

ASPECTS OF ANGLO-SCOTTISH RELATIONS

FROM 1471 TO 1513

Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements  
of the University of Liverpool for the degree of  
Doctor in Philosophy by David Dunlop.

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ABBREVIATIONS

- A. D. A. Acta Dominorum Auditorum. The Acts of the Lords Auditors of Causes and Complaints, 1466-1494, ed. T. Thomson, (London, 1839)
- A. D. C. Acta Dominorum Concilii. The Acts of the Lords of Council in Civil Causes, 1478-1495 and 1496-1501, ed. T. Thomson, G. Neilson and H. Paton, (Edinburgh, 1839 and 1918).
- A. D. C. P. Acts of the Lords of Council in Public Affairs 1501-1554 : Selections from Acta Dominorum Concilii, ed. R. K. Hannay, (Edinburgh, 1932)
- A. H. R. American Historical Review
- ANDRÉ Historia Regis Henrici Septimi (Bernard André), ed. J. Gairdner, R.S., X (London, 1858)
- A. P. S. Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, ed. T. Thomson and C. Innes, (Edinburgh, 1814-75)
- BACON Francis Bacon's Life of Henry VII (1622), ed. F. J. Levy, (Indianapolis, 1972)
- BAIN Calendar of Documents, Relating to Scotland, IV, 1357-1509, ed. J. Bain, (Edinburgh, 1888)
- BALFOUR'S HISTORICAL WORKS The Historical Works of Sir James Balfour, (Edinburgh, 1825)
- B. I. H. R. Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research
- B. L. British Library
- BOECE VITAE Hectoris Boetii Murthlacensium et Aberdonensium Episcoporum Vitae, Bannatyne Club, (Edinburgh, 1825)

- BRADLEY THESIS P. J. Bradley, Anglo-Scottish Relations during the Fifteenth Century : 1399-1485, Emory University, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1983
- BUCHANAN The History of Scotland....of George Buchanan, ed. J. Aikman, (Glasgow, 1827-30)
- BUCK The History of King Richard III (1619) by Sir George Buck, ed. A. N. Kincaid, (Gloucester, 1979)
- BYRNE'S LETTERS The Letters of King Henry VIII, ed. M. St. Claire Byrne, (London, 1968)
- H.VIII
- CARDEW THESIS A. A. Cardew, A Study of Society in the Anglo-Scottish Border, 1455-1502, St. Andrews University, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1975
- C. C. R. Calendar of the Close Rolls, (1900 - )
- C. F. R. Calendar of the Fine Rolls, (1911-1963)
- CHRONICLES OF LONDON Chronicles of London (Cotton Vitellius A.XVI), ed. C. L. Kingsford, (Oxford, 1905)
- COLEMAN THESIS T. F. Coleman, The English Policy of James IV of Scotland, 1488-1513 : A Study in Renaissance Diplomacy, Alabama University, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1971
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- COLLECTANEA J. Leland, De Rebus Britannicis Collectanea, ed. T. Hearne, (London, 1774)
- COMMYNES The Memoirs for the Reign of Louis XI, 1461-1483, ed. M. Jones, (Harmondsworth, 1972)

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- The Complaynt of Scotlande, ed. J. A. H. Murray, E.B.T.S., XVII, XVIII (London, 1872)
- CONWAY                              A. Conway, Henry VII's Relations with Scotland and Ireland, 1485-1498, (Cambridge U.P., 1932)
- COTT THESIS                        S. E. Cott, The Wardenship of Thomas Lord Dacre, 1485-1525, Manchester University, unpublished M.A. thesis, 1971
- C. P. R.                                Calendar of the Patent Rolls (1901 - )
- CROYLAND CHRONICLE              The Crowland Chronicle Continuations 1459-1486, ed. N. Pronay and J. Cox, (London, 1986)
- CROYLAND CHRONICLE,              Ingulph's Chronicle of the Abbey of Croyland,  
ED. RILEY                              ed. H. T. Riley, (London, 1893)
- C. S.                                    Camden Society
- C. S. P. MILANESE                  Calendar of State Papers, etc. Milanese, ed. A. B. Hinds, (London, 1912)
- C. S. P. SPANISH                    Calendar of Letters, Despatches and State Papers, Spanish, ed. G. A. Bergenroth and others, (London, 1862-1954)
- C. S. P. VENETIAN                  Calendar of State Papers, etc. Venetian, ed. R. Brown and others, (London, 1864-1947)
- DIETRICH THESIS                    S. C. Dietrich, Liberties and Lawlessness : Reiver Society in Tudor Tynedale and Redesdale, Cornell University, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1973
- DIETZ                                  F. C. Dietz, English Government Finance 1485-1558, (2nd ed., London, 1964)

- D. N. B. Dictionary of National Biography
- DRUMMOND William Drummond of Hawthornden, History of the Five James's, in The Works of, ed. J. Sage and T. Ruddiman, (Edinburgh, 1711)
- EARLY TRAVELLERS Early Travellers in Scotland, ed. P. Hume Brown, (facsimile ed., Edinburgh 1978)
- ED.V., GRANTS Grants etc. from the Crown During the Reign of Edward V, ed. J. G. Nichols, C.S., LX (1854)
- E. E. T. S. Early English Text Society
- E. H. R. English Historical Review
- ELLIS, LETTERS Original Letters Illustrative of English History, ed. H. Ellis, 11 vols., (London, 1825-1846)
- ENGLISH MISCELLANIES A Volume of English Miscellanies Illustrating the History and Language of the Northern Counties of England, ed. J. Raine, S.S., LXXXV (1890)
- E. R. Rotuli Scaccarii Regum Scotorum, The Exchequer Rolls of Scotland, ed. G. Burnett and A. J. G. MacKay, (Edinburgh, 1878-1908)
- EXCERPTA HISTORICA Excerpta Historica, ed. S. Bentley, (London, 1833)
- FABYAN'S NEW New Chronicles of England and France by R. Fabyan, ed. H. Ellis, (London, 1811)
- CHRONICLES
- FACS. NAT. MSS. Facsimilies of National Manuscripts from William the Conqueror to Queen Anne, ed. H. James, (Southampton, 1865)
- FACS. NAT. MSS., Facsimilies of National Manuscripts of
- SCOTLAND Scotland, ed. H. James, (Southampton, 1870-71)

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between the Courts of France and Scotland, ed.  
M. Wood, S.H.S., XX (3rd ser., Edinburgh, 1933)
- FOEDERA Foedera, Conventiones, Literae....accurante Thoma  
Rymer, (3rd ed., The Hague, 1739-45)
- GRAFTON Grafton's Chronicle or History of England,  
(London, 1809)
- HALL Hall's Chronicles, ed. H. Ellis, (London, 1809)
- HALLIWELL, LETTERS Letters of the Kings of England, ed. J. O.  
Halliwell, (London, 1846-48)
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Scotie Wilelmi Wallace Militis), ed. M. P.  
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à L'histoire d' écosse conservés aux Archives  
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H.VII Letters and Papers Illustrative of the Reigns  
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R.S., XXIV (1861-63)
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(Johnson reprint company, London, 1968)
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AND POWER Patronage, Pedigree, and Power in Later  
Medieval England, ed. C. Ross (Gloucester, 1979)
- PATRONAGE, THE CROWN,  
ETC. Patronage, the Crown and the Provinces in Later  
Medieval England, ed. R. A. Griffiths,  
(Gloucester, 1981)
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- the House of Stuart to that of Mary, with  
Appendixes of Original Papers, J. Pinkerton,  
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TRIALS  
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Register of the Great Seal of Scotland, 1424-  
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Rotuli Parliamentorum ut et Petitiones et  
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Rotuli Scotiae in Turri Londinensi et in Domo  
Capitulari Westmonasteriensi Asservati, ed. D.  
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(London, 1967)
- S. H. R.  
Scottish Historical Review
- S. H. S.  
Scottish History Society

- S. P., H.VIII                      State Papers of Henry VIII, (11 vols., London, 1830-1852)
- S. R. O.                              Scottish Record Office, Edinburgh
- S. S.                                  Surtees Society
- STAT. REALM                      Statutes of the Realm, (11 vols., London, 1810-1828)
- S. T. S.                              Scottish Text Society
- T. A.                                Compta Thesaurariorum Regum Scotorum.  
Accounts of the Lord High Treasurer of  
Scotland, ed. T. Dickson and J. B. Paul,  
(Edinburgh, 1877-1916)
- T. C. W. A. S.                      Transactions of the Cumberland and Westmorland  
Antiquarian Society
- T. R. H. S.                        Transactions of the Royal Historical Society
- T. R. P.                              Tudor Royal Proclamations, ed. P. L. Hughes and  
J. F. Larkin, (London, 1964-69)
- VERGIL                              Anglica Historia of Polydore Vergil, ed. D. Hay,  
C.S., LXXIV (1950)
- VERGIL, H.VI - R.III              Three Books of Polydore Vergil's English  
History, ed. H. Ellis, C.S., XXIX (1844)
- WILKINS, CONCILIA              Concilia Magnae Britanniae et Hiberniae,  
vol.III ed. D. Wilkins (London, 1737)
- Y. A. S. R. S.                      Yorkshire Archaeological Society Record Series
- Y. C. R.                              York Civic Records, ed. A. Raine, Y.A.S.R.S.,  
XCVIII, CIII, CVI, (1939-42)
- YORK RECORDS                      York Records of the Fifteenth Century, ed. R.  
Davies, (Gloucester, 1976)



ASPECTS OF ANGLO-SCOTTISH RELATIONSFROM 1471 TO 1513David DunlopAbstract of Thesis

The subject of Anglo-Scottish relations in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries merits reappraisal, and this study seeks to undertake the task by questioning long-standing traditions and by emphasizing the thematic continuity. The thesis begins by considering the relationship between the "auld-enemies" and the practical effects which this had on contemporaries. Though given a historical dimension, Anglo-Scottish antipathy was particularly prevalent from the reign of Edward I, and though a powerful emotion, enmity did not prevent monarchs from concluding truces and negotiating matrimonial alliances. Chapter Two questions the traditional causes of Anglo-Scottish conflict; English claims to suzerainty over Scotland, the "Auld-Alliance", disputes pertaining to Berwick, the Border, and the activities of the borderers, piratical and maritime activity, and the support which both sides offered to the malcontents, traitors (and occasional pretenders) of the neighbouring realm. Since an established machinery existed to prevent conflicts, none of these issues ought to have constituted a *casus belli*, but the attitudes manifest among the monarchs, their councillors and subjects, could and did undermine peace.

Chapter Three examines the conflicts of 1480-1484, 1496-1497, and 1513, but suggests that warfare was generally limited to recrimination, raid, and reprisal; large-scale campaigning and battles such as Flodden were comparatively rare. The neglected years between 1503 and 1511 are also considered, and are found to be of much greater interest than has hitherto been perceived. Chapters Four and Five examine the Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliances advocated between 1474 and 1503 in an attempt to resolve the outstanding problems of the relationship. No less than nine different alliances (involving eleven pairings) were considered until James IV married Margaret Tudor in 1503. Truces and matrimonial alliances characterised these years as a distinctive phase in Anglo-Scottish relations, though when difficulties emerged in 1512 and 1513, the matrimonial alliance, far from preventing the conflict, merely contributed to the problems. The final chapter considers neglected aspects such as culture, trade, and religion, and places the subject in the broader context of England's "problems of the North parts."

With both England and Scotland, the psychological fear of proximity to a potentially hostile neighbour greatly exceeded any military danger which they represented. England was stronger in manpower and finance, but since English monarchs were not strong enough to conquer Scotland, a precarious equilibrium governed the relationship. After 1503, their claims to the English succession strengthened the position of the Scottish monarchs for the remainder of the sixteenth century.

P R E F A C E

"Within short space of yeres ther should be no money nor tresor in thos partes nether the tenant to haue to pay his rentes to the lord nor the lord to haue money to do the King seruice with all for so much as in thos partes was nether the presence of his grace execution of his lawes nor yet but litle recours of merchaundisse so that of necessite the said contrey should eyther patyssh with the Skotes or of very pouertie enforced to make comocions or rebellions...."

Thereby Robert Aske eloquently outlined some of the problems of the North parts in 1536, but the difficulties which he perceived were far from being new ones. On the one hand, by the fifteenth century, though Yorkshire constituted part of the zone of Border fortifications, England north of the River Trent could no longer be viewed realistically as one large March. Yorkshire, large in population, and larger still in area, shared many characteristics with counties to the south, and her inhabitants had recourse to legal bodies based in London, such as the Star Chamber and Court of Requests. On the other hand, while Yorkshire paid Parliamentary taxation, and the Border counties were traditionally excused because of their defensive duties, it is clear that Yorkshiremen were also expected to defend the realm against the Scots, and there is no doubt that the River Trent constituted a powerful psychological barrier to many southern Englishmen; a barrier reinforced by tradition, antipathy, and rebellions such as the later Pilgrimage of Grace. Yorkshire constituted the secondary line of defence against Scotland, while the Border counties

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1. PRO E.36/118, ff.53-54 ; and see L. & P. H.VIII, xii (I) no.6; A. Fletcher, Tudor Rebellions, (2nd ed., Harlow, 1973), doc.5, p.123.

constituted the front line, but both areas experienced social, political, and economic problems well into the seventeenth century.

This thesis examines one aspect of the problems outlined by Aske; the proximity of the North parts to Scotland. R. L. Storey suggested that this "was the major factor in determining the political and social character" of northern England, and the reasons for this are clear from the following study of Anglo-Scottish relations.<sup>1</sup> With the growing participation of England and Scotland in continental affairs during the fifteenth century these two peripheral powers embarked on another phase of a rivalry which had been evident in their domestic relationship since the reign of Edward I. Anglo-Scottish relations are particularly interesting from the 1470's, as the monarchs of both countries sought to resolve their long-standing difficulties by recourse to truces and matrimonial alliances, and this development, which culminated in the marriage of James IV and Margaret Tudor in 1503, characterised this period as a distinct phase in Anglo-Scottish history. But Anglo-Scottish relations were only part of the reason why historians earlier this century came to perceive of a "problem of the North."<sup>2</sup>

In 1976 one authority posed the pertinent question whether northern history constituted a subject, and came to the conclusion that it was "an unattainable infinity like any other historical problem worth considering".<sup>3</sup> One of the major difficulties faced by any student considering northern history in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is that the

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1. R. L. Storey, 'The North of England', p.131, in Fifteenth Century England, 1399-1509 : Studies in Politics and Society, ed. Chrimes, Ross, and Griffiths, (Manchester, 1972), pp.129-142.
  2. see, for example, G. T. Lapsley, 'The Problem of the North : A Study in English Border History', A.H.R., 5 (1899-1900), pp.440-466; R. R. Reid, The King's Council in the North, (London 1921). *And see below, pp. 249-265.*
  3. J. Le Patourel, 'Is Northern History a Subject?', N. H., 11-12 (1975-76), pp.1-15, esp. p.15.

terms "North parties" and northerner were used by contemporaries without precision, and one ought sensibly to provide some degree of context and qualification.<sup>1A</sup> Generally speaking the terms could be applied to the large area north of the River Trent, but there are occasions when they were used more specifically (to mean Yorkshire, for example), and more generally, as evinced by a case of November 1580. On that date, Lawrence Brodbent, the receiver in Nottinghamshire, reported to the Lord Treasurer that a certain Richard Kerefurde:-

"thinkes it but a sport to deffraude a northeron man,  
ffor so he termethe all northeron men that be borne  
xx<sup>ti</sup> mylles northe from London...."<sup>1</sup>

Evidently a North-South antipathy based on sweeping generalisation was a common feature in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Travellers in northern England were often less than complimentary, and John Leland, for example, reflected in some measure the differences which he perceived North and South of the Trent.<sup>2</sup> The foreigner Aeneas Sylvius painted as grim a picture of northern England as he did of Scotland, describing the people as "barbarians" and their women as of easy virtue. Only at Newcastle did he feel that he beheld anything resembling civilisation, since Scotland and the English Borders were "a rugged wilderness, unvisited by the genial sun."<sup>3</sup>

Many Englishmen would doubtless have agreed with this indictment. Service in the North parts was unpopular, particularly among southern magnates, since it entailed geographical distance from the King and court in an environment which was perceived to be unremittingly hostile;

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1A. See below p. 251.

1. PRO SP.46/32, f.114.

2. The Itinerary of John Leland, ed. L. T. Smith, 5 vols. (London, 1907-1910).

3. Early Travellers, pp.28-29.

the belief that the northerners had acquired the taint of barbarism from the Scots, and experience of the conduct of the Borderers at Flodden and elsewhere, only intensified southern fears and prejudices.

While England's North-South divide cannot be compared with the cultural, political, social, economic, and linguistic divisions between the Scottish highlands and lowlands, it was nonetheless real, and was compounded by the imprecision and generalisation. In an age dominated by local and provincial perspectives, a measure of generalisation was perhaps the inevitable consequence of regional rivalry. When Henry VIII compiled his statutes and ordinances of war in 1513 he found it necessary to include northerners in his list of forbidden reproaches and insults; the suggestion that northerners were perceived as a race with the French, English, Irish, or Welsh, is interesting, although one is again confronted with the problems of imprecision and generalisation.<sup>1</sup>

North-South antipathy in England was undoubtedly intensified by the destructive march into southern England by Margaret of Anjou and her army of Scots, northerners, and miscellaneous undesirables, in 1461. This event generally elicits brief but hostile comment in chronicles and histories, but other evidence is more interesting.<sup>2</sup> Clement Paston, for example, wrote to John Paston in January 1461 that, since "the pepill in the northe robbe and styll, and ben apoyntyed to pill all thys cowntre", there was considerable unrest among southern Englishmen, "for they wold

1. T.R.P., I, no.73, p.114.

2. see, for example, Three Fifteenth Century Chronicles, ed. James Gairdner, C.S., XXVIII (new series, 1880), p.76 ; The Historical Collections of a Citizen of London in the Fifteenth Century, ed. James Gairdner, C.S., XVII, (new series, 1876), pp.212-214 ; C.S.P. Milanese, I, nos.54, 62-66.

be up on the men in [thel northe, for it ys for the welle of all the sowthe." The Abbot of St. Albans would doubtless have agreed, for in a political poem on the civil wars he lamented the harsh treatment dealt to the abbey by the rapacious and barbaric northern partisans of the Lancastrians, and reported Edward IV's success at Towton with some pleasure.<sup>2</sup> The threat to the Abbey of Croyland from the "whirlwind from the north" elicited a similar response from the Croyland chronicler who wrote in detail about the destruction caused by the northern army, and expressed the fear that the abbey might be attacked and sacked.<sup>3</sup> Henceforth London and the south of England feared the latent power of the northerners, and Richard Duke of Gloucester exploited this fear to good effect during his usurpation of the Throne in 1483.<sup>4</sup> The Croyland chronicler, unable to disguise his loathing for the "wretched northmen", described their devastation as one of the disastrous "evils" for which God had provided a "defender" in the person of Edward IV.<sup>5</sup> In the wake of such events one can appreciate why Richard III's post-Buckingham rebellion plantation of northerners in southern counties was regarded as tyrannous by his contemporaries, while there is probably no more vivid a comment pertaining to the North than the Croyland chronicler's infamous

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1. Paston Letters, I, 1422-1461, no.367, pp.540-541.
2. Political Poems and Songs relating to English History from the Accession of Edward III to that of Richard III, vol.II., ed. T. Wright, R.S. (1861), pp.lxvi, 258-266.
3. Croyland Chronicle, ed. Riley, pp.421-426.
4. For reactions in London in June and July 1483 see, for example, Acts of Court of the Mercers' Company, 1453-1527, ed. L. Lyell and F. D. Watney, (Cambridge, 1936), pp.155-156 ; The Stonor Letters and Papers, 1290-1483, vol.II, ed. C. L. Kingsford, C.S., (3rd ser.,1919), xxx, no.331, pp.160-161. See also Richard III ; The Road to Bosworth Field, ed. Hammond and Sutton, (London 1985), pp.103-118.
5. see note 3.

assertion that this was the area "whence all evil spreads."

It cannot reasonably be claimed that the twentieth century, with its confusing boundary changes, has brought much greater precision, or that the ever-prevailing emphasis on a North-South divide has produced much less in the way of prejudice and generalisation. Northern England, rather like the American west, constitutes a geographical and historical manifestation of certain self-perpetuating romantic myths and pseudo-legends which have resulted in the homogenisation of a concept far removed from any factual reality. Yet the myths have undoubtedly been partly responsible for some of the interest shown in northern history. Northern hills and moors have long proved conducive to those of a romantic disposition; one is, for example, drawn to P. M. Kendall's descriptions of the Duke of Gloucester sweeping on horseback across windswept moors, accompanied, or so it would appear, by the often less than dispassionate historian.<sup>2</sup>

In the very first article of the Northern History journal, Asa Briggs remarked on the limitations of our knowledge about the North of England, and pointed out that the "concept of a homogeneous" north was a "dangerous simplification."<sup>3</sup> This has been demonstrated in Northern History and elsewhere in the subsequent twenty years, and another authority has noted that the more historians study this "remarkably

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1. A. J. Pollard, 'The Tyranny of Richard III', Journal Medieval History, 3, (1977), pp.147-166 ; Croyland Chronicle, ed. Riley, p.509, and ed. Pronay and Cox, p.191.
  2. P. M. Kendall, Richard III, (New York, 1955). See below pp. 254 - 256.
  3. A. Briggs, 'Themes in Northern History', N.H., I, (1966), pp.1-6, esp. p.3.

diversified region", the more they become aware of its considerable dissimilarities.<sup>1</sup> The generalisations of Dr. Lapsley and Dr. Reid about a "problem of the North" are no longer tenable without major qualification, particularly since research has highlighted regional diversity, and played down the importance of the North on the whole.<sup>2</sup> Beckingsale, for example, has suggested that feudalism, Catholicism, and violence - the characteristics most often attributed to the Tudor north - constituted the "blurred and fading imprints of all provincial England".<sup>3</sup> Yet since Robert Aske and other contemporaries perceived of the North parts as sharing certain characteristics and difficulties one is justified in speaking of a series of problems of the north at any given moment in time, provided that the term is qualified and one perceives of the limitations and generalisations presented by the concept.

In considering Anglo-Scottish relations this thesis aims to give some consideration to the traditional assumption that proximity to Scotland was the most significant of the various "problems of the north" in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. I hope to show why Scotland represented a problem to successive English monarchs, but the impact of England on Scotland is also considered, and I intend to show how the Anglo-Scottish monarchs came to deal with the problem of their relationship. Finally, I intend to consider the problem presented by Scotland

1. see *N.H. Journal*, 1966 to the present, *passim* ; R. B. Dobson, 'Cathedral Chapters and Cathedral Cities : York, Durham and Carlisle in the Fifteenth Century', *N.H.*, XIX (1983), pp.15-44, esp. p.16.
2. *Ibid*, and see R. L. Storey, 'The North of England' cited on page xiv, note 1.
3. B. W. Beckingsale, 'The Characteristics of the Tudor North', *N.H.*, IV, (1969), pp.67-83, esp. p.67.



in some perspective by placing this in the context of how English monarchs sought to govern the North parts of their realm. Doubtless some may question the relevance and value of a study which concentrates on political and diplomatic aspects at a time when social and economic considerations predominate, but since I intend to challenge and undermine certain prevailing traditions it is hoped that my results and conclusions speak for themselves.

The extant evidence has determined the nature and chronological limitations of previous research in this as in any other field. The major works dealing with the North and the Borders generally concentrate on the sixteenth century or later, and pertain to problems of government and administration.<sup>1</sup> However, recent works, from short articles to lengthy theses, have covered new ground and their conclusions run counter to some traditional assumptions.<sup>2</sup> The study of late fifteenth century Anglo-Scottish relations has been dominated by Agnes Conway's detailed analysis of Henry VII's relations with Scotland and Ireland, published originally in 1932 from a London University M.A. thesis.<sup>3</sup> Though still useful, particularly as a guide to significant chronological errors in the Foedera and the Scots Rolls, this study is dated in some respects, and two features render additional study

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1. R. R. Reid, The King's Council in the North, (London, 1921) ; T. I. Rae, The Administration of the Scottish Frontier, 1513-1603, (Edinburgh, 1966) ; D. L. W. Tough, The Last Years of a Frontier, (Oxford, 1928) ; S. J. Watts, From Border to Middle Shire : Northumberland, 1586-1625, (Leicester, 1975) ; G. T. Lapsley, The County Palatine of Durham, (Cambridge, 1924) ; R. Somerville, History of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1265-1603, (London, 1953) ; see also the various local and county histories.
  2. eg. G. M. Fraser, The Steel Bonnets : the Story of the Anglo-Scottish Border Reivers, (London, 1974) ; M. James, Family, Lineage, and Civil Society : A Study of Society, Politics, and Mentality in the Durham Region, 1500-1640, (Oxford, 1974) ; Dietrich thesis ; Cardew thesis.
  3. Conway ; B.I.H.R., V, pp.39-43.

essential. For one thing, Miss Conway did not go beyond 1498, for reasons which are discussed in Chapter Three, and for another thing, I do not accept the assertions either that Henry VII's Scottish and Irish policies were co-ordinated at every step, or that their history is one and indivisible.<sup>1</sup> Two theses, completed in the United States in 1971 and 1983, span the subject of Anglo-Scottish relations in the period under consideration from the 1470's to 1513, and their arguments are discussed herein, but these studies do have limitations as I intend to demonstrate.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, since Dr. Bradley concentrated on the period from 1399 to 1485 and Dr. Coleman studied the subject between 1488 and 1513, they have neglected to stress the important themes of continuity between 1474 and 1503 in terms of Anglo-Scottish truces and matrimonial alliances. Beyond this the subject has attracted attention only in general studies of foreign policy, such as Wernham and Crowson, which concentrate on the Tudors, and which treat Anglo-Scottish relations as being of secondary importance.<sup>3</sup> General textbooks and relevant royal biographies fall into a similar trap for obvious reasons, though J. D. Mackie's 'The Earlier Tudors' is probably still the best thing in print on the subject in the much neglected later years of Henry VII's reign.<sup>4</sup> Surveys of Anglo-Scottish relations which cover long periods, such as those by Robert Rait or William Ferguson from the earliest times to 1707, tend to be superficial, and as Ferguson observed, surprisingly little work has been

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1. Conway, pp.xxix - xxxi. See below pp. 120-121.
  2. Bradley thesis ; Coleman thesis.
  3. P. S. Crowson, Tudor Foreign Policy, (London, 1973) ; R. B. Wernham, Before the Armada ; the Growth of English Foreign Policy 1485-1588, (London, 1966).
  4. J. D. Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, 1485-1558, (Oxford, 1952).

undertaken in this field in any case.'

In view of the importance of Anglo-Scottish relations as a theme in British history, it is clear that a new study of the subject is long overdue. Tradition, when tested against the extant source material, published and unpublished, is almost invariably found wanting. Among the published English record sources, the Scots Rolls are invaluable, and these may be supplemented by the Calendars of Patent and Close Rolls, the Rolls of Parliament, local record publications (such as the York civic records), and the Foedera for the diplomatic background. Published Scottish sources, though less extensive than the English, include the Exchequer Rolls, Lord High Treasurer's Accounts, the Acts of the Scottish Parliaments, and Joseph Bain's Calendar of Anglo-Scottish documents in the P.R.O. ; both of the latter works are particularly valuable. Printed chronicles and histories have been utilised where these are relevant, since they generally illustrate traditional and official interpretations of events; without doubt, the works of Polydore Vergil (which may have contained first-hand information from Richard Fox) and Edward Hall (which refers to now-lost manuscripts in discussing the events of August 1482), though later in date, are useful sources. In the main, however, early chronicles and histories are relatively poor sources for Anglo-Scottish relations since their authors were generally only interested in conflicts and important alliances, and they were not privy to the more interesting details of the diplomatic relationship. Again the Scottish chronicles and histories, being later in date for the most part, tend to be inferior to the English sources, but Major's ideas on Anglo-

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1. R. S. Rait, An Outline of the Relations between England and Scotland, 500-1707, (London, 1901) ; W. Ferguson, Scotland's Relations with England : A Survey to 1707, (Edinburgh, 1977).

Scottish union are of interest, and Pitscottie is valuable for his incorporation of local oral traditions which may otherwise have been lost. For the latter part of the period under consideration the published Calendars of Henry VIII's Letters and Papers, the State Papers of Henry VIII, and the Letters of James IV and James V, provide very detailed information, though, for reasons indicated later, the Scottish letters are not particularly valuable in the study of Anglo-Scottish relations. Finally, one ought not to ignore the Calendars of State Papers from the archives of Spain, Venice, and Milan, but these volumes are both dated and flawed, and one is unwise to place too much emphasis on otherwise unsubstantiated information. These sources offer tantalising glimpses of riches which may be uncovered at a future date were the calendaring and translation (in extenso) of the most interesting material undertaken anew; for practical considerations, however, this is unlikely.

The bulk of the manuscripts utilised are to be found in the extensive collections of the British Library and the Public Record Office, though some valuable material from the Scottish Record Office and the National Library of Scotland has been incorporated in appropriate places. Many of the English documents, have been calendared by Bain, but whenever possible I have endeavoured to consult the original manuscripts. In certain cases, such as Bishop Fox's instructions of 1497 or Thomas Wolsey's draft report of 1508, reference to the original manuscript is essential, while the French and Scottish diplomatic documents in the S.R.O. are only available in manuscript form. In addition to the diplomatic documents in the P.R.O., I have made considerable use of Chancery warrants for the Great Seal, and the collections of the Exchequer and State Paper Office; the financial records, particularly Henry VII's Chamber books of payments, are of great value as a supplement to the diplomatic materials. All of the large collections in the British

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1. For examples see below pp. 82-83, 118, 133-134.

Library have yielded interesting and valuable material, but for the study of Anglo-Scottish relations from 1471 to 1513, certain Cotton collection volumes, especially Caligula B.I., B.III, B.V, B.VI, and Vespasian C.XVI, are of vital significance.<sup>1A.</sup>

Any study which contributes to knowledge of the late-fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries - a neglected period in English and Scottish history - is of some intrinsic value. As Dr. Wormald has observed, Scottish history during this period has been perceived as either "fallow" or as "a bread and butter period between two layers of jam."<sup>1</sup> Her own researches have done much to alleviate this neglect, and recently Dr. Macdougall's biography of the ill-regarded James III has made a valuable contribution.<sup>2</sup> In English historical circles there is still a discernible tendency to dismiss the reign of Henry VII as a relatively insignificant relic of the Middle Ages or as a tedious introduction to the glories of the later Tudors. Neither interpretation is reasonable, and it is clear that this irrefutable neglect is the consequence of certain unfortunate circumstances. Sandwiched between, and completely overshadowed by, two colourful and controversial monarchs, Richard III and Henry VIII, both of whom have captured imaginations and headlines since their own times and are indelibly stamped on the public consciousness, Henry VII has also been ill-served by his biographers, and by the survival and publication of the evidence (which places unreasonable emphasis on the troubled first half of the reign, and on his later weaknesses rather than his enduring strengths). Beyond question, the reign has not yet emerged from the

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1A. See below pp. 41-42, 45-46, 56-57, 83, 123, 147, 150-151, 168-169, 256, for examples.

1. J. Wormald, Court, Kirk, and Community : Scotland, 1470-1625, (London, 1981), p.3.

2. N. Macdougall, James III : A Political Study, (Edinburgh, 1982).

mists in which it has been shrouded through a combination of Francis Bacon's powerfully persuasive fictions, and the interests and pre-occupations of the nineteenth and early twentieth century historians.<sup>1</sup>

Things have improved somewhat since William Nicolson wrote of the fifteenth century at the end of the seventeenth century that historians were unable "to form a regular History out of such a vast heap of rubbish and confusion", but the evidence does present problems.<sup>2</sup> For example, with reference to Anglo-Scottish relations, the source material is often propagandist in tone and content, but the chance survival of much larger quantities of English evidence also distorts the subject by overemphasizing England's role in the relationship. In these circumstances one can do no more than to recognise that such difficulties exist, and to try to provide some sense of balance and perspective. However, there can be little doubt that bias is not restricted to official Anglo-Scottish propaganda. George Buchanan, while writing his history of Scotland, talked in 1572 of the need "to purge it of sum Inglis lyis and Scottis vanite" ; he might also have mentioned English vanity and Scottish lies, but the general point is clear, and one can seek in vain for balance and impartiality even in more recent studies.<sup>3</sup> If the following contribution remedies this defect for even a short period in the long history of Anglo-Scottish relations it will have served some useful purpose.

1. Jo. Ba. remarked of Henry VII in the seventeenth century that "my Lord Virulaim [Bacon] hath washt his face so cleane with good language that with out aneare approach he is hardly discovered" ; MS. Sloane 2251, f.42, B.L.
2. cited by D. R. Cook, Lancastrians and Yorkists : The Wars of the Roses, (Harlow, 1984), p.77.
3. MS. Lansdowne 15, f.49 v, B.L. ; Ellis, Letters, III (3rd ser.), CCCCL, pp.373-375. John Lawson apologised for omitting Scottish history from his metrical chronicle in 1581 since he thought it best to "leue suche rotten matter" ; MS. Lansdowne 208, f.410, B.L.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION : THE "AULD-ENEMIES"

Until the reign of Edward I, Anglo-Scottish relations had been *periodically* *eventful*, but within a comparatively short time after the commencement of their Three Hundred Years' War, the belief that belligerence punctuated by occasional and short truces constituted the normal pattern of Anglo-Scottish relations, had become entrenched on both sides of the Border. Such ideas were acutely prevalent by the early sixteenth century, since more than two centuries of intermittent hostility and sporadic brutality had contributed to the acceptance of an established tradition of Anglo-Scottish antipathy which was somehow both explained and justified by its ostensibly inherent antiquity. Moreover, fifteenth and sixteenth century chroniclers attributed the origins of this antipathy to an historic and mythological past, and, as they were to discover, such an indeterminate chronology had manifold propaganda uses which went beyond the upholding of tradition.<sup>1</sup> Though France was perceived to be England's pre-eminent traditional enemy, Englishmen remembered a "very old and true" maxim:-

"If that you will France win,  
Then with Scotland first begin' ;  
For once the eagle England being in prey,  
To her unguarded nest the weasel Scot  
Comes sneaking, and so sucks her princely eggs ;  
Playing the mouse, in absence of the cat,  
To spoil and havoc more than she can eat."<sup>2</sup>

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1. see e.g. Chapter Two, section A.
  2. Shakespeare, King Henry V, Act I, Scene II.

Shakespeare's words stir passions, but pale before Edward IV's pragmatic assertion of 1481:-

"Where it ys soo that after long contynued warre and diuisyon bitwene this our Royalme of England and other Reaulmes and Countrees next therunto adiognant for the welthe and relief of the same our Reaulme It hath be in sondry wises practized by vs to haue a long and ferme peax with the said Reaulmes and Countres and namely with them of the Reaulme of Scotland whiche for nyghnesse of their marches to oures withoute see or grete Ryver haue be wont and myght of lyklyhod doo....greter annoyaunce to this our Royalme of England then eny wother...."

In view of the danger inherent in the frontier and the intention to cultivate peaceful relations, one might infer that there had been a reciprocal adjustment in Anglo-Scottish prejudices and antipathies, but, in practice, this could scarcely have been further from the truth.

In July 1498, two Spanish envoys in London reported to their sovereigns Ferdinand and Isabella that their ambassador Pedro de Ayala was "the only man who knows Scotland, all others looking on the Scotch only as their enemies, and flying into a passion as soon as the name of Scotland is pronounced".<sup>2</sup> Ayala observed, however, that Henry VII, "being more intelligent, and not a pure Englishman", did not share his subjects' jealousy and dislike of the Scots; an opinion supported by the King's

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1. MS. Harleian 78, f.3v, B.L. ; printed in The Coventry Leet Book, pt.II, ed. M. D. Harris, E.E.T.S., vol.135 (1st ser., 1908), pp.474-477.
  2. C.S.P. Spanish, I, p.161.



books of payments.<sup>1</sup> Skelton and Shakespeare provide well-known literary examples of the Scot being portrayed in a vitriolic light, and doubtless Edward Hall struck a chord when he observed that "an Ape, although she bee clothed in purple, will be but an ape, and a Scot neuer so gently entertained of an Englishe prince will be but a dissimulyng Scotte".<sup>2</sup> Yet while the English were loathe to waste words praising the Scots, they were quick to attribute anything positive to their own civilizing influences; James I's sojourn in England, for example, transformed his people "from wilde and beastly liuyng".<sup>3</sup> Most extant documents overflow with caustic comments. A relatively mild observation was that "the Scottes were naughtie people, and sought ever avauntage, whenne they might gett it", while Wolsey was once informed that the Scots would "never do good to England [while] the world standeth".<sup>4</sup> They were, in short, "that most perfidious, ingrateful, and barbarous nacion".<sup>5</sup> The Scots responded by declaring that their:-

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1. Ibid, p.176 ; For payments to Scots see, for example, MS. Additional 7099, ff.9, 66, 71-72, 92, 135, B.L. (printed in Excerpta Historica, pp.85-133); MS. Additional 59899, ff.8v, 19v, 38, 43v, 53v, 73v, 78, 87v, B.L.; MS. Additional 21480, f.15, B.L.; PRO E.101/414/6, ff.15v, 23-24, 25, 29v, 43, 45v, 46-48v, 58v, 64v, 75v, 81 ; PRO E.101/414/16, ff.10v, 19, 45, 61, 65v ; PRO E.101/415/3, ff.8v, 19, 30, 60v, 67, 77v, 79v, 81, 88 ; PRO E.36/214, ff.303-305, 308, 318, 321, 329. Henry VII was said to have been assisted by a Scot during his exile in Rouen ; see Major, p.393. See below pp. 82-83, 118, 133-134, for other examples.
  2. Hall, p.119 ; Grafton, I, p.553 ; Shakespeare, Macbeth ; and see John Skelton : The Complete English Poems, ed. J. Scattergood, (Harmondsworth, 1983), pp.113-121, 359-372.
  3. Grafton, I, pp.499, 554 ; Hall, pp.39, 120.
  4. S.P. H.VIII, I, CCXLVII, p.852 ; L. & P. H.VIII, iii, pt.I, 1206, pp.453-454.
  5. S.P. H.VIII, X, MCXXXVII, p.394.

"ald Ennemys cummyn of Saxonys blud,  
That neuyr zeit to Scotland wald do gud."

Blind Hary might well praise the Percies and Northumbrians for their warlike abilities, but he also denounced the English as "unsouerable" and "evir fals" ; duplicity and treachery were probably the commonest subjects of mutual recrimination.<sup>2</sup> In the mid-sixteenth century Robert Wedderburn described the English as Scotland's "mortal ald enemeis", "dissaitful volfis", and "ingrat tirrorans", while he perceived that there were not "tua nations vndir the firmament....mair contrar and different" though they shared one island and one language.<sup>3</sup> The Scots and English, Wedderburn concluded, could never "remane in concord vndir ane monarche or ane prince be cause there naturis and conditions ar as indefferent as is the nature of scheid and voluis".<sup>4</sup>

Although the continental image of Britain was often low up to the fifteenth century - grim, perfidious Albion and all that - foreign travelers from that period onwards were generally impressed with what they saw there as traditional horizons widened under the ethos of the Renaissance. In the early fifteenth century, Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini had painted a grim canvas of Scotland in which the inhabitants were poor, backward, immoral, unsophisticated, and warlike. Nothing pleased the Scots more "than abuse of the English", and doubtless he concurred with

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1. Hary's Wallace, I, p.1.
  2. Ibid, pp.10, 43, 112, 155, 231, xiv - xxvi ; M. P. McDiarmid, 'The Date of the Wallace', S.H.R., XXXIV (1955), pp.26-31 ; The Historical Collections of a Citizen of London, ed. J. Gairdner, C.S., XVII (1876), p.224.
  3. Complaynt of Scotland, S.T.S. ed., pp.1-2, 71-72, 83-84 ; E.E.T.S., ed. pp.1-2, 91, 106-107.
  4. Ibid, S.T.S., ed. pp.83-84 ; E.E.T.S., ed., pp.106-107.

the later remarks of the Englishman Sir Anthony Weldon that Scotland's air "might be wholesome but for the stinking people that inhabit it ; the ground might be fruitful had they wit to manure it".<sup>1</sup> Subsequent visitors in the wake of Piccolomini presented much more favourable accounts, as evinced by Ayala's report of July 1498.<sup>2</sup> Though Scotland continued to be overshadowed by her wealthy and fertile neighbour, foreigners generally preferred the Scottish people to the English. The Scots were much handsomer, "vain and ostentatious by nature", "extremely partial to foreigners, and very hospitable".<sup>3</sup> The English, on the other hand, displayed a virtually indiscriminating antipathy towards foreigners, and were xenophobic in the extreme.<sup>4</sup> Most observers appreciated that the English and Scots were "natural enemies", while the evidence cited below reveals that their antipathy was not confined to verbal and abstract forms of animosity.<sup>5</sup>

The evidence is much more meagre for Anglo-Scottish relations prior to the reign of Henry VIII and there is also a preponderance of material in favour of England, but clearly in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries many Scots flocked to England like so many Dick Whittingtons in search of streets paved with gold. The legislative and restrictive practices of English monarchs and of medieval towns and guilds regarding aliens are too well known to merit detailed comment herein, but

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1. Early Travellers, pp.24-29, 96-103, esp.27, 97.
  2. C.S.P. Spanish, I, pp.168-179, and Early Travellers, pp.39-49. Ayala's observations were also reflected in Andrea Trevisan's report ; see Early Travellers, pp.50-54, and Italian Relation. Other foreign reports are listed in the bibliography.
  3. Early Travellers, pp.44, 51-52 ; Italian Relation, pp.14-16 ; C.S.P. Spanish, I, p.172.
  4. Italian Relation, pp.20-22 ; Major, p.27.
  5. Early Travellers, pp.51-52 ; Italian Relation, pp.14-16.

discrimination against the Scots is of particular interest for this study.

The York city records undoubtedly yield the most interesting material concerning Scots. By the ordinances of 1419 no Scot or other alien might hold official rank within the City, enter any place where city business could be heard, hold meetings, sit on assizes, hold office, or serve on juries.<sup>1</sup> In view of northern fears of Scottish espionage, raids, and piracy, such restrictions are understandable, but in fact these were not conditioned by prevailing political circumstances, and the civic authorities rarely relaxed their vigilance even in peacetime.<sup>1A.</sup> In February 1501, for example, it was determined that every city ward should maintain stocks and "certan fethers" for the punishment of beggars, vagabonds, and misdoers, "and also a hamer at every barre to thentent that (no) Scotts person take upon theym to entre and come within this Citie bot to knoke first on the barre thei come to" and await the licence of the Mayor, warden, or constable, on pain of imprisonment.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, citizens who fraternized with the auld enemy received short shrift; in 1472 Robert Brown was instructed to "lefe that reule in payne of xl d." for associating with Scots and "othir suspect peple".<sup>3</sup> Guild regulations forbade members to employ aliens as servants or apprentices, and only Englishmen could become masters of their craft, while the 1475 Glovers' ordinances specifically discriminated against the Scots; any master employing a Scot was to forfeit 6s.8d.<sup>4</sup> Had more material survived one could doubtless have learned a great deal about this aspect of Anglo-

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1. York Memorandum Book pt.II (1388-1493), ed. M. Sellers, S.S., LXXV (1915) pp.xiii, 86. 1A. see below pp 95, 98-99, for the drain on the City created by a war with Scotland.
  2. Y.C.R., II, pp.165-166 ; Y.C.R.,I, p.18 n.l.
  3. English Miscellanies, p.25.
  4. York Memorandum Book, B/Y, ed. J. W. Percy, S.S., CLXXXVI (1973), pp.160, 179-180, 182 ; Y.C.R., III, pp.177, 180, 182.

Scottish relations, but clearly such discrimination was commonplace in northern England.' The Baker's guild of Beverley, for example, stipulated that only Scotsmen possessing the essential "cartam" (presumably letters of denization) could be taken into service, while as late as 1696 no shipwright of Newcastle could enter Scottish apprentices in the Company book or admit such apprentices to the freedom of the Company.<sup>2</sup> This evidence may be qualified by observing that the Newcastle Merchant Adventurers also refused to accept English born apprentices from Tynedale and Redesdale, "or anye other suche lycke places", from 1554 to 1676, because they were known "either by educatyon or nature, not to be of honest conversatyon".<sup>3</sup> Scots and borderers were evidently on a par with bastards, and were perceived in 1637 to constitute a potentially serious danger to the security of Newcastle.<sup>4</sup>

The implication of such discriminatory practices beyond their obvious value as testimony of Anglo-Scottish antipathy is that large groups of Scots found their way into England for a wide variety of reasons. Traders, pilgrims, and reivers were generally temporary

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1. Cardew thesis, p.197, for some examples. For Carlisle see page 19 note 3.
  2. H.M.C., Beverley MSS, 54 (1900), p.88 ; The Records of the Company of Shipwrights of Newcastle Upon Tyne, 1622-1967, ed. D. J. Rowe, S.S., CLXXXI, (1970, 1971, 2 vols.) ; vol.I, p.27, vol.II, pp.250, 254-255, 261, 266. The appearance of 6 Scottish apprentices from 1709-1771 suggests that the ordinance of 1696 was either short-lived or not strictly adhered to.
  3. Extracts From the Records of the Merchant Adventurers of Newcastle Upon Tyne, vol.I, ed. J. R. Boyle and F. W. Dendy, S.S., XCIII (1895), pp.27-29.
  4. Ibid ; Extracts From the Records of the Company of Hostmen of Newcastle Upon Tyne, ed. F. W. Dendy, S.S., CV (1901), p.78 n.

visitors, but the most interesting groups were those who lived and worked among their "auld" enemies. Analysis of the 145 Scots-born denizens enrolled on the Patent Rolls from the early 1470's to 1509 reveals that over ninety per cent were created by Edward IV from 1480-1482.<sup>1</sup> Evidently these Scots were made denizens during this Anglo-Scottish conflict to permit them to retain their property and to remain in England. Few grants provide extensive details, such as the recipient's birth-place in Scotland, but a small sample suggests that they came from a wide geographical area.<sup>2</sup> Less than 50 examples list the recipient's profession, but analysis uncovers a butcher, baker, miller, smith, labourer, husbandman, two brewers, and approximately forty clerics. There was evidently a strong bias in favour of settlement in or close to London, though why this was the case, apart from rather obvious suggestions such as the economic benefits of this region or settlement of other Scots, is difficult to assess.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, the evidence is much too slight to constitute the basis of any settlement patterns, and these statistics ought to be used with caution. Some Scots doubtless received letters of denization locally or became citizens of towns, while many others probably merged into the fabric of local society without ever revealing their Scottish origins.<sup>4</sup> Clearly too, some letters Patent were never

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1. Bain, 1399, 1462, 1465, 1468, 1471, 1473, 1498, 1500, 1509, 1511-12, 1523, 1541, 1572, 1573, 1582, 1583, 1623, 1625, 1629, 1630, 1631, 1645, 1646, 1667, 1731 ; C.P.R., 1476-1485, pp.141, 154, 175-342, 507 ; C.P.R., 1485-1494, pp.127, 376, 381 ; C.P.R., 1494-1509, pp.74, 110, 116, 136, 364.
  2. e.g. Aberdeen, St. Andrews, Berwick, Montrose, Edinburgh.
  3. e.g. London (33), Kent (15), Essex (8), Middlesex (6), Norfolk (6), Sussex (3) from a sample of c.95.
  4. York Memorandum Book pt.II (1388-1493), ed. M. Sellers, S.S., CXXV (1915), pp.33-34, 113-123, 182, 199-200, 217, 266-267, 274, 290-291, 298, for northern examples.

enrolled and the Patent Rolls do not provide any accurate indication of the number of Scotsmen in England at any time.

Very few of the Anglo-Scots of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century emerge from their relative obscurity to permit one to glimpse their lifestyle, but there are exceptions. Richard Nesbit, for example, was a priest who "lede a pouere liffe" in England for 14 years "geting his sustenance oonly by the teching of pouere childerne and scolars at scole", while a mariner named John Graunt informed Henry VII in 1498 that he had lived in England for 33 years "and hath had the principal rule of the best shippes bilonging to Bristowe".<sup>1</sup> Clearly some Scots remained in England for many years without acquiring letters of denization, and these were presumably protected by their anonymity or by their service to the Crown, as evinced by Nesbit and Graunt. Others may have held special royal licences, such as the Earl of Douglas' niece Margaret, and this was probably the case with noble Scottish exiles; such individuals do not appear to have sought denization since they generally aspired to reclaim their Scottish inheritances.<sup>2</sup> The letter of denization was particularly valuable during Anglo-Scottish conflicts since Scots in England were likely to be imprisoned, expelled from the realm, and have their property confiscated, as evinced by examples in 1480-1481 and 1513.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Bain, 1583 (PRO C.82/93), 1645, 1646 ; C.P.R., 1485-1494, p.381 ; C.P.R., 1494-1509, p.136 ; see Chapter Three, section B for Lady Catherine Gordon.
  2. PRO C.81/905/961 ; Bain, 1511, 1512 ; C.P.R., 1476-1485, p.540. For Scottish exiles see Chapter Two, section F.
  3. e.g. PRO IND.1/7040 (Bain, 1467) ; PRO SP.1/5, ff.21-22, and SP.1/7, ff.22-24, (L. & P. H.VIII, I, 2207, 2467) ; L. & P. H.VIII, iii (I), 45.

English monarchs were periodically troubled by the large numbers of Scots in their realm, especially when they destroyed property or disturbed their own subjects, and the royal response generally involved the appointment of commissioners to arrest offenders, as in 1477, or a proclamation ordering their expulsion, as in 1490.<sup>1</sup> Only householders or menial servants who were "of good name and disposition" and had sworn an oath of allegiance to the King (all denizens had sworn fealty) might be permitted to remain.<sup>2</sup> The statute of 1491, which gave Scots who were not denizens 40 days to leave the realm, is of interest in terms of the enforcement of an expulsion order.<sup>3</sup> This reveals that it was the responsibility of local constables to arrest Scots, seize their goods "to the Kinges use", and to convey them from Hundred to Hundred to the Scottish border, on pain of 20s. fine.<sup>4</sup> The Scots were to be conveyed north "in like maner and fourme as abjured men for felony be used to be conveyed frome the Seyntwarie wherin they abjure" and they were additionally to wear white crosses on their "vttermost garment".<sup>5</sup> What such documents fail to explain was how exactly the Scots returned to their own country could be persuaded to remain there. Evidently some returned to their birthplace or became vagrants in Scotland, while some undoubtedly recrossed the Border into England, and a few sought relief at the Scottish court; Cuthbert Colevile, a man born in England but exiled as a

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1. C.P.R., 1476-1485, p.50 (For evidence of a commission to the Earl of Northumberland in 1471 see York Memorandum Book pt.II, pp.182, 199-200); T.R.P., I, 22, p.23 ; C.P.R., 1485-1494, p.322.
  2. T.R.P., I, 22, p.23.
  3. Stat. Realm, II, 7, Henry VII, p.553.
  4. Lords of franchises were permitted "suche right and interesse as they have in any suche godes and cattalles."
  5. Ibid., p.553 ; Grafton, II, p.331 (for their clothing).



Scot because of his parentage, fell into this latter category and received £10 worth of land from James III in 1465 having become the King's "liege man".<sup>1</sup> The majority probably returned to familiar surroundings in Scotland or in England. Regardless of the efforts of Marcher officials there was no real means of frontier control which might stop the Scots from returning to England, and English raids, which caused economic devastation of the Scottish borders, probably only increased the number of Scots heading south. As Wolsey observed in 1523, after an English raid, starving Scots could not be kept out of England, either by imprisonment, cutting off their ears, or by branding their faces; stirring testimony indeed of both the economic plight of the Scottish borderers and of the brutality which often characterized Anglo-Scottish disputes.<sup>2</sup>

While denizens were permitted to retain their property whenever aliens (generally French and Scots) were expelled from the realm, there is some evidence that non denizens married to English women were allowed to retain half of their goods for the use of their families.<sup>3</sup> This confiscation of property was normal during conflicts, as evinced by the appointment of commissioners in August 1513 to seize the property of all Scots except ecclesiastics.<sup>4</sup> John Cryspe, commissioner for Kent, rendered account that November for 32s.9d., the value of a piece of canvas belonging to James Mekenes a Scottish inhabitant of Canterbury.<sup>5</sup> None of the Scot's other possessions had been found, and probably shrewd individuals sought to avoid surrendering their property by recourse to sharp

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1. E.R., VII, pp.320-321, 403, 629.

2. S.P. H.VIII, VI, LXI, p.173.

3. PRO SP.I/5, ff.21-22, (L. & P. H.VIII, I, 2207) ; Grafton, II, p.327.

4. L. & P. H.VIII, I, 2222 (16).

5. PRO B.101/518/1, (L. & P. H.VIII, I, 2438). See also PRO SP.I/7, ff.22-24, (L. & P. H.VIII, I, 2467).

practices. Nonetheless, since payment was customary for grants and confirmations of denization the Crown appears to have derived some financial benefit in either circumstance.

Letters of denization were evidently not retroactive and were granted for various periods; occasionally they even extended to the recipient's heirs.<sup>1</sup> The recipient was generally expected to behave well and to pay the tax known as "lot and scot", but the sums paid for grants and confirmations varied, probably because the King could grant exemptions from some of the traditional payments.<sup>2</sup> It is clear that the costs were considerably less during peacetime, when far fewer letters of denization were issued, while during periods of tension monarchs evidently sought to extort money from anxious Scots. Henry VII's instructions to his commissioners in 1497 are therefore of particular interest. The document declared that, notwithstanding a royal proclamation, "fewe or noone" Scots had left the realm and thus Henry instructed his commissioners to check the letters patent of all denizens, to seek out all Scots who were not denizens, to licence Scots wishing to become denizens, and to make "yndelaide restitucions" to Scottish denizens wrongly ransomed and "attachid" by the King's over-zealous subjects.<sup>3</sup> As the King declared, the authority to grant licences to Scots lay "oonly in the Kyngis powar and pre-emyence", and thus any profits should be utilised to relieve the

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1. For background see A. Beardwood, 'Mercantile Antecedents of the English Naturalization Laws', pp.64-76, Medievalia et Humanistica, XVI (1964), esp. p.73. For a grant including the heirs see PRO C.81/1520/13, (Bain, 1468).
  2. Beardwood article, pp.73-74. For a grant in 1492 see C.P.R., 1485-1494, p.381. Payments include 10s. and half a mark for confirmations, and 30s., 6s.8d., £7 8s.8d. for original letters patent ; Bain, 1541, 1523 (PRO C.82/12), 1625 ; C.P.R., 1485-1494, pp.127, 191, 381 ; C.P.R., 1494-1509, pp.74, 136, 364.
  3. PRO C.82/164, (Bain, 1634). The MS is blackened and badly crumpled in parts.

costs of "his roiall viage to Scottlond".

Those Scots without licences who desired to remain in England were to pay "the moyte" of their movable possessions in addition to the sum of one year's income, on pain of imprisonment and the forfeiture of all goods. Those who compounded for payment and who took the oath of fealty were then to receive a certificate permitting them to reside in England for life. A note however reveals that up to 1st July no Letters Patent or writs had emanated under this warrant.<sup>1</sup> The document is of considerable interest, not only on account of its reference to a now lost proclamation, but also because of the light thrown on contemporary English attitudes to the Scots and on the financial exactions of Henry VII. Furthermore, the King's reference therein to the anti-Scottish activities of his subjects introduces an aspect of Anglo-Scottish relations into the discussion which has never received adequate consideration.

Evidently some Englishmen in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries habitually sought to expose and exploit any individuals whom they believed to be Scots, despite the fact that many so accused were not Scottish at all. Contemporary anti-Scottish prejudices and an intensely local outlook undoubtedly helped to create a climate ripe for exploitation; a climate in which anyone with a different regional accent - especially a northern one - was vulnerable and might at any time be "wrongfully nosed and slaundersed as for a Scottes man born, and also unrightwisly vexit and turbilled....to grete hyndrance and scathe, als well in body as in gudez".<sup>2</sup> That this was also a manifestation of anti-

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1. Ibid. The memoranda concerning the "fynes of the Scottes" are left blank in PRO E.101/414/16, f.128v ; PRO E.101/414/6, f.127 ; PRO E.101/415/3, f.277 ; MS Additional 21480, f.165v, B.L.
  2. English Miscellanies, p.37.

northern prejudice is self-evident, but much is also explained by the fact that Scots who lived in England were understandably reluctant to admit to their origins and often claimed that they had been born in another part of their adopted realm.<sup>1</sup>

The accusation of Scottish birth carried not only the obvious dangers of imprisonment, expulsion, and loss of goods, but it had also come to be regarded as a term of defamation and as one of the gravest of calculated insults; merely to describe someone as a "Scot" was to attribute to them a multitude of unsavoury and barbarous characteristics. There can be no doubt that the expression constituted a popular term of abuse, especially in northern England, and cases of defamation involving accusations of Scottish birth and phrases such as "Skott's hore" and "mongreill Scott" are known to have come before ecclesiastical authorities in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.<sup>2</sup> Prevailing attitudes are understandable in view of the tendency of some contemporaries to regard Anglo-Scottish antipathy as historic and endemic, an interpretation manifest in the phrase the "auld enemies". Material of this nature may well appear to be insignificant, trite, and even amusing in the late twentieth century, but this was not the case at the time.

In July, 1461, Margaret Paston described how a certain Will Lynys "and swyche other as he is with hym, goo fast abowght in the contr, and ber men a hand, prests and others, they be Skotts, and take brybys of hem and let hem goo ageyn".<sup>3</sup> The "parson of Freton" had been so accused but

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1. Complaynt of Scotland, S.T.S. ed. p.82, E.E.T.S. ed. p.104.
  2. Depositions and other Ecclesiastical Proceedings from the Courts of Durham, ed. J. Raine, S.S., XXI (1845), pp.73-76, 89, 91, 253, 305-307; Acts of Chapter of the Collegiate Church of SS. Peter and Wilfrid, Ripon, 1452-1506, ed. J. T. Fowler, S.S., LXIV (1875), p.55.
  3. Paston Letters, II, 1461-1471, no.403, pp.29-30.

fortunately he had been rescued by Margaret's "cosyn, Jarnyngham the younger". Many others were not so lucky and suffered prolonged distress, imprisonment, punishment, and financial exactions. James Wilson of Scarborough, for example, was unfortunate enough to be taken as a Scot in 1496 when James IV was actively supporting Perkin Warbeck, and thus he was placed in the stocks until a declaration in June that he had in fact been born at Bishop Auckland.'

In 1490 (or later) Thomas Howard, Earl of Surrey wrote to Sir John Paston urging him to be "gode maistir" to Thomas Hartforde, a Norwich bower, "noysed in Norffolk for a Scoteman borne".<sup>2</sup> The Earl revealed that Hartforde had actually been born in York, where his father and godparents were still resident, and the Mayor and City council had evidently "made grete instaunce" to him to write and clarify matters. The potential gravity of the accusation is well illustrated herein by the forces of patronage manifest in the Earl's intervention and by the emphasis placed on the certification of traditional family connections with a particular locality. When certification or the intervention of local notables had failed to produce any positive results it was evidently essential to seek justice through the legal system. Alexander Richardson, for example, a Northumbrian born carpenter living in London, had been "arrestid....for a Scot" and bound for five marks.<sup>3</sup> Despite certification of his birth from the Earl of Northumberland, the Abbot of Alnwick, and Sir Henry Percy, among others, Richardson ultimately had to appeal to the Archbishop of York, as Chancellor of England, to call the case before him by "corpus cum causa", and to make a ruling as conscience required.

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1. The Register of Richard Fox Lord Bishop of Durham, 1494-1501, ed. M. P. Howden, S.S., CXLVII (1932), p.29.
  2. Paston Letters, III, 1471-1509, no.920, pp.365-366.
  3. PRO. C.1/61/347.

That the slander clung tenaciously to the accused is manifest in a dispute considered by the King's council on 2nd May 1482. A certain Richard Pierson had been taken and imprisoned as a Scot despite his denials, and this "matier longe hath hanged in the Kinges Counsaill vndecided". Having carefully considered the evidence, the councillors agreed that Pierson had been born in Newcastle, and thus the case "was putte to perpetuell silence of further besynes sute or vexacion".<sup>1</sup>

Between 1476 and 1506 the York records yield at least nineteen cases of the certification of birth for individuals taken as Scots.<sup>2</sup> All of those accused were northerners and certification of their English birth was provided by anything from two to in excess of twenty-five witnesses; these were either important local figures or obscure individuals who had known the accused from childhood. The intention behind such certification of birth was that the accused might thenceforth be recognised as an Englishman, and that others would no longer give "credennce to suche defame and detraction in hurtyng the same person in his good name and goodes...."<sup>3</sup> The witnesses occasionally commented on the "veray malesse" of the accusers, or attributed the slander to "the childern of wekydnes" ; in the case of John Malson in 1482 they were more explicit, "for as much as evill disposed people and childern of wekidnesse, thugh malice and envy, by the temptacion of an evill sperit, falslie and untrewlie hath noysed and slaunderd a trewe Inglissheman".<sup>4</sup>

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1. PRO E.28/92 A ; photocopy in SRO RH.2/4/555 (188) ; printed in Select Cases Before the King's Council, 1243-1482, ed. I. S. Leadam and J. F. Baldwin, Selden Soc., XXXV (1918), pp.117-118.
  2. English Miscellanies, pp.35-52 ; Y.C.R., I, pp.17-18, 24, 169, 175-176 ; Y.C.R., II, p.168 ; York Records, pp.298-299, 300-304 ; York Memorandum Book pt.II, pp.199-200, 217, 238-239, 247-248, 266-267, 275, 277.
  3. English Miscellanies, p.52.
  4. Ibid., pp.35-36, 40.

That those accused were not necessarily obscure figures is evinced by the case of John Harrington, clerk of York council, in 1486.<sup>1</sup> Harrington's certification was provided by Sir John Aske, Sir Robert Harrington, and Sir John Conyers, but a York baker, Andrew Lambe, produced even more impressive "recordes of auctoritie" in 1485, including letters from the Abbot of Alnwick, and the Earl of Northumberland.<sup>2</sup> The Earl, as Warden of the Marches, instructed the King's subjects that Andrew was:-

"to have and reiose his fre libertie according onto our said souverain lorde's lawes, as ye woll eschewe the punycion than may ensue unto you....for the contrary doing and os ye woll that I doo for you if thing require."<sup>3</sup>

The obvious danger of relying on documentary evidence to establish the birthplace of the accused was that forged evidence might be used against Englishmen; for example, in November 1484, Alexander Ambler had been accused before the York council by means of a "forget testimonyall" and the case had dragged on until early March 1485.<sup>4</sup> However, the importance of certification also explains why such documents have survived in official records such as the York House Books and Bishop

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1. Ibid., pp.46-48 ; York Records, pp.298-304 ; Y.C.R., I, pp.169, 171, 175-176.
  2. English Miscellanies, pp.43-46. Lambe had first been accused in 1471 ; see York Memorandum Book pt.II, pp.199-200. This illustrates how Scots were arrested in the Marches.
  3. English Miscellanies, p.44.
  4. Ibid., pp.41-43 ; Y.C.R., I, pp.113-114. In at least three known cases certification was made twice and clearly the slander had stuck to Lambe, John Rychardson, and Robert Elwald ; see English Miscellanies, pp.35, 37-38, 48-49 ; York Memorandum Book pt.II, pp.238-239.

Fox's register.<sup>1</sup> One case which came before Beverley council in March 1522 reveals that a certain Perceval Robson was loathe to forgive the man who had denounced his son as a Scot, and, in the end, he agreed to remit the matter only upon the express condition that proof of his English birth was formally registered in the town leger.<sup>2</sup> Another Robson of the mid-Tudor period was actually only a fictional character, but he also illustrates English attitudes. This Robson when told that he sounded like a Scot angrily retorted that he had fought the auld enemy in his youth and "had better bee hanged in a withie or in a cowtaile, then be a rowfooted Scot, for thei are euer fare and fase".<sup>3</sup> To what extent was this a typical northern response to the perfidious Scots, and to what degree can one distinguish between northern and southern attitudes?

Evidently there was no love lost between the Scots and some English northerners, but I would suggest that one ought to perceive more in Anglo-Scottish attitudes than an antipathy and contempt engendered by familiarity and geographical proximity. Any study based merely on a distinction between northern and southern attitudes will inevitably fail to refute the charge of superficiality. The attitudes manifest in York in 1501 or in Cornwall in 1497 cannot reasonably be regarded as typical of English attitudes north and south of the Trent since these varied between

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1. PRO. C.81/837/3383, (Bain, 1400) is a warrant to the chancellor, in 1471, to certify the English birth of the sons of one of the soldiers from Roxburgh castle. For other accusations of Scottish birth see PRO. SC.1/46, no.280, printed by C. L. Kingsford in the Camden Miscellany vol.XIII, C.S. (3rd. ser. vol.XXXIV, 1924), 355, p.17 ; Registrum Annalium Collegii Mertonensis, 1483-1521, ed. H. E. Salter, (Oxford, 1923), pp.216-217 ; Ancient Petitions Relating to Northumberland, ed. C. M. Fraser, S.S., CLXXVI (1966), pp.68-69. See also Sanctuarium Dunelmense et Sanctuarium Beverlacense, ed. J. Raine, S.S., V., (1837), pp.19, 37-38.
  2. H.M.C. Beverley MSS., 54 (1900), pp.55-56.
  3. A Dialogue Against the Fever Pestilence by William Bullein, ed. M. W. and A. H. Bullen, E.E.T.S., LII (extra ser., 1888), p.6.



social groups and according to the prevailing circumstances at any time.<sup>1</sup>

The example of Newcastle cited earlier demonstrates that even English northerners were susceptible to local attitudes and perspectives in fearing not only the Scots but also the lawless inhabitants of Tynedale and Redesdale.<sup>2</sup> In Carlisle, discrimination against Scots by custom, practice, and legislation had resulted in the situation whereby no Scot might remain there without the permission of the Mayor, nor could he walk there at night, sell merchandise, or learn or practise any trade within the town.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, the Carlisle authorities classified as being Scottish anyone living to the north of Blackford and Irthing about 4 miles away, and this reveals that even local horizons profoundly influenced attitudes.<sup>4</sup> Co-operation between Anglo-Scottish reivers (particularly between surname groupings) suggests that borderers distinguished their neighbouring allies from neighbouring enemies, and it is clear that all borderers were regarded with fear and suspicion by their fellow countrymen.<sup>5</sup> In September 1513, for example, in the aftermath of Flodden, Thomas Ruthall, Bishop of Durham informed Wolsey that most English soldiers "had lever dye then to cumme thedyr agayn" since they

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1. Y.C.R., II, pp.167-169. According to Vergil, pp.91-97, the Cornish rebelled against paying taxation for "such a small expedition against the Scots". The rebels evidently felt that because the North received tax concessions, northerners were obliged to provide Border defence.
  2. see page 7 notes 3 and 4.
  3. The Royal Charters of the City of Carlisle, ed. R. S. Ferguson, C.W.A.A.S., vol.X (extra ser., 1894), pp.297-298 ; Some Municipal Records of the City of Carlisle, ed. R. S. Ferguson and W. Nanson, C.W.A.A.S., IV (1887), pp.68, 94-95, 101, 112, 135, 148, 174, 184, 214, 269, 273, 274 (sixteenth to nineteenth century material).
  4. Carlisle Municipal Records, ed. Ferguson and Nanson, pp.66, 184, 274.
  5. For the borderers see Cardew thesis, passim.

"dare not trust the borderers, whiche be falser than Scottes, and have doon mor harme at this tyme to our folkes than the Scottes dyd".<sup>1</sup> The borderers had plundered from both sides during the battle and had delivered English prisoners to the Scots, so that, as Ruthall concluded, the English "feare the falshed of thaym" as much "as thay do the Scottes". Many of the English chronicles and histories of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were written from the viewpoint of London and southern England, and generally these works were interested in the Scots only as protagonists in warfare or occasionally as partners in short truces. The Mayor of Bristowe's chronicle does not mention Scotland at all, while the Croyland chronicler made few references to the Scots and saved his invective for English northerners.<sup>2</sup> Most chroniclers do, however, display anti-Scottish attitudes, and one cannot reasonably utilise this evidence to argue that northern and southern Englishmen viewed the Scots in a different light. Perhaps inevitably when one is considering such abstract concepts as attitudes, in order to make the exposition intelligible, one is forced to simplify complex feelings and ideas which may have developed over long periods of time, but clearly Anglo-Scottish antipathy was neither homogeneous in its origin, tone, or content. One cannot, for example, ignore socio-economic factors. Towns and ports which benefitted from Scottish trade might well remain hostile and impose unilateral restrictive practices but were unlikely to share the attitudes of border inhabitants in almost daily danger of Scottish attacks. Additionally, the lower social orders were unlikely to share the attitudes of social elites, since chivalric and cultural perceptions doubtless

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1. Facs. Nat. MSS., vol.2, doc.V, pp.7-8 ; SP.I/5, ff.41-42v ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 2283.
  2. The Maire of Bristowe's Kalendar by Robert Ricart, ed. L. T. Smith, C.S., V (2nd ser., 1872) ; Croyland Chronicle.

brought some degree of affinity between the nobility on both sides of the border. Attitudes also changed depending on the political circumstances, since raids and royal propaganda during periods of conflict clearly helped to fan reciprocal hostility. However, even during periods of Anglo-Scottish peace, traditional enmities were rarely completely dormant; in 1501, for example, a certificate of English birth may be found in one of the York House books sandwiched, somewhat ironically, between documents referring to the friendly reception being planned for the Scottish "ambassadors".<sup>1</sup> Without doubt, history, literature, propaganda, social background, practical knowledge and experience, economic and political circumstances, and the quirks of human behaviour, are just some of the aspects which ought to be considered, in addition to geography, when dealing with the origins and explanations for abstractions. Attitudes and prejudices may, nonetheless, appear deceptively simplistic when history and literature, themselves the products of collective perceptions of the past, in turn create, shape, and reinforce traditions and stereotypes, causing groups and individuals to behave accordingly rather than to question the ideological foundations on which their assumptions were originally based.

How can one reconcile the Anglo-Scottish rapprochement which characterized the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries with prevailing antipathies? Authorities have traditionally argued that Anglo-Scottish peace was unpopular with the majority of contemporaries; the implicit denunciation of James III's Anglophile policy by the Scottish Parliament in 1488 has been cited in support of this assertion.<sup>2</sup> In reality, however, popular opinion was insufficient to deter James III,

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1. Y.C.R., II, pp.167-169.

2. A.P.S., II, p.201 ; Conway, pp.16-23.

James IV, Edward IV, Richard III, and Henry VII from the pursuit of their dynastic designs; James IV, for example, though supported by an anglo-phobe faction, actually concluded a truce with England within a few months of his usurpation.<sup>1</sup> These monarchs may have occasionally paid lip-service to popular inclinations. James III was said to have made a secret agreement with the English to renew their truces every seven years, since he stated that "his counsellors and his people were not fond of the English and neither desired nor deemed it practicable that peace with them should last for long".<sup>2</sup>

Interestingly, and perhaps surprisingly, there is little evidence that monarchs sought to publicly sell Anglo-Scottish rapprochement or to mould public opinion accordingly by means of propaganda. Contrariwise, monarchs did not scruple to channel the unpopularity of Anglo-Scottish peace, and utilise established antipathies to their own ends, if and when it suited them to do so; this is evinced by the careful manipulation of popular antipathies to raise money and armies during the conflicts of 1480-1483, 1496-1497, and 1513.<sup>3</sup> Even that most peacefully inclined of monarchs, Henry VII, showed considerable skill in the manipulation of anti-Scottish prejudices through proclamations, loan requests, and appeals to Parliament. Anglo-Scottish monarchs aspired to conclude a matrimonial alliance long before there had been any reciprocal adjustment in the attitudes of their subjects.<sup>4</sup> But the subsequent course of sixteenth

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1. see Chapter Four.
  2. Vergil, p.29. There were far fewer Englishmen in Scotland than there were Scots in England but anglophobia clearly conditioned Scottish attitudes ; e.g. A.D.C.,I, pp.11, 17, 124 ; A.D.C.,II, pp.68-69, 240-241 ; A.D.A., pp.72, 112.
  3. see Chapter Three.
  4. see Chapters Four and Five.

century Anglo-Scottish relations revealed that significant changes in popular opinion constituted the essential pre-requisite of political change.

The proliferation and manipulation of propaganda, generally by means of genealogy and prophecy, demonstrates that later medieval monarchs did sometimes attempt to influence the opinions of social elites, though their intentions in so doing were almost overwhelmingly dynastic. Prophecy, for example, was utilised to meet the requirements of particular situations in Anglo-Scottish relations. An alliance of Scots and Britons and their subsequent massacre of the English constituted a popular theme of medieval prophecy, and for obvious reasons these lines were omitted when such prophecies were appropriated by the Yorkists.<sup>1</sup> In view of Edward IV's insecurity in the 1460's, and Scottish support for the Lancastrians, it is not surprising that the English monarch desired peace with James III. The readeption crisis of 1470-1471 merely confirmed Edward's insecurity, and therefore, from the early 1470's, Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliances were anticipated. It is highly significant that Edward IV, Richard III, <sup>and</sup> Henry VII, were all effectively usurpers whose actions were restrained by the need to establish themselves in power; only James<sup>IV</sup>, who succeeded his father, did not have to pursue a wholeheartedly dynastic policy.<sup>1A</sup> Pacification was an essential part of the price for domestic security, and probably only Henry VII pursued a peaceful policy by natural inclination. However, though unstable and unpopular governments have been known to distract the populace from domestic ills by the pursuit of warfare against traditional enemies, I would suggest that this tendency was not discernible in late fifteenth and early

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1. A. Allan, 'Yorkist Propaganda : Pedigree, Prophecy, and the 'British History' in the Reign of Edward IV', pp.184-185, in Patronage, Pedigree and Power, pp.171-192.

1A. Arguably, the circumstances of James <sup>IV</sup>'s succession also restrained his actions ; see pp. 80 - 84.

sixteenth century Anglo-Scottish relations.<sup>1</sup>

The preoccupation of Anglo-Scottish monarchs with reciprocal matrimonial alliances was not elevated into a historical theme until the early sixteenth century, and, perhaps ironically, it was a Scottish historian who first committed to paper the implications of recent historical events. John Major challenged the traditional assumption (that Anglo-Scottish hostility was acceptable because it was popular and historical) in 1521, and he did so by questioning tradition and history. "Not wont to credit the common Scot in his vituperation of the English, nor yet the Englishman in his vituperation of the Scot", Major advocated peace through intermarriage.<sup>2</sup> In his opinion, the Scots had never had more excellent monarchs than those born of English mothers, and despite centuries of hostility, neither country had made any discernible advances against the other.<sup>3</sup> This theme was argued consistently throughout, and, in certain respects, one can interpret Major's History as a flower which had germinated and grown in the fertile soil of almost fifty years of Anglo-Scottish rapprochement. Major represents that rarest of individuals, a patriot neither blinded by myth and tradition nor weakened in his vision and resolve by romanticism. His concept of Anglo-Scottish union was of a partnership based on marriage, not one based on the domination of England, and he categorically rejected grandiose claims of English political suzerainty.<sup>4</sup> Major was one of the few people who

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1. Bradley thesis, pp.vi, 358-360, suggests that English and Scottish wars were fought for propagandist reasons and in the pursuit of domestic goals.
  2. Major, pp.40-42.
  3. Ibid.
  4. Ibid., pp.128, 144, 216-219, 226, 263, 288-289.

proved able to "keep the temper of his mind founded upon right reason, and regulate his opinion accordingly", though political circumstance had long regulated the opinions of fifteenth and early sixteenth century monarchs.<sup>1</sup> Clearly the Scot enunciated ideas which were ahead of their time, and it took the remainder of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to temper Anglo-Scottish attitudes and open sufficient minds to the wisdom of political union; a union long considered, and, in some Scottish circles, even longer regretted.

Arguably, too few questioning minds like John Major's have been brought to the study of Anglo-Scottish relations, too many words have been wasted when more questions might have produced different answers, and instead of chipping away at traditions the chips have tended to appear on the shoulders of historians. The anglophiles, for example, have tended to approach the subject from positions of uncritical superiority and hindsight, while the anglophobes have either left the subject to the semi-obscurity of bland generalisation or have somehow succumbed to the urge to romanticise, justify, or explain it. Both schools of thought have fallen into the trap of opening too many books without responding to the challenge of opening their own minds or their readers' minds to new ideas.<sup>2</sup>

Ultimately, the historian's problem in analysing intangibles such as attitudes is that he must consider a subject which few contemporaries, at any time, ever bother to explain, elucidate, or clarify; that is to say, all those things assumed or taken for granted. James Joll has described

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1. Ibid., pp.40, 223.

2. W. Ferguson, Scotland's Relations with England : A Survey to 1707, (Edinburgh, 1977), provides significant insights but is too brief to be of much value.

these aspects as "unspoken assumptions", manifest both individually and collectively; he meant by this not only the personal influences and climates of opinion popular at a particular moment in time but also the assumptions which condition judgments, decisions, and attitudes, especially in periods of crisis.<sup>1</sup> Joll was referring to the origins of the First World War in 1914, but the concept of the "unspoken assumption" has much wider applications as evinced by this introduction to Anglo-Scottish relations. In the latter circumstance, however, the problems are compounded, not only because in trying to determine and understand the assumptions and attitudes of other periods or of other individuals the historian must attempt to rationalize the apparently irrational, but also because of the remoteness of assumptions and attitudes from those manifest in one's own time, and because so much less evidence is extant on which to base one's analysis. Many aspects, economic, diplomatic, military, political, social, and cultural, can assist in introducing one to the thoughts and actions of previous centuries, and these are considered, where relevant, in the study which follows.

If many questions are left apparently unanswered it is, perhaps, because they are unanswerable, especially in view of the limitations inherent in the nature of the subject, and because of the paucity of the evidence. The study of Anglo-Scottish attitudes has undoubtedly been neglected in the past, but this intangible subject ought to be considered in the light of the traditional explanations of Anglo-Scottish conflict as discussed in Chapter Two.<sup>2</sup> Even if the attitudes and assumptions

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1. J. Joll, 1914 : The Unspoken Assumptions, (London, 1968).
  2. Anglo-Scottish attitudes are briefly considered in Coleman thesis, pp.1-6, 13-16 ; Cardew thesis, pp.196-198 ; J. D. Mackie, 'Henry VIII and Scotland', T.R.H.S., XXIX (4th ser., 1947), pp.93-114.



manifest in previous study and in fifteenth and sixteenth century opinion were conditioned by traditional and pre-conceived interpretations of the past, I would suggest that the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century heralded the beginning of a more productive and peaceful phase in the history of Anglo-Scottish relations. Attitudes and assumptions undoubtedly form an essential counterpoint and introduction to this interesting material, and probably the key to a more comprehensive understanding of the subject. The minds of men may well be bewilderingly complex, but, as Joll himself concluded, "it is only by studying the minds of men that we shall understand the causes of anything".'

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1. J. Joll, 1914 : The Unspoken Assumptions, p.24.

CHAPTER TWO

THE TRADITIONAL CAUSES OF ANGLO-SCOTTISH  
CONFLICT, 1471-1513?

The very fact that historians have traditionally felt the need to explain the causes of Anglo-Scottish disputes has undoubtedly contributed to the tendency to regard conflict as the natural pattern of their relationship. Yet, if one discounts omnipresent affrays and transgressions on the Borders, the time spent in the field by English and Scottish armies from 1471 to 1513 runs into weeks and months rather than years, and I maintain that Anglo-Scottish relations were years of comparative peace punctuated by short and sporadic conflicts, rather than years of warfare interrupted by temporary truces. Evidently the traditional interpretations merit scrutiny and reappraisal in the light of this opinion.<sup>1</sup>

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(A) English Claims to the Suzerainty of Scotland

The questionable claim made by successive English monarchs that Scottish Kings held their kingdom as an English fief constituted a protracted irritant in Anglo-Scottish relations during the later Middle Ages. The idea had <sup>received particular emphasis since</sup> the reign of Edward I but was perceived by Englishmen to have originated in an historic and mythological past and English monarchs up to the reign of Edward IV did not scruple to forge evidence

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1. For another discussion of the causes see Bradley thesis, pp.309-360.

which might support their contention.<sup>1</sup> Numerous documents elaborate on the English claims to suzerainty over Scotland and in one of the best known, dated 1542, Henry VIII declared that the Scots:-

"haue always knowledged the Kynges of Englande superior lordes of the realme of Scotlande, and haue done homage and fealtie for the same".<sup>2</sup>

The King asserted that this was shown by history and "iudicially and autentiquely made" documents, and in a masterpiece of propaganda, he traced the English claim from the days of Brutus to the reign of Henry VII.<sup>3</sup> The fact that none of his recent predecessors had effectively asserted their authority over Scotland was explained by the fact that the usurper Richard III had no right to either realm, while both Edward IV and Henry VII had experienced certain domestic difficulties.<sup>4</sup> His father, for example, thought it politic "for that tyme to assay to tame" the Scots "by the plesant coniunction and conuersation of affinitie, then to charge them with theyr fault, and requyre duety of them, when opportunitie serued not, by force and feare to constrayne and compell them".<sup>5</sup>

Furthermore, Henry explained that he had refrained from demanding homage during the minority of James V, and thus he claimed that there were only

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1. Complaynt of Scotland, E.E.T.S., ed., App.I, pp.198-206 ; Grafton I, p.231 et passim ; Fabyan's New Chronicles, I, p.241 et passim, II, pp.396-397, et passim ; Three Fifteenth Century Chronicles, pp.3-24 ; Book of Howth, R.S. (1871), pp.241-242 ; MS. Cotton Julius D. II, ff.211v - 213, B.L. ; J. D. Mackie, 'Henry VIII and Scotland', T.R.H.S., XXIX (4th ser., 1947), pp.93-114, esp. p.104 ; Documents and Records Illustrating the History of Scotland, etc., ed. F. Palgrave, (London, 1837), pp.cxcvi - ccxxiv.
  2. Complaynt of Scotland, E.E.T.S., ed., p.198. The document is also in Hall, pp.846-856 ; Grafton, II, pp.477-487 ; L. & P. H.VIII, xvii, no.1033 ; Byrne's Letters H.VIII, pp.295-303.
  3. Complaynt of Scotland, E.E.T.S., ed., pp.198-206.
  4. Ibid., pp.205-206.
  5. Ibid.

thirteen "yere of sylence" since a Scottish monarch had paid homage to Henry VI.

The Scots, of course, completely rejected the English claims, and in 1521 John Major stated that Scottish Kings had only ever paid homage for the lands which they had once held in English territory.<sup>1</sup> A kingdom, he declared, was not a possession which any monarch could give away, and the English might only hold Scotland by lawful means, such as a just title or matrimonial alliance, and not by violence and oppression.<sup>2</sup> The Scots had always "spurned" the English claims and any assertions to the contrary were likely to provoke perpetual "strife and war".<sup>3</sup> The author of the 'Complaynt of Scotlande' further observed that the English launched "cruel veyris" against the Scots in an attempt to fulfil "there diabolic prophane propheseis" of superiority.<sup>4</sup> This issue clearly fanned Anglo-Scottish hostility, but not even Henry VIII could ignore the fact that "realms ar nocht conquest be buikis bot rather be bluid".<sup>5</sup> In view of the size of Scotland, the poverty of English monarchs in men and money, and the strength of Anglo-Scottish antipathy, the English could hardly hope to conquer and govern Scotland on the slender foundations of such contentious claims. The Declaration of Arbroath had clearly stated in 1320 that as long as a hundred Scots remained alive they would "never give consent" to bow beneath the yoke of English domination.<sup>6</sup>

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1. Major, pp.144, 216, and see 128, 217-218, 226, 263, 288.
  2. Ibid., pp.216-217.
  3. Ibid., pp.263, 288.
  4. Complaynt of Scotland, E.E.T.S., ed., pp.82-83 ; S.T.S., ed. p.65.
  5. Ibid., E.E.T.S., ed. p.82 ; S.T.S., ed. p.64.
  6. Scottish Historical Documents, ed., G. Donaldson, (Edinburgh, 1970), p.57.

Edward IV, Richard III, and Henry VII all paid lip-service to the principle of English suzerainty over Scotland, particularly during periods of Anglo-Scottish conflict, but only Edward placed much emphasis on this aspect by using it as a foundation for his agreements with the Duke of Albany.<sup>1</sup> Suzerainty over Scotland was a useful propaganda tool in requesting military and financial assistance from the English people against the Scots, but it did not constitute a principle on which to mount expeditions of conquest. Richard III is known to have described the Scots as his "enemies and rebels" in February 1484, but Henry VII merely described them as England's "ancient enemies" in his proclamations.<sup>2</sup> However, the Parliament of January-March 1497, which granted Henry two Fifteenths and Tenths, an aid and a subsidy, to pay for an army against the Scots, declared that James IV's attack was contrary to the "allegeaunce" and homage which he owed to the English King, "as his Progenytours have done afore".<sup>3</sup> Suzerainty was a popular theme in the propaganda of Edward IV, as evinced by the documents of early 1481, but in view of the conduct and brevity of the English campaign in July-August 1482, it is difficult to believe that Edward aspired to conquer Scotland by military might.<sup>4</sup>

As Henry VIII had evidently perceived, the English claim to suzerainty declined in significance during the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, and recent opinion suggests that even Henry utilised

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1. see section F for the agreements.
  2. Halliwell, Letters, I, pp.156-158 ; T.R.P., I, nos.34, 36, 37, pp.38-41.
  3. Rot. Parl., VI, pp.513-519.
  4. PRO E.39/102/25, (Bain, 1436 and App. 28, misdated 1476) ; MS. Harleian 78, ff.3v-4v, B.L. ; C.S.P., Venetian, I, 475, pp.142-143. cf Bradley thesis, pp.319-327, for the view that most fifteenth century English monarchs regarded the claim as "primarily a preliminary to real bargaining with Scotland", while Edward IV made conquests "the central theme" of his expedition.

suzerainty and dynastic union as threats in his relations with Scotland; this was not an "essential or determinative element in his policy".<sup>1</sup> Generally Scotland was treated as a diplomatic equal and as an independent country by English monarchs, perhaps less grudgingly than in the past, within the general framework of a later medieval diplomatic relationship. Yet one ought never to dismiss the suzerainty issue as an insignificant relic of a turbulent historical relationship, for it does explain a great deal about the nature of Anglo-Scottish antipathy.<sup>2</sup> The attempt to deny them their political independence was doubtless the main reason why the Scots so hated and feared the English, and probably why Anglo-Scottish union was resisted for so long. Threatened with political subservience (and fearful of cultural domination) the Scots appear to have acquired an inferiority complex on a large scale and this has been manifest in the exaggerated emphasis on Scottish superiority, independence, and nationalism in subsequent Anglo-Scottish relations.<sup>3</sup> In reality, English monarchs in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries sought a new and altogether more realistic rapprochement with their Scottish neighbours, and even if Henry VIII did not go so far as to make such a <sup>statement</sup>, arguably his pertinent observations on recent Anglo-Scottish relations add powerful support to this assertion.

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1. D. M. Head, 'Henry VIII's Scottish Policy : A Reassessment', S.H.R., LXI, I, no.171 (1982), pp.1-24.
  2. For fifteenth and sixteenth century opinions see Italian Relation, pp.16-17, 66-67 ; Early Travellers, pp.52-53, 73.
  3. cf. K. Webb, The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland, (Harmondsworth, rev. ed., 1978) ; R. Coupland, Welsh and Scottish Nationalism : A Study, (London, 1954) ; Coleman thesis, pp.15-16 ; W. Notestein, The Scot in History, (London, 1946).

(B) The "Auld Alliance" of France and Scotland

The existence of an established alliance of their traditional enemies, France and Scotland, was of particular concern to English monarchs from the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries. The "Auld Alliance" was ostensibly defensive but its potential was offensive and this was how the English had come to regard it. Moreover, the Scots were perceived as a potentially greater threat to England when considered in the context of this traditional alliance, and the tangible dangers of Franco-Scottish accord were greatly exceeded by psychological considerations.<sup>1</sup> The English feared concerted Franco-Scottish military action against them, and yet in the field the English acquitted themselves admirably, as evinced by the victories of 1513. The theory and the reality were stated by James Harryson in 1547 when he observed that the French had devised the alliance to weaken English militarism and that this had redounded to the "discomfiture" of France and Scotland.<sup>2</sup> While the French monarchy benefited from the alliance, Scotland experienced "infinite losses, misfortunes, slaughters, spoyles, and vtter ruyne" ; the status of Scots in France and the existence of the Scots guards being but "a golden and glisteryng bayte, alluryng our simplicitie and credulitie".<sup>3</sup> But since every Scottish monarch renewed the "auld alliance" its significance was clearly far from negligible.

The earliest documentary evidence of a Franco-Scottish alliance pertained to 1295, but tradition anticipated the origins of their accord

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1. H. Fenwick, The Auld Alliance, (Kineton, 1971) ; J. D. Mackie, 'The Auld-Alliance and the Battle of Flodden', Transactions of the Franco-Scottish Society, VIII (1919-1935), pp.35-56 ; J. D. Mackie, 'Henry VIII and Scotland', cited on page 29 note 1 ; J. Mackinnon, 'The Franco-Scottish League in the Fourteenth Century', S.H.R., VII (1910), pp.119-129.
  2. Complaynt of Scotland, E.E.T.S., ed., App. II, pp.207-236, esp.228.
  3. Ibid., pp.228-229.

in the reign of Charlemagne; another example of an inaccurate use of history to explain and justify an established relationship.' Scots and Frenchmen in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries romanticised the alliance as being "solid and secure", "unchanged and inviolate", but Froissart's account of Franco-Scottish co-operation in the late fourteenth century paints a very different picture.<sup>2</sup> Froissart praised Scottish courage, but denounced the people as "rude and worthless" since they both hated and abused their French allies.<sup>3</sup> The French Knights felt exploited in Scotland and feared being murdered in their beds; they are even said to have desired an Anglo-French alliance against Scotland, "for never had they seen such wicked people, nor such ignorant hypocrites and traitors".<sup>4</sup>

That there was more to the "Auld Alliance" than a romanticised tradition and an antipathy engendered by close contact is exemplified by contemporary observations and by the treaties concluded by them in 1484, 1491, 1512, and 1517.<sup>5</sup> Manifestations of Franco-Scottish accord were to be found across the broad spectrum of human activity, politically, socially, economically, and culturally. Ayala noted in 1498 that the French language and French education were evident in Scotland, that Scots

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1. R. Nicholson, 'The Franco-Scottish and Franco-Norwegian Treaties of 1295', S.H.R., XXXVIII, (1959), pp.114-132. For Franco-Scottish documents see S.R.O. SP.7/15-25A ; MS. Cotton Titus B.VI, ff.132-132v, B.L. ; MS. Additional 19044, B.L. ; MS. Additional 30666, B.L. ; MS. Harleian 4592, ff.143-154v, B.L. ; MS. Harleian 1244, B.L. ; N.L.S. Adv. MS. 35.1.5 ; For the history see N.L.S. MS.88 ; S.R.O. GD.4/406 ; Major, p.101 ; Buchanan, I, pp.261-262 ; Early Travellers, p.94 n.1. ; C.S.P. Milanese, I, 443, pp.279-280, (said to date from King Pipin's time) ; Inventaire Chronologique, p.127.
  2. Major, p.101 ; Early Travellers, pp.7-15, 93-94.
  3. Early Travellers, pp.10-11.
  4. Ibid., pp.12-13, 15.
  5. S.R.O. SP.7/15-25A ; Inventaire Chronologique ; Flodden Papers, etc.



were "well received" in France, and that the French were popular.' The Stewarts of Aubigny and the Dukes of Albany are perhaps the best known of the Franco Scottish families, while the French monarchs' Scots guards, founded in 1445, were arguably another manifestation of co-operation and goodwill (even if Harryson denied this).<sup>2</sup>

The benefits accruing to France were self-evident. Scotland was "useful and necessary" as a "buckler" against French enemies and as "a means for conquering England", while Francis I stated in 1522 that money sent to Scotland was "as profitable as if spent at home, for the prosperity of the one is the defence of the other".<sup>3</sup> The French rarely matched such rhetoric by effective action, but they were aware that the English were "at any moment inclined to fight" against France, and some Frenchmen suggested that Scotland would have lost her independence without their assistance.<sup>4</sup> To an extent, the diffusion of English military might on two fronts from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century did help Scotland to win and maintain her independence; while France bore the brunt of English hostility, the French chronicler Comynes apparently conceived of established relationships as a manifestation of natural order:-

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1. C.S.P. Spanish, I, p.174, and Early Travellers, p.48. For the potential of Franco-Scottish co-operation see Letters and Papers Illustrative of the Wars of the English in France, ed. R. J. Stevenson, R.S., vols.I, II, pt.II, (1861, 1864), passim.
  2. H. Fenwick, The Auld Alliance, esp. ch.2 ; Francisque-Michel, Les écossais en France, Les Français en écosse, (London, 1862) ; W. Forbes-Leith, The Scots Men-At-Arms and Lifeguards in France, 1418-1830, (Edinburgh, 1882) ; E. Cassavetti, The Lion and the Lilies : The Stuarts and France, (London, 1977).
  3. Early Travellers, pp.74, 78-79 ; L. & P. H.VIII, iii pt.II, 2435, p.1025.
  4. Comynes, p.358 ; Early Travellers, pp.73, 91-95.

"all things considered I think that God has created neither man nor beast in this world without creating something to oppose them in order to keep them humble and afraid....to the Kingdom of France He has opposed the English, to the English the Scots and to the King of Spain, Portugal."<sup>1</sup>

Some of the continental powers regarded Scotland as a peripheral power, "in finibus orbis", and since Scottish monarchs possessed few allies outside Ireland and Scandinavia the French alliance gave them a continental connection and a means of protection against English aggression.<sup>2</sup> Without doubt, England, Scotland, and France constituted an uneasy *ménage à trois* in northern Europe, but of the Anglo-French and Anglo-Scottish conflicts in the period under consideration - 1475, 1480-1484, 1492, 1496-1497, and 1513 - the "Auld Alliance" was only discernible in the latter instance. It has been suggested that the alliance was not very strong during the fifteenth century, and the fact that Commynes barely mentions Scotland in his memoirs is probably testimony of the fact that Louis XI and Charles VIII were only interested in their Scottish allies when they felt their security threatened by the English; theoretical reciprocity was rarely manifest in practice.<sup>3</sup> Perhaps as a consequence of Richard III's heavy handed diplomacy, Henry Tudor was assisted at Bosworth in August 1485 by a contingent of French and Scottish troops - a rare instance of fifteenth century Franco-Scottish military co-operation - and, during his subsequent reign, Henry sought to cultivate good relations with these countries. In view of the French

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1. Commynes, p.339.
  2. C.S.P. Milanese, I, 270, 272, pp.186-188 ; Nicholson article cited on page 34 note 1.
  3. Commynes, *passim* ; see Bradley thesis, pp.327-336, for the fifteenth century. She describes the alliance as a "tigre en papier". J. D. Mackie, 'The Auld Alliance', cited on page 33 note 1, calls it "a practical solution of a practical difficulty" (p.37).

preoccupation with the Italian Wars from 1494, the "Auld Alliance" was a sleeping dog in the political arena and Henry VII had no desire to revive it from its slumbers.<sup>1</sup> The French placed few obstacles in the path of Anglo-Scottish rapprochement and it was not until 1512-1513 that significant difficulties became manifest.<sup>2</sup>

Traditionally, the French have been blamed for the chain of events which culminated in the Scottish defeat at Flodden in 1513; James IV is perceived to have invaded England against his own best interests at the behest of France.<sup>3</sup> Recent schools of thought have deflected attention away from the Franco-Scottish alliance by emphasizing Henry VIII's responsibility or by suggesting that James IV desired war to enhance the status of his country in continental eyes.<sup>4</sup> I would suggest that the "auld alliance" ought to be placed back in the spotlight. A basic fact, which no-one appears to have discussed at the time, was the inherent incompatibility of the Franco-Scottish and Anglo-Scottish alliances. As J. D. Mackie has observed, in view of the defensive premise of the "auld alliance", the treaties were technically compatible while peace prevailed between England, France, and Scotland.<sup>5</sup> In practice, however, Scotland faced an "impasse" in perceiving of England as both a permanent and traditional enemy - the assumption of the "auld alliance" - and as a new

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1. One of the charges which Henry levelled against the French monarch in 1492 was that he encouraged the Scottish King "to make warre ayenst hym and this his land" ; PRO. C.82/329, no.53 (damaged).
  2. see Chapters Three and Five.
  3. J. D. Mackie, 'The Auld Alliance', cited on page 33 note 1.
  4. Ibid. ; Coleman thesis, pp.10-12, 214-215.
  5. J. D. Mackie, 'The Auld Alliance', cited on page 33 note 1, pp.49-51.

and permanent ally, the inference of an Anglo-Scottish perpetual peace.<sup>1</sup> While the three monarchs remained amicably inclined, and pursued peace in word and deed, the incompatibility remained potential and theoretical, but under monarchs such as Henry VIII, James IV, and Louis XII, and warrior popes, the incompatibility between the two alliances constituted a blueprint for disaster.

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(C) The Border and the Borderers

Despite the interest shown in Berwick and Carlisle, until comparatively recently the Anglo-Scottish Border had attracted little detailed study. Historically, 1237 has been regarded as a significant date, but G. W. S. Barrow has suggested that the Border was already an established institution by then; it was a "compromise" with a history going back three centuries.<sup>2</sup> One is conditioned to perceive of borders either as natural geographical boundaries or as artificial physical barriers (as evinced by Hadrian's Wall or the Berlin Wall), but all frontiers are effectively formed in the minds of men.<sup>3</sup> The idea of a border as a strictly defined line of demarcation is both anachronistic and misleading

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1. Ibid., p.51 ; J. D. Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, p.159, states that the 1502 Anglo-Scottish treaty incorporated "the germ of its own destruction".
2. G. W. S. Barrow, 'The Anglo-Scottish Border', N.H., I, (1966), pp.21-42, esp. p.41. For recent study see Cardew thesis ; Dietrich thesis ; T. I. Rae, The Administration of the Scottish Frontier, 1513-1603, (Edinburgh, 1966) ; D. L. W. Tough, The Last Years of a Frontier : A History of the Borders During the Reign of Elizabeth, (Oxford, 1928) ; S. J. Watts, From Border to Middle Shire : Northumberland, 1586-1625, (Leicester, 1975) ; G. Washington, 'The Border Heritage, 1066-1292', T.C.W.A.S., LXII (1962), pp.101-112 ; G. Macdonald Fraser, The Steel Bonnets : The Story of the Anglo-Scottish Border Reivers, (London, 1974) ; see also Ridpath, Victoria County Histories, and local studies ; Coleman thesis, pp.24-41 ; C. J. Bates, The Border Holds of Northumberland, Archaeologia Aeliana, XIV (1891).
3. D. Hay, 'England, Scotland, and Europe : the Problem of the Frontier', T.R.H.S., vol.25 (5th ser., 1975), pp.71-91, esp. p.91.

when applied to the Anglo-Scottish frontier; "the Border was not merely a line....it was a tract of territory separated in some senses from the countries on either side of it. It was thus a frontier of a peculiar kind".<sup>1</sup> In the late fifteenth century, Trevisan observed that England and Scotland were divided by "two arms of the sea, which penetrate very far inland", and by about 60 miles of mountains between these two rivers (presumably the Tweed and Solway).<sup>2</sup> Others observed that Berwick, Carlisle, and border fortresses, such as Norham, served as military guardians of the frontier.<sup>3</sup> In this respect the Anglo-Scottish Border was partly natural and partly artificial, but the two realms were not divided by language, religion, literature, or by economic and social characteristics; foreign travellers, such as Piccolomini, appear to have perceived little difference between the contiguous parts of southern Scotland and northern England.<sup>4</sup> Cross-border activity was evidently common, but even if the society and economy of the Borders overwhelmed the political boundary, the Anglo-Scottish Border constituted a significant psychological division.<sup>5</sup> This fact is illustrated, for example, by material relating to cross-border activities and by the precision with which a 1496 proclamation stated that the Scots had invaded four miles

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1. Ibid., p.80 ; and see Cardew thesis ; Dietrich thesis.
  2. Italian Relation, p.13 ; Early Travellers, pp.50-51.
  3. The Second Book of the Travels of Nicander Nucius of Corcyra, ed. J. A. Cramer, C.S., 17 (1841), p.17 ; Early Travellers, pp.59-60 ; and see section D ; The Castles and Fortified Towers of Cumberland, Westmorland, and Lancashire, J. F. Curwen, (Kendal, 1913).
  4. Early Travellers, p.29.
  5. For the geographical frontier see J. L. Mack, The Border Line, (rev. ed., Edinburgh, 1926) ; F. R. Banks, The Borders, (London, 1977).

of English territory.' The fact that local inhabitants may have ignored the Border ought not to be regarded as an indication that they were ignorant of the concept. Even before precise maps existed, the Border was preserved in "the testimony of living witnesses handed down from generation to generation", and it was doubtless further strengthened by the defensive requirements of Anglo-Scottish conflicts from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century .<sup>2</sup> Clearly the Border was well enough known to emerge as a subject of mutual recrimination and contention.

According to John Major, the Border was disputed "between Teviotdale and the Solway", and this small area between the rivers Esk and Sark has been immortalised in Anglo-Scottish history as the "debateable land".<sup>3</sup> There were evidently several areas of debateable jurisdiction, but the area on the West March and the closely related issue of fishgarths on the River Esk invites particular consideration as a result of the plentiful evidence. The basic problem with the "debateable land" was that neither England nor Scotland would recognise that the other had any right to the disputed territory, and contention prevailed well into the sixteenth century. Consequently this area was lawless even by border standards. From sunrise to sunset this no-man's land was used as a common pasture, but cattle or goods left there overnight could be seized or destroyed and any dwellings which had been constructed might be burned down and their inhabitants imprisoned.

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1. Cardew thesis, pp.13-14, 189-198, 263-277, et passim, for contacts in border society ; PRO C.82/331, (Bain, 1637 and App. no.35, but misdated 1497), and T.R.P., I, no.34, p.38.
  2. Barrow, 'A-S. Border', cited on page 38 note 2, p.23.
  3. Major, p.20. For the remainder of the paragraph see W. Mackay. Mackenzie, 'The Debateable Land', S.H.R., XXX, no.110 (1951), pp.109-125.

Anglo-Scottish truces sought to resolve the difficulties presented by the "debateable land" and the fishgarths, and while the "debateable land" was not mentioned in some of the later truces from 1497 to 1502, a general concensus prevailed that disputes pertaining to the fishgarths ought not to undermine the peace.<sup>1</sup> Arguably, domestic disputes relating to fishgarths and territorial jurisdiction had resulted in the pragmatism and realism manifest in royal attitudes on both sides of the Border.<sup>2</sup> A commission of December 1474, for example, stated that certain Anglo-Scottish lords (but specifically "not bordurers"), by questioning local inhabitants and by other means, were to establish "hough in old tyme the said fishgaert hath be kepte, and thereuppon....to fynyssh and determe that debate and quarelle".<sup>3</sup> In the meantime, subjects were to observe the truce and, if necessary, sue their superiors for redress. In February 1475 the Bishop of Durham was appointed to treat with the Scots regarding fishing rights on the Esk, but there is some evidence in Edward IV's instructions to Alexander Legh, dated circa April 1475, that the English commissioners had failed to meet with the Scots.<sup>4</sup> James III had evidently sent Edward "seuerell writyngges and messages" concerning the

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1. Cardew thesis, pp.279-280, 318-319, from Rot. Scot., II and Foedera ; Mackenzie article cited on page 40 note 3 ; R. B. Armstrong, The History of Liddesdale, Eskdale, Ewesdale, Wauchopedale, and the Debateable Land, Part I : From the Twelfth Century to 1530, (Edinburgh, 1883), esp. pp.171-174.
  2. eg. for York fishgarths see Y.C.R., I, pp.3-4, 19-20, 22-24, 29-30, 35, 64, 92-94, 98-100. Such practical experience may have helped to moderate attitudes when similar problems emerged on the borders.
  3. PRO E.39/96/27, E.39/99/88, (Bain, 1421) ; Foedera, V, pt.iii, p.53. For the 1470's to the 1490's see Rot. Scot., II, pp.450-452, 478-479, 491, 493, 496, 498-499, 513 ; Foedera, V. pt.iii., pp.53, 59, 185, 190, V,pt.iv, pp.72-73 ; PRO C.82/34, 65, 114, (Bain, 1533, 1559, 1599) ; PRO E.36/254, ff.1-4, (Bain, 1600 and App. 34) ; MS. Cotton Caligula B.VII, f.169, B.L.
  4. Rot. Scot, II, pp.450-451 ; Foedera, V, pt.iii, p.59. For Legh's instructions see MS. Cotton Vespasian C.XVI, ff.121-126, B.L., esp. ff.121-124.

redress of "attemptates" by land and sea, the "non obseruacion of dayes of metyng appoincted in the bordeurs", the failure to attend "diettes...assigned for the admiralles", and the fact that the "variaunce" over the fishgarth was "yit not finally determyned nor appeased". In view of Edward's intention to invade France, the Scottish monarch advocated that these difficulties ought to be "sett yn alle goodely hast" to prevent "inconueniences" between their subjects, "by occasion of the premisses". Legh was instructed to excuse the English absence from "the diet for the ffishgaert" on the grounds that English Lords were busy in Parliament. Edward IV urged the Scots to appoint another day to discuss the subject or to suggest "some othr waye" to avoid any "variaunce"; he hoped that James desired "to appease the saide variaunce with lytyll besynesse consideryng that hit is but a small thing of weight for so grete princes to varye for".

That most monarchs evidently agreed with Edward's assertion is evinced by the appointment of English commissioners on 8th August 1475, while many other English commissions concerning the fishgarths are extant from 1487 to 1494.<sup>1</sup> The dispute prevailed into the sixteenth century, though a temporary compromise appears to have been reached in the late fifteenth century. In April 1498, James IV granted Thomas Lord Dacre, Lieutenant of the English West March, his fishing rights on the Esk for 3 years with power to set fishgarths, and, in return, Dacre was to pay an annual rent to the captain of Lochmabane castle of four "seme of salmond".<sup>2</sup>

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1. Rot. Scot., II, pp.452, 478-479, 493, 496, 498-499, 513 ; Foedera, V., pt.iii, pp.185, 190, V. pt.iv, p.72 ; PRO C.82/34, 65, 114, (Bain, 1533, 1559, 1599) ; PRO E.36/254, (Bain, 1600) ; N.L.S., MS. CH.1., (a safe-conduct to Surrey and others, dated 2nd June, 1490).
  2. R.S.S., I, 1488-1529, no.192, pp.23-24 ; Cott thesis, pp.33-34 ; Armstrong, cited on page 41 note 1, pp.173-174.



The disputes concerning the fishgarths, and the compromises which emerged, are of interest as an indication that such seemingly divisive issues did not apparently provoke conflict between England and Scotland. In November 1493, for example, Henry VII appointed Lord Dacre, Richard Salkeld, and John Musgrave to inquire into fishing rights on the Esk, the "debateable land", and the boundaries of Canonby; all subjects which one might expect to have provoked Anglo-Scottish hostility.<sup>1</sup> An indenture of March 1494 reveals that this was not in fact the case. Following a raid in which the tenants of Canonby had lost their livestock and goods, the English and Scottish commissioners agreed to make redress, and they ordered the border officials to appoint days of truce "at convenable places as often as it shalbe sene spedefull" for redressing "such attemptates as are vnredressed".<sup>2</sup> A proviso further declared that this ought not to prejudice a diet at "Loughmabanestane" on 8th August "for to put affinall ende to the fishegarth and all debatable londes". The aspiration to resolve these matters for once and for all clearly motivated the sensible conduct of the various English and Scottish monarchs in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Even when this easy solution proved to be unattainable, since they could "not aggre vpon the particioun and deviding of the Debatable Londes" (in October 1510), they agreed to leave things "the same as they fonde it".<sup>3</sup>

Arguably, however, the evidence cited herein also reveals that these monarchs were aware of the precise nature and extent of their claims to border territory, and they clearly did not scruple to use any means to

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1. PRO C.82/114, (Bain, 1599) ; Rot.Scot., II, p.513 ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, p.72.
  2. PRO E.36/254, ff.1-4, (Bain, 1600 and App. no.34) ; MS. Cotton Caligula B. VII, f.169, B.L.
  3. SRO SP.6/35.

extend their jurisdiction and authority. While the 1494 indenture described the inhabitants of Canonby as Scottish, the English later claimed that the monastery was situated on English territory or on the "debateable land"; a claim vigorously disputed by the Scots.<sup>1</sup> This was not an isolated example. Edward IV's agreement with the Duke of Albany in June 1482 laid claim to Berwick, Liddesdale, Eskdale, Ewesdale, Annandale, and Lochmaben castle, while, in 1483, the same monarch granted Richard, Duke of Gloucester various Scottish territories, including Liddesdale, Eskdale, Ewesdale, Annandale, Waltopdale, and Cliddesdale, "wherof grete part is now in the Scotts handes".<sup>2</sup> The Scots, in turn, aspired to acquire English territory; in 1461, for example, Margaret of Anjou was said to have granted seven English sheriffwicks to Scotland, and in 1496 James IV was said to have demanded 100,000 marks, Berwick, and "the restorance of the vii serefdomis" as the price of military assistance for Perkin Warbeck.<sup>3</sup> The pretender was said to have negotiated James IV's demands down to 50,000 marks and Berwick only. I would suggest, however, that such grandiose territorial claims were both unreasonable and unrealistic, and one ought to place much more emphasis on the practical compromises which prevailed in Anglo-Scottish border disputes.

The fact that a complex administrative structure of Marcher law and government had emerged in the long history of Anglo-Scottish relations is

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1. Mackenzie article cited on page 40 note 3, pp.113-115 ; T.A., II, pp.xcvi, 454 ; Armstrong, cited on page 41 note 1, pp.192-194.
  2. PRO E.39/92/38, (Bain, 1476) ; Foedera, V.pt.iii, pp.120-121 ; Rot. Parl., VI, pp.204-205.
  3. MS. Harl. 543, ff.149-150, B.L., printed by Halliwell, Letters, I, pp.123-125 ; MS. Cotton Vespasian C.XVI, ff.154-155, B.L., printed by Ellis, Letters, I, (1st ser.), XIII, pp.25-32 ; Pollard, Sources, I, 101, pp.137-143 ; Pinkerton, II, App.II, pp.438-441.

further testimony that experience led to compromise and not conflict. Neither Border disputes nor the character and activities of the local inhabitants justified warfare, though, of course, these might be cited as excuses in times of particular stress.<sup>1</sup> Endemic criminal activity clearly contributed to tension at times, but the real cause of tension was generally the failure of the monarchs or their officials to implement and enforce the established machinery which existed for the redress of grievances. All Anglo-Scottish monarchs from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century could doubtless have justified hostile actions by referring to Border disputes or to the activities of the borderers, but evidently most chose not to do so. In 1475, for example, infractions of Anglo-Scottish truces failed to provoke conflict. Edward IV instructed Alexander Legh to inform the Scots of the reasons given by his Wardens of the Marches, the Duke of Gloucester and the Earl of Northumberland, for failing to hold diets and days of meeting on the borders, and:-

"farthermor he shall saye in this behalf that the King....being sory of the faillyng of the same diettes and dayes hath geuen the saide lordes straitly in charge that they see such othr dyettes and dayes to be hasteley appoincted and set....which may and shalbe kepte with alle diligence".<sup>2</sup>

On his way north Legh was to remind Gloucester and Northumberland "of the Kinges pleasir in this partye", and to instruct them to remedy their less than exemplary record of Marcher administration. Some of the meetings between the Wardens' Lieutenants were neither "kept ne obserued", while the King was unclear whether other meetings "shalbe kept or noo", and thus Legh was to discuss the matter with the Duke and the Earl. Further meetings were henceforth "to be kept and obserued without faile",

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1. cf. Bradley thesis, pp.310-312, 336-357.

2. For this and what follows see MS. Cotton Vespasian C.XVI, ff.121-126, B.L., esp. ff.123-126.

and "at every XV dayes hereafter when hit shalbe necessarie" Gloucester and Northumberland should ensure that "thair deputies mete at conuenient places ouer alle the marches for due reformation to be made". Finally Legh was to assure James III that Edward IV had "ordeigned and disposed for the Rule of the marches in his absence", and the English wardens were to be instructed to act "accordyng to the Kynges pleasir for his honor and surete".

Evidently, in normal circumstances, potentially divisive Border activities were regulated by the established machinery, and, when this failed, monarchs generally recognised that weaknesses manifest in the Border administration might be resolved by their direct intervention. This observation also applied to periods of Anglo-Scottish tension, such as 1513, for although the borderers might be blamed for violating the truce, the real problem was usually that one or other of the monarchs had either ignored the established machinery or had failed to correct the conduct of their local officials. Arguably, all disputes relating to the Border and the borderers were resolvable by recourse to custom and practice, and thus any attempt to justify conflict on these grounds was merely symptomatic of much more fundamental weaknesses in Anglo-Scottish relations at a particular moment in time.

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(D) Berwick, Carlisle, and the Border Fortresses

In 1498, Andrea Trevisan noted that Henry VII had constructed a bridge across the River Tweed at Berwick, "a very strong place both by nature and art", which had caused thousands of deaths in the past and "might do so again" were it not for the recent Anglo-Scottish peace.<sup>1</sup> Trevisan further observed that Berwick was closely guarded "from ancient

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1. Italian Relation, pp.17-18, and Early Travellers, pp.53-54.

natural instinct", and that the proceeds of the Calais wool staple paid for the garrisons in both towns.<sup>1</sup> In the fifteenth century, Berwick, being an "excellently well furnished guardian", was known as a Key to the Anglo-Scottish frontier, and the fortifications impressed most visitors in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.<sup>2</sup> Berwick was, in short, "a towne made for the service of God Mars and the Goddess Bellona", to which both England and Scotland laid claim.<sup>3</sup> It changed hands many times during the later Middle Ages, and both sides refused to relinquish sovereignty.<sup>4</sup> In 1461, Margaret of Anjou surrendered Berwick to the Scots in return for Scottish support for the exiled Lancastrians and it did not return to English hands until 1482. Edward IV informed the Pope that the recapture of Berwick was "the chief advantage" of the Duke of Gloucester's campaign, but while the King lauded his brother's "success", some fifteenth and sixteenth century chroniclers and historians ignored this event and Vergil even attributed the achievement to Lord Stanley.<sup>5</sup>

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1. Italian Relation, pp.45, 50. The statement about the financial provisions is not supported by other evidence.
  2. C.S.P. Milanese, I, docs.107, 109, pp.90, 93 ; Early Travellers, pp.81, 128-129, 132-133, 228-229, 230-231 ; The Life of Marmaduke Rawdon of York, ed. R. Davies, C.S., LXXXV (1863), pp.133, 140.
  3. MS. Harleian 7017, f.168, B.L., and ff.167-168v.
  4. In Anglo-Scottish tradition Berwick changed hands 13 times.
  5. C.S.P. Venetian, I, 483, pp.145-146. Gloucester's role is mentioned in Hall, pp.331-335 ; Grafton, II, pp.73-76 ; Greyfriar's Chronicle, C.S. ed. p.23 and R.S. ed., pp.178-179 ; Buchanan, 2, pp.210-211 ; Buck, pp.21-22 ; MS. Stowe 268, f.11, B.L. ; MS. Harleian 2252, f.6, B.L. ; MS. Cotton Vitellius F.XII, f.347, B.L. Vergil, H.VI - R.III, p.170, and the Chester chronicle MS. Harleian 2105, f.92, B.L., praise Lord Stanley, while Italian Relation, p.17, and Pitscottie, I, pp.183-184, state that Albany surrendered Berwick. Many sources do not mention the incident ; Fabyan's New Chronicles ; The Great Chronicle of London ; Chronicles of London ; Six Town Chronicles ; The Maire of Bristowe's Kalendar ; Y.C.R., I ; Mancini ; Major ; Christchurch, Cely, Stonor, Paston, and Plumpton correspondence ; cf. the celebration at Calais of success in Scotland, PRO SC.1/53, no.136, printed in the Cely Letters, ed. Malden p.113, ed. Hanham, pp.168-169.

The Croyland chronicler went even further by highlighting the high costs of maintaining the town, and by describing the recapture as a "trifling gain, or perhaps more accurately, loss".<sup>1</sup> This was clearly a reflection of contemporary disappointment in the outcome of the recent Anglo-Scottish conflict, but I maintain that Berwick was a psychological benefit to the English and of evident strategic, military, and political value. As a parliamentary preamble declared in 1495, "the sure keeping of the townes and castelles of Berwyk and Carlisle is a grete defence ageyn the Scottes, and a grete wele, suretie and ease to all this Realme, and in especiall to the North parties of the same".<sup>2</sup>

English monarchs spent vast sums on the defence and fortification of these Border fortresses; Henry VII, for example, appropriated the revenues of the Yorkshire lands of Richard, Duke of York and the customs of Newcastle to pay for the expense.<sup>3</sup> In view of their defensive duties, Berwick and Carlisle were exempt from parliamentary taxation, their officials were exempt from the duty of personal attendance on the King during his campaigns, and these were the only towns in England in which butchers were permitted to slaughter animals within the walls.<sup>4</sup> Both towns were vulnerable to Scottish attacks and intrigues but, because of Scottish claims, the authorities of Berwick had to maintain particular vigilance. A certain J. Marny wrote to his father Henry from Furnival's

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1. Croyland Chronicle, p.149.
  2. Rot. Parl., VI, p.496. For a similar comment pertaining to Berwick only see Ibid., p.394 (1487).
  3. Ibid., pp.394, 496-497. For Berwick accounts see PRO E.36/254, ff.5-109 ; PRO SC.6/1380, 1381 ; PRO DL.29/651/10528 and 10529 ; PRO E.364/119.
  4. Stat. Realm., II, pp.527-528, 582. (4 Henry VII c.3 and 11 Henry VII c.18) ; Stat. Realm., III, pp.26-27, (3 Henry VIII c.4).

Inn on 9th March 1497 with details of an abortive plot at Berwick.' This centred on a friar "in grett ffauyr" with Sir William Tyler, Lieutenant of the Castle, who conducted mass in the castle chapel and passed to and from Scotland. According to Marny, the friar "had apoyntyd with the skotts that uppon a sunday when Sir William tyllar wer att mas att the parych chyrche he and a certen off them schulde cum into the castell and kyll the porter and odyr offyssayrs within the castell and schott the gattes and att a posterne goyng owte off the castell there to haue lett in a nod certen cumpeny off them". Fortunately, however, the Scots "war asspyd and so takyn". It seems unlikely that this was an isolated incident since the monarchs of Scotland generally conspired to regain Berwick after 1482, by fair means or foul. Successive English monarchs perceived of a Scottish threat many times in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and while the maintenance of English garrisons in Scottish fortresses had constituted a significant problem earlier in the fifteenth century, the defensive preparations at Berwick reveal that this remained a bone of contention in Anglo-Scottish relations well beyond that period.<sup>2</sup>

There can be no doubt that the recapture of Berwick by the English inflamed Scottish passions. In 1488 the Scottish Parliament was moved to declare that the anticipated matrimonial alliances between James III and his two sons with Elizabeth Woodville and two of her daughters would not be concluded unless the English agreed to destroy Berwick or

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1. PRO SC.1/52/33, for what follows. Also mentioned in C.S.P. Venetian, VI, pt.III, 71, pp.1602-1603, which states that a French monk was behind the plot and that he was assisted by some English inhabitants.
  2. For threats to Berwick in 1485, 1487, 1488, and 1491, see Conway, pp.8-12, 16, 33-36 ; cf. Bradley thesis, pp.314-318 ; Macdougall, James III, pp.149-150.

surrender it to Scotland.<sup>1</sup> The English were unlikely to comply with the Scottish ultimatum since Henry VII's council had agreed in 1486 that war with Scotland was preferable to the loss of "any foote of the Kinges possession".<sup>2</sup> Clearly the matter touched on issues of pride and prestige to the extent that this threatened to undermine an otherwise amicable relationship, and yet the dispute never impeded the conclusion of subsequent Anglo-Scottish truces; moreover, these truces guaranteed the neutrality of the town and castle of Berwick. Probably the personal inclinations of ruling monarchs and their mutual experience of Border conflict had resulted in the proliferation of pragmatic and realistic attitudes. Henry VII, for example, could have justified conflict against Scotland many times (as in 1485) by citing threatened Scottish attacks on Berwick, and yet he chose not to do so. Another example pertains to Dunbar castle which the Duke of Albany had surrendered to the English in 1483.<sup>3</sup> The Anglo-Scottish truce of September 1484 specifically included Dunbar castle for six months, but James III was then free to give six weeks warning that the castle was no longer included therein, and thus when Dunbar fell in the winter of 1485/86 this did not constitute a *casus belli*; clearly too, Henry VII was in no position to fight over this issue.<sup>4</sup> Berwick had also been included in the 1484 truce, but without the same conditions, and it was not until 1486 that the Scots agreed not to attack the town and castle in return for an English commitment that they

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1. A.P.S., II, pp.181-182, and see Chapter Four.
  2. Select Cases in the Council of Henry VII, ed. Bayne and Dunham, pp.9-10, 16.
  3. PRO E.39/92/28, (Bain, 1505) ; Foedera, V, pt.iii, pp.150-151 ; Lesley, p.102.
  4. Ibid. ; Cardew thesis, pp.235, 278-279.



would not use Berwick to launch attacks against Scotland. This formulaic proviso was repeated in subsequent truces until 1502 when an additional clause prohibited open and secret hostility involving the Border fortress.<sup>1</sup>

Being situated north of the Tweed, the Scots felt that Berwick was unquestionably Scottish and an important port on their eastern seaboard, in addition to its obvious military and strategic benefits. However, the fact that extant Scottish records illuminate Berwick's economic attractions to the detriment of its strategic and military attractions, while the extant English records emphasize the latter aspects, ought not to lead one to the conclusion that there were fundamental differences in English and Scottish attitudes to the Border town. Berwick was both a busy centre of trade and a military outpost, as evinced by the English sources for 1482-1483. Since the Scots had been allowed to depart therefrom, depopulation was an inherent danger to Berwick's economic and military importance. Edward IV evidently sought to circumvent the problem by promising prospective settlers from the London companies "hows rome fre for euermore" in Berwick.<sup>2</sup> In the Parliament of early 1483 the burgesses and inhabitants petitioned Edward for various economic privileges in the hope of attracting more people to a town "so pore and desolate, that th'enhabitauntez of the same there may not long abide".<sup>3</sup> The petition asked that trade with Scotland should be limited to Berwick and Carlisle, and that only burgesses and franchised men of Berwick be permitted to sell salmon from the Tweed. The inhabitants also sought the farm of all

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1. Ibid. ; PRO E.39/93/10, (Bain, 1521) ; Rot. Scot., II, pp.475-476, 557 ; Foedera, V. pt.iii, pp.169-172, esp. p.171.

2. Acts of Court of the Mercers' Company, 1453-1527, ed. L. Lyell, (Cambridge U.P., 1936), p.143.

3. Rot. Parl., VI, pp.224-225 ; Stat. Realm, II, pp.475-476 (22 Edward IV c.8).

waters and fishing places within the town and lordship, the occupation of all liberties, franchises, and customs of the town, and the free shipment of all goods and merchandise to and from Berwick; the only proviso to the act was that it ought not to prejudice the rights of the Bishops of Durham. Evidently the economic rejuvenation of Berwick and the growth in population were perceived to be of military and strategic value, and one suspects that the inhabitants manipulated the fear of the English monarch (of a Scottish attack) to obtain economic concessions for themselves.

During the 1470's, James III had endeavoured to strengthen his security in Berwick by granting tenements therein to various individuals, and I would suggest that the Berwick accounts do not indicate that the local economy was as weak as the inhabitants later claimed (from 1483).<sup>1</sup> By 1465, the customars accounted at the Scottish Exchequer for £31.5s.1½d., and by 1481 this had risen to £146.6s.8d., while the chamberlains and bailiffs accounted for £127.11s.10d.<sup>2</sup> From 1478-1480, James III spent more than the Berwick accounts were bringing in, but this cannot reasonably be attributed to any local economic crisis.<sup>3</sup> The real problem for both Scottish and English monarchs was that the very high cost of defence greatly exceeded any local income, and, as the costs grew in the sixteenth century, Berwick came to present a financial crisis of national importance. Why then did Scottish monarchs refuse to relinquish their claims?

In addition to the personal prestige attached to Berwick by English and Scottish Kings, it was "a place of special importance either to make

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1. R.M.S., II, 1424-1513, nos.1133, 1165, 1275, 1276, 1280-1282, 1285, 1293, 1379, 1412 ; E.R., VII, pp.364, 421, 504, 578-579, 665 ; E.R., VIII, pp.118-119, 187-188, 388-389, 455-457, 539-540, 551-552, 620-621, 633-635 ; E.R., IX, pp.63-64, 81-82, 145-146, 157-158.
  2. E.R., VII, p.364 ; E.R., IX, pp.145-146, 157-158 ; Nicholson, p.400.
  3. E.R., VIII, pp.551-552, 633-635 ; E.R., IX, pp.63-64.

easy our entrance into that kingdom, or to keep them from invading ours....".<sup>1</sup> Possession of Berwick obviously increased one's chances of maintaining security and stability on the Eastern Marches, especially in view of the fact that, for practical reasons, Scottish expeditions entered England in the east; Fox noted in 1523 that "the Scottes haue not muche with a great army invaded" the other marches.<sup>2</sup> Berwick effectively obstructed the progress of any Scottish expedition since it either had to be besieged and captured (a difficult task for even a large army) or avoided altogether (thereby rendering the expedition vulnerable to a flank attack). Moreover, since the Scots also feared the English using Berwick to launch attacks, English possession of the Border fortress was both a psychological and a practical restraint on Scottish militarism on the eastern marches. Carlisle served a similar strategic function on the western marches, as evinced by the Scottish attempts to capture it in 1461 and the 1520's, and clearly English monarchs perceived of Carlisle and Berwick as the twin pillars of their security system in the North; Carlisle was, nonetheless, not threatened by the Scots to the same extent in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.<sup>3</sup>

The Border towns and castles (such as Wark, Ayton, and Norham) undoubtedly provoked a measure of contention in Anglo-Scottish relations. Friction surfaced from time to time, as evinced by the reciprocal attacks on Norham and Ayton in 1497, or by the affray at

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1. MS. Stowe 268, f.11, B.L. (an eighteenth century life of Richard III).
  2. MS. Cotton Caligula B.VI, f.287v, B.L. ; printed by Ellis, Letters, I, (3rd ser.), CXIV, pp.319-324.
  3. Carlisle Royal Charters, ed. Ferguson, pp.21, 25, 30, 37, 48, 53-89 ; PRO E.404/75/3, no.56, for royal concessions to Carlisle. Commynes, p.345, stated that frontier defence was an essential expense at all times.

Norham in 1498.<sup>1</sup> Such incidents were fairly natural manifestations of Anglo-Scottish militarism in the marches, and clearly disputes over Dunbar and Berwick were insufficiently serious to undermine Anglo-Scottish truces. Arguably the recapture of Berwick in 1482 marked the end of an era in Border warfare. The days of Border fortresses changing hands many times were effectively over, and instead of garrisoning captured fortifications, in the main, the English and Scots now sought to destroy them; perhaps a conscious attempt to demilitarise the neighbouring marches. This practice was manifest, for example, in the English attack on Ayton in 1497, and in the conduct of the Scottish army in 1513 which avoided Berwick and sought to capture and destroy some of the smaller English fortresses, such as Norham. In this respect the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries constitute something of a transitional period in Border history.

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#### (E) Piratical and Maritime Activity

From 1488, the provisions in Anglo-Scottish truces for the settlement of maritime disputes were less elaborate than in earlier truces, and generally referred to customary practice for the resolution of resolvable difficulties.<sup>2</sup> Provisions, such as those relating to shipwrecks and stolen goods, had evidently emerged from centuries of practical experience, and, in general, sought to protect mariners, merchants, and shipowners from plunder and extortion at the hands of traditional enemies.<sup>3</sup> In view of the existence of an established machinery, one would only expect maritime incidents to cause difficulties in Anglo-

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1. see Chapter Three.

2. Cardew thesis, pp.260-262.

3. Ibid. For maritime laws see MS. Harleian 771, ff.1-17, B.L.

See below pp. 243 - 245 for trade.

Scottish relations whenever tensions were already running high or in certain circumstances; clearly, for example, the piracy of rebel subjects constituted a markedly different crime to the depredations committed by loyal subjects during peacetime.

A notable case which emerged in the 1470's pertained to the ship "Salvator", built by Bishop Kennedy of St. Andrews, and the largest vessel on the seas.<sup>1</sup> The ship was wrecked near Bamburgh and plundered by the English, probably in 1472, and perhaps as early as 1471; the fact that agreement was not concluded until 1475 is testimony to the slow pace of the established machinery in resolving important disputes.<sup>2</sup> In 1473, James III complained to the Duke of Burgundy that the Scots had "sustenit gret skaith and dampnage vnredressit" by sea and land, and he observed that unless redress from the English was quickly forthcoming his subjects could not keep the "pese".<sup>3</sup> In September the English and Scottish commissioners at Alnwick had referred the matter to their Admirals.<sup>4</sup> In May 1474, the Scottish Parliament proposed that an embassy should discuss the "barga" with the English, and at the end of July, it was one of the subjects mentioned by Edward IV's commission to the English

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1. Lesley, p.87 ; Major, p.389 ; Pitscottie, I, p.154 ; Buchanan, 2, p.201 ; Nicholson, p.392.
  2. cf. Lesley, p.90 ; Nicholson, pp.392, 477-478 ; Rot. Scot., II, pp.434-435 ; Bradley thesis, p.260 ; Scotfield, Edward IV, II, p.102 ; E. Bateson, A History of Northumberland, I, (15 vols., 1893-1940), p.147 ; Balfour's Historical Works, I, p.197 ; chronicle in Pinkerton, I, App.XXI, p.503, and Macdougall, James III, App.A, p.311, and pp.96, 116, 118.
  3. Fasc. Nat. MSS. Scotland, II, doc.LXXVI, p.61 ; N.L.S., Adv.MS. 7.1.19, ff.98-105.
  4. PRO E.39/52, (Bain, 1409) ; Foedera, V, pt.iii, pp.34-35. The admirals were the royal dukes, Gloucester and Albany.

envoys.<sup>1</sup> Evidently the Anglo-Scottish commissioners reached some amicable settlement, for, on 25th October, James III issued letters of acquittance for the plunder of the ship, and Edward IV paid 500 marks to the Bishop of Aberdeen as restitution for the Scottish merchants; his receipt was dated 3rd February, 1475.<sup>2</sup> But no sooner had one dispute been resolved than another emerged, for the Scots again complained about English maritime depredation and the failure of the English to attend Border diets to settle such "attemptates".

James III complained of the "dispoille of the Kinges own proper carveille....by the Englisshe men being in the mary floure", and of the capture of "the lord of luf' his shipp by the Lord Grey".<sup>3</sup> Dr. Legh was instructed by Edward IV to inform the Scots that redress would be made when he received proof of the "verray value" of the goods despoiled. Furthermore, the Duke of Gloucester, the English Admiral, was to be informed that the King had sent out Chancery writs warning his subjects with complaints about Scottish "attemptates by see" to attend at Alnwick on 8th May 1475, "in manyer and forme of old tymes accustomed". At that time, the Lieutenants or deputies of the Duke of Gloucester, "for the admirallite", would receive the bills of complaint and assign a day for redress with the Scottish Admiral at South Berwick. Gloucester was also to inform the Scottish Admiral to send his officials to Alnwick on 8th May for the redress of Scottish complaints in the indenture which

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1. A.P.S., II, p.106 ; Lesley, p.90 ; PRO C.81/849/3977, (Bain, 1414) ; see also PRO C.81/1508, nos.4662-4664, (12-14) ; Foedera, V, pt.iii, p.44.
  2. PRO E.39/99/96, E.39/1/32, (Bain, 1416, 1424) ; Foedera, V, pt.iii, pp.46-47, 59.
  3. For the following see MS. Cotton Vespasian C.XVI, ff.121-126, B.L., esp. ff.123-126. This interesting MS. has never apparently been published, but the maritime aspects are briefly mentioned in T.A., I, p.lxii ; Pinkerton, I, p.284 ; Macdougall, James III, pp.117-118.

Diligence pursuivant had carried to London.<sup>1</sup> Those persons against whom the Scots made complaint "shuld be forthwith somoned or put vndir arrest" to ensure that they appeared to answer the charges, "as the lawe of the trewes and of the see requiren in this behalf", provided that all parties held safe-conducts from the respective Wardens.<sup>2</sup> If there was insufficient time to arrange things by 8th May, Gloucester and his council were to make suitable arrangements, but Edward IV stressed that this was "a matier syttyng hym so nygh that he trusteth his brothr of Gloucestr wol sett a spedy sadd and iust direction therin such as may be for the goode of peax and rest of thoo partyes in the Kynges absence". I would suggest that Richard was somewhat lax in the discharge of his duty as Admiral and Warden of the Western marches, and this was clearly why the established machinery had failed to resolve the difficulties which had arisen.<sup>2A</sup> This is perhaps nowhere more discernible than in the closing lines of Legh's instructions, for "where the Kyng of Scottes wrote to the King for restitution of the dispoille of two shippes wherof the oon was robbed by the Mary flower etc. the King wol that my Lord of Gloucestr be spoken with in that partye consideryng that the saide shipp was his at that tyme". Evidently the English Admiral was himself responsible for acts of piracy against the Scots. Fortunately, however, Edward implemented his good intentions by effective action; on 8th May, Sir John Culquhone acknowledged the receipt of 100 marks from Edward IV in recompense for a ship plundered "be the lord grey of cotnor and his familiares".<sup>3</sup>

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1. "Diligence pursuivant" received 53s.4d. from Edward IV in Easter term 1475 ; PRO E.405/60, m.8, (Bain, 1428).
  2. This contemporary description of the procedure for holding a border diet is of considerable interest. 2A. see below pp. 252 - 256.
  3. PRO E.39/92/33, (Bain, 1429).

In the 1470's maritime infractions of Anglo-Scottish truces clearly did not undermine goodwill, and the more minor the infraction, the more easily it was resolved; in Michaelmas term 1476-77, for example, Edward IV granted 20s. compensation to a Scottish and a French merchant, robbed off the Suffolk coast by William Talbott and other rebels, while English merchants sought and obtained redress from the Scottish Lords of the council.'

In the Anglo-Scottish conflict of 1480-1484, Edward IV sought to make effective use of English shipping, and the Tellers Rolls and Patent Rolls contain numerous interesting entries pertaining to the purchase and manning of vessels.<sup>2</sup> According to Lesley, the English ships ravaged the Forth and captured and burned "Blaknesse".<sup>3</sup> During the winter of 1481-1482 Berwick was besieged by land and sea, while in Michaelmas term 1482-83 William Eustas, sergeant at arms, received 33s.4d. for collecting various Scotsmen recently captured at sea.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, Richard III had a "remarkable success" against the Scots at sea in the summer of 1484.<sup>5</sup> However, the English were far from being masters of the seas, as evinced by references to Scottish pirates in the Cely correspondence, and by the licences granted to various Bretons in January 1483; the Bretons were permitted to ship and export beans, in recompense for merchandise lost at

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1. PRO E.405/63, m.lv, (Bain, 1443). For a Scottish example see A.D.A., I, p.22.
  2. PRO E.405/69, E.405/70, (Bain, 1466, 1474) ; C.P.R., 1476-1485, pp.240, 264.
  3. Lesley, pp.95-96 ; Nicholson, pp.490-492.
  4. PRO E.405/71, m.5v, (Bain, 1478) ; Lesley, p.96.
  5. Croyland Chronicle, p.173.



the hands of the Scots while assisting Edward IV against them.<sup>1</sup> Evidently, during conflicts, maritime relations degenerated into an extension of the land-based hostilities, and the system which existed for the redress of grievances was probably suspended until the vestiges of conciliation and co-operation were restored.

Under Henry VII, Anglo-Scottish maritime relations were of considerable interest despite the problems presented by the evidence. Buchanan implied, for example, that Henry sent ships to Scotland in 1488 to support James III, but there is no other evidence to confirm this assertion.<sup>2</sup> The evidence for 1489 to 1491 is more prolific, although there are some gaps; for example, the fact that Henry sent a shipment of munitions to Scottish rebels in Dumbarton castle is well enough known, but the travels of the vessel are somewhat mysterious.<sup>3</sup> The reference in the Scottish accounts in February 1489 to a "Kingis schip...chaysit in Dumbertane be the Inglismen" probably indicates that the English shipment reached its destination.<sup>4</sup> Perhaps ironically, most of the evidence of English maritime activity is to be found in Scottish sources.

According to Pitscottie, the Scottish mariner Andrew Wood captured five of Henry VII's ships off Dunbar with his vessels the 'Yellow Carvel' and the 'Flower'.<sup>5</sup> Probably, however, the English ships belonged to

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1. PRO C.81/884/5721 and 5722, (Bain, 1487) ; PRO SC.1/53, nos.69, 127, printed in The Cely Letters, ed. H. E. Malden, pp.57-58, 106, and ed. Hanham, pp.104-105, 161-162 ; see also PRO E.404/77/3, no.41 ; Scotfield, II, pp.340-341.
  2. Buchanan, 2, pp.223-224 ; Conway, p.20.
  3. PRO E.405/78, m.6 ; PRO E.36/124, ff.75-76, 82 ; Conway, pp.28-30 ; SRO GD.45/1/1, James IV's letter mentioning his "rebellis and traittoris" (13th Sept. 1489).
  4. T.A., I, p.129.
  5. Pitscottie, I, pp.226-231, esp.227 ; Buchanan, 2, pp.223-227 ; Conway, pp.30-31.

various merchants; since Henry VII reputedly only had five royal ships by 1488, it is unlikely that the capture of the entire fleet would escape comment in English sources.<sup>1</sup> Pitscottie claimed that Henry responded by offering £1,000 annuity for Wood's capture, and that the Scot then defeated the English under Stephen Bull in a battle "quhilk was werie terrabill to sie".<sup>2</sup> James IV reputedly followed the victory by sending Bull, his ships and mariners, and "giftis of gould and sillwer" to Henry VII.<sup>3</sup> These maritime incidents are not mentioned by English chroniclers and might well be regarded with considerable scepticism were it not for the fact that Wood's son probably provided Pitscottie's information; moreover, circumstantial evidence indicates that an incident had occurred, even if Pitscottie inserted some fanciful details. Both Bull and Wood received rewards from their respective sovereigns, and yet these maritime incidents do not appear to have caused long-term Anglo-Scottish animosity.<sup>4</sup> Interestingly, Henry VII continued to grant safe-conduct to Scottish merchants and mariners from 1489 to 1491 and he is unlikely to have done so if maritime infractions appeared to be undermining the peace.<sup>5</sup>

In 1493 English maritime activity was evidently a response to the machinations of Perkin Warbeck. During Easter term, Stephen Bull, John

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1. Pitscottie, I, p.226 ; Chrimes, Henry VII, pp.226-227 ; C. F. Richmond, 'English Naval Power in the Fifteenth Century', History, LII (1967), pp.1-15 ; C. S. Goldingham, 'The Navy Under Henry VII', E.H.R., XXXIII (1918), pp.472-488.
  2. Pitscottie, I, pp.227-230. This may hint at eye-witness testimony.
  3. Ibid., pp.230-231.
  4. PRO. E.403/2558, f.25, (Bain, 1566) ; R.M.S., II, 1424-1513, nos.2019, 2038, 2040.
  5. PRO. C.82/68 (provided that the peace endured), C.82/75, C.82/81, (Bain, 1550, 1565, 1567, 1575).

Clerk, and William Nasshe received 20 marks for a vessel named 'La Bonaventure' and for the payment of soldiers and other essentials.' In July, Henry VII wrote to Lord Dynham, Sir Reginald Bray, and Robert Lytton to have the "shippes of warre" under Bull, Clerk, and Nasshe revictualled and "newcopired" at Orwell, "and furthre to be waged for Six wekes"; Orwell was specifically chosen "because it lyeth metely bitwene the costes of fflanders and of Scotland for oure flete the sonner to be on the see And for the sonner to rancontre our rebelles and their complices in their saillinges to and fro".<sup>2</sup> Subsequent to the truce of June 1493 the English paid the Scots £50 and 1,000 marks in full satisfaction of all injuries which they had committed by land and sea, and for the remainder of Henry VII's reign there is little evidence concerning maritime activity; however, the English used ships during the Anglo-Scottish conflict of 1497 and safe-conducts continued to be granted to merchants.<sup>3</sup> The reigns of Henry VII and James IV are of undoubted interest in British maritime history, since both monarchs perceived that seapower had evident military and economic benefits.<sup>4</sup>

James IV's favourites, Robert, John, and Andrew Barton were merchants and sea-captains par excellence.<sup>5</sup> There is ample evidence of

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1. PRO. E.403/2558, f.39, (Bain, 1587).
  2. PRO. SC.1/51, no.110 ; printed by Conway, App. IV, pp.148-149.
  3. PRO. C.82/329/74, E.39/102/32, E.39/99/54, E.39/99/71, (Bain, 1591, 1595, 1596, 1597) ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, pp.70-71 ; Naval Accounts, ed. Oppenheim, pp.xlii, 82-132, from PRO. E.36/7, ff.135-208.
  4. see the articles cited on page 60 note 1 ; W. S. Reid, 'Sea Power in the Foreign Policy of James IV of Scotland', Medievalia et Humanistica, XV (1963), pp.97-107 ; C. S. Goldingham, 'The Warships of Henry VIII', The United Service Magazine, LIX (1919), pp.453-462.
  5. W. Stanford Reid, Skipper From Leith : the History of Robert Barton of Over Barnton (Philadelphia, 1962) ; R. L. Mackie, James IV, pp.207-210 ; Nicholson, pp.592-596 ; Coleman thesis, pp.129-138 ; James IV Letters, pp.lii-liv, and nos.1,41,43,84,125,148,157,166, 206-208, 217, 245, 277, 286, 310, 312, 324, 330, 387, 412, 414, 418, 565.

their legitimate mercantile activities, but it was as pirates that they attained notoriety in Anglo-Scottish tradition.' As a result of a maritime incident involving the Portuguese many years before, the Bartons' father, John, had received letters of marque from James III; this was the accepted means of obtaining redress when other means had failed, but the problem in this case was that a genuine grievance was perpetuated by the second generation of Bartons. For some reason James IV appears to have renewed the letters of marque in November 1506, though it is unlikely that he appreciated the degree to which the Bartons' piratical activities would annoy other western European monarchs and their subjects from 1508 to 1511.<sup>2</sup> Things came to a head in 1511, since, according to Edward Hall, Andrew Barton interpreted his letters of marque as a licence to plunder all shipping, including English vessels.<sup>3</sup> Henry VIII was reputedly furious at this Scottish piracy, and his subsequent response clearly provoked Anglo-Scottish tension. Instead of taking their grievances to the Admirals or to the Scottish Lords of the Council, the English merchants bypassed this established machinery and appealed directly to the King for redress. To compound matters, Henry VIII's actions ignored the provisions outlined in the 1502 Anglo-Scottish treaty; the English monarch was therein authorised to issue letters of marque only if the Scottish King had not responded to an appeal for redress within six months.<sup>4</sup> Henry characteristically jumped the gun by

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1. Ledger of Halyburton, ed. C. Innes (1867), pp.71, 73, 82, 89, 167, 192, 211 ; T.A., I - IV, passim.
  2. see page 61 note 5 ; L. & P. R.III and H.VII, II, pp.274-76 ; T.A., IV, p.106 ; James IV Letters, nos.125, 206-208 ; MS. Royal 13 B.I., ff.287-288, B.L. (a notarial copy of August 1560).
  3. Hall, p.525 ; Grafton, II, pp.242-243 ; Lesley, pp.130-135 ; James IV Letters, 315, 387, p.213 n.1 ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 828, p.440.
  4. R. L. Mackie, James IV, p.210 ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, p.169.

instructing Sir Edward Howard (his Admiral), and Lord Thomas Howard, to deal with Barton summarily and ruthlessly.' The other details are well known; the Howards put to sea in June 1511 and Barton was killed during their subsequent encounter in the Downs. A highly fanciful sixteenth century ballad reveals that this incident captured contemporary imaginations; according to this source Barton, "brase within and steelle without", rallied his men against the "English dogges" as he lay dying.<sup>2</sup> Little wonder that the Lord Charles Howard in this fictional account declared to his King that "England had never such an enniemie".<sup>3</sup>

Barton's ships, the 'Lion' and the 'Jenny Pirwin', were retained by the English, though the captured Scottish crewmen were pardoned by Henry VIII and returned home.<sup>4</sup> James IV consequently appears to have regarded himself as an aggrieved victim of English perfidy, but it is difficult to believe that he seriously expected Henry VIII to meet his demands and produce his Admiral before the Warden Court. The contrast with events in 1475 is of some interest since at that time James III had left discipline to the discretion of Edward IV, and the latter had duly responded by means of speedy redress and sharp communication with the Duke of Gloucester.<sup>5</sup> The problem in 1511 lay not only in the more fractious climate in Anglo-Scottish relations, but also in the different perceptions

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1. P. C. Standing, 'Henry VIII's Lord High Admiral', The United Service Magazine, XXIII (1901), pp.448-456.
  2. English Miscellanies, pp.64-75, esp. 68, 71-74 ; also in Naval Songs and Ballads, ed. C. H. Firth, Navy Records Society, XXXIII (1908), pp.xiii-xiv, 6-15, 340-341 ; English and Scottish Popular Ballads edited From the Collection of Francis James Child, ed. H. C. Sargent and G. L. Kittredge, (London, 1905), pp.407-412.
  3. English Miscellanies, p.74.
  4. L. & P. H.VIII, I, 969 (2, 7), pp.485-486 ; Rot.Scot., II, pp.576-577.
  5. see pp.56-57 and page 56 note 3.

of Barton's conduct. To the English, Barton was a pirate whose reign of terror had been curtailed by recourse to arbitrary, but essential, action, while the Scots doubtless regarded him as a sea-captain cruelly slain by their perfidious neighbours; in reality, Barton was by turns both patriot and pirate. The character of the two monarchs was also a significant consideration in 1511, since both James and Henry displayed insensitivity and high-handedness; for example, Henry reportedly told James that it did not become one prince to accuse another of breaking a treaty simply because he had dealt justice to a pirate.<sup>1</sup>

There is some evidence that the Barton incident threatened to undermine Anglo-Scottish accord in 1511, and it is therefore ironic, in view of the turn of events in 1513, that among those who laboured most assiduously to maintain the peace were Wolsey and Louis XII of France.<sup>2</sup> A comparison may be drawn between 1511 and the earlier dispute between Wood and Bull in 1490, but I do not accept that the Barton incident differed because James IV now desired to go to war with the English.<sup>3</sup> I maintain that the Scottish grievances were justified, and that the important differences between 1511 and 1490 pertained to the relationships between the monarchs and to the prevailing climates of opinion; where tension was tempered by conciliation in 1490, in 1511 the tension was clearly intensified by reciprocal heavy handedness. Contrary to the tradition that Anglo-Scottish conflict was somehow inevitable after the Barton incident, it is clear that Henry VIII aspired to restore the established machinery for the redress of maritime grievances.

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1. Hall, p.525 ; Grafton, II, p.243.

2. For defensive activity see L. & P. H.VIII, I, pt.1, 827, 833 (65), 845, 854 ; C.S.P. Venetian, II, 119, p.49 ; R. L. Mackie, James IV, pp.211-212 ; Rot.Scot., II, pp.575-577.

3. cf. Coleman thesis, pp.137-138.

In 1512 Thomas Lord Dacre and Nicholas West are known to have presented a list of English complaints to the Scots from merchants who had suffered from Scottish maritime depredations.<sup>1</sup> The Scottish pirates included Robyn and John Barton, and John Forman (a "houshald seruaunt" of James IV), while the crimes outlined in the document included robbery and plunder of ships and merchandise, the resetting of ships and merchandise by Scottish ports and pirates, and the ransoming of English mariners. A reasonable inference to be drawn from this document is that the machinery for the redress of grievances was not at fault, and that the failings lay with the monarchs who ignored the established procedure or neglected to coerce their officials to maintain the system. Evidently the established machinery did not collapse in the years preceding Flodden and, despite his actions in 1511, Henry VIII had clearly not turned away from custom and practice. The cause of Anglo-Scottish conflict presumably lies elsewhere.

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(F) Malcontents and Traitors in Anglo-Scottish Relations

Although Anglo-Scottish truces traditionally provided some measure of assurance that political rebels, traitors, and criminals, would be denied the support of neighbouring monarchs and their subjects, in reality, the practice of aiding, abetting, and "resetting" such malcontents was fairly widespread in Anglo-Scottish relations from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century.<sup>2</sup> One cannot reasonably compare the period up to the early sixteenth century with the success of the later Tudors in

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1. PRO E.36/254, ff.293-300, (damaged) ; abstract in L. & P. H.VIII, I, 1262, pp.577-578.
2. Cardew thesis, pp.263-276 (the truces) ; Bradley thesis, pp.312-314 ; 'Tudor Intrigues in Scotland', The Scottish Review, XXIV (1894), pp.225-252.

establishing an Anglophile party in Scotland, but it would be rash to deny that support for malcontents was a trump card which all English and Scottish monarchs were prepared to play. The fact that the results were generally disappointing, even in 1485 when James III indirectly assisted Henry Tudor to oust Richard III from the English Throne, is somewhat irrelevant, as I hope to show in the following pages.

Regardless of the technical illegalities involved in supporting and assisting neighbouring malcontents, the practice was enshrined not only in practical political relationships but also in contemporary political theory. In More's Utopia, for example, the clear association of such concepts as the Franco-Scottish alliance, English claims of suzerainty, and the habitual assistance of rebels and traitors, illustrates not only the political theory underpinning Anglo-Scottish practices, but also that political theorists apparently perceived of such multifarious ideological aspects as a manifestation of the same policy.<sup>1</sup> The French historian Philippe de Comynes based his political theories on the practices of Louis XI, "one of the cleverest and most subtle princes of his generation".<sup>2</sup> As he concluded, "a wise prince is always at pains to obtain a friend or friends in his adversary's party and to protect himself from him [= his adversary] as best he can".<sup>3</sup> English<sup>and</sup> Scottish monarchs in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries evidently subscribed to this theory, as was manifest by their actions. The time-honoured diplomatic practice of exploiting enemy weaknesses by supporting discord within the neighbouring realm constituted a reinforcement to policies of Anglo-Scottish rapprochement based on periodic truces and attempts to conclude

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1. The Complete Works of Sir Thomas More, vol.4, ed. E. Surtz, S. J. and J. H. Hexter, (London, 1965), pp.88-89, 204-205.

2. Comynes, p.317.

3. Ibid., p.199.



matrimonial alliances. Henry VII was something of a grandmaster of the practice, and despite the claims of English chroniclers and propagandists, the Scots held no monopoly of manipulation, duplicity, and deceit.

By supporting the exiled Lancastrians in the 1460's the Scots acquired Berwick and the promise of Carlisle. There can be no doubt that up to 1464 the Scots were thus able to undermine Edward IV's security in northern England, as evinced by the testimony of extant chronicles and contemporary correspondence.<sup>1</sup> Edward IV responded by concluding an agreement with the Earl of Ross, in February 1462, by which the Earl, Donald Balloch and his son John, and their subjects, agreed to become the liegemen of the English King and to assist him in Scotland and Ireland.<sup>2</sup> The English agent was the Earl of Douglas, a Scottish noble who had found sanctuary in England since his forfeiture and exile in 1455, and the fact that he received political and financial support from successive monarchs, Henry VI, Edward IV, and Richard III, illustrates that support for Scottish malcontents and traitors was an established practice which effectively circumvented factional and regnal chronology. Whether peace or conflict prevailed in Anglo-Scottish relations was of little relevance. On 9th December, 1463, for example, Edward IV and James III agreed to a short truce by land and sea, to 31st October 1464, and this included their reciprocal declaration not to assist various rebels.<sup>3</sup> Those

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1. Paston Letters, II, 1461-1471, nos.385, 387, 413, 452, 458, 459, 463, 464, etc. ; Stonor Letters, I, C.S., XXIX (1919), pp.62-63 ; MS. Harleian 543, ff.145-150, B.L., printed by Halliwell, Letters, I, pp.123-131, Ellis, Letters, I, (2nd ser.), XLI, pp.126-131 ; Warkworth's Chronicle, C.S., X, (1839), pp.1-3 ; Gregory's Chronicle, C.S., XVII (1876), pp.216-239 ; Three Fifteenth Century Chronicles, C.S., XXVIII, pp.77-80 ; Bradley thesis, pp.221-249.
  2. Rot.Scot., II, pp.402, 405-407 ; Nicholson, pp.401-402 ; Macdougall, James III, p.59 ; Foedera, V., pt.ii, pp.108-109.
  3. SRO SP.6/21 ; Foedera, V., pt.ii, p.118.

specifically mentioned included Henry VI, his queen and heir, Henry Duke of Somerset, Thomas lately Lord Roos, Robert lately Lord Hungerford, Sir Ralph Grey and Sir Richard Tunstall, while Edward IV agreed to detain his liegeman the Earl of Douglas and any of his other Scottish subjects in his own realm. In return, James III made similar promises if any Lancastrian exiles became his liegemen, and both monarchs agreed that this should "bee obserued in as gode fourme and maner accustomed as it hath herebifore been at any tyme kepte and obserued...." Both Kings appreciated from the outset that the "accustomed" manner of observing such diplomatic niceties involved paying lip-service to the principle of the agreement while doing more or less exactly as one pleased. Rhetoric bore little resemblance to diplomatic practice; despite the Anglo-Scottish truces of the 1460's, up to the 1470's, and beyond, the English gave financial assistance and political asylum to various Scots such as the ubiquitous Earl of Douglas and the disinherited Lord Boyd (from 1471), while the Scots continued to support Lancastrian exiles, such as the Earls of Oxford and Pembroke.

The Earl of Douglas, who had been elevated to the Order of the Garter in 1461, received confirmation of his annuity during the readep-  
tion of Henry VI, and this sum was evidently paid by Edward IV up to 1470 and from 1471.<sup>1</sup> By 1475 the annuity was said to amount to £390, and since the Earl was accompanying the King to France, it was agreed that if he died within three years of leaving England his executors might receive £600 from various counties and towns, provided that this did not

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1. C.C.R., 1468-1476, pp.152-153, (Bain, 1392) ; G. F. Beltz, Memorials of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, (London, 1841), pp. lxxi, clxiii ; MS. Additional 6298, f.312v, B.L. ; MS. Harleian 304, f.118v, B.L.

exceed £200 per annum.<sup>1</sup> In February 1484, Douglas was granted an annuity of £200 from Richard III, and he received payments of £40 in March and 20 marks in April and May.<sup>2</sup> In addition, the Earl received various sums throughout the period; for example, £141.16s.2d. for his retinue in Easter term 1475, £40 in Michaelmas term 1477-78, 10s.11½d. in Michaelmas term 1478-79, and two payments of 100 marks in Michaelmas term 1480-81 "for certayn causes concernyng the defense of this oure Reame in the saide marches toward Scotland".<sup>3</sup>

English generosity was also manifest in the payments made to Lord Boyd; for example, £50 in Easter term 1474, £50 in Michaelmas term 1474-75, 50 marks of a 200 mark annuity in August 1474, £70.10s.6d. for his retinue in Easter term 1475, and £20 in Easter term 1480.<sup>4</sup> Boyd is also known to have received £25 annuity from the issues of Gretton in county Northampton.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, both of these Scottish nobles attended Edward IV on the French expedition in 1475; Boyd was paid as a Baron at 4s. a day and his company consisted of 2 men-at-arms and 20 archers, while the Earl was paid 6s.8d. a day and was accompanied by 4 men-at-arms and 40

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1. PRO C.49/37, no.3, (Bain, 1423) ; Bain, 1427 ; C.P.R. 1467-1477, p.513 ; Rot.Parl., VI, p.132 (p.76 mentions "certeyn severall sommes" worth £500 per annum).
  2. Bain, 1494, 1496, 1497 ; PRO C.81/896/516 ; Foedera, V, pt.iii, pp.141, 143, 146 ; C.P.R., 1476-85, pp.449, 459 ; C.C.R., 1476-85, 1064, 1069, pp.315-316.
  3. PRO E.405/60, m.5v, E.405/61, m.1, (Bain, 1428) ; PRO E.405/65 ; PRO E.405/66, m.lv ; PRO E.405/69, m.l., lv, (Bain, 1466, misdated 1479-80) ; PRO E.404/77/2 (64).
  4. PRO E.405/58, (Bain, 1413) ; PRO E.405/59, m.2v ; Bain, 1415 ; C.P.R., 1467-77, pp.466, 536 ; PRO E.405/68, m.l., (Bain, 1463).
  5. PRO C.81/856/4314, (Bain, 1441) ; Bain, 1440 ; C.C.R. 1468-1476, 1410, pp.393-394.

archers.'

In 1473 the English support for Douglas and Boyd contributed to Anglo-Scottish tension, but the English responded to Scottish complaints with charges that the Scots continued to assist exiled Lancastrians; the Earl of Oxford and Lords Lovel and Latimer had, for example, received safe-conducts from James III in 1471, while in July and August of that year the Earl of Pembroke was said to have been "keeping matters unsettled in England" with Scottish assistance.<sup>2</sup> On 13th July 1473, James III wrote to the Earl of Northumberland regarding border "depredacionis", an anticipated meeting for the redress of grievances, and his support for the Earl of Oxford.<sup>3</sup> The King declared that the Scots "war neuer requirit" to deliver the Earl to the English, and countered that they had received his "rebell and tratoure Robert Boid" in England; despite this, however, the Scots intended to observe the truce "to the gud publik of baith the realmes". The subject of Oxford was also raised by English commissioners in September the same year, but the Scottish commissioners were manifestly conciliatory; they stated that the Earl's safe conduct had not been renewed, and that he had "departit richt evill content".<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, the Scots denied that Oxford had taken English ships and goods to Scotland, or that they had any hand in his conspiracies against Edward IV. Concerning the Earl "and al utheris sic like", the Scottish monarch was said to have resolved to maintain the letter of Anglo-Scottish truces in future. At the time the Earl's activities at sea were

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1. PRO E.405/60, m.3, 5v ; PRO E.405/61, m.1., (Bain, 1428) ; Edward IV's French Expedition of 1475, The Leaders and their Badges, ed. F. P. Barnard, (Oxford, 1925), pp.2-2v ; Foedera, V., pt.iii, pp.56, 58.
  2. R.M.S., II, 1424-1513, nos.1017, 1033, pp.210, 213 ; C.S.P. Milanese, I, 229-231, pp.160-161 ; C.S.P., Venetian, I, 437, p.129.
  3. PRO E.39/102/22, (Bain, 1430 and App. no.24, but misdated 1475).
  4. PRO E.39/96/28, (Bain, 1431 and App. no.25, but misdated 1475).

an irritant to Edward IV; he seized St. Michael's Mount in Cornwall but surrendered after a siege in January 1474, and thus he was removed as an issue of Anglo-Scottish contention.<sup>1</sup>

Evidently support for malcontents and rebels did not pass without diplomatic comment, but it is clear that the practice provoked insufficient tension to seriously undermine Anglo-Scottish relations. This may not have been the case had the practice been unilateral, but since both monarchs technically infringed their diplomatic agreements, neither could reasonably adopt the stance of the injured party beyond the conventions of mutual recrimination from time to time. The tone of the two Scottish documents of 1473 varies somewhat, but one ought not to infer from this that James III was less peacefully inclined than his councillors; it is likely that diplomatic convention underlay the conciliatory emphasis of the Scottish commissioners' letter, and both documents indicated that the Scots intended to maintain the truce.<sup>2</sup>

During periods of Anglo-Scottish conflict, the practice of supporting malcontents and rebels had a more discernible impact than at other times. Scottish annuitants resident in England and malcontents and Anglophiles in Scotland constituted a weapon which might be utilised to undermine the monarch's domestic position, and clearly these Scots formed a useful means of establishing cross-Border communication. Thus, for example, in 1480-1481, Douglas and Boyd received 200 marks and £20, respectively, from a grateful Edward IV for services rendered and

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1. Jacob, Fifteenth Century England, pp.571-572 ; Scotfield, II, pp.85-89 ; PRO E.405/56, 57, 58, (Bain, 1406, 1412, 1413) ; Rot. Parl., VI, pp.144-149 ; PRO C.81/868/4942, (Bain, 1458) ; PRO E.405/67, (Bain, 1460) ; Paston Letters, III, nos.723, 725, 733, 736.

2. cf. Bradley thesis, pp.257-259.

anticipated.' On 22nd June 1481, the English monarch commissioned John Bayn the Mayor of Carrickfergus, Patrick Halyburton a Scottish chaplain, and Henry Pole captain of the fleet, to conclude an alliance with John of the Isles, Lord of the Glens, his council, and Donald Gorme.<sup>2</sup> It seems probable that the £10 which James III paid to an unnamed Irishman indicates a counter-measure to stir the Irish on his behalf, and, additionally, he equipped a ship with the aim of capturing Halyburton.<sup>3</sup> Then, on 22nd August, Edward IV commissioned Richard Duke of Gloucester and the Earl of Douglas to win over malcontent and Anglophile Scots by promising them land and gifts in return for their services.<sup>4</sup> James III's response was evident from the activity of the Scottish Parliament in early 1482; the accusation that Lord Lyle had treasonably conspired with Douglas, the promised reward to whomsoever could slay or capture the Earl, the 24 days granted for Douglas's supporters to seek remission, and the general respite and remission granted to those who had committed treason or trespass in the past.<sup>5</sup> Anxious to unmask the "vntrew persounis" who sympathised with Douglas, James even revoked all exemptions from the jurisdiction of the Warden courts, with the exception of Berwick, and evidently the Scottish monarch was fearful for his security, especially on the Borders.

Without doubt, the zenith of Edward IV's achievement in winning over Scottish malcontents came in his agreements with Alexander Duke of

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1. PRO E.405/68, m.l., E.405/69, m.l.,lv, (Bain, 1463, 1466 ; see Nicholson, p.491 n. for the date).
  2. PRO C.81/1521/48, (Bain, 1469) ; E.R., IX, pp.xxxix-xl ; Foedera, V, pt.iii, p.114 ; PRO E.405/69, m.l., E.405/70 m.6., (Bain, 1466, 1474).
  3. E.R., IX, pp. xl n.l., 211, 219 ; Nicholson, pp.495-496.
  4. PRO C.81/1520/26, (Bain, 1470).
  5. A.P.S., II, pp.137-140 ; Nicholson, pp.495-496.

Albany, James III's brother, in 1482 and 1483. Edward is known to have contacted Albany in November 1481, but in view of the lack of evidence it is not inconceivable that the Earl of Douglas, Louis XI, and Albany's personal discontent all played a part in bringing the Duke into Edward IV's service.' From April 1482 the English financial records abound with details of Albany's expenses in Southampton, London, and the North, but the official agreements made by the King and the Duke reveal that Edward exacted a high price for his support.<sup>2</sup>

On 10th June 1482, Albany, described as Alexander King of Scotland, promised to pay homage to Edward IV when he had obtained his rightful realm of Scotland, to renounce the "Auld Alliance" with France, and to surrender Berwick to England within 14 days of reaching Edinburgh.<sup>3</sup> On the following day, Edward pledged to assist Alexander in obtaining the Scottish Throne provided that Berwick, Liddesdale, Eskdale, Ewesdale, Annandale, and Lochmaben castle were granted to England, and Albany further agreed to conclude a matrimonial alliance with the English royal house.<sup>4</sup> About the same time Edward granted the Duke a safe-conduct, of 6 months duration, permitting him to pass freely between England and Scotland.<sup>5</sup> How seriously and to what extent Edward intended to use Albany to impose his will over Scotland is a matter of considerable conjecture. It is unlikely that the King was so naive as to regard the Scot as a panacea for the recurring ailments which plagued Anglo-Scottish

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1. Scofield, II, pp.334-336 ; cf. Bradley thesis, p.287 ; Nicholson, p.496. Jacob, Fifteenth Century England, p.585, wrongly dates Albany's arrival 1481.
  2. PRO E.404/77/3, nos.21, 46 ; PRO E.405/70, m.lv., 4, 5v, 6, 7, 8, (Bain, 1474).
  3. PRO E.39/92/17, (Bain, 1475) ; Foedera, V, pt.iii, p.120.
  4. PRO E.39/92/38, (Bain, 1476) ; Foedera, V, pt.iii, pp.120-121.
  5. PRO C.81/1521/49, (Bain, 1477).

relations, but probably he aspired to reap any tangible gains which might accrue as a consequence of his actions. Clearly large-scale military support for the rebellious brother of a Scottish monarch already undermined by domestic dissension was much more important in its impact on Anglo-Scottish relations than the financial assistance habitually provided for dispossessed nobles and gentlemen. Success, however, ultimately depended on the active support which any malcontent could muster in his own country, and in the conflict of 1480-1483 Edward IV overestimated the strength of Albany's support in Scotland and underestimated the strength of Anglophobia; English militarism was likely to fall short of expectations in such circumstances.

Albany's agreement of August 1482 with the Archbishop of St. Andrews, Bishop of Dunkeld, Lord Avendale, and the Earl of Argyle, illustrates his relative weakness in Scotland, and thus, within a few months of his return, the Duke was again making overtures to England.<sup>1</sup> On 12th January 1483 he commissioned Archibald Earl of Angus, Andrew Lord Gray, and Sir James Liddale, to negotiate with Edward IV, and on 8th February, Edward responded with a commission to the Earl of Northumberland, John Lord Scrope, and Sir William Parre.<sup>2</sup> These activities culminated in a treaty, on 11th February, which echoed many of the provisions of the 1482 agreements. The Duke formally became the liegeman of Edward IV and renounced his allegiance to Scotland; in addition he promised to assist in the final conquest of Scotland, and agreed to renounce the "Auld Alliance", assist Douglas to recover his Scottish inheritance, marry an English princess without charge (presumably

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1. PRO E.39/96/14, (Bain, 1479) ; Foedera, V., pt.iii, p.122.

2. PRO E.39/63/1, E.39/63/2, (Bain, 1486) ; Foedera, V., pt.iii, p.127 ; Rot.Scot., II, p.458, (dated 9th February).



without a dowry), and cede all Scottish rights to Berwick to England.<sup>1</sup> Edward IV, in turn, undertook to assist Albany in conquering Scotland, and it appears that, despite the ignominious failure of their 1482 agreements, the King still aspired to use Albany as a pawn to extort concessions from Scotland. A safe-conduct to the Earl of Douglas in February indicates that the English monarch continued to foment domestic difficulties for James III and probably only his death in April 1483 prevented him launching another expedition into Scotland.<sup>2</sup>

During the brief reign of Richard III, English domestic dissension effectively prevented that monarch from continuing the policy of Edward IV, and though he sheltered and rewarded Albany and Douglas, he provided little if any military support for their invasion of Scotland on 22nd July 1484. Their feeble expedition was thus easily thwarted by the Scottish borderers, and the Earl was captured by Alexander Kirkpatrick one of his former retainers.<sup>3</sup> Douglas, who had lived in England since 1455, ended his days quietly within the confines of Lindores Abbey; a somewhat anti-climatic demise for a Garter Knight and the annuitant of three successive English monarchs.<sup>4</sup> Albany, on the other hand, escaped to France and was killed jousting with the Duke of Orleans during a tournament in 1485.<sup>5</sup> Superficially, the large sums spent by English monarchs in maintaining Scottish malcontents and rebels had rendered remarkably poor returns, but I maintain that the monarchs are unlikely

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1. PRO E.39/57, (Bain, 1489) ; Foedera, V., pt.iii, pp.127-128.
  2. PRO C.81/884/5734, (Bain, 1490) ; Foedera, V., pt.iii, pp.128-129 ; S.R.O., RH.2/2/13, no.12.
  3. Lesley, p.76 ; A.P.S., II, p.173 ; E.R., IX, pp.lv, 519 ; R.M.S., II, 1424-1513, no.1603 (see also 1590, 1594, 1597) ; Macdougall, James III, pp.211-212 ; Buchanan, 2, pp.213-214.
  4. Lesley, pp.76, 106.
  5. Ibid., p.102.

to have concurred with this assessment. As an established political practice, the results were probably not judged by means of such crude absolutes as success or failure. The Kings aspired to maximize the potential in any given situation and, since potential lies in the future unfolding of events, it was thus axiomatic that optimistic monarchs remained optimistic and so continued to invest their money in rewards and annuities accordingly. This observation also helps to explain why English monarchs devoted precious time and energy to some of their more incredible schemes and agreements involving Scottish malcontents.

Two of Henry VII's agreements with Scottish malcontents have attracted some adverse historical criticism. The first of these, dated 17th April 1491, involved two of Henry's established Scottish annuitants, John Ramsay (consistently described as Lord Bothwell, despite his forfeiture of the title in 1488), and James Earl of Buchan.<sup>1</sup> Bothwell and Sir Thomas Todde guaranteed to King Henry, "a this side" of Michaelmas, repayment of £266.13s.4d. which he had lent to Buchan and Sir Thomas, under a now lost indenture, whereby they were bound to deliver "the Kyng of Scottis now reynyng and his brother the Duke of Roos, or at the leste the said Kyng of Scotland". As security, Todde was said to have laid his son and heir in pledge with Henry VII. Ambitious schemes of this nature generally provoke authoritative debate, especially since in this case there are no other references to the arrangement in the extant sources.<sup>2</sup> Scottish experts have doubted the traitorous involvement of the Earl of Buchan, but one cannot lightly dismiss Miss Conway's evidence which proves a "perfectly consistent career as a spy".<sup>3</sup> Moreover, the

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1. PRO E.39/5/12, (Bain, 1571) ; Foedera, V., pt.iv., p.29 ; Conway, pp.36-37 (misdated 27th April).
  2. eg. see Coleman thesis, pp.55-56, for criticisms.
  3. Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, I, pt.I, pp.2-3, 5 ; Conway, p.37.

arrangement appears considerably less novel when placed in the context of other agreements between English monarchs and Scottish malcontents; it was, for example, no more of a wild gamble than Edward IV's agreements with Albany, the Lord of the Isles, or the Lord of the Glens.

The second of Henry VII's agreements has also provoked controversy and debate, largely because this too exists in virtual isolation. On 16th November 1491, Henry's commissioners, Sir John Cheyney and Sir William Tyler, on his behalf came to an agreement with Archibald, Earl of Angus, by which the latter endeavoured to persuade James IV and the Scottish Lords to maintain peace with England "during the life natural of both the said Kings".<sup>1</sup> If Anglo-Scottish conflict were to occur, as was evidently feared at the time, Angus promised "to make plain war" on the Scots who opposed peace, deliver Hermitage castle to the English, and send his eldest son George and Robert Elwood as pledges. In return, Henry VII promised to recompense Angus with lands or goods in England "at the least of as great value" as the castle, and it was agreed that no Anglo-Scottish truce would be concluded unless the Earl "shall be therein comprised and gif his advice vnto the same". The Earl and his son agreed not to come to terms with James IV nor receive his pardon or remission without the license and consent of the English council, while, at the "reasonable request and desire" of Angus, Cheyney and Tyler were to "stir the Borders of England to make sharpe war upon the Scots and specially such as are enemies to the said Earl and to fauour his friends and louers". Indentures were to be made to this effect in writing and oaths exchanged "upon the holy Evangels", while the pledges were to be delivered within twenty days.

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1. The following is based on PRO E.39/100/103, (Bain, 1578 and App. no.32 ; L. & P. R.III, and H.VII, I, pp.385-387) ; MS. Cotton Caligula, D.II, f.14, B.L. ; MS Harleian 4648, ff.21-21v, B.L.

The agreement may be interpreted more realistically when one considers that Angus was out of favour with James IV at the time; on 29th July 1491, James had apparently ordered that the Earl be imprisoned in Tantallon castle, and he was besieged there in October.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, on 29th December he was deprived of Hermitage castle, that most ominous and imposing Border fortress which commanded the pass into Scotland through Liddesdale, and, by an exchange of lands, he lost his grip on the Scottish borders to Patrick Hailes, Earl of Bothwell.<sup>2</sup> He had already lost the Wardenship of the Scottish Marches to Bothwell in 1489, and thus Miss Conway has observed that the 1491 agreement cannot have been worth a great deal to Henry VII at the time.<sup>3</sup>

The problems presented by this document are compounded by the fact that both manuscript copies are badly defaced, one by damp and the other by fire. The date endorsed on both copies, 16th November 1491, has been disputed, but an eighteenth century copy of the endorsement which states 15th November is probably a transcriber's error; due to damage, "xv" is the only discernible figure on the first line.<sup>4</sup> Yet another copy of the document, which hitherto appears to have escaped attention, may be found among the Harleian MSS., and this permits one to reconstruct the draft document for the first time.<sup>5</sup> The date is confirmed as 16th November 1491, and the document makes an interesting comparison with the Record

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1. T.A., I, pp.cv-cvii, 180-181 ; W. Fraser, The Douglas Book, II, pp.90-93 ; Conway, p.38.
  2. R.M.S., II, 1424-1513, 2072-2074, 2092, 2106 ; E.R., X, p.lv.
  3. Conway, p.38.
  4. PRO E.39/100/103 ; MS. Cotton Caligula D.II, f.14, B.L. ; MS. Additional 4617, f.235, B.L. ; Conway, p.38 n.5 ; see also the catalogues MS. Stowe 138, f.38v, B.L. ; MS. Additional 9778, f.59, B.L. (16th Nov.).
  5. MS. Harleian 4648, ff.21-21v, B.L. (docs. copied from Cotton Caligula D.II prior to the fire which damaged the original).

Office version. In particular, the final two paragraphs of the draft differ, and there are interesting references therein to indentures which had previously been made at Raby between Angus, Cheyney, and Tyler, about which the other manuscripts are silent.

Henry VII, as noted elsewhere, did not share his subjects' hatred of the Scots, and he may have had good reason to be indebted to his northern neighbours.' In Rouen, Tudor was said to have taken "his daily victuals in penury" in the house of a Scot named Patrick King who also "bestowed upon him a large part of his fortune".<sup>2</sup> Additionally, Major, Pitscottie, Lesley, and Drummond all record that Henry was assisted at Bosworth by a company of Scotsmen.<sup>3</sup> The evidence is confused, contradictory, and exaggerated (particularly the numbers said to have fought in the battle), but one cannot ignore the oral tradition reflected by Pitscottie, or the evidence of 1485-1488.<sup>4</sup> In November 1485, Alexander Bruce, the reputed captain of the Scottish contingent, received a safe-conduct from Henry VII, and in February 1486, James III granted him lands in Mekil-Byrgehame, "pro ejus fideli et gratuito servitio regi tam infra regnum quam extra idem impenso".<sup>5</sup> On 27th March 1486, Henry VII granted

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1. see Chapter One.
  2. Major, p.393.
  3. Major, p.393 ; Drummond, p.55 ; Pitscottie, I, pp.191-196 ; N.L.S. Adv. MS. 35.5.3., vol.I, f.42v, (a seventeenth century continuation of Boece which mentions a contingent of 1,000 Scots) ; Lesley, p.100 ; Balfour's Historical Works, I, p.209.
  4. Pitscottie, I, pp.cxviii-cxix ; Conway, pp.5-6 ; Macdougall, James III, pp.215-216 ; R. A. Griffiths and R. S. Thomas, The Making of the Tudor Dynasty, (Gloucester, 1985), pp.130-131, 135, 174 ; M. Bennett, The Battle of Bosworth, (Gloucester, 1985), pp.9-10, 83, 104 ; P. W. Hammond, 'The Scots at Bosworth', The Ricardian, IV, no.56 (1977), pp.22-23.
  5. Rot. Scot., II, pp.469-470 ; Materials, I, p.174 ; R.M.S., II, 1424-1513, 1638, p.345 ; Conway, p.6 n.6.

Bruce an annuity of £20 for his good, faithful, and approved services, and for his great labours lately done in person; he also received payments of 20 marks and £40 in Michaelmas term 1488-89 for unspecified services rendered or anticipated.<sup>1</sup>

Probably James III supported Henry Tudor as a means of undermining Richard III and in the hope of acquiring Dunbar and Berwick from the English. Support for rebels and malcontents could conceivably pay dividends, but in terms of Henry's victory at Bosworth, domestic discontent and French support were much more significant than any minor Scottish assistance. Moreover, Henry's victory was something of a qualified success for James III; though the new English monarch was amicably disposed towards his neighbours, there were tensions in late 1485, and the English soon made it clear that they had no intention of surrendering Berwick to Scotland.

Despite the novelty engendered by Henry VII's pre-Bosworth relations with Scotland, his financial records reveal a series of payments and annuities to various Scotsmen, of whom Sir Thomas Turnbull, Buchan, Bothwell, Sir Adam Forman, and William Ford are perhaps the best known. John Ramsay, Lord Bothwell, attended Henry's coronation in October 1485, and served on Scottish embassies to England, but it is from 1488 that his ties with the Tudor monarch are well established. In that year James III's envoys were in England to obtain support for their sovereign against his rebels; Buchan, for example, received payments of 20 marks, £26.13s.4d., and £40 in Michaelmas term 1487-88, and a present of a harness from Henry VII.<sup>2</sup> Bothwell dined at court on 27th April 1488 and

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1. PRO C.82/8, (Bain, 1518, misdated 7th March) ; PRO E.403/2558, f.15, (Bain, 1544) ; PRO E.404/80, no.268 ; Conway, pp.6-7, 7-8.

2. PRO E.404/79, no.47 ; PRO E.405/75, m.27v, 31 ; PRO E.403/2558, f.9v ; Materials, II, pp.219, 300 ; Bain, 1527.

"kept his all Hallowtide" at Windsor with the King.' On 25th June, Bothwell and Henry Wyatt received £13.6s.8d. and £10, respectively, while the same writ of privy seal also included payments of £4 to Carlisle pursuivant and £10 to Clarenceaux herald of France.<sup>2</sup> The events of 1488 have been discussed in considerable detail elsewhere, but there is no solid evidence that, prior to the succession of James IV, Henry gave much assistance to either faction in Scotland.<sup>3</sup> Until James IV sat on the Scottish Throne one cannot reasonably argue that Henry's payments constituted an attempt to buy the loyalty of Scottish malcontents, in view of the fact that the recipients were James III's supporters. However, James IV's accession considerably altered the situation since the Scottish Parliament accused Buchan, Bothwell, and Ross of Montgrenan, of intrigue with England; Henry VII thereby became the effective paymaster of a small group of Scots regarded by the new regime as rebels and traitors.<sup>4</sup> This illustrates vividly that circumstance had a significant impact in determining attitudes and perceptions.

After the murder of James III at Sauchieburn, "divers Scottes came to the King for Releve", and Henry found himself as a focus of opposition to the faction of James IV.<sup>5</sup> On 15th January 1489, the King wrote to the Pope on behalf of the exiled Sir John Ross, begging him to intercede with

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1. MS. Cotton Julius B.XII, ff.48v, 49v, 51, B.L., printed in Collectanea, IV, pp.238-243 ; Paston Letters, III, 904, p.344.
  2. PRO E.403/2558, f.11, (Bain, 1534) ; PRO E.404/79, no.43 ; Materials, II, pp.297, 329. Possibly Clarenceaux passed on a message to Bothwell in London, cf. Conway, pp.18-19.
  3. Conway, chapters I and II.
  4. A.P.S., II, pp.201-204, 210 ; Conway, App.I, pp.144-146 ; Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, I, pt.I, pp.2-11.
  5. MS. Cotton Julius B.XII, f.51, B.L., printed in Collectanea, IV, p.243.

James IV for his restoration to good grace and favour.<sup>1</sup> In addition, Henry contributed £10 towards Ross's costs on his journey to Rome; a mission which evidently met with success judging by his reinstatement by James between 1489 and 1490.<sup>2</sup> Other Scots similarly benefited from Henry VII's support and financial assistance. In December 1488, Bothwell (the exiled John Ramsay) received £20, and sometime prior to Easter term 1489 he acquired an annuity of 100 marks which Henry continued to pay until at least Michaelmas term 1496.<sup>3</sup> Sir Adam Forman received an annuity of £40, paid initially in monthly installments, from Michaelmas term 1488 until at least 1500.<sup>4</sup> Sir Thomas Turnbull had an annuity of £40 from as early as April 1487 until approximately 1491, while William Ford's annuity of £24 was paid from about November 1489 until Easter term 1491.<sup>5</sup> Additionally numerous Scots, including these annuitants, received various payments from Henry VII. Unfortunately the records

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1. C.S.P. Venetian, I, doc. 549, p.177.
  2. Materials, II, p.397 ; R.M.S., II, 1424-1513, 1904, 1989.
  3. Materials, II, pp.375, 392, 475 ; PRO E.403/2558, ff.13-15, 17, 28-31, 34, 38, 41v, 46, 49v, 51v, 53v, 56v, 58v, 65v ; MS. Additional 7099, ff.9, 35-36, B.L. (Excerpta Historica, pp.85-133) ; PRO E.36/124, f.72 ; PRO E.101/414/6, ff.31v, 38 ; PRO E.36/130, f.17v ; PRO E.36/125, ff.42v, 71v ; PRO E.404/80, nos.88, 191 ; PRO E.404/81 ; PRO E.404/82 ; PRO E.404/86, nos.10, 12 ; PRO E.405/75, m. 43v, 46v ; PRO E.405/77, m.2 ; PRO E.405/78, m.4v, 6, 22v, 30, 49, 51, 54, 60 ; PRO E.405/79, m.6v, 8v, 9, 21v, 22 ; Bain, 1544, 1549, 1560, 1570, 1576, 1581, 1598, 1602, 1606, 1611, 1620, 1624 ; R.M.S., II, 1424-1513, 2348-2349, p.500 (for his remission and rehabilitation by James IV in April 1497).
  4. Materials, II, pp.394, 423 ; PRO E.403/2558, ff.13-15, 51v, (Bain, 1544, 1606) ; PRO E.404/80, no.87 ; PRO E.404/81 ; PRO E.404/86, no.7 ; PRO E.405/75, m.46, 46v, 51 ; PRO E.405/78, m.4v, 6, 8v, 58 ; PRO E.405/79, m.6, 8v, 10, 21v ; PRO E.101/414/16, ff.7, 46 ; MS. Additional 7099, ff.12, 43, 51, 65, B.L. (Excerpta Historica) ; PRO E.101/415/3, f.23.
  5. Materials, II, pp.139, 398, 506, 557 ; PRO E.403/2558, ff.13-15, 17, 19-20, 27-28, (Bain, 1544, 1549, 1551, 1570) ; PRO E.404/79, no.47 ; PRO E.404/80, nos.39, 256 ; PRO E.405/75, m.47 ; PRO E.405/78, m.4v, 6v, 7, 9, 22, 24v, 28, 30 ; PRO E.36/124, ff.98, 133, 136, 159.



rarely provide details, and discrepancies, omissions, and inconsistencies are quite common. Occasionally, however, the extant documents afford tantalising glimpses of the activity manifest in the English finances. In April 1487, Turnbull was to receive £10 each quarter, "forsomuche that for suche business as he [h]ath to doo for vs in his contrey" he was unable to collect at the Exchequer.<sup>1</sup> Forman received £10 in May of an unspecified year because "he must breifly departe towards the parties of Scotland", while, at other times, Bothwell required money to attend Henry VII in France or to undertake business "in the north parties".<sup>2</sup>

1488 to 1491 was a time of particularly concentrated activity, since Henry attempted to give active assistance to Scottish rebels. In January 1489, Alexander Master of Huntley, wrote to the English monarch appealing for his assistance against the "fals ande vntrew legis" who had slaughtered James III.<sup>3</sup> The Earl of Buchan was said to have been "informyt at lenthth" of all the plans and Huntley declared that he would "sykkurly abyde" whatever was promised in his name. In March, perhaps in response to this appeal, the Earl of Northumberland "endentyd with the Kyng for the keypyng owte of the Schottys and warryng on them", but his murder in April evidently thwarted the implementation of the English plans.<sup>4</sup> Perhaps in response to this setback, Henry VII resolved to give the Scottish rebels more indirect assistance; it is in this context that one ought to consider Henry's efforts to send the shipment of munitions

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1. PRO E.404/79, no.47 ; Materials, II, p.139.
  2. PRO E.404/81 ; PRO E.404/86, nos.7, 10, 12.
  3. MS. Cotton Caligula B.III, f.20, B.L., printed with some errors by Pinkerton, II, App.I, p.437.
  4. Paston Letters, III, 908, p.351.

from Chester to the rebel castle of Dumbarton.' Interestingly however, as in the past, English support for Scottish malcontents and rebels had no discernible impact on Anglo-Scottish diplomatic relations; both Buchan and, later, John Ramsay served as Henry VII's eyes, ears, and conscience at the Scottish court, and their activities probably strengthened rather than undermined any Anglo-Scottish rapprochement.

The expediency of English activity in buying Scottish loyalty was evident from November 1495 to July 1497 when James IV assisted the Flemish pretender to Henry's Throne, Perkin Warbeck. The letters which Ramsay wrote to Henry VII in September 1496, pertaining to an English plot to kidnap Warbeck and the weakness of the Scottish preparations, are among the most interesting and remarkable documents of the period.<sup>2</sup> This correspondence amply illustrates Henry VII's wisdom and success in establishing Scottish support by means of the expedient and assiduous application of finance and diplomacy. However, one ought not to judge this material by the patriotic sensibilities of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as has often been the case. Perkin Warbeck was undoubtedly the most significant and interesting individual cultivated and supported by the Scots in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Moreover, in this instance, Scottish practice did provoke an Anglo-Scottish conflict, unlike their activities in the 1460's and 1470's. Support for a pretender hardly constituted a novel feature of Anglo-Scottish relations in view of the fifteenth century precedents, Albany and the "Mammet" (a pseudo Richard II). However, Warbeck's imposture is of interest because of the scale of his activity in Western European

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1. Conway, pp.28-30 ; PRO E.405/78.

2. MS. Cotton Vespasian C.XVI, ff.154-156, B.L. ; Ellis, Letters, I (1st ser.), XII, XIII, pp.22-32 ; Pollard, Sources, I, 100, 101, pp.136-143 ; Pinkerton, II, App.II, III, pp.438-443.

politics in the 1490's, and because the Scots ignored other English pretenders such as Lambert Simnel and the Earl of Suffolk.

In general, English monarchs were more successful in attracting Scottish malcontents than Scottish monarchs were in attracting English agents; the reasons for this are quite obvious in view of the comparative wealth of the English monarchy, and the factional and political instability of Scotland in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.<sup>1</sup> Scotland's ingrained regionalism was probably also a significant factor. However, this established political practice was far from being unilateral, and, as I have demonstrated, it was manifest in many forms. Monarchs habitually sought to hedge their bets and to prepare for the various eventualities which an uncertain future might bring. Neither magnates nor their monarchs scrupled to indulge in a little double dealing, and the practice of supporting malcontents and rebels only rarely effectively undermined Anglo-Scottish peace; this was doubtless because undermining the peace was rarely a monarch's intention. Anglo-Scottish Kings aspired to pay the piper so that, if needs be, they might call the tune. On the other hand, the malcontent won over by fees and annuities was placed in a difficult position; English monarchs, as a sixteenth century Scot perceived, "louis the traizon" but not "the tratours that committis the traizon".<sup>2</sup> Subsequent events, however, demonstrated that this fact was insufficient to deter monarchs and malcontents from indulging in such an established feature of Anglo-Scottish relations.

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1. for a similar observation see Bradley thesis, p.313.

2. Complaynt of Scotland, S.T.S. ed. p.83, E.E.T.S., ed. p.105.

(G) Conclusion

The issues considered herein constituted the fabric of Anglo-Scottish disputes from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century . One recent authority suggests that, since the traditional explanations of the causes of Anglo-Scottish conflicts are unconvincing, monarchs went to war in the pursuit of domestic goals and for reasons of a propagandist nature.' I maintain that one cannot effectively generalise to this extent about such a complex subject. Study of the Anglo-Scottish conflicts of 1480-1484, 1496-1497, and 1513, reveals that each was the consequence of a unique set of circumstances, prevailing at a particular moment in time.

The aspects which had the most discernible impact on Anglo-Scottish relations were undoubtedly the existence and activity of the "Auld Alliance", and the support offered to Albany and Warbeck; the English claim to suzerainty evidently also provoked the Scots. The other aspects afforded justification for conflict if excuses were needed, but it was generally military activity, either an impromptu raid or an organised expedition, which constituted the casus belli. To obtain the military and financial support of their subjects, monarchs generally justified their actions by citing their neighbour's duplicitous conduct and hostile intent, and thus traditional antipathy was of considerable importance in provoking Anglo-Scottish conflict; arguably, the causes cited in this chapter were largely manifestations of this antipathy. When discussed in isolation, these aspects may appear petty and inconsequential, but it is important to appreciate that it was generally a combination of events which led to Anglo-Scottish recriminations, raids, and reprisals. In examining the subjects which provoked contention one can simplify the main themes on analytical grounds, but contemporaries in the fifteenth

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1. Bradley thesis, pp.vi, 357-360.

and sixteenth centuries were faced with a series of events in evaluating and determining a reasoned response to any given set of circumstances.

The corpus of March law, maritime law, and customary practice, which constituted an established machinery for the redress of grievances, had evolved from the practical experiences of Anglo-Scottish relations to ensure that conflict might always be avoided. On most occasions, when monarchs were sensibly conciliatory, all difficulties which arose were readily resolvable by recourse to this machinery, while failure was generally either a consequence of the inefficiency of local officials or of the circumvention of established procedures by one or other monarch in favour of more arbitrary - and disruptive - methods.

Ultimately, I suggest that there is no reason to assume that Anglo-Scottish conflict was either an inherent feature of their relations or the inevitable consequence of any series of traditional causes. Such assumptions cannot reasonably remain unchallenged. Traditionally, the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries have been perceived as indistinct from the monotonous pattern manifest in earlier Anglo-Scottish relations, or interpreted as an insignificant and uneventful prelude to the Anglo-Scottish relations of the mid and late sixteenth century. I maintain, however, that the period from the 1470's to 1513 did represent a distinctive phase in Anglo-Scottish relations on account of the succession of truces and the numerous attempts to conclude a matrimonial alliance; the intensity was novel, even if the means were traditional. Conflict proved to be the exception rather than the rule from 1471 to 1513, and one ought, therefore, to place more emphasis on developments manifest in the diplomatic relationship.

CHAPTER THREE

CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE, 1480 - 1513

The Anglo-Scottish conflicts of 1480-1484, 1496-1497, and 1513, were characterised by a vast array of rhetorical and propagandist hostility, but by very short military campaigns; these were essentially wars of words rather than wars in the conventional sense of the term. Arguably, with the exception of an occasional Flodden or Solway Moss, Anglo-Scottish relations in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries followed an established pattern of raid, recrimination, and reprisal. Moreover, such conflicts were generally won, not in battle by armies, but on the domestic front by monarchs, their propagandists, financiers, and administrators. Certain important themes will therefore emerge in this chapter: the utilisation and impact of propaganda; the problems of supply in maintaining an army on the Borders; the significance of finance and bureaucratic efficiency at a time when warfare was becoming increasingly expensive; the role played by northern counties in defensive and offensive military activity against the Scots; the impact of the "Auld Alliance"; the problems created by the bias of the extant chronicles and by the paucity of the other evidence at crucial periods; and the significance of compromise and diplomacy in Anglo-Scottish relations.

(A) 1480 - 1484

The details of the Anglo-Scottish conflict of 1480-1484 are well enough known and, therefore, I intend to concentrate on certain of the

more controversial, obscure, and significant aspects.<sup>1</sup> By any standards, the 1480-1484 conflict may be regarded as something of an aberration in late fifteenth century Anglo-Scottish relations, since the first twenty years of Edward IV's reign, which had been characterised by truces and anticipated matrimonial alliances, seemed destined to culminate in an Anglo-Scottish alliance.<sup>2</sup> There are, or so it appears, as many explanations of the causes of this conflict as there are accounts of it, but, arguably, none of these is completely convincing, and beyond the blame which is generally focused on Edward IV's actions there is no traditional or orthodox interpretation of these events.<sup>3</sup> The chroniclers of the sixteenth century agreed that Louis XI, the Duke of Albany, and discontented Scottish borderers, had some catalytic effect in provoking conflict, but their accounts were confused and contradictory, and are only of value as an indication of later tradition.<sup>4</sup> James III, in 1483, attributed the outbreak of hostility to "the werkyngis and menyngis of evil disposed persones, incontrarie our mynde and entencion", though precisely who he had in mind is a matter of conjecture.<sup>5</sup> The crux of the problem

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1. eg. Macdougall, James III, ch.7-9 ; Nicholson, ch.16 ; Bradley thesis, ch.5 ; Cardew thesis, section III A ; Scofield, vol.II, Bk.5, ch.VII-IX ; C. Ross, Edward IV, (London 1974), ch.12 ; E. F. Jacob, The Fifteenth Century, (Oxford, 1961), pp.584-589 ; E. N. Simons, The Reign of Edward IV, (London, 1966), pp.290-293 ; L. Stratford, Edward IV, (London, 1910), ch.XV ; C. Ross, Richard III, (London, 1981), pp.44-47.
  2. see Chapter Four.
  3. cf. Bradley thesis, pp.vi, 269-270, 307-308 ; P. Hume Brown, History of Scotland, I, (Cambridge, 1902), pp.267, 272 ; and the sources cited in note 1.
  4. cf. Vergil H.VI - R.III, pp.169-171 ; Buchanan, II, pp.204-212 ; Pitscottie, I, pp.162-185, esp. 171, 178-180 ; Hall, pp.330-338 ; Lesley, pp.95-98.
  5. MS. Harleian 433, f.246v, B.L. ; L. & P. R.III and H.VII, I, pp.51-52 ; Harl.433, vol.III, pp.47-48.

lies also in the fact that the chronology of events from late 1479 to early 1481 is somewhat confused as a consequence of meagre and defective evidence. Judging by the safe-conducts and diplomacy of 1479, Anglo-Scottish goodwill was manifest as late as November of that year, and both monarchs apparently anticipated continued amity.<sup>1</sup> However, of approximately 128 licences granted to Scotsmen by Edward IV, as recorded in the Patent Rolls, from 1480 to 1482, no less than 115, or nearly 90%, were issued between February 1480 and June 1481, evidently on account of the emerging difficulties between England and Scotland.<sup>2</sup> This provides powerful testimony of the degeneration of Anglo-Scottish relations between late November 1479 and February 1480, after the remarkable cordiality of the years from 1474 to 1479.

The cause of the rupture appears to have been some kind of Border affray, but while both sides typically chose to blame the other for undermining Anglo-Scottish accord, I maintain that the English adopted the most uncompromising stance. Despite reciprocal military preparations and raids, 1480 proved to be something of a non-event in terms of Anglo-Scottish conflict, but in late 1480 or early 1481, Edward IV unequivocally rejected compromise by issuing a "Palmerstonian manifesto" to his envoys.<sup>3</sup> There was no conceivable justification for the high-handed demands which Edward made of the Scots: the surrender of Prince James by the end of May to guarantee the Anglo-Scottish marriage; the restoration of Berwick, Roxburgh, Coldingham, and other lands, to England; the restoration of the Earl of Douglas to his rightful Scottish inheritance; and the implementation of homage by James III and his heirs to the

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1. PRO. C.81/1516/4, (Bain, 1455) ; Rot.Scot., II, p.457 ; Foedera, V, pt.iii, p.123 (misdated 1482) ; Y.C.R., I, p.31 ; PRO. E.405/67, m.1., 4v, (Bain, 1460).
  2. C.P.R., 1476-1485, pp.175-342 passim ; Bain, 1462, 1465, 1468, (PRO. C.81/1520/13), 1471, 1473.
  3. C. Ross, Edward IV, p.279.



English monarch, "as he oweth to doo and as his progenitours haue doon in tyme passed".<sup>1</sup> This document was a unilateral ultimatum masquerading as an instrument of diplomatic negotiation, and I suggest that Edward IV's demands were consciously intended to antagonise the Scots into rejecting the matrimonial alliance of James, Duke of Rothesay and Princess Cecily which had been agreed in 1474. Evidently this was symptomatic of a breach in Anglo-Scottish relations, and, in an atmosphere of reciprocal recrimination, it is clear that the defensive military activities of 1480 had become offensive by the end of that year.<sup>2</sup>

During the period 1480-1482, in view of Edward IV's financial restraints, the severe winters and poor harvests (which led to acute grain shortages on the Borders), the difficulties of Border warfare, and the domestic and continental distractions which preoccupied both Edward and James III, the Anglo-Scottish conflict was necessarily characterised by raids, recriminations, and reprisals and not by large-scale military campaigns. Practical restraints, such as those imposed by distance, communication, supply, and finance, meant that military expeditions were always difficult to maintain in the isolated and economically backward Border regions, but the most significant restraint on Edward IV's activity was imposed by finance. Constrained by the "straitjacket of endowed monarchy", Edward evidently could not make war on Scotland without the financial assistance of his subjects, and yet, perhaps because

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1. PRO. E.39/102/25, (Bain, 1436 and App. no.28, but misdated February 1476). For opinions on the date cf. Nicholson, p.491 ; Scotfield, II, pp.276-277 ; Bain, p.xxxvi ; C. Ross, Edward IV, p.279 ; Macdougall, James III, pp.143-144.
  2. eg. C.P.R., 1476-1485, pp.205, 213-214, 237 ; PRO. DL.42/19, f.11 ; Pinkerton, I, App. XXI, pp.502-504, and Macdougall, James III, App.A., pp.311-313, (a brief anonymous contemporary Scottish chronicle) ; Y.C.R., I, pp.34-36 ; C.S.P. Milanese, I, 368, pp.244-245 ; MS. Harleian 78, ff.3v-4v, B.L., printed in The Coventry Leet Book, II, ed. M. D. Harris, pp.474-477.

of the popular suspicion that he had profited from the French expedition of 1475, the King chose not to seek Parliamentary financial support until 1483.<sup>1</sup> In 1480 the northern counties bore the brunt of the limited conflict through Edward's reliance on the commission of array and the military activities of Gloucester and Northumberland; such hand to mouth provisions proved sufficient for the raid and reprisal of this part of the war.<sup>2</sup> In 1481, however, the King had turned to more elaborate measures, militarily and financially, hence the reliance on benevolences, a clerical tenth, and part of a remitted Parliamentary subsidy.<sup>3</sup> There is some evidence that northern England, which contributed money, manpower, and supplies, found the costs of the conflict to be unduly burdensome.<sup>4</sup> By Edward IV's own admission to Pope Sixtus IV, the war effort was hindered by "adverse turmoil", though evidently sufficient sums were raised to enable the King to maintain activity at sea during 1481 and 1482, and to keep a substantial force of perhaps 20,000 men in the field

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1. J. R. Lander, Conflict and Stability in Fifteenth Century England, (London, 1969), p.113 ; Commynes, p.225 ; Scotfield, II, pp.386-387 ; Rot.Parl., VI, pp.197-198.
2. see the sources cited on page 91 note 2 for 1480.
3. C.P.R., 1476-1485, pp.240, 244, 249, 250, 264, 282 ; PRO. E.405/69, (Bain, 1466) ; C. F. Richmond, 'English Naval Power in the Fifteenth Century', History, 52 (1967), pp.1-15 ; Y.C.R., I, pp.38-48 ; MS. Harleian 78, ff.3v-4v, B.L., printed in The Coventry Leet Book, II, ed. M. D. Harris, pp.474-477 ; H.M.C. Ninth Report, I, App., p.144 ; Chronicles of London, pp.188-189 ; Fabyan's New Chronicles, II, pp.666-667 ; Calendar of Letter Book L, ed. R. Sharpe, (London, 1912), pp.175-176 ; Scotfield, II, p.305 ; PRO. C.81/1520, no.18 (5267) ; Wilkins, Concilia, III, p.612 ; C.F.R., 1471-1485, nos.656-662, pp.226-233 ; C.C.R., 1476-1485, no.768, p.229 ; The Records of the Northern Convocation, ed. G. W. Kitchin, S.S., CXIII (1907), pp.203, 379-387. For Scottish activity cf. A.P.S., II, pp.132-134 ; Nicholson, p.492 ; Macdougall, James III, pp.145, 149-150.
4. C.P.R., 1476-1485, pp.324, 339 ; Y.C.R., I, pp.52-53 ; Scotfield, II, p.334.

for four or five weeks in July and August 1482.<sup>1</sup>

Taking into account the expenses of campaigning in the Borders, and the acute problems of supply on account of crop failures and regional difficulties, Edward's achievement was undoubtedly praiseworthy, but the fact is that large-scale campaigning was limited during 1482 and non-existent during 1480 and 1481, and there is some evidence that the King paid for weapons out of the fees which he traditionally gave for the defence of the Marches.<sup>2</sup> Clearly by late 1482 even the King had perceived that renewed military activity in 1483 would depend on Parliamentary finance; he had "lived of his own", fighting a war of his own making, for probably as long as was realistically feasible, and one cannot ignore the fact that his financial exactions had been unpopular and had provoked discontent in return for the acquisition of Berwick.

There can be little doubt that during 1480 and 1481 Edward IV conducted the Anglo-Scottish conflict with no real sense of urgency, purpose, or direction, and it was the arrival in England of the Duke of Albany, from April 1482, which provided the momentum to sustain the English campaign; this was evident from the agreements concluded by the

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1. C.S.P. Venetian, I, 483, pp.145-146 ; Scofield, II, pp.386-387 ; For maritime activity see Lesley, pp.95-96 ; PRO. SC.1/53, nos.69, 127, printed in The Cely Papers, ed. Malden, C.S., I (3rd. ser., 1900) pp.57-58, 106, and The Cely Letters, 1472-1488, ed. A. Hanham, E.E.T.S., 273 (1975), pp.104-105, 161-162 ; PRO. E.404/77/3, nos.32, 41, 43, and Chapter Two section E. For the English army in 1482 cf. Pitcottie, I, p.180 ; Hall, p.331 ; C. Ross, Edward IV, p.288 ; Macdougall, James III, p.154 ; Scofield, II, p.344 ; PRO. E.405/70 ; PRO. SC.1/60, no.94, (Bain, 1491 and App.31).
  2. Pinkerton, I, App. XXI, pp.502-504, and Macdougall, James III, App.A, pp.311-313 ; PRO. C.81/880/5513, (Bain, 1472) ; C.P.R., 1476-1485, p.254 ; PRO. E.404/77/3, no.2 ; Scofield, II, pp.333-334 ; evidently Edward directed all available supplies of cereal crops towards the war effort. In March, 1482, Edward instructed the Treasurer to subtract the cost of 1,000 bows and 500 sheaves of arrows from 2,000 marks due to be paid to Richard, Duke of Gloucester ; PRO. E.404/77/3, nos.87, 90.

King and the Duke in June 1482 and February 1483.<sup>1</sup> Yet the only extensive military campaign of July and August 1482 lasted slightly more than four weeks and this had lost momentum when the Scottish protagonists had refused to fight any battles.<sup>2</sup> The Duke of Gloucester has come under fire from certain authorities for his irresolution and indecision in withdrawing from Edinburgh at the beginning of August, but I maintain that the criticism ought to be directed against Edward IV; the English monarch had not provided effective leadership during 1480 or 1481, nor did he delegate his responsibilities until 1482.<sup>3</sup> Arguably, Edward was in physical decline, since his behaviour was far removed from the energy and decisiveness manifest in his multifarious activities against the Lancastrians earlier in his career; Commynes, for example, stated that the English King was anxious not to embroil himself in "difficulties" with France, and that he pursued pleasure "more than before" and had

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1. Scotfield, II, pp.334-335 ; PRO. E.39/92/17, E.39/92/38, (Bain, 1475, 1476) ; PRO. E.39/57, (Bain, 1489) ; Foedera, V. pt.iii, pp.120-121, 127-128 ; Chapter Two section F. For military activity in 1482 see C.P.R., 1476-1485, p.320 ; PRO. E.405/70, (Bain, 1474) ; The Stonor Letters and Papers, 1290-1483, II, ed. C. L. Kingsford, C.S., XXX (3rd. ser., 1919), pp.145-147, 150 ; Y.C.R., I, pp.54-66, 82 ; PRO. SC.1/60, no.94, printed in The Cely Letters, 1472-1488, ed. A. Hanham, E.E.T.S., 273 (1975), p.283, Bain, 1491 and App. no.31, H. E. Malden, 'An Unedited Cely Letter of 1482', T.R.H.S., X (3rd. ser., 1916), pp.159-165 ; Rot.Scot., II, p.458 ; Foedera, V, pt.iii, pp.121-122 ; MS. Cotton Julius B. XII, ff.305-305v, B.L. ; A.P.S., II, pp.137-141 ; Nicholson, pp.493-496 ; Macdougall, James III, pp.148-152.
2. For the campaign see Hall, pp.331-338. For events in Scotland see Pitscottie, I, pp.171-181 ; Lesley, pp.97-99 ; Nicholson, pp.505-509 ; Macdougall, James III, ch.8.
3. eg. C. Ross, Edward IV, pp.289-290.

rown "very fat and gross".<sup>1</sup> One ought not to underestimate the practical difficulties faced by Duke Richard in August 1482; finance, for one thing, created particular difficulties, as evinced by the fact that York found it necessary to raise sums to maintain the City contingent in the field for an additional seven days.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, just as it proved difficult to conduct a conflict against a reluctant enemy, it proved similarly difficult to negotiate successfully with a divided enemy.<sup>3</sup> From the outset, the revolt against James III's government in 1482 had effectively precluded the conduct and diplomatic resolution of the Anglo-Scottish conflict, just as Edward IV's claims to suzerainty over Scotland and his championing of Albany had ultimately backfired on him. Albany was too closely associated with the English to win support in Scotland; in the late fifteenth century no Anglophile - even one whose loyalties were dictated by opportunism - was likely to enjoy a successful career at a Scottish court where the royal policy for rapprochement with the "auld" enemy flew in the face of popular inclination.<sup>4</sup>

To dictate terms in August 1482, the Duke of Gloucester would first have to establish which faction was in the ascendant, and, given the

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1. Comyns, pp.361-362, 393-396, 414, (Louis XI exploited Edward IV's desire for an Anglo-French matrimonial alliance to keep the English monarch in check). Edward's only administrative innovation was the maintenance of 10 couriers between London and Berwick from July to October 1482. Henry Balgey, John Fyssher, Ewen Whitston, William Borton, John Boswell, James Warner, John Rokley, Edmund Borowe, William Thursby, and Thomas Nostriche, were paid 12d. per day ; PRO. E.404/77/3, no.94.
  2. Y.C.R., I, p.60.
  3. For the English in Edinburgh see Hall, pp.332-337 ; cf. Bradley thesis, p.295 ; Macdougall, James III, pp.168-169.
  4. For Albany's subsequent career see Macdougall, James III, pp.175-189, 208-212 ; Nicholson, pp.508-517 ; E.R., IX, pp.xlvii - lix ; Chapter Two section F ; SRO. SP.13/19, printed in A.P.S., XII, pp.31-33 ; A.P.S., II, pp.145-152.

shifting sands of Scottish politics, this constituted a difficult task.<sup>1</sup> To retreat, having made agreements with Albany and the Edinburgh authorities, and to recapture Berwick was probably the most sensible military option open to Duke Richard in 1482, and thus I would suggest that his conduct of the campaign ought not to be judged too critically.<sup>2</sup> Contrariwise, the Duke does not deserve the praise attributed to him in certain Ricardian circles; as Professor Ross astutely observed, in no sense can the 1482 Scottish expedition provide testimony that Richard possessed any outstanding military ability.<sup>3</sup>

In view of the lack of evidence it is difficult to establish why the Anglo-Scottish conflict had developed in the first place. Border infractions and Franco-Scottish activity were undoubtedly prevalent in 1479 and 1480, but neither of these aspects ought to have constituted a *caus belli* unless there were extenuating circumstances. The tradition that the Scots rejected their truce with Edward IV because Louis XI had renounced the Anglo-French matrimonial alliance is evidently nonsensical since the Treaty of Arras was not concluded until December 1482.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, James III was prepared throughout to agree to a renewal of the Anglo-Scottish truce and matrimonial alliance, whereas Edward IV's actions from 1480 to

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1. cf. Bradley thesis, p.295 ; Macdougall, James III, pp.168-169.
  2. For Berwick see Chapter Two section D.
  3. cf. J. Potter, Good King Richard? (London, 1983), p.47 ; P. M. Kendall, Richard III, (London, 1955), pp.137-149 ; Buck, pp.19-22, 202 ; A. Hanham, Richard III and his Early Historians, 1483-1535, (Oxford, 1975), p.3 ; C. R. Markham, Richard III, (London, 1906), pp.85-86 ; More's history of Richard in Richard III The Great Debate, ed. P. M. Kendall, (London, 1965), p.35 ; C. Ross, Richard III, p.47.
  4. Vergil H.VI - R.III, pp.169-171.

1483 show that he consistently preferred conflict to conciliation.' The failure of the subsidiary alliance of Earl Rivers and James III's sister Margaret may have created some reciprocal tension and embarrassment in 1480, especially given the circumstances, but Miss Scofield has correctly argued that Edward IV was too preoccupied to permit this incident to cause a war with Scotland.<sup>2</sup> Neither can one convincingly argue that Edward went to war with Scotland in pursuit of his claim to suzerainty over that kingdom since he had conducted diplomatic relations with the Scots throughout the 1460's and 1470's; arguably, the subject of suzerainty emerged as part of a concerted propaganda campaign in early 1481.<sup>3</sup>

Dr. Bradley has suggested that Edward fought the Scots in an attempt to distract his subjects from the failings of his continental ambitions, but in fact one of the main reasons why his continental ambitions failed dismally was precisely on account of the fact that he became so embroiled in the Anglo-Scottish conflict that he could no longer effectively interfere in continental politics.<sup>4</sup> Without doubt, this had prompted Louis XI's machinations in Anglo-Scottish relations in the first place, and Edward IV had played right into his hands. Moreover, the Anglo-Scottish conflict, far from distracting the English monarch's subjects from his foreign and domestic difficulties, actually helped to provoke popular discontent on account of the heavy burdens of finance,

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1. eg. PRO. E.39/102/25, (Bain, 1436 and App. no.28) ; A.P.S., II, p.138 ; Lesley, pp.95-96 ; C.S.P. Venetian, I, 475, pp.142-143. In January 1481, Edward detained the Scottish "inbassyturs" at Newcastle and refused to see them ; PRO. SC.1/53, no.67, printed in The Cely Papers, ed. H. E. Malden, C.S., I (3rd ser.), pp.xxix, 55-56, and The Cely Letters, 1472-1488, ed. A. Hanham, E.E.T.S., 273 (1975), pp.102-104.
  2. Scofield, II, pp.252-253.
  3. cf. Bradley thesis, pp.308, 323-327. For English propaganda see PRO. E.39/102/25, (Bain, 1436 and App. no.28) ; C.S.P. Venetian, I, 475, pp.142-143 ; MS. Harleian 78, ff.3v-4v, B.L.
  4. Bradley thesis, pp.vi, 269-270, 307-308.

supply, and manpower, placed on the populace. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Anglo-Scottish war ultimately brought only hollow victories and deep disappointments to the English monarch and his subjects. In the City of York, for example, popular disappointment and discontent was manifest in dissension, by word and deed, against the Duke of Gloucester; it is surely not coincidental that certain "offenders" were punished in March 1482 for seditiously ringing the "common bell" when the Duke was at York, while alleged "sedicious words" were said against him in June 1482 and February 1483.<sup>1</sup> Additional popular discontent in the City was manifest in the refusal of the York contingent to go to Scotland in 1482 until the soldiers had received 28 days' wages (and not 14 days' as they had initially agreed).<sup>2</sup> Moreover, in December 1482, a certain John Lam was alleged to have stated that the City soldiers were "ill worthi to have thar waghys, for tha did nothyng for it, bot made whypys of thar bowstryngs to dryve cariage with".<sup>3</sup>

Contrariwise, the York authorities were always quick to respond to Richard's requests for military assistance, and to present him with delicacies on his numerous visits, since they perceived that his royal connections might be to their benefit in the long term.<sup>4</sup> This client-patron relationship was exploited by both the Duke and by the City; while Gloucester acquired their military support, he reciprocated by reducing the size of the York contingent from 120 to 100 and, more significantly, he brought their loyalty and support to the attention of Edward IV.<sup>5</sup> In

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1. Y.C.R., I, pp.viii, 52-53, 56, 68-69 ; Scotfield, II, p.334.

2. Y.C.R., I, pp.58, 60-62.

3. Ibid., p.67.

4. eg. Ibid., pp.15-16, 33-35, 41, 51-53, 54-56, 70, 72-76.

5. Ibid., pp.36, 42-43, 59-60.



December 1482, having assisted the Duke against the Scots in 1480, 1481, and 1482, the York authorities sought to utilise the opportunity proffered by a summons to Parliament to obtain either a grant of new tolls from the King or a reduction of the fee farm; moreover, York continued to exploit Richard's good lordship, by emphasizing its poverty and the "gret chargez" sustained "aswiele in the defence of this realme ayanst the Scotts as other wyse", as he rose up the ranks of power to become royal protector and finally King.<sup>1</sup> It is easy to see why the York authorities quickly responded to Richard's appeal for military assistance in September 1480, while ignoring a similar appeal from the Earl of Northumberland (to the latter's evident annoyance).<sup>2</sup> However, one ought not to romanticize the Duke's relations with the City of York, since he appears to have been the focus of some popular opposition; I suggest that Edward IV's Scottish policy was unpopular and that Richard constituted a ready target for local dissent (even if the reason for his unpopularity went deeper than discontent at the outcome of the 1482 campaign). At the heart of the opinion that the Anglo-Scottish conflict had been characterised by missed opportunities and by squandered finance, supply, and manpower, there lay two complementary perceptions, one tangible and the other somewhat more abstract.<sup>3</sup>

The abstraction consisted of a pervading feeling that England had somehow lacked purpose and direction since the gradual withdrawal from France during the fifteenth century, and this perception had perhaps intensified in the light of recent events; the anti-climax of the 1475

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1. Ibid., pp.65-66, 71-73 ; L. C. Attreed, 'The King's Interest : York's Fee Farm and the Central Government, 1482-1492', N.H., XVII (1981), pp.24-43.
  2. Y.C.R., I, pp.34-36.
  3. For criticism of the 1482 campaign see Croyland Chronicle, p.149.

campaign in France, and Edward IV's subsequent attempt to marry his daughter Elizabeth to the Dauphin. War was still considered to be a *raison d'être* of the social elites and it pervaded and unified contemporary society. Yet, while France and Scotland were England's traditional protagonists in wars, the glories of past victories undoubtedly outshone the diplomatic initiatives and lustreless conflicts of the later fifteenth century. Moreover, the grandiloquent claims of royal propaganda were partly responsible for the discontent since monarchs tended to fire popular imagination and traditional antipathy in raising finance and support, and the results consequently fell far short of expectations whenever diplomatic initiative prevented military activity; this was discernible, for example, in the French campaigns of 1475 and 1492, and in the Scottish campaign of 1482. Arguably, popular discontent was likely in such circumstances.

The more tangible, but closely related, aspect which merits consideration pertains to the subject of finance. The King's subjects undoubtedly felt cheated if their money was squandered or directed into the royal coffers, especially if the conflict had been of short duration (as on so many occasions). Particular difficulties emerged over Edward IV's introduction of a benevolence, "a new and unheard-of imposition" which raised "sums the like of which were never seen before."<sup>1</sup> Polydore Vergil was later to observe that Henry VII adopted King Edward's financial innovation, and that, on account of the popular discontent which this engendered, "this method of taxation might more appropriately be termed a malevolence rather than a benevolence."<sup>2</sup> In 1484, Richard III abolished such financial contrivances in Parliament, and yet he too had

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1. Ibid., p.135.

2. Vergil, p.49.

recourse to such pragmatic methods prior to the landing of Henry Tudor.<sup>1</sup> Evidently the discontent of Edward IV's subjects was exacerbated by his failure to launch a campaign against Scotland in 1481 and by the ineffectiveness of the 1482 campaign. Probably many of the Croyland chronicler's contemporaries shared his misgivings that the "very wealthy town" of Edinburgh had escaped "unharmd" from the English occupation, especially in view of the fact that the King's requests for financial assistance had stressed Scottish perfidy and Scotland's political subservience to England.<sup>2</sup>

Without doubt, Edward IV lay at the heart of Anglo-Scottish events from 1480 to 1483, and he evidently made most of the key decisions. Professor Ross, although aware that the King contended with many tangible difficulties (including inadequate financial and military resources, and the machinations of Louis XI), nonetheless concluded that "the entanglement with Scotland was a major misjudgement which greatly weakened his position in relation to continental powers".<sup>3</sup> I maintain, however, that the Anglo-Scottish conflict was a significant misjudgement on all fronts, at home and abroad. In the context of the Anglo-Scottish rapprochement of the 1460's and 1470's, the conflict of 1480-1484 was an aberration which benefited neither country, and it provides ample testimony of the indecision and inconsistency of policy, personality, and purpose, which undermined Edward IV's ultimate effectiveness as a monarch. Misjudgement, bad-timing, inconsistency, and ineptitude, were all manifest in Edward's conduct of Anglo-Scottish relations; a criticism which one cannot reasonably make of the more consistently capable Henry VII.

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1. Stat. Realm., II, p.478 ; Croyland Chronicle, p.173.
  2. Croyland Chronicle, p.149 ; MS. Harleian 78, ff.3v-4v, B.L.
  3. C. Ross, Edward IV, pp.294-295.

It is evident that Edward IV was motivated in 1480 by grievances which he perceived to justify hostilities against Scotland, and these clearly sustained him throughout the conflict and even led him to finance his activities without Parliamentary assistance. The climate of Anglo-Scottish relations degenerated in late 1479 or early 1480 as a result of a combination of aspects which in normal circumstances would not have led to the outbreak of conflict. Border infractions, rumours of Franco-Scottish rapprochement, and the failure of Princess Margaret to arrive in England, probably cumulatively aroused Edward's suspicion that something was amiss, and, perhaps fearing that the Anglo-Scottish alliance was being undermined, he may have adopted a harsh stance against the Scots; this conceivably led to the traditional pattern of raid, recrimination, and reprisal. Possibly the English monarch over-reacted in 1480, and things got out of hand as both monarchs fell back on traditional antipathies and fears which had never been far from the surface even during the rapprochement of recent decades. However, the inactivity of 1480 and 1481 provides testimony of the fact that the Anglo-Scottish conflict had little purpose or direction until 1482 when the Duke of Albany gave temporary momentum and reinvigoration to the English war effort. 1483 and 1484 were also characterised by military inactivity in view of the more pressing domestic considerations of James III and Richard III; the military activity by land and sea mentioned in the Croyland chronicle in 1484 was probably on a small scale, and cautious diplomacy preoccupied the two monarchs.' Without doubt, both sides had sought to justify their

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1. Halliwell, Letters, I, pp.156-158. In June 1483 one of the Cely family reported a rumour of Scottish activity ; see PRO. SC.1/53, no.19, printed in The Cely Papers, ed. H. E. Malden, pp.132-133, and The Cely Letters, 1472-1488, ed. A. Hanham, pp.184-185 ; Croyland Chronicle, p.173 ; Chapter Four.

actions in 1480 by blaming the other for the outbreak of the conflict, and James and Edward doubtless had recourse to the traditional cry of the decision-makers when things went wrong that events had somehow been beyond their control. It is, however, difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Anglo-Scottish conflict was sustained until April 1483 by Edward IV, and I maintain that this constituted a somewhat squalid interim in the Anglo-Scottish relations of the final decades of the fifteenth century.

(B) Perkin Warbeck, 1495 - 1497

Charismatic, enigmatic, and the subject of speculation from the late fifteenth century to the late twentieth century, Perkin Warbeck is beyond question the most interesting of the pretenders who threatened the security of the early Tudor dynasty. Warbeck's imposture acquired particular momentum from the support of the "old venomous serpent" Margaret Dowager, Duchess of Burgundy, but in the course of a remarkable career the pretender captivated many of the monarchs of Western Europe; his success as the "Duke of York" depended on a combination of luck, his own personality, and the credulity of monarchs who believed whatever they wanted to believe.<sup>1</sup> There can be no doubt that Warbeck was also assisted by the spectre of mystery and romance which haunted the imposture from the outset. The evidence pertaining to the pretender is by turns contradictory and meagre, and this probably explains the fact that, though Perkin captures imaginations, he has never been the subject of a full-

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1. For Margaret's importance see Vergil, pp.15-17, 63 ; Hall, pp.429-430, 461-464 ; Bacon, pp.90, 151-155 ; Buchanan, 2, pp.229-230 ; André, pp.65-69 ; cf. Coleman thesis, p.65.

scale modern biography.'

Research has uncovered little new evidence regarding Warbeck's career, and I intend, therefore, to concentrate briefly on the important ramifications of his sojourn in Scotland from November 1495 to July 1497. In view of the friction in Anglo-Scottish relations from 1488, and the precedent of Scottish support for the Mammet (a pretender whom the Scots had accepted as Richard II in the early fifteenth century), there is no need to provide a specific explanation for the conduct of James IV. In reality, however, most Scots have generally felt the need to explain this "embarrassing" period of Anglo-Scottish relations by citing Henry VII's ill-treatment of certain Scottish envoys, or by suggesting that the King was genuinely duped by the imposter; others have chosen to ignore Warbeck altogether.<sup>2</sup> Given Henry VII's propensity for solicitous conciliation of the Scots in 1493, 1494, and 1496, it seems unlikely that he would have antagonised James IV in 1495, but the Scottish monarch's belief in the pretender's identity is much more difficult to establish.<sup>3</sup> All of the contemporary rulers who supported Warbeck had

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1. Gairdner, Richard III, (London, 1898), pp.263-335 ; Vergil, pp.63-119 ; Lesley, pp.111-116 ; Hall, pp.461-491 ; Bacon, pp.151-211 ; Buchanan, 2, pp.229-238 ; André, pp.65-75 ; Buck, pp.143-173, 327-329 ; Horace Walpole, Historic Doubts....in Richard III The Great Debate, ed. P. Kendall, (London, 1965), pp.209-219, 237-239 ; Thomas Gainsford's, True and Wonderfull History of Perkin Warbeck (1618), in the Harleian Miscellany, VI, (London, 1810), pp.534-594 ; F. Madden, 'Documents Relating to Perkin Warbeck with Remarks on his History', Archaeologia, XXVII (1838), pp.153-210 ; W. A. J. Archbold, 'Sir William Stanley and Perkin Warbeck', E.H.R., XIV (1899), pp.529-534 ; C. Roth, 'Perkin Warbeck and his Jewish Master', Trans. Jewish Hist. Soc. of England, IX (1922), pp.143-162 ; T.A., I, pp.cxxi-cliv ; Coleman thesis, pp.59-75 ; Conway, esp. ch.VI.
2. Coleman thesis, pp.59-60, 69-70 ; Boece Vitae, pp.55-56 ; Conway, pp.88-89, 110. Chrimes, Henry VII, p.88 ; R. L. Mackie, James IV, pp.79-80 ; Lesley, pp.111-116 ; Gairdner, Richard III, pp.280, 306-307 ; C.S.P. Milanese, I, 548, p.331 ; Pitscottie, I, p.236 ; J. W. Mackenzie, A Chronicle of the Kings of Scotland From Fergus I to James VI, (Edinburgh, 1830), p.80.
3. see Chapter Four.

sufficient motivation for their conduct without necessarily believing in the imposture, and James IV was no exception; nonetheless, the fact that James never publicly admitted his error, and Warbeck's marriage to the King's kinswoman Lady Catherine Gordon, have been cited as conclusive evidence of his credulity.<sup>1</sup> Polydore Vergil was, however, prepared to give James the benefit of the doubt by suggesting that he was "either genuinely misled or pretending to be convinced".<sup>2</sup> According to Vergil, who had no first-hand knowledge, the Scottish councillors were sceptical about Warbeck's claims, but they were persuaded to support him so that "they might either extend the borders of their country or, at the worst, make a favorable peace with England".<sup>3</sup>

Vergil's interpretation is consistent not only with established pragmatism in Anglo-Scottish relations but also with the fact that Henry VII had established Warbeck's identity by 1493 and would doubtless have ensured that this information was promulgated among the pretender's potential supporters.<sup>4</sup> The few extant Scottish records which refer to Perkin almost invariably describe him as "the Prince" or the "duc of York", but a hitherto neglected manuscript reveals that the Scots were indeed sceptical about Warbeck's claims.<sup>5</sup> Among the Comrie papers, now in the Perth district archives, there is an instrument of resignation

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1. see the sources cited on page 104 note 2 ; C.S.P. Spanish, I, pp.lxxxiv-lxxxv ; C.S.P. Venetian, I, 665, p.227 ; IV, 1042, pp.482-483 (for Maximilian).
  2. Vergil, pp.85-87.
  3. Ibid., p.87 ; Buchanan, 2, p.233.
  4. eg. MS. Additional 46454, f.6, B.L. ; Ellis, Letters, I, (1st ser.), pp.19-21 ; Gairdner, Richard III, pp.275-277.
  5. eg. T.A., I, pp.242, 263, 267-268, 293-300, 303, 342-345 ; E.R., X, p.555 ; E.R., XI, pp.4, 15-16, 39-40, 43, 45, 49, 153-154 ; L. & P. R. III and H.VII, II, App. B., XVI, pp.326-335 ; James IV Letters, pp.9-10 ; A.D.C., 1496-1501, II, p.361 ; A.D.C.P., plx.

which was drawn up in Linlithgow palace on 30th December, 1495.<sup>1</sup> Among the witnesses was a certain Richard Plantagenet, the son of the serene Prince Edward the illustrious King of England, "vt asseruit". Such evidence is far from being conclusive proof that James IV was not fooled by the imposture, but the qualifying phrase "as he asserts" is sufficient to cast doubt on the traditional assumptions.

James was "fond of novelty", and shared with Maximilian ("ever the principal in deceiving himself"), a certain romantic, quixotic, and imaginative disposition.<sup>2</sup> Perkin undoubtedly captured their imaginations and motivated their ambitions (which always greatly exceeded their financial capabilities), but it is difficult to believe that James IV was deceived in 1495, especially if he had been involved in the early stages of the conspiracy; this early involvement is inferred from James IV's communications with Margaret of Burgundy and Ireland from late 1488, and from Warbeck's letter to the Scottish King in March 1492.<sup>3</sup> I suggest that the sums spent on Perkin's clothing from November 1495 and the pretender's marriage to a royal relation in December 1495 or January 1496 represented a conscious attempt on the part of James IV to counter Warbeck's

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1. MS. 78/9, Perth and Kinross District Archive, Perth, formerly SRO. GD.279/9. I am indebted to Mr Stephen J. Connelly, the archivist, for supplying me with a photocopy of this document. For James IV's presence at Linlithgow in December see T.A., I, pp.257, 267.
  2. Buchanan, 2, p.233 ; Bacon, p.138.
  3. R.M.S., II, 1424-1513, 1798, p.381 ; T.A., I, pp.lxxxv, 99, 120, 130, 199, cxxv ; L. & P. R.III and H.VII, II, pp.326-327. Initially it appears that Perkin intended to impersonate Edward, Earl of Warwick ; the French planned to exploit "Clarence's son" from 1491, presumably to counter Henry VII's activities in Brittany. This plan was quickly abandoned, probably because the genuine Warwick was alive and in Henry VII's hands, and because Lambert Simnel's imposture had failed in 1487. Some manuscript inventories list Warbeck's later appeal, "in the name of Richard one of the sonnes of the Duke of Clarence", to the Earl of Desmond asking for assistance in Scotland. Possibly Warbeck later reverted to the original plan in an attempt to revive his flagging fortunes (late 1496 or early 1497) ; Chrimes, Henry VII, pp.81-82 ; MS. Cotton Titus F.XIII, f.76v, B.L. ; MS. Additional 11595, ff.4-4v, B.L.



recent reverses; the failures at Deal and Waterford in July 1495 had undoubtedly undermined his plausibility to some extent.<sup>1</sup> James, however, reinvigorated the imposture by his actions, and Perkin probably cut a dashing and regal figure against the colourful backdrop of the Scottish court.

From late 1495 the implications of Scottish support for Perkin Warbeck became the subject of detailed discussion in Western European diplomatic circles; French preoccupation with the Italian peninsula, and the subsequent desire by Spain, Venice, Milan, the Papacy, and Maximilian, to entice England and Scotland into their Francophobic "Holy League" placed Anglo-Scottish relations in the forefront of continental interests.<sup>2</sup> James IV, who liked to be "talked of in the world", consequently found himself as a focus of continental diplomatic activity from 1495.<sup>3</sup> The Spanish monarchs, for example, sought unsuccessfully to prevent him from supporting Warbeck by exploiting the Scottish monarch's desire for a matrimonial alliance with one of their daughters.<sup>4</sup> In reality, Ferdinand and Isabella's high-handed interference may have merely hardened James IV's resolve; in view of Henry VII's evident insecurity in 1496 it is unlikely that James would have abandoned the pretender's cause without having at least made an attempt to launch his career in England.

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1. T.A., I, pp.256 n.1., 263-264, 267-268 ; L. & P. R.III and H.VII, II, pp.327-329 ; Vergil, pp.85-87 ; Buchanan, 2, pp.231-234, (Vergil and Buchanan imaginatively reconstruct Warbeck's reception at Stirling) ; Gairdner, Richard III, pp.295-301.
  2. eg. C.S.P. Spanish, I, pp.lx-lxxxv, cxxxi, 50-148 ; C.S.P. Venetian, I, pp.219-266 ; C.S.P. Venetian, IV, pp.482-483 ; C.S.P. Milanese, I, pp.298-332.
  3. C.S.P. Venetian, I, 861, pp.309-310 ; Chapter Five.
  4. Chapter Five ; the continental powers were unsure of Warbeck's precise whereabouts until March 1496 ; C.S.P. Spanish, I, 128, pp.88-89 ; C.S.P. Venetian, I, 690, p.236.

Henry VII faced the threats of foreign invasion and domestic rebellion, while his insecurity was also hindering the conclusion of a matrimonial alliance between his eldest son and Catherine of Aragon. The King sought to tackle his problems, from 1493, through the twin prongs of diplomacy and military preparation; the North was well prepared for defence against an anticipated Scottish attack from late 1495, and Bothwell's correspondence of August and September 1496 enabled Henry to perceive the most intimate details of the Scottish preparations.<sup>1</sup> James IV planned a raid against England between June and September 1496, but the high costs of military activity hit him hard and the higher costs of maintaining Warbeck and his entourage merely compounded the problems.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Chapters Four and Five ; C.P.R., 1494-1509, pp.7, 16, 32, 52-53, 67-68; Bain, 1607, 1608, 1610 ; PRO. C.82/132 ; Conway, chs.III-V. Sir William Stanley's execution in 1495 for his suspected sympathy with Warbeck's cause broke the back of any Anglo-Burgundian conspiracy ; Vergil, pp.65-79 ; W. A. J. Archbold, 'Sir William Stanley and Perkin Warbeck', E.H.R., XIV (1899), pp.529-534. Henry VII tried unsuccessfully to acquire John, the French born son of Alexander, Duke of Albany, from Charles VIII, to counter any Scottish attempt to support Warbeck ; MS. Cotton Caligula D.VI, ff.18-29, B.L. ; Conway, App. XIX, XXVII, pp.81-83, 200, 220 ; L. & P. R.III and H.VII, II, pp.292-296. See also T.A., I, p.279 ; PRO. E.101/414/6, ff.18, 24-25, 29v, 25v, 38 ; PRO. E.404/82. For Wyatt's letter see MS. Additional 62135, I, ff.85-85v, B.L., and Conway, App. XLV, pp.100-102, 236-239. For Ramsay's correspondence see MS. Cotton Vespasian C.XVI, ff.154-156, B.L. ; Ellis, Letters, I (1st ser.), pp.22-32 ; Pinkerton, II, pp.438-443 ; Pollard, Sources, pp.136-143 ; Conway, pp.102-108 ; T.A., I, p.cxxxvii ; Gairdner, Richard III, p.305 ; Busch, Henry VII, p.105 ; G. Temperley, Henry VII, p.135 ; R. L. Mackie, James IV, p.83. Ramsay appears to have returned to Scotland in late 1495 or early 1496 as Henry's agent ; PRO. E.404/86, nos.10, 12 ; dated from PRO. E.403/2558, ff.56v, 58v.
2. T.A., I, pp.cxxvii, cxxxvi-cxxxvii, 276-300, 335, 340, 342 ; L. & P. R.III and H.VII, II, pp.330-331. Warbeck's pension was £112 a month or £1,344 per annum. The Scottish burghs helped with the expenses ; See Extracts From the Council Register of the Burgh of Aberdeen, 1398-1570, I, ed. J. Stuart, (Spalding Club, 1844), p.57, but misdated 1495.

Worst of all, because of Henry VII's preparations and inside knowledge, the Scots had never held the element of surprise which had been so vital to the success of their expedition. Perkin Warbeck was always of greater potential value to his supporters than he ever proved to be in reality, and true to form the Scottish "Raid of Ellem" was a dismal and embarrassing failure; the continental reports and Vergil's account are evident exaggerations of the devastation caused by the Scots.<sup>1</sup> I maintain that, as Albany had discovered in 1482, the support of the "auld enemy" effectively undermined the pretender's cause from the outset, and, moreover, the initiative for responsive action now lay with Henry VII.<sup>2</sup>

Organisation and efficiency were the keynotes of the English preparations during 1496 and 1497, a bureaucratic efficiency against which the Scots could hardly hope to compete; the English King, his household officials, and his councillors evidently sustained the momentum of the military activity.<sup>3</sup> In October 1496, Henry had instructed his undertreasurer, Sir Robert Lytton, to make a search among the extant records to determine all "presidentes" pertaining to the defence of the Marches and

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1. cf. Chronicles of London, p.210 ; The Great Chronicle of London, p.264 ; Registrum Annalium Collegii Mertonensis, 1483-1521, ed. H. E. Salter, p.202 (dates the raid 21st-25th September), and England Under the Early Tudors, ed. C. H. Williams, (London, 1925), p.39 ; T.R.P., I, p.38 ; PRO. C.82/331, (Bain, 1637 and App. no.35, but misdated October, 1497) ; C.S.P. Venetian, I, 727, p.251 ; C.S.P. Milanese, I, 510, 514, pp.304-305, 308 ; C.S.P. Venetian, III, pp.634-635 ; Vergil, pp.87-91 ; Buchanan, 2, p.234 ; Y.C.R., II, p.128 ; T.A. I, pp.cxxxix-cxlii, 299-300, 321.
  2. Bacon, pp.180-184 ; Pollard, Sources, I, pp.150-155 ; MS. Additional 4160, ff.4-7v, B.L. ; MS. Additional 2219, ff.136-139v, B.L. ; MS. Harleian 283, ff.123v-124v, B.L., for Warbeck's proclamation. *The Pretender urged the Scots to cease their plunder and he returned to Coldstream on 21st September, the day James transported his artillery "oure the watir". The Scots remained in England until 25th September ; see Vergil, p.89 ; Buchanan, 2, p.234 ; T.A., I, pp.cxli-cxlii, 300, 321.*
  3. For Henry's preparations see C.P.R., 1494-1509, pp.16, 32, 52-53, 67-68, 86-93, 116 ; Bain, 1627 ; PRO. E.405/79 ; PRO. E.404/82 ; Naval Accounts, passim ; PRO. E.315/316.

to the progress of "grete armees" into Scotland since the reign of Edward III; the recent precedent of 1480-1484 appears to have been particularly influential, and the King utilised the experiences of his predecessors in marshalling his subjects against the Scots.' Sound finance was perhaps the most essential part of all military planning, and thus Henry VII was particularly active in this field. Perhaps because of Edward IV's difficulties in sustaining the conflict against Scotland from 1480 to 1482, Henry quickly sought to acquire the financial support of his subjects, the Great Council which assembled between 24th October and 5th November 1496, and the Parliament which sat from 16th January to 13th March 1497, granted the King a loan of £40,000, two fifteenths and tenths, an aid and a subsidy.<sup>2</sup> In addition the clergy granted Henry "ij dymys and an half", and certain authorities have therefore speculated that the King exploited the war in the pursuit of profit.<sup>3</sup> I do not subscribe to this interpretation. Since the extant financial evidence is incomplete, contradictory, and diffuse, it is probably impossible to precisely state the costs of the conflict with Scotland, but, arguably, the costs were higher and the receipts lower than F. C. Dietz originally perceived; if Henry VII repaid the loans to his subjects, at the most he may have

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1. PRO. E.404/82, no.53, October [1496].
  2. Chronicles of London, pp.211-213 ; The Great Chronicle of London, pp.274-275 ; Rot. Parl., VI, pp.509, 513-519.
  3. Chronicles of London, p.213 ; Wilkins, Concilia, III, p.645 ; The Records of the Northern Convocation, ed. G. W. Kitchin, S.S., CXIII, pp.lxii-lxiii (wrongly dated 1501), 203-204. For finance cf. Bacon, p.241 ; C.S.P. Venetian, I, 743, pp.256-257 ; Commynes, p.225 ; Utopia in The Complete Works of Sir Thomas More, ed. Surtz and Hexter, vol.IV (London, 1965), pp.90-93 ; Conway, p.109 ; Coleman thesis, pp.48, 72 ; Gairdner, Richard III, p.308 ; Dietz, ch.V., pp.78-79.

profited by about one third of the excess of £100,000 suggested by Dietz.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the evidence suggests that the English monarch intended to launch a "substanciall warre" against the Scots in 1497; for example, in March 1497, he appointed Sir Robert Lytton as his Treasurer for the War to receive all money without delay "to be by hym employed and spent necessarily to our vse and most prouffite abouteoure said werres".<sup>2</sup>

The loan requests of December 1496 have been neglected and merit additional consideration.<sup>3</sup> Drafted and duplicated by professional scribes hired for the purpose, the documents follow a set formula, and the names of the recipients, their county of residence, and the sums requested were inserted by royal clerks in the blank spaces.<sup>4</sup> All the recipients were men or women of "goode substaunce", but the sums requested varied; since groups and individuals received the privy seal letters, generalisation is difficult, but £10 to £20 was common, £40 was

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1. cf. Dietz, ch.V ; Chrimes, Henry VII, pp.197-200, 204. For receipts and expenses see PRO. E.36/126, ff.22-147v ; PRO. E.405/79-81 ; PRO. E.101/414/6, passim, esp. ff.55, 55v, 57, 63v, 71v, 75, 78v, 79v, 81v, 86. "Warr", as Edmund Dudley later noted, was "a greate consumer of treasure and riches" ; The Tree of Commonwealth, ed. D. M. Brodie, (Cambridge U.P., 1948), p.50.
  2. PRO. E.404/82 (not numbered). The phrase "substanciall warre" was used in Henry VII's loan requests, and the plan to construct three "bierhouses" at Berwick suggests that a large expedition was being prepared for 1497 ; C.P.R., 1494-1509, p.87 ; WAM 12265 (expenses for construction in Berwick - undated).
  3. eg. PRO. E.34/2 and 3 ; H.M.C., 55, I (1901), p.224 ; H.M.C., III, p.420 ; H.M.C., 72, Laing MSS. vol.I, 1287-1699, (London, 1914), pp.4-5 ; Christ Church Letters, ed. J. B. Sheppard, C.S., XIX (2nd ser., 1877), pp.62-63 ; Pollard, Sources, II, pp.45-47 ; PRO. E.39/100/128, (Bain, 1626) ; PRO. SC.1/58, no.55 ; PRO. SC.1/51, no.116 ; MS. Harleian 6986, f.7, B.L. ; MS. Cotton Titus B.V, f.155, B.L. ; MS. Cotton Cleopatra F.VI, ff.248-249, B.L.
  4. PRO. E.405/79, m.15, 23.

not unusual, and there are extant examples of £100 and £200.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, while some paid in full, others offered less; for example, John Turvey of Buckinghamshire was asked for £20 and "agrede for" £13.13s.4d.<sup>2</sup> Evidently much was left to the discretion of the local commissioners, and depended on the circumstances in particular cases. When Dame Elizabeth Elmys and her son William refused to pay more than £10 of the £40 requested, the commissioners gave "hir a monicion to apere byfore the Kynges counsell by fore candlemas", while a certain John Wylmote was also ordered to appear before the Council since "be the report of his nighburs" he was of sufficient means to pay "the holl" sum.<sup>3</sup> The vast majority of the extant loan requests pertain to southern counties but Yorkshire raised nearly £2,500, and the loan brought the King in excess of £50,000.<sup>4</sup>

Though James IV continued to shelter Warbeck after the failure of the Scottish expedition in September 1496, it is clear that thereafter the pretender was virtually useless as a pawn in Anglo-Scottish relations. Many of Perkin's followers were paid to leave Scotland in October 1496, and the Scottish records remain silent about the pretender until May 1497; the payment of Warbeck's monthly pension of £112 on 10th May, 7th June, and 27th June, preceded his own imminent departure from the realm.<sup>5</sup>

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1. eg. from a sample of 64 in PRO. E.34/2 the amounts requested were £10 (28), £20 (18), £40 (11), 100 marcs (3), £100 (3), and £200 (1).
  2. PRO. SC.1/58, no.55 ; cf. PRO. E.34/2, nos.4, 14, 24, 62, 68.
  3. PRO. E.34/2, no.44 ; H.M.C., 72, Laing MSS. vol.I, 1287-1699, pp.4-5.
  4. PRO. E.36/14, ff.225-373, esp.353-370. The total raised was given as £51,375 and 16d., more than the £40,000 anticipated, but less than the £58,000 mentioned in the London chronicle ; Chronicles of London, p.213. For background see G. L. Harriss, 'Aids, Loans, and Benevolences', Historical Journal, VI (1963), pp.1-19.
  5. T.A., I, pp.cxl11, 301-303, 335, 340, 342.

James, however, evidently anticipated an English attack in 1497, and he prepared his Border defences in late 1496 and early 1497.<sup>1</sup> Fortunately for the Scots, Henry VII's offensive activities were undermined and temporarily curtailed by domestic rebellion in Cornwall, "an area where it might have least been feared".<sup>2</sup> According to Vergil, the Cornish objected to "the weight of tax imposed for the Scottish war" ; their case was that the northern counties were obliged to defend the realm against the Scots, and that Henry VII's response was unwarranted for "such a small expedition".<sup>3</sup> It is interesting that the most vociferous opposition emerged in the region farthest from Scotland, and probably the northern counties had appreciated the danger of Warbeck's sojourn among their hostile neighbours; there is some evidence that Henry's taxation provoked discontent in York by early 1498, but these difficulties did not surface until the Scottish danger had greatly subsided.<sup>4</sup> The effective and expedient utilisation of propaganda undoubtedly assisted the English monarch in obtaining and maintaining the support of the majority of his subjects,

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1. Ibid., pp.cxlili-cll, 308-342, 351 ; R.M.S., II, 1424-1513, 2365, p.503 ; C.S.P. Venetian, VI, pt.111, 71, pp.1602-1603 ; PRO. SC.1/52, no.33.
  2. Vergil, p.91.
  3. Ibid., pp.91-99 (Bacon and Hall appear to have embellished this account of events) ; A. Fletcher, Tudor Rebellions, (Harlow, 2nd ed., 1973), pp.14-16, and see biographies of Henry VII ; Conway, p.110 ; PRO. E.405/79. PRO. SP.58, no.22, ff.1, 2, 3, 5, mentions James IV's "louyng mynde" during the Cornish rebellion, and the "natural inclynacion affeccion and good wil" that he bore at this time, but cf. note 1. Vergil, pp.99-101, confused the Scottish raids in June with the attack on Norham in August. See also C.P.R., 1494-1509, pp.86-93, 110, 116-118, 144 ; Y.C.R., II, pp.129-133 ; T.R.P., I, pp.39-41 ; Foedera, V., pt.iv., p.110 ; Bain, 1623 (PRO. C.82/332), 1625, 1628, 1629, 1630, (PRO. C.82/163), 1631-1633, 1634 (PRO. C.82/164) ; PRO. E.36/126, ff.22-38v ; MS. Royal 14 B.VII, B.L. ; L. & P. R.III and H.VII, II, pp.335-337. Henry maintained "posts" to inform him of events in the North and West parts from June to October 1497 ; PRO. E.101/414/6, ff.46, 47, 50, 55, 55v, 75, 79v, 81v, 86.
  4. Y.C.R., II, pp.133-138.

but once the Cornish rebellion of 1497 had highlighted his vulnerability, I would suggest that Henry VII turned to the kind of diplomatic solution for Anglo-Scottish relations which the powers of the Holy League also favoured.<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately, however, English diplomacy was ineffective in the face of James IV's continued recalcitrance.

The diplomatic instructions which Henry VII gave to Richard Fox, Bishop of Durham, on 5th July 1497, are nonetheless of considerable interest as an illustration of the King's opinion, and as an example of the double instructions which were evidently common by the sixteenth century.<sup>2</sup> Henry's desire to have Warbeck expelled from Scotland runs like a thread of steel through both parts of the document, but, failing this, Fox was also authorised to suggest a personal meeting between the two monarchs (at Newcastle or elsewhere), and to conclude an Anglo-Scottish peace which had evidently been discussed at "Jenyn Haugh". The pretender's expulsion from Scotland was the King's main concern, but he appears to have been prepared to accept peace at almost any price, even

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1. For propagandist interpretations of events see T.R.P., I, pp.38-41 ; Rot. Parl., VI, pp.513-519, and Henry's loan requests. For Spanish attempts to influence Anglo-Scottish peace see C.S.P. Spanish, I, pp.xxx-xxxii, 104-106, 114-119, 120-122, 125-128, 131-136, 139-142, 147-165, 168-219 ; G. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, (London, 1962), passim, esp. p.145, for the importance of Ayala's residency as ambassador in Scotland.
  2. PRO. SP.58, no.22, and see the later copies MS. Cotton Vespasian C.XVI, ff.147-150v, B.L., and PRO. 31/8/172, ff.433-438. For printed versions see L. & P. R.III and H.VII, I, pp.104-111 ; Pollard, Sources, III, pp.37-42 ; Bain, 1635 ; Report on Foedera, App.E., (London, 1869), pp.82-83. The two MS. copies were incorrectly dated 1496, an error repeated in the catalogue MS. Additional 11595, B.L., f.4v, but corrected in PRO. OBS.1/1177. The date in SP.58, no.22 was lost when the MS. was repaired, but the repairer's note is undoubtedly correct (see PRO. C.82/164 and Rot. Scot., II, pp.530-531). The MS. came from volume XL of Joseph Williamson's collection, and was probably placed in the present bundle when the PRO. State Paper collections were formed ; not all the materials in SP.58 are later transcripts as stated in PRO. catalogues. See also G. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, pp.40-41 ; L. & P. R.III and H.VII, I, p.xxix.



the unsatisfactory Scottish offers made at "Jenyn Haugh", provided that this might redound "to our honour and satisfaccion of reason to our subiectes".<sup>1</sup> In reality the pretender and his Scottish wife sailed from Ayr the day after Fox had received his instructions, and it is likely that Henry had failed to appreciate Warbeck's weakness after the fiasco of September 1496.<sup>2</sup> James IV now found himself increasingly isolated, and yet he appears to have been reluctant to negotiate with the English; perhaps partly as a declaration of Scottish military might, and partly as a reaction to Spanish diplomatic pressure, the Scots again raided England in July-August 1497. It has been suggested that James sought to co-ordinate his attack with Warbeck's landing in Cornwall, but I maintain that the evidence is too vague to support this conclusion.<sup>3</sup> The argument is further undermined by the fact that the truce of Ayton was concluded on 30th September while Warbeck was not captured by Henry VII until 5th October; moreover, no contemporary Englishman perceived of any such conspiratorial activity.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, it appears that James IV's heart

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1. Fox was to keep PRO. SP.58, no.22, ff.3-7 to himself (the part revealing Henry's desire for peace at all costs), while he was to show the Scots folios 1-2 and a letter signifying that he had "no further auctorite then is comprised in thos instruccions".
2. Consequently Fox's instructions may not have formed the basis of any Anglo-Scottish negotiations. T.A., I, pp.clii-cliii, 343-352 ; L. & P. R.III and H.VII, II, pp.331-332.
3. L. & P. R.III and H.VII, II, pp.lvii-lviii ; Gairdner, Richard III, pp.317-321 ; Busch, Henry VII, pp.114-115, 347 ; Temperley, Henry VII, pp.152-153 ; Storey, Henry VII, p.85 ; T.A., I, pp.cliv, 360, 371 ; Ledger of Andrew Halyburton, ed. C. Innes, (Edinburgh, 1867), pp.lix, 215.
4. see Chapter Five ; MS. Additional 46454, f.9, B.L., printed by Halliwell, Letters, I, pp.179-180, for Henry VII's letter to Sir Gilbert Talbot. The chroniclers of the sixteenth century and later wrongly state that James only abandoned the pretender after the conclusion of an Anglo-Scottish peace ; Vergil, pp.103-105 ; Hall, pp.482-483 ; Lesley, pp.114-115 ; Buchanan, 2, p.237 ; Bacon, pp.196-197. For Warbeck see Gairdner, Richard III, pp.317-326 ; Calendar of the Carew MSS., Book of Howth, ed. J. S. Brewer and W. Bullen, R.S. (London, 1871), pp.468-472.

was no longer in the fight; the object of the Scottish attack was Norham castle, an ostensibly easy target because of its proximity to Scotland.<sup>1</sup> In reality, Bishop Fox had made extensive arrangements for the defence of the castle, and the English under the Earl of Surrey responded to the provocation by besieging and destroying Ayton castle in Scotland.<sup>2</sup> At one point in August the English and Scottish armies had faced one another "upon Halidon hill", and it is clear from the English ordnance account that Surrey had been ready "to yif batell".<sup>3</sup> The Scots, however, had retreated from the field, and the English force, "vexid grevously all that tyme with contynuell rayn and cold wedyr", retired to Berwick after a campaign which had only lasted five days; little wonder that Henry VII lamented on 28th August that he had encountered "noo lytill dyfficulte" in subduing the Scots.<sup>4</sup>

James IV was evidently persuaded, probably more by the high costs and ineffectiveness of Scottish militarism than by the strenuous efforts of English and Spanish diplomats, that Anglo-Scottish peace was the most feasible and desirable proposition. Between 20th August, when Sir William Tyler met with James IV at Dunbar, and 30th August, when James ordered

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1. I.A., I, pp.clvi-clvii, 312-314, 344-349, 350-352.
  2. Letters of Richard Fox, 1486-1529, ed. P. S. and H. M. Allen, (Oxford, 1929), pp.xii, 23-24 ; PRO. DURH.3/61, m. 5, 13, 15, 21, abstract in 36th Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records, (London, 1875), App.I, pp.31-35 ; The Register of Richard Fox, while Bishop of Bath and Wells, ed. E. C. Batten, (1889), pp.43-47, 49-50 ; The Register of Richard Fox Lord Bishop of Durham 1494-1501, ed. M. P. Howden, S.S., CXLVII (1932), p.xxxiv ; Vergil, pp.99-101 ; R. L. Mackie, James IV, p.87 ; Lesley, p.114.
  3. PRO. E.36/7, ff.138-208, esp.206 ; Naval Accounts, ed. Oppenheim, passim, esp. pp.130-131 ; PRO. E.36/8.
  4. The Great Chronicle of London, pp.278-281 ; R. L. Mackie, James IV, pp.86-88 ; M. J. Tucker, The Life of Thomas Howard Earl of Surrey and Second Duke of Norfolk, 1443-1524, (The Hague, 1964), pp.67-68 ; Naval Accounts, ed. Oppenheim, pp.xlii-iv ; MS. Harleian 1393, ff.44-44v, B.L. ; MS. Cotton Claudius C.III, ff.40v-47, B.L.

his artillery "hame", the Scottish records allude to Anglo-Scottish negotiations.<sup>1</sup> Interestingly Henry VII issued a proclamation on 30th August mustering the inhabitants of the Marches for a Scottish attack which he expected would take place on 7th September.<sup>2</sup> Conceivably this provides testimony of the English monarch's continued insecurity and mistrust of James IV for there is no evidence that any Scottish attack was planned at this time; arguably, since service in the Scottish host at Ayton was unpopular, James had resolved to cut his losses by recourse to diplomacy.<sup>3</sup> Lingering antipathies doubtless contributed to the so-called affray of Norham in early 1498, a border squabble in which four Scots were killed, but this incident had no long-term significance.<sup>4</sup> Evidently neither James nor Henry wished to jeopardise their Ayton truce, and I suggest that this storm in a teacup was over-emphasized by sixteenth century historians because of the matrimonial alliance which they perceived quite wrongly to have been initiated by James IV at his subsequent meeting with Bishop Fox in Melrose Abbey.<sup>5</sup>

There can be little doubt that Perkin Warbeck's career has overshadowed the remarkable life of his Scottish wife, the "White Rose".<sup>6</sup>

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1. T.A., I, pp.clvii-clix, 353-355, 359, 365.
  2. T.R.P., I, p.41 ; C.P.R., 1494-1509, p.144 ; PRO. DURH.3/61, m.2 gives the date as "some tyme" in September.
  3. R.S.S., I, 1488-1529, nos. 1952, 1955-1958, 1961-1962, 1965, 1968, 1970, 1974, 2011, 2095, 2100, 2102, 2198, 2330 ; A.D.C., II, 1496-1501, pp.103, 116, 126 ; SRO. GD.45/27/13.
  4. Vergil, pp.111-115; Buchanan, 2, pp.238-239 ; H. Jerningham, 'An Affray at Norham Castle and its Influence on Scotch and English History', The Scottish Antiquary or Northern Notes and Queries, XV (1901), pp.179-188 ; C.S.P. Spanish, I, pp.145-192 ; C.S.P. Milanese, I, pp.332-358 ; C.S.P. Venetian, I, pp.263-275 ; PRO. E.101/414/16, ff.26v, 34, 53 ; Lesley, pp.116-117.
  5. Ibid. ; see Chapter Five.
  6. Bacon, pp.202-203 ; Lesley, pp.115-116.

Lady Catherine Gordon was a pawn in James IV's political machinations of 1495-1497 but there is some evidence that love blossomed between her and the pretender.<sup>1</sup> Lady Catherine was captured in Cornwall about 15th October 1497, and her subsequent career in England is of considerable interest.<sup>2</sup> One extant Scottish manuscript chronicle hints that Henry VII was greatly enamoured with Warbeck's young wife (incorrectly named Margaret therein), and that "sum menit at yai wer mareit".<sup>3</sup> The suggestion of matrimony was clearly false, but if Henry's affection is assessed by the yardstick of his generosity, Catherine was a favoured companion of the later years of his life. In 1497 she apparently reverted to her maiden name and was granted a position in the Queen's Household. Both the King and Queen treated Catherine well, and the English records abound with payments to her and her servants.<sup>4</sup> By 1508-1509, Catherine is known to have been in receipt of an annuity of 100 marks; on 10th December 1508 she also received 20s. "for stuf bought for the King", and on 25th March 1509 she received 18s.8d. "for iiii paynted clothis for the Kinges grace".<sup>5</sup> The extant wardrobe accounts provide further testimony of Henry VII's generosity, especially from 1501-1503, and she also played an active role in court events (such as Margaret's betrothal to

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1. eg. C.S.P. Spanish, I, 119, pp.78-79 ; Bacon, pp.202-203.
  2. PRO. E.101/414/16, f.2v ; Chronicles of London, pp.218-219.
  3. N.L.S. MS. 1746, f.112v.
  4. Vergil, p.109 ; Bacon, p.202 ; PRO. E.36/214, ff.119, 284, 292, 305, 323, 325, 329 ; PRO. E.101/415/3, ff.3v, 6v, 16, 21v, 32v, 38, 48v, 57v, 66v, 77, 89, 99v, 104 ; PRO. E.101/414/16, ff.2v, 6v, 18v-19, 60 ; MS. Additional 7099, f.43, B.L. (printed in Excerpta Historica) ; MS. Additional 59899, ff.8, 16v, 27, B.L.
  5. PRO. E.36/214, ff.292, 305, 323, 329.

James IV).<sup>1</sup> After Henry VII's death, Henry VIII continued to treat Catherine well; she became a denizen in May 1510, and on 2nd August she received some property in Berkshire provided that she agreed not to leave the realm without a royal licence.<sup>2</sup> Lady Catherine married three times during this reign and she outlived Warbeck by 38 years (dying in late 1537), having experienced the vagaries of fortune in the course of a remarkable career.<sup>3</sup> Few Scots were so successful in England.<sup>4</sup>

In the final analysis, the Anglo-Scottish conflict of 1496-1497 is of interest less on account of the uninspiring raids, reprisals, and non-events, and more on account of its potential, repercussions, and significance. At all times Warbeck's value lay more in his inherent potential to undermine Henry VII rather than any danger which he represented in reality, and James evidently failed to appreciate this fact; had the Scottish monarch merely given his recognition to the pretender and provided a place of refuge he could conceivably have conducted his relations with England from a position of strength. Instead James IV's actions effectively undermined Warbeck's value, and the fiasco of September 1496 handed the military and diplomatic initiatives, and the propaganda victory, to Henry VII. Only the Cornish rebellion of 1497 prevented Henry from launching a large scale military offensive against Scotland.

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1. eg. PRO. E.404/82 (unnumbered doc.) ; PRO. E.101/415/7, nos.26, 81, 133, 166, (Bain, 1685, 1688, 1702) ; PRO. E.101/415/10, (Bain, 1729 and App. no.36) ; Collectanea, IV, p.260.
  2. L.& P. H.VIII, I, 563 (8), 485 (7), pp.289, 329 ; PRO. E.36/215, ff.62-63.
  3. Busch, Henry VII, pp.440-441 ; her husbands were James Strangeways, Matthew Cradock, and Christopher Ashton.
  4. see Chapter One.

The repercussions of the conflict were manifold, but the primary significance of these events was that James and Henry were evidently persuaded that a matrimonial alliance proffered one solution to the difficulties which habitually plagued Anglo-Scottish relations.<sup>1</sup> Contrariwise, J. A. Williamson has suggested that an adverse consequence of the Cornish rebellion and the Anglo-Scottish conflict led to a "long suspension of the Cabot business" and to a reduction in Henry VII's financial contribution towards Cabot's 1498 expedition.<sup>2</sup> Conceivably the timing of Cabot's discovery of "the new Isle" was hardly fortuitous, but I maintain that even in the years of "crisis" from 1496 to 1498, the English monarch did not neglect trade and exploration (even if his patronage of Cabot was mainly a ploy, and an unsuccessful one, against Spain). The hiatus between the exploratory voyages of Henry VII's reign and the more prosperous endeavours of the later sixteenth century ultimately owed little to the political events of 1496-1497, and more to the failings of Henry's immediate successors, Iberian monopolies of trade with the new world, the failure of Cabot's 1498 voyage, and the failure of adventurers to capture the imagination and commercial support of the mercantile community.

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(C) The Quiet Years, 1503 - 1511

Despite the fact that there is a dearth of manuscript material for the study of Anglo-Scottish relations between 1503 and 1511 and that most English chroniclers concentrated on the first half of Henry VII's reign, I maintain that this period is more interesting and significant

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1. see Chapter Five.
2. J. A. Williamson, The Cabot Voyages and Bristol Discovery Under Henry VII, Hakluyt Society, CXX (2nd ser., 1962), pp.85-86.

than certain authorities have stated.<sup>1</sup> There are two main schools of opinion. Miss Conway, for example, suggested that the "peace and tranquility" of the later years of Henry VII's reign had left no landmarks.<sup>2</sup> Contrariwise, J. Gairdner and J. D. Mackie both stressed the prevalence of traditional Anglo-Scottish animosities and highlighted certain potentially divisive aspects : the murder of Sir Robert Ker; James IV's maritime activities; James IV's communication with malcontents such as the Irish O'Donnells and the Duke of Gueldres; and, above all, the prevailing power and influence of the "Auld" Alliance.<sup>3</sup> I suggest that conciliation and conflict were both manifest; compromise and goodwill were only to be expected in view of the Anglo-Scottish treaty and matrimonial alliance of 1502-1503, but, given the nature of traditional antipathies, tension was probably also inevitable.

After the marriage of James IV and Margaret Tudor probably the first manifestation of Anglo-Scottish co-operation occurred in the "Raid of Eskdale", a combined expedition against lawless borderers in August 1504.<sup>4</sup> The unruly state of the Borders was of concern to both Henry VII and James IV, and the raid, a "curious combination of picnic and warlike expedition", constituted the effective implementation of the spirit of

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1. cf. J. D. Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, (Oxford, 1952), pp.162-164 ; L. & P. R.III and H.VII, I, p.lxi ; Pinkerton, II, pp.53-54, 62-63 ; Gairdner, Henry VII, pp.204-205 ; Busch, Henry VII, pp.235-238 ; Temperley, Henry VII, pp.363-364 ; Alexander, Henry VII, pp.192-193 ; Hume-Brown, History, I, pp.325-327. Coleman thesis, ch.VI, and R. L. Mackie, James IV, chs.V, VII, largely ignore Anglo-Scottish relations between 1503 and 1509.
  2. Conway, p.xxix, (her study ends somewhat abruptly in 1498).
  3. J. D. Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, pp.163-164 ; L. & P. R.III and H.VII, I, p.lxi, II, p.lxxvi.
  4. T.A., II, pp.xciv-xcvii, 451-458 ; R. B. Armstrong, The History of Liddesdale, Eskdale, Ewesdale, Wauchopedale, and the Debateable Land, I, (Edinburgh, 1883), pp.191-195.

conciliation embodied in the Anglo-Scottish alliance.<sup>1</sup> Reciprocal goodwill was evident in the exchange of gifts between the Scottish monarch and the English borderers, while, in September, James rewarded English minstrels, a shipwrecked Englishman, and two English pilgrims "that wes spulzeit passand to Quhithirn".<sup>2</sup> The Scottish King also maintained an "Inglis doggar" (kennelman) at his court, and the two monarchs and their subjects evidently exchanged horses, dogs, and hawks, on many occasions from thenceforward.<sup>3</sup> Henry VII sent a messenger to King James at the beginning of October 1504, and although no details are provided, it seems likely that the communication pertained to their recent co-operation on the Borders.<sup>4</sup>

Despite the sweeping assertions of some historians that James IV brought a measure of tranquility to the Scottish Marches, the success of the Raid of Eskdale is difficult to determine, but clearly the implementation of justice and royal authority on the Borders was both a long-term aspiration and a perpetual undertaking.<sup>5</sup> Unceasing vigilance and activity, and continued Anglo-Scottish accord, were the prerequisites for long-term success, and I suggest that both monarchs sought to benefit from the treaty of perpetual peace by strengthening their authority in the Marches. Henry VII, for example, experimented with innovations in the traditional administration of the Borders, but at no time did he relax his vigilance, and the defence of Berwick was of particular concern for

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1. T.A., II, p.xlviii.

2. Ibid., pp.453-458.

3. Ibid., pp.459, 462 (and see 404-405, 423).

4. Ibid., p.461.

5. Coleman thesis, pp.107-108 ; R.S.S., I, 1488-1529, no.1116, p.163 ; Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, I, pt.i, passim.



the remainder of the reign; the concern for Berwick's security was manifest in the continued appointment of local officials and in the King's indentures which guaranteed the defence of the town and castle.<sup>1</sup>

Arguably, the English monarch sought a more permanent guarantee of security than was offered by the payment of annuities to local gentlemen in return for an obligation to defend Berwick with their retinues in times of siege or attack. On 27th April 1506, Henry VII declared that, to ensure the security of Berwick and the Marches, he had licenced his councillor Lord Darcy (captain of Berwick) to retain "a thowsande able persones for the warr", at his discretion, "ffrome oure Ryuer of trent northwardes to serue vs in his retynue....whenesoeuer he shalbe by vs commanded thervnto and as often as the caas necessary schall requier..."<sup>2</sup>

The size of Darcy's retinue was very large, and may be compared with the 630 men mentioned in Lord Conyers' indenture as captain of Berwick in December 1508.<sup>3</sup> Henry VII displayed further innovation with his Wardens of the Marches between 1504 and 1509; in 1504, for example, the Western and Middle Marches were linked under the wardenship of Lord Dacre, while the Eastern March and the Middle March were granted separate Wardens in 1505 and 1506.<sup>4</sup> I suggest that by taking advantage of the peace with Scotland and by making separate provisions for the defence of Berwick, Henry VII embarked on the temporary experiment of dividing the English Marches into three distinct power blocks; he thereby avoided the concentration of power, authority, and influence in the hands of a few great

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1. PRO. C.82/257, (Bain, 1738) ; C.P.R., 1494-1509, pp.403, 536, 596 ; Bain, 1741, 1751 ; C.C.R., 1500-1509, no.958, pp.359-360 ; James IV Letters, 209, p.131 ; For Berwick see Chapter Two section D.

2. MS. Cotton Caligula B.I., f.49, B.L.

3. Bain, 1751 ; C.C.R., 1500-1509, no.958, pp.359-360.

4. see Appendix, tables III and IV.

5. see below pp 257 , 263-264 , App tables II and IV.

northern potentates as had been the case for most of the fifteenth century.<sup>1</sup>

The Scottish historian Buchanan furnished the only detailed account of the murder of Sir Robert Ker, Warden of the Scottish Middle Marches, by the English; an incident which placed some strain on the relations between Henry VII (and later Henry VIII) and James IV.<sup>2</sup> Ker's brutal murder on a day of truce evidently threatened to undermine Anglo-Scottish accord largely because two of the murderers escaped Henry's justice and remained at large "in the interior of England"; one of these men, a certain Starhead, was later executed on English territory by the retainers of Ker's son, Andrew, in flagrant violation of the Anglo-Scottish treaty. Buchanan's narrative, although not contemporary and chronologically vague, is probably accurate in its essentials; the dates of the murders of Ker and Starhead cannot be stated with precision, but the Warden had evidently been killed prior to April 1508.<sup>3</sup> Henry VII's commission to Robert Rydon and Edward Ratclyf, on 2nd April 1507, was intended to redress reciprocal violations of the Anglo-Scottish peace, but there is no direct evidence to link this diplomatic activity with the aforementioned killings.<sup>4</sup> The English financial records throw some light on the Anglo-Scottish diplomacy of the years from 1507 to 1509, though the entries are often infuriatingly vague and mainly catalogue the sums received by various envoys and messengers.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, both James IV and Henry VII

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1. see Chapter Six. Alth h there were three Marches, until Henry's reign the E t and Ida Marches were generally held by the same warden.
  2. Buchanan, 2, pp.246-247.
  3. MS. Cotton Caligula B.VIII, ff.150-154v, B.L. ; R.S.S., I, 1488-1529, nos.291, 753, pp.37, 111, is of little help.
  4. PRO. E.39/76, (Bain, 1747) ; Foedera, V. pt.iv, p.237, (11th April).
  5. PRO. E.36/214, ff.148, 199, 207, 214, 232.

continued to grant safe-conducts and letters of protection to one another's subjects despite the tensions which probably prevailed between them.'

In 1542 Henry VIII's ambassadors to France informed the King that the French appreciated that he would show due regard for his matrimonial allies, "and moche better than Your Majestes father dyd esteme the Kyng of Scottes"; this reference is only intelligible if the difficulties experienced by James IV and Henry VII were well-known on the continent more than thirty years later.<sup>2</sup> I maintain, however, that their relationship was considerably more cordial than was perceived in the 1540's; arguably, Henry VIII's difficulties with Scotland were over-eagerly anticipated in the reign of his father. Furthermore, underlying tension was hardly a novel feature of Anglo-Scottish relations and was only to be expected from 1503; the treaty and matrimonial alliance did not reflect significant changes in Anglo-Scottish attitudes, while traditional antipathies were reinforced by the experiences and propaganda of their periodic conflicts.<sup>3</sup>

The dichotomy of conflict and compromise was particularly acute when tension prevailed between the Duke of Gueldres and the Emperor Maximilian and his son, Archduke Philip of Burgundy, on the continent from circa 1505. Since the Duke was an ally (and kinsman) of James IV, while Henry VII was allied with Maximilian and Philip, continental events had some bearing on Anglo-Scottish relations. In June 1505, James IV

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1. R.S.S., I, 1488-1529, nos.900, 1058, 1107, 1114, 1117, 1120, 1279, 1291, 1299, 1357, 1360, 1473, 1852, 1865.
  2. S.P., Henry VIII, I, CLXXXVI, esp. p.737.
  3. see Chapter One.

severely rebuked the Duke of Gueldres for receiving the English malcontent Edmund de la Pole, Earl of Suffolk, and, up to the end of 1506, the Scottish monarch urged the Duke and the Archduke to resolve their differences by recourse to arbitration.<sup>1</sup> However, in January 1507, James wrote to Henry VII expressing his concern at the attacks being made on the Duchy of Gueldres and urging him not to become involved in the conflict.<sup>2</sup> If Henry took up arms against Gueldres, James declared that he would be compelled regretfully to consider his father-in-law as his enemy, but all of this was highly hypothetical; as J. D. Mackie observed, James IV was probably only seeking to give diplomatic support to his kinsman without seriously contemplating a conflict with England.<sup>3</sup>

The Anglo-Scottish treaty permitted both parties to give defensive assistance to their allies, and in view of Henry VII's reluctance to involve himself in continental military activity, he was unlikely to quarrel with James over the Duchy of Gueldres. Scottish intervention on the continent would clearly weaken James IV's finances and dissipate his military and naval power, while the King evidently hoped to lead the Christian monarchs in a Crusade against the Infidel Turks.<sup>4</sup> It therefore seems unlikely that either Henry or James seriously considered jeopardising their accord over Gueldres in 1507.<sup>5</sup> The significance of the potential dispute lay in the illustration of the fact that England and Scotland traditionally belonged to different alliance systems; a fact

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1. James IV Letters, nos. 14, 17, 27, 34 ; L. & P. R.III and H.VII, I, pp.xlvii-1, and II, pp.192-197, 203-213.
  2. James IV Letters, no.70 ; L. & P. R.III and H.VII, II, pp.225-229.
  3. J. D. Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, p.163.
  4. The crusade is discussed in Coleman thesis and R. L. Mackie, James IV.
  5. For 1509 see James IV Letters, nos.226, 233.

which might well undermine the uneasy ménage à trois between England, France, and Scotland during a period of crisis.

The incompatibility of the Franco-Scottish and Anglo-Scottish alliances constituted one of the most interesting themes of the period from 1503 to 1513.<sup>1</sup> James IV maintained formal and informal contacts with the French and cultivated his relations with Louis XII to acquire timber for shipbuilding.<sup>2</sup> The strength of the "Auld" Alliance was put to the test in July 1507 when the French monarch requested Scottish assistance for the defence of the Duchy of Milan; in response to this request James Hamilton, Earl of Arran, was sent to France as the Scottish envoy.<sup>3</sup> Henry VII's suspicions were evidently aroused by this visit to France and, at the beginning of 1508, the Earl and Sir Patrick Hamilton, who were travelling through England without safe-conducts, were detained in Kent by Henry Vaughan and taken to London.<sup>4</sup> The Hamiltons were famous joust<sup>ers</sup>, particularly the "nobill and waliezeant" Sir Patrick, but though they were well treated at the English court (being entertained by the King and the Mayor of London), James IV was clearly vexed by their arrest.<sup>5</sup> Consequently the English monarch despatched an ambassador to Scotland.

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1. eg. James IV Letters, p.xliii ; Flodden Papers.
  2. James IV Letters, p.xxxviii, nos.1, 18, 35, 42, 43, 56, 57, 68, 80, 81, 84, 102, 126, 127, 132-134, 138-139, 142-143, 154, 157, 167, 175, 177-181, 189, 212, up to 1509, et passim thereafter ; T.A., I - IV, passim ; SRO. SP.7/21-25A ; Flodden Papers ; Inventaire Chronologique , ff 53 - 58.
  3. James IV Letters, nos.42, 115, 136, 138-140 ; Flodden Papers, pp.1-4 ; R.S.S., I, 1488-1529, no.1545, p.223.
  4. André, pp.105-108, from MS. Cotton Julius A.III, ff.18-23v, B.L.
  5. Pitscottie, I, p.235 (and pp.234, 243-244) ; André, pp.95-130, from MS. Cotton Julius A.III, ff.1-68v ; B.L., (an annal of 1507-1508).

The embassy of early 1508, one of the earliest duties in the remarkable career of the royal chaplain Thomas Wolsey, has generally been ignored by historians.<sup>1</sup> Pinkerton misled many authorities by erroneously attributing the extant report of April 1508 to Nicholas West; Gairdner, however, correctly identified the hand of the manuscript, and found an allusion to the mission in an early sixteenth century poem.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the financial records confirm the identity of the ambassador beyond doubt; "master Wolcy" received £20 and £10 from Henry VII, and £54 Scots from James IV.<sup>3</sup>

Between 22nd and 27th March Wolsey awaited a Scottish safe-conduct at Berwick, but from 2nd April to 10th April he had an audience with James IV each day and his report discussed all of the significant issues which contributed to Anglo-Scottish tension.<sup>4</sup> Henry VII had evidently complained to James on 13th January that various Scots and foreign ambassadors had passed through England "vndyr couert maner in abytes and aray dysymlyd" without safe-conducts. The Scottish King demanded to know to whom Henry was referring other than the Earl of Arran, the Archbishop of St. Andrews, and the ambassadors of Gueldres; in this

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1. cf. T. W. Cameron, 'The Early Life of Thomas Wolsey', E.H.R., III (1888), pp.458-477, esp.471-472 ; A. F. Pollard, Wolsey, (London, 1929), p.13 ; C. Ferguson, Naked to Mine Enemies : The Life of Cardinal Wolsey, (London, 1958), p.72 ; N. Williams, The Cardinal and the Secretary, (London, 1975), p.10 ; J. Ridley, The Statesman and the Fanatic : Thomas Wolsey and Thomas More, (London, 1982), pp.24-26. The Life and Death of Cardinal Wolsey by George Cavendish, ed. R. S. Sylvester, E.E.T.S., 243 (1959), says nothing about the embassy.
  2. Pinkerton, II, pp.62-63, 445-450 ; L. & P. R.III and H.VII, I, p.lxi ; MS. Royal 12 A.LXII, f.3, B.L.
  3. PRO. E.36/214, ff.240, 257 ; T.A., IV, p.120.
  4. MS. Cotton Caligula B.VIII, ff.150-154v, B.L. for what follows. The draft was printed and edited by Pinkerton, II, pp.445-450, and there is an abstract in James IV Letters, no.171, but it is essential to consult the original.

matter James "lenyth so fastly to hys owne oppynyon" that Wolsey referred the problem to the English monarch.

Though James IV stated that the Anglo-Scottish peace had been to the "honor plesure suerte riches profygth and auantage" of both himself and his merchants, he complained that some of his subjects had experienced "gret scathe"; this was evidently a reference to the murder of his Warden by the English. In the "matters of attemptates and redres makyng" James and Henry were "semblably myndyd" that "suche smale matters" should be remitted to their Wardens "with a streyt charge to make redres and mynyster Iustice"; the Scottish King nonetheless felt that certain of the English Wardens were of insufficient strength and power "to make conuenient redres" (which may suggest that Henry VII's innovation on the Marches was proving unsuccessful). Both monarchs agreed not to resort to letters of marque, especially in cases of murder, for though this had appeared expedient at the conclusion of the peace, subsequent "exsperiens" had shown that this "mygth be a gret occasyon of the breche". If due redress was not forthcoming, the monarchs agreed to expedite justice "with owt ffertherdelay"; this concept of royal supervision of Border officials was hardly novel.<sup>1</sup> In any case Wolsey had evidently informed the Scots that the English suffered four times as many "attemptates murderes robberyes and spoylys" than they had experienced.

Wolsey then went on to observe that the arrest of the Earl of Arran and Sir Patrick Hamilton by Henry VII had been taken "gretly to hert" by James IV and his subjects. The Scottish monarch desired Arran's return, but he refused to negotiate for his release and he further declared that if the Earl bound himself by an oath to Henry VII he would hang him at

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1. eg. see Chapter Two, sections C and E (for 1475, from MS. Cotton Vespasian C.XVI, ff.121-126, B.L.).

the first opportunity. Moreover, Sir Patrick Hamilton evidently heightened tension by deceitfully informing Queen Margaret that they were "well intretyd" while reporting the contrary to James and denying that Arran had given any oath to Henry VII. In response to English concerns about the "Auld" Alliance, the Scottish King gave Wolsey a carefully calculated reply which was conveyed to Henry VII in some detail:-

"Yowr seyde son seyth that as longe as ye be to hym louyng kynd and lyke god father he shal neuyr breke with yow nor renue the olde lege nor do that thyng that shal or mygth dyscontent yowr grace but at all tymys redy to love and dy with yow agenst all other wer yt the frenche or any other. He estemyth yowr loue and dyssplesure mor than the loue or dyssplesure of all other herthly princes. And that neyther fere nor yet posybylyte of successyon shal move or cause hym to kepe the amyte but only loue and kyndnes on yowr parte and hys othe seyth and promyse to yow mad in that behalf....from hens furth yf yowr grace be to hym as hys father he shud be to yow in all thynges as yowr louyng son."

Wolsey observed that the "holle body of Scotlond", except for the King, Queen, and Bishop of Murray, daily called for the reaffirmation of the "Auld" Alliance, and that "ther was neuyr man wers welkom" in Scotland than he was; even the "wyuys in the market" understood that the English envoy aspired to subvert the Franco-Scottish alliance. Though James IV would not openly say so, the delivery of the Earl of Arran constituted "the weyt of all" in that this was "the very thyng that shal cause hym to nat renue the lege". Certain Scottish councillors had even publicly stated that the Franco-Scottish and Anglo-Scottish alliances were not necessarily incompatible but "may well stand to gether".

The final paragraph of the draft report pertained to the question of a "personall mettyng" between the two monarchs. James was "very dysyros" to meet with Henry, but the Scottish councillors were "of contrary mynde" and thus the Scottish King refused to come further south than the Borders; a deleted paragraph reveals that Wolsey had been unable to



persuade James to travel to York, Durham, or Newcastle.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, Henry VII was informed unequivocally that he was unlikely to receive a "perfygt answer" from James IV until the Earl of Arran was released ("the key of all thes forseyd matteres".)

Without doubt, this constitutes one of the most interesting Anglo-Scottish documents of the early sixteenth century. Though many interesting themes are manifest therein, one perceives that James IV astutely exploited English fears of the "Auld" Alliance and of the possibility of a Scottish succession in England to counter the traditional English dominance in Anglo-Scottish relations. Above all one sees the importance of monarchical attitudes, especially when these flew in the face of popular inclination. Time and again it is evident that James IV countered English criticisms of his conduct by complaining about Henry VII's failure to utilise the established machinery in redressing his grievances. This provides additional testimony of the fact that whenever crises emerged, Anglo-Scottish relations degenerated to nit-picking over the smallest details and ambivalences in word, intention, and deed. Undoubtedly this response was a natural consequence of the desire by both sides to justify their own position, but the ironic fact was that, in spite of all this effort, arguments over detail were generally symptomatic of more fundamental Anglo-Scottish tensions, and when attitudes were antagonistic the details mattered little in any case (though these might provide an excuse to justify hostilities).

The reference in Wolsey's report to the clerical disguises adopted by certain Scotsmen and others may illuminate an undated letter sent by Henry VII to Sir Gilbert Talbot, Deputy of Calais; Talbot was instructed

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1. MS. Cotton Caligula B.VIII, f.154, B.L. (deleted and so not printed by Pinkerton).

to prevent a Scottish Friar Observant named Robert Steward from crossing to England by returning him to his convent without delay.<sup>1</sup> Possibly Steward was either a spy or a messenger engaged in the conveyance of secret correspondence between France and Scotland, and Wolsey's reference may have alluded to a network of couriers in "abytes and aray dysmyllyd". Probably Henry VII's suspicions were aroused by the continental diplomacy of 1508 (which culminated in the League of Cambrai in December), and he was particularly concerned that the "Auld" Alliance might undermine Anglo-Scottish accord; in reality Louis XII, being aware of a likely expedition to Italy at some future date, desired to maintain good relations with both his English and Scottish allies. In view of Wolsey's statement that James IV's conduct depended considerably on Henry's treatment of the Earl of Arran, it is unfortunate that at least two significant documents have been lost. Sixteenth century calendars reveal, for example, that on 8th August 1508 Sir Patrick Hamilton was permitted to return to Scotland having given an oath that he would return to England if required to do so, and on 13th August Arran agreed to stand as surety for his brother.<sup>2</sup> It is unclear when the Earl himself was allowed to depart since he was evidently in London at the time of Henry VII's funeral; he was, however, back in Scotland by November 1509.<sup>3</sup>

In March 1508, James IV requested his "derrest fadre" to grant the Bishop of Murray and his companions a safe-conduct for a journey to Rome, "and vtheris partes bezond sey", via England.<sup>4</sup> The tone of this

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1. MS. Additional 46454, f.3, B.L. (15th April) ; L. & P. R.III and H.VII, II, p.181.
  2. J. Ayloffe, Calendars of the Ancient Charters, etc. (London, 1774), pp.316-317 ; SRO. RH.2/4/1, f.126 ; MS. Stowe 138, f.55, B.L.
  3. L. & P. H.VIII, I, 20, 255, pp.21, 119 ; PRO. E.39/99/75 ; Foedera, VI, pt.1, p.8.
  4. PRO. SC.1/51,no.125 ; Bain,1748 ; L. & P. R.III and H.VII, I,LXIV,p.341.

letter was much more conciliatory than Wolsey's report, and thus one ought not to exaggerate the prevailing tension between Henry and James; goodwill is manifest in Henry VII's reward of £66.13s.4d. to the Bishop of Murray (the Scottish "Imbassador") on 12th July.<sup>1</sup> The English monarch's suspicions may have been allayed somewhat by the fact that Bernard Lord Aubigny, Louis XII's ambassador to James IV, visited him in London, and in view of the fact that the Scots-born Aubigny was a captain of the French King's Scottish guards, Henry probably showered him with the munificence of his royal hospitality.<sup>2</sup> The "Franch embassadouris" had been expected in Scotland in April, but did not arrive until early May, and Aubigny's death circa 15th June effectively undermined French diplomacy; the "Auld" Alliance was not confirmed until 1512.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, as J. D. Mackie observed, though the "old intimacy" of France and Scotland prevailed, it remained "a cardinal point of Henry's diplomacy to refuse to quarrel with the French King".<sup>4</sup>

To study Anglo-Scottish relations during late 1508 and early 1509 it is necessary to consult the meagre details of Henry VII's Chamber book of payments; the Scottish Lord High Treasurer's accounts are unfortunately missing from August 1508 to August 1511. On 22nd August 1508, a certain Richard Clement received two substantial payments "for his costes goyng in to Scotland", although the reasons for the journey are not provided.<sup>5</sup>

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1. PRO. E.36/214, f.273.
  2. André, p.113, from MS. Cotton Julius A.III, f.34v, B.L.
  3. T.A., IV, pp.xviii, lxxxiii, 42, 110, 117-118, 122, 124, 128 ; T.A., III, pp.xlv-xlvi ; Pitscottie, I, pp.241-244 ; SRO. SP.7/22 and 23 ; Lesley, pp.126-128.
  4. J. D. Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, p.164.
  5. PRO. E.36/214, f.282.

Anglo-Scottish co-operation is further evinced by the exchange of gifts and envoys, and I suggest that these references indicate more than diplomatic convention. On 22nd November 1508, Henry VII rewarded "one that brought hawkes from the King of Scottes" £6.13s.4d., and, on 26th November, a Scottish ambassador received £33.6s.8d.<sup>1</sup> The English monarch was particularly generous to the Scottish keepers of his falcons and hawks, as indicated by at least five payments of 6s.8d. from November 1508 to February 1509.<sup>2</sup> Other Scottish gifts may not necessarily have come from James IV; for example, on 10th December 1508 a Scot "that brought Greyhoundes" received £13.6s.8d. (and his two companions 20s. each), while a Scot bringing hawks received £6.13s.4d. on 25th March, 1509.<sup>3</sup> On 2nd January, Henry VII's messenger Halley received 40s. for "riding in to Scotland vpon the Kinges message", and there is sufficient evidence to indicate that Anglo-Scottish relations had considerably improved, after the tensions of 1507 and 1508, in the final five or six months of Henry's reign.<sup>4</sup>

In the history of Anglo-Scottish relations, the succession of Henry VIII in April 1509 was not a significant date (unless perceived so by hindsight). As the focus of early dynastic propaganda, the young monarch evidently received a measure of spontaneous popular enthusiasm and orchestrated acclaim, but one ought not to exaggerate the degree of change which he supposedly initiated in England's foreign and domestic policies.<sup>5</sup> Flodden was not an inevitable consequence of Henry VII's death. Change

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1. Ibid., ff.301, 303 : Lesley, p.129, for Henry's goodwill in late 1508.

2. Ibid., ff.303-304, 308, 318, 321.

3. Ibid., ff.305, 329.

4. Ibid., f.316.

5. cf. Coleman thesis, p.123, chs.VII, VIII.

took time, and while the francophobia of the young King and his subjects did not bode well for the long-term future of England's alliances with France and Scotland, I maintain that the years from 1509 to 1513 were not characterised by a "steady deterioration" in Anglo-Scottish relations (as one recent authority has claimed).<sup>1</sup> The precedents of 1475, 1480-1484, 1492, and 1496-1497, illustrate that Anglo-French and Anglo-Scottish conflicts might occur without provoking Franco-Scottish military and diplomatic activity.

In 1509 James IV and Henry VIII embarked on a honeymoon period; neither monarch could derive any evident advantage from a breach in Anglo-Scottish relations (especially in view of the unfortunate experiences of 1480-1484 and 1496-1497), and I maintain that aggression was not even considered until 1511.<sup>2</sup> From the outset, however, there were two potential sources of future discord. First, both James and Henry shared certain characteristics; they were, for example, heavy-handed, quixotic, uncompromising in the face of good sense, and ostentatious in policy and personality. Second, because the two monarchs traditionally belonged to different alliance systems there was always a possibility that events on the continent might place sufficient demands on James and Henry to undermine Anglo-Scottish accord. It is therefore possible to argue that the significant change in 1509 was not Henry VIII's succession but the repercussions engendered by the French victory over the Venetians at Agnadello in May; the francophobic Holy League, concluded in October 1511, and subsequent French attempts to revive the "Auld" Alliance, were to have a profound effect on Anglo-Scottish relations for the following two years.

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1. Ibid., pp.125, 140-142.

2. see sections A and B of this chapter.

On 1st May 1509, Berwick pursuivant received 40s. for carrying letters to the Scottish King, while James IV's herald, Lyon, and the Earl of Arran were evidently in London at the time of Henry VII's funeral.<sup>1</sup> On 11th June James wrote to Henry VIII with his own "il hand" to profess his goodwill.<sup>2</sup> James thanked his "derrest broder and cosyng" for the "lovyng lettirs" which he had personally written, "quare throw we onderstond good and kynd hart ze bere on to vs, of the quilk we ar rycht glade consideryng our tendernes of blode".<sup>3</sup> God willing, James declared that he would "bere the sam good hart" towards Henry whenever the latter was pleased to "scharg" him. Anglo-Scottish relations were unequivocally cordial in 1509, and reciprocal goodwill was manifest in word and deed; the English commissions of array and the fortification of Berwick do not infer underlying tension.<sup>4</sup> Though the continentals rumoured that James IV's military acquisitions (artillery and harness) were intended to be used against England, in reality the Scottish monarch was busily preparing for a Christian crusade against the Turks.<sup>5</sup>

On 29th June 1509, Henry VIII confirmed the Anglo-Scottish treaty of 1502, and James responded in July by appointing the Bishop of Murray to negotiate for the reformation of all attemptates on the Borders.<sup>6</sup> On

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1. PRO. E.36/215, f.7 ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 20, pp.17, 21.
  2. MS. Cotton Vespasian F.III, no.77 ; Ellis, Letters, I (1st ser.), p.63 ; Nat MSS. Scotland, III, doc.IX ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 69, p.36.
  3. Henry VIII's Letter is evidently no longer extant.
  4. PRO. E.36/215, ff.13, 16, 37 ; PRO. 31/8/172, ff.509-510 ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 94 (63), p.52.
  5. PRO. SP.I/1, ff.39-41 ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 83, pp.44-45.
  6. Rot. Scot., II, pp.568-572 ; Foedera, VI, pt.1, p.4 ; PRO. SP.49/1, ff.1-8 ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 88, p.45 ; SRO. SP.6/33 (dated 28th June) ; PRO. E.39/102/13 ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 114, p.59.

26th August, the Bishop received £100 from the English monarch and Lyon Herald received £20.<sup>1</sup> James IV's request for a safe-conduct had expressed the desire to maintain "gude lufe and cherite" with the English and to establish "gude reule" on the Borders.<sup>2</sup> The Bishop and Henry VIII gave their solemn oaths to observe the peace on 29th August, and interestingly both the Bishop, and later King James, described Henry therein as King of France without this creating the problems which had been evident in 1502.<sup>3</sup> On 7th September, Sir Robert Drury, Sir Marmaduke Constable, and John Batemanson, were appointed by the English King to receive James IV's oath and to negotiate for the redress of injuries; moreover, they received £270 from Henry for their expenses between September 1509 and March 1510.<sup>4</sup> James gave his oath to observe the Anglo-Scottish treaty at the end of November 1509, and among those present at the notarial attestation was the Earl of Arran.<sup>5</sup> Ferdinand of Aragon and the Venetians continued to anticipate emerging tensions between England and Scotland but such continental rumours were probably a consequence of wishful thinking and had little factual basis.<sup>6</sup> In reality, Polydore Vergil's well known request to James IV for the details of Scottish history provides ample testimony of the reciprocal goodwill which

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1. PRO. E.36/215, f.22.
  2. MS. Cotton Caligula B.VI, f.22, B.L. ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 129, p.61.
  3. PRO. E.39/5/11, E.39/5/19 ; Foedera, VI, pt.1, p.5 ; PRO. SP.49/1, ff.9-9v ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 153, p.74. For 1502 see Chapter Five.
  4. Rot. Scot., II, pp.572-573 ; Foedera, VI, pt.1, p.6 ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 155, 158 (90), 161, pp.74, 82 ; PRO. E.36/215, ff.22, 24, 48.
  5. PRO. E.39/99/82, E.39/99/75 ; Foedera, VI, pt.1, p.8 ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 252, 255, pp.118-119.
  6. C.S.P. Spanish, II, 27, pp.25-29 ; C.S.P. Venetian, II, pp.1-39 ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 253, 264, pp.118-119, 128-129.

prevailed in England and Scotland at the end of 1509.<sup>1</sup>

Unfortunately the evidence for Anglo-Scottish relations is meagre for the first half of 1510, though various Scots received safe-conducts in April, and Thomas Spinelly's correspondence in January indicates that the English and Scots were competing to purchase good quality artillery in the Low Countries.<sup>2</sup> Additionally, "Richecrosse pursuivant" was thrice rewarded for riding to Scotland on royal errands in May, July, and September.<sup>3</sup> On 1st June Henry VIII appointed two of his councillors, Sir Robert Drury and Sir Marmaduke Constable, to resolve outstanding Anglo-Scottish difficulties pertaining to the treaty and the Debateable Land; their costs were covered by grants of £100 and £190 on 2nd June and 24th November respectively.<sup>4</sup>

The manuscript indenture made by Drury and Constable with the Scottish commissioners Sir William Scot, Sir John Ramsay, and James Henrison, on 11th October 1510, at Coldingham, is of considerable interest and provides evidence that Henry VIII and James IV were "fully determynd" to sustain their accord.<sup>5</sup> Though the issue of the "Debatable Landes" remained unresolved, eight changes were implemented "in augmentacioun of the seid perpetuall peas and amyte"; these changes included provisions for holding meetings between the Anglo-Scottish Wardens, their Lieutenants, or Deputies, at least once a month, the holding of Warden Courts

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1. L. & P. H.VIII, I, 275, p.131 ; James IV Letters, no.282 ; Polydore Vergil's English History, I, ed. H. Ellis, C.S., 36 (1st ser., 1846), pp.vi-vii, xii-xiii, 105-107.
  2. MS. Cotton Galba B.III, docs.3-6, B.L. ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 324-325, 355, pp.145-147, 162 ; Ibid., 448 (1), p.278.
  3. PRO. E.36/215, ff.60, 69, 78.
  4. Rot. Scot., II, p.574 (date verified from MS. PRO. C.71/112, m.7) ; Foedera, VI, pt.1, pp.11-12 ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 486, 519 (1), pp.298, 304 ; SRO. SP.6/34 ; PRO. E.36/215, ff.62, 89.
  5. SRO. SP.6/35, for the following.



"euery quarter....at the leest", the giving of oaths by two honest neighbours in cases of restitution, and the prohibition of recovering goods "by violens nor force" in the neighbouring realm. For the punishment of borderers, "whech neither regarding god nor ther princes oft and many tymes steale breun and reiff attempting ther by to violat the perpetuall peax", it was agreed that three transgressions should constitute a capital offence. The Wardens of the Marches were thereby to "registre and ingrosse in ther bokes all billes and names of the persones nowe fyled at the comyng of the seid comissioners or that shall be fyled in tyme to cum so that the same registre may be a sufficient profe for the last convictioun and fynall pvnysshement of suche malefactores". Moreover, each Warden was to subscribe his colleagues' books to ensure that criminals did not slip through the administrative and judicial net.

Another article pertained to the hot trod, a provision whereby borderers were permitted to enter the neighbouring realm in the lawful pursuit of stolen property. It was agreed that up to twelve persons, "armed or vnarmed", might follow the "trodd within sex dais inclusive after....godes or catall taken", though within their own realm the number of followers was at the discretion of the victim of the crime. Finally it was agreed that anyone cleared of attemptates by swearing oaths "vnto thassize" of either realm, and subsequently found guilty according to Border law, was to be imprisoned at the Warden's discretion. Furthermore, the guilty were "to satisfy the party for thattemptat' accordyng to the lawe of the border and to be holden defamed in tyme to cum for euer". This document provides ample testimony of the desire of James IV and Henry VIII to improve the law and administration of the Borders in the light of practical experience; again one perceives that Anglo-Scottish peace depended on a combination of pragmatism, unceasing vigilance, an adaptability to local conditions, and, above all, on the personal super-

vision of regional officials by their monarchs. Perhaps the most interesting information yielded by the 1510 indenture was the fact that the Wardens of the Marches maintained books of offences; unfortunately none of these is extant but it is not inconceivable that some of the manuscript fragments pertaining to Border crimes once belonged to volumes of this nature.<sup>1</sup> Evidently the Border administration was more bureaucratic in the early sixteenth century than authorities have hitherto perceived, though whether it was more efficient in consequence is much more difficult to assess.

In October 1510, James IV sent the Bishop of Murray to the Pope in an attempt to promote peace among Christian princes and unite them against the Turks; the Bishop travelled via London and on 10th November Henry VIII rewarded him with £100 in gold.<sup>2</sup> The concept of a Crusade preoccupied James IV's attention at this time, while the English financial records reveal a substantial degree of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy between January and August 1511.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately the financial records lack detail, while the substantial corpus of James IV's correspondence is a relatively poor source for Anglo-Scottish relations. The Scottish monarch's letters reveal his crusading ambitions, his relations with leading powers such as France and the Papacy, and his evident reluctance to become embroiled in the politics of Gueldres and Denmark; one can only speculate from the paucity of Anglo-Scottish material that James found

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1. MS. Additional 24965, f.148, B.L. (bills of cattle stolen, July 1511), and PRO. E.36/254, ff.293-300 (merchandise taken at sea c.1512) ; abstracts in L. & P. H.VIII, I, 817, 1262, pp.438, 577-578.
  2. James IV Letters, nos.331-334 ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 593, 598-600, pp.341-342 ; C.S.P. Venetian, II, 85, p.39 ; PRO. E.36/215, f.88.
  3. PRO. E.36/215, ff.100, 105, 108, 113, 120, 121, 131.

little cause to complain to his "derrest broder" Henry.' James IV's evident preoccupation with reconciling Louis XII and the Pope was manifest to even his most obtuse contemporaries, and I suggest that Henry VIII would hardly have appointed Thomas Lord Darcy, Captain of Berwick, to command the English force being sent to assist Ferdinand against the Moors, if Anglo-Scottish tension had been prevalent on the Borders.<sup>2</sup> On the contrary, the issue of safe-conducts and commissions indicates that Anglo-Scottish accord was sustained until July 1511.<sup>3</sup>

The Barton incident in the summer of 1511 constituted the most serious breach in Anglo-Scottish relations since 1508, and provoked a great deal of activity.<sup>4</sup> Between September and December, William Atcliff received £290 for the maintenance of the Scottish prisoners in the Archbishop of York's "place", and during October and November, various English messengers and ambassadors, including Rougecrosse pursuivant, Nicholas West, and Christopher Walles, were paid to journey to Scotland; West's mission may, however, have been aborted at York.<sup>5</sup> On 30th September, Wolsey wrote to Bishop Fox that Henry VIII was considering sending West to James IV, "as well to declare the cause why he hath takyn hys shyppys and thus intretyd hys subiectis, as also to bere the Quenys bequest for

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1. James IV Letters, passim ; L. & P. H.VIII,I, passim ; L. & P. R.III and H.VII, II, pp.lxv-lxxvii, 185-279 ; MS. Royal 13 B.II, B.L. ; N.L.S., Adv. MS. 35.5.9. ; SRO. SP.1/1.
  2. L. & P. H.VIII, I, nos.645, 649, 725, 727, 728, 730, 731 (12, 41), 787, 795, 797, 837, 862 ; PRO. E.36/215, ff.122, 126, 129, 131 ; PRO. E.101/483/12.
  3. MS. Cotton Caligula B.VI, f.28, B.L. ; Rot.Scot.,II, pp.575-576 ; Foedera, VI, pt.1, pp.21-22 ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 773A, 799, 804 (34), 824, 827, 833 (65) ; MS. Cotton Titus F.XIII, 255, B.L. ; PRO. SP.49/1, ff.10-12.
  4. See Chapter Two section E.
  5. PRO. E.36/215, ff.139, 142, 143, 146, 147, 149, 151.

the wych she hath instantly wrytyn".<sup>1</sup> A certain Howard (presumably the Earl of Surrey's son, Edward) was inciting the King against the Scots, and by his "wantone meanys hys grace spendyth mych money, and ys more dyssposyd to ware than paxe". Thus Wolsey informed Fox that his presence at court was "very necessary to repress thys appetyte". However, Anglo-Scottish conflict was avoided in 1511 not only because the two monarchs, their more astute councillors, and the continental rulers, were disposed to sustain the accord, but also because Henry VIII's inclinations for military glory were evidently directed against France rather than Scotland.

The English monarch clearly thought that pardoning his Scottish prisoners would sufficiently appease James IV, but in the indenture of 12th December which appointed Thomas Lord Dacre Warden of the Middle Marches it was stated that if the Scots could not be contented with reason, Dacre was to make reprisals.<sup>2</sup> James was justifiably angry at Henry's breach of the treaty and wrote to Pope Julius II, on 5th December, to complain about the poor treatment which he had experienced at the hands of Henry VII and Henry VIII.<sup>3</sup> James stated that he had sought redress in vain, and, in view of recent events, that he was impelled to presume that both monarchs had been released from their obligation under apostolic sanction not to break the treaty; it was, he declared, a fair inference that the Anglo-Scottish treaty was to be dissolved through the disagreement of the signatories.<sup>4</sup> Flodden was by no means inevitable,

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1. MS. Cotton Titus B.I, f.104v, B.L. ; Letters of Richard Fox, 1486-1529, ed. P. S. and H. M. Allen, pp.52-55 ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 880, pp.462-463.
  2. L. & P. H.VIII, I, 927, 928, 969 (2, 7), 984 ; Rot.Scot., II, pp.576-577.
  3. James IV Letters, no.394 ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 974, p.493.
  4. Ibid.

since anything might conceivably happen over the next two years, but tensions were becoming increasingly prevalent. The honeymoon period of Anglo-Scottish relations was manifestly over.

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(D) The Flodden Conflict, 1512 - 1513

In July 1513, James IV wrote perhaps the best known of his many letters to his "derrest brother and Cousyn" Henry VIII, and therein he outlined the grievances which Scotland had experienced at the hands of the English; these included the liberty of Bastard Heron, the slaughter and imprisonment of Scottish "noble men", the withholding of Queen Margaret's legacy from her father, the slaughter of Andrew Barton, and the withholding of Scottish ships and artillery.<sup>1</sup> James further complained about English hostility towards Scotland's allies (particularly France), the English retort that the Scots spoke "faire wordes and thinke the contrary in dede", and the English denial of a safe-conduct to the Bishop of Murray. On pain of his breaking the treaty of perpetual peace, James urged the English monarch to "desiste fra farther invasyon and vtter distruccion" of his ancient Frency ally; presumably under some pressure from Louis XII, the "Auld" Alliance had recently been confirmed in consequence of the various "iniuries" the English dealt to Scotland.<sup>2</sup>

Henry VIII received the Scottish ultimatum as he was besieging Thérouanne in France, and replied on 12th August.<sup>3</sup> The English monarch

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1. L. & P. H.VIII, I, 2122, pp.959-960 ; James IV Letters, no.560 ; Hall, pp.545-547 ; MS. Cotton Caligula B.VI, ff.57-60, B.L. ; PRO. SP.49/1, f.15 ; C.S.P. Venetian, II, 278, pp.113-114 ; MS. Harleian 2252, ff.39-41v.
2. SRO. SP.7/21-25 ; Flodden Papers.
3. L. & P. H.VIII, I, 2161, pp.973-974 ; Foedera, VI, pt.i, p.52 ; Hall, pp.547-548 ; Halliwell, Letters, I, pp.216-219 ; MS. Harleian 787, ff.58-58v, B.L. ; MS. Harleian 2252, ff.42-43, B.L. ; MS. Harleian 4808, ff.98-105, B.L. ; PRO. SP.49/1, f.16 ; MS. Cotton Caligula B.VI, f.56, B.L. ; MS. Cotton Vespasian D.XVIII, ff.131v-133, B.L.

declared that James IV's actions in breaking the peace were especially dishonourable since he had consciously timed his perfidy until Henry was abroad, and he rejected the Scottish grievances as imagined contrivances designed to justify the violation of the peace. Such duplicity was, however, not surprising considering the "ancient accustomable manners" of previous Scottish monarchs who "never kept faith and promise longer than pleased them". Henry therefore announced that he had made preparations to resist all anticipated Scottish activity, and confidently asserted that with the aid of his allies (in the so-called Holy League) he would resist such schismatics; the latter remark was evidently a deliberate reference to James IV's excommunication. Further salt was rubbed in the wound with Henry's announcement that the Scots were perpetually disinherited from the English succession; the King of Navarre, as James was reminded, had lost his own throne by assisting the French monarch. The English monarch stated that he had answered the Scottish grievances many times, but he was particularly anxious to refute the claims that he had denied safe-conducts to any Scotsmen. In reality, Henry had informed Lord Dacre, in late July 1512, that though no Scot was "better welcom" than the Bishop of Murray, he felt that it was not "expedient" to assent to the Bishop's "further Iornay to fraunce".<sup>1</sup>

Evidently the Scots read Henry VIII's procrastination as a refusal to grant the Bishop of Murray a safe-conduct, and thereby they could accuse the English monarch of scuppering their initiatives for a peace among Christian princes. There can be no doubt that this incident constituted not only a significant turning point in the chain of events which culminated at Flodden, but also a manifestation of the mutual recrimination then prevailing in Anglo-Scottish relations. It is

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1. MS. Cotton Caligula B.VI, ff.50v-51, B.L.

essential to appreciate that while both monarchs had broken the letter of the treaty of perpetual peace by 1512, as evinced by the murders of Barton and Starhead, the spirit of Anglo-Scottish accord increasingly favoured conflict rather than conciliation.' Moreover, since conflict between the "auld" enemies was such a well-played scenario, events led quickly and inexorably into a spiral of cause, effect, recrimination, and self-justification.

Probably more has been written on the subject of Flodden than any other aspect of Anglo-Scottish relations in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.<sup>2</sup> The details are, therefore, sufficiently well known to render further exposition superfluous, especially since the period 1512-1513 yielded certain characteristics common to earlier Anglo-Scottish conflicts. One discerns, for example, the attribution of blame by the English to Franco-Scottish perfidy, the established pattern of recrimination, raid, and reprisal, the magnification of petty squabbles into

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1. see Chapter Two section E, and this chapter section C.
  2. eg. R. L. Mackie, James IV, chs.VIII-XI ; Coleman thesis, chs.VII-X ; Flodden Papers ; W. M. Mackenzie, The Secret of Flodden with 'The Rout of the Scots', (Edinburgh, 1931) ; E. Fitzwilliam, The Battle of Flodden and the Raids of 1513, (Edinburgh, 1911) ; R. Jones, The Battle of Flodden Field, (Edinburgh, 1864) ; C. J. Bates, 'Flodden Field', Archaeologia Aeliana, XVI (1894), pp.351-372 ; T. Hodgkin, 'The Battle of Flodden', Archaeologia Aeliana, XVI (1894), pp.1-45 ; R. White, 'The Battle of Flodden', Archaeologia Aeliana, III (1859), pp.197-236 ; 'A Contemporary Account of the Battle of Flodden, 9th September 1513', Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland, VII (1867), pp.141-152 ; 'The Flodden Death Roll', Scottish Antiquary or Northern Notes and Queries, XIII (1873), pp.101-111, 168-172 ; A. H. Burne, The Battlefields of England, (London, 1950), pp.156-185 ; L. W. G. Butler, 'Battle of Flodden, 1513', The United Service Magazine, XVIII (1899), pp.399-413 ; Common Errors in Scottish History, ed. G. Donaldson, (London, 1956), pp.10-11 ; T. J. Hunt, 'Where the River Ran Red : the Field of Flodden', Country Life, CXXXIV (1963), pp.559-561 ; J. D. Mackie, 'The Auld-Alliance and the Battle of Flodden', Trans. Franco-Scottish Society, VIII (1919-35), pp.35-56 ; J. D. Mackie, 'The English Army at Flodden', Scottish Historical Society Miscellany, XLIII (3rd ser., 1951), pp.35-85 ; J. McEwan, 'The Battle of Flodden', History Today, VIII (1958), pp.337-345 ; Nugae Derelictae, ed. J. Maidment and R. Pitcairn, (Edinburgh, 1822).

major issues, the support for malcontents (in this case, French support for Richard, the youngest of the De la Poles), and so on.<sup>1</sup> The literary outpourings of many generations reveal a fascination with the dramatic and romantic aspects of Flodden, and illustrate conclusively that the battle, which took place on 9th September 1513, captured imaginations in both realms.<sup>2</sup> The abundance of nineteenth and twentieth century historical studies is partly explicable by the pride of the English in their glorious military achievements (victories over France and Scotland), and partly by an idea shared by certain Scots that they must somehow explain away the tragedy either as a battle or as a manifestation of something much more fundamental in the nature of Scottish history.<sup>3</sup>

However, despite the publication of contemporary manuscript-material, it is clear that some documents pertaining to English military activity at the time remain obscure; for example, there is no modern study on the Flodden campaign to compare with C. G. Cruickshank's

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1. see this chapter sections A and B, and Chapter Two.
  2. eg. Scottish Ffiede, ed. J. P. Oakden, Chetham Society, XCIV (1935) ; English and Scottish Popular Ballads (F. J. Child), ed. Sargent and Kittredge, (London, 1905) pp.412-413 ; W. M. Mackenzie, The Secret of Flodden with 'The Rout of the Scots', (Edinburgh, 1931) ; The Oxford Book of English Verse, 1250-1918, ed. A. Q. Couch, (Oxford, 1939), p.558 ; The Scottish Field, ed. J. Robson, Chetham Miscellany, XXXVII (1856) ; Sir Walter Scott, Marmion a tale of Flodden Field, (London, 1810) ; Flodden Field, ed. H. Weber, (Edinburgh, 1808) ; C. E. Wright, 'An Unrecorded Scottish Poem', British Museum Quarterly, XII (1937-1938), pp.13-18 ; A Ballade of the Scottysse Kynge, written by John Skelton, Poet Laureate to King Henry VIII, ed. J. Ashton, (London, 1882) ; Scottish Feilde and Flodden Feilde : Two Flodden Poems, ed. I. F. Baird, (London, 1982) ; The Mirror For Magistrates, ed. L. B. Campbell, (Cambridge U.P., 1938), pp.483-494 ; N.L.S. Adv. MS. 20.6.1., ff.70-84v ; MS. Harleian 2252, ff.43v-48v, B.L. ; MS. Harleian 293, ff.55v-61v, B.L. ; MS. Harleian 367, ff.120-125, B.L. ; MS. Harleian 3526, ff.100-133, B.L. ; MS. Additional 45102, ff. 102-102v, B.L. ; MS. Additional 29506, ff.1-14, B.L.
  3. Flodden dominates studies of James IV's reign ; see Coleman thesis and R. L. Mackie, James IV.



analysis of Henry VIII's French campaign in 1513.' I maintain that Anglo-Scottish relations at the time of Flodden require reappraisal, particularly since most authorities have continued to perpetuate traditional interpretations. Allowing for the natural bias of the evidence, since most of it pertains to England, reappraisal will undoubtedly constitute a difficult task. While certain aspects of *Anglo-Scottish* and *Franco-Scottish* diplomacy are well known, the Cotton manuscripts in the British Library yield some Anglo-Scottish material from 1512 which has yet to receive adequate consideration.<sup>2</sup> Such detailed study is beyond the scope of this thesis, but I suggest that future research may help to clarify some of the issues discussed below.

Arguably, interpretations of the early part of Henry VIII's reign have suffered in consequence of insufficient research and extensive generalisation. I maintain, for example, that one ought to question the assumption that Henry's court and council were torn by two factions, an old school (led by Fox, Warham, and Fisher) which opposed franco-phobia and the warlike inclinations of the young King, and a new group of courtiers (led by the Howards and Wolsey) which encouraged the King and

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1. C. G. Cruickshank, Army Royal : Henry VIII's Invasion of France, 1513, (Oxford, 1969). For published documents see L. & P. H.VIII, I ; Flodden Papers ; James IV Letters ; Letters and Papers Relating to the War With France, 1512-1513, ed. A. Spont, Navy Records Society, X (1897) ; J. D. Mackie, 'The English Army at Flodden', Scottish Historical Society Miscellany, XLIII (3rd ser., 1951), pp.35-85, from PRO. E.101/56/27 and MS. Egerton 2603, B.L. ; C.S.P. Spanish, II, ; C.S.P. Venetian, II, III ; C.S.P. Milanese, I ; Nat. MSS. Facs., II. Manuscript sources include PRO. E.36/215 ; PRO. E.36/254, ff.110-138 ; PRO. E.101/61/9 ; PRO. E.101/676/46 ; PRO. E.101/674/29 ; PRO. E.101/690/13 ; PRO. E.101/56/28 ; PRO. E.101/57/6 ; PRO. E.101/57/4 ; PRO. E.101/57/13 ; PRO. E.101/417/6 ; PRO. E.101/417/7 ; PRO. E.101/417/12 ; PRO. E.101/61/27 ; PRO. E.101/62/25 ; PRO. E.101/55/30 ; PRO. E.101/56/7 ; PRO. E.101/518/1 ; PRO. E.101/483/12 ; PRO. E.404/87-89 ; PRO. E.36/1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 12, 128, 129 ; PRO. E.403/2558 ; PRO. E.315/4.
  2. eg. MS. Cotton Caligula B.I, B.II, B.III, B.VI.

indulged his ambitions.' This interpretation is too simplistic since Wolsey, for example, was initially a staunch ally of Fox, and evidently did not turn his hand to military administration until about 1512.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, though royal councillors might disagree on the means to an end, they neither could nor did oppose the will of a determined sovereign to any significant degree, and Henry VIII's inclinations were well known.<sup>3</sup>

As John Anislow informed the Bishop of Durham in September 1512, the French gave the Scots "no goodes but mone ffayre writyngges and ffayre wordes", but though James IV was manipulated by French propaganda and by tradition, two important points may be made.<sup>4</sup> First, Ayala's appraisal of the Scottish monarch had emphasized that James was his own man, and it is, therefore, misleading to regard him as the puppet of Louis XII in 1513.<sup>5</sup> Secondly, in 1475, 1480-1484, 1492, and 1496-1497, the "Auld" Alliance had little discernible impact on these Anglo-French and Anglo-Scottish conflicts.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, just as James had chosen not to assist his allies, the Duke of Gueldres and the King of Denmark, he was under no especial obligation to assist the French monarch, and evidently

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1. eg. Coleman thesis, pp.124-125 ; J. J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, (London, 1968), pp.25-26.
  2. eg. see Wolsey's letter cited on page 142 note 1 ; cf. Coleman thesis, pp.124-125 and J. J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, (London, 1968), p.26.
  3. Henry VIII's francophobia was atuned to the climate of the period, and as Mary Tudor later recalled, circa 1551, her father was "a Kyng not only of power, but also of knowledge howe to order hys power" ; MS. Lansdowne 1236, no.28, B.L. ; printed in Ellis, Letters, II (1st ser.), pp.161-163.
  4. MS. Cotton Caligula B.VI, f.24, B.L. ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 1380, p.636 ; J. D. Mackie, 'The Auld Alliance and the Battle of Flodden', Trans. Franco-Scottish Society, VIII (1919-35), pp.35-56.
  5. C.S.P. Spanish, I, 210, pp.169-175 ; Early Travellers, pp.39-49.
  6. see Chapter Two section B, and this chapter sections A and B.

the decision to do so was made by the King and his council.' Dr. Coleman has suggested that when James IV's aspiration to increase Scotland's prestige was no longer served by the concept of a Christian crusade, the King then sought to attain his goals through the "Auld" Alliance and war with England; the King's fundamental error was that his realm was "so ill-equipped" to enter the arena of Renaissance diplomacy.<sup>2</sup> However, I cannot accept that James wanted war with England in 1513.<sup>3</sup> In reality, the Scottish monarch had done all that he could to avoid conflict, and, while the decision to invade England was made at the Scottish court, James probably felt that he had few other alternatives; arguably, the idea that, during periods of crisis, groups and individuals fall back on traditions and assumptions helps to explain the sequence of events in 1512 and 1513.<sup>4</sup> All of the leading European powers claimed to be naturally disposed towards peace, and yet each subscribed to its own definition of the concept and sought peace on its own terms, with unfortunate consequences for Anglo-Scottish relations.

Professor J. D. Mackie suggested that while Henry VIII ought to carry most of the blame for events in 1513, developments on the continent were also important; the Papacy, in particular, was a motive force in the francophobic Holy League.<sup>5</sup> As in 1481, Scotland was the victim of Papal

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1. James IV Letters ; Flodden Papers ; L. & P. H.VIII, I. Dr. Coleman has cited the example of Denmark to illustrate that James ignored treaty obligations if he was otherwise inclined ; Coleman thesis, pp.118-122, 215.
  2. Coleman thesis, pp.151, 214-215.
  3. cf. R. L. Mackie, James IV, chs.VIII, IX, esp. p.212 ; Coleman thesis, pp.9-12, 151-172, 214-215.
  4. J. Joll, 1914 : the Unspoken Assumptions, (London, 1968).
  5. J. D. Mackie, 'The Auld Alliance and the Battle of Flodden', Trans. Franco-Scottish Society, VIII (1919-35), pp.35-56, esp.p.56.

opprobrium, but in 1513 the Scottish monarch was excommunicated in consequence of the treaty of perpetual peace. By tradition England and Scotland belonged to different alliance systems, and though the Scots had played down the incompatibility of the Franco-Scottish and Anglo-Scottish alliances in 1508, since 1502 this had the potential to create immense difficulties. Moreover, from mid-1511 the fabric of Anglo-Scottish relations deteriorated as a result of a series of domestic squabbles. Thus, though "the spark which kindled it came from abroad", the various incidents between the Scots and the English constituted "material for a fine bonfire".<sup>1</sup> Had James and Henry remained on good terms, the demands of the Holy League and the "Auld" Alliance were unlikely to have undermined Anglo-Scottish accord. Perhaps ironically, the difficulties experienced in 1512 and 1513 were not caused by Border disputes as had often been the case in the past; the Bishop of Durham was in fact informed on 11th September 1512 that there was "good grement at the days of trux and good peace on the borthures".<sup>2</sup> The real problem lay in the prevailing attitudes of the English<sup>and</sup> Scottish monarchs and their councillors, whereby petty incidents were easily magnified into the stuff of which greater quarrels are made.

The ultimate irony was probably the fact that the matrimonial alliance of 1502-1503 not only proved to be ineffective in preventing the outbreak of an Anglo-Scottish conflict, but also actively contributed to the climate of tension. As Lord Dacre informed the Bishop of Durham, James IV felt a "great gruge" because Queen Margaret's "legacy" was being

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1. Ibid., p.52.

2. MS. Cotton Caligula B.VI, ff.24-24v, B.L. ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 1329, 1380, pp.619-620, 636.

withheld from her.<sup>1</sup> Dacre suggested that it might be "honorable" to pay the legacy, "considring the some is so small", but his advice was evidently ignored. Little is known about the legacy since chroniclers attributed it to Prince Arthur, and the extant manuscripts of Henry VII's will are silent on the subject.<sup>2</sup> This dispute over a small sum of money exemplifies the fact that petty squabbles contributed significantly to the deterioration of Anglo-Scottish relations in 1512 and 1513. An Anglo-Scottish conflict was of no evident advantage to either Henry VIII or James IV, but the chances of maintaining peace were effectively undermined by the increasingly uncompromising attitudes prevalent on both sides of the Border, and by the decisions which the two monarchs subsequently made. Regardless of what Henry and James may have thought at the time, neither monarch was caught up in events which were beyond his control.

Much has been written about the battle of Flodden, particularly in an attempt to explain the magnitude of the Scottish defeat. Dr. Coleman ingeniously suggested that the "real, albeit intangible, cause of the defeat" was "the Scottish character at this point in history", since provincialism and indiscipline prevented military success against a more sophisticated enemy.<sup>3</sup> This idea is interesting, but clearly the Scottish defeat was the consequence of James IV's military strategy and of the

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1. MS. Cotton Caligula B.III, f.4, B.L. ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 1342, pp.623-624.

2. cf. Buchanan, 2, pp.243-244 ; Pitscottie, I, p.253 ; MS. Cotton Caligula B.VI, f.83, B.L. (in which Margaret referred to her "faderis legacy") ; Ellis, Letters, I (1st ser.), pp.64-65 ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 1767, p.805. For Henry's will see PRO. E.23/3 ; The Will of Henry VII, ed. T. Astle, (London, 1775) ; MS. Additional 4618, ff.423-462v, B.L. ; MS. Additional 36273 B, B.L. ; MS. Harleian 297, ff.8-27v, B.L. ; MS. Additional 27402, ff.33-35v, B.L. ; MS. Lansdowne 1, ff.114-115, B.L.

3. Coleman thesis, p.205.

evident economic and demographic disparity between England and Scotland; as evinced by previous conflicts, Scotland represented more of a psychological than a military threat.<sup>1</sup> Though large-scale confrontations were uncharacteristic of Anglo-Scottish warfare, Scottish monarchs were too poor and too dependant on the traditions of Scottish military service to render effective opposition to their English neighbours in the field (Bannockburn notwithstanding). As Flodden revealed, even with the absence of the English monarch, his nobles, and vast military resources, the North of England constituted an effective defensive barrier against even the largest of Scottish armies.

Although Flodden was undoubtedly a disaster for Scotland, one ought not to attribute all the changes and developments manifest in sixteenth century Scotland, such as the Reformation and the appearance of more realistic Anglo-Scottish attitudes, to the impact of a single military defeat.<sup>2</sup> Traditionally, the death of James IV with a large section of the Scottish nobility on the battlefield has been perceived as a tragedy for Scotland. Dr. Coleman has modified this idea somewhat by pointing out that the internecine quarrels of the Scottish nobility worked consistently to the detriment of the country, but I would qualify this opinion.<sup>3</sup> Later generations of Scottish nobles showed no less propensity for divisive activity, while James V's minority brought other problems in its wake.

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1. There was no "secret" or "mystery" of Flodden. In 1498 Ayala had opined that James was "not a good captain because he begins to fight before he has given his orders" ; C.S.P. Spanish, I, 210, p.170 ; Early Travellers, p.40.
  2. Coleman thesis, ch.X, overemphasizes the effects of the defeat.
  3. Ibid., pp.207-208.

Part of the difficulty which one experiences in considering the significance of the Flodden period in Scottish history stems from the fact that James IV's reign has come to be regarded as something of a golden age. I maintain, however, that the interpretations of R. L. Mackie and Dr. Coleman merit reappraisal, especially since they have both tended to anticipate Flodden as an almost inevitable consequence of the reign.<sup>1</sup> In my view, James IV was undoubtedly popular, as evinced by the favourable observations of Scottish chroniclers and historians, and he was clearly an active and energetic monarch. Nonetheless, though he compares well with James III and James V, arguably many of his achievements, such as the contribution to maritime power and the regional enforcement of justice and royal authority, were ultimately undermined by his premature death and by a clear failure to get to grips with the perennial problem of Scotland's finances. James was too idealistic, a weakness manifest in the crusading ambitions which only he took seriously, and I would agree with Dr. Wormald that he was rather a pathetic figure.<sup>2</sup> His reign was probably less the firework display of Scottish tradition and more of a damp squib which promised much and failed to achieve expectations in the long term. Bishop Lesley described how the charlatan Abbot of Tongland had sought to fly to France from the walls of Stirling castle wearing makeshift wings; failure to fly was attributed to the fact that hen feathers had been used in the wings, "quhilk yarnit and covit the mydding and not the skyis".<sup>3</sup> This incident constitutes a useful metaphor for

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1. Ibid. ; R. L. Mackie, James IV.

2. J. Wormald, Court, Kirk, and Community : Scotland 1470-1625, (London, 1981), pp.6-7.

3. Lesley, pp.125-126n.

James IV's reign since the King habitually coveted the skies only to land ultimately in the midden, and his fate (and unfortunatley Scotland's) was much worse than the broken leg suffered by the Abbot.

It has been suggested that in 1513 Henry VIII was so distracted by events on the continent that he missed an invaluable opportunity to exploit the Flodden victory.<sup>1</sup> The assumption behind this is that the English had conquered Scotland on the battlefield, a nonsensical interpretation of events which ignores the practical considerations of Anglo-Scottish relations. In any case, I maintain that though Henry VIII did not lay claim to suzerainty over Scotland, he did not fail to exploit his victory; the Scots were consistently punished through raids and reprisals on the Marches. The brutality of Anglo-Scottish warfare was particularly acute in the aftermath of Flodden, despite the fact that Margaret Tudor was appointed Regent in Scotland (until her marriage to the Earl of Angus in August 1514).<sup>2</sup>

Scotland remained a significant psychological threat against which Henry VIII continued to marshal his local military resources.<sup>3</sup> Thomas Lord Dacre informed the English council on 28th November 1514 that there was "never soo mekill myschefe robbry spoiling and vengeance in Scotland then there is nowe without hoppe of remedye".<sup>4</sup> Dacre prayed to God that this state of affairs would continue, though clearly the regency of Albany and resurgence in the influence of the "Auld" Alliance indicates that the

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1. eg. J. J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.38.
  2. For post-Flodden Scotland see eg. A.D.C.P. ; The Letters of James V, ed. D. Hay and R. K. Hannay, (Edinburgh, 1954) ; G. Donaldson, Scotland James V to James VII, (Edinburgh, 1971) ; Flodden Papers.
  3. see D. M. Head, 'Henry VIII's Scottish Policy : a Reassessment', S.H.R., LXI, I, no.171 (1982), pp.1-24, for a recent opinion on Anglo-Scottish relations. cf. Coleman thesis, p.207.
  4. MS. Cotton Caligula B.I, f.167, B.L.



English response backfired somewhat. Moreover, by the 1520's Scotland had recovered sufficiently from the debacle of 1513 to merit serious consideration in the formulation of English policy. Less than ten years after Flodden, on 3rd July 1523, Henry VIII's ambassadors to the Emperor informed Wolsey that they had told the Imperial council that compared to the "great charges" of a Scottish war, the Imperial expenses for Gueldres were "a gnatte to an elephante...." Evidently, even allowing for the effects of rhetorical hyperbole and diplomatic licence, the Scottish problem prevailed, and English fears were intensified by the proximity of the Scottish monarch to the English succession. This fact determined the conduct of Anglo-Scottish relations for the remainder of the sixteenth century, and restored a measure of the balance which had been lost when Edward I had first sought to intervene in Scotland in the late thirteenth century.

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1. S.P., Henry VIII, VI (1849), LVII, p.148.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ANGLO-SCOTTISH MATRIMONIAL ALLIANCES

1474 - 1503, PART I

ANTECEDENTS, 1474 - 1493

It is both ironic and somewhat curious that while Anglo-Scottish relations have been traditionally regarded as a subject of secondary importance in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century, except perhaps during Perkin Warbeck's sojourn in Scotland from 1495 to 1497, the Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliance of 1503 is perceived as an important achievement of Henry VII's reign.<sup>1</sup> The ambivalence is partly a reflection of current historical opinion pertaining to this monarch, but is largely attributable to the consequent union of England and Scotland. Henry VII's awareness of the inherent potential of the dynastic alliance has been questioned, but in view of the fifteenth and sixteenth century fascination for prophecy and genealogy, I would suggest that no marriage alliance is likely to have occurred without a careful consideration of most conceivable consequences; moreover, the Tudors were an unestablished

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1. eg. R. B. Wernham, Before the Armada : The Growth of English Foreign Policy 1485-1488, (London, 1966) ; P. S. Crowson, Tudor Foreign Policy, (London, 1973) ; J. D. Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, (Oxford, 1952) ; G. R. Elton, England Under the Tudors, (2nd ed., London, 1974) ; S. B. Chrimes, Henry VII, (London, 1972) ; M. Van Cleave Alexander, The First of the Tudors : A Study of Henry VII and His Reign, (London, 1981) ; R. Lockyer, Henry VII, (London, 1968, 1983) ; C. S. L. Davies, Peace, Print, and Protestantism, 1450-1558, (London, 1977).

dynasty.' Historians too often refer somewhat glibly to royal match-making as a game which reinforced dynastic diplomacy; it was rarely, if ever, considered thus superficially by Anglo-Scottish monarchs. Francis Bacon, the poetically persuasive biographer of Henry VII, observed that some of the King's councillors objected to the conclusion of the Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliance on the grounds that a Scottish monarch might eventually succeed to the English throne (as John Major was later to anticipate):-

"Whereunto the King himself replied; That if that should be, Scotland would be but an accession to England, and not England to Scotland, for that the greater would draw the less. And that it was a safer union for England than that of France. This passed as an oracle, and silenced those that moved the question."<sup>2</sup>

Bacon adapted this from a paragraph in the second edition of Polydore Vergil's *Anglica Historia*, published in 1546, and there is an argument against the interpretation that it was a mere invention.<sup>3</sup> As Professor Mortimer Levine has stated, the reply is consistent with the stance which Henry VII might reasonably take against dissent in the

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1. eg. S. B. Chrimes, Henry VII, p.91 ; S. Anglo, Spectacle, Pageantry, and Early Tudor Policy, (Oxford, 1969) ; S. Anglo, 'The British History in Early Tudor Propaganda', B.J.R.L., 44 (1961), pp.17-48 ; C. A. J. Armstrong, 'An Italian Astrologer at the Court of Henry VII', Italian Renaissance Studies, ed. E. F. Jacob, (London, 1960), pp.433-454 ; A. Allan, 'Yorkist Propaganda : Pedigree, Prophecy and the British History in the Reign of Edward IV', Patronage, Pedigree, and Power, pp.171-192 ; MS. Harl. 1074, ff.235-272v, (a MS. genealogy, temp. Henry VII).
  2. Bacon, p.221.
  3. Vergil, p.114 n. ; M. Levine, Tudor Dynastic Problems, 1460-1571, (London, 1973), pp.40, 143 ; G. G. Smith, The Days of James IV, 1488-1513, (London, 1890), pp.75-76 ; For the *Anglica Historia* see C. H. Clough, The Duchy of Urbino in the Renaissance, (London, 1981), item XIII, p.777 and Add. p.14.

council.' Furthermore, Vergil was personally acquainted with some royal councillors, including Richard Fox (experienced in Anglo-Scottish diplomacy), and he doubtless utilised their testimony in compiling his history. Study of the Liber Intrationum, a series of extracts made in the seventeenth century from the now lost council registers of the reign, reveals that Anglo-Scottish relations were debated by the council on earlier occasions, even if no reference is made to this particular episode.<sup>2</sup> Evidently by the early seventeenth century, when Bacon wrote and published his biography, this tale was already part of the mainstream of Anglo-Scottish tradition, but it was Bacon's version which subsequently captured imaginations; the strength of his influence is partly explicable by the fact that, until the late nineteenth century, Bacon's study was regarded as a primary source.<sup>3</sup> One may reasonably infer that Henry VII's most famous and profound observation was probably genuine and not the product of Vergil's prophetic imagination. However, the King was neither a far-sighted statesman (an anachronistic concept) nor an unprincipled opportunist; Henry VII was essentially a medieval dynast anxious to quell the very real fears which had been expressed concerning one conceivable outcome of the course of events.

Henry VIII was in no apparent doubt about the long-term aims of his father's conduct towards Scotland. As he later declared;-

"it hath ben very rarely and seldom seen before  
that a King of Scottis hath in marriage a

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1. M. Levine, Tudor Dynastic Problems, p.40.
  2. Select Cases in the Council of Henry VII, ed. C. G. Bayne and W. H. Dunham, S.S., vol.75, (London, 1956), pp.6-47 ; MS. Harleian 305, ff.25-40v, B.L. ; MS. Harleian 980, ff.130-131, B.L. ; MS. Hargrave 216, ff.145-153, B.L. ; MS. Additional 4521, ff. 104-119v, B.L.
  3. Lesley, pp.117-118 ; According to Bacon, p.110, Bishop Morton made a reference to the greater drawing the less in terms of France and Brittany.

daughter of England: we can not, ne wyll not  
reprehend the Kynge our father's acte ther in,  
but lament and be sory it took no better effecte.  
The Kynge our father in that matier intended loue,  
amitie, and perpetuall frendshyp betwene the  
posteritie of both, whiche how soone it fayled,  
the death of the Kynge of Scottis, as a due  
punyshment of God for his uniuert inuasion into  
this our realme, is and shall be a perpetuall  
testimonye to theyr reproche for euer..."<sup>1</sup>

Propaganda aside, both Henry's sister Margaret and Lord Dacre evidently agreed with this assessment that matrimony had been perceived as a long-term solution to some of the problems experienced in Anglo-Scottish relations.<sup>2</sup> There was nothing novel in the basic premise, but there was a measure of novelty in the degree to which Anglo-Scottish monarchs aspired to this end between 1474 and 1503. I maintain that this emphasis on matrimonial alliances characterises the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century as a distinctive phase in the history of Anglo-Scottish relations. Moreover, these alliances were not pursued unilaterally, either because Scotland felt vulnerable against English military and economic might, or because English monarchs desired to exert a dominant influence over Scottish affairs; the establishment of more amicable relations, which would allow monarchs to deal with their pressing domestic problems, appears to have been the primary consideration.

In theory, royal matrimonial alliances were perceived as an inherent feature of the fabric of dynastic diplomacy intended, primarily through the birth of heirs, to cement alliances and to prevent future conflicts between countries. In practice, however, matrimonial alliances rarely

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1. Complaynt of Scotland, E.E.T.S., p.192 ; Byrne's Letters H.VIII, p.296 ; Hall, pp.846-847 ; Grafton, II, p.477 ; L. & P. H.VIII, XVII, no.1033, pp.582-583.
  2. eg. L. & P. H.VIII, 111 (I), no.1190, and S.P., H.VIII, vol.IV, passim.

ensured that relations were either profitable or peaceful if the participants were otherwise inclined; for example, French Queens of England and English Queens of Scotland were no guarantee of good Anglo-French or Anglo-Scottish relations. Traditional antipathies were omnipresent among the populace regardless of the intentions and inclinations of Anglo-Scottish monarchs; this was manifest from Sir Antony Weldon's remark of 1617 that marriage to a Scot was akin to being "tied to a dead carcass, and cast into a stinking ditch."

Without doubt, the Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliance of 1503 has too often been considered in isolation, while the antecedents have tended to be lightly dismissed or ignored altogether.<sup>2</sup> This is understandable in view of the fact that early chroniclers were generally unaware of unsuccessful matrimonial negotiations, but one cannot excuse the shortcomings of more recent studies on these grounds. Even if one excludes the briefly considered matrimonial alliance between Edward IV and Mary of Gueldres (the widow of James II and mother of James III, of Scotland) in 1462, between 1474 and 1493 there were another eight attempted Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliances, prior to the protracted negotiations for the marriage of Margaret Tudor and James IV from 1496 to 1503.<sup>3</sup>

In 1474 matrimonial union was first anticipated between James Duke of Rothesay, the eldest son of James III and Margaret of Denmark, and

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1. Early Travellers, p.103 ; see Chapter One.
  2. M. A. Everett Green did, however, observe that the Anglo-Scottish marriage alliances from Edward IV to Henry VII constituted "a curious episode in the history of matrimonial diplomacy", Lives of the Princesses of England, III, (London, 1851), pp.416-417, n.3.
  3. For Anglo-Scottish relations in the early 1460's see Macdougall, James III, ch.3 ; Bradley thesis, ch.4. Among the ideas which never really got off the ground were marriage alliances involving Mary of Gueldres and James III with Edward IV and an unnamed English lady.

Princess Cecily, the youngest daughter (at that time) of Edward IV and Elizabeth Woodville. As a usurper undermined by domestic dissent Edward IV was doubtless anxious to conciliate the Lancastrians, and their opportunistic Scottish allies, as he sought to establish himself securely in power. Despite their early difficulties, or perhaps because of them, Scotland and England had concluded a fifteen year truce on 1st June 1464, which was extended, on 12th December 1465, until 1519.<sup>1</sup> This extension provides perhaps the first indication that Anglo-Scottish monarchs aspired to find a more permanent solution to their relationship, and there is no reason to assume either that such peaceful aspirations were not genuine or that accord would not last beyond 1480.<sup>2</sup> The readeption of Henry VI (October 1470 to April 1471) had doubtless emphasized the weakness of Edward IV's position, and the King's continued insecurity clearly reinforced his commitment to Anglo-Scottish rapprochement in the 1470's. Furthermore, Edward's aspiration to invade France from 1474 intensified his desire to strengthen his truce with the Scots; this explains his concern to redress outstanding Scottish grievances up to, and including, 1475.<sup>3</sup> James III's ambitious continental schemes, which may also have worried the English monarch, were opposed in the Scottish Parliament of 1473, and, increasingly frustrated in his dealings with Louis XI (who had misread the situation), the Scottish monarch found himself vulnerable to the pressures of English diplomacy.<sup>4</sup> One ought not to read too much into the evidence of Anglo-Scottish friction in April

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1. Rot. Scot., II, pp.410-412, 418-420 ; Bain, 1341, 1362, 1363 ; S.R.O. SP.6/21 and 22. In 1473, the Duke of Burgundy intervened to guarantee the truce for at least two years ; PRO. E.39/53, (Bain, 1405) ; Foedera, V, pt.iii, p.28 ; Rot. Scot., II, p.436.

2. cf. Nicholson, p.406.

3. see Chapter Two ; MS. Cotton Vespasian C.XVI, ff.121-126, B.L.

4. Macdougall, James III, pp.113-116, and Ch.6.

1474, for in May the Scottish Parliament announced its intention of sending an embassy to Edward IV concerning "gud materis of frendschep and amitie....ande keping of the pece in tym to cum".<sup>1</sup>

On 15th June 1474, Scottish envoys were commissioned to negotiate an alliance between Prince James and Princess Cecily, and Edward IV responded with a similar commission on 29th July.<sup>2</sup> The commissioners evidently worked quickly since indentures were concluded on the following day, but it is not inconceivable that more informal negotiations had already taken place.<sup>3</sup> At the eleventh hour, Louis XI clearly sought to prevent Anglo-Scottish rapprochement by negotiating a matrimonial alliance - which only he appears to have taken seriously - between James III and the Duke of Milan (in September).<sup>4</sup> An alliance with England was of much more practical benefit to the Scots, while Scotland had nothing to offer the Milanese; Duke Galeazzo informed his envoy on 3rd October 1474 that he did not intend to pursue the matter, first because his daughter was already married, and second because Scotland was remote.<sup>5</sup> Indentures for the marriage of Prince James and Princess Cecily, and others prolonging the truce to 1519, were concluded at Edinburgh on

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1. A.P.S., II, p.106 ; cf. T.A., I, p.49.
  2. Rot. Scot., II, p.443 ; PRO. C.81/849/3977, (Bain, 1414).
  3. Nicholson, p.478, for his comments on the "suspicious speed" and "almost unseemly haste".
  4. C.S.P. Milanese, I, 270, 271, pp.186-187 ; Bradley thesis, pp.262-264 ; For Edward IV's alliance with the Duke of Urbino see C. H. Clough, The Duchy of Urbino in the Renaissance, (London, 1981), item XI, pp.208-210.
  5. C.S.P. Milanese, I, 272, p.188.



26th October.<sup>1</sup> The preamble to the matrimonial agreement stated that

since:-

"this noble isle called grete Britaigne cannot be kepte and mainteigned better in welth and prosperite than such things to be practized and concluded betwene the Kings of both reames, England and Scotland wherby thaye and thair subgetts might be assured to lyve in peas....hit hath be agreed, accorded, and concluded that consideringe the longe continued troubles dissentions and debats betwene the both reames with grete and mortell werre that hath followed theruppon for the appesyng and setting aparte of the same a nerrer and a more especiall wey is to be found and had than only the truste of the trewe and abstinence of werre...."

The "more especiall wey" to which the indenture referred was a matrimonial alliance, to the intent that "comixtion of blode" might constitute the beginning of "peas and tranquillite perpetuel". Consequently the two monarchs agreed to ratify their 1465 truce, and promised not to assist one another's malcontents and traitors. The provisions for the matrimonial alliance are of particular interest since James and Cecily were aged two and four, respectively, and thus James III and Edward IV were bound to "procure" the consummation of the match within six months of the children obtaining their "lawfull age" (presumably fourteen in the prince's case). The princess was to obtain in dower all the lands and revenues pertaining to the prince's "old heritage" during his father's lifetime, the Duchy of Rothesay, the Earldom of Carricke, and the Lordships of the Stewart lands; if, however, the Queen Dowager outlived James III, Cecily was to receive a third part of the King's lands and patrimony in the meantime. Edward IV agreed to pay a dowry of 20,000 English marks to the Scots, in instalments of 2,000 marks for 3 years, and 1,000 marks per annum until the sum was paid. If

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1. Rot. Scot., II, pp.446-450 ; Foedera, V., pt.iii, pp.48-52 ; S.R.O. SP.6/23 ; MS. Lansdowne 141, ff.106v-117, B.L. ; MS. Cotton Vitellius C.XI, ff.70-88v, B.L. ; PRO. SP.9/138, ff.218-224 ; MS. Cotton Vespasian C.XVI, ff.67-70, B.L. These are the sources for the following paragraphs.

either child were to die, the two monarchs agreed to procure an alliance between any of their other children, provided that the payments for the first dowry were merely continued. If, however, no matrimonial alliance was consummated, the Scots agreed to repay all sums received over 2,500 marks within four years, while Edward IV was obliged to pay 20,000 marks if the alliance was concluded; obligations to this effect were issued on 5th and 26th November.<sup>1</sup>

On 26th October, the betrothal was solemnised at Edinburgh (in the lower chamber of the Friars preachers), with David Earl of Crawford and John Lord Scrope acting as proxies for James and Cecily.<sup>2</sup> The Scots ratified the agreement on 3rd November, and about the same time Edward IV publicly proclaimed the Anglo-Scottish truce throughout his realm.<sup>3</sup> The first instalment of the dowry was due to be paid in Edinburgh on 3rd February 1475, and in early December 1474 it had been agreed that James III should annually appoint his subjects, "good, feithfull and in sufficient nombre", to safely accompany the English envoys from Norham.<sup>4</sup> The authority of the Scottish guard was to be delivered to the Lieutenant of Norham castle for safe-keeping, while the English envoys were also to receive a safe-conduct before crossing the Tweed with the money.<sup>5</sup> The first such safe-conduct was issued on 16th January 1475, and the first instalment of 2,000 marks was paid by Alexander Legh (Edward IV's

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1. PRO. E.39/96/19, (Bain, 1420) ; SRO. SP.6/24.
  2. PRO. E.39/2/13, (Bain, 1417) ; Foedera, V., pt.iii, pp.47-48.
  3. PRO. E.39/54, (Bain, 1418) ; PRO. C.81/1508/24, (Bain, 1419) ; Foedera, V., pt.iii, pp.48-52 ; C.C.R., 1468-1476, 1284, pp.356-357.
  4. PRO. E.39/96/27, E.39/99/88, (Bain, 1421) ; Foedera, V., pt.iii, p.53.
  5. Ibid. ; and see PRO. E.39/102/23, (Bain, 1434 and App. no.26).

Almoner) in St. Giles' Church, Edinburgh, on 3rd February that year.<sup>1</sup>

The 1474 Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliance has rightly been regarded by some authorities as a significant agreement in the history of Anglo-Scottish relations and I do not accept the elaborate arguments which have recently sought to undermine this interpretation.<sup>2</sup> Some recent criticisms are questionable, being poorly grounded on sweeping assumptions about James III's attitudes, and on the dubious assumption that an Anglo-Scottish alliance necessarily had to be popular to be significant.<sup>3</sup> Though the Scottish monarch may not have been as enthusiastic as Edward IV to conclude a matrimonial alliance early in 1474, it is clear that he quickly came to appreciate the advantages of Anglo-Scottish accord. In view of the fact that the English had the resources (and usually the inclination) to attack Scotland, that James III was consistently financially embarrassed, and that the Scots had been by turns ignored, abused, and circumvented by Louis XI, an Anglo-Scottish alliance was an increasingly attractive proposition; moreover, in the later 1470's, James sought to conclude additional matrimonial alliances with Edward IV. The indenture of October 1474 indicates that both monarchs perceived of the alliance as a long-term solution to the problems of Anglo-Scottish relations, and even if the peace lasted only until 1480-1481, in view of the subsequent attempts to conclude Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliances, I maintain that the 1474 alliance did constitute something of a turning point. Certain ingenious suggestions have been made to the effect that Edward IV merely neutralised Scotland

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1. PRO. E.39/96/20, (Bain, 1422) ; PRO. E.39/96/21, (Bain, 1425) ; Foedera, V., pt.iii, pp.55-56, 58-59.
  2. eg. Macdougall, James III, p.117, for the significance.
  3. eg. Bradley thesis, pp.265-268, 272-273, for criticisms.

"for a small outlay" and never intended maintaining the Anglo-Scottish alliance beyond the time that it proved directly useful to him, but, if this had been the case, then Edward's relations with James III from 1475 to 1479 were somewhat illogical.'

For one thing, Edward continued to pay the instalments of the dowry; there are extant Scottish receipts, dated 3rd February, 1476, 1477, and 1478, and there is evidence that payment was received in early 1479.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, Edward IV's instructions and James III's commissions and letters reveal that the machinery established for the collection of the dowry continued to function effectively.<sup>3</sup> Evidently James issued receipts in anticipation of payment since on 28th April 1477 he "wele excusit the tary" payment of the sum due in February because of "the infirmite" of Alexander Legh and "the distemperance of the wedir that was richt hevvy for the tyme".<sup>4</sup> Too much has been made of the delay in payment, while the suggestion that Edward was "haggling" over the dowry is virtually nonsensical.<sup>5</sup> If the Anglo-Scottish alliance depended on Anglo-French accord to the degree intimated by Dr. Nicholson, then there would have been little reason for Edward IV to continue paying the dowry beyond 1475; the English invasion of France in July had not embroiled the English in a French conflict which would necessitate peace with Scotland,

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1. P. Hume Brown, History of Scotland, vol.I, (Cambridge, 1902), pp.267, 272-275 ; J. Hill Burton, History of Scotland, III, (8 vols. Edinburgh, 1898-1901), p.18 ; Nicholson, p.479 ; Bradley thesis, pp.268-270.
  2. PRO. E.39/55, E.39/56, E.39/60, E.39/102/31, (Bain, 1437, 1446, 1450, 1456 and App. no.30) ; Foedera, V., pt.iii, pp.68, 75.
  3. Ibid., PRO. E.39/102/23, E.39/102/24, E.39/102/27, E.39/92/9, E.39/96/13, (Bain, 1434 and App. no.26, 1435 and App. no.27, 1444, 1445, 1449) ; Foedera, V., pt.iii, p.75.
  4. PRO. E.39/102/28, (Bain, 1448 and App. no.29).
  5. R. L. Mackie, James IV, p.9.

while the Anglo-French Treaty of Picquigny anticipated a matrimonial alliance between Princess Elizabeth (Edward's eldest daughter) and the Dauphin.<sup>1</sup>

Arguably, Edward IV sought peaceful relations with England's traditional enemies, France and Scotland; a virtually revolutionary policy which he appears to have rejected by the early 1480's, but one which Henry VII was later to adapt with considerable success. It is not inconceivable that Edward merely sought to bluff the Scots with a desire for peace during the late 1470's, but I maintain that the most logical inference of the dowry payments from 1476 to 1479 is that the English monarch intended to marry Cecily to the Duke of Rothesay at some opportune date. Despite the paucity of the evidence for 1480-1481, one cannot reasonably argue that the outbreak of Anglo-Scottish conflict was caused by Edward IV's cynical manipulation of the Scots.<sup>2</sup> Commynes found Edward to be handsome and courageous, but nothing "outstanding", and I would suggest that such manipulation of events was far beyond his capabilities; arguably, historians have been unduly influenced by hindsight in detecting Machiavellian motives where no such motivation existed.<sup>3</sup> The evidence of Edward's will, dated 20th June 1475, has consistently been overlooked by most authorities, despite the fact that the King therein obliged his heir to pay the dowry "considering that the said mariage was by thadvis of the lords ofoure blode and other ofoure Counsaill for the grete wele of all thisoure Reame and ofoure heires in tyme to comme concluded".<sup>4</sup> Clearly the alliance was more than a pragmatic device to

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1. cf. Nicholson, p.487.

2. see Chapter Three, section A.

3. Commynes, p.184 ; cf. Bradley thesis, pp.268-270.

4. MS. Additional 4615, ff.6-7, B.L. ; Excerpta Historica, pp.366-379, esp. pp.369-370.

preoccupy the Scots during the 1475 invasion of France, and, until his son had attained his majority, peace with Scotland was evidently the only sensible course on which the King could advise his heir to embark. Ironically, Edward V's legacy in April 1483 included an Anglo-Scottish conflict.

From 1475 to 1479, Anglo-Scottish relations were remarkably cordial. In March 1479, for example, James III thanked his "derrest cousing ande bruthir" Edward for making a recent payment in English money, and declared that he would endeavour to accomplish his "plessour in thir partis" and hold him in his "tuicioune and gouernance".<sup>1</sup> Traditionally English chroniclers portrayed the Scots as the cause of Anglo-Scottish conflicts and the beneficiary of Anglo-Scottish accord, in the one case to exemplify their inherent perfidy and duplicity and in the other to exaggerate the prestige of an English alliance to the subservient Scots. In reality, Scottish monarchs rarely held the diplomatic initiative, but James III's activities placed him in this advantageous position in the later 1470's.

In his letter to Edward IV in April 1477, James III noted that Alexander Legh was privy to certain additional information, "in oure name anent the matir of mariage".<sup>2</sup> The reference is obscure and would make little sense were it not for the fact that another letter, which evidently pertains to the same year, throws light on the Scottish King's activities and aspirations.<sup>3</sup> I suggest that the Scottish aspiration to strengthen the 1474 Anglo-Scottish agreement by means of additional matrimonial alliances indicates a conscious strategy to find a more permanent

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1. PRO. E.39/102/31, (Bain, 1456 and App. no.30).
  2. PRO. E.39/102/28, (Bain, 1448 and App. no.29).
  3. MS. Cotton Vespasian C.XVI, f.127, B.L. ; Halliwell, Letters, I, pp.147-148 ; Ellis, Letters, I (1st ser.), IX, pp.16-17.

solution to the problems experienced in Anglo-Scottish relations. Moreover, since the age of Cecily and James effectively prevented the consummation of their alliance for many years, it was only sensible to consider other possible partnerships. The second letter reveals that James III had proposed alliances "betwixt our brother of Clarence and a sustre of the said King of Scotts; and another mariage also, to be had between our sustre the duchesse of Bourgonne and the Duc of Albany his brothr".<sup>1</sup> Legh was instructed by Edward IV to express his thanks, but to say that they might "not conveniently speke in this matier" at present, since, by English custom, "noon estat ne person honorable communeth of mariage within the yere of their doole"; this was evidently an indirect reference to the deaths of Isabel Duchess of Clarence and Charles Duke of Burgundy in December 1476 and January 1477, respectively. Edward declared, however, that at a more opportune moment he would feel the "disposicions" of his brother and sister, and thereupon inform James of their inclinations "in all goodely hast"; this constitutes a fine example of diplomatic procrastination since the English monarch was clearly trying to reject the Scottish suggestion without causing offence.

Most authorities agree that Edward IV's opposition to the Scottish initiatives was symptomatic of the increasingly fractious relationship between the King and his malcontent brother, George Duke of Clarence.<sup>2</sup> In considering Edward's reply to James III's letter, one cannot reasonably ignore the events which culminated in Clarence's attainder and execution in January-February 1478. Edward had already thwarted the suggestion of Margaret Dowager-Duchess of Burgundy that her favourite relation Clarence

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1. Ibid.

2. For background see M. A. Hicks, False, Fleeting, Perjur'd Clarence : George, Duke of Clarence, 1449-1478, (Gloucester, 1980).

should marry Mary of Burgundy.<sup>1</sup> In view of the anticipated Anglo-French matrimonial alliance there were sound political reasons for Edward's opposition, but the Croyland chronicler states that the King's opposition was partly on personal grounds; on account of his Yorkist links, the chronicler's opinion is likely to be reliable.<sup>2</sup> There was nothing in the proposed Scottish alliances which might conflict with English policy; had Clarence married Margaret they would doubtless have lived in England and thus one cannot argue that Edward was fearful of his brother's treasonable activities in a foreign land. Moreover, Edward evidently did not object to the attempts of Anthony Earl Rivers, brother of Queen Elizabeth Woodville, to conclude matrimonial alliances with first Mary of Burgundy and second Margaret of Scotland.<sup>3</sup> Clearly, therefore, the King objected to Clarence and not to the principle of the Anglo-Scottish alliances. There is no evidence to suggest that any objection had been made to the proposed alliance between Margaret of Burgundy and Alexander Duke of Albany, but it is not inconceivable that Margaret preferred to retain her independence and influence as a dowager-duchess, or that Albany desired a younger wife than the 31 year old duchess.

It is clear that the 1477 alliances suggested by James III failed to inspire Edward IV because of the prevailing acrimony between the English monarch and Clarence. Interestingly, three of the four individuals mentioned were among the greatest malcontents and schemers of their time; this may make one question James III's motives, but one can only ponder the potential consequences had these matrimonial alliances been

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1. Croyland Chronicle, pp.143-147.
  2. Ibid.
  3. Ibid., p.143, observes that Edward wished the Burgundian heiress to marry Maximilian.



consummated. Potentially they constituted the most interesting mis-alliances of the late fifteenth century, and, in particular, the marriage of Margaret and Albany would doubtless have ignited fireworks in an otherwise dull sky.<sup>1</sup> The tradition of Edward IV's duplicitous conduct towards Scotland in the 1470's has persisted in most recent studies, while few have appeared to appreciate the irony of the fact that the initiative in Anglo-Scottish relations was seized by James III, generally regarded as one of the most ineffectual rulers of his generation.

The marriage of James III's sister Margaret, first raised about November 1475, became a significant issue in Anglo-Scottish relations between 1477 and 1479, and was considered by at least two Parliamentary commissions; the second, in June 1478, referred to the despatch of an embassy to England "in all gudly haist".<sup>2</sup> On 14th December 1478, Edward IV appointed the Bishop of Rochester and Sir Edward Woodville to negotiate with the Dean of Dunkeld and Lyon King of Arms for the marriage of Margaret to Anthony Earl Rivers.<sup>3</sup> The details of the negotiations are obscure but on 23rd January 1479 a safe-conduct was issued for 6 months permitting Margaret and up to 300 persons to come to England to solemnise the marriage; James III promised to conduct her south at his expense before 16th May.<sup>4</sup> According to a Scottish document, dated 2nd February, Margaret's dowry was to consist of 4,000 English marks, paid in sums of

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1. For Margaret and Albany see Vergil, pp.15-17, 63-65 ; Bacon, pp.90, 151-154 ; P. M. Kendall, Richard III, (New York, 1956), p.141 ; Pitscottie, I, pp.162-164, 182-190.
  2. A.P.S., II, pp.112, 114, 119 ; Nicholson, pp.488-489 ; T.A., I, p.cclxxxvi. The Princess had only recently emerged from the nunnery of Haddington.
  3. Rot. Scot., II, p.456 ; misdated 1482 in Foedera, V., pt.iii, pp.126-127 and T.A., I, p.cclxxxvii.
  4. PRO. C.81/1516/4, (Bain, 1455).

650 marks per annum for 5 years, followed by a final instalment of 750 marks; however, payment was to be calculated by deducting these sums from the instalments of Cecily's dowry owed by Edward IV.<sup>1</sup> This meant that effectively Edward would pay only 350 marks per annum for the next 5 years (instead of the 1,000 marks due), followed by a sixth payment of 250 marks. Moreover, I would suggest that this financial arrangement illustrates reasonably conclusively that Edward IV did not intend to renege on the 1474 Anglo-Scottish matrimonial agreement.

The criticism voiced by Hary's Wallace has been cited as testimony of the unpopularity of James III's Anglophile policy, but it is clear that "till honour ennymis" was not the King's "haile entent".<sup>2</sup> James doubtless aspired to increase his prestige and security through matrimonial alliances while, at the same time, endeavouring to resolve the problems presented by his financial weakness and by Franco-Scottish and Anglo-Scottish relations. Clearly domestic opposition failed to deter James from pursuing his Anglophile policy, and Anglophobia may well have derived its main strength from Albany and a group of lowland lords; those Scots who benefitted from Anglo-Scottish trade or who lived in the Highlands and Islands may actually have supported the King.<sup>3</sup> Nor can one reasonably argue that Anglophobia was manifest in the activity of the Scottish Parliament; in March 1479, for example, the estates agreed to contribute 20,000 Scottish marks for the expenses of Margaret's marriage.<sup>4</sup>

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1. R.M.S., II, 1424-1513, 1417, pp.291-292.

2. Hary's Wallace, ed. M. P. McDiarmid, S.T.S., 4 (4th ser., 1968), esp. pp.xiv-xxvi, 1 ; M. P. McDiarmid, 'The Date of the Wallace', S.H.R., XXXIV, pp.26-31.

3. Macdougall, James III, pp.117-119.

4. A.P.S., II, p.122 ; The Bannatyne Miscellany, III, (Edinburgh, 1855), pp.427-431.

For the first half of 1479 Margaret's failure to arrive in England probably caused no alarm. On 21st August Edward wrote to the Mayor of York instructing the authorities to welcome his "right dere cousine" Princess Margaret, and to render "lovyng and herty chier" to her entourage; a second safe-conduct was consequently issued at Guildford on 22nd August anticipating a November marriage.<sup>1</sup> Various reasons have been provided for Margaret's subsequent failure to travel south, from James III's difficulties in raising the parliamentary taxation to Albany's treasonable activities (especially on the borders), but these suggestions are unconvincing.<sup>2</sup> Royal brides were occasionally the subject of scurrilous gossip, but it may well be that Margaret had been impregnated by William third Lord Crichton.<sup>3</sup> According to Buchanan, Crichton responded to James III's adultery with his wife by seducing Princess Margaret, "a lady....exquisitely lovely, but infamous for too close a connexion with her brother".<sup>4</sup> There are errors in the chronicler's account, but I suggest that Margaret's pregnancy affords a more feasible explanation for the failure of this alliance. Matrimonial agreements were often undermined by the death or marriage elsewhere of one of the intended partners, but doubtless the circumstances in this case embarrassed and irritated both James III and Edward IV. As an outrage against Edward's honour, at a

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1. Y.C.R., I, p.31 ; York Records, pp.99-102 ; Rot. Scot., II, p.457, misdated 1482 in Foedera, V., pt.iii, p.123, and T.A., I, p.cclxxxvii.
  2. Macdougall, James III, pp.141-142 ; Bradley thesis, pp.273-276 ; cf. Ramsay, Lancaster and York : A Century of English History, 1399-1485, vol.II, (Oxford, 1892), p.436 ; L. Stratford, Edward IV, (London, 1910), pp.303-304.
  3. For Margaret and her daughter see T.A., I, pp.cclxxxv - ccxcii. Nicholson, p.489, and Bradley thesis, pp.276-277, agree about the date of the pregnancy, but Dr. Macdougall places the liaison "during or after the 1482-3 crisis" ; James III, pp.156 n.16, 198-199.
  4. Buchanan, 2, p.213.

time when the King was already increasingly suspicious of Franco-Scottish activity, this incident could conceivably have provided him with an excuse to justify his subsequent hostility.<sup>1</sup> Interestingly however, the failure to consummate this matrimonial alliance was not cited as an excuse in the English propaganda of 1480-1481; Edward's ultimatum to James III, for example, said nothing at all about Rivers or Margaret.<sup>2</sup>

The English repudiation of the 1474 matrimonial alliance was manifest in the secret agreement concluded by the English monarch and Alexander Duke of Albany on 11th June 1482.<sup>3</sup> Among the provisions Alexander, as King of Scotland "be the gyfte of the King of England", agreed to marry Princess Cecily, formerly betrothed to James Duke of Rothesay, "gyf the said Alexander can mak hym self cler fra all othir women according to the lawes of Cristis chyrche withyn ane yere next ensuyng or souner". If this proved impossible, as Albany had married Anne de la Tour, daughter of the Count of Auvergne and Bouillon, then the Duke agreed to marry his son and heir, if he had one, to a lady of the King's blood agreeable to both parties. Even if Edward IV optimistically anticipated a more successful conclusion to this agreement than was feasible given Albany's circumstances (an exile supported by the English, but weak and insecure in Scotland), I suggest that the King's actions reveal misjudgment and inconsistency. Possibly the agreement had originated with the intention of finding a propagandist thorn to prick James III, but the argument that the alliance between Cecily and Albany was not really envisaged as likely by Edward IV is undermined by the

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1. Nicholson, pp.489-490, makes generalised assumptions about Edward IV's attitudes.
  2. PRO. E.39/102/25, (Bain, 1436 and App. no.28, but misdated 1476).
  3. PRO. E.39/92/38, (Bain, 1476) ; Foedera, V., pt.iii, pp.120-121.

King's subsequent conduct. Arguably, Edward squandered hard won achievement for the will-o'-the-wisp possibilities which events, in the shape of Albany, had appeared to present. If he erred therein, as he assuredly did, this was probably less evident at the time, and he was far from being the only English monarch to fall into the trap of underestimating the Scots and over-estimating his own power and influence; traditionally, English monarchs and their subjects cultivated an unhealthy contempt for their "auld enemies", and optimistic assertions of assured victory were not always so easily attained in reality.

The apparent success of the Duke of Gloucester's expedition to Scotland in July and August 1482 undoubtedly appeared to vindicate Edward IV's actions for a short time, and probably prompted the English King to formally repudiate the matrimonial alliance between Cecily and the Duke of Rothesay.<sup>1</sup> On 4th August 1482, the merchants, burgesses, and "communitie" of Edinburgh had resolved to pay Edward all sums "that war payt for the said mariage" if he repudiated the alliance before All Hallows, and Garter King of Arms had notified the town authorities to this effect on 27th October.<sup>2</sup> Within weeks, Albany's insecurity in Scotland was manifest, but by this time Edward IV was effectively committed to his cause, and in their second agreement, dated 11th February 1483, Albany resolved to marry one of the English monarch's daughters without any charge to him.<sup>3</sup> However unrealistic this

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1. For the campaign see Chapter Three, section A.
  2. PRO. E.39/92/10, E.39/50, E.39/100/104, E.39/5/20, E.39/99/86, (Bain, 1480, 1481, 1482, 1483, 1484) ; Foedera, V., pt.iii, pp.122-125 ; Charters and other Documents relating to the City of Edinburgh, 1143-1540, ed. J. D. Marwick, (Edinburgh, 1871), pp.146-154.
  3. PRO. E.39/57, (Bain, 1489) ; Foedera, V., pt.iii, pp.127-128. For Albany see Macdougall, James III, chs.8, 9. With the Duke's fall from grace and flight to England and France, the alliance with an English princess was quietly forgotten (though perhaps not by James III).

agreement might appear, one could conceivably argue that Edward IV remained committed to the principle of some kind of matrimonial alliance with Scotland from 1474 to 1483, even if the 1474 agreement was foolishly repudiated in 1482. After almost 20 years of Anglo-Scottish rapprochement, four of Edward's successors, from Richard III to Edward VI, were to consider matrimony as a means of resolving their Scottish problem. Arguably only Henry VII achieved more than a superficial success, despite the fact that it took a century for long established potential to flower in the shape of James I of England and Scotland.

The succession crisis which followed Edward IV's untimely demise on 9th April 1483 provided a natural hiatus in the Anglo-Scottish conflict which had prevailed since 1480, while Richard III's subsequent difficulties in consequence of his usurpation undoubtedly enabled James III to grasp anew the initiative in Anglo-Scottish relations; an initiative which he had lost to Edward during the conflict between them. The ambivalence displayed by Richard III in his conduct towards Scotland was reflected in the apparent vacillation between continued support for Scottish malcontents (Douglas and Albany) and the cautious exploration of the possibilities of renewing Anglo-Scottish accord.<sup>1</sup> His efforts to safeguard the Border in July 1483 were essentially defensive measures, and while Richard evidently considered a campaign against Scotland during 1484, it is clear that he also responded to James III's initiatives by granting safe-conducts to Scottish envoys from November 1483 to August 1484.<sup>2</sup> In view of the English King's insecurity as a usurper, his hands were effectively tied, and the desire for domestic security was doubtless the

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1. see Chapter Two, section F, for malcontents.

2. Rot. Scot., II, pp.461-464 ; Halliwell, Letters, I, pp.156-157 ; C.P.R., 1476-1485, p.462.

main consideration in his dealings with Scotland. The Francophobia which had been evident in England at the time of Edward IV's death clearly revived Charles VIII's interest in the "auld" alliance in 1483 and 1484, and therefore French activity had some bearing on Anglo-Scottish relations at this time.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, the recent experiences of 1480-1483 had doubtless exacerbated Anglo-Scottish antipathy and mistrust, and these considerations clearly dictated the caution with which Richard III and James III enveloped their conciliatory diplomatic activities.<sup>2</sup>

On 16th August 1483, James III informed Richard that the Scots were well disposed towards the English despite their recent difficulties caused "be the werkyngis and menys of evil disposed persones, incontrarie our mynde and entencion".<sup>3</sup> The Scots were resolved to henceforth maintain the peace with neighbouring realms and all Christian princes, and thus James requested safe-conducts for his commissioners and Richard's agreement to an eight month truce by land and sea. Richard replied, on 16th September, that he was "confirmable to the will and pleasure of God....in all resounable and conuenient peax, without fenyng", and safe-conducts followed on 29th November 1483, and 8th March and 13th April 1484.<sup>4</sup> The Scots evidently failed to take advantage of these safe-conducts, probably as a consequence of Franco-Scottish diplomatic activity and the reaffirmation of the "auld" alliance between December

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1. eg. Bradley thesis, pp.299-301.

2. Richard had many years<sup>of</sup> first-hand experience dealing with the Scots.

3. MS. Harleian 433, ff.246v-247, B.L. ; Harl. 433, vol.III, pp.47-48 ; L. & P. R.III and H.VII, I, pp.51-52.

4. MS. Harleian 433, f.247, B.L. ; Harl. 433, vol.III, p.48 ; L. & P. R.III and H.VII, I, p.53 ; Rot. Scot., II, pp.461-462.

1483 and March 1484.<sup>1</sup> On 13th April 1484, Richard instructed Northumberland Herald to await the response of the Scottish envoys at Berwick until 15th May, and, if they agreed to a short truce, this was to be proclaimed on the borders, and in Berwick and Dunbar.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, the herald was to deliver safe-conducts if the Scots desired to visit England and labour "for the good of peas". The instructions provide no details about Richard III's conditions for agreeing to a short truce, but the King expressly stated that the Debateable Land might not "be othrewise occupied than hit is at this day by any partie".<sup>3</sup>

At some time the prospect of an Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliance was raised by one of the monarchs; on 21st July 1484, one day before Albany and Douglas were defeated at Lochmaben, James III informed Richard that the Scots understood that the English monarch was "wele appliit and inclynit to the gud of trewes [and] abstinenc of werre....and also that luf, amytie, and speciall alliauncez of mariage was avisit, appointit, and concludit betwix your blode and oures; whereunto we ar in likewise inclinitt".<sup>4</sup> Again matrimonial alliance was perceived as a means of achieving "the ferme obseruacion and stabiliment of the said trewx", and James therefore appointed some of his councillors to attend to the Anglo-Scottish negotiations at Nottingham in early September; a truce was to prevail while the Scottish envoys were in England and for eight days after. Richard III granted a safe-conduct to the Scots, as requested, on 6th August, and, on the following day, he wrote to James, commending his

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1. SRO. SP.7/15, 16, 17, 18, 19, for Franco-Scottish documents.
  2. MS. Harleian 433, f.254, B.L. ; Harl. 433, vol.III, p.71 ; L. & P. R.III and H.VII, I, pp.55-56.
  3. see Chapter Two, section C.
  4. MS. Harleian 433, ff.263v-264, B.L. ; Harl. 433, vol.III, pp.105-106 ; L. & P. R.III and H.VII, I, pp.59-61.



"loving and toward disposicion".<sup>1</sup> By means of the Scottish embassy, Richard hoped to see "love and tendrenesse growe daily and encrease" between them, and, in view of his insecurity, one can well believe his claim that he desired Anglo-Scottish accord as much as any living prince.

James III responded to Richard's safe-conduct by appointing various notables, including the Earl of Argyll, the Bishop of Aberdeen, Archibald Whitelaw, and Lords Lisle and Oliphant, to negotiate for a marriage between James Duke of Rothesay and the Lady Anne de la Pole, Richard III's niece (daughter of his sister Elizabeth and John Duke of Suffolk).<sup>2</sup> This alliance clearly illustrates Richard's problem in having effectively denounced his mother as an adulteress and his brother Edward's children as bastards. Consequently the De la Poles basked in the King's favour; after the death of Richard's son and heir, Prince Edward, on 9th April 1484, an event which further increased his insecurity, John de la Pole, Earl of Lincoln (Anne's brother), was recognized as his heir, and the family was later to be a thorn in Henry VII's flesh because of its close Yorkist connections and dubious activities. Richard III's basic problem was that he had no daughter of his own to marry to the Duke of Rothesay, and, while Anne de la Pole was hardly an ideal choice, she was the only female relative whom the King could offer to the Scots at the time. Richard's other nieces, the daughters of Edward IV, would, in normal circumstances, have been eminently suitable, but given the fact that he had declared them bastards in the 1484 Parliament they would have been unacceptable to the Scots.<sup>3</sup>

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1. MS. Harleian 433, f.264, B.L. ; Harl 433, vol.III, pp.106-107 ; L & P R.III and H.VII, I, pp.61-62.
  2. PRO. E.39/2/29, E.39/2/32, (Bain, 1501, 1502) ; Foedera V , pt.111, p.149.
  3. Rot. Parl , VI, pp.240-242.

The Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliance of 1484 was undoubtedly less prestigious than the 1474 alliance, and it is an indication of James III's desire to conclude an agreement that he accepted this fact, apparently without demur; however, in view of the fact that no English princess was available and that the continental powers were sometimes reluctant to marry into the Scottish royal house, there was probably little alternative. It is possible to argue that James sought to appear more enthusiastic with Richard III than he was in reality, and that he was playing off his French and English allies to strengthen his own position, but I maintain that this interpretation should be treated with some caution; James never intended to reject an Anglophile alliance.

On 9th September, Richard made arrangements for the reception of the Scottish envoys at Nottingham; they arrived on the 11th and the next day were formally presented to the King in the great chamber of Nottingham castle.<sup>1</sup> Archibald Whitelaw gave an oration before the assembled company and presented James III's commissions for a truce and a matrimonial alliance "by twyene the prince of Scottis and one of the Kynges blood".<sup>2</sup> Richard's commissions appointed fifteen English notables to negotiate for the truce and ten others to negotiate for the matrimonial alliance, while only four personnel were common to both; John Bishop of Lincoln, John Duke of Norfolk, Sir Richard Ratcliffe, and William Catesby.<sup>3</sup>

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1. MS. Cotton Caligula B.V, ff.151-152v, B.L. ; L. & P. R.III and H.VII, I, pp.63-67 ; The Bannatyne Miscellany, vol.II, pp.33-48 ; Buck, pp.57-58, 205-206.
  2. MS. Cotton Vespasian C.XVI, ff.75-79, B.L., for the speech, (now separated from MS. Cotton Caligula B.V, ff.151-152v, B.L.) ; The Bannatyne Miscellany, vol.II, pp.41-48 ; Buck, pp.205-206.
  3. Rot. Scot., II, pp.464-466 ; the commissions are dated 14th September in the MS. account and 20th September in the Scots rolls.

The marriage treaty and a 3 year Anglo-Scottish truce were concluded on 21st September 1484, and James III's ratification was dated 21st October.<sup>1</sup> For reasons which are not entirely clear, the truce specifically excluded the Lordship of Lorne and the Isle of Lundey, while the emphasis on prohibiting aid to malcontents and rebels provides additional testimony of the insecurity of both monarchs. The matrimonial alliance has been neglected, probably largely because of Richard III's demise within less than a year, but it was significant at the time because of the implicit recognition of the Ricardian regime by a foreign monarch; moreover, Anglo-Scottish accord created an illusion of continuity, stability, and legitimacy, as Richard had doubtless intended. Arguably, the 1484 truce and matrimonial alliance represented a return to the rapprochement of Anglo-Scottish relations in the 1470's, and goodwill was manifest in the safe-conducts and commissions of November 1484 to May 1485.<sup>2</sup> Richard III's commission of 30th January 1485 to Sir Richard Ratclyff, Nicholas Redley, and John Cartington, pertaining to negotiations for the observance of the Nottingham truce, illustrates the activity of the traditional machinery for the redress of Anglo-Scottish grievances; this machinery had been reactivated the day after the conclusion of the truce, when the Anglo-Scottish commissioners had compiled indentures for the settlement of Border affairs by means of meetings to be held at

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1. PRO. E.39/93/14, E.39/92/28, E.39/2/26, (Bain, 1504, 1505, 1508) ; Foedera, V., pt.iii, pp.150, 156. P. M. Kendall, Richard III, pp.298-300, called the treaty Richard's "greatest diplomatic success" that year, but most authorities agree that the Scots had been behind the initiatives (esp. William Elphinstone) ; see Nicholson, p.517 ; C. D. Ross, Richard III, (London, 1981), p.193 n.3 ; G. Donaldson, Scottish Kings, (rev. ed., London, 1977), pp.108-109 ; J. D. Mackie, James IV, p.26 ; Coleman thesis, pp.44-45.
  2. Rot. Scot., II, pp.466-468 ; Foedera, V., pt.iii, pp.156-157, 160, 162-164 ; PRO. C.47/22/11 (53), (Bain, 1513).

Loughmabanstone, Hawdenstank, Ridanburne, and Dunbar.<sup>1</sup>

Within a few short months, the Anglo-Scottish agreements of 1484 were undermined by yet another usurpation of the English Throne. One could conceivably argue that political instability in England presented James III with difficulties in maintaining an Anglophile policy, but I would suggest that the Scottish monarch derived various benefits in the circumstances. Usurpers, for example, were generally preoccupied with domestic considerations and presented less of a threat to Scottish security and independence, while the preponderance of malcontents and rebels offered the Scots a means of circumventing any political claims which the English chose to advocate. Interestingly, Henry VIII was the first crowned English monarch in almost fifty years who was not a usurper, and yet his reign heralded a marked decline in Anglo-Scottish relations compared with the relations sustained by his usurping predecessors. One may say in defence of the oft-abused James III that his capable and reasonably consistent conduct towards four English monarchs provides evidence of some ability, and yet one must ultimately agree with Dr. Macdougall that the King's personal failings were many and constituted "the central problem of the reign".<sup>2</sup> The dichotomy is probably insurmountable.

According to Pitscottie, the Bishop of Dunkeld attended Richard III, on the Scottish monarch's "bissienes", immediately prior to the Battle of Bosworth.<sup>3</sup> The tale that Richard publicly put on his crown and declared that he intended to "die crownit King of ingland" may well be

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1. Rot. Scot., II, pp.466-467 ; PRO. E.39/2/39, E.39/96/24, (Bain, 1506, 1507) ; Foedera, V., pt.iii, pp.155, 159.
  2. P. Abercromby, The Martial Atchievements of the Scots Nation, vol.II, (Edinburgh, 1715), p.487 ; Macdougall, James III, conclusion esp. pp.305, 308.
  3. Pitscottie, I, pp.196-199.

apocryphal, and yet the incident is consistent with the King's innate perception of dramatic scenario, as conveyed by Domenico Mancini and other contemporary authorities.<sup>1</sup> The Scots were evidently anxious to be seen to have supported the victorious English faction, and by hedging his bets James may have calculated that he could not lose regardless of the outcome of the battle.<sup>2</sup> Various elements contributed to the favourable climate which prevailed in Anglo-Scottish relations at the beginning of Henry Tudor's reign. Scottish military assistance and Henry's position as a usurper are only two of the more significant aspects, and one cannot ignore the pacific inclinations of the two monarchs; moreover, peaceful inclination was not a euphemism for weakness, since inclination alone was rarely sufficient to prevent conflict.

On 22nd and 23rd September Henry VII issue<sup>d</sup> safe-conducts to various Scottish notables, some of whom may have attended his coronation on 30th October, and, from the subsequent issue of commissions and safe-conducts, evidently "negotiations between Henry VII and James III were in fact almost continuous."<sup>3</sup> On 30th January 1486, Henry Percy Earl of Northumberland was appointed by Henry VII to negotiate for an Anglo-Scottish truce, and 3 days later (2nd February) the King granted his safe-conduct to 12 Scottish envoys.<sup>4</sup> Henry's first royal progress followed by the rebellion of the Yorkist dissidents, the Stafford brothers and Lord Lovell, undoubtedly temporarily deflected the attention of the King from Anglo-Scottish relations, but James III appointed his commissioners on

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1. Mancini, pp.75-79, 83, 91, 95, 99 ; Mancini's Italianate style dwells on the dramatic aspects of the usurpation.
  2. see Chapter Two for Scots at Bosworth.
  3. Rot. Scot., II, p.469 ; Conway p.10.
  4. Rot. Scot., II, p.471.

6th May and the English monarch received them in state on 5th June.<sup>1</sup> Fortunately the meagre evidence of the Liber Intractionum supplements the uninspiring catalogue of commissions and safe-conducts to indicate that an Anglo-Scottish truce was debated by the English council between 18th and 23rd June 1486.<sup>2</sup> The councillors agreed to conclude a truce "at the lengest it maye", to establish a commission to determine the "boundes" (especially of Berwick), and to arrange a conference for the negotiation of an Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliance. Thus the 3 years' truce, concluded on 3rd July 1486, made provisos not only for the neutrality of Berwick, but also for the marriage of James Marquis of Ormond (second son of James III and Margaret of Denmark) to Lady Catherine (fourth surviving daughter of Edward IV and Elizabeth Woodville, and sister-in-law of Henry VII).<sup>3</sup>

Henry VII's problem for many years was that until late 1489 he had no daughter of his own to offer the Scots and, even after Margaret's birth, she was too young to be considered as a bride for a mature Scottish monarch. Moreover, possessing few noble female relations, other than his mother the Lady Margaret Beaufort (already married to Lord Stanley), he was at first compelled to turn to the sisters of his wife Elizabeth of York to find a suitable bride for any Scottish alliance; his first Parliament of November 1485 to March 1486 had removed the taint of illegitimacy from these royal princesses.<sup>4</sup> The daughters of Edward IV and Elizabeth Woodville presented Henry VII with a particular problem

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1. PRO. E.39/92/30, (Bain, 1520) ; MS. Cotton Julius B.XII, f.21v, B.L. ; Collectanea, IV, p.203.

2. Select Cases in the Council of Henry VII, ed. Bayne and Dunham, pp.9-10.

3. PRO. E.39/93/10, (Bain, 1521) ; Foedera, V., pt.iii, pp.169-172.

4. Rot. Parl., VI, p.289.

given the fact that their brothers had disappeared, presumed murdered, and that Tudor's own claim to the throne was so inherently feeble. Henry had married the eldest daughter, Elizabeth, on 18th January 1486, thereby strengthening his own position by attracting Yorkist support, but he had been crowned and recognised as King before the marriage since he had to ensure that he was not seen to base his claims on the rights of his wife. Had Henry VII died young or failed to produce an heir, Edward IV's daughters would doubtless have held significant claims to the English throne, and thus the fate of Elizabeth's four unmarried sisters was of evident concern to the King.' Why Henry passed over two of Catherine's elder sisters, Cecily (born in 1469), and Anne (born in 1475), is a matter for conjecture. Catherine, born in 1479, was aged seven at the time of the 1486 truce, while James Marquis of Ormond, born in March 1476, was aged ten years. Since Cecily had been betrothed to the Duke of Rothesay in 1474 and subsequently offered to the Duke of Albany in 1482, she may conceivably have been overlooked on the grounds of tact. Moreover, Cecily may have been considered unsuitable because of the disparity in their ages; though this did not weigh at a later date in the marriage alliance of Catherine of Aragon and Prince Henry, there had been no alternative bride, and it is clear from the Anglo-Scottish marriage indenture of 1474 that, if it was feasible, monarchs preferred a disparity in ages of less than three or four years. There is no evident reason why Anne was superseded by Catherine; she appears neither to have been sickly nor retarded since she married Thomas Howard, the Earl of Surrey's heir, in February 1495.<sup>2</sup> The involvement of the Marquis of Ormond in an

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1. For Edward IV's daughters see Chrimes, Henry VII, pp.35-36 n.2 ; M. A. Everett Green, Lives of the Princesses of England, vol.III, pp.394-437, vol.IV, pp.1-48.
  2. Macdougall, James III, p.220, wrongly dates the marriage 1475 (the year of her birth).

Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliance rather than his elder brother James Duke of Rothesay has provoked controversy since Dr. Macdougall has suggested that this may possibly indicate that James III "had begun to mistrust his eldest son".<sup>1</sup> Dr. Macdougall is rightly cautious of this hypothesis since there is no real evidence to show that this was indeed the case, but one cannot ignore the King's subsequent conduct or the fact that he appears to have had no other matrimonial alliance in mind for his eldest son and heir.

The Anglo-Scottish truce of 3rd July 1486 was confirmed by Henry VII on the 26th, delivered to the Scots at Berwick parish church on 1st September by Philip Knyghton, and finally ratified by James III on 24th October.<sup>2</sup> Four days after the conclusion of the truce, on 7th July, Henry issued a safe-conduct to various Scottish envoys permitting them to pass between the two realms for one year; this was presumably to facilitate their subsequent negotiations.<sup>3</sup> At some stage in the proceedings the matrimonial alliance was evidently extended to include both the Duke of Rothesay and James III himself; the Scottish monarch was bereaved with the death of Queen Margaret in July 1486.<sup>4</sup> The Anglo-Scottish negotiations which occurred between July 1486 and November 1487 are obscure, but it seems difficult to believe that James III was at first included in any triple matrimonial alliance; perhaps the original idea anticipated matrimony between James III's three sons with three of Edward IV's daughters, while the Scottish monarch was later included after a decent

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1. Ibid., p.218.

2. PRO. E.39/93/10, E.39/2/6, (Bain, 1521, 1524) ; Rot. Scot., II, pp.473-477 ; Foedera, V., pt.iii, pp.169-172, 181 ; Materials, I, pp.572-573 ; MS. Cotton Caligula C.IX, vol.2, ff.390-395, B.L.

3. Rot. Scot., II, p.472, (Bain, 1522).

4. T.A., I, pp.lxiv, 89, 345.



interval of royal mourning.<sup>1</sup>

During the first half of 1487 Henry VII was clearly distracted from Anglo-Scottish relations by the Yorkist machinations based on the imposture of Lambert Simnel. The details of the Simnel conspiracy and Henry's victory at Stoke on 16th June are too well known to merit additional consideration herein, but the events of January to June 1487 provide testimony of the insecurity of the Tudor monarch and of the difficulties experienced in maintaining negotiations with the Scots at such a time.<sup>2</sup> After defeating the rebels, Henry VII made a progress through the northern counties, and it was while he was at Newcastle that he despatched Richard Fox (Bishop of Exeter) and Sir Richard Edgecombe to renew negotiations with the Scots.<sup>3</sup> Vergil observed that it was the King's "great ambition....to be in friendship and peace with neighbouring monarchs, and specially with King James; so that his English subjects, knowing there was no refuge or place of safety for rebels in neighbouring lands, would the more readily be kept in obedience...."<sup>4</sup> It was during this meeting that James III reputedly agreed to a perpetual Anglo-Scottish peace (seven year truces periodically renewed), but while Vergil said nothing about a matrimonial alliance, an aspect of diplomacy rarely discussed by chroniclers, the Anglo-Scottish commissioners evidently met in August 1487; Fox was in Cambridge by 23rd September that year.<sup>5</sup>

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1. cf. Conway, p.10 ; Materials, II, p.120.
  2. eg. M. J. Bennett, Lambert Simnel and the Battle of Stoke, (Gloucester, 1987), and all biographies of Henry VII.
  3. Vergil, p.27 ; Hall, p.436.
  4. Vergil, p.29.
  5. The Register of Richard Fox while Bishop of Bath and Wells, 1492-94, with a Life of Bishop Fox, ed. E. C. Batten, (privately printed, 1889), p.19.

In October 1487, Thomas Lord Dacre, Warden of the West March, and other border officials, were empowered to negotiate with the Scots concerning the fishgarths on the Esk; this manifestation of co-operation was followed, on 7th November, by a commission to Carlisle herald to prolong the Anglo-Scottish truce and negotiate for a matrimonial alliance.<sup>1</sup> An indenture was subsequently sealed on 28th November between the English herald and his Scottish counterpart, Snowdon, in the house of the Blackfriars at Edinburgh.<sup>2</sup> The Anglo-Scottish truce was evidently prolonged from 3rd July 1488 until 1st September 1489, while it was agreed that for "the increasing of mare love and amite...and for the sure obervacion of the trewis", marriages were to be arranged not only between Ormond and Lady Catherine, but also between James III and the Queen Dowager Elizabeth Woodville, and the Duke of Rothesay and "ane" of Edward IV's other daughters.<sup>3</sup> Further meetings were to be held in January, May, and July 1488 to finalise the details of the matrimonial alliances, though there is some evidence that the first meeting did not take place.<sup>4</sup> Clearly jurisdiction over Berwick was the most significant cause of Anglo-Scottish friction, and this issue effectively prevented the consummation of the triple matrimonial alliance; the Scottish parliament instructed their envoys not to proceed with the negotiations unless the English surrendered or destroyed Berwick.<sup>5</sup> In November 1487, the Scots

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1. Rot. Scot., II, pp.479-480 ; PRO. C.82/32, (Bain, 1529).
  2. PRO. E.39/5/2, (Bain, 1530). The MS. is very badly damaged and illegible in parts.
  3. Rot. Scot., II, pp.480-482 ; cf. the brief comments by Alexander Grant in his review of Macdougall, James III, in S.H.R., LXII, 2 no.174 (1983), p.170.
  4. A.P.S., II, pp.181-182 ; Conway, p.11.
  5. Ibid.

stated unequivocally that the alliances were intended to achieve "the finall appeasing and cause of cesing all sic debaitis and controversies as in tyme past has bene for the castell and town of Berwik....of the quhilk....the said King of scottis desiris alwais deliverance at the finale appeasing of the said mariagis or any of thame".<sup>1</sup>

James III and Henry VII were to meet personally in July 1488, "at sic a place as canne be betwix thame agreit", to resolve their differences and discuss "uthir gretir intelligencis for the inccessing of mare lufe, amyte and tendernes".<sup>2</sup> Meetings between the monarchs were planned on various occasions in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, but none of the meetings ever took place; this was ironic in view of the proximity of the two realms and the essentially personal nature of the diplomacy of the period. Yet given the apparently irreconcilable attitudes of English and Scottish monarchs regarding Berwick, it is difficult to perceive what such a meeting realistically might have achieved in 1488.<sup>3</sup> In any case, James III's domestic problems intervened, as domestic dissention was wont to do in the course of Anglo-Scottish relations, and the rebellion against the Scottish monarch, and his subsequent murder at Sauchieburn, brought the diplomatic card-house of the triple matrimonial alliance crashing to the ground.<sup>4</sup>

The triple alliance between James III and two of his sons with Elizabeth Woodville and two of her daughters merits additional comment and scrutiny. James and Henry VII evidently sought a strong bond of a

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1. Rot. Scot., II, pp.480-481.

2. Ibid.

3. see Chapter Two section D ; Macdougall, James III, pp.216-218, 220-221, for the King's attitude concerning Berwick.

4. For Scotland see Macdougall, James III, chs.9-11.

dynastic nature, and the Scottish monarch had previously suggested a double alliance to Edward IV in 1477. There can be little doubt that the marriage of the Marquis of Ormond and Lady Catherine constituted the cornerstone of the triple alliance, and thus Dr. Macdougall has concluded that James III was "deliberately slighting his heir" in favour of his second son.<sup>1</sup> There is much to recommend this suggestion, though, as noted earlier, I would urge caution in view of the paucity of more substantial evidence. Moreover, it is conceivable that Lady Catherine's elder sister, Anne, was the intended bride of the Duke of Rothesay, and, if this was the case, then Dr. Macdougall's argument loses some of its conviction; on the grounds of age, 12 year old Anne probably had the edge over 7 year old Bridget as the proposed spouse of the 14 year old prince.<sup>2</sup>

Without doubt the triple alliance throws light on the later career of the Queen Dowager Elizabeth Woodville. The transfer of her widow's jointure to her daughter Queen Elizabeth in early 1487, and her subsequent retirement to Bermondsey convent with a small annuity, has been cited as evidence that Henry VII disliked his formidable mother-in-law and suspected her of complicity in the Simnel conspiracy.<sup>3</sup> Professor Chrimes, among others, has correctly doubted the tradition on the grounds of lack of evidence.<sup>4</sup> Vergil's suggestion that Henry made her "an

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1. Ibid., p.220 ; cf. L. J. Macfarlane, William Elphinstone and The Kingdom of Scotland 1431-1514, (Aberdeen, 1985), p.142.
  2. Macdougall, James III, p.220.
  3. eg. Busch, pp.35-36 ; Bacon, pp.83-84, popularised the tradition.
  4. Chrimes, Henry VII, p.76 and n.3 ; D. MacGibbon, Elizabeth Woodville (1437-1492) : Her Life and Times, (London, 1938), pp.193-194, 198, 213-221 ; A. Strickland, Lives of the Queens of England, vol.II, (London, 1890), pp.34-35 ; N. H. Nicolas, Privy Purse Expenses of Elizabeth of York, (London, 1830), pp.lxxvii-lxxxI.

example to others to keep faith" because of her reconciliation with Richard III in 1484 is particularly unconvincing and Elizabeth's retirement was probably voluntary.<sup>1</sup> The King's subsequent conduct towards the "right dere and right wel-beloved Quene Elizabeth" provides little evidence of mutual antipathy and appears to disprove any conspiracy theories.<sup>2</sup> It is quite ludicrous to suggest that the insecure and invariably cautious Henry VII would have considered the Queen Dowager's marriage to James III if he even suspected her involvement in a Yorkist plot, and one can only reasonably interpret the triple alliance as testimony of Henry's confidence in Elizabeth Woodville.<sup>3</sup> There can be little doubt that the anticipated match of James III and Elizabeth was potentially explosive; one can only ponder how James might have contended with such a capable and formidable spouse, particularly in view of the fact that her earlier public career had exemplified how a Queen consort ought not to behave.<sup>4</sup>

The period between 1488 and 1493 constitutes the longest phase in Anglo Scottish relations since 1474 during which an Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliance was neither anticipated<sup>n</sup> or negotiated. Domestic events temporarily disrupted the rapprochement as Scotland faced the problems which habitually followed a political<sup>c 's</sup>; fortunately for Scotland, however, James IV was the heir to the throne and so the problems were

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1. Vergil, pp.17-19.
  2. Crimes, Henry VII, p.76 n.3 ; Materials, II, pp.148-149, 225, 273, 296, 322, 555.
  3. cf. C. R. Markham, Richard III, (London, 1906), p.257, talks of Henry's efforts to deal with her because she knew too much (presumably about the fate of her sons).
  4. A. Crawford, 'The King's Burden? - the Consequences of Royal Marriage in Fifteenth Century England', pp.33-56, in Patronage, the Crown etc. p.53. It may be that Elizabeth did not want to marry the Scottish monarch or that James might have desired a younger wife (she was too old to bear children).

less acute than those experienced in England by Edward IV, Richard III, and Henry VII. With hindsight, it is evident that James IV had little to gain and a great deal to lose from any sustained Anglophobe policy, but Henry VII was doubtless concerned that power in Scotland had swung away from the Anglophile faction (with which he maintained an established association).<sup>1</sup> From 1488 to the late 1490's, Anglo-Scottish relations were complex and multi-faceted, and one discerns, for example, maritime conflicts, reciprocal assistance for malcontents and rebels (including Perkin Warbeck), the expulsion of Scots from England, grants of denization to Scots in England, grants of safe-conduct, commissions to regulate border disputes, and Anglo-Scottish truces.

On 12th September 1488, within three months of James IV's succession, Henry VII appointed commissioners to negotiate with the Scots; negotiations were held at Coldstream from 23rd September leading to the conclusion of a three year truce on 5th October, ratified at Westminster on 23rd October.<sup>2</sup> This truce preceded numerous grants of safe-conduct which Henry issued to various Scottish notables and merchants; such grants abound from 1488 to 1491 and suggest that, even when Anglo-Scottish tension was prevalent, co-operation was often also manifest.<sup>3</sup> In late 1489, the two monarchs exchanged gifts.<sup>4</sup> This was probably a conventional diplomatic gesture, but the presence of the Earl of Angus

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1. see Chapter Two, section F.

2. Rot. Scot., II, pp.487-490 ; T.A., I, p.lxxx ; PRO. C.82/45, (Bain, 1545).

3. eg. Rot. Scot., II, pp.490-497 ; PRO. C.82/49, C.82/50, C.82/63, C.82/64, C.82/65, C.82/66, C.82/68, C.82/75, C.82/77, C.82/81, C.82/86 ; (Bain, 1547, 1548, 1550, 1553, 1554, 1555, 1557, 1558, 1561, 1564, 1565, 1567, 1568, 1569, 1574, 1575, 1577) ; Foedera, V., pt.iii, p.198, V., pt.iv, pp.26, 31.

4. T.A., I, p.126 ; PRO. E.405/78 ; Conway, p.32.

and Scottish heralds at Henry VII's court in the early months of 1490 may indicate a reciprocal desire to establish Anglo-Scottish relations on a more substantial foundation.' The Scottish parliamentary initiatives of February 1490 may have resulted in Henry VII's subsequent commissions pertaining to the fishgarths on 4th April and 12th September 1490, and 4th April and 9th May 1491, and his safe-conducts to various Scottish notables in 1490 and 1491.<sup>2</sup> In June 1491, James IV's envoys received a safe-conduct permitting them to travel through England en route to the courts of France and Spain; this embassy was evidently an attempt by the Scots to reactivate the "auld" alliance and to establish the young monarch's interest in a continental matrimonial alliance.<sup>3</sup>

The matrimonial prospects of James IV form an interesting theme during the first half of his reign, and provide substantial evidence of Scotland's growing ambition in continental affairs. As early as October 1488, the Scottish Parliament suggested sending an embassy abroad to find a "nobill prenciss", since James was "of perfitt age to complett the haly band of matrimonze".<sup>4</sup> As Dr. Nicholson has perceived, this was "designed not only to titillate loyalty towards the new King but to serve as [an] excuse for a tax"; the £5,000 contribution was to be paid before 15th January 1489.<sup>5</sup> James utilised his matrimonial prospects "as an asset in internal politics and international diplomacy" for many years;

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1. PRO. E.405/78, m.7, 7v ; MS. Cotton Julius B.XII, ff.64v-66, B.L., printed in Collectanea, IV, pp.256-257.
  2. A.P.S., II, p.220 ; Conway, p.32 ; Rot. Scot., II, pp.493, 496-499 ; PRO. C.82/65, C.82/77, (Bain, 1559, 1561, 1568, 1569) ; PRO. C.82/66, (Bain, 1564).
  3. PRO. C.82/81, (Bain, 1574) ; Rot. Scot., II, pp.499-500.
  4. A.P.S., II, p.207.
  5. Ibid. ; Nicholson, p.534.

he was fortunate in having two surviving younger brothers and thus he was able to dally with a succession of royal mistresses while his envoys tried (and failed) to find him a prestigious continental bride.' While James looked to the royal ladies of France, Spain, and the Empire, there is no evidence that he raised the subject of matrimonial alliance with England during any of the embassies from 1488 to the early 1490's. Possibly an English alliance ran contrary to his personal inclination (understandable in view of the failures of 1474, 1484, and 1487), or contrary to the Anglophobia then prevalent in Scotland. More conceivably, perhaps James was swayed by the glittering prizes of a prestigious foreign alliance at a time when Henry VII could offer no attractive alternative; James was already of age when Margaret Tudor was born in November 1489 and, doubtless, no-one at the time perceived that she would one day marry the Scottish monarch.<sup>2</sup>

The 1488 Anglo-Scottish truce expired on 5th October 1491, but despite the declaration of the English Parliament that open war with the Scots was better than a feigned peace, I maintain that Henry VII's expulsion of Scots from his realm was mainly a precautionary measure for his expedition to France in 1492.<sup>3</sup> In fact, on 22nd October 1491, Henry issued a safe-conduct to various Scottish envoys, and, at the same time, he sought additional assurance by concluding an agreement with the Earl of Angus.<sup>4</sup> Arguably, Henry VII's conciliatory gestures during 1491 had

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1. Nicholson, pp.553-554 ; A.P.S., II, pp.207, 224, 230, 233-234.
  2. Margaret was born on 29th November 1489 ; see Chrimes, Henry VII, p.67 n.3 ; MS. Cotton Julius B.XII, ff.60v-63, B.L., printed in Collectanea, IV, pp.252-254. A. Strickland, Lives of the Queens of Scotland, vol.I, (London, 1850), pp.2-3, suggested that Henry VII and his mother had Margaret christened on St. Andrew's day to conciliate "the national predilections of the Scotch", but this seems unlikely.
  3. Stat. Realm, II, p.553 ; Conway, pp.37-38.
  4. PRO. C.82/86, (Bain, 1577) ; Chapter Two, section F.



been manifest in Edward IV's conduct prior to his expedition to France in 1475.<sup>1</sup> An Anglo-Scottish truce was evidently agreed at Coldstream on 21st December 1491, but difficulties relating to its ratifications have wrongly led to the assumption that James IV was a reluctant participant therein.<sup>2</sup> James ratified the truce on 18th March 1492 until 20th November the same year, while Henry VII evidently issued<sup>d</sup> two ratifications; the one was dated the same as James IV's ratification, while the other, issued on 9th January 1492, ratified the truce for five years to 21st December 1496.<sup>3</sup> The discrepancy is difficult to explain, but presumably Henry either cancelled the first ratification before issuing the second, or he may never have sent the January ratification to Scotland in any case. The fact that the March ratifications were both issued on the same day probably indicates that the two monarchs had agreed beforehand to a short extension of the truce (perhaps to enable their envoys to engage in additional negotiations); conceivably James IV may have favoured diplomatic procrastination while he assessed the impact of Henry's expedition to France on the "auld" alliance. Evidently, concluding that the French were otherwise preoccupied, the Scottish monarch perceived that he had nothing to gain by not extending the truce with the English.<sup>4</sup> On 4th August 1492, Henry VII issued a safe-conduct to the Scottish envoys and on the 22nd of the month he appointed his own commissioners, including the Bishop of St. Asaph and Lord Greystoke, to extend the truce with

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1. Rot. Scot., II, pp.497, 500 ; Chapter Two for 1475.
  2. Rot. Scot., II, pp.503-505 ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, pp.38-40.
  3. Ibid. ; PRO. E.39/64, (Bain, 1580) ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, pp.41-42 ; SRO. SP.6/25.
  4. Charles VIII renewed his treaty with Scotland on 1st October 1491 ; SRO. SP.7/20.

Scotland; James IV responded with his commission on 17th October.<sup>1</sup> Agreement was reached at Coldstream on 3rd November 1492 (coincidentally the same day on which Henry VII and Charles VIII concluded the Anglo-French Treaty of Staples) prolonging the truce until April 1494.<sup>2</sup> Henry VII issued his ratification on 26th January 1493, but the provision in the truce for a further meeting of the Anglo-Scottish commissioners may indicate that some problems remained unresolved.<sup>3</sup>

It was apparently at this stage that Henry VII reinvigorated the concept of an Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliance in an attempt to increase James IV's commitment to their truce. On 28th May 1493, English commissioners were appointed to negotiate a matrimonial alliance between the Scottish monarch and Henry VII's "cousin", the "princess" Catherine (daughter of Alianora Countess of Wiltshire, and granddaughter of Edmund, Duke of Somerset).<sup>4</sup> If possible, the English were to contract matrimony "per verba de presenti", and I would suggest that this demonstrates Henry's concern that the Scots might support the Yorkist malcontents active in the Perkin Warbeck conspiracy. Lady Catherine was hardly an ideal candidate to offer to James as his Queen consort, and evidently Henry VII's good intentions were again undermined by his lack of female relatives; his daughter Margaret was only three at the time. In view of James IV's ambitions in seeking a Spanish or Imperial bride, the English proposition was hardly attractive, and it is not inconceivable that the

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1. PRO. E.39/102/37 ; Rot Scot., II, pp.505-508 ; PRO. E.39/5/15, (Bain, 1585) ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, p.48.
  2. PRO. E.39/99/78, (Bain, 1586) ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, pp.50-51 ; MS. Stowe 501, ff.151-153, B.L.
  3. SRO. SP.6/26.
  4. PRO. C.82/329/70, (Bain, 1588) ; Rot Scot., II, pp.508-509 ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, pp.63-64.

Scottish monarch may have regarded this as a mild insult; nothing more is known about this matrimonial scheme after Henry issued his commission. Of all the Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliances suggested or anticipated from 1474 to 1503 this was possibly the most obscure and certainly the most feeble. However, it bridges the gap between the matrimonial agreements of 1487 and 1502 and provides substantial testimony of Henry VII's insecurity while Perkin Warbeck captivated the western European rulers.<sup>1</sup>

Following the May 1493 commission, on 25th June the Anglo-Scottish truce was extended for seven years to 30th April 1501; this was ratified on 8th and 20th July by Henry and James, respectively.<sup>2</sup> The subsequent payments by Henry VII, manifest in rewards to ambassadors and in compensation to aggrieved Scots, have attracted a measure of criticism, but Miss Conway correctly pointed out that the King's actions were dictated by expediency.<sup>3</sup> On 18th July Henry made arrangements for the exchange of ratifications with James IV and for the payment of 1,000 marks and £50 sterling for damages committed by the English; the Scottish receipts were dated 29th and 31st July.<sup>4</sup> Henry VII also gave generous rewards to various Scots during Michaelmas term 1492-93, such as 200 marks and a gilt cup to the Earl of Angus, and £20 each to various others (including Lord Semple, Sir Robert Carre, and Peter Creighton).<sup>5</sup> The gift to Angus

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1. For Warbeck see Chapter Three, section B.
  2. PRO. C.82/331, E.39/99/72, (Bain, 1590, 1592) ; Rot. Scot., II, pp.509-512 ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, pp.68-70.
  3. Conway, p.40 ; cf. Busch, Henry VII, pp.103-104, and page 198 note 2.
  4. PRO. C.82/329/74, E.39/102/32, E.39/99/54, E.39/99/71, (Bain, 1591, 1595 and App. no.33, 1596, 1597) ; Rot. Scot., II, p.512 ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, pp.70-71.
  5. PRO. E.403/2558, f.38, (Bain, 1584) ; PRO. E.405/78, m.53.

was exceptionally generous even by the standards of ambassadorial rewards, but the circumstances are obscure and the payments cannot be directly linked to any extant Scottish commission. Probably Henry VII was smoothing the way for the diplomatic negotiations in June by purchasing the goodwill of Scottish notables, while the large payment to Angus may have constituted a late reward for the indenture which he had made with the English in November 1491.<sup>1</sup> In addition, Henry paid Dr. Aynesworth 40 marks for his expenses in carrying the remunerations and a letter to Scotland.<sup>2</sup>

In view of James IV's subsequent support for Warbeck and his attacks on northern England in 1496 and 1497, it is easy to argue that Henry VII squandered energy and money on worthless Scottish truces, but when one removes the spectacles of hindsight, it is evident that the King's primary objective was to deny the pretender all potential support. The English monarch could not see into the future and within the two and a half years from June 1493 to November 1495 (when Warbeck was received in Scotland) anything might happen. Warbeck had been expected to invade England during 1493, and in view of the communication between the English rebels in Flanders and Scotland, Henry VII would have been rash to antagonise James IV. Arguably, the sums spent on conciliating the Scots were cheap as the price of dynastic security, no matter how dubious and superficial that security may have been in reality. Moreover, in endeavouring to uncover Scottish duplicity, one ought not to ignore the

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1. see Chapter Two, section F.
  2. PRO. E.403/2558, f.39. In his warrant to the Treasurer for delivery of the £50 and 1,000 marks, dated 6th July 1493, the King declared that "this maye not be failled to be doon with al the diligence that can be ffor the day of payment is at hand and the lak therof at the said day shalbe the breche vndoubtedly of the said trieux and the cause of a playn and expresse warre....that we ne wolde in any wise"  
; PRO. E.404/81, (8 H.VII).

evidence of Anglo-Scottish co-operation on the borders in 1493 and 1494.<sup>1</sup> Safe-conducts to merchants and other Scots were also manifest during 1494 and 1495, and these provide evidence of some stability since they anticipated Anglo-Scottish accord for 6 months to one year in advance; interestingly, some contained the proviso that they were valid only as long as the peace endured.<sup>2</sup> Henry VII evidently seized the opportunity to take defensive precautions, as evinced by the commissions to provide victuals and ordnance for Berwick in November 1494 and March 1495, and the commission of array for the area north of the River Trent on 22nd March.<sup>3</sup> The wisdom of this activity was soon manifest when James IV turned his back on the Anglo-Scottish truce in preference for the dubious opportunity (embodied by the Yorkist pretender) to undermine Henry VII's security.

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1. PRO. C.82/114, (Bain, 1599) ; PRO. E.36/254, ff.1-4, (Bain, 1600 and App. no.34).
  2. eg. PRO. C.82/331, C.82/135, C.82/136, C.82/140, (Bain, 1603, 1612, 1613, 1615, 1614, 1616, 1617, 1619) ; Rot. Scot., II, pp.513-519 ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, pp.73-74 ; SRO. SP.6/27.
  3. C.P.R., 1494-1509, pp.7, 16, 32 ; PRO. C.82/132 ; Bain, 1607, 1608, 1610.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE ANGLO-SCOTTISH MATRIMONIAL ALLIANCES,

1474 - 1503, PART II

THE THISTLE AND THE ROSE, 1496 - 1503

On 5th May 1496, Henry VII appointed Richard Fox Bishop of Durham, William Sever Bishop of Carlisle, and Thomas Howard Earl of Surrey, to negotiate for a marriage alliance between his six year old daughter Margaret and twenty three year old James IV.<sup>1</sup> Additional commissions were issued to the same effect on 23rd June and 2nd September, and the three English initiatives doubtless indicate Henry's insecurity during the first year of Perkin Warbeck's sojourn in Scotland.<sup>2</sup> The Anglo-Scottish negotiations evidently took place at Berwick, but Lord Bothwell had informed the English monarch unequivocally that James was "in no wyse....inclinitt to ye gud of peax nor amyte" unless "he myt haue sic things concludit as my Lord of Duresme com for".<sup>3</sup>

The Anglo-Scottish conflict of 1496 to 1497 effectively undermined diplomatic initiatives until early July 1497 when Bishop Fox received his

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1. PRO. C.82/148, (Bain, 1622) ; Rot. Scot., II, p.520 ; C.S.P. Spanish, I, 121, p.85.
  2. Rot. Scot., II, pp.521-522 ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, pp.80, 106 (the June commission is misdated 1495).
  3. MS. Cotton Vespasian C.XVI, ff.154, 156, B.L. ; Ellis, Letters, I, (1st ser.), pp.22-32 ; Pollard, Sources, I, pp.136-143 ; Pinkerton, II, pp.438-443 ; cf. R. L. Mackie, James IV, p.83 n.3.

famous instructions from Henry VII for an embassy to James IV.<sup>1</sup> This initiative was followed by the appointment of Henry's special envoys, including the Bishop of Carlisle, Dacre, Warham, and Wyatt, on 5th September, and by the issue of a safe-conduct on 16th September; there is some evidence of Wyatt's presence in Scotland later that month, while the commission to the Scottish envoys was dated 17th September.<sup>2</sup> The seven years' truce, concluded at Ayton on 30th September 1497, owed much to the patient diplomacy of Pedro de Ayala, Ferdinand's ambassador to the English and Scottish courts.<sup>3</sup> With this truce, the reinvigoration of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy led to a series of negotiations which were to culminate in the matrimonial alliance of 1502-1503. In October, Henry VII informed Waterford of the conclusion of the Anglo-Scottish truce and he stated that James intended to send him "a great and solemn ambassady for a league and peace to be had during both o r lives".<sup>4</sup> Ayala and Lyon Herald evidently carried a commission to this effect when they arrived in London with the Scottish ratification on 25th November, and, on 1st December, Warham was empowered to negotiate on Henry's behalf.<sup>5</sup> The Anglo-Scottish truce was extended, on 5th December, until one year after the death of the longest surviving monarch, and ratified by Henry VII on

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1. PRO. SP.58, ff.108-111v, no.22.
2. PRO. C.82/168, (Bain, 1636) ; Rot. Scot., II, pp.524-525, ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, pp.118-119 ; T.A., I, p.357.
3. Rot. Scot., II, pp.526-530 ; Trevisan, Italian Relation, pp.13-14 ; Vergil, pp.101-103, a masterpiece of blatant contradiction even by Vergil's standards (cf. "impartial mediator", "quickly debated", "protracted discussions", etc.). Ayala became Archdeacon of London and a Canon of St. Paul's in September 1502 ; C.P.R., 1494-1509, p.299.
4. Halliwell, Letters, I, pp.175-178 ; Pollard, Sources, I, pp.173-176 ; Cal. Carew MSS. vol.5, Book of Howth, R.S. (1871), pp.468-469.
5. C.S.P. Milanese, I, 549, pp.332-333 ; Conway, p.115.

the following day.<sup>1</sup> Subsequently, on 12th December, the English monarch appointed his councillor Dr. Robert Middleton as his special plenipotentiary to negotiate with the Scots, and, on the 13th, he agreed to the arbitration of Ferdinand and Isabella in all disputes pertaining to the Anglo-Scottish truce.<sup>2</sup> Henry's undated instructions to Norroy Herald were probably issued about this time, and may be cited as testimony of the King's prevailing dissatisfaction with the truce.<sup>3</sup> However, the instructions also reveal Henry VII's grasp of detail and his perception of the issues which threatened to undermine the accord with James IV.

Norroy was instructed to thank James for his "kynde and louyng lettres" and the ratification carried by Lyon Herald, but he was to stress that the English thought that the fourth article was of insufficient "force and strength". The sixth article, which pertained to the assistance given to malcontents and rebels, contained, in Henry's words, a "coloure of contradiccion", and the King desired to clarify the ambiguity. Henry VII was particularly anxious to excise reference to Warbeck's Scottish safe-conduct "to thentent that betwen the Kyng and his seid Cosyn ther shuld be no gruge nor colour of gruge". The English King explained that he had no wish to see crimes go unpunished because of "any darke or obscure wordes" in the truce, but that Norroy might accept either the original or the amended ratification as "best pleased and contented" the Scottish monarch. The herald was instructed to "endeavour hym self in as good maner and by as good reasons as he can" to "move and enduce" James to accept the alterations, but, if his efforts were

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1. Rot. Scot., II, pp.526-530 ; C.S.P. Milanese, I, 550, p.335 ; Chronicles of London, p.222, for Henry's proclamation.
  2. PRO. C.82/171, (Bain, 1639, 1640) ; Rot. Scot., II, pp.525-526.
  3. For the following see MS. Cotton Vespasian C.XVI, ff.118-119v, B.L. ; Conway, App. L., pp.242-244, 115-116.



unsuccessful, then he was to deliver an exact replica of the Scottish letters patent which Lyon Herald had conveyed to London.

Although diplomatic details were clearly important, one ought never to underestimate the significance of prevailing attitudes and climates of opinion in any relationship. If Anglo-Scottish relations degenerated to a situation of reciprocal recrimination, and both parties chose to ignore the established machinery by falling back on traditional antipathies, then clearly the diplomatic details were irrelevant; one thinks, for example, of the difficulties which arose in 1511 when Henry VIII refused to utilise the provisions of the Anglo-Scottish truce in dealing with the Bartons.<sup>1</sup> Contrariwise, if co-operation and conciliation prevailed, the fact that both sides broke the letter of their truces - as evinced by the support given to malcontents and rebels - generally provided insufficient justification for the outbreak of hostilities. Henry VII's evident concern in Norroy's instructions was to prevent the Scots assisting his rebel subjects in future, while James IV was clearly satisfied with the existing provisions and sought to keep his options open concerning his future conduct. On 12th February 1498, two days after James IV ratified the Ayton truce, Norroy Herald and Warham received £16.13s.4d. reward, and Warham appears to have returned to London with the document in March.<sup>2</sup>

Ayala, "the intimate eye-witness" of the Ayton deliberations, declared that, although James IV decided nothing without first consulting his councillors, "in great matters he acts according to his own judgment, and, in my opinion, he generally makes a right decision".<sup>3</sup> The Spaniard

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1. see Chapter Two, section E.
  2. T.A., I, p.377 ; PRO. E.39/2/4, (Bain, 1644) ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, pp.120-123 ; Rot. Scot., II, pp.526-530 ; C.S.P. Milanese, I, 557, p.342.
  3. Conway, p.116 ; C.S.P. Spanish, I, 210, p.170 ; Early Travellers, p.41.

recognized his influence "in the conclusion of the last peace, which was made against the wishes of the majority in his kingdom".<sup>1</sup> The significance of the Anglo-Scottish truce of Ayton has provoked a measure of debate among some authorities, but much of the recent emphasis on novelty is quite unwarranted; there had been compromise many times since the 1470's, and there was no novelty whatsoever in the concept of an Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliance.<sup>2</sup> The match between Margaret Tudor and James IV, though first raised in 1496, was a subject of serious negotiation from 1499, and constituted the ninth attempt since 1474 to conclude an Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliance.<sup>3</sup> The reasons for the consummation of this alliance are of particular interest and merit additional scrutiny. Evidently the circumstances were favourable, since recent efforts maintained the concept in the minds of successive monarchs and their subjects, while both James IV and Henry VII desired to concentrate their energies and activities on the perennial domestic problems, finance, the nobility, regional discontent, and dynastic inequity. External influences were also significant; the French, for example, placed no formidable obstacles in James IV's path, and the Papacy, various powers of the Italian peninsula, and the Catholic monarchs of Spain, were favourably disposed and actively cultivated the match. The Italian Wars, from 1494, and the impact of the Holy League cast powerful shadows, while Henry VII began to experience the benefits of the Anglo-Spanish Treaty of Medina del Campo. In this respect, one cannot divorce analysis of Anglo-Scottish relations from the important events which shaped and coloured contemporary continental politics, particularly since Perkin Warbeck's

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1. Ibid.

2. cf. Conway, p.116 ; Coleman thesis, p.75.

3. see Chapter Four.

impotence had focused continental eyes on the relationship between the  
old enemies.

On 25th July 1498, Ayala informed Ferdinand and Isabella that the  
task of concluding an Anglo-Scottish peace was very difficult on account  
of their traditional enmity; peace prevailed only because of the influence  
of Spain.<sup>1</sup> Ayala had told Henry VII that, as the Spaniards perceived a  
marriage alliance was necessary to preserve the accord, he had been  
instructed to speedily conclude an Anglo-Scottish marriage if negotia-  
tions were pending. This information had evidently pleased Henry judging  
by Ayala's description of his reaction, but he further reported that the  
English monarch had expressed his regret that he had no suitable  
daughter or sister to offer to James IV. Because of Margaret's youth and  
delicate constitution there were "many inconveniences" why she might not  
be proffered as a bride, and, besides Henry VII's personal doubts, his  
wife and mother were also "very much against this marriage". If, however,  
Ferdinand and Isabella married a Spanish Infanta to James IV, Henry  
declared that they would acquire considerable influence and would "be able  
always to preserve peace, which otherwise would not last a single year,  
the dispositions of the English and Scots being so averse from it".

It may well be that Henry VII was reluctant to marry Margaret to  
James IV in 1498, but he had evidently proposed the alliance himself in  
1496 - perhaps as a measure of desperation, at the behest of Ferdinand -  
and he overcame his doubts and scruples by 1499. Ayala agreed that  
Margaret was very young and small for her age, and his considered  
opinion was that the Anglo-Scottish peace might only be secured by  
marrying the Infanta Maria to James IV; some Englishmen, however, were

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1. C.S.P. Spanish, I, 210, esp. pp.168, 175-176, 178-179, for what  
follows.

jealous at the prospect of the Scots enjoying the same honour as themselves. Ayala stated that he intended to remain in England, on some pretext, to give Ferdinand and Isabella valuable time to reconsider the entire matter. He doubted that his capable sovereigns had dealt with Scotland with sufficient caution, as James IV now expected the hand of one of their daughters, and, since no Infanta was available, this would have adverse repercussions on their relations with the Scots. The key to this observation lay in the continental diplomacy of the 1490's.

The matrimonial ambitions of James IV indirectly benefited from Franco-Spanish rivalry in the Italian peninsula since Ferdinand and Isabella cultivated the support of both James and Henry VII and sought to undermine the "Auld" Alliance lest the English were too preoccupied with their Franco-Scottish enemies to support the Franco-Scottish Holy League.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the Catholic monarchs evidently tried to exploit the desire of English and Scottish Kings for a Spanish matrimonial alliance to exert an influence over their activities. In 1489, the Spanish envoys had been reproached by their sovereigns for offering Ferdinand's illegitimate daughter to the Scots by pretending that she was the legitimate offspring of a secret marriage.<sup>2</sup> This offer captured Scottish imaginations and influenced subsequent events for, although Ferdinand and Isabella stated unequivocally that they had no intention of marrying a legitimate Infanta to James IV, they deliberately sought to undermine the "Auld" alliance by deluding the Scottish monarch with false hopes; James was to be promised a Spanish Infanta if he persuaded Charles VIII to restore Roussillon and Cerdagne to them.<sup>3</sup> This apparent concession was intended to inveigle

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1. Ibid., introduction, esp. pp.lx-lxxxix.

2. Ibid., 41, pp 26-27.

3. Ibid

the Scots in "unpleasant negotiations" which might cause them to quarrel with France, and it deluded James IV for many years during the 1490's. The desire to win James and Henry as allies in the Holy League, and the aspiration to strengthen Henry's security before concluding an Anglo-Spanish matrimonial alliance, clearly motivated Ferdinand and Isabella to interfere in Anglo-Scottish relations.<sup>1</sup> However, even their considerable powers of manipulation were insufficient in controlling the complex conflict of interests which subsequently prevailed.

On 26th April 1496, the Spanish monarchs informed De Puebla, their ambassador in England, that although no Spanish Infanta was available, they intended to delude James IV's matrimonial ambitions while encouraging Henry VII to marry one of his daughters to the Scots.<sup>2</sup> Consequently, in January 1497, though the treaty for the marriage of Prince Arthur and Catherine of Aragon had been ratified, the Scots apparently believed that the same princess was to be married to James IV.<sup>3</sup> From 1496, Ferdinand and Isabella promoted an Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliance, while Henry VII's preference for a Spanish bride for James was well known in diplomatic circles; in November 1498, the Milanese ambassador in England informed Duke Ludovico that Henry favoured a Danish alliance for his daughter Margaret, not only because of the age of the parties concerned but also because England feared Denmark more than Scotland.<sup>4</sup> One cannot reasonably doubt Henry VII's evident reluctance

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1. Ibid., docs., 97, 98, 103, 106, 107, 112-113, 117, 121, 125, 128, 130, 132-133, 135-137, 142-143, 146, 150, 154, 157-158, 160, 170, 172, 175, 190, 197, 202-204, 206-207, 210-211, 221, 236, 239, 242, 244, 249, 257-258, 260, 268, 292.

2. Ibid., 132, esp. pp.96-98.

3. Ibid., pp.lxxx-lxxx1, 132-137.

4. C.S.P. Milanese, I, 593, pp.357-358 ; C.S.P. Venetian, I, 776, pp.274-275.

to marry Margaret to James, and thus it is important to perceive the significance of domestic considerations, of the antecedent Anglo-Scottish alliances from 1474, and of the favourable disposition of the continental powers, in influencing the outcome of events. The latter aspect was particularly important, and it is perhaps ironic that when the continental powers again interfered in Anglo-Scottish relations, in 1512 and 1513, they successfully revived hostility between the "auld" enemies.'

Traditionally, the affray at Norham castle in 1498 has been considered to be a momentous event in Anglo-Scottish relations<sup>2</sup> At the subsequent meeting between James IV and Bishop Fox at Melrose abbey in November 1498, Polydore Vergil described how the King first broached the subject of a matrimonial alliance:-

"He thereupon explained that it was his dearest wish to have as his wife Henry's daughter, Margaret by name, and that, if he were assured that Henry would not be opposed to the match, he would at once by an embassy seek the maiden's hand in marriage....Although Richard could not give a categorical answer to the question....he gave the young monarch hope of its success....and freely promised his own good offices..."<sup>3</sup>

The suggestion that James IV first raised the subject of an Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliance is of course highly misleading, and, if Richard Fox provided Vergil's information, one may perhaps infer that the chronicler allowed dynastic propaganda to displace factual accuracy. The alliance was typical of the dynastic matrimonial alliances of the time, and it is most unlikely that James dearly wished to marry a young girl

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1. see Chapter Three, section D.
  2. H. E. H. Jerningham, 'An Affray at Norham Castle, and its Influence on Scotch and English History', Scottish Antiquary, or Northern Notes and Queries, XV (1901), pp.179-188, (dated and to be read with caution) ; Vergil, pp.111-115 ; Buchanan, 2, pp.238-239 ; Lesley, pp.116-117.
  3. Vergil, p.113.

whom he had never seen, particularly given his predilection for a Spanish Infanta.' It is not inconceivable that Ayala may have persuaded James to broach the subject at Melrose, but Vergil placed a propagandist gloss on his account; evidently the intention was to elevate the prestige of the Tudor dynasty in continental eyes by suggesting that other monarchs were anxious to have Henry VII as their ally.

For some reason the Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliance was not discussed by Henry VII and James IV for almost a year and there is an extreme paucity of their diplomatic correspondence during 1498. Possibly the delay lay in James IV's continued preference for a Spanish bride, in some obscure English negotiations for an alliance with Denmark, in English or Scottish domestic opposition, or in a combination of these aspects. The opposition of Henry VII's wife, mother, and councillors, to the match was well known, but the King was probably personally reluctant to marry his young and frail daughter to a man "sa fer out of reason, and sa litill inclinitt to gudnes, bot all to traublen and cruelte without his wilbe fulfillit in all pounctis" (as Bothwell had described James).<sup>2</sup> It is likely that Henry VII overcame self-doubt and opposition in royal household and council chamber, in late 1498 and early 1499, possibly under pressure from the Spanish monarchs, and on account of the imposture of Ralph Wilford (another aspiring 'Earl of Warwick') and the continued machinations of Yorkist sympathisers to free Warbeck and Warwick from the Tower.<sup>3</sup> The Parliamentary opposition of 1504, when a young Thomas

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1. cf. C S P. Spanish, I, 239, pp.205-207.
  2. MS. Cotton Vespasian C.XVI, f.154v, B.L., and see page 200 note 3 for reference to printed editions. Conciliar opposition is discussed in Chapter Four.
  3. eg. Chrimes, Henry VII, p.92 ; Busch, Henry VII, p.121 ; Storey, Henry VII, pp.86-87 ; 53rd Annual Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records, (1892), App. II, pp.30-36.

More was said to have marshalled the Commons to petition Henry VII to accept £40,000 rather than the "two reasonable Aides" which he had requested, cannot reasonably be cited as testimony of English opposition to the 1503 Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliance.<sup>1</sup> The King's subjects were evidently motivated by opposition to Henry's attempts to exploit ancient prerogative rights and to investigate the subject of tenures.<sup>2</sup>

On 28th June 1499, Henry VII ordered that a safe-conduct be issued to the Scots coming on an "honorable embassy" to negotiate for a matrimonial alliance, and a warrant to this effect was issued on 2nd July.<sup>3</sup> On 12th July, at Stirling, the Anglo-Scottish truce was reaffirmed, being ratified by James on 20th July and by Henry on 8th September.<sup>4</sup> Commissions and safe-conducts continued to be granted, as evinced by Andrew Forman's safe-conduct of 1st August, and Richard Fox's commission of 11th September.<sup>5</sup> The contents of the Anglo-Scottish meetings are quite obscure, but on 16th December, the Archbishop of Glasgow, Forman, and

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1. cf. R. L. Mackie, James IV, p.93 ; Coleman thesis, p.81 ; J. D. Mackie review in S.H.R., XXXVIII (1959), p.135 ; Rot. Parl., VI, pp.532-542 ; see the biographies of More by Nicholas Harpsfield, William Roper, and Ro Ba, ed. E. V. Hitchcock, E.E.T.S. (o.s.), 186 pp.14-17, 308-310, 197, pp.7-8, 110, 222, pp.27-28, 152, 279, (London, 1932, 1935, 1950) ; Thomas Stapleton's biography, ed. E. E. Reynolds, (London, 1966), p.25.
  2. Chrimes, Henry VII, pp.200-201 ; cf. Life and Writings of Sir Thomas More, T. E. Bridgett, (London, 1891), pp.41-42 ; E. M. G. Routh, Sir Thomas More and his Friends, 1477-1535, (London, 1934), p.25, n.2 ; A. Cecil, A Portrait of Thomas More, Scholar, Statesman, Saint, (London, 1937), pp.64-66 ; R. W. Chambers, Thomas More, (Brighton, 1982), pp.87-88, 97-98 ; R. Marius, Thomas More ; A Biography, (London, 1985), pp.50-51.
  3. PRO. C.82/332, (Bain, 1653, 1654) ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, p.139.
  4. PRO. E.39/5/22, (Bain, 1655) ; PRO. C.82/331, (Bain, 1657) ; Rot. Scot., II, pp.539-542 ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, pp.140-142 ; SRO. SP.6/28.
  5. PRO. C.82/332, (Bain, 1656, 1658) ; Rot. Scot., II, pp.537-538, 542 ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, p.143 ; PRO. E.101/414/16, f.75, for details of Henry VII's rewards and expenses.



Bothwell, among others, received an English safe-conduct, and on 6th July 1500, the Bishop of Carlisle, Darcy, Cholmley, Cartington, and Hatton, were appointed to settle border disputes with the Scottish commissioners.<sup>1</sup>

The activities of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy are manifest in the extant financial records of both realms, while the matrimonial negotiations were discussed by the foreigners who came in contact with the English court.<sup>2</sup>

The confusion and contradiction evident in the correspondence of the contemporary continental observers was doubtless partly explicable by the protracted nature of the negotiations, and partly by the rivalry of Ferdinand's resident ambassadors Ayala and De Puebla.<sup>3</sup>

On 11th January 1500, De Puebla informed the Spanish monarchs that, contrary to English fears, James IV was willing to wait four or five years until Margaret Tudor was of marriageable age (an enormous obstacle to this alliance from the outset), but that the dowry constituted a problem; James expected the dowry which a Spanish Infanta might have brought, whereas Henry VII had offered less than half of the anticipated sum.<sup>4</sup> Despite the prevalence of rumours about a marriage alliance between James IV and Maximilian's daughter, De Puebla stressed that alliances rarely faltered over the dowry, and that if Ferdinand wrote to James and Henry, the match was readily attainable.<sup>5</sup> On 4th April 1500,

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1. PRO. C.82/332, (Bain, 1660) ; PRO. C.82/206, (Bain, 1664) ; Rot. Scot., II, p.543.
  2. eg. I.A., I and II, passim ; MS. Additional 7099, B.L. ; MS. Additional 21480, B.L. ; MS. Additional 59899, B.L. ; PRO. E.101/414/16 ; PRO. E.403/2558 ; PRO. E.101/415/3 ; PRO. E.101/414/6 ; C.S.P. Spanish, I, pp.93-266 ; C.S.P. Milanese, I, pp.332-365 ; C.S.P. Venetian, I, pp.263-293.
  3. eg. cf. C.S.P. Spanish, I, pp.190-191, 205-207, 210, xix-xxxii.
  4. Ibid., 249, pp.213-214 ; L. & P. R.III and H.VII, I, pp.113-115. De Puebla's figures appear unreliable.
  5. Ibid.

the more cautious Ayala mentioned that both Maximilian and the French monarch were contemplating Scottish matrimonial alliances and opined that an Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliance had very little prospect of success.<sup>1</sup> De Puebla then informed his sovereigns on 16th June that the Anglo-Scottish alliance had been concluded, and that Henry VII was aware of their desire to include James IV in the Anglo-Spanish alliance; in reality, Anglo-Scottish embassies continued throughout the following year, and Ferdinand and Isabella were doubtless bewildered by their ambassadors' blatant contradictions.<sup>2</sup> However, on 28th July 1500, Henry VII obtained the Papal dispensation necessary for the Anglo-Scottish alliance since James and Margaret were related within the forbidden degree of consanguinity; their great-great-grandfather was John Beaufort, Marquis of Dorset.<sup>3</sup> The arrival of this document probably indicated that the negotiations were proceeding apace with some measure of compromise and goodwill.

On 9th May 1501, Henry issued a safe-conduct, for eight months, to the Archbishop of Glasgow, Forman, and Bothwell, and, on 8th October, James IV commissioned these notables to negotiate for a perpetual peace with Henry VII, and to contract marriage in his name with Princess Margaret.<sup>4</sup> The slow progress of the negotiations probably does not indicate any reluctance to conclude a matrimonial alliance; James IV had clearly procrastinated for a time in the hope of attaining a more

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1. Ibid., 260, pp.218-219.
  2. Ibid., 268, pp.225, 228.
  3. Foedera, V., pt.iv, p.157 ; R. L. Mackie, James IV, pp.93-94 ; PRO. SC.7/4/8, and PRO. SC.7/5/1. (damaged).
  4. PRO. C.82/218, (Bain, 1670) ; PRO. E.39/27, (Bain, 1675) ; PRO. E.39/92/2, (Bain, 1676) ; Foedera, V. pt.iv, pp.159-160, 161-162 ; SRO. GD.249/2/3 ; R.M.S., II, 1424-1513, 2602-2604, pp.553-554.

prestigious continental alliance, but this was probably not the case by 1501. By this time, the concept of a matrimonial alliance had shaped and influenced Anglo-Scottish relations since 1474, and, in view of Margaret's age, 1503 was the earliest feasible date for the consummation of any marriage alliance. In addition, R. L. Mackie speculated that James had to "set his own house in order" by making provision for his illegitimate children and his current paramour Lady Janet Kennedy; the latter was installed in Darnaway castle, conveniently close to St. Duthac's shrine in Tain for the royal pilgrimages.<sup>1</sup>

On 28th October, a further safe-conduct was issued to the Archbishop of Glasgow and his colleagues, although they had been expected earlier; on 26th July, Henry VII had warned the York *authorities* of the imminent arrival of a Scottish embassy coming to conclude the perpetual peace and matrimonial alliance for which James IV "hath long sued unto us".<sup>2</sup> This alliance would, the King declared, "sowneth to the gret honour not oonly of us but also of this our reame and thuniversall weell and restfulnes of the same", and therefore the city officials were instructed to offer the ambassadors gifts, services, and honourable assistance.<sup>3</sup> On 13th October, it was agreed that the Mayor and six Aldermen in scarlet, with the Sheriffs and eight of the Twenty-four in crimson, would attend the Scottish ambassadors in St. Mary's Abbey, and "present theym with gret pykez, swanez, bremez and tenchez, mayn bred, rede wyn and swet wyn in silver pottez, perez and a covered basyn full of gret cumfetts".<sup>4</sup> Evidently the reception impressed the Scots for on 7th February 1502,

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1. R. L. Mackie, James IV, p.94.
  2. Foedera, V. pt.iv, p.163 ; Y.C.R., II, pp.167-168.
  3. Y.C.R., II, pp.167-168.
  4. Ibid., pp.168-169.

the Mayor read out the King's letter lauding their efforts and "desiryng to make theym semblable chere in theyr comyng homeward".<sup>1</sup>

The Scottish ambassadors entered London in November amidst celebrations for the marriage of Prince Arthur and Catherine of Aragon which had occurred on the 14th of the month. They arrived at Bishopsgate and rode to "Seynt Johannes without Smithfeld" via Cornhill and Chepe, accompanied by Lords and "many wele apparayled gentilmen".<sup>2</sup> The prevailing atmosphere of celebration doubtless fostered a convivial climate, and the Scottish ambassadors participated in the splendours of court ceremonial, attending tournaments by day, and disguisings and "noble and costious bankettes" in the evenings.<sup>3</sup> On 28th November, Henry VII commissioned Henry Archbishop of Canterbury, Fox (now Bishop of Winchester), and the Earl of Surrey, to negotiate with the Scots in all matters pertaining to the matrimonial alliance, including the ratification of the Papal Bull.<sup>4</sup> During Christmas week the Mayor of London entertained the Scottish ambassadors at a banquet attended by the Chancellor and other notables, at which the Archbishop of Glasgow's servant - almost certainly William Dunbar - composed and read a ballad in praise of London, "the fflour of Cities all".<sup>5</sup> Henry VII rewarded the "rymer of Scotland" with £6.13s.4d. in December; there may have been a repeat

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1. Ibid., p.172.
  2. Chronicles of London, p.252.
  3. Ibid., pp.252-253 (and pp.234-252 for the Anglo-Spanish alliance).
  4. PRO. C.82/225, (Bain, 1678) ; SRO. GD.249/2/3 (incorrectly attributed to temp. James V in the inventory of the Haddington muniments).
  5. Chronicles of London, pp.253-255 ; The Great Chronicle of London, pp.316-317 ; R. L. Mackie, James IV, pp.96, 281-282 ; MS. Lansdowne 762, ff.7v-8v, B.L.

performance in January as the "rymer" received another payment that month.<sup>1</sup>

Thanks to the convivial atmosphere, the Anglo-Scottish commissioners quickly got down to serious discussion, and on 24th January 1502, they concluded three agreements; a matrimonial alliance, a treaty of perpetual peace, and a treaty pertaining to the efficient administration of the Borders.<sup>2</sup> The latter agreement included many sensible regulations for the resolution of perennial Border disputes, and the indenture embodied the idea that infractions on the marches were resolvable by recourse to an established machinery which was continually improved through experience. The treaty of perpetual peace - which included the neutrality of Berwick - was to be ratified within three months of the Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliance, and it is the marriage treaty which merits attention herein.<sup>3</sup> The Princess was to be conveyed, at her father's expense, to Lamberton Kirk by 1st September 1503, and the marriage was to be solemnised within fifteen days of that date. James IV was to endow Margaret, on or by 1st July 1503, with a marriage portion of £2,000 sterling (or £6,000 Scots) per annum, with an additional sum of £1,000 Scots or 500 marks sterling per annum at her disposal. Twenty four of her attendants were to be English. In return, Henry VII agreed to pay a dowry of 30,000 gold "angell nobillis", 10,000 within six days of the marriage, and the remainder over the following two years; if the Princess died, James was to retain the sums already paid.

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1. MS. Additional 7099, ff.71-72, B.L. (Excerpta Historica, p.126) ; PRO. E.101/415/3, ff.77v, 81, (31st December and 27th January).
  2. PRO. E.39/92/18, E.39/92/12, E.39/93/12, (Bain, 1680-1682) ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, pp.165-172 ; SRO. SP.6/29 and 30.
  3. For the following see PRO. E.39/92/18, (Bain, 1680) ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, pp.165-167 ; MS. Harleian 292, f.126v, B.L.

On 25th January 1502, in Richmond palace, the young princess, in the presence of the King and Queen and various notables, "wittandly and of deliberate mind, haveing 12 yeares compleat in Age in the moneth of November" pledged herself to James IV.<sup>1</sup> Patrick Earl of Bothwell, as proxy for his sovereign, in turn, took the princess as his bride forsaking all others. Having made these declarations, the trumpeters and minstrels played "in the best and most joyfullest manner", the King dined with the Scottish ambassadors, and jousting, a banquet, and disguisings followed; the typical manifestations of early sixteenth century court ceremonial and celebration.<sup>2</sup> In addition, there were exchanges of gifts, and Henry VII displayed magnificent generosity even by his own standards; the Archbishop of Glasgow and Bothwell both received a cupboard including a gold cup, six silver pots, twenty four silver bowls, and a silver basin, ewer, and chasoir.<sup>3</sup> Forman received a gold cup and 1,000 gold crowns in a velvet bag, while the other gentlemen were given splendid velvet gowns, and these gifts provide ample testimony of Henry VII's pleasure at the conclusion of the Anglo-Scottish accord.<sup>4</sup> On the same day, 25th January, the alliance was formally proclaimed by a preacher at St. Paul's cross, and a Te Deum was "solempnely songen" within the cathedral.<sup>5</sup> On the following afternoon, ten or twelve "greate ffires" were lit throughout the City, at each of which a "hoggeshead" of

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1. Collectanea, IV, pp.258-264, esp. pp.261-262 ; for damaged and incomplete copies see PRO. SP.58, ff.122-124, and MS. Harleian 289, ff.12-12v, B.L. ; Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Edinburgh, 1403-1528, ed. J. D. Marwick, (Edinburgh, 1869), pp.93-94.
  2. Collectanea, IV, pp.262-264.
  3. Ibid., p.264.
  4. Ibid.
  5. Chronicles of London, p.255.

wine was provided; "the which wyne was not longe in drynkyng".<sup>1</sup> The celebrations have been cited as evidence that Londoners welcomed the prospect of perpetual peace with the Scots, but while they may have been tired of financing Anglo-Scottish conflicts, it is clear that most of the King's subjects continued to perceive of the Scots as their traditional enemies.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, unless popular opinion found unequivocal expression in revolt against unpopular royal policies, there is no evidence that it had any influence on Anglo-Scottish monarchs; Anglo-Scottish accord was mainly a consequence of prudent pragmatism based on more than two centuries of practical experience, and of dynastic considerations. It is likely that the popular celebrations in 1502 owed more to the free wine, the convivial atmosphere caused by two recent royal marriages, and to a certain 'national' pride that England was considered to be a prestigious partner by other ruling monarchs; of these, the free wine was probably the single most important reason. Henry VII's delight was, on the other hand, based on more tangible foundations, since, as Vergil observed, he hoped "that he would thereafter shut off all refuge in Scotland from any of his rebellious subjects".<sup>3</sup> Arguably, for an insecure monarch, plagued by a succession of pretenders and malcontents, this was the *raison d'être* of the Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliance.

Francis Bacon, writing within twenty years of the Union of the Crowns, suggested that popular rejoicing was a manifestation of some "secret instinct and inspiring (which many times runneth not only in the

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1. Ibid., for the Anglo-Scottish peace cf. Six Town Chronicles of England, ed. R. Flenley, (Oxford, 1911), pp.175, 188-189 ; Fabyan's New Chronicles, II, ed. Ellis, p.687 ; Greyfriars Chronicle, C.S., ed. pp.27-28, R.S. ed., pp.184-185. Contemporaries displayed much more interest in the Spanish alliance.
  2. cf. Coleman thesis, p.86.
  3. Vergil, pp.121-123.

hearts of princes but in the pulse and veins of people) touching the happiness thereby to ensue in time to come".<sup>1</sup> This is, of course, nonsensical, and R. L. Mackie has correctly observed that what contemporaries welcomed in 1502 was "the immediate elimination of every possible cause of war between them"; one might qualify this assessment somewhat by adding, as far as this was possible at any time in view of the tradition of Anglo-Scottish antipathy and the evident failure of the agreement to resolve the inherent incompatibility between the Anglo-Scottish and Franco-Scottish alliances.<sup>2</sup>

One cannot reasonably doubt that the Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Spanish matrimonial alliances of 1501-1502 represented the zenith of Henry VII's diplomatic success; the King was prosperous, "secured by the amity of Scotland; strengthened by that of Spain; cherished by that of Burgundy; all domestic troubles quenched; and all noise of war (like a thunder afar off) going upon Italy".<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately, this security prevailed for a very short time indeed; within less than three months, the death of Henry's heir-apparent Prince Arthur, on 2nd April, brought the achievement into considerable disarray. And thus the hard-working Tudor, instead of sitting back during what proved to be his sunset years, had to work harder still to reconstruct a new diplomatic system. That he managed to do so by 1507 is remarkable. In that year, informing the Mayor and Aldermen of London of the matrimonial alliance anticipated between Princess Mary and the Prince of Castile, Henry declared that:-

"by meane thereof and thother aliaunce which wee  
haue with our good sonne the King of Scots, this  
our Realme is nowe enviroind and in manner closed

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1. Bacon, p.220.
  2. R. L. Mackie, James IV, p.98.
  3. Bacon, p.221.



on every side with such mighty princes, our good  
sonns freinds confederates and alies that by the  
helpe of our Lord the same is and shalbe  
perpetually established in Rest and peace, and  
welthy condicion to our great honour and  
pleasure...."<sup>1</sup>

The treaty of 1502 has attracted considerable attention, since it is traditionally regarded as being one of the four or five greatest achievements of Henry VII's reign. It was the first perpetual treaty, as opposed to a temporary truce, since the short-lived Treaty of Northampton in 1328, and the significance of the treaty hinges on this aspect.<sup>2</sup> I maintain that the treaty supports my interpretation of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century as a distinctive and important period in the history of Anglo-Scottish relations; Dr. Cardew's contradictory remarks on the subject are not carried to this logical conclusion.<sup>3</sup>

It was agreed that the death of either Margaret or James IV prior to the conclusion of the marriage would not invalidate the Anglo-Scottish treaty, which was to be ratified by the Pope under the threat of excommunication of the monarch breaking the agreement.<sup>4</sup> The details pertaining to oaths and ratifications dominated Anglo-Scottish diplomacy for the remainder of 1502. The Scottish ambassadors returned home in February (presumably via York), and on 22nd February, James IV swore to observe the treaty of perpetual peace, on the "holy euangelies and Canon of the holy messe"; a problem emerged because he therein described Henry

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1. MS. Cotton Titus B.I, ff.5-5v, B.L. ; Halliwell, Letters, I, pp.194-196 ; for the importance of the Spanish alliance after Arthur's death see C. H. Clough, The Duchy of Urbino in the Renaissance, (London, 1981), item XI, pp.212-214.
  2. Facs. Nat. MSS. Scotland, II, XXVI, pp.20-21 ; Scottish Historical Documents, ed. G. Donaldson, (Edinburgh, 1970), pp.61-62 ; Source Book, I, ed. Dickinson, Donaldson & Milne, (1952), pp.136-139.
  3. Cardew thesis, pp.201, 249-252.
  4. PRO. E.39/92/12, (Bain, 1681) ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, pp.168-170.

VII as "King of England and of France and Lord of Ireland", and this issue merited further attention towards the end of the year.<sup>1</sup>

In the meantime, on 14th March 1502, Henry proclaimed the Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliance throughout England.<sup>2</sup> The preamble stated that the monarchs had contracted matrimony and perpetual peace, "forevermore and whilst the world shall endure", to the "laud of God, the honor of our said sovereign lord, and the tranquility and great weal of his realm and subjects". The Kings' subjects were informed of the provisions in the treaty pertaining to the perpetual neutrality of Berwick, the reciprocal promise not to assist one another's traitors and rebels, and to the provisions for mutual defence. Henry VII ordered his subjects "firmly and inviolably" to keep the peace and to do nothing which constituted a breach or violation of the same, upon the pain of the forfeiture of their bodies and goods. Arguably, it may have been prudent to provide the borderers with more elaborate details, since the inhabitants of the Marches were expected to maintain the provisions agreed by their sovereigns, and yet one may well accept Dr. Cardew's assessment that the details and minutiae of Anglo-Scottish diplomacy were of little interest or consequence to most borderers.<sup>3</sup>

The major issue with which the Anglo-Scottish treaty had not adequately come to grips was the problem of the "auld" Franco-Scottish alliance.<sup>4</sup> The French monarch was invited to become a party to the treaty within eight months, but the treaty also permitted Henry or James to defend the territory of their allies (even those at war with the

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1. PRO. E.39/99/67 ; Foedera, V., pt.iv., p.172 ; Y.C.R., II, p.172.
  2. T.R.P., I, 51, pp.56-57 ; R. Steele, Tudor and Stuart Proclamations, 1485-1714, (Oxford, 1910), p.5 ; C.P.R., 1494-1509, pp.289-290.
  3. Cardew thesis, p.251.
  4. see Chapter Two, section B.

other) without this constituting a breach of their agreement.' Evidently the French might seek to exploit this loophole at some time in the future, as Henry VII appears to have realised by mid-1502; possibly his fears were stimulated by Prince Arthur's death, which undermined his dynastic security. Henry wrote to James IV, on 27th June, desiring him, "for mony causis", to "supersede or cess the confirmacioun of the auld lyig" with France.<sup>2</sup> James informed his "richt dere and entirely belouit fader" that it was "always accustomyt" to renew the "auld" alliance whenever the monarch of either realm deceased, and yet he agreed to "supersede the confirmacioun" of the alliance until he had discussed the subject with him or until he was "forthir avisit". Moreover, James resolved that any future confirmation of the "auld" alliance would be neither "skaithfull nor preiudiciale" to the interested parties, and he then turned to the subject of the fees for Margaret's English attendants. Here too, James was conciliatory and he informed King Henry that while their treaty had made no provision for the payment of such fees, he was content to pay "competent feis zerely according to thare qualiteis and behavyng".<sup>3</sup> 1502 was clearly characterized by a climate of Anglo-Scottish conciliation and accord, despite the tradition that James IV intended to marry his recent mistress, Margaret Drummond, instead of Margaret Tudor. Consequently, certain Scottish Anglophiles were said to have poisoned the Drummond lady to ensure the consummation of the Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliance.<sup>4</sup> This Scottish tradition is probably

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1. PRO. E.39/92/12, (Bain, 1681) ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, pp.168-170 ; R. L. Mackie, James IV, pp.98-99.
  2. For the following see PRO. E.39/96/26, (Bain, 1728 and App. No.37, but dated 1503).
  3. For payment of the fees see eg. T.A., II, pp.336-338 ; T.A., III, pp.xciv-cii, 118-120, 324-325 ; T.A., IV, pp.67-68, 269-270.
  4. R. L. Mackie, James IV, pp.100-101.

apocryphal, and it is clear that marriage to Margaret Tudor did not prevent James IV's continued assignations with various paramours in any case.

On 31st October 1502, Henry VII ratified the treaty of perpetual peace with Scotland and appointed Sir Thomas Darcy and Henry Babington to receive James IV's oath.<sup>1</sup> On 10th December, at Glasgow, the Scottish monarch again promised to observe the treaty in a form markedly similar to his February oath, but this time he described Henry VII as "Kinge of Englonde and Lorde of Irlonde" only.<sup>2</sup> On the same day, in Glasgow Cathedral, two notarial instruments were issued attesting to the fact that James had sworn on the sacraments to observe the treaties with England, and that he had signed the first oath inadvertently since he had not observed the words "King of France" in Henry's official title.<sup>3</sup> Interestingly, the transcriber of the December copy appears to have initially written out the English monarch's full title, since a decorative flourish in the manuscript presumably disguises an erasure of the word "France". The real interest of this incident lay in the fact that Henry VII made no objection to James IV's second oath, and, more significantly, in the fact that the English monarch's formulaic title was used by the Scots without demur both before and after this particular case. Numerous examples may be cited, but one pertinent example suffices; in late November 1509, having renewed the Anglo-Scottish treaty with Henry VIII, James IV, both in his oath and in the subsequent notarial attestation, described his

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1. PRO. C.82/237, (Bain, 1686) ; Rot.Scot., II, pp.548-561 ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, pp.183-185.
  2. PRO. E.39/99/84, (Bain, 1690) ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, p.188.
  3. PRO. E.39/5/8, E.39/5/13, (Bain, 1691, 1692) ; Foedera, V. pt.iv., pp.188-190.

fellow monarch as "King of England and of France and Lord of Ireland".<sup>1</sup> I would suggest, therefore, that the cumulative evidence of 1502 indicates that the French King had exerted some pressure on the Scots during that year, and that James had felt compelled to make a public concession to his "auld" ally. The French monarch, otherwise distracted by his ambitions in the Italian peninsula, had not objected to the Anglo-Scottish treaty and matrimonial alliance because this had appeared to be in his best interests at the time, but he probably also desired some indication that, if a crisis developed, Scotland's loyalties would belong to her traditional allies. This argument is, of course, somewhat speculative, but I consider that it represents a more likely interpretation of events than is presented by R. L. Mackie.<sup>2</sup>

On 17th December 1502, James IV ratified the tripartite Anglo-Scottish treaty in three *magnificently* decorative manuscripts.<sup>3</sup> Henry VII's ratification, dated 31st October 1502, had been carried to Scotland by Darcy and Babington, and, although now damaged, this document is illuminated with Henry VII's arms and a border of red roses.<sup>4</sup> The illumination on the Scottish ratifications is even more luxurious, despite the damage caused by damp, and each manuscript bears the royal arms and crown of Scotland supported by unicorns.<sup>5</sup> The border of the ratification for the matrimonial alliance features the letters I and M entwined in a love knot beneath a jewelled crown, and thistles, marguerites, and roses.

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1. PRO. E.39/99/82, E.39/99/75, E.39/5/11, E.39/5/19 ; Foedera, VI., pt.i, pp.5, 8.
  2. cf. R. L. Mackie, James IV, p.101 ; Coleman thesis, p.89.
  3. PRO. E.39/58, E.39/59, E.39/81, (Bain, 1693-1695) ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, pp.190-192.
  4. SRO. SP.6/31.
  5. For the illumination see Bain, 1693-1695 ; T.A., II, p.lviii.

The symbolism is somewhat primitive and obvious, but this interesting aspect merits additional research; for example, one of the roses is an amalgamation of red and white, and this provides testimony that the Tudor Rose (symbol of the unity of Lancaster and York) was already an established token of dynastic propaganda. The manuscript illumination, for which Thomas Galbraith received 59s., is evidence of the artistic splendours of the Scottish court, and James IV evidently sought consciously to impress the English who were often quick to sneer at the Scots as barbarians.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the utilisation of Scottish culture was also manifest in Dunbar's literary allegory, "The Thrissil and the Rois".<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, however, despite such artistic and literary aspirations, the thistle and the rose, as personified by James IV and Margaret Tudor, never, in reality, merged as beautifully as they do in Dunbar's lilting poetry or in Galbraith's manuscript illumination.

On 19th December 1502, James IV commissioned the Bishop and Dean of Moray, and Lord Hume, to meet with the English envoys and exchange ratifications.<sup>3</sup> The notarial instrument attesting to this exchange was issued on 20th December, with a proviso therein that either James or Henry might make amendments as they thought fit.<sup>4</sup> John Forman, Lyon King of Arms, was sent to the English court with letters for Henry VII and with the Scottish ratifications. On the 23rd he received £28 from James IV "to pas in Ingland with the trewis" which Sir Thomas Darcy

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1. T.A., II, pp.lviii, 350, 365.
  2. J. Kinsley, The Poems of William Dunbar, (Oxford, 1979), pp.141-146 ; W. Mackay Mackenzie, The Poems of William Dunbar, (London, 1932), pp.107-112.
  3. PRO. E.39/4/16, (Bain, 1696) ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, p.192.
  4. PRO. E.39/2/28, (Bain, 1697) ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, pp.192-193.

"wald nocht interchange" for reasons which are not specified.<sup>1</sup> Lyon received £6.13s.4d. from Henry VII on 27th January 1503, and presumably he then returned to Scotland, for, in March, James IV gave him £140 "to pas in Rome for the confirmacioun of the trewis".<sup>2</sup> In addition, James paid £10 for the herald's horse, and Bute pursuivant received £4.3s.6d. to buy a coat, "jak", and "butis", to ride to England "and to cum agane".<sup>3</sup> On 3rd April 1503, Henry VII commissioned two of his Italian bishops, Adriano Castellesi, Bishop of Hereford, and Silvestro Gigli, Bishop of Worcester, to obtain Papal ratification of the Anglo-Scottish treaty.<sup>4</sup> The Bull of confirmation was issued at St. Peter's, Rome, by Pope Alexander VI on 5th Kalends of June (28th May) 1503; the Public Record Office copy of this lengthy and detailed document is virtually illegible because of damage, but fortunately the Scottish copy is in quite good condition.<sup>5</sup> Subsequently, on 26th June 1503, Henry VII commissioned Warham and Fox to appear before James IV and exchange the Papal confirmations.<sup>6</sup> This represented the final diplomatic stage, prior to the marriage ceremony, of a long and complex agreement which had been negotiated, on and off, since 1496, but which belonged to a series of Anglo-Scottish matrimonial initiatives stretching back to 1474. The only work still outstanding pertained to the provision of dower lands.

On 24th May 1503, James IV formally assigned the dower lands of his English wife; these included, among others, Ettrick forest, Newark

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1. T.A., II, pp.lix, 352 ; cf. R. L. Mackie, James IV, p.101 ; Coleman thesis, p.89.
  2. MS. Additional 59899, f.11v, B.L. ; T.A., II, pp.lix-lx, 361.
  3. T.A., II, pp.lix-lx, 362.
  4. PRO. C.82/243, (Bain, 1701).
  5. PRO. E.39/90, (Bain, 1719 but misdated 6th June) ; SRO. CH.7/42.
  6. SRO. SP.6/32.

castle, the Earldom of March, Dunbar and Colbrandspeth Lordships (with the exclusion of Dunbar castle), Linlithgow palace and Linlithgowshire, Stirling castle and Stirlingshire, the Earldom of Menteith, the Lordship and castle of Doune, and the palace and Lordship of Methven.<sup>1</sup> On the 26th of the month, James instructed his sheriffs to give seisin of all the dower lands to Margaret's attorneys, Thomas Lord Dacre, Robert Shirborne Dean of St. Paul's, John Cartington, and Richard Eryngton (appointed by Henry VII on 4th May).<sup>2</sup> On the 26th, James also issued his letters admitting these attorneys in all pleas, and between 29th May and 1st June they were granted seisin by the Scottish sheriffs of all the property assigned as the Queen's dower.<sup>3</sup> On 6th June 1503, further letters were issued by James to confirm Margaret's dower and the instruments of seisin made in favour of her attorneys, while the arrangement was ultimately confirmed by the Scottish Parliament (with the addition of the Lordship and castle of Kilmarnock) on 13th March 1504.<sup>4</sup>

The vast expenditure of James IV and Henry VII in 1502 and 1503 merits additional scrutiny. Spectacle, pageantry, and court ceremonial were the expected manifestations of Kingly Majesty and thus such expenditure, which may appear excessive, ought to be appreciated in the

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1. PRO. E.39/61, (Bain, 1706) ; Foedera, V., pt.iv., pp.196-197 ; R.M.S., II, 1424-1513, 2721, pp.577-578 ; MS. Harleian 6372, ff.5-6, B.L.
  2. Rot. Scot., II, pp.561-563 ; PRO. E.39/92/40, (Bain, 1707) ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, pp.194-197 ; R.M.S., II, 1424-1513, 2722, p.578.
  3. PRO. E.39/4/9, E.39/99/60, E.39/2/31, E.39/96/15, E.39/4/8, E.39/4/15, E.39/92/29, (Bain, 1708-1714) ; Foedera, V., pt.iv., pp.197-201 ; SRO. SP.13/22 (a fragment) ; R.M.S., II, 1424-1513, 2721, 2722, 2772, pp.577-578, 588-589.
  4. PRO. E.39/79, (Bain, 1718) ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, pp.201-202, 208-210 ; R.M.S., II, 1424-1513, 2724, 2772, pp.578-579, 588-589 ; A.P.S., II, pp.271-273 ; PRO. E.39/5/16, E.39/5/17, (Bain, 1736, 1737).



context of early sixteenth century expectations, aspirations, and values.<sup>1</sup> James IV spent lavishly on his building work at Holyrood, and on household furnishings, armour, rich cloth, and splendid gowns; in July 1503, for example, two gowns cost him £616 and £664.<sup>2</sup> His expenditure on the medieval science of alchemy has been cited as evidence that James was anxious to supplement his meagre income by desperate measures. There may be an element of truth in this tradition in view of the experiments of February-June 1503, but it is clear that James IV was a patron of science throughout his adult life; the Scottish monarch encouraged the activities of John Damian, "the French Leich" (and later Abbot of Tongland), who claimed an ability to fly among his other dubious talents.<sup>3</sup> To an extent, Dr. Coleman is correct to interpret James IV's expenditure as part of the King's vain attempt to increase Scotland's prestige on the continent, but I maintain that most authorities have been too uncritical of the Scottish King. Lavish expenditure was both expected and necessary, but in his spending James IV was open-handed to the point of being empty-headed.<sup>4</sup>

While Henry VII also spent large sums on his preparations, as evinced by the extant wardrobe and financial accounts, the English monarch was much more financially secure, and had a much shrewder perception of financial expediency. Study of the extant wardrobe accounts of Henry VII is likely to yield dividends in terms of dispelling some lingering popular perceptions about this much neglected reign, for

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1. For background see S. Anglo, Spectacle, Pageantry, and Early Tudor Policy, (Oxford, 1969).
  2. T.A., II, pp.lxi-lxvi, 197-240, esp. 208, 214 ; R. L. Mackie, James IV, pp.102-103.
  3. T.A., II, pp.lxxiii-lxxix, 97, 100, 102, 132-133, 140-141, 149-150, 153, 340, 356, 365, 407, 410, 421, 423, 436, 445, 465, 477 ; T.A., III, pp.lxxxvi-lxxxvii ; Lesley, pp.124-125.
  4. cf. Coleman thesis, pp.89-91.

when these are studied in conjunction with the King's Chamber books of payments, it is evident that the early Tudor court was a much more splendid and luxurious establishment under Henry VII than is traditionally imagined. This monarch, traditionally perceived as "grim" and "parsimonious", appears to have doted on his children and "derrest belouede wif the quene".<sup>1</sup> Arguably, the dichotomy between tradition and reality is a manifestation of a broader ambivalence pertaining to this reign. Henry VII's rule reveals, on the one hand, a series of dramatic crises in which an insecure monarch overcame the successive threats of various pretenders, the nobility, finance, and regional discontent, and, on the other hand, a series of diplomatic successes and colourful and dramatic events in the calendar of court ceremonial which highlighted the prestige, strength, and stability of the new dynasty. That the latter interpretation is generally neglected is partly the consequence of the preoccupations of previous historical research, and partly the consequence of a tendency to dismiss the positive assertions of early chroniclers and historians as manifestations of early Tudor propaganda.

The wardrobe warrants for the young Queen of Scotland make fascinating reading, particularly on account of the minutiae of details which they incorporate.<sup>2</sup> Of special interest is the way in which Henry VII utilised the trousseau and accoutrements of the bridal party as a means of displaying badges, such as the red rose of Lancaster, the Beaufort portcullis, and his own Royal arms; these were to be displayed on many surfaces from servants' liveries to the royal bed, altar cloths, saddles,

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1. PRO. E.101/415/7, nos. 20, 86, 125, for this description of the Queen.
  2. PRO. E.101/415/7, nos. 26, 41, 51, 99, 104-105, 107-108, 116-122, 133, 138, 140-141, 165-166, (Bain, 1677, 1679, 1685, 1688, 1689, 1698, 1699, 1700, 1702, 1704, 1705, 1715, 1716, 1717, 1720, 1721, 1722, 1723, 1724, 1725, 1727) ; PRO. E.101/415/10, (Bain, 1729 and Appx. no.36).

chairs, and the young Queen's litter.' Clearly the bridal progress represented nothing less than a splendid advertisement for the origins, prestige, wealth, and stability of the newly established dynasty.

While Henry VII personally checked the details of Margaret's wardrobe, James IV was similarly busy with his own preparations, despatching messengers to summon the Scottish notables, and somehow finding time to dally with his paramours.<sup>2</sup> The death of Margaret's mother, Queen Elizabeth, on 11th February 1503, did not significantly impede the matrimonial preparations. On 6th May, Henry VII instructed Sir Henry Vernon to attend the royal party from York to Scotland in his "best arraye", since the King and Council agreed that it was "inconvenient and not mete that any mornyng or sorofull clothinges shuld be woran or used at suche noble triumphes of mariage".<sup>3</sup> Evidently a bridal entourage in the sombre attire of court mourning was unlikely to capture imaginations or to convey Tudor prestige as it journeyed through the realm.

John Young, Somerset Herald, who accompanied the progress to Scotland, has left a detailed account of the journey.<sup>4</sup> On 27th June 1503, the royal party, including Henry VII, left Richmond for the Lady Margaret Beaufort's manor of Colyweston, and from thence Princess Margaret departed on 8th July.<sup>5</sup> Prior to her taking leave of Henry VII, the King

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1. PRO. E.101/415/7, nos. 99, 116, 120, 122, (Bain, 1705, 1716, 1721, 1727) ; PRO. E.101/415/10, ff.17v, 18, 18v, (Bain, 1729 and Appx. no.36).
  2. eg. T.A., II, pp.341, 366, 370, 379-381 ; R. L. Mackie, James IV, pp.102-105.
  3. H.M.C. Twelfth Report, pt.IV, Rutland MSS., (London, 1888), pp.17-18.
  4. Collectanea, IV, pp.265-300 ; PRO. SP.58, ff.125-142v, for an imperfect later copy.
  5. Collectanea, IV, p.265 ; Coleman thesis, p.92, wrongly states that the Countess of Richmond was buried at Colyweston when, in fact, she was still alive (until 1509!).

appears to have presented his daughter with a prayer book in which he had written inscriptions urging the Princess to remember her "kynde and louyng fader" in her prayers, and reminding her that "att all tymes" she carried God's blessing and his own.<sup>1</sup>

The Princess and her notable entourage headed by the Earl and Countess of Surrey, were "convayed vary noblely" from Colyweston to York, via Grantham, Newark, Doncaster, and Pontefract.<sup>2</sup> The bells in the towns and villages through which the company passed "wer rong dayly" and the inhabitants brought "grette vessells full of drynk" for the travellers.<sup>3</sup> Evidently Henry VII exploited every propagandist nuance afforded by the progress, and since Margaret fulfilled her role to the best of her ability, it was undoubtedly a triumph of early Tudor monarchy. Every orchestrated entry into every town was a manifestation on a smaller scale of the grandeur and opulence of court ceremonial and royal majesty, as Margaret became the focus of civic pageantry, the participant in religious services, and the recipient of generous gifts. The King had ensured that at various stages of the journey the royal party would be welcomed by local notables, and, on 15th July, Henry Earl of Northumberland, attired "more lyke a prince then a subiect", welcomed the Princess with his magnificent retinue two miles from York.<sup>4</sup> Margaret's reception in York was suitably splendid, and the City authorities presented her with "a goodly standyng silver pece" emblazoned with the York arms, valued at

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1. MS. Harleian 6986, ff.3-6, B.L. (copies of inscriptions made by Henry in his daughter's prayer book).
  2. Collectanea, IV, pp.265-267.
  3. Ibid., p.268.
  4. Ibid., pp.271-272 ; Hall, p.498.

£12.16s., containing a hundred gold angels.<sup>1</sup> The gift was doubtless presented with an element of self-interest, for, as the city council had noted on 12th July, the King "gevith yerely unto this Citie £60".<sup>2</sup> The royal visit was undoubtedly an unqualified success, although it had ended with a squabble over jurisdictions, when the Mayor disputed the right of Sir William Conyers, Sheriff of Yorkshire, to carry his rod of office "within the libertez" of the city.<sup>3</sup>

For the remainder of July the progress continued through northern England, via Newborough, Allerton, Darneton, Durham, Newcastle, Morpeth, Alnwick, and Berwick; the entourage spent the last two days of the month at Berwick where they "had grett Chere" of the captain of the town and castle.<sup>4</sup> On 1st August, Margaret was conveyed to "Lambertonkerke" where she was formally received and welcomed by the Archbishop of Glasgow and a Scottish "counte" (Bothwell).<sup>5</sup> The progress continued along the lines of the English leg of the journey, via Coldingham, Fastcastle, Haddington, and Dalkeith (where James IV first set eyes on his bride).<sup>6</sup> Young's account provides numerous details pertaining to the good natured dalliances of the Scots and English during the following days, and the more romanticized accounts dwell on the kisses which the King stole from the princess, and on the geniality of James IV's relations with the Earl of Surrey. Splendour and ceremonial did, however, remain important,

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1. Collectanea, IV, pp.272-275 ; Y.C.R., II, pp.184-189 ; R. Davies, 'Margaret Tudor at York', Yorkshire Archaeological Journal, VII (1882), pp.305-329.
  2. Y.C.R., II, p.185.
  3. Ibid., p.189.
  4. Collectanea, IV, p.279.
  5. Ibid., pp.279-281.
  6. Ibid., p.283.

especially in view of the Scottish efforts to impress the English, and Margaret's formal entry into Edinburgh on 7th August was characterized by magnificent attire, religious sobriety, and pageantry.<sup>1</sup>

The marriage of James IV and Margaret Tudor, the culmination of almost thirty years of Anglo-Scottish rapprochement, took place on 8th August 1503 in a magnificent ceremony in the chapel at Holyrood. The Archbishop of Glasgow performed the service while the Archbishop of York "red the bulles of our Holly Father the Pope of Rom", and the ceremony was followed by five days of revelry in the form of banquets and pageants.<sup>2</sup> The festivities were completed on Sunday 13th August, after which, as Young observed, "every man went his way".<sup>3</sup> There is little indication in the Herald's narrative that things were not well with the young Queen, but this is evident from her letter to her "most dere lorde and fader".<sup>4</sup> The Queen complained to her father that the Earl of Surrey was in such "great fauor" with James IV "that he cannott forber the companey off hym no tyme off the day"; understandably the young bride resented this state of affairs, though, in all fairness to James, he made strenuous efforts to welcome his bride to Scotland and to entertain her.<sup>5</sup> Margaret prayed that God would send her "comford", and that she and her attendants "that ben lefftt her....be well entretid". A more personal plea was made at the foot of the letter in her own hand:-

"For Godes sak Syr, oulde mea escwsyd that I wryt  
not my sylf to your Grace, for I hau no laysyr thys  
tym bot wyt a wishse I would I wer wyt your Grace  
now and many tymes mor wan I wold andsyr."

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1. Ibid., pp.287-291.
  2. Ibid., pp.291-300.
  3. Ibid., p.300.
  4. MS. Cotton Vespasian F.XIII, f.134, B.L. ; Ellis, Letters, I (1st ser.), pp.41-43 ; Pollard, Sources, I, pp.232-234.
  5. Collectanea, IV, pp.283-300 ; T.A., II, pp.lxx-lxxi.

The homesick young Queen apparently later came to accept her situation, but as evinced by her letter, Margaret was never enamoured with James IV or with Scotland. Her most recent biographer, H. W. Chapman, has suggested that the difference in the ages of James and Margaret, respectively 30 and 13, was a "serious barrier" between them, and also that their characters were fundamentally different; Margaret being passionate but unimaginative, and James being quixotic and something of a dreamer.<sup>1</sup> Thus, she argues, Margaret Tudor's story was one of "frustration, conflict and ultimate failure".<sup>2</sup> It is true that Margaret, who has been much maligned and vilified in historical tradition, was no more a rose without a thorn than Catherine Howard later proved to be as Queen of Henry VIII. Though a subject of romantic poetry, and praised for her virtues, Margaret was not the kind of princess to capture hearts or imaginations. Nor did she personify the ideals of a royal consort of the time; that is to say, the Queen who was not seen to interfere in politics, except in some merciful or ceremonial capacity. Her biggest faults were that she was inconsistent and appeared to be the female equivalent of Henry VIII, and it was unfortunate that in her character and personality she was somewhat ahead of her time. Without doubt, Margaret embodied many of the strengths and failings of the Tudors, but although she is traditionally perceived to be the least able member of the family, this is perhaps an unfair and outdated assessment. She was not without some measure of political acumen, as evinced by her observation to the Earl of Surrey in 1523, that Henry VIII had neither "asayed" Scotland with "pollicie nor force", the two means by which he

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1. H. W. Chapman, The Sisters of Henry VIII, (London, 1969), pp.44-46.

2. Ibid., p.215.

might "best bring it to a good poynt".<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately for Margaret, political acumen, a sense of good timing, and favourable circumstance, rarely coincided in her judgments, and her personal conflict of policy and force occasionally produced results which have redounded to her subsequent detriment.<sup>2</sup>

The Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliance of 1503, regarded with some justification by Ferdinand of Aragon as a triumph of Spanish diplomacy, heralded an interesting phase in Anglo-Scottish relations and in the domestic history of both realms.<sup>3</sup> James IV and Henry VII, and their subjects, derived manifold practical benefits from the Anglo-Scottish accord, though of course the death of Prince Arthur had undermined Henry's dynastic security to an extent.<sup>4</sup> Proximity to the Tudor succession, which was the lot of the Scottish monarchy for the entire sixteenth century, enabled the Scots to counter the traditional English claims to the suzerainty of Scotland. In this respect, and in the ultimate union of the Crowns and Kingdoms, the Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliance of 1502-1503 was possibly the most momentous alliance in British history.

It has been argued that James IV's extravagant hospitality "failed to dazzle his southern guests", but this is an unfair assessment based on Hall's later remark that the English had returned home "geuyng more prayse to the manhoode then to the good maner and nurture of Scotlande".<sup>5</sup>

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1. S. P. Henry VIII, IV, pt.iv, II, p.3.
  2. For Margaret see Chapman, pp.13-156 ; A. Strickland, Lives of the Queens of Scotland, vol.I, pp.1-268 ; D.N.B., XXXVI (London, 1893), pp.150-157 ; M. A. Everett Green, Lives of the Princesses of England, vol.IV, (London, 1852), pp.49-505.
  3. see Chapter Three, sections C and D.
  4. For James IV see eg. Coleman thesis, pp.95-122.
  5. R. L. Mackie, James IV, p.112 ; Hall, p.498 ; cf. Lesley, p.121.



I maintain, however, that James IV's efforts to impress his guests had been quite successful; John Young made no such criticism, and, being a Herald and an eye-witness, he is a much more reliable source than Hall. Pitscottie too has observed that Margaret and her entourage were "verie reioysed" in 1503 since "they trowit nevir to haue seine sic honour and honestie in scotland"; his authority is undermined somewhat by his claim that the English notables remained in Scotland for a year and a day.<sup>1</sup>

According to the extant evidence, which is somewhat defective, James IV received 10,000 nobles in August 1503, July 1504, and August 1505.<sup>2</sup> The first payment was made at Edinburgh after the conclusion of the marriage in 1503, and in the following years at Coldingham by Henry VII's commissioners John Benstead, Christopher Clapham, and William Cope. The complete documentation outlining the transaction is only extant for 1505; Henry VII's commission was dated 9th July, while James IV's safe-conduct was dated 21st July, and his letters of receipt 13th August.<sup>3</sup> One can supplement the meagre details with information from other sources. On 14th June 1503, for example, William Cope (the King's cofferer) received £3,333.6s.8d. to carry into Scotland.<sup>4</sup> On or about 12th August, James IV paid six men 4s. to bear "the Inglis coffir fra the Abbay to the Castell of Edinburgh", while on the 13th or 14th the English "cofferar" was paid £92 Scots and presented with "ane cowp of silver"

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1. Pitscottie, I, p.240 ; Lesley, p.121.
  2. R.M.S., II, 1424-1509, 2740, 2779, 2798, 2868, pp.582, 590, 595, 609 ; PRO. C.82/273, (Bain, 1740) ; R.S.S., I, 1117, p.163 ; Foedera, V., pt.iv, p.218 ; Rot. Scot., II, p.565.
  3. PRO. C.82/273, (Bain, 1740) ; Rot.Scot., II, p.565 ; R.S.S., I, 1117, p.163 ; R.M.S., II, 1424-1513, 2868, p.609.
  4. PRO. E.36/123, f.99. Both MS. Additional 7099, f.83, B.L. and MS. Additional 59899, f.31, B.L., record the delivery to Cope of £2,333.6s.8d. on 1st September.

worth £10 Scots.<sup>1</sup> In 1504, Cope took delivery from Henry VII of 16,666 sun crowns paid to him by the French monarch; the memoranda recording the transaction is undated, but the following entry records a reward of 50 crowns to Lyon Herald, parcel of a sum of 8,000 French crowns, and this corresponds with a reward of £6.13s.4d. given to Lyon on 17th May 1504.<sup>2</sup> If the sun crowns were paid to James IV in July 1504 then Henry VII was apparently using his French pension (paid in consequence of the Treaty of étaples) to pay Margaret's dowry; this adds an ironic twist to events in view of the traditional relations between England, France, and Scotland. An entry in the Lord High Treasurer's accounts further reveals that by 1504, James IV had been paid £23,333.6s.8d. Scots. parcel of the dowry.<sup>3</sup> But the details of the financial arrangements are of much less interest than the fact that nearly thirty years of Anglo-Scottish relations had culminated in a matrimonial alliance.

Between 1474 and 1503 no less than nine Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliances had been suggested, considered, negotiated, or agreed, involving eleven different pairings. The 1477 and 1493 initiatives were clearly never seriously considered, while the Albany-Cecily match of 1482-1483 was not an alliance made between two ruling monarchs. The other alliances were, however, taken very seriously and evolved well beyond the conceptual stage. Two in particular, involving James Duke of Rothesay and Cecily, and James IV and Margaret Tudor, resulted in formal betrothals and were anticipated for many years, but only the latter alliance was consummated. If one considers most of the nine examples in

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1. T.A., II, pp.386-387.

2. PRO. E.101/413/2/3, ff.1-2 ; MS. Additional 59899, f.55, B.L. ; Facs. Nat. MSS. I, LXV, pp.62-63.

3. T.A., II, p.196.

isolation, it is easy to dismiss many of them as fanciful and outrageous schemes which were too lightweight to carry conviction or to merit serious consideration. Cumulatively the alliances anticipated between 1474 and 1503 are of greater significance. One thereby discerns an aspiration pursued by successive Anglo-Scottish monarchs for three decades to conclude a matrimonial alliance as a means of resolving some of their outstanding differences; matrimony constituted one of the most cohesive of medieval social and political bonds, and expedient alliances were sought by monarchs and their subjects alike. Evidently between 1474 and 1503, in spite of prevailing tensions, for most of the time there was some consensus among English and Scottish monarchs that an alliance was either necessary or desirable. From 1488 to 1496 only one Anglo-Scottish marriage was suggested (in 1493), but I maintain that this was the unfortunate consequence of the prevailing circumstances; James IV's ambitions in the continental marriage market, the tense relations between James and Henry VII, and, above all, the fact that Henry had no suitable female relative to offer to the Scottish monarch.

The fact that the concept of an Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliance prevailed for so many years yields some interesting statistics. For example, James III's sister Margaret, and Edward IV's daughter Cecily, were both suggested as the brides of two different men, while James IV, as prince and King, had, at one time or another, been the anticipated partner of no less than five different English royal ladies. Moreover, though, as Prince of Scotland, James had been betrothed in 1474 to one of Edward IV's daughters, in 1503, as King of Scotland, he married the grand-daughter of the same English monarch. Without doubt, Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliances constitute a neglected theme of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, and, as I have sought to demonstrate, when one considers Anglo-Scottish relations from this

thematic perspective, many of the traditional interpretations of the subject are in evident need of reappraisal and restatement.

The fundamental flaw in the assumptions of successive Anglo-Scottish monarchs was that a peace treaty cemented by a matrimonial alliance would suffice to resolve the traditional conflicts between the "auld enemies" without significant changes in the attitudes of their subjects; evidently antipathy prevailed despite the 1503 alliance, and the treaty had failed to resolve the incompatibility between the Anglo-Scottish and Franco-Scottish alliances. Moreover, it was the prevailing climates and attitudes which influenced the conduct of Anglo-Scottish relations at any particular time, and not the fact that they were bound by velleum agreements or by matrimony. If reciprocal difficulties emerged and one or both parties refused to be conciliatory, then neither the words of a treaty nor the nationality of a matrimonial partner could guarantee the peace; this was evident from the events of 1513. Clearly, too, in periods of crisis, countries tend to rely on their traditional prejudices and alliances, and not necessarily on the fruits of more recent diplomatic agreements.

Analysis of the Anglo-Scottish matrimonial alliances between 1474 and 1503 challenges the traditional assumptions and constraints imposed by the artificial barriers of regnal chronology. As with subjects such as royal finance and the Crown lands, much can be learned by considering the Anglo-Scottish relations of the early Tudor period in the light of the reigns of Henry's Yorkist predecessors. Much too can be learned from a comparison of the various matrimonial alliances; the continental influences which had a discernible impact on James IV's marriage to Margaret Tudor are of particular interest. As I have argued, contemporary monarchs were not blind to the long-term potentialities of the alliance, especially since it had been originally conceived as a permanent

solution to the difficulties experienced by successive Anglo-Scottish Kings. But that within a century a Scottish monarch would be heading to London to claim his English crown would have seemed a nightmarish prospect to Henry VII, his Council, and his subjects, in 1503. The joy of success was in hearts and minds in that year, as an English princess, the eighth English royal lady considered as a Scottish bride since 1474, wended her splendid progress north to find herself welcomed "of Scotland to be Quene".<sup>1</sup>

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1. MS. Royal Appendix 58, ff.17v-18, B.L. (a madrigal said to have been written to celebrate the marriage) ; R. L. Mackie, James IV, p.109 ; A. Strickland, Lives of the Queens of Scotland, vol.I, p.58. Bernard André compared Henry VII's success with Scotland to Hercules' eighth exploit in subduing the "great bull" ; André, pp.307-327, esp. 318, from MS. Royal 16 E.XVII, ff.13-13v, B.L.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION : ASPECTS OF ANGLO-SCOTTISH RELATIONS

The late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries witnessed what R. B. Wernham described as "fundamental changes in England's circumstances", and these changes were manifest in the adoption of new attitudes towards her neighbours.' Scotland, however, constituted a unique problem to successive English monarchs since she was the only neighbour to share a land frontier with England, and this fact was compounded by the tradition of Anglo-Scottish antipathy. All the English monarchs considered herein, from Edward IV to Henry VIII, faced the same basic problems; the dangers inherent in an Anglo-Scottish land frontier, the fear of Scotland as an enemy in her own right (and as a base for malcontents and pretenders), and the potential dangers in consequence of the Franco-Scottish alliance. Scottish monarchs faced similar problems, for although the "auld"-alliance was of some benefit to them, they faced the additional psychological dangers of Scotland's evident inferiority in finance and manpower to England, and the grandiose claims which English monarchs sporadically made to suzerainty over Scotland.

For practical considerations, Scotland rarely constituted a military threat to the English monarchs, safely protected by the extensive defensive system of the North parts, but there can be little doubt that the psychological threat was immense. Although the Scots were more

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1. R. B. Wernham, Before the Armada ; the Growth of English Foreign Policy, 1485-1588, (London, 1966), p.9, et passim.

vulnerable to military defeat by the English, I do not subscribe to the view that the conquest of Scotland was a feasible proposition; the difficulties of large scale <sup>conducting</sup> expeditions were manifest in the campaign of July-August 1482, while Flodden had conclusively proved that even catastrophic defeats on the battlefield did not undermine Scotland's political independence. Arguably, Scotland's size, the relative poverty of English monarchs in terms of finance and resources, and the strength of Anglo-Scottish antipathy, effectively prevented the English conquest, while the successive usurpations of Edward IV, Richard III, and Henry VII, clearly presented each of them with more pressing domestic considerations. Scotland benefited from Henry Bolingbroke's usurpation of Richard II's Throne in 1399, from the Hundred Years' War, and from the dynastic wars of York and Lancaster in the fifteenth century; in particular, the Scots exploited the domestic problems of the English usurpers by supporting malcontents (and occasionally pretenders) against them. I maintain that a precarious equilibrium prevailed in Anglo-Scottish relations in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, for although England was manifestly stronger, she was unable to overwhelm Scotland, and the Scots rarely neglected an opportunity to benefit from English vulnerability; moreover, from 1503 the Scottish monarch stood in close proximity to the English succession.

The traditional causes of Anglo-Scottish tension are discussed in Chapter Two, but the importance of these aspects was declining and the key to Anglo-Scottish relations lay more in the attitudes displayed by monarchs, their councillors, and subjects.<sup>1</sup> I suggest that the interest shown by monarchs in truces and matrimonial alliances, from the 1470's to 1513, characterized the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries

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1. Chapter Two.

as a distinctive phase in the history of Anglo-Scottish relations. In the final analysis, however, this study has merely introduced the most significant themes of a complex and multi-faceted subject. Concentration on diplomatic and political aspects has consequently led to less emphasis being placed on the oft-neglected economic, religious, and cultural aspects of Anglo-Scottish relations.'

Anglo-Scottish monarchs were entirely conventional in their aspirations to emulate the cultured continental potentates; the tradition of the Dukes of Burgundy was particularly influential. Despite English sneers about Scottish barbarism, Scottish culture reflected continental and English influences, and these were manifest in buildings, furniture, clothing, music, art, and literature. In 1503, James IV made a conscious effort to impress his bride and her entourage with Scotland's cultural sophistication; this was evident in the Scottish court ceremonial, and in the fact that the King's "grett Chamber" was decorated with tapestries featuring the "ystory of Troy" and with stained glass windows ornamented with the arms of England and Scotland.<sup>2</sup> By the beginning of the sixteenth century, Scotland had acquired a third university (England had only two), and James IV's desire to involve his realm in the mainstream of continental events was mirrored in his cultural aspirations.<sup>3</sup> Above all, the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries have been regarded as something of a golden age in Scottish literature, and it is clear that some interesting poetry was inspired by Anglo-Scottish accord.<sup>4</sup> Gregory

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1. For society see Chapter One ; Dietrich thesis ; Cardew thesis.

2. Collectanea, IV, pp.281-300, esp. p.295.

3. Nicholson, pp.586-591 ; R. L. Mackie, James IV, pp.162-171.

4. eg. R. L. Mackie, James IV, pp.171-187. In addition to Dunbar's poetry see Walter Ogilvy's panegyric on Henry VII - N.L.S. Adv. MS. 33.2.24.



Kratzmann has recently favourably compared the vitality of Scottish literary endeavours with their duller English counterparts, and he maintains that "far from being a deterrent to cultural interchange, political circumstances seem to have fostered it"; diplomacy, for example, took William Dunbar to London in 1501-1502, and political exile led to Thomas Boyd's sojourn in England in the early 1470's.<sup>1</sup> Boyd borrowed a book from one of the Paston ladies on "the Sege of Thebes", while an unknown Scot served as a "scole maister" to Prince Arthur at a later date.<sup>2</sup> Books and manuscripts evidently passed between the two realms, and Kratzmann concluded that despite "different standards of taste and literary decorum", reciprocal influences were manifest in English and Scottish poetry.<sup>3</sup> At a cultural level, therefore, Anglo-Scottish relations are of some interest, even if the evidence for this subject is somewhat meagre.

Much more evidence is extant pertaining to Anglo-Scottish trade, but this also presents difficulties. From the abundance of maritime robberies and mercantile safe-conducts, it is clear that considerable trade was conducted not only reciprocally but also with the Low Countries; piracy, in particular, alludes to such activity.<sup>4</sup> Given the royal interest in shipping and trade in both countries, and in view of Anglo-Scottish relations with the Low Countries and the Hanseatic League, a great deal of work remains to be undertaken on the subject of trade. Moreover, if Anglo-Scottish rivalry in acquiring gunsmiths and artillery on the

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1. G. Kratzmann, Anglo-Scottish Literary Relations, 1430-1550, (Cambridge U.P., 1980), ch.1, esp. p.4.
  2. Ibid., pp.5-6 ; Paston Letters, III, 1471-1509, p.47 ; N. H. Nicolas, Privy Purse Expenses of Elizabeth of York, (1830), p.28.
  3. Kratzmann, cited in note 1, p.7, et passim.
  4. Chapter Two, section B ; e.g. PRO. C1/67/193 and C1/128/43.

continent is typical of their trade relations then research in continental archives may conceivably pay substantial dividends.<sup>1</sup>

While mercantile safe-conducts generally described the number of merchants and tonnage of the ships (where appropriate), they rarely provided much information about the goods to be traded.<sup>2</sup> English safe-conducts, for example, stated that the goods ought not to pertain to the Staple at Calais, and made the proviso that "suche custumes and othre Devoirs" owed to the King were to be paid "as right requireth".<sup>3</sup> The Scottish accounts of the customars of English goods are of interest, and when studied in conjunction with other evidence, it becomes clear that wool, hides, and fish constituted Scotland's major exports, while many commodities, including wine, corn, barley, malt, salt, cloth, iron, lead, and so on, were imported from England and elsewhere.<sup>4</sup> However, without more substantial evidence, statistical precision is probably impossible. Trade on the Borders was officially discouraged, probably in consequence of royal fears that it might provoke disputes, but it evidently continued on a large scale; Trevisan, for example, mentioned "the intercourse....on

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1. eg. MS. Cotton Galba B.III, ff.5-6v, B.L. ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 324, 325, pp.145-147.
  2. For safe-conducts see Bain ; Rot. Scot., II ; R.M.S., II, 1424-1513 ; R.S.S., I, 1488-1529 ; PRO. C.82, MSS.
  3. eg. PRO. C.82/81 and C.82/135, (Bain, 1575, 1614).
  4. E.R., VIII, pp.137-138, 198-199, 255-256, 313, 389-390, 464-465, 544-546, 628-629 ; E.R., IX, pp.68-69, 154-156, 289-290, 447-449, 545-546 ; E.R., X, pp.59-61, 144-145, 230-232, 298-299, 358-359 ; Ledger of Andrew Halyburton, ed. C. Innes ; Early Travellers, pp.43-44, 87-88. In a petition to Henry VII in 1503 (PRO. C.82/253), the merchants of Newcastle stated that northern wool was of inferior quality and that their prices were being undercut by cheaper Spanish and Scottish wool in continental markets. The 1512 list of maritime depredations suggests that fish and cloth were the most common commodities plundered from Anglo-Scottish merchants (PRO. E.36/254, ff.293-300 ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 1262, pp.577-578).

the borders".<sup>1</sup>

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Anglo-Scottish trade was that both realms were emerging as important mercantile nations in Western Europe, and continued their traditional enmity and rivalry in foreign markets and on the sea. One English poem of Henry VI's reign stressed the importance of mastery "of the narowe see", and the author anticipated that England would "ryght sone have pease" despite Scottish boasts, since Scottish shipping "muste nede passe by ovre Englysshe costis".<sup>2</sup> Clearly Anglo-Scottish trade was closely related to their political relationship, but English shipping was also vulnerable to Scottish attack and neither country could claim to have mastery of the seas in the period under consideration.

In religion, as in culture and trade, there was an element of rivalry between the neighbouring realms. English and Scottish monarchs cultivated a cordial and efficient working relationship with the Papacy, and the Popes responded with tokens of their favour; this was typical of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.<sup>3</sup> It is deceptively easy to idealise Anglo-Scottish relations with the later medieval Papacy, or to anticipate the breaches of the sixteenth century, but neither approach is reasonable. The elevation of St. Andrews to an Archbishopric in 1472 was evidently a consequence of Papal initiative, but Glasgow's elevation in 1492 was motivated partly by the vagaries of domestic politics and

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1. Italian Relation, p.18 ; Early Travellers, p.54.
  2. Political Poems and Songs relating to English History, from the Accession of Edward III to that of Richard III, vol.II, ed. T. Wright, R.S. (1861), pp.157-205, esp. pp.158, 168-169.
  3. eg. Macdougall, James III, pp.102-108, 224-232 ; R. L. Mackie, James IV, pp.30-35, 69-71, 82, 159, 205-236, 243 ; Chrimes, Henry VII, pp.240-244.

partly by "a desire for a parity with England".<sup>1</sup> This issue undoubtedly contributed to Anglo-Scottish rivalry, and presumably the documents copied in Harleian 433 concerning the primacy of the See of York over Scotland constituted an attempt by the English church to reassert the religious subordination of Scotland.<sup>2</sup>

Religious relations between England and Scotland were also manifest at other levels. When goodwill prevailed, clerics and pilgrims benefited from the proliferation of safe-conducts, and during periods of conflict, Scottish clerics received letters of denization and licenses of residence from English monarchs.<sup>3</sup> The abuse of clerical privileges, as evinced by Wolsey's report of 1508, did, however, provoke recrimination, and this may have some connection with the prevalence of clerics in Anglo-Scottish espionage and reconnaissance.<sup>4</sup> In view of this, and the fact that clerics frequently served on embassies, it is not going too far to suggest that the Church played an important role in Anglo-Scottish relations. Religious houses on the Borders (which may have safe-guarded their interests by supplying information to both sides) also received safe-conducts and privileges, but despite the fact that such establishments offered comparatively rich pickings to lawless borderers, it is evident from the example of Canonby that Anglo-Scottish monarchs tried not to make this an issue for mutual recrimination.<sup>5</sup> Some difficulties were consciously

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1. Nicholson, pp.461-469, 557-558.
  2. Harl. 433, vol.III, pp.76-98 (though the documents were first compiled c.1464).
  3. eg. R.S.S., I, 1488-1529 ; Bain ; C.P.R.
  4. MS. Cotton Caligula B.VIII, ff.150-154, B.L. ; MS. *Additional 46454*, f.3.
  5. eg. R.S.S., I, 1488-1529, nos.1357, 1865, pp.193-194, 286 ; PRO. E.36/254, ff.1-4, Bain, 1600 and App. no.34).

avoided by removing the potential causes of jurisdictional disputes. The Priory of Coldingham, for example, had theoretically depended on the Priory of Durham, but by May 1462 the English monks had been expelled from Scotland, and the Scottish Parliament of October 1466 pronounced that henceforth no Englishman would be permitted to enjoy any benefice within that realm.' In May 1488, in consequence of the adhesion of the Abbot and convent of Jedworth to the King's Scottish enemies, Henry VII was able to appoint Robert Raa to the vicarage of Arthureth in Carlisle diocese; such references are unusual among the extant sources.<sup>2</sup>

There can be little doubt that Anglo-Scottish relations had some impact on religion in the Borders; defensive requirements, for example, led to the fortification of Churches. In 1538, the inhabitants of Holm Cultram informed Cromwell that they wanted the Abbey church preserved, not only because of the religious needs of their community, but also because it was the only local building which provided "a grete ayde, socor, and defence for us ayenst our neighbors the Scotts".<sup>3</sup> Dr. Cardew has suggested that on account of the paucity of evidence for the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, it is difficult to assess the role played by religion in Border society and "almost impossible" to assess the attitude of the borderers.<sup>4</sup> Bishop Fox is known to have admonished individuals bearing the surnames of Tynedale and Redesdale to

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1. R. B. Dobson, 'The Last English Monks on Scottish Soil', S.H.R., XLVI (1967), pp.1-25 ; N. Macdougall, 'The Struggle For the Priory of Coldingham, 1472-1488', The Innes Review, XXIII (1972), pp.102-114 ; A.P.S., II, p.86 ; Nicholson, p.458 ; Lesley, pp.87-88 ; The Correspondence, Inventories, Account Rolls, and Law Proceedings of the Priory of Coldingham, ed. J. Raine, S.S., XII (1841).
  2. C.P.R., 1485-1494, p.224.
  3. MS. Cotton Cleopatra E.IV, f.293, B.L. ; Ellis, Letters, vol.II (1st ser.), pp.89-91.
  4. Cardew thesis, pp.35-56.

cease their lawless activities on pain of excommunication, but there is no evidence to suggest that religion had any significant impact on the borderers' conduct.<sup>1</sup> All that one can tentatively conclude is that in view of Anglo-Scottish rivalry, religion appears to have been less detrimental to their relations than it may have been, but religious issues did create some difficulties, and Scotland was the unfortunate victim of Papal politics in 1481 and in 1513; on both occasions the English sought to exploit the situation.<sup>2</sup>

Certain other aspects of Anglo-Scottish relations merit brief consideration. Espionage and reconnaissance work, for example, was an important duty of all Border officials. Henry VII clearly benefitted from information supplied by his informed sources at the Scottish court, but tantalisingly ambiguous entries in the financial records probably allude to more furtive activity on the Borders; this is a fascinating subject which has yet to receive adequate discussion.<sup>3</sup> The same thing may be said about Anglo-Scottish diplomats and diplomacy. Dr. Cardew's conclusion that the size and composition of commissions and embassies varied

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1. Ibid., pp.54-56 ; Dietrich thesis, pp.50-54 ; The Register of Richard Fox Lord Bishop of Durham 1494-1501, ed. M. P. Howden, S.S. CXLVII (1932), pp.80-84, 110-112.
  2. For background see W. J. Anderson, 'Rome and Scotland, 1513-1625', The Innes Review, X no.1 (1959), pp.173-193 ; J. H. Burns, 'The Conciliarist Tradition in Scotland', S.H.R., XLII (1963), pp.89-104 ; W. Stanford Reid, 'The Origins of Anti-Papal Legislation in Fifteenth Century Scotland', Catholic Historical Review, XXIX (1944), pp.445-469. James IV's relations with the Papacy are well documented in James IV Letters. After Flodden, Pope Leo X authorized Henry VIII to bury James (an excommunicate) in St. Paul's, but, according to John Stow, the body remained unburied until the later sixteenth century, and the head was interred in St. Michael's Church, London ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 2469, pp.1088-1089 ; MS. Cotton Vitellius B.II, ff.60-61v, B.L. ; A Survey of London by John Stow, ed. C. L. Kingsford, (Oxford, 1908), vol.I, pp.297-298 ; Nugae Derelictae, ed. J. Maidment and R. Pitcairn, (Edinburgh, 1822), pp.7-9.
  3. eg. PRO. E.101/414/6, ff.18, 24-25v, 29v-30 ; Chapter Two, section F.

considerably is somewhat sweeping, and she fails to point out that diplomacy was essentially personal and depended on the attitudes of the monarchs involved.' The careers of Alexander Legh, Richard Fox, Thomas Wolsey, and Nicholas West, reveal that individuals often discharged important diplomatic missions, while this aspect of Anglo-Scottish relations confirms G. Mattingly's suggestion that the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries constituted the "formative period" in the history of modern diplomacy.<sup>2</sup> In consequence of the increasing prevalence of vernacular diplomatic instructions one is able, for example, to study the details and nuances which underlay the important events of Anglo-Scottish relations. The French chronicler Comynnes cautioned that though it was necessary to send and receive ambassadors, it was unsafe to have them "coming and going so much because they often discuss evil things"; in fact most of the Anglo-Scottish ambassadors served their royal masters to the best of their considerable abilities.<sup>3</sup>

Another interesting subject, the impact of Anglo-Scottish war on the Borders and northern England, has attracted some discussion, but it is helpful to draw together the threads regarding recent research. In 1960, Edward Miller, perhaps in reaction to lingering romantic perceptions inspired by the Border minstrelsy, sought to analyse the economic and political regressions, and he suggested that though the simplicity of the northern economy may have allowed a measure of economic recovery, Anglo-Scottish warfare "seriously reduced" wealth and prosperity.<sup>4</sup> Moreover,

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1. Cardew thesis, pp.253-256.
  2. G. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, (London, 1962), pp.11-12, et passim.
  3. Comynnes, pp.198-199.
  4. The following paragraph is an abstract of ideas outlined by Edward Miller, War in the North : The Anglo-Scottish Wars of the Middle Ages, (Hull, 1960).

while conflict may have stimulated local industry and commerce to an extent, the loss far outweighed the gains. Reiving came to constitute a way of life on the Borders, and war increased the influence of the northern nobility by enabling them to subsidise private forces from royal resources; thus great northern families, such as the Nevilles and the Percies, were "overmighty subjects par excellence". Consequently the northern magnates had a vested interest in perpetuating disorder, and the old cliché that the North knew no prince but a Neville or a Percy stemmed from the fact that Anglo-Scottish warfare reinforced the social and economic ties between traditional elites and local inhabitants. To prevent any single family from acquiring too much power, monarchs exploited rivalries for local office and influence, but because of the long-term effects of war, the North remained a threat to national order well into the sixteenth century.

In view of the limitations of the evidence, and the brevity of the article, this analysis is over-simplistic, but many of Miller's ideas have been influential without having been subjected to more detailed scrutiny. Given the size of the area under consideration, the lengthy time span of the Anglo-Scottish wars, and the imprecision with which the term "north parties" was used in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, some generalisation is probably inevitable, as evinced by J. A. Tuck's recent study of medieval warfare and society in the North.<sup>1</sup> Dr. Tuck's perceptive article proffers some hypotheses to challenge traditional assumptions, and he suggests that economically, the "psychological climate" engendered by Border warfare was "perhaps more important" in the long term than actual destruction. He argues that the long-term contraction of the northern

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1. The following paragraph is an abstract of ideas outlined by J. A. Tuck, 'War and Society in the Medieval North', M.H., XXI (1985), pp.33-52.



rural economy may have been a consequence of disease, plague, and population decline, rather than war, which may actually have had "a modestly stimulating effect on the local economy"; defensive activity utilised local materials and manpower, and brought additional finance into the north. However, the gradual decline of the sums paid for Border defence in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries may have resulted in the evident preoccupation of sixteenth century English monarchs with the problems of Border administration; in view of the reliance on the surnames of Tynedale and Redesdale, such considerations may have induced social changes in the Border upland valleys.'

There can be little doubt that the connection between Anglo-Scottish relations and the problems of the North is very complex and requires further scrutiny. The publications of recent years have merely highlighted the glaring inadequacy of prevailing generalisations; for example, there were clearly differences between the three Yorkshire ridings, Cheshire, the palatinates of Lancaster and Durham, and the Border counties, while the differences between urban and rural socio-economic aspects cannot reasonably be ignored. The observations of Tuck and Miller were doubtless applicable to parts of northern England at different times during the Anglo-Scottish wars, and while the social and economic impact of such conflict is more easily assumed than demonstrated, there can be no doubt that the wars had both positive and negative effects as well as long and short-term ones. For example, the urban economy may have been stimulated by English campaigns against the Scots, but since conflict was sporadic any benefits are likely to have been mainly short-term ones. However, one cannot ignore such tangible considerations as geography, demography, and *settlement patterns, or*

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1. For Tynedale and Redesdale see Dietrich thesis.

such intangibles as the psychological impact of proximity to Scotland, when assessing these aspects of Anglo-Scottish relations. Moreover, distance from the centre of government, difficulties posed by communication, administration, jurisdiction, lawlessness, and the need for strong local rulers in a society inured to war and clannish in orientation and inclination, ought also to merit consideration. The problem of Anglo-Scottish relations, and the efforts made to resolve this by recourse to long truces and matrimonial alliances, constituted only one part of a series of problems - administrative, economic, judicial, and social - faced by English monarchs in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but proximity to Scotland undoubtedly highlighted and confounded the other problems of the North.

The origins of the problems of the North lay probably in geography, early settlement patterns, traditional antipathies, and psychological perceptions, but since the days of Norman rule many of the difficulties had been created by royal policy. Successive generations of monarchs helped to perpetuate the complex amalgam of conflicting jurisdictions until in the fifteenth century the Crown attempted to rule the North effectively by relying on the Neville and Percy families and by exploiting their rivalry for local power and office. The demise of the Nevilles with the death of the Earl of Warwick at Barnet in April 1471 initiated one of the most interesting phases in the history of northern England. Through the grants of his brother Edward IV, and especially in consequence of his marriage to Anne Neville in 1472, Richard Duke of Gloucester inherited the Neville affinity and sought to balance the Percy influence in northern government. In reality, Gloucester's authority merely perpetuated traditional Neville-Percy rivalries, for while the Duke and the Earl of Northumberland co-operated in defending the North against the Scots, the Duke's royal connections undoubtedly upset the

delicate equilibrium of regional power-politics. In an indenture of July 1474, the Duke and the Earl declared that they would not compete for offices, retain one another's servants, or impede one another in the execution of their duties; moreover, while Percy promised "to do service vnto the said duc at all tymes lawfull and conuenient whan he therunto by the said duc shal be lawfully Required", Richard reciprocated that he would be the Earl's "good and faithfull lorde at all tymes and....sustene hym in his Right".<sup>1</sup> This document has been misconstrued as a declaration of the subservience of Percy to the Duke of Gloucester, but the study of Anglo-Scottish relations suggests that Edward IV probably perceived of the Duke and the Earl as partners rather than protagonists in the administration and defence of the North.<sup>2</sup> However, a natural rivalry evidently prevailed between them, and this was not conducive to administrative efficiency, regional stability, or, ultimately to military success against Scotland.<sup>3</sup> Richard's domination is manifest from a recent study which reveals that, when he governed the North, 77% of royal appointments to local government office in the North were granted to his

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1. Percy family Syon House MS. Y.II. 28 (B.L. microfilm 358) ; a brief abstract is printed in H.M.C. Report VI, pt.i, p.223 ; for a modernised transcript see W. H. Dunham jnr., Lord Hastings' Indentured Retainers, 1461-1483, (New Haven, 1955), p.140 and pp.77-78.
2. This is inferred from Legh's instructions of 1475 (MS. Cotton Vespasian C.XVI, ff.121-126, B.L.), from the York city records (Y.C.R., I), and from an analysis of royal commissions and appointments in C.P.R. and C.C.R. The Duke was predominant in Cumberland and the West Marches, and the Earl in Northumberland and the East and Middle Marches, while they competed for power and influence in Yorkshire.
3. For Richard see the various biographies. For the Earl see E. B. De Fonblanque, Annals of the House of Percy, (London, 1887), I, pp.287-309, 549 ; G. Brenan and W. A. Lindsay, A History of the House of Percy, (2 vols., London, 1902), vol.I., pp.121-135 ; M. A. Hicks, 'Dynastic Change and Northern Society : The Career of the Fourth Earl of Northumberland, 1470-1489', N.H., XIV (1978), pp.78-107.

supporters, and this figure rose to 86% during his brief reign.<sup>1</sup> Both Richard and his predecessor the Earl of Warwick governed through a complex series of personal relationships, and their military power enabled them to control large areas of the North.<sup>2</sup> Edward IV intended initially to govern the North parts by placing his brother at the head of the established Neville affinity, but I would suggest that the Duke's continued aggrandizement, culminating in his acquisition of the West March palatinate in 1483, backfired by making Gloucester into the kind of overmighty subject which his appointment had evidently been intended to prevent in the first place.<sup>3</sup> Richard undoubtedly exploited his northern connection in usurping the throne in 1483, and then subsequently as King, although arguably the Crown's absorption of the Neville affinity paved the way for such administrative innovations as the Council of the North, and permitted the early Tudor experimentation with northern government.

Considerable interest has been shown in recent years in Richard's relationship with northern England, with Gloucester's partisans stressing his popularity in the North, his administrative abilities, and his

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1. Michael Weiss, "Loyalte me Lie" : Richard III and Affinity Politics in Northern England, University of California, Irvine, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 1977, pp.vii-viii, 196, (an interesting study which reveals both the benefits and the dangers of computer analysis in historical research). For background see also Coles thesis ; A. J. Pollard 'The Northern Retainers of Richard Neville, Earl of Salisbury', M.H., XI (1976), pp.52-69 ; M. Weiss, 'A Power in the North? The Percies in the Fifteenth Century', Historical Journal, 19 (1976) pp.501-509.
  2. Weiss thesis, pp.vii-viii, 197-198, et passim.
  3. Rot. Parl., VI, pp.204-205.

military talents against the Scots.' Aspects of Richard's connection with the North do have a certain appeal to those of a romantic and imaginative disposition, but while it is misleading and unfair to ascribe the excesses of P. M. Kendall to all studies of this subject, the traditional assumptions are not substantiated by the extant evidence.<sup>2</sup> On the contrary, the study of Anglo-Scottish relations reveals that Richard was neither an outstanding military leader (as has been claimed) nor was he an exemplary Border official. Suffice to say, Richard's documented relationships with the merchant oligarchy in York, like those with his retainers on his Middleham estates, ought not to be regarded as typical of the North of England, and even these were client-patron relationships on traditional lines; for example, Dr. Attreed's researches on the York City fee-farm have demonstrated the *complexity of the relations between the York authorities and the Crown from 1482 until 1492.*<sup>3</sup> It has been claimed that Gloucester's administration of the Marches provided a

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1. eg. R. E. Horrox, Richard III and the North, (Hull, 1986) ; "The Most Famous Prince of Blessed Memory" : Richard III and the City of York, ed. R. Freedman and E. White, (York, 1983) ; Richard III : the Road to Bosworth Field, ed. P. W. Hammond and A. F. Sutton, (London, 1985) ; D. Mitchell, Richard III and York, (York, 1983) ; D. Mitchell, Richard III, Middleham, and the King's Council of the North, (2nd ed., York, 1984) ; A. J. Pollard, 'North, South, and Richard III', The Ricardian, V pt.74 (1981), pp.384-389 ; Coles thesis ; Weiss thesis ; B. Williams, 'Richard III and Pontefract', The Ricardian, VI pt.86 (1984), pp.366-370 ; A. Cockerill, report on the seminar Richard III and the North of England, The Ricardian Bulletin, (Sept., 1985), pp.21-22 ; C. Ross, Richard III, (London, 1981), esp. pp.44-59, 119-124, 181-184 ; D. Seward, Richard III : England's Black Legend, (London, 1983), esp. ch.7, pp.71-89 ; J. Potter, Good King Richard? An Account of Richard III and his Reputation, 1483-1983, (London, 1983), esp. pp.21-23, 45-54 ; P. M. Kendall, Richard III, (London, 1955), esp. pp.105-150 ; M. A. Hicks, Richard III as Duke of Gloucester : A Study in Character, Borthwick Papers, 70, (York, 1986) ; and numerous other books and articles.
  2. eg. P. M. Kendall, Richard III, (London, 1955) ; V. B. Lamb, The Betrayal of Richard III, (London, 1959).
  3. Coles thesis ; L. C. Attreed, 'The King's Interest : York's Fee Farm and the Central Government, 1482-1492', N.H., XVII (1981), pp.24-43.

standard of excellence which later Wardens were expected to maintain, but the evidence is open to other interpretations, and the argument is undermined somewhat by Edward IV's personal intervention in 1475 and 1477.<sup>1</sup> In 1522, Wolsey merely mentioned the Duke as one of several former Wardens when he urged Lord Dacre to maintain the "quyet restfulnes and good order" of the Borders.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, in 1513 and 1514, Dacre's own references to Gloucester and Northumberland were an attempt to excuse his own failings; even with their "great and mighti powers" the Duke and Earl had also experienced difficulties, and he was "of litell substance" in comparison.<sup>3</sup> "Right harde and impossible it is", Dacre remarked, "for such a poure Baron....to make resistence and kepe the Kinges subgiettes and there goodes in suretie all along the Est Middill and West Marchies against the hole power....of Scotland without great help and assistance where as in tymes passed the duke of Gloucestre beyng a Kinges Broder and therle of Northumberlond with there great powers couth not well kepe them but ever distroyed".<sup>4</sup>

This interesting phase in northern history, which had commenced in 1471, continued throughout the reign of Henry VII in view of his interesting relations with Scotland both before and after the matrimonial alliance of 1502-1503. Superficially, as a usurper facing the threat of rebellion in a North where strong Yorkist influences had predominated, Henry VII's position was relatively weak. However, in view of the

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1. P. M. Kendall, Richard III, (London, 1955), p.129 ; MS. Cotton Vespasian C.XVI, ff.121-127, B.L.
  2. MS. Cotton Caligula B.III, ff.39-39v, B.L. ; L. & P. H.VIII, IV (1), p.52.
  3. MS. Cotton Caligula B.III, f.13, B.L. ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, (2), p.1054.
  4. MS. Cotton Caligula B.II, ff.200v-201, B.L. ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, (2), p.1260.

extensive areas of Crown land in the North, which had been enlarged by attainders and the acquisition of Neville and Yorkist interests, I would suggest that the King's hand was greatly strengthened by the considerable patronage at his disposal. The King began by relying on the traditional authority of the Percy family, but the Earl of Northumberland's murder in 1489 (and the minority of his son) enabled Henry to appoint his sons as nominal Wardens of the Marches and to experiment by creating deputy wardens and Lieutenants to carry out the official duties.<sup>1</sup> Arguably, the northern rebellion of 1489 constituted a turning point in Henry's reign, for the temporary demise of Neville and Percy power not only permitted the King to fragment and redistribute regional power among outsiders and lesser northern families, but an unpublished fragment of manuscript Cotton Julius B.XII reveals that social elites, including those of the North, sought to exploit the suppression of the rebels to their own advantage by ensuring that they were seen to support the Tudor monarch.<sup>2</sup> Interestingly, the North gave Henry VII comparatively little trouble for the remainder of the reign; Cornwall rather than northern *England* supported Perkin Warbeck, and it is significant that the King visited the North in 1486, 1487, and 1489, but not thereafter.

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1. see App., tables, III and IV ; R. L. Storey, 'The Wardens of the Marches of England towards Scotland, 1377-1489', E.H.R., LXXII (1957), pp.593-615 ; M. A. Hicks, 'Dynastic Change and Northern Society : the Career of the Fourth Earl of Northumberland, 1470-1489', N.H., XIV (1978), pp.78-107 ; M. E. James, A Tudor Magnate and the Tudor State : Henry Fifth Earl of Northumberland, (York, 1966).
  2. MS. Cotton Julius B.XII, ff.53v-56, B.L. (this describes the King's expedition to the North in May 1489 and consists mainly of the names of notables who assisted the King). The remainder is printed in Collectanea, IV, pp.246-248. For background see 'The Yorkshire Rebellion in 1489' (Anon.), Gentleman's Magazine XXX VI, (London, 1851), pp.459-468 ; M. E. James, 'The Murder at Cocklodge', Durham University Journal, LVII, no.11 (1965), pp.80-87 ; M. A. Hicks, 'The Yorkshire Rebellion of 1489 Reconsidered', N.H., XXII (1986), pp.39-62. None of these articles utilises the unpublished part of MS. Cotton Julius B.XII.

In 1489 Henry "established in the Northe Parties Therle of Surrey, Sir Richart Tunstall, and Sir Henry Wentworthe", and this was evidently the start of his subsequent policy of fragmentation and experimentation (a more comprehensive and innovative implementation of the checks and balances practised in the fifteenth century).<sup>1</sup> Since the Earl of Surrey had neither land nor traditional influence in the North, his authority depended on his social stature and derived directly from the King; the Earl's appointment was balanced somewhat by the fact that both Tunstall and Wentworth were long-standing royal servants, while Tunstall had well established northern connections (which the King strengthened with additional northern offices).<sup>2</sup> The King exerted considerable influence over the Earl of Surrey since the Howard estates, which the family had lost after the Battle of Bosworth, were only slowly granted back over a period of many years; it took the Earl's victory at Flodden in 1513 and the subsequent restoration of the Duchy of Norfolk for the Howards to attain the influence and position which they had held under the Yorkist monarchs.<sup>3</sup> Thus although the North of England, like Ireland in later centuries, can be said to have broken many a capable man, it evidently made the fortunes of Thomas Howard, Earl of Surrey, under the early Tudors. The Earl's powers and responsibilities, which were military, judicial, and administrative, have been discussed by his biographer M. J. Tucker in considerable detail, and are reflected in the wide

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1. MS. Cotton Julius B.XII, f.56, B.L. ; Collectanea, IV, p.246.
  2. M. J. Tucker, The Life of Thomas Howard, Earl of Surrey and Second Duke of Norfolk, 1443-1524, (London, 1964) ; J. M. Robinson, The Dukes of Norfolk. A Quincentennial History, (Oxford, 1982), pp.10-22 ; MS. Harleian 5804, ff.251-253v ; J. C. Wedgwood, History of Parliament, 1439-1509, vol.I, Biographies, (London, 1936), pp.882-884, 933-934.
  3. Tucker, cited in note 2 ; R. Bretton, 'The Howard Augmentation', The Coat of Arms, VI (1961), pp.290-293.



variety of terms used to describe his position; Surrey was, for example, "our Lieutenaunt and chieff officer in the contrey ther", vice-warden of the Marches, the "Lieutenant of the marches of England anempt Scotland", the "keper of the Estmarchesse and midelmarchesse of England", and "the Kynges Lieutenauntt generall in the north parties".<sup>1</sup> While Surrey resided in Sheriff Hutton castle and attempted to resolve local disputes, there is no evidence that the Earl presided over an official King's Council in the North as had been the case with the Earl of Lincoln under Richard III.

The early history of the Council in the North is well enough known thanks to the work of R. R. Reid, among others, but the evidence is very meagre indeed for the early Tudor period, and one cannot reasonably portray Henry VII's reign as "a period of retrogression compared with that of the Yorkists".<sup>2</sup> Without doubt, this subject constitutes one of the most difficult problems pertaining to early Tudor government. Richard III's northern council probably lapsed with his demise and, despite a reference in October 1490 to Surrey "and other of the King's counsellors staying on the spot", I suggest that any association of royal

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1. Tucker, cited on page 258 note 2 ; Y.C.R., II, p.66 ; PRO. C.82/65, (Bain, 1559) ; PRO. E.36/124, ff.147, 185 ; PRO. E.101/517/no.24, (the terms were used between 1490 and late 1509). Evidently terms such as "Lieutenant", "deputy", "keeper", "vice-warden", and "under-warden", were used interchangeably ; future research in this area will doubtless pay dividends.
  2. R. Lockyer, Henry VII, (Harlow, 1st ed., 1968), p.44, but omitted from the second ed. (Harlow, 1983), p.31. S. B. Chrimes, Henry VII, p 98, was also wrong in declaring that "no comparable institution appeared in his reign". For the Council see R. R. Reid, The King's Council in the North, (London, 1921) ; R. R. Reid, 'The Political Influence of the North Parts Under the Later Tudors', in Tudor Studies, ed. R. W. Seton-Watson, (London, 1924), pp.208-230 ; F. W. Brooks, York and the Council of the North, (York, 1954) ; F. W. Brooks, The Council of the North, (rev. ed., 1966) ; G. R. Elton, The Tudor Constitution, (Cambridge U.P., 2nd ed., 1982), pp.195-211 ; J. R. Tanner, Tudor Constitutional Documents, 1485-1603, (Cambridge U.P., 2nd. ed., 1951), pp.314-331 ; K. Pickthorn, Early Tudor Government, (2 vols. Cambridge U.P., 1934), vol.I., Henry VII pp.35-36, vol.II, Henry VIII pp.33-36.

councillors in the North parts was a more temporary arrangement than the Yorkist precedent.<sup>1</sup> To put things simply, there were councillors in the North, but the existence of an organised council (until the final decade of Henry VII's reign) is much more difficult to establish; for example, the York records reveal that Surrey and William Sever, Abbot of St. Mary's, were particularly prominent as royal officials, and Sir Guy Fairfax and Sir Richard Tunstall, among others, may have been associated with them from time to time.<sup>2</sup> In view of Henry VII's predilection for a "conciliar solution for every administrative problem", and the importance of private baronial councils in the later middle ages, it is likely that Fox, Sever, and Surrey were advised by councillors, but these were not necessarily the King's councillors in the North parts.<sup>3</sup> Unless additional evidence comes to light I would urge greater caution than some authorities have demonstrated.<sup>4</sup>

The participation of Surrey and Fox in Anglo-Scottish diplomacy and conflict illustrates that Henry VII probably perceived of Scotland as the most important aspect of a broader problem linking Anglo-Scottish relations to other economic, judicial, political, and administrative

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1. C.P.R., 1485-1494, p.332. For Richard III's regulations of July 1484 see MS. Harleian 433, ff.264v-265, B.L. ; L. & P. R.III and H.VII, I, pp.56-59 ; Harl.433, vol.III, pp.107-108 ; G. R. Elton, The Tudor Constitution, pp.200-201 ; R. R. Reid, The King's Council in the North, App.V (1), pp.504-505 ; English Historical Documents, vol.IV, 1327-1485, ed. A. R. Myers, no.360, pp.558-559.
  2. eg. C.P.R., 1485-1494, p.320. For Surrey and Sever in York see Y.C.R., II, pp.55, 60, 66, 92, 94, 97-110, 112-117, 121, 128-130, 136-137, 140-151, 151-159, 162-171, 176, 186-187.
  3. M. Condon, 'Ruling Elites in the Reign of Henry VII', pp.109-142 in Patronage, Pedigree, and Power, p.132 ; C. Rawcliffe, 'Baronial Councils in the Later Middle Ages', pp.87-108, of the same volume.
  4. cf. Tucker, cited on page 258 note 2, esp. pp.51-74 ; W. C. Richardson, Tudor Chamber Administration, 1485-1547, (Baton Rouge, 1952), pp.132-141.

problems concerning northern England. Most officials served the King well in multifarious duties, and clerics were particularly influential, probably partly on account of the royal influence over clerical appointments, and partly because they had no heirs to constitute a long-term threat to Crown interests. Richard Fox, for example, served as Bishop of Durham between 1494 and 1501 (years during which Anglo-Scottish relations doubtless preoccupied his attention), while William Sever (surveyor of the King's prerogative in the North from circa 1499) served as Bishop of Carlisle from 1495 and as Bishop of Durham from 1502 to his death in 1505.<sup>1</sup> Without doubt, Henry VII's relations with Scotland determined his freedom of manoeuvre in governing the North to a considerable extent, and thus Anglo-Scottish accord (and, to a lesser degree, Northumberland's murder in 1489) had a significant impact in northern history.

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, probably in consequence of the Anglo-Scottish accord, the Earl of Surrey was recalled to court, and the King thereby sought to modify "the authority of the traditional elites exercising power in the North" by establishing an autonomous King's Council in the North parts; it is unclear if he had Richard III's recent model in mind.<sup>2</sup> Thomas Savage, Archbishop of York from 1501, had served the King as "precedent of the Kinges Councell of the requestes", and was described circa 1504 as "than beyng president of the Kynges most

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1. The Register of Richard Fox, while Bishop of Bath and Wells, MCCCCXCII-MCCCCXCIV, with a Life of Bishop Fox, ed. E. C. Batten, (privately printed, 1889), pp.1-142, esp. pp.40-59 ; The Register of Richard Fox Lord Bishop of Durham, 1494-1501, ed. M. P. Howden, S.S., CXLVII (1932), pp.xiii-lvi, esp. pp.xxviii-xxxvii. Little is known about William Sever (or Senhouse), but see C. M. L. Bouch, Prelates and People of the Lake Counties : A History of the Diocese of Carlisle, 1133-1933, (Kendal, 1948), pp.132-134 ; WAM 16028, 16073, 12247.
  2. Condon article cited on page 260 note 3, pp.116-119, esp. p.117.

honorable counsell".<sup>1</sup> Moreover, a dispute between the Archbishop and the Earl of Northumberland about this time reveals that Savage held a commission as "president" of a "Counsell" in the North parts, to which the Earl had not originally been appointed, but which may have included Lords Clifford, Latimer and Conyers, Sir Marmaduke Constable, Sir Thomas Wortelay, and Sir Edward Savage.<sup>2</sup> The evidence pertaining to this Council remains meagre, but the York and Beverley records contain some useful information, while the regional rivalry of the Earl and the Archbishop resulted in their being bound by recognizance to keep the peace before the King's Council at Westminster.<sup>3</sup> According to the Liber Intrationum, Savage and Northumberland were both "men of honor and suche personns as the Kinges grace had cheifflye comitted to governinge and auctoritye in the partyes of the Northe".<sup>4</sup> The authority of Savage's northern council may have been confined to Yorkshire, but conclusions are hindered by inadequate evidence and by the imprecision of the contemporary term "North parts"; in 1504, for example, Savage described himself as "the King's Lieutenant and high commissioner withynne these the North parties".<sup>5</sup>

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1. Ibid., p.118 ; Select Cases in the Council of Henry VII, ed. C. G. Bayne and W. H. Dunham jnr., Selden Society, vol.75 (1956), p.xxxviii.
  2. PRO. E.163/9/27 ; Condon article cited on page 260 note 3, pp.118, 137-138 (n.42).
  3. Y.C.R., III, pp.3-8, 11-12, 16, 18, (p.3 mentions "my Lord Archebischop and other of the Kyngs Counseill") ; H.M.C., Report on the MSS. of the Corporation of Beverley, 1344-1821, (London, 1900), pp.168-170 ; Select Cases in the Council of Henry VII, ed. C. G. Bayne and W. H. Dunham jnr., Selden Society, vol.75 (1956), pp.41-44 ; R. R. Reid, The King's Council in the North, pp.83-91 ; The York Mercers and Merchant Adventurers, ed. M. Sellers, S.S., CXXIX (1918), pp.110-111 ; WAM 16027.
  4. Select Cases in the Council of Henry VII, ed. C. G. Bayne and W. H. Dunham jnr., Selden Society, vol.75 (1956), p.41.
  5. Y.C.R., III, p.5 ; Condon article, cited on page 260 note 3, pp.117-118, 137-138 (n.42).

On the Marches, where defence against Scotland was always the major consideration, Henry VII sought to exploit local rivalries and to rely on lesser northern families such as the Dacres and the Darcies; royal influence was maintained by a combination of insecure tenure of office, "fiscal and feudal harassment", and the division of power among a number of deputies and offices.<sup>1</sup> The Wardenship of the Marches merits detailed study under Henry VII and Henry VIII, not only in an attempt to assess the effects of the reduction of fees, but also to explain the increasing complexities of the Border administration as these monarchs sought to achieve defence on the cheap and to avoid creating overmighty subjects, by spreading responsibility and power among various families and officials.<sup>2</sup> An indication of the complexity is provided by the fact that John Heron of Ford, William Heron, Ralph Grey, Sir Richard Chomley, William Lord Conyers, and Sir George Strange, among others, were all officials on the Marches under Henry VII and yet little is known about any of these appointments.<sup>3</sup> For example, Edmund Dudley personally noted on a Chancery warrant of March 1509 that the bill was "made for the Lord Conyers for the Est marche oonly and nott as deputie to my lord prince but Immediatly by the Kinges grace as the Lord Darcy was", and this fact

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1. Condon article, cited on page 260 note 3, pp.118-119.
  2. cf. R. L. Storey, 'The Wardens of the Marches of England Towards Scotland, 1377-1489', E.H.R., LXXII (1957), pp.593-615 ; R. R. Reid, 'The Office of Warden of the Marches. Its Origin and Early History', E.H.R., XXXII (1917), pp.479-496 ; C. H. H. Blair, 'Wardens and Deputy Wardens of the Marches of England towards Scotland in Northumberland', Archaeologia Aeliana, XXVIII (1950), pp.18-95 ; T. Hodgkin, The Wardens of the Northern Marches, (London, 1908) ; Cott thesis ; H. Pease, The Lord Wardens of the Marches of England and Scotland, (London, 1913).
  3. eg. PRO. E.404/81 (John Heron, c.1495) ; Bain, 1661, PRO. C.82/332, C.P.R., 1494-1509, pp.200, 202, 213 (William Heron, Grey, and Chomley, c.1500) ; Bain, 1751, C.C.R., 1500-1509, pp.359-360, Rot. Scot., II, p.567, (Conyers, c.1508) ; C.P.R., 1485-1494, p.40 (Strange, c.1485) ; App., tables III and IV.

merits additional investigation.<sup>1</sup> There is some evidence that Henry VII sought to fragment local authority by perceiving of the Marches as three distinct areas, and the appointment of separate captains for the defence of Berwick and Carlisle from early in the reign probably facilitated a measure of experimentation.<sup>2</sup> However, experimentation was always effectively limited by the danger inherent in proximity to Scotland, and by the capabilities of those individuals appointed to positions of local power and responsibility.

In May 1537 Henry VIII would inform the Duke of Norfolk that on the Marches he refused to be bound "of a necessite to be served there with lordes", but would be served "with suche men, what degree soever they be of" that he chose to appoint.<sup>3</sup> In reality, however much monarchs might resent it, the fact was that their local officials had to have sufficient local power and influence (by means of landholding, marriage, or traditional ties) to command the respect of the populace; Dacre, for example, consistently lamented the weakness of his position.<sup>4</sup> In this respect one may well agree with Miss Condon's observations on the superficiality of changes in the structure of power at a local level in the short-term.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, it is clear that most English monarchs failed to identify and tackle the problems presented by the north parts save at a fairly elementary level, and, in particular, they often failed to appreciate

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1. PRO. C.82/325 ; Condon article, cited on page 260 note 3, p.138 (n.50).
  2. App., tables I and II.
  3. S.P., Henry VIII, vol.1, pt.II, LXXXVI, pp.547-548.
  4. Cott thesis ; for Dacre's correspondence see eg. MSS. Cotton Caligula B.I, B.II, B.III, B.VI, etc. See also Clifford Letters of the Sixteenth Century, ed. A. G. Dickens, S.S., CLXXII, (1962), pp.96-99.
  5. Condon article, cited on page 260 note 3, p.119.

the length of the Anglo-Scottish frontier, the clannish loyalties of Border society, and the sheer magnitude of the tasks with which they occasionally entrusted their under-endowed and over-extended Wardens. The Wardenship of three Marches was well beyond the capabilities of Thomas Lord Dacre, or indeed of any individual; as Fox informed Wolsey in 1523, "it shalbe to mucche for any oon persone to bere the burdeyn of all three marches in the tyme of werre", and this was also the case during peacetime.<sup>1</sup> There can be little doubt that Anglo-Scottish relations and the problems of the North parts created many important dilemmas for fifteenth and sixteenth century English monarchs, but this subject merits much more detailed research than it has hitherto received (perhaps along the lines indicated above).

Ultimately, I suggest that Anglo-Scottish relations may be considered most profitably from three different, though closely-related, perspectives. First, one needs to be aware of the nature of the contacts between the inhabitants of both realms; a contact which monarchs sought to restrict in an attempt to contain the problems of Border society. Dr. Cardew has offered some penetrating insights into this aspect of Anglo-Scottish relations, though her conclusions have of course been limited by the extant evidence.<sup>2</sup> In general, English and Scottish monarchs

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1. MS. Cotton Caligula B.VI, ff.287-288, B.L., esp. f.287v ; Ellis, Letters, vol.I (3rd ser.), CXIV, pp.319-324 ; Letters of Richard Fox 1486-1529, ed. P. S. and H. M. Allen, (Oxford, 1929), 81, pp.135-138. In 1514, Dacre pointed out that he had "no strienth ne help of men freyndes ne tenautes within the same Est marchies". The same document also reveals that his indenture as Warden granted him "the nominacion of the lieutenautes" and that he had "noo wages" for holding this office. In fact the Crown appointed Ralph Fenwick as Lieutenant of the Middle March rather than Dacre's candidate (his brother, Philip Dacre), and, in consequence, he requested that Fenwick and Sir Edward Ratclyffe would answer for their own activities, since "they haif the wages and office of Lieutenauntshipp and I the name of wardain" (MS. Cotton Caligula B.II, ff.201, 202, B.L.).
  2. Cardew thesis, passim.

realistically accepted that contact - and thus conflict - between their subjects was inevitable, and elaborate provisions had been established over a long number of years, as evinced by March Law and the Marcher administration, to eradicate reciprocal difficulties.' In this respect Border friction was endemic, but while mutual accord and conciliation prevailed, Border infractions did not constitute a *casus belli*. Secondly, one ought to perceive the local political contacts between the officials of the Marches; in this context, the officials dealt with the practical arrangements of local administration, such as punishment of offenders, redress of injuries, and the maintenance of the status quo. On occasion, local officials also dealt directly with the neighbouring monarch, but since diplomacy was essentially personal, the attitudes held by their Kings (and by royal councillors) were of much greater significance. Thirdly, one ought to perceive the official diplomacy maintained by the respective monarchs, and the occasional interest and intervention of continental powers, such as France, Spain, and the Papacy. This aspect of Anglo-Scottish relations has attracted the most attention in previous studies, both on account of the nature of the evidence, and because this has generally been defined as the subject matter of any relationship between two countries. Even here, however, hopefully I have demonstrated that there was room for re-emphasis and reinterpretation, since the old traditions do not stand up to rigorous examination, and regnal chronology has little relevance in some respects.

The link between the three perspectives was clearly provided by the attitudes and actions of the English and Scottish monarchs. In view of

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1. eg. W. Nicholson, Leges Marchiarum, or Border Laws, etc., (London, 1705), mainly from the MSS. PRO. SP.15/5, SP.15/6 (c.1568 and 1603). For Laws of the Marches from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century see also N.L.S. Adv. MSS. 25.4.15, 25.5.9, 25.5.6, 25.5.7, 7.1.9. ; MS. Lansdowne 263, B.L. ; MS. Harleian 4700, B.L. ; Percy family Alnwick castle MS. 1A (B.L. microfilm 280).



the traditional inclinations of their subjects, in an age dominated by personal diplomacy, the royal response to events on the Borders, diplomatic initiatives, or to external influences from continental monarchs, was of vital significance. An accurate appraisal of Anglo-Scottish relations at any time depends on a careful consideration of this tripartite perspective since the evidence rarely produces any uniform pattern of events. For example, the period from 1503 to 1509 may superficially appear to have been peaceful when, in reality, a measure of tension prevailed in 1507 and 1508. A more pertinent illustration concerns the period from 1512 to 1513; whereas many historians have detected a deterioration in Anglo-Scottish relations leading apparently inexorably to Flodden, in fact Border officials stated that the frontier was peaceful and their relations with the Scots quite cordial.<sup>1</sup> The tendency of both parties to sign truces on the one hand, while promoting internal discord in the neighbouring realm at every opportunity on the other hand, provides additional testimony of this general observation. Arguably, terms such as 'peace' and 'war' are meaningless in this context and ought not to be used without qualification when discussing Anglo-Scottish relations.

On another level, one discerns a certain tendency for contemporaries, from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century, to perceive of the Borders as becoming increasingly lawless; this constitutes a classic example of 'good old days' syndrome, and a lament for vanished days which had never existed in northern England. Furthermore, the relations between Anglo-Scottish borderers were complicated immeasurably by the attitudes adopted by their respective monarchs. Reiving, for example, though considered to be a heinous offence by monarchs and their local

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1. see Chapter Three, section D.

officials whenever Anglo-Scottish accord prevailed, was actively encouraged and organised by these same authorities as a patriotic manifestation of Border defence when England and Scotland were in violent dispute.<sup>1</sup> To the Borderer inured to reiving this ambivalence was doubtless perplexing, and this was also true of the fact that royal payments for defence depended on whether or not England and Scotland were officially in dispute. In March 1524, for example, Dacre informed Wolsey that the inhabitants of the Eastern Marches (where he had no traditional influence) refused to resist the Scots, "without thay had wagies now in the tyme of warr, lyke as they had the last yere".<sup>2</sup> Without some tradition of local authority Dacre could not provide adequate defence in the Eastern Marches; as Lord Monteagle observed in 1523, the North parts were "evil to rule, except it be with him that knoweth them".<sup>3</sup>

Without doubt, the relations between England and Scotland and between northern and southern England constitute closely linked themes of immense significance in British history. As Henry VII had anticipated, in the long-term the greater power did draw the lesser power, and since the Union England has consistently sought to dominate Scotland. Few Scots fail to perceive of the combination of condescension, exploitation, admiration, fear, and rivalry which conditions English attitudes towards them, and the Scots, in turn, have responded with exaggerated and ostentatious manifestations of Scottish nationalism; such nationalism occasionally romanticises Anglo-Scottish conflict by suggesting that the Scottish nation was forged in blood:-

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1. For detailed study of a group of border reivers see Dietrich thesis.
  2. S.P., Henry VIII, vol.IV, pt.IV, XLI, pp.73-76, esp. p.75.
  3. L. & P. H.VIII, III, pt.II, 2834 pp.1189-1190 ; For Dacre's problems see Cott thesis.

"O Flower of Scotland,  
When will we see your like again  
That fought and died for  
Your wee bit hill and glen?  
And stood against him,  
Proud Edward's army,  
And sent him homeward  
Tae think again".<sup>1</sup>

The recent emphasis on a North-South (and Anglo-Scottish) divide in the 1980's is, arguably, merely symptomatic of much more fundamental divisions of a political, social, economic, and cultural nature, with roots stretching back into our historical past. As evinced by this study, these divisions are neither a product of late twentieth century socio-economic crisis, nor are they as superficial as some contemporary politicians would have us believe. In particular, the 1987 General Election results, which have highlighted a large gulf in the aspirations and values of the peoples of England and Scotland, serve as a pertinent indication that while Anglo-Scottish union has prevailed since 1707, Anglo-Scottish relations are neither inert nor unchanging more than two and a half centuries later.

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1. Words and music, Ray Williamson, arranged by The Corries ; J. J. Sharp, The Flower of Scotland : A History of Scottish Monarchy, (Perth, 1981), p.51.

A P P E N D I X

TABLE I : Officials of Carlisle

1461	Richard Neville, Earl of Warwick. <sup>1</sup>
1470	Richard, Duke of Gloucester. <sup>2</sup>
1485	Richard Salkeld. <sup>3</sup>

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1. PRO. E.101/71/5, no.4 - captain and warden of Carlisle (town and castle), and of West March. \*see below.
2. PRO. E.101/71/5, no.11 - as above, and he appears to have retained the offices as King ; Rot. Parl., VI, pp.204-205.
3. Described as captain of Carlisle in November 1485 (PRO. E.404/79, no.83), as governor and constable in 1490, 1491, and 1499 (PRO. E.404/80 nos.46 and 212 ; PRO. E.101/72/6, no.1164).

\*Henry Lord Fitzhugh was retained as his Lieutenant of the town and castle in 1466 - MS. Lansdowne 203, f.195, B.L.

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Note.

The dates given pertain to initial appointments, and in most cases the individuals named served in the office until another was appointed in their place. However, continuity of service cannot always be proved. After 1483 (in the case of the West Marches) and after 1489 (in the case of the East and Middle Marches), the office of Warden remained in royal hands (Henry VII, for example, appointed his infant sons as nominal wardens) but the responsibilities and duties were undertaken by their deputies, Lieutenants, and vice-wardens ; this situation evidently prevailed until the early sixteenth century.

TABLE II : Officials of Berwick

1482	Henry Percy, Earl of Northumberland. <sup>1</sup>
1488	Sir William Tyler. <sup>2</sup>
1500	Sir Thomas Darcy, Lord Darcy. <sup>3</sup>
	Sir Richard Chomley. <sup>4</sup>
1509	William Lord Conyers. <sup>5</sup>
1509	Thomas Lord Darcy. <sup>6</sup>

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1. Percy was made captain of the town and castle after its recapture and held the position as Warden of the East and Middle Marches. An indenture for May-October 1483 is still extant - Ed.V Grants, pp.20-23.
2. For 1488, 1489, see PRO. E.404/79, no.138 ; C.P.R., 1485-1494, p.295. He presumably held the office as captain throughout the 1490's.
3. Described as captain in March, C.C.R., 1485-1500, 1193, p.355, (Bain, 1662). MS. Lansd. 207A, f.83, B.L. describes him thus in December 1498.
4. Described as Lieutenant of the castle in November ; C.P.R., 1494-1509, p.233.
5. Described as captain ; C.P.R., 1494-1509, p.596 ; For indenture, dated December 1508, see C.C.R., 1500-1509, 958 pp.359-360, (Bain, 1751).
6. Appointed warden general of East March and captain of Berwick in June ; see L. & P. H.VIII, I, 94 (65 and 66), 845 ; PRO. E.101/72/7/1165.

TABLE III : Officials of the West Marches,

1470 - 1514

1470	Richard, Duke of Gloucester. <sup>1</sup>
1484	Humphrey, Lord Dacre. <sup>2</sup>
1485	George Strange, Kt. <sup>3</sup>
1486	Thomas, Lord Dacre. <sup>4</sup>
1495	Henry, Duke of York. <sup>5</sup>
	Thomas, Earl of Surrey. } Thomas, Lord Dacre. } John Heron of Ford. } <sup>6</sup>
1496	Richard Fox, Bishop of Durham. <sup>7</sup>
1498	Thomas Darcy. <sup>8</sup>
1504	Thomas, Lord Dacre. <sup>9</sup>
1509	William, Lord Conyers. <sup>10</sup>
	Thomas, Lord Dacre. <sup>11</sup>

1. Warden to his death in 1485, with short interim for the Earl of Warwick during Edward IV's exile ; PRO. E.101/71/5, no.11 ; PRO. E.404/77/1, no.28 ; Rot. Scot., II, pp.423-424 ; Storey article, pp.607-608, 615. For his Lieutenant, Sir William Parre, see PRO. E.404/75/3, (Feb. 1474).
2. Lieutenant-general ; C.P.R., 1476-1485, pp.485-486.
3. C.P.R., 1485-1494, p.40 ; Lord Stanley's son. An interim appointment.
4. Lieutenant ; 1486, 1487, 1488, 1491 ; Rot. Scot., II, pp.472-473, 479, 486, 498, 515 ; PRO. C.82/10 and 40 ; PRO. E.101/72/3, no.1062.
5. Warden-general ; Rot. Scot., II, pp.517-518.
6. Dacre was Lieutenant (Rot. Scot., II, p.518), while Surrey was vice-warden and Heron Lieutenant, of the West and Middle Marches (C.P.R., 1494-1509, p.32 ; PRO. E.404/81).
7. Lieutenant ; Rot. Scot., II, pp.522-523.
8. Deputy ; Rot. Scot., II, p.532.
9. Dacre was Lieutenant of the West and Middle March in 1502 (PRO. C.82/227), but warden-general in 1504 (C.P.R., 1494-1509, p.379).
10. Warden-general (March, 1509) ; Rot. Scot., II, p.567.
11. Warden-general (July, 1509, and 1511) ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 132 (5) ; Rot. Scot., II, p.577.

TABLE IV : Officials of the East and Middle  
Marches, 1470 - 1514.

1470	Henry, Earl of Northumberland. <sup>1</sup>
	Marquis Montague. <sup>2</sup>
1474	Robert Multon, prior of St. John, <sup>3</sup>
	Henry, Earl of Northumberland. <sup>4</sup>
1490	Prince Arthur. <sup>5</sup>
	Thomas, Earl of Surrey. } Robert Multon. } 6
1495	Henry, Duke of York. <sup>7</sup>

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1. Rot. Scot., II, p.422.
2. E. March only, and d. 14 April, 1471 ; Rot. Scot., II, p.425.
3. Rot. Scot., II, p.442, and see below, note 6.
4. Percy held the office of warden until his murder in 1489, though George Strange, Kt., was warden from September to January 1486 (the period of the Earl's imprisonment) ; Rot. Scot., II, pp.442, 463-464, 470-471, 484-485 ; Ed.V Grants, pp.19-20 ; C.P.R., 1485-1494, p.40, for Strange.
5. Warden-general ; C.P.R., 1485-1494, p.314.
6. Surrey was vice-warden during the 1490's (C.P.R., 1485-1494, p.314 ; Rot. Scot., II, pp.501-502 ; PRO. C.82/65 ; Bain, 1559, 1562), while Multon was described as deputy Lieutenant in 1490-91 (Rot. Scot., II, p.494), a position which he may have held since the first year of Henry VII's reign (PRO. E.404/80, no.81).
7. Warden-general ; Rot. Scot., II, pp.517-518. Surrey served as his vice-warden, and Lieutenants and deputies c.1496-c.1500, included Richard Fox, Bishop of Durham, Sir Thomas Darcy, William Heron, John Cartington, Edward Ratcliffe, Ralph Grey, Sir Richard Chomley, and Richard Eryngton ; C.P.R., 1494-1509, pp.200, 213, (Surrey vice-warden of W. and M. marches) ; Rot. Scot., II, pp.522-523, 532 ; Bain, 1661, 1662 ; PRO. C.82/332. Another Lieutenant was Sir George Tailboys ; C.P.R., 1494-1509, p.176 ; Bain, 1652. Ratcliffe, Cartington, Tailboys, and Roger Fenwick held office and/or land of the Earl of Northumberland according to Percy family Syon House MS. C.IX 1a (B.L. microfilm 376), ff.6v-8. Arguably Henry VII used the local connections of Percy servants while avoiding placing the wardenship in the hands of the fifth Earl.

1495	Henry, Duke of York.
1504	Thomas Lord Dacre. <sup>1</sup>
1505	Thomas Lord Darcy. <sup>2</sup>
1506	Edward Ratclyffe and Roger Fenwick. <sup>3</sup>
1509	William Lord Conyers. <sup>4</sup>
	Thomas Lord Darcy. <sup>5</sup>
1511	Thomas Lord Dacre. <sup>6</sup>

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1. Warden-general of W. and M. Marches from July (C.P.R., 1494-1509, p.379 ; PRO. C.82/332 ; Bain, 1746) ; he was Lieutenant of these marches circa 1502 ; PRO. C.82/227, (Bain, 1683).
2. Warden-general of E. March ; he was Lieutenant of E. and M. Marches c.1498-1499 ; C.P.R., 1494-1509, pp.160, 442 ; PRO. E.404/83. For 1505 see PRO. C.82/276 ; Bain, 1742.
3. "custodes generales videlicet in partibus Middilmarchiarum" ; PRO. C.82/284.
4. Warden-general ; Rot. Scot., II, p.567 ; PRO. C.82/325.
5. Warden-general of E. March and captain of Berwick from June ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 94 (65 and 66). Darcy, Ratclyffe, and Fenwick were described as wardens-general of the M. March in July 1509, while Ratclyffe and Fenwick were described as Lts. of the M. Marches in May 1510 ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 132 (38), 485 (26).
6. Keeper, warden, and governor of E. and M. Marches ; L. & P. H.VIII, I, 984, 1003 (17 and 23) ; Rot. Scot., II, p.577. Ratclyffe and Rauf Fenwicke (Roger's son) were Lieutenants and governors of the M. Marches in 1514 ; PRO. E.101/72/7/1166. Dacre held these offices from 1511-1522 and 1523-1525. See Chapter Six, page 265 note 1, for Dacre as Warden, and Cott thesis, passim.



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E.403 Exchequer, Enrolments and Registers of Issues.  
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E.405 Exchequer, Rolls of Receipts and Issues.  
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DURH.3 Palatinate of Durham, Cursitor's Records.  
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