NELSON GOODMAN: 'AESTHETICA (KALO)LOGICA'?

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by

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NELSON GOODMAN: 'AESTHETICA (KALO)LOGICA'?

Liverpool 2004

Familiæ
proximis
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→

Nelson Goodman: 'aesthetica (kalo)logica'?

I.A

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I started working on the specific project undertaken in this doctoral thesis at the Philosophy Department of the University of Liverpool in early 2001. By July 2003, the first complete manuscript had been prepared. Slightly revised, the text was submitted for examination in October of the same year. This final version comprises *282* pp. or *99728* words (main text: pp. *27–214* or *78600* words).

I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY SINCERE THANKS TO: —

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Nikolaos A. N. Gkogkas
Liverpool, May 2004

I.B

EDITORIAL REMARKS

(i) BIBLIOGRAPHY

I have relied upon material and electronic resources provided by the University of Liverpool Library (often in affiliation with other Higher Education UK libraries, e.g. through interlibrary loans; in at least one case I had to ensure personal access to material at the Edinburgh University Library—see my Index and the relevant portion of the text).

The author–year system (: supplemented by page / section / chapter number(s) where necessary) is followed throughout this thesis for the acknowledgement of my sources. All (and only) cited works—including works by Nelson Goodman—are listed in Part III.A / 'References'.

Wherever I have partly relied on English translations of foreign works, I have indicated so.

Concerning philosophy and the arts, works of general interest (dictionaries, encyclopaedias, etc.) that I have consulted include: Audi 1995, Blackburn 1996, Chilvers 2003, Craig 1998 and 2000, Kelly 1998, Kennedy 1994, Langmuir & Lynton 2000, Turner et al. 1996. (On occasion, I have had recourse to online sources, like *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <http://www.utm.edu/research/iep>, and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, <http://www.britannica.com>.)

(ii) STYLE

For the above, as well as for other stylistic, grammatical, and lexicographical features of my text, I have drawn upon the following sources: Greenbaum 1996, Knight & Makins et al. 1995, Martin M G F 2000, Morwood 1998 and 2001, Price et al. 1999, the *OED* (=Simpson & Weiner 1984–89), and University of Liverpool 2003.

Concerning the styling of references to electronic sources, I have followed guidelines provided by the International Organization for Standardization (see <http://www.nlc-bnc.ca/iso/tc46sc9>).

As regards the transliteration from the Greek into the Latinate alphabet, I have likewise consulted ISO 1999.

(iii) WORKS BY NELSON GOODMAN [ET AL.]

Berka & Hernadi 1991 provide a comprehensive bibliography, which was compiled at that time with Goodman's own assistance. I have relied on this, as well as on an electronic version of it (maintained and updated by J. Lee; see reference for Berka & Hernadi 1991). However, whenever necessary, I have freely modified, corrected, and supplemented bibliographical information drawn from these and other sources.

(I have chosen not to consider any of the numerous translations of Goodman's works into other languages.)

a. reprints

Based on the information I have collected—and for reasons bearing on ease of reference, importance of original publication dates, dissemination, influence, etc.—I have compiled a separate listing of reprints for Goodman's works (=Part III.B / 'Nelson Goodman Reprints List'). Unless there is a specific reason to cite originals, in my text I invariably refer to later reprints (regarding Goodman's publications, as well as in general)—especially when these have been edited by their author: more often than not, they constitute revised versions.

b. abbreviations

Articles by Goodman [et al.] are customarily cited by year of publication. For books, title abbreviations are exceptionally used (adopted from Goodman's own work, and employed by his collaborators and most of his commentators). A table of these, arranged chronologically according to the *original* printing or edition of the corresponding book, is given below, on p. *21*.

c. omissions

Lastly, pp. *17–19* contain a listing of publications by Goodman [et al.] that have not been cited in my text (and, therefore, are not listed in Part III.A); neither have they been reprinted, separately or as part of larger works (and, therefore, are not listed in Part III.B either).

(My complete listing of Goodman's works—excluding translations and reprints—is available online through <http://gkogkas.topcities.com>.)

N. A. N. G.

SOME (RE)VIEWS AND INFORMAL EXCHANGES

Report on the 'Fifth Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic'. *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 4. **1939**: 176–177

Review of 'Die mathematisch–logistische Symbolsprache in philosophischer Sicht' (*Scholastik* 15. 1940: 57–62), by C. Nink. *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 5. **1940**: 157

Review of 'Logical Empiricism' (in: D. D. Runes. *Twentieth Century Philosophy*. New York: Philosophical Library. 1943: 371–416), by H. Feigl. *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 8. **1943**: 148

Review of 'Outline of a Logical Analysis of Law' (*Philosophy of Science* 11. 1944: 142–160), by F. E. Oppenheim. *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 9. **1944**: 105–106

Review of 'On the Nature of the Predicate "Verified"' (*Philosophy of Science* 14. 1947: 123–131), by E. W. Hall. *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 12. **1947**: 100

Review of 'The Nature of Formal Analysis' (*Mind* (new series) 58. 1949: 210–214), by C. H. Langford. *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 15. **1950**: 222

Review of 'Reds, Greens, and Logical Analysis' (*Philosophical Review* 65. 1956: 206–217), by H. Putnam. *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 22. **1957**: 318–319

'Parry on Counterfactuals' (reply to W. T. Parry, see *ibid.*), *Journal of Philosophy* 54. **1957**: 442–445

Letter to the Editor (on a paper by W. C. Clement, see *ibid.* vol. 65). *Mind* (new series) 66. **1957**: 78

'Memorial Note' (on H. Leonard), in: K. Lambert (ed.). *The Logical Way of Doing Things*. New Haven: Yale University Press. **1969**: ix–x

(I. Scheffler & N. Goodman.) 'Selective Confirmation and the Ravens: A Reply to Foster' (see *ibid.* vol. 68), *Journal of Philosophy* 69. **1972**: 78–83

'On Kahane's Confusions' (see *ibid.* vol. 68), *Journal of Philosophy* 69. **1972**: 83–84

'Introduction', in: W. V. O. Quine. *The Roots of Reference*. (The Paul Carus Lectures.) La Salle (IL): Open Court. **1973**: xi–xii

'Much Ado' (reply to D. Lincicome, see *ibid.*), *Synthese* 28. **1974**: 259

(J. Ullian & N. Goodman.) 'Bad Company: A Reply to Mr. Zabludowski and Others' (see *ibid.*, and *ibid.* vol. 71), *Journal of Philosophy* 72. **1975**: 142–145

(J. Ullian & N. Goodman.) 'Projectibility Unscathed' (reply to A. J. Zabludowski, see *ibid.*), *Journal of Philosophy* 73. **1976**: 527–531

'The Trouble with Root' (reply to M. D. Root, see *ibid.*), *Linguistics and Philosophy* 1. **1977**: 277–278

(N. Goodman & J. Ullian.) 'The Short of It' (reply to A. J. Zabludowski, see *ibid.* vol. 74), *Journal of Philosophy* 75. **1978**: 263–264

'In Defense of Irrealism' (letter to the editor, in response to W. V. O. Quine's review of N. Goodman's *Ways of Worldmaking*; see *ibid.* 23.XI.1978), *New York Review of Books*, 21.XII.**1978** [1 p.]. Available for purchase from Internet at <http://www.nybooks.com>

'Matter over Mind' (letter to the editor, in response to A. Seidel's further comments on N. Goodman's *Ways of Worldmaking*; see *ibid.* 25.I.1979), *New York Review of Books*, 17.V.**1979** [1 p.]. Available for purchase from Internet at <http://www.nybooks.com>

Letter on 'J. J. Gibson's Approach to the Visual Perception of Pictures'. *Leonardo* 12. **1979**: 175

'Foreword', in: C. Z. Elgin. *With Reference to Reference*. Indianapolis, Cambridge (MA): Hackett. **1983**: 1–2

'On What Should Not Be Said about Representation' (reply to D. Arrell, see *ibid.*), *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 46. **1987–88**: 419

'Contraverting a Contradiction: A Note on Metaphor and Simile, Reply to Tomas Kulka' (see *ibid.*), *Poetics Today* 13. **1992**: 807–808

A NUMBER OF PARTLY SUPERSEDED ARTICLES
(FOR GOODMAN'S COMMENTS ON THESE, SEE *PP*: xi.
SIMILARLY, CF. Goodman 1996*b*: 208–209 ON Goodman 1993)

'Sequences', *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 6. **1941**: 150–153

'On the Simplicity of Ideas', *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 8. **1943**: 107–121

'The Logical Simplicity of Predicates', *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 14. **1949–50**: 32–41

'New Notes on Simplicity', *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 17. **1952**: 189–191

'Axiomatic Measurement of Simplicity', *Journal of Philosophy* 52. **1955**: 709–722

'Graphs for Linguistics', *Proceedings of Symposia in Applied Mathematics of the American Mathematical Society* 12. **1961**: 51–55

LANGUAGE INACCESSIBLE

(N. Goodman & M. Brinker.) 'Representation and Realism in Art: A Debate', *Iyyun* 32. **1983**: 216–222 [in Hebrew]

(N. Goodman & T. Kulka.) 'How Metaphor Works its Wonders' (an exchange), *Filosofický časopis* 42. **1994**: 403–420 [in Czechoslovakian]

SOURCES INACCESSIBLE

(AS CITED BY Berka & Hernadi 1991: 101, 103)

'A Study of Methods of Evaluating Information Processing Systems of Weapons Systems'. University of Pennsylvania: The Institute for Co-operative Research. (Project Wescom DA36-039 SC 63143.) **1956**

'Determination of Deficiencies in Information Processing'. University of Pennsylvania: The Institute for Co-operative Research. (Project Wescom DA 36-039 SC 63143.) **1957**

(N. Goodman & H. Gardner.) 'The Randolph Museum Case'. Harvard University: Institute in Arts Administration. **1970**

MISCELLANEOUS

(See Berka & Hernadi 1991: 107–108 for Goodman's contribution to three multimedia productions.)

Table of Abbreviations for Books by Nelson Goodman [et al.]

SQ .....*(A STUDY OF QUALITIES)* ..... Goodman 1990 [=*1940*]

SA .....*(THE STRUCTURE OF APPEARANCE)*.....Goodman 1977 [*[1]1951*]

FFF.....*(FACT, FICTION, AND FORECAST)* .....Goodman 1983 [*[1]1954*]

LA .....*(LANGUAGES OF ART:*
An Approach to a Theory of Symbols) .....Goodman 1976 [*[1]1968*]

PP .....*(PROBLEMS AND PROJECTS)*..... Goodman 1972

WW....*(WAYS OF WORLDMAKING)* ..... Goodman 1978

MM ....*(OF MIND AND OTHER MATTERS)*..... Goodman 1984

RP .....*(RECONCEPTIONS IN PHILOSOPHY*
AND OTHER ARTS AND SCIENCES) ..... Goodman & Elgin 1988

I.C

ABSTRACT

Nelson Goodman: 'aesthetica (kalo)logica'? interprets Goodman's philosophical aesthetics as an application of his general theory of symbols. According to this theory, understanding consists ultimately in the methodical construction of its own subject matter (in an 'irrealist' process of making 'world-versions'), where practised tradition forms an exclusive factor of external regulation. In this context, it is shown that aesthetics and the philosophy of the arts become for Goodman self-subsistent systems of certain modes of symbological association; such systems at the same time construct their field of reference and determine their contents (and, by mutual differentiation, the contents of disparate systems, employed, e.g., in the sciences). Art as the field of aesthetic symbolization exhibits those particular referential relations whereby clarity of association has to be constantly achieved by attending to the opacity of the aesthetic symbol as such. This attention is not tantamount to a discovery of hidden relations but, so to speak, to a conversation with their possibility. Accordingly, Goodman's aesthetics is here described and appropriated as a form of metaphysical aesthetics—specifically as a *kalology*—in that the content of art and of the aesthetic does not appear to be fundamentally made up out of things, but out of a special mode of attending to 'bare' presences.

MAIN TERMS: (1) Philosophy of Art – Aesthetics. (2) Epistemology–Logic. (3) Metaphysics–Kalology. / (1:) signal–sign–symbol, symbology, extensionalism–translatability, exemplification, metaphor, notationality, authenticity, autographic–allographic, picture-making, music, literature, symptoms-of-the-aesthetic, practice, style, implementation, (non)transparency, cognition, understanding. (2:) 'grue', nominalism–platonism, entrenchment, constructionalism, pragmatism, rightness–truth, irrealism, worldmaking. (3:) ontology–'topology', presence, art, beauty, 'vision'.

CONTAINS 'Nelson Goodman Reprints List' and 'Index'.

For a work of art, as for a person, the basic paradox is that living is dying. [/] No calculus is to be expected, and no numerical values.

Goodman 1998: 323 / 325

Cf.:

(...my learning only saw me across that shore
Where swimming had forever brought me)

Elytis 1999: 34
(original on verso)

(...καὶ μελετώντας, πάλι βγῆκα ἐκεῖ
Ποὺ τὸ κολύμπι μ' ἔβγαζε ἀπ' ἀνέκαθεν)

II.A

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

Nelson Goodman seems to be endorsing an aesthetics that is, in a sense, not strictly 'aesthetic'. I explain: since at least 1967 (see the relevant section of Part III.B below for information about the final pages of *LA*), Goodman had wished to say, in short, that there is no sure way for aesthetics to establish a realm of certain entities as its exclusive subjects (pun intended). And that everything is, to a greater or lesser extent, somehow aesthetic (and / or somehow non-aesthetic).

This general insight was, I suppose, what initially attracted me towards a fuller examination. Since what Goodman seems to be offering is only in a marginal way a theory of the aesthetic (for, is it not also a theory of the non-aesthetic?), I was eventually compelled to qualify it as a metaphysical—specifically as a *kalological*—aesthetics. But, before going on to sketch a brief outline of my inquiry in this thesis, I would rather clarify my position on a couple of general points.

The metaphysical aesthetic dimension as a pervasive mode of being is not necessarily (and definitely not in Goodman's case) a commitment to a *quasi* romantic ideal of universal aestheticism. The possibility that all being as such can be described in terms of some aesthetically relevant categories does not automatically transform the world of beings into a reality that is fundamentally aesthetic *par excellence* (neither, I should say, is such a reality unappealably refuted). Indeed, as Goodman rightly seems to be allowing, the omnipresent aesthetic aspect does not dictate any primordial identity for the possible kinds of beings there might (or might not) be. It is precisely and merely this—an aspect—and it is concerned with viewing all ontological possibilities under a certain light: the light of a category of the aesthetic that transgresses already familiar categorizations of the sort.

In opting for *kalology* as a term linked to the ancient Greek notion of the *kalon*, I have essentially tried to invoke this sense of familiar categories cutting across one another (namely, the *kalon* describing a human as both morally and physically meritorious. I have decided to treat any other more substantial link as incidental for my inquiry—although I am by no means excluding the possibility of such a deeper affinity.) Moreover, *kalology* has been a convenient designatory term because it seems to have had no significant history of usage in familiar philosophical contexts (see my somewhat detailed account in § 24 below). Further still, my choice of terminology seems to be opportunely congruent with other essential aspects of Goodman's metaphysical apprehension of aesthetics. In particular, Goodman and the type of aesthetic theory he seems to be articulating, according to my treatment, must in the end avoid at all costs the postulation of any fixed relation between a theory and its purported ontological field of application.

The philosopher as the utterer of the aesthetic discourse cannot contend that his / her discourse strives to achieve any description of things and / or non-things as the most accurate description of their allegedly primordial nature. And this, not because there can be absolutely no 'genuine' or 'essential' description of such-and-such beings (for all we know), but because (as I said above) ontologically minded definitions are in this context irrelevant. The question is not about which things and / or non-things are (or are not) aesthetic, but about the ways in which they are (or are not), and about the mode in which their being (or not being) can be described as aesthetic or non-aesthetic to any degree. ('Reality' is neither affirmed nor refuted; realism and anti-realism are overtaken by the Goodmanian *irrealist* stance.)

What I am driving at, then, concerning *kalology* as a term is that—apart from being somehow analogous to the *kalon,* and relatively unambiguous due to its lack of compelling ancestral connotations—it corresponds very well to a certain epistemological attitude. This attitude accepts ways of being and their descriptions as ultimately giving rise to each other in a process of mutual determination. The construct and its tool, each presupposes the other, and both make up a self-sufficient world. Whatever is aesthetic and the way it is so are not separable. There is a more or less strict, but more or less externally unbounded, *logic* of the construction of the aesthetic. Thus, *kalology* is also conceived (kalo)*logically*.

However, in the same way that *kalological* aesthetics, as I have chosen to designate it in the Goodmanian context, is not to be confused with a total aestheticism, it must also avoid identification with any type of panlogism. Indeed, even in the early stages of his work in aesthetics, Goodman wishes to disassociate himself from any potentially misleading labels originating from his early twentieth century background in logical analysis and linguistic philosophy. It was nevertheless unavoidable that Goodman's treatment had to evolve towards the metaphysical outlook I have briefly sketched here from a more logico-analytical framework within which he had been immersed at the beginning of his career. In the main body of my text, I shall be building upon this progressive emergence of an aesthetic theory as defined by wider epistemological and metaphysical specifications.

THE STARTING POINT for Goodmanian aesthetics is—not surprisingly—his conception of language. I shall begin by an examination of Goodmanian languages as linguistic *and* non-linguistic systems of symbols. The importance of the notion of symbol in Goodman's idiosyncratic sense will become apparent from the fact that he conceives of aesthetics as an integral part of his general theory of reference through symbols—what I call his *symbology*. (: §§ *1–5*.)

Subsequently (: §§ *6–7*), I shall be explaining the ways in which Goodman's symbol systems manage to secure a virtually inexhaustible potential for referential elaboration, in that what they refer to becomes co-extensive with what they

can be *made* to apply to. Goodman's notationality theory (: § *8*) will be putting forth some syntactic and semantic rules that help us describe the ways in which some symbol systems may differ from others: appropriate codification may limit the unbounded possibilities of their referential potential. Nevertheless, there may be cases where this potential cannot be thereby totally 'harnessed': in fact, it will become evident that what renders something an artwork is precisely this inability of our sensibilities to reduce it without remainder to a definite sum of referential connections (or 'meanings'). And, by the same token, it will become evident that the particular referential status of artworks resides precisely in the fact that they seem constantly to be inviting an interminable attention to their inexhaustible symbological facets. (: § *9*.) I shall be exploring this peculiarity of the aesthetic symbol in greater detail, along the lines of Goodman's outlook, for the cases of picture-making, music, and literature, with due attention to some controversial distinctions and evaluations (: §§ *10–12*, and my First Chapter Appendix).

Still, it turns out that, although what makes a symbol aesthetically pertinent may reside in the irreducible non-transparency of its referential specifications, this fact remains a mere indicator of its aesthetic status—not a definitive criterion. It seems that, in the end, non-transparency is re-affirmed as a feature of all symbols, the differences between aesthetic and non-aesthetic ones being differences of degree. Goodman will have to further consolidate the import of his theory of the aesthetic by recourse to radically revised notions of style, function, tradition, originality, and inherited practice. The Goodmanian departure from an ontology of the aesthetic (in fact, away from any ontology) will be thus distinctively marked by an injunction both to concentrate on the individual work itself as a symbol, and to the multitude of referential paths that lead away from it in time and place—but crucially constitute integral parts of its own significance. (: §§ *13–15*.) Aesthetics will become a strategy of understanding through symbols—not to be confused with any rationalistic conception of truth and knowledge, but rather an invitation to weigh, balance, and enjoy embodied meanings as well as feelings (: §§ *16–17*).

From the very beginning, Goodman's conceptual arsenal will appear to have been that of a frugal, extensionalist nominalism, bearing the distant but unmistakable echo of early twentieth century Anglo-American analysis. Nevertheless, Goodman manages to produce an unexpectedly eloquent account of the aesthetic: in my second chapter, I shall be addressing Goodman's (epistemo)logical predilections, the ways in which they have been frequently misinterpreted, and the ways in which they sustain his treatment of the arts as aesthetic symbol systems. (: §§ *18–19*.) Goodman's insistence on the principle of entrenched rather than demonstrative truth (or, better, rightness) will point the way towards the rejection of absolutism in science as well as in art, and towards the irrealist perception of all that-which-is as a constantly shifting collection of several co-operating, competing, or conflicting descriptions (: §§ *20–21*). The arts as particular symbol systems will be emerging in this framework as constituting

their own, congenial world-descriptions (or world-versions). Aesthetic symbol systems will be thus epistemically grounded as particular constellations of signification that construct their tools and their field of application at the same time. (: §§ *22–23*. As foreshadowed above, the system and its field of application constitute an initially dynamic, self-evolving interpretational tool.)

In my third chapter, I shall be exploring some of the metaphysical implications of such an aesthetics. The moulding of things (and / or non-things), and of the aesthetic worlds they inhabit at once constructing them and being endowed with meaning by them, will enable me to speak of the aesthetically significant as made out of pulsating presences rather than fixed (un)knowns, in what I have called a kalological universe. As Goodman tirelessly reiterates, the invitation to decipher symbols, and to find some of them more aesthetic than others, betrays a genuine concern not for things but for the ways of things and / or non-things. Whatever they might present themselves as, they can always be shown to belong to this or that world-version, the version that sustains and is sustained by them. (: §§ *25–27*.) On a higher, self-reflexive level, the initial impetus that prompts us to actually engage in such an effort (at interpreting symbols in this way) is perhaps equally 'irreal' for Goodman, in the sense that it cannot be ultimately grounded in any supposed reality outside of itself, or denied by the lack of any such reality. I think, however, that this kind of effort provides its own reward and justification. And that, moreover, it is defensible because, like any other fabrication, it plays its role very well in dealing with competing fabrications (problems and impasses posed by traditional or rival theories). Ultimately perhaps, it serves its purpose very well if one can be convinced by it—if one can say that it defines a world-description one is happy to inhabit, at least for a while or at intervals. (: §§ *28–29*, and my Third Chapter Appendix.)

FOLLOWING THIS CURSORY outline of the main points of my thesis, some methodology–related remarks are perhaps in order.

I need first to allude to what Abel 1991: 311 calls Goodman's 'lucid and elegant Tacitean style'. Together with his subtly but devastatingly ironic rhetoric, Goodman's style may have often invited a confrontational reading of his philosophy (Elgin 1997*a*: xvi). Stalker is largely justified when he claims (1978: 197–198) that a lot of criticism directed against Goodman's aesthetic theory was localized on isolated chapters and secondary issues, unavoidably giving rise to misapprehensions.

As it must have become evident up to this point, I have chosen for my part to examine Goodman's theory of the aesthetic and his philosophy of the arts with the general framework of his thought as a guideline. I analyze some of the themes that marked his contribution to twentieth-century aesthetics, but I infer that this contribution cannot be fully appreciated if left out of the context of his epistemology and his metaphysics—his theory about how we know and about

what there is to know (if anything). Accordingly, I find that Goodman's aesthetics is inherently determined by his general theory of reference, his intriguing conception of understanding, and his peculiar metaphysical commitments.

It may be objected that the Goodman one finds in the pages of my text is not the Goodman one might have expected to find. This would indeed be a welcome objection, in that the opposite outcome would have been hardly worth its while. I am not of course trying to say that I have been guided by a blind urge to 'break new ground'. My study, having been conducted under specific guidelines for research (see University of Liverpool 2003: 13 & 41), was necessarily intended as a scholarly and constructive contribution to the discussion of pertinent problems. Consequently, (i) accessibility to the so-called average reader, or attractiveness of style could not have been my guiding principles. And (ii) concerning the unrefined notion of 'originality'—especially of the declarative sort—I have found it ambiguous and misguiding. After all, searching for the 'new' cannot amount to much more than a discovery of a 'different' version of the 'old'—and I am only relying on what Goodman's anti-ontological metaphysics would strongly concur with. (Cf. the aptly translated passage from the Bible 1998: Ecclesiastes 1.9 that '*there is* no new *thing* under the sun'—italics not mine.)

Overall then, I have treated both Goodman and my secondary sources (i.e. sources other than Goodman) as opportunities for conversation rather than confrontation. My aim was not primarily to evaluate Goodman's or anyone else's theoretical contribution as a contribution of that particular philosopher. (And this is part of the reason why I have tried not to treat any view as bearing the irresistible commendation of perceived authority—any authoritative philosophical source must prove itself anew in every particular context). On the other hand, I was not motivated by any deep-seated need to assert and justify my own beliefs and convictions. I set out to make sense of divergent approaches and communicated views, trying to steadily walk along a path that was being left open as the most promising interpretational alternative, according always to my judgement. (In this respect, even within my text itself, I have not intended the different sections (§§ *1–29*) to be best read in isolation.) McGhee 2000: i describes the philosopher as 'a kind of cartographer of a shifting interior landscape'. In what follows, I have tried rather to trace a way through an exterior landscape that is being discovered through an almost dialectical (sc. dialogical) inquiry—or at least an inquiry so intended—in the presence of texts as disparate voices.

FOR THE REMAINDER of this Introduction, I shall be offering some background information on (a) the historical–(auto)biographical context of Goodman's work, and on (b) a tentative outline of Goodman's position in the so-called 'analytic–continental' segregation in recent Western philosophy. Such information, although systematically not crucial, provides further support for part of my meth-

odological guidelines. It should also provide one with some illuminating insights, considerably useful for an initial approach to Goodman's work.

—a—

Goodman is 'one of the foremost philosophers of the twentieth century', Elgin proclaims repeatedly (1997*a*/ *b*/ *c*/ *d*: vii, 2000*a*: 149; and, similarly, 2001: 679).[1] Elgin's close collaboration with Goodman may be providing us with important insights when examining Goodmanian views. (Goodman and Elgin have co-authored relatively extensively—see 'Changing the Subject' (1987–88) and *RP*). I have already emphasized, nevertheless, that what follows is not meant as an auspicious reconnaissance of a promising (Goodmanian) theoretical land (in an Elginian manner—cf. Elgin 1983). It can neither be meant as a defence nor as an apology offered on behalf of Goodman's philosophy (however valuable and intelligent in itself—cf. much of Elgin's later work). Echoing, perhaps, Goodman's own theoretical predilections, I would rather refer to what follows as a (re)constructive exercise in interpreting Goodman's thoughts about the arts and aesthetics, in their unavoidable interweaving with the rest of what he had to say. Indeed, the almost interdisciplinary character of Goodman's work taken in its entirety has been both a hurdle and a key for the adequacy and balance of interpretation. In what must have been his last public contribution to an academic gathering, Goodman had this to say in retrospect:

> There is no such thing as the philosophy of Nelson Goodman any more than there is such a thing as the finger of Nelson Goodman. [...] There's a big tangle. [...] Untangling this mess might entail a good deal of loss, the kind of loss that you get if you try to untangle a plate of spaghetti: you would end up with some rather uninspiring strings of dough which would not have anything of the central quality of the whole meal. [...] Talking about my philosophy would mean talking about my philosophies. [Goodman 1997: 16–17.]

At least sixty years earlier, Goodman had been embarking upon his philosophical career principally as a Harvard logician of the Inter-War period. He was a devotee of B. A. W. Russell and R. Carnap; a student of C. I. Lewis;[2] and a collaborator

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1 NELSON GOODMAN, *Somerville* (MA), 7.VIII.1906 – *Needham* (MA), 25.XI.1998. Concerning Goodman's life and career, Schwartz 1999 and Carter 2000 provide information in some detail. Cf. also relevant Internet sites, such as: <http://pzweb.harvard.edu/History/NG.htm>, <http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/1998/12.03/goodman.htm>.

2 'The teacher who most stimulated my thinking on induction and on many another philosophical problem.' (*PP*: 362; see also *PP*: 416*f*.)

of W. V. O. Quine. Having served in the army during World War II, he taught at Tufts College (1944–45), the University of Pennsylvania (1946–64), and Brandeis University (1964–67), before becoming professor of philosophy at Harvard (1968–77, and then professor emeritus).

At least in his logical works, there is something of 'the strictest New England Puritan conscience for clarity in philosophy' (Margalit 1998: 319). Programmatically in his 1940 doctoral dissertation Goodman boldly formulates and justifies the need to philosophize as primarily a need to 'clear away perplexity and confusion on the most humble as well as on the most exalted levels of thought' (*SQ*: ix). In a paper first published in 1956 (=*PP*: 169–170), he wrote characteristically:

> A clear story cannot be told in unintelligible language. [...] There are limits to my tolerance of tolerance. I admire the statesman tolerant of divergent political opinions [...], but I do not admire the accountant who is tolerant about his addition, the logician who is tolerant about his proofs, or the musician who is tolerant about his tone.

And as late as 1972:

> Incompleteness is no more to be cherished for the sake of Gödel's theorem than is crime for the sake of detection; banishment of crime and incompleteness to the realm of fiction would hardly be a matter for regret. [*PP*: 154.]

In his introduction to *SA*, G. Hellman writes that not everyone can undertake the formidable task of clarifying language and thought by denying a lot of what is commonsensical and defending a lot of what sounds blatantly outlandish (and such terms could perhaps describe Goodman's own undertaking):

> Some will simply not make the effort. Others try and fail miserably. Others still become enchanted for a time with what one can accomplish boxing with naked fists only to return later in life, weary with scarred knuckles, to the Cantorian heaven beyond space and time, secretly hoping that in the end, all will be revealed. [*SA*: xxxi.]

But even granting the good cause of clarification, it can have the awkward result that once something has been clarified there is no further need for more philosophy. Goodman, accepting that 'the reward of success is banality', also recognizes that it would be unrealistic to expect the extinction of all that is obscure—and thus intriguing (*SA*: l; cf. *PP*: 167): failure to clarify everything indicates that there are still things for philosophy to work upon. (This pragmatic intimation is to take firmer root later in Goodman's work.)

In *MM*: 190 Goodman reviews from the distance of time the tremendous effect of symbolic logic, and the hopes it raised when it first 'burst upon the scene'; and on the other hand the impasses that emerged for positivistic and empiricist

philosophy. But the most recent (1988) comprehensive self-assessment of the large Goodmanian project has been offered by Goodman and Elgin in *RP*:[3] 164:

> Speaking schematically, the *first* phase of this effort begins by observing that the use—that is, the fabrication, application, and interpretation—of symbols is centrally involved in all these fields [arts, sciences, philosophy, ordinary perception, etc.]. Accordingly, a general theory of symbols and their functions is outlined (*LA; RR*[4]). The *second* phase confronts the consequences of recognizing that symbols are not merely devices for describing objects, events, a world waiting to be discovered, but enter into the very constitution of what is referred to (*WW*). The present *third* phase starts from the realization that the prevailing conception of philosophy is hopelessly deficient when all fields of cognition, symbols of all kinds, and all ways of referring are taken into account, and so goes on to a search for more comprehensive and responsive concepts.

And the insidious footnote is here inserted: 'Note, however, that the present third phase does not require agreement with all views set forth in the earlier two phases.' (*RP*: 164*n*).

I BELIEVE THAT such evidence is in support of my own decision to treat Goodman's thinking holistically—with balanced attention to his work as a whole—as well as in ways that could serve more isolated views and arguments. Following from this, my primary aim has *not* been to specifically examine Goodman's thought in relation to his acknowledged or other possible sources; the sheer bulk of such a task would require numerous further studies. For similar reasons, I have also refrained from attempting any substantial overall comparisons between Goodman and other general theoretical approaches concerning the problems he discusses. Such comparisons in the literature span to range from Marxism and social theory to phenomenology and existentialism.

Of course, these supplementary or secondary methodological guidelines have in part been dictated by the simple fact that Goodman himself is very sparse in acknowledging his sources. Concerning earlier work on logic, Goodman indi-

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3 As Siegel 1991: 710 registers, Goodman and Elgin present the whole book as a product of collaboration—but, for some of its chapters, only one of the authors accepts primary responsibility (*RP*: viii; see also Part III.B below, pp. *267–268*). It is true that one does notice some discrepancies, as when Elgin (: 9*n*, 110*n*) simply refers to, but has not taken into consideration, Goodman's partial revision of the notion of representation in chapter VIII of the book. Nevertheless, it has been appropriate for my purposes to cite *RP* uniformly.

4 =Elgin 1983.

cates his indebtedness to Prall 1936 (see *SQ*: 376, 378*n*, 384, and *SA*: 185–186, 193), and to C. I. Lewis in general. Concerning his theory of symbols, Goodman only cursorily refers to E. Cassirer, C. S. Peirce, C. W. Morris, and S. K. Langer (*LA*: xii, 77; 1983*a*: 256) as the foundational contributors to the field. (Relatively more lengthy and less confrontational references are reserved by Goodman for E. Cassirer; see *WW*: 1, 5; 1991*a*: 8–9.[5] The only substantial allusions to C. S. Peirce's work are critical of his key-distinction between tokens and types.[6])

Mitchell 2002 [: 1] suggests that the most impressive feature of *LA*—Goodman's major work on aesthetics—was precisely 'its refusal to enter into an Oedipal relationship with its philosophical predecessors (chiefly C. S. Peirce and E. Cassirer), much less to troll through contemporary theories of representation looking for rivals and competitors'.[7] And Margalit 1986: 500 holds that 'there is no comparison between the degree of complexity and sophistication of Goodman's account and any of his predecessors'.

Peculiarly, in his own work Goodman seems to have had reserved his highest praise for the work of art historians like S. Lee (see *MM*: 172–174), and psychologists like J. Bruner. Goodman 1991*b*: 97 favourably reviews Bruner 1991, concerning the ways in which the latter's work illuminates—and is illuminated by—the theoretical proposals of *RP*; but, most importantly, J. Bruner's findings in psychology had been previously employed by Goodman in *LA*, as well as in *WW*. (Gardner 2000: 245 reports that Goodman himself had served during WW II as a psychologist in the armed forces. As Feldman & Bruner 1986 [: 1] graphically describe, at the time of Goodman's studies, his Emerson Hall academic department at Harvard was shared by philosophers and psychologists—a fact that perhaps helped to partly shape his interests to be.)

'As a philosopher long allied with cognitive psychology' (*RP*: 91), Goodman's activity in the field of aesthetic education reflects very well his related views, namely his reliance on the (*à la* J. Piaget) hypothesis that cognitive development of the individual can be translated into the development of aesthetic sensibility (and perhaps *vice versa*). The tentative or trivial results similar hypotheses appear to have been yielding (cf. Parsons 1975–76, Rosenblatt & Winner 1988) do not in fact become part of Goodman's rigorous philosophical treatment. A lot of the experimental ambitions of aesthetics can frequently be relying on formalistic

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5 On E. Cassirer in this context, cf. Langer 1949: 400 and Slochower 1949: 633, 636*f*.

6 Types—that 'Cinderella of ontology' (as elegantly put by Zemach 1970: 239)—are things Goodman can do without, in his purely nominalistic moments (cf. *SA*: 261–263). Consequently, he can do without tokens, since he prefers to treat nominata as mere words that replicate one another (*LA*: 131*n*). More on such matters is to follow at the appropriate points below.

7 For an accessible summary of *LA*, see Pleydell-Pearce 1970. For a more technical presentation of specific important points, see Beardsley 1970.

principles or hypotheses (cf. Berlyne 1974)—and these are foreign to Goodman's theoretical interests. But this is a sub-case of the overall direction of Goodman's aesthetic theory: as I am going to be emphasizing, cognitivism is significantly re-invented in Goodman. And although he certainly valued inspired creativity in the arts, he also believed that 'what is unteachable may well be trainable' (*MM*: 156). As in the parallel case of education in the sciences, 'that we have no sure method of producing Edisons or Einsteins does not lessen the importance of providing training that they [...] need' (*MM*: 154). Skills and means are the prerequisites of creativity, and we cannot expect progress in the latter without having invested in the former (cf. also *MM*: 165).

In this context, it is true that Goodman never dissociated himself or the findings of his philosophy from matters of application and practical utility (although these are never equated, either). *LA*'s closing remarks refer to the possibilities of developing an aesthetic education based on the principles of a learned systematization and deployment of symbols. And in *WW*: ch. V Goodman is still investing a great deal in experimental results from the psychology of perception.[8] But, despite the significance of such issues, I have not deemed them pertinent or prominent enough so as to incorporate them into my present study.

ON THE OTHER hand, a holistic approach, as I have described it, raises a further issue with regard to any evidence suggesting possibly substantial modifications in Goodman's views over time. Again, it has *not* been my aim to explore such evidence *per se* in detail. I have treated it more as shift of emphasis rather than injurious inconsistency. I think that Haack 1977: 380 is right in adopting certain related principles of 'exegetical charity': in effect, we should not take contradictions at face value (i.e. as problematic), unless we are unable 'to reinterpret the evidence in such a way as to reconstruct a unified and consistent view', and unless we are unable 'to attribute the differences to a change of mind over time'.

Of course, one cannot but recognize that Goodman's focus shifts from logic and language in his earlier work into aesthetics and cultural studies in more mature stages (cf. Morizot 1992: 155). The significance of this will become clearer in my examination—but as a matter of systematic rather than historical importance. In other words, diachronically as well as synchronically, I have preferred to pur-

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[8] His objective is there to indicate that even the simplest of our perceptions about our environment are much a product of our own organism's constructions, and thus to animate his general claims that our environments are 'built' rather than 'discovered'. (Cf. Pessoa & Thompson & Noë 1998, as well as older research cited by Goodman in *WW*: ch. V.) This outlook is going to prove progressively more important in my treatment below.

sue maximum consistency than to relish in the detection of every instance of possible inconsistencies in Goodman's writings.

One further reason for avoiding the historical–evolutionary approach in my interpretation of the course Goodman's thinking followed over the years is that this might take us well beyond Goodman's theory and into his biography. As Morizot 1993: 147 speculates, there is a 'third' Goodman—namely Goodman the artist—that could be holding the key to much of Goodman the logician and Goodman the aesthetician (or even the philosopher and the psychologist—had things evolved slightly differently). From 1929 until 1941, Goodman worked as a professional art dealer (director of the Walker–Goodman Art Gallery in Boston), while at the same time preparing his doctoral dissertation at Harvard University. 'This detour in career reflected both his passion for art and the difficulties with which someone of Jewish parentage then faced in academia' (thus Schwartz 1999: 8). Whatever the circumstances, he had been a private art collector and museum consultant for most of his life;[9] still, he seems to have successfully protected the private character of his aesthetic choices and judgements (cf. Mitchell 2002 [: 3–4]). In the context, however, of his academic career, Goodman's active preoccupation with art and applied aesthetics found other ways of expression. He consistently and efficiently promoted education in the arts, while assisting young artists and students of aesthetics: he founded and directed the Dance Center of the Harvard Summer School, as well as the Harvard Project Zero, still active at present.[10]

But, was Goodman *in fact* an artist—as well as an art enthusiast, dealer, and theorist? After all, there are at least three multimedia installations he was the co-'creator' of, first performed in 1972, 1973, and 1985 respectively. (See references with short descriptions in Berka & Hernadi 1991: 107–108; for Goodman's description of the first one, see *MM*: 69–71; concerning the third one, see *RP*: 81–82 and Hernadi 1991: 1–2.) Such questions must remain outside my present scope, because they would eventually lead to a wholly different approach from the one I have adopted. In short, biography is not irrelevant here due to a supposedly plain difference of genre. For it could become a legitimate part of an inquiry, for instance, into Goodman's moral and political ideas. But I have to admit, in anticipation, that the prospects of a viable inquiry of this kind appear to be fairly

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9 Aided by his wife, the painter Katharine (Kay) Sturgis Goodman (*d.* 1996). Cf. <http://www.artmuseums.harvard.edu/exhibitions/sackler/goodman.html>, <http://www.worcesterart.org/Collection/euro_accessions_88-99.html>.

10 Concerning Project Zero, see *MM*: 146*f*, Goodman 1988, Perkins & Gardner 1988, Gardner 2000. In *MM*: 152 Goodman informs that *LA* was completed during the first year of this project. Also in *MM*: 158–159 he refers to some of the 'lecture-performances' or 'performance-demonstrations' that were taking place at Harvard University, as part of the Project Zero educational curriculum.

thin. (See, nevertheless, pp. *127*, *199* below.) Whether a logician, an aesthetician and artworld figure, a psychologist, or an artist, what I can presently say in this regard is, at most, that Goodman was also a politicized animal lover. Dogs were always in the house (Schwartz 1999: 8), and there is an interesting story about birds being protected from cats (see Elgin 2000*c*). More to the point, Carter 2000 informs us that Goodman funded animal rescue projects during the 1991 Persian Gulf War and elsewhere. Ironically, perhaps this was another sign of his disillusionment with politics, which was already evident in the 1950's aftermath of World War II. ('*Flashes in the desert have already begun to bow the head and close the eyes of the measure of all things.*'[11]) For Goodman, fighting for 'grandiose ideals' or for 'somebody's system' could not equal someone's simple wish to 'get home and eat some blueberry pie'—as reported somewhere about soldiers fighting in the war. Accordingly, Goodman went on to denounce all dogma and all conflict. He went on to do 'science and analytic philosophy', which are 'incompatible with conflict'. (See *PP*: 54, 55.[12])

—b—

Goodman's *LA* probably constitutes the most definitive work in twentieth century *analytic* aesthetics—so Robinson thinks, for example (2000: 213, 218). But, at the same time, Goodman is described by Shusterman 1989: 3 as one of the 'less paradigmatically analytic aestheticians'. The background of such an assessment is of course Shusterman's strategy towards a moderate vindication of 'pragmatist and activist' directions in contemporary (Anglo-American) aesthetics (*ibid.*: 14–15; cf. Gkogkas 2001*a*: 232, 233). Such tendencies (also envisaged by Meyer L B 1994: 336) are clearly opposed to the programme of formal definition and logical explication (cf. Wilkoszewska 1999: 91–92). It follows that, especially the later Goodman, cannot be grouped together with philosophers such as M. Weitz and F. Sibley. (Representing what Berleant 1991: ix has called 'that heyday of philosophical miniatures'. Nevertheless, in his early days, Goodman still held that 'in philosophy as in science the microscopic method has its own fascination and rewards'—see *SA*: xlix.[13])

Accurate as such differentiations might be, there are, according to Shusterman, even more decisive points of concern over current developments in analytic aesthetics. In fact, for Shusterman (1989: 7–8), it is art criticism that has been

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11 *PP*: 49. (Goodman at his most poetic.)

12 Cf. the innuendo on 'the noted linguist and political polemicist Noam Chomsky, one of my former students'. (*PP*: 58. 'Bourgeois I am [...]', Goodman would admit in *PP*: 449.)

13 For a discreetly critical review of *SA* see Quine 1951.

the crux of the analytical programme in the field of philosophical aesthetics (dating at least since G. E. Moore; *ibid.*: 12–13): what nature was for science, art criticism became for analytic aesthetics. Apart from (i) marginalizing the aesthetics of nature, this programmatic single-mindedness—Shusterman insists—could account for (ii) the politics of blindness, which analytic philosophy has practised towards examining the social context of the arts (*ibid.*: 11), and for (iii) the self-deceptive 'scientistic prejudice' of the neutrality said to be exhibited by analytic purism (*ibid.*: 15). This latter prejudice maintains that there are 'objectively' discoverable facts about aesthetic understanding, which are distinct from normative judgements about aesthetic value—something unacceptable by pragmatic standards. And it is in such a truly pragmatic spirit that Goodman & Elgin speak (1987–88: 222): they casually imply that the unending tasks pluralism and open-endedness dictate for philosophical inquiry, rather than being perhaps indefinite in a negative way, are actually an important guarantee that philosophers will keep themselves employed.

Despite these objections, Carroll 1993 still defends the analytical programme as a programme of aesthetic metacriticism, the need and use of which is ever increasing in our age of proliferating critical methodologies (which bear a continental birth certificate, so to speak). These methodologies of the 'hermeneutics of suspicion', fuelled by their corresponding political agendas—namely the ascription of 'symptomatic political content, including especially: latent or repressed sexism, racism, classism, imperialism, and so forth' (*ibid.*: 245)—often show disregard towards the theoretical role of authorial intentions. Thus, they leave considerable fertile ground for the employment of analytic elenchus—which, in effect, could prove to facilitate rather than (or as well as) refute the results of other critical domains of discourse, in a humane and reasonable fashion.

More generally, the case for defending the analytical programme (see Ujvári 1993: *ad loc.* 291, 297) could still reside in the right to defend one particular way of knowing—namely propositional knowledge—without being at the same time forced to justify it against any possible alternatives (just as in the case of the Kantian *Bedingungen der Möglichkeit*). The impasse here would be that, as B. A. W. Russell admits (in Wittgenstein 1961: xxii), merely the inability to refute something on its own grounds for truth or falsity, does not prove its general rightness on other possible grounds (and Ujvári *ibid.*: 295 recognises the importance of this problem).

Understandably then, voices of reconciliation are increasingly being heard (cf. Gabriel 2000). Of course, to the extent that 'analytic' coincides with anglophone, there is really (as T. M. Knox fears in Hegel 1975: ix) a question of 'a language framed by and for empiricism' (i.e. English). In effect, this can be seen as the thorny problem of translating a language, as well as a way of thinking—but is it really? For, in Habermas's terms (1999: 422–423, 441), whatever the answer to this question, it remains concentrated on the *semantic* aspects of language. Such one-sidedness fundamentally features in the heart of *both* the analytic and the

continental (or hermeneutic) tradition. Hence, elementaristic formal semantics (of the former) and holistic content semantics (of the latter) have been advancing hand in hand, all the time removed from the *pragmatic* aspects of the rationality of communication and its contribution towards social solidarity. (Or, pragmatism re-asserts itself). Steiner 1991 (: *ad loc.* 93*f*) sees this pervasive 'linguistic turn' in philosophy as part of what he more generally calls the 'contract' between word and world, which was finally and irrevocably 'broken' at about the end of the nineteenth century. Language no longer has any privileged revelatory access to the phenomenology of 'the world' (however that may described), but has become, in this regard, its own subject of inquiry.

More to my point, at a comparatively early stage (*PP*: 17), Goodman himself identified his brand of constructionalist philosophy as constituting a fourth stage in the development of Anglo-American analysis—following logical atomism, logical positivism, and verbal analysis. A lot of his theory of symbols and his kalology as I present it here developed into larger contexts. And, as Goodman & Elgin 1987–88: 220 are quick to recognize, 'analytic aesthetics need not end with metacriticism' (Shusterman's earlier point), because, if so, 'it is unable to address the main issue: It has nothing to say about art'.

In accordance with the foregoing—and on a meta-level of interpretation—I have avoided situating Goodman within a particular or clearly delineated tradition as a means for better interpreting his thought; many different paths of kinship can be traced, and that I have left open for further considerations.

II.B.1

AESTHETICA

1. AESTHETICS

> Some critics [...] think that the book [*LA*] leaves aesthetics just where it was. Perhaps it does, in much the way the automobile left the horse and buggy where it was and aviation leaves the railroad where it was. [*MM*: 198.]

Naturally, there have been controversial views on the importance of Goodman's *LA*; more peculiarly, critical response ranges from daring exaltation to outright libel.

O'Neill 1971: 361, 372 maintains that Goodman's *LA* is 'almost entirely worthless', and that it would be a 'waste of time' to pursue 'Goodman's errors to their last bolt-holes'. And as late as 1985, Sharpe concludes that 'unlike his work on the philosophy of science, Goodman's aesthetics marks a cul-de-sac'. On the opposite side of the spectrum, Pouivet 1996: 201 cites G. Genette's assessment that Goodman's *LA* is in fact the most illuminating philosophical contribution in the theory of the arts since I. Kant's *Critique of Judgement*.[14] This is surely an impressive compliment. And it does not appear to be isolated in space, time, or philosophical context. In Sparshott's words (1974: 202), *LA* made its appearance (in 1968) 'like the shadow of a great rock in a weary land' (because of 'its promise of lucidity, and the clear direction it opened for further inquiry'). One cannot of course heavily rely on such pronouncements, but the point here is that they may convey something of the very character of Goodman's work; opinion is sharply divided because usually there are important issues at stake.

Goodman himself is conscious of what he calls the 'heretic' or 'iconoclastic' features of his account (*LA*: 230–231). And at least for Ziff 1971: 515, this is the primal feature ultimately upholding Goodman's whole project:

> What constitutes a genuine instance of a work? What makes a painting a representational painting? These are nice questions the answers to which are not to be found in Goodman's *Languages of Art*. Even so, I wholeheartedly recommend this book to those concerned with problems of art and language, because it is a genuinely interesting presentation of unusual views. And as such it provokes and stimulates: it makes one think.

But, again, as Black is swift to remark caustically (1971: 534), 'heresy is no better for being heretical than dogma is for being dogmatic'. Therefore, dogma as condemnable delusion and heresy as commendable inspiration are hardly informative critical categories; my intention to refrain form apologetics or polemics in the context of Goodman's theory is anew reinforced from this point of view.

To return to the beginning then, what are the 'languages' of art, and—by extension—what is the Goodmanian aesthetic?

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[14] Reference for G. Genette's original (as cited by Pouivet): *Libération*, 6.IX.1990, p. 27.

The principal point to note is that, as Goodman himself concedes (*LA*: xi), his project does not belong to the field of ordinary aesthetics and criticism, in that it forms part of a general theory of symbols. Such a general theory is Goodman's overall objective, and aesthetic considerations become part of it by felicitous accident, so to speak. (This is not directed at diminishing the importance of philosophical aesthetics for Goodman, in the sense that collateral research results are sometimes at least as significant as the ones explicitly put forward.) In this framework, 'languages' of art is readily and successfully translatable, according to Goodman's terminology, into 'symbol systems' of art (*LA*: xi–xii; cf. *MM*: 57).

Before saying anything at all about art, it is tempting to understand 'languages' and 'symbol systems' on the basis of ordinary preconceptions about these terms. In the two following sections, I shall briefly present the way Goodman understands them, in order to avoid such prejudiced misapprehensions, which may easily undermine critical reliability. It is true that a lot of what Goodman wishes to convey is often describable only in a negative way—i.e. it is more to the point to say what he does *not* mean rather than what exactly he means. The problem is not that his notions are so cryptic; but knowing what something does not mean is often tantamount to knowing some at least of its meaning (in the same way, e.g., that *'a+b+c'* does not mean *'a'*, but incorporates it).

2. LANGUAGES

In the context of twentieth century philosophy of language, Goodman was not the first philosopher to generally define art as a form of language. Margolis 1974: 175*f* provides information on some early relevant work (notably by T. M. Greene and C. L. Stevenson); and he rightly recognizes that the problem has always consisted in how 'language' is to be understood.[15]

There has been a persisting tendency to treat Goodman's notion of the arts as languages in such a way as to imply that paintings, musical works, etc., are of the same order with discursive, natural languages. Walton 1974: 254 insists that assimilating pictorial representations to linguistic symbols can be a dangerous misconception. And Blocker 1974 joins him in contending that certain similarities between the way art and language function should not lead to a complete assimilation of the two. All this is intended to imply, of course, that Goodman is guilty of such complete assimilations—something that remains to be seen. It is also intended to imply that similarities bar differences—something that does not seem to follow.

On more specific syntactic and semantic grounds, Scruton 1983: 10–12 also criticizes Goodman for what he perceives as a wholly unsatisfactory definition of art as a kind of language. For, in this case, although rules of truth, falsity, and meaningfulness apply to our discursive languages, these surely cannot apply to pictures, sequences of sounds, and so on—hence Goodman's purported slip at a fundamental level of his treatment. This line of criticism has been followed up by, among others, Phillips & Wollheim 1996 (: *ad loc.* 223): pictures cannot simply be construed as languages because languages consist in the application of certain rules; but artistic creation does not abide by rules in the same way, say, that writing in English does.[16] And, most recently, Schmitter 2000 reiterates (not directly against Goodman, however) that the discursiveness and conceptuality of our ordinary languages can only partially deliver the whole import of artistic representations.

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15 As Schultz 1975 indicates, the art–language correlation could even be traced back to G. Frege, if 'language' is not described in terms of reference or denotation (Fregean *Bedeutung*) but in terms of sense (Fregean *Sinn*). (In Goodman, the distinction itself does not apply, but its import is relevant because Goodmanian reference *is*, in effect, the generator of sense.)

16 The context here is in support of R. Wollheim's 'seeing-in' theory—although, at least according to Robinson 1979: 72, Goodman's and R. Wollheim's views do not seem to be incompatible. (Incidentally, Dickie 1977: 56*f* already locates a related notion of 'seeing-as' in the work of V. Aldrich.)

Again, what is here implicitly presupposed and turned against Goodman is that because discursive languages and arts differ in some important respects they cannot have any significant common characteristics, either. For Goodman of course does not disregard all the plausible differences, but only reshapes the overall relation between the artistic and the (otherwise) linguistic, so that the differences are construed as variations on the theme of a higher-order affinity, so to speak. The affinity is simply that a language of the natural kind, couched in its alphabet, 'is a symbol system of a particular kind' (*LA*: 40*n*)—but still a 'symbol system' (which is Goodman's closest synonym for 'language'). Goodman's principal theoretical starting point is not refuted until at least we see what it means, and how is it that it can embrace the discursive and, for instance, the pictorial. And, secondarily, attributing discrepancies concerning identity and truth presupposes that Goodman's notions of identity and truth are obvious—but this is questionable, and it will have to remain so until later in my exposition.

Perhaps Howard 1975: 213 is making a point by saying that if Goodman's title had been 'The Non-Languages of Art' it would have better conveyed his dominant theoretical bias: not like the languages in the literal, etymological sense, but quite like them (even if by juxtaposition) in a broader systematic sense.

3. SYSTEMS

> I must repeat that I am here subscribing neither to any picture theory of language nor to any language theory of pictures; for pictures belong to nonlinguistic, and terms to nonpictorial, symbol systems. [*WW*: 103.]

A symbol *scheme* is simply a set of elementary units, or symbols—e.g. the range of different marks used in musical scoring, the letters of the alphabet, all paintings, etc. When these elements are moreover systematically correlated within a field of reference (notes corresponding to pitch, letters corresponding to phonemes, words and paintings signifying things), then the symbol scheme becomes a symbol *system*. In other words, a scheme of symbols, *along with* an interpretation responding to a field of referential correlations between these symbols, becomes a full symbol system with its own syntactic and semantic specifications (*LA*: 143).

'Symbol' remains, however, an ambiguous concept. But in Goodman, this is an *informative* ambiguity, precisely because a symbol itself signifies, in effect, whatever it has come to refer to, by virtue of a constructed referential affinity. As a matter of theoretical stipulation, 'when x refers to y, x is a symbol for y' (as Goodman plainly puts in 1981*b*).

There seems to be an inexhaustible historical background of polysemy concerning symbols, signs, semiotics, and related terms. So, facing Goodman's stark formula, it is tempting to invest it with one's preferred interpretation of what exactly it means to 'refer to' something else. In the following section, I am going to be providing some evidence to the effect that we had better accept Goodman's formula as it stands, rather than interpret it in the light of already existing theories of symbols. I have not been able to establish any definitive conceptual or terminological link between Goodmanian symbol-discourse and other related theories; and even if, under different circumstances, such a link *could* be established, no substantial alteration would follow in what I intend to say.

Furthermore, the following section responds to the need for the paths of Goodmanian reference to be elucidated, before any study of Goodman's aesthetics is made possible at all (for the latter forms an integral part of the former). Now, it might be true in Goodman's case that reference (through symbolization) and the vehicles of reference (or symbols) are not strictly separable: modes of reference determine and are determined by the kinds of symbols employed. Still, if one has to start from somewhere, this ambiguous but nonetheless informative, as I called it, notion of 'symbol' can precede the examination of reference through symbols.

4. SYMBOLS, SIGNS, ETC.

Goodman's 'symbol' is, in his own words again, a 'very general and colorless term' (*LA*: xi). The lexicographical definition (characteristically endorsed, e.g., by Hall 2001: ix) designates 'symbol' as something generally standing for, or denoting, or 'representing' something else. 'Standing for' stands for 'connecting', and 'connecting' stands for 'communicating' (as A. G. Baumgarten already noted in his *Aesthetica*; for which see Gregor 1983–84: 374). Symbols, then, are the fundamental tools, as well as the vehicles, in communicating that for which they stand—i.e. their referents. This need to stand for, or to refer to, indicates precisely that the referent is somehow absent, and its remoteness needs to be compensated by the directness of that which stands for it—i.e. its symbol.

Berleant 1970: 34–35 characteristically refers to this expanded conception of 'symbol' as an intellectualistic distortion of its usual meaning (and he also attributes it to C. J. Ducasse). If symbols have any value for aesthetic theory, this applies, in Berleant's view, only in so far as they enable us to speak about art in ways that could be described as metaphorical—namely, not good enough for exacting theory. Now Goodman is a staunch supporter of theoretical exactness; but he has also provided a theory of metaphor to match (I shall be referring to it below). Thus, metaphor and exactness are not necessarily incompatible—even if we confine ourselves to the earlier, more 'intellectualistic' part of Goodman's philosophy.

Ogden & Richards 1966: v*n* (first edition 1923) offer instead a very concise history of the term 'symbol'. Its etymological ancestor (Greek *σύμβολον /sýmvolon/*) signifies that, which put together with its counterpart constitutes a whole.[17] In this respect, and if the notion of a counterpart is that of a referent, a symbol could be described as a 'token' (in an ordinary, non-technical sense) that needs to be set against what it signifies: without the latter, any functioning of symbols is lost—what is a symbol devoid of a referent? (Peirce 1932: 2.297 thinks that his use of 'symbol' corresponds faithfully to the original etymology—but he relegates the matter to the reader's judgement. In which case, I cannot see how Peircean icons and indices are necessarily left out of the purview of */sýmvolon/*.)

It follows that symbolism in this sense is not to be identified solely with biblical or poetic symbolism (as Ogden & Richards remind us, *loc. cit.*). Langer 1957 also emphatically and repeatedly expresses the need to differentiate between the art symbol of aesthetic theory (e.g. Goodman's theory) and the 'symbol in art'—instances of the latter being abundant in psychological (or psychoanalytical) iconology, in painting and poetry of a religious or symbolistic or imagistic

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[17] Cf. DK 31 [21], Empedokles B 63 (=Diels & Kranz 1951–52: I, 336, 1–4); cf. also, Plato 1900–07: *Symposium* 191 d 4–5.

or surrealistic import, and so on. All these are perhaps instances of symbolization, but they do not so much constitute examples of the process of symbolizing as examples of fixed relations of symbols within a realm of reference, employed as blueprints for the interpretation of the phenomena purportedly belonging to that realm.

Quite apart from issues of literary symbolism, in some of the so-called continental traditions there has been indeed an emphasis on the notion of symbol and on the process of symbolization, underlying the view that through the use of symbols the human appropriates what may be said to lie outside it.[18] This centrality of symbols can be traced at least as far back as the late nineteenth century (from F. T. Vischer and through to E. Cassirer; see Gilbert 1949: 608–609).[19] But there seems to be a constant temptation to conflate what symbols are and what *signs* (or other related entities) are. Actually, the issue is not one of conflating different terms, because their meaning does not seem to be adequately fixed (for perhaps these are terms regulating the very way meaning is fixed). The tradition of sign-talk instead of symbol-talk has, interestingly, been equally (if not more) weighty in philosophical debate.[20]

Kristeva 1974: 22 (English translation 1984: 25) explicates 'sign' simply by reference to the etymology of its Greek equivalent (*σημεῖον /sêmeĩon/*): that, which distinctively marks. Surely, this version of 'sign' is equally generic with that of 'symbol' as 'that, which simply refers to'. But, nonetheless, an important distinction between signs and symbols persists here for Kristeva: as L. S. Roudiez indicates (in Kristeva 1984: 4), a sign is somehow 'naturally' related to its referent, and a symbol is conventionally so related. And Kristeva captures this in her juxtaposition between the natural, unconscious *id* on one side, and the cultural, conscious *superego* on the other. Thus, and to a certain extent, *le symbolique* embraces culturally implemented connotations, and *le sémiotique* naturally forced relations—while both comprise the scope of the general field of *la sémiotique*, namely of the science of symbols and *other signs* in general.[21]

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18 In my Introduction (p. *40f*), I have referred to the dubiousness of the distinction between what is 'analytic' and what is 'continental' in (western) philosophy.

19 According to Margalit 1986: 500, E. Cassirer's approach was more of an eclectic and encyclopaedic study on the effects of symbols, whereas what Goodman offers is a 'complex theory about the structure of symbols'. Still, similarities between the projects of E. Cassirer and Goodman may run deeper.

20 Not to mention linguistics; e.g., F. de Saussure's 'sign' is the fundamental 'psychological unity' of concepts and their relevant sound patterns (cf. Kristeva 1981: 19, Simms 1997: 8–9).

21 J. Kristeva's Freudian orientation is interestingly counter-balanced by C. G. Jung's relevant ideas (see Warmiński 1999: 52–53): a sign here appears in consciousness representing something knowable, whereas a symbol is more important as it

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Closer to Goodman's theoretical ancestry (in the Anglo-American stream), Peirce 1932: 2.247–2.249 famously stipulates that the second of the three trichotomies of signs in general comprises iconic, indexical, and symbolic signs (cf. Smith C M 1972–73: 23–24, Simms 1997*a*: 77–78). So, signs are here again the generic entities, and symbols make up the third sub-category of the second category of signs. And, more specifically, a symbol is defined as a sign that refers to its referent only by virtue of a rule of correlation (i.e. not by resemblance or by any other kind of direct association). For example, the mental act of saying 'this is a rainy day' is a symbol, as opposed to the index that distinguishes this day from any other in my experience, and as opposed to the icon of a mental composite photograph depicting all the rainy days I have experienced. Ogden & Richards 1966: 23 are roughly following this Peircean categorization of signs as the vehicles of semiosis in general (and they go on to provide a description of the familiar semiotic triangle). And similarly, for Morris 1938: 25–26 semiosis is the science of signs in general—although here their internal differentiation is structured along the lines of syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic relations (cf. Morris 1939–40). The effect is that, again, symbols are only a subset of signs in general, lying on the level of semantics and relating to their referents (or *designata*) by means other than iconic resemblance. (So that a photograph is an icon of what it actually portrays, whereas the word 'photograph' is a symbol for the photographic print—it could be replaced, e.g., by '*φωτογραφία*' in Greek.)[22]

Perhaps in an initial attempt to accommodate the perceived significance of sign-talk, Goodman uses the term 'signal' in the early stages of formulating his theory of reference through symbols (*PP*: 58). There, he accepts signals as a variety of reference whereby (i) there is a 'spatio-temporal relation' between the signal and its referent (e.g. cloud and rain), or (ii) the signal has 'sentential force' (e.g. 'a storm is coming' informs that a storm is coming). In this respect, nonverbal events can stand as signals for others (*PP*: 65); and statements are similar signals, possibly more complicated—because more specific. But, in effect, meaning is constituted out of the complex nexus of signalling, for 'under some circumstances or other, almost anything can be made to serve as a signal for almost any subsequent experience' (*PP*: 66). Similarly, in *LA*: 65 Goodman calls 'signs' precisely those special kinds of symbols, whereby a spatio-temporal—or an other-

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stands between the conscious and the collective phylogenetic unconsciousness. On the basis of this, C. G. Jung seems to be reproaching S. Freud for having spoken only of symbols, which always point to a monolithically structured unconscious.

22 Under these specifications—and as M. Inwood notes in Hegel 1993: 194—Hegelian usage can be somewhat confusing. Thus, *Zeichen* (=*sign*) is what Peircean semiosis would call symbol (e.g. the word 'dog' in relation to the dog); and the Hegelian *Symbol* is what Peircean semiosis would call an iconic sign (bearing intrinsic similarity to what it symbolizes; e.g. a picture of a dog). See Hegel 1979*a*: §458; also, § 556 (where beauty (*Schönheit*) is the 'sign of the Idea' ('Zeichen der Idee')).

wise causal—relation holds between the signifier and what is signified. It is evident, then, that Goodman is from the start restrained in circumscribing the domain of 'signalling' (or 'signifying'): only some kinds of reference belong to it—especially the ones experientially and causally established. By contrast, he invariably defines symbolization in terms of reference in general, without qualifications, without restrictions as to the causes, mediums, and the particular ways reference is established in each of its instances.

This treatment of signalling on the part of Goodman clearly reforms Peircean standards, whereby, conversely, symbols are a subset of signs. (And, to be sure, various problems seem to be arising from Peirce's pertinent definition of icons and indices—see Burks 1948–49: *ad loc.* 675–676, 679–680—a fact that might have influenced Goodman's own terminological choices). But Goodman's treatment also reflects some other familiar semiotic distinctions.[23] As prescribed by the semiotic triangle (for another description, see Ogden & Richards 1966: 11), a symbol symbolizes correctly and causally a thought or reference, and a thought or reference refers adequately and causally to a referent; but the referent stands for the symbol in an *imputed* true relation (for which there is no causal or other external criterion of correctness). Goodman is in fact corroborating this formulation—but only as far as the third side of the triangle is in question. As all acts of reference describe the relation between symbols and their referents, without a need for further causal considerations, the other two sides of the semiotic triangle collapse, as it were, together with the one linking symbol and referent. The important thing to note, however, is that this subsumption does not thereby eliminate experiential and causal relationships: signalling, in Goodman's sense, is preserved, but only as a species of symbolizing or generally standing for / referring to.[24]

By extension, we no longer need to speak of 'naturally' and, on the other hand, 'culturally' imputed symbolizing processes (in J. Kristeva's manner, for ex-

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[23] According to O'Toole 1979: 379, J. Mukařovsky develops still another version of semiosis, whereby the symbolic and the aesthetic are the two functions of the semiotic. These two functions differ in that the former poses the object in the foreground, while the subject is the focus for the latter. Accordingly, the aesthetic sign serves the sole purpose of reflecting, but not affecting reality, as it constitutes a projection of the subject's attitude towards reality. (Cf. Ostrowicki 1999: 197–198.) Such distinctions may become more pertinent later in my exposition, but will remain conceptually alien to Goodman's treatment.

[24] In *LA*: 65 Goodman seems to be implying that signalling is a species of 'nonreferential' symbolization. All the same, I am treating 'reference' and 'symbolization' as synonymous, given that there do not seem to be any other relevant distinctions of this sort in Goodman's work—on the contrary: see *MM*: 55, cited below introducing § 5. (At any rate, and especially by Goodman's standards, no absolutely exact synonymy is possible; cf. pp. *61*, *62* below.)

ample). For, if something is simply accepted as standing for something else, the question of 'natural' causality and 'artificial' conventionality is besides the main issue—which concerns the workings of reference, and not especially its provenance or its typology. (Cf. p. *57* below. Obviously—and in the context of S. K. Langer's aforementioned separation of art symbols and 'symbols in art'—Goodman's account could be made to incorporate literary symbolism within his symbolism of reference—although this is not a point that has occupied him to any great extent.[25])

But all this subversive semiotic background notwithstanding, I think that there are other ways, substantial rather than terminological, in which Goodman's account is firmly grounded in traditional semiosis. As articulated in non-technical terms by Ogden & Richards (1966: 23), the sign–symbol relation becomes more telling: symbols are those kinds of signs that embody means of communication. Namely, signs such as words, images, gestures, sounds, and the like are actually symbols, for they communicate referential relations (or 'meanings'); it follows that the study of these symbols will enable us to go beyond the common and confused usage of words (*op. cit.*: 148–149). In a similar vein, Morris 1938: 32 sees the process of semiosis as ultimately an instrument that we, the higher animal forms, possess in order to take into account what is distant and absent (by attending, that is, to what can stand for it in our proximity).

This process of communicating, of transmitting information from the knower to the learner, of apprehending what was previously insignificant, lies at the heart of Goodman's conception about reference through symbolization in general. In effect, lack of signification is lack of significance, and lack of significance is simply absence. That which has not been invested with some kind of meaning, which has not been integrated within some nexus of reference, which has not—in other words—become part of a symbol–referent relation, remains inaccessible. (Though this, strictly speaking, is false, because there is nothing there for us to say that it remains inaccessible.) Accordingly, any system of symbols—any 'language', whether pertaining to artistic or other symbols—is not merely an instrument for reference, but, at the same time, an instrument for the very construction of the things referred to. (Kristeva 1981: 17–18 ([1]1969; English translation 1989: 12–13) emphasizes the general status of signification in quite similar terms, drawing from C. S. Peirce. However, she employs here 'symbol' and 'sign' indiscriminately (along with their Greek etymological equivalents; cf. 1981: 292 or, in English, 1989: 296), i.e. without distinguishing between them in the way she appears to be doing in 1974—as seen above.)

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[25] The use of symbols in art, literature, biblical hermeneutics, etc., is perhaps itself a *symbolic* function, in that fixed allusions are transported and re-invested with significance.

Under such a perspective, it is not surprising that Goodman hardly ever returns to examine the fundamental character of what he accepts symbolization in general to be. As traditionally plotted, the differences between symbols, signs, signals, etc., are de-structured in Goodman's case, and at least some of his critics have felt uncomfortably about this (cf. Vuillemin 1970: 79). However, uneasiness in abandoning familiar terms and distinctions is no sufficient reason for sacrificing the interpretative potential of better-suited ones. Furthermore, Goodman's objective is to reach beyond the vehicles of symbolization: it is to examine more closely the mechanisms that drive symbolization in the first place. His attempts at answering this will constitute, in the end, attempts at explaining the reason why symbol systems are central to our understanding of the arts (among other things). If thus the Goodmanian notion of 'symbol' seems hopelessly bare—or hopelessly devoid of a clearly traceable ancestry—this is so much the better. Explaining the ways symbolization functions can be easily distracted by a mere description of its purported vehicles.

One wonders whether it would suffice to say that Goodman simply presents another version of semiosis. For, in fact, it would be far more accurate to say that he is articulating an idiosyncratic theory of symbols—let me call it *symbology* (to be distinguished from various symbolisms and symbolist movements).[26] After all, familiar terms prompt mistaken comparisons, alien to Goodman's project as I have conceived and described it. For instance, *semiosis* and *semiotic(s)* do not fail to consign one directly to C. S. Peirce's (and C. W. Morris's) theory of signs, which is practically synonymous with Peircean logic (cf. Smith C M 1972–73: 23). The post-Peircean American *semiotic* has also been reserved particularly for some kinds of behaviourism and 'pragmatic fallibilism' (see Scholes 1976–77: 476, 478). And the Parisian–French *sémiologie* has been perplexingly bound up with the wider projects of socio-psychological structuralisms and deconstructions (and perhaps with an adherence to 'Cartesian mentalism'—according to Scholes 1976–77: 476).[27]

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[26] Thus, in order to specifically indicate Goodman's account of reference (as presented here), I shall be using terms like 'symbological' and 'symbologically', reserving 'symbolic' and 'symbolically' for other familiar symbol-discourses.

[27] Scholes further proposes to reserve the term *semiotics* for U. Eco's 'dialectical synthesis' of *sémiologie* and *semiotic*.

5. SYMBOLOGY

'Reference' as I use it is a very general and primitive term, covering all sorts of symbolization, all cases of *standing for*. As a primitive relation, reference will not be defined but rather explicated by distinguishing and comparing its several forms. [*MM*: 55;[28] similarly, *RP*: 124.]

Goodman's approach to aesthetics as constituting a part of his general theory of symbolization (or reference through symbols) would imply that we are now faced with the question of deciding which kinds of symbols pertain to the arts. But I have to emphasize once more that the question is still not about what could allegedly be the exclusive subject matter of aesthetics. It is about the symbolizing process itself, and about the extent to which reference as a 'primitive relation' is sometimes invested with a significance that could be termed 'aesthetic'. Circumscribing the contours of the aesthetic is part of the description of the various forms symbolization might assume. Goodman observes what we normally appreciate as art, as science, as philosophy, and he wishes to systematize their appeal in terms of symbolization. Conversely, this systematization is not merely descriptive but, most importantly, also prescriptive: our recognition of something as a work of art is in fact a result of the underlying processes whereby it gains its peculiar significance. That is why Goodman claims to be uncovering, with his philosophy, the foundations supporting creativity—as well as experience and knowledge.

Consequently, aesthetics not only falls under Goodmanian symbology, but is also systematically linked with the general function of reference. It will not do to begin by saying (as I might have implied at the beginning) that aesthetics is part of a symbol theory (the part dealing with certain kinds of symbols): in that case, the criteria for distinguishing it from other 'compartments' of symbol theory would be eluding us. (How did we initially learn to recognize symbols—let alone differentiate and categorize them?) The case for Goodman is rather that the explication of aesthetic symbolization will necessarily follow from, and shown to be consistent with, the centrality of symbolization in general.

I have referred to this overall applicability of Goodmanian symbology as the problem of some initial 'distance' separating us from what needs to be referred to, in order for it to be rescued from total oblivion and anonymity—despite its being, in a sense, unaccounted for, inaccessible, or absent. In fact, a conviction to the effect that 'immediate experience' is something inconceivable constitutes a bequest of Peircean semiosis; for C. S. Peirce (as interpreted, e.g., by

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[28] There follows a taxonomy of the modes of reference which, accordingly, I shall not be following in a systematic way, but only depending on what my context may dictate.

Smith C M 1972–73: 28), everything that rises to awareness does so through signs. This is not to say that everything is a matter of discursive description and recognition, but that it needs to be presented and exhibited through signs so that it becomes possibly amenable to contemplation as well as to any other kind of comprehension. In this sense, semiosis and aesthetics become inseparable aspects of the Peircean semiotic universe (*op. cit.*: 29).[29]

Marsoobian 1996: 270 appreciates the way C. S. Peirce conceives the workings of meaning:

> The interpretant always gives the meaning of the relation between the sign and its represented object. It does so by placing this relation within an ever increasing context of other signs. Meaning is engendered by a continuing process of translation which, at the same time, makes the sign more determinate.

However, Marsoobian thinks that Goodman's reference theory has failed to render the fullness of such a general semiotic approach (: 276*n*)—and the purported reason is that, ironically, reference acquires a hegemonic role by overshadowing semiosis. But I suspect that Marsoobian, once again, mistakenly identifies Goodmanian reference with *propositional* reference (i.e. ordinary language). However, the 'open-endedness' of Peircean semiosis as described and cherished by Marsoobian, is also shared by Goodman when his symbology is correctly seen, in my opinion, as a theory of reference concerning the 'languages' of symbol systems in general. (Which are thus not to be reduced to L. Wittgenstein's 'claustrophobic'—as Nowak 1999: 169 calls them—language games).

Consequently, I think that in the same way that Peircean semiosis and aesthetics may become inseparable aspects of C. S. Peirce's semiotic universe, Goodmanian symbology and aesthetics become inseparable aspects of his universe of reference. For Goodman, reference constitutes the core of all philosophical enquiry, because it is precisely the process which substantiates enquiry, which makes enquiry possible. (Questioning something is, after all, tantamount to this 'primitive' act of referring to it, before anything else can be claimed or disclaimed about it.) The study of the ways of symbols provides the 'means for analyzing and for comparing and contrasting in significant ways the varied systems of symbolization used in art, science, and life in general' (*LA*: 157).

Aesthetic symbolization is one aspect of this process of enquiry, rather than a venture into a 'solidified' (possibly non-philosophical) symbolism, or into traditional structural semiotics. As Margalit 1986: 501 puts it, 'Goodman's emphasis is not on the psychogenesis of reference, i.e., the "roots" of reference, but rather on the many and varied ways of symbolization, i.e., the "routes" of reference.'

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29 G. W. F. Hegel had of course already highlighted the incomplete nature of immediacy, which necessarily turns out to be *mediated*. Cf. Houlgate 1999: *ad loc.* 43.

('Routes of Reference' is the title of chapter III,1 in *MM*.) This is a crucial point that, if not heeded, can misguide criticism. Discussion can revert to the possible tensions between symbols and their referents—which, for Goodman, are resolved by treating reference as a relation no less primitive than enquiry itself (viz. asking and answering).

For example, it sounds plausible to insist that artworks and the objects of our aesthetic experience cannot acquire their intrinsic value through the fact that they simply refer to something outside themselves. Aesthetic experience must safeguard its immanent, intransitive status—unlike, e.g., moral, cognitive, or religious experience (the point raised by E. Vivas; see Dickie 1964–65: 389). Similarly, it sounds plausible to dismiss (with Danto 1986: 45) semiotic theories in general because they seem to mistakenly present the interpretation of the work and the work itself as two distinct categories—whereas the symbol and what it stands for should be systematically inseparable. In other words, 'we need not insist that the work itself has some symbolic function in addition to possessing those [aesthetic] properties and attracting the critical attention of viewers and hearers' (Dempster 1989: 412).

To the extent that such objections can be directed against Goodman, they ignore the fact that Goodman nowhere supports the distinctions they presuppose. Goodman's almost Peircean conviction that referring is 'rising to awareness'—sc. becoming known or present—relies entirely on a treatment of symbols not merely as 'empty' mediums of reference, but also as indispensable constituent parts of it. 'Attracting the critical attention of viewers and hearers', interpreting aesthetic experience, is precisely what would *constitute* the perceived 'symbolic' function of visual and musical artworks within Goodman's symbology. (The same applies with what artworks can be said to be expressive of. Blinder 1982–83: 258 objects that Goodman's 'designative' theory does not capture expressive meaning; however, as it will become evident (see § 7 below), Goodman's account renders expression specifically as a non-denotative but 'exemplificational' species of reference.)

Characteristically, that Goodman sees symbols and referents in a lot of ways unified is evident from the fact that he frequently speaks of symbols as referring to themselves when exemplifying some of their inherent, non-referential features. (When, for example, we listen to the singer *and* to the singer's technical mastery of his / her voice, the singing is also referring to its own artistry of execution.) If 'to say that colors and forms [and sounds] symbolize or embody themselves is tautological and absurd' (Donnell-Kotrozo 1981–82: 367), then this is not to say anything in response to Goodman's pervasively symbological universe, containing both art and discourse (even if we concede that tautologies *are* absurd).

It is perhaps Langer 1957: 132–134 who poignantly expresses, and corroborates, the peculiarity of this kind of reference, whereby referring to and being referred to are not only inseparable from one another but also inseparable from

philosophical enquiry. As I have hinted at, symbolization becomes the instrument for the construction of discourse and of the things discourse postulates. Symbols thus conceived are at the same time articulating the very entities they are referring to, functioning as formulators of experience, carving the patterns of the world and fixing its entities (*op. cit.*: 132–134). When we talk, for instance, about J. M. W. Turner's 'painterly world(s)' our talk is bound by the postulated content of his paintings—although it is not a physical description of them. It is only in this respect that artworks as symbols can claim their importance and irreducibility for aesthetic theory. And, after all, that is why Goodman cannot be relying on the examination of symbols and their functions alone, in isolation from the ways in which reference is implemented by these symbols and these functions: two complementary but not theoretically equivalent routes.

6. NAMING MEANING'S EXTENSION

If symbology is Goodman's 'ideology of reference', so to speak, then his theory of meaning is a theory of the ways in which reference is articulated. Goodman has to employ an arsenal of relevant conceptions and principles, in order to describe what I have been addressing as the symbological dimension of reference (including aesthetics)—namely the dimension where reference becomes the underlying prerequisite of the scrutiny undertaken by all discourse and all creativity. These principles are going to be the rules according to which symbols and referents are actually brought together in reference relations, formulating the 'languages' or symbol systems mentioned above in the opening sections.

For Goodman, meaning thus specified arises certainly through the application of symbols-and-systems, which are being simultaneously structured out of one another in open relations. (Cf. *PP*: 66–67. The discussion in this relatively early piece is about signalling as a species of reference; see also pp. *52–53* above). Or, otherwise, if symbols can be said to constitute the elementary units that are assembled into systematic patterns, then the moulding of the rules of association cannot be strictly distinguished from the units or elements associated under these rules. Theoretically, there can be no priority relation between the elementary and the systematic part in the ways 'languages' operate (conceived as members of the symbological universe).

In this context, the meaning of a predicate consists, according to Goodman, in the sum of the possible elementary terms it applies to—following certain rules of correlation. Which is to say, e.g., that if '*x* is *a*' and '*y* is *a*' and '*z* is *a*', and so on, then the 'meaning' of *a* extends so as to include all the individual terms (*x*, *y*, *z*,...) of which it is predicable. Predicates, or the predicative verb 'to be', can of course be substituted by any other kind of Goodmanian symbols and 'primitive' relations, whereby the rules for their systematic correlation would generally follow the familiar formula '*x* stands for *a*'.

As long as the rules of correlation and the terms correlated arise, so to speak, out of each other, Goodman thinks that he need only derive meanings out of predicates and their extensions. He does not define, e.g., properties by means of rules of correlation alone (this being an intensional definition): *a*, above, is not to be defined as 'the property common to such-and-such things', but simply as that which is predicable of *x*, and of *y*, and of *z*, and so on. Goodman explicitly denies that intensions bear any special import whatsoever. On the contrary, he thinks that identification by means of infinities of ontological attributes (the 'such-and-such' part of the ostensive intensional definition) makes matters completely hopeless (*PP*: 443–444). In the end, we might never be able to find out what refers to what, given that totally adequate rules are not easily devised so as to systematize all the diversity of each symbological relation available.

Of course one might object that extensional definitions are equally incomplete, as we are in no position to sufficiently circumscribe the totality of the designata of any given term (how could we ever acquire a complete list of all 'red' things, for instance?). Goodman accounts for this by stipulating that extensional definitions refer to 'everything past, present, future to which the term applies; neither the making or the eating of cakes changes the extension of the term "cake".' (*PP*: 224.) If this brand of extensionalism is coupled with the philosophical and scientific conviction that ontological infinity is untenable, then Goodman can easily show that extensionalism is an adequate methodological principle for reference and definition: it captures all there is (/ has been / will be) to be captured. In fact, denouncing infinity amounts to a peculiar kind of nominalism (not necessarily identical with classical nominalism), according to which the boundless propagation of new entities out of pre-existing sets of entities is prohibited. This nominalism denies, in other words, that out of a certain number of individual entities we can equally accept classes of these individuals, along with classes of these classes, and so on, as distinct sets: if the content of such sets is identical (a certain number of the initial individual entities) then the sets are identical, however construed. (The opposed view is termed as platonistic, not because only abstract universals are accepted as 'real', but because there is always the possibility of universals of universals, and so on, *ad infinitum*—something which was, admittedly, Plato's own problem with his theory of Ideas.)[30]

Such (distracting perhaps) technicalities will be useful in illuminating certain important aspects of reference as symbolization (aesthetic or not). For, if reference pertains to the sum of the instances its descriptors apply to, then it follows that exact synonymy between terms is actually impossible, since every single application of a term counts toward its meaning. Even the closest of synonyms do not always and solely appear at the same time describing the same referential paths (attributing the same predicates, or bringing forth the same non-discursive associations). This becomes more evident if one takes into account how wide-ranging the referential differences are between a term and one of its compounds (the extension of the latter being 'secondary' as regards the former, in Goodman's terminology; see especially *PP*: V,2–3; *LA*: 205*n*).[31]

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30 The early papers in *PP*: IV,1–2 demonstrate the kind of reasoning that supports extensionalism, individuals, and nominalism. Especially in the light of his later work, Goodman does not really oppose abstract entities—in the way that W. V. O. Quine invariably does—but only the infinite proliferation of entities. Further on these matters, see mainly p. *147f* below.

31 Elgin (see, e.g., 2000*a*: 180–181) has spoken of the 'interanimation' of primary and secondary extensions. (For instance, what we take a dog to be will influence what we take a dog-description to be; but, more unexpectedly, the opposite is also right.)

Consequently, every similarity in (extensionally conceived) meaning is a similarity to a greater or lesser degree, a *likeness* of meaning. (See *PP*: 228–230, 234.) Every kind of resemblance in terms of reference through symbols must be at most a close approximation, a notion in constant motion; its relativity cannot be accommodated in a satisfactory manner, but it has to be theoretically substituted by different conceptual tools (*PP*: 444–446). It will not do to explain a referential path in terms of resemblances, because these cannot convey the focus of the symbological process, namely the how and the why apparent resemblances became the vehicles of reference. The consolation is bitter, but for Goodman perfectly acceptable: 'If statements of similarity, like counterfactual conditionals and four-letter words, cannot be trusted in the philosopher's study, they are still serviceable in the streets.' (*PP*: 446.) Now, even if we cannot concede that 'love' must be excluded from any worthwhile philosophy, I think that the philosopher's self-distancing from the '(wo)man-in-the-street' is not just one of Goodman's eccentricities.

It is important perhaps to note that Goodman's devaluation of ordinarily conceived similarity only works intralinguistically, within a given (natural) language. For it is possible to show that interlinguistically (from one language to another) any coextensive predicates not only have the same primary extensions, but they also share the same secondary extensions (see Hendry 1980 for the formal proof). But, as Elgin 1993*b*: 134 favourably acknowledges, a 'signal achievement' has been carried out by Heydrich 1993 in eliminating this 'long-standing weakness in the Goodmanian position'. Heydrich introduces the criterion of agreement in primary extension *and* mention selection. For example, let us take terms describing fictional entities, thus having no actual designata; these are indeed strictly coextensive terms—all sharing zero extensions—but the (secondary) extensions of their compounds do not coincide (a unicorn-picture, e.g., is not a centaur-picture). However, if compound-extensions of primary terms coincide interlinguistically (as shown by Hendry 1980), the problem of distinguishing them on extensional grounds persists. Heydrich's simple solution is to postulate that, e.g., 'Einhorn' mention-selects both English and German unicorn-descriptions, but not any other descriptions of fictional entities (like 'centaur', etc.).

In effect, and as Hellman 1976–77: 290 puts it, *LA* and Goodman's extensionality theory 'enables us to talk about transcendence in terms of translation from one language to another'. Even if it cannot solve everything, it provides a useful re-labelling of problems, transcending the obstacles of what purportedly lies within aesthetics as against what lies without, what is a language and what is 'merely' a code, what is 'similar' and what is 'different'. On the grounds of the impossibility of exact synonymy, Goodman even dismisses the much valued distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. He urges philosophers, instead, to turn to composing music (*LA*: 207). Regrettably perhaps, this is not an injunction implying the superiority of art over philosophy, but it follows directly

from the fact that the language of notes employed in musical composition is such that most problems of identity of meaning and synonymy appear to be resolved. (For this, see mainly § *8* on the theory of notationality.)

Naturally, the question of the very centrality of reference itself, as well as Goodman's other (epistemo)logical predilections (i.e. extensionalism and nominalism), will have to be addressed at some point, and this will lead towards a fuller examination of Goodman's more generalized, logico-metaphysical insights. (Accordingly, I shall be more directly addressing these in chapters 2 and 3.) But, for the moment, I think I am justified in welcoming such predilections simply as incomplete fragments of a wider text that needs to be supplemented. Even if, in the worst case, there might be reasons for an outright dismissal of the symbological reliance on names and extensions, these reasons cannot yet be automatically converted into arguments specifically against Goodmanian symbology.

Remaining, then, within the frame of such a symbology, and given its 'self-subsisting' nature, the inconspicuous yet integral part occupied by aesthetics has to be dealt with more rigorously. There are numerous questions and problems traditionally accepted as the subject matter of the philosophy of art. A lot of what Goodman's contemporary interlocutors have concentrated upon in their criticism revolves around such familiar themes and problems. Some of these have already been touched upon—especially concerning the representational arts, and partly arising from the status of symbols (or 'signals') bearing some experiential or causal relation to their referents. (As opposed, for example, to symbols that could be described as more 'artificial' than others; see § *4* above.) Goodman feels compelled to address such matters, and he can now conduct his examination with his symbol theory as the touchstone. His attempts are certainly of crucial import for his overall project, and I am going to be examining them in the course of the remainder of this chapter. My intention is always to investigate the possible virtues of Goodmanian symbology as I have described it, rather than to simply put my finger on its perceived weaknesses.

7. EXEMPLIFICATION *ET ALIA*

> Exemplification, though one of the most frequent and important functions of works of art, is the least noticed and understood. [*WW*: 32.[32]]

In Goodman's technical language, the primitive referential relation of symbols to their designata—their standing for something—is a *denotative* relation when these designata do not happen to include the actual symbols themselves: e.g., the word 'long' is not a long word, but it denotes plenty of other things (literally and metaphorically). In this sense, absolutely anything may be denoted, simply provided that something is accepted (conventionally or not) as its symbol. However, when what is denoted by the symbol is also possessed by the symbol itself, the referential relation is termed *exemplification*. For instance, the word 'black' as printed here, apart from anything else it might refer to by denotation (viz. all black things, literally and metaphorically), it is itself in black ink—it exemplifies the property of being black (among other properties). When McGhee 2000 is describing philosophy as a species of intellectual cartography (cf. p. *33* above), he is presumably intending this description in his book as applying to what follows in his book; and the cover illustration of the book's paperback edition is further exemplifying its author's conception of philosophy by featuring J. Vermeer's painting of the cartographer. As for my present section on exemplification, it trivially exemplifies the fact that it is a passage on exemplification. In other words, Goodman's 'exemplification is possession plus reference.' (*LA*: 53.)

Dickie 1977: 130–131 thinks that

> an example is more powerful and direct and less subtle than a symbol. Both exemplification and symbolization serve to call our attention to certain kinds of things and each has its place in art. However, there is not, I think, any good reason for calling exemplification a kind of symbolization.

The fundamental function of symbols as referring to themselves is, however, an indispensable part of Goodman's symbology (and not unrelated to classical Peircean semiotics; see pp. *57*, *58* above). In this context there is, I believe, no difficulty in treating examples as a species of symbols. (In fact, Goodman would precisely explain the power of all kinds of examples as the power of exemplificational reference.) More importantly, exemplification in this sense could perhaps easily be regarded as a close approximation of an 'iconic sign' theory: they both try to do justice to the claim that works of art should be attended to for their own sake, and not merely because they refer to something external to them (cf. Jensen 1973–74: 50). Notably, Beardsley 1970: 461 observes that this aspect of Goodman's theory leads in fact to a 'neater and more rigorous' version of the iconic sign

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[32] Cf. also *MM*: 54: '[...] the neglected notion of exemplificational reference [...]'

theories. However, such an identification is, I think, on the whole misleading, because a symbol exemplifying its own features can be radically different from an icon: only Goodmanian symbols can be said to exemplify absolutely *any* of the features they possess—whereas a Peircean icon is a sort of an example *resembling* or otherwise faithfully instantiating whatever it exemplifies. Attending to the symbol itself is of course an essential requirement of Goodman's symbology, but it does not suffice to render his account a branch of iconology (unless we remodel 'icon' along the lines of the Goodmanian 'symbol'—which certainly does not effect any genuine difference of theory).

Initially, the special point to note regarding exemplification is that Goodman speaks of (possessed) exemplified 'properties' only in an informal manner (whenever he does), because properties in general are defined intensionally (i.e. by way of rules of correlation), and not extensionally (i.e. by way of predicates assigned). But Goodman's extensionalism surely requires that the possession of properties is understood as predicability of *labels* (like 'long', 'black', 'cartography'). So, 'while anything may be denoted, only labels may be exemplified.' (*LA*: 57).

Perhaps this gives rise to the uneasy supposition that only words can be exemplified, that only words are labels because only words can be predicated of something. However, Goodman makes it clear from the beginning (*loc. cit.*) that 'not all labels are predicates'.

> A picture that represents Churchill, like a predicate that applies to him, denotes him. And reference by a picture to one of its colors often amounts to exemplification of a predicate of ordinary language. [*LA*: 58; cf. also 59, 84, 89.]

Labels can thus be verbal or non-verbal. 'Black' denotes all literally or metaphorically black things, and, as printed here, it exemplifies what it is to be black (by denoting itself as well). Similarly, a patch of black paint on a canvas denotes whatever it may denote in the context of the painting—say, if it has a certain shape, it may literally denote a black bird; in this case, the black patch also denotes itself because it is part of the (secondary) extension of 'black bird'. In effect, that (part of the) picture is a sample of a label: it exemplifies what it is to be a black bird in the literal sense, although it is only a patch of colour and not a linguistic predicate. (And, of course, the metaphorical connotations of black birds, either as predicates or as pictures, remain always open.) In fact, this can serve here as a first intimation as to how Goodman will controversially treat the pictorial arts: denotation by pictures is what he identifies as *representation* (the black figure represents a bird as far as it denotes it).

Now, denotation is denotation, whether literal or metaphorical: 'black bird' can denote a black bird or a sad soul—reference here runs in one direction. Exemplification, on the other hand, runs generally in two directions—from label both to denotatum and to the label itself: 'black' denotes all black things and it is

itself denoted by 'black' (it is itself, as a set of letters printed in black ink, an instance of 'blackness'). However, when exemplification is metaphorical Goodman identifies it as *expression* (see *LA*: 85*f*). If the picture of the black bird metaphorically denotes a sad soul, and thus metaphorically exemplifies what it is to be a sad soul as itself a pictorial sample of 'sad soul', then this picture *expresses* what it is to be a sad soul. And if a musical passage is said to expresses sadness, this means that it is itself one of the samples comprising the (primary and secondary) extension of the (verbal or non-verbal) label 'sadness': sad faces, sad words, sad sounds, sad colours, sad souls, and so on. (Wollheim 1973: *ad loc.* 301 poses the question of whether Goodman's metaphorical denotation by pictures—his *representation-as*, e.g., Churchill represented as a bulldog—is actually a form of expression. But this is not a crucial matter in my context here; for one thing, representations-as can also exhibit numerous expressive features.)

It is important to stress that modes of reference like *allusion, quotation, variation* (all of them frequently employed in literature, painting, and music) are to be distinguished, in Goodman, from both denotation and exemplification. And so is complex reference, namely a chain of combined referential paths that can lead from symbol to referent to symbol, each time related in different ways. In this sense, the direction of reference can be transitive (if *a* refers to *b*, and *b* to *c*, then *a* may refer to *c*); but its import is transformed in the process (*a* does not necessarily refer to *c* in the same way *a* refers to *b*, and so on. Cf. *MM*: III,1; also, Elgin 1997*c*: xiv.) Another point in need of clarification would be that—as Howard 1971: 275 points out—a symbol that exemplifies does not necessarily also denote other things (apart of course from denoting itself). For example (see Howard 1972: 52), expressive music can be denotative or non-denotative. Denotation occurs when phrases and themes acquire the function of musical names and descriptions (their expressive status not being affected thereby); when we hear a certain tune in a Wagnerian opera scene we sense that a specific heroine / hero will make her / his appearance. But a lot of music is expressive without being thus denotative of anything—e.g. in a great portion of Romantic music, as in 'love themes', whereby expressiveness is the sole, or dominant, extra-musical reference.

Concentrating on the issue of expression, Lammenranta 1988: 211–212 cites Sparshott 1974: 194–195 in support of the claim that expression cannot be defined as metaphorical exemplification of predicates: we may not even be able to describe, e.g., emotions by means of predicates, as emotions sometimes outreach linguistic formulations. Of course, such an objection cannot really be directed against Goodman, for Goodman talks of verbal and non-verbal labels, which include but are not co-extensive with predicates (verbal by definition). Thus, Ricœur 1975: *ad loc.* 299–301 (English translation 1977: *ad loc.* 237–239) lends a sympathetic ear to Goodman's overall approach, although he still feels compelled to allow for some important alterations. (These pertain especially to Goodman's extensionalism; Ricœur, that is, has here at least acquitted Goodman

of any alleged overemphasis on the linguistic aspect of expression and, more generally, of reference.) As for Sparshott, his own general conclusion (*op. cit.*: 198) is actually that

> while Goodman's analysis of expression neither recapitulates nor supports any version of the theory of expression that has been traditional in the aesthetics of the last two centuries, it corresponds much better than one would have expected, or than one had any right to ask, to the symbolic relations implicit in those theories. They turn out to be theories about special cases of what Goodman is talking about, and the ways in which the cases are special are easily accommodated by his discussion.

Similarly, at the time when Black was responding to Goodman (1971: 529), he thought that there was 'no better theory of expression' (although not totally unproblematic—as no theory could claim it is, anyway).

From a different point of view, Cohen 1993 (: section 4) and, on similar grounds, Prinz 1993 (: section 2), while indeed accepting that Goodman brought the verbal and the nonverbal closer together, both locate the problem in Goodman's nominalistic commitments. They complain that through his 'tidy' taxonomy of metaphor Goodman produces in fact an 'impoverished' account, insufficient to convey all that is important about metaphor—i.e. he talks merely of labels and not of meanings. And Arrell 1987–88: 48 thinks that 'there is an element of exemplification in all dense reference' which goes contrary to Goodman's account—but only because of his nominalism. (Ironically, Dempster 1989: 410 would wish to abandon exemplification altogether, because he thinks that it proves hostile to the nominalistic metaphysics he favours.) Accordingly, Arrell 1990 puts forth a non-nominalistic version of exemplification, whereby 'works of art do exemplify the categories we apply to them' (: 243), i.e. we can freely talk of properties and stylistic categories rather than restrict ourselves to labels and predicates. (At any rate, Arrell 1987–88: 48 concedes that Goodman's notion of exemplification remains 'the most promising development in contemporary semiotic aesthetics'.)

In my view (cf. p. *61* above), to the degree that Goodman's nominalism is mistakenly received merely as a prescriptive theory of a prejudiced ontological 'arithmetic' and not principally as a descriptive theory of meaning, such objections are somewhat misleading. To the degree that the objections attack Goodman's extensionalist theory of meaning, they do not touch on its presuppositions. The latter are surely not aesthetic in the ordinary sense and, as I have stressed, I am for the moment assigning a special significance to what Goodman has to say about the presupposed foundations of the arts before he can go on to examine these foundations in detail, even in the (not so likely) case that his theory is grounded on wholly unholy grounds.

To be sure, the important facet of Goodman's account of expression as metaphorical exemplification is that Goodmanian metaphor is to be compre-

hended in terms of a 'transmigration' of labels from one realm of entities to another: a cough and 'the beauty of the world' (see pp. *215*, *216* below) can be stifled inside of me. Presumably (and given its etymology), 'being stifled' was said of coughs before it came to be said of 'the beauty of the world'. Along these lines, for Goodman all metaphor is (metaphorically speaking) 'an affair between a predicate with a past and an object that yields while protesting' (*LA*: 69), 'a happy and revitalizing, even if bigamous, second marriage' (*LA*: 73). Equally, 'what is literal is set by present practice rather than by ancient history' (*LA*: 77). Our changing linguistic practices determine the flow of the meaning of words (and, if we extend this to non-verbal symbolization, so do our extra-linguistic practices with the 'meaning' of all remaining labels).

Now, what is the moving power, so to speak, behind this apparently wanton transmigration of labels, liable to fleeting habits? For Goodman, the need for metaphor is ultimately grounded on the need for accomplishing as much as possible with as little as possible. By employing existing labels to create and, at the same time, to render new meanings, we are in effect employing our conceptual and sensible resources as effectively and economically as possible (*LA*: 80). This is another of Goodman's firm beliefs: never do with more what you can accomplish with less; *less is more*. Although not necessarily always the best thing to do, it certainly does not seem unreasonable. (There are duties to oneself, I. Kant would say; and there are duties to others—not to withhold for oneself that which can be made redundant, possibly to the benefit of others.)

Eventually, it might be that *practice and habit* really are the moving forces of metaphor—and, along with it, the forces behind the evolution of meaning. In this case, no other special case for metaphor needs to be made—at the price, of course, of a need now to explain how 'practice' is meant. This will have been made clearer by the end of the present chapter. But, returning to the central theme of metaphor as a label-immigrant, the final and most decisive aspect of exemplification *à la* Goodman must be emphasized.

All possible labels that apply symbologically to the vehicle of symbolization itself are said to be exemplified by it. But, as Elgin 1993*c*: 177 admits, Goodman is not very helpful when it comes to distinguishing cases of metaphorical exemplification (sc. expression) instantiated by an object as a work of art, and when exemplification is aesthetically irrelevant. How are we to specify what the artwork expresses as such, when the labels metaphorically applied by it to other things and also applying to itself are countless? For instance, Elgin says, a writer's blocked work in progress expresses 'black hole' as a frustrated effort, not as a literary novel. (Perhaps, for this, it is still a novel about frustration but not due to its inherent features and not for its potential reader but only for the observer of the writer's frustration—as in the case that it were made into a film.) Goodman holds that, as far as artworks are concerned, metaphorically exemplified properties do genuinely belong to the artwork when they are 'constant relative to' the artwork's literal aesthetic properties (see especially *LA*: 41–43, 86, 87,

and Goodman 1978*a*: 165). And again, the problem is that—out of the indefinitely many features of, say, a picture—we are not given any substantial guidance as to which will qualify as literal aesthetic properties, being of the essence for the work as such. Elgin suggests that Goodman's intended (but not explicit) answer would point to the fact that we are still in the process of learning; learning 'from art itself' (*loc. cit.*).

Not denying the significance of Elgin's gloss, what Goodman does say is not that there is necessarily something to be learnt, once and for all, about how artworks symbolize (and how is it that we can recognize art before we learn what it is, anyway?). The process of describing an artwork can never be definitive; it is a process of 'infinitely fine adjustment' (*LA*: 238). We cannot prescribe what the literal (and, by extension, the metaphorical) features are, precisely because exemplification is about labels, about whatever can be said of, and / or otherwise attributed to, the artwork. We can always apply new labels to convey what exactly a picture exemplifies; in fact, even if we restrict ourselves to linguistic terms, the range of possible aesthetic features is virtually inexhaustible—especially given the impossibility of synonymy and of exact translation (cf. p. 62 above). We are constantly gaining in descriptive precision, when trying to describe what artworks express or otherwise symbolize; and the only reason we are compelled to stop is that we are at the same time progressively missing out on specificity and correctness of reference.

Goodman certainly does not offer canons for aspiring art critics, but only an articulation of what is at work as far as symbol systems are concerned, in the arts and beyond (*LA*: 235–236). In all art forms, 'endless search is always required [...] to determine precisely what is exemplified or expressed' (*LA*: 240). Goodman's notion of exemplification has been sometimes neglected, but I shall try to show how its power can become here all the more evident, by recourse to additional syntactic and semantic symbological distinctions.

8. NOTATIONALITY

> The five stated requirements for a notational system [...] are somewhat like a building code that legislates against faults in construction without prescribing the accommodations needed for particular families. [*LA*: 154.]

A (musical) score and a (written) text are examples of differing notations for music and language respectively. Outside the domain of the arts, other symbol systems also employ notational devices such as measured scales, maps, diagrams, etc. But as far as philosophical aesthetics is concerned—and if art is at large a *language* meant as a *symbol system*—then philosophy must revert to the study of those symbol systems that are associated with the arts. In order to do this, Goodman must initially be able to describe the ways in which symbol systems in general differ from one another, so that he can interpret functions and features peculiar to each system.

The theory of notationality specifically describes and codifies certain differences in symbological functioning that arise from the possibility of providing notations for some, but not for all, symbol systems. It is the theory that examines whether particular notations can be employed as codifications of symbological reference in some cases and not in others. Goodman is prepared to postulate certain notational requirements, which will precisely serve to separate notational from non-notational systems. (See mainly chapter IV of *LA*.)

The distinction between notational and non-notational cannot be said to coincide with the distinction between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic; Goodman will eventually have to devise additional (or separate) criteria (or combinations thereof). However, notations are indeed very important features of art making, and therefore must be taken into consideration. Being able to devise or provide a notation for a work of art is tantamount to being able to safeguard the work's repeatable instantiation and dissemination (something that has not been possible with, e.g., paintings; they are neither 'performable' nor 'readable'). Naturally, in doing so, notations instantiate an epitome of all those features of an artwork that have been deemed as indispensable for its status as such. The question of which exactly these features are seems to be grounded in antecedently accepted notions and conventions that have come to govern the articulation of notational rules. For, historically speaking, the expediency and urgency of notation became more fully felt in cases where the work is inherently ephemeral, as in music or the spoken word—and that explains the provenance of scripts and scores (the latter having emerged more recently, at least in a decipherable for us form). Conversely, in cases like the visual or the plastic arts, where the propagation of artworks has not been secured by way of notations, other aesthetic features have become prominent: the provenance in historical time and place, the context of unique inception and creation, craftsmanship and durability, etc. (Generally for these matters, see especially *LA*: 121–122, 195, 197–198.)

As mentioned, the requirements for notationality prescribe the specifications under which a symbol system is adequately codified by means of a notation of some kind. Deploying Goodman's related terminology: The extension of all things that are generally referred to by a symbol constitutes the class of its 'compliants'. Symbol systems are said to comprise symbols as 'characters' (a score or a text is such a character, within a notation). And each character consists of sets of individual 'marks' ('instances', 'inscriptions', 'utterances'), to which specific sounds or phonemes / words—or other referents relative to the system under question—are associated. (Note Goodman's statement in *RP*: 124–125 that '"symbol" applies equally to individual symbols and to characters consisting of several of them.').

The first syntactic requirement ensuring notationality follows: each character must be *disjoint*, namely its marks must be character-indifferent (although they need not themselves be discrete); each mark must always be uniquely identifiable as pertaining to a certain character. The other syntactic requirement is that characters be finitely *differentiated* (or *articulate*). This means that the system may not be syntactically *dense*: it may not be that we could always have a third character between any two given ones.

Now, the structure or syntax thus circumscribed by notationality only applies to symbol *schemes*, namely sets of marks syntactically correlated. The web of relations linking these marks to their referents, and circumscribing corresponding symbol *systems*, is for notationality at least as important as syntax. On this semantic level then, and in parallel with syntax, notationality first requires disjointness of compliance classes (i.e. they may not intersect); a character may not share compliants with other characters (or, different performances must be of different works). Accordingly, the second semantic requirement for notationality concerns finite differentiation: characters and referents must be articulately related; which is to say that syntactic density above finds here its semantic counterpart (compliants of characters must not be so ordered that between any two we can always have a third).

Finally, (semantic) *unambiguity* of characters completes the total of five requirements for notationality.[33]

By employing the criteria for notationality on any available symbol schemes or systems, we gain some valuable insights into their fundamental differences, stemming from the features that make them, or fail to make them, notational. In the context of philosophical aesthetics, pictorial systems are readily shown to be syntactically and semantically dense. Individual paintings or other images can never be completely identified and isolated in every detail of their

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[33] Incidentally, two characters may be co-extensive but not synonymous: e.g., scores determining performances of the same work may read either *c*-sharp or *d*-flat; however, this kind of redundancy does not affect notationality (*LA*: 205–206).

lines and colours; and we can always have a new painting so similar to an already existing one that it is almost impossible to specify the difference. Consequently, no notation is prescribed for pictorial systems, for they are 'obviously the very antithesis of a notational system' (*LA*: 160). On the contrary, musical scores (if we disregard directions concerning tempo, dynamics, timbre, etc.) employ unambiguous marks, which are as well syntactically and semantically disjoint and articulate—which is to say that music is a fully notational system. In the case now of (all forms of) literature, the alphabetical syntax is indeed a notational scheme (of disjoint and articulate letters), but the semantics of language are far from unambiguous, disjoint, or articulate. Thus, particular texts are characters in notational schemes but not in notational systems. (In the following sections, I shall be providing detailed accounts concerning all of these cases.)

Beyond such subtle distinctions, the main point is that, in fact, all the different sorts of symbol systems are describable in terms of possible combinations between the foundational features of syntactic density, semantic density, and their opposites—sc. syntactic and semantic articulateness (cf. Vuillemin 1970: 76–77; unambiguity seems unassailable, anyway). Black 1971: 532 sums them up as 'unambiguous effective articulation' (where 'effective' stands for 'segregated', or 'disjoint'). What these criteria—or their opposites—collectively seek to secure is a case for notationality such that one single inscription (like a score for a symphony) defines one single compliant of it (a performance of the symphony), whereby no cases are left theoretically undetermined or ambivalent (i.e. a given performance either is or is not the one dictated by the score, and all performances dictated by that score are of the same symphony). In Goodman's words:

> The properties required of a notational system are unambiguity and syntactic and semantic disjointness and differentiation. [...] A system is notational, then, if and only if all objects complying with inscriptions of a given character belong to the same compliance class and we can, theoretically, determine that each mark belongs to, and each object complies with inscriptions of, at most one particular character. [*LA*: 156.]

Obviously, the five requirements do not take into consideration matters of practical importance. In *LA*: 154, Goodman recognizes that his notationality criteria might not be complete, in that there are all sorts of practical and psychological limitations impeding or negatively affecting our perceptual acuity: what a notation prescribes might sometimes be almost impossible to discriminate (think of a tiny fraction of a musical tone, for example). 'But', Goodman concludes, 'none of this has anything to do with the basic theoretical function of notational systems.' Theoretically, for Goodman, everything is possible—apart form what is 'logically and mathematically grounded impossibility' (*LA*: 136). And if this sounds too severe, Raffman 1993, although recognizing the practical limitations of human psychology in the employment of notational systems, she still thinks that it is *always* theoretically possible to devise means for the employment of such systems (e.g. a

receptor-machine for detecting imperceptible differences in musical tone). Accordingly, she seeks to amend Goodman's syntactic and semantic differentiation requirements (as stated in *LA*: 135–136, 152) by making them stricter (Raffman 1993: 218[34]).

Another ensuing theoretical possibility is that notations can be readily devised, in principle, for any symbol system—and thus for any art form. 'A library-like decimal system assigning a numeral to each painting according to time and place of production would meet all five requirements.' (*LA*: 194.) But, obviously, such a result could not be accepted as a means for the promotion of art and the re-instantiation of artworks—which was, after all, the whole point in devising the appropriate notations. Notations, in other words, may play an indispensable theoretical role, but their deployment in the arts is actually a matter of practical importance. And as in all practical processes, there are really no guarantees for success here either. For instance, Goodman thinks that a fully notational language for dance has not been widely endorsed yet, despite some attempts at devising one. (See *LA*: 213–216, with *addenda* in Copeland & Cohen 1983: 409–410 (for these, cf. relevant references in Part III.B below); see also *MM*: 56).

The foregoing possibilities—concerning our theoretically unlimited resources for devising notational languages but also the practical limitations in deploying them for the arts—are important for the interpretation of Goodman's general outlook. They corroborate an attitude towards notations that treats them simply as sets of methodological tools which help us control and clarify the way the arts, as well as other dimensions of symbological reference, operate. Notations are not inherent specifications of aesthetic media and artistic forms, but seem to be invaluable aids towards arriving at such specifications, because they help ensure the reproducibility of artworks. Reproductions acceptable as genuine instances of a work are not possible in all cases. The theory of notationality does not prove or disprove such a claim, but it presents us with a general 'measure' of repeatability as met by our traditionally adopted practices (cf. the motto for this section). For *pictures*, where genuine repeatability is excluded, the symbol scheme / system is non-notational. For *sounds*, where repeatability is paradigmatically achieved, the symbol system is properly (syntactically and semantically) notational. For *texts*, where repeatability is partially achieved, only the symbol scheme is (syntactically) notational.

The question of 'acceptable' or 'genuine' reproduction of a work is important for the arts, unlike other symbol systems. This is why it becomes a central theme of Goodmanian aesthetics. And it is directly linked to the artistic problem of the authentic and the forged, to which I am now immediately turning (before I

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[34] As Raffman acknowledges (: 218*n*—in a mistaken reference), she has independently reached the same result with Walton 1971.

can address, that is, the issues specifically pertaining to pictures, sounds, and texts).

9. 'AUTHENTICITY' & AUTOGRAPHICITY

> Absolutely precise prescription cannot be accomplished by any notational system; differentiation requires gaps that destroy continuity. [...] Ironically the demand for absolute and inflexible control results in purely autographic works. [*LA*: 191.]

It follows generally from the foregoing that, as far as Goodman has silently waived the challenge of an ontology of the aesthetic in favour of a theory of symbological functioning, he has to pursue some *topology* of the aesthetic.[35] In other words, he has not set out to discover what *kinds* of things are properly regarded as art, but he considers the aesthetic as a dynamic category lying at the junctions of reference. He is, therefore, compelled to clarify those aspects of symbological reference that can be said to pertain to the philosophy of art. This is perhaps part of the underlying reason why (i) the problem of an artwork's individualization and identification in time (cf. the theory of notationality in the previous section above), and (ii) the present question of authenticity and forgery (for which see mainly *LA*: 99*f*), acquire such a prominent place amidst Goodman's theoretical concerns: the *what* must be found or 'measured'—if at all—by means of such terms as the *how*, the *where*, the *when*.

There is then the authentic artwork and the forged one. There are also copies of the authentic, reproductions, school-pieces, re-workings by the artist, and so on: all the latter are not regarded as forgeries (Sagoff 1976–77: 176–178). Conversely (cf. Wreen 1983*a*: 199), there can be forgeries of works that exist only within someone's imagination. (For instance, J. Shmarb presented in 1968 a symphony of his own composition as a 'J. Brahms manuscript'; see Cahn & Griffel 1975–76, Courtney 1975–76, Epperson 1975–76. The paintings by H. A. van Meegeren presented as 'J. Vermeer classics' also belong here, because they were not copies of any existing works.[36] See Levinson 1980: 382–383 for other cases, including literary ones.)

The question is whether the purported differences between originals and forged copies are important for the development of a philosophical aesthetics, or whether they should only concern the art dealing industry. Dutton 1979: 308 emphasizes that a forgery is intentionally attributed to a person other than its crea-

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35 The *OED* general definition for 'topology' is 'science of place' (in various senses). I am using it in a similar non-technical way, in order to designate a postulated 'space' where different symbological functions co-exist and are implemented. From a topological perspective, the emphasis lies in functions meeting at certain points (e.g. objects, words, feelings); from an ontological perspective, the emphasis lies in these points themselves (in 'mass' rather than 'space').

36 For the full story on the J. Vermeer forgeries by H. A. van Meegeren see Werness 1983 (cf. also Lessing 1964–65: 461–462, and Dutton 1979: 302–303).

tor, 'usually with the purpose of turning a profit'. And Margolis 1983: 161 verifies that 'forgery entails the intention to deceive, whereas inauthenticity does not'. (I take it that 'inauthenticity' signifies here the property of not being the original and not being cryptic about it.) Lessing's oft-cited paper concludes that (1964–65: 470) 'the fact of forgery is important historically, biographically, perhaps legally, or, as the van Meegeren case proved, financially; but not, strictly speaking, aesthetically'. Similarly, Wreen 1983*a*: 199 agrees that a forgery is, from the moral and the artistic point of view, both extrinsically and intrinsically wrong—but from the aesthetic point of view only extrinsically wrong.

All this conveys an apprehension of forgery that is expressly based on empirical facts and associations concerning artefacts as constructed objects, and not bearing on their intrinsic status as artworks. Forgery's role is apparently reserved only for a false attribution of artistic *skill*, a false claim on originality of technique *per se*—issues that are not regarded as 'aesthetic' (where 'aesthetic' seems to signify 'perceivable'. As for 'artistic skill', it can of course refer to the absence of artistic skill, too: painting like J. Pollock is not exactly the apotheosis of skill; some kinds of brushstrokes do not seem to require onerous training.) Ralls 1972: 17 is convinced that to provide with copies, whenever possible, 'would be bad for the dealer, and worse for the "collector". But it would be very good for the world.' On such accounts, the crucial matter is, in effect, that forgeries are simply false claims to a certain parenthood—a certain hand at a certain time at a certain place— and nothing aesthetically more significant than that.

First, one has to examine whether this distinction between the 'mechanics' of artistry and the 'aesthetics' of art is met by Goodman's theory. According to Rudner 1972*b* (: *ad loc.* 189–190), Goodman rightly regards the constitutive properties of artworks as not exclusively aesthetic (pertaining mostly to the senses), but also as artistic (pertaining to the identity and provenance of artworks). On the one hand, Rudner correctly recognizes that there can be no clear separation-point between what is merely perceived in an artwork and what is inferred from, or about, its historical identity (: 192*f*). However, he keeps aesthetics distinct from *artistics*, in that they are supposed to concern two wholly different realms: that of seeing and that of authenticating, respectively. (Thus, Rudner says (*op. cit.*: 172), Plato and L. Tolstoy were in fact talking only about artistics.)

Of course, to say that, in Goodman, aesthetics and artistics are correlated in this or in any other way is to suppose that they are distinct; it is to accept, to some degree, an aesthetics partly immune to contextual historical considerations. But even this much, and even before going on to examine Goodman's approach in its relevant details regarding the different arts, is probably not supported by his theory.

As seen earlier (p. *68*), Goodman does not attempt to articulate any strict distinction between literal and metaphorical aesthetic properties—although he does say that the latter are 'constant relative to' the former. This is not because he has not been able to extrapolate any systematic distinction between them, but be-

cause the lack of such a strict distinction is itself a feature of art's significance. As regards authenticity, Goodman cites relevant evidence from psychological research, showing that 'a single quantum of light may excite a retinal receptor' (*LA*: 107*n*). And elsewhere (1996*a*: 835) he insists that the highly trained 'expert eye' can sometimes surpass latest technology in discriminating and classifying artistic styles, and—consequently—in the correct dating of artworks. In this context, the very fact that perception cannot factually be circumscribed makes all the difference between, say, the original painting and an impeccable duplicate of it—since this simple fact can be taken metaphorically. Namely, if one is able to say (as Goodman does in different terms) that 'the aesthetic value of a painting consists in the fact that it is practically impossible to definitively isolate every single detail it presents us with', then this pronouncement constitutes a metaphorical linkage of 'value' with the literal act of 'attentive looking'. Therefore, the possibility—however slim—that the duplicate may in the end be proved, by whatever practical means, to have been created after a distinct original, makes a permanent *aesthetic* difference for me *now* (*LA*: 105, 106). Obviously, this difference does not concern the particular object in isolation, but also the way I apprehend the historical context that accommodated the artist's overall style and method, as well as the cultural context that fostered them (since these co-ordinates are necessarily different in the original and in the copy). The potential identity of the work I could find myself faced with (is it authentic or possibly forged?) asserts itself as one of the (metaphorical) aesthetic attributes of that work, even as a mere hypothesis about its 'true', material identity. (*Mutatis mutandis*, similar considerations apply when faced with known copies of the authentic, with reproductions, school-pieces, or re-workings by the artist.)

Evidently then, historical provenance takes its place into the set of a work's aesthetic attributes perfectly well. Where an artwork originates—literally and more or less objectively so—can always be metaphorically correlated to what it is from an aesthetic viewpoint (apart from all other aesthetic attributes, that is): sadness expressed in music can be the sadness of the composer working under particular circumstances. These circumstances can perfectly well become part of the listener's apprehension of the music—even if they are historically inaccurate or unrelated to the composer's presumed intentions. In other words, although the actual history of production is not affected by our ability or inability to correctly attribute a work to an artist (for the historical identity of a work cannot possibly be altered) the ramifications of our fallible apprehension of the work's identity crucially determine our aesthetic stance towards it (see *RP*: 65). Levinson 1980 affirms that, although material causation might be more appealing to our imaginative relation with the painter or the sculptor (: 379), there is also a *quasi* intentional relatedness that connects any work of every art form to its original inceptor in place and time (: 376–77). A 'sequence' of formal elements—like letters or musical notes—no matter how similar in the original and in the copy, is the 'sequence-as-indicated' by its creator only in the original (: 373). So, whether a

statue or a sonata, the work always contains an ineliminable link to its initial, original source.

Goodman provides thus no means for separating the purportedly aesthetic from the 'merely' artistic, not only because there are no clear boundaries to what is perceivable, but also because there is no way to forbid all sorts of broader or metaphorical labels from entering into the artwork's constellation of *definientia*. Characteristically on this, while Ralls 1972 (in his fierce polemic against Goodman) regards a painting's 'looks' essential and its historical specifications 'arbitrary and nominal' (: 15), he still wishes to abide by a brand of nominalism 'of the Anti-Goodman persuasion' (: 16, 18. Ralls again identifies Goodman's extensionalist theory of meaning with a standard version of nominalism, not shared by Goodman; however, this is not crucial here.) Ralls's nominalism admits then not of predicates but of artistic intentions as concretely embodied universals, as 'archetypes' executed according to their creator's 'recipes'; in these terms, copies are simply 'ectypes' that follow the same recipes of creation, and thus are almost as valuable as their archetypes (: 9, 16, 18). Goodman would indeed not have any problem accepting recipes of execution (his notations are, after all, such devices). Nevertheless, the relation between the creator and the archetypal recipe does not seem to be commensurable with the relation between the creator and the recipe's ectypes; and Goodman is more justified, I should think, in his wish to capture their differences or their similarities, for that matter.

Sparshott 1983 presents a powerful case for the irreplaceability of original artworks, as originality involves not an empirical decision of whatever perceptual similarities, but an acquaintance with the cultural context that has fostered the artwork. The human significance of authentic art has, for Sparshott, an erotic analogue in that it stands for the loved person that can be substituted by an alternative sex object only under 'conditions of desperation or poor visibility' (: 254). Thus, the genuine art lover must be the lover of genuine art. Meyer L B 1994: 64–65 similarly argues that forgeries corrupt the way we become aware of an artist's style, altering the history of art and, thus, distorting our cultural past. If this is an 'elitist' or 'snobbish' approach to forgery, then Goodman's treatment is much closer to this rather than to the one sketched above—namely the one that, despite all, still regards forgeries as perfectly acceptable on 'purely' aesthetic grounds (some would call this a kind of philistinism).

AUTOGRAPHIC AND *ALLOGRAPHIC* is the pair of terms introduced in *LA*: 113 'purely for convenience'. They serve to distinguish the cases where the most exact duplication of a work 'does not thereby count as genuine', from the cases where duplicates are accepted as genuine instances of works. Thus, painting and carved or terracotta sculpture are autographic arts, because duplicates are either mere imitations or forgeries; music and literature are allographic arts, because duplicates of scores or texts constitute perfectly acceptable versions of the *same*

works. Within the two categories, further differentiations apply (see especially Goodman 1996*a*: 834)—although they are less crucial and amenable to revision. Painting and printmaking are thus autographic, but the former is, furthermore, 'one-stage' and 'singular', while the latter is 'two-stage' and 'multiple' (the plates are first carved, and then more than one prints of the *same* work can be produced).[37] In the allographic arts, music is 'two-stage' and 'multiple', while literature 'one-stage' and 'multiple' (literary works are complete when written, while musical works need to be performed after their composition[38]).

Goodman provides a further point of clarification regarding the autographic–allographic distinction. He accepts cases where works can be neither autographic nor allographic as cases where work-identification neither depends on, nor is independent of history of production.[39] 'Where, for example, a composer provides prescriptions in a non-notational system rather than scores, the classes of performances called for do not constitute either autographic or allographic works.' (*PP*: 83.) Which is to say that 'the terms "autographic" and "allographic" are mutually exclusive, and they exhaust all cases *where work-identity is established at all*' (*PP*: 83–84; my emphasis). This (marginal) case should not be, nevertheless, confused with other instances, where a variety of 'mixed', notational and non-notational, systems applies—in aesthetic symbol systems such as architecture, for example.[40] However it might be, the context of the history of production remains the primary consideration in identifying works, even when it is further complicated by the problem of forgery.

It follows that—apart from being motivated by convenience—the autographic–allographic distinction, when defined in terms of originals and forgeries, is also preliminary and not wholly accurate (*LA*: 113*n*). It helps identify genuine artworks (when we have already established that we are dealing with an instance of an artwork), and it concerns the arts to the exclusion of other symbol systems. However, as I pointed out in the previous section, it is notationality that can best

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37 Printmaking includes etching, engraving, lithography, woodcut, and ordinary photography (but not daguerreotype or instant photography); cast (bronze) sculpture also belongs here (but not the wax models for the casts). (See *RP*: 74.)

38 On whether the reading of literature is tantamount to a kind of 'performance', see § *12* below.

39 In his examination of S. LeWitt's drawings, I think that Pillow 2003 has not sufficiently attended to this alternative case.

40 Goodman is of the opinion that 'architecture is a mixed and transitional case', comprising both autographic (vid. sketches) and allographic (vid. numerals) notational specifications (*LA*: 221); it is not customary to regard replicas of buildings as instances of the *same* work. (Cf. the case of dance, p. *73* above.) Fisher 2000 presents a Goodmanesque explication of architecture (although he seems to have restricted himself more to *LA* rather than Goodman's later works).

serve as a Goodmanian device for the individualization of symbol systems in general on syntactic and semantic grounds. It is thus regrettable that, according to Levinson 1980: 368–373, Goodman *de facto* equates autographicity in the sense of 'there can be no genuine duplicates' (*LA*: 113) with autographicity in the sense of 'there can be no notationally identifiable works' (*LA*: 117–118). Indeed, the two senses surely overlap, at least to some extent, and they help to localize symbological terms in the spectrum of the arts: e.g., notationally identifiable artworks (either as characters in symbol schemes, like ordinary language, or as characters in symbol systems, like musical scores) are allographic, i.e. non-forgeable.[41] If such a correlation is pervasive in all cases—or if, conversely, autographicity and (the impossibility of) notationality are in effect co-extensive when applied to the arts—what is the point of postulating both?

In this respect, Goodman explicitly insists that the autographic–allographic distinction is only allied to, but not defined in terms of, the possibility of forgeable works: typically, the distinction 'could obtain in a world of inventive angels free of imitative instincts or ill intent' (*MM*: 139). It is the possibility of identifying artworks independently of their history of production that remains the definitive criterion for distinguishing the autographic from the allographic arts. The question is: to what extent is this possibility significant? If some artworks can be identified on the basis of their 'inherent' characteristics only—independently, that is, from their location in place and time—then these characteristics might provide us with significant insights into the nature of those art forms as peculiar symbol systems (and elucidate their respective differences from other art forms).

UNFORTUNATELY OR NOT, I cannot but anticipate that such a rigorous distinction is not, after all, possible: allographicity not only applies to some, and not all, of the arts, but even in those cases where it applies it does not do so invariably. Only matters of practical expediency can, in the end, uphold the role of notations in devising adequate methods for the individualization of artworks irrespectively of their history of production.

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41 Wreen 1983*b*: 352 objects that Goodman does not allow here for the possibility of forging known musical works ('forgeries' of non-existing works are irrelevant, because no problem of identification can arise). However, Goodman's own remarks (*LA*: 113*n*, 118) capitalize on the fact that forged performances or (as in the case of literature) forged editions are, indeed, possible, but they do not constitute forged works (only forged *instances* of works). The same applies to manuscripts of musical scores: as Kivy 2000 emphasizes, an exact copy of a score is practically and ontologically possible (e.g. the forged 'original manuscript' of a J. S. Bach partita), but it is not a forgery of a distinct work.

Ralls 1972: 11 prefers to speak of forgery in terms of *ease* of reproduction: works are faked when, and because, they cannot be copied due to practical (not 'essential') limitations. This view moves closer to Goodman than Ralls perhaps would have thought. In *PP*: 128, Goodman readily accepts that the decision whether music (the paradigm of notational aesthetic symbol systems) is an allographic or an autographic art form depends on interpretation: interpretation of what, in effect, constitutes the work. And Goodman himself does not for a moment purport that he holds the formula for the best such interpretation. What he says is that, if notations are ultimately a matter of symbological inventiveness and accepted convention, then it must be that any art form could be rendered allographic, given the right developments in our adopted *practices*. In his response to Kennick 1985–86, Goodman 1985–86: 291 precisely stresses that an art like painting is not invariably autographic, for the ways we practise it may change. Not only may we indeed devise ways for notating pictures, but a time might come when these replicates will be perfectly acceptable instances of the initial 'recipe' of reproduction (in the way that musical performances following scores are. However, Goodman still doubts that such developments, if ever achieved, would lead to the production of works accepted as 'genuine'. To demonstrate this, he points to the fact that, although we already have related cases like L. Moholy-Nagy's 'dictated multiples', these are in current practice not accepted as 'original paintings'.)

Allographicity then is not to be understood as a fixed feature of some art forms. But, still, this is in a way too much: even on these grounds, allographicity seems eventually to falter. As Boretz 1970: 545 observes, in some instances of electronically performed music (when it moves beyond simple, computer-synthesized sequences) it is incorrect to talk of an allographic art (cf. especially p. *98* below). And Johnson 1974–75 rightly emphasizes that recorded music falls under the autographic arts. While Dutton 1979: 304 (and 1983: vii–viii) thinks that the electronic adjustment of the speed of recordings produces forgeries (which is to say that the original performances are not repeatable. This is, after all, why some performances can be perceived as more distinguished than others and cherished as such, i.e. as unique artistic and aesthetic achievements, rather than mere instances of works.[42])

It seems that the core of the history of production (or composition) of a work is resistant to any final corrosion under the grip of notations. Different genesis properties means numerically distinct works—as Wreen 1983*b*: 342 puts it. And numerically distinct works means that a systematic philosophy of the arts

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42 In this context, Lessing 1964–65: 466 thinks that forgery applies only to the *creative* arts—as opposed to the *performing* ones. Dutton 1979: 304 uses the same terminology, but implies that all arts are in some respects autographic and in some other respects allographic.

still eludes us: every work of every art is, ultimately, autographic (*op. cit.*: 347). As Kivy 2000: 234 detects, even a molecule-for-molecule 'super-Xerox' copy of a painting is still a distinct work (the molecules in the original are not the molecules in the super copy). Goodman's reluctant avowal is telling: 'Initially, perhaps, all arts are autographic.' (*LA*: 121.)[43]

Of course, it is this 'initial' status that is of the essence here; otherwise, we might as well remain within an undifferentiated symbological account, where there are no special provisions made for the arts as peculiar symbol systems. That artworks are at most characters in notational schemes or systems (viz. that they are at most allographic) does not convey anything sufficiently specific about them. To be sure, this could be a howling indication that *there is no* special status reserved for the arts in the Goodmanian symbological universe. And I can only bring the subject to a close by turning now to Goodman's treatment of the individual art forms, attending to more specific aesthetic media, and employing the principles and findings offered up to this point. It might be, after all, that we should only be talking of each art individually rather than trying to capture a generic notion of 'the aesthetic'. Or it might be that the arts differ from non-arts because they resemble more to each other—united through particular structural affiliations. Perhaps, in the end, the arts are set apart from other symbol systems (if at all) because of certain similarities they might bear to one another, and not because they necessarily exhibit specific differences from *everything else.*

At any rate, the problem of authenticity seems to be arising only from our (surely non-aesthetic) inability to be unflaggingly creative and, consequently, from our vicious proclivity towards usurping the creative genius of others. On the other hand, the autographic work, namely the prime matter and the prime product of creativity as singly instantiated in place and historical time, seems to be retaining its place as the sole 'authentic' concern for Goodmanian aesthetic theory:

> Even if we cannot see any difference between an original painting and a forgery or between an edible mushroom and a poisonous one, that difference matters in the bearing it has on our behaviour. We can either *look harder* for a difference or avoid paintings and mushrooms entirely. [Goodman 1996*a*: 835. My italics.]

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[43] Equally telling is Margolis's claim (1970: 146) that 'contrary to Goodman's view, [...] all works of art are to some extent autographic'. Margolis has later insisted (1983: 157) that for Goodman all arts can be described as allographic in some sense, because Goodman simply does not deny such a possibility. And in 1989: 177, Margolis was still thinking that Goodman's presuppositions are irreconcilable with taking all arts as autographic.

10. PICTURES *RE*PRESENTED

> To exorcize the myth of absolutism of representation is to [...] open the way to a unified general study of modes of symbolization. [*PP*: 83.]

Goodman owes a lot of the notoriety of his aesthetic theory to his apparent rejection of pictorial resemblance as a factor of particular aesthetic consequence. Pictures are not to be assessed as such in terms of their alleged fidelity to the world. That some pictures 'resemble' their depicted subjects is not the reason for interpreting them as pictures. (What is more, numerous pictures refer to fictional entities or to nothing specific at all—they are merely expressive, i.e. they metaphorically exemplify some of their features.) In accordance with such considerations, Goodman treats representation throughout as a species of denotational reference, which means that, in this sense, any visual image could be made to stand for almost anything, given the suitable symbological interconnections from symbols to referents to symbols, which are in turn dictated by accepted practice.[44]

Still, painted portraits, marble busts, photographs, etc., habitually and uncontroversially help identify real people as perceived and recognized; to say that the association is in every case somehow imposed or taught on other grounds would be a capricious assertion. Furthermore, there is scientific evidence that we readily recognize what pictures depict—while, for instance, we have to *learn* a natural language. Experimental psychology has shown that there are non-conventional factors in perceptual interpretation, which are to some extent biologically determined; namely, pictures can actually and accurately depict what we see in the world. (See Presley 1970: 392, Blinder 1982–83: 256–257, 263.) And as recently as 2001 (: 708*n*) Schwartz cites research results supporting the hypothesis that infants and non-westerners can understand pictures without prior relevant training.

It is possible, however, to argue that the ways we learn (as supported by scientific evidence), and the ways we interpret and employ this knowledge (as exhibited in our treatment of the faithfulness of pictures to what they are said to depict), may not be sufficient for explaining resemblance. Schwartz himself (*op. cit.*) chooses not to rely too heavily on psychological research results, on the grounds that learning and innateness are themselves empirical matters. In other words, the fact that one can 'read' a picture much more readily than one can read a text does not show that some process of adjustment is required only for the lat-

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[44] Goodrich 1988: 55—based on Goodman's stipulation in *PP*: 159 that there can be no 'distinction of entities without a distinction of content'—traces the problem, once again, in the fact that 'the nominalist's resistance to resemblance is a resistance to all non-individual entities'. For my fuller discussion of Goodman's nominalism and its significance—already underlined to some extent—see § *19* below.

ter but not for the former: resemblance and signification might not be mutually exclusive terms. (In this respect, the Peircean distinction between iconic and linguistic signs may be restricting, and Heffernan 1985–86: 178 urges that we should stop thinking of them in that way.)

It is perhaps interesting to note here that Drost 1994 reinforces the notion of resemblance as a broad ranging phenomenon—namely one entailing that all things resemble one another in some way, and that we only pick out a fraction of their similarities due to our fixed habitual practices, due to limitations in our capacity to detect all resemblances, and so on. But Drost, based on Husserlian phenomenology, goes on to support the further claim that there is a concept of resemblance *simpliciter* and a concept of 'recognized' resemblance. Of these, the latter is the one appropriate to the intentionality of the pictorial attitude; which is to say that the phenomenon of recognized resemblance is a necessary feature of the intentionality that operates within the pictorial attitude. This intentionality is such that we do not regard the depicted independently of the referent that is recognized through resemblance: the face in the picture is perceived as such only in conjunction with the assumption that there is in fact a 'real' object to which the depicted corresponds.

This phenomenological distinction is important because it indicates that we have been actually dealing with two distinct conceptions of resemblance, which are often easily conflated. Resemblance in the first, broader sense (resemblance *simpliciter,* for Drost) is apprehended, in Goodman's terms, as the symbological inescapability from the nexus of reference, entailing that there is some degree of interconnectedness and similarity (or 'correspondence') between everything. This is a symmetrical relation, whereby, if x resembles y then y equally resembles x. Resemblance in the second, more specific sense ('recognized' resemblance, for Drost) is apprehended as the mapping of usually formal co-ordinates in the vehicles of symbolization themselves (lines, colours, shapes, volumes, textures) with relevant features characterizing their referents (the objects of the 'real' world corresponding to them). Resemblance as imitation in the arts is often meant in this second sense, whereby art symbols are said to *represent* their subjects or referents to the degree that they resemble them. In this case, however, if x represents y then y cannot be said to represent x; unlike resemblance in the wider sense, this relation is not symmetrical.

Accordingly, Goodman's critique of representation as commonly perceived is a critique of what he calls the 'copy theory of representation' (*LA*: 9, and ch. I, *passim*). His objections undermine, in effect, the frequent conception of representation as a kind of confused resemblance, whereby pictures are said to resemble what they depict—but not *vice versa.* It is a mistake to suppose that there is no representation without (copied) resemblance, Goodman says, because if we were truly dealing with resemblance we should also hold that the actual object in the world represents its picture—which is obviously unacceptable on the above grounds. Therefore, Goodman's theory of representation is, in symbological

terms, a theory about recasting in pictures, denoting the unfamiliar or absent by the visual and immediately apprehended—it is a theory of *re*presentation rather than representation, where no mirrored similarity is necessary or implied: theoretically, anything can denote anything else.

> Plainly, resemblance in any degree is no sufficient condition for representation. [*LA*: 4.] Almost anything may stand for almost anything else. [: 5.] Anything is in some way like anything else. [*PP*: 440.] Every two things have some property in common. [: 443.][45]

These are plain consequences of Goodman's theory of denotation, but they certainly do not eliminate problems of a more practical nature (the 'almost' qualification in *LA*: 5). For,

> to deny that resemblance is the basis for pictorial representation is not to say that anything can be a picture of anything else. There may well be limits on the structure and complexity of systems we can master. [*RP*: 115.]

Namely, there are restrictions in that we cannot always actually establish referential relations between everything, because this might require an unmanageably large number or referential chains; but these limitations are not fatal for theory. (As seen above, notationality and allographicity are parallel cases: although they are fuelled by a practical interest in restricting the complicated singularities of referential correlations and in transmitting them outside their immediate environment, they do not theoretically manage to displace the significance of the autographic, self-authenticating work—viz. of its history of production.)

In short, Goodman's response concerning representation-as-copying has drawn upon the fact that resemblance in general as a necessary or sufficient criterion of representational reference in the arts becomes too inclusive and ineffective in making the distinction from non-representational reference (since, in Goodman's sense, anything may represent indefinitely many things).

The distinction between resemblance as a symmetric relation of similarity in different degrees and resemblance as a representational relation of depicted 'look' is not exactly a peculiarity of Goodman's symbology (with possible phenomenological connotations). In an account inspired by C. S. Peirce, Files 1996 pertinently suggests that resemblance *simpliciter* can be construed as a dyadic relation, embedded within a triadic representational relation. Thus, and with the semiotic triangle in mind (cf. pp. *52*, *53* above), only representation is purely conventional, because the symbol-entity that functions as the representation of the

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45 In slightly different, but related, contexts, Goodman argues that 'no matter what happens, the future will be in some way like the past' (*PP*: 441); or that any statement about anything is also about a given term relative to some other statement (*PP*: 263).

referent-entity does so only by virtue of a rule that *interprets* the two as standing in such a relation. (Whereas resemblance *simpliciter* requires symmetric correspondence, with no provision for an interpretant.) This is an analogue for Goodman's view that denotational reference is solely a matter of association following habitual practice. Files's objection to Goodman, however, is that by construing representations as thoroughly denotational (i.e. conventional), he oversees the fact that a subclass of representations so construed may function as such due to symmetric resemblance relations. Namely, since a thing may resemble something else to any extent, it is conceivable that some of the similarities can also be employed as clues for any otherwise conventional, 'agreed upon' representational correlations.

Evidently, two questions arise (related to one another). (a.) Does the 'copy theory of representation' really correspond to any 'canonical' view of representation in the arts? (b.) Even if the answer to the first question is negative—i.e. even if on no account is representation apprehended solely as mirroring—what is, at any rate, the significance of mirroring for representation? Does Goodman really wish to say that copying is incompatible with picturing? (And, if this formulation makes the answer predictable, what *exactly* is the role of resemblance in Goodman's notion of *re*presentation?) In the remainder of this section, I shall be responding to these questions, towards a more comprehensive result regarding Goodman's approach to the visual arts and his effort to effectively distinguish the pictorial from the descriptive—pictures from paragraphs. (: This effort remains part of the overall project of circumscribing the aesthetic amidst the otherwise symbological.)

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In his criticism of the 'copy theory of representation', it seems that Goodman has adopted too restricted a notion of resemblance as a constitutive criterion of representation in the arts. First of all, 'copying' itself, as Tong 1982–83 reminds us, can range from slavish tracing of form and texture to highly original creation, in the sense of communicating with the work of the great masters. It is often not possible to say what a copy is a copy of, as it may present its own merits, and it may even surpass its source. Moreover (as seen in the previous section especially), it does not follow that an exact copy is a token of, or embodies identical aesthetic values as its original. As Pole 1974: 73 insists, representation as imitation or mimesis is not at all to be identified with an impoverished notion of copying or mirroring; all Goodman seems to have done is to create a theory of representation that is easy for him to refute. A theory, namely, confined to looking with an 'innocent' eye, presupposing that what we see is what there is to reproduce, and that simply our looking at what lies in front of our eyes at a certain distance is the indubitable guideline of reproducing what we see.

However, such remarks seem to be reverting to the previous issue of differentiating between resemblance *simpliciter* and 'recognized' resemblance. Goodman does not purport to question the significance of resemblance (copying, correspondence) generally in the visual arts. That is, if the term 'representation' is to be understood in a more general sense than Goodman's '(copy theory of) representation', then it still falls under Goodman's own theory of *re*presentation as denotational reference, which precisely thematizes the multi-dimensional, symbological act of referring to appearances as a fundamental aspect of pictorial art. (And it pertains to the response to my second question, below.) In short, Goodman's 'copy theory of representation' does not stand for 'that theory of *copying*, which is called "representation"' (i.e. it does not take for granted that representation is always some form of copying); it stands for '"representation" when *taken as* a theory of copying'. And there is at least one dimension of representational theories in the latter sense that becomes the legitimate target of Goodman's appropriated concept of representing-as-copying: this dimension refers to the explanatory pre-eminence of the principles governing perspectival depiction in the visual arts. The oft-exhibited mathematico-geometrical foundations of perspective are certainly a challenge to anyone wishing (like Goodman) to show that seeing is a matter of learned interpretation through symbols; or that there is no, so to speak, inherent logic of perception. (Cf. here my Appendix on pictorial perspective at the end of this chapter.)

For Goodman, simply put, there are aesthetically consummate pictures that have nothing to do with any rules of perspectival depiction; and there are pictures drawn in perfect perspectival analogies that are aesthetically irrelevant or bad. Consequently, perspectival depiction is definitely not an earmark of what makes a symbol system more or less endowed with aesthetic significance. (And one should not forget that to distinguish aesthetic from other symbol systems is Goodman's principal objective concerning the arts.) Naturally, not being an earmark does not mean being totally excluded as a potential feature. The later Goodman clarifies this beyond doubt: 'I do not contend that perspective is an unfaithful way of rendering but only that it is one of many alternative systems that may be faithful or unfaithful, depending on the circumstances.' (Goodman 1981*a*.)

Donnell-Kotrozo 1981–82: *ad loc.* 368 recognizes that the principle of representation can be, and has been, applied to a wide range of artistic styles and traditions, form strict naturalistic realism to expressive non-objective art, but that some form of imagery seems a prerequisite for representation of even the most symbolic or conventional variety (cf. surrealism). For Goodman, such a 'residue' of pictorial duplication is not theoretically sustainable. Accordingly, the related view that he consistently wishes to oppose (cf. *LA*: 34*f*) is the one cherishing perspectival depiction as a measure of the merits of realism in art—or that perspective provides us with the only genuine instances of artistic realism *par excellence*. For Goodman, the eye sees what the mind directs it to see, or rather what the

mind allows to be seen. Ancient frescoes, mediaeval tapestries, nineteenth century naturalism, twentieth century non-objectivism—they are all examples of *realistic* systems of depiction to the degree that they constitute the canonical recipes for creating images. Realism in this sense is a set of rules that have been accepted as the guidelines for the production of meaningful pictures; and these pictures are to be judged, in turn, by those very guidelines. What is seen and how it is seen are inseparable; the way P. Cézanne sees a mountain-side is a description of *that* mountain-side—'less realistic' in its historical context of production, but 'more realistic' than, say, a child-like drawing of a mountain (provided that, nowadays, we can attribute some aesthetic value to child-like drawings). Even if its appearance remains the same, what is 'less realistic' can become 'more realistic' if seen accordingly. Goodmanian realism is then a kind of an *intra*pictorial realism, implying familiarity with a certain mode of pictorial symbolization.

In effect, for Goodman we see by learning; we do not learn by seeing. In a Kantian manner, perception is determined by our cognitive specifications before it can even be described as such. Of course, one can define 'seeing' so as to include these presuppositions (cf. p. *141* below)—but this notion is not here Goodman's target. Danto, on the contrary, (1999: *ad loc.* 327–328 and 2001: *ad loc.* 42, 44) insists that our 'primitive capacity' to perceive cannot be subject to the possibilities or capacities to depict; and that, although we can interpret what our eyes see in different ways, our eyes themselves only function in one certain way. What Danto is addressing here is certainly not to do with Goodman's preoccupation with picturing, since to say that there is a way our eyes function is not to say that we have learnt all about their function by looking at particular things. Eye-functionality and vision seem to be phenomena of different orders.

Incidentally, Goodman's view reinforces a conception of perspectival depiction that has been shared more recently by some of its most diligent researchers (see Maynard 1996, Kubovy 1998). This conception maintains that, in the end, perspective is but a tool, neither *necessary* nor *sufficient* for achieving what are taken to be successful or simply adequate representations, in the arts and elsewhere. It can be rightfully described as a technological artefact that takes advantage of the biological mechanisms of vision; the results vary greatly, depending, in particular cases, on the interaction of particular variables (the treatment of something as a picture, the viewer's ideological disposition towards it, the way space is conceived).

—b—

As in the particular case of perspectival depiction, Goodman clearly cannot dismiss the role of a somehow conceived visual fidelity between picture and object; such fidelity is surely and readily identifiable. He does not say that pictures never resemble their depicted subjects, but that whether they resemble them or

not is often debatable and definitely not decisive for their status as pictures. Goodman is, in other words, compelled to insist that the role of visual duplication is neither what necessarily nor what sufficiently distinguishes pictures from other descriptions (sc. denotational relations), because, on the one hand, there are purely expressive (sc. non-denotative) pictures, and because, on the other, there is no criterion for measuring any decisive amounts of similarity in the rest of cases. There is no way of saying, in effect, when a 'duplicate' starts resembling something else rather than what it was meant to duplicate (see *PP*: 437–438). And, *a fortiori*, there is no way of distinguishing an aesthetically significant picture (or text, for that matter) from a mere, say, scribble. If, despite this, one decides to treat any detectable similarity as sufficient, then anything becomes a representation of almost anything—a hardly helpful outcome for aesthetic theory.

Salmon 1974 correctly underlines the fact that Goodman does de-emphasize the role of similarity in representation but he does not thereby totally dismiss it. And Arrell 1987–88: 45–46 brings up onomatopoeia as a relevant special case of (denotative) representation. In accordance with Goodman's account, that some names acoustically imitate what they happen to denote is not necessary for, but neither is it excluded from, their denoting function (the overwhelming majority of names do not so denote). Pictorial depiction can be described in parallel ways. Pictures can indeed present objects recognizable from experience—they can invoke an 'object-presenting' experience. Their formal features are indispensable towards such an experience. And, although for Goodman anything may represent almost anything else—since their association is inculcated upon our sensibilities due to habitual practices (cf., e.g., *LA*: 38)—there are psychological reasons to say that some pictures represent some specific objects rather than not, and Goodman's account does not exclude this possibility (cf. Lopes 2000). He would not hold that a portrait does not really resemble the person it depicts, but only that, whatever this resemblance might be, it is a highly volatile relation; it covers only a fraction of the pictorial possibilities that may at any time be realized in the production of an image meant to serve as a portrait of a given person. In this context, perhaps Robinson 2000: 214 is justified in pointing out that 'perceptual theories of representation can be construed as filling in the gaps of Goodman's very schematic account'.

But, under this view, it has been up to now impossible to devise a mechanism by which to theoretically separate representations and descriptions (both species of denotational reference): a paragraph could be said to resemble the object it describes as much as a picture resembles it (since pictorial verisimilitude has not been shown to be a necessary criterion). Surely, there is something counterintuitive in this. And, indeed, concerning this relatively unsophisticated way Goodman treats representations as mere special cases of denotative reference (with a question mark hovering over their potentially aesthetic significance), there are points that he will find it worthwhile to elaborate upon.

According to the theory of notationality as I presented it in the relevant section above, pictures belong to syntactically and semantically dense systems, whereas texts are only semantically dense but syntactically articulate (or differentiated). Presumably, the fundamental difference between pictures and paragraphs must somehow lie in the syntactic density of pictorial schemes. (This is why, in the discussion below, semantic density of pictorial systems has not been taken into consideration. (For schemes–systems, density, etc., see especially pp. *49*, *71* above.) Moreover, this exclusion reflects the fact that, as repeatedly pointed out, not all pictures are representations—i.e. not all of them possess a semantic content. At least some pictures either effectively denote fictional entities, which are, for Goodman's ontology, semantically vacuous, or even intentionally denote no things, as in abstract expressionism.) But syntactic density alone can prove to be quite an unreliable criterion for the identification of what is a picture of what (given always that Goodman has waived the decisiveness of the principle of resemblance).

As one of Goodman's early exponents, Howard 1975 (: *ad loc.* 209, 211) explicitly (and 'unhappily': 208) corrects himself for an error in some of his earlier work (1972). In particular, he had assumed there that, because an inscription (or mark, or a class of compliants thereof) appears to function in a syntactically inarticulate (sc. dense) symbol scheme, it cannot acquire a new function under an articulate (or differentiated) one. However, it is clear now, Howard admits, that what is a picture in a dense scheme can become a description (or other text) in another articulate one. He cites the example of the contour of two mountain peaks, which could in a different context be read as the letter 'M'; and the example of paintings in an exhibition that, although having a number ascribed to them and thus being deployed in a differentiated numerical scheme, do not cease to be part of a dense representational scheme comprising painted pictures. (Or one can indeed think of examples from so-called 'concrete poetry', whereby the lines of printed verse are so arranged as to depict at the same time what it is that they are talking about: the text is in an articulate scheme, the picture is not.) Consequently, the kind of inscriptions a scheme comprises, their constitution so to speak, does not predetermine the syntactic characteristics of that or other possible schemes the inscriptions may become part of. An isolated inscription is not dense or articulate; only a scheme of inscriptions-as-symbols can be.

This may sound self-evident, but misunderstanding is not inexplicable. Howard 1975 also wishes to highlight similar errors in the work of some of Goodman's early critics. For instance, Bach 1970 rejects—and replaces—Goodman's criterion of syntactic density as a requirement for a 'scheme's being representational' (: 128). He does this because he is convinced it allows us to adequately interpret '"restricted" pointillism' in painting (: 136), which would be a problematic case of depiction in Goodman's terms. The reason is that, for Bach, pointillist paintings appear to be parts of syntactically articulate schemes: dots of colour theoretically differentiate one picture from another in an effective way. So,

it cannot be that such pictures are parts of dense, sc. pictorial or representational, symbol schemes. However—Howard retorts (*op. cit.*)—Bach fails to take into account that syntactic density is, as just clarified, a matter of positioning and arrangement within schemes, and not a measure of the structural quality of symbols in isolation. If we had a scheme solely comprising dotted pictures, then the scheme would be differentiated; if other, shaded pictures were included as well, then the scheme as a whole would be dense; and if shaded pictures were the only ones, theirs would be a scheme dense *throughout*. Consequently, the same dotted picture can be part of syntactically disparate schemes at the same time, and the fact that a picture is constituted by distinct dots of colour does not make all the schemes it potentially belongs to syntactically articulate.

Similarly, Harris 1972–73: 326 presents the art of mosaic as a counterexample to Goodman's syntactic density requirement for a symbol scheme to be pictorial or representational. The claim is again that, although a mosaic is a picture, and thus by stipulation part of a syntactically dense symbol scheme, it is also made up of distinct constituent parts; so it is, paradoxically, both syntactically articulate (possibly part of a notational scheme) and syntactically dense. But, as above, Howard's treatment detects and corrects the problem, resolving any apparent paradox.

In the context of different theoretical objectives, a similar mistake seems to have led Carter 1976 towards an effort to enlarge the domain of notational symbol schemes, so as to include the pictorial arts (which for Goodman are non-notational). Carter offers a model of pictorial representation whereby painting becomes a language in a strict syntactical sense that Goodman reserves for notational symbol schemes: shapes become the (pictorial) letters, and all painting follows as a combination thereof. Carter defends this view by observing (: 115–116) that not even languages possess fully differentiated syntactic units—for example, on the level of phonemes. (One need only compare the difficulty in pronouncing similar sounds in different languages or the different way identical letters are pronounced in the same language.) If we adhere to Howard's objections above, Carter seems to be motivated by the wrong reasons: even supposing that we succeeded in turning painting as an art into a notational system, there would always be numerous dense schemes of which the same paintings would automatically constitute parts. Moreover, history of production (even guided by notation) would still uniquely identify paintings, in ways ultimately not captivated by syntax. (As I tried to show in the preceding § *9*, authenticity always has to revert to autographicity.) And concerning the more general point of the expediency of devising notations for currently non-notational systems, Goodman himself would probably have remarked (for I know of no published comment on Carter's proposal) that letter-writing simply has been made to work, and picture-writing must be tested and shown to work. Workability is, after all, the aim and scope of notationality. (And, at any rate, being able to produce notational pictorial schemes does not coincide with being able to produce aesthetically significant or

acceptable ones, in the same way that knowing the alphabet does not imply knowing how to be a novelist. Semantic density remains 'unharnessed' by notational schemes, as in the case of ordinary languages.)

However, there still seems to be a real problem in how exactly syntactic density is to be assessed when considering different pictorial symbol schemes and, in turn, the ways they collectively differ from non-pictorial ones. As Elgin 1993*c*: 181 stresses (after Howard 1975), 'computer pictures, television images, and mosaics' are genuine pictures beyond dispute.[46] And, as it has been shown, dense schemes may include articulate sub-schemes comprising such 'digitized' pictures. Goodman finally addresses this problem of the *discontinuity* of dense schemes in chapter VIII of *RP* (which actually constitutes a late, more advanced examination of his notion of representation). But some complications had in fact already surfaced by 1976 (probably precipitated by Howard's earlier commentary), and the second edition of *LA* published that year had to incorporate 'some important if not extensive changes' (*LA*: vi), in order mainly to allow for a more adequate explanation of syntactic density.

In Goodman's jargon, syntactic (and semantic) density is what characterizes *analogue* symbol schemes (and systems); conversely, differentiation describes *digital* ones. (See *LA*: 159*f*; e.g., painting is an analogue system, musical scoring is digital. Goodman wishes to clearly disassociate his systematic terms of 'analogue' and 'digital' from what is commonly perceived as analogy and digits, respectively.) Density (or compactness) and differentiation (or articulateness) seem to be antithetical qualities, but Goodman urges that they are to be treated as mutually independent. In accordance with the foregoing, this is due to the fact that schemes in particular (as well as systems) may be analogue or digital only along some parts of their field of application, leaving intermittent gaps that may render them *discontinuously* analogue or digital. For instance (regarding now numerical symbols): the ordering of the rational and the irrational numbers together (sc. the real numbers) is dense *and* continuous (there are no gaps); the ordering of the rational only numbers is discontinuous but still dense (there are ratios of natural numbers that are not included, but there is always a third rational number between any other two). Thus, uninterrupted continuity makes symbol schemes analogue or digital *throughout*; but discontinuity does not thereby automatically turn an analogue scheme from dense into differentiated, or a digital scheme from differentiated into dense. (See *LA*: 136–137, 153, 163*n*, 227–228, 239–240.[47]) As in Howard's case (1975), perhaps the most relevant result from all this is that, in the end, density is more a matter of the *ordering* of symbols (at times discontinuous,

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46 But, concerning some of C. Z. Elgin's relevant views, cf. fn. 3 above.

47 In this context, there are also mixed systems (sc. both analogue and digital), such as some but not all maps, diagrams, and other scientific modelling devices; and still other systems are neither analogue nor digital. (See *LA*: 163–164.)

at times not so) rather than only a matter of the rules by which these are syntactically constituted in themselves. A dense ordering may be more compact and less continuous (with more gaps)—but it necessarily lacks differentiation throughout, i.e. it is analogue. (Symmetrically, a differentiated ordering may be more articulate and more continuous (with fewer gaps)—but it necessarily lacks continuity throughout, i.e. it is digital.)

Now, as far as pictures are specifically concerned, the (somewhat plausible) misconstructions in the cases of Bach 1970, Harris 1972–73, and Carter 1976, would support a claim that we are not—or that we are—able to 'score' paintings, on the basis of the presumption that all paintings are—or are not—characters in *syntactically dense* schemes. (What is significant is the correlation between image and syntactic density—positive or negative, no matter.) On the one hand, it is true that as things stand, we can (re)produce digitized images at a high, if not exact, level of fidelity, using information on pixel-arrangement. This means that we have devised a notation for pictures as belonging to digital pictorial schemes. However, there is no reason to exclude these schemes from belonging to several larger ones, which may well happen to be analogue. Namely, whether a scheme is pictorial or not cannot be defined solely in terms of syntactic density (either by negating of by affirming the connection). This is because syntax cannot convey the significance of the continuous or discontinuous ordering of symbols within greater schemes of schemes, and so on, but only utilizes their fragmentary syntactic specifications.

The later Goodman, drawing upon the above subtle distinctions introduced, but not explored, in his slightly amended edition of *LA* (in agreement with Howard's insights), wishes to pursue whatever it may be that such complications prescribe.[48] In *RP* (: *ad loc.* 127–131) he does this by precisely emphasizing the fact that the construal of density is not wholly explicated when simply applied to the symbols themselves as denoting marks. Pictures taken in isolation as vehicles of symbolization do not belong to any ordered sets; only in comparison with other symbols in the same realm (i.e. with other comparable pictures) can we say that they do, or do not, belong to overall analogue or digital schemes. And then, if the relevant scheme appears to be dense, further examination is needed in order to decide whether it is ordered in a way that makes it also dense throughout, or whether it exhibits some internal (fragmentary or not) differentiations—which means that it may contain digital, but still pictorial, sub-schemes.

As a further illustration, let us take a set of oil paintings, which constitutes a dense and continuous throughout pictorial scheme. These paintings can be 'transcribed' in a finely textured but strict pointillist idiom, producing a scheme of pictorial symbols with disparate degrees of internal differentiation. These dot-

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[48] Goodman expressly acknowledges V. A. Howard in the context of his examination of musical symbol systems. See below, p. 99.

ted paintings taken in isolation constitute a *digital* pictorial scheme, because we can always effectively differentiate between them (and reproduce them). Still, the pointillist pictures produced taken together with their analogue prototypes, constitute symbols ordered in an *analogue* and discontinuous scheme. In all cases, we are still left with pictures and not texts, although some of the possible pictorial sub-schemes (comprising only the dotted pictures) are differentiated throughout, as texts typically are. (Goodman uses a similar but more elaborate example of a pack of cards with different figures drawn on them.) The pervasive result is that 'in general, an analog scheme includes many digital schemes, and a digital scheme is included in many analog schemes; but obviously no digital scheme includes any analog scheme.' (*RP*: 128.)

All this indicates that the previous conclusion (based on Howard 1975 and on scattered points in *LA*) is explicitly confirmed by Goodman himself: there can be no general way of distinguishing the pictorial from all other analogue symbol schemes on grounds of density. 'Not every analog full scheme is pictorial.' (*RP*: 130.) Pictures can clearly belong to digital schemes, as long as they are effectively differentiated, and even if they appear as parts of larger, analogue and discontinuous schemes. Thus, density—at least in its syntactic counterpart—seems to be inadvertently losing its importance as a criterion for distinguishing representations from paragraphs (within the general category of denotational symbols). And pictorial systems no longer feature as 'the very antithesis' of notational systems (*LA*: 160; cf. p. 72 above), for they approach closer to texts (or even to other denoting symbols, like, e.g., mercury thermometers), retaining semantic density but partially dispensing with syntactic density. Inevitably, then, if the distinction between pictures and non-pictures is not to collapse, Goodman has to outline a relevant condition in a negative way. And that is what he does: the only 'hope' pictures have in being distinguished from non-pictures is 'by some lack of effective differentiation among them' (*RP*: 131).

LET ME HERE proceed by way of resuming: Concerning sets of symbols, resemblance to referents is, as I showed earlier, a theoretically insufficient criterion for the effective differentiation between pictorial and non-pictorial symbol schemes: there are pictures that resemble nothing; and anything could stand for almost anything else (regardless of possible perceptual similarities). Goodman's conviction on this matter is pervasive, and serves as a guiding principle in the deconstruction of traditional or ordinary beliefs about imitation and art. If it is at all true that 'art imitates the world', then this, in Goodman's view, must be only a metaphor for conveying a way of re-creating or expanding the world in terms of

(figuratively) duplicating it—or thus *re*presenting it.[49] The character of Goodmanian *re*presentation is not to be described in a supposedly neutral sense, i.e. in terms of art trying to match what we perceive, as if what we perceive were a primitive given. In effect, it is rather the other way around: art comprises what we take and know the world to be (cf., e.g., *LA*: 27–33). The description and its subject matter become constitutive of one another; *re*presentation becomes a kind of constructive exercise in learning all that which is to be learnt. 'That nature imitates art is too timid a dictum. Nature is a product of art and discourse.' (*LA*: 33.[50] If representational pictures characteristically depict and discourse characteristically describes, they both denote.) 'That a picture looks like nature often means only that it looks the way nature is usually painted.' (: 39.)

Now, if perceived resemblance cannot strictly separate pictures from non-pictures, overarching syntactic density of schemes will simply not do either, because it cannot account for the feature of internal discontinuity among possible sub-schemes that may not be dense. So, Goodman is inescapably compelled to revert to the syntactical relations symbols *themselves* bear to one another within a scheme, to the ways the internal syntax of schemes is modulated and articulated into disparate sub-schemes. As Elgin 2001: 685 illustrates, we recognize Santa-Claus pictures without having to compare them to anything 'real' outside of them; so, we must recognize landscape-pictures in the same way—by comparing them to one another (for we do not have to have 'met' the depicted landscape).

In this respect, neither resemblance nor general notational specifications are of much help. Consequently, Goodman has to put forth the negative criterion of the 'lack of effective differentiation' among symbols, if they are to be pictures. 'Can it be that—ironically, iconically—a ghost of likeness, as nondifferentiation, sneaks back to haunt our distinction between pictures and predicates?', Goodman plausibly asks (*RP*: 131).

This 'ghost of likeness' that returns to disturb Goodman's unstable, in a way, disassociation of his theory on representation from his theory on resemblance and syntactic density is that one has to turn to the image itself before one can fully describe it in symbological terms. Goodman will try and supplement or improve this non-sequitur by allowing for additional criteria or indicators, in his

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49 And mimesis apprehended along these lines might not be so drastically different from Plato's or Aristotle's version of it, in the sense that classical theory was not principally concerned with the products of mimesis, but with its status as an attempt at creation (is it genuine or simply ostentatious?). Thus, Rudner's remark about 'artistics' above (p. *76*) may be to the point, indicating that Plato's critique of art is not necessarily part of an 'aesthetic' theory in the familiar sense.

50 Cf. Shakespeare 1998: *The Winter's Tale*, 4.4.95–97: 'This is an art / Which does mend nature—change it rather—but / The art itself is nature.' (I do not think, however, that it is the 'aesthete' in Goodman talking here.)

more systematic effort to account for what makes his theory about symbols also a theory about art and aesthetics. But the provisional results here, as in the cases of exemplification and autographicity earlier, dictate that the autonomy of the art symbol, namely of the work of art, is resistant to any symbological codification. Goodmanian symbology appears to be engaged in an endless effort to describe its subject matter (at least in the field of the arts). And endlessness does not necessarily amount to hopelessness, but constitutes a distinctive affirmation of the artwork's importance in symbological terms.

11. SOUNDS UNDER-SCORED

As has been indicated more than once, the allographic art of music is in Goodman's terms a paradigmatic art form in that it has been possible to make it part of fully (syntactically and semantically) notational systems, through the application of scores. Each score ensures that one and only musical work is preserved and reproduced. It follows that the identity of the work depends on the score in a strict sense, in order for notationality to be secured: the slightest deviation from the score produces performances of different works. If we allowed for even one single wrong note at a time, then the way would be open towards the total infringement of notationality. One wrong note in the score would lead to one wrong sound in the performance, this performance would dictate a slightly different score, then the new score could be further altered in new performances, and so on, and we could find ourselves going 'all the way from Beethoven's *Fifth Symphony* to *Three Blind Mice*' (*LA*: 187). Surely, an unwelcome paradox.

> Nothing in *Languages of Art* has given more readers the opportunity to throw up their hands in delighted horror than the statement that a performance with a single wrong note does not qualify as a genuine instance of the work in question. This provides many readers with so much self-satisfaction that they ignore what follows in the same paragraph. [*PP*: 135.]

And what follows in that same paragraph is a recognition that definitions are precise but practice only approximates them, that no diagram on a blackboard is strictly a 'triangle', and no human strictly 'white'. 'After all, one hardly expects chemical purity outside the laboratory.' (*LA*: 186.) In other words (and in accordance with my earlier comments above, p. *85*), the point that we have, in theory, to safeguard and preserve the identity of the work does not exclude the possibility that in practice our principles may be more lenient (where we may accept slightly differing performances as performances of the same work).

Black 1971: 536–537 has indeed noticed the rest of the paragraph under consideration (in *LA*: 187), but he still thinks that Goodman should not have to sacrifice consistency with ordinary usage in favour of scientific, conceptual clarity. Even in the sciences, Black retorts, conceptual boundaries often tend to be fuzzy; this does not make empirical concepts useless, but always reminds us of the necessary adjustments. (And pure geometry works in ordinary life, albeit less literally.)

> Now why should we not be equally liberal for such expressions as 'the same performance'? Why not here follow ordinary usage, which may have more reason behind it than Goodman would concede, and restrain a zeal for precision which engenders paradox? [*Op. cit.*: 536.]

Of course, Goodman does indeed rely on ordinary habit and usage; his theory of notationality and his symbology in general are precisely founded on accepted practice in the application of symbols. (This has been and will increasingly become more significant for his whole endeavour.) Thus, Goodman would be the first to concede that the boundaries of what is accepted as an instance of the same work might change. Painting may become allographic if our practices change, in the same way that some contemporary musicians compose works that are not allographic. (Electronic music is not scoreable by standard notation, and so it constitutes an example of a clearly 'dense set of auditory symbols'—which is to say an example of 'depiction' by sounds; see Howard 1975: 212.) Whatever relevant changes might be adopted in our approach to the different arts, Goodman insists: 'Nothing in my theory is incompatible with such developments; and I have nowhere argued for fixity.' (*PP*: 136.)

Again, one might retort that Goodman is at least seriously inconsistent, if not contradictory: while practice is defied in the case of the 'wrong note paradox', it is upheld as the touchstone of theory in the case of notationality (see § *8* above). The inconsistency, however, dissolves if one is reminded of the fact that our habits concerning the arts are relevant in Goodman's context when the point is to preserve the identity of works and not the quality of performances (*LA*: 185). The scored performance is, after all, the mode in which the identity of the work is preserved. And it is thus not clear what exactly Black is referring to in his question about 'the same performance' (how can any performance be identical with any other?). If the issue is about taking certain performances as of 'the same' work, then the confusion that Goodman wishes to clarify has not been properly dealt with. And his own context of reference can be located in the following definition: 'A score, as I conceive it, is a character in a notational language, the compliants of a score are typically performances, and the compliance-class is a work.' (*LA*: 173.) Obviously, the problem has been transposed; it is not so much about the way in which theory and practice are related, but it concerns rather the link between musical works, scores, and performances thereof. Performances are different when they are of different works, but also when they are of the same work / score. That is why it is essential to know what 'the same work' is, or what 'the same score' is (how and whether, if at all, they are or exist), before arguing over its performances.

Towards this clarification, then, of the status of a musical work, is it sufficient on Goodman's part to speak of sounds by referring to notes, when examining music as an art? For his theory about music is a theory about music's notationality (see *LA*: 177*f*). However, music lovers in particular would vehemently refute the supposition that all there is in music can be captured and reproduced by scores. For example, Webster 1970–71: 493–597 and Ziff 1971: 513–515 present some compelling counterexamples involving fluctuations of tempo, tonality, audibility, speed. And much more recently, Edidin 2000: 324 reminds us that 'at a fine enough level of detail, all performance is improvisation'. The way the musi-

cian is going to sound a chord of the string instrument to produce the pitch and duration corresponding to the black mark on the page, the exact moment, the imperceptible acceleration of his / her 'attack', etc., are co-ordinates lying far beyond the expanse of the page. A performance completed after a certain score in thirty minutes will hardly give us the same impression as a performance after the same score decelerated enough so as to last thirty days. And for reasons such as these, an unlimited number of different performances are always expected to bring something different to the interpretation of the work. However, notations do not allow for any variety greater than tone and duration. Additional parameters of musical composition and performance appear to be indispensable for the identity of musical works; yet, they are not strictly and unambiguously codified in musical notation (cf. Ralls 1972: 7). Scores and works appear to stand in a starkly unbalanced relation.

In fact, Goodman himself is very well aware of such issues (cf. *LA*: 184–185): for instance, ordinary tempo and / or mood instructions are words, and as such, Goodman concedes, they cannot be part of a notational system (due to the semantic density of linguistic terms). So, in reality, 'the standard Western system for writing music does not in all respects qualify as a notation' (*MM*: 57). What is surprising again, as in the case of pictures, is not that Goodman explicitly recognizes the practical and theoretical shortcomings of his proposals, but that his course of action is in a way subversive, as if he were utilizing his own means against themselves, thereby blunting their initial effect. (This, of course, is a negative point only if what one is looking for is greater effect.) Goodman's escape route out of a rigid interpretation of scoreability led him—at least as soon as 1969, i.e. immediately after the first edition of *LA* (see *PP*: 127–128, and the relevant reference in Part III.B below)—towards an important qualification regarding the principles of his notationality theory. Being in a notational system only requires being effectively and unambiguously differentiated—but it does not require being precise or unique: for one thing, notes can be simply taken to prescribe range of pitch rather than a fixed number of vibrations per second. Under such possible specifications, scores could still be interpreted as parts of a notational language.

But this partial improvement by recalculation of parameters was not to prove adequate. By 1981 (original version of the paper reprinted in *MM*: 86; cf. my relevant reference in Part III.B), Goodman has indeed conceded that his treatment of music in *LA* (: *ad loc.* 232) 'needs some modification'. He acknowledges Kulenkampff 1980–81 (: 255), as well as 'conversations with Vernon Howard and further thought'. (In his important paper of 1975—which I have already cited in the context of pictorial density and continuity in my previous section—Howard describes 'scoreability' in terms that do not make it incompatible with auditory density. In the same way that digital pictures may belong to analogue schemes, scoreable musical works—i.e. no electronic or other autographic music—may belong to representational rather than notational systems.)

The problematic point seems to be constantly identifiable with Goodman's conflation, to some extent, of the musical work with the score. Goodman himself initially tries to explain this apparent conflation as a 'false impression', caused by the simple fact that the theory of 'notation occupies a prominent place' in his philosophy, and that, as a result, much of what he says about music 'happens to be about notation' (*MM*: 85). Whatever the fault is, Goodman wants now to make it fully clear that, while a performance as prescribed by the score belongs to an articulate system—which is descriptive, as in literature—the performance as functioning 'within the full spectra of sound' belongs to a dense system—which is representational, as in painting. (This actually constitutes a radicalization of the previous amendment: the fuzzy 'range of pitch' was, in effect, the first step towards 'the full spectra of sound'.) Thus, even correct performances of the same musical work may differ to some notationally unspecifiable degree. Or else: there is no real way to accurately reproduce a work by means of scores; the possibilities of internal differentiations are just not amenable to such effective articulation. As in the case of pictures, we may imagine by analogy that the same score can be rendered as part of indefinitely many other sets of scores: again, the articulate system could prove to belong to a larger densely ordered one ('within the full spectra of sound'). Accordingly, Goodman will be later unequivocally distinguishing the musical score from the musical work: it is only the former that lies within a digital notation, and not the latter, he emphasizes (1997: 18).

Predelli 1999*b* tries to strengthen Goodman's initial insights by turning back to suggest that the solution to the 'wrong-note paradox' would be to take into consideration the performers' intentions to produce a sound, and their ability to conform to such intentions—'within acceptable limits of discrepancy' (: 374). Predelli 1999*a* also thinks that it would be possible to add scoreable parameters in musical notation—such as instrument specifications, information on composer and title of piece, or other non-aural properties—regimented in such a way so as to preserve notationality according to Goodmanian requirements. These improvements could indeed prove useful if adopted by artistic practice, and they follow Goodman's own steps towards a preservation of musicality through scoreability. However, in the context of Goodman's later work, what has taken theoretical precedence is the examination of the art form as a symbol system, and not as a possibly *notational* symbol system. Notationality is something Goodman welcomes for practical purposes, and he recognizes genuine notational possibilities in virtually all art forms. But he is prepared to follow the implications of his symbology to the end, so to speak, even if they forcefully convey the limitations of notationality as an interpretative tool for aesthetics.

Thus, Goodman irreversibly concedes in the end that the musical work possesses a non-reproducible dimension, if all of its aspects are taken into consideration. There appears to be a core of autographicity at the very centre of music, which is, after all, the paradigm of allographicity; and this is of course only consonant with Goodman's intimation about all arts being initially autographic

(see p. *82* above). The ensuing implication is that musical works are also their history of composition. (And perhaps performances are constant approximations of the work, rather than only compliants of the score; even scoreability *a là* Predelli would rather prove insufficient here.) In Sagoff's words (1978: 470):

> The product must be appreciated in relation to the process: to judge a thing, we have to know what it is. We should be aware not only of the sound of the violin but of the way that sound is made. This is to be aware of the violinist—but more: the practice, the tradition, the history which, giving the art work authenticity, gives it value as well. What we are aware of is the past—not the pastness of the past, but its presence; we are aware of history—not as something dead but as what is already living. The artistic and natural processes of creation are themselves their most important products. What is their final creation but our own lives? What meaning, apart from them, could these lives have?

This irreplaceability of the authentic artwork itself is not pointing towards the work as a mere inscription within a symbol system, but towards the endlessness of the significational fertility that awaits us within and beyond the work. Perhaps paradoxically—but consistently—the work is, and is not, *itself*. It is itself as a point of reference to the outside of itself (or the point where the inside and the outside meet and make each other meaningful). So, Sagoff concludes: 'What matters in the end? Not just the response, but the object. Not just the quality, but the object itself—its nature and meaning as something inherited.'

In sum: as in the cases of exemplification, autographicity, and depiction, music as a system of sound-symbols preserves the autonomy of the artwork *itself*, even if it has been possible to partly codify its function for reasons of practical expediency (in this respect, the analogy with pictures is direct). Up to this stage, one must have been increasingly convinced that artworks as Goodmanian symbols are granted a somewhat exceptional status: they may refer to a great number of things but, above all, they refer to themselves as referring things, and for that they have to be observed with an almost interminable fervour, in order for more of their attributes to come to light. The examination of texts, as syntactically articulate but semantically dense systems, will provide the final contribution towards my general explication of Goodman's treatment as regards the different artistic media.

12. TEXTS RECITED / INTERPRETED

> Verstehen niemals ein subjektives Verhalten zu einem gegebenen „Gegenstande" ist, sondern zur Wirkungsgeschichte, und das heißt: zum Sein dessen gehört, was verstanden wird. [¶] So kann es mich nicht überzeugen, wenn mir eingewandt wird, daß die Reproduktion eines musikalischen Kunstwerks in einem anderen Sinne Interpretation sei als etwa der Verstehensvollzug *im Lesen einer Dichtung oder im Betrachten eines Bildes. Alle Reproduktion ist doch zunächst Auslegung* und will als solche richtig sein. In diesem Sinne ist auch sie „Verstehen". [Gadamer 1993: 441. My italics.][51]

Because a text (like a score) is a character in a syntactically notational language (see p. *71* above), as well as the basis of what we take the literary work to be, the problem Goodman is facing here pertains (as with scores) to the relation of the text as a written passage and the text as a reading or an interpretation of that passage. Namely, this is the fresh problem of locating the literary work within Goodman's symbologico-aesthetic universe. Goodman's best effort to elucidate such matters in a comparative manner reads thus:

> In the different arts a work is differently localized. In painting, the work is an individual object; and in etching, a class of objects. In music, the work is the class of performances compliant with a character. In literature, the work is the character itself. And in calligraphy, we may add, the work is an individual inscription. [/] The much discussed question whether a work of art is a symbol thus seems to me particularly fruitless. Not only may a work, depending upon the art, be an object or a class of objects or a character in a language or an inscription, but whichever it is it may in various ways symbolize other things. [*LA*: 210 / 210*n*.[52]]

Indeed, according to Goodman's phrasing here, we saw the manner in which autographicity proves to be an inherent attribute of paintings (or unique multiples thereof): the picture is shown to be the 'individual object', *even if* reproducible as part of digital schemes, because it remains a unique, semantically un-

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51 English translation 1987: 502. ('Understanding is never subjective behavior toward a given "object", but toward its effective history—the history of its influence; in other words, understanding belongs to the being of that which is understood. [¶] Therefore I do not find convincing the objection that the reproduction of a musical work of art is interpretation in a different sense from, say, the process of understanding when reading a poem or looking at a painting. All reproduction is primarily interpretation and seeks, as such, to be correct. In this sense it, too, is "understanding".')

52 Cf. the (mistaken) claim voiced by Margolis 1970: 142 that Goodman nowhere speaks of works as symbols.

bounded point of reference. As for music, based on Goodman's subsequent work as well, I tried to explain what he could have meant by defining the work as a 'class of performances' dictated by a score (sc. a 'character'). Goodman's later deliberations on the matter, without contradicting what he says here in *LA*, show that musical works are in effect collectively instantiated by an indefinitely large number of performances, which are only approximately notated by scores. Therefore, the (listened to) musical piece is in *all* of its detail an unrepeatable aesthetic event, like a picture. Now, with literature the question is about scores or 'characters', because that is what texts appear to be (according to Goodman's frame of reference in the extract above). And if this precise formulation concerning literature is upheld to the end, then we might here have an art form radically different from the rest. The literary work could prove to be an exceptional, fully replicable symbol (any copy of W. Shakespeare's works would do just as well), and not a symbol existing also in *itself* as a virtually inexhaustible reservoir of relations and connotations (deriving its aesthetic status precisely from this symbological nexus of reference). Perhaps I should warn that, again, syntactic determinism will not appear to be offering a very promising resolution of the matter.

A TEXT AS a 'character' of the Goodmanian sort naturally comprises all of its mark-by-mark (letter-by-letter) copies. But if this is so—namely, if Goodman accepts that the (accurately) printed copies of a novel constitute genuine instances of the novel as a work—this work must also comprise the oral, recited instances of the novel, and the recordings of someone reading it aloud, and, furthermore, the silent readings one conducts for oneself. All these must also be accepted as genuine instances of the novel as a literary work on the same grounds of character-replication, since each and every one of these instances is sufficient for the identification of the work. Goodman does indeed recognize that there is in this sense a 'text taken as a phonetic character' (*LA*: 208), and, accordingly, he is willing (in what follows there) to treat the text as a character comprising both inscriptions and utterances (something that he repeats in *RP*: 58). For this to hold, we must ensure that the clear matching between utterance and character is preserved (just as a script belongs to a syntactically articulate scheme of letters), so that no utterance may belong to different characters (*LA*: 208–209): it should be, and indeed it is, possible to decide whether a series of phonemes belong to one inscription (letter, word, phrase) or another.[53]

Nevertheless, this equal treatment of scripts and utterances actually reveals, in turn, the core of the central problem with Goodman's apprehension of

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53 Cf. the parallel notational possibilities (between scripts and utterances) as stipulated, e.g., by the international standards of phonetic notation and transcription: <http://www.arts.gla.ac.uk/ipa/ipa.html> (International Phonetic Association).

literature. Goodman is in fact compelled to treat scripts and utterances as equivalent instances of literary works, because, otherwise, he would have to accept scripts as 'scores' and utterances as 'performances': literature would have to be rendered in a manner similar to music. In other words, the literary work would have to be interpreted as a set of readings or interpretations of it, each complying with the script as a 'character', but collectively transcending every individual script and every individual reading of it—i.e. transcending the 'character itself'. Clearly, this would be a direct denial of the way Goodman chose to identify the literary work in the previous extract above (p. *102*: 'the work is the character itself'). So, necessarily,

> Utterances are not the end-products as are performances in music. [*LA*: 208.] What the writer produces is ultimate; the text is not merely a means to oral readings as a score is a means to performances in music. An unrecited poem is not so forlorn as an unsung song; and most literary works are never read aloud at all. [*LA*: 114.]

What is more, Goodman points out, if readings of a text were admitted as 'end-products' or 'performances' of the literary work, then 'the lookings at a picture and the listenings to a performance would equally qualify as end-products or instances' (*ibid.*).

Naturally, such claims (largely on empirical grounds), as to what we should or should not intuitively accept as the quintessential manifestation of an artwork are equivocal (given that numerous processes are involved in artistic function as a symbological point of reference). And, contrary to what Goodman says in places like *LA*: 210 (see p. *102* above), we could confidently argue that there are really no clear boundaries as to where the picture ends and the looking starts, or where the score ends and its performance starts and the music is 'complete'. Unexpectedly perhaps, Goodman himself provides elsewhere some of the means for such arguments, as I demonstrated for the cases of depiction and music (§§ *10*, *11* above). This is not to say that, strictly, he is contradicting himself: the work is the 'character', *as well*, rather than exclusively (so, when discussion focuses around syntax it is perhaps one-sided but not disoriented, in that it still examines some aspect of the work). In the case of music especially, Goodman retrospectively felt that he had been concentrating on scores rather that on works, and what he said about the former had been—by inertia, so to speak, but mistakenly—taken at large to be about the latter (see p. *100* above). As a matter of fact, I have not been able to identify any equally explicit remark by Goodman to the effect that, again, what he says about texts is accidentally conflated with what he has to say about literary works prescribed by the texts. However, based on some equivocal passages, I think that this is very much the case, and that the literary work (along with the musical and the pictorial works) does not evaporate into a 'bare' symbol ('inscription' or 'character'). Singers can enjoy performing to themselves, and musically literate individuals can 'hear' the music when going

through the score. Accordingly, I think Goodman can allow that reading a text (whether, of course, aloud or to oneself) constitutes a genuine instance of apperceiving it, which collectively contributes its own momentum to the process of identifying 'the work' (cf. Smith B H 1970: 556). Reading as interminable *understanding* is indistinguishable from the apprehension of literature (it is not an end-product): it is the 'looking at' and the 'listening to' of texts. In the same way that every single encounter with a picture or a song makes the picture or the song different (despite *prima facie* considerations), every reading of a poem must somehow be allowed to become part of the expansive appreciative experience triggered by the poem.

In the couple of paragraphs preceding his definition of 'work localization' (where the literary work was the 'character itself'—see p. *102* above), Goodman admits that his seeming identification of literature with syntax, or of work with self-contained sequences of linguistic entities (sc. texts), might arouse discontentment and disbelief. And he is prompt to add:

> To identify the literary work with a script is not to isolate and dessicate it [: *sic*] but to recognize it as a denotative and expressive symbol that reaches beyond itself along all sorts of short and long referential paths. [*LA*: 210.]

I think that this qualification already pronounces the unbounded symbological character of the literary work (although Goodman is preoccupied, at the moment at least, with explicating works within notations rather than works as such). For the work as a mere script does not stand independently of its field of symbological reference (as no symbol can be a symbol if divested of its field of reference).

Later, in *WW*: 55, Goodman emphatically reiterates his conviction that utterances and inscriptions are equally acceptable as instances of corresponding linguistic expressions, constituting replicas of each other (sc. instances of a text as a character)—unlike, that is, musical scores and performances (sc. characters and their compliants). But Goodman now goes on to assert that 'the relationship between a score and its performance [...] is as determinate as that between a written and a spoken word' (*WW*: 56). This is I think another indication that the equivalence relation between the written and the spoken word stipulated by Goodman, and the non-equivalence relation between score and performance are in fact more analogous than it would have appeared. If putting the notes down on a sheet of paper is tantamount to 'quoting also the sounded music' (*loc. cit.*), then referring to a chain of words and sentences is also referring to the reading of what they 'say'.

Of course (and this is something I have up to now refrained from clarifying), what a work 'says' (or 'reads') is not to be confused with what one can say about it. Namely, reading a work as reciting it, aloud or not, is perspicuously different from reading a work as studying it and producing *another* text on it. Reading in the first sense certainly and importantly involves understanding (an understanding of the routes of literary reference). Reading in the second sense is a

metaphor for creating new works (in varying literary genres). Consequently, this is perhaps part of the reason why Goodman seems to insist on the equivalence of syntax and work (although he knows that syntax as text is only a mere indicator of diverse literary reference). What he actually wishes to do, as the evidence shows, is to eliminate the possibility that a text and its commentaries become indistinguishable.

In accordance with this, in *RP*: 57–58 Goodman unequivocally stresses that (i) 'interpretations and translations are themselves works. But they are not identical with the works they interpret or translate.' And shortly afterwards (*RP*: 63) we are told (ii): 'Just as [...] "cape", despite its two applications, is one word not two, so *Don Quixote*, despite its multiple admissible interpretations, is one work not many.'[54] In (i), the 'interpretation' is a text syntactically different from the 'interpreted' (it is in other words a commentary, or a translation). The claim that such a text instantiates a different work is trivially true (especially given Goodman's conception of translation; cf. p. *62* above). In (ii), the way Goodman establishes a link between the two examples (of a 'cape' and of a *Don Quixote* 'reborn') requires, I think, some explication. On the one hand, upon seeing the word 'cape' on this page one knows that it can signify (depending on the context) at least two sorts of different things. On the other hand, if one found oneself with a copy of *Don Quixote* it would not be possible to know that it might have been created independently by different writers at different times: this information is not part of the text's signification as in the case of 'cape'. Goodman seems, therefore, to think that understanding what a text signifies and applying it to convey its possible meanings is a process of *interpretation* homologous to producing a text that happens to coincide syntactically with an existing one (which could stand as an interpretation in a marginal sense). Controversial as this may sound, it is in fact conceivable, given that Goodmanian 'meaning' is extensional (see § *6*). On this account, we learn what 'cape' is (viz. we interpret its 'meaning') by putting together all the instances where it applies as a predicate; we learn what *Don Quixote* is by putting together the version by M. de Cervantes and the (syntactically identical) version by (the fictional) P. Menard.

Still, even if we concede all this, the outcome no better justifies Goodman's preferences. Because, from the comparison in (ii) above, it follows that, if there are two syntactically identical texts, then they must constitute interpretations of each other, in the sense of constituting the extension of a corresponding predicate or a work (as a 'character'). But if we accept that a text constitutes an interpretation of its syntactically twin text, then from (i) we end up with two different

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54 'Cape' signifies 'headland', and a garment similar to a short cloak. *Don Quixote* here refers to the classic text by M. de Cervantes, and to an imaginary, much later replica of it, independently written by P. Menard (in the story devised by J. L. Borges; see *RP*: 61–62).

works (since interpretations are distinct works), and not with two inscriptions of the same work. And this result is contrary to what Goodman seeks; as I mentioned earlier, he nowhere allows for such a treatment concerning the identity of literary works.

Incidentally, one of the ensuing implications is that Goodman has to totally deflate the significance of literary intentionality, since authorial intentions would suffice to differentiate between 'the' text and its 'twin'—contrary to Goodman's treatment. The texts, taken together with the name of their genuine author, e.g., would no longer be indistinguishable, even if trivially so. Goodman cannot allow this:

> To deny that I have read *Don Quixote* if my copy, though correctly spelled in all details, happens to have been accidentally produced by a mad printer in 1500, or by a mad computer in 1976, seems to me utterly untenable. [*MM*: 141.]

Goodman's conviction is that, at least in literature, 'we can study the results independently of the thoughts of the makers' (*PP*: 125). Apart from the need for a measure of work-identification and preservation (instantiated by the text itself as a character in a language), Goodman finds additional reasons for this insistence on an inscriptional approach. He feels, for example, that he has to reject the absolutist view according to which the work means exactly what its maker intended it to (*RP*: 44–45). Total reliance on supposed authorial intentions might prove frustrating, if not irrelevant. 'Whether or not the author's intention yields an interpretation, it certainly does not yield *the* interpretation of a text.' (*RP*: 55.) And, what is more,

> it is not unusual for a work to have correct interpretations that its author cannot understand. (Consider, for example, Freudian interpretations of *Hamlet*.) Works whose authors are monkeys or machines are simply limiting cases of this phenomenon. [*RP*: 63–64.]

On the other hand, Goodman of course recognizes that the makers' intentions are inevitably involved in the setting up of symbol systems (the arts included). As we have seen in many other instances, a certain variable can make an important difference, without thereby asserting itself as a necessary criterion. For example, Elgin 1991: 93 confirms that the artist's intentions, although often obscure or even impenetrable, can indeed play a role in determining the artwork's interpretation; but in no way can this role be a privileged role. Accordingly, Sirridge 1980: 398 thinks that authorial intentions can easily be accommodated within Goodman's theory, because, of course, 'it is no objection to a general theory that it is not equivalent to some more specific version of it'. Indeed, the later Goodman seems once more to be undermining his insistence on inscriptionalism concerning textual interpretation and authorial intentions. His suggestion in *MM*: 142 is that an artwork is of course not the physical object but the way it functions (cf. 'found

objects'). It follows that we can also ascribe different functional roles to a given text, interpreting a copy of *Don Quixote* now as the Spanish classic, now as a syntactical look-alike independently authored by (J. L. Borges's) P. Menard. In which case, one cannot really hold that the significance of the two texts is the 'split' significance of one work. (Cf. Janaway 1992.)[55]

FOLLOWING THIS BY and large ambiguous condemnation of any extra-textual characteristic as determining the identity of the literary work, the general impression is that Goodman's intransigent reliance on textual syntax may have had two principal sources. (i) The literary work is a special case in that it is a work of / in language. So, while pictures and sounds remain always in an external relation towards the discourse that seeks to interpret them, texts do not. There is always a point where the work and its commentary begin to merge: the moment I am asked to describe my understanding of a literary work I start producing another text, my own commentary (whereas I do not always interpret pictures by pictures). (ii) Similarly, even the recitation of a text crucially involves all the nuances of signification invested on it by the reader: even the most intelligent or moving text becomes virtually incomprehensible under certain recitations.

This perhaps describes the background behind Goodman's decision to concentrate on the work as text, namely as a notational, reproducible, and transitively identifiable character in the symbol system of language. But, certainly, there are levels of aesthetic significance lying beyond such an 'aesthetics of literary conservation'. To mention some extreme ones, the intermingling of text and commentary is not something to be avoided on all grounds; e.g., we might wish to forego the concept of 'a work' as an autonomous, self-enclosed textual entity. Or, in parallel, we could transpose our conception of literature back to a prenotational era when works were the instantaneous products of the rhapsodists' genius. The welcome paradox is that, whenever Goodman happens to refer to literary works unrestrained by the requirements of notationality, he is in fact providing some arguments in favour of such diverse renderings. He speaks of words both as inscriptions and as utterances, as writings and as readings, all illuminating one another; as symbols that transform themselves depending on the function they serve and on their history of production; as symbols that reach beyond themselves, managing to somehow capture what is being referred to. In fact, I see

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55 Davies 1991: *ad loc.* 340*f* makes here plausible use of Goodman's notion of artistic style (see § *14* below). Goodmanian 'style' consists in those features that determine the origin of a work in time. Granted that stylistic properties are indispensable for appreciating the work, then the work cannot be coinciding merely with an arrangement of words. It necessarily includes the process or act through which this arrangement of words was generated.

many similarities between music and literature in Goodman's account (is it not, after all, that all utterances could be characters in properly notated musical scores?). And the fact that Goodman is more explicit in this respect about music than about literature is perhaps balanced by the fact that music's case was more complicated, and thus pressing. Scores were conceived as characters in both syntactically *and*, at large, semantically articulate systems—whereas texts are inherently part of the dense semantics of language, and thus less amenable to complete codification. (Or, in the end, energy and time were no longer in abundance; Goodman was eighty-six years old when *RP* was published, introducing the explicit amendments to which I have been referring.)

As with pictures and sounds, there can always be of course a 'reactionary' insistence on syntax, claiming that what essentially matters is sameness of articulation rather than similarity of reference (cf. Schwartz 1993: *ad loc.* 109*f*). But as far as Goodman's case is concerned overall, literature—when consistently interpreted within the framework of the Goodmanian theory of symbols—retains its symbological 'depth' (or, in correct Goodmanian terminology, its symbologically unbounded 'extension'). If we enjoy going back to the same picture to 'uncover' the work, and if singers can enjoy their performance in solitude (the performance being fundamentally about the work itself), then silent readers can also be essentially contributing something towards making the text what it is understood to be. While the writer produces a text, it is up to the reader(s) to participate in the process of understanding it, namely in the process of discovering its place in a symbological nexus of meaning: what it is about, what is shows forth or exemplifies or expresses, what it alludes to, what makes it, in short, indispensable in its contribution towards our apprehension of what needs to be referred to (sc. everything, for Goodman). Like looking at and listening to, reading can be taken—under Goodmanian specifications—as another name for understanding and interpreting (cf. the extract from Gadamer, introducing this section).

13. (5=1)? SYMPTOMS OF THE AESTHETIC

I have been examining Goodman's theory of symbols, and his aesthetics as an integral part of this peculiar, permeating symbology. I have been talking, almost indiscriminately, about paintings, numbers, and thermometers, or about novels and maps. I have been referring to features pertaining more to this or to that art form, and about the symbological structuring of reference in what is in different cases recognized as an artwork. But symbols and systems, syntax and semantics, the possible repeatability of internal structure and the uniqueness of its symbological nexus of reference—this would hardly answer to any ordinary preoccupations of aesthetic theory. But we must be reminded that the pervasive question Goodman has been addressing is a question concerning not what artworks are but where exactly and how they are situated at the junctions of a symbological continuum. In other words, it appears that 'the aesthetic', is for Goodman a mode of reference rather than a property of certain entities; it is a topology of symbological functioning (cf. p. *75* above).

Thus, traditional definitions that provide the 'necessary and sufficient' criteria for something to fall under a category are not to be expected in Goodman. As he puts it, 'a definition of hydrogen gives us no ready way of telling how much of the gas is in this room' (*LA*: 95). (The other point to take note of is that no claim for any alleged impossibility or uselessness of definitions is propounded, either.) Weitz's well-known critique (1970–71) that the concepts of aesthetics and of art are open, 'subject to perennial debate and disagreement' (: 487), both apply and fail to apply in Goodman's case, whose primary objective is to cancel the boundaries dividing the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic, rather than make the dividing lines fuzzy: boundaries become degrees or modes of symbological functioning.[56] Goodman here wishes to invoke the notion of a paradigm shift, reminding us that 'the classification of materials according to the proportions of earth, air, fire, and water they contain has yielded to a better system' (*PP*: 134).

Another implication of this 'paradigm shift' is that aesthetic considerations do not merely aim at the bestowal of merit awards to the 'best' artworks, but also concentrate on the scrutiny of work classification and characterization from a symbological point of view. The pervasive role of symbols (and of artworks as symbols, or symbols within systems) consists in that everything that can be said about art and its products certainly has to be conceived in terms of reference. And reference to the symbol and to its denotata amounts to the uncovering and the promotion of knowledge about what it is that makes them significant (if at all). In his familiar sharpness of style, Goodman asserts that

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[56] Cf. especially p. *196f* below (from my Appendix to the third chapter).

> judging the excellence of works of art or the goodness of people is not the best way to understand them. And a criterion of artistic merit is no more the major aim of aesthetics than a criterion of virtue is the major aim of psychology. [*PP*: 121.] Being a work of art no more implies being a good work than being a sentence implies being a true one. [*MM*: 138.]

If aesthetic merit enters Goodman's discussion at all, then it is a secondary subject of interest, or a subject where what he has to say is more part of his epistemology than part of his aesthetics (I am temporarily postponing further relevant considerations until my second chapter). At any rate, as late as 1997 Goodman still thinks (: 19–20) that the so-called 'peculiar' pleasure and value inhabiting art is not at all the subject proper of aesthetics. He disowns without reserve the task of the value-critique of art often assigned to the unsuspecting philosopher.[57] If it is accurate to say that the philosophy of anything and that thing itself (as presented within the same level of philosophical discourse) are two separate realms, it must also be accurate to say, for Goodman, that philosophy and art criticism are wholly different enterprises. The philosopher does not decide, as a philosopher, on the relevant merits of artworks, but examines the considerations and the means that might have led others (experts or not) to such axiological decisions (cf. *LA*: 119). If linked to art criticism at all, philosophy of art might be described, along these lines, as a meta-art-criticism. (Cf. p. 42 of my Introduction.)

Consequently, instead of criteria for something to qualify as aesthetic Goodman can only offer what he calls 'symptoms', namely special 'earmark' conditions or features; and although these are

> *severally* neither sufficient nor necessary for aesthetic experience, they may be *conjunctively* sufficient and *disjunctively* necessary; perhaps, that is, an experience is aesthetic if it has all these attributes and only if it has at least one of them. [*LA*: 254.]

The definition of 'symptom' is to be found in Wittgenstein 1964: 24–25. (This seems perhaps ironic, given the asystematic and anti-definitional vein of Wittgenstein's late writings. Goodman does not refer to Wittgenstein in this, or any other, context in his work—although he does acknowledge him as a 'great mind'; see Goodman 1978*b*: 504.[58]) A symptom is a 'phenomenon of which experience

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[57] For instance, that is why in *PP*: 146—reviewing *Art and Illusion*—Goodman criticizes Gombrich's rushed condemnation of abstract expressionism.

[58] Cf. also *MM*: 191: 'I find Wittgenstein exciting, original, and suggestive; but he treats a topic as a cat does a mouse, teasing it, leaving it, pouncing again. My own efforts are more of the bulldog sort. I try to follow through with certain insights, with certain techniques, and make systematic connections. I once said that science is systematization, and philosophy for me involves organization. Wittgenstein looks at philosophy as spot therapy for particular confusions and says he can stop →

has taught us that it coincided, in some way or other, with the phenomenon which is our defining criterion'. For instance, if a bacillus is the defining criterion for an inflammation, a sore throat is the symptom of that inflammation.

With his theory of the symptoms of the aesthetic, Goodman makes it clear that aesthetics is an abstraction from his theory of symbols: out of all the unrestrained multitude of symbological relations, those that exhibit the 'symptoms'—and to the degree that they do—are the ones deemed 'aesthetic'.[59] Concerning this lack of definitiveness, Sparshott 1974: 199 realizes that 'Goodman seems to have carefully blocked every avenue to understanding what he is talking about. One can only speculate about what he might be leaving unsaid, or what else he might have said.' If this is in a sense accurate, then I think it is precisely reflective of Goodman's attitude in this respect. Defining the kinds of reference comprising the range of the aesthetic is an inherently incomplete task: it depends on how we can detect the symptoms, interpret them, modulate their scope and their importance. In the end, symptoms do not convey a great deal of information about the nature of the 'disease', and it is this kind of information that Goodman would rather pursue and vindicate. (Again, until my fuller exposition in the second chapter, I have to caution against any hasty prejudgement about what kind of information this might be.)

The symptoms of the aesthetic are stated and briefly described in *LA*: 252–253 and in *PP*: 111. They are as follows.

(1.) *Syntactic density* (of symbol schemes). Borrowed from Goodman's theory of notationality (along with semantic density, sc. the second symptom), it helps distinguish, for example, representational schemes from articulate ones. Drawings are syntactically dense, as opposed to novels or symphonies (taken as characters in a scheme). But a parallel relation holds between, say, mercury thermometers and digital ones (non-aesthetic schemes). Furthermore, even in the field of schemes otherwise accepted as pertaining to the aesthetic, syntactic density underwent some additional devaluation in Goodman's work (see especially pp. *72*, *94* above), since several *non*-dense throughout schemes of denotative symbols were indeed shown to be aesthetically significant (cf. digital pictures).

(2.) *Semantic density* (of symbol systems). Ordinary languages are semantically dense, while proper notational systems are semantically articulate. Draw-

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whenever he wants to—although of course he never wants to. I do philosophy because I can't stop.'

59 At an unsuspected time (and while adopting an increasingly critical stance vis-à-vis nominalism), C. S. Peirce had expressed his worries that the nominalistic concentration on symptoms rather than criteria could prove unscientific (as when a disease is confused with its symptoms; see Haack 1977: 377). That aesthetics may not be 'scientific' is, at any rate, hardly a problematic prospect (and not only for Goodman).

ings, together this time with novels, admit of variable designations, but the musical notes making up the score of a symphony (ideally) correspond to a fixed pitch, and their relative position towards the surrounding tones can always be calculated. Again, since semantic articulateness applies (albeit marginally) to scores, it follows that such non-dense throughout systems are still aesthetically significant. Conversely (and more importantly), the semantic density of texts is in place whether we are dealing with a novel or, e.g., with a cake recipe.

(3.) *Relative syntactic repleteness.* This symptom is important because it shows how the different species of representational symbols can be distinguished (possibly into more aesthetic and less aesthetic ones). Ordinary pictures, for example, differ significantly from graphic diagrams, although the difference cannot be established optically or 'pictorially'. For example: a scientific chart curve conveys data according to its co-ordinates on a graded two-dimensional scale, but the visible qualities of the actual line demarcating this single curve (colour, thickness, shadow, and combinations thereof) are of no interest in themselves. In contrast, a similar looking curve, drawn in order to depict the outlined figure of a mountain, makes full use of all these visible qualities, acquiring different significance and pictorial value according to them. This is one of Goodman's favourite examples, where—in his terminology—the scientific curve is described as attenuate, while the mountain drawing as replete: repleteness depends 'on the comprehensiveness of the set of features that are constitutive of the characters of the scheme' (*PP*: 111). It requires all of our efforts to discriminate and, in a way, to measure the referential 'depth' of the syntactic make-up of a symbol. Notions like depths and intensions are of course something of a taboo for Goodman's vocabulary, but, however its import is formulated, I think that repleteness conveys very well the need to turn to, and scrutinize the symbols themselves in the multitude of their syntactical subtleties. 'To turn to the symbols' is of course not to turn to anything especially more 'symbolic' than anything else; for, in the context of Goodman's symbology, everything that is, is symbologically. Lack of referential connotations is utter incomprehensibility—or rather simple absence of all candidates for comprehensibility.

(4.) *Exemplification.* (Cf. § 7.) Like repleteness, this is a greatly effective symptom, in that it allows for a relatively clearer distinction between what is more part of an aesthetic rather than of a non-aesthetic symbological structure. It is one of the most striking features of an artwork that it can be itself what it is supposed to present us with, in both literal and metaphorical terms (metaphorical exemplification being *expression*). Unlike the indifference of denotational reference towards the individuality of symbols (anything can stand for almost anything), exemplification demonstrates the power of art to function as an individual example (either concrete or not) of what it is that it refers to (or of the 'meanings' it instantiates). Thus, the value of an artwork as an exemplifying symbol is rediverted towards itself, towards the fact that its *own* presence tries to compensate

for the concurrent unavailability of its referents. In the sciences, it is not as easy to identify instances of exemplification, either literal or metaphorical: the sky over the horizon-curve in a book of physics does not need any colouring; and the words 'sad person' in a psychological treatise (or on this page) cannot have anything sad about them—in the same way that a professional behaviourist's logbook cannot purport to be a literary novel concentrating on the misery (or whatever else) of its depicted subjects.[60]

Above all, then, exemplification 'exemplifies' this Goodmanian impetus for finding out and understanding the nuances of the referential routes comprising, in effect, our world (under a particular description). Lammenranta 1992 thinks that exemplification has thus become either too broad or too narrow a condition for discriminating the aesthetic. It is too broad and vacuous since it allows for the possibility that all artworks exemplify some of their (literal or metaphorical) properties. It is too narrow since it is defined in terms of the 'cognitive' value of artworks, and obviously, for Lammenranta, many artworks (especially non-representational ones) have no cognitive function. Assuming that by 'condition' Lammenranta intends 'symptom' rather than 'criterion' (the latter having been a notion that Goodman rejected), Goodmanian theory could probably withstand such objections. On one hand, aesthetic cognitivism is an ambiguous designation, and it is not at all certain that Goodman's version is the version Lammenranta rejects. As it will become more evident in my second chapter, cognition is for Goodman a comprehensive label, almost synonymous with understanding the ways in which symbols function. On the other hand, the fact that exemplification pertains to all artworks already contributes towards an initial distinction between art and non-art. But, most characteristically for Goodman, distinctions of this sort, classifications of things as artworks or not, is of far lesser importance than this aforementioned understanding of the ways that things function as the symbols that they are, under certain viewpoints and descriptions. (Their possible aesthetic status is, so to speak, one of these descriptions; no claim to universal and rigid designation can be made about it.)

(5.) *Multiple and complex reference.* Added in *WW*: 68, this fifth symptom of the aesthetic applies, as Goodman says, 'where a symbol performs several integrated and interacting referential functions'. Referential paths are often only indirectly identifiable, because every symbol and its referents can enter, in turn, within further correlations with other symbols and referents, and so on. The

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60 This is not to say that exemplification is altogether unimportant in the sciences (*RP*: 20). Apart from all the literal features that models and arguments *secondarily* exemplify for the scientific mind, they can also be expressive: 'Gödel's proof is, and presents itself as, powerful. In so doing, it metaphorically exemplifies power.' (Elgin 2001: 686.) Perhaps this is indicative of the aesthetic aspects of science, rather than of the 'scientific' aspects of exemplification (cf. p. *135* below).

chains of reference from denotatum to referent as denotatum for another referent, and so on, is not strictly transitive (cf. p. *66* above), and thus not always traceable (*LA*: 65–66). Even a simple picture, say, of an eagle can be said to symbolize freedom only through a shorter or longer chain of reference, which involves the invocation of birds, concepts, pictures, stories; the chain as a whole is not an instance either of denotational or of exemplificational reference, but a complex thereof (*MM*: 63, 70). And, apart from these two major branches of symbolization (sc. denotation and exemplification), multiple and complex reference can involve additional and equally diverse modes: in his later writings, Goodman devotes a lot of attention to *quotation*, *allusion*, and *variation*, as apprehended in both technical and non-technical contexts.[61] (Actually, it seems that this interaction of various referential modes was reflected, at roughly parallel times, in Goodman's own multimedia productions; see p. *39* of my Introduction). It is easy to realize that multiple and complex reference can be readily applied *par excellence* in referential contexts that would support aesthetic interests and experiences: multiplicity and complexity attract attention *to* themselves *through* themselves, and they demand a continuous effort in order to disclose the ever expanding, or the ever intensifying, signification of artworks as symbols.[62]

CONCERNING THE IMPORT of this theory of symptoms, Goodman remains unequivocal, even after the addition of the fifth symptom. His prevalent concern is to emphasize that symptoms are not necessary and are not criteria. To wit,

> even for these five symptoms to come somewhere near being disjunctively necessary and conjunctively (as a syndrome) sufficient might well call for some redrawing of the vague and vagrant borderlines of the aesthetic. [*WW*: 68–69; similarly, *MM*: 135]

All Goodman can positively assert about the symptoms is that they conjunctively make the presence of an aesthetic dimension more probable, enabling us, at best, to doubt that 'what is aesthetic often lacks all of them' (*MM*: 135). Which, to be sure, does not amount to saying that to have more of the symptoms is to be

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61 Already in *LA*: 65–66 Goodman had suggested that in such cases reference is neither denotational nor exemplificational (cf. p. *66* above).

62 McDonell 1983 attempts to introduce a *succinctness* criterion (with *diffuseness* as its opposite). The aim is to show that pictures differ decisively from words not in being referentially more specific (syntactically non-differentiated and, thus, self-subsistent), but because they present through their intricate symbol-webs more 'layers' of information, indispensable for proper aesthetic assessment. This criterion could serve, in my view, as something like a combination of Goodman's repleteness and complex reference symptoms.

'more' aesthetic (*MM*: 137). 'Density, repleteness, and exemplification, then, are earmarks of the aesthetic; articulateness, attenuation, and denotation, earmarks of the nonaesthetic.' (*LA*: 254.) As for exemplification and complex reference in particular, they are singled out by Goodman in *MM*: 135–136, as conspicuously linked with the aesthetic rather than with the non-aesthetic.

Following on from this résumé of the symptoms as 'earmarks', it would be accurate to say (as I have done in the previous sections above) that density can be found to have its interpretative limits. Repleteness, being a matter of syntax, probably cannot bear the full content of what makes art (and, indeed, all systematic symbolization) worthwhile. And complex reference is really a combination of the elemental referential relations—albeit in the way that makes the sum greater, in a sense, than its parts.

Consequently, I have often liked to think that Goodman's collection of the five symptoms of the aesthetic, which were initially four, are actually three—the following two: exemplification. Although a flagrant exaggeration, this overemphasis on exemplification conveys in my opinion very well the dual status of the aesthetic symbol, permeating all of Goodman's relevant writings: its symbological multi-dimensionality on the one hand, and its inherent value on the other. Symbological fertility does not cancel the irreplaceable individuality of the work, despite the fact that the work is literally and metaphorically significant to the degree, precisely, that it designates *other* things (besides being *itself*). This interweaving of what the work is, and its being so by means of what it refers to, is achieved through all the diversity of referential routing, taken as a whole. And it is paradigmatically instantiated by the exemplificational relation, whereby the work fundamentally refers to itself, to its own features, as well as designating the features of its referents. The reason, then, to think of exemplification in more emphatic terms is the fact that the discovery and appreciation of what is exemplified requires for Goodman a constant and ever discriminating power of attending to the work; to what it presents us with now, as well as to the authenticity of its unique provenance.

Incidentally, the artwork's own status as an individual symbol is perhaps linked to a notion of iconicity, in the Peircean sense (cf. p. *52* above)—even if 'individual' does not necessarily mean 'concrete'. Goodman of course opposed this kind of semiotic treatment by rejecting pictorial resemblance as a necessary attribute of depiction. Still, in the end, when he reluctantly had to face what he called a 'ghost of likeness' as 'nondifferentiation' (see p. *95* above), he may have been responding to the requirements of exemplification, following its consequences to their full. This is not to say that he revised his way of thinking in a cardinal way. Perhaps, in cases like that, his theory of symbols becomes in some respects a theory of *signs*, as it were, and *symbols*, i.e. a theory of works as recognizable things *and* as symbols for other things and qualities. Nevertheless, Goodman always seems to possess the means for subsuming the perceived thing and its referents under a functional model of symbological reference: maybe, af-

ter all, (concrete or not) individuality of things is nothing but a shorthand description for their functional specificity as symbols.

Thus, in the remaining sections of this chapter, I shall be examining the work of art as a more clearly outlined Goodmanian symbol, conceived at a topological junction: specifically as a self-subsisting entity, and, more generally, under its designation as one of the variable regions of symbological reference.

14. FROM TIME TO STYLE

> Obviously, subject is what is said, style is how. A little less obviously, that formula is full of faults. [*WW*: 23.]

For Goodman, 'whoever looks for art without symbols [...] will find none—if all the ways that works symbolize are taken into account. Art without representation or expression or exemplification—yes; art without all three—*no*.' (*WW*: 66.) This is the touchstone for anything presenting itself as a work of art: *functioning* as a symbol in certain ways (*loc. cit.*; also 69). Any other segregation—into *what* kinds of things are art and what are not—fails: it cannot, in effect, make any decisive distinction between mere objects and found art, environmental art, conceptual art, etc. (*WW*: 66).[63] Goodman's insistence on function rather than substance (the question of '*when* art is' rather than '*what*'; see *WW*: ch. IV) is often a point of critical approval. Nevertheless, it should not lead to the implication that the question of *what* art is becomes totally and permanently obsolete for Goodman:

> The further question of defining stable property in terms of ephemeral function—the what in terms of the when—is not confined to the arts but is quite general, and is the same for defining chairs as for defining objects of art. The parade of instant and inadequate answers is also much the same: that whether an object is art—or a chair—depends upon intent or upon whether it sometimes or usually or always or exclusively functions as such. Because all this tends to obscure more special and significant questions concerning art, I have turned my attention from what art is to what art does. [*WW*: 70.]

It is perhaps one thing to define the kinds of things that are to be taken as art, and another thing to define art; definition in the latter case can avoid the invocation of ontology by an appeal, e.g., to function through symbological reference. If anti-essentialism of this sort has dominated both analytic and continental aesthetics of the second half of the twentieth century (as Kelly 1998: xi recognizes), then Goodman is certainly no exception.[64] And the emphasis on this kind of anti-essentialism also becomes an emphasis against formalism. This is a welcome implication for Goodman's ever-present anti-formalistic rigour, which stems pre-

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63 Ross 1981 (: *ad loc.* 384) compares here Goodman's view with the institutional theory of A. C. Danto and G. Dickie. The plausibility of the link (also supported by Adam 1983) could be asserted, for Ross, by reading Goodman's theory of meaning and convention (see below for the latter) in the light of H. P. Grice's relevant contribution.

64 In my Appendix to the third chapter below, I am referring more specifically to matters of definition in traditional aesthetic theory.

cisely from the fact that his aesthetics is fundamentally an aesthetics of reference, where there can be no 'pure' form bearing inherent significance, offered for appreciative study in and for itself (cf. Brentlinger 1970: 207). It must be emphasized that such formalistic significance lies below self-reference (the latter notably pertaining to the case of exemplification), i.e. below the minimum level of reference. Because whenever form somehow manages to refer to itself (e.g. in purely 'abstract' painting) then its aesthetic value should be described for Goodman more in exemplificational terms, as e.g. 'making some relations of colour and line manifest'. Colour and line alone, pleasing or displeasing as they might be in isolated contemplation (if such a thing is possible at all), cannot possess aesthetic value in Goodman's terms. As Arnheim 1983 suggests, Goodman's conception of the artwork as living and having a history of change discloses the fact that thinking of something as either a specific artwork or not is a dichotomous form of thinking: 'works of art are events occurring in time. They change appearance while they survive in the minds of successive generations.' (: 240; cf. also 244.)

Evidently, then, within Goodman's symbology, the question of the *when* (/ *where* / *how*) of artworks has taken precedence over the *what* kinds of things they might be (cf. p. *75* above). And the *when* is clearly a question of function (cf. *MM*: 197–198. From this viewpoint, any conception of style as the mode of presenting a certain subject has to be re-structured: the subject matter *is* (also) the way it is presented—and *vice versa*; see below.) Goodman does not entertain any ontological concerns, but is instead interested in constructing a conception of the artwork as an intersection of diverse symbological functions. Temporality is integrated into this kind of functioning, and Goodman had always been interested in formally exploring the question of time, with interesting and insightful results (which I cannot fully pursue here; see *SQ*: ch. XI, *SA*: ch. XI). Reference takes place in time; it is the process whereby relations are formed and evolve; and, simultaneously, it is a process that directly reflects these relations on the level of *pragmatics*: reference occurs so long as it is controlled by the human as an *animal symbol[og]icum*. Learning how to adopt, manage, and eventually modify symbological practices and habits constitutes, for Goodman, the supporting ground for nurturing the symbological universe. He feels thus compelled to thematize this dimension of historicity, and make it an organic aspect of his account of symbolization. I have already shown how temporality enters the very identity of the artwork, irreversibly moulding it into an unrepeatable symbological junction-point. Before trying more generally to justify or explicate Goodman's almost religious adherence to practice as the generator of meanings in time (something that will take up some of the second chapter below), I wish here to explore this dimension of time and practice as a dimension that concludes and puts into per-

spective what Goodman had to say up to this point about the artwork and its aesthetic status.[65]

AN ISSUE OF initial concern is Goodman's apprehension of what exactly 'practice' designates. 'Precept', 'habit', 'entrenchment', 'fit' are notions that recursively appear in Goodman's work, employed for the legitimization of the way we pursue the arts and the sciences. Goodmanian practice is not dependent on artistic or scientific merit (/ truth / rightness), but determines this merit (*RP*: 160). We do not follow a habit because it is the best thing to do (under some particular circumstances); on the contrary, what is entrenched and habitual qualifies as the best. What has survived time and has been handed down through practice automatically reveals that it has actually been diachronically effective: it is not the case that what is best survives, but the converse. 'Habit must be recognized as an integral ingredient of truth. Though that may give pause, it follows as the day the night.' (*MM*: 38.) If this treatment of habit indicates that Goodman's theory has been infiltrated by a stale historicism of tradition, then the usual objection is raised: how is creativity possible? However, Goodman's effort in this respect is to avoid an emphasis on the conservative effects of established practice: 'change through adjustment to new elements' is continual, even if normally gradual (*RP*: 161). This Goodman never overlooks, and always regards as one of the most important functions of symbol systems. And, in order to avoid a rigid traditionalism, the alternative option Goodman seems to be cultivating is one where tradition does not point back to any myth of 'original' or 'natural' eventualities. Goodmanian entrenchment fundamentally refers to *accidents* 'repeated over and over'. It does not, therefore, lay a claim on whether there was a (rationalist, empiricist, or other) foundation that gave birth to a postulated *initial* accident, which, in turn, produced the history of its successions. (Nor, let me add, does it preclude any such foundational claim from being proposed and expounded; cf. 1978*a*: 281.) Contingency of practice refers to the identity and nature of what is practised; but it is only the link itself leading from the accident perceived as initial to the concurrent practice that circumscribes the scope of entrenchment. More often than not, we do not know why we follow the practices we do, and even if we *did* succeed in finding out some of the reasons, the import of practice would not dramatically be altered.[66]

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65 Time and practice, practice in time, implies a conception of time as being formed directionally, as moving along rather than just changing—what E. Moutsopoulos calls *pointed time* (*'kairos'*; see Apostolopoulou 1999: 364).

66 Accordingly, and in response to Cohen 1993 (: section 2), Prinz 1993 (: section 1) suggests that Goodman's notion of practice need not involve any position about how words acquire their meanings or extensions; their *use* is of sole importance.

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At this point, it is appropriate to invoke the fact that, in the preceding sections, I have more than once made mention of what is perceived as conventional, artificial, natural, cultural, and the like (in the context, e.g., of signs and other symbols, or of pictures and other descriptions). Not unexpectedly, in the framework of Goodmanian practice, function, and symbolization, the question of convention arises frequently. For, if symbological relations are a matter of habit, and habit is somehow determined by extra-subjective or 'objective' restrictions, imposed by an alleged 'way the world is', then habit—and, along with it, symbolization—might after all be subject to some fundamental control by what is truly best, real, etc. Namely, if symbolization is in fact a matter of imposed rather than agreed relations, then it ceases really to respond to basic Goodmanian requirements. This problem seems to constitute yet another version of the resemblance versus denotation controversy, and Goodman will need to render 'convention' (and its opposite) in a way that will divest it from 'naturalistic' connotations.

He is of course conscious of the semantic ambiguities of 'convention', and he takes advantage of them: 'conventional' may signify the 'artificial' as against the 'natural', but it may also signify the orthodox as against the heterodox. 'Thus we may have unconventional conventions (unusual artifices) and conventional nonconventions (familiar facts).' (*RP*: 93.) Goodman, in other words, maintains that referential conventions are far from arbitrary (as Robinson 1979: 74 does not fail to note); or, rather, that they follow already accepted relations, whether the latter can be described as 'natural' or 'artificial'. In this respect, Prinz 1993 (: section 1) suggests that Goodman equivocates between notions of the conventional as *normal* (usual, ordinary) and as *normative* (prescriptive, arbitrarily imposed, artificial). This is not, I think, adversely consequential: convention is for Goodman conventional as far as it follows the norm; and it can do that whether, on other grounds, the norm was based on 'artificially' or 'naturally' established links.

After all, what is crucial for symbology are the 'routes' rather than the 'roots' of reference (cf. p. 57 above). In the pertinent case of language, for example, Goodman's indifference to the 'roots' of convention, his indifference to the 'initial accidents' that were taken up and propagated by practice, is also pervasive: labels and extensions (like pictures and denotative symbols) are not crucially determined by any notion of natural, inherent links. One might readily object that linguistic signs may have been adopted on a conventional basis, but this does not mean there are no exceptions—cf. the case of onomatopoeia. Plato had already been forced to admit both conventionalist and naturalistic criteria (1901–07: *Cratylus* 435 c; cf. Annas 1982, Schofield 1982, Williams 1982). And if we turned to recent findings in scientific anthropology, it would still be difficult to make any decisions concerning the way language was first adopted and estab-

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Or, in Goodman's idiom, use is not determined by the applicability of labels (the opposite being actually the case).

lished by our ancient ancestors (see Dawkins 1998: 294–296, 310–311). However, even when convention as mere artificiality cannot adequately explain the adoption of linguistic signs or rules, the important thing to note is that the way these are interrelated is not arbitrary (cf. Morris 1938: 30).

In sum, conventionality does not amount to arbitrariness (i.e. a *quasi* chaotic pattern of choice), in the sense that it involves a requirement of committing ourselves to the rules—although the rules themselves might have been founded in a completely arbitrary or strictly naturalistic way, or both (in the process of their historical development). Since convention for Goodman signifies the norm above anything else, it is then primarily designed to reinforce, and to be reinforced, by the fact that without precisely this abiding conventionality of language the possibility of communication itself would hardly be imaginable (cf. Morris 1938: 35–38, 45–47). The issue in Goodman is not about any phylogenesis of language: Plato's problem of how 'names' where born is not an issue.

Carrier 1974 does not find any significant unravelling in Goodman's perception of convention versus originality. Artistic change does occur for Goodman, but the repeated appeal to a sense of human 'craving for novelty' remains with him a 'familiar and unsatisfactory suggestion' (: 283). It is perhaps to a certain extent true that Goodmanian conventionality is conceived in terms of the propagation of norms, and thus appears to be at a loss when faced with the question of creativity. However, since the norm is not a concrete event or action, Goodman would probably explain that the craving for originality is another form of accepted practice: what is valued and adopted is the new (the anti-conformist, the modernist, etc.).

> Shifts in standard can occur rather rapidly. The very effectiveness that may attend judicious departure from a traditional system of representation sometimes inclines us at least temporarily to install the newer mode as standard. We then speak of an artist's having achieved a new degree of realism, or having found new means for the aesthetic rendering of (say) light or motion. [*LA*: 37.]

In accordance with this, what seems to be more important than the historical 'roots' of convention in the framework of Goodmanian aesthetic theory, is not even the way in which art itself becomes a necessity in its historicity. (In case it really does; could art be interpreted, for instance, as a supposedly ineluctable need for making certain things to refer in certain ways? This is not part of Goodman's interest in aesthetics.) Theoretical priority is assigned to the workings of symbological functioning *in action*, with the aesthetic as one of its possible modes; or, aesthetics becomes part of Goodman's theory as a (greater rather than lesser) special interest in discovering and harnessing the peculiar symbological co-ordinates of works. There is neither necessary origin, nor necessary historical evolution in art. As far as his aesthetics is concerned, the only motivation behind Goodman's tireless elaboration of the artwork as a complex symbol is constant

variability and its scrutiny. This scrutiny leads him to regard the artwork's provenance in place and time as fundamentally constitutive of its identity—which is, thus, not only determined by its actually possessed, 'literal' aesthetic properties but also built up through its progressive existence in historical time. (In fact, insistence on the temporal, 'non-literal' context that gives rise to the artwork is part of the reason why I have been referring to Goodman's aesthetics as almost synonymous with his philosophy of the arts—to the exclusion of nature, that is.[67])

THE TERM 'STYLE' is introduced by the relatively later Goodman (see *WW*: *ad loc.* 34, 38–39) as a rubric for naming precisely all those features of a work that help us place it within a context of historical time, place, and identity of provenance. In this, style becomes a salient aesthetic notion; not surprisingly, it bears the mark of Goodman's philosophical temperament (when compared with more ordinary notions about style). I shall not be concerned with the question whether Goodman is (once more perhaps) guilty of conceptual aridity. I take his notion of style as plainly descriptive: the style of a work is all that, which identifies it, which makes it an individual singled out of the constant, habitual flow of creative practices. By contrast, Jacquette 2000 does detect here a circularity, in that we need to be able to distinguish what are the style-relevant features in order to characterize the style of a piece of art (: 459), namely the manner in which these features are conveyed. On the one hand, such criticism indicates that, *pace* Goodman, 'style' is not regarded as describing, but as prescribing what Goodman considers as stylistic features. On the other hand, if Jacquette (*ibid.*: 458) had not refused to examine Goodman's symptoms of the aesthetic, it might have been possible for the charge of circularity to be reviewed. For Goodman, the *how* and the *what* of works is not strictly distinguishable; it is not the case that an artwork's subject and the rendition of the subject are separable. The distinction between form and content,

> insofar as it is clear at all, does not coincide with but cuts across the distinction between what is style and what is not. Style comprises certain characteristic features both of what is said and of how it is said, both of subject and of wording, both of content and of form. [*WW*: 27.] That style is by definition characteristic of an author or period or region or school does not

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67 Smith B H 1970: 563 accuses Goodman of having conflated art and nature (in the way that she thinks Goodman conflates text and literary work, or history and fiction). This might be true as far as formal 'literal' qualities are concerned; but, even for Goodman, nature is neither temporally structured, nor otherwise symbologically 'created'. This is not to say, however, that either nature or art cannot have an aesthetic dimension—or, rather, a kalological one (see my third chapter).

> reduce it to a device for attribution; rather, so far as aesthetics is concerned, attribution is a preliminary or auxiliary to or a byproduct of the perception of style. [*WW*: 38.]

Finding out anything about the work is finding out about its style. The symptoms of the aesthetic are perhaps the most useful available instruments for the assessment of stylistic features *à la* Goodman. Although their results are non-definitive, these symptoms are the appropriate means devised for measuring the importance of artworks both syntactically and semantically, and for assigning to them a unique identity of the *who*, the *when*, and the *where* of their creation. Stylistic features proliferate along with aesthetic ones. I think that Jenny 2000, by looking at exemplification as the model of stylistic differentiation in Goodman, is closer to what my own study indicates. Style is in fact for Jenny a hierarchy of 'open' exemplifications (: 108, 110), where what matters is not so much the ostensibly essential or existent, but the pointed at, emphasized, 'found' in a process of *deixis* (112). As I have underlined, the overarching importance of exemplification lies in the fact that the polysemy of symbological reference, which extends from the symbol to its referents, is also reverted towards the symbol itself: this is what must, in effect, be the foundational web of relations that keeps itself apart as aesthetic. To identify it is to discern its distinctive presence as (part of) a particular style.

As I mentioned at the beginning of this section, temporality in Goodman forms an integral part of the artwork's appreciation, of its positioning within a symbological frame of reference. Historical identity is generally indispensable for symbological functioning. In the case of aesthetic reference, historical attributes lead to an understanding of the artwork as a set of transmitted connotations and referential functions; and, at the same time, as a transmitter of such agreed upon, normal (and not normative) significations, which make it valuable in itself. In this sense, being able to locate the work in time and place, as well as within the human context of its creation, amounts to being able to discern its style and communicate with what it has been made to carry across fields of reference. The more discriminative our general sensibilities allow us to be, the more accurately we understand the artwork's style. Ultimately, this understanding is a process whereby the work's past history is to an extent determined by its present apprehension. (This is why when mere objects survive through history they invariably become aesthetic symbols.) Style itself, like the work which is uniquely determined by it, is a recapitulation of the work's history. But it is also *in* history—it almost has a life of its own—because the way we conceive the historical identity of the work (sc. its style) is inadvertently determined by our own position in history in a continuous process of mutual symbological insemination.

15. 'ATTEND CONSTANTLY TO THE SYMBOL ITSELF'[68]

Works of art are not specimens from bolts or barrels but samples from the sea. [*WW*: 137; similarly, *RP*: 22.]

Artworks are what they are only historically, and not merely because their function and prominence change frequently with the passage of time. When the artwork is identified with an object (say, a sculpture in a public space), its very perceivable features, too, undergo the processes of deterioration, preservation, and restoration (Goodman 1998; cf. my general motto on p. *25*). In this respect, even reproductions of artworks are instrumental in 'activating' (in Goodman's latest terminology) the originals by disseminating and protecting them from premature decay (: 325). Activating an artwork and what it does in this sense is synonymous with what the work actually is about; aesthetic function is what defines artworks (: 322). Thus, the special 'aura' of the originals 'has to be interpreted rather as a complex of the history of the work together with its associations, allusions, and other referential relationships' (: 325); it is not to be inextricably tied up to an ephemeral object as such. Of course, works in the allographic arts are amenable to the same treatment, because their allographicity is, in effect, a matter of contingent choices (concerning the perceived need for their preservation). The effort to 'preserve' and 'restore' musical or literary works is the constant effort to apprehend them through performance and hermeneutics. In fact, that works in the non-allographic arts are physically transmuted with time, and thus in need of being reproduced, is another manifestation of our similar efforts to understand them. (As I indicated earlier, autographicity and allographicity become the two sides of the same coin—the pursuit of the 'authentic' artwork; see p. *78f.*)

This description of the life of artworks is what the later Goodman (*MM*: VI,9) calls *implementation*. (The notion is alien, e.g., to *LA*; cf. Cometti 2000: 237.) Implementation is obviously akin to that of function and action, or 'activation' (cf. Goodman 1998). Artworks are not executed once and for all; and they may even be ordinary 'found' objects. What turns them into *artworks* is that they are precisely made to *work as art* (*MM*: 142–145). Their artistic status is directly correlated with their activation and their functioning as part of the symbological nexus of the aesthetic. This implies that anything can function as art, if it is activated in particular ways—if, that is, it is made to project some of the aesthetically most pertinent of its features. This is also to say that implementation and function seem to supersede the distinction of the aesthetic versus the artistic (cf. Cometti 2000: 240–241): anything can function aesthetically, whether natural or crafted. In this context, G. Genette has written about the artwork as the agglomerate, so to speak, of an immanent, 'literally' aesthetic element, and a transcen-

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[68] *WW*: 69.

dent dimension; the latter is none other than the aesthetic function of the former. The artwork is like a 'mere' object put in action, and hence aesthetically, in a sense, upgraded (see Gaiger 2001: 96–97). Goodman's oft-cited criticism of the role of the museum is based on similar grounds, because implementing artworks, i.e. 'making them work' as artworks, is 'the museum's major mission' (*MM*: 179); unfortunately, however, most museums as we know them may not always be providing the best of preconditions for such an undertaking (*MM*: 182).

These consequences all follow from Goodman's symbological universalism, the pervasive significance of his notion of symbolization. What I am most concerned with here, though, is the sense in which Goodman's theory in its closure seems to be using its earlier tools as mere auxiliaries. I mean that, in the end, the need to engage with the artwork and try to discover its ever-expanding significance cannot be completely captured and measured by syntax, semantics, symptoms, and the like. What all symptoms of the aesthetic tend to effect is only a diminution of the *nontransparency* of artworks (*WW*: 69), making the requirement of concentration upon them all the more urgent (*MM*: 137).[69] They are useful tools, and they will always bring us closer to the work, but without ever elucidating it with the light of a *total* symbological understanding. Nevertheless, even if such complete illumination could be effected, what would it bring about? Probably the extinction of the artwork, because, for Goodman, without the self-proliferation of referential polysemy there could be no aesthetic symbol. The symbol that is transparent through and through cannot really be an art symbol at all (it could be a traffic light or a scientific text, on the other hand). Michelis 1964–65: 142–143 talks of '*transparent* symbols', wishing thereby to signify that art's meanings 'transpire' (para-etymologically) through their referents, i.e. only indirectly, because not everything about them can be straightforwardly stated. (And Michelis goes on to refer to T. Lipps and his *Einfühlung* theory of empathy—which brings us also closer to S. K. Langer.[70])

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69 In R. Ingarden's phenomenological aesthetics (at least as perceived by Kolnai 1964 and Stróżewski 1999), the indeterminacy of artworks is forcefully asserted, to the effect that an artwork's physical actualization (or 'concretion') is only there as something to be completed by the observer—within legitimate boundaries (cf. Osborne 1972: 19). The final artistic creation is communal in its essence, and only schematically definable: 'There is no ideal concretization of the work.' (Stróżewski 1999: 15.)

70 Goodman is of course critical of theories of empathy (*LA*: 62), as every relation between symbols and what they express is a relation between labels and not necessarily and actually possessed properties (a criticism that is once more directed against the iconicity of reference). I would rather not speculate here on how consequential this difference is in determining the links between later Goodmanian theory and empathetic theories.

From the opposite perspective, what seems to have been a most pervasive feature of Goodman's philosophical endeavour is that everything there is to be understood, and everything there is to be answered, is confined within the scope of the individual's subjectivity. Even Goodman's conception of practice and habit (one of the most likely *loci* of inter-subjectivity) portrays a self-confident individual, oblivious to the significance of the other, but only, so to speak, living out of the by-products of the interrelation of the self and the other. Commenting on Bruner 1991, Elgin 1991: 94 observes:

> The self that Bruner finds is no fixed Cartesian ego locked away in the black box of the mind, but a malleable construct that both shapes and is shaped by events, its construal of them, and other people's construals of its construals. That Goodman didn't say this first is something of a surprise.

(In fact, Goodman may have held a related view at places like *SA*: 273. Note at any rate that, whenever 'other people' enter the discussion, they are only to serve as the self's mirror.)

That Goodman thus 'overlooks the importance of communities' (Meyer L N 1997: 11) seems to be a natural consequence of his individualism. After all, the tradition of philosophical analysis was a tradition where—consciously or unintentionally—the escape from social history and ideology had been a prerequisite (cf. Goodman's 'disillusionment with politics', in my Introduction, p. *40*; but cf. also p. *199* below). In this respect, Goodman belongs to, and puts his own signature in this tradition (as Engström 1992: 337 accepts; but see also part of my Introduction, p. *40f*).[71] Avoiding all discourse on subjectivity, historicity, and social axiology is of course, of itself, no good way to avoid the fact that one is well within their grip. French (and 'Franco-inspired') thought has especially dwelled on the significance of the socio-political context of the aesthetic. In Baetens's words (1988: 194) 'rien de plus idéologique, on le sait, que le refus de toute idéologie' ('nothing more ideological, we know, than the refusal of all ideology'). And in Bourdieu's (1987–88: 207):

> Far from leading to a historical relativism, the historization of the forms of thought which we apply to the historical object, and which may be the product of that object, offers the only real chance of escaping history, if ever so little.

Thus, the interesting and somewhat problematic feature of Goodman's own conception of practice is the fundamental role it plays in his theory. Although he never systematically examines (as I have stressed) what practice is and how it is

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[71] There is an exchange between Mitchell 1991*a*, Elgin 1991, and Mitchell 1991*b* concerning Goodman's account of historicity, but it is focused around the particular problem of realism and representation (for which see my relevant § *10* above).

formed historically, the notion of habit and entrenchment through practice is indispensable for Goodman's account. (Since the various symbol systems are employed differently according to the norms accepted by the corresponding communities of symbol users.) As Engström 1992: 339 puts it, 'on the question and status of *practice*, Goodman's nominalism has led the philosophical horse to water but forced him to stay on the bank to be groomed'. (I am ignoring, for the moment, the allusion to nominalism.) Goodman's familiar jargon of 'sorting' referential paths and 'placing' symbols in schemes and systems implies an external and neutral vantage point (: 340); and, in this, it is completely misleading, Engström goes on—as if theories bear no socio-political import.

Whether all this is part of a politically suspect 'hermeneutics of suspicion' (Carroll 1993; see p. *41* of my Introduction), I shall not be pursuing here. When Goodman (*MM*: 200) faces a question concerning 'the problems of the present-day world' ('poverty, war', and the like) he relegates them to the politician.

> That is not philosophy's primary business. [...] Social betterment and technological progress are not the goals of Shakespeare's works or Einstein's but may help make possible such works and our increased understanding through them. [*Ibid.*]

I shall, accordingly, be reverting to the question of what exactly is the role of this apolitical *understanding* in Goodman's philosophy; why it is practically synonymous with the constant practice of symbolization; why it appears to be an end in itself; and of course how it embraces the aesthetic, making it the focus of a seemingly interminable attention, and how it treats the *cognitive*.[72] In doing this, I am going to turn first to the modern, rationalistic inception of aesthetics as a discipline, in order to point to the fact that—Goodman's arguments apart—cognitivism and the study of the arts may have been intertwined from the start in ways less straight-forward than perhaps anticipated.

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72 As Elgin 1993*b*: 139 confirms, Goodman's preference to use 'understanding' rather than 'knowledge' was heavily influenced by a willingness to avoid deeply ingrained philosophical tradition, which inescapably links knowledge with statements and true belief (cf. the case of truth versus rightness in § 22 below). In *WW*: 22*n* Goodman refers to the work by M. Polanyi as an illustration of his own notion of understanding.

16. *'GRADU QUIDEM SOLO DIFFERUNT'*[73]

Pouivet's *holisme symbolique* (1996: 65) enables him to follow Goodman's insistence on the fact that what makes an artwork is its functioning as such (*ibid.*: 170–171). But Pouivet does not think that this insistence entails a necessary abandonment of ontology: for essence can be nominal, in the Lockean sense (: 201). And, given the open character of aesthetic function (what is now functioning as an artwork may not continue to do so), this becomes an ontology of the vague (: *ad loc.* 179–80, with reference to the work of E. Zemach). In the end, function is not enough for Pouivet, and this deficiency signals the way back to a 'functionalized' ontology, where being is a mode of existential functioning.

Naturally, ontology under different specifications is not the same ontology. We can talk of a funtionalized or vague ontology without implying an acceptance of classical ontology. Goodman, after all, tries to specify what art is by specifying its function and style, its symptomatic rather than its necessary features: an endorsement of what it is for something *to be* (aesthetic, etc.) is not an endorsement of what kinds of *things* are (aesthetic, etc.). In the third chapter below, I shall draw on this easily conflated talk of metaphysics and ontology. For the moment, I wish to emphasize that Pouivet, in waiving classical ontology, chooses to turn to a Baumgartenian conception of the work of art when he writes (: 200): 'De l'œuvre d'art, nous avons moins qu'une essence, mais mieux qu'une simple définition nominale: nous avons une conception claire et confuse.' ('In the case of the work of art, we have something less than an essence, but something better than a simple nominal definition: we have a clear and confused conception.') I think that this conception of something which is lucid enough and at the same time inarticulate corresponds to what Goodman has to say. In his case, while symbological reference is precisely an attempt to maintain clarity in our apprehension of all aspects of the world—by eliminating intensional 'depth'—the results of extensionality reveal a conception of the symbol as something that has got to be constantly attended to, in order to convey its indefinitely dense signification.

Although a rationalist, A. G. Baumgarten clearly ventured to secure the autonomy and irreducibility of aesthetics as compared with conceptual knowledge, even perhaps 'at the price of philosophical inconsistency' (Wessell 1971–72: 341). Gregor 1983–84: 357–360 interprets this alleged inconsistency as a considerably radical variation on the rationalist canon, within which A. G. Baumgarten's work was certainly rooted. And Gross 2002: 411 implies that A. G. Baumgarten's departure from rational ideals of discursive perfection could have proved an important alternative to what I. Berlin regards as the 'one-sided' pur-

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[73] Baumgarten 1954: § CXVII.

suits of mainstream Enlightenment rationalism. In 1735 (as a *terminus ante quem*), aesthetics as a term made its historical première in the penultimate paragraph of Baumgarten's early work (see 1954: § CXVI). However, the later *Aesthetica* (1750) also provides crucial insights into his whole project. Gregor 1983–84 offers a valuable analysis of this later, unfinished text.[74] (Incidentally, I. Kant's dismissal of A. G. Baumgarten's project—a dismissal popular with subsequent philosophers—seems to have been the result of a limited and indirect knowledge of Baumgarten's later work.[75])

In Baumgartenian terms, then, *perception perfected*, the subject matter of the new science of aesthetics, is indistinct, i.e. *confused* within the nexus of similar perceptions. But its richness and vividness manages to preserve a *clarity that is extensional* (as opposed to the intensional conceptual clarity expounded by R. Descartes, G. W. Leibniz, and C. Wolff; see W. S. Pluhar's comments in Kant 1987: xlix–l; also, cf. Pouivet 1996: 17). Thus, 'confused (but clear in its own way) cognition' is a real possibility for the human mind; it generates a kind of clarity that pertains especially to the arts, as it consists in the concrete presentation of an *individual* perceptual presence. (See Gregor 1983–84: *ad loc.* 366, 369–370). What is more (*ibid.*: 367), extensional clarity (or clarity of individualization) has in fact for Baumgarten an advantage over its rival of demonstrative clarity (or clarity of analysis), namely that in all its 'darkness' it is the only one where the principle of association is at work. A poem invites the exercise of our power to connect given images and concrete meanings in the diversity of their peculiarity; demonstrative discourse, on the other hand, becomes clear and transparent, but at the same time it is divested of all the vividness otherwise fostered by conspicuous individuality. Already in his earlier work, Baumgarten fully articulates his confidence in the peculiarly significant character of this 'judgement of the senses', as he calls it (1954: § XCII), confused as it must be—but also extensionally clear.[76] The knowledge sought by such a faculty of judgement is a knowledge not so much of the general, not so much of the specific, but mostly of the *individual*. And the yielded 'aestheticological' truth is the truth *in concreto* that the artist always must strive for (see again Gregor's analysis of relevant passages from Baumgarten's *Aesthetica, ad loc.* 379–380).

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74 Concerning which, I shall be relying on Gregor's report.

75 It is true that we cannot even be absolutely certain as regards the identity of *Aesthetica*'s author(s), for the views of A. G. Baumgarten and those of his one-time student G. F. Meier could have be woven together in the *Aesthetica*. (See also W. S. Pluhar's remarks in Kant 1987: xlix.)

76 Baumgarten's Latin terms in this text (*passim*) derive from **intensiu-* and **extensiu-*, and are usually translated in the same edition as *intensive-* and *extensive-* (e.g., 'extensively'). But *intension-* and *extension-* are more accurate renderings in the context of philosophical logic (e.g., 'extensionally').

Gregor (: 382–385) not only discerns here a clear 'family resemblance' encompassing A. G. Baumgarten's theory and more recent cognitive theories—like S. K. Langer's and Goodman's—but also claims that it is A. G. Baumgarten who might survive the challenge. For A. G. Baumgarten, there can be no displacement of art by science—their realms being discrete. On the contrary, aesthetic cognitivism, according to Gregor, often manages to strip art of any inherent value, especially in view of the fact that scientific knowledge progresses and art does not necessarily do so: thus, art can easily be faced with the grim prospect of an empty future for itself. In other words, Gregor's concern is that—in the case of theories she identifies as cognitivist—if art, along with science, is made to respond to the same cognitive needs, then it is probably the case that art will prove the weakest competitor.

On one hand, at least the early Baumgarten considered that the relevant task of philosophy—namely the task of clearly delineating what is aesthetic (in his case: *poietic*) from what is not—was an almost impossible task by ordinary human standards (1954: (last) § CXVII). At any rate, he thought that the difference is bound to be a mere difference in degree: the aesthetic and the scientific or logical '*gradu quidem solo differunt*' (*ibid.*). On the other hand, I believe that Goodman's theoretical affinity with A. G. Baumgarten's project, although more likely to be accidental or independent, is clearly demonstrated by the fact that 'extensional clarity', 'association', 'knowledge of the individual work' are notions shared between them. It remains to be examined whether Goodmanian 'knowledge' as 'understanding' (cf. end of previous section) encompasses both the aesthetic and the logical, without subsuming the former into the latter (which is Gregor's concern above).

17. 'COGNITION IN AND FOR ITSELF'[77]

> The question of the cognitive status of art has traditionally generated more heat than light. [Lang 1970: 248.] Knowledge without action is essentially aesthetic in its function. [Jones 1984: 218.]

Although not straightforwardly describable as 'aestheticological' (as in A. G. Baumgarten above), the import of Goodman's symbology is clearly both about the aesthetic and about the logical (and, indeed, about any other conceivable realm of discourse and reality). Symbols and reference, after all, are the only constant categories partly describing our relation to what is apprehended as 'the world', and they are not confined to any particular realm. In brief, *competence* in the handling and the interpretation of such symbological relations is what Goodman would describe as *cognition and understanding*. Although this specification seems unequivocal, in order to distinguish Goodmanian cognitivism from the different senses which 'cognitivism' has been made to serve, a somewhat fuller elaboration is in order, followed by a brief survey of the general consequences for aesthetics and symbology.

Nagel 1943: 329, in an early critique of S. K. Langer, observes that overestimating the cognitive value of art has inevitably led to the complete blurring of what 'cognitive' means. Nagel's implication is that, presumably, the field of application of the concept of 'cognition' should not be inflated, because its original meaning is thereby blurred. In a similar framework, Berleant shares an apparently uncontroversial, restricted conception of cognitivism as being interchangeable *par excellence* with intellectualism (emphasizing, i.e., the mentalistic, rationalizing aspect of knowledge). In 1970 (: 33), Berleant subscribes to the critique of aesthetic cognitivism (as defended, under different formulations, by philosophers like E. Cassirer, E. Panofsky, and S. K. Langer), contending that it actually constitutes a by-passing of the aesthetic, and a corrosive of genuine aesthetic values. And in 1991 (: 213), Berleant again does not fail to emphasize that 'intellectualizing art risks making sows' ears out of silk purses'.[78] In each case, the perceived cancellation of boundaries between what is and what is not aesthetic seems to be unacceptable. (In fact, this is Gregor's argument in favour of A. G. Baumgarten, above: aesthetic cognitivism is only tenable if it can be kept apart from intellectualistic cognitivism.) Now, it might be true that S. K. Langer's the-

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77 *LA*: 258. Reference is made there to symbol systems in general—to scientific systems commonsensically linked with knowledge, as well as to aesthetic ones.

78 However, in the context of his notion of 'aesthetic engagement', Berleant accepts that aesthetics can serve as a *model* for science, both being advocates of 'engaged' experience. Thus, intellectualism does not necessarily ensue from every possible treatment of science together with art.

ory was 'received with respect rather than clear understanding' (Osborne 1972: 19). But the core of her pertinent contention only seems to have been that *'rationality arises as an elaboration of feeling'* (1957: 124)—feelings being the prime matter of aesthetic experience. This is to say that reason and feeling are not the same, but are linked in certain ways. The cognitive does not seem to be subsumed under the emotional any more than the emotional is subsumed under the cognitive (the latter being 'elaborated', refined and justified feeling). The issue taken up by S. K. Langer—and subsequently by Goodman—was to explore the differences and the similarities, and thus examine any postulated links between cognition and feeling—not to 'intellectualize' feeling. (I indicated that even in A. G. Baumgarten's case, the result was to treat the aesthetic and the logical–cognitivist as differing in degrees—and, consequently, also resembling in degrees.)

In his earlier writings, Goodman himself appears more than once to be rebuking the anti-intellectualist (especially of a Bergsonian or mystical persuasion; cf. 1946: 80, *PP*: 48), his 'arch enemy' as we read in *PP*: 17, and again in *PP*: 25 ('I can hear the anti-intellectualistic, the mystic—my arch enemy'). To say that Goodman was close enough to the anti-intellectualist so as to be in a position even to eavesdrop on his / her objections would be perhaps inconclusive. However, it is certain that Goodman, for all his apparent confidence in reason, never disclaims the value of the aesthetic. So, for him, the aesthetic must be at least compatible with the intellectualistic. Actually, in S. K. Langer's manner, Goodman cannot avoid the implication that 'in aesthetic experience the *emotions function cognitively*.' (*LA*: 248.) But the aim is, again, not to intellectualize the emotive; it is to link the emotive and the cognitive. In this sense, the link applies in both ways: not only do emotions form part of our cognitive engagement with our perceived world, but also 'the understanding is being endowed' with emotions (*loc. cit.*; cf. *MM*: 7–8). This is surely a 'reconstituted' version of cognitivism, and to say that it is not sufficiently distinguished from the rationalistic–intellectualistic version is merely to refuse an interpretation of it.

Cognitivist strategies (e.g. 'I enjoy Gibran's prose on p. *202* below because it teaches me so many inspired metaphors') might be more easily identified with rationalistic epistemological agendas, possibly because of the fact that 'to cognize' often signifies the application of a scheme of discursive thought on something external to the mind. From this point of view, Goodman's symbology can easily avoid the predominance of discursive rationality, for symbols are not always discursive, and do not always stand for something external to them. Already in C. S. Peirce, and certainly in S. K. Langer, externality is not the sole field of reference, because symbols also convey themselves, their own features mediated by an act of referring. And this is also crucially true in Goodman's case: exemplification is a 'self-reference' relation, and expression is metaphorical exemplification. So, Elgin can easily infer (2000*b*: 223) that 'even the expression of feelings, then, is not primarily a device for engendering feelings, but for referring to them'. The more paradoxical or absurd this sounds, the more it is a sign that we

have to modify the way we comprehend Goodmanian cognitivism in the context of his account of symbological reference. For Goodman it is clear that

> cognition is not limited to language or verbal thought but employs imagination, sensation, perception, emotion, in the complex process of aesthetic understanding. [*MM*: 9; similarly, 147.] In contending that aesthetic experience is cognitive, I am emphatically not identifying it with the conceptual, the discursive, the linguistic. Under 'cognitive' I include all aspects of knowing and understanding, from perceptual discrimination through pattern recognition and emotive insight to logical inference. [*MM*: 84.]

This is the kind of understanding, the kind of cognition that (as in A. G. Baumgarten's early account) 'admits of degrees' (*RP*: 119): degrees of symbol-apprehension, and symbol-creation.[79]

Incidentally, Goodman seems to exclude from his broadly cognitive model about the arts everything about them that is directed towards entertaining their audience (viewers, listeners, readers, etc.). In fact, the arts are important for Goodman only when not regarded as 'mere entertainment' (1988: 1). 'To take the feelings as ends in themselves is to put aesthetic experience in the same category as a hot bath.' (*MM*: 8.) Goodman, in his wish to defend the autonomy of the arts, argues against the ideology of art as 'mere entertainment', but also against the more exalted ideology of an elite 'high art', positioned at a 'plane far above most human activities' (*MM*: 154; similarly, 185). At any rate, he insists, 'most works of art are bad' (*MM*: 199 and *RP*: 33), so we had better concentrate on how to become acquainted and exercise our cognitive powers with what we can, rather than deprive ourselves of important opportunities for aesthetic–cognitive development. Perhaps Goodman has endorsed here an almost naïve notion of emotional catharsis as a vital effort to escape from the strain of experienced 'tragedy' or perceived ugliness (and this is, I think, because he confines himself only to the psychological or psychoanalytical conception of what is pleasant, entertaining, or disturbing; cf. *LA*: 246, 250). Perhaps he has misread Aristotle, for whom art is simply a manifestation of the natural human inclination to be creative (viz. *mimetic*), and, as such, an activity highly conducive to joy and knowledge (1831: *Poetics* 4, 1448 b 4–19). This acquisition of knowledge is by no means always an easy or agreeable task; indeed, educating the young is not an alternative to, or one of the ways of, entertaining them (: *Politics* IX 5, 1339 a 26–29). For Aristotle, then, it must be that some forms of knowledge (including the ones involved in art making) are more congenially pursued than others; while for Goodman all joy is

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[79] Thus, it is not the case that Goodman conceives of understanding in evolutionary terms—as an activity ensuring better survival rates, so long as the degree of its success increases. It is rather the 'advancement of the understanding' that 'makes survival and success worthwhile' (*MM*: 150).

probably pursued at the expense of aesthetic cognition. (I trust that the implications of this cannot greatly affect the purposes of my study, but there is certainly a lot more that could be said here.)

The case for 'cognition in and for itself' is not only made in the context of aesthetics—and this must be all but unpredictable, in view of the close link between the aesthetic and the (otherwise) apprehensible through symbols. Science is also described as ultimately not about the control of nature or the improvement of living, but pursued 'simply for the sake of discovering, of knowing, of understanding' (*MM*: 4). 'Just as thought experiments are fictions in science, works of fiction are thought experiments in art.' (Elgin 1993*a*: 25.)

Todd 1981 is probably right in trying to explain the notion of Goodmanian cognitivism by including in its purview what would under different circumstances be described in terms of 'ideology', 'world-view', 'meaning of life', etc. The affinities between art and science are thus more generally confirmed by the fact that they do not necessarily designate sharply differentiated realms of methods and activities, but only aspects of our attitude towards the world. For instance, Paulus 1959: 496–497 describes the scientific approach as aggressive and assimilative, while the aesthetic one as accepting and communicative. Such distinctions cut across any monolithic divide between art and science: it can easily be confirmed, for example, that some artistic styles can be described as more 'scientific' than others (e.g. classic art, as opposed to baroque art). Ultimately, science and aesthetic experience are linked not only on the level of theory, but also on the practical level of experimentation: different theoretical models can yield similar results; their respective empirical adequacy may then be in part determined on aesthetic grounds. (For a historically oriented account see Parsons & Rueger 2000.) As Clark 2003: 31 writes about G. Cantor's theorem (that the power set of x is always larger than x even when x is infinite), 'his initial proof was rather involved, but in time he was able to produce a very simple, short and beautiful proof'. (I take it that the latter was the most successful. Cf. p. *201* below.)

As a last point, it would be fair not to neglect the fact that bringing the aesthetic and the logical together under the cognitive does not eliminate their differences. After all, the objection voiced by the 'anti-intellectualist' concerning the undue intellectualization of the aesthetic should be fully met. Elgin 2000*b*: 224 stresses the fact that we should not lose sight of the differences between art and science, in spite of their congeniality: for example, whereas in art multiple and complex reference presides—rendering every artwork 'a chain of reference whose geometry is unique'—in science symbols 'strive for transparency'. We just have to avoid both scientism and aestheticism. And in a quite different direction, according to Maritain 1960 (: 168–169, 184–185, and elsewhere), art does exhibit a cognitive function, as well; but this function—as opposed to what is the case in the sciences—is subordinated to art's creative function. This is important because it allows Maritain to claim that knowledge becomes something more like an ex-

perience of learning; or, that it becomes something other than what we are used to call 'knowledge' (whereby a scientific nuance is never lost). 'The intellect knows in order to create' (: 168); namely, creative force dictates what is to be known. If this can be accepted under the rubric of cognitivism, it is certainly not cognitive in any intellectualistic sense.

Mutatis mutandis, Goodman also has the means to differentiate the scientific from the aesthetic, although he treats them both as species of the cognitive. As outlined above (see, e.g., § *13*), Goodman's theory of symbological structuring, in distinguishing among systems of reference, is precisely designed to bring about the required distinctions among more (or less) rationalistic, and more (or less) aesthetic, systems (with all other possible species catered for).

Of course, a problem remains: although Goodman wishes to render cognition as the fundamental process of relating to all that, which can be said to be (*before* it can actually be otherwise described), he sees aesthetic gratification and scientific utility as secondary, if not suspect. (But where do the limits lie between mere entertainment and genuine aesthetic appreciation, or between mere utility and genuine scientific interest?) Perhaps there is still a residue here of the 'intellectualistic' conception of cognition, imperceptibly slipping back into effect. But it is more likely that Goodman, in his routine search for definitional inclusiveness, does not altogether reject the secondary; he merely underlines that it is *not* primary: 'The primary purpose is cognition in and for itself; the practicality, pleasure, compulsion, and communicative utility all depend upon this.' (*LA*: 258.) Despite the occasional subversive allusions, Goodman's approach to curiosity, knowledge, discovery, understanding as the sole ultimate objectives of symbological functioning must, in the end, be interpreted so as to avoid the probability of positing the human as a hydrocephalic, so to speak, cognizing automaton. Because, above anything else, the latter vision is not where Goodman's investigation leads. The admission of art and the aesthetic as on a par with what is otherwise cognitive reminds one that sensing and feeling and, most importantly, *trying* to understand and sense and feel, distances the view of a monolithic, always perspicuous (thus starkly scientistic) symbology.

FOR GOODMAN, WE are fundamentally involved in a constant effort to *understand* by words, sights, sounds, and other entities and non-entities. Understanding has become a 'versatile term for a skill, a process, an accomplishment' (*RP*: 161). Therefore, what remains rather to be qualified is the ever-elusive content of this ecumenically applicable grip of symbological structuring. If symbols are in one way or another the vehicles for referring to all that which is (if anything), no hint has been given as to its nature (or as to its artificiality or absence). Accordingly, I shall be reverting (in the second chapter) to questions that have remained largely unanswered, especially concerning Goodman's predilection for an extensionalist and nominalist epistemology. Since the appreciation of art is in Goodman a con-

scious, broadly cognitive appreciation of referring in certain ways through symbols, it is crucial to investigate the 'origin' of symbolization, so to speak, or the rationale behind Goodman's reliance on a symbological universalism. Margolis 1998: 358 asserts that if the autographic–allographic distinction collapses, so does Goodman's entire theory of art. Apart from what I have said about the distinction, I have not thought of treating Goodman's results as a mathematical construction. Failures and successes are relative and always contextual. But I do think that the interweaving of aesthetics and epistemology in Goodman is too tight to be left out of context. In fact, if Goodman is at all to be regarded as an intellectualist philosopher, then this must be because he finds the ultimate justification of his tenets in a carefully constructed epistemology—and not because the treatment of his subjects is always strictly mentalistic. It will be indeed realized that Goodman's transposition of emphasis from the symbology of perspicuous structures to the symbology of non-transparent symbols (as presented in this chapter) constitutes a projection of the parallel way in which his epistemological presuppositions evolved. And this development, in turn, will have to be integrated into Goodman's theory of the aesthetic, so that the overall *(kalo)logical* nature of it can be demonstrated, according to my treatment. (For, I think, examining Goodman's views on aesthetics is one thing, but producing an assessment of the philosophical *character* of his aesthetics is another. What sort of an aesthetics is it? This question will be the main subject of my third chapter.)

Goodman's achievements remain ultimately ungrounded, if one expects him to show how things 'really' are, and what they are, and how they have the qualities they have (literally or metaphorically). Goodman recognizes this, but it is a task that he does not deem pertinent to the scope of his work, and which in *LA*: 78 he was 'content to leave to the cosmologist'. The irony is perhaps that, judging by the way his work developed, he might have been partly referring to his later self—but, as always, with a difference: the cosmologist, in searching for the correct description of 'the one' world, may find that there is none—or many.

FIRST CHAPTER APPENDIX ON PICTORIAL PERSPECTIVE[80]

Principally inherited from the Renaissance, the legacy of perspectival correctness has had an enduring effect on the study of art and painting, as well as the relevant philosophy of the arts. In fact, the whole history of painting has often been interpreted as a history of artistic striving towards an ideal resemblance between the representation and its represented actual subject, according to specific artistic rules. The claim here is that we *are* in a position to distinguish among more or less successful representations, although—or precisely because—we admit degrees of success and possibilities of conditioning. Consequently, on this account, resemblance as verisimilitude in the depiction of space cannot be merely an arbitrary matter of convention (cf. Gombrich 1972: 148–149), a matter of boundless and largely fortuitous learned association between symbols and referents or images and things; it must constitute an essential part of high artistic achievement.

It is interesting to note that this stance in favour of actual resemblance in depicting three-dimensional space on two-dimensional pictorial surfaces still seems to hold even if we disown one-point rectilinear perspective as our criterion. For instance, curvilinear perspective can provide a subsidiary set of rules (as E. Panofsky had already showed at the beginning of the twentieth century[81]—see Wood 1998: 480). And, indeed, curvilinear perspective has had a history at least as long as standard, rectilinear perspective (since Jean Fouquet and Leonardo da Vinci), albeit a neglected one (see Hansen 1973–74: 152–153). In fact Hansen (*op. cit.*) announces a wholly new system of (five-point) hyperbolic linear perspective, which is not only opposed to (one-, two-, or more point) rectilinear, but also to curvilinear perspective. Furthermore, again following E. Panofsky, Merleau-Ponty 1961: 197 (English translation 1972: 69–70) refers to the 'angular perspective' of the ancients, whereby the apparent size of objects is not related to their distance, but to the angle from which we see them. The Renaissance ideal was not false, for Merleau-Ponty (*loc. cit.*), in accepting different rules and following them; but it was false in believing to have discovered—once and for all—the only true, infallible art of painting.

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80 See above, p. *87*.

81 E. Panofsky's debt to E. Cassirer is traced by Gilbert 1949: 624*f*. Danto 1986: 200–201 regards E. Panofsky as 'neutral' in the debate on whether perspectival depiction is true to the way we actually see, or whether we learn to see things depicted in perspective.

At any rate, the upshot is always that there *are* ways to make pictures more truthful to the 'reality' they represent—i.e. there are ways to make better pictures.

As Maiorino 1975–76 registers in a learned paper, the Protagorean dictum of 'man as the measure of all things',[82] coupled with an intellectualization of space through the act of *perspicere* (looking through, examining), constituted the ideological spine of Renaissance ideals in pictorial (and literary, for that matter) depiction. If this *perspective* of things still remains important, it is because it 'can still be acknowledged as a lasting monument in man's quest for an imaginative realization of eternity', in Maiorino's words (*op. cit.*: 485). This is perhaps part of the reason why technical developments in the plastic arts did actually take place in antiquity, and images of high pictorial fidelity in terms of perspective and verisimilitude were produced; however, these developments were not pursued and reinforced immediately afterwards. (Fassianos 1993 offers illuminating details.)

For Goodman (*PP*: 145, from a review of Gombrich's *Art and Illusion*), it is a puzzling fact that Gombrich is unwilling to count perspective as a matter of learned association between modes of depicting and depicted subjects, given that Gombrich treats perception largely as a conceptually informed procedure, and he repudiates the myth of the 'innocent eye'. (As Wartofsky 1972: 153 confirms, the 'picture theory' of visual perception cannot even be rendered in terms of neurophysiology—let alone perspectival depiction; seeing is often a process of abstracting from, or distorting what optics describe as the 'real' objects. Seeing an image, in this sense, is preceded by—and does not precede—knowing the image.)

Indeed—contrary to some of the main points in *Art and Illusion*—it appears as one of Gombrich's firm convictions that 'we can never neatly separate what we see from what we know' (2000: 562). Beginning from his most recent work to his earliest, in 1993 Gombrich compares the fact that we allow for painterly inconsistencies and distortions with the fact that we allow tempered musical instruments to be slightly cacophonous. (Namely, that what we see or hear has been forged by what we know we should be seeing or hearing.) In the 1983 edition of *Art and Illusion* (: 331–32), Gombrich remarks that it is up to the enquiring mind (and not any 'innocent eye') to lift the veil of perceptual illusion; and that without this uncovering, pictures and words must unavoidably, and unfortunately, merge. In his 1972 paper, and as Jones 1972: 403 underlines, Gombrich thinks that 'there is no indication [...] that the aim of Western representational painting is to be *mistaken* for reality'. But it is precisely this latter aim (namely, that pictures should strive to trick us) that is expressly defended by Gombrich in the original edition *Art and Illusion* (Jones refers to p. 301 of the 1960 first edition).

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82 See DK 80 [74], Protagoras A 14, A 19, B 1 (=Diels & Kranz 1951–52: II, 258, 16–20; 259, 34–35; 263, 3–5 & 9–10; 264, 5–10).

It seems actually that this influential edition was something of an exceptional approach adopted by Gombrich, considering the rest of his work. As Stolnitz 1964: 274 notes, Gombrich's 'sequel' to *Art and Illusion* (sc. *Meditations on a Hobby Horse*) already turned against it in adopting 'less radical' positions (for Stolnitz, a negative development, but in my context the most pervasive one, considering Gombrich's later work).

It would seem, in effect, that the safest thing to say about E. H. Gombrich's contribution as a whole to the matter is that, ultimately, cultural history and artistic progress form the model of a two-dimensional learning process (cf. Horowitz 1998: *ad loc.* 316, 318). Pictures and the pictured, are distinct but connected; we cannot safely adjudicate on which takes precedence over the other (cf. Martin F D 1976–77: 379). And their relation has occasionally met with different descriptions—from 'magical' conflation of image and world, to naïve perceptual objectivity, to perceptual gullibility, to perceptual tolerance.

Consequently, Goodman's expressed puzzlement about E. H. Gombrich's equivocal assertions is perhaps justified. And the reverberations of this equivocation have continued. For example, according to O'Neill 1971: 368–369, Goodman has in fact misinterpreted E. H. Gombrich; the very passage Goodman quotes from *Art and Illusion* in *LA*: 7 should have allowed him to realize that Gombrich 'did not jump to the conclusion that anything can resemble anything equally (in respect of its visual appearance)'. Gombrich, O'Neill continues, was clearly 'also impressed by the fact that [...] the degree of realism of different styles of representation can be judged reasonably objectively'. But it is not clear what would count as a misinterpretation of something otherwise already equivocal ('reasonably objectively', even if accurately rendering Gombrich, also implies equivocation).

The issue is not perhaps of extreme importance, but Pole 1974: 76 seems to be aptly summarizing it by noting that E. H. Gombrich may indeed converge towards Goodman whenever he believes that making precedes matching, but 'he remains too sensible merely to scratch out the latter notion'. Pole's slip, I think, is to assume that Goodman *does* 'scratch out' resemblance in favour of purely conventional practice—agreed upon, learned, and 'made' by habit (see especially p. *88f* above). There are indeed aspects that are visible even to the naked, 'innocent eye', before the mind can assert anything else it might know about them; but these aspects are at best subsumed under, and at worst excluded from the symbological functioning of images.

Of course, ultimately—as Schwartz 2001: 718 concludes—all this may be a superficial matter of terminological dispute: a dispute over whether 'the process of assigning spatial significance to pictorial representations should not be called "reading" or "interpretation" but just plain "seeing".'

II.B.2

LOGICA

18. LOGIC

> Descartes faced his world as a skeptic with a method—in other words, as a courageous, humble and hopeful man. [*PP*: 48.]

Logic, the science, stems of course from the Aristotelian and Stoic endeavour to study the modes in which words and their meanings are correlated (cf. Fattal 2001:[83] 48, 257–258). 'Logic', the term, relates to the *logos* that Cicero translated into 'ratio' (Fattal 2001: 28*n*). So, logic and the rationality of reasoning have become inseparable in some of our common philosophical *lingua franca*—though departing from distinct sources.

For Pouivet 1996: 5–8, it is at the level of 'symbolic' reference rather than syllogistic inference where logic and rationality actually meet; symbols embody relations without having to provide a demonstration for their validity. Thus, and in advance of any further consideration, art and knowledge, for Pouivet, can be readily shown to relate to one another, if construed in terms of symbolic reference. Reference is no less (and rather more) 'logical' than inference. And this is a very helpful way to approach Goodman's symbological universalism from the perspective both of aesthetics and of epistemology.

Although in the course of his philosophical career Goodman became less engaged with symbol systems other than aesthetic ones, he was able to contend, as late as 1991*a*: 7, that clarity and the avoidance of chaos through systematization do not constitute a stark 'passion for pigeonholing' but a deeper need.

> The philosopher has a [...] quarrel with common sense.[84] He is not, as some think, her arch enemy; but rather her devoted admirer, whom she repeatedly betrays. [*PP*: 49.] The law must derive its authority from the people even though it must treat some of them harshly. [*PP*: 246.]

Goodman chose (successfully) to rid himself of the complexes of logical empiricism, but retained a preference for analyticity and precision. More importantly, nevertheless, he ventured to exercise this preference so as to convey what would easily be classified together with the abstract and the imprecise; the 'non-logical' together with the 'logical'; the symbol together with the proposition (as Pouivet would have it).

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83 Reviewed by Gkogkas 2002.

84 '[...] that repository of ancient error.' (*LA*: xii.)

19. FROM 'PLATONISM' TO 'GRUE'—AND BACK

The *'grue' paradox* is perhaps Goodman's most lasting contribution to philosophical logic. (The earliest grue-type argument is to be found in *PP*: 363–366, from a paper first published in 1946; for fuller explanation, see *FFF*: ch. III.) 'Grue' is a paradox of induction, and to demonstrate it, let us suppose that: (i) 'Green' describes all things observed up to a present moment and found to be green. (ii) 'Grue' describes all things observed up to a present moment and found to be green *and* to all other things (*non-temporally*) in case they are blue. It follows that if we wished to refer to *all* 'green' things—thus making an inductive inference about the future according to (i)—then we could equally accurately describe these as being *also* 'grue'. (If 'green' applies to all *x*'s, then 'grue' also applies to all *x*'s, since it applies to all *x*'s *and* to all *y*'s, according to (ii).) Now, we do not know whether we will in the future find blue emeralds, although all emeralds observed up to the present have been found to be green. But even if we did find some blue emeralds in the future, it would still be true to say that all emeralds in the world were 'grue'; 'grue' would comprise all the new blue emeralds *in addition to* the presently known green emeralds. Consequently, it is equally tenable at the present moment that 'all emeralds are green' (by classical induction) and that 'all emeralds are grue'. (Obviously, any other compound colour-word could be treated similarly.) So, why not use 'grue' at present, instead of 'green'?[85]

Hacking 1993 suggests that this is not really a *new* riddle of induction—D. Hume's being the *old* one—but that it could have arisen before or without D. Hume; thus, it may require a totally different approach and solution. I cannot examine the vast literature of possible responses and attempts at 'solving' the paradox, but only its import as it pertains to my purposes.

H. Putnam (in his foreword to *FFF*) discerns in Goodman's grue paradox the elegance and the simplicity of 'something very much like a work of art', masterfully combining a logical proof with a theoretical puzzle (: vii–viii). Perhaps this is only an indirect hint at Goodman's views as bringing proof, science, art, and theory closer together—but it constitutes an intimation of what I have been investigating.

Goodman's objective with his *new riddle* was to demonstrate the fact that induction is not at all about discovering regularities and using them in predicting similar future circumstances. 'Regularities are where you find them, and you can find them anywhere.' (*FFF*: 82.) The real question concerning induction asks which of the regularity-based hypotheses (green-like or grue-like?) will be pro-

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[85] The paradox arises even if we waive positionality. Namely, it is not necessary to limit our cases so that they depend upon a critical point in time; see Elgin 1997*b*: xiv–xv.

jected as relevant inferences about the empirically yet unknown. There are numerous ways to systematize reference and language, but we only adopt some of them (and thus, perhaps, communication is made possible). Projection of the 'right' predicates, preference to use some of them rather than others (out of an indefinite number of readily devisable predicates), turns out for Goodman to be fundamentally a matter of entrenchment and habitual practice (*FFF*: *ad loc.* 95). We use 'green' not because it is 'more' correct than 'grue' (as defined above), but because it is

> a function of our linguistic practices. Thus the line between valid and invalid predictions (or inductions or projections) is drawn upon the basis of how the world is and has been described and anticipated in words. [*FFF*: 121.]

There is no world outside of our descriptions, simply 'waiting' to be described. What appears to be a true description of perceived reality, is actually an entrenched description, which has therefore been elevated to the realm of truthfulness. 'The reason why only the right predicates happen so luckily to have become well entrenched is just that the well entrenched predicates have become the right ones.' (*FFF*: 98.) By extension, even 'scientific procedure rests upon chance choices sanctified by habit' (*PP*: 357). The syntax or the semantics of scientific language will never be adequate for the decision between which inductive hypotheses are going to be more valid and projectible than others (: *loc. cit.*; cf. Goodman's reply to D. Davidson, *PP*: 411).

On the other hand, of course (just as we saw in the case of practice and style in the arts), adherence to habit does not exclude the possibility that habit may consist in the encouragement of novelty. 'Entrenched capital, in protecting itself, must yet allow full scope for free enterprise.' (*FFF*: 97.)

This general conception of what (there) is as resulting from what we have been conditioned to say of it bears of course—apart from a strong notion of practice—the distinctive tinge of an embedded nominalism. At least since Black 1971: *ad loc.* 522 and Savile 1971: 24–25, the theoretical 'sterility' of nominalism in general—and concerning Goodman in particular—has been too often proclaimed, in one way or another. However, as I have repeatedly remarked (see especially p. *61f*), one should be cautious about the kind of nominalism one ascribes to Goodman.

AT LEAST SINCE 1940 Goodman had maintained that nominalism is not in fact incompatible with its perceived opponent—realism—because each system presents its own explanatory advantages over its rival (*SQ*: 185). A nominalistic and a realistic system are constructed in different ways, and different problems may be addressed more adequately by one of them rather than by the other. Thus, differences in the kinds of entities that will be accepted as the building elements of the

systems (*nomina* or *realia* respectively) are not always the most crucial consideration in opting for nominalism or for realism. In this spirit, Goodman does not outright reject phenomenalism or physicalism (*SA*: ch. IV), and realism or particularism (: ch. VI) on the basis of metaphysical presuppositions, but he is constantly prepared to examine each system's specific virtues in confronting specific problems (or to regard them as alternative but not opposing treatments of a subject, if no pressing conflict arises).

Goodman's continuous quarrels are not then necessarily with the perceived opponents of nominalism, but with all forms of absolutism:

> The error of absolute monism, absolute pluralism, absolute nominalism or absolute realism is the failure to recognize that no unit or type is fundamental except with reference to some selected criterion. [*SQ*: 209–210; cf. *PP*: 57.]

In Steiner's words (1991: 200), this exorcizing disposition 'suspects in any thirst for absolutes not only an infantile simplicity but the old, cruel demons of dogma.' (And on Goodman, politics and dogma, I have commented in my Introduction, p. *40*.) Understandably, being absolutist and being dogmatic are the two sides of the same coin of philosophical sin. Nevertheless, being anti-dogmatic does not automatically cause one to be right (cf. p. *45* above), or even indicate the alternative directions recommended for inquiry. In Goodman's case, although his preference for a nominalistic epistemology was constant, his reasons for doing so were with time transmuted in certain important ways.

In their 1947 paper, Goodman and Quine (see *PP*: 173) justify their opting for nominalism as a refusal to countenance abstract entities; accordingly, they justify this refusal as, ultimately, a matter of 'philosophical intuition [...] fortified [...] by certain *a posteriori* considerations' (*PP*: 174). In particular, they cannot accept, as a matter of principle, that there may be infinitely many objects in the whole of the space-time continuum (cf. *PP*: 156–157, from Goodman's important 'A World of Individuals'). This means that Goodman and Quine cannot accept any theory which admits of classes, whereby starting from a few individual members we end up with infinitely many classes of classes of classes, and so on. In Goodman's terminology, this is a methodology endorsed by *platonistic* theories. (See *PP*: 158–159 for a lucid explication of the infinite 'proliferation' of entities in such platonistic systems). The admission of abstract entities—along with their classes—in one's philosophically systematized world leads to the admission of infinity. But the latter is unacceptable for Goodman and Quine—so, abstract entities must be ostracized from a 'well-made' world.

As Haack 1978: 488 points out, Goodman's nominalism began as a refusal to countenance abstract entities (a refusal shared with W. V. O. Quine). But by the time of *SA*, Haack continues, the reasons for preferring nominalism were con-

fined to a rejection of classes, with no consequences as to what *kinds* of entities would be accepted within the correctly described world.[86] However, according to the extracts cited above from *SQ*, Goodman seems to have maintained *from the start* an indifference towards what kinds of entities will be admitted in a well-constructed description of the world. Accordingly, in *SA* he maintained that the choice of basis for the construction of a nominalistic system was entirely irrelevant for the system itself—the method of construction was all that mattered. Thus, perhaps with the exception of his collaboration with Quine, Goodman had invariably considered that the only requirement for acceptable construction of theoretical terms was that the method of construction not be allowed to create different entities out of the same basic elements. The systematic basis, the kinds of foundational elements accepted, could be anything (even platonistic abstract entities; Goodman explicitly distances himself from W. V. O. Quine in *MM*: 51, 53). On the contrary, a platonistic system, by accepting only a small number of elemental entities, can generate infinitely many sets of classes of classes (and so on) of them, whereby an unlimited number of differing sets will eventually be made up out of exactly the same foundational elements.

Now, Goodman's requirement is a strong one: he is not simply saying that only entities made up of different sets of atoms are endorsed, for different sets can actually comprise the same atoms arranged differently. Instead, all sets have to be 'broken down' into their elementary atoms, so that the comparison can take place. Entities that can be thus shown not to include any shared 'content' are Goodman's *individuals*. Note that individuals do not have to be compact. 'A broken dish is no less concrete than a whole one, but merely has complicated boundaries; and any totality of individuals, however disperse in space and time, counts as an individual in turn.' (*PP*: 179.)

Haack 1978: 491 characterizes Goodman's new emphasis as 'super-extensionalist'. She also (*ibid.*: 492) claims that Goodman is not justified in this strict extensionalism: we can prepare indefinitely many different cakes using the same ingredients, for instance. Without going into the perplexities of set theory, I can only cite Hellman 2001: 692–693, according to whom Goodman never really gave a 'genuine argument' against (platonistic) set theory. Goodman's work continued into different kinds of problems, while other developments in logic provided surprising technical advances. However the case might have been, Hellman concludes (: 703):

> Suppose a good, historical / scientific case were made that genuine scientific or mathematical progress would be adversely affected were scientists

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86 'Steps toward a Constructive Nominalism' (with W. V. O. Quine) was published in 1947 (=*PP*: 173–198), and 'A World of Individuals' in 1956 (=*PP*: 155–172); *SA* was first published in 1951, and it constituted an extended re-working of *SQ* (Goodman's 1940 doctoral dissertation). Cf. the relevant references in Part III.B below.

> or mathematicians even to read the likes of Chihara, Feferman, Field, Goodman, Hellman, et al., let alone be persuaded by what any of them has written. Then better that they shouldn't read them! What has that got to do with whether or not there is good epistemic reason to believe in a literal interpretation of set theory?

Far from saying that—due to his own epistemic predilections—Goodman's account marks a defeat of what he defines as platonistic methodology, I think it is important to point out that his theory of individuals stands eventually much closer to a platonistic treatment of 'the world'. Not only can individuals be abstract entities, but now the objection to infinity becomes more of a choice left to be made by the philosopher's 'conscience'; indeed, there can be non-finitist systems that are nominalist. As Goodman characteristically describes it,

> Any nominalistic system is readily translated into a platonistic one. [*PP*: 156*n*—while the opposite is 'usually far from easy' (*SA*: 26).] A nominalistic system is a platonistic system curtailed in a specific way. [...] The nominalist is unlikely to be a nonfinitist only in much the same way a bricklayer is unlikely to be a ballet dancer. The two things are at most incongruous, not incompatible. [*PP*: 166.]

Even according to Peircean standards (as presented by Haack 1977: 380, 388, 392, 396), Goodman's nominalism would be more accurately described as a form of *platonistic* nominalism, precisely because of the fact that Goodman does admit abstract individuals, although he does not admit any universals. The distinctive features of Goodmanian nominalism remain his inclination towards finitism (which is not a decisive feature) and, in relation to this, his strict constructional rules, which do not admit different entities in the systematized world, if these are not different as regards their fundamental constitutive atoms (the ones that have been accepted as the elemental constructional units of that world, and not classes thereof).

Under this rendering, frequent attacks on Goodman based on a different (perhaps standard) notion of nominalism do not seem to be finding their target. Shusterman 1981 carries out a remarkably poignant critique of this sort, objecting (: 124) that Goodman's definitions of artworks are platonistic, and that he does not provide any nominalistic translations thereof. In fact, Shusterman continues (: 126), Goodman could not accept any nominalistic definition to the effect that a literary text, for instance, consists merely in a range of instances (its copies) that all happen to be designated by a common label (e.g. *Hamlet*). Similarly (Shusterman: *loc. cit.*), Goodman could not accept any definition positing the work as a 'superindividual' composed by the sum of its instances (in which case every copy of *Hamlet* would be a mere fragment of the work). This is certainly an insightful perception of the way Goodman treats the different art forms. (I bypass the fact that he sometimes deliberately uses non-nominalistic language in order to avoid technicalities.) The important relevant point, nevertheless, is again that his nomi-

nalism consists in how to construct the symbological realms corresponding to the different arts, rather than provide an ontology of artworks (as I have also had the chance to highlight at various points in the first chapter. Even his theory of notationality was an auxiliary method towards reaching a specification concerning the largely 'non-transparent' identity of the different artworks.)

BY WAY OF resuming: Goodman's riddle of induction pointed the way towards a world whose descriptions are largely dependent on (linguistic) entrenched practice. The non-applicability of any external, non-linguistic point of reference for testing the truthfulness of such (linguistic) descriptions *within* language pointed initially the way to Goodman's nominalism. But this nominalism seems now to have transformed itself into an exercise in accomplishing the same results with fewer means (i.e. the same results accomplishable within platonistic systems; cf. *SA*: 1). We can accept anything as part of the world under description (i.e. not only words and their extensions), but need only be careful with its conceptual handling. There is no question of externality, of theory 'corresponding to reality'; neither is any notion of such a 'reality' endorsed. Goodmanian nominalism, in effect, is content with ridding itself of what is repetitious and redundant; thus, it only allows for *whatever* individuals (as defined above). The restrictions that apply in our description of the world are to do with the way this world responds to itself rather than to some other external 'reality' (because, even if such a reality is in effect conceded, it has automatically become part of the world-description). 'When the nominalist and the platonist say *au revoir*, only the nominalist can be counted on to comply with the familiar parting admonition they may exchange: "Don't do anything I wouldn't do".' (*PP*: 171.)

Being theoretically parsimonious has its obvious virtues—which may not be strictly theoretical ones. But, eventually, 'the motive for seeking economy is not mere concern for superficial neatness. To economize and to systematize are the same.' (*SA*: 48; cf. *FFF*: 47.) The real objective is to achieve maximum systematization, maximum scientific efficiency—and economy is the way to do it. 'With no simplicity we have no system and no science at all' (*PP*: 277), because science is generally about 'classifying and ordering nature and making it lawful' (: 278). Of course, none of this is to say that simplicity alone can overrule all other objections to scientific truthfulness (cf. *PP*: 352): a certain theory is not the best alternative just because it is the simplest one among its rivals. But simplicity is not sought after truth has been allegedly discovered, either; for it is itself one of the standards of validity and truthfulness (*PP*: 280).[87] Systematic simplicity is gener-

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87 The Ptolemaic or the Newtonian scientific models are not proved false because altogether inapplicable, but because of the fact that their application 'would be intolerably complex' (*PP*: 279). Moreover, the simplicity of a theory can not be meas-

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ally the mark of the scientific and the test for scientific truth (*PP*: 337*f*), frequently overriding our contentions about truth in favour of some of its available 'neat approximations' (*PP*: 346).[88]

As it happens, it is more befitting for Goodman's nominalism to perform such a task of systematization through simplicity and economy, since the entities he admits do not combine endlessly into a proliferating, 'self-generating' universe of infinity. For Goodmanian nominalism, the only values admitted in the system are the ones that can be *taken as* individuals—regardless of what we might say they are: anything can be construed as an individual, and this *construal* is what matters (*SA*: 27–28). As far as the theory of symbols is concerned, the referential relations of denotation, exemplification, quotation, allusion, variation (and subspecies, or combinations, thereof) function in such a jointly intertwined way, that the choice of Goodmanian nominalism to pursue ontological parsimony is entirely vindicated (Elgin 1997*d*: xiv–xv). For the multiple ways in which only a few kinds of elements (sc. symbols) are related can yield a complex result of numerically unlimited, so to say, end products. Goodman's choice to multiply semantic instead of ontological commitments (topological density of reference instead of ontological articulation) may prove more sensitive and flexible; thus, more right (*ibid.*: xvii). In all:

> The anti-intellectualist may point to this as ground for his contention that all systematic analysis distorts fact and should therefore be shunned. [...] Even a good lens distorts somewhat but still often enables us to see better,

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ured merely by a count of its foundational terms, because the complexity and relevant importance of their relations are simplicity-factors to be taken into consideration. (See *PP*: 295*f*, 320*f*.)

88 And from a 'reformed' formalistic point of view: In one of his early pieces (1994: 5–21; first published in 1956–57), Meyer L B had adopted the physical law of entropy in his attempt to interpret artistic (mainly musical) styles as probability systems. For example: the musical tone that follows builds on what has preceded; the higher the probability of a specific consequent the lower the entropy; the way uncertainty and anticipation are employed on these grounds (where meaningless occurrence competes with intentional design) determines many of the work's attributed values. Meyer L B admits in 1994 (: 3) that he 'would now tend to be more circumspect in the use of information theory'—but he has not waived formalism. In particular (: *ad loc.* 231–232), he wishes to defend aesthetic formalism not as an exponent of rigid specifications, but as a guarantor of relativistic and pluralistic art theories. This somewhat qualified formalism simply denounces that any singular or absolutist ascription can capture the fluidity of cultural activity. Such an activity can only be adequately interpreted by a theory based on principles of the 'human need for pattern and simplicity' (: 226), and of a 'parsimony of method and standard' (: 227)—principles that are at the same time transformational as well as general enough, albeit relatively vague.

> and [...] the distortion need not deceive us if we are aware of its nature. [*SA*: 203.]

This adherence to clarity through simplicity is one of the pervasive philosophical credos Goodman always defends. As pointed out by Düring 1966: 336*n*, Aristotle often refers to this 'principle of logical economy', which later became known as 'Ockham's razor' (see, for instance, Aristotle 1831: *Topics* VII 3, 140 a 33 – b 2). To this, of course, one could always retort (as Küng 1972: 25 does) that, on phenomenological grounds for example, there is an equally defensible principle of 'non-miserliness', meant to defy the nominalistic principle of economy. 'Reality is so complex that it seems safe to follow the rule: why should it be simple if it can be complicated?' (*ibid.*) Be that as it may, I can only treat Goodman's preferences in this respect as, if one likes, a hermeneutical 'full point'; a negative one, for that matter—not in any evaluative sense, but because it stipulates what kinds of things are to be *excluded*. Goodman's ultimate criterion for choosing the right entities (the ones that will best be said to constitute a self-sufficient world) dictates as much clarity, simplicity, and conceptual economy as possible: the only restriction comes down to a permanent exclusion of classes—and, probably, infinity.

The full implications of this are yet to be realized. The general objective sought by logical economy and the results effected in the field of aesthetics—among everything else—are of the essence in my context. On the other hand, entrenched practice seems to have remained as the significant other side of this principle of logical economy.

20. PRAGMATIC BUT *IRREAL* CONSTRUCTIONS

> It is within the language system alone that we possess liberties of construction and of deconstruction, of remembrance and of futurity, so boundless, so dynamic, so proper to the evident uniqueness of human thought and imagining that, in comparison, external reality, whatever that might or might not be, is little more than brute intractability and deprivation. Thus the self-referential, self-regulating and transformative cosmos of discourse is neither like the world, nor unlike it (how would we know?). [Steiner 1991: 97.]

The model of logical construction as a principle and a necessity (sc. the 'construction' of individual entities in the previous section) was already one of Goodman's preoccupations in his 1940 doctoral dissertation, where he denounced the label of 'logical positivist' for himself, in favour of the 'less colorful label "constructionalist"' (*SQ*: iv). Although perhaps the decisiveness of accepted linguistic practice was a later development, the prerequisites of simplicity and parsimony were always present in Goodman's thought: 'If we are to succeed in saying in the language of a system just what we want to say and no more', 'accuracy seems to require special vigilance against natural confusion' (*SA*: 177). Systematization translates and untangles everyday linguistic inadequacies. I wish to examine the ways in which this constant accompanying injunction can be reconciled with Goodman's later conception of the artwork as a largely non-transparent symbol, and of his own philosophy as a 'big tangle' (: p. *34* in my Introduction. To be sure, the differences must be differences in emphasis; Goodman never denounces, nor much modifies what is at stake here. Shift of emphasis, amplification of formerly latent interests, and introduction of new problems is what I think best characterizes most apparent changes in his thought.)

According to the preceding section, Goodman's foundational elements are to be as economical as possible, in order to carry out the re-formulation of 'such sentences as we care about' (*SA*: 17). This re-formulation will effect clarity and systematization of what appears otherwise as incomprehensible, absurd, or too complicated to be understood. The important point is that the choice of the minimal foundational elements is not guided by any purportedly 'objective' standards (: 20); there are no 'absolute primitives' (: 46) or 'original givens' (: 188).

If Goodman is to accept any elements whatsoever as the foundations of his 'cleansed' language, then a question arises concerning their relative correctness: why these and not different ones? Internal coherence is necessary but not sufficient (*WW*: 125), because incompatible systems may be equally coherent, and they may also be logically valid; so, we have to choose among them on other grounds (*PP*: 62). As the case of the 'grue' paradox demonstrated, the force of adopted practice is again invoked as the touchstone of correctness, which be-

comes, in effect, only 'a judicious mixture of faithfulness to practice, concern for systematic coherence, and arbitrary decision' (*SA*: 50).[89] Rightness of foundations depends on right or appropriate categorizations in each case, which are, in turn, a product of entrenched linguistic and logical practices (cf. *MM*: 37–38).

IF CONSTRUCTIONALISM AND rightness complement and justify each other, the ensuing question follows naturally: What exactly—and how—is Goodman's constructionalism constructing? Goodman does indeed describe a full system in *SA* (: mainly ch. VI), which is acceptable on his own terms but in no way definitive or devoid of possible problems. (It actually constitutes an appropriation of R. Carnap's system in *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*.) Interestingly for a nominalist, Goodman accepts a version of *qualia* as the atoms of this system. However, he never put it to any apparent use in any of his subsequent work. For instance, in *LA*: 57*n* Goodman stipulates that, apart from labels, *qualia* can also be exemplified (according to the framework of his *SA* system). Although this is only mentioned as a possibility under one system, it constitutes one more indication, I think, to the effect that extensions, predicates, and labels do not exhaust reference *in toto*, but only under a certain system generated for its description. If such a system proves inadequate—as when, e.g., an artwork is seen as a non-transparent symbol—the implication is that the system can be supplemented (with entities other than labels), or it can be modified: labels can be still the subjects of exemplification, but their fields of application may become dense, and indefinitely extended.

At any rate, this reluctance to put the theory of constructionalism into use, to employ it for the formulation of viable systems describing what we take the world to be, may be reflected well in Krukowski's comment (1992: 207):

> Philosophical constructionalism seems to have become stranded on the difficulties—and point—of going beyond the first few moves of the construction. In hindsight, it is as if the disputes over the choice of basis were the interesting issues, and the promised result—an empirically impeccable language—was never really believed in, or was despaired of early on.

On the other hand, it might be that we do not really have to go beyond the basis of the system, if this is the height of the knowledge it provides, rather than its foundation. For, if truth is relational—as opposed to absolute and beyond

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89 Nadeau 1993: 212*n*, as well as Cometti 1993: 221, underline the fact that Goodman's notion of *judiciousness* bears an interesting similarity to J. Rawls's theory of 'reflective equilibrium'. The phrase 'judicious vacillation' appears in *MM*: 32, but the principle of weighing cognitive interests and means in constructing systems is a constant theme in Goodman's writings. (Elgin 1983: 187*n* also refers to J. Rawls in this context.)

doubt—then any proposition is equally fundamental (or equally derived; this is, incidentally, the kind of truth that Annas 1982: 103–104 attributes to Plato, with Descartes as the counterexample). In *SA*: 213, Goodman readily recognizes that not everything can be part of the system—not everything that the system requires, that is. Although definitions are part of the system, there are always facts of a pre-systematic order upon which the *rules* of systematization are imposed: these rules determine in effect the shape of the system, and are thus no part of it. For instance, in the closing words of *SA* (: 276), Goodman admits that the difficulties tackled by constructional systems are not so easily dealt with when it comes to the natural languages (something he went on to address in his subsequent work; sc. induction, the 'grue' paradox, and entrenchment of predicates).

Nevertheless, whether constructionalism as a foundational discipline has its limits or not, constructionalism as a methodology of building what is, out of what we can posit there to be, indeed occupies most of Goodman's efforts. Just as in art we see what we have been made to see (following past associations of anything to anything else, etc.), in constructing a world we find what we have made (*MM*: 29, 36). Consequently, the construction of a world seems to start well before, and to continue well after, the corresponding constructionalist 'manual' is produced. (And by 'construction' one need not only have in mind a bare 'construction in words', but also (unmediated by language) constructions in images, sounds, feelings, etc.)

At the opposite end, what will the yardstick for successful constructions be, as long as there is nothing to be postulated about any alleged externality to which they could be said to 'agree' (and if there is it simply constitutes another construction)? If any sort of entity could equally well occupy the compartments of an acceptable Goodmanian nominalism, then Goodman has to revert once again to the principle of entrenched practice as the only abiding externality to the randomness of theory. It is true that there is a constant tension between the claim to clarity and pragmatic concerns. Goodman has to invoke anew the philosopher's conscience:

> I may not *understand* the devices I employ in making useful computations or predictions any more than the housewife understands the car she drives to bring home the groceries. The utility of a notion testifies not to its clarity but rather to the philosophic importance of clarifying it. In the absence of any convenient and reliable criterion of what is clear, the individual thinker can only search his philosophic conscience. [*FFF*: 32.] If your conscience is more liberal than mine, I shall call some of your explanations obscure or metaphysical, while you will dismiss some of my problems as trivial or quixotic. [*FFF*: 33.]

And, since conscience is far from clear or clearly constructed, any shift in its disposition can occur. The nominalist (*PP*: 169–170)

> adopts the principle of nominalism in much the same spirit that [...] logical philosophers in general adopt the law of contradiction. None of these is amenable to proof; all are stipulated as prerequisites of soundness in a philosophic system. They are usually adopted because a philosopher's conscience gives him no choice in the matter. This does not mean that he need deny that he might some time change his mind. If the neopragmatist pushes me hard enough, I will even concede that I might some day give up the law of contradiction in the interests of getting better results—although if I should give up the law I am puzzled about what the difference would then be between getting results and not getting results. But I make this concession only if the pragmatist concede in return that we might some day even give up his Law of Getting Results. Or does he want to exempt this as constituting the essence of the human mind?

Practice and pragmatic concern about 'results' exhibit numerous different facets depending on the relevant contexts, but there have been attempts, e.g., to compare Goodman and the American pragmatists (see Cometti 1993: 219–223). According to C. S. Peirce's maxim (as presented by Haack 1977: 389), pragmatism consists in such a conception of an object, that the effects of that object are included in its very conception—that it *is* what it can *do*. Elgin 2000*a*: 182 also contends that the future can change the past, in the sense that anticipated future changes in our theoretical tools directly and irrevocably affect the way we construct things: something can be good *now* because of my expectation that it will help me *tomorrow*. In this sense, 'we participate in the construction of the world that we and our descendants will inhabit' (*ibid.*: 183). And H. Putnam, in his foreword to *FFF* (: xv, xvi), is able to detect what he calls Goodman's 'energy' (akin to, but not the same as, a form of optimism), which stems from his interest in 'concrete and partial progress' rather than in grand visions of cultural evolution. 'Goodman is a man with methods and concepts to sell (his word).'

Goodman's constructionalism seems indeed to be envisaging an open future for philosophy, but at the same time it is grounded on what has been accepted in the past. It consists specifically in the epicentral endeavour of the cognitive appropriation of what there appears to be. Goodman's conscience cannot thus easily entrust the test for the truth of a construction in its anticipated practical yield. Indeed, the foundation of success is the adherence to, and the observance of, practice—but of an inherited practice concerning meanings. What has been known and understood is bound to give rise to present insights about how things work, irrespectively of whether the wisdom of foregone practice will be put to new practice and will be called (pragmatic) 'truth'. In one of his most characteristic moments, Goodman specifies that in proposing a system as an organization pattern 'what needs to be shown is not that it is true but what it can

do.[90] Put crassly, what is called for in such cases is less like arguing than selling.' (*WW*: 129.) And what is well-constructed presumably 'sells' well. 'Unlike terminal skepticism and irresponsible relativism, constructionalism always has plenty to do.' (*RP*: 166.)[91]

Goodman's pragmatism appears in effect to be a pragmatism of understanding past practices and thus better understanding the constructed worlds bequeathed by these practices; of understanding that what was conceived in the past as the future to be, became indeed the present moment. This is not a pragmatism of 'practical' truth, of truth judged solely on what is bound to 'get results' (cf. *MM*: 200). In *RP*: 158–159, Goodman & Elgin attribute to C. S. Peirce this faulty reduction of pragmatism to mere practicality; but 'running a machine successfully does not amount to understanding it in all ways' (: 159).[92] And understanding is the genuine objective sought after by Goodman's pragmatist spirit. (Cf., above, the example of the housewife and 'the car she drives to bring home the groceries'. May I add that any sexist nuances are only incidental.)

THE NET RESULT is that, fortunately or unfortunately, there still seems to be no provision for a way out of Goodman's constructions, no external touchstone on which to test their validity, apart from a weak internal criterion of clarity and simplicity (see the end of previous section) and a difficult to capture pragmatist concern. But questions become all the more pressing. What are symbological constructions referring to, after all? What is the subject matter of our cognitive relation towards the arts and the sciences? Goodman's constructionalism becomes an enterprise of creating everything out of nothing, making symbols symbolize what they are made to symbolize, and—in particular—making artworks that frequently and characteristically symbolize what is difficult to discern. Clarity seems to bear the seeds of obscurity and antecedent practice the uneasy suspicion of self-delusion and empty conformity.

But this is precisely the *irrealist* (i.e. neither realist nor anti-realist) version of things Goodman is compelled to, and does indeed, adopt. It is not only a rejec-

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90 'What it can do' here means 'what it can do from a constructionalist perspective', or how effectively it re-constructs its field of reference.

91 Scheffler 2001: 672 also calls Goodman 'one of the world's great salesmen'. (Scheffler is referring to an incident where he was persuaded by a ninety-year-old Goodman to write a paper for a conference in France—which was to be Scheffler 1997).

92 'Goodman's solution to the new riddle of induction is pragmatic. The reason for favoring entrenched predicates lies not in their syntactic, semantic, or metaphysical priority, but in their utility.' (Elgin 2001: 689.) I can only interpret 'utility' here as 'usefulness towards understanding'.

tion of what could be perceived as 'fundamentally' real or nominal under different descriptions, but a total indifference towards the conception of something being the 'real', the 'true', etc. The term 'irrealism' itself is introduced in the foreword to *WW* (cf. Goodman 1996*b*: 203). Later, Goodman notes (1996*b*: 206*n*):

> The principles and attitude of irrealism were already evident in my earliest philosophical writing, not only in *The Structure of Appearance* (1951) but even in *A Study of Qualities* (1940, but not published until 1990), and in unpublished studies during the preceding decade. Lately, I have more often called the same complex of views 'constructionalism'.

So, evidently, the problem constructionalism had to face, namely the 'deconstruction' of any notion of 'real' constructions, is re-appropriated (or maybe reconstructed) under the rubric of irrealism. Irrealism is now made to occupy the place of constructionalism in its relation towards the pragmatism of inherited practice (see above, and Goodman 1983*a*: 256). The difference is that it is designed to resist any objection to the effect that there is no subject matter for reference; because irrealist reference creates its own subject matter as it goes along. It structures what there is by positing presences, i.e. referential opportunities emerging in the horizon of human livelihood.

Sartre 1940: *ad loc.* 364–373 (English translation, 1983: 220–226), saw the *irréel* as the only genuine territory of the aesthetic, in the sense that nature, essence, existence—they are all permeated by the nauseating disgust of (objectifiable) reality. Imagination remains for Sartre the only access route to this authentic topos of irreality, creating art as only an *analogon* of the irreal—our only opportunity to take a glimpse at a territory uninfected by ordinary reality. Goodman's irreal is more radical, because, as I said, it does not constitute a denial of that which is perceived as real, but a denunciation of all tendency towards establishing or relinquishing any notion of fixed reality (of whatever ontological specifications) opposite a postulated counterpart. Irrealism means total indifference to pronouncements concerning the real or the phenomenal, the necessarily true or the necessarily false. (One can open one's eyes to the irreal without having looked for *any*thing in advance—whereas in order to look for *some*thing, or for *no*thing, one has to partially know *it* beforehand.) There must be at least as many 'realities' as plausible reality-constructions (not 'constructions of reality', because there is no independent reality to be tentatively matched by a construction). This procedure of freely constructing the irreal becomes Goodman's central notion of 'world-making'. Thus, the 'truth' about the world is 'not a shush, but a chatter' (*PP*: 31); it is continually achieved.

21. 'A WORLD IS AN ARTEFACT'[93]

> Making a just rendering, like making a good chair or airplane takes effort, skill, and care. Success is limited by our energy, patience, training, discrimination, craftsmanship, ingenuity, and by the materials at hand. [Goodman 1991*a*: 9.]

In *FFF* Goodman is adamant that actuality engulfs all possibilities, namely that 'all possible worlds lie within the actual one' (: 57). 'A predicate ostensibly of possibles as compared to a correlative manifest predicate, like an open umbrella as compared to a closed one, simply covers more of the same earthly stuff.' (*Loc. cit.*) That is, no matter in how many ways we choose to describe possibilities in the world, they are just that: compartments *within the* world. Goodman's aversion towards notions of possibility does not at all diminish in his later work, when, at a comically hostile moment for example, he insists that 'the question here is not of the possible worlds that many of my contemporaries, especially those near Disneyland, are busy making and manipulating' (*WW*: 2). Similarly, in *LA*: 68, Goodman contends that 'the metaphorical and the literal have to be distinguished within the actual.' And in *LA*: 88–89 one reads that 'talking does not make the world or even pictures, but talking and pictures participate in making each other and the world as we know them.' (As also indicated in my Appendix to the first chapter, this interdependency between seeing and making is still valid in hard-and-fast cases like that of pictorial perspective.) Unequivocally, there is here *one* world, and it is at least partly the product of our relation with it. But if Goodman follows the consequences of this, he must say that this one world 'is many ways' (*PP*: 31—from an article first published in 1960); for we talk and compose pictures etc. in diverse ways. Thus, if what we make of the world is what the world is, there cannot really be *one* particular world. In *PP*: 3–4 Goodman, perhaps for the first time, articulates the ensuing contention that what we call 'the world' is actually nothing but a 'world-description'; or, that descriptions 'apply to the world only obliquely, through applying to discourse about the world. We need not shun syntax or coherence or simplicity for fear the world is ungrammatical or incoherent or complex.' (*PP*: 337.) Apart form all frames of reference, that is, there is nothing left to be called a 'world' (*WW*: 3 and 4, where Goodman refers to Rorty 1972; similarly, *WW*: 100–101). 'The onion is peeled down to its empty core.' (*WW*: 118.)

As Elgin repeatedly urges, we should actually think of Goodman's 'world-descriptions' or 'world-versions' as the new term he uses from *WW* onwards to denote (constructional) systems or 'theories'. (See Elgin 1993*b*: 130; 1997*a*/ *b*/ *c*/ *d*:

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93 *RP*: 53.

viii; 1997*a*: xvi; 2001: 683).[94] If there is no world 'out there', clearly our theories cannot be attempts at a conceptual capturing of any such world, but only constructs emerging out of previous theories as pre-existing world-versions: 'the making is a remaking' (*WW*: 6). The quest for discovering the ultimate substance of things transmutes into an interest to examine the function of what has been taken to stand as it stands (*WW*: 7).

Of course, such a counterintuitive result cannot be easily taken at face value. One is often inclined towards re-uniting Goodman's many worlds (cf. Dutra 1999), and it may be that such a tendency to unify is not always just a 'modern philosophical neurosis' (as put by Meyer L N 1997: 12). Conversely, Scheffler's efforts to grapple with the puzzle of irrealism have gone as far as the invention of a new conception of 'plurealism' (2000), or the acceptance of numerous, equally real worlds. This approach is intended to combine a Peircean monistic realism and a Goodmanian pluralistic irrealism, to the effect that there are indeed many worlds, but their existence is independent of one another and of ourselves. It is in describing these worlds that we always have to depend upon a given version (Scheffler 2001: 672–673). And it is a necessary consequence of Scheffler's account, that, for incompatible but equally credible versions, their worlds (or 'domains', for Scheffler) cannot be affirmed at the same time, because their existence is determined by what is actually real—not by our making it be so (*ibid.*: 675).[95]

In Goodman there is simply no perspective from which we can even begin to say whether there is one or more worlds (Elgin 1997*a*: xvii). Scheffler's worlds above (and all other attempts at compromise) become just one more making of 'the real'. And the postulation of multiple, equally valid versions of 'the world'

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94 Ricœur 1972: 106–107 (English translation 1981: 177) employs a notion of 'world' to indicate that (literary) works of art do not simply present us with different (imaginary perhaps) situations which are, so to speak, 'pointed out' to us, but they open up whole new dimensions of habitable being—they refer, in other words, to whole new worlds. Wolterstorff (see 1976–77) also uses the term 'world' as a collective designator of what an artwork refers to or implies; but, for him, fictional objects are kinds, and artistic worlds are 'segments of possible worlds' (: 131; cf. Bennett 1981–82).

95 Schwartz 2000 develops a notion of the remaking of worlds, wishing to effect a compromise between the proponents and the opponents of the conception of worldmaking. He construes (: *ad loc.* 157–158) made worlds as mere 'recipes' that need to be actualized—in the way identical ingredients can bring about many different end-products. So, there must be basic ingredients, 'but there are no privileged, self-presenting building blocks inherent in Reality. Nor is some singular account of what-is-there presupposed by all cognitive construction.' (: 158.) I think, however, that no notion of any pre-existing substratum could persuade Goodman to a compromise.

is, again, unacceptable (*PP*: 4): Goodman explicitly (*RP*: 51) disassociates himself from philosophers of pluralism like R. Rorty, T. Kuhn, P. Feyerabend (or what Meyer L N 1997: 12 calls 'pluralistic perspectivism'). To say that there are numerous equally tenable views about 'the world' is still to rely on a dubious substratum of reference.

If making worlds were totally arbitrary, however—if versions were freely floating, so to speak, in a chaotic universe of discourse—then communication would obviously be a problematic prospect. But if for communication to be possible there had to be a common, external ground of reference, then Goodman's irrealism would be defeated. His own response in this matter consists therefore in explaining that versions only appear to be of the same *facts* whenever they share some *terms*, whenever, i.e., they can be translated into one another (*RP*: 95). This model of interrelation does not serve as a device for the substantiation of a purported 'real' world, filled with entities that are partially captured by each version. Terms like 'rest' and 'motion' may serve as an illustration, since they 'do not sort bodies into classes; all bodies are at rest and in motion', depending on the version we use to describe them (*RP*: 96). Thus, facts 'are', and at the same time 'are not'. Version-independent facts are paradoxical (*RP*: 100), and, for Goodman, there is nothing paradoxical about this. The general result is that, like 'meaning', 'fact' also becomes in Goodman a syncategorematic term (defined purely extensionally and *isomorphically*[96]): there are no externalities to which versions must respond and interpret, but only terms that lead from one version to the other, making them intertranslatable (*WW*: 93). Thus, to think that some things are out there in an 'aboriginal' world is for Goodman an illusion resulting from versions that exhibit some points of tangential contact. 'Facts are small theories, and true theories are big facts.' (*WW*: 97.)[97]

For Charlton 1980: 281, Goodman's purported irrealism 'is really an eirenic form of metaphysical relativism. Different metaphysical systems suit us at different times.'[98] This sounds plausible, but if it were true it would make Goodman's

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96 On extensional isomorphism (pertaining to structure as well as to extension of systematic terms), see *SA*: 10, 18, 20; *PP*: 84; *WW*: 100. Cf. Rudner's explanation in 1972*a*: 373, as well as the critical approach by Kelly & Hausman 1986.

97 Goodman 1996*b*: 204 does not see himself as an idealist, or as a neo-Kantian either (as alluded to by G. Hellman in *SA*: xl). To be sure, Goodman's worlds are not necessarily ideas. And it is perhaps interesting to note that in his only (published) philosophical dialogue Goodman seems to be identifying himself with the 'Berkeleyans' rather than the 'Leibnizians': see *PP*: 69–75.

98 Meiland & Krausz 1982 describe relativism as 'one of the cornerstones of modern thought' (: 8), in view of its many possible instantiations, centred around 'factors variously called conceptual schemes, conceptual frameworks, linguistic frameworks, forms of life, modes of discourse, systems of thought, Weltanschauungen,

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case considerably weaker. For Goodman explicitly denounces the relativism of 'anything goes' (cf. 1984*a*). His initial brief explication of irrealism is a 'radical relativism under rigorous restraints' (*WW*: x; similarly, 94). And already in 1940, he warned that nothing is emptier than a relativism generally admitting alternative solutions but not really venturing to solve any problems (*SQ*: v).[99]

Goodman's relativism constantly warns against permanent and absolute truths—but it does not go so far as to accept any constructed model for truth whatsoever. For Goodman, there are still standards to be reached, and progress in the construction of worlds to be made. Although his irrealism is indifferent to the kinds of worlds that will correspond to well-built systems, it *does* distinguish between well and badly constructed worlds. There *are* right and wrong world-versions, and ours is the intricate and rewarding task to (re)construct them out of already existing ones. Problems arise when we are to choose between world-versions that are incompatible but equally right constructions (e.g., it is true, in different worlds, that the earth is moving and that it is not moving). To say that conflicting world-versions are right from different points of view, or that they apply relative to a system of reference, would be problematic; for in every such case it would be theoretically possible to combine them so that they refer to an allegedly 'unified' world, described from variant aspects each time (*WW*: 112–116). Therefore, the efficiency of competing world-versions must be applicable to wholly disparate realms, although in our theories and practices 'we flit back and forth between extremes as blithely as a physicist between particle and field theories' (*WW*: 119). There is here, it seems, an issue that is of the essence: Goodman needs to address more directly the question of how versions become comparable, and what enables us possibly to choose the best among competing ones.

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disciplinary matrices, paradigms, constellations of absolute presuppositions, points of view, perspectives, or worlds' (*ibid.*).

99 Further afield, Putnam 1992: 123–133 compares J. Derrida's postmodern–deconstructional strategies with Goodman's irrealist relativism. Goodman himself (1996*b*: 206) does not seem to be making much of this, and Robinson 2000: 213 reports having heard Goodman's remark that J. Derrida deconstructed worlds, whereas he himself constructed them.

22. RIGHTNESS > TRUTH

> Instead of appealing to truth, we must seek a more general notion of rightness that may sometimes subsume and sometimes compete with truth. That's tough. [*MM*: 98.]

By definition, truth concerns statements; but since Goodmanian world-versions consist in far more diverse features, qualities, and constituent parts (structured in all the different symbol systems we employ), truth can only be a partial consideration when determining the overall rightness of theories as world-versions. (For they might consist not only in statements; e.g. what can the statement be when the poet (on pp. *25*, *26* above) says he reached the same shore by swimming and, later, by studying? can this utterance be described as either true or false?)

> 'The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth' would thus be a perverse and paralyzing policy for any worldmaker. The whole truth would be too much; it is too vast, variable, and clogged with trivia. The truth alone would be too little, for some right versions are not true—being either false or neither true nor false—and even for true versions rightness may matter more. [*WW*: 19; similarly, 120–121.]

In Goodman's 'world of worlds' (the one that remains really to be justified, i.e. his view of worldmaking when regarded as a world-version itself), it is in fact an exaggerated commonplace to treat truth as the privileged sanctum even of science. What can be said at most is that some aspects of truth, like correctness of denotation, pertain to science, but others (exemplification-related) do not (cf. *PP*: 132).

> Despite rife doctrine, truth by itself matters very little in science. We can generate volumes of dependable truths at will so long as we are unconcerned with their importance. [...] Science denies its data as the statesman denies his constituents—within the limits of prudence. [*LA*: 262–263.]

As in the case of worldmaking in general, Goodman was already in *LA* defending a notion of scientific practice founded only partly on what is (sententially) true, opting for a redefinition of our cognitive prime objective as 'appropriateness under different names' (*LA*: 264). On these grounds, there is 'no schism between the scientific and the aesthetic', he claimed. The differences concern only specific fields of application, marked by 'a difference in domination of certain specific characteristics of symbols' (*loc. cit.*). This is the familiar model of the precedence that symbological functioning takes over its special cases—like scientific or aesthetic symbol systems. As long as the difference between art and science is only one of degrees in the symbological realization of disparate referential relations through disparate media, excellence of symbological functioning super-

sedes the distinction of what might be more aesthetic or more scientific (*LA*: 258–259). Within the context now of worldmaking as symbol-system-making, the efficiency of made world-versions is generally measured by *rightness*—whereas truth is reserved for parts only of some world-versions (the ones dealing exclusively with—or to the degree that they deal with—statements). Rightness 'pertains to symbols of all sorts' (Elgin 1993*b*: 137), while truth affects predominantly declarative sentences. Simply put, 'rightness, unlike truth, is multidimensional' (*RP*: 156), with truth as an occasional ingredient (: 156, 157).[100]

Having taken into consideration the different types of symbol systems, the way they are developed and tested through habitual practice—and, analogically, all the past world-versions they respond to, and all the future world-versions they help (re)construct—traditionally accepted truth becomes a complex issue of *rightness of fit* between alternative acceptable descriptions, representations, exemplifications, expressions, etc. (*WW*: 132–133, 138). Unavoidably, the matter of choice between them must take us back to entrenched associations and adopted referential practices. There is no external ground for testing, and there is no conclusive reason to prefer one right version from another equally right (the earth as moving—in relation to the moon—and the earth as stationary—in relation to me standing on it). To invoke the perceived world 'out there' in order to legitimize certain world-versions would be to invoke these versions themselves—viz. it would not amount to any 'real' evidence in favour of them. Worldmaking is, after all, a more comprehensive label for symbol-making; a label for constructing systems within which to re*cognize* worlds. Symbol systems have become in this way not mere tools for the clarification of a vague notion of reality; they have become the reality—or the different realities.

It is only too natural that Goodman himself—already in *FFF*—recognizes the flagrant circularity of the argument: practice determines rightness, which in turn is what determines what we should choose and put to practice.

> But this circle is a virtuous one. The point is that rules and particular inferences alike are justified by being brought into agreement with each other. *A rule is amended if it yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling to amend.* [*FFF*: 64.]

The 'virtue' of this (otherwise vicious) circle, could be better perhaps felt if the circle were pictured more like a spiral (which is H. Putnam's suggestion in his foreword to *FFF*: ix, in turn echoing J. Dewey). The same spiral that seems to be

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100 Before formulating this special conception of rightness, Goodman entertained a view about truth as 'permanent acceptability' (e.g. in *WW*: 123–124). Criticism of the notion of permanent acceptability has concentrated on many different aspects (cf. Lyas 1985: 320), but Goodman's tactic, in the end, to treat truth as strictly sentential suffices to avoid previous problems.

running through Goodman's aesthetics and Goodman's epistemology—or perhaps the label 'spiral' exemplified by the theory as struggling to gradually disengage from an unproductive circular trajectory. Or, in the final analysis, the theory torn by the force of adverse influences: logical clarity and aesthetic opacity; scientific knowledge and aesthetic understanding; established practice and the advancement of action; world-making and world-finding. (Exemplification of some of its features renders thus the theory itself more aesthetic, in a way that exclusive talk about variables, predicates, extensions, and the like could not have done.)

23. AESTHETICO-LOGIC...[101]

> There is no medium which art cannot utilize—not even the process of living. And when life itself becomes a work of art, the opposition between art and life (between esthetically indicated values and activity aiming to control and directly possess values) is overcome. [Morris 1939–40: 139.]

Goodman's 'eternal critic', Margolis, expresses his inability to see how the 'peculiar fixities' of *LA* can be reconciled with the 'so-called "irrealism"' of *WW* (1989: 174). Margolis thinks that

> Goodman's motivation is to extricate a strongly anti-hermeneutic (that is, a formal semiotic) conception of artworks *for* his own favoured extensionalism. There could not be a more curious marriage of ideas. [*Ibid.*: 178–79.]

Such criticism is to a certain extent justified in its bewilderment, but I do not think that it can shake Goodman's well-grounded commitment to a general theory of symbolization as worldmaking. I referred earlier (see p. *153* above) to the ideal of methodological simplicity and clarity as one of the hermeneutical 'full points' in the interpretation of Goodman's thought. His ultimate reliance on practised reason and practised feeling is not perhaps itself another such point of hermeneutical arrest, because—for one thing—it is hardly characteristic of his particular case. Yob 1992: 484 reminds us of the simple finding that 'all truths, scientific and religious, are accepted or rejected in two contexts—their setting in a system of understandings and their setting in a community of users and believers'. And Meyer L N 1997: 13–14 poignantly insists that the 'epistemological dogma' of propositional beliefs as the foundation of world views has to be abandoned; it is rather habit and faith that undergirds many fundamental aspects of culture.

Inherited practice in Goodman directly points to worldmaking as the probable candidate of an axiomatic hermeneutical superlative: there is no higher or more inclusive category in Goodman's account by means of which his notion of worldmaking could be justified. Because, in the end, practice as Goodman intends it (namely not in a utilitarian sense) signifies an inherited universe of previously constructed worlds. And, since there are no means for testing the efficiency of such worlds other than comparing them with each other, worldmaking can indeed be interpreted as Goodman's ultimate epistemological commitment—which, at the same time is a metaphysical commitment, since it thematizes all-that-which is simply as all-that-which is constructed.

For Goodman (see *PP*: 418), what no one and nothing can achieve, 'even with the worst will in the world', is utter chaos. 'The concepts of chaos and conceivability are incompatible.' To understand is to ascribe regularities, and, with-

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101 For this conjunction of terms, cf. p. *130* above.

out these, there is no understanding; i.e. there is no reality. 'To be real, relative to any context, is to exhibit certain prescribed uniformities.' The extent to which uniformities are there to be transgressed, or the way they sometimes transmute themselves, remains in question. 'It remains a question whether there is an evident and absolute distinction between what we have been referring to as "what comes to us" and the schemata we apply.' (*PP*: 419.) Similarly, the worldmaking process as a primordial fact defining collectively our understanding and our sensibility remains an assumption. The explication of that ultimate need for coordination between what understands and what is understood, Goodman is content to relegate to the theologian: the possibility of a 'search for a universal or necessary beginning is best left to theology', Goodman says (*WW*: 7). And in *WW*: 138–139 he confirms that fit with practice and the ensuing evolution of tradition are matters determined by authority rather than reliability of results: hence, there are no unchangeably valid results. And, moreover, equally acceptable results must become, or must show that they are, consonant with the leading choices of the community of interested parties.

Perhaps the overall consequence is a distasteful vacillation between apparently oppositional tendencies in Goodman's thought (cf. end of previous section). And perhaps Margolis's bewilderment (at the beginning of this section) expresses a genuine concern that Goodman, in trying to compromise incongruous perspectives, deprived them all of their especial interpretative potentialities. (Possibly the price for not being unrepentant in fallacy; cf. my general motto on p. 25.) However, for my purposes, there is now important evidence to the effect that Goodman's theory of the arts and of the aesthetic—as an integral part of his theory of symbols—has also become an integral part of the process of worldmaking. For worldmaking is the unbounded construction of world-versions. So, it also includes aesthetic world-versions: the worlds of the arts, of particular artists, of particular works. This is to say that the aesthetic, in making its own world(s), its own field(s) of certain referential peculiarities rather than others, is not to be juxtaposed with a supposed antithetical non-aesthetic—within a given world-version. If symbolization proceeds with no reference to what is not symbolized (but only according to internal and inherited rules), aesthetic symbolization creates aesthetic world-versions *ab initio*. In other words, symbological aesthetics is fundamentally a metaphysical aesthetics—a *kalology*, as I shall call it: it concerns all-that-which presents itself as the constructed content of a relevant world-version, to the extent that it is, and if it is at all, a relevant ('aesthetic') version. This kind of aesthetics is not an ontological classification of things in 'the world', or even a way of perceiving 'the world'. It consists in world-versions whereby the elements of symbological reference are transparent enough to be employed as such, but also opaque enough to constitute a continuous challenge, pointing towards the possible limits of reference in general (as well as a challenge to familiar categorizations). In a way, kalology thus conceived belongs to a world of reference that strives to present and make more perspicuous the aesthetic symbol it-

self as a palpable but not wholly penetrable presence *par excellence.* In my last chapter, I shall offer a systematically looser and more tentative characterization of Goodman's aesthetics within such a framework, in order to consolidate my notion of a metaphysical aesthetics of presence as a form of kalology through symbolization.

II.B.3

KALOLOGIA

24. KALOLOGY

> No doubt aesthetic emotions have the property that makes them aesthetic. No doubt things that burn are combustible. The theory of aesthetic phlogiston explains everything and nothing. [*LA*: 247.] I am concerned less with the nature of thought than with its modes, less with its substance than with its forms. [*MM*: 26.]

Not only is Goodmanian aesthetics repellent of any ontology in favour of aesthetic 'topology' (as I have described, e.g., on pp. *75, 110, 117, 152* above), but its metaphysical orientation is of a special case. Aesthetics, for Goodman, is a form of referring to made worlds, in ways that referents and vehicles of symbolization, meanings and symbols, justify each other's being as they are (with only established practice as an external criterion), and they also bring forth and *present* their relations in the penumbra of their indefinable opacity. This is part of why I chose to differentiate this symbolo-metaphysical aesthetics by designating it as *kalology*. In the following sections (concluding my appropriation of Goodman's philosophy of the arts), I shall try to qualify notions like 'presence' and 'kalology'. I shall be initially providing some lexicographical and historical background information (required especially in this section for the case of 'kalology').

I. SYKOUTRIS (IN Aristotle 1991: 33**n*) refers to one of Democritus's works as bearing the title *Περὶ καλολογίης ἐπέων /Perì kalologíês epéôn/* (=*On the Kalology of Names*), but this is probably a mistake. His source, DK 68 [55], A 33[102] cites *καλλοσύνης /kallosýnês/* instead of *καλολογίης*; and DK's source, Diogenes Laertius (1999: I 665 (=9.48)), also cites *καλλοσύνης* or *καλωσύνης /kalôsýnês/*. It is rather the case that, according to the *Thesaurus Graecae Linguae* (*TGL*; =Hase et al. 1831–65), the earliest attested instance of the Greek *καλολογία /kalología/* occurs in the ancient lexicon by Hesychius Alexandrinus. Due to the obscurity of the manuscript tradition, it is only by approximation that the term can be identified as a fifth century CE interpolation (see the incomplete edition of Hesychius Alexandrinus 1953–56: II 224). In fact, what we find there is not an explanation of the entry for kalology, but */kalología/* itself as an explanation of *εὐηγορία /euêgoría/* (eloquence, persuasive or graceful rhetoric; with *καλορρημοσύνη /kalorhrêmosýnê/* as another synonym offered in the ancient lexicon).[103]

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102 =Diels & Kranz 1951–52: II, 91, 25.

103 I am grateful to Dr P. A. Hansen for having indicated this entry to me in a private communication (April 2002). Dr Hansen is the current editor of the rest of the *Hesychii Lexicon* (letters *π–ω*; it resumes the aforementioned uncompleted edition by K. Latte).

Evidently, in this oldest traceable occurrence of */kalología/* the first base word determines the second; hence, we can roughly explicate kalology in this case as 'the kalon of discourse (logos)'. This is a concept primarily pertaining to the stylistic or formal features of discourse, and it has other synonyms, as well (like *ὡραιολογία /hôraiología/*, *καλλιλογία /kallilogía/*: see the *TGL* entry for */kalología/*). However, it can equally be the case that 'logos', as the second base word, determines the first: hence, kalology can acquire the meaning of 'discourse on the kalon'. (Analogously we have, e.g., the Greek and English equivalents for 'mythology', 'archaeology', etc.) Vizyinos 1995—a work first published in 1881—expounds precisely this second conception of kalology (in a Neoplatonic context). But in more recent, contemporary Greek, both extensions of the term in effect coexist (see Dimitrakos 1964, Babiniotis 1998). Sometimes they are more intricately conflated, and */kalología/* comes to signify the study of the kalon in written or oral discourse (see Institute of Neohellenic Studies 1998).

The etymology of 'kalon' is not certifiable beyond doubt, but the term seems to be linguistically and semantically connected to the classical Sanskrit **kalya-* and / or some of its derivatives (see Monier-Williams 1899, Frisk 1960–70, Chantraine 1968–80). Particularly for the English language—and following the *OED*—'kalon' is first recorded in 1749. There are numerous other compound words bearing 'kalon' as their root in its different stem-forms: **kal-* (**kall-*) or **cal-* (**call-*).[104] But 'kalon' itself is defined in the *OED* as 'the (morally) beautiful; the ideal good; the "summum bonum"'. And, accordingly, its compound words always designate some excellence and / or beauty (relative, in each case, to the second base word).[105]

Although 'kalology' does not appear in the *OED*, one can readily locate it, for example, in World Wide Web resources (such as on-line lists of rare and obscure words, compiled by amateur language enthusiasts; it is invariably defined

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104 On my part, I have adopted throughout the transliteration of the Greek 'kappa' ('κ') into the Latin alphabet as 'k' and not as 'c'. As stated in my preliminaries (see p. *15*), in thus romanizing Greek letters I am following the transliteration rules prescribed by ISO 1999.

105 The affinities of the morally good to the *kalon* have always formed an integral part of the conception of both goodness and beauty in general (cf., recently, McGhee 2000; reviewed by Gkogkas 2001*b*). The *kalon* as *pulchrum* was counted frequently (but not always) among the mediaeval transcendentals (along with *res* and *aliquid*)—while *ens, unum, verum, bonum* were the most commonly recognized transcendentals. As for the *'kalon'* in Modern Greek, it signifies 'good', whereas the *sensu lato* 'beautiful' is rendered by the equivalent word for 'timely' or 'auspicious' (=*ὡραῖον /hôraîon/*). The significance of the issue notwithstanding, I shall confine myself to some brief remarks at the end of my Appendix to this chapter (p. *203*), as befits my context.

there as the 'study of beauty', and sometimes spelt as 'calology').[106] Its ancestry is difficult to trace. In the *New Standard Dictionary of the English Language* (=Funk 1963), the earliest occurrence of 'kalology' is defined as 'the doctrine or theory of beauty in itself considered' (also called 'kallisophy'—cf. 'philosophy'), and it is attributed to McCosh 1880: 149 (an interesting perhaps coincidence, considering the nearly contemporary first edition of Vizyinos 1995). This is correct, apart from the fact that McCosh actually proposes 'Kalology, or Kallisophy' in an earlier still work (1860: 288, 402[107]).

McCosh was convinced that 'the peculiar aesthetic sentiment is always something above and beyond mere sensibility' (1880: 153). For the first time since the inception of aesthetics, McCosh's proposal seemed to be challenging the science of the sensibles as having too narrow a scope. It is important to note that, in order to do this, McCosh did not directly reach towards some wider notion of ideal beauty (the 'fair' as he calls the Platonic kalon; 1860: 288, 402). His primary aim was to discover a science that would properly study the 'laws of the feelings'—whereas aesthetics was only a science 'which would determine the laws of the beautiful' (the latter forming only a part of the laws of the feelings; *ibid.*: 401). However, the feelings themselves are merely 'rising out of the sensations and relations'; but they 'proceed' from ideas (1880: 169). McCosh willingly returned to a fully metaphysical Platonic understanding of the ideal and the actual, clinched together in a relation of mergence in separation; and he apparently did so in order to authenticate a possible 'new' science of kalology.

Gilson's conception of the French equivalent *'calologie'* (1963: 38, 1964: 10) seems to diverge (and, at any rate, there is no indication of dependence on J. McCosh). Berleant 1966–67 offers a somewhat favourable review of (an English translation of) Gilson 1963.[108] But the main problem is that Gilson, for Berleant, 'avoids being wrecked on the Scylla of intellectualism only to be swept under by the Charybdis of ontology' (: 296). This could prove to be very much to the point. Gilson, indeed in my opinion, aims programmatically at undermining any intellectualistic approach to art as knowledge (1963: 9–10). On the other hand,

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106 Examples to be found at: <http://phrontistery.50megs.com/index.html>, <http://www.islandnet.com/~egbird/dict/dict.htm>. Also, see <http://ideonomy.mit.edu/index.html> for P. Gunkel's eccentric project on the science of ideas as the cataloguing of concepts ('ideonomy'), where 'calology' (or '*calologie*') is included.

107 I gratefully acknowledge that the Oxford English Dictionary Information Service provided me (in May 2002) with the information on the earlier McCosh publication, as well as on the term *čalologie* in the work of É. Gilson (see below).

108 As opposed to Beardsley's almost provocatively dismissive tone in reviewing the same work (1968).

however, he does not appear to distinguish clearly between metaphysics and ontology (1963: 38; 1964: 10).

Surely, his *calologie* treats the beautiful metaphysically, namely as a transcendental mode of being qua being; *calologie* thus holds in relation to the philosophy of art the same position that epistemology holds to scientific knowledge of truth, of true being qua being. The object of epistemology is, on this account, convertible into the object of *calologie*. Thus, both truth and beauty (in the present context) are manipulated, so to say, by ontology, their common object becoming part of the general object of ontology: the true and the beautiful are converted into (more or less) true or beautiful *beings*. *Being* is inevitably transformed into being some*thing*; and *calologie* becomes a region of ontology.

Within the wider tradition he is expounding, it is perhaps not surprising that Gilson tends to use 'metaphysics' and 'ontology' in a way that makes it difficult to differentiate them completely. Already for Anselm of Canterbury, God's '(simply) being' meant '(actually) existing'—i.e. being and existing were treated as two identical realms; and for Thomas Aquinas, the higher part of the Soul necessarily acquired 'subsistence' (cf. Cottingham 2002: 245; 138–139). This effort to invest 'genuine' essence with some substance (notice the ordinary meaning of 'substance') is not of the same kind as, e.g., the Trinitarian notion of *hypostasis*, because only in the latter case may we have a single essence substantiated into numerous hypostases (which become, thus, categories of substance[109]). For Athanasius the Great (*ca* 293 – 373 CE) this was the ultimate affirmation of the Trinitarian God.[110] (Whereas Aquinas thought that only the affirmation of one substance (or subsistent essence) was within the potential of reason—the rest falling under the potency or scope of revelation.)

Even if this is a stretched (or mistaken) link, Gilson does use his ontic *calologie* (part of an 'ontological metaphysics', or a 'general ontology') as the vantage point from which he is able to reject aesthetics conceived as one of the 'orders' of knowledge (1963: 206). In his terminology (see 1964: 10), producing beautiful beings out of the metaphysical reserves of beauty is what *philosophy of art* proper is concerned with; whereas interpreting the kind of experience of the beauty found in the fine arts is the subject matter of *aesthetics* proper. These are complementary realms. But cancelling our attention to the production of beauty in favour of simply recognizing it when we encounter beautiful things is, for Gilson, a kind of philistinism that usurps the place of beauty and reserves it under

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109 Actually, *hypostasis* is the etymologically correct (Greek) equivalent of (Latin) *substantia*.

110 Similarly, the Cappadocian Fathers (4th century CE) talked of divine relations and energies (not of substance, but of essence and hypostases). Cf. Apostolopoulou 1999: 363 (where reference is made to the contemporary Greek philosopher C. Giannaras).

the name of truth (1963: 219). Such an approach amounts, for Gilson, to an unacceptable elimination of creation (studied by philosophy of art) in favour of cognition; and an unacceptable elimination of experiencing (studied by aesthetics) in favour of *re*cognition.

Gilson's perception of the problem is not particularly peculiar to him. In different contexts, C. S. Peirce maintains (according to Haack 1977: 379, 395) that everything real exists, but that the opposite is not true: reality is transcendental in its mode of being, but existence is immanent. And Steiner does not seem to be escaping from what M. Heidegger would criticize (for his own reasons; cf. p. *183* below) as an onto-theological apprehension of God. When Steiner mentions, for instance (1991: 99), 'the grammatical act of grammatical self-definition in God's "I am who I am"', he is presumably mis-rendering the 'I am He who-is' (/Egô eimí ho Ôn/). In the latter formulation of the definition—but not in the former—that-which-is (male gendered) does not really leave room for something-else-to-be (since it thematizes the 'act' itself of *being*).

It is not perhaps difficult to explain why anti-essentialism has been chiefly identified as a stance dismissive of ontology—an ontology, that is, of essences and beings (cf., most recently, Tillinghast 2004), which is not always tantamount to a metaphysics of essence and being. Nevertheless, contemporary advancements in free logic are attempting to divest singular logical terms of the redundant requisite of substantiation into existence—in the same way that classical predicative logic of the late nineteenth century onwards sought to dispense with the mediaeval substantiation of types. Goodman, in opting for his irrealist worlds, not only seems to be quietly bypassing such controversies, but he also manages to offer an intelligent anti-essentialist defence of 'bare' being.

25. 'FLATFOOTED PHILOSOPHY' METAPHYSICS[111]

Introducing his tenet of irrealism (in a preface, *MM:* vii), Goodman writes:

> I am a relativist who nevertheless maintains that there is a distinction between right and wrong theories, interpretations, and works of art; I believe neither that a literary work is determined by the intent of the author nor that all interpretations are equally right; I am a nominalist who lets anything be taken as an individual, and a rather behavioristically oriented cognitivist who recognizes the cognitive functions of emotion. *I am an anti-realist and an anti-idealist—hence an irrealist.* I oppose both the scientism and the humanism that set the sciences and the arts in opposition to each other. And I am a theorist concerned with practice as informing and informed by theory. [My italics.]

In this somewhat extensive quote (see especially my emphasis), Goodman presents us with a concise summary of his fundamental philosophical credos, and he asserts his irrealism as a kind of synthesis or sublation of both realism and idealism. This is somewhat surprising; for idealism also talks about what is ultimately *real,* and specifies it as belonging to the realm of the noumenal. So, idealism may also be described as a kind of realism (having, perhaps, materialism as its opposite, namely the view that what is ultimately real belongs to the realm of the physical). Thus, in Goodman's definition, 'realism' is semantically close to 'physicalism' (or 'materialism'), whereas 'irrealism' (meant as a negation of 'realism') is not merely a negation of 'physicalism' (but a negation of its opposite, as well—and probably a negation of the dualism thereof).

This asymmetry clearly discloses the ambiguity of the 'real'. As a moderate relativist, Goodman never argues for a nihilism in the sense of *there being nothing.* However, he couples this with an acceptance of the possible rightness of a world-version according to which *nothing is real* (see *MM*: 32–33). There are (right) world-versions, which possibly posit their particular realities successfully, without, however, dictating a single common reality when taken together with other right versions. Their fields of reference are incommensurable, and this is as it should be if Goodman is to safeguard his irrealism. On p. 106 of the 1983 printing of *MM*: 30–39 (see the relevant reference in Part III.B below), Goodman had in-

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111 In *WW*: 119 Goodman characterizes the difference between realism and idealism as 'conventional'. Responding to Hempel's critique of such a careless and imprecise formulation (1980: 198), Goodman defends himself subsequently in *MM*: 44. What he really meant, he says, was that the difference between realism and idealism simply 'flickers out' after we examine what they both stand for. 'But after a time,' Goodman adds, 'one wearies of writing flatfooted philosophy.'

cluded the following remark (which is also to be found, with only two minor changes, in a prefatorial piece in *MM*: 29):

> Irrealism does not hold that everything or even anything is irreal ['unreal' in a similar phrase in *MM*: 43], but sees the world melting into versions and versions making worlds, finds ontology evanescent, and asks after what makes a version right and a world well-made.

Irrealism 'is rather an *attitude of unconcern* with most issues between such doctrines' (*MM*: 43; my italics), doctrines that seek after what may be consummately real. Right versions may talk of that-which-is but we cannot conclude that there *is* such a thing. Irrealism is a denial of ontological co-ordinates for that-which-is, while preserving multiple possibilities for it to be: the priority is not on things but on their presuppositions. In other words, what is posited as right is not permitted into substantiation, because the hypothetical metaphysical space it would occupy has to be shared by indefinitely many disparate versions; the moment some version raises a claim to higher 'existential rights' than the other versions the whole edifice is shuttered.

Thus, irrealism becomes a denial of every-*thing* that is purportedly real (whether physical or noumenal), but in no conceivable way is it a denial of the freedom of *being* real—it cannot deny all that-which-is although it denies that there is some-*thing*. Accordingly, the worlds of conflicting versions are not describing ultimate 'realities', but multiple actualities or dynamic versions of ever-changing realities:

> A true version is true in some worlds, a false version in none. Thus the multiple worlds of conflicting true versions are actual worlds, not the merely possible worlds or nonworlds of false versions. *So if there is any actual world, there are many.* [*MM*: 31; my italics.]

The case of nominalism versus realism was similar: Goodmanian nominalism does not present a case for *nomina* rather than *realia*; it objects to a certain way of making worlds, but is entirely compatible with irrealism—the latter insisting on 'distinguishing between well-made and ill-made (or unmade) worlds' (*MM*: 29–30).

Goodman remains adamant that if there is anything at all, then it is the multiplicity of actual worlds; even fiction is strictly about something actual (if about anything). 'Saying that there is something fictive but not actual amounts to saying *that there is something such that there is no such thing*.' (*MM*: 125.) Hence, being actual is for Goodman tantamount to simply being—actual being is 'bare' being.

26. METAPHYSICAL AESTHETICS

> Never mind mind, essence is not essential, and matter doesn't matter. [*WW*: 96.] Trying to define 'art' by defining 'work of art' is a bit like trying to define philosophy by saying what constitutes a philosophy book. A work of art cannot stand alone as a member of a set. [Binkley 1976–77: 271.]

For Goodman it is uncontroversially the case that 'the philosophy of art should be conceived as an integral part of metaphysics and epistemology' (*WW*: 102; similarly, *MM*: 1, 148). For art is, in effect, about discovering all-that-which-is and understanding the modes in which it is what it presents itself as. Ernst 2000 (: *ad loc.* 339) favours Goodman's conception of the philosophy of art as an integral part of metaphysics and epistemology, and he thinks that Goodman's metaphysics is in fact the ideal basis for his aesthetic theory.

It is also one of Adam's central tenets that Goodman is a metaphysical aesthetician 'in the sense that Goodman's general views in the philosophy of art are determined by his answer to the question of what there is' (1983: 1, and in the Abstract). Elsewhere in this work, Goodman is probably misinterpreted—as when his nominalism of individuals is presented as a species of materialism and monism in the sphere of 'concrete' artworks (*ibid.*: 123, 130, 133, 135). However, Adam's confidence in the plausibility of a convergence between language analysis and metaphysics (*op. cit.*: e.g. 136) is notable.

Finally, Morizot 1993: 146 understands Adam's pronouncement as an expression of the fact that Goodman's aesthetics turns away from the dominant meta-aesthetic current in analytic philosophy of art—namely, the tendency to legitimize philosophy of art by identifying it as the philosophical examination of art criticism (cf. p. *40f* from my Introduction above). In the same vein, Scholz 1993: 4 also recognizes that, with Goodman, analytic aesthetics stops upholding the stipulation that it only restrict itself to (meta-aesthetic) art criticism. In this sense—in that it is not solely about criticism—Goodman's aesthetics could initially be described as 'metaphysical'. But this may not be sufficient.

It is true that there is a problem in how Adam conceives metaphysics in the case of Goodman's aesthetics. Plainly, this metaphysics cannot be determined by Goodman's 'answer to the question of what there is' (as already cited above), because Goodman always avoids this question, persistently speaking only of *all that which is, 'if anything'*. 'I have never held that every version makes a world, only that some do. Thus, to cite some versions that make no commitment to the existence of anything is no counterargument.' (Goodman 1996*b*: 211–212.)

So as to avoid misleading terms like 'ascribed', 'described', or 'attributed', Goodman wishes his world-versions to be 'imputed' (1996*b*: 213*n*). Versions are not necessarily statements, and not necessarily 'about worlds' (separate from their versions); they *are*, in effect, worlds. Thus, features may be imputed to a world by its 'answering' version, but the relation between version and world

cannot be founded on stipulated similarities or actual correspondences (*ibid.*: 212–213). We accept still images of moving objects, or of no actual objects at all (i.e. fictional objects); similarly, we must accept versions and worlds answerable to each other but ontologically unbounded by each other. In this sense, the force of the kalological presence of accepted versions, the force of their referential depth remains intact. The significance of aesthetic symbols (the disparate works of art) precedes all consideration about what kinds of things they are, and turns our attention instead to their *being there*. The fact that they are, that we recognize their presence, means that they are offering themselves as chances for the deployment and the flourishing of our senses, our thoughts, our needs, our wishes, etc. And the reality that dwells in such a special relationship is the intimation of an incompleteness of life (our life? their life?); an incompleteness that seeks to be gradually diminished.

27. PRESENCE

Presence and what I have called kalological reference—reference that is both articulate and indefinite—remain the defining features of an aesthetic that cannot be ontologically segregated: we do not have things, but ways of things. (Derrida 1972: 9–10 (English translation 1982: 9) recognizes presence as such a dimension of signification, but infers that the sign or the symbol itself, as the vehicle of signification, becomes secondary in relation to what it signifies. In this respect, I have frequently underlined (primarily in the first chapter above) the fact that Goodmanian symbology does not treat the vehicles of signification as always separable from the open-ended multitude of their referential content.)

Although I have certainly not intended kalology as an interpretative tool inspired by Aristotle, Aristotle's relevance must, nevertheless, be noted when any sort of metaphysical perspective is invoked.[112] What I have been trying to underline as the 'metaphysics versus ontology' debate, is in this context derivable perhaps from Aristotle. The different branches of philosophy deal with different species of substance or essence—*ousia*—which means, for Aristotle, that there must be a *first ousia*, incorporating all the former; its immediately ensuing genera are the One and the Being (Aristotle 1831: *Metaphysics* III 2, 1004 a 3–6). In Düring's terms (1966: 598), the different regions of Being—the different beings—seem to dictate for Aristotle the postulation of a primaeval *first ousia*, which is not itself a certain kind of being but it grounds all Being as such. My conception of presence, although not pertaining to any notion of primaeval substance, is perhaps remotely related to the latter through an apprehension of the dynamic act of *being present*.

Derrida 1972: 10 (English translation 1982: 9) notes that essence and presence—*ousia* and *parousia* indiscriminately—'ont toujours dénoté la présence' ('have always denoted presence'). And already in 1967: 23 he characteristically conflates 'presence comme substance / essence / existence (*ousia*)', so that, in the end (and with G. W. F. Hegel as his philosophical landmark), he can summarily designate presence (*parousia*) as 'la proximité à soi de la subjectivité infinie' (: 39). Such misleadingly comprehensive designations serve the general purpose of showing how all talk about being and entity is derivative in relation to Derrida's primordial process of *differing / deferring* (: 38).[113]. For, what he is himself con-

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112 Blinder 1982–83: 262 presents a strongly favourable apprehension of Aristotle, but on quite distinct grounds: 'The phenomenological approach to expressive meaning affords us a way of rethinking the classical notions of *mimesis* and naturalism as basic to art. The philosophy of art I am advocating might then be understood [...] as a series of footnotes to Aristotle.'

113 English translations in 1976: 12, 24, 23 respectively.

cerned with (see, e.g., 1972: 24*f* or, in English, 1982: 23*f*) is the Heideggerian story of Being as begetting its own route through history, a route where the difference between the different beings and the 'act' of what it is to be (or of 'bare' being) was—and had to be—forgotten.

From another viewpoint, M. Heidegger's (and, indirectly, J. Derrida's) critique of metaphysics as the 'metaphysics of presence' seems to rest heavily on a speculative exploitation of etymology—in itself not necessarily out of order (see White 1996: 162*n*): whether we can infer that 'what is one's own' (*ousia*) can be reduced to 'one's real estate or familiar premises' is debatable; so is the issue of which of these two senses was derived from which (the 'metaphysical' out of the 'physical' or *vice versa*). In fact, when Heidegger himself 1977: *ad loc.* 10–11, 34 ([1]1955) praises ancient Greek art for having revealed its truth, for having called upon non-being to appear as presence, he uses *Gegenwart* for 'presence'. However, in his critique of the 'concretization' of essence as presence, *Anwesen* stands now for 'presence' (which in German is indeed related to 'real estate'; cf. White *loc. cit.*).

I believe that talking about presence in my context is not necessarily being guilty of what M. Heidegger and J. Derrida may be targeting—that is, presence is not necessarily bound up with the presence of beings (an affiliation that might somehow prove oblivious to the differences between beings and the 'act' of being). In short, one can employ the notion of presence as corresponding to a notion of being that has not necessarily entered Heideggerian (and, ultimately, Hegelian) time.

On such a fresh basis for instance (and without having to invoke a presocratic, pre-classical conception of being, highly esteemed by M. Heidegger), Seel 1999 enunciates a new history of (German) aesthetics constructed out of his notion of *Erscheinen*. (It is translated as 'appearance' in Seel 1998 and 1999; and, more correctly, as 'appearing' in Seel 2003 onwards.[114]) What could be described as the subject of appearing is a presence offered to be fully—and thus aesthetically—perceived, culminating in the perception of ourselves as human beings (1999: 411–412). In different terms, appearing, being present, and being perceived, are prerequisites of our aesthetic awareness—which, in turn, is a constitutive element of the fullness of human life. Seel speaks of an aesthetics of appearing in a way that does not imply any familiar opposition of an alleged 'reality' of being to an alleged 'illusion' of what could be described as phenomenal, as merely apparent. What appears is not necessarily an 'appearance', so to speak, of some *thing* before our very eyes (a thing otherwise or hitherto concealed and / or unfathomed). The special character of appearing resides importantly in the inter-

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114 I thank Prof. Seel for having readily responded to my queries concerning some of the points presented here (private communication, 14.IV.2003).

play of appearances as simply showing themselves forth; so, aesthetic perception can serve perhaps as the primal instantiation of appearing.

Seel's conception of appearing is then important in that it bypasses the all too artificial contradistinction of illusionary appearance and authentic being—a distinction so fundamental for the history of aesthetics (2003: 18–19). It is also important in that it adheres to an aesthetics of appearing as, still, an aesthetics of presence. Indeed, in Seel, 'appearing' is unequivocally the appearing of a 'presence'; and 'presence' is the presence of a prerequisite being: 'Appearing is that being that can become aware only as an unreduced simultaneity of the features of phenomenal being and thus as passing presence' (2003: 24). Therefore, Seel's aesthetics of appearing amounts to an aesthetics of (the appearing) presence (of being).

Seel does not choose to examine whether his discourse is guilty of the 'crime' of essentiality, in Heideggerian terms. But, at any rate, according to Seel's account (1998: 113–114), essentialist aesthetics is not viable: art is not to be considered as the container of a class of things, but as the study of these things that we happen to have taken as art (no one knows what the future holds—so no ultimate definition is possible). Understanding art is understanding 'the cultural possibility of making and perceiving art' (1998: 114)—not giving an answer, but posing questions (in a Wittgensteinian manner). In effect, Seel's focal aim is aesthetic perception as 'attentiveness to the phenomenal individuality' (2003: 20) of appearing presences. In this way, he remains faithful to the programme of aesthetics as a science founded on the function of sense perception; that is why he feels compelled to argue (1998) against A. C. Danto's segregation of art and its apparent qualities.

Nevertheless, in Seel's case, perception is considerably and substantially reformed through his conception of appearing. And I believe that this latter conception is congruent with Goodman's symbological emphasis on the manifestation of the ways symbols work—which is a manifestation of their possibly kalological dimension.[115] I must re-emphasize here that this dimension is neither productive of a reality of its own, nor a *privileged* aspect of all possible symbol-functions and reality-versions. (Cf. some of the opening remarks in my Introduction. Welsch 1997: *ad loc.* 22–23, 36–37, 44 seems to be especially concerned about such aberrations of metaphysical aesthetics.) The dismantling of traditional aesthetic questions (whether in a Heideggerian or in a Wittgensteinian manner)—although not a priority for Goodmanian theory—is successfully met, I believe, by Goodman's ultra-liberal metaphysics. In such a context, I have used the notion of presence to characterize, in effect, the relation holding between aesthetic–

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115 Concerning Goodman, in Seel's German monograph on the aesthetics of *Erscheinen* (2000), references do not extend to works more recent than *LA*.

symbological world-versions and their makers; between being aesthetic and somehow apprehending the aesthetic.

28. 'GREY ANONYMITY'

> In Goodman's aesthetics, merit transmutes from end to means. Differences in value serve as goads not goals of aesthetic understanding. The strategy is characteristic of Goodman. What may at first seem omissions turn out to be reassignments. History, truth, intention, and the like are not excluded absolutely. But they are stripped of their preeminence, and their function is reconceived. They are factors that may contribute to understanding in the arts and elsewhere, but they have no epistemically privileged position. [Elgin 1991: 95.]

'Grey anonymity' is what characterizes Goodman's aesthetic vocabulary, according to Mitchell 2002 [: 3]. It is supposed to be the kind of anonymity stemming from his alleged relativistic, cerebral stance towards the aesthetic, the one that

> seeks a certain wise passivity in the presence of the nonverbal symbol, a suspension of evaluation and even interpretation in favour of a long pause, a breath-taking prolongation of the 'merely' descriptive moment [*ibid.*].

Of course, no language (theory, philosophy) can be a meta-language (meta-theory, meta-philosophy) of itself. Or, as Steiner 1991 puts it, non-scientific theories are not really verifiable or refutable by recourse to their supposed touchstone of a (naively conceived) natural externality; 'they cannot transcend the medium of their own saying' (: 75). Goodman is naturally conscious of the limitations of any attempt at 'total' interpretation:

> The appeal to abandon problems of detail and turn to the great issues is an appeal to abandon method and jump to conclusions. There are indeed times of emergency when this must be done. But the making of emergency decisions by conjecture is not the proper business of the scientist or the philosopher. [*PP*: 53.]

Goodman does fully recognize that his world of worlds is, in effect, a nominalistic world, specifically constructed to cater for what he recognizes as vital requirements. He cannot welcome any kind of world whatsoever in his world of worlds, because any distinction and principle for their construction would then become meaningless.

> Acceptance of the eligibility of alternative bases produces no scientific theory or philosophical system; awareness of varied ways of seeing paints no pictures. A broad mind is no substitute for hard work. [*WW*: 21.]

In other words, 'the fabrication of facts is of course itself a fabrication' (*WW*: 107), and by no means easily accomplished (cf. *MM*: 35, 42). In repeatedly recognizing this, Goodman challenges not the limits of relativistic (and inconsequential, for that matter) tolerance, but the potential for the generation of competing 'fabrications', which will be put to the test and judged for whatever they can yield. 'Recognition of multiple alternative world-versions betokens no policy of laissez-

faire. Standards distinguishing right from wrong versions become, if anything, more rather than less important.' (*WW*: 107.)

Goodman's world of worlds—i.e. his world-version that speaks of world-versions—cannot itself escape from scrutiny. As Goodman puts it, 'relativity goes all the way up' (*MM*: 40). The complication is that, even if rejected, this world of worlds is in a sense affirmed, because the means for its rejection are provided by itself. Yet, where is the world that Goodman is standing on in order to describe his world of worlds? For he recognizes himself that, among right versions,

> almost always some *stance* or other is adopted. Merely noting that many alternative versions can be constructed does not provide us with any. We have to hold some things steady for a while as a working basis. Along with the recognition that there is no *fixed* distinction between fact and convention must go the recognition that nevertheless there is almost always *some* distinction or other between fact and convention—a transient distinction drawn by the stance adopted at the time. [*RP*: 99.]

Consequently, Goodman's final strategy is to suggest that it is legitimate to doubt his (and our) foundational commitments as befits our purposes in a certain context. This attitude seems to be lifting all residual dogmatism; but, ironically perhaps, it also seems to irreversibly attenuate the engaging power of any particular philosophical proposal, situating it (once again in Mitchell's manner, as in the beginning of this section) at the precipice of a 'grey', 'anonymous', 'wise passivity', one that would befit speculative and non-pragmatic minds. Thus, it is now I think more expedient to recapitulate on how Goodman's *grand version* might ultimately suggest itself.

29. THE POWER OF VISION

> To the question 'How do you know what is right?' our answer is that we don't know that or anything else. The known is unknown. [*RP*: 164.]

Goodman's metaphysical commitment is a commitment against any 'ontic' ontology (sc. any ontology purportedly describing what kinds of *things* there are). But is it also a commitment against all talk about being itself? Otherwise put: although Goodman is wholly indifferent to *what* there is *if anything*, can he also totally evade the question of what it is to *be there* (since his ultimate metaphysical vocabulary crucially involves this notion of *being there*)?

Of course, Goodman's world of worlds is a logical construction, a theory, a flexible structuring of predicates (concepts, words). And anything one might consider or say about this world is still vulnerable to the all-absorbing power of assimilation into the structuring of worlds. As I have indicated, it seems impossible for any discourse to overcome the infinite route of self-referentiality—unless it can somehow point out or insinuate a horizon as its possible limit. Nevertheless, again, this postulated horizon would be destructive for the autonomy of theory once accepted in, and by, its discourse.

In the counterexample of the mirror and what is mirrored—unlike the sayer and what is said—the dilemma is resolved by a paradox: mirror and the mirrored can clearly *see* one another, while still their distance in light space puts them infinitely far apart (following the endless cycles of reflected light).

Gutting 1982: *ad loc.* 327–330, in a comparative study of twentieth century major philosophers—including Goodman—has precisely tried to show that the source of philosophical understanding lies, ultimately, in some kind of philosophical vision, of theoretically 'reflected' light. All that philosophers can successfully undertake is the provision of some 'intellectual room' for the development of their *view*points. The instruments of philosophical reasoning are but special means for the articulation of pre-existing images—which, in turn, might have been previously unexamined, rejected, or even accepted under different descriptions. (The origin of these images, as well as of course the way they succeed each other in the course of intellectual and cultural development, are further problems raised by the postulation of this 'vision of vision', i.e. the vision that wishes to follow this route from vision to discursive philosophy. And so on.)

Indeed, Scheffler 1996 sums up his long list of theoretical exchanges with Goodman by admitting there must be something else behind it; something deeper must be generating a conflict of opinions, where no one can have the last word and where there is always a reasonable retort *ad infinitum*. This can no longer be a mere conflict of reasoned opinion but it appears more as a 'deep-seated misunderstanding or conflict of visions' (: 171). And Adler 1990: 715 sums up his ambivalent assessments of Goodman's points by seeing (: another kind of speculative vision) the philosopher as someone who 'for many years [...] has

pursued an audacious vision, a vision not only allowing him to see further, but one that illuminates in different directions, many unsuspected'.

Read 1964–65: 43 quotes J. Ortega y Gasset's conviction that *essence* is important for the art of the (European) North, whereas *presence* is what counts for a 'Mediterranean person'. J. Ortega y Gasset also maintains that metaphysical idealism accompanies impressionism (and modern art), while realistic art exhibits an affinity to the actuality of the concrete. These contradistinctions are questionable in as much as they depend on the way their terms are specified; nevertheless, they convey a rationally inexplicable tendency for different interests, or for different developments.

On this note, Apostolopoulou 1999: 365 confirms that, for a large and significant part of Greek Mediterranean philosophy, what has been more decisive is a great vision rather than a great theory of the world. The future prospect of conciliating vision and theory may seem open, but its character could still remain situated within the greater unbound openness of vision—after all, vision and theory are not fundamentally distinct.[116] In this framework, Steiner 1991: 69–70 offers a short history of 'theory' in the English language. But for him only science is the topos of 'theories' properly so-called, the topos i.e. where the theory can be tested on the touchstone of phenomenal, natural externality; all other 'theory' becomes, in effect, narrative and myth—and as such it is one of the poetic genres (: *ad loc.* 86). Or, discursiveness fails in important cases.

Finally, Santayana 1976–77 reports J. Racine's predicament (similar to Raphael's), when he felt that 'perfect tragedies were not worth writing', because perfection is always paid at the price of an extinguished impulse to savour it. This feeling that only the end of life can embody the exaltation of human potentialities for knowledge and beauty is also shared—among others—by Papanoutsos 1975–76 (nature rarely passes into art, i.e. rarely do we meet such a complete and exceptionally self-achieved personality); and by Derrida 1984: 184 (the indefinite point of death as the point of the 'not yet'—not yet deferred, not yet *been*). Again, the vision of an end (in its double meaning of 'termination' and 'objective') offers itself as the most appropriate (though unproductive) tool for capturing the elusive distance of intellectual, artistic, and existential heights.

I CANNOT SAY how close the Mediterranean and Goodman's New England may stand to each other (map geography notwithstanding). But could it really be that Goodman is equally dependent on some sort of speculative vision—for instance,

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116 It is to *praxis* that *theoria* is juxtaposed. Theorizing and viewing, on the other hand, appear to have a common core, a common objective to cease things before they are ceased, so to speak—whereas in action, that which acts also touches upon and distorts.

the vision of an artist *manqué*? (Cf. my Introduction, p. 39.) For one thing, it is not perhaps surprising to find Goodman in one of his last publications (1997) admitting that, which one might have sensed all along. Giving a brief summary on the development of his own philosophy (or 'philosophies'), he confesses (: 17):

> Although the inclusion of art as a legitimate part of human understanding and human activity was the *impetus*, I was equally concerned with whatever could be learned about the nature of science from this comparison.

Moreover, in places like *MM*: 30–31 Goodman discloses the further 'impetus' that lead him to his world-making irrealism: namely, the unacceptability of contradiction. If there can be right and well-built but genuinely conflicting versions (the table as seen and as a 'mess of molecules', *WW*: 119), then these versions cannot all be true in the same world, because in that case anything whatsoever could be true and / or false in that world (since 'all statements follow from a contradiction'—*MM*: 30, and, similarly, *RP*: 50). Consequently, there must be right different worlds.

This primal untouchability of contradiction is somewhat put in tension when faced with the vagueness and the fluidity of the world 'melting' into world-versions (*MM*: 29), the world of the kalological presence of art. Furthermore, while contradiction is a timeless relation, time plays an all important role in Goodman's thinking, for it constitutes part of what concepts and predicates mean: time dictates the pervasiveness of accepted practice. (Cf. the 'virtuous' circularity of Goodman's 'vision' on p. *165* above.) The conjunction of space and time acquires in Goodman its full, multi-dimensional sense; it becomes, from a mere conjunction of two variables, a 'consolidation' of space *in* time, and time *in* space (cf. *MM*: 99–100). The world of world-versions becomes utterly dense not with possibilities or with self-generating entities, but with ever shifting actualities (namely, its versions): there are both particles and waves; there is still Ptolemaic and Newtonian and Einsteinian space-time, because they reside in right—albeit radically different—worlds, which frequently meet up.

Goodman's theory—with all its important contributions to aesthetics, epistemology, and metaphysics—seems to have constituted a bringing into presence, an endeavour in viewing what is otherwise impossible, paradoxical, or contradictory. Viewing does not deliver arguments but it has here created their vital territory.

THIRD CHAPTER APPENDIX ON MATTERS OF DEFINITION

Goodman seems nowhere to systematically examine traditional aesthetic concepts like, e.g., the beautiful, the sublime, etc.; he is not concerned with necessary *and* sufficient conditions, or definitions of art or, indeed, of the aesthetic. He confines himself to the deployment of a general metaphysical theory of symbolization, leaving room for its aesthetic relevance (or its kalological dimension, as I have described it). I believe, however, that traditional aesthetic questions turn out to be details (albeit not insignificant ones) that can be accommodated by Goodman's account as I have interpreted it, rather than omissions that would count as counterexamples to his theory. The following remarks are meant as an initial contribution towards such a treatment (as well as a supplement to previous sections in my text), even if further research needs to be conducted concerning some of the issues I am addressing.

'AESTHETICS'

Going back to A. G. Baumgarten's 'invention' of *aesthetica* (see p. *130* above), the history of the appropriation of the new term by subsequent philosophers is most of all indicative of its artificial—i.e. 'created'—character. Of course, for A. G. Baumgarten himself this was a vital artificiality, because it enabled him to elevate the study of art to a scientific level. This had its own philosophical merits, but it also followed from the fact that the fine arts as such had themselves only relatively recently secured their separate—professional and academic—identity. But it soon became evident that the philosophical implications for the new science as the science of 'sense perception' were often problematic.

The Greek equivalent for 'sense perception' (i.e. *αἴσθησις /aísthêsis/*) as A. G. Baumgarten's starting point was never in fact unquestionably adopted by subsequent philosophy. Notably, ambiguity permeates both the Latin *sensus* and the English 'sense': for instance, both the sensual and the intellectual may be signified as 'sensible'. 'Perception', too, is itself ambiguous. On the one hand, some of it could be non-sensory (according at least to some working scientific hypotheses, as defended, e.g., by Schmeidler 1969: 'Introduction'). If it is sensory, it can be so in controversial ways: the status of the so-called 'lower senses' (smell, taste, touch) has hardly ever been thoroughly examined (cf. Coleman 1965).[117] And the

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[117] But see Korsmeyer 1999 (reviewed by Diffey 2001), who actually employs some of Goodman's ideas.

prospects do not appear revolutionary in this field (cf. Welsch 1997*a*: *ad loc.* 162–163, Wilkoszewska 1999–2000: *ad loc.* 56)—apart perhaps from the ecological–environmental interest in other sensual modes like kinaesthesia, the vestibular system, synaesthesia, etc. (see Berleant 1992: *ad loc.* 17, 20). If, lastly, perception is sensory in non-controversial ways, the ambiguity of 'sense' re-emerges: the Aristotelian *sensus communis* is different from the commonsensical 'common sense' (cf. 'common sense philosophy'). The interweaving of allegedly 'uninterpreted' data and of their interpretation has never been easy to decipher—so why should the case of */aísthêsis/* be different (i.e. lucid)? In fact, it is similarly questionable whether A. G. Baumgarten himself had in mind */aísthêsis/* as a *quasi* neutral, objectifiable reception of sensual data (if such a notion can be upheld at all). Gross 2002: 409 precisely awards to */aísthêsis/* a clearly spiritual dimension, not only as intended by E. Cassirer, but also as meant by Aristotle—who, after all, was Baumgarten's stated authority in the *Aesthetica*.

In other words, even in its origins, the 'science of sense-perception' was imbued with semantic complications, which have been naturally reflected in the debate over what is to feature as the domain of aesthetics.

Following on from A. G. Baumgarten, the meaning of 'aesthetics' in Kant's first *Critique* is much broader than in his third *Critique*: what is the science of sense knowledge in the former case, has become the science of the perception of beauty in the latter (as W. S. Pluhar observes in Kant 1987: xlix). It was in fact Kant who already appeared critical of A. G. Baumgarten's term for the new science. However, Kant himself adopted and further propagated the distinction between thought and sensibility—with one difference: our sensibility could now be aesthetic not merely because it formed the content of our senses, but to the extent that it was expressed through the a priori powers of our (relevant, aesthetic) judgements. (See Kant 1956: A 19–22 = B 33–36; and 1957: A 43–48 = B 44–48, A 174–78 = B 176–79.) Again, this separation, whatever its grounds, was nevertheless false, according to the Czech F. Palacký.[118] In his 1823 study, he maintained that beauty was no less a matter of spirit than a matter of perception; so, aesthetics had to be renamed as the *krásověda* ('science of beauty'). I shall have to return below to the notion of beauty, but what is important for the evolution of aesthetics as a discipline is that, in circumstances of relevant isolation, F. Palacký's effort never gained any serious support. On the contrary—and as Diffey 1995: 64 recognizes—it was G. W. F. Hegel's initiative that proved much more influential for the identification of aesthetics as an autonomous branch of philosophy. This, however, meant that aesthetics was in effect 'displaced' from where it stood (as the 'science of the sensible') and identified in particular with the study of art alone. Straight from the opening paragraphs of his *Lectures on Aesthetics* (see 1979*b*, and the 1993 English translation of the Introduction I am referring to),

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[118] Regarding F. Palacký, I am relying on the important article by Hlobil 2001: 178–91.

Hegel explicates his decision to adhere to *Ästhetik*, expressly rejecting the alternative *Kallistik* ('kallistic', 'science of beauty'). But his rationale is not that he purportedly seeks to separate thought and sensibility in a Baumgartenian (or Kantian) way. The reason he states is his lack of strict concern with beauty, in favour of the philosophy of art—indeed, of the fine arts. For Hegel, there could be, in principle, a science of beauty in general—incorporating natural beauty—but such a prospect is left unrealized because of his conviction that art stands higher than nature, in the light of their relation to the Ideal. Consequently, Hegel eventually adopts *Ästhetik* only on the basis of established usage (as he attests *loc. cit.*), and in order to avoid a generalization towards what is not art—not a generalization towards what is not sense perception.

THAT GOODMAN DOES not isolate the aesthetic at the level of sense-perception (however defined) is a truism. (At most, he speaks of literal and metaphorical attributes—the former presumably depending on perceptual data more often than not; cf. pp. *68*, *76* above.) In addition, it is a fact that Goodman does not intentionally differentiate art and the aesthetic. To be sure, he is invariably concerned with the arts, but his theory of symbological reference as the subject matter of his metaphysical aesthetics (or kalology) does not exclude, e.g., nature. (Cf., above, pp. *95*, *123*, *125* and fn. *67*.) In a Goodmanian vein, a real flower can be the reference point for sensations, feelings, and memories just as, for instance, any still life painting of flowers can be. In this respect, nature, as well as art, can provide valid and important points of kalological significance.

But before turning to the definitional question concerning the affinity between aesthetics and art—and to the question of beauty *sensu lato* brought up by F. Palacký—there is one more remark to be made. Instead of aesthetics being too narrowly conceived—in comparison at least to Goodman's comprehensive treatment—aesthetics has sometimes been perceived by non-aestheticians, at the opposite end, as too wide a term, usurping the subject matter of science proper, viz. sensations and feelings. More restricting terms were cursorily proposed, like *callaesthetic(s)* (Whewell 1967:[119] 569) or *apolaustic* (Hamilton 1859: I 124).[120] These suggestions were purportedly more appropriate for indicating the study of only a specific portion of perceptual phenomena—those referring to matters of taste, beauty, the fine arts, etc. (In which case the problem of definition for aesthetics returns.)

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119 Originally published in 1840.

120 Cf. Diffey 1995: 63–64. Osborne 1972: 4 cites 'apolaustics' (in analogy to 'aesthetics'). The term derives from the Greek *ἀπόλαυσις /apólausis/*, i.e. 'enjoyment' or 'relish'.

That the subject matter of aesthetics has been at times regarded both as more and less than the same things (namely perception, art, and beauty) is probably a symptom of the semantic polysemy of aesthetics. This polysemy is characteristically exhibited by Goodmanian kalology, circumscribed as it is by an opaque symbological multitude, coupled with the constant effort for its clarification through the discovery and the realization of its different aspects. The debate over whether something is valued as perceivable or purely intelligible, crafted or natural, beautiful or not, etc., is superseded by the process of our saying of it that it is, or is not, such-and-such a thing. Everything we can say of it contributes to its kalological depth, in so far as we are genuinely concerned precisely with that: i.e. with what we can possibly say of it[121]—or, in other words, with the space we can create for it within the universe of present being. A presence as a multitude of predicates that can be added on indefinitely (when are we to stop when talking about a song as a song or about a flower as a flower?) is much more dynamic that an ontology of the allegedly *right* predicates. Consequently, although Goodman might not always directly address issues pertaining to traditional treatments of aesthetics as a discipline, these issues do not seem to be posing any outstanding challenges to his own account.

'ART'

A plausible Goodmanian response to the question of what is and what is not art would naturally follow the same strategy—especially since, even for traditional theory, the ontology of art is a subset of the ontology of the aesthetic. Therefore, my eventual purpose in the context of art-definitional discourse will be to trace the route leading via ontology towards historicism, and to locate the possible challenge posed now for Goodman by historicism as the endeavour to define the essence of art in terms of the historical transformations of the concept of art.

I mentioned that A. G. Baumgarten's project might have involved some risk, but it was also responding to the emergence of the fine arts as such, by then in the process of securing their own separate identity (for the artistic as well as for the academic communities). In Goodman's case, the question about an essentialist definition of art and fine art is again important only from a negative aspect, namely in order to see why Goodman need not have been much concerned with it.

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121 Aesthetic theory is always a linguistic meta-level in relation to art, but the implication is not of course that only words are the subject matter of kalology. Words describe their referents not always or necessarily as other words; yet, they are themselves the only tools philosophy can employ. This is a pertinent distinction in Goodman's work as well (cf. some of the opening remarks in my Introduction).

WITH SOME VARIATIONS, the fine arts have traditionally included fine literature, music, dance, and the visual arts of Renaissance *disegno*, i.e., painting, sculpture, and architecture (McCosh 1880: 209 includes 'landscape gardening'). As Tatarkiewicz informs (1980: 20, 22, 40, 60–62), C. Batteux first wrote about the 'Beaux Arts' in 1747; however, C. Perrault had introduced the term in 1690, and the Portuguese Francisco de Hollanda (1517–84) was already speaking of 'Boas Artes'. (Hamilton 1859: II 465–71 provides some additional information concerning seminal 'pre-aesthetic' theories during the first half of the eighteenth century.) And, according to Wilde 1993: 21, the beginnings of the concept of Fine Art as the art which—in contrast with artisan *craft*—aspires to be involved in intellectual and self-reflecting activity are to be found already in L. B. Alberti (1404–72). Collingwood 1958 fully adopts this distinction (according to his own rationale and for his own purposes, of course), and explains that 'art' is actually a shorthand term, and that we are to read '*fine* art' whenever we read 'art' (: 6). Usage of terms must precede their definition (: 1–2), and, in this case, usage has divested '(fine) art' of other ancient meanings (viz., art as craft or skill). In thus treating the arts, Collingwood is perhaps expressing a notion still prevailing in common usage: not only has 'art' been standing for the 'fine arts', but—even more specifically—it has been used primarily to refer to the plastic arts. ('Art galleries' and even 'dictionaries of art' are usually hosting the arts of *disegno* alone.)[122]

As an exceptionally well versed historian of ideas, Tatarkiewicz eventually reaches a disjunctive definition of art, which could only be trivially true, in the sense that the more conjuncts we add, the more likely it is for one of them to hold, making the definition as a whole valid:

> Art is a conscious human activity of either reproducing things, or constructing forms, or expressing experiences, if the product of this reproduction, construction, or expression is capable of evoking delight, or emotion, or shock. [1971: 150.]

(Here, a similarly constructed but 16-fold definition springs to mind; see Ogden & Richards & Wood 1922: 20–21, or Ogden & Richards 1966: 142–143.)

Although Dziemidoc 1988, to name but one example, does not exactly follow Tatarkiewicz in thus defining art, he shares a certain disillusionment about the possibility of a generalized ontological definition. He thinks ontology is problematic because it cannot respond to the plurality of real but different definitions

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122 On the other hand, of course, high art and popular art—as well as other cross-cultural activities that enrich sensibility and encourage all sorts of creativity (cf. Iwánska 1971, Okpewho 1976–77, Mazaraki 1984)—have nowadays been drawn as close together as ever (cf. Wilde 1993: 22). Although this is not the standard attitude, Dewey 1980 (as early as [1]1934) was already asserting that 'all rankings of higher and lower are, ultimately, out of place and stupid. Each medium has its own efficacy and value.' (: 227.)

(all the multifarious things we would be prepared to call 'art'). This Wittgensteinian tendency is still evident in more recent work (cf. Zangwill 2002, Dean 2003); and it is certainly justified through experience. Anti-essentialist objections are undoubtedly meant here as objections against ontological but not necessarily against metaphysical considerations, as I insisted mainly in my third chapter above. And, in the field of aesthetics, they have always claimed an intellectual affinity to Wittgenstein's 'family resemblances' theory (1953: *ad loc.* § 66*f*), which, incidentally, could be traced back to D. Stewart (see Dickie 1977: 20), as well as to T. Reid (see Osborne 1972: 6).[123] And presumably earlier than Wittgenstein, Ogden & Richards 1966 ([1]1923) raised the suspicion (with emotivism as their starting point) that words may be misleading us, positing qualities and entities where we simply have instances of the same word. They claimed that the discovery of common properties is always possible given the philosophical perseverance required to find them (: 146): or, more simply, one can always find what one is looking for. Thus, a word like 'art' or 'beauty' is (emotively or by other routes) used to signify different relevant denotata, which, taken together as a set, are indefinable. The only legitimate way of employing such a term is when treating it as a 'useful low-level shorthand' (: 147) for some of its denotata.

According to Tilghman 1972–73: 519, L. Wittgenstein's most important contribution on this matter was to indicate—along similar lines to Ogden & Richards—that identification and classification (whether of artworks or of other things) are not the rigorous, routine exercises we may have thought them to be. However, L. Wittgenstein could not have wished to show that there is no common element in the things that bear the same name, Tilghman continues, because such a question already presupposes the intelligibility of this quest for a common denominator (*ibid.*: 520). In effect, by denying what demands affirmation (namely the existence of some common denominator), philosophers like M. Weitz, P. Ziff, and W. E. Kennick had been engaged, for Tilghman, in a futile quarrel not over the possibility of definition, but over the degree of its inescapable vagueness (*ibid.*: 521–522; cf. also Sclafani 1970–71). But vagueness does not imply indefinability, as it is itself a definitional strategy. There is, for that matter, epistemic (or 'open texture') vagueness, and identical (or 'essential') vagueness (see Chatterjee 1994: 6*f*). In the first case, we can define, say, the concept of 'bird' so as to include some animals and not others—although the boundaries are flexible, responding to our needs and interests. And in the case of essential vagueness—take for ex-

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123 Sosnowski 1999: 145 notes that Goodman belongs to that current in analytic aesthetics that critically resorts not only to Wittgensteinian language games (early analytic, anti-essentialist), but also to Wittgensteinian cultural forms of life (later analytic). The notion of practice—as it is characterized by the element of action, of relating language to world— lies, for Sosnowski (: 155), between a language game and a form of life.

ample the predicate 'young'—'we cannot by fiat introduce any sharp demarcating line in the series associated with the concept without robbing it of its explanatory value' (*ibid.*: 15).

Consequently, as soon as we even *start* to speak of the perceived overall impossibility of definition (and as soon as we have reached an agreement that there are no overall common elements in the entities to be summarily defined), we are automatically leaving its possibility somehow open, at least under less strict specifications: trivially (as in Tatarkiewicz's example above), arbitrarily (as in the concept of 'bird'), or *essentially* vaguely (as in the concept of 'young'). Of course, in Goodman's case, essential vagueness (the most intriguing of the above definitional strategies) could not be conceived as a quantifiable ontological variable. Public space graffiti or the cheap poster in a student room bear some vague aesthetic relevance not because they are situated in a hypothetical limbo of aesthetic value. Like all the other contents of our aesthetic sensibilities (whether clearly marked as art or not), their aesthetic vagueness, so to say, consists in our having to question the hand that drew them or put them on the wall: this process of questioning and of tentative clarification makes things aesthetically relevant to the degree that it reveals more and more of their significance in a symbological universe, or a Goodmanian 'world'. Thus, Goodman's theory as I have interpreted it involves again a metaphysical concern about the modes of *being* of things, rather than about what things *are*. If vagueness is essential for art then, the content of such vagueness is not some vague entity (or entities); it is the procedure whereby what may be vaguely apprehended wishes continually to become more articulate (cf. § *15* above). Art defies definition in Goodman only to the extent that definition is meant as the pursuit of necessary *and* sufficient predicatives; in this, his theory is anti-essentialist. But if by 'definition' we mean a process of self-generative (and thus 'vague') predication, Goodman's conception of art is not anti-definitional in a metaphysical manner.

Without explicitly invoking vagueness, but following a similar tactic, Khatchadourian 1957–58 criticizes L. Wittgenstein's family resemblances theory on the grounds that things can be of the same 'kind' even if they do not share any determinate or relatively determinate characteristics—determinable or relatively determinable ones are sufficient. E.g., the qualitative observation that humans have eyes (determinable) is not conferred upon the observation that some eye colours are identical (determinate) or more similar to some of the rest (relatively determinate), and so on to cover all the members of the human 'family'. Thus, that 'all humans have eyes' is true even if human irises come in a great variety of colours. As for Mandelbaum 1965, he forcefully defends the theoretical importance of problems 'which are more comfortably avoided than pursued' (: 228), referring to the task of dealing with art in a 'synoptic' (sc. unifying) framework. He accuses L. Wittgenstein (along with P. Ziff and M. Weitz) of only emphasizing on directly exhibited resemblances (cf. Khatchadourian's 'determinate' features), at the expense of such *relational* attributes as readily exhibited in biological connec-

tions, in intended usage of terms, etc. (*op. cit.*: 222*f*). And Danto 1999: 326 confirms that L. Wittgenstein's disregard for relational properties blinded him towards the fact that class unity can also reside in these properties, which may not be themselves directly perceived, but are directly inferred from perceivable properties.

I shall not discuss whether this talk of 'determinables' and 'relational properties' falls under ontological essentialism or under some topology of essence (cf. pp. *75, 110, 117, 152* above), favoured by Goodmanian kalology (whether, in other words, the 'what' is more important here than the 'how' or not). However, there is here another crucial, I think, concern—explicitly for example in Mandelbaum's case (1965: 227, where he refers to P. O. Kristeller's oft-quoted work on art history). In our effort to define art, we inevitably turn to its history and expect that our theory will reflect the peculiarities of this history. But if there have been historically many conceptions of 'art', in what sense should our theory also become historicized? If definitions are not necessarily the hunters of 'the thread that runs through' in space (because there might not be such a thread), are they after the thread that runs through in time and holds the instances of 'art' together?

Characteristically, for Levinson 2002 (: *ad loc.* 378–379) art is an irreducibly historical concept: 'what is an artwork' cannot be determined in the way that 'what is a chair' can be (i.e. something to be sat upon—regardless of its formal characteristics). It follows that what art is, it is so because of the history it has had. First, this implies that history itself is contingent: there could have been another history, and, therefore, a different concept of what art is. Second, holding that there could have been another concept of art eventually amounts to admitting that we somehow know that these two concepts (the actual one that we possess and the possible one we could have possessed) are both in effect concepts of art. This objection is succinctly presented by Currie 2000, where the analogy of the concept of water is offered. 'Water as H_2O' is a historical concept, while it still refers to a 'clear, odourless, tasteless fluid'; and it is acceptable to regard this latter definition as a definition of some world-independent concept of the 'waterish' (cf. the *a priori*, non-historical concept of 'square'). Similarly, it should also be expected form aesthetic theory to formulate a world-independent, non-historical concept of the 'artish'—something that, as Currie admits, has not been accomplished (but the possibility of such a formulation is not precluded, either). This kind of generalization from the point of art's historicity ('art' applied over time rather than over things) is already upheld by Diffey 1979: *ad loc.* 17–18. The fact that Wittgensteinian reasoning can indeed 'free' us from the question of what exactly art is, Diffey says, as a gain is also a loss—an unfortunate omission of the question why different people at different places and times have 'invented' perspicuously affiliated categories of 'art'.

But, again, similar considerations can block the significance of the historicized concept of art. Brook 2002, for instance, denies that art is a historical concept, or that art history is possible at all. His principle of *mimetic innovation* is put

forth as the proper name for 'art': this principle explains—in an obviously neo-Darwinist manner—that the driving force behind each one of our creative acts is to be 'explained as a desire to know what regularities there are in the world such that consistently successful instrumental performances are possible' (*ibid.*: 338). The (mimetic) propagation of 'memes' is to be carefully balanced with the need for a meaningful (i.e. instrumental, and not simply neophiliac) expansion of bio-physical mastery and power. The significance of Brook's conception in my context is that, by offering a dynamic model in order to circumscribe the scope of art, he is both disowning *and* adopting a certain definitional strategy—just as in the case of conceptual vagueness the lack or the possibility of definition depends on what aspects of art one wishes to define.

OVERALL, IT APPEARS indeed possible to define 'art' in numerous (right) ways. The most pertinent considerations for my own frame of reference seem to be posing art as both past and present, as a remote but also palpable presence (a lot, if not most, of the art we value is inherited from times long gone). So far as Goodman's account is concerned, there is no special provision for a historicized kalology, in the sense that *all* meanings and *all* symbological functions are entrenched through inherited use (cf. pp. *127*, *168* above). The dimension of the aesthetic is irrevocably shaped by time: I might not wish to think of the painter's circumstances when s/he was producing the image in front of me, but, once I do take them into account, the whole significance of the work has been transposed (as when I learn something new about the artist, and, consciously or not, my appreciation of the work is no longer the same; cf. § *14* above).

It would be more to the point to say that Goodman does not specifically thematize the social dimensions of symbology—in the sense that history is also the history of communities themselves, as well as of the linguistic and other practices constituting their heritage (cf. pp. *40*, *127f* above). The kalological elucidation of the world(s) appears as a lonely enterprise: one is to immerse oneself into the ocean of symbological density with individual training and intelligent perseverance as one's only weapons. This is certainly not an irremediable deficiency in Goodman's account, and it could be explained as a lack of emphasis. However, since I am still concerned with the ways of defining art, the socio-historical dimension may constitute, I think, a field of reconciliation in the debate over the ontology of the essential for both Wittgensteinian anti-essentialists (where L. Wittgenstein does not necessarily belong) and Goodmanian metaphysicians. The dynamic character of socio-historical variables is no news for Goodman's treatment, but it helps all sides to arrive at a conception of definition incorporating the indefinite together with the definitive.

Wittgenstein appears, after all, to have thought that 'to describe a set of aesthetic rules fully means really to describe the culture of a period' (1970: § 25*n*). Or that 'what belongs to a language game is a whole culture' (*ibid.*: § 26). And Shus-

terman 2001: 364 maintains that all we need is a useful definition of art; one that can best interpret art as cultural practice and bearer of values; or, one that can 'read' the meaning art embodies (cf. Forsey 2001: 408). Meanwhile, Steiner 1991: 83 defines art as *'the maximalization of semantic incommensurability in respect of the formal means of expression'*, namely as the field of creation where syntax will always be insufficient for the full explication of its meaning. All this is perhaps in agreement with Goodman's insistence on the opacity of the aesthetic symbol, on the constant need for its articulation into the clearer shapes of words, and on the ultimate inability of reason to ground its own convictions anywhere else than outside of itself—for instance, in entrenched practice and in pragmatic action.

'BEAUTY'

According to Robinson's view (1996: 179–180), it was none other than the British empiricists who 'established aesthetics as an independent philosophical field'; and they did it apparently by disassociating aesthetics from traditional problems of beauty, substance, universality, and the like. In fact, concepts like 'beauty' and 'art' were 'subordinated logically' by the British empiricists of the eighteenth century 'to the position of a subclass of the aesthetic' (Stolnitz 1961–62: 142).

Nevertheless, the concept of beauty does not seem to have been divested of all significance in the study of art and aesthetics. Tatarkiewicz 1971: 137 places at the heart of aesthetic theory from the 1750's to the 1950's the dogma that *art is the production of beauty* (a dogma different from the ancient one, namely that *art is production governed by rules*). It is true that Wilde 1993: 22 can only see nowadays in beauty an 'impoverished concept', replaced actually by the concept of *the aesthetic*; but such a 'replacement' might prove precisely a sign of the endurance of the beautiful. For instance, Lorand 2001–02 seems indeed to identify beauty exactly with that, which makes art valuable (whether conventionally beautiful in form or ugly, expressive or formalistic, etc.). Under these specifications, beauty can frankly become a notion employed according to one's needs; a 'useful low-level shorthand' (Ogden & Richards 1966: 147) for describing what one regards as the core feature of art and aesthetics, whether a given essence and / or a dynamic and relational attribute. In this respect, there is nothing to stop us from describing Goodman's 'beautiful' as, e.g., the 'opaque multitude of symbologically decipherable aspects of beings, conceived as vibrant presences and not as fixed entities'. After all, has beauty really ever been a monolithically defined concept?

ALMOST A DECADE after A. G. Baumgarten's *Aesthetica*, Home (Lord Kames) confidently asserted:

> Beauty, a quality so remarkable in visible objects, lends its name to express every thing that is eminently agreeable; thus, by a figure of speech, we say

> a beautiful sound, a beautiful thought or expression, a beautiful theorem, a beautiful event, a beautiful discovery in art or in science. [1840: 83, and—identically—in the first edition of the work, 1762: I 243.[124]]

For Home, the move from beauty in the strict sense to beauty *sensu lato* (cf. the ancient *kalon*) is a matter of figurative speech; but, as Goodman would be the first to point out, the difference between the literal and the metaphorical is not a difference between the correct and the mistaken (or *vice versa*; cf. § 7 above). Depending on actual linguistic usage, what seems now literal might have been metaphorical, and what sounds metaphorical might become canonical and literal. At any rate, neither the literal nor the metaphorical raises higher claims to right interpretation. In fact, it is metaphor that appears as the moving force behind the evolution of meaning: the invention of a metaphor represents the vital need for completing any hollow spaces in the nexus of already available significations. In his *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man* (1785), T. Reid must have held a similar view when he thought that 'material things cannot be truly beautiful, but only beautiful as reflections of the mental, which itself is the only thing beautiful in the literal sense' (I am citing here from Kivy's report, 1989: 323).

Tatarkiewicz 1980: 121*f* locates the origins of the theory *par excellence* of (sensible and intelligible) beauty in classical antiquity. But he feels compelled to recognize that this theory had been in continuous decline almost from the moment of its inception: indeed, ever since the sophists, a continuous rival—that of mere sensible beauty—led to the conceptual confusion we have inherited. Gorgias's view is pertinent here, for he was practically the first one to equate the beauty of the *kalon* with bodily beauty and adornment (in his */Helénês egkômion/*; see DK 82 [76], B 11[125]). The nineteenth and twentieth centuries, according to Tatarkiewicz 1980, only offered the *coup de grâce* for the old theory of beauty as sensible, intelligible, and even (perhaps) moral harmony and symmetry. Since then, beauty has truly been a category of its antique self (: 174), a *pars pro toto* (: 148). Confined to particular formal features, it represents only a fraction of what once belonged to it. (Only romanticism could be said to have sustained a conception of beauty *sensu lato* (: 175, 198).) Michelis concurs (1955: 4, 208–209, 214) that the classical and the anti-classical senses of beauty were almost born together; but it was partly the Roman appropriation of ancient Greek art that one-sidedly stressed classical *ratio* and *ordo*.[126]

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124 Access for consultation of the first edition was granted to me at the Edinburgh University Library.

125 =Diels & Kranz 1951–52: II, 288, 2.

126 Such an interpretation may seem reminiscent of F. Nietzsche, but we must take heed of a somewhat different emphasis on the supposed incommensurability of the Apollonian and the Dionysiac. For Nietzsche, the (anti-classical) follower of Dionysus can only relate to, and be understood by, his / her peers (1972: § 2, p. 30);

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In the so-called Middle Ages, beauty as predicable of anything, as one of the *transcendentalia* or ultimate genera of substance (cf. fn. *105*), seems to have constituted a major reference point for theory—whether this was a one-sided development from classical times or not. (Marenbon 1996 provides useful details, along with references to Albertus Magnus, Ulrich of Strasbourg, et al.)

A further facet of the polysemy of 'beauty' lies in the question concerning the classical versus the classicist. As Düring 1966: 169 seems to be accepting, beauty *sensu lato* was an expression of classicist aspirations rather than an ideal of the classical age—or, in other words, classical beauty was plainly a child of (neo)classicist theory. Perhaps, after all, 'classical' had better be used to signify any style in its peak, in its maturity of development—before its disintegration, that is, into numerous successors (and possibly into 'baroque'-type decadence; see Michelis 1955: 251).

To conclude this schematic survey into a historically fragmented concept: There has been recently some new emphasis on 'beauty'; among several of his colleagues, Brand 1999: 8 announces that beauty is back 'with a vengeance'. And Carroll 2000: 191–192 welcomes a current tendency to (re)turn away from art-making as a politico-conceptual tool, and towards the domain of the aesthetic proper, which is—in this case—made to stand for the domain of beauty. In whatever context it may be an accurate observation that beauty is showing signs of revitalization (as so many times in its history), Nehamas 2000: 402 urges us not to invest much hope on a possible solution to the ancient problem, i.e. the status of beauty. Old or new, genuine or not, the repeated failed attempts at defining beauty constitute for Nehamas a clear indication of beauty's status, namely of the fact that it is not to be found where we have been looking for it, among the swarm of the (un)countable features that add up and compose each of all the multitudes otherwise known as things. If beauty 'is back', it is no longer hidden or disguised—it is a new sort of beauty.

One cannot but be reminded here of Gibran's aphoristic remarks:

> *The aggrieved and the injured say, 'Beauty is kind and gentle. [¶] 'Like a young mother half-shy of her own glory she walks among us.' [¶] And the passionate say, 'Nay, beauty is a thing of might and dread. [¶] 'Like the tempest she shakes the earth beneath us and the sky above us.' [¶¶] The tried and the weary say, 'Beauty is of soft whisperings. She speaks in our spirit. [¶] 'Her voice yields to our silences like a faint light that quivers in fear of the shadow.' [¶] But the restless say. 'We have heard her shouting among the mountains, [¶] 'And with her cries came the sound of hoofs, and the beating of wings and the roaring of lions.' [¶¶] At night the watchmen of the city say, 'Beauty shall rise with the dawn from the east.' [¶] And at noontide the toilers and the wayfarers say, 'We have seen her leaning over the*

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whereas Michelis wishes to stress the dialectical relation between the classical and the anti-classical.

> *earth from the windows of the sunset.' [¶¶] In winter say the snow-bound, 'She shall come with the spring leaping upon the hills.' [¶] And in the summer heat the reapers say, 'We have seen her dancing with the autumn leaves, and we saw a drift of snow in her hair.' [¶] All these things have you said of beauty, [¶] Yet in truth you spoke not of her but of needs unsatisfied, [¶] And beauty is not a need but an ecstasy. [¶] It is not a mouth thirsting nor an empty hand stretched forth, [¶] But rather a heart inflamed and a soul enchanted. [¶] It is not the image you would see nor the song you would hear, [¶] But rather an image you see though you close your eyes and a song you hear though you shut your ears. [¶] It is not the sap within the furrowed bark, nor a wing attached to a claw, [¶] But rather a garden for ever in bloom and a flock of angels for ever in flight. [...] Beauty is life when life unveils her holy face. [¶] But you are life and you are the veil. [¶] Beauty is eternity gazing at itself in a mirror. [¶] But you are eternity and you are the mirror.* [1992: 95–97.]

If the mirror and its onlooker coincide, then beauty is no longer encapsulated, so to say, in things, but it is a kalological dimension of presences. It apprehends things not as such, but as instantaneous manifestations of all that, which points towards, and away from, things—what has gone before their coming to our attention and what is hoped to become of them later. Indeed, it is only on a meta-level that beauty becomes an ever-regenerative presence of different images and different meanings—because it can encompass a great diversity of particular images and particular meanings. However, through the converse route, it is not perhaps misleading to identify it with a certain facet of things or thoughts, as long as its malleability is somehow thematized.

'GOODNESS'

Wittgenstein 1961: 6.421 proclaims that 'Ethik und Ästhetik sind Eins' ('ethics and aesthetics are one'). On the contrary, for Sartre, only nauseating physical reality includes the moral—the aesthetic being the prerogative of imaginative negation; thus, Sartre says it would be 'stupid' to confuse the aesthetic and the moral (1940: 372; English translation 1983: 225).

It is true that the moral has a dimension which cannot readily be thematized by the aesthetic, and which in Lewis's words is 'the holy ground of the genuine being of others' (1984: 12). Casey 1984: 137, 152–153 seeks to designate a field where the aesthetic and the moral are subsumed under the category of the 'noble', a category best instantiated in some ideal 'remystified' politics. And I think that Gołaszewska 1999: 242–243 has possibly got a congenial conception in mind—from an existential rather than a political viewpoint.

The aesthetic appears at least sometimes to be competing with the moral; but the moral can, in turn, appear to be competing with the aesthetic. Not everything that can be valued in terms of its kalological efficacy is also always beyond

criticism on ethical grounds, and the conflicts between purportedly neutral artistic insights and morality are certainly not new. (For a more recent debate, see the several articles in Kunkel 2001.)

There is a case that can be made in favour of aestheticism: only beauty can possess the power of perseverance necessary to combat pain, evil, and dehumanization. But the price is that, in some cases, this kalological transcendency will adopt evil itself and—like an indifferent step-parent—foster it. In such cases, there is nothing more to be said: one must make a choice. On Goodman's account as I have tried to appropriate it, such a choice has not been, and cannot be readily made.

II.C

CONCLUSION

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Here follows an overview of the main points of my argumentation in this thesis. (The content of each section is roughly indicated.)

Goodman employs the notion of 'symbol' to designate the elementary atoms of both linguistic and non-linguistic semiotic systems. (In this sense, the term 'language' is not always linguistic, but more generally designates any symbol system.) But Goodman's theory is not directly or evidently linked to other familiar semiotic or semiological theories; it is an idiosyncratic *symbological* theory of minimally qualified 'standing for' relations. It involves a conviction (i) that nothing can be apprehended outside the defining framework of some kind of symbological reference. And a conviction (ii) that this pervasive referential relationality does not supersede the significance of individual symbols as the bearers of referential relations: symbols stand for, but they are not thus dispensable in favour of what they stand for. In particular, symbols may denote their referents, but a lot of what can be thereby symbolized might also be instantiated by the symbols' particular features, i.e. symbols can also directly or indirectly symbolize some of their own properties—they can be *exemplificational* as well as *denotational*. (And, in any case, literal as well as metaphorical; in fact, 'expression' is defined and deployed by Goodman as metaphorical exemplification). Aesthetics enters this discussion only as an integral part of Goodman's general theory of reference through symbols. It is necessary, therefore, to establish a topos of symbology that can be interpreted as the topos of *aesthetic* symbolization. In other words, it is necessary to distinguish between disparate symbological *meanings*, in order possibly to locate what is of especial aesthetic significance. (: §§ *1–5*.)

Meaning, then, consists for Goodman simply in the way reference is articulated. Namely, the study of the ways symbols and their referents depend on each other (for symbolization to work and evolve) constitutes a sufficiently complete account of their meaning. We only need to know in each case what can refer to what: meaning is strictly extensionally conceived. One of the important implications is the impossibility of absolute sameness of meaning or of accurate translatability, since no terms apply to *exactly* the same referents, especially in a non-temporal universe. Past, present, and future referential relations have to be taken into consideration when describing what any symbol can stand for; so, no absolutely co-extensive symbological terms can be postulated in the universal continuum. (: § *6*.)

Now, concepts like 'meaning' and 'translatability' must not lead one back to the supposition (which I tried straight away to discourage) that Goodman has

confined himself to *words* as symbols *par excellence*: the status of non-linguistic symbolization is identical. Semantic extensions are made up not solely of names but of all (linguistic and non-linguistic) *labels*. Their pertinent characteristic is that they are constantly mutated and regenerated: due to our practical needs for maximum communicative ability at minimum cost, we handle labels and the symbol systems they comprise with a certain frugality and flexibility. The generalized import of metaphor conveys a lot of this attitude towards symbological relations, because the literal and the metaphorical collaborate closely in enhancing the referential potential of any given term: there is an economy of terms, but not of meanings. In effect, what we are engaged with, according to Goodman, is an effort to safeguard an inexhaustible referential depth for the inescapably limited amount of symbological terms we can put to use. For instance, if the different arts are to be interpreted as systems of such terms, then it seems necessary for Goodman to be able to describe what it is that makes them irreplaceable—in other words, what it is that makes them too precious to be substituted by other simpler, or non-aesthetic modes of signification. (: § 7.)

Accordingly, Goodman intends his notationality theory (: § 8) as a useful instrument towards the rough calculation of the referential specifications characterizing different symbol systems. He puts forth some syntactic and semantic rules in the hope that they can help us codify the ways in which some symbol systems function (e.g., scores and texts can stand for musical and literary works respectively). However, as Goodman admits from the onset, the referential potential of symbological relations is hardly anywhere totally 'harnessed' by our powers of codification. This becomes all the more evident in the case of the 'hunt' for the authentic artwork: when all of its attributes are taken into account, it becomes in effect a completely autonomous entity, irreducible to any other symbol that could falsely appear more conveniently tractable. In fact, no such equivalence could be stipulated: the attributes of the artwork are indefinitely devisable and describable. The extension of the literal and metaphorical labels (pictorial, linguistic, etc.) that can be brought to describe it remains indefinitely open to expansion. Therefore, every genuine artwork must be in principle irreplaceable and irreproducible, since it invites an interminable attention to all of its possible attributes—especially including the ones concerning its history of creation and dissemination. Even in the best of cases, such attributes can only be incompletely codified (and, further on, imperfectly reproduced). (: § 9.) This general inference seems to be confirmed no matter what art form we choose to turn to. In picture-making, the notion of resemblance indeed asserts itself stubbornly as a criterion able to sufficiently separate the pictorial from the otherwise descriptive (or else, to sufficiently show how pictures as such become aesthetically irreplaceable). However, even in the apparently 'hard case' of perspectival depiction (cf. my First Chapter Appendix), resemblance itself becomes again in the end a matter of endlessly attending to all of the picture's attributes. The further hint is here to be found in the fact that what counts as a picture in one system ceases to count as a

picture in another (cf. the case of concrete poetry): pictures are not thus to be seen but, as with any other kind of symbol, to be *inferred*. (: § *10*.) In a parallel manner, the qualities of sound are only partially captured by our best devices designed for the symbological codification of music, i.e. scores. What makes a musical work is nothing less that the work itself in the multitude of its performances and the irreducible multi-dimensionality of its attributes. (: § *11*.) And in literature, the fully reproducible text brings along with it a plurality of readings (the ones intended by its author as well as by its past, present, and future readers), all of which become also an integral part of the text's significance. Or, the work cannot be confined to the text as an inscription; it is the text as a symbol that points to itself and also, essentially, *away* from itself. (: § *12*.)

The net result is that Goodmanian symbological meaning is hardly ever totally circumscribed for any specific term. There is no exact 'synonym' or explanatory equivalent for any simple symbol—let alone for any work of art when apprehended as a certain kind of complex symbol. Which means that, despite all efforts, the realm occupied by aesthetic symbols cannot be clearly identified: all symbols thrive in semantic proliferation, and consequently they cannot be clearly and efficiently differentiated, along these lines, into aesthetically pertinent ones and non-aesthetically pertinent ones (or aesthetically non-pertinent ones). There seem to be no exclusively aesthetic 'meanings' and no exclusively aesthetic 'labels'. Only weak indicators of aesthetic status remain to be postulated: these are what Goodman calls *symptoms* of the aesthetic. They are based on some of the syntactic and semantic specifications explored earlier in the context of notationality, but they also crucially involve what I have been insisting upon when talking of the complexity of reference and of the self-referential, exemplificational dimension of symbolization. The more a symbol can be shown to exhibit (some of) these symptoms, the more chances there are that it is an aesthetically relevant symbol (but note that more symptoms do not imply greater aesthetic value). (: § *13*.)

The implications of this result have to be fully realized in conjunction with what Goodman has to say in some of his later or more indirectly related moments. If symbological multi-dimensionality is not the exclusive topos of the aesthetic (but only provides some symptomatic evidence in its favour), other means must be employed in order to further qualify this self-suggestive exclusivity. Thus, Goodman's project goes on to employ the notion of style as a summary-description of the aesthetic symbol's peculiar function, according to which the work and its 'subject' become inseparable (namely, style is not just the 'manner' in which a supposedly pre-given content is presented). Apart from the semantic requirements concerning the strict interdependence of symbols and their referents in the constitution of meaning, Goodman's equation of style and content thematizes the problem of tradition versus innovation: art is made up of works as symbols that appear to evolve historically. Goodman can interpret history in this sense only as sub-case of the reality of inherited practice: we follow what has

been somehow successful in the past, even if we frequently wish to go beyond it (the strive for originality can be itself interpreted as an inherited strive). Practice dictates what is normal—not what is normative—and what is normal constitutes to a great extent the core of any symbol's very symbolic nature: i.e. that it is *accepted* as standing for what it stands for. (: § *14*.) Furthermore, it is here of great importance that notions like style and practice (although concentrated on the individual rather than on the community of practitioners) are indicative of a process of *understanding*. For, in Goodman's sense, understanding is nothing else than a kind of continuous symbological appropriation, carefully built upon inherited practice. As already shown in the case of the semantic multi-dimensionality of complex, exemplificational symbols, the additional pragmatic boundlessness of their application in place and time greatly contributes to the realization of their status. Artworks as points of reference in the vast nexus of applied symbolization are shown, once again, to transcend the mere objects with which we usually identify them. (For one thing, objects deteriorate but the significance of artworks does not thereby change.) Consequently, artworks are symbols that need to be constantly attended to; they are 'non-transparent' symbols, the full significance of which must be interminably gauged out of their context of genesis and history. (: § *15*.) Clearly then, what Goodman posits as understanding through symbols does not amount to a rationalistic cognitive internalization of what is being referred to. The artwork, although semantically and pragmatically complex and densely structured, retains the exemplificational clarity of its concrete *individuality* (which invites interpretation). Thus, thoughts and feelings are not subsumed under an intellectualistic domain of cognizing the artwork. They reveal, instead, that our understanding of the world through symbols like artworks neither defines the ontology of the latter as stratified—there are only *degrees* of difference among them—nor the world as something separate from our dealings with it. (: §§ *16–17*.)

IT BECOMES EVIDENT at this point that my programmatic aim to examine Goodman's aesthetic theory has taken a negative course—at least provisionally, following my first chapter. According to Goodman, when faced with any meaningful entity or situation, we are facing symbols. The features exhibited by these symbols (in the manner specified by Goodman's 'cartography' of syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic dimensions) allow us to discriminate between them. In some cases, the result will correspond more adequately than not to what we have otherwise learned to classify as, e.g., aesthetic or pertaining to the arts. But no other 'essential' correspondence can be established between aspects of symbols and kinds of things. Whatever their ontological status (if any), all entities have numerous aspects according to Goodman's symbology: it is the study of these aspects (i.e. our understanding of the ways of things and non-things, regardless) that forms the most comprehensive and legitimate objective of philosophical in-

quiry. And, consequently, if the ontology of artworks is something possible at all, then it must surely be of secondary importance. In accordance with all this—and in the context now of my own research—it is both accurate and inaccurate to say that Goodman is not in effect offering a theory of what is aesthetic in the familiar sense and what is not. Because, in Goodman's universe, symbols as the sole genuine points of reference for our sensibilities can be both aesthetic and non-aesthetic, or more / less aesthetic than non-aesthetic, or ambiguously aesthetic and / or non-aesthetic—depending on the degree in which, and the direction to which, we have been able to scrutinize them. This is generally the reason why my research on Goodman's work had to turn to a closer examination of the groundwork, so to say, supporting Goodman's symbology (an examination here represented in the second and third chapters of my thesis). In opting for a parsimonious extensionalist semantics and in choosing to talk of symbols rather than of things, Goodman is articulating a distinctive philosophical vision: an insightful type of epistemology, coupled with an equally insightful type of metaphysics. The merits or demerits of this combination directly shape Goodman's discourse on 'art' and 'the aesthetic'. I have thus felt compelled to try and deliver a complemented interpretation, one that helps prevent what could otherwise have been a partial, and thus unduly prejudiced, approach to that portion of Goodman's thought which is more straightforwardly connected to the subject of my own inquiry.

In particular, as my further examination has showed, Goodman's preference for semantic precision and economy (one of the most pervasive features of his way of philosophizing) does not necessarily lead to an 'impoverished' ontology—in fact, as I have already tried to indicate, it does not involve any ontological commitments at all. For Goodman is not concerned with what kinds of entities are the most 'economical' (e.g., *nomina* instead of *realia*); his extensionalist theory of meaning does not shun, for example, abstract or fictional entities. Goodman speaks instead of 'individuals', and advances a matching 'platonistic' version of nominalism: what counts is systematization effected by the choice of the right individuals, and not their ontological pedigree, so to speak. (: §§ *18–19*.) The ontological problem is thus transmuted into a problem of what the 'right individuals' should be. Now—as clearly seen in the case of the individual members of an art form—a systematization employing a certain type and structuring of individual symbols is rightly interpreted or it constitutes a successful systematization when it is ultimately the result of entrenched interpretations and systematizations. In other words, practised tradition in the handling and the employment of symbol systems emerges as the optimal test for their rightness. An important implication of this is that no external touchstones seem to be allowed, i.e. no 'realities' upon which we could test our symbol systems. Entrenchment of reference correlations determines the internal function of systems and their choice of terms but not their field of application. In effect, symbol systems describe and at the same time constitute their own worlds: the metaphysical specifications of these

worlds are, in turn, entirely open to diverse possibilities. This is Goodman's second fundamental epistemic conception (following his principle of systematic simplicity): processes of symbological construction are the makers of 'irreal' worlds. For the arts, this is an epistemological signal of the fact that works are to be appreciated as individual symbols populating particular artistic worlds; there are no pre-existing rules of value, because (in the final analysis) value is not something separate from symbological functioning. (: § *20–21.*)

A further important implication follows from the fact that practised tradition and entrenched referential strategies determine current usage and interpretation of symbol systems. Since Goodman wishes to avoid a notion of relativism that leads to no conclusions, he has to accept that there might be numerous well-built, i.e. right symbological worlds: a lot of different systematizations might be equally well structured and entrenched through practised tradition. In the inevitable cases where these worlds may posit conflicting irrealities, they must simply co-exist. Made words become, more accurately, world-versions (symbological versions that correspond to worlds). Consequently, the arts as particular symbol systems constitute particular world-versions, i.e. constellations of signification that construct their field of application and derive their own meanings within it. To return to the ontological status of things as artworks, Goodman's epistemology makes it clear that the description of a world made up out of art-objects is not a necessary prerequisite for any other world-description postulating art-symbols. Aesthetic status is not something attributed to certain (kinds of) *beings*; it is a certain mode of *being* within a version made up of, e.g., dense, ambiguous, and individually identifiable articulations of complex and non-transparent symbological relations. (: §§ *22–23*).

Admittedly, practised tradition and rightness of symbolization imply each other in a circular manner; for what has been handed down as right must have been interpreted as the right thing to be handed down. However, this is for Goodman a virtuous circle. His philosophical conscience dictates such a conviction, along with his belief in semantic extensions and irreal individuals. What I have further undertaken in this thesis (especially in the third chapter) is to appropriately describe the metaphysical signification of such general arguments as far as the arts are concerned. Specifically, I have used *kalology* (I examine it as a term in § *24*) in order to designate Goodman's metaphysical apprehension of being, when this being can acquire an aesthetic aspect. Since Goodman speaks of symbol-relations and corresponding world-versions, a world is nothing more and nothing less than a self-generated mode of being. In its framework, the postulated symbological points of reference (entities and / or non-entities) emerge as pulsating presences rather than more or less fixed things. For the everyday or more sophisticated worlds we happen to inhabit, the point is that any (kind of) thing can also be taken up by a different world version and presented under the light of an aesthetic symbol (as prescribed by Goodman). Any (kind of) thing can thus become aesthetic to certain degrees. What is of the essence for Goodmanian

aesthetics pertains to the theoretical act of deciphering the possibilities of aesthetic presences, dictated by the multiplicity of irreal worlds surrounding us. (: §§ *25–27*.) The initial impetus that encourages us to actually engage in such an effort (at detecting potentially aesthetic presences) belongs perhaps itself to one of these worlds. It is perhaps itself a fabrication, a theoretical vision based on our practical needs and our intellectual capabilities, careful enough to listen to some of the rules but also bold enough to try and controversially change some of them. Whether or not all this constitutes a sufficiently good self-defence in favour of such a fabrication, there may be additional reasons for listening to Goodman's proposals as I have presented them here. Traditional problems in aesthetics and in the theory of art and beauty can be examined from a different perspective, which may prove useful not of course in 'solving' the problems but, more importantly, in helping to re-think them. (: §§ *28–29*, and my Third Chapter Appendix.)

—b—

On the whole, I have tried to present an appropriation of what Goodman has to say about matters pertaining primarily to the arts—but also necessarily involving epistemology and metaphysics. I have chosen to view his general theory of symbols (or *symbology*) as a theory about remoteness and presence: the remoteness of what lies outside the systems of association through symbols, and the presence of what is indicated by symbolization—whether it be words, things, thoughts, sights, sounds, etc. Thus, I have considered symbolization as a process constitutive of the arts (as well as of other things), rather than as a solidified ontological taxonomy of the aesthetic. I have found that, through this process—the study of which I have named *kalology*—artworks acquire their vital status as points of reference for our sensibilities, and that they gradually but interminably are there to reveal something of the non-transparency, or richness, of their referential content. I have examined such an account of aesthetic signification, offered under some qualifications by Goodman, as an expression of a more general need to make sense of worlds / the world surrounding us, by assimilating it / them kalologically as well as conceptually, practically, and so on. I have found in Goodman no ultimate answers, except for the injunction to sustain one's efforts along philosophical routes. After all, Goodman defers the chance to talk about any ultimate commitments:

> Some of you will expect me to solve all the most profound capital-letter problems of Life, Values, and Human Destiny, while the rest of you are firmly convinced that a philosopher knows nothing of any use to anybody. This second group is the nearer right. [*MM*: 174–175, addressing an audience of museum professionals.]

Nevertheless, he tirelessly attends to his duties:

> Any approach to universal accord on anything significant is exceptional. My readers could weaken that latter conviction by agreeing unanimously with the foregoing somewhat tortuous and in a double sense trying course of thought. [*WW*: 140. Cf. the earlier parallel (but surely more hopeful) remark:] I cannot reward your kind attention with the comforting assurance that all has been done, or with the perhaps almost as comforting assurance that nothing can be done. [*FFF*: 124.]

Of course, disowning ultimate answers is itself an answer to the question concerning ultimate answers. (What is more, an irrealist of the Goodmanian sort could have equally well claimed a right to positive ultimate answers—e.g., if they could be upheld as the bearers of viable world-versions.) But below the surface (and despite the few self-conscious moments of this sort), Goodman's discourse has most of all tried to remain at all costs faithful to the ideal of rational inquiry exercized with exacting vigour rather than with facile declarations of self-righteousness. In parallel, this inquiry has adhered to, and conversed with, a peculiar (even if not extraordinary), pre-theoretical fascination regarding art (or certain forms of it, anyway)—a feature that greatly stimulated my own interest in Goodman's approach. In trying to take advantage of it, and employ it in ways that seemed in my view to be worthwhile, I have treated Goodman's insights, if not with unreserved admiration, at least with reflective respect._

How can I stifle inside of me
the beauty of the world?
This sky of mine,
this sea within my reach...

What could I ever trade for
my beaming gaze of light?
Trails of sun my cradle,
motherly unfolding life

Lurking in the muddy waters,
what is the tongue mumbling
of those who expect me
to lower my wings?

Kindynis & Xarchakos & Xylouris 1974
(original lyrics by K. Kindynis on verso)

Πῶς νὰ σωπάσω μέσα μου
τὴν ὀμορφιὰ τοῦ κόσμου;
Ὁ οὐρανὸς δικός μου,
ἡ θάλασσα στὰ μέτρα μου…

Πῶς νὰ μὲ κάνουν νὰ τὸν δῶ
τὸν ἥλιο μ' ἄλλα μάτια;
Στὰ ἡλιοσκαλοπάτια
μ' ἔμαθε ἡ μάννα μου νὰ ζῶ

Στοῦ βούρκου μέσα τὰ νερά,
ποιά γλῶσσα μοῦ μιλᾶνε
αὐτοὶ ποὺ μοῦ ζητᾶνε
νὰ χαμηλώσω τὰ φτερά;

III.A

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416–419 (VIII, 8: 'Snowflakes and Wastebaskets')
{Talk delivered at a memorial meeting for C. I. Lewis, Harvard University, 23.IV.1964}

423–436 (IX,1: 'Order from Indifference')
{Revised version of a talk delivered to the Psychology Colloquium of the University of Pennsylvania, middle 1950's}

437–446 (IX,2: 'Seven Strictures on Similarity')

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1–22 (I: 'Words, Works, Worlds')
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23–40 (II: 'The Status of Style')
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21–28 (I,6: 'On Thoughts without Words')

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30–39 (II,1: 'Notes on the Well-Made World')
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61–69 (Part of III,1: 'Routes of Reference')
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*(viii)

***RP**

(Earlier or later versions of chapters may indicate single authorship; cf. **RP:** *viii and my fn. 3 above.)*

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49–65 *(III: 'Interpretation and Identity: Can the Work Survive the World?')

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83–92 *(V: 'Sights Unseen')

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135–152 *(IX: 'The Epistemic Efficacy of Stupidity')

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Goodman 1991*a*

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(viii) *b*

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III.C

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This is, in effect, an index of sources: it includes proper names and references to Nelson Goodman's works. (The latter are listed by their abbreviations—as on pp. 16, 21 above—with three-digit page numbers (for books), and with asterisks (*) indicating that phrases or longer extracts have been directly quoted in my text.)