative efficiency was sacrificed in favour of political stability. The high mobility of authorities does not allow formulation of long-term plans for local communities.

Ejido, nonetheless, had even more complexities. Regime of concession was an example. While arable land is usually granted to individuals, forest and pasture land is assigned to either community or collective groups. This situation makes more conflictive forestry *ejidos* management since decision-making has to be collective, implying constant (and eroding) negotiation for every single action, multiple procedures before government, and more political control from state.

This type of organisation together with the Environment Impacts Assessment (EIA) to run any productive project has made forestry *ejidos* management more conflictive. For instance, an interviewed

public official in Campeche (a federal state) expressed: 'it is very hard to believe that if somebody wants to produce oranges or any other fruit, nobody (any authority) asks for an EIA, but if somebody want to work with forest he/she needs to go through many procedures'. In essence, this structure of *ejido's* decision-making together with multiple bureaucratic procedures have partly eroded recent reforms.

As with many institutions in Latin America, *ejido* was provided with a dysfunctional structure of decision-making, since vertical decision-making structure of rural policy (institutional presidency-PRI-CNC-LIGA-local agrarian organisations-*ejido*) emphasises politics, and it is pervaded by an extensive horizontal decision-making organisation within *ejido* (with economic goals). In this structure, all members of *ejido's* have to participate in most decision-making, affecting negatively policy-outcomes.

In view of this, the main paradox is that while *ejido* is integrated into a vertical structure of decision-making (government-PRI-CNC-Liga-*ejido*), its internal life has to be horizontal, implying serious problems for decision-making and internal efficiency. For example, most important decisions on *ejido's* are made by external institutions (vertical structure of decision-making), whereas operational activities within *ejido* are hard to be undertaken because collective decision-making makes conflictive any initiative or change. In practice, *ejido* is a conflictive institution subject to diverse and multiple interests.

Policy instruments as political control

Since political control has been government's top priority, policy-instruments that intervene in countryside have been as complex as diverse. Basically, the Mexican government has controlled *ejido* through three levels or degrees of influence, a) legal framework, b) political representation, and c) social reproduction. Political control, through PRI and CNC, ensured political demobilisation, while bureaucratic control (SRA and SARH) and social agencies (Sedesol and multiple social programmes) managed subsidises and economic compensations.

a) Legal control

Until 1992, legal control on the *ejido* was so strong that there were specific regulations on peasants' duties and rights, as well as organisational rules for production (for instance, peasants must work directly their land [being unable to hire workers]). Furthermore, they could not sell or rent their land, loosing it automatically when absent for more than two years. Inheritances and access to common land were highly regulated as well.

The state used three legal tools to control *ejido* (bureaucracy playing a key role, especially SRA). Those instruments were a) legitimisation of *ejido*'s internal life, b) government arbitration, and c) public funds.

The first process was to legitimise *ejido*'s internal decision-making, through a representative of SRA, who had to be present during main meetings, and major decision-making (e.g. land distribution, internal regulations). In addition, public funds' allocation must be endorsed by either the national government representative or local authority.

On the other hand, while the state arbitration was undertaken through administrative tribunals (integrated into SRA), which make final decisions on either legacies or border controversies, public funds and services were managed by three policy instruments, loans and endorsements (e.g. exchanged by harvest); public enterprises (e.g. Conasupo, in charged of marketing harvest, played a monopolist role in countryside by controlling prices); and water management (run by SARH).

b) Political representation

Political representation within *ejido* has been of an authoritarian nature, but inclusive (Mexican formula of corporatism). Social movements of peasants were either co-opted or confronted by state, forming different type of organisations and orientations. De Janvry *et al.* (1997:5), for example, identify three types of peasant institutions: namely, corporatist organisations, traditional community organisations, and organisations derived from social movements.

While corporatist organisation was the main institution for political control since it could be directly managed by pro-governmental organisations and government itself, the other two were used to set up criteria to recognise authoritative peasant organisations defining criteria of inclusion (and exclusion as a consequence).

Interestingly, the state jointed corporatist organisations and rising leaders in countryside to control peasants using public programmes and budget. In this manner, government built a broad network, linking corporatist organisations, *ejido* leaders, regional committees, state (regional and local) leagues, and CNC, at the same time supporting the *ejido* in economic terms. De Janvry *et al.* (1997: 5) point out that public programmes reaching new social actors (women, young people, and specific groups of producers within *ejido*) contributed to support emerging leaderships in countryside.

The other two institutions were related to establishing criteria to recognise authoritative peasants organisation, defining criteria of inclusion and exclusion. Since state had a regulative power, corruption and clientelism (economic resources and legitimisation in exchange of political support for government decisions) were not strange in this relationship. In a broad sense, this relationship allowed state became liaison between peasants and the rest of Mexicans.

Finally, agrarian ideology worked as a social reproduction of *ejido*, based on two central points, the alliance between the state and peasants, aiming in theory welfare of peasants, and the empowerment of state agents as stakeholders between peasants and the remain of Mexican society. This strategy worked fundamentally through political discourse.

Social policy network

Social policy has been managed by several secretariats participating in health, education, housing, and infrastructure fields, as well as in ethnic conflicts, mainly in indigenous communities and the poorest *ejidos*. Those public agencies built up a functional structure of government, in which agencies and programmes in charged of social issues were mainly addressed to *ejidos* and poor communities while agricultural offices were driven to private farmers and the richest *ejidos*.

Since 1970s, the Mexican government has formulated different programmes to deal with poverty. For example, Investment's Programme for Rural Development (PIDER, 1970-1982), Programme to deal with poor regions and marginal groups (Coplamar, 1976-1983), Programmes of Regional Development (PDR, 1983-1988), National Programme of Solidarity (Pronasol, 1988-1994), Programme of Education, Health and Food (Progresa, 1994-2000), and the current

Programme of Assistance to 250 micro-regions. Procampo and *Alianza para el campo* were formulated in the 1990s to support peasant production.

Like the rural policy network, social policy network was composed at the institutional presidency, PRI, CNC, governors, mayors, and *ejido* leaders. The difference was the inclusion of ministries in charged of social fields (e.g. Health, Education) and social programmes (e.g. Pronasol, Progresa). In 1992, the Social Development Secretariat (Sedesol), which sectorised all the social agencies, began to be the key ministry to manage Mexico's social policy. This secretariat that included environmental agencies, such as the National Institute of Ecology (INE) and the Federal Attorney's for Environmental Protection (Profepa), was the main instrument to apply distributive policies with clientelistic patterns.

As rural economy has worsened, the peasant sector has increased their dependence on social policy. In rural policy, state economic intervention changed (direct subsidy) to supporting a specific type of organisation (emphasis on targeted groups, such as Pronasol or Procampo). Up to late 1980s, peasants were considered to be important economic actors (and peasant production as a sector), while today they are focused as targets of welfare rather production policy. In Mexican agenda, peasants shifted from economic policy to social welfare. Targeting peasant production encourages productivity by

supporting those who can produce a surplus for the market, while most subsistence producers should change their occupations.

Social programmes developed during the Salinas and Zedillo administrations had three goals: *a)* to help buffer political conflicts produced by economic reform, *b)* to ensure political control over social groups through clientelism rather than corporatism, and *c)* to ensure social stability –especially in the countryside— while gaining electoral support for PRI. The Salinas administration implemented two important social programmes. While Pronasol was a decentralised, community based, demand-driven programme, Procampo was a direct-subsidy programme for very small scale agricultural producers, including subsistence producers. Progresá, while substituted the Pronasol, was implemented by the Zedillo administration to deal with extreme poverty.

Though those programmes had a positive impact on rural areas, they had three main constraints, *a)* the transitional philosophy whereby cash transfers or improved access to existing categories of services were only needed until the economy grew to give other strategies, *b)* the individualistic targeting of those subsidises, independently of the community structure, it did not consider the social disruption caused by those programmes to target all the eligible community members, and *c)* the building up of parallel committee or delivery structures for those programmes and municipal development funds that competed

with traditional organisation, while did not build long-term local capacity.

The state withdrawing from the countryside meant that public agencies ceased to provide economic support to poor producers. To deal with this, government kept the social state net programmes, fundamentally the extensive networks of government-supplied village food stores (Conasupo) and rural clinics. Also the government supported Pronasol's soft production loans and village-level public works programmes. The main difference between Pronasol and Progresa was that while the former encouraged organisations to design and implement community development and public works projects, the later was driven to support the poorest groups through direct cash transfers.

Weakened the corporatist framework built by Revolution, the Mexican government propelled a new relationship with society. In practice, the government attempted to keep political control through distributive policies rather than corporatist relationship in view of the growing pluralism and the end of state intervention era. Pronasol and Progresa aimed to connect groups outside of the PRI's traditional sector with government. This strategy was undertaken at expense of PRI and its corporations. Since then, members of PRI's corporations had to compete for resources.

Finally, the deep poverty of countryside made social stability a serious concern for decision-makers. Not surprisingly, distributive policies of Pronasol and Progresa were conditioned by politics (more evident in the former). For example, the government frequently drove funds of Pronasol to areas where PRI had lost elections, while their distribution went to those organisations that were “cooperative” (those that shift from political opposition to the PRI or government). Pronasol’s success in electoral terms was observed in the elections of 1991 when PRI had a notable recuperation.

Although the Mexican government has continued applying similar programmes (in terms of philosophy and principles), they are allocated according to technical criteria rather than politics. Nonetheless, institutional framework and imprecision to focusing anti-poverty projects have affected programmes’ efficiency. Because of the Mexican countryside’s poverty, social policy network is of crucial importance for peasants.

CNC

Like PRI, CNC was formed by local organisations creating a political Leviathan in 1936. While becoming as the cornerstone of rural politics during its first thirty years, CNC became one of the PRI’s pillars by developing clientelistic relationship between the ruling party and peasantry with electoral aims.

CNC had a double goal: managing politics of peasantry as well as the social demands of countryside. CNC, initially considered to be an instrument to channel peasant demands, became soon after political apparatus for social protest's contention (Gordillo, 1988: 151-3) by torpedoing independent organisations' initiatives.

The CNC, with a massive membership, has never paradoxically set a close relationship with their members. For example, the lowest positions of the CNC in countryside usually are CNC's formal members, but they do not actually participate in its internal politics, since they are excluded from the major policy-making decisions.

To deal with this problem keeping political control, government pushed for soft reforms of CNC's in 1965, 1973 and 1986, which produced poor policy outcomes. Those reforms failed because of bureaucratic interests that impeded actual decentralisation and membership's empowerment. The first two reforms increased the political control of CNC without opening that organisation to democracy (in terms of political representation and decision-making). The last reform, on the other hand, failed because traditional bureaucratic interests filled key positions of CNC's decision-making, blocking any possible change.

While the CNC expanded its span of control with the former reforms, since sectorisation was increased and vertical structure of decision-making was strengthened, its electoral system, largely pervaded by manipulation, did not change. In practice, the government did not decentralise decisions, nor empowered membership. As a result, political fragmentation (e.g. National Confederation of Plan of Ayala (CNPA), and the National League of Autonomous Regional Peasant Organisations (UNORCA), Independent Central of Agriculture Workers and Peasants (CIOAC)), and social protest took place.

Though traditional bureaucracy collapsed CNC's 1986 reform, did not stop two broader changes in countryside, produced by Mexico's economic crisis. While the former was marked by the rising importance of rural middle class in rural politics (at the expense of poor peasants) by filling top positions in CNC, the later was characterised by growing relevance of a) public economic agencies (at expenses of the Liga), as well as b) financial agencies (e.g. Banrural, bank in charged of agriculture funding) and agro-industrial public enterprises (at expenses of CNC and PRI themselves).

These two unexpected processes, which were the: a) strengthening of government at the expense of the PRI and its agrarian corporation, and b) the significant change of rural policy network eroded the rural political governance built by Revolution, while political organisations experienced changes among and within them.

The deep reform, launched by Salinas administration in 1991 mirrored this. It was carried out with a two-fold objective, modifying the relationship between a) rural producers and the state, and b) among rural productive agents.

The second agrarian reform

Central agrarian reform amendment (constitutional article 27) was the privatisation of formerly, communally held *ejido* land, pushed by poverty and structural problems of agricultural production (Cornelius and Myhre, 1998: 1-24; Warman, 2001), decline of *ejido* as institution of political control and economic support in countryside (Carton, 1995:105-67), and promotion of market and private investment rules in countryside (Appendini, 1998: 25, de Janvri *et al.* 1997:1-12).

As rural governance had been sustained by corporatism and clientelism, reflected in exchange of political support by land distribution and economic compensations, in the second half of twentieth century, most of Mexico's land was in the hands of peasants and farmers. As a consequence, overlapping between poverty, indigenous communities, *ejido*, and high biodiversity areas took place.

At present, *ejidos* and indigenous communities constitute 58.6 percent of Mexico's territory (3.5 million peasant productive units

owning roughly more than 103 million hectares), mainly forestlands (70 percent of national land) and agricultural lands (80 percent) (Quadri, 2002: 41; Toledo, 1996a: 255). Except for forestry protection category (which can allow controlled log extraction), '40 of the 124 reserved protected areas (40 percent) either border or include municipalities with more than 30 percent indigenous population' (Molnar *et al*, 2001: 540).

According to INEGI (1995), 18 million inhabitants live in forest lands, while increasing rates of rural poverty reach following dimension: there are 8.8 million of poor people; adults' average education is 3.3 years, while the national average is 7; only 63 percent of the young rural habitants --between 15 and 20—know how to read and to write, and the growth of some indigenous groups is higher than the nation's (1.7 percent annual), e.g. Mixtecos (5.2) Nahuatls (4.0) and mixe 3.5) (Conapo, 1995). Paradoxically, as a part of the demographic process, while peasants were demanding more land, growing emigration from countryside to biggest Mexico's cities and the US between 1980 and 1995 produced a declining interest in land and primary activities (Zendejas and Mummert, 1998:180-1).

Agrarian reform allowed the emergence of two innovating political factors, a) political fragmentation among rural organisations and new policy actors linked to rural policy network after decades of controlled

leaderships, as well as *b*) the rising of a relatively new field of study associating land tenure systems with natural resources management.

While liberalisation policies (emphasising economic aims rather than politics) eroded traditional mechanisms of political control in the countryside, Mexico's main forestry problem was centred on the coexistence of rich biodiversity (with its consequent economic potential) with poverty of inhabitants and high rates of deforestation.

The end of land distribution and decreasing subsidises eroded rural governance (exchange of welfare policies by political support) reflected in the emergence of new organisations (e.g. UNORCA and CIOAC) and the end of the CNC as political monopoly. In this scenario, Mexico's forestry statement revealed huge contrasts: Mexico's fourth place on the world list in terms of biodiversity, but fourth in deforestation (Profepa, 2002), tenth in forest cover, but twenty-sixth in forest production (Morán, 2000:17), enormous economic potential of forest, but substantial trade deficit in this sector (Barton and Wexler, 1996:218).

Forestry policy definition

While the second agrarian reform altered countryside's establishment, new social issues emerged (e.g. ecology, rules for accessing to natural resources, forest, water, and environment). On one hand, some

scholars (i.e. Toledo, 1996a: 253) strongly criticised the agrarian reform arguing that it weakened the social sector (fundamentally made up by *ejidos*), by encouraging land privatisation, and favouring new big owners and stockholder firms. On the other hand, others (i.e. Quadri, 2002; 29-40) applauded this amendment stressing the importance of modernisation of rural sector, new investment for agriculture, and undermining of political control's old agents (e.g. corporations and caciques).

In the early 1990s, it was clear that a) agrarian reform affected forestry policy because of, at least, its unplanned human settlements throughout Mexico, and failing agricultural policy, and b) Mexico's government did not have clear definition of forestry policy. Gradually, government forestry policy definition has associated politics, ill-equipped policies, change of land uses, forest fires, and forest's unsustainable clearing for commercial and domestic aims (*Programa Nacional Forestal, 2001-06*).

Agrarian reform has affected deforestation by a) prohibiting social participation on protection of Mexico's ecological patrimony (citizens, foundations, civil organisations or enterprises cannot buy land with aims of conservation); b) prohibiting to forest enterprises to held rustic property (they only can work on communal or *ejido* lands subject to renewed rent); c) formulating unclear property rights and disorder in land tenure; d) encouraging land distribution affecting PNA, largely

dispersing peasant settlements along critical areas (fragile zones within PNA); e) encouraging of clearing and colonisation programmes, as well as the National Food Programme during 1970s; and f) encouraging forestry overexploitation, mainly through National Fund of *Ejido's* Encouragement (FONAFE) (Carabias and Provencio, 1992: 7-12; Zabin, 1998: 401-25; Toledo, 1996a: 247-60; Quadri, 2002: 29-31).

Though government initially associated *ejido* (communal land) with environmental degradation (deforestation in particular), and private sector with conservation, soon after Carabias (INE's head) and Provencio (1992: 11-2), who would become the top public officials in the following administration, arguing that land tenure was not a determinant factor of productivity and sustainability. For example, they advocated several works pinpointing the importance of access to irrigation as critical factor differentiating farms in terms of output.

Gradually, association of social property with degradation lost power of explanation. In fact, some scholars have suggested the contrary. Barbier (2002: 1-8), for example, suggests that *ejido* helped to reduce the amount of deforestation taking place during expansion of agricultural land (1960-85), while Merino (1999: 1-2; Merino and Arias Toledo, 2002: 250-75) finds that successful cases of forestry protection are strengthened by social property or common land, since

this land regime develops rules and mechanisms of natural resources management, which prioritise resources of the common pool.

Barbier suggests that 'effective rural institutions (when compared to open access situation) may impose additional costs on tropical deforestation through agricultural conversion'. Thus he mentions that in 1960-85, strong presence of *ejido* rules on forestlands, signified strong institutional restrictions, which may have constrained 'the rate of adjustment in the amount of new land converted and thus limited agricultural expansion' (Barbier, 2002: 2).

For Merino (1999: 1-2; Merino and Arias Toledo, 2002: 250-75), the most devastating policy failures have been the land uses' changes, forest fires, and unsustainable clearing of forest both for commercial and domestic aims. Morán, on the other hand, identifies as the most important causes of deforestation the peasant exclusion from the production process of wood; traditional system of peasant production (clearing and firing trees); insufficient budget for the agricultural sector; ill-equipped technology; market failures and easy access to forest for clearing; ill-equipped fiscal and trade policies; centralisation of decision-making; discontinuity of public programmes and administrative de-coordination.

What is relevant here is that the forestry policy's main problems are poverty (instead of social property), and insufficient investment

threatening high biodiversity. Basically Mexico has a socio-environmental problem rather than an economic one, as the forestry sector is not relevant to Mexico's economy. Main problem is exploitation of the forestry dealing with ecological restrictions while creating opportunities for local inhabitants. The problem is not the presence multinationals.

For instance, unlike other Latin American countries (e.g. Chile, Argentina or Brazil), Mexico has never developed a commercial timber industry nor pursued the possibility for timber plantations, despite its rich potential of forest and non-timber products (e.g. Mexico's forest represent 10 percent of world biodiversity, Mexico could gain between 30 and 35 millions of dollars in ecotourism, 1, 500 million of dollars from trade of medicinal plants, and between 26 and 4,646 million dollars from pharmaceutical activities, according to the World Bank, [González, 2002:1]) .

Not surprisingly, the current forestry policy, known as sustainable forestry development, is understood as a process which aims better and sustainable processes of forestry production, improving quality of life of people without affecting the equilibrium and integrity of forestry ecosystems (*Programa Nacional Forestal 2001-06*, 2001:68).

Defined as a national security policy, Mexican forestry policy identifies its main goals as a) the organisation of producers, and b) the

formulation of non-politicised and inclusive policies, favouring conditions of land security, decentralisation, and social and inter-institutionalised participation, especially of rural inhabitants.

This policy, nonetheless, has neither economic nor political support as the forest only represents an insignificant percent of rural budget (Merino and Segura, 2002:9), while Semarnat remains a specialised ministry, easily penetrated by other ministries and policy networks. The core problem is that the main political clients (peasants) are strongly controlled by the state and independent groups of policy network are under representative and weak (e.g. ENGOS, timber interests).

Policy outcomes: new rural institutions

The Salinas administration's agrarian reform created new institutions, (Procede, Procampo, and the Agrarian Attorney General's Office [Procuraduria Agraria]). As the state was no longer responsible for land distribution and it was important to recognise rights of property, main political objective became the official land titling. Procede was the answer for this requirement. Old problems related to borderlands, overlapping, and land titles, became central issues in agrarian politics.

While Procampo was a targeted credit programme addressed to financially strengthen small farmers and *ejidatarios* (taking into account the economic openness policy before agricultural imports) expressed in subsidises granted as a function of holding size, the *Procuraduría Agraria* was in charged of dealing with the 'adjudication backlog and to encourage accountability in the process of land titling and boundary disputes' (Fox, 1995: 9).

In spite of those changes, the countryside remained strongly controlled by the state because reform modified the ways of state-peasant relationship (policy, state intervention), but not its essence (authoritarian governance and strong political control). This is explained by the weak position of peasants within Mexico's polity, and as Fox (1995: 1-30) points out, by the lack of accountability mechanisms to implement and evaluate policy changes.

Fox, while analysing the redesign of state intervention in four policy areas of agrarian reform (rural economic development, decentralisation to rural municipalities, efforts tom improve administration the of justice, and electoral process in rural areas), argues that state's accountability mechanisms to implement its reforms have not been sufficiently effective (considering that state's capacity to launch effective reforms depend on building new forms of exercising public authority), because new reshaping institutions

remained weak and limited, and distrust continues among policy actors of rural policy.

For example, peasants –especially indigenous groups— have not much faith in government agencies for complaints about unfair situations of crop payments or land tenure amendments if electoral system, historically distrusting, does not respect their votes or the local police do not fairly apply, while the law favouring local elites (caciques).

In spite of this article was written in 1995 (before the PRI's defeat), several political conditions remain in countryside, since new political order has not yet been created. For example, caciques continue imposing their laws, there is insufficient budget for agricultural sector, rural agencies are still inefficient, decentralisation is very limited yet, and justice is still deficient since peasants can hardly properly defend by themselves because of their poverty and lack of education.

However, there are some indicators reflecting change in countryside. For instance, traditional rural corporatism has began to be broken down since CNC does not represents anymore the main political liaison between state and peasants. In addition, social programmes (such as Procampo and Progresa, Contigo) are increasingly exercised by fair criteria, instead of clientelistic patterns, like in the past. For example, Progresa and current Contigo have been more neutral than

Pronasol, in political terms, implementing an anti-alleviation policy since they a) have statistically used rigorous methods to identify extreme poor households (no discretionary decision-making), b) have been centrally managed by federal government (keeping away from local political influences); and c) have developed a clear process of selection of benefited.

Mexico's countryside mirrors a process of transition, where old and new patterns operate in day-to-day activities. This is important as forestry policy (in spite of being integrated into the environmental sector) is largely still influenced by clientelism and corporatism (structural features of state-peasant relationship), neutralising (or at least obstructing) second agrarian reform's expected great impacts. In this line, whereas the state keeps relevant intervention in the countryside (experiencing a interregnum in political and organisational terms), peasants still register the same political behaviour and social demands of short-term nature because of rural structural poverty.

Environmental and political impacts

Together with the amendment agrarian act, forestry law's modification radically changed the legal scheme re-orientating forestry policy more strongly, emphasising private invest for forestry plantations rather than an agro-forestry sector.

Though it is difficult to assess the ecological impact of new agrarian law, reforms have produced bigger degrees of freedom. Basically Mexican decision-makers attempted to specify and enforce new property rights, while encouraging the willingness of agricultural producers to invest, through four strategies.

Firstly, peasants had for first time the option to have partners according to interests of both peasants and partners (instead of the state's). Then, land could be rented or sold to third parties. Thirdly, price control was ended and Mexico's borders were opened to agricultural imports. Finally, political control, exercised by the federal government, was diminished by constraining SRA's power on *ejidos* and peasants. Indeed, since Mexico's borders were opening to agricultural products, financial strengthening of small private farmers and *ejidatarios* to cope with that competition by Procampo became a fundamental issue in this reform.

The 1992 forestry law emphasised deregulation of the forestry sector in various ways. Two of most significant ingredients of this law are modifications in system of permits for timber extraction and privatisation of technical services required for commercial timber. The former change stressed the simplification of bureaucratic procedures to processing wood with commercial aims, while the later attempted to remove old bureaucratic relationship between technical service

providers to peasants called UCODEFOS and *ejidos*, since it was required that the old agrarian bureaucracy intervened in their negotiating contracts.

Policy outcomes, however, have been unexpected. Since simplification has depended on a one-time stamping of cut logs with a special hammer, corruption and contraband have increased because bureaucracy has wide discretionary power, and timber interests are not respecting the law. On the other hand, the state has withdrawn from negotiating contracts between UCODEFOS and *ejidos* are deepening their inequality since richer *ejidos* are able to pay more than poorer *ejidos* and hiring more competitive engineers, which may be left with poorer quality of technical services.

In environmental terms, those reforms have caused serious contradictions, since they were conceived to solve economic and social concerns instead of ecological problems. For example, that amendment act constrains options to parcel (break into pieces) *ejido* lands containing forest and rain forest, and neglecting the right of making transaction of forest *ejido* lands in favour of individuals (private property).

Though this law was conceived with good intentions, policy outcome produced poor results since peasants have had perverse incentives to deforest their lands. As *ejidatarios* (peasants) had the restriction of

parcelling their forestlands, they saw that it was convenient to clear their forest in order to be included in the list of parcelling lands. In other words, peasants had incentives to destroy forests with the aim of reaching rights of private property.

Another contradiction is related to parcelling lands set before the amendment act of 1992. For instance, in Southern-East Mexico, where various Protected Natural Areas are placed (i.e. *Calakmul*, *Sian Kaan*, *Celestun*), vast amount of lands have already been parcelled and cannot be reverted. Thus, according to the forestry law, it is prohibited to give permits of forest exploitation to individual forestlands (since forest lands are collectively owned). As a consequence there are only available permits for legal lands, which are common property. So, parcelled lands before 1992 are living in legal limbo (existent, but not legal). As a result, *ejidatarios* are clearing their forests, and transforming their *ejidos* in arable lands –ironically legal for private property— with the aims of survival and getting property rights. Alternatively, *ejido* can ask for permission to exploit the forest for peasants, although it becomes vulnerable to political pressures soon after.

In addition to those contradictions, reforms showed low conservationist profile since the option of rustic land for ecologic conservation is non existent and it is quite restricted extension of

individual forest land to 800 hectares, affecting forestry conservation, and development of forestry industry.

Basically, land constraints of the amendment act of 1992 were defined by the historical role of private property in Mexico. Mexican revolution was largely motivated by unequal distribution of land, and poor conditions of peasants. So, land extension, privatisation of land, and competitiveness in countryside are controversial issues in Mexico.

Nonetheless, those reforms are necessary as social, economic and political conditions of the countryside have radically changed during the last thirty years. Because of this, agrarian politics are still conditioning ecological transformations and most importantly environmental problems. For example, the overlapping of borders between *ejidos* derived from ill-equipped planning, distributive populism, political perversity, law decisions in function of political pressure, and conflicts among lands with different land tenure's regime (arable, forest, cattle, etc) have caused deforestation and change of land use.

One key problem for *ejido* is its complex goals, which attempt to achieve political and economic at the same time. This situation has generated a three-sided problem: a) *ejido* might become more democratic and efficient simultaneously, in conditions of insufficient funds; b) *ejidatarios* have not sufficiently trained to manage the *ejido*;

and c) the authoritarian relationship between state and peasants remains so far.

Basically, the *ejido* itself has become increasingly more democratic, but an authoritarian system has remained despite of the current political transition. In other words, there is a democratic institution (*ejido*) inside extensive authoritarian governance (rural policy network). Two scenarios where economic efficiency has not been emphasised since democracy has encouraged peasant participation (decision-making is more complex), and authoritarian governance has aimed political control through corporatism and clientelism.

However, the main problem here is how *ejido* works. Despite of its different organisational ways of working, *ejido* presents a horizontal manner of decision-making. In view of this, decisions (regardless of their importance) have to be made in a collective way, producing delays, and sometimes paralysis for a community forming *ejido*.

Certainly, today, in some *ejidos* major economic decisions are made by an assembly elected by a community, leaving other lesser decisions (day to day problems) in the hands of people. This system has offered in some cases better policy outcomes for communities. However, this has been the exception, not the rule.

In this context, public policy might push, in the short-term, for organisational change in *ejido* rather than democratic governance. Moreover, *ejido* might be analysed –going further than ideological considerations— in terms of viability for current economy. The same is true for rural governance, as PRI has lost power and the main controls, not only in countryside, but also in the political system, as a whole. The problem, in political terms, is not anymore how the Mexican authoritarian political system must be broken down, but which institutions must be funded instead.

Ejido is maybe not absolutely necessary anymore for all cases. However, discussion of this issue is over-shadowed by ideological positions. So, the question here should not be centred on strategies to maintain *ejido* as a key institution of Mexican politics, but how the rural income should be increased, while reducing pressures on forestry areas occupied by poor peasants.

For example, Winters *et al* (2002: 139-56), while analysing diversification of income in rural areas, suggests that '*ejido* organisation is important in determining participation in crop livestock production, non-agricultural wage employment and remittance income', together with location of households in relation with urban areas, and available infrastructure. Thus, they propose that government, taking into account that many *ejidatarios* are no

longer dependent on land, made cash transferences to agricultural producers, making the use of those subsidies more flexible.

Another proposal is that the government should consider social and public capital variable when designing policies to improve income-generating capacity of *ejidatarios*, such as recognising and respecting values and social considerations of community, as well as enhancing the role of formal and informal organisations. For example, in order to implement a strategy of non-agricultural employment opportunities for *ejidatarios*, the government should understand role of *ejido* relationships, and improving *ejido* organisation.

Those questions are important for the remainder of this thesis, since forestry, environmental and rural policies are demanding new views to face multiple problems that seem quite hard to overcome, taking into account not only structural problems of Mexico, but also rural policy network organisation, created for political control rather than for encouraging productivity.

Conclusions

The value of the policy network concept consists of its strengths to explain horizontal and vertical relationships among social actors. Also policy networks are useful to analyse dynamics established by the network and/or policy actors to make decisions. Nonetheless,

structural problems might be considered in developing countries. Particularly, in Latin America policy networks might take into account the deficient criterion of an impersonal exercise of power, the outstanding political weight of informal relationships for decision-making, and the presence of various dysfunctional institutions to successfully explain decision-making.

Because of that, Mexican policy networks have had a top-down profile. The rural policy network in this context was built to exercise political control rather than encourage economic production. The revolutionary regime built up an agrarian policy rather than an agricultural one, strengthening *ejido* and CNC as an institution and a political instrument, respectively, to manage corporatism in the countryside.

Though forestry policy is considered to be a part of environmental policy, it is still largely influenced by agrarian policy network, greatly pervaded by clientelism and corporatism (structural problems of state-peasants relationship). This situation together with the structural poverty of the countryside is obstructing better performance of second agrarian reform. Certainly, reforms have produced bigger degrees of economic freedom, but insufficient economic funds for poor peasants.

Clearly agrarian politics have prevailed on natural resources management because of structural poverty of countryside. Because of this, the main pillar of rural corporatism was linked to poverty

(landless). The land distribution was an instrument that mixed co-optation and authoritarian strategies. Thus, after many decades of land distribution, in Mexico there is a high overlapping between poverty, indigenous communities, *ejido*, and high biodiversity areas, making environmental and forestry policies conflictive arenas.

Because of the regulative characteristic of natural resources management in Mexico, and the strong position of institutional presidency, main rural institutions were managed by an unaccountable bureaucracy, making the forestry sector highly vulnerable. In addition, forestry policy has been pervaded by important degree of corruption, and subordinated to other stronger interests (i.e. agrarian politics, poverty, political control, land distribution, land titling). Not surprisingly, the 1992 amendment act was focused on land tenure regimes rather than land uses and access to natural resources.

On the political side, few deep political changes have taken place, obstructing even more forestry policy. Though traditional authoritarian governance of the rural policy-network was modified as new ways of representation were set up, the essence of state-peasants relationship is still the same. New institutions in the countryside (i.e. the committees of Solidarity (enrolled in the Pronasol) Procampo, *Procuraduria Agraria*) still exchange political support for public services between peasants and state, reallocating power in favour of

government at expense of PRI and CNC. However, there has been a scarce empowerment of peasants, and policy instruments have not been sufficiently accountable to carry out the formulated changes, while distrust between state and peasants has continued.

Finally, some consensus –i.e. *ejido* as a necessary instrument for rural development— should be discussed taking into account the context of economic and political transformation, leaving ideological positions in a secondary role. If considered that Mexican forestry policy (with high potential of exploitation) only has to deal with domestic problems (poverty, political organisation, internal policy actors), unlike other Latin American countries (Brazil, Argentina, Chile) facing international factors and interests, this policy has a lot of opportunities to improve its performance in the future. Basically, Mexico's forest policy greatly depends on domestic reforms.

Chapter 3

The role of environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOS) in Mexico's environmental policy 1970-1994

Introduction

In the first chapter, the formal and informal institutions of Mexican politics were examined, while the second chapter was centred on the state-peasant relationship, which has been based on authoritarian patterns (corporatism and clientelism). In this chapter the focus is centred on explaining why environmental policy has been given only marginal importance in Mexican politics.

ENGOS have had little introduction into the main decision-making process. This situation is not surprising because environmental policy is a relative new issue in world politics, and is increasingly incorporating new policy-actors into existent policy-networks. This situation is gradually changing the environmental policy process.

Thus, the political scenario has influenced forestry policy. Mexico's forestry sector has been subject to the agrarian and social agendas. However, after the second agrarian reform, forestry policy took on unexpected importance when land tenure was modified and the natural resources issue emerged as an independent issue in the Mexican public agenda.

This chapter analyses the ENGOs role within Mexico's environmental policy and its relation with the forestry policy process. In doing this, the environmental policy is examined to identify major characteristics of the state-ENGOs relationship between 1970 and 1994. This covers the period from the first Mexican environmental law to the incorporation of the environment into public administration at cabinet level. As environment policy was broadly defined by the state until the late 1980s, Mexico's environmental policy process has been centred on the evolution of environmental institutions.

The central hypothesis is that ENGOs can still play a key role in Mexican politics, by strengthening the forest policy network (changing their strategy of systematic confrontation with the government) and becoming a go-between among public agencies, international actors, peasants and timber companies to encourage political agreements among them.

This chapter analyses environmental policy, emphasising pollution, because the Mexican ENGOs initially participated in this field, practically ignoring the natural resources deterioration issues until 1992. The ENGOs role is analysed with the aim of explaining the small significance of environmental organisations in Mexican politics so far, in spite of Mexico's multiple environmental problems that have made the Mexican government vulnerable.

Mexico's authoritarianism and structural problems (economic dependency and the political system's deficiencies) together with the ENGOs weaknesses (under-representative, poorly connected with other relevant policy-actors, organisational and structural weakness, and absence of long-term strategies) have largely conditioned poor environmental policy-implementation.

This chapter has six sections. Firstly, the context of Mexico's environmental politics is analysed. Then, the main structural problems that affect Mexico's environmental policy implementation are stressed to examine ENGOs role while the third section analyses forestry politics in the 1970s, when the Mexican ENGOs were absent from forestry policy. The next section examines environmental policy during the Salinas administration, regarding the growing importance of environmental politics in a scenario of rising electoral competition and political conflict. The fifth section examines international factors that have affected Mexico's environmental policy, while conclusions take place in the last section.

The first four sections analyse environmental policy in the period 1970-1988, marked by strong governmental influence on environmental policy design, while the two following sections centre on the Salinas administration (1988-1994), characterised by growing influence of international factors and external actors. During the first period, environmental policy registered important legal and formal

progress, the Salinas administration was marked by definition of environmental policy priorities, gradual openness to international ENGOs, and specification of policy-targets.

Mexico's environmental politics

Mexico's environmental policy is defined as the set of actions designed to manage the environment (Brañes, 2000: 176). This policy has greatly been influenced by the authoritarian nature of the Mexican political system, characterised by its top-down strategies of policy-making. Indeed, since Mexico's forestry and environmental policies have broadly been of a regulatory nature, the unaccountable bureaucracy of executive power managed those policies practically without political opposition.

Thus, environmental and forestry policies have widely been defined by the state. Mexico's forestry political scenario has been composed of players (local communities, peasants, *ejidatarios* [landholders of common lands] greatly dependent on the state, farmers, and in different times timber entrepreneurs) throughout the twentieth century, as the land allocation and forest exploitation had been highly controlled by the government through the *ejido* and PRI (specifically the CNC).

Mexico's government used another strategy to deal with ENGOs, since corporatism was not effective with them, or clientelism was not as efficient as with other social groups. Thus, social participation of peasants was highly controlled by the CNC, while co-option and regulation were used to manage social participation of ENGOs.

In this scenario, the main linkage between peasants and state was managed by PRI and CNC, while ENGOs established more contact with the government (public officials and agencies in charge of environment). In this new policy-network, the main strengths of peasants were their traditional organisation, compact social demands, and their capacity for social mobilisation to pressure the government. By contrast, the government had traditionally controlled them, their organisations were highly penetrated by state interests (through corporatism and clientelism), and independent social mobilisation was rather weak.

On the other hand, ENGOs were usually consisted of middle-upper class groups, usually practising liberal professions (not dependent on corporations, government positions, or clientelistic relationship); well educated; and with the capacity to challenge the state, especially in those fields related to environmental policies, and even social policies.

However, ENGOs usually have been elitist and little connected with major social organisations and political parties; their capacity of

challenging the state is dependent on the relative openness of the political system since they have no broad social support or clear strategies to deal with state initiatives; and their demands are diffuse forming a not very cohesive social group with poor communication among and within ENGOs themselves.

In view of this, Mexico's environmental policy-formation (the earliest stage) is basically centred on the government as central actor, emphasising institutional evolution, law amendments and state actors. It is worthy to note that the early stages of Mexico's environmental policy were basically focused on urban environmental quality (pollution) rather than deterioration and wild conservation of natural resources. Indeed, since the forestry policy was not greatly linked to environmental issues until the early 1990s, both policy processes have followed different paths in Mexican politics during most of the period analysed here.

Thus, environmental and forestry policies have in common that they have been greatly defined by the state, relatively irrelevant for Mexico's public agenda, and highly regulatory. At the same time, those policies have wide differences. While the former is a relatively new policy, clearly transectoral (either urban or rural, and integrated in different economic sectors), and an emerging issue in Mexican politics, the latter is more confined to the primary sector, although it has connections with other economic sectors, an old issue (roots of its

history can be located in the nineteenth century), and one of the least important issues of Mexican politics.

While Mexico's forestry is an important issue without adequate public attention (social and political), related at the same time to one of the most traditional allies of the revolutionary regime (peasants), pollution was an evident problem for the middle class (a more actively participant constituency in Mexican politics).

Mexico's environmental policy

Mexico's forestry policy is associated with poverty and migration (*Programa Nacional Forestal*, 2001:18). Unlike other Latin American countries, Mexico's forestry policy does not have strong timber interests to deal with. As a consequence, the main policy actors were peasants and the state until the late 1980s. By that time (and more clearly in the early 1990s), ENGOs were incorporated into forestry policy. Initially, ENGOs were more concerned about the brown agenda (pollution) than the green agenda (natural resources) because the first environmental groups were highly urban groups and middle class. In this context, pollution quickly became both a political and an electoral problem.

The forestry policy has had a low profile in the environmental agenda, and as such has had low priority in Mexican politics. This low priority

(expressed in constant changes of public officials in this area, insufficient budget, undermining forestry agencies and programmes) has contributed to its poor development and lack of attention from the public. For example, only two out of seven newspapers reviewed for this thesis have shown a relatively constant attention to forestry concerns in the last four years (*La Jornada* and *El Financiero*, 1999-2003).

While the inefficient timber sector and corporatist peasants are weak constituencies in the political arena, the government is interested in launching both agro-forestry and commercial plantations projects at the same time as it considers that those strategies are not mutually exclusive (at least, this was the common idea of interviewed public officials). Nonetheless, there are two main political problems in implementing this.

On the one hand, ENGOs have usually favoured peasants in the forestry policy, eroding their image of neutrality. Therefore they have problems to be legitimate stakeholders at present. On the other hand, traditional distrust between peasants, timber interests, and the government has complicated the discussion of policy options. The false dilemma between policies favouring either peasants or timber interests has shadowed Mexico's real forestry problem based on making compatible the rich forests with the poverty of their inhabitants.

There are two different problems that affect Mexico's forest policy, trust and funds. On one hand, forest plantations need investment to undertake long-term projects (forest is a sector of long-term investments). On the other hand, agro-forestry requires that forest policy actors (timber interests, peasants, and state actors) trust one each other to carry out their projects.

At this point, it is important that ENGOs consider the new conditions of Mexico's political scenario (growing democratic process), and they take an active part in the forestry management as mediators, becoming part of the solution instead of being part of the problem (by systematically opposing to governmental initiatives). The role of facilitators is necessary in the environmental arena since the two strategies are not mutually exclusive since they need different inputs. The problem is focused on strategy and management.

Until 1994, there did not exist an environmental sector in Mexico's public administration. Basically, the environment was an issue incorporated into the government agenda (National Development Plan, PND, 1982-88) by government decision, aimed at providing an international political image rather than a real concern for environmental problems.

That situation changed during 1992, when Mexico signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and increasingly was incorporated into the world economy, particularly into US's and Canada's economies. At that time, social and international pressures became central elements pushing Mexico's environmental policy.

Although the initial stages of Mexican environmental policy were not problematic, in general the environmental policy usually works in conflictive arenas. The regulatory characteristics of Mexico's environmental policy conditioned the low conflict. While the government –which is one of the largest polluters— has avoided monitoring enterprises and companies, the political opposition and ENGOs had been vulnerable policy actors in Mexican politics until 1988.

In theory, the central problem is that unless the state compensates polluters for costs of pollution control (which it often does), environmental policy requires that polluters bear the abatement costs. When a pollution problem is included in the political agenda, polluters initially face concentrated costs, which are very visible and are, therefore, controversial. Environmental policy involves political costs because it, as a new policy, incorporates new participants into the policy process. In this scenario, traditional networks perceive that their interests can be affected by new environmental policy actors.

This has been the case in Mexico in several policy-arenas (e.g. industrial, trade, agriculture, agrarian).

Identifying roots of the problem

Two main causes broadly explain environmental troubles both in Mexico and Latin America: a) Mexico's economic development policy, and b) structural problems that affect policy implementation. The former implies subordination of rural interest in favour of urban areas, producing steady emigration from the former to the latter, and a deficient industrial structure, which generates pollution in most cities, including Mexico City (Nuccio, 1991: 112). The latter affects policy implementation, especially that of a regulatory nature because of its vulnerability *vis à vis* bureaucracies, often characterised by unaccountability.

The main economic factor that caused degradation was Mexico's industrialisation policy, encouraged by the Import-Substituting industrialisation model (ISI), implemented between 1940s and 1960s (encouraging oil industry, manufacture and urbanisation). This policy was run at the expense of the agricultural sector as cheap food was provided for the working class, and exchanged for capital goods. However, this sector, while it became an adjunct to industrialisation, was gradually substituting the use of labour with more technology, including improved seeds, pesticides, fertilisers, and so forth.

Simultaneously, government economic support was channelled to large agribusiness companies, subordinating peasant interests. Both processes affected the environment. Serious problems of soil and water, as well as deforestation were the final effects. Big farmers and poor peasants expanded their plots devastating forests and exploiting water, although for different reasons: the former to increase their businesses, while the latter did so to survive.

On the other hand, the oil industry was increasingly pushed by the Mexican government. From the mid-1970s onward this industry experienced its most relevant growth when new oil fields were discovered in the Gulf of Mexico. Mexican Petroleum Company (PEMEX) became Mexico's strongest public enterprise, and Mexico's biggest polluting company as well.

Manufacturing industry was another factor in contamination since it has been the most dynamic sector in Mexico since the 1940s, favouring employment at expense of the environment. Mexico's manufacturing industry grew from 20 percent of the Gross National Product (GDP) in 1940 to 39 percent in 1980 (Brañes, 2000:571), while the pollution intensity of manufacturing industry increased by 50 percent between 1950 and 1970s, and by another 25 percent between 1970 and 1990 (Hogenboom, 1998: 68). In addition, subsidies to energy prices (hydrocarbons) raised the energy-intensity of

Mexico's industry, increasing air pollution. In fact, while OECD countries diminished energy-intensity of manufacturing, Mexico was led in the opposite direction. The energy use per unit of output grew more than the rate of growth of output (Kate, 1993: 31-9).

Finally, urbanisation is the other key factor that has produced contamination. Deficient urban planning and uncontrolled urbanisation, encouraged by industrialisation, produced severe problems of air pollution, high demand and contamination of water (e.g. Mexico City, Aguascalientes and several cities in central Mexico), as well as deforestation (e.g. new cities built on the Peninsula of Yucatan, such as Cancun, Playa del Carmen, or Tulum).

This has been a serious problem. For example, in the second half of the twentieth century, Mexico became an urban country. In 1990, 66% of the population lived in urban areas, while in 1940, 4 out of 5 lived in the countryside. In the same period Mexico's population has risen four-fold (Coll Hurtado, 1993:18). Thus, Mexico's quick urbanisation has been a key factor that has affected the environment, which represented in 2002 11 percent of Mexico's GNP (*La Jornada*, 2003: 1).

Structural problems

In developing countries, structural problems largely affect the environmental policy. For instance, the major environmental problems are limited by a) difficulties involved in linking environmental issues with social justice concerns; b) economic policies that promote exploitation of natural resources as well as the weakness of the public sector; and c) the broad influence of groups with vested interests in continuing environmental degradation activities (e.g. the paper industry).

In addition the developing countries face two major problems when dealing with environmental matters. On the one hand, the economic dependency on developed countries, and on the other hand those associated with the structural problems of their political system. The former includes 'demonstration effect' consistent with adopting environmental laws, pressured by nations of the first world, while the latter embraces problems related to a) poor connection between ENGOs and society, b) the authoritarian characteristics of political systems of developing countries, c) bureaucratic limitations and d) the relative irrelevance of laws, especially in Latin America.

In this regard, most of Latin American environmental laws have a set of reforms that deal with the effect of pollution and environmental degradation rather than the origin of problems. Those laws basically

highlight the developing nature of the region, and the major responses to environmental degradation derived from the industrialisation process of their societies (Mummer *et al.*, 1988: 8; Kruse, 1974: 683-4). The problem of those laws is that they just build up a "good" environmental image of governments in developing countries rather than dealing with the roots of the environmental degradation.

This has a consequence on the policy process. While policy formulation is usually well designed (even creating consensus among domestic political forces), policy-implementation is often problematic because social groups and economic interests realise how and to what extent they are really affected when the policy is actually being run. This is because most governments in developing countries usually do not consult the population for most of their decision-making. As a result, the population does not have the chance to change the decisions until the implementation stage. For example, most tourist projects in the Mexican coasts from the 1990s-onwards, which have had environmental impacts on local communities, illustrate this problem. Local inhabitants protest when projects are already being run.

The second set of limitations is marked by the characteristics of developing countries politics, especially those of Latin American political systems. There are four types of assumptions linking environmental policy deficiencies to structural political problems. The

first group of hypothesis points out the large gulf between the elite and the masses, suggesting that environmental policy is essentially elitist. This situation makes the environment a technical issue (distanced from the common citizen).

Christen, *et al.* (1998: 59) support this idea by pointing out that environmental groups in Latin America are elitist in structure and in participant base. In addition, between the 1970s and 1994, Mexico's environmental issues were examined almost exclusively in scientific centres by specialists. Moreover, most environmental laws and policy-analysis were undertaken by middle public officials without social participation.

A second set of assumptions centres upon the authoritarian nature of political systems in Latin America. It is suggested that there is a direct relationship between openness of the political system and favourable solutions to environmental concerns (Lundqvist, quoted by Mummer *et al.*, 1988: 9; Umlas, 1998:161-90; 1996:243-52).

'From this perspective, major obstacles to development of environmental policies are found in single-party or limited pluralism systems employing a variety of methods to limit or co-opt the articulation of interests in society'. As a result, 'such systems reinforce elite decision making and agenda domination, restricting the

opportunities for environmental policy development' (Mummer *et al.*, 1988: 9).

In the case of Mexico, although some environmental policies are of a redistributive character, the final policy-outcome tends to be mild, because the Mexican government has managed those arenas in a regulatory mode. As a consequence, the importance of Mexico's environmental policy implementation depends on the chief of state, and the degree of freedom permitted by polity. Mexico's political system, for instance, was gradually opening to social participation without stopping to apply co-optation or repression when considered necessary.

Paradoxically, the regulatory nature of some environmental policies has been managed as distributive or re-distributive policies. In practice, the regulatory policies have looked like another distributive policy favouring symbolic and formalistic measures rather than sanctions and penalizations. This is true for environmental policy. The Mexican government has opted to formulate formal instruments (persuasion and bargaining) to achieve vague environmental goals, avoiding political conflicts (by avoiding application of coercion).

Together with the lax application of law, the ENGOs intrinsic weaknesses have contributed to keeping the environmental policy at the bottom of the Mexican public agenda. For example, ENGOs have

been unable to a) build a strong policy-network with other relevant policy actors; b) encourage a long-term plan to deal with structural problems of the countryside and insufficient funding mechanisms; c) re-functionalise or break down the traditional rural policy network, broadly defined by agrarian interests, usually not pro-environmental; and d) use policy-analysis with more precision when dealing with forestry plantations.

At this point, it is worth noting that several ENGOs have used the same logic in most countries facing forest plantations projects, by blocking them regardless of local needs, project convenience, ecological and economic impacts, and power allocation (for example, if timber interests really represent a menace for local inhabitants), collapsing opportunities of development for the local communities. Importantly in some of these countries, the forestry sector is significant for the economy, a situation that is different for Mexico.

In essence, the forestry policy's main problem is the absence of a realistic long-term strategy. There is neither great cohesion among groups that push for peasant participation in decision-making in the forest, nor alternatives for organisational change in *ejido*. In this regard, academics and ENGOs have centred their efforts on stopping forest plantations, confronting the government, instead of offering alternative ways of organising peasants without corporatism, or

propelling alternatives of organisational change for more efficient decision-making in *ejidos*.

For example, in Quintana Roo state (whose main economic activity is the tourism), the development of a tourist project was attempted. A local environmental group (Grupo de Ecologistas del Mayab, GEMA) confronted this decision arguing that the land, where this project was going to be developed, had high environmental value. At the end of the day, neither was the land of high value, nor was the project undertaken. The project was cancelled, but GEMA became famous (through national and local press and mass media) and important *vis à vis* local and national authorities.

The ENGOS maybe have failed to pressure the government because they are using the wrong strategy. As Mexico's main forestry problem is of an organisational nature (e.g. state peasant relationship, structure of *ejido*'s decision-making, insufficient subsidies and investment), ENGOS strategies could be more productive if they contributed to finding better rules to build up a win-win scenario for involved policy actors. This scenario would make ENGOS efficient go-betweens among government, producers and peasants. The basic problem here is the systematic position of ENGOS in favour of peasants, and against the government. This situation erodes their neutrality and credibility to be intermediaries among the involved policy actors.

A third group of hypothesis is focused on bureaucratic limitations to formulating and implementing the environmental policy in underdeveloped countries. Problems such as corruption, insufficient information, bureaucratic over-politicisation, administrative dispersion, short-term instead of long-term planning, ill-equipped personnel, and so on are emphasised as the key factors affecting environmental policy (See for example the works of Riggs, 1967, 412-32; Simonian, 1995; Silva, 1997: 457-94, who illustrate those problems). The case of Semarnap-Semarnat is a good example of those problems, as will be widely explained in the next chapter.

Finally, the fourth limitation is the limited importance of the law in Latin American countries. The Root of this problem in Mexico is the assumption that the law can solve problems by itself, a paradoxical situation in view of the fact that law compliance is not part, in general, of Latin cultures (e.g. Spain, Portugal, Italy and Latin American countries). This limitation is going to be analysed widely in the next section.

The relative irrelevance of the law in developing countries, particularly in Latin American countries, explains the vulnerability of the regulatory arena. As a consequence, the regulatory policies are regarded as weak and hard to implement because the affected groups are usually organised and powerful enough to influence the political

system, characterised by personal linkages, ambiguity in laws, weak judiciary and legislative powers, as well as corruption in the executive power. On the other hand, citizens –affected by pollution— are disperse and unorganised.

Not surprisingly, most important environmental progress has fallen into formal activities (e.g. law, codes, higher hierarchy of environment agencies within public administration, laws that encourage social participation, strengthening of environmental information data, environmental education, formulation of plans and programmes for ecosystem protection and programmes of reforestation), rather than substantial actions (e.g. empowerment of environmental agencies, effective policy instruments, decentralisation, strengthening of agencies in charge of environmental law application, imposition of economic sanctions on polluters).

In Mexico, for instance, most important environmental laws formulated until the late 1980s (the Federal Law to Prevent and Control Environmental Pollution [1971], the Federal Law of Environmental Protection [1982], and the General Law of Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection, LGEEPA [1987]), did not clearly defined economic sanctions against polluters, because this implied confrontation with powerful economic interests, both governmental and private. For example two of the biggest polluters in Mexico are public enterprises, PEMEX and CFE, which have enjoyed

broad economic power. In view of this, the Federal Attorney's Agency for Environmental Protection (Profepa) has applied few sanctions against polluters or environmental criminals since 1992, when this institution was created.

ENGOS and environmental politics

The environmental groups began to emerge recently in most developing countries. For example, in Mexico since the 1980s, several ENGOS have had a growing presence, such as the Group of 100 (Grupo de los 100), Ecologist Alliance (Alianza Ecologista), Pact of Ecologist Groups (Pacto de Grupos Ecologistas), Grupo de Ecologistas del Mayab (GEMA), to name just some of the most famous. In spite of this growing presence of environmental groups, the Mexican government has preferred avoiding problems, being flexible with polluters to implementing strict rules where beneficiaries are weak (citizens and ENGOS).

Degradation and pollution became top-issues in the political agenda of the De la Madrid administration, while the environmental policy remained of low profile (Hoogenboom, 1998: 84). Symptoms of the problem were identified by the government, although the roots of the degradation remained ignored. While degradation and pollution were identified as the main problems in environmental terms, the Mexican government avoided formulating an environmental policy. The

intention of the government was to evade intervening in the production process, because it implied regulating the private sector and imposing costs on polluters.

Perceiving the emerging environmental movement around the world, the Mexican government started to get close to ecological groups. This political strategy was encouraged by some government officials, who toured Europe analysing the green movement (*ibid*), while other social leaders, mainly from the left-wing (e.g. Martínez Verdugo, Julia Carabias, Alicia Bárcena), pushed for environmental initiatives on the domestic front.

In spite of the weak presence of ecological groups in Mexico, they had the virtue of being outside of the PRI's structures of consultation and representation. ENGOs did not build political linkages with corporations and traditional policy-networks. So potential independent mobilisation was possible, becoming a threat for the establishment. This is relevant because the government had shown inefficiency when facing independent social groups, basically composed of the middle classes. For instance, in 1968 the government dealt with the student movement using its military power, eroding the revolutionary regime's legitimacy.

Since 1968, the Mexican elite was increasingly fearful of independent social groups. As a result, the Mexican government improved its

methods of co-option, by incorporating emergent social groups and their demands into its structures, or detecting and recruiting new leaders. This strategy has largely marked the state-ENGOS relationship.

In the 1980s, the Mexican ENGOS characteristics (well-educated leaders and participant-base, usually oppositionist, and interested in various issues) had shown that they would not be easy to control. Despite the rising ecological movement during the 1980s, its political consistency remained weak, because its initial advantages became its biggest problems. Its non-corporatist characteristics were an obstacle for its political connections, its political independence was an issue when setting up political connections with other social and political organisations, and its diversity was the base for deficient strategies to deal with the government. In fact, diversity of ENGOS implied, in practice, dispersion of goals.

On the government side, the De la Madrid administration implemented a three fold strategy by: a) forming contacts with ENGOS and detecting possible areas and issues of political conflicts; b) making ENGOS, in practice, the major linkages between state and society for environmental issues in view of the absence of institutional structures to run this; and c) setting up formally the National Commission of Ecology (CONADE) as a centre of popular consultation, which did not work properly because most communication between

the government offices and ENGOs were through personal contacts. These political actions were of an inclusive nature because various critical organisations were incorporated into the debate and discussions. However, the government did not make any serious commitments.

This situation largely explains the collaboration of ENGOs with the De la Madrid administration. The economic crisis together with the growing social protests, and the relative irrelevance of the environment in the Mexican public agenda influenced the strategy of negotiation with the government undertaken by the Mexican ENGOs. Negotiations could help both sides: on the one hand, ENGOs could influence policy design, and on the other hand government could improve its legitimacy, profoundly deteriorated in those hard times.

Thus, the setting up of ENGOs as one of the most relevant connections with the society allowed the government to build up a scenario in which it could gain in at least three ways: a) the government could keep informed of social concerns and opinion on government policy; b) the environmental government agencies could be provided with linkages, experienced personnel, personal contact and general help from the ENGOs; and c) the strategy of negotiation with ENGOs would help the government to increase its eroded legitimacy, as the usual criticism from ENGOs could reduce.

Obviously, ENGOs run the risk of being co-opted, losing independence (following the same rout as most social organisations in Mexico) and being absorbed into PRI's corporations. For example, the Mexican Ecologist Movement (headed by Alfonso Cipres) and then the National Ecologist Alliance (AEN), which have transformed today into the Mexico's Ecologist Green Party (PVEM) (led by Jorge González Torres) are good examples of this. Both organisations nowadays have scarce credibility among ENGOs and the public opinion in general.

In fact, the former is identified as an environmentalist who has not strongly supported the environmental movement when necessary (e.g. during the NAFTA negotiations), while the latter is labelled as an ex-PRI member with strong linkages and interests in that party (actually, his father was a state governor in the 1970s, nominated by the PRI).

Other ecologist groups have had relative success, such as the Group of Hundred, and the Pact of Ecologist Groups (PGE). The former consists of intellectuals, while the latter has been working as a network, where each organisation follows its own policy and strategy. Various internal problems have weakened this network, as there is not a uniform and coordinated strategy to deal with the government and common problems.

The Mexican environmental movement was encouraged by civil organisations that began political actions to be recognised by state, to

present themselves as alternatives to the PRI's corporations during the 1980s. Paradoxically, while in Europe political movements have addressed their efforts to building up non-institutional models, in Mexico they have developed in an opposite direction as civil organisations have considered that the state must meet demands and satisfy needs.

This has been part of the problem. The Mexican ENGOs push society for independence from corporatist organisations, but they are not independent themselves. In practice, they do not represent an actual alternative. Though ENGOs, as a part of rising social movements, encouraged political liberalisation in the 1980s (eroding the corporatism built during the 1930s), they have not been able to consolidate a really independent organisation or a strong policy network.

The role of ENGOs

Various deficiencies have torpedoed the construction of an authentic environmental movement. Most ENGOs are quite small, usually based in Mexico city, with scarce resources and a lack of continuity in their activities. Also they have distrust among themselves and *vis à vis* the government and other political organisations, a lack of political abilities and common strategies, little solidarity and long-term vision,

personalism, a middle class or elitist bias; and authoritarian political culture.

On the other hand, political parties-ENGOS relationships in Mexico have essentially been irrelevant because ENGOS have been afraid of a) losing identity within party structures; b) being hurt by internal problems and conflicts of political parties; and c) creating internal problems within the ENGO itself. In addition, ENGOS have had the impression that alliance with political parties is not a good deal for them, as political parties are usually vertical structures and mainly interested in gaining votes. Nonetheless, the ENGOS main problem has been their incapacity, as a whole, to set commitments with other social groups and civil organisations.

The weak linkages between ENGOS and political parties, indeed, are associated with the lack of democratic tradition of ENGOS (authoritarian political culture), and the absence of a long-term strategic view. Firstly, repetition of negative traditions of the Mexican political system, such as clientelism, paternalism, personalism, weak practice of democratic decision-making (e.g. in Calakmul and Nohbec various ENGOS have fallen into those practices) have affected political alliances of ENGOS and their relationship with other social groups.

Secondly, ENGOS have had little long-term political vision, and limited strategies to face government and other civil organisations. In general,

leaders of ENGOs have failed in involving political parties in environmental problems, while they have not been able to change their position from reactive to active policy actors *vis à vis* government initiatives.

Ideology rather than pragmatism has prevailed in the strategy of ENGOs until recently. This situation has shadowed central problems, such as deforestation. It is common for ENGOs to play an opposing role, without analysing either government or private companies plans (behaviour shared by most Latin-American ENGOs [See, for example, Rodrigues, 2000:125-54; Laarman, J. G. 1999:11-37]). Most of Mexico's environmental organisations understand their political role as defending the poor versus rich people rather than as a facilitator of solutions. 'Popular environmentalism', that mixes ecological, agrarian, and ethnic issues, is a good example of this (See Mires, 1993:17-31; Martínez, 1992).

In practice, various ENGOs have stopped several projects without analysing alternatives, more interested in causing political problems than in protecting the environment, partly because they are focused on government actions. This is partly because they do not have a more sophisticated understanding of problems and projects. As Barkin (1991:92-3) and Alfie (1995:18) note, ENGOs have been more concerned about specific and local problems than the structural causes of environmental degradation.

However, other ENGOs have started to change this position building consensus and agreement with other organisations, government itself, and even private companies, keeping their independence. Nowadays, GEMA is an example of the first trends as its position is usually against any government initiative, whereas Friends of Sian Ka'an apparently represents the new trend, playing a role of go-between. This organisation has opted to facilitate solutions to preserve natural areas in the region of Yucatan, using dialogue as a political strategy.

There are three main factors explaining Mexican ENGOs behaviour. First, most environmental organisations have mixed social considerations with environmental concerns, but they have not mixed ecological issues with political participation (besides protest and denouncement) and strategic alliances with other social, economic or political organisations. Then, despite various scholars having actively participated in environmental research, some of them have assumed an active political position instead of acting as facilitators of solutions to build up successful cases to illustrate future actions in other areas. Others have proposed technology, but not strategies to apply it.

Finally, Mexico's environmental movement has usually preferred playing a testimonial role (formal, denouncement) to an active role. As a consequence, their demands have been secondary in the public agenda, as they neither have enough cohesion to pressure

government, nor enough strong linkages with social and interest groups (mainly with political parties). Environmental organisations have often rejected participating in the electoral arena, resigning a useful tool to pressure the state given that minority parties are increasingly becoming central actors in Mexico's congress.

This has been another important mistake. Now for example, PVEM, a political party of questionable commitment to environmental issues, has filled the political space for environmentalism. This political party has gained excellent political results (seats both in federal and local congresses) without really formulating any serious environmental policy (both in brown and green agendas). Its condition of minority party has let PVEM set alliances with other political parties with pragmatist criteria (e.g. 2000 with the right-wing party, and at the present, with the PRI in the federal level. In local elections, its alliances has been more diverse), rather than with environmental orientation. Unlike the ENGOs, the PVEM has understood the importance of political participation, as well as the relevance of minorities in pluralistic systems in gaining political advantages.

Forestry policy-implementation

ENGOs participation in Mexican forestry policy practically did not exist until the early 1990s. The government formulated forestry policy without strong political opposition, as it exercised large control on the

major involved policy actors (e.g. traditional inhabitants, converters and producers) through different political instruments (e.g. co-option, clientelism, repression, and concessions and bans in the particular case of forest policy).

In view of this, the government was able to undertake an oscillating strategy stressing either the role of the state or the market without significant problems, depending on predominant bureaucracies (pro-market or pro state) and specific political circumstances within government. Discontinuity and erratic forestry policy with poor results was the consequence.

For example, between the 1970s and 1980s, the forestry policy favoured large-scale industry use of native forest, and promoted forestry community projects supporting organised peasants communities. By contrast, from 1986 –and mainly after 1990— Mexico's forestry policy implemented an outstanding change, introducing a market-oriented system, based on the Chilean model of large-scale industrial plantations. Peasant protest took place, but political control through CNC and PRI kept the situation under control.

In the early 1970s, the president López Portillo (1970-76) created an office for peasant affairs in the forestry service (dependent on SARH), where a group of experts worked in favour of community forestry

(state intervention), while in the early 1990s the Salinas administration destroyed the forestry community efforts by appointing a new cohesive team in favour of market-oriented strategies, formulating a new forestry bill (which encouraged large-scale plantations over native forestry management, and cut off organised peasants from government aid).

In view of the fact that forestry policy has broadly depended on bureaucracy, the policy network has been largely influenced by the government following erratic direction (e.g. federal forest service, foresters, state governors, local caciques, SRA, SARH, SEDUE). Policy formulation was more an inter-bureaucratic struggle than a policy negotiated with social groups, as the substance of politics has taken place in the executive branch, while social actors have been either so controlled or so weak (under-representative).

On the one hand, the forestry policy was a struggle to gain appointment to office, and bureaucratic in-fighting between patron-client networks to dislodge opponents from offices gained. For example, during the second agrarian reform process (1992), there was a political confrontation within SARH, between the under-secretaries, Gustavo Gordillo and Luis Téllez, as they represented different rural policy orientations.

While the former was an enthusiastic supporter of empowerment of peasants, by transferring to them many state run enterprises and increasing agricultural investment and subsidies, the latter was a supporter of empowering the rural middle class, encouraging land privatisation and free-market policies. Those policy-orientations marked large differences for the forestry policy as they are largely conditioned by agrarian issues (land tenure) and the rural economy (subsidises and investment).

On the other hand, political conflict between peasants and timber interests has been highly managed by the state, focusing the forestry problem on federal bureaucracies (in view of the fact that congress did not have a relevant role in Mexican politics) rather than in the social field. This is because timber interests and peasants have largely relied on concessions and bans to exploit forest, managed by the bureaucracies of SRA (land tenure) or SARH (forest exploitation) and other non-cabinet agencies. In 1992, timber interests and peasants however were allies against trade liberalisation (second agrarian reform and NAFTA processes in 1992), instead of fighting for the control of forestry because both were affected by the strong new competition from the US and Canadian wood and paper industries.

The forestry policy process was led by the prevailing bureaucracy, (maybe a normal process in an authoritarian system). As the ENGOS did not take part in forestry policy design until the 1990s, it is worth

describing the forestry policy process in order to figure out how bureaucracies set alliances with social actors, even with political opposition (e.g. more radical factions of the left-wing).

In the 1970s, Mexico's government intervened in the forestry activities because *a*) this kept under control its political clientele (peasants) and the forestry sector in economic terms, and *b*) it attempted to impose peace in regions of conflicts affected by guerrillas. In this period, in order to recover political support from peasants (effects of ISI model on the agricultural sector, and the consequent CNC's political crisis), the 1970s populist administrations (Echeverría and López Portillo) encouraged land distribution and economic projects involving change of land uses.

In the mid-1970s a group of public officials promoted to manage forest by empowering forestry communities, identifying peasants as policy-targets. The General Directorate of Forestry Development was in charge of creating policies and programmes in favour of peasants and indigenous people. However, efforts were inconsistent as the alliance formed by bureaucrats, productions-oriented reformers, and more radical members from the left-wing, recruited in the Autonomous University of Chapingo (specialising in land sciences, with a left-wing profile) was weak and instable.

In practice, the alliance between the government and some left-wing groups could not be made, as a) they did not represent a serious threat to the regime, as a whole; b) the government gained political allies which often questioned its actions; c) the government gained technical expertise to run its policies; and d) this alliance was led by government agencies, instead of social groups ensuring governmental control. At the end of the day, the main problem was of an inter-governmental nature (e.g. SRA-SARH-INI-SEDUE), not of the state-society relationships (state-peasants, or state-political parties, or state-timber interests), making any trouble manageable.

In addition, forestry management has been exercised by the middle bureaucracy of federal government as it has been subordinated to other policies, usually more conflictive (e.g. agrarian reform, agriculture). By the 1970s the forestry policy lost even more importance in so far as the petroleum, industrialisation and economic crisis gained importance in Mexico's political agenda. In fact, in 1980 the Forestry Under-secretariat was eliminated from the SARH, fragmenting institutions charged with forestry policy.

Forestry policy outcomes. The local variable

When De la Madrid's administration created the Directorate of Forestry Development (DDF) in 1982 within the SARH, forestry policy recovered formal importance, but kept a low profile in Mexican

politics. Although De la Madrid's forestry policy encouraged forestry community projects –initiated in the 1970s—, the agency in charge of managing this policy was ill-equipped. Furthermore, organisational, economic and political resources were insufficient. This policy, however, had irregular policy outcomes as the governors and local political groups were intervening in different ways and degree of importance.

For example, in Oaxaca and Michoacán the old traditional political class did influence the policy process. Corporatism and discretionary application of the law were the main instruments of the state governments. In the former state, groups of political establishment implemented a top-down strategy of forestry organisation, by promoting formation of vertical regional forestry organisations, made up of various local communities, around the public forestry workers. In this strategy, pro-government organisations were favoured more than the independent ones. In Michoacán, forestry policy was constrained by bans and political control exercised by the traditional political groups, controlling the agricultural sector and forestry activities in particular.

In contrast, in Quintana Roo the state government was a key actor in encouraging the agro-forestry projects. Specifically, the governor in alliance with the private sector tourist interests (the strongest economic group in Quintana Roo) pushed timber companies to

bargain directly with peasant cooperatives and facilitated public funds for this negotiation. Indeed, the Governor 'also assured the cooperatives' control over sales and profits by foiling the SARH's attempt to manage funds on the cooperatives' behalf (Silva, 1994:710).

The initial success of Quintana Roo's case was possible thanks to the absence of a traditional political class and strong economic interests. This federal state was created in 1974, and the political class began to be formed in that time, while economic groups had been concentrated in rural areas, with marginal political power at the regional and national levels. In addition, the lack of political power of timber interests made this change of policy orientation manageable, favouring peasants rather than timber companies. A key ingredient in this policy change was the presence of international organisations supporting this government strategy with funds and technical support. Most importantly, the formation of an incipient pro-agro forestry policy network was possible.

These cases show that the forestry policy has been used as an instrument for solving other core problems for the government. In this regard, the forestry policy has helped to keep under control the most relevant economic policies (development policy, food policy, foreign investment, and so forth), social variables (land possession, rural jobs

creation, etc) and political concerns (the political control over the rural policy network).

In environmental terms, the period 1940-82 produced more environmental deterioration. Imbalances derived from the net transference of value from agriculture to industry by the 1960s, as well as the 'petrolisation' of the economy in the 1970s produced the worsening of Mexico's ecological conditions. This process was the culmination of a long period of steady economic growth initiated in the 1940s. On the political side, this constant economic expansion contributed to the stability of the Mexican political system, unique in Latin America, which through the PRI distributed benefits to the major political actors (e.g. peasants, workers, the growing middle class, and entrepreneurs).

This policy strategy did not work properly since the forestry sector remained in crisis, while corruption continued to grow at the same time. The private sector and the growing presence of public enterprises did not stop the commercial deficit of forestry production, whereas production was concentrated in the hands of few people. In addition, the most important economic decisions of the forestry sector were centralised by the central bureaucracy. ENGOs in that time practically did not exist or they were concentrated in the brown agenda, more concerned with pollution issues.

Environmental policy during the Salinas administration

During the first half of the Salinas administration, environmental policy had unparalleled importance due to the fact that it became one of the most sensitive issues for urban constituencies. This period precedes the NAFTA negotiations when international ENGOs began to influence Mexico's environmental policy. While on the domestic front, electoral difficulties pressured the Salinas administration to pay attention to environmental issues, NAFTA was the key factor influencing environmental policy formulation on the external front. It is important to note that external and internal factors were concerned with the brown agenda rather than green agenda

Salinas took the presidential office in 1988 in a context of high political competition, when emerging social movements pushed government, through electoral means, to implement political changes. Salinas continued the environmental policy of the De la Madrid's administration, focusing on anti-pollution programmes rather than deterioration of natural resources, as in electoral terms this was more profitable.

The Salinas administration modified the traditional Mexican economic policy orientation (closed economy) by encouraging Mexico's integration into the North American economy (NAFTA). This strategy

generated unintentional consequences as it encouraged international influence in various areas of Mexican politics.

One of the most controversial issues was the environment. During the negotiation of NAFTA, several ENGOs (both international and Mexican) warned about the possible environmental degradation produced by trade and economic growth that would affect the region, especially Mexico because of its condition as a developing country. In practice, the The Salinas administration used the brown agenda to recuperate votes (urban areas) and gradually, in the second half of *sexenio*, used the green agenda to launch the Mexican government's environmental international image.

On the domestic side, the environment was a key point during the Salinas' political campaign, stressing the importance of continuing De la Madrid's policy in 1988. He added new content to the environmental policy by emphasising better regulation, improving policy-implementation and pinpointing hierarchical problems and strategies, unlike De la Madrid's policy more concerned with comprehensive focus.

Largely, Salinas wanted to build up his environmental image without criticising his predecessor. Thus, he attempted to build bridges between PRI and ENGOs pressured by huge political competition, and

by the real possibility of losing elections, an unparalleled situation experienced by a PRI candidate until then.

Salinas came to the presidential office in 1988 under suspicion of electoral fraud. In order to reverse this lack of legitimacy, Salinas started to rebuild the state-society relationships by constructing new channels of free social participation, instead of the traditional relation based on clientelism, paternalism and corporatism. The environment was one of the key issues for this task.

In various aspects, Salinas continued De la Madrid's policy-orientations, including the environmental policy. For example, he continued De la Madrid's economic policy (hugely challenged by various civil organisations, such as ENGOs, peasants, workers, middle class, and so forth), while setting up new linkages with society and new social groups. Also he modified the Mexican long-time economic and foreign policies towards the US, based on nationalism and a closed economy, keeping at the same time evident distance from the US.

In the environmental field, the Salinas administration identified environmental protection as one of the four core policy goals for the Mexican government (the other three were improving living standards, social participation and international cooperation) pinpointing that the

main objective was synchronising economic growth with the preservation of environment.

Despite the fact that environmental policy goals gained precision, the Salinas administration did not offer new policy strategies, nor did it take into account (like De la Madrid) key areas, such as natural systems and ecosystems. The environmental policy, therefore, was incremental since there were no big modifications from one administration to another.

For example, Salinas continued strategies for environmental protection, social participation and popular mobilisation, international policy for the environment (agreements, signifying up to protocols), growing systematisation of data collection on Mexico's environmental degradation, increasing studies in environment, and progressive definition of policy-instruments and policy problems (See Brañes, 2000:193-6; Carabias and Provencio, 1994:405; INAP, 1999: 5-9).

In the context of growing political competition and a deficit of legitimacy, pollution became even more important for the Salinas administration, since contamination was one of the most sensitive issues for Mexico City's population. This was one of the most important factors that influenced voting trends in that city. Inhabitants of Mexico City had favoured political opposition in 1988,

causing the PRI to lose its majority of the electoral districts and the presidential election, in Mexico City.

At that time, environmental concerns had enormous importance (expressed in the multiple anti-pollution programmes and the growing investment in them) because of constituencies of urban areas, where Salinas and the PRI had lost an important amount of votes in 1988. President Salinas then launched various new antipollution programmes for Mexico City, and announced a four-year plan, where it was included the innovative of 'Day without car' programme, in which car owners could use their cars for four out of five working days.

Though environmental programmes received an unparalleled amount of funds, according to Hoogenboom, (1998: 97-8) and Nuccio (1991:115-6), the policy outcomes were more successful in political terms than in environmental improvement. While the PRI recovered congress seats in 1991, between late 1991 and early 1992, total air pollution reached levels never before experienced in Mexico City.

Nature conservation was a key issue for Salinas' international image mainly during the second half of the Salinas administration (this policy is more connected to peasants and timber interest, weaker constituencies of polity) once he had recovered the political initiative. This was reflected in the creation of protected areas, actions in favour

of protected areas and endangered species, stricter hunting regulations, and more attention to the Lacandon jungle at Southern Mexico. Furthermore, the first stages of environmental policy decentralisation were partially undertaken, by empowering federal state environmental laws.

Environmental politics during the Salinas administration

After political mobilisation encouraged by the state in the 1980s, the environmental movement gained its own political life actively criticising not only Mexico's environmental condition, but also challenging the authoritarian polity itself. The government response was to stop this growing movement through discrete but permanent attacks against main critical ENGOs (Umlas, 1996:243-52; Mumme, 1992; and Hoggenboom 1998:101).

The Salinas strategy mixed reaction and pre-emption, as well as traditional corporatist methods (e.g. environmental leaders' incorporation into government positions) in his administration. He put the environmental groups back on the defensive, by encouraging impressive environmental actions (e.g. permanent closure of large factories, organisational changes within public administration and law amendments) during the second half of his administration. Hoggenboom (1998:101), for instance, notes that whereas president Salinas was building up an environmental image, most ENGOs were

deliberately weakened, identifying 1988 July-December as the most critical term (between federal election and date of taking office).

The Salinas environmental policy reforms were developed into two phases, from 1988 to 1991 and from 1991 to 1994. The former was marked by policy analysis, where government was establishing priorities and avoiding rhetoric, like previous administrations, while the latter was influenced by the growing international pressure derived from the NAFTA.

This latter phase included a) spectacular measures (e.g. permanent closure of large industries and PEMEX's factories settled in Mexico City); b) cooperation with the Bush senior administration to face contamination in the border area, enhancing and giving more profoundness to the La Paz agreement; c) acknowledgment of the GATT as a valid organisation for solving a controversial issue between Mexico and the US related to tuna; and d) the increasing number of SEDUE's personnel for inspecting pollution in the border and the strengthening of laws, codes and regulation on pollution control. Also, according to Mummer, (1998:102-3) president Salinas launched an aggressive campaign to promote new Mexico's environmental face in Washington, combating the US ENGOs political offensive.

On the political side, the moderate ENGOs were slightly strengthened soon after Salinas took the presidential office, by his stressing the

importance of popular participation in ecological planning. However, this social participation was as diffuse as it was limited, because the law was so general and abstract that enforcement was practically impossible, while popular participation was highly regulated and constrained as a consequence. The limited participation was undertaken because the critical environmental groups were excluded from forums of consultation, while the moderate groups were integrated into them. The government only paid attention to friendly groups.

On the economic side, the Salinas administration's strategy for funding Mexican environmental policy was to reduce the government budget, while brought funds from international organisations and foreign governments for environmental projects. Thus, Japan, Germany, Britain, France, as well as the World Bank multiplied their funds devoted to Mexico by channelling multi-million dollar loans for the air pollution programmes and natural conservation programmes. In addition, president Salinas set up linkages with large US ENGOs based on long-term projects. In view of this, it was not rare that president Salinas won international prestige, including prizes like the Earth Prize in 1991.

The PRI's recovery and international recognition helped the Salinas administration deal successfully with the ENGOs' pressure. From 1991, the critical ENGOs failed to deal with government strategies

because of three factors: a) the growing social support for president Salinas, b) the environment was successfully dealt with by the Salinas administration *vis à vis* public opinion, and c) the public opinion perceived democratic signs in the Salinas administration as the President set up a strategic alliance with the opposition right-wing Action National Party (PAN), gaining a domestic image as a negotiator.

The ENGOs' strategies then shifted from domestic politics to the international sphere by enhancing their international contacts, mainly with US and Canadian counterparts (which were pressuring their governments to be stricter with the Mexican government during NAFTA negotiations), and strengthening their internal structure.

External factors

External factors inaugurated a second large phase of Mexico's environmental policy, broadly influenced by NAFTA and the Mexico-US border. The international coalition of North American ENGOs, and the growing economic importance of the Mexico-US border were the outstanding factors affecting Mexico's environmental policy.

Between 1982 and 1988, environmental policy was widely politicised in Mexican politics, but international influence did not take place until the emergence of trade between the United States and Mexico. In fact, the Mexico-US border in the context of rising trade among the

North American countries gained bilateral relevance in environmental terms, as the growing economic activities provoked environmental degradation reflected in scarcity of water, degradation of soil and pollution of rivers and lakes in Northern Mexico.

Transnational environmental organisations in NAFTA

The emergence of a transnational relationship among Mexican, US, and Canadian ENGOs was an unintentional consequence of NAFTA. This situation evidenced again the weak position of the Mexican ENGOs, and the rising role of international ENGOs within Mexico's political system.

This convergence of North American ENGOS, considered a novelty, was developed by stages. In the first term, between June 1990 and May 1991, ENGOs explored issues and opportunities for cooperation. Interestingly, two transnational positions developed, one supporting, and the other one criticising NAFTA.

The Mexican ENGOs, in general, criticised the free trade initiative and government intentions for broadly overlooking sustainable development and environmental protection. Various academics (e.g. Nuccio and Ornelas, 1990; Carabias and Provencio, 1991) and ENGOs (e.g. Green Peace) questioned the compatibility of free trade and sustainability, as proposed by the NAFTA supporters, as they

assumed that NAFTA would intensify exploitation and degradation of Mexico's ecosystems and natural resources. In addition that agreement would drive towards more extensive subordination of ecological considerations to economic expansion.

Mexico-US border

In the early 1980s, Mexico was not interested in participating in a big project involving Canada, US, and Mexico itself, so in that time Mexico did not attempt to influence congressmen in Washington to defend its environmental initiatives. Mexico acted under the logic of a closed country, arguing sovereignty to make any decision (including the environmental one obviously). Nevertheless, the Mexican-US border was already a great focus of trade, industry and conflict. Of course, the attention of both countries was necessary in so far as the Mexico-US border took on a huge dimension in economic terms.

Already known as the fourth member of NAFTA, the Mexican-US border area includes approximately 2,000 miles, six Mexican states and four US states with 22 million people, \$ 300 billion in GDP, \$ 100 billion in trade, and similar history and culture. In 1995, this border registered 225 million legal crossing in both directions, mostly Mexicans shopping in US, where they spent \$ 22 billion, paid 1.7 billion in taxes, and created 400,000 jobs without receiving benefits of

public services. 'Balanced against the costs of Mexican illegals, American taxpayers made a 600 percent profit' (Brown, 1997: 105).

This made Mexico the US's second largest trading partner, the capital of this border region being Paso del Norte (Juarez-El Paso), which is a bi-national metropolis of 2 million. The major problems are water, immigration, and drugs trafficking, health, welfare, environment, and infrastructure (*Ibid*). On the Mexican side, more than 13 million people live in this region (16.3% of the total Mexican population) and one of its main activities is the *maquiladora* (manufacture industry) (Ranger, 1996:321).

The social, economic and political dimension of the border was a key motor in influencing environmental policy in Mexico. As political organisation is similar in both countries (presidential, federal and republican system), environmental policy and the politics around it have been quite similar as well. For example, in both countries, the federal government set environmental policy and enforcement has generated equivalent public institutions. Also ENGOs have tended to coordinate their actions and strategies to pressure their governments. In this point, Barkin (1991:103) notes that US ENGOs contribution helped Mexican ENGOs to launch successful initiatives.

In this sense, besides SEDUE and its US counterpart the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the international boundary

and Water Commission, states and local authorities were involved in environmental policy during De la Madrid's administration. ENGOs played an active role, mainly in specific issues, together with the private sector to defend their interests *vis à vis* the authorities.

In addition, the non-border areas problems received more attention from national and international ENGOs. The Mexican environmental organisations received funds and information from their American and Canadian counterparts to develop their projects. Interaction among those organisations helped Mexican ENGOs actions to become successful.

The other external factor was the World Bank, which supported Mexico with loans for projects having environmental components, between 1981 and 1989. However, most of these projects were delayed or cancelled because of the environment's low priority for this institution until 1986. In fact, The World Bank did not become really interested in Mexico's environmental policy until the Salinas *sexenio*.

Conclusions

Environmental policy was born during the most authoritarian period of the Mexican state expressed in the strong presidentialism. Not surprisingly, environmental policy has been highly controlled by the

governmental actors, usually remaining at the bottom of the Mexican public agenda.

The main problem of Mexico's environmental policy is the big gap between policy formulation (goals) and actual policy implementation. This is reflected in the broad formalism of policies, where laws underestimate concrete commitments or aims, while implementation is disruptive and discontinuous because of the sexennial cycle, carried out by politicians rather than by specialists. In addition, the policy is not programmatic.

Six features characterise the Mexican environmental policy:

- 1) The influence of international politics and external actors, as well as the importance for the Mexican government to show internationally a pro-environmental image,
- 2) The constrained political role of civil organisations in shaping this policy, and their low capacity for leading social mobilisation,
- 3) The low profile of environmental degradation in the decisory Mexican agenda, as the pollution problems in major cities have more often captured government attention,
- 4) Limited budget and poor policy results,
- 5) Weak environmental agencies,
- 6) The fact that Mexican environmental policy has been of a rhetorical nature, long-term fragmentedness, and non-enforcement legislation.

Basically Mexico's environmental law is full of good and formal intentions. Environmental policy, in addition, has been a) pervaded by sexenalism, and over-politicised (implemented by politicians rather than specialists); and b) carried out by weak policy actors (agencies, institutions and non- government actors).

In practice, the environmental policy did not signify a big concern for the Mexican government until the early 1990s, when international factors began to influence the most important policies, such as those economic, development and international ones. From the late 1960s until the late 1980s, the dominance of the Mexican government was evident as environmental awareness was encouraged by the PRI, while independent ENGOs had been absent in Mexican politics.

When the 1980s economic crisis influenced social and political changes, ENGOs supported political opposition and put environmental concerns on the public agenda and partially on the mass media, as well as helping to put the government back on the defensive. However, their short sightedness in not building up strategic alliances on a strong environmental movement through synchronisation of political actions aborted further development.

On the other hand, the international influence of ENGOs by pressuring their own governments and exchanging information with

the Mexican ENGOs modified the habitual scenario of political control in Mexico. The big difference between the 1970s and the 1990s in Mexico was the growing importance of the environment in Mexico's international business and Mexico's incorporation into the global economy. During the 1970s, the Mexican government only considered the environment as a subject of international image, while in the 1990s NAFTA, US and Canadian ENGOs obliged the Mexican government to be compliant with environmental international standards.

This policy process shows that, unlike agricultural policy, where policy-actors have been highly controlled by the government using paternalistic strategies, environmental policy has been managed by co-optation. Indeed, it has been evident that the domestic environmental groups have had a scarce presence in Mexican politics, while international actors have pressured the Mexican government to implement more environmental enforcement and broader reforms.

Both the deficiencies and structural problems of Mexico's political system, and the ENGOs intrinsic weaknesses have contributed to poor environmental policy-implementation. Basically, Mexico's ENGOs:

- a) Have had little representative base as they have focused on state agents rather than social groups (repeating state-corporatism of Mexico's traditional organisations);

- b) Have failed to establish linkages with other relevant policy actors because ENGOs have confused autonomy (freedom to make decisions in the context of political participation) with isolationism (neither contact nor commitment with other political agents);
- c) Have had deficient organisational structure because they have favoured traditional relationships with state (e.g. personalism, clientelism, exchange of political support for subsidises), short-term projects and policies, attention to local problems, rather than managerial focus (e.g. encouragement of internal organisational change, recruitment of personnel, planning, competition for private and international funds), long-term projects, and a comprehensive view of Mexico's environmental problems; and
- d) Have been unable to set up long-term strategic alliances as they have not had the political initiative to combine ecological issues with political participation. Instead they have had systematic reactive positions *vis à vis* governmental initiatives (expressed in denouncements and demonstrations).

In the political scenario, ENGOs have adopted a flawed strategy by assuming a systematic position in favour of peasants, instead of realistic solutions. As a consequence, ENGOs have been part of the problem, instead of the solutions in the Mexican environmental arena. This is explained by ENGOs immature characteristics, as they are

quite new organisations in Mexican politics, while they reproduce traditional practices of Mexican corporatism (e.g. elitist nature of the environmental movement, which looks like a replica of PRI's corporations, in which decision-making are top-down in nature).

Nonetheless, ENGOs can play a key role by changing their strategy of systemically supporting peasants groups, by instead becoming a go-between. In this role, ENGOs would contribute to build a strong forestry policy network. This is possible if they became more organised. In fact, ENGOs could repeat the political strategy, implemented during the NAFTA negotiation, when transnational strategic alliances took place. Basically, the Mexican ENGOs have not shifted from the positions of protest to a more active role, by proposing solutions and alternatives to the government.

Chapter 4

Institutionalisation of Mexico's environmental policy: Agencies of the environmental sector

Introduction

Chapters from one to three of this thesis have analysed the importance of the main institutions of Mexico's political system, as well as the role of peasants and Environmental Non Governmental Organisations (ENGOS) in environmental and forestry policies. Those chapters have showed that both environmental and forestry policies are made up of weak policy actors, as they are vulnerable compared with state and other policy-actors.

While Chapter one examined the institutional presidency and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) as key factors to define the most important decisions in Mexico, the Chapter two centred on the authoritarian patterns of the state-peasant relationship, as well as the institutional change of agrarian and agricultural agencies derived from the 1990s agrarian reform. As analysed in that chapter, those agencies have not been sufficiently empowered, as their instruments have not been able to implement the formulated changes.

Following on from Chapters one and two, Chapter three on the other hand showed that the environmental policy has been managed by the Mexican state with co-option strategies rather than paternalistic

patterns. This situation has been conditioned by the characteristics of membership of ENGOs and their role in Mexican politics. Basically, as showing in the Chapter three, ENGOs have kept far from corporatist and clientelist relationships with the state (most members are of middle class, little representative base, low degree of alliances with other social and political groups and deficient organisational structure).

The third policy actor of Mexico's forestry policy network is the government itself. Due to this fact, the present chapter is centred on the study of public environmental agencies, while analysing the institutionalisation process of environmental issues and its impact on policy outcomes. This area has been scarcely studied in Mexican literature on public administration. The government has been the most important player within the forestry policy network, as forestry policy has largely been conditioned by bureaucratic in-fighting between patron-client networks, while policy actors have been broadly dominated by the institutional presidency and PRI.

The main goal of this chapter is to analyse institutional evolution of the environmental sector within Mexico's public administration, emphasising the government's role within environmental and forest policy networks (It also focuses on some key agencies involved in the forestry policy).

This chapter has four sections. The first one examines the environmental agencies' role from 1982 to 2000 identifying their major organisational problems and challenges for the environmental public sector (e.g. coordination, decentralisation, budget and public personnel). In the following section, analysis is centred on the ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, Semarnat (2000-onward) to examine the extent and limitations of this ministry, in charged of defining environmental goals and challenges. The third section aims to examine three major environmental agencies created between 1992 and 2001 (the National Institute of Ecology [INE], the Federal Attorney's Agency for Environmental Protection [Profepa] and the Forestry National Commission [Conafor]). Conclusions take place in the last section.

The first section's main goal is to understand the weak structural position of environmental agencies at the cabinet level (Urban Development and Ecology secretariat, SEDUE, and Semarnat) within Mexico's public administration. The second section's goal is to analyse the extent and limitations of the current environmental agency. Finally, the third section aims to demonstrate that new agencies have made forestry decision-making more complex, but not more efficient, as old political patterns (e.g. unaccountability, emphasis on political control, deficient coordination, bureaucratic in-fighting) remain in those new agencies (old problems in new bottles).

The central hypothesis is that incipient institutionalisation of the environmental sector has contributed to more precise and efficient environmental goals, tasks, and challenges, but many environmental agencies still fail because they have not been sufficiently empowered, nor have their policy instruments been provided with efficient strategies to be implemented.

There are three important stages within the Mexican environmental public administration from 1982-onward: *a)* the formulation of the most important laws in terms of policy instruments to deal with environmental issues, *b)* the re-sectorisation of environment from urban development to the strategic social field of public administration, and *c)* building of the environmental sector within the public administration from 1994-onward.

Sectorisation is the process of integration of environmental agencies under the same umbrella of public administration, driven by a leading ministry. For example, the ministry of Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries (Semarnap in 1994), which became Semarnat in 2000, where brown and green agendas have been integrated.

Prior to 1994, the General Law of Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection (LGEEPA) was the only policy instrument to regulate environmental problems, but it did not set roots to make up a national system of environmental management. Not surprisingly, the

government dealt with the effects of the problem, but not with its roots, that is, policies were driven to deal with pollution without intervening in productive process, since it implied a collision with the private sector's interests.

Two recent events make important analysis of the environmental sector, the growing importance of environment issues coinciding with the state reform (e.g. managerialism, reinvention of government, public administration reform) within the international public agenda, and the construction of new environmental agencies at the cabinet level around the world, especially in the third world.

In the case of Mexico, that convergence has affected the established policy networks because a) the environment, as a self-contained issue, has largely been incorporated into politics, making policy-making more complex; b) the profile of public officials of environmental agencies is pushing for the building of civil service, novel situation in Mexico, where public personnel is in constant change (according to the changes of the *sexenio*); c) most importantly, new agencies are being built, reorganised and reinvented to deal with complex environmental problems, producing constant changes in allocation of power within public administration, and d) environmental policy instruments have been shifting from command and control (planning and regulation) to economic incentives (e.g. ecotaxes, permits to emit pollution).

Mexico's environmental agencies

Mexico's environmental agencies have experienced at least five administrative deficiencies since the 1980s. These include: resource restrictions, intergovernmental conflicts, top-down and centralised policy making, legal and administrative formalism, and ill-equipped administration. Before the 1980s, the main problem was that the Mexican government ignored the environmental problems. The main concern, then, was of conceptual nature rather than administrative.

For example, when Godau (1984:47-84) and Mumme *et al*, (1988:1-20) identify coordination as a major problem faced by Undersecretariat of Improvement of the Environment (SMA) in the early 1970s, they do not consider two important factors a) the presence of a centric-state (the revolutionary state), defining problems (and non-problems as a consequence) almost autonomously, and b) the absence of environmental issues in the governmental agenda.

That situation was mirrored in the insignificance that pollution issues have in the Mexican agenda, the consequent absence of policy definition to deal with problem, and the lack of social pressure on the government. On the other hand, the initial misconception of the Mexican government about environmental problems made the government to identify pollution as a health problem. As a result, SMA was placed within the ministry of Health (SSA). This situation

produced a double weakness for SMA: *a)* the pollution problem was undermined by SSA's top officials (more concerned with traditional problems of health), and *b)* this situation eroded the SMA's capacity to coordinate other agencies of cabinet and non cabinet level even further, supposedly subordinated to SMA. In essence, the SMA's major problem was not coordination, but lack of empowerment.

As the environmental sector is growingly consolidated, coordination and ill-equipped public administration have become the most important challenges for Mexico's public administration because of two structural problems: *a)* centralisation of policy-making and *b)* absence of a civil service. Those problems lead to more criticism towards state and local governments as most of them, in organisational terms, are not prepared to deal with environmental problems.

In this regard, Mexico's current environmental problem is of administrative nature rather than of conceptual focus, as the main concern is centred on policy strategies, new ways of institutional mechanisms of coordination, and instruments to implement the formulated reforms, rather than identification of problems and creation of institutions.

SEDUE: identifying problems

In the 1980s, the environment issue experienced important progress in terms of laws and precision (definition of problems). While there is no consensus about whether international (Godau, 1984:47-84) or domestic variables (Mumme *et al*, 1988:1-20) had more impact on the formation of Mexico's environmental policy, it is clear that the government was the main player in that time.

Essentially, controversy is centred on the most important policy actors influencing the early stages of environmental policy, such as domestic actors (academic, ENGOs, researchers and even social groups) or international factors (international pressure on Mexico's government, Mexico's political image *vis à vis* international politics, and the US government).

Though the revolutionary regime was always concerned with its international image, its traditional isolation until the 1990s, and the absence of domestic social pressure, allowed Mexico's government to formulate an environmental law in 1971 within a pattern of elite-dominated policy, since the law was practically designed in-house at upper levels of Mexico's SSA with little participation of organised interests or private citizens. As a result, the environmental policy was highly controlled by the federal government.

Between 1970 and 1984, Mexico's major government instruments to deal with pollution problems were one code (law covering air, water, soil, and sanitation, while emphasising centralisation as all responsibilities were placed in the hands of the federal government) and one institution with different titles along that time (SMA (1972-76), Directorate of Ecology linked to the urban development sector (1977-1982), and the under-secretariat of Ecology within SEDUE (1983-88)).

The environmental laws until 1980s were of comprehensive focus, broad content, and dependent on Mexico's development policy, while environmental agencies had a low profile within Mexican public administration (Mumme *et al*, 1988: 13-4). However, this was less significant due to high levels of bureaucracy, vague definition, and administrative dispersion for policy-implementation, which marginalized environmental policy from Mexico's decisory agenda.

The Mexican environmental policy was shaped by the middle ranks of bureaucracy (e.g. non cabinet agencies and under-secretariats), and was never identified as an independent policy (This was evident when other public agencies did not cooperate with SMA, implicitly questioning and eroding its authority). Nor were environmental concerns considered as central factor of social policy, as they were regarded in terms of material and human resources, and funds devoted to antipollution programmes.

The 1985 earthquake together with Mexico's most severe economic crisis pushed inclusion of environment on Mexico's public agenda. In that time Mexico's government changed the orientation of development policy, while trends in favour of an emergent environmental market pressured the Mexican government to intervene in the environmental sector.

Two important policy changes were undertaken in the 1980s. On the one hand, the 1980s marked a transition between 1970s, characterised by a confusing policy-formation (lax criteria of command and control, and weak regulation on polluters) and the current environmental market policy-orientation (market criteria, methods of environmental assessments, and businessmen's compliance to environmental laws).

On the other hand, in the 1980s, Mexico's environmental policy was changed from health sector to strategic social sector (1992). This is a key point as poverty is included in the social sector, and poverty plays a significant role in an authoritarian and developing country because alleviation policy is shaped in top-levels of bureaucracy, and driven by the strongest institutions and policy actors (the institutional presidency in the Mexican case). Furthermore, social policy was one of the most salient redesigned policies during the 1980s Mexican economic reform.

The De la Madrid administration (1982-1988) put the environment at the centre of Mexican politics, as one of the key points for Mexico's economic and social development for first time in 1982 (included in the National Development Plan 1983-1988, PND), adding new points to the previous environmental law launched by López Portillo administration. Nonetheless, most points were related to programmatic laws, that is, of rhetorical nature (formal rules) without clear and specific punishments, fines, or judicial processes.

Two very important constitutional amendments were that the Mexican government would be obliged to preserve the environment from then on (stressing that the use of productive resources by social and private sectors must be subject to environmental protection), and that environmental responsibilities would be reallocated among federal, state and local authorities in the environmental subject.

The law's major significance was its policy-instrument character. In fact, LGEEPA was the first constitutional instrument that defined the range of obligations and power within the Mexican state when dealing with environmental issues (on a horizontal level: congress, judicial power and executive power; and on a vertical level: federal, state and local responsibilities). In fact, this law did not include the concept *federal*, implying broader political action (through decentralisation of

the state and local intervention, and social participation) in favour of the environment.

The three most significant environmental policy-outcomes of the De la Madrid administration were a) constitutional amendments stressing the compulsory state intervention in the environmental issue, and its relations with planning process and development policy, b) the launching of LGEEPA and c) the SEDUE's foundation where the environment had cabinet-level for the first time.

Despite the multiple environmental initiatives of the De la Madrid administration environmental initiatives, environmental policy remained secondary policy with poor results. The causes explaining this failure were deficient institutional building and large gaps between law formulation and policy-implementation.

Even though the environment was included for the first time in middle/top levels of Mexican public administration, SEDUE basically represented the same environmental policy established by previous administrations, and did not create a genuine environmental ministry. There are four reasons that explain this.

Firstly, SEDUE was not conceived as a ministry with broad powers and integral focus since it did not absorb other ministries' tasks, with exceptions of some from the Ministry of Agriculture (SARH, today

SAGARPA). Then, this ministry was linked to urban development, sharing the same concepts as the former administration while subordinating the environment theme to urban development issues as well. Thirdly, SEDUE was not a specialised ministry because it did not mean a reorganisation of the Mexican public administration, affecting the environmental agencies of other ministries. Finally, there was another agency in charged of environmental issues-coordination (National Commission of Ecology (CONADE)), overlapping tasks with SEDUE, in charged of the same work.

On the other hand, the gap between formulation laws and policy implementation is explained by extensive formalism, which permeates Mexican politics (like in all Latin America), since authorities and population suppose that law by itself is capable of solving problems. Not surprisingly, more important environmental progress since the 1980s-onward has been registered in the legal field (e.g. more complex and specific laws on pollution and regulation of natural resources management, land tenure system amendments, enhancement of environmental information data and environmental education, stricter regulations).

Like the former presidents, De la Madrid launched this policy hoping to gain a good international political image rather than to solve a serious domestic problem. SEDUE did not have an integral focus (integrating pollution and natural resources into the same ministry)

because there was not a real interest, nor enough information, to build up a strong environmental agency. However, it is worthy to note that natural resources degradation had not been widely studied until then, nor was the government in conditions to alter agricultural or agrarian policy networks.

Environmental policy was not a priority policy (mainly if compared with urban policy in times of launching a housing policy). The earthquake of 1985 proved that governmental priority was to improve the economy through building houses and building for people who lost their houses instead of encouraging environmental initiatives.

As SEDUE was not a specialised ministry, the government did not have an integral view of the environment (e.g. agriculture (forest and water), fishing and industry policy networks remained unaltered). Agencies in charged of natural resources practically did not exist then. On the other hand, ill-equipped planning meant SEDUE overlapped tasks with other agencies. The creation of SEDUE was driven to satisfy government need to compact public units rather than formulate an integral environmental agency.

The principal problem faced by SEDUE was its weak power compared with other ministries and policy-networks. This was reflected in the facts that: a) SEDUE relied on other agencies for policy-implementation because of its insufficient funds; b) the Mexican

government preferred supporting PEMEX and profitable public agencies to environmental units; and c) lack of efficient and sufficient personnel. Furthermore, SEDUE was excluded from policy design and formulation, since its officials only participated in the implementation phase of policies (when decisions had already been made).

In terms of regulation, De la Madrid's environmental policy was centred on pollution. Natural resources and ecosystems received little attention. At the same time, while major focus was the industrial sector and urban areas, regulation went on depending on planning, bargaining, education, and information rather than sanctions and punishments on polluters.

Semarnap: Identifying administrative challenges

In the 1990s, environmental policy gained in terms of policy definition and institutionalisation, but it remained the same in terms of political importance. The same is true for forest policy as it obtained growing importance during the Zedillo administration (1994-2000), and even more when the current president Fox included forest and water into the national security agenda. The main problem is that political discourse was not translated into political actions.

In addition to environmental policy problems in the early 1990s (e.g. governmental attention to the environment due to international image,

highly designed by top-down strategy, low profile of natural resources degradation in Mexican politics, limited budget, weak environmental public agencies, and rhetorical nature of policy), organisational deficiencies emerged as the environmental policy became institutionalised.

Organisational deficiencies were reflected in five challenges for Mexico's environmental public administration: resources restrictions, inter-governmental conflicts, top-down and centralising policy-making, legal and administrative formalism, and the usual ill-equipped public administration, including inexperienced public personnel.

Resource restrictions

Mexico is the OCDE's member which devotes the lowest proportion of its GNP to environment with only 0.39 percent, the Netherlands being the highest contributor with 1.1 percent of GNP, according to Fernández, 1999:6-7). Indeed, the budget dedicated to environmental protection between 1990 and 1998 has ranked between 0.48 percent (1993) and 0.25 percent (1998), showing constant drops in those years.

Semarnap's budget in 1999 only represented 5.9 percent of the federal budget, devoting 77 percent of it to the National Water Commission (usually used for management of water infrastructure), leaving only 33

percent (1.3. percent of federal budget) to environmental issues (natural resources deterioration and anti-pollution programmes) (Romero, 2000: 389-99). In 1998, the trends were the same (See Fernández, 1999: 12-5).

In practice, environmental prevention and natural resources protection have not received enough importance from the Mexican government. In the case of water, the problem has been more evident in the last decade, mainly in the North, making the government increase the budget of this field. Essentially, this problem has arisen in the Mexican agenda rather by political pressure than by an environmental concern.

Water is a large problem for Northern Mexico involving the Mexican-US border, and of social and economic nature since water is highly subsidized for domestic and agricultural consumption, mainly affecting social groups with the lowest income in urban and rural areas. In addition, 100 out of 257 water bodies are overexploited affecting the sustainability of Northern states' industry, the most dynamic Mexican economic area, according to the World Bank (González, 2002: 1)

Intergovernmental conflicts

Intergovernmental conflicts have been another permanent problem. Competition between Semarnap and other ministries and non-cabinet

agencies has proven the weak position of the former, as other interests have often prevailed rather than environmental. This is reflected in the state and local spheres, where environmental agencies are often overwhelmed by other stronger and more powerful government institutions.

For example, in Campeche state, there is an overlapping of bureaucratic functions when dealing with forest issues. The state public officials of environment and agriculture have units in charged of forest issues, and there is strong competition for functions, budget and roles in this issue. In mid-2002, two public officials interviewed (one from each secretariat) mentioned that a project related to forest plantations kept them in frequent competition for resources, and influence (and power, as a consequence) on the most important decisions. Information and public officials' experience, in this context, make the difference in policy-making (complicating policy-coordination).

The bureaucratic competition for information, resources, and enhancing of functions and power was a notorious characteristic in this context, as the two ministries had similar functions in forest issues (although the interviewed officials did neglect this situation). In this inter-bureaucratic struggle, the environmental agency was weaker as its its bureaucracy had less political experience than the agricultural agency did.

Another example, in terms of policy coordination, has occurred in Quintana Roo, illustrated by the distribution of subsidies throughout the year by two federal agencies. While Semarnap allocated subsidies, at the beginning of the year, with the aim of preserving the forest in environmental terms, SAGARPA at the mid-year allocated money in order to incentivise agriculture, implying the cutting of trees. Obviously, peasants did not complain of getting two payments during the year for undertaking two different jobs with opposite outcomes.

Of course, as explained in the last chapter, when conflicts have taken place, at least since mid-twentieth century, between environmental agencies and other organisations of the public sector related to the economic sector (e.g. industry, trade, manufacture, infrastructure, agriculture), often the former have ended up losing in these confrontations.

As stated earlier, the main problem of Mexico's forestry policy is centred on state-ENGOS relationship since the government and civil organisations, rather than peasants and timber interests have had key roles in the policy orientation in the last decade. Basically, ENGOS have made two mistakes in their relations with the government: *a*) their systematic confrontation with environmental agencies has undermined those agencies even further, and *b*) their incapacity to build a stronger policy network to propose alternatives and build a consensus.

On the one hand, ENGOs have challenged environmental agencies, structurally weak inside Mexico's public administration, with the logic that they are undermining the government (when in reality they are weakening the environmental sector rather than the government as a whole), instead of cooperating to find innovating strategies to build successful experiences. On the other hand, though ENGOs have the capacity to formulate plans, policies, strategies, organisational changes, as well as building political alliances and policy networks, since they have specialised personnel (or linkages with academics), they have favoured conflicts (even among themselves) and protests.

Though ENGOs are structurally and organisationally weak, they have had relevant roles *vis à vis* the government, since their leaders have access to main (mid and top) public officials (contrary to peasants and most of timber entrepreneurs). That situation confirms that the main problem of the forestry policy is of political nature rather than economic. ENGOs, in this scenario, have maintained a reactive role making this scenario and decision-making more conflictive.

Centralisation

In Mexican public administration, centralisation is the third constant problem that affects environmental agencies. Mexico's political system has been a highly centralised polity, vested of a federal formalism,

characterised by the concentration of most of public personnel (80 percent of the bureaucracy works at the federal level (*El Financiero*, 1999: 3)) and the best qualified bureaucracy at the federal sphere, clear prevalence of federal government in the national budget by making 74 percent of the total government expenditures, and the absence of laws and policies to empower the state and local authorities (Romero, 2000: 392). The cost of Mexico's bureaucratic inefficiency is around 5 percent of the GNP (*El Financiero*, 1999:3).

Decentralising actions until 1999 (104 actions of decentralisation until 2000, according to INAP, (1999: 282)) centred on the partial or whole transference of some procedures to Semarnat's and INE's state offices (e.g. the Unified Environmental Licence (*licencia ambiental única*, or LAU), and the annual operational permit (*cédula operacional anual*, or COA); regulation on some industrial activities, most of them related to emissions polluting the atmosphere; and strengthening the channels of intergovernmental coordination with local and state authorities (e.g. the coordination for delivering the LAU); and simplification of some procedures (again coordination for delivering permits).

In spite of the fact that Semarnap has started to carry out decentralised environmental management based on empowering sub-national (state and local) governments, and devise new financial instruments for environmental investment at state level, the

environmental sector is still less decentralised than traditional sectors (health, education, agriculture, and infrastructure).

Decentralisation policy so far has presented at least four deficiencies. a) Functions transferred to state and local authorities have not been accompanied by enough resources, or mechanisms to finance those functions at state level; b) Mexico's fiscal structure does not offer sufficient incentive to promote local cost recovery for environmental services (the ministry of treasure manages fines without participation of local authorities), nor does it push industries to use clean technologies or punish those that pollute; c) fragmentation of responsibility becomes hard policy-implementation since environmental actions often extend further than the boundaries of a municipality (local government); and d) the state and local governments are not well-equipped in terms of policy instruments (organisational units, bureaucracy, laws, and funding).

In the forestry policy, centralisation has two faces. Because local authorities often respond to caciques (local leaders who informally have controlled regional groups, and imposed their interests), federal power (central authorities) becomes the most convenient and trustful arbiter for all policy actors involved. However, since there are not counterbalances for federal bureaucracy, environmental management becomes a serious problem susceptible to be corrupted.

The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), for example, is a policy instrument that presents serious deficiencies of transparency. Because of the centralising character of the EIA, this policy instrument has become an inefficient instrument for ecological evaluation, since the discretionary character of Mexico's decision-making and lack of check and balances for the executive power have made this policy instrument another bureaucratic procedure. Not surprisingly, various private agents negotiate with environmental agencies the permission for new activities, opening window for corruption. In addition, when a public institution is the main interested in developing new activities, the government becomes a partial judge since it is at the same time an evaluating authority and an interested.

Another problem of the federal bureaucracy, as a top environmental instance, is that environmental problems are not solved considering the local conditions of biodiversity. For example, LGEEPA identifies the federal environmental agencies as the only instances to authorise and evaluate the EIAs to begin new activities or facilities in most of Mexico's sectors. Other government spheres or public interests cannot emit opinion, nor have they political authority to trade off the federal power, since the law constraints this situation.

Centralisation versus decentralisation is not an easy decision-making for environmental and forest policies. As stated earlier,

decentralisation of natural resources management can be influenced by caciques' interests and local groups little concerned with the preservation of the forest, but centralisation implies the strong presence of federal power, pervaded by several inefficient and corrupt bureaucratic groups. Perhaps, the solution is the empowerment of judicial power as the last instance in case of environmental controversies together with the growing decentralisation of natural resources management in spite of the multiple problems derived from a deficient judicial system.

Legal and administrative formalism

The fourth problem faced by Mexico's environmental policy is the weak respect for the law and the administrative formalism. Since the law is not deeply rooted in Mexican politics, real policy-making is undertaken in other areas than those set by the constitution. In environmental policy, the key decisions are usually made by central authorities, instead of the decentralised units, that is, by Semarnat instead of INE, Profepa or the National Commission for the Biosphere (Conabio).

In addition, the horizontal coordination of environmental agencies has been quite weak, since the most important relation has been of vertical nature (with Semarnap-Semarnat). This constrained institutionalisation has affected the logic between what is reasonable

and what is feasible to regulate and enforce. In other words, the legal front is divorced from the enforcement.

Romero (2000:395), for example, found that in the period 1996-97 Semarnap had designed four national programmes, four procedures, and seven instruments to evaluate the environmental impact of Mexico's agriculture. In spite of Profepa –in charged of environmental law application— had regional offices nationwide, none of the peasants and interviewed farmers knew anything about those government dispositions, nor had they been inspected by any environmental institution. This example illustrates that the central authorities make decisions (top-down strategy), while the decentralised organisations know little about the most important decisions.

Another fact is that the management of budget of decentralised institutions (non-cabinet agencies) had been elaborated in Semarnap, instead of the decentralised organisations themselves. For example, in spite of the formal autonomy of those environmental organisations, personnel contracts were centrally managed by Semarnap. This fact conditioned several decisions, since employees were hired according to political rather than technical criteria (there is a not civil service in Mexico), often responding to interests far from those of the environmental agency. The INE, however, is one of the few environmental organisations that have started to professionalise its

personnel, favouring experience and technical background in environment since 1999 (Fernández, 1999: 19).

There are two additional problems associated with legal and administrative formalism: a) Mexico's labyrinthic legal system and b) the already mentioned gap between law formulation and policy implementation. A good illustration for the first problem is the civil responsibility *vis à vis* environmental damages. Unlike other international environmental laws (e.g. US and Germany), where a possible environmental criminal has to prove his/her innocence, in Mexico the affected has to justify with evidences his-her judicial demand.

An additional problem at this point is the laxity of the law to punish environmental crimes. Once the legal process is initiated, there are two alternatives. If the accused is found guilty, and the environmental criminal is a public institution, the punishment is only of administrative character (recommendation to repair the damages, and possible payment of compensations). By the contrary, if the law declares the accused as a not guilty, Profepa starts a long judicial procedure, dealing with the deficient, slow, bureaucratic, and Mexico's broadly corrupting judicial system.

On the other hand, a gap between law formulation and policy implementation is illustrated by a statement covering international

trends of environmental performance. The UN's statement pointed out the progress in terms of policy formulation in the institutionalisation and sectorisation of environmental issues (creation of national bodies within the public administration in charged of specific environmental problems), the rising interest for environmental education, and the inclusion of forest and deforestation, biodiversity, sustainable agriculture, and planning of land uses policy in the international environmental agenda.

The same statement, not surprisingly, reported that most important failures or delays were linked to environmental politics and policy implementation. They were the poor implementation of the agenda 21, one of the most powerful instruments for the integration of sectoral policies aimed to implement sustainable development, with the participation of social actors; the little production of national environmental indexes and statistics; and the exclusion of important environmental issues from the environmental agenda, such as oceans, dangerous waste, and sustainable development in mountain regions.

Ill-equipped management and inexpert public personnel

Finally, the ill-equipped administration is a central problem for the consolidation of Mexico's environmental sector. Not only have been the structural problems of Mexican politics (e.g. clientelism, corporatism, patrimonialism), but also the unprofessional bureaucracy (e.g.

absence of civil service, laxity of laws and corruption) the biggest problems for environmental protection, reflected in confusing laws, absence of a long-term policy, and deficient policy instruments.

Absence of a civil service is a serious problem because in each *sexenio*, new public officials have to justify laws during two years, leaving only four years to implement policies. For example, Fox administration made the same mistake of previous governments, by carrying out a complete change of personnel, wasting experience and talent from technical professionals who were working during the Zedillo administration. In practice, these changes obey more to politics than actual political focuses or policy orientation.

If considered that a policy of continuity is quite important in most of policy areas, in the environmental field is quite fundamental, since policy outcomes usually can be regarded and evaluated after many years. For example, forest/deforestation, climate change, policies in favour of endangered species, and so forth can only be assessed after long periods of time, and it is not a question of *sexenal* changes of policy orientation.

Finally, environmental policy instrument is another problem influenced by the ill-equipped bureaucracy and deficient laws. For example, the Ecological Ordering of Territory (OET) is insufficiently specified or decentralised. In practice is not a useful instrument for

the other two instruments. Furthermore, the OET is useless, for instance, either to relocate economic activities or analyse the compatibility of economic activities and population densities for not altering the environmental balance of a specific region or county.

Institutionalisation of environmental policy. The challenges for Semarnat

While, in environmental terms, the decade of the 1970s was characterised by the first government actions to deal with environmental problems, and 1980s by ENGOS' emergence pushing environmental initiatives, the decade of the 1990s is identified by conceptual changes, such as the emergence of environment as an independent issue, expressed in its sectorisation in public administration, institutional (re)design (creation and reorganisation of public agencies, launching of natural resources management programmes, and law amendments), and a policy change orientation shifting from corrective to preventive policy.

While initial stages in Mexico's environmental policy (1970s) were imprecise (roots of environmental problems were not clearly identified), during the 1980s several laws and growing political participation took place pushing government initiative to protect the environment. Nonetheless, strong presence of state and weak position of social policy actors impeded deeper changes, since the former did

not need to establish commitment with the latter because social pressure practically did not exist.

In 1992, Salinas administration reorganised environmental agencies of Mexico's public administration without creating a single environmental sector. SEDUE was substituted by the ministry of Social Development (Sedesol), where INE and Profepa were included, which had a semi-autonomous character (the heads of those agencies had direct contact with the Minister, and INE's and Profepa's decision-making was broadly made outside Sedesol's traditional bureaucracy). Still, the problem with this organisational change was that environmental agencies were subject to other broader concerns. In this case, environmental problems were subordinated to social goals, since anti-alleviation programmes were the priority for Sedesol.

While the INE was charged with analysis and projection of environmental policy, Profepa was in charged of environmental enforcement laws. Prestigious academics were appointed as head of those organisations (e.g. Julia Carabias as head of INE). This strategy was used by the government to build bridges with intellectuals, environmental specialists, and some leftwing sectors (Carabias had studied at the Autonomous National University of Mexico, maybe the most important symbol of criticism against the revolutionary regime, and she was also a former leftwing member).

In 1993, Colosio was nominated PRI's presidential candidate. Carabias lobbied with him, taking advantages from their close relationship, to formulate the creation of an environmental ministry. Soon later, Zedillo substituted Colosio as PRI's presidential candidate, and Carabias had to start her lobby again. Zedillo finally founded Semarnap in 1994.

Semarnap's foundation implied the beginning of three processes, *a)* institutionalisation of the environmental sector, *b)* definition and specification of several issues around sustainable development (which began to be treated as a single issue) deriving in amendment laws and formulation of new ones (e.g. forestry, land allocation, reforestation), and *c)* incorporation of the environment into Mexican politics as a self-contained issue (no as a part of health, urban development or social policies).

Semarnap's creation marks structural, procedural and strategic-organisational changes, reflecting respectively in *a)* sectorisation and institutionalisation of the environment, *b)* more complex laws and regulations to connect the environment with other sectors, and *c)* organisational change and reallocation of responsibilities among/within public administration (strategic-organisational).

Semarnap: defining goals

Semarnap concentrated green and brown issues under the same roof for the first time, while LGEEPA was broadly modified with the consensus of various political forces (practically all of the political parties) with the aim of reallocating responsibilities among the three levels of government (federal, state and local), updating policy instruments and adding others, regulating biodiversity, redefining some aspects of pollution, enhancing paths for social participation and regulating environmental information law, as well as reviewing enforcement strategies of law.

Also, the government defined programmatic spheres of intervention (i.e. forest, water, hazardous waste), goals and priority regions; organisational changes among public agencies in vertical (within the federal government) and horizontal (three levels of government, and even in those of bi-national character) ways to implement environmental policy; and formulated innovative policy instruments such as OET, EIA, and the Mexican official Norms (NOM).

In the words of Carabias and Tudela (1999: 332), Semarnap's strategies were undertaken in function of three main goals: the contention of environmental and natural resources deterioration, encouragement of sustainable production, and as instrument to contribute to mitigate poverty –mainly in rural areas— through

natural resources management, calling attention for policy integration and transversal policies rather than traditional administrative division.

In doing this, Semarnap set connections (administrative units) with both areas of production activities (e.g. fisheries, water, and several forest programmes), and environmental planning, such as INE and Profepa. In essence, Semarnap was conceived as an organisation to deal with environment considering the multiple social problems related to natural resources. In other words, sustainable development should be dealt with as a transversal policy by public administration.

There are three problems, in general, with this focus: a) little empowerment of environment agencies within public administration, b) easy penetration of the environmental policy network by other interests and policy-networks; and c) multiple agencies to be coordinated by/with environmental agencies.

The first consideration is supported by Backstrand *et al.* (1996: 209-30). They say that despite the well designed treaties, laws and government programmes, central sustainable development does not lead to policy formulation nor implementation in any of the organisational settings, since the presence of traditional administrative settings (governmentalism, standard operating procedures, hierarchical solutions, high sectorisation) are huge

problems for effective policy implementation (e.g. SEDUE in 1980s, Semarnat versus PEMEX at the present, or Semarnat versus tourist industry interests in Mexico's various regions).

The second problem is that environmental organisations are easily penetrated by other interests, and more importantly, environment policy network is very weak (or vulnerable) since policy actors usually do not make up a cohesive group *vis à vis* other either political or bureaucratic interests (e.g. Semarnat versus SRA –representing land allocation and peasant interests—, Semarnat versus Secofi –representing industry interests).

Finally, as the institutionalisation of environment grew, more political groups, transectoral agencies, and social groups (e.g. ENGOs) began to emerge around or enter in relation with the environmental and forest policies, making decision-making more complex. Though environmental agencies were supposed to coordinate the rest of agencies and policies, their weak position in politics has made policy-reforms hard to be implemented. (e.g. SMA in the 1970s, CONADE in the 1980s, Semarnat itself in the 1990s).

Semarnat: more precision

Current Fox administration is deepening the transectoral character of Semarnat. This ministry was reformed by eliminating the department

of fisheries (transformation Semarnap-Semarnat), which was sent to Sagarpa, as well as by reorganising the under-secretariats in function of processes or skills, instead of specialised areas or issues (e.g. forest, water, natural resources). The withdrawal of fisheries means the end of Semarnat's participation in productive activities, focusing on normative and regulative skills instead.

Semarnat's current core functions are codes (regulation), natural resources protection, and planning, managed by a system of procedures within the ministry (figure 8). This organisation by processes has encouraged inter-bureaucratic struggles rather than cooperation and coordination inside Semarnat.

Unlike Semarnap, where different processes or stages of a policy were carried out by the same administrative unit (e.g. permits, incentives, subsidises, implementation of EIA were carried out by the same organisation), current Semarnat favours processes by fragmenting different stages of a policy throughout the secretariat. In this scenario, an organisation (administrative unit) formulates law and rules (permits) of a specific policy (e.g. reforestation, exploitation of wood, hunting), another one implements the policy (e.g. subsidises, budget, technical support, economic incentives), and another one evaluates the policy (permits of natural resources exploitation is provided by Semarnat, Conafor is in charged of implementing the policy, while Profepa is in charged of evaluating policy outcomes). In Mexico's

bureaucratic system, built to compete for power instead of cooperating, policy implementation turns conflictive.

Conafor's creation in 2001 is a good illustration of Mexico's inter-bureaucratic problems. Conafor's foundation implied a reallocation of functions within the environmental sector. The new organisation should concentrate all the forest issues under the same roof, but inter-bureaucratic problems conflicted this intention.

Since the new head of Conafor did not take the office immediately because he was finishing his period as a governor, one of the strongest Semarnat's under-secretariats allocated functions for Conafor keeping the control of key areas. In this context, Semarnat kept the control of flora and fauna, decentralisation of forest services and land uses, permits for natural resources exploitation, linkages with political actors related to sustainable development policy, several competencies on decentralisation policy (implying linkages with governors and local political groups), and the power to participate in preservation policy (relevant policy considering the regular negotiation with peasants, academics, ENGOs, and timber interests to manage Mexico's protected natural areas).

In practice, Semarnat gave up bureaucratic functions, but not competencies for Conafor. There was a de-concentration of functions (bureaucratic procedures) instead of a decentralisation (empowerment

of non-cabinet level agencies), since Semarnat's under-secretariat kept the key tasks to negotiate with relevant policy actors, and regulate environment. In practice, this under-secretariat still exercised strong influence in the most important decision-making.

Not surprisingly, Conafor and Semarnat entered in confrontation, making the reorganisation of the environmental sector quite slow and conflictive. In essence, Conafor had responsibilities, but not power. Semarnat would define the policy, and Conafor would simply have to implement the most important decisions. In this scenario, Semarnat would keep the activities related to politics, while Conafor would keep with policy-implementation. In fact, in 2002 Conafor did not count with proper offices in Mexico City, and some of its officers complained about the slow process by which Semarnat was transferring functions, but not funds.

Additional problems in this scenario were the relative power of this undersecretary because of his personal friendship (direct contact) with Mexico's president, the relative weakness of the minister (he was finally substituted by the Conafor's President in September 2003), and the little knowledge of Conafor's head on forest issues (it was a political appointment). In this scenario, the personal relationship and political ambitions conditioned political conflict, making coordination a strategy difficult to be implemented.

Conafor deals with two serious problems, its weak power and the law restrictions set by PND. Though Conafor is irresponsible for a long-term forest plan (25 years), it has not been empowered to do this, since its most important tasks are related with coordination (which represents serious problems for environmental agencies given their weak power). Because PND is formulated only for six years, Conafor's long-term plan could not be implemented by future administrations, as Mexican politics changes public personnel each six years.

Semarnat: current challenges

Like the majority of administrative organisations, Semarnat has core and secondary tasks. To deal with problems of decentralisation (caciques, ill-equipped local bureaucracies, insufficient funds, coordination problems, organisational and legal resources), Semarnat may decentralise secondary tasks, by strengthening local, regional and civil institutions, keeping central roles, such as policy coordination, national planning, as well as national and international areas of public interest.

Gradual decentralisation of environmental responsibilities might be carried out depending on local environmental conditions of regions, and political and economic conditions of each federal state (e.g. bureaucratic capacity, power of governor, economic conditions of state, infrastructure, local biodiversity). For example, the Northern

states may exercise the new environmental responsibilities more easily than the Southern states because of their better economic and administrative conditions (e.g. regulation on companies, implementation of recycling process of water).

Training of state government personnel for new competencies in the environmental field, creation of a national environmental index, setting of a methodology to give permits for natural resources exploitation, plans for forest management, and empowerment of state governments are further tasks to be developed to implement decentralisation.

In this vein, INE reports incipient decentralisation (actually deconcentration) to federal states (INAP, 1999; 283-4), highlighting coordination, simplification and deconcentration of procedures. This shows the slow and little decentralisation, as decision-making remains in the hands of the federal government. The same is true for programmes to be decentralised, emphasising operational actions rather than decisional policies.

Largely, the biggest constraints of Semarnat to decentralise are: a) the capacity of local authorities to receive new functions and tasks, b) the broad reactive character of civil groups in terms of social participation, and c) the absence of coordination between actions and programmes, derived from the competition between bureaucracies (normal in an

authoritarian regime), and lack of exchange of information among bureaucracies.

Building the environmental sector

The environmental sector was created in the 1990s, marking one of the most important events of Mexican public administration. Three factors influenced this decision: a) various pro-environmental officers, b) conflictive domestic scenario (e.g. democratisation process, economic crisis, and emergence of environmental groups) and c) international pressures (e.g. integration of Mexico's economy into world economy, and the growing presence of international ENGOs). These factors pushed the Zedillo administration to constitute environmental organisations to respond integrally to the environmental challenges.

Unlike the early 1990s, when there were only three main institutions (all of them non-cabinet agencies) devoted to preservation of natural resources (INE, Profepa and CNA), at the present there are seven environmental organisations with specific aims (adding the National Commission of Natural Protected Areas (CONANP), the Mexican Institute of Water Technology, Conafor, and Conabio) sectorised in Semarnat (cabinet agency) (see figure 9). The latter institutions show the gradual process of building institutions in Mexico, stressing the

importance of natural resources protection, remarkably forest and water.

Before 1992, the most important administrative limitations for the environmental management were the scarce environmental information; fragmented policies and dispersion of policy instruments; strong decision-making; fragmentation of responsible agencies, as well as little attention to environmental goods and services. In fact, some of these constraints remain in Mexico's public administration.

INE and Profepa

In 1992, INE and Profepa were created within the Sedesol. The former was designed as an institution for the long-term environmental planning (environmental policy-analysis), while the latter was an agency of short-term decision-making. Essentially, the INE would be in charged of formulating regulations and norms, as well as policy definitions; while the Profepa would be in charged of the enforcement and monitoring of compliance with environmental laws, standards, criteria and programmes as well as the mechanisms and administrative procedures to ensure environmental protection.

Profepa essentially develops a political function, while INE is a technical and scientific institution. Given the need for offering short-term solutions, the former was initially provided with more resources

than the later. Not surprisingly, most of the INE's heads come from universities, public sector and ecologist movements, whereas those of Profepa belonged to traditional political class.

Profepa's initial political functions were broader if considered that this institution was funded in a sensitive period for Mexican public opinion. An explosion in Guadalajara provoked by PEMEX in 1992 had caused panic in Mexico. This explosion was produced by the presence of fuel and other chemical substances in Guadalajara's sewerage. Since PEMEX used similar sewerages throughout Mexican cities to spill its fuel, the panic in the population grew. This was the tip of the iceberg of a serious problem of security and prevention of some industrial sectors.

INE and Profepa, created during Mexico's state reform reform, became two of the most important policy instruments for environmental regulation, integrating the private sector into policy-making, by encouraging clean business, friendly legal frameworks to set clear rules for the private sector, and self regulation for enterprises. This view was important for further developments in terms of policy orientation.

With the appointment of Carabias as head of Semarnap, coming from the academic field, the political weight of INE and Profepa was modified, since the former favoured the world dominant focus, based

on entrepreneurial and self-regulation strategies. Profepa, on the contrary, while encouraging command and control to modernise environmental laws and policies, chose strengthening of state. Nonetheless, the current environmental strategies of Mexico's government (2003) include more entrepreneurial and auto-regulation measures (known as voluntary regulation).

Conafor

Defined as a national security policy, the forest policy gained importance in the current Fox administration, albeit the actions have not supported the discourse. While identifying the deficient planning of agricultural activities, population growth, poverty and deficient technology for sustainable exploitation of natural resources as the main problems for forests, the chief of National Security of the Fox administration justifies the creation of an agency in charged of coordinating the institutional strategies to deal with deterioration of forests, as the initial stages to solve the forestry problem (Aguilar Zinser, 2001a). Implicitly, Aguilar Zinser suggests the key role of Semarnat to coordinate this policy.

In April 2001 Conafor was created as a decentralised agency in order to carry out the sustainable forestry management aimed to preserve, encourage and restore Mexico's forest. The new agency generated some political problems since Semarnat and Conafor pushed to lead

the most important decisions, while SAGARPA kept a neutral position. This conflict continued when the new General Law of Sustainable Forestry Development (LGDS) was passed by the Congress in February 2003, since Semarnat was questioning this law elaborated by Conafor.

The different forest programmes were placed in Conafor. It is supposed to have more coherence as they are coordinated by the same agency. Nonetheless, these programmes may be still more simplified in order gain efficiency. For example, Prodeplan (forest plantations), prodefor (technical assistance for producers), pronare (reforestacion), and forest fires may be grouped in a comprehensive programme, while Procymaf (conservation and sustainable management of forest resources), and agro-forestry may be classified as a social forestry programme, and Geomatia (forest maps), soils, health and I + D (Research on Development and Technological Innovation), may be set in the same umbrella of an information and research programme.

The LGDFS' major amendments are centred on stronger fines on illegal cleaning of trees and the involvement of federal and local authorities in forestry policy (called forestry federalism by Conafor). This package of reforms includes the National Forestry Fund (FNF) aiming to pay environmental services (services provided by natural ecosystems, such as water provision, capture of carbon, polluters and natural components, climate regulation, and so forth), as well as the

creation of the Forestry National Service (SENAFOR) (article 8) in charged of the forest policy coordination (strategies, agencies, policy instruments, policies, services, and institutional actions), led by Semarnat, where different ministries and the state governments are included.

SENAFOR is more a formal authority since its power is quite lax, if considered the strong presence of some governors and ministries. For example, the ministries of National Defense and SAGARPA, represent stronger policy networks. In fact, SENAFOR is a political instance where decisions are made, but it is not an organisation that defines policy making, as SENAFOR is not provided with personnel, own funds or political attributions. According to article 10 each organisation participating in SENAFOR might be willing to offer its funds and personnel. It is fundamentally part of government rhetoric, which has accompanied forestry policy since various decades ago.

Forestry policy options

Since the early 1990s, Mexico's forestry policy has gained in precision. It has shifted from an agrarian problem (1992 agrarian reform amendment did not considered forest as a core issue) to specific development of policy instruments to deal with forestry concerns, as well as a new focus that emphasises forests as a public good. This is reflected in: a) emergence of new policy actors in the stage of policy-

design, b) new policy instruments, and c) diversification of bureaucracies around forestry policy.

As analysed in the second chapter, most discussions about the 1992 agrarian reform amendment were centred on land tenure as Mexican revolution made land distribution one of its central demands. In those discussions the most important policy actors were members of government (the new leaders integrated into CNC coming from UNORCA), PRI and institutional presidency. In essence, the semi-authoritarian regime was properly working since political opposition and the interest groups were highly controlled or at least neutralised.

Nonetheless, during the 1990s there were five main policy actors pressing for a new amendment, such as timber interests, forest engineers, Profepa, and peasant forest organisations from *ejidos* and local communities, and ENGOs. This political confrontation was illustrated during the 1997 amendments of the forestry law. Since core point was centred on the dilemma of encouraging social forestry (local communities) or forestry plantations, those interests groups were pushing government to define its position in this debate to design forest policy.

Timber interests pressed to make forestry plantations a national priority; formulation of long-term forestry policy (including new regulations and codes, creation of a new agency in charged of

encouraging forest plantations, and economic incentives); governmental programmes to build infrastructure aiming to link forestry plantations centres with points of transformation; and definition of clear methods for *ejidos*-investors partnerships.

Forestry engineers (foresters), on the other hand, a traditional interest group in the forest policy, were pressing to control the technical field of policy. They attempted to impose their political and technical criteria in the forestry field, by torpedoing presence of other professions (e.g. agronomists, forest technicians) in *ejidos* and forestry plantations. This group has traditionally been linked to the PRI and its organisations, setting a corporative relationship. However, the new group of politicians coming from left-wing organisations, which head Semarnap in 1994 ended with this situation, as the new minister did not exchange political positions by political support with that group.

Profepa and local communities attempted to modify the law aiming to empower the former with more legal enforcements to deal with the illegal exploitation of the forest (the black market of woods). Local communities also were also pressing for more economic support for agro-forestry projects.

ENGOS presented contradictory positions, as several organisations supported agro-forestry projects, while others opted to negotiate with the government some amendments to control forestry plantations. The

former were integrated by some environmental organisations, journalists, and deputies from the political opposition (mainly from the left-wing), little involved in the forestry arena, and agrarian organisations, while the latter were constituted by some ENGOs, such as the Civil Council for Silviculture. Gradual progress was regarded in policy outcomes by setting strict prohibition of substituting native forest with forestry plantations, and stricter regulations (e.g. the duty of a forestry management programme) for forestry plantations to obtain a permit to exploit forests.

In relation to policy instruments, recent developments have emphasised the importance of non-regulative instruments for funding forest conservation, taking into account the low impact of regulatory instruments so far (Quadri 2002: 17-20).

While classifying the non-regulative instruments as incentive, contractual and compensatory, Quadri suggests the use of policy instruments depending on the land tenure regime and particular circumstances. For example, a) incentives may be used in individual property, since *ejidos* usually do not pay taxes; b) contractual instruments may be used in areas of low conflict, mainly in non-communal land tenure; areas of low demographic pressures; and lands with no problems of property rights; c) subsidises for agro-forestry projects (e.g. Procampo ecológico, which would be a cash transference for agro-forestry projects), funds labelled for social

development and infrastructure (Ramo 33) within the national budget, and certification of products may be used in areas of poverty, regardless of land tenure regime and degree of conflict.

This scheme (non-regulative instruments) is of strategic nature. As one of the most important critiques is centred on ill-equipped programmes and deficient planning to encourage forestry development, the strategy for forestry policy funding considering weak timber interests (forestry plantations), and poor peasants (agro-forestry and economic support for *ejidos*) makes the difference when dealing with deforestation problem.

Quadri (2002) also suggests that the Mexican government should concentrate (through regulative and non-regulative instruments) on forestry protection rather than forestry plantations because Mexico's forests are made up of trees with unworthy woods for international markets, while Mexico's forest ecosystems are relatively weak compared with those of the US, Canada and Chile.

At this point, ENGOs are apparently confused. They have pointed out the relevance of not substituting natural (native) forest with forest plantations, as it would be an ecological disaster. Julia Carabias, however, has stressed that Mexico's government strategy has not attempted to substitute forest preservation by forestry plantations. Mexican government, according to Carabias has been to encourage

forestry plantations in ex-agricultural and useless lands in order to reactivate Mexico's rural areas, and create employment (interview, May 2003).

In essence, there is a misunderstanding produced by a) deficient communication between government and ENGOs, b) lack of clear government strategy to undertake forest policy, and c) radicalism of some ENGOs and rural organisations. In addition, the institutionalisation of the environmental sector has not produced effective policy instruments, as regulation has been more discourse than reality.

The most important bureaucratic changes have been reflected in the incorporation of new professions, not previously linked to either government or PRI's corporations, into government (e.g. biologists), the emergence of new institutions (e.g. Profepa, Conafor, INE) with professionals of diverse profiles, professional politicians, and ENGOs' members without previous participation in politics or experience in governmental tasks.

Conclusions

The incipient institutionalisation of environmental and forestry policies has impacted the policy definition stage rather than policy implementation. Recent organisational changes in Semarnat (shifting

from issues to processes) have emphasised the coordination between agencies and administrative units in a political system where institutions have been built to compete, not to cooperate. While the government has provided its environmental agencies with laws, and the capacity to coordinate (with) other institutions, those have not been empowered with efficient policy instruments, nor political strengthening.

Inter-bureaucratic fighting has taken place as a result. For instance, the Minister (Victor Lichtinger) was substituted by Conafor's former head (Alberto Cárdenas), while the under-secretariat of the environmental management keeps conflictive relationship with Conafor's new head and the current Minister.

Environmental agencies have structurally been weak in Mexican politics, because they have been provided with functions, not with power. This is because a) the government has preferred to deal with the causes of the problem, instead of its roots, by offering solutions to deterioration without affecting productive processes; b) though environmental agencies emphasise on organisational change (e.g. civil service, efficiency, new policy instruments based on technical rather than political criteria), old problems remain (e.g. centralisation, legal and administrative, legal and administrative formalism, ill-equipped administration, inter-governmental conflicts) because Mexican political traditions impose dynamism and major guidelines (other

policy networks, representing the establishment, largely influencing environmental sector); and c) the big gap between policy formulation and policy-implementation is reflected in the fact that the government only offers formal responses (programmatic), without defining responsibilities (strict application of law) on environmental crimes. As a consequence of those three phenomena, the environmental sector has made forestry decision-making more complex, not more efficient.

This is illustrated by the vulnerability of the environmental policy network *vis à vis* other policy networks, policy agencies and other sectors. Actually, environmental agencies face a double problem, which erodes its capacity, a) their weaknesses before other agencies and sectors inside the government; and b) their lack of empowerment to respond efficiently to ENGOs and peasants' demands. In addition, the forestry sector is placed on the worst of political scenarios, because it is influenced by weak (environmental), highly controlled (agrarian) and clientelar (Sedesol) agencies inside the government, when the state is the strongest policy actor in the forestry arena.

For example, Mexico's agrarian reform (1992) was elaborated by SARH without participation from other ministries (e.g. Sedesol, INE) although it affected various sectors (e.g. forestry). The reform's central point was the land tenure system (subordinating other problems), which had highly influenced by an intra-bureaucratic conflict of SARH. In view of this, environmental degradation was not considered

in this reform because neither government nor peasants were interested in this topic.

Environmental policy was then placed in an uncomfortable situation: too irrelevant for SARH, and too inconvenient for Sedesol. While SARH was centred on agricultural issues, Sedesol was more concerned about social issues (managing the most important alleviation programme) than ecology. Furthermore, Sedesol's minister was greatly focused on the presidential succession, as he was one of the strongest candidates. In this scenario (second half of the Salinas administration), with the least political conflicts to deal with, the higher the chances to become the Mexican president. In this context, Sedesol left agrarian political conflicts of reform in the hands of SARH.

In the last decade, environmental issues were increasingly more precise, but not more politically important. It is frequently mentioned in political speeches, but the reality is that environmental degradation still continues. For example, according to the World Bank, Mexico's rate of ecological worsening is unsustainable with rate of poverty reduction, since current natural capital is insufficient to further Mexico's economic development (González, 2002:1).

Two additional problems are the absence of trustworthy environmental information and deficient policy instruments (e.g. EIA). The former means that Mexico's deforestation statistics are little clear

and there are big differences in calculation (for instance, Toledo calculates that Mexico's deforestation rate is 1,500 hectares per year, and Masera estimated only 668 [Semarnat, 2001:1]). The latter implies that environmental instruments lose efficiency, by making a bureaucratic procedure as they are applied with political criteria rather than technical considerations.

To deal with multiple administrative problems, there are several strategies that can be undertaken by government. To face inter-bureaucratic struggles, the government might formulate the environmental civil service, encouraging the same policy in the federal states.

This policy can be undertaken by a) evaluating the current public personnel and b) hiring new personnel employing technical criteria. In addition, as federal states guarantee the existence of specialised personnel in environmental issues (for example, environmental civil service), more functions and budget may obtain.

Most importantly, state-ENGOS relationship should be provided with more institutional mechanisms, where established rights and duties for both sides. In this scenario, ENGOS would be obliged to participate and cooperate, instead of only protesting and opposing to any governmental action. In turn, the government would inform its policy with suggestions from ENGOS.

Decentralisation and organisational change of environmental and forestry agencies would be another policy. Of course, this implies the presence of civil service with well-equipped public personnel, and sufficient organisational and economic resources. Decentralisation should also be undertaken considering local conditions of each state. In addition, forestry programmes should be reorganised in order to have a more integral and coherent focus, saving money, and gaining in efficiency.

At this point, the implementation of non-regulative instruments to encourage forestry preservation and forestry plantations is a relevant point. Funding programmes in favour of agro-forestry and preservation programmes is a need for this policy, in view of the constraining resources. The *Procampo ecológico*, where subsidies are clearly associated with preservation of forestry ecosystems, is an interesting solution. Funding could be integrated by international organisations (e.g. the World Bank) and federal and state governments. Of course, it is necessary to create a system of measures to evaluate the progress of this strategy.

Finally, assuming the deficiencies of Mexico's judicial power, courts have to be empowered in order to set stricter fines for ecological crimes at the constitutional level. The message here is that

environmental crimes would not only have administrative consequences, but also strong fines for ecological criminals.

Chapter 5

The Forestry Pilot Plan (PPF) and the Calakmul Reserve

Introduction

The thesis has examined the political scenario where Mexico's environmental and forestry policy-networks are undertaken (Chapter one), which include policy-actors, formed by peasants (Chapter two), environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOS) (Chapter three), and environmental agencies (Chapter four). While examining main formal and informal institutions and rules of Mexican politics, those chapters also analysed the roles of forestry policy-actors in the policy network.

The main goal of this chapter centres on two case studies, which were chosen due to their international importance and their similarity in social and economic terms. The analysis of two case studies helps us to understand the importance of policy networks as a central factor that can influence forestry policy process (and indirectly policy-outcomes), as both policies were developed in similar regions. Furthermore, they were influenced by analogous policy-actors, with a similar degree of social participation and similar goals.

The PPF and the Calakmul Reserve are two of the most outstanding forestry policy cases in Mexico because of their temporary relatively successful policy outcomes, international attention, and active participation of public and social actors. Both cases occur on the Peninsula of Yucatan (at the South East of Mexico), characterised by its tropical forests.

What makes these policy cases different is their relative success in a policy area full of failures and political conflicts in Mexico. Most importantly, the formation of a policy network influenced the policy process. Though both policy cases are in crisis now, their organisational and institutional legacies are of remarkable importance for further developments.

The PPF –formulated in 1983 in Quintana Roo state— was the product of a broad convergence of three policy actors (state and federal governments, *ejido* leaders and the international community) while Calakmul Reserve policy, initiated in 1984 in Campeche state, was formulated in a context of political conflict, which offered, however, an organisational novelty: the policy process was led by a peasant organisation with extensive political and executive power.

While both policy cases finished in 1997 (marked by forest policy reformulation by Quintana Roo's state government, and change in Campeche's state government, ending its close relationship with the

leading peasant organisation), they offered initial different policy outcomes.

PPF-Quintana Roo improved *ejidatarios'* income, and pushed for some organisational changes within *ejidos*, regarding sustainable exploitation of forestry, while in the Calakmul Reserve *ejidatarios'* income remained the same, and there were traditional responses to new problems since this strategy did not encourage organisational changes within *ejidos*, nor was the environment centrally considered from the start.

PPF and Calakmul Reserve offer different policy outcomes because they were formulated in different contexts. While the former had a strategic plan supported by an incipient but cohesive policy network, the latter was the product of improvisation and absence of a policy network. Whereas the Xpuhil's Regional Council (CRASX) showed that modification of decision-making structure and active social participation are not enough to undertake organisational change, PPF demonstrated that planning and efficient intermediary work is able to create new organisational values and new institutional ways of forest management.

This chapter has three sections. The first one analyses the PPF process, emphasising policy actors' behaviour, strategies, goals and organisational problems faced by PPF during the implementation

process, while the second section examines the policy process undertaken in Calakmul Reserve considering similar variables. The last section, conclusions, compares both policy cases by analysing policy processes.

This chapter's central hypothesis is that both composition of the policy network (coordination and degree of importance of each policy actor), and efficiency of strategies –more than social participation, as usually argued by institutional focus on forest policy— were the key factors which influenced the policy process, and its consequent policy outcomes.

In both PPF and Calakmul Reserve, analogous policy actors (peasant, international actors and government agencies) participated, and social participation had relatively the same degree of importance. In political terms, while in Campeche there was a political class concerned with participating in the reserve's governance, since federal agencies were making most important decisions regarding that geographical area displacing state government, in Quintana Roo the local political class and entrepreneurial interests were practically absent. Since Quintana Roo had recently been founded as a federal state, political decisions were made in Mexico City rather than by local political personnel.

The facts: Public institutions affecting PPF and Calakmul Reserve

Four government institutions largely affected both policy cases between 1982 and 1997: the Forestry under-secretariat (SSF) dependent on the ministry of Agriculture (SARH), the ministry of Urban Development and Ecology (SEDUE), the state government of Quintana Roo, and the ministry of Social Development (Sedesol) through its key alleviation programme, called Pronasol (National Programme of Solidarity). From 1994 onwards, the ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (Semarnat, previously Semarnap) and local environmental agencies have affected this policy.

The SSF's role, headed by a group of experts favouring community-based forestry projects in 1982, was expressed in: a) SARH's power to undertake social policy, b) exclusive capacity of SARH to design forest policy, and c) use of social participation focus to implement the policy. Though this strategy initially worked, it had two unintentional impacts, which eroded its efficiency: a) strong political reaction from marginalized agencies, expressed in alliances between excluded bureaucracies and local interests in some states, blocking social participation, and b) deficient technical support which accompanied social participation methods, making this experience more a political instrument than a policy-instrument to deal with forestry problems.

SEDUE's influence was its regulatory role regarding the environment. As SEDUE was in charge of classifying Protected Natural Areas (ANPs), and as most of Mexico's land is held by peasants (80%), a problem emerged as SEDUE pushed for the enlargement of ANPs, where the borders affected local communities and *ejidos*, causing conflict in government/peasants relationships (e.g. peasants have to get permits to work their land when they are integrated into an ANP).

Between 1988 and 1994, Pronasol infused PPF and Calakmul Reserve with social participation. Though formally PPF endured until 1997, policy outcomes and international support have helped until recent years to keep the essence of policy, influencing public programmes and government agencies (Calakmul Reserve is still working, although different strategies are used to run this policy).

In both cases, Pronasol promoted forestry activities, encouraging social participation, allocating economic resources, and promoting new forms of state-society relationship by emphasising networks of social groups (e.g. women, young, elderly people) instead of the traditional corporatism (e.g. Peasantry National Confederation (CNC), Revolutionary Institutional Party, (PRI)).

Finally, from 1994 Semarnat has influenced PPF and Calakmul Reserve through forest regulation (e.g. permits and authorisation of forest management plans) and promotion of grassroots movement in

the forestry sector since Semarnat is concerned with diversification of Quintana Roo's and Campeche's rural economy, as well as in new forms of social organisation to exploit forest.

PPF

Defined as a set of ideas applied by different institutional actors (Galleti, 1998), PPF has been one of the most successful communal forestry policies in Latin America (and the only successful experience in Mexico's tropic, (Galleti, 1998:6)). PPF was launched by a convergence of public, private and social interests to deal with the end of the forest concession era, and to launch a community-based alternative in some *ejidos* of Southern Quintana Roo, where the peasant was the key actor managing forest.

Encouraged by state government (attempting to deal with deforestation), and supported by the international community (seeking to preserve Mexico's tropical forest), SSF and *ejidos*' leaders (concerns for economic development of their communities and control of their own natural resources), PPF was launched to take advantage of Mexico's new forestry policy, which favoured agro-forestry projects.

In organisational terms, PPF largely redesigned the power structure in Quintana Roo's forestry sector, it reallocated assets previously managed by MIQRO (the timber company operating until 1983 in

Quintana Roo, during the federal regime of forestry concessions), and it changed the vertically integrated production chain of the concession period and collapsed MIQRO's monopsony.

PPF also created a new institution, the forestry civil society, to support local forest management (e.g. Society of Forestry *Ejido* Producers of Quintana Roo [SPFEQR], Organisation of Forestry *Ejido* Producers of the Maya Zone [OEPFZM]). This institution is a federation of *ejidos*, ruled democratically by representatives from member *ejidos*. It brings under the same umbrella a number of previously dispersed or poorly organised responsibilities, including political representation, community organising, technical assistance, and the transmission of government reservation norms and regulations.

In practice, PPF was never an institution, but a project or plan undertaken by a policy network. Because of this, its evolution and orientation have been largely affected by institutional policy changes. Though formally PPF does not exist any more, its institutional and organisational legacies in *ejidos* remain in the sector made up of *ejidos* and timber private companies, government agencies and environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOS).

ENGOS and PPF formulation

The PPF cannot be explained without the participation of international ENGOS. The German Agency for International Development (GTZ), through the Mexico-Germany Agreement (AMA) was a key actor in carrying out the PPF. While the GTZ has gradually been reducing its support, the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) –since 1995— has developed a growing role in Quintana Roo, coordinating forestry policy actors and supporting PPF's institutional and socio-economic dimensions.

In this experience, planning was one of the outstanding factors for its initial success. Since there was an incipient cohesive policy network, policy designers were able to formulate targets and strategies without political opposition. Policy-implementation was another story though.

In essence, AMA defined PPF formulation based on seven strategies, *a)* flexible planning, *b)* pilot conception, *c)* precision of goals and actions precision, *d)* 'shared power' concept *e)* specification of actions through institutional and operational levels, *f)* use of non traditional bureaucratic channels, and *g)* labelled external economic support.

PPF's main initial goal was to fill the political space left by the end of forestry concessions in 1982 with a community-based alternative, gradually building commercial, political, and technical fronts to deal

with timber interests, government, and productive challenges respectively.

In doing this, PPF should be adaptable to changing circumstances without losing its central goal (sustainable use of natural resources); its actions should be restricted to a specific area with strategic criterion (specific *ejidos* with Permanent Forestry Areas [AFP] inside) and oriented by capacity of an operative team in charged of the project, that is innovative actions to be developed within the region, and strategies to deal with negative reactions of local actors or to prevent PPF's unintentional effects.

The precision of goals and actions attempted to reduce socio-economic and technical unpredictabilities as possible by formulating modest strategic novelties to target key aspects that could change the regional situation. Likewise, the shared power concept implied that none of involved policy actors would manage all the political variables affecting forest policy. In addition, this concept implied that PPF would set up its own political space within and established socio-economic and institutional network.

In doing this, PPF would have to be carried out on two levels: institutional (federal and state governments) and operative (project personnel interacting with local public personnel). Most importantly, project personnel should keep a critical view in relation to specific

actions and policy actors in order to keep a strategic view. While this project should be carried out with a new institutional view, outside of traditional bureaucracies, external funds should be channelled to specific activities with subsidiary criteria (supporting only specific activities, which could not be funded by peasants themselves or public agencies).

The fact is that the policy's central differences compared with others were its strategic character and the unusual coordination of policy actors in a political regime where institutions have been built for conflict instead for cooperation. Because of the traditional top-down strategy of Mexican public policy, PPF was a new experience considering its bottom-up character, where funds and policy actors were not absolutely controlled by state, and most importantly, a consistent policy network was built based on cooperation and trust in a regime where bureaucratic conflict is the rule.

Policy implementation, conflicting policy-network

Though policy design was clearly defined, policy implementation (the process to drive PPF) was conflictive, since the two teams leading the PPF, the local (based in Quintana Roo) and central (based in Mexico City) proposed different strategies. Since AMA did not directly run PPF, a local organisation (the forestry technical section of the peasant organisation) was encouraged, to perform actions and strategies,

becoming soon after a problem since it proposed different methods of work, enlarging its power by (re)defining policy and strategies. The most important policy-implementation process was developed during Joaquin administration in Quintana Roo (1981-87). The next administration (1987-93) diminished the support towards this policy, while the Villanueva administration (1993-99) ended this policy process.

While the local team favoured research-action methodology, PPF's direction remained in Mexico City, far from the region where implementation was undertaken, devoted to setting institutional ties. Whereas the local team pushed for establishing linkages with peasant sectors and aggressive promotion of social participation, the central team underestimated the development of local socio-political equilibria, alternatively offering personal political relationship with the relevant institutions and policy actors, to which they provided technical support.

While the 'shared power' concept was useful during policy-design, policy implementation showed its limitations when policy actors pushed for different policy strategies. Community-based forestry project implementation was a good illustration of this.

While the local team propelled more technical and promotional support and the hiring of more personnel, the central team proposed

the opposite by encouraging the use of small number of personnel and a modest budget for technical and promotional activities. In addition, the top-down decision-making style in this process blocked interaction with other policy actors and access to other external funds.

In practice, the local team dominated the main decisions thanks to its capacity to drive the process (technical advisers and peasants), and its ability to build regional networks and power equilibria. This team launched two strategies in order to deal with groups affected by PPF: Proposing Actions and Actions of Contention. The former were intended to achieve main goals, and the latter to control factors negatively affecting the PPF's actions.

The Proposing Actions were undertaken in 1983 with the aim of affecting a specific area (six *ejidos*), while the Actions of Contention attempted to influence the social atmosphere. While SSF extended its social participation policy into forestry *ejidos* by encouraging forestry civil societies, the state government launched the Forestry State Plan (PFE) in order to widen sustainable forestry exploitation further than the six *ejidos* selected by PPF.

Though regulation substituted traditional unsustainable ways of exploiting forest, the spatial enlargement fragmented technical capacity of PPF, reducing its efficiency. This strategy worked in terms of extension, but it failed in terms of deepening of policy's impact. An

additional problem was the end of local administration in 1993 since the PFE disappeared, affecting peasants and their capacity to drive the process.

Since forestry civil societies' actions have been dependent on equilibrium among policy actors (peasants, timber interests, federal and state governments), the policy scenario has been in constant change. Not surprisingly, PPF was deliberately introduced into institutional infrastructure in order to undertake dynamic actions, marginalizing traditional bureaucracy. Since Mexico's forestry policy is crossed by three government levels, federal government (top authorities), operative level (usually state governments and middle federal bureaucracy), and local government (municipalities), PPF was inserted into the mid-level (operative) in order to have access to top decision-makers, and to infuse programmes with more horizontal characteristics, simultaneously.

PPF also attempted to become a liaison between the top level of federal government and beneficiaries, and to deal with the *sexenal* turnover of bureaucracy, by becoming an instrument of forestry policy continuity. While PPF developed new ways of operating forestry policy outside of traditional bureaucratic channels, PPF's team operated within the government (federal and state governments) with relative autonomy. Gradually, this team was getting closer to forestry civil societies,

developing an independent coalition consisting of PPF's promoters and peasants.

The Zedillo administration (1994-2000) encouraged development of the operative level undermining the strength of social organisations, while at the same time the Villanueva administration (1993-1999) empowered itself in political terms, asphyxiating channels of communication and political operation between PPF and peasants and timber interests. Though Sedesol attempted to compensate for this problem by directly providing funds to social organisations, new federal dispositions obliged Sedesol to put the funds in the hands of state and local governments instead. Now, federal and state agencies directly coordinate funds to carry out forest policy, undermining participation of social organisations.

Like Quintana Roo's case, ENGOs participating in Calakmul have been useful in initiating sustainable development policy-processes, but they have been unable to survive when either 'normal' bureaucracy takes the control of policy, or the policy process takes other dimensions. Likewise, the alliances between civil organisations and peasant organisations have eroded their impartial role, and as a consequence, their role as stakeholders.

Though the PPF does not exist anymore (ended in 1997), its institutional and organisational legacies remain in Quintana Roo. In

view of this, the rest of this section is devoted to the current institutional and organisational problems that the PPF was not able to overcome, centred on the organisational problems of *ejido* and the serious challenges of the forestry civil societies.

Ejido organisational problems

The main social institution affecting PPF implementation is the *ejido* and its organisational assets. The main organisational problem faced by PPF was insufficient separation between the *ejido*'s trade and social functions, producing poor policy outcomes, deficient management, decapitalisation, and corruption.

Since *ejido* decision-making is essentially of a political nature, economic decisions are quite deficient (as stated in the second chapter, the *ejido* is a peculiar mixture of legal, social, political and economic functions). *Ejidors* are ruled by a Commissioner (comprised of all members of the *ejido* [*ejidatario*]), elected by a general assembly, in which each *ejidatario* has a vote.

The top authority is the General Assembly (consisting of a president, secretary and treasurer), which has the power to appoint/remove the commissary and his/her officials, serving three-year terms. This structure is completed by the Council of Inspection, which also has a president, secretary and treasurer. In theory, the commissariat and

general assembly only rule on land use, but in practice they are the local authority making decisions on internal affairs, and representing the community before external agents (e.g. government and timber enterprises).

Because forestry administrative structure is usually the same as the *ejido's*, there is a mixture of functions that requires different strategies of management (e.g. entrepreneurial, commercialisation, promotion). Forestry activities are undertaken by the *ejido's* head, allocating functions between Commissioner and the President of Commission of Inspection. This situation leads to a constant tension between business imperatives for the forestry activities and the *ejido's* socio-political context, because of the absence of any position between the general assembly and commissioner.

That position largely should be the equivalent of a council of administration of an enterprise. For example, the position that largely defines contracts, budget, personnel, and negotiates prices is the general assembly, which undertakes these tasks with political criteria (reflecting confusion of functions, positions and personnel profiles). Though in various Quintana Roo's *ejidos*, there has been an intermediate instance created between the general assembly and the *ejido's* authority, the *ejido's* council (made up of respectable people from the community), there is not an entrepreneurial counterpart to

deal with *ejido* forestry management (and in general to deal with communal economic activities).

The three main problems produced by this governance (*ejido*'s forestry collective management) are: *a*) the outstanding importance of politics on forest enterprise management, *b*) the low emphasis of forest enterprises on maximising profits, and *c*) commissioner's lack of an entrepreneurial view and managerial abilities.

Waged employment in the communal forest is often distributed as political patronage, systematically excluding women, non-*ejidatarios*, and male *ejidatarios* out of political favour. The patronage system also leads to staffing decisions being made for political reasons more than for competence and experience. Furthermore, *ejidatarios* normally vote in assemblies to distribute forestry profits rather than reinvest them. While this decision-making is explained by the social needs of the people, most of the *ejido*'s forestry enterprises are, as a result, undercapitalised.

The forestry enterprise is not set up to maximise profits. For example, customary payment schemes for activities depend widely on the SPFEQR's *tabulador*. Since the *tabulador* was designed initially to negotiate more favourable prices, these costs are often overstated. As a consequence, there exists little incentive to pass along cost savings as the difference between actual cost of an activity and that indicated

in the *tabulador* becomes a rent to the contractor. In practice, the *tabulador* hides the real profitability of timber extraction.

Finally, in most *ejidos*, the commissioner manages forestry finances and marketing without proper training. Forestry-derived funds have often been used for expenditure on social welfare, and community projects. Many *ejidatarios* often complain that commissioners often accept bribes from buyers. In many *ejidos*, commissioners have been removed from office because of fears, founded or not, that *ejido's* money is being misappropriated. Corruption, real or otherwise, is one of the most important problems in *ejido* management. An additional problem is the continuity of *ejido* leadership within forestry societies, since the leaders are leaders before external actors, but leadership is fragmented within forestry civil societies, as they are only leaders of their own *ejido*.

The *ejido's* forestry management problems are especially serious in collective sawmill operations. Because those cutting timber are paid by tree, low quality wood often arrives at the sawmill. Various *ejidos* have run kilns for drying wood, but none have been functional so far. Moreover, buyers complain that *ejidos* often deliver their product late, fail to meet quality standards or agreed-upon species mixes, or break contacts.

Role of Quintana Roo's forestry societies

Forestry societies, which are maybe the most important PPF legacy, are managed by elected peasants leaders, with outstanding support from their professional technical staff and from development agencies. They vary in age, organisational, and resources endowment. While SPFEQR and OEPFZM have received most external support, the former concentrates *ejidos* with the state's most valuable timber resources.

Because of their funding, forestry societies have become key actors in Quintana Roo's forestry sector. These societies have multiple functions, such as technical assistance, regulation of forestry exploitation, a democratic role, an instrument to encourage social participation, a political role and go-betweens.

As they provide technical services through Forestry Technical Departments, they could also offer effective technical assistance while maintaining wide social support (e.g. these societies have been able to regulate forestry exploitation, reducing at times the amount of wood extracted by forestry in a context where peasants are pressuring for increasing wood's exploitation to export). At the same time, the forestry societies have huge local credibility because of the democratic nature of their leaders, while they have been able to expand social participation in forestry.

Their political role derives from their weight as a counterbalance to private timber interests. Forestry societies have played a key role in blocking the resetting of MIQROO as a monopsony, the setting of prices for timber, information exchange by participating in policy forums, and their participation in national peasant forestry networks. Finally, forestry societies have been efficient instruments for getting external support from national and international agencies (e.g. GTZ, ODA) for infrastructure and technology to exploit forestry.

Challenges dealing with the forestry civil societies

The forestry societies deal with many obstacles challenging their future development. Two of them are the constant turnover of societies' leadership and the societies' incapacity to pay for efficient technical delivery. The former affects the forestry policy implementation's efficiency, project management and representation of *ejido's* interests, while the later influences the societies' financial capacity.

Basically, constant change of personnel in forestry societies is a micro-cosmos of Mexico's political system in the countryside, where administration is sacrificed at the expense of political stability. Both in SPFEQR and OEPFZM leaders are elected for a one-year term according to internal statute. Though, in theory, they can be re-

elected, the whole administration is normally replaced each year. Fear of corruption is the main cause explaining this phenomenon, since the Assembly does not have a formal procedure to evaluate and remove an elected leader. Paradoxically, a society leader can be removed if his home *ejido* withdraws his status as forestry delegate. This situation, interviewees reported, has recently happened to two of the SPFQR's presidents, confirming that societies' leadership is strong before other external actors, but weak within the society (since societies' leaders depend largely on the trust of their home *ejido*).

The second main problem is related to the financial crisis of the technical services that regulate extraction and strengthen ties between *ejidos* and their forestry societies. Though the SPFEQR and EPFZM's technical services were subsidised by federal and state agencies until the late 1980s, all civil societies have to pay for their technical needs. Most of the cost is charged to extraction of Mahogany; the charge per cubic meter for mahogany is nearly four times that charged for other woods, despite the actual cost of providing the service being the same. Productivity generated by economic inequality among *ejidos* makes financing technical services cheaper in the richer forestry *ejidos* with larger AFP and dense mahogany stands.

The main problem with this tendency is that rich *ejidos* (e.g. *Petcacab*, *Nohbec* or *Tres Garantías*) are subsidising technical services to poorer

ejidos, and the former are quitting from civil societies, weakening these institutions (e.g. *Nohbec* and *X'Hazil ejidos*).

Organisational implications of external influences on forestry

The second agrarian reform and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have complicated even more the civil societies' difficult situation because they have undermined societies' financial and organisational capacity to deal with problems. As stated in the second chapter, article 27 –reformed in 1992 and amended in 1997— promoted private investment, free markets for products and services, and an important reduction in government involvement in forestry.

Simultaneously, NAFTA has encouraged the decline of importations of wood (for multiple uses) since Mexican mahogany and other tropical hardwoods have been cheaper than other woods on the international market. Nonetheless, in the long term both *ejido* and private timber companies will be affected by inefficiency problems derived from their structural weaknesses and organisational assets.

The second agrarian reform helped the emergence of forestry work groups. Though they are not widely spread among *ejido* members, the work groups are likely to have a relevant impact on forestry society. Firstly, they have emerged in the largest and richest *ejidos*, obligating a reorganisation that requires additional time and resources.

Secondly, the groups have diminished the societies' credibility before some external support institutions.

The real impact of the groups on the possibility of coherent forest management is not yet clear. The work groups create new organisational and financial pressures on the societies' technical departments. For example, in *Petcacacab* a technician complained that he now had 12 extraction chiefs and teams. This situation demands not only complex logistics but also time and training of people without forestry experience. Various opportunities arise for internal problems over how to divide up volumes (since extraction conditions vary), the time of marketing and harvesting and the organisation of post-harvest cleaning.

Organisation into groups creates new challenges to the formal structure of governance in forestry societies, initially designed to represent whole *ejidos*. For example, in addition to modifying societies' internal distribution of power in favour of *ejidos* with groups, this situation could encourage formation of work groups for political more than technical goals. A further problem is that groups may encourage the actual fragmentation (*parcelización*) of forestlands.

In political terms, forestry societies deal with a problem of legitimacy. In addition to the economic imperative to compete in markets and a social condition to allocate enough material benefits to maintain their

members' support (like any peasant organisation), forestry societies have to consider ecological sustainability criteria.

Various problems of legitimacy are derived from forestry societies' ambiguity in dealing with work groups and the *ejidos'* needs produced by inequality among them. While the former problem affects the forestry societies' credibility before national and international agency supporters, since work groups may be politically disintegrating *ejido* and encouraging eventual *parcelización* of forestlands, the later erodes the capacity of forestry societies to represent *ejidos* before external agents. Both situations affect forestry societies, as the challenge to achieve ecological goals implies not only social participation, but also technical support and political stability.

Since PPF encouraged training of peasants as technical assistants, a new generation of long-term staff work in Quintana Roo's *ejidos* now. The problem with those technical assistants is that they are more focused on their technical goals than their needs for their skills to organise community, conflicting policy implementation since new staff is perceived as little involved with people, little experienced, and low credibility. Essentially, new staff has not understood its political role in community.

Policy outcomes

The PPF's three main policy outcomes between 1982 and 1997 are a) delimitation of AFPs, b) local economic improvement, and c) more employment. The former point contributed to production, conservation and regulation. While there was an efficient alliance between PPF's technical assistants and *ejidatarios* to set boundaries inside *ejidos*, *ejido* members reached internal consensus on the importance of this strategy. This policy outcome was successful in view of the internal agreement in *ejidos* and the negotiation abilities of PPF's team.

The PPF helped the local economy since the price of timber increased in the first year of post-MIQROO monopsony from \$800/m cubic to \$19,000/m cubic (Arguelles and Armijo, in Taylor and Zabin, 2000:144). In fact, it was the first time that profits were produced for and allocated among every *ejido* member (in this included in PPF). Furthermore, various public services have been funded by PPF's profits since then.

Finally, employment was an important device. While MIQROO had only employed unqualified *ejidatarios*, the incipient timber business offered new jobs, such a tractor drivers, sawmill operators, forestry technicians, and other paid specialised jobs. Most importantly, PPF and its derivations have encouraged the education of young *ejidatarios*, and now they are working as technical assistants in their

own *ejidos*, partially stopping the traditional emigration to Mexico City.

Calakmul Reserve

The forestry policy process undertaken in Calakmul Reserve was different since planning and improvisation were the key ingredients together with the top-down process of policy implementation, initially through a civil organisation that gradually was getting closing to government and PRI, the Xpuhil's Regional Council (CRASX). In this process there were two attempts to transfer PPF-Quintana Roo experience to Calakmul, (1984-87 and 1991-95).

While the former was characterised by its low profile in institutional terms since there were: a) a limited amount of strategies, fundamentally centred on forestry zoning, and b) the lack of a policy network connecting the most important institutions (federal agencies) with local institutions and policy actors (state government, local governments, peasants, ENGOs), the later was influenced by the Pronasol's growing importance in Mexico's social policy, and the CRASX's consolidation like the core institution of policy network around Calakmul Reserve.

Unlike Quintana Roo's case, lack of stakeholders or negotiators supported by a technical team between 1984 and 1987 eroded the

capacity of this first attempt to implement the PPF in Calakmul. While the negotiation process was left in the hands of the PPF's inexperienced local team, which soon became isolated from most important policy actors, policy implementation relied on the capacity of a local peasant organisation, which was confronted with Campeche's government.

The second attempt was marked by Pronasol and its ambitious goals of spreading social participation throughout the region, instead of specific areas joined to the CRASX's formation as coordinator organisation of an incipient policy-network around Calakmul Reserve. Multiplication of institutions and political conflicts made more complex the policy process, mainly when international ENGOs entered into the social scenario, and the state government decided to create a new municipality, on the space occupied basically by the reserve. This second attempt is characterised by three stages in institutional terms, a) CRASX's foundation, b) CRASX's consolidation; and c) CRASX's decline as core institution.

Occupation of regional space: 1984-1987

PPF's initial team was only formed by SSF's personnel. Unlike PPF-Quintana Roo, this team was not preceded by a regional analysis and preparation of the base-project. In fact, SSF did not pact its presence in Calakmul with Campeche's government, which had a different view on the region, making policy-coordination difficult (e.g. inter-

governmental problems, inter-bureaucratic conflicts and functions' overlapping).

One of the most important organisational problems was that SSF could not manage its local office in Campeche since the state government filled this position with local personnel, creating an inter-bureaucratic conflict between a federal agency (SSF) and a local one (state government), complicating policy implementation.

a) Political conflict, organisational consequences

Main political actor at the beginning was Campeche's government in a context where political conflict was reflected in bureaucratic fragmentation. State government dealt with three fronts of conflict: PPF, Zoh Laguna fabric, and the Mayan People *Ejid*os' *Unión* of Campeche (UEPCM). Since there was not a process of personnel selection, PPF's team was formed by inexperienced personnel without power of negotiation. At the same time, peasant organisational fragmentation took place in Campeche since the state government created new organisations called ARIC in order to weaken the Campeche's *Unión* of Forestry *Ejido* (UEF), which had been a political tool of the previous governor.

While ARIC, supported by the state government, pushed for becoming the new monoposony substituting the Zoh Laguna factory (timber

interests), state government undermined UEPCM (PPF's ally) in order to control the local timber business. At the end of the day, state government had set up alliances with the Zoh Laguna factory, and it had expelled PPF's team and UEPCM from Calakmul.

The main policy outcomes until then had been the abortion of agro-forestry projects (grassroots movement), and the multiplication of political organisations and their respective bureaucracies. While an agency of federal government had attempted to penetrate the region without planning and political support (national or local), the state government reacted by stopping the action by considering it an intrusion into its territory.

b) AMA and Pronasol

While Calakmul Reserve policy dealt with the same organisational problems in *ejidos*, AMA's strategy transferred various principles taken from Quintana Roo's experience. Encompassed by the concept of 'focusing on the problem', those strategies were a) the limited number of participant *ejidos*, b) participation limited to forest activities, c) strategic criteria to chose participant *ejidos*, d) integration into the existent dynamic within *ejido*, and e) diffusion of concept AFP. The Main weaknesses of this process were the PPF's deficient political negotiation ability and the lack of strategic planning.

The Salinas administration (1988) considerably influenced the forestry policy in Calakmul Reserve since new political patterns (weakening of corporatism, compensatory social policy implemented through Sedesol and Pronasol, PRI's weak position in Calakmul) were encouraged, and this ANP was shown before the international community as a good example of Mexico's new ecological orientation.

PRI's recuperation was a priority for state and federal government in 1989. Since this region was considered as 'an unfilled space' because of its low demographic density, creation of institutions became an urgent need to recover politically this region. It is worthy to note that PRI had lost elections in Calakmul without institutional consequences since there were no local authorities (Calakmul was settled on a region crossed by different municipalities within Campeche).

Pronasol Brigades entered this region marking the beginning of a strong presence of federal government in the region since the programme was centrally managed. Again, the national government was intervening in the region without the participation of the state government.

Pronasol encouraged social participation out of traditional bureaucracy and corporatism, by building social networks from very local spaces (suburbs, *ejidos*), which directly exposed their demands before Pronasol's representatives. PRI's corporations and traditional

bureaucracy were effectively excluded from this process, while Pronasol's bureaucracy increased, as the social network was gradually growing until eventually forming a huge national structure.

While Pronasol set up direct linkages with Mexico City in order to avoid traditional bureaucracy, the Indigenous National Institute (INI) was the main organisation to manage budget sent by federal government, since INI was considered a useful institution to avoid middle bureaucracy (e.g. state government, local government, local representations of federal agencies in Campeche) because of its condition of decentralised institution dependent directly on the presidency.

Pronatura-Yucatan, an environmental civil organisation, had marginal participation in 1991, when the regional occupation had begun. This organisation practically was deleted from the region when the National Programme of Reforestation (PRONARE) encouraged its quick occupation of Calakmul, since Pronatura was in favour of a gradual, slow and planned occupation of this region.

c) CRASX's creation

Pronasol designed social assistance centres of a regional nature to centralise peasant demands. While this programme identified lack of budget as the main rural problem, it encouraged social participation

without planning and with short-term political goals (offering quick solutions in order to provide PRI with electoral profits).

Though Pronasol undermined corporatism, its policy implementation in Calakmul was undertaken with a highly hierarchical view (direct liaison with Mexico City and centralised budget without passing for accountable agencies, such as state government or local congress). Though Pronasol's brigades did not have a technical team, they tried to become the main policy actors in Calakmul, imposing decisions on the other policy actors (state government, timber interests, peasants).

Pronasol encouraged the formation of a peasant organisation representative of communities living within the reserve, CRASX, in order to administer the budgets. The initial conflict, however, took place when the CRASX's historic leader pushed for an independent peasant organisation, and the Pronasol's brigades attempted to exercise political control of the region through budget and subsidies.

Since CRASX did not have a legal personality in that time (it was a civil organisation), and as a consequence the CRASX was not allowed to manage money or to apply for loans, INI was empowered to manage funds for Calakmul. The policy process started with the Pronasol brigades receiving peasant demands, which were then sent to INI's local agency, finishing in Mexico City, where the main decisions were

made. Solutions took exactly the same route in the opposite direction. Pronasol replaced local organisations instead of integrating into them.

In practice, Pronasol brigades operated their forestry policy using the same method of social participation as SSF (social involvement without technical support), managing the funds in a direct way through a decentralised agency (avoiding the middle bureaucracy), and pursuing, in political terms, the recovery of political influence for PRI and social stability in the region. In addition, federal government recovered its presence in the region, replacing the weak presence of the state government of Campeche.

Second attempt: CRASX's consolidation

CRASX's consolidation presented two stages, the regional occupation led by federal government, and the CRASX's institutionalisation as a core organisation to execute public policies. While the former is characterised by political changes and inter-organisational conflicts, the later is centred on the organisational design of Calakmul's decision-making, which consisted of the CRASX-reserve management axis.

Calakmul Reserve had to deal with various problems within Mexico's government since SARH and SRA had pushed to keep this area as a forest region susceptible to be exploited by timber interests and public

agencies, as well as an available source of land to be allocated to peasants, respectively.

When federal government decided to create the Calakmul Reserve in late 1980s, SRA did not pay attention and continued its land distribution policy, pressuring settlements inside the reserve. Since SEDUE was a weak new agency, managed by biologists without political experience, SRA's criteria were imposed, and negotiation with recent peasant immigrants had to be undertaken to set up the reserve.

During Salinas administration, Calakmul Reserve policy network began to be built through three main policy actors: a) a group of anthropologists integrated into Pronasol in Mexico City, which was concerned about the lack of planning of Pronasol's brigades in Calakmul, b) PPF-Quintana Roo's leader, who set up closer linkages to the Pronasol's group, and c) CRASX's leader, who set up alliances with PPF.

Though PRONARE and CRASX formed a strong alliance (without the participation of Campeche's government), various organisational problems undermined Calakmul's forestry policy, a) the strong presence of Sedesol as guidance ministry, which emphasised development issues rather than ecological concerns; b) the change in state administration and its consequent political redefinition; and c)

CRASX's weak organisational structure to exercise economic and political management.

Since Sedesol was more interested in social concerns, ecological actions lost impetus in Calakmul, since Pronasol and other agencies in charge of social and development issues were stronger than environmental agencies inside Sedesol. For example, the National Institute of Ecology and General Attorney's Agency for Environmental Protection, INE and Profepa respectively, had considerably less political weight than Pronasol.

Sedesol's actions, through Pronare, attempted to influence the future policies' governor, who would take office in 1991. Unlike PPF-Quintana Roo, where the governor gave strong personal support to the agro-forestry policy network getting involved in it, Campeche's governor opted for building a traditional regional political structure around central policy actors participating in Calakmul's politics, without getting involved himself.

The strategies of the Campeche government were: *a)* providing political support to UEPCM's historic leader in order to co-opt him (keeping him away from political opposition), and becoming CRASX's president; *b)* providing direct and personal support to a former PPF-Quintana Roo manager as informal supervisor of Calakmul policy process; *c)* undermining ARIC and UEF by supporting CRASX; and *d)*

establishing alliances with Pronasol since the federal presence was unavoidable.

Finally, CRASX's weak organisational structure to manage budget, soon enabled the organisation to be easily co-opted by state government. This situation weakened its legitimacy, reflected in the emigration of some of its member to other organisations. In practice, CRASX became a quasi-governmental organisation (quago) to politically manage Calakmul while applying forest and social policies. An additional problem with this organisation is that CRASX's leaders were not trained to deal with political challenges, or to lead social and forestry policies with a long-term view.

Unlike PPF-Quintana Roo, where the main target was to gradually institutionalise new ways of exploiting forest, spreading new organisational customs and values, giving political goals a secondary role, in Campeche the Pronasol's main priority was quickly to occupy the region gaining political support, by implementing social and agricultural programmes. Political needs overcame development policies.

CRASX's institutionalisation as a core organisation

This period is characterised by three major institutional changes: a) integration of the Reserve's area and its *ejido* neighbours into the

same regional scheme, b) CRASX's consolidation as coordinator organisation of all regional public policies and c) transformation of SEDUE into Sedesol in 1992, replacing the conservationist concept with the sustainable development discourse favoured by the later. This was reflected in new policy-orientations, where the main goal was to stop the isolated situation of Calakmul Reserve, in institutional terms, by integrating new agencies into its management, since it had only been led by SEDUE until then.

This strategy was centred on a two-fold plan, a) creation of ecologically friendly economic activities on border areas (surrounding areas) of the reserve, in order to advance inside latter, and b) the reserve's transformation into a regional element potentially attractive for international funding.

Gradually Sedesol, Campeche's government, and the institutional presidency became interested in Calakmul Reserve. While AMA proposed a similar scheme as that in PPF Quintana Roo, where state government was the central institutional actor during the early stages, Campeche's government undertook a low profile forestry policy.

To deal with this situation, the reserve's director put strong emphasis on CRASX and the incorporation of new national and international organisations (e.g. civil organisations, institutions) into the policy process, broadening social representation, and gaining new allies.

These strategies helped to gain social support for ecologically friendly economic activities around the reserve's borders, and the reserve's promotion before conservationist organisations in order to get funds for conservation, creating employment and social opportunities for local inhabitants.

The Reserve's management soon became the main regional stakeholder among the multiple organisations participating in Calakmul. As a consequence, different social actions were undertaken in Calakmul (e.g. archaeological, organic agriculture, water management), becoming a new social-geographical area with growing institutional participation. In organisational terms, this was an institutional laboratory, where three elements were developed, a) the functional use of ecological discourse as a central theme of the regional constitution; b) international participation in this experiment designing sustainable development policy; and c) ENGOs' funding.

While public institutions were not strongly involved in the forestry policy implemented in Calakmul Reserve, projects developed by civil organisations had to be approved by either formal or informal agencies, creating a complex organisational scenario. The two main decision-makers, CRASX and reserve's management, which analysed development projects presented by civil organisations, were not strongly supported by public institutions, concerned more with political aims than sustainable development policy.

While the reserve's management was in charge of institutional coordination and land use planning, and it was made up of ENGOs and public institutions led by state government (the director was appointed Campeche's governor), CRASX was a peasant representative organisation, consisting of an *ejido's* representative assembly, in charge of being a go-between between peasants and institutions (both national and international). In practice, the reserve's management was in charge of policy-formulation (technical abilities), whereas CRASX was the implementation agency (political organisation).

This organisational structure showed various problems, since both institutions reflected democratic deficit and broad autonomy without accountability. Its main characteristics were: a) centralisation, b) non-accountability, c) lack of check and balances, and d) deficient view of long term in organisational terms (e.g. strategy to transform this structure into more decentralised and functional one in long-term).

Since this organisational structure favoured a top-down strategy, there were no internal or external alternative mechanisms of decision-making, generating a strong centralisation of the most important regional decisions, (e.g. budget management, criteria to give economic support, investment for socio-environmental policies). In practice, this scheme did not empower a regional strategy of socio-environmental

actions, but an emergent political group (CRASX-Reserve's management axis).

Calakmul's organisational structure of decision-making did not build a participant based culture, as most important decisions were executed depending on local demands (not always analysed or prioritised), supervisors' view and funding capacity. In addition, CRASX presented the same problems as that of Quintana Roo's civil societies, where political and trade functions were not differentiated.

Like PPF, the CRASX's main problem was its system of political representation. *Ejido's* representatives (constituencies) are elected in their home *ejido* to CRASX's general assembly, which in turn, elects members for the management. Both agencies largely depend on politics. As a consequence, CRASX's management council is not usually made up of the most capable members. Since there is a mechanism of election, but not of personnel recruitment, it is usual that CRASX's president, strongly empowered, makes the most important decisions in a centralised manner (without real social participation).

Because of the lack of checks and balances, serious problems of administration, such as corruption and ill-equipped decisions, were not corrected as management in practice did not offer reports. The problem was potentially bigger because neither CRASX's

constituencies nor public institutions asked for reports. The former because they were not informed about their rights, and the latter because CRASX offered political stability, the main priority for federal and state governments. Government exchanged political stability for tolerance of corruption.

Finally, the initial centralised pattern of decision-making in Calakmul—justified by the policy coordination needs—operated in favour of certain individuals (the reserve's director and CRASX's president), shadowing a long-term plan for organisational change to deal with institutional enlargement. The main problem was that leaders did not see more than the first stage of policy, where a basic centralised and personalised organisational structure exercised environmental management.

Not surprisingly, at the end of this stage, the main restriction was CRASX's incapacity to respond to process of institutional differentiation due to its monolithic, and poorly differentiated and specialised organisational nature because:

- a) CRASX was over-dimensioned in terms of geographical space and functions (neither leaders nor technicians were able to cover all the Calakmul area and its main problems).

- b) CRASX was not able to develop a strategic long-term leadership (personalisation and charismatic leadership was favoured rather than long-term organisational development).
- c) CRASX did not develop a strategic plan since the main peasant political achievement had been for them to be free to manage funds without interference from public institutions. PRONARE supported this practice by funding social demands presented by CRASX without technical analysis.
- d) CRASX did not develop a scheme of sectorisation for economic activities, since productive projects were discussed in general assemblies, instead of specific committees.
- e) CRASX lost its original view of being a self-funding organisation in the long-term. Instead, it became a quango in charge of managing public and private funds without an economic, organisational, or development plan. CRASX gradually became dependent on government and its political party, PRI.
- f) While CRASX did not favour a plan of personnel recruitment, agricultural specific projects were undertaken without planning and coordination. CRASX favoured social mobilisation and employment without considering productive goals.

- g) In practice, the reserve's management worked as a branch of CRASX since functional division between them determined that the latter made the most important decisions. While the reserve's direction formulated plans and goals, the later implemented according its criteria, needs and political pressures (there was a non-accountable, centralised and unquestionable organisation since there were no checks and balances).
- h) The group of participants within the reserve's management contributed to a certain degree of trade off among sectors, but it was poorly integrated into the reserve. As a consequence, its scope of action was very limited.

CRASX's decline

CRASX's decline was preceded by a regional and sectoral division. Since Calakmul Reserve extended along different municipalities within Campeche, local inhabitants attempted to undertake different strategies to gain socio-economic benefits, fragmenting CRASX's role as organisation coordinator. Together with groups' regional differentiation according to economic interests, there was a political diversity since various groups began to emigrate from CRASX arguing that it was a political instrument of PRI.

This situation was partially produced by a lack of coordination among policy actors and partially by the organisational structure of decision-making:

- a) While the CRASX-reserve's management axis attempted to set up a long-term peasant structure, parallel to local institutions (state and municipalities), in order to achieve a two-fold aim: getting autonomy for the most important decisions in the region; and being independent from traditional bureaucracy, characterised by its inefficiency, corruption and slowness; the state administration pushed for the creation of a new municipality with a double goal: using CRASX to occupy the region (which was in dispute with Quintana Roo), and politically controlling the region, where opposition was rising. Different goals followed by different policy actors using the same resources made it hard to implement coherent policies, undermining CRASX's legitimacy.

- b) Since CRASX's presidency did not want to decentralise management of funds among its different groups, membership's fragmentation and formation of new organisations took place, strengthening political opposition. Because there was not a political trade off for CRASX's decision-making structure, there were no internal instances to analyse organisational changes such as this. Centralism's initial advantage became the biggest

problem when regional economic and political diversity appeared.

- c) While the reserve's director had planned CRASX as a regional development instrument, whose main function would be as a stakeholder among policy actors (taking politics a secondary role), and the reserve as an organisation to design sustainable development policy; state government pushed CRASX to be a political instrument for control, closely linked to PRI, and the Reserve as a pivot for further political positions, such as mayor of the eventual future municipal corporation.

- d) Given the Reserve's vast geographical area and the CRASX's centralised organisation, policies were not able to be undertaken throughout the territory. In addition, CRASX was not able to provide an organisational structure to offer specialised assistance to economic sectors, regarded individually. For example, the electoral system did not guarantee that *ejido's* representatives before CRASX's assembly represented the most important economic sectors of their community. Though CRASX implemented some organisational reforms, problems remain since representation mechanisms are still indirect.

Clearly, CRASX's decline was marked by the end of Reserve's director, and the renewal of CRASX's management council. Since charismatic

leadership shadowed organisational change to create institutional instances of decision-making, and the new CRASX's president was not trained in exercising leadership, CRASX became a political instrument, where bad management and corruption were the main characteristic.

Together with this double problem, the creation of a municipality transferred political power to the city council. CRASX had lost its function as an administrative organisation and as peasant representative organisation since the municipality came to play an institutional role in managing funds coming from public institutions, while the emergence of new peasant organisations eroded CRASX's legitimacy before its members, and political efficiency before government.

At present, the state government does not strongly support CRASX, since it channels budgets to Calakmul through municipal authorities. The reserve's management is a current problem since state government, CRASX, and Semarnat attempt to influence local policies. In spite of these problems, the reserve's management is attempting to renew its key role, by strengthening the reserve's technical council made up of different institutions, both public and private.

Conclusions

PPF and Calakmul Reserve show that the formation of a policy network in the first case influenced the policy process, and indirectly a more successful policy outcome. These cases also illustrate how similar problems can lead to different policy-outcomes relying on the composition of the policy network and the efficiency of strategies. Though both policies were developed in the same region, had similar degree of social participation, influenced by analogous policy actors, and pursued similar goals (implementation of sustainable forestry development policy) policy outcomes were different.

In spite of their similarities, the formulation contexts of PPF and Calakmul Reserve were different. While the former was formulated by active ENGOs, in a federal state without a strong political class, and in absence of an ANP; the latter was born in the middle of inter-organisational problems (SEDUE,-SRA-SARH- Campeche's government-ARIC-UEF- the Zoh Laguna factory), in a state with a traditional political class (concerned with federal government presence in its territory), and the policies were fundamentally carried out by federal agencies to manage a ANP.

On one hand, PPF was a set of ideas (a plan), developed in *ejidos* of Southern Quintana Roo, to implement social development strategies through peasant participation, to design new institutions (forestry civil societies), and to promote organisational change (new ways of production, peasants training as technical assistants, trade innovation for wood). On the other hand, Calakmul Reserve was a set of policies to transform a region from a basic economy centred on a single sawmill to a more diversified economy, pervaded by socio-environmental policies.

Given those policy scenarios, PPF was able to build a weak but cohesive policy-network, and to successfully formulate a forest sustainable plan, while Calakmul Reserve had to undertake its actions with improvisation, inter-organisational conflicts, and focusing on specific space from the start. In organisational terms, PPF emphasised solutions, agreements, and planning while Calakmul underlined problems, conflicts, and broad policies.

Basically PPF was a) a set of ideas driving to policies, and b) a plan to implement pro-grassroots forestry policy. In terms of policy process, PPF 1) formulated plan, and then mechanisms to fund it, 2) prioritised goals and institutions rather than politics (including charismatic leaderships), and 3) emphasised processes (plans, strategies, concertation, consensus) rather than structure of policy-making (agencies, bureaucracies, allocation of power).

On the other hand, Calakmul Reserve was *a)* a set of policies leading to build an organisational structure of decision-making to ensuring political control for public institutions, where sustainable development strategies were included, and *b)* a result of political needs of government. In terms of policy process, Calakmul Reserve *1)* presented first funds and then solutions, *2)* prioritised politics rather than goals and institutions, and *3)* emphasised organisational structure of decision-making rather than processes.

Not surprisingly, PPF encouraged organisational change in Quintana Roo, while Calakmul Reserve only was able to modify temporarily the structure of decision-making (considering government/peasant relationship) by exercising exceptional power to manage Calakmul's governance. Because of this, at present, in Quintana Roo the current limitation of PPF's organisational legacies (personnel training, forestry civil societies) are discussed, while in Calakmul traditional political problems are still on the local agenda (e.g. *ejido's* production problem, political fragmentation, corruption in peasant organisations).

PPF's policy network was the key factor in undertaking the sustainable forestry plan since trust among policy actors, and clear goals helped to successfully implement PPF's strategies. Absence of this factor caused conflict in Calakmul Reserve, since policy actors –

using the same resources— pursued different goals, increasing distrust and conflict even more.

This situation let PPF adapt its goals to changing circumstances, while Calakmul Reserve –constituted as a centralised structure of decision-making— was hardly able to modify its strategies. In PPF's strategy, goals were the central issue (politics had a secondary role), while in Calakmul's organisational structure of decision-making to exercise political control shadowed policy goals (social development had marginal importance). While the former was designed to change over time, the latter was built to consolidate a structure of political control, through a rigid organisational structure of decision-making.

Though both case studies have practically disappeared as originally conceived, their legacies are important references for further policies and developments. Basically, both cases were unable to keep long-term political support because of different reasons. While PPF failed to encourage further organisational changes within *ejido*, and to focus on marketing strategies, Calakmul Reserve failed to promote organisational change both in *ejido* and CRASX's structure of policy-making, and to encourage institutions promoting long-term changes (such as the forestry civil societies in Quintana Roo).

Conclusions

Introduction

The findings of this thesis show that Mexico's forestry policy is a serious problem, with national and international long-term consequences. Mexico's bio-diversity, mixed with the poor conditions of population living in those forests, make forestry policy a central issue for the international and Mexican public agenda. Conservation of forests is not only an environmental concern, but also a political, economic and social issue.

The three main findings of this thesis relate to:

- ❖ The major characteristics of the forestry policy actors that have conditioned the formation of a poor cohesive policy network,
- ❖ The most important institutional consequences for Mexico's forestry sector when it was changed from the rural and social arenas to the environmental sector, and
- ❖ The importance of policy networks (and their strategies) to influence the forestry policy process, and indirectly the policy-outcomes.

Domestic policy-actors (government, environmental non-governmental organisations [ENGOS] and peasants) have built up an inconsistent

forestry policy network, which has generated poor results. There are three main findings in this regard: a) While the government has failed to formulate long-term forestry policy, b) ENGOs have been deficient go-betweens, and c) peasants have remained passive actors, often controlled by old political interests, linked closely to the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Together these factors have seriously affected the efficiency of the formulation and implementation of much needed environmental and forestry policy reforms.

This problem, however, is not reflected in the public opinion and the public agenda. This is because Mexico is a) a non-agricultural country with conflictive, but controlled agrarian policy network; and b) a non-forestry nation (in economic terms), but with high biodiversity (ranked 4th in the world), high potential of forestry exploitation, and partner of the two strongest world timber producers. In addition, the irrelevance of the forestry sector for the Mexican economy and the structural weaknesses of policy-actors do not contribute to incorporate this issue into the Mexican agenda as a core problem.

In more detail, the structural weaknesses of the Mexican environmental agencies within the government, the lack of strategic view of ENGOs and the weak position of peasants in Mexican politics have largely conditioned the poor results of the forestry and environmental policies. Formation of a cohesive and strong forestry policy network is the biggest challenge for those policy actors, in view

of the vulnerable situation of the environmental sector in both Mexican politics and public administration.

For example, if the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) took the presidential office in the forthcoming elections (2006), the forestry policy actors would be in situation whereby they would be better positioned to negotiate and shape alternatives to be followed to create a more cohesive and productive policy network. If most public policies require long-term strategies, forestry policy needs long-term governmental actions to be successful. The forestry policy outcomes can only be evaluated in the long-term.

This policy needs to be implemented with long-term goals, independently of political party or composition of congress. At present, the low importance of forestry policy in Mexican politics is a potential advantage, as it does not mean political polarisation. For instance, the last two amendments (1997 and 2003) have been passed by the federal congress with high consensus of political groups. This example shows that forestry policy-actors can build up successful political scenarios when participating in politics.

In terms of the impact produced by the creation of the environmental sector, Mexico's forestry policy has shifted from a dual policy network—composed of rural and social policies—to a loose, single, and unstable policy network from when the environmental sector was set

up in Mexico's public administration. While the rural policy network favoured political goals rather than productive or environmental aims, the environmental policy network has encouraged sustainable development policy with poor results.

Environmental sector's creation implied an outstanding modification of Mexico's public administration. While agencies in charge of fisheries, social and agricultural issues were affected by the creation of the ministry of Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries (Semarnap-Semarnat), the new environmental agency had deep restrictions to modify the existent policy networks and their interests.

While the policy actors have maintained serious distrust of one another, Semarnap was in charge of ambitious goals without sufficient organisational, political, and legal instruments and funds. Not surprisingly, the current problem of Mexico's environmental policy relates to the implementation stage, not in the formulation stage. While the environmental codes and regulation have been upgraded, the environmental agencies are fragile, and their policy instruments are weak in terms of the ways in which they have applied.

Finally, the case studies analysed in this thesis show that similar problems can lead to different policy-outcomes that rely on the composition of the policy network and the efficiency of strategies. Though both policies (PPF and Calakmul Reserve) were developed in

the same region, influenced by analogous policy actors, had similar degree of social participation, and sought to achieve similar goals (implementation of sustainable forestry development policy) policy outcomes were different.

This finding challenges the hypothesis that social participation makes the difference in environmental and forestry fields. Basically, social participation and economic support from international ENGOs were constant factors in both cases. The big difference between those cases is that the PPF was characterised by the presence of a relative cohesive policy network, while the Calakmul Reserve was implemented in the absence of a network of policy-actors.

Characteristics of the forestry policy actors

Mexico's current policy network is characterised by *a*) the presence of policy-actors, who have effectively been undermined by both state peasant relationship and under representation within the Mexican political system (environmental non-governmental organisations, ENGOs); *b*) weak position *vis á vis* other interests (e.g. Mexican Petroleum [PEMEX], agrarian policy network, agricultural policy network); *c*) policy actors' low cohesion (there is a large distrust among peasants, ENGOs and public agencies), and *d*) both ENGOs and government agents are not usually elected members making decisions in various case studies in Mexico.

As stated earlier, Mexico's forestry problem has problems to be seriously considered within the public agenda because of its less important role within the Mexican economy. Basically, Mexico's forestry problem is of a socio-environmental nature rather than economic. In essence, the most important strategy to launch a successful forestry policy is to find mechanisms in funding forest conservation through public budget and international support, in view of the multiple social problems around Mexico's forests, and the incapacity of the Mexican government to deal with deforestation.

Although Mexico is a developing, non-agricultural and non-forestry country, it has a relevant agrarian policy network (80% of land is common property), high biodiversity (ranking 4th around the world), huge potential of forestry exploitation, and rising rates of population and poverty in protected areas. These conditions make the forestry sector a conflictive arena in environmental and political terms.

This situation reflects various problems, such as:

- The overlapping of poverty, indigenous communities, *ejido* and high biodiversity areas (public policy problem),
- Fragile environmental agencies (public administration problem),
- and

- Weak policy actors (problem of politics). Those factors that largely influence environmental and forestry policy have low priority in Mexican public agenda.

In this way, the Mexican rural policy network presents a three-sided problem:

- a) the existence of a political interregnum in countryside,
- b) presence of new powerless agrarian agencies, with limited power of responsiveness and vulnerability when dealing with other public agencies, as well as programmes that still are susceptible to corruption; and
- c) *ejido*'s traditional organisational assets, emphasising politics, as agrarian reform has not encouraged organisational change.

Old political patterns (political culture, based on authoritarianism, clientelism, statism, and corporatism) survive together with new policy-orientation (market orientation) causing inefficiency as agrarian reform reshaped state-peasant relationship (state intervention in countryside), but it did not modify its essence (clientelistic and authoritarian relationships). Distrust among state and peasants, as well as strong state control of peasants have remained as a consequence.

New agrarian agencies are incapable of dealing with new peasants demands since old practices and policy actors largely prevail in the agrarian arena, and reform in institutions has been limited. For example, Agrarian Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría Agraria) still has to face caciques and strong local interests (incompatible with sustainable development strategies) far from majority interests, or public programmes devoted to offer subsidises (e.g. Contigo, Procampo) has to deal with clientelism and corporatism. New agencies have to deal with old political patterns, which are difficult to eradicate.

Finally, agrarian reform has failed to promote efficiency in *ejido* because it has not encouraged organisational change, since *ejido* does not have functional differentiation to operate business and socio-political life, affecting forest *ejidal* management because of a) the predominance of politics in decision-making, b) the small emphasis of forest enterprises in maximisation of profits, and c) commissioner's lack of entrepreneurial view and managerial abilities.

On the other hand, environmental agencies have presented a dual weakness, since they have been vulnerable faced with other public agencies (e.g. PEMEX) and with their clients (ENGOs and timber interests). On the other hand, the Mexican ENGOs have been under-represented as a social group, weak *vis á vis* state, not as cohesive as an interest group, and with limited connection to relevant social groups, in spite their strong potential as independent groups, well-

educated members, and non dependent on corporations or Institutional Revolutionary Party's (PRI) corporations.

While ENGOs have undertaken the wrong strategy to deal with state by systematically opposing government decisions, environmental agencies have been powerless. This situation has produced the worst political scenarios. Environmental agencies, which are pressured by ENGOs, are structurally weakened by other public agencies. This situation undermines their capacity for responsiveness, weakening in turn their image when facing ENGOs and public opinion in general. The final outcome is a double weakness: environmental agencies are weak in terms of the government and in terms of the society.

Fundamentally, ENGOs have undertaken a bad political strategy, as they are systemically opposing government decisions, as if Mexico had strong timber interests. Basically, ENGOs have made three mistakes of calculating and appreciation:

- Most of their members (usually middle class) regard the government with distrust (as if political rules remained unchangeable). Their strategies are systematically reactive *vis á vis* governmental policies as if it was still necessary to undermine the political regime (strategy followed by several civil organisations during the revolutionary regime) without considering the current democratisation process

- The absence of ENGOs' long-term common project to build alternatives and strategies. Most of Mexican ENGOs do not understand that Mexico's forest problem is centred on the creation of employment and income in the countryside rather than on the dilemma between communal forestry and forest plantations. Most ENGOs develop their political strategies as if Mexico had a strong timber sector, driving the discussion to conflictive political scenarios. Therefore, they are more concerned to stop forest plantations than to become efficient go-betweens between policy actors.

- Finally, ENGOs have pushed the government to build up agencies oriented towards promotion of social participation rather than efficiency and accountability. This situation has generated at least two problems: *i*) public agencies promoting social participation in developing countries sooner or later become instances driven by clientelism, paternalism and corporatism, especially in the countryside; and *ii*) while social participation does not necessarily increase efficiency, the key problem in Mexican countryside has been the absence of accountable agencies to implement the policy reforms.

The first mistake is a basic issue of strategy since ENGOs have been failing to focus their agencies-targets to exercise pressure. Basically,

NGOs still push executive power, not the congress where the budget is actually defined at the present. This is explained by a) the minor participation of NGOs in political parties, and their close linkages with governmental agencies, b) the limited political experience of NGOs' personnel and c) the highly ideological content of NGOs' strategies.

The second strategic problem generates confusion in Mexican politics. In Mexico there is not a struggle between peasants and timber interests, since both groups are weak constituencies of forestry policy network. For example, in 1992 peasants and timber interests were allied to deal with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which largely affected the forestry sector. Unlike other countries (e.g. Brazil, Chile or Argentina), where strong multinationals represent possible menace to the rainforest and local inhabitants, in Mexico the central problem is focused on high rates of deforestation, inefficiency of the forest sector and lack of alternatives for inhabitants of forests.

The third strategic mistake of NGOs derives from their lack of deep policy analysis. NGOs assume the questionable premise that social participation can contribute to policy-efficiency. In this regard, NGOs have been strongly influenced by good intentions rather than by studies and expertise. In fact, social participation can make decision-making more complex –and maybe more democratic—, but hardly more efficient.

In this regard, ENGOs' change of strategy would imply shifts from the political (denounce and protest) to the electoral arena (seats in congress where budget is defined), through new instruments to pressure (or support) government (not necessarily revolutionary) under new democratic rules. At this point, ENGOs should reformulate their systematic confrontation against government by a political strategy of pressuring/supporting government, depending on specific cases.

Obviously, this ENGOs' strategic role would imply deeper policy-analysis and broader view of Mexico's forestry and environmental problems. ENGOs' participation in political and electoral arenas would be complemented by a greater presence in the international arena, seeking funds, participating in international projects, and integrating into international networks.

On the other hand, public agencies might centre on organisational activities rather than on social participation, since *a*) participation does not necessarily increase decision-making's efficiency (and it is not guarantee of better solutions); and *b*) public agencies that encourage social participation (mainly in developing countries) sooner or later become government political instruments rather than policy instruments.

The environmental sector and recommendations

The environmental sector has shown important progress in policy-analysis and policy formulation, but it has failed in policy implementation, since agencies have not been sufficiently empowered. This is explained by *a)* the deliberate Mexican government policy to deal with deterioration without affecting productive processes (that is, it deals with causes, but not with the roots of problem); *b)* the vulnerability of environmental and policy networks *vis á vis* other interests; and *c)* the big gap between policy formulation and policy-implementation.

Recommendations

Management and strategies can help to solve those problems. State, ENGOs and peasants might redesign their strategies. In this regard public agencies could focus on planning and strategies. ENGOs may focus more on becoming go-betweens among the various policy actors, and by promoting social organisation in communities, and providing peasants with training, and encouraging *ejido's* organisational change. Finally, peasants should take courses and training to manage new conditions of the countryside and *ejido* (e.g. more competition, less subsidises, emphasis on productivity).

There are various proposals to deal with the multiple problems around environment and forest issues. Some of them are embraced by administrative reforms:

1) Creation of the sustainable development sector with cabinet level support them to integrate the various secretariats into a sustainable development project (not only the non-cabinet agencies which depends on Semarnat, but also other cabinet and non-cabinet agencies) to pursue the environmental specific goals the ENGOs seek to achieve. At this point, creation of indexes to measure policy-outcomes will be necessary.

This sectorisation would set up the environment in similar levels to cabinet of national security, economic or foreign affairs, gaining presidential attention, and would also strengthen the environment cabinet by establishing goals to be achieved (by different secretariats), in ways that close the gap between law formulation and policy implementation. This strategy would help to deal with the current situation, whereby sustainable development as a transectoral policy, has been supported by secretariats, which are more concerned with other issues (e.g. agrarian, poverty, agricultural issues).

This is the most prescriptive strategy as it largely depends on the government. Production of statistics and measures is a long process in view of the absence of reliable information about forests in Mexico. At

the same time, the creation of the sustainable development sector with cabinet level support, in political terms, the formation of a strong policy network (on the social side) to push the government to provide them with power. ENGOs can operationalize this strategy by: a) setting up alliances with political parties, and b) participating in the electoral arena in order to influence the legislative agenda.

2) To provide the non-cabinet agencies (e.g. National Forestry Commission [Conafor] Water National Commission [CNA]) with real autonomy. To do so, reforms should be aimed to build up more efficient institutions (autonomous from Semarnat), and encourage inter-institutional coordination by building an environmental civil service in those institutions (removing it from the usual political struggle of each *sexenio*), as well as clear mechanisms or spaces to set institutional communication within egos and their ENGOs and their client groups.

This strategy can be operationalized by the central government. It has to provide with political support as well as enough economic funds and policy instruments. Most importantly, those non-cabinet agencies might be provided with autonomy to define their policy-instruments to successfully implement their policies. With these mechanisms, those institutions would be reinforced with functional instruments to apply laws and they would be more resistant to external pressures.

The case of the National Institute of Ecology (INE) is a good illustration of this recommendation. It is an agency with growing autonomy, which has been gaining efficiency and prestige in the Mexican public administration lately. The apparent key factor of this agency to be successful is its civil service, which has helped to contribute to overcoming the usual political struggle among political camarillas in times of elections. In addition, the new public personnel of this agency are hired depending on their technical abilities rather than their political nexus.

3) The creation of an environmental policy network implies the institutionalisation of (formal/informal) relationship among policy actors. In Mexico, this strategy implies regulation of mechanisms for efficient communication among ENGOs, peasants (if referring for example to forest, natural resources management, conservation, or fauna policies), cabinet and non-cabinet agencies (involving those embraced by Social Development [Sedesol], Agrarian Reform [SRA], Agriculture [SARH-SAGARPA], Semarnat, and even National Defence Secretariats), timber interests, foresters, and congress.

The state and local governments are key factor to operationalize this strategy. As Mexico has broad diversity of flora and fauna, the main way to institutionalise and increase the communication between government and society is through the local governments and local communities. This instrument would not imply the creation of more

institutions or agencies. It would mean only the creation of calendar and agenda of meetings and priorities established by both sides (government and community), participating the ENGOs as go-betweens.

4) The creation of a civil service for the environmental sector can be undertaken by evaluating the current personnel (not necessarily hired by its technical knowledge), setting parameters to be filled with the aim of reorganising human resources of agencies. After this process, vacant positions would be filled by formally qualified people. Federal states should undertake the same process to gradually get new functions coming from central government.

5) Decentralisation is the last recommendation. To operationalize this strategy, the central government would consider each state government as being capable of dealing with new responsibilities. Then, state governments would prove, at least, that they have well-equipped personnel, infrastructure, updated regulation and codes, worthy environmental information (e.g. extension of preservation's areas in each state, what to preserve, and what and where it is advisable to exploit forest or fauna), and an efficient management plan (including linkages between entrepreneurs and *ejidatarios*). Though federal government is decentralising some functions, most of them remain in federal sphere without check and balances within executive power (federal/state/local structure).

Other strategies are related to forestry policy, specific to the planning of sustainable rural development. Recommendations may be classified into three areas, 1) planning, 2) policy implementation, and 3) strategic policies. Included in the first group are a) organisational change in *ejido*, and new political governance, b) strengthening of land ecological planning, c) provision of flexibility to specific programmes and policies, according to regional, national and micro-regional needs, and d) establishing of efficient mechanisms of communication among policy actors involved in environmental and forest policies (e.g. clear rules, mechanisms of collaboration, allocation of responsibilities, sources of funding and goals' coordination).

Proposals falling into the second group are: inter-sectoral planning (ENGOs, government and peasants organisations), a) coordination of government/ENGOs, b) diversification of employment supply and income through sustainable friendly activities, c) trading strategies for agricultural customs with ecological processes, d) training of peasants and local leaders to manage business in *ejido*, e) strengthening of local organisations' institutional capacities, f) resources decentralisation, g) development of environmental education programmes and indexes on biodiversity, h) and monitor of natural resources deterioration.

Proposals included in the third group are: a) long-term policy formulation, b) rising number and maintenance of national protected

areas (APN), and c) mechanisms to allocate profits derived from sustainable use of biodiversity, d) design of social, economic and environmental indexes orientated towards the conservation of biodiversity and ecosystems, and e) design of fiscal scheme where state governments have more participation in resources management derived from ANP (e.g. eco-tourism).

Though the three types of forestry strategies are challenged by local interests and inter-bureaucratic struggles, the coordination between government (specifically the environmental agencies) and ENGOs can contribute to improve the forestry policy outcomes. In essence, to operationalise the planning, implementation and strategic initiatives of the forestry policy, ENGOs can concentrate in three main areas: a) training of peasants for ecological and organisational change in *ejidos*, b) the promotion of Mexico's natural reserve areas in the world to bring private investment to conserve the forests, and c) the promotion of social organisation in *ejidos*. In these jobs, ENGOs would work with their own funds provided by international economic support and government budgets.

On the other hand, the environmental agencies would formulate (with the support of academic centres and specialists) ecological plans, institutional mechanisms of communication between civil organisations and government, and practical instruments to evaluate the results. Fundamentally, in this policy, government can be a

regulator rather than an active actor, as one of the main policy actors (ENGOS) is made up of educated and informed members, who can implement the strategies.

Most importantly, these strategies are highly realistic, as Mexico does not have strong timber interests, and there is a notorious absence of forestry multinationals. In other words, the central problem of Mexico's forestry policy is the preservation of forests rather than the deforestation produced by strong economic interests. This makes a big difference, in the sense of that the sources of problems and solutions of the forestry policy are placed on domestic actors rather than on international or strong economic policy actors. Peasants in this context remain as passive actors, while international ENGOS can be a key factor to attempt new strategies and alternatives.

Although ENGOS may face various challenges as training/change agencies, the political and economic support from the government and international organisations can largely help them to implement changes in the long-term. For example, in Southern Quintana Roo the PPF's legacy has contributed to organisation of *ejidatarios* and organisational change in various *ejidos*. In fact, the most important challenge in those *ejidos* is how to modernise the new organisational structure (working groups), formed in the 1980s and 1990s, to deal with the new market demands. The problem is not the question of social participation (necessary previous stage in *ejido*, given its

characteristics, to implement any organisational change), but the continuity of organisational change in *ejidos*.

The most important challenge facing ENGOs is perhaps their internal organisational problems and lack of long-term perspective and a common project concerned with the question of peasant organisations. The current government does not have initiative for the countryside, while the PRI has lost many political controls. The political interregnum experienced by the countryside is a great opportunity for ENGOs to become central policy actors for change. The PPF and Calakmul Reserve demonstrate that if ENGOs offer alternatives, other policy actors (including the government) can support them, as they can build up scenarios of low conflictive, in view of the absence of policies and strategies.

Policy-networks making the difference

PPF's policy network was the key factor in undertaking the sustainable forestry plan since trust among policy actors, and clear goals helped to successfully implement PPF's strategies. Absence of this factor caused conflict in Calakmul Reserve, since policy actors – using the same resources— pursued different goals, increasing distrust and conflict even more.

This situation let PPF to adapt its goals to changing circumstances, while Calakmul Reserve –constituted as a centralised structure of decision-making— was hardly able to modify its strategies. In PPF's strategy, goals were the central issue (politics had a secondary role), while in Calakmul's organisational structure of decision-making to exercise political control shadowed policy goals (social development had marginal importance). While the former was designed to change over time, the latter was built to consolidate a structure of political control, through a rigid organisational structure of decision-making.

In spite of their similarities, the formulation contexts of PPF and Calakmul Reserve were different. While the former was formulated by active ENGOs, in a federal state without a strong political class, and in absence of an ANP; the latter was born in the middle of inter-organisational problems (SEDUE,-SRA-SARH- Campeche's government-ARIC-UEF- the Zoh Laguna factory), in a state with a traditional political class (concerned with federal government presence in its territory), and the policies were fundamentally carried out by federal agencies to manage a ANP.

Basically PPF was a) a set of ideas driving to policies, and b) a plan to implement pro-grassroots forest policy. In terms of policy process, PPF 1) formulated plan, and then mechanisms to fund it, 2) prioritised goals and institutions rather than politics (including charismatic leaderships), and 3) emphasised processes (plans, strategies,

concertation, consensus) rather than structure of policy-making (agencies, bureaucracies, allocation of power).

On the other hand, Calakmul Reserve was a) a set of policies leading to build an organisational structure of decision-making to ensuring political control for public institutions, where sustainable development strategies were included, and b) a result of political needs of government. In terms of policy process, Calakmul Reserve 1) presented first funds and then solutions, 2) prioritised politics rather than goals and institutions, and 3) emphasised organisational structure of decision-making rather than processes.

Though both policy cases have practically disappeared as originally conceived, their legacies are important references for further policies. Basically, both cases were unable to keep long-term political support because of different reasons. While PPF failed to encourage further organisational changes within *ejido*, and to focus on marketing strategies, Calakmul Reserve failed to promote organisational change both in *ejido* and CRASX's structure of policy-making, and to encourage institutions promoting long-term changes (such as the forestry civil societies in Quintana Roo).

Finally, while investment and political factors are fundamental for a successful forestry policy in Mexico, the policy actors have to design new strategies to deal with the existent poor policy outcomes. They

might focus the strategies to build up a strong policy network capable to deal with other interests. The initial changes can be those related to public administration and the organisational changes in social and public organisations. Calakmul Reserve and the PPF showed that social participation is an important factor, but not sufficient to implement a successful forestry policy. Policy networks and efficient strategies can make the difference to get better policy outcomes.

Importance of unwritten rules
 1. 'The Right' of incumbent
 Pres of choosing his successor
 2. Successor was part of the
 Minister cabinet of current
 president

FRAMEWORK OF MEXICO'S DECISION-MAKING




FIGURE 1

PRI's roles:
 1. Instrument of mass organisation's control
 2. Distributive populism
 3. Electoral legitimacy

Fig. 2. CNC's STRUCTURAL ORGANISATION





FIGURE 3 FORESTRY POLICY ACTORS



Graphic elaborated with information from:
 Camino de, R. (1999). *Forest policy in L.A.*,
 Washihgotn: IDB/John Hopkins University Press:
 93-109.

FIGURE 4

Mexico's forest policy process.

Two main stages


- Before 1992.
- Main policy network: Government-PRI-CNC-*ejidos*-peasant- (quite marginal timber interests). Corporatist and authoritarian relationship.
- Low conflictive arena
- Rational policy. Problem defined by bureaucracies.
- Two main policy actors: state and peasants.
- Emphasis on forestry communities. State intervention
- Since 1992:
- Main policy network: Government-Congress-Agrarian Council (where included CNC)-ENGOS-peasants-(marginal timber interests).
- Middle conflictive arena
- More negotiating decision-making.
- Four main policy actors: Government, Congress, ENGOS, and peasants.
- Emphasis on forestry plantations.State withdrawn.

FIGURE 5

MEXICO'S FORESTRY POLICY ACTORS

BEFORE 1992

FORMULATION POLICY



ELECTORAL SUPPORT

POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

GOVT TRIED TO CONTROL SOC PART. (IMPL. IS LESS CONTROLLED BY BUREAUCRACY)

THREE STRATEGIES:


- ✓MANAGING LAND TENURE
- ✓INCREASING FINANTIAL SUPPORT
- ✓CREATING NEW PEASANT ORGANISATIONS

EASY TO IMPLEMENT BECAUSE:
LOW PRIORITY OF FORESTRY POLICY
LOW CONFLICTIVE ARENA.

FIGURE 6

Forestry policy since 1992

Changing policy network



- Economic reform affecting land tenure
- Emphasis on market rules for land tenure
- Erosion of *ancien régime*
- Change of state-peasant relationship
- NAFTA
- Incorporation of Engos into forestry policy.
- New policy actors: Congress, Engos, and eventually timber interests.

FIGURE 7

CURRENT FORESTRY POLICY DECISION- MAKING





FIGURE 8

MEXICO'S ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCIES 2004



Each Sub-secretariat includes between five and six General Directorates.

Source: Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources

FIGURE 9


2004. Mexico's environmental Sector.



National Institute of Ecology




National Commission For the Biosphere



National Water Commission




Mexican Institute of Water Technology



National Forest Commission




National Commission of Natural Protected Areas



Federal Attorney for Environmental Protection

Fig. 10. FORESTRY CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK







Source: Taylor and Zabin, 2000:

146

Key: UNOFOC: National Union of Communal Forestry Organisations
 UNORCA: National Union of Autonomous Regional Peasant Organisations
 GTZ: German Development Assistance Agency
 SEDESOL: Ministry of Social Development
 SEMRANAP: Ministry of Env., Nat. Resources and Fisheries
 UNORCA: National Union of Autonomous Regional Peasant Organisations
 DFID British Department for International Development
 SIMAP: Infrastructure, Env. And Fisheries Secretariat
 WWF: World Wildlife Fund


Fig. 11 INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS: 1984-1987



-  Conflicting relation
-  Supportive relation
-  Inter-organisational problems


Source: Graphic elaborated with information of Galleti, 1998:101.

Fig. 12 INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS. SOLIDARITY'S BRIGADES STAGE




Source: Galleti, 1998:102

FIG. 13. CRASX'S CREATION AND CONSOLIDATION



Key:
 AMA: Mexico-Germany Agreement
 CRASX: Xpuhil's Regional Council
 INAH: National Institute of Archaeology and History
 INI: Indigenous National Institute
 PPY: Pronatura Yucatan
 PRONARE: National Programme of Reforestation
 SECTUR: Ministry of Tourism
 SEDESOL: Ministry of Social Development
 SEDUE: Ministry of Urban Dev. and Ecology

Fig.14 CRASX AS A CORE INSTITUTION: CRASX-CALAKMUL RESERVE'S AXIS



Key:
 AMA: Mexico-Germany Agreement
 CRASX: Xpuhil's Regional Council
 INI: Indigenous National Institute
 PPY: Pronatura Yucatan
 PRONARE: National Programme of Reforestation.

APPENDIX 1

THE LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

AGUILAR, William	Researcher at the Universidad de Yucatan. Merida Yucatan. January 2002. (30 minutes).
ARELLANO, Alfredo	Director of the National Reserve of Sian Ka'an, 2000-onwards. Cancun, Q Roo. February, 2002. (45 minutes).
ARGUELLES, Alfonso	Director Pro-Trópica rural. Chetumal, Q Roo. February 2002. (20 minutes).
CARABIAS, Julia.	Former minister of Semarnap, 1994-2000. Mexico City. May 2003. (45 minutes).
CASTRO, Jose Luis	Researcher at the Universidad de Yucatan. Merida Yucatan. January 2002. (25 minutes).
CHALLENGER, Anthony.	Adviser at the office of the minister. 1997-onwards. Mexico City. April 2002. (40 minutes).
DUHNE, Enrique	President of Comadep. Merida, Yucatan. February, 2002. (30 minutes).
ESCAMILLA, Alberto	Chief of Forestry department in Campeche, 1997-2002. Campeche, Camp. March, 2002. (20 minutes).
FOLAND, William	Researcher at the Autonomous University of Campeche. Campeche, Camp. February 2002. (15 minutes).
GRAIZBOARD, Boris	Researcher at El Colegio de Mexico. 2002. Mexico, City. April 2002. (20 minutes).
GUTIERREZ, David.	Former deputy-president of the Commission of Natural Resources, at the Federal Congress, 2000-2003. Merida, Yucatan. January 2002. (30 minutes).
HERNANDEZ, Carlos.	Regional Director of Conafor, 2002-onwards. Merida, Yucatan. January 2002. (40 minutes).

JIMENEZ, Juan	Researcher at the Universidad de Yucatan. Merida Yucatan. January 2002. (20 minutes).
MEDINA, Fernando.	Regional representative of Sedesol in Yucatan, 2001-onwards. Merida, Yucatan. February, 2002. (15 minutes).
MERINO, Leticia	Researcher at the UNAM. Mexico, City. April 2002. (1 hour).
PALACIOS, Javier	Under-Director of Conafor, Mexico, City, 2002-onwards. Mexico City. May 2002. (Two interviews: total time 1 hour).
RAMIREZ, Gustavo.	Director of the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor (section Mexico), 2000-onwards. Mexico City. April, 2002. (40 minutes).
ROSALES, Paulino.	Director of Forestry Department at the Government of Quintana Roo, 1997-onwards. Chetumal, QRoo. March, 2002. (20 minutes).
SEGURA, Gerardo.	Director of Agro-forestry Programme (Procymaf) at Conafor, 2002-onwards. Mexico City. May 2002. (40 minutes).
VILLARREAL, Ma. Luisa	President of the College of Biologists. Chetumal, QRoo. February 2002. (1 hour).

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