

**TOURISM, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNANCE:
THE CASE OF LIVERPOOL 1974-2000**

By

Greg Connelly

Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of Liverpool for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy
February 2003

ABSTRACT

Urban tourism has never been more important, nor the issues it confronts more complex. The aim of this study is to examine the tourism policy process within the context of governance structures and economic restructuring in Liverpool.

The thesis argues that to research developments which are creating 'new' forms of urban tourism there is a need to develop a governance perspective through a 'middle-order' theoretical framework, applying key concepts from theories of urban entrepreneurialism proposed by Harvey (1989) and especially, Jessop (1997, 1998) in order to understand the dynamics of local change.

The analytical framework was used to review the history of tourism development in Liverpool tracing the origins of tourism organisation since the county of Merseyside was created in 1974. In the period since, the thesis identifies three distinct phases of tourism policy which reflect a response to the legacy of the industrial past and which are indicative of the shift from *government* to *governance*. The first phase (1974-1986) represents the beginnings of a tourism industry in Liverpool, signalling a shift from government to governance. The major introduction of tourism to the local economy, in this period, emanated from the establishment of the Merseyside County Council's Tourism Development Office in 1978 and the success of three main Merseyside Development Corporation's initiatives in the early 1980s. These two organisations were the first to initiate policies which encouraged new tourist attractions and thus demonstrated the tourism potential of the city. However, it is the argument of the thesis that the realisation that tourism could make a significant contribution to urban regeneration, in this period, stemmed from a mixture of good reasoning, default and opportunism. The second phase (1986-1994) represents the repositioning of tourism policy on the urban agenda. The response was a proliferation of new agents of governance, and the shift towards public-private partnerships gathered pace as the city increasingly attempted to compete for visitors, investment, jobs and the regeneration of its physical infrastructure. The thesis argues that during this period a space emerged which fitted most comfortably with unlocking resources from higher levels of government and espousing a pro-growth tourism agenda. The final phase (1994-2000) emerged with the introduction of EU Objective 1 structural funds. The thesis argues that this new supranational tier of policy intervention complicated the governance picture in Liverpool as intervention was now taking place at local, regional, national and supranational levels. With so many new influences and bureaucracies involved contests and tensions emerged between different tiers of governance with regard to the effective working of tourism programmes. Nevertheless, the drive to prioritise entrepreneurship and the pursuit of the new intensified as did the range of new tourism policy initiatives and delivery mechanisms.

The thesis concludes with reflections on the theoretical approach and empirical findings, a number of policy recommendations and proposals for future research.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	i
Contents	ii
List of Figures	vi
List of Tables	vii

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1	The Focus of the Thesis: Understanding Tourism, ‘New’ Forms of Governance and Local Economic Development	1
1.2	The Case-Study Area: Liverpool	1
1.3	The Theoretical Framework: Hall and Jenkins (1995) Public Policy Organising Framework, Theories of Urban Entrepreneurialism Proposed by Harvey (1989) and Especially, Jessop (1997, 1998)	3
1.4	Structure of the Thesis	6

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL CONTEXT: POSITIONING URBAN TOURISM WITHIN THE ‘ENTREPRENEURIAL CITY’

2.1	Introduction	9
2.2	Urban Tourism: the Existing Literature	9
2.3	The Concept of Urban Tourism: Some Approaches Towards its Analysis	10
2.4	The Role of Institutional Arrangements, Power and Ideology	19
2.5	The Entrepreneurial City and the ‘New Urban Politics’	32
2.6	Key Elements of Entrepreneurial Activity: Place Promotion and Pro-growth Local Economic Development Strategies	45
2.7	Linking Theory to Research	55
2.8	Conclusion	64

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS

3.1	The Choice of the Study Area	67
3.2	Research Methodology and Methods	68
3.3	The Fieldwork Experience	77
3.4	Conclusion	86

CHAPTER 4: THE 'URBAN PROBLEM' AND ITS TOURISM POTENTIAL

4.1	Introduction	88
4.2	The Urban Problem in a British Context	88
4.3	The Rising Profile of Tourism at the National, and Local Level	91
4.4	Public Policy and Tourism Governance	94
4.5	Conclusion	103

CHAPTER 5: PHASE I 1974-1986: THE EMERGENCE OF TOURISM IN LIVERPOOL

5.1	Introduction	105
5.2	The Merseyside County Council's Contribution to Tourism Development	107
5.3	Local Government	120
5.4	The Merseyside Development Corporation (MDC) and Tourism Development In Liverpool	125
5.5	Promoting Liverpool's Competitive Position in Tourism: Strong Versus Weak Competitive Approaches	138

CHAPTER 6: PHASE II 1986-1994: REPOSITIONING TOURISM POLICY ON THE URBAN AGENDA

6.1	Introduction	143
6.2	Institutional Searching for a Competitive Edge	144
6.3	The Ownership and Control Structure of Tourism Governance	148
6.4	Tourism Governance: Policy Priorities	156
6.5	The Learning Economy: Research and Development, Innovation and Competitive Advantage	164
6.6	Marketing Liverpool	171
6.7	Promoting Liverpool's Competitive Position in Tourism 1986-1994: Strong Versus Weak Competitive Approaches	180
6.8	Conclusion	183

CHAPTER 7: PHASE III 1994-2000 CONSOLIDATING TOURISM GOVERNANCE IN LIVERPOOL

7.1	Introduction	186
7.2	The Emerging Strategic Framework for Tourism	186
7.3	Merseyside SPD: Issues of Contested Governance- Focal Points for Conflict	193
7.4	Some Examples of EU Influence on Tourism Policy at the Local Level	198
7.5	Place Promotion Delivery Mechanisms: Strong Versus Weak Competition	203
7.6	Delivery Mechanisms for Tourism Related Employment Training Provision	217
7.7	Tourism a Strategy for Sustainable Employment?	222
7.8	The 'Learning Economy': Innovation and Competitive Advantage	227
7.9	Conclusion	236

**CHAPTER 8: TOURISM, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNANCE:
THE CASE OF LIVERPOOL**

8.1	Introduction	240
8.2	Theoretical Reflections	240
8.3	Empirical Findings	243
8.4	Policy Issues	248
8.5	Future Research	254
8.6	Conclusion	256
	REFERENCES	258

LIST OF FIGURES

2.1	Elements in the Tourism Policy-Making Process	20
2.2	The Structure of the State with Reference to Tourism	22
2.3	Developing a Middle-order ‘Theoretical Fix’ to Understand Changing Form of Tourism, Economic Development and Governance at the Local Level	66
3.1	A Methodological Framework for Studying Tourism Policy and Governance	87
4.1	The Strategy of Urban Tourism	93
4.2	Statutory Tourist Board Framework in Britain	94
5.1	Tourist-Related Governance in Liverpool 1974-2000	106
5.2	ETB Grant Aid by Development Area 1972-1977 (£ millions)	109
6.1	Some Organisational Features of New Tourism Governance	150
6.2	Summary of the Ownership and Control Structure of Tourism Governance 1986-1994	152
6.3	Differences Between NMGM Control and County Council Control Of Art Galleries and Museums in Liverpool	154
6.4	Merseyside Tourism Board – Staffing	155
8.1	Summary of Framework for Examining Tourism Policy	242

LIST OF TABLES

3.1	Intensive and Extensive Research: A Summary	71
3.2	Secondary Material Sources	73
3.3	General Heads of Discussion	75
3.4	Question Types	75
3.5	Respondents in the Research	81
4.1	The Conditions of Urban Decline	89
5.1	Enquiries at Liverpool City Centre Tourist Information Office - July 1977 and July 1978	110
5.2	Key Objectives of the Albert Dock Scheme	132
6.1	Some Examples of New Tourism Governance Operational Structures	154
6.2	Priority Policy Objectives in Five New Tourism-Related Governance Agencies 1986-1994	157
6.3	Public Sector Funding as a Percentage (%) of Total Income	160
6.4	Summary of MTB's Marketing Activities	176
7.1	Priorities in Merseyside's Single Programming Document (SPD)	188
7.2	Measures to Support the Cultural, Media and Leisure Industries	189
7.3	Summary of the Liverpool UDP Tourism Policy Objectives	190
7.4	Merseyside's Top 20 Awards from Objective 1 Budget 1994-1999	201
7.5	Tourism Based ERDF Projects in Liverpool 1994-1999	202
7.6	Allocation of MTCB Objective One Funds	206
7.7	Key Tourism-Related Research Studies	229

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Focus of the Thesis: Understanding Tourism, ‘New’ Forms of Governance and Local Economic Development

This thesis will attempt to explore issues surrounding tourism governance and local economic development through a study of one of Britain’s oldest industrial cities: Liverpool. The aim of this chapter is to introduce briefly the case study area and the theoretical framework to be adopted in the analysis and to set out the structure of the thesis.

Over the last two decades urban tourism has received an unprecedented level of political attention. The view that tourism could bring prosperity to cities has resulted from a growing recognition (particularly in official circles) of the size and continued expansion of the industry and the belief that tourism must surely gain from increasing affluence, greater mobility and more leisure time. Moreover, in the 1980s, both central and local government advocated tourism as a major hope for employment and as such, tourism was seen as part of the general solution for many of the old industrial cities, particularly in the northern part of the country, who had experienced the loss of whole industries. Subsequently, since the early 1980s, the drive for tourism-led economic regeneration has continued unabated in many British industrial cities and this is no more apparent than in Liverpool where the growing importance of tourism in regeneration programmes has positioned the sector almost at the top of the urban agenda.

1.2 The Case-Study Area: Liverpool

Although during the post-war period many other cities have experienced structural, economic and social problems, and particularly high rates of unemployment, none have suffered to the same extent or for as long as Liverpool has. In part this was due to the historical forces that were in place such as dependence on the port and a small manufacturing sector, and partly due to the political ideology and activities of local councillors (Meegan, 1993, 1999; Parkinson and Bianchini, 1993; Parkinson, 1985).

Salvation of some sort came in the 1960s, in this period Merseyside was the major beneficiary of a stronger policy for the redistribution of industry following the 1960 Local Employment Act. Planned expansion of the British motor industry on Merseyside comprised Ford at Halewood, Standard Triumph at Speke, Vauxhall at Ellesmere Port and motor components firms, notably at Kirkby. However, the benefits brought by the motor industry proved to be short lived. From the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s a continuing stream of redundancies in the port and a termination of growth in the newly arrived manufacturing sector revealed the scale of the collapse of the port economy. In total, employment declined by 14.4% in the decade to 1976 (Cornfoot, 1982, Table 2.2, p.17). From the mid 70s unemployment in Liverpool was increasing at three times the national average (Lane, 1986).

In the period since, Liverpool has been recognised by both central government and the European Union (EU) as a city in decline. In 1981 one of the first Urban Development Corporations (MDC) was established, along with London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC), by parliament to regenerate 865 acres of the Mersey waterfront. In 1993 Merseyside was granted Objective One status for European funding 1994-1999, and this is to continue for another six years because of the intractability of the region's problems. Not least, the population of Liverpool continues to fall, between 1991 and 1997 by 3.5% (LCC, *Economic Development Plan*, 1999/2000). Compared to a 2% population growth for the UK (ONS, 1997, 1998). Moreover, the city is still suffering from redundancies and liquidations, the rate of job loss over the past decade in Liverpool (13.8%) has been significantly worse than that experienced regionally (a Merseyside decline of 8.5%), nationally (an increase of 1.2%) and in other major GB cities (LCC, 1998). Overall, it is not really surprising that the city has been the subject of development status and the recipient of virtually all forms of EU and central government urban regeneration initiatives and financial support throughout the post war period (see for example, Lawton and Cunningham, 1970; Lawless 1981; Lister, 1982; Aughton, 1990; Parkinson and Bianchini, 1993; Lauria, 1994; Evans, 1996; Meegan, 1999).

Historically, the idiosyncratic culture of 'working class' Liverpool has been largely patriarchal, with employment being predominately male and manual with large employers, a lack of self-help and an under-developed entrepreneurial skills base. In recent years, however, the concern with structural unemployment in Liverpool has led to an increased policy focus upon local economic development strategies as an engine of regeneration.

Additionally, there has been a proliferation of organisations from the public and private sector, creating 'new' forms of governance, who have become involved in local policy making and attempts to affect the local economy.

Since the 1970s the increasing commitment to tourism-led economic development in the city and the proliferation of agencies dealing with this sector, represents a significant re-ordering of governance in order to meet the challenges of the changing economy. To focus discussion, the empirical research of the thesis is focused upon Liverpool from 1974. It will attempt to identify three distinct phases, focusing on the evolution of new forms of local tourism governance as part of the emergence of the *entrepreneurial city* as a reaction to the continued climate of crisis. To establish the significance of these new forms of governance a number of questions are asked. What regulatory role do the proliferation of agencies and agents involved in tourism governance play? How are tourism strategies and policies established in the local governance system? What effect are tourism governance structures having on economic development?

1.3 The Theoretical Framework: Hall and Jenkins (1995) Public Tourism Policy Organising Framework, Theories of Urban Entrepreneurialism Proposed by Harvey (1989) and Especially, Jessop (1997, 1998).

During the 1980s and 1990s a substantial change in the form and practices of the British state was undertaken by successive Conservative governments, characterised by the shift from 'urban managerialism' to 'urban entrepreneurialism'. The rise and diffusion of urban entrepreneurialism as the new dominant policy strategy for local economic development has created the 'entrepreneurial city'. Such cities, are no longer portrayed primarily as centres of production but rather centres of consumption and Liverpool is a city that has been substantially affected by these changes. The aim of this thesis is to test whether re-working Hall and Jenkins (1995) policy organising framework within Jessop's (1997, 1998) analytical framework for theorising entrepreneurial city strategies and integrating key concepts drawn from Harvey's (1989) thesis on urban entrepreneurialism can provide insights into the processes which are affecting tourism, the local economy and polity.

Arguably, Hall and Jenkins (1995) organising framework for understanding tourism and public policy, is perhaps, one of the most detailed published to date. The approach

emphasises, public policy cannot remain independent of the political process and cannot be value free. Consequently, it is crucial for researchers to go beyond simply describing what policy-makers do (inputs and outputs), and to investigate what happened during the decision-making process in order to understand the causes and consequences of policies, decisions and actions.

The approach is organised around a number of critical concepts each of which raise a number of key research issues. The aim here is to reconstruct Hall and Jenkins (1995) approach by focusing on three themes which are of particular relevance to this research namely *institutional arrangements*, *power relationships* and *ideologies*. The concepts are interlinked and thus provide opportunities to analyse tourism public policies at a number of interrelated levels: supra-national, national, regional and local. Policy is therefore a consequence of the political environment, ideologies, the distribution of power, institutional arrangements and of decision-making processes (Hall and Jenkins, 1995, p.5). This combination, I would argue, provides a useful concrete research agenda which can be located within the analytical framework outlined by Jessop (1997, 1998) (see below).

Over the last two decades, urban geographers have been seemingly preoccupied with theorising the apparent transformation in the way cities are governed. This evolution has supposedly seen urban governance shift away from a 'managerialist' and localised provision of welfare and services towards more 'entrepreneurial' approaches emphasising local economic development. Many commentators term such modes of governance as entrepreneurial (Cox and Mair, 1988; Harvey, 1989; Kotler, Haider and Rein, 1993; Jessop, 1997, 1998).

Other commentators have challenged this contention, particularly concerning the extent to which managerialism has been overshadowed by entrepreneurialism (for a recent review of the debate, see Hall and Hubbard, 1996). It is not necessary, however, to accept uncritically the idea of this transformation, to agree that there has indeed been a pronounced shift to a more entrepreneurial form of urban governance, not least in the British context (Parkinson, 1989, 1996; Boyle and Hughes, 1994; Loftman and Nevin, 1994, 1996, 1998; Lawless, 1991).

David Harvey has been a key figure in this debate, linking the forms of development associated with urban entrepreneurialism to broader processes of economic change. Most

notably, the move in the regime of accumulation towards more service based activities particularly tourism. Harvey (1989) usefully identifies four key competitive approaches pursued by the coalitions engaged in urban entrepreneurialism involving competition over: the international division of labour (attracting mobile investment and employment); the spatial division of consumption (tourism and consumerism – “attracting the consumer dollar”); the acquisition of control and command functions (securing high-status activities – corporate Headquarters, media and financial decision makers); and the redistribution of surpluses by Central Government (transfer payments, defence contracts etc). Clearly, the concept of inter-urban competition plays a key role in the account, in that, the task of urban governance is to “maximise the attractiveness of the local site as a lure for capitalist development (Harvey, 1989, p.5).

Despite Harvey’s (1989) contribution to theorising the dynamics of capitalist urbanisation there have been remarkably few attempts to directly apply the framework set out in the 1989 article (Roberts and Schein, 1993). According to Wood (1998, p.122), it is difficult to put a finger on why this might be. He suggests that in part the synthetic nature of Harvey’s account makes it difficult to generate particular propositions that might guide concrete research. Moreover, the general framework is developed at a relatively high level of abstraction; accordingly, it is difficult to directly apply the framework to concrete research. The author concludes that operationalising the framework would necessitate the development of concepts at lower levels of abstraction, that remain consistent with the more abstract account.

Whilst the above commentators suggest it is difficult to find work that seeks to advance the argument laid out in Harvey’s (1989) thesis. In this author’s opinion, Jessop’s (1997, 1998) approach to theorising entrepreneurial city strategies, has indeed, developed beyond Harvey’s account and as such is of particular relevance for this research.

Competition is at the very forefront of Jessop’s approach and from this he makes a distinction between entrepreneurial policies oriented towards ‘strong competition’ and those oriented towards ‘weak competition’. Strong competition is directed towards positive-sum attempts to improve the overall (structural) competitiveness of a locality through continuing economic, political and social innovations. It is argued that these factors are relatively immobile as it is their simultaneous occurrence in particular cultural, ideological and political contexts in space and time which seems to create a synergy effect, which is difficult to recreate elsewhere.

This approach acknowledges that advantage in inter-urban competition is no longer based upon resources (natural economic factor endowments), but on innovative capacity.

Weak competition refers to essentially zero-sum attempts to secure reallocation of existing resources at the expense of other localities. These policies are more concerned with facilitative and supportive measures aimed at capturing mobile investment as well as simple image building measures with the same purpose. Such factor-based advantages, however, are difficult to sustain given the standardisation of many flagship development initiatives and local identity scripts (permitting their quick and easy adoption if the necessary finance and skills are available).

To sum up, I would argue that the more broadly Jessop's approach can be understood and directly applied the more one can differentiate and contextualise the different forms of competitiveness associated with new policy innovations.

1.4 Structure of the Thesis

Chapter 2 develops the analytical framework of this thesis. It is argued that bringing together the concrete features of Hall and Jenkins (1995) approach with theories of urban entrepreneurialism proposed by Harvey (1989) and especially, Jessop (1997, 1998), through developing 'key' mid-level concepts, provides an appropriate 'middle-order' framework for understanding the changes which are collectively creating 'new' modes of entrepreneurial governance and 'new' forms of urban tourism. A number of related aims and questions for investigation are outlined for applying the theory to the empirical research.

Chapter 3 provides an account of the research methodology and methods adopted. It attempts to justify undertaking research on the case study area of Liverpool and the adoption of a critical realist based method of intensive research. Qualitative research methods are primarily used, including: an extensive local and national newspaper search and semi-structured interviews. A synopsis of the fieldwork experience is provided, highlighting the ways in which the research evolved, the issues which emerged and the pitfalls of doing qualitative research.

Chapter 4 gives an historical overview of the urban problem and its tourism potential. It focuses on the aims and objectives of urban tourism and the role of Tourist Boards (national

and regional), in terms which take account of changes in emphasis and, in governance that the national policy framework has undergone since the 1969 Development of Tourism Act. The aim of this Chapter is to set the scene for the main study period which will be covered in Chapters 5-7.

Chapter 5-7 cover the period 1974-2000 and each Chapter attempts to relate a sub-period to the evolution of tourism development in Liverpool arguing that there was a process of transition taking place from 'urban managerialism' to 'urban entrepreneurialism' with three distinct phases.

Chapter 5 shifts to the period 1974-1986, arguing that this period represents the beginnings of a tourism industry in Liverpool. During this period experiments in tourism governance began to be introduced, signalling the beginnings of a shift from *government* to *governance*. The major introduction of tourism to the city's economy stemmed from the activities of two specific organisations, namely the Merseyside County Council (MCC) and the Merseyside Development Corporation (MDC). Both these organisations initiated policies, which for the first time, actively encouraged tourism development and in doing so demonstrated Liverpool's tourism potential.

Chapter 6 turns attention to the period 1986-1994, focusing on the proliferation of new agents of governance in the field of tourism development, in particular, the emergence of a locally-led public-private sector partnership regime which identified with the philosophy of the thematic of the entrepreneurial city. It argues that during this phase a space emerged which fitted most comfortably with unlocking resources from higher levels of government and espousing a pro-growth tourism agenda. In effect, this period represents a far greater commitment on behalf of policy-makers towards tourism governance and the creation of an institutional structure based on the foundations of partnership.

Chapter 7 examines the period 1994-2000 when a new City/region political context emerged with the introduction of EU Objective 1 structural funds. It argues that this new supra-national tier of policy intervention effectively complicated the governance picture in Liverpool as intervention was now taking place at local, regional, national and supra-national levels. With so many influences and bureaucracies involved there inevitably emerged contests and tensions with regard to the effective working of tourism programmes.

Nevertheless, in the vacuum of continued economic problems and the orientation of local, national and European policy, the commitment to prioritise entrepreneurship and the pursuit of the new intensified as did the range of new tourism policy initiatives and delivery mechanisms.

Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by drawing together the findings of each Chapter. The aim of this Chapter is to draw together a range of relevant conclusions and recommendations. It will reflect on the theoretical approach undertaken in this thesis. Empirical observations are made and some policy suggestions outlined. Finally, some possibilities for future research are proposed.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL CONTEXT: POSITIONING URBAN TOURISM WITHIN THE 'ENTREPRENEURIAL CITY'

2.1 Introduction

This Chapter attempts to provide an analytical framework for exploring urban tourism within the context of the rise and diffusion of urban entrepreneurialism as the new dominant policy strategy for local economic development in Liverpool and other UK cities. It does so by bringing together the Hall and Jenkins (1995) organising framework for understanding urban tourism policy with theories of urban entrepreneurialism proposed by Harvey (1989) and especially, Jessop (1997, 1998). This combination, I would argue, enables a clear distinction to be made between the **processes** and **structures** of the '*local*' political economy. Local conditions are important and can be analysed by contextualising urban entrepreneurialism, as the new locally based approach to economic regeneration and as a new model of local government behaviour. This offers a distinctive approach to the study of politics and the issue of power, capturing the key concepts of governance, the key players and how the politics could be reflected in local economic development strategies. The core of the argument presented in the thesis is that the study of urban tourism within the context of the entrepreneurial city helps us to understand how the social meaning and materiality of space is created through the practice of tourism itself, and how these representations are then incorporated into the accumulation process.

2.2 Urban Tourism: the Existing Literature

Urban tourism has, as a field of academic enquiry, been addressed only in recent years. Existing knowledge of urban tourism is limited in general terms because of the way tourism has evolved as an area of study, typically as a sub-discipline of other social science subjects in the 1970s and 1980s.

Although the volume of urban tourism literature has expanded dramatically during the last ten years or more, much writing to date has been involved in the description of supply and demand and assessment of current trends (Law, 1993, 1996) and the nature of existing

strategies and administrative structures (Cooper, 1987; Adams, 1991; Richards, 1995; Godfrey, 1998). Thus, the emphasis has tended to be descriptive as opposed to the development of a rigorous theoretical basis (Mullins, 1991; Hughes, 1992; Page, 1995; Ball & Stobart, 1998) and this lack of rigorous theorising is no more evident than in many investigations concerning the tourism sector, where, 'positivism is still the prevailing paradigm in many areas of tourism research' (Decrop, 1999, p.157; Riley, 1996).

Consequently, the subject has remained on the periphery of contemporary debates in economic geography. For example, tourism makes no more than a fleeting appearance in the pages of major social science journals instead, much of the tourism literature has been channelled into specialist journals such as *Annals of Tourism Research* and *Tourism Management*. Although other subject areas have their own specialist journals, in the case of tourism its weak representation among non-specialist journals means the subject is effectively academically isolated (see for example, Britton 1991; Williams & Montanari 1995; Page 1995; Ioannides 1995; Hall & Jenkins, 1995; Williams, 1997). To an extent, this largely isolationist stance, may be part of the reason why tourism researchers have, often in the past, refrained from using the theories which are at the forefront of contemporary mainstream theoretical debate.

2.3 The Concept of Urban Tourism: Some Approaches Towards its Analysis

A number of authors, albeit small, have attempted to theorise the dynamics of tourism over time (Noronha, 1976; Butler, 1980; Haywood, 1986; Debbage, 1990). Noronha (1976) has suggested that, tourism develops in three stages: (1) discovery, (2) local response and initiative, (3) institutionalised 'institutionalisation'. The concept of a consistent process through which tourist areas evolve was elaborated in the 'resort life cycle model' developed by Butler (1980) which is extensively documented (Page, 1995: 121) and popularised in various guises by many geographers to theorise the dynamics of resort evolution (Ioannides 1995: 50). Butler's (1980) model draws heavily from product life cycle theory used in marketing science, and is summarised as follows: visitors will come to an area in small numbers initially, restricted by lack of access, facilities, and local knowledge. As facilities are provided and awareness grows, visitor numbers will increase. With marketing, information dissemination, and further facility provision, the area's popularity will grow rapidly. Eventually, however, the rate of increase in visitor numbers will decline as the levels

of carrying capacity are reached. Thus the attractiveness of the area declines relative to that of other areas and, because of overuse and the impacts of visitors, the actual number of visitors may also eventually decline (Butler, 1980, p. 6).

Although this model provides a perspective on the rise and decline of resorts and potentially, therefore, on a shift in their regional distribution, one still has to question the validity of models developed within a logical positivist tradition which believe that human behaviour and activities can be rationalised into generalised models and provide a self-sufficient and unitary system of enquiry.

To conceptualise urban tourism, Ashworth (1992) identifies three approaches: First, emphasising the supply of tourism facilities in urban areas, where the categorisation and inventories of facilities by geographers have led to research on the distribution of hotels (Bull and Church, 1994; Jeffrey and Hubbard, 1988;), restaurants (Smith, 1983), tourist attractions (Johnson and Thomas, 1990; Townsend, 1992), shopping (Jansen, 1989; Jones and Simmons, 1987), night-life (Bianchini, 1995; Hughes, 1999) and other tourist-related services. This approach may also be directed at a comprehensive inventory for a particular city or group of cities (De Bres, 1994; Jansen-Verbeke, 1992). Ashworth points out that in a number of more recent tourism studies, the 'facility approach' has developed a stage further with the use of the term 'product' as a particular selected package, to highlight the diversity and variety of tourism resources to form a new and distinct consumable item. Secondly, there has been a focus on demand for urban tourism, where research has often been descriptive to establish the purpose of visits, the patterns and behaviour of tourist activities, and the ways in which destinations are perceived by visitors (Cohen, 1972; Graefe and Vaske, 1987; Ryan, 1991, 1995; Pearce, 1993). Thirdly, there are policy perspectives on urban tourism. Traditionally these have examined the rationale and the organisations responsible for functions including land-use zoning, site development, accommodation, the density of tourism development, the presentation of cultural, historical and natural tourism resources, and the provision of infrastructure. However, there appears to be a growing awareness of the need to integrate social concerns into the economic drive which underpins tourism development in general (Murphy, 1985; Pearce, 1989; Gunn, 1994; Hall and Jenkins, 1995; Woodley, 1999; Nelson, 1999).

Although the above approaches are not comprehensive, they do identify the limitations of the existing literature, particularly the lack of rigorous theorising. While there still remains a paucity of theoretically based research on urban tourism “a handful of authors have sought to introduce tourism within current geographical debates concerning industrial restructuring, post-Fordism, and postmodernism” (Ioannides, 1995, p50). A number of these approaches are examined below.

Tourism and the Transformation to Post-Fordism

Numerous examples of revitalised 19th-century post-industrial areas in British cities (Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham, Glasgow), confirm the thesis that tourism may represent an important element in the economic regeneration of urban areas. Indeed, in the last two decades of the twentieth century urban tourism lies at the centre of many of the restructuring processes which are shaping the map of British cities. It plays a crucial role in changing perceptions of urbanism and the post-industrial city becomes the place where people spend their leisure time, a place which is attractive, vibrant and wanted, which changes its image and the way residents and outsiders perceive it. Thus, cities are no longer portrayed primarily as centres of production but rather as centres of consumption. The industry also plays a key role in economic reorganisation, not only in the rejuvenation of depressed regional and local economies, but as a central instrument used by capital and policymakers to counteract, and engage in, inter-urban competition.

Recent developments in leisure theory (Henry and Bramham, 1990; Roche, 1992, Page, 1995) highlight how perceived structural changes in capitalist society have been accompanied by processes shaping the public sector provision of tourism and leisure activity in many post-industrial cities. They identify shifts in regimes of capital accumulation from mass consumption and a strong public welfare commitment (e.g. Fordism) towards new forms of consumption under conditions of post-Fordism. Under Fordist forms of consumption public tourism and leisure policy underlined leisure opportunities as a right of citizenship whilst leisure investment emphasised social provision and anticipated positive externalities (improved health, reduced crime). Under post-Fordist conditions policy emphasis is on providing cultural infrastructure to attract new investment from new industries or in some cities, providing infrastructure for new indigenous cultural industries, maximising tourism multiplier effect, providing safety net welfare services in the inner city and minimising the

cost of achieving positive externalities. Clearly, under post-Fordist conditions the public sector function has shifted from that of provider to one of an enabling or catalytic role in the social provision of tourism. Consequently, a major issue for city tourism is how to manage the product and its development to the benefit of local residents and industry players alike.

Mullins (1991) provides an interesting study which offers a new insight into the conceptualisation of how cities develop through tourism. He argues that 'tourism urbanisation' represents a new and extraordinary form of urbanisation because it is based on the sale and consumption of pleasure. This form of urbanisation contrasts with the industrial cities that emerged in the nineteenth century generally for reasons of industrial production, commerce and housing. Tourism urbanisation is for pleasure, excitement, relaxation and leisure and thus it is not a permanent feature, but a transitory function unrelated to basic human needs in the way of housing, health care, education and so on. Along with tourism urbanisation Mullins uses the concepts of the 'postmodern city' and 'gentrification' to highlight change in the nature of consumption resulting from a new regime of capital accumulation, one associated with a new society and a new form of urbanisation. Terms such as 'post-Fordism', 'flexible accumulation' and 'post-industrialism' have variously been used to describe this emerging regime which supposedly dates from about the early 1970s and is based on new systems of production and consumption (Hogget, 1991; Little, Clements and Jones, 1998; Ashworth and Voogd, 1990).

Mullins (1991) identifies a number of characteristics associated with the post-Fordist urban tourist destination that are helpful in identifying the distinctive features of urban tourism destinations. Hence, where tourism urbanisation exists, it is geographically different, in that the observed patterns of development and land use do not coincide with those characterised in the urban geographical models discussed in the previous section. The quest for the consumption of pleasure, Bauman (1988) maintains, is now the major focus of people's lives and he uses the term 'postmodernity' to identify this contemporary obsession. Rather than appearing as an entity in itself the 'postmodern city' prevails as parts of existing cities where 'We no longer plan the whole, but design the parts' (Harvey, 1988: 33). Although tourism urbanisation is a striking form of the postmodern city, the 'consumption compound' is the city's clearest manifestation. These compounds include large attraction complexes often conferred with flagship status and usually located in the inner city. The aim of these compounds is to attract not only tourists, but all city residents, to spend some of their

disposable income on the leisure services and goods on offer (Sawicki, 1989; Harvey, 1987; Brooks, 1993; Smyth, 1994). In addition, there are specialised consumption compounds which offer specific pleasure opportunities to particular people, these can include cultural centres, opera houses, chic retail venues and so on.

Therefore, although postmodernity involves mass consumption in the sense that everyone regardless of class or status can be involved, customised consumption highlights the fact that there are differences between people regarding what is consumed (Meegan, 1988). Consequently, areas within the city become socially and physically distinct. Tourism urbanisation is also symbolically distinctive, with the urban symbols acting as lures to tourists and magnets for further investments, and as tools for local governments and business leaders to promote and advertise their cities. This symbolism is expressed specifically through the city's built environment where buildings often signal the opportunity for the consumption of pleasure. Thus this form of consumption results in a specific type of social differentiation, one that is based on 'symbolic capital' (Bourdieu, 1984; Featherstone, 1987) (see below).

Mullins (1991) study makes a significant contribution to tourism research because it raises a number of important issues which are essential, in order, to further our understanding of how social meaning and the materiality of space and place are created through the process of tourism urbanisation, and how these representations are then incorporated into the accumulation process. In contrast, it is apparent in the literature, to date, that geographers have tended to treat tourism almost solely as a discrete economic subsystem. In adopting this approach important links have been missed between tourism and other politically and theoretically important geographic issues which help to demonstrate the wider role and position of tourism in capitalist accumulation. A problem with Mullins conceptualisation, however, is that by implication it suggests that tourism urbanisation since the 1970s has had its origins in plan-led development. Yet, this is not necessarily the case in many older industrial cities in Britain where tourism urbanisation has derived more from a combination of responses to particular problems, such as what to do with vacant buildings of historic interest, the need to change the image and perception of the area, how to capitalise on areas of economic growth, and certainly a willingness to experiment in the absence of alternatives.

Britton (1991) has identified four forms of symbolic capital in which tourism is implicated. First, in the built environment. Competition in this sphere would include the construction,

refurbishment and promotion of: cultural centres and facilities; waterfront developments; indoor shopping complexes; conference/exhibition centres, and hotels to attract business related consumption (Law, 1987, 1992, 1993); gentrified inner-city neighbourhoods; ethnic neighbourhoods; and built environments of historic or cultural interest and value and so forth. Secondly, there are spectacles. Competition is equally fierce as cities strive to become designated as venues for international trade, cultural and sporting events. 'Trade expositions are perhaps the epitome of contrived attempts at meshing the pursuit of symbolic capital and tourism spending' (Britton, 1991, p 471). These spectacles, in addition to their economic objectives of attracting not just local residents, but domestic and particularly international tourists, also hold out the tentative possibility of creating an international image of a location in the mind of corporate investors. Conventional wisdom suggests that there is a strong association between the locational decisions of potential investors and the social and cultural infrastructure of a locality (Hughes, 1999). Thirdly, there are property markets. With the increasing mobility of capital and the quest for high-yielding and secure investments, there has been a marked increase in international property speculation. This has been made possible by the changing political economy, characterised by new forms of global, economic, and political relations which have the capacity to break down previously strong national and regional economic and political barriers to the cross-border mobility of capital (Harvey, 1989; Turok, 1992). Hence there has been a readily available supply of investors prepared to invest in suitable commercial, and particularly inner city properties. The result is that commercial buildings have become a major investment vehicle in their own right. As commodity forms, buildings are increasingly integrating exchange values with aesthetic fashions to portray symbolic capital for tenants and investors alike. Fourth, are festival markets. Attention has been drawn by various commentators that contemporary ('postmodern') landscapes often reflect "premixed design packages that reproduce pre-existing urban forms" (Boyer, 1992, p. 184). This is no more apparent than in the widely copied form of festival market places. These places are designed to create a certain ambience, combining a sanitised version of the excitement and cultural richness of the city's life. Hence part of their appeal is the manner in which spending opportunities are linked with pleasure and leisure in a secure and controlled environment (Harvey, 1987; Griffiths, 1998). As such, festival markets are 'an amalgam of symbolic capital and spectacle combined with a celebration of impulse shopping' (Britton, 1991, p. 472).

Zukin's (1990) focus is on what she terms 'cultural capital', that capital, particularly large-scale, which specialises and invests in 'culture industries', such as tourism, film, entertainment, arts, architecture and so on. Her thesis is that consumption biased complexes centred on 'culture industries' are reshaping not only investment and consumption activities, but because of the necessity for spatial fixity and embeddedness required to validate these forms of investment, circulating cultural capital is creating new regional and international investment poles. Furthermore, the significance of spaces, created by 'cultural capital' based in part on tourism expenditure, is their capacity to increase the value of investment capital because the consumption on which they are based is not exposed to the usual property and business cycles. Such investments, that is the sale of cultural, symbolic, and entertainment products, also enjoy an elasticity of demand that is clearly above that encountered with manufactured consumer goods.

For Zukin (1991) the restructuring of the city centre reflects a new perspective on the city, one that is premised on cultural power. This point is crucial because the promotion of cultural production and consumption of, and in, the city, alongside the attraction of cultural specialists, is precisely the means by which cities in Britain and Europe have attempted to address the problems of the post-Fordist city. Admittedly, 'the growth of the symbolic economy in finance, media, and tourism may not change the way entrepreneurs do business. It has however, forced the growth of cities, created a vast new workforce, and changed the way consumers and employees think' (Zukin, 1995, p.134).

Harvey (1989), Zukin (1988, 1995), and others working within a neo-Marxist perspective, view culture as a means by which capitalist social and economic relations can be created and recreated. This concept has been challenged on the ground that it is essentially deterministic not only of culture but also of cities and urban life. Such a view tends to underline culture as a lifestyle indulgence for urban elites. However, high art, opera and ballet are not the dominant forms compared to popular music, film, dancing, night clubs, video games and so forth. Culture it is argued is a far more complex concept, rather, it should be seen as a particular way of life, one that expresses meaning and values not only in art but also in institutional and ordinary behaviour (Williams, 1958; Mulgan and Walpole, 1986; Montgomery, 1995). Nevertheless, various authors have linked the development of class fractions to the emergence of postmodern consumption. Lash and Urry (1987) link this pattern of consumption to the life-styles of the new service class. Featherstone, (1991), on the other hand, emphasises the

importance of a particular fraction, 'the new cultural intermediaries', artists, intellectuals, media professionals, and academics, who specialise in symbolic production. In his opinion, these groups provide important mediating links between economic restructuring and cultural change and an important role in the subversion of traditional cultural hierarchies and in undermining the division between high art and popular culture.

The consumption of pleasure is also important for symbolic reasons that is not for its value alone rather for symbolically what it conveys about consumers. Tourism is an activity that reflects an individual's wealth, status and lifestyle. Taking holidays in the 'right places' and the frequency of holidays taken are potent symbols of social position (Rojek, 1985; Urry, 1990). Indeed, it is as important to be seen at an upmarket tourist attraction, as it is to contemplate the attraction (Williams and Montanari, 1995). However, it has been argued that symbolic capital diverts the attention of local residents, and potential investors away from the city's more pressing social and economic inequalities by fostering local pride and encouraging support for urban entrepreneurialism (Boyle and Hughes, 1994; Stewart, 1996; Griffiths, 1998).

From the debate so far it is clear that the growing tourism market can be related to a shift in capitalist economies from managerialism to entrepreneurialism. A key feature of the narratives and/or discourses of the 'entrepreneurial city' (see section 2.5) is the move in the regime of accumulation towards more service-based activities and, in the broadest sense, cultural production (Harvey, 1989b; Hall and Hubbard, 1996). If this interpretation is correct, the shift to the production of services, rather than goods, as commodities may well be enduring. Clearly, for cities able to promote themselves as sustainable and attractive tourist destinations, the potential financial rewards are immense. Conversely, to develop a local economic structure based upon tourism, and then to lose out in the inter urban competition for the 'tourist dollar' could well be disastrous. How, then, can tourism policies be formulated to maximise the benefits and minimise the risks?

As already argued in section 2.1 much of the writing to date concerning urban tourism is dominated by descriptive accounts as opposed to the development of rigorous theoretical perspectives. This is no more apparent than in the literature on tourism policy where the dominant approach is organised around prescriptive pluralistic models of tourism planning as a basis for urban regeneration (see for example, BTA, 1999; DCMS, 1999; Getz, 1987; Gunn,

1988, 1994; Inskip, 1991; Law, 1993, 1996; Kaczmarek, 1999). Such idealised representations of the opportunities for cities to participate in the tourism planning process may serve as a guide to an ideal situation. However, Hall (1998, p.12) argues they do not provide detailed insights into the real world of planning and its associated set of values, power and interests. Therefore, it is not really surprising that major gaps exist in our understanding of the processes contributing to tourism and the way it functions in different environments, particularly urban areas (Hudson and Townsend, 1993; Page, 1995; Tyler, 1998).

Although recent studies have begun to redress this situation, the study material is relatively scarce. Nevertheless, a number of academics have provided approaches to tourism policy studies which go beyond normative models which seek to demonstrate how policy-making should occur relative to pre-established standards to focus on the way in which the policy process actually occurs (see for example, Bull, 1997; Evans and McNulty, 1995; Hall, 1998; Hall and Jenkins, 1995; Tyler, 1998; Williams and Shaw, 1998; Cooper *et al.*, 1999). Although these approaches have an empirical rather than a theoretical focus, it could be argued they have made a significant contribution to investigating tourism policy, in that they acknowledge that the policy-making process undertaken to establish the tourism product is shaped by the social and political conditions of the particular city or sub-city area rather than the nature of the product. Moreover, it could be argued further that they have laid the foundation for the development of more exacting concrete research agendas which can be linked to appropriate theory to validate theoretical claims.

Arguably, the approach of Hall and Jenkins (1995) to investigating the forces that shape tourism policies, and the intended and unintended consequences of tourism policies in terms of their impacts on communities and on the political system, is possibly one of the most detailed, published to date. The approach is organised around five critical concepts: institutional arrangements; values and ideologies; interest groups; power relationships, and monitoring, each of which raise a number of key research issues. The authors, however, openly encourage researchers to accept, reject and utilise aspects of the approach that reflect their values and interests. The aim here is to re-work Hall and Jenkins (1995) approach by focusing on three themes which are of particular relevance to this research namely institutional arrangements; power relationships; and values and ideologies (see Figure 2.1 below). In order to provide an appropriate concrete research agenda which can be brought within the theoretical framework discussed in Section 2.7 to validate theoretical claims.

2.4 The Role of Institutional Arrangements, Power and Ideology in Tourism Policy


The first theme emphasises that institutional arrangements are a significant research question because they provide the framework within which tourism operates. In Hall and Jenkins (1995) opinion they are best viewed as a filter that mediates conflict by providing a set of rules and procedures that regulates how and where demands on policy can be made, who has the authority to make choices, and take certain decisions and actions. In short, we might think of institutions as an entity formulated to organise interrelationships between individuals or groups of individuals by influencing their behaviour. As a concept and as an aspect of policy making, they are extensive and pervasive forces in the tourism political system operating within 'the entrepreneurial state' (See Figure 2.2 below).

Components of institutional arrangements

Governing in the 'entrepreneurial city' is always an interactive process because no single actor, public or private has the knowledge and resource capacity to tackle problems unilaterally (Kooiman, 1993). Thus new modes of urban governance refer to a complex set of institutions and actors that are drawn from but also beyond government (Stoker, 1998, p. 19). This is no more evident than in the landscape of funding and support for tourism which has become increasingly complex as a vast array of new partnerships representing a divergent coalition of interests have assumed tourism roles at international, national, regional and local levels. As a result, public-private partnerships are now part of the reality of public services and decision-making in the entrepreneurial state (Sharpley, 2002; Evans *et al* 2003).

Local politics, regeneration structures, the role of the city in the regional or national scene, city jurisdiction issues and international pressure (for example, EU funding) all determine the nature of the urban tourism policy process. Thus by implication much of the behaviour within and outside organisations is rule bound. Making policy decisions within a set of rules requires actors to consider their own role within the 'rules of the game'. However, 'In any city, there will be interest groups and individuals seeking to further their own position' (Page, 1995, p.163).

Figure 2.1 Elements in the Tourism Policy-making process



Source: Hall and Jenkins, 1995, p. 6.

Thus, the decision-making process is one often associated with conflicting interests. Further constraints on the policy process can arise from participants having difficulties in interpreting their roles and responsibilities or confronting certain ambiguities (for example, vague policy statements).

As argued above, tourism policy is forged and shaped principally within political and public institutions. Consequently, an understanding of the policy-making process requires a firm grasp of the machinery of governance, and the lines of responsibility, roles and functions of various key actors, agencies and institutions involved. Two areas of particular importance are intergovernmental relations and interorganisational relations.

Intergovernmental relations

Policy-making is filtered through a complex institutional framework (Brooks, 1993; Hall, 1994, 1998; Pal, 1992). However, as Hall and Jenkins (1995, p.31) point out any analysis of institutions can have as its subject the rules at many levels of decision-making.


As Williams and Shaw (1988) recognise, the study of tourism policy is made more complex because different state levels tend to have different tourism objectives. Indeed, policies at one level may contradict policies at another level, or be implemented with little consultation between levels. Consequently, 'studies which adopt a single lens view, or analyse at a particular level, are necessarily limited and partial in explaining any public policy or associated decisions and actions' (Hall and Jenkins, 1995, p.14). Nevertheless, the authors stress that it is crucial for researchers to keep the distinction between levels firmly in mind if cogent analyses are to result.

Interorganisational relations

The stakeholder concept (Freeman, 1984) recognises that the business of tourism comprises connected networks of customers, suppliers or facilitating businesses, employees, financiers, communities and numerous other interest groups. Thus tourism is, by its very nature dependent upon inter-organisational relations to achieve organisational and regional goals. An inter-organisational relationship exists when two or more organisations interact and trade resources with each other, in order to increase their capacity for obtaining their own objectives. These resources may include technical, financial, physical, reputational, organisational and human resources. Some inter-organisational relations may be maintained by co-operation and mutual support, while others may be based on self-interest, as they compete for resources and seek different policy outcomes.

An inter-organisational relationship may be formal (joint projects) or informal (the use of friends, acquaintances, and business associates, to obtain resources and opportunities), and may be driven by short-term considerations (developed and terminated according to need) or long-term interests.

Figure 2.2 The Structure of the State with Reference to Tourism



- *Executive and legislature*: e.g. systems of government, heads of state, government and opposition, minister
- *Public service (bureaucracy)*: e.g. government departments (and their staff), Departments of Tourism, tourism bureaucrats.
- *Judiciary and regulatory systems and agencies*: courts of law.
- *Intergovernmental agencies and networks*: committees, councils, conferences, networks and partnerships (formal and informal)
- *Government enterprises*: trading banks, essential services (e.g. communications and transport), statutory travel and tourism promotion organisations.
- *Statutory authorities*: central banks, educational institutions (schools and higher education).
- *Para (semi) – state individuals and agencies*: media, interest groups, trade unions, industry bodies, tourism associations.
- *Lower levels of government*: local/regional governance.

Source: Adapted from Hall and Jenkins, 1995, p.20

‘The idea of a network provides a powerful insight into how entrepreneurial ventures establish themselves, how they locate themselves competitively, and how they sustain their positions in their markets (Wickham, 1998, p.39) responsible for tourism.

According to Hall and Jenkins (1995, p. 30) two main approaches to studying the nature of this interaction have emerged. The first one is based on exchange theory as presented in the seminal paper by Levine and White (1961, in Pearce, 1992), where organisations are seen to interact voluntarily (perhaps forming policy coalitions) as a means to achieve mutual organisational goals. The second approach (Selin and Beason, 1991; Pearce, 1992, in Hall and Jenkins, 1995) emphasises power or resource dependency, and treats the inter-organisational network as a political economy so that organisations are seen to be induced to interact by a more powerful organisation or group of organisations.

Issues arising from inter-organisational relations are numerous. Some of the more common features observed in the tourism field (Selin and Beason, 1991, Lauria, 1994; Page, 1995; Haywood, 1999; Nelson, 1999) include:

- Resource acquisition (namely, financial, human resources, technical, and authority;
- Resource scarcity and conflict
- The transfer of local politics and power
- Co-ordination of local, regional and national plans

To study inter-organisational relationships, it is vital for researchers, amongst other things, to identify and access the relevant key actors and agencies, examine their values, perceptions and interests, and isolate the relationships within and between stakeholders in the tourism policy process (Hall and Jenkins, 1995).

In summary, understanding tourism policy requires a sound knowledge of, and reference to, the institutional arrangements in which policy is made. Recognition of the institutional arrangements would provide a conceptual and theoretical approach to investigating many issues of vital importance to tourism policy. It would take us beyond studies which simply describe what governments do to contribute to an understanding of how to link different levels or agencies of government more effectively with one another as well as with different types of corporate, business and private groups.

Power Relationships in Tourism Policy-making

The second concept examines the exercise of power in public policy. At the broadest level power (usually treated as synonymous with influence) is defined as the ability to achieve certain ends. This debate revolves around the need to acknowledge that the concept of power in tourism policy is inextricably linked to a given set of values, interests and institutional arrangements which predetermine the range of its application. In the absence of such recognition Hall and Jenkins (1995, p. 79) stress that much tourism research will be blind to the critical role of argument in the decision-making process and thus maintain its supposedly value-neutral appraisal of tourism policy.

The concept of power

The pluralist account of power, of which Robert Dahl (1961, 1967) provided the clearest exposition, asserts that power is diffused and balanced in modern societies so that there is no one interest group able to dominate decision-making in the public policy-making process. Pluralism refers to the belief that access to the policy agenda is available to a wide range of interest groups. As a result, political decisions are reached through a process of bargaining, negotiation and compromise between the various interests involved. Decisions are ultimately legitimised by the institutions of the state who take on the role of umpire adjudicating among competing interest groups.

Pluralism has been strongly criticised on several counts (DeAngelis and Parkin, 1980; Fischer and Forester, 1993). According to Johnston (1989, p. 348) the major attempt to refute pluralism is still that of Miliband (1969) who reasserts class domination of the state and sets out to show that pluralism 'far from providing a guide to reality, constitutes a profound obfuscation of it'.

At a more concrete level Hall and Jenkins (1995, p. 71) have advanced a number of criticisms about the theory that remain consistent with the more abstract accounts referred to above. First, it is clearly possible to identify a number of interests that are relatively unorganised and thus carry little power as an interest group, for example, ethnic minorities and the unemployed. Second, as noted above, certain interest groups notably business, are demonstrably more powerful in the policy-making arena. Third, voting power is somewhat

limited as a form of protest because election issues and choice are usually quite narrow. Fourth, although there may be a wide range of interest groups operating in the policy process, power is unevenly distributed between them. Fifth, there will be a bias by government towards interest groups that are recognised by government and consulted by them. *Sixth*, any consensus in favour of a policy or values must favour certain interests over others. In short, ‘the pluralist approach to policy analysis, though influential, is extremely misleading as it fails to recognise the inherently political nature of public policy’ (Hall and Jenkins, 1995, p. 65). As Wickham (1998, p. 372) recognised:

“If we define power as an ability to influence the course of actions within the organisation it becomes a necessary feature of organisational life. Power is a feature of situations in which resources are limited and outcomes are uncertain. Under these conditions actions *must* be influenced or the organisation would not be an organisation. In this respect power is an inevitability and, like the organisation itself, it can be made to work for good as well as ill”.

Dollinger (1999, pp. 57-58) identified seven dimensions in the analysis of power each focusing on different aspects which can influence the survival, development, and profitability of a new venture:

- *Degree of organisation.* The extent to which stakeholders are organised for collective action locally, regionally and nationally.
- *Resource capability.* The degree to which stakeholders have access to resources that help influence businesses, agencies and individuals.
- *Extent of influence.* The degree to which the interest group is able to promote its agenda.
- *Nature of interest.* The type of agenda the interest group has (a specific agenda or a general agenda).
- *Duration.* The length of time the interest group has been active and its potential staying power.
- *Degree of manifestation.* The ability of the interest group to take its case directly to the public or the media.
- *Bases of influence.* The extent to which an interest group can gain support from other interest groups that share an affinity for similar causes.

Clearly, this analysis provides a sound basis for evaluating the power base of an organisation however, “The way in which authority translates into actual power depends on how the people who make up the organisation regard the holder’s standing and the position they occupy. While one group may recognise the position, others may not do so” (Wickham, 1998, p. 372).

Setting the Tourism Policy Agenda

Decisions affecting tourism policy, the nature of government and inter-governmental agencies involvement in tourism, the structure of tourism agencies, the nature of tourism development, and interest group involvement in tourism policy all emerge from a political process. This process involves different interest groups, often in the guise of various forms of partnership competing for attention and resources to advance their own interests, establish their own values, and achieve their own goals. It is an arena which reflects the dominance of asymmetries of power with “the relatively established groups defending their share of the available funding and the less established ones remaining outside unsure, and in many cases unable (not least because of the bureaucratic rules of the game) to participate” (Lloyd and Meegan, 1996, p. 92-93).

An important issue which arises in the identification of the different dimensions of power is the manner in which the policy agenda may be set prior to various interests being involved in policy debates. According to Hall and Jenkins (1995, p. 68-69), problems and, hence, policy alternatives can be defined before they reach the policy arena in two primary ways. First, is by way of a dominant ideology or set of values which defines the parameters within which problems are defined and discussed, and solutions conceived and carried out. This ideology may be a state or an organisational ideology. For example, *Tomorrow’s Tourism* (DCMS, 1999) the Government’s new tourism strategy for England has a very strong economic orientation and an organisational culture which emphasises the role of the marketplace. Hence, the organisational values of the government and its members provided the dominant values to be found in the analysis and research conducted under its terms of reference. The second means is setting the ‘rules of the game’ by which policy debate is carried out. The ‘rules of the game’ refer to a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals and institutional procedures. Therefore, institutionalised rules condition normative understandings of different actors thereby facilitating some strategies while constraining others. The rules refer to accepted ways of viewing how society operates and consequent prescriptions for attaining

aims and objectives. For example, a local government committee may be established to enquire into particular issues concerning the tourism industry, but the terms of reference which are set by the committee will determine the scope of their policy debate.

Power, place and urban tourism

Place marketing with its emphasis on reimagining or reinventing the city, has been one of the defining features of entrepreneurial modes of urban governance which evolved from the late 1970s (Leitner and sheppard, 1998; Short and Kim, 1998; Smyth, 1994). However, the philosophical shift, embodied in commercially-motivated representation of place, is inscribed through power structures, which have often served to restrict historical representation to both visitors and the local community (Griffiths, 1998; Hughes, 1999; Norkunas, 1993).

Urban heritage conservation, particularly waterfront regeneration schemes such as those in London and Liverpool, reflect the power relationships that exist within and outside a community. Hall and Jenkins (1995, p75-76) argue that within such relationships, it is apparent that the heritage of the losers is often ignored, or only partially represented. Historical accounts of labour, class and ethnicity are typically replaced by romance and nostalgia. Conflict, whether between ethnic groups, classes or, more specifically, in terms of industrial and labour disputes is ignored or glossed over in 'official' tourist histories. Indeed, "public history texts as well as tourist texts are involved in a form of dominance, a hegemonic discourse about the past that legitimates the ideology and power of present groups" (Norkunas, p. 1993, p. 26).

In Short and Kim's (1998, p. 73-74) opinion, it is useful to see the city as text, that is constantly being re-written. The city as a text metaphor raises the notion of authorship and what is left out as well as what is written. Because the city is written from a particular perspective for a particular audience, it is not really surprising that the dominant images invariably represent conflict-free cities, where pluralism leads to a variety of visitor attractions rather than competition for scarce resources. In short, place marketing can be seen as serving functions other than just marketing. The ideological nature of such publicity (taking ideology to mean the use of imagery to mask the nature of power relations) has been commented on by several writers (Harvey, 1989; Crilley, 1993; Brownhill, 1994; Griffiths, 1998).

This begs the question of why people accept the construction of their places by such a process, when there are democratic institutions and channels in place, for the representation of diversity, conflicts and issues. The answer is that in many cases they do not. Political battles between communities and redevelopment agencies are well documented in many British cities. However, awareness of the political dimensions of tourism and more specifically the uneven allocation of power in a society or a community, should caution us about the representativeness of outcomes of tourism policy (Hall and Jenkins, 1995, p. 77). Community participation in tourism policy-making may be more a form of placation than a means of empowering communities to make their own decisions (Haywood, 1988; deLeon, 1994). Indeed, although “on ethical grounds community involvement and some level of control are essential...examples where a community-based approach to tourism development has been successfully applied are rare, in spite of an abundance of policy statements and documents committing to this approach” (Woodley, 1999, 298-299).

It should not be automatically assumed therefore, that participation necessarily affects policy outcomes. There may, for example, be a high level of support in a community for a particular tourism development, but a low level of awareness of the possible costs and implications of that development. Coercion is also a tried and tested means of gaining support for development projects. As Harvey (1993, p. 9) notes:

“Coercion arises through interplace competition for capital investment and employment (accede to the capitalist’s demands or go out of business; create a ‘good’ business climate’ or lose jobs) or more simply, through the direct political repression and oppression of dissident voices (from cutting of media access to the more violent tactics of the construction mafias in many of the world’s cities)”.

In summary, the role of power relationships in tourism policy is a key element in understanding how decisions are made and why certain values are excluded from the decision-making process. As Hall and Jenkins (1995, p.68) recognised, research on tourism policy should attempt to understand not only the politically imposed limitations upon the scope of policy and decision-making, but also the political framework within which the research process itself takes place.

Values in the Tourism Policy Process

The third concept focuses attention on the values of individuals, agencies and the state in the policy process. In particular, it examines the role of values and value conflicts in tourism policy. Values comprise goals, interests, beliefs, ethics, biases, attitudes, traditions, morals and objectives that change with human perception and with time, and that can have a considerable influence on power conflicts relating to the policy-making process. Values therefore lie at the core of public policy and, hence of tourism policy.

Values at the organisational and individual level

Public policies are therefore representative of value choices. For example, to declare an area as an open space rather than allow building development to occur may reflect the pre-eminence of environmental values over economic values. If we are to understand tourism policy, it is crucial to examine the values and value change that tourism policies represent, and the winners and losers in the decision-making process. The impacts of values on tourism policies occur at a number of levels of analysis and throughout the policy process. Values are not only important at the government or state level, but are also significant at the individual and collective level. Tourism policy-making occurs in an arena of competing and complementary values and interests. In many cases these values are articulated by organised groups. At other times the values of key actors, such as senior politicians, bureaucrats, or captains of industry, will influence the path that a policy takes in its formulation and implementation.

The managerial approach to economic development strategies so typical of the 1960s concentrated on supply-side factors such as incentives that lowered costs (capital, land and labour), including loans and tax exemptions. However, that approach has steadily given way to entrepreneurial forms of action from the 1970s onwards. The new entrepreneurial state increasingly focuses on demand-side strategies which aim to create and develop new markets, urban tourism being a prime example. Indeed, 'the use of tourism as a mechanism to regenerate urban areas through the creation of desirable middle-class leisure-tourism environments appears almost universal in Western society' (Hall, 1998, p.13). However, the change of values in attitudes towards tourism raises a number of important issues. As already argued, in focusing on one set of economic and social interests other community interests

particularly those of traditional inner-city residents of lower socio-economic status, are being ignored or neglected.

Individual values also play a significant role in the policy-making process. Individual decisions and actions may reflect personal and organisational values. Individuals also get involved in the policy process through, for example, membership of political parties, trade unions and other interest groups (see below), in order to try to exert pressure on public policy. Individual and collective cultural values are also important, not least, in the representation of heritage to tourists and in conflicts over the authenticity and validity of these experiences.

Values and governance

The shift towards more corporate models in government economic strategies is also reflected in a similar shift in tourism organisational values. For instance, over the last fifteen years or so Tourist Boards have tended to take a more entrepreneurial stance to their operations. Tourist Boards now tend to be managed more like private sector organisations (e.g. boards of directors or advisory boards comprised of members of the tourism industry), which are primarily geared towards maximising visitor numbers and economic benefits as opposed to government departments with a broader sense of public service and public good.

Values also play an important role within and between institutions. Tourism organisations which are wholly government controlled will have different sets of corporate values than agencies which have a degree of statutory independence and which are closely linked to the private sector orientation of the tourism industry. Moreover, although agencies may be responsible for similar tourism resources their management and operation of those resources will be fundamentally different because of their agency objectives and associated 'organisational cultures' (shared set of values, norms and procedures). To express this in its most simple form it can be argued that 'national park agencies are more geared towards conservation and visitation than forestry agencies which are more concerned with timber yields' (Hall and Jenkins, 1995, p.34).

Values and ideology

The concept of values is closely related to that of ideology. Ideologies are systems of beliefs, attitudes and values about some important area or issue that has strong effects in structuring and influencing our thought. 'As with policies, ideologies may be represented in a constitution, a declaration of rights, a treatise, or from communications that are designed to influence behaviours, attitudes and values' (Hall and Jenkins, 1995, p.35). Many values and ideologies however, often appear hidden. As Norkunas (1993, p.5) observed:

"The public would accept as 'true' history that is written, exhibited, or otherwise publicly sanctioned. What is often less obvious to the public is that the writing or the exhibition itself is reflective of a particular ideology".

In short, 'The simple equation of party politics and policy positions tends to mask the ideological positions which influence policy-making' (Richards, 1995, p.155). Ideologies are therefore extremely important in legitimising, defining and identifying particular attitudes and interests, whether positive or negative, in social and political issues.

Subsequently, in order to inform the analysis of tourism policy development, particularly in providing a more solid theoretical base for such work, research needs to go beyond the traditional view that decision-making is undertaken by neutral administrators under the watchful eye of elected policy-makers. 'The professional advice of administrators has to be viewed in the political context of the elected representatives and their particular ideologies' (Page, 1995, p. 163).

In summary, the value of any theory lies with links to concrete research agendas (Wood, 1998; Painter and Goodwin, 1995). Indeed, Jessop (1982, p.220) argues 'empirical evaluation' is vital to substantiate theoretical claims. The core of the argument presented here is that the above reconstruction of Hall and Jenkins (1995) organising framework offers a flexible and potentially powerful concrete research agenda in which to place tourism within the analytical framework discussed in section 2.7. As argued above the movement towards new modes of entrepreneurial governance has become increasingly congested by new economic actors, dependencies and relationships. The aim is therefore, to question what the agencies and institutions with an interest in and influence upon tourism do, and why?

To pursue these concerns requires examining their administrative structure and functions, how responsibilities are divided, and the ways in which power and ideology is dissipated in the formulation of strategy and policy within partnerships. How are tourism strategies and policies formulated? What are the agendas of those participating in the decision-making process? Who do these different participants represent?

Clearly, the use of an appropriate theory to help explain events must be introduced into the analysis. In the section that follows the thematic of the 'entrepreneurial city' is presented in order to introduce the analytical framework of this thesis for applying theory to empirical research.

2.5 The Entrepreneurial City and the 'New Urban Politics'

From the debate so far it is clear that, tourism is an important avenue of capitalist accumulation in an everchanging spatial organisation and political economy of production and consumption. What is essentially being argued here is that, given the centrality of entrepreneurial governance in shaping the character of place, there is little point in studying urban tourism political transition in isolation from broader social, cultural and economic trends. That said, there are both theoretical and practical dangers in positioning urban tourism within new governance, most notably "research on governance, in respect of tourism, is too little developed to allow such a discourse" (Williams and Shaw, 1998, p.376). Therefore, it is not really surprising that the current state of tourism research means that the debate focuses more on government than governance. Nevertheless, as Tyler *et al* (1998) observes:

"If the field of urban tourism is to progress, it must begin to enquire into the nature of the changes in urban economies and governance that tourism is part of...thus it is the intrinsic nature of urban governance that shapes the city along with the commoditisation of the city which is shaped by tourism"
(p.3)

In an attempt to redress this situation the core of the argument presented here is that the writings of Harvey (1989a, 1989b), and Jessop (1997, 1998) could provide a theoretical springboard from which tourism can be integrated into an analysis of territorial competition, economic restructuring and cultural change, all of which underpin new governance.

Since the early 1970s cities have experienced increasing economic uncertainty precipitated by global, national, regional and local economic and political restructuring as will be discussed in Chapter 4. The increasing economic uncertainty faced by cities, and the rising dominance of political discourses promoting a belief in the 'free' market economy and competitiveness, have presented cities with a mix of pressures and opportunities, which in turn has led them into more intensified competition with one another.

'Under pressure to take responsibility for improving the competitiveness of their city, urban policy-makers developed more activist, entrepreneurial strategies and created new institutional structures of urban governance, commonly referred to as urban entrepreneurialism' (Leitner and Sheppard, 1998, p. 286). "This involves more than an objective trend in urban economic development policy; for being an 'entrepreneurial city' has also become a central element in many cities self-imagining and/or place-marketing activities" (Jessop, 1998, p.4). This shift in policy priorities reflects a broader transition in the role of local government away from managerial towards more entrepreneurial approaches (Harvey, 1989; Hubbard, 1996; Hall and Hubbard, 1996; Jessop, 1998; Hughes 1999). Indeed, it is argued that declining cities unwilling to implement entrepreneurial policies focused on encouraging economic growth, are contributing to their own economic demise (Kotler, Haider and Rein, 1993; Fainstein, 1994).

Whilst there are many definitions of entrepreneurialism two common characteristics can be identified in these definitions:

- creativity and innovation; and
- the chance for gain or growth under conditions of risk and uncertainty.

It is argued in this thesis that the spur to all economic development is entrepreneurial activity. Economic development is the consequence of entrepreneurial activity by some form of intervention which succeeds in changing the terms of trade and political economy of place under conditions of risk, but equally, it could lead to forms of economic regression. If there is no risk then outcomes (or returns) are certain. An organisation operating in a risk-free environment would continue to expand indefinitely, since a negative outcome could not occur.

Producing Entrepreneurial Urban Economies

Few academics have made a more sustained and influential attempt to investigate the role of urbanisation and urban change in the transformation of advanced capitalist societies than David Harvey (1973; 1982; 1985; 1989). Indeed, Harvey's (1989) paper "From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: the transformation in urban governance", has quickly become a citation classic with close to 100 citations in major journal articles (Wood, 1998, p.120).

Harvey (1989) was one of the first to acknowledge that urban 'governance' has a far deeper theoretical meaning than urban 'government' in that it focuses on the increasing trend towards partnership and collective action. In the modern state the power to make decisions involves a host of governmental and non-governmental actors whereas government usually refers to the formal institutional structures and decision making processes. Harvey argues that there is an increasing need for innovative approaches in governance strategies to combat the problems which are afflicting deindustrialising regions, and characterises change in urban governance over the last two decades as a move from 'urban managerialism' where local authorities were the providers of services and welfare, to 'urban entrepreneurialism' where:

"The new entrepreneurialism has as its centerpiece the notion of public-private partnership in which a traditional local boosterism is integrated with the use of local government powers to try and attract external sources of funding, new direct investments or new employment sources" (Harvey, 1989, p.7)

In adopting entrepreneurialism Harvey maintains that four broad options present themselves to place-based governing coalitions. First, competition within the international division of labour means the creation and exploitation of particular advantages for the production of goods and services. These advantages may derive from the available resource base or a favourable location, whilst others may be created through public and private investments in the kinds of social and physical infrastructure that strengthen the economic base of the area as an exporter of goods and services.

Secondly, cities can seek to enhance their position within the spatial division of consumption. This often involves improving the tourism product in terms of consolidating the existing

facilities and investing in their quality, or product enlargement in terms of adding new elements of importance to the local tourism product, and organising urban festivals and events (whether temporary or permanent). But it also goes much further, to focus on the quality of life. Gentrification, cultural innovation, and physical upgrading of the built environment (post-modernist styles of architecture and design), have all become features of regeneration strategies (Bianchini and Parkinson, 1993; Gold and Ward, 1994; Hall and Hubbard, 1998). Uppermost, “the city has to appear as an innovative, exciting, creative, and safe place to live or to visit, to play and consume in” (Harvey, 1989, p. 9).

Thirdly, cities can compete to acquire key functions in financial and governmental command and control, and in media and communications processing. These strategies may require heavy investment in the communications infrastructure (such as airports or office space), or creating support services and institutional mechanisms that will enhance the agglomeration economies to be derived from having specialist organisations and expertise in one place.

Finally, cities can attempt to enhance their position in the competition for state surpluses distributed by national and supranational governments. This might include bidding for funds available through urban regeneration programmes, or bidding for sources of funding that have no specific urban objectives such as those offered by National Lottery grant distribution bodies. This type of strategy may, also be directed towards high-value government contracts especially in military and defence industries which, apart from the vast amount of money involved, have the added benefit of high status employment and spin-offs in other high tech industries.

These four strategies are not mutually exclusive and the mix of particular strategies adopted is seen partly to determine the ‘fortunes and misfortunes’ of urban regions. Growth depends upon the nature of the coalitions that have formed, the ability to exploit particular resources (natural, human, locational) with which the locality can work, and which gives it a competitive advantage, and the strength of the competition. In short, the governance of local economic development has therefore, become much more oriented to the provision of a ‘good business climate’ and focused on bringing capital into the locality. Critics of these strategies, suggest that such a ‘bricks and mortar’ approach tends to benefit local elites and does very little to alleviate the problems of marginalised groups. (Loftman and Nevin, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998; Meegan, 1999) (see section 2.6).

In total, there is a greater locational flexibility in the contemporary local economy. This has been underlined by the growing pool of mobile capital, which in the case of tourism is witnessed in the growing number of tourists, conventions, festivals and events. Short and Kim, (1998) suggest, however, that the perceived mobility of capital, as well as the actual mobility of capital, is part of a general trend which emphasises impermanence and change rather than permanence and stability. Consequently, the threat or potential of hypermobility of capital, as much as the actual mobility of capital, promotes entrepreneurialism in local governance.

It is important to recognise, however, that cities do not have a free choice in selecting an entrepreneurial strategy. The options available to any city will depend essentially on the position it currently occupies in the new global order. There is, as many commentators have noted, a very definite trend towards greater unevenness in urban fortunes resulting in part from the interactions that can and do occur between different strategies (see for example, Massey, 1984, 1995; Loftman and Nevin, 1995, 1996, 1998; Meegan, 1993, 1999). For example, greater unevenness in urban fortunes can stem from the synergism that leads one kind of strategy to be facilitative for another. For instance, the pursuit to acquire key functions in governmental command and control will be enhanced if the city has already consolidated its position as an international centre for tourism. Such thinking has guided the growth strategies of Frankfurt, Paris, Barcelona, Berlin and various other leading European cities (Bianchini and Parkinson, 1993; Kearns and Philo, 1993; Harding *et al.*, 1994).

A number of commentators have advanced the argument, in the British context at least, that Harvey overemphasises the capacity of private interests to facilitate the shift towards urban entrepreneurialism while understating the role of local government to engender change (Boyle and Hughes, 1994; Lawless, 1994; Valler, 1996). Other commentators have challenged Harvey's contention regarding the extent to which managerialism has been eclipsed by entrepreneurialism on the grounds that there has always been a strong element of management in local economic development (for a recent review of the debate, see Hall and Hubbard, 1996). There does, however, nevertheless seem to be a general consensus in the literature on contemporary urban change that there has been a marked shift to a more entrepreneurial form of urban governance where in the UK context Development Corporations have played a leading role (Parkinson, 1989; Pacione, 1990, 1997; Thornley, 1991; Lawless, 1991; Deakin and Edwards, 1993).

Entrepreneurialism, the mode of urban governance which has emerged from the crisis of managerialism can be defined through two basic characteristics. First, a political prioritisation of pro-growth local economic development; and, secondly, an associated organisational and institutional shift from urban government to urban *governance* (Jessop, 1997, 1998; Loftman and Nevin, 1996,1998). According to Hall and Hubbard (1998, p. 2) the notion of entrepreneurialism, which evocatively captures the sense in which cities are being run in a more businesslike manner, is now a widely cited concept, regularly employed in the rhetoric of local politicians and policy-makers who increasingly promote the adoption of an entrepreneurial stance as the key to creating conditions conducive to capital accumulation within a city's boundaries. Jessop (1998) suggests that entrepreneurial strategies have become the dominant response to urban problems because of the popularity and plausibility of this discourse, which appears particularly attractive to those cities caught in a seemingly downward spiral of deindustrialisation and decline. Consequently, this reorientation of the local state, and the adoption of pro-growth policies has resulted in cities such as Glasgow, Liverpool, Milan and Marseilles being cited as the archetypal entrepreneurial cities (Hall, 1988; Vicari and Molotch, 1990).

Entrepreneurial Cities?

That said, there are both theoretical and practical dangers in accepting uncritically the discourses of the 'entrepreneurial city'. According to Hall and Hubbard (1998, p.14) while urban managers are undeniably adopting a more proactive stance and spending more on local economic policies than ever before, this expenditure rarely rivals that on education and welfare services. This would suggest that there has not been a wholesale abandonment of traditional managerial ideas and policies, and that there are still important continuities between the two modes which are often mistakenly portrayed as polar opposites.

There is a need to consider how the notion of entrepreneurship could apply to cities. Although early work tended to see 'entrepreneurs as small business founders with a strong independent streak, and maybe a flair for the dramatic...entrepreneurs were once born not made' (Dollinger, 1999, p. 9). It is now widely accepted that entrepreneurship can also be exercised collectively. This not only applies to firms (whether acting alone, or in strategic alliances or in networks) but also for institutions such as the state.

In an attempt to define the nature of 'entrepreneurial cities' and identify the various ways in which cities can be (said to be) entrepreneurial, Jessop (1998, p.87) suggests that from a structural viewpoint, an 'entrepreneurial city' would be one which is so institutionally and organisationally equipped that it offers a privileged strategic space for innovation. From a strategic viewpoint, it would be one that has achieved the capacity to act entrepreneurially. It may itself directly act as an economic entrepreneur, targeting for example, one or more of the above-mentioned options suggested by Harvey (1989); and it may also actively promote 'entrepreneurial' behaviour within state institutions through the introduction of new forms of management and quasi-market relations (Painter, 1998). In addition, it may promote various institutional and/or organisational conditions favourable to more general economic entrepreneurship on the part of other forces (Hjalger, 2002; Kerr *et al* 2001).

According to Leadbeater (1998) there is much more entrepreneurship in the public sector than many people realise. He argues that, at the grass roots of the public sector, a generation is emerging frustrated by bureaucracy and prepared to take risks to create new ways of delivering services. He does point out, however, that entrepreneurship in the public sector takes a different form. Civic entrepreneurship is about political renewal as well as managerial change. Entrepreneurship requires risk taking. In the public sector managing those risks requires political skill and leadership. In his opinion, the reason why straight business entrepreneurship will not work in the public sector is that business entrepreneurs are not good at managing political risks or winning public legitimacy for change.

The discussion above strongly suggests that entrepreneurial cities do not emerge by chance, rather they are produced through substantial institutional reform (including shifts in ideology) and discursive construction.

Painter, (1998, p. 268-269) recognises that learning to be entrepreneurial in public sector organisations at the individual level and at the level of the organisation as a whole does not happen automatically or through some kind of evolutionary practices. Rather, it is likely to involve a wide range of new knowledges including, amongst other things:

- the acquisition of specific skills, such as those associated with place marketing, negotiation with private sector institutions, and the preparation of funding applications;

- the development of new self-understandings which may involve, for example, a subordination of the role of 'welfare provider' to that of 'business supporter', or the role of 'bureaucrat' to that of 'strategic manager';
- acquiescence (rather than active resistance) in the face of centrally imposed requirements to shift towards more entrepreneurial practices of governance;
- the acceptance of change and of 'challenges' as inevitable, or even desirable, in contrast with previous expectation of stability

The willingness to develop these skills indicates a softening of attitude towards the new entrepreneurial order by local government, or as Valler (1996, p. 840) states, local authorities now begin to 'facilitate market functions in stimulating enterprise and identifying investment opportunities' where bargaining and negotiation are the skills required to make the partnerships work. He sees this reorientation as requiring, first, in-depth research by local authorities into their local economies and second, internal reorganisation to enable external relationships to develop.

Partnership and Urban Entrepreneurialism

Increasingly urban policy is becoming preoccupied with promoting economic development strategies as an engine for regeneration (Cox and Mair, 1988; Boyle and Hughes, 1994; Leitner and Garner, 1993; Oatley, 1998). This movement towards 'local economic development' could be interpreted in many ways. It could be seen as something very precise such as job creation. Alternatively, the term could be seen as integrating a number of broader activities which could benefit the community and region, taking account not only of present requirements but also of future needs. For the purpose of this research:

'Local economic development concerns the wide range of factors which underpin the growth and development of local economies' (Bennett and Krebs, 1991, p.1)

Public-private partnerships between local political and business elites have become the institutional mainstay of urban entrepreneurialism (Leitner and Sheppard, 1998, p.297). To deliver regeneration it is now acknowledged as normal (rightly or wrongly) that the process of economic development must be conducted by a 'partnership' consisting of local businesses and community interests, local authorities, and a host of government and non-governmental agencies and organisations. Indeed, demonstrating that an effective local partnership had been

formed between the public and private sectors and the community became, by the late 1980s, a key structural requirement for access to funding through programmes like City Challenge and other components of what is now the Single Regeneration Budget (Stewart, 1994). In addition, partnership is also a condition for the participation of British local authorities in European funding programmes. Thus by the late-nineties, urban partnership as a requirement of contemporary, and probably continuing, urban policy is no longer an issue (Stewart, 1998). In the case of local economic development, this involves changing roles for local government, central government and European-level policy actors.

In the case of the local state, there are two things that stand out: First, local authorities are more important than ever in shaping and 'enabling' of economic, social, cultural and environmental policy. In this instance, local authorities play the co-ordinating role in 'local coalitions' and takes responsibility for local economic development (Leach and Davies, 1996; Meegan, 1999; Stewart and Stoker, 1989, 1995). Local authorities are the only body at the local level that have an economic and social remit (Stewart, 1994; Tyler, 1998). Secondly, and paradoxically, this does not mean that the local state is more powerful. Local government has both suffered decline in its major resources of income (central government grants and local taxes); and, politically, local government has had its statutory powers progressively reduced over the last two decades. An added complication for tourism policy-makers, however, is the fact that tourists do not recognise administrative boundaries, and so local authorities have to work in partnership with each other to be able to develop coherent programmes. This can be a problem in a region such as Merseyside where administrative jurisdiction is divided between 5 district councils, and where the central and emerging tourist areas cross boundaries between councils that do not necessarily share the same political complexion.

Central government remains the central political authority both within the nation state (domestic regulation) and for the nation state (in relation to other countries and supranational bodies). There are four points that need to be made in this context: First, the context of political economy change is a re-orientation of national policy towards encouraging 'market-led' initiatives; encouraging growth and competition through supply-side measures. Second, within this 'market-led' agenda, there is the active encouragement and promotion of business intervention by the central government, both nationally and locally. Thirdly, a downgrading of United Kingdom (UK) regional policy, in terms of policy initiatives, which has shifted from

redistribution of economic resources and social welfarism, to an emphasis on supply-side measures such as training and business and tourism infrastructure development. Fourth, the creation and support given to initiatives which transfers functions and control of 'traditional' local government services, such as education, health, transport and leisure, to non-elected organisations, the so-called 'quango state'.

At supranational level, the 1990s have seen the European Commission encouraging the development of partnership at local and regional levels and produce significant changes in the design and implementation of economic development programmes in many parts of the UK. Primarily, this is a result of the increasing importance of the European Union (EU) Structural Funds. A key objective of the EU is to reduce disparities between various regions by creating the opportunity for actors within regions to take a more active role in the determination of their economic and social futures within an increasingly integrated global economy. Specifically, there are two aspects of EU regional policy that need to be outlined. First, the powers of the (EU) are less direct than those of national government. The programmes themselves are nationally determined but supposedly through local partnership, and the end proposals formally have to pass through appropriate UK government ministries. In an attempt to co-ordinate activities on a regional basis the creation of Government Offices (GOs) in 1994 in each of the English regions brought together four separate Departments of State: Education and Employment, Environment, Trade and Industry and Transport. From April 1999, Regional Assemblies and Regional Development Agencies have also been in operation in the English regions. Secondly, the emphasis placed on the region as an entity, a player and as the beneficiary of regeneration programmes in the European political economy is central to the philosophy of the European Union. In marked contrast, the UK government at this time placed the emphasis on the firm as the beneficiary not the region itself. Thus there was no concept of the region other than as a container for various kinds of programmes operated strictly in accordance with government prescription (Lloyd and Meegan, 1996). Nonetheless, "...the philosophy of the European Union has been grudgingly recognised by the British government" (Oatley, 1998: 153). Therefore, it would be fair to say that the economic and political integration which stems from the EU has in the case of the UK, redefined and effectively undermined traditional national regional policy.

What was formerly a fairly uniform system of government in the UK, based on partnership between central and local government, has within the last fifteen years or more undergone a

series of crucial transformations in the social, political and economic relations through which local governance operates. To this end, local governance has become an increasingly crowded platform "...in which a multitude of unelected agencies (public, private and voluntary) have become involved in attempting to influence the fortunes of local areas" (Goodwin and Painter, 1996: 635). Many of these institutions and non-departmental public bodies are heavily influenced by central government (through either centrally derived resources or centrally appointed officials who head such agencies) and are dominated by business elites (Basset, 1996; Peck, 1995; Ward, 1995). Such agencies often referred to as the 'quangocracy' (Council for Local Democracy, 1995) or as the 'new magistracy' (Stewart and Davies, 1994), are responsible for a level of expenditure that rivals that of local authorities (Stewart and Davies, 1994; Garside, 1998).

As already argued, 'partnerships' have come to dominate the sphere of regeneration and local economic development. Although the partnership agenda was promoted by the Conservative administrations in the late 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, the promotion of inter-sectoral partnership working is also a key policy priority for the new Labour Government which came to power in May 1997. Indeed, within a few months of taking office, a consultation document was published which reinforced the government's view that partnership was essential to effective urban regeneration (DETR, 1997). The term 'partnership' presents a pluralist model of urban regeneration in which all interested parties have an input and hence provides a basis for legitimising decisions. It also fits an 'enabling' model in that the pooling of resources which may include finance, skills, information, political access and people, enhances the possibility of achieving objectives and the means to do so. Many of those involved in such developments have talked in terms of increased efficiency and effectiveness benefits to regeneration projects, implying that an ideal model exists. However, despite the prevalence of the term 'partnership' its meaning remains unclear (Hastings, 1996; Atkinson, 1996, 1999) indeed, "... there are no agreed definitions of partnership, nor is there a clear theoretical framework within which to analyse partnerships" (Stewart, 1998: 79). Lawless (1991) also notes there is nothing that can be called a 'typical' partnership. Nonetheless, for the purpose of this thesis, the term 'partnership' will be used to describe:

"... a coalition of interests drawn from more than one sector in order to prepare and oversee an agreed strategy for the regeneration of a defined area" (Bailey *et al*, 1995: 1)

Inter-Urban Competition and Urban Entrepreneurialism

The concept of inter-urban competition plays a key role in the narratives and discourses of the 'entrepreneurial city'. Indeed, 'urban entrepreneurialism and inter-urban competition are so closely associated with one another that frequently they are treated as synonymous' (Leitner, and Sheppard, 1998, p.296). To this end, tourism has been at the forefront not only of the regeneration of depressed local and regional economies, but has been a central tool used by capital and political managers to counter and engage in, territorial competition, most notably the huge investment in city place promotion or boosterist activities (see section 2.6). Increasingly, the political economy of cities is framed in an entrepreneurial ideology and directed at putting in place a 'favourable environment' that will attract capital (Harvey, 1989).

Harvey (1989) argues that inter-urban competition imposes clear limits upon the power of specific local economic development strategies to transform the fortunes of particular cities, in that, as competition becomes more vigorous, it will invariably function as an 'external coercive power' over individual cities to bring them into line with the discipline and logic of capitalist development. The emphasis on inter-urban competition is also used as a means to relate the forms of development associated with urban entrepreneurialism to broader processes of economic change. Here the argument suggests that the shift towards entrepreneurialism has had an important facilitative role in the transition from locationally rigid Fordist production systems to a far more geographically open and market based form of flexible accumulation. This facilitative role includes: opening up mechanisms of social control through the promotion of local place-based identities and enhancing the geographical mobility of multinational capital.

Harvey (1985) also stresses, that the uneven spatial consequences of economic development under capitalism, force cities to compete for jobs, trade, investments, and so forth. But since economic power is deployed within a hierarchical structure of urban areas, it is, therefore, not a competition between equals. Likewise, there is an unequal distribution of economic and political power between different social classes for command over the conditions which enhance their own existence. The local state, in its role as a manager of these conflicts and contradictions tends to support the capitalist class because of the necessity of conserving capital accumulation. Ideology, values and power relations (see section 2.7) are inscribed not

only in space through the process of uneven development (Harvey, 1993, p.9, Lefebvre, 1991), but also through the representation of place (Norkunas, 1993; Hall and Jenkins, 1995).

Leitner and Sheppard (1998) argue that urban entrepreneurialism depends on two critical assumptions which they contend are unsustainable: that inter-urban competition takes place on a level playing field and that cities are analogous to single firms. With respect to the first assumption the authors argue that each city has a unique *geographical trajectory* resulting from its historical role and location within the broader political and economic system. In other words, a set of national, regional and local institutions, regulatory systems, traditions and norms that condition the nature and possible outcomes of local initiatives. As a consequence, identical local urban development practices function in different ways, and may have different outcomes, in different contexts (Tickell and Peck, 1992).

With respect to the second assumption they maintain that cities are certainly very different from firms (see also Porter, 1995; Storper, 1997). The governance of cities is defined by their territoriality with legally fixed boundaries and in the final instance on democratic processes. In contrast, firms are governed by their owners and their location is contingent mainly on considerations of profit. Furthermore, firms work with a clear definition of the product they offer while, in contrast, cities provide a range of 'products' that often cannot be isolated from their environment and are highly interdependent (van den Berg and Braun, 1999). In each regard urban entrepreneurialism contains the element of uncertainty that many see as the very essence of entrepreneurial activity. In this sense 'it is speculative in execution and design and therefore dogged by all the difficulties and dangers which attach to speculative as opposed to rationally planned and co-ordinated development (Harvey, 1989, p.7).

This particular issue has been vividly illustrated many times in the urban tourism story. In the case of Sheffield's 1991 Student Games, for example, only limited success was achieved in an expensive entrepreneurial venture which burdened local residents with a large long term debt repayment to be met from council taxes (Goodwin, 1993; Lawless, 1994). In attempting to portray Birmingham as an International City, able to attract and entertain visitors, most notably business tourists. Birmingham City Council's significant financial investment in prestige developments (International Convention Centre and the National Indoor Arena) resulted in the diversion of scarce public resources away from basic services particularly housing and education which the city's disadvantaged groups are particularly dependent on

(Loftman and Nevin, 1994, 1998). The most recent and arguably, the most spectacular example of a tourist project that fell far short of its expectations is the Millennium Dome. Such examples expose how fragile the basis of entrepreneurial policies (particularly those associated with tourism) can often prove to be. Even when such speculative policies do succeed in attracting investment, within the 'successful' cities, there will be many communities that continue to find themselves isolated from the benefits (Logan and Molotch, 1987; Harvey, 1989; Goodwin, 1995).

2.6 Key Elements of Entrepreneurial Activity: Place Promotion and Pro-growth Local Economic Development Strategies

In the 'entrepreneurial city' certain types of activities have taken centre stage in the entrepreneurial repertoire: these include place promotion and property-led development projects (Leitner and Sheppard, 1998, p.298). Various commentators have suggested that city marketing is the most common form of economic development strategy (Griffiths, 1998; Hall and Hubbard, 1996; Hughes, 1999). This marketing is designed to promote a positive image (very often a new image replacing the old) in an attempt to boost the confidence of current or potential businesses, residents and visitors in a particular city or area within a city.

Flagship development projects subsidised by the public sector have been most significant in terms of the extent of public financial commitment in many cities. Some of these focus on attracting investment in manufacturing or knowledge-based industries such as science and technology parks. Others are orientated towards providing an attractive landscape of consumption for tourists and more affluent residents, such as museums and other heritage attractions, hotels, and other leisure facilities, including speciality shopping, marinas, concert halls and pubs/restaurants. As Rutheiser (1996) suggests, entrepreneurial urban policies can 'bedazzle and bamboozle the multitudes', potentially distracting from the social and economic problems that may persist in the city. Therefore, it is vital to look behind the gloss, and consider the wider implications of the strategies outlined above. It is towards these wider issues that the section now turns.

Place Promotion and Tourism

No matter what form the new urban politics takes at the local scale, it is clear that place marketing with its emphasis on the projection of deliberately crafted images to external audiences and local populations, has been one of the defining features of entrepreneurial modes of urban governance which evolved from the late 1970s (Page, 1995; Griffiths, 1998; Hughes, 1999; Jessop, 1998). This commodification of the city is now perceived as a requisite strategy in local economic development. Current approaches to place marketing typically attempt to 'reimage' or reinvent the city, promoting local traditions and manipulating 'place myths' as a means of stressing their uniqueness as a site for external investment (Bianchini and Schwengel, 1991; Boyle and Hughes, 1994; Hubbard, 1996; Hall and Hubbard, 1996).

When referring to the term commodification, this thesis will use the following definition 'Commodification refers, literally, to the extension of the commodity form to goods and services that were not previously commodified' (Jackson, 1999, p.96). The more recent celebration of 'enterprise culture', the 'free market', and 'consumer choice' has witnessed the transfer of the logic and rationality of the commodity market into areas that were previously regarded as relatively uncommodified, including healthcare, education and culture.

The role that tourism can play in transforming collective and individual values is inherent in the ideas of commodification (Cohen, 1977). This is evident in many tourism pursuits (arts, heritage and culture) which have been transformed into experiences which are produced and consumed as commodities. Two points need to be made about place marketing. First, place marketing is rarely limited to advertising alone. Invariably it accompanies the creation of a new urban landscape which portrays both an expression and a consequence of attempts to reimage or reinvent the city (Roberts and Schien, 1993, Short, *et al.*, 1993; Griffiths, 1998). Second, selling places to inward investors is not a new idea (Gold and Gold, 1990). Ward (1990) shows that local authorities have been doing it at least since the inter-war period. British New Towns are prime examples of early place marketing. What is new, however, is that the focus of place marketing has shifted from simply extolling the virtues of a given city (access to vacant factory space, adequate housing, a pool of unskilled labour) to emphasising culture and quality of life (Stewart, 1996; Gold and Ward, 1994; Griffiths, 1998).

Critical discussion of place marketing strategies has focused on two major themes: their ideological effects and their socially regressive consequences. Essentially, place marketing is predicated on the manipulation of meanings and perceptions. Therefore, in the process of reimagining a city, place marketing creates a selective relationship between the promoted image and the reality. Consequently, some aspects of its identity are emphasised whilst others are ignored, marginalised or even denied. According to MacCannell (1976: 110), all societies sanctify certain phenomenon as tourist attractions by recognising their importance with markers, by codifying (legislation, cultural and heritage places signification), framing and elevation (displaying, preserving, enhancing) and via enshrinement as symbols (reproductions). Without markers that label a tourist attraction as a site many attractions are unrecognisable (Culler, 1981; Britton, 1991). MacCannell (1976) argues that many of these institutional mechanisms will be capitalistic in nature, but they are not necessarily so. His conceptualisation of a tourist attraction is fundamentally a semiotic one, in which the object cannot be separated from its subjective social and cultural construction. As such, this analysis does give an insight into how attractions are created and assimilated into, capitalist production and tourism products.

In constructing places in the image of tourism, both socially and physically, the boundaries between fiction and reality become blurred (Hewison, 1987; Hughes, 1992b; Griffiths, 1998). In Western society tourism and leisure are now firmly established as something to be consumed, from a vast array of experiences produced and distributed by an enterprising tourism industry. This ideology and dynamism of the tourism and leisure market, helps to conserve the notion that the choice of 'fun' and 'entertainment' offered, is one of individual freedom for the consumer and thus entirely free of political consequences. (Wilson, 1988; Hall, 1994). However, the philosophical shift, embodied in commercially-motivated representation of place, is inscribed through power structures which have potentially served to lead to a one-dimensional representation of place to visitors. As Norkunas (1993: 97) describes:

“The ruling class carefully controls the form and content of historical recreations and tourist landscapes, legitimising itself by projecting its own contemporary sociocultural values upon the past. This struggle, the tension between groups with power and groups with varying but lesser degrees of power, is replayed in many spheres in which the public enactment of identity is staged”.

As such, the historical narratives transmitted through heritage can be selective, partial and distorting. They are premised on a false history which ignores the complexity of historical processes and relationships, and sanitises the less savoury aspects of the past. This contrasts with the work of professional historians where “testable truth is the chief hallmark and the historians credibility depends on their sources being open to scrutiny” (Lowenthal, 1996: 120). Consequently, myths concerning the representation of history can be popularised and institutionalised by those with the power to do so. In the process, discrepancies between ‘promoted image’ and ‘real identity’ cease to have significance. What matters to capitalist enterprises is economic growth which translates as income, rent, interest and profit (Crick, 1989; Hughes, 1992; Hall and Jenkins, 1995). Indeed, “That places *can* be sold slips, by elision, into places *will* be sold” (Ashworth and Voogd, 1990: 14). Ideologies are therefore important in legitimising, defining and identifying particular attitudes and interests in social and political issues.

Detailed examination of the promotional imagery used in publicity materials highlights the extent to which a limited number of common themes have been adopted by markedly dissimilar places. Far from promoting distinctive identities, reimagining strategies have tended to reinforce uniformity and convergence (Sadler, 1993; Barke and Harrop, 1994; Holcomb, 1994). Griffiths (1998) argues this is a result of a deep internal contradiction in the logic of place marketing. In capitalist society, city leaders need to enhance the qualities that make their cities’ resources stand out from the rest in order to get noticed by intended audiences: there is an *imperative of differentiation*. But the intrinsically speculative nature of place marketing, imposes a countervailing obligation to avoid unnecessary risk and to stick to a tried and tested formula: there is a strong *imperative of uniformity*. Propagandist texts and images devised by local regeneration agencies are always part of a wider ‘representational process’ which operates through other cultural products, such as novels, travel books, films, TV and newspaper reports (Gruffudd, 1994). Thus, there are limits to the extent to which the representation of place can be locally controlled. It is important to note that the hegemony of the urban regime is never complete, but is always subject to negotiation and challenge (Hall and Hubbard, 1996; Griffiths, 1998). Although the grassroots reception of local development strategies is vital for their survival, people do not always absorb uncritically the meanings which have been encoded by urban elites in the selling of place or of development embraced by the elite coalition (Goodwin, 1993; Hubbard, 1995). Nevertheless, opposition to urban

regimes is curtailed by the local state, with many major decisions taken out of the realm of public politics and separated from community pressures (Sadler, 1993; Imrie *et al.*, 1995).

Apart from their ideological effects, place marketing strategies can also have significant distributional consequences. It has been argued that place marketing not only diverts attention away from social and economic inequalities, it can also exacerbate them (Henry and Bramham, 1986; Imrie and Thomas, 1992; Hall and Hubbard, 1996). This phenomenon has been noted in a number of UK cities. As already noted, for example, it has been argued that in Birmingham spending on these entrepreneurial policies has detracted from welfare and education expenditure, with dire results for the more disadvantaged residents in the city (Loftman and Nevin, 1992, 1994, 1998). In Glasgow, 'reimaging strategies' have resulted in a contested debate about the extent to which the benefits of a changing image (the Merchant City and the City of Culture) have in any way benefited the Glaswegians of the peripheral estates (Boyle and Hughes, 1991, 1994; Paddison, 1993). In a number of USA cities, entrepreneurial strategies have been associated with the creation of a new urban 'underclass' (Hambleton, 1991; Galster, 1992). Logan and Molotch (1987) emphasise that as entrepreneurial strategies invariably favour economic development as opposed to the redistribution of wealth and opportunity, it is inevitable that there will be a net transfer of wealth from the less well-off to urban elites. Whilst research on the cultural politics of the post-industrial city has highlighted the unequal distribution of power in regime politics, geographers have been remarkably reserved when it comes to identifying the social and territorial inequalities resulting from such policies (S.J. Smith, 1994; Hall and Hubbard, 1996). Indeed, debates about the effectiveness of entrepreneurial policies in improving social equity in the city are dominated by the hollow rhetoric of politicians and policy-makers (Leitner and Garner, 1993). Nevertheless, Harvey (1992) has developed a set of propositions which in theory could be applied to any given planning policy or political decision, namely, governance must minimise exploitation, liberate marginalised groups, empower the oppressed and pursue non exclusionary forms of social control. By focusing attention on the mechanisms, as opposed to the outcomes, of urban policies, Harvey in effect provides a framework that could be used to assess the extent to which entrepreneurial strategies establish social justice in the city.

The Flagship Approach to Urban Regeneration

A major feature of urban policy adopted by UK local authorities and central government in the 1980s and the 1990s has been the promotion of property-led regeneration. One of its central aims was to break the spiral of economic decline, and to improve external perceptions of the city, often through the use of high-profile prestigious 'flagship' buildings as symbols of renewed dynamism and confidence (Middleton, 1990; Smyth, 1994; Hubbard, 1996; Loftman and Nevin, 1996). In the older industrial areas these strategies have generally meant there has been massive expenditure on large-scale 'flagship' projects that promote science and technology, culture, tourism, specialist shopping, sports and leisure or conference facilities. All this in a bid to attract other investment, and in the belief that the benefits would 'trickle-down' to disadvantaged groups (Robson, 1988; Turok, 1992; Healey *et al* 1992). There are two types of 'flagship' project which can be identified: 'prestige' and 'local, small-scale' ones. As Loftman and Nevin (1996) argue:

"prestige developments are pioneering or innovative large scale projects which are primarily concerned with the harnessing and creation of economic growth. In general, prestige developments are targeted at encouraging and attracting large-scale private investment; generating additional economic spin-offs at a city wide and regional level and changing outside perceptions of business-decision makers and/or potential visitors from outside the locality, particularly at the national and international levels, in a bid to increase local economic activity and wealth. Local flagships, on the other hand, are smaller scale projects geared at encouraging or facilitating organic growth within urban areas and/or changing local perceptions about particular localities" (p.992).

Loftman and Nevin (1995) identify five factors which have influenced substantially the proliferation of flagship forms of development in Britain in the 1980s and 1990s. First, the global restructuring of industry over the last two decades has accelerated the longstanding economic decline experienced by many British cities, particularly, in manufacturing and port-related industry. In response, city governments and urban regeneration agencies have attempted to restructure the function and form of cities, in order to meet the new demands of capital. Secondly, the internationalisation of capital has intensified inter-urban competition for footloose private sector investment. In response, British cities have invested heavily in flagship projects and place marketing activities to secure footloose private investment (Harvey, 1988, 1989; Wilkinson, 1992; Ashworth and Voogd, 1990; Loftman and Nevin,

1994, 1995). Thirdly, Conservative central government policy during the 1980s resulted in a shift away from welfare issues towards economic and, in particular, property-led regeneration (Healey *et al.*, 1992; Turok, 1992; Atkinson and Moon, 1994). Central Government's commitment to tackling urban decline through private sector property-led regeneration (in many cases heavily subsidised by the public sector) is evident in a number of urban policy initiatives. In particular this approach has been enthusiastically pursued by the government's leading agencies of regeneration in England and Wales, the Urban Development Corporation's (UDCs), which sought to promote urban regeneration through flagship development schemes (Turok, 1992; CLES, 1990; Coulson, 1990). Indeed, in the 1980s the consensus amongst policy and decision-makers was that "a city without a flagship did not have a regeneration strategy" (O'Toole and Usher, 1992, p. 221).

Fourthly, during their period in office consecutive Conservative governments applied unprecedented restrictions on the resources and functions of local government in Britain which by the late 1980s resulted in many local authorities adopting a more pragmatic approach towards the 'rhetoric of partnership' (Colenutt, 1993, p.175) and compliance with central government's urban policy priorities. Indeed, Bianchini *et al.*, (1992, p.247) argue that "Labour controlled local authorities often support flagship schemes because there seems little else they can do to attract public-private sector resources for physical renewal projects and to prove they still have a role to play in urban regeneration". Fifthly, there is a long tradition of Britain emulating the United States, and the development of flagships is no exception. By the mid-1980s the influence of US approaches to urban regeneration, emphasising the role of flagship developments had become firmly established in British urban policy (Parkinson and Judd, 1988; Hambleton, 1990; Keating, 1990). This influence stemmed from the much publicised success of these approaches to urban regeneration which, it is claimed, has ensured the renaissance of previously declining US cities such as Baltimore and Detroit (Falk, 1986; Barnekov *et al.*, 1989; Hambleton, 1990; Boyle, 1989; Bianchini *et al.*, 1992).

The Claimed Economic Impact of Flagship Projects

Although flagship developments in UK cities have diverse backgrounds, characteristics and forms, a common thread runs through the arguments put forward in support of these developments. Proponents argue that flagship projects are effective mechanisms for

regenerating declining or neglected urban areas, and act as magnets for attracting further investment. According to the DOE (1990) report *Tourism and the Inner City*, tourism related flagships have a number of very positive attributes which distinguish them from other categories of inner city project:

- Tourism projects thrive in situations where there are redundant docks, old buildings and abandoned 'heritage'. In this respect inner city areas have a comparative advantage over other areas.
- Tourism projects often combine several different types of benefit in one project. It is not uncommon for the same project to create jobs, improve the environment and contribute to changing the perceptions of the area. This spectrum of benefits is much less common in the case of other types of project.
- Tourism projects create important secondary effects which may be more significant than the primary effects. One secondary effect which is unique to tourism projects is that by their nature they attract visitors into the area.
- Tourism is a growing industry therefore tourism projects are far less likely to displace existing tourism businesses and jobs created are more likely to be additional jobs.

It has been suggested that flagship developments provide benefits for all city residents through the creation of wealth, jobs, an improved physical environment and new places to visit, admire and enjoy. In addition, disadvantaged groups and neighbourhoods will inevitably share in the wealth generated by such projects via the trickle-down process (Brooks, 1993; Lock, 1993, 1994; Smyth, 1994).

It has been argued that such developments can assist the older industrial cities previously dependent on declining industries to diversify their economic base (Lawless, 1990; Imrie and Thomas, 1993; Loftman and Nevin, 1994) in that they facilitate the physical restructuring of urban areas through the promotion of new land uses and infrastructure to meet the new patterns and demands of production and consumption activities (Tavsanoğlu and Healey, 1992). Thus flagship projects can be instrumental in aiding cities to come to terms with the process of wider economic restructuring, in line with the changing global economy, which is deemed essential for sustaining the economic survival of urban areas (Loftman and Nevin, 1995).

This approach to regeneration also requires the formulation of a coherent city vision, which “nurtures productive team building and partnership development within and between local authorities and outside agencies and organisations...ultimately, it may boost the local policy machine in ways that enhance and extend the status and strength of the local economy” (Stobart and Ball, 1998, p.228). This is evident in the partnership arrangements concerning tourism related flagship developments in Birmingham, Sheffield, Liverpool and Manchester (see Lawless, 1990; Loftman and Nevin, 1994; Meegan, 1998; Peck and Tickell, 1994). At a broad level, flagships represent a vital place-marketing tool to enhance a city’s attractiveness in the inter-urban competition for tourism, consumer expenditure, scarce central government resources and private investment. Their high-profile symbolism can demonstrate that a city, or an area of a city, is physically, economically and culturally restructuring: “In essence, the flagship is acting as a large advertising hoarding for the area, the implied message being that this is the place for others to spend or to invest” (Smyth, 1994: 21). Apart from boosting civic pride, flagships can also be used to promote a city’s less well-known existing assets. Lastly, these projects have access to funding, from national and supranational governments, that would not have been available for traditional welfare purposes, in other words, the local opportunity cost has been negligible.

Some Criticisms of Flagship Developments

The criticisms of the flagship approach to urban regeneration are many. The approach, it is argued, encourages the fragmentation of cities, urban regeneration and planning policies because it focuses on individual elements in designated zones or sites (Harvey, 1988; Healey *et al.*, 1992). In this context flagship projects are not geared at creating equitable cities or localities, typically, they focus development and investment activity on discrete parts of urban areas (Wilkinson, 1992; Loftman and Nevin, 1995). This strategy, with its focus on a few locales (the city centre or waterfronts) may result in the projects not being properly integrated physically and functionally into the rest of the urban fabric and the city’s life. Many flagship buildings have been for ‘high culture’ uses, such as museums, art galleries and opera houses, reflecting the transformation of many city economies into centres of pleasure and consumption, with emphasis placed on adjusting cities to the life style preferences of the more affluent residents or visitors. It is open therefore to question whether local residents particularly the unemployed or minority ethnic groups will be able to enjoy as consumers the new attractions that these locales have to offer. These attractions may well be too expensive,

too difficult to access by public transport or even characterised by an unwelcoming social atmosphere. Furthermore, there is very little evidence that the trickle-down process generates significant employment or other benefits for disadvantaged residents (Bianchini *et al.*, 1992; Loftman and Nevin, 1992, 1995, 1998; Smyth, 1994). Much of the growth in employment which has resulted from tourism related projects, in particular, is located in sectors that are characterised by low pay, low-skill and part-time work. Indeed, critics have argued that prestige developments serve to exacerbate existing social divisions within cities. This is because the flagship approach to urban regeneration is posited on the notion of wealth creation with little or no regard to wealth distribution issues (Hambleton, 1991; Loftman and Nevin, 1992; Deakin and Edwards, 1993). It must be recognised that strategies based on the premise of trickle-down have already lost part of their policy appeal, particularly with the establishment of the City Challenge and Single Regeneration Budget initiatives where the emphasis is increasingly on regenerating communities, not just property markets.

Accountability is also an issue that has come in for heavy criticism. In particular, the secrecy surrounding negotiations concerning flagship developments, not least the lack of access to publicly available relevant information concerning the conception and development of flagships and, when up and running, information on their performance. There is also a lack of genuine consultation and of channels through which ordinary citizens and community groups can influence policy formulation. In short, the policy formulation and decision-making process is restricted to powerful interests, which in turn curtails and undermines public debate and involvement in the development and operation of such schemes (see Dawson and Parkinson, 1990; Bianchini *et al.*, 1992; Smyth, 1994; Loftman and Nevin, 1995).

A number of commentators have argued that the inter-city competition for private investment has led to the serial reproduction of standardised models of certain flagship schemes, in particular, waterfront developments and festival market-places. In effect this 'theming' of the urban landscape renders ephemeral any competitive advantage gained from such schemes by cities (Bianchini *et al.*, 1992; Albrechts, 1991; Keating, 1991). Furthermore, there is the danger that unfettered competition between cities may lead to the over-supply and the under-use of facilities. "Put simply, how many successful convention centres, sports stadia, Disney-worlds and harbor places can there be?" (Harvey, 1987: 278).

The ideological implications of the role of flagships in urban regeneration also need considering. Harvey (1989) for instance, argues that one of the aims of flagship developments is to divert attention away from increasing social problems and conflicts within the city, reinforced by the emergence of spatially segregated urban underclasses and by intensified ethnic, racial and class polarisation. According to Bianchini *et al* (1992) some local authorities are less forthcoming, nevertheless, they share the view that although flagships were not implemented as instruments for social and political diversion, they may however, obscure high levels of deprivation for a significant but increasingly less-visible number of city residents.

A final criticism levelled at property-led regeneration strategies in general is that they are susceptible to the vagaries of the national and international property market, and thus do not offer a sound basis on which to generate stable and sustainable local economic regeneration (Brownhill, 1990; Colenutt, 1993; Hambleton, 1998). Turok (1992) argues that one of the major problems of property-based approaches in facilitating economic regeneration is that the other preconditions for growth are likely to be absent or weak in the target cities.

Despite the misgivings, however, it is highly likely that the development of these projects will remain an important feature of urban regeneration for a number of years to come. Indeed, a significant proportion of the Millennium Fund is devoted to large capital projects of regional or national importance.

2.7 Linking Theory to Research

As already argued the value of any theory lies with links to concrete research agendas. This thesis attempts to remedy the insensitivity of countless theories on urban tourism to fail to take into account the relationship between tourism and the complexity of emerging forms of urban governance and economic change. The aim is to use a reconstruction of Hall and Jenkins (1995) tourism policy organising framework as a concrete research agenda and locate it within the analytical framework for investigating entrepreneurial city strategies outlined by Jessop (1998) in his essay *The Narrative of Enterprise and the Enterprise of Narrative* and to offer a 'reconstructed hybridisation' in order to develop a *middle-order theory* for understanding transformations in governance that tourism is part of.

From the discussion so far, it is evident that there is a wide range of entrepreneurial city strategies. Furthermore, what all these initiatives share is the entrepreneurial concern to create 'new combinations' of economic factors which will further local and regional competitiveness. It is also conceded that the eventual success of all such strategies will still depend on market forces.

To this end, Jessop's (1998) reworking of the thematic of the 'entrepreneurial city' as a key feature of urban regeneration in Britain is of particular relevance to this research. Jessop takes his theoretical lead from the work of Schumpeter (1934) who defined entrepreneurship as the creation of opportunities for surplus profit through 'new combinations' or innovation. From this, Jessop makes a distinction between entrepreneurship oriented towards 'strong competition' and that oriented towards 'weak competition'. Strong competition refers to potentially positive-sum attempts to improve the overall structural competitiveness of a locality through economic, political and social innovations. Weak competition refers to essentially zero-sum attempts to secure reallocation of existing resources at the expense of other localities. This approach is more concerned with modifications in facilitative or supportive measures, aimed at capturing mobile investment usually through building, land and tax subsidies, in conjunction with place marketing strategies to enhance place boosterism.

Whilst there are many forms of inter-urban competition and different bases of each, the author maintains one useful distinction is that between 'static comparative' and 'dynamic competitive' advantages. The former refer to superior so called 'natural' factor endowments as compared to those of potential competitors (in the case of tourism, this might include heritage or cultural legacies or an abundance of cheap wage labour). The latter are somewhat more obviously socially created and can be socially transformed. These might include: measures to support entrepreneurs (venture capital, subsidies, investment in knowledge production via public R&D or locally oriented R&D consortia, local and regional development funds and so forth). More generally, policies should favour approaches that are (a) concerned with the embeddedness of industrial practices in specific contexts and regions (b) production-systems-oriented rather than firm-oriented, and (c) directed towards the ongoing adjustment capacities of regional economies, rather than once-and-for-all implementation of so called best practices (p.88). This approach puts a high value on forms of institutional arrangements which enable economic actors to share risks and to cope with

uncertainty through dense social and institutional networks (Amin and Thrift, 1994; Storper, 1997).

If competitiveness is recognised purely in terms of comparative advantages, then the prime concern is the overall efficiency of resource allocation, especially in producing traded goods and services. This approach is often said to be the most relevant to nations, regions and cities. However, such factor-based advantages are usually hard to sustain, especially given the relative ease at which innovations can be adopted or superseded as best practise by competitors. In the case of tourism, this is nowhere more apparent than in the “serial reproduction of world trade centres, waterfront developments, post-modern shopping malls, etc” (Harvey, 1989, p.10).

As already argued, the transformation in urban governance towards entrepreneurialism has led to a new urban order where jobs and investment move quickly and often around the world, from city to city, up and down the urban hierarchy. “In this chaotic geography, cities need to position and reposition themselves” (Short and Kim, 1998, p.57). Consequently, “longer-term competitiveness would be better based on developing and maintaining dynamic competitive advantages. This holds not only for firms but also for industrial central business districts, cities, regions, nations and any other spaces able to create spatialised competitive advantages” (Jessop, 1998, p.82).

Using this distinction, it is clear that not all cities are concerned with the same forms of competitiveness. In some cases policy innovations involve little more than:

“consultants reports, outline proposals, non-binding agreements, glossy brochures, more or less regular conferences, meetings, or seminars, cultural exchanges and databases....there has been a proliferation of small scale partnerships with limited co-ordination, insufficient resources, and, often, conflicting goals. There is a greater emphasis on civic boosterism and delegatory place-marketing than on public-private partnerships seriously oriented to structural competitiveness in a post-Fordist age and able to consolidate the socially embedded, socially regulated conditions for dynamic competitive advantage” (Jessop, 1997, p.40).

In other cases, cities and regions implement economic, political and social innovations to enhance production and other conditions affecting the structural competitiveness of both local

and mobile capital. This would be reinforced to the extent that they possess a socially dense and 'institutionally thick' space for economic reflexivity (Dublin and Barcelona may provide two such examples). The more broadly these are understood (including the social context of enterprise) the more one can contextualise 'structural competitiveness' of new forms of economic strategy and/or economic governance (p.82).

Amin and Thrift (1994) argue that 'institutional thickness' is the key to sustained local economic development. Institutional thickness is dependent on four factors: strong institutional presence, high levels of interaction between institutions in an area, collective representation by a wide range of agencies, and consensus of a common purpose. It is a 'thickness' which continues to stimulate entrepreneurship and consolidate local embeddedness of industry (p.15). They contend that institutional thickness produces six outcomes:

“The first is institutional persistence, that is local institutions are reproduced. The second outcome is the formulation of an archive of commonly held knowledge. The third outcome is institutional flexibility, which is the ability of organisations in an area to both learn and change. The fourth outcome is a high innovative capacity, which is not just specific to individual organisations, but it is the most common property of a locality. The fifth outcome is the capacity to extend trust and reciprocity. Finally, and least common of all, is the consolidation of a sense of inclusiveness, that is, a widely held common project which serves to mobilise the regions with speed and efficiency (p.15).

The examples they give of localities with strong institutional thickness include the City of London and Silicon Valley. In contrast, it is difficult to envisage tourism-dominated areas as having a strong institutional thickness, due in no small part to the fragmented nature of the industry. Indeed, Pridham (1996) argues that the institutional setting for tourism policy has been particularly weak due to fragmentation in the industry, so that tourism is ill-equipped to compete effectively against other sectors in the contest for state resources. Nevertheless, according to Williams and Shaw (1998) tourism in some localities, particularly urban areas, may contribute to institutional thickness.

Porter, (1990) argues that any city, by creating and maintaining a competitive advantage, can provide high-wage jobs and improved social and environmental conditions; a 'high road' to

urban development where growth and prosperity reinforce one another. This argument ignores, however, the influence of the new urban order on the ability of cities to pursue such a 'high road' to economic growth. As Jessop, (1998, p.86) observes:

“The capacity of cities to remain at the top of both national and regional hierarchies is linked to their ability to remain at the forefront of economic and institutional innovation. But inter-urban competition can also lead to displacement of competitive advantages across cities lower down the hierarchy. Some cities begin apparently irreversible decline as they are outmanoeuvred by innovations in other established or emerging cities; this is especially likely where their initial superiority in the hierarchy was based on static comparative advantage”

In addition, Jessop (1998, p.96-97) maintains that entrepreneurial strategies are subject to at least four sets of constraints: first, there are dilemmas around producing place and capturing flows in space, 'Strong competition' typically attempts to overcome this dilemma by linking the two processes. But 'soft competition' is more concerned with capturing mobile factors of production and is therefore more prone to promote 'zero-sum' competition between cities, switching mobile investments around without expanding them. Secondly, there are strategic dilemmas in striking a balance between co-operation and competition (both in and among cities); between imitation (of existing best practice) and innovation (the search for new and better practices). Thirdly, given the multi-tiered governance of entrepreneurial policies, issues arise about how best to articulate the urban level with other scales of innovation to increase the chances of successful projects. In the case of tourism, this issue has created a number of contradictory pressures. For example, the changing priorities of the inner cities also impinge considerably on the work of tourism policy-makers. Often the funds that are offered to Regional Tourist Boards by the government on a competitive bidding basis are for urban regeneration purposes through the SRB. Subsequently, the Boards may often have to forgo their independently established strategic plans in order to tap into funds offered by government with conditions attached that direct the focus of initiatives towards the government's own priorities. In short, autonomy is exchanged for financial resources. Furthermore, sometimes competition may need to be suspended at the city level in order to secure for example, EU funding which is administered for broader-based urban and regional projects. Fourthly, there are limits associated with the insertion of entrepreneurial activities into broader structures and activities of the state. It may for instance, be difficult for governments (particularly those in Labour strongholds) to break with inherited commitments

to welfare and equity and to live with the redistributive effects of entrepreneurialism (see for example Harding, 1995; Hughes, 1999).

In summarising the nature and features of entrepreneurial city strategies it is evident that there is no quick and easy recipe for success. Nevertheless, this section has attempted to demonstrate the utility of Jessop's (1998) approach which clearly goes beyond issues of 'reproduction regulation' to include the pursuit of entrepreneurial policies oriented to (permanent) innovation in inter-urban competition. In this context governance must mobilise not only ideological and political apparatuses but also forms of organisational intelligence and mechanisms for collective learning in territorial context (Storper and Scott, 1995). The development of such capacities would depend on the supply of organisational intelligence rather than capital; on shaping the institutional context in which firms operate rather than providing subsidies; and on organising place-specific advantages rather than an abstract space of flows (Jessop, 1998, p.90).

This author would argue that a combination of the two closely related approaches (strong and weak competition) outlined by Jessop (1998) in conjunction with a reconstruction of Hall and Jenkins (1995) tourism policy organising framework could offer a potentially powerful analytical framework with which to theorise transformations in local governance that affect the durability and strategic nature of urban tourism development policies and strategies. A number of related research issues are identified in Table 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 below.

Some Research Issues

As argued above the movement towards new modes of entrepreneurial governance has become increasingly congested by new economic actors, dependencies and relationships. It is not the intention of this thesis simply to chart the emergence of new mechanisms and structures of governance as this may become too descriptive, but to ask critical questions about those institutions and networks which are emerging to replace traditional government. This should allow an examination of the purpose of the new forms of governance that tourism is part of, questioning the rationales and interests of these agencies and institutions (see Table 2.1) and how and why these particular forms of governance were brought together.

Table 2.1 Institutional Arrangements (network) Oriented Towards Strong and Weak Competition

Strong Competition	Weak Competition
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutional ‘embeddedness’ or ‘thickness’. This creates complex and changing opportunities for cities to organise place-specific advantages and to share risk and cope with uncertainty through dense social and institutional networks. • Changing structures which promote the development of shared visions which might foster new institutional arrangements to supplement and/or complement existing patterns of governance. In both respects it involves the shaping of the context within which institutional arrangements can be forged <i>rather</i> than developing strategies and initiatives and/or providing subsidies for them. • Institutional and organisational innovations which foster and reproduce a local culture of innovation, entrepreneurship and mutual collaboration. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutional fragmentation – makes co-ordinated growth strategies difficult • Institutional inertia – lack of initiative or misinterpretation of development • Local resistance to change (governments for example, may find it difficult to break with inherited commitments to welfare and equity and to live with the redistributive effects of entrepreneurialism).

These sorts of debates and a focus on governance, lead on to questions about power relationships in the decision-making process. Stone (1989) claims that the examination of power can be reconceptualised as being a matter of social production rather than social control, concerned with the capacity to act rather than to act over. As Stone (1989) claims “What is at issue is not so much domination and subordination, as a capacity to act and accomplish goals” (p.229). The ‘new’ governance claims to embrace this capacity of power to act, as actors and institutions attempt to blend their resources, skills and purpose into a viable and sustainable partnership. Alternatively, there has emerged a number of critics who suggest that power is increasingly held by a small number of people with like-minded, usually business interests and creating a mainly unelected power elite (Lloyd and Meegan, 1996; Meegan, 1999; Peck, 1995). In addition, a great deal of scepticism has emerged amongst some researchers who claim that in the majority of initiatives, the involvement of the community in the decision-making process has never proceeded beyond the rhetorical stage and in some cases it has been actively discouraged (Duffy and Hutchinson, 1997; Foley *et al.*, 1998). It follows that the geometry of power within partnerships needs to be considered, to see which interests are involved, how they obtain their ‘capacity to act’ and what they are trying to achieve (see Table 2.2).

Table 2.2 Power Arrangements (network) Oriented Towards Strong and Weak Competition

Strong Competition	Weak Competition
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A tourism policy community possessing the power to insulate and/or exclude itself from other policy areas which might impinge upon its work. In short, the power to define its own agenda. • Power arrangements which adopt an open approach to decision-making (and often, more public scrutiny) where power is dispersed as widely as possible, and exercised as locally as practicable. Albeit, recognising the need to make the community (or more correctly its representatives) aware of what they can reasonably expect in terms of participation in structures and with regards to outcomes. • Decision-making power should be devolved, where possible, to the local level to allow for the construction of effective and spatially targeted support mechanisms and to engender greater local ownership and therefore greater commitment to deliver outputs within an agreed strategy. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policies that implement major decisions made by central power (national and international) and other more powerful or politically motivated policy sectors and sub-sectors. • Power arrangements fixed around 'representative' as opposed to participatory-democracy and characterised by secrecy. • Lack of a grant of power to local government from higher tiers of the state – restricting the efficacy of local government's actions regarding the social construction of place.

Orthodox approaches to economic development have accorded primacy to market forces, entrepreneurialism, 'flexibility' and business interests. In the most extreme variant 'trickle-down' from economic development is seen as the primary means of economic and social regeneration. The role for 'new' forms of governance, therefore, has become one seeking alternative strategies defining and delivering an appropriate mix of welfare alongside the pursuit of economic growth. Consequently, this raises concern about the ways in which different economic, political and social values are articulated in urban tourism policy (see Table 2.3). The research therefore, needs to question whether the mix of economic and social policy currently adopted by these agencies and institutions are suitable to meet the problems being faced in these localities.

Table 2.3 Values (network) Oriented Toward Strong and Weak Competition

Strong Competition	Weak Competition
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policies directed towards positive-sum attempts to improve the overall (structural) competitiveness of a locality through continuing economic, political and social innovations. These factors are relatively immobile as it is the simultaneous occurrence of certain forms of social and political arrangements, in specific cultural and ideological contexts which seems to have a positive or negative effect on economic development. The major reason why these factors exhibit place fixity is the necessity of their simultaneous occurrence in space and time in order to create a positive effect, this is a synergy effect, which cannot easily be <i>recreated</i> elsewhere. This approach acknowledges that advantage in inter-urban competition is no longer based upon resources (natural economic factor endowments), but on innovative capacity. • Co-operation v Competition – the capacity to strike a balance between policies which encourage co-operation and those that stimulate economic growth through competition (both in and among cities). • Policies which initiate or precede national trends • Policies which inform the preparation of a shared vision for tourism development at the city and/or regional level that all partners can work toward and to provide a context for intervention, with a clear strategy for implementation. • Policies which relate directly to local conditions. These conditions include local innovative capacity and traditions and the development of human capital endowments. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policies focused on superior so-called ‘natural’ economic factor endowments as compared to those of potential trading partners. These policies are usually more concerned with modifications in facilitative and supportive measures aimed at capturing mobile investment as well as simple image building measures with the same purpose. Such factor-based advantages, however, are difficult to sustain especially given the standardisation of many prestige flagship development initiatives and local identity scripts (permitting their relatively quick and easy adoption if the necessary finance and skills are available). A major problem with this approach is that it tends to reduce entrepreneurial activities to all manner of routine economic activities for the presence of strong entrepreneurial activities. Whilst this may be sufficient to maintain capital accumulation it does not mean the city concerned is entrepreneurial. Some cities may simply be administering or managing an existing business-friendly climate efficiently rather than actually engaged in innovation • Too isolationist or misinterpreting competitors as potential allies (both in and among cities) • Policies which tend to follow the spontaneous trends of the national economy • Fragmented or indeed, isolated policy measures that focus on individual tourism policy facets. Additionally, policies that provoke conflicts of interest between metropolitan regions and their localities. (for example, one single city area may have more than half of the population of the wider region. Such a configuration could create a feeling of menace to the other localities, especially from an economic and political perspective). • National or even regional policy measures applied indiscriminately at the local level.

2.8 Conclusion

This Chapter has attempted to review urban entrepreneurialism and issues surrounding the emergence of new governance. By drawing on Jessop (1997, 1998) the Chapter has also attempted to establish an analytical framework with which to theorise the dynamics of the relationship between governance and tourism at the local level which sees institutional change as being driven as much by the imperatives of the 'political' as it is by the 'economic'.

This Chapter offers three justifications for the study of entrepreneurial governance at the local level. The first concerns the apparent 'hollowing out' of national institutional and regulatory forms. This has involved the state devolving powers downwards to local or regional levels and a shift in power upwards (especially to the EU), and outwards to organisations in civil society. The second justification for studying local governance is that the concept brings together a diverse range of actors in new formal and informal arrangements. This involves organisations from different scales of spatial resolution (local, regional, national and supra-national levels) formulating, co-ordinating and delivering policy and programmes to meet economic and social challenges. Local governance therefore, focuses attention on the emergence of new institutions and the forging of new relationships between actors. The third justification is that governance needs to be seen in terms of the local policy style, local performance and local politics of the 'partnership' between governmental and non-governmental agencies. The proliferation in the number of 'partnerships' appears to be part of the broader shift in the process of governing. To achieve success in local economic development it is widely perceived that it will only be possible by working in 'partnership'.


How does tourism fit into this picture of governance? First and foremost the governance agents in tourism are essentially the same as in other sectors, but are characteristically fragmented. Therefore, "the importance of developing partnerships to achieve synergy between the private and public sector is inescapable" (Middleton, 1998, p.90). Secondly, tourism is highly localised in many respects (the majority of tourism services have to be produced and delivered at the point of consumption), consequently, there is particular interest in its role in economic development. Thirdly, tourism has become increasingly important in European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) programmes in the UK particularly Merseyside (see Chapter 5 and 6), which demonstrates both the increased importance of

tourism and changes in the geography of regional aid. Not all states, however, have the same interest in tourism:

“this depends on the capacity for developing tourism, the form of **governance**, the current state of the industry and the dictates of wider economic considerations such as the need to create jobs in response to recession, or to particular crises in other economic sectors” (Williams and Shaw, 1998, p.383) (author’s emphasis).

What is being suggested is an hybridisation of theory which links the concrete features of Hall and Jenkins (1995) tourism policy organising framework with the abstractions of Jessop’s thesis on entrepreneurial city strategies. The potential for the development of a middle-order theory have tentatively been suggested (Goodwin and Painter, 1997; Harding, 1997; Jessop, 1997; Lauria, 1997; Wood, 1998). But the use of theoretical hybridity can be charged with creating “chaotic conceptions” (Sayer, 1992) which ultimately obscures more than it reveals, and so this involves questioning whether approaches from different perspectives can be coherently combined. However, this author will attempt to demonstrate that a middle-order ‘theoretical fix’ can be defined (as schematically summarised in Figure 2.3) which provides an analytical framework capable of understanding the changes which are collectively creating ‘new’ modes of entrepreneurial governance and ‘new’ forms of urban tourism.

Figure 2.3 Developing a Middle-order ‘Theoretical Fix’ to Understand Changing Forms of Tourism, Economic Development and Governance at Local Level



CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS

3.1 The Choice of the Study Area

Liverpool was chosen as the location for fieldwork for five main reasons. First, the significant local economic change (traditional industrial deterioration) and policy transformations (particularly European assistance and how this relates to the national and local state) taking place in the city provide significant scope for a study investigating issues of changing forms of governance and attempts at local economic development. Secondly, tourism has been proposed in an effort to address the socio-economic problems associated with the city's long term structural decline. The Merseyside Objective 1 plan, the Liverpool City Council's own Tourism Action Plans (TAP's) 1994/95, 1996/97, and the Mersey Partnership's 1999 'five year programme for sustainable tourism' provide a plethora of initiatives in tourism suitable for research. Indeed the city has already been an important 'testing ground' for national initiatives, most notably with the first International Garden Festival in 1984, and in 1998 Liverpool received the English Tourist Board's award as the Day Trip Tourist Destination of the year, tourism is thus a well established component of the city's economy. Additionally, the tourism sector in Liverpool has been identified very much as a growth industry with significant development potential (MTB, 1988, 1990; MDC, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998; Interim Assessment of Objective 1 Programme-University of Liverpool, 1999; LCC, Economic Development Plan, 1996/97, 1998/99, 1999/2000). Thirdly, there are few cities where full economic impact studies have been undertaken and even fewer where more than one has been undertaken enabling a comparison over time. Liverpool is one city where comparison is possible and where tourism policy has been important (Law, 1992, p.614-615). Three comprehensive studies of tourism on Merseyside have been undertaken, in 1985 (DRV Research, 1986) in 1990 (MTB, 1991) and 1995 (MTCB, 1996a). The three studies attempted to demonstrate the importance of tourism to the economy. Fourth, with being a 'local' (born and bred in Liverpool) mature student, the author has an interest in the history, current issues and future of the city. Fifth, it was possible to tap into existing contacts including a number of city councillors and trade union officials, made through a lifetime of working and living in the city as starting points for the fieldwork.

3.2 Research Methodology and Methods

There is a tendency to use the concepts of *methodology* and *methods* interchangeably. More specifically *methodology* is often used when *method* is more appropriate. *Methodology* provides a sense of vision as to how research should or does proceed. It includes discussions on how theories are generated and tested, the line of reasoning used, what criteria they have to satisfy, and how specific theoretical perspectives can be linked to specific research problems. *Methods* of research on the other hand, furnish the means for bringing that vision into reality. They are the actual techniques and procedures used to gather and analyse data related to some research question or hypothesis. The forms that these methods take can include examining documents or other records (e.g. audio/visual) of human activity, asking people to fill in questionnaires, engaging people in formal (structured) or informal (free flowing) conversation and observing behaviour.

Applying Critical Realism

This thesis draws upon a philosophy of science known as critical realism, which seeks to discover the relational *cause-and effect* of society and deliver "...a coherent account of nature, society, human agency and philosophy" (Bhaskar, 1989, p.191). Critical realism is theoretically informed by the philosophy of realism built on a critique of positivism (Sayer, 1985). This 'radical' philosophy is defined by Johnston (1989) as:

"A philosophy of science based on the use of **ABSTRACTION** to identify the (necessary) *causal powers and liabilities* of specific *structures* which are realised under specific (contingent) *conditions*" (p.387, original emphasis).

Realist theory therefore enables the researcher to 'unpack' (an integral part of realism's conceptual vocabulary) rationally or abstract from the complexity of the real or 'concrete' world in order to determine relevant causal, as well as contingent, relations between objects. Sayer (1982, 1985, 1992) has made significant contributions to the use of realist method in human geography and has shown how empirical analysis rests upon how the object of study is characterised. Such decisions "...need to exclude the inessential but avoid dividing the indivisible" (Sayer, 1982, p.69).

The realist approach separates the abstract from the concrete through establishing the necessary and contingent relations between objects. Central to critical realism is the notion of reality as being stratified – made up of not only events but also of *mechanisms* and *structures*. Structures are seen as sets of internal relations which have characteristic ways of acting (causal powers and liabilities) which they possess by virtue of what they are and which are therefore necessary and which are realised through ‘mechanisms’. Identification of mechanisms and structures, however, is not a straightforward process, because they rarely stand in visible isolation in the real world. Consequently their disclosure requires a research strategy in which theoretical categories inform and in turn are informed by empirical evidence. It is for this reason that abstraction figures prominently in realist theory. For critical realism the object of investigation comprises the properties in reality which cause things to happen, the forces that produce events. These forces, or causal mechanisms are regarded as being linked to social structures which in effect are enduring and difficult to change. The concrete effects of different causal mechanisms are always reliant on particular contextual circumstances; the mechanisms thus find expression in different ways in different specific social and cultural contexts.

Realist method can also justify the use of a case study as a mode of analysis because realist theory accepts that specific and actual concrete patterns and contingent relations are unlikely, or indeed intended to be, ‘representative’, ‘average’ or ‘generalizable’ (Sayer and Morgan, 1985). Realist theory can therefore frame the bounds of the case study and defend it against claims of unrepresentativeness and particularity because each case study is the concrete product of mediated necessary and contingent relations.

Apart from recognising explicitly the importance of combined theoretical and empirical research a realist method also acknowledges that empirical work is necessary, not simply to apply theory or to test it; but as an essential input to the development of theory. As Sayer (1992) states:

“...theories make their strongest claims at the abstract level about necessary or internal relations, and about causal powers, or in other words necessity in the world. Where relations between things are contingent, their form must always be an empirical question, that is one which must be answered by observing actual cases” (p. 143, original emphasis).

This brings attention to two research designs which could be considered as research methodologies: **intensive** and **extensive** (Sayer, 1992; Sayer and Morgan, 1985). Essentially, in order to meet their objectives the two types of design ask different sorts of question, use different techniques and method and define their objects and boundaries differently (see Table 3.1 below). Extensive research aims to detect regularities and common patterns within a population and is familiar from orthodox science and commonly used in economic geography. Methods of extensive research include large-scale surveys, formal questionnaires, standardised interviews and statistical analysis. Extensive research concentrates on taxonomic groups, that is groups whose members share similar attributes but need not interact with one another. The logic behind using extensive research methods is to use a representative sample but this can be criticised for failing to explain the processes that have formed the revealed patterns and thus for lacking analytical power (Sayer and Morgan, 1985). For the purpose of this research an intensive research design was undertaken. Intensive research is particularly useful in looking at a particular case or a limited number of cases in attempting to explain causal processes. It focuses mainly (though not exclusively) on groups whose members may be either similar or different but which actually relate to each other structurally or causally. Consequently, specific identifiable individuals are of interest in terms of their properties and links to others. Thus, specific identifiable individuals are of interest in terms of their properties and their mode of connection to others. Intensive research also allows the study of respondents during interactive and semi-structured interviews and the use of qualitative analysis in order to understand peoples representations and constructions of what is occurring in tourism development and governance and the structures within which they operate (Alasuutari, 1995; Briggs, 1986; Dey, 1993; Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996; Robinson, 1998; Strauss, 1987).

Table 3.1 Intensive and Extensive Research: A Summary

	Intensive Research	Extensive Research
Research question	How does a process work in a particular case or a small number of cases? What produces a certain change? What did the agents actually do?	What are the regularities, common patterns, distinguishing features of a population? How widely are certain characteristics or processes distributed or represented.
Relations	Substantial relations of connection.	Formal relations of similarity.
Type of groups studied	Causal groups.	Taxonomic groups.
Type of account produced	Causal explanation of the production of certain objects or events, though not necessarily a representative one.	Descriptive 'representative' generalisations, lacking in explanatory penetration.
Typical methods	Study of individual agents in their causal contexts, interactive interviews, ethnography. Qualitative analysis	Large scale survey of population or representative sample, formal questionnaires, standardised interviews. Statistical analysis
Are the results generalizable?	Actual concrete patterns and contingent relations are unlikely to be 'representative', 'average' or generalizable. Necessary relations discovered will exist wherever their relata are present, e.g. causal powers of objects are generalizable to other contexts as they are necessary features of these objects.	Although representative of a whole population, they are unlikely to be generalizable to other populations at different times and places. Problem of ecological fallacy in making inferences about Individuals.
Disadvantages	Problems of representativeness.	Lack of explanatory power. Ecological fallacy in making inferences about individuals

Source: Sayer and Morgan, in Massey and Meegan, 1985, p.151

Research Methods

Up until the 1960s positivist geography assumed the separation of subject (the researcher) and object (the researched). However, a number of humanists (Entrikin, 1976; Ley and Samuels, 1978) and marxists alike (Gregory, 1978, 1981; Harvey, 1982) came to recognise the essential subjectivity of both the investigator and the investigated in ways which departed (often dramatically) with the more mechanistic models developed during the 'quantitative revolution'. Their work stressed the importance of human agency, and was characterised by a drive to connect with that special body of knowledge, reflection and substance about both human experiences and expressions. It was argued that objectivity in social science research cannot exist because factors such as age, experiences, training, social background, ethnicity,

gender, marital status, perspective and presentation of self in a research project influence the research experience, the data collected, and the interpretation of the information:

“Whether we like it or not, researchers remain human beings complete with all the usual assembly of feelings, failings and moods. And all of those things influence how we feel and understand what is going on. Our consciousness is always the medium through which the research occurs; there is no method or technique of doing research other than through the medium of the researcher” (Stanley and Wise, 1993, p.157).

“Interpretation by the researcher is a vital but highly subjective component” (Robinson, 1998, p.411)

Therefore, it must be accepted and acknowledged that doing research and the methods used in it are socially constructed and conditioned.

The methods of research used in this thesis are primarily qualitative. A qualitative research methodology enables the researcher to impute subjective understanding rather than statistical description from research findings. Qualitative data essentially deal with descriptions of people’s representations of what is occurring in their world in order to understand and interpret how events and actions are generated (Dey, 1993; Eyles and Smith 1988; Strauss, 1987). As Robinson (1998) claims:

“Qualitative data deals with meanings and distinctions as they reside in social practice” (p.410).

Such an approach contrasts with quantitative methods which concentrate more upon statistical techniques and theorems employed to test hypotheses using empirical data or to undertake pure mathematical modelling from a set of initial abstract assumptions. As Dey (1993) suggests:

“Qualitative data deals with meanings, whereas quantitative data deals with numbers” (Dey 1993 p.3).

For the purpose of this thesis qualitative data was collected from three main sources: secondary sources, an extensive local and national newspaper search, and semi-structured interviews. The use of a number of methods is intended to maximise understanding of the

research questions and by applying triangulation, which involves using two or more methods of data collection, the aim is to increase the validity of research findings (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996).

Secondary Sources

“ ‘Secondary data’ means information which has already been collected by someone else and which is available for you, the researcher, to inspect” (Clark, 1997, p.57)

The research began with a literature search of the theoretical debates and empirical work which surround governance, tourism and local economic development already discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. The literature review was complemented with a search of secondary material on the case study area, Liverpool (see Table 3.2 below).

Table 3.2: Secondary Material Sources

Type	Examples
Academic literature	Theoretical and empirical journal articles, reports and books
European publications	Programme documents, draft reports, strategy documents
National government publications	Select committee reports, tourism strategy documents
Local government publications	Economic development strategies, economic assessment and reviews, tourism policy and action plans, committee reports, council minutes, press releases, corporate information
Corporate material	Reports and accounts, promotional material, internal policy documents
Tourism material	NMGM, TMP, MTCB, MCC, Tate Liverpool, NWTB, BTA, ETB, MDC, DCMS, strategy documents, assessments, reports, surveys, promotional material, press releases
Public-private agency publications	Economic development strategies, draft reports, reports and accounts, press releases, promotional literature
Sound Recordings	Radio: Radio Merseyside Television: Granada Television, BBC

Local and National Newspaper Search

Searching newspapers can prove an important research method providing a rich source of information which covers both national and local scales (Clark, 1997). A local newspaper

search was carried out on microfilm and by sifting through 'a forest' of paper copies, of the *Liverpool Echo* and *Liverpool Daily Post*, ranging back to the late 1960s (a long, slow process). This information was obtained from the Merseyside Record Office (Liverpool Central Library). This was a relatively straight forward task in that the information sought was to be found in the one location, furthermore, the holdings include a number of separate files (catalogued and indexed) containing a range of national and local tourism related press cuttings. Whilst doing the fieldwork this local search was enriched by a national newspaper search dating back to the late 1960s using *The Times* on microfilm, primarily because there was a full published index available for the period. More recent national newspaper searches, particularly *The Guardian*, were carried out using CD-ROM. Likewise, this information is held in one location namely the Liverpool University - Sidney Jones Library, making it easy to access.

Semi-Structured Interviews

Semi-structured interviews were the main sources of data collection used in this research (Robinson, 1998; Robson, 1993; Valentine 1997). The semi-structured interview is a flexible and adaptable way of finding things out, involving the researcher in working out a number of heads of discussion and questions in advance (for an example of those used in this research see Tables 3.3 and 3.4 below). However, the sequence and wording of these interviews are not worked out beforehand and emerge as the interview progresses, with the researcher being sensitive to which questions are relevant and meaningful and which questions need to be left out or which need to be added. Probes are also used to encourage the interviewee to expand on a response, some techniques include: a period of silence; an enquiring glance; 'mmhmm...', repeating back what has just been said or asking for more explanation or a personal response. Cohen and Manion (1989) list the value of open ended questions:

"... they are flexible; they allow the interviewer to probe so that he [she] may go into more depth if he [she] chooses, or clear up any misunderstandings; they enable the interviewer to test the limits of a respondent's knowledge; they encourage co-operation and rapport; and they allow the interviewer to make a truer assessment of what the respondent really believes. Open-ended situations can also result in unexpected or unanticipated answers which may suggest hitherto unthought-of relationships or hypotheses" (p.313).Table 7.3: General Heads of Discussion

Table 3.3: General Heads of Discussion

- History
- Role of Government (local, regional, national, European)
- Role of Agencies
- Competition
- Delivery of Tourism Policy/Strategies
- Workings of Tourism Governance Structures
- Influence of Dominant Players
- General /Conclusion

Table 3.4: Question Types

History

- Could you give me a brief history of your agency/council committee or department?
- What role does this agency/council committee or department fulfil?

Role of Government/Agencies

- What place would you say tourism has in the city's urban regeneration strategy?
- What do you think are the tourism issues and priorities for this area?
- What do you think are the greatest problems that you have faced and are facing?
- How did you overcome them/are overcoming them?
- In what ways have you become involved in enhancing the city's competitive position in the tourism market place?
- Could you tell me about the various funds and delivery mechanisms that are available?
- What links exist with other agencies?
- Do you think the components of the city's tourism product are functionally integrated?
- Do you think your work aids in tourism development? Why/How?

Governance

- What links exist between different agencies?
- Has this changed over time?
- Do you think there are too many agencies?
- How do local political structures relate to the regional, national and European?
- In what ways are decisions taken with regards to tourism development?
- To whom is the structure accountable?
- Do you think that contests are taking place?

General/Conclusion

- How much progress has been made towards collaborative working and an organised approach to promoting the interests of this sector?
- Which are the key agencies?
- What impact has your work had?
- What lessons have you drawn from your involvement?
- What would you do differently?
- What are the future growth prospects for tourism in the city?
- Any other comments?

Each interview varies according to the interests, experiences and views of the interviewees, and the researcher must be aware that the answers given could vary depending on the respondents interpretation of the question and what they feel about the interviewer:

“The interview is a social encounter, and how the respondent answers the questions will depend to some degree upon what the respondent and the interviewer feel about each other” (O’Connell Davidson and Layder, 1994, p.118).

The aim is to insure that the questions have the same meanings for all respondents and to engage in ‘conversation’ with the respondent rather than simply running through a list of pre-determined questions (Eyles and Smith, 1988). As a researcher you must be an empathetic listener and a good conversationalist, able to keep a dialogue going, and a social theorist, linking responses and meaning to a broad body of knowledge:

“At no time do you stop listening, because without the data your listening furnishes, you cannot make any of the decisions inherent in interviewing. Has your question been answered, and is it time to move on? If so, move on to what question? Should you probe now or later? What form should the probe take?” (Glesne and Peshkin, 1992, p.76)

Spontaneity and unpredictability are central and accordingly researchers must think and talk on their feet.

The material generated is analysed using a textual approach, relying on words and meanings, rather than statistics, with the benefit of this approach coming from the recording of peoples thoughts and experiences which allow the researcher:

“To probe deeply, to uncover new clues, to open up new dimensions of a problem and to secure vivid, accurate, inclusive accounts from informants based on personal experience” (Burgess, 1982, p.101).

Despite the potential to offer ‘information rich cases’ semi-structured interviews have come in for strong criticism on a number of issues including researcher bias, reflexivity, positionality and ethics (see for example, Baxter and Eyles, 1997; Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Robson,

1993). To reiterate a theme developed by Ely *et al* (1996) it would appear that conducting semi-structured interviews:

“...is like walking a tightrope without a net while juggling sharp words. It is far from easy and there is a tremendous amount of pressure and responsibility...There should be a balance between designed questions, ad-libbing, and not leading a respondent down the ‘expected’ paths to knowledge” (p.66).

Viewed in this light self-critical reflection should be a constant companion before, during and after data collection (see Section 3.3 below).

Nevertheless, of all of the methods adopted for this research, the semi-structured interview provided the most information. Although personal opinions were actively sought rather than the ‘party line’ of the agencies they represented, some respondents simply regurgitated promotional literature without giving the questions much thought. Despite this, by applying triangulation much of the information was corroborated by audits, assessment/appraisal reports, newspapers, promotional material, copies of funding bids and other published information. Triangulation means looking at the same phenomenon, or research question, from more than one source of data. Information coming from different angles can be used to corroborate, elaborate or illuminate the research problem. It limits personal and methodological biases and enhances a study’s generalizability (Denzin, 1978; Henderson, 1991; Baxter and Eyles 1997; Patton 1990). Additionally, much of the information which could have been labelled as ‘subjective’ or ‘anecdotal’ was reinforced by the experiences of several other respondents as it emerged that a number of commonly held beliefs were prevalent across many of the agencies.

3.3 The Fieldwork Experience

Carrying out research on complex organisations and power broking, local elites and coalition building within public private partnerships, inter-governmental and inter-agency alliances involves some methodological difficulties. By their very nature, partnerships are dynamic entities that operate on the basis of a complex interaction between partners, as well as within different institutional and policy frameworks. They tend to be action-orientated, pragmatic, innovative and responsive to new opportunities, while maintaining few records of past failures or having the time or resources to evaluate their activities fully. Therefore, it was decided that

a series of interviews with a variety of actors and an extensive use of secondary sources, would provide the necessary “aids to interpretation” (Stone, 1989).

As a result, the methodology had three main components: (1) reputational analysis (2) review of elite perceptions and (3) tourism project case studies. Reputational analysis identified key players from the public and private sector involved in the promotion of tourism and economic development, and in making policy decisions. Local elites comprised a number of influential office-holders who were demonstrably interested in or affected by strategic tourism and economic development issues. In selecting case studies, attempts were made to look at examples which portrayed different regimes of ownership, management and operation (see Table 3.3), and evidence of action ‘on the ground’. The examples used are intended to illustrate the main dimensions of tourism and economic development policy.

Sampling

Before the fieldwork could commence potential informants needed to be identified and case studies selected:

“...sampling is important. At the very least, the essential characteristics of qualitative sampling strategies should be considered” (Baxter and Eyles 1997, p.513)

The selection procedure for identifying relevant informants for this research revolved around three sampling strategies. First, it is claimed that organisational lists, which provide information on members, can be valuable (Burton and Wilson, 1999; Gray and Guppy, 1994). To this end, the *Liverpool City Council Handbook 1998/99* provided a rich data source regarding the political composition of the City Council with entries providing information (for example, the structure and membership of the various tourism committee’s, and contact addresses and telephone numbers) on senior decision-makers involved in the tourism policy process. Secondly, the use of key informants also proved valuable for identifying relevant people. These included: a recently retired North West Regional Industrial Officer for the GMB union (a personal friend), LCC’s Deputy Chair of the Economic Development Committee (a personal friend) and the Chair of the Leisure and Tourism Committee. At the outset these key actors were contacted and asked for their opinions as to which potential informants I should target. All were extremely helpful not only in identifying relevant people

to interview but more importantly, through their contacts they were able to set up a number of interviews. These included a Director and two Heads of Service for the LCC, as well as two hotel managers and two full time union officers. In fact of the three sampling approaches adopted for this research the use of key informants was by far the most beneficial. Finally, the common identification method of 'snowballing' was used, in which each informant was asked to identify others with the same target characteristics. While in the main this did prove beneficial it also revealed that the researcher needs to be mindful that self-selection 'biases' may come from snowball-sampling. For example, it became evident as the fieldwork progressed that some informants move in narrow social and political circles, which at times led to (unknown and unwanted) social concentrations of contacts who are easy to access but have only limited capacity to comment on issues relevant to the research question. Consequently, it was deemed crucial that this research would try and establish the range of possible respondents (an ongoing process) by selecting proportionally from all potential groups/types.

From this there is one further message and that relates to sample size. A pertinent question for any research project is the number of informants that are needed for the project to be (numerically) adequate. The simple response is that there is no answer, hence the complexity (Bouma, 1993).

Baxter and Eyles (1997, p.513), claim sample size is determined largely by the need to involve as many experiences as possible in the development of a conceptual framework/theory. Recruitment then occurs until 'redundancy' or 'saturation', that is, until no new themes or constructs emerge. In an ideal world this approach would be central to all qualitative studies. However, the realities of any research project are governed by an interaction of considerations related to the time that is available to complete the work alongside the cost of different strategies. Moreover, a desirable sample size is also determined by the nature of the project – whether the study seeks a picture of a general population, elucidates dimensions of human behaviour or explores a unique event. Subsequently, the goal of the researcher is to represent adequately the realities of the informants in the sample selected. If the sample is small, the diversity of human action is less likely to be identified. A larger sample increases the chances of identifying rich diversity but uncertainty abounds over whether this covers the variability that exists. A desirable sample

size for this research was deemed to have been reached when I could answer the question, 'is what I have found unique or part of a general trend?'

Initially, the informants were contacted by letter, addressed to a named person, setting out the aims of my research, a self addressed envelope was included for the reply. Although the response rate was good it was also rather slow, possibly due to the 'out of sight out of mind syndrome', in some cases it was more than a month before the reply was received and two or three weeks more before the interview was carried out. Therefore, in an effort to speed up the process it was decided to dispense with the stamp addressed envelope and to inform the respondent in the letter that I would contact them shortly by telephone. This tactic speeded up the process considerably, on average interviews with public officials for example, were completed within three weeks of initial contact. Arranging interviews with operators of tourist attractions and hotels, however, proved to be a more lengthy process due in no small part to their holiday commitments.

This contact system underpins the way the interview schedule was developed and in this case it eventually proved successful although it had to cope on a number of occasions with secretaries failing to pass on messages or respondents failing to return calls. The point to highlight here is that perseverance can and in some cases did overcome initial refusal or lack of response by a potential interviewee.

The respondents for this fieldwork were of seven main types. First, public officials such as local politicians and council officers. Secondly, representatives of major tourism providers in the city, Thirdly, representatives of the hotel trade. Fourthly, representatives of organisations directly involved in tourism employment and training issues such as Merseyside TEC, Employment Links (ELS) and unions. Fifth, representatives of identified public/private partnerships which have been formed with the intention of stimulating enterprise, development and regeneration of which tourism is part. Sixth, representatives of private sector advertising agencies. Finally, representatives of the media namely the *Liverpool Daily Post*, and the *Liverpool Echo* (see Table 3.3 below).

Table 3.5 : Respondents in the Research

Respondents Identified	Numbers Interviewed	Types of Respondent	How Selected
Public officials	27	Present Liverpool councillors and council officers	Councillors serving on tourism and economic development committees, and elected members representing wards which contain high levels of tourism activity, plus senior council officers from tourism and economic development committees and departments
Major Tourism Providers (in total responsible for 17 high profile attractions)	11	Managers, heads of marketing and public affairs	Different regimes of ownership, management and operation
Hotel/Conference providers	10	Managers	A range covering budget to four star, well established and new development
Organisations involved in tourism employment and training issues	5	Training Co-ordinators, senior union officers at local and regional level	Major tourism job training providers, unions representing workers in the tourism industry
Public-private partnerships	6	Formed organisations aimed at promoting tourism and economic regeneration	Component parts of the broader Mersey Partnership and the Liverpool Partnership Group
Private sector image and marketing organisations	4	Marketing consultants, advertising and strategic communications executives	Involved in the city's current image campaigns
Media	3	Editorial staff, journalists	Reporting on tourism and economic regeneration issues on Merseyside

The aim of the case studies selected was to describe how each one had developed, its funding sources, organisational arrangements and implementation strategies.

The interview phase of the fieldwork was carried out between October 1998 and September 1999, with many hours spent in both the Merseyside Record Office (Central Library) and the Liverpool Record Office (Cunard Buildings) to build up a detailed political, social and economic data base to supplement the study. This desk research was followed, as shown in Table 3.3, by 66 semi-structured interviews. In most cases, due to the nature of the respondents being officials from institutions and organisations or business people, the

interview was conducted on 'their patch', although on a small number of occasions other locations were used such as a cafe, a pub, and Liverpool University.

Semi-Structured Interviews: Challenges and Issues

Each interview was conducted utilising an aide-memoire with the heads of discussion tailored to the interview (see Table 7.3 above). Each respondent was informed that there would be no direct attribution of any of their remarks by name, but any information taken from these interviews would be attributed to their organisation and broad job description unless they wanted their statements to be treated confidentially. Virtually all the interviews were tape recorded (as well as a brief written record made) which enabled me to concentrate on the interview without the added pressure of writing down the interviewee's every word. These interviews were then transcribed in as full a detail as possible. A research diary was kept outlining the context of the interviews, how the interview had gone, whether the interviewee could be of further assistance in the future, any potential ideas and inspirations which stemmed from the interview and which could be used in later interviews or ways of analysing material.

A major drawback was the amount of time transcription took (especially when there are 66 interviews) and this was exacerbated by the fact that the first 30 interviews were transcribed verbatim, with each one hour of interview taking on average ten hours to transcribe. In conversations with other PhD students it was clear that many were of the opinion that this was a classic case of 'overkill', and in retrospect to a large extent I agree. Nevertheless, Strauss and Corbin (1990) have made the point that more should be transcribed at the start of an investigation, when the categories respondents use to describe social phenomena are less well known.

As the fieldwork progressed, however, an improved understanding of theory-data links strongly suggested that full transcription was not necessary, particularly if tapes are used for cross-checking (accompanying extracts with a location on the tape counter). Riessman (1993) is among those who hold that not all material needs to be transcribed, provided what is transcribed is selected on a theoretical basis. Subsequently, partial transcription focused by the concurrent development of theory within the research reduced the time factor by almost fifty percent (1 hour of conversation taking approximately 5-6 hours to transcribe).

However, transcription (whole or partial) is not the least of a researcher's time-eaters. As discussed above, interviews require careful preparation, which takes time. Arrangements to visit; securing necessary permissions; confirming arrangements; rescheduling appointments to cover cancellations or crises, all these need more time as does the subsequent analysis. Hence, time planning and time budgeting requires perhaps, a stronger commitment on behalf of researchers using semi-structured interviews as a mode of (successful) enquiry, than most if not all other techniques.

As discussed above, the process of establishing empathy depends on the confidence the interviewee has in the interviewer and the interview situation. However, as Derman (1990) points out, since most semi-structured interviews involve people who either were not acquainted, before the interview or are only slightly familiar, despite claims to 'depth of insight', researchers should be aware that they might only touch the surface of the interviewees' views. In interviews with public officials it became apparent very quickly that respondents were often experienced at interviewing and being interviewed and consequently knew how to subvert, control or deny access to key information. To this end, typical responses ranged from 'I haven't got that information to hand', through 'That information is very hard to get hold of', to 'At the moment we are in the process of collating that information so hopefully it should be available soon'. In some cases respondents appeared skilled at transposing the 'party' line to represent their own personal experience. On a small number of occasions the response represented little more than a verbatim record of extracts from their organisation's promotional literature, this was particularly evident among the more junior organisational spokespersons.

Although audio-taping provides an accurate record of the verbal component of an interview and thus can provide a rich data set. Recording has been criticised on two main counts, first, some people are uncomfortable with it (Western, 1992; Byron, 1993), secondly, it can encourage informants to be less candid (Plummer, 1983; Walford, 1994). With regards to the former, only three of the sixty six informants for this research refused to allow the interview to be taped. These comprised two small hotel owners and a junior spokesperson for a department of the City Council, which might suggest a sensitivity about the questions or a lack of familiarity with being interviewed. With regards to the second criticism above, the problem of participants providing only partial accounts of their experiences and meanings is more problematic as it is difficult for a researcher to detect gaps between what is reported and

what 'actually occurred'. Furthermore, this problem may not be of the informants own making not least, he or she may not have access to privileged information. However, as Winchester (1992) suggests, the fact that there are different 'stories' do not mean one is right and others wrong. Indeed, "It is not confirmation that is required from respondents as much as a commentary from them on the plausibility of the interpretation offered" (Baxter and Eyles, 1997, p.512).

Feminist researchers have stressed the importance of interacting and sharing information with participants rather than treating them as subordinates from whom you are extracting information (England, 1994; Gilbert, 1994; Stanley and Wise, 1993). This principle of sharing experiences and exchanging ideas and information with participants led me via the MTEC into discussions with the Head of Geography – Archbishop Beck Catholic High School (Liverpool), over ways to make geography a more attractive option for students in the final two years of their education. However, opportunities to 'give something back' are very limited and in most instances, little more than personal gratitude can be extended to those organisations and people who took part in the research. Copies of transcripts were not made available unless requested and a copy of the thesis is to be made available on request.

'Positionality' and Ethics

To complicate further the reality of qualitative research, relationships are not fixed from one interview to the next. They shift and mutate depending on the positionalities of those involved. Consequently, there needs to be a "recognition of the positionality of the researcher and her/his subjects and the relations of power between them" (McDowell, 1992, p.399). In short, the task of the researcher is to examine critically how these may influence the research process (Fine, 1998).

With the author being a 'local' of the case study area, it has to be acknowledged that this 'positionality' had some impact on the social interaction between myself and the way respondents reacted to the research (England, 1994). In some cases, being seen as part of the 'same team', such that I was, in effect, looking at the same phenomena with similar perspectives or sharing a similar background (for example, born and bred in the city and/or studying at Liverpool University) or finding other points of contact with the informant created

a rapport which produced a rich, detailed conversation based on empathy and mutual respect and understanding.

However, even when rapport with research participants has been established, commonality on one dimension, perhaps age, gender or life experience cannot guarantee access to privileged information or a power-free relationship (see for example, Buraway, 1992; Fine and Vanderlice, 1992). Indeed, it seemed that in some, of what may be termed 'development' or 'promotional' agencies, there was considerable suspicion and reservations regarding the research. On some occasions the researcher felt like the one being researched following an interrogation, it could be suggested that the motive was to find out the researcher's own ideas and interpretations and in the extreme whether the information requested would be used solely for a PhD thesis. Perhaps, the latter stemmed from the fact that being a 'local' and at least thirty years older than the average PhD student some may have thought (wrongly) that I had a hidden agenda. Maybe for example, as an 'activist' of some description for a trade union or a community group or whatever, to whom the information could be useful.

While it is generally assumed that power lies in the hands of the researcher, but this is not always the case (Ball, 1994). In the face of elites, such as professionals and politicians it became apparent very quickly that they had the power to transform the researcher-researched balance in their favour. In some cases attempts were made to control or redirect the research by demanding to vet interview questions, and failing to answer questions directly by going on to another topic. On a handful of occasions I was asked to turn the tape off before the respondent would continue.

Field protocol and analysis must also be shaped by ethical considerations. Formal permission was sought from individuals (where known) and from agencies, before setting up and undertaking semi-structured interviews. A number of methodological tools were employed to avoid mis-representing respondents' opinions and in writing-up the analysis a number of respondents' statements are taken directly from transcribed tape recordings, in order to reveal the real meanings expressed by the respondents in their words rather than mine.


A similar ethical dimension is the question of anonymity of the respondent. On a handful of occasions respondents wished comments they made be kept confidential, and it was decided that specific names of respondents would be withheld to respect the respondent's

confidentiality. However, a general label of the organisations and agencies of respondents have been attached because these are central to any study about tourism governance and local economic development (see Robson, 1993 for a full discussion). An exception to anonymity is when material attributable to a specific person has been taken from the press or other accessible records found in the public domain. In these instances the published name has been retained.

3.4 Conclusion

This Chapter has attempted to show that a 'rigorous' approach was adopted to carrying out qualitative research on issues of tourism, governance and local economic development. The broad starting point involved identifying the number and kind of tourism related agency's and the forms and types of policies being adopted to encourage economic development. This identification then helped to structure questions to be used in semi-structured interviews and each interview, in turn, generated a number of other ideas and questions and greater awareness of the key research themes. This approach, I would argue, enabled the research to gain analytical strength, to develop or dismiss earlier concepts and to provide what Glaser (1978, 1992) terms a more grounded approach to the research and its findings. It has also attempted to justify, within the context of critical realism, the rationale and the appropriateness of an intensive research methodology for the research and the use of multiple methods of qualitative data collection. The procedures for selecting respondents have been outlined alongside discussion of the techniques used in semi-structured interviews, the problems encountered and the approaches adopted for analysing the interviews including interview quotations and press reports. Table 3.4 below, shows the type of flexible methodological framework for the study of tourism policy used in this thesis:

Figure 3.1: A Methodological Framework for Studying Governance and Tourism Policy



Source: Adapted from Hall and Jenkins, 1995, p.95.

CHAPTER 4

THE 'URBAN PROBLEM' AND ITS TOURISM POTENTIAL

4.1 Introduction

The particular reasons for state intervention in the regulation of tourism has already been dealt with in Chapter 2. In short, national government is a key agency in the regulation of tourism as a social system, which is understood as “processes which mitigate contradictions, promote system reproduction and displace crises spatially or temporally” (Goodwin and Painter, 1996, p.638).

This Chapter provides an insight into the aims and objectives of urban tourism and an understanding of the key functions of the national (regional) Tourist Boards, in terms which take account of changes in emphasis and, in governance that the national policy framework has undergone since the 1969 Development of Tourism Act. The aim of this Chapter is to set the scene for the main study period (1974-2000) which will be covered in Chapters 5-7.

4.2 The 'Urban Problem' in a British Context

The problems experienced by many older industrial cities since the 1970s (at least) are well documented and require only brief mention. An extensive literature introduces the causes of an urban problem, noting amongst other issues globalisation, decentralisation and deindustrialisation (see for example, Lawless, 1991; Imrie and Thomas, 1992, 1993; Cornfoot, 1982). The definition of decline is made more apparent in the model of causation. Middleton (1991) presents a five stage model of urban decline which, although possessing a tendency to simplify the processes, outlines the main forces at work (Table 4. 1).

More specifically, it is considered that the current problems of Britain's inner cities have their roots in the shifting nature of Britain's industrial base, the loss of manufacturing jobs, and the bulk of service sector employment growth now being found in small and medium sized towns. The inner areas of large cities have also lost service sector jobs in utilities, transport, distribution and facilities for declining local populations (Audit Commission, 1989, p.9).

Table 4.1 The Conditions of Urban Decline

STAGE	FEATURES
1. Absence of job opportunities	➤ Concentrated poverty. In many cities additional desperation is leant by immigrant workers and ethnic minorities who find it more difficult to find employment
2. Declining services	➤ Fewer buses, schools and clinics ➤ Roads, pavements, houses and parks decay ➤ Shops, cafes etc. go down market and finally fall out of business ➤ Discourages investment and disappearing jobs are not renewed
3. Increased crime rates	➤ Increased vandalism, muggings, and maybe riot, arson and looting caused by boredom, bitterness and frustration, occasionally from real need
4. Outwards migration of population	➤ Younger and more skilled seek employment elsewhere ➤ Those who can afford seek accommodation in more desirable areas ➤ Traders and small businesses have insufficient turnover to support Inner city rent and rates
5 Descending spiral of decline	➤ Empty property results in plummeting revenue from local taxes; a time when public authorities need revenues for social work, policing, health care, housing repairs

Source: Adapted from Middleton, 1991, pp 15-16

Furthermore, cities tend to attract displaced workers from elsewhere, migrants and rootless young people. Thus the high population density is accompanied by social and environmental problems of a different order. Sources such as the Audit Commission (1989) suggest leading indicators of a malfunctioning urban economy to be high unemployment and a substantial area of derelict land (p.9).

It may thus be suggested that a number of key changes and trends in the urban economics of deindustrialised areas during the 1980s can be summarised as follows:

- The rapid decline of manufacturing employment.
- The long-term continuance of derelict and under-use sites in inner city areas, at the same time as major growth and development in other parts of the same city.
- The increasing role of small and medium enterprises (SME's) in employment creation.

- The tendency for male job losses and longer-term unemployment to be much more severe than female.
- The longer term persistence of low wage and high unemployment rates in specific social groups and even in particular families in local areas.

As the extent and persistence of the problems facing the inner city became more apparent, it was clear that a different approach to urban governance was required, a need made all the more urgent by the 1981 riots in Liverpool (Toxteth) and London (Brixton). Many ideas were borrowed from the United States (see below) and have become embodied in the concept of the 'entrepreneurial city' (Harvey, 1988, 1989a, 1989b; Jessop, 1997, 1998; Hall and Hubbard, 1998). As already argued in Chapter 2 this is a form of governance which with respect to economic development is proactive, opportunistic and competitive.

Concurrent with this economic decline in cities, tourism was being perceived as a growth industry. It was during the recession of 1980-82 that a strategy of tourism for British cities emerged and was to grow and evolve during the decade (Law, 1991). The view that tourism could bring prosperity to cities has resulted from a growing recognition (particularly in official circles) of the size and continued expansion of the industry and the widely held belief that tourism must surely gain from increasing affluence, greater mobility and more leisure time. A great deal of the interest in the potential of tourism as a tool for urban revitalisation was focused on non-traditional tourism areas including 'difficult' urban areas that lack an appropriate tourist image, suffer from unfavourable socioeconomic conditions, or need infrastructural improvement (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1990; Buckley and Witt, 1985, 1989)

Thus the issue of urban decline and the role of tourism in regeneration features prominently in both local and central government policy initiatives. In addition, as already argued in Chapter 2, the business community are increasingly involved in regeneration initiatives, particularly via partnerships. In the case of local authorities their role is primarily one of facilitator; local authorities may contribute directly to urban regeneration and economic development as a planning authority, as a provider of infrastructure and services and as the major deliverer of education, training and leisure. Their role is thus often central to tourism development.

4.3 The Rising Profile of Tourism at the National, and Local Level

Prior to the 1980s tourism was firmly positioned in the context of balance of trade considerations with arguments in favour of increased government intervention for tourism based on the contribution of tourism to the balance of payments and the growing competitiveness of international tourism (Heeley, 1989; Richards, 1995). But this position has changed remarkably since the early 1980s due to central government's overt linking of tourism with job and income creation:

Tourism is "one of our great industries...with increased leisure higher incomes and early retirement, tourism in the next decade will be one of the great growth industries" (Rt.Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP, September 1985).

"Tourism keeps the life blood pumping through our economic arteries. And the indirect effects of tourism on jobs and job creation are immense"
(Sir Basil Feldman, ETB board member December 1992).

"Tourism generates wealth, it creates jobs and promotes entrepreneurship... and has enormous potential for helping to regenerate our towns and cities"
(DCMS, 1999).

Promotional statements, such as those above have been accompanied by a number of reports (see for example, ETB, 1980, 1988; HMSO, 1985; Institute of Manpower Studies, 1986; MTB, 1988, 1990; MTCB, 1993, *Employment Gazette* April 1987; August 1989; September 1990, which have produced a plethora of statistics emphasising the importance of tourism as a means of wealth and employment creation. Such statements and reports have served to give tourism an unprecedented level of political attention (see for example, Cooper, 1987; Williams and Shaw, 1988). Indeed, since the early 1980s the drive for tourism-led economic regeneration (see Mathieson & Wall, 1982; Law 1991, 1992, 1993, Haywood, 1992; Page, 1995; Kaczmarek, 1999), has continued almost unabated in many British Industrial cities (Ball & Stobart 1998). Whereas in the past tourism development had been perceived as limited to a few types of places, the new wisdom from tourism planners is that tourism has potential almost anywhere (Law, 1991; Ball and Stobart, 1995, 1998).

Aims and Objectives of Urban Tourism


Perhaps the most commonly accepted prescription for urban tourism is that given by Law (1993) (see Figure 4.1). Law suggests that investment in attractions and environmental improvements which are then marketed to visitors can have a number of positive impacts on the local economy. The assumption is visitor expenditure will provide a greater income for the local economy brought about through tourism as an export industry. This income may allow for further investment into attractions and environmental improvements and the expansion of other economic activities. The result is therefore considered to comprise not only prospects for further expansion within the tourism sector but prospects for physical, economic and social regeneration in a city/region-wide context. The initial and indeed subsequent rounds of investment into attractions and environmental improvements may have two further possible 'regeneration' impacts; the environment will be enhanced thus creating a space which is a nicer place in which to live, work and visit and, in doing so will improve the image of the city. In turn this may help to attract new industry to the area, increase civic pride and attract potential residents, thus slowing population decline or maybe creating population growth.

Although the prime motivation for implementing a strategy of Tourism for British cities has been the desire to generate new forms of economic activity and jobs (Bramwell, 1993; Page, 1986; Gill, 1988; Richard and Wilkes, 1990), other influences have also played a part in reinforcing the interest of local government in tourism. These include: the recognition of the city as a potentially attractive area for the tourist (Law, 1993); the broadening of actual or perceived ideas about what constitutes an attraction or specific activities, for instance, 'cultural tourism', 'shopping tourism' (Ashworth, 1992); the quest for any possible source of jobs and income in the face of local economic decline (Ball and Stobart, 1995). Others have become involved through grant funding for community regeneration (Ball, 1997). More important, the perception of urban tourism in older industrial cities had already been accepted by many major cities in the US.

During the 1980s numerous British central and local government policy makers and politicians in search of solutions to pressing urban problems, visited places most notably Boston and Baltimore, which had physically revitalised their downtown areas and seemingly, secured their economic fortunes (Loftman and Nevin, 1995; Law, 1992; Falk, 1986;

Hambleton, 1990). Thus US patterns diffused to Britain and the rest of Europe. Indeed, the CBI championed that Britain's problem cities should utilise the experience of Baltimore to arrest urban decline (CBI Task Force, 1988). Proponents of tourism, however, commonly claim this economic potential can be combined with environmental rehabilitation, conservation and 'urban imaging strategies' (Hall, 1995), and upgrading facilities for the local community.

Figure 4.1 The Strategy of Urban Tourism




Source: Law, 1993, p.29

4.4 Public Policy and Tourism Governance

Tourism Governance Framework in Britain

In Britain, national and regional public sector agencies have existed since the Development of Tourism Act of 1969, which was the first Act of Parliament ever to be specifically devoted to tourism. The Act's main provision was the setting up of the British Tourist Authority (BTA), three national tourist boards for England (ETB), Scotland (STB) and Wales (WTB) and regional tourist boards. The BTA was responsible for the overseas promotion of the UK, the national tourist boards to encourage domestic tourism in the UK, and regional tourist boards to operate at the regional scale (Adams, 1991; Richards, 1995). Many years on, the outcome of the 1969 Act for Britain is the structure shown in Figure 4. 2

Figure 4. 2: Statutory Tourist Board Framework in Britain



————— Executive Link

..... Advisory Link

Source: Adapted from Cooper *et al*, 1999, p. 228 Note

The Northern Ireland Tourist Board (NITB) was not covered by the Act since it was already established and responsible to the then Northern Ireland Parliament at Stormont.

The Act can be seen as part of a general shift in the 1960s towards greater state intervention in social planning and social consumption in general, and by the very late 1960s tourism consumption in particular. The model for such intervention, in the case of tourism, was the establishment of quangos which would implement government policy at 'arms length', therefore preserving the apparent political neutrality of the policy areas involved (Coalter *et al.*, 1988).

It is important to note that the statutory Tourist Board framework in Britain can only be regarded as the core of public sector involvement in tourism. As already argued in Chapter 2 besides the departments of state, appointed government agencies and the local authorities who have the planning powers to implement tourism programmes on the ground, there is a whole host of public-private partnerships that have an interest in tourism. Public-private partnerships may have visions for either a large area like the city centre, a distinct part of the city centre, or for the tourism sector in general. Furthermore, given that the majority of all tourism enterprise is currently in the private sector, and that most public sector tourism policy is delegated to these growth coalitions, tourism initiatives tend to be corporatist in nature. Tourism policy analysis, then, is highly amenable to the organising framework suggested by Hall and Jenkins (1995), in the sense of considering the role institutional arrangements, values and power relationships play in decision-making within and between organisations at different state levels

While there are significant variations in the structure of public administration of tourism in England, Wales and Scotland, which in turn depend on the size of the tourism industry and the importance government attaches to the various reasons put forward for public sector involvement in tourism. Public sector intervention is necessary to ensure that the benefits associated with the industry are maximised and potential problems are minimised on behalf of the wider economy, society and the environment, as well as the long-term sustainability of tourism itself (Charlton and Essex, 1996, p.175).

Since the Development of Tourism Act 1969 national tourism policy has undergone a series of changes in emphasis and, in part governance. The first signs of a new policy emphasis for tourism were contained in a Circular from the Department of Environment (13/79, 1979) entitled 'Local government and the Development of Tourism'. This circular asked local authorities to consider whether they should do more by the redeployment of resources to

realise the full potential of tourism to create and sustain jobs and to produce income in their locality. However, it was still left to individual local authorities to “have regard to the importance of tourism in their particular area in forming their policy”. According to Richard and Wilkes (1990) “Essentially, this allowed authorities indifferent or antagonistic to tourism developments to continue ignoring tourism issues” (p.7). The ruling Labour group on the city council in Liverpool between 1983-1987 provide a prime example (see Chapter 5). Nevertheless, from the 1980s onwards there has been a significant shift in attitude by local authorities towards the tourism industry (see below).

This new emphasis on jobs was a consequence of rapidly rising unemployment, and a recognition that dwindling manufacturing jobs would have to be replaced by service sector employment. The link between tourism and employment was exemplified by the report *Pleasure, Leisure and Jobs* (HMSO, 1985), which advanced the employment creation potential of tourism, and the subsequent transfer of ministerial responsibility for tourism from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) to the Department of Employment. Such a move reinforced the neo-corporatist element of tourism policy, with emphasis being given to public sector strategies joining private sector establishments aimed at creating employment. The new focus on employment creation was highlighted most strongly through the changing objectives of the English Tourist Board (ETB). By 1987 the primary objective had become “to maximise tourism’s contribution to the economy through the creation of wealth and jobs” (Richards, 1995, p. 165). Clearly, this was a sign that the balance of payments justification for state intervention had been replaced by wider economic development issues.

Further changes in departmental responsibilities came with the establishment of the Department of Heritage in 1992 to oversee both tourism and cultural developments. In a sense this also reflected the increased emphasis placed on the whole notion of heritage in economic development during the early 1990s. The Labour Government of 1997 have made further cosmetic changes by renaming the Department of Heritage, the Department of Culture, Media and Sport. Such constant switching of responsibility for tourism is indicative of the confused nature of government policy (Williams and Shaw, 1998) (see below).

The Role of the Tourist Boards

The BTA is mainly concerned with general strategic planning for tourism and as such advises central government directly. It is responsible for developing overseas tourism to Britain, consequently, much of its effort goes into overseas marketing. In addition the BTA serves as an outlet for central government's economic and regional policy, by promoting particular regions and their attractions to overseas markets.

The national Tourist Boards of England, Scotland and Wales have the role of focusing the broad strategy of central government's response to tourism within their specific national contexts. For example, the ETB, since its creation, has embraced a number of long term objectives:

- The encouragement of the general, long term economic performance of England's tourist industry
- To increase public understanding of the social, economic and cultural value of tourism
- To extend the tourist season and spread the economic benefits of tourism and increasing prosperity throughout England
- To raise the standard of information, accommodation, catering and other services for tourists
- To maintain a balance between tourism growth and the capacity and types of tourist facilities

These aims are pursued by the Board through three major strategies: marketing, the provision of information and advice and, in the past financial assistance (see below). Under the first of these the ETB has undertaken a number of national promotions such as 'The English Garden' between 1979 and 1981, and 'Maritime England' during the period 1982-1985. The ETB has also mounted more specific marketing campaigns to promote tourism in 'development areas'. For example, in the past efforts have been made to encourage holidaymakers to visit the Cumbria coast, Merseyside (see Chapter 5), Northumbria and Yorkshire (MCC, 1979). Moreover, under section 4 of the 1969 Act, the ETB, (along with other national boards), was empowered to grant financial assistance to any project which provides or improves tourism amenities in England (ETB, 1981). No project could receive more than 50% of total costs.

Between 1971 and 1980, the regional tourist boards in England approved assistance to over 1,250 schemes and by 1987 some £45 million of grants had been approved (Williams and Shaw, 1998).

Because tourism was identified as one of the major growth industries of the 1980s, tourism initially escaped cut-backs in public sector spending implemented by the Thatcher administration. The total income of the four statutory Tourist Boards grew from £21m in 1976/77 to £77m in 1986/87 (Heeley, 1989). In January 1989, however, the grant giving powers of the ETB were abolished although tourism investment incentives were maintained in Scotland and Wales (Richards, 1995). The rationale for the suspension was that levels of investment in tourism were at a record £2.5 billion, thus 'the future prosperity and growth of tourism no longer depends on this scheme' (Department of Employment, 1989). According to Williams and Shaw (1998, p. 217) the abolition of this scheme was a serious blow to tourism development at a time when competition and segmentation within tourism was increasing in the domestic market.

There are ten Regional Boards throughout England and they vary considerably in their area of coverage, constitutions and internal organisations. In effect, the Boards are autonomous administrative organisations, in that they draw their funds and members from local authorities and commercial tourism operators within their respective areas. One of the most important roles of the Regional Tourist Boards is to offer advice to both commercial operators and local authorities on tourism planning. However, it is within this important area of activity that conflict often arises between regional aims and local priorities (Godfrey, 1998; Richard and Wilks, 1990; Williams and Shaw, 1998), (see Chapter 6 and 7).

Area Based Policies for tourism Development

During the 1980s the increased importance given to tourism as a form of economic development heralded new policy initiatives by the ETB. These were premised on two main ideas: to achieve effective partnerships between public and private funds, and to focus resources on designated areas both urban and rural (ETB Annual Reports 1987, 1988/89). The first approach operated from the mid-1980s until the early 1990s through a series of Tourism Development Action Programmes (TDAPs). Established as a partnership between the ETB, the local authority and the private sector, the aim was to "generate a new

momentum, and set new directions through a burst of concentrated action and involvement” (Davies, 1987, p.168). Each programme was of limited duration (usually three years) after which the lead devolved back to the local authority. The first TDAP was established in Bristol (started August 1984) other examples being Bradford, Lancaster and Norwich (although Liverpool was not designated as a TDAP location, the LCC through a series of partnerships with other agencies implemented a three-year Tourism Action Plan in 1994 which had similar aims and objectives) (see Chapter 7). Geoff Broome of the ETB reportedly saw the importance of TADPs as “they lift the profile of tourism within an area...they legitimate tourism and produce a more corporate approach within the authority” (as quoted in Davies, 1987, p.171). In contrast, William and Shaw (1998) argue that in general, such schemes proved problematic in that attempts to bring together a range of interested partners from the public and private sectors often produced considerable conflict. In addition, some of the early TDAPs gave an over-emphasis to marketing without really exploring the characteristics of the tourism product they were selling.

More recent emphasis to promoting urban tourism, was through the initiatives under the ETB’s ‘Vision for Cities’ programme, launched in 1989 for a five-year period. This formalised links with central government ‘Action for Cities’ programme. The aim of the programme was to promote leisure and tourism projects in five run-down inner city areas: Manchester; Sheffield; London (East End); Wolverhampton and Stockton-on-Tees, with more to follow. According to Adams (1991, p.166) critics argued that what was wrong with this ETB initiative, was the lack of funding behind it. It was all hype and glossy brochures and the appearance of activity, but nothing much could happen without genuine investment. These new style objectives marked the conversion of the tourist boards from a social democratic administrative function to bodies restricted to addressing ‘market failure’ (Davis, 1993).

According to Williams and Shaw (1998, p.219) since the early 1990s ETB has given much more emphasis to local area initiatives (LAIs) which, like TDAPs involve partnerships between local expertise and private sector companies. Although the emphasis is therefore the same, such area-based policies have been focused much more on the needs of seaside resorts and between 1991 and 1993 some six resorts were identified for LAIs. Increasingly during the 1990s the responsibility for tourism policy has, to a significant extent, shifted away from the ETB, reflecting wider processes of ‘hollowing out’ (Jessop, 1995, 1997, 1998) in forms of

governance. In contrast, both county and district councils have assumed increasing concern and responsibility for tourism development, as evident in the case of cities such as Glasgow, Liverpool (see Chapters 5-7), Bradford, Sheffield and Wigan.

Historically, policy issues for tourism have been devolved to the ETB and this has led to a number of tensions. According to Weed and Bull (1997) since its inception as the Department of National Heritage in 1992, the DCMS does not appear to value the role played by the ETB as it has both significantly cut its resources and, more recently shown a trend towards directly intervening in areas of the Board's work. The decline in central government support for the ETB was even more pronounced in the 1990s where its funding was cut from £13.9 million in 1993/94 to only £9 million in 1995/96 (Charlton and Essex, 1996, p.175). Moreover, in 1997 the DCMS established a Tourism Advisory Forum a 57 member body, with representatives from a range of organisations involved in tourism and related areas to advise it on tourism matters (DCMS, 1999), which is the exact role the ETB was set-up to fill in 1969. It would appear, therefore, that the 'arms length' principle on which the ETB was established has gradually been eroded. This leads to the conclusion that at the present time policies are unclear and unhelpful to the industry. To this end very little appears to have changed over the last fifteen years or more. For example, the House of Commons all-party Select Committee on Trade and Industry in 1986 stated in the course of its review of the industry over the previous year:

"The truth is that the Government cannot quite decide what its own role is...The Government minimises the appearance of involvement by reducing policy aims to statements of the obvious but maintains the fact of involvement in the tourist boards and the grants provided through them. The trouble is that this actual financial commitment is then left without there being any clear specific strategy to guide its use" (cited in Cooper *et al.*, 1999, p.230).

This situation may, however, change in the very near future. Currently, maintaining or improving the quality of the domestic product is done, with funding from DCMS by the ETB. The DCMS has published, and has consulted on, a number of options for replacing the ETB with an alternative support structure for tourism in England (BTA, 1999). The exact structure and role of this new body English Tourism Council remains unclear, however, given its

establishment by the Blair government (1997-present) it is likely that it would have a more central role than that of the ETB.

Tourism Project Assistance from the European Union

The European Union (EU) has become increasingly involved in developing regional development policies, with available funding through its Structural Funds. This marked the introduction of a new tier of government intervention in local economic development and a new influence on tourism development and on the growth of entrepreneurial governance (see Chapter 7). Strengthening the economic and social cohesion of the regions of the community has been a major objective of the EU since the 1970s, when a Common Regional Policy was first implemented and financed. Project assistance from the Union is given under four structural funds:

- 1. The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), which funds projects such as employment creation through industrial investment, infrastructure improvements and general local economic development schemes.**
- 2. The European Social Fund (ESF) which is used to support job creation through vocational training and employment assistance.**
- 3. The European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund Guidance Funds (EAGGF) which promotes the adjustment of agricultural businesses and rural development measures.**
- 4. The Financial Instrument of Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) to support the fishing industry**

Since much of tourism's potential for economic development and job creation is realised in regions which would otherwise have difficulty in finding alternative sources of economic stimulus, the expansion of tourism is consistent with one of the EU's major objectives – that of regional development (Davidson, 1998). With the adoption of the Single European Act (1987), with the intention to create one market in Europe and a single currency, there is a commitment by the EU to promote social and economic cohesion through actions to reduce regional disparities. To this end the Maastricht Treaty (1992) on European Union acknowledged for the first time that the EC should take specific action on tourism. This

reflected the economic importance of the industry and the need to introduce links between policies on tourism, consumer affairs and natural and cultural heritage.

Of the four Structural Funds, the ERDF is the principal source of subsidies for tourism development. Tourism projects tend to be public sector led and according to Cooper *et al* (1999, p.486-487) the principal aspects that should be addressed when bidding for EU assistance are:

- the use of the project should be 50% non-local;
- the project should result in an increase in overnight stays;
- the programme should result in an increase in employment opportunities;
- the economic position of the project within the local area should be examined;
- the project should form part of a tourism strategy for the local area. Thus the project should sit within a community support framework (CSF)/single programming document (SPD), which is the regional strategy approved by the member state and the community; and
- national/regional tourist organisation support will give weight to the application.

The authors note that tourism projects are well suited to EU funding requirements because they are labour intensive and commonly have a high operating leverage; that is, a relatively low level of operating costs but a high level of fixed costs caused by prior capital spending. Once the financing of capital has been taken care of, the project usually runs into surplus after three years and can maintain itself thereafter.

In its capacity as the provider funding support, the EC does have a strategic role in UK regions, however, the regulations governing their allocation (subsidiarity, etc) give institutions in Member States 'a decisive say' in how programmes are operated (Carvel, 1994, p.6). Given the diversity of the tourism product the division of intervention in the tourist industry between member states and the EU is likely to remain controversial. Cooper *et al* (1999) argue, that at the political level, this issue has been technically put to one side by article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty which states that:

"The community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action

cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community” (p.490)

To summarise, in recent years the EU has become a key benefactor to UK regions through its regional policies, especially the Structural Funds. Support for tourism development particularly manifests itself in the Objective 1 regions and, to an extent, in Objective 2 regions where tourism has contributed to the diversification of economic activities in areas of industrial decline. It would seem fair to suggest that without the provision of grants and loans for tourism projects in various parts of Britain, particularly Merseyside (see Chapters 6-7), many would not have been possible without EU assistance. Indeed, it has been argued that a period of stringent economic conditions, following the (almost) dismantling of national regional policy and the masking of reductions in urban policy funding via the SRB, has forced UK local authorities to concentrate more on securing economic regeneration funding from the EC rather than the national exchequer (Lloyd and Meegan, 1996; Shutt, 1996; Martin, 1997).

4.5 Conclusion

While there is considerable enthusiasm to reap the political and economic benefit offered by urban tourism, any such policies face numerous problems. The planning response to tourism is highly complex. It is characterised by a wide range of plans and organisations and by its rapidly changing form and content. Particularly in view of the plethora of decision-makers in the tourism policy arena, it is perhaps worth drawing attention to some areas of critical concern. First, from the above discussion it can be suggested that a more positive national approach in tourism is needed. Central Government’s present objectives amount to little more than a statement of good faith in the regional economic development contributions of tourism. They do not provide a basis on which to super-impose a national perspective on the strategies which are emerging at the regional and local level (see Chapters 5-8). It would be fair to suggest that in the 1990’s the government’s commitment to the industry was focused on encouragement rather than active support. This is in line with the government’s approach to business in general. The ideology is that the less government is involved directly in any industry, the more competitive that will be in the long run.

Secondly, there does not appear to be a lead agency in the tourism policy community. The ETB has seen its funding cut and has become increasingly marginalised, and as a result

reduced the core funding of Regional Tourist Boards. Therefore the government which ultimately controls the purse strings is able to direct the ETB and the Regional Tourist Boards' where, in theory, the expertise is invested, by offering them funds often on a competitive bidding basis through the SRB with conditions attached that direct the focus of initiatives towards their own economic and social regeneration priorities. In turn this raises issues about values and power relationships, not least, the ability of tourism policy communities to insulate themselves from other more powerful or politically motivated, policy communities (see Chapters 6-7).

Thirdly, while the general trend towards the 'hollowing' of the local state and a shift of entrepreneurial governance away from elected local authorities may have some validity in terms of the efficacy in tourism marketing. Charlton and Essex (1996, p.191) argue that it can hinder the ability of local authorities to take an integrating overview of tourism in its wider context within the locality. Such a situation may be reinforced in entrepreneurial cities where new projects which may have a strong tourism component often arise completely independent of any tourism strategy, grand vision or plan, as unexpected opportunities occur (Law, 2000). In Liverpool the emergence in the 1970s of Croxteth Country Park (see Chapter 5), and in the 1980s of the Albert Dock (see Chapters 6-7) provide examples of this process. Indeed, it has been argued that it may be easier to attract business with a concrete proposal rather than a general plan (Cochrane, 1996; Peck and Tickell 1994).

CHAPTER 5


PHASE 1 1974-1986: THE EMERGENCE OF TOURISM IN LIVERPOOL

5.1 Introduction

Central to the debate in this thesis is how sensitive local political arrangements are to the inclusion of any real incentives or competitive edge in tourism policy making decisions. Chapters 5-7 cover the period 1974-2000 and each chapter attempts to relate a sub-period to the evolution of tourism development in Liverpool arguing that there was a process of transition taking place from 'managerialism' to 'entrepreneurialism' with very distinct phases. As already discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, the periodisation presented here has three phases: the beginnings of a tourism industry in Liverpool 1974-1986; the re-positioning of tourism policy on the urban agenda 1986-1994; and in terms of a strategy mix the final phase 1994-2000 could be seen as either reinforcing the 'pro-growth' corporatism of the previous phase or representing the emergence of a new progressive local economic agenda. Figure 5.1 below shows the main agencies and institutions involved in tourism related governance during the three phases.

Jessop (1998) called for the need to demarcate strong and weak competition when investigating entrepreneurial city strategies, and so, as was discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.7, this Chapter will examine the first phase 1974-1986 arguing that in this period, experiments in tourism governance began to be introduced in response to the particular economic situation of manufacturing decline, signalling the beginnings of a shift from *government* to *governance*. The major introduction of tourism to the Liverpool economy emanated from the establishment of the Merseyside County Council's (MCC) Tourism Development Office in 1978 (see section 5.2) and the success of three main Merseyside Development Corporation (MDC) initiatives in the early 1980s (see section 5.4). During this period the LCC played only a very minor role in tourism development in the city (see section 5.3). These two organisations were the first to initiate policies which encouraged new tourist attractions and in doing so demonstrated the tourism potential of the area. In effect, both could be classed as the founders of the city's tourism industry. The final section 5.5 (phase 1 analysis) attempts to analyse their innovative capacity to create competitive advantages in inter urban competition, recognising that localities are not isolated from broader political and economic fronts.

Figure 5.1 Tourism-Related Governance in Liverpool 1974-2000



Note
MTB – Merseyside Tourism Board
MTCB – Merseyside Tourism & Conference Bureau
MT – Mersey Tourism
TMP – The Mersey Partnership
EL – Employment Links

5.2 The Merseyside County Council's Contribution to Tourism Development in Liverpool

Formed in 1974 the Metropolitan County of Merseyside covers two hundred and fifty square miles and embraces the districts of Liverpool, Sefton (which includes Southport), Knowsley, St Helens and Wirral. The largest District by size of population in 1974 was Liverpool with 610,000, whilst for the entire county it was 1, 658,000. But in terms of area Liverpool only comes fourth with 43.5 square miles. Largest of all is Wirral with 60.3 square miles (Brack, 1976, p.2). Of the area within the county only Southport had a history of tourism development, as a result of its resort function. The only other resort within the county was New Brighton (within Wirral), but by 1974 this was in a state of decline.

From its inception in 1974 until it was abolished by the Conservative Government in 1986 (see below), the MCC had a strategic role for tourism throughout Merseyside:

“Under the County of Merseyside Act 1973 as part of the reorganisation of government, the tourism function was given to the Merseyside County Council. They were the tourist authority and they set up Mersey Tourism Office which acted like a mini-tourist board and in size and resources was far larger than any activity within the districts....if you like they were the umbrella organisation for promoting and developing tourism across the region. But also each of the districts played their part so far as their own individual tourism potential was concerned. Although you must remember that at that time, the mid 1970s to mid 1980s, tourism was not a major item on the agenda in terms of regeneration as it is now” (Chair Tourism and Leisure Committee and former Merseyside County Councillor, interviewed 1/10/98).

From the out-set MCC was charged with the administration and upkeep of a whole range of tourist facilities in the conurbation. In the case of Liverpool, responsibility for many of the City's major tourist attractions (including, Liverpool Museum, Walker Art Gallery, Philharmonic Hall and St Georges Hall) passed from the City Council to the newly formed County Council in 1974. The decision to transfer responsibility to the larger authority (population 1.6 million) reflected the 'more than local significance' of the cultural facilities with 50% of visitors coming from outside the Liverpool City Council boundary (Sudbury and Forrester, 1996, p. 72).

Although these changes represented a significant shift in decision-making power from the local (district) level upwards to the regional level they appear to have been accomplished

without any noticeable value conflicts in the tourism policy environment. Indeed, in the case of Liverpool, change may even have been encouraged. By this time the effects of economic decline and urban restructuring were beginning to make a strong impact on the city. Between 1961 and 1971 the population of the City had fallen from 745, 750 to 610, 200 (-18.2%). Over the same period employment fell by 22.2% whilst unemployment rose by 31.4% (LCC, 1987, p.5). Consequently, with the City Council's finances becoming increasingly stretched this was no time for major investments (Couch and Farr, 2000).


As already argued in Chapter 4 the ETB, under the 1969 Development of Tourism Act, was required to give assistance and encouragement to tourism in the Special Development Areas. Merseyside was accorded this status in 1974 (till November 1984) hence right from the formation of the County the ETB and its subsidiary the NWTB sought to encourage discussions with the MCC on the role tourism might play in the local economy. In the 1970s encouragement to develop tourism for the benefit of Merseyside and Liverpool in particular was complemented and supported by two main policy objectives of the North West Tourism Strategy (NWTB, 1982). Namely Policy B1: To encourage appropriate investment in the development of tourism in areas not traditionally associated with tourism; and Policy B6: To develop tourist attractions in the inner cities.

From the mid to late 1970s a number of surveys and reports highlighted Merseyside's tourism potential. A report by the MCC (1979) revealed employment in hotels and other residential establishments increased by over 30% on Merseyside between 1972 and 1977. This growth exceeded most other sources of service employment in the County, during this period (see Daniels, 1982). The 1976 British Home Tourism Survey shows that Merseyside attracted some 12% of the domestic tourism in the North-West. In the same year the International Passenger Survey found that overseas visitors expended approximately £12 million on Merseyside. In total, the magnitude of all tourism expenditure (overseas and domestic) in the region was £34 million, during that year (MCC, 1979). A study carried out by the BTA in 1977 suggested that each £1 million of tourist expenditure generates 400 jobs directly and nearly as many again through demand induced elsewhere in the economy (MCC, 1979, p.2). Based on this assumption the £34 million expended in 1976 is likely to have directly supported some 13,600 jobs, although as with all estimates of tourist 'outputs', some caution needs to be retained. Indeed, in a report produced two years later by the ETB (1978) the figure was put at 10,000 jobs (MCC, 1979, p.2).

It is important to note that this growth in expenditure and employment was achieved before the area had been actively promoted as a tourist resource. Thus, “The perception of tourism in older industrial cities as something new was of course false” (Law, 1992, p.599). Large cities have a long history of attracting visitors from outside their area, whether staying overnight or as day visitors, because of business activity, retail, cultural and sports facilities and to see friends and relatives. In the case of Liverpool, the early attendance figures for the Walker Art Gallery have not been surpassed. In 1881, for instance, 610,799 people visited the gallery in 260 days (MCC, 1980a). However, what was new was that the 1980s witnessed a significant shift in attitude by cities towards the tourist industry it was now seen as an industry of great potential importance and one that should be encouraged (Law, 1993).

As already discussed in Chapter 4, under Section 4 of the Development of Tourism Act 1969 the ETB was empowered to provide financial assistance for projects which would attract tourists and help to revitalise economies in the Development Areas. However, as Figure 5.2 shows the take up of grant aid for projects in Merseyside was considerably less than in other Development areas:

Figure 5.2 ETB Grant Aid by Development Area 1972-1977 (£ millions)



Source: adapted from MCC, 1979 Section 5.17, Table 15

There is no reference in the MCC (1979b) report as to why the take up of grant aid in Merseyside over this period followed this trend. It is, of course, understandable that the MCC, faced with immediate urgent needs in the fields of housing, education and social

services, in conjunction with very high unemployment levels may have felt that expenditure on tourism should receive secondary status. In June 1981, for example, 121,260 people were registered as unemployed in Merseyside County representing an unemployment rate of 16.9 per cent, over one and a half times the national rate (Meegan, 1999, p. 12). Furthermore, under Section 4 of the 1969 Act the precise level of government funding required depended upon the amount of support that could be attracted from community, trade and investment interests. Therefore, it would seem reasonable to suggest that such support would be more forthcoming in the more well-established tourism areas shown in Figure 5.2, notably Cumbria (the Lake District) and Yorkshire (not least the City of York) as opposed to Merseyside where tourism at this time was in its infancy. Nevertheless, examples of projects that received ETB Grant Aid in Liverpool included the Walker Art Gallery and the Everyman Theatre which was extensively rebuilt during 1977 (MCC, 1979b, p.17).

Revenue finance could also be made available to the Development areas to assist with appropriate marketing to develop their tourist potential. As argued in Chapter 2, partnerships and place marketing are two major components in the thematic of the entrepreneurial city. To this end, early initiatives by the MCC in partnership with, and using funds available from the ETB and the BTA resulted in three national advertising campaigns and the publication of three editions of *Discover Merseyside* a tourism booklet promoting places of interest to visit, over the period 1976-78. Preliminary indications that this partnership had been successful in actively promoting the region and Liverpool in particular, are shown in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Enquiries at Liverpool City Centre Tourist Information Office – July 1977 and July 1978

	July 1977	July 1978	% increase/ decrease
Tourist N.W.	344	422	+ 22.6
Tourist Other	302	525	+ 73.8
Accommodation	286	351	+ 22.7
Tourist Liverpool	1366	2447	+ 79
Civic	121	140	+ 15.7
Miscellaneous	1864	1669	- 10.5
Total	4283	5554	+ 29. 67

Source: Weekly Enquiry Records July 77 – July 78 cited in MCC 1979, Section 3.22, Figure 13.

Table 5.1 shows that the number of enquiries at the Liverpool Office increased by almost 30% over figures for July 1977. Only queries of a miscellaneous nature decreased. It is noteworthy that enquiries about tourist attractions in Liverpool showed the greatest increase in both absolute (1081) and relative terms (+79%). In addition, approximately 11,000 enquiries from overseas, were made directly to Merseyside County Council's public relations office by 1978 - six times greater than the previous year.

Merseyside Economic Development Committee (MERCEDO)

In 1978 the County Economic Development Committee reorganised its activities and established the Merseyside Economic Development Office (MERCEDO). Within this unit a Tourism Development Office was set up, which comprised a Tourism Development Officer along with a staff of seven and its own promotional budget. In the same year the MCC contributed £10,000 towards the cost of a research programme which was undertaken in partnership with the ETB to investigate Merseyside's tourism potential (MCC, 1979b). As part of this programme a report prepared by a consultant *Review of Existing and Potential Tourist Resources on Merseyside*, D McEwen was published in February 1979. This report was both innovative and far-sighted.

First and foremost it classified Merseyside's tourism attractions in terms of their relative competitive advantages at different state levels. The categories used were:

Category A – an international class attraction capable of competing favourably with similar attractions anywhere in the world.

Category B – important attractions of regional and some national significance which have to compete with other attractions elsewhere in Britain and abroad.

Category C – attractions that are essentially local in appeal with powerful competitors elsewhere in the region, Britain and abroad.

Examples given of Liverpool's attractions included: Category A – Beatles-Liverpool Museum-Walker Art Gallery. Category B – Two Cathedrals-Speke Hall. Category C – theatres-shopping-restaurants.

This report was innovative in that it represented the first attempt in Merseyside to raise the level of awareness of competition and its associated implications for tourism policy makers, providers and operators in the public and private sector alike. However, it did little to change the ideological positions of tourism policy-makers in Liverpool during the 1974-1986 phase (see section 5.5). As the Chairperson for the LCC, Leisure and Tourism Committee, puts it:

“At that time there wasn’t really much competition throughout the North West region as far as urban tourism was concerned. It was a growing business as such, and not everybody had hit the mark with tourism. It was recognised that what we had in the City, the fine architecture, the theatres, museums and art galleries and also the Albert Dock provided enormous impetus as far as tourism was concerned. But there wasn’t very much on the ground, there were very few hotels at that time, we didn’t have the large number of bars and restaurants that we now have, so the infrastructure was not there, so inter urban competition was not an issue” (interviewed,1/10/98)

McEwen’s (1979) report also suggested there was considerable scope for tourism development in the region and in particular Liverpool. With regards to the latter Liverpool City Centre was identified as a potential Category A attraction, one that if developed could compare with many other cities in the UK, Europe and the world. In addition, it emphasised the importance of waterfront development – taking advantage of listed warehouses, enclosed water areas and large amounts of vacant land in close proximity to the Pier Head. Much of this report was incorporated in the Merseyside County Council’s (1980b) Structure Plan and has provided the basis for subsequent development. Indeed, the MCC was one of the first metropolitan councils to give tourism development a prominent place in its Structure Plan policies (MCC, 1985, p.11).

When the Structure Plan was submitted for the Secretary of State’s approval in 1979, it was accompanied by a warning of the possible violent results of frustration and deprivation in the inner cities if the strategy of urban regeneration should fail (MCC, 1985). In Liverpool, the unemployment rate increased from 10.6% in 1971 to 20.4% in 1981 (more than twice the national rate) representing a 92.5% change in unemployment rate over the decade (LCC, 1992). This period of social and economic decline finally resulted in an outbreak of rioting in 1981 giving the area the unwanted distinction of being the first city in mainland Britain to experience the use by the police of CS gas to quell a civil disturbance. Liverpool is still scarred by the riots that occurred in 1981 (see Chapters 6 and 7).

In one of the earliest local policy statements to recognise the importance of tourism in economic regeneration, the Merseyside Structure Plan (1980b) sought a change in government tourism development policy so that it recognised Merseyside's potential. On its own behalf it proposed to make the most of existing attractions particularly the cultural facilities in Liverpool's city centre (MCC, 1980b, p.132). Up to this stage tourism was seen as a way of promoting the County Council's own attractions (Couch and Farr, 2000; Law, 1985). Consequently, this policy emphasis conditioned the form of urban entrepreneurialism being adopted with place marketing largely aimed at attracting visitor interest in the City's tourist attractions. Out-and out urban entrepreneurialism in the global market place for tourism related inward investment was not on the agenda during the 1970s.

From 1980 onwards, the MCC's strategy involved a more proactive 'place marketing' approach and a more direct engagement with tourism development. Central to this strategy was the view that public investment was an essential stimulus to a return of private investment for urban regeneration. The adoption of a more active entrepreneurial approach was necessarily shaped by the introduction of a new ideology namely the 'enterprise culture' of the Thatcher governments of the 1980s (as was discussed in Chapter 2).

'New Combinations' to Enhance Competition?

As was discussed in Chapter 2 above, there is a wide range of entrepreneurial city strategies. Moreover, what all these initiatives share is the entrepreneurial concern to create 'new combinations' of economic factors which will enhance local and regional competitiveness. Although the Merseyside Development Corporation (MDC) has received much of the credit for developing a tourist industry in Liverpool (see section 5.4) one should not lose sight of the fact that the MCC was the first organisation to demonstrate the tourism potential of the City. Apart from being responsible for the continuous upkeep of many of Liverpool's major tourist attractions and marketing the city's tourism assets, the MCC implemented a number of innovative ventures (in the MCC's own terms) centred around creating new tourist attractions, a programme of events and job training initiatives.

Maritime Museum

Although the idea of a Maritime Museum had arisen many years earlier and various proposals had been put forward none came to fruition. However, in 1978 the MCC declared its firm intention to develop a Maritime Museum and the necessary studies were set in hand. This yielded a proposal for restoring quaysides, land and buildings at Canning Docks, Liverpool (Couch and Farr, 2000). The first phase of the museum opened in the former Pilotage Building in July 1980 and attracted 60,000 visitors during its first short season. In 1981 after a museum shop and cafeteria had been added the number rose to 110,000 (MCC, 1983, p.53).

The success of the museum under the MCC's administration is evidenced by the fact that at the time the MCC was abolished in 1986 (following the Local Government Act 1985), the museum had received or shared with the Albert Dock in a number of international and national awards (NMGM, 1986 *Review* 1989, p.19). Indeed, "The Maritime Museum was a catalyst for the Albert Dock development" Head of Marketing and Public Affairs, NMGM (interviewed, 29/7/99). By 1985 visitor numbers had risen fourfold, to 237,000 (MDC, 1997b, Table 4.2b).

According to the LCC Chair for Leisure and Tourism :

"The development of the Maritime Museum has led to a number of important benefits for the city. Beyond preserving a wide range of outstanding collections and making them available to the public. These inventories have enabled the museum to, in a sense, show the wider world what they have got in their shop and on display. I would say, overall, the Maritime Museum has proved to be the major contribution to tourism from the Merseyside County Council" (interviewed, 1/10/98)

Since it opened its doors in July 1980, the Maritime Museum (which included the Museum of Liverpool Life since 1993 and the Transatlantic Slavery Gallery since 1994), has had a clear role as a major source of information on Liverpool's maritime, industrial and social history. However, as already argued in Chapter 2, one needs to be mindful of the fact that flagship projects can create islands of affluence and in the process become remote from the community that watched them develop (see Chapters 6 and 7). After the MCC was abolished in 1986 responsibility for the museum was transferred to the newly created National Museums

and Galleries on Merseyside (NMGM) and it was relocated to the north warehouse of the Albert Dock itself (see Chapter 6).

As the above quote suggests the Maritime Museum may well have been the MCC's most important tourism initiative in Liverpool. However, as was discussed in Chapter 2, 'strong competition' represents policy directed towards improving the *overall* (structural) competitiveness of a locality. In contrast, 'weak competition' represents fragmented or isolated policy measures that focus on individual tourism policy facets. It is in this context that such developments are examined in section 5.5

Croxteth Country Park

According to Christopher Law (2000), because entrepreneurial cities tend to be pragmatic and opportunistic there is a tendency to be project driven, with schemes (even flagship schemes) being promoted as unexpected opportunities arise. Consequently, there may sometimes appear to be no grand vision or plan.

The development of Croxteth Country Park in Liverpool provides a prime example of how an unexpected opportunity was turned into a major tourist attraction serving the half million population of the City and the wider county beyond. The Park which comprised a 500 acre closed private estate with a stately home, stable yard, home farm, parkland, farmland and woodland, was presented by the Countess of Sefton to the MCC in 1974, for the use of the people of Merseyside. Over the period 1974-1986 the County Council with generous help from the Countryside Commission developed displays in Croxteth Hall, a cafe in the stable yard, a rare breeds farm unit in the home farm, restored greenhouses and a walled garden, created a nature reserve and opened footpaths and bridleways through the woodland and parkland. In 1981 after a permanent exhibition and visitor centre had been added the number of visitors to the Park had risen tenfold, to 350, 000 and was ranked second among new tourist attractions by the British Tourist Authority (MCC, 1983a, p.53). The Park less than 4 miles from the city centre was described as 'a lung for Liverpool' (Sudbury and Forrester, 1996, p.73).

The development of the Park draws attention to the innovative capacity of the MCC in attempting to introduce a new type of tourism, one that was not associated with older

industrial cities in general, and certainly not in close proximity to the city centre as was the case in Liverpool. Nevertheless, as Jessop (1997, 1998) points out, policies oriented towards a strong competitive approach require *continuing* economic, political and social innovations. To this end, there is little evidence to suggest that policies have been directed towards this requirement in the period since (see Chapter 7). Although it is important to note that in the case of the Park policy-makers have never really had the overall power to define their own agenda (see section 5.5) due to influences from other policy areas:

“Croxteth Park was given to the Merseyside County Council in 1974 with a ‘deed of gift’ which controls how the Park can be used. It has to be used for cultural, educational or civic purposes. In effect this would prevent a hotel being built or holding car boot sales or other such events or the whole place becoming a theme park and so on. So we have always had to be aware of this as far as development planning is concerned. (Manager, Croxteth Country Park, interviewed, 9/7/99).

Mersey River Festival

As was discussed in Chapter 2, Harvey (1989) argues that the one defining feature of urban entrepreneurialism is the growing use of the ‘urban spectacle’ including the staging of one-off events (to attract the “consumer dollar” in Harvey’s terms). It is interesting that it was precisely such an event that demonstrated how the MCC could take the lead in new initiatives, by finding a new use for the river. The event in question was the Mersey River Festival.

The Public Relations Office started the idea in 1981, with the backing of the ETB and the eventual support of over forty companies, clubs, societies and prominent individuals. The festival programme comprised more than thirty events including regattas, water-skiing and a cross-river race. Following this success, a second festival was held in 1982 and it then became an annual event (MCC, 1983a). As the Mersey Partnership’s Tourism Manager put it:

“I think the River Festival was a symbol of the opening up of the river again to both residents and visitors. I think as it has happened in so many cities, Liverpool turned its back on the river. It turned its back on the river when the dock system changed and the ships were no longer coming down in the same numbers and it became a no go area if you like” (interviewed, 25/11/98)

In effect, the success of the River Festival highlighted a new natural resource both for the city and the region . Subsequently, it set the scene for many other river events, some of which were of international significance, not least, the Tall Ships which called in on the city in 1984 and again in 1992 (see Chapter 6).

The London Office

In terms of ‘urban entrepreneurialism’ of the place marketing kind, the MCC established a London Office in 1974 from which the newly created County could influence political and official opinion about Merseyside. In the early years the role of the office was one of general influence with an emphasis on property development, trade promotion and lobbying. With the formation of MERCEDO in 1978 (see above) the office became known as the London Office of MERCEDO, and it was given a broader remit to act as the London base for the whole of the County Council. This broader remit included image promotion and to a lesser extent tourism promotion.

According to the MCC, (1984) since the opening of the office in 1974 the most difficult problem encountered was Merseyside’s image problem and this was mainly due to the area being portrayed by the media as one of poor labour relations, rampant militancy, low productivity and poor quality of life. In a bid to counter those distortions (or realities) the Press Officer introduced a programme of activities in late 1981 which comprised a series of press facility visits, regular press releases on positive news stories and constant face to face meetings with journalists. It was suggested that “these initiatives proved themselves valuable and cost effective and had resulted in a number of very positive articles appearing in the national press over the last couple of years” (p.24).

As far as tourism promotion was concerned:

“During the 1970s the general public could not go into the office to see what was on in Liverpool. By 1980 tourism was becoming more important so they linked into the economic development side of tourism and so it became a sort of drop in shop to find out about Liverpool. It also started to profile the tourism element on Merseyside as well, but not significantly, it tended to relate to business investment” (Chair of Tourism and Leisure Committee, LCC and former County Councillor, interviewed, 1/10/98).

Towards the mid 1980s tourism policy was given a higher profile by the London Office. In February 1984 the MCC applied for an ERDF Grant (total cost £63,000) to relocate the London Office (located at the 4th floor, 5-7 Chancery Lane) to a ground floor publicly visible 'shop front' style location opposite Charing Cross Station. A new shop style location was deemed necessary to "take advantage of the passer-by element, which is so crucial in promoting tourism" (MCC, 1984, p.23). A programme of activities geared to promoting the quality of life in Merseyside was also planned to make good use of the new office (p.24).

At the time this document was published (July, 1984) the lease documentation was proceeding and a decision from Westminster City Council regarding planning consent was expected within the near future. However, this proposal did not come to fruition and the office closed in 1986.

The Merseyguide Initiative

Merseyguide training, began in 1980, when the Tourism Development Office in partnership with Liverpool University ran a special training course. According to the MCC (1983a) within six months nearly six thousand people had been taken on guided walks or coach tours, including visitors on package holidays. Subjects ranged from weekly guided Beatle walks, a 'Murders and Mysteries of Bygone Liverpool' coach tour and Mersey Beatle Weekends (often booked to capacity). By 1982 the Merseyguides programme included thirty different walks and a dozen coach tours, covering most of the County. As well as relying on tour operators the Tourism Development Office had from 1981 organised its own holiday break weekends, these 'Theme Weekends' were designed around visits to football games, theatre performances and concerts. In 1984 there were 47 guides who worked on a part-time basis as and when required (Law, 1985).

In 1982 attempts were made to strengthen links with the private sector with the formation of a Tourism Action Committee. This contained representatives of both the public and private sectors and had as its objectives the dissemination of information thus enabling the creation of a more effective development and promotion programme. Such initiatives to attract private sector investment, in Liverpool at least, appear to have met with some success a few years later. In 1984 for example, the Beatle City Exhibition Centre by Radio City costing £1

million was opened along with the Cavern Walks speciality shopping centre by the Royal Insurance which cost £9 million (MTB, 1988).

From November 1983 the Tourism Office also administered a scheme for Tourism Development Grants, restricted to Liverpool, which was 75 per cent financed from the Urban Programme. According to Law (1985, p.67) There was about £100,000 a year available with grants limited to £15,000 per project and examples of grants included hotel improvement, a restaurant in the Anglican Cathedral and a visitor interpretative display. However, these examples may have represented the exception rather than the rule, according to the Chair of the Tourism and Leisure Committee, LCC (interviewed, 1/10/98) “there was very little private sector involvement in tourism very little indeed, that was not something that was on the agenda at that time”.

When in 1980 MCC approved the 5 year Structure Plan it did so on the basis that a review would be necessary in 1985 (MCC, 1980). To this end, *Agenda for Merseyside* (MCC) was published in January 1985. Commenting on the past performance of tourism development in the region, the report (MCC, 1985, p.12) went on to state:

“In five years local and national perceptions of Merseyside’s tourism potential have been completely changed, moving from the initial scepticism of the local press to a position where Merseyside is now accepted in Government and EEC circles as an area for further tourism investment. Measured in its own terms, and a part of a campaign to improve Merseyside’s image with private investors, tourism development has been an unqualified success. On a broader front, the only qualification that needs to be introduced, and one to which the County Council has frequently referred, is that new jobs created directly in tourism-related industries will only have a very marginal impact on Merseyside’s unemployment problem”

It would appear that the dominant organisational values to be found in the report had a very strong place marketing orientation with little if any emphasis on job creation. Yet, at the same time the MCC was urging the local authorities to give priority to policies which sought to develop locally generated employment in a bid to address the scale and seriousness of the regions unemployment problem (MCC, 1985, p.30). As such this raises a related research issue namely the need to distinguish between policies which foster economic growth and those which generate employment.

Summary

Overall, it is clear from the above discussion that the MCC was at the forefront of formulating and implementing tourism policies in Liverpool. What is more important for this research, however, is the extent to which the MCC's approach went beyond issues of 'reproduction regulation' to include entrepreneurial policies oriented to (permanent) innovation to derive a competitive edge in inter urban competition. In this respect, the MCC was certainly innovative in that it was one of the first metropolitan councils to give tourism a prominent place in its Structure Plan policies. Subsequently, a substantial tourism development and marketing programme was built up by the County Council which laid the foundations for further development by the MDC (see section 5.3).

Tourism development was in this period conditioned by changes in national urban policy (see section 5.5) local level political conditions (see section 5.3) and the County Council's *modus operandi* (loosely defined as a kind of mixed 'entrepreneurial and partnership' approach). However, with hindsight the notion of 'partnership' during this phase was more wishful thinking rather than an actuality. Indeed, the MCC (1985, p.7) felt it necessary to acknowledge that instead of institutional arrangements bringing together relevant agencies, jointly examining key problem areas and deploying their resources through a co-ordinated response, many were simply a financing mechanism (notably the Urban Programme) and traditional approval procedures. Furthermore, Logan and Molotch (1987) catalogue a whole series of 'auxiliary players' including the media, universities and sports teams, who foster a sense of 'place patriotism' and help promote the legitimacy of the entrepreneurial ideology. It could be argued that the Merseyguide initiative in partnership with the Liverpool University, discussed above, provides a good example.

Section 5.3 below, focuses on the role tourism played within the Liverpool City Council's political agenda during the phase 1 period.

5.3 Local Government

Over the period 1974-86, local government in Liverpool had a very low profile in the promotion and development of a tourist industry (Evans, 1996; Law, 1985; Sudbury and

Forrester, 1996). This lack of local government intervention in this period, however, was not something new. Green (1996) recounts that:

“In Liverpool, the great wealth of the 19th century has left us with legacies in terms of the built fabric, artistic collections, networks with the ‘establishment’, networks with the world, creativity within the population. For thirty years post 1945, the City institutionally, forgot about them” (p.112).

Liverpool’s failure to exploit its opportunities in the tourism policy area, however, must be seen in the larger economic, cultural and political context in which decisions in the city are made. According to Parkinson and Bianchini (1993, p.157) there were two important reasons why the issues of culture and its contribution to the local economy failed to materialise during this period. Firstly, much of the attention and resources were focused on working class residential areas on the periphery of the city, as such these priorities prevented the potential role of the city centre getting on the political agenda. This had a decisive impact on the debate about the contribution tourism and the arts could make to Liverpool’s future, in that, the majority of local cultural facilities and activities are located in the city centre. Secondly, the ideological character of the Liverpool Labour Party was crucial. The party was dominated by working-class rather than middle-class interests thus the leadership structure and policies were focused on the welfare needs of its supporters and members. Consequently, it was much less interested in or actively opposed to other policy priorities such as the economic potential of activities like tourism, and the arts or even white-collar services sector jobs located in the city centre were regarded with scepticism (see also Evans, 1996).

This continued neglect of the city centre not only hastened the departure of many businesses from the central area it also resulted in many professionals looking for other more prosperous towns in the region such as Chester and Southport as retail, arts and entertainment centres for themselves (Evans, 1996). In turn, this compounded the lack of political support for a Liverpool city centre development strategy encompassing the formulation of cultural policies (Parkinson and Bianchini, 1993).

This situation was exacerbated when the Militant Tendency led by Derek Hatton engineered control of the Labour party in the early 1980s and subsequently political control, when in 1983, the Labour party eventually took majority rule of Liverpool city council. This ‘coup’ was without any precedent or parallel in British politics and produced some predictably

adventurist tactics (Lane, 1997). When the Labour Party took control of the council it had two main objectives in mind. The first was to renovate and expand the public housing sector in the most deprived parts of the city. The second was to expand the public sector as it was the major employer within the city. From 1983 until 1987, the argument became increasingly vitriolic as the Labour council threatened to bankrupt the city if the Conservative government did not give it more money. The confrontation dominated the national headlines for several years but finally ended in 1987 when 47 Labour councillors were expelled by the national Labour leadership for their involvement with the Militant Tendency (see below).

According to the majority of the representatives that were interviewed during this research the 'power politics' played out in the city during this time has left a scar on the city's reputation which is still evident today:

"The damage done politically during the Militant years cannot be underestimated, nationally it was very very harmful. They did not give a damn, they put Liverpool in the bin, reputation wise at least....that had to change and I think it is changing now but it has to be given a kick" (Deputy Chair Economic Development Committee, LCC, interviewed, 10/9/98).

"Liverpool, during the Militant era went through a very difficult period both politically and economically. There was a feeling that the city had lost its way, it couldn't really deliver anything other than trying to build new council houses. It didn't have any sense of what you need in cities which is diversity, quality, we had some great pieces of architecture which are world renowned and which we allowed to decay. St Georges Hall was mothballed, Lime Street Chambers at the front of Lime Street Station and the Royal Infirmary in London Road were left empty along with the building that the Liverpool Institute of Performing Arts went into, the old Institute. There were major problems with the Philharmonic Hall, the home of the orchestra. These were important symbols that should have been brought back into use to bring life to the place, and to provide jobs. (Assistant Chief Executive, LCC, interviewed 8/12/98).

"The Militant Tendency's municipal housing policy combined with the almost total neglect of other areas of economic activity such as manufacturing, retailing, tourism and cultural industries and the neglect of small businesses meant that the private sector felt very insecure and so was loath to invest in the city" (Journalist, Liverpool Daily Post & Echo, interviewed, 19/1/99).

One should not lose sight of the fact that the lack of will by the Militant administration to include tourism and cultural resources as part of the political debate in the City, was not entirely of its own making. As already argued above, responsibility for much of Liverpool's tourism product was handed over to the newly created County Council in 1974, almost ten years before Militant came to power. Therefore it is not really too surprising to find that tourism was not a major issue on their agenda:

“There were other things on the agenda from their point of view. Whilst there were things happening in the city, there was a number of pop concerts, for example, which did encourage a lot of people from outside, they did not see the merits of encouraging tourism. I wouldn't say the Militant administration was anti-tourism but I wouldn't say it was for. They just ignored it, they just allowed the Merseyside County Council to get on with it, because during the Militant era tourism was still a function of the MCC. (Chair Leisure and Tourism Committee, LCC, interviewed, 1/10/98).

The perception of tourism as an industry, which is seasonal in character and providing low wages, can also be reflected in the ideology of a ruling political party. Viewed in this manner the tourist industry is not a proper one to be developed and preference should be given to other activities such as manufacturing. Indeed, where this view has prevailed, such as Bristol and Liverpool, it has been difficult to bring a tourism organisation into existence, whether inside or outside the local authority, and any failure has been used as an excuse for withdrawal of support (Bassett, 1993). In August 1981 Liverpool City Council requested the MCC to take over its Information Office (and four staff) which included amongst its tasks that of tourism. This was agreed in August 1982 and the Information Office and the Tourism Unit moved into new premises in Lime Street. After the Office was handed over LCC merely retained a Public relations Officer to produce brochures and in the process spending very little money on advertising or on development (Law, 1985).

It is well documented that as a result of the media coverage of this situation Liverpool acquired a national reputation as a centre of 'defiance' of national government. Nonetheless, the Militant Tendency driven Labour council was consistently returned to office during the 1980s with an apparent popular mandate for its policies and its tactics (Parkinson and Bianchini, 1993). Furthermore, the politics of the financial crisis gave meaning and substance to local politics in a way that was never there before. According to Peter Facey,

parliamentary officer for the Independent Electoral Reform Society, the slump in voting figures since the mid 1980s is at least partly attributable to the demise of Militant. During this period opinion was polarised by the Militant faction, you were either for them or against them but everyone had an opinion thus a high percentage of people voted. But now there is a common feeling that there is nothing to vote for, there is no unifying issue (*Liverpool Daily Post*, 3/5/99).

The confrontation with central government which dominated national and local media finally ended in 1987 when the national Labour leadership suspended the Liverpool Labour party and then expelled the 47 councillors for their membership of the organisation. From that date onward a new Labour administration committed to rethinking policy priorities emerged, especially in the economic development sphere, and rebuilding relationships with the private sector. Subsequently, tourism has steadily advanced up the political agenda (see Chapters 6 and 7).

To summarise, as already argued in Chapter 2, the thematic of the entrepreneurial city is based on local authorities supporting pro-growth economic strategies and forming partnerships in order to fulfil that aim, however, this did not translate well to Liverpool during the 1980s:

“They [the Militant] didn’t want to go into partnership with anyone else because they thought they were the elected members and so should make all the decisions” (Council Officer, interviewed, 28/1/99).

Ostensibly the Labour administration did have an economic strategy but because it was essentially employment by the City Council or through investment in housing, it was based on consumption and not long-term economic development. Additionally, it was unsustainable, the city could not fund it (Evans, 1996; Parkinson, 1985, 1990). Combined with this, the administration also had an ideological political agenda that it followed until the city was brought to the brink of bankruptcy, an unusual, to say the least, pro-growth strategy. During the 1974-1986 period although Liverpool was operating with an escalating economic crisis it was undoubtedly an elected leadership. Both the Liberal administration and the Militant led Labour administration controlled the political process and they *governed* the city. The most significant additional impact on tourism development in Liverpool during this period came

from the Merseyside Development Corporation established in 1981. It is to this organisation the next section turns.

5.4 The Merseyside Development Corporation (MDC) and Tourism Development in Liverpool

Introduction

It would be fair to suggest that in one sense tourism in Liverpool owes its existence to the riots of 1981. Those troubles set in motion a chain of events which ran in short order from the appointment of Michael Heseltine as Minister for Merseyside, and the establishment of the Merseyside Development Corporation that same year. The MDC represents the most significant additional public source of finance in recent years and, its achievement in focusing upon the potential of tourism in Liverpool has been crucial.

The Transfer of Local Development Powers in the UK

Urban Development Corporations, the centrepiece of Mrs Thatcher's urban policy, represented most dramatically the British government's vision of city regeneration in the 1980s. Launched in the immediate aftermath of the 1981 urban riots the first UDCs were introduced into the Liverpool and London docklands. After the 1987 election the government introduced a further series of UDCs in the Black Country, Trafford Park, Bristol, Manchester, Leeds, Cardiff, Sheffield, Tyneside and Teeside.

Underpinning the Thatcher Government's ideology concerning UDCs was the assumption that a single purpose agency with limited objectives, using streamlined administrative procedures and free from political ambiguity is better placed than local authorities to rejuvenate a closely defined area (Adcock, 1984). With their statutory origins in the 1980 Local Government Planning and Land Act, UDCs were charged with bringing land and buildings into effective use, encouraging the development of existing and new industry and commerce, creating an attractive environment and ensuring that housing and social facilities are available to encourage people to live and work in the area (S 136 Local Government Planning and Land Act, 1980). The UDCs were not intended to become permanent bodies. They were expected:

“...to achieve their objectives within a relatively short timescale – perhaps 10-15 years – and will then be dissolved” (DOE, Statement to House of Commons Environment Committee Session 1982/83, October 1982).

In order to carry out this regeneration, UDCs were granted extensive financial, planning and land acquisition powers. According to Dawson and Parkinson (1991) UDCs could acquire land by compulsory purchase, by voluntary agreement or by the Secretary of State vesting it in them. They were also invested with responsibility for development control policy and decisions within their area. By displacing local authority planning powers in this manner, UDCs were intended to remove the political uncertainty and restraints of local democracy which, in the government’s view at least, represented a significant barrier to the development process and a hindrance to private sector investment (Lauria, 1994; Parkinson and Evans, 1988).

Although not locally accountable (see below), UDCs were politically accountable to Parliament, administratively accountable to the Department of Environment (DoE) and financially accountable to the Treasury (Dawson and Parkinson, 1991, p.51). This was consistent with the Government’s aim of removing political uncertainty and constraints of local government and of democracy. In addition, UDCs had to undergo scrutiny by the Auditor-General of the National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee and a degree of control was exerted through the approval of the UDCs annually updated Corporate Plan and individual projects (Lauria, 1994, p.7). Thus, accountability to central government was quite extensive.

Each UDC was governed by a Board of up to 11 members appointed by the Secretary of State commonly comprising local businessmen, senior local politicians and the Corporations Chief Officer. They had three major sources of finance: Grant-in-Aid from central government; the national loan fund for commercial projects; and capital receipts from land and building sales.

Overall, UDCs were designed to create the conditions and the confidence necessary to attract private capital. To this end, government financial support was tailored to providing incentives to the private sector by reducing the cost and risks of inner city investment (Dawson and Parkinson, 1991). As such, this approach assumed an entrepreneurial capacity that was in sharp contrast to the alleged inflexibility and bureaucratic nature of local government. In practise, UDCs placed heavy emphasis on quickly realised and highly visible results most

notably 'flagship projects' in an attempt to enhance the local environment and its image. As already argued in Chapter 2, however, the tendency to stress property-led regeneration can dilute wider urban policy goals (see below).

In many ways the first two UDCs could not have differed more greatly in their potential to regenerate their respective areas. The London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC) was faced with regenerating an area, which had an unfilled development potential equal of any piece of real estate anywhere in the world. Located within a mile of one of the leading financial centres of the modern capitalist economy which was about to reap the economic benefits flowing from the deregulation of the domestic financial market and the internationalisation of world financial markets in the 1980s, London Docklands was ripe for development (Parkinson and Evans, 1988). In contrast, the MDC's designated area lay at the core of one of the most economically depressed cities in Western Europe which had experienced a massive withdrawal of private capital during the previous three decades and endured a series of political traumas in the process (Parkinson, 1985).

Unlike London there was less 'grassroots' reaction to the creation of the MDC. This was primarily because virtually all of the designated area was non-residential in character (Dawson and Parkinson, 1990, 1991; Meegan, 1999). Additionally, "early difficulties in securing the redevelopment of the docklands probably led to them being divorced in the public mind from the life of the rest of the city" (LCC, 1987, p.7).

MDC: Organisational Structure

The MDC came into being in March 1981 and its designated area at its inception covered just 865 acres of waterfront in Liverpool. In November 1988 this was almost trebled to 2,372 acres including for the first time land on either side of the Mersey (see Chapter 6). The responsibility for administering the MDC rested with a Board presided over by a Chairman and Deputy Chairman which at its inception contained ten members comprising leading Merseyside businessmen and senior politicians from the County and District Councils and two appointments from academic backgrounds in the North West (Adcock, 1984).

From the outset the MDC comprised three departments: *Development* – responsible for all physical regeneration policies and programmes; *Commercial* – responsible for all estate

management functions and attraction of investment and development proposals; and *Finance and Administration* – whose financial functions included grants and loan to developers, internal audit, payments and the preparation of accounts. From time to time special purpose sub-committees have been established to handle the detailed aspects of development projects, for example, a Festival Executive Committee was formed to progress the International Garden Festival. The total permanent ‘in house’ staff employed by the Corporation at the beginning of 1984 was 52 (Adcock, 1984, p.272). Given their small numbers, the MDC staff tended to perform an executive role and private consultants and contractors were relied upon both to generate suitable redevelopment proposals and to implement them. The MDC also made use of the expertise and knowledge of local government staff either by direct recruitment or via consultations on particular projects (LCC, 1987).

The Merseyside Task Force (MTF) provided a direct link between the MDC and the DoE. The MTF was established in 1981 by Michael Heseltine – the Minister for Merseyside, following the Toxteth riots, to provide a co-ordinated central government approach to urban regeneration on Merseyside. The MTF (later to become part of Government Office Merseyside) was responsible for coordinating the MDCs Corporate Planning process. Corporate planning is central to the relationship between UDCs and the DoE (National Audit Office, 1988, paragraph. 1.10). The MTF was also responsible for effective allocation of public funds and for integrating the MDC into the network of central government initiatives such as the Urban Programme (Lauria, 1994). The MDC received its financing from four main sources: Grant-in-Aid from central government; The European Development Fund (ERDF); the national loan fund for commercial projects; and capital receipt from land and building sales.

Power Relationships

Part of any new partnership with the MDC would need to be set in the context of the continuing concern about the level and degree of local accountability. First and foremost the MDC was the local planning authority for its designated area. MDC’s decision-making style followed a corporate model: decisions were made by a small number of elites within the corporation, by large developers and financial institutions based principally on their particular market criteria. Board meetings were held in private and minutes were not subject to public disclosure (Dawson and Parkinson, 1991; Lauria, 1994). Although there was provision for a

member of each of the three local authorities directly affected by the MDC (Liverpool, Sefton and Knowsley) to be 'represented' on the Board they served in an individual capacity and, strictly speaking, were accountable to the Secretary of State rather than their respective councils (LCC, 1987). Indeed, council members were forbidden to relate any secret meetings to their respective local authorities (Parkinson and Evans, 1988). Because of this, between 1983 and 1989 no-one from the Labour controlled Liverpool City Council took up the available seat (Meegan, 1999).

Although there were defined consultation procedures with the local authorities and other relevant agencies on planning applications and development proposals, the consultation period was restricted and the power of decision making rested fully with the Corporation (see section 5.5) unless the Secretary of State chose to exercise 'call-in' powers (Adcock, 1984; LCC, 1987). Nonetheless, MDC's initial policy approach reflected a concern to adopt a co-operative rather than confrontational stance. "In particular, it has attempted to take on board community aspirations and local authority plans rather than ride roughshod over local wishes (Dawson and Parkinson, 1991, p.52). This co-operation has gained practical expression in that only three out of 250 planning applications determined by the MDC proved to be a source of major disagreement (LCC, 1987, p.19). However, consultation is no substitute for co-ordination (see section 5.5).

The MDC Strategy: Industry and Commerce Versus Tourism

The MDC first revealed its strategy for the Liverpool docklands in 1981. It intended to adopt a mixed use plan of industrial, commercial, residential and leisure development. In terms of land use, the MDC allocated 55% of its land for industrial development, 40% for commercial, residential and recreational use and 5% for port related activity (MDC, 1981). In the first three years of its life, the MDC implemented an extensive programme of land reclamation, physical construction work and servicing within its designated area. However, "In a depressed region like Merseyside, the mere provision of reclaimed land and renovated buildings does not attract inward industrial investment" (Parkinson and Evans, 1988, p.9).

By 1984 it was realised that there had been a significant shortfall in demand for industrial uses such that the MDC found it necessary to abandon its original strategy. The reorientation, in strategy, involved substituting a tourist and leisure based strategy for the original emphasis

on industrial development. By 1984 the tourism potential of the area had been demonstrated by the success of three major initiatives: the Albert Dock renovation (phase 1 opened in 1984) which attracted over 2 million visitors annually; the International Garden Festival which attracted 3 million visitors and the Tall Ships race held in 1984 which again attracted over 2 million visitors.

“This new preoccupation with tourism... and the realisation that large numbers were prepared to visit Liverpool in spite of the perception of an often violent northern industrial city in straightened circumstances, made the authorities look at its assets and see what could be done with them”
(*Financial Times*, 19/10/89)

After a consultants review which was heavily influenced by the drawing power of these three initiatives the new Waterfront Development strategy (WDS) which focused on a leisure and tourism-based strategy was adopted by the MDC in December, 1984 and early in 1986 these proposals, along with the Corporate Plan, received the approval of the Secretary of state (LCC, 1987). This period also reflected a distinct shift towards the ‘place marketing’ or ‘boosterism’ aspects of regeneration. In the early stages, the Corporation’s resources had been focused largely on physical regeneration, with little effort paid to its marketing strategy. In 1984, however, a new campaign began, one aimed at drawing attention to the changes occurring as a result of the MDC. This was to promote a positive image of Merseyside and to help stimulate investment within the designated area (Lauria, 1994; Madsen, 1992).

Up to the end of March, 1986 the bulk of MDC’s reclamation had been upon two major projects – the restoration of the Albert Dock (£25m) and the International Garden Festival (£31m) (LCC, 1987, p.10).

Restoration of the Albert Dock

Albert Dock, built in the 1840s, is the largest Grade 1 listed buildings in the country. However, the scale of neglect and dilapidation which set in after the closure of the Dock to shipping in 1972, was such that by 1981 the warehouses were no longer weather proof and the dock was silted up. “Albert Dock had become a major eyesore on Liverpool waterfront” (MDC, 1997, p.56). The consequent cost of rehabilitation works had continually frustrated attempts by LCC and MCC to redevelop the buildings for alternative uses in the 1970s (see below).

In 1982 the MDC acquired the freehold possession of the Albert Dock by agreement with the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board (MDHB). The Albert Dock project was developed as a partnership with the Arrowcroft Group to redevelop all the warehouses except Block D for a variety of uses including offices and exhibition areas, residential apartments, an art gallery, and a public house with the entire ground floor area to be devoted to retailing, a restaurant, wine bars and other quayside commercial uses. For its part the MDC undertook to meet the costs of external restoration and structural stabilisation of the buildings, engineering works to the docks, river and quay walls and also infrastructure works. The MDC also grant aided works undertaken by a number of the main occupiers. The MDC's restoration work was complemented by the MCC's adaptation of the remaining warehouse (Block D) for the extension to the Maritime Museum which had already been established in the former Pilotage House nearby. The Arrowcroft Group were responsible for internal conversion of the blocks and quayside works. At the outset Arrowcroft set up a subsidiary company known as the Albert Dock Company to operate and manage the development.

According to the LCC (1987, p.30-31), in 1986 the Albert Dock attracted 2 million visitors and by March 1987, 65 tenants comprising speciality shops and restaurants had located within the development. As a result of these retailing activities, associated offices and investment by Granada Television and Whitbreads Breweries in the adjacent Dock Traffic Office and Pump House, respectively, accounted for over 500 permanent jobs and a further 140 seasonal jobs associated with the Maritime Museum. The LCC (1987) concluded: "The Albert Dock is undoubtedly proving to be the MDC's flagship and the exceptional degree of interest so far shown in the 100 residential apartments to be offered for sale is an indication that the development is beginning to create its own market" (p.31). These achievements, however, must be viewed in the light of the MDC's special executive powers, freedom from local political accountability and its sizeable budget.

The MDC marked the introduction of a new tier of government intervention in local economic development and a new influence on the growth of governance. According to a number of academics (see for example, Dawson and Parkinson, 1991; Stoker, 1989) the MDC adopted a somewhat cosy, consensual approach mindful of the interests and concerns of the neighbouring local authorities and local business which stood in contrast to the LDDC. The research revealed very little evidence to support this view, indeed, philosophical objections from local councillors appeared to be widespread, reflecting the view that:

“The City Council had been subject to tight expenditure controls since the Tories came to power in 1979 so there were serious concerns about whether the funds allocated to the MDC represented additional money or merely a redirection of funds which had been earmarked for the City” (City Councillor, interviewed, 9/2/99)

“I think the general view was that the MDC was a mechanism to reinforce the centralisation of power in the hands of central government” (City Councillor, interviewed, 4/12/98).

“As a planning authority we had no control over the development down there [Albert Dock] at all or no influence, though we had a member from the council but that is only one voice amongst a lot and there was no democratic decisions made” (City Councillor, interviewed (30/10/98).

According to the MDC (1997a, p.20), although the key objectives of the Albert Dock scheme were not formally defined by the MDC at the start of the project, on the basis of Board papers and strategy documents of the time the main objectives would seem to have been as follows:

Table 5.2 Key Objectives of the Albert Dock Scheme

- **To bring the largest group of Grade 1 listed buildings back into productive use;**
- **To create a major leisure/recreation/visitor destination, which would add significantly to Merseyside;**
- **To promote a successful flagship scheme which would boost the image of the City and region, and act a catalyst for regeneration;**
- **To enhance the environment of Liverpool Waterfront; and**
- **To provide residential accommodation on the Waterfront**

This approach smacks of a common held belief amongst the ‘inner circle’ of decision makers that economic growth would be to the advantage of all citizens. Clearly the economic development strategy was premised on raising the wealth of the area then creating jobs. This may be interpreted as implicitly subscribing to the school of ‘trickle-down’ economics. The common held belief in the trickle-down of economic growth to marginalised communities must be rejected due to its continued failure. This approach received widespread criticism particularly amongst public officials working within economic development departments:

“The MDC was very much infrastructural, capital and trickle-down based, deprived communities do not feel any benefit from such an approach” (Council Officer, interviewed, 18/11/98).

“I am not a believer in the ‘trickle-down effect. If you are really going to tackle some of the more difficult problems that this City faces, you won’t do it through the trickle-down, you have to have a more direct intervention” (Assistant Chief Executive, LCC, interviewed, 8/12/98).

“The trickle-down idea has never worked anywhere and least of all in Liverpool. To say get the economy right first and you’ll solve all the social problems of poverty and unemployment just won’t happen” (Council Officer, interviewed, 24/2/99):

By the mid eighties the Development Corporation appears to have been successful in adopting tourism and leisure as *part* of a strategy for its designated areas. However, as already argued in Chapter 2, a general criticism made of the flagship model of regeneration is that these projects are merely mechanisms for achieving the physical and economic regeneration of discrete parts of urban areas (Harvey, 1988; Loftman and Nevin, 1995; Wilkinson, 1992; Healey *et al.*,1992) (see Chapters 6 and 7). To take planning access as an example, tensions primarily between promoters of the MDC and the LCC were evident:

“When the Dock first opened in 1984 it wasn’t physically and functionally integrated into the city’s life because of the Strand and access routes. But now the fact that we have the Smart Bus coming through the Dock every fifteen minutes and there is a footpath through Chavaase Park we have direct links, so yes we class ourselves as part and parcel of the inner city. We don’t see ourselves as being edge of town” (Head of Albert Dock Development Company, interviewed, 15/2/99).

“Personally I think there is a bit too much made of the need for closer links between the waterfront and the city centre. This is a small city you can actually walk from the city centre to the Albert Dock without too much difficulty. I don’t really see the tourism product generally being so desperate or distracted from each other” (Director, Mersey Partnership, interviewed, 1/2/99).

“There has never been locational linkages between the Albert Dock and the city centre. If we had better communications we could capitalise on visitors a lot more. You cannot walk across the Strand it is too difficult, sadly, we are not learning the lesson or we are learning the lesson, we are not attracting the right kind of developers in, socially aware developers to get the whole thing moving on a city wide basis, not just their parochial localised projects. So one way or another we have to solve that, we have to

link the Dock with the whole city area” (Council Officer, interviewed, 18/1/99).

“One of my aims as Deputy Chair of the Planning and Transportation Committee, now that the MDC has gone, is to integrate the Albert Dock into the City. One of the reasons we were very unhappy with the development of the Dock was, we believed that because of the difficulty in crossing the Strand many visitors to the Dock never reached the city centre” (Deputy Chair, Planning and Transportation Committee, interviewed, 29/9/98).

At the outset the Government expected the UDCs to perform a ‘pump priming’ role whereby public investment would lever in private investment. In the case of the MDC, the lack of buoyancy in the local economy and the minimal private sector interest during the 1980s, ensured the Corporation had to act almost like a public sector agency (Meegan, 1999, p.16). This prompts a fundamental question, was an entirely new agency in the form of the MDC necessary in the first place?

Liverpool International Garden Festival (IGF)

The concept of the IGF is based on the Bundesgartenschau, introduced in Germany as a means of restoring war-damaged areas to productive use, but later adopted in other western European nations to deal with other forms of dereliction. In 1980 the idea was adopted by Michael Heseltine, then the Secretary of State for the Environment, and bids were invited to stage the first British Garden Festival. Submissions were narrowed to two schemes - Liverpool and Stoke-on-Trent. MDC’s proposal for Liverpool was finally accepted in September 1981. Stoke-on-Trent was subsequently assured of staging the 1986 Garden Festival.

In 1980, the 250-acre IGF site comprised the Otterspool domestic refuse tip (still in operation), derelict oil installation depots, an underground petroleum store and neglected woodland and playing fields (LEDIS, 1985, p.1). Following the announcement in September 1981 that the MDC’s bid to host the Garden Festival in 1984 had been successful, The reclamation and servicing of the entire area was completed in just 18 months. The 1983 Garden Festival in Munich on a site a little larger than Liverpool’s took seven years to build (LEDIS, 1985, p.1). In all, over 1.7 million tons of silt, rubble and refuse was removed. A

further 170, 000 tons of domestic refuse had to be removed and filled with sand before the foundations of the Festival Hall could be laid. This project was then the largest urban reclamation scheme in the country. By 1984, the former refuse tip was home to the Festival Hall, an arena, water features and several major international gardens and quarter of a million trees and shrubs were planted (Lauria, 1994).

According to the LCC (1987) much of the IGF's success was due to the way in which the project was managed and organised. The MDC expedited the design and implementation process by letting a single contract to a Festival Management Contractor who then oversaw the 200 sub-contracts and over 90 design contributions. Management decisions were taken by a special Festival Executive Committee responsible to the MDC Board containing representatives from City and County Councils, the horticultural and landscape industry, the local Chamber of Commerce and government departments. The MDC also managed to localise local community organisations not only to become involved in the design of some of the gardens but in addition to mount highly successful 'fringe' artistic events. The only disappointment was that the financial outturn did not meet expectations. While land reclamation, capital and operating costs were about £31 million it had been hoped to recoup this from admission charges, sponsorship, income from franchises, souvenirs and so on. However, visitor spending amounted to only £6.1 million along with £2.6 million of private sector sponsorship monies (p.29-30).

During the summer of 1984, the completed International Festival Gardens attracted 3.4 million visitors and 300 operational staff were required to run the site (LCC, 1987, p.29). These visitor figures far exceeded the lower estimates made before the Festival. Many people even within the MDC thought the lowest estimates were over optimistic before the festival opened (LEDIS, 1985, p.2). Furthermore, with the restoration of the Garden Festival site, the MDC demonstrated an approach unique in Britain to rapid reclamation and rehabilitation of the most severely degraded and derelict land and structures that merit attention from all relevant urban development authorities and agencies (Aldcock, 1984; Lauria, 1994).

It should be pointed out, however, that much of the alleged success of the IGF was premised on quantitative studies concerning tourist 'outputs' with a relatively small research base to examine the extent to which the Festival actually met its development objectives. In broad terms, the intention was to optimise development for hard end uses, associated with a

planning brief, and envisaged as a three part process whereby large areas of severe dereliction would be transformed both environmentally and economically. The first stage would involve land reclamation. The second phase would focus on constructing a series of gardens, displays and other features, all with a horticultural theme, extending not more than six summer months. The third and final stage was the long-term development of the reclaimed site in what was now a vastly improved environment (Titchener, 1995, p.388)

Few could argue that the MDC was not successful in achieving the first two aims above. However, the long-term development of the Festival site remains a source of contention. as, since this initiative, there has been little evidence of any successful new tourism initiatives, nor has the site been occupied by other industries. A number of the respondents interviewed for this research expressed their concern over this issue:

“I don’t know where this self destructive capacity comes from but for any good idea they have, there seems to be a little demon going how can we mess this up, how can we shoot ourselves in the foot. We will have a wonderful big Garden Festival and we will have it running for six months and then not think about it after that, and then it closed and I think that is pathetic and shameful....If any future proposals land in the same hands of dinosaur officers who just put a six month life cycle onto the Garden Festival, then you will see a load of failed projects and white elephants and lets hope it don’t happen” (Journalist, Liverpool Daily Post and Echo, interviewed 11/1/99).

“The Garden Festival was highly successful but then ramifications of that meant it was a derelict site for horticulture, then we had Pleasure Island and that failed and there has been very little since. This actually leads to disillusionment and people feel that the city isn’t progressing. So I really think there should have been far more extensive preparatory work done before the Festival proposal was accepted” (Council Officer, interviewed, 18/2/99).

“I think the whole idea of the Liverpool Garden Festival was purely a political, cosmetic exercise by the Tories with no real intention of tackling the problem of social deprivation in the City. Its no coincidence that the Garden Festival followed hot on the heels of the Toxteth riots, and disappeared when these became history” (City Councillor, interviewed, 22/1/99)

In all, it would appear that MDC policy was focused on the speed of reclamation and the event itself rather than long term considerations. It has been claimed by the LCC (1987b, p.21) that local authorities given comparable resources and powers could perform a similar

role to UDCs (see section 5.5). As such, if the MCC or the LCC had been the local authority planner in charge then it would be reasonable to suggest that expectations would have been more focused on longer term urban renewal. Indeed:

“When the Garden Festival proposal was put forward the City Council wanted it to be a long term permanent development and I agree with them on that. Because in the past we have seen so many things that have been there for five years and then have been derelict for another five years” (City Councillor, interviewed, 9/10/98).

Summary

Despite difficulty in attracting further developers to manage the site, it could be argued that the Garden Festival is perhaps the most innovative and imaginative tourism policy/strategy implemented in the City to date. In effect, in less than two years, the former Otterspool Tip (80 acres) along with 170 acres of severely degraded and derelict land was transformed into a major flagship attraction of international significance, and one which along with the Albert Dock (see below) placed Liverpool firmly on the tourist map.

This particular initiative exhibits a number of key policy innovations that are deemed necessary to secure strong competitive advantages. As already argued in Chapter 2, Jessop (1998) maintains that policies oriented towards strong competition should initiate or precede national trends. Here, the Liverpool IGF provides a good example, as argued above this strategy was first unveiled in Liverpool thus at its inception it had the potential to gain a competitive edge over all other British cities. Indeed, the success of this ‘event’ is reflected in the suggestion that the Liverpool experience could provide a role model for all relevant urban development authorities and agencies (see above). Furthermore, as Jessop (1998) points out, strong entrepreneurialism is reinforced when policies cannot easily be recreated elsewhere. To this end, the Bureau International des Expositions confers international recognition on only one Festival per year anywhere in the world (LEDIS, 1985, p.1). Consequently, this constrains a relatively quick and easy adoption of this policy even if the necessary resources are available. It needs to be said that of the three garden festivals held in the UK during the 1980s only Liverpool’s was an international event. The others were Stoke National Garden Festival 1986 (NGF) and Glasgow Garden Festival 1988 (GGF). Unfortunately for the city this initial competitive edge disappeared soon after the ‘event’ due in no small part to a lack

of innovative policy measures focused on after-uses of the site. A number of the issues discussed above are revisited in Chapters 6 and 7 and section 5.5 below.

5.5 Promoting Liverpool's Competitive Position in Tourism 1974-1986: Strong Versus Weak Competitive Approaches

As already argued, not all 'entrepreneurial cities' have the same interest in tourism, for this depends on the structure of local governance and the capacity for developing tourism. This section attempts to identify the extent to which the range of development policies discussed above, translate into the overall competitiveness of the city. Over the period 1974-1986 the tourism policy community revolved around two lead agencies: the MCC and the MDC (see Figure 5.1). As already argued above, throughout this period tourism was essentially sidelined by the City Council first by the Liberal administration and then latterly by the Militant Tendency influenced Labour administration.

In relation to entrepreneurial policies and the shaping of patterns of urban development in order to promote a city's competitive position, the competitive logic is much more explicit in a continuing series of official reports, rather than in evidence of substantial action. A prime example is the Thatcher government's decision to impose a Development Corporation to press ahead with the redevelopment of the former Liverpool docklands, rather than the more 'community-oriented' scheme proposed by the MCC in their Structure Plan (1980). Indeed, the MCC's proposed strategy "of concentrating investment in the built-up area and more specifically, the encouragement of tourism development along the Liverpool waterfront closely matched the MDC's proposals" (LCC, 1987, p.18). In a condensed form, the government's main argument was that in order to stay competitive Liverpool should not rely on local actions. Major initiatives and investment were needed to strengthen the City's economy. Paradoxically, this argument was advanced by the very same government that simultaneously abolished the MCC without establishing an alternative body to co-ordinate planning in the area. The prioritisation of market values in this case was evidently intended to symbolise (as well as aid) a revitalisation in the inner city economy.

In fact, this begs the question of how the priorities of competitive strategies are actually constructed. According to Jessop (1998; 1997) among the key elements to be considered regarding cities' organisational capacities in pursuit of a competitive edge is the manner in

which the institutions and structures are embedded in broader social arrangements, so that the capacities of the city (or localised structure) are in some sense collective and thus irreducible to those of individual agencies resident or active within. Clearly, the mobilisation of a representative coalition of local economic interests to secure collective competitive action in Liverpool during this period did not happen (see above). This situation was due in no small part to central government's political ideals.

According to the LCC (1987) the City Council had not been given the opportunity to comment on the content of the Corporation's five year corporate plan which is updated and submitted to the Government annually (p.2). In addition, "a recent DOE Draft Memorandum stated that the relevant local authorities must have regard to the policies and proposals of the MDC when preparing their Unitary Development Plans (UDP's). The Memorandum makes no reference to the need for the MDC to have regard to the policies and proposals of the relevant UDP when planning their land use strategies" (p. 19-20). It is not really surprising therefore to find that by the end of this period:

"The impact of public policies on Merseyside is best characterised as fragmented and polarised. At a time when the Government has determined to abolish the County Council a strong case can in fact be made for a stronger regional body for the Merseyside region" (MCC, 1985, p.2)

A fragmented local political and institutional base in conjunction with a weak private sector, during this period, undermined the development of political coalitions that a strong competitive approach requires. Undeniably, however, this period witnessed increased efforts by both the MCC and the MDC to identify policies which could boost Liverpool's competitive position in tourism. Although, these did, in fact, emerge as relatively orthodox approaches to tourism development tackling well tried areas of activity with for the most part, well tried measures. It was a clear feature of the policies that they were significantly lacking in innovation.

In part, it can be suggested that this was a product of the way the tourism decision-making process was conducted. Jessop (1998) draws attention to the fact that there are limits associated with the insertion of entrepreneurial activities into the broader structures and activities of the locality. In the case of Liverpool, the struggle over ideology between the MCC and the MDC was likely to suppress innovation. On the one hand, the County

Council's ideology was based on the premise that Liverpool could not be left to the free play of the market forces, its development had to be managed (MCC, 1985, p.19). On the other, the MDC's ideology was premised on the free market – entrepreneurialism. The MDC's lack of accountability also meant that little opportunity existed for feedback to generate more imaginative and innovative thinking. Indeed, as already argued above, the entire process was cloaked in secrecy.

Andrew Coulson (1990) argues that UDC's suffer grievously from short-terminism. "Their short life means their top priority is to get bricks and mortar onto derelict sites. They risk so doing without sufficient thought as to the long-term consequences, either within UDC areas or outside them" (p.302). This weakness is evident in a number of MDC initiatives in Liverpool for example, there is still poor access between the Albert Dock and the City Centre, along with a redundant IGF site. In contrast, local authorities are aware of the need to adopt long-term timescales in relation to city centre development. They have no alternative but to be aware of public feeling in the area. An interesting but difficult question in this regard is how far a general climate conducive to entrepreneurship can be attributed to the form of the City itself as opposed to other localised factors, such as the presence of UDC's and/or other differential institutional capacities (see Chapters 6 and 7).

What the debate so far can tell us, perhaps, is that the MCC's contest for more powerful regional government was easily over-ridden by prescriptions for flexible local systems of governance for delivering national policy. Government and its associated hierarchy of power has been able to dominate the more flexible systems of governance which the national state itself created, in this case the MDC. This unequal power relationship was particularly evident in the contest for financial resources during this period. "While the entrepreneurial mission for local authorities has become even more sharply trumpeted by central government, the resources to carry out the mission have been consistently reduced" (Lloyd and Meegan, 1996, p.78). Indeed, the LCC (1987, p.21-22) argued that the MDC's dockland regeneration programme was partly at the expense of other programmes. At the same time as the MDC's central government cash contribution increased from £10 million in 1981/82 to about £35 million in 1986/87, the City Council's housing allocation, for example, declined from £40 million to £27.5 million over the same period. The 1987 report concluded:

“The real question is not whether the action pursued by the MDC should have been done, but whether it should have been done at the expense of local authority funding” (p.22).

In addition, a fundamental review of regional policy in 1984 resulted in Assisted Areas being extended from covering 28 per cent of the national workforce to covering some 35 per cent, thereby diminishing Merseyside’s priority within a reducing allocation. This expansion meant that rates of Regional Development Grant for all Merseyside reduced from 22 per cent to 15 per cent. The MCC (1985) argued that:

“This expansion of Assisted Areas is inconsistent with urban policies which seek to concentrate resources in areas of greatest need....although changes in the structure of Assisted Areas has widened the range of qualifying activities to include certain services of importance locally, particularly transport and communications these do not include tourism which is a local growth industry (p.19).

Whilst the MCC (1985) report acknowledged the importance of ERDF, which provided £46.5 million (1981-mid 1984) to Merseyside mainly for public sector infrastructure, it also pointed out relatively small sums were allocated to promoting tourism (p.20). This situation changed significantly when Merseyside was designated as being eligible for Objective 1 funding for the period 1994-1999 (see Chapter 7).

In summary, it is not difficult to see why the impact of public policies in Liverpool was best characterised as ‘fragmented and polarised’. The most problematic aspect of the governance issue in the respect of tourism development which emerged in this period, was that policies were directed almost entirely towards ‘reproduction-regulation’ rather than the pursuit of policies oriented towards (permanent) innovation in inter urban competition. This takes us back to the heart of the theoretical debate. The root of the problem lies close to the institutional arrangements that marked out the boundaries of power and responsibility in the city. What seems to have been lost in the process of applying tourism policies is the pragmatic and political importance of institutional capacity. At the most practical level there was a lack of the sheer capacity to conceive and include continuing economic, political and social innovations in programmes as ambitious as say, the IGF and Croxteth Country Park (see Chapter 7). At the outset both were potentially innovative and ground-breaking but the

necessary capacity to deliver long-term benefit has been largely absent. The need for building of institutional capacity may derive as much from the presumed capacity of partnerships to challenge and change the bureaucratic nature of public agencies, as it does from the anticipated benefits of regeneration projects (Hastings, 1999, 1996; Deakin and Edward, 1993; Clarke and Newman, 1997). It is in this sense that the partnership ethos can be understood to be political in character. This institutional capacity building requires a process of mutual learning, discussion and idea-sharing, which is crucial for the preparation of a shared vision at the city and/or regional level that all partners can work toward and to provide a context for intervention with a clear strategy for implementation. Over the 1974-1986 period this programming need seems to have been ignored in the rush to get tourism projects off the ground.

CHAPTER 6

PHASE II 1986-1994: REPOSITIONING TOURISM POLICY ON THE URBAN AGENDA

6.1 Introduction

During the period 1986-1994 the move to prioritise entrepreneurship and the pursuit of the new, gathered pace. In parallel, there was a ‘hollowing-out’ of the national state (Jessop, 1995) – a move in crude terms, from a situation in which the state attempts to regulate the economy to one which the state actively disengages itself from regulatory activity in the economic sphere and restricts itself to only a minimal safety-net role in the social sphere. For the cities and their inhabitants this broad shift from managerialism to entrepreneurialism, in Harvey’s (1989) terminology was being conducted within a hegemonic discourse premised on the notion that their prime task was to pay their way in the world (Jessop, 1992, 1994). As already argued in Chapter 2, in concert with this, all those who represented local interests, elected or otherwise, were expected to deliver effective supply-side advantage (in the case of tourism, cheap flexible and skilled labour, desirable tourist sites and infrastructure in a climate of entrepreneurship) to businesses capable of holding their own in inter urban competition. However, as Lloyd and Meegan, (1996) point out:

“For the entrepreneurial state and the entrepreneurial city-region the winning option is the only one to be countenanced. The result is a scramble for competitive position from regional and national circumstances which offer distinctly differing prospects of success” (p.77)

To this end, the Liverpool experience in relation to tourism is instructive. Against a backdrop of weak local elected politics (see below) a space emerged for a proliferation in the number of public-private partnerships which fitted most comfortably with unlocking resources from higher levels of government and espousing a pro-growth tourism agenda. Overall, the period 1986-1994 is symbolic because it marked a commitment towards tourism governance and the creation of an institutional structure based on the foundations of partnership.

6.2 Institutional Searching for a Competitive Edge

The period 1986-1994 saw a major change in the tourism governance of Liverpool. As was discussed in Chapter 5, essentially, there were two key organisations namely the MCC and MDC involved in tourism development in the City up to 1986. Paradoxically, however, the demise of the County Council early in 1986 provided, perhaps, the single most important impetus for tourism development in Liverpool during this period and for that matter to date. This event thrust three new key players: National Museums and Galleries on Merseyside (NMGM); Merseyside Tourism Board (MTB); National Trust (N/T), into the tourism policy domain previously occupied by the County Council. Later in this phase they were joined on this increasingly crowded platform of local governance by such bodies as the Tate Gallery; Merseyside Training and Enterprise Council (MTEC); The Mersey Partnership (TMP) and others (see fig 5.1). All having to carve out roles for themselves in the new flexible system of governance. What this amounts to is a move by old players to adopt new tasks at the same time as new players coming in to take over old ones.

This period also marked an ideological shift in local government thinking (see below), whereas the previous Labour administration had concentrated resources upon municipal services in the city's most deprived areas, the new Labour leadership encouraged the evolution of a new economic development strategy forum, in which the tourism potential of the city-centre began to play an important part (Parkinson and Bianchini, 1993; Evans, 1996). However, it was not until 1994 that this ideological shift produced any substantive action (see Chapter 7).

Whilst institutional searching is a widely observed phenomenon (Peck and Tickell, 1994), "it is a process driven as much from the realm of competing ideas as from the politics of power" (Lloyd and Meegan, 1996, p.78). In the realm of ideas, the new organisations highlighted above were a key source of new scripts about the tourism development process – both in the sense of the competitive approach adopted and in terms of their views on the most appropriate institutional arrangements. Moreover, the powers conferred on these organisations via government resources and initiatives gave them a legitimate seat in the tourism policy arena.

The Emergence of the 'Partnership' Model in the New Flexible System of Governance

Below is a brief outline of some prime motivations behind the formation of new organisations which came into being during the period 1986-1994. It is important to note, that there were clear variations in the new participants' institutional arrangements, sources of funding and objectives and hence the competitive approach adopted (see sections 6.3 and 6.4). What they did have in common was they were all based on the 'partnership' model. The concept of partnership is central to the thematic of the entrepreneurial city, and as already argued in Chapters 2 and 4, local public-private partnership organisations have been encouraged by the English Tourist Board for tourism and by central government for a wide range of activities, including urban policy. The concept of local partnership was given strong support in the ETB's policy statement *A Vision for England* in 1987 and in *Planning for Success* in 1991, and in the government's urban policy statement *Action for Cities* which argued that a pooling of the resources of the public and private sectors is the way to achieve real success in the inner cities.

Perhaps, the creation of the **Merseyside Tourism Board (MTB)** represented most fully, this new found commitment to develop public/private partnerships which were locally driven, locally led and with local ambitions. Following the abolition of the County Council, the MTB was set up in April 1986, specifically to act as the natural authority for all Merseyside tourism matters (MTB, 1987, p.2). In contrast to the County Council, the MTB operated on strict business principles. After its inception the Board endeavoured to continue many of the activities of the previous administration and at the same time set up an organisational framework and channels of communication appropriate to a private company (MTB, 1987, 1988) (see section 6.3). Thus emphasising a marked shift from *government* to *governance*. Consistent with the emphasis on entrepreneurship and the pursuit of the new, the MTB and its partners (up to its demise in 1993) had then, become infused by the drive to enhance the competitive edge of the City-Region (see sections 6.4 and 6.5).

In 1986, with the need to act on the demise of the Merseyside County Council and with the opportunity to establish an appropriate stewardship for the Merseyside collections, the Board of Trustees of the **National Museums and Galleries on Merseyside (NMGM)** came into being on 1st April 1986. According to the NMGM 1986 *Review* 1989, this followed the recommendation of the then Minister for the Arts, Lord Gowrie, that it would be appropriate,

given the outstanding quality of the collections in the Merseyside Museums and Galleries, to accord them national status under the terms of Section 46 of the Local Government Act 1985. The seven institutions transferred to the new Board of Trustees were: the Liverpool Museum, the Merseyside Maritime Museum, the Museum of Labour History, The Large Objects Collection, the Walker Art Gallery, Sudley Art Gallery and the Lady Lever Art Gallery (Wirral). At its inception NMGM was by far been the largest provider of tourist attractions in Liverpool and has remained so ever since.

In the realm of the entrepreneurial city, there is little doubt that the NMGM and its advisors provided a key source of new policy scripts for the city's tourism development process during this phase. The extent to which such policies have fostered strong and/or weak competitive approaches at the individual and the city-wide level will be discussed in section 6.4 and 6.5 respectively.

The **National Trust (N/T)** was another form of governance that entered the tourism policy domain as a direct result of the abolition of the County Council. Over the period 1974-1986 Speke Hall, was leased from the National Trust and administered by the MCC, however, in April 1986 the Hall reverted to N/T control. Located 8 miles South-east of Liverpool City Centre (close to Liverpool Airport), Speke Hall is a late 15th century Tudor House set in its own 57 acres of ground. "The Hall is one of the most famous half-timbered houses in the country" (Merseytravel, 2000, p.20).

Over twenty-five years ago Robin Fedden observed:

"A marked feature of the National Trust is the degree in which the spirit of its founders – enthusiasm, flexibility and the absence of formal rules – has survived in a large corporate body. There can be few organisations of comparable size which remain, after a life of some eighty years, so human, so little rigid and with so many valuable illusions. The Trust's informality may sometimes exact a price in terms of strict efficiency, but it brings its own rewards" (Fedden, 1974, p.54).

As will be discussed below, the Trust's primary work in tourism development in Liverpool over the period 1986-2000 strongly suggests that the organisational features identified by Fedden (1974) above, are still relevant today.

Perhaps, one of the most intriguing and exciting developments to follow the creation of the NMGM was the development of Liverpool's **Tate Gallery**. The Trustees of the Tate Gallery began looking for a northern site in 1980. Under consideration were locations at Manchester, Sheffield, Bradford and Liverpool. The Albert Dock site (Block C, Commonwealth Pavillion) was selected, with refurbishment starting in 1986 and the gallery opened in May 1988. It could be argued, from the outset the Tate development had the potential to foster strong competition because it reflected a willingness to implement innovative measures and to set ambitious objectives (see section 6.4) and this is nowhere more apparent than in an early mission statement:

“Tate-Liverpool has set out to create a programme which draws on the strength of the Tate (London), collection, while introducing a balanced selection of twentieth-century art to address an audience with almost no experience of modern and contemporary art” (Tate Biennial Report, 1988-1990).

As with the Maritime Museum, actual visitor numbers to the Tate exceeded initial expectations. Prior to opening, a total of 200,000 visitors per annum was anticipated. However, numbers reached 490,952 for the first year of operation (1988) which comprised only eight months (MDC, 1997, p.72). Since 1993, however, the Tate has seen a downward trend in its visitor numbers, due in no small part to increased competition from other museums, moreover, the Tate's audience has also become increasingly localised (see Chapter 7).

Between 1990 and 1992, the Government set up 82 Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) to deliver a radical new innovative approach to government-supported job training programmes for adults and young people, and enterprise support for small to medium sized firms. **Merseyside Training and Enterprise Council (MTEC)** was established in June 1991 and was responsible for Liverpool, Sefton and Knowsley (with a combined population of nearly 1m), at the outset, with a budget of some £45 million a year, it was claimed to be one of the largest in the country (Merseyside Task Force, 1992).

Throughout its administration, MTEC worked in partnership with many organisations while implementing its plans for Liverpool, and one of the key partnerships was with the private sector. In addition, many of the educational and training programmes were tourism focused.

However, despite the impressive and possibly well intentioned mission statements of MTEC there remains a credibility and accountability gap. As will be argued in Chapter 7, this was due in no small part to the fact that TECs were a national political strategy which set the agenda for local governance. Furthermore, it has been argued that many TECs aspired to move beyond their originally intended training role to take the central role in place marketing, particularly as public funding for training declined (Lovering, 1995, p.117). To this end, MTEC is no exception (see Chapter 7).

The final participant to enter local governance in this phase was **The Mersey Partnership (TMP)** which was created in 1993. In the first five years or so of its administration, TMP's focus was on promoting the City-Region as a business investment location. In 1998, TMP also became responsible for marketing Merseyside as a tourist and conference destination through the incorporation of Mersey Tourism (the newly created arm of the TMP) and MTCB (see Chapter 7). Prior to the creation of TMP there was no one organisation promoting the region to whom potential investors could turn. In fact the position was very complex. According to a report by Hill and Knowlton Ltd (1990) a variety of public and privately funded operations had, by necessity, assumed the role of promoters of Merseyside by region, sector or audience. These organisations included MDC, Business Opportunities on Merseyside (BOOM), MTB, DTI Regional Office, IBB, INWARD, or one or all of the five local authorities. The effect of this diversity for Merseyside as a whole was that promotional resources (human and financial) were fragmented.

Overall, it is inevitable that this influx of new players to the decision making process would, even without other complications, render coordination of urban tourism policy an increasingly contested domain (see section 6.4).

6.3 The Ownership and Control structure of Tourism Governance

According to Jessop (1997,1998) the capacity of cities to remain at the top of urban hierarchies is linked to their ability to remain at the forefront of economic and institutional innovation. With regards to institutional innovation, he argues that strong competition necessitates changing structures which promote the development of shared visions which might in turn foster new institutional arrangements to supplement and/or complement existing patterns of governance. In both respects it involves the shaping of the context within which

institutional arrangements can be forged as opposed to developing strategies and initiatives and/or providing subsidies for them.

Institutional Innovation

As already argued in Chapter 2, institutional innovations to derive strong competitive advantages necessitate policies that initiate or precede national trends. In contrast, weak competitive approaches tend to follow the spontaneous trends of the national economy. Perhaps the first point to be made is that at the individual network level it is noteworthy that all the agencies involved in tourism governance during this period (see Figure 5.1) either initiated or were at the forefront of institutional innovations which preceded national trends. The creation of the NMGM in 1986, for example, was a unique event:

“Never before has an entire national museum been created in its own right in an English provincial city. The intention was to create a Trustee body to administer the museums and galleries on Merseyside which would give them national status on line with the major institutions in London....This was an experiment of huge importance which could be used as a pointer to the future development of outstanding collections in other large cities in the UK” (Head of Marketing and Public Affairs, NMGM, interviewed, 29/7/99).

The MTB which was set up in April 1986, specifically to act as the natural authority for all Merseyside tourism matters also provides a prime example of an institutional innovation which preceded national trends:

“Merseyside Tourism Board was a none-profit making private company which did not form part of the national network of Regional Tourist Boards....Having a Board for the region meant there was a far higher degree of coordination and effort not just in Liverpool but in all five districts, for effective corporate decision-making for tourism” (Chair, Tourism and Leisure Committee, LCC, interviewed, 1/10/98).

Likewise, the interviewee at Tate Gallery Liverpool noted several ways in which the Gallery has been at the forefront of regional innovations:

“Tate Liverpool, is a relatively small and flexible organisation that has an experimental role in relation to the Tate Gallery as a whole...Tate Liverpool has, from its inception, laid great stress on the innovative use of invigilators

in a combined security and informative role. We also established a Young Tate group in 1993 to target youth groups outside the education system. General lessons in relation to these initiatives have been applied to the development of Tate Gallery St Ives which opened in 1992, and have also stimulated activity at Millbank. (Press and Publicity Officer, Tate Gallery Liverpool, interviewed, 26/7/99)

Some Organisational Features

A number of general organisational features were identified in these organisations (see Table 6.1) some of the more distinctive features will be discussed below.

Figure 6.1: Some General Organisational Features of New Tourism Governance

All were assured core funding (either directly or indirectly) from central government

All their decision-making processes followed a corporate model; decisions were made by a small number of elites within the organisation, none of which were elected by the local population as a whole.

Consistent with the emphasis on entrepreneurship, all organisations intended in preparing annual budgets for subsequent years, that a crucial factor would be further development of commercial sponsorship and trading revenues.

While the private sector was very important in terms of management board composition, the resources of these organisations were more dependent on public sector grants.

All were given a grant of power from central government in that they were either established by, or afforded legitimacy by, central government


Source: Tate Biennial Report 1988-90; MTB, January 1988; NMGM, 1986 Review 1989; TMP, 1993,1994; Merseyside Task Force, 1991, 1992, MTEC, September, 1991; N/T, 1993.

Two points need to be made here, first, while agencies such as NMGM, MTB, MTEC, TMP were secure enough in their (narrowly defined) political position they were untried as potential agencies for policy delivery. As will be argued in section 6.4, the proliferation of local partnership organisations in this phase did not necessarily result in a more efficient local tourism polity, but on the contrary, may have encouraged a fragmentation and lack of

integration in Liverpool's competitive approach to tourism development. Secondly, such agencies may at first sight appear relatively autonomous, operating to a locally defined agenda, in the main they took up positions of power created by, or strongly influenced by, central government (see below). Consequently, it might be mistaken to view these as autonomous tourism development agencies. Nevertheless, all received a grant of power from central government broadly defined, as either a concrete institutional form as decision-making powers and resources are devolved by the state, or a more ideological form as the state confers upon the partnership's 'voice' in discourses of tourism development and urban regeneration (see below and section 6.4). In very broad terms the ownership and organisational structure of these partnerships can be summarised as shown in Figure 6.3 below.

It is beyond doubt that these organisations made business interests more influential at the local level. As well as this shift in the representation of local interests, it should also be noted that board members were not elected by the local population as a whole but rather appointed by their own members, or in the case of the Tate Gallery and NMGM by the Prime Minister and the Chancellor for the Duchy of Lancaster respectively. Clearly, the newly assembled modes of tourism governance along with the MDC in this phase represented the unelected local state or put another way "Appointed boards constitute the unknown government of localities" (Stewart and Davis, 1994, p.33).

Figure 6.2 Summary of the Ownership and Control Structure of Tourism Governance 1986-1994



In principle, partnership within tourism governance can be taken to mean joint control over the use of resources and shared resourcing. During this period the private sector was well represented on the boards of all the tourism governance organisations under investigation. For example, MTB's 15 member board included two local authority representatives (Sefton and Wirral), also two each from NMGM and MDC, one from the University of Liverpool and 8 representatives from the private sector (see for example, MTB Annual Reports and Accounts, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990). The board of NMGM included eight representatives from various educational establishments and trusts, and seven commercial member representatives (including the Chairman of the Board, Sir Leslie Young from 1986-1995) (NMGM, 1986 *Review* 1989, 1995 *Review* 1998). In the case of Training and Enterprise

Councils two thirds of their Boards of directors were drawn from among leading local business figures at chief executive or managing director level with others representing education, trade unions, the voluntary sector and other local interest groups. Among the companies represented on MTEC's board of 15 members were Plessey GPT, Royal Insurance, Ford Motors, Marks and Spenser and Littlewoods (MTEC, 1991). The Mersey Partnership's board included representatives from the five Merseyside local authorities, also one each from the MDC and MTEC (in addition the Chief executive is automatically a Director) and seven from the private sector (TMP, 1993).

However, while the private sector was very important in terms of management board composition, the resourcing of these organisations was relatively more dependent on public sector funding (see Table 6.3 below). Liverpool's Tate, for example, gets financial support from Central Government, but indirectly via the Tate Gallery, London which is funded primarily by Grant in Aid. The Liverpool Tate is given an income target which must be reached (£200,000 1993/94). If this money is not raised, the difference will be deducted from the money provided by the London Tate, in 1993/94 funding for the Liverpool Tate was in excess of two million pounds (Tate Biennial Report 1992-1994).

Cutting across the ideologies of entrepreneurship and individualism which were fostered so purposefully in this phase, it will be suggested below that private-sector-led solutions to urban problems cannot be understood as an autonomous development on the part of the private sector. In the case of Liverpool at least, it would appear that more often than not, 'individual businessmen' were spending public money, not private money. This is nowhere more apparent than in the emerging number of interlocking directorships between tourism governance agencies over this period (see for example, MTB, MDC, NMGM, Tate Gallery Annual reports for this phase).

For the purpose of defining their aims and policies in planning for the future all the organisations prepared a corporate plan soon after their inception (see section 6.4). To achieve their aims and objectives, NMGM for example, established a divisional structure composed of a directorate and four curatorial divisions namely Art Galleries, Liverpool Museum, Maritime Museum and Conservation, supported by a Central Services Division that drew together all the previously site-based administrative, financial, property, design and personnel services (NMGM, 1986 *Review* 1989).

The interviewee at NMGM noted several ways in which the organisation now differs from County Council controlled organisations (see Figure 6.3 below).

Figure 6.3: Differences between NMGM control and former County Council control of art galleries and museums in Liverpool

Members of the Board of Trustees are National figures
There is assured core funding
Are an exempt charity, as such are able to raise funding from private sources
On par with other national museums e.g. Victoria and Albert, Imperial War Museum
Raises the expectations of staff, offers them civil service conditions of service
Raises the international profile
Able to liaise with London colleagues. All the staff are within the same milieu and thus enjoy spin-offs in term of scholarship and awareness
Enables international collections to come to Liverpool e.g. Jordan exhibition which had Liverpool as its only UK location

Source: Head of Marketing and Public Affairs, NMGM, interviewed, 29/7/99.


In general the operational structures laid out in the plans revolved around key functions reflecting the broad areas of the organisation’s work (see Table 6.1 below).

Table 6.1 Some Examples of New Tourism Governance Operational Structures

Merseyside Board	Tourism	The Mersey Partnership	Merseyside Training and Enterprise Council
Marketing		Marketing	Enterprise and Economics
Visitor Services		Public Relations	Equal Opportunities
Research & Development		Finance	Education & Training
Finance		Training	Employers

In the case of MTEC and TMP each of these functions were overseen by an executive director and supported by administrative staff. In a bid to achieve their aims and intentions, MTB established a staff structure as shown in Figure 6.4 below:

Figure 6.4: Merseyside Tourism Board – Staffing



Note: The Administration Officer was responsible for the regular provision of information to the Board on its financial position

Source MTB January 1988, p.7

In 1988 the Merseyside Conference Bureau (MCB) was launched and it was envisaged that it would eventually replace MATTCH and the Liverpool Hotels and Conference Association. Although the Bureau was operated by MTB’s Business Tourism Manager it reported to a consultative committee drawn from conference and exhibition venues on Merseyside. When MTB ceased trading due to changes in public sector funding, its work was continued by Merseyside Tourism and Conference Bureau (MTCB) which was set up in April 1993 (see Chapter 7).

There can be no doubt that the organisations discussed above were valued for their potential individual entrepreneurial achievements, typically their success was attributed to entrepreneurial drive, vision and ability (see for example, MTB, 1988,1990,1992, LCC, 1987, 1994; Lorente, 1996; MDC, 1997; TMP, 1993, 1994, 1999; MTEC, 1993). The difficulty here is to separate the rhetoric of political discourse from the reality of political power. As already discussed in Chapter 2, there are theoretical dangers in accepting uncritically the discourses of the 'entrepreneurial city'. Not least there is a risk that cities may misinterpret all

manner of routine economic activities for the presence of strong entrepreneurial activities. Consequently some cities may simply be managing a business friendly climate efficiently rather than actually engaged in innovation, it is to these issues the next section turns.

6.4 Tourism Governance: Policy Priorities

The first point to make is that during this phase there appeared to be a willingness among all parties to set ambitious objectives and this is clearly evident in their early mission statements:

“In the longer term Tate Gallery Liverpool has the ambition to become one of the significant locations in Europe for the display of current art, a distinctive voice alongside such equivalent regional centres as CAPC in Bordeaux and the Kunsthalle, Basel” (Tate Biennial Report 1988-90, p.31)

“The Mersey Partnership will work hard to ensure Merseyside is one of the prime places in Europe in which to do business” (TMP, 1994p.2).

“Speke Hall is not only one of Britain’s finest historic houses. It also has a vital role to play in the regeneration of one of Liverpool’s most important industrial and residential areas” (National Trust, 1987, p.2)

“The Board intends that MTEC will be a focus for partnership benefiting the whole community, an enterprise organisation capable of driving radical reform” (MTEC, November, 1991, p.1)

“There is already a thriving tourism industry on Merseyside; MTB’s major task is to expand this successful business as an integral part of the overall process of reshaping the area’s economy” (MTB, 1987, p.3).

Perhaps, one of the more interesting features of the organisations’ corporate plans as they emerged from the decision-making process during this phase was that, despite differences in precise wording, they were all remarkably similar. All addressed economic development and competitiveness, and all had strong priorities for building tourist industries, though this was subsumed in the case of MTEC under broader headings.

In broad terms, the priority policy objectives as the basis of each plan can be summarised as shown in Table 6.2 below:

Table 6.2 Priority Policy Objectives in Five New Tourism-Related Governance Agencies (1986-1994)

PRIORITY MEASURES	MTB	NMGM	N/T	TATE	TMP
Implement innovations (institutional & economic) to secure tourism supply-side competitive advantages	•	•	•	•	•
Action to raise the tourism profile of the organisation at different levels:					
1. local/regional	•	•	•	•	•
2. national	•	•		•	•
3. international		•		•	•
Strengthen tourism base by stimulating R&D	•	•	•	•	•
Action to generate additional private sector income	•	•	•	•	•
Assist diversification and new tourism growth	•	•	•	•	•
Action to attract inward investment	•	•	•	•	•
Investments in communities and people	•	•	•	•	•
Image enhancement	•	•	•	•	•
Developing and promoting the skills, knowledge and experience of the staff:					
1. for the benefit of the organisation	•	•	•	•	•
2. as a resource to be shared with others		•		•	

Source: MTB (January, 1988) Corporate Plan 1988-90; National Trust (1987, 1993) Speke Hall Revival Plan, Phase 1 1987-1992, Phase 2 1993-1998; NMGM, 5 year Corporate Plan 1988-93; Tate Gallery, 10 year Corporate Plan 'a Review and forward Plan' (1990); The Mersey Partnership, Corporate Plan (1993).

While there are many similarities in the choice of priorities summarised in Table 6.2, with regards to implementation, tourism governance in this period provides some valuable insights about the ways in which different views emerged as to the most appropriate competitive approaches for delivering policy objectives. Whereas the structural changes introduced during the 1974-1986 phase had simpler objectives, the proliferation in the number of tourism agencies, often rapidly introduced during this phase, ensured there was no single solution, no single agency and no one single delivery framework that could be developed; institutional and

economic innovations had to be formulated, realigned and readapted in different ways. Consequently, the use of various permutations of structural and economic change had an effect both on whether the organisation's priority objectives were matched in practice, and the extent to which they enhanced or diluted the aims of the policy-makers.

Funding: Public Versus Private Investment

First and foremost it is noteworthy that during this phase all the organisations shown in Table 6.2 moved to a position of greater self-reliance, both in their funding and administration. However, whilst private investment came to play a more important role in the organisations' activities (see below), especially as grant-in-aid diminished in absolute or relative terms, one should not lose sight of the fact that:

“National Museums and Galleries on Merseyside will continue to depend on Grant-in-Aid if we are to maintain standards of conservation, scholarship, display and interpretation. The costs of satisfying these basic responsibilities are such that public investment is essential” (Head of Marketing and Public Affairs, NMGM, interviewed, 29/7/99)

The interviewee at Tate Liverpool expressed a similar view:

“While we are delighted to receive additional resources from the private sector, the principle of placing fine works of art and culture in the public domain for the benefit of all requires that the basic running costs of the Gallery and maintenance of the fabric are properly a government responsibility” (Press and Publicity Officer, Tate Gallery Liverpool, interviewed, 26/7/99).

Most people would agree it is important that the original status of organisations such as NMGM, Tate Liverpool and N/T (Speke Hall) as public institutions, existing for the education and enjoyment of a broad public, should be *strengthened* rather than *compromised* by this development. It is argued below, that issues about the levels of public sector funding during this period rendered local tourism governance an increasingly contested domain. One in which tensions were created between the government, which ultimately controls the purse strings, and the local tourism agencies where, in theory, the expertise is invested.

As Table 6.2 above shows, all the organisations' acknowledged the need to attract financial support from outside sources. A number of interviewees, however, drew attention to the difficulties in raising large capital sums in a city such as Liverpool:

"Fund-raising in Liverpool is highly competitive with a limited range of potential donors....apart from the universities and other charities, another national institution, the Tate Gallery Liverpool, is also actively seeking funds" (Head of Marketing and Public Affairs, NMGM, interviewed, 29/7/99)

"On Merseyside, private sector finance cannot be the answer. In the arts, as in other spheres the Government has to recognise that longer-term investment is required, if a local response is to be stimulated" (Press and Publicity Officer, Tate Gallery Liverpool, interviewed, 26/7/99)

"At the time you are talking about the main stumbling block in obtaining private contributions was the sheer number of groups in Liverpool seeking sponsorship to do something for the city, and so Merseyside Tourism Board was just seen as one of the pack" (Chair, Leisure and Tourism Committee, LCC, interviewed 1/10/98).

Nevertheless, all the agencies discussed above implemented initiatives to further their levels of private investment. To this end, the Tate Gallery Liverpool Development Committee was formally established in 1991 to strengthen support for the Gallery from individuals, trusts, foundations and companies both in this country and abroad. By the end of this phase this initiative had secured significant local and international assistance. In 1993 for example, Tate Gallery Liverpool's first Business Sponsorship Incentive Scheme Award *Gary Hill: in Light of the Other* attracted sponsorship from Littlewoods (Liverpool); Art services Management (USA); McCollisters Moving and Storage Inc (USA); Martinspeed Limited (UK) and Pioneer High Fidelity (GB) (Tate Biennial Report 1992-1994, p.36).

Likewise, NMGM established a wholly owned Trading Company, NMGM Enterprises Limited in January 1992. The Company undertakes retail, information, cloakroom, car parking and conference facilities at the museums and galleries, along with catering provision. NMGM has paid over its profit to the Trustees under a deed of covenant in each of its three years of operation. In addition, towards the end of the period a new Development Trust, under the patronage of His Grace The Duke of Westminster was established to enhance and enlarge NMGM's already growing success in attracting gifts from private individuals and businesses following a series of fund-raising lunches held at the Walker Art Gallery

(NMGM 1992 *Review* 1995, p.10-12). Clear evidence of the interest and generosity of the patrons, sponsors and donors of both NMGM and Tate Liverpool is shown in the appendices accompanying their Triennial and Biennial Reports for this period.

As a non-profit making company, MTB's activities were governed by the funds it managed to raise by means of corporate contributions, subscriptions, sponsorships, grants, advertising and sales income. In the beginning the Board had little more than the grant from the MDC (£250,000) and income from sales via TIC to work with. Fund raising therefore, was allocated a high priority. In an attempt to increase private sector funds the MTB set up a commercial and corporate membership scheme in February 1987, and by the end of that year there were 120 members (MTB 1987, Annual Report). At the end of the 1990 financial year (December) the number of commercial members had risen to 140. Over this period substantial contributions were received from a wide range of private sector organisations including the Thistle Hotel Group, Mount Charlotte Hotels and the Albert Dock Company (MTB, Annual Report 1990).

There is little doubt that private sector funding played a more crucial role in providing the financial means to develop public programmes and services. Nevertheless, the fact remained that throughout this phase all these agencies remained heavily reliant on central government grant-in-aid and, as will be argued below, this in effect conditioned the type of competitive approach adopted. Table 6.3 below shows both the highest and lowest levels of grant-in-aid dependency experienced by tourism-related agencies during this phase:

Table 6.3 Public Sector Funding as a Percentage (%) of Total Income

MTB			NMGM		
YEAR	TOTAL INCOME	%	YEAR	TOTAL INCOME	%
1987	£534. 099	63	1987	£11. 144m	91
1990	£783. 000	52	1990	£13. 598m	80
1993	£600. 000	54	1993	£15. 848m	85

Source: figures calculated from MTB and NMGM Annual Reports

While the Merseyside Development Corporation (MDC) was also very much dependent on central government grant-in-aid during this phase, and indeed throughout its administration (see Chapter 7). This is not really surprising when one considers that much of its expenditure was dominated by land reclamation, building refurbishment and general environmental improvements. Indeed, “this is the very reason for the Corporations’ existence – if derelict land and buildings could be reclaimed at a profit then clearly the private sector would have done so” (MDC, Annual Report ,31st March 1990, p.27). Nevertheless, as already argued in Chapter 2, an important part of the MDC’s role was to stimulate and attract private sector investment. To this end, the MDC also found private sector investment was weak. By the end of the 1987/8 financial year, the Corporation’s expenditure of £171 million had only attracted some £26.5 million of direct private sector investment: one pound of public investment attracting just 15 pence of its private sector counterpart (figures calculated from MDC Annual Reports).

Contested Governance?

While the Government encourages a competitive mode in the tourism development process and creates a setting within which competition can occur, in the case of public institutions in particular, the heavy reliance on grant-in-aid creates a substantial opportunity for central government to dictate the competitive process. For competitors such as NMGM, Tate Liverpool, MTB and N/T (Speke Hall) this can remain a zero-sum game, as the funding available is reduced within the overall public expenditure planning process. To this end, the following quotes taken from Tate Gallery and NMGM Reports published during this period are instructive:

“Tate Gallery Liverpool opened in 1988 with inadequate funding by Government...the purchase grant must be increased if the Gallery is to add significant works of art to the Collection. Purchase grants have been static for five years and now stand at a level below that of 1980-1981” (Tate Gallery Biennial Report 1988-90, p.10).

“The historic underfunding of the Tate Gallery Liverpool was brought into sharp focus by the financial constraints on the whole Gallery in early 1992. A decision was made to cut the autumn and winter exhibition programme at Tate Liverpool, although this was averted through a series of last-minute measures which included a partial response by Government to our plea for additional funding in Liverpool, supplementary grants from the Merseyside Development Corporation and the European Arts Festival and reluctant

restrictions in some services. We are naturally grateful, but fear for future years when such short-term expedients may not be available to us" (Tate Biennial Report, 1992-1994, p.28)

In a similar vein, NMGM felt that Government needed to give far more attention to the issue of public funding:

"The Arup survey on the condition of national museum buildings, commissioned by the Office of Arts and Libraries, revealed the extent of the work needed to put NMGM buildings in sound condition by the Millennium. Trustees are concerned that the resources to do this are insufficient and are unlikely to be obtained to any great extent from sponsorship or patronage....the purchase grant has remained static for over six years and its purchasing power is very seriously diminished" (NMGM, 1989 *Review* 1992, p.10).

"The pressure on the operating budget occasioned by the inadequate grant-in-aid settlements continues to cause great anxiety" (NMGM, 1992 *Review* 1995, p.9).

Likewise, fears for the future of Merseyside's Tourism Board were raised in 1991 after reports that its funding was under threat. According to an article by Neil Hodgson in the *Liverpool Echo* 23/4/91, entitled 'Tourism Board Hits Cash Fear', speculation raged over its future following the decision to close its Welcome centre in Liverpool's Clayton Square each Sunday and shed three of its 22 staff to balance its budget. It was claimed fears of budget cuts among the five local authorities, as well as by big business supporters, fuelled the streamlining moves. The article went on to state that although Samir Rihani, MTB chief executive, rejected the rumours, he launched a scathing attack on the lack of funding. He said:

"Not only is financial support suffering, but I haven't got the hearts and minds of my lords and masters any more. We cracked the job and now everyone has become complacent"

It was further claimed that the biggest contribution to MTB's £783,000 funding for the previous year (1990) was Merseyside Development Corporation's £270,000, the limit allowed by the government's Merseyside Task Force. In contrast, Aberdeen's new Tourist Board had been granted £1.7m, while Glasgow had a budget near £3m.

This lack of public investment can also create tensions between different institutions at the local level. For example, according to the National Trust (1993, p.4)

“It costs the National Trust nearly £50,000 a year to preserve Speke Hall and keep it open to the public, over and above any income we receive from paying visitors, trading and grants. Without an annual grant of £137,000 from the **National Museums and Galleries on Merseyside** the cost would be £186,000. The National Trust is an independent charity. We can only meet these costs through our own fundraising efforts. There is no way that we can fund any major improvements to Speke Hall from our own resources (author’s emphasis added).

The NMGM is required to make an annual grant towards the upkeep of Speke Hall under an agreement reached between the Minister for the Arts and the Chairman of the National Trust in 1985. The grant continues up to the year 2015 and the level of funding is determined each year against an annual report compiled by the National Trust. While the Board continued to honour its inherited obligations to make annual grants towards the operation of Speke Hall, in the early 1990s it expressed concern that:

“The support for this institution presents problems since it pre-empted a significant amount of grant-in-aid at a time when this is being spread ever more thinly to cover the full range of the Trustees’ responsibilities” (NMGM, 1989 *Review* 1992, p.10).

What the above examples can tell us, perhaps, is that in the context of tourism development in Liverpool, the contest for more powerful modes of local governance for delivering tourism policy (which the national state itself created) was easily overridden by the dominance of central government power. The dominance of central government in this unequal power relationship was assured by the fact that for all the tourism governance agencies discussed above, the only significant financial resources available to underpin the drive to out-compete their rivals came from the public purse. Consequently, the struggle for resources and effective control of them, restricted the institutional capacity to deliver both power arrangements and ideologies oriented towards strong competition. As already argued in Chapter 2, strong competition requires that a tourism policy community should possess the power to insulate and/or exclude itself from other policy areas which might encroach upon its work, in other words, the power to define its own agenda. Financial stringency also provoked fundamental ideological differences as to the most appropriate approach to adopt. Consistent with the dominant view from the government that, insofar as tourism policy exists in the UK, its purpose is to ensure the better functioning of the markets, this runs directly counter to the Trustee’s ideology which is not only to widen access, understanding and appreciation of national collections to a wider audience, but also to add significant works of art to their

collections. In short, what is right for a company, quango or central government is not necessarily right for local tourism governance.

6.5 The Learning Economy: Research and Development, Innovation and Competitive Advantage

“If entrepreneurial urban economies involve discipline, learning and performance, the same is true of entrepreneurial governance. Just as participants in the urban economy (the objects of governance) have to learn their parts, so too do participants in the urban regime. Promoting the competitiveness with other urban regions and generating the institutional transformations, involves new practices of governance that themselves have to be learnt” (Painter, 1998, p.268).

It is claimed that we are now in a ‘new era’ of economic activity dominated by the emergence of a knowledge-based economy which is more strongly and directly rooted in the production, distribution and use of knowledge than ever before (Foray and Lundvall, 1996, p.12). Historically relations between knowledge and economic development were centred on the use of tacit knowledge, where individuals and institutions learn through the process of carrying out activities on a relatively informal and practical basis. In the entrepreneurial economy, economic success is critically dependent on the capacity of an institution to organise and develop forms of social learning in which it learns, in an interactive way with other institutions rather than acting alone. Such reflexive forms of learning can be characterised as ‘learning by learning’ (Raco, 1999, p.955). While know-how and learning have become the key resource for firms and institutions to remain competitive, crucially, “some organisational forms and social routines are more conducive to fostering innovation and learning than others (Morgan, 1997, p.494). To this end, the way in which tourism governance attempted to develop a learning environment in Liverpool during this phase is instructive.

Perhaps, the most influential research publication during this phase was the *Economic Impact Study of Tourism and Associated Arts Development* (DRV Research) published in June, 1986. This major research project for the first time identified the size of the contribution to the economic performance of the city that existing tourism/arts institutions were making both by appealing to external elites, and creating new jobs and wealth. The value of the 1986 study cannot be overestimated. It not only played an extremely effective role in advocating the case for tourism to the city council it also became the platform for MTB’s marketing activities.

In the case of the Liverpool city council (LCC) the first significant signs of the impact of this report came only a few months after the May 1987 local elections, when a new moderate Labour Group replaced Militant councillors who had been disqualified from office (see Chapter 5). In December 1987 Liverpool city council published its first strategy document specifically devoted to tourism policy *A Tourism Strategy for Liverpool – A Framework*. This important report located the development of the tourism industry within the council's new overall economic development framework, and related it especially to its strategies for tourism and the redevelopment of the city centre. Linking tourism policy to economic development was an important *ideological shift* for the city council. Prior to this, the city council's modest initiatives in the tourism policy field were no exception to most other British cities, which traditionally prioritised social integration and democratisation of access to tourism facilities, rather than economic regeneration.

From the outset MTB placed much emphasis on research and development and this is evidenced by the fact that in 1987 one member of staff was designated specifically to this role (MTB, 1988). Much of the early work concentrated on the strategic framework for the future development of tourism and in particular the production of an overall strategy; entitled *Tourism – A Flagship For Merseyside* which was published in April 1988. Whilst both these documents had the common objective of maintaining and enhancing the health and prosperity of this sector of the local economy, they also provided a broader consensus as to 'who does what for whom and why'. With regards to the latter, however, there are some notable differences in their agendas. The LCC's new strategy attempted to strike a balance between traditional social welfare concerns of the city council and the imperative to achieve economic development. The former would be protected by attempting to maximise community access and participation in tourism activities. As for employment the major focus of the city council was not just to secure the maximum number of jobs, but to seek to ensure that such jobs are worthwhile and rewarding (particularly pay and conditions). By attracting more people into the City it was suggested that this would secure improvements to facilities and the environment, to make it a better place to *live*. It is noteworthy that no mention whatsoever is made in the 1987 document about these improvements making it a better place to *work* or to *visit* (although both these verbs are used extensively in LCC tourism literature during the next phase, see Chapter 7). Thus the city council's ideological position during this phase reflected the view that tourism development was in part still a social welfare function. The economic development dimension, by contrast, would involve support for facilities and businesses

(albeit limited) important to maintaining and improving the city's regional role as a centre for tourism and the promotion of new tourism activities and a programme of events.

In sharp contrast to the LCC agenda, the Merseyside Tourism Board agenda was focused almost entirely on effective mechanisms and policies to maximise tourism's contribution to economic development in the region. In short, the shift from managerialism to entrepreneurialism was far more pronounced in MTB's research agenda compared to the LCC's agenda.

As already argued above, strategic networks can be conceived of as patterns of interaction between mutually dependent actors and institutions that evolve around research problems and projects. It is noteworthy that in an attempt to produce a learning environment in which innovation could be constructively created both LCC and MTB's research designs encouraged reflexive forms of learning. For example, six months prior to the publication of the LCC (1987, December) tourism strategy document a draft strategy was circulated for comment to a wide range of interested parties including MDC, NMGM, NWTB, other local authorities on Merseyside and a number of private firms and individuals (see Appendix 4, p.26). Moreover, it was intended to "provide further guidance to the Merseyside Tourism Board on the City Council's policy stance on tourism so as to inform the development of their own strategy" (p.2).

In a similar vein following the launch of MTB's draft strategy in June 1987 copies were circulated to over one hundred organisations and individuals with an interest in Merseyside's tourism future. Comments on the draft were invited by the end of September. During September 1987, four area presentations on the strategy were held in Liverpool, Knowsley, Sefton and Wirral attended by some 60 people. The Vice Chancellor of the University of Liverpool also hosted a presentation about the strategy which was attended by some 75 people from the academic, cultural and business community. According to MTB (1988) the comments made at these presentations together with the more detailed written comments received from many organisations were taken into account in the final version of the strategy.

To return to the heart of the theoretical debate, clearly, the research was designed to take account of the importance of the way in which policy problems are constructed to the rest of the policy process, particularly the nature of the solutions proposed. More importantly, both

research projects did not simply seek to achieve organisational structuring, but sought to challenge the attitudes, values and assumptions (hearts and minds) of the people involved in order to bring about transformation of cultures and practices. Such approaches were certainly innovative at this time particularly when one considers that:

“During the 1980s and the early 1990s a large proportion of the general public of Liverpool and that included councillors and local ‘captains of industry’ were not aware that there was a thriving tourist industry in the City....the wider role tourism could play in changing the image of the City and in encouraging investment was not universally understood” (Tourism Manager, The Mersey Partnership, interviewed, 25/11/98).

Despite the fact that both MTB and the LCC adopted strong competitive approaches to promote research and development in the early part of this phase, neither was able to sustain this competitive edge throughout the phase. In the case of the LCC lying behind the specific problems facing tourism development were the general ones of Liverpool. The city council’s continuing fiscal problems were compounded by the fact that in 1991, for example, the unemployment rate was 21.6% and poverty was experienced in some form by 50% of the population (LCC, Key Statistics, Liverpool Wards, 1971/81/91). Such problems raised questions about the scale of the local market for tourism consumption which can often depend upon relatively high levels of disposable income. Indeed:

“At the time you are talking about not all Council members were convinced about the merits of encouraging tourism. Some councillors were concerned that because tourism policy was focused exclusively on the city centre this could alienate residents of deprived outer estates and some inner city areas who may have found the city centre’s tourism provision difficult to access....so tourism just tinkered along until the mid 1990s when tourism really started to spark and also started to develop into what it is now” (Chair, Leisure and Tourism Committee, LCC, interviewed, 1/10/98).

As already mentioned above, it took until 1994 for tourism to gain a significant position in City Council affairs. In this year tourism was included in the Unitary Development Plan for the authority. In addition a Tourism Officer was appointed to work within the Policy and Research Office of the newly formed Tourism, Arts and Heritage section (see Chapter 7).

Although the MTB did spend time and effort in assisting others in their strategic work during this phase, for example, by the late 1980s early 1990s tourism had been the subject of

strategic reports by all five Merseyside Districts following discussions with the MTB (see for example, MTB, 1987, 1989, 1993). In addition, MTB cooperated with the Merseyside Enterprise Board in developing and launching MEB's Merseyside Small Firms Fund. MTB was an advisory agency for the purpose of this fund in relation to tourism activities (MTB 1988). Nevertheless, in the MTB's own words:

“MTB has played a fairly passive role in development advice to date, responding to specific enquiries on an ad hoc basis and distributing information on sources of finance as requested” (MTB, 1993, p.42).

The only other major research project involving the MTB during this phase was 1990 *Visitors to Merseyside* survey, published in June 1991. This study was funded by nine bodies including the five district councils, Merseyside Task Force, MDC, Merseytravel and MTB. Whilst the results of this study provide valuable information concerning the image of Merseyside and the economic effects of tourism. It makes little if any attempt at qualitative analyses, being a quantitative study of tourism outputs. Bearing in mind that MTB and LCC were the only two agencies with a remit to promote tourism at a city wide level it is clear that by the end of this phase there was a relatively small research base to support tourism policy and action in Liverpool. At the individual network level, however, particularly with regards to the museums and galleries, this situation was markedly different.

The state of Research in Museums and Galleries in Liverpool

One of the primary responsibilities of a museum or gallery is to undertake study and research on its collections and to make that knowledge available in catalogues, scientific monographs, learned journals, popular guidebooks and leaflets. Throughout this period there was an encouraging flow of scholarly work regarding the study, research and publication of both the NMGM and Tate Liverpool's diverse collections (see for example, NMGM, Triennial Reports, 1986/89, 1989/92, 1992/95; Tate Biennial Reports, 1988/90, 1990/92, 1992/94). As to be expected much of this research was scholarship focused, however, it is noteworthy that both organisations showed a willingness to undertake research associated more closely with the tourism element of their activities. To this end, the museums and galleries put considerable time and effort into listening to what the public had to say. As the interviewee at Tate Liverpool put it:

“I think that experience has shown that it was really good that we did all that visitor research in the early 90s because we were able to make changes that people responded to. The other good thing is we are coming up to the New Disability Act when lots of things are coming into force and you have to provide facilities for people who have different levels of disability. And because we have bothered to do our research there is very little now that we need to change about the building to enable people to have full access whatever their disability. And its things like that where you actually bother to listen to what the public are saying, that is probably the key thing” (Press and Publicity Officer, Tate Gallery Liverpool, interviewed, 26/7/99).

Although the need for visitor research is emphasised in much tourism literature in reality it would be fair to say that the delivery of tourism is dominated by the ideologies of the providers and their advisors rather than being defined by the needs and wishes of the consumers (see for example, Hall and Jenkin, 1995; Hughes, 1992a, 1992b, Booth and Boyle, 1993) (see Chapter 7). Nevertheless, as the Manager for Mersey Partnership pointed out:

“Obviously there are all sorts of factors that can influence whether an attraction does well or not, I mean weather can be a big influence, the environment surrounding the attraction, there is a whole range of things. But there are clear messages that the attractions that do well are the ones that are customer focused rather than product focused, they listen to what customers say, they listen to what people who are not visiting their attraction say, you know they do research to find out about it, they are constantly putting something new into the attraction” (Tourism Manager, Mersey Partnership, interviewed, 25/11/98).

Likewise, NMGM commissioned research by the Liverpool University to evaluate visitor response to the various displays. This was seen as a first step in the development of an education plan which would inform decisions on the development and use of future displays (NMGM, Triennial Report, 1986/89). According to the interviewee at NMGM:

“We have always placed a high priority on securing the co-operation of Liverpool University on research projects which benefit NMGM” (Head of Marketing and Public Affairs, NMGM, interviewed, 29/7/99). “

Both NMGM and Tate Liverpool showed a strong commitment to seek more innovative ways of attracting wider audiences. Collaborating with others provided one means of engaging an audience for many of their programmes. Under agreements with Liverpool University and Polytechnic (now The John Moores University) the Tate Gallery’s series of talks by artists and critics were made mandatory for students. Furthermore, in 1991 a joint research post was

set up with the Liverpool Polytechnic aimed at developing modules for courses based on the Gallery as a resource (Tate Biennial Report, 1990/92, p.29). NMGM also gave added emphasis to student groups, at the Walker Art Gallery the GCSE examinations brought a substantial increase in mid-teenage audiences (NMGM, 1989 *Review* 1992).

By the end of the period both organisations had set new standards for the presentation and interpretation of their research, relating it clearly to their central activities. One innovation during the *Natural Order* display was a 'hands on' workshop for all visitors to the Tate Gallery Liverpool, and this 'Open studio' has been repeated in connection with subsequent loan exhibitions. According to the Tate Gallery Biennial Report (1992/94,) "it is the most effective means yet devised by the Gallery for engaging the general visitor" (p.29). A number of innovations for improving access were implemented by NMGM towards the end of this period with the emphasis very much on storage-on-display. In the Liverpool Museum, for example, the new Natural History Centre enabled members of the public to select and handle zoological, botanical and geological specimens from a 'mini-store' on the public gallery.

Throughout this period NMGM and Tate Liverpool made a significant number of loans to assist with teaching and research, indeed:

"Lending objects and works to museums in the UK and overseas is an important way of increasing access to and knowledge of our collections [NMGM]...over the years we have lent many important works of art and scientific specimens to exhibitions and research workers at home and abroad" (Head of Marketing and Public Affairs, NMGM, interviewed, 29/7/99).

In a similar vein The Tate Gallery implemented a vigorous programme of loans to various institutions and other specialists in the field, in this country and abroad. For example, a total of 1,309 works were lent in the 1992-1994 biennium compared with the previous biennium's total 1,105, representing an increase of 18 per cent (for a complete list of individuals and institutions involved in both organisations, see Tate Biennial Reports 1988/90,1990/92, 1992/94, and NMGM, 1986 *Review*1989, 1989 *Review* 1992, 1992 *Review* 1995).

By the end of this phase the NMGM Library and the Tate Liverpool Library, initially a service for their curatorial departments had after computerising their operations become widely recognised as major national resources in the field of research. It is noteworthy that

these increased research facilities were available to both scholars and first time visitors, moreover, their respective records in the Library and Archive can be consulted both within the organisation and from outside.

From the above discussion it is clear that in the case of the museums and galleries in particular, both their institutional and power arrangements were oriented towards strong competition, in that the impetus for collaboration and innovation came from within the city and between the organisation's themselves rather than through state-led programmes. In short, they had the capacity and the power to define their own research agendas.

6.6 Marketing Liverpool

As already argued in Chapter 2, place marketing has been one of the defining features of entrepreneurial modes of governance that evolved from the late 1970s. Indeed, a number of commentators have suggested that city marketing is the most common form of economic development strategy in inter urban competition (see for example, Griffiths, 1998; Hughes, 1999; Smyth, 1994; Ward, 1998; Page, 1995).

As was discussed in Chapter 5, the perceived success of the MDC's key central flagship project, the Albert Dock and the 'flagship events' of the International Garden Festival and the visit of the Tall Ships in attracting visitors to the area had clearly reinforced the shift in policy towards the promotion of tourism. This policy emphasis also conditioned the form of 'urban entrepreneurialism' being adopted with promotional 'place marketing' largely aimed at attracting visitor interest in the city's tourism attractions. In this phase, however, there was a switch in policy emphasis particularly in the case of the MDC, away from place marketing solely aimed at attracting tourists to a more full-blown form of 'urban entrepreneurialism' in the global market place for inward investment.

Although over this period the MTB was the only organisation that had a remit for place marketing at the city-wide level, the MDC also made a substantial contribution both in financial and human resources. In addition, the museums and galleries were active in developing promotional programmes at the individual network level. The Mersey Partnership's promotional programme did not get underway until 1995 (see Chapter 7), for its initial 12 months of existence the Partnership had internal preoccupations, firming its team,

and setting about broadening its membership and financial base. Likewise, during Phase 1 of the Speke Hall Revival Plan (1987-1993) the emphasis was on the restoration and repair of the ancient buildings and estate as opposed to marketing the attraction. However, this situation changed during Phase 11 of the Plan (see Chapter 7).

Merseyside Development Corporation

During this period the MDC became more carefully interwoven into an extended network of tourism institutional arrangements which enabled it to position its place marketing activities within a broader, city-region wide framework. To this end, the Corporation agreed to fund the organisation and operation of the Mersey River Festival in 1986 and subsequent years. MDC's commitment to the success of its waterfront tourism strategy was further emphasised by its successful bid (in collaboration with Liverpool City Council, Wirral Metropolitan Borough Council and the Mersey Docks and Harbour Company) to host the 'Tall Ships' in 1992. The Corporation agreed to contribute £250,000 towards the establishment of the MTB in 1986 and funding for subsequent years, the Corporation was represented on the Board by its Chairman, Donald Foster and the Chief Executive, Dr John Richie. When MDC's funding commitment to the MTB expired in 1992/93 it prompted a complete reorganisation in which MTB ceased to exist in its current form. The MDC sought to reposition the Tourist Board's activities encouraging the merger of the Board with the recently created Conference Bureau to create the Merseyside Tourism and Conference Bureau (MTCB) in 1993, where the MDC was represented on the new steering group (see Chapter 7). Furthermore, the Corporation also helped, in 1992, to sponsor the establishment of the Mersey Partnership, a public/private body (see above) which brings together the five local authorities with a range of private firms and the area's universities to engage in 'image campaigns' and 'place marketing'.

During this phase the MDC increasingly shifted more of its own money into place marketing activities. At the end of the 1987/88 financial year, the Corporation had spent some £400,000 on marketing and promotional activities, 1.5 per cent of its total expenditure. By the end of the 1992/93 financial year these figures had risen to £2.2m and 5.6 per cent respectively (MDC Annual Reports, 1987/88, 1992/93).

As already argued in Chapter 2, the ideological shift, embodied in commercially motivated representation of place, is inscribed through power structures which have potentially served to

lead to a one-dimensional representation of place to visitors. In effect the ruling class has the power to project their own values on the form and content of tourism landscapes, legitimising themselves by projecting the notion that the choice of 'fun' and 'entertainment' offered, is one of individual freedom for the consumer and thus entirely free of political consequences (see for example, Wilson, 1988; Hall, 1994).

As was discussed in Chapters 2 and 5, one defining feature of 'urban entrepreneurialism' is the increasing use of the 'urban spectacle' including the hosting of one-off events. It is interesting that it was precisely such an event that provoked MDC's most public censure. The event in question was arranged in 1992 around the return visit to Liverpool of the fleet of sailing ships, the so-called 'Tall Ships', that had visited the city in 1984. This time the visit was part of the global commemoration of the 500th Centenary of Christopher Columbus' North American foray.

To mark the climax of the Tall Ships an open air musical spectacular hosted by Sir Peter Ustinov with the King and Queen of Spain as special guests was held on reclaimed dockland at Kings Dock in Liverpool. This event featured what was said to be the greatest line up of classical singers ever in the UK. The MDC handed over the organisation of the concert to a private promotions company. According to the concert organiser Brendan Carroll:

"This unique event was the brain child of Sir Desmond Pitcher, Chairman of the Merseyside Development Corporation who wanted something to complement the sheer scale of the Grand Regatta Columbus....All lovers of music will be treated to an unforgettable experience at the finest waterfront location in Europe" (Merseyside Task Force, 1992, p.3)

However, in a city in which, in the 1990s the 'arts' had to be sustained from a shrinking resource base (Parkinson and Bianchini, 1993, p.175), the event was, to put it mildly, always likely to be risky in terms of public support at the 'booking office'. And so it proved, according to Meegan (1999) the MDC had to step in at the last minute to take up and distribute unsold tickets and meet other expenses to allow the 'event' to take place. The promotions company went bankrupt, leaving behind a trail of creditors and, in due course, the Corporation found its involvement in this fiasco coming under the scrutiny of the National Audit Office. Subsequently, having been found guilty of 'unauthorised spending' by the National Audit Office the MDC was duly fined some £295,443- a figure which was deducted

from its grant-in-aid for 1994/95 (pp. 34-35). A reminder, if one was needed, that the choice of 'fun' and 'entertainment' offered can never be free of personal values, unequal power relationships and political consequences.

In the early 1990s MDC shifted its emphasis in marketing and promotion towards attracting private sector investment with North America providing the focus. This shift was inaugurated with the MDC's sponsorship of the Royal Liverpool Philharmonic Orchestra's USA Tour and Trade Mission in February 1992. The Orchestra was accompanied by a delegation of Merseyside business and civic leaders including the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Corporation (MDC Annual Report, 1992). Following on from the MDC USA marketing initiative, visits were made by 20 US companies resulting in 12 projects and 4 companies giving verbal commitment to invest Here (MDC Annual Report, 1993,p.24). Indeed, "it was strongly felt that 'place marketing' of Merseyside, in the US would encounter less negative 'image' problems" (Meegan, 1999, p.29).

In the UK context MDC's marketing strategy for 1992/93 also reflected a change in policy emphasis. In an attempt to raise awareness and improve perceptions of the area, the marketing strategy aimed to reduce reliance on advertising, and obtain broadcast and press coverage to (in their terms) realistically portray the Merseyside of today. According to the MDC (1993) the results were numerous in-depth national, regional and local articles as well as generally wider and more favourable reporting of current events.

Merseyside Tourism Board

Marketing is central to all MTB's activities. "Ultimately it is the yardstick by which MTB's success will be measured" (MTB, 1987, Annual Report, p.4). During this phase there were two aspects to MTB's marketing function. Firstly, unlike the MDC which was launched in 1981 with great fanfare by central government, there was a need for MTB to engage in marketing activity on its own behalf to gain recognition and enhance its financial resources. Secondly, to promote a positive image for Merseyside. However, for much of this period MTB's task of marketing Merseyside had to be given second priority. Apart from the fact that successful actions and a reasonable track record had to be earned by MTB, before moving aggressively into external marketing. Staff and financial resources were simply not available

to tackle both marketing tasks simultaneously. In the case of advertising, for example, it was claimed that:

“Based on a realistic view of MTB’s probable resources over the next three years or more, it seems unlikely that the funds devoted to advertising could be increased substantially. Consequently, a number of desirable actions such as an ‘image changing’ national campaign, significant TV advertising and substantial advertising in national daily or Sunday newspapers, could not be undertaken” (MTB, 1988, Corporate Plan, p.28) (original emphasis).

Nevertheless a good deal of promotional activity for Merseyside was undertaken by MTB during the 1986-1994 period. It should be pointed out that compared to many other large industrial cities involved in tourism promotion this was accomplished on a very limited marketing budget. In 1987 MTB spent £140,375, on marketing (27% of total expenditure) (MTB, 1988). In 1994 the marketing budget was £174,146 (31% of total expenditure) (MTCB, 1995). This represents a somewhat modest increase of 24% over the 7-year period. In contrast, Manchester’s expenditure on the promotion of tourism amounted to £435,000 in 1987 alone. In 1987 Glasgow’s expenditure on tourism promotion and publicity was £1,026,000 (LCC, 1987a, p.29), by 1990 this figure had risen to near £3m (Hodgson, 1991). However, according to the Chair of the Leisure and Tourism Committee for LCC, MTB’s marketing budget is, in practise, only the tip of the pyramid:

“Merseyside Tourism Board’s marketing budget was limited, but you must appreciate its impact in generating a much larger marketing spend. So say for example, the MTB placed an advert in a magazine, it might cost five-hundred pounds but that small initial outlay might result in an extra five-thousand pounds worth of business for hotels or other tourist attractions....MTB must be viewed as an enabling organisation that made things happen, so you can’t estimate the value of its marketing activities purely by looking at MTB’s net spending alone” (Chair, Leisure and Tourism Committee, LCC, interviewed, 1/10/98).

First and foremost, it is noteworthy that much progress was made in raising the level of awareness of MTB’s activities to a broader public during this period. A review of MTB’s marketing activities can be summarised as shown in Table 6.3 below.

Table 6.4 Summary of MTB's Marketing Activities

<p>ADVERTISING – Main Activities: Advertisements in selected publications known to produce a good response, for example, <i>England Holidays (ETB)</i>, <i>North West Guide (NWTB)</i>, Regional Newspaper Daytrip features. Place modest advertisements in Travel sections of appropriate national dailies. Advertise at tourist information points at selected locations and areas, such as Manchester Airport.</p>
<p>PUBLICATIONS & VIDEOS – Main Activities: The production of a wide range of publications in the form of leaflets, brochures, pocket guides and maps. This includes various editions of <i>Discover Merseyside</i> and <i>Where to Stay on Merseyside</i> and a series of leaflets promoting guided walks and tours in Liverpool. MTB also produced a video <i>Merseyside Surprise</i> in 1987 which comprised a basic promotional version and two variations to promote MTB and Conference Marketing respectively.</p>
<p>TOURIST INFORMATION CENTRES – Main Activities: The operation of two TIC's one at Lime Street, and one at the Albert Dock (opened in March 1987). In addition to offering a full service to visitors, MTB acted as an agency for theatre bookings, accommodation bookings, tickets for events and guided tours.</p>
<p>PRESS & PUBLIC RELATIONS – Main Activities: Press releases, articles, T.V. and radio interviews, press familiarisation visits and participation in and initiation of special features on Merseyside. Examples of the latter include Financial Times Survey of November, 1986, <i>Liverpool: Gateway to Merseyside and North West England</i> (Autumn 1987) and <i>Merseyside – more than you ever imagined</i> (1990).</p>
<p>TRAVEL TRADE – Main Activities: Organising familiarisation visits for the travel trade. Produce <i>Travel Trade Manual</i> annually. Targeted campaigns on travel agencies in specific areas for example, Irish agencies to promote shopping breaks and 'Soccer Weekends'. Participation in major travel trade workshops and exhibitions including Moot, World Travel Market, Dublin Holiday & Leisure Fair. Organising workshops locally on behalf of the tourist trade.</p>
<p>EVENTS PROMOTION – Main Activities: The creation, co-ordination and promotion of a season of events each year. Produces and continuously updates a monthly events programme listing events from the present to the end of the following year – widely distributed particularly to the media. Sponsorship of certain events, such as the 'Festival of Comedy' and the 'May Horse Parade'. Continue its policy of support (£6000 per annum 1987-1991) to the monthly <i>What's On-Look Alive</i> magazine to include a pull out full colour <i>Events Supplement</i> at least once a year.</p>
<p>CONFERENCE & BUSINESS TOURISM PROMOTION – Main Activities: Modest advertising in conference magazines and journals and participation in selected conference exhibitions. Regular familiarisation visits for conference organisers. Launched the Merseyside Conference Bureau in April 1988. In 1989 MTB produced its first conference guide ("Portfolio") to be updated annually.</p>
<p>PACKAGES – Main Activities: The philosophy adopted for packages involves a basic accommodation/attraction deal (for example, hotel /football match) and associated travel and other choices. Ongoing discussions with tour operators, British Rail and foreign airlines to negotiate travel add-ons, enabled national as well as international promotion of the packages.</p>

Source: MTB Corporate Plan 1988-1990 and MTC Annual Reports, 1987,1989,1990,1992

From Table 6.4 it is clear that MTB implemented a wide range of initiatives to promote tourism during this phase, however, in the main these were marketing initiatives to promote a product rather than the city. Indeed:

“I think in the past we sort of became obsessed with the products themselves. I am quite involved in the tourism elements and the way we shape up the European Funding Programmes and I would like to see a much more area approach rather than a product approach” (Tourism Manager, Mersey Partnership, interviewed, 25/11/98).

As already argued in Chapter 2, Jessop (1997,1998) maintains that strong competitive approaches acknowledge that advantage in inter-urban competition is no longer based on resources (natural economic factor endowments), but on innovative capacity. In the case of MTB, however, it is clear that many of their marketing policies focused on promoting factor-based advantages (weak competitive approach) rather than attempts to improve the overall (structural) competitiveness of the locality. A major problem with this approach is that such factor-based advantages, are difficult to sustain especially given the standardisation of many tourism development initiatives and local identity scripts (permitting their relatively quick and easy adoption if the necessary finance and human resources are available). Indeed, it could be argued that in general terms all the policy measures shown in the Table 6.4 above, represent no more than routine reproduction, in the sense that they have either been copied from, or could be easily be recreated elsewhere. On a practical level:

“There is a risk that most cities believe they can succeed in the entrepreneurial race and/or can successfully pursue policies that have worked elsewhere. If every city is entrepreneurial in a ‘me-tooist’ way, however, any resulting particular competitive advantages may well prove ephemeral” (Jessop, 1998, p.86).

Nevertheless, MTB did implement a small number of initiatives where a distinction can be made between routine reproduction or what Jessop (1997,1998) terms ‘reproduction regulation’, and economic entrepreneurialism proper. As was discussed in Chapter 2, exercising an entrepreneurial function typically involves taking uncertainty (since innovation means venturing into the unknown). Consequently, entrepreneurship in its strict sense involves the devising and realisation of new ways of doing things. In this sense, three particular MTB innovations are worthy of note.

First, in an attempt to enhance the visitors experience of Merseyside, the Board approved an overall training policy for the MerseyGuides in March 1987, the first practical outcome being the launch, in August that year, of the *Open Your Eyes to Merseyside* tourism awareness course designed to acquaint Merseysiders with the local tourism industry. This was initiated in the belief that the promotion of Merseyside should be built on local awareness in the first instance. Selected MerseyGuides were trained to provide 'Quality of Life' tours of Merseyside in addition to their normal work in tourism. These tours involving visiting VIP's, business persons, potential investors and relocation activities. In relation to the last sector, perhaps, the most ambitious project undertaken by MTB's MerseyGuides was initiated by the Merseyside Task Force, Liverpool City Council and the MDC's bid for the relocation of the Customs and Excise VAT Headquarters. This involved presentations to 1200 employees of the Customs and Excise Department in London and Southend over a period of two weeks in November 1989 (MTB, Annual Report, 1990,p.2). Following the announcement of the successful bid in October 1990, by the then Secretary of State for the Environment, Chris Patten, the MerseyGuides undertook a series of familiarisation visits for staff involved in the relocation.

The 'Friends of Merseyside' and the 'Mersey Wanderers' were two further significant innovations launched by MTB in 1987. Both were novel ideas in capitalising on the goodwill of local people and those who come from Merseyside but now live elsewhere. According to MTB, 1988, 1990), the 'Friends of Merseyside' were a handpicked group of local people who would befriend visitors as required and allay any misgivings they might have about a visit to Merseyside. The Friends were also expected to write to the press and media to counter any bad publicity given to the area. Early in 1990 the Friends formed themselves into an organisation with its own committee and constitutions (MTB, Annual Report, 1990).

'Mersey Wanderers' was launched in a bid to encourage expatriate Merseysiders throughout the world to renew their links with Merseyside via a club that would keep them informed of life back home. The idea was to encourage such people to act as ambassadors for the area in their present region of residence and also to persuade them to visit Merseyside. According to the MTCB (1994) since their inception these initiatives have gone from strength to strength and both now have a regular column in the *In Touch* monthly listings magazine. Indeed:

“It is a matter of pride to state that the way in which MTB, organises the guiding service on Merseyside is unrivalled elsewhere” (MTB, Annual Report, 1990, p.3).

Overall, although MTB’s external PR function for Merseyside had to be given second priority during this phase, nevertheless, some progress was made in changing the media image of the City, particularly the persistent use of Liverpool by TV and national newspapers as an example of *anything bad*. The murder of Jamie Bulger in Walton (Liverpool) occurred during 1992, yet this was accompanied by what appears to have been a deliberate positive campaign to retain a positive image of the city. Hence the *Times* included a major article as a focus on Merseyside (*Times*, July 13, 1992), promoting the tourism and regeneration of the area. Likewise in 1992, *The Independent on Sunday* included a major article as a focus on the spirit of revival in Liverpool, titled ‘Mersey turns the tide’ (*Independent on Sunday*, May 3, 1992, p.21). Regarding the Board’s PR function to gain recognition and enhance its financial resources this appears to have been far more successful. In this respect it is interesting to note, that in a bid to raise the profile of the organisation a substantial proportion of MTB’s work covered fields of activity well beyond the traditional tourism sphere. To underline this wider role, a seminar, titled “Tourism, Commerce and Industry-Partners in Success”, was jointly hosted by MTB and Parkman Consulting Engineers in June 1989 (MTB Annual Report, 1989). Perhaps, the best illustration of a better awareness of MTB’s wider role in Merseyside’s economic revival during this phase can be seen in MTB’s Corporate and Commercial membership which increased from 120 members to 190 between 1987 and 1994 (MTB, 1988, MTCB, 1995). Moreover, MTB’s development was supported by a number of contributions from bodies not involved in leisure and tourism, including Royal Insurance UK, Barclays Bank, Gardner Systems PLC, Littlewoods Organisation and Wimpey Property Holdings (see for example, MTB Annual Reports, 1988, 1990, 1992).

At the end of this period there was one organisation in Liverpool that did consider that they could successfully re-image the city and had the finances necessary. It was the firming up of the Objective One European Union funding regime for Merseyside in the spring of 1994 that paved the way for the Mersey Partnership’s image campaign (see Chapter 7).

To summarise, it is clear that at the individual network level all the organisations discussed above showed a willingness to implement a range of innovative and ambitious policy measures. However, as already argued in Chapter 2 and 5, it is not necessarily the case of

how valuable any individual tourism development policy might be, but rather, the extent to which such policies translate into the overall competitiveness of the city. It is to these issues the next section turns.

6.7 Promoting Liverpool's Competitive Position in Tourism 1986-1994: Strong Versus Weak Competitive Approaches

An integral vision of tourism development at the city and/or regional level is an absolute condition for sustainable development. Indeed, "without vision, efficient and effective organising capacity is a utopia, an 'unguided missile'" (Berg and Braun, 1999, p.997). In the thematic of the entrepreneurial city organising capacity, must be extended to a partnership culture, in which mutual co-operation between the involved public and private actors can flourish. In this way it is argued that institutional 'embeddedness' or 'thickness' is a key prerequisite for fostering and reproducing a local culture of *entrepreneurship*, *innovation* and *mutual collaboration*, which in turn is central to developing local economic competitiveness (see for example, Amin and Thrift, 1992, 1995; Best, 1990; Cooke and Morgan, 1995; Jessop, 1997,1998).

From the discussion so far it is clear that tourism underwent major structural changes during this period, as evidenced by the proliferation of new entrants to the tourism policy arena, and the organisational context within which they operated. As was discussed in Chapter 2, the focus of Jessop's (1997,1998), approach is based on an understanding of strong versus weak competitive approaches which argues that 'successful' regions flourish as a consequence of implementing policies directed towards improving the overall (structural) competitiveness of the locality through continuing economic, political and social innovations. These factors are relatively immobile as it is the simultaneous occurrence of certain forms of social and political arrangements, in specific cultural and ideological contexts in space and time, which can create a synergy effect, which cannot easily be *recreated* elsewhere. With regards to organising capacity it could be argued that innovations in institutional arrangements at the organisational level, during this period, adhered closely to what Jessop (1997,1998) terms a strong competitive approach to inter urban competition. As already argued, the demise of the MCC, provided the opportunity to develop new forms of social and political institutional structures which occurred over time and within particular ideological contexts. As such, it

would be reasonable to suggest that it would be difficult if not impossible for these structures to be reproduced quickly by other potential competitors.

Although from the above discussion it is clear that these agencies had the organising capacity to deliver their own sought for competitive advantage, this did not translate into a shared vision for tourism development at the city and/or regional level. With respect to the latter the following comments given at interview are instructive:

“I think that although the Merseyside Tourist Board did try to pull together a lot of the different elements, for me there is still a sense that a lot of those elements operated in isolation of each other. One of my particular bug bears if you like is that the city has always been divided into partnership areas or what you might term tourism regeneration ghettos and they fight each other for funding and investment so at the end of the day there is no sense of a bigger picture. I think if we had a tourism strategy or an image strategy for the city as a whole that everyone was completely sold up to then we would benefit greatly from it” (Head of Public Relations, LCC, interviewed, 18/12/98).

“Functionally one of the problems with tourism is that there are a lot of organisations involved. Over the years you had the MTB then the MTCB and now Mersey Tourism which were put in to bring it together, but from my dealings with them they seem to be a bit ineffective. If for example, you have a query with NMGM and you are looking at what they are doing you go to them as opposed to the tourist board, equally St Georges Hall is a council thing so you go to them rather than the tourist board. So I think the continuing problem is no one group looks after these attractions” (Editorial Staff Member, Liverpool Daily Post, interviewed, 19/1/99).

“I think for years we have all been doing our own thing, you know hotel managers doing their own thing the council doing its own thing. I feel that a lot of these little pockets of people doing their own thing has made the promotion of the city very fragmented really. I bring my own display with me to various venues, but that is because I think there has always been a lack of things happening you know as far as co-ordinating things in the city” (Hotel Manager, interviewed, 22/3/99).

The most problematic aspect of the governance issue in respect of tourism development which emerged from the Liverpool case in particular takes us back to the heart of the theoretical debate. What seems to have been lost in the decision-making process was the pragmatic, not political importance of institutional capacity. At the most practical level there was a lack of the sheer capacity firstly, to ensure that the institutional capacity of all the organisations in the

tourism development process, was actively fostered as an integral part of that process. Secondly, to manage and develop programmes as ambitious as say, LCC's *A Tourism Strategy for Liverpool* (December 1987) and MTB's *Tourism a Flagship for Merseyside* (1988). These plans were potentially innovative and ground-breaking, both emphasised the need for an integral vision and provided a context for intervention, with a clear strategy for implementation. But the necessary local capacity to deliver these programmes was largely absent. As argued above, the continuing fiscal problems of the LCC ensured that tourism did not gain a significant position on their agenda until 1994 (see Chapter 7). Therefore in essence, the MTB was the only organisation that had a remit for co-ordinating policy and thus promoting Liverpool's competitive position in tourism during this phase.

Despite the fact that the *Tourism – A Flagship For Merseyside* plan offered an ambitious vision for tourism development, unfortunately that ambition was not really underpinned by any specific measures to strengthen MTB's position. It could be argued that MTB's lack of organising capacity to co-ordinate tourism policy was due to what appeared to be the opening up of an 'entrepreneurial deficit' within the organisation by the late 1980s. Perhaps, much of the blame for this entrepreneurial deficit can be placed on two kinds of conservatism: ideological conformism and risk-aversion of the programme schedule. It is often said that competition breeds similarity because everyone is looking over their shoulder to see whether they are the same (like having flagship developments and a calendar of events) rather than trying to be different. In the case of MTB, it is clear from Table 6.4 that the Board's promotional strategy represented a series of mechanical, formulaic and samey initiatives, significantly lacking in innovation and imagination. Therefore, it is not really surprising that it bedded down to become a relatively orthodox traditional programme for tourism promotion.

Perhaps it's easy to say in hindsight, but its clear today that much of MTB's thinking that underpinned this weak competitive approach was wrong. Most notably, by allowing its creative decision-making to become too risk-averse MTB underwent an ideological shift from *engaging* with competition, and being inspired by it, to *reacting* to it. The problem here is that any tourism organisation that reacts to competition simply by playing safe exposes itself to the danger of visitors become bored with what could be termed *safe tourism*. As such cities which are, in reality, distinctly different become homogenised with an endless repetition of standard devises, from flagship projects through festivals and events to cultural quarters (see for example, Griffiths, 1998; Holcomb, 1994; Short and Kim, 1998). Perhaps, this could

partly account for the drop in annual visitor figures for the Albert Dock from a high of 6.2m in 1990 to 4.4m in 1992 (MTCB, 1998). This 29 per cent decrease in visitor figures should certainly have been a cause for concern particularly when one considers that in 1992 the Tall Ships returned to Liverpool.

6.8 Conclusion

As already argued in Chapters 2 and 5, a primary way in which entrepreneurship has been promoted by government has been through support for public-private partnership. Crucially, government support for partnership may derive from the presumed capacity of partnerships to bring about transformation of cultures and practices, as it does from the anticipated efficiency and effectiveness benefits to regeneration projects. With regards to changing attitudes and practices, it is evident from the above discussion that in broad terms all the organisations met with some success. All for example, were willing to accept the need to change themselves, as well as aspire to change the attitudes and values of those involved in state institutions. This large scale cultural change through which hearts and minds could be engaged, was orchestrated through a political agenda which can be characterised as a strategy to reshape institutional arrangements and to erode the conventional distinctions between public and private sector, between state and market provision. Thus, the public sector was exhorted to become more like the private sector in its values and ways of working. In particular it was to become less bureaucratic and more business like. The shift from managerialism to entrepreneurialism intensified as did the range of new institutions and actors ceding control over tourism policy, during this phase. There did, however, appear to be widespread recognition amongst all parties that cultural 'transformation' was an integral part of the partnership agenda.

With respect to policy implementation, during this phase there was certainly more evidence of substantial action to implement entrepreneurial policies in order to promote the city's competitive position, than in the previous phase. Unfortunately, much of this effort was centred on individual organisations rather than on mutual collaboration. To this end, organisations tended to focus on in-house product and process improvements and there was an absence of widespread collaboration between them. In essence, all their corporate plans appeared to have been framed around a desire to draw down, spend and account for government grant-in-aid assistance with a particular emphasis on supporting their existing

programmes. Consequently, the fragmented nature of these partnerships denied opportunities for innovative action and a degree of local institutional capacity building that is essential for strong competitive approaches to tourism development. Indeed:

“Crucially, it is now suggested that the benefits of collaboration can overcome the negative externalities of corrosive competition and diseconomies of scale” (Raco, 1999, p.965).

The new opportunities for more integrated and coherent planning through the medium of the MTB was not grasped in this period. As argued above, to an extent this was the fault of MTB itself due in no small part to cultural conformism and the risk-aversion of its schedule, not least to secure funding and organise spend against a tight timetable. Consequently, the wealth of creative and technical talent (in MTB’s own terms) in Liverpool during this period could not be fully exploited until the likes of the MTB started to take risks instead of blaming failure on constraints of its own making, like schedules.

Nevertheless, failure to deliver the holy grail of city and/or regional competitive edge was not all of these organisations’ own making, struggles for resources and effective control of them was intense. During this period stark contradictions were evident in government policy which on the one hand, advocated entrepreneurship, freedom and initiative, yet, on the other, seemed set on producing rigid guidelines tailoring the funding activities of organisations including MDC, NMGM, MTB and Tate Liverpool. Indeed, as Atkinson (1999, p.63) argues government determines the ‘rules of the game’ that localities must accept if they wish to have the possibility of accessing scarce funds (Atkinson, 1999, p.63). In addition, the continuation of that success is dependent on the governments power to reprimand those institutions which engage in practices the government does not like (Painter, 1991, p.209). This was nowhere more evident than in the public censure of MDC highlighted above.

What should be apparent from the discussion so far is that these organisations entered a situation in this period, in which the resources and capacities necessary to exercise power and define the organisational context were heavily weighted against them. Whilst all were accorded a ‘voice’ in tourism discourses in pursuit of their aims, the limits for such internal debate were circumscribed by higher level discourses which specified the centrality of notions such as economic efficiency and effectiveness (with an emphasis on measurable tourism outputs). In effect, part of the problem came down to the mundane fact of whether there was

enough money in the kitty to take risks with. As such, it could be argued that during this period the city did not have a tourism climate that would support creativity and risk-taking in the long-term.

CHAPTER 7

PHASE III 1994-2000: CONSOLIDATING TOURISM GOVERNANCE IN LIVERPOOL

7.1 Introduction

The period 1994-2000 saw major changes in the tourism governance of Liverpool. In conjunction with the emergence of a more committed local elected politics, more importantly, a new supra-national tier of policy intervention was introduced in the form of EU Objective 1 structural funds. This Chapter will argue that the significance of these new tiers of policy intervention was not only the increased sources of funding they made available for the city, but also their influence on local governance and the type of competitive approach adopted. The need for economic development activity remained throughout this phase, given the structural defects in the local economy and the problems of unemployment and job loss. The response, in terms of tourism governance, was shaped by the increasing complexity of national, European and local governance relationships, the evolving notion of partnership, the accepted focus on place marketing, developing 'strategic sites' and key projects, and the emerging development of specialist governance agencies.

7.2 The Emerging Strategic Framework for Tourism

Arguably 1994 marked a major watershed for tourism development in Liverpool. Faced with an increasingly competitive and globalised economic environment, Liverpool found itself facing many economic, political and social challenges, particularly that of reducing unemployment. It is here that, in 1994 three major policy responses occurred. In September of this year Liverpool City Council published its first Unitary Development Plan (LCC, 1994b), which gave clear guidance on a wide range of land-use issues including tourism, and its first *Tourism Strategy and Action Plan* (LCC, 1994a) which set out the role of LCC in contributing to the development of the city's tourism industry over the 1994-95 period. More importantly, the Single Programming Document (SPD, November, 1994) for the Merseyside Objective 1 Programme was introduced. Despite the lack of a widely appreciated Liverpool vision these three plans represented a significant opportunity to stimulate tourism

development in Liverpool and to form part of wider efforts to develop a coherent framework for the city and, in the process, promote an ‘institutionally thick’ setting for tourism policy.

The Introduction of Merseyside’s Objective 1 Programme 1994-1999

In July 1993 the European Commission (EC) designated Merseyside an Objective 1 region within the European Union (EU). This was a clear indication of the depth and severity of economic and social disadvantage. The criteria for Objective 1 status is that a region’s per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is less than 75% of the EU average. Prior to 1993 Merseyside had been designated an Objective 2 region – a region ‘seriously affected by industrial decline. Objective 1, with an injection of £1.6 billion, made up of £650 million in grants and £950 million in matched funding from the private sector and public and voluntary sources (COI, Merseyside, 1998, p.1), represented a major opportunity for Merseyside to tackle its entrenched problems. In its capacity as provider funding support, the EC’ strategic role in UK regions marked the introduction of a new tier of government intervention in local economic development and a new influence on the growth of entrepreneurial governance.

Merseyside’s Objective 1 Programme was administered by a local partnership of representatives from the public, private and voluntary sectors, further and higher education, the three TEC’s and statutory agencies. They worked through a Monitoring Committee, two Technical Panels – one for Industrial Development and one for the people of Merseyside – supported by a secretariat. The secretariat was based in the Government Office for Merseyside. The basis on which the requisite funds from European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and European Social Fund (ESF) was to be spent and accounted for, was drawn up in Merseyside’s SPD. This provided an appropriate regional development strategy identifying a set of ‘drivers for change’ and associated measures designed to meet them. The five ‘economic driver’ priorities that underpin the SPD are shown in Table 7.1 below.

While tourism did not have a particular driver (see Table 7.1), the SPD (1994) did, however, emphasise that there should be a significant increase in support for the provision of tourism related projects:

“There is a crucial need to secure investment in growing sectors of the economy...Tourism is a growing industry on Merseyside and is a major potential source of investment and employment in the region” (p.30)

Table 7.1 Priorities in Merseyside’s Single Programming Document (SPD)

1. Inward investment and corporate business development
2. Development of indigenous enterprise and local business development
3. Knowledge-based industries and advanced technology development
4. Development of the cultural, media and leisure industries
5. Action for the people of Merseyside: Integration, community development and a better quality of life

Source CEC, 1994, November, p. 2

In broad terms all the priority measures to support Driver 4 action would have an influence on tourism development in the region. The five measures to support Driver 4 are shown in Table 7.2 below.

There is little doubt that the measures proposed in Table 7.2 in conjunction with EC Structural Funds support had the potential to make a significant contribution to the development of a ‘critical mass’ for tourism in the region. However, the delivery of the SPD on Merseyside has not been uncontroversial. Indeed, as will be argued in section 7.3 below, the involvement of the EU in Liverpool was a classic case of ‘contested governance’. These contests were indicative of the unequal power relationships and conflicting ideological stances on issues such as economic development policy and institutional (delivery) arrangement, being played out at the local level, local – national and local – national – supranational. Where all constantly sought to impose their mark on the structure, content and delivery of the SPD. Moreover, it will be suggested below that despite the scale of resource applied to the Objective 1 programme, in the case of tourism policy in particular, for the most part, innovation took second place to more pragmatic concerns in attempting to deliver orthodox approaches to development or what Jessop (1998) terms ‘reproduction regulation’.

Table 7.2 Measures to Support the Cultural, Media and Leisure Industries

MEASURE	KEY OBJECTIVES
4.1 The cultural and media industries of Merseyside: development of facilities for investors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To increase employment opportunities • To encourage indigenous growth in the cultural and media sector
4.2 Better quality in the cultural and media industries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assist the protection or creation of jobs • To make the qualifications of the workforce in the cultural/media field more relevant to market needs • Improve SME business performance and increase competitiveness in the cultural/media field
4.3 Attracting visitors to Merseyside: help for investment in festivals, events and tourist attractions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To increase visitor numbers and expenditure • Increase regional income and employment from tourism • Improve the region's endowment of tourist attractions and facilities • Improve the region's quality of accommodation and facilities • Ensure adequate and effective promotion of the industry
4.4 Improving quality and upgrading skills in the tourist industry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To improve the quality of service for tourists and visitors
4.5 Protecting and developing the natural and historic built environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To increase the number of buildings and sites brought back into productive or tourist use • To increase visitor numbers, and public understanding of these sites and habitats

Source CEC, 1994, pp.108-122

The Emergence of Liverpool City Council as a Key Player in the Tourism Policy Arena

In this phase the LCC also emerged to become a strategically significant player in the city's already heavily populated tourism policy arena. As was discussed in Chapter 6, the Council had recognised the importance of developing tourism as a focus for economic development. However, the foundations of tourism-led regeneration remained at best unstable due in no small part to the city's continuing fiscal problems and the lack of a coherent tourism strategy.

In 1994 this situation changed significantly. The Council was now in a position to undertake a much more formalised involvement in tourism development. This stemmed in a large part from the opportunity to access European Objective 1 funding. And the fact that a prerequisite of EU support for projects is that there must be an agreed local tourism strategy and that such tourism projects will attract visitors from outside the area. The Council's policy response was framed in two strategy documents: *Liverpool Unitary Development Plan* (LCC, 1994b) and *Tourism Strategy and 1994/95 Action Plan* (LCC, 1994a). Both plans recognised the need for a coherent tourism strategy which linked priorities to resources, agreed goals and actions. The Council also made a number of institutional improvements in its capacity to implement its strategy (see below).

Liverpool Unitary Development Plan (UDP)

This was Liverpool's first UDP and once adopted it was the only city wide development plan, replacing the Liverpool Development Plan (1958) and the Merseyside Structure Plan (1980). The Plan set the context for the Council's land use policies on issues such as housing, employment, transport and tourism. It has a time horizon of 10-15 years and deals with economic regeneration and environmental improvement.

Detailed tourism policy objectives (E10) are found in Part 2 of this Plan under the heading Economic Regeneration and these can be summarised as shown in Table 7.4 below:

Table 7.3 Summary of Liverpool UDP Tourism Policy Objectives

- Improve and protect key visitor attractions.
- Guiding the development of new tourist attractions and accommodation to appropriate locations, particularly within the city centre.
- Improve visitor support facilities.
- Carry out environmental improvements to key visitor linkages.
- Improve information and promotion facilities.
- Encourage and promote business tourism.
- Create and support employment and generate local income.
- Establish a flourishing economic sector, diversifying complementing and strengthening the city's economy.
- Enhance the image of the city as a place to visit, live, work and invest in.

Source: Liverpool Unitary Development Plan (LCC, 1994b, pp. 64-70)

Perhaps, the first point to make is that compared to the Council's 1987 policy document *A Tourism strategy for Liverpool – A Framework*, the 1994 UDP represents a distinct ideological shift in the Council's attitude towards tourism development. In the 1987 document LCC's ideological stance was underpinned by a view that tourism development was still very much a social welfare function (see Chapter 6). It is clear from Table 7.4 however, that by the start of this phase in 1994, the Council had undergone a marked shift in policy priorities, most notably the development of more activist, entrepreneurial strategies. Moreover, while both documents emphasise the importance of tourism as a means of job creation, unlike the 1987 document, the UDP makes no mention about the importance of the quality of jobs created. Indeed, perhaps the focus of the UDP is best summed up in the Council's own words:

“By encouraging proposals for a wide range of improved visitor attractions, the City Council will aim to maximise the contribution of leisure and tourism toward the economic and physical regeneration of the city” (LCC, UDP, p. 67).

The implementation of these policies is best seen in the City Council's two action plans discussed below.

LCC's Tourism Strategy and Action Plans 1994/95 and 1996/97

The City Council's strategic framework and consequent action programme aimed at sustaining the growth of tourism in Liverpool over the 1994-1997 period was set out in two documents, namely: *Tourism Strategy and 1994/95 Action Plan* and the *Tourism Strategy and 1996/97 Action Plan* (TAP). Both plans are based firmly on partnerships and co-ordinated action with other public, private and voluntary sector agencies. The implementation of the TAP's was focused around eight strategic development objectives:

1. Partnership
2. Training
3. Development
4. Marketing
5. Quality of Services to Visitors
6. Communication

7. Environment
8. Tourism for All

The primary purpose of the tourism strategy was to promote action on the ground in pursuit of the strategic objectives identified above. This was to be achieved through a combination of initiatives carried out directly by the City Council and /or through a series of partnerships with other agencies.

This shift towards a more corporate model in local government economic strategy was accompanied by a similar shift in tourism organisational values. The latter was clearly demonstrated by the establishment in 1994 of a Tourism, Arts and Heritage Service located within the Leisure Services Directorate, in order to provide the focus for the city council's tourism related programme and developments. Moreover, in the same year the Council established the Liverpool Tourism Advisory Forum, made up of representatives drawn from key agencies and organisations with an interest in the city's tourism industry. The aim was to provide an important means of discussing key strategic issues, development plans and for the development of partnership initiatives. According to the LCC (1994/95, p. 7, 1996/97, p. 10), this corporate re-organisation with its emphasis on Corporate management would provide a greater degree of co-ordinated and priority action across the key council services.

As already argued in Chapter 2 (see also Table 2.1), institutional arrangements oriented towards strong competition necessitate changing structures which promote the development of shared visions. It is noteworthy, that both TAPs were developed to complement, the key strategic context and action plans which would influence the future development of tourism in Liverpool (see Section 7.4). These included:

- Merseyside Objective 1 Programme 1994-1999
- Unitary Development Plan for Tourism and Economic Development
- Liverpool City Centre Plan
- English Tourist Board Strategy
- North West Tourist Board strategy – 'Building on Success'

7.3 Merseyside SPD: Issues of Contested Governance – Focal Points for Conflict

This section moves on to examine Merseyside's recent experience of Objective 1 status (1994-1999), with particular reference to the delivery of the region's SPD. In the UK the relationships between the plethora of key players in implementing Structural Funding are often conflictual. There is strong evidence that during 1994-1999 this had important impacts on the design and delivery of many, if not all, recipient regions' SPDs (see for example, Boland, 1999, 2000, Lloyd and Meegan, 1996). One major problem stems from the conflicting ideological stances which emerged between the UK Government and the EC. These arose from the fact that the (then) UK Government advocated a more flexible approach to economic development with institutional arrangements aimed at delivering policy and spending resources efficiently, rather than policies directed towards regional plans and regional governance structures which formed the key objectives of the EC. Indeed:

“By contrast with Europe, the UK's own version of regional industrial policy sees the beneficiary as the firm and not the region per se. This is consistent with an overarching view which has no concept of the region other than a container for programmes of various kinds operated under the auspices of national government” (Lloyd and Meegan, 1996, p.79).

This is the first tier of what has been referred to as contested multi-level governance “a multi-layered battle for control over policy direction and resource distribution (Boland, 1999, p.649).

Institutional Issues: The Delivery of Regional and Local Economic Development Policy and Resources in England

With regards to the above, this meant that the spatial scale of contested governance shifted downwards to those regions receiving support, whom were faced with the difficulty of preparing the strategy and delivery mechanisms for their SPDs while having to reconcile “the conflicting ideas and instructions emanating from Brussels and Whitehall” (Lloyd and Meegan, 1996, p.76). Nevertheless, at a time when UK regional policy was in decline and had been downgraded in Merseyside and more specifically in Liverpool, European regional policy offered assistance to the UK's disadvantaged regions. EU money was also allocated using clearly defined criteria and to areas which themselves were selected on the basis of

agreed rules. However, the research revealed a consensus of opinion among those in the local partnership which suggested that the UK government was substituting the cuts in regional policy with EU Funds:

“In the past the problem has been, and this is political, that we’ve had a government which looks upon European money as its own. The government know that any underspend in the programme goes back to the national treasury. I believe that the Government Office deliberately saved a proportion of total funding, so that it ultimately went back to the government” (Council Officer, LCC, interviewed, 14/1/99).

“The impression is that Whitehall wanted to spend as little money as possible, so they took advantage of EU funding by limiting the amount of central government assistance available for this area. The UK government also sees the European funds as their money which they can draw back from Government Office and they have certainly done this with ESF” (City Councillor, LCC, interviewed, 8/12/98).

From a local perspective, there were concerns expressed over the positioning of national government within the European programme. In particular, similar to the problems with national funding programmes dealt with by GO-NW, there were concerns over the role of Government Office for Merseyside in dealing with the European programme as they were accused of working to a national agenda which failed to represent the needs of the local area:

“The SPD has got priorities and measures, but the actual delivery of many of those measures is simply not within local peoples control. The resources have to be channelled through other bodies elsewhere, and the matching funding has to come from other bodies elsewhere, which don’t necessarily have the same priorities. This has led to a three way tension between Europe, Government Office and local partners” (Council Officer, LCC, interviewed, 26/1/99).

“I’ve been uncomfortable with Government Office Merseyside in terms of their commitment to delivering the European programme. They have become caught up in their own internal systems, there is very little local influence and they do not fully understand or appreciate this area. Quite simply we have received second rate support from the Government Office” (City Councillor, LCC, interviewed, 9/2/99).

There are also 'local' frustrations over the administration of the European programme. Both funding and policy from Europe was criticised as being bureaucratic and difficult to access. With a series of in-built delays making the release of funds a very slow process:

"In terms of European funding the process has been long, tedious, drawn out and red-taped. There are tourism projects that applied at the beginning of the year and only received approval at the end of that year or even half way through the following year" (Tourism Manager, Tourism Development Agency, interviewed, 25/11/98).

"I have great reservations about the way the whole Objective One structure works. When you work with European schemes you have to deal with the regional, national and European bureaucracy. That bureaucracy is not in parallel it is in series, so you have got to get through the lot, and then it comes back down through the same structure" (Inner City Regeneration Committee, member, LCC, interviewed, 20/10/98).

"The biggest problem we've got with European funding is the bureaucracy since it takes months filling in all the forms and going through all the hoops. In the first few years it was mayhem, and we wasted an awful lot of opportunities to further tourism development in the city" (Chairperson, Leisure and Tourism Committee, LCC, interviewed, 1/10/98).

The availability of EU funding also had implications for local governance as it began to have a significant influence on shaping the nature of partnership. In many cases the 'partnership' has been created as a marriage of convenience to conform with the culture of grant-chasing (Jones and Ward, 1998). It certainly appeared that a large number of agencies began to adopt a strategy which attempted to meet the criteria of funding rather than the specific need of the area:

"It is about meeting the funding criteria, and that is about using the correct jargon, and current buzz words like sustainable tourism, capacity building, additionality and transparency. All these things massively increase your chances of getting the cash" (Council Officer, LCC, interviewed, 18/2/99)

"If EU money is available then you go for it and that's where I start from. A good bid is tailor-made to meet the criteria set down by the EU programme. My point is let's use the money on offer and worry about justifying it to the funders later" (Opposition Spokesperson, Economic Development Committee, LCC, interviewed, 30/10/98).

"You try to set up whatever partnership is necessary in order to draw down money to support a project. Because it's been promoted by Europe and the UK government that anything you do has to have its own partnership which

forces you to work with others” (Spokesperson, Liverpool Architects and Design Trust, interviewed, 20/1/99).

Asymmetries of Power

So far the discussion has demonstrated how the competing ideologies of the UK government and the EC over economic policy adversely affected the delivery of Merseyside’s SPD, particularly in terms of resource allocation. This problem, however, was further compromised by the fact that the geometry of power within the regional partnership on Merseyside during the 1994/99 period was characterised by unequal power relationships. In essence, the decision-making process was dominated by the key players, with the GOM in pole position, ably supported by the five local authorities, the three TECs, MDC and other local quasi-public agencies and local privatised utilities (see for example, Boland, 1999, 2000; Lloyd and Meegan, 1996).

As already argued in Chapter 2, the ‘new’ governance claims to embrace the capacity of power to act, as actors and agencies attempt to blend their resources, skills and purpose into a viable and sustainable partnership. However, the research found no evidence to support this pluralist account of power within Merseyside’s SPD decision-making process. In fact, the findings represent an almost studied reversal.

There has been a limited role for the marginal players, such as voluntary and community groups, trade unions and other social partners. Local public officials voiced their misgivings at the lack of community empowerment. A fundamental problem facing these groups is their inability to generate matching resources:

“The big problem for Liverpool communities is they can’t get hold of matching funds to fund their projects. In my Ward [name of ward] for example, we have put community bids in that were creative and new. But we can’t even get these projects off the ground never mind up and running. You are talking big money, so who will take the risk on a community which may have no record of past achievements” (City Councillor, LCC, interviewed, 8/2/99).

“One of the problems with European funding, is the need to match it all the time. I know you shouldn’t just throw money into somewhere, but the very fact that you’ve got to match it means you’ve got to find it. This restricts what you can do and restricts who can do it. So locally it is heavily dependent on LCC or large organisations like the Mersey Partnership,

National Museums and Galleries and the MDC who have matching resources that they can put in" (Council Officer, LCC, interviewed, 17/2/99)

"In the past, community and voluntary groups have put some real imaginative ideas on the table. But because they can't come up with the money to match fund these projects then, these ideas get high-jacked by the big institutions who do have the money, so they come in and take over. 'Where is the community empowerment in that?'" (City Councillor, LCC, interviewed, 20/1/99).

From the discussion so far, it would appear that the problem of unequal power relations in the SPD decision making process arose in no small part from differential access to knowledge, expertise and resources. In the entrepreneurial economy, competition becomes the driving force of progress where, knowledge and power are inextricably bound together in a context of domination which privileges certain groups over others. In the case above, this process of privileging stemmed from the fact that the key players had the necessary power bases, expertise and resources at their disposal which, combined with a familiarity of the bureaucratic rules of the game under previous EC Funding programmes (Merseyside Objective 2 Structural Fund programme 1989-1993) allowed them to monopolise the process. Turning to the question of power relations between participants in a partnership:

"Partnerships frequently recreate existing relations of economic, social and political dependency thereby effectively perpetuating the position of the disempowered" (Stewart and Taylor, 1995, p.63).

Consequently, it is crucial to examine the geometry of power within partnerships in order to see which interests are involved, what their aims are and how they obtain their capacity to act. Jessop (1998,1997) argues that power arrangements directed towards strong competition need to adopt an open approach to decision-making where power is dispersed as widely as possible and exercised as locally as practicable. In contrast, power arrangements in weak competitive approaches are centred around 'representative' as opposed to participatory democracy (see for example, Table 2.2 above). From the above discussion, it is beyond doubt that the competitive approach adopted to deliver the region's SPD was underpinned by weak competition.

To sum up, the introduction of the European tier of regional policy effectively complicated the governance picture as intervention was now taking place at local, regional, national and supra-national levels. With so many influences and bureaucracies involved in local economic

development there inevitably emerged contests and tensions with regard to the effective working of the European Objective 1 programme. However, what is clear is that the introduction of Structural Funds into Merseyside provided an impetus to local regeneration. Significantly, the influence of Europe had three clear implications in shaping the local regime. First, European policy reinforced the UK government's movement towards governance. Secondly, it reiterated the importance of working in partnership. Finally, it set funding priorities which informed the local accumulation strategy adopted by local governance. Nevertheless, as Lloyd and Meegan (1996, p.85) contend once UK SPDs emerged from the negotiation process, their policy content shared a common degree of standardisation and uniformity, significantly lacking in innovation (see Sections 7.5 and 7.6 below).

7.4 Some Examples of EU Influence on Tourism Policy at the Local Level

Tourism development in Liverpool was also significantly influenced by developments in local politics during this final phase. As already argued in Section 7.2 above, both the City Council's TAPs 1994/95 and 1996/97 identified tourism as a key growth sector in Liverpool and both these documents provided (in their terms) a context for intervention, with a clear strategy for implementation, firmly based on a partnership model. Moreover, the strategic objectives identified for tourism within Merseyside's SPD, most specifically measure 4.3; 4.4; 4.5 under Driver 4 (see Table 7.1 and 7.2 above), are central to those identified in the two TAPs. The primary aim of the City Council's Tourism Strategy and Action Programmes was to develop a critical mass of tourism attractions and facilities in the City. This was to be achieved through the city council developing its role in three distinct ways:

- As an operator of three key tourist attractions: St Georges Hall; Town Hall and Croxteth Hall/Country Park
- As a partner and facilitator to tourism related developments, events/festivals and targeted promotional initiatives;
- Achieve improvements in the quality of the environment, infrastructure and services in key tourist area in the city

The EU influence on UK regional policy was further evidenced by the fact that in November 1995 Liverpool city Council published its Objective One City Centre strategy *Ambitions For The City Centre*. This report sets out a strategy to guide and justify Objective 1 projects submitted by the City Council and others. According to the 1995 report:

development there inevitably emerged contests and tensions with regard to the effective working of the European Objective 1 programme. However, what is clear is that the introduction of Structural Funds into Merseyside provided an impetus to local regeneration. Significantly, the influence of Europe had three clear implications in shaping the local regime. First, European policy reinforced the UK government's movement towards governance. Secondly, it reiterated the importance of working in partnership. Finally, it set funding priorities which informed the local accumulation strategy adopted by local governance. Nevertheless, as Lloyd and Meegan (1996, p.85) contend once UK SPDs emerged from the negotiation process, their policy content shared a common degree of standardisation and uniformity, significantly lacking in innovation (see Sections 7.5 and 7.6 below).

7.4 Some Examples of EU Influence on Tourism Policy at the Local Level

Tourism development in Liverpool was also significantly influenced by developments in local politics during this final phase. As already argued in Section 7.2 above, both the City Council's TAPs 1994/95 and 1996/97 identified tourism as a key growth sector in Liverpool and both these documents provided (in their terms) a context for intervention, with a clear strategy for implementation, firmly based on a partnership model. Moreover, the strategic objectives identified for tourism within Merseyside's SPD, most specifically measure 4.3; 4.4; 4.5 under Driver 4 (see Table 7.1 and 7.2 above), are central to those identified in the two TAPs. The primary aim of the City Council's Tourism Strategy and Action Programmes was to develop a critical mass of tourism attractions and facilities in the City. This was to be achieved through the city council developing its role in three distinct ways:

- As an operator of three key tourist attractions: St Georges Hall; Town Hall and Croxteth Hall/Country Park
- As a partner and facilitator to tourism related developments, events/festivals and targeted promotional initiatives;
- Achieve improvements in the quality of the environment, infrastructure and services in key tourist area in the city

The EU influence on UK regional policy was further evidenced by the fact that in November 1995 Liverpool city Council published its Objective One City Centre strategy *Ambitions For The City Centre*. This report sets out a strategy to guide and justify Objective 1 projects submitted by the City Council and others. According to the 1995 report:

“The city Centre is crucial to the regeneration of Merseyside. It is the most important location on Merseyside for shaping and influencing the area’s image. More than this, Liverpool City Centre must have the central role in achieving the Objective 1 vision for Merseyside” (LCC, 1995, p.3).

This report takes the following form. First, it sets out the Objective 1 policy context. Secondly, it assesses the City Centre’s key assets and opportunities. Here the aim is to target job creating investment in the cultural and media industries, tourism and leisure, higher education, the office sector and retailing, and to develop Liverpool as a 24 hour City, making the best use of its physical, cultural and economic assets. Above all “it will use the City centre as a shop window – a prime focus for giving the city an exciting, dynamic and attractive image” (p.1). Finally, this leads to the formulation (in their terms) of realistic ‘ambitions’ for the City Centre, and a related set of strategic Themes and Objectives. These were to be refined and amplified in discussion with various departments within the city Council and with other agencies.

In a similar vein, the approval of Merseyside’s SPD brought about changes in Merseyside Development Corporation’s priorities in the last years of its development work. To this end, the Corporation recognised its role in delivering the objectives of the SPD within its designated area and the delivery of the Programme to the Merseyside region in its wider context. MDC’s priority to support efforts to increase tourism focused on SPD Driver 4: The Cultural, Media and Leisure Industries (see for example, MDC, 1997b, pp.2-3), and in particular the following SPD measures:

- 4.1 Development of facilities for cultural, media and leisure industries
- 4.3 Attracting visitors to Merseyside; and
- 4.5 Protecting and developing the natural and historic built environment

The introduction of the SPD also resulted in a significant repositioning of the Corporation in the local policy arena. According to Meegan (1999, p.39) this £1.6 billion spending programme for the period 1994-1999 not only meant that, politically, the MDC was no longer “the only regeneration show in town” but was also able to position its development activities in a broader strategic planning framework for Merseyside as a whole. He went on to argue that with representation on the Monitoring Committee, and advisory sub-committees, the MDC was able to relate its own priorities to those set out in the SPD.

background of continuing uncertainty about core public sector funding, European funding has been invaluable” (LCC, Chairperson, Leisure and Tourism Committee, interviewed, 1/10/98)

Table 7.4: Merseyside’s Top 20 Awards from Objective 1 Budget 1994-1999

Merseyside Special Investment Fund: £16.1m	Knowsley Industrial Park, Phase 2: £4.3m
Speke – Garston Development Company: £14.07m	LCC: Old Hall Street Zone: £4.126m
LCC: Rope Walks Action Plan: £9.15m	National Museums and Galleries on Merseyside: £3.649m
North Liverpool Business Association: £8.89m	LCC: Beatles Themed Hard Days Night Hotel: £3.285m
Liverpool Airport Development Phase 2: £8m	Knowsley Industrial Park Rail Freight Terminal: £3.250m
Merseyside Passenger Transport Authority: £6.1m	Sefton MBC: Southport Ocean Plaza: £3.25m
Knowsley MBC: Development Partnership: £6.012m	Sefton MBC: Bootle Town Centre Developments: £3.190m
Sefton MBC: Atlantic Park Phase 1: £4.747m	Merseyside TEC: £3.096m
Liverpool Airport Development Phase 1: £4.7m	English Partnerships: Queens Square Hotel: £3.0m
English Partnerships: Speke Garston Additional Works: £4.42m	LCC: Merseyside ACME: £2.97m

Source: Liverpool Daily Post ‘Business Week Supplement’, January 12, 2000, p.2

The firming up of the Objective 1 funding regime for Merseyside also paved the way for the two high profile image campaigns launched by TMP during this phase (see Section 7.5 below). Subsequently, the importance of European funding proved crucial to the establishment of the Partnership’s mandate:

“An image campaign has always been at the centre of our objectives, yet when the Partnership was formed in April 1993, with just six founder-members, we had neither the human resources, the budget or the mandate to consider attempting such a challenge” (TMP, Director, interviewed, 1/2/99).

In total, there is little doubt that the Merseyside SPD laid the foundation for much of the public sector intervention in the Liverpool economy during the period 1994-1999 (see for example, LCC, 1995, 1997, 1998/99, 1999/2000). Moreover, achieving the objectives of the SPD was deemed crucial (by all parties in the negotiation process) for enhancing the region’s relative competitive position. In the case of tourism, there is no doubt that Objective 1 has had a significant impact in unlocking much of the potential of Liverpool’s tourism resources. Major infrastructure schemes such as the Rope Walks Action Plan, Liverpool Airport

Development Plan, improvements to key tourist assets such as the Tate, NMGM, and the Liverpool Playhouse Theatre (see Tables 7.4 and 7.5), and support for re-imaging campaigns (see Section 7.5) and training programmes (see Section 7.6) made probably the most significant contribution to the growth and prosperity of the city's tourism industry during this phase and for that matter to date.

Table 7. 5: Tourism Based ERDF Projects in Liverpool 1994-1999

Measure	Applicant	Project	ERDF	Total Cost	Grant Rate
1.1	MDC	Albert Docks Blocks E & B-Structural Work	£983,527	£2,754,977	35.70%
1.3	TMP	Programme for Investment & Tourism	£1,378,000	£3,426,000	40.22%
4.3	TMP	The Grand National Festival	£42,000	£91,500	45.90%
4.3	MTCB	The Tourism Campaign	£500,000	£1,760,000	28.41%
4.3	MTCB	The Tourism Campaign-Phase 2	£243,000	£681,000	35.68%
4.3	Tate	Tate Liverpool-Phase 2 Developments	£1,500,000	£6,819,698	22.00%
4.5	NMGM	NMGM 2001-Building Programme	£3,649,000	£14,933,246	24.44%
4.1	LCC	Liverpool Playhouse Refurbishment	£1,256,437	£2,610,408	48.13%
4.3	LCC	Events, Festivals & Celebrations	£150,000	£795,000	18.87%
4.3	LCC	Liverpool Tourism Signage Scheme	£44,235	£110,235	40.13%
4.4	LCC	Croxteth Hall & Country Park (Phase 3)	£100,000	£445,000	22.47%
4.5	LCC	Sefton Park Palm House	£110,750	£1,848,000	5.99%
4.5	LCC	Victorian Parks Restoration	£510,000	£1,020,000	50.00%
5.7	LADT	River of Light	£420,000	£927,067	45.30%
4.3	MSMF	The Mathew Street Music Festival	£50,000	£192,307	26.00%
4.3	EP	Queens Square Hotel & Associated Car Park	£3,000,000	£13,001,020	23.08%
4.3	ET Trust	Empire Theatre L'pool (Development)	£300,000	£3,330,259	9.01%
4.5	ET Trust	Empire Theatre (Refurbishment)	£200,000	£449,245	44.52%
4.3	NWDA	Speke Aerodrome Complex	£2,289,084	£4,736,988	48.32%
4.5	FSPPH	Sefton Park Palm House Phase 2 Works	£16,000	£32,000	50.00%
4.5	Railtrack	Lime Street Station Regeneration	£76,000	£200,000	38.00%
4.3	CQI	Beatles Tourism Project	£33,800	£71,800	47.08%
2.2	NWTB	Merseyside Tourism SME Support Initiative	£10,500	£39,000	26.92%
4.1	UT	Unity Theatre Building Development	£340,539	£1,411,853	24.12%

Source: Government Office North West (2000)

Note

LADT – Liverpool Architects and Design Trust

EP – English Partnerships

FSPPH – Friends of Sefton Park Palm House

CQI – Cavern Quarter Initiative

UT – Unity Theatre

However, as has been argued throughout this thesis, when assessing tourism projects against a framework (in this case the SPD), it is essential to establish the extent to which the approaches to secure competitiveness are oriented towards strong versus weak entrepreneurialism. Subsequently, Section 7.5 and 7.6 below, will attempt to assess Merseyside's performance in delivering outputs within the agreed SPD strategy. The focus here is on two key issues:

- Place promotion
- Job creation/education and training provision

These are particularly important because they underpin the key principles of the Structural Funds philosophy under Driver 4 of the SPD.

7.5 Place Promotion Delivery Mechanisms: Strong Versus Weak Competition

There is little doubt that the city's 'image' was at the core of much of its regeneration strategy during this phase (see for example, LCC, 1995, 1997/1998, 1999/2000; MTCB, 1995,1998; TMP, 1995, 1998, 1999; MDC, 1994/95, 1995/96, 1996/97, 1998). It will be argued below that the movement towards full-blown 'place marketing' in the global market place for inward investment in this phase, was reinforced to a significant extent by European regional policy. According to the SPD (1994) to create the conditions under which private sector investment (inward or indigenous) is forthcoming, requires the strategy to overcome a number of major obstacles, most notably, "poor external perceptions, coupled with inadequate promotion of the region" (p.28), consequently, "targeted action to overcome the image problem" (p.29) is crucial. Subsequently, this section will examine the competitive approaches adopted and their impact upon the image and external perception of Liverpool.

Liverpool's Image Problem

"With many mixed industrial areas seeking to develop a veneer of tourism, the 'Achillies heel' is often their modest, perhaps negative, image to outsiders" (Ball and Stobart, 1998, p.347). When it comes to looking at place marketing in further detail, Liverpool is instructive. It is arguably the only city in Britain (apart from London) upon which other Britons have definite opinions and it is perceived a city of problems where the people

themselves are seen as part of the problem (Lane, 1997). Although the image held by outsiders is predominately negative, many insiders would consider this outdated. One explanation for this is the media image, which local people frequently blame for the city's bad reputation. From the *New Statesmen* to the *Economist*, and *The Times* to the BBC, not to mention the tabloids, a coherent imagery of the city has been presented, an imagery which in effect constituted a stereotype. The stereotype is of a poverty stricken, run-down, depressing city with seemingly insurmountable social and employment problems. To make matters worse, during the 1980s the city was run by so called loony left wingers. The following incident shows what bizarre dimensions this image can sometimes take on:

“In Grantham (birthplace of Margaret Thatcher), an estate developer applied to the district council for permission to rename a street, Liverpool Close, as Ipswich Gardens. Allegedly the houses on Liverpool Close had been unsaleable for three years, unlike those in adjacent streets” (*Independent*, 17 June 1991, cited in Madsen, 1992, p.633).

Such reactions are not exceptional. As a result, it became increasingly clear as the 1990s progressed that the urban regeneration of Liverpool must be accompanied by 'reimaging' strategies. Consequently, since the mid-nineties great efforts and large sums of money most notably EU funding assistance (see Table 7.4 above) have been put into improving this image through extensive place-marketing.

The Promotion of Liverpool

In this phase the new governance was structured around two dominant public-private partnerships which set the agenda for place marketing at the city-wide level. The two dominant partnerships were The Mersey Partnership (TMP) and the Merseyside Tourism and Conference Bureau (MTCB). As far as the LCC was concerned “Given the scope of activity embraced by tourism in Liverpool, The City Council's role will be more about 'management of tourism' rather than mass marketing and promotion” (LCC, 1994/95, p.8).

Merseyside Tourism and Conference Bureau (MTCB)

In December 1994 MTCB secured European Objective 1 funding of £500,000 towards a £1.76m tourism campaign to run from January 1995 to March 1997. Match funding for the

campaign comes from Bureau's public and private sector partners and other Bureau income (MTCB, 1998,p.3). According to MTCB's 1995 Annual Report their success in attracting EU funding made a vital contribution not only to promoting the growth and development of high impact activity but also to improve the quality and quantity of data available to monitor the performance of tourism on Merseyside. (p.2-5) (see Section 7.7). To this end, MTCB was fully committed to working in partnership with others to bring about sustainable economic growth to Merseyside. As the representative organisation for public and private sector tourism interests MTCB worked closely with agencies including NWTB, TMP, MDC, Business Links, Liverpool City Centre Partnership and Government Office for Merseyside to capitalise on the area's tourism potential.

The Bureau had two broad corporate aims:

- 1 To maximise the economic benefits of Merseyside as a visitor destination by:-
 - Attracting more visitors
 - Encouraging visitors to stay longer and spend more money locally
- 2 To lever in and stimulate more private sector investment (inward and indigenous)

Most of the funds have been committed to enhancing key Bureau promotional programmes (see Table 7.5 below). According to MTCB, (1995, 1997) this had led to better, more comprehensive marketing and research publications, more familiarisation visits and exhibitions attended and enhanced media coverage as well as joint ventures with private sector partners. These increased resources also enabled the Bureau to widen its membership base to ensure private businesses were playing their role in the marketing of Merseyside and Liverpool in particular, as a tourist destination. It is worthy to note that "During 1995, the Bureau welcomed many new members bringing the total to 190. Membership revenue now amounts to £50,000 excluding public sector core contributions" (MTCB, 1995 Annual Report, p.4). Table 7.6 below shows the allocation of MTCB Objective 1 Funds over this period.

Table 7.6: Allocation of MTCB Objective One Funds

Promotional Programmes	1994/95 £000	1995/96 £000	1996/97 £000
Business/Conference Visitor Programme	20	72	77
Leisure Visitor Programme	21	122	128
Providing a Warmer Welcome	20	20	20
Total Objective One	61	214	225

Source: MTCB, Annual Report 1995, p.11

The Mersey Partnership (TMP)

During this period EU funding enabled TMP to launch two high profile image campaigns. In the Autumn of 1993 the Partnership secured an allocation of £1 million from Brussels for 1994 and 1995, some 35% of total funding on the understanding that the Image Campaign became a central theme (TMP, 1995, p.2). The first was launched on June 14, 1995 and used the slogan “Merseyside a ‘pool of talent’”, the budget for Year One of the campaign was £660,000 (TMP, 1995,p.3). TMP’s agency brief spelt out the Image Campaign’s objectives: nationally, to promote the strengths and correct any perceived weakness of the area; locally, to champion Merseyside and create a sense of self esteem. The programme had three targets: to bring in investment, to bolster business confidence, and to help create a sustainable economic future for Merseyside.

The whole point of the campaign was not to try to change the Merseysider so much as the outside world’s perception of him or her. Subsequently, it sought to reverse the worst Merseyside stereotypes by using them as promotional devises. To this end, two posters underpinned the campaign. Harry Enfield’s scousers are an extreme parody of accent and social misfortune. So one poster depicted a look-alike complete with black wig and all with the caption “To make a Japanese worker even more productive, turn him into a Scouser”. The poster draws attention to the fact that Merseyside’s car industry has adopted proven Japanese production methods and working practices. Hence Merseyside workers are 12% more productive than the national average. To combat poor labour relations which have been a

bone-of-contention for many years in Liverpool, the second poster depicted Liverpool football stars Ian Rush and Robbie Fowler with the caption “Liverpool is down to a handful of strikers”. Somewhat embarrassingly the latter had to be scrapped after a wave of industrial action in Merseyside within months of the campaign launch (*Liverpool Daily Post*, 19/11/98, p.10).

In contrast to the ‘Bradford’s bouncing back’ and ‘Glasgow’s miles better’ campaigns which were directed to attracting a more general interest in the city, whether that be for tourism, leisure and recreation, business or education. “Merseyside a ‘pool of talent’” was more directed towards encouraging prospective employers to consider a Merseyside location with a Merseyside workforce. The campaign was hailed a success by TMP:

“Our research shows a genuine increase in investment enquiries resulting from the previous campaign [“Merseyside a ‘pool of talent’”]. That was perfect for the audience we were aiming at. We showed that Merseyside has some unique qualities which makes it very attractive to businesses” (Marketing Director, TMP, interviewed, 1/2/99).

While the research found a consensus of opinion regarding the need for an image campaign, a number of interviewees questioned the use of what they saw as outdated images of Liverpool:

“You see absolutely pitiful self defeating attempts by Merseyside Partnership in particular, to attract inward investment in Liverpool. For example, you have an image of Fowler and Rush saying they are the only two strikers left on Merseyside and that is actually reinforcing that sort of popular mythology about the city’s public relations records or whatever” (Spokesperson for Liverpool Democracy Commission, interviewed, 6/5/99).

“In a city which uses its own misfortune as a source of humour the Scouser stereotype is strong enough as it is, without posters adding to it” (City Councillor, interviewed, 3/2/99).

TMP’s second image campaign costing £500,000 was launched in November 1998 and is in stark contrast to the previous campaign. An unusual feature of the campaign is the absence of a recognisable slogan. However, this was a conscious decision on the part of the three advertising agencies involved McCann-Erikson of London, together with Liverpool companies Finch Advertising and Kaleidoscope, because the late 1990s public is believed to be suffering from ‘slogan fatigue’ (*Liverpool Echo*, 19/11/98). In a bid to challenge negative

stereotypes of life in Merseyside, billboard adverts which revolve around the theme of “putting the ‘me’ back into Merseyside were placed on major commuter routes into London and on the London underground, magnifying the region’s quality of life in a bid to attract young executives. In conjunction with the poster campaign, a comprehensive Internet website, lifestyle brochures for interested companies and organisations, an accompanying CD ROM package was introduced, all part of the drive to bolster the image of Merseyside as offering a superior life style to London and the South East. According to Christopher Gibaud the then Chief Executive of TMP “My belief is that this is the best approach” (TMP, 1995, p.6)

The speculative Nature of Place Marketing

As already argued in Chapter 2, as with all forms of entrepreneurial image enhancing strategies the policies pursued are inherently speculative. The meanings encoded by urban elites whether by means of landscape projects, publicity campaigns or spectacular events, are always subject to negotiation and challenge (see for example, Griffiths, 1998; Hall and Hubbard, 1996). Alternative meanings critical or otherwise damaging to official narratives of revitalisation, can be advanced intentionally or unintentionally, by dissatisfied local populations or by outside forces. Unwelcome media coverage, unexpected events and other eventualities can all seriously dent elaborately and expensively orchestrated image campaigns, and in this respect it would be fair to say that Liverpool has suffered more than most. Apart from international media attention in the wake of the three defining tragedies of Liverpool’s recent history: Heysel, Hillsborough and the murder of toddler James Bulger, and the ‘dockers’ strike which lasted for two and a half years (making it the longest strike in history) ending in January 1998 with the dismissal of the 330 workers involved. The city’s image has been further tarnished by a number of television documentaries portraying life in the city. A very recent example and one that has probably invoked more controversy than any other was the BBC2 series *Mersey Blues* a five-part fly-on-the-wall documentary which focused on the Liverpool police, the first episode being shown in January 1999. The programme which at the outset informed viewers that “Crime has practically become a career option for some in Merseyside” received severe criticism throughout the city. One of Merseyside’s image-makers, Chris Gibaud, the Chief executive of Mersey Partnership said the programme gave a ‘decayed’ view of Merseyside (*Liverpool Daily Post* 9/1/99, p.9). Likewise, Norman Bettison Merseyside’s chief constable strongly condemned the programme for being ‘sensationalist’

and misleading. Mike Storey leader of the City Council said “We are like a pot of honey for the television documentary makers. They come here in droves and try to portray a life in Merseyside which is not as we know it” (*Liverpool Daily Post*, 17/5/99, p.3). Whilst this documentary series may have made good viewing for the lay person, its impact on both the image and economy of the city was felt almost immediately:

“I would have preferred if ‘Mersey Blues’ had not been screened, the shame of it is that it reinforces this bad image in peoples minds. Unfortunately the only people other than the police shown in the programme were hardened criminals, you are not seeing the ordinary people of the area. My clients view is that it has been quite damaging” (PR Director, interviewed, 16/2/99).

“The programme Mersey Blues has cost us up to now a couple of hundred jobs in this area, because somebody was going to bring in a business in the Sefton area and they have now reneged against it because they have seen the programme and heard about it” (Group Chief Executive, Investment Management Group, interviewed, 18/1/99).

Once having embarked on the image reconstruction route such a challenge could not be ignored, whether it was right or wrong. Subsequently, to parody the controversial *Mersey Blues* documentary, Mersey Partnership put together and sent out a national promotional package labelled ‘Mersey Blues – The Reality’. This comprised a written and recorded compilation of positive comments from figures in Liverpool (*Liverpool Daily Post*, 14/1/99). Likewise, Norman Bettison the Chief Constable sent in the report, to more than 60 individuals or groups on Merseyside explaining that since the programme was made (filming stopped in March 1998 but legal problems prevented the programmes being broadcast at that time) the situation on Merseyside and nationally had changed.

This defensive and somewhat insular attitude within the city towards what is seen as adverse publicity can in effect mask the actual cause of the problem. In this particular case it could be argued that Merseyside police were largely responsible for the bad publicity that followed the programme. Jenny Crowther the producer of *Mersey Blues* when asked why they chose Merseyside said “We spoke to a number of different forces and the reason we chose Merseyside was simply that they were so helpful” (*Liverpool Daily Post*, 9/1/99, p.5). A Detective Chief Inspector who figured prominently in the programme was arrested and jailed for five years after being found guilty of passing on confidential information to major

criminals, another senior officer in the programme is still under investigation. In one episode the police even get locked in an office they have broken into on the trail of hard drugs and are heard to say 'We're the police. Can you let us out?' Consequently, it is not really surprising when a national newspaper such as the *Observer* describes the programme as a "fly-on-the-wall series that shames corrupt and stupid Liverpool police" (10/1/99, p.14).

No sooner has Liverpool picked up the pieces of its shattered image following the *Mersey Blues* series than another television series *Nightclub* appeared menacingly on the scene. The BBC2 programme shows life at the city's famous Grafton club. The documentary was heavily criticised by civic leaders and the local media for raking up negative images of Liverpool, indeed, Mike Storey the City Council leader called on documentary makers to stop stoking up popular stereo-types of Liverpool life. Ironically, the programme was made for the BBC by Liverpool based independent production company Planet Wild. The series director Sol Papadopoulos said he was prepared for the usual outcry from 'blinkerered' members of the public who view any film here as an intrusion (*Liverpool Daily Post* ,17/5/99).

Although is too early to suggest how successful TMP's latest image campaign may be, due to the periodisation of the research, the local *Daily Post* along with Radio Merseyside asked a number of people to give their initial opinions. The newspaper (19/11/98, p.10) reports that when canvassed for his opinion top marketing guru Alan Mitchell, lead columnist for the magazine *Marketing Week*, warned that the drawback with this kind of campaign is that most advertising is only noticed by the people who are thinking about the subject in hand. In this case people would have to be thinking about moving north before the adverts would have any impact on them, "and I wonder how many executives in London are doing that?".

Likewise the campaign came under fire from public relations guru Max Clifford. He said in a radio interview that the Mersey Partnership has wasted a golden opportunity to put Merseyside on the map by concentrating on the wrong issues. Organising golf demonstrations for regular commuters down at Euston station, in order to talk to them about the quality of life on Merseyside, is totally stupid. "Liverpool is about the Beatles and football, not golf. You've got to play to your strengths....You have the hottest football star in the country when you have got Michael Owen, now if he was to start to talk to young people about how wonderful it is in Liverpool, that will have a far greater effect than someone

knocking golf balls at one of the stations in London. I am sorry but I don't think it will work" (Roger Phillips phone in programme, Radio Merseyside 27/1/99).

In the same radio interview Chris Gibaud, then chief executive of TMP acknowledged that Max Clifford had made some very obvious points, but stressed that he had in fact, missed the main one:

"Max Clifford assumes we are purely talking about promoting Liverpool but this is a Merseyside campaign and it is extremely important that we get across the fact that it is the whole area and the strengths of the whole area that has to be projected, that is extremely important, we are not just focusing on Liverpool here" (Roger Phillips phone in, Radio Merseyside 27/1/99).

When asked for their opinions as to whether the marketing focus should be on the region rather than the city or vice-versa, interviewees had very clear views on this issue and fell into two distinct groups. Amongst those directly involved in marketing (albeit a small minority), there was a consensus that Merseyside should lead. This was seen as particularly important when it comes to business, where it was argued business people want more than just the city, they want to be able to live in the world outside, to this end, the region's golf courses were frequently mentioned. Additionally, a number of respondents pointed out that the city centre has not got a big enough base to encourage more tourism or certain types of business, examples given included lack of bed spaces and facilities for large call centres. Therefore, it was argued that if these facilities are only available outside the area then you have to promote the region more than just the city. One could argue, however, that all cities are limited with regard to the amount of facilities they can provide and to an extent must rely on their regional infrastructure for support nevertheless, this has not stopped the more successful cities such as Glasgow, New York and Barcelona from focusing internally.

Moreover, when one considers that Liverpool City centre is the most important location on Merseyside for shaping and influencing the area's image and that in economic terms, Merseyside cannot succeed if the City Centre fails (Objective One City Centre Strategy November 1995, p.3) then this raises questions as to the logic in marketing Liverpool on the back of Merseyside:

"When I first came here I highlighted what I thought were six major weaknesses in the city. The first over-riding weakness which I corresponded to the City Council and the Mersey Partnership was about the use of the name Liverpool. Liverpool is a world-wide name it is known globally

Merseyside isn't. Now that we are in a global economy we need every advantage we can get so I think we should be using the name Liverpool far more extensively to promote the whole of Merseyside" (Hotel Manager, interviewed 26/5/99)

"I think over a period of years Merseyside has been marketed by the Mersey Partnership and they represent the five districts that make up Merseyside, and it has been Merseyside that has been plugged, to an extent at the expense of Liverpool" (Head of City Centre Development Team, interviewed 27/1/99)

"I think promoting Merseyside over Liverpool is just a way of accommodating political sensitivities here" (Journalist, *Liverpool Daily Post*, interviewed 19/1/99)

"We need to market ourselves as Liverpool not Merseyside, I think there is a real imbalance there. When you are targeting visitors from outside the UK they have no idea where Merseyside is but they know about Liverpool and where it is on the map. I think we have used Merseyside a lot because we are embarrassed about using the term Liverpool which has an image of industrial unrest, the 'militant', poverty, deprivation and crime. As a result it has been difficult to attract visitor confidence or tourism confidence or developer confidence in the city" (Council Officer, interviewed 11/12/98).

"Marketing Liverpool on the back of Merseyside is a nonsense and I think they are beginning to realise it. There is a recent study which showed Liverpool was the second most recognised city in the UK after London. Yet the whole of the marketing strategy of Mersey Partnership is based on a premise of compromising Liverpool's identity against competing authorities in Merseyside. All these say we do not want to be marketed on the back of Liverpool because it has got a terrible reputation. I think we should have the self confidence to say well fuck them that's their problem, it is not where investment is going to come from as far as tourism is concerned" (Spokesperson, Liverpool Democracy Commission, interviewed, 6/5/99).

The evidence presented above strongly suggests that Liverpool has in effect been positioned as the embarrassing relative of Merseyside. As already argued in Chapter 2, two particular dimensions of urban place marketing which are crucial for creating an effective image of place are first, to identify the city's target groups (Urry, 1990; Berg and Braun, 1999) and second, the projection of uniqueness of place (Kotler *et al.* 1993; Ward, 1998). When questioned on these two issues the majority of interviewees felt that place marketing strategies in Liverpool had in effect addressed neither, rather surprisingly this group included a number of city marketers:

“Where Liverpool might have suffered in this respect is that it has not encapsulated one particular aspect and pushed it. Birmingham talks about itself as a meeting place and it concentrates very much on the conference market, whilst Barcelona concentrates on night-life and food...When it comes to visitors I think we need to be more selective. We should focus on those people who may have more dollars to spend, absolutely” (Marketing Director, Mersey Partnership, interviewed 1/2/99).

“I think an image has developed over the past twenty years or longer that has almost developed despite what is going on in the city. I think in the past, marketing has not been done either at all or in any co-ordinated fashion but there is a willingness to do it and I am absolutely convinced that within the next two, three, four years you are going to see significant changes, significant advances in the outsider’s perception of Liverpool” (Head of Public Relations LCC, interviewed 8/12/98).

“Liverpool has never marketed itself at all, We need to put far more emphasis on our strengths and recognise the different audiences and what it is they know about and what they want” (Group Chief Executive, Investment Management group, interviewed, 18/1/99).

From the above discussion it is clear that the high levels of uncertainty attached to entrepreneurial ‘imaging strategies’ are more acute in Liverpool than most (if not all) other British cities due in no small part to “the strong media interest in the city and its difficulties” (TMP, October 1999, p.42). Consequently, place marketing is a somewhat fragile basis on which to seek to regenerate the fortunes of the City. Although it is tempting to assume place promotion plays a vital role in enabling one city to gain a competitive edge over another, the reality of the process in Liverpool points to another conclusion. As far as inward investment is concerned it is not necessarily the place that is being promoted but rather the inducements available here. Given:

“The reason why businesses such as Capital Bank and Barclays Call Centre and others are relocating to Liverpool has a lot to do with the Objective 1 incentive for them to come....we have the best grant package in the whole country” (Deputy Business Editor, *Liverpool Daily Post*, interviewed, 11/1/99).

Then it is reasonable to suggest that identity (reality) rather than image (perception) has played a crucial role in enhancing Liverpool’s competitive position. The difference between image and identity lies at the heart of this dichotomy. While Liverpool continues to have an objective identity, it is being represented as something quite different to different groups in

image terms. Under such circumstances “what is being promoted is a kind of placelessness, in the sense that claims made for a specific place may bear only a limited relation to reality or be equally applicable to many other places” (Barke and Harrop, 1994, p.111). In short, behind a successful image may lie a different reality. This is nowhere more apparent than in the fact that in March 1998 the city was ranked the number-one most deprived area in England (DETR, 1998). In the same year Liverpool received the ETB’s ‘England For Excellence Award as Tourist Destination of the year.’ It could be argued that this conflict, if not downright contradiction, between the promoted ideal and the reality illustrates that in general the whole arena of place promotion in Liverpool is by definition aimed at ‘outsiders’ as opposed to the local community. Indeed, as Goodwin (1993) contends, culture is used as an instrument of false consciousness by the elite in the advancement of their own (entrepreneurial) interests.

Place Promotion: Innovation v Reproduction

As already argued in Chapters 2 and 6, the high levels of uncertainty attached to place marketing projects has in turn ensured that cities have tended to abide by what can be seen to already have been successful elsewhere. It will be argued below that this ‘herd mentality’ is clearly evident in the promotional strategies adopted by both TMP and the MTCB.

In the promotional literature provided by these two organisations, Liverpool like almost any other city promoting itself, claims a central location. This concerns an extensive rail network (timetables to London and other major cities), access to international airport connections through Manchester and Liverpool Airports, a relatively uncongested road network (good connections to motorway network) and transport by sea (rationalised and modernised port). The credibility of the business environment is shown by listing the firms already in and around the city: Littlewoods, Royal Insurance, Ford, General Motors and GEC-Marconi. With regards to housing much emphasis is placed on the fact that Liverpool does not consist entirely of council housing, but ranges from modern suburban houses to Georgian and Victorian ‘elegance’ to newly developed luxury flats in refurbished warehouses in the city centre and on the waterfront. The major argument for housing in Liverpool is the very low prices compared to London and the South-East. As for shopping, the image is embedded in recently developed shopping malls (the award winning Cavern Walks, Albert Dock and St Johns Market).

When it comes to tourism, the city is presented as the leading tourist attraction in the North-West, with over 10 million day visitors alone in 1996. This is substantiated by a listing of Liverpool's major attractions: NMGM, the Tate Gallery, the Albert Dock and the Beatles, and sports and recreation facilities which cater for both being a spectator or participant. Further, Liverpool is projected as an exciting and vibrant cultural and entertainments centre based on five live theatres and the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra. Attention is also drawn to Liverpool's new status as a media city with both Granada and BBC TV studios and Merseyside Television Company (producers of Brookside). Additionally, higher education is emphasised by describing initiatives of Liverpool University and the Liverpool Polytechnic (now the John Moores University). Finally, emphasis is placed on a number of large projects for the future, symbolising a continued vitality: developing Liverpool Airport into a major international airport; and in the late 1990s Liverpool's bid to become European Capital of Culture in 2008.

The total aim of the features discussed above has been summarised thus by the TMP and MTCB: 'To improve the image of the city as a place to live in, invest and visit' (MTCB, 1995, 1998; TMP, 1995, 1999). With regards to competition however, it is clear that both organisations adopted a weak competitive approach to place marketing. The features emphasised in Liverpool's promotion do not show any new or innovative initiatives, on the contrary, they represent well-tried and tested orthodox blueprints for place promotion. The problem is that by following a highly standardised prescription: locational advantages, business opportunities and quality of life (environment, heritage and culture), the promotion fails to differentiate the city's image from the images of other cities in the North. Manchester, Wigan and Bradford, for example, are all serious competitors mobilising the same promotional strategy. Clearly, action to differentiate the projected place-image of Liverpool necessitates a much more innovative and interpretative package (see Chapter 8).

To sum up, there are three reasons for the dominance of the MTCB and TMP in the governance process during this period. First, they were the original agencies set up to deal with the promotion of the City/region which enabled them to capture power over the development of local strategies. Second, both these organisations held the largest 'local' financial resources (in the main EU assistance) which they allocated according to their own priorities, particularly business support, inward investment and the promotion of Liverpool as a tourist destination. Thirdly, the boards of these organisations contained the major local

actors from local government, the business community and powerful senior officials from publicly created institutions (for example, NMGM, MTEC and MDC) which reinforced the importance of these agencies. Their pivotal positions within the local promotional regime effectively enabled them to set the agenda for the plethora of other public-private partnership based tourism agents of governance which were operating in this phase. This secured a broad measure of support for the 'local' tourism accumulation strategy set by these dominant agencies, which in turn gave them legitimacy. It appears that three forms of hegemony were being practised by these agencies to maintain their control of the local promotional strategy. First, attempts were made to manage external relations with central government and Europe. Secondly, support was mobilised behind the manipulation of local symbols (particularly large flagship projects) which demonstrated the effectiveness of their work. Finally attempts were made to gain local acceptance through the promise of jobs and an improved quality of life.

However, while Liverpool has come some way towards improving its image, it may still fail, partly due to the movement towards delegating authority and responsibility for place marketing, to regional (district) governance agencies such as the MTCB and TMP. There are three points to make to explain this possible failure. First, as argued above, there are real 'political' problems between the region's five districts, and these are no more apparent than in place marketing activities. Secondly, county-wide governance has not wholly acknowledged in which competitive context Liverpool operates. Finally, the marketing effectiveness of TMP has come in for strong criticism from politicians and senior council and business leaders alike. According to an article in the *Liverpool Daily Post* July 19, 2000, Merseyside MP Ben Chapman, has begun a thorough investigation into TMP's performance and costs to the tax payer. He said:

"What bothers me is value for money. As far as I can see the money available to the Partnership is steadily increasing and there's around £2m going in each year. By and large the amount of public contribution is increasing and private sector decreasing. So where is the sustainability in all of this and where's the value for money"

Indeed, Mr Chapman argues that jobs created in the region, along with its increased attractiveness to outside investors, may have occurred without input from the agency.

7.6 Delivery Mechanisms for Tourism Related Employment Training Provision

According to the Merseyside SPD (1994):

“The aim of a better training system is to map a route out from potential exclusion from the labour market through to real employment opportunities and jobs” (p.125).

In Liverpool two agencies were particularly active during this phase: MTEC and Employment Links (ELS) to meet the skills and training requirements of the tourism industry. As already argued in Chapter 6, MTEC (launched in June 1991) was designed to deliver a radical new approach to adult and youth training, to undertake a ‘skills revolution’. Likewise, ELS (the only new entrant to the tourism policy arena in this final phase, see Figure 5.1) was launched in 1997 with a similar agenda:

“We were set up via the partnership working of MTEC, Liverpool City Council and the Employment Service. We were created because after Objective Two finished they didn’t seem to be making much impact on the areas in Liverpool with the highest unemployment. So we were set up specifically to tackle those areas and to provide innovative approaches to old problems, but not duplicating what the TEC and Employment Service had to offer” (Tourism and Leisure Sector Co-ordinator, ELS, interviewed, 6/7/99).

Ownership and Control Structure of Employment Links (ELS)

Established in 1997, Employment Links (ELS) was a five-year Government funded programme aimed at bringing jobs to the people who live in the city, particularly to those in the most disadvantaged areas. These areas are known locally as Pathways Areas. Pathways areas were created when Merseyside was granted Objective 1 status by the EC in 1994. There are eleven Pathways areas in Liverpool which were defined by a number of economic activity factors such as high levels of unemployment, low levels of car ownership and so on. In order to ensure representation for Pathways areas on major project committees, ELS in consultation with partnership areas adopted a cluster approach (ELS, 1998, p.11). This involved grouping the eleven Pathways together in four groups. The four groups are:

North East which includes 580, L.E.A.P. and Queens Partnerships.

North central which includes Parks, Stanley and North Liverpool.

South central which includes Granby/Toxteth, Duke St/Cornwallis and Dingle.

South which includes Speke/Garston and Netherley/Valley

According to ELS (1998) the scheme focuses on the needs of two distinct groups:

- Local employers, including inward investors and existing business
- The people of Liverpool, particularly those who are long-term unemployed and may have been excluded from the job market

With regards to the former, ELS provides a free, comprehensive training and recruitment package tailored to meet the business needs of each employer. In the case of the latter, at a local level, ELS provides job specific training and individual support to (in their own terms) people who are keen to progress (p.1).

In addition to the wider recruitment service, ELS identified four sectors of employment growth in which specific expertise is available, namely:

- 1. Construction**
- 2. Health**
- 3. Leisure and Tourism**
- 4. Retail**

Each of the four sectors shown above has a Sector Co-ordinator and is managed by a steering committee. According to ELS (1998, p.13) key features of all the co-ordinator posts are:

- Each Co-ordinator is a specialist in their own field
- Each project is led by the private sector with support and advice from the public sector
- Each Co-ordinator is ideally placed to access support and resources from the key agencies and others in the city, in order to provide employers with financial and other support for training and recruitment.

Employed through and based at Merseyside Tourism and Conference Bureau (MTCB), the Leisure and Tourism steering Committee is made up of Holiday Inn, Cavern City Tours, Urban Splash (a local property development company), Pathways representatives and ELS (ELS, 1998, p.13).

In broad terms the ownership and organisational structure of ELS is very similar to that shown in Figure 6.2 above. ELS has a Management Team who take day to day responsibility for the implementation of the programme. The Management Team work to the Management Board who make decisions relating to policy and funding approval. Members of the Management Board consist of representatives from the major partner agencies and Liverpool Pathways Groups. The Board has overall responsibility for the approval of projects and implementation of the programme, and meets on a six weeks cycle. Linda Bloomfield, Chief Executive of Merseyside TEC is the Chair of the ELS Management Board (ELS, 1998, p.5).

Training Development: Strong Versus Weak Competitive Approaches

The discourse of vocational training provision, tends to be constructed as local people devising local policies to meet local needs. In the case of MTEC and ELS it would appear that their agendas were anything but local. In fact it would be fair to say their remit essentially involved the delivery of national programmes albeit in some respects tailored to meet local needs. There is little doubt that the empowerment of these two agencies as 'partners' in urban regeneration, ensured both were financially secure and organisationally strong. With regards to funding, for example, MTEC received one of Merseyside's top twenty awards from the Objective 1 budget, see Table 7.4 above. In the case of ELS:

“ELS is an SRB funded regeneration project but we can and often do use it with or against EU money as clean match. This wouldn't be used on a physical development like a building, but on people based projects, employment initiatives and intermediate labour markets, for example”
(Tourism and Leisure Sector Co-ordinator, ELS, interviewed, 6/7/99)

However, it would seem, rather than operating to a locally defined agenda both agencies took up positions of power created by, EU and central government action. Typically, they were operating within a set of parameters determined by higher tiers of the state, and this in turn ensured they lacked policy autonomy in that they did not have the power to set their own agendas. Neither agency, for example, had any control over the stock of training places, these being set by the Employment Service. They were, however, able to influence which individuals were suitable for training and to a certain extent what kind of training these people could expect to undertake. So while both agencies had a degree of scope for local discretion, this was significantly restricted by the unequal power relationships between the agencies and

the state. Indeed, "Autonomy exists as long as actions are consistent with the broad parameters of government policy" (Peck, 1995, p.34).

As already argued in Chapter 6, in the entrepreneurial economy, economic success is critically dependent on the capacity of an organisation to exchange and produce information. In the case of MTEC and ELS, there is little evidence of any attempts to develop a learning environment. Indeed, the extent of coordination between research and planning, in either agency, appears almost non-existent. When the interviewees were asked, for example, a simple basic question as to the levels of people that undertake training and go into jobs, neither spokesperson appeared to have access to information which could establish the efficiency or impact of their interventions:

"Tourism is the biggest sector for training and employment opportunities... I haven't got any statistics on how many people we train up or how many actually get jobs. I haven't got that information it is very difficult to get hold of. Our outreach workers are supposed to track and keep on top of people who have gone through training and have failed to get a job, so that they can be fed into the next system in the recruitment process. But that's something they do on a community level" (Tourism and Leisure Sector Co-ordinator, ELS, interviewed 6/7/99).

"I haven't got any definite figures as to the amount of people who undertake tourism training and actually get jobs at the end of it, or how long they stay in the job. This is a problem in Liverpool, what I am trying to do is to work with other people to improve the information system, so that I can actually measure these figures. We do need to do a lot more work on an intergrated skill strategy. We have a number of products, services and organisations that are involved in tourism. We need to bring them into a more co-ordinated approach. Skills must sit inside a wider human resources strategy. We need to engage the educational sector, create information flows between the private sector and schools and colleges, and equally important we need to be able to gather research that has been done in the city, and use that to work out our human resource strategy. This information would help tourism decision-makers in the city as well" (MTEC, Tourism Sector Specialist, interviewed, 21/6/99).

From the evidence above, it would seem, that the relationship between research and planning within MTEC and ELS is strongest at the level of strategic (rather than operational) planning. Moreover, weak internal communication within each organisation has contributed to weak research operational links.

With regards to identifying local needs and the value of skills shortage predictions, both agency's rely almost entirely on evidence provided by the employer:

“Input from the employer is crucial, it is no good training for training sake. It's my job to survey employers, find out what they want, then organise training to skill up unemployed people to the essential requirements of that job. But the people we train up still have to compete with other applicants because the jobs will be advertised in the *Liverpool Echo*...So yes all our courses are tailored to exactly what the employer wants, and this is very important because after all, the local employers are the ones that know what skills are going to be needed” (Tourism and Leisure Sector Co-ordinator, ELS, interviewed, 6/7/99).

“My role is to engage the private sector and to identify what their training needs are. So I am involved quite a lot with programmes to help and support unemployed people and for people that have employed status. On the customised training side we try to identify opportunities where there are potential jobs for example, from a new bar opening or a hotel. Then we go and talk to the employers, ask them what they want and then put a customised training course on. For people who go on that course we can't guarantee a job but we can guarantee an interview. To go on a modern apprenticeship programme you must have employed status...The modern apprenticeship is a framework of what the industry says it would like. (MTEC, Tourism Sector Specialist, interviewed, 21/6/99).

If there is to be a skills revolution in Liverpool, which all interested parties agree is necessary, then surely strategic development for both organisations needs to be about anticipating and responding to the skill requirements of tomorrow not surrendering to the short-term imperatives of job-filling. However, it is not clear at present whether MTEC or ELS have the necessary labour market intelligence capacity to fulfil this role. Other than making subsidy for Government schemes conditional on quantifying the number of people into training and jobs; levels of public/private sector leverage and; National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) performance. Indeed:

“We have seen massive investment in leisure and tourism infrastructure over the past few years, but there hasn't been adequate training provision to drive up service standards which we have to have to develop and sustain the tourism market for the future” (Head of Service, Tourism, Arts & Heritage, LCC, interviewed, 27/10/98).

“Now that we are coming to the end of the current European Funding programme and we are bidding for the next six years, we need to place far

more emphasis on customer service training than we have in the past. (Tourism Manager, Mersey Partnership, interviewed, 25/11/98).

To sum up, much of MTEC and ELS policy intervention exemplifies what Jessop (1997,1998) terms a weak competitive approach. Three points need to be made here, first, their unequal power relationship with central power (Government and EU) restricted the extent to which they could translate needs into plans and actions. In essence, both agency's policies represented major decisions made by more powerful and politically motivated policy sectors, which in turn directed attention away from local needs towards outputs focused on enforcing numerical/budgetary targets. Secondly, in both cases there was weak internal communication about collating and interpreting economic intelligence. Thirdly, both organisations relied heavily on the use of evidence from employers as objective and replicable. However, such skills predictions can be misleading, not least, they can fail to take account of the reasons for short falls at the organisational or individual business level.

7.7 Tourism a Strategy for Sustainable Employment?

While growth-promoting entrepreneurial strategies have facilitated the revitalisation of the built environment of many inner cities, and contributed to the creation of new images and economic recovery, they have not been able to redress such very real problems as a shrinking number of quality employment opportunities (Harvey, 1989; Leitner and Sheppard, 1998,p.302). Indeed, in some cases they have exacerbated them (Harvey, 1989; Leitner and Garner, 1993; Stewart, 1996). Nevertheless, tourism has been advocated as a major hope for employment growth in the UK by central government planners and politicians and local government or the broader coalition of forces constituting local governance (see for example, DCMS, 1999; Law, 1992; Page, 1995).

In the case of Merseyside and Liverpool in particular, EU policy intervention also had a significant impact on raising the profile and perceived credibility of tourism as a means of job creation. Indeed, when asked for their views as to what place tourism has within the city's urban regeneration strategy, all interviewees responded positively. Commonly used words in this context included 'important' to 'very important' to 'absolutely crucial'. However, it is somewhat ironic that when questioned about employment opportunities in tourism-related

industries the vast majority of interviewees raised concern about the quality and the sustainability of jobs created in this sector (see below).

There are a number of reasons why issues concerning the quality of tourism-related employment are particularly important in Liverpool. First, tourism has been identified as a key growth sector by the LCC (1995/96/1997/98, 1999/ 2000). Secondly, *Merseyside's Tourism Vision* (TMP, 1999) is to create 12,000 new jobs by the year 2005. Chris Gibaud, former chief executive of the Mersey Partnership which is pushing the tourism drive said "These figures have not been plucked from the air, a careful analysis has been undertaken to prove these jobs can easily be created". (*Liverpool Daily Post* 15/4/99). The same article went on to state that tourism chiefs expect most of the jobs to be created in the hotels, bars and restaurants which are expected to come to Liverpool. If one accepts that the majority of jobs in these types of establishments usually comprise very high levels of part-time, and casual work and "for many employed in these sectors the career path is short, with limited opportunity for career enhancement" (Ryan, 1991,p.83), then this must raise questions as to the desirability of this type of employment in a city like Liverpool which has a relatively weak economy with a relatively weak labour market:

"One of my concerns is that the use of ERDF money which is provided in order to build up the city's GDP has been used to encourage developments, for example, the new hotels, which foster low wages. So therefore you have the problems of a low wage economy, it may have helped to relieve the unemployment problem but nothing has changed except the title of the problem. We now have a low wage problem everybody is in a crappy job working for three-pound per hour, but poverty is still the same. This taps into broader issues such as what they have got in store for us when they harp on about tourism and things like call centres, its all low wage activity" (Spokesperson for Liverpool Architects & Design Trust, interviewed, 20/1/99)

There are numerous publications which consider the nature of aggregate tourism-related employment in Liverpool (see for example, MTCB, 1996, 1998; TMP, 1999, LCC, 1998/99, 1999/2000). Unfortunately, there are comparatively few examples of intensive empirical research as to the quality of the jobs created. To this end, the Liverpool fieldwork results represented here does little to dispel the perception held by numerous academics (see Chapter 2) of tourism employment as a predominately part-time low paid occupation:

“If you did a job evaluation exercise right across all types of industry in the city, then tourism-related workers would be right at the bottom. Not necessarily in job skills, for example, silver service waiters need a number of skills, but certainly when it comes to pay. Many of the jobs in tourism have a set hourly rate, so for those that work on a Saturday or a Sunday there are no weekend rates or enhanced rates. If you contrast their rate of pay which is around the £3 mark with other industries such as Jacobs (biscuit manufacturers), the lowest wage there is £7 per hour and some of them are not very skilled at all” (Trade union, Regional industrial Officer, interviewed 18/2/99)

“I don’t think tourism jobs give any long-term possibility for a career as such, for a few people maybe but not for the majority” (City Councillor, LCC, interviewed, 30/11/98)

“At the moment it is difficult to recruit people to work in finance, we can’t get properly qualified staff because it is low pay and in certain other areas like the cleaners we have actually had to increase their level of pay. And for staff we deem as pay bands 1-3 we have also had to increase the threshold because of the difficulty of retaining and replacing those staff. Even so museums don’t pay a great deal” (Head of Marketing & Public Affairs, NMGM interviewed 29/7/99).

“I think the quality of tourism employment is an extremely important concern. I am not a great supporter of part-time work because it does not give the employee the opportunity to develop themselves and to make a full time commitment to their job...We have got to try and develop tourism so that we can attract good quality people, totally dedicated and fully committed and by that I actually mean full time” (Group Chief Executive, Investment Management Group, interviewed, 28/1/99).

It is, however, often recognised that whilst many of the jobs are low-skilled this particular feature of tourism may be beneficial to the often large labour reserves of the unskilled located in or near the inner city (Johnson and Thomas, 1992, p.46; Law, 1992. p604). Two points need to be made here, first, the research reinforced the reputation which tourism has as an employer of predominately female labour. Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that a problem of mismatch may occur, in that job losses may be concentrated amongst men whilst new job opportunities are taken by women. As such, tourism in Liverpool may not provide appropriate job replacement in the inner city area. Second, the city’s high student population may also exacerbate the problem of mismatch in the labour market:

“What annoys me is that we have lots of new wine bars, pubs and so on opening up and they say they are giving jobs to local people. The reality is in many cases they are not. That house over in the corner has about 40 student tenants and eight of them work part-time in the fast food take-away next door but one. They were given the grant to open there on the understanding they were going to employ x amount of local labour. You go up to the three big bars in this road and see how many students are working there part-time, and to me this is wrong. The reason they employ students is that they will do the job cheaper and it is casual. For example, and I know this for a fact, they will give them a ‘tenner’ for 4 or 5 hours work, so they are not paying them the minimum wage of £3.60 per hour” (Hotel Manager, interviewed 20/5/99)

Issues relating to part-time work are of particular importance in Liverpool because in 1996 a survey by the GMB Union revealed that of new jobs advertised, Merseyside had more for part-time work than anywhere else in England. Forty-three per cent were for part-timers and almost half the new jobs created in the region were for less than 14 hours a week (*Liverpool Echo* 23/1/96). According to an official from the GMB Union changes in the licensing laws have resulted in full-time employment being replaced by part-time and casual employment:

“If you take recent changes in the licensing laws as an example, although more people are working in the industry they are working shorter hours, three hours here, three hours there. Now if you measured all the hours up at the end of the week many are working less than 15 hours whereas before you had lots of full-timers, working 35-40 hours, now it is mostly part-timers. In many cases the work patterns in wine bars, pubs and restaurants are aimed at keeping people under 15 hours per week so they can’t claim the rights and protection afforded by the Employment Protection Act” (Union, Regional Industrial Officer, interviewed, 18/2/99).

In considering some implications concerning seasonal employment, Ball (1989) notes:

“that many local seasonal workers are voluntary temporary participants in the labour market...perhaps because they have other commitments outside of the seasonal work period (e.g. students) or perhaps they prefer the leisure time that working only seasonally may offer...More important, where it draws people from the unemployment register it could be said to provide respite from the dole, a ‘safety valve’ for the deprivation that...typifies parts of many urban labour markets” (p.44).

On the one hand, there is little doubt that there will always be a percentage of people who for any given number of reasons would prefer to work in the casual economy either at home or

away, and as such, if this suits them well that is fine. On the other, it became evident in interviews with union officials that there is also a percentage of employees who have no alternative but to join the casual workforce. Often these people go away to work in the summer to the south coast or to North Wales and when they return they take up either part-time jobs in hotels, and catering or join a band of casual workers who are brought into these establishments, when and where required and typically for banquets or sportsman's dinners. Consequently a major concern for unions is that there is no stability. These employees have no roots therefore it is very difficult for unions to organise negotiations on wages and conditions. This was seen as not only keeping wages deflated but in many cases it resulted in people working for less than the social security 'poverty line'.

Lastly, given the intensely competitive character of the tourism industry there are powerful pressures to increase competitiveness by reducing labour costs. Arguably, such measures could have a reverse effect. In the sense that cutting costs may reduce competitiveness if the standards of service are lowered. After all, 'service' is possibly the most crucial element of the tourism product. Subsequently, this may have a drastic effect both on the competitive position of individual establishments and for the economic well-being of the city itself. The lack of service culture in Liverpool was cited by a number of interviewees as a factor inhibiting further tourism development:

"It still grieves me that people, and I see this all the time, that people will invest thousands and thousands of pounds in improving attractions and you know developing new bars and hotels but they won't spend a penny on training their staff" (Tourism Manager, Mersey Partnership, interviewed, 25/11/98).

"I think you will find particularly in the hotel and catering sector, that in the main, the only training employers are prepared to provide for people without any qualifications is on the job training. Many employers expect people to come to them with qualifications like NVQ's, and not pay for them to go off the job and get them" (Education and Training Officer, GMB Union, interviewed, 18/3/99).

In summary, to some extent, the employment creating objectives of tourism have been met. The industry now supports approximately 18,000 jobs on Merseyside, 11,500 of which are based in Liverpool (Head of Tourism, Arts & Heritage, LCC, interviewed 27/10/98). This

represents an increase of some 4,000 tourism jobs on Merseyside from 1990 (MTCB, 1996, p.1). However, one should consider that “Many public calculations fail to mention tourism’s element of female, part-time, low pay, non-union and seasonal work, even in calculations of productivity ratios” (Hudson and Townsend, 1993, p.55). This is certainly the case in Liverpool, where the focus appears to be targeted solely on aggregate numbers as opposed to, more crucially, the quality of jobs created. For example, the LCC, Economic Development Plans 1998/1999, 1999/2000; Merseyside ‘s Tourism Vision for 2005 (TMP, 1999); BDO Stoy Hayward’s Tourism and Objective 1 Study all provide aggregate employment figures and emphasise the point that tourism is a substantial contributor to employment in the region. Yet, none of these reports pay any attention whatsoever to the quality of the jobs being created. It would seem that the implications of tourism-related employment growth for the local labour market seem to be ignored. On the one hand, it may have helped to relieve the unemployment problem, on the other, it has helped to reinforce a low wage economy, therefore, poverty remains very much the same. Nonetheless, there is little doubt that the conventional approach used to measure job numbers (aggregate) benefits local tourism governance. Not least, in the thematic of the entrepreneurial city, to be recognised as ‘an industry’ employing many people can be a powerful asset, especially when seeking public subsidies (Leiper, 1999, p. 608).

7.8 The ‘Learning Economy’: Innovation and Competitive Advantage

As already argued in Chapter 6, over the 1986-1994 period there was a relatively small research base to support tourism policy and action in Liverpool. However, this situation changed considerably in the 1994-2000 period. Consistent with the emphasis on entrepreneurship and the pursuit of the new, agencies such as the LCC, TMP, MTCB, MDC became infused by a drive to enhance the competitive edge of the City as a tourist destination. This was conducted against an intensive period of investigation and analysis of the organisational requirements, policies and actions to drive tourism forward. Table 7.7 below shows a number of key contributing tourism research studies published during the 1994-2000 phase.

There are some notable ideological differences between research publications in this phase and those of the previous phase. As argued in Chapter 6, over the 1986-1994 period there was a lack of institutional capacity coupled with a lack of monies to co-ordinate and develop the

city's learning economy per se. However, it is clear from Table 7.7 that in this phase there was an increasing ideological shift towards cementing an entrepreneurial culture in the city, underpinned by investing in knowledge. It is noteworthy for example, that much of this research indicated the desire to see the city's tourism strategy set in a clear strategic context that dovetails with emerging regional strategies and EU policy intervention. Furthermore, attention should be drawn to the fact that the majority of these research studies were shared with appropriate commissioning groups. At the strategic level this represents a strong competitive approach. In that, all this research emphasises the importance of collaboration, co-operation and innovation transfer between the attractions themselves and through City/region-led programmes. In short, it represents an amalgamation of current thinking drawn from a variety of sources which in turn is a pre requisite for promoting the development of a shared vision. Moreover, perhaps the most salient characteristic of tourism research during this period has been the growing use and reliance on knowledge. After all, consistent with the focus on entrepreneurship, "the dissemination of information and communications is crucial for increasing the pace of innovation in product and process development" (Raco, 1999, p.953).

As already argued in Chapters 2 and 6, information rich collaborative relationships provide the most appropriate context for innovation-based entrepreneurial economies. Nonetheless, alongside the growing importance of knowledge are wider questions concerning the way it is distributed (see for example, Atkinson, 1999; Foray and Lundvall, 1996; Hastings, 1999). According to Gregerson and Johnson (1997):

"Learning processes have become institutionalised and feedback loops for knowledge accumulation have been built in, so that the economy as a whole is learning by interacting" (p.480).

Table 7.7: Key Tourism-Related Research Studies

Title	Author	Client	Date
Tourism Strategy and Action Plans: 1994/95 and 1996/97	LCC	LCC	Jan 1994 & 1996
Liverpool City Centre – The Vision (Action Plan)	Skidmore, Owings & Merrill inc	LCC	Dec 1998
City Marketing Strategy (Strategic Regeneration framework)	LCC	LCC	July 2000
Visiting Merseyside: a five year programme for sustainable tourism	TMP	Mersey Tourism	Jan 1999
Project Appraisal: Albert Dock (Final Report)	KPMG	MDC	June 1997
Assessment of Tourism	ERM Economics	MDC	May 1997
Leisure Industries on Merseyside – Sectoral Targeting Study	L & R Leisure Consultants	TMP/Merseyside Inward Investment forum	Nov 1998
Tourism and Objective 1	BDO Stoy Hayward	TMP/Driver IAG	Jan 1999
Interim Assessment of the Current Objective 1 Programme (including Tourism Measures 4.3 and 4.4)	Liverpool University	GONW	1999
An Information and Communications Technology Strategy for TMP/MTCB	Tourism Enterprise And Management Consultants	TMP/MTCB	May 1998
A strategy for Tourism Business Development	Tourism Enterprise And Management Consultants	MTEC	July 1998
Sustaining Progress – A sustainable strategy for tourism in the North West	NWTB	NWTB	Nov 1998

In the case of tourism in Liverpool, the research found little evidence to support this view. Indeed, it is argued below, that rather than developing a learning environment in which mutual collaboration can be created, knowledge transfers mediated through the city's tourism institutional structures have reinforced hierarchy rather than governance.

“I think the Mersey Partnership see us as being outside the main city tourism image. It is very hard for us to get on the band-wagon for tourism development because we are located on the periphery, and virtually all that development occurs within the city centre. We are members of the NWTB and they do most of our marketing at the regional level. But at a local level we are not actually into partnerships yet, in fact we are not even in a partnership area for the city which cuts our chances for extra funding. The only partnerships we are in, are those with private sector building and ground-maintenance company's and these are all related to overall LCC policy. But the possibility exists and given the chance we would probably use the Mersey Partnership....Tourism development in the city needs to include us and that means we need to get other people like the Mersey Partnership to be marketing us, as well as ourselves. That's when it will

really start to happen” (Manager, Croxteth Country Park, interviewed, 9/7/99).

“All the emphasis is placed on looking after visitors who arrive in the city centre. There is a far less cohesive strategy for attractions which are located in the immediate hinterland such as Speke Hall or Croxteth Country Park. I feel that the sense of ownership of these attractions is much more tenuous to the Tourism Board. The Further you go away from the city centre the less grasp you have of what other area attractions have to offer...The National Trust is a member of the Mersey Partnership and we do liase with the City Council through the Leisure Services Directorate, it is a fairly tenuous link it has to be said. The City Council doesn’t actively promote things that are not under their remit and Speke Hall isn’t. They will include us in their publications and directories if we so want, but we have to be very pro-active here....The biggest weakness with the city’s tourism product is the fact that there are too many players in the market each of whom feels justifiably, that what they are doing is the best way and the way forward, tourism is too disparate. I think the promotion should be left to one organisation and let’s all agree as to who that should be and then let’s all support them” (Manager, Speke Hall, interviewed, 27/8/99).

In the ‘knowledge-based economy’, different sets of socioeconomic relationships create different geographies (Jessop, 1997, 1998; Painter1998; Raco, 1999; Atkinson, 1999). Consequently, from the evidence above it is not difficult to be seduced by the notion that for attractions located on the periphery, a culture of ‘out of sight out of mind’ prevails. However, the research also revealed a consensus of opinion amongst those in ‘core’ locations which suggested that they too were very much concerned as to the lack of institutional capacity to foster collaboration and integration between different levels of governance.

“We are administratively different from other attractions. So for example there are **no links with local government** in terms of the way we operate. I meet up now and again with the Council’s Head of Tourism but I am trying to develop better links. Recently we have been working with the Head of Public Relations for the City Council in terms of profound opportunities. I mean we are part of the profile of the city through having quality attractions. So really the City Council should promote us as part of the product and we hope this will happen” (Head of Marketing and Public Affairs, NMGM, interviewed, 29/7/99, emphasis added).

“I have never been sure if we are part of the overall picture in the city. I think historically when we first came here [Tate Gallery] it was seen as a transplant from London and not very well received by the politicians....In the past I have worked on an ad hoc basis with the MTCB and more recently with the Mersey Partnership on short break packages to do with the Gallery.

It is not for want of us wanting to do it, it is difficult for us because while there are people in posts within the Mersey Partnership that are tuned in to the worth of the cultural industries in Merseyside and, that do want to involve us in things. You need to get the top echelons involved to get things moving and up to now this hasn't really happened. Mind you that is slowly changing they are sort of forming new initiatives now, to package up theatres, galleries and museums. So I have got high hopes that we will be part of it. I think they see the Beatles or football as the big draw rather than us, we are seen as a player but not a major player" (Press and Publicity Officer, Tate Gallery Liverpool, interviewed, 26/7/99).

Clearly, the utilisation and generation of knowledge in which to develop a learning economy, was to put it mildly inadequate. This is evidenced by the fact that over the 1994-2000 period, LCC for example, published four comprehensive tourism research studies (see Table 7.7), all potentially innovative and all emphasising the need to encourage a local culture of entrepreneurship and mutual collaboration. Yet, at the end of this phase, there was little evidence to show that either local government or TMP had made any serious attempts to forge links with lower tiers of governance (individual institutions). This is nowhere more evident than in the fact that at the end of this phase local government had virtually no links with the NMGM – the largest provider of tourism attractions in Liverpool. Paradoxically, however, it would appear that there was a willingness on behalf of the individual institutions highlighted above, to facilitate the exchange of information with and through higher tiers of tourism governance.

What this can tell us, perhaps, is that rather than encouraging a local culture of collaboration in the drive to create competitive advantage, in the context of Liverpool's 'learning economy' the distribution of knowledge is hierarchical with polarisation taking place at higher tiers of governance and across space. As a result it is plainly failing to attain its potential. Central to this growing vulnerability are the types of integration and co-operation that exist between different levels of local governance. In the first instance, the research strongly suggests that vertical integration is low, with the form and regularity of direct official contacts between the city's tourism policy-makers and the individual institutions being particularly weak. Secondly, there is a general lack of information flows between these participants, which again inhibits utilisation capacity, the latter being a potentially critical determinant of the trajectories and competitiveness of entrepreneurial economies.

To sum up, first and foremost, knowledge and power are inextricably bound together. Subsequently, the hierarchically constituted context in which tourism governance operates in Liverpool, ensures that more powerful organisations such as the LCC, TMP and MDC will set the context within which other organisations function. In this case the power to do this derives from a combination of political and legal authority and command and control of resources. However:

“The mere existence of an official discourse advocating empowerment and partnership is no guarantee that this will actually be translated into practice, in an unmediated fashion or that the intention of such a discourse is *genuinely* to empower” (Atkinson, 1999, p.60, original emphasis).

Consequently, in the case of tourism governance in Liverpool, it could be argued that the decision to develop closer relations between different levels of local governance becomes a trade-off between the benefits of mutual collaboration and the potential loss of autonomy and competitiveness in the contest for local governance. In short, this represents a weak competitive approach in that the policies fail to inform the preparation of a shared vision for tourism development at the city level that all participants can work towards. As Jessop (1997, 1998) maintains strong competition necessitates that power arrangements are dispersed as widely as possible and, exercised locally as practicable, in the case of Liverpool, however, there is little evidence to suggest that decision-making power has been devolved to the individual organisational level.

Territorial Competition and the Generation of Knowledge Within the Learning Economy

The research revealed a lack of awareness by City/region policy-makers as to the scale (and for that matter the existence) of territorial competition on Merseyside and within Liverpool. Which in turn has invoked a conflict of interest between tiers of local governance, that needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency. Subsequently, the research reinforces Ball and Stobart's (1998) argument that “the tourism development scene is an increasingly competitive arena. Yet, competition is an unspoken word within the realms of tourism professionals” (p.342). The fact that that differing parts of the City/region have to compete with each other for visitors, is not explicitly recognised or formally discussed in the literature produced by TMP, MTCB. For example, in TMP's (1999) *Five Year Programme for Sustainable Tourism* no mention is made about the likelihood of competition occurring within the city or within the

conurbation itself. Instead there is a strong suggestion that all competition stems solely from outside the region, notably, Manchester, Wigan, Chester and other areas within the North west.

However, as Ball and Stobart (1998, p.349) rightly point out, the major source of competition often stems from neighbouring areas. At the present time, Southport under the banner “Day time, Night time, Great time” (*Capture the Spirit, tourist guide*, 1999) is striving to reposition itself as the North West’s premier tourist destination (*Liverpool Daily Post* 25/8/99, p.10). The Hamilton Quarter in Birkenhead is the subject of a tourism and heritage SRB and is rapidly becoming a successful arts and cultural quarter (TMP, 1999, p.23). Moreover, all five districts have a number of conference venues, as well as an annual festival and event calendar; additionally, all have major planned new developments including hotels and tourist attractions (for a complete list see TMP, Mersey Tourism, 1999, Tables 2-7, pp.14-18). If one considers that Merseyside is primarily a day visitor destination with 9 out of 10 visitors staying just for the day (TMP, 1999, p. 25). Then, it is highly likely that, time constraints will ensure that visitors are highly selective when it comes to choosing an area of the region to visit.

Likewise, in the case of Liverpool, the need to compete at the intra-city level, particularly, for attractions that share similar product themes, is not recognised or rarely discussed by both local government and regional governance representatives. In contrast, lower order governance particularly hotel managers and operators expressed a considerable amount of concern about the rising level of competition within the city. Indeed, some of the interviewees felt strongly that the current level of competition was unsustainable.

During the 1990s Liverpool witnessed a substantial increase in new hotel development which in total comprised an increase of 800 new bedrooms. In addition two hostels have opened in Liverpool aimed at the younger traveller, including a new 100 bed YHA, and there have been substantial additions to university student accommodation, catering for visitors during vacations. Planning permission has also been granted for a further four hotels (the first is due to open in 2001), which in total will provide 291 new bedrooms (TMP, 1999, p13-14). This hotel boom has received widespread acclaim in the local press where it is invariably reported as providing evidence that investors and developers have now got renewed confidence in Liverpool and demonstrates that the city is becoming ever increasingly popular with tourists and business visitors. The implication is that the city’s hotel boom will continue unabated and

the term 'competition' will never enter the vocabulary. Generally, council officials reinforced this perception:

"I would say hotels are mutually supporting because what you have got is you have had a number of hotels built within the last five years or so and there is no competition. If you try and get a hotel room in Liverpool on a Friday or Saturday night or a weekend it is impossible" (Chairman, Leisure and Tourism Committee, LCC, interviewed 1/10/98).

"New hotel chains are starting to come to us now they are starting to queue up for building quality standard hotels in Liverpool" (Head of Service, tourism, Arts & Heritage, LCC, interviewed 27/10/98).

The opinions held by those directly involved in the operation of the hotel sector regarding the level of new hotel development in Liverpool were, in a majority of cases in direct contrast to those of the local press and council officials:

"The hotel market is saturated now, I know by the amount of calls we are getting, we are not getting the amount of calls we got. And the situation will get worse, they are going to open a Beatles hotel in North John Street and build one up at the airport. If you ask Mrs Jackman who owns a hotel further down Mount Pleasant and who was born on Mount Pleasant 70 years ago, she has said she has never known anything like it" (Hotel, D, Owner/Manager, interviewed, 20/6/99)

"There is a danger of over-provision there are a lot more bedrooms coming in, into the Albert Dock for instance, there is a hotel going into Speke Airport, so there is a danger of there being too many bedrooms. Speaking to other hoteliers I think maybe, well certainly the Atlantic tower has been hurt by ourselves which is quite natural because of our geographic presence" (PA to Manager, Hotel, F, interviewed, 3/3/99).

"If hotel development in the city continues at the current rate the market place will definitely become saturated, in fact I am amazed it has not become saturated already"(Personal Manager, Hotel, J, interviewed, 11/5/99)

"This hotel opened in 1970 and at the moment, for the first time in our history business is terrible. It has a lot to do with the big hotels, many are offering cheap weekends so that is affecting us badly" (Hotel, C, Manager, interviewed 11/5/99).

Concerns about over-provision were not restricted solely to the hotel sector. The proposed £60m bid to bring the world famous Guggenheim museum of modern art to Liverpool has

also created tensions between council officials and museum operators in the city. Directing the bid process is Carol Judge, manager of Liverpool's European Initiatives Unit who says Liverpool would provide an ideal setting. "The cultural infrastructure is already here and this could be the missing piece of the jigsaw" (*Liverpool Daily Post* 8/7/99, p.5). Councillor Flo Clucas, responsible for environmental and European matters at the city council "If we can play it right, the number of visitors it would bring is just amazing" she said (*Liverpool Daily Post* 8/7/99,p.1). However, when questioned about the development of flagship projects in the city, the Head of Public Relations, LCC said "I think sometimes there is a propensity to develop at any cost. It is like if it is a new development it must be good so let's have it" (interviewed 18/12/98). To this end, the Guggenheim museum may well be a prime example:

"One of the problems we have got is that the tourism market is not growing to the extent that we would like it to grow. As more product comes on stream the more competition you create in the city. I mean there is talk about the Guggenheim which the city council are proposing, but that won't necessarily grow the market. I think it will just spread it more thinner, it will just displace. We think we have more or less reached a Plateau and that gives us cause for concern because our Heritage Lottery grant means we have to grow our market and we have a business plan that has to be sustained and if we are not selling the amount of tickets then of course that is a problem...at the moment it is a bit of a dilemma" (Head of Marketing & Public Affairs, NMGM, interviewed 29/7/99).

Clearly, the research findings show that competition between tourism related providers within the city would seem to be extensive. As already argued in Chapter 2, the task of urban governance is, in short, to maximise the attractiveness of the local area as a lure for highly mobile flows of capitalist investment (see Harvey, 1989; Cox and Mair, 1988). However, as the Lisbon Group (Petrella, 1995, cited in Begg, 1999,p.798) points out, there is a danger that an excessive pursuit of competitive advantage will lead to a neglect of other policy aims such as sustainability.

This author would argue that, to an extent this situation has already occurred in Liverpool and may become much worse. If one takes into account the fact that presently "Liverpool has far more tourist attractions than most other cities" (Tourism Manager, TMP, interviewed 25/11/98). And that the new developments which are in the pipeline, including a major leisure park, and a range of arts/cultural attractions in the Duke Street area (for a complete list see TMP 1999, Tables 2-7, pp.14-18) will add considerably to the city's tourism product.

Then, it could be argued that the current and proposed wave of tourism projects may well play out to be a zero sum game rather than effective regeneration tools. Consequently, in realising the potential of sustainable tourism development in the city it may be more appropriate to focus on product improvement as opposed to product enlargement (see Chapter 8).

In total, by the end of the 1990s intra-city competition had begun to undermine the competitive advantages that Liverpool has enjoyed since the unveiling of the Albert Dock in the mid-1980s. It would seem that this situation stemmed in a large part from the fact that higher order local governance (TMP and LCC) lacked the capacity to strike a balance between policies which encourage co-operation and those that stimulate economic growth through competition within specific tourism sectors in the city. As such, this is a weak competitive approach in that it misinterprets competitors as potential allies. In marked contrast, lower order governance (hoteliers and NMGGM) appeared to be fully aware of the difference between co-operation and competition within their respective sectors. This takes us back to the heart of the argument in this Section, namely the possession of an intangible asset such as knowledge and the ability to generate and utilise it is a crucial ingredient in the competitiveness of 'innovative' activity. Unfortunately, regional governance and the LCC have so far failed to recognise that cities which have the capacity to generate and maintain effective learning systems are best placed to gain and sustain a competitive edge (Jessop, 1997, 1998).

7.9 Conclusion

It is clear that policy changes at the local, national and supra-national level which reinforced the movement towards governance and partnership significantly affected the nature of the local tourism policy agenda. The introduction of the Merseyside SPD in 1994, coupled with European Structural Funds, had a substantial local impact (see Sections 7.4, 7.5, 7.6 above). In essence, this provided a 'spring-board' for much of the tourism policy intervention in the Liverpool economy during the period 1994-2000. The local tourism arena was affected in four distinct ways. First, the role of local government was increasingly diminished. Secondly, there was a growing commitment to the creation of new county-wide tourism agencies, in particular MTCB, TMP and Mersey Tourism, which emerged to occupy ground previously held by local authorities. As one respondent stated:

“What became developed in Liverpool was a self-perpetuating oligarchy of public/private agencies, dominated by chief executives and directors making decisions on behalf of everybody else” (Councillor, LCC, interviewed, 26/11/98).

Thirdly, the availability of EU monies, firmly established the priorities of prevailing private sector interests in the local tourism agenda. Finally, running through the tourism regime was elite consensus in determining the tourism accumulation strategy. This consensus had two main features. First, was what could be described as a *written* strategy namely the priorities identified in the Merseyside SPD (1994-1999). The aim of these *written* policy themes was to change the emphasis of the local economy from being dominated by port and port-related activities and manufacturing industries to becoming a centre for tourism and leisure with key flagship projects, such as the Rope Walks Action Plan and waterfront regeneration, symbolising the change in the politics of production. The strategic line was also underpinned by new discursive constructions which present ‘tourism’, ‘entrepreneurship’ and ‘innovation’ as the key to regeneration.

This leads on to the *unwritten* strategy of the development agencies which had a social engineering agenda aimed at changing the local culture in line with the desired changes in the local economy. It was pointed out in the research by a number of respondents that, because of historical reasons, an ‘unentrepreneurial culture’ exists with two major engrained beliefs. The first is the perception that what constitutes a ‘proper job’ is a full-time manufacturing job, jobs which are increasingly in short supply. Secondly, many of the alternative forms of employment, such as retail work or tourism, are not considered a ‘mans job’. Such ideas are believed to be the result of years of employment in large manufacturing and processing industries providing full time (mainly male dominated) unskilled or semi-skilled jobs. The unwritten aim of development agencies then, has been to attempt to change the local culture towards acceptance of entrepreneurialism and work in new areas of employment, such as tourism – and in part-time and low paid work:

“One of the big problems you’ve got with the local community is whether they’ve got a genuine willingness to move into less traditional areas of employment such as tourism and leisure. Our role is to sell this idea that these are as important as any other form of employment, and get local people interested in it” (Tourism Manager, Mersey Partnership, interviewed, 25/11/ 98).

“We are not going to see manufacturing jobs coming back to Liverpool and one of the growth areas in the city is tourism. One of the things people have said is that jobs in tourism are not real jobs, whatever that is supposed to mean. This is one of the issues we are trying to address, we are trying to get across to people that these are real jobs” (Councillor, LCC, Inner City Regeneration Committee, interviewed, 20/10/98).

What this all adds up to then, is a tourism policy process based on governance by a largely unelected elite and a local accumulation strategy formed on the basis of national economic conditions, policy created by the central government and Europe and very much reliant on external funding sources. While national government or Europe may not be imposing direction day-to-day, local accumulation strategies have been developed to fit within the general context of supra-national accumulation strategies. This supra-national local fit is clearly evident in the way that the local tourism regime privileged the role of the private sector in policy formulation and in terms of the selection of key priorities oriented towards economic growth.

This Chapter has argued that the issue of contested governance has had a negative affect on the delivery of the city’s tourism development programmes, and this takes us back to the heart of the theoretical debate. In terms of programme delivery the fundamental problem is the process has been dominated by asymmetries of power and a lack of local capacity to act. This unequal power relationship in the emerging form of governance during this phase does not relate solely to that between Europe and central government and between the state and its quangos. But as demonstrated above is also clearly evident in the lack of integration and mutual discourses between tiers of local governance. Most notably, between higher administrative levels of local governance (for example, TMP, LCC, MTCB), and lower order governance levels (individual networks). In essence, effective programme delivery in Liverpool has been handicapped by the dominance of a small clique of key actors who have effectively monopolised the process.

If differential institutional capacities and knowledge capacity utilisation are key variables in achieving competitive success in entrepreneurial economies, then there is a signal failure not to conceive, but to deliver programmes as enterprising as say the Merseyside SPD and those shown in Table 7.7. To this end, there is a need to ensure that the institutional capacity of all participants in the tourism development process, is actively fostered as an integral part of that process. At the level of functionality, this should feed serious debates about how to utilise

and generate knowledge and how to distribute policy 'functions' between tiers of local governance. It is beyond doubt that the formulation of programmes and the adoption of policy instruments can benefit from both top-down and bottom-up inputs, so that here, different assignments could be envisaged (see Chapter 8).

Overall, the contested governance in Liverpool may well reinforce rigidity rather than flexibility, bureaucracy rather than institutional effectiveness, and most notably, hierarchy rather than governance. Of course the local picture continues to evolve and change may come, but there is a serious concern that City/regional tourism governance can easily override lower order governance such as the providers of attractions, where in theory, the expertise is invested.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION: TOURISM, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF LIVERPOOL

8.1 Introduction

The aim of this thesis was to apply a theoretical framework based on a synthesis of Hall and Jenkins' (1995) tourism policy organising framework and theories of urban entrepreneurialism proposed by Harvey (1989) and especially, Jessop (1997, 1998) to an understanding of how governance has emerged to influence tourism and economic development in Liverpool. This Chapter concludes the thesis with some reflections on the theoretical approach used, a summary of key empirical findings and, finally, a number of policy recommendations and suggestions for future research.

8.2 Theoretical Reflections

This thesis has attempted to position tourism within the context of the rise and diffusion of urban entrepreneurialism in Liverpool. To do this, this thesis would argue that an amalgamation of Hall and Jenkins analysis of the forces that shape tourism policy (in particular institutional arrangements, power relationships and ideologies) and Harvey and Jessop's theories of urban entrepreneurialism (in particular the notion of strong/weak competition) could provide a suitable framework through which the development of tourism within the changing urban agenda in Liverpool could be explored.


Theories on the transition to entrepreneurial governance are particularly useful in understanding how dominant political public/private partnerships (elected and unelected) establish and maintain the capacity to govern and provides a richer picture of local interests, struggles and strategies involved in the political transformations of governance. The attraction of this approach is that it offers a way of linking changes in the economy to those in politics at a high level of abstraction seeing, as it does, the supranational state, the nation state, local state and governance as components of entrepreneurial modes of governance within a particular regime of accumulation (Jessop, 1997, 1998; Harvey, 1989). It could be suggested that the appeal of entrepreneurial theory lies in its emphasis on political processes but its real strength is its focus on competition at the 'local' level.

Consequently, it could be argued that such theories are well placed to fill some of the gaps in other widely used contemporary governance theories, most notably, regulation theory and regime theory. On the one hand, regulation theory has been accused of only dealing with large scale processes (national and international) and with purely economic explanations, failing to take into account spatial variations and underestimating the importance of local actors and institutions (Hirst and Zeitlin, 1991; Dunford, 1990; Amin, 1994). Jones (1997) believes that such a structural account denies human agency and ignores transformation and struggle. On the other hand, regime theory has been criticised for its insensitivity to macroeconomic and political change. Some have argued that regime theory needs to move away from just studying 'local' players and incorporate higher-level authorities who participate in 'local' economic development. In the same way that the local level may be an important element in regional, national or supranational accumulation strategies, so these different levels will impact within a 'locality' (see for example, Harding, 1998; Lauria, 1997; Ward, 1995, 1996). In short, there is a need to move away from theories being solely applied at national scale and local scales, respectively (Painter, 1997).

That said, some of the key themes in the urban entrepreneurialism debate have been equally contested. One set of commentators have argued that the reorientation of the local state, and adoption of pro-growth strategies, was initially noted in the previously affluent industrial cities of mature Western nations (Hubbard and Hall, 1998, p.5). Moreover, the impression conveyed by much of the literature that place marketing is an entirely new phenomenon, uniquely associated with entrepreneurial forms of governance is misleading. The promotion of place has a long history (Gold and Gold, 1990, 1994; Ward, 1988, 1990). In short, how new is 'new' governance? Other commentators have expressed concern that such theories underplay the role of local government in driving entrepreneurialism while overstating the capacity of private interests to influence policy (Peck and Tickell, 1994; Boyle and Hughes, 1994; Lawless, 1994; Valler, 1996). There are a number of key points about the use of urban entrepreneurial theory that emerge from the research.

First and foremost, this approach did provide a robust tool for examining the dynamics and evolving system of tourism governance in Liverpool as it focused attention on the significance of developments in politics, policy and institutional structure in terms of social processes and social networks within a clearly defined theoretical framework (see Figure 8.1 below).

Figure 8.1 Summary of Framework for Examining Tourism Policy



This represents a marked shift away from the planning and control emphasis prevalent in studies of tourism (see for example, Evans *et al.*, 2003; Cooper *et al.*, 1999; Pearce, 1992, 1996; Sharpley, 2002) towards a more socially critical agenda which attempts to capture the reflexivity and indeterminacy inherent in tourism as a form of economic development. Under the former approach there is little room for a researcher to express political commitment to emancipatory social change. Indeed, as Botterill (2001) concludes:

“The tendency to an uncritical science in interdisciplinary tourism research carries with it the possibility of a defence of conventional ways of knowing tourism” (p.212).

‘Normative’ models of organisational analysis with their penchant to celebrate the fixity of social behaviour and institutions were rejected in this research in favour of a multi-causal explanation of political behaviour. The explanation is one which recognises that tourism histories and economic development are shaped by institutional arrangements, power relations and ideologies and that all combine at a place to create a context that influences organisational behaviour. What is of paramount importance in this approach is that space is constructed by dynamic and evolving social processes. In short, “These perspectives replace the featureless surface of the reductionist with the interwoven tapestry of a real place” (Davis, 2001, p 127), and thus help researchers to understand better the actions of tourism organisations.

The second point to make is that “Institutional innovations transect public and private sectors, and set out new rules of the game” (Hjalger, 2002, p.466). Consequently, as argued throughout the thesis, it is crucial to distinguish carefully between strong (innovative) and weak (reproduction) competitive approaches in the definition of tourism policy initiatives. The underlying logic of the approach is that it is a task for researchers to track back the impacts on innovation that come out of the institutional, power and value networks of tourism enterprises, and to examine how, and in what form, knowledge is disseminated to enterprises for further development, through which channels, how fast and what public incentives can change the intensity and direction if necessary. As the findings reported in the preceding case study chapters (Chapters 5 6 and 7) show, this helps us to understand the processes by which an organisation/network can develop and change itself, rather than being forced to change by outside forces. More specifically, it is necessary to understand the extent to which collaboration is based on genuine partnerships and mutual trust where power is dispersed as widely as possible as opposed to being the result of intermediation by other organisations

whose power arrangements are fixed around 'representative' as opposed to participatory democracy and characterised by secrecy. One example would be tourist offices/boards where activities are often undertaken at 'arms-length' from individual enterprises. In weak competitive approaches those responsible for plotting an organisation's tourism strategy are more concerned with how to react to constraints on the supply and/or demand side of the market. In contrast, in strong competitive approaches policy-makers are more concerned with influencing and shaping the tourism environment in which their organisation/network operates through the development and integration of their organisational learning. This is a precondition that facilitates changing structures which promote the development of shared visions (to organise place-specific advantage) which may foster new institutional arrangements (by expanding and/or relaxing organisation boundaries) to supplement and/or complement existing patterns of governance, which in turn enables an organisation to exercise a higher degree of control over its own destiny. That said, I would argue that the potential application of the framework would have value in other areas of tourism policy/research and to other economic development situations more generally. It is to these issues the section now turns.

While the thesis is committed to presenting research which draws heavily from discourses surrounding the 'entrepreneurial city' this does not represent a paradigm shift away from traditional applied tourism research as much as continuing to add social theoretical perspectives as an aid to understanding tourism phenomena. Clearly, tourism histories appear to have some real significance for more general developments in many other economic situations within a process of regeneration. This is first in relation to the current industrial society's preoccupation with 'place', 'image' and 'inward investment', and second the 'flexibility' of business and labour relations, all these features have characterised tourism for a long time. Potentially therefore, there is much to be learned from tourism histories about the political economy of locality-oriented economic development.

The point of these examples is, however, to illustrate the need for an appropriate analytical framework which has the potential to expand the focus of tourism studies. Indeed, Gordon and Goodall (2000, p.297) make the point "In the case of metropolitan tourism, the benefits are those of urbanisation rather than localisation (i.e. of scale, and scope, in a wide range of activities not simply tourism)". I would argue that the theoretical framework used in this research has a wider relevance and applicability beyond the confines of the case study period,

place and tourism context. A virtue of this approach is that it can suggest a range of researchable questions which could be applied to other areas of tourism policy/research and other economic development situations more generally. These questions are about:

- Whether there are theoretical reasons for the existence of systematic differences in the institutional capacity of tourism organisations (and other economic regeneration organisations) to innovate, or provide milieux which stimulate innovation and entrepreneurialism across national, regional and local economic spaces?
- Circumstances particularly likely to stimulate such innovation within established places (as with Jessop's version of strong/weak competition).
- Complementarity between the locational requirements of much tourism activity and those of dominant (office based) economic sectors. More specifically the role tourism can play in mixed use developments – of buildings and whole areas of cities in an era of deregulation/internationalisation.
- The use by tourism enterprises of more specific forms of network and relations of trust, and the types of tourism locality in which this is more prevalent, for example, urban, rural, resorts or fully inclusive facilities in isolated sites such as theme parks.
- Variation in tourism policies of different tourism localities, in terms of scale of effort, competitive strategy, likely beneficiaries and degrees of innovativeness.
- Concentration/specialisation – the comparative (dis)advantage arising from inherited local/accessible resources (including deficiencies in resources required for alternative/competitive strategies).
- The learning economy – how interactions between different tiers of governance (supranational, national regional and local) shape tourism and other economic development policy, and the ways in which these relations are conditioned by different sorts of structural, ideological and historic factors.

The value of this approach is that it has the potential to distinguish the explanatory links between tourism policy development and broader economic development policy over time. The value of expanding the approach in the way suggested above is the need to make explicit those factors which can lead to markedly different trajectories of policy and product development in different places and/or the same place in different circumstances. These include both specific variables embodied in the approach, such as the degree of protection afforded by access to resources (natural, human, financial) and underlying assumptions about forms of competition within as well as between localities. In short, perhaps this research agenda might be encapsulated in three pivotal angles: competition, innovation and governance borne out of uneven development.

8.3 Empirical Findings

In relation to the concerns of this thesis, what stands out is that there are three distinctive regimes of governance in the history of tourism in Liverpool.

Phase I covers the years 1974-1986 and was distinctive in that it signalled the beginnings of a tourism industry in Liverpool, encouraged primarily by the emergence of a shift from *government* to *governance*. During this period, 'new' tourism governance was structured around two dominant organisations the MCC and MDC. These two organisations were the first to initiate policies which demonstrated the tourism potential of the area. Both these expansions not only underlined the dependency of tourism development on two dominant organisations but also demonstrated the key role of national government in the local economy. This role was further reinforced by regional policy itself. It could be argued that central government had privileged Liverpool with grants and the direction of 'new' tourism initiatives (most notably, the IGF and the Albert Dock) into the area. However, in hindsight, it would appear that tourism policies and actions were underpinned largely by a mixture of good planning, default and opportunism. By the end of this phase the influence of central government was diminishing as evidenced by the cutting of regional assistance to the economy of Liverpool. At the same time, local government slowly began to realise that the City had serious structural economic defects, with its reliance on old traditional industries in decline (such as port related activities and manufacturing). A new governance regime was in the making.

Phase II, covering the years 1986-1994, can be defined by the emerging commitment to develop public-private partnerships which were locally driven, locally led and with local ambitions. This was marked by the attempts by organisations including the MTB, MDC and MTEC to persuade businesses to become formally involved in local economic regeneration. Moreover, a proliferation of new governance agencies began to emerge as new *unelected* actors gained increasing influence on decision-making. Private sector involvement saw the espousal of a 'pro-growth' strategy. In effect, the shift towards governance involved the diminution of local democracy that could be characterised as a *decommissioning of representative democracy*. This period is significant because it represents a sea-change in implementation of local economic development towards 'business-led' agendas and passive involvement from local elected politics. By the end of this phase tourism was firmly

established on the local agenda and the introduction of European Structural Funds and the reduced powers of local government marked the beginning of a new governance regime.

Phase III, covering the period 1994-2000, saw major changes in tourism governance in Liverpool. Local government had been weakened by national government policy changes and in Merseyside was further weakened by district parochialisms. Local government was unable to cope with these economic problems with the reduced powers and finance it had available and so the shift towards public-private partnership gathered pace, with two main strands. First, policy became much more about seeking financial incentives to assist with economic regeneration which increased reliance on external funding from both national government and Europe. Secondly, the power of *unelected elites* was further reinforced by their ability to access funding streams (particularly EU) and by being invited (appointing themselves) to sit on the most important tourism decision making bodies. In terms of governance, the shift towards creating county-wide organisations and 'specialist' agencies around identified local assets gathered pace, along with greater emphasis being placed on 'strategic sites' and 'flagship initiatives'. It remains to be seen whether a distinctly different tourism regime will emerge and, more significantly if it does, whether it will be any more successful than previous regimes?

Reflections on the Local Tourism Economic Development Strategy to date

The major question is whether the existing tourism development strategy is appropriate to the needs of the local community? The answer to this question depends on what one sees as the objectives of economic development. In Liverpool the existing *written* approach to tourism-led regeneration is a well trodden path reflecting the priorities of dominant 'local' partners and locked into policy and funding programmes dictated from Brussels and London. The resulting approach has brought 'local' consensus in the development of tourism and inward investment. The approach predominately reflects the prevailing 'pro-growth' economic development strategy which emphasises the creation of the 'right' environment for attracting visitors, business growth and new investment. Predictably, infrastructural schemes with tourism 'flagship projects' like harbour regeneration, town centre improvements and 'strategic sites' for tourism development have dominated the economic development agenda. Whether these prove to be sustainable projects, however, is open to debate. What does appear to be clear is that the *unwritten* strategy has in a large part failed and that the desired shift in

cultural dependency on traditional (manufacturing), full-time work and patriarchal dominance towards 'softer', cleaner industries, such as tourism, part-time work and the spirit of entrepreneurialism has not been achieved.

It is clear that the belief in economic growth benefiting all and a reliance on the fallacy of 'trickle-down' economics has led to an approach lacking in innovation and creative thinking. Arguably, local agents are introducing strategies which are reliant on uncritical acceptance of new tourism policies and/or accepted approaches such as attracting inward investment or establishing a business support structure that is believed to be transferable between contexts:

“ I think what people are doing are taking the standard prescriptions that work in most places in the UK and saying that 'we'll have some of that. It doesn't work like that, it has got to be different and whatever we do must be different. I don't know what should be targeted but it won't be the standard off-the-shelf approach that says we should all get into call centres and tourism. You can mess around at the margins of these things but none of them are going to make a significant difference” (City Councillor, interviewed, 10/2/99).

At the moment the strategy is to develop those parts of the economy that seem easiest, but does a 'flagship project' such as a call centre or waterfront regeneration offer a solution when the same solutions are being applied in many other locations? Are they simply the products of particular vested interests?

In Liverpool, tourism-led regeneration has seen physical redevelopment, new jobs created and the 'place-image' has improved because of the redevelopment. On the negative side, the strategy has been more concerned with maximising economic returns than with the *type* and *quality* of new tourism jobs and businesses (particularly the boom in eating and drinking establishments) and has failed to increase the capability and capacity of the local community. It would appear that the failure of the strategy lies in its failure to understand the peculiarities of the locality. There are four things to say in this context. First, it is clear that apart from the financial incentives discussed in Chapters 5-7, the city does not have any real competitive edge ('location factors') to attract new companies and people other than quality of life aspects. The benefit of providing resources to encourage new industries through inward investment is questionable as for many years this has been over resourced and largely unsuccessful. An alternative must be to focus on product improvement as opposed to product

enlargement particularly for established tourism sectors with good growth prospects. Product improvement is seen in terms of consolidating existing assets specifically those which are unique to the city, not least the Beatles connection, and investing in their quality. This could result in planning for a better functional and spatial integration of existing resources and implies only minor additions or alterations in the city centre. Examples could include the introduction of a more flexible system of opening hours for shops and certain tourist attractions such as museums and art galleries. Minor improvements might include more secure car-parks or the relocation of visitor parking space and better signposting. Product enlargement, in terms of adding new elements to the tourist product, seems to describe more clearly the present attitude of tourism policy-makers in Liverpool. Yet, as argued in Chapter 7, this tendency has resulted in over-provision of certain elements in the tourism product.

Secondly, the agents of governance involved in local economic development appear to be restricting themselves to simply recycling and retreading national provision. It is questionable if any of these agencies have attempted to take a strategic approach about how best to regenerate the economy, particularly with regards to reducing duplication and maximising exchange of knowledge. At the moment the strategy is to target whatever can be attracted. Funding-led with effective delivery, the main issue. Thirdly, it appears that none of the agencies in Liverpool have faced up to the economic reality of the suitability of the type and quality of tourism employment *for the people who live in the area* because the conclusions are not politically popular. This view was perhaps best expressed - not surprisingly by a Trade Union, Regional Industrial Officer:

“In general you get three types of people who come into the tourism industry. You get the kids who have nowhere else to go and are just looking for a wage, you have the housewives, single parents whatever who will come in and do the in-betweens and then you have people who are around fifty-plus years of age who are unemployable in most other places and will come in and do that type of work for their last years” (Trade Union, Regional Industrial Officer, interviewed, 18/2/99)

Fourthly, those who believe that the current boom in tourism-related development particularly the proliferation in the number of new bars and eating establishments in the city centre indicates the extent of the city's economic revival (there was a strong consensus among the respondents to support this view) may be surprised by any suggestion that Liverpool's economy is still lagging behind rival cities. For example, at the time of writing, latest

Government statistics raise some serious concerns over the economic success of Objective 1, moreover, it is argued that “they paint a familiarly disturbing picture” (Boland, 1999, p.791). Recent unemployment figures, for example, reveal that Merseyside still has the highest unemployment rate of any county in the UK, a figure of 8.5% that remains double the UK average of 4.2% (ONS, 1999). An unemployment rate of 9.5% for Liverpool in April 1999 represents one of the highest rates for any local authority area in the UK (LCC, *Economic Development Plan 1999/2000*). More alarming is the fact that Merseyside is to benefit from a second round of Objective 1 support which indicates that regional GDP has not progressed beyond 75% of the EU average. In fact, according to Boland (2000) Merseyside’s GDP per capita is currently 72% of the EU average. At the time of designation in 1993 it was 73%, so in effect GDP performance is moving away and not towards the EU average. Indeed, Merseyside was recently placed bottom of a league of UK regions in order of growth in gross domestic product, published by Oxford Economic Forecasting (*Liverpool Daily Post*, 22/8/2000, p.12).

Nevertheless, these issues appear to have had little effect on the City Council’s Licensing Sub-Committee:

“Leeds which calls itself a 24-hour city has six entertainment licences in the city centre, Liverpool has over three hundred many of which run through to 6 am. If you go around Concert Square at 2 am in the morning, it is daylight, its vibrant, people standing around talking and drinking...this is an aspect of the tourism economy that is very often ignored” (Chairman, LCC, Licensing Committee, interviewed 19/9/98).

Surely the city council must acknowledge that the city cannot build its new prosperity on the sale of alcoholic beverages or for that matter the quick profits being made by developers in the current boom in ‘niche’ developments. Whilst property development is a necessary and welcome activity, on its own it will not provide a sustainable economic base for the future.

8.4 Policy Issues

In terms of future policy the thesis has attempted to show the importance of understanding the interaction of local, national and supranational politico-economic processes. The major challenge facing tourism policy is to create sustainable development which raises a number

of important issues about the way forward for policy – in terms of both governance and economic development strategy.

Issues of Governance

In terms of governance (barring radical restructuring of nation state regulation and funding streams and a real shake up of both local agencies and individuals involved in economic development) three major policy proposals for improving the effectiveness of governance can be put forward.

First, this thesis has argued that contested governance, a process that has negatively affected the design and delivery of the region's tourism programmes, has undermined collaborative working and an organised approach to promoting the interests of the tourism sector in Liverpool. In terms of the design of tourism policy the fundamental problem is that there is no true city-wide plan. At one level the involvement by many different agencies is to be welcomed, it is indicative of the importance attached to tourism in the city and the willingness to assist it to grow. From the private sector viewpoint, however, it presents a confusing picture. There appear to be no clear priorities or strategic leadership, indeed:

“To be honest I think Liverpool's tourism product needs a hell of a lot of work to bring it up to a class and standard that we would all be proud of. I think individually each part is probably ok, with a lot of the time looked after and sometimes not looked after. But I think we have a hell of a lot of work to do to rebuild our product and present it right to the outside world and get ourselves known as a sort of European tourism destination” (Director, Liverpool City Partnership, interviewed, 15/12/98).

Funding rather than market need dictates programmes and despite large sums of money spent there is little perceived benefit by the individual operator. With regards to the delivery of programmes these have been dominated by asymmetries of power, money chasing and a lack of capacity to act particularly among lower tiers of local governance.

To address these problems future policy would need to progress towards designing a strategic city-wide tourism development plan, establishing a stronger commitment to partnership that is underpinned by *inclusivity* predicated on a genuine bottom-up, grassroots approach to

development, as opposed to the essentially top-down characteristic of current programmes. A more inclusive partnership based approach is required that is driven by proper dialogue and discussion, mutual idea sharing and a far wider exchanging of research and knowledge from current and previous experiences. It would also be worthwhile placing less emphasis on the standard neo-liberal supply-side policies (in particular so-called 'natural' economic factor endowments), encapsulated in the trickle-down approach. And instead design more socially constructed, socially regularised and socially embedded locally-specific innovative measures which are aimed at stimulating aggregate demand and increasing social inclusion (for instance, Pathways to Integration), in the pursuit of inter urban competitiveness. The development of such capacities depend on the supply of relevant knowledge and organisational intelligence rather than capital, and shaping the institutional context in which organisations operate rather than providing subsidies. Equally, there is a need for a wider tourism policy agenda which acknowledges and takes into account the importance of qualitative research particularly in areas such as job creation and training and not least in research projects themselves. Overall, such an approach contrasts with those attempted to date which identify a pot of money, set a timetable for the implementation of schemes and then, target a range of quantitative goals.

Secondly, there is the need for greater accountability and more democratic participation in decision making. Presently the secretive nature of policy development and the failure of agencies to admit their own inadequacies has resulted in local frustration among councillors, some agencies, the local media and, on some occasions, particular individuals. The model of governance to date has in effect empowered particular agencies to work to protect their own interests:

“The Mersey Partnership like to see themselves as a major player in local economic development, but there are a number of issues there, particularly relating to their lack of accountability. More significant is the fact that they have their own development plans and strategies, and there has been a certain amount of conflict about the way they and us would like to see things progress” (Councillor, interviewed 17/2/99)

“I am critical of the way agencies, and within them particular individuals, have developed their own priorities” (Councillor, interviewed 11/1/99).

“Often you find the same faces, and many are unelected, strategically positioning themselves on every important board, committee or panel going

so they can network and disseminate their own ideas and make sure their particular project is a success” (Councillor, interviewed 23/10/98).

Clear lines of accountability need to be developed and more democratic participation encouraged in both policy making and implementation. Indeed, the need for greater accountability has received a fair amount of coverage in the local press only recently. For example, an article in the *Liverpool Daily Post* (13/9/2000) highlighted the fact that Sir Bob Scott, the chief executive of the Liverpool bid to become European Capital of Culture in 2008, works three days per week for the limited company set up to spearhead the bid, but he refuses to reveal how much he is paid. The article concluded that this is wrong. His employer may be technically a private company but it is financed by the council taxpayers, who have the right to know where their money goes. Moreover, the *Liverpool Echo* (16/7/99,p.6) reported that for those not tangled up in the web of partnerships and agencies that have proliferated across Merseyside in recent years “There are many people at every level of local life who are increasingly concerned that a major opportunity, as well as huge amounts of public money, is being squandered”.

It is clear that implementation is a professional job suited to specialised, local delivery agents. Nonetheless, in policy making the role of the local council is of prime importance given that they are democratically elected to represent the local community. As such they need to take the lead in developing strategy, taking into account the views of the local agents of governance and also developing more effective linkages with the local community. The role of the private sector, while vital because of its expertise in processes of marketing, investment, job creation and product development, however, further complicates the issue of policy making and the development of clearer lines of accountability. The challenge is to find the correct balance between public and private sector agendas which provides real public-private - in that order – partnership. However, this, may be easier said than done, in that the members of quangos and partnerships absorb and reflect the expectations of the government that appointed them.

Thirdly, there is a need to develop a more qualitative framework for assessing both the potential and the impact of tourism policy. This could involve a monitoring system that from the outset identified and tracked potential individual beneficiaries and canvassed their views on the qualitative as opposed to the continuing path-dependent reliance on purely quantitative,

impact of policies. Indeed, "An emphasis upon measurable outputs may deflect an organisation from its principled objectives so that 'what is measured is what gets managed'" (Hodges *et al.*, 1996, p.11). This would be a useful introduction into the evaluation of tourism to integration related initiatives where the focus would be on the need to improve local capacity building. This qualitative approach would help to engender a more critical and reflective analysis of the achievements, or otherwise of previous programmes. It would also provide a clear evaluation of how things can be done differently and identify improvements for future policy decisions.

However, reforming governance structures alone will not resolve the problems of social and spatial disadvantage. There are also crucial policy issues to address concerning the specifics of tourism-led economic development.

Issues for Economic Development

Significantly, with increased European assistance under the Merseyside 2000-2006 European Objective One Programme, I would suggest that it is necessary to develop a more selective economic development approach. There are five suggestions for enhancing the current local economic development strategy.

First and foremost, BDO Stoy Hayward's (1999, p.2-3) *Tourism and Objective 1 Study* suggests that Merseyside's relative tourism allocation for the 1994-1999 programme (some 29% of the EU average) is closer to the average for certain Objective 2 areas and would appear to fall below Greater Manchester, the West Midlands and East Scotland. This would appear to indicate a relative under evaluation of the impact of tourism in Merseyside compared to other regions. Moreover, the Report went on to state that this may be further evidence that tourism is at an earlier stage of the 'Product Lifecycle' than nationally. If this is indeed the case, then on the one hand, it demonstrates some of the areas competitive weaknesses, on the other, it bodes well for the future of the industry and its capacity to generate wealth for the people of Liverpool. Subsequently, this adds weight to the argument in favour of increasing support to tourism in the area.

One alternative approach for developing a targeted economic development strategy within the next Objective 1 programme could be to encompass tourism as a specific measure within a

particular driver. Arguably, with the potential available from tourism, and by emphasising its importance as an economic and social driver it is possible the area could derive a significant increase in Structural Fund support towards tourism.

A further approach would be to establish a tourism-based action plan with an explicit cross cutting theme. Involving cross sector support through transport, the environment, image, marketing and training. In essence, support to the attraction of visitors and investment should not be seen as a single element of the post-2000 programme (as it was in the first programme), but rather an integral aim of sites and premises, infrastructure, image and the environment. Moreover, support under strategic sites for example, should be equally available to visitor facilities as it is to manufacturing and distribution-led developments for appropriate schemes, with similar support mechanisms as have been developed under the first programme to attract new investment.

With regards to job creation the characteristics of tourism employment strongly suggest that in the case of Liverpool at least, tourism should be seen as complementary to other industries in the economy rather than as a substitute for them. Thus, the broader question of the relations between tourism and other economic activities could be related to the segmentation of the tourist market and to the policy choices to develop certain types of tourism rather than others. Exploring potential combinations of activities, relative to the specific attributes of Liverpool, may help to identify opportunities to which policy-makers might respond in formulating a broader programme for local economic development and employment. There are for example, complementarities between the Albert Dock and the promotion of research and development in such areas as environmental quality. The desilting of the Dock and improvements in the quality of the water secured through eliminating the inflow of contaminated water from the river, and the introduction of marine filter feeders (particularly mussels) which help to keep the water clean together represent a substantial environmental resource. Indeed, MDC's own research has indicated that the quality of the water is now significantly better than the standards set by the European Commission for bathing beaches (MDC, 1997). As such this not only provides a dramatic setting for the Albert Dock warehouses and other waterfront developments it also serves as a location for watersports enthusiasts and provides a habitat for a variety of marine life including crabs, jelly fish, barnacles, and a number of species of fish.

The difficulties of economic development, in particular attracting visitors and inward investment are clearly compounded by the city's bad image in terms of safety, security, crime and environmental standards (which can lead to high operational costs). Hard outputs are difficult to quantify and the development of a wider programme of promotional activities needs to be carefully developed. There is however, considerable scope for marketing as a means of co-ordinating and linking tourism products, in particular creating a synergy between the city centre and the numerous smaller and less well known attractions located outside (not least, Speke Hall and Croxteth country Park).

Liverpool unlike many other British cities including Glasgow, Birmingham, Manchester and Wigan has not invoked any innovative representation that might enable competitive advantage. It is not the 'heart of ' or 'centre of ' or a 'bridgehead' or 'gateway' to somewhere. Neither has it coined an epithet signifying its attractiveness or its cultural identity. Admittedly, a simple slogan will not capture the whole product, nevertheless, if a city has got something which is regarded as a strength and in the case of Liverpool its heritage is certainly a strength, then it would seem reasonable to promote that as the leading brand, and then other brands may follow.

It would appear that the failure of the strategy lies in its failure to identify which visitor market it needs to address. Is one market more beneficial than another? Is there a 'tool' which may attract all markets? Although a contented visitor to friends and relatives is a stronger, and far cheaper tool than any nation-wide poster campaign, there remains a hierarchy of the types of visitors which are of most benefit. Those in social classes AB who are in a position to relocate or expand business into the local economy are the most prized visitors. These are people who will possibly stay overnight in high quality hotels and eat in expensive restaurants. Middle managers and professionals are also highly prized as these people, if they do enjoy a visit enough to contemplate relocation may purchase expensive property, will send their children to school and pay local council taxes. This may appear a simplistic view of the impact, but it is that which policy makers are frequently quoting. The issue in Liverpool remains that any visitor, whatever their purpose or social status, is beneficial both economically and in terms of image change. The city is not yet at a stage where it can be selective. It needs to welcome all visitors with equal enthusiasm. Nevertheless with the increased need for cities to compete in a global market a marketing campaign is necessary. In the past, most of the campaigns were designed to market the city to all visitors

and business sectors. Arguably, there is a need for individual campaigns each designed to address both different visitor types and business sectors, but all with the same slogan or image. This form of targeting enables a more focused approach and produces the image of a city which knows what it wants, not one which wants anything it can get.

8.5 Future Research

In terms of future research, there are four substantive areas where further studies could contribute to improved understanding of the processes.

First and foremost, the positivist epistemology that pervades tourism research (see for example, Page, 1995; Williams, 1997; Riley, 1996; Decrop, 1999) can be construed as a potentially serious flaw. Typically, tourism research adopts empirically tried and tested models of organisational and business studies in an attempt to mirror optimum performance in other economic sectors. Under such an approach there is little room for a researcher to explore the dimensions of power, ideology and institutional arrangements that structure tourism. Consequently, research needs to engage in the pursuit of a more satisfactory epistemological solution in the social sciences that over arches the positivist tradition. To this end, tourism researchers need to become bolder and more outward looking in their quest to become accepted within contemporary mainstream theoretical debate, and to encompass notions of governance, entrepreneurialism, the learning economy, reflexivity and indeterminacy in their studies.

Secondly, comparative studies with other old industrial cities formerly dependent on a major industry that has declined, could provide insights into future development possibilities of local economies, tourism and governance. The most obvious contenders for such a comparison in the UK are Birmingham, Manchester, Sheffield, Stoke-on Trent and Bradford. All these old industrial cities are devoting significantly enhanced resources to tourism. Moreover, they have different lengths of experience of tourism development, with some having promoted themselves for over 20 years or more (for example, Birmingham and Bradford) and others having started relatively recently (notably, Sheffield). Subsequently, it could be argued that such city's would provide a solid basis for investigating the character and dynamics of urban tourism governance.

Thirdly, analysis of **corporate** governance and change could also advance our understanding of the future direction of economic development policy (Imrie *et al.*, 1995; Rogerson and Boyle, 1998; Wood *et al.*, 1998). If policies are designed to nurture the development of industrial clusters greater understanding is needed whereby companies and businesses get involved in tourism and economic development. How can firms adapt corporate governance principles to meet the considerable diversity of objectives and management structures within the public sector? The typology raises two issues: have the structural and managerial changes promoted or diluted the government's objectives? Secondly, in terms of the advantages and disadvantages of the changes to the various stakeholders, how far are the changes likely to continue or to be modified and diluted?

Finally, a further area of research could be to assess how changes in the spatial scale of governance such as the 'new regionalism' seen in Europe with the movement towards a 'Europe of the regions' and, in the UK, with the creation of Regional Development Agencies, will affect areas like Merseyside and those of other regions. In essence, 'new regionalism' constitutes an additional spatial unit within which tourism policy can be formulated and administered. The concept is based on the premise that collaborative development not only in the field of tourism but in other sectors, would have a synergetic effect, whereby the combined benefits would exceed the sum of the benefits resulting from unco-ordinated action by each area (see for example, Harding *et al.*, 1996, 1999; Whitehead, 1999). How can cities position themselves as a 'partner' within their respective regions? How will they be perceived by regional, national and European levels of government? Can the designation of a city as part of a new regional development programme resolve the problems of its tourism sector? After all, many of the older industrial cities are subject to two out of three conditions which have been used to categorise a difficult area for tourism development (Buckley and Witt, 1985, 1989), namely an adverse image and the need for considerable investment in infrastructure.

8.6 Conclusion

Liverpool is suffering from the legacy of an industrial past, global economic restructuring, the deindustrialisation of the UK economy and ineffective City/regional policies. The decline in Liverpool cannot be reduced to a single cause and there will be no single remedy, single project or big idea. The positive lessons to learn from governance are integration, strategy,

transparent partnership and open evaluation. The lesson to learn in terms of tourism and economic development is to recognise that there are a range of economic, educational, environmental, geographical and social problems that cannot be addressed using a uniform strategy. Instead, the tourism economic development strategy requires a flexible integrated programme with not only economic benefits but community gains, educational qualities (notably the quality of employment opportunities and the qualifications offered), and environmental interests. Hard questions need to be asked. The tendency to 'sing from many hymn sheets' within Liverpool needs to be remedied and the principles of transparent partnership resuscitated. Far greater emphasis should be placed on the utilisation and generation of knowledge and on building the capacity to distribute policy functions particularly between different tiers of local tourism governance. More innovation is also required in terms of tourism projects and schemes.

Liverpool continues to pursue assistance from Europe. This assistance to date, however, has not fundamentally changed the people or the economy. The people continue to feel down-trodden and the economy remains in the doldrums with long-term unemployment, spatial concentrations of social deprivation and industrial decline endemic. In fact, there is a dichotomy: in order to attract investment the city it has to emphasise the successes and say how well everything is going. Then in order to get funding from the EU it has to emphasise all the social and economic problems in the area. Indeed, it has been suggested that despite a large hike in access to funding "Getting Objective 1 status is in a sense a double-edged sword. It acknowledges that things have gone badly wrong in the past – and that can be accounted a negative signal to the rest of the world" (cited in Carvel, 1994, p.4).

There appear to be two stark futures for tourism development in Liverpool. Either the agents of governance take more seriously the problem of economic failure and its social outfall and meet it head on or the governance of slow decline will continue with local tourism development agencies comprising little more than tokenistic gestures to regeneration. What is clear is that the area faces a distinctly uncomfortable future.

REFERENCES

- Adams, I. (1991) *Leisure and Government*, Routledge, London.
- Adcock, B. (1984) 'Regenerating Merseyside Docklands: The Merseyside Development Corporation 1981-1984', *Town Planning Review*, 55 (3), pp. 265-289.
- Alasuutari, P. (1995) *Researching Culture. Qualitative Method and Cultural Studies*, Sage Publications, London.
- Albrechts, L. (1991) 'Changing roles and positions of planners', *Urban Studies*, 28, 1, pp. 123-127.
- Amin, A. (ed) (1994) *Post-Fordism: A Reader*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
- Amin, A. and Thrift, N. (1992) 'Neo-Marshallian nodes in global networks', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 16, pp. 571-587.
- Amin, A. and Thrift, N. (1994) 'Living in the Global', in Amin, A. and Thrift, N (eds), *Globalisation, Institutions and Regional Development in Europe*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Amin, A. and Thrift, N. (1995) 'Globalisation, institutional thickness and the local economy', in Healey, P., Cameron, S. and Davoudi, S. (eds) *Managing cities: The New Urban Context*, John Wiley and Sons, Chichester, pp. 91-108.
- Ashworth, G. J. and Voogd, H. (1990) *Selling The City*, Belhaven, London.
- Ashworth, G.J. (1992) 'Is there an urban tourism?', *Tourism Recreation Research*, 17, 2, pp. 3-8.
- Ashworth, G.J. and Tunbridge, (1990) *The Tourist-historic City*, Belhaven, London.
- Atkinson, R. (1996) 'Urban regeneration, community participation and social exclusion', in Lainevuori (ed) *An interdisciplinary Conference on Milieu Construction*, University of Technology, Helsinki, pp. 1-17.
- Atkinson, R. (1999) 'Discourses of Partnership and Empowerment in Contemporary British Urban Regeneration', *Urban Studies*, 36, 1, pp. 59-72.
- Atkinson, R. and Moon, G. (1994) *Urban Policy in Britain: the city state and the market*, Macmillan, London.
- Audit Commission (1989) *Urban Regeneration and Economic Development: The Local Government Dimension*, HMSO, London.
- Audit Commission (1991) *The Urban Regeneration Experience: Observations from Local Value for Money Audits*, HMSO, London.

- Bailey, N., Barker, A. and MacDonald, K. (1995) *Partnership Agencies in British Urban Policy*, UCL Press, London.
- Ball, R. (1989) 'Some aspects of tourism, seasonality and local labour markets', *Area*, 21.1, pp.35-45.
- Ball, R. (1997) *The poor cousin fights back: the resurgence of interest in industrial heritage tourism as a force for the reassertion and regeneration of community*, Occasional Papers in Geography, Staffordshire University.
- Ball, R. and Stobart, J. (1995) *The Economic potential of tourism in the Cannock Chase area: towards a strategy*, Consultancy Report submitted to Cannock Chase District Council.
- Ball, R. and Stobart, J. (1998) 'Local Authorities, Tourism and Competition', *Local Economy*, 12, 4, pp. 342-353.
- Ball, S.J. (1994) 'Political interviews and the politics of interviewing', in Walford, G. (ed) *Researching the powerful in education*, UCL Press, London, pp. 96-115.
- Bareham, P. (1992) 'Festivals or Fiascos'. Garden Festivals as a tool for Urban Improvement, Regeneration and Green space Provision: Germany and the UK. Sustainable City Forum Report: Streetwise No 11, Summer 1992.
- Barke, M. and Harrop, K. (1994) 'Selling the industrial town: identity, image and illusion', in Gold, J.R. and Ward, S.V. (eds) *Place Promotion: The Use of Publicity and Marketing to Sell Towns and Regions*, Wiley, Chichester, pp. 93-114.
- Barnekov, T., Boyle, R. and Rich, D. (1989) *Privatisation and Urban Policy in Britain and the United States*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Barnes, I. and Barnes, P. (1993) 'Tourism Policy in the European Community', in Lavery, P. and Pompl, W. (eds) *Tourism in Europe – Structures and Development*, CAB International, Wallingford.
- Bassett, K. (1993) 'Urban Cultural Strategies and urban regeneration: a case study and critique', *Environment and Planning, A* 25, pp. 1773-1788.
- Bassett, K. (1996) 'Partnerships, business elites and urban politics: new forms of governance in an English city' *Urban Studies*, 33, pp. 539-555.
- Bauman, Z. (1988) 'Sociology and postmodernity', *Sociological Review*, 36, pp. 790-813.
- Baxter, J. and Eyles, J. (1997) 'Evaluating qualitative research in social geography: establishing 'rigour' in interview analysis', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, NS 22, pp.505-525.
- BDO Stoy Hayward (1999) *Executive Summary, Tourism and Objective One*, report for The Mersey Partnership and Driver 4 IAG, January, BDO Stoy Hayward, Liverpool.
- Begg, I. (1999) 'Cities and Competitiveness' *Urban Studies*, Vol. 36, Nos 5-6, pp. 795-809.

- Bennett, R. J. and Krebs, G. (1991) *Local Economic Development: Public-Private Partnership Initiation in Britain and Germany*, Bellhaven Press, London.
- Berg, L. And Braun, E. (1999) 'Urban Competitiveness, Marketing and the Need for Organising Capacity', *Urban Studies*, Vol. 36, Nos 5-6, pp. 987-999.
- Best, M. (1990) *The New Competition*, Polity Press, London.
- Bhaskar, R. (1989) *Reclaiming Reality: a critical introduction to contemporary philosophy*, Verso, London.
- Bianchini, F. (1995) 'Night Cultures, Night Economies', *Planning Practice and Research*, 10, 2, pp.121-126.
- Bianchini, F. And Parkinson, M (eds) (1993) *Cultural Policy and Urban Regeneration: The West European Experience*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, pp. 155-177.
- Bianchini, F. and Schwengel, H. (1991) 'Re-imagining the city', in Corner, J. and Harvey, S. (eds) *Enterprise and Heritage*, Routledge, London, pp. 212-234.
- Bianchini, F., Dawson, J. And Evans, R. (1992) 'Flagship projects in urban regeneration', in Healey, P., Davoudi, S., Tavsanoglu, S., O'Toole, M. and Usher, D. (eds) *Rebuilding the City: property-led urban regeneration*, E. & F.N. Spon, London, pp. 245-255.
- Boland, P. (1999) 'Contested Multi-Level Governance: Merseyside and the European Structural Funds', *European Planning studies*, Vol. 7, No 5, pp. 647-664.
- Boland, P. (2000) 'Urban governance and Economic Development: a critique of Merseyside and Objective 1 status', *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 7 (3), pp. 211-222.
- Booth, P. and Boyle, R. (1993) 'See Glasgow, see culture', in Bianchini, F and Parkinson, M. (eds) *Cultural policy and urban regeneration. The Western European experience*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, pp. 21-47.
- Botterill, D (2001) 'The epistemology of a set of tourism studies', *Leisure Studies*, 20, pp. 199-214.
- Bouma, G.D. (1993) *The research process*, (revised edition) Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia.
- Bourdieu, P. (1984) *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, Andover, Hants.
- Boyer, M. C. (1992) 'Cities for sale: mechandising history of South Street Seaport' in Sorkin, M. (ed) *Variations on a Theme Park: A New American City and the End of Public Space*, Hill and Wang, New York.
- Boyle, M. and Hughes, G. (1991) 'The politics of the representation of the 'real': discources from the Left on Glasgow's role as European City of Culture, 1990, *Area*, 23, pp. 217-228.

- Boyle, M. and Hughes, G. (1994) 'The Politics of Urban Entrepreneurialism in Glasgow', *Geoforum*, 25, 4, pp. 453-470.
- Boyle, R. (1989) 'Partnership in Practice', *Local Government Studies*, March/April, pp. 17-28.
- Brack, A. (1976) *The New Merseyside*, MCC.
- Bramwell, B. (1993) 'Planning for tourism in an industrial city', *Town and Country Planning*, January/February, pp.17-19.
- Briggs, C. L. (1986) *Learning How to Ask: A Sociolinguistic Appraisal of the Role of the Interview in Social Science Research*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- British Tourist Authority, (1999) *Business Tourism Leads the Way*, Business Tourism Department, BTA January.
- Britton, S. (1991) 'Tourism, capital, and place: towards a critical geography of tourism', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 9, pp.451-478.
- Brooks, M. (1993) 'City enters the bullring in defence of its inner city policy', *Municipal Journal*, 27, pp. 30-31.
- Brooks, S. (1993) *Public Policy in Canada*, McClelland and Stewart, Toronto.
- Brownhill, S. (1994) 'Selling the inner city: regeneration and place marketing in London's Docklands', in Gold, J and Ward, S.V (eds) *Place Promotion*, John Wiley and sons, Chichester, pp. 133-151.
- Buckley, P. and Witt, S. (1985) 'Tourism in Difficult areas 1: case studies of Bradford, Bristol, Glasgow and Hamm', *Tourism Management*, Vol 6, No 3, pp.205-213.
- Buckley, P. and Witt, S. (1989) 'Tourism in difficult areas II: case studies of Calderdale, Leeds, Manchester and Scunthorpe', *Tourism Management*, Vol 10, No 3, pp 138-152.
- Bull, A. (1991) *The Economics of Travel and Tourism*, Pitman Publishing, London.
- Bull, P. (1997) 'Tourism in London: policy changes and planning problems', *Regional Studies*, 31, (1), pp. 82-85.
- Bull, P.J. and Church, A. (1994) 'The Geography of Employment Change in the Hotel and Catering Industry of Great Britain in the 1980s: A Sub-regional Perspective', *Regional Studies*, 28, 1, pp. 13-25.
- Buraway, M. (1992) *Ethnography unbound*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles.
- Burgess, R.G. (1982) *Field Research: a source book and Field Manual*, Allen and Unwin, London.

- Burton, R.F. and Wilson, G.A. (1999) 'The Yellow Pages business directory as a sampling frame for farm surveys', *Journal of Rural Studies*, 15, pp.91-102.
- Butler, R.W. (1980) 'The concept of a tourist area cycle of evolution: implications for management of resources', *Canadian Geographer*, 24,1, pp. 5-12.
- Byron, M. (1993) 'Audio-visual aids and geography research', *Area*, 25, pp. 379-85.
- Carvel, J. (1994) 'Objective Europe. Two into One Will Go' *Quorum*, Issue 1, The Mersey partnership, pp. 4-7.
- Centre for Local Economic Strategies (CLES) (1990) *Inner City Regeneration: a local authority perspective*, CLES, Manchester.
- Charlton, C and Essex, S. (1996) 'The involvement of district councils in tourism in England and Wales', *Geoforum*, Vol 27, No 2, pp. 175-192.
- Clark, G. (1997) 'Secondary data sources', in Flowerdrew, R. and Martin, D. (eds) *Methods in Human Geography: a guide for students doing research*, Longman, Harlow, pp. 57-69.
- Clarke, J. and Newman, J. (1997) *The Managerial State: Power, Politics and Ideology on the Remaking of Social Welfare*, Sage, London.
- Coalter, F., Long, J. and Duffield, B. (1988) *Recreational Welfare: The Rationale for Public Leisure Policy*, Avebury, Aldershot.
- Coccosis, H. (1996) 'Tourism and sustainability: perspectives and implications, in Priestley, G.K., Edwards, J.A., and Coccosis, H. (eds) *Sustainable Tourism? European Experiences*, CAB International, Wallingford.
- Cochrane, A. (1993) *Whatever Happened to Local Government?*, Open University Press, Buckingham.
- Cochrane, A. (1996) 'From Theories to Practices: Looking for Local Democracy in Britain' in King, D. And Stoker, G. (eds) *Rethinking Local Democracy*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 193-213.
- Cohen, E. (1972) 'Towards a sociology of international tourism' *Social Research*, 39, pp.164-182.
- Cohen, E. (1977) 'towards a sociology of international tourism', *Social Research*, 39, 1, pp. 164-182.
- Cohen, L. And Mannion, L. (1989) *Research Methods in Education*, (Third edition), Routledge, London.
- COI (Merseyworld) (1998) *Merseyside Objective 1 1994-1999*.
- Colenutt, B. (1992) *Social Regeneration: directions for urban policy in the 1990s*, CLES, Manchester.

Colenutt, B. (1993) 'After the urban development corporations? Development elites or people-based regeneration', in Imrie, R. and Thomas, H. (eds) *British Urban Policy and the Development Corporations*, Paul Chapman Publishing, London, pp. 175-185.

Confederation of British Industry (CBI) Task Force (1988) *Initiatives Beyond Charity*, CBI, London.

Cooke, P. and Morgan, K. (1995) 'Growth regions under duress: renewal strategies', in Amin, A. and Thrift, N. (eds) *Globalisation, Institutions and Regional Development in Europe* Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 91-117.

Cooper, C. (1987) 'The changing administration of tourism in Britain', *Area*, 19, 3, pp. 249-253.

Cooper, C., Fletcher, J., Gilbert, D. and Wanhill, S. (1999) *Tourism: Principles and Practice*, (2nd Edition) Longman, Essex.

Cornfoot, T (1982) 'The economy of Merseyside 1945 – 1982: quickening decline or post-industrial change?', in Gould, W.T.S. and Hodgkiss, A.G. (eds) *The Resources of Merseyside*, Liverpool University Press, Liverpool, pp. 14-26.

Couch, C and Farr, J. (2000) 'Museums, Galleries, Tourism and Regeneration: Some experiences from Liverpool', *Built environment* Vol 26, No 2, pp. 146- 163.

Coulson, A. (1990) 'Flagships and flaws – assessing the UDC decade', *Town and Country Planning*, 59, 11, pp. 299-302.

Council for Local Democracy (1995) *Taking Charge: The Rebirth of Local Democracy*, Council for Local Democracy, London.

Cox, K.R. (1993) 'The local and the global in the new urban politics: a critical view', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 11, pp. 433-448.

Cox, K.R. and Mair, A.J. (1988) 'Locality and community in the politics of local economic development', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 78, 2, pp. 307-325.

Crick, M. (1989) 'Representations of international tourism in social sciences: sun, sex, sights, savings and servility', *Annual review of Anthropology*, 18, pp. 307-344.

Crilley, D. (1993) 'Megastructures and urban change: aesthetics, ideology and design', in Knox, P (ed) *The Restless Urban Landscape*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, pp. 127-164.

Culler, J. (1981) 'Semiotics of Tourism', *American Journal of Semiotics*, 1, pp. 127-140.

Dahl, R.A. (1961) *Who governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*, Yale University Press, New Haven.

Dahl, R.A. (1967) *Pluralist Democracy in the United States*, Rand MacNally, Chicago.

- Daniels, P.W. (1982) 'Services: the growth sector for the 1980s?', in Gould, W.T.S. and Hodgkiss, A.G. (eds) *The Resources of Merseyside*, Liverpool University Press, Liverpool, pp. 56-68.
- Davidson, R. (1998) *Travel and Tourism in Europe*, (2nd Edition), Longman, Essex.
- Davies, L. (1987) 'If you've got it, flaunt it, making the most of city tourism', *Employment Gazette*, April, pp. 167-171.
- Davies, W. (1993) 'The Critical Path Analysis', *Tourism Enterprise*, 89, pp. 10-11.
- Davis, J. (2001) 'Commentary: tourism research and social theory – expanding the focus', *Tourism Geographies*, 3 (2), pp125-134.
- Dawson, J. and Parkinson, M. (1990) 'Merseyside Development Corporation 1981-1989: Physical Regeneration, Accountability, and Economic Challenge', in Keith, M. and Rogers, A. (ed) *Rhetoric and Reality in the Inner City*, Mansell, London.
- Dawson, J. and Parkinson, M. (1991) *Urban Development Corporations: the Merseyside experience 1981-1990; Physical regeneration, political accountability and economic challenge*, Centre for Urban Studies Working Paper 13, University of Liverpool.
- De Angelis, R.A. and Parkin, A. (1980) 'Critiques of pluralism', in Parkin, A., Summers, J., and Woodward, D. (eds) *Government Politics and Power in Australia: an Introduction Reader*, Longman, Melbourne.
- De Bres, K. (1994) 'Cowtowns or Cathedral precincts? Two models for contemporary urban tourism', *Area*, 26, 1, pp. 57-67.
- Deakin, N. And Edwards, J. (1993) *The enterprise culture and the inner city*, Routledge, London.
- Debbage, K. (1990) 'Oligopoly and the resort cycle in the Bahamas', *Annals of Tourism Research*, 17, pp. 513-527.
- Decrop, A. (1999) 'Triangulation in qualitative tourism research', *Tourism Management*, 20, pp. 157-161.
- DeLeon, P. (1994) 'democracy and the policy sciences: aspirations and operations', *Policy Studies Journal*, 22, 2, pp.200-212.
- Denzin, N. (1978) *The Research Act*, McGraw-Hill, New York.
- Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (1994) *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, Sage, London.
- Department for Culture, Media and Sport (1999) *Tomorrow's Tourism*, DCMS.
- Department of Employment (1989) *Press Notice*, 170/89.
- Department of Environment (1979) Circular 13/79, HMSO, London.

Department of Environment (1993) *Annual Report 1993*, HMSO, London.

Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions (1997) *Local Government Programme Newsletter 1997-98*, DETR, London.

Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions (1998) *1998 Index of Local Deprivation*, DETR, June, London.

Derman, W. (1990) 'Informant interviews in international social impact assessment', in Finterbusch, K., Ingersoll, J. and Llewellyn (eds) *Methods for social analysis in developing countries*, Boulder, CO, Westview, pp. 107-24.

Dey, I. (1993) *Qualitative Data Analysis: a user-friendly guide for social scientists*, Routledge, London.

Dollinger, M.J. (1999) (2nd edition) *Entrepreneurship: Strategies and Resources*, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey.

DRV Research (1986) 'An Economic Impact Study of Tourist and Associated Arts Developments', in *Merseyside: The Tourism Study*, DRV Research, Liverpool.

Duffy, K. and Hutchinson, J. (1997) 'Urban policy and the turn to community', *Town Planning Review*, 68, 3, pp. 347-362.

Dunford, M. (1990) 'Theories of regulation', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 8, 3, pp. 297-322.

Ely, M., Anzul, M., Freidman, T. and Garner, D. (1996) *Doing qualitative research: circles within circles*, Falmer, London.

Employment Gazette/ Labour Market Trends, June 1996.

Employment Links (ELS) (1998) *Information Pack, Structures and Strategies*, ELS, Liverpool.

England, K.V.L. (1994) 'Getting personal: reflexivity, positionality and feminist research', *The Professional Geographer*, 46, 1, pp. 80-89.

English Tourist Board (1980) *Tourism and the Inner City*, ETB, London.

English Tourist Board (1981) *Planning For Tourism in England*, Planning Advisory Note 1, ETB, London.

English Tourist Board (1988) *A Vision for Cities*, ETB, London.

Entrikin, J. N. (1976) 'Contemporary humanism in geography', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 70, pp. 43-58.

- European Commission (CEC) (1994) *Merseyside Single Programming Document 1994-1999*, Directorate General for Regional Policies, CEC, Brussels.
- Evans, G. and McNulty, A. (1995) 'Planning for Tourism in London: World City, whose city? A critique of Local Development Plans and Tourism Policy in London', paper presented to The Urban Environment Tourism conference, South bank university, London, September, 1995.
- Evans, N. Campbell, D and Stonehouse, G. (2003) *Strategic Management for Travel and Tourism*, Butterworth-Heinemann: London.
- Evans, R. (1996) 'Liverpool urban regeneration initiatives and the arts: a review of policy, development and strategic issues' in Lorente, P. (ed) *The Role of Museums and the Arts in the Urban Regeneration of Liverpool*, University of Leicester, Working Paper, No 9, pp. 7-22.
- Eyles, J. and Smith, D. (eds) (1988) *Qualitative Methods in Human Geography*, Polity Press, Cambridge.
- Fainstein, S. S. (1994) *The City Builders: Property and Planning in London and New York*, Blackwell, Oxford.
- Falk, N. (1986) 'Baltimore and Lowell: two American approaches' *Built Environment*, 12, 3, pp. 145-152.
- Featherstone, M. (1987) 'Lifestyle and consumer culture', *Theory, Culture and Society*, 4, pp. 55-70.
- Featherstone, M. (1991) *Consumer Culture and Postmodernism*, Sage, London.
- Fedden, R. (1974) *The National Trust: past and present*, Cape London.
- Fine, M. (1998) 'Working the hyphens: reinventing self and other in qualitative research' in Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (eds) *The landscape of qualitative research*, Sage, London, pp. 131-52.
- Fine, M. and Vanderslice, V. (1992) 'Reflections on qualitative research', in Posvac, E. (ed) *Methodological issues in applied social psychology*, Plenum, New York, pp. 271-87.
- Fischer, F. and Forester, J. (eds) (1993) *The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning*, Duke University Press, Durham.
- Foley, P., Hutchinson, J. and Fordham, G. (1998) 'Managing the challenge: winning and implementing SRB', *Planning Practice and Research*, 13, 1, pp.63-80.
- Foray, D. and Lundvall, B. (1996) 'The knowledge-base economy: from the economics of knowledge to the learning economy', in OECD (ed) *Employment and Growth in the Knowledge-based Economy*, OECD Documents, Paris, pp. 11-34.
- Frankfort-Nachmias, C. And Nachmias, D. (1996) *Research Methods in Social Sciences*, (Fifth edition), Edward Arnold, London.

- Freeman, R.E. (1984) *Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach*, Pitman Publishing, Boston, MA.
- Galster, G. (1992) 'A cumulative causation model of the underclass: implications for urban economic development policy', in Galster, G. and Hill, E. (eds) *The metropolis in black and white*, Center for Urban Policy Research, The State University of New Jersey, New Brunswick, NJ.
- Garside, P. (1998) 'Local governance, economic development, democratic subsidiarity and the future of local government in Britain', in Holmes, J. and Lynch, K. (eds) *The Kingston Papers: A Geographical Perspective on the Environment, Economy and Society*, School of Geography, Kingston University in association with the Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers), pp. 92-117.
- General Municipal and Boilermakers Union (1999) *Casual Economy On Increase*, Press Release, March 1999, GMB, London.
- Getz, D. (1987) 'Tourism planning and research: traditions, models and futures', paper presented at the Australian travel Research workshop, Bunbury, Western Australia, 5-6 November.
- Gilbert, M.R. (1994) 'The politics of location: doing feminist research at "home"', *The Professional Geographer*, 46, 1, pp. 90-95.
- Gill, I. (1988) 'Tourism and Entertainment Services in Local Government' Chapter 7 in Benington, R and White, C. (ed) *The Future of Leisure Services*, 1988, Longman, UK.
- Glaser, B. (1978) *Theoretical sensitivity*, Sociology Press, Mill Valley, CA.
- Glaser, B. (1992) *Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis: emergence versus forcing*, Sociology Press, Mill Valley, CA.
- Glesne, C. and Peshkin, A. (1992) *Becoming Qualitative Researchers: an introduction*, Longman, New York.
- Godfrey, K. B. (1998) 'Attitudes towards 'sustainable tourism' in the UK: a view from local government, *Tourism Management*, 19, 3, pp. 213-224.
- Gold, J.R. and Gold, M.M. (1990) 'A place of delightful prospects: Promotional imagery and the selling of suburbia', in Zonn, L. (ed) *Place Images in Media: Portrayal, Experience and Meaning*, Rowman and Littlefield, Savage, Maryland, pp. 159-182).
- Gold, J.R. and Ward, S.V. (eds) (1994) *Place Promotion: The Use of Publicity and Marketing to Sell Towns and Regions*, John Wiley, Chichester.
- Goodwin, M. (1993) 'the city as commodity: the contested spaces of urban development', in Kearns, G. and Philo, C. (eds) *Selling Places*, Pergamon Press, Oxford, pp. 145-162.

- Goodwin, M. (1995) 'governing the spaces of difference: regulation and globalisation in London', paper to 10th Urban Change and Conflict Conference, Royal Holloway, University of London.
- Goodwin, M. and Painter, J. (1996) 'Local governance, the crisis of Fordism and the changing geographies of regulation', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 21, pp. 635-648.
- Goodwin, M. and Painter, J. (1997) 'Concrete research, urban regimes, and regulation theory', in Lauria, M. (ed) *Reconstructing Urban Regime Theory: Regulating Urban Politics in a Global Economy*, Sage, Thousand Oaks, California, pp. 13-29.
- Gordon, I and Goodall, B. (2000) 'Localities and Tourism', *Tourism Geographies*, 2 (3), pp. 290-311.
- Government Office North West (GONW) (2000) *Tourism Based ERDF Projects 1994-99*.
- Graefe, A.R. and Vaske, J.J. (1987) 'A framework for managing quality in the tourist experience', *Annals of Tourism Research*, 14, pp. 389-404.
- Gray, G. and Guppy, N. (1994) *Successful surveys*, Harcourt Brace, Toronto.
- Green, A. (1996) 'Liverpool City Council and the evolution of the 'Creative Quarter'', in Lorente, P. (ed) *The Role of Museums and the Arts in the Urban Regeneration of Liverpool*, (1996), Working Paper No 9, Centre for Urban History, University of Leicester, pp.112-118.
- Gregerson, B. and Johnson, B. (1997) 'Learning economics, innovations systems, and European integration', *Regional Studies*, 31, pp. 479-491.
- Gregory, D. (1978) *Ideology, Science and Human Geography*, Hutchinson, London.
- Gregory, D. (1981) 'Human Agency and Human Geography', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, NS 6 pp. 1-18.
- Griffiths, R. (1998) 'Making sameness: Place Marketing and the New Urban Entrepreneurialism' in Oatley, N. (ed) *Cities, Economic Competition and Urban Policy*, Paul Chapman Publishing Ltd, London, pp. 41-57.
- Gruffudd, P. (1994) 'Selling the countryside: representations of rural Britain', in Gold, J.R., and Ward, S.V. (eds) *Place Promotion: The Use of Publicity and Marketing to Sell Towns and Regions*, John Wiley, Chichester.
- Gunn, C.A. (1988) *Tourism Planning*, 2nd edn, Taylor and Francis, New York.
- Gunn, C.A. (1994) *Tourism Planning*, 3rd edn, Taylor and Francis, Washington.
- Hall, C. M. (1994) *Tourism and Politics: Policy, Power and Place*, Belhaven press, London.
- Hall, C. M. (1998) 'The politics of decision making and top down planning: Darling Harbour Sydney', in Tyler, D., Guerrier, Y., and Robertson, M. (eds) *Managing Tourism in Cities*, John Wiley, Chichester, pp. 9-25.

- Hall, C.M. (1995) *Tourism and Politics: Policy, Power and Place*, Wiley, Chichester.
- Hall, C.M. and Jenkins, J.M. (1995) *Tourism and Public Policy*, Routledge, London.
- Hall, P. (1982) (2nd Edition) *Urban and regional Planning*, Penguin, Middlesex.
- Hall, P. (1988) *Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning*, Blackwell, Oxford.
- Hall, T. And Hubbard, P. (1996) 'The entrepreneurial city: new urban politics, new urban geographies?', *Progress in Human Geography*, 20, pp. 153-174.
- Hall, T. And Hubbard, P. (eds) (1998) *The Entrepreneurial City – Geographies of politics, regime and representation*, John Wiley and Sons, Chichester.
- Hambleton, R. (1990) 'Urban Government in the 1990's: Lessons from the USA', School for Advanced Urban Studies, Occasional Paper 35, University of Bristol, Bristol.
- Hambleton, R. (1991) 'The regeneration of US and British cities', *Local Government Studies*, 17, 5, pp. 53-69.
- Hambleton, R. (1998) 'Competition and Contracting in UK Local Government', in Oatley, N. (ed) *Cities, Economic Competition and Urban Policy*, Sage, London, pp58-76.
- Harding, A. (1994) 'Urban regimes and growth machines: towards a cross-national research agenda', *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, 29, 3, pp. 356-382.
- Harding, A. (1997) 'Urban regimes in the United States of Europe? *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 4, 4, pp. 291-314.
- Harding, A. (1998) 'Public-private partnerships in the UK', in Pierre, J (ed) *Partnership in Urban Governance: an international perspective*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 71-92.
- Harding, A., Dawson, J., Evans, R. and Parkinson, M. (eds) (1994) *European Cities Towards 200*, Manchester University Press, Manchester.
- Harding, A., Evans, R., Parkinson, M. and Garside, P. (1996) *Regional Government in Britain: an economic solution?*, Policy Press, Bristol.
- Harding, A., Wilks-Heeg, S. and Hutchinson, M. (1999) 'Regional Development Agencies and English regionalism: the question of accountability', *Mimeograph*, European Institute for Urban Affairs, John Moores University, Liverpool.
- Harvey, D. (1973) *Social justice and the city*, Edward Arnold, London.
- Harvey, D. (1982) *The limits to capital*, Blackwell, Oxford.
- Harvey, D. (1985) *The Urbanisation of Capital: Studies in the History and Theory of Capitalist Urbanisation*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

- Harvey, D. (1987) 'Flexible accumulation through urbanisation: reflections on 'post-modernism' in the American city', *Antipode*, 19, pp. 260-286.
- Harvey, D. (1988) 'Voodoo cities', *New Statesman and Society*, 30 September, pp. 33-35.
- Harvey, D. (1989) 'From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: The transformation in urban governance in late Capitalism', *Geografiska Annaler*, 71 B, 1, pp. 3-17.
- Harvey, D. (1992) 'Social Justice, postmodernism and the city', *International Journal of Urban and regional Research*, 16, pp. 588-601.
- Harvey, D. (1993) 'From space to place and back again: reflections on the condition of postmodernity', in Bird, J., Curtis, T., Putman, T., Robertson, G. and Tickner, L. (eds) *Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change*, Routledge, London.
- Hastings, A. (1996) 'Unravelling the process of 'partnership' in urban regeneration policy', *Urban Studies*, 33, 2, pp. 253-268.
- Hastings, A. (1999) 'Analysing Power Relations in Partnerships: Is There a Role for Discourse Analysis?', *Urban Studies*, Vol 36, No 1, pp. 91-106.
- Haywood, K.M. (1986) 'Can the Tourist-Area Life Cycle be Made Operational?', *Tourism Management*, 7, 3, pp. 154-167.
- Haywood, K.M. (1988) 'Responsible and responsive tourism planning in the community', *Tourism Management*, 9, 2, pp.105-118.
- Haywood, K.M. (1992) 'Identifying and responding to challenges posed by urban tourism', *Tourism Recreation research*, 17, 2, pp. 9-23.
- Haywood, K.M. (1999) 'Sustainable development for Tourism: An Organisational Perspective', in Nelson, J.G., Butler, R., and Wall, G. (eds) *Tourism and Sustainable Development: Monitoring, Planning, Managing, Decision Making*, Department of Geography publication series, No 52, University of Waterloo, Canada, pp. 311-320.
- Healey, P., Davoudi, S., O'Toole, M., Tavsanoglu, S. and Usher, D. (eds) (1992) *Rebuilding the City: Property-led Urban Regeneration*, E. and F. N. Spon, London.
- Heeley, J. (1981) 'Planning for tourism in Britain', *Town Planning Review*, 52, pp. 61-79.
- Heeley, J. (1989) 'Role of national tourist organisations in the United Kingdom', in Witt, S.F. and Mutinho, L (ed) *Tourism Marketing and Management Handbook*, Prentice Hall, Hemel Hemstead.
- Henderson, K.A. (1991) *Dimensions of Choice: A qualitative approach to recreation, parks and leisure research*, Venture Publishing, State College.
- Henry, I. and Bramham, P. (1986) 'Leisure, the local state and social order', *Leisure Studies*, 5, pp. 189-209.

Henry, I. and Bramham, P. (1990) 'Leisure politics and the local state', unpublished paper, Department of Leisure, Recreation and Physical Education, Loughborough University.

Hewison, R. (1987) *The Heritage Industry*, Methuen, London.

Hill and Knowlton (UK) Ltd (1990) *Summary of Themes and Recommendations for promoting a 'vision' for the Merseyside Region*. Report prepared for The Mersey Partnership, Liverpool.

Hirst, P. and Zeitlin, J. (1991) 'Flexible specialisation versus post-Fordism: theory, evidence and policy implications', *Economy and Society*, 20, pp. 1-56.

Hjalger, A. (2002) 'Repairing innovation defectiveness in tourism', *Tourism Management*, 23, pp.465-474.

HMSO (1985) Cabinet Office (Enterprise Unit) *Pleasure, leisure and jobs. The business of tourism*. HMSO, London.

Hodges, R., Wright, M, and Keasey, K. (1996) 'Corporate Governance in the Public services: Concepts and Issues', *Public Money and Management*, April-June, pp. 7-13.

Hoggett, P. (1991) 'A new management in the public sector?' *Policy and Politics*, 19, 4, pp. 243-256.

Hogwood, B. and Gunn, L. (1984) *Policy Analysis for the Real World*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Holcomb, B. (1994) 'City make-overs: marketing the post-industrial city', in Gold, J.R. and Ward, S.V. (eds) *Place Promotion: The Use of Publicity and Marketing to Sell Towns and Regions*, Wiley, Chichester, pp. 115-132.

Hubbard, P. (1995) 'Symbolic violence and urban entrepreneurialism: the role of urban design in city regeneration'. Paper presented to the 10th Urban Change and Conflict Conference, September 1995, Royal Holloway University of London.

Hubbard, P. (1996) 'The Transformation of Birmingham's Urban Landscape', *Geography*, 81, 1, pp. 26-36.

Hubbard, P. and Hall, T. (1998) 'The Entrepreneurial city and the 'New Urban Politics'', in Hall, T. and Hubbard, P. (ed) *The Entrepreneurial City*, John Wiley and sons, Chichester, pp. 1-23.

Hudson, R. and Townsend, A. (1993) 'Tourism Employment and Policy Choices for Local Government', in Johnson, P and Thomas, B. (eds) *Perspectives on Tourism Policy*, Mansell Publishing, England, pp. 49-68.

Hughes, G. (1992a) 'Conceiving of tourism': a comment, *Area*, 23, 3, pp. 263-267.

Hughes, G. (1992b) 'Tourism and the geographical imagination', *Leisure Studies*, 11, pp. 31-42.

- Hughes, G. (1999) 'Urban Revitalisation: the use of festive time strategies', *Leisure Studies*, 18, pp. 119-135.
- Hutton, W. (1996) *The State We're In*, Revised Edition, Vintage, London.
- Imrie, R. and Thomas, H. (1992) 'The wrong side of the tracks: a case study of local economic regeneration in Britain', *Policy and Politics*, 20, pp. 213-226.
- Imrie, R. and Thomas, H. (1993) *British Urban Policy and the Urban Development Corporations*, Paul Chapman Publishing, London.
- Imrie, R., Thomas, H. and Marshall, A. (1995) 'Business organisations, local dependence and the politics of urban renewal in Britain', *Urban Studies*, 32, pp. 31-47.
- Inskip, E. (1991) *Tourism Planning: an Integrated and Sustainable Approach*, Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York.
- Institute of Manpower Studies/English Tourist Board (1986) *Jobs in tourism and leisure*, ETB, London.
- Ioannides, D. (1995) 'Strengthening the ties between tourism and economic geography: a theoretical agenda', *Professional Geographer*, 47, 1, pp. 49-60.
- Jackson, P. (1999) 'Commodity cultures: the traffic in things', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 24, pp. 95-108.
- Jansen, A.C.M. (1989) 'Funshopping as a Geographical Notion, or: the Attractions of the Inner City of Amsterdam as a Shopping Area', *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, 80, 3, pp. 171-183.
- Jansen-Verbeke, M. (1992) 'Urban Recreation and Tourism: Physical Planning Issues', *Tourism Recreation Research*, 17, 2, pp. 33-45.
- Jeffrey, D. And Hubbard, N.J. (1988) 'Foreign Tourism, the Hotel Industry and Regional Economic Performance', *Regional Studies*, 22, 4, pp.319-329.
- Jessop, B. (1982) *The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods*, Martin Robertson, Oxford.
- Jessop, B. (1991) 'The welfare state in transition from Fordism to post-Fordism' in Jessop, B., Kastendiek, H., Nielsen, K. And Pedersen, O.K (eds) *The Politics of Flexibility*, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, pp. 82-105.
- Jessop, B. (1992) 'Fordism and post-Fordism: a critical reformulation', in Storper, M. and Scott, A.J. (eds) *Pathways to Industrialisation and Regional Development*, Routledge, London, pp. 46-69.
- Jessop, B. (1994) 'Post-Fordism and the state', in Amin, A. (ed) *Post-Fordism: a reader*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 251-279.

Jessop, B. (1995) 'The regulation approach, governance and post-Fordism: alternative perspectives on economic and political change' *Economy and Society*, 24, 3, pp. 307-333.

Jessop, B. (1997) 'The Entrepreneurial City,' Re-imagining localities, redesigning economic governance, or restructuring capital?, in Jewson, N., and MacGregor, S. (eds) (1997) *Transforming Cities-contested governance and new spatial divisions*, Routledge, London, pp. 28-41.

Jessop, B. (1998) 'The Narrative of Enterprise and the Enterprise of Narrative: Place Marketing and the Entrepreneurial City', in Hall, T. And Hubbard, P (eds) *The Entrepreneurial City*, John Wiley, Chichester, pp. 77-99.

Johnson, P. and Thomas, B. (1990) *Museums an Economic Perspective*, Tourism Working Paper 7, Department of Economics, University of Durham, Durham.

Johnson, P. and Thomas, B. (1992) *Tourism, Museums and the Local Economy: The Economic Impact of the North of England open Air Museum at Beamish*, Edward Elgar Publishing, Aldershot.

Johnson, R.J (1989) *The Dictionary of Human Geography*, (Second Edition), Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

Jones, K. And Simmons, J. (1987) *Location: Analysing the Retail Environment*, Methuen, Toronto.

Jones, M. (1997) 'Spatial selectivity of the state: the regulationist enigma and local struggles over economic governance', *Environment and Planning A*, 29, pp. 831-864.

Jones, M. and Ward, K. (1998) 'Grabbing Grants? The role of coalitions in urban economic development', *Local Economy*, 13, 1, pp. 28-38.

Judge, D., Stoker, G. and Wolman, H. (eds) (1995) *Theories of urban politics*, Sage, London.
JURUE (1986) *Evaluation of environmental projects under DOE Inner Cities Research Programme*, HMSO, London.

Kaczmarek, S. (1999) 'Tourism and Urban Revitalisation', *European Spatial Research and Policy*, Vol 6, No I, pp.99-104.

Kearns, G. And Philo, C. (eds) (1993) *Selling Places. The City as Cultural Capital, Past and Present*, Pergamon, Oxford.

Keating, M. (1990) 'The disintegration of urban policy: Glasgow and the new Britain', *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, 24, 4, pp. 513-536.

Keating, M. (1991) *Comparative Urban Politics: power and the city in the United States, Canada, Britain and France*, Edward Elgar, Aldershot.

Kerr, C. (1988) 'The Magic of the Pool', *The Geographical Magazine*, May, pp.21-25.

- Kerr, B., Barron, G. and Wood, R (2001) 'Politics, policy and regional tourism administration: a case examination of Scottish area tourist board funding' *Tourism management* 22, pp.649-657
- Kinnaird, V. and Hall, D. (1996) 'Understanding tourism processes: a gender-aware framework', *Tourism Management*, 17, 2, pp. 95-102.
- Kooiman, J. (1993) 'Social-Political Governance: Introduction', in Kooiman, J. (ed) *Modern Governance*, Sage, London, pp. 1-9.
- Kotler, P., Haider, D. H. and Rein, I. (1993) *Marketing Places: Attracting Investment, Industry and Tourism to Cities, Nations and States*, The Free Press, New York.
- Lane, T (1986) 'We Are The Champions: Liverpool v The 1980s', *Marxism Today*, January, pp. 8-11.
- Lane, T. (1997) *Liverpool City of the Sea*, (2nd revised ed), of (1987) *Liverpool Gateway of Empire*, Liverpool University Press, Liverpool.
- Lash, S. and Urry, J. (1987) *The end of Organised Capitalism*, Polity Press, Oxford.
- Lauria, M. (1994) *Waterfront Development, Urban Regeneration and Local Politics in New Orleans and Liverpool*, College of Urban and Public Affairs, University of New Orleans, Louisiana, USA.
- Lauria, M. (1997) (ed) *Reconstructing Urban Regime Theory: Regulating Urban Politics in a Global Economy*, Sage, Thousand Oaks, California.
- Law, C. (1985) *Urban Tourism Project, Selected British Case Studies*, Working Paper No 1, July 1985, University of Salford: Department of Geography.
- Law, C. (1987) 'Conference and Exhibition Tourism', *Built Environment*, 13, 2, pp. 85-95.
- Law, C. (1991) 'Tourism and Urban revitalisation', *East Midland Geographer*, 14, pp. 49-60.
- Law, C. (1992) 'Urban Tourism and its Contribution to Economic regeneration' *Urban Studies*, 29, pp. 599-618.
- Law, C. (1993) *Urban Tourism: Attracting Visitors to Large Cities*, Mansell, London.
- Law, C. (1996) *Tourism in Major Cities*, International Thomson Business Press, London.
- Law, C. (2000) 'Regenerating the City Centre Through Leisure and Tourism', *Built Environment*, Vol 26, No 2, pp. 116-129.
- Lawless, P. (1981) 'Economic promotion and the inner city', in Gould, W.T.S. and Hodgkiss A.G (eds) *The Resources of Merseyside*, Liverpool University Press, pp. 40-55.

- Lawless, P. (1990) 'Regeneration in Sheffield: from radical intervention to partnership', in Judd, D. and Parkinson, M. (eds) *Leadership and urban Regeneration: cities in North America and Europe*, Urban Affairs Annual Reviews 37, Sage, Newbury Park, pp. 133-151.
- Lawless, P. (1991) 'Urban Policy in the Thatcher decade: English inner-city policy 1979-1990', *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, 9, pp. 15-30.
- Lawless, P. (1994) 'Partnerships in urban regeneration in the UK: the Sheffield Central Area Study', *Urban Studies*, 31, pp. 1303- 1324.
- Lawton, R. and Cunningham, C. M. (1970) *Merseyside: social and economic studies*, Longman, London.
- Leach, S. and Davies, H. (eds) (1996) *Enabling or disabling local government*, Open university press, Milton Keynes.
- Leadbeater, C. (1998) 'Innovation and Risk Taking that Break Free of Bureaucracy', *Financial Times* 28th April, (1998).
- Lefebvre, H. (1991) *The Production of Space*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
- Leiper, N. (1999) 'A conceptual analysis of tourism-supported employment which reduces the incidence of exaggerated, misleading statistics about jobs' *Tourism Management*, 20, pp. 605-613.
- Leitner, H (1992) 'Urban geography: responding to new challenges', *Progress in Human Geography*, 16, pp. 105-118.
- Leitner, H. And Garner, M. (1993) 'The limits to local initiatives: A reassessment of urban entrepreneurialism for development', *Urban Geography*, 14, pp. 57-77.
- Leitner, H. and Sheppard, E. (1998) 'Economic Uncertainty, Inter-Urban Competition and the Efficacy of Entrepreneurialism' in Hall, T. And Hubbard, P. (eds) *The Entrepreneurial City*, John Wiley, Chichester, pp. 285-308.
- Ley, D. F. and Samuels, M. S. (eds) (1978) *Humanistic Geography: prospects and problems*, Maaroufa Press, Chicago.
- Lickorish, L.J. (1994) *Developing Tourism Destinations: policies and perspectives*, Longman, London.
- Little, J., Clements, J. and Jones, O. (1998) 'Rural Challenge and the Changing Culture of Rural Regeneration Policy', in Oatley, N (ed) *Cities, Economic Competition and Urban Policy*, Paul Chapman Publishing, London, pp. 127-145.
- Liverpool City Council (1981) *Local Economic Trends and future prospects*, City Planning Department, LCC.
- Liverpool City Council (1987a) *A Tourism Strategy for Liverpool: A Framework*, LCC.

- Liverpool City Council (1987b) *Merseyside Development Corporation, The Liverpool Experience*, LCC, July 1987.
- Liverpool City Council (1992) *Key Statistics Liverpool Wards 1971/1981/1991*, LCC.
- Liverpool City Council (1994b) *Liverpool Unitary Development Plan*, September, 1994, LCC.
- Liverpool City Council (1994a) *Tourism Strategy and Action Plan 1994-95*, LCC.
- Liverpool City Council (1995) *Ambitions for the City Centre: Objective One city Centre strategy*, LCC, November.
- Liverpool City Council (1996b) *Economic Development Plan 1996/97*, LCC.
- Liverpool City Council (1996a) *Tourism Strategy and Action Plan 1996-97*, LCC.
- Liverpool City Council (1997b) *Economic Review*, Department for Economic Development and European Affairs, LCC.
- Liverpool City Council (1997a) *Economic Development Plan, 1997/1998*, LCC.
- Liverpool City Council (1998a) *Economic Development Plan, 1998/99*, LCC.
- Liverpool City Council (1998b) *Poverty. The extent of poverty in Liverpool*, Anti-Poverty team, LCC.
- Liverpool City Council (1999) *Economic Development Plan, 1999/2000*, LCC
- Liverpool City Council (2000) *Liverpool Vision 2000 - Regeneration strategy*, The City Centre Regeneration Company, Outline Draft Strategy, 25th April 2000.
- Lloyd, P. and Meegan, R. (1996) 'Contested governance: European exposure in the English regions', *European Planning Studies*, 4, 1, pp. 75-97.
- Local Economic Development Information Service (1985) 'Liverpool International Garden Festival', LEDIS, February.
- Lock, D. (1993) 'Birmingham's path to self-confident splendour', *Town and Country Planning*, 62, 11, p320.
- Lock, D. (1994) 'Limits to planning', *Town and Country Planning*, 63, 1, p32.
- Loftman, P. (1998) 'Flagship projects: are we repeating past mistakes?' *Urban Environment Today* 5/3/1998.
- Loftman, P. and Nevin, B. (1992) *Urban Regeneration and Social Equity: a case study of Birmingham 1986-1992*, Faculty of Built Environment Research Paper 8, University of Central England, Birmingham.

- Loftman, P. and Nevin, B. (1994) 'Prestige project development: economic renaissance or economic myth? A case study of Birmingham', *Local Economy*, 8, 4, pp 307-325.
- Loftman, P. and Nevin, B. (1995) 'Prestige Projects and Urban Regeneration in the 1980s and 1990s: a review of benefits and limitations', *Planning Practice and Research*, 10, 3/4, pp. 299-315.
- Loftman, P. and Nevin, B. (1996) 'Going for Growth: Prestige Projects in three British Cities', *Urban Studies*, 33 (6), pp. 991-1019.
- Loftman, P. and Nevin, B. (1998) 'Pro-Growth local economic development strategies: civic promotion and local needs in Britain's second city, 1981-1996', in Hall, T. and Hubbard, P (eds) *The Entrepreneurial City – Geographies of Politics, regime and representation*, John Wiley, Chichester, pp. 129-148.
- Logan, J. and Molotch, H. (1987) *Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place*, University of California, Berkeley, CA.
- Lorente, P. (1996) 'Museums as catalysts for the revitalisation of ports in decline: lessons from Liverpool and Marseilles' in Lorente, P. (ed) *The Role of Museums and the Arts in the Urban Regeneration of Liverpool* (1996), Working Paper No 9, Centre for Urban History, University of Leicester, pp.36-60.
- Lovering, J. (1995) 'Creating discourses rather than jobs: the crisis in the cities and the transition fantasies of intellectuals and policy makers', in Healey, P., Cameron, S., Davoudi, S., Graham, S. and Madani-Pour, A. (eds) *Managing Cities: the new urban management*, John Wiley, Chichester, pp. 109-126.
- Lowenthal, D. (1996) *The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History*, Viking, London.
- MacCannell, D. (1976) *The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class*, Macmillan, London.
- Madsen, H. (1992) 'Place Marketing in Liverpool: A Review', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 16, 4, pp. 633-640.
- Martin, S. (1997) 'The effects of EU regional policy on local institutional structures and policies', in Bachtler, J. and Turok, I (eds) *The Coherence of EU Regional Policy*, Jessica Kingsley, London.
- Massey, D. (1984) *Spatial Divisions of Labour: social structures and the geography of production*, MacMillan, Basingstoke.
- Massey, D. (1995) (2nd Edition), *Spatial Divisions of Labour: social structures and the geography of production*, MacMillan, Basingstoke.
- Mathieson, A. and Wall, G. (1982) *Tourism: Economic, Physical and Social Impacts*, Longman, Essex.
- McDowell, L. (1992) 'Doing gender: feminism, feminists and research methods in human geography', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 17, pp. 399-416.

- Meegan, R. (1988) 'A crisis of mass production? In Allen, J and Massey, D. (eds) *The economy in question*, Sage, London.
- Meegan, R. (1993) 'Urban Development Corporations, urban entrepreneurialism and locality' in Imrie, R. and Thomas, H. (eds) *British Urban Policy and the urban Development Corporations*, Paul Chapman Publishing Ltd, London, pp. 58-73.
- Meegan, R. (1999) 'Urban Development Corporations, urban entrepreneurialism and locality: the Merseyside Development Corporation', in Imrie, R. and Thomas, H. (eds) *British Urban Policy – An evaluation of the urban development corporations*, (Second Edition), Sage, London, pp. 64-105.
- Merseyside County Council (1979a) *Draught Merseyside Structure Plan*, December 1979, MCC.
- Merseyside County Council (1980a) *A Guide to Pictures in the Walker art Gallery Liverpool*.
- Merseyside County Council (1980b) *Merseyside Structure Plan*, December 1980, MCC.
- Merseyside County Council (1981) *Merseyside Industrial Monitor*, County Planning Department, MCC.
- Merseyside County Council (1983a) 'Planning into Action', a *Handbook* of development initiatives in Merseyside. MCC.
- Merseyside County Council (1983b) Tourism Committee, *Merseyside Tourism, 1983 Review*. MCC.
- Merseyside County Council (1984) ERDF Quota Section, Co-ordinated Main Submission of Projects for Grant Aid, MCC, July 1984.
- Merseyside County Council (1985) *Agenda for Merseyside*. The urban regeneration strategy; performance, prospects and proposals. MCC.
- Merseyside County Council (MCC) (1979b) *Merseyside Structure Plan: Report of Survey Tourism*, MCC June 1979.
- Merseyside Development Corporation (1981) *Initial Development Strategy*, Proposals for the regeneration of its area, MDC August.
- Merseyside Development Corporation (1989) *Annual Report and Financial statements for the Year Ended 31st March 1989*, MDC, Liverpool.
- Merseyside Development Corporation (1990) *Development Strategy: Liverpool*, MDC
- Merseyside Development Corporation (1992a) *Annual Report for the Year Ending 31st March 1992*, MDC, Liverpool.
- Merseyside Development Corporation (1992b) *Corporate Plan*, MDC, Liverpool.

Merseyside Development corporation (1993) *Annual Report for the year ending 31st March 1993*, MDC, Liverpool.

Merseyside Development Corporation (1995) *Annual Report 1994/95*, MDC, Liverpool.

Merseyside Development Corporation (1996) *Annual Report 1995/1996*, MDC, Liverpool.

Merseyside Development Corporation (1997c) *Annual Report 1996/97*, MDC, Liverpool.

Merseyside Development Corporation (1997a) *Post implementation Project Appraisal: Albert Dock* June 1997, MDC.

Merseyside Development Corporation (1997b) *Assessment of Tourism Outputs: 1981- March 1996*, report prepared by ERM Economic, May 1997.

Merseyside Development Corporation (1998) *All Our Tomorrows. Merseyside Development Corporation 1981-1998*. MDC, Pier Head, Liverpool.

Merseyside Plan (1944) *A Report* prepared in consultation with a Technical Committee of the Merseyside Advisory Joint Planning Committee at the request of the Minister of Town and Country Planning, HMSO, London.

Merseyside Task Force (1991) *Newsletter*, Spring, 1991, MTF, Liverpool.

Merseyside Task Force (1992) *Newsletter*, Summer, 1992, MTF, Liverpool.

Merseyside Tourism & Conference Bureau (1996a) *Visitors to Merseyside*, Merseyside Information Service report of the 1995 survey.

Merseyside Tourism & Conference Bureau (1993) *Tourism on Merseyside*, MTCB, Liverpool.

Merseyside Tourism & Conference Bureau (1994) *Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ending December 1994*, MTCB, Liverpool.

Merseyside Tourism & Conference Bureau (1995) *Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ending December 1995*, MTCB, Liverpool.

Merseyside Tourism & Conference Bureau (1996b) *Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ending December 1996*, MTCB, Liverpool.

Merseyside Tourism & Conference Bureau (1997) *Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ending December 1997*, MTCB, Liverpool.

Merseyside Tourism & Conference Bureau (1998) *Tourism on Merseyside*, February 1998, MTCB, Liverpool.

Merseyside Tourism Board (1987) *Annual Report and Accounts for Year Ending December 1987*, MTB, Liverpool.

- Merseyside Tourism Board (1988b) *Annual Report and Accounts for Year Ending December 1988*, MTB, Liverpool.
- Merseyside Tourism Board (1988c) *Corporate Plan 1988-90*, MTB, Liverpool, January 1988.
- Merseyside Tourism Board (1988a) *Tourism a Flagship for Merseyside*, MTB, Liverpool.
- Merseyside Tourism Board (1989) *Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ending December 1989*, MTB, Liverpool.
- Merseyside Tourism Board (1990a) *Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ending December 1990*, MTB, Liverpool.
- Merseyside Tourism Board (1990b) *More than you ever imagined*, MTB, Liverpool.
- Merseyside Tourism Board (1991b) *Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ending December 1991*, MTB, Liverpool.
- Merseyside Tourism Board (1991a) *Visitors to Merseyside*, June 1991, MTB, Liverpool.
- Merseyside Tourism Board (1992) *Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ending December, 1992*, MTB, Liverpool.
- Merseyside Training and Enterprise Council (1991) *Draft Summary of Corporate Plan*, September, 1991, MTEC, Liverpool.
- Merseytravel, (2000) *Out and About 2001-2*, Merseytravel, Liverpool.
- Middleton, A. (1990) 'Foreword' in Loftman, P. (1990) *A Tale of Two Cities: Birmingham the Convention and Unequal City*, Faculty of Built Environment Research Paper 6, University of Central England, Birmingham.
- Middleton, M. (1991) *Cities in Transition: The Regeneration of Britain's Inner Cities*, Michael Joseph, London.
- Middleton, V.T.C. (1998) *Sustainable Tourism: A Marketing Perspective*, Butterworth Heinmann, Oxford.
- Miliband, R. (1969) *The State in Capitalist Society*, Quartet, London.
- Montgomery, J. (1995) 'the Story of Temple Bar: creating Dublin's cultural quarter', *Planning Practice and Research*, 10, 2, pp. 135-172.
- Morgan, K. (1997) 'The learning region: institutions, innovation and regional renewal', *Regional Studies*, 31, pp. 491-504.
- Mulgan, G. and Walpole, K. (1986) 'Saturday Night and Sunday Morning? Comedia', London.
- Mullins, P. (1991) 'Tourism Urbanisation', *Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 15, 3, pp. 326-342.

- Murdock, J. and Marsden, T.K. (1995) 'The spatialisation of politics: local and national actor spaces in environmental conflict', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 20, pp. 368-380.
- Murphy, P.E. (1985) *Tourism: A Community Approach*, Routledge, London.
- Myerscough, J (1986) *Economic Importance of the Arts on Merseyside*, Policy Studies Institute, Merseyside Arts, Liverpool.
- Myerscough, J. (1994) *The Network of Cultural Cities of Europe*, Department of Performing Arts, Glasgow City Council.
- National Museums and Galleries on Merseyside (1988) *Corporate Plan (1988-93)*, NMGM, Liverpool.
- National Museums and Galleries on Merseyside, 1986 *Review* 1989, NMGM.
- National Museums and Galleries on Merseyside, 1989 *Review* 1992, NMGM.
- National Museums and Galleries on Merseyside, 1992 *Review* 1995, NMGM
- National Museums and Galleries on Merseyside, 1995 *Review* 1998, NMGM.
- National Trust (1987) *Speke Hall Revival Plan Phase 1 1987-1992*, N/T.
- National Trust (1993) *Speke Hall Revival Plan Phase 2 1993-1998*, N/T.
- Nelson, J. G. (1999) 'The Spread of Ecotourism: Some Planning applications', in Nelson, J.G., Butler, R., and Wall, G. (eds) *Tourism and Sustainable Development: Monitoring, Planning, Managing, Decision Making*, Department of Geography publication series; No 52, University of Waterloo, Canada, pp. 135-158.
- Norkunas, M. K. (1993) *The Politics of Memory: Tourism, History, and Ethnicity in Monterey, California*, State University of New York Press, Albany.
- Noronha, R. (1976) *Review of the Sociological Literature on Tourism*, World Bank, New York.
- O'Connell Davidson, J. and Layder, D. (1994) *Methods, Sex and Madness*, Routledge, London.
- O'Connor, J. (1993) 'Manchester and the Millennium: whose city, whose civilisation', *Regenerating Cities*, 1-2, pp. 17-19.
- O'Toole, M. and Usher, D. (1992) Editorial, in Healey, P., Davoudi, S., O'Toole, M., Tavsanoğlu, S. and Usher, D. (eds) *Rebuilding the City: Property-led Urban Regeneration*, E. and F. N. Spon, London, pp. 212-215.

- Oatley, N. (ed) (1998) *Cities, Economic Competition and Urban Policy*, Paul Chapman Publishing, London, pp. 77- 90.
- Office for National Statistics (1997) *Regional Trends 32*, The Stationary Office, London.
- Office for National Statistics (1998) *Regional Trends 33*, The Stationary Office, London.
- P.A. Cambridge Economic Consultants in collaboration with Gillespies Dudley (1990) *An Evaluation of Garden Festivals*, Department of Environment-Inner Cities Research Programme, HMSO, London.
- Pacione, M. (1990) 'What about people? A critical analysis of urban policy in the United Kingdom', *Geography*, 75, 3, No 328, pp. 193-202.
- Pacione, M. (1997) 'Urban restructuring and the reproduction of inequality in Britain's cities: an overview', in Pacione, M. (ed) *Britain's Cities: Geographies of division in urban Britain*, Routledge, London.
- Paddison, R. (1993) 'City marketing, image reconstruction and urban regeneration', *Urban Studies*, 30, pp. 339-350.
- Paddison, R. (1999) 'Decoding Decentralisation: The Marketing of Urban Local Power?' *Urban Studies*, Vol 36, No 1, pp. 107-119.
- Page, I. (1986) 'Tourism promotion in Bradford', *The Planner*, February, pp.72-75.
- Page, S. (1995) *Urban Tourism*, Routledge, London.
- Painter, J. (1997) 'Regulation, regime and practice in urban politics', in Lauria, M. (ed) *Reconstructing Urban Regime Theory: Regulating urban politics in a global economy*, Sage, Thousand Oaks, California, pp. 122-143.
- Painter, J. (1998) 'Entrepreneurs are Made, Not born: Learning and Urban Regimes in the production of Entrepreneurial Cities', in Hall, T., and Hubbard, (eds) *The Entrepreneurial City*, John Wiley, Chichester, pp. 259-274.
- Painter, J. and Goodwin, M. (1995) 'Local governance and concrete research: investigating the uneven development of regulation', *Economy and Society*, 24, 3, pp. 334-356.
- Pal, L.A. (1992) *Public Policy analysis: An Introduction*, Scarborough, Nelson, Canada.
- Parkinson, M. (1985) *Liverpool on the Brink*, Policy Journals, Hermitage.
- Parkinson, M. (1988) 'Urban regeneration and development corporations: Liverpool style', *Local Economy*, Vol 3, No 2, pp.109-118.
- Parkinson, M. (1989) 'The cities under Mrs Thatcher: the centralisation and privatisation of power', Centre for Urban Studies Working Paper 6, University of Liverpool.

- Parkinson, M. (1990) 'Leadership and Regeneration in Liverpool: Confusion, Confrontation or Coalition', in Judd, D and Parkinson, M. (eds) 'Leadership and Urban Regeneration, Cities in North America and Europe', Sage Publications, pp.241-257.
- Parkinson, M. (1996) 'Twenty-Five Years of Urban Policy in Britain – Partnership, Entrepreneurialism or Competition?', *Public Money and Management*, 16, 3, pp. 7-14.
- Parkinson, M. and Bianchini, F. (1993) 'Liverpool: a tale of missed opportunities?', in Parkinson, M. and Evans, R. (1988) *Urban Regeneration and Development Corporations: Liverpool Style*, Working Paper No 2, University of Liverpool.
- Parkinson, M. and Harding, A. (1995) 'European cities towards 2000: entrepreneurialism, competition and social exclusion', in Rhodes, M. (ed) *The Regions and the New Europe: Patterns in core and periphery development*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, pp. 53-77.
- Parkinson, M. and Judd, D. (1988) 'Urban revitalisation in America and the UK – the politics of uneven development', in Parkinson, M., Foley, B. and Judd, D (eds) *Regenerating the Cities: the UK crisis and the US experience*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, pp. 1-8.
- Patton, M.Q. (1990) *Qualitative evaluation and research methods*, Sage, Newbury Park.
- Pearce, D. (1989a) *Tourist Development*, Longman, Harlow.
- Pearce, D.G. (1989b) 'Tourism and Environmental Research: a review', *International Journal of Environmental Studies*, 25, pp. 247-255.
- Pearce, D.G. (1991) *Tourist Development*, Longman, London.
- Pearce, D.G. (1992) *Tourism Organisations*, Longman, Harlow, Essex.
- Pearce, P. (1993) 'Fundamentals of tourist motivation' in Pearce, D.G. and Butler, R.W. (ed) *Tourism Research: Critiques and Challenges*, Routledge, London, pp. 113-134.
- Peck, J. (1995) 'Moving and shaking: business elites, state localism and urban privatism', *Progress in Human Geography*, 19, 1, pp. 16-46.
- Peck, J. and Tickell, A. (1994) *Business goes Local: dissecting the 'Business Agenda' in Manchester*, Faculty of Geography Working Paper 2, University of Manchester, Manchester.
- Peet, R. and Thrift, N. (1989) *New Models in Geography*, (volume one), Unwin Hyman, London.
- Petrella, R. (1995) cited in Begg, I. (1999) 'Cities and Competitiveness', *Urban Studies*, Vol 36, Nos 5-6, pp.795-809.
- Plummer, K. (1983) *Documents for life*, Unwin Hyman, London.

- Polytechnic of Central London (1990) *Tourism and the Inner City: An Evaluation of Grant Assisted Tourism projects*, HMSO, London.
- Porter, M. (1990) *The Competitive Advantage of Nations*, Free Press, New York.
- Porter, M.E. (1995) 'The competitive advantage of the inner city', *Harvard Business Review*, May-June, pp. 55-71.
- Pridham, G. (1996) *Tourism Policy in Mediterranean Europe: Towards Sustainable Development?* University of Bristol, Centre for Mediterranean Studies, Occasional Paper 15, Bristol.
- Public Sector Management Research Unit (1988) *An evaluation of the Urban development Grant Programme*, HMSO, London.
- Raco, M. (1999) 'Competition, Collaboration and the New Industrial Districts: Examining the Institutional Turn in Local Economic Development', *Urban studies*, Vol, 36, Nos 5-6, pp. 951-968.
- Richards, G. (1995) 'Politics of national tourism policy in Britain', *Leisure Studies*, 14, pp. 153-173.
- Richards, G. and Wilkes, J. (1990) 'The role of Local Authorities in Tourism Development and promotion in England', Papers in Leisure and Tourism Studies No 2, University of North London.
- Riessman, C.K. (1993) *Narrative Analysis*, Sage, Newbury Park, CA.
- Riley, R. (1996) 'Revealing socially constructed knowledge through quasi-structured interviews and grounded theory analysis', *Journal of Travel and Tourism Marketing*, 5 (1/2), pp. 21-40.
- Roberts, S. and Schein, R. (1993) 'The entrepreneurial city: fabricating urban development in Syracuse, New York', *Professional Geographer*, 45, pp. 21-33.
- Robinson, F. and Shaw, K. (1994) *Who Runs the North?*, UNISON, Newcastle upon Tyne.
- Robinson, G.M. (1998) *Methods and Techniques in Human Geography*, John Wiley, Chichester.
- Robson, B. (1988) *Those Inner Cities*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Robson, C. (1993) *Real World Research – A Resource for Social Scientists and Practitioner-Researchers*. Blackwell, Oxford.
- Roche, M. (1992) 'Mega-events and micro-modernization: on the sociology of the new urban tourism', *British Journal of Sociology*, 43, 4, pp. 563-600.
- Rogerson, R. and Boyle, M. (1998) 'Glasgow's reluctant mavericks and inward investment: local dependence and its applications', *Scottish Geographical Magazine*, 114, 2, pp. 109-119.

- Rojeck, C. (1985) *Capitalism and Leisure Theory*, Tavistock, Andover.
- Rusheiser, c. (1996) *Imagineering Atlanta: The Politics of Place in the City of Dreams*, Verso, London.
- Ryan, C. (1991) *Recreational Tourism: A Social Science Perspective*, Routledge, London.
- Ryan, C. (1995) *Researching Tourism Satisfaction: Issues, Concepts, Problems*, Routledge, London.
- Sadler, D. (1993) 'Place marketing, competitive places and the construction of hegemony in Britain in the 1980s', in Kearns, G. and Philo, C. (eds) *Selling Places. The City as Cultural Capital, Past and Present*, Pergamon, Oxford.
- Sawicki, D. (1989) 'The festival market as public policy', *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 55, pp. 347-361.
- Sayer, A. (1982) 'Explanation in human geography: abstraction versus generalisation', *Progress in human Geography*, 6, pp. 68-88.
- Sayer, A. (1985) 'Realism and Geography, in Johnson, R.J (ed) *The Future of Geography*, Methuen, London, pp. 159-173.
- Sayer, A. (1992) *Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach*, (Second Edition), Routledge, London.
- Sayer, A. and Morgan, K. (1985) ' A modern industry in a declining region: links between method, theory and policy', in Massey, D and Meegan, R. (ed) *Politics and Method – Contrasting studies in industrial geography*, Methuen, London, pp.144-176.
- Schumpeter, J. (1934) *The Theory of Economic Development*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
- Selin, S. and Beason, K. (1991) 'Interorganisational relations in tourism', *Annals of Tourism Research*, 18, 4, pp. 639-652.
- Sharpley, R (ed) (2002) *The Tourism Business: an introduction*, Business Education Publishers Ltd: Sunderland.
- Shaw, G. and Williams, A.M. (1993) *Critical Issues in tourism: A Geographical Perspective*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
- Short, J.R. and Kim, Y. (1998) 'Urban Crises/Urban Representations: Selling the City in Difficult Times', in Hall, T. and Hubbard, P. (eds) *The Entrepreneurial City*, John Wiley, Chichester, pp. 55-76.
- Short, J.R., Benton, L.M., Luce, W.B. and Walton, J. (1993) 'Reconstructing the image of an industrial city', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 83, pp. 207-224.

- Shutt, J. (1996) 'Appraising Europe in the Regions 1994-1999: A case study of recent experience in Yorkshire and Humberside, United Kingdom, in Alden, J. and Boland, P. (eds) (1996) *Regional Development Strategies: A European Perspective*, Jessica Kingsley, London.
- Smith, S.J. (1994) 'Urban geography in a changing world', in Gregory, D., Martin, R and Smith, G., (eds) in *Human geography: society, space and social science*, Macmillan, London, pp. 44-63.
- Smith, S.L.H. (1983) 'Restaurants and dining out: a geography of a tourism business', *Annals of Tourism Research*, 10, pp. 515-549.
- Smyth, H. (1994) *Marketing the City: the role of flagship developments in urban regeneration*, E & FN Spon, London.
- Stanley, L. And Wise, S. (1993) *Breaking Out Again: feminist ontology and epistemology*, Routledge, London.
- Stewart, J. and Davies, H. (1994) 'A new agenda for local governance', *Public Money and Management*, 14, pp. 29-36.
- Stewart, J. and Stoker, G. (eds) (1989) *the Future of Local Government*, MacMillan, Basingstoke.
- Stewart, J. and Stoker, G. (eds) (1995) *Local Government in the 1990s*, MacMillan, Basingstoke.
- Stewart, M. (1994) 'Between Whitehall and Town Hall: the realignment of urban regeneration policy in England', *Policy and Politics*, 22, 2, pp. 133-146.
- Stewart, M. (1996) 'Competition and Competitiveness in Urban Policy', *Public Money and Management*, July/September, pp. 21-26.
- Stewart, M. (1998) 'Partnership, Leadership and Competition in Urban Policy', in Oatley, N (ed) *Cities, Economic Competition and Urban Policy*, Paul Chapman Publishing, London, pp. 77-90.
- Stewart, M. and Taylor, M. (1995) *Empowerment and Estate Regeneration: A Critical Review*, Policy Press, Bristol.
- Stobart, J. and Ball, R. (1998) 'Tourism and Local Economic Development', *Local Economy*, November 1998, pp. 228-238.
- Stoker, G. (1989) 'Urban Development Corporations: A Review', *Regional Studies*, 23, pp.159-166.
- Stoker, G. (1995) 'Regime Theory and Urban Politics', in Judge, D., Stoker, G. And Wolman, H. (ed) *Theories of Urban Politics*, Sage, London, pp. 54-71.
- Stoker, G. (1998) 'Governance as theory: five propositions', *International Social Science Journal*, 155/March, pp. 17-28.

Stone, C.N. (1989) *Regime Politics: Governing of Atlanta 1946-1988*, University of Kansas, Kansas.

Storper, M. (1997) 'The city: centre of economic reflexivity' *Service Industries Journal*, 17, pp. 1-27.

Storper, M. and Scott, A.J. (1995) 'The wealth of regions: market forces and policy imperatives in local and global context', *Futures*, 27, pp. 505-526.

Strauss, A. L. (1987) *Qualitative analysis for social scientists*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Sudbury, p. and Forester, J. (1996) 'Some museum developments in Liverpool. Their benefits to the community', in Lorente, P. (ed) *The Role of Museums and Arts in the Urban Regeneration of Liverpool*, Centre for Urban History, University of Leicester, pp. 71-89.

Tavsanoglu, S. and Healey, P. (1992) Editorial, in Healey, P., Davoudi, S., Tavsanoglu, S., O'Toole, M. and Usher, D. (eds) *Rebuilding the City: Property-led urban regeneration*, E. and F. N. Spon, London, pp. 117-124.

The Mersey Partnership (1993) *Action Plan*, TMP, Liverpool.

The Mersey Partnership (1995) *Quorum*, Issue 3, Newsletter, Autumn, 1995, TMP, Liverpool.

The Mersey Partnership (1999) *Visiting Merseyside*, A five-year programme for sustainable tourism, Mersey Tourism, October 1999.

Tate Gallery (1990b) *10 Year Corporate Plan 'A Review and Forward Plan 1990'*, Tate Gallery, London.

The Tate Gallery (1990a) *The Tate Gallery Biennial Report 1988-90*, Tate Gallery, London.

The Tate Gallery (1992) *The Tate Gallery Biennial Report 1990-92*, Tate Gallery, London.

The Tate Gallery (1994) *The Tate Gallery Biennial Report 1992-94*, Tate Gallery, London.

Thornley, A. (1991) *Urban Planning Under Thatcherism*, Routledge, London.

Tickel, A. and Peck, J. (1992) 'accumulation, regulation and the geographies of post-Fordism : missing links in regulationist research', *Progress in Human Geography*, 16, 2, pp. 190-218.

Titchener, S. W. (1995) 'National Garden Festivals: Liverpool to Ebbw Vale with special reference to Stoke-on-Trent 1986', *Journal of Planning and Environmental Law*, May 1995, pp. 388-396.

Townsend, A.R. (1992) 'The Attractions of Urban Areas', *Tourism Recreation Research*, 17, 2, pp. 24-32.

Turok, I. (1992) 'Property-led urban regeneration: panacea or placebo?', *Environment and Planning A*, 24, pp. 361-379.

Tyler, D. (1998) 'Introduction: policy, process and practice in urban tourism', in Tyler, D, Guerrier, Y and Robertson (eds) *Managing Tourism in Cities*, John Wiley and Sons, pp.1-3.

University of Liverpool (1999) *Interim Assessment of the Current Objective 1 Programme*, Report by Professor Peter Batey, Dean of the Faculty of Social and Environmental Studies, University of Liverpool.

Urry, J. (1990) *The Tourist Gaze: Leisure and travel in Contemporary Societies*, Sage, London.

Valentine, G. (1997) 'Tell me about....using interviews as a research methodology', in Flowerdrew, R. and Martin, D. (eds) *Methods in Human Geography: a guide for students doing research*, Longman, Harlow, pp. 110-126.

Valer, D. (1996) "strategic" enabling? Cardiff City Council and local economic strategy', *Environment and Planning, A*, 28, pp. 835-855.

Van den Berg, L and Braun (1999) 'Urban Competitiveness, Marketing and the Need for Organising Capacity', *Urban Studies*, Vol 36, Nos 5-6, pp. 987-999.

Vicari, S. and Molotch, H. (1990) 'Building Milan: alternative machines of growth', *International Journal of Urban and Regional research*, 14, pp. 602-624.

Walford, G. (1994) *Researching the powerful in education*, UCL Press, London.

Ward, K. (1995) 'Business elites and urban politics', Working paper, 5, University of Manchester.

Ward, K. (1996) 'Rereading urban regime theory: a sympathetic critique', *Geoforum*, 27, 4, pp. 427-438.

Ward, S. (1998) *Selling Places*, E & FN Spon, London.

Ward, S. and Gold, J (1994) *Place Promotion. The use of publicity and marketing to sell towns and regions*, John Wiley, Chichester.

Ward, S.V. (1988) 'Promoting holiday resorts: a review of early history to 1921', *Planning History*, 10, pp. 7-11.

Ward, S.V. (1990) 'Local industrial promotion and development policies 1899- 1940', *Local Economy*, 5, pp. 100-118.

Weed, M.E. and Bull, C.J. (1997) 'Influences on Sport-Tourism Relations in Britain: The Effects of Government Policy', *Tourism Recreation Research*, 22, 2, pp. 5-12.

Western, J. (1992) *A passage to England: Barbadian Londoners speak of home*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.

- Whitehead, A. (1999) 'From regional development to regional devolution', in Dungey, J. and Newman, I (eds) *The New Regional Agenda*, Local Government Information Unit, London.
- Wickham, P.A. (1998) *Strategic Entrepreneurship*, Imprint Financial Times, Prentice Hall.
- Wilkinson, S. (1992) 'Towards a new city? A case study of image-improvement initiatives in Newcastle upon Tyne', in Healey, P., Davoudi, S., Tavsanoglu, S., O'Toole, M., and Usher, D (eds) *Rebuilding the City: Property-led Urban Regeneration*, E & F Spon, London.
- Williams, A. and Montanari, A. (1995) 'Tourism Regions and Spaces in a Changing Social Framework' *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Social Geografie*, 86, 1, pp. 3-12.
- Williams, A. M., Shaw, G. and Greenwood, J. (1989) 'From tourist to tourism entrepreneur, from consumption to production: evidence from Cornwall, England', *Environment and Planning A*, 21, pp. 1639-1653.
- Williams, A.M. and Shaw, G. (1995) 'Tourism and Regional Development: Polarisation and New Forms of Production in the United Kingdom', *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, 86, 1, pp. 50-63.
- Williams, A.M. and Shaw, G. (1998) *Tourism and Economic Development: European Experiences* (3rd Edition), John Wiley and Sons, Chichester.
- Williams, A.M. and Shaw, G. (eds) (1988) *Tourism and Economic Development: Western European Experiences*, Belhaven Press, London.
- Williams, C. (1997) *Consumer Services and Economic Development*. Routledge, London.
- Williams, R. (1958) *Culture and Society, 1780-1950*, Chatto and Windus, London.
- Wilson, J. (1988) *Politics and Leisure*, Unwin Hyman, Boston.
- Wilson, R. (1998) 'UK labour market prospects', in Institute for Employment Research (ed) *Review of the Economy and employment*, University of Warwick, Coventry, pp. 1-30.
- Winchester, H.P.M. (1992) 'The construction and deconstruction of women's roles in the urban landscape', in Anderson, K. and Gale, F. (eds) *Inventing places*, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, pp. 139-56.
- Wood, A. (1998) 'Making sense of urban entrepreneurialism', *Scottish Geographical Magazine*, 114, 2, pp. 120-123.
- Wood, A., Valler, D, and North, P. (1998) 'Local business representation and the private sector role in local economic policy in Britain', *Local Economy*, 13, 1, pp. 10-27.
- Woodley, A. (1999) 'Tourism and Sustainable Development: The Community Perspective', in Nelson, J.G., Butler, R., and Wall, G (eds) *Tourism and Sustainable Development: Monitoring, Planning Managing Decision Making*, Department of Geography publication series; No 52, University of Waterloo, Canada, pp. 295-310.

World Travel and Tourism Council (1995) *European Union Travel and Tourism Towards 1996 and Beyond*, WTTC, Brussels.

Zukin, S. (1988) *Loft Living: culture and capital in urban change*, Radius, London.

Zukin, S. (1990) 'Socio-spatial prototypes of a new organisation of consumption: the role of real cultural capital', *Sociology*, 24, 1, pp. 37-56.

Zukin, S. (1991) *Landscapes of Power: From Detroit to Disney world*, University of California Press, Berkeley, California.

Zukin, S. (1995) *The culture of cities*, Blackwell, Oxford.